

Digital Diplomacy in Times of Upheaval: How Foreign Ministries Use Twitter During Crises

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Doctor of Philosophy*

By

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


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Thesis Abstract

The 21st-century has seen the emergence of an interconnected and multipolar world. Processes such as globalization complicate diplomatic crises and increase their frequency as regional conflicts have global ramifications and global events lead to regional confrontations. Amid this climate of perpetual and complex crises, diplomats will increasingly be called upon to practice crisis management. This thesis aims to explore whether the recent adoption of social media by ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) influences the management of diplomatic crises. Thus, its guiding research question is- How do MFAs use digital tools in times of crises, and how can the use of these tools inform strategies to manage crises? The thesis postulates that during a crisis, MFAs will create frames through which digital publics can make sense of a crisis. The thesis further postulates that by evaluating the difference between two MFAs' frames, one can measure the scope of relative disagreement between two governments and the likelihood of crisis escalation. To test these hypotheses, the thesis builds on the works of Erving Goffman and develops a 'frame distance' model that monitors the progression of a crisis in near-real time and identifies crisis pressure points at which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted or effective. Two case studies are used to evaluate the applicability of the frame distance model: the use of Twitter by the U.S. and Russian MFAs during the Crimean Crisis, and the use of Twitter by the Israeli MFA and the Hamas government during the 2014 Gaza war. An analysis of 2,012 tweets demonstrates that MFAs do in fact use Twitter to create real time frames through which a crisis may be understood. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that by measuring the difference between two MFAs' frames, one can identify crisis pressure points where diplomatic mediation may be most effective. Thus, the advent of online

diplomacy enables diplomats to tailor diplomatic interventions to the offline progression of a given crisis, increasing the efficacy of diplomatic crisis management.

Keywords: digital diplomacy, social media, crisis management, Crimean Crisis, 2014 Gaza war, framing theory

Acknowledgments

It might seem somewhat odd to begin this thesis by acknowledging an inanimate object. And yet my family's story begins with such an object. Specifically, it begins with a white coat that my grandmother took with her when fleeing the Łódź Ghetto in 1940. She was standing in line at a bank when a man complemented her on the coat. She responded that she bought the coat in Tel Aviv and that she lived in Tel Aviv for more than a year before returning to Poland on the eve of the War. He then told her that a group of young people with similar circumstances (students and others) are organizing to get British certificates which would allow them to leave Europe and enter Palestine. The group consequently left the Ghetto by train, travelling with their Yellow Stars, thereby making them subjects to numerous checks and interrogations on their hazardous journey. When arriving at one of many border crossings, a group of German officers boarded her train. They arrested the woman on my grandmother's right and a man sitting in front of her. Yet they did not arrest my grandmother. As the officers left her carriage, one turned around and said in German 'Madam, that is the finest coat I have ever seen'. My grandmother thanked him and made her way out of Poland and via Vienna and Trieste migrated to Mandatory Palestine.

As the family matriarch, my grandmother placed family above all other matters. And this thesis would not have come to fruition without the support of my entire family. Chief among these is my mother who inspired me to seek an academic career and whose dedication to my own success traversed borders and time zones. Drafts of this thesis followed my mother to Geneva, China, France and even to a battered London freezing in the wake of the 2018 'Beast from the East'. In her quest to aid me in producing this thesis my mother's technological capabilities have increased dramatically and she is now truly a digital

immigrant having mastered cloud storage technology as well as PDF post-its. My mother *is* the giving tree and I hope that through this acknowledgment I have learned the lessons of childhood.

Second, I am indebted to my father who motivated me to research the evolving world of diplomacy. When my father joined the Israeli foreign ministry the facsimile machine appeared only in science fiction films. By the time he retired from the ministry, he was required to upload his Selfies onto Twitter. My father's passion for knowledge, history and statecraft have shaped this thesis. It is through my father that I have met foreign diplomats, visited foreign ministries, sat at diplomatic dinners and attended diplomatic banquets. Each of these experiences contributed to my conceptualisation of digital diplomacy and my understating of diplomatic practices. Yet my father's greatest contribution to this thesis lies not in his trade, but in his love and devotion which knows no bounds and which has strengthened my hand whenever it has wavered over the past four years.

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Finally, four years spent in Oxford, with its long and elaborate history, and at Oxford University and St. Cross College have certainly left an indelible mark on me. I will treasure the time spent here and the memories that come with it.

Abbreviations

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CNN	Cable News Network
EU	European Union
G8	Group of Eight
IAF	Israeli Air Force
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTs	Information and Communication Technologies
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Chapter I: Introduction & Theoretical Framework

Introduction

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar system were supposed to usher in a new era of global stability. Two decades into the 21st-century, it appears that instability now characterizes the international system. Processes such as globalization, increased connectivity, the empowerment of non-state actors (e.g. terror groups), and the transition towards a heteropolar world all complicate and increase the frequency of diplomatic crises. 21st-century crises become more complicated as a conflict in one part of the world sends immediate ripple effects through another part, while the number of actors involved in a crisis multiplies given increased competition over regional and global hegemony. Proxy wars and expansionist foreign policies become the norm rather than the exception while organisations such as the United Nations (UN), tasked with peacefully resolving crises, increasingly become paralyzed.

Amid this climate of instability, diplomats will increasingly be called upon to manage diplomatic crises. Yet as crises increase in complexity and prevalence, diplomats may require new approaches to crisis management that tailor diplomatic interventions to the unique characteristics of a given crisis and distinguish between short-term containment and long-term resolution. Containment may prove useful to prevent crisis ripple effects and the increased involvement of outside actors with regional ambitions. Resolution may prove useful by dealing with the root cause of the crisis.

This thesis examines the impact that digital diplomacy has had on diplomats' management of crises. Specifically, the thesis aims to explore whether the recent migration of ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) to social media can enable diplomats to track the progression of a crisis in near-real time and identify crisis pressure points where diplomatic

mediation may prove most warranted or most useful. Thus, the question guiding this thesis is – **How do MFAs use digital tools in times of crises, and how can the use of these tools inform strategies to manage crises?**

The thesis rests on the assumption that MFAs use social media to create a prism, or frame, through which digital publics can interpret a crisis. By measuring the relative difference between two MFAs' prisms, one may be able to assess the scope of disagreement between their two governments and the acuteness of the crisis. Thus, this thesis develops a frame distance model for tracking changes in MFA frames in near-real time. This model is then tested on two case studies: the use of Twitter by the Russian and U.S. MFAs during the Crimean Crisis, and the use of Twitter by the Israeli MFA and the Hamas government during the 2014 Gaza war.

This chapter introduces the theoretical foundation of the thesis and the rationale behind the use of the frame distance model. The chapter begins by making five broad arguments that demonstrate the increasing need for effective diplomatic management of crises. Next, the chapter elaborates on Erving Goffman's concept of primary frameworks, which serves as the theoretical foundation of the envisioned model. Thereafter, the chapter introduces the key concepts and characteristics of the frame distance model before outlining the research questions and hypotheses used to evaluate its applicability.

Crisis Management in the 21st-Century

The month of October in 1962 was a momentous one in American history. On 01 October, comedian Johnny Carson became the permanent host of NBC's The Tonight Show. Over the course of three decades, Carson would become a fixture in the homes of millions of Americans. On 03 October, Wally Schirra was catapulted into space, becoming the fifth

American to defy the Earth's gravity; on the 6th, the first James Bond film, Dr. No, opened in cinemas across the country. Yet it would be 14 October that would forever mark this month in American history, for on this day, a U-2 spy plane flying over San Cristobal, Cuba, uncovered that the Soviet Union had placed medium-range, ballistic missiles 90 miles off the coast of Florida. So began the Cuban Missile Crisis, a period of 13 days in which the world faced the abyss of nuclear war (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

For diplomacy and international relations (IR) scholars, the Cuban Missile Crisis is a prime example of crisis diplomacy and the manner in which states and actors can increase or decrease the likelihood of war. Within the scope of this thesis, the Cuban Missile Crisis is representative of an inherent contradiction – that crises are both generic and unique. Indeed, all crises share certain features such as high uncertainty, an increased probability of military altercations, the need to make decisions under time constraints (Boin, 't Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 2013; Cahill, 1996; Garrison, 2001), and an escalatory momentum referred to by Coral Bell as crisis slide (1971).

However, crises are also distinctive, as no two crises are identical. The uniqueness of crises stems from a range of variables including the shared history of opposing countries, their relative balance of military power, ethnic ties that can bind countries together, their economic interdependence, and possible membership in military alliances. Each of these factors influences a crisis, as do the characters of national leaders (Acuto, 2011; Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Diehl, Reifschneider & Hensel, 1996; Freedman, 2014; Huth, 1998). The Cuban Missile Crisis could have ended differently if the U.S. had been led by Richard Nixon, as opposed to John F. Kennedy, or if the Soviet Union been led by Joseph Stalin, as opposed to Nikita Khrushchev. Thus, it can be argued that each crisis is unique.

Within the scope of diplomacy studies, crises are viewed as notoriously difficult to manage. Some have argued that such difficulties arise from the very nature of crises, as these constitute ill-defined situations in which events rapidly outpace one another and whose management necessitates decision-making based on limited information (Freedman, 2014; Garrison, 2001). Both Kennedy and Khrushchev were required to play a game of nuclear strategic risk without fully grasping each other's intentions, military capabilities, or mindsets.

Additionally, crises see intense competition within decision-making forums as bureaucrats compete over access to leaders (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 166). As Graham and Allison's Government Politics Model stipulates, decision-making forums do not act as a monolithic unit striving for the best possible outcome. Rather, crises see intense competition between bureaucratic systems, with representatives of each system striving to secure their organisation's interests and accumulate power and prestige (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 176). At times, crises can actually pit several organizations against each other, leading to a refusal to share information, insight, and resources. Such competitions impede the ability to manage crises as consensus among decision-makers is harder to reach, information may be kept from leaders, actions may be taken without authorization, and paralysis may take hold over the government (ibid, p. 166).

What stems from Allison and Zelikow's model is that a government's response to a crisis is not only the result of collective decision-making, but also of collective bargaining among decision-makers (ibid, p. 256). A government's management of a crisis will thus depend greatly on the relative power of various organisations and their representatives within the decision-making room (ibid, p. 255-257).

Allison and Zelikow's seminal work suggests that crisis management is a result of political bargaining and power dynamics at two levels: within governments and between governments. Robert Putnam (1988) proposes a similar argument, suggesting that crisis management may be the result of a two-level game consisting of the national and international levels of politics.

At the national level, interest groups and constituents (e.g. labor unions, non-governmental organisations) pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies. At the international level, governments attempt to meet the pressures and demands of their domestic constituents, while at the same time minimizing the possible adverse impact of foreign developments (Putnam, 1988, pp. 433-434). Putnam's model indicates that during diplomatic negotiations, leaders may purposefully misrepresent their political agency or political will. For instance, by claiming that domestic groups would never ratify an agreement, a leader may obtain concessions when negotiating with a foreign counterpart. Conversely, a leader may portray himself as being dragged into an international agreement to pacify domestic interest groups (*ibid*, p. 440). Thus, what a leader says and what he aims to achieve may be two very different things.

Although Putnam's model does not focus on diplomatic crises, its conclusions demonstrate yet again the complexity of crisis management given the gap between a leader's constraints and goals at the national and international levels (*ibid*, p. 429). Indeed, a leader can grandstand and refuse to make compromises on the international level given the need to solidify his political position at the national level (*ibid*, p. 444). At other times, a leader may attempt to secure concessions at the international level so as to offset losses at the national level. Such was the case with Khrushchev, who, during the Cuban Missile Crisis,

was in need of a foreign policy success to compensate for his domestic policy blunders (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). What emerges is that crisis management necessitates that one analyse an opponent's intranational and international interests and identify gaps between an opponent's statements and his actual goals. It is this realisation that led Putnam to conclude that 'the complexities of the players of this two level game are staggering' (ibid, p. 434).

While Putnam's work suggested that crisis management is confounded by the two level game, Boin et al., (2013) introduced a third level, that of cognitive limitations. Some cognitive limitations apply to organisations as a whole and their ability to predict a crisis. Crisis management requires that organisations predict the unpredictable, pool data that is accumulated by various departments, pool resources from various individuals, and agree on the interpretation of this data (Boin et al., 2013; McConnell & Drennan, 2006). Another cognitive barrier to crisis management is risk normalisation, by which organisations feel that they have developed the means to tackle certain predictable risks. This leads to an accepted level of risk and to 'risk neglect' as organisations, and individuals, grow overconfident. Moreover, organisations and individuals may create working routines and procedures to deal with a crisis once it has begun. Yet they may still fail to anticipate an impending crisis or identify a crisis in its initial stages (ibid, pp. 24-25).

Lastly, Boin et al., argue that crisis management is impeded by an 'information overload' as events rapidly evolve on the ground with limited and disjointed information flowing to decision-makers. Amid this atmosphere of confusion and information deficit, stress emerges as a powerful cognitive barrier that hinders decision-makers' performance. Leaders who are under stress are more likely to focus on short-term solutions as opposed to

long-term ones, to fall back on deep-rooted behaviours that may be inadequate when facing a novel crisis, and to stereotype events and actors based on previous experiences. Stress also leads decision-makers to rely on heuristics, or rules of thumb, which may often lead to faulty analysis (ibid, pp. 29-32).

Even more fundamental is the fact that a crisis can only be managed once it has been declared. By announcing that a crisis is in progress, actors, institutions, and leaders can spring into action while emergency working procedures can be implemented. Yet political and bureaucratic leaders may prefer not to describe an event as a crisis given political, financial, or organisational concerns (Boin et al., 2013). Whether one focuses on cognitive limitations or intragovernmental politics, he is forced to admit that to err is human, to successfully manage a crisis divine.

Yet as Corneliu Bjola (2016b) recently argued, even if a crisis has been successfully managed in the short-term, its root causes may endure, leading to future instability. Bjola's thesis rested on the assumption that diplomats view crises as progressing in a linear fashion, with the crisis ending when the costs of instability and hostilities are too great for one party (ibid, p. 344). Therefore, diplomats often focus on short-term solutions such as ending hostilities, while neglecting to address long-term solutions such as identifying the cause of hostilities and promoting structural changes to avert future conflicts.

Bjola concluded that diplomats should view crises as fractal occurrences. In this light, a crisis is understood as 'a series of self-similar events that repeat themselves at different scales in an ongoing feedback loop' (Bjola, 2016, p. 337). Each fractal event in a crisis is similar, yet each event also varies in scale. A fractal approach is helpful as it suggests that

unless the feedback loop is broken, fractal events will continue to occur. In other words, only long-term solutions can help avoid future crises.

One can imagine how a fractal approach might be applicable to the ongoing crisis between Israel and the Hamas government, which controls the Gaza Strip. Each cycle of violence between the two entities is a fractal occurrence. These fractals are similar, but vary in scale (e.g. scope of Israeli aerial bombardments or intensity of Hamas rocket fire). Yet unless the two sides come to recognise one another's right to exist, there will be no solution and the feedback loop will never stop. In this manner, fractal approaches force diplomats to take into account both short-term and long-term calculations. Similarly, Bjola demonstrated the fractal approach by arguing that diplomats looking to solve the 2014 Crimean Crisis should have focused on preventing Russian troops from crossing into Ukraine while also re-imagining future relations with Russia and searching for ways to manage this relationship successfully (ibid, p. 345).

Topper and Lagadec (2013) also advocated for a fractal approach to crisis management. They define fractals as geometric shapes that can be split into parts, each of which is a reduced copy of the original (ibid, p. 10). If each fractal is identical, then diplomats can attempt to identify recurring elements within fractals and use this insight to solve the root cause of the crisis. For instance, one might argue that Russia's incursion into Crimea in 2014, and into Georgia in 2008, were fractals or events that shared similar traits and were representative of a larger construct - Russia's management of its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. By analysing how Russia managed each incursion, and identifying the cause that led to these incursions, diplomats may be able to seek more permanent solutions that meet the demands of both Russia and its neighbours.

In summary, it can be argued that effective diplomatic crisis management remains an elusive and demanding goal. Yet it may also be stipulated that crisis management is likely to play a pivotal role in 21st-century diplomacy, as contemporary crises are increasingly complex ones. Processes such as globalization complicate crises; they enhance economic interdependence and demand planetary solutions to global challenges, as no single country can reverse the effects of climate change or halt the spread of pandemics (Metzl, 2001; Slaughter, 2009). In an economically interdependent world, the decisions of one actor immediately impact the financial and political institutions of other actors. Such was the case with the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump - both of which have been credited with increasing support for populist movements in Europe (Gusterson, 2017; Inglehart & Norris, 2016).

Moreover, the 21st-century is already witnessing a transition from a unipolar world to a heteropolar one. These new configurations of power also complicate crises as numerous actors seek to exert influence in various world regions. The civil war in Yemen, for instance, has seen Saudi and U.S. backed forces wage war on groups supported by Iran. Peacefully resolving crises such as the civil war in Yemen requires diplomatic solutions that meet the strategic goals of numerous parties, as well as their proxies. Yet such solutions are nearly impossible to obtain. Indeed, the proliferation of actors involved in the Yemeni war, and their conflicting interests, prevented the international community from reaching a negotiated solution to the war despite intense negotiations over a four-year period. Presently, proxy wars are being waged in Southern Israel, Iraq and Syria, while elsewhere in the world, new modalities of power are contributing to increased tensions, as is the case with China's military build-up in the South China Sea.

The global spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has also profoundly impacted the nation state, which is losing diplomatic agency. In a networked world, the nation state's power is migrating upwards to transnational actors such as the EU or the African Union and downwards to non-state actors including NGOs and terror groups such as ISIS (Awan, 2017; Copeland, 2013). Loss of diplomatic agency may further reduce states' abilities to manage and resolve crises. Some scholars have even argued that we are now in the age of perpetual crises (Constantinou, 2015; Ish Shalom, 2015).

The proliferation of crises is also facilitated by the policy of diplomatic disengagement currently perused by the U.S. Since the election of Donald Trump, the U.S. has withdrawn from UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement, and has threatened not to abide by NATO's mutual defence clause (Foulkes, 2018; Haaretz, 2019; Laub, 2019). Such unilateral actions erode trust between nations, hamper the ability of countries to solve crises through coalition-building, and breed a sense of instability around the world.

Increased interdependence among states, the emergence of a heteropolar world, the loss of state agency, and the diplomacy of disengagement all contribute to the paralysis now evident in the institutions that shaped diplomacy in the latter part of the 20th-century. The UN Security Council has been unable to act in unison to end the bloodshed in Syria or in Yemen. The EU is threatened by the rise of right-wing populists throughout the continent, as well as waves of immigrants and refugees fleeing the Middle East, while NATO is in the midst of a structural challenge brought about by the demise of democracy in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary. Other diplomatic organisations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have been unable to curb Russia's expansion policies in

Crimea, while the Trump administration's policy of defunding UN institutions prevents the organisation from solving political or humanitarian crises around the world.

It is against this backdrop of perpetual diplomatic crises, and a structural crisis in diplomacy, that diplomats are asked to manage and resolve crises between states. In the last decade alone, diplomats have attempted to resolve the crises surrounding Kosovo's independence, Russia's incursion into Georgia, the violent oppression of protests in Iran, the deposing of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, the war in Libya, the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, internal fighting in South Sudan, the terror attacks of Boko Haram, Iran's nuclear program, North Korea's nuclear ambitions, Russia's incursion into Crimea, Israel's wars with Hamas, and the increased dangers of climate change. Yet as crises become more frequent and intertwined, diplomats often focus on short-term crisis containment rather than long-term crisis resolution. Such was the case with the Iran nuclear agreement.

In 2015, the P5+1 countries (China, France, Russia, UK, U.S., and EU) and Iran announced that an agreement had been reached regarding the latter's nuclear weapons program. When 'selling' the Iran Deal to the American public, President Obama repeatedly stated that the Deal would focus solely on Iran's nuclear ambitions. The agreement would not address Iran's regional ambitions, its financial support of terrorist activities, its proxy wars in other countries, or its ballistic missiles program, which threatens Israel as well as Sunni states (Bjola & Manor, 2018). Moreover, the deal would only be binding for one decade. It was assumed that after a decade of increased financial trade with the world, Iran would not resume its nuclear activities given fear of new economic sanctions. Thus, the Iran Deal contained the country's nuclear program rather than solved the regional crisis posed by Iran's expansionist foreign policy. Similarly, when imposing financial sanctions on Russia,

the U.S. and its allies did not solve the Crimean Crisis, but rather, aimed to contain Russia's actions and prevent it from invading other countries in the region. The same is true of recent negotiations by the UN to obtain a long-term truce between Israel and Hamas, rather than a comprehensive peace deal between Israel and Palestine.

As these lines are written, the world finds itself yet again on the brink of nuclear war given escalating tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. As was the case in 1962, so in 2019, the Korean nuclear crisis is managed under conditions of uncertainty, information deficits, and time constraints. This may be the reason why Bjola (2016b) recently argued that diplomats have made little progress in their abilities to manage crises. However, recent years have also seen the employment of digital communication tools in the management of crises, namely social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. A few important questions are, have these digital tools influenced diplomats' management of crises and if so, in what manner? Has the adoption of digital tools increased diplomats' abilities to meet the awesome challenge of crisis management? These questions are the ones that underpin this thesis.

How Digital Tools Impact Crisis Management

The emergence of web 2.0 applications such as social media, messaging applications, blogging sites, and Wikipedia proved a formidable challenge to MFAs. First, following the rise of web 2.0 applications, the audiences of diplomacy were fragmented into 'networks of selective exposure' (Hayden, 2012, p. 2). While some digital audiences learned about the world through Twitter, others turned to trusted bloggers. Gone were the days when diplomats could reach large segments of the population by appearing on CNN or writing an op-ed for the London Times. Second, new media actors utilised web 2.0 applications to

frame or narrate world events. These actors included bloggers, citizen journalists, and civil society organisations whose frames often negated those of states. For instance, during the Arab Spring, citizen journalists framed Arab protests as democratic revolts while Arab media channels framed them as dangerous riots. Importantly, traditional media institutions came to rely on the reporting of citizen journalists and adopted their framing of events (Causey & Howard, 2013; Manor, 2016). Lastly, when migrating to web 2.0 applications, traditional media organisations adopted the practice of real time journalism, or reporting on events as they unfolded on the ground.

MFAs therefore found themselves operating in a complex media environment characterized by new platforms (e.g. social media), new actors (e.g. citizen journalists), and new practices or methods for attracting audiences (e.g. real time reporting). Importantly, diplomats have always aspired to use media channels in order to promote their framing or narration of world events. It is through media channels that diplomats may narrate their country's policies, demonstrate how such policies promote desired values, identify the problems these policies aim to address and, ultimately, create a receptive environment for their country's policies amongst foreign publics (Cull, 2013; Melissen, 2005).

Yet media channels have also traditionally influenced diplomats' chosen policies. Previous studies have demonstrated that media reporting focuses public attention on a certain issue or event. As an issue begins to dominate societal conversations, and as public opinion begins to rally in favour of a certain outcome, diplomats formulate corresponding policies. Policy-makers are thus required to attend to issues that media institutions focus on (Robinson, 1999, p. 301). For instance, the 24-hour news cycle brought about by CNN and the like focused public attention on humanitarian crises, eventually leading to U.S.

diplomatic interventions to end humanitarian suffering. Diplomats' need to respond to heightened media attention was thus referred to as 'the CNN effect' (Gilboa, 2005; Livingston, 1997; Robinson, 1999).

To contend with the new complex media environment, compete with new and traditional media actors, and influence the public's understanding of world events, MFAs migrated en masse to social media sites in a practice commonly referred to as digital diplomacy (Bjola & Holmes, 2015). It is currently estimated that 90% of UN member states have established some form of social media presence. The question that follows is, do these MFAs use social media for crisis management and, if so, how have these tools impacted diplomats' abilities to manage a crisis? Do they increase or limit one's ability to manage a crisis?

It is the contention of this thesis that MFAs use social media to frame crises and to influence how global publics perceive a crisis and its possible outcomes. This assumption stems from the fact that during a crisis, a nation will perceive a credible threat to its interests (Bell, 1971). To secure its interests, a nation will adopt certain policies. Through social media framing, these policies may be communicated to a globally connected public sphere. Specifically, MFAs may use social media to articulate a nation's policies during a crisis, justify its use of power, and offer interpretations of offline events as they unfold on the ground. Such online activities may create a receptive environment for a country's policies, thus enabling it to obtain its policy goals during a crisis. Importantly, it is assumed that MFAs will adopt the practice of real time framing given their need to compete with other actors who also disseminate frames on social media including citizen journalists,

traditional media outlets, and other states. As such, MFA framing on social media can mitigate the 'CNN effect' as diplomats create and disseminate their own frames.

To summarise, this thesis postulates that MFAs will employ real time social media framing to create a receptive environment for their chosen policies during a crisis. This assumption is based on recent works that have examined MFAs' or embassies' use of social media to frame the following: discussions with online publics (Bjola & Jiang, 2015), their nation's adherence to certain values and norms (Manor & Segev, 2015; Natarajan, 2014), their country's past involvement in atrocities (Manor, 2016), a country's policies in a specific region (Metzgar, 2012), and specific foreign policy achievements such as the Iran Deal (Seib, 2016). Importantly, it was the need to counter the online framing activities of al-Qaeda that led the U.S. State Department to migrate online in the first place (Hallams, 2010). The assumption that MFAs will adopt the practice of real time framing also stems from recent work that argues that on social media, diplomats must practice a form of real time diplomacy if they are to successfully compete over the attention of digital publics (Seib, 2012). This is because social media users expect to learn about global events as they unfold (Manor & Crilley, 2019).

Yet MFAs' real time framing of offline events may also increase one's ability to identify instances in which diplomatic mediation may be used to resolve a crisis. During a crisis between two states, both of their MFAs may use social media for framing purposes. By measuring the difference between two MFAs' frames, diplomats may be able to assess the scope of disagreement between two governments. It is the contention of this thesis that the greater the difference between two MFAs' interpretations of offline events, the greater the scope of disagreement between their governments and the greater the possibility of crisis

escalation. Conversely, the smaller the difference between two MFAs' interpretations of offline events, the narrower the scope of disagreement between their governments and the greater the possibility of crisis de-escalation. Given that MFAs are expected to engage in real time framing during a crisis, monitoring differences between MFAs' frames may enable one to track the progression of a crisis in near-real time.

Previous scholarly work has suggested that diplomatic negotiations include 'turning points', which are events that move the process of negotiations on a trajectory either towards or away from an agreement (Druckman, 2001, p. 519). Druckman argues that while scholars agree that such turning points exist, they have yet to create a framework for identifying turning points and seizing them to reach agreements. This thesis reconceptualizes crisis 'turning points' as 'pressure points' in which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted or most effective. Prevention pressure points aim to prevent crisis escalation and are thus used for short-term crisis containment. Prevention points may be identified by increased differences between two MFAs' real time framing of events. Intervention pressure points aim to capitalize on reduced tensions to seek a long-term resolution of the crisis. Intervention pressure points may be identified by reduced differences in two MFAs' real time framing of events. As MFAs are expected to engage in real-time framing, measuring differences between their respective frames can help identify crisis pressure points as they emerge. This can lead to tailored diplomatic interventions that meet the unique attributes of a crisis, especially with regard to timing. This is crucial as intervening too soon in a crisis may cause negotiations to fail, while intervening too late may be futile as leaders have committed themselves to the use of military power (Fearon, 1997; Sauer, 2007).

To measure differences in MFAs' framing of events and understand the conditions necessary for the formation of crisis pressure points, this thesis develops an innovative frame distance model that is based on the works of sociologist Erving Goffman and media scholar Robert Entman. Within the scope of this thesis, the model is applied to two crises that have occurred in recent years and that saw increased digital diplomacy activity: the 2014 Crimea Crisis and the 2014 Gaza war. The frame distance model is developed towards three ends: First, to examine if MFAs do indeed create and disseminate real time frames during a crisis. Second, to assess whether one can measure the difference, or distance, between two MFAs' frames. And third, to explore the conditions necessary for the emergence of crisis pressure points. The basis of this model is the concept of primary frameworks developed by sociologist Erving Goffman, which is elaborated on in the following section.

The Basis of the Crisis Intervention Model - Goffman's Theory of Primary Frameworks

Goffman maintained that human beings constantly strive to make sense of their social surroundings in order to select the most appropriate behaviour. Thus, people strive to answer the question 'What is going on?' This is achieved by employing cognitive schemata that allow one to interpret social situations. These schemata are referred to by Goffman as 'primary frameworks' (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). As Goffman wrote, the purpose of a primary framework is to offer meaning unto a social scene that would otherwise be meaningless (ibid). Once a primary framework has been employed, the social event at hand may be described and the most fitting behaviour adopted.

Primary frameworks are accompanied by sets of rules and expectations that govern social behaviour (Goffman, 1974, p. 25). Thus, primary frameworks offer both meaning and structure. For instance, if one employs the primary framework of dinner parties, he will not be surprised when asked to sit at the dining table, nor will he be surprised when asked to engage in polite conversation with others.

Goffman stated that there are two kinds of primary frameworks: Those that govern behaviour of individuals and those that govern the behaviour of an entire society. For instance, the view of society as made up of certain classes, as well as the relationships between these classes, are frameworks that govern the behaviour and expectations of an entire society. They are, to quote Goffman, 'a group's framework of frameworks - its belief system' (Goffman, 1974, p. 27).

What are shared by individual and societal frameworks are the issues of motive and intent (Goffman, 1974, p. 26). Human beings strive to make sense of the world around them, while societies wish to impose order. In addition, human beings are likely to select frameworks that increase their agency or that allow them to obtain their goals. For instance, a person looking to make influential contacts may employ the framework of dinner parties, while a person longing for solitude may define the same event through the framework of social burdens. Similarly, societies are likely to adopt frameworks that conform to a desired belief system and result in a desired social hierarchy. Thus, the selection of frameworks is not wholly automatic, but also the result of intent.

Within a primary framework one may also frame other individuals. Such is the case with the theatrical frame. When entering a theatre, one will observe rows of seats, a stage, and a curtain; following these observations he is likely to employ the theatrical frame. Once

this has taken place, he is able to govern his behaviour and exceptions such as anticipating darkness during the play. Yet he will also frame the person moving on stage and understand that the person speaking is not really King Lear, but an actor depicting the role of a British king (Goffman, 1974, p. 125). Goffman maintains that one cannot observe any event without applying frameworks as these tell us what has happened before, what is happening now, and what will happen next (ibid, 1974, p. 38).

Keys and Keying

Central to Goffman's theory is the concept of keying. To key is to transform one activity, already identifiable by a primary framework, into something that is 'patterned on this activity yet is recognizable by all as something different' (Goffman 1974, p. 43). Such is the case with people playing at fighting. The participants in this activity all know that they are not really fighting, but rather, playing at something modelled on fighting.

For keying to take place all participants must realign their frameworks. If one participant does not recognize that keying has taken place, or does not adjust his behaviour, the new framework will not take hold (ibid). Such is the case with a boy who violently hits his friends while all others are playing at fighting.

Keying also alters the answer to the question, 'What is going on?' Children playing at fighting will all answer that a play is going on. However, this may not be true for an onlooker who might mistakenly conclude that the children are in fact fighting. Keying is often recognised solely by those partaking in the activity being transformed (ibid, p. 43).

The issue of keying is best explained through the term 'lamination' (ibid, p. 82). Goffman argued that each act of keying may be thought of as a layer, or lamination, that is

added to the activity. In wrestling the core activity is a fight. However, a lamination has been added to this activity, as it is now a scripted fight. Similarly, if a novel is turned into a musical, one lamination has been added. Yet, if that musical is then turned into a motion picture, two laminations have been added to the original novel.

Keying can challenge our notion of reality, for if we do not recognise that a lamination has been added to a fight, we may fail to identify the reality of the wrestling match taking place before our very eyes (Goffman, 1974, p. 47). Goffman added that individuals are adept at identifying laminations given that social situations often include keyings such as ceremonies, rehearsals, and make believe (ibid).

Upkeying and Downkeying

Despite the fact that individuals are adept at identifying laminations, errors in keying may still occur. Goffman asserted that people can add or remove laminations from other individuals' primary frameworks. A relevant example is that of a bank teller who, upon seeing a customer holding a revolver, starts laughing and thinks she is witnessing a practical joke. The teller has taken the activity of a robbery and added the lamination of humour. Such occurrences are known as Upkeying (ibid, p. 307).

Downkeying occurs when one removes a lamination from a given activity. Such is the case with a man arrested by police for walking with a toy gun. The police officers have removed the lamination of humour, focusing on the core activity of gun holding (ibid, p. 307).

Out-of-Frame Activity and Frame Breaking

Out-of-frame activity refers to actions that negate the rules and expectations of a selected primary framework. For instance, scratching one's nose at a dinner party is an out-of-frame activity as it is not subservient to the framework of dinner parties (ibid, p. 204). This is also the case with a man making a joke during a funeral or an actor breaking character to ask for silence from the audience.

Out-of-frame activity may often result in frame breaking. For instance, frame breaking occurs when audiences notice puppeteers controlling figures on stage. With this revelation, the framed reality that existed on stage is broken and real life replaces fantasy (Goffman, 1974, p. 216). When one Upkeys or Downkeys an activity without authorization from others, he may also break a frame. For instance, a child who stops playing at fighting and begins to hurt his friends has broken their collective framework (ibid, p. 359).

However, individuals may at times purposefully break frames. Such is the case with an actor who tells a joke while playing a dramatic role. The actor has broken the frame of drama with humour, yet with the intention of providing audiences with a rounded and believable character (Goffman, 1974, p. 204). Thus, just as intention and motive play roles in frame selection, so they may play roles in frame breaking.

On Frame Disputes

Given that frameworks answer the question 'What is going on?', frame disputes may be understood as occurrences in which there are two contradictory answers to this question. In a trial, a defendant may claim that he was not attempting to rob a bank but rather, was playing a practical joke, thus employing a humorous framework. The prosecution, on the

other hand, may maintain that the defendant was intent on robbing the bank thus employing the robbery framework. The two answers to the question 'What is going on' are substantially different and there is little expectation that the two sides will come to agree on a joint definition of the situation (Goffman, 1974, p. 322).

Within certain contexts, frame disputes are resolved by an authority figure. For instance, the judge and jury are meant to settle frame disputes in legal contexts by accepting either the defendant's framework or that of the prosecution (ibid, 1974, p. 342). This example suggests that one can conceptualize frame disputes as frame competitions in which two actors attempt to convince a third party to adopt their primary framework. The higher the stakes of the frame competition (e.g. a guilty verdict), the greater the need to sway the third party in one's favour.

Limitations of Goffman's Work

Despite the robustness of Goffman's theory of primary frameworks, there are several areas in which his theory is deficient. First among these is the lack of detail pertaining to the elements comprising a primary framework. While Goffman stated that such frameworks are cognitive schemata that answer the question 'What is going on?', he did not define the mechanisms or components that enable an individual to answer this question. For instance, a primary framework may be comprised of descriptive questions such as who is in the room, what they are wearing, and how loudly they are talking. Such questions would be relevant to identifying the activity taking place in a given room. Conversely, a primary framework may be composed of emotional questions like are the people in the room happy, sad, or joyful? Such questions would also be relevant to identifying the activity in the room.

Second, Goffman did not offer the means for assessing the severity of frame disputes. It is possible to assume that frame disputes may differ from one another in severity. The frame dispute between the defence and prosecution in a murder trial may be more severe than a frame dispute between two participants of a dinner party. In addition, the greater the severity of the frame dispute, and the more important the event, the greater the frame competition between two actors looking to sway a third party.

However, if one were to identify the elements comprising a primary framework he may be able to differentiate between severe and mild frame disputes. For instance, one could argue that a primary framework is comprised of three questions: Who is in the room? What are they wearing? How loudly are they talking? Should two people agree that the room is occupied by lawyers, that they are wearing suits, and that they are talking loudly, there is no apparent frame dispute between them. If two individuals agree that there are loud people in suits in a room, but they disagree on their occupation, then they have a mild frame dispute. Finally, if two people offer different answers to all three questions, then their frame dispute would be severe.

This thesis develops a model that will analyse frame disputes between two MFAs. The model assumes that during diplomatic crises, MFAs employ primary frameworks so as to offer social media followers real time interpretations of unfolding events. Moreover, MFA primary frameworks will offer a context through which actors and policies may be understood. Thus, like Goffman's primary frameworks, MFAs' frameworks will explain what is happening now, what has happened before, and what will happen next. The model is also based on the assumption that MFA frameworks will consist of four elements: a problem definition, a causal attribution, a moral evaluation, and a suggested remedy. This

assumption stems from Robert Entman's work (1993, 2004), which has investigated how administrations frame both domestic and foreign policies. According to Entman (1993), to frame is to 'Select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described' (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

Given that both MFAs' primary frameworks will consist of the same four elements, the model enables one to compare two MFAs' frameworks, measure the severity of their frame disputes, and, by extension, extrapolate the possible trajectory of a crisis. While the model's unit of analysis is an individual MFA's framework, its unit of observation is a tweet published by an MFA during a crisis.

The following section details the rationale of the frame distance model, as well as its main assumptions.

Frame Distance as a Crisis Tracking Model

MFA Primary Frameworks

It is the contention of this thesis that during crises, MFAs will aim to create a frame, or prism, through which Twitter followers are to interpret a crisis. Notably, these frameworks will be aimed at four online audiences: the national citizenry, foreign populations, local and global media outlets, and other diplomatic actors and institutions.

Following Entman's (1993, 2004) analysis of foreign policy framing, it is hypothesised that MFA primary frameworks will include four elements. First, they shall identify the problem that is at the core of the crisis, and the cause of the crisis. By defining the problem

and cause of the crisis, MFAs may begin to garner domestic and global public support for their policies (Bloch-Elkon, 2007; Dimitrova et al., 2005; Entman, 1993). For instance, by alleging that Russia had invaded Crimea in order to expand its sphere of influence, the U.S. was able to secure European support for its imposition of economic sanctions on Russia. Moreover, by defining the problems at the core of the crisis, one may also begin to frame its desired resolution as 'different problems require different solutions'. For instance, a lone wolf terrorist attack may require increased security presence in public spaces while an act of war may require the invasion of another country.

Third, MFAs are likely to incorporate moral evaluations into their framing of a crisis. This assumption stems from the fact that values and norms breed legitimacy in diplomacy. As Peter Van Ham (2013) argued, states often attempt to wield Social Power or define the norms and values that should govern state action. Such values can, in turn, facilitate or limit state action. For instance, nations are less likely to encounter opposition to their foreign policies if they are seen as advancing accepted norms like peace or human rights. As Quelch and Jocz (2009) stated, nations may even be able to exercise military force if such force is seen as advancing desired values. But norms and values can also limit state action as nations cannot be seen as defying the values deemed as desirable by the international community (Natarajan, 2014). It is therefore hypothesised that MFAs will include a moral evaluation in their primary framework, as this may legitimise their country's policies and simultaneously de-legitimise those of another country.

Finally, MFAs' frameworks are likely to include a suggested remedy for the crisis. It is expected that MFAs will identify suggested remedies given the fact that social media platforms are competitive framing arenas in which multiple actors vie over audience

attention and support (Manor, 2016; Seib, 2016). Thus, MFAs will market their desired resolutions among the online demos. In addition, MFAs are likely to identify resolutions to the crisis, as this may justify their chosen policies. For instance, the goal of maintaining Ukrainian territorial integrity, and preventing additional Russian incursions into Eastern Europe, justified U.S. economic sanctions on Russia. MFAs may also identify desired resolutions to the crisis to signal potential negotiators looking to bridge differences between conflicted parties (Gilboa, 2001; Gilboa, 2002; Samuel-Azran, 2013).

The image below illustrates how Entman's four elements create a prism through which MFA audiences are to interpret a crisis.




Illustration 1.1: Construction of an MFA's Primary Framework

MFA Frame Disputes

It is expected that during times of crises, MFAs will have frame disputes, as each MFA seeks to obtain a different outcome. Moreover, it is fair to assume that two MFAs will view the

cause of the crisis and its resolution differently given that crises, by nature, pit one country's interests against another (Bell, 1971). This thesis proposes a model of frame distance for tracking such disputes.

Frame distance relates to the extent to which two MFAs' primary frameworks differ from one another. This distance can be measured because both MFAs' frameworks are made up of four elements: a problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and suggested remedy. Should two MFAs agree on all four elements of a crisis, then the distance between their frames would be 0% and there would be no frame dispute. If the two MFAs agree on the problem and cause of the crisis, but not on its moral dimension or suggested remedy, there would be a frame distance of 50% between their primary frameworks. Finally, if the two MFAs disagree on all four elements, then there would be a frame distance of 100% between their frameworks.

Importantly, frame distance is indicative of crisis acuteness. A frame distance of 0% implies that there is no crisis between two parties. A frame distance of 25% suggests that two parties may be growing apart, while a frame distance of 100% indicates that two parties are engulfed in a crisis. It should be mentioned that the frame distance model measures the severity of MFA frame disputes as a means of assessing the scope of disagreement between governments. The greater the frame distance between two MFAs, the greater the disagreement between their respective governments and the greater the likelihood of crisis escalation.

The Crimean Crisis offers a relevant example of frame distance. At the onset of the crisis, the Russian MFA argued that Russia was supporting separatists in Eastern Ukraine since the lives of Russian minorities in Crimea were threatened by a neo-Nazi government

that had staged a coup in Kiev. The solution to the crisis was the dissolution of the newly-formed Ukrainian government. Conversely, the U.S. State Department argued that Russia was staging an illegal invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to expand its sphere of influence. The solution was an immediate withdrawal of all Russian forces. It may be argued that the frameworks of both MFAs differed on all four elements that comprise a primary framework, leading to a frame distance of 100%. This, in turn, suggests that from the beginning of the Crimean Crisis, the American and Russian governments shared little ground and thus the crisis was likely to escalate.

The frame distance between the U.S. and Russian MFAs at the onset of the Crimean Crisis is shown in the image below.




Illustration 1.2: Frame distance between U.S. and Russian Primary Frameworks

It is expected that as a crisis progresses, the frame distance between two MFAs will alter. Bloch-Elkon (2007) segmented a crisis into three stages: the onset stage, in which tensions between states begin to mount; the escalation stage, during which the interests of states are threatened and the risk of conformation increases; and the de-escalation stage, when states begin to search for an agreed-upon resolution to the crisis.

Within the scope of this thesis, the onset stage is marked by the first tweets published by either MFA in reference to a given crisis (i.e. first Russian tweet mentioning events in Crimea, first Israeli tweet commenting on events in the Gaza Strip). The escalation stage is marked by a rapid succession of events over a short duration of time, which demands action from decision-makers. According to Ole Holsti (1989), crises are defined by a severe threat to important values, limited time to deal with the threat, and a growing sense of urgency and time constraint (pp. 12-13). Like Boin et al., (2013) Holsti also asserted that crises intensify as events begin to rapidly unfold given that decision-makers are faced with growing uncertainty, anxiety, and limited information from which they must make fast decisions (Holsti, 1989, pp. 26-28). In addition, the more events unfold on the ground, the more information is distilled and filtered by mid-level bureaucrats, often leading decision-makers to rely on fragmented or even misleading information (ibid, p. 17). Even more importantly, a rapid succession of events can increase the number of organisations involved in crisis management and, subsequently, the number of individual decision-makers. From the lonely diplomat at an embassy to a policy-maker at the MFA level and a mid-level analyst at an intelligence unit, they all must determine what actions to take and what information to filter to their superiors. Therefore, a rapid succession of events over a short period of time can signify to decision-makers that the crisis has entered a new and more demanding stage, ultimately impacting their management of the crisis.

In the case of the Crimean Crisis, one might argue that the escalation stage emerged during the night of 22 February, 2014 as Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych fled Kiev and made his way to Russia. During the hours that followed there was effectively no government in Ukraine while diplomats stationed on the ground scrambled to make sense of events. Over the next 48 hours the head of the opposition was released from jail, temporary presidential powers were assigned to the parliament's chairman, and pro-Russian rallies in Crimea condemned the new administration in Kiev, following which clashes between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian protesters broke out in various regions of Crimea. This rapid succession of events saw a direct threat to Russia's values and interest, having lost the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych. Similarly, the pro-Russian rallies in Ukraine threatened U.S. and NATO interests in the region.

Finally, the de-escalation stage is marked either by an agreement between two sides, which resolves a crisis, or the emergence of a status quo that contains a crisis. For instance, the 2014 Gaza war ended when Israel and the Hamas government agreed to abide by an Egyptian-mediated ceasefire agreement. Conversely, the Crimean Crisis ended in a tense status quo that persists to this day, with Russia annexing Crimea and the U.S. refusing to acknowledge Crimea's separation from Ukraine.

This thesis proposes that MFA primary frameworks will alter as a crisis transitions from one stage to another. For instance, it could be expected that as a crisis transitions from the onset stage to de-escalation, the frame distance between two MFAs will narrow. This is due to the fact that both governments begin to agree on a possible resolution. The image below demonstrates such a hypothetical scenario between the U.S. and Russian MFAs. As the crisis transitions towards the de-escalation stage, the frame distance between the U.S.

and Russian MFAs' primary frameworks narrows from 100% to 75%. This, in turn, suggests that the scope of disagreement between the two governments has narrowed and that crisis de-escalation may soon follow.




Illustration 1.3: Changes in Frame Distance Between U.S. and Russian Primary Frameworks

Crises may also progress through all three stages of Bloch-Elkon's (2007) model. During the onset stage, two MFAs may disagree on the problem and the cause of a crisis (50% frame distance). During the escalation stage, the frame distance may grow as both

MFAs now also differ on the moral dimension and suggested remedy of the crisis (100% frame distance). Finally, during the de-escalation stage, the frame distance may narrow as both MFAs begin to transition towards resolution and agreement (25% frame distance). Such a hypothetical scenario is depicted in the image below.




Illustration 1.4: Changes in Frame Distance Following Bloch-Elkon's Model

However, primary frameworks are also likely to alter throughout a crisis due to a myriad of external reasons including changing circumstances (Russian troops operating in Eastern Ukraine), de-escalation in tensions (a breakthrough in negotiations), new policies

(the U.S. placing economic sanctions on Russia) and the involvement of new actors (the UK also placing sanctions on Russia).

Crisis Pressure Points

From a crisis management perspective, changes in frame distance between MFAs help conceptualise crisis pressure points. Within the scope of this thesis, pressure points are understood as instances in which diplomatic interventions may be most effective or most warranted. Thus, the thesis differentiates between intervention pressure points and prevention pressure points.

Intervention pressure points are instances in which diplomatic interventions, or mediations, are most likely to succeed as the disagreement between two parties has narrowed. In other words, intervention pressure points aim to capitalise on the inertia of a crisis to achieve a long-term resolution. Within the frame distance model, intervention points are identified by a reduction in frame distance. For instance, if the frame distance between two MFAs narrows from 100% to 50%, then the scope of disagreement between two governments may also be narrowing. Diplomatic interventions at these moments are more likely to succeed than those undertaken at the height of tensions. Crucially, the goal of intervention pressure points is to resolve the crisis and reach an agreement between both sides.

Conversely, prevention pressure points aim to prevent further escalation through short-term crisis containment. Within the frame distance model, prevention pressure points are identified by a growth in frame distance. For instance, if the frame distance between two MFAs grows from 25% to 100%, then their respective governments may be growing further apart, suggesting a possible escalation of the crisis. During prevention pressure

points, diplomats may take preventative measures such as offering to serve as intermediaries between sides, calling for discussions in multilateral forums, urging both sides to exercise restraint, and even using military force to enact no-fly zones (Cahill, 1996). Most importantly, the goal of prevention pressure points is to prevent crisis escalation through containment.

The model developed in the scope of this thesis conceptualises and maps crisis turning points in real time by analysing the frames disseminated by two MFAs on Twitter. This thesis's conceptualisation of pressure points builds on Druckman's work on turning points in negotiations (2001). According to Druckman, turning points are events that move the process of negotiations on a trajectory towards or away from an agreement (p. 519). He defined turning points as signals of a progression from one stage of negotiations to the other (p. 520). Turning points in negotiations may include resolving an impasse, signing a new framework agreement, or reacting to external events. Moreover, he classified turning points as a) procedural, in which the venue or format of negotiations is changed; b) substantive, in which new concepts and ideas are introduced; and c) external, which include events that are outside the immediate domain of negotiations. Druckman argued that while scholars agree on a definition of turning points, they have yet to create a framework for identifying turning points during negotiations or understanding when turning points may be utilised to edge negotiations toward resolution and agreement (ibid, p. 520).

Druckman also distinguished between types of negotiations based on their issue (e.g. security, environment, trade). He argued that security issues (e.g. arms control, war termination, conflict resolution) lead to especially difficult negotiations as countries are risk averse when dealing with such issues and are distrustful of their counterparts, leading to

false bargaining (ibid, p. 521). Thus, security negotiators have little opportunity to create turning points and leverage them for a breakthrough in negotiations. Lastly, security negotiations are challenging as they are likely to be influenced by external events rather than events taking place in the negotiation room.

This thesis aims to address the challenge articulated by Druckman by discerning between two types of 'pressure points': those that lead a crisis towards short-term containment and those that lead a crisis towards long-term resolution.

MFA Laminations- Avoiding Frame Breaking

Goffman asserted that primary frameworks are not infallible. In fact, primary frameworks may be broken either intentionally or by accident. For instance, an actor can intentionally break the framework of the theatre play to ask audiences to remain quiet. Similarly, a child who begins to harm his friends has broken their collective frame of fighting.

During crises, MFAs are forced to comment on unfolding events and rapidly changing circumstances in near-real time (Seib, 2012). This necessitates that MFAs continuously update their primary frameworks. Failure to do so may render a framework irrelevant and lead to frame breaking. On the other hand, an MFA cannot alter its framework too radically as that too may lead to frame breaking. The question that follows is, how do MFAs maintain frame consistency while integrating recent events into their primary framework?

Goffman would have stipulated that frame consistency may be achieved through Upkeying and Downkeying or adding and removing laminations from primary frameworks. Within the scope of the frame distance model, laminations are viewed as layers that enable an MFA to adjust its primary frameworks to new circumstances. In this way, laminations

help MFAs maintain frame consistency, comment on events in real time, and avoid frame breaking (**note** that for the sake of simplicity, Upkeying and Downkeying will be referred to throughout this thesis as the ‘adding’ or ‘removing’ of laminations).

For instance, during the 2014 Gaza War, the Israeli MFA turned to social media to narrate Israel’s policies (Yarchi, Samuel-Azran & Bard-David, 2017). During the first week, the MFA argued that Israel had commenced a military operation against the Hamas government given its launching of rockets at Israeli cities. Yet by the second week of the war, Israel justified its military operation by arguing that Hamas was infiltrating Israeli cities alongside the Gaza border. In other words, the Israeli MFA added a lamination to its primary framework - it changed the root cause of the crisis from rocket fire to infiltration. By doing so, the Israeli MFA adapted its primary framework to changing circumstances while maintaining its core argument: that a military operation was the correct response to Hamas violence (Manor & Crilley, 2018a).

Laminations may also prove useful in determining the issues that are of greatest concern to various parties. By continuously adding and removing laminations, an MFA may be able to preserve a primary framework for several days or weeks. Other frameworks may be abandoned within hours. The longer the life span of a primary framework, the more central it may be to how an MFA frames events and, by extension, a country’s interests. By monitoring the use of laminations by an MFA, the frame distance model elucidates the central arguments, and interests, of conflicted parties.

Integral Frame Distance Scores

Thus far, the frame distance model has measured the distance between two MFAs' primary frameworks as a means of assessing the scope of disagreement between governments and

extrapolating the possible trajectory of a crisis. However, MFA social media content offers a wealth of information that can be utilised to more accurately assess the scope of disagreement between two governments. The frame distance model therefore takes into account six additional indicators, four of which are rhetorical indicators.

The first rhetorical indicator includes statements made by national leaders during a crisis. Such statements, which are shared by MFAs on Twitter, are of importance as they can signal a nation's interests, policies, strategy, and desire to reach an amicable solution to a crisis (Gilboa, 2002; Samuel-Azran, 2013). The frame distance model uses qualitative analysis to measure the positive or negative sentiments of leaders' statements. Positive statements may indicate a willingness to negotiate a joint resolution to a crisis, while negative statements may indicate a willingness to escalate tensions.

The second rhetorical indicator is statements made by official representatives following high-level meetings or during press conferences (e.g. foreign secretaries or high-ranking diplomats). Such is the case with statements made by Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry following the meetings they held throughout the Crimean Crisis. Statements following high-level meetings are important for three reasons. First, they can offer insight into the ability of conflicted parties to reconcile their differences. Such is the case with statements that mention concrete actions to diffuse tensions. Second, they can offer insight into conflicted parties' risk analysis and how they view the possibility of further escalation. Negative statements that include threats or lament a lack of progress may suggest that the road to de-escalation remains long. Third, statements made after high-level meetings are meant for wide circulation by the press. Thus, they may include analyses of the crisis's future trajectory alongside signals sent by

officials to their peers. As was the case with leaders' statements, the frame distance model qualitatively analysed the sentiments of statements made following meetings.

The third rhetorical indicator is summaries of phone calls between world leaders. For instance, throughout the Iran nuclear negotiations, the White House, the Israeli government, and the EU all tweeted that their respective leaders had conversed with one another over the phone to coordinate diplomatic action (Seib, 2016). These tweets often included a short summary of each leader's position and a shared statement. Within the scope of the frame distance model, phone calls are also qualitatively analysed. Positive summaries may be indicative of two parties coming closer together or of the diplomatic community taking action to resolve crises, while negative summaries may be indicative of growing tensions.

The fourth rhetorical indicator is the positive or negative sentiment of tweets published during press conferences either by high-ranking diplomats (e.g. foreign secretaries) or by national leaders. Leaders and diplomats may use press conferences to impact the media's framing of events and to identify national interests and acceptable solutions to a crisis. Press conferences may also be used by leaders to signal their intentions to their counterparts and allies. Negative statements at press conferences may suggest that a crisis is far from over, while positive statements may indicate that two governments are moving closer together. The fifth rhetorical indicator is the positive or negative sentiment of all crisis-related tweets that cannot be categorised as leaders' statements, leaders' phone calls, and statements following high-level meetings.

The final indicator used to assess the scope of disagreement between two governments is the number of crisis-related tweets published by an MFA during a given

week. A high number of tweets could indicate that a crisis has come to dominate the agenda of conflicted parties. A low number of tweets could suggest that a crisis is less dominant or is transitioning from one stage to another.

In summary, the model developed in the scope of this thesis will be based on a matrix of calculations that takes into account the frame distance between MFA primary frameworks, rhetorical indicators, and levels of Twitter activity to offer a single measurement for the scope of disagreement between two governments. This measurement is called the Integral Frame Distance Score. The higher the Integral Frame Distance Score, the greater the scope of disagreement between two governments and the greater the likelihood of crisis escalation. Conversely, the lower the Integral Frame Distance Score, the smaller the scope of disagreement between two governments and the greater the likelihood of crisis de-escalation. Put differently, the Integral Frame Distance Score is the independent variable, while crisis acuteness is the dependant variable.

Goffman in International Relations Scholarship

The fields of sociology and IR may be regarded as intertwined given that diplomacy is a social institution constituted by social agents (i.e. diplomats) (Manor, 2016). Indeed, the conduct of diplomacy is influenced by diplomats' personal experiences and senses of self. As Mead (1962) stated, the importance of the self of diplomats is evident given that diplomacy is a social structure constructed by human experiences and interactions. In addition, one can view the state as a self and relations between nations as relations between personified countries (Manning, 1962). Wendt (2004) argued that states are people as they have intentions, purpose, and are comprised of a collective of selves.

This thesis is not the first to employ Goffman's theories to the realm of IR. Faizullaev (2006) has employed Goffman's assertion that the 'self' is a ceremonial object that must be treated with care and cultivated through rituals. Building on Goffman's assertions, Faizullaev (2006) argued that diplomatic ceremonies serve as a means through which diplomats can collectively experience and honour the state, thus enabling them to express their deep association with the state's selfhood.

While Faizullaev (2006) focused on diplomats in general, Pouliot (2011) examined the social interactions between permanent representatives and diplomats assigned to multilateral organisations (i.e. NATO). Although such organisations are meant to be less hierarchical, Pouliot argued that they too are marked by a 'pecking order' that regulates interactions between permanent representatives. Pouliot analysed this pecking order through Goffman's concept of 'sense of place'. According to Goffman (1959), a sense of one's place relates to one's feeling of rank and the ranks of others in social situations. Such a sense of place is conceptualised as a social skill that governs social interactions between individuals. In other words, there are unwritten conventions and rules that govern social interactions between individuals. Pouliot likens Goffman's sense of place to the pecking order observed by permanent representatives in multilateral organisations and their feelings of rank and the ranks of others.

Shimazu (2011) used Goffman's dramaturgical theory to analyse summit diplomacy. In her analysis of the 1955 'Bandung Conference', Shimazu (2011) conceptualised diplomacy as a 'theatre' in which various 'actors' perform on a 'stage' in front of 'audiences'. By doing so, Shimazu hoped to unlock the symbolic meaning of diplomatic summits. Her central argument was that diplomacy 'gains its significance by enactment and creates symbolic

meanings through that process' (Shimazu, 2011, p. 5). Diplomacy is thus as much about onstage theatre as it is about back-door negotiations.

An important component of Goffman's theory of self-presentation is impression management. Goffman (1959) asserted that in social situations, individuals are primarily concerned with managing their impressions or images. The concept of impression management has often been used by IR scholars. For instance, Zhang (2006) evaluated the ways different nations offered Asian countries foreign aid following the 2004 tsunami. Zhang argued that such aid stemmed from nations' desires to manage their impressions and appear as good or moral countries on the world stage.

Adler-Nissen (2012, 2014) further cemented the application of Goffman's theory of impression management in IR scholarship by evaluating the role negative impressions play in diplomacy. Her analysis explored the manner in which Greenland was able to shame its former coloniser, Denmark, into opposing a whale hunting ban by the European Union. Adler-Nissen (2012) maintained that Goffman's 'interaction order' deals with the rules and conventions that govern all face-to-face interactions between individuals. Such conventions are often employed in order to save face and prevent embarrassment. Indeed, in social situations, people will ignore certain faux pas in order to prevent another's loss of face and a disruption of the social situation. Adler-Nissen (2012) claimed that Greenland threatened to portray Denmark as a past coloniser that prevented native populations from maintaining their cultural heritage, such as banning Inuits from whale hunting. In an attempt to save face and prevent embarrassment, Denmark opposed the EU ban and secured a special dispensation that allowed Inuits to continue whale hunting.

Thus far, the employment of Goffman's concepts in IR scholarship has focused on social interactions and the presentation of the self. However, some IR scholars have employed Goffman's theory of frame analysis in order to analyse diplomatic negotiations. Schimmelfennig (2002) analysed the manner in which international actors may use frames to achieve strategic goals. Goffman (1959) asserted that when appearing in front of others, one will attempt to frame the situation to one's advantage. It is through self-presentation that one may lead others to act in a certain way, thereby accepting his framing or definition of the situation. Schimmelfennig (2002) argued that like individuals, actors in the international arena also influence the framing of events and issues to their advantage. For instance, social movements may employ frames to portray a situation as a great injustice and sound a call to arms to oppose such an injustice. By doing so, social movements attempt to influence how other actors frame the situation and understand its possible solution. To enhance the efficiency of their framing, social movements may align their frames with those of the target population (Snow, Rochford, Worden & Benford, 1992). However, Schimmelfennig (2002) also added that framing is a contest in which there is a symbolic struggle to determine which group's definition of the situation will prevail (Klandermans, 1997).

While previous scholars have employed Goffman's work to the realm of IR, they have yet to employ his framing theory in the study of diplomatic crises. By creating a crisis intervention model that is centred on Goffman's framing theory, this thesis offers a novel contribution to the study of crises and to the study of the intersection between sociology and IR.

Summary

The frame distance model presented thus far proves to be an innovative tool for crisis tracking. Specifically, the model aims to use social media content published by MFAs to extrapolate the possible trajectory of a crisis and identify crisis pressure points. At the model's core lies the assumption that MFAs use real time framing techniques during crises to obtain a desired resolution. The following section identifies the key characteristics that comprise the frame distance model and the interaction between these characteristics.

Key Characteristics of the Frame Distance Model

The frame distance model is based on four characteristics. The first of these is the distance between the primary frameworks employed by two MFAs. Frame distance is calculated through a matrix that takes into account the primary frameworks of each party, the number of tweets published by both MFAs, and rhetorical indicators that can signal agreement or disagreement between conflicted parties (e.g. statements by national leaders, statements made after high-level meetings, press conferences following meetings, and summaries of phone conversations between leaders). As noted above, frame distance is a means of assessing crisis acuteness as it measures the scope of disagreement between two governments and the likelihood of crisis escalation.

The second key characteristic is crisis stage. For the purpose of building the frame distance model, it will be assumed that diplomatic crises follow a specific pattern including onset, escalation, and de-escalation stages (Bloch-Elkon, 2007). While it is true that not all crises follow this linear pattern, and that some crises never reach de-escalation, the development of the frame distance model necessitates the employment of a linear progression given the expected linkage between frame distance and crisis stage. It is

expected that growth in frame distance will correlate with the transition from the onset stage to the escalation stage, while a reduction in frame distance will correlate with a transition from escalation to de-escalation. It should be mentioned that by adopting a linear perspective to crisis progression, this thesis may be able to describe how crises evolve over time. Thus, the first two characteristics comprising this model are intrinsically linked.

The third characteristic is crisis pressure points. These are understood as instances in which diplomatic interventions may be most effective or most warranted. However, it is expected that this characteristic will not follow the linear progression of onset, escalation, and de-escalation. In fact, it is expected that intervention and prevention pressure points will be identified throughout a crisis as frame distance may narrow or grow during each crisis stage. For even in the midst of the escalation stage, two governments may come to agree on the moral dimension of a crisis while disagreeing on its cause and resolution. Such an agreement between two governments would result in a small reduction in frame distance and the identification of a possible intervention pressure point. Thus, the frame distance model will demonstrate that pressure points are not dependent upon a specific crisis stage.

The fourth key characteristic of the frame distance model includes laminations, which enable MFAs to maintain frame consistency over time, frame events as they unfold in real time, and avoid frame breaking. Within the scope of this thesis, laminations also elucidate the issues that are of greatest concern to each party and the interests that each party aim to secure. Thus, while frame distance helps one map crisis pressure points, laminations can help one prepare for the actual task of negotiating as he or she may anticipate the position of each party.

Markedly, the goals of diplomatic interventions must correlate with frame distance. Diplomatic measures taken in congruence with growth in frame distance should seek to contain a situation and avoid crisis slide, while measures taken in congruence with the narrowing of frame distance should seek a permanent and final resolution to the crisis.

Importantly, this thesis explores the relationship between online and offline diplomacy. This is evident in the thesis's guiding question- **How do MFAs use digital tools in times of crises, and how can the use of these tools inform strategies to manage crises?** The thesis postulates that during crises, MFAs will create primary frameworks that will offer digital publics the ability to make sense of a rapidly changing event. Moreover, MFA primary frameworks will justify national policies and attempt to rally foreign and domestic support for these policies. However, it is also expected that MFAs will adapt their frameworks to events unfolding on the ground. Failure to do so may lead to frame breaking and render an MFA's communication irrelevant. As such, offline events will impact the online framing activities of MFAs. The envisioned relationship between online and offline diplomacy is thus a cyclical one in which online diplomacy is used to manage an offline crisis while at the same time the offline crisis impacts online diplomacy. Yet it is also expected that third party diplomats will be able to analyse MFAs' online frameworks and identify offline pressure points in which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted due to escalation, or most likely to succeed due to de-escalation. Moreover, offline diplomats may analyse MFA frameworks to identify the core interests of each side thus obtaining long-term solutions instead of short-term containment. Here again online diplomacy informs strategies for offline management of a crisis. The following section reviews and validates the main assumption of the frame distance model.

Main Assumption of the Frame Distance Model

The first assumption of the frame distance model is that MFAs will utilise Twitter for framing purposes during a crisis. Numerous communication studies have shown that governments routinely frame foreign policy issues, actors, and events in an attempt to garner public and media support for their policies (Brewer, 2006; Dimitrova et al., 2005; Entman, 2004; Wood & Peake, 1998). Moreover, digital diplomacy studies have shown that diplomatic institutions also frame government action and, even more importantly, that social media can be a powerful tool for foreign policy framing (Bjola & Jiang, 2015; Manor, 2016; Seib, 2016). Indeed, the practice of digital diplomacy is rooted in the Bush administration's attempt to counter the narratives spread online by al-Qaeda and establish better virtual ties with Muslim internet users (Hallams, 2010). Thus, digital diplomacy has traditionally dealt with frames and narratives, while online platforms have traditionally been regarded as competitive framing arenas (Hayden, 2012).

Additionally, social media platforms have become frequently-used framing tools by MFAs given the global proliferation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). As Hayden (2012) and Seib (2012) argued, ICTs enable citizen journalists, bloggers, NGOs, and civil society organisations to frame events in real time (Causey & Howard, 2013). In order to contend with these frames, MFAs have had to adopt the practice of near-real time diplomacy, which is practiced through social media. It may thus be expected that MFAs will turn to social media during crises given the need to immediately comment on rapidly changing circumstances. When analysing the Crimean Crisis, Freedman (2014) wrote, 'In recent years there has been much discussion of "narrative" as an essential prerequisite of a successful strategy, a storyline that not only provides a justification for particular actions but

also creates expectations for the future and so helps others, friends as well as opponents, adapt to a new situation. It is through words that crises are framed and their salient points identified' (p. 30).

The assumption that MFAs will employ Twitter during crises is also strengthened by the finding that diplomatic institutions have integrated social media into their crisis management procedures, be it in times of consular or diplomatic crises (Cassidy & Manor, 2016; Hocking & Melissen, 2015). Scholars have also argued that MFAs utilise different social media sites for different purposes. While Facebook is used for communicating with diasporas and the national citizenry, Twitter is employed for elite communication with policy-makers, opinion-makers, the press, and other diplomatic institutions (Bjola, 2017). Additionally, studies suggest that Twitter is used for top-down, state-centric communication (Clarke, 2015) and that tweets enable diplomats to immediately comment on world events, while Facebook posts are used to craft more elaborate messages at a later time (Kampf, Manor & Segev, 2015).

The frame distance model also assumes that when using Twitter, MFAs aim to communicate with specific target audiences: a globally connected public sphere, media outlets, and other diplomatic institutions. Recent studies have shown that MFAs do in fact follow one another on Twitter (Cassidy & Manor, 2016; Manor & Pamment, 2019) and that MFAs take into account tweets published by their peers when making policy recommendations (Manor, 2016). Additional studies indicate that MFAs use social media in an attempt to influence issues debated by their followers (Bjola & Jiang, 2015; Bjola, 2016; Comor & Bean, 2012; Khatib, Dutton & Thelwall, 2012) as well as media coverage of events, issues, and actors (Hayden, 2012; Seib, 2012; Seib, 2016).

One could, of course, argue that there is no global public sphere. Indeed, some countries limit their citizens' access to digital platforms (e.g. Iran, Turkey). Others erect great firewalls meant to stem the flow of information into their country (e.g. China) or employ trolls to influence online debates (e.g. Russia). Lastly, not all citizens around the globe have access to digital platforms, nor do they all wish to join digital platforms. Older generations rely on mass media rather than social media or the internet to learn about the world (Anderson & Perrin, 2017). However, this thesis offers three arguments that substantiate the claim that diplomats aim to engage with a global public sphere.

First, studies have shown that MFAs migrated online to frame events and actors and communicate with global audiences. Such was the case when the U.S. State Department engaged with Muslim internet users throughout the world following President Obama's Cairo address or when Sweden launched a virtual embassy meant to facilitate ties between Swedish diplomats and Second Life users around the globe (Khatib, Dutton & Thelwall, 2012; Pamment, 2012). More recently, the coalition against ISIS has taken to social media to combat ISIS propaganda on a global scale, while the Indian foreign ministry has launched a smartphone application that offers digital users all over the world insight into Indian foreign policy and Indian diplomacy (Manor & Crilley, 2018b; Manor, 2019). Even more importantly, many Twitter and Facebook profiles operated by MFAs do not target a specific national audience but, rather, target a global audience. As the head of Israel's digital diplomacy unit stated in an interview, 'our English language Facebook page aims to serve as a varied information center, both for our English speaking followers around the world and for our embassies worldwide' (Rudich, 2014). Similarly, the director of the Polish digital diplomacy unit has stated that the MFA employs Facebook to promote the 'Polska' brand on a global

scale (Manor, 2016). As such, when engaging in digital diplomacy, diplomats envision a global public with which they aim to interact and whom they wish to influence.

Second, diplomats also migrated online to influence how media organisations frame events and actors. As Seib (2012, 2016) wrote, MFAs were forced to migrate to social media following the Arab Spring and the realisation that old and new media institutions were using digital platforms to shape public perception of events unfolding in the Arab world. This necessitated that diplomats frame events as soon as they occur, thus competing with the media's narration of events. These new practices have led Pamment (2014) to conclude that MFAs have been mediatised in that they adopt the logic and practices of media institutions. Yet diplomats also attempt to use digital tools to influence the media's depiction of events and actors. By doing so, MFAs can potentially extend their reach beyond social media. For instance, the Israeli embassy in London aims to influence the terms used by the BBC in reference to Hamas operatives. The BBC presently uses the term 'combatants' while the Israeli embassy's Twitter account implores the BBC to use the term 'terrorists'. If it should be successful, the Israeli embassy could extend its reach to other mediums, as the BBC employs similar language across all of its outlets, including television and radio. By shaping the language and viewpoint of media institutions online, MFAs can interact with those populations that have yet to migrate online, thereby engaging with a global public sphere.

Lastly, this thesis argues that a global public sphere does exist as people from all over the world can now access information published by diplomats, debate it, and either share this information or reject it. Global discussions soon emerge on the Twitter profiles and Facebook pages of diplomats, constituting a global public sphere. Such was the case when First Lady Michelle Obama published a selfie while holding a sign that read 'Bring Back

Our Girls'. This selfie referenced the abduction of more than 200 Nigerian schoolgirls by Boko Haram. While Obama's tweet may have sought to bring media attention to the plight of the kidnapped girls, it was soon met by a global countercampaign in which people from all over the world published selfies and wrote 'Bring Back Your Drones', referencing the Obama administration's use of drones in the War on Terror. Correspondingly, Haynal argued that digital platforms have seen the emergence of a volatile and global online demos that is asserting itself in unpredictable ways, at times complementing diplomacy and at other times challenging diplomacy (2011).

Crucially, as is the case with any public sphere, the digital one that has emerged on the social media profiles of diplomats is not accessible to all. Government censorship, generational gaps, access to the internet, and digital skills can all prevent individuals from accessing and partaking in this public sphere. Yet this fact does not diminish the global nature of digital diplomacy's public sphere. In addition, it is worth noting that all public spheres, online and offline, have limited access. Physically disabled people cannot attend town hall meetings, while expats forfeit the right to impact political processes in their countries of origin. Yet these limitations do not nullify public spheres.

The assumption that an MFA's primary framework will employ moral evaluations is based on studies that examine the roles of norms and values in diplomacy. As diplomacy scholars have noted, norms and values can facilitate or constrain state action (Natarajan, 2014; Van Ham, 2013). This is due to the fact that nations cannot be seen as failing to adhere to accepted norms. Moreover, nations that portray their actions as promoting accepted values (e.g. peacekeeping or humanitarian aid) may encounter less resistance to their foreign policies, including the use of military power (Quelch & Jocz, 2009). Public

diplomacy studies have also found that nations may employ moral arguments in order to increase their credibility or avoid blame for negative outcomes (Mor, 2006).

Communication and media studies have also found that morality plays an important role in the creation of news frames. Cross-national comparisons have found that news outlets are likely to use moral arguments and covenants when creating news frames (de Vreese, Peter & Semetko, 2001; de Vreese, 2005) and that governments employ moral arguments when framing adversaries (Entman, 2004). Such was the case when President George W. Bush defined the War on Terror as a war on evil (Entman, 2004) or when President Ronald Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as the focus of evil in the modern world. Thus, it is expected that during a crisis, MFAs will portray their adherence to accepted norms and values, as well as their adversary's lack of adherence to such norms.

This thesis also assumes that statements made by leaders, or on behalf of leaders, may offer insight into the progression of a crisis and the extent to which two parties have grown closer or further apart. This is also true of high-level meetings between diplomats from both sides. Media diplomacy studies have demonstrated that leaders use media channels during crises to signal one another and escalate or de-escalate tensions (Gilboa, 2001; Gilboa, 2002; Samuel-Azran, 2013). Such was the case when President George H. W. Bush issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein through CNN (Gilboa, 2002). In these instances, the media channels in question become tools for signalling and message exchange. Similarly, Entman found that leaders and their administrations use the media in order to transmit foreign policy frames to the general public (Entman, 2004).

The fifth assumption of the model is that MFA frameworks will alter throughout the progression of a crisis through adding and removing laminations. Communication studies

indicate that government framing does in fact alter as a crisis progresses. At the onset stage, governments may frame a crisis as infringing on national interest so as to gain media support, while during the de-escalation stage, governments are likely to frame their policies as successful to retain media and public support (Bloch-Elkon, 2007; Lee & Yang, 1996). It is fair to assume that MFAs will alter their social media frames in a similar manner.

The frame distance model further assumes that MFA frameworks will substantially differ from one another, thus enabling the measurement of frame distance. This assumption is supported by the very definition of a crisis as a turning point in the relationship between nations who perceive a credible threat to their interests (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Bell, 1971; Boin et al., 2013; Ramcharan, 2008). As such, each nation is likely to pursue a resolution that protects its own interest while preventing the adversary from making substantial gains. Thus, the prism through which each actor views the crisis will differ and, subsequently, so will its primary frameworks.

The sixth assumption states that the identification of crisis pressure points may help track a crisis's progression in near-real time and facilitate diplomatic mediation. The assumption that pressure points can be identified, and that their identification increases the efficacy of diplomatic mediation, is based on a series of studies that have explored crisis turning points (Druckman, D., Husbands, J. L., & Johnston, 1991; Druckman, 2001; Tomlin, 1989). Using past case studies, scholars have determined that identifying such points in real time may help diplomats achieve breakthroughs in negotiations.

Research Questions and Statements

It is important to note that this thesis takes an overtly positivist stance. In other words, the thesis assumes that there exists a truth in international politics that can be approached

through academic enquiry (Wendt, 1998). This positivist stance is manifest in the frame distance model, which views the nation state as a unitary rational actor that seeks to obtain specific goals to strengthen its strategic stance or protect its interests. Moreover, the model assumes that when a state believes that its interests are under threat, it will act to protect these interests. The frame distance model also ascribes agency to diplomats who use framing techniques to make sense of a crisis and to manage a crisis. Accordingly, MFA tweets are not simply a manifestation of diplomatic action but, rather, are part of a well-formulated communication strategy that aims to influence digital audiences.

Notably, this positivist approach is firmly rooted in framing theory, as well as the works of Goffman (1974) and Entman (1993), who view framing as an intentional act meant to influence people's understanding of events, actors, and the world around them. Moreover, this positivist approach aims to tackle one of the main limitations of framing literature: identifying the components that comprise primary frameworks and evaluating how actors' frames interact with one another. While Goffman has argued that actors' frames do interact with one another, he failed to articulate the elements that make up a primary framework. While Robert Entman has identified the components of frames, he has failed to demonstrate interactions between actors' frames. This thesis aims to employ a positivist approach in order to link these two theories.

However, this thesis does not assume a causal relationship between crises and MFA frameworks. As Wendt (1998) argued, the adoption of a positivist stance does not necessitate that one adopt causal theories or search for causal explanations. Rather, he may also adopt constitutive theories. Wendt lays the foundation for the use of constitutive theories by positivists when he describes the two stories that social scientists can adopt

when examining their subject matter. The first is the outsider's story that is used in the natural sciences, which 'Explains' the workings of nature and of humans through causal mechanisms and laws. The second is the insider's story, which 'Understands' what events mean in a sense that is distinct from laws of nature. The insider's story seeks to 'recover the individual and shared meaning that motivated actors to do what they did' (p. 102). While explaining is often associated with positivists, understanding is associated with post-positivists.

But Wendt rejected the view that explaining is adopted by positivists, who are subsequently engaged in a scientific endeavour, while post-positivists limit themselves to the non-scientific endeavour of understanding. Rather, Wendt argued that explaining and understanding characterise scientific work in both the natural and social sciences and that the two differ in the questions that they ask and in the objects they examine. Understanding rests on asking the question 'how are things in the world put together so that they have the properties they do?' If this question is asked in relation to objects in the social world (e.g. the state, international society) then one can only answer this question by engaging in an 'interpretive recovery of actors' private and shared beliefs' (p. 103). That is because objects in the social world are essentially ideas that exist in the minds of individuals. Yet, if this question is asked in relation to objects in the natural world, such as DNA, then one must examine their material structure and chemical building blocks. And so the hard distinction between positivism and explaining, and post-positivism and understanding begins to soften.

