

## **DELIBERATION THROUGH MISREPRESENTATION?**

### **Inchoate Speech and the Division of Interpretive Labor**

**ABSTRACT:** Much political speech takes the form of protest movement slogans, tweets, artistic expression, or hazy and underdeveloped arguments. While such modes of “inchoate” political expression have a number of virtues, they may not seem promising as contributions to deliberation. This paper considers how a deliberative system can facilitate rational uptake of inchoate political expression through the “division of interpretive labor,” the process in which making sense of inchoate speech is outsourced to an intermediary such a journalist or social scientist. I show how such intermediaries can facilitate “democratic deliberation within” through idealized rational reconstructions of inchoate political expression even when the claims in the reconstructions differ from the claims made by the inchoate speakers. In doing so, I provide an account of how inaccurate representations of citizens’ thinking can enable an understanding of their viewpoints, and I address various normative concerns one may have about intermediaries’ use of inaccurate representation. Answering these questions is, I argue, crucial for understanding how a deliberative system can have inclusive and high-quality deliberation without being overly demanding on citizens.

### **1. Introduction**

According to many philosophers and political theorists, democratic decision-making requires more than a fair aggregation of judgments. It requires that those judgments be informed by public deliberation.<sup>1</sup>

However, the ability to make clear and informed contributions to public deliberation seems – at least at first blush – very demanding given modern conditions. Policy questions are often complex and require specialized training to understand, let alone evaluate. Moreover, individuals often hold conflicting values, and they lack time and training to make their political

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<sup>1</sup> For some canonical defenses of the importance of deliberation, see Gutmann and Thompson 1996, Habermas 1996, Elster 1998, Young 2002, Goodin 2008, and Cohen 2009. Claims about the instrumental value of public deliberation have been subjected to empirical scrutiny in Sanders 1997 and Christiano 2012.

views coherent and precise enough to yield determinate verdicts about various policy disputes. It is therefore no surprise that when we look at actual political speech, we do not just see articulate, informed, and reasoned arguments. Rather, much political speech is what I will call “inchoate” in that it is vague, patchy, haphazardly expressed, and rife with seeming inconsistency. For instance, much political speech takes the form of vague slogans from social movements like Occupy Wall Street or the Tea Party, ambiguous messages in artistic works, snarky tweets, or just the normal hazy and underdeveloped arguments of everyday political discussion. Clear, reasoned argument is only a small part of political expression.

While such modes of inchoate political expression have a number of virtues, they may not seem promising as contributions to deliberation. For it is difficult to rationally engage in any sophisticated way with such speech in its “raw form.” Such speech is—*ex hypothesi*—patchy, vague, and incoherent, which makes reflection on the force of its claims challenging, sometimes perhaps impossible.

However, rational engagement with inchoate speech looks more feasible if we shift attention away from direct engagement and towards engagement within the broader “deliberative system,” the set of practices and institutions within which public deliberation takes place.<sup>2</sup> Instead of rationally engaging with the Occupy Wall Street slogans *directly*, we might read an Op-Ed or a book that tries to put some structure on the movement’s speech by laying out a clear set of claims and arguments that is supposed to *make sense* of Occupy Wall Street members’ positions and claims. When we do this, part of the deliberative process that is typically performed by either speaker or hearer—the “making sense” of inchoate expression—is “outsourced” to an intermediary such as a journalist or social scientist, which

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<sup>2</sup> Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012.

helps citizens engage in “democratic deliberation within”,<sup>3</sup> the “internal-reflective” aspect of deliberation in which individual citizens reflect on issues from the perspectives of other citizens.<sup>4</sup> This outsourcing is what I will call the “division of interpretive labor.”

Such a division of labor offers a potential means of reconciling conflicting demands on a democratic deliberative system. While there is much discussion about what properties such deliberative systems should possess, there are three basic values that many agree are desirable: (i) a good deliberative system should be *inclusive*, (ii) it should not make participating in deliberation *too demanding*, and (iii) it should feature *high-quality* deliberation. Unfortunately, these three values seem to conflict under a plausible auxiliary assumption: that it is demanding to make high-quality deliberative contributions. Such contributions would seem to require careful normative reflection and detailed institutional and policy knowledge, and—as classic discussions of the rationality of political ignorance emphasize<sup>5</sup>—engaging in such reflection and acquiring such knowledge has substantial costs. The division of interpretive labor promises to alleviate this tension by shifting the demanding work of making sense of and elaborating on inchoate views from citizens to intermediaries.

However, there are reasons to be concerned whether such interpretive burden shifting is truly compatible with deliberative democratic ideals. Intermediary actors tend to be social

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<sup>3</sup> Goodin 2000.

<sup>4</sup> Some recent examples include Skocpol and Williamson 2012 on the Tea Party, Todd Gitlin 2012 on Occupy Wall Street, Kathryn Cremer 2016 on “rural consciousness,” Arlie Hochschild 2016 on the views of Southern conservatives, and Chris Lebron 2017 on the historical roots of the Black Lives Matter movement.

<sup>5</sup> Downs 1957.

elites, and engaging with inchoate speech through their filter might threaten to overwrite or sanitize inchoate voices, particularly those from marginalized communities. Such concerns are particularly pressing because in order for intermediaries' interpretations to help citizens rationally engage with inchoate speech, those interpretations often need to be *inaccurate* on certain dimensions: they need to be more coherent and comprehensive than the originals. *Inchoate* views need to be represented as *non-inchoate*. Yet, to the extent that intermediaries introduce inaccuracies in their representations of inchoate speech (to enable the reader to better engage with that speech), one might worry that intermediaries necessarily lead their readers *away* from engaging with the original speech, and therefore with the speaker.

Call this the "puzzle of inaccurate inclusion." This paper aims to address this puzzle and thereby explain and vindicate the division of interpretive labor as a strategy for addressing the tension among deliberative democratic ideals. The puzzle has both epistemic and normative aspects.

First, there is an *epistemic* question: how can transforming speech improve our understanding of that speech? It seems that in order for inaccurate representation to constitute a means of integrating inchoate speakers into discussion, it must impart some form of *insight* into speakers' perspectives or arguments. However, this seems puzzling because, you might think, the more inaccurate your representation of a speaker's thinking, the less grappling with that representation will give you understanding of the speaker's perspective.

Second, there is a *normative* question: how could practices and institutions that systematically inaccurately represent other's speech be politically desirable and justifiable in a deliberative context? In particular, how can those whose views are being inaccurately represented count as being *included* in the normatively relevant sense? Inaccurate representation might seem to involve some kind of exclusionary overwriting.

