

Imagined Security

Collective Identification, Trust, and the Liberal Peace

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Michael Crawford Urban

Balliol College

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Abstract

While not uncontested, the finding that liberal democracies rarely, if ever, fight wars against each other represents one of the seminal discoveries of international relations (IR) scholarship. Nevertheless, ‘democratic peace theory’ (DPT) – the body of scholarship that seeks to explain the democratic peace finding – still lacks a satisfactory explanation for this phenomenon. In this thesis, I argue that a primary source of this failure has been DPT’s failure to recognize the importance of collective identification and trust for the eventuation of the ‘liberal peace’. Building on existing DPT scholarship, most of it Realist or Rationalist in its inspiration, but also employing insights from Constructivist and Cognitivist scholarship, I develop a new model of how specific forms of collective identification can produce specific forms of trust. On this basis, I elaborate a new explanation of the liberal peace which sees it as arising out of a network of trusting liberal security communities. I then elaborate a new research design that enables a more rigorous and replicable empirical investigation of these ideas through the analysis of three historical cases studies, namely the Canada-USA, India-Pakistan, and France-Germany relationships. The results of this analysis support the plausibility of my theoretical framework, and also illuminate four additional findings. Specifically, I find that (1) IR scholarship needs a more nuanced understanding of the interaction between agents and structures; (2) ‘institutionalized collaboration’ is especially important for promoting collective identification; (3) DPT scholarship needs to focus more attention on the content of the narratives around which collective identification takes place; and (4) dramatic events play an important role in collective identification by triggering what I term catharses and epiphanies. I close the thesis by reviewing the implications of my findings for IR and for policymakers and by suggesting some areas worthy of additional research.

Preface

Sitting down to compose these remarks more than a year after having completed my thesis is a bit of a surreal experience. Looking back on my experience writing the thesis, I am immediately struck by a deep feeling of gratitude for having had the incredible opportunity to explore the universe of the mind in such a free and pure way. I've never felt more alive than in those moments when a flash of inspiration illuminated for me some new idea or perspective and it is such an incredible privilege for which I will never cease being profoundly thankful. Below, I will attempt to thank those who this incredible privilege possible; for those many I will inevitably miss, while I beg your forgiveness for my forgetfulness, please know that your contributions are also treasured nonetheless.

Before I begin my thanks, however, a quick note about the thesis itself is probably in order. I came to Oxford aiming to study International Relations with the hope that in so doing, I could equip myself with the tools I would need to help design and build the new instruments of international cooperation and governance that I believed were necessary to solve the big global challenges I saw confronting humanity. I left Oxford having realized that to whatever extent these international instruments were needed (and many of them certainly are) unless they emerge out of strong foundations built at the state and local levels, their ability to solve any problems will be greatly constrained. In short, by studying international politics, I came to recognize much more than before the continued importance of national politics even in this supposedly global era.

This realization has changed the trajectory of my career and my life and has led me to seek out new ways of contributing to the greater good outside of the academy. But while my energies are, at the moment, focused elsewhere, I still believe in the importance of the conclusions reached in this paper and, in fact, am constantly finding new and surprising ways in which the improved understanding of trust developed herein can be used both in the study of international politics and other disciplines. Thus, it is my fervent hope that the efforts distilled here can contribute in some small way to the advancement of International Relations and, in so doing, help to advance the peace, justice, security, and prosperity of our international system.

But as I said, the primary objective of these acknowledgments is to thank those who made this work possible. Given the immensity of the task, I might as well start at the beginning by thanking the institution which enabled me to attend the University of Oxford in the first place and without which this thesis would likely never have been written. The Rhodes Trust provided me with an opportunity that quite simply would not have been open to me otherwise. I am so deeply thankful for that and for the work of all those at Rhodes House whose work is dedicated to making the world a better place by supporting scholars and helping them to fight the world's fight as best they can. The Rhodes Trust also connected me with a wonderful community of Rhodes scholars from around the world who helped to ensure that my time at Oxford was stimulating and always filled with kind and generous friends. My friends from the Canadian Rhodes class of 2007, especially, have become some of my best friends and our time together among the dreaming spires is something that I will always look back on with great fondness.

Balliol College, and especially the graduate community centred at Holywell Manor, also deserves a prominent mention for both providing a convivial and friendly community in

which to work during my time in Oxford and also for the significant financial support they provided me during my studies there. While I am clearly a failure in terms of effortless superiority, I will, nonetheless, always be a proud Balliol man. Naturally, some individual names from this wonderful community also stand out. Aime and Jenn, I promised you that you'd get mentioned in these acknowledgements and, even though I'm a little late on this, thanks for everything you did. Your friendship was a real highpoint of my time at Oxford and a great inspiration. Chris, my erstwhile tut-mate, thanks for sticking with me for almost the entire five-years in Oxford. It was quite the journey and I'm glad I got to share so much of it with you. And how could I forget my friends in the Wednesday Night Supper Club (the originators, Tamara, Danielle, Eric, Fred, Adélaïde as well as those who joined a bit later or from time to time, namely, Kate, Mirosława, Chris, Ashley, and Andrew). Y'all made even the more difficult periods at Oxford so much fun, especially with the YouTube. Thank you.

When I wasn't socializing and found time to actually do some work, the Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford provided a stimulating environment in which to do so. The department also provided important financial support at various stages during my studies which was greatly appreciated. In particular, however, I'd like to thank Marga Lyall for her steady and formidable service as departmental secretary for much of my time in the department. Whenever I needed help navigating the byzantine labyrinth of the Oxford bureaucracy, you were there and helped to make my life so much easier. After Marga retired, Andrew Melling largely took up this gauntlet, in addition to his other duties. Thank you both so much – you were for me the real, and very friendly, face of the department. I also had a wonderful group of colleagues in the department who not only contributed greatly to my work through the organization and participation in seminars and colloquia, but who also made the experience of writing a doctoral dissertation, a potentially daunting and lonely undertaking, much more pleasant. Thank you Christine, Serena, Urvashi, Nick, Amy, Ruben, Sean, Seth, Dave, Francesca, Camilla, Kate, Julia, Michael, Nora, Claire, Henning, Ellen, James, Nina, Suwita and everyone else. It was wonderful to work and play beside you. I wish I got to still see you as frequently as I used to.

At the level of institutions, I'd also like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for their financial support throughout this project, as well as the Canadian Centennial Scholarship Fund for their support. I also owe a great debt to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa (now Global Affairs Canada) for the support they gave me in the form of the Cadieux-Léger Fellowship. This fellowship was a great financial support for my work, and the chance to work among such a wonderful group of public servants at Fort Pearson for nine months was a real treat. Thank you to Alan, Vincent, Andréanne, Marketa, Greg, Hector, Janice, Sarah, Deb, and Niall for being so friendly and helpful and for allowing me to work among you and to learn so much. I could not have finished this marathon without you.

Finally, it goes almost without saying that this thesis would not exist if not for the efforts of a number of senior academics who did me the incredible privilege of engaging with my ideas seriously and sharing their own thoughts generously through the five years with it took to complete this dissertation. Professor Anne Deighton, though not directly involved in the creation of this thesis, put me solidly on the path to success with her guidance during my MPhil and continued to offer her informal support throughout my DPhil. I'd also like to thank Professor Nicholas Wheeler and Professor Todd Hall for their stimulating examination of my

thesis and suggestions for how I might advance this project further; suggestions which I am happy to say have already born significant fruit. But most of all, I'd like to thank my long-suffering supervisor, Professor Edward Keene. While I know my methodological, one might even say overly-meticulous approach, and the philosophical tangents in which I sometimes indulged, certainly delayed the completion of the thesis (and probably tried your patience) thank you for giving me the freedom to learn my own lessons and for being there to help me figure out what those lessons were when the time came. This thesis, and any success it has had or will have, is a tribute to you.

Shifting from the professional, this thesis also carries a significant numbers of personal debts. The transatlantic crossing which I undertook mid-way through my thesis was something of a difficult transition and I don't know how I would have managed it if not for the support of my sort-of roommates Katie and Amy. You girls kept my head above water and helped keep me on track when I really needed it most. I love you both muchly. Katie, later, after we'd dropped the pretense and the 'sort-of' in our move to the Big Smoke, you continued to serve as a true inspiration and best friend. The final 15 months were lonely and hard sometimes, but thanks to you, they ended successfully – with a dance party.

Kirstie, you only came on board in the final stages of the thesis, but you provided a level of support and encouragement during that time that has only been surpassed in the months that followed the completion of my thesis. I hope that you realize how essential you were to the successful completion of this work and, through your incomparable kindness, generosity, and companionship, have been to my enjoyment of the most consistently happy period of my life. Thank you my love, I don't know how I could have done this without you.

I'd also like to say thank you to my family who have been with me for the entire ride and have been unstinting in their support and voluble and steadfast in their encouragement. Ti, Stuart, and Jazzmine, thank you so much for your love, your kindness, and all the fun that you continually add to my life. It's always such a pleasure to share time with you whether it be via Skype, when I'm home for the holidays or simply in need of a game of squash.

Matthew, my first and longest lasting friend, thank you for always being lovable and wonderful you. I'm so lucky to have such a big-hearted friend and lil' brudder. You are an incredible inspiration and I really hope that you know how much I value the bond we share and how important it has been to this work and everything else that I've done. I love you very much.

Finally, I'd like to thank my parents Chris and Laurie. I have been blessed my entire life with parents on whose unconditional love and support I always knew I could count, without fail. I don't know if you realize how important that has been over the years – I certainly do not tell you frequently enough. I have often remarked to others that even when things looked their bleakest, or I was faced with what appeared to be insurmountable obstacles, I took comfort and strength from the certainty that no matter what I did or how badly I failed, you would always be there for me without question or hesitation. This support, whether it has manifested financially, emotionally, or just in terms of being interested in what I'm doing, has made this work possible.

Conversely, and only slightly less importantly, I knew that no matter how well I succeeded you would ensure that I didn't get too big for my britches.

Mum and Dad, from the bottom of my heart, thank you for everything you have done for me and for everything you continue to do. I couldn't have done it without you. As a pitifully inadequate token of my appreciation for all you've done, but one given with all my love, I'd like to dedicate this work to you.

Toronto, May 2016

Michael Crawford Urban

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Introduction

Uncertainty, insecurity, and trust

Introduction

While not uncontested, the basic finding that liberal democracies rarely, if ever, fight wars against each other represents one of the seminal discoveries of international relations (IR) scholarship.¹ Besides comprising “one of the most significant nontrivial products of the scientific study of world politics”,² it is also a “powerful finding with far-reaching implications for both policy and theory”.³ Whether as the rationale for democracy promotion’s inclusion as the ‘third pillar’ of US President Bill Clinton’s foreign policy or the conceptual framework undergirding US President George W. Bush’s policies in the ‘greater Middle East’, the ‘democratic peace’ finding has influenced international politics to a degree seldom seen in the discipline.⁴ From a theoretical perspective, the democratic peace finding represents an important anomaly for the once dominant Realist interpretation of international politics.⁵ By challenging Realism’s assumptions on its intellectual home turf of ‘high politics’, the democratic peace has both helped to justify the claims of scholars who argue for opening the ‘black box’ of the state and supplied reasons to believe that an escape from a supposedly unending ‘tragedy of great power politics’ may be possible this side of paradise. Nevertheless, despite its status as the empirical regularity that arguably “comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations,”⁶ IR scholarship still lacks a

¹ Kahl (1998: 143).

² Maoz and Russett (1993: 624).

³ Lipson (2003).

⁴ Gartzke (2007: 167). US President Barack Obama has also associated himself with the theory. Hayes (2012a: 73).

⁵ Lipson (2003: 59); Maoz (1998: 9).

⁶ Levy (1989: 88).

widely-accepted theoretical explanation for this phenomenon.⁷ This failure represents not only an embarrassing *lacuna* in IR scholarship, but also creates a dangerous blind spot for policymakers. To date, ‘democratic peace theory’ (DPT) – the body of scholarship that seeks to explain the democratic peace finding – has been used as a contributing rationale for a host of different policies ranging from election monitoring to coercive regime change.⁸ If knowledge generated in the academy is to be employed by policy-makers in such consequential ways, it behoves scholars to develop as accurate an explanation of the phenomenon as possible in order to avoid incorrect and/or incomplete understandings resulting in wrong-headed and harmful policies.⁹ Finally, developing such a robust explanation also represents an important existential challenge to the discipline: If scholars are unable to explain the closest thing to an empirical law presented to them, one might reasonably wonder what purpose the academic study of international politics actually serves.

Justification of the project

The lack of a widely-accepted explanation for the democratic peace – or as I argue is more appropriate, the liberal peace¹⁰ – is not due to a lack of effort. Indeed, over the past thirty years the liberal peace research programme has been one of the most popular in the discipline and has generated a voluminous output with contributions emerging from almost every theoretical and methodological perspective.¹¹ The diversity of explanations documented in

⁷ Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999: 805); Owen (2004: 606); Senese (1997: 484). Cf. Lipson (2003: 59-60); Hayes (2009: 980).

⁸ Keohane (2005: xii) cites the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as an example.

⁹ Kahl (1998: 144).

¹⁰ See Doyle (1983a), Owen (1994), and Layne (1994: 5 – Footnote 1) for discussions supportive of this terminology.

¹¹ Hayes (2012b: 768).

Chapter 1 reflects this breadth of interest.¹² Initially, many of these explanations were crudely specified, but over time they have become increasingly precise. Importantly, however, this increased precision has also resulted in the realization that while many of these mechanisms provide important components of an explanation, they cannot account for what causes the peace in every instance, or even all of the processes that combine to cause it in a single instance. Consequently, scholars have increasingly sought to integrate several of these more precisely specified mechanisms into more comprehensive multi-mechanism models. And while the increased sophistication of these models represents progress, it has also created new challenges. First among these is the increased danger of incoherence: as more separate mechanisms are linked, it becomes increasingly difficult to ensure the compatibility of the various assumptions which underpin them. Second, as complexity increases, it becomes easier for analysts to lose track of what in a model is actually doing the causal work, with the result that the roles of key variables get misplaced.

Both these problems afflict scholarship on the liberal peace, but it is this second problem that is most obvious, especially insofar as it concerns *trust*. Read through almost any study of the liberal peace and odds are that trust will eventually be invoked in a causally important, often central, way. Wade Huntley gives perhaps the best articulation of this tendency when he asserts that “[t]he most important quality that republican government brings to this climate is not a ‘peaceful disposition,’ but rather a capability to be trusted.”¹³ Jarrod Hayes notes that liberals believe that “[p]olicies involving negotiation and reconciliation... are justified by appealing to democratic norms and identity. Leaders emphasize that the external state warrants these approaches as a trustworthy member of the democratic community, that these

¹² A sample of the differing methods that have been employed includes Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) – formal methods; Elman (1997a) – historical case studies; Cederman (2001a) – computer simulations; and Russett and Oneal (2001) – statistical analysis.

¹³ Huntly (1996: 58).

behaviors are expected in return, and that the situation can be approached without significant concerns over violence.”¹⁴ Michael Doyle, one of DPT’s most important early theorists, argues that amongst liberal democracies there exists a “differentiation of policy toward liberal and nonliberal states, requiring trust of and accommodation toward fellow liberals and producing distrust of and opposition toward nonliberals.”¹⁵ He asserts that “[t]here exists a singular lack of trust between liberal regimes and non-liberal regimes”¹⁶ and that “there is no guarantee that commercial and other forms of interdependence will alone provide material foundations for cooperation among societies, rather than for sources of imperial rivalry... unless trade and investment are part of a relationship of trust and respect.”¹⁷

These positions are echoed by John Owen and Charles Lipson, two scholars who have developed two of the most sophisticated multi-mechanism explanations of the liberal peace. Owen bases his theory of the liberal peace on the idea that “liberal states contain elites who believe that peace is intrinsically good [and] that liberal states are more pacific and trustworthy [than non-liberal states]”.¹⁸ He asserts that “[t]hose states that respect their own citizens’ autonomy will be trusted to be rational and pacific,”¹⁹ and that, by extension, “liberals believe they understand the intentions of other liberal democracies, they trust them, and since these true interests do not require threatening them, they act pacifically towards them in return.”²⁰ Indeed, one of Owen’s central hypotheses is that “[l]iberals will trust states they consider liberal and mistrust those they consider illiberal ... Because they share the enlightened ends of self-preservation, material well-being, and liberty, liberal democracies

¹⁴ Hayes (2009: 983).

¹⁵ Doyle (2005: 464).

¹⁶ Doyle (1983b: 326).

¹⁷ Doyle (2005: 463).

¹⁸ Owen (1997a: 5).

