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The Classical Asset: Receptions of Antiquity under the Dictatorship of 21 April in Greece (1967–73)

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This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text.

This dissertation does not exceed the regulation in length, including footnotes and references, but excluding the bibliography.

Short Abstract

This thesis stakes out to reframe the debates surrounding a widely criticised chapter in the cultural history of modern Greece: the receptions of the classical past under the Dictatorship of 21 April (also known as ‘the dictatorship of the Colonels’) during the period 1967 to 1973. Informed by the hermeneutics of classical reception studies, I aim to provide a new perspective on the dictatorship, one that focuses on the contemporaneity of its discursive and visual renderings of antiquity, but which departs from a conceptual framework that is dictated by the master narrative of the Cold War (by the polarisations between Right and Left).

The project converges on the ideological discourses, educational policies and the mass spectacles of the Colonels, each of which has been designated as fraught with ‘ancestoritis’ or ‘pseudoclassicism’ in the literature. In breaking away from value judgments and notions of misappropriation, it is my intention that the project functions as an exercise in a critical levelling with the dictatorship’s multifold classicisms. Concomitantly, I propose that in order to better understand the politics of reception of the Aprilians, which have often seemed impenetrable, it is necessary to branch out into more cross-disciplinary methods of enquiry than those that have been employed in the past. My own approach borrows analytical tools from theories of counter-intelligence, cultural studies, political theory, educational sociology and performance studies. With this exploratory patchwork, the present study hopes to contribute toward opening up a field on which it is possible to examine the dictatorship on its own terms, while taking into account the composite articulations of antiquity with power, upward social mobility, economic development, and entertainment and leisure culture in 1960s Greece.

Long Abstract

This thesis seeks to reframe the debates surrounding a subject that tends to feel all too familiar: the receptions of classical antiquity under the Dictatorship of 21 April in Greece in the period 1967 to 1973 (also known as 'the dictatorship of the Colonels'). Although there has yet to be a study devoted to an examination of the subject, over the years the Colonels' discursive and visual renderings of the classical past have earned wide notoriety as paradigms of an abortive fascist project in 1960s' Greece, as inscrutably trite and as aesthetically vulgar. In departing from a tendency to assess the dictatorship's receptions of antiquity against the yardstick of interwar fascism, and in looking beyond Cold War polarisations between Left and Right, I aim aim to provide a new perspective on the regime, one that emphasises the contemporaneity of its discursive and visual renderings of the classical past, as well as the multivalent implications and functions of that past in dictatorial (and pre-dictatorial) Greece. In doing so, it is my intention that this project operates as an exercise in a critical levelling with the multifold classicisms of the dictatorship, toward an aperture and fragmentation of a set of reception processes that have often seemed impenetrable.

The project converges on a set of case studies that have earned the Dictatorship of 21 April the utmost notoriety as a regime fraught with 'ancestoritis' and 'pseudoclassicism' in the literature and in Greek public discourse. These are the ideological discourses, the educational policies and the mass spectacles of the Colonels. In staking out a reassessment of those case studies, the chapters to follow seek to contextualise both the dictatorship and its classicisms; to explore the new implications acquired by the dictatorship's renderings of the past that have otherwise been designated as trite; and to investigate a number of the regime's lesser-known or less studied reception

exploits. These objectives coalesce to form a research project that endeavours to evade the temptation of imposing programmatic order onto the regime’s uses of antiquity. By doing so, it takes into consideration the ideological cleavages between the Colonels, as well as the experiences of diverse demographics and interest groups under the dictatorship.

Furthermore, in this project I propose that in order to better understand the politics of reception of the Colonels, it is necessary to branch out into more cross-disciplinary methods of enquiry than those that have been employed in the past. My own perspective takes as a point of departure the hermeneutics of classical reception studies, in order to establish the inevitability of the mediatedness of reception, and to place the dictatorship on a dialogical par with the cultural texts that the Colonels appropriated and with which they interacted. I then go on to draw analytical tools from theories of counter-intelligence, cultural studies, political theory, educational sociology and performance studies on a chapter-by-chapter basis. The chapters additionally revisit ideas advanced in the secondary literature on the dictatorship, ideas both old and new, in order to challenge, explore and substantiate long-held views on the regime. With this exploratory patchwork, the present study hopes to contribute toward opening up a field on which it is possible to examine the dictatorship on its own terms, while taking into account the composite articulations of antiquity with power, upward social mobility, economic development, and entertainment and leisure culture in 1960s Greece.

Chapter 1 converses with recent literature on the intrigue surrounding a Greek military contingency plan and its renaming in March 1967, a plan whose new code name would go on to make international news headlines one month later. This was the infamous operation code named ‘Prometheus’ (formerly ‘Ierax II’), which brought to power the cadre of officers who would go on to rule Greece over the following seven years.

Informed, in particular, by the ongoing research project of Greek historian Leonidas Kallivretakis — a project that investigates the historical circumstances that made the Dictatorship of 21 April possible — and drawing on theories of counter-intelligence, Chapter 1 unfolds three scenarios: two of them possible, one of them certain. The first possible scenario is that two of the ringleaders of the coup d'état, Georgios Papadopoulos and Nikolaos Makarezos, were responsible for the naming of the Prometheus plan. On this basis, the chapter probes into the reasons why Greece's future dictators might have chosen that code name (one of them being their self-referentiality as revolutionaries). The second possible scenario is that the army leadership selected (or signed off on) the code name 'Prometheus', as a token gesture to inspire and unite an otherwise restless and divided Greek officer corps. As is well-known, the upper echelons of the army were themselves planning to stage a coup in Greece in 1967. They were also well aware of the major career-related frustrations of the Greek officer corps since the 1940s. In light of the problems that low morale could pose to the army leadership's designs, I take cue from scholarship on the art of naming military operations in order to ask how the Titan Prometheus may have sought to inspire the men involved in the preparation and execution of the army leadership's coup.

The third scenario discussed by this chapter is the certainty that by projecting their designs onto the Prometheus plan in the weeks leading up to the coup d'état, Papadopoulos, Makarezos and their confederates instigated the formulation of new roles for Prometheus as a deceptive figure in the realm of counter-intelligence. In staking out this multi-angular reading of the ways in which the Prometheus plan and its mythical namesake operated in the interstices between secrecy and disclosure between March and April 1967, Chapter 1 seeks to frame an interpretive context for the Dictatorship of 21 April and its receptions of classical antiquity.

The chapter establishes the close involvement of Greece's future dictators in the statecraft and operations of the pre-dictatorial regime, in order to frame my contention that the Colonels were more interested in reclaiming, rather than reinventing, a repertoire of dominant discursive and visual renderings of antiquity in the period 1967 to 1973. This contention is most demonstrably revisited in Chapter 4 of the project, in which I discuss the visual language of the nationalist mass spectacles of the Dictatorship of 21 April. In parallel, the chapter provides an historical backdrop against which the dictatorship's broader uses of antiquity must be seen, thus preparing the ground for all of the chapters to follow.

Chapter 2 provides a rereading of some of the foremost ideological texts and primers of the Colonels and their ideologues, in order to contend that they utilised an idea of Greek antiquity, the idea of the (ancient) Greek miracle, in such a way so as to promote a culture of developmentalism in Greece. In other words, I show that Greece's dictators (particularly Georgios Papadopoulos) took recourse to the notion of 'the wonder that was Greece' in order to build up a moral imperative for the production of a future Greece that would be developed and competitive. The analytical perspective of this chapter is inspired by Marxist sociologist Nicos Poulantzas's *La Crise des Dictatures* (1975), but departs from the base-superstructure model employed by Poulantzas. Rather, it converses with recent literature on developmentalism as discourse, as belief and as quixotic in terms of its future end goals, in order to further argue that the Colonels were primarily constructing subjecthood around notions of underdevelopment with their nationalist developmentalist discourses. In addition, the chapter frames those discourses in terms of the officers' self-images, their personal ambitions and desires, and concludes by reassessing them within the framework of a broader Cold War discourse of containment.

The chapter begins by departing from the anticipation that a discussion of the dictatorship's ideological discourses should broach this subject through the lens of the

Cold War anti-communist discourse of *ethnikofrosyni* (national-mindedness), an angle of approach that has come to dominate classical reception research on post-war Greece over the past decade. The final sections of the chapter circle back to the instrumentalisation of the classical past in the spirit of anti-communism, in order to propose that studies of the discourse of *ethnikofrosyni* should take into account the commodification of antiquity and antiquities in post-war Greece.

Chapter 3 investigates the ways in which the dictatorship's reversal of a recent educational reform programme in 1967 provided the conditions for the Colonels to progress their dynamic pedagogical and political agendas through the Greek educational system. More specifically, the chapter discusses those earlier curriculums and teaching resources that the dictatorship reinstated in order to hastily replace those it had abolished. Widely viewed by scholars as pedagogically detrimental and as a regression of general education to a state of 'pseudoclassicism' (due to the emphasis on ancient Greek language learning and the pre-eminence of the archaised variety of modern Greek, the *katharevousa*), the chapter does not dispute the legitimacy of these views, but rather asks how the regime's educational revivals worked in its favour. In making the pre-ordained curriculums and textbook narratives converse with the dictatorship's broader school culture, I contend that the teaching resources reinstated by the regime served the Colonels' dynamic agendas particularly well. These agendas included the ingratiation of the dictatorship with powerful stakeholders in traditional humanistic education, the control and discipline of schoolchildren, and the discouragement of secondary school students from entering into higher education.

The chapter additionally brings to light a little-known educational exploit of the Dictatorship of 21 April, as well as the contestedness of its hidden curriculum (which refers to the broader organisation of school life, extracurricular activities and student communities). The exploit in question is the initiative of the dictatorship to distribute busts of Alexander the Great to schools across Greece in late 1971. In showing that the regime made a calculated effort to play down the scope and political implications of this initiative — and thus provided little information on the rationale behind the bust campaign — I provide an interpretation of how Alexander the Great was intended ‘to inspire Greek children from their tender years’ (as per a relevant newsreel) by looking to the political context and the regime’s school culture at that time. The discussion picks up from a remark made by political scientist Jean Meynaud in his examination of the dictatorship in the late 1960s, and proceeds to interpret the case of the busts as an initiative seeking to build a cult of personality for Georgios Papadopoulos, as a unifier of Hellenes and as a modernising ethnarch.

The final section of Chapter 3 engages with the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi* (*Soma Ellinon Alkimon*), a youth organisation with a sinister history that was commandeered by the regime hardliners in the late 1960s. Having shown, first, that Greece’s dictators viewed the youth as a problem (as well as that they relayed their nationalist developmentalist discourses to those audiences in more menacing ways than to older demographics), I demonstrate that the hardliners capitalised on such views in order to organise a paramilitary wing for the dictatorship with its own ideological precepts. That the *Alkimoi* already claimed ties to classical Sparta provided the conditions for the hardliners to progress their agendas for a revival of the ideology of the interwar dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas (1936–41), as well as to further militarise the Corps. This case study represents the most dramatic instance of the ideological cleavages between the Colonels that is covered by the present project.

Chapter 4 turns to the mass spectacles of the Dictatorship of 21 April held at the Panathenaic Stadium in Athens, whose historical pageantry and visual language have earned perhaps the utmost notoriety in terms of their receptions and modes of representation of antiquity. In a departure from aesthetic value judgments and notions of misappropriation, the chapter asks why the uses of the past at those spectacles appear to be so mediated (thus their designations as riddled with ancestoritis and as aesthetically kitsch). More specifically, in this chapter I argue that the regime appropriated certain classicisms precisely for the mediatedness of those classicisms, and for the associations of their modes of representation with particular institutions and interest groups. I focus primarily on the visual language of the spectacles for the celebration of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks (*Imera tis Polemikis Aretis ton Ellinon*; the most notorious of the regime's spectacles) and the spectacles inaugurated by the regime to celebrate the anniversary of the 1967 coup d'état.

In conjunction with a framework of chapters that seek, first, to frame an interpretive context for the Dictatorship of 21 April (Chapter 1), and then to revisit its most infamous receptions of antiquity (Chapters 2–4), this project should be viewed as structured along a fold. Chapters 1 and 4 engage closely with the pre-dictatorial period (although not exclusively so), in order to challenge rigid periodisations of the dictatorship's reception aesthetics and to frame the thesis. Chapters 2 and 3 focus almost exclusively on the dictatorial period. Inspired by the strand of literature that seeks to historicise the Dictatorship of 21 April and to ground it in the political cirumstances of the post-war period in Greece, it is my intention that the chapters converse with one another in an entangling of the dictatorial period and what preceded it.

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Transliteration of Greek Characters into Latin Characters

After George Themistocles Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic. Social Conditions and Party Strategies in Greece* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) p. xxi.

GREEK	**LATIN**	**GREEK**	**LATIN**
α	a	ν	n
β	v	ξ	x
γ	g	ο	o
δ	d	π	p
ε	e	ρ	r
ζ	z	σ	s
η	i	τ	t
θ	th	υ	y
ι	i	φ	f
κ	k	χ	ch
λ	l	ψ	ps
μ	m	ω	o
αυ, ευ, ηυ	av, ev or af, ef, depending on pronunciation	μπ	b if initial, mb otherwise
γγ	ng	ντ	d if initial, nt otherwise
γκ	g if initial, ng otherwise	ου	ou
γχ	nch		

Abbreviations

AHEPA	American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association
AMAG	American Mission for Aid to Greece
ASDEN	Anotati Stratiotiki Dioikisi Esoterikou kai Nison, the Supreme Military Command of the Interior and the Islands
ASPIDA	Axiomatikoi Sosate Patrida Idanika Dimokratia Axiokratia, Officers Save Fatherland Ideals Democracy Meritocracy (meaning ‘shield’)
EAM	Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo, the National Liberation Front
ECA/G	Economic Co-Operation Administration Mission to Greece
EDA	Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera, the United Democratic Left
EENA	Enosis Eleftheron Neon Axiomatikon, the Union of Young Free Officers
EK	Enosis Kentrou, the Centre Union
ELAS	Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos, National Popular Liberation Army
ERE	Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis, National Radical Union
GNTO	Greek National Tourism Organisation
IDEA	Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon, the Holy Bond of Greek Officers
JUSMAPG	Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group
K.A.T.E.	Kentra Anoteras Technikis Ekpaidefseos, Centres for Higher Technical Education
KKE	Kommunistiko Komma Ellados, the Communist Party of Greece
KYP	Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion, the Central Intelligence Service
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SOE	(British) Special Operations Executive

Introduction

Perhaps more so than any other regime in modern Greek history, the right-wing military dictatorship that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974 is notorious for its uses of ancient Greek history and culture. Since, as British historian Richard Clogg has put it, the phenomenon of 'ancestoritis' (the obsessive return to, usually ancient, ancestors) 'has been characteristic of so much of the country's cultural life', this notoriety of the Dictatorship of 21 April is striking.[1] In his topical chapter on the ideology of the dictatorship written in the early 1970s, Clogg himself diagnosed that dictator '[Georgios] Papadopoulos and his colleagues suffer in full measure from […] *progonoplexia*, or ancestoritis'.[2] Anecdotes of megalomaniacal pipe dreams to rebuild the Colossus of Rhodes and of bans on Aristophanic comedies became protagonists in Anglophone obituaries of Papadopoulos in the summer of 1999.[3] In Greece, the ostentatious re-enactments of ancient battles at the regime's mass spectacles for the celebration of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks (*Eortasmos tis Imeras tis Polemikis Aretis ton Ellinon*) continue to fascinate and have figured prominently, in 2017, in tribute articles marking the fifty years since the coup d'état.[4] Today, the Dictatorship of 21 April has made it into the prestigious Classical Presences series of Oxford University Press (with a valuable contribution by Gonda Van Steen and the series' first monograph on such a narrowly delimited period in modern Greek history), while references to the regime's 'ragbag notions about racial purity and heroic ages' have additionally made their way into tourist guides to the Greek islands (admittedly, a peculiar choice).[5]

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[1] Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 3rd edn (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 2.

[2] Richard Clogg, 'The Ideology of the "Revolution of 21 April"', in *Greece Under Military Rule*, ed. by Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (London: Secker & Warburg, 1972), p. 45.

[3] Robert Shannan Peckham, 'George Papadopoulos', obituary, *The Independent*, 27 June 1999 <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/obituary-george-papadopoulos-1102966.html> [accessed 6 July 2017].

[4] Pantelis Boukalas, 'Tou kits i mana', *I Kathimerini* (Athens, 2017) <http://www.kathimerini.gr/906405/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/toy-kits-h-mana> [accessed 15 October 2017]. Thanasis Vasileiou, 'Eksynchronistikes diktatories', *I Efimerida Ton Syndakton* (Athens, 2017) <http://www.efsyn.gr/arthro/eksyghronistikes-diktatories> [accessed 15 October 2017].

In spite of the fact that the uses of the classical past under the Dictatorship of 21 April have stirred the interest of scholars, journalists and other social agents since the dictatorial period, this subject has yet to form a niche of scholarly inquiry. This is perhaps indicative of a general feeling that the dictatorship's discursive and visual renderings of antiquity are all too familiar, a feeling that extends to other aspects of the dictatorial period and which, until recently, had discouraged new scholarship on this regime.[6] This research project aims to address this lacuna in the literature, while critically engaging with the assumptions engendered by the numerous yet predominantly anecdotal accounts of the receptions of antiquity of the Colonels. In doing so, I do not only seek to challenge, but also to explore and substantiate long-held truisms regarding the regime.

More specifically, with this research project I aim to provide a new perspective on the dictatorship, one that engages closely with the contemporaneity of its uses of the classical past (as well as of the mediatedness of that past), but one which departs from an analytical framework that is dictated by the divides that underpin the master narrative of the Cold War (the polarisations between Left and Right, albeit not to the exclusion of those polarisations). In doing so, on the one hand I challenge the lingering proclivity in scholarship and public history to view the dictatorship's receptions of antiquity as signifiers of an abortive recrudescence of fascism in a chronotope when/where fascism did not belong. On the other hand, I problematise the predominant emphasis of recent classical reception research on the relationship between dominant uses of antiquity and anti-communism in post-war Greece (discussed in Section 2 of this introduction). More specifically, whereas scholars have prepared the ground for an incumbent study of the Colonels' practices of classical reception through the lens of the anti-communist discourse of *ethnikofrosyni* (literally 'national-mindedness'), the present thesis proposes a more composite analytical perspective: one that takes into account the articulations of antiquity with power, economic development, upward social mobility, and entertainment and leisure culture in 1960s Greece.

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[5] Lance Chilton, Marc S. Dubin, and Mark Ellingham, *The Rough Guide to the Greek Islands*, 5th edn (London and New York: Rough Guides, 2004), p. 637.

[6] Leonidas Kallivretakis, 'Eptaetia: Sovaro elleima stin istoriki erevna', *Ta Nea* (Athens, 21 April 2007), pp. 10–11.

Informed by the hermeneutics of classical reception studies, and drawing on a range of analytical tools, I argue that the Dictatorship of 21 April found in a multifold set of more or less contemporary classicisms a venerated yet serviceable asset. In referring to the regime's classicisms and receptions of antiquity, here, I mean the diverse processes through which the dictatorship conversed both with an idea of Greek antiquity, broadly understood as a 'set of images, associations and "facts" concerning classical Greece', as well as with the cultural texts that mediated and were mediated by this idea in a particular historical circumstance.[7] By arguing that the regime utilised classical antiquity as an 'asset', my intention is first and foremost to connote the multivalent processes, objectives and implications of reception under the Dictatorship of 21 April. Accordingly, the economic implications of the term, as well as its connotations of actuality and ownership, relate to a number of sub-arguments raised across this project. A subtext that runs across the present study, moreover, is that Greece's dictators maintained an attachment to antiquity for its perceived cultural capital, an implication that the term 'asset' also aims to denote in this context.

The view that the Colonels maintained an attachment to a glorious idea of antiquity and its patriotic, authoritative and prestigious implications is, of course, widely acknowledged by the constellation of studies on other aspects of the dictatorship. However, in squaring this phenomenon in the interstices between acceptable narratives of tyrannical excess (fascism, anti-communism) and reflections on the regime's inscrutable triteness (an example being Clogg's reference to the dictators' 'ancestoritis' above), scholarship presently relies on an analytical framework that, more often than not, renders the dictatorship's uses of the past impenetrable. As classical scholar Katie Fleming observes, 'to single out what, intuitively, we disagree with, or find distasteful, in the usage of ancient sources, figures, images, and so on surely does not get us very far.'[8] In my view, it is largely this sense of impenetrability that continues to fascinate and alarm, an impenetrability that also raises important questions regarding the hold of the dictatorship's authoritarian practices and forms on present-day thinking *vis-à-vis* that regime.

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[7] Neville Morley, *Antiquity and Modernity* (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), p. 141.

This project hopes to contribute toward an aperture and fragmentation of the dictatorship's uses of the past, a multifarious set of practices, which, for all their conspicuousness and ostentation during the dictatorial period, continue to circumscribe and intercept with their seeming inscrutability to this day. It is undeniably true that the ideological discourses of Georgios Papadopoulos, for instance, were riddled with assertions of national exceptionalism and were (and remain) cumbersome to navigate (Clogg 1972: 43). In advocating in favour of more cross-disciplinary methods of enquiry, as well as a revisiting of ideas both old and new, however, the present thesis contends that the closedness of this regime can and should be unpacked.

In what can be described as an exercise in a critical levelling with the dictatorship's multifold and, at times, conflicting, classicisms, this project ultimately aspires to participate in a pointed reframing of the debates surrounding the dictatorship's cultural politics. To this end, the chapters to follow converge on those case studies that have come to acquire the greatest notoriety as paradigms of the Colonels' trite fixations on the ancient ancestors (the ideological discourses, educational policies and mass spectacles of the regime). In departing from established narratives of tyrannical excess, I investigate the conventionality of the dictatorship's recourses to and modes of representation of antiquity, as well as the ways in which social groups other than left-wing citizens became implicated in the regime's power structures of domination. Furthermore, in an intentional effort to evade imposing programmatic order onto the Colonels' politics of reception, this project seeks to offer new insights on the dictatorship as 'an ideological patchwork and a work in progress'.[9] In staking out the above, it is my hope that this thesis will contribute toward opening up a field on which it is possible to better understand the Dictatorship of 21 April on its own terms, as well as the experiences of that regime's subjects, while demonstrating that the classical apparatus of the state in Cold War Greece was more heterogeneous than has traditionally been assumed.

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[8] Katie Fleming, 'The Use and Abuse of Antiquity: The Politics and Morality of Appropriation', in *Classics and the Uses of Reception,* ed. by Charles Martindale and Richard F. Thomas (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 129.

In the chapters to follow (outlined in Section 4 of this introduction), I focus on the period 1967 to 1973. My decision to taper the research project in such a way so as to encompass most, but not the entire scope of the dictatorship (which fell in July 1974), comes down to the toppling of Georgios Papadopoulos by hardliner Dimitrios Ioannidis (1923–2010) on 25 November 1973. The change of guard in power, at that juncture, marks the conclusive discontinuation of a number of publications, initiatives and spectacle repertoires that form the main case studies of this project. Furthermore, although the identities of the dictatorship's foremost personalities remained relatively constant during the first six years of the regime, the dynamic agendas of the dictators and the emergent cleavages between them, alone, require a diversified approach to the regime's politics of reception. In other words, it is for reasons of research structure and economy of space that I focus on the so-called Papadopoulos years. In order to steer clear of an approach that presents too homogeneous or centralised an account of the dictatorship and its classical receptions, however, I make a number of necessary digressions. These digressions include the concerted efforts of the dictatorship hardliners to institutionalise a totalitarian youth organisation that drew inspiration from classical Sparta in the late 1960s to the early 1970s (in Chapter 3).

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[9] Dimitris Antoniou, 'The Junta through the Lens of World War II', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 35.2 (2017), p. 285.

Since this project does not seek to provide a fluid narrative of the Dictatorship of 21 April inasmuch as to broach a kaleidoscope of case studies and aphorisms from different angles, Section 1 of this introduction provides a necessary and succinct overview of the dictatorial period 1967 to 1973.

I. The Dictatorship of 21 April

In the early hours of 21 April 1967, a cadre of middle-ranking officers staged a coup d'état in Greece. The plan for the coup was executed swiftly and with great success for its leading perpetrators — Colonels Georgios Papadopoulos (1919–99) and Nikolaos Makarezos (1919–2009), and Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos (1912–2016) — a feat largely owed to the fact that the plan had been primed over the previous few months for an imminent coup of the Greek army leadership. Within twenty-four hours of the coup, the police, gendarmerie and a small number of army officers had dragged out of bed and arrested over 8,000 citizens (among them being senior officers, the caretaker Prime Minister and MPs of the Centre, Left and Right);[10] columns of tanks had rolled into the main Greek cities and were stationed outside government buildings; communications and airports were shut down and soldiers in tin helmets patrolled the countryside.[11] At dawn, the radio announced that martial law had been declared by royal decree, thus immediately suspending a number of constitutional articles that protected citizens against unlawful arrests and that safeguarded their rights of assembly and association, the freedom of the press and secrecy of correspondence.[12] By the evening of 21 April, the Greek king, Constantine II, had begun to form a new cabinet (under duress), with Colonel Papadopoulos appointed as Minister to the Presidency, Colonel Makarezos as Minister of Coordination and Brigadier Pattakos as the new Minister of the Interior. As a gesture of compromise with the Crown, the officers became saddled with a civilian prime minister, the former Prosecutor of the Supreme Court Konstantinos Kollias, who was himself a figure of questionable integrity and repute.[13]

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[10] Leonidas Kallivretakis, 'Politikoi kai diktatoria tis 21is Apriliou: Mia apopeira apografis', in *I diktatoria ton syntagmatarchon & i apokatastasi tis dimokratias*, ed. by Pavlos Sourlas (Athens: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon, 2016), p. 243.

Within the first week of the officers' takeover, official justifications for the coup d'état seesawed between denouncements of the corruption and irresponsibility of Greece's political elites, impending communist insurrections and the insidious threats of a general state of moral decline and social anarchy.[14] These disparities attest to the officers' major doubts regarding the success of their coup in the first place and to the lack of coordination between them thereafter. The initial statements issued by the various spokespersons of the new regime were aligned first and foremost in their representations of the coup and dictatorship as emergency measures. The threat of a communist uprising was soon adopted as the official pretext for both, the dictatorship branded itself as the 'Revolution of 21 April' and Greece ultimately remained under dictatorial rule for seven years.

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[11] 'Greece: Liberty Is Put to Sleep', *The New York Times* (New York, 30 April 1967), p. 190. Richard Eder, 'Salonika Is Quiet as Troops Parade', *The New York Times* (Salonika, 24 April 1967), pp. 1 & 6.

[12] Martial law was declared with the forged signature of the king and was therefore itself unconstitutional. Giorgos Papadimitriou, 'I atelesfori prospatheia ggia ti syntagmatiki organosi tou diktatorikou kathestotos', in *I diktatoria 1967-1974: Politikes praktikes-Ideologikos logos-Andistasi*, ed. by Gianna Athanasatou, Alkis Rigos, and Seraphim Seferiadis, 3rd edn (Athens: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 1999), pp. 53–4.

[13] Konstantinos Kollias had served as the lead prosecutor in the trial regarding the assassination of popular left-wing MP Grigoris Lambrakis in May 1963 and had made a name for himself for obstructing the inquiry into that high-profile and momentous case. Evi Gkotzaridis, *A Pacifist's Life and Death: Grigorios Lambrakis and Greece in the Long Shadow of the Civil War* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), pp. 366–7.

[14] For the regime's first official proclamation to the Greek public see Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou, *Politiki agogi* (Athens: KABANAS-HELLAS, 1970), pp. 224-6. Two days after the coup, the new spokesman of the dictatorship and the former MP of the far-right wing of the National Radical Union (*Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis*, ERE), Nikolaos Farmakis, stated that the coup d'état had taken place to prevent a 'communist revolution' 'fomented by former Premier Georgios Papandreou' (a liberal politician and an anti-communist). Henry Kamm, 'Junta in Greece Says Coup Balked Papandreou Plot', *The New York Times* (Athens, 24 April 1967), pp. 1 & 5. A few days later, during his first press conference with Greek and foreign correspondents, Georgios Papadopoulos professed that the real danger was 'an anarchic mentality which had been imposed upon almost all of the people in society' and which menaced to 'cut off the Nation from its onward course [away] from Communism'. Georgios Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 1 (Athens: Geniki Diefthynsi Typou, 1968), p. 10.

During their first eight months in power, the officers navigated an uneasy symbiotic relationship with the Crown and attempted to legitimise their regime by capitalising on the climate of communisto-phobia cultivated by Greece's political and social elites over the previous few years.[15] This period was also marked by the implementation of an armoury of measures of control, including the declaration of martial law, the arrest and incarceration of thousands of citizens, the banning of political parties and youth organisations, and the imposition of preventive censorship. Notably, the inclusion of classical texts in the regime's first Book Index of banned books in 1967 — most influentially immortalised in the closing credits of the Academy award-winning anti-dictatorial film *Z*, by Costa Gavras (1969) — quickly earned the dictatorship a reputation as a monstrous political animal that was dissentient of the values most prized by the West. In addition to the hold of classical cultural texts on the Western imaginary and its canon, the preventive censorship of texts from the so-called Golden Age of classical Athens was alarming to observers at a time when liberal democracy enjoyed ideological hegemony in both the West and in Greece.[16]

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[15] Despina Papadimitriou, 'I ideologia tou kathestotos', in *I stratiotiki diktatoria 1967-1974*, ed. by Vangelis Karamanolakis (Athens: Dimosiografikos Organismos Lambraki, 2010), pp. 105–6. As Despina Papadimitriou has shown, public discourses that converged on anti-communism, anti-parliamentarism and the decline of traditional values had proliferated in Greece in the period 1965 to 1967. Despina Papadimitriou, 'I diktatoria tis 21is Apriliou kai i ideologiki proetoimasia gia tin apodochi tis', in *I diktatoria ton syntagmatarhon & i apokatastasi tis dimokratias*, ed. by Pavlos Sourlas (Athens: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon, 2016), pp. 35–49.

In December 1967, however, the abortive counter-coup of the Greek king (and his and Kollias's effective self-exile thereafter) cleared the way for Papadopoulos's ascension to the apex of power and ushered in a period of consolidation and relative stability for the dictatorship. Between late 1967 to 1973, Papadopoulos assumed the posts of Prime Minister (1967–73), Minister of National Defence (1967–73), Minister of Education (1969–70), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1970–73) and Minister of Social Policy (1971–73). Following the king's counter-coup, the leading triumvirate also resigned from the military, adopted civilian attire and institutionalised their authority with a rigged referendum that introduced a new constitution in September 1968. As historian Eleni Kouki has recently shown, it was also in 1968 that the regime adopted the palingenetic phoenix fronted by a silhouette of a soldier as its official symbol (see Appendix 1).[17] In spite of some major challenges faced by the regime along the way — including an attempt on Papadopoulos's life, international injunctions for human rights violations, cleavages within the regime's ranks, and large-scale protests at the funerals of former liberal Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou in 1968 and Nobel laureate George Seferis in 1971 — the dictatorship enjoyed relative stability until 1973.

Beginning in early 1973, however, a series of civilian protests and military mutinies shook the foundations of the dictatorship and exacerbated the divides between its foremost personalities.[18] In light of this situation, in June of that year, Papadopoulos announced the transition of the dictatorial regime into some form of democracy, calling for a referendum to introduce a new constitution, in order to transform the Greek political system into a republic with Papadopoulos as president. This liberalisation experiment aggravated the discontent of the regime hardliners. Following the violent suppression of the landmark event of resistance against the dictatorship, the student uprising at the Athens Polytechnic in November 1973, the Ioannidis counter-coup toppled Papadopoulos on 25 November of that year.

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[16] Giorgos Kaminis, 'Diktatoria kai syntagma sti notia Evropi: Ellada-Ispania-Portogalia', in *I Diktatoria 1967-1974: Politikes praktikes-Ideologikos logos-Andistasi*, ed. by Gianna Athanasatou, Alkis Rigos, and Serafeim Seferiadis, 3rd edn (Athens: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 1999), p. 67. As Gonda Van Steen elucidates, the dictatorship's first Book Index blacklisted mostly Marxist and Russian literature, certain works of Aristotle and 'suspect' translations of Aristophanes and the classical tragedians, as well as a number of studies by classical philologists and historians. Gonda Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance Under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967-1974* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 97–99.

[17] Eleni Kouki, 'Politikes gia ton elencho tou ethnikou parelthontos apo to kathestos tis 21is Apriliou', unpublished doctoral thesis (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2016) pp. 142-151.

II. Classical Prisms: Refractions of Tyrannical Excess

There is a general consensus among scholars (albeit a partial and often understated one) that the Dictatorship of 21 April was 'ruthless and reprehensible' but that it cannot be designated as a fascist regime.[19] The main quandary regarding this consensus is that interpretations of fascism have proven to be contingent as well as contested,[20] and that understandings of the reasons why the Greek regime should not be designated as fascist have conversed with the diverse vantage points and paradigmatic shifts in political theory and comparative fascist studies since the 1960s. Evidently, to engage with the debates on the definitions of fascism lies outside the scope of this introduction. One recurrent and prevalent observation among scholars is that, whether by virtue of its ideology or its style of political action, the dictatorship failed or lacked the drive to mobilise a mass movement.[21] The development of a mass organisation or movement was a characteristic feature of numerous fascist regimes of the interwar period, including non-Axis variants such as the Romanian Legionary Movement (or Iron Guard; 1927–41) and the Brazilian Integralist Action (1932–37).[22] A corollary of this first observation is that the Greek regime was overwhelmingly more reactionary than politically transformative or culturally radical — be it in terms of its attachments to established power structures, or of the form, content or extra-linguistic manifestations of its ideology.[23] It is true that in branding itself as the 'Revolution of 21 April' and adopting the palingenetic phoenix as its symbol, the discursive practices of the Dictatorship of 21 April bore some formal affinities with what scholars have identified as the 'palingenetic ultra-nationalism' of fascism.[24] However, as Roger Eatwell has indicated, the notion of palingenesis (rebirth) can also operate as a 'philosophically banal' concept — an observation which seems to be substantiated rather than challenged by the regime's political and cultural practices.[25] In my view, the

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[18] Sotiris Rizas, 'Esoteriki kai oikonomiki politiki', in *I stratiotiki diktatoria 1967-1974*, ed. by Vangelis Karamanolakis (Athens: Dimosiografikos Organismos Lambraki, 2010), pp. 88.

[19] Walter Laqueur, *Fascism: Past, Present, Future* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 115.

[20] For a succinct and critical overview of the competing interpretations of fascism, see Daniel Woodley, *Fascism and Political Theory: Critical Perspectives on Fascist Ideology* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 1–13.

[21] Clogg, 'The Ideology of the "Revolution of 21 April"', p. 53. Theodore A. Coloumbis, 'The Greek Junta Phenomenon', *Polity,* 6.3 (1974), pp. 350–51. Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of Dictatorships: Portugal,*

Greece, Spain, trans. by David Fernbach (London: NLB, [1975] 1976), p. 56. Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, 2nd edn (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, [1978] 1979), pp. 112–13. David H. Close, *Greece Since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society* (Essex: Pearson Education, 2002), pp. 118–19. Meletis Meletopoulos, *I diktatoria ton syntagmatarchon: Koinonia, ideologia, oikonomia*, 3rd edn (Athens: Ekdoseis Papazisi, [1996] 2008), p. 281.

[22] Leandro Pereira Gonçalves and Odilon Caldeira Neto, 'Brazilian Integralism and the Corporatist Intellectual Triad', *Protuguese Studies*, 32.2 (2016), 225–43. Oliver Jens Schmitt, 'Approaching the Social History of Romanian Fascism', *Fascism*, 3.2 (2014), 117–115.

[23] In his *Fascism and Dictatorship* (first published in French under the title *Fascisme et Dictature* during the dictatorial period) Marxist political sociologist Nicos Poulantzas draws a brief contrast between the structurally transformative mass base of fascist regimes and 'the case of movements installed from below by means of the [existing repressive state] apparatus and its branches, as with some military dictatorships of "colonels"'. Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, trans. by Judith White, ed. by Jennifer O'Hagan, and Timothy O'Hagan (London and Norfolk: Verso), p. 338. On the dictatorship's use of the *katharevousa* (the linguistic form of its discourses) and on this archaised variety of Greek as the language of officialdom, see Alexandros Argyriou, 'To yfos mias glossas kai i glossa enos yfous', in *Dekaochto keimena*, ed. by Giorgos Seferis (Athens: Kedros, 1970), pp. 189–204. On the content of the dictatorship's ideological discourses as reactionary see Clogg, 'The Ideology of the "Revolution of 21 April"', pp. 53–54. Gonda Van Steen describes the dictatorship's mass spectacles as 'the fascist equivalent of classicizing, historicizing, or patriotic drama in its reactionary definition'. Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance Under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967-1974*, p. 31.

[24] Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance Under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967-1974*, pp. 31–32 n. 37. British historian Roger Griffin has argued that the *sina qua non* of generic fascism is its 'palingenetic ultra-nationalism', a blend of palingenetic myth (a utopian myth of rebirth), populist ultra-nationalism (the 'charismatic' galvanisation of a revolutionary mass movement under a new leading elite) and a myth of decadence (granting currency and impetus to the palingenetic myth). Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London and New York: Routledge, [1991] 2006), pp. 38–40.

[25] Roger Eatwell, 'On Defining the "Fascist Minimum": The Centrality of Ideology', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 1.3 (1996), pp. 311–12.

following observation of Meletis Meletopoulos is a most apposite one: whereas there are undeniable correspondences between fascism and the militaristic outlooks of the regime's personalities, this does not necessarily entail that the regime was itself fascist.[26]

In spite of this relative consensus, it is often the case that the dictatorship's engagements with the classical past are assessed against the (wavering) yardstick of fascism — a comparative perspective whose tenacity attests to what Fleming describes as the temptation 'to isolate [a dictatorship's] appropriations of the past within an acceptable narrative of tyrannical excess'.[27] The designation of the dictatorship as fascist is genealogically bound up with the oppositional discourses of the Greek Left and other social agents during the dictatorial period.[28] Yet the use of classical antiquity as a vector to further articulate the regime with fascism was most influentially established in Greece in the 1980s. Informed, in particular, by theorisations of fascism as reactionary and by mass culture theories of kitsch, the narrative put forward in the 1980s (principally in the domain of public history) used classical culture in such a way so as to expose a genealogy of the repression of the Greek Left that extended from the interwar dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas (1936–41) to the Dictatorship of 21 April.[29] With its focus on the ways in which unchecked power has historically made a spectacle of classical antiquity (and, by extension, of repression) in twentieth-century Greece, this narrative rediscovered and analysed the regime's nationalist mass spectacles at the Panathenaic Stadium.

However, and notwithstanding the ethical responsibility of scholarship to recognise and position itself in relation to matters of repression, designations of the dictatorship as fascist have much larger implications for the study of this regime than are perhaps immediately apparent. As Dimitris Antoniou argues, ‘thinking of 21 April as a straightforwardly fascist regime nowadays creates a rigid framework of historical enquiry’ and this framework makes many an aspect of the regime appear ‘as a complete paradox’ (2017: 285; 286). To this observation I add that, more often than not, the paradoxes engendered by this conceptual framework lead scholars to conclude that the dictatorship represented an abortive recrudescence of fascism, instead of offering a critical reassessment of the framework itself.

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[26] Meletopoulos, *I diktatoria ton syntagmatarchon: Koinonia, ideologia, oikonomia*, p. 275.

[27] Katie Fleming, 'Fascism', in *A Companion to the Classical Tradition*, ed. by Craig W. Kallendorf (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p. 342.

[28] Eleni Kouki and Dimitris Antoniou, 'Making the Junta Fascist: Antidictatorial Struggle, the Colonels, and the Statues of Ioannis Metaxas', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 35.2 (2017), 451–80.

[29] Jessica Kourniakti, 'From Fascist Overload to Unbearable Lightness: Recollections of the Military Junta as Kitsch in Postdictatorial Greece', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 35.2 (2017), pp. 351–55.

Scholars who have expressed their reluctance to identify the dictatorship as fascist, and who regard fascism as revolutionary and as radicalising, have described the regime’s nationalist ideology as ‘pseudo-fascist’ and its mass spectacles as ‘quasi-fascist’ — or as ‘the fascist equivalent of classicizing, historicizing, or patriotic drama in its reactionary definition’.[30] Such approaches are underpinned by the notion that the regime failed to meet certain ideological or aesthetic criteria, a notion that ultimately renders the regime’s ideological and cultural politics impenetrable. It is in light of this impasse that the ideology of the dictatorship has perforce been reconstituted out of anecdotes, such as the slogans and maxims of the Colonels (‘Greece of the Christian Hellenes’, *Ellas Ellinon Christianon* and the ‘Helleno-Christian Civilisation’, *Ellinochristianikos Politismos*), or formidable episodes of brutality (the beating up, in 1968, of two Greek journalists for suggesting that ‘many of the worthies of ancient Greece had been homosexual’; the assailant was notorious hardliner, Colonel Ioannis Ladas).[31] In a similar vein, the spectacles of the dictatorship have earned fleeting descriptions as ‘kitsch popular extravaganzas’ and as ‘characterized by a delirium of kitsch nationalism’, in which the use of evocative adjectives communicate a level of nationalist ostentation that is practically indescribable.[32] The alternative, of course, is to actually describe in enlightening but painstaking detail the historical pageantry and militaristic performances that punctuated these events, which Gonda Van Steen has done, albeit in a self-professed state of disbelief (leading her to ask: ‘were these grandiose but clumsy displays really meant to instill patriotic pride in the Greek tradition?’; 2015: 163). Although not always made explicit, it is my view that such approaches almost invariably use the classical past as a signifier of the regime’s tyranny, only to foil such apprehensions by signposting its doctrinal or executive failures. In saying this, I do not mean to imply that the dictatorship is trivialised by scholars. Irony represents a perfectly legitimate way to approach the dictatorship and to retrospectively divest it of its authoritarian power. As I hope has become clear from this discussion, however, such approaches carry self-imposed limitations that do not help to understand the dictatorship inasmuch as to reproduce its perceived incoherence.

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[30] Respectively: Clogg, ‘The Ideology of the “Revolution of 21 April”’, p. 53. Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance Under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967-1974*, pp. 169, 31.

[31] Clogg, ‘The Ideology of the “Revolution of 21 April”’, pp. 41, 37.

Before addressing the ways in which scholars have prepared the ground for a study of the dictatorship’s uses of the classical past through the lens of Greek Cold War anti-communism, note should be made of the prevalence of comparisons between the Dictatorship of 21 April and the interwar dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas. More specifically, scholars have often pointed out that a number of the Colonels underwent their military training, in their ‘impressionable and formative years’, under Metaxas’s ‘Fourth of August Regime’. This is undeniably true; among the most prolific figures of the subsequent dictatorship, Georgios Papadopoulos, Nikolaos Makarezos and Ioannis Ladas (1920–2010) enrolled at the Evelpidon Military Academy in 1937 and graduated in 1940; the slightly older Stylianos Pattakos graduated in 1938.[33] According to Vangelis Angelis, while the propaganda of Metaxas was not as systematically enforced at the Military Academy as in other institutions (universities, the academies of the security forces), 'the general spirit that prevailed at the time certainly affected the psychology of the cadets'. As the same scholar additionally notes, however, comparative approaches to the regime of the 1930s and that of the late 1960s often 'place their comparative outlooks in a static perspective', in a vein that overlooks the turbulent years and developments that intervened between them.[34] Furthermore, As Eleni Kouki and Dimitris Antoniou have recently shown, even in cases where the period between the two dictatorships is factored in, 'understanding the regime as ideological kin to that of Ioannis Metaxas has nowadays become mainstream' and this has come to 'dictat[e] that a proper examination of the junta's ideology should start in 1936'.[35]

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[32] Dimitris Papanikolaou, *Singing Poets: Literature and Popular Music in France and Greece* (London: Legenda, 2007), p. 130. Kostis Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics and the Long 1960s in Greece* (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013), p. 97.

In agreement with these observations and their advocacy for a departure from this tradition in scholarship, it is important to add that the links drawn between the nationalist visions of the Fourth of August Regime and the Dictatorship of 21 April are often tenuous. Indicatively, the Colonels' slogan 'Greece of the Christian Hellenes' — which became 'blazoned on walls, in neon signs at the airports and along the motorways'[36] — has often been likened to the tripartite structure of Metaxas's 'Third Hellenic Civilisation'.[37]

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[33] George Zaharopoulos, 'Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece', in *Greece Under Military Rule*, ed. by Richard Clogg and George Yannnopoulos (London: Secker & Warburg, 1972), pp. 31–32. Thanos Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy* (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), p. ix. Leonidas Kallivretakis lists a number of additional Military Academy classmates who participated in the *coup d'état* of 1967 or who became appointed to positions of power under the dictatorship of 21 April. Leonidas Kallivretakis, 'Ti synevi ton Ianouario tou 1968; Fatriastikes syngrouseis kai diplomatikes dolichodromies stin poreia statheropoiisis tou diktatorikou kathestotos', *Archeiotaxio*, 16 (2014), pp. 180-1.

[34] Vangelis Angelis, 'Change and Continuity: Comparing the Metaxas Dictatorship and the Colonels' Junta in Greece', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 27.3 (2016), pp. 46, 39.

[35] Kouki and Antoniou, 'Making the Junta Fascist: Antidictatorial Struggle, the Colonels, and the Statues of Ioannis Metaxas', p. 452.

[36] Athenian [Roufos], *Inside the Colonels' Greece*, trans. by Richard Clogg (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1972), p. 120.

[37] Zaharopoulos, 'Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece', pp. 32–33. Clogg, 'The Ideology of the "Revolution of 21 April"', p. 54.

However, this motto mainly resembled Metaxas's nationalist vision in terms of sloganistic form. As Philip Carabott explains, Metaxas viewed the Hellenistic, Ottoman and post-1830 periods as 'lacking in splendor and grandeur'. By contrast, the austere military state of ancient Sparta and, to a lesser extent, ancient Macedonia, coupled with the flourishing of culture and the arts in Classical Athens (but to the exclusion of its democratic polity), represented for Metaxas the 'First Hellenic Civilisation'. The second, the Byzantine Empire, 'was credited for forging a religious ideal which it instilled in millions' and for the emergence of 'enlightened autocrats', who had survived via the institution of the monarchy.[38] The 'Third Hellenic Civilisation' was envisioned to be that of Metaxas's Fourth of August Regime.

By contrast, the Dictatorship of 21 April did not propose a tripartite model of national history interceded by periods of decline, but rather a narrative of perpetual Hellenic military and cultural indestructibility. For instance, the foremost ideological primer of the dictatorship (Clogg 1972: 46–48), published in 1970 for the re-education of citizens and written by one of the regime's leading ideologues, Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou, presented the Hellenistic period as a time during which

> the Greek language became a universal language, the Greeks came to play an international role and the sciences, particularly [the fields of] astronomy, mathematics, geography, medicine and physics, principally advanced by Greeks, became enormously developed, the only comparable [development to which] made its appearance in Europe from the 17th century.[39]

Furthermore, and unlike Metaxas, the Colonels idealised the democracy of classical Athens, an appreciation that has also earned a place among 'the semantic difficulties involved in the regime’s understanding of terms such as “democracy”, “liberal”, “popular”, “parliamentary”, “freedom” etc.’ (Clogg 1972: 36).

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[38] Philip Carabott, 'Monumental Visions: The Past in Metaxas' Weltanschauung', in *The Usable Past: Greek Metahistories*, ed. by Keith S. Brown and Yannis Hamilakis (Lanham, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2003), pp. 29, 31, 29–31.

[39] Papakonstantinou, *Politiki agogi*, p. 430.

This is not to suggest that placing the Dictatorship of 21 April in a comparative perspective with the Fourth of August Regime is necessarily a futile exercise. In the chapters to follow, there arise a number of examples in which the influence of the nationalist visions of Metaxas and an admiration of that dictator are apparent (among them being the ideological perspectives of Ioannis Ladas and his protégé, Konstantinos Plevris, and the Spartan visions of the youth organisation of the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi*, *Soma Ellinon Alkimon*). However, to propose the existence of unmediated links between the two regimes is to overlook the transformative experiences and developments of the 1940s and the post-war period, and to ultimately present the Dictatorship of 21 April as an anachronism.

Between the 1980s and 1990s, there emerged an important strand of literature on the dictatorship that sought precisely to understand the historical circumstances that made the Dictatorship of 21 April possible in 1960s Greece.[40] With their emphasis on the macrohistorical implications of the Greek Civil War (1946–49), as well as the interwar period, the studies in question provided the conditions for a turn to genealogical investigations of the regime’s ideological discourses and political practices. Of particular relevance, here, are those studies that focused on the institutionalisation of anti-communism as the dominant discourse and organising principle of the Greek post-war state and of the Dictatorship of 21 April, under the watchword of ‘*ethnikofrosyni*’

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[40] Dimitris Antoniou and others, ‘Introduction: The Colonels’ Dictatorship and Its Afterlives’, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 35.2 (2017), pp. 281–2. Among the studies of the 1980s and 1990s are Nicos Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974: Opseis tis ellinikis embeirias*, ed. by Venetia Stavropoulou, 3rd edn (Athens: Ekdoseis Themelio, [1983] 1995); Meletopoulos, *I Diktatoria ton Syntagmatarchon: Koinonia, ideologia, oikonomia*; Gianna Athanasatou, Alkis Rigos, and Seraphim Seferiades (eds.), *I Diktatoria 1967-1974: Politikes praktikes-Ideologikos logos-Andistasi* (Athens: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 1999).

(literally, ‘national-mindedness’).[41] Broadly understood as a discourse that converged on a ‘set of negative myths and stereotypes intended to portray the Greek Left as a segment of society divested of its “Greekness”’,[42] *ethnikofrosyni* was supported by a range of aggressive policies that sought to criminalise Communism and to exclude left-wing citizens from political and civic life in post-war Greece. As a number of scholars have shown over the past decade, the repression and othering of leftists encompassed the instrumentalisation of diverse classical cultural texts in the pre-dictatorial period (among these cultural texts were material culture, ancient drama, classical philosophy and the democracy of classical Athens).[43] Given that the Dictatorship of 21 April was a violently anti-communist regime and capitalised on those measures put in place in the name of anti-communism in Cold War Greece (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this project), there is good reason to anticipate that the present project might, too, focus on the uses of the classical past against the Greek Left.

Yet, and for a number of reasons, to approach the dictatorship’s receptions of antiquity as a reworking of Greek Cold War anti-communism would be a limiting angle of enquiry. The ideological dichotomies presupposed by the master narrative of the Cold War can blind us to a wider array of implications that classical culture came to acquire in post-war Greece, and which had a strong bearing on the dictatorship’s perspectives on and uses of antiquity. For instance, it is my view that within the intensified counter-intelligence environment of the Cold War, code names culled from classical antiquity worked in such a way so as to reinforce the sense of insubordination of Greek intelligence officers to civilian rule. This point raises larger implications regarding the heterogeneity of the Greek Right and the complexity of the strategic functions of the classical apparatus of the state in post-war Greece (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1 of this project). In parallel, the dependence of the Greek post-war regime on the repressive apparatuses of the state (the army, but also the police forces, gendarmerie and KYP; *Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion*, the Central Intelligence Service) encouraged a sense of entitlement to state power and its discursive and visual renderings among career officers who were so inclined. This point is crucial in understanding the reasons why Greece's future dictators would become more interested in reclaiming, rather than reinventing, the historical narratives of 1950s schoolbooks and an existing repertoire of nationalist pageantry, for instance (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively). Furthermore, if *ethnikofrosyni* is primarily understood as a reactionary discourse that othered the Left with few properties unto itself except in the negative (or negating), this discourse does not account for the dictatorship's all-encompassing ideological politics of futurity and national development, within which the classical past took centre stage (Chapter 2). The commodification of antiquity and antiquities, too, be it for the purposes of mass tourism, public relations campaigns or sheer entertainment, must be viewed within the perspective of the upswing in mass leisure and popular culture in the decade of the 1960s.