In addressing these questions, I provide an account of deliberative inclusion through intermediary actors and the norms that apply to such actors in this capacity. Such an account aims to reconcile activist and everyday political expression with deliberative ideals. I will proceed as follows. I begin by offering a more precise definition of the term “inchoate speech” (§2) and considering why we have reason to include such speech in democratic deliberation (§3). I then set up the puzzle of inaccurate inclusion by arguing that inclusion cannot be achieved either by mere discursive responsiveness or by charitable interpretation (§4). Inaccurate representation is required. With this established, I then consider, but ultimately reject, addressing the epistemic and normative questions about inaccurate representation by appealing to hypothetical ratification by inchoate speakers in §5. §6 proposes my own approach to these questions that appeals to the notion of a “rational reconstruction” and certain objective constraints on inaccurate representation.

## 2. What is “Inchoate Speech”?

Political expression takes a wide variety of forms.<sup>6</sup> What matters with a view to *contributing to deliberation* is the way in which expression enables us to engage in a kind of mental activity that is valuable from the deliberative perspective: “rational engagement” with a political argument or viewpoint. What I call “inchoate speech” is defined negatively. It is speech that does *not* readily facilitate such engagement.

“Rational engagement” involves thinking through and from the speaker’s political view, engaging in what Robert Goodin has called “internal deliberation.”<sup>7</sup> It typically consists in a

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<sup>6</sup> See Dryzek 2000; Estlund 2001; Young 2001, 2002; Fung 2005.

<sup>7</sup> As Goodin (2000) says, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on face-to-face discussion among

number of intellectual activities such (i) reflection on the *truth* of various parts of the speaker's argument or viewpoint, (ii) consideration of the *rational relationships* among those parts, and (iii) the thinking through various *implications of* and *support for* parts of the argument or viewpoint.<sup>8</sup> Such engagement is important from the deliberative perspective because of the special normative status enjoyed by *influence* through rational engagement as well as rational engagement's facilitating *rational understanding* of a point view, influence and understanding being two important reasons individuals are interested in deliberative inclusion in the first place.

While speech's "inchoateness" can come in degrees, there are three kinds of cases we should distinguish. First, there are those cases in which political speech does, in some sense, "point to" or "embody" a political argument or viewpoint (what this means will be considered later at length), but the speech does not facilitate rationally engaging with that argument or viewpoint due to inconsistencies, mistakes, vagaries, and omissions. For example, this is the

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distinct individuals ("external-collective" aspect of deliberation) when providing an account of public deliberation. A focus on the "internal-reflective" aspect of deliberation can mitigate concerns about the infeasibility of organizing representative face-to-face discussions in a mass democracy, and much of the good of face-to-face discussion consists in its facilitating a process in which citizens *on their own* think through the perspectives of others.

<sup>8</sup> This description is more rationalistic than the kind of imaginative projection that Goodin focuses on. However, the reason imaginatively projecting ourselves into another's situation is deliberatively relevant is, presumably, because it reveals the features of the agent's view (more rationalistically conceived) and facilitates rational engagement with it.

problem we may encounter in trying to rationally engage with Trumpism as a worldview on the sole basis of Trump's monologues (assuming there is roughly a single Trumpism).

Second, there are those cases in which the argument or viewpoint is *underdetermined*, and in which there are multiple, mutually exclusive arguments or viewpoints that the political expression may be said to "point to" or "embody." For instance, some have argued that the Tea Party protests could be interpreted as embodying either libertarian *or* Trumpist views. There are multiple ways one *could* fit things together, but none are privileged, making rational engagement with a single view difficult. Such underdetermination can be more or less radical.

Third, there are those cases in which there is *no* argument or viewpoint that the political expression embodies. For instance, some critics charged that in the case of Occupy Wall Street, there was outrage but no ideology.<sup>9</sup>

These three kinds of cases are interconnected, as the features that make it the case that inchoate expression embodies some particular viewpoint also explain the plurality of viewpoints it embodies (if it does embody multiple viewpoints), and lacking those features explains what it is for inchoate expression to embody no viewpoint at all. Thus, getting clear on the first problem will help us address the other issues. However, as we will see, there are some distinct issues that arise in cases of underdetermination.

A few clarifications. Inchoate speech, understood in this way, is not the same as speech that fails to explicitly lay out an argument or viewpoint. This is because laboriously laying out arguments and viewpoints are not the only ways to facilitate rational engagement.<sup>10</sup> Speakers

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<sup>9</sup> For instance, Mataconis 2011.

<sup>10</sup> See also Goodin 2000.

can facilitate rational engagement with a view by, for instance, referring to a view without spelling it out and relying on the speaker's background knowledge, as well as employing all the typical devices speakers have available to communicate much while saying little (e.g. Gricean norms). Consequently, failing to lay out arguments does not mean that one is speaking inchoately.

Moreover, on this conception, political speech may be inchoate even if it *does* lay out a set of claims and arguments that are individually clear and intelligible. This is because it is possible to understand an individual claim without being able to rationally engage with the *viewpoint* of which the claim is a part, as when the claim is made in conjunction with other claims that seem disconnected or in conflict with it.

Finally, in labeling some speech “inchoate,” there is no assumption that all political expression is or should be aiming to facilitate rational engagement. Political expression might aim to rouse emotion, express dissatisfaction, share experiences, focus attention on a topic, etc. These are all important and distinct functions of expression, and making such speech better as deliberative expression will often make it worse on another dimension. This is particularly the case when the political aspect of a speech act is secondary or incidental, as in artistic works.<sup>11</sup> Crucially, the fact that speech does not aim at rational engagement does not mean that it cannot offer knowledge and insight that might serve as a basis for such engagement. It only means that mining that knowledge and insight requires reconstructive work.

### 3. Why Include Inchoate Speech?

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<sup>11</sup> See Shelby 2015.



Given that inchoate speech is, by definition, difficult to integrate into deliberation, one might be skeptical that it needs to be integrated into deliberation at all. However, there are a number of reasons why including inchoate speech in democratic deliberation is important. Understanding these reasons provides us with a framework for assessing whether particular ways of potentially including it answer to the interests citizens have in inclusion.