¹⁹ Owen (1997a: 36).

²⁰ Owen (1994: 95).

are seen as trustworthy and pacific.”²¹ Similarly, Lipson argues that “[p]artners that are trustworthy and transparent have much better chances of resolving differences peacefully by striking reliable bargains short of war.”²² Elsewhere he adds that “[b]ecause democracies have more accurate perceptions of each other, they are better able to cooperate, build trust, and avoid war.”²³ Indeed, for Lipson, “[t]rust and confidence are, in turn, essential elements of any deeper peace.”²⁴

Unfortunately, despite the crucial role played by trust in these and other authors’ models, scholars of the liberal peace rarely, if ever, define trust, let alone provide a robust conceptualization thereof, leaving the reader with scant explicit discussion of its crucial causal role and, consequently, leaving a gaping trust-shaped hole right in the middle of our understanding of the liberal peace. In the pages that follow I seek to remedy this problem.

The problématique: vulnerability, insecurity, and the perception of threats

At its most basic level, explanations of the liberal peace aim to explain how and why is it that liberals have come to rely on the dependable use of non-violent dispute resolution (hereafter non-violence) in their interactions with other liberals, when doing so necessarily involves them voluntarily accepting increased vulnerability to these other states.²⁵ In order to understand how and why liberals are able to do this, and why their ability to do so is so

²¹ Owen (1994: 103). My emphasis.

²² Lipson (2003: 53).

²³ Lipson (2003: 72).

²⁴ Lipson (2003: 58).

²⁵ For a conceptual discussion of how cooperation increases vulnerability to one’s partner see Hollis (1998: 41). There are a variety of ways that the peaceful resolution of disputes entails the acceptance of vulnerability. The most obvious is as follows: by resolving disputes peacefully when Agent A has an advantage, A foregoes the ability to exploit this advantage. In so doing, A makes herself more vulnerable to B than she would have been had she exploited this advantage because B is now stronger than he would have been had she done so. Because B is now stronger, he will be able to harm A to a greater extent than he would have been able to earlier. Cf. Jervis (1988: 676).

surprising, it is essential that I introduce a few critical definitions, assumptions, and concepts on which my analysis depends, beginning with vulnerability. By vulnerability I mean the condition of being exposed to the possibility of harm and, at the extreme, death. Vulnerability is a fact of life, both for states and for individuals.²⁶ It is possible for agents to reduce their vulnerability but it is generally not possible for agents to eliminate it. Unfortunately, the fundamental questions of how and why states respond to this vulnerability as they do is underdeveloped in scholarship on the liberal peace and thus represents a significant constraint on its further development.²⁷

Scholars in the Realist tradition argue that states normally respond to the fact of vulnerability by arguing that given the anarchic nature of the international system, the ability of states to harm each other, and the impossibility of knowing the minds of others, the rational response to the pervasive vulnerability that characterizes the international system is to interpret it as implying 'insecurity.'²⁸ I define insecurity as the subjective perception that harm is not only theoretically possible but also has some positive probability of occurring that must be actively guarded against. These scholars also correctly point out that the existence of a perception of insecurity will exercise an important influence on agents' decision-making.²⁹ And while many might argue that a perception of insecurity is not a necessary result of the existence of vulnerability – after all, vulnerability is, like anarchy, largely what agents make of it – it seems clear that the international system has been a dangerous and insecure

²⁶ Vulnerability can naturally be qualified. For example, it is possible for a state to be economically vulnerable while not necessarily or immediately being physically vulnerable.

²⁷ Hayes (2012b: 776).

²⁸ Waltz (1979:116-20).

²⁹ See Mearsheimer (2001: especially Chapter 2) for instance. I argue that insecurity is generally the result of the three material components of threat identified by Walt (1987: 5), namely aggregate power, offensive capabilities, and proximity. The addition of the fourth component, aggressive intentions, transforms a perception of insecurity into a specific perception of threat.

environment for much of history and that most states have tended to experience it as such for much of this time.

Realists also suggest that, given such a threatening environment, states will naturally exercise significant prudence in their dealings with other states. By behaving prudently I mean that, when interacting with others, prudent agents will evaluate others on the basis of their capabilities and, proportionate to this evaluation, behave to some non-trivial degree *as if* these other agents threatened them, regardless of whether these others had demonstrated any specific aggressive intentions. In acting prudently, agents will not take all the steps they would to defend themselves if they believed these others actually threatened them, but equally they will take more defensive measures than if they were simply ignoring them. A good example of prudent behaviour is the maintenance of military capabilities. After all, if war exists as a possibility, if states possess the ability to harm each other, if it is impossible to know other states intentions for certain, and if there is no third party to protect states from attack, it only makes sense for states to ensure the readiness of their own defences, even in the absence of any specific threat.

The problem for states, however, is that, besides having significant costs associated therewith, such prudent behaviour ends up becoming its own source of insecurity because of how it generates the 'security dilemma'. The security dilemma is the name given to the problem in which, *inter alia*, actions taken by one state solely to increase its security end up reducing the security of others – as well as, potentially, its own security.³⁰ One of the most pernicious impacts of the security dilemma is that it can generate conflict between states, even in the absence of any other reasons for conflict, because of how it creates its own

³⁰ Jervis (1978: 169). See Booth and Wheeler (2008: Introduction) for a more comprehensive exposition and definition of the security dilemma.

incentives for aggression.³¹ And while most explanations of the liberal peace recognize this fact, this recognition tends to be superficial. For example, as discussed in Chapter 1, it is only at the very end of Owen's and Lipson's theoretical expositions that the specific problem of this security dilemma generated insecurity is even implicitly recognized, and even then the problem is 'addressed' only by a casual invocation of trust. While not incorrect, this simple invocation is grossly insufficient as it is provided without an explanation of what trust is or how it is generated, let alone a deeper exploration of how it addresses the problem or the roles trust plays in sustaining other aspects of these explanations.

The liberal peace represents an important anomaly in international politics because it consists of a set of states that have transcended the security dilemma and the conflict generating effects specific to it. This is an extremely significant accomplishment; indeed, at the most fundamental level, this thesis is best characterized as an attempt to explain how and why these states have managed to do so. I argue that trust, and more specifically the way that certain forms of trust – I am most concerned with trust-beliefs derived from the tenets of liberalism which I call *liberal trust* – enable agents to buck the logic of prudence and, instead of responding to vulnerability by hedging and attempting to reduce their insecurity, respond instead by selectively accepting it. In so doing, these agents are able to break the logical chain whereby vulnerability is transformed into insecurity, insecurity is then responded to prudentially, prudent behaviour generates the security dilemma, and the foundations for conflict are laid.³² Of course, to achieve peace, liberal states need to also overcome other potential sources of violent conflict, a topic with which I also engage. In transcending the security dilemma, however, states make the resolution of these other problems much easier, and it is in explaining this remarkable development that this work makes its contribution.

³¹ Jervis (1978: 168) explores some of the ways in which the logic of the security dilemma can lead to conflicts intended by none of those involved.

³² Risse-Kappen (1995a: 504).

The variables: peace and non-peace

Having described this project's initial *problématique* by posing the question of how and why liberal states have been able to transcend the security dilemma, and suggesting that the answer to this question lies in the role played by trust in disconnecting vulnerability from the perception of insecurity and threat, the next step that needs taking is to lay out the means by which I propose to substantiate this thesis. Critical to this enterprise is the identification of the variables whose inter-relationship I seek to explore. While trust might seem an obvious independent variable, for methodological reasons illuminated in Chapters 2 and 3, I actually define trust as an intervening variable and define the co-occurrence of a set of factors that generate a specific form of collective identification – out of which trust then emerges – as the independent variable.³³ The definition of my dependent variable, namely peace, is slightly simpler, but also requires some additional explanation.

Bruce Russett and John Oneal note that “[t]he usual condition of interstate relations is, therefore, peace, though ‘peace’ is a broad category that includes the ‘special relationship’ of the United States and Britain, indifference (Burundi and Ecuador, for example), as well as a lull in ongoing hostilities (Israel and Syria over much of the last few decades).”³⁴ Such a broad definition is analytically unhelpful as it conflates numerous types of relationships that are affected in different ways by varying levels of perceived insecurity, thereby obscuring the important differences in how agents respond to these factors and the ways in which this differentiates these different types of relationships. Thus, in order to isolate the influence of

³³ Cf. Johnson (2004: 36) who proposes a model that is formally similar for his argument about overconfidence and war.

³⁴ Russett and Oneal (2001: 81).

these factors on agents' decision-making, Russett and Oneal's conception of peace needs to be disaggregated. I refer to the relationship that Russett and Oneal suggest exists between Burundi and Ecuador as *non-war* and the relationship between the USA and Britain as *peace*.³⁵ In order to illuminate the difference between the two, I need to first define *non-war*, and in order to define *non-war* I need to first define *war*.

I define war as *the use of organized violence by the authorities of one independent political community against another for the achievement of political purposes*.³⁶ This definition departs from the Correlates of War (CoW) definition of war, the standard definition employed in much of the DPT literature, which requires that hostilities generate at least 1,000 battlefield fatalities in a year to qualify as a war.³⁷ My definition is superior for my purposes because it focuses on what I see as the crucial essence of war, that is, the authoritative/official, political, and strategic character of the violence being employed, an essence that explicitly rejects the non-violent resolution of disputes embodied by the transcendence of the security dilemma that I am seeking to explain. My definition also has the merit of both cohering with explanations of the liberal peace that emphasize the importance of norms, which the CoW definition does not, and forcing models that assume cost-averse agents, as most do, to specify much more precisely what it is about war that causes these agents to prefer peace, and at what point in the development of a war this preference for peace is activated. In so doing, I avoid many vexing definitional/categorization problems, e.g. those raised by the use of covert operations.³⁸

³⁵ This differentiation is a common one. See Evans (1998) definition of peace.

³⁶ This definition was largely inspired by Barkawi and Laffey's (2001a: 10) similar definition.

³⁷ This threshold definition is an attempt to measure the severity/intensity of a conflict and has no real deductive basis having resulted from an attempt to draw a dividing 'line of best fit' that separates those conflicts which historians have generally classified as constituting a war and those they have not (Author's private correspondence with Paul Diehl, Melvin Small, and J. David Singer. 1 April, 2009).

³⁸ See Barkawi (2001) for a discussion of these problems.

With this definition of war in hand, I now define *non-war* as *the simple absence of war between two independent political communities*. In cases of non-war in *politically significant* dyads,³⁹ agents are likely to experience insecurity and to even perceive other agents as threatening if they perceive these other agents as holding aggressive intentions. Crucially, I also hold that in relationships defined by non-war, even if perceptions of a specific threat do not obtain, agents' prudence will cause them to hedge, thereby activating, even if only mildly, the security dilemma. Consequently, this perception of insecurity and associated hedging will represent an obstacle to cooperation and the acceptance of vulnerability, thereby leaving open the possibility for transformation of instances of non-war into instances of war.

Over and above non-war, however, I posit that states can also achieve something called *peace* in their relations with other states.⁴⁰ I define peace as *the existence of a state of non-war between two political communities characterized by (1) a system for resolving disputes between these communities non-violently that both accept, and (2) the belief on the part of both communities that this situation can be relied upon not to change*.⁴¹ The key distinction between peace and non-war and war (which we might lump together in a new category called *non-peace* because both lack the key element differentiating them from *peace*, namely expectations of dependable reciprocation of non-violent dispute resolution)⁴² is that in

³⁹ The idea of political significance refers to the meaningfulness of the relationship between the states and, by extension, the possibility that these states could experience conflicts of interest. Essentially, the political significance of a relationship depends on the capabilities of a state. States that are proximate are much more likely to possess the capabilities to interact with each other and thus the potential to come into conflicts of interest. Minor states generally only have the possibility of interacting in a meaningful way with their close neighbours and are thus involved in politically significant relationships with only these neighbours. Alternatively, major powers have the capabilities to interact meaningfully with many states, even those not in proximity to them, thus involving them in many more politically significant relationships. Most research on the liberal peace properly focuses on politically significant relationships.

⁴⁰ Pouliot (2008: 280); MacMillan (2004: 484).

⁴¹ This definition of peace is similar to concepts such as Keohane and Nye's 'complex interdependence' (1989); Boulding's stable peace (1978); Deutsch et al.'s security community (1968); Adler and Barnett's revival of security community (1998a); and Wendt's Kantian culture of anarchy (1999). In constructing this definition I drew specifically on Banks' (1987) idea of peace comprising non-war plus a positive element.

⁴² Cf. Deutsch et al.'s concept of *dependable expectations of peaceful change* (1968). My definition of non-peace and peace largely aligns with Thomas Hobbes' (1651: 185-186) definition in which war "consisteth not in

situations of peace, agents have managed to transcend the security dilemma and thus eliminate this potential source of insecurity, while in non-peace they have not, regardless of whether there are actually hostilities, or even perceptions of specific threat. In such a relationship, agents will be more prepared to accept vulnerability because they will believe that any disputes that arise will be resolved peacefully. In such a formulation, the dispute resolution mechanism obviously plays a critical role. Specifying how the combination of trust and liberalism creates such a mechanism is the focus of the first three chapters of this thesis.

The Argument

With the conceptual foundations of the project identified, it is now useful to explain how these elements fit together by summarizing the overarching argument that will tie this thesis together. The thesis has three linked but distinct parts. The first part begins with the identification of trust as a critical but under-specified element of the factors that combine to generate the liberal peace by enabling certain states to transcend the security dilemma and the insecurity it generates.

With trust identified as a central but under-examined component of the process that generates the liberal peace, the bulk of the first part of the thesis is devoted to the development of an understanding of trust capable of simultaneously bearing the theoretical weight required of it by the liberal peace while also aligning with a common sense understanding of what trust is. The result is a general understanding of trust in which it is the result of a collective identification between individuals defined by a shared salient commonality and generated by a combination of sufficient levels of what I call familiarity and positive affect. This first part culminates in the elaboration of a more specific explanation of the liberal peace that argues

actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.”

that it is best understood as a network of trusting security communities defined by their shared adherence to liberalism.

Having identified the importance of trust, developed an understanding of it that is at first general, and by then using this understanding to construct a more specific explanation of the liberal peace as generated by a specifically liberal form of trust, the theoretical part of the thesis is complete. In the second part, I shift from theoretical and conceptual analysis to an attempt to validate the insights derived from this analysis by translating them into forms that can be evaluated in the empirical world. Specifically, I build a research design for investigating the plausibility of my conceptualization of trust and how it is generated. This translation accomplished, I use this research design to analyze three empirical case studies when opportunities for trusting behaviour obtained and to understand why these opportunities did or did not produce instances of trust. These analyses should not be considered empirical tests of the theory advanced in the first part as they are too limited and the theory still too under-developed for such a test. Instead, these analyses represent opportunities to probe the plausibility of my understanding of trust and how it is built. Ultimately, insofar as I am able to support this understanding of trust, this analysis should also be considered as supporting the plausibility of my larger explanation of the liberal peace because of how trust represents such a central component thereof.

The third and final part of the thesis is devoted to analyzing the results of the second part and discussing the implications of these findings for the theoretical analysis developed in the first part and for IR scholarship more widely. Central to this discussion, and to my argument more generally, is the critical importance of combining insights from what Brian Rathbun has termed the Constructivist and Cognitivist paradigms with the Realist and Rationalist insights

that have long formed the primary materials out of which theories of the liberal peace have been constructed.⁴³ I argue that it is only by recognizing the implications of humans' cognitive limitations and biases, their emotions, and the importance of the substantive content of the knowledge structures that structure their thinking – points that have been heretofore neglected in research on the liberal peace – that we can understand this phenomenon. Moreover, by enabling a better understanding of trust, this paradigmatic pluralism also enables, in the form of my explanation of the liberal peace as a network of liberal security communities, the realization of important opportunities for cross-fertilization between scholarship on the liberal peace and scholarship on what has variously been called stable peace or security community, something that I argue offers great promise for further research.

Plan of the thesis

With this conceptual ground clearing and higher-level summary completed, all that remains by way of introduction is to present a detailed plan of the thesis that elaborates the ways in which this larger argument is unfolded. As suggested above, the first part of Chapter 1 consists of a review of existing scholarship on the liberal peace. However, instead of simply repeating already-existing summaries, I undertake a critical review of this literature aimed at identifying the fundamental theoretical building blocks used by scholars to construct their more comprehensive explanatory models of the liberal peace. In so doing, I identify thirteen causal mechanisms that have been offered by theorists as explanations for how liberal states have avoided fighting wars against each other.

⁴³ Rathbun (2007); cf. Maoz (1998: 74).