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[41] Constantine Tsoucalas, ‘The Ideological Impact of the Civil War’, in *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, ed. by John Iatrides (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 320–37. Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974: Opseis tis ellinikis embeirias*. Constantine Tsoucalas, ‘The Ideological Impact of the Civil War’, in *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, ed. by John Iatrides (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 320–37.

[42] Alexander Kazamias, ‘Antiquity as Cold War Propaganda: The Political Uses of the Classical Past in Post-Civil War Greece’, in *Re-Imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, ed. by Dimitris Tziovas (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 128.

[43] Yannis Hamilakis and Eleana Yalouri, ‘Antiquities as Symbolic Capital in Modern Greek Society’, *Antiquity*, 70 (1996), pp. 124–25. Eleana Yalouri, *The Acropolis: Global Fame, Local Claim (Materializing Culture)* (Oxford: Berg, 2001), pp. 43–44. Yannis Hamilakis, *The Nation and Its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 205–241. Gonda Van Steen, *Theatre of the Condemned: Classical Tragedy on Greek Prison Islands* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Alexander Kazamias, 'Antiquity as Cold War Propaganda: The Political Uses of the Classical Past in Post-Civil War Greece'.

This project seeks to position itself within a growing body of literature that takes a culture-oriented approach to the Dictatorship of 21 April — an area of enquiry invested both in exploring the cultural genealogies at play during the dictatorial period, and in arriving at a better understanding of the cultural politics of that period on its own terms. An analytical schema that an emerging generation of scholars is increasingly referring to as the 'continuities and ruptures' thesis,[44] this approach was initially motivated by a research agenda that sought to challenge the widely-held view that the Dictatorship of 21 April cut off a budding cultural spring in 1960s Greece. Since the late 1990s, scholars have increasingly focused on countercultural practices under the regime, with an eye to demonstrating that creative expression and the acculturation of international cultural currents continued under the censorship of the Colonels, albeit in necessarily (and, at times, radically) renegotiated ways.[45] More recently, scholars have turned to exploring the cultural politics of the regime itself, in order to challenge rigid periodisations and frameworks of enquiry, as well as to bring to light largely unexplored facets of the dictatorship (for instance its mass spectacles, uses of history and modernisation projects).[46] Perhaps the two most significant contributions of this latter strand of scholarship are its unfolding of how the Dictatorship of 21 April renegotiated various cultural and modernisation projects inherited from the pre-dictatorial period, and its unravelling of the plurality of the dynamics at play within the ranks of the dictatorship itself (and, by extension, its cultural politics). It is to this strand in the cultural turn in dictatorial scholarship that present thesis hopes to contribute. Informed by the hermeneutics of classical reception studies, it seeks to depart from making value judgments on the dictatorship's aesthetics of reception, and to rather ask why and how the regime's uses of classical antiquity have appeared to be reactionary or inconsistent in the past. In parallel, the project engages with the new implications that pre-ordained cultural texts acquired during the dictatorial period, as well as with a set of lesser-known reception exploits of the Colonels themselves.

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[44] Kornetis, p. 4. Antoniou and others, p. 282. Paschalis Samarinis, 'Urban Politics, Planning, and Public Discourses on the City During the Greek Dictatorship (1967-1974): Continuities and Ruptures in Postwar Modernization', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 35.2 (2017), 397–424.

[45] Karen Van Dyck, *Kassandra and the Censors: Greek Poetry since 1967* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Gonda Van Steen, 'Playing by the Censors' Rules? Classical Drama Revived under the Greek Junta (1967-1974)', *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 27.1–2 (2001), 133–94; Papanikolaou, *Singing Poets: Literature and Popular Music in France and Greece*; Dimitris Papanikolaou, '"Kanontas kati paradoxes kiniseis": O politismos sta chronia tis diktatorias', in *I stratiotiki diktatoria 1967-1974*, ed. by Vangelis Karamanolakis (Athens: Dimosiografikos Organismos Lambraki, 2010), pp. 175–96; Thomas Doulis, *The Iron Storm: The Impact on Greek Culture of the Military Junta, 1967-1974* (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2011); Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics and the Long 1960s in Greece*; Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance Under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967-1974*.

[46] Kostas Katsapis, 'Proslipseis tou parelthondos apo ti Diktatoria tis 21is Apriliou: I ennoia tis "andreias" kai i diacheirisi tou 1821', in *I Elliniki Epanastasi tou 1821: Ena evropaïko gegonos*, ed. by Petros Pizanias (Athens: Kedros, 2009), pp. 389–406. Gonda Van Steen, 'Rallying the Nation: Sport and Spectacle Serving the Greek Dictatorships', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 27.12 (2010), 2121–54. Dimitris Antoniou, 'Unthinkable Histories: The Nation's Vow and the Making of the Past in Greece', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 34.1 (2016), 131–60. Kouki, 'Politikes gia ton elencho tou ethnikou parelthondos apo to kathestos tis 21is Apriliou'. Paschalis Samarinis, 'Urban Politics, Planning, and Public Discourses on the City During the Greek Dictatorship (1967-1974): Continuities and Ruptures in Postwar Modernization'. Michalis Nikolakakis, 'The Colonels on the Beach: Tourism Policy During the Greek Military Dictatorship (1967-1974)', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 35.2 (2017), 425–50.

III. The Classical Asset

On a fundamental level, dictatorships appropriate from revered cultural traditions in order to legitimise power and to justify policy. This is particularly well-attested in classical reception research, which has demonstrated that uses of classical antiquity are not limited to dictatorships of the Right (as evidenced, for instance, by the Soviet Union's promotion of the Marxist revolutionary paradigm of class struggle, the Thracian slave Spartacus), nor to dictatorships that strictly belong to the West.[47] More that providing a set of merely rhetorical or symbolic devices, the past has been used by dictators in order to provide their doctrines with a sense of authenticity and intellectual foundations, as well as to imbue their world views with vitality. Indicative, for instance, are the philological, archaeological and physical anthropology projects commissioned in the latter half of the twentieth century by the Albanian communist chief of state, Enver Hoxha (1908–1985) — a set of projects that sought to scientifically demonstrate the descent of the Albanian people from the ancient Illyrians and their autocthonous ethnogenesis from their neighbouring Balkan peoples.[48] The vitality and charisma of Italian Fascism, argues Jan Nelis, derived from 'the tension between the essentially *passatista* ("which looks mainly to the past") *romanità* [the cult of Rome] and Fascism's modernism', a tension made manifest in the architectural style of Benito Mussolini's dictatorship through 'a sort of stripped classicism with modernist influences'.[49] Of course, at the heart of dictatorial appropriations of antiquity is also the objective to galvanise the support of the subjects. In appropriating cultural texts and narratives with popular resonances (such as that of a glorious national past), dictators seek to win over support for their state-sponsored ideologies and political practices.

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[47] Wolfgang Zeev Rubinsohn, *Spartacus' Uprising and Soviet Historical Writing* (Oxford: Oxbow, 1987). Zara Martirosova Torlone, Dana Lacourse Munteanu, and Dorota Dutsch (eds.), *A Handbook to Classical Reception in Eastern and Central Europe* (Oxford & New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017).

The method of enquiry of classical reception entails placing a cultural text that is received on equal footing with its receiving culture, and the interpretation of the diverse ways in which the two converse with one another in specific contexts. Intended, initially, to radically challenge positivistic views of ancient Greece and Rome, as well as essentialist interpretations of the 'traditions' and 'legacies' of these cultures to the post-classical world,[50] the reception model of parity also has important implications for approaches to a receiving culture. In particular, in adopting this model, the literature on receptions of antiquity under different forms of dictatorship has developed strategies in order to level with such regimes, without inadvertently veering into the terrain of apologisms or exculpations of dictatorships. I have already mentioned, in the previous sections of this introduction, Katie Fleming's discussion of the morality of appropriation under fascist regimes (understood as a process of reception that entails the act of taking possession of an ancient cultural text to serve contemporary circumstances and agendas), in which she concludes:

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[48] Michael L. Galaty and Charles Watkinson, 'The Practice of Archaeology under Dictatorship', in *Archaeology Under Dictatorship*, ed. by Michael L. Galaty and Charles Watkinson (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004), p. 9.

[49] Jan Nelis, 'Constructing Fascist Identity: Benito Mussolini and the Myth of Romanità', *Classical World*, 100.4 (2007), pp. 407, 408.

[50] Charles Martindale, *Redeeming the Text: Latin Poetry and the Hermeneutics of Reception* (Cambridge, New York and Oakleigh, Victoria: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. xiii.

> simply to dismiss, explicitly or implicitly, the appropriation of antiquity in the fascist regimes in the twentieth century as abuse is to understand neither the dynamics of that appropriation nor, ultimately, the regime that made it.[51]

It should be noted that those scholars who have engaged with the Dictatorship of 21 April and its receptions of antiquity generally do not present the regime as abusive of the classical past, mainly because they do not subscribe to positivistic interpretations of that past. It is rather more common to encounter, in these works, the implicit notion of misappropriation, a value judgment that gestures both to moral reprehensions of the dictatorship's uses of force and to its apparent failure to meet the ideological and aesthetic standards of fascism. As I hope has become clear from the previous section of this introduction, it is my view that the notion of misappropriation poses almost insurmountable obstacles to the study of the dictatorship's classical receptions. For this reason, such a study benefits greatly from the critical levelling between received and receiver proposed by classical reception studies.

This brings me to a second way in which my research project is informed by this field. I have indicated that scholars have developed strategies through which to engage with the processes of classical reception under dictatorships, one of which, as we have already seen, is the heuristics of appropriation. The notion of appropriation, which is underpinned by a recognition of the agency of the receiver and is able to connote power, has been applied to the political cultures of a wide range of dictatorial regimes, including Mussolini's cult of *romanità* and Metaxas's Third Hellenic Civilisation.[52] Of course, political appropriations of the past are necessarily accompanied by (often telling) exclusions of other cultural texts and can manifest in various ways, including rewriting, citation, re-imaging and other forms of representation.[53] Equally important, however, are other processes of reception whose underpinnings are not necessarily grounded in the uses of antiquity as a means to an end, and which are not entirely 'active'.[54] How is it possible, for instance, to square classical appropriation with the reinstatement of (otherwise obsolete) ancient history schoolbooks under the Dictatorship of 21 April (discussed in Chapter 3), when these textbooks were not reinstated in 1967 for their felicitous versions of the past inasmuch as for their availability to hastily substitute other textbooks, introduced between 1965 and 1966?[55] More importantly, how is it possible to engage with the ways in which the content of these textbooks acquired new meanings in the dictatorial context? In my view, the answers to such questions can be provided by the notion of 'interaction', which is so central to classical reception, expounded by Katherine Harloe as the dialogical relationship between how different agents may 'bring extremely different frames of reference to [an] interaction' and how cultural texts can 'shape receivers' values, expectations and goals' within particular contexts.[56]

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[51] Fleming, 'The Politics and Morality of Appropriation', p. 137.

[52] Nelis. Carabott.

Third, the emphasis of classical reception on the mediatedness of an idea of antiquity and of the 'classical' — as well as that of the cultural texts that both condition and are conditioned by these ideas — is particularly relevant to a dictatorship whose receptions of antiquity were, for lack of a better term, conspicuously mediated (thus their designations as ‘reactionary’ and as characterised by ‘ancestoritis’). As James Porter elucidates, classicism, ‘an awareness of and appreciation for what is classical, however that is understood’,[57]

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[53] Lorna Hardwick and Christopher Stray, 'Introduction: Making Connections', in *A Companion to Classical Receptions*, ed. by Lorna Hardwick and Christopher Stray (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), pp. 1–10. Jessica Priestley and Vasiliki Zali, 'Introduction', in *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Herodotus in Antiquity and Beyond*, ed. by Jessica Priestley and Vasiliki Zali (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2016), p. 2.

[54] Miriam Leonard and Yopie Prins, 'Foreword: Classical Reception and the Political', *Cultural Critique*, 74.1 (2010), p. 4.

[55] Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and Modernization in Greece* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, Bureau of Research No. 7–1111, 1974), pp. IX-1–2.

[56] Katherine Harloe, 'Can Political Theory Provide a Model for Reception? Max Weber and Hannah Arendt', *Cultural Critique*, 74.1 (2010), pp. 19, 20.

> is no one thing […]. Across its various modes, however, one trait remains stubbornly the same. In whatever form it obtains, *classicism is a transferential experience*, and is forever mediated by a middle term. The classical is never directly apprehended: it always comes indirectly and secondhand, which is to say that it is the transference not merely of a perception, *but of an illusion*, or fantasy about the past. Only, the fantasy had is always courtesy of *another’s* fantasy, triangulated around some imaginary object.[58]

The inevitability of the mediatedness of reception provides a helpful vantage point from which to reconceptualise the negative exceptionalism of the reception practices of the Dictatorship of 21 April as regressive or as pathologically trite. Such a reconceptualisation is necessary if we intend to step away from semi-derisive approaches to the Colonels’ cultural politics, and toward a better understanding of the transferential experiences through which they arrived at their classicisms, as well as the wider social implications of those classicisms in the period 1967 to 1973.

It can be claimed that the Greek dictatorship’s receptions of antiquity were conspicuously mediated in that, unlike the reception practices of twentieth-century fascist dictatorships, for instance, the Colonels did not proactively seek to reinvent the grammar of the past in order to construct new world views. Indicatively, scholars have long observed that the vitality of the revolutionary cultural doctrine of Fascist Italy was ‘based largely on a skilful reformulation and a new application of nationalist ideology’ that blended Roman imperial visions with modernism.[59] While it was not strictly a fascist regime, the ‘Third Hellenic Civilisation’ of the Metaxas dictatorship also drew inspiration from an historical schema advanced by nineteenth-century Greek romantic nationalism, one reworked under the Fourth of August Regime to engineer Metaxas’s ‘New State’ (*Neon Kratos*).[60] By contrast, the nationalist narrative promoted by the foremost personalities of the Dictatorship of 21 April adhered to a well-established grammar of cultural continuity invented in the nineteenth century (a point I will return to below). In drawing this contrast, my intention is not to suggest that the dictatorship failed to fascistise, but rather to make a helpful comparative distinction on the point of mediatedness in terms of form and content.

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[57] James I. Porter, ‘What Is “classical” about Classical Antiquity? Eight Propositions’, *Arion-Journal of Humanities and the Classics*, 13.1 (2005), p. 30.

[58] Ibid., p. 54. (Porter’s emphases.)

[59] Philip V. Cannistraro, ‘Mussolini’s Cultural Revolution: Fascist or Nationalist?’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 7.3–4 (1972), p. 116. See also Romke Visser, ‘Fascist Doctrine and the Cult of Romanità’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 27.1 (1992), 5–22.

At this juncture, it is important to elaborate on two points arising from the main argumentation of this project. These are what I have termed the classical apparatus of the state in post-war Greece and the notion of antiquity as an asset. In referring to the classical state apparatus my objective is not to suggest that the Greek post-war state was in possession of an immutable instrument that was somehow ‘classical’. Rather, my intention is to indicate a network (or an economy) of heterogeneous elements associated with antiquity that operated, dynamically, at the intersections between power and knowledge.[61] In the conflict-ridden decade of the 1940s and in post-war Greece, the functions of the classical state apparatus could be both ideological and repressive.[62] Perhaps the most salient example of these dynamics is that of the prison camp on the island of Makronissos between 1947 and 1951, where political internees were required to build replicas of classical monuments and theatres as part of their re-indoctrination and forced labour regimes. As Yannis Hamilakis explains, on Makronissos the internees'

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[60] Metaxas’s trilateral model adapted from the example most influentially set in the nineteenth century by historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, in his multivolume *History of the Greek Nation* (serialised between 1860 and 1874). Aristotle A. Kallis, ‘Fascism and Religion: The Metaxas Regime in Greece and the “Third Hellenic Civilisation”. Some Theoretical Observations on “Fascism”, “Political Religion” and “Clerical Fascism”’, in *Clerical Fascism in Interwar Europe*, ed. by Matthew Feldman, Marius Turda, and Tudor Georgescu (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 26. In addition to his rejection of classical Athenian democracy, Metaxas looked to the Minoan Bronze Age for recently excavated symbols of robustness, renewal and power that could be sacralised and interfused with Christianity (notably the labrys, or the Minoan double-axe). Marina Petrakis, *The Metaxas Myth: Dictatorship and Propaganda in Greece* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 221 n.103. Hamilakis, pp. 185 n. 22, 202.

[61] Giorgio Agamben, *What Is an Apparatus? And Other Essays*, trans. by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, [2006] 2009), p. 3. My perspective on apparatuses is informed, here, by Giorgio Agamben’s development of Michel Foucault’s concept of the *dispositif* (apparatus), as well as by the vast corpus of literature on the prominent role(s) of classical antiquity in the formation and renegotiations of the modern Greek identity and nation state.

> 'building, literally, with their own hands, "ancient Greece" in the present, was aimed at inscribing upon their bodies the idea that not only is Greekness at odds with ideologies such as communism, but also that the Greek Civil War was just another re-run of the millennia-old national drama, where Hellenism fights its "others".[63]

In this context, the symbolic value of classical monuments served the ideological politics of othering and indoctrination of the anti-communist Greek regime, while the materiality of the monuments provided the conditions for the forced physical exertion, control and repression of prisoners.

For the purposes of this thesis, though, I view the classical apparatus of the state as predominantly ideological and as that which operated at the intersections between the 'triangle of power' of Greece's post-war regime; that is, between the Crown, the army and the political elites of the Right.[64] As Nicos Mouzelis puts it:

> Although it would be a gross error to see the throne, the army, and the right-wing parliamentary leadership as a monolithic alliance, it is quite true that in the early fifties, when the system of repressive parliamentarianism was working quite smoothly, these three power centres presented a united front to the outside world. Their differences would only

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[62] After Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, the ideological apparatus of the state refers to a loose cluster of institutions that exercise power in functioning by and for ideology (among them being political, educational, religious and cultural institutions, as well as the family). In this framework, ideology is constituted of the dialogical relationship between the imaginary positioning of individuals in relation to their sociopolitical context, and their practices that (re)produce that context and its power structures; tese dynamics are taught by the ideological apparatuses. The repressive apparatuses of the state are those institutions that exercise power in their functioning by repression and violence (the army, the police, the prisons, the courts). Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)', in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, ed. by Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 127–86.

[63] Hamilakis, p. 224.

[64] Christos Kassimeris, *Greece and the American Embrace: Greek Foreign Policy Towards Turkey, the US and the Western Alliance* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), p. 58.

> emerge once the existing system of political controls could no longer cope with the massive social changes and popular dissatisfaction of the late fifties and early sixties.[65]

The classical apparatus of the state, then, also refers to the ways in which a set of elements associated with antiquity participated in the formation and presentation of ideological alliances between the three centres of power (to the exclusion of the Left and, in the 1960s, of the non-Right), as well as to the ways in which these major stakeholders came to use the same elements to undermine one another. The dynamics of these processes are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1 of this research project, as are the transferential experiences through which Greece's dictators came to lay claim to the classical past in order to partake in these antagonistic relationships.

As I have indicated above, in arguing that the regime used classical antiquity as an 'asset', I want first and foremost to convey the multiplicity of the processes, objectives and effects of reception of the Dictatorship of 21 April. These practices and their implications are approached on a chapter-by-chapter basis. For reasons of posterity, however, it is necessary to provide a brief review in relation to what I have signposted as the actuality and cultural capital of the classical past, which I will now go on to do in relation to the dictatorship's positioning *vis-à-vis* the Greek language question and its maxim of the 'Helleno-Christian Civilisation'.

Scholarship on the cultural history of Greece has established the prominent role of classical antiquity in the formation of the Modern Greek identity and the Greek nation state; it has further established the intricacies of the dynamics between successive, coeval — and often competing — imaginings of Hellenism, before, during and ever since Greek Independence. The decades-long Greek language question, a diverse and complex trajectory of disputes over which variety of modern Greek should become the official language of the state — the *katharevousa* (literally the 'purist', archaised language) or the demotic vernacular — represents the foremost case in point. As Peter Mackridge explains:

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[65] Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, pp. 117–18.

> At the heart of the Greek language question was the desire to develop a written language that would reflect an ideal national image that would in turn embody and express the relationship of the modern Greeks to the ancients. The problem was that different members of the Greek elite entertained different versions of this national image. Archaists and purists claimed that the best way to demonstrate the modern Greeks' connection with the ancients was to imitate Ancient Greek linguisting models (chiefly in vocabulary and morphology), while vernacularists (later known as demoticists) argued that they could best demonstrate their direct cultural descent from the ancients by writing in a variety of Greek that was as close as possible to the spoken tongue, since, they asserted, the spoken language was the outcome of the natural and continuous development of the Greek language from ancient times to modern times.[66]

A controversy that originated in the eighteenth century (prior to Greek Independence, which was acquired in the early nineteenth century), and which continued in its various permutations until the fall of the dictatorship in 1974, the language question was both one of competing visions of the Greek national identity, and of competing claims to cultural authority and power (Mackridge 2009: 5). Whereas the debates themselves presented (often radically) different perspectives on the issue, both ultimately affirmed the cultural ties of modern Greece to ancient Greece. In this sense, it can be claimed that the Colonels' use and promotion of the *katharevousa* (the official language of the state since 1911) was a banal nationalist one (after Michael Billig).[67] Given that the *katharevousa* was also viewed as the language of officialdom in the 1960s and that it continued to be the language used in universities,[68] however, the Colonels' uses of that idiom should also be seen in relation to their class and power aspirations, 'as a sign of education, as a status symbol'.[69] Crucially, and as Chapter 3 will go on to show, the Greek language controversy was very much in the air in the mid-1960s, a circumstance that permitted the Colonels to make allies out of powerful stakeholders in traditional humanistic education and in the pre-eminence of the *katharevousa*.

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[66] Peter Mackridge, *Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766-1976* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 2.

[67] After Michael Billig, nationalism is an 'endemic condition' in established nations, and 'banal nationalism' refers to the daily and discursive flagging (and, by extension, the renewal) of nationhood. Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 6.

[68] Argyriou.

The narrative of Greek continuity espoused by Greece's dictators was, too, an old one. The earliest known use of the term 'Helleno-Christian' (*ellinochristianikos*) is found in the introduction of Spyridon Zambelios to a short collection of Greek folk songs published in 1852.[70] Considered as one of the pioneers of Greek romantic historiography, Zambelios is credited for conceiving of a new schema of national history in the nineteenth century (constituted of the continuity between classical, medieval and modern Hellenism), as well as for integrating the Byzantine Empire into that narrative at a time when Byzantium was generally seen as incompatible with the rationalist ideals of the European Enlightenment and their acculturation in Greece.[71] The same narrative of continuity was most influentially established by historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos in his multi-volume *History of the Greek Nation* (*Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*) serialised between 1860 and 1874.[72] As historian Antonis Liakos elucidates, the narrative put forward by Greece's romantic historians reconstructed national time in the mid-nineteenth century, so as to fill the 'immense time gap[s]' between classical antiquity and the revival of antiquity in modern Greece (revivalism being the original constitutive myth of the Greek nation state).[73]

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[69] Othon Evangelos Anastasakis, 'Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece: Ideology and Education under the Dictatorships of 1936 and 1967' (London School of Economics and Political Science, 1992), p. 221.

[70] Konstantinos Th. Dimaras, *Ellinikos Romantismos* (Athens: Ekdotiki Ermis, 1982), p. 378.

[71] Ibid., pp. 376–7.

[72] Ibid. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, 'On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea', in *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity*, ed. by David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 1998), pp. 25–33.

[73] Antonis Liakos, 'Hellenism and the Making of Modern Greece: Time, Language, Space', in *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, ed. by Katerina Zacharia (Hampshire and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Variorum, 2008), p. 206.

In the twentieth century, however, the concept of Helleno-Christianity was additionally transformed into a tool used by institutions of power for the purposes of social edification, as well as to serve the anti-communist cause of the post-war state.[74] In adopting this maxim (and its sloganised derivative, ‘Greece of the Christian Hellenes’) the dictatorship was therefore able to lay claim to its patriotic, religious and moralistic implications, to assume command of a mission to re-educate their Greek subjects and to ostensibly legitimise the pretext for the 1967 coup d’état (revisited in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of this project).

In short, whereas the Colonels’ recourses to classical antiquity derived, for the most part, from precepts and narratives established in the spirit of nation-building in the nineteenth century, those precepts and narratives continued to be renegotiated in the twentieth century and to acquire new implications. It was precisely this multifold mediatedness of classicisms that Greece’s dictators sought to capitalise on in the period 1967 to 1973, not solely in the spirit of fashioning an image for themselves as anti-communist patriots, but also in order to present themselves as cultured (and, where necessary, as civilised), to exert power and to ingratiate themselves with powerful interest groups. The cases of the contemporary Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships were different in that they had been in power long enough to reinvent themselves and their pasts by the 1960s. Following the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), the regime of General Francisco Franco promoted archaeological research on Spain in the Roman and Visigothic periods, particularly because it was argued that it was during those periods that Spain had first become united.[75] Until he was incapacitated in 1968, the Estado Novo

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[74] Effi Gazi, *O defteros vios ton Trion Ierarchon: Mia genealogia tou ‘ellinochristianikou politismou’*, 2nd edn (Athens: Nefeli, 2004). Peter Mackridge, ‘Cultural Difference as National Identity in Modern Greece’, in *Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, ed. by Katerina Zacharia (Hampshire and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), p. 302 n. 17.

[75] Margarita Díaz-Andreu, ‘Archaeology and Nationalism in Spain’, in *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology*, ed. by Philip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 39–56.

(New State) regime of António de Oliveira Salazar promoted the Portuguese Copper Age as ‘a prehistoric mirror image of Salazar’s vision for an ideal Portugal’, as a colonial and missionising power.[76]

Finally, and relatedly, it should be indicated that my perspective in this project is informed by scholarship that reads modern Greek identity politics through a postcolonial lens and which emphasises the double-edged relationship of western Philhellenism with modern Greece since the turn of the nineteenth century. The history of modern Greece is closely intertwined with European (and beginning in the late 1940s, American) interference in that country, not in the formal sense of political colonisation, but rather through a less obvious form of cultural colonisation, underpinned by Greece’s economic dependence on western nations. Described as Greece’s ‘crypto-colonial’ constitution,[77] the crux of this phenomenon lies in the interplay between the tendency of western nations to view modern Greece through the idealised lens of its ancient past on the one hand (often resulting in unrealistic projections onto the Greek people) and the efforts of the Greek people to play up to western imaginings of Hellenism on the other (leading to the effective ‘colonization of the ideal’ self, or the Greeks’ effective self-colonisation).[78] In particular, I find Artemis Leontis’s discussion of ‘Neohellenism’s contrapuntal relation with Western Hellenism’ to be a particularly helpful analytical approach, in that it grants agency to the self-colonised and acknowledges that such processes can work advantageously with regard to the agendas of the subjects.[79]

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[76] Katina T. Lillios, ‘Nationalism and Copper Age Research in Portugal during Salazar Regime (1932–1974)’, in *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology*, ed. by Philip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 57, 67.

[77] Michael Herzfeld, ‘The Absence Presence: Discourses of Crypto-Colonialism’, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 101.4 (2002), 899–926.

[78] Stathis Gourgouris, *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution Modern Greece* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 124. Artemis Leontis, *Topographies of Hellenism: Mapping the Homeland* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 11. Vangelis Calotychos, *Modern Greece: A Cultural Poetics* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2004), pp. 47–53.

[79] Leontis, *Topographies of Hellenism: Mapping the Homeland*, p. 9.

IV. Project Structure

In light of the fact that the objective of the present thesis is to contribute to a critical reframing of the reception politics of the dictatorial period, the chapters to follow focus on a set of case studies that have come to acquire notoriety as the pinnacles of the Colonels' so-called ancestoritis and pseudoclassicism. These are the ideological discourses, educational policies and the mass spectacles of the Dictatorship of 21 April (Chapters 2, 3 and 4, respectively). This selection of case studies permits re-readings of those reception practices that have been designated as paradigms of the anachronistic or trite nationalism of the Colonels, through investigations of the recent genealogies that conditioned the regime's receptions, as well as the new implications acquired by pre-dictatorial classicisms in the dictatorial period. Furthermore, each of the case studies presents opportunities to examine a number of lesser-known or less studied reception exploits of the Dictatorship of 21 April, among them being Papapdopoulos's promotions of classical antiquity as a conduit to national economic development, the distribution of hundreds of busts of Alexander the Great to schools in the winter of 1971, and the spectacles inaugurated by the dictatorship for the celebration of the anniversary of the coup d'état. Chapter 1 stands out from the rest in that it primarily seeks to frame an historical and interpretive context for the Dictatorship of 21 April and its receptions of antiquity. It assumes as a case study the operational code name 'Prometheus' (that is, the code name of the military operation that brought the Colonels to power), in order to provide a conceptual map for the context of production of the dictatorship's classicisms.

A second way in which to view the configuration of this project is by identifying the chapters as structured along a fold. Chapters 1 and 4 engage closely with the pre-dictatorial period (albeit not exclusively so), in order to propose a reframing of rigid periodisations of the aesthetics of reception of the dictatorship, as well as to frame the present project. Chapters 2 and 3 focus predominantly on the dictatorial period. In structuring the thesis thus, it is my intention that the chapters converse with one another in an entangling of the dictatorial period and what preceded it. This is not to suggest that I am proposing that the nature of this dictatorship was commensurate with the precarious parliamentary system of the post-war period in Greece. Nor do I subscribe to alternate periodisations proposed by scholars, such as the 'long Civil War' or the 'long 1960s' (although my perspective is informed by such approaches).[80] Rather, in what follows, I hope to contribute toward a grounding of the dictatorship and its multifold aesthetics of reception in their political, social and cultural contexts, as well as to a teasing out of ideas, both old and new.

Chapter 1 takes as a point of departure the illustrious military contingency plan code named 'Prometheus', which, as is well-known, brought the Colonels to power in 1967. Informed, in particular, by the body of literature on the historical circumstances that made the Dictatorship of 21 April possible, and in drawing on theories of counter-intelligence, this chapter unfolds three scenarios surrounding the implications of the naming of the operation and the functions of its code name between March and April 1967.

Through a discussion of Prometheus plan my objective is not to ascribe a meaning to its code name but rather to demonstrate that, even in circumstances when meaning is inapparent, a query into disparate processes of reception can function as a helpful exercise in order to better understand their context of production. This point is representative of the broader spirit of this project. In fact, one could argue that a code name is uniquely poised to provoke reflection on the complexity of the mediatedness of reception, an exercise that might bring to light otherwise unexplored facets of its genealogical complexity or uncharted links between the interlocutors implicated in that process. This is because, ideally, a code name is chosen by agents of counter-intelligence for its perceived discongruity with particular designs and circumstances in the present. In the absence of evidence of code-naming protocol, then, an investigation of an operational code name culled from classical antiquity must necessarily look to the transferential experiences (after Porter 2005) though which said agents arrive at such an appropriation of antiquity. In the case of this chapter, such a query works to provide an historical backdrop to the dictatorship, to position Greece's future dictators in close proximity with the so-called triangle of power in the pre-dictatorial period, and to advance the argument that the officers had their own stakes in preserving the traditions of certain dominant classicisms after their coup d'état. Similar questions are revisited in Chapters 2 to 4 of the project.

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[80] The phrase 'the Greek Thirty-Year-War' was coined by writer Alexandros Kotzias in 1979 in order to express the polarisation between Left and Right from the mid-1940s to the fall of the dictatorship in 1974. Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance Under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967-1974*, p. 7 n. 7. This phrase is more or less commensurate with the periodisation termed the 'long civil war', which recent scholarship on the pre-dictatorial period has employed. See, for instance, Gkotzaridis. The 'long 1960s' heralds from British historian Arthur Marwick and proposes a periodisation of seemingly contradictory socio-political phenomena and cultural politics that spans, more or less, from 1959 to 1974. For an example of its application to the Greek case, see Kornetis.

Chapter 2 begins by veering away from an investigation of the ideological discourses of the Dictatorship of 21 April through the lens of the anti-communist discourse of *ethnikofrosyni*, in order to arrive at a reframing of that discourse in the final sections of the chapter. More precisely, in this chapter I argue that the Colonels (Georgios Papadopoulos, in particular), as well as their ideologues, utilised an idea of antiquity, the idea of the (ancient) Greek miracle, in order to promote a culture of developmentalism in Greece. This analytical perspective is inspired by, but does not strictly adhere to, that of Marxist political sociologist Nicos Poulantzas, whose 1975 *La Crise des Dictatures* located developmentalism and a drive for technical progress within the regime's ‘ideology of technocracy’.[81] Rather than taking an approach framed by the base-superstructure model akin to that used by Poulantzas, the chapter converses with recent literature on developmentalism as discourse, as belief and as quixotic in terms of its end goals. In doing so, I show that the Colonels and their ideologues promoted the idea of the Greek miracle in such a way so as to galvanise a sense of moral accountability and patriotic industriousness for the production of a future, developed and competitive Greece, and contend that these discourses ultimately amounted to constructions of subjecthood around notions of ‘un-Greek’ underdevelopment in the present.

The chapter frames these discourses in relation to the officers’ self-referentiality as guarantors of post-war stability and prosperity (a self-image that derived from their involvement in the conflicts of the 1940s, outlined in Chapter 1), as well as to their personal ambitions and desires. It addresses, moreover, the underlying frames of reference that those discourses shared with the discourse of *ethnikofrosyni* and a broader Cold War discourse of containment. In concluding the chapter on that note, I propose that understandings of *ethnikofrosyni* should be opened up to new readings that take into account the commodification of antiquity and antiquities in post-war Greece, as well as the implications of such practices with regard to social groups that are not limited to left-wing citizens.

Chapter 3 builds on the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2, particularly with regard to higher education, while considering the ways in which an educational policy heavy in traditional humanism (understood here as an emphasis on ancient Greek language learning and the archaised variety of modern Greek) and pre-ordained textbook narratives came to acquire new significations under the dictatorship. I take as a starting point the consensus in the literature that the dictatorship aimed (and accomplished) to methodically reverse a set of modernising educational reforms ushered in by the Centre Union between 1964 and 1965. In particular, I focus on the pre-1964 educational agenda and teaching resources that the dictatorship reinstated in 1967 (in order to hastily replace those that it had withdrawn), a revival that has been described by scholars as a regression of the Greek educational system to pseudoclassicism. Notwithstanding the fairness of critiques in terms of the detrimental pedagogical effects of the regime’s interventions in education, I argue that the reinstatement of a curriculum heavy in traditional humanism, along with the respective teaching resources, served the dynamic agendas of the dictatorship particularly well.

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[81] Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain*, trans. by David Fernbach (London: NLB, [1975] 1976), p. 120.

In order to arrive at a better understanding of the new implications acquired by pre-ordained curriculums and narratives under the dictatorship, I contend that these should be read as interacting with the dictatorship’s broader school culture. Concurrently, I contend that that school culture, as well as the educational agenda reinstated by the regime, can offer valuable insights to otherwise obscure educational initiatives taken by the Colonels themselves, namely: a little-known intiative to distribute busts of Alexander the Great to schools across Greece in 1971.

Furthermore, in this chapter I engage with the discrepancies between the Colonels’ attitudes to young pupils and their profound mistrust of the youth (teenagers, university students, young adults). I show that in viewing the youth as a problem, the Colonels relayed their nationalist developmentalist discourses to these audiences in more menacing ways than to older demographics — a point that substantiates the argument in Chapter 2 that such discourses were intricately linked with a securing and perpetuation of the dictatorship’s power and control. This mistrust also made allowances for the regime hardliners to commandeer a youth organisation with a sinister history and to present it as the official Scout movement of the regime. The organisation in question was the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi*, whose identifications with classical Sparta permitted the hardliners to progress their own visions for a revival of Metaxas's 'Fourth of August Regime' in Greece of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The case of the *Alkimoi* represents the most dramatic example of the ideological cleavages within the dictatorship's ranks addressed by this project.

Chapter 4 focuses on the genealogical complexity of the repertoires of the regime's nationalist mass spectacles, and mirrors Chapter 1 in its close engagement with the pre-dictatorial period. In particular, the chapter seeks to show that inscribed in the visual language of the historical pageantry of the dictatorship were multifold classicisms associated with particular institutions of power (notably, the Crown and the Greek military), diaspora tourism and contemporary entertainment culture (such as Greek film musicals). In staking out an analysis of this complexity, with particular emphasis on the spectacles for the celebration of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks (the most infamous of the regime's mass spectacles), my aim is to evade value judgments on the aesthetics of those events, to rather frame those aesthetics as mediated classicisms themselves, and as appropriated with a purpose under the dictatorship. In framing the chapter thus, I contend that the uses of the classical past at the regime's spectacles should be viewed as inextricably linked with their modes of representation, a contention that is supported by the shifts in the visual language of the events, depending on whom they were addressed to and why.

For the discussion of the dictatorship's spectacles for the celebration of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks, I am indebted to historian Leonidas Kallivretakis who has shared with me a file from his personal archival collection on this subject. Kallivretakis's file titled '*Polemiki Areti*' (Combative Virtue) consists of newspaper articles and images that map a genealogy of the celebrations, from their institutionalisation in 1959 to commemorate the anniversary of the defeat of the Left in the Greek Civil War, to their replacement with the 'Day of the Armed Forces' (*Imera ton*

Enoplon Dynameon) in 1975. The articles are arranged chronologically and are divided across three periods: the pre-dictatorial, dictatorial and post-dictatorial periods. In light of the fact that the file itself demonstrates that re-enactments of mythical and historical battles were already being staged at the spectacle of 1966, Chapter 3 does not strictly adhere to the periodisations of the collection. It rather takes as a point of departure the event of 1965 (when the first historical pageant was introduced into the repertoire of the spectacles), whose scenario and visual language are not covered in the file.

The project draws on a range of primary source material, including the ideological primers and newsreels produced by the dictatorship, pro-dictatorial newspapers — principally *Eleftheros Kosmos* (Free World) and *Nea Politeia* (New State) — as well as other press publications that continued to circulate under the regime (for instance, the Athens dailies *Ta Nea* and *To Vima*, and the daily of Thessaloniki, *Makedonia*). Among the limitations of the newspaper articles published under the dictatorship is that, after the lifting of preventive censorship in 1970, publishers and journalists were able to evade republishing the details of the dictatorship's activities. An indicative example is a spectacle held for the third anniversary of the coup d'état in 1970, whose repertoire was particularly rich in its references to pre-historic and ancient Greece (as evinced by a relevant newsreel), but whose organisational details were largely absent from contemporary newspaper articles. Of course, the years of preventive censorship left much excluded from the printed press, while the dictatorship's policy to prescribe articles that newspapers were obligated to publish resulted in identical accounts of particular events across different publications (Van Steen 2015: 163). Furthermore, whereas newsreels provide valuable live-action footage of the dictatorship's activities, it is also important not to lose sight of the fact that they present highly selective and mediated frames of those activities, which the dictatorship sought to present as realities. My discovery of a documentary with technicolour footage of one of the regime's mass spectacles (*Greece* *of the Christian Greeks*, 1972; see Appendix 12) has further put into perspective the powerful visual elements that are lost in the monochrome footage of newsreels.

In order to piece together the scope of the dictatorial initiative to distribute busts of Alexander the Great to schools in 1971 (discussed in Chapter 3), I have taken recourse to the blogosphere and the digital archives produced by individuals of their hometowns and schools (evidence of which is shown in Appendix 3). Source material on this particular case study has otherwise been difficult to uncover (with the exception of a newsreel and newspaper article in *Eleftheros Kosmos*), and has not even been encountered by scholars whose archival research has specifically focused on the public portraiture of historical figures under the dictatorship (the scholar in question is Eleni Kouki, whom I consulted in 2017). It is possible that municipal archives hold further material on this case study and others, some of which can be accessed through the Greek General Archives of the State (*Genika Archeia tou Kratous*, GAK), but most of which has yet to be digitised and to be made accessible to scholars outside of Greece.

The secondary sources consulted for the purposes of this project range from the seminal collective volume *Greece Under Military Rule*, edited by Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos and published during the dictatorial period (1972), to recent scholarship in Greek and unpublished doctoral projects. In light of the fact that the dictatorship's receptions of classical antiquity have yet to form a niche of scholarly enquiry, however, the subject-specific secondary literature consulted for this project is necessarily limited.

Chapter 1:
The Faces of Prometheus:
A Retelling of the 1967 Coup d'État

Between March and April 1967, the Prometheus myth provided the nominal auspices for the preparation of two distinct yet contiguous plots for a coup d'état in Greece. The first was a design of the upper echelons of the army (with the support of the Crown), who plotted to forestall, at all costs, the growing certainty that Georgios Papandreou and his liberal Centre Union party (*Enosi Kentrou*, EK), would emerge with a majority in the Greek general elections scheduled to take place on 28 May of that year.[82] The second was the clandestine plot of a cadre of middle-ranking officers, whose most pressing goal had become to outmanoeuvre the coup of their superiors (although the election and its predicted outcome were also catastrophic in their view). The two coup designs converged on the deployment of the same contingency plan, which, in March 1967, was revised under the new code name 'Prometheus'.[83] While the army leadership were in the process of deliberating over the tactical considerations of their coup, in the early hours of 21 April 1967 their subordinates executed the Prometheus plan of their own accord.

In this chapter, I use the Prometheus plan and its mythical namesake as a vantage point from which to frame an interpretive context for the Dictatorship of 21 April and its receptions of classical antiquity. By unravelling the intersections of competing designs on the same contingency plan, my objective is to position Greece's future dictators in relation to the pre-dictatorial centres of power, while conversing with recent literature that casts light on the historical circumstances that made the Dictatorship of 21 April possible. In parallel, my objective is to highlight the compositeness and ambiguities of the classical apparatus of the state in pre-dictatorial Greece — an analytical perspective that is served well by the calculated abstraction of a code name culled from classical antiquity. More specifically, in what follows I am less interested in the intended meaning (if any) of the code name ‘Prometheus’ than in the ways in which its mythical namesake lends himself to multiple, yet contextually specific, interpretations. In staking out this two-pronged analysis, I seek to demonstrate that the economy of the classical apparatus of the pre-dictatorial state was more heterogeneous than has traditionally been assumed, and that Greece’s future dictators were not bystanders, but active participants in the production of its complexity.

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[82] On the growing certainty that the Centre Union would win the general election of May 1967 and the various plans put forward to forestall the elections, see Ilias Nikolakopoulos, *I Kachektiki Dimokratia: Kommata Kai Ekloges, 1946-1967* (Athens: Ekdoseis Pataki, 2001), pp. 355-368.

[83] Leonidas Kallivretakis, 'I Omada Papadopoulou Stin Teliki Eftheia Pros Tin Exousia (1966-1967)', in *I Stratiotiki Diktatoria 1967-1974*, ed. by Vangelis Karamanolakis (Athens: Dimosiografikos Organismos Lambraki, 2010), pp. 78-80, 73-74.

Although well-known, the Prometheus plan has yet to be approached in such a way so as to explore how its mythical namesake operated in the interstices between secrecy and disclosure in the months leading up to the coup d’état of April 1967. In doing so, I begin by adding to the conceptual map of the classical apparatus of the state the strategic function of counter-intelligence, broadly understood here as a defensive or offensive activity that relies on a fusion of security and intelligence, and which works against an opposition’s intelligence activities.[84] The strategic function of counter-intelligence is followed by that of the appeasement and inspiriting of the Greek officer corps. First, however, it is necessary to establish the context within which the designs for two coups d’état became formulated.

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[84] Hank Prunckun, *Counterintelligence: Theory and Practice* (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto and Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), p. 42.

I. The Events of July 1965 and Their Aftermath

In July 1965, a succession of disputes between King Constantine II and Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou reached a climax when the king denied the premier his constitutional right to assume command of the Ministry of Defence. The justification provided by the king for this denial — a justification that he continues to maintain to this day — was that the Centre Union MP and premier's son, Andreas Papandreou, was under investigation at that time regarding his involvement in the conspiracy of the clandestine military society ASPIDA (meaning 'shield', a backronym for *Axiomatikoi Sosate Patrida Idanika Dimokratia Axiokratia*, Officers Save Fatherland Ideals Democracy Meritocracy).[85]

The existence of ASPIDA — itself an alias with an archaic ring to it, evocative of shielded hoplites or embattled heroes — was discovered in early 1965 and was quickly escalated into a full-blown conspiracy by both the right-wing enclaves of the army and the political elites of the Right. A small-scale association of relatively junior officers, who had pledged to defend Greece from Communism, to defend democracy and to ensure meritocratic processes within the army, ASPIDA was presented as a subversive organisation seeking to install a socialist-neutralist dictatorship in Greece at the behest of Andreas Papandreou.[86] The calculated implication of Papandreou in this conspiracy-mongering was intricately linked with a general distrust of the MP and a sense that he would destabilise the power relations between various right-wing interest groups as they had come to stand since the end of the Greek Civil War (1946–49); this mistrust would skyrocket over the following two years.[87] Insofar as Constantine was concerned, denying the Prime Minister the Ministry of Defence was also grounded in the king's conviction that control over the army fell under the jurisdiction of the monarchy and not (as stipulated by the Greek Constitution of 1952) under that of a government elect.[88]

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[85] Konstantinos Glyxmbourng, *Vasilefs Konstantinos: Choris Titlo*, ed. by Georgios P. Malouchos (Dimosiografikos Organismos Lambraki, 2015), p. 127.

[86] Jeffrey M. Bale, 'Aspida Affair', in *Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia*, ed. by Bernard E. Cook (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 533–35.

[87] Christos Kassimeris, 'Causes of the 1967 Greek Coup', *Democracy and Security*, 2.1 (2006), 61–72.

In light of his rift with the Crown, Georgios Papandreou was forced into resignation on 15 July of that year, taking down with him what turned out to be the last democratically elected government of Greece until the post-dictatorial period. The premier's effective toppling rapidly escalated into 'the most divisive event in Greek politics after the Civil War', with waves of worker and student protests over 70 days, discord between and within political parties, and the revival of an old dispute regarding the nature of the regime and role of the monarchy in Greece.[89] As Nicos Alivizatos details, one additional major consequence of the Crown's interventionism was that in obstructing civilian control over the military and unseating a liberal government elect, Constantine legitimised the views of specific right-wing groups within the army regarding the autonomy of the Armed Forces from civilian rule, as well as their contempt for parliamentarianism.[90]

Between the summer of 1965 and early 1967, Greece was ruled by a succession of unstable governments constituted of apostates of the Centre Union. In October 1965, the second of these governments, led by Stefanos Stefanopoulos, succumbed to the pressures of the Crown to promote Lieutenant General Grigoris Spandidakis to the prestigious position of Army Chief of General Staff. This promotion was controversial, not least because Spandidakis was widely regarded as undeserving by his peers, was a client of the Crown and a member of IDEA (*Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon,* the Holy Bond of Greek Officers), a once extremely powerful right-wing military society that had strongly intervened in Greece's political affairs in the 1940s and which had attempted a coup in 1951.[91] IDEA — also a backronym that paid tribute to the pantheon of Greece's national imaginary and, in particular, to the country's irredentist vision of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the *Megali Idea* (or Great Idea)[92] — had also represented one of the main points of contention between the Crown and Papandreou earlier that year.[93] In the eyes of the king, Papandreou's wish to retire from the army members of IDEA, who continued to obstruct policy-making and civilian rule, placed in jeopardy the authority and powers of both the monarchy and the military.[94]

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[88] Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974: Opseis tis ellinikis embeirias*, pp. 267–69.

[89] Christos Kassimeris, 'Causes of the 1967 Greek Coup', *Democracy and Security*, 2.1 (2006), 61–72. Kornetis, pp. 26-30. Rizas, *The Rise of the Left in Southern Europe: Anglo-American Responses*, p. 46.

[90] Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974: Opseis tis ellinikis embeirias*, pp. 269–71.

Within 18 months of Spandidakis's appointment, a large network of former members of IDEA and its offshoot, EENA (*Enosis Eleftheron Neon Axiomatikon*, the Union of Young Free Officers), received transfers to Athens and promotions in rank. Among them were Stylianos Pattakos and Nikolaos Makarezos (both former members of IDEA) and Georgios Papadopoulos (once a member of IDEA and, in the mid-1950s, a founding member of EENA).[95] According to Leonidas Kallivretakis, these transferals aimed to serve a dual purpose: to indemnify Spandidakis's former fellow-travellers for their relegations to subsidiary posts by the Centre Union, and to surround Spandidakis with like-minded officers who would be of assistance when the king eventually resolved to establish a royal dictatorship.[96] In overseeing this process, however, Spandidakis gravely overestimated the shared loyalties of EENA, whose members had pledged, in 1957, to create the circumstances for a powerful intervention of the army in Greece's political affairs, to overthrow the establishment, and to impose order and the fair distribution of wealth across Greek society.[97]

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[91] For the account of a former member of IDEA, see Georgios Karagiannis, *1940–1952. To drama tis Ellados: Epi kai athliotites – E.N.A kai I.D.E.A.* (Athens: n.p., 1964), pp. 249–56; 261–67. Dimitrios A. Papadiamantis, 'Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfiliaki Ellada (1949-1967)', unpublished doctoral thesis (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2012), pp. 17–35, 49–54.

[92] The *Megali Idea* was the dominant ideology of the Greek nation state in the mid-nineteenth century and the rallying point for the territorial expansion of the Greek kingdom into a 'Greater Greece' until the 1920s. In its most utopian form, this project had come to represent a revival of the Byzantine Empire through Greater Greece, with Istanbul (or Constantinople in Greek discourse) as its capital. After the Balkan Wars and First World War, however, the defeat of the Greek forces in Asia Minor in 1922 and the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 delivered a major blow to this irredentist project. Anastasia Stouraiti and Alexander Kazamias, 'The Imaginary Topographies of the Megali Idea: National Territory as Utopia', in *Spatial Conceptions of the Nation: Modernizing Geographies in Greece and Turkey*, ed. by Nikiforos Diamandouros, Thalia Dragonas, and Çağlar Keyder (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 11–34.

[93] Spyros V. Markezinis, *Synchroni politiki istoria tis Ellados (1936-1975). Tomos G', 1952-1975* (Athens: Ekdotikos Organismos Papyros, 1994), p. 115.

[94] Kassimeris, *Greece and the American Embrace: Greek Foreign Policy Towards Turkey, the US and the Western Alliance*, p. 45.