There are both instrumental and non-instrumental reasons for inclusion. First, including inchoate speech is instrumentally valuable because the quality of deliberation (and quality of decisions arising from deliberation) benefits from the presence of a sufficient number of voices representing distinct points of view.<sup>12</sup> It is a familiar point that knowledge and insight are distributed among actors in society, and not every actor (or occupant of every structural position) has the time, training, and desire to put the knowledge and insight they have acquired into a form that allows others to easily engage with it.

Second, there are non-instrumental reasons to care about inclusion. If public deliberation only included the voices of those with clear, well-worked-out arguments, deliberation would be highly *inegalitarian*. Those in privileged structural positions typically have more time and training to put their points of view into this particular form, and when they lack such time and training, they can hire others to make their arguments for them.<sup>13</sup> By contrast, those in structurally disadvantaged positions often face significant hurdles in making their voices equally heard. Society's set of conceptual resources may be "structurally

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<sup>12</sup> See Anderson 2010 and Landemore 2012 on the importance of having different points of view represented in public discussion.

<sup>13</sup> Of course, the political speech of those in privileged positions is also often inchoate, as recent political experience makes vivid.

prejudiced,” inadequate for effectively interpreting and articulating aspects of minority experiences.<sup>14</sup> Prejudice may make their claims less likely to be believed or even considered, leading to frustration and disincentivizing participation through typical deliberative channels. As a result of these and other factors, social movements and others engaged in political contestation may self-consciously reject norms governing elite public deliberation. For all these reasons, systematically excluding inchoate speech creates deliberative inequalities.

Such deliberative inequalities are problematic for individuals on multiple grounds. Unequal deliberation would preclude many members of society from having an equal—or even minimally sufficient—opportunity for exercising *informal influence* on legislation and public opinion.<sup>15</sup> Inegalitarian deliberation would also make it difficult for other citizens to *understand* their situation and point of view. Citizens have an interest in being understood, not just being influential. Finally, a deliberative system that excludes certain citizens might seem *disrespectful* on expressive grounds – it expresses that certain groups are incompetent or not worth being addressed.

#### 4. Setting Up the Puzzle: Inclusion Requires Inaccurate Representation

So there are strong reasons to integrate inchoate speech into our system of public deliberation. In a mass democracy, integration of this sort is typically achieved by employing deliberative intermediaries such as the mass media, think tanks, and academics.<sup>16</sup> In this section, I consider and reject two natural proposals for how deliberative intermediaries might include inchoate speech: to *respond* to it without representing it, and to represent it *charitably but*

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<sup>14</sup> See Fricker 2007

<sup>15</sup> For recent discussion, see Kolodny 2014, especially 332-336, as well as Shiffrin 2017.

<sup>16</sup> For a discussion of the role and importance of such intermediaries, see Page 1996.

*accurately*.

The upshot is that deliberative inclusion requires intermediaries to “make sense” of inchoate speech in a way that goes beyond what inchoate speaker’s actually say and think, employing what Onora O’Neill has termed “idealization” in representing inchoate points of view.<sup>17</sup> Intermediaries need to take a *reconstructive*, rather than merely interpretive, stance towards inchoate speech. This sets up the puzzle of inaccurate inclusion—how can inaccurately representing inchoate speech facilitate including it?

#### *4.1 Including Inchoate Speech Requires More Than Discursive Responsiveness*

What is it for intermediaries to include inchoate speech? A plausible thought is that inclusion is secured simply by *responsiveness* to inchoate speakers. For example, when in light to Tea Party protests, the *Wall Street Journal* publishes an editorial discussing the protests and defending libertarian economic views, the editorial is deliberately responsive to the Tea Party’s speech.

Note that in such an editorial, the *Wall Street Journal* might take up some Tea Party slogans in order to elaborate on them and sharpen them up without presenting themselves as trying to “make sense” of the Tea Party or “speak for” the movement in any way. We simply have *more speech*, an independent deliberative contribution. If discursive responsiveness were sufficient for inclusion, then the epistemic and normative questions around inaccurate representation of inchoate speech would be moot—there need be no *inaccurate* representation because there need be no *representation* at all.

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<sup>17</sup> See particularly O’Neill 1988, 1989, and 1996. The distinction O’Neill draws between *abstraction* (the omission of detail) and *idealization* (inaccurate representation) is also often drawn in discussions of modeling in the sciences (e.g. Godfrey-Smith 2005 and Potochnik 2017).

However, deliberative responsiveness is not sufficient for inclusion. This is because mere responsiveness secures neither understanding nor the relevant kind of rational influence, the things that make inclusion valuable. Consider the fact that studies of the Tea Party indicate that most members were primarily motivated by concerns about changes in the broader culture as well as a sense of ethnic and racial threat rather than libertarian anti-government ideology.<sup>18</sup> Assuming this is correct, if the *Wall Street Journal* mentions the protests in order to promote *libertarianism*, the article will not help us understand the concerns of Tea Party members. Moreover, to the degree that article helps the protests exercise rational *influence*, the influence exercised will be the rational influence from *libertarian* arguments rather than that of ethno-cultural arguments. Tea Partiers will have been co-opted and utilized, not included.<sup>19</sup> Internal deliberation will have been facilitated, but not with the Tea Party point of view. In short, for intermediaries to facilitate inclusion of inchoate speech, they need not only to respond to it but also to “make sense” of it in some way.

#### 4.2 Including Inchoate Speech Requires More than Charitable Interpretation

When we direct our attention to this phenomenon of “making sense” of inchoate speech, our first philosophical impulse may be to think of it on the model of *radical interpretation*, and thus the solution to be *charitable* interpretation. Making sense of “Tear Down This Wall Street!”

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<sup>18</sup> See e.g. Skocpol and Williamson 2012.

<sup>19</sup> Indeed, this charge has been made against many commentators when it comes to the Tea Party (see Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

is like interpreting the cry of “Gavagai!”<sup>20</sup>

There are a number of philosophers who have held that there is an *a priori* constraint on interpretation such that, roughly, we should interpret others in a way that makes their utterances come out, on the whole, as true or rational.<sup>21</sup> If “making sense” of inchoate speech were exhausted solely by charitable interpretation, then the epistemic and normative questions would admit of trivial answers: there is no need to justify any inaccurate representation of the citizens’ perspective because no inaccurate representation is going on. There is simple description of the speaker’s beliefs, a description we come to using the correct, charitable, mode of interpretation.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Quine 1960. There is also a more theoretical reason to think charitable interpretation is called for here: the activity of “making sense” seems normative in some way. We seem to be looking for some kind of *rational* intelligibility. Later, I will argue that we *are* sensitive to truth and rationality in making sense of inchoate speech, but not in the way that charity principles suppose.