Wendt concluded that the distinction between understanding and explaining rests on the questions that they ask. Explainers ask causal questions while understanders ask constitutive questions. Importantly, Wendt also argued that non-casual inquiries can be

explanatory, a notion that is many times rebuked by positivists. The crux of Wendt's argument is that the distinction between explaining and understanding is not between explanation and description, but between explanations that answer two different types of questions - causal questions and constitutive questions (p. 104).

Causal explanations answer questions that take the forms of 'why?' and 'how?' When answering causal questions, one assumes a causal relationship between two variables that consists of three rules: 1) that X and Y exist independent of one another; 2) that X precedes Y in time; and 3) that but for X, Y would not have occurred. This relationship between the two variables is necessary as causal questions aim to explain changes in the state of variables or systems (p. 105).

Constitutive explanations do not examine how one variable effects another or how a system transitions from one state to another. Rather, constitutive questions offer a static 'snapshot' of a given system at a given time (p. 105). As such, constitutive questions do not assume a temporal relationship between two variables, nor do they necessitate that two variables exist independent of one another. Constitutive explanations account for the properties of things 'by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist' (ibid). The goal of such questions is to show how the properties of a system are constituted. Thus, constitutive questions take the form of 'what' or 'how possible'? What is central about Wendt's argument is that constitutive questions can also offer explanation and not mere description, in both the social and natural sciences. He concluded that constitutive theories provide explanations and, although these explanations are not causal, they are explanations all the same (ibid., p. 108).

The decision whether to peruse causal or constitutive explanations depends on the object under investigation. Constitutive questions examine an instance of a phenomenon rather than investigating how that phenomenon came about (ibid., p. 107). Moreover, they investigate the properties of a certain structure. When that structure is of a social kind, and if the structure rests on concepts and ideas, then one should ask constitutive questions. Finally, one should peruse a constitutive explanation when the properties of a social structure cannot exist independently of that structure. As Wendt argued, 'the factors constituting a Cold War do not exist apart from a Cold War, nor do they precede it in time; when they come into being, a Cold War comes into being with them, by definition and at the same time' (p. 106).

While this thesis adopts a positivist stance, it answers constitutive questions for four reasons. First, this thesis aims to examine an instance of a phenomenon - diplomats' use of social media framing during a given crisis. It does not examine how a crisis comes about or how social media framing becomes diplomatic practice. Second, crises are social objects that exist in the minds of diplomats and decision-makers. For a crisis to occur certain events need to be conceptualised as a crisis. As Boin et al., (2013) and Holsti (1989) argued, leaders come to regard events as crises when they are required to make quick decisions under conditions of uncertainty and when they are faced with a rapid succession of events. Crises also necessitate that diplomats and leaders perceive a credible threat to their nation's interests (Bell, 1971).

In addition, the relationship between the two variables examined in this thesis, crises and MFA frameworks, is not causal, but constitutive. MFA frameworks do not exist independently of a crisis. Rather, they come into being when a crisis comes into being. This

is because frameworks are used by diplomats to make sense of a crisis and manage a crisis. By framing events on social media, diplomats offer followers a prism through which rapidly changing circumstances may be understood. By doing so, diplomats begin to make sense of a crisis. Diplomats can also negatively frame adversaries on social media, thus limiting adversaries' range of possible actions and management of a crisis. Moreover, a crisis does not precede a framework in time. As events begin to unravel on the ground, an MFA's framework begins to emerge. Once events are conceptualised as a crisis by leaders and diplomats, MFA frameworks may also label events as a crisis. MFA frameworks and crises thus exist simultaneously and influence one another in a dynamic fashion. Subsequently, the relationship between this thesis's two variables does not meet the three conditions necessary for a causal relationship.

Lastly, the relationship between this thesis's two variables meets Wendt's falsification criteria (p. 106). Wendt states that answers to constitutive questions must 'support a counterfactual question of necessity' - that in the absence of a given structure, the properties of that structure would not exist. As was argued above, in the absence of a perceived crisis, an MFA's corresponding framework would not exist.

While constitutive theories and questions do not offer causal explanations, they too must meet falsification criteria. In this thesis, falsifiability is not about the crisis 'causing' framing or vice-versa, but about the framework explaining how the crisis is constituted by two parties. The following section introduces this thesis's research questions, statements, and falsifiability criteria.

This thesis focuses on framing's constitution of a crisis given that digital crisis management is now a competition over whose narrative, or framework, 'wins' the support

of digital publics (i.e. social media users, media organisations, the diplomatic milieu). Indeed, Manor and Crilley (2018b) have found that the coalition against ISIS uses social media to counter ISIS's online narrative of a successful caliphate and disrupt ISIS recruitment efforts. Similarly, the Lithuanian MFA is currently developing a new strategic narrative meant to counter Russia's digital framing of Lithuania as a 'failed state' (Manor, 2016).

This thesis conceptualises framing's constitution of a crisis in four stages. In the first stage of a crisis, MFAs author primary frameworks that consist of four elements (problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and suggested remedy). The stage of *frame development* sees MFAs disseminate their interpretation of a crisis, or framework, among digital publics to win support for their desired resolution to the crisis. This stage is soon followed by *frame disputes*, in which the interpretations that two MFAs offer online publics begin to differ substantially. This is the result of diplomats' differing views of the evolution of the crisis as each MFA seeks to protect its national interests. The *frame dispute* stage is manifest in changes to frame distance. The third stage is that of *frame adaptation*. In this stage, MFAs aim to integrate rapidly changing circumstances into their frameworks to avoid frame breaking and losing the battle of narratives. To this end, MFAs add and remove laminations to their frameworks. In the final stage of *frame action*, differences between MFA frameworks are used by third parties to map and identify intervention and prevention pressure points that may facilitate crisis containment or resolution. In this manner, MFA frameworks also constitute the possible solution to the crisis.

The broad question driving this thesis, therefore is: **How do MFAs use digital tools in times of crises, and how can the use of these tools inform strategies to manage crises?**

Notably, this guiding question entails an assumption regarding the relationship between online and offline diplomacy. It is expected that MFAs' use of online tools to manage an offline crisis will carry with it certain benefits such as augmenting diplomats' ability to track a crisis's progression in near-real time and identify offline pressure points in which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted or most likely to succeed.

To answer this guiding question, one must first understand how MFAs use digital diplomacy in times of crises. This is achieved through the first research question of this thesis. Next, one must understand the conditions necessary for the formation of crisis pressure points, which may help contain or resolve the crisis. This is achieved through the second and third research questions of the thesis. In other words, the first research question examines how MFAs use digital tools during crises, while the second and third research questions explore how the use of digital tools can inform the offline management of a crisis. To answer these three research questions, this thesis aims to validate four statements.

The first research question focuses on the frame development stage:

RQ1: How do MFAs use framing techniques on Twitter during a crisis?

It is hypothesised that during a crisis, MFAs will create real time primary frameworks through which a crisis may be interpreted. Moreover, it is hypothesised that primary frameworks will include a problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and suggested remedy and will thus answer the question, 'What is going on?' for Twitter users, media outlets, and the diplomatic milieu. Primary frameworks will thus be used by MFAs to garner public support for their nation's policies while promoting a desirable or favourable resolution to the crisis. In this way, primary frameworks will enable a nation to protect its

national interests which are under threat during a crisis. It is , however, possible that MFA frameworks will focus more on one dimension than the other. For instance, it is possible that MFAs will tend to highlight the suggested remedy to the crisis as opposed to its cause. Thus, this thesis's first statement is:

S1: In time of crisis, MFAs seek to maximise support for their position by articulating favourable frameworks of interpretation that are composed of a problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation and suggested remedy.

Falsification: S1 will be falsified if there is no divergence between the primary frameworks disseminated on Twitter by two opposing MFAs. In other words, S1 will be falsified if both MFAs offer similar problem definitions, causal attributions, moral evaluations, and suggested remedies, for in such an instance there is no disagreement between two MFAs and subsequently, no crisis between their two governments.

Importantly, S1 does not rely on external validation or that conflicted MFAs define a given situation as a 'crisis' for a crisis to exist. Indeed, conflicted MFAs may consciously choose not to use the term 'crisis' for several reasons. First, by referring to a situation as a crisis, MFAs may heighten tensions and contribute to the escalatory momentum of events. Second, MFAs may choose not to define a situation as a crisis to avoid increased scrutiny by other states, offers for mediation, and increased diplomatic activity in multilateral forums. Third, MFAs may only describe a situation as a crisis once it has reached the escalation stage. As Holsti (1989) stated, it is only when important events outpace one another, when disjointed information reaches leaders, and when multiple organisations become involved in monitoring events that leaders and diplomats perceive an event as a crisis. Subsequently, if one were to wait for diplomats to define a situation as a crisis, he would lose the

opportunity to intervene during the onset stage of a crisis when the differences between two parties are still relatively small. By implementing the frame distance model when disagreements between two countries first emerge, diplomats can track a crisis from its early stages, identify growth in frame distance, and intervene before the crisis reaches fever pitch.

The second research question examines whether or not the creation of primary frameworks is a dynamic process during which frameworks alter over time. As such, it examines the frame disputes and frame adaptation stages.

RQ2: Does the perceived severity of a crisis lead to a more dynamic use of Twitter?

A crisis, by nature, is characterised by a certain trajectory or escalatory momentum. During the onset stage of a crisis, events begin to unravel on the ground, posing a possible threat to a nation's interests. Soon, the crisis enters an escalatory thrust known as 'crisis slide' (Bell, 1971) in which events rapidly outpace one another, necessitating that leaders make swift decisions. Yet their ability to do so is confounded by limited and disjointed information, an atmosphere of confusion, and increased stress (Boin et al., 2013). Next, the crisis enters the escalation stage. It is in this stage that actors perceive a credible threat to their national interests and, subsequently, seek to secure their interests while preventing an adversary from doing the same. The escalation stage sees rising tensions between conflicted parties and an increased likelihood of military altercations. Finally, the crisis enters the de-escalation stage, during which conflicted parties begin to agree on a desired resolution to the crisis.

The frame distance model is predicated on the assumption that frame distances will alter as a crisis progresses. Between the onset and escalation stages, frame distance is

expected to grow as both actors seek to secure their interests and obtain a desired resolution to the crisis. Moreover, it is during the onset and escalation stages that nations perceive a credible threat to their interests. As such, the divergence between two MFAs' frameworks will grow as they each identify different problems, causes, and suggested remedies to the crisis. Conversely, frame distance is expected to narrow between the escalation and de-escalation stages as both nations begin to agree on a shared resolution while the perceived threat to national interests subsides. Thus, this thesis's second research statement is:

S2: Offline escalation is conducive to *divergence* between primary frameworks while offline de-escalation is conducive to *convergence* between primary frameworks.

Falsification: S2 will be falsified if there is no change to the frame distance once a crisis transitions from one stage to another. Under such conditions, the scope of disagreement between conflicted parties is static and there is no escalatory momentum, which is characteristic of crises.

As was the case with S1, S2 does not rely on external validation or conflicted MFAs describing a crisis as escalating or de-escalating. The reason is that conflicted MFAs may be unaware that a crisis is escalating or de-escalating. For instance, Bell (1971) described that after they erupt, crises enter a 'crisis slide' stage in which tensions steadily grow until they erupt violently, leading to a recognition by all that a crisis has emerged. In such a scenario, conflicted MFAs would be unaware that the crisis is slowly escalating towards a violent melting point. Similarly, conflicted MFAs may be unaware that a crisis is de-escalating as they focus on securing their interests, while neglecting to measure the scope of relative difference between their statements and those of their counterparts.

It is also hypothesised that MFAs will alter their frameworks to comment on rapidly changing circumstances in real time. This will be achieved by adding or removing laminations from primary frameworks, thereby adapting them to new circumstances while preventing frame breaking. Notably, a rapid succession of seismic events (e.g. collapse of government, fleeing of a president, troop movements) over a short period is one of the main characteristics of a crisis. However, it is unlikely that MFAs will comment on every event unfolding on the ground given the need to gather relevant information before commenting online, the sheer number of events unfolding simultaneously and the perceived importance of different events. While some events, such as troop movements, demand a response by MFAs, other events such as a low-level meeting between diplomats may go unmentioned. Moreover, commenting on every single event may confuse Twitter followers who are bombarded with a host of different problem definitions and suggested remedies. Thus, MFAs are expected to comment on those events that might have an impact on the crisis's progression and possible resolution. As such, this thesis's third research statement is:

S3: The adding and removing of laminations from primary frameworks reflects the perceived severity of the events unfolding on the ground.

Falsification: S3 will be falsified if MFAs do not add or remove laminations in response to events that are unfolding on the ground. Under such conditions, the events in question are not viewed as relevant or severe by MFAs and thus do not affect their national interests or contribute to the rapid escalation of the crisis.

Notably, S2 and S3 are intrinsically linked. It is expected that as events unfold on the ground, MFAs will comment on them by adding or removing laminations, leading to a

change in frame distance. Moreover, it is expected that certain stages will see greater use of social media for framing purposes. Such is the case with the escalation stage, which includes a rapid succession of events. This link between laminations, events, and the crisis stage will demonstrate that the frame distance model can be used to track a crisis's progression in near-real time and identify pressure points as they emerge.

The third and final research question aims to identify the conditions under which crisis pressure points may emerge. As such, it examines the frame action stage.

RQ3: How do Twitter framing techniques inform strategies for managing a crisis?

It is hypothesised that the emergence of prevention pressure points, in which short-term crisis containment is necessary, will be preceded by Upkeying. This is because Upkeying, or the adding of laminations, enables an MFA to comment on rapidly changing circumstances and adapt primary frameworks to new conditions while maintaining frame consistency and avoiding frame breaking. The more events unfold on the ground, the more acute a crisis may become as changing circumstances breed confusion, anxiety, and stress among decision-makers. It is also hypothesised that the emergence of intervention pressure points, in which long-term resolution of a crisis may be obtained, will be preceded by Downkeying or the removal of laminations. This is because MFAs can revert to their principle argument, or primary frameworks given a relative stalemate that emerges on the ground.

S4: Prevention pressure points are constituted once MFAs add laminations to primary frameworks while intervention pressure points are constituted once MFAs remove laminations.

Falsification: S4 will be falsified if the adding of laminations will not precede prevention pressure points or if the removing of laminations will not precede intervention pressure points. In such instances, pressure points emerge independently of Upkeying and Downkeying and the adding and removing laminations is not indicative of crisis escalation or de-escalation.

It is important to note that each of this thesis's research statements explores the relationship between online and offline diplomacy. The first statement assumes that MFAs use online platforms to rally offline support for their nations' policies and interests by interpreting a crisis. The second statement argues that offline escalation manifests itself in a growing divergence between two MFAs' online interpretations of a crisis. The third statement examines how important offline events lead MFAs to adapt their online interpretations of a crisis while the fourth assumes that online framework adaptation may be indicative of crisis escalation.

The Original Contributions of the Frame Distance Model

The frame distance model will contribute to three strands of academic literature. The first of these is the digital diplomacy research corpus. Despite the fact that digital diplomacy has attracted scholarly work for nearly a decade, few studies have attempted to offer a broad theoretical prism through which the utilisation of digital tools in diplomacy may be understood. The majority of digital diplomacy studies focus on *how* digital tools are used, as opposed to *why* they have been so warmly embraced by MFAs the world over. For instance, studies have explored how digital tools can be used in public diplomacy activities (Attias 2012; Khatib, Dutton & Thelwall, 2012; Metzgar, 2012; Pamment, 2012; Seo, 2013), nation

branding campaigns (Manor, 2016; Natarajan, 2014), diaspora engagement, and consular crisis management (Hocking & Melissen, 2015; Rana, 2013).

While these studies are all valuable, they do not capture the manner in which online and offline diplomacy complement one another, nor do they amply illustrate the influence digitalisation has had on the very nature of diplomacy. This thesis, and the frame distance model, will address this important gap. Imbued within the frame distance model is the assumption that digital tools such as social media are used to obtain specific offline goals - namely, rallying support for a country's policies, thereby creating the conditions necessary for an actor to obtain his foreign policy objectives. This is achieved by offering online publics interpretations of events and actors shaping their world.

In addition, the frame distance model suggests that MFAs are now online narrators who aim to influence people's understanding of the world around them. Yet unlike 20th-century diplomatic tools, MFAs must now wage framing competitions that take place in near-real time. An MFA's goal is thus not just to narrate an event, but to counter the narration offered by another actor. To do so, MFAs need to monitor one another's content, analyse one another's frames, and respond to one another's arguments. Thus, online diplomacy is both an independent diplomatic sphere, and a sphere that complements offline diplomacy.

Most importantly, the frame distance model suggests that MFA social media content has analytical value and that it may be utilised by both diplomatic scholars and practitioners. Within the frame distance model lies the assumption that tweets are not simple manifestations of offline diplomacy, but rather are indicators of a government's stance and

foreign policy objectives. As such, they may be used to assess the scope of disagreement between diplomatic actors and have analytical value.

Second, this thesis will contribute to the crisis diplomacy research corpus by developing a new model for understanding turning points during a crisis. Thus far, scholars have stipulated that crisis turning points may edge a crisis towards, or away from, a negotiated settlement (Druckman, 2001). Yet scholars have also suggested that they lack the ability to identify turning points and seize them to resolve a crisis. This thesis's theoretical model reconceptualises turning points as 'pressure points' in which diplomatic mediation may be most effective or warranted. Moreover, the model identifies the conditions necessary for the emergence of pressure points - namely, differences in MFAs' framing of events. This model is based on the conduct of digital diplomacy and thus takes into account the most recent development in the field of diplomacy: the utilisation of digital technologies towards the achievement of diplomatic goals.

The frame distance model also takes into account the increasingly complex media environment in which diplomacy is now practised. MFAs' use of social media for framing purposes stems not only from their desire to rally public support for their policies, but also from the need to compete over the attention of digital publics. This thesis builds on the emergence of a new and competitive framing arena to understand and map crisis pressure points.

By linking crisis pressure points with diplomats' real time framing of offline events, this thesis's theoretical model also enables the mapping of pressure points as they emerge. This form of real time tracking of a crisis's progression can help increase the efficacy of crisis management by tailoring interventions to the unique evolution of a given crisis. Scholarly

work suggests that while most diplomatic crises share certain features, each crisis is also unique and is influenced by a myriad of factors ranging from the identity of national leaders to the relative power of the states involved. As such, the manner in which a crisis may unfold, and the duration of crisis stages, may differ substantially. Thus, the timing of diplomatic interventions must be tailored to the specific characteristics of a given crisis.

From a theoretical perspective, the frame distance model contributes to scholarly work regarding the nature and frequency of crises. Some scholars have argued that ours is a crisis society (Constantinou, 2015; Ish-Shalom, 2015). Processes such as globalisation, the rise of networks, and the end of the Cold War have brought about a world that is both flat and stratified. Superpowers such as America exist, yet they cannot fully exercise their superpowers. Small actors, non-state actors, and transnational actors all challenge the nation state, which is looking to reassert itself in new ways. The transition from a unipolar to a heteropolar world is one that breeds confrontation. The growing ability of non-state actors to influence diplomatic processes further complicates the practice of diplomacy, resulting in crises becoming the new norm. Contemporary crises are also increasingly complex as multiple actors aim to obtain conflicting interests, either directly or through proxies.

It is against this backdrop of perpetual and complex crises that this thesis is developed as the frame distance model distinguishes between short-term containment of a crisis and long-term resolution of a crisis. By doing so, it recognises the fractal nature of crises, on the one hand, and the increasingly complex nature of 21st-century crises on the other, a complexity that often leads diplomats to settle for crisis containment and not resolution.

Third, this thesis contributes to scholars' understanding of the utilisation of digital technologies to manage diplomatic crises by situating diplomats' social media framing at the intersection between sociology and media studies. According to scholars such as Erving Goffman, framing is second nature to individuals as humans constantly strive to make sense of their surroundings in order to adopt the most appropriate behaviour. Frames are a tool for bringing order to a chaotic world that is constantly bombarding individuals with sensory information and emotional cues. Order is maintained by employing cognitive schemata, or frames, that make sense of one's surroundings, enable him to adopt the most fitting behaviour, and govern his interactions with others.

Yet media studies suggest that framing is more than an attempt to make sense of one's world. Rather, framing is an attempt to influence one's opinions. Media actors such as journalists and politicians consciously use frames to set the agenda for public debates, influence which issues will be debated by society, and influence people's perception of these issues. Media scholars have thus argued that framing 'bares the imprint of power' as its goal is to influence and not merely to communicate (Entman 1993, 2004).

Times of crises are accompanied by increased senses of confusion, anxiety, and disorientation, both among the public and policy-makers. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Americans held their breath while awaiting President Kennedy's televised address to the nation. It may thus be argued that at such times, frames may be most impactful as people increasingly strive to make sense of the world around them and bring order to a chaotic situation. Moreover, times of crises often see a temporary alliance between the media and policy-makers. As a crisis comes to infringe on a nation's interests, the media tend to 'rally support for the flag' and abstain from criticising the government and its policies. During

crises, the media even adopts and further disseminates the government's framing of events. As such, MFA framing during a crisis may be an especially powerful tool for crisis management. Given conditions of uncertainty, and in light of the media's support, MFAs can use framing to more effectively manage public expectations, rally support for their chosen policies, define their desired outcomes, and justify their possible use of force.

It is through social media and digital technologies that MFAs can disseminate these frames amongst the domestic population, foreign populations, and media channels, thus reaching a globally connected public sphere. The use of social media even enables MFAs to deliver specific frames to specific target audiences. Such was the case during the Gaza war of 2014, when the Hamas government attempted to target its frames to Israeli citizens and impact their support of the Israeli government's chosen policy - a ground invasion of Gaza. As such, the use of digital technologies during a crisis emerges as a powerful tool for crisis management, which can influence people's perception of events, and create a receptive environment for a government's policies, both at home and abroad.

Lastly, the frame distance model will serve as a theoretical link between the works of Goffman and contemporary IR scholarship. While Goffman's theories have already been employed in diplomacy and IR studies, the majority of the studies have focused on his theory of the presentation of the self and the state in everyday life, as noted earlier. Studies that have employed primary frameworks followed Goffman's own shortcoming in neglecting to identify the elements that comprise primary frameworks. As such, primary frameworks have remained black boxes. While framing scholars such as Entman have identified the elements of foreign policy frames, they have yet to demonstrate how the frames of several actors interact with one another.

This thesis will address these two gaps. The development of the frame distance model will entail the identification of the elements that comprise a primary framework and the manner in which actors' frameworks interact with one another. Thus, the frame distance model will offer a novel contribution to the framing and IR research corpuses.

Limitations of the Frame Distance Model

Finally, it is important to note three limitations of the frame distance model. The first of these deals with issue of reflexivity and the fact that during a crisis, nations may deliberately misrepresent their negotiating positions and interests. As Putnam's (1988) work suggests, leaders may portray themselves as being dragged into an agreement on the international level in an attempt to pacify domestic resistance to an agreement. Conversely, leaders can misrepresent the level of domestic support they enjoy in an attempt to extract concessions from their negotiating partners. Similarly, during times of crisis, nations may overstress the importance of one issue, and downplay another, all with the aim of obtaining leverage in future negotiations. Such activities could potentially impact the frame distance model's ability to identify pressure points and issues that may serve as entry points to negotiations.

Yet the frame distance model deals with this limitation by measuring the distance between two MFAs' frameworks throughout the duration of a crisis. As a crisis progresses, MFAs must respond to one another's arguments and frameworks. For instance, during the Crimean Crisis, the U.S. State Department had to respond to Russia's assertion that Ukrainian neo-Nazis had deposed the democratically elected government of Viktor Yanukovich. Similarly, Russia had to respond to the U.S.'s claim that it had invaded and occupied Crimea in defiance of international law. It is the interaction between MFA frameworks that enables the frame distance model to measure the relative scope of

disagreement between governments and identify crisis pressure points even if governments overstate their positions on a certain issue. Indeed, the model measures the subjective reading of a crisis by a state and not an objective one.

The second limitation of the frame distance model relates to the number of Tweets published by each MFA. The model relies on several rhetorical indicators to measure frame distance, including tweets summarising phone calls between leaders, tweets made following high-level meetings, and tweets comprised of leaders' statements. Should MFAs fail to publish a substantive amount of such tweets, the frame distance model may be unable to identify crisis pressure points. This limitation, however, is mitigated by the fact that the model also takes into account other rhetorical indicators, including the overall number of crisis-related tweets published during a given week and the sentiment of all crisis-related tweets. Moreover, while MFAs may not publish many tweets summarising leaders' statements, they are expected to publish tweets following high-level meetings as these target journalists and media institutions.

Third, the frame distance model requires that all tweets published by MFAs during a crisis be collected and analysed. Yet one's access to MFA tweets may be limited due to algorithmic filtering. It is possible that Twitter users in the UK and in France will see slightly different Twitter feeds when examining Russia's Twitter profile. Overcoming this limitation may be achieved in two ways: First, using external software that offers one access to all tweets published by an MFA. Such is the case with the TwimeMachine application used in this thesis. Moreover, one may access the same Twitter feeds using two different IP addresses to examine whether these feeds are in fact filtered by social media algorithms.

In conclusion, the frame distance model developed in the scope of this thesis proves a robust tool for analysing MFAs' use of digital tools during a crisis and evaluating how the use of these tools can inform strategies to manage the crisis. The following chapter details the methodology developed within the scope of this thesis to tests the applicability of the frame distance model.

Chapter II: Thesis Methodology

Introduction

This thesis seeks to answer the question- **How do MFAs use digital tools in times of crises, and how can the use of these tools inform strategies to manage crises?** To do so, the thesis developed an innovative frame distance model that assesses the scope of disagreement between two governments and extrapolates the possible trajectory of a crisis in near-real time. The frame distance model was then applied to two case studies: The Crimean Crisis of 2014 and the 2014 Gaza War.

These case studies were selected for three reasons. First, both case studies included actors that are avid users of social media. Indeed, the Israeli MFA was one the first foreign ministries to migrate online and is still regarded as a pioneer in the field of digital diplomacy (Kampf, Manor & Segev, 2015). In recent years, the Israeli MFA has established a formidable online presence while developing its own algorithms and using social networks to promote pro-Israeli messages (Manor, 2019). The U.S. State Department was also among the first ministries to establish a digital presence. Already in 2012 it was estimated that the State Department was managing a social media empire of 1,200 accounts (Hayden, 2012; Seib, 2012). The same is true of the Russian MFA that joined Twitter in 2011. Lastly, the Hamas government also warmly embraced social media using platforms such as Twitter to engage in conversations with foreign populations (Manor, 2019). It was thus assumed that all four actors were active on Twitter during the crises of 2014 providing the author with a rich research corpus.

Second, both crises were but fractals of larger feedback loops. Russia's ground incursion into Crimea was similar to its invasion of South Ossetia in August of 2008. In both cases, Russia

sought to manage its sphere of influence through limited military means. Similarly, the Gaza War of 2014 was but one in a chain of military altercations between Israel and Hamas since 2007. Fractal crises can only be resolved through long-term solutions that break feedback loops. The frame distance model was applied to fractal crises in order to test the model's ability to map pressure points in which long-term resolutions may be obtained.

Third, while both crises were but fractals in feedback loops, they also differed from one another in scope. The 2014 Gaza War was a high-intensity crisis which saw a direct military confrontation between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Hamas's military wing. During the War, both Israel and Hamas invaded one another's territory leading to a string of battles within the Gaza Strip and along Israel's southern border. These took a heavy toll on both sides. By contrast, the Crimean Crisis was a low-intensity crisis, which developed over the course of four months and did not see direct military confrontations between U.S. and Russian armed forces. Moreover, while Israel responded with military force to Hamas's actions, the U.S. responded to Russia's incursion into Crimea with financial sanctions. Lastly, while the Crimean Crisis pitted two states opposite one another, the Gaza War saw a crisis between a state and a quasi-state. Yet quasi-states are now as active as states on social media and they use social media to obtain legitimacy for their policies and recruit new netizens as evident from ISIS's use of digital platforms (Alfifi, Kaghazgaran, Caverlee & Morstaffer, 2018; Awan, 2017; Farwell, 2014). The difference between both case studies enabled the author to test the applicability of the frame distance model on both low-intensity and high-intensity crises, as well as crises between states and quasi-states.

This chapter introduces the methodology used to develop and apply the frame distance model. It begins by articulating this thesis's research questions and statements. Next, it details the sample used in both case studies and explains how primary frameworks and laminations were operationalized and identified. Finally, the chapter introduces the matrix used to calculate Integral Frame Distance Scores which assess the scope of relative disagreement between two governments.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

This thesis aimed to answer three research questions (RQ) and address four research statements (S). The first research question focused on how MFAs use Twitter to narrate a crisis for social media users (**RQ1: How do MFAs use framing techniques on Twitter during a crisis?**). It was hypothesised that during crises actors (i.e. MFAs, Hamas's military wing) will create primary frameworks through which they interpret a crisis and rally domestic and foreign support for their policies. By doing so, actors can promote their desired or favourable resolution to the crisis.

S1: In times of crisis, MFAs seek to maximise support for their position by articulating favourable frameworks of interpretation that are composed of a problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation and suggested remedy.

The second research question examined if the use of Twitter during a crisis is a dynamic process (**RQ2: Does the perceived severity of a crisis lead to a more dynamic use of Twitter?**). It was assumed that during the onset and escalation stages of a crisis, nations will view a credible threat to their interests. As such, the divergence between two actors' frameworks will

grow as each actor identifies a different problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation and suggested remedy. Conversely, during the de-escalation stage two actors' framework are expected to converge as they come to agree on a shared solution to the crisis.

S2: Offline escalation is conducive to *divergence* between primary frameworks while offline de-escalation is conducive to *convergence* between primary frameworks.

It was also hypothesised that actors will alter their frameworks to comment on rapidly changing circumstances in near-real time. This could be achieved by adding and removing laminations from primary frameworks. Yet it was also hypothesized that actors will comment on those events that might have an impact on the crisis's escalatory momentum.

S3: The adding and removing of laminations from primary frameworks reflects the perceived severity of the events unfolding on the ground.

The third and final research question aimed to identify the conditions under which crisis pressure points emerge. (**RQ3: How do Twitter framing techniques inform strategies for managing a crisis?**). It was hypothesised that the emergence of prevention pressure points would be preceded by the adding of laminations to MFA frameworks as these must comment on evolving circumstances. It was also hypothesised that the emergence of intervention pressure points would be preceded by the removal of laminations from MFA frameworks as a status quo takes hold on the ground.

S4: Prevention pressure points are constituted once MFAs add laminations to primary frameworks, while intervention pressure points are constituted once MFAs remove laminations.

Answering this thesis's three research questions was achieved by developing the frame distance model. To do so, this thesis employed an inductive and deductive approach to framing research, which is elucidated in the following section.

Sample

Testing the applicability of the frame distance model was achieved by analysing the use of Twitter by the Russian and U.S. MFAs during the Crimean Crisis of 2014, as well as Israel and Hamas during the Gaza War.

U.S.-Russia Case Study

Time Frame: The U.S.-Russia case study included tweets published between 4 December 2013 and 30 March 2014. This time frame was selected as it included the onset stage, the crisis slide stage, and the escalation stage of the Crimean Crisis. The first week of December 2013 denotes the onset of the Crisis as it saw thousands of pro-EU protesters flood Kiev's Independence Square demanding that the government sign an association agreement with the EU. That same week also saw the seizing of government buildings by protestors and violent clashes between protestors and security forces. The week of 24 March witnessed the final absorption of Crimea into the Russian Federation alongside financial sanctions imposed on Russia by the U.S. and its European allies, a UN resolution condemning the annexation of Crimea and Russia's exclusion from the G8 group of nations. This week was the last to be analysed as it signified the beginning of a diplomatic stalemate over the status of Crimea, which persists to this day.

Sample Size, Retrieving and Storing Strategy: The analysis of the U.S.-Russia case study included 510 tweets published by the Russian MFA and 260 tweets published by the U.S. State

Department, resulting in a sample of 761 tweets. All tweets were retrieved and stored by the author. Tweets published during December 2013 were gathered by the author, who visited both MFAs' Twitter accounts on a daily basis. During each visit, all tweets published over a 24-hour time period were stored by capturing screen images of the MFAs' Twitter feeds. This ensured that the author could review these tweets at a later time, even if they were deleted. Tweets published by both MFAs between 01 January and 30 March 2014 were also printed by the author to ensure that these tweets could be reviewed at a later time.

In addition, all tweets published by both MFAs between January and March of 2014 were stored electronically. Electronic storing was achieved using the TwimeMachine application, which enables one to access and store the 3,200 most recent tweets published by any Twitter account. Storing tweets electronically served two purposes. First, it enabled the author to extract the text and hyperlinks of all tweets and to convert this data into an Excel worksheet. This worksheet would then serve as the basis for the coding of all tweets. Second, the electronic storage of tweets helped ensure that the author had sampled the majority of tweets published by both MFAs, given that tweets gathered on daily visits may have been filtered through social media algorithms.

Methodological Issues: There a number of important notes to be made with regard to this case study's sample.

Other Social Media Platforms: This thesis relies on tweets published by the U.S. and Russian MFAs in order to identify the frameworks created by each ministry and to measure frame distances. Yet MFAs now operate profiles on a host of social media platforms including

Facebook, YouTube, and Medium. The question that follows is: can this thesis rely solely on tweets to identify MFA frameworks? Previous studies suggest that MFAs tend to duplicate social media content across their platforms. This often stems from limited resources as digital diplomacy departments are overburdened and understaffed (Hocking & Melissen, 2015). One study from 2015 found that the majority of the content published by 11 MFAs on Facebook was also published on Twitter (Kampf, Manor & Segev, 2015). These MFAs included those of Ethiopia, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Poland, Rwanda, Somalia, South Korea, the U.S. and the U.K. Duplication of content thus seems to be common practice among MFAs from different world regions and with varying levels of resources.

In order to ensure that the MFAs evaluated in this case study publish similar information on multiple social media platforms, this thesis examined all Crimea related Facebook posts published by the U.S. State Department during two time periods: 01-20 January 2014 and 03-24 March 2014. These two periods were selected as the author saved all posts published during these time-periods. During January and March of 2014 the State Department published 16 Facebook posts dealing with the Crimean Crisis. Of these, 15 were identical in terms of content to tweets published by the State Department. Thus, this analysis found that during the height of the Crimean Crisis the State Department duplicated content across its social media platforms and subsequently shared identical frameworks across social media platforms.

Sample Size of Each Country: There was a substantial gap between the number of Russian and U.S. tweets comprising this study's sample (510 Russian tweets compared to 260 U.S. tweets). This gap might lead one to conclude that the U.S. was less involved in the Crimean Crisis than Russia. However, an analysis conducted within the scope of this thesis found that the Russian

MFA is consistently more active on Twitter than the State Department. Three months in the years 2014-2017 were selected for comparison, yielding a total of 12 months. For those months selected, the approximate number of tweets published by each MFA was calculated. In each month evaluated, the Russian MFA published more tweets than the U.S. State Department. The relative difference ranged from 6% (January 2016) to 272% (March 2017). As can be seen in Table 2.1 (next page), the relative difference in February 2017 and March 2017 was far higher than that observed during the Crimean Crisis.

Table 2.1: Number of Tweets and Relative Difference in the Number of Tweets Published by the
U.S. and Russian MFAs

Time period	Approx. Number of Russian Tweets	Approx. Number of U.S. Tweets	Relative Difference (percentages)
August 2014	390	300	30%
September 2014	621	572	9%
October 2014	624	425	47%
January 2015	588	322	83%
February 2015	625	483	29%
March 2015	675	391	73%
January 2016	513	483	6%
February 2016	650	460	41%
March 2016	750	598	25%
January 2017	364	207	76%
February 2017	400	150	260%
March 2017	500	184	272%

Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria: Distinguishing between Russian digital diplomacy and Russian

digital disinformation: It is important to draw a distinction between Russian digital diplomacy and Russian digital disinformation. In recent years, Russia has turned digital disinformation into a tool for foreign interventions. Studies have found that Russia has employed fake news sites, trolls and bots in order to warp public opinion and subsequently impact political processes in foreign countries. While Russia originally limited its digital efforts to neighbouring states, since 2016 Russian disinformation was deployed during the U.S. elections, the Brexit referendum and the recent elections in Germany and France (NATO Stratcom, 2015, 2016; Pamment, Nothhaft, Agardh-Twetman, & Fjallhed, 2018).

This thesis limited its analysis and sample to Russian digital diplomacy channels, which are defined as social media accounts, operated by Russian diplomatic institutions. This is because the frame distance model rests on measuring the relative difference between two governments' stated interpretations of a crisis and their stated desired resolutions to that crisis. Thus, the thesis examined official diplomatic channels and statements. The thesis did not take into account statements and information disseminated covertly online by other Russian state organisations. Moreover, the thesis did not examine social media content spread by Russian trolls or fictitious accounts as these do not necessarily offer insight into Russia's interpretation of a crisis. Rather, bots and trolls are more likely to mask the Russian government's true intentions and positions given that the goal of Russian disinformation is to alter people's perception of reality either by contesting reality or by questioning the existence of an objective truth (Pamment et al., 2018). Tweets published by state run news agencies were analysed only

if they were re-tweeted by the Russian MFA. In such cases, the MFA officially endorses and approves the content in the aforementioned tweets.

This thesis also did not evaluate Russian digital propaganda, which is used by Russia to impact events in foreign countries by identifying discontent segments of society, highlighting contentious issues, using past events to stoke social tensions, sowing the seeds of discord, and driving wedges between social groups (Manor, 2019, p. 154; Pamment et al., 2018). Here again, Russia relies on covert means to alter people's perception of reality rather than offer official interpretations to world events and the actions of other state actors.

Gaza War Case Study:

Time Frame: Testing the applicability of the frame distance model was also achieved by analysing the use of Twitter by the Israeli MFA and Hamas's military wing during the 2014 Gaza War. Specifically, this case study included tweets published between 29 June and 29 August 2014. This time frame included the onset stage, the crisis slide stage, and the escalation stage of the Gaza War. June 29 saw the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers by Hamas terrorists. The abduction and murder of the teens led Israel to attack Hamas outposts following which Hamas began firing rockets and Israeli cities. It was thus the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers that served as the *casus belli* of the war. The Gaza War ended on 29 August as both sides agreed to honor a truce brokered by Egypt.

Sample Size, Retrieving and Storing Strategy: The sample of the Gaza War case study included 1,356 Tweets: 906 were published by the Israeli MFA and 450 were published by Hamas's military wing. All tweets were retrieved and stored electronically by the author during

September of 2014. Electronic storing was achieved using the TwimeMachine application. Next, all tweets were exported into an excel worksheet in which the coding and categorisation of tweets into frameworks would take place.

Notably, the tweets published by the Israeli MFA during the Gaza War may still be viewed online. The author could access these tweets using the data retrieved by the TwimeMachine application, which includes the content of tweets, their date of publication and a link to each tweet. This enabled the author to compare between Israeli tweets and Facebook posts published during the Gaza War and to ensure that tweets would suffice for the framework analysis. During August of 2014, the Israeli MFA published 14 posts dealing with the Gaza War. Of these, 12 duplicated content shared by the MFA on Twitter. Thus, MFA tweets were deemed sufficient in order to identify the frameworks employed by Israel during the war. However, the author could not access the tweets published by Hamas as Twitter suspended the military wing's channel. The author's data set of Hamas tweets, extracted using the TwimeMachine application, thus represents a unique archive, which includes all Hamas tweets published during the Gaza War.

Crisis Segmentation

U.S.-Russia Case Study: In order to test the applicability of the frame distance model, the Crimean Crisis was segmented into weekly time intervals. This reflected the need to compare the frameworks employed by each MFA and measure the distance, or difference, between these MFAs' respective frameworks. It was assumed that each week would provide a sizable

number of tweets given MFAs' need to frame unfolding events in Ukraine in real time and comment on rapidly changing circumstances.

In addition, the Crimean Crisis was further segmented into two stages: the onset stage and escalation stage. The week of 20 February was identified as denoting the beginning of the escalation stage given that this week saw the fleeing of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich, the appointment of an interim government in Ukraine, pro-Russian rallies in Eastern Ukraine, and clashes in Crimea between pro-Russian activists and government forces. Therefore, it was during this week that the Ukrainian Crisis, which centred on an EU association agreement, morphed into the Crimean Crisis, which centred on the future status of the Crimean peninsula. Notably, given the rapid development of events during the week of 20 February it was segmented into two sections: That of February 20-21 and February 22-27.

Gaza War Case Study: The Gaza War was also segmented into weekly intervals based on the assumption that each week would see the publication of a sizable amount of tweets. These could then be used to identify the frameworks employed by Israel and Hamas's military wing. In addition, the Gaza War was further segmented into two stages: onset and escalation. It was determined that Week 4 would denote the beginning of the escalation stage. This decision stemmed from the fact that Week 4 saw a dramatic escalation in tensions as Israel mounted a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip while Hamas terrorist infiltrated Israel using underground terror tunnels. It was thus during Week 4 that the Gaza War morphed from a limited Israeli military operation into a ground war between Israel and Hamas. Week 4 also saw an increase in the number of decision-makers who could influence the escalatory momentum of the crisis and who must decide which information to filter to superiors, ranging from unit commanders to

intelligence officers sifting through dozens of reports. This week therefore met Holsti's (1989) characterisation of the escalation stage. Once the war had been segmented into weekly intervals, all tweets published by both MFAs during a given week were analysed in order to identify primary frameworks.

Weekly Frame Distance Measurement

The frame distance model relies on a single, weekly measurement to assess the scope of disagreement between two governments and, by extension, the progression of a crisis toward escalation or de-escalation. The greater the scope of disagreement between two governments, the greater the likelihood of crisis escalation. Conversely, the smaller the scope of disagreement between two governments, the greater the likelihood of crisis de-escalation. This single weekly measurement, or Integral Frame Distance Score, is based on a multidimensional score composed of four factors.

The first factor is the distance between two actors' (e.g. MFA, Hamas government) frameworks. This distance is measured by comparing the four dimensions that comprise a framework: a problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and suggested remedy. The distance between two actors' frameworks can vary from 0%, if both agree on all four dimensions, to 100%, if both differ on all four dimensions. The second factor is the number of tweets published by each actor during a given week. The third factor consists of the positive or negative sentiment of rhetorical indicators, including tweets that describe phone calls between world leaders, statements made by diplomats following high-level meetings (i.e. foreign ministers), statements made during press conferences, and statements made by world leaders.

The fourth factor is the positive or negative sentiment of all tweets that cannot be classified as rhetorical indicators. These rhetorical indicators were selected given previous studies, which demonstrate that leaders and diplomats utilise the media, including social media, to narrate state action during crises, comment on rapidly changing events, and signal a willingness to de-escalate or escalate tensions (Gilboa, 2001, 2002; Hallams, 2010; Samuel-Azran, 2013; Seib, 2012; Yarchi, Samuel-Azran & Bar-David, 2017). The following section illustrates how the Integral Frame Distance Score was operationalised and measured in both the U.S.-Russia and Gaza War case studies.

Operationalising and Identifying MFA Frameworks

Scholarly research has differentiated between issue-specific frames and generic frames (de Vreese, 2005). Issue-specific frames deal with one topic or event, such as a war or the depiction of a minority on television (Downs, 2002; Edy & Meirick, 2007; Entman, 1991; Morey & Yaqin, 2011). Conversely, generic frames may be applied to a range of different topics and cultures (de Vreese, 2005; Neuman, Just & Crigler, 1992; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). While issue-specific frames offer great detail and in-depth analysis, they do not allow generalisation or comparison (de Vreese, 2005). Given that this thesis aimed to compare Russian and U.S. frames, as well as Israeli and Hamas frames, it employed generic frames by operationalising Entman's (1993) definition of a frame as consisting of four elements: a problem definition, a causal attribution, a moral evaluation, and a suggested remedy.

According to de Vreese, framing studies share little common ground as frames are defined and operationalised to meet the requirements of each individual study. Thus, there is a

lack of consensus on how to identify frames. One approach to framing research is inductive and refrains from using pre-defined frames (de Vreese, 2005). In the inductive approach, frames 'arise' from the text itself. In their critique of the inductive approach, Matthes and Kohring (2008) state that it is often difficult to understand how frames were actually extracted from the source material. Thus, researchers might end up finding the frames they were consciously or unconsciously looking for, thereby reducing the reliability of their findings (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). A second approach to framing research is the deductive approach, which investigates frames based on predefined criteria. In such studies, frames are coded in standard content analysis (ibid, 2008, p. 262). The main limitation of the deductive approach is that one must know which frames to look for (ibid).

Given the exploratory nature of this thesis, and the fact that few studies to date have analysed MFA framing on Twitter, it was decided to use a mixed-methods approach combining inductive and deductive framing methods. In the first stage of analysis, all tweets published during a crisis week were reviewed so as to detect tweets that identified the problem at the root of a crisis. Thus, a deductive approach to framing research was employed. Importantly, during most weeks of the crises, both actors offered more than one problem definition as they employed more than a single framework. Thus, there was a need to categorise all tweets based on the problem they addressed before classifying them as those offering causal attributions, moral evaluations, or suggested remedies. This categorisation was achieved by employing thematic analysis, which Braun and Clarke (2006) defined as a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting on patterns, or themes, within a given data corpus (ibid). In thematic analysis, themes arise from the research corpus itself.

The thematic analysis employed in this study followed the roadmap offered by Braun and Clarke (2006). Initially, all problem definitions tweets were used to create subject matter categories. For instance, during Week 6 of the Crimean Crisis, the Russian MFA identified three different problems driving events in Ukraine: a neo-Nazi coup in Kiev, infringements on the rights of Russian minorities, and Western meddling in the internal affairs of Ukraine. Each of these problem definitions was translated into a subject matter category. Next, half of all the tweets published during a given week were categorised based on their subject matter. For instance, all tweets focused on the rights of Russian minorities were grouped into the 'infringement of rights' category, while tweets dealing with the Ukrainian opposition were categorised under the 'neo-Nazi Coup' category. At times, the thematic analysis led to the identification of a new problem definition. For instance, during Week 7, it was discovered that several tweets focused on the role NATO should play in the Crimean Crisis. This led to the identification of an additional problem definition.

Next, all tweets published during a given week were categorised yet again into problem definition categories, thus ensuring the validity of the thematic analysis. Finally, all tweets within a problem definition category were classified as those offering causal attributions, moral evaluations, and suggested remedies (for example see tables 2.2 and 2.3 below). In this manner, the frameworks employed weekly by each actor were identified. Given that the subject matter categories in the thematic analysis arose from the research corpus itself, this stage employed an inductive approach to framing research.

The reliability of the thematic analysis used to operationalize and identify MFA primary frameworks rests on two foundations. First, during his Masters' thesis, the author employed thematic analysis in order to identify primary frameworks disseminated on Twitter by the US State Department. The author categorized State Department tweets into those that offer a problem definition, a moral evaluation, a causal interpretation and a suggested remedy. Two coders were trained and asked to categorize a sample of US tweets into the aforementioned four categories. Kappa calculations yielded values ranging from 0.65 to 0.8 indicating a high inter-coder reliability. In addition, the author has recently published an academic article identifying the primary frameworks used by the Israeli MFA during the Gaza War of 2014 (Manor & Crilley, 2018a). Two coders were trained in categorizing MFA tweets into those identifying a problem definition, moral evaluation, causal attribution and a suggested remedy. Here again, the Spearman coefficient of correlation was calculated and indicated a high inter-coder reliability. These previous studies serve to further validate this thesis' use of thematic analysis to operationalize and identify MFA frameworks.

Table 2.2: Examples of the Four Dimensions of Primary Frameworks (U.S.-Russia Case Study)

Framework Dimension	Example
Problem Definition	
Causal Attribution	
Moral Evaluation	
Suggested Remedy	

Table 2.3: Examples of the Four Dimensions of Primary Frameworks (Gaza War Case Study)

Framework Dimension	Example
Problem Definition	 Israel Foreign Min. (@IsraelMFA) Following This morning, IDF thwarted a #terror attack via tunnel from #Gaza bit.ly/1nzAbi8 #IsraelUnderFire 12:42 PM - 17 Jul 2014 37 Retweets 12 Likes
Causal Attribution	 Israel Foreign Min. (@IsraelMFA) Following The Hamas tunnel industry, targeted by the IDF, is used for terrorist attacks on Israeli territory bit.ly/1lECzV #Gaza 4:02 PM - 18 Jul 2014 30 Retweets 10 Likes
Moral Evaluation	 Israel Foreign Min. (@IsraelMFA) Following PM Netanyahu: "We chose to commence this operation after we had exhausted the other possibilities." #IsraelUnderFire #Gaza 6:44 PM - 18 Jul 2014 28 Retweets 11 Likes
Suggested Remedy	 Israel Foreign Min. (@IsraelMFA) Following IDF begins ground operation in #Gaza, targeting Hamas' #terror tunnels that enable terrorists to infiltrate Israel & carry out attacks. 11:01 PM - 17 Jul 2014 103 Retweets 36 Likes

Following the identification of actors' frameworks, the weekly frame distance between both frameworks was calculated by comparing the four dimensions comprising each framework. However, during several weeks, both actors employed more than one framework or lamination. The comparison between several frameworks was made possible by identifying those frameworks that corresponded with one another (i.e. that offer a similar problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, or suggested remedy). In such cases, the weekly comparison began with the actor that employed the smaller number of frameworks and laminations. For instance, during Week 5 of the Gaza War the Israeli MFA employed five primary frameworks, while Hamas's military wing employed only three. Thus, the measurement of frame distance during this week rested on comparing each Hamas framework with the five Israeli frameworks while attempting to find corresponding dimensions (e.g. similar problem definitions, causal attributions). Finally, an average frame distance was calculated.

Operationalising and Identifying MFA Laminations

Within the scope of the frame distance model, laminations are regarded as layers that enable actors to adjust their primary frameworks to new circumstances. By doing so, actors can comment on rapidly changing circumstances while avoiding frame breaking. As such, laminations assist actors in maintaining frame consistency and offering a coherent answer to the questions 'What is happening now?', 'What has happened before?', and 'What will happen next?' Laminations can also help third-party diplomats identify the core interest of each actor embroiled in a conflict. By adding and removing laminations, actors can preserve a primary framework over the course of several weeks. The greater the longevity of a framework, the

more it may represent an actor's core interest as each framework consists of a central argument made by a country.

Laminations were identified using an inductive approach to framing research. Specifically, laminations were identified when actors altered the dimensions of a primary framework while retaining the framework's central argument. For instance, during the first week of the Crimean Crisis, the Russian MFA argued that the problem driving events in Ukraine was violent altercations between security forces and a pro-EU opposition. The cause of the problem was the aggressive actions of the pro-EU opposition while the solution was internal Ukrainian dialogue and non-interference from outside parties. During the following week, the Russian MFA stated that the cause of the problem lay in the EU's attempt to pressure Ukraine into signing an association agreement. The cause of the problem was that the EU was forcing Ukraine to choose between associating itself with Russia or Western Europe while the solution lay in internal Ukrainian dialogue. These two Russian frameworks should not be viewed as separate. Rather, during the second week of the crisis, Russia identified the EU as the outside party that was meddling in internal Ukrainian affairs. Russia's focus on the EU may thus be seen as a lamination, or layer, that was added to its argument regarding non-interference. Indeed, all other dimensions of the framework remained the same with Russia calling for internal Ukrainian dialogue and urging outside parties to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine.

Similarly, throughout the first four week of the Crimean Crisis, the U.S. State Department argued that the problem driving tensions in Ukraine was the government's violent response to pro-EU protests. The cause of the problem lay in the Yanukovich government's decision to confront the opposition rather than engaging in mediation talks. The solution to the

problem called on the government to listen to the will of its people. Yet during Week 5 the State Department altered the dimensions of its framework following the deaths of 88 protestors in Kiev. Indeed, the U.S. argued that mob democracy had replaced deliberations in democratic institutions as a result of the government's crackdown on protestors. At its core the U.S. argument remained the same- government violence was causing an internal crisis in Ukraine. Yet the deaths of 88 protestors led the U.S. to add a lamination, which suggested that there was now a real threat to the stability of Ukrainian democracy. The U.S. thus added a layer to its framework and adapted it to changing circumstances.

The removal of laminations was also identified through an inductive approach to framing research. Specifically, the removal of laminations was identified once an actor reverted to an argument made in previous weeks. For instance, during the second week of the Gaza War the Israeli MFA introduced the 'Ground Invasion' framework. According to this framework, the problem leading to tensions with Hamas was its use of terror tunnels to infiltrate Israel. The cause of the problem lay in Hamas's desire to kill Israelis while the solution was a ground invasion of Gaza and the destruction of Hamas terror tunnels. During Week 6 of the war, the Israeli MFA added a lamination to this framework following the alleged kidnapping of an Israeli soldier by Hamas forces. This lamination stipulated that Israel would continue its ground operation in Gaza until the soldier was returned. However, by the following week this lamination was removed as it was discovered that Hamas had not kidnapped a soldier. The Israeli MFA thus reverted to its original argument stating that the ground invasion of Gaza was necessary in order to destroy Hamas terror tunnels, and not retrieve a captured soldier. The

MFA thus removed a lamination in order to update its frameworks and comment on unfolding events.

Sentiment Analysis

Following the calculation of weekly frame distances, all rhetorical indicators were coded based on their positive and negative sentiment. The sentiment analysis employed in this thesis followed five stages. In the first stage, the author identified all the rhetorical indicators published during the onset stage of each crisis (e.g. weeks 1-5 of the Crimean Crisis). Next, all rhetorical indicators were ranked on a scale ranging from 0-4, with 0 indicating a very positive sentiment, 2 indicating a neutral sentiment and 4 indicating a very negative sentiment (see examples in the following page). This enabled the author to create a codebook that included examples of tweets that received scores along the sentiment scale. Next, all rhetorical indicators published during the onset stage were scored yet again along the sentiment scale using the codebook. Each tweet's two scores were compared to ensure the validity of the sentiment measurement. In the following stage, all onset stage tweets that could not be categorized as rhetorical indicators were also scored on the sentiment scale. This offered a measurement of the general sentiment of all tweets published during a given crisis week. Table 2.4 below offers examples of tweets and their scores on the sentiment scale.

Table 2.4: Examples of Ranking Tweets on the Sentiment Scale (U.S.-Russia Case Study)

Sentiment Scale	Example
0 (Very Positive)	
1 (Positive)	
2 (Neutral)	

3 (Negative)	 Department of State ✓ @StateDept Follow ▼ . @JohnKerry on #Ukraine : #Russia made a choice. We believe it is the wrong choice. Russia must choose to de-escalate. 11:34 PM - 5 Mar 2014 172 Retweets 55 Likes   33  172  55 
4 (Very Negative)	 US Mission to the UN ✓ @USUN Follow ▼ . @AmbassadorPower after Security Council vote: "Today's vote is a reflection of what #Russia denies but the whole world knows." 7:31 PM - 15 Mar 2014 84 Retweets 34 Likes   8  84  34 

Lastly, all escalation stage tweets were ranked on the sentiment scale. To assess the inter-coder reliability of the sentiment ranking, two coders were trained and asked to rank the sentiment of 100 tweets (25 from each category: Press Conference, Phone Calls, Leaders' Statements, and After meetings). Next, the Spearman coefficient of correlation was calculated yielding a value of 0.7 and indicating a high inter-coder reliability.

A similar methodology was employed in the Gaza War case study. However, as the Gaza War's onset stage lasted only one week, all tweets published between Weeks 3 through 5 were categorised into rhetorical indicators and ranked on a sentiment scale ranging from 0 (very positive sentiment) to 4 (very negative sentiment). This led to the creation of a codebook of Israeli and Hamas tweets. Once the codebook had been created, it was used to score all tweets published between Week 3 and 5 yet again. The tweets' two scores were then compared to ensure the validity of the sentiment measurement. Next, all tweets that could not be

categorised into rhetorical indicators were ranked on the sentiment scale. Finally, all escalation stage tweets were also ranked from negative to very positive. Table 2.5 below offers examples of tweets and their scores on the sentiment scale.

Table 2.5: Examples of Ranking Tweets on the Sentiment Scale (Gaza War Case Study)

Sentiment Scale	Example
0 (Very Positive)	
1 (Positive)	
2 (Neutral)	

3 (Negative)	
4 (Very Negative)	

Notably, the sentiment scale employed in this thesis, ranging from very positive to neutral and very negative is based on the works of Agarwal et al., (2011) who analyzed the sentiment of more than 5,000 tweets. The stages of the sentiment analysis also rest on the roadmap offered by Pak and Paroubek (2010). However, while Pak and Paroubek (ibid) eventually used computer software to assess the sentiment of more than 300,000 tweets, in this thesis all sentiment analysis was conducted by a human researcher. This approach was employed for two reasons. First, few studies to date have analyzed the sentiment of MFA tweets, or have shown that computer software may be used to identify the sentiment of tweets published by diplomatic institutions. Second, the historical and cultural context of tweets necessitated that these be analyzed by a human researcher. For instance, in several tweets, the Hamas organization stated that it would lead the people of Gaza to a glorious death. This may

be viewed, at first, as a negative tweet. Yet this was actually a positive tweet as Hamas often promises to lead martyrs to their deaths in an attempt to galvanize support from Gazans for its altercations with Israel.

Calculation of Weekly Integral Frame Distance Scores

The weekly Integral Frame Distance Score was calculated using a matrix of calculation. Notably, all factors comprising the Integral Score were ranked on a scale ranging from 0 to 4. Frame distance measurements were simply converted from percentage scores (0% to 100%) to a scale of 0 to 4. The number of tweets published by each MFA was converted into a scale by using a sample of three months' Twitter activity. Between January and March 2014, the U.S. State Department was found to publish an average of 90 tweets per week, while the Russian MFA averaged 70 tweets per week. These were used to create a scale measurement for each MFA ranging from 0 (no tweets published) to 4 (average number of tweets per week published). The distribution of the weekly number of tweets was used to allocate scores between 0 and 4. For instance, weeks during which the U.S. State Department published 90 tweets scored 4, while weeks in which it did not publish any tweets scored 0. Lastly, both the Russian and U.S. MFA scores were averaged to offer a single measurement. Similarly, it was found that between January and March of 2014 the Israeli MFA published an average of 30 tweets per week while Hamas's military wing published an average of 12 tweets per week.

All sentiment analysis scores, which were already ranked on a scale from 0 to 4, were averaged for each actor, and then between both actors, in order to offer a single sentiment measurement. For instance, in Week 7 the average sentiment of Russian tweets summarising

phone calls between world leaders was 2, the American average was 2.36, and their combined average was 2.18. This process was repeated for each rhetorical indicator. Notably, tweets that merely described phone calls between leaders, without providing further detail, were scored as 1 given that direct contact between leaders may be viewed as a positive sign of crisis management.

Once all factors were scaled from 0 to 4, a matrix of calculation was used to estimate the weekly Integral Frame Distance Score (see table below). The score was calculated as a weighted average with half of the weight allocated to the measured distance between the two actors' frameworks (i.e. the frame distance) and the other half equally divided between the following factors: number of crisis-related tweets, sentiment of statements following high-level meetings, sentiment of press conference tweets, sentiment of leaders' statements, sentiment of phone calls between world leaders, and the sentiment of all crisis-related tweets that could not be categorised as rhetorical indicators. The relatively large weight allocated to the frame distance represents its major role in the frame distance model. The equal contributions of all other factors stem from a lack of prior supremacy of any one factor over the others. A sensitivity analysis was conducted with small changes in the weights allocated to each factor. The results of the integral frame distance calculation remained markedly similar.

In total, 761 tweets were analysed as part of the U.S.-Russia case study. Of these, 150 tweets were excluded from the frame distance analysis, as they could not be categorised into frameworks or rhetorical indicators. Such was the case with tweets that merely mentioned Crimea as one more issue addressed by high-ranking diplomats or tweets that included links to external materials, such as press briefings or white papers. Similarly, of the 906 tweets

published by the Israeli MFA, 82 were excluded as they could not be categorised into rhetorical indicators of frameworks. These included tweets that merely mentioned meetings between world leaders, tweets that included links to a timeline of the Gaza War and tweets honouring dead soldiers. Of the 450 tweets published by Hamas's military wing, 23 were excluded. These included tweets that publicised Hamas's email address and tweets in which Hamas apologised for not tweeting for several hours. However, the sentiment of all these tweets were integrated into the Integral Frame Distance Scores, as they were regarded as crisis-related tweets published by actors in a given week.

In addition, re-tweets were excluded from the analysis. Throughout both the Gaza War and the Crimean Crisis, MFAs often re-tweeted statements made by senior officials, diplomats stationed abroad, journalists and citizens. These were excluded from the analysis for two reasons. First, this thesis sought to evaluate whether MFA-authored content can offer insight into the possible trajectory of a crisis. Specifically, the thesis sought to demonstrate that tweets authored at the MFA level have analytical value. Thus, it was decided to focus solely on those tweets authored by MFAs or Hamas's military wing. Additionally, there were times in which MFAs re-tweeted statements that negated their framing of events. For instance, the Israeli MFA re-tweeted comments made by news pundits that were critical of the loss of life in Gaza. It is possible that the MFA used these tweets to demonstrate Israel's openness to public criticism thus highlighting Israel's status as a democracy and validating its depiction of Hamas as dictatorial Islamic caliphate. Yet the motive of the Israeli MFA could not be validated without interviewing Israeli diplomats. As such, it was decided not to analyze such re-tweets.

Similarly, all three MFAs evaluated in this study re-tweeted news stories whose headlines supported national frameworks. For instance, the Israeli MFA re-tweeted opinion pieces published in the New York Times or the Daily Telegraph lambasting Hamas for firing rockets at Israeli civilians. Yet here again the question of motive is imperative. While previous studies have found that MFAs frame information online to influence how journalists, foreign populations and the national citizenry interprets events, no study to date has evaluated why MFAs re-tweet news articles. As this thesis did not include interviews with diplomats it was decided to exclude re-tweets of news articles. In addition, MFAs' re-tweets of news articles only included the headlines of these articles. Measuring the sentiment of these news articles necessitated that the author visits external websites. However, this thesis focused solely on MFA tweets and did not include an analysis of any external links. This again led to the exclusion of re-tweets of news articles.

Finally, interactions between MFAs and Twitter users were also excluded from the analysis. These were excluded as MFAs merely referred Twitter users to MFA websites and external documents or listed email addresses to which Twitter users could email questions and queries (e.g., American citizens looking for consular aid in Ukraine). Given that these conversations did not offer insight into how MFAs interpret an escalating crisis, they were excluded from the analysis.

Notably, this thesis's methodology built on previous studies, which has extended the reach of framing research to Twitter and other social media platforms. Indeed, scholars have used tweets and quantitative analysis to examine how different actors frame similar events

(e.g. the Arab Spring protests) or how social media users frame political actors (Groshek & Al-Rawi, 2013; Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012; Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013).

Table 2.6: Example of Calculation of Weekly Integral Frame Distance Scores

Week	Frame Distance	Number of U.S. Tweets	Number of Russian Tweets	Average Sentiment of U.S. Tweets (0-4)	Average Sentiment of Russian Tweets (0-4)	Average Sentiment of U.S. Statements After Meetings (0-4)	Average Sentiment of Russian Statements After Meetings (0-4)	Average Sentiment U.S. Press Conference Tweets (0-4)	Average Sentiment Russian Press Conference Tweets (0-4)	Average Sentiment of U.S. Leaders' Statements (0-4)	Average Sentiment of Russian Leaders' Statements (0-4)	Average Sentiment of U.S. Phone Calls (0-4)	Average Sentiment of Russian Phone Calls (0-4)
7	75%, 100%	65	54	2.15	2.35	1.33	0	2.6	0	4	0	2.36	2
Scale from 0 to 4	3.5	4	3										
Total	3.5 * 0.5	(Average of 4 and 3) * 0.083		(Average of 2.15 and 2.35) * 0.083		(Average of 1.33 and 0) * 0.083		(Average of 2.6 and 0) * 0.083		(Average of 4 and 0) * 0.083		(Average of 2.36 and 2) * 0.083	
Integral Frame Distance Score	Frame Distance (3.5 * 0.5) + Sentiment and Number of Tweets (1.78*0.5) = 2.64												

Methodological Limitations

There are two important limitations to this thesis' methodology that warrant further elaboration. The first, is that the analysis of MFA tweets requires that one be familiar with a nation's history, its historical narratives and culture. For instance, throughout the Crimean Crisis, the Russian MFA alleged that the Interim-Ukrainian government was promoting Russo-phobic behavior including the desecration of monument to the Red Army's victory on Nazi Germany in WWII. These arguments may have been used to de-legitimize and discredit the new government established in Kiev following the fleeing of President Viktor Yanukovych. These Russian tweets may have especially resonated with Russian Twitter users or Russian minorities in Eastern Ukraine. This is because the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany is an important component of Russia's collective memory. Notably, only someone familiar with Russia's history would be able to deduce the meaning of these tweets and their possible use to de-legitimize the interim government.

Similarly, throughout the Gaza War, Hamas's military wing published tweets calling for martyrs in the war with Israel, while also promising to lead the people of Gaza to a glorious death. Someone unfamiliar with Hamas rhetoric may have deduced that these were very negative tweets. This would have led an unfamiliar coder to rate these tweets as highly negative, thus influencing the calculation of weekly Integral Frame Distance Scores. However, these were actually positive tweets from Hamas's perspective. Indeed, Hamas often promises to fight to a glorious death as a way of galvanizing support from its citizens and assuring them that Hamas will not stop fighting until all its conditions are met. In the case of the Gaza War,

Hamas vowed to fight on until Israel lifted its siege of the Gaza Strip. In this way, Hamas offered its citizens a positive vision of the future.

Both these examples demonstrate an important limitation of analyzing MFAs' tweets and assessing their sentiment as one must be familiar with national narratives, national history and national rhetoric. This limits the spectrum of nations that a scholar may investigate online, as well as that of the coders that he may employ. In this thesis, this limitation was addressed through the fact that the author has investigated the Russian MFAs' online activities in the past as well as the Russian MFAs' use of historical narratives (Manor, 2019). Likewise, the author lived for several years in the US and has lived through the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for more than 30 years.

A second methodological limitation stems from the fact that this thesis analyzed 140-character tweets. There is, of course, a limited amount of information that one may infer from a single tweet even if this tweet consists of a declaration of war or a statement by a national leader. However, it is important to note that this thesis rests on identifying primary frameworks which are an accumulation of numerous tweets. Additionally, as is evident in the results section, each component MFA's primary framework includes several tweets. For instance, during most weeks of the Crimean Crisis, the Russian MFA published a host of tweets that identified the same problem, or advocated the same solution to the Crisis (e.g. Crimea joining the Russian Federation). So while this thesis' unit of observation is an individual tweet, its unit of analysis is MFAs' primary frameworks. As was the case with the studies mentioned above, this thesis found that individual tweets could be analyzed in terms of negative or positive sentiment. Indeed, the majority of tweets analyzed in the thesis did not receive a neutral score.

Ethical Limitations

The first ethical limitation arises from the fact that the Hamas's Twitter account has been suspended as it often incites to hatred and violence against Israelis. The author was only able to analyze Hamas tweets as these were gathered during the 2014 Gaza War. The dilemma that follows is should such tweets be analyzed given that they are violent and can no longer be accessed by other scholars? Three considerations led the author to analyze these tweets. First, these are official statements made by a quasi-state whose government has been recognized by several foreign states. Moreover, this quasi-state has been recognized de-facto by Israel. Each cycle of violence between Israel and Hamas has been resolved through negotiations between both parties, while Israel has repeatedly stated that it views Hamas as responsible for all violence emanating from the Gaza Strip. In addition, these tweets were only removed as some states, including the US, have designated Hamas a terror organization. If this were not the case, Hamas' account may have remained active. This assertion rests on the fact that Iran's Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly used Twitter to call for the destruction of Israel yet his account has not been suspended as he is the Supreme Leader of Iran. Finally, this ethical issue comes to fore solely in the case of social media channels. Had the author analyzed Hamas's radio stations, or pamphlets distributed in Gaza or even text messages that it sends to Israelis during times of conflict, this issue would not arise. As such, it was decided to analyze Hamas tweets and include them in the thesis despite their violent nature.

A second ethical limitation stems from the fact that the author is an integral part of the Israeli-Gaza crisis. During the writing of this thesis, the author has repeatedly sought shelter from Hamas rockets fired at Tel Aviv. Moreover, the author was an active soldier in the Israeli

Defense Forces (IDF) and served in the Gaza Strip. Finally, the author is an Israeli citizen. All of these may have impacted the analysis of the Gaza case study. For instance, the author may have been more prone to take Israeli statements at face value and may have been less critical of Israeli narratives, while adopting the Israeli MFA's language including terms such as 'terrorists', 'terror tunnels' and 'human shields'. Second, the author may have been more critical of Hamas statements and even prone to give more examples of violent Hamas tweets, and less likely to give examples of violent Israeli Tweets. The author has also grown accustomed to representing the official stance of the Israeli government, being the son of an Israeli diplomat.

However, this limitation accompanies all scholars who try to critically evaluate their nation's activities during times of war. Like journalists, scholars also tend to 'rally around the flag' when their nation is at war or when their nation perceives a threat to its existence. This limitation was addressed in two ways. First, two coders were used to analyze the sentiment of Hamas tweets. While one of them was Israeli, the other was not. High inter-coder reliability suggests that the author was able to assess the positivity and negativity of Hamas tweets to a satisfactory degree. Additionally, the vast majority of Hamas tweets were integrated into primary frameworks. As such, the author's possible tendency to highlight Hamas's violent and offensive Tweets may have been mitigated.

Conclusion

The frame distance model developed in the scope of this thesis offers an innovative contribution to the fields of digital diplomacy and crisis management. By applying framing methodologies to the realm of digital diplomacy, the model offers scholars new means through which they can study the use of social media by states and quasi-states in times of crises. Moreover, by building on findings from media studies, the model demonstrates the analytical value of the abundance of information now shared by actors online ranging from summaries of leaders' phone calls to statements made during press conferences. The model can also help scholars examine the evolution of different kinds of crises including multi-lateral crises, regional ones and crises between proxies of states. Lastly, the frame distance model can help scholars identify and map the emergence of crises pressure points in which diplomatic mediation may be most likely to succeed.

Importantly, the frame distance model also extends the reach of crisis management studies to the new realm of social media. The model elucidates how states and quasi-states use social media to interpret crises for online audiences and how such interpretations can help manage the offline progression of a crisis. Here again, this thesis's linkage between online and offline diplomacy is made apparent. It is worth noting that the development of the frame distance is especially robust as it is based on the analysis of 2,117 tweets. The following chapter deals with application of the frame distance model to the Crimean Crisis of 2014.

Chapter III: The U.S.-Russia Case Study

Introduction

The demise of the Cold War and dissolution of the bipolar system was supposed to usher in an era of increased stability and security. The end of ideological confrontations between the west and east were meant to serve as the foundation for a single, global economic system rooted in private enterprise and headed by the United States. This hegemonic prophecy never fully materialised. From the perspective of 2019, it could be argued that the Cold War was followed by an era of global instability and insecurity. At present, the world is rife with conflict and war. In the Middle East, American and Israeli forces are preparing for a confrontation with those of Russia, Iran, and Syria, as well as their non-state clients. In Europe, political instability has become endemic following years of rapid migration and the rise of populist parties, not to mention the existential limbo of Brexit. Africa remains plagued by civil wars and terrorist incursions while in the Pacific, increased tensions in the Korean peninsula alongside China's territorial ambitions threaten to undermine a tense status quo. In all regions of the world, authoritarianism is in vogue while democratic institutions are in recession.

Yet most importantly, the post-Cold War world is one that is undermined by its greatest strength - that of global connectivity. It is a world in which money and information are in constant flux, where commodities and goods are not bound by the physical limitations of time and space, and where the crashing of a computer server in one country leads to the collapse of financial markets in another. It is also a world in which a crisis in one region immediately impacts crises in other regions and where subnational confrontations can lead to international conflicts.

In a connected yet unstable world, there is an urgent need for preventive diplomacy or ‘the use of diplomatic techniques to prevent disputes arising, prevent them from escalating and, if that fails, prevent armed conflict from spreading’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1996). However, the use of diplomacy to prevent disputes or crises from escalating and spreading has traditionally been hampered by the abilities of leaders and diplomats. This is because times of crises are characterised by high stress, a lack of information, misinformation, limited coordination between national actors, and a desire to obtain short-term solutions that often ignore the root cause of a crisis (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Bjola, 2016b; Boin et al., 2013; Garrison, 2001; McConnell & Drennan, 2006).

Cahill (1996) suggested that preventive diplomacy may benefit from a medical approach. In preventive medicine, one begins by searching for the fundamental cause of a disease as a means of stopping transmission (*ibid*, p. 7). When death does occur, it is followed by a rigorous post-mortem so that ‘the failures of the past become the building blocks of a better approach in the future’ (*ibid*, p. 5). The same should be true of diplomatic measures to stop a crisis from escalating. One must focus on identifying the cause of the crisis and search for a solution that addresses the root of the crisis.

Writing in 1996, Cahill stated that contemporary challenges to prosperity and security are greater than those at the end of WWII. These include the emergence of nonstate actors, the weakening of the sovereign nation state, and a new technological landscape that is fundamentally altering diplomacy. Yet Cahill also asserted that ‘the international community seems unable to rise to the challenge’ (*ibid*, p. 7). He therefore concluded that the notion of early detection, as well as early intervention, in crises should be as important to international relations as crisis management (*ibid*, p. 4).

However, early interventions in a crisis would require that diplomats be able to track a crisis's progression in real time and identify instances in which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted or most effective. This form of tailored intervention is one that has alluded institutions mandated with protecting global peace and security. As former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote, the UN is only able to intervene in a crisis once a crisis has been identified and once the UN has at its disposal information pertaining to the cause of the crisis and the possible remedies that may be applied (Boutros-Ghali, 1996).

Importantly, crisis management may now also take place in a new arena - that of social media. In recent years, MFAs have flocked to social media sites in a practice commonly referred to as 'digital diplomacy' (Bjola & Holmes, 2015). MFAs employ social media to narrate their nations' policies and create a receptive environment in which their policy goals may be obtained. The question that follows is, has the use of social media by diplomats also influenced the practice of crisis management? Or, more specifically, how does MFAs' use of digital diplomacy during times of crises affect the management of a crisis? It is this central question that this thesis aims to answer. To answer this question, the thesis develops and employs a model for tracking a crisis's progression in near-real time and identifying crisis pressure points in which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted or effective. This model is based on MFAs' Twitter activity during crises.

The frame distance model takes into account the new competitive and digital environment in which crises are presently managed and reconceptualises the notion of crisis 'turning points' as *pressure points* in which crises can either be contained as a short-term solution or resolved as a long-term solution. As the model is based on content shared by MFAs

on Twitter, it can also be used to identify areas of agreement between two parties that may serve as an entry point to diplomatic negotiations.

To examine the validity of the frame distance model, this specific chapter follows Cahill's logic of a postmortem as it explores whether the frame distance model could have been applied to the Crimean Crisis of 2014. Specifically, the chapter examines whether tweets published by the Russian MFA and U.S. State Department could have been used to measure the scope of disagreement between the American and Russian governments and, by extension, to identify crisis pressure points.

The remainder of the chapter consists of four parts. First, the chapter offers a justification for regarding the Crimean Crisis as one that pitted the U.S. against Russia. Next, the chapter offers a brief historical background of the Crimean Crisis. The following section includes the results of the frame distance analysis, while the final section consists of a comprehensive discussion that links this chapter with previous scholarly work.

Was the U.S. a Direct Party to the Crimean Crisis?

The thesis postulates that during crises, MFAs will create frameworks, or prisms, through which digital publics can make sense of a crisis. To test this assumption, this thesis examines the use of Twitter by the U.S. and Russian MFAs during the Crimean Crisis. Using this case study, however, necessitates that one first demonstrate that the U.S. was a direct party to the Crimean Crisis and that, subsequently, this was a crisis between Russia and the U.S. Unlike Russia, U.S. forces were not deployed on Ukrainian soil, nor did the U.S. engage militarily with Russian or Ukrainian forces. Even more importantly, according to the Russian MFA, the Crimean Crisis was the result

of the EU's insistence that Ukraine sign a new trade agreement. Thus, according to Russia the EU, and not the U.S., was a direct party to the Crisis.

Nevertheless, scholars have offered three arguments that demonstrate that the U.S. was in fact a direct party to the Crimean Crisis. First, William Burke-White (2014) asserted that the Crimean Crisis saw a direct challenge to the international legal order established by the U.S. and Europe following WWII. According to Burke-White, Russia took advantage of the tension between two legal principles: that of a people's right to self-determination, and that which prohibits territorial gains through the use of force (ibid, p. 1). Essentially, Russia used the principle of self-determination to legitimise its territorial gains and use of force. By doing so, Russia directly challenged the legal order promoted by the U.S. and ushered in a new era of legal fluidity in which global powers can reinterpret international law to suit their regional ambitions (ibid, p. 2). This legal challenge could not go unanswered by the U.S. and thus, the Crimean Crisis pitted U.S. interests against those of Russia (ibid, p. 9).

