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Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public goods games.

Abstract:

The production of public goods by the contribution of individual volunteers is a social dilemma because an individual that does not volunteer can benefit from the public good produced by the contributions of others. Therefore it is generally believed that public goods can be produced only in the presence of repeated interactions (which allow reciprocation, reputation effects and punishment) or relatedness (kin selection). Cooperation, however, often occurs in the absence of iterations and rel...

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Publication status:
Published

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, MPLS, Zoology
Role:
Author
Journal:
Evolution; international journal of organic evolution
Volume:
65
Issue:
4
Pages:
1140-1148
Publication date:
2011-04-05
DOI:
EISSN:
1558-5646
ISSN:
0014-3820
URN:
uuid:934e1884-3ccf-4dfb-8b86-b8f3e7319081
Source identifiers:
209262
Local pid:
pubs:209262

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