<sup>21</sup> See e.g. Quine 1960, Hollis 1970, Lewis 1974, Davidson 1984, Gauker 1986.

<sup>22</sup> In discussions of philosophy of language and mind, the “principle of charity” typically functions to adjudicate among potential interpretations of an agent’s *actual* attitudes, meanings, and speech behavior. This adjudication can take a *metaphysical* form, where charity helps metaphysically fix an agent’s attitudes, or it can take an *epistemic* form, where it plays a role in helping us determine which attitudes to ascribe in cases of uncertainty (see Williams 2020). Crucially, whether metaphysically or epistemically, charity is used to determine agents’ *actual* attitudes in both of these cases. However, sometimes the “principle of charity” is used in a more colloquial sense to mean an interpretation that *goes beyond* what an individual actually

However, the problem we face in radical interpretation is quite different than the problem we face when we encounter inchoate speech. In radical interpretation, we do not know the *meaning* of certain utterances, but there is no reason to think that the agent's attitudes are somehow misguided. In the case of inchoate speech, we (usually) *do* know the meaning of various expressions, but there *is* reason to think that the agent's attitudes may be misguided. As a result of these differences, interpretive charity is not sufficient for making sense of inchoate viewpoints.

In particular, appeals to interpretive charity in this context face a dilemma: the types of charity principles that will “smooth out”—render non-inchoate—inchoate speech are those that we have reason to reject as overly simplistic. However, more sophisticated charity principles will yield interpretations of such speech that preserve its inchoate character – the ascriptions will be vague and incoherent in a way that precludes easy rational engagement.

To illustrate this point, consider the following overly simple charity principle:

*Simple Truth Charity:* We ought to interpret others as believing what is true.

If we were to use *Simple Truth Charity* to make sense of the Tea Party's inchoate speech, we would be required to ascribe many true beliefs to Tea Party members, even regarding esoteric political topics. For instance, in interpreting their views about the federal deficit, we would

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thought and thereby *inaccurately represent* it (e.g. Stern 2016). The discussion here concerns charity employed to determine actual attitudes. If we take charity in this other more colloquial sense, then we need an account of the nature and justification of this idealization, and my account of reconstruction can be thought as a particular account of charitable interpretation.

have to ascribe to them correct views about the allocation of federal spending. While this would be a way of facilitating rational engagement with Tea Party inchoate speech, such an ascription would be absurd, as it is unlikely that most members have true beliefs on these matters.

This issue is not specific to the Tea Party. Political scientists routinely point out that most Americans have many false beliefs about policy, political institutions, and social scientific information.<sup>23</sup> Applying *Simple Truth Charity* would require ascribing beliefs to citizens that it would be absurd to ascribe to them.

A similar problem arises for simple charity principles centered on rationality rather than truth. Consider a version of such a principle:

*Simple Rationality Charity:* We ought to interpret others as believing what it is rational for them to believe.

If we were to use *Simple Rationality Charity* to make sense of the Tea Party's inchoate speech, we would be required to interpret Tea Party members as possessing rational beliefs regarding normative principles and esoteric political topics. While such an ascription would be easier to engage with, it is unlikely that member's beliefs meet such a demanding standard. As psychologists and political scientists like to point out, much reasoning about politics is *not* strictly rational: individuals employ various imperfect heuristics and are susceptible to framing effects.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Brennan 2016, chapter 2; Achens and Bartels 2016.

<sup>24</sup> Brennan 2016, pg. 39-48; Thagard and Nisbett 1982; Stein 1997.

These particular charity principles are overly simplistic, which is why they yield implausible ascriptions. More sophisticated treatments of interpretive charity can account for false belief and irrationality (as well as various other errors) in a number of ways. For instance, they might add a *ceteris paribus* clause or restrict the principle to some privileged set of beliefs.<sup>25</sup> Charity might be *one factor* balanced against other others in interpretation,<sup>26</sup> or be something we aim to *maximize* under various constraints such as the individual's evidential situation and behavior.<sup>27</sup> If charity is employed in selecting among interpretations that map *inner state types* to propositional attitudes rather than interpretations that map *individuals* to a complete set of attitudes, then charity can easily yield individuals with irrational combinations of attitudes.<sup>28</sup>

The exact nature of these complexities will not matter for our purposes. What is crucial is that adding these complexities to an account of interpretive charity renders charity compatible with the ascription of falsity, vagueness, incoherence, and internal conflict, the features of speech and attitudes that get the problem of inchoate speech off the ground in the first place. And once we see that applying charity is *compatible* with ascribing inchoate meanings and attitudes, it is only a short step to recognizing that the kinds of scenarios we are dealing with are ones in which a more sophisticated application of charity is *likely* to yield such inchoate ascriptions.

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<sup>25</sup> For instance, to observation sentences and easily discernable logical inferences (e.g. Quine 1960, 1970), or to some privileged “bridgehead” (Hollis 1970). Note that these are cases in which false and irrational belief are particularly unlikely and inexplicable.

<sup>26</sup> Lewis 1974, Hattiangadi 2019.

<sup>27</sup> Williams 2019.

<sup>28</sup> Robert J. Williams has made this point in conversation. See also Williams 2019.



For consider two platitudes about *any* plausible account of interpretive charity. First, the relevant charity principle cannot apply strictly and universally. It would be absurd to think that each person has completely true or rational beliefs. Error is possible. Second, errors are not random. Our ascriptions of false and irrational belief should be governed by, roughly, where we should expect to find error, and why we might expect to find error there.<sup>29</sup> More sophisticated accounts of charity are designed to respect these platitudes.

It follows from these two platitudes that even if there is some *a priori* charity constraint on interpretation, it does not follow that we should interpret others such that the majority of their *political beliefs* will be true, rational, or sharply delineated. Political beliefs are a subset of beliefs in which falsehood, irrationality, and vagueness are things we often have reason to expect. We therefore have reason to expect that a sophisticated account of charity will ascribe such attitudes in these instances. The upshot is that either charity will be applied simplistically and thereby recommend non-inchoate but false ascriptions, or it will be applied in a sophisticated way and thereby recommend correct but (likely) inchoate ascriptions.

The intuitive problem is simply that inchoate political speech is often the product of inchoate thoughts on the part of the speaker, and sophisticated accounts of charity aim to *capture* rather than *correct* these features of thought.<sup>30</sup> For instance, the reason Tea Party or

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<sup>29</sup> See particularly Henderson 1993.