[95] Kallivretakis, 'I omada Papadopoulou stin teliki eftheia pros tin exousia (1966-1967)', pp. 60-63. On the membership of Papadopoulos, Pattakos and Makarezos in IDEA, see Dimitrios A. Papadiamantis, '"Favloi" alla Kai Chrisimoi: Oi Aprilianoi Kai O Politikos Kosmos', in *I Diktatoria Ton Syntagmatarhon & I Apokatastasi Tis Dimokratias*, ed. by Pavlos Sourlas (Athens: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon, 2016), pp. 226-27. On Papadopoulos as a founding member of EENA, along with Dimitrios Ioannidis, see Papadiamantis, 'Stratos Kai Politiki Exousia Sti Metemfiliaki Ellada (1949-1967)', pp. 130-35. There is insufficient evidence to corroborate that Makarezos and/or Pattakos were involed in EENA. Leonidas

In late February 1967, Spandidakis assigned to Colonels Papadopoulos and Makarezos the task of effectively repurposing a contingency plan of the Greek military into a plan for a coup d'état.[98] The objective of this coup was to thwart the growing certainty that the Centre Union would once again emerge with a majority in the general elections scheduled for May 1967, an outcome which the right-wing enclaves of the army viewed 'as nearly equivalent to a Communist victory'.[99] Whereas Georgios Papandreou was a self-professed *ethnikofron* in the post-war period, his heir apparent as leader of the Centre Union, Andreas Papandreou, had come to lead an increasingly autonomous and popular centre-left wing of that party since the events of July 1965. Regardless of the fact that he did not ally himself with the communists, the Greek military elites appear to have been convinced that the MP was nonetheless a communist.[100] By extension, and given the

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Kallivretakis, 'Oi Gnostoi "agnostoi" aprilianoi Synomotes', in *I Stratiotiki Diktatoria 1967-1974*, ed. by Vangelis Karamanolakis (Athens: Dimosiografikos Organismos Lambraki, 2010), pp. 29.

[96] Kallivretakis, 'I Omada Papadopoulou Stin Teliki Eftheia Pros Tin Exousia (1966-1967)', pp. 61-2.

[97] Papadiamantis, 'Stratos Kai Politiki Exousia Sti Metemfiliaki Ellada', (1949-1967)', pp. 130-5. Leonidas Kallivretakis, 'Mia Istoria Tou 1958, Proangelos Tou 1963 (Kai Tou 1967)', in *Praktika Imeridas Dolofonia Lambraki: I Istoriki Syzitisi 50 Chronia Meta*, ed. by Pavlos Sourlas (Athens: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon, 2016), pp. 202.

[98] Nikolaos Makarezos, *Pos Odigithikame Stin 21is Apriliou* (Athens: Ekdoseis Pelasgos, 2005), pp. 463-4. Kallivretakis, 'I Omada Papadopoulou Stin Teliki Eftheia Pros Tin Exousia (1966-1967)', pp. 78, 73-74.

[99] Keith R. Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 226.

[100] Sotiris Rizas, *The Rise of the Left in Southern Europe: Anglo-American Responses* (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 42.

advanced age of Papandreou senior, the right-wing enclaves of the army viewed the Centre Union as a communist power-in-waiting in the late 1960s.

Papadopoulos was an almost perfect candidate for the repurposing of the contingency plan, given that he had been made responsible to draft and lead a similar operation in 1961, which, incidentally, also ended up with a code name culled from classical antiquity. In his capacity at that time as branch leader of propaganda and counter-propaganda at KYP (the Central Intelligence Service), the (then) lieutenant-colonel had been commissioned to prepare an operation for the use of electoral fraud, violence and intimidation tactics in the general election of October 1961. Code named ‘Pericles’, whose Funeral Oration represents (and represented) the most celebrated tribute to classical Athenian democracy (Kazamias 2014: 132), the name of this operation was no doubt a self-aggrandising euphemism for the perception that the dominance of anti-communism was tantamount to the triumph of democracy and patriotism in Cold War Greece (Kazamias 2014). Yet, like in the case of the army leadership’s coup in 1967, the enemy envisioned by Pericles encompassed a motley group of derogatively-termed ‘yellows’, including ‘Communists, fellow travelers, and neutrals’, the implication being that both of these plans consolidated a dividing line between the Right and non-Right in the 1960s (rather than solely between anti-communists and communists).[101]

At the same time, it was the proven track-records in ruthless anti-communism and conspiratorial activity that gave Papadopoulos and Makarezos a competitive edge for professional advancement and posts of responsibility in 1960s Greece. Notably, in 1965, Papadopoulos had made Greek newspaper headlines for fabricating intelligence of an organised communist sabotage of military vehicles near the Greek border (the vehicles were timeworn and had simply malfunctioned). On this occasion, the press had additionally exposed his participation in the torture of the young soldiers who were framed as the saboteurs, and referred (for the second time in a few months) to his involvement in Operation Pericles.[102] Notwithstanding the public relations nightmare and indignation caused by the revelation of the sabotage, Papadopoulos was merely confined in military prison for a few days and would soon go on to receive his promotion to the rank of Colonel.[103] The assignment of Makarezos to the coup taskforce was also most likely the outcome of a report he had drafted in 1967 (in his own capacity at that time as branch leader of espionage at KYP), in which he exaggerated forewarnings of a Soviet military threat to Greece and of a prospective communist ambush via the sewer lines of Athens.[104]

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[101] Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front* (London: André Deutsch, 1971), p. 112. As Ilias Nikolakopoulos notes, this dividing line between the Right and the non-Right forces was brought to the fore in the early 1960s with the manipulation of the elections of October 1961 by the Right, and Georgios Papandreou’s declaration of his ‘unyielding struggle’ (*anendotos agonas*) against ERE immediately after. Nikolakopoulos, p. 272.

Three weeks after being assigned to the coup taskforce by their commanders, the colonels (joined, also, by Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos and other mid-level officers) resolved to execute the plan of their own accord. At that juncture, the plan was code named ‘Ierax II’. In late March, however, it became renamed ‘Prometheus’ on account of the static picked up by Greek analysts in Washington regarding ‘Ierax II’ and the preparation of the security apparatuses of the state to arrest thousands of Greek citizens upon its triggering.[105]

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[102] Leonidas Kallivretakis, ‘To “sambotaz” tou Evrou choris zachari: Mia apopeira anapsilafisis’, *Archeiotaxio*, 12 (2010), 132–60.

[103] Michalis Papakonstantinou, *I taragmeni exaetia (1961-1967), tomos B’: Apo ti monarchia sti diktatoria* (Athens: Ekdoseis Proskinio, 1998), pp. 138–40.

[104] Kallivretakis, ‘I omada Papadopoulou stin teliki eftheia pros tin exousia (1966-1967)’, p. 78. Makarezos, p.473.

[105] Kallivretakis, ‘I omada Papadopoulou stin teliki eftheia pros tin exousia (1966-1967)’, pp. 73-4. See also Mogens Pelt, *Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations, 1949-74* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2006), p. 428 n. 936. As late as 24 March 1967, the US Ambassador in Athens William Phillips Talbot reported in a telegram to the State Department that ‘Lt. General Spandidakis, Chief of Greek Army General Staff, has recently acted to prepare for implementation of Ierax (Hawk) 2, an alleged plan for military control of Greece contingent upon occurrence of another political crisis’. William Phillips Talbot, ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State’, *Foreign Relations of*

From this vignette of the events of July 1965 and their aftermath, it emerges that abuses of authority, intrigue and military conspiracies represented the rule rather than the exception in terms of the *modus operandi* of the triangle of power in 1960s Greece (the Crown, the army and the right-wing political elites; Kassimeris 2010: 58).[106] As a tool implicated in the performance of that power (to other the Left, and in the 1960s, the non-Right), the classical past also operated at the intersections of the relations of knowledge between these dominant interest groups. In their fundamental components, code names such as ‘Pericles’ and ‘Prometheus’ served to preserve the secrecy of major intrusions on democratic processes and their operational art from the enemy or the uninitiated, while facilitating communication between those networks in the know.[107] It seems likely, moreover, that code names culled from classical antiquity were chosen ‘with an eye toward the inspiration of fighting men’, that is, the men involved in the preparation and the execution of such operations, and perhaps even to serve as part of a public relations strategy, to solicit the support of third parties for operations during or after their execution.[108] As evidenced by the discovery of and response to ‘Operation Pericles’, such processes were not necessarily successful. What is more, the appearance of clandestine military societies, whose members progressed their own agendas through this precarious balance of power, brought their own frames of reference to the classical apparatus of the

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the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey (Athens, 1967) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d264> [accessed 23 March 2018].

[106] Scholars have employed a range of epithets to describe the oppressive and semi-parliamentary nature of the Greek post-war regime. Seraphim Seferiades designates the post-war regime as a system characterised by ‘fundamental authoritarianism, or quasi-authoritarianism’. Seraphim Seferiades, ‘Polarization and Nonproportionality: The Greek Party System in the Postwar Era’, *Comparative Politics*, 19.1 (1986), 69–93. Nicos Mouzelis writes of the post-war consolidation of ‘a system of repressive parliamentarianism or “guided democracy”’. Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, p. 117. Elias Nikolakopoulos describes Greek post-war parliamentary democracy as ‘cachectic’, the implication being that the institution of democracy was atrophied by undemocratic practices (especially the manipulation of elections). Nikolakopoulos, p. 9.

[107] Graham Webster, ‘History of the British Inter-Services Security Board and the Allocation of Code-Names in the Second World War’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 29.5 (2014), p. 732.

[108] William M. Arkin, *Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World* (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005), p. 15. Gregory C. Sieminski, ‘The Art of Naming Operations’, *Parameters*, 25 (1995), pp. 81, 95.

state. A shared knowledge of ‘Prometheus’, for instance, worked to form alliances between those in the know, but also to conceal the cleavages between them.

II. Prometheus Between Secrecy and Disclosure

If the army leadership followed the standard procedure of naming military operations,[109] it is likely that the task of assigning a new code name to the plan was delegated to the same mid-level officers who were already revising its strategy. Papadopoulos was, after all, Head of Operations at Greek Army General Staff at that juncture (Papadimitriou 2007: 397). If it was in fact the case that the colonels were responsible for assigning a new code name to the plan, it is plausible that Prometheus appeared to Papadopoulos and Makarezos as a suitable alias for their forethought to mutiny against their commanders and Greece’s political leadership — ‘Prometheus’ meaning ‘forethought’ in ancient Greek, and the reception history of the Titan, who defied Zeus to steal fire to give to mankind, being closely linked with the theme of rebellion against authority.[110] It is notable that Greece’s future dictators had already begun to identify as a ‘Revolutionary Council’ (*Epanastatikon Symvoulion*) as early as December 1966.[111]

A relevant and telling reflection arises in the post-dictatorial memoirs of Nikolaos Makarezos. In retort to the political Right’s indictments against the Greece’s dictators and their lack of *leventia* after the coup — *leventia* being a principal cluster of qualities in the normative value system of the military since Greek Independence, including ‘a strong belief in the so-called “honorable profession of arms”’[112] — Makarezos takes great pride in the military art of deception. More importantly, Makarezos cites Aristotle's *Politics* in order to legitimise this view: 'Aristotle writes: "Revolutions are sometimes achieved by force, and sometimes by fraud".'[113] Deception is, of course, indispensable in order to gain tactical advantages in times of war and it is in order to validate this point that Makarezos cites Aristotle. What is of greater interest here is that the target of fraud envisioned by Makarezos was not a communist enemy but Greece's politicians. One could go as far as to argue, then, that if the colonels had a say in the renaming of 'Ierax II', the code name 'Prometheus' may have been inspired by re-imaginings of the Hesiodic trickster figure,[114] or by extrapolations of deceit on the act of Prometheus's theft of fire — either of which would be justifiable, according to the logic of Makarezos, on account of their ancient origins. Regardless of whether the colonels were responsible for the naming of the operation, however, this did not prevent them from projecting onto the Prometheus plan their own agendas, which instigated the formulation of new roles for the Titan as an enigmatic and deceptive presence in the realm of counter-intelligence. Whereas covert action and clandestine operations have always been among the 'most vilified methods of statecraft',[115] Makarezos's reflections additionally intimate that Greece's future dictators took great pride in such activities.

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[109] Sieminski, ‘The Art of Naming Operations’, p. 82.

[110] On the theme of rebellion in the tragedy *Prometheus Bound* and its reception history, see Carol Dougherty, *Prometheus* (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 19, 72–73, 93–100, 103–104. On the twentieth-century reception history of Prometheus by the Greek Left as a symbol of defiance see Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance Under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967-1974*, pp. 125–133.

[111] Kallivretakis, ‘I Omada Papadopoulou Stin Teliki Eftheia Pros Tin Exousia (1966-1967)’, p. 69.

[112] George Andrew Kourvertaris, ‘Professional Self-Images and Political Perspectives in the Greek Military’, *American Sociological Review*, 36.6 (1971), p. 1047. *Leventia* is additionally ‘related to military

Initially, the close involvement of Papadopoulos and Makarezos in the preparation of this plan and their inclusion in the inner circle of the initiated puts into perspective the proximity of Greece's future dictators to the top tier of the triangle of power in pre-dictatorial Greece. This positioning of the officers should be viewed within the

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virtues and physical manliness, stature, graciousness or movement and glamor, as well as the moral qualities of a magnanimous and brave man'. Ibid.

[113] Makarezos, p. 515. Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. by Ernest Barker (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), V.4.1304^{b}5. (Barker's translation.)

[114] On the development of Prometheus as a trickster figure in the Hesiodic epics , see E. F. Beall, 'Hesiod's Prometheus and the Development in Myth', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 52.3 (1991), 355–71.

[115] Rose Mary Sheldon, 'The Ancient Imperative: Clandestine Operations and Covert Action', *Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 10.3 (1997), p. 299.

perspective of the larger issue of the unholy alliances between the Greek post-war regime and what has been called the Greek 'para-state' (*parakratos*, sometimes translated in English as 'deep state'), which ultimately made the coup d'état of 21 April 1967 possible.[116] Among the interest groups that made up the para-state were IDEA and EENA, whose members became particularly useful to the political Right after the general elections of 1958, when the left-wing party EDA (*Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera*, the United Democratic Left) emerged as the main opposition party to the victorious right-wing ERE (*Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis*, the National Radical Union). Indicative is the case of Papadopoulos, whose involvement in EENA earned him a disciplinary relegation to Serres in 1957 (in northern Greece) and, after the 1958 election, a transferral back to Athens in a strategically pivotal position within KYP (the Central Intelligence Service).[117] From this position, Papadopoulos would become involved in the sustained political campaign of ERE to vilify and suppress Communism at the turn of the 1960s, would sit on various committees responsible for the elaboration of psychological warfare, and would be ordered to draft Operation Pericles in 1961.[118] It was also from this position that Papadopoulos would get to travel around Greece at the expense of KYP, which he reportedly exploited as an opportunity to recruit younger officers into a shady 'faction of *ethnikofrones*' within the army.[119]

On a second level, the involvement of Papadopoulos and Makarezos in the preparation of the Prometheus plan helps to place in perspective the ways in which the conspirators could share the advantages of those measures put in place in the name of national security, while simultaneously progressing their own agendas through the same channels. As a number of analysts have detailed, the operation that was formerly 'Ierax II' was first drafted in the 1950s to respond to the eventuality of an invasion from the Soviet Union or a Balkan satellite state. A plan drafted by the Hellenic Army General Staff that followed the general framework of NATO contingency planning (Greece had become a fully-fledged member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1952), it made provisions for the swift occupation of strategic points, key administrative and communication centres, and the arrest of thousands of citizens 'who might have formed an internal fifth column during an invasion'.[120] Conveniently, for the army leadership and for the conspiring officers, this plan did not go as far as to account for the steps for a return to normal operating practices in the aftermath of such an emergency. It has been observed, with reference to the Prometheus plan, that '[o]n paper, the plan for a military coup d'état will look very much like the outline of an emergency defensive plan [in] the event of an attempted coup by enemies of the state'.[121]

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[116] Nicos Alivizatos has explored what he terms the 'para-consitution' of the Greek post-war regime, a series of repressive emergency measures that issued from the 1940s and which continued to guarantee the exclusion and persecution of left-wing citizens in post-war Greece. Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974: Opseis tis ellinikis embeirias.*

[117] Kallivretakis, 'Mia Istoria Tou 1958, Proangelos Tou 1963 (Kai Tou 1967)'.

[118] Ioannis Stefanidis, '...Dimokratia dyscheris? I anaptyxi ton michanismon tou "antikommounistikou agonos" 1958-1961', *Mnimon*, 29 (2008), p. 199–241. The responsibilities of these committees included the defamation of Soviet products and the deployment of mobile 'information' units to the countryside to enlighten rural populations in the spirit of anti-communism. Ibid.

[119] Pavlos Apostolidis, *Mystiki drasi: Ypiresies pliroforion stin Ellada* (Athens: Ekdoseis Papazisi, 2014), p. 195.

Furthermore, in 1967 the appendices of the operation contained the names of over 8,200 citizens who were classified as dangerous and singled out to be arrested upon the triggering of the plan, a figure that attests to the far-reaching surveillance and record-keeping practices of the Greek security apparatuses in the pre-dictatorial period.[122] As I have indicated above, two of the foremost personalities of the Dictatorship of 21 April held important posts within KYP between the late 1950s and 1967. Established in 1953, KYP was primarily responsible for the surveillance and tracking of left-wing citizens, for collecting intelligence on Greece's communist neighbours in the Balkans and for liaising with the intelligence services of the country's western allies.[123] From their posts within KYP, Papadopoulos and Makarezos partook in the production of a body of knowledge that was a crucial cog in sustaining the dominance of the anti-communist post-war regime, while taking liberties to exaggerate and falsify intelligence to their own ends. These agendas were both aligned with those of their superiors and worked against them. Ultimately, and as Kallivretakis has shown, in their execution of the Prometheus plan, the officers needed simply add the names of 68 figures of the army leadership and of politicians of the Right and Centre in order to bring the country to a complete standstill.[124]

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[120] Robert V. Keeley, *The Colonels' Coup and the American Embassy: A Diplomat's View of the Breakdown of Democracy in Cold War Greece* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2010), p. 89. On the drafting of the contingency plan in the 1950s (under the right-wing governments of Constantine Karamanlis), see Kallivretakis, 'I Omada Papadopoulou Stin Teliki Eftheia Pros Tin Exousia (1966-1967)', pp. 81-2. On the operational art of the contingency plan, see Cyrus L. Sulzberger, 'Greece under the Colonels', *Foreign Affairs*, 48.2 (1970), p. 305.

[121] Franco Ferraresi, *Threats to Democracy: The Radical Right in Italy after the War* (Princeton, NJ and Chichester, West Sussex: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 78.

[122] As Minas Samatas indicates, the origins of mass political surveillance in Greece dates back to the early interwar period (under the liberal statesman Eleftherios Venizelos; 1846–1936), a practice that was from its origins inextricably linked with the institutionalisation of anti-communism as state policy. However, with Greece's emergent position as one of the first war theatres of the Cold War in the late 1940s and the effective military defeat of the Greek communist guerilla forces in the Civil War in 1949, anti-communist surveillance assumed 'totalitarian dimensions' in the post-war period and 'affected the entire Greek

If counter-intelligence *de facto* works against an opposition's intelligence activities, then, the opposition envisaged by Greece's future dictators was at least twofold: the 'communists' (including the liberals in the 1960s) and the political and military elites. The code name 'Prometheus' should be viewed within this perspective.

I have indicated that in its fundamental components, a code name works to preserve the secrecy of a plan and its operational art from the enemy or the uninitiated,

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population's private life and beliefs'. Minas Samatas, *Surveillance in Greece: From Anticommunist to Consumer Surveillance* (New York: Pella Publishing, 2004), p. 23.

[123] John Nomikos and Andrew Liaropoulos, 'Truly Reforming or Just Responding to Failures? Lessons Learned from the Modernisation of the Greek National Intelligence Service', *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 5.1 (2010), 31. In addition to KYP, surveillance and record-keeping were also practiced by the police, gendarmerie, the General Directorate of Foreign Citizens and the Intelligence Service of the Hellenic Army General Staff — not to mention the large network of police informers on secret payrolls in the early 1960s, many of whom were ex-communists 'who purchased their personal safety with information'. Minas Samatas, 'Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S. Truman-McCarthy Era', *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 13.3&4 (1986), p. 31. Constantine Tsoucalas, 'The Ideological Impact of the Civil War', in *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, ed. by John Iatrides (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 1981), p. 328.

[124] Kallivretakis, 'I Omada Papadopoulou Stin Teliki Eftheia Pros Tin Exousia (1966-1967)', pp. 73-4, 81-2.

while helping the initiated to identify the operation without making explicit reference to its strategy and tactics. The Prometheus myth — be it that of the trickster of Hesiod's *Theogony*; the defiant fire-bearer of (pseudo?) Aeschylus's *Prometheus Bound*; and/or the etymologically defined 'forethinker' of Plato's *Protagoras* — did not intimate the operational art of the Prometheus plan of 1967.[125] Nor did the long and intricate reception history of the Titan as 'a radical revolutionary, a crucified martyr, a prophetic philosopher, an intellectual humanist, a national hero, a dangerous anti-monarchist, a sublime Satan, a prototype of technological man.'[126] If anything, the complex reception history of the Prometheus myth helped to further obscure the nature of the operation. The benefits of this perceived discongruity between the operational art of the Prometheus plan and its mythical namesake were shared by those in the know, namely, the army leadership and the cadre of officers, the latter of whom had entered into a quiet competition over the operation with their superiors.

Yet, with minimal effort, the new code name of the plan was in fact far more effective with regards to the officers' counter-intelligence agendas than to those of their superiors. From the perspective of the army leadership, 'Prometheus' worked as means to intercept the exposure of the repurposing of 'Ierax II' (a repurposing that commuted the provenance of an ostensible enemy from outside to strictly within Greece) and to continue communicating classified information on a need-to-know basis. In this sense, the operational code name was aligned with the precepts of *ethnikofrosyni*, in that it instrumentalised classical culture to create networks of exclusion and inclusion, while providing those in the know with a sense of patriotic mission and an affirmation of their privileged knowledge in matters of national security.

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[125] There is a long-running debate in classical scholarship on whether *Prometheus Bound* is by Aeschylus, in whole, in part or at all. For reasons of brevity and in light of the fact that '[e]ven if a pastiche of Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* has been informing the idea of Aeschylus since the fourth century BCE', I refer to the tragedy as Aeschylus's for the purposes of this discussion. Ian Ruffell, *Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound* (Croydon, Surrey: Bristol Classical Press, 2012), pp. 10, 8–10. For a succinct comparative analysis of the renegotiations of the Prometheus myth in the ancient sources see Olga Raggio, 'The Myth of Prometheus: Its Survival and Metamorphoses up to the Eighteenth Century', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 21.1/2 (1958), pp. 44–47.

[126] Yopie Prins, 'The Sexual Politics of Translating *Prometheus Bound*', *Cultural Critique*, 2010, p. 164.

In choosing a code name inspired by classical myth, it is conceivable that the interlocutors of the Prometheus plan additionally capitalised on Western (in this case, American) identifications of Greece with the classical past, as well as on an awareness, in Washington, that the code names of NATO operations and military drills in post-war Greece were often gleaned from antiquity.[127] In other words, a code name culled from classical myth was able to intimate that the scope of the Prometheus plan was domestic and that its ideological colouring was pro-Atlanticist, the implication being that a second interception of the operation might reassure, rather than alarm, Greece's allies in the West.

For Greece's future dictators, the renaming of the plan was advantageous for the same, as well as two additional reasons. Prometheus allowed the officers to hide their own designs in plain sight (that is, *vis-à-vis* their superiors) and to drop off the radar of the US State Department's intelligence services, who had been monitoring Papadopoulos's conspiratorial activities over the previous two years.[128]

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[127] Indicatively, between 1956 and 1959 thousands of Greek reservists participated in annual national military drills by the names of 'Gordian Knot', 'Alexander the Great', 'Philip' and 'Leonidas' (respectively) near the Greek-Albanian border. These exercises were intended to assess the preparedness of the reservists in the event of a sudden attack from Greece's communist Balkan neighbours and were attended by an audience of eminent NATO executives. 'Entos Ton Plaision Tin Etision Gymnasion Ai Askiseis Para Ta Ellino-Alvanika Synora: I Symmetochi Anglikou Kai Tourkikou Stolou', *To Vima* (Athens, 17 July 1959), p. 6. 'Ypo Synthikas Atomikou Polemou Tha Diexachthi I Etisia Ethniki Askisis Tou stratou "Leonidas"', *I Kathimerini* (Athens, 6 August 1959), p. 6. On American identifications of modern Greece with ancient Greece see 'Ypo Synthikas Atomikou Polemou Tha Diexachthi I Etisia Ethniki Askisis Tou stratou "Leonidas"'.

[128] Laurence Stern indicates that between 1965 and 1967, approximately fifteen American intelligence reports of a 'Rightist Greek Military Conspiratorial Group' involving Papadopoulos had reached the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research. Laurence Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy* (New York: Times Books, 1977), pp. 42–46.

III. Prometheus Inspiring Fighting Men

The prospect that the officers encoded their own designs into 'Prometheus', and the certainty that they projected these designs onto the plan, opens up a field on which it is possible to frame the precarious relationship between Greece's future dictators and the post-war regime, as well as the repercussions of this relationship on receptions of the classical past in the realm of counter-intelligence.

I have indicated that the toppling of Georgios Papandreou in July 1965 legitimised the views among particular circles in the officer corps regarding the autonomy of the Armed Forces from civilian rule, as well as their broader contempt for Greece's political elites. Whereas Greece's future dictators had participated in guaranteeing the political dominance of the Right since the late 1950s, this did not necessarily entail that they were satisfied with that state of affairs. It was, after all, under ERE and the premiership of Constantine Karamanlis that Papadopoulos, Ioannis Ladas and Dimitrios Ioannidis had set up the clandestine military society EENA, which envisioned to overthrow the political establishment and to install a military dictatorship in Greece.

The anti-parliamentarianism of the Colonels has been linked with their experiences as cadets under the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas, but should also be viewed in relation to the relentless conflicts of the 1940s and their frustrated career ambitions in the post-war period.[129]

With the king and his government-in-exile having taken refuge in Cairo and London during the Axis occupation of Greece (1941–44), officers who participated in the non-communist resistance back home had come to feel deserted by their leaders. It was on the desertion of Greece by its statesmen that Pattakos and Makarezos would later place blame regarding the rise of the principal resistance movement against the Axis, the communist EAM (*Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo*, the National Liberation Front) and its armed wing, ELAS (*Ellinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos*, National Popular Liberation Army). Of course, in alignment with the tradition of ardent anti-communism, both Pattakos and Makarezos denied the legitimacy of EAM-ELAS as a national resistance movement.[130]

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[129] 'Ypo Synthikas Atomikou Polemou Tha Diexachthi I Etisia Ethniki Askisis Tou stratou "Leonidas"'.

After liberation, a series of violent conflicts between the communist resistance forces and reestablished Greek National Army (with the backing of Britain and right-wing paramilitary groups) escalated into a bloody civil war, whose circumstances further catalysed the officer corps' contempt for civilian rule. The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 heralded the beginning of the coordination and supervision of the Greek army's operations by the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG; renamed as the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group, JUSMAPG, in 1948), a development which, by 1950, had ossified the army into a profoundly anti-communist enclave of American influence, with acute disdain for Greek politicians and parliamentarianism.[131] It was no doubt with this precedent in mind that Papadopoulos reportedly stated to his co-conspirators in December 1966: 'Once a dictatorship is established, it will seek U.S. support in order to implement social and economic measures which can deter the present tendency toward the left.'[132]

The appointment of Field Marshall Alexander Papagos as Commander in Chief in January 1949 and his emergent stature as the heroic victor of the Civil War later that year did more than affirm the sense of autonomy of career officers from civilian rule.[133] With his appointment as Commander in Chief in 1949, Papagos was granted 'almost dictatorial powers' over the Greek National Army and its operations (without having to consult with the government or any other authority), a settlement that validated the autonomisation of the Armed Forces on an institutional level.[134] Whereas Papagos's emergency powers were for the most part dismantled by a new set of laws and decrees in the early 1950s, the spirit of unrestraint and the high expectations of career officers did not dissipate so easily. The conclusion of the Civil War in August 1949 emboldened the army's self-referentiality as 'guarantor of internal order and guardian of the state against external challenges' (Veremis 1997: 153) and officers were filled with a new certitude that it was to them that the Greek elites owed their survival over the previous decade and their power in the post-war period.[135]

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[130] Stylianos Pattakos, *21is Apriliou 1967: Diati? Poioi? Pos?* (Athens: Ekdoseis Viovivl, 1993), p. 19. Makarezos, pp. 42-74, 253-256.
[131] Thanos Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy* (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), pp. 151–152.
[132] Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*, p. 43.
[133] Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, *Pos efthasame stin 21i Apriliou 1967 – 1940-1944. Ethniki Andistasi: Istorika dokimia*, 3rd edn (Athens: Vivliopoleion tis 'Estias', 2007), pp. 23–30.

When Papagos resigned from his post in May 1951, the clandestine military society IDEA (founded in 1944) attempted a coup d'état in order to establish a dictatorship in the Field Marshall's name. During Papagos's short-lived political career as leader of the right-wing Greek Rally (*Ellinikos Synagermos*) and his stint as prime minister between 1952 and 1955, the officers involved in the abortive coup of 1951 were reinstated following a brief period of demobilisation, the implication being that the perpetrators learned that unlawful activity 'could carry absolutely no consequence' (Gkotzaridis 2016: 220). As evidenced by the endurance (and usefulness) of Papadopoulos in various key posts from the late 1950s onwards, such views would be reaffirmed time after time.

The developments involving Papagos were crucial for the additional reason that they catalysed the ambivalent attitudes of IDEA and then EENA *vis-à-vis* the monarchy. Papagos's rift with the Crown in the early 1950s had rendered the Field Marshall a rallying point for disgruntled career officers (including members of IDEA) whose professional advancements were obstructed by the clientelistic networks that awarded promotion to loyalists of the Crown (Veremis 1997: 152). Furthermore, and although no systematic research has verified this contention, it is my impression that the accession of King Constantine II to the throne in 1964 did not help reconcile the officers with the monarchy. With his reputation as ‘a rather brash playboy, not serious, not very bright, interested in sailing’, the twenty-four-year-old monarch lacked the seniority and distinguished military career of some of his not so distant ancestors.[136]

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[134] Nicos Alivizatos, 'The Greek Army in the Late Forties: Towards an Institutional Autonomy', *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 5.3 (1978), pp. 43, 40–45.
[135] Kallivretakis, 'Oi gnostoi "agnostoi" aprilianoi synomotes', p. 24.

Accordingly, the promotion of Spandidakis to the post of Army Chief of General Staff in 1965 reaffirmed the nepotistic privileges afforded to clients of the Crown within the army, an appointment which had been preceded by a rift between EENA and IDEA. In response to the lukewarm attitudes of some members of IDEA regarding the installation of a military dictatorship in Greece in the early 1960s, Papadopoulos reportedly arraigned against IDEA the accusation that the members of that society were ‘traitors’.[137] In short, by 1967 the officers were embittered against the ensemble of the top brass of the triangle of power and, more importantly, the army leadership were very much aware of this state of affairs.

In their knowledge of this dissatisfaction, it seems plausible that the army leadership viewed ‘Prometheus’ as an apposite code name to unite an otherwise restless and divided officer corps — one that could tap into and humour the various self-images and ambitions of officers, while, theoretically, aligning them with the official plan of the upper echelons of the army. Having acquired an ‘emotional acquaintance with a glorious heritage’ as cadets in the early twentieth century, code names culled from classical antiquity worked in such a way so as to invoke the identifications of officers as champions of an ‘ethnic truth’ (Veremis 1997: 45). Such code names were also closely intertwined with those wartime experiences of officers through which they had come to identify as defiant heroes and as guarantors of national security in the 1940s. In this sense, it can be claimed that the close intertwinements of the reception history of the Prometheus myth with the theme of rebellion against authority could pay tribute to these experiences, while simultaneously indulging those officers who envisioned themselves as revolutionaries in the present.

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[136] Stan Draenos, *Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), p. 151. For instance, the role of Constantine I (the grandfather of Constantine II) as Commander in Chief during the Balkan Wars in the early twentieth century had served his popularity well when he acceded to the throne in 1913. Michael Llewellyn Smith, ‘Venizelos’ Diplomacy, 1919-23: From Balkan Alliance to Greek-Turkish Settlement’, in *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship*, ed. by Paschalis M. Kitromilides (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), pp. 134–78.

[137] Kallivretakis, ‘Oi gnostoi “agnostoi” aprilianoi synomotes’, pp. 35-6.

For instance, at the behest of his old classmate, Grigoris Spandidakis, in 1942 Stylianos Pattakos became the cipher officer of ‘Homer’, a well-organised espionage network that operated under the direction of the British SOE (Special Operations Executive) in Cairo. This organisation was one of many espionage and sabotage networks that operated under ancient Greek proper names in occupied Greece, some of which were formed by the SOE (such as ‘Midas 614’, led by Major Ioannis Tsigantes) and others of which were predominantly republican and which came to ally themselves with the British (such as ‘Prometheus II’).[138] Known to other Homer operatives by the code name ‘Mr. Pavlos’, Pattakos was made responsible for coding and decoding messages between Cairo and suicide radio squads in Athens, for collecting coded messages from ‘neutral’ locations (usually near the occupation barracks or prisons, since ‘Gestapo raids seldom took place on their own doorsteps') and for renting out safe houses for radio transmissions.[139]

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[138] ‘Prometheus II’ was a dramatically reorganized version of an earlier resistance group that went by the code name ‘Prometheus’. André Gerolymatos, ‘British Intelligence and Guerilla Warfare Operations in the Second World War: Greece 1941-1944, A Case Study’, unpublished doctoral thesis (McGill University, Montreal, 1991), pp. 302–304. On ‘Midas 614’, see ibid., pp. 354–357.

The spirit of bravery and rebelliousness galvanised behind classically-inspired code names was no doubt informed by the disdainful attitudes of the Axis occupying powers, who rejected associations between the Greek people and their ancient ancestors, and who rather viewed the former as '"Balkan fanatics" who had come under "Semitic influence"'.[140] Furthermore, such code names served to protect the identities of resistance group members from being discovered by the enemy, but also to raise the morale of acting officers, to form collectivities between strangers (many of whom never met in person) and to bridge them with the Allies.

In his post-dictatorial memoirs, Pattakos takes great pride in his role in Homer and additionally takes issue with the aliases of the communist resistance forces — a reflection that both reproduces the view that communists were not entitled to lay claim to Greek nationhood and which intimates the importance assigned to such code names: 'The seductive, pompous titles [of EAM-ELAS]: National, Popular, Liberation, Resistance, and other resonant adjectives were traps, they had nothing to do with reality.'[141]

It is notable that whereas the practice of naming military operations originated in Germany during the First World War, this practice became widely adopted by both the Axis powers and the Allies during the Second World War, with code names gleaned from natural phenomena and slang, to mythology, history and folklore.[142] To the best of my knowledge, there is no known evidence of a specific protocol regarding the naming of Greek military operations, in the style of Winston Churchill's famous memorandum from

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[139] Harry Scott Gibbons, *The Genocide Files* (London: Charles Bravos Publishers, 1997), pp. 347, 345–48.

[140] Jan Bank and Lieve Gevers, *Churches and Religion in the Second World War*, trans. by Brian Doyle (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), p. 270.

[141] Pattakos, p.95 n.1.

[142] Sieminski. On the culling of classified code words from a range of sources during the Second World War, see Robert I. Alotta, 'Code-Named Operations of World War II: An Interpretation', *Names*, 30.1 (1982), 5–14.

August 1943, for instance (in which he expounded the propriety of code names borrowed from 'heroes of antiquity', 'figures from Greek or Roman mythology', of 'famous racehorses').[143] However, the involvement of the British SOE in the Allied war effort in occupied Greece no doubt played a major role in facilitating exchanges regarding intelligence and operational protocol.

Even more so did the disengagement of the British from the anti-communist war effort in Greece and the change of guard to the United States with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Under the direction of JUSMAPG, the Greek National Army executed a number of operations with code names culled from Greek antiquity. These code names would be proudly exhibited by the Dictatorship of 21 April at a six-month-long Exhibition of The Military History of the Greeks (*Ekthesis tis Polemikis Istorias ton Ellinon*) in 1968, and then immortalised in the second of two substantial volumes on the same subject published in 1970. Among the names of these operations were 'Erinys' (1947; *Erinys*, Fury, after the chthonic deities of vengeance and justice) and 'Pergamus' (1948; *Pergamos*, both the grandson of Achilles and the name of the citadel of Troy in the *Iliad*).[144] The tripartite 'Operation Torch' (*Pyrsos*) — perhaps an allusion to the Olympic torch or to the notion of civilisation — represented the final campaign of the Greek Civil War and was executed under the command of Papagos. Viewed by the Dictatorship of 21 April as the operation that concluded the war of 'red totalitarianism against one of the most vital defensive theatres of the West',[145] in the minds of officers, Operation Torch signalled the ascendancy of the Greek army to the status of guarantor of post-war stability for Greece as well as the so-called Free World. It was not a far leap, then, for the code name ‘Prometheus’ to invoke and indulge such self-images, particularly in view of intertwinements of the Prometheus myth with the emancipation of mankind, with fire and the theme of civilisation.

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[143] In this famous memo, Churchill warned his Chief of Staff against the use of code names that might disparage an operation in any way, to avoid enabling 'some widow or mother to say that her son was killed in an operation called "BUNNYHUG" or "BALLYHOO"'. Note to General Ismay from Prime Minister, 8 August 1943, CAB 121/109, cited in Graham Webster, 'History of the British Inter-Services Security Board and the Allocation of Code-Names in the Second World War', *Intelligence and National Security*, 29.5 (2014), pp. 750–51.

[144] Robert I. Alotta, 'Code-Named Operations of World War II: An Interpretation', *Names*, 30.1 (1982), 5–14. p. 703.

[145] Ibid., p. 699.

By the 1960s, Greece’s future dictators had come to view themselves as soldiers embroiled in a modern intelligence and psychological war against Communism, while Greece’s political elites and, indeed, the army leadership, reaped the benefits of their struggle on the home front. Still, the involvement of the officers in covert operations and clandestine activities reaffirmed their self-referentiality as privileged connoisseurs of matters of national security, and imbued them with a sense of pride and patriotism. In a 1969 essay in support of the American intervention in the Vietnam War, Ioannis Ladas would go on to state: ‘Plato is proven right once again, when he writes: “What most people call peace is nothing other than an undeclared war”’. For Ladas, contemporary ‘[p]ropaganda, psychological warfare, diplomacy, economic concessions, terrorism, [and] espionage’ were all equally honourable acts of modern warfare (particularly when used in the spirit of combatting Communism), while his inclination to cite and corroborate this line from Plato’s *Laws* testified both to his ethnocentrism and his felt erudition regarding Cold War statecraft.[146] It was one such undeclared war that the code name ‘Prometheus’ had worked to conceal and abet two years earlier, a war not prosecuted against communists but against Greece’s political and military elites, which the officers had won on 21 April 1967.

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[146] Ioannis Ladas, *Logoi* (Athens: Eptalofos E.P.E., 1970), pp. 44–45.

IV. Prometheus Unbound

In a speech in the city of Trikala (in northwestern Thessaly) six months after the coup d'état, Stylianos Pattakos, the Minister of the Interior of the first dictatorial cabinet, proclaimed:

> [T]he Revolution of 21 April sprang from the national necessity to protect the freedom of the Greek people. So that we would not see Greece exposed, [like in the] sentence of Prometheus, on the rock of a newer Caucasus, [with Greece] being devoured by the red vulture.[147]

It seems then, that the code name 'Prometheus' was at least partly successful in inspiring the officers involved in the execution of the plan, albeit not in the way that the army leadership may have hoped. In this context, Pattakos did not identify the officers with Prometheus as an heroic benefactor to mankind and, by extension, to the Greek nation and people. It was rather the nation that was presented as a righteous but helpless Prometheus exposed to communist scavengers, the implication also being that Prometheus's fetters were embodied by the political and military elites. Interestingly, there was no preordained role for the Dictatorship of 21 April within the mythical framework of this scene; the Colonels quite literally intruded on the Prometheus myth in order to avert the agonising sentence of the Titan, the implication being that the coup d'état and dictatorship were portrayed as extraordinary measures and as revolutionary.

In his post-dictatorial memoirs, Pattakos would go on to present a somewhat different version of the coup d'état and its perpetrators by virtue of the figure of Prometheus. In reiterating that the takeover of the Colonels pre-empted a communist insurgency in Greece (the official line of justification for the coup d'état, adopted a few days after the officers took power) Pattakos maintained that the officers were faced with a dilemma in 1967: to be ‘Prometheuses or Epimetheuses?’[148] In actuality, he continued, there was never such a dilemma, given that to remain passive ‘[was] not befitting and acceptable for military men, who [were] responsible everywhere and at all times to guard Themopylae’. In this context, Pattakos aimed to draw a positivistic contrast between the ostensible foresight and patriotism of Greece’s dictators and the ‘Epimetheuses’ of Greece at that time (literally the ‘afterthinkers’, after the imprudent twin brother of Prometheus in Plato’s *Protagoras*), presented as ‘the foolish, the sedentary, the cowardly, the indifferent, [and] the unworthy’ who did not intervene sooner in 1967. These adjectives referred to a wide range of interest groups, among them being the military leadership (‘the sedentary’, who deliberated for too long, as the officers perceived it, on whether to trigger the Prometheus plan) and Greece’s political elites (‘the unworthy’).[149]

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[147] 'Omilon Eis Trikala O K. St. Pattakos Etonisen: Ethniki Anangaiotita Ekalypsen I Epanastasis Tis 21is Aprilou', *Eleftheros Kosmos* (Athens, 17 October 1967), p. 7.

On a second level, Pattakos’s reference to both Prometheus and Epimetheus — who ‘might be twins, sibling rivals for the fearful legacy of the gods, or a single Janus-faced personality’[150] — inadvertently intimated the kindred relationship between the Colonels and the pre-dictatorial regime. Notwithstanding the officers’ extensive grievances in the 1950s and 1960s, the centres of power and their accomplices within the officer corps could agree that an electoral victory of the Centre Union represented a common threat in 1967. Since July 1965, Andreas Papandreou had come to lead an increasingly autonomous centre-left wing of the Centre Union and had become a vocal critic of the Crown, the right-wing upper echelons of the army, of Greece’s right-wing politicians and the country’s relations with the United States, a situation that had thrown all the interest groups he criticised into a state of turmoil.[151] Therefore, the slip-up of

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[148] Pattakos, p. 70.

[149] In their memoirs, both Makarezos and Pattakos express, in different ways, the inadequacy of the army leadership’s planning. Makarezos, p. 502. Pattakos, pp. 99-105.

[150] Donald R. Kelley, ‘Epimetheus Restored’, *History of the Human Sciences*, 6.4 (2003), pp. 100–101.

[151] Legg, *Politics in Modern Greece*, p. 226. Rizas, *The Rise of the Left in Southern Europe: Anglo-American Responses*~~,~~ pp. 38– 42.

Pattakos regarding Prometheuses and Epimetheuses can also be interpreted as an admission to the complicity of the post-war triangle of power for the coup d'état of 21 April 1967. Whereas the powers that presided over Greece in the 1960s were not responsible for the installation of a military dictatorship at that time, their effective incapacitation of an already precarious parliamentary system and the appointment of suspect officers to positions of strategic importance provided the conditions for the swift and effective execution of the Colonels' coup.

This reading of the code name 'Prometheus' has extrapolated from the implications and functions of that code name not in order to affix meaning to it, but rather to provide a sort of metaphorical roadmap to the rationale behind the present project. In other words, this chapter represents a *sui generis* reception reading of code names culled from classical antiquity and their relationship to national, political and military identities in Greece in the late 1960s, a reading that has sought to map out a conceptual framework for the chapters to follow, in a number of ways.

Firstly, the pre-dictatorial involvement of Greece's future dictators in the undemocratic manoeuvres of the post-war regime placed them in strategically pivotal positions whence they could organise and execute their own coup d'état with relative ease. At the same time, this positioning of the officers encouraged their self-referentiality as guarantors of an inadequate post-war system, which, as they perceived it, had failed to provide meritocratic promotions and adequate remuneration to its officer corps, and was too lax in its repression of the Left and the radicalising youth (especially in light of the mass student protests in July 1965).[152] These circumstances and perceptions encouraged a sense of entitlement to the repertoire of state power among officers who were so inclined, a sense of privilege that was further promoted by the post-war regime's mitigating and honourary gestures to allay the frustration of the officer corps. Operational code names gleaned from antiquity represented one way in which the upper echelons of the army might have attempted to elevate the morale of officers, while simultaneously reproducing the exclusionary dynamics of the discourse of *ethnikofrosyni*. Another such gesture was the introduction, in 1966, of historical pageantry into the military spectacles for the anniversary of the Greek Civil War, which the Dictatorship of 21 April would also go on to reclaim (discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis).

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[152] Papadiamantis, '"Favloi" alla Kai Chrisimoi: Oi Aprilianoi Kai O Politikos Kosmos'. On the radicalisation of the youth as alarming to the officer corps (and not only to the officer corps) and on this phenomenon as one of the principal factors that led to the coup d'état in 1967, see Kostas Katsapis, 'Peri Tis "politikis Agogis" ton Neon. Ena Encheirima Gia Ton Politiko Fronimatismo Tis "anexelengtis Neolaias" sti Diarkeia Tis Diktatorias Ton Syntahmatarchon', *Ionios Logos. Epistimoniki Periodiki Ekdosi Tmimatos Istorias Ioniou Panepistimiou*, 3 (2011), 203–20.

Crucially, the case of the Prometheus plan represents a very good example of the processes through which Greece's future dictators came to realise the tremendous advantages of sharing an existing grammar of classicisms with the post-war regime, rather than inventing new ones. Prometheus helped save the officers from being discovered on at least one occasion, when, on 20 April 1967, the army leadership questioned Papadopoulos and Pattakos separately regarding reports of an impending coup that was not their own.[153] Had the officers used a different alias for their own design to seize power in early 1967, an internal investigation conducted by the Hellenic Army General Staff may have easily uncovered and thwarted their rival operation. After the execution of the coup d'état the following night, the dictators would redeploy the lessons learned through such experiences in order to allay the frustration of those they had betrayed.

Secondly, the motley code names and references to classical antiquity covered by this chapter are largely indicative of the Colonels' broader affective attachments to an idea of antiquity, rather than to particular periods, figures and cultural texts of the classical past. For instance, Makarezos's citation of Aristotle on fraud is first and foremost indicative of the colonel's sense that the rhetorical impact of a classical reference is 'as important in making an account plausible as the content of the substantive arguments which, supposedly, such references and examples [are] intended to decorate or support' (Morley 2009: 146). The implication was that since Aristotle makes allowances for deception, deception is justifiable. That Makarezos arraigned the lofty voice of Aristotle against the political Right, however, sheds light on the heterogeneity of the Greek Right and their competing visions of the proprietorship over power and the national imaginary in 1960s Greece.

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[153] Papadiamantis, '"Favloi" alla Kai Chrisimoi: Oi Aprilianoi Kai O Politikos Kosmos'. pp. 78-80.

Finally, in view of the fact that 'Prometheus has always been a symbol of progress',[154] it should be noted that the code name of the operation that brought the Colonels to power was additionally able to pay homage to the self-referentiality of the Armed Forces as the harbingers of post-war stability, economic development and modernisation in Greece. At the inauguration of a new international airport in Chania, Crete, in November 1967, Antonios Skarmaliorakis (an Airforce man, a former member of EENA and among the leading figures of the conspiratorial group of the April coup d'état) proclaimed that with this new airport, Greek civil aviation would be able 'to anticipate, as a Prometheus, the rapid developments [in civil aviation technology and infrastructure] rather than [to] chase desperately after them, as it [had done] until yesterday'.[155] The implication, here, was that the advent of the military dictatorship could now provide the modern infrastructure necessary for Greece to become a global leader in tourism and to pioneer, like Prometheus had done, with his gifting of fire to mankind. It was in order to promote such self-images as modernisers and as agents of economic development that some of the foremost personalities of the Dictatorship of 21 April and their ideologues would utilise classical culture in their ideological discourses and primers.

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[154] Kostas Katsapis, 'Peri tis "politikis agogis" ton neon. Ena encheirima gia ton politiko fronimatismo tis "anexelengtis neolaias" sti diarkeia tis diktatorias ton syntagmatarchon', *Ionios Logos. Epistimoniki Periodiki Ekdosi Tmimatos Istorias Ioniou Panepistimiou*, 3 (2011), 203–20.

[155] 'Epestrepse cthes ek Kritis to kyvernitikon klimakion', *Eleftheros Kosmos* (Athens, 11 November 1967), p. 8.

Chapter 2:

The Past of Development:

Classical Antiquity and the Ideology of the Dictatorship of 21 April

When the Colonels took power in 1967, Greece was in the process of a second 'Greek miracle'. The first, as classical scholar Johanna Hanink explains, is a concept that first gained currency in the nineteenth century and which refers to the 'flowering of philosophy, literature, art, architecture, and democracy in classical Greece'. The second, also by Hanink's account, was a 'very different kind of Greek miracle—hailed as a modern economic miracle'; '[f]rom 1950 to the early 1970s, Greece experienced a generation of thrilling prosperity and earned the title of fastest-growing economy in Europe.'[156] Insofar as Greece's dictators were concerned, the two so-called miracles were closely intertwined and were owed to the accomplishments of military men, both ancient and modern. More importantly, as the dictators perceived it, the country's modern economic miracle paled in comparison to that of the ancients, and although it would inevitably continue to do so, their Greek subjects were nonetheless required to strive, rentlessly and indefinitely, to make the two meet.

In this chapter, I focus on the ideological discourses of the Dictatorship of 21 April and argue that the regime used an idea of antiquity, the idea of the (ancient) Greek miracle, in such a way so as to promote a culture of developmentalism in Greece. In other words, I show that the Colonels and their ideologues utilised the notion of Greek exceptionalism, or the '"glory" or "wonder" that was Greece',[157] in order to enlist a sense of moral accountability and uncompromising industriousness for the production of a developed and competitive future Greece. Informed by recent approaches to developmentalism as a discourse, I contend that these discourses of the dictatorship ultimately amounted to constructions of subjecthood around notions of ‘un-Greek’ underdevelopment in the present. I focus, in particular, on the discourses of Georgios Papadopoulos, but I also draw on some of the foremost ideological primers published by the dictatorship, as well as the published speeches of regime hardliner, Colonel Ioannis Ladas. In doing so, I do not claim to offer a comprehensive account of the dictatorship’s ideological discourses, but rather a close reading of some of its foremost ideological texts and primers, which also broadly shared the same target audience: the Greek public.

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[156] Johanna Hanink, *The Classical Debt: Greek Antiquity in an Era of Austerity* (Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2017), pp. 148, 149.

[157] Edith Hall, *The Ancient Greeks: Ten Ways They Shaped the Modern World* (London: Vintage, 2015), p. xi.

In the first section of this chapter, I provide a short overview of recent literature regarding the ideological discourses of the regime and discuss the intricacies of the Colonels’ relationships with the Cold War anti-communist discourse of *ethnikofrosyni*. In explaining that Greece’ dictators engaged in the practices and reproduced the precepts associated with this discourse in many ways, but that they did not identify as *ethnikofrones* (especially not Papadopoulos), I frame a rationale for a discussion that looks beyond the instrumentalisation of classical culture as a means to other the Greek Left in dictatorial Greece. The second section of this chapter engages with Papadopoulos’s all-encompassing ideological politics of futurity, through which he refracted the precocious pioneerism and innovations of the ancients as inexhaustible conduits to national economic and social development. It addresses, moreover, the quixoticness of the realisation of a satisfactorily developed Greece, as well as that of the fulfillment of a certain moral debt to the ancestors, which was part and parcel of Papadopoulos’s nationalist developmentalist discourses. The two final sections of the chapter go on to unfold the contiguities between the developmentalist discourses of the dictatorship, imaginings of classical Athenian democracy and the discourse of *ethnikofrosyni*, which shared important underlying frames of reference with one another.