This analysis lays the foundation for the second part of Chapter 1, which comprises a focused engagement with two of the most important and sophisticated of those comprehensive models, namely those offered by Charles Lipson and John Owen.⁴⁴ Engaging with Lipson's and Owen's work is valuable for two reasons. First, it provides two of the most sophisticated examples of how these aforementioned building blocks are assembled into more comprehensive models. Engaging with these multi-mechanism models is important because scholarship on the liberal peace has progressed such that these thirteen mechanisms are now rarely, if ever, offered as stand-alone explanations. Second, engaging with these multi-mechanism models illuminates how even they fail to properly understand the important role played by trust in generating the liberal peace and reveals how this failure hobbles even the best scholarship in this area. Building on this analysis, I conclude Chapter 1 by identifying three questions that must be answered for a coherent and comprehensive explanation of the liberal peace to become possible. The answering of these questions guides the analysis contained in the subsequent two chapters.

Given the analysis completed in Chapter 1, the most obvious next step is answering the question: what is trust and where does it come from? I begin tackling these questions in Chapter 2 where I engage with existing understandings of trust, develop my own conceptualization thereof, and demonstrate how my conceptualization is more useful than existing ones, at least for the study of international politics. The key argument that I advance in this chapter concerns how existing Rationalist models of trust are incapable of providing a coherent explanation for how agents come to rely on each other's dependable reciprocation of non-violence without assuming the existence of a 'trustworthy' type of agent and assuming the ability of agents to recognize such trustworthy types as such. Essentially, these definitions

⁴⁴ Lipson (2003); Owen (1994), (1997a), (1997b), and (2004).

of trust assume, rather than explain, what I am arguing is the essential core of trust. Yet, given the inability of agents to ever know the minds of others, it is unclear how uncertainty about another's intentions can ever be *rationally* banished from an agent's calculations, at least to the extent required for agents to be willing to disconnect their existential vulnerability from perceptions of insecurity in the ways required for them to transcend the security dilemma. I solve this problem by arguing that since trust both seems to exist and cannot be understood from the perspective of a rational agent, we need to re-conceptualize agents as 'reasonable' instead of rational.

With this understanding of what trust is secured, Chapter 3 begins by describing the interrelated processes by which trust is generated and how trustworthy agents recognize each other as such. I argue that trust is the result of a reasonable process of collective identification that combines the accumulation of 'familiarity' in ways similar to the Rationalist mechanisms described in Chapter 1 and 2, as well as parallel 'arational' processes that generate positive affect. When sufficient familiarity and positive affect have been generated, and if combined with a perception of what I call a 'salient commonality', these factors trigger a collective identification comprising the formation of a psychological in-group between the agents involved. I close the first half of Chapter 3 by outlining a model, built on research in various fields such as psychology, behavioural economics, and even neurology, which specifies six mechanisms capable of generating the positive affect required for collective identification to occur.

With this generic model of how trust is generated in place, I turn to describing how specific forms of trust are built, specifically the form of trust that can emerge between liberal states, and which enables them to transcend the security dilemma and establish the liberal peace. In

Chapter 2, I assert that trust is always a specific belief; that is, Agent A trusts Agent B to do X.⁴⁵ Building on the analysis completed in the first half of Chapter 3, I argue that the specific form of trust that emerges from a particular collective identification (the aforementioned X) is determined by the substantive content encoded in the narrative associated with the salient commonality around which that collective identification occurs. In the case of the liberal peace, I argue that it is the central liberal belief in the non-violent resolution of disputes between liberals that licenses expectations of dependable reciprocation of non-violence and, by extension, enables liberals to trust each other not to take advantage of any vulnerability that they accept in their relations with other liberals. In support of this argument, I offer an analysis of liberalism as an ideology that demonstrates the centrality of non-violence to liberalism. With this conceptual analysis complete, I close the main theoretical section of the thesis by offering my explanation for the liberal peace.

I transition from the theoretical to the empirical parts of this work in Chapter 4 where I operationalize my theory of trust and lay out my research design. I begin by addressing a couple of residual conceptual issues that impact on attempts at operationalizing the arguments laid out in Chapters 2 and 3, namely the nature of agency and its location in the decision-making structures of polities. With this complete, I combine all these conceptual elements and elaborate a five-step research procedure that has as its goal the identification of instances of trust and the determination of whether the conceptualization of trust I have developed aligns with, and can help us better understand, instances of trust in the real world. A major portion of this chapter is taken up by elaborating a set of five factors, and empirical indicators thereof, that I use to measure whether conditions are ripe for the emergence of trust. I close the chapter with a discussion of my case selection.

⁴⁵ See Hardin (1993: 506-507) for an explanation of why this is an analytical superior approach.

With these theoretical issues resolved and a research design outlined, the next step in my project is to evaluate the usefulness of my new conceptualization of trust through empirical analysis. Chapter 5 comprises my first case study, the relationship between the United States of America (USA) and Canada which itself comprises two sub-cases that help isolate and highlight the role played by trust in the relationship, namely Canada's non-acquisition of nuclear weapons in the immediate post-war period (1945-1957) and the interactions between Canada and the USA during the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962). This is followed in Chapter 6 by an examination of the relationship between India and Pakistan with a specific examination of Pakistan's decision to acquire nuclear weapons (1972-1998) and Pakistan's decision to precipitate the Kargil conflict in 1999. My final case study, Chapter 7, comprises an examination of the relationship between France and Germany with emphases on France's decision to invade and occupy the Ruhr valley in 1923 and the decision by the French government to share nuclear secrets and pursue a joint nuclear weapons programme with Germany between 1956 and 1958.

These empirical chapters are followed by Chapter 8 in which I evaluate the findings of this empirical research and its implications for my theory. This discussion of implications is organized under four heads: (1) the need for a more nuanced picture of the ways in which agents and structures interact in international politics; (2) the importance of institutionalized collaboration; (3) the need for a greater focus on the substantive content of narratives in scholarship on the liberal peace; and (4) the surprising role of catharsis and epiphany. In my final Conclusions chapter I discuss the implications of my findings for IR scholarship more generally, for policymaking, and for future research on the liberal peace and trust.

Conclusions

The perceptive reader will note that while this thesis begins with a focus on explaining the liberal peace, it quickly broadens its focus to engage more comprehensively with the question of the role of trust in international politics. This is in some ways a tribute to the work that has already been done on the liberal peace; indeed, I submit that existing scholarship already does a good job of explaining most of how the liberal peace comes about. That said, once one takes a good look at this impressive theoretical achievement, it becomes clear that the logic of the entire argument depends on something called trust obtaining. Unfortunately, this thing called trust currently looks less like a link in the theory and more like a hole. Thus, the aim of this work is, beyond pointing out the hole, to fill it in by providing a comprehensive conceptualization of trust and initiating an empirical research programme designed to validate this conceptualization. In so doing, I hope to significantly strengthen our understanding of the liberal peace, but also to improve IR scholarship's understanding of trust more generally.

Chapter 1

The importance of trust for the liberal peace

Introduction

Since it became a focus of sustained research in the 1980s, explanations for the liberal peace have improved significantly. A good portion of these improvements are the result of more precise descriptions of the fundamental causal mechanisms theorized as generating the liberal peace. In the first part of this chapter I review the thirteen most important of these basic causal mechanisms. Another significant source of this aforementioned improvement derives from scholars' combination of these increasingly precise mechanisms into more and more sophisticated multi-mechanism explanatory models that show how these mechanisms work in concert to generate the liberal peace. While the construction of these multi-mechanism models has generated significant gains, however, these gains have come with a cost: greater complexity, an increased risk of logical incoherence, and a greater possibility that the variables actually responsible for the liberal peace might get lost in the theoretical shuffle. In the second part of this chapter, I review how these problems manifest in two of the most sophisticated explanations of the liberal peace, namely those offered by Charles Lipson and John Owen.¹

The approach I employ in the first part of this chapter has been inspired by Sebastian Rosato, who emphasizes the importance of isolating and examining closely the various causal

¹ Research on the liberal peace is a wide and varied field that has begun to overlap with a number of other previously distinct research programmes. I limit my review to those theories that posit a specific role for *liberal democracy* in the reduction of war as defined in the Introduction. For some good reviews of the field and its evolution see Chan (1993 and 1997), Elman (1997b), Russett and Starr (2000), Barkawi and Laffey (2001), Rosato (2003), Owen (2004), and Hayes (2012b).

mechanisms on offer as explanations for the liberal peace.² Rosato grounds his analysis in the argument that theories are composed of two elements: a “hypothesis stipulating an association between an independent and a dependent variable and a causal logic that explains the connection between those two variables.”³ While not denying the importance of empirical testing of hypotheses, Rosato notes that the evaluation of a theory’s ‘internal validity’ is just as essential but has, unfortunately, often been neglected.⁴

This insight is especially important for the study of the liberal peace, which has been dominated by large-*N* quantitative studies in which operationalizations of many explanations often prove difficult, and where the results of these tests often prove indeterminate. Arguing that the quantitative studies that dominate the field cannot provide more than evidence of correlation, Jarrod Hayes suggests that “the emphasis on large-*N* studies has produced a significant lacuna when it comes to understanding the mechanisms of the democratic peace” and this *lacuna* represents the field’s “central problem”.⁵ By shedding light on the “fundamental processes of nature” that produce these outcomes, he suggests that qualitative studies help to bring the study of the liberal peace closer to understanding causation, and in so doing, closer to the “real goal” of scientific inquiry.⁶

While Rosato’s 2003 intervention was an important step forward for the study of the liberal peace, it was not without its limitations. Crucially, because Rosato’s inquiry was not comprehensive, we still lack a comprehensive exposition and analysis of the diversity of

² Though Chan (1993: 209) called for this sort of approach many years earlier.

³ Rosato (2003: 585).

⁴ See also Slantchev, Alexandrova, and Gartzke (2005: 462).

⁵ Hayes (2012a: 65).

⁶ Hayes (2012b: 768).

mechanisms on offer.⁷ I seek to remedy this problem by presenting a more extensive theoretical excavation of the existing literature. I use the term ‘mechanism’ to refer to what Jon Elster has termed “plausible, frequently observed ways in which things happen.”⁸ Each of the mechanisms I identify below is an attempt to capture a distinct and irreducible causal statement of the $A + B = C$ or $X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$ variety. The goal of this exercise is to build models of the “generative nexus that produced or brought about the event (or pattern) to be.”⁹ Once this distillation is complete, it will be much easier to identify the assumptions on which these relationships depend, establish whether they can account for the causation being hypothesized, and determine whether the larger explanations they help constitute manage to integrate them in a coherent fashion.

The greatest difference between my approach and Rosato’s is that, while Rosato evaluates and critiques each mechanism separately, I delay my critical evaluation until after I have assembled these mechanisms into larger multi-mechanism models in the second part of the chapter. This approach is better suited to my larger project because, while it is important to focus on each mechanism in order to illuminate its specific attributes, few of the most sophisticated explanations for the liberal peace claim that any of these fundamental mechanisms generate the liberal peace by themselves. Thus, evaluating the ability of each of these mechanisms in isolation does not seem very productive; better to use these individual mechanism-specific reviews as the foundations for evaluations of the more comprehensive multi-mechanism models.¹⁰ This approach allows me to identify three major theoretical

⁷ While Hayes (2012a) was more comprehensive, his engagement with the actual mechanics of the mechanisms was much more superficial.

⁸ Cited in Pierson (2004: 6). Jon Elster goes on to argue that social scientists are ‘light years away’ from being able to formulate proper theories and should concentrate on specifying mechanisms. Chan (1993: 209) concurs.

⁹ Hayes (2012b: 768).

¹⁰ Doyle (2005).

problems that remain unaddressed by the two models under consideration here and that continue to block progress towards a coherent comprehensive explanation.

Part 1: The mechanisms

The Decision-making Mechanism represents the most fundamental of the mechanisms I have identified. The logic underpinning this mechanism is so straightforward as to be almost trivial: it holds that the liberal peace is the result of agents making decisions on the basis of their beliefs to achieve their objectives. These agents can be anyone, from the most exalted President to the lowliest anonymous voter; all that is required is that they (1) make a decision based on their understanding of what it is they should do that is somehow predictably influenced by liberal democracy and (2) this decision helps generate non-war. There are two reasons why this simple mechanism is an important component of many explanations. First, it is compatible with processes that enable agents to differentiate between different types of other states, thereby enabling dyadic explanations of the liberal peace.¹¹ Second, it is open to being flavoured by scholars with a variety of different assumptions about agents' underlying beliefs.

¹¹ Monadic explanations are explanations whose operation depends on a specific attribute obtaining in a single state. A theory that argues that the liberal peace occurs because liberals are pacifists would be an example: in this case, liberal states would be pacifistic because of their own internal inclinations and this mechanism would operate without reference to a second state. Dyadic explanations are explanations whose operation also depends on the attributes of a second state. Theories of the liberal peace that require states to be jointly liberal are dyadic because they require both states to be liberal for peace to obtain. The weight of the existing empirical evidence suggests that the liberal peace is primarily a dyadic phenomenon. See Rousseau et al. (1996); Raknerud and Hegre (1997: 395); Gleditsch and Hegre (1997: 307). One of the problems that has bedevilled scholarship on the liberal peace is the reality that many of the mechanisms that have been suggested are essentially monadic mechanisms attempting to explain a dyadic phenomenon. Hayes (2009a: 979). See also the debate between Rosato (2003 and 2005) and Kinsella (2005). While there has been some suggestion that the dyadic phenomenon is actually just the result of an accumulation or multiplication of monadic factors – see Choi (2010) and Rosato (2005: 467) – this speculation has not yet been thoroughly elaborated or clearly demonstrated.

On the basis of the differing assumptions regarding agents' underlying preferences, three broad variants of this mechanism can be discerned. The first, primarily used by Rationalist accounts, is the *cost-aversion variant* in which the liberal peace occurs because agents perceive that war with another state will result in an aggregate loss of utility compared with what would be realized through some version of non-war. This can occur either because the costs of the war itself would outstrip the potential benefits, or because, while the war itself might result in an aggregate gain, the opportunity cost of the war would be greater still.¹² The costs in such a calculation may be as simple as the price in blood and treasure required to wage the war, or they may be more complex and involve the costs of lost trade and/or foreign investment or the cost of extracting gains from a conquered territory.¹³ Crucially, all this only becomes an explanation for the *liberal* peace when it is paired with some additional, distinctively liberal, mechanism(s) – often one or more of the institutional mechanisms discussed below.

The second, *normative variant* is engaged when agents are assumed to possess a distinctive, liberal, normative injunction against the use of violence to resolve disputes, either in general or, more commonly, with other liberals.¹⁴ Because of this injunction, agents abstain from war and the liberal peace results.¹⁵ Most theorists argue that this occurs because liberals externalize their own domestic norms of interaction, including the non-violent resolution of disputes, to other liberal states.¹⁶ Spencer Weart argues that this externalization is due to a desire for consistency: “leaders will tend to act toward their foreign counterparts in the way

¹² Polachek and Xiang (2010).

¹³ Gartzke (2007: 166).

¹⁴ Muller (2004: 498); Maoz (1998: 58); Russett and Oneal (2001: 65).

¹⁵ Maoz and Russett (1993: 625).

¹⁶ Weart (1994) and (1998:15 and 80); Dixon (1994:15-17). See also Hermann and Kegley (1995); Russett and Oneal (2001: 56 and 65); Rendall (2004: 584); Maoz (1998: 6) Hermann and Kegley (1996: 456).

they are accustomed to act toward rival domestic political leaders.”¹⁷ Since this mechanism has often been challenged by the argument that it seems to suggest that democratic states should be uniformly peaceful and not just with other liberal states, this argument needs to be paired with an explanation for how liberal states differentiate each other from illiberal states.

A third *psychological variant* posits that non-violence between liberals springs from the formation of a liberal ‘in-group’. This theorizing draws on Social Identity Theory and argues that when individuals recognize other individuals as sharing membership in an in-group, a psychological bias toward members of the in-group is formed. This bias will sometimes manifest itself in tolerant behaviour toward other members of the in-group and antagonistic behaviour toward non-members.¹⁸ The argument holds that the liberal peace is produced when agents, on the basis of their shared membership in this in-group and its associated bias, abstain from war in their relations with members of the in-group.¹⁹ As a purely psychological theory the effect of this mechanism is fairly limited; the strictly psychological effects of in-group bias are not particularly determinate as agents’ ‘interests’ are always determined by the specific social setting in which they find themselves. Thus specification of this social setting is required to unlock the full potential of this mechanism – a project I undertake in Chapter 3.