<sup>30</sup> At the end of the day, it is not surprising that charity will not help with “making sense” of inchoate speech, since sophisticated charity principles are not designed for this purpose. Such principles are rather typically developed for the purpose of giving naturalistic reductions of mind, meaning, and representation generally. In giving such accounts, one wants the principles

Occupy protesters might be speaking inchoately is precisely that their *attitudes* are vague, patchy, or inconsistent.<sup>31</sup> However, what we want when “making rational sense” of speakers in such cases is *not* to discern their (indeterminate, inconsistent, and patchy) *actual* attitudes. Rather, we want to see whether there is a sensible view “behind” these attitudes, where this view cannot simply be retrieved from what the speaker in fact intends or thinks. Intermediaries need to *construct* this view.

This constructive exercise begins where the interpretation of an agent’s actual attitudes ends. It starts from actual attitudes and – in the kind of construction considered in this essay – applies a kind of “hyper-charity” that goes beyond the attitudes we have reason to actually ascribe to individuals. We turn now to what constraints should govern this constructive exercise and why.

## 5 Problems with Inclusion Through Hypothetical Ratification

If intermediaries are employing idealization in this way to partially *construct* (rather than merely faithfully report on) an inchoate speaker’s view, how can the public’s engagement with such a constructed view be a way of including the original inchoate speaker herself?

One immediately tempting thought is that these constructs could be vindicated by

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to capture our pre-theoretic intuitions about these phenomena, e.g. that agent’s attitudes can be patchy, internally inconsistent, inapt, and vague.

<sup>31</sup> There is also an additional reason that the relevant attitudes may be inchoate: groups like the Tea Party or Occupy may contain internal conflicts or only agree on vague platitudes. *Group’s* political expressions may be inconsistent or vague without any group *member* having inchoate attitudes.

some kind of hypothetical attitude on the part of inchoate speakers. In particular, one might suppose that inchoate speakers are included when the intermediary's construction would be *ratified* or *endorsed* by the inchoate speaker. This idea embodies an attractive moral-political ideal: justification for engaging with the construct rather than the original speech goes through *consent* to that substitution. It also might be thought to capture the idea that intermediaries should be trying to capture the speaker's "intentions," when the speaker has only inchoate intentions. In so doing, hypothetical ratification seems to track something of both epistemic and normative significance.

However, appealing to hypothetical ratification in this context faces a number of difficulties. First, there is the oft-mentioned point that hypothetical consent cannot invariably play the same role in normative argument as actual consent.<sup>32</sup> There are two primary reasons we might care about actual ratification of an intermediary's representation of inchoate speech. One reason is epistemic – ratification serves as evidence about whether the representation of a view is an accurate representation. However, hypothetical ratification cannot play this role because unlike actual ratification, a hypothetical ratification cannot serve as *independent* evidence that a representation is a good one. This is because the only way to determine whether an inchoate speaker would hypothetically ratify an intermediary's construction would be to reflect on the reasons why such a speaker would ratify it.

A second reason that citizens might care about actual ratification is because they have a legitimate interest in controlling how their views are represented in the public sphere.

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<sup>32</sup> For example, in responding to Rawls, Dworkin (1975) famously remarked that "[a] hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all" (18). David Enoch explores these concerns in Enoch 2005 and Enoch 2017.

However, hypothetical ratification cannot serve this role any more than, say, hypothetical consent to sex can safeguard individuals' interest in controlling their sexual lives. As a general matter, exercising control over your life depends on ensuring that what happens to you depends on your *actual* choices.

That is, the ostensible ways that hypothetical ratification accounts can help address the epistemic and normative questions turn out to be illusory on reflection.

Beyond such concerns, there is an additional problem with appeals to hypothetical ratification: it is difficult to specify in a principled way the relevant hypothetical conditions under which ratification matters. If an inchoate speaker is taken as is, then hypothetical ratification will be sensitive to features of the speaker's psychology and environment that are irrelevant to whether a construct is a good way of making sense of a speaker's view. For instance, say the best way of making sense of the Tea Party worldview takes certain racist assumptions as core elements. Even if racism were a core element of the Tea Party view, members of the Tea Party might be disposed not to ratify this representation because of strong social norms against explicit racist belief. However, the mere fact that Tea Partiers will not ratify this way of making sense of their view does not show, *by itself*, that racism is not a core part of their worldview.

Similarly, there can be reasons that an agent *is* disposed to ratify an idealized version of inchoate speech that are irrelevant to whether that idealized version is a good way of making sense of the original inchoate speech. For instance, perhaps Trump is disposed to ratify any particular version of his view as long as it comes from Fox & Friends. However, not just any idealized version of Trumpism is a way of bringing Trump's worldview into the deliberative forum for consideration and critique. The point is that there are some objective standards for

making sense of an inchoate view, and speakers may be wrong about whether a proposed construction meets those standards.

Of course, we can fiddle with the conditions of hypothetical ratification such that what matters is not whether the actual person—in all his or her psychological particularity—would ratify an idealized construct but whether some idealized version of the inchoate speaker would ratify the construct. However, once we start idealizing the speaker in this way, it is not clear what work hypothetical ratification is doing. The purpose of idealizing the speaker is presumably to ensure that the speaker's responses are tracking the appropriate reasons to endorse a construct as her view. But then we need an account of what these reasons are.<sup>33</sup>

Stepping back, the initial plausibility of appeals to hypothetical ratification in this context, I believe, derives from conflating the question of what properties of an idealized version of an inchoate view allow it to serve certain epistemic and practical functions with distinct institutional design questions—questions of how to design institutions to ensure that inaccurate representations have those characteristics. For example, as I will later discuss, it might be that the best way to ensure that an idealized version of a group's views has the relevant properties is for institutions to have some accountability mechanisms such as consultation with members of the relevant groups. However, that is a separate question from the question of what the relevant properties are.

## **6. My Approach: Inclusion Through Rational Reconstruction and Deliberative Partnership**

If we cannot solve the “puzzle of inaccurate inclusion” by appealing to hypothetical

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<sup>33</sup> See Enoch 2017 for related points.

ratification, what can we appeal to? My answer is that we can appeal to certain objective constraints on the idealized representation itself, constraints that enable the idealized construct to serve certain epistemic functions and are expressive of the right kind of relation towards inchoate speakers. After all, it is the fact that an idealized construct serves these epistemic functions and embodies such a relation that makes it worthy of ratification. The key questions are what constraints these are, how they facilitate understanding, and what conception of deliberative interaction they express.