I. From the Communist Myth to Hellenic Development

The ideology of the Dictatorship of 21 April is perhaps best known for its convolutedness and slogans, for its anti-communism and trite nationalist exceptionalism. Since historian Richard Clogg's topical study on the subject questioned whether the Colonels were equipped with an ideology at all in the early 1970s (1972: 36), scholars have moved away from attempting to impose programmatic order onto the regime's 'ideological nebulas' and toward exploring the ways in which they participated in longer genealogies of dominant discourses.[158] In particular, scholars have broached the subject of the regime's ideological discourses in relation to the Greek variant of Cold War anti-communism known as *ethnikofrosyni*, or 'national mindedness' (Tsoucalas 1981; Alivizatos [1983] 1995; Elefantis 1993), an angle of enquiry that also raises important implications in terms of understandings of the Colonels' receptions of antiquity.

Ethnikofrosyni first gained currency during the interwar period in Greece as a concept that posited that patriotism and anti-communism transcended political loyalties and party lines.[159] During the conflict-ridden decade of the 1940s, however, this concept came to acquire dramatically new implications. From the latter half of that decade, in the emergent international climate of the Cold War, the hostilities and bloody culmination of the Greek Civil War saw *ethnikofrosyni* transformed into the dominant ideological principle of the anti-communist Greek state. As a discourse, the fundamental components of *ethnikofrosyni* converged on 'a set of negative myths and stereotypes, intended to portray the Greek Left as a segment of society divested of its "Greekness" and thereby removed from the body of the Greek nation' (Kazamias 2014: 128). These stereotypes included the othering Greek communists as 'traitors', as 'Slav' or heretic enemies of the

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[158] Despina Papadimitriou, 'I ideologia tou kathestotos', p. 105.

[159] Despina Papadimitriou, *Apo ton lao ton ton nomimofronon sto ethnos ton ethnikofronon: I syndiritiki skepsi stin Ellada, 1922-1967* (Athens: Savvalas, 2006), p. 15.

Christian Greeks, as well as the typecasting of Communism as inherently criminal, as fraudulent and as a sickness.[160] Within this frame of othering, after 1945 bourgeois politicians and intellectuals came to use classical philosophy in order to claim that the materialist philosophy of Marxism was irreconcilable with the spiritual ideals of Hellenism.[161] The Cold War alliance of Greece with the Western Bloc, whose self-proclaimed mission was to defend western democracy against Soviet totalitarianism, was also accompanied by a new importance attached to classical Athenian democracy and to freedom by the Greek elites.[162] That the communist EAM had proclaimed the demotic as the official language of its provisional 'government of the mountains' in 1944 further heightened the anti-communist implications of the *katharevousa*, 'giv[ing] the impression that the language controversy was part of the intense struggle between nationalism and Communism' (Mackridge 2009: 310). The nineteenth-century maxim of the 'Helleno-Christian Civilisation', which syncretised classical culture with Christian Orthodoxy, provided a formula that could encapsulate the scope of the Greek Cold War regime's anti-communism and its self-referentiality as guardian of national values.[163]

Of course, inextricably linked with the invectives of *ethnikofrosyni* was an arsenal of measures that aimed to terrorise and persecute left-wing citizens, as well as to ensure their systematic exclusion from Greece's political and civic life. The Communist Party of Greece (*Kommounistiko Komma Elladas*, KKE) was outlawed in 1947 and remained banned until the post-dictatorial period. In the latter half of the 1940s, thousands of leftists and other ‘suspect’ citizens were incarcerated on barren Greek prison islands and received sentences that ranged from one year of imprisonment in indoctrination and labour camps, to execution.[164] In 1967, the dictatorship reopened some of those camps that had been closed down in the post-war period and sent thousands of political prisoners into internal exile there. Converted communists were made to sign repentance declarations which could be exchanged for their freedom, and which were published in the Greek press — a practice that the Dictatorship of 21 April also enforced.[165] Outside the prisons, citizens with a record of leftist activity or affiliation were denied ‘certificates of civic-mindedness’ (*pistopoiitika koinonikon fronimaton*) by the police, a prerequisite for employment in the public sector, for access to university and for the acquisition of a driver’s licence or a passport.[166] In light of the fact that the Dictatorship of 21 April adopted those cultural idioms that acquired distinctly anti-communist implications in Cold War Greece (the *katharevousa*, the ‘Helleno-Christian Civilisation’), and since the regime capitalised on those post-war measures put in place in the name of anti-communism, one might expect that the Colonels’ receptions of classical antiquity would, too, converge on the othering of the Left.

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[160] Tsoucalas, p. 330. Despina Papadimitriou, *Apo ton lao ton nomimofronon sto ethnos ton ethnikofronon: I syndiritiki skepsi stin Ellada, 1922-1967*, pp. 216, 218–19. Stratis Bournazos, 'To kratos ton ethnikofronon: Antikommounistikos logos kai praktikes', in *Istoria tis Elladas tou 20ou aiona, tomoi D1-D2: Anasyngrotisi-Emfylios-Palinorthosi*, ed. by Christos Chatziiosif (Athens: Vivliorama, 2009), pp. 17–19.

[161] Alexander Kazamias, 'Pseudo-Hegelian Contrivances: The Uses of German Idealism in the Discourse of the Post-Civil War Greek State', *Kambos: Cambridge Papers in Modern Greek*, 19 (2012), 47–73. Kazamias, 'Antiquity as Cold War Propaganda'.

[162] Ibid.; Despina Lalaki, 'On the Social Construction of Hellenism Cold War Narratives of Modernity, Development and Democracy for Greece', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 25.4 (2012), 552–77.

[163] Gazi.

This was certainly the case to an extent. For instance, in an address to the Union of Young Scientists of Piraeus on the ‘nation-saving’ importance of the Truman Doctrine in 1967, Georgios Papadopoulos referred to the many ‘innocents, or rather, the naïve, who [had] believed […] the sirens of Communism and surrendered themselves to the nets of the communist Circe' during the Civil War.[167] Papadopoulos was here using Homeric seductresses in order to typecast Communism as exotic and therefore foreign, as female and as dangerously guileful, the implication being that Greek society be gendered as a male hero that needed to be kept on his patriotic course. Similar references to Homeric enchantresses can be found in the speeches of regime hardliner, Colonel Ioannis Ladas, who was rather more belligerent in linking Communism to the Sirens' song, and rapprochements between Right and Left to an amnesic insult to 'the memory of the thousands of innocent victims of the slaughterers of the KKE' (the Communist Party of Greece) in the Civil War.[168] In the same speech, Ladas claimed that 'the differences between Greeks and communists are not differences in ideology, but differences in blood', the implication being that the bloody civil conflict had rendered leftists racially and irreparably un-Greek.[169]

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[164] Polymeris Voglis, *Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners During the Greek Civil War* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002), pp. 58–62.

[165] Alivizatos, *Oi politikoi thesmoi se krisi 1922-1974: Opseis tis ellinikis embeirias*, pp. 226–227. For examples of these declarations published in newspapers during the dictatorial period, see Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S. Truman-McCarthy Era’, pp. 62–3.

[166] The certificates of civic-mindedness were first introduced under the interwar dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas and essentially ‘penalized communism as a political ideology and prosecuted individuals for their political views’. Voglis, *Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners During the Greek Civil War*, p. 40. The certificates continued to be used in the post-war period, were abolished by the Centre Union in the period 1964 to 1965, but were reintroduced by the Dictatorship of 21 April. For an example, see Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S. Truman-McCarthy Era’ p. 64.

Whereas Papadopoulos pardoned the ostensible naivety of left-wingers in order to disalienate them (should they bend to the regime's will under torture or duress, or should they manage to obtain from the police a practically unobtainable certificate of civic-mindedness), Ladas was therefore less forgiving, as evidenced by the notoriety he would acquire for personally beating two journalists for suggesting that 'many of the worthies of ancient Greece had been homosexual' (Clogg 1972: 41).

Initially, these examples gesture to the ideological cleavages within the regime. A self-declared admirer of Ioannis Metaxas but also of writer Pericles Yannopoulos (1869–1910), a 'most extreme advocate of ethnocentrism', Ladas did not hesitate to promote his views on Greek biological determinism at a time where references to race were largely viewed as politically and ethically unacceptable in both the Western and communist Eastern world.[170] That said, Ladas was not alone in openly endorsing race consciousness in post-war Greece, a consciousness whose proponents included authors, journalists, distinguished academics and politicians (Stefanidis 2007: 36–39). Ladas claimed that in the 1940s, the communists had '[s]tricken Hellenism, not only as an idea, but also as a biological entity', only to be defeated by 'the instinct of the self-preservation of the race' that emanates 'from the depths of the soul of our race' (1970: 16). A major component of the Hellenic soul and spirit, after Ladas, was the scientific acumen of the ancients, exemplified by Classical and Hellenistic philosophers, astronomers and mathematicians. According to this warped logic, the Greek people were hardwired to seek 'knowledge of truth' (1970: 15), their reasoning therefore being irreconcilable with the seductive chimera of Communism. Furthermore, and notwithstanding his numerous references to Goethe, Nietzsche and to 'the contribution of the Americans to the idea of Freedom' in the ongoing Vietnam War, Ladas railed against modern Western thought and its receptions of ancient Greek history and culture: 'I assure you that the foreigners have contributed nothing. They copied everything from us and afterwards presented [everything] as their own'.[171]

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[167] Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 1, p. 30.
[168] Ladas, *Logoi*, p. 18.
[169] Ibid., p. 16.

By contrast, Papadopoulos generally evaded references to Metaxas and biological determinism, and was more measured in terms of his selective anti-Westernism.[172] The men's presentations of Communism in terms of Homeric seductresses, however, betrays an agreement on the intractable masculinity of the ancients and the nation to be defended, within the framework of a regime that had claimed the pre-emption of a communist insurgency as its originary myth.

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[170] Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945-1967* (Hampshire and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), p. 36. For examples of Ladas's self-declared admiration of Yannopoulos and Metaxas, see Ladas, pp. 12-13, 15, 35.

[171] Ladas, p.12. On Goethe's *Faust,* see ibid, p. 15. On Nietzche's *Twilight of the Idols* see ibid, p. 20. On war in Vietnam, see ibid, p. 131.

[172] On the selective anti-Westernism of Papadopoulos and his co-conspirators, see, indicatively Thanos Veremis, 'To kinima tis 21is Apriliou 1967 kai i "theoria" tou', in *I diktatoria ton syntagmatarhon & i apokatastasi tis dimokratias,* ed. by Pavlos Sourlas (Athens: Idryma tis Voulis ton Ellinon, 2016), pp. 77–90.

To approach the dictatorship's receptions of antiquity as a renegotiation of *ethnikofrosyni*, however, would be limiting for a number of reasons. Firstly, while the Colonels and their ideologues did reproduce the basic precepts of this discourse, and the dictatorship reinstated and amplified the anti-communist measures of the post-war state, some of the foremost personalities of the regime systematically avoided identifying as *ethnikofrones*. Direct references to *ethnikofrosyni* were conspicuously absent from the speeches of Georgios Papadopoulos, for instance, which began to be serialised under the title *Our Creed* (*To Pistevo Mas*) in 1968. As historian Despina Papadimitriou points out, *ethnikofrosyni* had come to be associated with the elites who had emerged victorious from the Greek Civil War, whom the Colonels did not identify with, and whose failures and corruption the usurpers first named as the cause for their coup d'état in 1967.[173] As discussed in Chapter 1, Greece's future dictators had been involved in various conspiratorial plots since the 1950s and — despite being caught red-handed and receiving strikingly lenient treatment at various junctures — had grown acutely resentful in light of what they perceived as a waning involvement of the army in Greece's political affairs, and due to their thwarted ambitions to rise in rank and power (Veremis 1997: 157–58). Beyond their recalcitrant contempt for Greece's political bourgeoisie, the Colonels' reticence to publicly subscribe to *ethnikofrosyni* therefore also reads as a discursive strategy of estrangement from the established order and towards branding their coup d'état and regime as a popular 'Revolution of 21 April'.

In actuality, of course, the officers' nationalist anti-communism often participated in the same grammar of othering as that of their political predecessors. Indicatively, one year before the coup d'état, ERE leader Panagiotis Kanellopoulos (one of the foremost proponents of *ethnikofrosyni*; Kazamias 2014: 129) had also signalled the susceptibility of the Greek youth to 'the charms of the evil Sirens' of Communism, while exhorting the necessity to teach the youth to fasten themselves, like Odysseus, to the mast of the ship, unswervingly bound on the nation's onward journey. Somewhat prophetically, Kanellopoulos went on to extend his metaphor to forewarn that '[i]f a dictator ties them [the youth] up, we fail to accomplish anything'.[174]

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[173] Despoina Papadimitriou, 'I ideologia tou kathestotos', p. 108.

Secondly, the rhetoric of the regime that resonated with the precepts of *ethnikofrosyni* must be viewed within the perspective of the legitimisation strategies of the Colonels during what is sometimes called the 'first phase' of the dictatorship (spanning April to December 1967).[175] When the officers proclaimed they had saved the nation from a communist uprising, they were capitalising on a climate of communisto-phobia cultivated by the Crown and Greece's political elites (especially, but not exclusively the Right) since the events of July 1965.[176] King Constantine had also done his part to add fuel to rumours regarding his proclivity to rule (rather than reign) in the name of anti-communism in that period. For instance, in his 1966 New Year's address to the Greek public, Constantine alerted the unsuspecting and 'always good Greek' of the dangers of Communism, 'a miasma born outside of Greece' whose only principles were 'lies and treason'.[177] It was with such precedents in mind and in light of an uneasy symbiotic relationship with the Crown during the regime's first eight months in power that Papadopoulos would use Homeric seductresses to allay the frustration of the *ancien*

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[174] 'G. Papandreou: Den kindinevei to ethnos, alla monon i E.R.E.', *To Vima* (Athens, 13 March 1966), p. 5. After the fall of the dictatorship in 1974, Kanellopoulos would testify that intelligence of a potential coup had become rife by early 1967; this forewarning, however, came almost a year earlier. Kanellopoulos cited in Lena Doukidou, *Pos ftasame sti diktatoria tou '67: Oi protagonistes tis istorias, martyres katigorias to 1975 sti diki ton syntagmatarchon* (Athens: Dimosiografikos Organismos Lambraki, 2012), p. 18.

[175] Rizas, 'Esoteriki kai oikonomiki politiki', p. 87.

[176] Despina Papadimitriou, 'I diktatoria tis 21is Apriliou kai i ideologiki proetoimasia dia tin apodochi tis'.

[177] 'Diangelma tou vasileos pros ton ellinikon laon', *Eleftheria* (Athens, 1 January 1966), p. 15.

régime, and to present the coup as the natural outcome of a pre-dictatorial communist threat. Papadopoulos had, after all, participated in developing and falsifying intelligence of such a threat and, in this sense, had delivered on his oath as a founding member of EENA in 1957, to create the circumstances for an assertive intervention of the army in Greece's political affairs.[178]

The king's abortive counter-coup in December 1967 and his effective self-exile thereafter, however, would open up new territory for Papadopoulos to ascend to the apex of power. This new historical circumstance would be accompanied by a shift in Papadopoulos's discourses, from anti-communism to 'notions of unity of the nation or the moral education of the Greeks'.[179] These discourses punctuated the second and longest phase of the dictatorship (until May 1973), a period during which the regime would institutionalise its power (with the introduction of the constitution of 1968, for instance), enjoy relative stability and publish a number of ideological treatises and primers in the spirit of a national re-education campaign. Among these publications were: the seven volumes of Georgios Papadopoulos's public addresses, serialised under the title *Our Creed*, the first volume of which was published to coincide with the first anniversary of the coup d'état in April 1968; the regime's substantial 1970 civics reader, entitled *Education of the Citizen* (*Politiki agogi*), authored by ex-communist, regime ideologue and Minister of Education (1967–69), Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou; and lead dictatorship propagandist, ex-communist and ex-'Sovietologist', Georgios Georgalas's 1971 *The Ideology of the Revolution: Not dogmas, but Ideals* (*I Ideologia tis Epanastaseos: Ochi dogmata, alla ideodi).*[180] As Gonda Van Steen observes, the dictatorship infantilised the Greek people, whom Papadopoulos would refer to as '"childish," "irresponsible," and "quirky individualists"' in need of re-education on various occasions (2015: 71–72), an ostensible problem that these publications sought not so much to tackle inasmuch as to amplify.

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[178] Papadiamantis, 'Stratos kai politiki exousia sti metemfiliaki Ellada (1949-1967)', pp. 130–35.

[179] Despina Papadimitriou, 'George Papadopoulos and the Dictatorship of the Colonels, 1967-1974', in *Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rules of South Eastern Europe*, ed. by Bernd J. Fischer (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2007), p. 403.

[180] Between 1960 and 1964, Georgalas had launched, owned, edited and written most of the articles of *Sovietology* (*Sovietologia*), a monthly periodical that undertook a 'scientific' vigilance of leftist activities in Greece that claimed to provide 'reliable studies about Communism, statistics [and] verified news'.

The appearance of Ladas's *Speeches* (*Logoi*), printed by an independent publisher in 1970 (as opposed to the state-run General Directorate of the Press that serialised Papadopoulos's *Our Creed*), is of interest for the additional reason that it challenged the monopoly of Papadopoulos's authoritative voice on ideological matters. In spite of different disagreements and rifts within the regime's ranks (Pattakos, for instance, was already warning Papadopoulos that the centralisation of power under his person was becoming infuriating to his confederates in 1968), to my knowledge, no other of the initial culprits went as far as to publish their own speeches during the dictatorship. In an essay he wrote in May 1970, Ladas made clear some of the reasons for his frustration:

> I personally believe that in the battle against the enemies of morality, of religion, of [the rule of] law and of humanism we should have no reservations, because if we do, we will be defeated, and we will be defeated not as individuals, but as defenders of the values I have already mentioned. Nevertheless, and since our societies do not grant us the permission to act without hesitation against the Marxists, let us make sure that we win the battle within the limitations of [that] hesitation, if it is possible.[181]

Georgios Georgalas, *I ideologia tou antikommounismou (Arnisis tis arniseos)* ([n.p]: [n.pub.]), p. 42. While accessible to a broader public via subscription, *Sovietology* was directly financed by the Service of Information and Enlightenment under ERE at the turn of the 1960s and was circulated to the Armed Forces and security apparatuses, who were additionally initiated to Sovietology (the subject) through a seminar taught by Georgalas himself (who was on the payroll of the Ministry to the Presidency and recipient to a substantial salary for his services). Meletopoulos, *I diktatoria ton syntagmatarchon: Koinonia, ideologia, oikonomia*, p. 212. After the discontinuation of *Sovietology* in 1964 (under Georgios Papandreou's Centre Union government), Georgalas continued to act as a 'special associate' of the Hellenic Army General Staff in matters of psychological warfare and public enlightenment, and he was additionally a presenter of the Armed Forces radio broadcasting service. Georgios Georgalas, 'Liga logia gia ton syggrafea' Georgios Georgalas, *I propaganda: Methodiki kai techniki tis agogis ton mazon* (Athens: Ekdotikos Oikos Kambanas, 1967).

[181] Ladas, p. 133.

The implication, here, was that communists were immoral and that the moral qualms of the good, Christian Greeks held them back from unleashing uninhibited violence against their communist enemies. According to Ladas, even good Christians should be able to curb their morality when it came down to confronting Communism. This statement also intimates Ladas's view that his militancy was being unreasonably constrained by his environment, a point that is important to bear in mind in relation to the Spartan visions of the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi* in the following chapter of this project.

Therefore, if *ethnikofrosyni* is primarily understood as an antagonistic discourse targeting the Left with few properties unto itself except in the negative (or negating), this discourse does not account for the dictatorship's all-encompassing ideological politics of social (re-)education and futurity. Within the framework of this discourse the classical past took centre stage, such that 'a system that is free and Hellenic [would] radiate the splendor of the Hellenic spirit across the modern civilised world'.[182]

The dictatorship's primers, I want to argue, used classical culture in such a way so as to galvanise a culture of developmentalism in Greece, broadly understood as

> an ideological orientation characterized by the fetishization of development, or the attribution to development of the power of a natural (or even, divine) force which humans can resist or question only at the risk of being condemned to stagnation and poverty.[183]

In other words, the primers projected onto the ancients a quasi-messianic power to drive (or even coerce) Greek social and economic development in an interminable global 'horse race' for economic growth and competitiveness (Dirlik 2012: 34). Within the framework of this discourse, the maturation of the Greek people was presented as contingent on acquiring a profound sense of moral accountability to do right by the great legacies of the classical past, whereas stagnation, unproductiveness and underdevelopment became the principal sites of othering that threatened to divest citizens of their ‘Greekness’.

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[182] Georgios Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 2 (Athens: Geniki Diefthynsi Typou, 1968), p.21.
[183] Arif Dirlik, 'Developmentalism: A Critique', *Interventions*, 16.1 (2012), pp. 30–31.

My angle of approach is informed by Marxist political sociologist Nicos Poulantzas, whose 1975 *La Crise des Dictatures* makes the following observation of the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese dictatorships’ ideologies:

> [T]he contradictions within the power bloc are expressed in the top ranks of the administrative apparatus in a particularly confused way, on account of the new dominant ideology within this apparatus in the present phase of imperialism. The dominant ideology now shifts from the juridico-political domain (embodiment of the general will, civil liberties, etc.) towards the economic domain, particularly in the form of technocracy (the “technocrats” of the Spanish and Greek regimes in particular, but also those under Caetano). By its apparently apolitical character, this ideology of technocracy enabled the top ranks of the state administration to give direct and massive support to regimes that actively contributed towards the new dependence of these countries on imperialism, corresponding with their accelerated industrialization. These elements saw in the dictatorship special factors of “technical progress” and “modernization” (“developmentalism”).[184]

In this chapter I give precedence to an ideological orientation toward development over technocracy, although Georgios Papadopoulos was also certainly inspired by technocratic thought. The reason for this precedence is that the receptions of antiquity and notions of the ancient Greek miracle in the discourses of Papadopoulos predominantly relayed progress as an affective national imperative. By and large, Papadopoulos’s references to classical antiquity revealed a cursory acquaintance with and callow understanding of classical texts, but also a personal disregard for perspicuity and an unquestioning confidence in the ancients’ power to inspire.[185] Furthermore, the Colonels would not hesitate to sideline some of their more proficient ideological allies under a regime that these allies had helped engineer in the first place (including Professor of Sociology, Dimitrios Tsakonas).[186] Insofar as the main outlets of the dictatorship's ideological discourses were concerned, then, receptions of classical antiquity lacked the expert manpower for a methodically articulated technocratic 'logic of scientific-technical progress and purposive rational-action'.[187] Nonetheless, among those ancient pioneerisms championed by Papadopoulos and the dictatorship's ideologues were the scientific accomplishments of the Classical and Hellenistic Greeks, a point that suggests that in spite of being ill-equipped, Papadopoulos wanted to be perceived as a technocrat or as a pro-technocratic leader (a point that is also revisited in Chapter 3 of this project).

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[184] Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain*, p.120.

[185] Indicative, for instance, is the dictator’s misattribution of a line from the chorus in Sophocles’ *Antigone* to some unnamed Greek philosopher in a 1968 address to civil servants: ‘The great Greek philosopher [once] said: Troubles there are many, of all things man is most troublesome’. Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 2, p. 46. In the original *katharevousa*, this statement reads ‘O megas filosofos eipen: ‘Polla ta deina, ouden anthropopou deinoteron.”’ Based on the context and content of this speech, which emphasised the need to re-educate civil servants in morality, humility and discipline, and to rid them of individualism, it seems that Papadopoulos was additionally confounding the understanding of ‘*deina’* as ‘troubles’ (the

A second angle of divergence from Poulantzas regards the scope and intricacies of the regime's fixation on national development. Unlike the tapered (and contested) focus on Greece's industrial and economic dependency broached in *La Crise des Dictatures,* I am rather interested in the dictatorship's developmentalism as discursive practice, which I view as conditioned by a complex palimpsest of discourses past and present, personal outlooks, power relations and cultural developments (for lack of a better term).[188] This perspective is informed by recent studies of developmentalist discourses, which emphasise the 'hybridization of development' and the acculturation and idiosyncracies of this discourse within different contexts.[189]

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troubles of individualism) in the modern variety of Greek, with its use to express the 'wonders' of man in the classical text. This speech, and many others like it, would go on to be incorporated into the volumes of *Our Creed*, which were intended 'to be studied carefully and thoroughly by all Greeks irrespective of class' and age across the country. Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas,* vol. 1 p. 7. Clogg, 'The Ideology of the "Revolution of 21 April"', p. 43.

[186] Meletopoulos, *I Diktatoria Ton Syntagmatarchon: Koinonia, Ideologia, Oikonomia,* p.248.

[187] John C. Oliga, *Power, Ideology and Control* (New York and London: Plenum Press, 2007), p. 100.

[188] Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain,* p. 14-15. For instance, Nicos Mouzelis questions the extent to which notions of dependence are able to account for the idiosyncracies and internal structure of economies, as well as the power of class agencies to condition relationships with these structures and with capital. Nicos P. Mouzelis, *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, 2nd edn (London & Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1979), pp. 45–48.

[189] Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith*, ed. by Patrick Camiller, 3rd edn (London and New York: Zed Books, 2008), p. 108.

I have indicated above that the dictatorship's ideological primers projected onto the ancients a quasi-messianic power to drive social and economic development, such that a maturation of the Greek people was presented as contingent on acquiring a profound sense of moral accountability to do right by the great legacies of the classical past. In other words, these primers resonated with the remedial and re-educational instrumentalisation of classical culture deployed under the banner of Cold War *ethnikofrosyni* (Hamilakis 2009: 214), a notion that was now extended to encompass Greek society and which became intricately linked to the regime's discursive economy of power.

In addition, if the early post-war period had seen a reappraisal of classical culture as a national 'valuable resource, a well-packaged commodity' to balance the country's accounts, the perspectives of the dictatorship's personalities betrayed the extent to which the fetishisation of antiquity had become internalised by specific alcoves of the lower-middle classes (in the case of Papadopoulos and Ladas, for instance), almost two decades on.[190] In other words, the developmental power of Hellenism was not grounded in political or economic grand strategy, inasmuch as in the Colonels' beliefs and desires, which often made for particularly vague uses of the classical past.[191]

II. The Quixotic Future of Development

Emmanuela Mikedakis has recently shown that a cyclical narrative of a past, present and future Greece permeates the entire corpus of Georgios Papadopoulos's speeches. Using a quantitative content analysis of *Our Creed* and additional addresses published in the Greek printed press, she argues:

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[190] Stavros Alifragkis and Emilia Athanassiou, 'Educating Greece in Modernity: Post-War Tourism and Western Politics', *The Journal of Architecture*, 18.5 (2013), 706.

[191] On development as belief, see Rist, pp. 21–24; on development as desire, see Aditya Nigam, *Desire Named Development* (Delhi: Penguin Books, 2011).

> Papadopoulos proposes a "negative" recent past that necessitated a "revolutionary" present; a "revolutionary" present that will create the preconditions for a prosperous future Greece; and a future Greece that embraces the attributes of a distant past – far removed from those of the recent past.[192]

In this context, the 'distant past' includes a broad range of cultural and historical milestones, namely: 'the legacy of Classical Greece, Byzantium, and past struggles, such as the National Revolution of 1821, the Albanian campaign (1940-1) and the Civil War against the Communists (1943-9)' (Mikedakis 2007: 317). Initially, this cyclical framework goes some way to confirm that classical antiquity systematically participated in Papadopoulos's ideological politics of futurity and was articulated with notions of national progress and prosperity. What Mikedakis's conclusions understate, however, are both the quixotic indeterminacy of this future, and the extent to which Papadopoulos (and his confederates) used Hellenism to construct subjecthood around notions of underdevelopment in the present.

If classical material culture had represented an apparatus to re-educate leftists out of their aberrant ideologies on Civil War prison islands in the late 1940s (Yalouri 2001: 43–44; Hamilakis 2009: 205–41), by the 1960s, it had come to epitomise a desirable national aesthetic geared by the effective demand of mass tourism and that industry's emergent position as Greece's national industry.[193] Insofar as Papadopoulos was concerned, however, the production of classical forms retained its power as a corrective exercise, precisely because of their touristic allure.

For instance, the dictator proposed that the findings of excavations should 'constitute the guide[s] for what for that which we produce today', the implication being that Greek manufacturing become aligned with the production of archaeological knowledge, and that both secondary industry and archaeology catch up (and keep up) with ‘the needs of consumption’.[194] In this context, an interminable race for the influx of foreign currency and social evolutionism intermingled with a moralistic demand on small manufacturers to do right by the ‘heavy legacies’ of the past, such that productivism was equated with the development of a form of a dutiful, embattled patriotism. As Papadopoulos went on to admonish ‘we are today in the full throttle of the battle of the Nation’; ‘there will be no toleration of desertion, there will be no toleration of fallback’.[195] Such expectations no doubt also placed additional pressures on archaeologists to develop ‘an “impressive find” mentality’ (that is, those who were not subjected to dismissals and suspensions under the regime’s director of the Archaeological Service, Spyridon Marinatos), in service of a broader campaign to stage the thriving momentum of Greek archaeology.[196]

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[192] Emmanuela Mikedakis, 'Renouncing the Recent Past, "Revolutionising" the Present and "Resurrecting" the Distant Past: Lexical and Figurative Representations in the Political Speeches of Georgios Papadopoulos (1967-73)', unpublished doctoral thesis (University of New South Wales, 2007), p. 1.

[193] Michalis Nikolakakis, 'The Colonels on the Beach: Tourism Policy During the Greek Military Dictatorship (1967-1974)', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 35.2 (2017), p. 444.

As an aside, it should be noted that the commodification of antiquities for the purposes of mass tourism was already in full swing by the eve of the coup d’état, a situation that no doubt informed Papadopoulos’s discourses, as well as his audience’s understandings of the dictator’s proclamations. By the mid-1960s, Athens was populated by an estimated 350 little touristic shops, 200 kiosks and 100 street vendors, with mass-produced classical figurines, miniatures of the Parthenon and plastic Evzone dolls (or *tsoliades*) for sale. According to an investigative journalism piece published by *Eleftheria* newspaper in August 1966, approximately 100,000 foreign and Greek consumers bought imitations of ‘popular art or of a […] Socrates or of the goddess of beauty’ (Aphrodite) each year in the prefecture of Attica alone.[197] This sellability of classically-inspired commodities was a good thing, according to the same article, but the problem was that the commodities themselves were often of poor quality and failed to adequately reproduce the forms of the original statues or monuments: 'They produce [a] Socrates holding a shield — yes, there [actually] exists such a statuette [!] — [or] an Aphrodite [with] a snake pressed up against her legs, [or] the Acropolis with [the Parthenon having] 20 fewer columns than [what it] normally has'.[198] As the same article indicates, some of these trinkets were made in Greece and others were made in Japan, a telling specification when one takes into consideration that the so-called post-war economic miracle of Greece was surpassed only by the growth rates of the Japan's Gross National Product.[199]

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[194] Georgios Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, vol. 3 (Athens: Geniki Diefthynsi Typou, 1969), p. 160.
[195] Ibid., p. 162.
[196] Dimitra Kokkinidou and Marianna Nikolaidou, ‘On the Stage and Behind the Scenes: Greek Archaeology in Times of Dictatorship’, in *Archaeology Under Dictatorship*, ed. by Michael M. Galaty and Charles Watkinson (New York: Springer, 2004), p. 179.

But Papadopoulos's incitements to emulate the ancients stretched beyond tourism, or even the somewhat more obvious fields of science and technology, where Democritus's atomic theory was relayed as inspiration for modern research in physics, for instance.[200] His incitements to '[p]hilosophise as Greeks on behalf of mankind', to 'develop [their] mental faculties' and become 'the society that mankind must follow' speak to a vague instrumentalisation of classical philosophy to serve a fixation on national progress and international competitiveness, with an eye to social self-betterment.[201] In an address to the Ministry of Industry in May 1969, Papadopoulos would go as far as to propose that Greek mining and quarrying plans would benefit from 'studies of Polybius or of any other ancient writer, who refers to the worldly [things] of those times', as well as from consultations with archaeologists and of ‘maps that are ancient’.[202] While his intention, here, was to suggest that ancient cultural texts may hold secrets to the bearings of untapped natural resources, Papadopoulos was also promoting an edifying exercise in patriotic and professional scrupulousness, through which these cultural texts (and archaeological knowledge) represented minable national resources for collaboration in state corporatism. As Papadopoulos evocatively explained: ‘The lot has fallen on us to die fighting in the field of battle’; it was only with ‘total self-sacrifice, total self-denial’ and ‘a lot of work’ that Greece would ‘move [forward] at a modern speed’ and survive ‘as a Nation, as a People, as a State’.[203]

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[197] Grigoris Michalopoulos, 'Ta eidi laïkis technis pio "pista" stis paradoseis', *Eleftheria* (Athens, 5 August 1966), p. 5.

[198] Ibid.

[199] Stavros B. Thomadakis, 'The Greek Economy: Performance, Expectations, & Paradoxes', in *The Greek Paradox: Promise vs. Performance*, ed. by Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 43.

[200] Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 1, p. 154. Papadopoulos's positive view of Democritus was at odds with those views expressed by post-war *ethnikofrones* on the materialist philosopher. Kazamias, 'Antiquity as Cold War Propaganda: The Political Uses of the Classical Past in Post-Civil War Greece', pp. 138-9.

[201] Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 1, p. 195.

Elsewhere, he spoke of bringing the Greek medical profession up-to-date with contemporary advancements in medicine and therefore in line with ‘the development of the Hellenic spirit of Greek antiquity’, the implication being that Hellenism was equated with novelism and was to be earned through perpetual training and further education.[204] To lawyers, the ‘wardens of Themis’, Papadopoulos charged the task of channelling the natural ‘intelligence’ and ‘political acumen’ of the Greek people to the rule of law, such that ‘there will be the modernisation necessary’ for Greece to survive in ‘the international competition among other peoples’.[205] What these usually cursory allusions to the pioneerism and illustriousness of the ancients invariably shared was both a vague future end goal and a demand on the time and efforts of the dictatorship’s subjects in the present.

From this vignette of Papadopoulos’s recourses to classical culture, it is clear that the dictator championed an idea of antiquity rather than specific cultural texts, figures or strictly delimited periods of the classical past. This was the idea of the ancient Greek miracle, which tends to be underpinned by notions of the uncanny ‘bloom of Greek genius' in classical Athens and of the cultural autonomy of the ancient Greeks.[206] Similar precepts can be found in Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou's much-publicised civics reader, which was printed in hundreds of thousands of copies in 1970 and was distributed freely to civil servants, the security apparatuses, to clerics, educators and students.[207] Papakonstantinou claimed that, with no significant cultural precedent to build on, '[t]he Greeks created something entirely new', thus proving themselves to be 'a privileged people, entirely different in terms of its psyche, its mentality and its capabilities from the other peoples' who inhabited the Mediterranean and the Near East in antiquity.[208] Because the cultural heritage of the modern Greeks was 'more precious than [that] of any other nation', Papakonstantinou continued, it was 'also especially heavy' and created 'corresponding responsibilities' in the contemporary moment.[209]

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[202] Georgios Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 5(Athens: Geniki Diefthynsi Typou, 1970), pp. 106-107.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Georgios Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 4 (Athens: Geniki Diefthynsi Typou, 1969), p. 91.
[205] Ibid., pp. 143, 147, 145.

For all the urgency and moral imperatives that permeated such discourses, however, there was no clear indication as to what (or when) the end goal of such a struggle was, other than to evade some form of premature national death. To put it differently, the quixotic future of a satisfactorily developed Greece and an inescapable national debt to the heavy legacies of the Greek miracle commingled into perpetuity, such that the duration of the supremacy of the regime, too, carried into the future, indefinitely. Take, for instance, the following statement of Papadopoulos's to an audience of journalists in 1967:

> [W]e must all come to realise that, if this ship sinks, it is Greece that will sink and we Greeks will sink also. If the ship arrives at the harbour by following the course that we have

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[206] Edith Hamilton, *The Greek Way* (New York and London: W.W.Norton & Company, [1964] 2017), p. 15. Suzanne Marchand, '"What Did the Greeks Owe the Orient?" The Question We Can't Stop Asking (Even Though We Can't Answer It', *Archaeological Dialogues*, 17.1 (2010), 117–40.

[207] For Papadopoulos's announcement regarding the publication of the unprecedentedly 'erudite work' of Papakonstantinou, see Georgios Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, vol. 6 (Athens: Geniki Diefthynsi Typou, 1970), pp. 25-6. On the distribution of the civics reader, see Clogg, 'The Ideology of the "Revolution of 21 April"', pp. 46–47.

[208] Papakonstantinou, *Politiki Agogi*, pp. 424, 423.

[209] Ibid., p. 432.

> charted, then Greece will continue [on] the course of progress and of development atop the Helleno-Christian ideals, [thus] continuing the tradition of handing off the baton from our generation to the coming [generation], a baton that is deeply rooted in the past and [wherein] time will bear witness [and] radiate [our] trimillennial history.[210]

Notwithstanding the somewhat disorienting syntax and reasoning behind this metaphor, what Papadopoulos was essentially proposing here was that the trimillennial history of the Greeks would shine through the protractedness of a national effort for progress and development. In other words, and to extend Papadopoulos's metaphor, the 'destin[y] of the Nation' was not to reach a harbour in safety, but to maintain the momentum of a national relay race. The relay race, evocative of Olympic athletics and a favourite metaphor of Papadopoulos's, was itself interminable in that both he and his confederates incited the youth to similar pursuits, albeit in more sinister ways (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this research project). To reach the end of the road, to cry, after the Marathon runner Pheidippides, '*Nenikikamen* [we are victorious], our children' ('our children' being Papadopoulos's add-on),[211] was simply to pass on the baton of development and a debt to a growing lineage of ancestors to the following generation. In short, if, as Georgios Georgalas put it in his 1971 treatise, the regime's 'battle for progress' relied on the 'cultivation of our magnificent national heritage' towards the 'all-round exploitation and development of [a] free Greece',[212] the Dictatorship of 21 April was essentially setting up its subjects for failure.

In the meantime, to resist or question the necessity of such a struggle was a non-option. In Papadopoulos's other speeches, the biopolitical imperative to make ~~(~~the nation~~)~~ live (after Foucault) stood in stark contrast with his disdain for 'he who does not work' (including retirees), to whom the dictator figuratively denied 'rights in life' and referred to as social ‘carcinomas’.[213] In a similar vein, Papakonstantinou’s civics primer named ‘the engagement in a *profession* that is useful both to the individual and to the nation’ among the ‘personal responsibilities’ of citizens to the state, such that the citizen would not become ‘useless or a burden to the collective’.[214]

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[210] Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, vol. 1, p. 17.
[211] Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, vol. 6, p. 173.
[212] Georgios Georgalas, *I Ideologia Tis Epanastaseos: Ochi Dogmata, Alla Ideodi* (Athens, 1971), pp. 23-4.

Ultimately, the notion of the ancient miracle participated in the developmentalist discourses of the dictatorship in such a way so as to make subjects out of the Greek people as underdeveloped and infantile — development having ‘a range of meanings associated with unfurling and growth’, as Gilbert Rist observes, including the ‘development of a child or a plant’ (2008: 26). The precondition for a developed Greece, which, as we have seen, was itself a quixotic prospect, was invariably that the Greek people should attain maturity in terms of an unquestioning adherence to the dictatorship’s rule of law and its dictums. To these ends, the regime’s ideologues took recourse to classical cultural texts in order to contradistinguish between the ostensible callowness of the Greek people and the advanced state of the ancients, the implication being that the contemporary Greeks were essentially presented as ‘unGreek’ on account of their underdevelopment.

For instance, the introduction of Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou’s *Education of the Citizen* opened with references to Plato and Aristotle in order to establish that ‘the necessity of “the education of citizens”’ ‘had already been underlined by the ancient Greeks’: ‘Plato considers citizenship education to be the pinnacle of any educational effort [… for] man to become a perfect, integrated citizen’; ‘Aristotle, on the other hand, sets as a precondition for political and social stability […] the adaptation of education to the nature of the state'.[215] On this basis, Papakonstantinou elaborated the necessity of his book as follows:

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[213] Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, vol. 5, p. 123. Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*, ed. by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. by David Macey (London and New York: Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 239–64.

[214] Papakonstantinou, *Politiki Agogi*, p. 300. (Papakonstantinou’s emphasis.)

> The Greek is indubitably in need of citizenship education because he is not a "citizen". […] And he is not a citizen because he is constantly hostile toward the state, from the cradle to the grave, and because he does not know why this state exists, nor how it works, nor what it offers him, nor what he owes to it.[216]

In addition to legitimising the agendas of indoctrination of the regime, in this context, Papakonstantinou's references to Plato and Aristotle served to draw a sharp contrast between the sagaciousness of the ancients and the incognisance of the modern Greeks, an incognisance that precluded the Greek people from citizenship entitlements. One such entitlement was the right to vote or to be elected.

Finally, it is crucial to note that references to the ancient Greek miracle or to classical cultural texts were conspicuously absent from addresses to two enormous demographics, namely, women and the agricultural classes. These exclusionary discursive politics of the regime attest to its gender and class biases. They also attest to the Colonels' beliefs regarding the moral accountability of men (and, indeed, of military men) to do right by the great legacies of the classical past in the so-called battle for progress, as well as to the social prestige they associated with classical antiquity. Whereas women would inevitably attend many of Papadopoulos's public addresses or would come into possession of the ideological primers of the regime (thanks to their distribution to educators or students, for instance), the texts addressing women, specifically, rather urged their audiences 'to become useful women for society, useful Greeks and useful mothers'.[217] The regime's sexual objectification and suspicion of women is also exemplified in Papakonstantinou's civics reader, in which he reserved a special section for ‘minxy-Bovary-like women’ (*sousoudo-bovarizousai gynaikes*) who were ‘fellow-travellers’ of Communism: ‘loveless due to [their] repulsive hideousness or unsatisfied due to [their] neurotic frigidity’, ‘they lie shamelessly, a lot more so than men’ and ‘have [to a] maximal level [a] reduced sense of responsibility’.[218] Such views were largely consistent with the gynophobia that punctuated post-war discursive and visual renderings of *ethnikofrosyni* (Kazamias 2017), as evidenced, too, by the use of Homeric seductresses by both Papadopoulos and Kanellopoulos to typecast Communism as dangerously guileful.[219] Furthermore, that Papadopoulos did not refer to classical antiquity in addressing farmers, for instance, confirms the observation of Thanos Veremis that in spite of the dictatorship’s populist rhetoric and its self-referentiality as the champion of the interests of the less privileged classes, the dictatorship’s ideological discourses effectively privileged the middle classes.[220] Accordingly, these discourses attest to the personal class aspirations of Greece’s dictators, which informed their recourses to classical antiquity.

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[215] Ibid., pp. 11–12.
[216] Ibid., p. 14.
[217] Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, vol. 5, p. 47.

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[218] Papakonstantinou, *Politiki Agogi*, pp. 187-8. As Minas Samatas notes, the designation ‘fellow-travellers’ (*synodoiporoi*) was used by the Greek post-war regime in order to stigmatise persons who ‘never publicly declared themselves as either *ethnicofrones* or leftists’, an exercise that the Dictatorship of 21 April also continued. Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S. Truman-McCarthy Era’, pp. 33, 12. According to Papakonstantinou, fellow-travellers included those who were systematically dependent on Communism (it not being clear what the difference between a communist and a fellow-traveller was) or those who flirted with Communism opportunistically. Papakonstantinou, *Politiki Agogi*, pp. 185–90.

[219] As Karen Van Dyck has shown, the regime further tried to specify set gender roles in its broader normative patriarchal view of gender relations and its acute mistrust of sexual ambiguity — a mistrust that made the figure of woman a particularly agile metaphor for dealing with and challenging political oppression under the dictatorship. Karen Van Dyck, *Kassandra and the Censors: Greek Poetry since 1967* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 101–39. In particular, Van Dyck emphasises what she calls the ‘undecidability’ of the identity of woman, which poets, cartoonists and novelists of the Left harnessed in order to challenge the monolithicism of the regime: ‘It is not simply the claustrophobia and subordinate status of feminine experience that provide a way of describing life under an authoritarian regime but the fact that feminine experience can be deployed to so many different ends’. Ibid., p. 103.

[220] Veremis, ‘To Kinima Tis 21is Apriliou 1967 Kai I “Theoria” Tou’, p. 87.

III. Athenian Democracy with a Twist of Roman Republicanism

An examination of the ways in which classical culture participated in the dictatorship's ideological politics of futurity would be remiss without a discussion of the regime's assurances for the eventual restoration of democracy. This is of particular relevance to this chapter, not solely because such assurances made for a variety of calculated appropriations of Athenian democracy and classical works of politics and philosophy, but also because the eventuality of a 'New Democracy' (*Nea Dimokratia*) was presented as conditional on the development of the Greek people and economy.

For instance, in a speech delivered in his native Crete in October 1967, Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos posited the Dictatorship of 21 April at a crossroads between a repugnant recent past, and the nation's (re-)ascension to the Pnyx hill, the pinnacle of democracy in the Athenian 'Golden Age':

> We are cleaning [out] the stables from the excrements with which they were filled. We are obliterating [social] complexes –Communism, fascism, Nazism, obsequiousness and all natures of indignity and we are leading our people from the Roman Agora to the Pnyx.[221]

Here, a descent in time was entangled with the sanitisation of Greek politics and society from the afflictions of foul partisanship, ideologies and mentalities, followed by an uphill expedition of the nation (led by the dictatorship) to the summit of the democracy of Classical Athens. In other words, the mission from the baseness of the present to the lofty heights and democratic liberties of the past would be a protracted and demanding one, requiring citizens to develop out of their ostensible complexes and to emerge into orderly and amenable subjects. Not unlike the case of the vague prospect of a satisfactorily developed Greece, the historical remoteness and idealised stature of the Athenian democracy worked to obscure the anticipated duration and scope of the regime's interventions, with no clear indication that an arrival at the Pnyx would necessarily entail the Colonels' withdrawal from political life.

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[221] Vasilis Vasilikos, *Ypothikes Papadopoulou Pattakou* (Athens: PLEIAS, 1968), p. 107.

In his capacity as Minister of Economic Coordination, moreover, in 1969 Nikolaos Makarezos named economic development as one of the prerequisites for the rebuilding of a contemporary Greek democracy, akin to that of classical Athens:

> [T]he government is applying a complete system for achieving economic, social and cultural progress. It's [*sic.*] results will be a prosperous political democracy, a worthy contemporary, representative of classical democracy, which is frequently spoken of, but is not in evidence anywhere in the world.[222]

Evidently, the questions of liberalisation and of a transition to some form of democracy were informed by a range of factors and the respective discourses of the Greece's dictators became renegotiated in light of a number of contingencies. The regime's struggle to gain legitimacy at a time when liberal democracy enjoyed ideological hegemony in both Greece and the West, the growing cleavages and conflicts between the dictatorship's hardliners and its more moderate figures, and the mounting visibility of expressions of dissent (particularly after 1970) rendered a regime change an increasingly pressing and divisive issue for the Colonels.[223] Accordingly, these eventualities informed the appropriations of ideas of antiquity and of classical cultural texts at specific junctures. In order to shed light on these dynamics, I will focus here on two indicative examples. The first relates to how the Colonels brought their own frames of reference to the championing of an idea of Athenian democracy, which had become a staple of the anti-communist discourse of *ethnikofrosyni* in the post-war period (Kazamias 2014). The second relates to Georgios Georgalas's treatise of 1971, in which Georgalas used classical philosophy and the Hellenistic historian Polybius in such a way so as to intimate an admiration of the Roman Republic and, by extension, American republicanism. In different ways, both examples reveal the close intertwinements between the regime's notions of democracy, the ancient and modern Greek miracles.

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[222] Makarezos cited in Nina Mavridis, 'Elite Transformation and Modernization in Greece, 1967-71' (New York University, 1973), p. 110. (Mavridis's translation.)

[223] Kaminis, p. 67.

In Chapter 1 of this research project, I indicated that in 1968 the Dictatorship of 21 April organised a six-month-long 'Exhibition of the Military History of the Greeks' that culminated with the publication of two substantial volumes covering the military history of the Greeks from mythical times down to the 'Revolution of 21 April'. The first of these two volumes introduced classical Athens thus:

> The state of Athens, after many adventures, long struggles and social upheavals, became Democratic, in its reliance on equality, the freedom of the individual and the freedom of speech. As a result, the education of the Athenian citizen, too, was free and his spiritual cultivation became [of] paramount [importance], affording those [who were] naturally most capable the ability and the opportunity for personal advancement.[224]

Irony aside (since the dictatorship had suspended democratic processes and imposed preventive censorship one year prior to the exhibition), it is important to note that the volume did not solely refer to the democracy of classical Athens, but it in fact idealised it as an egalitarian society with ample opportunity for upward social mobility (for those who were worthy). This avowal should be viewed in relation to the self-images of the officers as the guarantors of post-war stability and prosperity in Greece, as well as to their grievances regarding remuneration and their career prospects after the Civil War.

The officers regarded their triumph against the communists as akin to that of the Greek victory in the Greco-Persian Wars, in the sense that both had provided the conditions for the flourishing of a certain 'Greek miracle'. Yet, whereas the democracy of classical Athens, as they perceived it, had guaranteed equality of opportunity for all of its citizens, the precarious democracy of post-war Greece and its corrupt politicians had failed to reward those most responsible for the establishment of that system. The staggering growth rates of Greece's Gross National Product in the post-war period, 'exceeded only by those of Japan', had had a dramatic if asymmetrical impact on Greek society, including the Greek officer corps.[225] Most of the conspirators came from working-class or lower-middle-class backgrounds (Pattakos, Papadopoulos, Makarezos and Ladas were the sons of a shepherd, a village schoolteacher, a hamlet grocer and a village priest, respectively), and the burgeoning increases in salaries, upward social mobility and consumption standards of the post-war period had galvanised high hopes and great frustrations in the officers (recall that among the foremost objectives of EENA, in 1957, had been fair distribution of wealth across Greek society).[226] According to William McNeill:

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[224] Geniko Epiteleio Ethnikis Aminis, vol.1, p. 63.

> For professional army officers, who spend most of their active career in or near […] garrison towns, the appeal of Athens has the quality of the Sirens' song which Homer sang of: seductive but also corrupting. The defense of Hellenism and the pursuit of the heroic ideal to which they are professionally committed cannot be reconciled with the softness of urban living as experienced in Athens. Yet, with an irony often to be observed in human affairs, assignment to Athens and to one of the headquarters services echeloned in the capital, is a goal almost all army officers strive for; and on retirement a very large proportion of them take up residence in a suburb of Athens close to the "Greek Pentagon" where a benevolent government has made building lots available to officers at especially favorable prices. Hence the provinciality of army life, real though it is for a majority of the active officers and men, has not blunted the attraction of the capital, even though resistance to the charms of Athenian urban living also finds open expression in ranks of the Greek army.[227]

After the coup d'état, many of the Greece's dictators became ensnared by their own Sirens' song, as evidenced by the abandonment of their small apartments for luxurious villas, their involvements in innumerable economic scandals, and their finking on one another with accusations of corruption and embezzlement.[228] More importantly, for the purposes of this chapter, the example above testifies to how the dictators could share a grammar of nationalist anti-communism with their political predecessors while simultaneously projecting their class and power aspirations onto those discourses (discussed in greater detail in the following section of this chapter).