Second, Lawrence Freedman (2014) argued that the Crimean Crisis saw a direct challenge to NATO's regional ambitions. The annexation of Crimea, according to Freedman, stemmed from Russia's desire to establish a customs union that would counter EU integration policies in former Soviet states. Once the pro-Russian Yanukovich government collapsed, Russia decided to annex Crimea to draw new fault lines in Europe and prevent both the EU or NATO from undermining Russia's immediate sphere of influence. This challenge to NATO required a diplomatic response from the U.S. as the de facto leader of the alliance. Thus, U.S. officials held talks with eastern members of NATO throughout the Crisis. Following the Crisis, NATO also committed additional troops to its eastern flank. Freedman concluded that U.S. efforts during

and after Crimea were focused on preventing further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. As such, Freedman also viewed the Crimean Crisis as one that pitted the U.S. against Russia.

Third, Roy Allison (2014) maintained that Russia's initial goal in Ukraine was to create a Eurasian customs union that would address not only trade issues, but also security cooperation and the promotion of values such as conservatism, religion, and state authority to generate social stability (ibid, p. 1256). The fleeing of Viktor Yanukovych and the emergence of a pro-Western government in Kiev challenged Russia's regional hopes as well as its internal sense of stability. To counter this, Russia broke the norms of the international community and covertly took control of Crimea as a means of creating a buffer zone with NATO (ibid, p. 1267). This normative rule-breaking had dangerous implications for the U.S. as it could lead other nations to follow suit. As such, Russia's actions could shake the foundations of the existing world order managed by the U.S. and its Western allies and complicate the task of managing relations between states, be it in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. The Crimean Crisis thus necessitated U.S. action to exact a price from Russia and reinforce the Western world order. Moreover, a full-scale escalation of tensions in Ukraine could have led to the first proxy war since the end of the Cold War, as Crimean minorities backed by Russia would face the new Ukrainian government backed by the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. therefore intervened in the Crisis to prevent it from escalating any further (ibid, p. 1297).

Importantly, the U.S. did not merely support the new Ukrainian government by words but also through military assistance. By the end of 2014, the U.S. had allocated more than \$120 million in military assistance to the fledgling Ukrainian government and supplied it with military hardware (Pifer & Talbott, 2015). Thus, while U.S. soldiers did not engage in direct military combat on Ukrainian soil, the U.S. government directly backed one of the sides engaged in

armed conflict in Ukraine. It should also be noted that the EU did not offer direct military aid to Ukraine. Rather, certain European countries, including the UK, Poland, and Lithuania, independently took it upon themselves to train and advise Ukrainian soldiers (ECFOR, 2016).

A fourth argument demonstrating the U.S.'s direct role in the Crimean Crisis stems from the very definition of a crisis as a turning point in the relationship between nations (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Bell, 1971; Boin et al., 2013; Ramcharan, 2008). In his 2012 re-election campaign Barack Obama demonstrated his foreign policy achievements by referring to his ability to 'reset' relations with Moscow following four years of turbulent relations under George W. Bush. According to Stent (2012), the reset policy consisted of 'interest-based pragmatism and a restrained policy toward Russia's neighbors and toward Russia's internal politics'. U.S.-Russian relations did improve during Obama's first term as the two countries signed new nuclear accords, and agreed to impose tougher sanctions on Iran, while Russia also agreed not to sell advanced air-defense systems to Iran. Russia was also accepted to the WTO after 19 years of negotiations, with Washington's support (Stent, 2012).

Yet within two years, U.S.-Russian relations soured. Indeed, the relationship between the U.S. and Russia was substantially altered following the Crimean Crisis. This included the mutual expulsion of diplomats, the closing of diplomatic missions, the imposing of financial sanctions and, more recently, threats to abandon nuclear accords (Stent, 2012). As one BBC article from 2016 noted 'It is hard to imagine a period since the end of the Cold War, when relations between Russia and the United States have been quite so bad' (Marcus, 2016). Given that a crisis is a turning point in the relations between nations, and given that U.S.-Russia relations were dramatically altered following the Crimean Crisis, it can be argued that the Crimean Crisis was a crisis between Russia and the U.S.

Lastly, it should be mentioned that Russia denies that it was a direct party to the Crimean Crisis. According to the Kremlin, the conflict was between the interim Ukrainian government and separatist movements in Crimea. As the Russian MFA tweeted on 04 December, 2013, 'What's happening is Ukraine's internal affair. We don't understand (the) scale of opposition's aggressive actions'. On 14 February, 2014, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov stated that 'we aren't against collaboration between officials and opposition if they want. But we aren't going to insert ourselves as mediators' and 'We have always assumed that it is a sovereign right of each state to choose its course of development'. Similarly, in statements published during March of 2014 Lavrov stated that Russia was 'ready to continue the dialogue (with the U.S.) assuming it should be equal and honest without presenting Russia as a party to the conflict'. Thus, a nation need not declare itself a party to a crisis to take a direct role in that crisis.

Given the aforementioned arguments, this thesis examines the Crimean Crisis as one between Russia and the U.S. and explores both countries' use of Twitter during the Crisis's 12-week duration. The following section offers a brief historical overview of the Crimean Crisis.

Historical Background

According to Lawrence Freedman (2014), the roots of the Crimean Crisis were sewn at a 2009 summit in Prague in which the Eastern Partnership was announced. The Partnership sought to integrate additional Eastern European countries into the EU's financial sphere of influence - namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The goal of the Partnership was to build a 'common area of democracy, prosperity, stability and

increased interactions and exchanges' (ibid, p. 14) and countries willing to undergo financial reforms would be granted increased access to the EU Internal Market.

From its announcement, Russia viewed the Eastern Partnership initiative as an attempt to extend the EU's sphere of influence along its borders. Subsequently, in 2011, Russia announced its own initiative to establish a Customs Union with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, among others. Russia's vision was of a Customs Union that would ultimately take the form of an ultranational entity that would integrate legal systems and military capabilities, thus mirroring similar processes in the EU (Freedman, p. 15). Freedman argued that Ukraine was seen by Russia as an essential building block in the Customs Union. But during November of 2013, Ukraine was offered the opportunity to sign an Association Agreement with the EU that would include trade issues, thus preventing Ukraine from joining the Russian Customs Union.

So it was that in November of 2013 Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych was faced with two options: signing an EU Association Agreement and moving towards financial integration with the Eastern Partnership, or joining the Russian Customs Union. Yanukovych chose the latter, which sparked the Crimean Crisis (Allison, 2014; Faizullaev & Cornut, 2017; McMahon, 2014).

On 21 November 2013, president Yanukovych formally announced the abandonment of trade talks with the EU in favour of closer ties with Russia. On the same day, hundreds of Ukrainians gathered in Kiev's Independence Square to protest the president's decision. The following day, Yulia Tymoshenko, the jailed opposition leader, called on Ukrainians to protest against the government's plans to abandon talks with the EU. By 24 November, some 100,000 pro-EU protesters had gathered in Kiev only to be met by increased police violence and use of

tear gas (McMahon, 2014; Reuters, 2014). Support soon grew for the pro-EU protesters as images of police brutality circulated in the media and online platforms (Al Jazeera, 2014).

As Freedman (2014) wrote, the protests in Kiev were mishandled by president Yanukovych, who transitioned rapidly from carrots to sticks, from increased crackdowns on protesters to the promise of amnesty. On 20 November, the Ukrainian police attempted to storm Kiev's Independence Square and disperse protestors by force. They failed and by 1 December, some 350,000 protestors clashed with police forces as opposition leaders openly called for president Yanukovych to resign.

On the 04 December EU ministers and senior officials began visiting the protesters in Kiev's Independence Square while calling for mediated talks between the government and the opposition. The first round of talks between Yanukovych and the opposition, held on 13 December, resulted in a stalemate. Two days later 200,000 people protested in Kiev while Independence Square was transformed into a tent city (Reuters, 2014). On 17 December, Yanukovych met with Russian president Vladimir Putin, who agreed to purchase \$15 billion of Ukraine's debts and reduce the cost of gas supplied to Ukraine.

The Russian economic lifeline failed to impress pro-EU protesters and on 12 January, 50,000 of them marched in Kiev. Five days later, president Yanukovych signed a law banning protests against the government. The law was immediately condemned by the opposition and thousands of protestors gathered in defiance of the new legislation (Reuters, 2014). On 22 January, violence in Kiev escalated dramatically as three protestors were shot and killed. In response, the EU threatened to take measures against the Yanukovych government while the Ukrainian parliament quickly repealed the anti-protest law (Al Jazeera, 2014).

On 29 January, a new bill was passed in parliament promising amnesty to all protestors if they evacuated government buildings seized during the protests. By February 2014 the pressure on Ukrainian president Yanukovich had mounted significantly. Mass protests were still held throughout Kiev and the EU had denounced his use of force, while Russia suspended part of its \$15 billion aid package until Ukraine paid its gas bill. On 16 February the opposition ended its occupation of Kiev's City Hall, and in return 234 protestors were released from jail (Al Jazeera, 2014). Yet two days later, violence in the capital escalated as pro-EU protestors condemned parliament's inability to limit presidential power. Between 20 and 21 February, more than 100 people were killed in clashes with security forces. As chaos spread across the city, Russia accused the U.S. of plotting a coup in Ukraine and the EU of attempting to increase its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe (Allison, 2014).

21 February was perhaps the most crucial day of the Crimean Crisis. It began with an agreement mediated by the EU and signed between president Yanukovich and the opposition promising to end violence and promote constitutional reforms (Faizullaev & Cornut, 2017). Later in the day, however, the parliament voted to limit presidential powers and free jailed opposition leader Tymoshenko. As protests escalated in Kiev, president Yanukovich fled the capital and made his way to Russia.

Over the course of the following days the Ukrainian parliament assigned presidential powers to its speaker while Tymoshenko addressed a large crowd in Kiev. Yet on 23 February pro-Russian protestors assembled in Crimea to denounce the new government in Kiev. Although the U.S. warned Russia not to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine, on 27 February armed men in combat fatigues seized control of the Crimean parliament and hoisted Russia's flag on the building. On the following day, armed men took control of two airports in Crimea (Allison,

2014). On 1 March, the Russian parliament approved president Putin's request to use military power, if necessary, in Crimea (Reuters, 2014).

The White House soon warned that Russia would face political and economic isolation if it did not de-escalate tensions in Eastern Ukraine (Reuters, 2014). Nonetheless, on 02 March, Russian military convoys headed for Crimea while the Ukrainian prime minister accused Russia of declaring war on his country (Allison, 2014). The following day the Russian Black Sea Fleet demanded the surrender of the Ukrainian Navy in Sevastopol. Ukraine responded by calling up its reserve forces, while Secretary of State John Kerry condemned Russia's 'incredible act of aggression' (Reuters, 2014). On 03 March, Russia's ambassador to the UN held a letter from Ukrainian president Yanukovich formally asking Russia to use military force to restore order and peace to Ukraine (Allison, 2014).

President Putin publicly addressed the Crisis for the first time on 4 March, stating that Russia reserved the right to use military force to protect Russian minorities in Eastern Ukraine (Allison, 2014; McMahon, 2014). The same day, Putin ordered military units conducting war drills on the border with Crimea back to barracks, while U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited Kiev and announced that the U.S. was working on implementing sanctions against Russia. The following day the EU pledged 11 billion euros in support to Ukraine, while Russia stated that 'self-defence' forces operating in Crimea were not under its control (Allison, 2014).

06 March saw the Crimean parliament vote to join the Russian Federation, as did the City Council of Sevastopol. Crimea's pro-Russian leaders set the date of 16 March for a referendum on joining Russia. That same day, President Obama announced that the

referendum was a violation of international law, and ordered sanctions against those Russians responsible for the military intervention in Crimea (Reuters, 2014).

Between 11 March and 16 March, the Crimean Crisis ended with a diplomatic stalemate that persists to this day. On 12 March, President Obama met with the temporary president of Ukraine to exhibit U.S. support for the new government. Three days later the UN Security Council voted to condemn the Crimean referendum as illegal. Russia vetoed the motion. On 16 March, the Crimean Referendum ended with 95% of voters supporting the region's annexation into the Russian Federation (Faizullaev & Cornut, 2017). The next day, the U.S. and the EU froze assets and implemented visa bans on those involved in Crimea's separation from Ukraine. Despite this, Crimea was formally integrated into the Russian Federation on 18 March.

On 22 March, the remaining Ukrainian military installations in Crimea were seized by pro-Russian forces. Two days later, the Group of Seven (G7) nations met for the first time without Russia while Ukraine's acting president ordered all remaining troops to withdraw from Crimea.

Analysis of Crisis Primary Frameworks

The Onset Stage: December 2013 to February 2014

Week 1: 04 Dec - 12 Dec

December 2013 saw a rapid escalation in the tensions between pro-European protestors and the Ukrainian government headed by president Viktor Yanukovich. On 01 December, an estimated 300,000 people gathered to protest in Kiev's Independence Square demanding

that Ukraine sign an association agreement with the EU. During the protest, the City Hall building was seized by activists. As a tense stalemate gripped Ukraine, both the Russian MFA and the U.S. State Department took to Twitter to comment on unfolding events. These tweets comprise the first primary frameworks employed by both MFAs in relation to the violence that erupted in Ukraine.


According to the Russian primary framework, the Ukrainian stalemate was an internal issue that should be resolved by Ukrainian leaders in accordance with the Ukrainian constitution. The problems leading to the stalemate in Ukraine were violent altercations between the opposition and the security forces. The cause of the stalemate was the aggressive actions taken by the pro-EU opposition. The labelling of the opposition as 'aggressive' in nature also offered a moral evaluation as opposition activists were depicted as preventing a constitutional solution to the stalemate. The solution proposed by the Russian MFA was twofold. First, both the opposition and the Ukrainian government were urged to commence settlement talks and seek a constitutional solution to the stalemate. Second, outside parties were urged to refrain from meddling in an internal Ukrainian affair. For instance, on 04 December, the Russian MFA accused NATO of attempting to interfere in internal Ukrainian disputes. Notably, the Russian MFA stated that the area of Donetsk be included in Ukrainian settlement talks. This was the gun that would fire in the third act of the Crimean play. The table below offers examples of tweets comprising the Russian primary framework of 'No Outside Interference'.

Table 3.1: Russian Primary Frameworks - Week 1

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference	 			  

According to the U.S. State Department, the problem at the core of the Ukrainian stalemate was the government's violent response to pro-European protests. The cause of the stalemate was the Yanukovich government's decision to break into the opposition's offices, seize computers, and intimidate activists. The moral evaluation stated that such behaviour does not befit a democracy. This implied that the Ukrainian government should remain true to democratic values, including freedom of assembly and freedom of speech. Lastly, the U.S. State Department argued that the solution to the stalemate lay in the government's need to listen to the Ukrainian people who wanted to live in freedom and prosperity. Thus, the U.S. State Department also advocated for settlement talks between the opposition and the government. This solution was manifested by a U.S. diplomat handing out food to both police and protesters assembled in Kiev. The table below offers examples of tweets comprising the U.S. State Department's primary framework of 'Government Violence'.

Table 3.2: U.S. Primary Frameworks - Week 1

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Government Violence				

When comparing the two MFAs' primary frameworks, it is evident that both differed with regard to the cause of the stalemate as the Russian MFA focused on the 'aggressive' opposition, while the U.S. focused on the government's violent response to protests. Moreover, the MFAs differed in their moral evaluations, with Russia labelling the opposition as a barrier to settlement talks and the U.S. focusing on democratic values. However, both MFAs stated that the solution to the stalemate was direct talks between the government and the opposition. Moreover, both MFAs agreed that the violence, whether originating from the government or the opposition, was the instigator of internal tensions in Ukraine. As such, both MFAs agreed on the problem and the solution to the stalemate, leading to a **50% frame distance between their respective primary frameworks.**

Week 2: 12 Dec - 19 Dec



On 17 December, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced plans to purchase \$15 billion worth of Ukrainian government bonds and to reduce the cost of natural gas sold to Ukraine. These actions were framed by the Russian MFA as a response to the EU's attempt to influence internal events in Ukraine. According to the Russian MFA, the EU aimed to pressure Ukraine into signing an association agreement that was favoured by protesters in Kiev but rejected by the Yanukovich government. The EU's external pressure was thus framed as the problem leading to heightened tensions in Kiev.

However, this argument should not be viewed as an entirely new one. Rather, the focus on the EU can be regarded as a lamination, or a layer, added to Russia's argument in the previous week that external actors were attempting to meddle in the internal affairs of

Ukraine. As such, the Russian MFA adapted its original framework and focused on one specific external actor.

The cause of the upheaval in Kiev, according to the Russian MFA, was the EU's attempt to force Ukraine to choose between associating itself with the EU or with Russia, thus drawing artificial borders in Europe. A moral evaluation stated that the logic of peace should govern the actions of states rather than 'outdated methods' of geopolitical struggles. The Russian MFA thus depicted the EU's policy towards Ukraine as one of warmongering, while framing Russia's relationship with Ukraine as resting on the values of friendship and beneficial cooperation. The MFA may have thus attempted to create a moral dichotomy between Russian diplomacy, which was based on cooperation, and EU diplomacy, which rested on coercion. Finally, the Russian MFA offered two remedies to the violence in Ukraine. The first was to extend a loan to Ukraine and to offer it new trade agreements. The second was to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine and allow Ukrainian leaders to resolve their differences independently. Indeed, the MFA argued that Russia's diplomatic initiatives always rested on respecting other states' sovereignty. The table below offers examples of tweets comprising the Russian primary framework. New frameworks and laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 3.3: Russian Primary Frameworks - Week 2

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference Lamination: EU External Pressure				
				

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference Lamination: EU External Pressure (continues from previous page)				MFA Russia @mfa_russia Follow #Putin: Why did we make this decision to extend this loan to #Ukraine and to reduce gas price? eng.kremlin.ru/news/6425#sel=...  8:31 AM · 19 Dec 2013 MFA Russia @mfa_russia Follow #Putin: We believe in Ukraine. Our decision was therefore political, pragmatic and economic eng.kremlin.ru/news/6425#sel=...  10:54 AM · 19 Dec 2013 20 Retweets 9 Likes

During the week of 04 to 12 December, the U.S. State Department did not comment on events in Ukraine. It was therefore assumed that the U.S. State Department had not changed its framework and that it still argued that the cause of tensions in Ukraine was government violence, that such violence does not befit a democracy, and that the Ukrainian government should listen to its people. By contrast, the Russian MFA argued that the tensions in Kiev were the result of EU external pressure, which was caused by petty geopolitics, and that the solution to the stalemate was respecting nations' sovereignty. Thus, the two MFAs differed on all four dimensions of primary frameworks, resulting in a **frame distance of 100%**.



Week 3: 14 Jan - 1 Feb

The week of 14 January saw the Ukrainian parliament pass and repeal a controversial anti-protest bill. While the original bill sought to ban anti-government protests, it was soon replaced with new legislation promising amnesty to all protesters should they abandon seized government buildings. While these actions should have reduced hostilities in the capital, this week saw further escalation as gun smoke filled the air in Kiev, leaving three protestors dead from live ammunition. These deaths, coupled with the controversial anti-protest bill, brought about a series of violent clashes between protesters and security forces.

As was the case in previous weeks, the Russian MFA continued to employ its 'No Outside Interference' primary framework. On Twitter, the Russian MFA continued to argue that the problems instigating turmoil in Ukraine were the violent clashes between the


government and militants. The causes of the turmoil, however, were ‘inappropriate’ attempts by external actors to mediate between opposing sides in Ukraine. The solutions lay in financial aid offered by Russia, and respecting the sovereignty of countries while allowing them to determine their own fates. The latter should be understood as a moral evaluation suggesting that states should be free to exercise self-determination. An additional moral evaluation stated that equality and mutual respect should underline relations between countries. These arguments echo those of the first two weeks and demonstrate a certain consistency in Russia’s framing of events in Ukraine. Examples of tweets published during this week are included in the table below.

Table 3.4: Russian Primary Frameworks - Week 3

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference	 #Lavrov: Important not to interfere in situation in Ukraine en.itar-tass.com/russia/716253 #Ukraine @RusembUkraine Moscow urges West not to encourage Ukrainian militants a... Important not to interfere in situation in Ukraine, Lavrov said. tass.com 5:37 PM - 25 Jan 2014 29 Retweets 2 Likes	 Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov: Foreign mediation now totally inappropriate for Ukraine en.itar-tass.com/russia/716229 @RusembUkraine Ambassador: Foreign mediation now totally inappropriate f... Zurabov believes this situation is not inexplicable tass.com 5:34 PM - 25 Jan 2014 19 Retweets 1 Like	 #Lavrov: We are confident that equality and mutual respect should underlie relations with all countries, including the Eastern Partnership 2:56 PM - 21 Jan 2014 7 Retweets 3 Likes  #Lavrov: Respect for nations' right to determine their fate is fundamental in a modern world 2:56 PM - 21 Jan 2014 11 Retweets 4 Likes	 #Venizelos: Russian government decided to buy €15 billion in Ukrainian bonds, saving #Ukraine from a fiscal collapse gr2014.eu/news/press-rel ... 11:17 AM - 24 Jan 2014 12 Retweets 3 Likes  #Putin: #Russia ready to support #Ukraine, regardless of govt Putin: Russia ready to support Ukraine, regardless of govt ... Moscow is ready to support not the government of Ukraine, but the Ukrainian people, President Putin said, referring to Russia's loan to its neighboring state and its offer to reduce gas prices. rt.com 9:54 PM - 28 Jan 2014 14 Retweets 7 Likes  #Lavrov: Respect for nations' right to determine their fate is fundamental in a modern world 2:56 PM - 21 Jan 2014 11 Retweets 4 Likes

During the week of 14 January, the U.S. State Department also continued to employ its primary framework of 'Government Violence'. According to the State Department, the problem at the root of the Ukrainian upheaval was the government's violent response to protests. The cause of the upheaval was the anti-protest bill passed by the government and the government's unwillingness to listen to protesters who 'want to live freely in safe, prosperous country'. The moral evaluation was evident in the State Department's critique of Ukrainian legislation as undemocratic while the solution was direct talks between the government and the opposition. To this end, Secretary Kerry met with opposition leaders on the sidelines of a security conference in Munich. Examples of U.S. State Department tweets published during the third week are included in the table below.

Table 3.5: U.S. Primary Frameworks - Week 3

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Government Violence		  		

During the week of 14 January, both MFAs continued to employ primary frameworks first introduced in previous weeks while adapting them to changing circumstances, such as the deaths of pro-EU protesters and external attempts to mediate between the Ukrainian government and the opposition. Both MFAs differed with regard to the cause of the turmoil, with the U.S. focusing on undemocratic legislation and Russia on external attempts to mediate tensions in Ukraine. The MFAs also differed in their moral evaluations, with the U.S. advocating respect for democratic norms and Russia advocating respect for states' sovereignty. Lastly, the MFAs differed in their suggested remedies, as Russia offered financial aid and the U.S. pressed for direct talks between both sides. However, both agreed on the problem driving the turmoil- violent clashes between the government and the opposition. **Thus, the frame distance during the third week was 75%.**

Week 4: 01 Feb - 06 Feb

The first week of February saw continued clashes between protesters in Kiev and security forces. While violence spread out across the city, the Russian MFA argued that such clashes could not be resolved so long as the EU attempted to pressure and coerce the Ukrainian government into signing an association agreement. The MFA stated that such coercion demonstrated the West's lack of respect for Ukrainian sovereignty and its right to determine its own path. The Russian MFA thus argued that the root problem behind tensions in Kiev was the West's lack of respect for national sovereignty. This was also a moral evaluation that depicted the West as failing to respect basic principles of statehood. The cause of tensions was identified as EU pressure, while the solution was dialogue between Russia and Ukraine and respecting Ukraine's right to determine its future. Thus, the Russian MFA

reverted to the lamination it had employed during the second week of protests, one that identified the EU as the source of outside interference in Ukrainian affairs. Importantly, Russia employed new terminology during this week, which equated the EU with the West in general and suggested that the upheaval in Ukraine could see Europe returning to the fault lines of the Cold War. Tweets published as part of this lamination are included in the table below.

Table 3.6: Russian Primary Frameworks - Week 4

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference Lamination: EU External Pressure				

During the fourth week of protests, the U.S. State Department did not publish any tweets pertaining to Ukraine. Thus, it was assumed that the State Department still employed the 'Government Violence' primary framework, according to which the problem precipitating tensions in Ukraine was government violence, the cause was anti-democratic legislation, the moral evaluation advocated for upholding democratic norms, and the solution was direct talks between the opposing sides. By contrast, the Russian framework identified the problem and the moral evaluation as the West's disregard for state sovereignty, while the cause was EU external pressure, which could be counterbalanced by Russia's respectful dialogue with Ukraine. As both MFAs differed on all four dimensions of their primary frameworks, **the frame distance measured during this week was 100%.**

Week 5: 12 Feb - 19 Feb

The week of 12 February saw a rapid succession of events in Ukraine. Violent clashes between security forces and protestors left 18 dead and many more injured. These clashes erupted, in part, due to the parliament's inability to pass constitutional reforms and limit presidential powers. Consequently, activists seized government buildings as tensions between the government and the opposition reached fever pitch.

The rapid chain of events during this week was soon manifested on the Twitter account of the Russian MFA as it employed two different frameworks and one new lamination. During the first part of the week, the MFA continued to employ the 'EU External Pressure' lamination. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued, Ukraine was being told to choose between Russia and the EU in a process that defied the logic of peace in

Europe and disregarded Ukrainian sovereignty. Lavrov also employed the 'Western' terminology, alleging that Western news outlets were launching a media campaign against Russia, further aggravating the turmoil in Ukraine. The solution was therefore non-interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine and the adoption of a 'philosophy of cooperation', as Lavrov put it. However, the Minister added that dialogue and cooperation between the West and Russia could solve both the crisis in Ukraine and other security issues. One suggestion was to resolve tensions through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Notably, this week saw the first reference to events in Ukraine as a 'crisis'.

Yet as events in Kiev escalated, the Russian MFA introduced a new framework. According to this framework, the problem driving events in Ukraine was that street violence had replaced democracy. The cause of the crisis in Ukraine thus lay in the nature of the opposition, which was branded by the Russian MFA as ultranationalist. The MFA argued that ignoring the true nature of the opposition would risk further exacerbating the crisis. The moral evaluation rested on the depiction of the opposition as right-wing extremists and a manifestation of Ukrainian nationalist sentiments. The solution to the crisis lay in recognizing the true nature of the opposition and supporting the legitimate government of Ukraine headed by Viktor Yanukovich.

By the end of the week, the Russian MFA added a lamination, or layer, to the 'Opposition are Nationalists' framework, identifying the opposition as neo-Nazis and alleging that they were attempting to seize power in a *coup d'état*. Indeed, it is the association between the opposition and the Nazi regime that is the moral evaluation of this lamination, and it is a powerful one given that Russian opposition to the Nazi regime is an



integral part of Russia's collective memory. The suggested remedy was for the opposition to cease the bloodshed and resume dialogue with the government. Tweets comprising these frameworks and lamination are included in the table below. New laminations of frameworks are coloured in grey.

Table 3.7: Russian Primary Frameworks - Week 5

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference Lamination: EU External Pressure	   	  	  	   

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference Lamination: EU External Pressure (continues from previous page)				 MFA Russia @mfa_russia Following #Lavrov: It is time to carry out the @OSCE and @NATORussia decisions on establishing peace, security and stability in the #Euro-#Atlantic 12:00 pm · 13 Feb 2014 9 Retweets 6 Likes 9 6  MFA Russia @mfa_russia Following #Lavrov: We discussed the #Ukraine crisis. We believe the Ukrainians themselves should find a solution that will benefit their interests 12:14 pm · 14 Feb 2014 9 Retweets 2 Likes 9 2  MFA Russia @mfa_russia Following #Lavrov: From early on we said the choice belonged to Ukrainian people. We did not insist that they side with any party and let them decide 1:23 pm · 14 Feb 2014 7 Retweets 3 Likes 7 3

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists	 			

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Neo-Nazi Coup		  	 	 

Unlike the Russian MFA, the U.S. State Department did not introduce new frameworks or laminations during the week of 12 February. Rather, the State Department employed, yet again, the 'Government Violence' framework, which stated that the root problem in Ukraine was government violence, which would only lead to further chaos. The cause of heightened internal tensions was the president's inability to engage in dialogue with the opposition. The moral evaluation stated that Ukrainian divisions would not be healed by spilling more blood. The U.S. State Department called on the Ukrainian president and the government to resume dialogue with the opposition, de-escalate internal tensions, and seek a ceasefire between protesters and security forces. This week also saw the first Twitter statement by President Obama, who condemned the violence taking place in Ukraine. Examples of tweets published during this week are included in the table below.

Table 3.8: U.S. Primary Frameworks - Week 5

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Government Violence	 	 		 

Given that the Russian MFA employed two frameworks during this week ('No Outside Interference' and 'Opposition Are Nationalists'), two frame distances were measured. The distance between the 'No Outside Interference' and the U.S. State Department's framework **was 75%**, as both agreed that internal Ukrainian dialogue was necessary to diffuse internal tensions and solve the crisis in Ukraine. Conversely, the distance between the Russian MFA's 'Opposition Are Nationalists' framework and the U.S. State Department's framework of 'Government Violence' was **100%**. The final, or average, frame distance measured this week was thus **87.5%**.

Tracking Frame Distance - The Onset Stage

As noted earlier, the weekly Integral Frame Distance Score rests on four factors, including the distance between two MFAs' primary frameworks, the general sentiment of MFA tweets, the sentiment of rhetorical indicators, and the number of tweets published by each MFA. The matrix of calculation used to calculate the weekly Integral Frame Distance Scores of the onset stage of the Crimean Crisis is included in Table 3.9 below.

Table 3.9: Onset Stage Matrix of Calculation (Weighted Scores)

Week	Frame Distance ^a	Number of Tweets ^b	Positive/ Negative Sentiment ^b	Phone Calls ^b	Statements After Meetings ^b	Press Conferences ^b	Leaders' Statements ^b	Integral Frame Distance Score
1**	1	0	0.26	0.19	NS*	0.19	NS*	1.63
2	2	0	0.34	NS*	NS*	NS*	0.04	2.46
3	1.5	0	0.18	0.2	NS*	0.09	0.05	2.02
4	2	0	0.26	0.06	NS*	0.17	NS*	2.48
5	1.75	0.2	0.26	0.3	0.17	NS*	0.2	2.87

* NS=No Score

^a In calculating the weighted average - the frame distance score had a weight of 0.5

^b In calculating the weighted average- the score of all rhetorical indicators had an overall weight of 0.5 which was equally divided between all indicators.

** For explanation of the values in row 1 see the following page

The Integral Frame Distance Score, exhibited in table 3.9 above, rests on a calculation of frame distances and an analysis of the sentiment of rhetorical indicators. Weighted scales are used with half of the weight of the Integral Frame Distance Scores allocated to the frame distance and half distributed equally between all rhetorical indicators. Notably, this includes only those rhetorical indicators that received scores. In weeks where all six rhetorical indicators had scores, the weight allocated to each score was $0.5/6$. In week 1, there were no Statements After Meetings and no Leaders' Statements. Thus, each of the remaining four rhetorical indicators was allocated a weight of $0.5/4$, that is 0.125.

Frame Distance: The frame distance in week 1 was 50%. This was converted to 2 on a scale ranging from 0-4, and multiplied by 0.5.

Number of Tweets: The Russian MFA published 9 tweets in week 1, scoring 0 on a scale from 0-4. This indicates a below average number of tweets. Similarly, the US published 8 tweets also scoring 0. The two scores were averaged and multiplied by 0.125 yielding a result of 0.


Positive/Negative Sentiment: The average sentiment of Russian tweets during this week was 2.33, while the American average was 1.8. This two scores were averaged and multiplied by 0.125 yielding a result of 0.26.

Press Conference: The average sentiment of Russian press conference tweets was 2, while the American average was 1. This two scores were averaged and multiplied by 0.125, yielding a result of 0.19

Finally, all results were added yielding an Integral Frame Distance Score of 1.63.

As can be seen in Table 3.9, above, the weekly Integral Frame Distance Scores varied throughout the onset stage. The graph below illustrates this variability.

Graph 3.1: Integral Frame Distance Scores throughout the Onset Stage



As Graph 3.1 shows, there was steep increase in the Integral Frame Distance Scores between Weeks 1 and 2 of the Crimean Crisis. This is not a surprising finding given that the onset stage is, by definition, the moment in which a diplomatic crisis erupts. As Wood and Peake (1998) wrote, crises do not gradually build, but rather, tend to burst onto the scene. However, Graph 3.1 also illustrates that frame distances can vary throughout a particular crisis stage. Between Weeks 2 and 3, for instance, the Integral Frame Distance Scores narrowed from 2.46 to 2.02. Moreover, between Weeks 3 and 5, the Integral Frame Distance Score grew gradually, unlike the rapid growth between Weeks 1 and 2.

The frame distance measurements visualized in Graph 3.1 also enable one to identify crisis pressure points, or instances in which diplomatic mediation is most necessary or most

likely to succeed. Prevention pressure points are instances in which two governments grow further apart, possibly leading to crisis escalation. Thus, prevention points are instances in which diplomats may intervene with the goal of short-term crisis containment. The first prevention point during the onset stage was between Weeks 1 and Week 2. Additional prevention points can be identified between Weeks 3 and 4, and Weeks 4 and 5. In fact, these three weeks were characterized by a steady growth in Integral Frame Distance Scores, which is compatible with the escalatory momentum of a 'crisis slide' (Bell, 1971).

But Graph 3.1 also identifies an intervention pressure point in which diplomatic mediation may have been most likely to succeed in securing a long-term resolution to the crisis as the two governments grew closer together. Such is the case with the sharp decrease in Integral Frame Distance Scores between Weeks 2 and 3.


The identification of prevention and intervention pressure points in the onset stage of the Crimean Crisis suggests that the frame distance model may be used to track a crisis's progression in near-real time and tailor diplomatic interventions to the unique evolution of the crisis. Indeed, if the frame distance model was employed during December of 2013, diplomats could have realized that the Crimean Crisis was rapidly escalating between Weeks 3 and 5 given the surge in Integral Frame Distance Scores. This could have prompted an array of diplomatic containment measures ranging from discreetly engaging with both sides to holding emergency discussions at multilateral forums such as the UN or the OSCE. Similarly, diplomats using the frame distance model could have also realized that the U.S. and Russian governments were in partial agreement during Week 3, prompting them to seize this momentum and seek a permanent resolution to the crisis. This could have taken

the form of calling for direct talks between both sides, offering to host mediation talks, or offering mediation services either directly or through multilateral forums.

Importantly, given that the frame distance model is based on both qualitative and quantitative analysis, and as it analyses the Twitter content published by both MFAs, the model provides diplomats with insight into the respective stance of each government. This insight can be used as an entry point to negotiations. For instance, diplomats using the frame distance model to intervene during Week 3 would have known that the U.S. and Russian governments agreed that the problem underpinning the crisis in Ukraine was violent clashes between the government and the opposition. This could have served as an entry point to negotiations. Moreover, intervening diplomats would have known that, while Russia viewed the opposition as the cause of the crisis, the U.S. found fault with the pro-Russian government. Thus, diplomats could have anticipated which issues were likely to drive a wedge between the two parties in the negotiation room.

The graph below visualizes both the Integral Frame Distance Scores of the onset stage and its various crisis pressure points.

Graph 3.2: Crisis Pressure Points throughout the Onset Stage



Importantly, the frame distance model offers greater insight into a crisis's possible progression than the simple monitoring of events. For instance, Week 2 saw a tenuous stalemate between the opposition and the Ukrainian government. During this week, there were no significant clashes between protesters and security forces and the violence that gripped Kiev seemed to subside. This stalemate could have led diplomats to assume that the crisis had been averted, or was progressing towards de-escalation. However, as Graph 3.2 illustrates, the Integral Frame Distance Scores actually grew from 1.63 in Week 1 to 2.46 in Week 2. The reason for this growth was that the Russian MFA altered its causal attribution and suggested remedy by openly attacking the EU, and alleging that the EU was exerting pressure on the Ukrainian government and interfering in the domestic affairs of Ukraine.

Thus, the simple monitoring of events does not allow one to identify crisis pressure points and to tailor the diplomatic management of a crisis.

But Graph 3.2 also demonstrates that the frame distance model is not detached from events unfolding on the ground. This is due to the fact that the model is based on the real time framing of events by MFAs. Thus, the model indirectly accounts for the reality unfolding on the ground. For instance, there was a steady increase in Integral Frame Distance Scores between Weeks 3 and 5. This increase coincided with rapidly escalating events including mass protests in Kiev, the opposition seizing government offices throughout the capital, the parliament's inability to pass a reform bill, and the deaths of several protesters.

Notably, the matrix of calculations on page 149 demonstrates that the weekly Integral Frame Distance Score can differ from the distance between two primary frameworks. For instance, between Weeks 4 and 5 the distance between both MFAs' frameworks narrowed from 2 to 1.75. Yet, the Integral Frame Distance Score grew from 2.48 to 2.87. This was due to the increasingly negative sentiment of tweets published by both MFAs and the negative sentiment of phone calls between leaders. Had one relied simply on measuring the distance between MFA frameworks, one would have assumed that the disagreement between both governments had narrowed, thus failing to realize that the crisis was actually entering a crisis slide and that this was a prevention pressure point rather than an intervention point.

However, the opposite is also true. Merely relying on the sentiment of tweets and leaders' statements can also lead to faulty analysis. As Table 3.9 (see page 149) shows, the sentiment of Russian and U.S. tweets grew more positive between Weeks 3 and 4. Yet, the

distance between the MFAs' frameworks actually grew from 1.5 to 2. Relying solely on sentiment analysis might therefore also confuse intervention pressure points with prevention points or vice versa. The aforementioned results suggest that it is an integrated model, such as the one developed in this thesis, that can help diplomats use digital diplomacy content for crisis management.

Analysis of Crisis Primary Frameworks

The Escalation Stage: February 2014 to March 2014


Week 6 Part 1: 20 Feb - 21 Feb

February 20th and 21st saw tensions in Ukraine reach new heights as clashes between protesters and security forces left some 88 protesters dead and many more wounded. Footage originating from Kiev showed snipers shooting into large crowds of protesters. During these tense days, the Russian MFA continued to employ two laminations from previous weeks. The first lamination, added to the 'No Outside Interference' framework, suggested that tensions in Kiev were the result of EU pressure on the Ukrainian government to sign an association agreement or face Western sanctions. The Russian Ambassador to the UN went as far as claiming that the cause of the crisis in Ukraine was the EU's deliberate attempt to destabilize Ukraine, thus offering a clear moral evaluation of the EU's foreign policy. Moreover, the Russian MFA stated that EU pressure was a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. According to Russian tweets, the solution to the crisis was a policy of non-interference alongside cooperation between Russia and the EU.

The second lamination suggested that extremists, or neo-Nazis, were attempting to stage a *coup d'état* in Kiev. According to this lamination, the problem precipitating the crisis

in Ukraine was the opposition's refusal to abandon violence or honour previous agreements. In addition, the opposition was using violence to seize power in Ukraine. The only solution was to abandon violence, commence negotiations with the government, and peacefully resolve the crisis. Tweets comprising these frameworks may be seen in the table below.

Table 3.10: Russian Primary Frameworks - Week 6.1

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference Lamination: EU External Pressure	 3:04 PM - 20 Feb 2014 42 Retweets 9 Likes	 6:07 PM - 22 Feb 2014 54 Retweets 13 Likes  6:08 PM - 22 Feb 2014 54 Retweets 12 Likes	 6:07 PM - 22 Feb 2014 54 Retweets 13 Likes  6:08 PM - 22 Feb 2014 54 Retweets 12 Likes	 2:38 pm - 20 Feb 2014 14 Retweets 5 Likes  11:53 PM - 21 Feb 2014 38 Retweets 11 Likes


Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Neo-Nazi Coup	 V. Churkin: If those so-called dem. opposition come to power on the shoulders of thugs that will not produce democracy in Ukraine V. Churkin on Ukraine: the opposition didn't want to settle the situation in constitutional framework. They wanted to take power by force.	 	 	

By contrast, the U.S. State Department employed a new lamination on 20 February. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian turmoil, the U.S. State Department argued that the cause of the internal upheaval was the government's violent and undemocratic response to pro-EU protests. Yet, on 20 February, the State Department argued that the cause was no longer government violence, but rather, the emergence of street democracy, which had replaced debates in democratic institutions. The moral evaluation stipulated that the rights of people to protest must be respected by both the government and the security forces. The solution was direct negotiations between the protesters and the Ukrainian president.

At its core, the U.S. argument remained similar- government violence was causing an internal crisis in Ukraine. Yet, the bloody altercations in Kiev led the U.S. State Department to further suggest that there was now a direct threat to the stability of Ukrainian democracy as a whole. Thus, the U.S. State Department responded to unfolding events by adding a lamination to its original 'Government Violence' framework. This finding demonstrates how MFAs can use laminations to adapt a primary framework to unfolding events and practice real time social media framing.

The tweets comprising the 'Crisis of Democracy' lamination can be seen in the table below. New frameworks and laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 3.11: U.S. Primary Frameworks - Week 6.1

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Government Violence Lamination: Crisis of Democracy				

The U.S. lamination of 'Crisis of Democracy' best resonated with Russia's 'neo-Nazi Coup' lamination. While the Russian and U.S. laminations differed in their moral evaluations and the problem definitions, both MFAs agreed that the only solution was direct negotiations between the government and the opposition. Moreover, both MFAs agreed that the causes of the crisis in Ukraine were the emergence of street democracy and the rule of mobs. **Thus, the frame distance between the two MFAs was 50%.**

Week 6 Part 2: 22 Feb - 27 Feb

The eve of 21 February would serve as the harbinger of the Crimean spring. In the late hours of the day, Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich fled Kiev and made his way to Russia. The following day, opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko was released from prison and addressed a mass rally in the Ukrainian capital. On 23 February, the Ukrainian parliament assigned temporary presidential powers to the parliament's chairman, while a date was set for new presidential elections. Yet, on the same day, pro-Russian protesters held a rally in Crimea condemning the new administration in Kiev. On 25 February, a pro-Russian activist was appointed leader of the Sevastopol region as pro-Russian rallies continued throughout Crimea. On 26 February, clashes between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian protesters erupted in Crimea, thus setting the stage for future escalations in the region. It could be argued that these days saw the crisis in Ukraine morph into the Crimean Crisis.

During this week, the Russian MFA continued to employ laminations and frameworks introduced previously, while also introducing a new lamination. The first lamination employed by the MFA argued that Kiev was in the grips of a neo-Nazi coup. The problem

statement stipulated that extremists had seized control of Kiev and were refusing to acknowledge previous agreements such as the one signed on 21 February by the opposition and former president Yanukovich. The agreement stated that a national unity government would be formed, that new presidential elections would be held, and that the government would investigate the use of violence in suppressing protests in Kiev. The cause of the crisis was the opposition's continued use of violence to maintain power. The moral evaluation depicted the opposition as violent neo-Nazis who were attempting to rewrite history. The solution to the crisis was threefold: First, both the government and the opposition should honour the 21 February agreement. Second, both sides should agree on a set of constitutional reforms. Third, and most importantly, these constitutional reforms should then be put to a referendum that included the Eastern and Southern parts of Crimea and Sevastopol.


It was therefore in this week that Russia began to focus its attention on Eastern Ukraine. This was evident when the Russian MFA added a new lamination to the 'Opposition are Nationalists' framework. According to this lamination, the problem in Ukraine was that the nationalist government was infringing on the rights of Russian minorities in Eastern Ukraine. Examples of such infringements included the cancellation of Russian as a regional language in Eastern Ukraine and bills passed in the Ukrainian parliament that failed to recognise the rights of Russian minorities. The cause of the crisis was 'Russophobic' behaviour that included desecration of monuments for Russian military victories in WWII and a ban prohibiting Russian television companies from broadcasting in Ukraine. The moral evaluation stated that the nationalist government was violating the human rights of Russian minorities while the solutions to this 'outrage' were respect for the rights of Russian

minorities and avoiding religion-based conflicts in Ukraine. This new lamination demonstrates how MFAs can adapt their frameworks to create a receptive environment in which they may achieve their diplomatic goals. By stating that the crisis in Ukraine was an ethnic one, and portraying Russian minorities as being under threat, the Russian MFA may have attempted to set the stage for, and legitimised, its growing involvement in Crimea.


Lastly, the Russian MFA continued to employ the framework of 'No External Pressure', which argued that Western countries were attempting to influence internal events in Ukraine by forcing its government to choose between Russia and the West. This was due to the fact that Western countries were guided by unilateral geopolitical considerations. The solution was adopting a policy of non-interference given that previous Western mediations only exasperated the crisis.

The table below includes examples of tweets comprising Russian primary frameworks. New frameworks and laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 3.12: Russian Primary Frameworks - Week 6.2

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Neo-Nazi Coup				
				
				

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
(continues from previous page)				
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Rights of Russian Minorities	  		 	 

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference	 	 		  

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference (continues from previous page)				

Following the fleeing of president Yanukovych, and the appointment of a new interim president, the U.S. State Department introduced a new primary framework- that of 'Restoring Democracy'. According to this framework, the problem in Ukraine was that violence had replaced national dialogue. The causes of the crisis were a disregard for democratic institutions and reliance on violence, while the moral evaluation stated that the new government should enter into comprehensive dialogue with all internal actors based on the principle that the people of Ukraine be allowed to determine their own future. The solution, according to the U.S. State Department, included the formation of a broad technocratic government, setting a date for new elections and parliamentary efforts to stabilise the country as it emerged from weeks of internal violence. Notably, the U.S. State Department argued that the solution to the crisis would entail U.S.-Russian cooperation. Tweets comprising this new framework can be seen in the table below.

Table 3.13: U.S. Primary Frameworks - Week 6.2

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Restoring Democracy		 	 	  

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Restoring Democracy (continues from previous page)			Department of State @StateDept Deputy Secretary Burns: U.S. deeply admires courage, determination of the people of #Ukraine. go.usa.gov/Bu9G  8:00 PM - 26 Feb 2014 98 Retweets 42 Likes	Department of State @StateDept Votes taken today by elected Ukrainian representatives from all parties offer the best, most promising path forward. go.usa.gov/B6rF 11:48 PM - 23 Feb 2014 46 Retweets 23 Likes Department of State @StateDept .@JohnKerry told FM Lavrov that we hope Russia joins concerned countries to help #Ukraine emerge stronger, united. go.usa.gov/B6rF 12:13 AM - 24 Feb 2014 42 Retweets 19 Likes Department of State @StateDept Deputy Secretary Burns will discuss U.S. support for #Ukraine's efforts to secure a stable, democratic future. go.usa.gov/B6y3 7:17 PM - 24 Feb 2014 36 Retweets 12 Likes

It could be argued that week of 20 February marked the beginning of the escalation stage of the Crimean Crisis as events quickly outpaced each other. Within four days, the Ukrainian government was disbanded and its president fled the capital, a new president was appointed, and clashes erupted in Crimea while in Sevastopol, pro-Russian protesters were challenging the legitimacy of the new government in Kiev. These rapid changes were manifested in MFAs' employment of new frameworks and laminations. While the Russian MFA focused on depicting the nature of the Ukrainian opposition and the rights of Russian minorities, the U.S. State Department focused on the urgent need to stabilise Ukraine and restore faith in its democratic institutions. Each MFA identified a different problem, causal attribution, moral judgements, and suggested remedy. **Thus, the frame distance between both MFAs was 100%.**

Week 7: 27 Feb - 04 Mar

The week of 27 February to 04 March saw the initial disintegration of Ukraine's territorial integrity. On 27 February, armed pro-Kremlin activists seized government buildings in Crimea. Although the Ukrainian parliament vowed to prevent the country's dissolution, on 28 February, men in combat fatigues captured Simferopol International Airport alongside a military airfield in Sevastopol. When commenting on possible troop movements in Crimea, the Russian government stated that it was acting in accordance with previous agreements with Ukraine and safeguarding its naval fleet positions in the Crimean peninsula. On the first day of March, the Russian parliament officially approved a request by president Putin to use military force in Crimea. The following day, troop convoys began making their way to the capital of Crimea while in Kiev, the interim Ukrainian president stated that Russia had

declared war on his country. On 03 March, Russia's Black Fleet demanded the full surrender of all Ukrainian naval forces in Crimea while on 04 March, Vladimir Putin stated that Russia reserved the right to safeguard the lives of Russian minorities in Eastern Ukraine.

The rapid succession of events during this week was evident on the Russian MFA's Twitter feed, which included five different frameworks and laminations. As was the case during previous weeks, the Russian MFA continued to employ its 'No Outside Interference' framework, urging all actors to take a responsible approach and avoid the temptation to place geopolitical interests ahead of the interests of Ukraine. While the moral evaluation of this framework alleged that some nations put geopolitics ahead of the lives of Ukrainians, the solution to the crisis remained the implementation of the 21 February agreement and constitutional reforms.

Additionally, the Russian MFA introduced a new lamination to the 'No Outside Interference' frameworks- one which stated that NATO should not be involved in settling the Crimean Crisis. This lamination came in response to Poland's initiative to hold NATO consultations under Article 4, which is invoked when a NATO member feels its independence or security is threatened. The problem identified in this lamination was NATO's attempt to blame Russia for the military escalation in Crimea. The solution, according to this lamination, was NATO's exclusion from playing a substantive role in revolving tensions in Crimea given its Cold War mentality. This lamination demonstrates yet again how layers may be added to frameworks so as to comment on unfolding events and practice real time social media framing.

As was the case in previous weeks, the Russian MFA also invoked the 'Nationalists on the Rise', framework which focused on depicting the Ukrainian opposition as right-wing

nationalists. During this week, the Russian MFA employed three laminations of this framework. The first focused on the rights of Russian minorities in Eastern Ukraine which, according to the MFA, were violated by the extremist government. This lamination stated that the problem leading to the instability in Crimea was the debasement of Russian heritage in Eastern Ukraine. The cause was the extremist government's attempt to alter the status of Russian minorities in that region. The moral evaluations called for respecting human rights, while the solution was Russia's commitment to protect the lives of Russian minorities in the region.

Second, the Russian MFA also employed the 'neo-Nazi Coup' lamination, which compared the Ukrainian opposition to neo-Nazis and stated that they were the descendants of Ukrainian Nazi collaborators. This lamination stated that the problem fuelling tensions in Crimea was the extremist government's attempt to rewrite history while the cause of the crisis lay in the government's lack of regard for minorities' rights, a disregard that echoed that of the Nazi regime. The solution was exposing the true nature of the Ukrainian opposition and holding it responsible for crimes against minorities.


Lastly, the Russian MFA also introduced a new lamination to its 'Nationalists on the Rise' framework- one which portrayed events in Ukraine as a threat to Russian interests. The problem at the core of the Crimean Crisis was, according to this lamination, the disintegration of Ukrainian institutions and the breakdown of civil order. This lawlessness enabled the extremist government to threaten Russian military personnel and Russian military installations in Eastern Ukraine. The moral evaluation urged actors to disassociate themselves from the extremist opposition, as Russia had done. The solution was Russian

financial aid to Crimea and further attempts to resolve the Crisis through dialogue with the Ukrainian government.

The table below includes tweets comprising these frameworks and laminations. New laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 3.14: Russian Primary Frameworks - Week 7

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference	 			  

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference Lamination: No Role for NATO				
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Rights of Russian Minorities				 

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Neo-Nazi Coup	  	 	 	 

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Threat to Russian Interests				  

As was the case with the Russian MFA, the U.S. State Department also employed several frameworks and laminations during the week of 27 February. The first framework was that of 'Restoring Democracy' in Ukraine following the fleeing of president Yanukovych. The problem facing Ukraine, according to this framework, was the need to move beyond violence and strengthen its democratic institutions. The cause of this problem was the scope of violence endured by Ukrainians during the clashes between protesters and security forces. The moral evaluation and suggested remedy were similar- enabling the Ukrainian people to determine their own fates in accordance with democratic principles.

During the second part of the week, and following Russia's covert and overt actions in Crimea, the U.S. State Department also introduced a new framework. This framework, titled 'Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity', argued that the territorial integrity of Ukraine must be respected. According to this framework, the problem at the root of the Crimean Crisis was now Russia's incursions into Eastern Ukraine. The cause of the Crisis was Russia's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, while the moral evaluation stated that Russia's military actions risked further aggravating the Crisis. The solution to the Crisis was threefold: First, the U.S. called on Russia to de-escalate tensions and withdraw all troops from Eastern Ukraine. Second, the U.S. warned that there would be costs to Russia's incursion into Crimea. Third, the U.S. would consult with all its allies in order to seek a joint approach for dealing with Russia's military actions.

By the end of the week, the U.S. had introduced a new lamination to the 'Respect for Territorial Integrity of Ukraine' framework. According to this lamination, Russia had violated international law by invading and occupying Eastern Ukraine. Thus, the U.S. State Department now depicted Russia's actions as a full-scale occupation of Eastern Ukraine

rather than a mere military incursion. The problem at the root of the Crimean Crisis was identified as Russia's brazen act of military aggression. The cause of the crisis was Russian de facto occupation of Crimea. The moral evaluation stipulated that Russia had reverted to 19th-century tactics of statecraft that were based on force rather than diplomacy. The solution, according to this lamination, was the international isolation of Russia should it refuse to withdraw from Ukraine. This isolation was manifested at the end of the week when the G8 group of nations became the G7, following Russia's expulsion.




Examples of tweets comprising these frameworks and laminations may be seen in the table below. New laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 3.15: U.S. Primary Frameworks - Week 7

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Restoring Democracy	John Kerry @JohnKerry Incredibly moving visit to Shrine of the Fallen. Courageous, proud people. We stand w/ Ukrainians for self-determination  6:53 PM - 4 Mar 2014 767 Retweets 378 Likes	Department of State @StateDept The U.S. stands with #Ukraine. Deputy Secretary Burns honored the memory of the victims of #Maidan in Kyiv. go.usa.gov/BJFw 9:41 AM - 27 Feb 2014 83 Retweets 28 Likes	Samantha Power @AmbPower44 The U.S. stands with the people of #Ukraine in determining their own destiny, their own government, and their own future. 1:09 AM - 1 Mar 2014 298 Retweets 124 Likes	Samantha Power @AmbPower44 The U.S. stands with the people of #Ukraine in determining their own destiny, their own government, and their own future. 1:09 AM - 1 Mar 2014 298 Retweets 124 Likes

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity				
				
				
				

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity (continues from previous page)				 

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity Lamination: Russian Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine	  	 	 	   

Given the plurality of frameworks and laminations used by both MFAs during the week of 27 February, two frame distances were calculated. The distance between the U.S. State Department's 'Restoring Democracy' framework and the Russian 'No Outside Interference' **framework was 75%** as both agreed that the solution to the crisis was an internal one that was based on inter-Ukrainian dialogue. While the Russian MFA stated that this dialogue should be based on the 21 February agreement, the U.S. State Department stated that the dialogue should rest on a recommitment to democratic processes. However, **there was a 100% frame distance** between the U.S. State Department's 'Respect for Territorial Integrity' framework and Russia's laminations focusing on NATO's possible role in crisis, a neo-Nazi coup, the rights of Russian ethnic minorities, and threats to Russia's interests in Crimea. **The final, or average, frame distance measured during this week was 87.5%.**

Week 8: 05 Mar - 11 Mar

The week of 05 March 2014 saw the final disintegration of Ukrainian territorial integrity. On 06 March, Crimea's parliament voted unanimously in favour of joining the Russian Federation. Within hours, a similar declaration was made by the city council of Sevastopol. In response to these events, on 11 March, the EU proposed a trade package to Ukraine with the aim of supporting its failing economy. On the same day, the Crimean regional parliament adopted a Declaration of Independence.

During this week, the Russian MFA employed three frameworks and laminations- all of which were first introduced in previous weeks. The first framework was that of 'No

Outside Interference'. Once again, the Russian MFA argued that the problem at the core of the Crimean Crisis was the EU's attempt to meddle in the internal affairs of Ukraine. Moreover, the EU was accused of using double standards when interpreting Ukrainian constitutional law as a means of discrediting the rights of Crimean regions. The moral evaluation stated that the Crimean Declaration of Independence was in accordance with international law and similar to that of Kosovo. By implication, the Russian MFA also argued that the EU was violating international law by attempting to prevent Crimean independence. The solution to the crisis was recognising Crimea's independence.

Additionally, the Russian MFA continued to highlight the risk posed to Russian ethnic minorities by ultranationalists operating in Kiev. According to this lamination, the cause of the Crimean Crisis was that the interim Ukrainian government was whitewashing the crimes of ultranationalists and failing to safeguard the lives of all ethnic minorities in Eastern Ukraine. Russia further argued that the actions of the nationalists were neither civilised nor democratic, thus offering a moral evaluation. The solution, according to the Russian MFA, was to respect the rights of minorities in accordance with UN human rights' resolutions and for Western countries to recognise the true nature of the opposition.

Lastly, the Russian MFA continued to portray events in Kiev as a neo-Nazi coup. The cause of the crisis was thus the takeover of Ukraine by armed extremists who roamed its streets and who failed to adhere to the Ukrainian constitution. The moral evaluation was evident in Russia's claim that it was open to fair, honest, and equal dialogue with foreign partners as a means of overcoming the crisis. The solutions to the crisis were Ukrainian national dialogue, a national unity government, and adherence to the 21 February agreement. The national unity government would, of course, not include Crimea, which was

recognised by Russia as independent. In addition, Russia demanded that other states recognise the coup in Ukraine as illegal. The table below includes tweets comprising these frameworks and laminations.

Table 3.16: Russian Primary Frameworks - Week 8

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference				

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Rights of Russian Minorities	 MFA Russia @mfa_russia Following Actions of Ukrainian border guards against Russian citizens hindering bilateral agreements  TASS @tass 10:26 PM · 6 Mar 2014 Actions of Ukrainian border guards against Russian citizens hindering bilateral agreements 35 Retweets 8 Likes  RussianMissionGeneva @mission_russian 12:51 AM · 7 Mar 2014 in this situation #Russian and other minorities in #Ukraine are in danger #HRC25 14 Retweets 4 Likes  MFA Russia @mfa_russia 9:26 PM · 8 Mar 2014 #Lavrov: The conflict in #Ukraine was inspired from abroad but not from #Russia 52 Retweets 24 Likes	Amb. Churkin on an attempt to whitewash Nazi collaborators by the Ukrainian Ambassador  RussianMissionGeneva @mission_russian 12:51 AM · 7 Mar 2014 Current #Ukraine authorities cannot or dont want to control extremists armed goup #HRC25. 18 Retweets 4 Likes  MFA Russia @mfa_russia 9:28 PM · 8 Mar 2014 #Lavrov: The situation in #Ukraine is very troubled. The so-called "Right Sector" calls the tune by using terror and intimidation 26 Retweets 8 Likes  MFA Russia @mfa_russia 9:32 PM · 8 Mar 2014 #Lavrov: Threats are made not only against officials in Kiev and Ukraine's regions, but also heads of Russia's regions bordering on Ukraine 29 Retweets 3 Likes  MFA Russia @mfa_russia 9:36 PM · 8 Mar 2014 #Lavrov: Our partners have not kept their promises. That is probably the reason for the current situation in #Ukraine 61 Retweets 14 Likes	 RussianMissionGeneva @mission_russian 12:52 AM · 7 Mar 2014 Russia concerned by situation in #Ukraine: killings, tortures, disappearance made by extremist armed goup #HRC25. 18 Retweets 6 Likes  MFA Russia @mfa_russia 9:34 PM · 8 Mar 2014 #Lavrov: The "Right Sector" demands that #Ukrainian Army's arsenal be opened for it to get access to the weapons 38 Retweets 8 Likes  MFA Russia @mfa_russia 9:35 PM · 8 Mar 2014 #Lavrov: I don't understand how this can be perceived as civilised or democratic 30 Retweets 13 Likes	 RussianMissionGeneva @mission_russian 12:54 AM · 7 Mar 2014 Solution of #Ukraine crisis-protection of #humanrights and inclusion in the process all the #Ukrainian population #HRC25 11 Retweets 3 Likes  MFA Russia @mfa_russia 9:14 AM · 7 Mar 2014 #Russia envoy for human rights urged the West to react to extremist statements of leaders of a Maidan adequately  TASS @tass 9:14 AM · 7 Mar 2014 Dolgov urged the West to react to extremist statements of leaders of a Maidan adequately 20 Retweets 6 Likes

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Neo-Nazi Coup	 	  	 	   

Like the Russian MFA, the U.S. State Department also employed frameworks and laminations that were introduced in previous weeks. First, the State Department employed the 'Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity' framework, which stated that the problem at the core of the Crisis was Russia's decision not to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The cause of the Crisis was Russia's incursion into Crimea, which united the world in favour of the rights of Ukrainian people to determine their fate. The moral evaluation was evident in the United States' admiration for those who died during the protests in an effort to determine their own future. The solution to the crisis was U.S. commitment to maintaining the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

In addition, the U.S. State Department employed the lamination of a 'Russian Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine'. The problem, according to this lamination, was that Russia had violated international law by invading Ukraine. Thus, the cause of the crisis was Russian military aggression. The moral evaluation was evident in the U.S.'s commitment to upholding international law and preventing Russia from occupying Eastern Ukraine. The solution to the Crisis lay in new visa restrictions on Russian officials and a joint response by the U.S. and its allies to Russia's aggression. Notably, this week saw the U.S. State Department's first use of the word 'crisis' in reference to events in Ukraine. Examples of U.S. State Department tweets comprising these laminations may be seen in the table below.

Table 3.17: U.S. Primary Frameworks - Week 8

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity				

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity Lamination: Russian Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine	 DepSec Burns: @JohnKerry made clear the United States' commitment to #Ukraine's sovereignty in the face of #Russia's aggression. 7:20 PM - 6 Mar 2014 32 Retweets 10 Likes  ..@JohnKerry: President Obama has been clear we cannot allow #Russia or any country to defy international law with impunity. 9:43 PM - 6 Mar 2014 139 Retweets 59 Likes	 DepSec Burns: @JohnKerry made clear the United States' commitment to #Ukraine's sovereignty in the face of #Russia's aggression. 7:20 PM - 6 Mar 2014 32 Retweets 10 Likes	 "We have been mobilizing the international community to condemn this violation of international law" —Obama on the situation in #Ukraine 9:06 PM - 6 Mar 2014 223 Retweets 81 Likes  President Obama: "The world can see that the United States is united with our allies and partners in upholding international law." #Ukraine 9:10 PM - 6 Mar 2014 261 Retweets 109 Likes  "We are moving forward together—united in our determination to oppose actions that violate international law." —Obama #Ukraine 9:07 PM - 6 Mar 2014 80 Retweets 26 Likes	 U.S. pursuing options in response to #Russia's ongoing violation of #Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. 4:47 PM - 6 Mar 2014 73 Retweets 18 Likes  At direction of POTUS, @StateDept putting in place visa restrictions on officials threatening sovereignty of #Ukraine 5:01 PM - 6 Mar 2014 104 Retweets 26 Likes  Simultaneous with sanctions, U.S. seeks diplomatic solution that de-escalates the situation in #Ukraine. go.usa.gov/K4DE @WhiteHouse 5:18 PM - 6 Mar 2014 69 Retweets 16 Likes  President Obama: "We have taken steps to reaffirm our commitment to the security and democracy of our allies in Eastern Europe." #Ukraine 9:09 PM - 6 Mar 2014 81 Retweets 27 Likes

While the frameworks and laminations employed by both MFAs during this week differed substantially from one another, there was also a recurring theme that characterised their moral evaluations: that of international law. According to the U.S. State Department's lamination of 'Russian Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine', Russia had violated international law by invading Ukraine. Similarly, Russia's 'No Outside Interference' framework argued that the Crimean Declaration of Independence was in accordance with international law. **The distance between these two frameworks was thus 75%.** Moreover, both MFAs employed the rhetoric of human rights. The U.S. lamination of 'Respect for Territorial Integrity' stated that the people of Ukraine had the right to determine their own fate. Similarly, the Russian 'Rights of Russian Minorities' lamination stated that ultranationalist aggression must be met by a commitment to the human rights of ethnic minorities in Eastern Ukraine. **As such, there was another frame distance of 75% between U.S. and Russian laminations.**

Week 9: 12 Mar - 17 Mar

The week of 12 March saw a whirlwind of diplomatic activity surrounding the Crimean Crisis. While a referendum on the future of Crimea was set to take place on 16 March, the week began with a meeting between President Barack Obama and the interim Ukrainian president, which was held at the White House. During the meeting, Obama stated that the U.S. would 'utterly' reject the Crimean referendum. On 14 March, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in London in an attempt to diffuse mounting tensions between Russia and the U.S. The following day, the majority of the UN Security Council voted on a draft resolution, labelling the upcoming Crimean referendum as

illegal. The resolution failed to be adopted given a Russian veto. Despite this flurry of diplomatic activity, the referendum went ahead on 16 March with a reported 95% of voters supporting Crimea's decision to join the Russian Federation. In response, the U.S. and its European allies froze assets of, and placed visa bans on, individuals associated with the Crimean referendum. This week also saw the Ukrainian parliament vote in favour of creating a 60,000-person National Guard tasked with defending Ukraine.

Prior to the Crimean referendum, the Russian MFA employed three frameworks and laminations. The first of was the 'Neo-Nazi Coup' lamination, which stated that the problem facing Ukraine was that all dissidents who dare defy the extremist government in Kiev faced the threat of violence. The cause of the problem was that the extremists were allowed to stay in power as the U.S. refused to acknowledge their true nature. Moreover, the extremists were able to cling onto power given a legal vacuum that followed the coup. The solution to the Crisis was for Russia to offer aid to all civilians under threat from the extremists and the establishment of a diplomatic mechanism for resolving the crisis in Ukraine.

The second lamination focused on the rights of Russian minorities in Eastern Ukraine. The problem was that these minorities, which were historically and culturally linked to Russia, were being terrorised by Ukrainian authorities. The historical link to Russia was compared to the Falkland Islands' ties with the UK. The cause of the problem was that international actors, such as the UN, refused to acknowledge the rights of Russian minorities in Ukraine. While the 'terrorising' of minorities by ultranationalists offered a moral evaluation, the solution was for all nations to respect the Crimean referendum and Russia's right to defend its compatriots from terror.

Lastly, the Russian MFA also employed its 'No Outside Interference' primary framework, according to which the Crimean Crisis was a result of Western geopolitical ambitions and the EU's persistence that Ukraine should sign an EU association agreement. The Russian MFA attempted to create a moral equivalence between Crimean independence and Kosovo's independence. The solution was an inclusive national dialogue between all regions in Ukraine that would enable constitutional reform. Notably, in both the 'Neo-Nazi Coup' and the 'Rights of Russian Minorities' laminations, Russia expressed a willingness to overcome its differences and negotiate a resolution to the Crisis.

Following the Crimean referendum, Russia employed a new framework focusing on international law and the legality of the Crimean referendum. The problem exacerbating the Crimean Crisis was now framed as the West's decision to place sanctions on Russia. The cause was the West's refusal to acknowledge the decision made by the people of Crimea to join the Russian Federation. The moral evaluation was that the referendum was legal under international law as the Crimean people exercised their sovereign right to join the Russian Federation. The solution was Crimea's official annexation into the Russian Federation.



The table below includes tweets comprising these frameworks and laminations. New laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 3.18: Russian Primary Frameworks - Week 9

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Neo-Nazi Coup	Russia's UN envoy: Protesters in Kiev were shot at from Maidan's commandant's office en.itar-tass.com/russia/723475 @PressRUSUN Russia's UN envoy: Protesters in Kiev were shot at from ... According to the latest information available the shots were fired from the office of so-called "Maidan commandant", the man who now leads the UN Security Council, he said sputniknews.com 7:26 AM - 14 Mar 2014 36 Retweets 3 Likes All dissidents are exposed to threats of violence in Ukraine-Russia's UN envoy @PressRUSUN	US refuses to listen to voice of reason over Ukraine crisis - Moscow voiceofrussia.com/2014_03_15/US- ... @PressRUSUN US refuses to listen to voice of reason over Ukraine crisis... The US has refused to listen to the voice of reason when they submitted their draft resolution on the Ukrainian crisis to the UN Security Council, the Russian Foreign Ministry has said. "We sputniknews.com 8:53 PM - 15 Mar 2014 57 Retweets 12 Likes Churkin: Crimea within Ukraine impossible due to legal vacuum after coup en.itar-tass.com/russia/723697 @PressRUSUN Churkin: Crimea within Ukraine impossible due to legal v... Churkin: Crimea within Ukraine impossible due to legal vacuum after coup tass.com 9:04 PM - 15 Mar 2014 45 Retweets 13 Likes	Russia's UN envoy: Protesters in Kiev were shot at from Maidan's commandant's office en.itar-tass.com/russia/723475 @PressRUSUN Russia's UN envoy: Protesters in Kiev were shot at from ... According to the latest information available the shots were fired from the office of so-called "Maidan commandant", the man who now leads the UN Security Council, he said tass.com 7:26 AM - 14 Mar 2014 36 Retweets 3 Likes	Russia to consider Ukrainian civilian requests for protection from radicals - Moscow Russia to consider Ukrainian civilian requests for protec... Russia has received numerous requests from Ukrainian civilians to protect them from radicals, including those from the right Sector group, and has promised consider them, a Russian For... sputniknews.com 8:52 PM - 15 Mar 2014 88 Retweets 14 Likes Kremlin hopes for partners' wisdom not to deepen standoff over Ukraine Kremlin hopes for partners' wisdom not to deepen stand... Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, that despite dramatic disagreements with other countries, Russia values continuing contacts with them tass.com 9:33 PM - 15 Mar 2014 34 Retweets 6 Likes Russia seeks peaceful solution to Ukrainian crisis - UN envoy Vitaly Churkin voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_03_1 ... @pressrusun Russia seeks peaceful solution to Ukrainian crisis - UN e... Moscow's ambassador to the United Nations told an emergency meeting of the Security Council on Thursday that Russia does not want to go to war over the Ukraine crisis. "Russia does not sputniknews.com 11:59 PM - 13 Mar 2014 29 Retweets 7 Likes

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Neo-Nazi Coup (continues from previous page)				 MFA Russia   @mfa_russia Following ▼ Russia ready to cooperate with partners to form mechanism for resolving crisis in #Ukraine  Russia ready to cooperate with partners in resolving cri... Moscow urges contact group to ensure Ukraine's non-bloc status fixed in UN Security Council resolution – Russian Foreign Ministry. "As has been repeatedly explained by the Russian side, spox.mkrenews.com 1:25 PM · 17 Mar 2014 32 Retweets 3 Likes   10  32  3 

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference				 

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
International Law	 MFA Russia @mfa_russia Following Russia's #Lavrov tells US's Kerry sanctions 'unacceptable', threatens consequences voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_03_1 ... @RusEmbUSA #Ukraine  9:11 PM - 18 Mar 2014 85 Retweets 19 Likes  MFA Russia @mfa_russia Following Russian Foreign Ministry vows retaliatory steps against EU voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_03_1 ... #Ukraine  4:04 PM - 18 Mar 2014 98 Retweets 14 Likes	 RussianMissionGeneva @mission_russian Follow Those who still doubt what the people of #Crimea really want are recommended to watch #Ukraine  Party time in Simferopol after Crimea's yes in referendum Party time in Simferopol. The pubs had hardly closed in Crimea's capital and the streets were filled with music and national flags. Violators, families euronews.com 9:59 AM - 17 Mar 2014 26 Retweets 6 Likes	 Russians at NATO @natomission_ru Following Amb.A.Grushko: Crimean people made their sovereign choice. No statement (nato.int/cps/en/natoliv ...) can influence it.  1:00 AM - 18 Mar 2014 26 Retweets 6 Likes	 MFA Russia @mfa_russia Following Vladimir Putin signs decree recognising Crimea as sovereign and independent state  Putin signs decree recognising Crimea as sovereign and independent st... The decree entered into force upon signature, the presidential press service said tass.com 10:24 PM - 17 Mar 2014 136 Retweets 25 Likes
	 MFA Russia @mfa_russia Following Putin told Obama that Crimea referendum fully complies with int'l law voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_03_1 ... OSCE mission should cover all Ukrainian regions  Putin told Obama that referendum in Crimea fully compli... Putin told Obama that referendum in Crimea fully complies with int'l law, US Chamber, according to the statement released by the Kremlin. President Vladimir Putin on Sunday told US President spudniknews.com 12:19 AM - 17 Mar 2014 80 Retweets 18 Likes			


MFA Russia @mfa_russia



Prior to the Crimean referendum, the U.S. State Department continued to employ the 'Invasion and Occupation' lamination. According to this lamination, the problem driving the Crimean Crisis was Russia's decision to hold a referendum that was orchestrated by the Kremlin and midwived by the Russian military. The cause of the Crisis was that Russia's referendum was a ruse meant to legitimise its occupation of Crimea- a ruse that was evident to members of the UN Security Council. The moral evaluation stated that the U.S. would continue to support the Ukrainian people's right to determine their own fate, while the solution was direct negotiations with Russia and a warning that Russia would face consequences unless it altered its policies.


Following the referendum, however, the U.S. State Department introduced a new lamination to the 'Respect Ukraine Territorial Integrity' framework. This lamination stipulated that a referendum held at gunpoint is illegal under international law. The problem underlying the crisis was therefore that the Crimean referendum was held under the threat of violence and intimidation. The cause was Russia's policies toward Ukraine, which were a clear act of provocation, as well as Russia's unwillingness to discuss the future of Crimea with the Ukrainian government. The moral evaluation stated that the referendum did not comply with international law, while the solutions were the rejection of the referendum, holding fair elections to determine all of Ukraine's future, and exacting costs from Russia for its violation of international law.

The table below includes tweets comprising these frameworks and laminations. New laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 3.19: U.S. Primary Frameworks - Week 9

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity Lamination: Russian Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine				

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity Lamination: Russian Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine (continues from previous page)				 

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity Lamination: Referendum Under Gunpoint is Illegal				
				
				
				

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity Lamination: Referendum Under Gunpoint is Illegal (continues from previous page)				   

Prior to the Crimean referendum, the U.S. and Russia differed in their appraisals of the problem at the root of the Crimean Crisis, its cause, and its moral dimensions. Additionally, both MFAs differed with regard to a suggested remedy. However, both MFAs did call for direct talks between American and Russian representatives as a means of diffusing tensions in Ukraine. Such was the case with Russia's 'neo-Nazi coup' lamination and the State Department's 'Invasion and Occupation' lamination.. As such, **the frame distance prior to the referendum was 75%**. Yet, following the referendum, **the frame distance grew to 100%** as both MFAs differed on the cause of the Crisis, its moral dimension, and its solution. **The average frame distance measured this week was thus 87.5%.**

Week 10: 18 Mar - 23 Mar

On 18 March 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a document officially integrating Crimea into the Russian Federation. On the same day, a Ukrainian soldier was shot and killed by gunmen attempting to infiltrate a Ukrainian military base in Simferopol. The following day, pro-Russian forces overtook the base in question and met no resistance. On 20 March, the U.S. and EU formally condemned the annexation of Crimea and expanded the sanctions placed on individuals who facilitated Crimea's separation from Ukraine. On 21 March, Ukraine announced that it would not recognise Crimea's new status and on the next day, Russian forces took hold of a Ukrainian airbase in Belbek and a naval base in Novofedorivka.

In the aftermath of the Crimean referendum, the Russian MFA employed three frameworks and laminations. The first, which had been introduced in the previous week, focused on the legality of the referendum under international law. The problem, according to this framework, was that NATO refused to recognise the legality of the referendum. The cause of the problem was the West's exceptionalism, which allowed the West to ignore international laws and norms when doing so suited its goals. The moral evaluation lay in Russia's assertions that the referendum was legal, that Russia would promote the rule of law and equality in Crimea, and that the 'reunification' with Crimea would stabilise the region. The solution to the Crisis entailed three aspects. First, Russia would remain committed to diplomatic engagement with the West and NATO, but on equal footing. Second, Russia would facilitate the inclusion of Crimea into the Russian Federation and ensure the safety and rights of all Russian compatriots. Third, Russia would re-establish friendly ties with the Ukrainian government in Kiev.

The second lamination used by the Russian MFA was that of a neo-Nazi coup. According to this lamination, the cause of the Crisis in Crimea was the West's choice to turn a blind eye to the fact that ultranationalists had taken over power in Kiev. The solution to this problem was for the West to condone the activities of neo-Nazis and for Russia to document the activities of ultranationalists so as to demonstrate their true nature.

Finally, the Russian MFA employed the 'No Outside Interference' primary framework. Here, Russia focused on two different actors. The first was the EU, which was portrayed as the instigator of the Crimean Crisis. The problem driving the Crisis was the West's sanctions on Russia, which created new artificial barriers to international cooperation. The cause of the Crisis lays in the EU's inability to accept that the geopolitical

balance had shifted and that the bipolar system had ended. Indeed, it was geopolitical calculations that led the EU to propose a Ukrainian association agreement in the first place. According to the Russian MFA, the EU was misguided as it assumed that a multipolar world is an unstable one when, in fact, a multipolar world is more stable than a unipolar or bipolar one. The moral evaluation stated that the West's interpretation of Crimean independence as an annexation was an insult to all Crimeans. The solution, however, was a joint Russian and Western OSCE mission to Ukraine.