### 6.1. *The Epistemic Question: Rational Reconstruction and Understanding*

To see what kind of objective constraints a construct needs to satisfy in order to help increase understanding, let's consider a simple example.

Say that you're a philosophy tutor, and a student comes to see you to talk about his Big Idea for a political philosophy paper. Unfortunately, the Big Idea is not well worked out. There is no clear thesis, the main points are hazy, and the argumentative structure leaves much to the imagination. The student's thoughts are topically associated, but they do not add up to a coherent view or argument, making rational engagement difficult.

The student's Idea is *inchoate*. If you do want to reflect on and discuss the Big Idea, you need to *reconstruct* the student's argument. What are you doing when you do this? You are not just "interpreting" the student's speech but rather aiming to figure out what the student is *trying to get at*. What the student is thinking is a cluttered mess, and, intuitively, you're trying to clear away the clutter and fill out an intelligible argument that "stands behind" what seem to be his main claims. In constructing this argument, you aim to *approximate* the student's claims but with various subtractions, additions, and corrections. Moreover, you are not aiming to simply come up with *your own* (independent) view but rather represent the student's view in

some idealized form.

But now we've arrived at the *epistemic question*: how exactly can we increase our understanding of the student's Idea by coming up with an idealized, schematic argument of this kind?

Intuitively, the purpose of the schematic argument is to provide you with an object with which you're able to perform the sorts of activities that make up rational engagement: reflection on particular claims, consideration of the rational relations among them, and considerations of additional implications and sources of support. But how does idealization accomplish this?

I think a clue about how to answer this question is to consider another context in which inaccurate representation is used to increase our understanding: scientific modeling. While there are various stories about how model-based science works (for an overview, see Weisberg 2013), modeling typically involves the construction of comparatively simple scenarios in which relationships among the scenario elements can be easily grasped and intellectually manipulated. Relationships among elements in a model are made easier to grasp by *ignoring* certain aspects of the actual scenarios and *idealizing away* certain kinds of distracting "noise." In a typical scientific model, the typical kind of noise that has been eliminated is *causal* noise. Various interfering conditions are imagined away, and a model makes clear how the system's parts are causally connected absent various kinds of causal interference.

Like such a causal model, a rational reconstruction helps you grasp and intellectually engage with a system of thought by putting clearly on display a kind of dependence structure characterizing that system when various kinds of "noise" are eliminated. In this case, the kind of dependencies that one seeks to put on display are not causal but *rational* – it is the rational relations among elements of a view that we are interested in when we *rationally engage* with it.

Consequently, the kind of “noise” that needs to be eliminated is characterized not causally but *normatively*. You’re trying to eliminate sources of *confusion* and *error* that obscure the plausibility and rational organization of the argument.

In particular, there are three kinds of “noise” that are typical roadblocks to understanding: incoherence, inaccuracy-to-the-world<sup>34</sup> (under which I include *imprecise* claims), and “patchiness,” omissions such as failures to draw obvious implications, recognize obvious sources of support, and include intermediary steps in reasoning. An idealization that is sufficiently coherent and similar to the original but corrects for these mistakes is one that *clarifies*—i.e. reduces incoherence and inaccuracy—and *makes comprehensive*—i.e. reduces patchiness—inchoate speech, thereby making it rationally intelligible.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> I’ve picked this term to distinguish the accuracy of the model’s claims *about the world* from how accurately the model depicts the original inchoate speech. It is the former that concerns us.

<sup>35</sup> Note that analogues to values employed in interpretive charity principles to justify attitude *ascription* are now being employed in rational reconstruction to justify certain kinds of *idealization*. Although the values are similar, the roles of these values and justification for employing them are quite different. These differences are reflected in a difference in the ultimate aim of ascription and reconstruction. Attitude *ascription* is aimed at *explanation*, and consequently one needs to explain how an agent came to have certain attitudes as well as how those attitudes might explain the agent’s behaviors. When we aim at explanation, we do not necessarily aim at *rational* intelligibility. We aim at another form of intelligibility, one that can be achieved by causal explanations of the sort that psychology and political science may deliver to us. However, with *reconstruction* we are aimed at *rational engagement* rather than explanation,



By idealizing away inconsequential mistakes (by reducing incoherence and inaccuracy), rational reconstruction enables us to focus reflection on the issues that “make a difference” to an argument or view. By eliminating omissions, the reconstruction fills out the view in order to tell us where a certain chain of thoughts “leads” and inform us of what claims the agent would be rationally required to modify were she to make particular targeted changes. These idealizations take some of this reflective burden off of citizens, thereby facilitating “deliberation within.”<sup>36</sup>

Note that while there is sometimes a unique best way to reconstruct inchoate speech, there may also be multiple distinct but equally good ways to clarify and make more comprehensive. These are cases where the viewpoint “embodied” in inchoate speech is underdetermined. Where there are multiple ways to reconstruct inchoate speech, the total set of options charts out the possible positions that one could take around an issue subject to certain constraints of the agent’s inchoate viewpoint. A grasp of these options provides more *complete* understanding of inchoate speech. Of course, if we only engage with a *single* reconstruction when there are other reconstructions that would have been equally good, our understanding will be less complete than if we had engaged with the full set of equally good reconstructions. However, while this may raise normative worries (to be discussed shortly), *from the perspective of understanding*, one should not let the complete be the enemy of the improved.

## 6.2. *The Normative Question: Deliberative Partnership*

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and thus we are more directly in the space of reasons rather than the space of causes.

<sup>36</sup> Moreover, they facilitate it in a way that also promotes the more instrumental aims of deliberation: thinking through the good versions of views with the ultimate aim of improving the quality of democratic decision-making.

So far, I've given an account of how transforming inchoate speech by rationally reconstructing it can enable others to *understand* and *engage* with that speech. Such reconstructions facilitate inclusion by promoting the interests that individuals have in being included: understanding and rational influence.

However, you might be concerned even if such idealized representations can provide these important benefits, engaging with them might not satisfy all of citizens interests in inclusion in the normatively relevant sense. In particular, given that individuals are interested not only in exerting influence and being understood but also being *respected*, we need to consider whether the division of interpretive labor employing rational reconstruction might undermine respect. There are a number of worries here.