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[225] William H. McNeill, *The Metamorphosis of Greece Since World War II* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 21.
[226] Meletopoulos, *I Diktatoria Ton Syntagmatarchon: Koinonia, Ideologia, Oikonomia*, pp. 51-7.
[227] McNeill, p. 222.

Published to coincide with the fourth anniversary of the coup d'état, Georgios Georgalas's doctrinal booklet *The Ideology of the Revolution: Not dogmas, but ideals* represented perhaps the most authoritative statement on the regime's ideology (Clogg 1972: 39). This did not prevent the author from arranging his treatise under a somewhat paradoxical binary. On the one hand, Georgalas attempted to rationalise the dictatorship's reticence (or failure) to produce an ideological manifesto and/or to identify with an existing ideology, which he described as 'everlasting, immutable and stagnant socio-political Dogma[s].'[229] On the other, and as evidenced by the book title, Georgalas ventured to compound precisely such a manifesto, albeit one that reflected the dictatorship's 'anti-dogmatic ideology' underscored by a 'dialectical, evolving Ideal' of 'Hellenic Thought'.[230] In actuality, the organising principle of this treatise was that Communism is dogmatic and that, by negation, the dictatorship's ideology was not. In this sense, Georgalas's thesis relied on a basic precept of post-war *ethnikofrosyni*, whereby classical culture was used to present modern radical ideologies as incompatible with the morals of the nationally-minded (Hamilakis 2009: 233; Kazamias 2014: 140), but he also attempted to reverse it, such that it was the dictatorship's ideology which was presented as somehow radical or revolutionary.

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[228] Dionysis Eleftheratos, *Lamogia Sto Chaki: Oikonomika "Thavmata" kai Thymata Tis Chountas*, ed. by Sylvi Rigopoulou (Athens: Ekdoseis Topos, 2015).

[229] Georgalas, *I Ideologia Tis Epanastaseos: Ochi Dogmata, Alla Ideodi*, p. 15.

[230] Ibid., p. 17.

Georgalas's *Ideology* identified the Presocratic sophists, 'who did not construct nor present some [sort of] Dogma-thing' as the 'first political thinkers in history'. The sophists were followed by the foremost philosophers of classical Athens and Polybius, in order for Georgalas to construct the primary stages of a concise linear narrative of Hellenic anti-dogmatism.[231] A closer reading of this narrative, however, reveals that Georgalas engaged in strategies of palimpsestic writing, in order to articulate the regime both with the Greek Independence Wars and with the American Revolution.

To Socrates, Georgalas attributed an incitement to man to conduct 'unbound research' and to think with 'his soul's eyes, open wide and watching', the latter being a line paraphrased from Dionysios Solomos' 1849 poem 'The Shark' (*O Porfyras*).[232] As the poet of the 1823 *Hymn to Liberty* (which was set to music and became Greece's national anthem four decades later), and as Greece's national poet, invoking Solomos, here, was no accident. The anachronistic reverberation of the poet's voice in the dialectics of Socrates served to claim the philosopher as the forerunner of the Greek freedom-loving and patriotic spirit, a spirit made manifest in the mythified Revolution of 1821, and again with the 'Revolution of April 21'.

Furthermore, Georgalas explained that Polybius' *Histories* 'influenced, perhaps more profoundly than anyone else, the most anti-dogmatic–composite [system] of all modern political systems, that of the USA.'[233] Initially, this reference to the American Constitution and the federal system of government served to articulate Polybius with the outcomes of the American Revolution, with the invention of modern nation states and their constitutional charters. The mixed constitution of the Roman Republic, described in book six of Polybius' *Histories*, had been particularly influential in the drafting of the

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[231] Ibid, p. 16.

[232] Ibid. In the sixth stanza, Solomos' poem reads 'My soul's eyes are open wide and watching.' ('Anoichta panta ki agrypna ta matia tis psychis mou.').

[233] Ibid.

Constitution of the United States in the late eighteenth century, and formative for the federal government's separation of powers (between legislative, executive and judicial).[234] More to the point, however, was Georgalas' use of Polybius' 'anti-dogmatism' to underwrite his esteem for American politics. The ideologue located Polybius' anti-dogmatic spirit in his non-parochial and open-minded appreciation for a system that was not Greek, but Roman, for an 'eclectic-mixed regime [most] capable to secure stability and to avoid decline'. This statement intimates an attempt to legitimise an admiration for American liberal democracy and its branches of government, and raises questions regarding how far the dictatorship's broader ideological orientation towards development followed the slogan 'Don't do as the Americans tell you to do, do as the Americans did'.[235]

IV. The Past of Development

At this point, it is important to turn to the unspoken assumptions of the dictatorship's nationalist developmentalist discourses and, specifically, their intersections with discourses that intermingled development with anti-communism.

It is my view that the urgency that underpinned Papadopoulos's nationalist developmentalist discourses stemmed from those discourses and measures associated with the Cold War policy of containment. In the face of devastating conflicts, escalating Cold War pressures, and Greece's growing dependency on American financial aid (and its conditions) in the late 1940s, ideas of antiquity and antiquities had come to acquire new implications as bulwarks against Communism and Soviet expansionism. Sociologist

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[234] Gilbert Chinard offers a detailed discussion of the consultation of Polybius' *Histories* by the Founding Fathers. Gilbert Chinard, 'Polybius and the American Constitution', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1.1 (1940), 38–58.

[235] Erik S. Reinert, *Developmentalism*, Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics (Tallinn, 2010), p. 8 <http://technologygovernance.eu/files/main/2012032710251212.pdf> [accessed 1 January 2017].

Despina Lalaki has recently argued that in the latter half of the 1940s, the direct intervention of the United States in Greece's internal affairs set in motion a paradigmatic shift in the configuration and ideological orientations of Hellenism in Greece. Whereas, she explains, Greek imaginings of Hellenism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been primarily informed by European movements and developments, the extreme historical circumstances of the late 1940s catalysed a reconfiguration of these imaginings, in a vein that veered closer to 'American visions of democracy, development and modernization'.[236]

In accordance with the stipulations of the Marshall Plan and the Economic Co-Operation Administration Mission to Greece (ECA/G), tourism had emerged at that time as a short-term strategy in order to fast-track the influx of foreign currency and to balance the country's accounts, such that poverty and economic destitution would not leave Greece vulnerable to the Soviet Union's appeals to social equality and basic needs.[237] The relaunching of the Greek National Tourism Organisation (GNTO) in 1950 had been accompanied by the strategic and prevalent commodification of classical culture and archaeological sites (designated by the ECA/G as 'assets […] for the attraction of foreign visitors' to Greece),[238] such that the sellability of Greece's cultural heritage came to frontline as an indirect means of national defence and internal security. As Lalaki puts it, 'purified in the springs of antiquity, both victorious America and civil-war-wrecked Greece […] pledged to combat communism with Doric columns and tourism' (Lalaki 2012: 570–71).

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[236] Despina Lalaki, 'On the Social Construction of Hellenism Cold War Narratives of Modernity, Development and Democracy for Greece', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 25.4 (2012), p. 553.

[237] Michalis Nikolakakis, 'Representations and Social Practices of Alternative Tourists in Post-War Greece to the End of the Greek Military Junta', *Journal of Tourism History*, 7.1–2 (2015), p. 7.

[238] Alifragkis and Athanassiou, p. 702.

Whereas Papadopoulos, for instance, did not draw direct links between classical antiquity and economic development as part of the Cold War policy of containment, he did glorify both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as the guarantors of Greek post-war stability and prosperity against Communism. Indicatively, in the same speech during which he compared Communism to the sirens in the *Odyssey*, Papadopoulos also stated:

> [The Truman Doctrine] provided the necessary means for the Greek Army to face the hordes of bandits and to free the country from the communist monster, and indeed [it provided the means] to make it possible, subsequently, [for the country] to move forward on the ascending path to progress and prosperity, both in the economic and in the social sector[s]. The economic assistance offered by the Truman Doctrine and then by the Marshall Plan provided [the conditions] for the avoidance of famine, to remedy the ruins of the Occupation and to boost the economy of the country. […] [I]n this way [Truman] saved both us and all of the small countries of the Free World with the provision of economic assistance.[239]

He continued: ‘Who creates danger? Communism or the circumstances that [Communism] exploits? Undoubtedly the greatest danger derives from social circumstances. […] Here is why the new policy of the United States […] prevented the infiltration of red totalitarianism’.[240] These statements speak to Papadopoulos’s esteem for American economic foreign policy during the Cold War, a policy that had precipitated the ascendancy of developmentalism as a discourse and practice, in aid of ‘containing the Soviet Union and dealing with national liberation movements throughout much of Asia and Africa’.[241] In view, then, of Lalaki’s discussion the reorientations of Hellenism above, it is not a far leap to surmise that the nationalist developmentalist discourses of Papadopoulos (and their urgency), as well as the idealised presentations of classical Athens as an egalitarian society, commingled with anti-communism.

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[239] Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas,* vol. 1, p. 29.

[240] Ibid., p. 30.

[241] Tony Smith, ‘Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies?’, *World Politics,* 37.4 (1985), p. 533. The foundational moment of American Cold War developmentalism tends to be associated with President Harry Truman’s inaugural address in January 1949. Although notions of development exist in all societies, as Gilbert Rist explains, Truman’s address heralded a number of paradigmatic shifts in development discourse in the West. The appearance of the term ‘underdevelopment’ in the 1940s ‘evoked not only the idea of change in the direction of the final state [of development] but, above all, the possibility of bringing about such change’. Rist, p. 73. In the place of colonial discourses, whereby ‘[c]olonized and colonizer had belonged to two opposed universes’, developmentalist discourse came to present ‘*“developed” and “underdeveloped” [as] members of a single family*’, whereby to be ‘underdeveloped’ connoted the ‘incomplete’ development of a nation in relation to its ‘developed’ partners; ‘an acceleration of growth was

Of course, should this have been the case, Papadopoulos's discourses were fundamentally flawed in that they were underpinned by a set of practices that heightened social inequalities. The exclusionary politics of the discourse and practices of *ethnikofrosyni*, as well as the systematic exclusion of left-wing citizens from the country's economic life and the class and gender biases of the regime, all coalesced to perpetuate such inequalities. Yet, and notwithstanding the genealogical links between Papadopoulos's developmentalist discourses and anti-communism, the regime was not interested in ameliorating these inequalities, but only to ensure that the officers themselves would move up an existing social pyramid. As Nicos Mouzelis puts it, 'the Greek colonels intervened strictly "from above", not to defend their country from Marxism but to defend their own role within the state' (1978: 129); accordingly, their major aim was 'the "containment" of the masses, the task of keeping "the lower strata in place"' (Mouzelis 1978: 129), a situation which became particularly evident in terms of the regime's educational policies (discussed in Chapter 3). It is within this framework of class aspirations, power-mongering and social control that the Colonels' recourses to classical antiquity should be viewed.

Finally, note should be made of yet another discrepancy in the nationalist ideological discourses of Papadopoulos. This can be clustered under what he referred to as the regime's 'New Great Idea' (*Nea Megali Idea*). The New Great Idea of the dictatorship was inspired by a similar vision advanced by the Society of Greek Studies

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thus the only logical way of bridging the gap'. Ibid., pp. 73, 74. 'In this comparison', he adds, 'each nation was considered for itself: its "development" was very largely an internal, self-generated, self-dynamizing phenomenon, even if it could be "assisted" from outside'. Ibid., p. 74.

(*Etairia Ellinikon Spoudon*) in the 1960s, a think tank of liberal conservatives whence the regime would pool a number of its administrators (Meletopoulos 2008: 300). The Society's New Great Idea, as presented in 1966, aimed to accomplish 'the material, social and the spiritual elevation of the Greek people' through an economic development plan that remained true to Greek culture and traditions, and which would avoid the 'monkeyisms and imitations' of western consumerist societies.[242] Georgios Papadopoulos expressed similar views when he exhorted Greek manufacturers to keep up with the production of archaeological knowledge, and in his (and the ideologues') promotions of a certain re-education of Greek society. In his *Ideology of the Revolution*, Georgios Georgalas proclaimed that the dictatorship's New Great Idea represented a revived national project with a revised centre of gravity: 'from the outside (Great Greece) to the inside (Developed Greece)' (Georgalas 1971: 23). The state of development, according to Papadopoulos, would be achieved by way of the shipping industry and by 'export[ing]' the Hellenic spirit, by way of the diaspora (especially Greek-Americans).[243]

In his addresses to these audiences, Papadopoulos moderated the infantilising tone and substance of his speeches, since both of these groups were crucial assets to the regime and could withdraw their capital and support at any given moment.[244] For instance, in an address on the occasion of Greek Shipping Week in the summer of 1969, Papadopoulos cited the Argonautical expedition, the Trojan War and the Battle of Salamis as testaments how the Greeks' seafaring spirit had 'charted the fate of Hellas in the years before Christ'.[245] The implication, here, was that glorious military naval expeditions were equated with the lucrative shipping trade routes of ‘Greek shipowners, [the] ambassadors of the modern Great Idea’, to whom Papadopoulos payed ‘homage’.

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[242] *Praktika 6ou panelliniou synedriou tmimaton Etairias Ellinikon Spoudon* (Crete: Etairia Ellinikon Spoudon, 1966), cited in Meletopoulos, *I diktatoria ton syntagmatarchon: Koinonia ideologia, oikonomia*, p. 294.

[243] Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 2, p. 173.

[244] As Nicos Mouzelis notes, shipping 'was a sector which assumed colossal proportions in the post-war period' and 'it c[ould] be always moved elsewhere if the State bother[ed] it with heavy taxes or other restrictions'. Mouzelis, p. 120.

[245] Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 5, p. 174.

In addressing Greek-Americans, Papadopoulos further moderated his speeches in order to serve an affective strategy for the establishment of an asymmetrical relationship of diasporic patronage to the ‘Motherland’ (as opposed to the ‘Fatherland’, which he used when addressing domestic audiences). In gendering the body of the nation as woman, the objective of Papadopoulos was to strike a sentimental chord in her diasporic ‘children’, in order to personify Greece as vulnerable and in need of economic assistance (presumably through investments or tourism). At the same time, and on behalf of the ‘Motherland’, Papadopoulos asked of these ‘Panhellenes’ that they continue ‘to maintain the Greekness of the souls of [their] children’ by virtue of the Greek language.[246] This point should be borne in mind with regard to the dictatorship’s educational campaign, in 1971, to distribute busts of Alexander the Great to schools across Greece (also discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3). For the moment, however, it will have hopefully become clear that an idea of the ancient Greek miracle and specific cultural texts could be deployed to a range of ends by the regime. Be it used to control or undermine, to claim prestige or to praise, classical antiquity was an asset to the Colonels.

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[246] Papadopoulos, *To pistevo ,mas,* vol. 2, pp. 110, 173-4.

Chapter 3:

The Perks of 'Pseudoclassicism':

Reversals, Revivals and Interactions in School and Youth Culture

Not unlike the case of the Colonels' ideological discourses, scholars have described the dictatorship's educational policies as fraught with 'pseudoclassicism' and 'ancestoritis'.[247] Within the specific framework of the Greek educational system, such critiques denote the dictatorship's retrogressive and detrimental interventions in education, and especially those regarding language. In 1967, the dictatorship made it a priority to methodically reverse an educational reform programme ushered in by the Centre Union between 1964 and 1965, a programme whose principal objectives had been to democratise and modernise Greek general education. Although commended by many, these reforms had been ill-received by influential stakeholders in traditional humanistic education (broadly understood in terms of the emphasis on ancient Greek language learning and the *katharevousa*, as well as instruction in the precepts of Christian Orthodoxy), and the programme had begun to be dismantled following the toppling of Georgios Papandreou in July 1965. In other words, the dictatorship precipitated and redoubled a reversal process that was already under way by April 1967.[248] In doing so, the the regime restored the dominance of the archaised *katharevousa* in general education, the teaching of the Greek Classics in the original ancient Greek in secondary schools (as opposed to with the use of translations), it reintroduced Latin as a compulsory subject, and reinstated history (and other) textbooks published prior to 1964.

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[247] Sifis Bouzakis, *Neoelliniki ekpaidefsi (1821-1998): Exartimeni anaptyxi*, 5th edn (Athens: Gutenberg, 2006), p. 133; Triantafyllos Doukas, 'To scholeio kata tin epochi tis diktatorias (1967-1974)', in *Panorama istorias tis ekpaidefsis: Opseis kai apopseis, tomos B': Neoelliniki ekpaidefsi 1821-2010*, ed. by Sifis Bouzakis (Athens: Gutenberg, 2011), p. 251.

[248] On traditional humanistic education in pre-1974 Greece, see Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and Modernization in Greece* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, Bureau of Research No. 7–1111, 1974), p. I-8. On the reactions against the reforms and their dismantling by the monarchy-backed governments following the events of July 1965, see Bouzakis, pp. 129-32, n.53, 133.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that a curriculum heavy in traditional humanism, as well as the respective teaching resources reinstated by the Dictatorship of 21 April, were better poised to progress the agendas of that regime than those of its political predecessors. In my employment of the term ‘pseudoclassicism’, which is used by scholars in order to communicate the emphasis of traditional classical humanism on form over content, my intention is not to subscribe to notions of authenticity and inauthenticity. Rather, it is my intention to frame the chapter as a response to the literature that does, and to contend that classical educational formalism played a crucial role in advancing the educational agendas of the dictatorship. These agendas encompassed the strict control of the Greek youth, the promotion of the cult of the army and the dictatorship’s propaganda, as well as the channelling of schoolchildren away from higher education and toward employment (while having taught them, first, why such a branching off was patriotically necessary).

In framing my argument thus, my intention is also not to claim that the regime reinstated pre-1964 policies and textbooks in order to serve a clearly formulated educational strategy. Rather, I contend that these resources acquired new implications under the Colonels due to their interactions with the dictatorship’s broader school culture. In this context, school culture is understood as encompassing ‘[c]urricula content and orientation, pedagogical discourse and practices, as well as the hidden curriculum, the organization of school life, extra-curricular activities, school rituals, [and] student communities’.[249] As an economy of prescribed texts, performances, social relations and ideological orientations that seek to condition the relationships of schoolchildren in regard to a particular historical circumstance, the presentist dynamics at play within the framework of a certain school culture can offer valuable insights to the new implications acquired by otherwise conventional educational policies and pre-ordained narratives. Accordingly, these dynamics, as well as the policies and textbooks reinstated by the regime, can shed light on otherwise obscure pedagogical initiatives taken by the dictatorship itself. One such initiative was the distribution of hundreds (if not thousands) of busts of Alexander the Great to kindergartens, primary and secondary schools across Greece in late 1971, a little-known exploit discussed in Section 3 of this chapter.

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[249] Despina Karakatsani, ‘The History of Citizenship Education in Greece during the Post-War Period (1950-1990): Content and Aims’, in *Childhood in South East Europe: Historical Perspectives on Growing Up in the 19th and 20th Century,* ed. by Slobodan Naumović and Miroslav Jovanović (LIT Verlag Münster, 2004), p. 265.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that, historically, the Greek educational system has represented a contested site wherein political projects and conflicts are played out, a discussion of Greek school culture should take into consideration the broader political context within which that school culture operated at a given point in time.[250] Significantly, and as I will go on to show, the regime seems to have made a strategic effort to play down the education-wide scope and political implications of the distribution of busts of Alexander the Great to schools in 1971. This self-censoring may have been attributable to matters of international diplomacy, as well as to a calculated effort to moderate the conspicuousness of Papadopoulos's emergent cult of personality, which had begun to aggravate his confederates as early as 1968. In addition, I show that school culture (the hidden curriculum, in particular) remained a contested site under the dictatorship. In the late 1960s, the regime hardliners commandeered the youth organisation of the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi* in order to transform it into a paramilitary organisation, with an eye to installing a fascist regime. The organisation in question claimed descent from Lycurgus, the symbolic founder of the Spartan city state in the eight century BCE — a link that came in handy for the hardliners to claim their own ties to the interwar dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas and to impart their National Socialist ideas to the youth (discussed in Section 4 of this chapter).

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[250] Andreas M. Kazamias, 'I Katara Tou Sisyfou Stin Elliniki Ekpaideftiki Metarrythmisi, 1964-2000: Mia Koinoniko-Politiki Kai Politismiki Ermineia', in *Panorama Istorias Tis Ekpaidefsis: Opseis Kai Apopseis, Tomos B' Neoelliniki Ekpaidefseis 1821-2010, Vol. 2,* ed. by Sifis Bouzakas (Athens: Gutenberg, 2011), pp. 300.

I. Reversals, Revivals and Interactions

Scholars have long agreed that the dictatorship's 1967 interventions in general education were driven by a strategy of political counteraction, in order to reverse the modernising reforms ushered in by Georgios Papandreou's Centre Union government between 1964 and 1965.[251] The Centre Union's reforms had been modernising in the sense that they sought to foster universal education and equality of opportunity, while synchronising the structure and content of curriculums with the demands of Greece's burgeoning economic development in the early 1960s.

Illiteracy remained high in Greece in the early 1960s, particularly among rural and semi-rural populations and women, while approximately one third of the total population did not complete their primary school education. Public secondary education came at a cost (tuition fees, books and stationary), thus barring entry to children coming from lower socio-economic backgrounds. In addition, the emphasis of secondary school curriculums on ancient Greek language learning — an emphasis that dated back to the nineteenth century — rendered secondary education elitist and largely irrelevant to those demographics.[252] The decades-long language question, the disputes over which variety of modern Greek should be the official language of the state, had also beleaguered the educational system since the first decades of the twentieth century.[253] In spite of important attempts to institutionalise the vernacular as the official language of primary education in the previous decades (between 1913 and 1917, and again in 1929), the archaised *katharevousa* continued to dominate education in the early 1960s. This, too, posed major challenges to the democratisation of Greek education and to literacy, particularly in view of the growing feeling that the *katharevousa* represented the language of officialdom and was out of sync with the realities of Greek life and culture at that time.[254]

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[251] A Leading Greek Educationalist, 'Traditionalism and Reaction in Greek Education', in *Greece Under Military Rule*, ed. by Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (London: Secker & Warburg, 1972), pp. 135–7. Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and Modernization in Greece*, p. VII-15. Bouzakis, p. 134.

[252] Kazamias, *Education and Modernization in Greece*, p. IV-13. According to Andreas Kazamias, in 1971, 14 per cent of the population aged ten or over was illiterate, 21.7 per cent of women were illiterate and one third of the population had not completed elementary school. Ibid., p. VII-33.

Still, purists in influential positions in the early 1960s, such as conservative politicians and professors at the University of Athens, continued to maintain that the demotic was ‘only spoken by communists’ and ‘idiots’, and that to challenge the ascendancy of the *katharevousa* represented an ‘Hellenophobic’ affront to ‘the Helleno-Christian worldview’.[255] According to the Constitution of 1952, the foremost objective of Greek general education was the ‘moral and intellectual’ initiation of schoolchildren to the precepts of the ‘Helleno-Christian civilisation’, a clause that betrayed the extreme nationalism, anti-communism and anti-demoticism of the post-war state (Mackridge 2009: 311).

In 1964, the Centre Union regarded the unresolved language question as a critical obstacle to academic proficiency and, in the spirit of assuaging this problem, introduced the demotic into all levels of education (not to the exclusion of, but rather on equal terms with the *katharevousa*).[256] It was also in line with this rationale that the liberal government introduced the use of translations of classical works into secondary education, while the restructuring of secondary schools into a two-level system (divided into two three-year cycles, the *gymnasion* and the *lykeion*) rendered the study of ancient Greek and Latin conditional on personal choice and/or tertiary education goals.[257] Whereas the Centre Union's secondary school timetable continued to devote a substantial proportion of teaching hours to the instruction of the Classics,[258] the introduction of new courses in the social sciences and in technical subjects worked in such a way so as to diversify and update the content of curriculum, in order to meet the growing need for a skilled Greek labour force in the 1960s.[259] More importantly, these courses worked to democratise secondary education in terms of course content and by offering students elective choices, with the introduction, for instance, of a new civics course entitled 'Elements of the Democratic Regime' (*Stoicheia tou Dimokratikou Politevmatos*), as well as introductory courses in philosophy, psychology and economics, and vocational electives. These changes to the curriculum participated in a broader set of measures that further sought to make the educational system accessible to students coming from lower socio-economic backgrounds, including: the extension of compulsory schooling from six to nine years, the introduction of educational gratuity and free meal services for primary school pupils.[260]

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[253] Peter Mackridge, *Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766-1976* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 257.

[254] Ibid., p. 312.

[255] ‘I Filosofiki Scholi sto Panepistimio Athinon exakolouthei na katadioki tin ethniki mas glossa kai na einai panta propyrgio skotadismou!’, *Eleftheros* (Athens, 14 April 1963), p. 2. Konstantinos D. Georgoulis, ‘I epidromi tis metarrythmiseos kata ton morfotikon idrymaton’, *I Kathimerini* (Athens, 4 October 1964), p. 5.

[256] Mackridge, p. 315.

Within the Colonels' first few months in power, the dictatorship reversed all of the above measures and more (such as the establishment of the Pedagogical Institute, which the dictatorship abolished), to the extent that it is indubitable that a reversal of the

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[257] The systematic study of ancient Greek beginning in year ten (the first year of the *lykeion*) became conditional on whether students would opt to continue their schooling beyond the compulsory education stage (extended from six to nine years). The conversion of Latin into an elective subject rendered the joint learning of European classical languages contingent on personal preferences and/or higher education goals. Kazamias, *Education and Modernization in Greece*, p. VI-25–26.

[258] Alexis Dimaras, *I metarrythmisi pou den egine. Tomos B', 1895-1967* (Athens: Ekdotiki Ermis, 1974), p. 271.

[259] Nikos M. Georgiadis, 'Educational Reforms in Greece (1959-1997) and Human Capital Theory', *Journal for Critical Education and Policy Studies*, 5.2 (2007), p. 346.

[260] Bouzakis, pp. 126-8.

Centre Union's reforms represented 'an end in itself'.[261] It is undeniable, moreover, that the educational policies and teaching resources reinstated by the regime posed major challenges to language proficiency and the content-based learning of the Classics, that they restricted the freedom of choice and equality of opportunity in education.

In September 1967, the regime abolished the sole instruction of the demotic vernacular across all six years of primary school in favour of the simple *katharevousa*, which was reintroduced from year four onwards. To serve this item on the educational agenda, the dictatorship also reinstated elementary school reading primers (*anagnostika*) published over a decade earlier, whose demotic texts the General Directorate of General Education corrupted to facilitate pupils' transition into the *katharevousa* later on. As Peter Mackridge notes, these interventions marked a return of language educational policy to its pre-1917 state (1917 being the year when Eleftherios Venizelos had introduced demoticist reforms into primary education).[262] This was also the view of a Greek school headmaster, who, in a statement to the *San Francisco Chronicle* in 1969, added that 'the mental confusion [caused to pupils] is painful'; '[n]o wonder that younger children hardly know the names of basic things'.[263] In the Constitution of 1968, the regime would go as far as to institutionalise the *katharevousa* as the official language of the education (it being the official language of the state since 1911), an article that was accompanied by the stipulation that '[a]ny intervention to alter the language is prohibited'.[264]

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[261] Leading Greek Educationalist, p. 136. The Pedagogical Institute was a new body established in 1964 and made responsible for the elaboration of curriculums, the professional development of teaching staff and for providing guidance on school administrational issues. Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and Modernization in Greece*, p. VI-29–30.

[262] Mackridge, pp. 316, 269–70. On the reinstatement of 1954 reading primers, see Anna Frangoudaki, *Ta anagnostika vivlia tou dimotikou scholeiou: Ideologikos peithanangasmos kai paidagogiki via* (Athens: Themelio, 1978), p. 8.

[263] Roy Perrot, 'Athens Is Talking about the Junta's Permanency', *San Francisco Chronicle* (San Francisco, CA, 13 August 1969), p. 6.

[264] Leading Greek Educationalist, p. 131. (Their translation.)

In a similar vein, in 1967 the dictatorship proceeded to restore the teaching of classical texts in the original ancient Greek, thus abolishing the use of translations introduced into the secondary school curriculum in 1965 and 1966 (among them being *The Odyssey*, translated by early twentieth-century demoticists, Argyris Eftaliotis and Nikolaos Poriotis).[265] This marked a return to formalist ancient Greek language instruction, which disadvantaged the study of classical works for their content and 'beautiful world of ideas' in the modern vernacular (Kazamias 1974: VI-23–4). Like in the case of the elementary school reading primers, this item on the dictatorship's education agenda was accompanied by the reinstatement of Classics textbooks from the 1950s or earlier, which were usually composed of select passages extricated from the original text.[266] In this sense, both the language and fragmentary structure of the dictatorship's Classics curriculum would render a well-rounded understanding of a set text particularly challenging.

Meanwhile, the ancient history textbooks (in the *katharevousa*) reinstated by the regime did little to counterbalance this state of affairs, particularly in view of the fact that their contents focused overwhelmingly on military history and the ways in which 'great men' shaped history thanks to their exceptional qualities as military leaders.[267] In an article published in the left-wing periodical *Anti* one year after the dictatorship's demise, folklorist Alki Kyriakidou-Nestoros recalls her personal experiences teaching ancient history to secondary school students in the early 1970s:

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[265] Elli Giotopoulou-Sisilianou, *Ekpaideftika: Ta aftonoita kai anepitefkta* (Athens: Kedros, 2007), pp. 76-7.

[266] Among the reinstated textbooks were an eighth grade edition of *Selected Passages by ancient Greek Writers* (ranging from Aesop's fables to Lucian's *Dialogues of the Dead*), and an eighteenth edition of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* in excerpts (for grades ten and twelve), whose first edition had been published during the Civil War in 1947. *Eklogai ex archaion ellinon syngrafeon, A' gymnasiou*, ed. by Viktoras Kritikos and Georgios Papaoikonomou, 7th edn (Athens: OEDV, 1967).

[267] The 'great man' thesis is originally a nineteenth-century concept according to which 'history is handmaiden to men; great men actually change the shape and direction of history' thanks to their 'exceptional characteristics as leaders'. Montgomery Van Wart, *Dynamics of Leadership in Public Service: Theory and Practice* (Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 6.

> When, for instance, the greatest cultural phenomenon of Athens in the 5th century BC, [that is] drama, is found [scattered and] fragmented across different chapters […], is it really possible for the teacher to reconstruct the phenomenon – in this case, drama – and to present it in its complete form, with [all of] its aesthetic and political implications? The orientation of history teaching, as it is conveyed by the official instrument of the educational apparatus, the "approved" textbook, discourages entirely such an effort.[268]

As the same scholar explained, however, the regime's educational policies 'did not change the orientation nor the method of education'; they rather 'continued on the beaten track'.[269]

Notwithstanding the fairness of such critiques, it can be claimed that the educational policies and textbooks reinstated by the regime were much more effective with regard to the political and educational agendas of Greece's dictators than to those of their political predecessors.

To begin with, by redoubling on the reversal of the reforms in 1967, the new regime was able to ingratiate itself with some of those powerful stakeholders in traditional humanistic education who had been outraged by the reforms in the mid-1960s. One such interest group was constituted of academics of the Philosophy School at the University of Athens, many of whom would be spared from the regime's purges of university staff (discussed in greater detail in Section 2 of this chapter). In fact, a number of these academics would be awarded promotions under the dictatorship and, in exchange, would deliver panegyrics expressing their gratitude to the regime precisely for reversing the reforms of the Centre Union:

> [I]t is a source of great consolation and hope and strength and courage, th[at] initiative by which the government restored the pedagogical education of the youth onto the tried and nationally beneficial path, [on] that [path] which is dictated by the [principles of the] Helleno-Christian civilisation. […] Because a true education […] is only accomplished

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[268] Alki Kyriakidou-Nestoros, 'O Georgios Papadopoulos, i istoria kai i didaskalia tis istorias sta ellinopoula', *Anti* (Athens, 1975), p. 20.

[269] Ibid., p. 19.

> when [those being] educated remain on this path, far from foreign influences and other interests, which divert the mind [away] from the principal objectives and from the course of the ideals, which guide and will [continue to] guide the destinies of the nation.[270]

The regime was able to capitalise, moreover, on those arguments arraigned against the Centre Union's new teaching resources to its own ends. Take, for instance, the following statement of Papadopoulos's regarding the history textbooks introduced in 1965:

> We had reached the point where approved secondary school history textbooks constituted copies of Soviet treatises [and] it is known worldwide just how grossly these [treatises] subvert historical truth in favour of their respective propagandist expediencies.[271]

In this context, Papadopoulos was most likely referring to Kostas Kalokairinos's *Roman and Medieval History from 146 BC to 1453 AD* (*Istoria Romaïki kai Mesaioniki apo to 146 P.Ch. os to 1453 M.Ch.*), an eighth-grade textbook which had been fiercely attacked when it was introduced to the curriculum in 1965. Beyond its demotic language, *Roman and Medieval History* presented Byzantium as the eastern development of the Roman Empire (therefore calling into question the Greek continuity narrative), and had been critiqued at that time as a thinly disguised Marxist 'schoolbook-trap' for its class-based analyses.[272] As evidenced by Papadopoulos's statement above, such recent controversies afforded the Colonels' the ammunition they needed to legitimise the withdrawal of the Centre Union's history textbooks and curricula, while also lending validity to the pretext for their coup.

Crucially, the reversal of the Centre Union's reforms and the reinstatement of an educational agenda heavy in traditional humanism worked in such a way so as to subtract from the free will of schoolchildren, to restrict intellectual freedoms, and to progress the propaganda of the dictatorship in schools.

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[270] Geogios A. Papantoniou, 'I istoria os ethnikos odigos', *Epistimoniki epetirida Filosofikis Scholis Athinon*, II.18, p. 64.

[271] Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 5, p. 34.

[272] Apostolos Lakasas, 'Scholika vivlia pou kopikan os erga psevdous', *I Kathimerini* (Athens, 2015) <http://www.kathimerini.gr/843495/article/politismos/vivlio/sxolika-vivlia-poy-kophkan-ws-erga-yeydoys> [accessed 1 February 2017]. Charis Athanasiadis, *Ta aposyrthenda vivlia: Ethnos kai scholiki istoria stin Ellada, 1958-2008* (Athens: Alexandreia, 2015), pp. 144-84.

When the regime abolished courses in the social sciences and reinstated the six-year-long *gymnasion*, for instance, it chipped away at the freedoms of choice and the intellectual freedoms of secondary school pupils to branch out from those subjects known as *fronimatistika* (literally 'subjects of conviction'). These subjects included history, ancient and modern Greek language learning, as well as civics, geography and modern Greek literature, and broadly aimed to 'transmit political messages, national ideals and [to] influence, albeit indirectly, the political education and socialization of future citizens' (Karakatsani 2004: 265–6). The return of compulsory ancient Greek and Latin language learning, then, should be viewed within the context of a clampdown on secondary education, whereby a learning of the classical European languages themselves came to represent a restriction on free will. That these measures took away a set of opportunities which had already been extended to secondary school students worked in such a way so as to heighten the implications of deprivation and control. Accordingly, such measures should be viewed within the broader framework of the dictatorship's repressive hidden curriculum, which included the policing of dress (with bans on miniskirts and slacks, even on weekends), compulsory Sunday mass for all students and their teachers, and obligatory attendance at some of the regime's mass spectacles.[273]

On a second level, under the dictatorship the learning of ancient Greek came to represent an exercise in discipline, as evidenced by the following excerpts taken from the secondary school curriculum of 1968: 'the learning and experience [of ancient Greek] disciplines the spirit'; '[p]articular attention will be paid to the practice of students of the correct enunciation'; '[t]he interpretive assignments in the classroom will aim toward the comprehensive understanding and experience of students […] of the virtues of the ancient Greek language', including 'conceptual clarity', 'scrupulousness' and 'precision'.[274] Of course, such specifications that emphasised the moralising effects of ancient Greek language learning and the correctness of grammatical forms were largely symptomatic of the wider phenomenon of 'extreme formalism which characterize[d] the entire Greek educational system' (Mouzelis 1978: 137). Yet within the framework of the regime's highly regulated school culture, a strict adherence to grammatical rules participated in a broader set of activities whereby classical culture was intended to discipline young minds and bodies, another crucial example being the growing emphasis on physical education in the early 1970s.

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[273] Bayard Stockton, *Phoenix with a Bayonet: A Journalist's Interim Report on the Greek Revolution* (Ann Arbor, MI: Georgetown Publications, 1971), pp. 221–22. Rodis Roufos indicates that teachers were held responsible for the attendance of their pupils at the regime's mass spectacle for the anniversary of the coup d'état in 1969, 'except those excused on the basis of a medical certificate signed by *two* doctors'. Athenian [Roufos], p. 93.

In 1972, the dictatorship's Ministry of Education issued a circular to schools establishing the equivalency between physical education and all other subjects (that is, the *fronimatistika* subjects), on the grounds that 'gymnastics' (*gymnastiki*, as opposed to 'physical education', *fysiki agogi*) had represented a vital component of the education of (male) youths in ancient Greece.[275] That the total number of hours allotted to 'gymnastics' were equal to the combined hours allocated to religious studies and civics in the regime's secondary school timetable attests to the importance of physical education as one of the foremost *fronimatistika* subjects of the dictatorship.[276] Notable, too, are the affinities between the objectives of physical education and ancient Greek language learning stipulated by the regime's curriculums. Among the aims and methods of instruction of physical education were: 'the cultivation in students of the spirit of order and discipline'; 'the technical analysis of the sports of classical athleticism'; 'the development of the interest [in] and of the love of students for […] the ancient Greek athletic spirit'; the development of 'moral and social virtues' with emphasis on 'precision'; and the development 'of an inclination […] toward work'.[277]

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[274] Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou, *Koinopoiisis analytikon programmaton ton mathimaton ton scholeion mesis ekpaidefseos* (Athens, Greece: Ypourgeion Ethinkis Paideias kai Thriskevmaton, 1968), pp. 23, 26, 30.

[275] Zoi Koutsoura, *To scholeio kleinei... Diktatoria (1967-1974) kai scholeio* (Katerini: Mati, 2010), pp. 160-1. 'During the dictatorship of the "junta" (1967–1974), PE programmes were consistently referred to as "gymnastics" in an attempt to legitimise the military regime through a direct reflection of the glories of Greek antiquity'. Dimitris Foteinos, 'Images of the Body: The Greek Physical Education Curriculum since the Second World War', *Journal of the History of Education Society*, 41.6 (2012), p. 811.

[276] Dimaras, p. 300.

Crucially, both an attention to grammar or enunciation (presumably by reading aloud in class), and an attentiveness to 'order' and 'precision' in physical education, required schoolchildren to perform these tasks, the implication being that an education in the virtues of the ancients represented a pedagogy in docility (after Foucault).[278] An attention to grammatical rules, for instance, might translate to conformity to other rules and laws, while imparting to students 'the sense of responsibility and obligations of the modern Greeks, which emanate from [the] great national heritage' of antiquity.[279] Similarly, physical education in schools, accompanied by a panoply of extracurricular public gymnastics rituals and sporting competitions (many of which had been inaugurated before the dictatorship), heightened the coercive pedagogy of students in composure and perseverance, one of whose of objectives, as we have seen, was to instill an 'inclination to work'.[280]

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[277] Papakonstantinou, *Koinopoiisis analytikon programmaton ton mathimaton ton scholeion mesis ekpaidefseos*, p. 90-1, 97. Koutsoura, p. 161.

[278] 'Docile bodies', after Michel Foucault, are formed out of 'a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour'. These technologies of discipline do not only solely work in such a way so as to 'defin[e] how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do as one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines'. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. by Alan Sheridan, 3rd edn (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 138.

[279] Papakonstantinou, *Koinopoiisis analytikon programmaton ton mathimaton ton scholeion mesis ekpaidefseos*, p. 24.

[280] For a discussion of the gymnastics demonstrations under the regime, see Anestis Giannakopoulos and Evangelos Albanidis, 'Attempts at the Militarization of Physical Education and Sport during the Dictatorship Period in Greece, 1967-1974', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 32.11–12 (2015), pp. 1366–7.

Third, the contents of the teaching resources reinstated by the regime accorded with the political agendas and propaganda of the Colonels impeccably. Education sociologist Anna Frangoudaki has shown that the primary school reading primers reestablished by the dictatorship (but also the previous editions, revised under the Centre Union) presented pupils with 'monstrous' social models of subservience and parochialism; as she notes, these primers set the foundations to mould 'a citizen for whom patriotism [was] tantamount to the uncritical acceptance of any political power whatsoever, provided that it represent[ed] power.'[281] The same can be said of the regime's history syllabus, which converged on ancient history in years four, seven and ten. Take, for instance, the following passage on classical Athens in the year seven ancient history textbook (originally published in 1949):

> The heyday of Athens during the glorious fifty years was owed to the patriotism and the initiative[s] of the Athenian people. Principally, however, it was the accomplishment of the men who led in that period [the peoples'] fates.[282]

At a time when portraits of Papadopoulos had made their way onto classroom walls and teachers were required to deliver panegyrics in favour of the regime (which could not be 'too lukewarm'),[283] such narratives of ancient Greek history worked to present authoritarian power structures as being among the foremost factors that guaranteed the greatness and continuity of the Greeks. To eliminate any doubt regarding who the holders of this power might be identified with under the regime, as well as what was expected of their subjects, the textbook went on to state:

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[281] Frangoudaki, pp. 7-8.

[282] Christos Malliaros, Anastasios Lazarou and Dimitrios Chatzis, *Archaia istoria apo ton archaiotaton chronon mechri tou 146 P.Ch. A' & D' Gymnasiou*, 3rd edn (Athens: OEDV, 1969), p. 216.

[283] Athenian [Roufos], p. 93.

> Blessed are the people who have the good fortune to be ruled by intelligent, capable, patriotic and moral men! And if they do not always lead them to greatness, at least they secure for them [the people] prosperity and progress.[284]

Such texts in ancient history textbooks invited the drawing of obvious parallels. Consider, for instance, that schoolchildren were required to write essays on topics such as ‘How we spent our day when we found out at home that the debt of our father to the Agricultural Bank was cancelled’.[285] They were also required to attend the mass spectacles held by the dictatorship for the anniversaries of the coup d’état, the second of which featured ostentatious floats bearing taglines such as ‘We Are Building a New Greece, Today’ or ‘Our Shipping Industry, First in the World’.[286] In interacting with the regime’s school culture, the teaching resources reinstated by the dictatorship came to herald the revival of the ancient Greek miracle in the contemporary moment, a miracle spearheaded by the ‘intelligent, capable, patriotic and moral’ officers who took power on 21 April 1967.

This point begs the question of how the officers envisioned that present-day schoolchildren would come to operate as future citizens, as well as the role of the *fronimatistika* subjects and the regime’s broader school culture in that process. A different way to frame this question is by asking what kind of society the Colonels sought to formulate in the near future.

As I have indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the officers held conflicting views on this matter. In order to elucidate this point, as well as to arrive at a discussion of the busts of Alexander the Great and the Spartan visions of the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi*, it is first helpful to consider the attitudes of the Colonels with regard to older youth demographics and higher education. As I will now go on to discuss, the officers viewed the youth and its domains of socialisation (one of them being universities) as major problems in the contemporary moment. For this reason, they relayed their developmentalist notions of the ancient Greek miracle to university students in more sinister ways than to older demographics. Their views diverged, however, on the desirability of university education overall. On the one hand, Papadopoulos used the traditional elitism and the pre-eminence of classical studies in Greek university culture in order to actively discourage schoolchildren from considering further study at these institutions. Such assertions stemmed from his suspicion of the students and academics who populated universities, as well as from his growing belief that 'his mission was not solely to police, but also to modernise the state', albeit in questionable ways.[287] On the other, Ioannis Ladas promoted an extremely ethnocentric form of higher education, according to which all degree programmes should use, as their core texts, classical Greek works. More importantly, Ladas equated study under such a system with armed patriotism, a view that was closely intertwined with his designs on the Greek youth and the future of the regime.

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[284] Malliaros, Lazarou and Chatzis, p. 217.

[285] Koutsoura, p. 187.

[286] ‘Eortasmos tis 2is epeteiou tis 21is Apriliou sti Mitropoli Athinon, sto Panathinaiko stadio, sto Dimo Moschatou kai sto Kaftatzogleio’, *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1969). On the compulsory attendance of school pupils at this event, see Athenian [Roufos], p. 93.

II. The 'Youth Problem' and the Pedagogy of Containment

There is a broad consensus among scholars that the radicalisation of the youth and the advent of Western countercultures in Greece in the 1960s were among the most pressing issues of consternation for the officers who took power in April 1967.[288] In fact, these socio-political developments were causing great distress to the many upholders of conservative values by the eve of the coup d'état. As Kostas Katsapis notes, the mobilisation of left-wing youth organisations and student movements in the 1960s, as well as the growing popularity of Western fashion codes, Rock n' Roll and hippie culture since the 1950s, had engendered, by April 1967, a prevalent discourse that 'the "youth" factor had gradually assumed the dimensions of a "problem"'.[289] It was in light of such apprehensions that ERE leader Panagiotis Kanellopoulos had exhorted, in 1966, that the youth enter into a Ulysses pact of anti-communist restraint as it were.

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[287] Veremis, 'To kinima tis 21is Apriliou 1967 kai i "theoria" tou', p. 78.

[288] Katsapis, 'Peri tis "politikis agogis" ton neon. Ena encheirima gia ton politiko fronimatismo tis "anexelengtis neolaias" sti diarkeia tis diktatorias ton syntahmatarchon', pp. 203-20. Vangelis Karamanolakis, 'I antistasi ton neon enantion tou diktatorikou kathestotos', in *I stratiotiki diktatoria 1967-1974,* ed. by Vangelis Karamanolakis (Dimosiografikos Organismos Lambraki, 2010), pp. 161.

The Colonels shared these views and — notwithstanding the claims made in the regime's first official proclamation to the Greek public, regarding a need to address 'the burning problems of our youth, [and] the maltreatment of our […] students'[290] — the dictatorship would go on to make a concerted effort to contain and suppress its ostensible youth problem. Within ten days of the coup d'état, the regime announced the dismantling of those youth organisations affiliated with parties of the Right, Centre and Left, its foremost *bête noire* being the illustrious Lambrakis Youth movement (which had merged with the youth movement of the left-wing party EDA in 1964 and had been a prime mover in the mass protests of July 1965). One week later, the dictatorship issued a second announcement stipulating its decision to dismantle another 279 youth clubs and societies, thus delivering 'a strong blow against the right to build societies and preserve networks and spaces of sociability'.[291]

Accordingly, in 1967 the regime made it a priority to dismantle student unions and societies in higher education, to appoint new student councils with charters that bore the dictatorship's stamp of approval, and to reinstate the requirement to obtain a certificate of civic-mindedness for admission to universities.[292] Equally significant were the draconian measures of surveillance imposed by the regime (a conspicuous edict being the assignment, in 1968, of Government Commissioners to all institutions of higher education, they usually being retired army officers),[293] and its profound mistrust and purges of teaching staff. By the end of 1969, thirty per cent of the university teaching staff appointed in the pre-dictatorial period had been relieved of their duties, some of whom resigned in protest to the regime, but the majority of whom were dismissed on political grounds and on account of the lowering of the retirement age for professors.[294] Meanwhile, the countercultural values and practices of the youth triggered in the dictatorship various paroxysmal reactions, the most notorious of which was the ban, in 1967, on miniskirts for women and long hair on men (as well as the quick retraction of this decree, lest it harm the country's tourism industry; Clogg 1972: 40).

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[289] Katsapis, 'Peri tis "politikis agogis" ton neon. Ena encheirima gia ton politiko fronimatismo tis "anexelengtis neolaias" sti diarkeia tis diktatorias ton syntahmatarchon', pp. 203-5.
[290] Papakonstantinou, *Politiki agogi*, p. 224.
[291] Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics and the Long 1960s in Greece*, pp. 48, 26-32.
[292] Ibid., p. 48. Karamanolakis, p. 161.

It is important to clarify, however, that in the Greek university system the dictatorship also found in place a set of conventions and practices that were particularly amenable to the officers' agendas and cultural predilections overall. For a variety of reasons, a number of those academics who were spared by the regime's purges came to align themselves with the official line of the dictatorship and to readily promote that regime within universities.[295] As I have indicated in the previous section of this chapter, one reason for this state of affairs was that the dictatorship had assumed the mantle of the counter-reformist regime and defender of traditional humanistic education. In order to establish the extent to which academics had stakes in maintaining the educational *status quo*, it is helpful to consider the following excerpt from an article published in the left-wing student periodical *Argo* of the School of Philosophy at the University of Athens in April 1967, just days before the coup d'état:

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[293] Leading Greek Educationalist, p. 138.

[294] Kostas B. Krimbas, 'I anotati paideia ton kairo tis chountas', in *I diktatoria 1967-1974: Politikes praktikes-Ideologikos logos-Antistasi*, ed. by Gianna Athanasatou, Alkis Rigos, and Seraphim Seferiadis, 3rd edn (Athens: Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 1999), pp. 135–9.

[295] For a comprehensive discussion of the fear, ideological affinities and clientelistic relations that moved professors to collaborate with the regime, see Theodosis Boyiatzakis, 'Aristocracy, Tradition, and Collaboration: The Greek Professors Under Dictatorship', unpublished doctoral thesis (Wayne State University, 1977).

> In Germany, I met some young man who was studying agronomy and who was working on his thesis at that time. Do you know what subject he had chosen? "The agronomy of the ancient Greeks". As a Greek, he explained to me, this was the kind of subject he had to choose. It was for this reason that he was resorting to my wisdom [to see if] I could, as a [Classical] philologist, recommend some [reading] aids. I was baffled and […] I told him that it seems strange to me that he should be wasting his time on such things, that the objective of his studies in Germany was to learn the higher art of agronomy from the Europeans and to bring it [back] to our country. What kind of agronom[ic know-how] could our glorious ancestors have possibly had? [If there was o]ne thing I knew for sure, [it was that] they left the land in ruins. […] They did nothing other than to destroy their forests and their plantations. […] Don't worry, though. […] Such researches, in other words, such [research] titles, [do] make an impression in Greece. You can be appointed professor at the higher agronomic school, just like others were appointed at the University [thanks to] similar studies. Almost all of the studies on the ancients are like this. Be they interpretive studies, or commentaries, or [be they] on Attic law, or on the *agoge* of the Lacedaemonians or of the Athenians, or on the ideas of Plato, they are copies and poor summaries of German books. To the foreigners they demonstrate our scholarly incompetence, but in Greece they can, if the circumstances and the networks are amenable, [have the] writer declared as an enlightened researcher and interpreter of the glorious ancestors. Read, out of interest, what the archaists write about one another in critical moments, [when] the time [comes to become] organised for the [power-]grab [over] some university chair.[296]

From this excerpt, it emerges that the problem of 'pseudoclassicism' (after *Argo*) was ubiquitous in the Greek university system on the eve of the coup d'état, as well as beyond the boundaries of that system.[297] The entrenched ascendency of classical studies in Greek university culture could earn any candidate, irrespective of the depth of their knowledge or the quality of their research, a competitive advantage for promotions in institutions and faculties that did not even specialise in the Humanities. This point helps to put into perspective the Colonels' own cursory recourses to classical culture, in that it was not necessarily an isolated phenomenon and that such practices could have very tangible effects on upward social mobility in Greece in the late 1960s. It attests, moreover, to the tried and tested channels through which the dictatorship could establish mutually beneficial networks of exchange with old and new teaching staff within institutions of higher education.