The second actor Russia saw as interfering in the internal affairs of Ukraine was NATO. The problem that was escalating the Crisis, according to this lamination, was NATO's desire to expand its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The cause of the Crisis was NATO's return to the *raison d'être* of the Cold War. The moral evaluation lay in the claim that NATO was forcing countries to choose between the West and Russia, while Russia's foreign policy was one that focused on unifying East and West. The solution to the Crisis would include mutually beneficial relations with NATO, using soft power rather than hard power to resolve the issue of Russian-speaking minorities in Eastern Europe, and accepting the fact that Russian military interventions contribute to the stabilisation of countries in Eastern Europe.



The table below includes tweets comprising these frameworks and laminations. New laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 3.20: Russian Primary Frameworks - Week 10

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
International Law	Russians at NATO @natomission_ru Amb.A.Grushko: NATO Sec Gen's statement - goo.gl/6ZQrJx - makes it clear that for NATO (cont) tl.gd/n_1s11njik NATO Secretary General condemns moves to incorporat... I condemn President Putin's announcement of new laws incorporating Crimea into the Russian Federation. nato.int 3:17 AM - 19 Mar 2014 22 Retweets 4 Likes Russians at NATO @natomission_ru NATO sees int'l law as norms which meet its own ideas - Russian envoy goo.gl/uZeIZ1 4:21 PM - 19 Mar 2014 5 Retweets 2 Likes	MFA Russia @mfa_russia West reaffirming its exceptionalism at the expense of int'l law – Lavrov West reaffirming its exceptionalism at the expense of int... The Ukrainian crisis has proved that the West has been seeking to reaffirm its exceptionalism at the expense of international law. Russia's foreign policy chief Sergei Lavrov said today. spu.blnnews.com 10:53 AM - 20 Mar 2014 15 Retweets 3 Likes Russians at NATO @natomission_ru Amb.Grushko: The latest innovation in International Law: "NATO is a source of political (cont) tl.gd/n_1s12epj 4:49 PM - 20 Mar 2014 19 Retweets 5 Likes	Russians at NATO @natomission_ru NATO sees int'l law as norms which meet its own ideas - Russian envoy goo.gl/uZeIZ1 4:21 PM - 19 Mar 2014 5 Retweets 2 Likes MFA Russia @mfa_russia #Lavrov: We continue to abide by international law and the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndo ... 1:29 PM - 20 Mar 2014 15 Retweets 4 Likes MFA Russia @mfa_russia #Lavrov: Moving forward, we'll continue promoting the rule of law, equal dialogue and a unifying agenda 1:29 PM - 20 Mar 2014 11 Retweets 5 Likes Russian FM: #Crimea's reunification with #Russia not violate stability in Europe	MFA Russia @mfa_russia #Lavrov to MFA's regional representatives: Our diplomatic efforts are aimed at facilitating socioeconomic progress 1:11 PM - 20 Mar 2014 14 Retweets 3 Likes MFA Russia @mfa_russia #Lavrov: This means ensuring that all of #Russia's regions are engaged in foreign economic, humanitarian and other relations 1:12 PM - 20 Mar 2014 9 Retweets 3 Likes MFA Russia @mfa_russia #Lavrov: Practical steps are currently taken to implement the treaty on admitting two new constituent entities to the Russian Federation 1:18 PM - 20 Mar 2014 17 Retweets 1 Like

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
International Law (continues from previous page)				 #Lavrov: We will defend interests of Russians, our compatriots using political, diplomatic and legal means to ensure their rights and freedoms 1:31 PM - 20 Mar 2014 29 Retweets 5 Likes Government of Russia Dmitry Medvedev: The #Crimea referendum is a fact. We should move forward taking into account this new political and legal reality 6:30 PM - 21 Mar 2014 52 Retweets 19 Likes #Medvedev: Our goal is friendly relations with Ukraine and Russia's other neighbours; we want to avoid escalation #Crimea #Ukraine

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Neo-Nazi Coup		 		

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference		   		  

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
No Outside Interference Lamination: NATO's Cold War Mentality			Amb.Grushko: All our proposals were aimed at uniting Europe's East and West, preventing scenarios where our neighbours have to face false choice between Russia and EU 	   

During the week of 18 March, the U.S. State Department continued to employ two frameworks and laminations introduced in previous weeks. The first lamination focused on respecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine and stated that the encroachment on Ukraine's territory was a violation of international law. The cause of the problem was Russia's attempt to violate international law without repercussions, while the moral evaluation stated that only the Ukrainian people could determine their future. The solution was collaboration between the U.S. and its Baltic allies, alongside sanctions and a call on Russia to de-escalate tensions in Ukraine.

In addition, the U.S. State Department employed the 'Invasion and Occupation' lamination. According to this lamination, the problem driving events in Crimea was that Russia no longer adhered to the principles that govern 21st-century state relations. Therefore, the cause of the Crimean Crisis was Russia's attempt to redraw its borders. The moral evaluation stated that Ukrainians should be allowed to determine their future and that Russia had chosen a 'dark' path in its foreign policy. The solutions were isolating Russia internationally, exacting economic costs, and continued U.S. support for the interim Ukrainian government.

Examples of tweets comprising State Department laminations may be seen in the table below.

Table 3.21: U.S. Primary Frameworks - Week 10

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity				  VP Biden and @PremierRP discussed the US commitment to #Poland and situation in #Ukraine. http://go.usa.gov/KUwh

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity (continues from previous page)				 Department of State @StateDept Follow Under Secretary Sherman reaffirms US support for Ukrainian people, #Ukraine's sovereignty. flic.kr/s/aHsjV7CkT7  6:43 PM · 21 Mar 2014 139 Retweets · 63 Likes     

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity Lamination: Russian Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine			 	   

When comparing the U.S. State Department's framework of respecting Ukrainian territory, and Russia's lamination of NATO's Cold War mentality, it becomes apparent that both MFAs focused on international law and both agreed that the solution to the Crisis was adherence to international law. Thus, **there was a 75% frame distance**. When comparing the U.S. State Department's 'Invasion and Occupation' lamination with Russia's 'No Outside Interference' and 'Neo-Nazi Coup' frameworks, it becomes apparent that both MFAs offered different problem definitions, causal attributions, moral evaluations, and solutions. Thus, **there was a frame distance of 100%**. The average frame distance measured this week was thus **87.5%**.

Week 11: 24 March - 30 March

On 24 March, the G7 nations met for the first time without Russia signifying that Russia was formally banished from this group of nations. The following day, Ukraine's acting president ordered Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the Crimean peninsula. On 27 March, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution stating that the annexation of Crimea was illegal and on the 29th, the Ukrainian presidential election campaign officially started.

During this week, the Russian MFA employed three frameworks and laminations. The first lamination depicted events in Ukraine as a neo-Nazi coup. The problems, according to this lamination, were rampant discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism in Ukraine. The cause of the problem was, yet again, the West's forgiving approach to the ultranationalists who had seized power in Kiev. The moral evaluation depicted 'massive'

abuse of Russian minorities in Ukraine. The solution was recognition of Crimea's independence, given the character of the new nationalist regime.

The Russian MFA also employed the 'International Law' framework. The problem and moral evaluation were that the West refused to recognise Crimea's independence, which could possibly lead to more bloodshed. The cause of the Crisis was that the U.S., the leader of the West, refused to acknowledge the legal similarities between Crimea and Kosovo. The solutions were the deployment of OSCE observers to Ukraine and recognition of Crimean independence.

Lastly, the Russian MFA also introduced a new framework that focused on the politicisation of the UN. The problem identified in this framework was that the UN resolution on Crimea was counterproductive and confrontational in nature. The causal attribution and moral evaluation stated that Western countries manipulated other countries to lend their support to the resolution and that the West was trying to artificially inflate tensions. The solution was drafting a new Ukrainian constitution that recognised the country's status as not belonging to either the Eastern or Western block.

The table below includes tweets comprising these frameworks and laminations. New laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 3.22: Russian Primary Frameworks – Week 11

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Opposition are Nationalists Lamination: Neo-Nazi Coup	MFA Russia @mfa_russia Russian train passengers plundered by Ukrainian nationalists voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_03_2 ... #Ukraine Russian train passengers plundered by Ukrainian nation... Moscow can't understand why Ukrainian law enforcement agencies refuse to probe an incident at the Vinnytsia railway station where Ukrainian nationalists have plundered Russian ... spuiknews.com 3:48 PM - 24 Mar 2014 22 Retweets 4 Likes RussianMissionGeneva @mission_russian European parliamentarians express alarm over anti-Semitism, xenophobia and Nazi symbols in "new" #Ukraine #humanrights efdgroup.eu/newsroom/item/ ... Translated from Russian 10:33 AM - 26 Mar 2014 15 Retweets 4 Likes MFA Russia @mfa_russia Radicals' threats to priests in #Ukraine sign of religious intolerance Radicals' threats to priests in Ukraine sign of religious in... The threats to priests in Ukraine, which have become more frequent, are regrettable and an atmosphere of religious intolerance rules in Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry said. spuiknews.com 3:29 PM - 25 Mar 2014 12 Retweets 3 Likes	RussianMissionGeneva @mission_russian #Russia calls US and EU short-sighted for their approach to ultra-nationalists in #Ukraine Russia calls US and EU short-sighted for their approach... This approach is hard to explain, commented Russian Foreign Ministry's representative bass.com 4:01 PM - 26 Mar 2014 16 Retweets 6 Likes MFA Russia @mfa_russia Moscow surprised by Kiev's claims of 'growing xenophobia' in Russia Moscow surprised by Kiev's claims of 'growing xenopho... Russia's Foreign Ministry says Kiev is trying once again to shift the blame bass.com 9:29 PM - 26 Mar 2014 13 Retweets 6 Likes	MFA Russia @mfa_russia #Russia collects evidence of massive rights abuse of Russian-speakers in #Ukraine Russia collects evidence of massive rights abuse of Rus... Russia is collecting and intends to publish evidence of the massive violations of the rights of the Russian-speaking community in Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry said on ... spuiknews.com 9:36 PM - 26 Mar 2014 44 Retweets 10 Likes RT @RT.com Lavrov: West's duplicity & inconsistency obstructs dialogue over Ukraine Lavrov: If West accepts coup-appointed Kiev govt, it must accept a Russi... The West is inconsistent in not recognizing the Crimea referendum as legitimate, while recognizing the military coup in Kiev, Russian FM Sergey Lavrov said. He BC... rt.com 1:45 PM - 30 Mar 2014 44 Retweets 16 Likes	MFA Russia @mfa_russia Interview #Lavrov : If West accepts coup-appointed Kiev govt, it must accept a Russian Crimea rt.com/news/lavrov-cr ... 3:48 PM - 30 Mar 2014 149 Retweets 48 Likes

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
International Law	 RT @RT_com Follow #LAVROV on similarity of Kosovo & #Crimea. Do you want Crimea to shed blood until it is recognized?  Russia not clinging to G8 if West does not want it – Russian FM — RT Wor... Russia is not clinging to the G8 format, as all major world problems can be discussed at other international venues such as G20, Russia's Foreign Minister... rt.com 9:13 PM · 24 Mar 2014 78 Retweets 30 Likes	 MFA Russia @mfa_russia Following Russian MFA is surprised by US President's statement regarding an independence referendum in Kosovo voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_03_2 ... @RusEmbUSA Russia surprised at Obama's false claim that Kosovo sec... The Russian Foreign Ministry is surprised by US President Barack Obama's statement regarding an independence referendum in Kosovo. Obama's speech delivered at the Palais... sputniknews.com 11:13 PM · 28 Mar 2014 30 Retweets 4 Likes	 RT @RT_com Follow #LAVROV on similarity of Kosovo & #Crimea. Do you want Crimea to shed blood until it is recognized?  Russia not clinging to G8 if West does not want it – Russian FM — RT Wor... Russia is not clinging to the G8 format, as all major world problems can be discussed at other international venues such as G20, Russia's Foreign Minister... rt.com 9:13 PM · 24 Mar 2014 78 Retweets 30 Likes	 MFA Russia @mfa_russia Following Russia, #OSCE discuss deployment of special monitoring mission to Ukraine en.itar-tass.com/world/725570 @RF_OSCE @OSCE_ru Russia, OSCE discuss deployment of special monitoring ... Earlier, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreed to send an observer mission to Ukraine after two weeks of consultations itar-tass.com 4:43 PM · 27 Mar 2014 19 Retweets 3 Likes MFA Russia @mfa_russia Following #OSCE mission's work in Ukraine may not be extended if it is biased- Russian official voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_03_2 ... @OSCE_RF OSCE mission's work in Ukraine may not be extended if i... Russia will not allow the extension of the OSCE mission's operation in Ukraine beyond the initial six month period if it finds its work to be biased. Russian envoy to the OSCE in Vienna sputniknews.com 2:38 PM · 28 Mar 2014 14 Retweets 3 Likes

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Unlike the Russian MFA, the U.S. State Department did not introduce new frameworks or laminations during the week of 24 March. Rather, the State Department employed the 'Respect Territorial Integrity of Ukraine' framework. The problem underscoring events in Crimea was the violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity. The cause of the problem was that Russia refused to engage with the Ukrainian government. The moral evaluation stated that the U.S. and its allies must help Ukraine chart a democratic course. The solutions were robust U.S. support for the Ukrainian government and a financial aid package.

The U.S. State Department also employed the lamination of 'Russia's Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine'. The problem defined in this framework was the illegal annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine, which was a Russian assault on Ukrainian sovereignty. The moral evaluation stated that Ukrainians should be allowed to make their own decisions, like all free people. The solution was the condemnation of Russia by all members of the G7, isolating Russia politically and financially and downgrading bilateral ties between the U.S. and Russia. The table below includes tweets comprising these frameworks and laminations..

Table 3.23: U.S. Primary Frameworks – Week 11

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity				 

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Respect for Ukraine Territorial Integrity Lamination: Russian Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine	Samantha Power @AmbPower44 Following Today's UN resolution made it clear: the world won't accept #Russia's illegal annexation of #Crimea. #UnitedforUkraine 7:00 PM - 27 Mar 2014 174 Retweets 65 Likes Department of State @StateDept Follow President Obama: Together, we have condemned #Russia's invasion of #Ukraine, rejected legitimacy of Crimean referendum. #UnitedForUkraine 8:58 PM - 26 Mar 2014 98 Retweets 30 Likes	Department of State @StateDept Follow Pres. Obama: #Russia's violation of international law - assault on #Ukraine's sovereignty - must be met with condemnation. #UnitedForUkraine 8:57 PM - 26 Mar 2014 68 Retweets 25 Likes	White House Archived @ObamaWhiteHouse Follow Obama: "What we want is for the Ukrainian people to make their own decisions—just like other free people around the world" #UnitedForUkraine 8:36 PM - 26 Mar 2014 374 Retweets 171 Likes	Department of State @StateDept Follow #G7 leaders met in The Hague to reaffirm support for #Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. The Hague Declaration 11:34 PM - 24 Mar 2014 62 Retweets 25 Likes Department of State @StateDept Follow #G7 Leaders: We will suspend our participation in the #G8 until #Russia changes course. The Hague Declaration 11:45 PM - 24 Mar 2014 119 Retweets 41 Likes White House Archived @ObamaWhiteHouse Follow President Obama and other world leaders held a G-7 meeting last night in The Hague → go.wh.gov/2tJ8mT 4:45 PM - 25 Mar 2014 622 Retweets 468 Likes

The Russian MFA's 'International Law' framework stated that the cause of the Crimean Crisis was the United States' refusal to accept the legality of the Crimean referendum. Similarly, the U.S. State Department's 'Invasion and Occupation' lamination stated that the Crisis was caused by Russia's violation of international law. As such, both frameworks focused on interpreting international law, and therefore, the **frame distance between them was 75%**. Conversely, the frame distance between the U.S. State Department's 'Respect for Ukraine's Territorial Integrity' framework and the Russian 'Neo-Nazi Coup' and 'Politicized UN' frameworks **was 100%**. The final, or average, frame distance measured this week was thus **87.5%**.

Tracking Frame Distance - The Escalation Stage

As was the case with onset stage, an Integral Frame Distance Score was calculated for each week of the escalation stage. This score took into account four factors, including the frame distance between both MFAs' frameworks, the number of tweets published in each week, the sentiment of crisis-related tweets, and the sentiment of rhetorical indicators.

Notably, during the escalation stage, both MFAs employed numerous frameworks in each week. This led to the measurement of multiple frame distances between their respective frameworks. In such cases, an average frame distance was calculated given the need to arrive at a single score that could be integrated into the frame distance matrix of calculation. For instance, during the week of 12 March, there were 100% and 75% frame distances between U.S. and Russian primary frameworks. These two measurements were converted into scores ranging from 0-4 (i.e. 100% frame distance was converted into 4, 75%

frame distance into 3). Next, the two scores were averaged, which results in a frame distance of 3.5 between the U.S. and Russian frameworks. The table below details the matrix of calculations for each week of the escalation stage.


Table 3.24: Escalation Stage Matrix of Calculation (Weighted Scores)

Week	Frame Difference	Number of Tweets	Positive/Negative Sentiment	Phone Calls	Statements After Meetings	Press Conferences	Leaders' Statements	Integral Frame Distance Score
6.1	1	0.08	0.21	0.08	0.08	0.13	0.17	1.76
6.2	2	0.2	0.20	0.16	0.15	0.05	NS*	2.70
7	1.75	0.29	0.19	0.17	0.02	0.06	0.17	2.64
8	1.5	0.20	0.23	0.06	0.11	0.15	0.16	2.41
9	1.75	0.3	0.27	0.17	0.15	NS*	0.21	2.85
10	1.75	0.20	0.21	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.13	2.55
11	2	0.17	0.23	0.04	0.09	0.07	0.10	2.70

*NS=No Score

As seen in Table 3.24, the frame distance between the U.S. and Russian MFAs varied throughout the escalation stage.

Graph 3.3: Integral Frame Distance Scores throughout the Escalation Stage



Graph 3.3 (above) further illustrates the variability in frame distance between the Russian and U.S. MFAs throughout the escalation stage. Importantly, this includes a steady decrease in Integral Frame Distance Scores between Weeks 6.2 and 8 and Weeks 9 and 10. These results suggest that even during the escalation stage of a crisis, two governments may move closer together. This finding indicates that the real time monitoring of a crisis's progression can enable diplomats to achieve long-term resolutions to a crisis, and not just short-term containment of a crisis.

Yet, Graph 3.3 also illustrates the numerous instances in which the frame distance between the two MFAs increased. The largest growth in Integral Frame Distance Scores was measured between the first and second parts of Week 6 (Week 6.1 and Week 6.2). This is


not surprising given that this week saw mass clashes between protesters and security forces, the fleeing of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, and the appointment of an interim government in Ukraine. Prior to these events (Week 6.1), both MFAs stated that the Ukrainian crisis was an internal one that should be resolved through direct talks between the government and the opposition and possible constitutional reforms. Following these events (Week 6.2), the U.S. government called for democratic reforms whilst the Russian government depicted events in Kiev as a neo-Nazi coup.

The growth in Integral Frame Distance Scores between Weeks 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrates that MFAs do indeed use social media for real time framing of unfolding events and that, subsequently, the frame distance model does account for such events as it rests on an analysis of MFA frames.

Moreover, unfolding events are taken into account through the rhetorical components of the model. For instance, the second largest growth in Integral Frame Distance Scores occurred during Week 9. This, again, is not surprising, as this week saw the Crimean referendum, following which Crimea was officially integrated into the Russian Federation. The third largest increase occurred during Week 11, which saw the UN's condemnation of Russia and the banishing of Russia from the G8 group of nations. These results demonstrate that although the frame distance model does not directly take into account events taking place on the ground, these invariably influence the frame distance measurement through numerous factors, including the sentiment of tweets, the sentiment of statements following high-level meetings, statements by world leaders, and the number of tweets published given MFAs' need to comment on unfolding events.

The impact that unfolding events have on the measurement of Integral Frame Distance Scores demonstrates that the frame distance model can be used to track a crisis's progression in near-real time and identify crisis pressure points. Graph 3.4 (below) identifies intervention and prevention pressure points throughout the escalation stage of the Crimean Crisis.

Graph 3.4: Crisis Pressure Points throughout the Escalation Stage




In addition to tracking a crisis's progression in near-real time, the frame distance model can help diplomats identify conversion points between two governments that can then serve as entry points for negotiations. For instance, in Week 8, both the U.S. and Russian governments employed arguments relating to human rights. While the U.S. State Department argued that the people of Ukraine have the right to determine their own fates,

the Russian MFA stated that the human rights of Russian minorities in Ukraine must be protected. Thus, respect for human rights may have served as an entry point for diplomats seeking to bridge differences between the U.S. and Russian governments. Similarly, during Week 10, the U.S. State Department argued that Russia had violated international law by encroaching on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, while the Russian MFA stated that the Crimean referendum was held in accordance with international law and the Kosovo precedent. As such, international law may have served as an entry point for negotiations during that week. The examples of Weeks 8 and 10 suggest that the frame distance model not only enables diplomats to identify crisis pressure points, but also enables them to identify points of convergence between governments.

Graph 3.5 (below) displays changes in Integral Frame Distance Scores throughout the entire sampling period.

Graph 3.5: Integral Frame Distance Scores throughout the Crimean Crisis



A comparison between the four factors contributing to the Integral Frame Distance Score offers valuable insight into how Twitter data may be used to track and extrapolate the possible trajectory of a crisis.

Analysis of Rhetorical Indicators

The frame distance model developed in this thesis aims to evaluate whether social media content published by MFAs can be used to track a crisis's progression in near-real time and identify crisis pressure points. In addition to measuring the distance between two MFAs' primary frameworks, the model relies on four rhetorical indicators and the overall sentiment of crisis-related tweets published by MFAs. Each of these was employed to offer greater insight into the relative scope of agreement or disagreement between the two governments. The data gathered using the rhetorical indicators is included in Table 28 below.

Table 3.25: Calculation of Integral Frame Distance Scores Weeks 1 – 11 (Weighted Scores)

Week	Frame Distance	#Tweets Russia	#Tweets U.S.	Russian Sentiment 0-4	U.S. Sentiment 0-4	Russian Phone Calls	U.S. Phone Calls	Russia After Meetings	U.S. After Meetings	Russian Press Conf	U.S. Press Conf	Russian Leaders' Statements	U.S. Leaders' Statements	Integral Frame Distance Score
Week 1	2	0	0	2.3	1.8	NS*	3	NS*	NS*	2	1	NS*	NS*	1.63
Week 2	4	0	0	2.3	1.8	NS*	NS*	NS*	NS*	NS*	NS*	0.5	NS*	2.46
Week 3	3	0	0	1.3	2.25	NS*	4	NS*	NS*	1.8	NS*	1	NS*	2.03
Week 4	4	0	0	1.83	2.25	1	NS*	NS*	NS*	2.66	NS*	NS*	NS*	2.48
Week 5	3.5	4	0	2.95	2.17	2	4	2.38	1	NS*	NS*	NS*	4	2.87
Week 6.1	2	1	0	2.9	2.18	1	1	NS*	2	3.25	NS*	NS*	4	1.76
Week 6.2	4	3	1	2.94	1	1.5	0.8	2.9	NS*	NS*	1	NS*	NS*	2.7
Week 7	3.5	4	3	2.15	2.35	2	2.3	NS*	1.33	NS*	2.6	0	4	2.64
Week 8	3	4	1	2.88	2.5	1.42	NS*	NS*	2.66	2.65	1	NS*	3.75	2.41
Week 9	3.5	3	3	2.23	3.2	1	2.4	1.18	1.72	NS*	NS*	3	1.25	2.85
Week 10	3.5	4	1	2.2	2.84	2	NS*	2	NS*	2.14	NS*	1	2.17	2.55
Week 11	4	3	1	2.8	2.66	1	1	1.33	2.14	1.71	NS*	NS*	2.5	2.7

*NS=No Score

Table 3.25 offers several insights that warrant further elaboration. In each week of the Crisis, the rhetorical indicators provided data that was integrated into the calculation of Integral Frame Distance Scores. This was even the case during the initial weeks of the Crisis, during which there was limited Twitter activity by both MFAs. For instance, the Integral Frame Distance Scores of Weeks 1 and 3 took into account the sentiments of phone calls between world leaders, statements made by world leaders, and statements made by officials during press conferences. This suggests that the rhetorical indicators do provide valuable insight that contributes to the assessment of the scope of disagreement between the two governments.

Notably, the sentiments of both MFAs' tweets conflicted during several weeks of the escalation stage. For example, during the second part of Week 6, the Russian sentiment was 2.94, while the U.S. sentiment was a far more positive 1. In Week 9, the Russian sentiment was 2.23, as opposed to the U.S.'s far more negative 3.2. These differences can be explained in part by the events that took place during each week. Week 6.2 saw the fleeing of president Yanukovych and the release of opposition leaders. This led to positive U.S. tweets about the future of Ukraine and negative Russian tweets about a neo-Nazi coup. Similarly, Week 9 saw positive Russian tweets following the Crimean referendum alongside negative U.S. tweets describing a Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine. These results indicate that the sentiment of MFA tweets depends on whether unfolding events contribute to or harm the national interest. As such, sentiment analysis alone cannot be used to assess the scope of disagreement between governments as it precludes one from identifying the areas in which two governments agree or see eye-to-eye.

When comparing the weekly frame distance between the two MFAs' primary frameworks and the sentiment of tweets describing phone calls between leaders, it becomes apparent that the two factors do not correspond. For instance, while the frame distance narrowed from 4 to 3.5 between Weeks 6.2 and 7, the tone of Russian phone call tweets grew from 1.5 to a more negative 2. Similarly, while the frame distance grew between Weeks 8 and 9, the sentiments of Russian phone call tweets became more positive, decreasing from 1.42 to 1. The same is true of U.S. phone call tweets, which grew more positive between Weeks 6.1 and 6.2, despite a substantial increase in frame distance, and grew more negative between Weeks 6.2 and 7, despite the narrowing of frame distance. The lack of congruence between the sentiments of phone calls and frame distance measurements could be explained by the fact that phone call summaries are used to depict world leaders as engulfed in the task of crisis management or as attempting to lower tensions between sides; thus, these summaries tend to be of a positive nature. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that the majority of Russian and U.S. phone call tweets during the escalation stage had a relatively positive sentiment. Indeed, the most negative Russian phone call tweet scored 2, which was a neutral score on the sentiment scale, and the most negative U.S. tweet scored 2.4.

When examining the sentiments of tweets summarising high-level meetings, it is evident that these varied greatly throughout the escalation stage. In Russia's case, the sentiment of meeting tweets were especially negative during the crisis slide stage and Week 6.2, which included the fleeing of president Yanukovich. This is not surprising, as these weeks saw a direct challenge to Russia's interests in Ukraine. By contrast, the sentiment of Russian meeting tweets during the Crimean referendum was far more positive, scoring 1.18

in Week 9 and 1.33 in Week 11. Similarly, the sentiment of U.S. meeting tweets grew more negative from Week 8 onwards, as Russia's annexation of Crimea became a de facto reality. However, there was a lack of congruence between changes in frame distance and changes in the sentiment of meeting tweets. For instance, between both Weeks 7 and 9 and Weeks 9 and 10, changes in frame distance contrasted with changes in the sentiments of Russian meeting tweets. This again suggests that the rhetorical indicators offer additional insight beyond that of the frame distance.

Unlike the previous rhetorical indicators, the sentiments of Russian tweets published during press conferences remained negative throughout the Crimean Crisis. Indeed, in Week 4, the sentiment of Russian press conference tweets was 2.66, while in Week 6.1, it was 3.25. Additionally, in Week 8 the sentiment of Russian press conference tweets was 2.65, while in Week 10 it was 2.14. The lack of variability in the sentiments of press conference tweets could suggest that these were used by the MFA as a tool to secure Russia's interest and rally support for Russia's stance. By negatively framing events, and using a negative sentiment, an MFA can portray a crisis as infringing on national interests, thus galvanising the local media and the local population. In addition, harsh terminology may attract further media attention to a crisis, thus increasing the pressure on one's opponent and possibly harming their ability to manage a crisis.

While the U.S. State Department published far less press conference tweets than the Russian MFA, it did frequently publish tweets that consisted of leaders' statements. Moreover, the sentiment of these tweets remained highly negative throughout the Crisis. In Weeks 5, 6, and 8, the sentiment of leaders' tweets was 4 - the most negative score on the sentiment scale. During Week 8 the sentiment of such tweets was 3.75, while in Week 11 it

was 2.5. It is possible that the U.S. State Department employed leaders' statements in a similar manner to Russia's tweets from press conferences. Harsh statements by America's leaders could have galvanised the U.S. press to support the administration's policies, raised support amongst the domestic population, and attracted media attention, thus applying pressure to the Russian leadership, who now had to comment on these statements in near-real time.

In summary, the analysis presented in this section suggests that each rhetorical indicator used in the frame distance model offers valuable insight by measuring different aspects of an MFA's Twitter communication during a crisis. Moreover, each indicator corresponds differently with the frame distance measurement, suggesting that the indicators evaluate different aspects of a crisis. It is the integration of all these indicators, and the frame distance qualitative analysis, that offers the means to assess the overall scope of disagreement between governments based on their MFAs' Twitter activity.

Analysis of Frame Consistency

The analysis presented in the previous section suggests that the Russian and U.S. MFAs employed numerous frameworks and laminations throughout the Crimean Crisis. This section identifies the frameworks and laminations that were repeatedly, or consistently, employed by each MFA throughout the Crisis. From a sociological perspective, consistent framing and narration of events may help people make sense of a crisis and reduce feelings of anxiety and insecurity. Indeed, consistent narration offers a permanent answer to the question 'What is going on?' From a media studies perspective, consistent narration can

help journalists identify and further disseminate government frames given the desire to ‘rally behind the flag’. Lastly, from a crisis management perspective, frame consistency can help third party diplomats identify the core interests of each side. Given that each framework or lamination includes a central argument, frame consistency enables one to identify the most central arguments employed by an MFA when commenting on a crisis. These central arguments may, in turn, serve as the basis for negotiations in each crisis stage.

Russian Frame Consistency

As seen in Graph 3.6 (see page 244), during the first week of the Crimean Crisis, Russia employed the ‘No Outside Interference’ framework. According to this framework, the crisis in Ukraine was an internal matter that should be resolved through direct talks between the Ukrainian government and the opposition. In Week 2, the Russian MFA added a lamination to this framework stating that EU external pressure to sign an association agreement was exasperating the crisis. Notably, the ‘No Outside Interference’ framework was consistently employed by the Russian MFA in Weeks 1 through 10. Similarly, the ‘EU External Pressure’ lamination was consistently employed during the onset stage of the crisis (i.e. Weeks 1 to 6.1).

Conversely, two laminations of the ‘No Outside Interference’ framework were employed inconsistently. These were the ‘No Role for NATO’ lamination, employed solely during Week 7, and ‘NATO’s Cold War Mentality’, employed solely during Week 10. The latter lamination may be regarded as an attempt by the Russian MFA to adapt its framework

to rapidly changing circumstances, such as NATO's increased diplomatic activity in Week 7 demonstrating yet again that laminations are a tool for framing events in real time.


The second most consistent Russian framework was the 'Opposition are Nationalists' framework, employed in Weeks 5 through 11. According to this lamination, ultranationalists had staged a coup in Kiev, replacing the rule of law with the rule of thugs. Equally consistent was the 'Neo-Nazi Coup' lamination, which depicted the nature of the ultranationalists who had seized power. It was through this lamination and framework that Russia laid the foundation for its rejection of the interim Ukrainian government.

Yet, the 'Opposition are Nationalists' framework also included less consistent laminations. For instance, the 'Rights of Russian Minorities' lamination, which stated that Russians in Eastern Ukraine were at risk from the neo-Nazi government, was employed only in Weeks 6.2 to 9. These weeks also saw the employment of the 'Threat to Russian Interests' lamination, alleging that the ultranationalists posed a threat to Russian military infrastructure and military personnel. Importantly, these laminations were employed during the four weeks leading up to the Crimean referendum and may thus be viewed as a strategic attempt by Russia to legitimise the referendum and Crimea's subsequent annexation by creating a receptive environment for its policy objectives.

During Week 9, Russia introduced the 'International Law' framework, which further legitimised Crimea's annexation. This framework was then consistently employed during Weeks 10 and 11. It is the introduction of this new framework that illustrates how primary frameworks can be used to legitimise an actor's policies during a crisis.

The analysis presented thus far suggests that the Russian MFA consistently employed frameworks and laminations to narrate events in Ukraine, depict the actors involved in the Crisis, and outline solutions to the Crisis. Frameworks were also employed strategically to facilitate policy goals. Importantly, diplomats using the frame consistency analysis could have anticipated Russia's stance during possible pressure points. For instance, diplomats seeking to negotiate a resolution to the Crisis during Week 5 could have anticipated a Russian rejection of all external mediation in Ukraine, as well as an insistence on the EU rescinding the proposed association agreement. Similarly, during Week 9 negotiators could have expected Russian diplomats to focus on the danger posed to Russian minorities from the neo-Nazi government in Kiev. By anticipating these arguments, negotiators may have been more likely to succeed in peacefully resolving the Crisis.

Graph 3.6: Consistency of Russian Frameworks and Laminations (Number and Issue Discussed)



U.S. Frame Consistency

During the first week of the Crimean Crisis, the U.S. State Department employed the 'Government Violence' framework, according to which the Ukrainian government was refusing to listen to the will of the people and was increasingly meeting protests with violence. The 'Government Violence' framework was consistently employed throughout the onset stage of the crisis (Weeks 1 to 6.1).

Yet, the most consistently employed framework by the U.S. State Department was the 'Respect for Ukrainian Territorial Integrity' framework and its lamination, 'Russian Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine'. Both of these stated that the Crisis was a result of Russian aggression and brazen military action, which was inconsistent with 21st-century diplomacy. These two frameworks were introduced in Week 7, two weeks prior to the Crimean referendum, and may have laid the foundation for America's rejection of Crimea's annexation to the Russian Federation and created a receptive environment for U.S. policies.

The least consistent lamination employed by the U.S. State Department was the 'Crisis of Democracy' lamination, which was a layer added to the 'Government Violence' framework. This lamination stated that the crisis in Ukraine was a crisis of democracy, as street rule had replaced institutional democracy. Yet, by the second part of Week 6, the U.S. State Department abandoned this lamination given the fleeing of the Ukrainian president and the appointment of a new interim government. Thus, this lamination demonstrates that as the reality of a crisis alters, so does an MFA's frameworks and laminations. Equally inconsistent was the 'Referendum Under Gunpoint is Illegal' lamination, which was used solely during Week 9 to immediately comment on the results of the Crimean referendum.


This lamination demonstrates how frameworks can be used to frame events in near-real time.

Lastly, the 'Restoring Democracy' framework was employed during Weeks 6.2 and 7, and was then abandoned. This may have been a result of the fact that events in Ukraine had shifted attention from the new government and democratic legislation to the future of Crimea and Russia's stealth invasion of Eastern Ukraine.

The analysis of U.S. State Department frame consistency differs somewhat from that of the Russian MFA. Unlike the Russian MFA, the U.S. State Department had no framework that was consistently employed throughout all 11 weeks of the Crisis. Rather, the U.S. State Department adopted new frameworks once the escalation stage of the crisis began (Week 6.2 and onwards). Moreover, while the Russian MFA employed a total of six laminations, the U.S. employed only three. This could explain why no U.S. framework was employed throughout all weeks of the Crisis, as laminations can be used to adapt a framework to new circumstances and increase its longevity.

However, the framework and lamination analysis presented in this section could have also aided negotiators seeking to reduce tensions between Moscow and Washington. During Week 5, negotiators could have anticipated a U.S. insistence on meaningful dialogue between the government and opposition members as the only solution to the Crisis. Conversely, during Week 8, negotiators could have anticipated a U.S. insistence on labelling Russia's actions as an invasion of Ukraine. By anticipating these arguments, negotiators may have been more likely to succeed in peacefully resolving the Crisis.

Graph 3.7: Consistency of U.S. Frameworks and Laminations (Number and Issue Discussed)



Laminations and Crisis Pressure Points

The analysis presented thus far demonstrates that both the U.S. State Department and the Russian MFA consistently employed certain primary frameworks over relatively long durations of time. In Russia's case, the 'No outside Interference' primary framework was employed in ten out of the eleven weeks evaluated in this thesis. Similarly, the U.S. State Department employed the 'Respect for Ukrainian Territorial Integrity' framework during five of the seven weeks comprising the escalation stage of the Crimean Crisis.

Primary frameworks may be regarded as a core argument made by an MFA in relation to a crisis. The primary framework identifies the challenge a crisis poses to a state's interests as well as its desired resolution. Indeed, Russia was determined to prevent Ukraine from aligning itself with the EU, as is manifested in the 'No outside Interference' framework, while the U.S. was determined to show its support for Ukraine and curb Russia's future expansionist actions - hence the 'Respect for Ukrainian Territorial Integrity' framework.

Laminations, on the other hand, are used to adapt frameworks to events unfolding on the ground. Laminations enable an MFA to integrate changing circumstances into its framework, thus avoiding frame breaking and maintaining frame consistency, which is crucial if one is to win over the support of digital publics. The more consistent one's narration of events, the more he can help people make sense of a crisis and reduce feelings of anxiety.

It was hypothesised that MFAs would add laminations to their frameworks prior to the formation of prevention pressure points, or instances in which diplomatic mediation is necessary to contain a crisis and prevent further escalation. This assumption was based on

the fact that a rapid succession of events during a crisis contributes to crisis acuteness. As events begin to unravel, decision-makers find themselves flooded with new information that must be analysed and interpreted. Conflicting accounts may soon hamper the ability of decision-makers to make sense of reality, while various organisations or groups within a government vie over access to leaders. Unravelling events also add to the senses of confusion, anxiety, and stress that accompany crisis escalation. Lastly, the more acute a crisis becomes, the greater the demand for quick decision-making under conditions of uncertainty (Boin et al., 2013; Holsti, 1989). These conditions would all manifest themselves in the adding of laminations to primary frameworks, as it is through laminations that MFAs comment in real time on rapidly evolving circumstances.

Conversely, it was assumed that the removal of laminations would accompany the formation of intervention pressure points, or instances in which diplomatic mediation may build on reduced tensions to seek long-term resolution of a crisis. The reason for this is that reduced tensions during a crisis are more likely to be accompanied by tense stalemates or fragile status quos than by rapid successions of events. As the momentum of a crisis begins to slow, so does the pressure on decision-makers and the sense of urgency that accompanies escalation. It is amid this climate that decision-makers may take stock of their gains and losses, reassess their respective positions, and even contemplate negotiations. Decision-makers may also choose not to unsettle the tense status quo, thus preventing further escalation. These conditions would manifest themselves in the removal of laminations, as during a status quo there is no need to comment on rapidly changing events. Moreover, events that have happened in the past may no longer be relevant during a stalemate, rendering these laminations redundant. Finally, it is during times of relative calm

that MFAs may focus their online framing activities on their core arguments, or primary frameworks, to emphasise their desired solution to the crisis.

Table 3.26 (below) offers an analysis of the removal and adding of laminations by both the U.S. and Russian MFAs prior to the formation of prevention and intervention pressure points. Specifically, the table evaluates whether increases in Integral Frame Distance Scores were accompanied by the adding of laminations, and whether reductions in Scores were accompanied by the removal of laminations. Instances in which the emergence of pressure points did not coincide with the hypothesised adding and removing of laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 3.26: Comparison Between Laminations and Integral Frame Distance Scores

Crisis Stage	Weeks	Change in Integral Frame Distance Score	Type of Pressure Point	Events	Russian Laminations	U.S. Laminations	Total Number of Laminations Added and Removed by Both MFAs
Onset Stage	1-2	+ 0.83	Prevention	President Putin announces plans to purchase \$15 billion worth of Ukrainian government bonds and to reduce the cost of natural gas sold to Ukraine	Russia adds 'EU External Pressure' lamination	-	1
	2-3	-0.45	Intervention	Ukrainian parliament passes and repeals a controversial anti-protest bill; clashes between security forces and pro-EU protesters	Russia removes 'EU External Pressure' lamination	-	1
	3-4	+0.46	Prevention	Violent clashes between security forces and pro-EU protests erupt across Kiev	Russia adds 'EU External Pressure' lamination	-	1
	4-5	+0.39	Prevention	Violent clashes between protestors and security forces leave 18 dead; parliamentary debates on constitutional reforms enter stalemate; parliament unable to pass bill to limit presidential powers	Russia adds 'Opposition are Nationalists' framework Russia adds 'Neo Nazi Coup' lamination	-	2

Crisis Stage	Weeks	Change in Integral Frame Distance Score	Type of Pressure Point	Events	Russian Laminations	U.S. Laminations	Total Number of Laminations Added and Removed by Both MFAs
	5-6.1	-1.11	Intervention	Clashes between security forces and protesters escalate, leaving 88 dead	-	U.S. adds 'Crisis of Democracy' lamination	1
Escalation Stage	6.1-6.2	+0.94	Prevention	Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich flees Kiev; opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko released from prison, addresses a mass rally in Kiev Ukrainian parliament assigns temporary presidential powers to the parliament's chairman; date set for new presidential elections Pro-Russian protesters hold rally in Crimea condemning the new administration in Kiev; pro-Russian activist appointed leader of the Sevastopol region; pro-Russian rallies continue throughout Crimea Clashes between pro-Russians and pro-Ukrainians erupt in Crimea	Russia adds 'Rights of Russian Minorities' lamination	-	1

Crisis Stage	Weeks	Change in Integral Frame Distance Score	Type of Pressure Point	Events	Russian Laminations	U.S. Laminations	Total Number of Laminations Added and Removed by Both MFAs
Escalation Stage	6.2-7	-0.06	Intervention	Armed pro-Kremlin activists seize government buildings in Crimea; men in combat fatigues capture Simferopol International Airport alongside a military airfield in Sevastopol Russian parliament officially approve use of military force in Crimea; Russian troop convoys make their way to capital of Crimea Interim Ukrainian president says Russia declared war on his country; Russia's Black Fleet demands full surrender of all Ukrainian naval forces in Crimea	Russia adds 'No Role for NATO' lamination Russia adds 'Threat to Russian Interests' lamination	U.S. adds 'Russian Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine' lamination	3
	7-8	-0.23	Intervention	Crimea's parliament votes in favour of joining the Russian Federation; Crimean regional parliament adopts a Declaration of Independence EU proposes a trade package to Ukraine	Russia removes 'No Role for NATO' lamination Russia removes 'Threat to Russian Interests' lamination	-	2

Crisis Stage	Weeks	Change in Integral Frame Distance Score	Type of Pressure Point	Events	Russian Laminations	U.S. Laminations	Total Number of Laminations Added and Removed by Both MFAs
Escalation Stage	8-9	+0.43	Prevention	Meeting between President Barack Obama and the interim Ukrainian president held at the White House Secretary of State John Kerry meets with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in London Majority of the UN Security Council vote in favour of a draft resolution labelling upcoming Crimean referendum as illegal; Russia vetoes Security Council resolution Crimean referendum ends with 95% of voters supporting Crimea's decision to join the Russian Federation U.S. and its European allies freeze assets of, and place visa bans on, individuals associated with the Crimean referendum Ukrainian parliament votes in favour of creating a 60,000-person National Guard tasked with defending Ukraine	-	U.S. adds 'Referendum Under Gunpoint is Illegal' lamination	2

Crisis Stage	Weeks	Change in Integral Frame Distance Score	Type of Pressure Point	Events	Russian Laminations	U.S. Laminations	Total Number of Laminations Added and Removed by Both MFAs
Escalation Stage	9-10	-0.29	Intervention	Putin signs document officially integrating Crimea into the Russian Federation; Ukraine announces that it will not recognise Crimea's new status Ukrainian soldier shot and killed by gunmen attempting to infiltrate a Ukrainian military base in Simferopol; Pro-Russian forces take control of Ukrainian military base in Simferopol U.S. and EU formally condemned the annexation of Crime and expand the sanctions	Russia adds 'NATO's Cold War Mentality' lamination Russia removes 'Rights of Russian Minorities' lamination	U.S. removes 'Referendum Under Gunpoint is Illegal' lamination	3
	10-11	+0.15	Prevention	G7 nations meet for the first time without Russia Ukraine's acting president orders troops to withdraw from Crimea UN General Assembly adopts a resolution stating that the annexation of Crimea is illegal Ukrainian presidential election campaign officially starts	Russia adds 'Politicizing the UN' lamination Russia removes 'NATO's Cold War Mentality' lamination	-	2

As can be seen in Table 3.26, the formation of all prevention pressure points were accompanied by the adding of laminations by at least one of the two MFAs. For instance, between Weeks 1 and 2, there was a 0.83 increase in Integral Frame Distance Scores, suggesting that both governments were growing further apart and that the crisis was escalating, leading to the formation of prevention pressure points. This was accompanied by the addition of the 'EU External Pressure' lamination by the Russian MFA. Similarly, the growth in Integral Frame Distance Scores between Weeks 3 and 4, and Weeks 4 and 5, were both accompanied by the addition of laminations by the Russian MFA.

Similar results were obtained during the escalation stage. The growth in Integral Frame Distance Scores between Weeks 6.1 and 6.2 saw the Russian MFA add the lamination of 'Rights of Russian Minorities', while between Weeks 8 and 9 the State Department added the lamination of 'Referendum Under Gunpoint is Illegal'.

However, Table 3.26 also demonstrates that not all intervention pressure points were accompanied by the removal of laminations. For instance, between Weeks 5 and 6.1, there was a 1.11 reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores, suggesting that both governments were growing closer and that diplomatic mediation may be able to build on this momentum towards crisis resolution. Yet this week was accompanied by the State Department *adding* the 'Crisis of Democracy' lamination. Similarly, the intervention pressure point between Weeks 6.2 and 7 was accompanied by the adding of two Russian laminations and one U.S. lamination. Of the five intervention points identified in Table 3.26, three were accompanied by the removal of laminations and two were accompanied by the adding of laminations.

Lastly, Table 3.26 demonstrates that as a crisis escalates, and as events begin to gain momentum, MFAs increasingly add and remove laminations from their frameworks. During most of the onset stage, the total number of laminations added or removed by both MFAs in a given week was either 1 or 2. During the escalation stage, the total number of laminations added or removed during a given week ranged between 2 to 4. These results suggest that the adding and removing of laminations may be indicative of crisis acuteness. Indeed, the more laminations that are added and removed during a given week, the more events are unfolding on the ground and the greater the pressure on decision-makers.

The conflicting results presented in Table 3.26 may be explained by the fact that the frame distance model takes into account a myriad of factors, each of which impacts the Integral Frame Distance Scores. For instance, the intervention pressure point between Weeks 5 and 6.1 emerged following a sizable reduction in the number of tweets published by the Russian MFA, a more positive sentiment in tweets describing Russian phone calls with other leaders, and a more positive sentiment of State Department tweets describing phone calls with world leaders. Yet during the same week, a dramatic event took place as clashes between pro-EU protesters and security forces left 88 people dead, prompting the State Department to add the lamination of 'Crisis of Democracy'. Similarly, the intervention pressure point between Weeks 6.2 and 7 emerged following a more positive sentiment in Russian tweets. Yet this week saw a rapid succession of violent events, which prompted both MFAs to add several laminations to their frameworks.

The frame distance model therefore cannot rely on the mere adding or removing of laminations to explain the formation of intervention and prevention pressure points. Rather, it is the combination of factors that are used to arrive at the Integral Frame Distance Scores

that better account for this. However, the overall number of laminations added and removed by MFAs may be used as an indicator for crisis acuteness. Indeed, as the Crimean Crisis intensified and entered the escalation stage, the overall number of laminations added and removed by MFAs each week grew significantly. This was to be expected as the escalation stage would see rapidly changing circumstances and a growing need to frame events in near-real time. Thus, the overall number of added and removed laminations may be integrated into the frame distance model as an additional indicator of crisis acuteness and, subsequently, of the relative scope of disagreement between two governments.

Discussion

The goal of this thesis is to answer the question, **How do MFAs use digital tools in times of crises, and how can the use of these tools inform strategies to manage crises?** Answering this question is important for two main reasons. First, it is expected that the 21st-century will witness more frequent, intertwined, and complex crises. New modalities of power, loss of state agency, and global interconnectedness foster a reality in which regional crises have global implications and in which the number of actors and interests involved in a crisis multiplies. Subsequently, diplomats will increasingly be tasked with the management of diplomatic crises. Equally important, given the complex nature of crises, diplomats may be forced to settle for short-term containment of a crisis rather than long-term resolution.

Second, recent years have seen the emergence of a new diplomatic arena: social media. Faced with a new and complex media environment, diplomats migrated en masse to social media to offer their framing, or narration, of world events and compete with the framing of other actors including traditional media institutions, new media actors, and other states (Hayden 2012; Seib, 2012). As such, diplomatic crises now see a plethora of online diplomatic activity used to create offline conditions in which diplomatic goals may be obtained. Understanding offline crisis management is thus intrinsically linked to grasping diplomats' online activity during a crisis.

This thesis postulates that MFAs use social media to frame events during a crisis in near-real time. Subsequently, it argues that digital diplomacy content may be used to track a crisis's

progression in near-real time and identify crisis pressure points in which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted or most effective.

The frame distance model rests on four main assumptions. The first is that MFAs will utilise Twitter to offer a prism, or frame, through which a crisis can be interpreted. This assumption stems from previous studies that trace the emergence of digital diplomacy to MFAs' need to counter frames disseminated by nonstate actors, online publics, citizen journalists, diplomatic actors, and the media and compete over the attention of digital publics (Hallams, 2010; Hayden, 2012; Manor, 2016; Seib, 2012). Within this competitive global media ecology, MFAs are forced to comment on events in near-real time. One way to do so is through the creation and dissemination of frames (Seib, 2016). Moreover, previous studies have found that administrations often frame foreign policy crises to gain support for their policies from both the media and the public (Auerbach & Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Entman, 2004, 2008; Wood & Peake, 1998).

The second assumption underpinning the frame distance model is that MFAs will frame a crisis by employing primary frameworks. These frameworks, to paraphrase Erving Goffman, are cognitive schemata that explain what is happening now, what has happened before, and what will happen next (Goffman, 1974, p.38). This assumption stems from the fact that crises threaten the interests of a state. Moreover, crises constitute periods of increased anxiety and uncertainty among publics, as well as policy-makers. MFA frames may therefore be most effective during crises, as they offer the public a prism through which rapidly changing circumstances may be understood. Such frames may also create a receptive environment in which a state can obtain its policy goals and secure its interests. Thus, it was assumed that MFA

frameworks would promote a desirable or favourable resolution to a crisis. Building on the works of Robert Entman, it was hypothesised that primary frameworks would consist of four elements: a problem definition, a causal attribution, a moral evaluation, and a suggested remedy (Entman, 1993).

The analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates that MFAs do indeed use Twitter for real time framing purposes. Throughout the Crimean Crisis, both the U.S. and Russian MFAs employed Twitter to offer interpretations of the events unfolding in Ukraine. Additionally, as this chapter has demonstrated, these frameworks consisted of the four elements identified by Entman (1993).

In each week, both MFAs identified the problem at the root of the Crimean Crisis and its cause. Notably, this problem definition was intrinsically linked to a suggested remedy. For instance, during Week 2, the Russian MFA argued that the problem driving events in Ukraine was an attempt to force Ukraine to associate itself with the EU. The proposed solution was to respect Ukrainian sovereignty. Similarly, during Week 7, the Russian MFA stated that the problem underpinning the Crisis was the threat posed to Russian ethnic minorities from the ultranationalist government in Kiev. The solution was for Russia to make every effort to protect the lives of these minorities. Lastly, during the same week, the U.S. State Department argued that the Crisis was the result of Russia's invasion and occupation of Crimea. The solution was a complete military retreat from Crimea.

These examples demonstrate that by framing the problem at the root of a crisis, MFAs can also promote their desired or favourable solution for the crisis. Importantly, these

examples also begin to illustrate the interaction between online and offline diplomacy. The framing of the Crimean Crisis by both MFAs can be understood as a tool for achieving offline diplomatic goals. By stating that there was a threat to Russian ethnic minorities in Crimea, the Russian MFA may have sought to legitimise the deployment of Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine. By framing Russia's actions as an invasion and occupation of another country, the U.S. State Department may have sought to rally support from its allies in condemning Russia. This insight demonstrates the manner in which framing theory can help scholars conceptualise the use of social media in diplomacy as narration with intent to influence people's perception of events and rally support for one's policies.

Each MFA's framework also included a moral evaluation. The results of this case study suggest that morality plays three important functions in MFA framing during crises. First, both MFAs attempted to wield Social Power through Twitter. Van Ham (2013) defined Social Power as the use of values and norms to facilitate or constrain state action. Throughout the Crisis, the Russian and U.S. MFAs invoked norms and values to legitimise their actions and constrain those of the other. For instance, during Week 7, the U.S. State Department depicted Russia's actions as a 19th-century act of aggression that did not correspond with 21st-century covenants of diplomacy. Similarly, during Week 6, the Russian MFA stated that the West was guided by unilateral geopolitical calculations rather than the logic of peace and cooperation. Lastly, both MFAs repeatedly invoked international law to legitimise their actions. According to the U.S. State Department, Russia violated international law when invading Ukraine and must thus face international sanctions. According to the Russian MFA, the Crimean referendum was legal under international law following the Kosovo precedent. In all these cases, norms and values

were invoked to facilitate or legitimise one's own actions and constrain or delegitimise those of an adversary. This finding again demonstrates how online diplomacy can be used to achieve offline diplomatic goal- namely, limiting the possible offline actions of an adversary and preventing him from securing his interests.

Moral evaluations were also used to frame diplomatic actors. Such was the case during Week 5 when the Russian MFA depicted the U.S. as supporting a neo-Nazi coup, or when the U.S. alleged that the Yanukovych government had spilled the blood of innocent Ukrainians. These moral evaluations may have been employed to win the competition over the hearts and minds of social media followers, both at home and abroad. Indeed, it is hard to believe that the U.S. could continue supporting the interim Ukrainian government if social media followers came to view this government as a neo-Nazi administration. Thus, these examples suggest that social media framing is a competitive practice in which diplomatic actors vie for the attention and support of online publics (Hallams, 2010; Hayden, 2012; Manor, 2016; Seib, 2016).

Lastly, both the U.S. and Russian MFAs created moral dichotomies through which they distinguished themselves from one another. For instance, during Week 2, the Russian MFA argued that the EU was motivated by outdated concepts of geopolitical struggles and was forcing Ukraine to draw artificial borders in Europe. By contrast, the MFA depicted Russian foreign policy as resting on the principles of friendship and beneficial cooperation. Similarly, in Week 10, the U.S. State Department argued that Russia had adopted a 'dark' foreign policy that did not adhere to the norms that govern diplomacy in the 21st-century. By contrast, the U.S.'s foreign policy was guided by the principle that people should be allowed to determine their own futures. By employing moral dichotomies, both sides may have attempted to lay the blame

for events in Ukraine on the other's doorstep. As Mor (2006) wrote, moral argument may be employed for strategic blame-shifting in which one actor identifies another as responsible for negative outcomes. This enables states to constrain the actions of other actors during a crisis, thus preventing these actors from obtaining their strategic goals.

The centrality of morality in MFAs' primary frameworks resonates with the argument that morality breeds legitimacy in the international arena. When nations are seen as acting in accordance with, or in favour of, accepted norms and values, they are less likely to encounter resistance to their foreign policies and actions. Moreover, norms and values can legitimise the use of hard power, including military power (Natarajan, 2014; Nye, 1990; Quelch & Jocz, 2009).

In adherence with Goffman's conceptualisation of primary frameworks as cognitive schemata, MFA frameworks offered Twitter users an interpretation of what had happened before, what was happening now, and what would happen next in the Crimean Crisis (Goffman 1974). Such was the case with the U.S. State Department's first framework, which stated that violent altercations had taken place in Kiev, that the government's response to the protests was unbefitting of a democracy and that the government should listen to the people. Similarly, Russia's primary framework stated that violent altercations had taken place in Kiev, that the opposition was aggressively stoking the government, and that both sides should resume settlement talks. These results suggest that during crises, MFA frames may include a temporal dimension that elucidates the past, narrates the present, and identifies a desired future. Such linear frameworks may make a crisis more comprehensible to online followers looking to gain insight into events shaping their world.

Importantly, both MFAs' frameworks differed during the first week of the Crisis. As violence erupted in Kiev, the Russian MFA argued that outside parties should not interfere in an internal Ukrainian matter. Conversely, the U.S. State Department argued that government violence towards protestors was the cause of mounting tensions in Ukraine. Both MFAs thus differed in their problem definitions as well as their moral evaluations. However, both MFAs did agree that talks between the government and the opposition were the best way forward.

The results presented thus far validate this thesis's first research statement (**S1**: In times of crisis, MFAs seek to maximise support for their position by articulating favourable frameworks of interpretation that are composed of a problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation and suggested remedy). Statement 1 also did not meet its falsification criteria as the frameworks employed by the U.S. and Russian MFAs diverged to varying degrees throughout all weeks of the crises. (**Falsification**: S1 will be falsified if there is no divergence between the primary frameworks disseminated on Twitter by two opposing MFAs).

The third assumption of the frame distance model is that MFA frameworks will differ from one another during a crisis, thus enabling the measurement of the frame distance between them. This assumption is based on the fact that a crisis is, by definition, a turning point in the relations between two nations who perceive a credible threat to their interests. Thus, each country is likely to pursue a policy that promotes its interests (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Bell, 1971; Boin et al., 2013; Ramcharan, 2008). The fourth assumption of the model is that the distance, or difference, between two MFA frameworks will alter throughout a crisis. During the onset stage, the frame distance may grow as each nation attempts to secure its own interests.

During the de-escalation stage, the frame distance is likely to narrow as both nations come to agree on a solution.

The results of the U.S.-Russia case study demonstrate that MFA frameworks do indeed differ from one another. Moreover, such differences are linked to the interests of each actor. Following the fleeing of president Viktor Yanukovych, the Russian MFA and the U.S. State Department employed substantially different frameworks. According to the Russian MFA, neo-Nazis had staged a coup in Kiev and were threatening the lives of Russian minorities in Eastern Ukraine. According to the U.S. State Department, there was a need to support Ukraine as it rebuilt confidence in its democratic institutions. Each framework may be linked to a separate set of interests as Russia attempted to maintain control of its sphere of influence while the U.S. looked to strengthen its ties with a new pro-Western government. These different offline interests manifested themselves in the online framing of each MFA.

However, as was expected, there were many instances in which both MFAs' frameworks corresponded with one another, leading to variability in frame distance throughout the Crimean Crisis. Such was the case during Week 3, when both MFAs identified violent clashes as the problem driving events in Ukraine, or in Week 6, when both agreed that the cause of the Crisis was mob democracy and that the only solution was direct talks between the government and the opposition.

In Goffman's terminology, frame distance measures the severity of frame disputes between two governments. Goffman stated that frame disputes arise when there is more than one answer to the question, 'What is going on?' (Goffman, 1974, p. 332). However, as Goffman

did not identify the elements comprising frameworks, his work prevents one from assessing the severity of frame disputes. The frame distance model overcomes this limitation and demonstrates that the severity of frame disputes between two governments can be measured and, subsequently, the progression of a crisis can be monitored. Diplomats relying on the frame distance model would have been able to discern that the Crimean Crisis was not progressing in a linear fashion, as was suggested by the literature (Bjola, 2016b; Topper & Lagadec, 2013). Rather, throughout the Crisis, there were points of convergence and divergence between the U.S. and Russian governments.

Yet, the frame distance model does not rely solely on the measurement of MFA frame disputes. The Integral Frame Distance Score is composed of additional factors, including rhetorical indicators and the number of tweets published. All factors are integrated using a matrix of calculation to offer a single measurement of the scope of disagreement between two governments. Markedly, the onset stage began with a sharp increase in Integral Frame Distance Scores. This is not a surprising result given that crises tend to burst onto the scene (McConnell & Drennan, 2006; Wood & Peake, 1998). The crisis slide (Weeks 3 to 5) saw a steady and rapid increase in frame distance, as could be expected given that this stage includes an escalatory momentum that signifies the transition from the onset stage to the escalation stage (Bell, 1971). As such, offline escalation during the onset and crisis slide stages led to a greater divergence between U.S. and Russian primary frameworks. However, during the escalation stage, Integral Frame Distance Scores varied suggesting that even at the height of a crisis, two governments may move closer together and diplomats may find common ground. In these

instances, offline de-escalation manifested itself in a growing convergence between the MFAs' frameworks.

These results validate this thesis's second research statement (**S2**: Offline escalation is conducive to *divergence* between primary frameworks while offline de-escalation is conducive to *convergence* between primary frameworks). However, it should be noted that the frame distance between the Russian and U.S. MFAs did not narrow at the end of the Crisis, given that the Crimean Crisis ended with a tense stalemate that persists to this day. Notably, S2 did not meet its falsification criteria given changes to frame distances between crisis stages (**Falsification**: S2 will be falsified if there is no change to the frame distance once a crisis transitions from one stage to another. Under such conditions, the scope of disagreement between conflicted parties is static and there is no escalatory momentum, which is characteristic of crises).

The fifth assumption of the frame distance model is that changes in frame distance denote crisis pressure points. Within the scope of this thesis, crisis pressure points are conceptualised as instances in which diplomatic mediation may be most effective or most warranted. Increases in Integral Frame Distance Scores suggest that the two governments are growing further apart and thus signify prevention pressure points at which diplomatic mediation is necessary to contain a crisis and prevent further escalation. Conversely, decreases in Integral Frame Distance Scores denote that the two governments may be moving closer together, thus signifying intervention pressure points in which mediation is more likely to succeed at resolving a crisis. The analysis of the U.S.-Russia case study identified six prevention pressure points and five intervention pressure points.

This thesis's conceptualisation of crisis pressure points builds on Druckman's work on 'turning points' in negotiations. Druckman (2001) argued that turning points are events that move the trajectory of negotiations towards or away from an agreement. He further posited that, while scholars have agreed on a definition of turning points, they have yet to create a framework for identifying and utilising turning points during negotiations (ibid, pp. 519-520). By reconceptualising 'turning points' as pressure points and measuring differences in MFAs' real time framing of events, the Frame Distance model enables one to track a crisis's progression, map pressure points, and identify issues that may serve as a gateway to negotiations. This is because the frame distance model enables diplomats to anticipate each side's core arguments, and to analyse each side's key interests and areas of relative agreement.

For instance, diplomats using the frame distance model would have identified Week 3 as a crisis intervention point given the substantial decrease in Integral Frame Distance Scores. By qualitatively comparing both MFAs' frameworks, diplomats would have realised that both governments agreed that the cause of the crisis was violent clashes between the opposition and the government. This could have served as an entry point to negotiations, as previous studies suggest that when two sides begin to discuss the same issue, their frames may become more aligned, ultimately leading to a possible resolution of the crisis (Snow et al., 1986). But diplomats would have also anticipated disagreements with regard to the cause of the crisis, with Russia focusing on Western interference and the U.S. focusing on the undemocratic response of president Yanukovych. By anticipating differences between the two sides, diplomats could have entered mediation talks with an array of possible solutions that could have met both sides' demands.

Additionally, diplomats could have used frame consistency analysis to identify each side's interests. Diplomats using the frame distance model during Week 3 could have realised that Russia's key interest was to limit Western intervention in its sphere of influence, given the fact that this was the third consecutive week to employ the 'No Outside Interference' framework. Similarly, diplomats using the frame distance model during Week 10 could have realised that the U.S.'s interest was to prevent further territorial incursions by Russia, as this was the fourth consecutive week it had employed the 'Occupation and Invasion' lamination. By identifying the core arguments and interests of each side, diplomats could have sought long-term solutions, which would have prevented similar crises in the future. In this way, the feedback loop of fractal crises may have been more adequately addressed (Bjola, 2016b; Topper & Lagadec, 2013).

As Allison & Zelikow's (1999) seminal work suggested crises see intense competitions within decision-making forums as bureaucrats compete over access to leaders while striving to secure their organisation's interests and accumulate power and prestige (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 176). This can lead to a refusal to share information, insight, and resources. Such competitions impede a government's ability to manage crises, as consensus among decision-makers is harder to reach (ibid, p.1 66). The frame distance model can help diplomats overcome this impediment. As noted above, by identifying frameworks that are consistently used by an MFA throughout a crisis, diplomats may be able to identify that actor's key interests and to propose solutions that address these interests. Such solutions may gain consensus within governments as they address a nation's key concerns- concerns that bureaucrats competing over power are more likely to agree on. As such, the frame distance model could help

diplomats resolve crises even under conditions of internal bickering and competitions within conflicted governments.

In summary, the frame distance model makes a valuable analytical contribution that meets three challenges. The first, articulated by Druckman (2001), is that diplomats cannot identify crisis turning points. The second, articulated by Bjola (2016b), is that diplomats have made little progress in their ability to manage a crisis. The third, articulated by Sauer (2007), Acuto (2011) and Regan (1998), is that diplomatic interventions during crises must be tailored to the unique characteristic of each crisis. Intervening too soon may lead to the collapse of negotiations, while intervening too late may be futile, as leaders have already invested too much capital in going to war (Fearon, 1997). The frame distance model enables diplomats to tailor interventions to the relative scope of disagreement between governments.

While both the Russian and U.S. MFAs used Twitter to create primary frameworks, they also employed laminations. Goffman (1974) argued that laminations are layers that can be added to a primary framework. Laminations prevent frame breaking, or occurrences in which one's actions break a collective framework (ibid), such as a wrestler who removes the lamination of a scripted fight and begins to harm his fake opponent. Within the scope of the U.S.-Russia case study, laminations enabled both MFAs to comment on rapidly changing circumstances and to adapt their frameworks to unfolding events, thus preventing frame breaking.

The use of laminations to adapt frameworks was most evident in weeks that saw a rapid succession of events. Week 5 of the Crimean Crisis, for instance, saw the deaths of eighteen

protesters in Kiev, a deadlock in parliamentary debates, and the seizure of government buildings in the capital. In response, the Russian MFA added a layer to its framework of 'Opposition are Nationalists', which described the opposition as mounting an attempted coup. In this manner, the MFA continued to depict the opposition in a negative light while commenting in real time on their seizure of government buildings. Similarly, Week 6 saw an escalation in clashes between protesters and security forces that left 88 people dead. In response, the U.S. State Department added a lamination to its 'Government Violence' framework, according to which there was now a crisis in Ukrainian democracy as street rule had replaced democratic processes. Here, again, the MFA was able to adapt its framework to changing circumstances. These results suggest that during crises, MFAs use social media to comment on events in near-real time while maintaining their interpretation of events. This utilisation of social media is necessary given MFAs' need to compete with other actors who also frame events, including the media, citizen journalists, and other diplomatic actors (Hallams, 2010; Manor & Crilley, 2019; Seib, 2012, 2016).

Despite the fact that both MFAs added and removed laminations to their frameworks, they also consistently employed certain frameworks. As the frame constancy analysis demonstrates, the Russian MFA employed the 'No Outside Interference' in eleven out of the twelve weeks evaluated in this case study, while the 'Opposition are Nationalists' framework was employed in eight consecutive weeks. The U.S. State Department employed both the 'Respect for Territorial Integrity' and the 'Russian Invasion and Occupation' frameworks in five of the six weeks that made up the escalation stage. These results could suggest that MFAs use social media to offer a consistent and coherent interpretation of a crisis, thus avoiding frame

breaking. From Goffman's perspective, coherent and consistent interpretations may increase the efficacy of a framework, as they offer a constant answer to the question, 'What is going on?' Consistency may thus also help an actor create a receptive environment for his policy goals.

But even more importantly, frame breaking may limit social media followers' ability to understand and anticipate events, leaving them rattled as they are confronted by a succession of rapidly changing circumstances. Thus, frame breaking could prevent MFAs from being viewed as trusted sources of information and analysis. Upkeying and Downkeying, or adding and removing laminations, may therefore be regarded as an important component of MFAs' use of social media during a crisis - one that increases their trustworthiness in the eyes of their followers.

It could be argued that the more consistent a frame, the more it articulates a country's key interests. This assumption rests on Topper and Lagadec's (2013) argument that resolving crises rests on identifying recurring themes within a crisis's fractals. The consistency of Russia's argument against foreign meddling in Ukraine suggests, yet again, that its core interest may have been to limit Western involvement in its backyard. The consistency of the U.S.'s 'Invasion and Occupation' lamination suggests that the U.S. may have sought to limit future invasions by Russia in Eastern Europe. Frame consistency therefore suggests that MFAs use social media to secure key interests during times of upheaval. Here again, online diplomacy is used to complement offline diplomatic goals.

That said, there were also instances in which the dynamic nature of the Crisis forced MFAs to employ temporary laminations. During Week 7, the Russian MFA employed five frameworks and laminations, including the 'No Role for NATO' lamination, which was used only once to comment on a NATO summit. Similarly, the U.S. State Department employed the 'Crisis of Democracy' framework only one time during Week 6.1. These examples demonstrate that the dynamic nature of crises can often lead to frame breaking, as events render frameworks irrelevant. Subsequently, crisis framing may be regarded as a vexing and resource-intensive endeavour.

Yet it should be noted that the adding and removing of laminations in response to offline events may limit the ability of MFAs to act as coherent narrators. This is especially true if MFAs employ a high number of frameworks and laminations during the same week. For instance, during Week 7, the Russian MFA employed six frameworks and laminations. Social media followers soon found themselves flooded with multiple interpretations of the events unfolding in Ukraine. According to one framework, the Crisis was a result of the EU's attempt to interfere in an internal Ukrainian matter. Another framework lay the blame for the Crisis on neo-Nazis who had staged a coup in Kiev while a third framework stated that the Crisis had escalated due to a threat to Russia's military interests. Each of these frameworks also offered a different solution to the crisis ranging from the implementation of the February 21 agreement to holding Ukrainian nationalists responsible for their crimes against Russian minorities. While the Russian MFA may have employed all these frameworks and laminations in an attempt to comment on unfolding events, the result may have been confusion and angst among social media followers who could no longer receive a clear answer to the question 'What is going on?'

The same was true of the U.S. State Department, which during Week 9 argued that the Crimean Crisis was a result of Russia's violation of international law, its de facto invasion and occupation of Crimea and Russia's decision to hold an independence referendum under the threat of force. The solutions to the Crisis included direct negotiations with Russia, threatening Russia with sanctions and holding free and fair elections in Ukraine. Thus, as was the case with the Russian MFA, the State Department's attempt to offer real time narration of events unfolding on the ground may have confused followers and limited the U.S.'s ability to act as a coherent narrator.

In summary, it seems that both MFAs felt compelled to comment on a plethora of events unfolding on the ground by adding and removing laminations. This may have stemmed from the perceived severity of these events. For instance, during Week 6.2, the Russian MFA could not afford *not* to comment on the interim government's decision to abandon the February 21 agreement as this agreement ensured the longevity of the Yanukovich government and the close ties between Russia and Ukraine. Similarly, Russia may have felt compelled to comment on NATO's decision to hold an emergency session during Week 7 as it feared that the alliance might take a more active role in the Crisis. The U.S. State Department, on its part, could not afford *not* to comment on Russia's incursion into Crimea during Week 7, or its decision to hold a mock referendum during Week 9. Indeed, both events challenged the legal world order established by the U.S. and its allies following WWII. From a strategic perspective, MFAs must balance the need to comment on crucial events in near-real time with the necessity of offering a clear and consistent answer to the question 'What is going on?'

The finding that MFAs added and removed laminations from their frameworks in response to unfolding events validates this thesis's third research statement (**S3**: The adding and removing of laminations from primary frameworks reflects the perceived severity of the events unfolding on the ground). S3 did not meet its falsification criteria, as both MFAs repeatedly responded to unfolding events by integrating them into their frameworks through laminations. Once these events ended (i.e. NATO discussions regarding Crimea), the laminations in question were removed (**Falsification**: S3 will be falsified if MFAs do not add or remove laminations in response to events that are unfolding on the ground. Under such conditions, the events in question are not viewed as relevant or severe by MFAs and thus do not affect their national interests or contribute to the rapid escalation of the crisis).

The results presented thus far demonstrate that MFAs frame events in real time by adding and removing laminations. The question that follows is, does the removing and adding of laminations account for the formation of intervention and prevention pressure points? The results of the U.S.-Russia case study offer conflicting answers to this question. The formation of prevention pressure points, in which crisis containment is necessary, were all accompanied by the adding of laminations by at least one MFA. As was hypothesised, prevention pressure points saw a rapid succession of unfolding events which demanded that MFAs alter their frameworks so as to comment on events, and maintain frame consistency. However, not all intervention pressure points, in which long-term crisis resolution may be achieved, were accompanied by the removal of laminations. In two instances, reductions in Integral Frame Distance Scores were accompanied by the adding of laminations, as well as rapidly changing circumstances on the ground.

The reason for this discrepancy is that Integral Frame Distance Scores are based on a myriad of factors that are not necessarily linked to the number of events occurring during a given week. For instance, between Weeks 6.2 and 7, there was a reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores, despite the fact that this week saw armed pro-Kremlin activists seize government buildings in Crimea, men in combat fatigues capture airports in Crimea, and the Russian parliament approve the use of force in Crimea. The reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores, and the emergence of an intervention pressure point, was the result of a more positive sentiment of Russian tweets. Similarly, despite the fact that Weeks 5 and 6.1 saw the deaths of 88 protesters in Kiev and the adding of a lamination by the U.S. State Department, this week also saw the emergence of an intervention pressure point given a more positive tone of Russian and U.S. phone call tweets and a reduction in the number of tweets published by the Russian MFA.

The results presented thus far only partially validated the fourth statement of this thesis (**S4**: Prevention pressure points are constituted once MFAs add laminations to primary frameworks, while intervention pressure points are constituted once MFAs remove laminations). Thus, the mere adding and removing of laminations do not account for the formation of intervention or prevention pressure points. Yet the frequent adding and removing of laminations may serve as an indicator of crisis acuteness. The overall number of laminations added and removed in a given week grew once the Crimean Crisis entered the escalation stage. Subsequently, the overall number of added and removed laminations may be incorporated into the frame distance model as an additional indicator of crisis acuteness. This indicator would more closely link the model to events unfolding on the ground as the rapid adding and

removing of laminations suggests that numerous events are occurring and that an escalatory momentum is in progress.

S4 was the only statement to partially meet its falsification criteria (**S4 will be falsified if the adding of laminations will not precede prevention pressure points, or if the removing of laminations will not precede intervention pressure points**). Yet as has been argued, while the emergence of intervention and prevention pressure points is not wholly dependent on Upkeying and Downkeying, it is also not completely divorced from the adding and removing of laminations. Rather, the rapid adding and removing of laminations is indicative of crisis acuteness.

The results of the U.S.-Russia case study illustrate how MFA framing is similar to that of the media in that it also rests on framing techniques such as selection, emphasis, repetition, and exclusion (de Vreese, Peter & Semetko 2001; Entman, 1993). Throughout the Crimean Crisis, both MFAs used Twitter to emphasise certain events and repeat certain arguments. In the case of the Russian MFA, this was most evident in its attempt to brand the Ukrainian opposition as both ultranationalist and Russophobic. To this end, the MFA highlighted the desecration of monuments to Russian victories in WWII, the rejection of Russian as a regional language, a ban on Russian companies broadcasting in Ukraine, and a document tying the opposition to Ukrainian Nazi collaborators. The U.S. State Department chose to focus on the bravery of the Ukrainian people, who wished nothing more than to determine their own fates. This was evident in a statement that proclaimed that the U.S. stood with the people of Ukraine, visits by U.S. officials to Kiev's Independence Square and to a shrine honouring those who died

in the protests, and pictures of U.S. officials conversing with the ‘courageous’ people of Ukraine.

Entman (2004) and Gitlin (1980) have asserted that like the media, governments also employ framing techniques, as these increase the likelihood of journalists adopting the administration’s interpretation of events. Moreover, digital diplomacy studies suggest that MFAs use social media to bypass traditional media and disseminate their frames directly to a globally connected public sphere (Bjola 2016a; Hocking & Melissen, 2015; Pamment, 2012; Pamment, 2014). Both of these objectives may have been achieved by the U.S. and Russian MFAs given their reliance on framing techniques such as repetition and selection.

However, both MFAs also published a host of tweets during press conferences alongside addresses by national leaders. These tweets may have been aimed directly at journalists covering the Crimean Crisis. This assumption, which warrants further analysis, could suggest that the media retains an important role in the framing of global events and that Entman’s cascading activation model remains relevant, even in the age of social media (Entman, 2004, p. 10).

Previous studies suggest that framing is not mere narration, but rather, narration with the goal of influencing the public’s world view and their subsequent behaviour. Thus, framing bears the imprint of power (Entman, 1993, p. 5). Influencing the worldview of the public may be achieved during the frame setting stage, during which frames interact with audiences’ previous dispositions and knowledge (D’Angelo, 2002; de Vreese, 2005). Both MFAs seem to have created frameworks that resonated with their national audiences. The U.S. State Department’s

frameworks depicted the Crimean Crisis as one centred on democratic aspirations. During the onset stage, the U.S. State Department portrayed events in Kiev as the brutal oppression of Ukrainians' democratic spirit. During the escalation stage, it portrayed the fledgling Ukrainian democracy as being besieged by a Russian menace. The Russian MFA, on the other hand, depicted events in Ukraine as a fight against neo-fascism. Subsequently, American Twitter users may have interpreted events in Ukraine as another struggle in America's enduring fight for democracy, while Russian audiences may have interpreted the Crisis as another stage in Russia's historical battle against fascism.