The next five mechanisms have traditionally been grouped together under the ‘institutional/structural’ mechanisms rubric.²⁰ The first of these, the *Checks-and-balances Mechanism*, holds that due to the divided form of governance required by liberal democracy, liberal states will tend to be less warlike because decision-making processes will be characterized by greater numbers of veto points, thus increasing the possibility that one of

¹⁷ Weart (1998: 77-78).

¹⁸ Hermann and Kegley (1996: 439).

¹⁹ Hermann and Kegley (1995: 516-517).

²⁰ Maoz and Russett (1993: 625-626).

these veto points will be activated and block moves toward war.²¹ In its most basic form, this argument holds that the greater the number of veto points, the greater the likelihood of a veto, thereby reducing the occurrence of war. One could also argue that, if liberals are randomly distributed in a population, then the greater the number of veto points, the greater the likelihood that one will be randomly captured by a liberal and, correspondingly, the possibility of war would be reduced. Most common, however, is the argument that in liberal states there is a greater than random likelihood that one of these veto points will be captured by a liberal, thus making liberal states less warlike than non-liberal states with similar numbers of veto points.²² Either way, this mechanism requires one of the *Decision-making* variants to cause the liberals possessing a veto to use it.

The argument behind the *Electoral Mechanism* holds that in a liberal democracy those who pay for and fight in wars are the ones who control the government, so citizens can be expected to vote so as to avoid wars they do not want to pay for or fight in. Which wars citizens do not support depends on which variant of the *Decision-making Mechanism* obtains. The *Electoral Mechanism* has also been elaborated in another way, namely through the use of the concept of audience costs. In this case, leaders not only avoid war because they will be punished by their electorates for fighting at all, they also avoid breaking promises and ‘flip-flopping’ for the same reason.²³ While this additional elaboration does not add much on its own, it can become part of a powerful model when it is combined with some of the other

²¹ Peceny and Butler (2004: 569).

²² For examples of this type of argument see Choi (2010); Maoz and Russett (1993: 626); Morgan and Campbell (1991: 191-192, 195 and 197); Lipson (2003: 79, 91 and 93); Ray (1995: 18-19); and Russett (1993: 28, 38 and 40).

²³ Lipson (2003: 81); Schultz (2001: 33-34). Cf. Russett and Oneal (2001: 55); Huth and Allee (2002: 759). Trachtenberg (2012: 37) characterizes this theorized punishment as a ‘surtax’ that leaders are always ‘charged’ for changing positions regardless of the substance or circumstances of such an action. Jervis (1988: 686 and 693) offers a possible explanation for this ‘surtax’ by pointing out that it is psychologically painful to reverse previous commitments with the result that voters punish leaders who cause them to do so, even if it is only vicariously through their state that they experience this pain.

mechanisms discussed below, especially the *Commitment Mechanism*.²⁴ In all these cases, causation is transmitted either through the electoral removal of decision-makers who pursue unpopular policies or through the self-restraint of those who seek to avoid such removal.²⁵

The basic claim embodied in the *Slow Escalation/No Surprise Attack Mechanism* is that, because liberal states experience greater domestic constraint on decision-making, they are less able than non-democratic states to quickly mobilize their war-fighting capabilities and are thus slower to escalate disputes. These constraints also ensure that liberals are less able to launch surprise attacks. Both of these results are supposed to provide additional time during which diplomats can locate non-violent resolutions to whatever dispute is threatening to ignite hostilities. Moreover, by reducing the pressures associated with compressed timelines and the possibility of being pre-empted, these mechanisms enable the accessing of a whole class of resolutions that might otherwise have been unavailable.²⁶ Naturally, this requires an assumption that additional time will increase the likelihood of a solution being found, which in turn probably relies on one of the *Decision-making* variants obtaining.

The logic of the *Stability Mechanism* holds that because liberal democracies are more stable than other state forms, they will be involved in fewer wars.²⁷ This argument is specified in two ways. First, because liberal democracy, at least once it is well-established, is a more stable form of government, liberal states will be less likely to be perceived as vulnerable and attacked.²⁸ This claim is buttressed in a number of ways, but especially by the argument that

²⁴ For example, see Lipson (2003: 48). Trachtenberg (2012: 7) points out that audience costs only function if they are recognized and understood by the other state.

²⁵ Morgan and Schwebach (1992: 307); Russett and Oneal (2001: 54).

²⁶ Russett (1993: 39); Lipson (2003: 102); Maoz and Russett (1993: 626); Maoz (1998: 6); Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995); Choi (2010: 444).

²⁷ Maoz and Russett (1993: 625).

²⁸ Russett (1993: 29); Lipson (2003: 114 and 135). Cf. Russett and Oneal (2001: 117-118); Senese (1999: 486); Oneal et al. (2003: 383-384).

liberal democracies, through the use of elections, have largely eliminated one of the greatest historical sources of instability, namely succession crises.²⁹ The second specification holds that because liberal states are more likely to enjoy at least the consent, if not the support, of their citizens, governments will be less likely to attempt to divert citizens' attention away from domestic problems by pursuing belligerent foreign policies.³⁰

The *Transparency Mechanism* is best understood in the context of Rationalist theories of war that argue that war, being a sub-optimal outcome that rational actors seek to avoid, is caused by either (1) a lack of information; (2) an inability to credibly commit; or (3) issue indivisibilities.³¹ The idea behind this mechanism is that because of the way liberal states and their politics are structured, they are much more transparent than other state forms. This transparency is the result of liberal states' open decision-making processes, divided governance, and the free press.³² This transparency alleviates problems associated with insufficient information, thereby reassuring other states of liberals' benign intentions, or alternatively providing evidence of their resolve.³³ Because other states have greater certainty concerning liberal states' intentions, many wars that might have occurred because of misperception or a lack of information are avoided.³⁴

Proponents of the *Superior War Selection Mechanism* argue that liberal democracies are simply better judges of which wars they can win and thus, recognizing that many they could wage are not worth the effort, choose to avoid them.³⁵ This claim is elaborated by arguing

²⁹ Lipson (2003: 112-115, 122, 127-129 and 135); Gaubatz (1996: 116).

³⁰ Russett (1993: 29); Senese (1999: 486). See also Lipson (2003: 114).

³¹ Fearon (1995: 381-382). See also Lipson (2003: 49-51).

³² Lipson (2003: 47, 73, 77 and 85); Chan (1997: 81); Russett and Oneal (2001: 64); Kydd (1997:117); Schultz (1999: 237-238).

³³ Huth and Allee (2002: 777-778); Schultz (1999: 234).

³⁴ Russett and Oneal (2001: 64); Lipson (2003: 12, 47, 93 and 106); Gaubatz (1996: 122-123); Jervis (1988).

³⁵ Bennett and Stam (1998: 345).

that (1) liberal states' decision-making is unavoidably slow, meaning that the possibility of poor decisions being made in the heat of the moment is reduced;³⁶ (2) the open and more meritocratic policy-making processes of liberal democracies and the free exchange of ideas that institutions like a free press provide result in better policy decisions;³⁷ and (3) electorates reliably punish leaders who lead them into failed or poorly waged wars leading leaders to choose the wars they wage carefully.³⁸

The argument advanced for the *Superior Deterrent Mechanism* is similar and holds that liberal states are better at fighting wars, with the result that other states avoid fighting against them.³⁹ Proponents argue that liberals tend to win wars because they are more economically efficient and possess relatively greater national wealth, which enables them to devote relatively greater resources to national security.⁴⁰ They also argue that, because liberal governments are accountable to the people, their policies tend to enjoy greater legitimacy and support, meaning that liberal states are better able to mobilize resources for war.⁴¹ Finally, in much the same way that electoral accountability forces leaders to choose only winnable wars, it also pushes them to 'try harder' to win wars once they have begun than would an unaccountable leader.⁴²

As discussed earlier, according to Rationalists the second source of war lies with states' inability to credibly commit to agreements.⁴³ Scholars who advance the *Commitment Mechanism* argue that liberal states possess a superior ability to make credible commitments

³⁶ Ferejohn and Rosenbluth (2008: 23-24). C.f. Maoz (1998: 6).

³⁷ Lipson (2003: 54); Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 49 and 52); Reiter and Stam (1998: 377-779); Johnson (2004: 35, 47-48, and 181).

³⁸ Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999: 794); Lipson (2003: 81); Russett and Oneal (2001: 54-55); Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1992: 644); Bennett and Stam (1998: 365).

³⁹ Cf. Cederman (2001a) and Cederman and Gleditsch (2004).

⁴⁰ Ferejohn and Rosenbluth (2008: 4); Russett and Oneal (2001: 57); Lake (1992: 24).

⁴¹ Lake (1992: 24); Reiter and Stam (1998: 377-389); Hermann and Kegley (1996: 456).

⁴² Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999: 794); Huth and Allee (2002: 755).

⁴³ Gaubatz (1996:113).

and are therefore able to access a range of settlements not available to other types of states.⁴⁴ Liberal states possess this capability because of their unique constitutional structures, which provide: (1) a clear hierarchy of commitment-making instruments calibrated to express different levels of solemnity;⁴⁵ (2) unique abilities to ‘self-bind’, such as the separation of powers and requirements for legislative supermajorities;⁴⁶ (3) for a regularized rotation of leadership which (a) helps ensure stability, thereby enabling the building of stronger reputations, and (b) gives leaders incentives to keep their predecessor’s agreements;⁴⁷ and (4) transparency that makes it easier to observe liberal states decision-making processes. Together, these factors increase other states’ confidence in the predictability of liberal states, thus increasing the credibility of liberals’ commitments, which in turn reduces the frequency of wars.

The logic behind the *transnational enmeshment mechanism* holds that because of their uniquely open societies, liberal states are especially pre-disposed to transnational exchanges and interdependence.⁴⁸ As interdependence develops, the costs of cutting off these exchanges increase,⁴⁹ while the potential gains to be made from war decrease,⁵⁰ thereby creating increasingly strong pressures for the peaceful resolution of disputes.⁵¹ Similarly, the openness of liberal societies allows for the formation of transnational coalitions that possess interests antithetical to war between their members’ states, interests that these members will seek to have their governments advance.⁵² As more networks of interdependence obtain, the sheer variety of these ties will reduce the likelihood that any single dispute is capable of souring the

⁴⁴ Lipson (2003: 4).

⁴⁵ Lipson (2003: 78).

⁴⁶ Lipson (2003: 12 and 93-100); Gaubatz (1996: 117 and 121).

⁴⁷ Lipson (2003: 80, 86, 101, 122, and 132).

⁴⁸ Doyle (1983a: 231-232). Cf. Barnett and Adler (1998: 425-426); Kahl (1998: 119 and 122).

⁴⁹ Gartzke (2007: 170).

⁵⁰ Gartzke (2007: 166 and 170-171).

⁵¹ Russett and Oneal (2001: 29, 39, 74-75, and 126); Mousseau (2003: 495).

⁵² Risse-Kappen (1995: 209); Mousseau (2003: 502).

entire relationship.⁵³ Additionally, as transnational activity builds, so too does a demand for governance of this activity. Matthias Dembinski and colleagues suggest that democratic states tend to address these demands by generating a disproportionate number of international institutions, which in turn engages the *Transparency mechanism*.⁵⁴ This greater institutionalization is also theorized as helping generate peace through the generation of shared identity and the activation of the *psychological variant*.⁵⁵ Finally, if wars are irrational, and open societies enable the greatest free flow of ideas and, by extension, the best policy results, open societies will be the least likely to make the types of mistakes that might lead to war.⁵⁶

The *Democratic Leadership mechanism* is the final mechanism I have identified and holds that the political systems of democratic states tend to either select for, or socialize individuals toward, a particular leadership style that emphasizes negotiation, consultation, and conciliation, which tends to be more successful in democratic domestic settings.⁵⁷ As Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley put it “we are proposing that a constant push emanates from democratic culture and institutions for the election of leaders who respect and respond to democratic values.”⁵⁸ The result of this selection is that those leaders who are more adept at these styles of leadership stick to their strengths in their interactions with other states and, in so doing, end up engaging in fewer violent conflicts.⁵⁹ This does not mean that liberal leaders will seek to be accommodative of everyone. While liberal leaders may prefer accommodative approaches and give other leaders the benefit of the doubt initially, if the

⁵³ Doyle (1983a: 231-232).

⁵⁴ In Dembinski et al. (2004: 547) it is unclear whether this occurs because of a unique democratic tendency toward institutionalization of governance or is simply the result of a greater amount of activity between democracies in need of governance.

⁵⁵ Dembinski et al. (2004: 548); Russett and Oneal (2001: 166).

⁵⁶ Cf. Gartzke (2007: 173).

⁵⁷ Dixon (1994:16); Owen (1994:96-97). See also Russett (1993: 39); Hermann and Kegley (1995: 521); Farnham (2003: 410); Kahl (1998: 130-131).

⁵⁸ Hermann and Kegley (1995: 522).

⁵⁹ Hermann and Kegley (1995: 522); Farnham (2003: 410).

leaders of another state do not reciprocate, democratic leaders will switch to a more confrontational approach.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, the overall argument is that these leaders' styles will result in fewer disputes and, when two democratic-style leaders are involved, disputes will be much more likely to be resolved without violence.⁶¹

Part 2: Lipson's and Owen's multi-mechanism models

As mentioned earlier, few of these mechanisms are now offered as stand-alone explanations. Indeed, some of these causal mechanisms have, to my knowledge, never been recognized as discrete mechanisms before now. Nonetheless, they have all been advanced as a component of some multi-mechanism explanation at some point. Because of this, the most appropriate way of evaluating these mechanisms is to examine them in the less artificial context provided by the multi-mechanism models into which they are often assembled. Accordingly, in the pages below, I review what I see as the two most sophisticated existing attempts at comprehensive explanations of the liberal peace, namely those advanced by Charles Lipson and John Owen.

Lipson's Model

Lipson's analysis takes the Rationalist theory of war as its starting point. This move includes the adoption of its key underlying assumptions, namely that (1) the agents who participate in international politics are, on average, rational security-seekers, and (2) because war is costly and destructive, rational agents can be relied upon to prefer peace to war. In so doing, Lipson adopts the *cost-aversion variant* of the *Decision-making Mechanism* as the foundation for his

⁶⁰ Farnham (2003); Schafer and Walker (2006).

⁶¹ Schafer and Walker's (2006: 577) findings seem to support this.

theory. Lipson also accepts the Rationalist argument that war is the result of either a lack of information, an inability to make credible commitments, or issue indivisibility.⁶² On this basis, Lipson argues that the liberal peace is the result of liberal states' uniquely powerful abilities to solve the first two of these problems by providing both more information about their intentions and by making more credible commitments. More specifically, Lipson argues that the inadequate information problem is overcome by liberal democracies' relatively greater ability to reveal information through the illumination of public opinion and government decision-making processes (*Transparency Mechanism*), and in particular their more successful revelation of private information through the creation of audience costs (the *Electoral Mechanism*). For Lipson, the second problem is addressed by liberal states' greater predictability (*Stability Mechanism*), and their greater ability to credibly commit (*Commitment Mechanism*).⁶³

The validity of Lipson's model rests on the claim that by ameliorating the two problems identified by Rationalists, liberal states are able to rely on each other to dependably reciprocate non-violence. This is a significant claim: the dependable reciprocation of non-violence represents an important deviation from normal state behaviour that not only contradicts some of the most ingrained nostrums of international politics, but also involves accepting significant vulnerability. Lipson argues that liberals are willing to take this risk when dealing with other liberals for two reasons. First, because liberal states reveal more information about their capabilities and intentions, their partners believe they can predict their future behaviours more accurately than would be possible for non-liberal states. Second, since states are assumed to be rational and to prefer peace to war, this additional information

⁶² Fearon (1995: 381-382) has largely dismissed issue indivisibility as a primarily theoretical concern and has focused instead on the first two causes, a path which Lipson also follows.

⁶³ Lipson explicitly rejects the idea that liberals' preferences are different from those of other agents, which further confirms that his model depends on the cost-aversion variant of the *Decision-making* mechanism. Lipson (2003: 55-56).

allows liberal states to reduce the misperceptions and errors that often obstruct the optimal resolution of disputes, thereby allowing them to realize their basic pacific preferences.

Setting aside the fact that Lipson's first claim regarding democracies' abilities to reveal information is contested,⁶⁴ the problems with Lipson's argument really begin with the fact that much of the explanatory work is being done by his assumptions about the rational and pacific natures of humans, assumptions that simply do not hold. First, humans are, at best, boundedly rational creatures, with the bounds of their rationality set by both the biological limits of human cognition and by the knowledge structures that constitute the cognitive frameworks through which they interpret the world.⁶⁵ This creates two problems for Lipson's theory. First, humans – especially the types of humans who tend to end up leading states⁶⁶ – have a biological predisposition to overconfidence with the result that even with perfect information they tend to overestimate their chances of victory.⁶⁷ Thus, even in situations where war is irrational many will perceive it as rational.