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[296] Charalambos Theodoridis, 'Panepistimio', *Argo*, II.4 (1964), 5–6. The original author of this article was Charalambos Theodoridis (1883–1957), the acclaimed Professor of Philosophy of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki who is best known for his pioneering historical materialist work on the Hellenistic philosopher Epicurus. Asimakis Panselinos, 'Enas daskalos pou agapouse ta niata', *I Avgi* (Athens, 26 November 1957), p. 3. That the article of Theodoridis (who passed away in 1957) was republished by the left-wing student periodical *Argo* in April 1967 attests to the view of the publishers that Theodoridis's observations continued to apply to the Greek university system (it was most likely also meant as a tribute to the professor on the tenth anniversary of his death).

[297] Theodoridis, p. 5.

It is additionally important to bear in mind that many of those academics appointed to university positions in the pre-dictatorial period had themselves been required to acquire certificates of civic-mindedness in the 1950s and early 1960s, many of whom were and remained intransigent anti-communists.[298] Under the dictatorship, the intense suspicion of higher education meant that a proven track record in extreme nationalism and anti-communist abuse would mark an academic as 'safe', such that that academic was likelier to earn job security or a promotion. In light of these circumstances, aggressive anti-communism came to commingle with laudatory lectures or speeches on ancient Greece, to the extent that academic staff came to act as apologists for inhumanities. Take, for instance, the following statement of the Adjunct Professor of Medieval and Modern History at the University of Athens, Georgios T. Kolias, on the 'anniversary of the suppression of the Slavo-communist movement' (that is, the December Events of 1944 to early 1945) in December 1967:[299]

> The hatred [of Communism] toward the great national past had blinded it so much that it bewailed, [how] tender-hearted [it was] (!), the blood and sweat that the slaves of Athens spilled for the erection of the temple of Athena, the Parthenon on the Acropolis, would you believe![300]

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[298] As Alexander Kazamias has shown, some of the foremost proponents of *ethnikofrosyni* were university professors in the post-war period. Alexander Kazamias, 'Pseudo-Hegelian Contrivances: The Uses of German Idealism in the Discourse of the Post-Civil War Greek State'.

[299] Georgios T. Kolias, 'Mnimosynon thymaton mias ideas', *Epistimoniki Epetirida Filosofikis Scholis Athinon*, II.18, 386.

[300] Ibid., p. 388.

Slavery, then, was acceptable, so long as it delivered iconic monuments and especially because it was castigated by the Left. The implications of such declarations are truly horrifying, especially when one takes into consideration the fact that many of the students of such professors had been arrested and sent into internal exile on island prison camps immediately after the coup d'état (Kornetis 2014: 48–49). Within three months of making this speech, Kolias had been promoted to a full professorship, no doubt largely thanks to his demonstrated 'national-mindedness'.[301]

In their many visits to universities and addresses to students, the Colonels relayed their nationalist developmentalist discourses to these audiences in more sinister ways than to older demographics, precisely because they viewed the youth as a problem. For instance, in an address to students at the University of Athens in December 1968, Ioannis Ladas urged his student audiences to do right by their ancestral ephebes, to 'eliminate once and for all the shameful designation of underdevelopment', since the ancestral 'shadows remain among us and watch us and judge us'.[302] This statement reverberated with a very current subtext of surveillance and control. Refracting the ephebes as spectres of development gestured to an extensive network of student informers to the regime, who posed a demoralising threat to students who might join the 'dirty long-haired hippies, who g[a]ve refuge to the useless and the lazy', for instance.[303] By contrast, Ladas lauded the true Greek youth, who 'filled with vitality, health, [and] momentum' persistently worked to revive 'the past and unforgettable greatness of our race'. The implication was that conscientiousness and productivism were drafted into some obscure patriotic mission for development and, of course, would keep the youth occupied and away from the

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[301] Three months later, Kolias would deliver a speech on the occasion of Greek Independence Day and was introduced as the provost of the Philosophy School at the University of Athens and 'Professor of Medieval and Modern History'. Georgios T. Kolias, 'I 25i Martiou enanti tou parelthontos, tou parontos kai tou mellontos tou ellinikou ethnous', *Epistimoniki epetirida Filosofikis Scholis Athinon*, II.18, p. 89.

[302] Ladas, p. 24.

[303] Ibid., p. 18. On surveillance at the universities, see Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics and the Long 1960s in Greece*, p. 49.

‘insolent monkeyism that is called xenomania’.[304] Notably, among the university informers were members of the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi*, who, according to a clandestine left-wing youth periodical published under the dictatorship, were encouraged to remain ‘vigilant’ of their peers and to report back any suspicions of anti-dictatorial activity to the police.[305] In other words, whereas Ladas’s statement was first and foremost a threat conveyed to the general student population, the *Alkimoi* could identify with those virtuous Greek youths who were fulfilling their debts to their ephebic ancestors.

In the case of Georgios Papadopoulos, a personal contempt for higher education and a mistrust of academic proficiency commingled in a frame whereby notions of the ancient Greek miracle conflicted with the curbing of intellectual freedoms. For instance, in addressing an audience of valedictorians at the University of Athens in February 1968, Papadopoulos stated:

> Our ancient ancestors transcended the darkness of the future from a distance of three thousand years, and [by] piercing with the[ir] spirit through the darkness of metaphysics, they formulated the course of enquiry and the course for the struggle [that is] human endeavour, for the expansion of the limits of the natural world.[306]

In the same speech, Papadopoulos exhorted his audience to contain their inquisitive spirit, thus foiling his promotion of the ingenuity and pioneerism which, as he perceived it, had borne forth the ancient Greek miracle:

> Evaluate your real capabilities, evaluate the real capability that your self has given you and the environment [within which] to place yourselves in the mosaic [the “mosaic of eternal and immortal Greece”]. Do not seek to conquer territory that is greater than that which nature has designated for you. You will face the gridlock of defeat.[307]

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[304] Ladas, pp. 19-20, 12.
[305] Nikos Kytopoulos, ‘Neolaia, ethnos kai diktatoria’, *Neos Kosmos*, 10 (1970), p. 22.
[306] Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 1, p. 154.
[307] Ibid., pp. 150, 149.

In parallel, Papadopoulos promoted romanticised ideas of classical sportsmanship in order to appeal to the perceived physical vitality of the youth, as well as to impart a moral accountability for the control of that vitality, which represented a potentially critical obstacle to the regime's supremacy: 'Fight on the [athletics] track, filled with the immortal Greek Olympic spirit. [Keep] [a]way from compromise [which would be] blasphemic on your part'.[308] According to this logic, then, students were required to make intellectual compromises but not physical ones. Imbued with a moral imperative for friendly, but relentless competition, students were charged with the task of a lifelong struggle, with no indication as to what the end goal of such a struggle was other than to evade insulting the memory of ancestral athletes or to evade premature death.[309]

There are a number of highly suggestive indications that Papadopoulos would in fact have been quite happy to see university admissions statistics dwindle. According to former diplomat, writer and anti-dictatorship activist Rodis Roufos, Papadopoulos was rumoured to have privately stated that '[w]e don't have that much need of educated people' in the late 1960s.[310] In actuality, the dictator practically came out and proclaimed this view to an audience of tens of thousands of university students and schoolchildren gathered at the Panathenaic Stadium in 1969. The occasion was the spectacle held in honour of the second anniversary of the coup d'état, an event that was repeated on a Monday for the exclusive benefit of the youth and their educators (so that absenteeism would not pass unnoticed) and whose theme was 'the great achievements [accomplished] during the first two years of the National Revolution'.[311] In his speech to his young audiences, Papadopoulos proclaimed:

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[308] Ibid., p. 154.
[309] Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 5, p. 43.
[310] Athenian [Roufos], p. 88.
[311] 'To pliris programma tou eortasmou tis 21is Apriliou eis to stadion', *To Vima* (Athens, 11 April 1969), p. 2. As Gonda Van Steen notes, such spectacles 'were typically held on Sundays, ensuring that many more people were free to attend'. Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance Under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967-1974*, p. 164. The year 1969 marked the beginning of a new tradition

> [A]llow me, in taking advantage of this joyful moment, to say to all of the youth of Greece [the following]: Society is not only constituted out of knowledge and education. […] Therefore, do not all aim for higher education. Orientate yourselves, guided by your abilities, by the abilities of your parents, by the particular inclinations which you have [been given] by nature, toward the respective domain[s] of social and economic activity.
>
> There is no form of work that is shameful. There is no [form of] work that demeans the individual. [It is] people who often demean the work which they are performing.[312]

If we accept the view that Papadopoulos was acutely mistrustful of the students and academics who populated universities, as well as the observation that he maintained a hostile attitude towards Greece's social elites (as discussed in Chapter 2 of this project), these considerations intimate that the dictator was quite serious in exhorting his audiences to seek alternative engagements to higher education. More importantly, in this context Papadopoulos was essentially using the elitism of higher education as a deterrent to prospective applicants, an elitism which he was intent on keeping in place. To put it differently, a university system weighed down by 'pseudoclassicism' (after *Argo*) helped Papadopoulos to insinuate that higher education was largely irrelevant to most, so that schoolchildren would not enter into the potentially dangerous spaces of universities and would enter employment sooner rather than later. In this sense, from Papadopoulos's perspective, the reversal of the Centre Union's reforms was advantageous for the additional reason that it had lowered the school leaving age from fifteen to twelve.

In June 1970, *The New York Times* reported that the dictatorship was debating whether to lower the school leaving age by an additional year, in view of a feeling that 'education can provide discontent if it is not directly tied to job training'. On this occasion, the newspaper also cited another statement of Papadopoulos's from 1969, in

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ushered in by the dictatorship, whereby the spectacles for the anniversary of the coup d'état would run twice: on a Sunday, for the general public, and again (usually on a weekday) for the youth.

[312] 'O prothipourgos k. G. Papadopoulos diekirixe pros tin spoudazousan neotita: I Epanastasis anikei stin elliniki neolaia', *Nea Politeia* (Athens, 1969), pp. 2.

which he reportedly questioned ‘whether it is really useful for everybody to know everything’.[313]

By contrast, in his advocacy of an extreme form of ethnocentrism, Ioannis Ladas urged students to immerse themselves in their studies as a form of armed patriotism, to ‘toil in times of peace, with the shovel and with the quill’ (Ladas 1970: 82). In his view:

> [A] University professor, who, for instance, claims that the separation of the powers of the state was [first] conceived by Montesquieu, should be fired, without hesitation, since that professor ought to know [that Montesquieu was] preceded by the Stagirite [Aristotle], who analysed completely and scientifically the issue.[314]

These discrepancies in the attitudes of the officers with regards to higher education intimate their conflicting views on the nature of the society they sought to formulate in the near future. It is in relation to these views that I will now go on to consider the busts of Alexander the Great, followed by the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi*.

III. Alexander the Great and Papadopoulos’s Cult of Personality

In late 1971, the Dictatorship of 21 April distributed hundreds (if not thousands) of identical busts of Alexander the Great to kindergartens, primary and secondary schools across Greece. Presented as a gift to education from the Greek Armed Forces, the busts were streamlined replicas of the Azara Herm, itself a replica of an earlier statue attributed to the fourth-century sculptor Lysippus, and the only known inscribed portrait of Alexander at that time (housed by the Louvre in Paris; see Appendix 2).[315] According to a newsreel dated December of that year, the objective of the initiative was to ensure that

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[313] Alfred Friendly Jr., ‘Greece Said to Weigh Cutting Required Schooling to 5 Years’, *The New York Times* (New York, 7 June 1970), p. 14.

[314] Ladas, p. 12.

[315] Diana M. Buitron, ‘The Alexander Nelidow: A Renaissance Bronze?’, *The Art Bulletin*, 55.3 (1973), p. 397.

‘this great figure of Hellenism will inspire Greek children from their tender years’.[316] The question of exactly how Alexander was intended to inspire schoolchildren is entirely open to interpretation, particularly since the regime seems to have made a strategic effort to play down the education-wide scope of this initiative, as well as its political implications. In order to arrive at such an interpretation, one must necessarily look to the regime’s broader school culture, as well as beyond it.

The initative to distribute busts of Alexander the Great to schools is of particular interest, not solely because it was nationwide, but also because it was uncharacteristically absent from some of the foremost news publications of the period (for instance the Athens dailies *Ta Nea* and *To Vima* as well as the daily of Thessaloniki, *Makedonia*). To the best of my knowledge, the single newspaper article that referred to the busts was published by the pro-dictatorial newspaper *Eleftheros Kosmos*, but even this article left much unsaid regarding the scope of and rationale behind the initiative. Like in the case of the newsreel, the article indicated that sixty-eight busts of Alexander were conferred upon headmasters of primary and secondary schools located in the prefecture of Attica, during a ceremony held at a school in the Athenian municipality of Zografou on 16 December 1971.[317] In so indicating, this article concealed the fact that one week earlier, school *and kindergarten* administrators in the city of Katerini (in Central Macedonia) had been summoned to collect their respective busts of Alexander from the Military Command of that region.[318] It is thanks to the blogosphere and the personal initiatives of individuals to create digital archives of their hometowns that my enquiry has located identical busts of Alexander still on display in schools in Trikala (Thessaly), Crete and the Peloponnese (Appendix 3).[319] In other words, the reach of this campaign extended far beyond Attica and encompassed all levels of general education across the country. More recently, Georgios Petalotis, the former Deputy Minister of Justice of PASOK (*Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima*, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement; 2011–12), has recalled that 'the junta filled with thousands of busts of Alexander the Great, schools, [public] services, hospitals and public spaces'.[320]

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[316] ‘Paradosi protomon tou Megalou Alexandrou se scholeia tis Attikis, apo ton nomarchi Attikis G. Dimakopoulo', tech. proc. by General Film Hellas Ltd’, *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1972) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=1056&thid=1211> [accessed 30 December 2017].

[317] ‘Dorea tou stratou pros ta scholeia’, *Eleftheros Kosmos* (Athens, December 1971), p. 7.

[318] Koutsoura, p. 176. (My emphasis.)

In light of the fact that the single newsreel segment regarding the busts telecasted only the ceremony at Zografou, and offered no more information than the article in *Eleftheros Kosmos*, there seems to be little doubt that the regime was self-censoring. By focusing on the conferment ceremony in Athens, press and broadcasting outlets within the dictatorship's immediate sphere of influence reframed the nationwide scope of the bust campaign and rather presented it as limited to schools belonging to a single prefecture. Furthermore, by enumerating the local military, police and municipal authorities who attended the ceremony at Zografou, the article of *Eleftheros Kosmos* resounded with the non-attendance of ministers or high-ranking government officials, such as the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs at that time, Gerasimos Frangatos.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that the inclination to play down the campaign may have been attributable to the intricacies of the so-called Macedonian Question and matters of international diplomacy. Like the pre-dictatorial governments of Greece, the dictatorship denied the existence of an ethnically distinct Macedonian minority in the country (sometimes referred to as Slavic or Aegean Macedonians), and subjected this population to a process of forced Hellenisation, arrests and imprisonments.[321] In his seminal study of the dictatorship's relations with the communist regimes of Greece's neighbouring Balkan states, Sotiris Walldén has shown that whereas this issue created major strains in Greek-Yugoslav relations in the period between 1967 and 1974, bilateral gestures of conciliation had peaked in 1971.[322] A very public distribution of busts of Alexander to schools across the country, including north-eastern Greece, then, would very likely have been apprehended as an act of hostility against both the Macedonians and the Yugoslav federation.

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[319] 'Axizei na episkefteite', *Flabouresi* <http://www.vbcsupport.gr/alphaxi943zetaepsiloniota-nualpha-epsilonpiiotasigmakappaepsilonphitauepsilon943tauepsilon.html> [accessed 30 December 2017]. 'Xenagisi: To scholeio simera (2010)', *Ilektroniko imerologio 2ou dimotikou scholeiou Siteias*, 2010 <http://blogs.sch.gr/2dimsitelas/2010/11/18/το-σχολειο-σημερα> [accessed 30 December 2017]. 'To scholeio mas ekpembei S.O.S', *To blog tou Karatoula*, 2010 <http://karatoula2009.blogspot.ch/2010/12/sos.html> [accessed 30 December 2017].

[320] 'O Petaliotis tin "peftei" se 24 galazious vouleftes gia ton... Mega Alexandro', *Politiki Tribune*, 2014 <http://www.tribune.gr/politics/news/article/75924/o-petalotis-tin-pefti-se-24-galazious-vouleftes-gia-ton-mega-alexandro.html> [accessed 30 December 2017].

Another potential reason for the understatement of the scope and rationale of this initiative may have been to avoid further aggravating Papadopoulos's confederates. According to political scientist Jean Meynaud, Papadopoulos was reputed to have privately asked of his colleagues to address him as 'Alexander the Great' after the coup d'état.[323] While this anecdote might have very well been the outcome of back-fence talk, the evidence suggests that there are grains of truth to Papadopoulos's identifications with the king of Macedon.

In a speech to students at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki in January 1968, Papadopoulos proclaimed his joy to be addressing the youth from the pulpit whence 'the creators and realisers of the Great Idea of the unity of Hellenism, Philip and Alexander', had launched their Panhellenic campaign in classical antiquity. Now, he continued, it was he who was 'addressing to all of [the Greek people] the summons [for a] call to arms toward the effort that the Nation has taken on', the 'rebirth of the spirit of Hellenism'. In his usual contempt for higher education and his suspicion of university students, Papadopoulos proclaimed that a rebirth of the Hellenic spirit would entail, among other things, that 'the Greek student must feel that to have a letter sent by the dean to his village [and] to be read by the priest during mass, will be a much graver penalty for [that student] than to be expelled from university'.[324] Notwithstanding the parochialism of this statement, Papadopoulos was here tentatively identifying with the unifying and ostensibly civilising mission of the Macedonian kings.

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[321] Loring M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World* (Princeton, NJ and Chichester, West Sussex: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 78. While the antiquisation of the Macedonian identity is a phenomenon that largely post-dates the Greek dictatorship, by the late 1960s the Yugoslav federation had begun to lay claim to ancient Macedon and Alexander the Macedonian (rather than 'Alexander the Great') as part of its nation-building process. Anastas Vangeli, 'Nation-Building Ancient Macedonian Style: The Origins and the Effects of the So-Called Antiquization of Macedonia', *Nationalities Papers*, 39.1 (2011), p. 16. It is possible, then, that this also informed the initiative to distribute busts of Alexander to schools across Greece.

[322] Sotiris Walldén, *Parataíroi etairoi: Elliniki diktatoria, kommounistika kathestota kai Valkania, 1967-1974* (Athens: Ekdoseis Polis, 2009), pp. 411–26.

[323] Jean Meynaud, *Oi politikes dynameis stin Ellada: Vasiliki ektropi kai stratiotiki diktatoria*, vol. 2 trans by. Panagiotis Merlopoulos and Alexis Emmanouel, 2nd edn (Athens: Ekdoseis Savvala, 2002), p. 374.

In the summer of that year, the Athenian newspaper *To Vima* published an article commemorating the death of Alexander the Great, in which the anonymous writer declared: 'It is fortunate for Greece that the 2,200 years since the death of Alexander the Great […] coincid[e] with the governance of Greece by the National Government, which […] united anew the Greek people divided by the corrupt politicians'.[325] According to the same article, this was because Alexander had been the architect of the first 'homogeneous and united Greek state' in history, a unification that had provided the conditions for Alexander's conquests and for Greek culture to 'rule over the entire known world' as the 'pinnacle of civilisations' in antiquity. That the same article referred to Papadopoulos's speech at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (delivered a full six months earlier) — and that it was published at a time when the dictatorship's censors prescribed articles that newspapers were obligated to print[326] — leaves little doubt that this article was planted by some regime official.

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[324] Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 1, p. 110.

[325] 'I synenosis ton ellinon ergon ton megalon igeton', *To Vima* (Athens, June 1968), p. 5.

[326] Robert McDonald, *Pillar and Tinderbox: The Greek Press and the Dictatorship* (New York and London: Marion Boyars, 1983), p. 54.

Crucially, the publication of this article more or less coincided with the arrival of the American-Canadian Pan-Macedonian Association in Greece, where the Association would hold its annual convention with the full cooperation of regime.[327] During this visit, Papadopoulos would stand in the Odeon of Herodes Atticus, at the foot of the Acropolis hill, and would proclaim his 'New Great Idea' to the Association. 'The notion of a Greater Greece', he explained, was 'not an imperialist one'; 'it [was] not today, at least, and it [would] not [be] in the future' (Papadopoulos 1968b: 173); this Greater Greece would be one united in spirit rather than territory, in the 'Hellenic and the Christian spirit' to be exact.

Two years later, the Order of the AHEPA (the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association) would hold its forty-eighth Supreme Convention in Athens and would publish an album in order to commemorate that occasion. This album included a transcript of Papadopoulos's greeting message to the visiting Greek-Americans and Greek-Canadians in 1970, a message accompanied by an image of the 'tetradrachm of Lysimachus' (housed by the British Museum), a coin bearing the profile of Alexander, diademed and wearing a ram's horn (see Appendix 4).[328] Although certainly a banal flagging of kinship with the AHEPA (after Michael Billig), this specimen, along with the confluence of statements, publications and events discussed above, suggest that Papadopoulos wanted to identify with Alexander as a unifier of Hellenes across the globe.

Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that this self-image of Papadopoulos's made its way into the regime's educational legislation. In 1970, the dictatorship passed a law 'For the Education of Greek Children Abroad', according to which Greek schools in foreign countries were required to follow the curriculums of the Greek Ministry of Education and would be organised and controlled by the regime (including the appointment and dismissal of teaching staff).[329] In this way, the dictatorship could ensure that the education of the children of the diaspora would perpetuate the affective ties of second-generation immigrants abroad with Greece, especially through the learning of modern Greek, as per Papadopoulos's determination to 'preserve the Greekness of the soul of the children [of the diaspora]' (Papadopoulos 1968b: 110). In sharing the same textbook editions with their peers in Greece, the children of the diaspora would learn that since antiquity, the Greek language had always 'reinforce[d] the sense of national unity' between Greeks, as well as 'their difference[s] to others'.[330] They would additionally learn that regardless of their place of birth, their formal nationality and the country that they lived in, the Greek dictatorship considered them to be Hellenes, since Hellenism (constituted of the Greek language and Christian Orthodoxy) 'had always been a much broader concept than the concept of Greece as a state'.[331]

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[327] 'Pammakedonikon synedrion: I Makedonia tha ginei o engefalos tis choras. Pandote ito elliniki', *Ta Nea* (Athens, 5 August 1968), pp. 1 & 9.

[328] Order of the AHEPA, *48th Supreme Convention*, ed. by Dem. Nikolitseas (Athens: Order of the AHEPA, 1970), p. 19. Cf. The Trustees of British Museum, 'Silver Tetradrachm of Lysimachus', *The British Museum*, 2015 <https://www.bmimages.com/preview.asp?image=00031026001> [accessed 30 December 2017].

It is notable, too, that beginning in 1969, the AHEPA launched the 'AHEPA Youth Summer in Greece Program', an annual five-week-long trip to Greece for Greek-American secondary school students.[332] By 1971, the dictatorship was extending invitations to other Greek communities in South Africa, Belgium and the Netherlands (to name only a few), through which the children of expatriates came to spend their summers in Greece at the 'invitation of the National Government'.[333] It was at the end of that year that the busts of Alexander the Great were distributed to schools across the country, a concurrence that intimates that Papadopoulos's 'New Great Idea' was finding its way into education at home.

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[329] Evaggelia Kalerante, 'Discourse Critical Analysis of the Dictatorship Educational Policy (1967-1974) about the Greek-Speaking Education of the Greeks Abroad', *International Journal of Language, Translation and Intercultural Communication*, 2 (2014), 69–78.

[330] Papakonstantinou, *Politiki agogi: Diaskevi dia tas G' kai ST' taxeis tou gymnasiou*, p. 264.

[331] Ibid., p. 270.

[332] George G. Leber, *The Order of AHEPA 1922-1972* (Washington, DC: The Order of AHEPA, 1972), p. 502.

[333] 'Afixi paidion ellinon omogenon tis Notiou Afrikis stin Athina, tech. proc. General Film Hellas Ltd.', *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1971) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=3350&thid=10359> [accessed 30 December 2017].

If we accept the conjecture that the initiative to distribute these busts to schools derived from Papadopoulos's vainglorious self-image as the contemporary unifier of Hellenes, this raises the question of how Alexander the Great was meant to 'inspire Greek children from their tender years' within Greece. To begin with, the positioning of those busts in schools would always remind schoolchildren that '[s]ince ancient times, Macedonia has been purely Greek', as well as that the 'monstrous expansionist appetites' of the Yugoslav federation 'deman[d] the constant vigilance of the Greek nation'.[334] In other words, the busts (along with reinstated and new textbooks published by the dictatorship) would help to instil in schoolchildren a disavowal of the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece, as well as a fear of and hostility towards the 'menace from the north' — a genealogically-complex discourse that was underpinned by belligerent anti-communism in the post-war period.[335] Furthermore, Alexander was a king and a military commander, both of which were consistent with the authoritarian power structures and the cult of the army that the dictatorship sought to convey to schoolchildren.

Yet the personalistic portraiture of Alexander (a 'great man') in schools was only paralleled by the equally personalistic portraits of Papadopoulos, which decked classroom walls. Schoolchildren were further required to write essays on topics lifted from Papadopoulos's *Our Creed* (Athenian [Roufos] 1972: 93) and, by 1971, new textbooks published by the dictatorship on the history of modern Greece had come to include chapters on the ’21 April 1967’, accompanied by a full-page photograph of Papadopoulos (contrary to the smaller photos of King Constantine II or Alexander Papagos, for instance).[336] In other words, it is conceivable that Alexander was meant to participate in the construction of a cult of personality for Papadopoulos, according to which future citizens would be wholly devoted not to the ‘Revolution of 21 April’, but only to Papadopoulos.

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[334] G. Kalamatianos and others, *Anagnostikon, E' dimotikou*, 10th edn (Athens: Organismos Ekdoseos Didaktikon Vivlion, 1971), p. 214. Papakonstantinou, *Politiki agogi: Diaskevi dia tas G' kai ST' taxeis tou gymnasiou*, pp. 312, 314.

[335] Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952-1967* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).

It is notable that Alexander would not have been the only figure of Greek history that the dictator wanted to identify with, a point that supports the view that Papadopoulos was inclined to build a cult of personality for himself by using ‘great men’ as a point of reference. As Eleni Kouki and Dimitris Antoniou have shown, Papadopoulos also wanted to identify with the Cretan statesman Eleftherios Venizelos (1864–1936), whose political leadership had ‘led to the modernization of political life and the army, as well as eventually to the triumph in the Balkan Wars’ in the early twentieth century.[337] The territorial gains made during the Balkan Wars of 1912 to 1913 had almost doubled the territorial size of Greece and had marked the apogee of the irredentist project of the *Megali Idea*. It seems, then, that there emerges a pattern in terms of Papadopoulos’s identifications with those men credited with the greatest territorial conquests waged in the name of a certain Greek idea.

If Papadopoulos principally viewed himself as ‘a new Venizelos, who would modernize the country (Kouki and Antoniou 2017: 472), however, the same logic can be extended to Alexander the Great and his representations in schools. It is worth pointing out that the teaching resources reinstated by the regime presented Alexander as a man of impeccable moral qualities (magnanimity, honesty, industriousness, studiousness, bravery), of great strength, genius and ambition,[338] a profiling that resonated with contempotary presentations of Papadopoulos in pro-dictatorial newspapers:

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[336] Konstantinos Sakkadakis, *Elliniki istoria ton neoteron chronon, ST’ dimotikou* (Athens: Organismos Ekdoseos Didaktikon Vivlion, 1971), pp. 180; cf. 178, 173.
[337] Kouki and Antoniou, p. 467.

> As a personality, Mr. G. Papadopoulos represents the humanly [possible] ideal synthesis of leaderly virtues: He originates from the people and remains connected with the dreams, the expectations and with the problems of the people. […] He approaches problems with scientific integrity, with [an] understanding of their details and with unusual erudition. He is daring, fearless, unyielding and fighter. His many foreign visitors and conversants (politicians, scientists and journalists of all political orientations), even the dissenters, have not hidden that Georgios Papadopoulos is *a leader of European calibre*, of magnificent civility, radiating cultural refinement and brilliant intellect.[339]

In interacting with the dictatorship's broader school culture, the busts of Alexander could help to consolidate for Papadopoulos an image as a modernising technocratic ethnarch. According to Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou's *Education of the Citizen*, which was adapted to serve as the regime's civics textbook for years nine and twelve (after its publication in 1970):

> The unification of all the Greek city states by Alexander the Great (356–323 BC) into one empire […] created the conditions for the development of a new Greek civilisation during what is known as the *Hellenistic period* […].
>
> During this period, the Greek language became a universal language, the Greeks came to play an international role and the sciences, particularly [the fields of] astronomy, mathematics, geography, medicine and physics, principally advanced by the Greeks, the only comparable [development of which] made its appearance in Europe from the 17th century.[340]

In presenting the Hellenistic period as the precursor to the European Enlightenment, the civics textbook also presented Alexander as the synergist who made possible the creation of an archetype of European modernity (principally understood, in that context, in terms of scientism and technologism). When the same textbook presented the ‘principal goal of the Revolution’ as being ‘the extrication of Greece from the state of retardation’, references to such pioneerisms worked both to draw a stark contrast between the advancedness of the past and the backwardness of the present, and to accentuate correlations between progress and the leadership of ‘great men’.[341] Notably, with the inauguration of public vocational schools across the country and the introduction of legislation for the establishment of public technical colleges in 1970, or K.A.T.E. (*Kentra Anoteras Technikis Ekpaidefseos,* Centres for Higher Technical Education), Papadopoulos was finally able to claim that he was putting in place the infrastructure for the ‘technological evolution’ of Greece.[342] These were generally unsuccessful, however, a situation that has been attributed to the internal contradictions of the dictatorship’s educational policies and its failure to break away from its ‘ancestor-worship, its nationalist and religious fanaticism’.[343]

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[338] Christos Malliaros, *Istoria ton anatolikon laon kai tis archaias Ellados: Apo ton archaiotaton chronon mechri tou thanatou tou M. Alexandrou*, 6th edn (Athens: Organismos Ekdoseos Didaktikon Vivlion, 1971), p 243. On the magnanimity of Alexander, see Evangelos P. Fotiadis and others, *Anagnostikon, ST' dimotikou*, 11th edn (Athens: Organismos Ekdoseos Didaktikon Vivlion, 1972), pp. 318–19.

[339] 'To politikon mellon tis choras kai o Georgios Papadopoulos', *Nea Politeia* (Athens, 1968), p. 1. (Emphasis in the original.)

[340] Papakonstantinou, *Politiki agogi: Diaskevi dia tas G' kai ST' taxeis tou gymnasiou*, p. 268.

Ultimately, in agreement with Roufos’s observation that Papadopoulos aspired to create a society not constituted of ‘thinking citizens’, but of ‘gullible technocrats’ (Athenian [Roufos]: 94), it is my view that the busts of Alexander gestured to a personalistic modernisation project that operated within the framework of a set of limitations that Papadopoulos himself imposed. In tandem with these limitations, Papadopoulos’s project was fundamentally flawed in that it was the death of Alexander that had heralded the origins of the Hellenistic period, and Papadopoulos had no intention to withdraw from power.

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[341] Ibid., p. 120

[342] Papadopoulos, *To pistevo mas*, vol. 5, p. 84. Doukas, p. 249.

[343] Michalis Kassotakis, ‘To provlima tis anaptixis tis technikis-epangelmatikis ekpaidefsis stin Ellada apo to 1950 mechri simera: Mia ermineftiki prossengisi’, in *Panorama istorias tis ekpaidefsis: Opseis kai apopseis, vol.2,* ed. by Sifis Bouzakis (Athens: Gutenberg, 2011), p. 347.

IV. The Spartan Visions of the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi*

In closing this chapter, I want to focus on the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi* in order to show that school culture remained a contested site under the dictatorship, and that the regime hardliners were able to advance a radically different perspective of the future of the Greek youth and regime through the channels of the hidden curriculum. In harnessing the constitutive myth of the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi* as an organisation that had 'revived, since the year of its founding in 1924, the Greek institution of Lycurgus of Sparta, *Alkimismos* [Alkimism]',[344] the hardliners were able to progress their own project for a revival of the ideology of Metaxas's 'Fourth of August Regime' in Greece of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This project additionally commingled with a revivalist agenda concerning the precepts of German National Socialism (in particular, with the input of the ghost leader of the *Alkimoi*, Konstantinos Plevris), as well as with the militarisation of the youth and their education in an extreme form of ethnocentrism.

It is well-known that the *Alkimoi* participated in the mass spectacles of the Dictatorship of 21 April (Kornetis 2014: 97; Van Steen 2015: 167), as well as that the Corps assumed the dimensions of the official youth organisation of the dictatorship, even though it was never publicly declared as such (Giannakopoulos and Albanidis 2015: 1364–66). More specifically, although the dictatorship banned most youth groups and organisations in 1967, the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi* was among the select few that were permitted to remain active under the regime (along with the Boy and Girl Scouts). The declaration of martial law and the suspension of the freedom of assembly in April 1967 meant that the Corps and its leadership were unable to hold meetings in the months following the coup d'état. In October 1967, however, the ASDEN (*Anotati Stratiotiki*

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[344] Christos Blos, 'Oi Alkimoi', *Embros* (Athens, 4 April 1950), p. 4.

Dioikisi Esoterikou kai Nison, the Supreme Military Command of the Interior and the Islands) granted the *Alkimoi* permission to reconvene.[345]

The reasons for the preferential treatment of the Corps can be summarised as follows. The *Alkimoi* had a long and well-known history as an anti-communist youth organisation of the far right, which had proven useful, at the turn of the 1960s, in the anti-communist campaign of ERE.[346] The organisation maintained close ties with the military (in fact, many of its leading members had themselves been career officers),[347] and its strict hierarchical structure and militaristic identity resonated with the cult of the army that the dictatorship sought to instil in the Greek youth.

While Papadopoulos is reputed to have opposed the formation of an official youth organisation for the dictatorship — lest the regime come to be perceived as 'fascist' — in early 1968 the Corps was brought under the 'control and supervision' of the General Secretariat of Sport (along with the Scouts), a newly established body made responsible for all curricular and extracurricular sports and athletic events, and which was directly answerable to the Prime Minister (that is, to Papadopoulos).[348] By the early 1970s, what had once been a marginal group had become twenty thousand strong. The Corps held very public mass swearing-in ceremonies in stadiums in downtown Athens, to the great alarm of parents, who began to place phone calls to newspapers in order to ask whether an abstention from joining the *Alkimoi* 'might have consequences on the progression of their children at school'.[349] The answer was no, although before long, reports of principals blackmailing schoolchildren to join the *Alkimoi* in rural areas began to surface.[350] After the fall of the dictatorship in 1974, it was discovered that the *Alkimoi* had been supplied with thousands of firearms by the General Secretariat of Sport and that they were recognised by some dictatorship officials as 'an army authorised to police'.[351]

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[345] Soma Ellinon Alkimon, 'Apospasma praktikon synedriaseos D.S./S.E.A. tis 25 Oktomvriou 1967', in *O Anarchikos*, 90 (1994), 17–18.

[346] First founded in 1924, the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi* had started off as a paramilitary organisation of the far right that unleashed violence against Jews, communists and leftist youth groups involved in demonstrations at that time. Antonis Liakos, 'L'apparition des organisations de la jeunesse: Les cas de Salonique', in *Actes Du Colloque International Historicité de l'Enfance et de La Jeunesse*, ed. by Spyros Asdrachas and others (Athens: Secretériat Général à la Jeunesse, 1984), p. 530. It was re-established in 1948 (during the Greek Civil War), at which point the Corps aligned itself with the precepts of *ethnikofrosyni* and resumed its identity as a paramilitary group. Its objectives, as stipulated in a circular penned by the (re-)founder and General Chief of the *Alkimoi* in 1948, were to 'proudly offer law-abiding and loyal soldiers to his Royal Majesty the King and [to] the Patria, and, to Greek Society, serviceable and law-abiding citizens raised with a sense of Honour, Faith, Religion, Family and the execution of duty'. Soma Ellinon Alkimon, 'Apospasma praktikon synedriaseos D.S./S.E.A. tis 25 Oktomvriou 1967'. At the turn of the 1960s, ERE used the *Alkimoi* Corps as one of several private organisations and institutions through which to promote anti-communism in exchange for monetary and material gains. This unholy alliance did not prevent the Corps from proselytising the youth by 'imitating, both in terms of [the organisation's] structure and in terms of the appearance of its members, the paramilitary model of fascist youth organisations of the interwar period'. Ioannis Stefanidis, p. 215.

[347] Stavros Zormbalas, *O neofasismos stin Ellada (1967-1974)* (Athens: Ekdoseis Synchronis Epochis, 1978).

[348] 'A.N. 397: Peri epanasystaseos tis Genikis Grammateias Athlitismou kai ton armodiotiton aftis', *Efimeris tis Kyverniseos tou Vasileiou tis Ellados* (Athens: Ethniko Typografio, 1968) <https://www.eetaa.gr/metaboles/fek/1968/fek_101a_1968.pdf> [accessed 27 December 2017]. On Papadopoulos's opposition to establishing a youth organisation, see Meletis Meletopoulos, 'I ideologia ton

Before engaging with the ideological orientations of the Corps, it is important to elucidate that although Papadopoulos was complicit (at the very least) for the activities of the *Alkimoi* during the dictatorial period, it is likely that this organisation would have been used in aid of deposing Papadopoulos in due time. By all accounts, the *Alkimoi* were commandeered by the regime hardliners in the late 1960s, in order to be transformed into 'a paramilitary organisation, that would represent the popular iron arm of the regime'.[352] These were Ioannis Ladas and Konstantinos Aslanidis (the Secretary General of Sport, as of early 1968), with the support of other officers and the close involvement of Konstantinos Plevris — then the twenty-something private secretary of Ladas, a proponent of National Socialism and of the ideology of Metaxas's Fourth of August Regime (a blend he referred to as 'Greek National Socialism').[353]

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syntagmatarchon', *Anti*, II.344 (1987), p. 35. Konstantinos A. Plevris, *Gegonota 1965-1977: Ta agnosta paraskinia* (Athens: Ekdoseis Ilektron, 2009), p. 64. Manolis Daloukas, 'Alkimoi', online audio recording of an interview with Konstantinos Plevris (YouTube, 2013) <https://youtu.be/zBMXibIN1nQ> [accessed 27 December 2017].

[349] A.M., '20,000 Alkimoi s'olin tin Ellada', *To Vima* (Athens, 31 May 1970), p. 2.

[350] 'To provlima tis paideias sti simerini Ellada', *Neos Kosmos*, 11 (1972), p. 56.

[351] '1,800 toufekia eiche ferei i G. Grammateia Athlitismou gia tis organoseis neon', *To Vima* (Athens, October 1974), pp. 1–2. Aris Skiadopoulos, 'I "chrysi neolaia" ton aprilianon', *Ta Nea* (Athens, 28 October 1974), p. 7.

[352] Plevris, *Gegonota 1965-1977: Ta agnosta paraskinia*, p. 66. Meletopoulos, 'I ideologia ton syntagmatarchon'.

[353] Konstantinos A. Plevris, *Antidimokratis*, ed. by Giannis Schoinas, 3rd edn (Athens: Nea Thesis, 1987).

According to Plevris, who was also the protégé of Ladas, in 1967 Papadopoulos feared that the establishment of an official youth organisation would 'be reminiscent of I. Metaxas's EON, without explaining [to Plevris], why this would be a bad thing'.[354] EON (*Ethniki Organosi Neolaias*, the National Youth Organisation) was the official youth organisation of the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas during the interwar period. Established in 1936, it had been modelled on the youth organisations of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, with near-compulsory membership for all school children, while all other youth organisations were banned.[355] In the early days of the dictatorship, then, Papadopoulos feared that founding of a new organisation or the conspicuous commandeering of an old one would create the impression that the regime was taking measures to totalise its control over the youth.

By 1968, however, Papadopoulos's confederates had begun to grow frustrated with the increasingly personalistic nature of the dictatorship and, more importantly, Papadopoulos was aware of this fact.[356] Therefore, the placement of the General Secretariat of Sport under the auspices of the premiership in 1968 should not be viewed solely as a measure aiming to centralise control over the youth, but also as one that brought Aslanidis (the Secretary General) and the other hardliners affiliated with the *Alkimoi* under the watchful eye of Papadopoulos. It is of course well-known that in September 1971 Papadopoulos's confederates attempted to depose and to replace him with Makarezos, an incident that was ironically prevented by Dimitrios Ioannidis (who would himself go on to depose Papadopoulos two years later).[357] In his memoirs, however, Plevris feigns ignorance of Ladas's hopes 'for something about which [Plevris] was unaware' and claims certainty that '[i]f *Ladas* had prevailed, Greece would still be ruled by [the Dictatorship of] 21 April' today.[358] This supposition intimates that whereas Papadopoulos's challengers could agree that he should be toppled, the men held very different views on the identity of his successor and, by extension, on the future of the nature of the regime. Given Ladas's close ties with the *Alkimoi*, the exponential growth and strengthening of the organisation, and his perception that the youth 'd[id]n't need advice but fields of action' (Ladas 1970: 79), it seems probable that the *Alkimoi* were being prepped to topple Papadopoulos and to install a different form of dictatorship in the early 1970s.

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[354] Plevris, *Gegonota 1965-1977: Ta agnosta paraskinia*, p. 64.

[355] Marina Petrakis, *The Metaxas Myth: Dictatorship and Propaganda in Greece* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 20.

[356] Kallivretakis, 'Ti synevi ton Ianouario tou 1968; Fatriastikes syngrouseis kai diplomatikes dolichodromies stin poreia statheropoiisis tou diktatorikou kathestotos', pp. 172-89

[357] Ioannis Tzortzis, 'Fake or Failed? A Greek Would-Be Reforma Pactada', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 12.2 (2012), pp. 317–18.

The ideological orientations of Plevris are of paramount importance here, particularly because he would come to serve as the ghost leader of *Alkimoi* under the Dictatorship of 21 April (Meletopoulos 2008: 276–7). In 1965, Plevris had founded the 'Party of the 4th of August' (*Komma 4is Avgoustou*, K4A), a party whose ideological orientations he had expounded in his doctrinal booklet *Anti-democrat* (*Antidimokratis*), first published earlier that year. *Anti-Democrat* was essentially a manifesto for what Plevris called a 'third way' between Communism and democracy (the 'two forms of national treason'), for the creation of a single-party militarised state led by enlightened autocrats (presumably counting himself) and guided by the ideology of 'Greek National Socialism', inspired by that of the Fourth of August Regime (and clearly indebted to the doctrines of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels).[359] In this book, Plevris railed against democracy, Communism, capitalism, Jews, Turks, plutocrats and the bourgeois elites. Tellingly, he omitted references to Christian Orthodoxy, the Church or the monarchy. His ultranationalism was underpinned by the subservience of individuals to the state, an affective devotion to the nation, biological determinism and scientific racism.[360] The K4A (Plevris's fringe party) was itself military in structure and had been involved in the violent suppression of youth demonstrations following the events of July 1965.

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[358] Plevris, *Gegonota 1965-1977: Ta agnosta paraskinia*, p. 82, 285. (My emphasis.)

[359] Plevris, *Antidimokratis*, pp. 66-8, 83.

While the establishment of an official youth organisation would in itself invoke Metaxas's EON (in Plevris's view), under the Dictatorship of 21 April, the identifications of the *Alkimoi* with Sparta came to commingle with the ideological orientations of Ladas and Plevris, such that the tenets of the Corps closely mirrored Plevris's model of 'Greek National Socialism'. The *Alkimoi* (meaning youthful and doughty) claimed descent from Lycurgus, the symbolic founder of the Spartan city state in the eighth century, and specifically from Lycurgus's organisation, military education and exacting discipline of the Spartan youth.[361] As I have indicated in the introduction to this project, the Fourth of August Regime also claimed ties to Sparta, while Metaxas's contempt for the democratic polity of classical Athens (Carabott 2003: 29–31) was, too, mirrored by the *Alkimoi* under the dictatorship. Published in 1973, the first *Book of the initiate Alkimos* (*To vivlio tou protopeirou Alkimou*) presented a summary of 'The Ancient History of Greece' that omitted entirely any reference to the democracy of classical Athens:

> Sparta played a leading role [as one of "the first organised states" of antiquity], it being organised into a powerful military state in 754 BC by the wise lawmaker Lycurgus, as did Athens, which became the city of arts and letters.
>
> The Persian invasion and the danger it posed transformed the disunity of the Greeks into national unity. Following epic battles of insurmountable heroism, the Greeks repelled the powerful invader. The city of Athens, [which] contributed to the victory against the Persians, developed art and philosophy and erected immortal artistic monuments under the leadership of Pericles in 450 BC. This period was named the "Golden Age".[362]

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[360] Ibid., pp. 71, 73–74.

[361] Soma Ellinon Alkimon, *To vivlio tou protopeirou Alkimou* (Athens: Soma Ellinon Alkimon, 1973), p. 5.

[362] Ibid, p. 32.

The reference to Pericles, here, was not an indication to democracy, although mention of the statesman's name may have hypothetically helped to reassure parents regarding the ideological orientations of the organisation their children were involved with.

According to Plevris's *Anti-Democrat*, democracy had only been defended 'by demagogues and [the] corrupt' since antiquity; in fact, Pericles himself had been an anti-democrat, with extraordinary powers, as had been 'the luminaries of worldwide intellect', Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.[363] The views expounded by Plevris in his pre-dictatorial manifesto were reflected in a circular issuing from the headquarters of the *Alkimoi* in 1968, albeit indirectly: 'We are proud because we are *Alkimoi*, because Alkimism represents the revival of the principles of Lycurgus, of Plato and of Aristotle'.[364] The same circular indicated that the motto of the *Alkimos* was 'We shall become far mightier than you', a phrase sung by the choir of youths at Spartan festivals to pledge that they would continue to surpass the valiance of their elders in the future. The Corps additionally took trips to Thermopylae (see Appendix 6) and was reputed to have run lectures on the subject of Hitler's rise to power, which seems likely in view of its ghost leader's evident admiration of German National Socialism.[365]

According to a book on ancient Greek philosophy authored by Plevris and published in 1970, the contemporary Greek educational system was in a state of deterioration, precisely because if drove students to seek mindless forms of employment, and because it failed to educate them properly in the Classics:

> [W]e Greeks are obliged to confess that it is a disgrace to [come to the] realisation that no graduate from the *Gymnasion* [secondary school], no [university] student and no graduate of an institution of Higher Education knows what was said by the Ancient Greek philosophers. 'The *Gymnasia*, the Universities and the Polytechnics produce minds clogged up with cement, drugs, planks, laws and screws, and they send them [young minds]

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[363] Plevris, *Antidimokratis*, pp. 58-9.

[364] Diefthinsis Propaidefseos Geniko Archigeio Somatos Ellinon Alkimon, 'O Alkimismos: Anaviosis ton archon tou Lykourgou', *Eleftheria* (Larissa, 24 May 1968), p. 4.

[365] Nikos Kytopoulos, 'Neolaia, ethnos kai diktatoria', *Neos Kosmos*, 10 (1970), p. 22.

> out into national society, capable of concerning themselves [only] with the problems of cement, drugs, planks, laws and screws, but incompetent to face the problems of existence, of the world and of life.[366]

In view of the ideological orientations of Plevris expounded in his *Anti-democrat* and the statements of Ladas discussed in Section 2 of this chapter, this statement intimates that the hardliners were intent on preparing the members of the Corps of the Alkimoi to form the intelligentsia of a new regime, one inspired by Metaxas's 'Fourth of August Regime' and by National Socialism.

In a context where the foremost personalities of the dictatorship were idealising the democracy of classical Athens as an egalitarian system, promoting returns to the Pnyx and the creation of new democracies, the ideological outlooks of the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi* were radically different to those sanctioned by the official line of the dictatorship. In the same way that Greece's future dictators had managed to progress their own agendas through their precarious alliances with the 'triangle of power' in the pre-dictatorial period, however, the disgruntled regime hardliners now progressed their agendas through the regime's hidden curriculum.

V. The Perks of Pseudoclassicism

In an investigation of the ways in which the educational policies of the dictatorship were able to progress the Colonels' dynamic pedagogical and political agendas in the period 1967 to 1973, this chapter began by showing that the implications of the dictatorship's so-called educational pseudoclassicism moved beyond the limits of a regression to educational traditionalism. The reinstatement of a curriculum heavy in traditional humanism in 1967 participated in a multi-dimensional political manoeuvre of the dictatorship, which delivered a fatal blow to the Centre Union's reform programme, imposed repressive measures on schoolchildren, and turned stakeholders in educational conservatism into allies of the regime.

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[366] Konstantinos A. Plevris, *Ellines Filosofoi*, 2nd edn (Athens: Ekdoseis Ilektron, [1970] 2012), pp. 5–6.

The chapter has built on the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2 in order to explore how renderings of classical antiquity in the dictatorship's school culture progressed the regime's developmentalist agendas. In view of the fact that children, by their very nature, are in the process of development, the dictatorship could not as easily construct subjecthood around notions of underdevelopment with this demographic. What it could do, however, was discourage pupils from pursuing secondary or tertiary education, while having taught them, first, that their moral debt to their ancient ancestors made industriousness and productivism patriotically necessary. For those who were intent on pursuing secondary education, a curriculum heavy in traditional humanistic education and the Classics would pave their academic trajectories with a spate of hurdles, such that some would give up and enter the job market sooner, and the rest would become educated in the patriotism of struggle and perseverance.

The chapter has engaged, moreover, with the discrepancies between the Colonels' attitudes to young pupils and their profound mistrust of the youth (teenagers, university students, young adults). In viewing the youth as a problem, Greece's dictators relayed their nationalist developmentalist discourses to these audiences in more menacing ways than to older demographics, in order to contain their intellectual freedoms and to remind them that they were being watched. This mistrust also made allowances for the regime hardliners to commandeer the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi* in the late 1960s.

Chapter 4:

The Classical Past as Spectacle:

Historical Pageantry and the Repertoire of Power

Of the numerous different spectacles staged by the Dictatorship of 21 April between 1967 and 1973, the spectacles for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks (*Imera tis Polemikis Aretis ton Ellinon*) held annually at the Panathenaic Stadium in central Athens have earned the utmost notoriety.[367] This notoriety is largely attributable to the interplay between the ostentatious visual language of those occasions and their modes of commemoration of historical (but also mythical) military events and, in particular, of the Greek Civil War (Kourniakti 2017). As I have indicated in the introduction to this project, in the 1980s, these spectacles came to be pointedly used by the Greek left-wing intelligentsia in order to communicate the decades-long repression of the Left in the twentieth century. At that juncture, a complex genealogy of receptions of classical antiquity and of top-down spectacle-making (broadly understood here as events that seek to control the response of an audience using affective and sensory incitements) also became influentially relayed as a paradigm of the (not innocent) blindness of the majority of the general population to the persecution of left-wing citizens (Kourniakti 2017: 354–5).[368]

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[367] As the first scholar to have closely studied these spectacles, Gonda Van Steen translates the abridged '*Eorti tis Polemikis Aretis ton Ellinon*' as 'Festivals of the Military Virtue of the Greeks'. Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance Under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967-1974*, p. 163 n. 3. In an earlier article on the subject Van Steen has employed the translation 'polemic' instead of 'military' since, as she explains, '[t]he name [in the original *katharevousa*] flaunted the more aggressive term "polemic", or "warlike", rather than "military"'. Gonda Van Steen, 'Rallying the Nation: Sport and Spectacle Serving the Greek Dictatorships', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 27.12 (2010), p. 2123. I have opted to translate '*polemiki areti*' as 'combative virtue', since the term 'combative' lies somewhere in the interstices between 'polemic' and 'military' as it were, in that it is able to connote aggression without being overly literal (after Van Steen 2015: 163 n.3).