In Goffman's terminology, the resonance between MFA frameworks and national history is actually a resonance between an individual's framework and that of society. Goffman stipulates that a society's framework of frameworks constitutes a belief system that promotes certain values, ideals, and ideologies (Goffman, 1974, p. 27). As such, societal frameworks, like MFA frameworks, are the results of intent and agency. By employing crisis frameworks that resonated with societal frameworks, both the Russian and U.S. MFAs may have increased the effectiveness of their narration, as it was more likely to adhere to followers' pre-existing worldviews. This also suggests that both MFAs attempted to win domestic support for their foreign policies, which included the use of military and financial power. This finding indicates that MFAs use social media during crises to garner support at the national level, to achieve goals at the international level. In this way, social media can facilitate governments' abilities to play the two-level game of diplomacy (Putnam, 1988).

The finding that both MFAs used digital diplomacy to garner support at the domestic level for policies at the international level echoes other studies that suggest that digital

diplomacy has seen the emergence of domestic diplomacy. Traditionally, MFAs have been characterised as organisations that face the world with their backs to the nation (Copeland, 2013). As such, MFAs never established domestic constituencies. By migrating to social media, MFAs could begin to cultivate such constituencies as their Facebook profiles attracted both domestic and foreign audiences eager to learn about the world around them. Thus far, scholars have argued that MFAs cultivated domestic constituencies, to safeguard their territory within governments, which were steadily eroding given the fact that numerous ministries now face the world and collaborate with their foreign peers (e.g. health, environment, agriculture). By engaging with domestic audiences, MFAs hoped to demonstrate their contribution to state affairs and prevent further losses of territory (Bjola & Manor, 2018). Thus, MFAs launched social media accounts in national languages and developed smartphone applications for the delivery of consular aid (Melissen & de Keulenaar, 2017). Yet the results of this thesis suggest that MFAs may also be practicing domestic diplomacy to better play the two-level game of diplomacy during crises (Putnam, 1988). By cultivating a domestic following and disseminating frameworks that resonate with collective memories and societal frameworks, MFAs are better positioned to maintain public support for their foreign policies even under conditions of uncertainty and in the face of possible military altercations. Domestic diplomacy thus emerges as yet another example of how online diplomacy facilitates the obtainment of offline diplomatic goals.

However, true to the two-level game of diplomacy, both the U.S. and Russian MFAs also attempted to garner support from foreign audiences. This is evident in two findings. The first, is that the Russian MFA used its English language account to narrate events unfolding in Crimea

and justify Russia's policies. MFAs' English social media accounts are traditionally used to interact with, and influence a myriad of foreign audiences including journalists, policy-makers and citizens of foreign countries. As the head of Israel's digital diplomacy unit stated in an interview "Our English language Facebook page aims to serve as a varied information center, both for our English speaking followers around the world and our embassies worldwide" (Manor, 2014). By using the English language, the Russian MFA was able to offer its narration of the Crisis to a global public sphere.

Additionally, both the Russian and U.S. MFAs employed frameworks that may have resonated with the pre-existing knowledge and worldviews of foreign populations. Such was the case with the State Department's lamination of "Russian Invasion and Occupation of Ukraine" employed between Weeks 7 and 11. According to this lamination, Russia had invaded Ukraine in a "brazen" act of military aggression. This lamination may have resonated with older social media users who still recall the tensions of the Cold War and can summon the tales of Russian tanks sent to suppress the spring of Prague. The resonance with the Cold War was also visible in U.S. tweets emanating from the U.N. Security Council. During week 9, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. stated that "world knows that referendum scheduled for tomorrow in #Crimea was hatched by Kremlin and midwived by Russian military". This verbal attack on Russia is reminiscent of Adlai Stevenson's attacks on the U.S.S.R during the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. By suggesting that the referendum in Crimea was but a Cold War *deja vu*, the U.S. may have been able to rally support for its policies among the populations of allied countries including NATO members. This, in turn, could help the U.S. obtain its policy goals- creating a

coalition of countries that would place economic sanctions on Russia in response to the invasion of Crimea.

The Russian MFA also employed frameworks and laminations that could have resonated with the pre-existing worldviews of foreign populations. Such is the case with the Russian “No Outside Interference” primary framework employed between Weeks 1 and 10. According to this framework, the EU and the U.S. did not accept Crimean independence as they were guided by narrow geopolitical concerns and a refusal to acknowledge that the bipolar system had ended. The Russian MFA further asserted that while Russian diplomacy sought to protect the lives of vulnerable minorities, EU diplomacy sought to expand its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Lastly, the MFA suggested that the U.S. and the EU were hypocritical when accepting Kosovo’s independence but not Crimea’s. Through these primary frameworks, Russia portrayed the U.S., and the ‘West’ in general as committed to geopolitics first, and the lives of individuals last. This framing may have resonated with audiences that are critical of U.S. policies including social media users in the Middle East or left wing Europeans. Moreover, this framing may have resonated with audiences that are critical of the division between the affluent ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’ such as social media users from the global south. By resonating with the pre-existing world views of foreign publics, and using the English language, both MFAs seem to have targeted foreign populations while attempting to gain their support.

Framing studies have also examined the interaction between the media and administrations during times of crisis and conflict. These studies have found that, when national interests are perceived to be at risk, the media rallies around the flag and raises support for the administration’s policies. Moreover, the media is likely to support the government during the

escalation stage and refrain from criticising it until the de-escalation stage (Auerbach & Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Bloch-Elkon, 2007; Kim, 2000; Lee & Yang, 1996; Park, 2003). The analysis of the U.S.-Russia case study found that both MFAs were quick to label events in Ukraine as a crisis. Russia did so during Week 5, while the U.S. State Department first employed the term during Week 8. Boin et al., (2013) have argued that leaders may prefer not to label an event as a crisis given political and financial concerns. Yet, it is possible that both MFAs were quick to label events in Ukraine as a 'crisis' to rally media support for their respective policies and actions.

Moreover, the term 'crisis' may serve as a diplomatic template through which MFAs can instigate processes and spring actors into action. A 'crisis' in Eastern Europe, for instance, is likely to rally European allies and NATO to the U.S.'s side. Similarly, a crisis caused by Western interventions may cause Russian allies, such as China, to spring into action. Additionally, once a crisis has been declared, diplomats can begin using offline forums to obtain their goals, whether these forums are the UN Security Council or the OSCE. Crises may also facilitate coalition-building in diplomatic forums, as they bestow a sense of expediency and a threat to the existing order between states. Thus, social media emerges, yet again, as a tool for obtaining offline diplomatic goals, such as rallying support from one's allies.

Notably, this thesis assumed that MFAs would prefer not to label events as crises and thus it did not rely on MFAs' use of the term 'crisis' to begin measuring frame distances. While both MFAs labeled events in Crimea as a crisis, both did so once the crisis entered the escalation stage. Had diplomats waited for both MFAs to use the term 'crisis', they would have only been able to mediate tensions once the crisis had reached fever pitch. The results of this case study demonstrate that the frame distance model can be used to track a crisis's

progression from its early stages, offering diplomats the ability to identify the 'crisis slide' stage and seek a resolution to the crisis prior to escalation and widening differences between conflicted parties.

This chapter's results demonstrate the constitutive relationship between this thesis's two variables: crises and MFA frameworks. Both U.S. and Russian frameworks did not exist independently of the Crimean Crisis. Rather they came into being as the crisis took shape. It was through frameworks that diplomats made sense of the crisis, as was the case with MFAs' use of problem definitions to articulate their desired resolution to the crisis. Moreover, both MFAs morally de-legitimised one another so as to limit one another's range of possible actions thus managing the Crisis. Such was the case when Russia hoped to limit U.S. support for the Ukrainian opposition by framing the interim government as neo-fascist. As this case study has demonstrated, crises do not precede frameworks in time. As events begin to unravel on the ground, an MFA's framework begins to emerge and this framework is then used to limit the actions of an adversary. MFA frameworks and crises thus exist simultaneously and influence one another in a dynamic fashion. Subsequently, the relationship between this thesis's two variables does not meet the three conditions necessary for a causal relationship.

In summary, the analysis of the U.S.-Russia case study offers an initial answer to this thesis's question: **How do MFAs use digital tools in times of crises, and how can the use of these tools inform strategies to manage crises?** MFAs use digital tools, such as social media, to offer a prism, or framework through which a crisis may be interpreted. By monitoring the digital diplomacy content of MFAs involved in a crisis, diplomats can track a crisis's progression in near-real time and identify pressure points, which may edge a crisis towards containment or

resolution. Crucially, digital diplomacy content can enable diplomats to tailor their interventions to the unique progression of a given crisis, thus recognising that while all crises share certain features, each crisis is also unique and requires a form of tailored interventions. Lastly, digital diplomacy content can be used by diplomats to identify the core arguments of each side and its interests, as well as issues that may serve as gateways to negotiations, thus increasing the possibility of obtaining long-term solutions that break the feedback loop of fractals. In other words, online diplomacy can be used for more effective offline management of diplomatic crises.

Finally, it is important to note four limitations of the U.S.-Russia case study. The first is the relatively high number of tweets that could not be integrated into the rhetorical indicators. These tweets often included links to external materials, such as a summary of bilateral meetings, or listed Crimea as one more topic discussed by diplomats. However, these tweets were integrated into the Integral Frame Distance Scores, as they were counted as crisis-related tweets published by both MFAs. One way of addressing this limitation may be to consider tweets that list a crisis as a topic for discussion as a positive sign of crisis management, as these tweets suggest that diplomats and states are engulfed in the task of crisis management. Additionally, it may prove beneficial to take into account who is debating the crisis. For instance, emergency meetings between world leaders could indicate that a crisis has come to dominate global events. This could be indicative of crisis escalation. In contrast, meetings between opposing foreign ministers could indicate a willingness to reduce tensions, thereby suggesting crisis de-escalation. In this way, additional tweets may be integrated into the rhetorical indicators of the frame distance model.

The second limitation was the relatively low number of tweets published by the U.S. State Department throughout the Crimean Crisis. As opposed to the Russian MFA's 510 tweets, the State Department published a mere 260. In addition, there were two weeks during which the U.S. State Department did not publish any tweets. This may be a result of the fact that the Crimean Crisis took place in 2014, during which the U.S. State Department's use of Twitter was more limited than it is today. This assumption is strengthened by the finding that between January and March of 2014, the U.S. State Department published an average of 90 tweets per week. By contrast, between November of 2017 and February of 2018, the U.S. State Department published an average of 174 tweets per week. It is thus fair to assume that in future crisis, the U.S. State Department would publish a greater number of tweets, thus enabling one to apply the frame distance model.

The third limitation is that the Crimean Crisis never entered a de-escalation stage. Rather, the status of Crimea remains unresolved, with many nations failing to recognise its accession to the Russian Federation. Moreover, the Crimean Crisis led to a tense diplomatic stalemate that persists to this day. Given that the Crisis never entered de-escalation, the U.S.-Russia case study fails to demonstrate that the frame distance between two MFAs will narrow as their respective governments begin to search for a shared solution to a crisis.

The fourth and final limitation of the U.S.-Russia case study lies in the frame distance model's ability to contend with situations in which diplomatic actors employ multiple frameworks and laminations per week. This limitation was addressed by analysing frameworks and laminations that resonated with one another, thus resulting in the measurement of several frame distances. However, a different approach may be to shorten the duration of crisis

segments from weeks to several days. This might limit the number of laminations and frameworks employed by each MFA, thus enabling the calculation of a single frame distance. The following chapter applies the frame distance model to the 2014 Gaza War.

Chapter IV: The Gaza War Case Study

Introduction

Perhaps no region in the world is as volatile as the Middle East. It is a region overburdened by history, faith and natural resources. Indeed, throughout the Cold War and well into the 21st-century, the Middle East has been central to global competitions over hegemony. The perceived volatility of the Middle East has only increased in recent years due to three major events. The first was the Arab Spring of 2011 which led to the collapse of regimes throughout the region (Anderson, 2011; Howard et al., 2011; Lotan et al., 2011). The second was the Hamas government's takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007 (Milton-Edwards, 2008; Sayigh, 2010). The third was the escalating Civil War in Syria. The latter two events altered the balance of power in the Middle East as new and old actors attempted to increase their regional hegemony. Russia soon came to the aid of the besieged Syrian president while, in the process, creating a permanent presence in the area. Iran soon increased its support of the Hamas government in Gaza thus creating a base of operations along the borders of Israel and Egypt. The U.S., on its part, continued to support Israel and Arab nations through financial and military aid.

The policies of Russian and Iran demonstrate how 21st-century crises become complex and intertwined. As expansionist foreign policies become the norm, rather than the exception, the number of actors involved in a crisis multiplies. For instance, violent clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinian militant organisations traditionally led to tensions between Israel and the U.S., which sought to maintain its close ties with Arab nations, and with Jordan and Egypt, who faced domestic criticism for their peaceful relations with Israel.

Yet since 2015, a crisis between Israel and the Hamas government threatens to engulf the U.S., Jordan and Egypt as well as Iran and Russia. Iran is central to such crises as it aids the Hamas government both financially and militarily (El Hussein, 2010). Russia plays a role in such crises given its attempt to negotiate truces between both sides. Indeed, since it entered the Syrian Civil War, Russia has attempted to become a broker between Israel and the Palestinian leadership. Moreover, Syria is part of a power Axis that spans from Teheran to Damascus, Beirut and Gaza City, an axis that shares resources, means and weapons (El Hussein, 2010). As such, Russia has situated itself at the nexus of Israeli-Hamas relations.

Since 2007, Israel and Hamas have engaged in several military conflicts. One of the most costly conflicts was the 2014 Gaza War which saw the destruction of much of the Gaza Strip as well as the deaths of more than 1,000 Palestinians. This war also saw Hamas deploy advanced offensive capabilities. Throughout the war, Hamas terrorists invaded Israeli territory through underground tunnels and killed numerous Israeli citizens. Moreover, Hamas fired thousands of rockets at Israeli cities and towns bringing life in the country to a virtual standstill. Perhaps most shocking of all was Hamas's decision to fire rockets at Tel-Aviv, Israel's financial center. The 2014 Gaza War thus saw a full scale military altercation between two parties, each capable of inflicting serious harm.

This chapter applies the frame distance model to the Gaza War case study. It does so in order to examine whether the model can be used to extrapolate the progress of a high-intensity crisis and identify pressure points in which diplomatic mediation may be most effective or warranted. The chapter consists of three parts. The first offers a brief historical background of the Gaza War. The second includes an analysis of the frameworks and laminations employed by both parties throughout the war. The third includes a

comprehensive discussion regarding the applicability of the frame distance model to high-intensity crises.

Historical Background

On 12 June, 2014, Hamas terrorists abducted three Israeli teens as they made their way home in the West Bank. On 30 June, Israeli security forces located the bodies of the three teenagers in a field north of Hebron (IDF, 2015). The abduction and gruesome murder of the three teens would signal the beginning of the 2014 Gaza War. Indeed, numerous Israeli politicians, including the prime minister of Israel, argued that Israel must avenge the deaths of the Israeli teens and 'recoup' their blood. According to Bouris (2015), these calls radicalized Israeli society to the extent that it would support a military assault on Palestine. While searching for the three missing teenagers, the IDF arrested hundreds of Hamas leaders in the West Bank while also destroying Hamas's infrastructure. According to Robinson (2015), these mass arrests directly contributed to Hamas's willingness to engage militarily with Israel.

On 02 July, a Palestinian teenager from East Jerusalem was beaten and then burnt to death in what was believed to be a reprisal for the murder of the three Israeli teens. This horrific death contributed to mounting tensions between Israeli security forces and Palestinian protestors along the Gaza border. Soon, Hamas's military wing began firing rockets at Israeli cities and townships. By 07 July, Hamas fired more than 60 rockets at Israel, bringing life in the country's southern part to a halt. As sirens rang out in Israeli cities, the Israeli government launched operation 'Protective Edge', a limited aerial campaign meant to 'disrupt and disable the launching of projectiles into Israel' (Israeli MFA, 2015).

Between 08 and 11 July, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted hundreds of aerial raids on Gaza targeting Hamas's terror infrastructure, operatives, and rocket-launching sites. Within the first few hours of these raids, more than 100 Palestinians were killed (RTE, 2014). During the same time, Hamas intensified its rocket fire at Israel, targeting both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. On 15 July, one week into Operation Protective Edge, the Israeli government decided to accept an Egyptian ceasefire initiative. Hamas, for its part, refused to accept the ceasefire and fired more than 50 rockets at Israel (IDF, 2015; RTE, 2014).

Hamas later stated that it would reject all ceasefire initiatives that did not include the full removal of Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip initiated in 2007 (RTE, 2014). Indeed, Bouris (2015) argued that Hamas hoped to achieve through force what it failed to achieve through negotiations: the end of Israel's blockade of Gaza by land, sea, and air.

On 17 July, a dozen Hamas operatives emerged from an underground tunnel with the aim of attacking an Israeli kibbutz near the Gaza border (IDF, 2015). The offensive capabilities of Hamas, and its use of underground tunnels to infiltrate Israel, shocked the Israeli public. In response, the IDF was ordered to mount a full-scale ground invasion of the Gaza Strip with the goal of unearthing and destroying all Hamas tunnels leading to Israel (IDF, 2015). As Israeli forces made their way into Gaza, the Israeli MFA stated that Israel had agreed to a series of ceasefire proposals—all of which were rejected by Hamas, leaving Israeli no choice but to invade the Gaza Strip (Manor & Crilley, 2018a).

Three days into the ground invasion, IDF forces entered the Shuja'iyya neighborhood. The battle that ensued between IDF forces and Hamas operatives was the most intensive of the whole war, resulting in the deaths of 13 Israeli soldiers and the

reported abduction of the body of a slain Israeli soldier (IDF, 2015). The battle also left 70 Palestinians dead, including innocent bystanders (RTE, 2014).

Between 20 and 22 July, Israel attracted global media attention due to the high death toll in Gaza. As media outlets and foreign leaders rebuked the Israeli government, the IDF announced two new initiatives. The first was the opening of humanitarian windows during which Israel would hold its fire so that the injured could be tended to. In addition, the IDF opened a field hospital on the outskirts of Gaza that would treat wounded Palestinians (Manor & Crilley, 2018a).

On 23 July, Israel targeted and destroyed a hospital in the Gaza Strip, arguing that it was used by Hamas operatives as a military outpost and a rocket- launching site (IDF, 2015). Although the hospital was empty, 16 Palestinians were killed in the attack, bringing the death toll in Gaza to 500 (RTE, 2014). By this date, Hamas had fired more than 3,000 rockets at Israel (IDF, 2015). The following day, 15 Palestinians were killed in yet another Israeli attack on a school in the Gaza Strip (RTE, 2014).

On 25 July, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry proposed a seven-day truce between Hamas and Israel. Although both sides rejected the proposal, they agreed to observe a 12-hour ceasefire. Israel later agreed to extend the ceasefire, yet Hamas refused to follow suit. As the fighting between both sides intensified, the death toll in Gaza reached 1,000. In response, U.S. President Barack Obama urged the Israeli government to show restraint when attacking targets in Gaza (RTE, 2014).

Between 29 and 31 July, Israel continued to attack Hamas infrastructure while also targeting civilian infrastructure, including Gaza's main power station and a UN school. While nations throughout the world, including the U.S., condemned Israel's actions, the Israeli

government called up 16,000 reserve soldiers, signalling a willingness to further escalate its war on Hamas (RTE, 2014).

On 01 August, Israel began to withdraw its ground forces from the Gaza Strip following the destruction of 32 Hamas terror tunnels (Israel MFA, 2015). On 03 August, as the remaining Israeli soldiers made their way out of the Gaza Strip, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the operation would continue until quiet was restored to Israel's south (RTE, 2014). At the same time, Hamas violated yet another ceasefire agreement by firing rocket barrages at Israel. This was the fifth ceasefire to be honored by Israel and violated by Hamas (ibid).

On 04 August, Israel announced a 72-hour unilateral ceasefire. This was followed by another 72- hour ceasefire that was agreed upon by both Israel and Hamas. Between 5 and 21 of August, Israel and Hamas agreed to, and violated, a series of Egyptian ceasefire proposals negotiated in Cairo by Israeli and Hamas officials. All the while, Hamas rockets continued to fill the skies of Israeli cities while IAF bombs obliterated entire areas of the Gaza Strip. The fighting between both sides ultimately subsided on 26 August with a temporary ceasefire accord (Israel MFA, 2015; RTE, 2014).

In total, 6 Israelis and 2,125 Palestinians were killed during the Gaza War of 2014 (Israel MFA, 2015) in addition to some 1,600 Israelis who were injured from Hamas rockets and projectiles (UN Commission, 2015, p. 20). According to the Israeli MFA, a total of 4,000 projectiles were fired at Israel by Hamas, the vast majority of them aimed deliberately at civilian targets (Israeli MFA, 2015). Although most of these projectiles were intercepted by the Iron Dome defense system, Hamas rockets left an enduring scar on the Israeli psyche as some 10,000 Israelis vacated their homes and headed for the northern parts of Israel (UN

Commission, 2015, p. 20). In Gaza, some 20,000 homes were destroyed by the IAF, displacing nearly half a million Palestinians (Dearden, 2014). The reconstruction of the Gaza Strip would thus last for several years.

Analysis of Crisis Primary Frameworks

Week 1: 29 June - 06 July

During the first week of the Gaza War, three Israeli teenagers were abducted in the West Bank. Soon, the Israeli government asserted that the three had been kidnapped by the Hamas terror organisation and stated that Hamas bore responsibility for teens' safety. On 30 June, the bodies of the three teenagers were found by Israeli security forces. The abduction of these teenagers, as well as the violent nature of their deaths, would serve as the trigger for the 2014 Gaza War.



Throughout the first part of this week, the Israeli MFA formulated its first primary framework of 'Kidnapped Teens'. According to this framework, the problem contributing to heightened tensions was that the Hamas terror organisation had kidnapped three teens who were simply making their way home. The cause of the problem was that Hamas was a terror organisation devoid of scruples. This was evident in the revelation that Hamas actually distributed kidnapping manuals to its operatives. The moral evaluation asserted that Hamas was so evil that it was willing to kidnap innocent children. Moreover, the MFA argued that every child has the right to return safely to their home, an assertion made by the mothers of the kidnapped teens when addressing the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. The solution proposed by the Israeli MFA was threefold. First, the world should demand that Hamas release the kidnapped teenagers. Second, the MFA asserted that the world should condemn and isolate Hamas politically and financially. Third, the MFA argued that Mahmud Abbas, president of the Palestinian National Authority, should also distance himself from Hamas and tear up his agreement with Hamas to form a national unity government.

On 30 June, with the revelation that three teens had been murdered, the Israeli MFA formulated a new argument according to which Hamas was the kind of organisation that would murder innocent teens rather than just kidnap them. However, this argument was not an entirely new one. Instead of formulating a new framework, the MFA updated its first framework by adding a new layer; the problem was not that Israeli teens were abducted, but rather, that they had been violently murdered. Yet all other dimensions of the framework remained the same. The causal attribution still stated that Hamas was a terror organisation devoid of scruples that would kill children in cold blood. The moral evaluation made it clear that while Hamas kidnaps teens, Israel came together to weep for them. The solution remained threefold and asserted first that the world should come together to cherish the memories of the murdered teens. Second, the world should condemn and isolate Hamas and, third, Hamas should be forced to pay the price for its violence.

The frameworks and laminations employed by the Israeli MFA during this week may be seen in the table below. Notably, during this week Hamas did not publish any tweets.

Table 4.1: Israeli Primary Frameworks- Week 1

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Kidnapped Teens	 		 	   

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Kidnapped Teens Lamination: Murdered Teens	 	  	 	   

Week 2: 07 July – 13 July

On 07 July, an IAF (Israeli Air Force) strike killed seven Hamas operatives in the Gaza Strip. In response, Hamas began firing rocket barrages at the southern part of Israel. The following day, a Hamas commando unit landed on a beach near Kibbutz Zikim and was met with Israeli fire. By 9 July, Israel was conducting dozens of air raids and destroying Hamas outposts and infrastructure, as well as the homes of prominent Hamas leaders. In retaliation, Hamas fired more than 200 rockets at the southern part of Israel. As tensions near the Gaza border mounted, Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas called an emergency session of the Palestinian government while also asking Egyptian leaders to broker a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. By 13 July, the IAF had targeted more than 400 sites in the Gaza Strip while Hamas had fired more than 600 rockets at Israel. Notably, these rockets were no longer aimed exclusively at the southern part of Israel. Hamas projectiles had landed in the northern part of Israel and near Jerusalem. Although the majority of Hamas rockets were intercepted by the Iron Dome missile defence system, they forced many Israelis to abandon their homes. During this week, Israel also called up reserve soldiers in anticipation of a possible military operation in Gaza.

During the first part of this week, the Israeli MFA crafted the 'Rockets at Israel' primary framework, according to which the escalating conflict with Hamas was a result of Hamas's rocket fire at Israel. The cause of the problem lay in Hamas's nature as it was a terror organisation intent on killing civilians. The moral evaluation focused on the lives of Israeli citizens now living in perpetual fear of rocket fire. A series of videos depicted Israeli children frantically looking for cover from Hamas rockets. Finally, the solution was for

Hamas to assume responsibility for mounting tensions and to hold its rocket fire. Notably, in this framework, Israel recognised Hamas as the de facto ruler of the Gaza Strip.

On 08 July, the Israeli MFA added the 'Military Operation' lamination to the 'Rockets at Israel' framework following the official launch of Operation Protective Edge. According to this lamination, the problem was still Hamas rocket fire at Israel and the cause still lay in Hamas's evil nature as it targeted innocent civilians and fired indiscriminately at Israeli cities and towns. The moral evaluation contrasted Hamas's indiscriminate fire with Israel's 'measured response' and stated that Israel had a right to defend its citizens. Yet the solution was now a full-scale military operation meant to end all rocket fire at Israel and restore 'quiet' to Israel's borders.

By the end of the week, the Israeli MFA formulated a new 'Islamic Axis' framework. According to this framework, the problem was that Hamas was part of an Islamic Axis that wanted to destroy the state of Israel. The Axis included other Islamic and fundamentalist actors such as Hezbollah, ISIS, Boko Haram, and Iran. The causal attribution stated that Hamas was part of this Axis as it sought to kill Israelis given its 'vision of death'. The moral evaluation contrasted Hamas's use of Gazans as human shields, given that the organisation fired rockets from populated areas, with Israel's shielding of its own citizens and Israel's decision to supply Gaza with humanitarian aid. The solution was for Israel to launch a military operation against Hamas outposts and terrorist infrastructure.

The frameworks and laminations employed by the Israeli MFA during this week may be seen in the table below. New laminations and frameworks are coloured in grey. During this week, Hamas did not publish any tweets relating to its conflict with Israel.

Table 4.2: Israeli Primary Frameworks - Week 2

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Rockets at Israel				
		 	 	 

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Rockets at Israel Lamination: Military Operation (continues from previous page)				

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Islamic Axis	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following RT @IsraelNitzan: .@IsraelinUN Prosor: #Iran-supplied rockets in #Gaza threaten 3.5M Israeli civilians #ProtectiveE... buff.ly/1oD1ta1 2:15 AM · 10 Jul 2014 22 Retweets 5 Likes 7 22 5 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following RT @YigalPalmor: A little-noticed #UnitedNations report discloses the #Tehran regime's role in fueling Middle East #... buff.ly/1k6tBQb 8:33 AM · 10 Jul 2014 17 Retweets 3 Likes 2 17 3 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Just like the #ISIS, #AIQuaeda #BokoHaram & others as such, Hamas aspires to establish a violent, repressive, antisemitic islamist state. 2:12 AM · 11 Jul 2014 29 Retweets 5 Likes 6 29 3 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following #Iran is a major destabilizing force in the middle east as it supplies & trains Hamas & other terrorist orgs in #Gaza. #IsraelUnderFire 7:50 AM · 11 Jul 2014 26 Retweets 12 Likes 7 26 12 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Long-Range Missiles from #Iran Used by Hamas during "Operation #ProtectiveEdge" 1:47 PM · 11 Jul 2014 34 Retweets 9 Likes 6 34 9 	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Hamas' #vision is of death, maybe that's why it chooses to shoot at civilians while hiding behind civilians. 10:07 AM · 11 Jul 2014 46 Retweets 11 Likes 5 46 11 It's your vision that matters youtube.com	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Hamas targets Israeli civilians with its rockets while using #Gaza civilians as Human Shields. #IsraelUnderFire 10:29 PM · 9 Jul 2014 66 Retweets 30 Likes 26 66 30 Israel targets terrorists to protect its civilians Hamas targets civilians and uses its own people for cover	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following PM Netanyahu:"The military strikes will continue until we can be certain that the quiet has returned to Israeli citizens." #IsraelUnderFire 9:24 PM · 11 Jul 2014 42 Retweets 23 Likes 7 42 23 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following PM Netanyahu: "Hamas's leaders & activists are hiding behind the residents of #Gaza and they are responsible for any injury to them." 9:50 PM · 11 Jul 2014 40 Retweets 14 Likes 13 40 14 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following PM Netanyahu:No intl pressure will prevent us from operating with full force against a terrorist organization that calls for our destruction 12:18 AM · 12 Jul 2014 58 Retweets 24 Likes 21 58 24

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Islamic Axis (continues from previous page)			 Israel Foreign Min. ✓ @IsraelMFA Following ▼ PM Netanyahu:"We develop defensive systems against missiles to protect our civilians and they use their civilians to protect their missiles" 10:59 PM - 11 Jul 2014 57 Retweets 31 Likes 10 57 31  Israel Foreign Min. ✓ @IsraelMFA Following ▼ Although Hamas deliberately attacks #border crossings,Israel has not closed them for passage of #humanitarian goods.  8:57 AM - 11 Jul 2014 109 Retweets 35 Likes 12 109 35	

Week 3: 14 July - 18 July

The week of 14 July saw a rapid succession of events as tensions between Israel and Hamas escalated further. On 14 July alone, Hamas fired 115 rockets at Israeli cities. The following day, the Israeli government chose to accept a ceasefire proposal put forward by Egypt, which was quickly rejected by the Hamas leadership, who were vowing to fight on until Israel lifted its siege on the Gaza Strip. On the same day, an Israeli rabbi was killed by a mortar shell in the southern part of Israel. On 16 July, an Israeli gun boat killed four Palestinian children playing soccer on the beach of Gaza. The airstrike was soon denounced by countries and leaders throughout the world, who exerted pressure on Israel to end its military operation. Subsequently, Israel agreed to honour a five-hour humanitarian ceasefire brokered by the UN. The ceasefire came to an abrupt end when Hamas operatives emerged from an underground tunnel dug into Israel near Kibbutz Sufa, shocking the Israeli public. An airstrike killed the operatives. The following day, the IDF called up 18,000 reserve soldiers.

During this week, the Israeli MFA employed two primary frameworks and one lamination. As was the case in Week 2, the MFA employed the 'Military Operation' lamination, which sought to end Hamas's rocket fire at Israel. The MFA continued to argue that the problem underlying tensions with Hamas was the latter's rocket fire at Israeli cities. The cause lay in Hamas's character as a terrorist organisation that was deliberately targeting civilians. The moral evaluation focused yet again on the lives of Israelis seeking shelter from rockets. The solution was a military operation meant to restore quiet to Israel.

During this week, Israel also employed the 'Islamic Axis' framework first introduced in Week 2. The problem, according to this framework, remained Hamas's status as a member of an extremist Islamic Axis that was willing to lead its own people to death and

martyrdom. The causal attribution stated that Hamas was willing to endanger its own civilians in a bid to kill Israelis. The moral evaluation contrasted Hamas's use of humanitarian funds to build terrorist infrastructure and its use of human shields against Israel's decision to supply Gaza with humanitarian aid. The solution was for Israel to launch a military operation against Hamas while attempting to ensure that innocent civilians in Gaza were not harmed.

Finally, the MFA also introduced a new framework of 'War Crimes'. According to this framework, the problem underlying the conflict in Gaza was that Hamas was firing indiscriminately at Israeli civilians. The cause of the problem was that Hamas was committed to terror, while Israel was committed to peace. The moral evaluation stated that Hamas was committing double war crimes when firing at Israeli civilians while hiding behind its own civilians. The solution was international condemnation of Hamas alongside Israel's willingness to accept an Egyptian ceasefire. Notably, in this framework, the MFA recognised Gaza as a de facto state capable of committing war crimes.

The frameworks and laminations employed by the Israeli MFA during this week may be seen in the table below. New laminations and frameworks are coloured in grey.

Table 4.3: Israeli Primary Frameworks - Week 3

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Rockets at Israel Lamination: Military Operation	 Israel Foreign Min.  Almost a thousand rockets fired from #Gaza into Israel by Hamas in just 6 days. #IsraelUnderFire #GazaUnderAttack  9:12 AM - 14 Jul 2014  Israel Foreign Min.  40% of the Israeli population - approximately 3.5 million people - is currently in range of the rockets from #Gaza. #IsraelUnderFire 4:41 PM - 9 Jul 2014 41 Retweets 6 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min.  Hamas fires almost a thousand rockets from #Gaza at Israel, aimed deliberately at civilian targets. bit.ly/1xy31O #IsraelUnderFire 11:10 AM - 14 Jul 2014 51 Retweets 13 Likes  Israel Foreign Min.  Tony Blair on #Gaza rockets fired at Israel: "These rockets are fired indiscriminately at the Israeli population."  Tony Blair: Time is running out "Time is running out" to resolve the Gaza conflict according to Middle East peace envoy Tony Blair. bbc.com 5:22 PM - 16 Jul 2014 53 Retweets 13 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min.  These #children have 15 seconds to find #shelter. 15 seconds that separate life from death vine.co/v/MPTXFnAn9KY #IsraelUnderFire 3:13 AM - 14 Jul 2014 20 Retweets 3 Likes  Israel Foreign Min.  This father has 15 seconds to jump out of the car, open the buckle, get his child out of the car seat & find #shelter buff.ly/1nyxdIG 2:02 AM - 15 Jul 2014 17 Retweets 3 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min.  No country can sit idly when its civilian population is subjected to terrorist rocket fire. #IsraelUnderFire #Terrorism 2:30 AM - 16 Jul 2014 44 Retweets 17 Likes  Israel Foreign Min.  Over 1,200 rockets fired at Israel in one month, No country would allow such attacks on its citizens without responding. #IsraelUnderFire 7:14 PM - 14 Jul 2014 87 Retweets 20 Likes
Islamic Axis	 Israel Defense Forces  RETWEET Hamas spokesperson: "We aren't leading our people today to destruction. We are leading them to death"  Hamas Spokesperson: "We Are Leading Our People to D..." Hamas spokesperson, Sami Abu Zuhri, says of Hamas' policy during Operation Protective Edge: "We aren't leading our people today to destruction. We are leadin..." youtube.com 11:28 AM - 14 Jul 2014 538 Retweets 121 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min.  By using #Gaza civilian pop. as human shields & targeting Israeli civilians, Hamas bears full responsibility for casualties in Israel & Gaza 11:30 PM - 14 Jul 2014 50 Retweets 11 Likes		 Israel Foreign Min.  While Hamas attacks from civilian population areas, IDF pinpoint attacks aim to strike terrorists, avoid civilians mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPol ... 5:29 PM - 14 Jul 2014 33 Retweets 10 Likes

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Islamic Axis (continues from previous page)		 Israel Foreign Min.   @IsraelMFA Hamas & other terrorist organizations systematically use many mosques in #Gaza for military purposes. bit.ly/1rreu99 9:47 PM - 16 Jul 2014 39 Retweets 11 Likes  Israel Foreign Min.   @IsraelMFA Hamas positions rocket launching sites, #weapons caches & command centers in areas surrounded by #civilian buildings bit.ly/1m6HvBs 12:48 PM - 14 Jul 2014 22 Retweets 4 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min.   @IsraelMFA Instead of building shelters for its people, Hamas devotes all its resources to making & getting rockets for its #terrorist infrastructure 2:32 AM - 15 Jul 2014 44 Retweets 13 Likes  Israel Foreign Min.   @IsraelMFA Under rocket fire from #Gaza, Israeli #humanitarian aid continues bit.ly/1m6HopC #IsraelUnderFire #GazaUnderAttack 1:57 PM - 14 Jul 2014 39 Retweets 6 Likes  Israel Foreign Min.   @IsraelMFA The flow of goods & fuel into #Gaza continued today - In the last 3 days a total of 300 trucks loaded w/ #humanitarian supply entered Gaza. 6:27 PM - 15 Jul 2014 44 Retweets 5 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min.   @IsraelMFA Israel May Be Raising The #Moral Standards Of #Warfare Israel's warning procedures could become a model. read.bi/1koT1sp 8:10 PM - 14 Jul 2014 33 Retweets 8 Likes  Israel Foreign Min.   @IsraelMFA When targeting #terror sites in #Gaza, the IDF makes it a top priority to avoid civilians. youtu.be/yE7ykidY7FA #IsraelUnderFire 7:29 PM - 16 Jul 2014 42 Retweets 17 Likes

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Double War Crimes	The rockets being fired from #Gaza are indiscriminate weapons that target civilians, in violation of #InternationalLaw. #IsraelUnderFire Every rocket aimed at Israeli cities constitutes a war crime, as the objective is to kill civilians - @BradSherman buff.ly/U4yUse PM Netanyahu: Hamas has chosen to target our cities with massive and indiscriminate #rocket fire. bit.ly/1nmtaRP #IsraelUnderFire	Israel was committed to the ceasefire, but Hamas remained committed to #terrorism & destruction. #IsraelUnderFire Today, Israel accepted the ceasefire. Today, Hamas rejected the ceasefire. Who's to blame for tomorrow's casualties? #IsraelUnderFire	The rockets being fired from #Gaza are indiscriminate weapons that target civilians, in violation of #InternationalLaw. #IsraelUnderFire Every rocket aimed at Israeli cities constitutes a war crime, as the objective is to kill civilians - @BradSherman buff.ly/U4yUse Hamas' double #WarCrime: 1. Hamas uses Palestinian civilians in #Gaza as human shields 2. Hamas targets Israeli civilians. #IsraelUnderFire	The time has come for the intl community to put an end to Hamas' barbaric behavior towards Palestinians & Israelis alike. #IsraelUnderFire The Security Cabinet, this morning decided to accept the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire starting at 09:00 today. Pls Retweet @JohnKerry 's clear condemnation of Hamas' blunt rejection of the ceasefire that was accepted by Israel. "I cannot condemn strongly enough the actions of Hamas, in so brazenly firing rockets in multiple numbers, in the face of the good will effort to offer a cease fire" John Kerry United States Secretary of State

Week 3 was the first week in which Hamas commented on the escalating conflict with Israel on Twitter. During this week, Hamas introduced its 'Retaliation' framework. The problem driving events with Israel, according to this framework, was that Israel had deliberately engaged militarily with Hamas operatives in the Gaza Strip. The cause of mounting tensions was that Hamas was forced to respond to these Israeli attacks. The moral evaluation suggested that Allah was fighting alongside Hamas operatives, while the solution was to launch offensive measures and engage the IDF. Tweets comprising this framework may be seen in the table below.

Table 4.4: Hamas Primary Frameworks - Week 3

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Retaliation	A group of Qassam brigades clashed with a special force fortified in Container, west of Ashkelon	URGENT The Zionist enemy admits that there were casualties in the bombing of Qassam rockets in Tel Aviv	You did not kill them, but God killed them and did not throw when you threw but God threw "	The Qassam Brigades shell the Zikim military base with 3 120 mm mortar shells

During this week, the Israeli MFA employed several frameworks. Weeks in which actors employed multiple frameworks would require the measurement of several frame distances. It was decided that during such instances, the analysis would begin with the actor that employed the smaller number of frameworks. The frameworks employed by both actors would then be compared in order to identify frameworks that resonated with one another. **The distance between Hamas's 'Retaliation' framework and Israel's 'Military Operation' framework was 75%.** Although each side identified a different problem and causal attribution, with Israel focusing on rocket fire and Hamas on IDF engagement with its operatives, both actors agreed that the solution to the conflict was a military equilibrium in which each side would respond to the attacks of the other. Hamas targeted Tel Aviv after the IDF engaged its operatives in Gaza while Israel launched a military operation due to Hamas's rocket fire at Israeli cities.

Week 4: 18 July – 23 July

The week of July 18 saw a dramatic escalation in tensions between Hamas and Israel. On the night of 18 July, after calling up an additional 18,000 reserve soldiers, Israel mounted a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. Simultaneously, IDF forces began uncovering and destroying the underground tunnels that Hamas dug along Israel's borders. The following day, as Hamas rockets flew over Israeli cities, nine Hamas operatives infiltrated Israel through an underground tunnel while wearing IDF uniforms. They soon came in contact with IDF forces and a short battle ensued. On 20 July, seven Israeli soldiers were killed during a protracted battle over the Gazan neighbourhood of Shuja'iyya. In the midst of the battle, Hamas operatives were able to kidnap the body of a slain soldier. On 22 July, three more Israeli soldiers died in altercations in Gaza. By this time, the IAF had obliterated 2,800 targets in Gaza, while 1,497 rockets were fired at Israel. On 23 July, Hamas claimed that it had shot down an Israeli F-16 fighter jet over Gaza, while Israel came under heavy international scrutiny for firing at a hospital in the Gaza Strip.

During this week, Israel employed four primary frameworks and one lamination, three of which were introduced in previous weeks. As was the case in Weeks 2 and 3, the Israeli MFA employed the 'Military Operation' lamination, which argued that Hamas rocket fire was responsible for the cycle of violence with Israel. The cause of the conflict lay in Hamas's indiscriminate fire at Israeli cities and towns. The moral evaluation focused yet again on the lives of Israelis seeking cover from the 'reign of rocket terror' that could only be eliminated through a large-scale military operation.

The MFA also continued to employ the 'Islamic Axis' primary framework, portraying Hamas as part of a radical Islamic Axis that included both state and non-state actors.

However, the MFA added a lamination to this framework. As opposed to Week 3, in which the MFA argued that Hamas was guided by a vision of death, in this week, Israel focused on Hamas's habit of hiding its weapons and rockets near civilian infrastructure. The MFA added this lamination of 'Civilian Infrastructure' once it became apparent that Hamas hid rockets in United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) schools throughout the Gaza Strip. According to this lamination, the cause of the conflict was Hamas's call for Jihad against Israel. The MFA used a moral dichotomy contrasting Hamas's use of civilian infrastructure to shield its weapons with Israeli attempts to shield its citizens. The solution to Hamas's radical activities was cautious Israeli military activity that would limit civilian deaths in Gaza.

In addition, the MFA employed the 'Double War Crimes' framework introduced during Week 3. The framework identified Hamas as responsible for the suffering on both sides as it committed double war crimes when firing at civilians from behind civilians. The moral evaluation contrasted Hamas war crimes with Israel's right to defend itself. The solution lay in the international community's support of Israel and condemnation of Hamas.

Yet as events unfolded in Gaza, the Israeli MFA also introduced two new primary frameworks. The first framework of 'Ground Invasion' stated that the problem leading to escalated tensions was Hamas's infiltration of Israel through terror tunnels. The cause of the tensions lay in Hamas's objective of killing Israeli citizens and its repeated rejection of Egyptian ceasefire proposals. The moral evaluation stated that Israel had exhausted all efforts in its attempt to end the violence through ceasefires and that it was still delivering aid into Gaza while coming under fire. The only solution to Hamas's terror tunnels and its repeated rejection of ceasefire proposals was for Israel to launch a ground invasion of Gaza. Yet the MFA did allude to the fact that Israel was willing to accept further ceasefires and

that 'quiet would be met with quiet'. This was evident in a string of tweets that stated that Israel only launched the ground offensive to restore quiet to Israel's borders.

As Israel launched its ground invasion and continued to bombard Gaza from the sky, a new problem emerged as the death toll of civilians in Gaza grew exponentially, attracting global media attention. The MFA thus disseminated the 'High Death Toll' framework. While the problem addressed in this framework was the number of dead Gazans, the cause of the problem was Hamas's use of human shields when firing rockets at Israel. The moral evaluation stated that Israel regretted the loss of life and did all it could to minimise it. The suggested remedy was for Israel to open a field hospital, thus providing Gazans with medical care.

The frameworks and laminations employed during this week may be seen below. New frameworks and laminations are coloured in grey.



Table 4.5: Israeli Primary Frameworks- Week 4

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Rockets at Israel Lamination: Military Operation	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA At least 1,350 rockets fired at Israel from #Gaza since the start of Operation #ProtectiveEdge bit.ly/1xzy31O #IsraelUnderFire 7:06 PM - 17 Jul 2014 65 Retweets 11 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA #IsraelUnderFire: Over 1350 rockets fired at Israel from #Gaza since 7.7.14. That's 1 rocket every 10 minutes bit.ly/1jPd20v #Gaza 9:49 PM - 17 Jul 2014 78 Retweets 11 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA This evening in Israel, sirens sounded in 76 cities & villages following rockets fired from #Gaza. #IsraelUnderFire ISRAEL, RED ALERT JULY 17 17:59 HAMAS launches rockets at Israeli civilians - Israelis at 76 cities and villages are in shelters. Israel must defend itself 3:29 AM - 18 Jul 2014 138 Retweets 32 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Tony Blair on rockets fired from #Gaza: "These rockets are fired indiscriminately at the Israeli population." Tony Blair Official Envoy of the Quartet on the Middle East 15.7.2014 "It's important to remember that these rockets are fired indiscriminately at the Israeli population." 1:08 AM - 17 Jul 2014 95 Retweets 43 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Rescue of a #baby in Sderot, where a house was hit by a Hamas rocket fired from #Gaza. youtu.be/myWq_URGa6g #IsraelUnderFire A baby is rescued from a house hit by a rocket fired from... Rescue of a baby in the Israeli city of Sderot, where a house has just been hit by a Hamas rocket fired from Gaza youtube.com 8:38 PM - 22 Jul 2014 74 Retweets 12 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA These children have only 15 seconds to find shelter & save their lives from the rockets fired from #Gaza by Hamas. youtu.be /8P0a3I82kx8 10:15 PM - 19 Jul 2014 42 Retweets 8 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA FM Liberman briefs Israeli ambassadors: "Israel will do everything in its power to end this reign of rocker #terror" bit.ly/Ue1x6G 7:27 AM - 18 Jul 2014 26 Retweets 13 Likes

The image is a screenshot of two tweets from the official Twitter account of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (@IsraelMFA). The top tweet, posted at 12:37 PM on July 19, 2014, contains the text: "IDF does everything possible to avoid civilian casualties but Hamas deliberately puts #Gaza civilian lives in danger you.tu.be/uzFgIhFKI18". It has 37 retweets and 10 likes. The bottom tweet, posted at 7:35 PM on the same day, contains the text: "IDF does more than any modern army to prevent civilian casualties in #Gaza, but Hamas uses them as human shields, causing civilian casualties". It has 57 retweets and 23 likes. Both tweets feature the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs logo and a blue verified badge. The interface elements, including the retweet and like icons, are visible for both posts.

Double War Crimes

Ground Invasion

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Ground Invasion (continues from previous page)		  	 	 

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
High Death Toll	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Israel regrets any harm to uninvolved civilians, but it's Hamas that bears full responsibility for damage & suffering in #Shujaia. #Gaza 7:30 AM - 21 Jul 2014 100 Retweets 43 Likes 37 100 43	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Hamas uses teens in #Gaza as human shields: Hamas: We Will Give Hand -Grenades to Our Youth youtube.com/watch?v=I_UbLH ... #IsraelUnderFire 9:40 AM - 20 Jul 2014 58 Retweets 5 Likes 8 58 5 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following While the IDF does all it can to avoid civilian casualties, Hamas deliberately puts lives of #Gaza civilians in danger youtu.be /uzFglhFKII8 3:38 PM - 20 Jul 2014 34 Retweets 17 Likes 11 34 17 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Aboveground - goods are imported into #Gaza from Israel; Underground - Hamas continues to export #terror into Israel. SUPPLIES SUPPLIES SUPPLIES SUPPLIES  7:16 PM - 21 Jul 2014	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Israel regrets any harm to uninvolved civilians, but it's Hamas that bears full responsibility for damage & suffering in #Shujaia. #Gaza 7:30 AM - 21 Jul 2014 100 Retweets 43 Likes 37 100 43	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following IDF will establish a field hospital at Erez Crossing today to supply #medical assistance & humanitarian care to Palestinians from #Gaza. 1:19 PM - 20 Jul 2014 39 Retweets 15 Likes 16 39 15 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following The IDF has authorized a #humanitarian window to evacuate injured Palestinians from Shuja'iyya in #Gaza between 13:30-15:30 1:59 PM - 20 Jul 2014 28 Retweets 11 Likes 4 28 11

During the week of 18 July, Hamas crafted three new primary frameworks when addressing the conflict with Israel. The first framework of 'Siege on Gaza' argued that the problem escalating the conflict was the high death toll among the Palestinian population. The cause of the conflict was that Israel maintained an inhumane siege of Gaza by air, sea, and land that ruined the economy of Gaza and the lives of Gazans. The moral evaluation stated that Israel shed crocodile tears after learning that its air strikes killed innocent civilians. The solution to the conflict was twofold: first, that Hamas would engage Israel militarily to lift the siege on Gaza, and second, that Arab nations in the Middle East should support Hamas in its efforts to free Gaza.

The second primary framework, 'Killing Women and Children', stated that the problem driving tensions with Israel was the targeting of vulnerable populations. The cause of the tensions lay in Israel's murderous policy towards Gaza. The moral evaluation was evident in the terms used by Hamas, which referred to Israel's 'massacre' and 'onslaught'. The solution to the conflict was Gaza's willingness to martyr itself as part of the war with Israel. Moreover, Hamas would seek a military equilibrium in which Israeli fire would be met by Palestinian fire.

The third and final framework of 'Ceasefire' identified a new problem: all ceasefire proposals put forth by foreign actors were tainted by the fact that the world supported the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Thus, the current cycle of violence was but a fractal in a constant military conflict. The causal attribution stated that powerful nations were willing to support Israel's policies. The moral evaluation stated that Palestine would fend for itself and that Hamas would help Palestinians achieve all their national aspirations. The solution was a rejection of all ceasefire proposals until Israel was willing to lift the siege on Gaza and meet

other Palestinian pre-conditions. Later in the week, Hamas presented its own ceasefire initiative, which addressed the siege on Gaza and identified Qatar and Turkey as possible mediators.

The frameworks employed by Hamas during this week may be seen in the table below. New frameworks and laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 4.6: Hamas Primary Frameworks- Week 4

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Siege on Gaza	3 #siblings 've been #killed after an #Israeli #missile struck while they were #sleeping in their #bedroom, #Gaza Death toll in #Gaza reaches 321 #GazaUnderAttack #Pray4Gaza #ShameonIsrael الْوَكِيلُ وَنِعْمَ اللَّهُ حَسْبُنَا @qassamfeed @Qassam_Arabic Sat Jul 19 #Israeli air strikes pounded #Gaza Today, taking the death toll from a 12-day bombardment to 337 #GazaUnderAttack #PrayForGaza @qassamfeed	#Hamas is ready for all possibilities & 'll break the #siege -#Khaled_Meshaal #Gaza #GazaUnderAttack #PrayForGaza @qassamfeed @Qassam_Arabic 2014 As #Israeli attacks on #Gaza intensify, Gaza only get 2 hrs of #electricity a day increasing their hardship considerably #GazaUnderAttack #Gaza strip has sustained damages of roughly \$3 billion since the start of the #Israeli offensive #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes #Gaza #agriculture losses during the #Israeli aggression hit \$24 million @qassamfeed	#ZIONIST ARMY #KILLS THEN #CRIES & #LIES http://t.co/pFoXBCgWxJ #Gaza #GazaUnderAttack #ShameOnIsrael @qassamfeed	"#Israel is playing with fire." - #Turkey deputy PM @emrullahisler #Gaza #GazaUnderAttack http://t.co/jvldiGGjsc @qassamfeed #Statement: Al-Qassam carried out an operation behind enemy lines, Heavy fighting is ongoing with the forces of the occupation. @qassamfeed Sat Jul 19 #Turkey's EU Minister @MevlutCavusoglu Accuses Western nations & Muslim World of Hypocrisy Over #Gaza #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Killing Women and Children	Ongoing Bombardment by #Israel kills 10 More #Palestinians In #Gaza including #Children #GazaUnderAttack #ShameOnIsrael @qassamfeed Death toll in #Gaza rises to 345. 2268+ injured (657 children & 408 women, with some physically handicapped) #GazaUnderAttack #Pray4Gaza Heavy #Israeli shelling in #Gaza's eastern Shejaiya district has killed over 60 people, including children #GazaUnderAttack @qassamfeed	The operation was in retaliation for the "massacre" in Shujaiyeh on Sunday, our fighters destroyed an Israeli military jeep. (2/2) Around 15 #mosques were completely #destroyed & 25 others partially #damaged since the #Israeli onslaught on #Gaza which began 2 weeks ago	The operation was in retaliation for the "massacre" in Shujaiyeh on Sunday, our fighters destroyed an Israeli military jeep. (2/2) Around 15 #mosques were completely #destroyed & 25 others partially #damaged since the #Israeli onslaught on #Gaza which began 2 weeks ago	Al Qassam operations continue in response to the #Israeli crimes on #Gaza civilians, in the early hrs of 14th day of the Eaten Straw battle Sun Jul 20 08:34:47 +0000 2014 Al-Qassam Brigades kills 14 #Israeli soldiers in an ambush east of #Gaza city in response to their Crimes http://t.co/9tniijGcXq @qassamfeed Sun Jul 20 08:40:14 +0000 2014 The blood of my family and the families of Shojae'ya bring us closer to #victory, says # Hamas leader Dr. Khalil Al Hayya #Gaza @qassamfeed Most recent Martyr in #Gaza is 4 year old girl Muna Rami al-Kharawt in northern Gaza Strip #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes #PrayForGaza

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Ceasefire	#International moves aim at saving the #Israeli occupation & blocking the #resistance from scoring any achievement: #Hamam #GazaUnderAttack	#International moves aim at saving the #Israeli occupation & blocking the #resistance from scoring any achievement: #Hamam #GazaUnderAttack	#Hamam aims to unify the #Palestinian demands to meet the hopes of the Palestinians. #Resistance #Gaza "The #world must understand that #Gaza has decided to end the blockade by its blood and its heroism," deputy #Hamam leader Ismail Haniyeh	There will be no #ceasefire agreement without prior consent to all conditions of the #resistance factions: #Hamam #Israel #Gaza @qassamfeed #Palestinian #Resistance proposes #Ceasefire Agreement #Hamam #Gaza #Qatar #Turkey #US #Israel @qassamfeed #Palestinian #resistance factions 've proposed a #ceasefire initiative presented with #Qatari & #Turkish support Details 'll be updated soon #Hamam would firstly discuss ending siege & stopping the ongoing aggression, & then the issue of the captured #Israeli soldier. #Resistance Hamam's main condition for halting its fire is a lifting of Israel's 8 yr blockade on enclave, but also "release of those recently detained"

The distance between Hamas's 'Siege on Gaza' framework and Israel's 'High Death Toll' framework **was 75%**. While both actors offered different moral evaluations and causal attributions, with Hamas focusing on Israel's inhumane siege and Israel commenting on Hamas's use of human shields, they both agreed that the conflict was escalating due to the high death toll in Gaza.

Similarly, the distance between Hamas's 'Killing Women and Children' framework and Israel's 'Ground Invasion' framework **was also 75%**. Although both actors offered different problem definitions and causal attributions, with Hamas addressing the deaths of women and children in Gaza and Israel commenting on the use of terror tunnels to kill Israeli civilians, both actors identified a similar solution: a military equilibrium in which fire would be met with fire and quiet would be met by quiet.

Lastly, the distance between Hamas's 'Ceasefire' framework and Israel's 'War Crimes' framework **was also 75%**. Both actors agreed in their moral evaluations that Hamas was the ruler of the Gaza Strip. Indeed, when arguing that Hamas was committing war crimes, Israel acknowledged Hamas as the ruling government of Gaza and a quasi-state capable of committing war crimes. Similarly, Hamas argued that it and it alone would fend for Gaza and help Gazans achieve their national aspirations.

The final frame distance during this week, calculated through an average of three distances listed above, was 75%.

Week 5: 23 July – 28 July

The week of 23 July saw a series of ceasefire initiatives adopted and then rejected by both Israel and Hamas. On 24 July, an UNRWA school in Gaza was shelled, leaving eleven Palestinians dead, seven of them children. Although Israel denied firing at the school, it did argue that the school was used to hide Hamas rockets and ammunition. On 25 July, Palestinian leaders called for a 'Day of Rage' against Israel in the West Bank. As Israeli ground forces continued operating within the Gaza Strip, three Israeli soldiers were killed, while the Palestinian death toll rose to 867. On the same day, both Israel and Hamas reviewed a ceasefire proposal formulated by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry that called for an end to Hamas rocket fire in exchange for the opening of the border between Israel and Gaza, as well as the establishment of an airport and seaport in Gaza. Israel rejected the ceasefire as it did not refer to the need to destroy all Hamas tunnels leading into Israel. However, Israel did agree to a 12-hour humanitarian window. On 26 July, a tense stalemate arose as both sides respected the 12-hour window. By that time, the death toll in Gaza rose to 1,000 Palestinians. On 27 July, Israel agreed to and Hamas rejected a series of humanitarian windows. As sirens rang out in Israeli cities, the IAF and Israeli ground forces carried out the destruction of Hamas terror tunnels. On the evening of 27 July, U.S. President Barack Obama spoke to Israeli prime minister Netanyahu on the phone and reaffirmed his support for Israel's right to defend itself, while also expressing concern over the loss of life in Gaza.

During this week, the Israeli MFA employed five primary frameworks and one lamination, three of which were introduced in previous weeks. The 'Ground Invasion' framework, first introduced in Week 2, argued that the problem underlying the conflict with

Hamas was the organisation's use of terror tunnels to infiltrate Israel and carry out terror attacks. The cause of the conflict was Hamas's desire to kill Israelis and its continued rejection of ceasefire proposals. The moral evaluation focused on Hamas's violence against Israeli civilians and civilian infrastructure. The solution included the continuation of the ground operation, the destruction of Hamas tunnels, and restoration of peace to Israel's borders and cities.

As was the case in Week 4, the Israeli MFA also employed the lamination of 'Civilian Infrastructure', which was added to the 'Islamic Axis' framework. According to this lamination, the problem exacerbating the conflict was Hamas's affiliation with an Islamic Axis of fundamental state and non-state actors. The cause of the conflict was that like its affiliates, Hamas was a radical organisation that indoctrinated children and hid behind civilians. The moral evaluation centred on Hamas's use of civilian infrastructure to hide its rocket launchers, while the solution was Israeli resilience in the face of terror.

The MFA also employed, yet again, the 'High Death Toll' framework first introduced in Week 4. According to this framework, Israel regretted the loss of life in Gaza, since its battle was with Hamas, not the people of Gaza. The cause of the high death toll in Gaza was Hamas's use of human shields as it fired rockets from densely populated areas. The moral evaluation stated that Israel regretted the tragic loss of life, while the solution was for Israel to deliver medical care to the Gaza Strip and open humanitarian windows, during which the wounded could be evacuated.


Yet as events unfolded on the ground and in the sky, the MFA formulated two new frameworks. The first framework, 'UN Hypocrisy', was published following a debate at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), in which Israel was criticised for its military

bombardment of Gaza. According to this framework, the problem was that the UNHRC was hypocritical when blaming Israel for the violence in Gaza while ignoring Hamas's war crimes. The cause of the problem was that the UN had double standards when it came to Israel. This was evident in a statement by the foreign minister, which specified that UNRWA actually helped arm Hamas operatives. The moral evaluation stated that the UN should condemn all acts of terror. The suggested remedy was for decent people everywhere to utterly reject the condemnation of Israel in the UNHRC.

Lastly, near the end of the week, the MFA formulated the 'Six Million' framework, since nearly all of Israel's cities were now in range of Hamas rockets. According to this framework, the problem heightening tensions with Hamas was the increased reach of the rockets and the fact that six million Israelis were targeted by Hamas. The cause lay in Hamas's nature as a terrorist organisation that targets civilians rather than military installations. The moral evaluation stated that instead of caring for its citizens, Hamas invested international aid money in building offensive capabilities like long-range rockets. The solution to the conflict was disarming Hamas and creating a new government in Gaza that would actually care for the people of Gaza.



The table below includes the frameworks and laminations employed during this week by the Israeli MFA with new frameworks coloured in grey.

Table 4.7: Israeli Primary Frameworks - Week 5

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Ground Invasion	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA #Gaza: How Hamas tunnel network grew bbc.com/news/world-mid-... via @BBCNews  Gaza: How Hamas tunnel network grew Defence analyst Eado Hecht assesses the growth of Hamas' tunnel network in Gaza - one of Israel's stated reasons for its offensive in the territory. bbc.com 9:37 PM - 23 Jul 2014 26 Retweets 7 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Israel is fighting a defensive & just war to protect its citizens from highly dangerous & amoral terrorists buff.ly/1rBl7se @TheHill  Israel's just war in Gaza If the Israeli government did not respond to the escalating danger from Hamas, it would be failing in its most basic reason for being. thehill.com 10:08 PM - 23 Jul 2014 59 Retweets 34 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA #terror tunnels leading from civilian centers (including a hospital) in #Gaza into Israeli territory.  4:31 AM - 26 Jul 2014 114 Retweets 29 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA The main objective of Op #ProtectiveEdge is to re-establish stability & quiet for Israel's citizens once & for all. bit.ly/1ruMhhO 5:06 AM - 23 Jul 2014 32 Retweets 14 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Israel's operation against the Hamas in #Gaza is aimed at restoring the quiet to the citizens of Israel. bit.ly/1sQsjw8 9:33 PM - 25 Jul 2014 25 Retweets 15 Likes
	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA The #terror tunnels dug by Hamas lead to the backyards of Israelis in cities and villages near #Gaza.  Hamas Terror Tunnel Attacks July 17-21, 2014 10:33 PM - 23 Jul 2014	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Israel agreed to the 15/7 Egyptian brokered ceasefire, Hamas brutally rejected it & broke 2 humanitarian windows bit.ly/1nZKMTS #Gaza 6:35 PM - 25 Jul 2014 60 Retweets 23 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Hamas uses terror tunnels to infiltrate Israel from #Gaza & carry out terrorist attacks against civilians.  Terror Tunnels - A Nightmare Come True Hamas uses terror tunnels in order to infiltrate Israeli territory and carry out acts of terrorism against civilians. IDF's ground action in Gaza aims to neu... youtube.com 6:15 PM - 26 Jul 2014 45 Retweets 12 Likes	

Islamic Axis

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
High Death Toll	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Ambassador: Israel's fight is with Hamas, not the people of #Gaza on.thestar.com /1wX8WDU via @torontostar  Ambassador: Israel's fight is with Hamas, not the people of Gaza The Star Israel's ambassador to Canada says his country is fighting to ensure its citizens can enjoy "the peace and quiet to which they are entitled." thestar.com 8:02 PM - 23 Jul 2014 43 Retweets 20 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Hamas endangers the lives of Palestinians in #Gaza by using them as human shields, youtu.be/fcrWy3PT6zc 4:17 AM - 23 Jul 2014 69 Retweets 28 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following "The fact is that Hamas uses civilians as shields & they fire from a home & draw the fire into the home." @JohnKerry  6:00 AM - 23 Jul 2014 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Hamas & Other Terror Orgs in #Gaza Use Medical Facilities and Ambulances for Military-Terrorist Purposes buff.ly/1paPwXU 6:18 PM - 23 Jul 2014 33 Retweets 5 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Israel aims to prevent civilian casualties, but Hamas does its best to use its own people as Human Shields youtu.be/eOU6FYIs5d0 11:12 AM - 25 Jul 2014 41 Retweets 14 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following As much as Israel makes efforts to avoid civilian casualties in #Gaza, Hamas intentionally endangers their lives  3:40 AM - 26 Jul 2014 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Documented: Hamas' Human Shields and Israel's Humani... Hamas uses the civilian population of Gaza as human shields for its terrorist activities. Rockets are stored in schools and terrorists flee in ambulance. Pri... youtube.com 54 Retweets 18 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Under rocket fire from #Gaza, Israeli humanitarian #aid continues. bit.ly/1m6HopC #IsraelUnderFire 11:49 AM - 24 Jul 2014 29 Retweets 10 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Field #hospital for wounded Palestinians from #Gaza opened by the IDF in cooperation with the Red Crescent. bit.ly/1m6HopC 7:50 AM - 24 Jul 2014 52 Retweets 15 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Since the beginning of Op Protective Edge, more than 864 trucks carrying fuels, food, medical & general supplies crossed into #Gaza. 12:46 PM - 24 Jul 2014 69 Retweets 11 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Israel agrees to a 12-hour humanitarian window in #Gaza today, starting this morning at 8AM until 8PM local time. 9:35 AM - 26 Jul 2014 55 Retweets 14 Likes

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
UN Hypocrisy	Amb Manor: Hamas is committing #WarCrimes when it fires rockets from #Gaza indiscriminately at Israeli towns. http://t.co/KFgQnyyLqf Wed Jul 23 13:12:41 +0000 2014	FM Liberman: Once uncovered, @UNRWA returned the rockets to Hamas instead of handing them over to Israel. http://t.co/Xx7RJmlxq4 #Gaza Wed Jul 23 22:01:35 +0000 2014	President Peres: I call upon the #HumanRights Council to condemn terrorism, especially of Hamas. http://t.co/7iDQ5dldq4 #Gaza Wed Jul 23 22:42:48 +0000 2014	#UNHRC decision should be rejected by decent people everywhere http://t.co/COWi9z2TOQ #Gaza #Terror Wed Jul 23 21:20:35 +0000 2014
Six Million	 MAP: The expanding rocket threat - The range of Hamas rockets fired at Israel from #Gaza. #IsraelUnderFire 4:33 PM - 25 Jul 2014	 Each & every one of the 2350 rockets Hamas fired so far from #Gaza at Israel is an attempt to kill civilians. 9:05 AM - 25 Jul 2014 94 Retweets 28 Likes	 Instead of building schools & hospitals for the people of #Gaza, Hamas chose to invest \$1.25Bn in #terror tunnels. 10:15 AM - 25 Jul 2014 181 Retweets 48 Likes	 The U.S. should push for the disarming of Hamas in #Gaza-Israel cease-fire. wapo.st/Uoq1KG via @washingtonpost 6:41 PM - 24 Jul 2014 39 Retweets 18 Likes

Six Million
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During the week of 23 July, Hamas employed three frameworks first introduced in previous weeks while also formulating two new laminations. The first framework to be employed yet again was the 'Siege on Gaza' framework, which argued that the problem driving the conflict with Israel was the high death toll of Palestinian civilians. The cause of the conflict was Israel's inhumane siege on the Gaza Strip, while the moral evaluation stated that Israel fired indiscriminately at civilians. The solution was to engage Israel militarily and lift the siege by force.

Hamas also employed the 'Killing Women and Children' framework, introduced in Week 4. The problem exacerbating the conflict was that Israel was killing scores of women and children in Gaza. The cause of the problem lay in Israel's criminal offense against Palestinians, while the moral evaluation created a dichotomy where Gazans' desire for martyrdom was greater than Israel's respect for life. The solutions to the conflict were for Gaza to martyr itself and for Hamas to retaliate against Israeli attacks.

Finally, Hamas also employed the 'Ceasefire' framework, according to which the conflict with Israel was escalating because Israel had rejected the U.S. ceasefire proposal. The cause of the problem was that Israel could afford to reject ceasefires as powerful nations accepted its occupation of Palestine. This was also a moral evaluation that suggested that other countries had accepted the egregious violation of Palestinian rights. The solution stated that any ceasefire agreement must include opening Gaza's borders.

Following Israel's shooting at an UNRWA school, Hamas added the lamination of 'UN Installations' to its 'Killing Women and Children' framework. The problem was that Israel was firing at UN installations in the Gaza Strip in general, and on schools in particular. The

cause of the problem remained Israel's murderous nature, while the moral evaluation centred on Israel's 'massacre' of children. The solution was to fire rockets at Israeli cities.

Lastly, Hamas added another lamination to the 'Killing Women and Children' framework that focused on the religious aspect of the conflict with Israel. The problem driving the conflict was that Israel fought for Satan. The cause of the problem was Israel's willingness to kill innocent women and children. The moral evaluation contrasted Hamas, which fought with Allah on its side, with Israel, which fought with Satan at its side. The solution was for Gazans to pray for Hamas operatives.

The frameworks and laminations employed by Hamas during this week are shown below, with new frameworks coloured in grey.

Table 4.8: Hamas Primary Frameworks - Week 5

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Siege on Gaza	Since Today's sunset, 13 Palestinians have been killed due to the Israeli strikes on Gaza #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes #PrayForGaza Wed Jul 23 19:01:44 +0000 2014 Death toll reaches 701 & over 4,519 Palestinians have been wounded & some 140,000 have been displaced due to the Israeli attacks on #Gaza Wed Jul 23 23:44:11 +0000 2014	#AllPraisesToAllah Today, Al-Qassam Brigades hit an Israeli F-16 warplane over the besieged Gaza Strip. (1/2) Wed Jul 23 15:24:49 +0000 2014 On average, Israel killed 2 Palestinians, injured 12 & demolished 7 houses in Gaza per hour for past 20 days. #GazaUnderAttack #PrayForGaza Mon Jul 28 08:44:40 +0000 2014	Today, 12 were killed in the fierce and indiscriminate Israeli shelling of eastern Khan Yunis #Gaza #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes Wed Jul 23 14:45:01 +0000 2014	16:00 We attacked enemy soldiers & armored vehicles in Kissufim, east of Khan Yunis & blew up several explosive & clashed with them directly Wed Jul 23 14:58:29 +0000 2014 Here is the image of 3 Zionist soldiers who were killed by Al-Qassam Brigades east of Khan Yunis this morning #Gaza http://t.co/5wEstDU6vA Wed Jul 23 16:28:14 +0000 2014 During the operation today, Al-Qassam Brigades destroyed an armored personnel carrier with an RPG 29, a rocket-propelled grenade. Thu Jul 24 18:53:26 +0000 2014

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Killing Women and Children	Death toll reaches 815 including 200 children, 99 women & 52 elder people; 5260+ injured due to Israeli crimes on Gaza #GazaUnderAttack Fri Jul 25 09:13:33 +0000 2014 Women of Gaza making food items for Eid in schools to which they were displaced after Israeli strike on their homes http://t.co/R62demLv00 M on Jul 28 14:00:11 +0000 2014	Death toll rises to 836; 5400+ injured due to Israel's crimes on Gaza #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes #PrayForGaza #OhWorldWakeUp Fri Jul 25 18:15:44 +0000 2014 # Hamas pledges to dump #Israeli army in mud of #Gaza in response to brutal crimes of Israel #ShameOnIsrael #GazaUnderAttack @qassamfeed Sat Jul 19 17:16:45 +0000 2014	Atrocities by #Israel couldn't undermine #Palestinians' will. #Resistance will continue to inflict great losses on the occupiers: #Hamas Sun Jul 20 12:16:14 +0000 2014 The blood of my family and the families of Shojae'ya bring us closer to #victory, says #Hamas leader Dr. Khalil Al Hayya #Gaza @qassamfeed Sun Jul 20 17:12:05 +0000 2014 Most recent Martyr in #Gaza is 4 year old girl Muna Rami al-Kharawt in northern Gaza Strip #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes #PrayForGaza Tue Jul 22 10:58:12 +0000 2014	Today at 10 am, our fighters bombed a 'Merkavah' tank in eastern Jabaliya in response to #Israel's Crimes on #Gaza #Resistance #Hamas Wed Jul 23 15:04:49 +0000 2014 21:00 Al-Qassam Brigades fired occupied Ashdod with 18 Qassam rockets in response to Israel's crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hamas Wed Jul 23 18:20:16 +0000 2014 Al-Qassam Brigades fired Tel Aviv with a Fajr 5 missile and 4 M75 missiles in response to Israel's crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hamas Wed Jul 23 18:27:49 +0000 2014 An Israeli military vehicle was hit by an underground explosive device east of al-Tuffah neighborhood in response to Israel's crimes on Gaza Thu Jul 24 16:16:29 +0000 2014

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Ceasefire	Minutes before a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire, 20 members of a Palestinian family killed in Khan Yunis refugee camp due to Israeli crimes Sat Jul 26 08:59:58 +0000 2014 16:45 In response to the violating of ceasefire by Israel and continuing their crimes on Gaza, Qassam fired Kiryat Gat with 5 Qassam rockets Sun Jul 27 16:18:24 +0000 2014	The resistance will continue against Israeli war despite the pressures & conspiracies that intend to diminish Palestinian self-determination Mon Jul 28 16:27:56 +0000 2014	The resistance will continue against Israeli war despite the pressures & conspiracies that intend to diminish Palestinian self-determination Mon Jul 28 16:27:56 +0000 2014	Khaled Meshaal says Hamas' acceptance of any humanitarian truce in Gaza depends on an end to Israeli siege. http://t.co/BxWg4YUu7e Wed Jul 23 19:22:58 +0000 2014 Khaled Meshaal demanded Gaza's borders be open and an end to the blockade against it, calling Palestinians "the true owners of the land." Wed Jul 23 19:25:13 +0000 2014 We will continue our #resistance until we achieve all the demands of the #Palestinians: #Hamas Thu Jul 24 21:23:40 +0000 2014

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Killing Women and Children Lamination: UN Installations	15+ killed & nearly 100 injured when Israeli army shelled a Beit Hanoun school run by @UNRWA in northern Gaza Strip. #Massacre #PrayForGaza Thu Jul 24 16:24:10 +0000 2014 "Over the past 2 days in #Gaza, 1 Palestinian child has been killed every hour," says @UNRWA #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes #PrayForGaza Thu Jul 24 17:05:17 +0000 2014	"Israeli attacks wouldn't go unpunished." Photos:Israel shelled a school run by @UNRWA #StopMassacre #GazaUnderAttack http://t.co/h6NBhEy4DE Thu Jul 24 18:04:23 +0000 2014	15+ killed & nearly 100 injured when Israeli army shelled a Beit Hanoun school run by @UNRWA in northern Gaza Strip. #Massacre #PrayForGaza Thu Jul 24 16:24:10 +0000 2014	21:00 In response to the ongoing massacres done by #Israel on #Gaza, Al-#Qassam Brigades fired Haifa with rocket R160 #Resistance # Hamas Thu Jul 24 18:10:32 +0000 2014
Killing Women and Children Lamination: Religious Fighting	Believers fight in the way of Allah & Disbelievers fight in the way of Satan. Fight against Satans. Surely Satan's strategy is weak. ~ Quran Sun Jul 27 19:30:55 +0000 2014	Believers fight in the way of Allah & Disbelievers fight in the way of Satan. Fight against Satans. Surely Satan's strategy is weak. ~ Quran Sun Jul 27 19:30:55 +0000 2014	Allah does no harm to lets down or 've broken & we 'll go on in the path of Allah until He writes for us, 1 of 2 goals - victory or martyrdom Sat Jul 26 08:32:06 +0000 2014 {"Fight them & Allah will punish them by your hands, cover them with shame, help you (to victory) over them, heal the hearts of Believers"} Mon Jul 28 16:44:42 +0000 2014	"Believers! When you encounter a host in battle, stand firm and remember Allah much that you may triumph."~ Qur'an 8:45 Wed Jul 23 23:47:05 +0000 2014 Thus prays the people of Gaza on the morning of Eid #PrayForGaza

The distance between Israel's 'Ground Invasion' framework, and Hamas's 'Killing Women and Children' framework **was 75%**. Although each actor identified a different problem, causal attribution, and moral evaluation both agreed on the remedy to the conflict - a military equilibrium in which fire would be met by fire. Similarly, the distance between Hamas's 'Siege on Gaza' framework and Israel's 'High Death Toll' frameworks **was also 75%** as both sides recognised that the high death toll of Palestinian civilians was fuelling the conflict. However, Hamas and Israel disagreed on the cause of the problem; Israel depicted Hamas's use of human shields, and Hamas focused on Israel's inhumane siege of Gaza. Lastly, the distance between the remaining Hamas laminations and Israel's frameworks **was 100%**. Indeed, Hamas's allegations that Israel had rejected ceasefire proposals, that Israel was deliberately targeting UN installations and children, or that Israel fought for Satan did not resonate with any dimension of the Israeli frameworks. **Thus, the final, or average, frame distance during this week was 83.3%.**

Week 6: 28 July -04 August

On 28 July, 2014, the UN Security Council held an emergency session during which it called for a permanent humanitarian ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. The same day, Hamas operatives infiltrated Israel via an underground terror tunnel and attacked an Israeli military base near Nahal Oz, killing five IDF soldiers. In response, Israel carried out air raids in three neighbourhoods in Gaza. By the following day, 100 Palestinians had been killed while the IDF also bombed Hamas's television station. That same day a group of Hamas operatives infiltrated Israel using a terror tunnel. On 29 July, an UNRWA school in Gaza was shelled by Israel, leaving 19 dead and many more injured. Subsequently, Israel proposed a four-hour humanitarian ceasefire that was immediately rejected by Hamas. On 31 July, the IDF called up an additional 18,000 reserve soldiers, and in the south of Israel, five IDF soldiers were killed in a mortar attack. Later that day, Israel and Hamas agreed to a 72-hour humanitarian ceasefire. Moreover, both sides agreed to participate in mediation talks in Egypt in an attempt to reach a final solution to the conflict. The talks in Cairo, hosted by Egypt, would also include U.S. and UN diplomats. On 01 August, just minutes before the humanitarian ceasefire was to go into effect, Hamas operatives emerged from a tunnel and attacked an Israeli reconnaissance unit, killing three Israeli soldiers and abducting the body of one of the slain soldiers. In the following hours, the White House Press Secretary, the U.S. Secretary of State and the UN Secretary General all denounced Hamas's actions as an outrageous and barbaric violation of the truce and called for the immediate release of the kidnapped soldier. On 02 August, Hamas altered its statements and argued that it did not kidnap the soldier in question. All the while, the IDF expanded its operation in Gaza, laying several neighbourhoods to waste. By 03 August, the death toll in Gaza had climbed to 1,000, while IDF ground forces were nearly finished with uncovering and destroying Hamas's terror

tunnels. By 04 August, Israel began to withdraw some of its ground forces and establish a defensive perimeter along Gaza's borders.