Second, once humans enter into a conflict mindset the brain quickly becomes even less rational as abstract thought gives way to affective responses.⁶⁸ Third, *contra* Lipson's assumptions, it is actually not that difficult to imagine a cognitive framework within which it might be quite 'rational' for states to prefer war to peace.⁶⁹ Germany under Adolf Hitler is probably the classic example of this,⁷⁰ but there are plenty of other, less extreme,⁷¹ and more

⁶⁴ Rosato (2003: 598); (Rosato 2005: 469); Trachtenberg (2012: 32).

⁶⁵ Tversky and Kahneman (1974); Ferejohn (1991); Lebow (2008); Goldstein and Keohane (1993); Crawford (2002: 14-15); Johnson (2004: 28 and 188).

⁶⁶ Johnson (2004: 24).

⁶⁷ Johnson (2004); Pinker (2011: 512).

⁶⁸ Pinker (2011: 511). This may have been a useful evolutionary development to help increase the intensity of humans' motivation when engaged in conflicts.

⁶⁹ Pinker (2011: 232, 286, 647, and 687). Owen makes this same point when he refers to the 'warrior ethic' present in ancient Greek democracies. Owen (1997a: 17). Cf. Adler (1997: 257).

⁷⁰ Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 31); Trachtenberg (2012: 35); Kissinger (1994: 288-290).

⁷¹ Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 261).

democratic, examples of states that have seemed to prefer war to a peaceful negotiated settlement, such as the United Kingdom (UK) when it helped launch the Crimean War in 1853 and the USA when it initiated the Spanish-American War in 1898.⁷² Publics, even democratic ones, cannot be assumed to be naturally peaceful, as was well demonstrated by the general enthusiasm for war during the July crisis of 1914.⁷³ Moreover, the mere existence of such historical examples makes it that much more difficult for agents to be able to assume the 'rationality' of their peers, notwithstanding the uncertainty reducing features of liberal forms of government.

Nevertheless, Lipson's second argument, that liberal states are better able to credibly commit, may still be a strong one. Lipson's claim rests on the logic of the *Commitment Mechanism* which holds that liberal states have unique powers to (1) precisely signal the level of importance they attach to an agreement, (2) credibly self-bind, (3) build reputations and incentive structures for keeping agreements, and (4) enable others to monitor their adherence to commitments. The main problem with this mechanism, however, is that each of these constraining factors is actually quite weak.

For instance, while it may not be pervasive, the fact that states renege on commitments, even of the solemn variety, is not news. Similarly, the effectiveness of self-binding mechanisms is debateable at best.⁷⁴ Setting the question of reputations aside for a moment, the fact that there exists a long history of covert interventions by liberal states that have successfully avoided

⁷² Ray (1995: 2) agrees. See also Owen (1994: 91) and James and Mitchell (1995: 87-88).

⁷³ Johnson (2004: 64); Widmaier (2005: 434).

⁷⁴ Consider the failure of the US Supreme Court to compel either the federal government or the state of Georgia after its ruling in *Worcester v Georgia*. Similarly, while it may be difficult to achieve ratification of a treaty by the US Senate, nullification of a treaty is not clearly a Senate responsibility (Congressional Research Service 2001: 199). That the USA is probably the most constrained democracy is also worth noting: in Westminster jurisdictions, treaty-making is a royal prerogative and responsibility rests with the cabinet, making it even easier to renege on treaty commitments. See also Trachtenberg (2012: 32).

discovery by the public, press, and the legislators specifically tasked with the monitoring thereof, provides ample evidence of the weakness of this constraint.⁷⁵ Consequently, because perceptions of the *Commitment Mechanism*'s effectiveness are integral to its actual effectiveness, the fact that such claims need to be considered serves to undermine the mechanism's effectiveness, regardless of the claims' ultimate abstract validity.

This analysis demonstrates that Lipson's model leaves liberals with significant grounds for uncertainty concerning whether or not other agents can be relied upon to dependably reciprocate non-violence, even when the effects of all the component mechanisms have been taken into account. The continued existence of this 'residual uncertainty' presents a problem for Lipson's theory for two reasons. First, its very existence threatens to undermine the certainty that the aforementioned mechanisms are supposed to have generated in the first place.⁷⁶ Like an arch missing its capstone, whatever other bases for certainty are in place, so long as residual uncertainty remains, the model is incomplete and incapable of bearing the required weight. Take, for instance, the demonstrated ability of US Presidents to circumvent the constitutional constraints concerning congressional control over declarations of war through the use of covert operations.⁷⁷ The possession of this ability ensures that any sensible agent faced with a choice of whether to rely on these constitutional constraints has reason to question whether they should, thereby undermining their effectiveness in producing the liberal peace.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ See Forsythe (1992); James and Mitchell (1995); and Kegley and Hermann (1996). US President Polk's manipulation of the Matamoros incident to instigate the Mexican-American War provides an apt example of such a failure. See Owen (1997a: 211). I discuss why even non-traditional forms of war, such as covert operations, cannot be dismissed as being too limited in scope to enter into agents' calculations in the next chapter.

⁷⁶ See Risse-Kappen (1995a: 499) for a similar point.

⁷⁷ Rosato (2005: 468).

⁷⁸ Hermann and Kegley (1995: 516).

Second, even if these mechanisms manage to provide the increments of certainty that Lipson argues they do, the fact that some uncertainty concerning the intentions of other agents remains, when combined with the high levels of insecurity present in international politics, means that agents possess strong reasons for not accepting the vulnerability to others required for the liberal peace to eventuate.⁷⁹

Lipson himself seems to sense this problem, noting that any bargain – of which the reciprocation of non-violence is a very specific example – is necessarily an ‘incomplete contract’.⁸⁰ This is because no matter how detailed an agreement is, it cannot possibly anticipate every future eventuality.⁸¹ Recognizing the need to deal with the uncertainty generated by incomplete bargains, Lipson turns to the concept of reputation. For Lipson, reputations “are informed guesses about how a particular actor will behave in particular circumstances, perhaps in a wide range of circumstances (such as a personal reputation for honesty).”⁸² Reputations derive from states’ past actions.⁸³ Lipson argues that reputations, combined with the already-discussed mechanisms, are the determining factor for whether agents rely on others to uphold their commitments.⁸⁴ But, and this is crucial, reputations for what? Lipson argues that the liberal peace is enabled by liberals’ ability to build reputations for trustworthiness.⁸⁵ This concept of trustworthiness is then presented as neutralizing the negative effects of residual uncertainty and incomplete contracts, thereby dissolving these aforementioned problems. To return to my earlier analogy, reputations for trustworthiness are meant to provide the arch’s capstone.

⁷⁹ See Mearsheimer (1990: 50) and Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 32) for similar arguments.

⁸⁰ Lipson (2003: 5 and 52).

⁸¹ Lipson (2003: 5).

⁸² Lipson (2003: 82).

⁸³ Lipson (2003: 78, 82 and 101).

⁸⁴ Lipson (2003: 48, 53, 63-64 and 103).

⁸⁵ Lipson (2003: 103).

Regrettably, despite relying heavily on this concept of trust(worthiness), Lipson fails to provide a thorough conceptualization of trust or properly explain how it is created or sustained. The only discussion he offers indicates that trust is somehow linked to a state's reputation. Certainly, Lipson is not wrong to link trust to reputation; however, a record of past actions cannot by itself generate trust. Much like a scientific theory, trust requires both evidence and an organizing logic. Without such a logic, it is impossible to make sense of agents' past actions and to discern patterns that could be expected to repeat in the future. Because Lipson, as a Rationalist, makes no differentiation between the rationality of liberals and non-liberals, he is unable to provide an organizing logic specific to trustworthy individuals (liberals) and according to which these individuals could be differentiated from untrustworthy ones (non-liberals). And in so doing, Lipson's conceptualization of trust remains an underdeveloped *deus ex machina* that serves to obscure, rather than illuminate, the origins of the liberal peace.

Owen's Model

While Lipson advances a theory that focuses on what he sees as 'objective' factors, John Owen sees liberalism generating the liberal peace in two steps, one subjective and one objective. First, while still endorsing the view that agents are rational actors, Owen resists deriving a model of how agents behave directly from assumptions about agents' rationality. Instead, he argues that liberal agents must be understood as rational within the bounds of liberalism, which he refers to as their 'institutional identity': "[i]n giving an account of how the world works, particularly what causes people to act as they do, liberalism acts as a map, illuminating and obscuring various options for action, but also as a travel guide that helps

them to choose the right destination...”.⁸⁶ Owen accepts that agents desire to maximize their utility, but also argues that this desire is often indeterminate. Instead, he holds that agents rely on knowledge structures, such as institutional identities, to define their interests and the optimal ways of achieving them.⁸⁷ In so doing, Owen clearly includes the *normative variant* of the *Decision-making Mechanism* as an integral part of his model.

However, for the *normative variant* to function, agents making decisions need the ‘map’ described above in order to plan their behaviour. Thus, for his explanation to be complete, Owen must also specify the content of the liberal ‘institutional identity’ he posits. For Owen, liberalism is “a system of thought that seeks to uphold individual autonomy”.⁸⁸ He goes on to assert that “[w]hatever the particular strategy chosen to secure individual autonomy, liberals are strongly attached to peace and self-determination rather than violence and coercion” and that “liberals believe that it is rational to choose peace as a means to the good life. Believing that all persons are at least capable of this rationality, liberals tend to trust properly informed, uncoerced people to be pacific...”.⁸⁹ Thus, “[l]iberals are content to trust the reasonableness of those states that recognize their citizens’ right to self-rule.”⁹⁰ Owen then proceeds to combine this liberal normative compatibility with other liberals with the *psychological variant*, thereby reinforcing liberals’ motivation for cooperation with other liberals with the psychological bias generated by shared membership in an in-group.⁹¹

⁸⁶ Owen (1997a: 19). This conception corresponds to the first and second causal pathway along which Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 12) argue that ideas can affect outcomes.

⁸⁷ Owen (1997a: 24-25). See also Mercer (1995: 233) and Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 17).

⁸⁸ Owen (1997a: 32).

⁸⁹ Owen (1997a: 32).

⁹⁰ Owen (1997a: 36).

⁹¹ Owen (1997a: 12 and 27). This combining of the normative and psychological variants has been further developed by Hayes (2009a, 2012a, and 2012b).

Thus, Owen's account of liberalism provides a clear picture of the subjective causes of the peace. One wonders, however, how the liberals in question actually come to influence foreign policy. The answer to this question forms the second, objective, step in Owen's model: in addition to agents who adhere to a liberal 'institutional identity', the liberal peace also requires that these liberals inhabit an objectively liberal state, that is, a state that allows citizens to consistently and reliably influence foreign policy. In order for such a state to exist, Owen argues that it must integrate two objective characteristics: "freedom of discussion and regular competitive elections of those empowered to make war",⁹² thereby incorporating the logic of the *Electoral, Checks-and-balances, and Transparency* mechanisms into his explanation.⁹³

Importantly, Owen also accepts that not all citizens of liberal states will be liberals⁹⁴ and acknowledges that illiberal individuals can even become the leaders of 'objectively' liberal states.⁹⁵ Owen goes on to argue that in 'ordinary time', citizens calculate that their ability to influence foreign policy is so limited that it is not worth paying much attention to foreign affairs, thus leaving leaders constrained only by an interested elite. During crises, however, citizens recognize the higher stakes involved and are motivated to make their voices heard. This is crucial for Owen because this public engagement acts as a constraint of final resort; if an illiberal leadership has managed to bring a liberal state to the brink of war with another liberal state, liberal citizens will oppose this and the belligerent illiberal leadership will be

⁹² Owen (1997a: 3).

⁹³ He also recognizes the importance of the *Transnational Enmeshment Mechanism*, but it is not integral to his theory. Owen (1997a: 5).

⁹⁴ Weart (1998: 242) notes that "authoritarian subcultures" including "colonial bureaucracies, the military, secret agencies, sometimes business corporations" could exist in "established republics." Consequently, analysts "must attend not just to overall political culture but to the characteristics of the people making key decisions on the scene."

⁹⁵ Owen (1997a: 43). This need not be a sinister development, as 'illiberal' leaders might be liberal in their domestic policies, but may practice a *realpolitik* foreign policy. Many important historical figures such as Winston Churchill and Lord Palmerston arguably fit such a description. See Layne (1997: 90 – Footnote 99). Cf. Doyle (2005: 464); Elman (1997b: 37); Morgan and Schwebach (1992: 306); Hayes (2009b: 26); Widmaier (2005).

forced to back down.⁹⁶ This point is important because it adds an implicit third criterion to Owen's model of an objectively liberal state, namely that if the liberal elite fails to halt the march to war itself, the liberal citizenry will be sufficiently aroused and influential enough to do so.⁹⁷

While Owen's model offers some possible solutions to the shortcomings of Lipson's model, it also leaves open several important questions of its own. Chief among these is the question of how liberal states come to differentiate other liberal states, with whom they can form an in-group and on whom they can rely to dependably reciprocate non-violence, from illiberal states with and on whom they cannot? Owen goes some way to answering this question by asserting that liberals will perceive other states that possess institutions they want in their own states as liberal. The usefulness of this answer is limited, however, because Owen fails to explain the processes by which agents will perceive and evaluate the institutions existing in other states and the standards by which they will decide whether they themselves desire these institutions in a way that enables prediction.

Basically, Owen seems to argue that the question of whether a state is liberal or not is essentially an empirical question that can only be answered after the fact.⁹⁸ While this might be a fair response from an historian, this failure to provide a means of determining *ex ante* whether a state will recognize an other as liberal is problematic for social scientists⁹⁹ for three reasons. First, it seems to go against the evidence we have for how agents actually evaluate other states, which relies primarily on evaluations of the leaders of these states and their

⁹⁶ Owen (1997a: 47).

⁹⁷ Owen (1997a: 46).

⁹⁸ Owen (1997a: 56). Cf. Jackson (2003).

⁹⁹ Pierson (2004: 58).

actions.¹⁰⁰ Second, it severely limits the ability of the analyst to predict whether an agent will recognize another state as liberal or not.¹⁰¹ Third, it undermines the ability of agents themselves to predict whether another agent will recognize them as liberal and, in so doing, undermines the internal logic on which the operation of the mechanism itself depends.

This third point is especially important. Owen sees liberalism producing the liberal peace mainly because liberalism can be depended upon to reliably constrain liberal states from fighting other liberal states. This is accomplished by the fact that liberalism leads liberals to define their interests so as to make fighting other liberals unthinkable. In order for the liberal peace to be possible, however, Owen needs to show how liberalism also eliminates another potential source of conflict and war from relations between liberals, namely the uncertainty about other's intentions and the security dilemma that this uncertainty generates. Only by eliminating this uncertainty can liberals rationally abstain from traditional *realpolitik* modes of interaction and transcend the security dilemma.¹⁰² Unfortunately, because Owen's definition of a liberal state cannot provide a means by which liberal states can reliably identify other liberal states *ex ante* – or know that they have been so identified by other liberal states in return – liberal states cannot eliminate uncertainty regarding the intentions of other states, even if they might suspect them to be liberals. And because they are unable to eliminate this uncertainty, liberal states, just like any other type of state, are unable to transcend the security dilemma and the pull toward war that it generates. Consequently, Owen's definition of a liberal state is not capable of supporting the expectations and behaviours on which the liberal peace depends.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Farnham (2003: 406-407).

¹⁰¹ Indeed, it leaves Owen open to charges of tautology. Layne (1997: 90 – Footnote 99). Cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999: 792).

¹⁰² Gartzke (2007: 171).

¹⁰³ This is a problem of recognition shared by many theories. See Hayes (2012b: 776); Hermann and Kegley (1995: 514). I address this problem directly in the next chapter. For Owen, this problem is rendered even more

One could argue that the solution to this problem lies in Owen's assertion that not only does liberalism provide a basis for the externalization of non-violence between liberals, but that this rational basis is underwritten by a common bond of trust that Owen argues liberalism also generates.¹⁰⁴ One could argue then that liberals, once they have identified other liberals as such, will trust them to remain liberals or to ensure that their state remains so, thereby solving Owen's problem. But even this invocation of trust does not solve Owen's problem. Under Owen's theory, liberal states are incapable of determining *ex ante* whether another state, even one that may currently appear liberal, is sufficiently liberal for the mechanisms by which truly liberal states hold illiberal elements in check to operate. So while Owen, sensing a need to break the link between vulnerability and insecurity, incorporates trust into his theory, he fails to provide an explanation for how trustworthy states manage to recognize each other as such and banish the insecurity that comes from knowing that their perceptions may have been mistaken.