[368] The term 'spectacle' is notoriously difficult to define and has come to acquire negative connotations in its modern usage. For these observations and for my use of the term in this chapter I have drawn on Anastasia Bakogianni's discussion of the spectacle as an event 'controlled by a producer(s), who seeks to elicit particular responses from their audience' (but an event is nonetheless mediated by the performances and the variegated responses of participants, including actors and audiences), as well as a 'multi-media

At the same time, these events lent themselves to ridicule on account of their visual language, a ridiculing which, in some cases, carried notions of misappropriation. Indicatively, in her inaugural speech at the opening of an exhibition on Greek kitsch organised under the auspices of the left-wing periodical *Anti* (a landmark publication of resistance to the dictatorship), in 1984, the Greek Minister of Culture and Sciences, Melina Mercouri stated:

> The use of tradition, of history and more generally of the past begins to fade, while reference to the past, to tradition, to history becomes pictorial-photographic and only [that]. I don't think that there exists a better example of this condition than the organised celebrations of the dictatorship in the Panathenaic Stadium for the "combative virtue of the Greeks".
>
> For someone to refer to our History, it sufficed to dress the soldiers themselves in the costume of Pericles, or Fokas, or Karaiskakis (of course, as imagined by the "decorators" of the junta). I don't know if Alexander the Great also performed stunts on a motorcycle, but in my opinion it wouldn't be a stretch [to assume he did].[369]

With this statement, Mercouri summoned the exceptionalism of national heroes in order to create a stark contrast with the mass spectacles of the dictatorship and their sensationalist, hollow and even inadvertently caricatured representation of those heroes. The dictatorship's spectacles for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks converged on the exhibitionism of power, intense militarism, re-enactments of mythified (and harrowing) conflicts of the past, with a visual language 'punctuated by tinseled costumes, synthetic props of all shapes and sizes, motorized floats, flashing neon lights and smoke machines' (Kourniakti 2017: 399–40). It was this visual language that Mercouri was referring to here. More importantly, for the purposes of this chapter,

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event' that utilises sensory incitements. Anastasia Bakogianni, 'War as Spectacle, a Multi-Sensory Event Worth Watching?', in *War as Spectacle: Ancient and Modern Perspectives on the Display or Armed Conflict*, ed. by Anastasia Bakogianni and Valerie M. Hope (London, New Delhi, New York and Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 4-6.

[369] Melina Mercouri, 'Chairetismos', in *Kati to Oraion: Mia Periigisi Sti Neoelliniki Kakogoustia*, ed. by Charis Kambouridis, Dafni Koutsikou, and Christos Papoutsakis (Athens: Oi Filoi tou Periodikou Anti, 1984), pp. 11.

Mercouri's statement gestured to an inextricable link between the dictatorship's appropriations of classical antiquity and their modes of representation at the spectacles held at the Panathenaic Stadium.

In this chapter, I argue that the historical pageantry that interspersed the spectacles of the Dictatorship of 21 April reified a genealogically-complex yet contemporaneous set of classicisms, whose visual qualities and relationalities the regime was able to deploy in response to a range of circumstances in the period between 1967 to 1973. To put it differently, I contend that in the historical pageantry of the Colonels was inscribed a heavily mediated and multifold repertoire of classicisms, whose components the regime could marshal out onto the stadium track at a moment's notice, depending on whom the dictators were addressing and why. The term 'repertoire', after Diana Taylor, broadly refers to performance traditions and embodied actions that transmit memory, rituals and daily social practices within particular contexts.[370] For the purposes of this chapter, I am particularly interested in a repertoire of staging traditions, their visual language(s) and implications, with particular focus on the spectacles for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks. In staking out an analysis of the repertoire of those events in the pre-dictatorial and dictatorial periods, it is my intention to build on the existing literature on the dictatorship's mass spectacles in order to substantiate a number of insights on the derivations of their historical pageantry, with an eye to reframing their modes of representation as contemporaneous in 1960s Greece.

Section 1 of this chapter discusses the introduction of historical pageantry into the spectacles of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks (which were inaugurated in the pre-dictatorial period; Van Steen 2015: 163; Kourniakti 2017), with a focus on the years 1965 and 1966. In doing so, I show that the modes of representation of those events were closely intertwined with an exhibitionism of the ties between the Crown and the military prior to the coup d'état of 1967. In parallel, my intention is to frame the ways in which the Colonels (and the broader Greek public) came to identify the historical pageantry of the spectacles with Greece's new regent and with power, as well as how the ideological underpinnings and re-enactments of the occasions paid tribute to the Greek officer corps. These intricate dynamics and their modes of representation typify the first classicism addressed by this chapter, a classicism that the dictatorship would go on to appropriate in 1967 precisely due to its mediatedness and the identities of its mediators (discussed in Section 2). Section 3 builds on the observation that the regime's militaristic historical pageantry was evocative of Hollywood sword-and-sandals films (Van Steen 2015: 173), in order to unravel a further aspect of the genealogical links of the dictatorship's spectacle repertoire. This discussion complements those of Sections 1 and 2, in that it adds to the genealogy of the spectacles the identifications of military men with the aesthetics of such films.

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[370] Diana Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 20.

Section 4 goes on to branch out of the repertoire of the spectacles for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks and into that of the mass spectacles inaugurated by the dictatorship to celebrate the anniversary of the coup d'état. In focusing on the first and last of those occasions (held in 1968 and 1970, respectively), the section draws attention to two further classicisms harnessed by the regime, that of contemporary Greek film musicals and that of the Lyceum of Greek Women.

I. The Production of a Repertoire of Power

Since the advent of the spectacles for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks to the archive of Greek public history on the dictatorship years, scholars have explored but have also looked beyond the anti-communist implications of these events. Of those scholars, two stand out in particular for their detailed and complementary analyses of spectacles. The research projects of Gonda Van Steen (2010; 2015) have focused on close readings of the spectacle of 1967, with an emphasis on the theatricality of its historical pageantry, its athletic rituals and the genealogical links between the spectacles of the Dictatorship of 21 April and those staged under the interwar dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas. In his study of the spectacles of 1968 to 1971, Kostas Katsapis focuses on the ways in which the Colonels attempted to brand their regime as the 'Revolution of 21 April' in association with representations of the Greek War of Independence (or the 'Revolution of 1821', *i Epanastasis tou 1821* in the *katharevousa*), while also signalling some striking elisions in the historical pageantry of some of the dictatorship's spectacles (for instance, the elision of the Byzantine Empire from the spectacle of 1968). Katsapis engages, moreover, with the promotion of archetypes of masculinity at the spectacles, with their eye to the 'anarchistic' (but not necessarily communist) youth.[371]

Together, the approaches of these scholars coalesce to present an intricate picture of the dynamics at play in the historical pageants staged by the dictatorship, but leave more or less unexplored the recent precedents on which these pageants were closely based. By extension, the associations of this form of pageantry with the institution of the Crown, as well as the involvement of Greece's future dictators in the pre-dictatorial production of the repertoire of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks, remain uncharted. These considerations are crucial if we are to better understand the reasons why the Dictatorship of 21 April would go on to lay claim to the repertoire and visual language of the spectacles over the following years.

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[371] Kostas Katsapis, 'Proslipseis tou parelthondos apo ti diktatoria tis 21is Apriliou: I ennoia tis "andreias" kai i diacheirisi tou 1821', in *I Elliniki Epanastasi tou 1821: Ena evropaïko gegonos*, ed. by Petros Pizanias (Athens: Kedros, 2009), pp. 389–406.

I have shown elsewhere that the decision to set aside a ‘Day of the Combatants and the Combative Virtue of the Greeks’ (*Imera ton Polemiston kai tis Polemikis Aretis ton Ellinon*) hailed from the right-wing government of ERE and the premiership of Constantine Karamanlis in 1959, that year marking the tenth anniversary since the end of the Greek Civil War. The purported objectives of this celebration were twofold. On the one hand, it sought to commemorate precisely ‘the tenth anniversary of the victory […] against the bandits’ (‘the bandits’ being an abbreviation of the derogatively termed ‘communist-bandits’, *kommounistosymmorites*) and was part and parcel with the anti-communist campaign of ERE following the electoral success of the left-wing party EDA in 1958. On the other, it was expressly a measure taken to elevate the morale of Greek reserve officers, at a time of ‘intense restlessness and backhanded scheming among junior and middle-ranking army officers, including Greece’s future dictators’, a situation which ‘no doubt informed ERE’s mitigating, honorary gesture’.[372] To put it differently, according to the rationale behind this commemoration, a celebration of anti-communist aggression was made tantamount to an honouring of the officer corps, a first step that entitled officers to lay claim both to the anniversary itself and its celebration repertoire.[373]

The introduction of historical pageantry into the repertoire of the celebration for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks, though, coincides with the period following the toppling of Georgios Papandreou in July 1965. In other words, these performances and their ostentatious visual language debuted in an historical circumstance where an already precarious parliamentary system was effectively incapacitated by the Crown, a synchronicity which was not accidental. The advent of this form of pageantry to the repertoire of a celebration of the defeat of the Left in the Greek Civil War should be viewed as an expression of the spectator politics of the Crown and (having been given the chance) of the Greek military in the mid-1960s. In this context, ‘spectator politics’ is understood in terms of the processes through which institutions of power undermined participatory democracy by consigning citizens to roles as spectators.[374] Accordingly, as events that ‘construct narratives that relate, impart and perpetuate an interpretation of the past […] by the appropriation of key events and figures to suit the immediate purposes of a community’,[375] the historical pageants incorporated into the spectacles should be viewed as serving the agendas of the community that was staging them, namely, the triangle of power in 1960s Greece (the Crown, the military and Greece’s right-wing political elites).

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[372] Kourniakti, p. 362 n. 9.

[373] It seems that a Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks was already being celebrated by military associations prior to 1959. Its hijacking by the political authorities worked in such a way so as to heighten its anti-communist colouring and to exclude reservists of the non-Right (including liberals) from various events organised in municipalities and military bases. Antonios Th. Kambouris, ‘I epeteios tou Vitsi eis to Langadan’, *Makedonia* (Thessaloniki, September 1959), p. 1.

The spectacles of 1965 and 1966 catered to very different audiences and therefore used different scenarios, props and performers. The spectacle of 1965 was dedicated to the Order of the AHEPA, and featured the re-enactment of a Panathenaic procession performed by women of the Lyceum of Greek Women; it also bore a conspicuous resemblance to another Panathenaic procession staged at the stadium the previous year in honour of the marriage of King Constantine II to Princess Anne-Marie of Denmark (a point I will return to).[376] By contrast, the repertoire of the spectacle of 1966 was addressed to a predominantly Greek public and set the blueprint for that of the first spectacle held under the dictatorship the following year (Kourniakti 2017: 346).

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[374] Douglas Kellner, *Media Spectacle* (London & New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), p. 177.

[375] Joan FitzPatrick Dean, *All Dressed Up: Modern Irish Historical Pageantry* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2014), p. 1.

[376] ‘Gamos tou Vasilia Konstantinou V’ kai tis pringipissas tis Danias Annas-Marias stin Athina’, *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1964) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=3491&thid=12648> [accessed 28 December 2017].

For the first time since the invention of this celebratory tradition, the spectacle of 1966 saw the performance of a narrative of Greek military continuity, with re-enactments of mythical and mythified battles from the chronicles of the Greek imaginary. Under the monarchy-backed government of Stefanos Stefanopoulos, the event was organised by the ASDEN (the Supreme Military Command of the Interior and the Islands) and was attended by the royal couple, government officials and Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus.[377] During the opening speeches, the Minister of Defence, Stavros Kostopoulos, trumpeted the spirit of the occasion as follows:

> The Trojan War, Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, the war triumphs of Alexander the Great, Byzantium, the Revolution of 1821, the liberation wars of 1912 to 1920, the epic of Asia Minor, the legendary "NO" [*OCHI*], the national resistance, and finally, the victorious battle of Grammos-Vitsi, constitute the most majestic proof of the matchless warrior ethos of the Greek spirit.[378]

The culmination of this narrative with the Civil War cast a shadow on the previous battles as episodes of a Greek warrior epic of exceptionalism and of the Right, against perceived foreign and leftist anti-nationals alike.

The customary precision and training routines performed by the military units over the previous years were followed by a second spectacle programme, an historical pageant evocative of a chronicle play (a typical feature of that form of pageantry),[379] spearheaded by a re-enactment of the Trojan War.[380] An enormous Trojan Horse was wheeled into the stadium, in order to form the centrepiece around which soldiers dressed as Achaeans and Trojans simulated battle using sword and shield props. The Trojan War was followed by re-enactments of episodes of the Persian Wars, with the Marathon runner Pheidippides collapsing on the stadium track, the conquests of Alexander the Great (mounted on horseback), the championing of Christianity with the Byzantine Empire, the mythified 1821 War of Independence and the Greco-Italian War of 1940 to 1941. Greece's military chronicles were drawn to a close with a narration of the Civil War broadcasted through the stadium megaphones (rather than being performed), a telling, if minor, gesture to mediate public indignation.[381] The events were performed by hundreds of supernumeraries pooled from Greek military units, with horses from the cavalry (or perhaps even the palace stables), costumes, props and custom-made floats decorated with ornamental stencils (derived from Greek pottery and popularised by the country's national tourism industry).[382]

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[377] The ASDEN was a Corps-sized formation established in Athens 1961 and was responsible for the defence of both the capital and the Aegean islands. Supreme Military Command of the Interior and the Islands, 'Istoriki exelixi tis ASDEN', *Stratos kai enimerosi* (Athens, 2009), pp. 26–27.

[378] 'O eortasmos eis olokliron tin choran tis "Imeras tou Efedrou Polemistou"', *Makedonia* (Thessaloniki, 6 August 1966), p. 7.

[379] Erika Fischer-Lichte, *Theatre, Sacrifice, Ritual: Exploring Forms of Political Theatre* (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), pp. 90-91.

Michalis Fakinos, 'Enopion vasileos kai Makariou. I istoria "psalidismeni" stin eorti tou stadiou', in *File 'Polemiki Areti', Leonidas Kallivretakis Archival Collection* (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1966).

This spectacle made manifest the spectator politics of the Crown and the army leadership in a number of ways. To begin with, members of parliament, local authorities, and the general public were largely opposed to a joint celebration of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks with one of the victory of the Right in the Greek Civil War. Although the two had been celebrated together since the late 1950s, Greek governments of the Right and Centre had made various attempts to play down anti-communist associations of the Day of Combative Virtue during the 1960s, especially following the assassination of the popular left-wing MP Grigoris Lambrakis in 1963.[383]

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[381] 'O eortasmos eis olokliron tin choran tis "Imeras tou Efedrou Polemistou"'.

[382] 'Eortasmos Tis "Imeras Tis Polemikis Aretis Ton Ellinon" Sto Panathinaiko Stadio, Dir. by Geniki Diefthynsis Typou Kai Pliroforion', *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1966) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=3262&thid=16647> [accessed 5 January 2018].

[383] I have indicated elsewhere that in 1963, 'the interim government of Panagiotis Pipinelis seems to have made a telling, if minor, attempt to do away with a commemoration of the "defeat of the communist bandits" in favor of a somewhat less divisive standalone Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks'. This tactical move participated in a broader strategy 'to temper the anti-communist rhetoric of ERE in light of the assassination of the independent, left-wing, and popular MP Grigoris Lambrakis in May of the same year'. Kourniakti, p. 363. Furthermore, in 1964, Georgios Papandreou opted to articulate the Day of Combative Virtue with the Resistance to the Axis powers in the 1940s, as well as with his refusal of the Acheson Plan

By contrast, the event of 1966 saw a very explicit revival of the Civil War *defeat* of the Left as grounds for celebration, mediated by an unprecedented (for that celebration) form of pageantry. While the Ministry of Public Order Apostolakos attempted to diffuse tensions by claiming that the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks was a celebration of 'national content and [one] unrelated to politics', Grigoris Spandidakis (the Army Chief of General Staff and the rival plotter of Greece's future dictators), persistently articulated the Day of the Combative Virtue with the 'defeat of the communist-bandits', while seizing the opportunity to forewarn of the continuing 'dangers of communist domination'.[384] Spandidakis added: 'The Greek soldier is determined to fight for the preservation of liberty whomever she [liberty] is threatened by' — no doubt a warning to the Papandreou camp and to the Centre Union. One year later, after having been blindsided by the coup of his subordinate officers and having lost no time to rally himself to their cause, Spandidakis would be sitting in the front rows of the stadium to watch a repetition of the spectacle in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister of the first dictatorial cabinet.[385]

Meanwhile, in 1966, the Minister of Public Order indicated that the Ministry had taken 'all necessary [and] effective measures' to contain possible protests, a statement that speaks to the full awareness of officials that this spectacle would be met by public outrage, as well as to the blatant disregard of those officials for popular mandate.[386]

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put forth by the United States and Britain for the partition of Cyprus: 'Today we celebrate the combative virtue of the Greeks. The glory of the Greek army. The combative virtue of the Greeks means NO. And the "NO" will be repeated if the country requires it'. 'O Prothypourgos K. Papandreou Tonizei: To N.A.T.O. Ofeilei Na Epivali Tin Eirinin Eis Kypron Mechri Tis Gen. Synelefseos Tou OIE', *Eleftheria* (Athens, 8 September 1964), p. 3.

[384] 'Metra Pros Apofygin Oiondipote Politikon Ekdiloseon Eis Thessalonikin Kai Athinas', *Eleftheria* (Athens, 3 September 1966), p. 8.

[385] 'Eortasmos Tis Imeras Tis Polemikis Aretis Ton Ellinon, Tis Imeras Tou Efedrou Polemisti Kai Tis 18is Epeteiou Tis Machis Grammou-Vitsi Stin Athina, Dir. by Ypourgeio Proedrias Kyverniseos, Diefthynsis Optikon Meson', *Geniki Diefthynsis Typou, Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1967) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=3285&thid=14357> [accessed 3 January 2018].

[386] 'Metra Pros Apofygin Oiondipote Politikon Ekdiloseon Eis Thessalonikin Kai Athinas'.

Notably, for all the conspicuousness and ostentation of the event, photojournalists were not permitted to capture images of the spectacle. In fact, upon being threatened with physical violence by the commander of the ASDEN and some unnamed lieutenant colonel in anticipation of the grand opening, the journalists walked out of the stadium in protest.[387] The re-enactment of the Trojan War, as well as a number of other battle re-enactments staged at this spectacle, were also conveniently elided from the relevant newsreel covering the event.[388] It seems, then, that the military and the Ministry of the Presidency (which was responsible for the filming and production of the newsreel) were already censoring and self-censoring, a praxis that can be explained by the lieutenant colonel's accusation that journalists were 'incorrigible' in their slandering (presumably of the Crown and the army).[389] One journalist did manage to capture a photograph of the re-enactment on the Trojan War, however, an image that was published in *To Vima* newspaper in 1966 and which bears testimony to the staging and visual affinities of the last pre- and first post-coup spectacles (see Appendix 7).[390]

The spectator politics of the Crown were widely viewed as inscribed in the visual language of the spectacle of 1966, as well as in the narrative of Greece's military chronicles and its elisions. For instance, an article published in the Thessaloniki daily *Makedonia* indicated that 'in addition to the [habitual] military exercises' of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks, the spectacle of 1966 would include 're-enactments of the most important periods of Greek history' in honour of the attendance of the royal couple and members of the royal family.[391] Although this article was not critical of the upcoming spectacle (nor of the king's spectator politics), it nonetheless indicates the association of historical pageantry with the institution of the monarchy. This association becomes all the more evident when one takes into consideration the affinities between the spectacle held in honour of the royal wedding in 1964 and that of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks in 1965.

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[387] 'Diamartyrontai Oi Fotoreporters', *To Vima* (Athens, 8 August 1966), p. 4.

[388] 'Eortasmos Tis "Imeras Tis Polemikis Aretis Ton Ellinon" Sto Panathinaiko Stadio, Dir. by Geniki Diefthynsis Typou Kai Plyroforion'.

[389] 'Diamartyrontai Oi Fotoreporters'.

[390] 'Apo Tis Istorikes Anaparastaseis Sto Stadio', *To Vima* (Athens, 6 September 1966), p. 4.

[391] 'Parousia Tou Vasileos Tha Telesthi Eis Athinas I Eorti Tis Polemikis Aretis Ton Ellinon', *Makedonia* (Thessaloniki, 28 August 1966), p. 4.

One week prior to the royal wedding in September 1964, the Panathenaic Stadium had seen the staging of a ‘popular celebration’ for an audience of 70,000 Athenian citizens, various members of parliament, the Greek and Danish royal families, and the king and the queen to be.[392] The highlight of this event, which was organised by the ASDEN, was the performance of a re-imagining of a Panathenaic procession, which aimed to put on a display a remarkable and distinctly Greek ritual that played up to the majesty associated with monarchical pageantry, for Greek and Nordic royal audiences alike.

The procession was foreshadowed by a chronicle of the mythical origins and history of the Panathenaic Games, broadcasted through the stadium megaphones to brief audiences on the historic importance of the upcoming performance. A Panathenaic procession of incense bearers in green chitons and Canephoroe draped in white entered the stadium, followed by the entry of a reconstructed Panathenaic ship, a golden-brown vessel on wheels with the *peplos* raised on the mast, with three priestesses on deck and another sixteen flanking the ship on foot (see Appendix 8). In her role as high priestess to the goddess Athena, actress Maria Bonelou recited several verses in the *katharevousa*, wishing the future queen that the ‘Sacred bond of Hymen’ bring her marital bliss, and that her reign ‘be bright and glorious for our small, but resplendent [country] with a history of three thousand years’.[393] The symbolic rite of passage to receive the Danish princess into the Greek royal family, performed on behalf of her new Greek subjects, was sealed with the conferment of a wreath and the *peplos* upon Anne-Marie. The ship's sail, 'made of woollen light yellow fabric with depictions of the clashes of the goddess Athena against the Giants', was lowered, folded and decorously handed to the princess, along with the wreath 'made of pure gold and diamonds'.[394] The incorporation of these lavish gifts, fit for a monarch, into an otherwise popular festival, worked to align the majesty of regal pageantry with that of the classical past. It should be noted that '*peplos*' in Greek is also the word for the nuptial veil, which goes some way to place in perspective why this particular ritual was chosen to bestow upon the Danish princess the status of Greekness and sovereignty over the capital (like the goddess Athena) and its periphery.

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[392] ‘Ai Laïkai Dexioseis Eis Ta Anaktora Kai I Megaliodis Eorti Tou Stadiou’, p.6.
[393] Ibid.

At the spectacle of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks in 1965, the same Panathenaic ship circulated the stadium (albeit with an ordinary sheet for a sail), with three young women in the roles of priestesses draped in white on deck, and more accompanying the ship float on foot. This performance led spectators into gymnastics routines performed by the Military School of Physical Education, martial arts displays (judo, karate and jiu-jitsu, arguably not the most Greek of sports), military precision exercises and acrobatics on motorcycles performed by the ESA (*Elliniki Stratiotiki Astynomia*, the Greek Military Police).[395] As I have indicated above, the reason why this otherwise distinctly militaristic celebration came to feature a re-enactment of a Panathenaic procession — with the participation of women, too — was that the event was being staged 'in honour of the AHEPANS', under the auspices of GNTO (the Greek National Tourism Organisation).[396] Since the beginning of that year, an estimated 12,000

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[394] Nikos Papadimitriou, 'Lambra I Nykterini Eorti Eis to Stadion', *Eleftheria* (Athens, 15 September 1964), p. 3.

[395] Platanos.

[396] 'I Polemiki Areti Ton Ellinon', p.4. By contrast, the first spectacle for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks to be staged in the Panathenaic Stadium in 1961 (featuring mainly military parades and excersices) had been 'dedicated by the army, to the totality of the Greek people'. 'Eortastikai Ekdiloseis Eis Olin Tin Choran Epi Ti Epeteio Tis Ittis Ton Kommouniston', in *File 'Polemiki Areti', Leonidas Kallivretakis Archival Collection* (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1961).

Greek-Americans of the AHEPA had boarded ships and charter flights set up especially by Israeli El Al Airlines from the United States, in order to attend the forty-third annual AHEPA convention that was being held in Greece for the first time. This was described by *The New York Times* in August 1965 as 'one of the biggest civilian trans-Atlantic airlifts in aviation history'.[397]

On one level, this Panathenaic procession participated in a tradition of similar events held for the purposes of 'diaspora tourism' or 'visiting friends or relatives tourism' since the early 1950s.[398] On a second level, however, the re-enactment of a Panathenaic procession in 1965 (following that of 1964) should be viewed within the context of an emergent spectacle repertoire of a new regent, as well as in terms of the implications of his new reign.

Constantine II had been crowned regent of Greece in early 1964 (after the death of his father, King Paul) and the royal wedding to Anne-Marie in mid-September of that year was part and parcel of consolidating his reign. In accordance with the conventions of monarchical protocol, the royal wedding of 1964 would also provide the conditions to ensure a line of succession in order to guarantee the future of the Crown in Greece. Therefore, the spectacle of 1964 and the performance of a re-imagining of a Panathenaic procession at that event worked in such a way so as to ratify the ascendancy of Constantine, the alliance between the Greek and the Danish royal houses and the institution of the Greek Crown itself. In his role as priest to the goddess Athena, actor Thanos Martinos conveyed to Constantine the warm wishes of the Greek people that

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[397] 'Laurels for El Al', p. 58.

[398] Elpida Vogli, 'The Making of Greece Abroad: Continuity and Change in the Modern Diaspora Politics of a "Historical" Irredentist Homeland', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 17.1 (2011), p. 28. According to Elpida Vogli, in 1951 Greece had embarked on a new policy of diaspora politics according to which expatriate Greeks, especially those living in the United States, were invited to visit 'their homeland to do their part in its [post-war] reconstruction'. Ibid., p. 25. As the same scholar explains, the taking of this initiative had been driven by the expectation that American financial aid to Greece would be cut following the outbreak of the Korean War, an initiative that was encouraged by the ECA/G and the American Ambassador in Athens.

‘[his] reign would radiate [with light] and that [he would] come to see, ascending to [his] golden Throne, heirs upon heirs’. In the same speech, Martinos ceremoniously asked Constantine for permission to gift to Anne-Marie the *peplos* of the Panathenaic ship, ‘as a token of the love, worship and the wholehearted devotion of the Greek people’ to their new queen.[399] The implication was that like in the case of the cultic practices and offerings to the goddess Athena in classical Athens, this Panathenaic procession and the offering of the *peplos* functioned as rituals for the ostensible self-consecration of Greece to her new monarchs.

The spectacle of 1964 was overall particularly well-attended and well-received by the public, a response that was no doubt informed by the high hopes that the advent of a new, young king might finally bring to a close the deep polarisations and political repression engendered by the Civil War.[400]

With the toppling of Papandreou in July 1965, however, the tables had turned for Constantine II. With the king now widely viewed as a despot who was intent ‘not only to reign but to rule in the name of anti-communism’ (Rizas 2015: 46), the spectacle of 1965 was transformed into a site of protest. Members of the 114 youth movement filled the stadium with their cries of Papandreou’s name, both before the celebration and after it.[401] These exclamations of dissent lasted for forty-five minutes as the ceremony commencement was delayed in anticipation of the king’s arrival (who, incidentally, was probably warned of the uproar and never showed up). After the closing of the ceremony, groups took to the streets surrounding the Herodes Atticus Theatre and the Zappeion

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[399] Nikos Papadimitriou, ‘Lambra I Nykterini Eorti Eis to Stadion’.

[400] Kostas Katsapis, ‘“Tis Apistias O Kataratos Ofis”: Ermineies Gia Ti Schesi Kommounismou kai “Apistias” ti Dekaetia Tou ’60 Kai Mia Vasiliki Paremvasi Gia Tin Anaschesi Tis Ligous Mines Prin Apo Ta Iouliana Tou 1965’, in *Atheates Opseis Tis Istorias: Keimena Afieromena Ston Gianni Gianopoulo*, ed. by Despina Papadimitriou and Serafeim Seferiadis (Athens: Ekdoseis Asini, 2011), pp. 278-9.

[401] The 114 Movement was a student activist movement that took its name from the penultimate article of the 1952 Constitution, according to which ‘the implementation of the constitution [was] guaranteed by the citizens themselves’. Correspondingly, ‘[s]tudent activists reappropriated the vague formulation of the article to […] spearhead the movement for more democratic rights’. Kornetis, p. 15.

Megaron Hall of Athens, calling: ‘Elections – Democracy – 114 – Papandreou – Not Another Novas – There’s only one leader – [Give] the mandate to Papandreou – The people will rule!’.[402] It seems likely that the affinities between the visual language of the Panathenaic processions of 1964 and 1965 came to inform the spirit of protest, too, particularly since the ritual of the previous year had sought to affirm Constantine’s sovereignty over Greece (Appendix 8).

Although the 1965 and 1966 spectacles for the celebration of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks utilised different scenarios and performers, the former spectacle introduced into the repertoire of those celebrations a certain pageantic mode of representation of classically-inspired events that came to be associated with the Crown. In 1966, this association was additionally framed in terms of the scenario of Greece’s military chronicles presented at the stadium, especially on account of its elision of Eleftherios Venizelos and the period 1917 and 1920 from the narrative (Kourniakti 2017: 349). As I have inidicated elsewhere, in 1966 ‘journalists attributed the censored chronicles of Greece’s military history to King Constantine—and to his outdated but suspicious obsession with the Crown’s dramatic rift with Venizelos in the early twentieth century—and probably rightly so’ (350). Meanwhile, the spectacle was boycotted by local authorities and MPs of the Centre Union on precisely these grounds (the elision of Venizelos), a reaction that amplified the associations of the staging practices and visual language of the event with Constantine II.[403]

From this vignette of the spectacle of 1966 and its genealogical background, then, it emerges that the last pre-dictatorial spectacle for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks was dictated by similar principles to those I have outlined in Chapter 1 of this project. In other words, like in the case of the code name ‘Prometheus’, the 1966 spectacle for the Day of the Combative Virtue drafted classical culture into the production of networks of exclusion and inclusion, with the inclusion of the centres of power and the exclusion of the vast majority of the Greek population. With a visual language associated with the Crown (and the military, as I will go on to discuss in Section 3) and a scenario associated with the military (and the Crown), Greece’s military chronicles and their modes of representation worked in such a way so as to present a powerful united front of the king and the army.

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[402] Platanos, p. 7.

[403] ‘Diamartiries Kai Aitimata’, *Ta Nea* (Athens, 6 August 1966), p. 7. ‘O Eortasmos Eis Olokliron Tin Choran tis “Imeras Tou Efedrou Polemistou”’.

If we accept this observation, and in alignment with the arguments advanced in Chapter 1 of this project, it is important to briefly consider how the staging of this spectacle might have looked to foster the sense of inclusivity of army officers. The celebrations were, after all, presented as tributes to the officer corps, too.

It is my view that the re-enactment of the Trojan War should be viewed within the intensified intelligence environment of the Cold War, as a grand display of the contemporaneity of the military art of deception, with the Trojan Horse standing in as a Greek archetype of offensive counter-intelligence. To put it differently, the spectacularisation of the Trojan War worked in such a way so as to parade activities that otherwise needed to be kept secret and that went undetected by the general public (sort of), but which were nonetheless perceived by career officers as acts of modern warfare, deserving of recognition and acclamation (as discussed in Chapter 1).

It is notable that references to the Trojan Horse abound in newspaper articles from the period, usually in order to allege that the Centre Union was concealing ‘Trojan Horses’ who were ‘red fellow-travellers’ among its ranks, or to maintain that communists were deceiving naïve craftsmen, or to brandish Soviet designs on Greece.[404] On the other side of the fence, Andreas Papandreou castigated the Right of planting a 'Trojan Horse in the Centre Union' and *I Avgi*, the mouthpiece of the left-wing party EDA, denounced the 'tactic of the Trojan Horse' according to which the Greek government was looking to depose Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus.[405] In spite of their ideological differences, what these references invariably shared was a fixation on back dealings and duplicity — a common thread that speaks to the atmosphere of the times — as well as opprobrious views of the so-called tactic of the Trojan Horse.

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[404] ‘Na Kyvernisi!’, *I Kathimerini* (Athens, 6 March 1966), p. 1. ‘Mellothanatoi Tha Isan Oi Epangelmatoviotechnai Ean Epikratei Pote O Kommounismos Stin Ellada’, *I Kathimerini* (Athens, 12

By contrast, the spectacle for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks in 1966 presented this tactic as a testament to the military ingenuity and prowess of the 'good-guy Greeks', as would the spectacle of 1967 (Van Steen 2015: 175). As I have indicated above, in 1966, the Minister of Defence named the Trojan War as one of a series of battles that were constitutive of the 'majestic proof of the matchless warrior ethos of the Greek spirit'.[406] Little did he and his colleagues know just how far specific enclaves within the officer corps shared this view. Within the next few months, Greece's future dictators would deploy their own tactic of the Trojan Horse, albeit with the Titan Prometheus as their decoy.

II. Appeasing the Crown and the Claiming of a Repertoire of Power

The first dictatorial spectacle for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks was held on 3 September 1967 and followed a strikingly similar configuration to that of 1966. In light of the fact that this spectacle has been discussed in detail by Van Steen (2015: 162–83), and that the affinities between the two events have been shown elsewhere (Kourniakti

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August 1966), p. 8. Savvas Konstantopoulos, 'I Anoitos Apofasis Ton Ergatikon', *Eleftheros Kosmos* (Athens, 14 October 1967), p. 1.

[405] 'Plisiazei I Anametrisi: I Eklogiki Niki, Afetiria Tis Neas Ellados', *Ta Nea* (Athens, 12 September 1966), p. 1. 'Apo Ethniko Symferon Kai Mono', *I Avgi* (Athens, 29 January 1965), p. 1.

[406] 'O Eortasmos Eis Olokliron Tin Choran tis "Imeras Tou Efedrou Polemistou"', p. 7.

2017: 346–50), in what follows, I will focus primarily on the new implications acquired by the scenario and visual language of the historical pageantry of 1966 in 1967.

In 1967, the dictatorship relied on but also amplified the extreme anti-communism of the repertoire of the spectacles for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks. To begin with, in 1966, the Ministry of the Interior had announced that as of the following year, this celebration and the anniversary of 'the battles of Grammos and Vitsi' (as opposed to 'the defeat of the communist-bandits') would be held separately.[407] Such declarations implied that the protestations of the Greek public had been heard and raised hopes that a mitigation of the intense climate of communisto-phobia cultivated over the previous two years might begin to wane in the near future (although it is debatable whether the coup of the Crown and the army leadership would have actually led to an enforcement of this decision).

Under the dictatorship, the unabridged designation of those events was 'the Celebration of the Day of the Reserve Soldier, of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks and of the anniversary of the defeat of the communist-bandits' (*Eorti tis Imeras tou Efedrou Polemistou, tis Polemikis Aretis ton Ellinon kai tis epeteiou tis syntrivis tou kommounistosymmoritismou*)[408] — a designation that was rendered all the more aggressive by the expectations raised in 1966, the foiling of a much-anticipated general election that had been scheduled to take place in May 1967, and the dictatorship's mass incarcerations and institutionalised torture of left-wing citizens.

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[407] 'Ypechorisan Oi Apostatai: Monon Efetos O Syneortasmos Ton 2 Epeteion', p.8. Although technically a tripartite celebration — that is, a tribute to reserve officers, an homage to Greek military history, and an aggressively anti-communist commemoration of the Civil War — the repertoire of these occasions intermingled one with the other in such a way so as to render them inseparable, as had been the case in 1966. As Gonda Van Steen notes, the scheduling of the events in late August or early September — to coincide, more or less, with the anniversary of the 1949 battles of Grammos and Vitsi (the unofficial anniversary of the victory of the Right in the Greek Civil War) — worked in such a way so as to frame the spectacles at the Stadium as triumphs of the harrowing civil conflict. Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance Under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967-1974*, p. 178.

[408] For an example, see '21i Apriliou: Ethniko Orosimo', *Ta Nea* (Athens, 1 September 1967), p. 10.

The spectacle of 1967 featured an historical pageant with re-enactments of battles ranging from the Trojan War and episodes of the Persian Wars, to the 1821 Greek War of Independence, the Greco-Italian War (1940–41) and the Civil War itself.[409] The latter was a contribution of the dictatorship; as I have indicated in the previous section of this chapter, the annals of the military virtues of the Greeks had culminated with a narration of the Civil War broadcasted through the stadium megaphones in 1966. With the placement of the Greek communist forces on a par with some of the most formidable adversaries that the ancient, medieval and modern Greeks had known — even though the appearance and mettle of those adversaries were presented as incommensurate with the military prowess and valour of the Greeks (Van Steen 2015: 176) — the Left was flaunted as essentially un-Greek, as per the precepts of *ethnikofrosyni*. If a re-enactment, after Van Steen, represents 'a set or fixed performance, which has lost the flexibility of […] spontaneous enacting' to serve a certain 'Regime of Truth' (2015: 171), the introduction of re-enactments of the Civil War further worked to amplify the dictatorship's control over spectators' (and performers') apprehensions of that conflict, with the escalation of prescribed sensory incitements (which came to encompass the powerful elements of the visual and the embodied).

In parallel with the exhibitionistic othering of the Left, however, in 1967, a close mirroring of the scenario and the visual language of the spectacle of the previous year, along with some telling add-ons, worked in such a way so as to invoke the close bonds between the military and the Crown. As I have indicated in Chapters 1 and 2 of this project, many of the the Colonels did not identify as monarchists and their relationship with the Crown remained politically strained until the end of 1967 (when the king carried out his abortive counter-coup and fled the country). Therefore, a re-enactment of the spectacle of 1966, coupled with a heightening of the anti-communist implications of that event, worked in such a way so as to stage for the dictators an image as allies of King Constantine, as well as to lend legitimacy to the pretext for their coup d'état (a pretext for which the king was complicit, to say the least). If viewed within this frame, the marshalling out of the same Trojan Horse that had been used the previous year, for instance, reads as a gesture to stage discernible affinities with the king by virtue of a visual language and with the use of props that had come to be viewed as constitutive of the pageantry of the new monarch.

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[409] Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance Under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967-1974*, pp. 159-89.

Tellingly, and as historian Eleni Kouki has also noted, in 1967 the pageant of Greece's military chronicles concluded with a float bearing a large Crown perched on a pole and supported by a sailor, a soldier and a paratrooper (see Appendix 9).[410] This rather unambiguous representation of the bolstering of the Crown by the different services of the Greek Armed Forces worked in such a way so as to renew the bonds between the king and the army in a new historical circumstance. In the spirit of bridging a new chasm between the regent and the perpetrators of the coup — the self-proclaimed representatives of the Greek National Army (*Ethnikos Stratos*)[411] — this float worked to reframe Greece's military chronicles in terms of the continuity of the camaraderie between the Crown and the army in the present. The Colonels cause was not helped by the fact that the king did not attend the spectacle of 1967. However, it was attended by Princess Irene, Constantine's sister, with an eye to whom Grigoris Spandidakis (who had betrayed the trust of the Crown in a most formidable way) spoke the following lines:

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[410] Kouki, p. 145 n. 367. 'Eortasmos Tis Imeras Tis Polemikis Aretis Ton Ellinon, Tis Imeras Tou Efedrou Polemisti Kai Tis 18is Epeteiou Tis Machis Grammou-Vitsi Stin Athina, Dir. by Ypourgeio Proedrias Kyverniseos, Diefthynsis Optikon Meson'.

[411] Shortly after the coup d'état, the Colonels made it a priority to force into retirement high-ranking military officials and to purge the Armed Forces of dissenters. In addition, and as Meletis Meletopoulos specifies, the vast majority of the perpertators of the coup d'état derived from the Land Army, and were therefore unrepresentative of all the units of the Greek Armed Forces (such as the navy, which mutinied in the early 1970s). Meletopoulos, *I Diktatoria Ton Syntagmatarchon: Koinonia, Ideologia, Oikonomia*, p. 49 n.1.

> Boys and girls, men and women and children, let us hold Greece within our hearts and, purified in the baptismal font of today’s celebration, altogether, with one body, with one soul, with a willingness to give and to sacrifice, [and] together with our young King, let us march [forward] on the path to our destinies. The path illuminated by the star that shines from the firmament of the thirty centuries of our history. The path of the virtue of the Greeks.[412]

In this context, the reference to Greece’s trimillennial history commingled with the purification ritual of baptism in the Christian Orthodox tradition in order to propose that the king (and the Greek people) let bygones be bygones, with that history representing the unifying and guiding way forward. This statement puts into perspective the close mirroring of the scenario and visual language of the spectacle of 1966 in 1967, a mirroring that, ironically, was a reminder of the recent events which Spandidakis was here advocating should ultimately be forgotten.

Concomitantly, if we accept the interpretation of the Trojan Horse of 1966 as a symbolic tribute to those officers involved in clandestine activities and covert operations in pre-dictatorial Greece, the reappearance of the same Horse in 1967 reads as a glorification of the scheming that had made the coup d’état possible earlier that year. In this sense, the deception of the officers (championed as a virtuous act of warfare) would have stared Constantine in the face had he attended the spectacle.

It is notable that at the Exhibition of the Military History of the Greeks held at the Zappeion Megaron Hall in Athens one year later (see Appendix 10), as well as in the first volume on the same subject published in 1970, the Colonels would, too, express a great appreciation of the tactic of the Trojan Horse. The volume indicated that the Trojan Horse had been a ploy ‘conceived by the cunning Odysseus’ in a war where the (Achaean) Greeks had been ‘[p]unishers of irreverence […] in order to return to the patria the kidnapped beauty' of Helen of Troy.[413] In light of the fact that the officers had not participated in direct combat since the 1940s, and since they took great pride in their involvements in covert Cold War statecraft (as discussed in Chapter 1), the Trojan Horse at the spectacle of 1967 can be viewed as an exhibitionistic display of their own clandestine activities and cunning in the pre-dictatorial period. As they perceived it, they had also acted as punishers of irreverence with the arrest of Andreas Papandreou and other Greek politicians.

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[412] ‘Protofanis O Enthousiasmos Tou Laou Kata Tin Chthesinin Lambran Eortin Tou Stadiou’, *Ta Nea* (Athens, 4 August 1967), p. 1.

These intricate dynamics — aggressive anti-communism, a precarious appeasement of the Crown, and a self-aggrandising celebration of hot and cold war struggles — all commingled in 1967 in a spectacle repertoire whose grammar and visual language was, for the most part, provided by the pre-dictatorial period. Following the counter-coup and departure of the king in December 1967, however, the Colonels would no longer need to keep up appearances and would more pointedly appropriate this repertoire as a self-serving repertoire of power.

With a float bearing the palingenetic phoenix added to the tail end of the sequence of Greece's military chronicles as of 1968 (this being the year that the dictatorship adopted the phoenix as its official symbol), the dictators made flagrantly manifest their claims to the repertoire of the spectacles for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks, while simultaneously staging the 'Revolution of 21 April' as the apogee of those chronicles. As Kouki has shown, the fully-fledged adoption of the phoenix following the self-exile of King Constantine in December 1967 figured as a symbolic representation of the newfound autonomy of Greece's dictators (see Appendix 11).[414] The introduction of the phoenix further worked to place the coup d'état of 1967 and the Colonels themselves on a par with those celebrated battles and heroes featured in the historical pageants, as well as to frame the dictatorship as a new (and equally glorious) chapter of Greek history (Katsapis 2009: 390).

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[413] Geniko Epiteleio Ethnikis Aminis, vol. 1, pp. 31, 25.
[414] Kouki, pp. 145-51.

Over the following years, the dictatorship would go on to supplement the repertoire of the spectacles for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks with additional symbols that resonated with the discourses and metaphors of the Colonels and Papadopoulos, in particular. In the spectacle of 1971, for instance, the phoenix came to be perched atop a Greek column with a representation of the serpent of Asclepius at its base, an exhibit that evoked Papadopoulos's famous metaphor of the plaster cast and the regime's self-proclaimed mission to be curing Greece of its political and social ailments. The banality of this float becomes particularly apparent when one takes into consideration that similar serpents could be found outside pharmacies across the country.[415] Yet it was precisely this recognisability of classically-inspired symbols in their contemporary permutations — in their highly mediated states — that the dictatorship capitalised on, in order to render the regime's propaganda intelligible and to imbue those symbols with new meanings.

III. The Colonels' Swords and Sandals

In addition to the dictators' claims to a repertoire of power, there is reason to query another facet of the historical pageantry at the spectacles for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks that very likely informed the officers' identifications with the modes of representation of the battle re-enactments.

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[415] 'Eortasmos Tis Imeras Polemikis Aretis Ellinon, Tis Imeras Tou Efedrou Polemisti Kai Tis 22is Epeteiou Tis Machis Grammou-Vitsi (Avgoustos 1949) Apo Tin Anotati Stratiotiki Dioikisi Esoterikou Kai Nison Parousia Tou Prothypourgou G. Papadopoulou', *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1971) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=3360&thid=11824> [accessed 30 December 2017].On Papadopoulos's metaphor of the plaster cast, see Van Dyck, p. 16

The staging practices and visual language of these re-enactments have been aptly likened to those of contemporary Hollywood sword-and-sandals films, as has been the championing of ‘male physical supremacy and unconditional moral right’ at the dictatorial spectacles (Van Steen 2015: 173). In the period 1967 to 1972 (when the last of these spectacles was staged), cavalry formations in plumed helmets would gallop across the stadium with their spears raised;[416] hundreds of recruits would simulate battle dressed in gilted armour costumes (see Appendix 12);[417] army tents and campsites would be set up on the stadium track, and women would be relegated to roles waving their warrior husbands farewell.[418] While it is undeniably true that the pre-dictatorial and dictatorial spectacles lacked the aesthetic qualities of international sword-and-sandals films (Van Steen 2015: 173), the evidence suggests that the spectacles at the Panathenaic Stadium were purposely derivative of these movies, especially since Greek officers and soldiers had been involved in the production of such films in the pre-dictatorial period.

During the 1960s, a number of international sword-and-sandals blockbusters began to be filmed in Greece, with the Greek army supplying foreign filming crews with supernumeraries for the live action epics. The implications of such ventures should not be underestimated, not solely because they provided the conditions for military men to participate in and associate with the aesthetics of the genre, but also because they assumed the dimensions of a national political, military and economic affair in Greece.

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[416] ‘Eortasmos Tis Imeras Tis Polemikis Aretis Ton Ellinon, Tis Imeras Tou Efedrou Polemisti Kai Tis 19is Epeteiou Tis Machis Tou Grammou-Vitsi Stin Athina, Tec. Proc. ERA-Technofilm’, *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1968) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=1193&thid=2550> [accessed 30 December 2017].

[417] ‘Eortasmos Tis Imeras Polemikis Aretis Ellinon, Tis Imeras Tou Efedrou Polemisti Kai Tis 22is Epeteiou Tis Machis Grammou-Vitsi (Avgoustos 1949) Apo Tin Anotati Stratiotiki Dioikisi Esoterikou Kai Nison Parousia Tou Prothypourgou G. Papadopoulou’.

[418] ‘Ekdilosi Sto Panathinaiko Stadio Gia Tin Tripli Eorti Tis Imeras Tis Polemikis Aretis Ton Ellinon, Tis Imeras Efedron Polemiston Kai Tis 23is Epeteiou Tis Machis Grammou-Vitsi Parousia Tou Prothypourgou Georgiou Papadopoulou, Tech Proc. ERA-Technofilm’, *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1972) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=1907&thid=5303> [accessed 31 December 2017].

Circumstantial evidence additionally suggests that some of the foremost personalities of the Dictatorship of 21 April were closely involved in these productions at the turn of the 1960s.

A revealing example is the Twentieth Century Fox film *The 300 Spartans* (also known as *The Lion of* Sparta; 1962), which was filmed near the seaside resort town of Loutraki at the turn of the 1960s. A retelling of the Battle of Thermopylae — the fifth century BCE battle between King Leonidas's three hundred Spartans and the vast Persian army of Xerxes I — this film featured an international star cast (American actor Richard Egan as Leonidas; British actor David Farrar as Xerxes; Greek actress Anna Synodinou as Queen Gorgo of Sparta), vibrant colours, awkward re-enactments of armed conflict (especially on the side of the Persians), and the interpolation of a love story into a narrative that was otherwise closely based on that provided by Herodotus's *Histories*.[419] The main cast of actors was supported by two thousand Greek soldiers, the vast majority of whom were evidently required to play Persians.[420]

According to the screenplay writer, George St. George, in the spirit of making 'not only a commercial, but also a serious historical film', in 1960, the film screenplay was submitted to classicist Roger Beck at the University of Oxford, as well as to Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark (who was an anthropologist), both of whom delivered corrections and their stamps of approval to the text.[421] Before receiving permission to film on Greek soil, however, St. George and director Rudolph Maté were also required to submit the screenplay to the Greek Ministry of the Presidency. According to St. George, to obtain authorisation from the Ministry was an arduous and ideologically-charged affair:

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[419] For a discussion of *The 300 Spartans* and the accuracies and inaccuracies of that film in relation to the ancient sources, see Andrew E. Larsen, 'The 300 Spartans: 300 vs 300', *An Historian Goes to the Movies: Exploring History on the Screen*, 2016.

[420] David Nathan, 'O "Leon Tis Spartis" i I Anatomia Enos Epous', *I Kathimerini* (Athens, 31 December 1960), p. 7.

[421] Giorgos K. Pilichos, '2,000 Stratiotes Os Kombarsoi Sto film "O Leon Tis Spartis"', *Ta Nea* (Athens, 5 December 1960), p. 2.

> [A]pproximately three months ago, we submitted the script to the Greek Ministry of the Presidency, which approved [the script] after instructing us to change two or three scenes that might create negative impressions of certain Greek figures [in the eyes of] foreigners, [figures] who are connected to the history of the battle of Thermopylae. The Ministry asked us, for example, not to present Demaratus as a traitor but as an advisor to Xerxes whom he [Demaratus] misleads with his advice to the benefit of the Greeks. Another requirement of the ministry had to do with the necessity not to speak of and not to show that in the army of Xerxes there were Greek soldiers from Ionia, Macedon and other Greek regions. Of course, I can't enumerate all of the changes we made to the script here. It is a fact, though, that in the same way that we were forced to omit certain factual events, we were forced, too, to add certain other and completely fictional ones, such as the love story of Phyllon […] with the Spartan girl Ellas, so that there might be an additional element of interest in the film to its historical [element].[422]

From this account, it emerges that a foreign venture to film in Greece provided the conditions for the Greek authorities to claim proprietorship over the narratives of ancient historical events and their adaptations on an international scale, under the pretext that such films somehow bore testament to the state of affairs in contemporary Greece. By doing so, the authorities took liberties to redact the narratives recounted in classical sources (such as the motives of the dethroned Spartan king Demaratus) and to interject sentimental subplots into main plot lines, presumably in order for the films to appeal to women.