During this week, the Israeli MFA employed three frameworks first introduced in previous weeks while also formulating two new laminations. The first framework to be employed by the MFA was the 'Six Million' framework. The problems fuelling the conflict with Hamas, according to this framework, were the long range of Hamas rockets and the fact that Hamas had considerable offensive capabilities given that it invested aid money in weapons and terrorist infrastructure. The cause of the conflict was Hamas's terrorist activities, which targeted civilians rather than soldiers. The moral evaluation focused on Hamas's use of aid money to build terror tunnels, rather than schools and hospitals, while the proposed solutions were the de-militarisation of the Gaza Strip and the establishment of a new government that would care for the people of Gaza.

The second framework to be employed yet again was the 'Islamic Axis' framework, which depicted Hamas as a radical and extremist Islamic organisation dedicated to murdering Israelis. The problem underpinning the conflict with Israel was the fact that, like Hezbollah and others, Hamas was also devoted to killing at the expense of its own people. The moral evaluation focused on the indoctrination of children and abuse of journalists by Hamas. Finally, the solution was for journalists to offer accurate coverage of Hamas's rule, which was characterised by fear and intimidation.

The Israeli MFA also continued to employ the 'Ground Invasion' framework which stipulated that the conflict was a result of Hamas's use of terror tunnels to infiltrate Israel. The cause was Hamas's desire to kill civilians, while the moral evaluation focused on Israel's acceptance of humanitarian ceasefires and Hamas's violation of these ceasefires. The


solution was a military operation meant to restore quiet to Israel's border and eradicate the tunnel threat.

However, following the alleged kidnapping of an IDF soldier, the Israeli MFA also added the lamination of 'Kidnapped Soldier' to its 'Ground Invasion' framework. The problem now driving violence between Israel and Hamas was the abduction of the soldier, rather than the terror tunnels. The causal attribution stipulated that Hamas was intent on killing Israelis and thus repeatedly violated ceasefires while the moral evaluation stated that by violating ceasefires, Hamas was depriving Gazans of much-needed aid. The solution was intentional condemnation of Hamas and the immediate return of the kidnapped soldier.

Following Hamas's violation of the 72-hour ceasefire, Israel also added the lamination of 'Hamas Abuses Gazans' to its 'High Death Toll' framework. This lamination stated that the high death toll in Gaza stemmed not from IDF operations, but from Hamas's willingness to turn Gaza into a terror fortress. The cause of the high death toll was thus Hamas's abusive behaviour and continued use of human shields. The moral evaluation and solution contrasted Hamas's actions with Israel's continued delivery of aid into Gaza, even under fire.



The table below includes the frameworks and laminations employed by Israel. New frameworks or laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 4.9: Israeli Primary Frameworks - Week 6

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Six Million	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Over 2,555 rockets have been fired at Israel from #Gaza in 3 weeks. bit.ly/1xzy310 10:58 AM - 29 Jul 2014 35 Retweets 12 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA While goods and supplies are imported into #Gaza from Israel, Hamas only exports terror from Gaza into Israel.  12:19 AM - 30 Jul 2014 137 Retweets 53 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA For years, Hamas chose to build terror tunnels instead of investing in #health and #education for #Gaza's civilians.  11:38 PM - 29 Jul 2014	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA PM Netanyahu: If Hamas is weakened, & demilitarized, then we may have a chance to work with more moderate forces. bit.ly/1nQm6mD 1:13 PM - 29 Jul 2014 51 Retweets 30 Likes
	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA #IsraelUnderFire - Map visualization of the rockets fired from #Gaza at Israel redalert.co.il #ProtectiveEdge 1:31 PM - 30 Jul 2014 33 Retweets 9 Likes			Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA PM Netanyahu: US & European support of the need to demilitarize terrorist orgs is an important achievement for Israel bit.ly/1p1uijj 9:26 AM - 3 Aug 2014 39 Retweets 11 Likes
	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Since the start of Op Protective Edge, at least 2,670 rockets have been fired at Israel from #Gaza. bit.ly/1xzy310 3:48 PM - 30 Jul 2014 27 Retweets 9 Likes			

Islamic Axis

Ground Invasion

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Ground Invasion Lamination: Kidnapped Soldier				
				

Lamination:
 Hamas
 Abuses
 Gazans

During this week, Hamas employed two frameworks and two laminations. The first framework employed yet again by Hamas was that of 'Killing Women and Children'. The problem identified in this framework was that Israel was killing scores of vulnerable women and children. The cause was Israel's willingness to 'massacre' Gazans. The moral evaluation focused on Hamas's willingness to martyr itself to save women and children, while the solution was a military equilibrium in which Israeli fire would be met with Hamas rocket fire.

The second framework was the 'Siege on Gaza' framework, which argued yet again that the problem driving the conflict with Israel was the high death toll of Gazans. The cause of the conflict was Israel's inhumane siege on Gaza, as made evident by the use of the hashtag 'oh world wake up!' The moral evaluation stated that Israel fired indiscriminately at Palestinian civilians. The solution was to continue the battle against Israel- one that Hamas was winning.

Later in the week, Hamas added the lamination of 'Israeli Violations' to its 'Ceasefire' framework. This lamination stipulated that Israel had violated its own, self-declared ceasefire. The cause of this violation was Israel's desire to massacre Gazans. The moral evaluation stated that unlike Israel, Hamas was committed to the truce and fired only at soldiers and not civilians. The solution was for Israel to halt its attacks, end the siege on Gaza, and agree to a permanent ceasefire.

Following the alleged abduction of the Israeli soldier, Hamas added the lamination of 'Kidnapped Soldier' to the 'Ceasefire' framework denying that it has kidnapped an IDF soldier. According to this lamination, the problem fuelling the conflict was Israel's decision to lie and blame Hamas for kidnapping a soldier. The causal attribution stated that Israel simply needed an excuse to continue bombarding Gaza and ignore ceasefire proposals. The

moral evaluation stated that Israel used the kidnapping to continue its 'massacre' in Gaza, while the solution lay in uncovering the truth -that Israel had likely killed its own soldier.

The frameworks and laminations employed by Hamas can be seen in the table below, with new frameworks and laminations coloured in grey.

Table 4.10: Hamas Primary Frameworks - Week 6

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Killing Women and Children	Gaza suffers \$4,000,000,000 in losses following Israeli assault. Israeli attacks 've destroyed over 40,000 homes & displaced 10,000 families Fri Aug 01 17:27:05 +0000 2014	In initial response to massacre of Shojae'ya, Qassam targetted the vehicle "Amolosaa" packed with explosives east Juhor Al-Dik with Kornet Wed Jul 30 17:41:58 +0000 2014 22:15 In response to the massacres of Jabalya & Shojae'ya, Qassam Brigades fired Ofakim with 4 Grad missiles & Tel Aviv with 4 M75 missiles Wed Jul 30 21:03:48 +0000 2014	Beautiful Qira'ath of Abdul Hamid before attaining martyrdom in war #Gaza #Israel #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes http://t.co/pDOa4R1nPg Wed Jul 30 11:59:59 +0000 2014 15 martyred and 160+ injured in the new Zionist massacre in a market of Neighborhood Shojae'ya, Gaza #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes Wed Jul 30 15:37:43 +0000 2014	02:25 Al-Qassam Brigades fired Tel Aviv with 4 M75 missiles in response to Israel's crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hamas #PrayForGaza Tue Jul 29 00:24:22 +0000 2014 02:25 Al-Qassam Brigades fired Tel Aviv with 4 M75 missiles in response to Israel's crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hamas #PrayForGaza Tue Jul 29 00:24:22 +0000 2014 Yesterday, Al-Qassam Brigades killed 19 Zionist soldiers including officers in response to Israel's crimes on Gaza. Till now, 110 killed. Tue Jul 29 01:13:09 +0000 2014

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Siege on Gaza	Death toll reaches 1458 & 8300+ injured. #Gaza #Israel #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes #PrayForGaza #OhWorldWakeUp #PalestineWillBeFree Fri Aug 01 13:09:52 +0000 2014	Death toll reaches 1458 & 8300+ injured. #Gaza #Israel #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes #PrayForGaza #OhWorldWakeUp #PalestineWillBeFree Fri Aug 01 13:09:52 +0000 2014	At least 40 Palestinians were killed and more than 100 others injured in Israeli shelling of the Gaza Strip Today. #GazaUnderAttack Fri Aug 01 15:02:22 +0000 2014	29/7: Al-Qassam Brigades targeted personnel carrier of the type Hizarryt in the Kissufim area with missile Kornet and hit directly. Wed Jul 30 07:46:47 +0000 2014 Zionist enemy officially recognized the fall of 6 of its soldiers killed & wounded in the bombing of Qassam in northern sector of Hchudat. Wed Jul 30 12:41:05 +0000 2014 Secret filming during a raid by the settlement for Al-Qassam & 10 soldiers were killed #Resistance #Gaza #Israel https://t.co/nv9rTbatCi Wed Jul 30 13:50:30 +0000 2014 Israeli military analyst @BenCaspi: " Hamas had won the ongoing round [of the conflict] despite the strong operations of the Israeli army" Fri Aug 01 08:36:06 +0000 2014

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Ceasefire Lamination: Israeli Violations	At least 17 killed & 200 wounded in bombardment near #Gaza City - Shujae'ya during "humanitarian pause" unilaterally announced by #Israel Wed Jul 30 17:26:13 +0000 2014	# Hamas' statement on Shujayea market bombardment, describing it as "another blatant massacre" #Resistance @hamasinfo http://t.co/09f5wdYaL3 Wed Jul 30 17:32:26 +0000 2014	"Israel ended the 72 hour humanitarian ceasefire unilaterally. We are committed to the truce and only respond to aggression." ~ Hamas Fri Aug 01 13:07:23 +0000 2014 "We are only targeting Israeli soldiers and have not sought to hurt civilians in Israel." :Mohamed Daif, Qassam's leader @AqsaTVChannel Wed Jul 30 12:57:07 +0000 2014	"Israel must not only halt its military offensive but also lift the blockade on Gaza if there is going to be a truce." :Mohamed Daif Wed Jul 30 12:53:59 +0000 2014 A unilateral Israeli withdrawal wouldn't "commit" us to anything. Hamas ready to continue fighting if necessary. ~ Spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri Sat Aug 02 20:34:28 +0000 2014

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Ceasefire Lamination: Kidnapped Soldier	Qassam Statement Clarifying Israel's Violation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire, the Claim of Disappearance of 1 Soldier http://t.co/ZVzuVwvmxm Sat Aug 02 20:26:26 +0000 2014	Israel's announcement of capture was simply "justification for Israel retreating from truce, & a cover-up for massacres especially Rafah" Fri Aug 01 16:49:30 +0000 2014	Israel's announcement of capture was simply "justification for Israel retreating from truce, & a cover-up for massacres especially Rafah" Fri Aug 01 16:49:30 +0000 2014	00:31 - Al-Qassam Brigades have no knowledge on the missing soldier nor his whereabouts nor the circumstances of his disappearance Sat Aug 02 07:08:47 +0000 2014 13:54 - Al-Qassam: "We lost communication with a group of our fighters, when Israeli occupation forces penetrated east of Rafah. (1/2) Sat Aug 02 18:52:43 +0000 2014 ... We suspect they were all killed by Israeli shelling, including the Israeli soldier, who, supposedly, disappeared." (2/2) Sat Aug 02 18:54:58 +0000 2014

Similar to the results of previous weeks, there was a **75%** distance between Israel's 'Ground Invasion' framework and Hamas's 'Killing Women and Children' framework. Although Israel stated that the conflict was exacerbated by Hamas's use of tunnels to infiltrate Israel, and Hamas alleged that the conflict was a result of Israel targeting children and women, both sides agreed that the solution was a military equilibrium in which quiet would be met by quiet. Similarly, there **was a 75%** difference between Israel's framework of 'Hamas Abuses Gazans' and Hamas's 'Siege of Gaza' framework. While Hamas claimed that Israel was maintaining an inhumane siege on Gaza, and while Israel focused on Hamas's use of Gaza as a terror fortress, both agreed that the high death toll was the problem escalating the conflict. The distance between the remaining laminations and frameworks of Hamas and Israel **was 100%. The final, or average, frame distance for this week was 83.3%.**

Week 7: 03 August - 09 August

The week of 03 August saw a tense stalemate emerge between Israel and Hamas as both actors agreed to a series of ceasefire initiatives. The week began, however, with the deaths of 20 Palestinians, who were killed during an IAF air strike near a school in Gaza. On 04 August, Israel declared a seven-hour humanitarian window. Minutes before the window came into effect, an Israeli attack killed a Hamas operative, leading to a barrage of rockets. Hours later, a Palestinian man used an industrial digger to ram a bus in Jerusalem, and an IDF soldier was shot near Mount Scopus. By the eve of 04 August, both Israel and Hamas agreed to observe a 72-hour ceasefire. The following day, talks between both sides began in Cairo, with Egypt serving as a mediator between conflicted parties. On 06 August, Israel agreed to Egypt's proposal to extend the ceasefire, yet Hamas refused, stating that if its demands of ending the siege on Gaza were not met, it would resume its rocket fire. Israel later agreed to ease the siege and expand Gaza's fishing zone if the militant groups in Gaza would all disarm. 08 August saw the collapse of the Egyptian ceasefire as Hamas rockets rained on Israeli cities. Israel retaliated through a series of IAF strikes, while Israeli negotiators left Cairo, refusing to 'negotiate under fire'. The following day, 30 rockets were fired at Israel, while the IAF struck 49 targets in Gaza.

During this week, Israel employed two laminations first introduced in previous weeks, while also formulating a new framework. At the beginning of the week, following the attack on the Palestinian school, the Israeli MFA employed the 'Hamas Abuses Gazans' lamination, which stated that the high death toll stemmed from Hamas's willingness to transform Gaza into a terror fortress and its rejection of previous ceasefire agreements. The cause of the death toll was Hamas's abuse of Gazans, while the moral evaluation and


solution contrasted Hamas's use of Palestinians as human shields with Israeli aid meant to elevate the suffering of Palestinians.

By the week of 03 August, Israel had ended its ground operation in Gaza while destroying a network of Hamas underground tunnels. Yet as rockets continued to target Israeli cities, the MFA employed the 'Military Operation' lamination first introduced in Week 2. According to this lamination, Hamas rockets were to blame for the current cycle of violence. The causal attribution stated that Hamas was a terror organisation willing to fire indiscriminately at Israeli cities. The moral evaluation stated that Israel had the right to defend itself from such fire, while the solution was continued air raids in Gaza.

During the second part of the week, as talks in Cairo were underway, the Israeli MFA formulated the 'Egyptian Ceasefire' framework. The problem preventing the resolution of the conflict was that Hamas had rejected previous ceasefires while firing at Israel from above, with rockets, and from below, via terror tunnels. The cause of the problem lay in Hamas's nature as it was an organisation that was addicted to terror. The moral evaluation contrasted Hamas's rejection of ceasefires with Israel's acceptance, as evident by the phrase 'Israel Ceases. Hamas Fires'. At first, this framework identified a truce as the desired resolution to the conflict. Yet once Hamas violated the Egyptian ceasefire, the solution was to respond with force to Hamas rocket fire and continue the military operation in Gaza.

The table below includes the frameworks employed by Israel, with new frameworks or laminations coloured in grey

Table 4.11: Israeli Primary Frameworks - Week 7

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
High Death Toll Lamination: Hamad Abuses Gazans	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Hamas violated the ceasefire and is responsible for any resulting harm to the residents of #Gaza who are exploited by Hamas as human shields 6:30 PM - 8 Aug 2014 84 Retweets 33 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Exploiting their own ppl's suffering & media's complicity in it, is nowhere more cynically demonstrated than in #Gaza buff.ly/1nl1z3Q 10:36 am - 4 Aug 2014 26 Retweets 13 Likes Israel Defense Forces @IDF New map confirms: the Shuja'iya neighborhood is a terrorist stronghold where Hamas uses residents as human shields. 	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Follow Hamas fires rockets from civilian areas in #Gaza & endangers civilians' lives. These reporters caught it live. WATCH Le Hamas tire des roquettes à proximité des reporters d... youtube.com 11:40 pm - 3 Aug 2014 61 Retweets 19 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Follow According to Hamas manual on "Urban Warfare", Hamas' callous use of #Gaza's population was intentional & preplanned bit.ly/1mhWQJC 1:43 am - 5 Aug 2014 65 Retweets 21 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Follow The real enemy of the Palestinian people is not Israel but the Hamas and those who support it. geeskaafrika.com/?p=4783 #Gaza Ethiopia: So who is the real enemy of the Palestinian peo... Addis Ababa (HAN) August 6, 2014 – Expert Analysis, Your Power & Regional Influence Magazine, opinion page sent to Geeska Afrika Online Editorial by Leo Vinovezky, Deputy Chief of geeskaafrika.com 6:50 am - 6 Aug 2014 39 Retweets 20 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Follow Under rocket fire from #Gaza, Israeli humanitarian aid continues bit.ly/1m6HopC 8:30 am - 4 Aug 2014 22 Retweets 9 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Follow Israel Electric Corp. begins repairing power grids for #Gaza, that were damaged by rockets fired from Gaza bit.ly/1of7Nr8 5:59 am - 6 Aug 2014 67 Retweets 16 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Follow 1,752 trucks with #humanitarian aid have entered #Gaza Since July 8th, despite constant attacks by Hamas. bit.ly/1mfK4Cn 12:37 pm - 4 Aug 2014 94 Retweets 18 Likes PM of Israel @IsraelPM Follow #Hamas prevents residents of #Gaza from receiving humanitarian aid – Israel helps the intl community send aid to Gaza  8:04 am - 4 Aug 2014 518 Retweets 187 Likes

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
High Death Toll Lamination: Hamad Abuses Gazans (continues from previous page)	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Follow Anyone who cares about #Gaza civilians' lives MUST act against Hamas using them as human shields. #FreeGazaFromHamas Children should be protected, NOT exploited as human shields!  Free Gaza From Hamas 8:08 am · 6 Aug 2014			

[illegible]

Egyptian Ceasefire

During this week, Hamas published only six tweets. These were all part of the 'Siege on Gaza' framework, which argued that the high death toll in Gaza prevented the resolution of the conflict with Israel. The cause of the conflict was Israel's inhumane siege, while the moral evaluation suggested that Israel was responsible for a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The solution was to break the siege through armed opposition. The table below includes the framework employed by Hamas during this week.

Table 4.12: Hamas Primary Frameworks - Week 7

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Siege of Gaza	Death toll: 1,800+ Muhammad Jumaa al-Najjar seriously injured during Israel's assault on Gaza died today #PrayForGaza http://t.co/FhY2QMrUQt Thu Aug 07 12:47:45 +0000 2014	"\$200 million damage in #Gaza agricultural sector due to #Israel's attacks targeting agricultural land." #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes Thu Aug 07 12:43:53 +0000 2014 10 new electric back-up generators installed in Gaza in order to avert a humanitarian crisis in the besieged coastal enclave #PrayForGaza Thu Aug 07 12:54:04 +0000 2014	10 new electric back-up generators installed in Gaza in order to avert a humanitarian crisis in the besieged coastal enclave #PrayForGaza Thu Aug 07 12:54:04 +0000 2014	Made By Al-Qassam Brigades .. A1 - R160 - J80 - M75 - S55 #Resistance #Hamas #Gaza_will_win #PrayForGaza http://t.co/0BHplBVxyd Sat Aug 09 03:08:36 +0000 2014 "Resistance fighters have their hands on the trigger." ~ Hamas @izzat_risheq warned against any attempts by Israel to shrug off the demands Thu Aug 07 06:32:45 +0000 2014

Given the fact that Hamas disseminated only one framework during this week, only one frame distance was measured. Hamas's 'Siege on Gaza' framework best resonated with Israel's 'Hamas Abuses Gazans' framework. This is because both actors agreed that the problem fuelling tension was the high death toll in Gaza. However, while Israel stated that the high death toll was a result of Hamas's decision to transform Gaza into a military fortress, Hamas argued that the high death toll was the result of an inhumane siege on the Gaza Strip. While Israel's moral evaluation contrasted Hamas's abuse of its citizens with Israeli delivery of humanitarian aid, Hamas focused on the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. For Hamas, the solution was to engage Israel militarily and break the siege, while for Israel, the solution was to supply Gaza with humanitarian aid. **Thus, the frame distance between the two actors was 75%.**

Week 8: 10 August - 15 August

10 August saw increased efforts to end the conflict between Israel and Hamas through a series of ceasefire initiatives brokered by Egypt. On 10 August, both sides accepted a three-day ceasefire. During this period, Israel had to suspend the delivery of aid into Gaza following an attack on the border crossing with Israel. Later in the day, Hamas operatives attempted to infiltrate Israel through the same crossing. The following day, Egypt opened its border with Gaza, enabling the delivery of aid into the Gaza Strip. On 11 August, the UNHRC announced the formation of a fact-finding mission that would ascertain whether Israel was responsible for committing war crimes in Gaza. Israel rejected the mission as biased. The following day, media reports indicated that progress had been made in talks in Cairo, despite the fact that an Israeli navy destroyer had fired on a Palestinian shipping boat.

On 13 August, two journalists and six Palestinians were killed in Gaza. While initial reports indicated that they had died as a result of an IAF air strike, it was later discovered that all eight were killed during an attempt to diffuse an unexploded IAF bomb. Although the ceasefire was still in effect on 14 August, Israel decided to respond to sporadic rocket fire from Gaza. The following day, news reports detailed the terms of a possible truce between Hamas and Israel, including a halt to all rocket fire on Israel in exchange for the delivery of aid into Gaza, collaborative efforts by Israel and the Palestinian National Authority to raise funds for the reconstruction of Gaza, and an expansion of Gaza's fishing zone. Israel and Hamas also agreed to discuss the construction of a seaport in Gaza at a later time.

During this week the Israeli MFA employed four frameworks and one lamination, all of which were introduced in previous weeks. As talks in Cairo progressed, the MFA

employed the 'Egyptian Ceasefire' framework, which argued that the problem preventing a resolution to the conflict was Hamas's continued violations of ceasefire agreements. The causal attribution stated that Israel could not agree to a ceasefire while it was being fired upon. The moral evaluation stated that Hamas could have chosen peace but, instead, chose to prolong the war. Yet despite its condemnation of Hamas, Israel's solution to the conflict was to further extend the ceasefire.

At the same time, the MFA also employed its 'High Death Toll' framework; that stipulated that the high death toll in Gaza could only be blamed on Hamas, which cared little for the lives of Gazans. The cause of the high death toll was Hamas's firing on the border where Israeli aid crossed and made its way to Gazans. The moral evaluation focused on the treatment Israel offered Gazans in its field hospital, while the solution was to continue the delivery of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.

Later in the week, as talks slowly progressed in Cairo, the MFA employed the 'Islamic Axis' framework, creating an association between Hamas and the likes of ISIS and Boko Haram. The problem identified by the MFA was that Western reporters were offering a biased report of the conflict. The cause of the problem was that like its affiliates, Hamas was harassing and threatening journalists. The moral evaluation and suggested remedy lay in recognising the true nature of Hamas and the danger it, and its affiliates, posed to democracies everywhere.


Another lamination employed during the week of 10 August was 'Hamas Abuses Gazans', which argued that the problem protracting the conflict was Hamas's devotion to terror rather than caring for its citizens. The cause of the conflict and the moral evaluation stated that Hamas invested its resources in terror infrastructure rather than civilian

infrastructure. The solution was to disarm all Palestinian factions in Gaza and demilitarise the Gaza Strip.

Finally, once the UNHRC announced the formation of a fact-finding mission, the MFA employed the 'UN Hypocrisy' framework, arguing that the UN legitimised the claims of Hamas, a terror group, while ignoring Israel's claims. The cause of the problem was UN hypocrisy, while the moral evaluation stated that Israeli evidence contradicted claims of indiscriminate IDF fire in Gaza. The solution was for the UNHRC to visit countries where war crimes were actually taking place. The table below includes the frameworks and laminations employed by the Israeli MFA.

Table 4.13: Israeli Primary Frameworks - Week 8

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Egyptian Ceasefire	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Since the end of the ceasefire last Friday, Hamas has fired approximately 100 rockets from #Gaza at Israel. bit.ly/1xzy31O 11:31 AM - 10 Aug 2014 61 Retweets 14 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA PM Netanyahu: Israel will not negotiate under fire & will continue to take all action in order to bring quiet to all of its citizens. 5:44 PM - 10 Aug 2014 47 Retweets 18 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Hamas could have chosen peace. Instead, it made #Gaza suffer. wapo.st/1u7bOkL via @washingtonpost  Hamas could have chosen peace. Instead, it made Gaza suffer. The group squandered opportunities after Israel's withdrawal. washingtonpost.com 4:02 PM - 11 Aug 2014 25 Retweets 11 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Despite the firing of eight rockets from #Gaza last night, the ceasefire has been extended for five days. mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPol ... 4:52 PM - 14 Aug 2014 50 Retweets 15 Likes
	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA 3,488 rockets fired at Israel from #Gaza since July 8 until last night's beginning of the Egyptian brokered ceasefire buff.ly/1uGJRxu 8:01 PM - 11 Aug 2014 38 Retweets 10 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA With neighbors like Hamas in #Gaza, would you give up control over your border? There is No Israeli Siege On Gaza http://bit.ly/1m6H0pC The numbers speak for themselves - 1.7 Million tons of merchandise were imported into Gaza via the Israeli border in the last 2 years. ... youtube.com 2:25 PM - 16 Aug 2014 65 Retweets 24 Likes		
	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Protective Edge: Hamas' violations of ceasefires - A #chronology bit.ly/1u3hLMI #Gaza 9:27 PM - 14 Aug 2014 24 Retweets 7 Likes			

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy	
High Death Toll	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following "Hamas has consistently, not just in this conflict, been less than protective of their civilians." @HillaryClinton  Hillary Clinton: 'Failure' to Help Syrian Rebels Led to the Rise of ISIS The former secretary of state, and probable candidate for president, outlines her foreign-policy doctrine. She says this about President Obama's "Great nations 1:10 PM - 13 Aug 2014 18 Retweets 9 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Israel saves its enemies; Hamas endangers its friends: A tale of two hospitals: One in Israel, one in #Gaza  CRUZ: A tale of two hospitals: One in Israel, one in Gaza If you want to judge a nation, look at how it treats its most vulnerable civilians. Hospitals are a good place to start. 4:30 PM - 10 Aug 2014 57 Retweets 20 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following The Kerem Shalom Crossing through which humanitarian supplies enter into #Gaza was temporarily closed due to Hamas' rocket fire from #Gaza 30 Retweets 5 Likes 5 30 5 	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Hamas prefers terror over welfare Rocket attack forces closure of Israel-#Gaza border crossing youtu.be/ouyJ_h_qDrI  8:16 PM - 10 Aug 2014 47 Retweets 8 Likes 8 47 8 	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Israel works on an ongoing basis to transfer the ill & the wounded from #Gaza to hospitals in Israel & abroad. bit.ly/1rbOTUZ 50 Retweets 11 Likes 18 50 11 	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following On 11.8, 248 trucks carrying 4,881 tons of goods & supplies entered #Gaza via the Kerem Shalom Crossing. bit.ly/1m6HopC 33 Retweets 13 Likes 6 33 13 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Among 248 trucks that entered #Gaza, 150 trucks carried 2,956 tons of food & 10 trucks carried 115 tons of #medicine  12:06 PM - 13 Aug 2014 73 Retweets 39 Likes 9 73 39

Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA

Following

Hamas prefers terror over welfare|Rocket attack forces closure of Israel-#Gaza border crossing youtu.be/ouyJ_h_qDrI

8:16 PM - 10 Aug 2014

47 Retweets 8 Likes

8

47

8

Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA

Following

Israel will continue its efforts to transfer humanitarian aid into #Gaza, provided the border crossings are not attacked by Hamas rockets

32 Retweets 12 Likes

1

32

12

Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA

Following

IDF field hospital treats #Gaza civilians bit.ly/XeK3Jy

2:14 PM - 12 Aug 2014

27 Retweets 8 Likes

5

27

8

Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA

Following

Israel works on an ongoing basis to transfer the ill & the wounded from #Gaza to hospitals in Israel & abroad. bit.ly/1rbOTUZ

11:01 PM - 14 Aug 2014

50 Retweets 11 Likes

18

50

11

Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA

Following

On 11.8, 248 trucks carrying 4,881 tons of goods & supplies entered #Gaza via the Kerem Shalom Crossing. bit.ly/1m6HopC

9:47 AM - 13 Aug 2014

33 Retweets 13 Likes

6

33

13

Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA

Following

Among 248 trucks that entered #Gaza, 150 trucks carried 2,956 tons of food & 10 trucks carried 115 tons of #medicine

12:06 PM - 13 Aug 2014

73 Retweets 39 Likes

9

73

39

Islamic Axis

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
High Death Toll Lamination: Hamas Abuses Gazans				
UN Hypocrisy				

During this week, Hamas employed two frameworks that were first introduced in previous weeks. The first was the 'Ceasefire' framework, which stipulated that the problem preventing the resolution of the conflict was Israeli ceasefire violations. The cause of the problem lay in Israel's aggressive nature. The moral evaluation focused on Israel's decision to open fire on Palestinian fishermen, thus violating the agreed-upon humanitarian window. The solution identified was twofold. First, Hamas would agree to a short-term truce. Second, Hamas would create the the conditions necessary for a long-term agreement that would end the siege on Gaza.

The second framework to be employed during this week was the 'Siege on Gaza' framework. According to this framework, the problem exacerbating the conflict was the high death toll in Gaza caused by Israel's 'murderous' nature. The moral evaluation decried the betrayal of Palestine by some Arab states while calling on others to support efforts to breach the siege. The solution was continued military opposition until the siege was lifted.

Lastly, Hamas formulated a new framework during this week meant to portray itself as a national political actor that sought to secure the interests of all Palestinians, including those in the West Bank. The problem identified in the framework of 'Hamas Leadership' was that Palestinians in the West Bank were falling prey to Israel. The cause of the problem was Israeli nightly raids, during which Palestinians were kidnapped from their villages. The moral evaluation was evident in the word 'prey', which portrayed Palestinians as being in need of a champion and Israel's policies as predatory. The solution was for Hamas to act diplomatically opposite other states in the region, such as Jordan, to promote Palestinian interests. The table below includes the frameworks employed by Hamas, with new frameworks or laminations coloured in grey.

Table 4.14: Hamas Primary Frameworks - Week 8

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Ceasefire	#Israel violates 72 hour humanitarian truce, fires at #Gaza fishermen http://t.co/6imrTkuxEv #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes Wed Aug 13 15:22:29 +0000 2014 Israeli Airstrikes Over Gaza early today Violate the Ceasefire Read the news in detail: http://t.co/SV9IZnC6Xw http://t.co/SAPeVqviSj Thu Aug 14 11:53:42 +0000 2014	In case of Israel's continued aggression, Hamas is ready with other Palestinian factions to resist & politically & to face all possibilities Mon Aug 11 04:43:46 +0000 2014	#Israel violates 72 hour humanitarian truce, fires at #Gaza fishermen http://t.co/6imrTkuxEv #GazaUnderAttack #StopIsraelCrimes Wed Aug 13 15:22:29 +0000 2014	The present truce "is one of the ways/tactics to ensure successful negotiations or to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza" Mon Aug 11 03:43:19 +0000 2014 A #lasting_truce must lead to the #lifting by #Israel of its #blockade of the #Gaza Strip. ~ #Hamas chief Khalid Mashaal Mon Aug 11 03:41:30 +0000 2014 The final "#goal we insist on is having the demands of #Palestinians met and the #Gaza Strip exist without a blockade". ~ Hamas Mon Aug 11 03:44:17 In case of Israel's continued aggression, Hamas is ready with other Palestinian factions to resist & politically & to face all possibilities Mon Aug 11 04:43:46 +0000 2014

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Siege of Gaza	Israel murdered 1,910 Palestinian civilians & injured 10,000+ #Gaza #GazaUnderAttack #PrayForGaza #PalestineWillBeFree #StopIsraelCrimes Thu Aug 14 11:48:17 +0000 2014	Israel murdered 1,910 Palestinian civilians & injured 10,000+ #Gaza #GazaUnderAttack #PrayForGaza #PalestineWillBeFree #StopIsraelCrimes Thu Aug 14 11:48:17 +0000 2014	Despite the betrayal of some Arab states, the resistance was able to make significant achievements & to inflict heavy losses on Zionist army Tue Aug 12 19:14:02 +0000 2014	Yesterday 11.55pm, Al-Qassam fired a rocket at 'Tel Aviv'; 3 Grads at 'Kiryat Malachi'; a rocket at 'Sidi Tamman'; 4 rockets at 'Kfar Azza'. Mon Aug 11 09:24:38 +0000 2014 Qassam published a video clarifies manufacturing missiles were fired at Israeli military bases during war on Gaza https://t.co/aO37b0gONX Thu Aug 14 11:45:55 +0000 2014 The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) condemns Israel's terrorism against Gaza civilians Read the news: http://t.co/RCodzwfmxe Thu Aug 14 12:02:03 +0000 2014 # Hamas leader @Khalid_Meshaal, runs the battle "confidentially" and "persistently". ~ Israeli political analyst Yossi Melman in @MaarivNews Sat Aug 16 18:16:29 +0000 2014

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Hamas Leadership	Palestinian prisoners falling prey to Israeli hounding Read more at http://t.co/Y7TlrDJofd #PalestinrWillBeFree #ShameOnZionists Wed Aug 13 15:27:01 +0000 2014	At dawn Today, Israel kidnaps 50 Palestinians from their homes in Jerusalem and 6 others during raids in Al-Khalil and Bethlehem cities. Thu Aug 14 12:05:09 +0000 2014 Yesterday, Israeli forces abducted at least 14 Palestinians during the night and in predawn raids across the West Bank #PrayForPalestine Thu Aug 14 11:57:06 +0000 2014	Palestinian prisoners falling prey to Israeli hounding Read more at http://t.co/Y7TlrDJofd #PalestinrWillBeFree #ShameOnZionists Wed Aug 13 15:27:01 +0000 2014	Hamas urged Jordan to assume its role in protecting Palestinian holy sites under its custodianship, especially Aqsa, from Israeli violations Sat Aug 16 15:11:21 +0000 2014 Hamas urged the Arab League & OIC to assume their responsibilities towards the Palestinian Islamic and Christian holy sites Sat Aug 16 15:12:37 +0000 2014

During this week, three frame distances were measured. The distance between Israel's ' Hamas Abuses Gazans ' lamination and the ' Hamas Leadership ' framework **was 75%**, as both agreed that the problem driving the conflict was the suffering of the Palestinian people. However, both disagreed on the cause of this suffering, with Israel blaming Hamas for investing in terror infrastructure rather than civilian infrastructure and Hamas blaming Israel for terrorising Palestinians in the West Bank. While Israel called for the demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip, Hamas vowed to act diplomatically and secure the rights of all Palestinians.

The difference between both actors' ceasefire frameworks **was 50%**; both agreed that the conflict could not be resolved so long as ceasefire agreements were violated and both agreed that the best way forward was to extend a short-term truce while working toward a long-term agreement. Lastly, the distance between Hamas's ' Siege on Gaza ' framework, and Israel's ' High Death Toll ' frameworks **was 75%**, as both identified the high death toll in Gaza as the problem fuelling tensions on the ground. Yet while Israel stated that the solution was to provide Gazans with aid, Hamas vowed to end the siege by force. **The final, or average, frame distance measured this week was thus 66.6%.**

Week 9: 17 August – 23 August

On 17 August, Israel removed its fishing blockade on Gaza as a gesture of goodwill. While negotiations for a prolonged ceasefire continued in Cairo, Israel made it clear that no deal would be struck without the demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip. The following day, Israel and Hamas announced that they were close to signing an agreement. Later in the day, Israel arrested 93 Hamas operatives in the West Bank, stating that they had planned to launch a coup against the Palestinian National Authority. On 19 August, reports suggested that Israel had agreed to remove the siege of Gaza in return for U.S. assurances that Hamas would not be allowed to rearm itself once the cycle of violence ended. Yet later that day, three Hamas rockets were fired at Israel, breaking the ceasefire. This prompted Israel's prime minister to recall his negotiators from Cairo. By the end of the day, Hamas fired 50 rockets at Israel while IDF strikes hit 50 targets in Gaza. Between 21 and 22 August, more than 168 rockets were fired at Israel, and the IAF struck 92 targets in Gaza. Israel also called up an additional 10,000 reserve soldiers, signalling a willingness to escalate its operation in Gaza. On 22 August, Hamas fired long-range missiles at Ashdod and Tel Aviv, destroying a synagogue, while a mortar attack killed a 4-year-old Israeli child. On 23 August, Hamas fired 100 rockets at Israel, while an Israeli air strike on an apartment complex in Gaza led to the building's collapse, killing and injuring several Palestinians.

During this week, the Israeli MFA employed three laminations, two of which were introduced in previous weeks. At the beginning of the week the MFA employed the 'Egyptian Ceasefire' framework. However, the MFA added a lamination to this framework that focused on Israel's resilience in the face of Hamas's terror. The problem preventing a ceasefire, according to this framework, was that Hamas believed that Israel did not possess

the resilience required to continue its military operation in Gaza. For this reason, Hamas violated ceasefire agreements as it sought to increase its bargaining position in Cairo. The causal attribution stated that Hamas was addicted to terror and thus sought to increase its gains at the expense of the lives of Israeli civilians. The moral evaluation focused on Hamas's targeting of cities and towns and the loss of civilian life. The solution to the conflict was twofold. In the beginning of the week, Israel asserted that its negotiators in Cairo would insist that all of Israel's security needs be addressed in any final agreement. Yet once Hamas violated the ceasefire with intense rocket fire, the proposed solution was a powerful military response.

The MFA also continued to employ the 'Hamas Abuses Gazans' lamination, which specified that the death toll amongst Gazans was the result of Hamas's use of the civilian population as human shields. The cause of the problem was that Hamas cared more about terror than its own people. The moral evaluation focused on Israel's delivery of aid to Gaza, while the solution lay in helping wounded Gazans.

The third framework employed was that of the 'Islamic Axis', which portrayed Hamas as a member of a fundamentalist Islamic Axis in the Middle East that consisted of terror groups and rogue regimes, like Iran. During this week, however, the MFA added the lamination of 'Hamas is ISIS' to its primary framework. According to this lamination, the problem preventing a ceasefire was that like ISIS, Hamas was willing to kill and martyr its own people in order to attack Israel. The causal attribution stated that Hamas's mentality was one that prioritised terror and death over life. The moral evaluation centred on equating Hamas with ISIS and emphasising both actors' reign of terror over their territory. The solution stated that the global war on terror would be stopped at Israel's borders.

Lastly, the MFA employed the 'Six Million' framework, which stated that the problem driving the conflict was that Hamas had renewed its rocket fire that could now reach most Israeli cities. The cause was that Hamas favoured attacking Israel over caring for its people. The moral evaluation and suggested remedy focused on the need to disarm Hamas.

The table below includes the frameworks and laminations employed during this week by the Israeli MFA, with new frameworks coloured in grey.

Table 4.15: Israeli Primary Frameworks- Week 9

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Egyptian Ceasefire Lamination: Israeli Resilience	   	 	  	   

Lamination:
Hamas
Abuses
Gazans

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Six Million				

During the week of 17 August, Hamas employed two frameworks that were first introduced in previous weeks. The first framework of 'Ceasefire' stated that the conflict had yet to end as Israel refused to meet Palestinian demands. The causal attribution stated that Israel was unwilling to lift the siege on Gaza. The moral evaluation asserted that lifting the siege was the humane thing to do, while the proposed solution to the conflict was the complete removal of the siege on Gaza.

The second framework was 'Killing Women and Children'. According to this framework more than a thousand people had been martyred in Gaza due to Israeli shelling on populated areas. Hamas now also argued that Israel was able to carry out the shelling of civilian targets thanks to military aid from the U.S. The moral evaluation was evident in the allegation that Israel 'shells' and kills indiscriminately. The solution was a military equilibrium in which Israeli attacks would be met with Palestinian fire. The table below includes the frameworks employed by Hamas.

Table 4.16: Hamas Primary Frameworks - Week 9

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Egyptian Ceasefire	Egyptian proposals failed to meet Palestinian demands. Israel has to accept Palestinian conditions "or face a long-term war of attrition." Sun Aug 17 15:44:09 +0000 2014	#Hamas called on #Israel to lift its siege on #Gaza so as to move closer to reaching a lasting ceasefire. Sun Aug 17 15:46:40 +0000 2014	Fulfilling Palestinian demands would facilitate a lasting truce. Otherwise, it would be difficult. The demands are legitimate & humanitarian Sun Aug 17 15:50:49 +0000 2014	"The Palestinians would not accept anything less than an end to Israel's blockade of Gaza" ~ Ismail Haniyeh Fri Aug 22 15:58:15 +0000 2014
Killing Women and Children	Death toll reaches 2090+ martyrs & 10500+ injuries due to Israeli shelling to the populated areas #GazaUnderAttack http://t.co/ATjt1nnDb3 Sat Aug 23 06:15:53 +0000 2014	#US sends #Israel weapons, #Venezuela offers Palestinians free scholarships to study. Wonderful initiative President #Maduro! #Solidarity Sun Aug 24 16:31:08 +0000 2014	Death toll reaches 2090+ martyrs & 10500+ injuries due to Israeli shelling to the populated areas #GazaUnderAttack http://t.co/ATjt1nnDb3 Sat Aug 23 06:15:53 +0000 2014	18:30 Al-Qassam Brigades bombed Beerli in the Eshkol with 120 mortar in response to Israel's crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hamas #PrayForGaza Fri Aug 22 16:02:27 +0000 2014 17:15: Al-Qassam Brigades fired 3 mortars at Sderot in response to Israel's crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hamas #PrayForGaza #WeAreHamas Fri Aug 22 15:51:32 +0000 2014 16:10 Al-Qassam Brigades bombed Nahal Oz Terminal with

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Killing Women and Children (continues from previous page)				4 mortars in response to Israeli crimes on Gaza #Resistance # Hamas #PrayForGaza Fri Aug 22 13:29:15 +0000 2014 16:00 Al-Qassam Brigades bombed site Fuga in Eshkol with 107 missile in response to Israeli crimes on Gaza #Resistance # Hamas #PrayForGaza Fri Aug 22 13:28:20 +0000 2014 16:00 Al-Qassam Brigades bombed Nahal Oz terminal with 2 120 mortars in response to Israeli crimes on Gaza #Resistance # Hamas #PrayForGaza Fri Aug 22 13:24:11 +0000 2014 15:00 Al-Qassam Brigades destroyed Zionism surveillance system on the border of the northern Gaza Strip in response to Israel crimes on Gaza Fri Aug 22 13:22:24 +0000 2014

Because Hamas employed only two frameworks during this week, two frame distances were measured. The distance between the 'Hamas Abuses Gazans' and 'Killing Women and Children' frameworks **was 75%** as both sides agreed that the high death toll in Gaza was a main driver of the tensions between Israel and Hamas. Yet while Hamas vowed to strike back at Israel, the Israeli MFA focused on increasing humanitarian aid to alleviate the suffering in Gaza. The distance between the ceasefire frameworks of both sides **was 100%**. Indeed, while Hamas focused on the demand to lift the inhumane siege on Gaza, Israel vowed to respond to rocket fire with force given the assumption that Hamas doubted the resilience of Israeli society. **The final, or average, frame distance measured during this week was thus 87.5%.**

Week 10: 24 August – 29 August

The week of 29 August saw the implementation of a final ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel, which ultimately ended the Gaza War. On 24 August, 135 rockets were fired at Israel. On the same day, a mortar attack hit an Israeli motorcade carrying wounded Palestinians. Israeli prime minister Netanyahu urged all Gazans to vacate Hamas launch sites and asserted that any such site was a legitimate military target. On 25 August, sources in Gaza reported that Hamas would agree to a month-long ceasefire with the goal of resuming talks with Israel in Cairo. The following day, the IAF struck and destroyed a thirteen-story building in Gaza, leaving many dead and wounded. Despite this attack, Hamas announced that it had agreed to an Egyptian ceasefire proposal, stating that important issues such as the construction of an airport and seaport in Gaza could be delayed until after the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. That same day, the ceasefire was breached by both Israel and Hamas. Despite these violations, the ceasefire remained in effect and the rocket fire finally ended on 29 August.


During this week, the Israeli MFA employed one framework and two laminations, all of which were first introduced in previous weeks. The first framework was 'Egyptian Ceasefire'. The problem preventing the final implementation of the ceasefire, according to this framework, was continued rocket fire at Israel. The causal attribution stated that Hamas was a consistent violator of ceasefire agreements. The moral evaluation focused on Hamas's targeting of Israeli cities and the killing of a 4-year-old child. In the beginning of the week, the MFA stated that Israel would respond with force to Hamas aggression. Later in the week, as the ceasefire stabilised, the MFA announced that Israel had accepted a permanent ceasefire agreement. According to the MFA, Hamas accepted this ceasefire thanks to Israeli


military pressure. Moreover, the MFA also argued that none of Hamas's preconditions for a ceasefire were met.

The MFA also employed the 'Hamas is ISIS' lamination. The problem preventing the resolution of the conflict was that Hamas had turned the entire Gaza Strip into a military base where it could hide behind civilians. The reason for this was that Hamas was similar in nature to other extremist groups such as ISIS. The moral evaluation centred on the brutality of Hamas's rule as made evident in executions and the terrorising of journalists. The solution was for international actors to recognise the similarity between Hamas and ISIS and condemn Hamas.

Lastly, the MFA employed the 'Hamas Abuses Gazans' lamination. The problem addressed in this lamination was that Hamas was firing at an Israeli border crossing, the Erez Crossing, through which Israeli aid made its way into Gaza every day. The causal attribution suggested that Hamas cared little for the lives of Gazans, evidenced by the fact that it used civilian facilities as shields when firing at Israel. The moral evaluation contrasted Hamas's firing at the Erez Crossing with Israel's continued provision of humanitarian aid, while the solution was to continue delivering aid into Gaza. The table below includes the frameworks and laminations used by the Israeli MFA during this week.

Table 4.17: Israeli Primary Frameworks - Week 10

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Egyptian Ceasefire	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Since July 8th, over 4,000 rockets were fired at Israel from #Gaza. This weekend, one of them killed a 4 year-old boy. bit.ly/1xzy310 12:44 AM - 24 Aug 2014 74 Retweets 10 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Since Hamas ended the latest ceasefire, over 570 rockets were fired from #Gaza, some of them from civilian facilities bit.ly/1wnSdPh 1:48 PM - 24 Aug 2014 29 Retweets 2 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA One of the 4,000 rockets that were fired from #Gaza by Hamas killed a 4 year old boy. Hamas targets Israeli civilians  5:51 PM - 24 Aug 2014 54 Retweets 11 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Israel's decision to respond to Hamas rocket-fire from #Gaza is what any government would choose. dexpr.es/1p0nuOf @daily_express 7:26 PM - 23 Aug 2014 43 Retweets 15 Likes
	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Over 130 rockets were fired today from #Gaza at Israeli towns and cities. Several Israelis were wounded. #IsraelUnderFire 12:35 AM - 25 Aug 2014 54 Retweets 11 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Hamas agrees to another ceasefire (starting at 7PM) before immediately breaking it. #Gaza  7:14 PM - 26 Aug 2014 104 Retweets 22 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Over 130 rockets were fired today from #Gaza at Israeli towns and cities. Several Israelis were wounded. #IsraelUnderFire 12:35 AM - 25 Aug 2014 54 Retweets 11 Likes	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Israel has agreed to Egyptian proposal for ceasefire that will be unlimited in time. 7:41 PM - 26 Aug 2014 118 Retweets 34 Likes
	Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA a long-range rocket was fired from #Gaza at Tel Aviv this morning at 6:30 am. Another rocket hit an Ashkelon home, injuring several residents 9:03 AM - 26 Aug 2014 36 Retweets 8 Likes			Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Hamas accepted the same ceasefire proposal it previously rejected because of Israel's military pressure on it: mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPol ... 1:57 PM - 27 Aug 2014 53 Retweets 14 Likes
				Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA PM Netanyahu: Hamas was hit hard & it did not receive even a single one of the conditions that it set for a ceasefire mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/ ... 8:41 PM - 28 Aug 2014 24 Retweets 6 Likes

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Islamic Axis Lamination: Hamas is ISIS	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Hamas turned the #Gaza Strip into a terrorist base and uses its population as human shields. youtube.com/watch?v=58LK_s... #FreeGazaFromHamas 7:34 PM - 24 Aug 2014 61 Retweets 20 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Hamas #manual captured by IDF soldiers calls for hiding bombs in civilian homes in #Gaza: buff.ly/1qmm6dK  11:20 AM - 26 Aug 2014 35 Retweets 14 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following #ISIS & Hamas come from the same radical Islamic roots with pervasive indifference to human #life & freedom huff.to/1AyQCor #Gaza  ISIS and Hamas: The Double Standard Hamas and ISIS are two sides of the same Islamic terror coin, yet while the West has rightfully united in condemnation and action against ISIS, it has ap... 8:22 PM - 23 Aug 2014 62 Retweets 25 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following PM Netanyahu: "Hamas is #ISIS and ISIS is Hamas. They are two extremist Islamic #terrorist movements that abduct and murder innocents." 9:23 AM - 25 Aug 2014 54 Retweets 18 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following PM Netanyahu: "Hamas and ISIS shrink at nothing including the willful murder of children." bit.ly/1rujxJB 10:10 AM - 25 Aug 2014 36 Retweets 17 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following You'll find it hard to tell the difference between Hamas & #ISIS, simply because they're just the same you.tube.be/Eza9OtoH60A #Gaza  Hamas is ISIS - ISIS is Hamas Like ISIS, Hamas performs public mass-executions of civilians. You will find it hard to tell the difference between them, simply because there isn't any diff... 10:29 AM - 26 Aug 2014 33 Retweets 9 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following When comparing the #terrorist methods used by Hamas & #ISIS, their similarity is very clear. youtube.com/watch?v=Eza9Ot... 6:06 PM - 26 Aug 2014 28 Retweets 13 Likes	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Under restrictions and intimidation, foreign & local #journalists in #Gaza followed Hamas' policy guidelines: bit.ly/1vBoDoS 5:29 PM - 23 Aug 2014 25 Retweets 10 Likes Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following Not just public mass-executions: Hamas in #Gaza & #ISIS in Iraq have more in common than you may think. #SameThing  6:59 PM - 23 Aug 2014	 Israel Foreign Min. @IsraelMFA Following PM Netanyahu tells #UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon: "The world saw that Hamas is like #ISIS." bit.ly/1mEx6i2 10:07 PM - 24 Aug 2014 38 Retweets 19 Likes

During this week, Hamas continued to employ one framework introduced previously while also formulating two new laminations. At first, Hamas added the lamination of 'Disarm Israel' to its 'Ceasefire' framework. According to this lamination, the problem preventing a lasting truce was Israel's military might, which rested on U.S. aid. The cause of the problem was that America was arming Israel, thus maintaining its military superiority over Hamas and the Palestinians. The moral evaluation stated that Palestinians remained committed to their rights to the land of Palestine and to freedom from Israeli occupation. The solution was a ceasefire agreement that respected Hamas's right to bear arms and ended the siege on Gaza.

The second framework that was employed was that of the 'Siege on Gaza'. According to this framework, the conflict with Israel centred on the siege, which was a crime. The causal attribution blamed the Israeli leadership for enforcing the siege while leading Israelis to their own destruction, as Hamas would fight on until the siege was lifted. The moral evaluation asserted that free people everywhere supported Hamas's right to defend itself against Israeli crimes. The solution was the Palestinian victory in its battle with Israel alongside support from allies, such as Turkey, in breaking the siege.

Lastly, Hamas added a lamination of 'War Crimes' to its 'Siege on Gaza' framework. According to this lamination, Israel had committed a series of war crimes during its battle with Hamas. The causal attribution stated that Israel had attempted to wage a genocidal war on the Palestinians, thus also offering a moral evaluation. The solution was suing Israel in the International Criminal Court.

The table below includes the frameworks and laminations employed by Hamas, with new frameworks coloured in grey.

Table 4.18: Hamas Primary Frameworks - Week 10

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Ceasefire Lamination: Disarm Israel	What is needed is the disarmament of Israeli army & preventing the US administration from providing it with weapons... ~ Hamas (2/2) Sun Aug 31 14:06:52 +0000 2014 Any international attempt to disarm Palestinian resistance would be worthless. ~ Hamas (1/2) Sun Aug 31 14:05:18 +0000 2014	What is needed is the disarmament of Israeli army & preventing the US administration from providing it with weapons... ~ Hamas (2/2) Sun Aug 31 14:06:52 +0000 2014	Palestinian people are committed to their right to their land, to defend themselves and to life the siege imposed on Gaza. ~ Khalid Meshaal Tue Aug 26 04:27:50 +0000 2014	"The Palestinian resistance will not accept any international resolution which touches resistance weapons or does not fully end the siege." Tue Aug 26 04:23:37 +0000 2014

Primary Framework	Problem Definition	Causal Attribution	Moral Evaluation	Suggested Remedy
Siege of Gaza	"Palestinian resistance has morally triumphed over Israeli crimes. Popular support in Gaza was main reason behind victory." - Khalid Meshaal Sat Aug 30 06:58:52 +0000 2014	To the Israelis, I say that your leadership is leading you to destruction. ~ Khaled Meshaal, Head of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas Tue Aug 26 04:26:36 +0000 2014	Thanks... Leaders of Turkey, Qatar, Tunisia, & the nations of Latin America & the free peoples of the world for their continued support. Sat Aug 30 07:01:43 +0000 2014	Recep Tayyip Erdogan visits Palestinians injured in Gaza who are receiving treatment in Ankara, #Turkey @RT_Erdogan #Solidarity Mon Aug 25 16:40:49 +0000 2014 "#GazaVictory is a turning point towards the decisive victory" - Abu Obeida, Al-Qassam Brigades' Spokesman #Gaza #Hamam #Resistance #Israel Sat Aug 30 06:56:43 +0000 2014
Siege of Gaza Lamination: War Crimes	"The destruction of a residential building by Israel – leaving dozens injured and families displaced – is a war crime." ~ Sami Abu Zuhri Sun Aug 24 16:37:07 Relentless Israeli attack left at least 2,105 Palestinians, mostly civilians, dead & 10,000+ others injured since July 7 #GazaUnderAttack Sun Aug 24	Austrian President Heinz Fischer on 24-08-2014, Sunday launched a scathing attack on Israel for its genocidal war on the besieged Gaza Strip Tue Aug 26 02:45:38 +0000 2014	Austrian President Heinz Fischer on 24-08-2014, Sunday launched a scathing attack on Israel for its genocidal war on the besieged Gaza Strip Tue Aug 26 02:45:38 +0000 2014	Resistance will not remain idle on the Israeli war crimes in Gaza http://t.co/ILCX19ucx0 Tue Aug 26 03:08:35 +0000 2014 #Hamam signed a proposal for Palestinians to apply to join International Criminal Court at which legal action could be taken against Israel Sun Aug 24 16:46:25 +0000 2014

Despite the fact that this week saw the final resolution of the Gaza War, **the measured frame distance was 100%**. While both Israel and Hamas employed ceasefire frameworks, these differed on all four dimensions, with Israel accepting a prolonged ceasefire because none of Hamas's preconditions were met and Hamas agreeing to a ceasefire yet promising to continue working toward ending the siege on Gaza. The distance between Hamas's 'Siege on Gaza' and Israel's 'Hamas Abuses Gazans' **was now also 100%**. While in the past these frameworks resonated with one another given a shared emphasis on the high death toll in Gaza, during this week, Hamas framed the siege as a crime while Israel focused on Hamas's firing at a border crossing through which humanitarian aid made its way into the Gaza Strip. Finally, while Israel used the 'Islamic Axis' framework to label Hamas as an affiliate of ISIS, Hamas labelled Israel as a war criminal vowing to sue Israel in the International Criminal Court.

Tracking Frame Distance- the Gaza War Case Study

The Gaza War saw a direct, high-intensity, military conflict between Israel and the Hamas terror organisation. What marks this conflict is the speed with which it escalated. By the third week, Israel had attacked more than 400 targets in the Gaza Strip, while Hamas fired more than 900 rockets at Israeli cities and townships. By the fourth week of the conflict, Israel had destroyed some 2,800 targets in Gaza, while Hamas fired more than 1,500 rockets at Israel and infiltrated Israeli territory through underground terror tunnels.

The intensity of the conflict between Israel and Hamas is manifest in the fact that the onset stage lasted only one week. In the Gaza War case study, Week 3 was the first to include tweets published by both the Israeli MFA and Hamas and thus marks the beginning of the conflict. While Israel employed three primary frameworks and argued that it was forced to launch a military operation in order to combat the fundamentalist Hamas organisation, Hamas employed the 'Retribution' framework, promising to meet Israeli fire with fire. By Week 4, however, Israel had launched a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. What followed was a string of battles between Israeli soldiers and Hamas operatives throughout the Gaza Strip, as well as a dramatic increase in the number of rockets fired at Israel. Week 4 serves as the beginning of the escalation stage of the Gaza War, as the Israeli ground invasion increased the number of decision-makers who could negatively impact the conflict. Any wrong decision by a platoon or battalion commander could increase tensions between both sides. Moreover, the ground invasion substantially increased the number of events unfolding on the ground in real time, possibly resulting in fragmented information reaching decision-makers. A fast succession of unravelling events may have also added to senses of confusion and stress among leaders, thus hampering the decision-making process,

while competitions between organisations over access to leaders intensified (Boin et al., 2013; Holsti, 1989). As such, it was during Week 4 that the Gaza War morphed from a limited skirmish into a full-fledged military altercation.

Notably, during most weeks of the Gaza War, both the Israeli MFA and Hamas employed several frameworks and laminations. This led to the measurement of multiple frame distances between their respective frameworks. In such cases, an average frame distance was calculated because of the need to arrive at a single measurement that could be integrated into the frame distance matrix of calculations. For instance, during Week 5, three frame distances were measured (75%, 75%, and 100%). These were converted into scores ranging from 0-4 (i.e. 75% frame distance converted to 3 and 100% frame distance converted to 4). Next, the three scores were averaged, resulting in a frame distance of 3.3. The table below details the matrix of calculation for each week of the Gaza War.


Table 4.19: Frame Distance Matrix of Calculations (Weighted Scores)

Week	Frame Distance	Number of Tweets	Positive/Negative Sentiment of Tweets	Phone Calls	Press Conferences	Statements After Meetings	Leaders' Statements	Integral Frame Distance Scores
3	1.5	0.43	0.34	NS*	NS*	NS*	0.22	2.67
4	1.5	0.66	0.48	NS*	NS*	NS*	0.49	3.1
5	1.67	0.5	0.36	NS*	NS*	NS*	0.18	2.89
6	1.66	0.4	0.29	NS*	0.1	NS*	0.15	2.76
7	1.5	0.58	0.45	NS*	NS*	NS*	0.44	2.96
8	1.33	0.67	0.41	NS*	NS*	NS*	0.29	2.69
9	1.75	0.67	0.47	NS*	NS*	NS*	0.5	3.39
10	2	0.66	0.46	NS*	NS*	NS*	0.42	3.5

*NS =no score

As seen in Table 4.19, the frame distance between the Israeli MFA and Hamas varied throughout the Gaza War; while in some weeks the frame distance grew substantially, during others, it decreased. This was also true of Integral Frame Distance Scores that consist of frame distances, the sentiment of crisis-related tweets and rhetorical indicators. The graph below depicts changes in Integral Fame Distance Scores throughout the Gaza War.

Graph 4.1: Integral Frame Distance Scores throughout the Gaza War



Graph 4.1 above illustrates the variability in Integral Frame Distance Scores throughout the Gaza War. This includes a steady decrease in Scores between Weeks 4 and 5, as well as another decrease between Weeks 7 and 8. These results suggest that even during a high-intensity military altercation, two actors may move closer together. Actors may even move closer together during the escalation stage of a military conflict, which is evident in the graph above. The results presented in Graph 4.1 indicate that by tracking a crisis's progression in near-real time, diplomats may be able to obtain long-term resolution of a crisis, rather than just short-term containment. This can be achieved by identifying instances in which two actors grow closer together as their relative scope of disagreement narrows.

Yet Graph 4.1 also illustrates the many instances in which the frame distance between Israel and Hamas grew. The largest growth in Integral Frame Distance Scores occurred between Weeks 8 and 9. This is not surprising given that this week saw the collapse of talks between both sides in Cairo and Israel's decision to recall its negotiators. Moreover, this week saw Hamas fire rockets at Israel's financial center, Tel Aviv, while a Hamas mortar attack killed a 4-year-old child. In the wake of these attacks, Israel called up an additional 10,000 reserve soldiers. Moreover, by the middle of this week, Israel struck an apartment complex in Gaza, leading to the building's collapse and the deaths of several Palestinians.

Both Hamas and the Israeli MFA took to Twitter following the aforementioned events. The Israeli MFA added a lamination to its 'Egyptian Ceasefire' framework, stating that the crisis between Israel and Hamas was now exacerbated by Hamas's belief that Israel lacked the societal resilience to continue its military operation. The solution was a strong


military response to Hamas's provocations that would prompt Hamas to return to the Cairo talks. Israel also continued to employ its 'Hamas Abuses Gazans' framework, laying the blame for the high death toll on Hamas, which cared more about killing Israelis than the welfare of its citizens. Lastly, the MFA employed the 'Islamic Axis' and 'Six Million' frameworks, suggesting that Hamas rockets were endangering the lives of most Israelis and that Hamas was akin to ISIS in its desire to kill. Through these frameworks and laminations, the MFA framed or narrated the collapse of the talks in Cairo ('Egyptian Ceasefire' lamination), Hamas's rocket fire at Tel Aviv and the killing of a child ('Six Million' framework), the collapse of the residential complex in Gaza ('Hamas Abuses Gazans' lamination) and Hamas's refusal to reach an accord in Cairo ('Hamas is ISIS' lamination). In this way, the MFA used Twitter to frame events as they unfolded and offered followers a prism through which a rapidly escalating conflict could be understood.

Similarly, Hamas framed the collapse of the Cairo talks through its own 'Ceasefire' primary framework, alleging that Israel refused to meet the basic demands and needs of the Palestinian people. Moreover, Hamas framed the attack on the residential complex through its 'Killing Women and Children' framework focusing on the high death toll among vulnerable populations in Gaza.

The analysis of the frameworks and laminations employed during Week 9 demonstrates that actors do in fact use Twitter to frame events in near-real time. Even more importantly, this analysis demonstrates the linkage between unfolding events and frame distance measurements. Although the frame distance model does not take unfolding events directly into account, these events invariably impact frame distance measurements as actors frame events and occurrences as they unravel.

In addition, unfolding events are taken into account through the rhetorical indicators of the frame distance model. Weeks 3 and 4 saw the second-largest growth in Integral Frame Distance Scores as the Gaza War entered the escalation stage. Congruently, the sentiment of Israeli tweets increased in negativity from 2.87 in Week 3 to 2.99 in Week 4. The same was true of the sentiment of Hamas tweets, which grew from 2.58 in Week 3 to a more negative 2.84 in Week 4. The increasingly negative sentiment of both sides' tweets stemmed from their need to comment on events ranging from IAF air strikes in Gaza to barrages of rockets fired at Israeli cities. These results demonstrate yet again that events unfolding on the ground impact frame distance measurements and that, subsequently, the frame distance model can be used to track a crisis's progression in near-real time and identify crisis pressure points. Graph 4.2 (below) identifies intervention and prevention pressure points throughout the Gaza War.

Graph 4.2: Crisis Pressure Points throughout the Gaza War



As can be seen in Graph 4.2, the analysis of the Gaza War case study led to the identification of seven crisis pressure points. Four of these were prevention pressure points in which the Integral Frame Distance Scores grew, indicating that the crisis was entering an escalatory momentum. During such pressure points, diplomats could seek to obtain short-term containment of a crisis rather than a long-term resolution as the scope of disagreement between both sides widened, limiting their ability to accommodate one another's demands, needs and interests. It should be mentioned that the Gaza War case study ended with a steady *increase* in Integral Frame Distance Scores, suggesting that the conflict between Israel and Hamas did not progress in a linear fashion of onset, escalation, and de-escalation. Indeed, the war came to an abrupt end when Hamas finally agreed to reach a short-term agreement with Israel and to delay discussions on other issues, such as the construction of a seaport, to a later time.

Of the seven pressure points illustrated in Graph 4.2, three were intervention pressure points (Weeks 5, 6, and 8) in which diplomats could have built on reduced tensions or tense status quos to seek a long-term solution to the conflict. In these instances actors have either grown closer together, and may be willing to accommodate one another's demands, or they have arrived at a stage in which they may be willing to agree to a cessation of hostilities given the high cost of the conflict and the fear of further escalation. Such was the case during Week 5 of the Gaza War, which saw three events that temporarily reduced tensions between Israel and Hamas. The first was a ceasefire proposal put forth by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. The second was an agreement on a 12-hour humanitarian window during which the wounded and the dead could be evacuated. The third was a phone call between U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli prime minister Benjamin

Netanyahu, during which Obama expressed his concern over the loss of life in Gaza, thus increasing pressure on Israel to halt its military operation.

In addition to tracking the progression of a crisis in near-real time, the frame distance model can also help diplomats identify points of convergence between two governments that can serve as entry points to negotiations. For instance, Week 6 saw the emergence of an intervention pressure point as the result of a reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores. During this week, both the Israeli MFA and Hamas offered a similar solution to the crisis between them: a military equilibrium in which fire would be met with fire and quiet would be met with quiet. Such an equilibrium may have served as an entry point to negotiations with third-party diplomats attempting to urge one side to hold its fire, resulting in the other side following suit. Week 6 also saw another area of agreement between the Israeli MFA and Hamas, as both sides stipulated that the high death toll of Gazans was exacerbating the conflict and preventing its resolution. Indeed, the deaths of Palestinian citizens were met with Hamas rocket fire which, in turn, was met with Israeli air strikes that only increased the fatality rates. Third-party diplomats using the frame distance model could have sought to leverage this area of agreement as an entry point to negotiations by publicly urging both sides to engage in dialogue in order to save the lives of innocent Gazans. Alternatively, diplomats could have sought to implement longer humanitarian windows which would evolve over time into a permanent ceasefire as tensions died down.

Week 8 saw another reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores and the emergence of an intervention pressure point. The reduction in Scores was, among others, a result of an agreement on both sides that any ceasefire should be based on a short-term accord, to be followed by more extensive negotiations at a later time. Diplomats using the frame distance

model could have identified this area of agreement and seized on it to bring both sides to the negotiation table while putting forth an interim accord. The examples of Weeks 5 and 8 demonstrate that the frame distance model enables diplomats to identify both crisis pressure points and points of convergence between two actors that may serve as entry points to negotiations.

An analysis of the four factors contributing to the Integral Frame Distance Scores offers important insight into how Twitter can be used to track and extrapolate the possible trajectory of a crisis. Such an analysis is presented in the following section.

Analysis of Rhetorical Indicators

The frame distance model aims to evaluate whether social media content published by actors may be used to track a crisis's progression in near-real time and identify crisis pressure points. In addition to measuring the distance between two actors' frameworks and laminations, the model relies on four rhetorical indicators as well as the overall sentiment of all tweets that cannot be classified as rhetorical indicators. These rhetorical indicators include the sentiment of tweets describing phone calls between world leaders, the sentiment of tweets published following high-level meetings, the sentiment of tweets published during press conferences, and the sentiment of tweets that include statements by world leaders. Each of these indicators is used to offer greater insight into the relative scope of disagreement between two actors. The data gathered using the rhetorical indicators can be seen in Table 4.20.

Table 4.20: Calculation of Integral Frame Distance Scores Weeks 3-10 (Weighted Scores)

Week	Frame Distance	#Tweets Israel	#Tweets Hamas	Israel Sentiment 0-4	Hamas Sentiment 0-4	Israel After Meetings	Hamas After Meetings	Israel Press Conf	Hamas Press Conf	Israel Leaders' Statements	Hamas Leaders' Statements	Israel Phone Calls	Hamas Phone Calls	Integral Frame Distance Score
Week 3	3	4	3	2.87	2.58	3.33	0	NS*	NS*	3.66	0	NS*	NS*	2.67
Week 4	3	4	4	2.99	2.83	NS*	NS*	NS*	NS*	2.66	3.33	NS*	NS*	3.1
Week 5	3.33	4	4	2.84	2.9	NS*	NS*	NS*	NS*	3.2	1	3	0	2.88
Week 6	3.33	4	4	2.9	2.9	NS*	NS*	0	2	2	1	4	0	2.75
Week 7	3	4	3	2.67	2.71	NS*	NS*	NS*	NS*	2.25	3	NS*	NS*	2.96
Week 8	2.67	4	4	2.4	2.5	NS*	NS*	NS*	NS*	3.5	0	NS*	NS*	2.69
Week 9	3.5	4	4	2.88	2.77	NS*	NS*	NS*	NS*	3	3	NS*	NS*	3.38
Week 10	4	4	4	2.82	2.7	NS*	NS*	NS*	NS*	4	3	NS*	NS*	3.5

*NS =no score

Table 4.20 offers several insights. First, in every week of the Gaza War, the rhetorical indicators offered data that was integrated into the calculation of Integral Frame Distance Scores. As such, the rhetorical indicators were useful in assessing the relative scope of disagreement between Israel and Hamas. However, this was mostly true of tweets summarising Leaders' Statements. While both the Israeli MFA and Hamas published many tweets that consisted of statements by national leaders, they did not publish tweets from high-level meetings or press conferences. They also rarely published tweets that summarised phone calls between leaders. The reason for this is that Israel and Hamas have no official diplomatic ties, nor do they officially recognise one another. Thus, Hamas and Israeli diplomats do not meet one another, Hamas leaders and Israeli prime ministers do not confer over the phone, and Israeli foreign ministers do not attend press conferences with their Hamas counterparts. This finding illustrates the limitation of using the frame distance model to track a crisis between a state and a quasi-state actor.

That said, Table 4.20 does demonstrate that terror groups or quasi-states are as avid users of social media as MFAs. In all weeks except Week 3 and Week 7, Hamas published a higher than average number of tweets. In fact, during several weeks of the Gaza War, Hamas published a higher number of tweets than the Israeli MFA. For instance, during Week 6, both Hamas and the Israeli MFA published 106 tweets. During Week 7, Hamas published 148 tweets while the Israeli MFA published 125 tweets. This indicates that terror groups and quasi-states publish a substantial number of tweets that can serve as a rich data corpus for the calculation of Integral Frame Distance Scores.

The frame distance model also uses the number of tweets published by actors as an indirect measurement of crisis acuteness. The model assumes that the greater the number

of crisis-related tweets published by an actor, the greater the number of events he must frame and, subsequently, the greater the likelihood of crisis escalation given the rapid succession of events. Notably, during the Gaza War, both actors published large volumes of tweets. In fact, there was no variance in the number of tweets published by the Israeli MFA. This was most likely the result of the MFA's need to continuously comment on and frame unfolding events. Such was the case during Week 5 when the ministry commented on a series of ceasefire initiatives that were rejected by Hamas, the shelling of an UNRWA school in Gaza, a 'Day of Rage' in the West Bank against Israel, a ceasefire proposal by John Kerry, the destruction of terror tunnels along the Gaza border, and the deaths of some 1,000 Palestinians. This finding suggests that the number of tweets published by actors may fail to serve as an indicator of crisis acuteness during high-intensity conflicts that see military altercations.

When comparing the sentiments of Israeli and Hamas tweets, it becomes apparent that the sentiment of Israeli tweets was more negative in Weeks 3, 4, 9, and 10. This could be expected, as these weeks saw direct threats to Israel's national interests. During Week 3 of the war, an Israeli gunboat accidentally killed three children who were playing football on the beaches of Gaza. Israel soon came under intense international pressure to halt its military operations while Hamas rockets rained on Israeli cities. This international pressure could have prevented Israel from obtaining its military goals. During Week 4, Israel mounted a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, which was met with steep opposition from Hamas operatives. Eleven soldiers were killed during this week, while the body of one of the slain soldiers was allegedly abducted by Hamas. In the past, Israel has freed convicted terrorists in order to ensure the return of the bodies of dead soldiers. Thus, the possible abduction of a soldier was a dramatic event for Israel that could substantially increase the price it would

have to pay for a prolonged ceasefire. Finally, during Week 9, Hamas fired rockets at Tel Aviv. For the Israeli leadership, rocket fire on Tel Aviv is a *casus belli* given that such fire can cripple Israel's economy and suspend all air travel to and from Israel.

Similarly, during Week 5, the sentiment of Hamas tweets was more negative than that of Israeli tweets. Here again, the reason may be a threat to the interests of the Hamas terror organisation. This week saw the publication of a ceasefire proposal put forth by John Kerry that called for the opening of Gaza's borders and the establishment of a seaport and airport. For Hamas, the proposal was an important diplomatic achievement because it could bring Israel's siege on Gaza to an end, elevate the suffering of Palestinians, and demonstrate Hamas's ability to deliver on its promises. However, the proposal was soon rejected by Israel because it did not include the destruction of Hamas terror tunnels. It therefore appears that the sentiment of tweets published by actors depends on whether unfolding events contribute to or harm their national interest. Subsequently, sentiment analysis alone cannot be used to measure the relative scope of disagreement between two actors as it precludes one from identifying the issues on which they agree.

When comparing weekly frame distances and the sentiment of Leaders' Statements it becomes apparent that there is no correlation between the two factors. For instance, while the frame distance during the fourth week of the War was 3, the sentiment of Israeli Leaders' Statements was a more positive 2.66. In Week 6, the sentiment of Israeli leaders' statements was 2, as opposed to a far more negative frame distance of 3.3, while in Week 7 the sentiment of Israeli Leaders' Statements was 2.25 as opposed to a more negative frame distance of 3. The reason for this discrepancy may be threefold.

First, leaders' statements are often used to justify one's policies and gain international support for a chosen course of action. Indeed, during Week 4 of the Gaza War, Israeli president Shimon Peres told his Italian counterpart that Israel wants 'permanent peace rather than ongoing terror'. Similarly, during Week 7, Israel's foreign minister publicly thanked the U.S. administration for its unequivocal support of Israel. Both these statements were positive and sought to rally support for Israel's war on Hamas.

Second, leaders' statements tend to be positive, as they are used to promote a positive vision of the future for both domestic and international audiences. For instance, during Week 6, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that a weakened and demilitarised Hamas would enable Israel to 'work with more moderate forces'. In the following weeks, he stated that Israel could only exist peacefully alongside a demilitarised Gaza Strip. Thus, the war on Hamas was framed as a war for peace. Likewise, during Week 7 Netanyahu stated that the IDF's operation would end with peace and quiet restored to Israel's borders.

Third, leaders' statements are used to assure domestic and foreign audiences, as well as the media, that a nation is making progress in securing its interests. Such was the case during Week 4, when Netanyahu assured Israelis that the IDF's operation was progressing according to plan. For all these reasons, leaders' statements tend to be positive.

When analysing the sentiment of statements made by Hamas leaders similar results were obtained. Throughout the Gaza War, Hamas leaders vowed to destroy Israel, called on Gazans to martyr themselves in the battle against Israel, promised that the hands of Hamas operatives would be 'light on the trigger', suggested that the blood of the dead would bring Gaza closer to victory, and vowed to lead Gazans to their deaths. While these statements

might seem negative in nature, they are actually positive from the perspective of Hamas, which was attempting to galvanise Gazans for the battle with Israel and offer a positive vision for the future of Gaza in which the siege was lifted.

The analysis of rhetorical indicators suggests that tracking the progression of a crisis and extrapolating its possible trajectory using social media content require the measurement of several indicators, because each indicator relates to a different aspect of a crisis, ranging from an actor's national interests to its leaders attempt to rally domestic and foreign support for the nation's policies. However, identifying areas of convergence that can serve as entry points to negotiations also demands that one uncover the core interests of each actor. This can be achieved through an analysis of frame consistency.