Conclusions

I began this chapter by identifying the causal mechanisms that have been proposed by a variety of scholars as explanations, or parts of explanations, for the liberal peace. Noting that scholarship on the liberal peace has evolved and that it is now rare for any of these mechanisms to be proposed as stand-alone explanations of the liberal peace, I selected two of the most sophisticated multi-mechanism explanations of the liberal peace for further evaluation. While both Lipson's and Owen's models provide useful and important insights,

intractable by (1) his admission that even leaders who appear liberal at one moment may not be; (2) his related admission that states that recognize another state as liberal can quickly change their opinion; and (3) the fact that liberal states may temporarily decide to conduct their foreign policy on non-liberal bases. See Owen (1997a: 43 and 49). Cf. Oren (1995: 178-179).

¹⁰⁴ Owen (1994: 103).

the above analysis illuminates a number of important problems that remain for students of the liberal peace.

Both theorists recognize, at least implicitly, important limitations on the ability of the mechanisms they posit to reduce agents' uncertainty concerning the intentions of others. They also seem to recognize that the existence of this 'residual uncertainty' represents an obstacle to the eventuation of the liberal peace insofar as it inhibits the emergence of a dispute resolution system capable of supporting the holding of the expectations of dependable reciprocation of non-violence needed for the liberal peace to obtain. Significantly, not only do both theorists recognize this problem, they both seek to solve it in the same way: by deploying trust as a means of neutralizing the effects of this residual uncertainty. In both models it is the presence of trust that ultimately licenses agents to hold these aforementioned expectations of dependable reciprocation. However, despite the critical role played by trust in both models, neither provides an adequate conceptualization thereof, thereby rendering its use an analytically unsatisfactory solution to the problem.

While invocation of trust as part of an explanation of the liberal peace is quite common, unfortunately, so too is a failure to sufficiently engage the concept of trust once it has been invoked. This is perhaps unsurprising given that trust has been largely neglected as a focus of sustained theoretical analysis within IR scholarship.¹⁰⁵ This is unfortunate because, as we have seen, trust seems to play an important role in influencing agents' decision-making and behaviour. With Lipson's and Owen's theories, this insufficient focus on trust creates three

¹⁰⁵ Wheeler (2010: 321) and Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010b: 71). For a few notable exceptions within IR see Kydd (2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2005) Hoffman (2002, 2006), Booth and Wheeler (2008), Adler and Barnett (1998a), Mercer (1995, 2005), Keating and Ruzicka (2014), Rathbun (2009, 2011a), and Zak and Kugler (2011). To supplement this corpus, I have drawn on trust scholarship outside of IR including Luhmann (1979), Lascaux (2008), Gambetta (1988a), Lane and Bachmann (1998), Hardin (1993), Baier (1986), Barber (1983), Hollis (1998), and Coleman (1990).

problems that serve to undermine the coherence and usefulness of both models, namely: (1) an insufficient explanation of what trust is and how it is able to support the holding of the expectations of dependable reciprocation of non-violence needed for the liberal peace to obtain; (2) poor specification of the preferences and narratives agents must possess and adhere to in order for these expectations to be conceivable by agents; and (3) the lack of an explanation of how agents recognize trustworthy agents and differentiate them from untrustworthy ones in ways that are consistent with the solutions to (1) and (2). In the next two chapters I use these three problems as a framework for my analysis. In so doing, I develop solutions to these problems that I argue will enable scholars to continue pushing the research agenda for both the liberal peace and the role of trust therein forward.

Chapter 2

A Conceptual Framework for trust

Introduction

I concluded the preceding chapter by outlining three problems that afflict theories of the liberal peace. In this chapter I address the first of these problems, namely the lack of a sufficient explanation of what trust is and how it can enable the holding of dependable expectations. In so doing, my aim is to develop an abstract conceptualization of trust appropriate to the study not only of the liberal peace, but to the study of international politics more generally. Nevertheless, in order to keep the analysis from getting too abstract, I illustrate my arguments throughout this chapter with reference to how the trust that emerges between liberals – that is, liberal trust – enables the holding of the dependable expectations of reciprocation of non-violence needed for the liberal peace to obtain.

I proceed in two ways: First, I review existing conceptualizations of trust and show how they fail to capture the full meaning of the concept by failing to include a number of its essential conceptual components. Because they represent the most developed family of theories of trust within IR scholarship, I begin by focusing on Rationalist theories of trust, specifically Andrew Kydd's account, which represents the best example thereof of which I am aware. I evaluate this Rationalist conception of trust against two sets of criteria (1) whether it is capable of supporting the expectations of dependable reciprocation of non-violence required for the eventuation of the liberal peace, and (2) whether it is compatible with the common sense understanding of trust that I outline below. From this analysis, I draw two conclusions: (1) that Rationalist theories of trust are not actually theories of trust at all; and (2) that,

regardless of whether these theories model ‘trust’ or not, Rationalist models like Kydd’s are incapable of supporting the transcendence of irresolvable uncertainty and, by extension, the security community required for the liberal peace to obtain. The second step I take is to present and justify my adoption of a conceptualization of trust that I argue captures its meaning with greater fidelity than the ones critiqued earlier. The central innovation I introduce in this re-conceptualization is my substitution of what I call *reasonable* agents for rational ones.

Critically, the analysis presented in this chapter remains fairly abstract and represents only a conceptual framework for understanding more specific forms and instances of trust, such as the type of trust required for the liberal peace to obtain. What I am able to do by erecting this framework, however, is to provide a conceptual foundation for the analysis that I present in Chapter 3, analysis that serves to both offer solutions to the second and third problems identified at the end of Chapter 1 and to much more fully flesh out the conceptual elements identified here as being critical components of any conceptualization of trust. In so doing, I prepare the ground for Chapter 4 in which I tackle the operationalization of these elements.

Conceptualizing Trust

In order to proceed, it is necessary to first get to grips with what we really mean when we use the word trust, as it is only then that we can evaluate the comprehensiveness and fidelity to that meaning of another’s conceptualization. It is in this spirit that I present the following definition, which I assert captures the common sense meaning of trust:

*Trust: An agent's (the trustor's) **specific reasonable** belief, held despite **irresolvable uncertainty**, that: (1) she can accurately **predict** certain of another agent's (the trustee's) intentions; and (2) the trustee is in some way **obliged** to have these intentions. For trust to exist, (1) and (2) must prevail to the extent that the trustor makes herself **vulnerable to betrayal** by the trustee through reliance on these predictions in the planning and execution of her future actions.¹*

There are a couple of important implications of this definition that it is helpful to highlight immediately. First, according to this definition, trust is always a **specific** belief, that is, X trusts Y to do Z.² While it is true that many people make statements like X trusts Y and mean it in a general sense, I maintain that in reality such statements actually represent a shorthand for a portfolio of much more specific trust-beliefs that would be revealed by rigorous investigation.³ Second, note that I have *emphasized* a number of key terms in the definition. As we progress, these concepts will feature prominently in my analysis and I will demonstrate why their inclusion is essential to the successful conceptualization of trust.

The Rationalist conceptualization of trust

While he does not provide an explicit conceptualization of trust, Lipson does argue that between agents' knowledge of the incentives that structure potentially cooperative situations

¹ For some representative alternative definitions of trust see Kydd (2005: 3), Gambetta (1988: 217), Booth and Wheeler (2008: 230), and Pouliot (2008: 278-279). Note that my use of the term *reasonable* corresponds to Mercer's (2005) use of the term *rational* insofar as he argues that rationality requires an affective/non-rational component. I use the term rational in a way that corresponds with the way it is used by the 'rationalists' who Mercer criticizes. I take these usages, and much inspiration, from Hollis (1998). I thank Caylan Ford for her suggestion regarding the importance of including betrayal in the definition.

² Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010a: 21) agree.

³ Note this separates my conception of trust from 'generalized' trust. By using a concept of generalized trust, scholars like Rathbun (2011a: 244) define trust as a disposition and not a specific belief. While I am not denying the existence of a disposition that sees others as more cooperative, for reasons discussed throughout the chapter I do not see subsuming trust – something that I see as a specific, distinct, and discrete phenomenon – under such a heading as analytically useful.

and their knowledge of others' reputations, agents can come to believe that they can predict others' future behaviours and will decide whether to cooperate or not on that basis.⁴ Thus, for Lipson, trust amounts to a belief derived from a rational calculation that the trustee will cooperate. This calculation is itself effectuated on the basis of the information about the trustee gathered by the trustor, both through observation and as distilled in an agent's reputation, and amounts to a fairly standard Rationalist conceptualization of trust. Unfortunately, Lipson's limited analysis does not advance further than this. Therefore, in the interest of providing as strong a statement of the Rationalist conceptualization of trust as possible, it is useful to shift attention to Andrew Kydd's more developed account and ask whether Kydd's theory can provide a compatible account of trust capable of filling some of the holes left in Lipson's more limited one.⁵

Kydd defines trust as "a belief that the other side is trustworthy, that is, willing to reciprocate cooperation".⁶ Kydd models the decision-making process that produces cooperation under trust in a formal model he calls the 'Trust Game'. In this game, agents decide whether or not to 'trust' by comparing their beliefs concerning the trustworthiness of the potential trustee given the specific circumstances with their level of risk acceptance and the potential rewards from cooperation – the values of both of which are assumed and exogenous.⁷ In his more complex 'Reassurance Game', however, Kydd partially addresses this limitation by providing an account of how agents' past experiences – both in general and of the potential trustee in

⁴ Lipson (2003: 103).

⁵ I see Kydd's theory of trust as compatible with Lipson's model. Indeed, Lipson cites Kydd's as a foundation for his model. Lipson (2003: 55-56).

⁶ Kydd (2005: 3).

⁷ Kydd (2000a: 402-404) and Kydd (2000b: 333). Kydd does not seem to explicitly acknowledge risk acceptance as a separate and variable term in his model; rather he seems to view it as a function of the potential rewards for cooperation. This seems problematic as agents' level of risk acceptance no doubt varies independently of potential gains as well as in connection with them.

particular (i.e. their reputation) – and a process of ‘costly signalling’ provide information and, in so doing, influence agents’ beliefs concerning the probability that others are trustworthy.⁸

For Kydd, costly signals “serve to separate trustworthy types from untrustworthy types; trustworthy types will send them, untrustworthy types will find them too risky to send.”⁹

Costly signals can take a number of forms, including the type of military forces agents invest in, their ideology, their policies toward weaker neighbours, and their domestic policies toward minorities.¹⁰ In his ‘Reassurance Game’, Kydd models a process of costly signalling that occurs in the first round of the game, thereby providing an endogenous source of information on the basis of which agents form their beliefs concerning others’ trustworthiness in the second round, which he models as a round of the aforementioned ‘Trust Game’.

As described up to this point, Kydd’s theory fits the description of what Aaron Hoffman has labelled a ‘predictive’ account of trust in which trust comprises a belief on the part of an agent that the other will act in a particular way given a particular incentive structure.¹¹ In predictive accounts this belief is predicated on information about an agent’s past behaviour that the agent has gathered either through direct observation or via that agent’s reputation. Based on this information, agents make **predictions** about other agents’ future behaviours and **rely** on them to plan their own future actions. Calling this sort of belief ‘trust’ is problematic, mainly because it is not clear how such a belief is different from simply thinking strategically.¹² Similarly, Hoffman argues that such ‘predictive’ approaches are inherently flawed because it is not possible to distinguish behaviours taken on the basis of ‘trust’ of this

⁸ Kydd (2000b: 331-332 and 340).

⁹ Kydd (2000b: 326); Kydd (1997: 117).

¹⁰ Kydd (1997: 141-145). In so doing, Kydd aligns himself with a strong current in ‘defensive realism’. Edelstein (2012: 8).

¹¹ Hoffman (2002: 379).

¹² Cf. Michel (2013).

sort from other forms of risk-taking. And while trust always involves risk, Hoffman notes that risk-taking does not always involve trust and that predictive accounts of trust cannot differentiate risks taken on the basis of trust from risks taken for other reasons such as risk acceptance and expected utility.¹³

These arguments demonstrate that it is possible to describe the processes that comprise such ‘predictive’ accounts of trust without using the word trust at all and without losing any crucial conceptual content.¹⁴ Consequently, predictive conceptualizations miss an essential aspect of trust and even raise the question of whether trust should exist as a distinct analytical concept. Believing that it should, Hoffman argues that the solution to this challenge lies in adopting what he has termed a ‘fiduciary’ approach to trust, which combines confidence in expectations and the concept of **obligation**.¹⁵ In such a conceptualization, trust actually emerges not from the predicted interaction between an agent’s reputation and an external incentive structure, but rather from a hypothesis that an agent possesses an internalized obligation that will prescribe certain behaviours and proscribe others *regardless of the pay-offs*.¹⁶ While information gathering is still essential to such an account, the information that is gathered does not simply constitute a record of past actions, but is also used to provide support for or against an agent’s hypothesis that the other possesses a particular set of obligations.

The idea of **betrayal**, and its importance to trust, is useful for illustrating the difference between these two conceptualizations. When an agent takes a calculated risk and events turn

¹³ Hoffman (2002: 381). Cf. Rathbun (2009, 351-352 – footnote 2), who makes a similar point.

¹⁴ Cf. Mercer (2005: 95): “[e]mphasizing incentives as the basis for trust eliminates both the need for trust and the opportunity to trust. If trust depends on external evidence, transparency, iteration, or incentives, then trust adds nothing to the explanation.”

¹⁵ Hoffman (2002: 381).

¹⁶ Hoffman (2002: 381).

against them she may be disappointed, but her reaction will not have the same psychological depth as if events had turned against her because she had been betrayed by a trusted other. Betrayal carries with it a clear affective character that renders it far more damaging from the point of view of the trustor, likely because one of its results is to call into question not just an agent's beliefs about the world, but their concept of self and sense of ontological security as well.¹⁷

Obligations are usually understood in moral/ethical terms: agents trust others to 'do what is right' according to some moral code.¹⁸ However, such a moral/ethical dimension is not essential. Instead, trust derives from a belief that agents will act according to a particular logic that, while it could be moral, might also be completely amoral.¹⁹ For example, I might conceive of the USA as a rational actor and thus believe that it is *obliged* to refrain from bombing Iran as a means of resolving its dispute over Iran's nuclear program because such an action would constitute an irrational means of achieving the USA's objectives. In other words, the USA's rational character obliges it to act rationally. Consequently, in order to continue to qualify as a rational actor in my mind, *ceteris paribus*, the USA would be *obliged* to not bomb Iran.

If obligations are so important, where do they come from? Unfortunately, other than assuming that obligations have been assimilated into Rationalists' concept of actor types, obligations cannot be said to have formed an important focus of existing Rationalist scholarship. I maintain that obligations derive from agents' identities. Following Alexander Wendt, I define identities as "relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations

¹⁷ Michel (2013: 880-883); Hogg et al. (2004: 263). See Mitzen (2006) on ontological security.

¹⁸ Hoffman (2002: 379); Hollis (1998: 10).

¹⁹ Hogg and Reid (2006: 13).

about self”²⁰ that generate “motivational and behavioral dispositions”,²¹ which in turn provide the basis for the definition of an agent’s interests through the interaction of these dispositions with particular contexts.²² I discuss identities in greater depth in Chapter 3, so it is sufficient for the moment to say that identities can be conceived of as organizing logics that allow agents to interpret the information they gather from their environment. Identities provide agents with a basis for predicting the future behaviours of other agents; agents that are believed to possess a particular identity will be predicted to act in accordance with the parameters of this identity.²³

If we accept that identities are important in this way – and, indeed, it is only by understanding processes of information gathering such as costly signalling as exercises in the imputation of identities that theories like Kydd’s are intelligible²⁴ – then the next step is to identify the parameters needed for an identity to be capable of supporting trust. Trust is always a specific belief, and so different types of trust – for example, liberal trust – will depend on different sets of parameters.²⁵ Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some abstract parameters that all types of trust must possess. Martin Hollis argues persuasively that the *sine qua non* of trust is its ability to justify a trustor’s expectation that the trustee will act in a certain way, even if doing so goes against the trustee’s interests.²⁶ If we accept this formulation – and to my mind this seems to capture the essence of common sense understandings of trust perfectly – then

²⁰ Wendt (1992: 397); Wendt (1999: 21).

²¹ Wendt (1999: 224).

²² Wendt (1992: 398); Wendt (1999: 231 and 329). See also Zehfuss (2001: 318-320).

²³ Hogg and Reid (2006: 10-11).