Most centrally, one might worry that taking the “reconstructive stance” expresses some kind of insult insofar as reconstructing inchoate speech (i) expresses a judgment that other citizens’ speech is defective and (ii) expresses a judgment that the intermediaries are in the position to improve upon it. These assumptions of deliberative superiority might seem especially insulting given that the intermediaries are judging that they can improve upon inchoate speakers’ *understanding of their own views*.

However, this concern can be addressed. First off, the reconstructive stance need not express a negative appraisal about the speaker or the speaker’s viewpoint. Rather, it may indicate interest and engagement. As previously mentioned, inchoate speech often contains insight, and taking the reconstructive stance might express exactly that.

Moreover, even in cases in which the reconstructive stance does express a negative appraisal of the speaker’s speech, it does not necessarily express a disrespectful attitude towards *the person*. Here, it is important to distinguish between what Darwall (1997) calls “appraisal respect” from what he terms “recognition respect.” To have appraisal respect for

some individual (for some property) is to have positive regard for that individual (for possessing that property). By contrast, recognition respect for an individual consists in the disposition to take some property of that individual appropriately into account in one's deliberation regarding that individual.

When considering another as an interlocutor, one might fail to respect them in either the appraisal or recognition sense. One might fail to appraisal-respect someone who advocates false or irrational views or is unable to articulate them. By contrast, one might fail to recognition-respect someone as an interlocutor by failing to appropriately respond to their status as your partner in deliberation.

What is it to respond appropriately to someone's status as your partner in deliberation? It is to treat their view in a way that respects their *deliberative aims*, the aims we ascribe to inchoate speakers as partners in deliberation. These are not contingent objectives that speakers may have but rather aims that you necessarily ascribe to those speakers insofar as you are committed to treating them *as interlocutors*.

Recall the student's inchoate Idea. In aiming to give your student's Idea a fair hearing, you would try to suggest a *good* version of it. But "good" according to what set of standards? The standards that the student, as a matter of fact, takes seriously, you might think. However, this cannot be correct. Imagine your student believes that good philosophy should be obscure, deep-sounding, and pleasing to potential romantic partners. If you take your student seriously as an interlocutor, your suggestions as to how to modify his view should not be sensitive to these standards. Making a suggestion that aims to render the student's inchoate idea more obscure, superficially deep, and titillating—merely because your student takes those standards seriously—is not to respect him as an interlocutor and act as his deliberative partner. It is to indulge him and act as his matchmaker.

Rather than being sensitive to whatever aims and standards your student has taken up, treating your student as a *deliberative* partner requires trying to make sense of his view in a way that is sensitive to standards that are more directly related to the goals of deliberation. These standards are *shared, internal* standards that make a view good *as a view*: coherence, comprehensiveness, and accuracy-to-the-world. The reason these standards are relevant is that in addressing the student *as an interlocutor*, you are treating the student as someone who has a particular set of aims: articulating a good version of a view (that is good *as a view*).

That is, we see that the same features that make an idealization of inchoate speech expressive of respect are also those that enable it to provide rational intelligibility. This might seem surprising. For why should there be such a preestablished harmony between respect and intelligibility? I believe the answer is that the reason *why* these values—coherence, comprehensiveness, accuracy-to-the-world—are constitutive of discursive partnership is that they are conducive to rational intelligibility. After all, what deliberative partners are committed to trying to do is make each other's views rationally intelligible.

Moreover, this points to an important interconnection among citizens' interests in influence, understanding, and respectful address: the kind of informal influence citizen deliberators have a legitimate interest in exercising is one that proceeds from an understanding of their perspective, and the relevant kind of "understanding" is one that is inflected with a moralized conception of them as interlocutors, as persons whose views are to be addressed, not merely explained.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> When citizens are interested in being "understood," they are not merely interested in e.g. other citizens possessing a causal explanation of their preferences and voting behavior. Rather, they want some more sustained, sympathetic engagement with their viewpoint, the kind of

Of course, this is not to deny that there are cases in which taking the reconstructive stance may not be appropriate. For instance, one should not treat *non-inchoate* contributions *as if* they were inchoate, as in certain cases of gaslighting or mansplaining. Taking the reconstructive stance is only appropriate in certain kinds of situations: those in which it is reasonable to expect that individuals do not have the time and training to work out non-inchoate views. Yet note that this is exactly the situation of citizens in a mass democracy. The fact that individuals have inchoate views and arguments about matters of policy does not imply stupidity or incompetence. It is quite demanding to work out articulated, clear, and intelligible views and arguments.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, a system that provides them with aid in making sense of themselves is one that is responsive to their deliberative needs, not one that insultingly impugns their intelligence or competence.

Nevertheless, you might still have some normative concerns. I'll consider three. First, since objective standards about what makes a view good can float free from citizens' opinions about what meets these standards, might not rational reconstructions become *too* independent of citizens' self-understandings? Such a worry might, after all, seem to underlie the appeal of hypothetical ratification as a constraint on reconstruction.

In response, I would first note (as mentioned earlier) that it is important not to conflate

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understanding relevant to *addressing them* in co-deliberation. Recall Obama's comment that working-class voters in industrial towns "cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren't like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations." The outcry around this remark was based in anger at being treated as an object of explanation rather than address.

<sup>38</sup> See Christiano 1996 and Beerbohm 2012.

the issue of whether individuals' have some special authority regarding the best way of "making sense" of their views—i.e. whether their actual or hypothetical judgment is part of what *makes it the case* that a particular construct is a good way of making sense of a view—with distinct institutional issues.

It is true that well-ordered public sphere institutions will have mechanisms for citizens to provide *feedback* to deliberative intermediaries and *opportunities for contestation* of reconstructions. Moreover, note that many actual public spheres are shot through with norms, institutions, and practices that serve exactly these functions. For instance, social scientists typically check with their subjects about their depictions of their views, and often note when their subjects disagree with their interpretations.<sup>39</sup> Newspapers receive and publish letters to the editor that might contest interpretations made by intermediaries.