Analysis of Frame Consistency


This thesis postulates that during crises, actors turn to social media in order to frame events and answer the question 'What is going on' for diverse audiences. By doing so, they may influence how the crisis and its possible resolution are viewed by the national citizenry, foreign publics, and media institutions. From a sociological perspective, frame consistency plays an important role during crises because it provides audiences with a consistent answer to the question, 'What is going on?', thus reducing feelings of insecurity brought about by a rapid succession of events. From a communicative perspective, frame consistency helps journalists identify government frames. Journalists are then likely to further disseminate these frames given the need to rally behind the flag. From a crisis management perspective, frame consistency is important because it may help third party diplomats identify the core arguments and interests of each side. This is because each framework and lamination consist of a central argument pertaining to a crisis and its evolution. By identifying

frameworks or laminations that are consistently employed by an actor, third-party diplomats can also identify that actor's core interests, which must be addressed during any negotiation attempt.

Israeli Frame Consistency

As seen in Graph 4.3 below, the most consistent framework employed by the Israeli MFA was the 'Islamic Axis' framework, which was used during eight of the ten weeks of the Gaza War. According to this framework, Hamas was part of an Islamic Axis of state and non-state actors that sought to destroy Israel due to its vision of death.

Graph 4.3: Israeli Frame Consistency throughout the Gaza War (Number and Issue Discussed)



The 'Islamic Axis' framework further stipulated that Hamas was an amoral actor that used its own citizens as human shields, used humanitarian funds to develop offensive capabilities, and brutally oppressed its citizenry. The framing of Hamas as amoral was most evident in Week 9, when Israel argued that 'Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas's. This framework may have been employed in order to help Israel justify its military operation in Gaza. Indeed, if the world had the right to defend itself from ISIS, then surely Israel had the right to defend itself from Hamas. This was also the solution identified in the 'Islamic Axis' framework - a military operation that would defend Israelis from the barbarity of Hamas. By the second week of the war the solution changed to include an emphasis on fighting Hamas while limiting the anguish of Gazans.

The second most consistent Israeli framework was the 'High Death Toll' framework, which was employed for seven weeks. This framework was first introduced during Week 4 of the war as global media attention focused on the high rates of casualties among Gazans. In response, the Israeli MFA argued that the high death toll could only be blamed on Hamas, which used Gazans as human shields while firing rockets from populated areas. This framework demonstrates how actors attempt to respond to unfolding events and media narratives through social media framing. Importantly, Israel may have attempted to strategically shift the blame for the high death toll onto Hamas in order to prevent other nations from exerting pressure on Israel to end its military operation before its objectives had been realised.

Notably, in Week 7, Israel added a lamination to its 'High Death Toll' framework according to which Hamas was abusing Gazans. The 'Hamas Abuses Gazans' lamination, which was consistently employed for five weeks, argued that Hamas was not only using

Gazans as human shields, but that it was also denying Gazans humanitarian aid by firing at Israeli border crossings. By doing so, the MFA exhibited yet again the amoral nature of Hamas while attempting to limit global condemnation of Israel's military policies. The proposed solution to Hamas's abuse was the continued delivery of humanitarian aid by Israel to the Gaza Strip.

In addition, the Israeli MFA also employed both the 'Egyptian Ceasefire' and 'Six Million' frameworks for four weeks. According to the 'Egyptian Ceasefire' framework, Hamas was a consistent violator of ceasefire agreements and responded to negotiations with rocket fire. Here, Israel may have sought to frame Hamas as responsible for the collapse of the talks in Cairo while subsequently retaining the right to act militarily in Gaza. Yet in each week, the solution identified by the MFA altered. In Week 7, the MFA suggested that both actors should agree to a short-term truce. In Week 8 it called for extending humanitarian windows, and in Week 9 it argued that Israel would not negotiate under fire. In this way, the framework was adapted to the changing circumstances on the ground.

The 'Six Million' framework, employed between Weeks 5 and 9, identified a new problem: the majority of Israeli citizens were in range of Hamas rockets. This framework may have been used to demonstrate that Israel was not using its awesome military might against a helpless group of bandits or freedom fighters. Rather, this framework framed Hamas as a military organisation with substantial offensive capabilities- one that could threaten the national security of Israel. In the face of such a threat, Israel proposed a new solution to the conflict: the demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip and the disarming of Hamas.

The results discussed so far demonstrate that the Israeli MFA consistently employed certain frameworks and hoped to shape how online audiences perceived the conflict with

Hamas. Yet the MFA also employed frameworks and laminations for short durations of time. Such was the case with the 'UN Hypocrisy' framework, which was employed solely during Weeks 5 and 8 when the UN Human Rights Council condemned Israel's military activities in Gaza. Similarly, Week 6 was the only one to see the employment of the 'Kidnapped Soldier' lamination that was added to the 'Ground Invasion' primary framework. The reason for this is that by the end of the week, it became apparent that Hamas had not kidnapped an IDF soldier. Finally, the 'Civilian Infrastructure' lamination was employed solely during Weeks 4 and 5 as Israel legitimised its attacks on UNRWA schools by arguing that Hamas was using civilian infrastructure to hide its offensive weapons. These three examples demonstrate that actors often use frameworks and laminations inconsistently, given an immediate need to comment on events that end or become irrelevant.


Crucially, diplomats analysing Israel's frame consistency could have anticipated its negotiating stance during various crisis pressure points. For instance, during Weeks 5 through 8, Israel would have likely demanded that Hamas be disarmed and that the Gaza Strip be demilitarised. Similarly, during Week 9, Israel would have sought recognition that it was facing a radical foe that was not so different from ISIS. Finally, during Weeks 4 through 6 Israel would have insisted that the terror tunnels dug into Israel be destroyed as part of any ceasefire accord. By anticipating Israel's starting position, diplomats and negotiators may have been better equipped to resolve the crisis between Israel and Hamas.

Hamas Frame Consistency

As can be seen in Graph 4.4 below, Hamas also consistently employed certain frameworks and laminations, thus increasing the efficacy of its online framing. The most consistent framework employed by Hamas was the 'Siege on Gaza' framework. This framework,

employed between Weeks 4 and 10 of the war, argued that the high death toll of Gazans stemmed from the inhumane Israeli siege on the Gaza Strip. The solution called for engaging militarily with Israel until the siege of Gaza was lifted. It was through this framework that Hamas may have been able to legitimise its actions as the firing of rockets at Israel was framed as part of a struggle for freedom from an evil oppressor. Moreover, this framework negatively framed Israel, accusing the country of both denying Palestinians their freedom and killing innocent civilians while firing indiscriminately at residential areas. Through this framework, Hamas may have sought to strategically shift the blame for the war onto Israel and increase international pressure on Israel to end its activities in Gaza.

Graph 4.4: Hamas Frame Consistency throughout the Gaza War (Number and Issue Discussed)



Hamas also consistently employed the 'Ceasefire' framework during six of the ten weeks of the Gaza War. According to this framework, Israel was a consistent violator of ceasefire agreements, at times even violating its own ceasefire initiatives. The cause of Israel's violations altered throughout the war. During Week 5, Hamas argued that Israel could afford to reject ceasefires since it was supported by powerful nations. During Week 9, Hamas argued that Israel refused to abide by ceasefire agreements given its desire to maintain the siege on Gaza. However, throughout all six weeks, Hamas identified the same solution to the conflict with Israel: the complete removal of the siege. In this way, Hamas was able to adapt its framework to changing circumstances while simultaneously offering a consistent narration of the war with Israel and its desired resolution.

The third most consistent framework employed by Hamas was 'Killing Women and Children', which was used between Weeks 4 and 6, as well as during Week 9. According to this framework, Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip had resulted in the deaths of countless women and children. This framework positioned Israel as an amoral actor willing to fire indiscriminately at vulnerable populations. The solution to Israel's actions lay in creating a military equilibrium where fire would be met with ferocious fire and quiet would be met with quiet. It was through this framework that Hamas further justified its own policies as it came to the aid of the vulnerable citizens of Gaza.

The three frameworks analysed thus far demonstrate that like the Israeli MFA, Hamas also offered a consistent narration of the Gaza War and the actors involved. However, Hamas also employed frameworks and laminations for short durations of time. For instance, during Week 5 Hamas, added a lamination to the 'Killing Women and Children' framework. This lamination of 'UN Installations', employed solely during Week 5, argued

that Israel was targeting UN schools given its murderous nature. In this way, Hamas was able to comment on an unfolding event while integrating it commentary into its overall narration of the Gaza War.

Similarly, Week 8 was the only one to see the employment of the 'Hamas Leadership' framework, stating that Hamas would act to secure the interests and needs of all Palestinians, including those in the West Bank who fall prey to the Israeli military. This framework may have been employed during Week 8 as talks in Cairo were making headway and Hamas was already thinking of framing itself as the champion of all Palestinians, not just those living in Gaza. Lastly, Week 6 was the only week in which Hamas employed the 'Kidnapped Soldier' lamination. According to this lamination, Israel blamed Hamas for kidnapping a soldier because it needed an excuse to bombard Gaza. However, once it was revealed that no soldier had been kidnapped, Hamas no longer employed this lamination.

The aforementioned examples all demonstrate that like Israel, Hamas used frameworks and laminations inconsistently given the need to adapt frameworks to changing circumstances. Diplomats' analysis of Hamas's frameworks could have mapped its core interests during various weeks of the Gaza War. For instance, diplomats hoping to open negotiations during Week 8 could have anticipated a demand by Hamas to lift the Israeli siege of Gaza by land, air, and water. Yet these diplomats would have also recognised Hamas's willingness to obtain a short-term truce to be followed by a long-term agreement with Israel. Conversely, diplomats hoping to start negotiations during Week 9 could have anticipated that Hamas would agree to an equilibrium whereby Israel would halt its attacks on Gaza in return for Hamas holding its rocket fire. In this way, diplomats may have been better prepared to resolve or contain the conflict between Hamas and Israel.

Laminations and Crisis Pressure Points

As noted above, this thesis aims to examine whether diplomats may use social media content in order to track a crisis's progression in near-real time and extrapolate its possible trajectory. Specifically, the thesis aims to investigate whether diplomats can use tweets to identify pressure points in which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted or most likely to succeed. It was hypothesised that MFAs would add laminations prior to the formation of prevention pressure points or instances in which diplomatic mediation is most necessary to prevent further escalation. The reason for this is that laminations are used by actors to comment on rapidly evolving events and to narrate new occurrences. The greater the number of unfolding events, the greater the acuteness of the crisis, as each event can trigger an escalation. Moreover, a rapid succession of events increases pressure on decision-makers at all levels while hampering their ability to gather accurate information. Lastly, the greater the number of events unfolding on the ground, the greater the number of decision-makers who can impact the progression of a crisis. As such, the number of laminations employed by an actor may serve as an indirect measure of crisis acuteness.

Conversely, it was hypothesised that the removal of laminations would be indicative of intervention pressure points in which diplomats may build on reduced tensions and seek a long-term resolution of the crisis. The reason for this is that the removal of laminations suggests that the crisis has entered a tense stalemate as the succession of rapidly evolving events has ceased, reducing the tension and anxiety felt by decision-makers. Once such a status quo has emerged, leaders and decision-makers on both sides may think twice before initiating further actions. Thus, the removal of laminations may be an indirect measure of crisis de-escalation.

Table 4.21 offers an analysis of the adding and removing of laminations by the Israeli MFA and Hamas prior to the formation of intervention and prevention pressure points. Moreover, the table analyses the overall number of laminations added and removed by both actors before the formation of pressure points, since this too may be indicative of crisis acuteness. Indeed, the more laminations both actors add and remove during a given week, the more they are forced to adapt their framework to changing circumstances. Instances in which the emergence of pressure points coincided with the hypothesised adding and removing of laminations are coloured in grey.

Table 4.21: Laminations and Crisis Pressure Points

Weeks	Changes in Integral Frame Distance Scores	Type of Pressure Point	Events	Israel Laminations	Hamas Laminations	Total Number of Laminations Added and Removed by Both Actors
3-4	+0.43	Prevention	Israel mounts ground invasion of the Gaza Strip; Hamas operatives infiltrate Israel through a terror tunnel; seven soldiers die in intense fighting in Gaza Strip	Israel adds 'Civilian Infrastructure' lamination	-	1
4-5	-0.21	Intervention	Israel shells an UNRWA school leaving many dead and wounded; death toll in Gaza rises to 867; John Kerry proposes ceasefire agreement		Hamas adds 'UN Installations' lamination Hamas adds 'Religious Fighting' lamination	2
5-6	-0.13	Intervention	Hamas operatives infiltrate Israel via tunnel and attack IDF base; Israel calls up 18,000 reserve soldiers; Hamas allegedly abducts an Israeli soldier minutes before a humanitarian window	Israel removes 'Civilian Infrastructure' lamination Israel adds 'Kidnapped Soldier' lamination Israel adds 'Hamas Abuses Gazans' lamination	Hamas adds 'Israeli Violations' lamination Hamas adds 'Kidnapped Soldier' lamination	5

Weeks	Changes in Integral Frame Distance Scores	Type of Pressure Point	Events	Israel Laminations	Hamas Laminations	Total Number of Laminations Added and Removed by Both Actors
6-7	+0.20	Prevention	Israel kills Hamas leader minutes before a humanitarian window; two terror attacks in Jerusalem leave a soldier gravely wounded; both sides accept and then violate an Egyptian ceasefire proposal	Israel removes 'Ground Invasion' lamination	-	1
7-8	-0.27	Intervention	Both sides accept a three-day ceasefire; Israel delays delivery of aid as border crossing comes under Hamas fire	-	Hamas adds 'Hamas Leadership' lamination	1
8-9	+0.69	Prevention	Hamas rocket fire leads Israeli prime minister to recall negotiators from Cairo; Israel calls up an additional 10,000 reserve soldiers; Hamas fires rockets at Tel Aviv	Israel adds 'Israeli Resilience' lamination Israel adds 'Hamas is ISIS' lamination	-	2
9-10	+0.12	Prevention	Israeli attack leads to the collapse of a 13-story building in Gaza;; Hamas fires more than 100 rockets at Israel; both sides agree to a ceasefire proposal by Egypt		Hamas adds 'Disarm Israel' lamination Hamas adds 'War Crimes' lamination	2

As seen in Table 4.21, the formation of four prevention pressure points was accompanied by the adding of laminations by at least one of the actors involved in the Gaza War. Such was the case during Week 4, where the growth in Integral Frame Distance Scores was accompanied by the Israeli MFA adding the 'Civilian Infrastructure' lamination. Similarly, the prevention point in Week 9, was accompanied by the adding of two Israeli laminations: 'Israeli Resilience' and ' Hamas is ISIS'. Finally, the growth in Integral Frame Distance Scores in Week 10 was accompanied by Hamas adding the laminations of 'Disarm Israel' and 'War Crimes'. However, the prevention pressure point in Week 7 was accompanied by the *removal* of a lamination by the Israeli MFA.

While the majority of prevention pressure points were accompanied by the adding of laminations, there was only one instance in which intervention pressure points were accompanied by the removal of laminations. Such was the case in the intervention pressure point between Weeks 5 and 6, where Israel removed the 'Civilian Infrastructure' lamination. However, this week also saw the *adding* of laminations by both Israel and Hamas. Thus, it is apparent that intervention pressure points were not accompanied by the removal of laminations, as was hypothesised.

The discrepancy between the formation of intervention pressure points and the removal of laminations is tied to the factors that influence the Integral Frame Distance Scores. For instance, the intervention pressure point that emerged between Weeks 4 and 5 was a result of a more positive sentiment of Israeli tweets, as well as a far more positive sentiment of Hamas Leaders' Statements. However, this week also saw a major event in the evolution of the war: the shelling of an UNRWA school and the subsequent deaths of many Palestinians. Moreover, during this week, the death toll of Gazans climbed dramatically.

Hamas responded to these events by adding two laminations and arguing that Israel was an amoral actor that fired at civilian buildings in Gaza while also vowing to martyr Gaza in the name of Allah.

The same is true of the intervention pressure point identified between Weeks 7 and 8. The reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores is attributed to a reduction in frame distance between both actors' frameworks and a more positive sentiment of Israeli tweets, Hamas tweets and statements made by Hamas leaders. However, as talks progressed in Cairo, Hamas added a new lamination of 'Hamas Leadership' hoping to frame itself as the leader of all Palestinians, not just those living in the Gaza Strip. Thus, this intervention pressure point was accompanied by the adding of laminations.

In summary, the analysis of laminations and crisis pressure points offers conflicting results. The formation of pressure points in which diplomatic mediation is warranted to prevent further escalation do seem to be accompanied by the adding of laminations. Yet intervention pressure points in which diplomatic mediation may be most likely to succeed are not accompanied by the removing of laminations, as actors are still required to comment on events, even if they are positive ones such as the progress made in the Cairo talks.

One question that follows is: Is there a link between the overall number of laminations added and removed by actors and the formation of crisis pressure points. The Gaza War case study suggests that such a link does *not* exist. For instance, one of the smallest changes in Integral Frame Distance Scores occurred between Weeks 5 and 6. Yet this week also saw the greatest number of laminations added and removed by Israel and Hamas. Moreover, the largest change in Integral Frame Distance Scores occurred between Weeks 8 and 9, but this was accompanied by the mere adding and removing of two

laminations by the Israeli MFA and Hamas. As such, it appears that changes in the number of laminations employed by both actors do not directly correlate with the emergence of crisis pressure points.

The analysis presented thus far was based on the segmentation of the Gaza War into weekly clusters of seven days. The decision to use seven-day clusters stemmed from the need to gather a sizable amount of tweets from both actors that would enable the identification of their frameworks and laminations. Moreover, weekly clusters were used because of the need to accumulate a sizable amount of tweets whose sentiments could then be measured. However, the segmentation of the crisis into seven-day clusters is accompanied by a major limitation. Because Hamas only began Tweeting in English during the third week of the war, there were only ten weeks in which Integral Frame Distance Scores could be measured and only ten weeks in which crisis pressure points could be mapped. Yet diplomats using the frame distance model would likely require more measurements if they were to track a crisis's progression in near-real time. Indeed, the more measurement or data points diplomats have at their disposal, the greater their ability to identify consistent trends such as a narrowing in frame distances between two actors and the emergence of intervention pressure points. In order to test whether a larger number of data points would increase diplomats' abilities to identify trends in a conflict, the Gaza War was analysed yet again using three-day clusters. This analysis is presented in the following section.


The Gaza War in Three Day Clusters

The segmentation of the Gaza War into three-day clusters resulted in the measurement of 14 Integral Frame Distance Scores. Graph 4.5 depicts (see two pages below) changes to

Integral Frame Distance Scores throughout the Gaza War. By using three-day clusters, the onset stage of the Gaza War (Clusters 1-3) became more visible. It was during Cluster 3 that the Gaza War entered the escalation stage as Israel mounted a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. As seen in Graph 4.5, this was preceded by a rapid and steady growth in Integral Frame Distance Scores, one which is consistent with Bell's assertion that the onset stage includes an escalatory momentum known as 'Crisis Slide' (Bell, 1971).

Graph 4.5 also validates the findings presented in previous sections, since the escalation stage of the war, shown in clusters 3 to 14, saw several instances in which the frame distance between both actors narrowed substantially, leading to the emergence of intervention pressure points. Thus, even during a high-intensity crisis that saw military altercations between two sides, diplomats using the frame distance model could have identified the emergence of intervention pressure points and seized on them to obtain a long-term resolution of the war. Importantly, when using three-day clusters, the emergence of these intervention pressure points is more evident. Indeed, the intervention pressure point between Clusters 3 and 6 is evident in four measurements, as opposed to just two, when using seven-day clusters (See Graph 4.2, Weeks 5 to 6).

Graph 4.5: Integral Frame Distance Scores Using Three-Day Clusters



The same is true of prevention pressure points. The prevention pressure point between Weeks 6 and 7 is evident between Clusters 6 and 8. Similarly, the prevention point between Weeks 8 and 9 is evident between Clusters 9 and 11. In other words, relying on three-day clusters and a larger number of data points increases one's ability to identify consistent changes in frame distances and the emergence of pressure points. This is made apparent in Graph 4.6 (see two pages below).


The analysis of three-day clusters also demonstrates more clearly that crises do not necessarily progress in a linear fashion of onset, escalation, and de-escalation. Throughout crisis stages, two actors may move closer together or further apart. Notably, the analysis of three-day clusters did reveal that the Gaza War ended with a reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores. This was not the case when using seven-day clusters, which suggested that the war actually ended with an increase in Integral Frame Distance Scores.

It is also important to note that the use of three-day clusters reduces the volatility of changes to Integral Frame Distance Scores. For instance, the Integral Frame Distance Score grew by 0.67 between Weeks 8 and 9. The same growth can be seen between Clusters 9 and 11. Yet this growth is far more mild, going from 2.79 in Cluster 9 to 2.95 in Cluster 10 and 3.28 in Cluster 11. Thus, once again, it is evident that increasing the number of data points increases one's ability to use the frame distance model to track a crisis's progression and extrapolate its possible trajectory.

However, the analysis of three-day clusters was accompanied by two main limitations. First, the number of tweets published during each cluster was smaller than the number of tweets published during the seven-day clusters. While the average weekly cluster included 104 Israeli tweets and 60 Palestinian tweets, the average three-day cluster included

59 Israeli tweets and 38 Palestinian tweets. This led to another limitation: a larger number of tweets that could not be categorised into frameworks and laminations. The reason for this is that arranging tweets into frameworks requires the identification of tweets that offer a problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and suggested remedy. Yet in some cases, three-day clusters included only two or three of the requisite components (e.g. problem definition and moral evaluation), while the other components were published in the following cluster (e.g. suggested remedy).

Graph 4.6: Crisis Pressure Points Using Three-Day Clusters



Discussion

This thesis seeks to answer the question **How do MFAs use digital tools in times of crises, and how can the use of such tools inform strategies to manage crises?** The thesis postulates that MFAs use Twitter to offer online publics a frame, or prism, through which a crisis may be understood. From a sociological perspective, framing during times of crisis may be especially effective as publics and media institutions scramble to make sense of unfolding events. In other words, by using frames to narrate events and actors shaping a crisis, MFAs may be able to influence how that crisis is perceived by local and global audiences. Given the expectation that MFAs will use Twitter for framing purposes, the thesis also assumes that social media content may be used to track a crisis's progression in near-real time and extrapolate the possible trajectory of a crisis. By analysing differences between two actors' framing of a crisis, one may be able to assess their relative scope of disagreement. The greater the scope of disagreement, the greater the likelihood of crisis escalation. Conversely, the smaller the scope of disagreement, the greater the likelihood of crisis de-escalation. Lastly, this thesis hypothesises that by measuring the scope of disagreement between two actors, one can identify crisis pressure points in which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted or most effective in resolving the crisis. Testing the aforementioned assumptions is achieved through the development and employment of the frame distance model, as is the case in this chapter.

The development of the frame distance model is pertinent for two reasons. First, the 21st-century is likely to witness frequent, intertwined, and complex crises. One poignant example of a 21st-century crisis is the one currently unfolding in Syria. What began as a popular uprising morphed into a bloody civil war that threatened the rule of president

Bashar Assad. The possible collapse of Assad harmed the regional interests of Russia, Iran, and certain factions in Lebanon. The war in Syria also threatened the interests of the U.S. and its allies given the rise of ISIS in Syria. As the civil war continued, other countries saw a threat to their interests, including Israel and Turkey. Resolving the Syrian crisis thus required that diplomats take into account the interests of Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Russia, Syria, Turkey, and the U.S. while bringing all these players to the same negotiating table. Amid the climate of perpetual and complex crises, diplomats will increasingly be called upon to manage crises either through long-term resolutions or short-term containment.

Yet the development of the frame distance model is also pertinent given the mass utilisation of social media by MFAs. Presently, some 90% of UN states have established some form of social media presence (Bjola, 2017). Moreover, MFAs now rely on social media to comment on global events and crises in real time, thus competing with the framing of other actors including media institutions, citizen journalists, and other states (Hayden 2012; Manor, 2016; Seib, 2012). Notably, it is through online framing competitions that MFAs can create offline conditions for the obtainment of foreign policy goals. In this manner, online diplomacy is intrinsically linked to offline diplomacy. By creating a crisis management model that is based on tweets published by actors involved in a crisis, this thesis explores the new digital environment in which diplomacy is currently practiced.

The frame distance model rests on four assumptions; the first states that MFAs will utilise social media to offer audiences a frame, or prism, through which a crisis can be interpreted. This assumption is based on previous studies that have demonstrated that administrations often use frames when commenting on foreign policy crises in order to gain support from the media and the public. For instance, by framing an event as infringing on

the national interests of a country, administrations can raise support for their policies as the media is quick to 'rally behind the flag' (Auerbach & Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Entman 2004, 2008; Wood & Peake, 1998).

The second assumption of the frame distance model states that MFAs will frame a crisis by employing primary frameworks or cognitive schemata that explain what is happening now, what has happened before, and what will happen next (Goffman, 1974, p. 38). As Goffman argued, framing is inherent to human nature as individuals constantly strive to make sense of the world around them. Times of crises are accompanied by feelings of uncertainty and anxiety as events quickly outpace one another preventing individuals from comprehending their world and answering the question, 'What is going on?' By framing a crisis, MFAs offer audiences answers to these questions, thereby reducing feelings of insecurity. This, in turn, may help MFAs rally support for their policies from audiences. Such support is crucial given that crises see a direct threat to the interests of a state. Following the works of Robert Entman (1993), it was assumed that MFA frameworks would include a problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and a suggested remedy.

The analysis of the Gaza War case study demonstrates that both the Israeli MFA and the Hamas terror organisation used Twitter to comment on unfolding events and frame the Gaza War in near-real time. Moreover, these frameworks consisted of the four elements identified by Entman (1993). Indeed, during each week of the war, both actors identified the problem leading to heightened tensions as well as the cause of the problem. Yet these problem definitions altered as the reality on the ground changed. For instance, during Week 3 the Israeli MFA stated that the problem driving events in Gaza was Hamas's firing rockets at Israeli towns and cities. The cause lay in Hamas's nature as a terrorist organisation that

was deliberately targeting civilians. By the following week, however, the MFA identified a new problem - Hamas's infiltration of Israel via terror tunnels. The cause of the war now lay in Hamas's desire to kill Israelis and its repeated rejection of ceasefire proposals. Thus, as the reality on the ground changed, so did the MFA's frameworks.

Similarly, during Week 3, Hamas argued that the problem fuelling tensions along the Gaza border was Israel's deliberate engagement with Hamas operatives. The cause of mounting tensions lay in Hamas's need to respond to Israel's aggressive policies. By Week 4, Hamas identified a new problem: the high death toll among the civilian population of Gaza. The cause of the problem now lay in Israel's inhumane siege on Gaza. By Week 5, Hamas argued that the war was escalating given Israel's rejection of John Kerry's proposed ceasefire initiative. In all these cases, Israel and Hamas used Twitter to update their frameworks in real time.

Importantly, the solutions identified by both actors were intrinsically linked to the problem definitions they employed. During Week 2, Israel stated that the problem driving events in Gaza was Hamas's rocket fire. The suggested remedy was a military operation meant to restore quiet to Israel's southern border. In Week 5, the MFA suggested that the solution to the extended range of Hamas's rockets was to disarm Hamas and establish a new government in Gaza. During the same week, Hamas stated that the problem underlying the war with Israel was the siege on Gaza. The suggested remedy was a military campaign meant to break the siege. During Week 8 Hamas argued that Israel was also engaged in inhumane activities in the West Bank, since it kidnapped Palestinians from their homes at night. The solution was for Hamas to secure the needs and interests of all Palestinians while engaging diplomatically with other countries in the region. These examples demonstrate

that by identifying the problem at the root of the crisis, actors can also promote a desired favourable resolutions to the crisis.

The link between actors' problem definitions and suggested remedies also sheds light on how social media framing is used by diplomats to obtain offline diplomatic goals. By depicting Hamas as an existential threat to Israel's existence given the range of its rockets, the Israeli MFA may have sought to rally international support for disarming Hamas. The MFA may have also sought to prevent other countries from exerting influence on Israel to end its military operation despite the high death toll in Gaza, for how could Israel cease its activities when coming under an existential threat? Similarly, by depicting Israel's siege on Gaza as inhumane, Hamas may have sought to legitimise its rocket fire at Israeli cities. In this manner, Twitter framing may be conceptualised as narration with the intent to influence people's perception of a crisis, and rally their support thus creating the conditions necessary for obtaining a nation's foreign policy goals. During crises, rallying support for one's foreign policy goals becomes a crucial diplomatic task given the perceived threat to national interests.

Both actors' primary frameworks also included moral evaluations. In most weeks, both the Israeli MFA and Hamas attempted to create moral dichotomies through which they contrasted one another's behavior. For example, during Week 2, Israel employed the 'Islamic Axis' framework, which contrasted Hamas's use of human shields with Israeli attempts to shield its citizens. During Week 3, Israel contrasted Hamas's use of human shields with its own decision to supply Gaza with humanitarian aid. Likewise, during Week 5, Hamas employed the 'Siege on Gaza' framework arguing that Israel fired indiscriminately at civilians while Hamas limited itself to military engagements. During the same week, Hamas

also argued that Israel fought for Satan while Hamas fought for Allah. Finally, in Week 7, as talks in Cairo were underway, Israel stated that it ceases while 'Hamas fires'.

These moral dichotomies may have been employed towards three ends. First, both actors may have sought to shift the blame for the escalation of the war onto the opponent. Mor (2006) conceptualised strategic blame shifting as the use of moral arguments by one actor to identify another as responsible for negative outcomes. By framing Hamas as hiding behind human shields, Israel could blame Hamas for the high death toll in Gaza. Similarly, by contrasting Israel's acceptance of ceasefire proposals with Hamas's rejection of these proposals, Israel may have been able to blame Hamas for the continuation of the war. By arguing that Israel fired indiscriminately at civilians, Hamas may have sought to blame Israel for the escalation in tensions between both sides. This form of blame shifting may have been used by both actors to constrain one another's range of possible actions. If the world came to blame Israel for the deaths of countless Gazans, Israel would have to end its aerial bombardment of the Gaza Strip. Similarly, if the world came to blame Hamas for using Gazans as human shields, Hamas would find it difficult to continue its rocket fire at Israel. In this way, online framing is used to constrain the offline actions of parties involved in a crisis.

In addition, moral dichotomies may have been used by both actors in order to legitimise their actions and de-legitimise those of the opponent. Moral arguments may help an actor legitimise his actions as morality breeds legitimacy on the international stage. Countries that are seen as promoting positive values, whether these are human rights or peacekeeping, encounter less resistance to their foreign policies, even if these include the use of hard power (Natarajan, 2014; Quelch & Jocz, 2009). Obtaining moral legitimacy is crucial during a crisis as nations must fend off pressure to alter their policies. For instance,

throughout the Gaza War, American diplomats and leaders attempted to exert influence on Israel to halt or end its military operation. By framing Hamas as responsible for the collapse of ceasefire talks, and itself as adhering to ceasefire initiatives, Israel may have been able to fend off American pressure until it concluded its ground operation in Gaza and unearthed all terror tunnels. Similarly, by framing Israel as firing at countless innocent Gazans, Hamas may have hoped to fend off Egyptian pressure to halt its rocket fire. Moral framing is thus strategic, as it seeks to create the conditions necessary for obtaining foreign policy goals.

Third, moral dichotomies may have been employed by both actors to win the support of foreign populations. This may have been achieved by employing frameworks and laminations that resonated with the pre-existing knowledge and worldviews of foreign populations. Framing studies have found that frames that resonate with one's pre-existing knowledge or beliefs are more likely to impact how one understands the world around him (D'Angelo, 2002; de Vreese, 2005). For instance, during Week 9 Israel employed the 'Islamic Axis Framework' which framed Hamas as yet another Islamic radical organisation dedicated to terror and death. The MFA also added the lamination of 'Hamas is ISIS' stating that like ISIS, Hamas was willing to sacrifice its own people to win the war with Israel. Moreover, the Israeli MFA stated that like ISIS, Hamas maintained control over its territory through a reign of terror that violated women's rights, oppressed Christians and persecuted homosexuals. The MFA even promised that the global war on terror would be stopped on Israel's borders.

By portraying Hamas as an associate of ISIS, the Israeli MFA may have attempted to formulate frameworks that would resonate with foreign populations, especially those living in countries that have been plagued by terrorist attacks including the U.S., the U.K. and France. Moreover, by framing the struggle against Hamas as yet another battle in the 'War

on Terror', the MFA may have attempted to rally support from right-wing oriented individuals in Europe and the U.S., as well as Shiite audiences in the Middle East. Finally, by focusing on Hamas's abuse of women, Christians and homosexuals, the MFA may have sought to rally support from liberal foreign populations. Yet above all, by associating Hamas with ISIS the MFA may have hoped to influence how foreign populations, who know little about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, viewed Hamas. For if these audiences come to associate Hamas with the atrocities of ISIS, they may be more willing to support Israel's military actions and view Israel as a moral actor dedicated to safeguarding its citizens and an ally in the war on extreme Islam.

Similarly, during Week 4 Hamas contrasted its ceasefire proposals with Israel's inhumane siege on the Gaza Strip and its targeting of women and children in Gaza. This moral dichotomy, between a savage aggressor and vulnerable protagonist, may have resonated with audiences that are critical of the Israeli occupation of Palestine and who believe that Israel is a consistent violator of human rights. Moreover, this framing would resonate with activists around the world who support the BDS movement (Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions). The assumption that both actors targeted foreign populations, and attempted to gain their offline support, is strengthened by the finding that both tweeted in English as opposed to Hebrew or Arabic. By creating frameworks that resonated with foreign audiences' pre-existing knowledge, beliefs, values and worldviews both actors may have attempted to maximize support for their policies and desired resolution to the war.

In addition, both Hamas and Israel referred to vulnerable populations in their moral evaluations. For instance, during Week 4, Hamas employed the 'Killing Women and

Children' framework, which alleged that Israel was 'massacring' innocent children in Gaza. The following week, Hamas added the 'UN Installations' lamination to this framework, arguing that Israel was firing at schools in the Gaza Strip, thus directly targeting helpless children. Similarly, throughout the Gaza War, the Israeli MFA focused on citizens' frantic attempts to find shelter from impending Hamas rockets. Vulnerable populations may have been invoked to gain support from average social media users. As digital diplomacy studies have indicated, MFAs use social media to frame events both for media institutions and everyday users (Cull, 2018; Manor & Holmes, 2018). By rallying support from social media users, both actors may have also attempted to shape foreign public opinion, which, in turn, could influence foreign governments' attitudes towards the Gaza War.

Lastly, both actors attempted to frame one another as violating international law. Such was the case in Weeks 3 and 4 when the Israeli MFA employed the 'Double War Crimes' framework, alleging that Hamas was breaking international law when firing at civilians from within civilian areas in Gaza. Similarly, in Week 10, Hamas added the lamination of 'War Crimes' to its 'Siege on Gaza' framework alleging that Israel had committed war crimes as it fought a 'genocidal war' against Palestinians. Hamas even vowed to sue Israel in the International Criminal Court. Both Hamas and Israel may have invoked international law as a way to constrain another's actions. Van Ham (2013) argued that framing may be used by nations to identify norms and values that are deemed as desirable by the international community. Actors may choose not to violate these norms given fear of international sanctioning and isolation. By framing one another as violating international law, both Hamas and Israel may have attempted to isolate one another internationally. Thus, while the Cold War was characterised by the notion of MAD, or Mutually Assured Destruction, the Gaza War seems to have been characterised by

Mutually Assured De-legitimation. By calling one another's character into question, both Hamas and Israel stood to lose as much as they gained.

It should also be noted that the primary frameworks of Israel and Hamas included a temporal dimension, thus adhering to Goffman's (1974) conceptualisation of framing as answering the questions 'What is happening now?', 'What happened before?', and 'What will happen next?' For instance, during Week 3 the Israeli MFA employed the 'Military Operation' framework, which stated that Hamas had fired rockets at Israel, that Israel was launching a military operation in Gaza, and that the operation would end with quiet restored to the country's south. Likewise, in Week 5, Hamas employed the 'Ceasefire' framework, which argued that Israel had violated several ceasefire agreements, that it continued to do so because it had the support of powerful countries, and that Hamas would fight on until an agreement was reached that included the end of the siege. In this way, both actors narrated the present, framed the past, and offered a clear vision of the future. Such a temporal dimension may have increased the potency of Israel and Hamas's framing as it demonstrated the role that the Gaza War would play in the broader relationship between Israel and Palestine.

Yet throughout the Gaza War, the primary frameworks employed by both actors differed. During Week 3, the first in which Hamas tweeted, both actors differed in their problem definitions and causal attributions, with Israel focusing on Hamas rocket fire and Hamas on its need to retaliate against IDF attacks. Yet both sides agreed on a suggested remedy: a military equilibrium in which fire would be met with fire. The following week, while Israel blamed Hamas for the use of human shields and Hamas blamed Israel for maintaining an inhumane siege on Gaza, both sides agreed that the high death toll was

exacerbating tensions along the border. In Week 6, both sides identified different problems; Israel emphasised Hamas's use of terror tunnels, while Hamas framed Israel as targeting vulnerable populations. However, both agreed that the solution to the war was an equilibrium in which quiet would be met with quiet. Lastly, in Week 9, the ceasefire frameworks of both sides differed in all four dimensions as Hamas demanded an end to the siege on Gaza and Israel promised to show resilience in the face of terror.

The results presented thus far validate this thesis's first research statement (**S1**: In times of crisis, MFAs seek to maximise support for their position by articulating favourable frameworks of interpretation that are composed of a problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and a suggested remedy). Statement 1 also did not meet its falsification criteria, as the frameworks of Hamas and Israel diverged to varying degrees throughout the whole Gaza War (**Falsification**: S1 will be falsified if there is no divergence between the primary framework disseminated on Twitter by two opposing parties).

The third assumption of the frame distance model is that two actors' frameworks will differ during a crisis, thus enabling the measurement of frame distances. This assumption stems from the fact that crises are turning points in the relationship between two actors. Moreover, times of crises see a credible threat to the interests of both actors. Subsequently, both actors adopt policies that aim to secure their own interests while preventing the opponent from obtaining theirs (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Bell, 1971; Boin et al., 2013; Ramcharan, 2008). The fourth assumption of the model is that the frame distance between two actors' frameworks will alter as a crisis progresses. During the onset stage the frame distance may grow, as each actor seeks to secure his interests, while during the de-escalation stage it may narrow as both sides come to agree on a compromise.

The Gaza War case study demonstrates that actors' frameworks do, in fact, differ throughout a crisis. During Week 3, the first to include tweets by both actors, Israel employed the 'Military Operation' framework, arguing that the crisis in Gaza was a result of Hamas's decision to fire rockets at Israeli cities. At the same time, Hamas employed its 'Retribution' framework, stating that the IDF was deliberately engaging its operatives, who would meet fire with fire. Notably, each of these frameworks may have been employed in an attempt to secure one's own interests. Israel, on its part, needed to justify its aerial bombardment of Gaza and its preparations for a possible ground invasion. As such, it focused its framing on the threat posed to Israeli citizens from Hamas rockets. Hamas, on its part, needed to justify its decision to fire upon Israel. It did so by arguing that the IDF was the one escalating tensions by deliberately engaging Hamas operatives.

The link between frameworks and national interests is most apparent when examining Hamas's 'Siege on Gaza' framework and Israel's 'Six Million' framework- both of which were employed during Week 5. When employing the 'Siege on Gaza' framework, Hamas blamed Israel for the high death toll in Gaza, suggesting that this was a result of Israel's military activities *and* its inhumane siege on the Gaza Strip. This frame was used to help Hamas obtain its most important goal- the removal of the Israeli siege on the Gaza Strip. Indeed, Hamas has been attempting to breach the Israeli siege for nearly a decade. By suggesting that the siege contributed to the high death toll, Hamas may have sought to bring international pressure to bear on Israel to lift the siege. Israel's 'Six Million' framework argued that Hamas invested aid money in terrorist activities against Israel rather than caring for its own people. Hamas's choice to target Israel and betray the Palestinian people could only be remedied if Hamas was disarmed and a new government was established in Gaza. Through this framework, Israel attempted to obtain its own most important goal- the

demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip and collapse of the Hamas government. These examples demonstrate that actors' frameworks do indeed differ from one another as each actor attempts to obtain their own goals. Yet these examples also demonstrate that framing during crises may be used to obtain goals that exist independent of the crisis. Such is the case with Hamas's long-time goal of ending the siege on Gaza, and Israel's long-time goal of demilitarising the Gaza Strip.

But as the frame distance model assumes, there were also many instances in which both actors' frameworks resonated with one another, which lead to variability in frame distances throughout the war. During Week 6, both sides agreed that the solution to mounting tensions was a military equilibrium. During Week 8, both sides agreed that the solution to the war was a short-term ceasefire agreement, to be followed by negotiations for a long-term settlement. Finally, during most weeks of the war, both actors agreed that the high death toll in Gaza was increasing tensions.

The variability in frame distances between Hamas and Israel elucidate this thesis's contribution to works of Goffman, who asserted that frame disputes may arise when there is more than one answer to the question 'What is going on?' (1974, p. 332). Such is the case during a trial when a defendant claims that he was playing a prank by pointing a gun at a bank teller, while the prosecution claims that the defendant's intent was, in fact to rob the bank. However, as Goffman did not identify the components of primary frameworks, it is impossible to measure the severity of frame disputes. The frame distance model addresses this limitation by identifying the four components that comprise primary frameworks and measuring the distance, or difference, between the frameworks employed by two actors. As such, the model enables one to measure the severity of frame disputes between two actors

and, subsequently, track the progression of a crisis. As the Gaza War case study demonstrates, crises do not necessarily unfold in a linear fashion of onset, escalation, and de-escalation as suggested by some scholars (Topper & Lagadec, 2013). Rather, as a crisis progresses, there are points of convergence and divergence between two actors. Crises are thus fluid.

The frame distance model also contributes to the digital diplomacy research corpus by demonstrating that social media content can be used to track a crisis's progression in near-real time. This is achieved by calculating Integral Frame Distance Scores, which are composed of frame distances, rhetorical indicators, and the number of tweets published by each actor. All these factors are integrated using a matrix of calculation that offers a single measurement for the scope of disagreement between two governments. The initial analysis of the Gaza War based on seven-day clusters suggested that this crisis violently burst onto the scene as it transitioned from the onset stage to the escalation stage within one week. Moreover, the analysis did not reveal a crisis slide stage in which tensions between two actors steadily mount leading to an escalatory momentum (Bell, 1971). Finally, the analysis found that the Gaza War ended with an increase in Integral Frame Distance Scores.

Given the aforementioned findings, the Gaza War case study was re-evaluated using three-day clusters, as opposed to weekly clusters. This enabled the measurement of additional Integral Frame Distance Scores as each week was segmented into three data points. The three-day cluster analysis found that while the Gaza War burst onto the scene, as is the case with most crises (McConnell & Drennan, 2006; Wood & Peake, 1998), it began with a steady increase in Integral Frame Distance Scores and a growing divergence between both actors' frameworks. Diplomats using the frame distance model could have discerned

that the crisis between Hamas and Israel was in the crisis slide stage. The three-day cluster analysis also found that Integral Frame Distance Scores varied throughout the escalation stage, suggesting that even at the height of a military altercation, two governments can move closer together. Indeed, the escalation stage saw multiple occasions in which there was a convergence between both actors' frameworks. This occurred when both sides reviewed a ceasefire proposal from John Kerry and when Israel and Hamas agreed to honour a 12-hour humanitarian window. Similarly, there was a small convergence between both actors' frameworks in the last three-day cluster as Israel and Hamas agreed to a short-term ceasefire agreement negotiated by Egypt. This convergence denotes the de-escalation stage of the Gaza War.

The results presented thus far validate this thesis second research statement (**S2:** Offline escalation is conducive to *divergence* between primary frameworks while offline de-escalation is conducive to *convergence* between primary frameworks). S2 did not meet its falsification criteria (**Falsification:** S2 will be falsified if there is no change to the frame distances once a crisis transitions from one stage to another).

The fifth assumption of the frame distance model is that changes in frame distance denote crisis pressure points. Such points are conceptualised as instances in which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted or effective. Increases in Integral Frame Distance Scores indicate that two governments are growing further apart, signifying prevention pressure points in which diplomatic mediation is necessary to contain a crisis and prevent further escalation. Decreases in Integral Frame Distance Scores indicate that two governments are moving closer together, signifying intervention pressure points in which diplomatic mediation may be effective at securing a long-term resolution to the crisis.

The analysis of the Gaza War case study through seven-day clusters identified four prevention pressure points and three intervention pressure points.

The use of Integral Frame Distance Scores to map and identify pressure points contributes to previous work on 'turning points' in negotiations. By measuring changes to Integral Frame Distance Scores, the model is able to identify pressure points in near-real time. Moreover, the qualitative analysis of each actor's frameworks enables one to identify entry points to negotiations or areas of relative agreement between two actors. Lastly, the qualitative analysis can help map each side's core interests and core arguments, thus anticipating opening positions during negotiations. In this way, the frame distance model overcomes the limitations addressed by Druckman (2001); diplomats using the model can identify and seize turning points with the objective of advancing negotiations toward an agreement.

For instance, diplomats using the frame distance model could have identified Week 6 as an intervention pressure point, given a reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores. Using qualitative analysis, diplomats would have found that both Hamas and Israel view the high death toll in Gaza escalating tensions in Gaza. Moreover, both also agreed that the solution to mounting tensions was a military equilibrium in which quiet would be met with quiet. These areas of agreement could have served as an entry point to negotiations. Indeed, as previous studies suggest, when two sides begin to discuss the same issue their frames may align, leading to a possible resolution of the crisis (Snow et al., 1986). In an attempt to seize this intervention pressure point, diplomats could have focused their efforts on obtaining a series of daily truces between both sides in which quiet would be met with quiet, thus slowly diffusing tensions and reducing the number of casualties in Gaza. Importantly,

diplomats could have also anticipated areas of disagreement during this week, with Hamas demanding that the siege on Gaza be lifted and Israel demanding that all factions in Gaza be disarmed. Yet by anticipating these stances, diplomats may have been better prepared to address each side's demands.

Similarly, diplomats using the frame distance model during Week 6 could have identified the core interests of each side. This was the third consecutive week in which Hamas employed the 'Siege on Gaza' framework and the second consecutive week that Israel employed the 'Six Million' framework, which called for the demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip. By mapping the core interests of each side, diplomats could have entered the negotiations with long-term solutions that partially met the needs of both actors. For example, diplomats could have suggested the formation of an arbitration mechanism in which disputes between Israel and Hamas could be resolved. Such a mechanism would be useful since both sides have no official diplomatic ties. Alternatively, diplomats could have suggested that Israel expand the fishing zone in Gaza in return for open elections in the Gaza Strip. In this way, the frame distance model could have helped diplomats seek a long-term resolution to the war thereby breaking the fractal feedback loop that characterises Israeli-Hamas relations (Bjola, 2016b; Topper & Lagadec, 2013). Equally important, long-term solutions that address the core interests of each side are more likely to gather support in decision-making forums, even amidst a climate of stress, anxiety, and competition over access to leadership (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

By tracking a crisis's progression in near-real time, the frame distance model also addresses another challenge identified by scholars- the need to tailor diplomatic interventions to the unique evolution of each crisis. While all crises are similar in that they

denote turning points in relationships between states, see a high risk of military altercations, and are accompanied by a need to make decisions based on limited information, they also differ based on the historic ties between opposing sides, their relative power, and their levels of economic interdependence. Sauer (2007), Acuto (2011), and Regan (1998) argued that the unique nature of crises demands that interventions be tailored to the unique progression of each crisis. As the Gaza War case study demonstrates, the frame distance model enables diplomats to tailor interventions to the relative scope of disagreement between two actors at any given time.

The discussion thus far has focused on the primary frameworks employed by the Israeli MFA and Hamas. It is important to note that both sides also employed laminations. Goffman (1974) conceptualized laminations as layers that may be added to a primary framework. Such is the case with a group of children who pretend to be fighting. The group has collectively added a lamination to the framework of fighting. Notably, if one of the children begins to harm his peers, he has removed the lamination of play. This may break the collective framework employed by the children. From a sociological perspective, frame breaking limits the ability of an actor to influence the perceptions of his audiences, as there is no longer a clear and consistent answer to the question 'What is going on?' From a media studies perspective, frame breaking reduces the likelihood of journalists adopting government frames as journalists can no longer clearly identify the stance of the government or the prism it employs to make sense of a situation. Thus, within the scope of this thesis, laminations are conceptualised as layers that are added onto primary frameworks and that enable a framework to adapt to changing circumstances, thereby avoiding frame breaking.

During the Gaza War, both the Israeli MFA and Hamas employed laminations to prevent frame breaking. Such was the case in Week 4 when Israel added the 'Civilian Infrastructure' lamination to its 'Islamic Axis' primary framework following the discovery of Hamas rockets in UNRWA schools. By adding this lamination, the MFA was able to comment on an unfolding event while maintaining its core argument- that like ISIS and Boko Haram, Hamas is a fundamentalist organisation willing to martyr its citizens and hide behind them. Similarly, in Week 5, Hamas added the 'UN Installations' lamination to its 'Killing Women and Children' framework. While the framework still stated that the problem driving events in Gaza was Israel targeting vulnerable populations, the lamination exemplified this problem by focusing on Israel's decision to shell UN schools in Gaza. During Week 6, both sides added a 'Kidnapped Soldier' lamination to their primary frameworks given the need to immediately comment on this event that attracted mass media attention and led to the rebuke of Hamas by global leaders. Both actors also used laminations at the end of the war, made evident by Hamas's use of the 'War Crimes' lamination that promised to sue Israel in the International Criminal Court. The use of laminations demonstrates that actors use social media to practice real time diplomacy (Seib, 2016) through which they constantly comment on unfolding events, thus competing with the framing of other actors.

It should be noted that both actors also removed laminations from their primary frameworks once certain events ended. Such was the case in Week 7, when both actors removed the 'Kidnapped Soldier' lamination as it was revealed that Hamas did not kidnap the body of a slain IDF soldier. In Week 8 Israel removed its 'Military Operation' framework following the unearthing and destruction of Hamas terror tunnels, while in Week 6, Hamas removed its 'UN Installations' lamination since Israel no longer targeted UNRWA schools in Gaza.

While the adding and removing of laminations helped both actors avoid frame breaking, both also consistently employed certain frameworks, thus offering audiences a consistent narration of events unfolding in the Gaza Strip. The most consistent framework employed by the Israeli MFA was 'Islamic Axis', which was employed in eight of the ten weeks comprising the Gaza War. The framework consistently depicted Hamas as yet another fundamentalist organisation dedicated to death and to threatening the values of democracies. This framework enabled Israel to continuously justify its military operation against Hamas. Israel also consistently employed the 'Six Million' framework, which was used in four of the ten weeks that made up the Gaza War. This framework may have been used to offer a frame, or prism, that resonated with Israeli and Jewish audiences. The figure of six million is a symbolic one for Jews and Israelis because it represents the number of Jews murdered in the Holocaust. By stating that six million Israelis were now in the range of Hamas rockets, the MFA may have sought to associate Hamas with a long history of individuals and organisations that have threatened Jews. In this way, the MFA could rally support for its policies from both foreign and domestic audiences. MFA frameworks can therefore enable diplomats to play the two-level game of diplomacy as they gather domestic support for foreign policies (Putnam, 1988). Indeed, recent studies suggest that digital diplomacy is to a large extent domestic diplomacy (Bjola & Manor, 2018).

The most consistent framework employed by Hamas was the 'Ceasefire' framework, which argued that Israel was a serial violator of ceasefire agreements. However, this framework was altered by Hamas as the Gaza War progressed. During Week 5, in which Israel rejected Secretary Kerry's ceasefire agreement, Hamas stated that Israel could reject the agreement as it was backed by powerful nations. In Week 9, as talks in Cairo stalled, Hamas stated that Israel refused to reach an agreement because it desired to maintain its

siege on Gaza. By adapting its framework, Hamas consistently framed Israel as the obstacle to a peaceful resolution. The second most consistent framework employed by Hamas focused on the killing of women and children. By highlighting victims from vulnerable populations, Hamas may have attempted to craft frameworks that would resonate with critics of Israel, especially those who criticise Israel for its human rights violations. Thus, like Israel, Hamas may have sought to play the two-level game of diplomacy, raising foreign support for its domestic policies, including firing rockets at Israel. The use of social media framing to play the two-level game of diplomacy demonstrates again how online diplomacy is used to obtain offline diplomatic goals.

Goffman argued that like individuals, societies also employ frameworks. Moreover, as is the case with individuals, societal frameworks are the result of agency and intent. It is through societal frameworks that certain norms and values are adopted and certain logics come to dominate social life (Goffman, 1974, p. 27). By creating frameworks that resonated with societal frameworks, whether through the invocation of the six million Jews who died in the Holocaust or the view of Israel as a consistent violator of human rights, both Israel and Hamas may have increased the potency of their frameworks. This is because these frameworks resonated with the pre-existing world views of target audiences. Importantly, both the Israeli MFA and Hamas sought to influence the worldviews of their audiences and their perceptions of the war. Framing through social media is thus not merely an exercise in communications, but an exercise in power.

Topper and Ladagec (2013) argued that resolving a crisis rests on the identification of recurring themes within crisis fractals. The frame distance model can help identify such themes through an analysis of frame consistency. The more consistent a framework, the

more it articulates an actor's key interest. The consistency of Hamas's 'Siege on Gaza' framework suggests yet again that Hamas's core interest lay in removing the Israeli siege. The consistency of Israel's 'Six Million' framework indicates that its core interest was in disarming Hamas.

The analysis of frame consistency in the Gaza War case study demonstrates this thesis's contribution to crises management. As stated in the introduction, the 21st-century is likely to see frequent and complex crises which involve a host of different actors each pursuing their own goals. Diplomats will thus have to choose between short-term containment and long-term resolutions. Short-term containment, however practical, is but a bandage placed on a haemorrhaging wound. This is visible in the case of Israeli-Hamas relations. Since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007, it has engaged in military conflicts with Israel in 2008, 2012, 2014, 2018 and 2019. Each of these conflicts has been remarkably similar beginning with Hamas rocket fire on Israel or Israeli aerial bombardments of Gaza. Each of these conflicts has also ended in a similar manner- a short-term accord negotiated by Egyptian and UN diplomats. And each of these accords has been violated by one of the two parties. This conflict thus fits the mould of a fractal crisis whose feedback loop has never been resolved. This is because diplomats have focused on containment rather than long-term resolutions.

By using the frame distance model, and the frame consistency analysis, diplomats could have proposed solutions that meet the long-term goals of both sides. For instance, the consistency of Hamas's 'Siege on Gaza' framework clearly indicates that Israel will know no peace so long as it imposes a physical embargo on the Gaza Strip. Similarly, Hamas will not enjoy the fruits of power so long as it refuses to disarm itself. Using this insight, third party

diplomats may find creative solutions that meet the interests of both sides. For instance, diplomats may suggest that Israel withdraw its siege in stages and that each stage be accompanied by the demilitarisation of a different part of the Gaza Strip. Conversely, diplomats might suggest that Israel withdraw its siege if Hamas agrees to allow Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) officials to take back the administration of Gaza's borders. Diplomats may even condition Israel's lifting of the siege with Hamas's willingness to forfeit some of its weapons. By using the frame distance model, diplomats may enter negotiation rooms with a clear understanding of each sides positions, motives and interests. This may enable diplomats to seek out long-term resolutions and decrease the need for short-term containment which is but a temporary measure.

However, both actors also employed inconsistent frameworks and laminations. Such was the case in Week 5 when Israel employed the 'UN Hypocrisy' framework and blasted the UN for being biased against Israel. This framework was abandoned by the following week, as the UN no longer debated the war. Similarly, the MFA only employed the 'Israeli Resilience' lamination during Week 9 in order to signal to Hamas that it would not be forced to make concessions in Cairo. Yet as the talks progressed in Week 10, this lamination was abandoned. Similarly, Week 8 was the only one to see Hamas employ the 'Hamas Leadership' framework, in which it vowed to represent the needs and interests of all Palestinians given progress in the Cairo talks. Yet as tensions mounted in the following week, Hamas abandoned this framework. These examples demonstrate that events can often render frameworks and laminations irrelevant, leading to their abandonment.

It should, however, be noted that the Israeli MFA employed more frameworks and laminations than Hamas. Between Weeks 3 and 8, Hamas employed an average of three

frameworks and laminations per week, while the Israeli MFA employed an average of five frameworks and laminations. Likewise, during Weeks 3 through 5 Hamas employed a maximum of five frameworks and laminations, as opposed to seven frameworks and laminations used by the Israeli MFA. This gap may stem from the fact that the Israeli MFA has a digital diplomacy unit dedicated to creating, disseminating, and evaluating social media content. Moreover, this department had gained several years' experience in social media framing prior to the Gaza War and may have thus been better positioned to comment on rapidly changing events in near-real time. This gap in frameworks and laminations may have given Israel an advantage when competing opposite Hamas since it was Israel that offered the most up-to-date coverage of the war, thus attracting interested audiences. This assumption, which warrants further research, suggests that framing competitions during times of upheaval are resource-intensive and that actors must develop the skills and resources necessary to win such competitions.

While both actors attempted to adapt their frameworks to unfolding events, the use of multiple frameworks and laminations may have rendered them incoherent narrators. Indeed, when using multiple frameworks and laminations actors offer followers several interpretations of offline events that might cause confusion. For instance, during Week 4 the Israeli MFA informed its audiences that the war with Hamas was a result of rockets being fired at Israel, Hamas's use of Gazans as human shields, Hamas's association with other Islamic groups and Hamas's war crimes. The solutions to the War included the opening of a field hospital near Gaza, opening humanitarian windows, a ground invasion of the Gaza Strip and international condemnation of Hamas. So while the Israeli MFA employed multiple frameworks to comment on a long series of unfolding events, its online

activities may have prevented it from offering a simple answer to the question 'What is going on?'

The same was true of Hamas which during Week 6 identified four problems exacerbating the war with Israel: the killing of women and children, the high death toll of Gazans, Israel's ceasefire violations and Israel's allegation that Hamas had abducted an IDF soldier. Here again Hamas offered multiple solutions to the war ranging from a military equilibrium in to Israel's halting its attacks on vulnerable populations. From a tactical, or short-term perspective employing multiple frameworks and laminations may be beneficial as it enables actors to frame events in near-real time thus offering followers an added value and avoiding frame breaking. Yet from a strategic, or long-term perspective MFAs and quasi-states may lose credibility when offering multiple accounts of the same crisis. As such, real time framing requires that diplomats walk a tightrope between the need to compete with journalists and the media, and the need to offer a clear answer to the questions 'What is happening now? What has happened before? What will happen next?'

When analysing the use of lamination by both actors, it becomes apparent that they sought to comment on events that could have significant ramification on the crisis's progression. For instance, in Week 4 Israel added the 'Civilian Infrastructure' lamination following revelations that Hamas hid weapons in UNWRA schools. This lamination may have been added as Israel feared that it might need to attack these schools following which it would face international condemnation. Indeed, during Week 5 Israel targeted UN facilities leaving many dead. Following this attack, Hamas added its own lamination of 'UN Installations' alleging that Israel was deliberately targeting and 'massacring' vulnerable children in the Gaza Strip.

Another examples lays in Israel's immediate decision to add a lamination following the alleged abduction of an IDF soldier. The possible abduction of a soldier would have demanded a swift Israeli retaliation which could have dramatically escalated the crisis. Similarly, Hamas also added a lamination dealing with the abducted soldier knowing full well that it would force Israel to extend its military operation. In Week 5, both actors added laminations to their frameworks as the death toll in Gaza reached 1,000 individuals. Israel, on its part, had to comment on this milestone fearing that it would come under pressure to halt its military advance. Hamas, on its part, felt compelled to address this issue in fear of losing domestic support for its struggle with Israel. So while Israel argued that the high death toll stemmed from Hamas's use of human shields, Hamas argued that it was the result of Israel's targeting of women and children. These examples demonstrate that actors and MFAs feel compelled to comment on events that can have a dramatic or severe impact on the progression of a crisis.

The finding that both actors added to and removed laminations from their frameworks in response to unfolding events validates this thesis's third research statement (**S3**: The adding and removing of laminations from primary frameworks reflects the perceived severity of the events unfolding on the ground). S3 did not meet its falsification criteria, as both actors repeatedly responded to unfolding events by integrating them into their frameworks through laminations. Once these events ended (i.e. fear of a kidnapped soldier or the collapse of the Cairo talks in Week 8) the laminations in question were removed (**Falsification**: S3 will be falsified if actors do not add or remove laminations in response to events that are unfolding on the ground).

These results indicate that both actors used laminations to comment on events in near-real time. This could suggest that the adding and removing of laminations is indicative of crisis pressure points. Instances in which actors add many laminations to their frameworks may be those in which events quickly outpace one another, denoting an escalation in a crisis. Conversely, instances in which laminations are removed may be those in which a status quo emerges, denoting de-escalation in tensions. The Gaza War case study did not entirely validate this assumption. On the one hand, the majority of prevention pressure points in which diplomatic mediation is necessary to contain a crisis- were accompanied by the adding of laminations by both actors. However, most of the intervention points in which diplomatic mediation is most likely to succeed- were not accompanied by the removal of laminations. In fact, in most instances, intervention pressure points were accompanied by the *adding* of laminations. Moreover, there was no correlation between the overall number of laminations added and removed by both actors and pressure points.

One explanation for the discrepancy between the formation of pressure points and the adding or removing of laminations is that the Gaza War was a high-intensity military altercation that saw a constant and rapid succession of events. For instance, although Week 6 saw a reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores and an intervention pressure point Israel still employed five frameworks and laminations during this week given the need to comment on the new range of Hamas rockets, the infiltration of Israel through terror tunnels, the alleged kidnapping of a soldier, and the growing death toll in Gaza. During Week 5, which also saw the emergence of an intervention pressure point, Hamas employed five frameworks and laminations given the need to comment on Israel's rejection of an American ceasefire proposal, Israel's shelling of an UNRWA school, and the growing number

of dead Gazans. The nature of military altercations may thus limit one's ability to use the addition and removal of laminations as a measure of crisis acuteness.

Another explanation for the discrepancy between the adding and removing of laminations and the formation of pressure points rests on the factors comprising the Integral Frame Distance Scores. In both Weeks 5 and 6 there was a reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores due to a more positive sentiment of Israeli tweets and a more positive sentiment of statements made by Israeli and Hamas leaders. Yet this positive sentiment does not imply that the number of events unfolding on the ground has necessarily decreased. Thus, intervention pressure points are not necessarily accompanied by the removal of laminations.

These results only partially validated the fourth statement of this thesis (**S4: Prevention pressure points are constituted once actors add laminations to their primary frameworks, while intervention pressure points are constituted once actors remove laminations**). S4 was also the only statement to partially meet its falsification criteria (**S4 will be falsified if the adding of lamination will not precede prevention pressure points or if the removing of laminations will not precede intervention pressure points**). As has been argued, this might be one limitation of using the frame distance model to track high-intensity military conflicts.

When reviewing the frameworks employed by both actors, it becomes apparent that they used framing techniques that are usually associated with the press. Gitlin (1980) and Entman (2004) have argued that administrations employ framing techniques because these increase the likelihood of journalists adopting the government's frames. Both the Israeli MFA and Hamas relied on the framing techniques of selection and emphasis. For instance,

throughout most of the war Israel attempted to brand Hamas as an affiliate of ISIS, Boko Haram, and Iran. To this end it focused on issues that have been addressed by the press when covering ISIS that include the indoctrination of children, the harassment of journalists, and the abuse of women and homosexuals. By repeatedly associating Hamas with Islamic fundamentalism, and using frames that have been employed by the media, the Israeli MFA may have increased the likelihood of journalists adopting its frames. Likewise, throughout most of the Gaza War, Hamas framed Israel's siege on Gaza as inhumane, resonating with the media framing of the Israeli occupation as inhumane. Thus, like media institutions, both Hamas and Israel relied on framing techniques in their social media communication.

Framing studies have found that administrations often frame events as a crisis that threatens the national interests of a country, thus gaining the support of the media. Moreover, studies have found that the media is unlikely to criticise an administration's policies during the onset and escalation stages of a crisis (Auerbach & Bloch-Elkon, 2007; Kim, 2000; Lee & Yang, 1996; Park, 2003). For this reason, administrations may at times be quick to label an event as a crisis. However, neither Hamas nor the Israeli MFA labelled the Gaza War as a crisis or a war, for that matter. The title 'Gaza War' was one that was articulated by the foreign media. The question that follows is - why did both actors refrain from labelling their altercation as a crisis given that this would have rallied media support to their causes? This thesis offers three answers to the aforementioned question.

First, both Israel and Hamas may have preferred not to label their altercation as a crisis out of fear of attracting international pressure. Indeed, the term 'crisis' may spring international actors into action. A 'Crisis in Gaza', for example, would likely be accompanied by emergency sessions in the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Security Council, and the

European Union. Each of these would then bring pressure to bear on the actors to halt their fire before they had obtained their main goals: the end of the siege on Gaza and the unearthing of Hamas terror tunnels.

Second, the term 'crisis' can instigate an escalatory momentum, thus increasing existing tensions. If the Israeli MFA adopted the term 'crisis', it would increase feelings of anxiety and stress among Israeli citizens, thereby increasing pressure on decision-makers. Moreover, the term 'crisis' may have instigated more bitter competitions over access to leaders, as each governmental organisation hopes to increase its media profile and prestige.

Lastly, it is possible that neither Israel nor Hamas needed to label the conflict as a crisis to gain the media's support. This was already guaranteed given the nature of unfolding events including the ground invasion of Gaza, the mass firing of rockets at Israeli cities, and the deaths of soldiers and Gazans. In other words, the national media in both Gaza and Israel was already recruited in favour of the administration and its polices.

The analysis of the Gaza War case study demonstrates the constitutive relationship between this thesis's two variables: crises and actors' frameworks. Indeed, the frameworks employed by both Hamas and the Israeli MFA did not precede the Gaza War. Instead, these frameworks emerged as the Gaza War unravelled. Once the reality on the ground in Gaza altered, so did actors' frameworks- whether during the alleged kidnapping of an Israeli soldier or Hamas operatives' infiltration into Israel. Changes in reality also altered each actor's suggested remedy. The infiltration of Hamas operatives lead Israel to launch a ground invasion meant to unearth terror tunnels, while Israel's rejection of a ceasefire proposal lead Hamas to target Tel Aviv. In addition, both Hamas and Israel used frameworks to de-legitimise one another online, hoping to narrow one another's range of possible

actions offline. Actors' frameworks and the Gaza War thus existed simultaneously and influenced one another in a dynamic fashion. Therefore, the relationship between this thesis's two variables does not meet the condition necessary for a causal relationship.

This chapter can now offer an initial answer to this thesis guiding question **How do actors use digital tools in times of crises, and how can the use of these tools inform strategies to manage crises?** Actors use digital tools to offer a framework, or prism, through which a crisis may be understood. These frameworks are updated in near-real time in order to avoid frame breaking and ensure the relevance of one's prism. Thus, social media content published during a crisis, or war, may be used to track a crisis's progression, extrapolate its possible trajectory, and identify pressure points in which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted or most effective. The use of pressure points to obtain short-term containment or long-term resolution of a crisis offers diplomats the ability to tailor their intervention to the unique evolution of a crisis, thus recognising that each crisis is unique and that crises do not necessarily progress in a linear fashion of onset, escalation, and de-escalation. Rather, as a crisis progresses, two actors can grow closer together or further apart. Lastly, diplomats may use social media content to analyse each side's core interests, thus proposing solutions for long-term resolution of a crisis and breaking fractal feedback loops.

Finally, it is important to note two limitations of the Gaza War case study. The first is the inability to use all rhetorical indicators. This limitation stems from the fact that Israel and Hamas do not officially recognise one another. As such, there were no high level meetings between Israeli and Hamas diplomats, no press conferences with both sides' foreign ministers, and no phone calls between their respective leaders. This limitation is likely to manifest itself whenever the frame distance model is employed to analyse a crisis

between states and non-state actors, quasi-state actors, terror groups, or nations that have no official diplomatic ties.

A relevant question is- were there additional rhetorical indicators that could have been integrated into the frame distance so as to measure the scope of disagreement between Hamas and Israel? One such indicator could have been the number of crisis-related tweets published by the main broker between Israel and Hamas - Egypt. Like its peers around the world, the Egyptian MFA has also migrated to social media. The number of Egyptian tweets could have served as an indirect measure of crisis acuteness, as the Egyptian MFA had to comment on events taking place in Gaza. Moreover, one could have measured the sentiment of Egyptian tweets. This indicator would offer an indirect assessment of the progress made in Cairo talks and the possibility of crisis de-escalation. In addition, the frame distance model could have included tweets published by countries that hold sway over both actors. In Israel's case, tweets published by the U.S. State Department could have offered insight into the progression of the crisis. Negative tweets pertaining to Israel could indicate that the U.S. administration was applying pressure on Israel to end its operation. Positive tweets could have indicated that Israel still had a free hand, since America supported Israel's right to defend itself. The same is true of Turkish or Qatari tweets that pertain to Hamas. Lastly, the frame distance model could have measured the sentiment of statements made during press conferences by other organs of the state. For instance, throughout the Gaza War, the IDF spokesperson uploaded press statements to its official Twitter account. The sentiment of these tweets could have also been used as indicators of crisis acuteness. In this way, social media content published by other actors could be used to better assess the scope of disagreement between two actors who do not officially recognise each other.

The second limitation of the Gaza War case study is the number of tweets published by each actor. The frame distance model uses the number of tweets as an indirect measure of crisis acuteness- the greater the number of tweets, the greater the number of events unravelling on the ground, and the greater the likelihood of crisis escalation. However, during all weeks except two, both Israel and Hamas published a higher than average number of tweets. Thus, there was little variance in the number of tweets they published each week. This is not surprising given the nature of the Gaza War as both sides were forced to constantly comment on a barrage of events taking place in Gaza. Rather than measure the total number of tweets published each week, one could measure *differences* in the number of tweets published in each week. A growth in the number of tweets published by each side could be indicative of crisis escalation, while a reduction in the number of tweets could be indicative of crisis de-escalation. In this way, the number of tweets becomes a better indicator of crisis pressure points.

The following chapter compares between the two case studies evaluated in this thesis.

Chapter V: From Crimea to Gaza and Back Again- Comparing Two Case Studies

This thesis has tested the applicability of the frame distance model, which seeks to increase diplomats' abilities to manage crises. To do so, the model was employed on two case studies: the Russian stealth invasion of Crimea and the 2014 Gaza War. Both case studies bear certain similarities. For instance, the Crimean Crisis and the Gaza War are both representative of 21st-century crises, which are complex, intertwined, and challenge the interests of multiple actors. The collapse of Viktor Yanukovich's government directly harmed the interests of Russia, which had hoped to incorporate Ukraine into its own customs union (Freedman, 2014). Moreover, the collapse of this government threatened to increase the EU's dominance in Russia's immediate sphere of influence. The Russian incursion into Crimea, on the other hand, threatened the interests of NATO, which saw Ukraine as a buffer zone with Russia, the national security of Eastern European members of NATO, and the stability of the EU as Europe could descend into a new Cold War. The invasion also directly challenged the world order established by the U.S. and its allies in the wake of WWII as Russia openly defied international law (Allison, 2014). Each of the aforementioned actors soon sought to influence the Crisis with NATO, calling an emergency session under Article 4, the EU dispatching diplomats to Kiev to obtain an agreement with the Ukrainian opposition, and the U.S. pledging to isolate and incur a financial cost from Russia should it fail to retreat from Ukrainian territory.

The same was true of the Gaza War, which saw a direct threat to the national security of Israel and Hamas's rule over Gaza. Yet the War also threatened the interests of Iran (which backs the Hamas government), the interests of the U.S. (which supports Israeli governments while also maintaining close relationships with Arab states), the interests of Egypt (which shares a tense border with the Gaza Strip), the interest of the Palestinian government in the West Bank, and the interests of Qatar (which contributes to the financial

welfare of Gaza). As tensions between Israel and Hamas escalated, Egypt sought to end the cycle of violence by mediating between the two sides. The U.S. urged Israel to show restraint, possibly fearing a negative backlash in other Arab states, and Qatar was soon called upon to help finance the reconstruction of Gaza. Resolving this war necessitated that the interests and demands of Egypt, Hamas, Israel, Qatar, and the U.S. all be taken into account.

Another similarity between both case studies is that they were mere fractals in ongoing feedback loops that have lasted for several years (Bjola, 2016b; Topper & Lagadec, 2013). Russia's incursion into Crimea was not dissimilar to its incursion into Georgia in 2008 following the actions of a pro-Western government that hoped to join NATO. As was the case in Crimea, Russia managed its sphere of influence through the use of force and territorial annexation— in this case South Ossetia. The Gaza War was another fractal in Israeli-Hamas relations. Since Hamas's takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, both sides have battled one another repeatedly, with Israel launching several air and land assaults on the Gaza Strip in 2008 and 2012. The fractal nature of both case studies suggests that diplomats were unable to obtain long-term resolutions to previous crises and thus settled for short-term containment. In the case of Gaza, this translated into a long series of ceasefire accords, while in the Russian case, this included a refusal of world powers to recognize Russia's annexed territories.

A third similarity between the Gaza and Crimean case studies is that both burst onto the scene and escalated quickly. On the eve of 21 February, Ukraine's leader fled to Russia. By 27 February, regional parliaments in Crimea declared their intention to join the Russian Federation, while by 3 March, Russian troop convoys were headed to Crimea. Similarly, on 7

July 2014, the IAF killed seven Hamas operatives in Gaza. By 13 July, the IAF had targeted more than 400 sites in Gaza, while Hamas fired more than 600 rockets at Israeli cities.

While crises, by nature, tend to burst onto the scene and escalate quickly (McConnell & Drennan, 2006; Wood & Peake, 1998), both the Crimean and Gaza case studies demonstrate that effective crisis management rests on diplomats' abilities to identify crisis pressure points before tensions escalate, following which long-term resolution may be much harder to obtain. This necessitates that diplomats identify the 'crisis slide' stage (Bell, 1971) in which tensions between two actors steadily build before reaching fever pitch. Both the Crimean and Gaza case studies began with a crisis slide or a slow, steady increase in Integral Frame Distance Scores. In the case of Crimea, the crisis slide stage lasted for two weeks. In the Gaza case study it lasted only one week. Yet when analysing the Gaza case study through three-day clusters, the crisis slide stage lasted for two clusters and was thus more noticeable. The crisis slide stage of the Gaza War lasted for only one week due to an important difference between both case studies—the Gaza War saw a direct military confrontation between two actors, while in Crimea there was no direct military engagement between Russian and U.S. forces, nor was there a full-scale battle between the two sides. Rather, the Crimean Crisis saw a succession of border skirmishes that lasted for many months.

This difference has implications for the employment of the frame distance model. Direct military engagements are high-intensity events in which the reality on the ground changes from one minute to the next as battles between both sides constantly create new conditions. The intensity of such crises necessitates that the frame distance model be employed using small clusters (e.g. three-day clusters) so that diplomats may identify

pressure points as they emerge in real time. Using seven-day clusters during high-intensity crises may prevent diplomats from seizing opportunities to contain or resolve crises as pressure points are not identified in time. Conversely, crises between world powers may evolve at a slower pace, as neither side is eager to plunge the world into the abyss of a world war. Moreover, crises between world powers may progress slower as both sides constantly seek to signal one another. For instance, while Russian convoys made their way to Crimea following the collapse of the Yanukovych government, they were instructed *not* to enter Crimea (Al Jazeera, 2014). These troop movements were thus a signal sent from Moscow to Washington. As such, the frame distance model may be employed using seven-day clusters when assessing the scope of disagreement between major powers. The decision about which type of cluster to employ in the frame distance model is important because weekly clusters include more tweets, thus enabling the identification of more frameworks and laminations and leading to a more accurate assessment of the scope of disagreement between two actors.

An additional similarity between both case studies was a reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores during the escalation stage. Indeed, the Crimean case study saw a reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores between Weeks 6.2 and 7, Weeks 7 and 8, and Weeks 9 and 10. Each of these constituted an intervention pressure point in which diplomats could have seized on a more positive momentum to obtain a long-term resolution to the crisis. The analysis of three-day clusters found that the Gaza case study included six intervention pressure points in which there was a reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores, indicating that the scope of relative disagreement between Israel and Hamas had narrowed. These findings indicate that the frame distance model may be applied to two types of scenarios: high- and low-intensity crises. Moreover, findings indicate that both types of crises do not

necessarily progress in a linear fashion of onset, escalation, and de-escalation, as has been suggested in the literature (Bell, 1971; Bloch-Elkon, 2007; Boin et al., 2013). Rather, crises are fluid and actors move closer and further apart as a crisis progresses. As such, the comparison between the two case studies demonstrates that diplomats may hope to seek long-term resolutions to both high- and low-intensity crises.

Notably, three of the four actors evaluated in this thesis used their frameworks to offer Twitter followers a broader context through which a crisis could be understood. Such was the case with Russia's repeated framing of the Ukrainian opposition as neo-Nazis who had staged a coup in Kiev and were threatening the lives of ethnic Russian minorities in Crimea. By framing the opposition as neo-Nazis, Russia signalled to its followers that the Crimean Crisis was but one more battle in Russia's long war against fascism, one that dates back to the great victory of WWII. From a sociological perspective, Russia's context may have increased the potency of its framing among Russian or pro-Russian audiences, as it resonated with their pre-existing world views and pre-existing knowledge. Yet this framing would not necessarily impact foreign Twitter users who have been exposed to other frames of WWII. Thus, it is possible that Russia used its framing of the Ukrainian opposition to rally domestic support for its foreign policies and win over sympathetic audiences in Crimea.