²⁴ Kydd (1997: 117). This approach is the same if reputation is substituted for type. See Mercer (2005: 89-91) for an explanation of the impossibility of a meaningful concept of reputation in models that assume rational actors. Cf. Mitzen (2006: 357).

²⁵ I discuss the specific parameters required to generate the liberal peace in the next chapter, but generally, the liberal peace requires agents to hold expectations of dependable reciprocation of non-violence.

²⁶ See Hollis (1998: especially page 79) for an in-depth explanation of this position. C.f. Fukuyama (1995: 10). One Rationalist solution to this problem is to expand the notion of self-interest such that actions that might appear other-regarding are re-interpreted as self-regarding in a psychological or more enlightened sense. This may be logically possible, but as an analytical approach it is essentially tautological [Wendt (1994: 386)] and largely incapable of producing anything but *post hoc* ‘explanations’ [Stein (1998)].

any instance of trust must be underwritten by a belief on the part of the trustor that the trustee is the type of person – that is, one who possesses an identity containing obligations capable of ensuring that they will act in accordance with the trustor’s expectations – who will act as expected even if doing so would go against the trustee’s interests.

Recognizing the role played by identity is an important one because it illuminates the critical limitation of Rationalist models of trust like Kydd’s, namely their under-specification of agents’ identities.²⁷ According to Hollis, Kydd’s agents are, by definition, incapable of trusting because their self-regarding utility-maximizing identity fails – on the side of the trustor – to provide them with the conceptual vocabulary needed to render trust intelligible and – on the side of the trustee – to provide them with the obligations that would ensure their trustworthiness.²⁸ Just as a chess player unaware of the *en passant* rule is incapable of effectuating the move, Kydd’s rational agents are incapable of trusting others because doing so steps outside of their understanding of the possible. While the chess player is capable of physically moving the piece as if she knew the rule, she would not do so because doing so would not make sense to her. Similarly, a rational agent could conceive of actions that would accord with a trust belief, but these actions would not make sense to her and, thus, she would not attempt them or expect rational others to do so either.

It is true that by differentiating between revisionists and security-seekers, Kydd and others show some flexibility in the area of identity by recognizing that even self-regarding rational

²⁷ Pierson (2004: 61; footnote 5) points out that one of the main limitations of game-theoretic scholarship like Kydd’s is the extremely limited anthropologies that stand behind their assumptions about agents preferences.

²⁸ “Intentions are hence themselves moulded in part by language at the disposal of the author, for we cannot intend something that is impossible to conceptualize and to endow with linguistic form.” Freeden (1996: 108). Cf. similar conceptualizations in Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 8); Hall (1993: 35 and 52); Taylor (2004: 55); King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 39); Jackson (2003: 236); and Crawford (2002: 20).

utility maximizers can *define* their interests in different ways.²⁹ However, according to Hollis any such enrichment of agents' identities is ultimately doomed because, by definition, it cannot provide these agents with the ability to act against their own interests so long as they remain *rational* actors.³⁰ Even if these agents have learned the *castling* rule, they still cannot play *en passant*. If a security-seeker, or indeed any other self-regarding rational utility maximizer, is presented with an opportunity to increase her utility, however defined, by exploiting another agent, she will do so and cannot be trusted to do otherwise as the narratives that constitute her identity *oblige* her to do so.³¹

So far, I have argued that, at base, Rationalist theories understand trust as an agent's belief that another agent will cooperate with them. For Rationalists, this belief derives from the interaction between an agent's knowledge of the incentives that structure potentially cooperative situations, and their knowledge of other agents' past behaviours as distilled in their reputations. By itself, such a 'predictive' characterization of trust is insufficient because it fails to distinguish it from other forms of risk-taking, and because it fails to recognize that reputations only make sense when they are reputations *for something*. More sophisticated 'fiduciary' conceptions of trust solve both these problems by recognizing agents as having identities. However, with the recognition of the importance of these identities, our focus must shift to their content.³² Indeed, recognizing the important influence of an agent's identity on

²⁹ See also Fearon (2008); Glaser (1994-1995); and Glaser (2010). Kydd (2001) goes even further and provides a model in which there are four different types of states each with their own distinctive logic. Cf. Schweller (1996).

³⁰ See Hollis (1998: 42-43).

³¹ Interestingly, Hoffman's predictive/fiduciary typology breaks down on closer inspection because the difference between the two is actually an artefact of many 'predictive' theorists' non-essential commitments to a specific conception of agents' identities.

³² To be clear, I am not arguing that the 'logic of appropriateness' trumps the 'logic of consequences' or that 'Constructivism' trumps 'Rationalism'. Rather, these two logics are so thoroughly interpenetrated that agents' behaviours are incomprehensible without both. Indeed, part of our mission as social scientists should be to describe this interpenetration so that we can understand the hybrid logics that motivate actual human behaviour. While such a position may sound more compatible with Constructivism, it is by no means incompatible with a

their behaviour, some Rationalists have responded by recognizing that different agents can define utility in different ways.³³ Nevertheless, so long as these agents remain ‘rational actors’ at their cores, any such enrichment is ultimately doomed because of the way that ‘rational actors’ must, by definition, always exploit their partners if doing so would serve their utility, regardless of how they define that utility.

This brings us to something of a fork in the road. If we accept Hollis’ argument about the essence of trust lying in an agent’s ability to act against their own interests, then it seems clear that a Rationalist theory of trust is impossible. We are thus faced with the choice between proceeding by either (1) abandoning the assumption that agents are rational actors and positing an agent capable of choosing to act against their own interests, or (2) abandoning the idea that trust, as Hollis defines it, is central to our explanation, thereby freeing us to argue that theories like Kydd’s are still perfectly capable of explaining how the liberal peace eventuates. I argue that we must take the first option because, ultimately, only the abandonment of rational actors in favour of what I term ‘**reasonable**’ agents can provide a satisfactory explanation for trusting actions and, by extension, the liberal peace. In the final section of this chapter I describe what I mean by reasonable and explain how one can construct a coherent theory of trust on this basis. Before I do, however, I outline why I do not follow the second, Rationalist, path.

The importance of ‘irresolvable uncertainty’

‘thin’ version of Rationalism [Ferejohn (1991: 280-282)] or the ‘boxes within boxes’ approach advocated by Lake and Powell (1999). Cf. Fearon and Wendt (2002) and Snidal (2002).

³³ Indeed, even Kydd argues that agents’ identities are “something that should be the subject of empirical inquiry.” (2005: 18).

Rationalist characterizations of trust are ultimately unable to explain the liberal peace because of what I call ‘**irresolvable uncertainty**’.³⁴ The argument over whether Rationalist theories are capable of accounting for the liberal peace does not turn on whether ‘irresolvable uncertainty’ exists or not; most scholars accept that it does. The real argument is over its implications. Some argue that these are so significant that the acceptance of the kind of vulnerability entailed by the cooperation required for the liberal peace to obtain is such that prudence would make such cooperation rarer than we observe in the real world.³⁵ Others argue the implications are not so significant and that the levels of existing cooperation are consistent with what we should expect from agents who are rational actors.³⁶ Below, I respond by drawing on the analysis of threat perception outlined in the Introduction and by arguing that additional explanation is required because existing Rationalist explanations: (1) overlook the fluidity of agents’ identities; (2) neglect who is actually perceiving threats; (3) fail to recognize the length of time required to realign capabilities with changing threat environments; (4) ignore how agents do not actually calculate like rational actors; and (5) disregard the effect of predictable psychological biases and emotions on agents’ thinking. Because of these omissions, Rationalist theories of ‘trust’ fail to appreciate the full extent of the explanatory work that needs doing for the liberal peace to eventuate, with the result that they fail to recognize the indispensability of trust and the insufficiency of the explanations they offer.³⁷

Before addressing these five specific points, however, it is useful to begin by briefly reviewing the three fundamental sources of ‘irresolvable uncertainty’. First, because of what

³⁴ I am inspired in this usage by Booth and Wheeler (2008: 188).

³⁵ See Edelstein (2002) for a concurring view. The level of vulnerability that agents must accept depends on the specific form of trust in question: for example, states risk less when they trust each other to respect the inviolability of their diplomats than when they trust each other not to attack.

³⁶ Kydd (1997: 117); Glaser (1994-1995: 59-60).

³⁷ Wendt advances a similar argument (1994: 391).

philosophers call the ‘problem of other minds’, agents can never be certain that an other’s actions are actually representative of that other’s intentions and that they are not misunderstanding or being misled.³⁸ Second, even if agents could be certain of others’ current intentions, they know that intentions can change and that currently benign states could become threatening in the future.³⁹ Third, we do well to remember that international politics is, simply put, an incredibly complex and ambiguous arena. The ability of the human mind to understand all the factors shaping events, let alone predict the outcome of their interactions, is extremely limited.⁴⁰ These are all facts of which any agent of average intelligence and imagination will be aware. Consequently, John J. Mearsheimer argues that rational agents will see the international system as an extremely dangerous environment in which it is not possible to ever predict the future with much accuracy, with the result that it is best to prepare for the worst.⁴¹

Remembering that I have defined trust as requiring the voluntary acceptance of **vulnerability**, if we accept this argument it makes sense that the obstacles that must be overcome before trust can obtain will be very, if not prohibitively, high.⁴² Other theorists such as Charles Glaser disagree. While accepting that uncertainty is irresolvable, and even that misplaced trust can lead to tremendously bad outcomes,⁴³ they argue that the implications that scholars like Mearsheimer draw are out of proportion.⁴⁴ They argue that agents have a variety of tools – such as costly signalling – that allow them to discern others’

³⁸ Hopf (2010: 549). After all, Hitler presented himself as a man of peace and many believed him. Pinker (2011: 248). See also Mearsheimer (2001: 3); Barnett and Adler (1998: 414); Edelstein (2002: 1). Kydd (2005: 18) largely admits this.

³⁹ Mearsheimer (2001: 31); Kydd (1997: 116); Glaser (1994-1995: 56); Edelstein (2002: 2).

⁴⁰ Pierson (2004: 125).

⁴¹ Indeed, Mearsheimer (1994: 11) draws from this assessment the conclusions that “[t]here is little room for trust among states.” Cf. Booth and Wheeler (2008: Chapter 1).

⁴² Mearsheimer (2001: 32). Lipson (2003: 63) seems to agree, at least to the extent that he sees trust as being very dangerous in international politics.

⁴³ Kydd (2005: 19).

⁴⁴ Kydd (1997: 117); Glaser (1994-1995: 59-60).

intentions with a fair degree of certainty, rendering the chances of grave miscalculation minimal.⁴⁵ Thus, they argue that the obstacles to cooperation are not nearly as high as scholars like Mearsheimer have suggested.

Certainly, this optimistic second group of theorists is right to point out that agents do possess some tools for accumulating information about others' intentions. In fact, most of the mechanisms discussed in the first half of Chapter 1 functioned at least partially in this way. Certainly these tools enable agents to build familiarity with other agents and confidence in their predictions concerning these others' future actions. Scholars like Kydd would even argue that this information allows agents to impute identities to others enabling them to predict their future intentions. Crucially, as discussed earlier, these theorists neglect the fact that agents' identities are fluid and subject to change meaning that agents' identities are *always* in process and that any stability in an agent's identity is relative.⁴⁶ Changes in agents' identities can alter their definition of their interests, their perception of their threat environment, and the strategies that they understand as 'rational' means for meeting these threats.⁴⁷ Moreover, agents are aware of this possibility, and that change can occur relatively quickly – at least in terms of strategically important activities like procurement, weapons systems development, and alliance building – thereby limiting the time available for crafting a response.⁴⁸ The fact that agents usually possess a number of identities at once, and will shift between them on the basis of the context in which they find themselves, only exacerbates the

⁴⁵ Kydd (1997: 117).

⁴⁶ Hermann and Kegley (1995: 520). Mearsheimer (2001: 31) makes this point more abstractly by pointing out that it is impossible to be certain about other states' intentions. See also Wendt (1994: 386).

⁴⁷ Oren (1995); Jervis (1978: 168).

⁴⁸ Jervis (1978: 199-200); Russett and Oneal (2001: 22).

problems just identified,⁴⁹ as does the logic of backward induction that, somewhat ironically, can be especially debilitating for rational agents.⁵⁰

Thus, whatever information is revealed by costly signalling is only useful for predicting an other's future behaviour insofar as that other's identity does not change.⁵¹ Kydd does recognize that states' identities can change, but also claims that this has not been the cause of many, if any, wars and consequently largely disregards further consideration of the uncertainty created by the fluidity of identities.⁵² This is problematic, mainly because Kydd's claim ignores a number of examples where concern over potential identity changes did contribute to wars.⁵³ Rationalists might still respond that, at least for democracies, identity change is unlikely to be a problem because of the way that democratic decision-making, due to its transparency, reveals the full spectrum of possible identities a state might assume and provides ample warning of any impending shifts, thereby greatly reducing the likelihood of genuine surprises.⁵⁴ Leaving aside the contested nature of this claim,⁵⁵ this argument fails to recognize the ability of liberal states to use covert operations as an effective substitute for war (traditionally defined) and of illiberal leaders to circumvent those aspects of liberal governance responsible for creating transparency.⁵⁶

The insecurity that results from all this only grows if we integrate the second of the aforementioned omissions and focus on the agents actually making the decisions as opposed to states: since it is actually regimes and individual leaders that make decisions, *regime*

⁴⁹ Wendt (1994: 385); Hogg et al. (2004: 252).

⁵⁰ See Hollis (1998: Chapter 3).

⁵¹ Greenhill (2008: 255); Zehfuss (2001: 326 and 338). This need not be a Cognitivist or Constructivist explanation, as an Institutional [Moravcsik (1997)] model can also account for internal changes of this type.

⁵² Kydd (1997: 118).

⁵³ Western support for the Whites in the Russian Civil War (1919-1922), which sought to block the creation of a Bolshevik state, provides an apt example. See also Lipson (2003: Chapter 5) for more examples.

⁵⁴ Kydd (1997: 117); Lipson (2003: 6-7).

⁵⁵ Rosato (2003: 598) argues the opposite, for instance.

⁵⁶ Chan (1993: 207).

security is often a better lens through which to understand state decision-making than is *state* security.⁵⁷ The reason for this is twofold: First, the interests of individual agents will never align perfectly with those of the state. Thus, in addition to actual threats to the state, which will usually pose a threat to the decision-maker in some form, actions that pose no or limited threats to the state *qua* state, but serious threats to decision-makers – such as *coups d'état*, or career setbacks – will enter agents' calculations more than they would if the Leviathan itself could make decisions. Second, states are actually much harder to harm than individuals or regimes. Correspondingly, the severity of the threat posed by certain actions, like assassinations and foreign sponsorship of domestic rebellions, will figure much larger in agents' calculations than in calculations taken from the state's perspective.⁵⁸ Thus, even if uncertainty can be reduced to a great extent from a state perspective, regimes and individuals will still be more reluctant to accept vulnerability.

Rationalist theories' third failure is that it is not even clear that transparency is an effective safeguard for agents' strategic interests. As just noted, the timeline required for strategically important decisions to have an impact can actually be fairly long. Britain's famous 'ten year rule', whereby British interwar procurement and re-armament decisions were based on a forecast of whether Britain could expect to find itself involved in a major war at some point in the next decade provides a good illustration of the extended time frames according to which these decisions are made. With modern warfare especially, these elongated timeframes are the result of a recognition of the time needed to mobilize not just existing personnel and material, but also the time needed to develop technologically sophisticated weapons systems and to convert civilian industries to wartime production.

⁵⁷ Hermann and Kegley (1995: 514-515 and 528). This logic is the most powerful insight of Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues' (1999) 'selectorate' argument and applies especially forcefully to weak states. See also Clapham (1996: 4-5); Roessler (2011). Jervis (1978: 174) makes a similar argument.

⁵⁸ See Salehyan (2010) for an example.

Fourth, theories like Kydd's fail to accurately model the processes by which states deal with uncertainty.⁵⁹ Predictive theories posit that agents seek to overcome uncertainty by gathering information about others' types and circumstances and then calculating whether agents are trustworthy in particular situations on the basis of this information. Interestingly, however, it is actually the absence of calculations of this type that often demonstrates the presence of trust.⁶⁰ For instance, contrary to basic Realist predictions,⁶¹ Canada is not continually calculating ways to improve its ability to defend against a possible American onslaught, nor is the USA examining every potential trade agreement with Canada to assess whether Canada stands to increase its relative capabilities *vis-à-vis* the USA.⁶² If a Rationalist model of cooperation assumes that agents act in a certain way in order to gather the information they require to justify cooperation, but agents do not engage in the actions required to gather this information and show no signs of making these calculations, it seems clear that the cooperation that ensues cannot be understood as having any causal connection to these theorized calculations.