In saying this, it is not my intention to critique the authenticity or lack thereof of *The 300 Spartans*, but rather to draw attention to the Greek authorities' own disregard for such questions. The Ministry of the Presidency assigned priority to the mass appeal and propaganda power of a Hollywood live action epic, whose screenplay inspired by Herodotus's *Histories* provided the conditions for the Ministry to interpose its own propagandist asservations into the film (for instance, that no Greek could join enemy forces or be a defector). Beyond the ideological messages imparted to Greek spectators (who would get to watch *The 300 Spartans* in cinemas in 1962), the filming process was also an exercise in the ideological instruction of the 2,000 extras provided by the army, 700 of whom were dispatched from their posts on the Greek-Macedonian border to join the production in south-west mainland Greece.[423]

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[422] Ibid.

Of course, this full cooperation of the Greek authorities was first and foremost motivated by the economic benefits that such a large-scale filming venture afforded to Greece. The production would reportedly bring an estimated two million dollars into the country, while locals were employed as helping hands on set and the salaries of soldiers were doubled. According to one Greek newspaper article from the period, the soldiers hoped that the 'filming would continue indefinitely', not for what was required of them, but rather because the food was better than in the barracks and because they had access to 'sweets and cigarettes' at the filming site.[424] Nonetheless, the ideological colouring of the film was evidently also of great importance to the Greek authorities, particularly since the filming of this movie in Greece coincided with Karamanlis's anti-communist campaign. When it was released, *The 300 Spartans* was interpreted as an allegory for the 'larger struggle for the freedom of the West against the tyrannical East',[425] an interpretation that we can now surmise the Greek authorities were partly responsible for.

Crucially, this was a time when Georgios Papadopoulos and Georgios Georgalas sat on committees of the Ministry of the Presidency which were responsible for approving or rejecting such filming ventures in Greece (an example being the rejection of a Soviet project to adapt *The Iliad* to film in 1959).[426] This circumstance suggests that some of the foremost personalities of the Dictatorship of 21 April came to identify as co-producers of Hollywood sword-and-sandals films and as guarantors of their ideological propriety, a point that helps to put into perspective the battle re-enactments and visual language at the spectacles for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks. For instance, and as Gonda Van Steen notes, Greece's military chronicles at the spectacle of 1967 elided the Peloponnesian Wars and the subjugation of Athens to Sparta, a chapter that 'would have tainted […] the desired image of Greek consensus' (2015: 176). Such strategic elisions are also found in the repertoire of the spectacle of 1966 and in *The 300 Spartans,* the latter of which had come to assume the proportions of a re-narrativised epic of ancient and modern Greek unity.

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[423] Pilichos.

[424] Nathan.

[425] Sean R. Jensen, 'Reception of Sparta in North America: Eighteenth to Twenty-First Centuries', in *A Companion to Sparta, Vol. 1*, ed. by Anton Powell (Hoboken, NJ and Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2018), p. 714.

[426] Ioannis Stefanidis, pp. 221-2

Furthermore, the involvement of the Greek military and soldiers in such productions no doubt fostered their identifications with the acts and visual language of the films, which goes some way to explain the introduction of historical pageantry into the spectacle for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks in 1966, as well as the preservation of that staging tradition thereafter. In 1966, the introduction of battle re-enactments, armour costumes and sword props into the repertoire of those events complemented the pageantry of the Crown with a pageantry of the army. At the same time, such re-enactments paid tribute to the involvement of soldiers in productions like *The 300 Spartans* (to their fifteen minutes of fame as extras in Hollywood films) and provided entertainment for military audiences (and quite possibly not only for those audiences). In light of the widespread association of swords-and-sandals films with American McCarthyism in the first half of the 1960s,[427] it can further be argued that the anti-communist implications of the pre-dictatorial and dictatorial spectacles were inscribed in their visual language — not solely in terms of the performances and the appearance of the enemies (Van Steen 2015: 175–6), but also through the very evocation of the films.

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[427] Ward W. Briggs Jr., 'Peace and Power in the Fall of the Roman Empire', in *The Fall of the Roman Empire: Film and History*, ed. by Martin M. Winkler (Oxford, Malden, MA and Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 231.

Ultimately, regardless of whether Papadopoulos and Georgalas viewed themselves as co-producers of Hollywood sword-and-sandals films in the pre-dictatorial period, after April 1967 they could view themselves as directors of an acculturated, live version of those films, with all of their implications.

IV. The Anniversary Spectacles of 21 April

In closing this chapter, I want to briefly focus on the spectacles held for the anniversary of the coup d'état between 1968 and 1970 (after which those spectacles were discontinued). The anniversary spectacles have been explored to a lesser extent than those of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks and were, of course, inaugurated by the dictatorship. In this sense, their staging repertoire and visual language can provide valuable insights to the public image that the dictators sought to fashion for themselves outside of the celebratory traditions inaugurated in the pre-dictatorial period.

The spectacles for the anniversary of the coup d'état at the Panathenaic Stadium were organised by the municipal authorities of Athens, under the direction of the dictatorship-appointed Mayor of Athens, Dimitrios Ritsos, rather than by the ASDEN (which was responsible for the organisation of the spectacles of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks). Given that the date 21 April was institutionalised as a national holiday in 1968 (Van Steen 2015: 164) — just five days before the launch of a week-long celebration programme for the first anniversary of the coup d'état — the organisation of the spectacles additionally operated under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, which was headed, at that time, by Stylianos Pattakos. This meant that on paper, the coup was placed on a par with the two foremost national holidays (25 March, Greek Independence Day and 28 October, ‘No’ or ‘*Ochi*’ day), as an historical event that was ‘distinguished by a spirit of unprecedented patriotic uprising or self-sacrifice’ and/or a ‘landmark [event] in the historical evolution and the life of the nation’.[428]

Notwithstanding the establishment of certain prescribed conventions connoted by the institutionalisation of 21 April as a national holiday, the staging practices and themes of the anniversary spectacles varied enormously from one year to the next. These oscillations attest to the shifting self-images of the Colonels, as well as to the renegotiations of the modes of representation of those self-images in light of various contingencies at particular junctures.

In order to engage more closely with these dynamics and the ways in which certain classicisms were opportunistically drafted into the regime’s anniversary spectacles, I will focus here on two of those events and their visual language. The first is the spectacle of 1968, which featured a float of a trireme and a float that bore an Ionic column capital (among other things) to represent the Greek people. The second event I will discuss is the third and final anniversary spectacle of the dictatorship, which featured performances to display the continuity of the Greeks in terms of arts and culture. In addition to their different themes, it is important to point out that the spectacle of 1970 replaced the use of floats bearing static scenes with performances. This switch is a telling one, particularly when one takes into consideration that by May 1970 (when that spectacle was held), the dictatorship had come under heavy fire for its violations of human rights.

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[428] ‘V.D. 284: Peri Kathieroseos Tis 21is Apriliou Os Panelliniou Ethnikis Eortis’, *Efimeris Tis Kyverniseos Tou Vasileiou Tis Ellados* (Athens: Ethniko Typografeio, 1968) <http://www.et.gr/idocs-nph/pdfimageSummaryviewer.html?args=sppFfdN7IQP5_cc--m0e1-x2bAKBowzCjlqIy7OBb_i8rzSZFxgk-ShIYBAfBXJ-kAYi3ORfmaqW1q0BqnniZ3kxcPQvNBMtY9T3IvMHxXpABIQE1JCW9FiNMrQQT-Ek_FKlm_8xYoxpUzOhgqYEVrrEi63llu2v28ipWbdS4VA8KUbmq0tZWw..> [accessed 5 January 2018].

The first anniversary spectacle of the Dictatorship of 21 April commingled an exaltation of the Greek Armed Forces with ancient and modern symbols of nationhood, framed by the phantasmagoria of the 'cinema of attractions' found in contemporary Greek film musicals.[429] The objective was to stage the unity and euphoria of the Armed Forces and the Greek people thanks to the coup d'état of 21 April 1967, an assuming 'hyper-spectacle' (*ypertheama*) punctuated by floats of tremendous proportions in order to mirror the calibre of the dictatorship's power and importance.[430] The king was now out of the picture, and the dictators' spirits were high.

In April 1968 (prior to the institutionalisation of 21 April as a national holiday), the regime appointed a 'Celebration Committee' led by Mayor Ritsos and comprised of renowned directors, scenographers and choreographers with career trajectories in the theatre and cinema. In a press conference of this committee in early April 1967, choreographer and artistic consultant, Manolis Kastrinos, declared that the upcoming spectacle on 28 April would be 'a blend of beauty, power, art, dance, song, a lighting galaxy of an intoxication of colours [set] to the harmony of light and sound'.[431] As a regular collaborator of Finos Film (the film production company that dominated the Greek film industry in the post-war period),[432] Kastrinos was no stranger to the spectacle and glamour of film musicals, whose visual language and phantasmagorical atmosphere he seemed to intend to transcribe to the first anniversary spectacle of the Dictatorship of 21 April. As Lydia Papadimitriou elucidates in one of her studies of those productions, 'strong, bright and highly contrasting colours' intermingled in contemporary film musicals to ‘convey a sense of energy, optimism, [and] artificiality’.[433] Also members of the committee were director Kostis Michailidis and scenographer Marios Angelopoulos, whose professional paths had crossed at the State Theatre of Northern Greece’s production of *The Merchant of Venice* in November 1967. During the press conference, Angelopoulos disclosed his design of ‘five colossal floats […] [to] symbolise the greatness and the *kleos* [glory] of the Greek army, the Navy, the Airforce, the Security Forces, and of the Greek people’, as well as the float of the ‘nation’s rebirth’.[434]

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[429] Lydia Papadimitriou, *The Greek Film Musical: A Critical and Cultural History* (Jefferson, NC and London: McFarland & Company Inc., 2005), p. 19.

[430] 'O Simerinos Megaleiodis Eortasmos', *To Vima* (Athens, April 1968), p. 1.

[431] 'I Pallaiki Eorti Tis 21is Apriliou Eis to Stadion', *To Vima* (Athens, 14 April 1968), p. 6.

[432] 'Manolis Kastrinos', *Finos Film* <http://www.finosfilm.com/movies/artistView/328%3E [accessed 8 February 2016];> [accessed 3 January 2018].

Angelopoulos’s floats represented the main attraction of the spectacle held on 28 April 1967, particularly due to their scale, which the regime ensured to propagandise in advance of the occasion with the publication of prescribed articles in the Greek press. One such article prefigured the event with the emphatic description of the ‘colossal floats’ as being ‘four metres in height and with a surface area of 80 square metres’.[435] In this context, floats whose forms and accoutrements drew inspiration from classical antiquity worked in such a way so as to add augustness to awe-inspiring structures, as well as to exemplify the cultural continuity of the Armed Forces and the Greek people in static scenes. Sixty sailors in uniform hauled into the Panathenaic Stadium an enormous trireme with a Greek flag for a sail made of blue and white flowers (see Appendix 13).[436] This was the float of the navy, whose form invited notional conjurings of the Battle of Salamis, for instance, and whose sail quite literally flagged the inextricable link between the ancient and modern Greek naval forces. The float of the Greek people, which moved around the stadium track toward the end of the float parade, superimposed the wide capital of an Ionic column on a rolling platform covered by a bed of flowers (arranged to form a white cross), with men and women in traditional folk costumes sitting and standing around (and even atop) the column, waving balloons to show their elation (also Appendix 13).

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[433] Lydia Papadimitriou, ‘Greece’, in *The International Film Musical (Traditions in World Cinema),* ed. by Corey Creekmur and Linda Mokdad (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), p. 95.

[434] ‘I Pallaiki Eorti Tis 21is Apriliou Eis to Stadion’.

[435] ‘O Simerinos Megaleiodis Eortasmos’.

[436] ‘Megaleiodeis Eortastikai Ekdiloseis Se Oli Ti Chora: Myriades Laou Epeufimoun Tin Ethnikin Kyvernisin’, *Ta Nea* (Athens, April 1968), p. 12. ‘Eortasmos Tis 1is Epeteiou Tis 21is Apriliou Me Tin Parousia Tou Antivasilea Georgiou Zoitaki Kai Tou Prothypourgou Georgiou Papadopoulou Stin Athina’, *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1968) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=3453&thid=13767> [accessed 5 January 2018].

In parallel, the affinities between the visual language of the floats and contemporary film musicals worked in such a way so as to evoke the tourist imagery and escapist implications of those films, which were now instrumentalised by the regime to subdue and subject. More specifically, if film musicals used tourist imagery 'to provide entertainment and escapism, and to feed the desire to be someone else, somewhere else',[437] the dictatorship's spectacle worked to anchor the presence and gazes of the audience in the stadium, as well as to distract and to quell.[438] The blend of columns, triremes, folk costumes and flags resonated with the 'characteristically, even stereotypically, Greek iconography' of the musicals, while the uncomplicated forms of the floats (the trireme, for instance, was simplified to a unireme) were also redolent of the 'bold and simple motifs evocative of an equally crude vision of what is Greek and what is beautiful' in such films.[439] A brief glance at the contrast between the appearance of the dictatorship's trireme (Appendix 13) and the wooden Panathenaic ship that had circulated the stadium at the spectacles of 1964 and 1965 (Appendix 8) will help to put the blunted form of the trireme into perspective.

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[437] Lydia Papadimitriou, 'Traveling on Screen: Tourism and the Greek Film Musical', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 18.1 (2000), p. 95.

[438] On the compulsory attendance of 'officials, civil servants, "time-servers", factory workers, schoolteachers and schoolchildren', see Van Steen, *Stage of Emergency: Theater and Public Performance under the Greek Military Dictatorship of 1967–1974*, p. 168.

[439] Ibid., pp. 100–1.

In capitalising on the familiarity of film musical motifs (particularly since these films remained the most popular Greek film genre until 1969),[440] the visual language of the anniversary spectacle of 1968 further sought to entertain. With the additional participation of celebrities who were well-known for their roles in film musicals (among them being Rena Vlachopoulou, Kostas Voutsas, Dinos Iliopoulos and Stavros Paravas),[441] this form of entertainment worked to enthuse audiences and to distract from the preoccupations of daily life under the dictatorship. Meanwhile, the participants in the float parade remained stationary (with the exception, of course, of the sailors who hauled the trireme into the Panathenaic Stadium). This would also be the case in the spectacle of 1969, but not in that of 1970.[442]

The third and last spectacle for the anniversary of the coup d'état in May 1970 marked a turning point in the staging practice of those events, principally due to the replacement of floats with performances. The programme of the spectacle also intermingled an episodic narrative of military achievements with a parallel narrative to show the artistic, dansical and musical continuity of the Greeks, the latter of which were dominated by women performers.

Over the previous few months, the dictatorship had come under heavy fire for its human rights violations, a circumstance that suggests that the dictatorship chose to depart from the use of lifeless floats toward an animated staging of public engagement and participation. In late 1969, the international media had railed against the dictatorship after a report of the European Commission of Human Rights on the institutionalisation of torture as 'government policy' in Greece had been leaked to the press.[443] On 15 April 1970, the Council of Europe went on to pass a resolution to make public another 1,200 page report on the case against the dictatorship and its violations of the Convention of Human Rights, which made headlines in Greek newspapers the following day. This was just one of several criticisms of the dictatorship that had begun to appear in the Greek press (with the lifting of preventive censorship between late 1969 and early 1970), another example of which was the trial of the anti-dictatorial organisation Democratic Defence (*Dimokratiki Amyna*).[444]

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[440] Lydia Papadimitriou, 'Athens in the 1960s Greek Musical', in *World Film Locations: Athens*, ed. by Afroditi Nikolaidou, Anna Poupou, and Eirini Sifaki (Chicago and Bristol: Intellect Ltd., 2014), pp. 106.

[441] 'Synechizondai Ai Eortastikai Ekdiloseis Dia Thn A' Epeteion Tis 21is Apriliou', *To Vima* (Athens, April 1968), pp. 1 & 5.

[442] The second anniversary spectacle of the coup d'état (which I have mentioned in Chapter 3 of this project) was dedicated 'to the great achievements [accomplished] during the first two years of the National Revolution'. On this occasion, seven 'symbolic floats' (after Dimitrios Ritsos) were intended to exhibit the modernising accomplishments of the Dictatorship of 21 April, and went in a different direction to the militarism of the preceding year. The floats were (in scheduled order of appearance): the float of the Armed Forces, the Agriculturists, the Workers, of Maritime Commerce and of the 'infrastructural achievements and the prospects for the future'. 'To Pliris Programma Tou Eortasmou Tis 21is Apriliou Eis to Stadion'.

In their anniversary speeches that foreshadowed the events at the stadium, Papadopoulos (who was now serving as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence) and Georgios Zoitakis, the dictatorship-appointed Vice-Regent of Greece, expressed their bitterness toward European criticisms and sanctions against the regime. Clearly bothered by the international backlash against the dictatorship's use of torture and the call for a return to parliamentary democracy, Papadopoulos declared that 'the Greek problem will be solved by the Greeks in accordance with their national interests and at the pace that they will choose'. Similarly (and equally ironically) Zoitakis stated that '[t]he people […] are capable to decide their fate for themselves, and they do not need foreign protectors'.[445]

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[443] James Becket indicates that the report may have been leaked by Greeks themselves in order to raise international awareness of the use of institutionalised torture in Greece. James Becket, 'The Greek Case Before the Human Rights Commission', *Human Rights*, 1.1 (1970), p. 106. As it became increasingly apparent that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe intended to expel Greece on the basis of the violation of the Convention on Human Rights, the Greek delegation pre-empted expulsion by walking out of the Council on 11 December 1969.

[444] Dimitrios Stamos has shown that in 1970 (with the lifting of preventive censorship), *To Vima* newspaper began to openly criticise and antagonise the regime with pieces on political prisoners (such as the case of Professor Sakis Karagiorgas, of Democratic Defence), the publishing of the minutes of the trial of Democratic Defence, and tribute articles to Nobel Laureate George Seferis (particularly after his death, in 1971), who had become an icon of resistance to the dictatorship since his anti-dictatorial speech 'This anomaly must end' was broadcasted on the BBC World Service in March 1969. Dimitrios Ch. Stamos, 'I Politiki Grammi tou "Vimatos" kata Tin Eptaetia 1967-1974', unpublished doctoral thesis (Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, 1980), pp. 97–101, 107–112, 213–15.

[445] 'Diangelma Antivasileos, Minima K. Prothypourgou', *To Vima* (Athens, 3 May 1970), p. 14.

In the spirit of staging the appearance of popular approval for the dictatorship, the newsreel covering this spectacle compiled frames of individuals in the audience to evince the support of different demographics (pregnant women, children, youths, older men and women), while indicating that these populations had come together to 'demonstrate their joy and enthusiasm for the great anniversary'.[446]

If read in this frame, it can be claimed that the dictatorship's spectacle repertoire appropriated but also watered down motifs from that of the Lyceum of Greek Women, which was actively involved in the staging of this event, in order to additionally frame the dictatorship as ostensibly harmless and as civilised. The historical pageantry of the occasion was launched with a procession inspired by Minoan Bronze Age frescoes and figurines, with a Minoan Snake Goddess seated in a ceremonial throne that rested on the shoulders of four men in loincloths. This procession was followed by simulations of musical performances (using lyre props) and dances performed by white-clad women moving gracefully in harmony — a tribute to classical Athens.[447] The Lyceum of Greek Women had staged similar performances in the post-war (and interwar) periods, and had additionally been responsible the introduction of the Minoan Bronze Age into 'the parade of the ages of Greek history' in the early twentieth century.[448] In 1951, when Greece had embarked on a new policy of diaspora politics, King Paul had declared that year as 'Greek Home-Coming Year' (Vogli 2011), a designation that was accompanied by a range of events held in honour of the visiting expatriates, one of which had been a performance of the Lyceum at the Panathenaic Stadium in June:

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[446] 'Ekdiloseis Gia Ton Eortasmo Tis Epeteio Tis 21is Apriliou 1967 Apo to Dimo Athinaion Me Parousia Tou Antivasilea Georgiou Zoitaki Sto Panathinaïko Stadio, Tec. Proc. ERA-Technofilm', *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1970) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=1809&thid=9127> [accessed 5 January 2018].

[447] 'Ekdiloseis Gia Ton Eortasmo Tis Epeteio Tis 21is Apriliou 1967 Apo to Dimo Athinaion Me Parousia Tou Antivasilea Georgiou Zoitaki Sto Panathinaïko Stadio, Tec. Proc. ERA-Technofilm'.

[448] Van Steen, 'Rallying the Nation: Sport and Spectacle Serving the Greek Dictatorships', p. 2149 n. 60.

> The programme of tomorrow’s celebration includes re-enactments of scenes from the most glorious periods of the history of Greek civilisation, [of] the traditions, the morals and customs, which have endured through the centuries like an unbroken chain. The first part [will] represen[t] the Minoan period with the religious procession and the bloodless sacrifice, the classical period with battle scenes of the Amazons and spearwomen, the peaceful period with the sacred procession and the hymn to peace, and the Byzantine period with [Aelia] Eudocia.[449]

The staging of rituals inspired by the Minoan Bronze Age and classical antiquity for a diaspora audience in 1951 and in 1965 (at the spectacle for the celebration of the Day of the Combative Virture of the Greeks; and in between those years, no doubt) reads as a gesture of reciprocity, in the frame of which these rituals stood as acts of mutual recognition and gratitude between kindred Greeks. In 1970, however, such performances worked to show the ‘connecting links’ (as stated by the newsreel commentator) between the military history of the Greeks and an idealised and gendered form of Greek artistry for foreign audiences, too (with the elision of the representation of women as warriors, for instance, as had been the case in the Lyceum’s procession in 1951).

V. Conclusion

This chapter has sought to engage closely with the modes of representation of the classical past at the mass spectacles held at the Panathenaic Stadium in the pre-dictatorial and dictatorial periods, in order to reframe those modes of representation as contemporaneous and as appropriated with a purpose by the Dictatorship of 21 April. In stepping away from value judgements on the aesthetics of the occasions, I have broached the visual language of the historical pageantry of the regime as one that bore the imprint of multifold, heavily mediated classicisms, through the reproduction of which the dictatorship attempted to establish relationships with the perceived mediators and audiences of those classicisms. In this sense, the manifestations of classical antiquity at the spectacles represented conduits for the invocation, renewal and renegotiation of relationalities, as well as expressions of the Colonels' power and self-aggrandisement.

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[449] ‘I Avriani Eorti Tou Stadiou’, *To Vima* (Athens, 9 June 1951), p. 2.

Conclusion

I. The Classical Asset

This project has not sought to rewrite a comprehensive or flowing cultural history of the Dictatorship of 21 April and its receptions of antiquity. It has rather sought to reassess a cross-section of classicisms that have earned the dictatorship infamy for its politics of reception, to ground them in their historical contexts and to open them up to new readings and extrapolations.

Having taken as a point of departure the inevitability of the mediatedness of classical reception, the thesis has staked out to problematise a tradition in scholarship to view the dictatorship's receptions of particular classicisms as paradigms of the Colonels' political and aesthetic failures. In the introduction to the project, I outlined the ways in which scholars have incrementally assessed the regime's discursive and visual renderings of antiquity against the radical political cultures of twentieth-century fascist regimes. I showed, moreover, that this comparative framing has often led scholars to conclude that the Dictatorship of 21 April was too banal or ostentatious in its politics of reception to meet the aesthetic standards of fascism and, by extension, that the regime misappropriated classical antiquity. The notion of misappropriation has reappeared in different forms across the project, among them being the terms 'ancestoritis' and 'pseudoclassicism'. Whereas this concept has historically been used to express moral reprobations of the Colonels' repressive policies and to retrospectively divest the dictatorial past of its authoritarian power, this project has contended that misappropriation poses almost insurmountable obstacles to understanding the dictatorship and its cultural politics on their own terms.

The thesis has not sought to dispute that the dictatorship's renderings of antiquity were largely banal in terms of their form and content, however. On the contrary, it has sought to nuance such observations by asking why the Colonels were more interested in reclaiming, rather than reinventing particular classicisms, and to ask what the mediatedness of those classicisms can tell us about the Dictatorship of 21 April. In doing so, the project has added to appropriation — the principal analytical tool used in classical reception research on dictatorships — the analytical tools of mediatedness and interaction, in order to demonstrate that notions of nationalist exceptionalism, the formalism of traditional educational humanism, and a visual language of nationalist pageantry acquired a range of new implications under the Dictatorship of 21 April.

Chapter 1 took as a point of departure the operational code name 'Prometheus', in order to illustrate the point that Greece's future dictators were able both to share a grammar of classicisms with the dominant interest groups of the pre-dictatorial period, and to bring their own frames of reference to pre-ordained cultural texts. More specifically, the chapter sought to map some of the reasons why sharing a classical cultural text with those groups was desirable for the Colonels, as well as how its mediation by third parties could prove far more effective in terms of realising the Colonels' objectives than those of its contemporary prime mediators. A coup operation with a code name other than 'Prometheus' might have easily been discovered and prevented by the army leadership, meaning that the Colonels' appropriation of this particular classicism was not a failure, but a tremendous success for the officers.

Chapters 2 to 4 have built on the above contentions in different ways. In Chapter 2, I showed that Georgios Papadopoulos's promotion of an aphorism of Greek exceptionalism, the notion of the (ancient) Greek miracle, was closely intertwined with the dictator's poetics of power and his self-imaging as a modernising ethnarch. In doing so, the chapter departed from the derisive and, to an extent, dismissive, designations of

Papadopoulos's discourses as riddled with 'ancestoritis', and rather opened up the notion of exceptionalism to readings of its renegotiations by the dictatorship. Chapter 3 took as a point of contention the designations of the Colonels' educational policies as fraught with 'pseudoclassicism' (also a derisive term referring the formalism of traditional humanistic education in Greece). It sought to step away from notions of authenticity and inauthenticity, as well as to move beyond incriminations of the dictatorship's forced regression of the Greek educational system, and rather asked what were the effects of reinstated curriculums and textbooks within the regime's school culture. Through this approach, the chapter demonstrated that the educational agenda reinstated by the dictatorship was particularly conducive to the promotion of the Colonels' dynamic agendas in general education and in universities. In broaching the visual language of the dictatorship's mass spectacles as inscribed with power-laden classicisms (as opposed to as excessively ostentatious or insufficiently radical), Chapter 4 has elucidated the ways in which the dictatorship strategically deployed those classicisms in response to different contingencies and to address different audiences in the period 1967 to 1973. Together, the chapters have demonstrated that by stepping away from value judgments on the dictatorship's receptions of antiquity, and by harnessing their mediatedness as an analytical tool, it becomes possible to gain new insights to their context of production, as well as to the multifarious ways in which classical culture participated in the ideological, educational and cultural politics of the Colonels.

In parallel, the project has shed light on a number of lesser-known and less studied reception exploits of the dictatorship, in order to challenge perceptions of the regime as monolithic and as simply reactionary, and to open up new questions on the plurality and dynamics of its cultural politics. For instance, in piecing together the scope and an interpretation of the rationale behind the initiative to distribute busts of Alexander the Great to schools in 1971, Chapter 3 has advanced the argument that Papadopoulos sought to build a cult of personality for himself by the early 1970s in relation to the King of Macedon. In the same chapter, the discussion of the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi* has unfolded an additional field upon which the ideological conflicts between Greece's dictators were played out (the hidden curriculum), and it has further demonstrated that the Spartan visions of the Corps were radically different to those expounded by the more moderate figures of the dictatorship. In Chapter 4, the examination of the spectacles for the anniversary of 21 April has drawn attention to the contrasts between the classicisms and modes of representation deployed from one year to the next, thus demonstrating that the dictatorship's receptions dynamically responded to contingencies.

Finally, in what can ultimately be designated as an open-ended exercise in a critical levelling with the Dictatorship of 21 April and its receptions of classical antiquity, this project has employed a range of analytical tools and has conversed with a number of perspectives. In doing so, it has been my intention to suggest that a more cross-disciplinary approach to the dictatorship can open up a field on which it is possible to better understand the Dictatorship of 21 April on its own terms. For instance, in the context of this project, consultations of theories of counter-intelligence and of literature on the art of naming military operations have alerted the author of the present study to the significance that career officers might attribute to such practices. Furthermore, in revisiting arguments and observations put forward by scholars during the dictatorial period (such as Nicos Poulantzas's discussion of developmentalism as part of the dictatorship's ideology of technocracy, or Jean Meynaud's remark on Papadopoulos's identifications with Alexander the Great), this thesis has uncovered valuable insights that have helped to tease out certain strands of the Colonels discourses and initiatives that otherwise seem particularly obscure.

Future studies on the dictatorship may look to explore in greater detail the extent to which Georgios Papadopoulos's desires to identify with Alexander the Great and Eleftherios Venizelos led the dictator to create an image for himself as the descendant of a certain lineage of Greek modernisers. Such a lineage would suggest that Papadopoulos invented the grammar of a new continuity narrative for personalistic reasons, and might lead to a radical challenging of the banality thesis. Furthermore, a future study of the smaller-scale events held at a municipal level in the dictatorial period will work to decentralise the field of enquiry of the mass spectacles held in Athens, and will provide valuable insights to how average citizens came to participate in the production of the regime's state machinery. Among these events were the annual *Anthesteria* (also inaugurated in the pre-dictatorial period), which took the form of street parades with floats bearing floral arrangements of the Acropolis hill or the Argo, for instance, and which were held in towns and cities to celebrate the coming of spring.[450] Also warranting further study are the commodification of antiquity and antiquities for the purposes of mass tourism, as well as implication of the commodified past in the management of public and international relations campaigns.

II. The Making of a Reputation

In drawing this thesis to a close, it seems apposite to revisit the genealogical complexity of the reasons why the Dictatorship of 21 April has come to acquire infamy for its receptions of classical antiquity.

During the dictatorial period, the subject of the dictatorship's uses of the classical past was not a priority in the writings of scholars and social agents who were pressed to draw international attention to the brutality and inner workings of the regime. Nor, however, did the Colonels' nationalist discourses, slogans and policies escape their attention altogether. For instance, in his monograph on the asymmetries in the historical development of political and democratic institutions in Greece (which sought to explain the advent of the dictatorship in the late 1960s), political scientist Keith Legg presented the dictators' recourses to the classical past and to Christian Orthodoxy as a calculated strategy to fill an ideological vacuum (a vacuum which, according to Legg, would have better been served by concentrating on economic development; 1969: 235). For Jean Meynaud, Papadopoulos's rumoured identifications with Alexander the Great attested to his delusional megalomania (justifiably so), while his fondness of quoting Aristotle laid bare the dictator's lower-middle-class pretences (2002: 374–5). Rodis Roufos described at some length the incident involving Ioannis Ladas's violent reaction to the article on homosexuality in ancient Greece, only to fend off assumptions that 'Greece ha[d] been transformed into a monastery inhabited by pious and asexual ascetics', especially since 'drugs, promiscuity, [and] nudity' continued to thrive on Greek islands (Athenian [Roufos] 1972: 121; 121–3). In spite of their diverse vantage points, these anecdotes of the dictatorship's nationalist discursive practices and paroxysmal reactions communicated in one way or another the regime's doctrinaire and/or executive failures. Of course, these were the perspectives of critics of the regime who understandably wanted to see it fail.

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[450] 'Ta "Anthestiria" stin Kyparissia', tech. proc. General Film Hellas Ltd., *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1971) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=3347&thid=13610> [accessed 5 March 2018].

Yet, the period 1967 to 1974 did not only see the publication of polemics against the regime, but also positive accounts of the 'Greek Revolution'. Interestingly, a number of those apologists of the dictatorship were foreign journalists, including American freelancer and former *Newsweek* correspondent, Bayard Stockton, and David Holden, the foreign correspondent of *The London Sunday Times*. For Stockton, whose admiration of Papadopoulos seems to have earned him audiences with the dictator or permission to shadow him for a day or two, Papadopoulos's 'fond[ness] of interjecting classical quotations in his conversation […] indicate[d] some of his earlier erudition'.[451] This observation speaks to Stockton's questionable knowledge of the Classics, while the journalist's admiration of Papadopoulos additionally led him to contradict himself. Whereas the Greek dictator's recourses to the classical past testified to his ostensible erudition, the 'overinflated sense of the Greeks' own importance', who 'flatly assumed [that the world] revolves around the Acropolis', was, to Stockton, 'not especially appealing' (1971: 18; 19). In the view of David Holden, the coup had been 'an occasion for a familiar despair at the realization that […] Plato's [dictum]—about the consequences of too much freedom and too little restraint, had proved true yet again in Greece'.[452] The implication was that the coup d'état and dictatorship were part and parcel with a redressal of natural order. In the tradition of a strand of discourses that participate in the production of Greece's crypto-colonial constitution, the views of Stockton and Holden shared a contempt for the Greek people, a contempt framed in relation to the cultural capital of the Classics, but also to the journalists' appreciations of the so-called dictatorial solution in Greece (although Stockton was considerably more enthusiastic regarding the regime than Holden).

Meanwhile, in a country weighed down by preventive censorship, the notion of 'ancestoritis' came to be used as a discursive site through which to express criticism of the policies of the Dictatorship of 21 April. In an article published in the pro-dictatorial newspaper *Nea Politeia* in 1968, an anonymous contributor counselled against notions of classical revivalism: 'We must not forget that we are the Greeks of 1968 and not those of

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[451] Bayard Stockton, *Phoenix with a Bayonet: A Journalist's Interim Report on the Greek Revolution* (Ann Arbor, MI: Georgetown Publications, 1971), p. 227. Stockton describes in detail the daily routine and itinerary of Papadopoulos. Ibid., pp. 225–27.

[452] David Holden, *Greece Without Columns: The Making of the Modern Greeks* (London: Faber, 1972), p. 234.

430 BC or 1821'. As the author went on to admonish, those who failed to comprehend that classical antiquity could inspire but could not be revived in the contemporary moment suffered from an 'unproductive, but also a dangerous [case of] ancestoritis'.[453] In view of the timing of the publication of this article (September 1968), the contributor was most likely referring to the regime's institutionalisation of the *katharevousa* as the official language of the Greek educational system under the new Constitution of September 1968. That the *katharevousa* became 'totally discredited' by the use that the regime made of it (Mackridge 2010: 318), and that the final resolution of the decades-long Greek language question was made a political priority after the fall of the regime in 1974, have played a tremendous role in the remembrance of the dictatorial period as one riddled with ancestoritis.

In response to such criticisms in September 1968, Georgios Bakopoulos, the dictatorship's Minister of Commerce and the former chairman of the committee that had drafted the 1952 Constitution of Greece, came back with the unequivocal retort: 'We are *progonopliktoi*' (We suffer from ancestoritis).[454] In a reclaiming of the derogatory term 'ancestoritis' and a championing of the *katharevousa* and traditional humanistic education, Bakopoulos maintained that ancestoritis was that which 'ke[pt] the gaze of all the Greeks fixated on the Parthenon'. Georgios Georgalas would also go on to rebuff the prospect that the dictatorship's 'practical struggle for the realisation of today's strategic goals for the Nation' would be viewed as tantamount to 'sterile ancestor-worship' (*steira progonolatreia*; Georgalas 1971: 22). Among those goals was the 'transformation of Greece into a modern country, [into a] worthy member of the family of developed countries', an 'Idea that was on a par with that of [the Greeks'] ancestors' (1971: 23).

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[453] 'Ichoi kai apoichoi', *Nea Politeia* (Athens, 21 September 1968), p. 7.

[454] Giorgos Bakopoulos, 'To syntagma kai i glossa', *Eleftheros Kosmos* (Athens, 5 September 1968), pp. 9.

Notwithstanding their different vantage points and preoccupations, these statements indicate that the question of how the national past should best be used was one that was very much in the air in the dictatorial period, as well as that regime officials were well aware of (and affected by) the criticisms arraigned against their reception aesthetics.

The officers themselves made sure to develop an international image for their regime in relation to the ancients, as has become clear from the discussion of the last spectacle for the anniversary of the coup d'état, for instance. It is additionally notable that the code name of the Prometheus plan was leaked to Cyrus Sulzberger, the foreign correspondent of *The New York Times*, by one (or more) of the conspirators almost immediately after the coup. Notwithstanding their inclination to be 'remarkably discreet about Prometheus because they d[id]n't want to disclose coup-making techniques to potential opponents', Sulzberger was able to publish, two weeks after the officers' takeover, an article subtitled 'Prometheus Unbound'.[455] This point harks back to Chapter 1 of this project and raises interesting questions regarding the extent to which the code name 'Prometheus' was chosen with an eye to galvanising support for the operation in the aftermath of its execution.

Finally, with Greece under dictatorial rule, certain initiatives came to be misconstrued as megalomaniacal dictatorial projects, some misconceptions of which carried into the post-dictatorial period. When Georgios Papadopoulos passed away after a long battle with cancer in the summer of 1999, *The Economist* published an obituary of Greece's former dictator that likened him to Benito Mussolini, 'who foolishly tried to create a new Roman empire for Italy'. Among a number of anecdotes used to sketch out a profile of Papadopoulos's nationalist visions and political ambitions was a project to rebuild a Colossus of Rhodes:

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[455] Cyrus L. Sulzberger, 'Foreign Affairs: Prometheus Unbound', *The New York Times* (New York, 3 May 1967), p. 43.

> The equally nationalistic Mr Papadopoulos believed that the prestige associated with ancient Greece could be regained by decree. He banned "decadent" long hair for men and mini skirts for women. "Greece is risen" was one of his slogans. Among his grandiose, but unfulfilled, plans was to rebuild the Colossus of Rhodes, a statue that was among the seven wonders of the ancient world.[456]

While it is certain that there were talks of a plan, or rather, of multiple plans, to build a new Colossus on Rhodes during the dictatorial period, Papadopoulos seems to have had very little to do with any of them.[457] More to the point, it was rather the dictatorship-appointed mayor of Rhodes, Georgios Vrouchos (1930–2007), who seems to have waged a public relations campaign by virtue of a Colossus project, in order to keep Rhodes in the international headlines during the winter months (usually between December and February). In late January 1972, Vrouchos himself asserted that 'we are not so much interested in the construction of the Colossus, inasmuch as in the public discussion and promotion of Rhodes'.[458] Given the exponential growth of mass tourism in Rhodes in the 1960s, as well as the island's growing economic dependence on the influx of foreign holidaymakers and their respective currencies, a new Colossus would prove a major asset both to Rhodes and to Greece's national tourism industry.

From this vignette of some of the discourses and assumptions that emanate from the dictatorial period, it emerges that a future study of the ways in which the regime's classicisms were received in the period 1967 to 1973 might unfold new insights to the dynamics at play in the dictatorship’s reception politics. Genealogical and cultural historiography projects have much to offer in terms of better understanding the cultural continuities and ruptures between the dictatorial and pre-dictatorial periods. Such studies further alert us to the mediatedness of our own analytical tools and compel us to reassess their empirical value on the basis of the assumptions that they carry.

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[456] 'Obituary: George Papadopoulos', *The Economist*, 1 July 1999 <http://www.economist.com/node/219259> [accessed 6 July 2017]. This anecdote seems to have been drawn from C. M. Woodhouse's 1985 book *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*. Christopher M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985), p. 60.

[457] One project was that of Felix de Weldon, the Austrian-born American sculptor who is best known for his design of the National Marine Corps War Memorial (or the Iwo Jima Memorial, 1954) located in Arlington Ridge Park, Virginia. In Greece, de Weldon is also known as the sculptor of the AHEPA Truman Memorial erected in Athens in 1963, a statue of American President Harry S. Truman that is 'the most hated statue in Athens' and which has been bombed, chainsawed and scragged since the 1960s.
'Einai afto to pio misito agalma stin Athina?', *LIFO*, 2013 <http://www.lifo.gr/team/neighborhood/38463> [accessed 7 January 2018]. De Weldon had paid his first visit to Rhodes in 1966 in order to finalise and turn over his proposal for a thirty-metre tall Colossus, which would stand upon a museum of the Colossus. 'Kataskevi neou "kolossou" eis Rodon proteinetai ypo amerikanou glyptou', *Makedonia* (Thessaloniki, 22 October 1966), p. 6.

[458] '"Mas endiaferei i syzitisis kai i provoli tis Rodou"', *I Rodiaki* (Rhodes, 28 January 1972), p. 1.

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'Ypechorisan Oi Apostatai: Monon Efetos O Syneortasmos Ton 2 Epeteion', *To Vima* (Athens, 2 September 1966), p. 8

'Ypo Synthikas Atomikou Polemou Tha Diexachthi I Etisia Ethniki Askisis Tou stratou "Leonidas"', *I Kathimerini* (Athens, 6 August 1959), p. 6

Zaharopoulos, George, 'Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece', in *Greece Under Military Rule*, ed. by Richard Clogg and George Yannnopoulos (London: Secker & Warburg, 1972), pp. 17–35

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Zormbalas, Stavros, *O Neofasismos Stin Ellada (1967-1974)* (Athens: Ekdoseis Synchronis Epochis, 1978)

Appendix 1

The palingenetic phoenix, rising from the flames and fronted by a silhouette of a soldier. The official symbol of the dictatorship would appear in schoolbooks, town squares and at the Athens airport, as well as on currency, matchboxes and stamps in the period 1967 to 1973.



'Greek Military Junta of 1967-1974', *Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia,* 2017 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_military_junta_of_1967–1974> [accessed 27 January 2018].

Appendix 2

A still from the newsreel segment concerning the bust conferment ceremony held at a school in the municipality of Zografou, Athens (1971), during which 68 busts of Alexander the Great were bestowed upon school headmasters by Loukas Dimakopoulos, the prefect of Attica.

'Paradosi protomon tou Megalou Alexandrou se scholeia tis Attikis, apo ton Nomarchi Attikis G. Dimakopoulo', tech. proc. by General Film Hellas Ltd., *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive* (HeNAA) (Ellinika Epikaira, 1972) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=1056&thid=1211> [accessed 30 December 2017].

Appendix 3



A bust of Alexander the Great, still on display in the primary school of the village of Flabouresi in the regional unit of Trikala, north-western Thessaly, Greece.

‘Axizei na episkefteite’, *Flabouresi* <http://www.vbcsupport.gr/alphaxi943zetaepsiloniota-nualpha-epsilonpiiotasigmakappaepsilonphitauepsilon943tauepsilon.html> [accessed 30 December 2017].



The bust of Alexander at the second primary school of Sitia, in the municipality of Lasithi, Crete. The bust is now housed by the school utility room.

‘Xenagisi: To Scholeio Simera (2010)’, *Ilektroniko Imerologio 2ou Dimotikou Scholeiou Siteias*, 2010 <http://blogs.sch.gr/2dimsitelas/2010/11/18/το-σχολειο-σημερα> [accessed 30 December 2017].

A bust now relegated to the municipal storeroom of the village of Garipa, Heraklion, Crete, which formerly decked the reception area of the primary school of that village.



Nektarios F. Vasilakis, ‘O Megas Alexandros stin apothiki ton Romion’, *Anapodiaris*, 2013 <http://anapodaris.blogspot.ch/2013/05/blog-post_24.html> [accessed 30 December 2017]

A bust in the abandoned and run-down primary school of the village of Karatoula, in the prefecture of Elis in the western part of the Peloponnese.



‘To scholeio mas ekpempei S.O.S’, *To Blog Tou Karatoula*, 2010 <http://karatoula2009.blogspot.ch/2010/12/sos.html> [accessed 30 December 2017]

Appendix 4


ΕΛΛΑΣ
21 ΑΠΡΙΛΙΟΥ

ΧΑΙΡΕΤΙΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΜΗΝΥΜΑ
τοῦ Πρωθυπουργοῦ
κ. ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΥ ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ

Πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους καὶ τὰ μέλη τῆς ΑΧΕΠΑ ἀπευθύνω ἐπ' εὐκαιρίᾳ τοῦ ἐφετεινοῦ Συνεδρίου της θερμὸν χαιρετισμὸν ἐκ μέρους τῆς Ἐθνικῆς Κυβερνήσεως καὶ τοῦ ἑλληνικοῦ λαοῦ, εὐχόμενος πλήρη ἐπιτυχίαν τῶν ἐργασιῶν του.

Ἡ λαμπρὰ Ὀργάνωσίς σας ἀποτελεῖ εἰς τὴν μεγάλην ὑπερατλαντικὴν Δημοκρατίαν, ὅπου ζῆτε καὶ σταδιοδρομεῖτε τόσον ἐπιτυχῶς, τὸν θεματοφύλακα τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀξιῶν, αἱ ὁποῖαι κατευθύνουν ἐπὶ αἰῶνας τὰ βήματα τοῦ ἑλληνισμοῦ.

Ἡ προκοπή σας μᾶς προξενεῖ εὔλογον χαρὰν καὶ ἡ μακρὰ ἐκπολιτιστικὴ καὶ ἀνθρωπιστικὴ δρᾶσις σας μᾶς πληροῖ ὑπερηφανείας, διότι ἀνεξαρτήτως τοῦ ποῦ ἐγεννήθητε σᾶς θεωροῦμεν—καὶ εἶσθε—τέκνα τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

Εὔχομαι ὅπως ἡ ἐπιτυχία στέφῃ πάντοτε τὰ Συνέδριά σας καὶ τὸ ἔργον, τὸ ὁποῖον ἔχετε τάξει ὡς σκοπόν σας.

ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ ΠΑΠΑΔΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ
ΠΡΩΘΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ

19

Order of the AHEPA, *48th Supreme Convention*, ed. by Dem. Nikolitseas (Athens: Order of the AHEPA, 1970), p. 19.

The Greeting Message of the Prime Minister, Mr Georgios Papadopoulos

To the conventioneers and the members of the AHEPA I address, on the occasion of this year's Convention, the warm greetings of the National Government and of the Greek people, [with all good] wish[es] for the complete success of its [the AHEPA's] operations.

Your distinguished Organisation represents, in the great transatlantic Democracy where you live and progress so successfully, the custodian of the moral values, which guide through the centuries the strides of Hellenism.

Your diligence brings us due joy and your long [history of] culturalising and humanistic activities fills us with pride, since, regardless of where you were born, we consider you to be—and [indeed] you are—children of Greece.

I wish that success will always crown your Conventions and the goal which you have designated as your mission.

Georgios Papadopoulos
The Prime Minister

Order of the AHEPA, *48th Supreme Convention*, ed. by Dem. Nikolitseas (Athens: Order of the AHEPA, 1970), p. 19.

Appendix 5

The oath-swearing ceremony of the Corps of the Greek *Alkimoi* held at the Nea Filadelfia Stadium in north-western Athens in 1970 (today known as the 'Nikos Goumas Stadium'). Over 3,700 boys and girls are sworn in in one go.



‘Panigyriki Orkomosia Neon Alkimon’, *To Vima* (Athens, 31 May 1970), p. 16.

Appendix 6

A memento of a trip of the Corps of the *Alkimoi* to the Leonidas Monument at Thermopylae (circa 1972).

Soma Ellinon Alkimon, *To Vivlio to Protopeirou Alkimou* (Athens: Soma Ellinon Alkimon, 1973), p. 48.

Appendix 7

The photograph of the re-enactment of the Trojan War at the spectacle for the celebration of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks in 1966, captured by a photojournalist of *To Vima* newspaper. Discernible is the form of the Trojan Horse emerging through the gates of Troy in the centre of the image.



Apo Tis Istorikes Anaparastaseis Sto Stadio’, To Vima (Athens, 6 September 1966), p. 4.

The re-enactment of the Trojan War at the first dictatorial spectacle for the celebration of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks in 1967.



Kounalaki, Xenia, ‘Ti simainei chounta’, *Amagi*, 2016 <http://amagi.gr/content/ti-simainei-hoynta> [accessed 12 January 2018].

Appendix 8

The re-imagining of a Panathenaic procession staged in honour of the marriage of King Constantine II to Princess Anne-Marie of Denmark in 1964.



‘Gamos Tou Vasilia Konstantinou II’ Kai Tis Pringipissas Tis Danias Annas-Marias Stin Athina’, *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1964) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=3491&thid=12648> [accessed 28 December 2017]

The re-enactment of the Panathenaic procession at the spectacle for the celebration of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks in 1965. The head above the picture reads '114 (after the 114 Movement) and 'Normalcy' (an ironic remark).



«114», «'Ομαλότης»

Platanos, Vasilis, 'Dimokratika Sinthimata Sti Giorti Tou Stadiou', *Ta Nea* (Athens, 9 August 1965), p. 7

Appendix 9

The float bearing the Crown at the regime's first spectacle for the celebration of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks in 1967.



'Eortasmos Tis Imeras Tis Polemikis Aretis Ton Ellinon, Tis Imeras Tou Efedrou Polemisti Kai Tis 18is Epeteiou Tis Machis Grammou-Vitsi Stin Athina, Dir. by Ypourgeio Proedrias Kyverniseos, Diefthynsis Optikon Meson', *Geniki Diefthynsis Typou, Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1967) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=3285&thid=14357> [accessed 3 January 2018]

Appendix 10



The exhibition room on Mycenae and the Trojan War at the 1968 ‘Exhibition of the Military History of the Greeks’ at the Zappeion Megaron Hall in Athens. To the left is a maquette of the city of Troy with a disproportionately large Trojan Horse inside its gates. Presumably intended to represent a scene shortly before the Achaeans emerged from the Horse to raze Troy to the ground (particularly since the sky is painted dusky behind the maquette and there is no evidence of a battle past), the Trojan Horse stands as a symbol of the strategic patience and military craftiness of the Greeks. The conspicuous absence of Trojans around the structure heightens these implications, as well as the portrayal of the Trojans (in absentia) as unsuspecting and as poor adversaries for the Greeks.

Geniko Epiteleio Ethnikis Aminis, *Ekthesis Tis Polemikis Istorias Ton Ellinon*, vol. 1 (Athens: Archigeio Enoplon Dynameon, 1970), p. 49.

Appendix 11

The float bearing the palingenetic phoenix at the dictatorship's spectacle for the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks in 1969. It is notable that this float is considerably larger and more elaborate than that which had borne the Crown in 1967 (see Appendix 9), while the parading flanks present an image of popular support for the regime which was evidently not the foremost priority in 1967.



Eortasmos tis Imeras tis Polemikis Aretis ton Ellinon, tis Imeras tou Efedrou Polemisti kai tis 20is epeteiou tis machis Grammou-Vitsi, tech. proc. ERA-Technofilm (Ellinika Epikaira: 1969) Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=3454&thid=13593> [accessed 5 January 2018].

Appendix 12

A still from the historical pageantry at the spectacle for the Celebration of the Day of the Combative Virtue of the Greeks in 1971.



Chronopoulos, Kostas, Simon Louvish, and Jorge Tsoucarossa, *Greece of the Christian Greeks* (England, 1971) <http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x16hs18> [accessed 3 January 2018].

Appendix 13

The floats of the navy (above) and of the Greek people (below) at the first spectacle for the anniversary of the coup d'état of 21 April in 1968.





'Eortasmos Tis 1is Epeteiou Tis 21is Apriliou Me Tin Parousia Tou Antivasilea Georgiou Zoitaki Kai Tou Prothypourgou Georgiou Papadopoulou Stin Athina', *Hellenic National Audiovisual Archive (HeNAA)* (Ellinika Epikaira, 1968) <http://mam.avarchive.gr/portal/digitalview.jsp?get_ac_id=3453&thid=13767> [accessed 5 January 2018].