Similarly, the Israeli MFA framed Hamas as yet another organisation dedicated to killing Jews and Israelis. Through its 'Six Million' framework, the MFA portrayed Israel as being, yet again, under an existential threat, as was the case during the Holocaust. The MFA thus created a framework that resonated with the worldviews and pre-existing knowledge of Israeli and Jewish diasporas. Like Russia, Israel too may have sought to rally support for its policies from domestic constituencies and sympathetic Jewish audiences abroad. Lastly, the

U.S. State Department framed Ukraine as a fledgling democracy coming under threat from a dictatorship. The U.S.'s support of Ukraine was therefore consistent with a century of U.S. foreign policy frames. In all three cases, MFAs seem to have used broader contexts to play the two-level game of diplomacy and rally domestic support for their foreign policies (Bjola & Manor, 2018; Putnam, 1998).

The past was also present in the framing of all three MFAs. The Russian MFA invoked the memory of the 20th-century when arguing that NATO could not play a role in the Crimean Crisis due to its Cold War mentality. The Israeli MFA repeatedly invoked Jewish history through its 'Six Million', framework while the State Department alluded to Russia's communist past, suggesting that the Crimean referendum was 'hatched by the Kremlin and midwifed by the Russian military'. In their conceptualisation of strategic narratives, Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle (2014) argued that the past is often invoked in order to make sense of the present. They further asserted that the past can serve as a template through which the present can be understood. By summoning the past to the present, all three MFAs may have hoped to use frames strategically in an attempt to win over the support of elites, including new and old media institutions, journalists, and editors. This is because historical templates help journalists make sense of events and government policies.

However, the comparison of the two case studies reveals that Hamas did not offer followers a broad context through which they could understand the conflict with Israel nor did Hamas summon the past to the present. Rather, Hamas focused on framing the present crisis, outlining its goals and demonstrating its achievements. This could suggest that the strategic use of framing for media relations during a crisis is a diplomatic skill that is best practiced by veteran diplomatic institutions, as opposed to terror groups or quasi-states.

This assertion has been validated in studies that demonstrate that foreign policy-makers and administrations routinely frame foreign policy events as crises as a way to rally media support for their policies (Bloch-Elkon, 2007; Lee & Yang, 1996). Hamas's failure to summon the past to the present highlights another important difference between both case studies: Hamas tweets evaluated in this thesis were authored by the organisation's military wing, not by a diplomatic institution.

Notably, all four actors evaluated in this thesis focused on creating moral dichotomies through which they distinguished themselves from one another. For instance, Russia framed EU and U.S. foreign policies as being motivated by outdated notions of geopolitics while accusing the EU of trying to draw new fault lines in Europe. Conversely, Russian foreign policy was framed as resting on the concept of reciprocity. The U.S. State Department argued that Russia had resorted to 19th-century acts of aggression, while American diplomacy rested on the 21st-century notion of self-determination. Israel, for its part, contrasted Hamas's use of human shields with its attempts to shield Israeli citizens, while Hamas argued that it fought alongside Allah and Israel fought alongside the devil. It is possible that all four actors employed moral dichotomies, as these help reduce the complexity of geopolitical crises. Whilst journalists and diplomats may be able to grasp the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the internal Palestinian conflict between the Gaza and West Bank governments, regular social media users may be perplexed by conflicting narratives and news reports. By stating that a 'good' Israel was fighting an 'evil' Hamas, the Israeli MFA offered followers a clear and simple prism through which the Gaza War could be understood. Similarly, by framing the EU as attempting to redraw the maps of Europe, the Russian MFA offered a simple prism for understanding the importance of Crimea's fate.

Yet the aforementioned examples also elucidate an important difference between the two case studies: Hamas's reliance on religious arguments and invocation of the images of Allah and the devil. Many Hamas tweets included religious components and might be interpreted by diplomats and scholars as extremely negative. Such was the case with Hamas's calls on Gazans to martyr themselves, its promise to lead the people of Gaza to glorious death, and its assertion that the blood of the dead will pave the way to victory. However, from Hamas's perspective, these were positive tweets that served as a rallying cry for the people of Gaza— one that sought to ensure popular support for Hamas's war on Israel, despite the high cost in terms of fatalities. This duality in sentiment, in which positive tweets may be seen as negative, poses a challenge to the frame distance model, which relies on the sentiment of tweets to calculate Integral Frame Distance Scores. One solution to this challenge is to ensure that the sentiment analysis is conducted by one well-versed in local vernacular, history, and politics.

On the other hand, it should be mentioned that Hamas's military wing used Twitter in a manner consistent with that of three MFAs evaluated in this thesis. First, Hamas employed Twitter in order to frame events unfolding in Gaza in near-real time. Such is the case with the string of tweets seen below, which were published on 13 July 2014.

14:30 Al-Qassam Brigades fired military base 'Raeim' with 107 missile in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hamas #PrayForGaza

13:59 Al-Qassam Brigades fired troop concentrations, eastern central with 3 120mm mortars in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza #Resistance

13:55 Al-Qassam Brigades fired troop concentrations, east of Tuffah with 6 120mm mortars in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza #Resistance

13:30 Al-Qassam Brigades fired troop concentrations, east of Shujae'ya with 12 mortars in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza #Resistance

13:45 Al-Qassam Brigades fired troop concentrations in military base 'Zikkim' with 2 120mm mortars in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza

13:05 Al-Qassam Brigades fired armored vehicles, east of Tuffah with rocket in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza #Resistance #PrayForGaza

12:30 Al-Qassam Brigades fired 'Erez' with 2 120mm mortars in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hammas #PrayForGaza

11:10 Al-Qassam Brigades fired 'Karam Abu Salem' with 2 120mm mortars in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hammas #PrayForGaza

10:05 Al-Qassam Brigades fired 'Kissufim' with 107 missile in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hammas #PrayForGaza

08:15 Al-Qassam Brigades fired Tel Aviv with M75 missile in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hammas #PrayForGaza

08:25 Al-Qassam Brigades fired Occupied Ashdod with 5 Grad missiles in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hammas #PrayForGaza

0:10 Al-Qassam Brigades fired Hchudat, east of Shujae'ya with 3 107 missiles in response to Israeli Crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hammas

Al-Qassam Brigades fired armored vehicles near the College of Agriculture with 107 missile in response to Israeli crimes on Gaza #Resistance

23:05 Al-Qassam Brigades fired Ofakim with 3 Qassam rockets in response to Israeli crimes on Gaza #Resistance #Hammas #PrayForGaza

Second, like the MFAs, Hamas used Twitter to link its problem definition with a desired resolution to the conflict with Israel. At the onset of the conflict, Hamas argued that the problem driving events in Gaza was the high death toll of Gazans killed by the IAF. The solution to this problem was the removal of the Israeli siege on Gaza. As the crisis progressed, Hamas argued that the conflict was escalating given Israel's choice to target vulnerable populations, while the solution was to disarm Israel. Third, every Hamas framework also included a moral evaluation of Israel ranging from Israel's murderous nature to its affiliation with the devil. Fourth, Hamas frameworks included a temporal dimension,

thus offering answers to the questions ‘What is happening now?’, ‘What has happened before?’, and ‘What will happen next?’ For example, in Week 5, Hamas argued that Israel had violated and would continue to violate ceasefire agreements because it had the support of powerful states. Hamas thus vowed to keep fighting Israel.

Moreover, much like the MFAs, Hamas used frameworks to justify its use of force. Such was the case with its ‘Retribution’ framework, which alleged that Hamas had to respond to Israeli attacks on its operatives. Hamas also consistently employed certain frameworks, thus offering audiences a consistent and coherent answer to the question ‘What is going on?’ However, Hamas’s frameworks were not stagnant and were adapted to comment on unfolding events by adding and removing laminations. Such was the case in Week 6 when Hamas removed the ‘UN Installations’ lamination, as Israel stopped targeting UN schools in Gaza. Finally, Hamas used Twitter to depict Israel as a consistent violator of human rights. In this way, Hamas’s frameworks resonated with the worldviews of social media users who are critical of the Israeli occupation. In summary, although Hamas’s tweets were not authored by an MFA or a diplomatic actor, they were used in a manner that is similar to that of MFAs. Namely, Hamas used Twitter to obtain its policy goals and protect its interest while preventing an adversary from doing the same.

The final similarity between the two case studies is that both ended in a tense stalemate rather than a long-term resolution. The Gaza War ended with a ceasefire accord that has since been breached, negotiated, and renegotiated several times. As this thesis is being written, alarms may be heard outside, warning those nearby of impending Hamas rockets. Similarly, the Crimean Crisis ended with the ultimate annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation alongside Russia’s banishment from the G8 group of nations and the

imposition of Western financial sanctions. Yet since 2014, the border between Crimea and Ukraine has flared up with skirmishes erupting every few months. The frame distance model captured these stalemates as both the Crimean Crisis and the Gaza War ended with an increase in Integral Frame Distance Scores when using seven-day clusters.

Although there were many similarities between the two case studies, there were also important differences. Unlike the Gaza War of 2014, the Crimean Crisis was a wholly unexpected crisis, which caught many diplomats off-guard. What began as an internal debate about the future of Ukraine soon spiralled into an international crisis, which resulted in one European country invading another. It is thus fair to assume that third-party diplomats would not have employed the frame distance model during the early stages of the Crimean Crisis. Rather, they would have waited until one of the parties defined unfolding events as a 'crisis'. This occurred in Week 5 when a Russian tweet labelled affairs in Ukraine as an internal constitutional crisis. Conversely, third-party diplomats were very familiar with Israeli-Hamas conflicts by 2014, and would have therefore assumed that the Gaza War would soon spiral into a full-scale military altercation. Diplomats would have thus been likely to employ the frame distance model once Hamas's rockets began landing in Israeli cities.

The aforementioned difference is important as it demonstrates one of the limitations of the frame distance model: that it can only help manage a crisis if diplomats conceive an event as a crisis. Yet this may preclude diplomats from using the model in new and unfamiliar situations given the phenomenon of risk normalisation by which individuals are prepared to deal with crises that fit into templates of past occurrences. Moreover,

diplomats may feel overconfident in their abilities to manage crises to the point where they fail to grasp that a new event also constitutes a crisis (Boin et al., 2013; Holsti, 1989).

Markedly, while both the U.S. and Russian MFAs labelled events in Ukraine as a crisis, neither the Israeli MFA nor Hamas defined their conflict as a crisis. This difference elucidates how diplomats may use certain terms to obtain certain policy goals. For instance, actors may employ the term 'crisis' in reference to an event in order to instigate processes in diplomatic forums, create coalitions in diplomatic organisations, and mobilise allies to their side. It is possible that Russia and the U.S. were quick to label events as 'crises' given a desire to use diplomatic forums to pressure one another into altering their policies. Both sides did in fact rely on diplomatic forums as there was not direct altercation between American and Russian soldiers. In other words, rather than use military force to obtain policy goals, these actors relied on diplomatic pressure.

The opposite is true of Hamas and Israel, who attempted to use military force to obtain their policy goals. Moreover, both actors may have feared that diplomatic pressure would be used to end hostilities before they had obtained these goals. Both sides therefore deliberately refrained from employing the terminology of 'crisis' as they relied on military force rather than diplomatic pressure. Thus, the decision whether or not to invoke the term 'crisis' may depend on how an actor wishes to protect his interests while preventing an adversary from protecting his.

An additional difference between both case studies deals with the issue of legitimacy. During the Crimean Crisis, both Russia and the U.S. went to great lengths to frame the character of the Ukrainian opposition. The Russian MFA de-legitimised the opposition by arguing that it consisted of fascists who had staged a coup in Kiev, suppressed

opposition by force, and threatened Russian minorities in Crimea. Conversely, the U.S. State Department legitimised the opposition by arguing that it was the true representative of the Ukrainian people who sought to determine their own fate. Israel's framing of Hamas was somewhat more sophisticated in that Israel legitimised Hamas's rule over Gaza, only to then de-legitimise Hamas by attacking its character. When arguing that Hamas bore responsibility for all terrorist activity in Gaza, Israel legitimised Hamas's identity claim of being the sole, official government of Gazans. When arguing that Hamas committed double war crimes by firing at civilians from behind civilians, Israel legitimised Hamas's claim that Gaza was a quasi-state. Yet Israel then de-legitimised Hamas by arguing that its quasi-state was in fact a fundamentalist Islamic caliphate that abused its citizens, celebrated their martyrdom, and put them in harm's way. Israel thus recognised Hamas's de facto rule over the Gaza Strip while immediately arguing that this rule must come to an end and that a new, moral, demilitarised government be established. In this way, legitimacy may be a double-edged sword during a crisis which is used to counter the self-narrative of an adversary.

Another important difference between both case studies is their potential ripple effects. The Gaza War was unlikely to see the direct involvement of other actors. The past has demonstrated that Egypt is the preferred mediator between both sides, but it never plays a direct role in the conflict. Similarly, Jordan denounces Israeli military operations in Gaza, yet it does not use force to stop them. In 2014 there was also little chance of Syria or Lebanon joining the theatre of war, since both Assad's forces and Hezbollah were entrenched in the brutal Syrian Civil War (El Hussein, 2010). This fact may have enabled diplomats to obtain a long-term resolution to the Israel-Hamas crisis that ended the feedback loop between both sides because there was no immediate threat of regional escalation. Diplomats could have thus taken short-term measures to contain the violence

while waiting, for the emergence of an intervention pressure point in which the scope of disagreement between Hamas and Israel narrowed.

This was not the case with the Crimean Crisis, which, at its height, threatened to engulf Europe in a major war. Indeed, during the Crisis there was considerable fear among the Baltic states that Russia would respond to Western financial pressure with further military incursions (Sperling & Webber, 2017). Even countries such as Poland feared the possible ramifications of a Russian invasion in Europe, convening an emergency meeting of NATO under Article 4. Given this fear of escalation and possible ripple effects in Europe, diplomats probably sought to contain the Crisis through short-term solutions. Diplomats using the frame distance model would have thus intervened as soon as a prevention point emerged. This, however, could be construed as a miscalculation. As this thesis finds, even during the escalation stage of a crisis, nations may grow closer together while also finding areas of agreement. It might therefore be more beneficial for diplomats to wait for the emergence of intervention pressure points in which fractals can finally be resolved.

The intensity of both crises differed substantially and, subsequently, so did the number of events that unfolded daily. With the exception of Week 6.2, which saw the fleeing of president Yanukovych and the creation of a new interim government, most weeks in the Crimean Crisis saw a limited number of events. During one week, protestors clashed with police, leaving several of them dead. In another, Crimea prepared to hold an independence referendum, while in still another, the Ukrainian parliament passed and repealed a law banning protests. By contrast, the week of 28 July alone saw Hamas operatives infiltrate Israel and attack a military base; the deaths of 100 Palestinians in AIF strikes; the shelling of an UNRWA school; Israel call-up and deployment of 18,000 reserve

soldiers; Hamas's possible kidnap of the body of a slain Israeli soldier; and IAF bombardments of residential complexes in Gaza. This difference in intensity was manifest in the framing activities of conflicted parties with the Israeli MFA and Hamas having to narrate and comment on a larger number of events than the MFAs of Russia and the U.S.

Indeed, during the Crimean Crisis, the average week saw Russia employ 2.6 frameworks and laminations, while the State Department employed 1.3. In total, the American and Russian MFAs employed an average of 1.9 frameworks and laminations per week. By contrast, during the Gaza War, the average week saw the Israeli MFA employ 3.7 frameworks and laminations, while Hamas employed 2.3. In total, Hamas and Israel employed an average of 3 frameworks and laminations per week. This suggests that high-intensity crises necessitate greater digital resources as actors must constantly comment on numerous events, monitor the framing of other actors (be it the media or one's adversary), respond in real time to other actors' frames, and adjust existing frameworks to new circumstances. Here again it seems that Hamas was up to the challenge of real time framing using social media, much like the Israeli MFA.

However, the fact that high-intensity crises see the employment of many frameworks and laminations poses a challenge to the frame distance model, as several frame distances must be measured. This limitation was overcome in this thesis by starting the analysis with the actor who employed the smaller number of frameworks, comparing frameworks that resonated with one another in terms of issues (e.g. the high death toll of Gazans), and calculating an average frame distance.

In both case studies, the frame distance model was used to assess the scope of relative disagreement between two actors. The question that follows is, can the frame

distance model be used to compare the severity of two crises? For instance, the highest Integral Frame Distance Score registered during the Crimean Crisis was 2.874 (out of a possible 4), while the lowest score was 1.663. The highest score registered during the Gaza War was a much more negative 3.752, while the lowest was 2.265. A comparison between these figures could lead one to assume that the Gaza War was more severe because it saw a much higher Integral Frame Distance Score. Yet this comparison is not possible given that Integral Frame Distance Scores are comprised of several indicators, including rhetorical indicators, as well as the overall number of tweets published each week. As the Gaza case study has shown, some crises may see little use of rhetorical indicators, especially when there are no press conferences by foreign ministers or phone calls between leaders. The lack of rhetorical indicators impacts the calculation of Integral Frame Distance Scores. Thus, it is possible to compare two scores from the *same crisis*, but not two scores from *different crises*. It is, however, possible to compare the volatility of two crises. The difference between the highest and lowest Integral Frame Distance Score recorded during the Gaza War was 1.487, as opposed to 1.221 during the Crimean Crisis. Thus, it appears that the Gaza War was indeed more volatile than the Crimean Crisis.

Finally, the most important difference between the case studies lay in the diplomatic relations between both actors. Unlike the U.S. and Russia, Hamas and Israel do not formally recognise one another and have no bi-lateral ties. This difference between the case studies demonstrates both the importance and relevance of the frame distance model. Due to their lack of official ties, Hamas and Israel could not negotiate directly with one another, as was the case with the U.S. and Russia. They were thus wholly dependant on third-party diplomats to mediate between them and propose solutions that might resolve their dispute. These third-party diplomats could have used the frame distance model to track the war's

progression in near-real time, identify crisis pressure points, map areas of convergence or agreement, and offer long-term solutions that addressed the interests of each party. In this way, the frame distance model meets one of the challenges recently articulated by Bjola, who asserted that diplomats have made little progress in their abilities to manage crises (Bjola, 2016b).

Chapter VI: Discussion

On 23 January 2014, a procession of high-ranking diplomats descended upon the city of Geneva. They had arrived to partake in a UN-mediated conference aimed at ending the destructive Syrian Civil War. This was the first conference to bring together the Syrian government, headed by Bashar Assad, and the Syrian opposition, which vowed to topple the Assad regime. Seated within a luxurious hotel on the banks of Lake Geneva, the foreign ministers of Canada, Russia, the UK, the U.S., and Qatar offered their visions for Syria's future. What was most remarkable about the Geneva conference was not its format or achievements, but the fact that most of the comments made within the negotiating room were shared on Twitter in near-real time. Social media users following the hashtag #Geneva2 knew which nations were represented in the negotiating room, what their official stances were with regard to Bashar Assad's rule, and what solutions they had offered the Syrian opposition (Manor, 2014). Twitter users were even granted a voyeur's look at diplomacy as images shared on Twitter showed the foreign ministers of Russia, the U.S., and Qatar conferring with one another between the day's sessions. Notably, tweets from the Geneva conference were not shared online by journalists, bloggers, or even activists. Rather, it was the MFAs of participating countries that flung open the doors of international diplomacy.



Image 7.1: Behind- the-Scenes Look at Geneva Conference

The Geneva conference is representative of a fundamental shift in the practice of diplomacy in the 21st-century. What was once a profession that demanded secrecy and prioritised discretion has been forced to become more transparent. Diplomatic processes no longer take place far from the public eye. On the contrary, diplomats now perform acrobatic feats to attract the gaze of digital publics. Ambassadors tweet their opinions on matters of the day, world leaders share jokes online, MFAs publish videos from meetings between world leaders, and UN institutions broadcast their deliberations online (Twiplomacy, 2018).

Some have argued that the digitalisation of diplomacy, or mass migration of diplomats to social media, has merely created a new stage on which diplomacy may be performed. Much like international summits, the tweeting of ambassadors or Facebooking of world leaders is but a play meant to attract global audiences and assure them that the waters of international relations are running smoothly (Comor & Bean, 2012; Comor, 2013; Morozov, 2009). Others have asserted that the advent of social media has had a profound

impact on how diplomacy is practiced both in times of calm and in times of crises (Bjola & Holmes, 2015; Bjola & Pamment, 2018; Hocking & Melissen, 2015; Pamment, 2012; Seib, 2016). From this perspective, the tweets emanating from the Geneva Conference were more than a performance. They were an instrument used to manage the Syrian Civil War. By publishing their solutions to the crisis, and demonstrating a united front, the MFAs of Canada, Russia, the UK, the U.S., and Qatar hoped to bring pressure to bear on the Syrian opposition and the Syrian government to end their three-year conflict.

This thesis sought to examine whether the migration of diplomats and diplomatic institutions to social media has had an impact on the diplomatic management of crises that goes beyond mere theatrics. Specifically, it sought to examine how MFAs use social media during times of geopolitical crises and whether this use offers new means for managing crises. The thesis's guiding research question was thus: **How do MFAs use digital tools in times of crises, and how can the use of these tools inform strategies to manage crises?** Notably, this question seeks to examine the relationship between online and offline diplomacy as diplomats' digital activities may offer insight necessary for the real-world management of a crisis.

The relevance of this thesis stems not only from the advent of digital diplomacy, but also from the state of the world at the dawn of the 21st-century. Contemporary scholars suggest that the modern society is also the 'risk society' as new technologies bring with them catastrophic and global challenges that require global solutions (Beck, 1986; Giddens, 1990). Thus, the nations of the world are required to act in unison to face unprecedented challenges. Processes such as globalisation increase interdependence as no one country can stop the spread of Ebola or reverse the effects of climate change. Moreover, the end of the

Cold War has seen a transition towards a heteropolar world, which is one that breeds confrontation. While superpowers still exist, they cannot fully exercise their superpowers. New modalities of power, and the emergence of new dominant actors, complicate diplomatic crises as nations adopt expansionist foreign policies. The globalised and networked world is also one in which regional conflicts have global ramifications, while global tensions lead to regional confrontations (Metzl, 2001; Slaughter, 2009, 2017). The current clash between Israel and Syria, for instance, is also a battle between the U.S. and Russia. Thus, contemporary crises see a host of actors confronting one another, each hoping to protect his own set of interests. Crises also become more complex given the loss of state agency as the state's power has migrated upwards to transnational actors, downwards to non-state actors, and outwards to quasi-state actors that claim to establish their own states or caliphates (Copeland, 2013; Haynal, 2011). The ability of non-state actors, such as NGOs, to influence diplomatic negotiations further complicates the task of crisis management (Allen & Hadden, 2017). These processes have resulted in a world that is prone to frequent and complex crises. Set against this backdrop, this thesis aimed to examine whether social media may offer diplomats new tools that augment their abilities to manage crises either through short-term containment or, preferably, long-term resolutions.

To answer its guiding question, this thesis developed and employed the frame distance model, which uses social media content published by MFAs to measure the relative scope of disagreement between two governments embroiled in a crisis. From an epistemological perspective, this thesis adopted Kevin Cahill's medical approach to preventive diplomacy (1996). Cahill argued that in preventative medicine, one searches for the fundamental cause of a disease in order to prevent transmission. When death does occur, it is followed by a rigorous postmortem so 'that the failures of the past become the

building blocks of a better approach in the future' (1996, p. 5). Cahill further asserts that early detection of crises should be as important to international relations as crisis management. He concludes that diplomats may increase their abilities to detect and defuse crises before they escalate by conducting postmortems of previous diplomatic interventions. Within the scope of this thesis, the postmortem approach was used to test the ability of the frame distance model to track and extrapolate the possible trajectory of a crisis in near-real time, thereby identifying crisis pressure points in which diplomatic mediation is most necessary or most likely to succeed. For this reason, the frame distance model was employed to analyse two past crises: the Crimean Crisis and the 2014 Gaza War. Importantly, the post-mortem approach was used on two different types of crises: a low-intensity crisis between world powers (i.e. Russia and the U.S.) and a high-intensity crisis between a state actor and a quasi-state actor (i.e. Israel and Hamas).

Moreover, three research questions were formulated in order to answer this thesis's guiding question. The first question asked, **How do MFAs use framing techniques on Twitter during a crisis?** It was hypothesised that MFAs would use Twitter to create real time frameworks through which a crisis may be interpreted by digital publics. It was also assumed that these frameworks would consist of a problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and a suggested remedy. These hypotheses rest on the findings of previous studies that demonstrate that diplomats and administrations use frames when commenting on crises so as to rally support for their policies from the media and domestic publics (Dimitrova et al., 2005; Entman, 2004; Wood & Peake, 1998). Studies have also shown that MFAs originally migrated to social media to frame events and actors, negate the framing on non-state actors and win the support for foreign populations (Hallams, 2010; Metzgar, 2012; Pamment 2012; Yarchi, Samuel-Azran & Bar-David, 2017). Finally, studies have shown that

MFAs now engage in framing competitions opposite a plethora of actors including old and new media, bloggers, non-state actors, and other states (Causey & Howard, 2013; Cull, 2013; Bjola 2016a; Hayden, 2012; Seib, 2012, 2016).

The results of both case studies demonstrate that MFAs do indeed use Twitter to create primary frameworks through which digital audiences can interpret a crisis. Importantly, however, the actors evaluated in this thesis used framing in a strategic manner. This manifested itself in three ways. First, MFAs used online framing to obtain offline diplomatic goals. By continuously employing the 'Opposition are Nationalists' framework, Russia laid the foundation for its offline rejection of the interim Ukrainian government, which was established after the fleeing of Viktor Yanukovich. By creating the 'Rights of Russian Minorities' lamination, Russia was able to legitimise the Crimean referendum offline and portray it as a humanitarian intervention. In this way, Russia set the stage for obtaining its offline policy goals while preparing digital audiences for what was to come. Similarly, the U.S. State Department consistently employed the 'Russian Invasion and Occupation' lamination as a way to lay the groundwork for its offline rejection of the Crimean referendum. This was a crucial component of America's framing of the Crimean Crisis, for how could America refuse to accept the results of a referendum while proclaiming to be the 'leader of the free world' and a staunch supporter of people's rights to determine their own fates? Simply refusing to accept the Crimean referendum would damage America's image and credibility, as it would negate America's self-portrayal as a bastion of democratic values. Thus, the U.S. used Twitter to frame the referendum as one held under threat of Russian military force (**note** that given the finding that Hamas's military wing used Twitter like the Israeli, Russian and U.S. MFAs, this discussion will use the term 'MFAs' throughout when referring to all four actors).

The same was true of the Israeli MFA and Hamas's military wing. Israel's constant comparison of Hamas with ISIS in its 'Islamic Axis' framework enabled it to continue its offline military operation in Gaza, because how could Israel afford not to fight an ISIS-like caliphate situated on its southern border? Hamas, for its part, used the 'Siege on Gaza' framework to consistently depict Israel as an evil oppressor, thus framing its policy of firing rockets at Israel as a battle for Palestinian freedom. In all these cases, the actors investigated in this thesis employed primary frameworks and laminations strategically in an attempt to obtain offline policy goals.

These results offer an important contribution to the digital diplomacy research corpus because they demonstrate the association between online and offline diplomacy. The majority of digital diplomacy studies focus on how MFAs use social media (Kampf, Manor & Segev, 2015; Khatib, Dutton, & Thelwall, 2012; Natarajan, 2014; Seo, 2013; Sevin, 2018; Yarchi, Samuel-Azran, & Bar-David, 2017). By doing so, many of these studies fail to capture the manner in which offline and online diplomacy complement one another. MFAs' use of social media to obtain offline policy goals, as exhibited in this thesis, contributes to the digital diplomacy research corpus by explaining why diplomats have embraced social media so warmly. They have done so given their need to create a receptive online environment through which they may obtain their offline policy goals. The results of this thesis therefore also offer scholars a broad theoretical prism through which they may conceptualise MFAs' migration online, the prism of strategic framing. Herein lies this thesis's first theoretical contribution.

In addition, the actors evaluated in this thesis used framing for strategic blame-shifting. Mor (2006) stated that strategic blame-shifting occurs when one actor identifies

another as responsible for negative outcomes. In both case studies, MFAs and actors used primary frameworks and laminations to lay the blame for events on one another's doorstep. In its 'High Death Toll' framework, the Israeli MFA stated that Hamas bore the sole responsibility for the death of innocent Gazans as Hamas hid behind civilians while using them as human shields. Conversely, Hamas employed its 'Ceasefire' framework to frame Israel as a consistent violator of ceasefire initiatives, resulting in the escalation of the Gaza War. In a similar manner, Russia framed the U.S. as responsible for the violence in Kiev given its refusal to admit that the opposition was attempting to stage a coup and illegally depose a democratically elected president. The State Department framed Russia as the sole instigator of the Crimean Crisis given its stealth invasion of Eastern Ukraine. It is possible that all four actors strategically shifted the blame for the Gaza War and Crimean Crisis onto one another because of their desire to gain the support of digital publics, whether they are domestic or foreign.

It is the use of framing for strategic blame-shifting that demonstrates how social media platforms have become competitive framing arenas in which diplomats vie over the attention and support of digital publics. Herein lies this thesis's second theoretical contribution—for while previous digital diplomacy studies have argued that social media are competitive framing arenas (Cassidy & Manor, 2016; Hayden, 2012; Seib, 2012), this thesis illustrates how these competitions manifest themselves and how actors seek to win such competitions. Specifically, actors may win such competitions by assigning blame for a crisis on an opponent.

Lastly, the actors evaluated in this thesis used framing on social media to target specific populations and obtain their offline support. For instance, Russia's assertion that it

opposed the Ukrainian interim government due to its historic struggle against fascism and Nazism resonated with the worldviews and pre-existing knowledge of Russian minorities in Crimea. This framing may have led these ethnic minorities to support Russia's annexation of Crimea. Similarly, Israel's 'Six Million' framework targeted the Jewish diaspora, suggesting that, once again, Jews were facing an existential threat from a powerful foe. Global Jewish support for Israel's policies and American Jewish support in particular may have enabled Israel to complete its military operation and fend off American pressure to halt its ground invasion of Gaza. Lastly, America targeted Western social media users when portraying Ukraine as yet another fledgling European democracy threatened by a mighty Russian bear. Supporting the U.S. therefore meant supporting democracy and Western values. These findings illustrate how MFAs now use social media to communicate directly with a global online demos while circumventing traditional gatekeepers, such as the newsroom elite.

The strategic use of framing by the actors evaluated in this thesis demonstrates that as is the case with the media or individuals, MFAs' framing also rests on intent and agency. Specifically, the intent of MFAs is to shape the perceptions, opinions, and offline behaviors of digital publics. MFA framing thus also bears the imprint of power (Entman, 1993). Herein lies this thesis's third theoretical contribution, as it positions diplomats' framing activities during a crisis at the intersection of sociology and media studies. From a media studies perspective, the ultimate goal of framing activities is to influence audiences' worldviews and opinions. Previous studies have demonstrated that diplomats and administration use frames towards these goals (Dimitrova et al., 2005; Entman, 2004; Wood & Peake, 1998). However, these studies have yet to demonstrate how a crisis may increase the potency and effectiveness of diplomats' framing. From a sociological perspective, framing during times of crisis is an especially powerful tool as digital publics cannot answer the question, 'What is

going on?’ given a rapid succession of complex events. Goffman (1974) asserted that individuals constantly strive to make sense of their surroundings to employ an appropriate behavior. Failure to do so may result in feelings of anxiety and uncertainty, such as the ones experienced during a crisis. By offering an answer to the question, ‘What is going on?’ during a crisis, MFAs can reduce feelings of stress and increase the effectiveness of their framing as publics may come to rely on an MFA's interpretation of events. As such, this thesis uses the works of sociologist Erving Goffman to explain how MFAs may obtain the goal of framing articulated by media studies—that of influence.

It should, however, be mentioned that MFAs have not abandoned their goal of interacting with the media and ensuring that the media support and disseminate government frames. One example of MFAs' attempts to interact with the media was the frequent reference by all four actors to international law. According to Russia's ‘International Law’ framework, the Crimean referendum complied with international law following the Kosovo precedent. The U.S. State Department countered this claim in its ‘Referendum Under Gunpoint is Illegal’ lamination, stating that a referendum held under the threat of military force violates international law. Similarly, Israel's ‘Double War Crimes’ framework alleged that Hamas was violating international law when firing at citizens from civilian areas, while Hamas vowed to sue Israel in the International Criminal Court. It is possible that these actors referred to international law to demonstrate how they adhered to, or violated, the norms and values that have been deemed as desirable by the international community (Quelch & Jocz, 2009; Van Ham, 2013). Such moral framing is especially familiar to journalists. Studies have shown that news frames across the world often include a moral dimension (de Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001; de Vreese, 2005). Moreover, references to international law may reduce the complexity of crises as they

separate the 'just' from the 'unjust', enabling journalists to more easily identify and disseminate government frames. The use of the term 'war crimes' may be especially relevant to media actors as it makes for attractive headlines that garner online and offline attention. The reference to international law could thus suggest that diplomats both circumvent and rely on media institutions when framing crises online.

The strategic use of framing discussed thus far demonstrates the constitutive relationship between this thesis's two variables: crises and MFA frameworks. The actors' frameworks did not precede the crisis, but rather, they came into being once the crisis erupted given the need to create a prism through which the crisis could be interpreted. However, actors' frameworks were also used strategically to manage the crisis and secure their interests. Thus, this thesis's two variables influence one another and, as such, their relationship fails to meet the criteria of a causal relationship.

This thesis's conceptualisation of MFA framing through the work of Erving Goffman also offers insight into the practice of real time diplomacy. While previous studies have argued that diplomats now practice real time diplomacy (Seib, 2012, 2016), they have failed to demonstrate how this practice comes about. Herein lies this thesis's fourth theoretical contribution. By employing Goffman's concept of laminations, this thesis addresses the aforementioned theoretical gap and illustrates how real time diplomacy is practiced de facto by MFAs. In both case studies, conflicted actors used laminations in order to adapt their primary frameworks to unfolding events while averting frame breaking. From a sociological perspective, the use of laminations increases the potency of one's framing as he offers a consistent answer to the question, 'What is going on?' The use of laminations to continuously comment on new events may also increase the credibility of an MFA. Studies

suggest that ambassadors enjoy a certain level of prestige and credibility. This is due to the fact that people view ambassadors as dedicated civil servants who have access to the highest echelons of power. Ambassadors thus have privileged access to information, yet they are not tainted by the stain of politics. Moreover, ambassadors are viewed as custodians of peace and those responsible for the tranquility of international relations. Therefore, digital publics regard ambassadors as credible spokespeople, increasing ambassadors' abilities to use social media for framing purposes (Manor, 2019).

The same is not necessarily true of MFAs, whose online content may be seen by some as 'Twipoganda' rather than 'Twiplomacy'. This is because MFAs are not guardians of peace, but rather, organs of the state tasked with creating the conditions necessary for the obtainment of national policies, be it through negotiations, trade wars, or military invasions. Similarly, while the digitalisation of diplomacy has increased the transparency of MFAs, they are still shrouded by an aura of discretion. Yet by offering digital publics a consistent narration of a crisis, and integrating unfolding events into that narration through laminations, MFAs may increase their credibility as they offer sense-making at a time of increased angst and uncertainty. Like Goffman's primary frameworks, MFA frameworks and laminations bring meaning unto a situation that would otherwise be meaningless (Goffman, 1974, p. 21).

What was most noticeable about MFA frameworks was the speed with which they commented on unfolding events. Israel employed its 'UN Hypocrisy' framework on the same day that the UN debated the rapidly escalating crisis in Gaza. Likewise, the MFA's 'High Death Toll' framework emerged soon after media outlets framed Israel as responsible for the deaths of countless Gazans (Manor & Crilley, 2018a). Hamas's military wing formulated

the 'UN Installations' lamination immediately following Israel's shelling of UNRWA schools and hospitals in the Gaza Strip. Russia lamented NATO's Cold War mentality following an emergency session of the organisation under Article 4, while the State Department disseminated the 'Restoring Democracy' framework as soon as Viktor Yanukovych fled Kiev.

This thesis's first statement argued **S1**: In times of crisis, MFAs seek to maximise support for their position by articulating favourable frameworks of interpretation that are composed of a problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and a suggested remedy. In both case studies, the frameworks articulated by conflicted parties diverged from the onset of the crisis. For instance, during the first week of the Crimean Crisis, the Russian MFA argued that the problem driving events in Ukraine was violent clashes between government forces and a pro-EU opposition. The cause of the clashes was the aggressive actions of the pro-EU opposition. The labeling of the opposition as 'aggressive' served as a moral evaluation. The suggested remedy was for the government and the opposition to commence internal settlement talks, while external actors were urged not to intervene in an internal Ukrainian affair. At the same time, the U.S. argued that the problem underlying events in Kiev was the government's violent response to pro-EU protests, while the cause lay in the government's attempts to threaten the opposition. The moral evaluation argued that the actions of the Ukrainian government did not befit a democracy, while the solution lay in settlement talks between both sides. The government of Ukraine was also urged to listen to the will of the Ukrainian people. Thus, the Crimean case study was constituted as a crisis from the moment violence erupted in Kiev.

Similarly, during the first week of the Gaza case study, the Israeli MFA argued that the crisis was caused by Hamas firing rockets at Israel, the cause of which was Hamas's

nature as a terror group that targets civilians. The solution was a military operation meant to restore quiet to Israel's southern border, while the moral evaluation focused on the lives of innocent Israelis fleeing for safety from Hamas-launched projectiles. The MFA also argued that the crisis was exacerbated by the fact that Hamas was a radical Islamic organisation willing to martyr its own people in a bid to kill Israelis. During the same week, Hamas argued that the crisis was brought about by the IDF's deliberate engagement with Hamas operatives in the Gaza Strip. The moral evaluation stated that Hamas fought alongside Allah. As was the case with the Crimean Crisis, the Gaza War was constituted as a crisis from its very onset.

This thesis can now answer its first research question: **How do MFAs use framing techniques on Twitter during a crisis?** The answer is that MFAs use Twitter to create and disseminate a primary framework through which a crisis can be interpreted by domestic and foreign social media users, specific target populations (e.g. Russian minorities on Ukraine) and the media. These frameworks identify the problem driving a crisis and its cause while also offering a moral evaluation and a suggested remedy. MFAs update frameworks in real time to avoid frame breaking and increase their credibility. This is achieved either by creating new frameworks or adding laminations to existing ones. MFA frameworks are also used strategically to enable actors to obtain their offline policy goals and secure their offline interests.

The thesis's second research question asked, **Does the perceived severity of a crisis lead to a more dynamic use of Twitter?** S2 hypothesised that the onset and escalation stages of a crisis would see a growing divergence between two actors' primary frameworks, while the de-escalation stage would see a growing convergence between actors'

frameworks. This hypothesis was based on the findings of previous studies, which segment a crisis into three stages (Bell, 1971; Bloch-Elkon, 2007; Lee & Yang, 1996). During the onset stage, tensions between conflicting parties begin to mount as each side perceives a credible threat to its national interests. As each side prepares to secure its interests while simultaneously preventing an adversary from doing the same, the crisis enters an escalatory momentum referred to by Bell (1971) as 'crisis slide'. The crisis slide stage ends with the eruption of a direct confrontation between the two actors. This conformation also marks the beginning of the escalation stage during which neither side is willing to cease hostilities or recognise the demands of an adversary. Soon, the crisis may enter a tense status quo in which both sides take stock of their achievements and their losses. Conflicted parties may then be willing to cease hostilities as the price of a protracted conflict becomes too high (Bjola, 2016b). It is at this point that the de-escalation stage begins.

Previous studies have asserted that effective preventive diplomacy rests on intervention during the onset stage of a crisis, thus averting the crisis's escalation altogether. (Cahill, 1996). Yet as the UN Secretary General has stated, this is an elusive goal given that diplomats can only intervene in a crisis once an event has been labeled a crisis. Thus, diplomacy is usually put into action during the escalation stage (Ramcharan, 2008). This is problematic because it is during the escalation stage that two sides may be least likely to accept diplomatic mediation. The goal of diplomats during the escalation stage is thus to obtain short-term containment through which the escalatory momentum can be stopped. Moreover, short-term containment may avert ripple effects in which additional actors become embroiled in the crisis. It is only during the de-escalation stage that diplomats may peruse long-term resolutions that bring a crisis to an amicable end or break the feedback loop of fractal crises.

The analysis of frame distances in both case studies found that the divergence in actors' frameworks increased steadily during the onset stage in a manner consistent with Bell's conceptualisation of a 'crisis slide'. Moreover, the escalation stage of both crises saw the greatest divergence between actors' frameworks. In the case of the Gaza War, the analysis of three-day clusters revealed that the war ended with a small convergence between actors' frameworks. These results validate this thesis's hypotheses.

Yet the most important finding was not the correlation between framework divergence and crisis stages but, rather, that the frameworks of conflicted parties converged during the escalation stage. Indeed, in both case studies, the escalation stage saw reductions in frame distances as both actors came to agree on certain issues. In the Gaza War, both Hamas and Israel agreed that their conflict was escalating due to the high death toll of Gazans. They also agreed that they should pursue a short-term accord to be followed by a long-term agreement. Similarly, during the escalation stage of the Crimean Crisis, both the U.S. and Russia argued that the Crisis centered on issues pertaining to human rights, with the U.S. advocating for Ukrainians' rights to determine their own fates and Russia advocating for Crimeans' rights to join the Russian Federation. During Week 10, both actors agreed that the Crisis centered on the legality of the Crimean Referendum. Thus, this thesis finds that even during the escalation stage of a crisis, two MFAs' frameworks may converge around certain issues. Moreover, the thesis argues that these issues may serve as an entry point to negotiations between both sides. Diplomats may thus use the frame distance model to measure the scope of relative disagreement between two actors and identify issues on which they agree.

The aforementioned results suggest that crises do not advance in a strictly linear fashion of onset, escalation, and de-escalation. Rather, crises are fluid, as two governments may grow closer or further apart. Crucially, this is also true of high-intensity crises that see direct military confrontation between two sides, as was the case during the Gaza War. This conclusion serves as yet another theoretical contribution. Previous studies on crisis management have tended to segment a crisis into distinct stages. Boin et al., (2013) have characterised the escalation stage as the one in which crisis management becomes increasingly difficult due to stress, anxiety, a rapid pace of events, and disjointed information in addition to cognitive limitations. Allison and Zelikow (1999) stated that during the escalation stage, crisis management may become untenable as organisations within government compete over access to leaders and influence. Holsti (1989) followed suit and suggested that the escalation stage increases the number of decision-makers and the number of individuals who must choose what information to filter to superiors. Finally, Bjola (2016b) argued that it is during the de-escalation stage that leaders may be willing to consider negotiations, as the costs of a crisis are too high. Yet this thesis has demonstrated that governments grow closer together and further apart in each crisis stage. It may thus be incumbent for IR scholars and diplomats to reimagine crises as fluid events in which governments continuously converge and diverge, offering a plethora of opportunities for diplomatic interventions aimed at resolving the crisis and breaking fractal feedback loops.

The frame distance model is used to measure the relative scope of disagreement between two actors. The greater the scope of disagreement, the greater the likelihood of crisis escalation. The narrower the scope of disagreement, the greater the likelihood of crisis de-escalation. However, the model does not rely solely on the measurement of frame distance. Rather, the model uses several variables in order to arrive at a single

measurement for the scope of disagreement between two governments. This measurement is called the Integral Frame Distance Score. The variables, or rhetorical indicators that contribute to this single measurement, include the sentiments of tweets summarising phone calls between world leaders; tweets published during press conferences; tweets posted following high-level meetings; leaders' statements; the sentiment crisis-related tweets published during a given week; and the number of tweets published by each actor. Previous studies have demonstrated that world leaders, diplomats, and foreign ministers all use media channels to signal their opponents and allies and outline their assessments of a crisis's future trajectory (Entman, 2004; Gilboa, 2001; Gilboa, 2002; Samuel-Azran, 2013). The frame distance model embraces these findings and implements them in diplomacy's news media ecology, which is that of social media. The model therefore makes use of the abundance of information that diplomats and diplomatic institutions now share online. Indeed, the digitalisation of diplomacy has seen MFAs create social media empires through which they publish a host of information (Hayden, 2012). This thesis demonstrates that such content has analytical values that may inform the offline management of geopolitical crises. From phone calls between leaders, which indicate that actors are taking steps to manage crises, to statements made during the press conferences of two opposing foreign ministers, social media content can help scholars and diplomats assess the scope of relative disagreement between two actors and identify instances in which diplomatic mediation may be most warranted or most effective. Herein lies another theoretical contribution.

It is important to note that there were many weeks in which the frame distance between both actors narrowed, yet there was an increase in Integral Frame Distance Scores. For instance, between Weeks 4 and 5 of the Crimean Crisis, the frame distance between Russia and the U.S. narrowed from 4 to 3.5, while the Integral Frame Distance Scores rose

from 2.48 to 2.87. This was due to a much harsher tone of tweets summarising phone calls between leaders. Similarly, between Weeks 9 and 10, the frame distance measurement remained 3.5, while the Integral Frame Distance Scores narrowed from 2.85 to 2.55. This was a result of a far more positive sentiment of Russian tweets, U.S. tweets, and Russian leaders' statements. These differences demonstrate that the rhetorical indicators used in this thesis provide additional insight that cannot be derived from the mere measurement of frame distance. Moreover, each indicator measures a different aspect of MFAs' management of a crisis on Twitter. The Gaza War case study found that leaders' statements are often used to assure the public that a nation is successfully protecting its interests while offering a credible vision of the future. Thus, leaders' statements shared by MFAs target the domestic population and tend to be positive. Conversely, the Crimean Crisis study demonstrates that press conferences tend to include negative statements as high-ranking diplomats attempt to rally media support by highlighting threats to the nation while also applying pressure on the opponent by shifting the blame for the crisis onto them. The Integral Frame Distance Scores thus offer a robust measurement of the extent to which two nations diverge or converge during a crisis.

In Goffman's terminology, Integral Frame Distance Scores measure frame disputes between two actors. Goffman (1974) stated that frame disputes arise when there is more than one answer to the question, "What is going on?" At times, frame disputes are settled by an authority figure, such as a judge and jury during a trial. Goffman's work suggests that frame disputes may vary in their severity and importance. For instance, during a murder trial, frame disputes between the prosecution and the defense are paramount as the accused may face life imprisonment or a death sentence. A frame dispute surrounding table manners at a dinner party is far less consequential. Frame disputes between two actors

embroiled in a conflict are pivotal as each actor views a credible threat to his national interests. Moreover, losing frame disputes during crises may incur heavy losses. Actors who fail to gain support for their policies and their interests may face international isolation—as Israel experienced following the Gaza War—may lose territory— which is what happened to Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea—and may face financial sanctions—as in the case of Russia. This suggests that MFAs assign great importance to their online framing activities given the need to secure the support of third parties including other states, the media, and the digital demos. This, in turn, indicates that tweets have analytical value and may help identify the needs, interests, and stances of each actor embroiled in a conflict, thus further validating the methodology of the frame distance model. And it is this methodology that enables the model not only to measure frame disputes, but also to identify crisis ‘pressure points’.

This thesis's ability to measure frame disputes constitutes an additional theoretical contribution. While Goffman (*ibid*) argued that individuals apply primary frameworks to make sense of their world, he did not identify the elements that comprise primary frameworks. This has traditionally prevented scholars from measuring frame disputes or the extent to which two frameworks differ. Primary frameworks have thus remained black boxes for several decades. Yet by linking Goffman's work to that of Entman (1993), and demonstrating that primary frameworks are comprised of the four elements that constitute a frame, this thesis offers one the ability to compare two frameworks and assess the severity of frame disputes. In this manner, this thesis expands the work of Goffman and offers scholars a new avenue of academic research because different kinds of frame disputes may be researched, not just those that take place during crises. Indeed, as Goffman (1974) argued, frame disputes vary in both severity and importance. A frame dispute during

bilateral negotiations may be less important than one that exists during a geopolitical crisis, yet could also be just as severe.

While previous scholarly work has focused on turning points in negotiations, few studies to date have offered the means through which diplomats may identify turning points in near-real time and seize on them to bring a crisis to an end (Druckman, Husbands & Johnston, 1991; Druckman, 2001; Tomlin, 1989). This thesis overcomes this limitation by reconceptualising crisis turning points as crisis ‘pressure points’ in which external pressure by third-party diplomats may help contain or resolve a crisis. The emergence of crisis pressure points is linked to Integral Frame Distance Scores and the severity of frame disputes. The greater the frame dispute between two actors, the higher the Integral Frame Distance Score and the greater the likelihood of crisis escalation. Increases in Integral Frame Distance Scores thus denote ‘prevention pressure points’ in which third-party mediation is most warranted in order to contain a crisis, prevent escalation, and limit ripple effects. Conversely, the milder the frame dispute between two MFAs, the smaller the Integral Frame Distance Score and the greater the likelihood of crisis de-escalation. Decreases in Integral Frame Distance Scores thus denote ‘intervention pressure points’ in which third-party diplomats may seize on reduced tensions to seek a permanent resolution to a crisis. This is true of low-intensity crises between major powers, high-intensity crises between states and quasi-states, and fractal crises, which are but a chain in a never-ending feedback loop of hostilities.

By re-conceptualising crisis turning points as ‘pressure points’, this thesis offers an additional novel contribution to the crisis management research corpus. The frame distance model enables scholars to identify the emergence of ‘pressure points’ in near-real time

through the calculation of Integral Frame Distance Scores. In this way, diplomatic interventions may also be tailored to the unique progression of a crisis, an important attribute given that while all crises share certain features, each crisis is also unique and has its own trajectory.

Importantly, both case studies demonstrate that intervention pressure points arise during the escalation stage of a crisis again suggesting, again, that crises are fluid and do not adhere to a strict progression of onset, escalation, and de-escalation. Given that the frame distance model evaluates MFA tweets in near-real time, be it through weekly or three-day clusters, the model also enables diplomats to time their interventions. This is important because the timing of diplomatic mediations is crucial to the success of negotiations. Intervening too early may lead to the collapse of talks, while intervening too late may be futile as leaders have committed themselves to war. In summary, this thesis has validated its second research statement, while also demonstrating that two governments may converge during the escalation stage of a crisis (**S2**: Offline escalation is conducive to divergence between primary frameworks while offline de-escalation is conducive to convergence between primary frameworks).

This thesis's third research statement contended that (**S3**) the adding and removing of laminations from primary frameworks reflects the perceived severity of the events unfolding on the ground. Thus far, laminations have been discussed in reference to MFAs' need to frame events in real time in order to adapt primary frameworks and prevent frame breaking. Yet a review of the laminations used by all four actors demonstrates that laminations are employed when events threaten an actor's interests or when events can contribute to the escalatory momentum of a crisis. For instance, during Week 5 of the Gaza

War, Hamas added the lamination of 'Religious Fighting' to its 'Killing Women and Children' primary framework. The reason for this was that the death toll of Palestinians had reached 1,000 individuals. Hamas thus used this lamination, which framed the war against Israel as a holy one, to ensure that it retained the support of Gazans. Without such support, Hamas would not be able to continue firing rockets at Israel and pressuring Israel into removing the siege on Gaza. During the same week, Hamas also added the 'UN Installations' lamination following Israel's shelling of UN schools. Here again, Hamas hoped to maintain support for its policies, albeit from foreign populations. In Week 6, Israel added the 'Kidnapped Soldier' lamination to its 'Ground Invasion' framework. The MFA was quick to add this lamination because kidnapped soldiers increase the cost Israel must pay to resolve a crisis.

Traditionally, Israel has gone to great lengths to secure the return of the bodies of slain soldiers. These extreme measures have included releasing convicted terrorists and agreeing to new arrangements vis-a-vis the Hamas government in Gaza. Israel thus immediately added a lamination dedicated to the possible kidnapping while hoping to secure international condemnation of Hamas. This was soon followed by both the UN Secretary General and the U.S. Secretary of State denouncing the 'barbaric' actions of Hamas.

Similarly, during Week 4 of the Crimean Crisis, the Russian MFA added the lamination of 'EU External Pressure' to its 'No Outside Interference' framework. This lamination was added following a visit to Ukraine by high-ranking EU diplomats and their attempt to mediate tensions between the government and pro-EU protestors. Ukraine's possible signing of an EU association agreement was a direct threat to Russia's military and financial interests. Militarily, it would allow the EU and NATO to expand their interests in Russia's immediate sphere of influence. Financially, Russia hoped to create its own customs

union with Ukraine (Allison, 2014; Freedman, 2014). The Russian MFA was thus quick to denounce the EU's visit as a breach of Ukrainian sovereignty.

During Week 6.1, the U.S. State Department added the lamination of 'Crisis of Democracy' to its 'Government Violence' framework. This followed the eruption of mass violence in Kiev and the deaths of 88 protestors. For the U.S., Ukraine's descent into anarchy posed a serious challenge. First, it would destabilise NATO's eastern flank. Second, internal fighting in Ukraine could spill over into neighboring states, further de-stabilising NATO's borders. Lastly, the eruption of internal fighting could give Russia the excuse it was looking for to intervene militarily in Ukraine under the guise of a peacekeeping mission. Thus, as soon as the violence erupted on the streets of Kiev, the State Department added a lamination to its framework. In summary, it may be argued that the greater the severity of an event, or its potential impact on a nation's interests, the greater the likelihood that MFAs will use laminations to comment on this event. The same is true of events which threaten to escalate a crisis, such as the kidnapping of soldiers.

The analysis of Hamas's framing activities offers an additional theoretical contribution; it demonstrates how actors use social media framing to play the two-level game of diplomacy (Putnam, 1998). During Week 5 of the Gaza War, Hamas faced two challenges. Domestically, the war with Israel had taken a great toll on Gaza, marked by the deaths of 1,000 Gazans alongside the utter destruction of entire neighborhoods in the Gaza Strip. Internationally, Hamas's constant firing at Israeli civilians and targeting of Israeli cities took a toll on Hamas's image because it was becoming associated with terrorism rather than freedom. Hamas thus used social media frames to target both domestic and foreign audiences while tailoring its communication to the attributes of each audience.

Domestically, Hamas framed the war with Israel as both a holy Jihad and a religious imperative. This may have helped Hamas retain domestic support for a while longer. Internationally, Hamas framed Israel as an amoral actor that targets schools and UN civilian installations. Its war with Israel was thus framed yet again as a war for freedom from an oppressor, possibly enabling Hamas to retain international support. And so Hamas played a two-level game of diplomacy, obtaining support on both the domestic and international levels while also formulating different arguments for each level.

However, all four actors also frequently removed laminations from their primary frameworks. This was because certain events had ended or were no longer relevant to the crisis. For example, Hamas removed its 'UN Installations' lamination once Israel stopped targeting UN schools in the Gaza Strip. In week 10, Israel removed its 'Israeli Resilience' lamination, as there was no longer a need to frame Israel's refusal to negotiate with Hamas under fire. Russia, for its part, removed the 'Rights of Russian Minorities' lamination during Week 9 because it no longer had to justify its plans to annex Crimea given the overwhelming results of the Crimean referendum.

Yet all four actors also created primary frameworks that were soon abandoned. Such was the case with Israel's 'UN Hypocrisy' framework, which was employed only during those weeks in which UN forums discussed Israel's actions in Gaza. Week 8 was the only one to see Hamas employ the 'Hamas Leadership' framework, which sought to frame Hamas as the national representative of all Palestinians, not just those living under its rule in Gaza. The U.S. abandoned its 'Resorting Democracy' framework once Russia began its stealth incursion into Ukraine and following the appointment of an interim government and president in Kiev. Thus, events that unfolded on the ground rendered Israeli, Hamas, Russian and U.S.

frameworks irrelevant. In summary, events may render both laminations and frameworks irrelevant. The speed with which laminations and frameworks are formulated, disseminated, evaluated, and abandoned demonstrates yet again that MFAs do practice real time diplomacy and, subsequently, that this thesis's model can track the progress of a crisis in near-real time.

This thesis can now offer an answer to its second research question: **Does the perceived severity of a crisis lead to a more dynamic use of Twitter?** The perceived severity of a crisis, or certain events that unfold during the crisis, lead to a more dynamic use of Twitter. This manifests itself in three ways. First, as a crisis transitions from the onset stage to the escalation stage, and as nations perceive a severe threat to their interests, there is a growing divergence in MFA frames. Correspondingly, the transition between the escalation and de-escalation stage sees a growing convergence between MFA frameworks as the perception of a threat to national interests subsides. Second, MFAs use laminations in order to comment on events that may impact their national interests or contribute to the escalatory momentum of the crisis. Third, MFAs create and abandon frameworks in order to comment on unfolding events, which may become irrelevant as a crisis progresses.

This thesis's third research question asked, **How do Twitter framing techniques inform strategies for managing a crisis?** It was hypothesised that the formation of prevention pressure points would be preceded by upkeying, or the addition of laminations to MFA frameworks. This is because laminations are added to primary frameworks as a way to comment on rapidly changing circumstances, such as the ones that unfold during the escalation stage. Conversely, it was hypothesised that intervention pressure points would be preceded by downkeying, or the removal of laminations as the rapid succession of events

comes to a halt. In both case studies, prevention pressure points were preceded by MFAs adding laminations to their framework. However, intervention pressure points were not preceded by the removal of laminations. Moreover, unlike the Crimean Crisis, in the Gazan War there was no association between the overall number of laminations added and removed by MFAs and the formation of crisis pressure points. In other words, the number of laminations added and removed by actors was not indicative of crisis escalation or de-escalation.

S4 was thus the only research statement that was not fully validated in this thesis, and the only statement to partially meet its falsification criteria (**S4 will be falsified if the adding of laminations will not precede prevention pressure points or if the removing of laminations will not precede intervention pressure points. In such instances, pressure points emerge independently of upkeying and downkeying, and the adding and removing of laminations is not indicative of crisis escalation or de-escalation**).

One explanation for the lack of association between downkeying and the formation of intervention pressure points lies in MFAs's need to practice real time diplomacy. The emergence of cable news networks in the 1990s led to an evolution in the practice of diplomacy. Prior to the arrival of CNN, diplomats looking to influence the coverage of global events were required to contend with a morning and evening news cycle. Morning papers could carry op-eds written by press attachés, while evening newscasts could include interviews with ambassadors. Yet cable news introduced a 24-hour news cycle in which diplomats were required to constantly monitor and influence the coverage of world events. Even more problematic for diplomats was the impact of cable news on foreign policy priorities. Issues that rose to dominance on CNN soon rose to dominance in U.S. public

opinion, forcing diplomats to formulate new foreign policies. Often referred to as the 'CNN effect', the emergence of the 24-hour news cycle led to an insatiable desire for news stories while altering the relationship between diplomats and journalists (Gilboa, 2005; Livingston, 1997; Robinson, 1999).

The digitalisation of diplomacy has seen the emergence of a minute-by-minute news cycle, which means that digital publics now expect to learn about world events as they unfold. New and old media organisations have altered their practices to meet public desires, as have influential bloggers (Causey & Howard, 2013; Pamment, 2014; Seib, 2012). One poignant example was the 2016 Turkish coup attempt. As Turkish soldiers deployed tanks near bridges and government buildings in Istanbul and Ankara, independent news sites began to tweet about a possible coup d'etat in Turkey. Soon, bloggers joined the coverage, uploading images and videos published online by Turkish social media users. Next, major news outlets like the BBC and CNN reported that soldiers had taken control of parts of Turkey in a 'possible' coup attempt. In order to influence the perceptions and worldviews of social media users, MFAs and diplomats also had to begin tweeting about events unfolding in Ankara, despite having only fragmented pieces of information. Failure to do so would render MFAs irrelevant and potentially harm their credibility. Moreover, MFAs had to explain the policies of their respective countries towards the coup. Some countries, for example, were quick to denounce the coup on Twitter, stating that Turkey was a democracy and that changes in power should be done via ballot boxes and not tanks (Manor, 2019; Sevin, 2018).

During the Gaza War, both the Israeli MFA and Hamas were required to meet the demands of a minute-by-minute news cycle as part of their online competition over the

attention and support of the media and public opinion. This led to the frequent adding of laminations, even prior to the emergence of intervention pressure points in which the scope of disagreement between two governments narrows. For instance, the reduction in Integral Frame Distance Scores between Weeks 7 and 8 of the War was accompanied by the adding of laminations by Hamas, which hoped to portray itself as a national leader following progress in the talks in Cairo. Similarly, the intervention pressure point between Weeks 4 and 5 saw Hamas add two lamination to its frameworks as a result of Israel's shelling of an UNRWA school in Gaza.

The demands of a minute-by-minute news cycle can also account for lack of association between the overall number of laminations added and removed by Israel and Hamas and crisis escalation. For instance, the emergence of the intervention pressure point between Weeks 4 and 5 saw Israel add two laminations because of the MFA's need to comment on the possible abduction of an Israeli soldier and Hamas's firing on border crossings through which Israel supplied aid to the Gaza Strip. Thus, although both actors grew closer, they were still required to comment on a host of evolving events.

Yet it should be noted that in the Crimean case study, there was an association between the overall number of laminations added and removed by both MFAs and crisis acuteness. As such, it is possible that upkeying and downkeying may account for the formation of crisis pressure points during low-intensity crises in which the number of events unfolding daily is smaller than that which unfolds during a high-intensity crisis, such as a war. It is also important to note that in the Crimean case study, intervention pressure points were accompanied by the removal of laminations by both MFAs.

It is at this stage that this thesis can offer a partial answer to its third research question: **How do Twitter framing techniques inform strategies for managing a crisis?** The emergence of prevention pressure points is preceded by upkeying, or the adding of laminations, given an actor's need to narrate a succession of unfolding events in near-real time.

Notably, the emergence of crisis pressure points alone cannot bring about a resolution of a crisis, whether through short-term containment or long-term agreements. By tracking a crisis's progression and identifying crisis pressure points, diplomats may tailor their interventions to the unique evolution of a crisis. Yet diplomats must enter the negotiating room with a set of solutions that are likely to be adopted by both actors. Moreover, for negotiations to end successfully, diplomats must be able to identify the core interests of each actor and his opening position when arriving at the negotiation table. The frame distance model enables diplomats to map actors' interests and anticipate their opening positions in two ways. First, diplomats may use the frame distance model to detect frameworks and laminations that are constantly employed by MFAs. The more consistent a frame, the more it represents the core interest of an actor. For instance, Russia employed the 'No Outside Interference' framework for ten consecutive weeks, suggesting that its core interest was to limit U.S. and EU involvement in its immediate sphere of influence. Similarly, Israel employed its 'Six Million' framework for four weeks, suggesting that one of its core interests was to demilitarise the Gaza Strip. The analysis of frame consistency can thus help diplomats map the likely demands of each actor, their opening position at the table, and the issues that are most important to them. Next, diplomats may begin to devise solutions that meet these core interests. Such solutions are more likely to be accepted by governments even when these are embroiled in internal bickering and competitions. This is because such

solutions address the fundamental national needs of an actor. Herein lies an additional contribution to the existing crisis management research corpus. The analysis of frame consistency demonstrates that social media can help diplomats augment their crisis management abilities by obtaining long-term resolutions to crises.

In addition, the qualitative analysis of each framework can help diplomats map areas of convergence between both actors, which may serve as entry points to the negotiations. In the Crimean case study, the issues of international law and human rights may have helped start negotiations between Russia and America. As previous studies have found, when actors begin to discuss the same issue, their frames may soon become aligned (Snow et al., 1996). In the Gaza War, the high death toll of Gazans and the need to arrive at a short-term agreement could have served as entry points to negotiations between Hamas and Israel.

Both of the crises evaluated in this thesis were resolved through short-term containment, whether that means a limited truce between Israel and Hamas or the placement of economic sanctions on Russia. Neither of these solutions has ended the crises, since the border between Ukraine and Crimea is still tense while Israel and Hamas have just ended another round of violence. It is possible that in both cases, diplomats opted for short-term containment given the fear of regional or even global ripple effects. Yet such an approach only contributes to the fractal nature of these crises because it fails to address the underlying cause, whether that cause is identified as Hamas and Israel's refusal to acknowledge one another or Russia's aggressive policy of protecting its interests in its immediate sphere of influence through force (Topper & Lagadec, 2013).

The results of this thesis demonstrate that even during high-intensity crises, intervention pressure points emerge during the escalation stage. These are instances in which diplomats can seize on a positive momentum or a tense status quo to find a permanent solution to a fractal crisis. Thus, diplomats may need to alter their crisis management tactics. Short-term containment may be used during the escalation stage of a crisis to prevent ripple effects and minimise the loss of life. During the Gaza War, for instance, third-party diplomats could have taken time to coordinate actions with the leadership of Jordan and Egypt while warning Iran not to interfere in the battle between Israel and Hamas. Moreover, diplomats could have used press briefings and UN deliberations to place pressure on both actors to minimise the loss of life. Yet diplomats would be wise to wait with direct mediation until the formation of an intervention pressure point. It is at this point that both parties should be forced into the negotiation room, and it is at this point that diplomats may finally be able to break the fractal feedback loop (Topper & Lagadec, 2013).

This thesis conceptualised framing's constitution of a crisis in four stages. The results presented thus far lend credence to this conceptualisation. In the first stage of a crisis, MFAs author primary frameworks that consist of the four elements identified by Entman (1993). This stage of frame development sees MFAs disseminate their frameworks online to win the support of digital publics and the media. This stage is followed by frame disputes, in which the primary frameworks of two MFAs begin to differ substantially as each actor seeks to protect his nation's interests and obtain a desired resolution. It is during the frame dispute stage that frame distances begin to vary. The third stage is that of frame adaptation, in which MFAs integrate rapidly changing circumstances into their frameworks to avoid frame breaking and compete with the narration of other actors. Frames are adapted by adding and

removing laminations. The frame adaptation stage is also the one that sees MFAs adopt the logic of a minute-by-minute news cycle. In the final stage of frame action, third-party diplomats map and identify crisis pressure points in which diplomatic mediation is most necessary so as to contain a crisis or, most likely, to succeed in resolving the crisis. Thus, MFA frameworks constitute both the crisis and its possible resolution.

It is also important to note that this thesis contributes to IR scholarship by applying Goffman's concepts of frameworks, frame disputes, and laminations to the realm of crisis management. While previous studies have employed Goffman's work in IR, these have focused on issues such as diplomats's needs to express their association with the state (Faziulaev, 2006); the existence of a pecking order in multilateral settings (Pouliot, 2011); the theatrical nature of international summits (Shimazu, 2011); nations' use of foreign aid to manage their impressions (Zhang, 2006); nations' need to save face and avoid shaming in the international area (Adler-Nissen, 2012; 2014) and framing competitions waged by non-state actors (Schimmelfenning, 1997). While these studies have applied Goffman's work in the realm of IR, they have yet to employ framing theory to diplomatic crises. By creating a crisis intervention model that is centered on Goffman's framing theory, this thesis offers a novel contribution to the study of crises and the study of the intersection between sociology and IR.

This thesis can now answer its guiding research question-**How do MFAs use digital tools in times of crises, and how can the use of these tools inform strategies to manage crises?** During times of crises, MFAs use social media to create prisms, or frameworks, through which a crisis may be understood by domestic and foreign audiences as well as media and news organisations. These frameworks are updated in real time to comment on

rapidly changing circumstances and offer audiences a consistent narration of a crisis. MFA frameworks may enable diplomats to win over support for their offline policies and are thus used in a strategic manner. Subsequently, third party diplomats can use social media content published by conflicted MFAs to track a crisis's progression in near-real time, extrapolate the possible trajectory of a crisis, and identify crisis pressure points in which diplomatic mediation is most necessary for short-term containment or likely to result in long-term resolutions. As such, diplomats can tailor diplomatic interventions to the unique evolution of a crisis.

Finally, it is important to discuss the limitations of this thesis and the frame distance model. The most important limitation of the frame distance model is that the model can only help diplomats manage crises once it has been employed. Given that crises tend to burst onto the scene (McConnell & Drennan, 2006; Wood & Peake, 1998), it is likely that diplomats will only employ the model during the escalation stage, thus missing the opportunity to avert the crisis altogether during the onset stage. That said, there are certain scenarios in which diplomats are likely to use the frame distance model from a crisis's early stages. Such is the case with fractal crises in which tensions between two actors routinely flare up and escalate quickly. For instance, diplomats are by now familiar with Israel-Hamas crises and have learned that these escalate into full-scale military engagements within days. Employing the frame distance model from the onset of a crisis thus requires a conceptual shift among diplomats in which they recognise the analytical values of social media content published by conflicted parties. This may motivate diplomats to employ the model from the moment that tensions between two actors begin to mount.

The second main limitation of the frame distance model, and this thesis, is that the model is wholly dependent on the volume of tweets published by conflicted actors. However, this thesis found that MFAs may fail to tweet about a crisis, whether during the onset or escalation stages. For instance, there were two weeks in the Crimean case study that saw no U.S. tweets, as well as a week in which Hamas's military wing published less than ten tweets. The absence of tweets prevents the calculation of frame distances and the identification of crisis pressure points. In the Crimean case study, this limitation was overcome by assuming that the State Department had not altered its framing of the crisis as it did not tweet any new information. While lack of social media content impairs the ability of the frame distance model to track a crisis in near-real time, this limitation may be less relevant in 2019 than it was in 2014. Indeed, studies suggest that since the Crimean Crisis and the Gaza War, the volume of tweets published by MFAs has only increased (Manor & Pamment, 2019). Thus, diplomats using the frame distance model in 2019 would have an abundance of tweets with which they could track a crisis's progression and identify crisis pressure points.

An additional limitation of this thesis is the assumption that MFAs's social media content does in fact represent the stance of governments. However, models such as the two-level game of diplomacy (Putnam, 1988) suggest that what governments say and what they mean may differ substantially. Governments and leaders may pretend to be dragged into negotiations on the international level to appease audiences on the national level. Conversely, leaders and governments may use national constraints to gain concessions on the intentional level. This indicates that the frameworks employed by MFAs may not be truly representative of a government's position, rendering the analysis of frameworks irrelevant. While this is a substantial limitation, it is important to bear in mind that such

gaps complicate any form of negotiations, as what diplomats say on the stage of diplomacy and what they say within the inner sanctums of diplomacy may differ. Moreover, the frame distance model partially overcomes this limitation through the number of measurements it relies on, or the number of data points it collects. While an MFA may strategically misrepresent its government's stance during one week of the crisis, it is unlikely to do so over several weeks. This is because MFAs must use social media to offer real time narration of the crisis while commenting on unfolding events. Failure to do so will prevent the MFA from rallying support for its offline policies from digital publics and the media. Unfolding events thus force an MFA to offer its analysis of the crisis, including the root cause of a crisis and its desired resolution. Moreover, the more constant an MFA's framework, or the more it is employed throughout the duration of a crisis, the more it truly represents a nation's core interest. This is because each framework includes a central argument pertaining to the crisis. Analysing frame consistency can thus help scholars and diplomats identify the actual stance of governments embroiled in a crisis.

This thesis's analysis of the Crimean Crisis was limited to tweets published by the U.S. and Russian MFAs. However, the Crimean Crisis was also a crisis between the interim Ukrainian government in Kiev and pro-separatist activists in Crimea. These may be regarded as proxies of Russia and the U.S. During a crisis, the actions of proxies can also impact relations between world powers and contribute to the escalatory momentum of the crisis (Bell, 1971). For this reason, it may be beneficial to include tweets published by proxies into the frame distance model. For instance, the number of tweets published by proxies during each crisis week, as well as the sentiment of these tweets, may be added to the matrix that calculates Integral Frame Distance Scores. In this way, the model would directly take into

account the complexity of 21st-century crises in which regional conflicts have global implications.

A fifth limitation of this thesis is that the analysis of MFA frameworks demands that one be familiar with the norms, values, and collective memory of conflicted parties. For instance, the meaning imbued into Israel's 'Six Million' framework would only be meaningful to those familiar with Israeli and Jewish history and the symbolic importance of the 6 million figure. Similarly, Russia's framing of the Ukrainian opposition as neo-Fascists would hold significance to those familiar with the centrality of the Red Army's victory in WWII to Russia's collective memory. This is also true when analyzing the sentiment of tweets. Tweets from Hamas, which called for a holy Jihad against Israel would only be regarded as positive in nature by those familiar with Hamas's reliance on religious arguments to bolster domestic support for its offline policies. This limitation suggests that scholars and diplomats may only be able to employ the frame distance model in familiar crises, or crises in which they are familiar with the history, norms, and values of conflicted parties.

The final limitation of this thesis lies in the gap between the digital expertise of the Israeli MFA and Hamas. By the 2014 Gaza War, Israel had created an extensive digital presence, both at the MFA and embassy levels (Manor, 2019; Yarchi, Samuel-Azran, & Bard-David, 2017). Conversely, it was only in 2015 that Hamas began to use social media in sophisticated ways, such as holding Twitter Q&A sessions with digital publics (Manor & Crilley, 2018a; Manor, 2019). This gap was evident in the Gaza War case study, as Israel published more tweets than Hamas and employed a greater number of frameworks, thereby offering followers real time framing of the war. This gap may limit one's ability to measure frame distances since actors less familiar with digital platforms may create a

smaller number of frameworks. Moreover, actors less familiar with digital platforms may fail to update their frameworks in real time, preventing the model from tracking a crisis's progression in near-real time. Subsequently, the frame distance model may best be applicable when analysing the digital activities of actors with similar levels of digital proficiency.

This thesis offers a novel contribution to both the digital diplomacy and crisis management research corpuses. By applying the works of Goffman and Entman to the realm of diplomatic crisis management, the thesis reconceptualises MFA communication in times of crises and demonstrates how crisis communication is practised in a world governed by a minute-by-minute news cycle. Yet this thesis is but a first step in a new and exciting line of academic inquiry. Future studies can build on this thesis to offer additional insight. First, studies may examine if other social media platforms can also be used to measure frame distances. Recent studies suggest that MFAs publish the same content across social media platforms due to limited resources (Kampf, Manor, & Segev, 2015). However, social media platforms differ in the amount of information that can be shared. Facebook posts are much longer than 280-character tweets. Thus, MFAs may elaborate on a crisis and events shaping a crisis on Facebook while using Twitter for short bursts of diplomacy (ibid). As such, analysing Facebook posts may enable scholars to better identify MFA frameworks and more accurately measure frame distances.

Studies should also examine the role that images play in MFA framing. For instance, image analysis may help uncover the target audiences of MFAs. The image below (on the left) was published by the Israeli MFA during the Gaza War. The image on the right is the map of the 1947 UN Partition Plan, which sought to create two states in what is currently

known as Israel—a Jewish state and a Palestinian one. The visual resonance between the two mages would only hold meaning to Israelis who study the partition map in high school. Thus, this MFA tweet was most likely targeted at Israeli social media users.




Image 7.2: Visual Similarity between UN Partition Map and Israeli Tweet

Conversely, the images below, which compare Hamas to ISIS, resonates with Western media's framing of ISIS as a barbaric terror organisation that rapes women and oppresses its citizenry by force. Thus, these tweets were likely targeted at foreign populations.



Image 7.3: Israeli MFA Comparison between Hamas and ISIS

Image analysis may thus help diplomats and scholars map the audiences with which MFAs interact. This insight can help increase the accuracy of frame distance measurements, as scholars may focus primarily on those frames that target the foreign media and foreign populations given a nation's need to obtain foreign support for its offline policy goals.

Just like images, future studies may examine how hashtags can be incorporated into the frame distance model. Hashtags are central to communication on Twitter because they organise discussion and help users find information more easily (Small, 2011). Yet within tweets, hashtags are framing devices that can help anchor the meaning of a tweet (Meraz & Papacharissi, 2013). For instance, in the Crimean case study, American tweets often ended with the hashtag #UnitedforUkraine, suggesting that the U.S. would not accept the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, nor would it accept the results of the Crimean referendum. Israeli tweets, on the other hand, often ended with the hashtag #IsraelUnderFire. This hashtag was a direct response to a trending Palestinian hashtag of

#GazaUnderFire. The Israeli hashtag may have been used to anchor the meaning of tweets and clearly state that Israel would not cease its military operation until Hamas rocket fire had ended. Analysing hashtags may thus make the task of identifying MFA frameworks easier. Moreover, the sentiment of hashtags may be incorporated into the matrix used to calculate Integral Frame Distance Scores. For instance, Hamas's hashtags #GazaVictory and #PalestineWillBeFree may be viewed as negative ones given the assertion that Hamas would not cease its fire until the war was won with Israel removing the siege on the Gaza Strip.

Lastly, studies may examine diplomats' past crisis interventions and assess whether these took place during crisis pressure points. It is possible that diplomats already have the skillsets necessary to identify prevention pressure points and that they have, in the past, taken preventative actions during prevention pressure points, such as initiating emergency discussions in multilateral forums. However, it is also possible that diplomats are unable to identify intervention pressure points and have thus, in the past, failed to leverage these points towards obtaining long-term resolutions of crises. By using a postmortem approach, scholars can employ the frame distance model to past crises while analysing how diplomats mediated these crises. This line of inquiry may help address the arguments of Druckman (2001) and Bjola (2016b), who asserted that as diplomats cannot detect crisis pressure points they have made little progress in their ability to manage crises.

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