However, the reason for these institutions is not that actual (or hypothetical) ratification of intermediaries' idealized constructs is constitutively connected to their facilitating inclusion (e.g. via performance of the relevant epistemic functions). The means by which idealized constructs provide understanding—improvements in coherence, comprehensiveness, and accuracy-to-the-world—are no more the objects of individuals' special authority than the logical relations among those individuals' beliefs. Rather, the reason for such mechanisms is that (i) feedback and contestation make it more likely that intermediaries' constructs satisfy the conditions of a reconstruction, (ii) they provide safeguards for citizens and satisfy their interests in control over what views are ascribed to them, and (iii) they put citizens in the position to appreciate that the constructs are

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<sup>39</sup> E.g. Lareau 2011.

reconstructions, when they are.<sup>40</sup>

More broadly, what is crucial for democratic inclusion is not whether each citizen *agrees* that a construct is a reconstruction but whether the construct *is* a reconstruction and whether citizens are *put in the position to appreciate* this. In this respect, inclusion is no different from other political values that specify some objective requirements on institutions and individual behavior but also specify that individuals should be in the position to understand those requirements and recognize their realization, e.g. “justice should not only be done but seen to be done.”

A second normative concern is that intermediaries may possess some objectionable form of power in cases of multiple, equally good reconstructions. Of course, in such cases, intermediaries should be clear about the way they are idealizing, as well as upfront if they believe there are other equally good ways in which the relevant viewpoint could be reconstructed. However, given that, as a matter of fact, intermediaries have a certain amount of discretion in selecting a reconstruction among a set of possibilities that are equally good along the relevant dimensions, could intermediaries abuse this kind of “discursive power,” systematically choosing reconstructions that suit them?

However, this is less of a concern than it might seem. Even if intermediaries do have discretion, this discretion is limited to choosing among the *optimal* versions of an agent’s view.

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<sup>40</sup> These checks might satisfy these interests in control even if they cannot ensure that each citizen is satisfied with each reconstruction of his or her view. Moreover, they may also serve an educative function (in cases where an idealization meets the standards of a reconstruction but this fails to be recognized) because intermediaries may be called on to justify their idealizations.

Thus, even if intermediaries follow their own interests in choosing among a set of potential constructs, the constructs they are selecting among are all in the deliberative interests of the inchoate speaker. Moreover, such power is limited by the fact that inchoate speakers are unlikely to be dependent on a single intermediary to reconstruct their views in a competitive marketplace for news and academic research. For instance, if there are multiple ways of reconstructing Trumpism, these will likely be canvassed in the public sphere. Finally, as just mentioned, in a well-ordered public sphere, intermediaries are subject to a number of checks on their reconstructions. These checks serve to prevent intermediaries from acting on objectionable motives in selecting among various potential reconstructions.

Let's now consider one final normative concern. You might worry that even if reconstruction facilitates *rational* understanding and influence, it might nevertheless objectionably inhibit other kinds of understanding and influence, for instance by thwarting the persuasive power of certain kinds of inchoate political expression. The example we have primarily focused on – a student's inchoate Idea – is one in which inchoate speech is unlikely to receive *any* uptake at all absent rational reconstruction. But this might not be so for artistic works, slogans, or narratives. Might not such non-argumentative forms of inchoate expression provide a kind of understanding distinct from that which you achieve in systematically laying out an implicit political viewpoint? And might not such understanding be inhibited if inchoate artistic speech is laundered through the reconstructive process?

However, this concern is misplaced. First off, engaging with a rational reconstruction need not replace engaging with the original inchoate speech. Just as reading the secondary literature on a historical philosopher does not prevent you from reading the original text, a rational reconstruction in the political context can be used as a *tool* to engage with the actual inchoate speech, making it easier to grasp previously obscure claims and connections. Second,



when rational reconstructions are used in this way, they may *enhance* the power of rhetoric, imagery, or protest slogans by showing the structure of the ideas “behind” them, just as artistic and philosophical texts can be enriched by reading them through an understanding of a reconstruction of the ideas expressed within them.

Of course, the power of *certain* rhetoric or imagery may evaporate when the background ideas contained within it are put clearly on display. But this is as it should be – citizens have no complaint if their inchoate rhetoric is made less effective through reconstruction if *the reason why* it is made less effective is that the reconstruction reveals specious assumptions or inferences. There is no injustice in revealing rhetorical manipulations.

Let’s step back and take stock. The key idea we have been developing in this section is that respecting inchoate speakers – in the normatively relevant sense – involves responsiveness to their deliberative aims. These aims are not contingent objectives of inchoate speakers but rather internal to the ideals of good deliberation. The way in which responsiveness to these aims can be realized in a complex deliberative system is by intermediaries providing rational reconstructions of inchoate speech, as well as providing reasonable opportunities for feedback and clarification of these rational reconstructions. It is the connection to rational standards (and the role these standards play in deliberation) that allows a rational reconstruction to facilitate inclusion, since sensitivity to such standards facilitates understanding, enables the right kind of informal influence, and expresses respect (and these are the things that make inclusion valuable for individuals). Treating citizens as deliberative partners involves not trying to *predict* what they would endorse but rather trying to rationally understand them by seeing their speech as an intimation of a comprehensive rational viewpoint.

Taken together, these ideas put us in the position to draw a deeper contrast between

the moral ideals of deliberative partnership and those embodied by hypothetical ratification views when it comes to engaging with inchoate speech. According to hypothetical ratification views, at least in their more straightforward versions, the standards for making sense of inchoate speech should be sensitive to the actual psychological particularities of speakers. However, this is crucially wrong when it comes to political morality. For just as students may have the wrong standards for good philosophical discussions, political actors may have the wrong standards for good democratic deliberation. Sometimes inchoate speakers do not desire an accurate, coherent, and comprehensive view but rather desire to communicate a message that is simplistic, superficially plausible, or pleasing to the political authorities. However, there is no moral or political reason for deliberative intermediaries to help inchoate speakers meet *those* standards. Idealizing inchoate contributions in *that* way would not contribute to making their views more rationally intelligible; it would simply serve their aims of manufacturing conviction and pleasing those with social power. Intermediaries should be facilitators of democratic deliberation, not toadies or PR agents.

## **6. Conclusion: Deliberative Systems and the Division of Interpretive Labor**

This paper has considered a mechanism by which a deliberative system may facilitate inclusive high-quality deliberation without making overly ambitious demands on citizens' knowledge and reflection. The suggestion was that a deliberative system divide interpretive labor between intermediaries and citizens, off-loading the work of "making sense" of inchoate speech to intermediary actors, thereby giving citizens space for "internal" deliberation regarding other political perspectives. However, in order for this kind of solution to work, we need to answer the philosophical question of what exactly "making sense" of inchoate speech involves such that a deliberative system can count as including the views of those whose

speech is rearticulated in this way. This paper has aimed to answer this question.<sup>41</sup>

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