Finally, Rationalist theories of trust are fatally undermined when one realizes that, as numerous studies have shown, humans' decision-making is not rational and is instead prone to a host of predictable psychological and cognitive biases.⁶³ One such bias is the tendency toward overestimating the likelihood of one's own success. As many scholars have shown, leaders consistently overestimate their own capabilities and underestimate their opponents',

⁵⁹ For examples, see Rathbun (2011a) and Rathbun (2011b). Ostrom (2005: 70-78) reviews supportive experimental evidence.

⁶⁰ Hopf (2010: 552-553).

⁶¹ Russett and Oneal (2001: 219).

⁶² Cf. Pouliot (2008: especially page 258) and Wendt (1999: 289-290). See also Jervis (1988: 680); Fukuyama (1995: 9).

⁶³ Tversky and Kahneman (1974); Mercer (2010: 21); Jervis (1988: 700); Haidt (2012: xiv); Pinker (2011: 511); Michel (2013: 881-882); and Johnson (2004: 28).

even in the teeth of contradictory evidence.⁶⁴ Similarly, agents consistently over-estimate the likelihood of dramatic and difficult-to-fathom events.⁶⁵ A consequential example of this is the so-called ‘one percent doctrine’ adhered to by the US administration of President George W. Bush. According to Vice-President Dick Cheney, “If there's a 1% chance that Pakistani scientists are helping *al Qaeda* build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response”.⁶⁶ Consequently, agents over-weight the importance of certain types of threatening information and perceive threats as more important than they actually are.

Similarly, Rationalist theories fail to recognize the importance played by emotions in threat perception and decision-making.⁶⁷ For example, instead of relying on facts and observations, agents will often take belief-consistent feelings as evidence confirming the correctness of their beliefs.⁶⁸ Likewise, in laboratory experiments, participants will consistently reduce their own utility in order to exact revenge on other participants they perceive as having betrayed them.⁶⁹ When combined with other self-serving biases, such as the fundamental attribution error (the human tendency to over-value dispositional explanations and under-value situational explanations for the behaviours of others), emotional rationales for action can very quickly spiral out of control and induce extremely destructive sub-optimal conflicts for all involved.⁷⁰ Indeed, as Steven Pinker points out, agents are often very happy to trade material utility for emotional satisfaction.⁷¹ And even in the rare cases when predatory violence is initially motivated by purely rational acquisitive considerations, any resistance by the prey

⁶⁴ Johnson (2004); Pinker (2011: 513). See (Jervis 1988: 693) on motivated bias.

⁶⁵ Jervis (1988: 690).

⁶⁶ See Suskind (2006).

⁶⁷ Lebow (2008); Pinker (2011: 530).

⁶⁸ Mercer (2010: 7); Haidt (2012: 60).

⁶⁹ Pinker (2011: 537). Cf. Mercer (2010: 11).

⁷⁰ Jervis (1988: 686 and 692). See also Johnson (2004: 8, 19, and 43-44).

⁷¹ Pinker (2011: 676); Mercer (2010: 11); Haidt (2012: 179-180).

will likely induce the engagement of the predator's emotions, thereby creating the possibility of such an aforementioned spiral.⁷²

Reasonableness

I have neither the space nor expertise to discuss whether or not the problems just identified can be overcome within a Rationalist framework. That said, these problems do seem significant enough to justify exploring the alternative modes of explanation identified earlier. Insofar as many of these aforementioned deviations from 'rationality' are predictable,⁷³ the solution to many of the theoretical problems they cause lies with the inclusion of the concept of 'reasonableness' in the definition of trust. In including 'reasonableness', I follow a number of scholars who argue that *both* rational calculation and *arational* factors like emotion represent important bases of beliefs such as trust, and by extension agents' decision-making.⁷⁴ The inclusion of arational bases is critical because it creates the possibility for the obstacles generated by the interaction between irresolvable uncertainty and rationality to be avoided through a short-circuiting of 'objective' rationality.⁷⁵ Below, I show how this short-circuiting occurs.

From the perspective of individuals, reality is unmanageably complex and so full of uncertainty that it risks becoming debilitating. In response, a number of mechanisms that

⁷² Pinker (2011: 511); Jervis (1988: 686 and 693). While these biases may possess an evolutionary logic, since the unit of evolution is the *gene*, such logics are not necessarily rational for an *individual*, let alone a state. Pinker (2011: 583); Kydd (2000a: 398); Clutton-Brock (2009). I thank Zinta Zommers for her insight on this point. Cf. Zak and Kugler (2011: 140-141); Hoffman (2006: 23).

⁷³ Jervis (1988: 700); Mercer (2010: 25).

⁷⁴ Michel (2013); Zak and Kugler (2011: 140); Hollis (1998: Chapter 8); Booth and Wheeler (2008: 232); Hoffman (2006: 23); Mercer (2010: 6); Lascaux (2008: 5); and Freedman (1996: 29-31 and 37) are all supportive of this approach. See Mercer (2010) for an interesting argument for why purely 'rational' actors cannot make reasonable decisions. See Haidt (2012: 33), Pouliot (2008: 278-279), Hopf (2012), Fukuyama (1995: 11 and 325), and Crawford (2002: 14-15) for similar approaches.

⁷⁵ Zak and Kugler (2011: 140).

render reality more tractable have evolved.⁷⁶ Knowledge structure is a general term that I use to identify one such simplifying mechanism which, *inter alia*, enables action by emphasizing critical aspects of reality at the expense of others and by providing agents with intelligible causal stories about how these emphasized aspects interact with each other.⁷⁷ In so doing, knowledge structures bound agents' rationality by detaching subjective rationality from what might be called objective – or omniscient – rationality.⁷⁸ The result of this is that boundedly rational – that is *reasonable* – agents act in certain predictable ways that might appear irrational from an omniscient/objective perspective, or even from an alternative subjective perspective bounded by different assumptions.⁷⁹ Essentially, the integration of a specific knowledge structure into an agent's cognitive framework – the term I use to refer to the larger assemblies of beliefs within which agents interpret their surroundings and make decisions at any one time – alters the assumptions that this framework encodes, thereby altering the kinds of behaviour that make sense in this cognitive context.⁸⁰

Trust-beliefs are a particular form of knowledge structure that, in bounding agents' rationality in a certain way, enable them to justify decisions to cooperate with others without having to undertake the costly cognitive processes that characterize 'rational' decision-making.⁸¹ This is because if an agent trusts another agent to do something, then the trustor's decision to

⁷⁶ Luhmann (1979: 8); Hogg et al. (2004: 255).

⁷⁷ Khong (1992: 26) offers the following definition of a 'schema', which serves as a good general definition of a knowledge structure: "[a] schema is a generic concept stored in memory. It may refer to objects, situations, events, or sequences of events and people. A schema may also be viewed as a person's subjective 'theory' about how the social or political world works. This subjective 'theory' is typically derived... from 'generalizing across one's experiences' in the political world..." Khong (1992: 26-27) also notes that "[n]either the cognitive psychologists nor the political scientists have seen fit to distinguish strictly between" various structures such as schemas, knowledge structures, etc because the "functional similarities are much more impressive and pertinent than their differences." See also Mercer (2005: 87); Lascaux (2008: 8); Stein (1999: 216); and Hogg et al. (2004: 256). Cf. Mitzen's (2006) conceptualization of a routine.

⁷⁸ See Lake and Powell (1999: 18) on the importance of theorizing agents' beliefs. Risse-Kappen (1995a) provides an example of how the norms that define a collective identity influence the behaviours of members of this in-group. Cf. Rousseau (2006: 6); Lascaux (2008: 8-9).

⁷⁹ Tversky and Kahneman (1986); Stein (1999: 214). This predictability means that my theory meets the standard set out by Rosato (2005: 468) for the incorporation of perceptions into one's theory.

⁸⁰ Cf. Crawford (2002: 48).

⁸¹ Zak and Kugler (2011: 140).

cooperate will not be based on a rational calculation of whether the other is trustworthy or not, but instead on whether the trustor already believes that the potential trustee is trustworthy in this particular context.⁸² Naturally, a trust-belief can be incorrect, but the point is that agents assume that it is correct and rely on it to plan their actions.⁸³

The analysis above describes how knowledge structures like trust-beliefs influence agents' decision-making. However, this account does not explain how these trust-beliefs are generated initially. As described in greater detail in Chapter 3, I argue that when an agent comes to trust an other, this represents a shift from one cognitive framework, specifically a more prudential one in which confidence in rational calculations tend to predominate as the bases for decision-making, to another in which trust-beliefs predominate. Once this shift has occurred, the trustor's belief in the reliability of the trustee becomes an assumption concerning her trustworthiness instead of a subject of calculation.⁸⁴

Crucially, in order for this shift to be possible, a foundation of confidence must already exist.⁸⁵ If this is so, however, how, when, and why does this shift occur? As is discussed in Chapter 3, I maintain that this shift is the result of a process of collective identification in which the trustor and the trustee mutually identify as members of the same 'in-group'. This experience of collective identification – and the associated triggering of an arational psychological bias toward others perceived as sharing membership in an 'in-group' – converts the foundation of rational confidence into a trust-belief, thereby combining the

⁸² Cf. Pouliot (2008) and Michel (2013) on background dispositions.

⁸³ Haidt (2012: 282).

⁸⁴ Risse-Kappen (1995b: 30) makes the same claim. Cf. Wendt (1994), especially page 386 for a similar analysis.

⁸⁵ Trust-like beliefs, such as faith – that is, a belief in things unseen that cannot be disproved [Mael and Ashforth (2001: 210)] – may arise spontaneously, say through religious conversion, but as such a belief would not contain a rational component, it would not qualify as reasonable, and thus would not qualify as a trust-belief. Cf. Johnson's (2004: 7) comparable differentiation between 'positive illusions' and 'positive delusions'.

rational and arational bases of trust and transforming them into a reasonable justification. As is discussed shortly, the important role played by collective identification in the generation of trust serves to make clear an essential link between the liberal peace and another important phenomenon, namely security community.

That said, collective identification by itself is insufficient; the results of any particular identification depend on the content of the narratives associated with the commonality around which the identification occurred.⁸⁶ More precisely, in order for an agent to trust an other in a specific way, the identity shared by the two agents must be constituted by a set of narratives that contain the conceptual vocabulary and justificatory causal story needed to enable the specific type of trust in question.⁸⁷ For example, medieval monarchs clearly recognized each other as sharing a common identity and trusted each other in certain ways – for example, to act according to the code of chivalry in their treatment of enemy nobles during war – but, critically, the narratives that constituted this identity did not prohibit violence as a means of resolving their disputes. Consequently, despite sharing an identity, war between monarchs occurred frequently, thus highlighting the importance of attending to the narrative content of agents' identities in efforts to explain their behaviours.⁸⁸

This is a critical point because it highlights how simply sharing an identity does not necessarily result in peaceful relations within a group, something that is often missed in scholarship on both the liberal peace and security communities, and something that must be accounted for within any theory that relies on the *psychological variant*.⁸⁹ As we shall see in

⁸⁶ Khong (1992: 21-22 and 27).

⁸⁷ Cf. Adler (1997: 257); Adler and Barnett (1998b: 34); Weldes (1999: 12); Crawford (2002: 48). See also Wendt's (1999: Chapter 6) discussion of how the content of a particular culture of anarchy influences state behaviour.

⁸⁸ Crawford (2002: 6); Weldes (1999: 8-9).

⁸⁹ Maoz (1998: 55); Hermann and Kegley (1995: 518).

the next chapter, I argue that in order to accommodate this fact, the *psychological variant* must be combined with the *normative variant*, in order for a coherent account of the liberal peace to emerge. It is only by combining in-group bias with liberalism, an identity that encodes parameters specifically equipped to support expectations of dependable reciprocation of non-violence toward other members of an in-group, that the type of trust necessary for the liberal peace to emerge can do so. More generally, this argument highlights the importance of integrating both Constructivist and Cognitivist insights into our understanding of the liberal peace, a theme to which I return throughout this thesis.

Significantly, this analysis all goes toward answering the question of *why* a trust-belief is created. The answer to the question of *how* trust-beliefs are created is more dynamic and is closely entwined with questions concerning how trust is built and how agents recognize each other as sharing membership in an in-group, topics I discuss in the first part of the next chapter.

Conclusions

At the end of the last chapter I argued that, notwithstanding the important progress achieved by theorists like Lipson and Owen, three problems continued to block progress toward a better understanding of the liberal peace. In this chapter, I tackled the first of these problems by illustrating how a new conceptualization of trust is needed to address the lack of a comprehensive and persuasive explanation of what trust is and how it supports the holding of the expectations of dependable reciprocation of non-violence needed for agents to transcend the security dilemma and, by extension, for the liberal peace to obtain. I began by engaging

with the most fully developed Rationalist theory of trust and showed how existing Rationalist theories of trust have failed to provide coherent accounts of trust.

To summarize, I argued that according to rationalist conceptions of trust, trust is indistinguishable from other forms of risk-taking, thereby impoverishing the term to the point of superfluity. This is a problem because, as discussed in Chapter 3 and in the case studies, there is an important difference between the two, and the fact remains that we do observe trusting behaviour (in my reasonable sense) in international politics.⁹⁰ Indeed, as John Dunn argues “[t]he question of whom to trust and how far is as central a question of political life as it is of personal life.”⁹¹ Moreover, even the reduced Rationalist version of ‘trust’ contains its own contradictions. Even if trust is nothing more than calculated risk-taking, agents still need something on the basis of which they can calculate these risks, namely an organizing logic, the adherence to which agents can impute to others, thereby enabling them to make sense of others’ previous actions and model their future behaviour. Rationalists refer to this logic as an agent’s type. In order for the liberal peace, for example, to obtain, however, agents need to have in their heads a conceptual vocabulary that renders the actions required to generate the liberal peace intelligible, namely liberalism. Because rational agents are unable to act in ways that go against their rational self-regarding interests, however, not only are they incapable of acting in the ways required for the liberal peace to obtain, they are highly unlikely to believe that another state would do so either, at least in a context as dangerous as international politics. Thus, in order for the liberal peace to be possible, it is necessary to assume that agents are reasonable instead of rational, that is, are agents whose decision-making contains both rational and arational components.

⁹⁰ Zak and Kugler (2011: 139).

⁹¹ Cited in Wheeler (2010: 321). Kydd (2005: 26) agrees.

By making these arguments I have outlined a conceptual framework for understanding trust. However, the task of elaborating this framework remains incomplete, as does the task of filling in the conceptual components of the framework required for the specific type of trust needed to generate the liberal peace. In order for liberal trust to be a useful concept and a valid part of a rigorous social scientific explanation of the liberal peace, not only must one's account of trust describe the way in which trust enables the holding of expectations of dependable reciprocation of non-violence, it must also address the second and third problems identified earlier, namely (2) the poor specification of the preferences and narratives agents must possess and adhere to in order for these expectations to be conceivable; and (3) the lack of an explanation of how agents recognize trustworthy agents and differentiate them from untrustworthy ones. It is to the resolution of these problems that I now turn.

Chapter 3

Components of Trust

Introduction

In Chapter 2, I explained how my definition better captures the meaning of trust than other, Rationalist, conceptions of the term. I also argued that trust is always specific and that, in order for the type of trust required to support the reciprocal holding of the dependable expectations of non-violence required for the liberal peace to obtain, agents need to subscribe to a narrative capable of justifying such expectations and to recognize each other as doing so. In this chapter, I argue that it is in agents' identities that narratives of this type are to be found. More specifically, I argue that it is the liberal narrative that encodes the substantive obligations required for the type of trust needed for the liberal peace to eventuate. In order to substantiate this claim, I provide a general account of how narratives constitute agents' identities and, by extension, define their interests. Building on this account, I illustrate the process by describing the specific ways in which liberalism serves these functions and enables the holding of the dependable expectations of non-violence required for agents to transcend the security dilemma for the liberal peace to eventuate, thereby addressing the second problem identified at the end of Chapter 1.

However, before I can make this argument effectively, I need to address the third problem identified in Chapter 1, namely how agents come to recognize other agents as trustworthy and differentiate these agents from untrustworthy ones. Taking my discussion of rationality in Chapter 2 as a starting point, I argue that agents do this by short-circuiting rationality and that this short-circuiting is accomplished by the introduction of 'in-group bias'. Drawing on

research in social psychology, I argue that ‘in-group bias’ is the result of a reasonable process of collective identification that integrates both rational and arational processes. Building on this analysis, I review the limited literature on collective identification that currently exists in IR. Finding this scholarship inadequate, I incorporate additional findings from other disciplines including history, behavioural economics, and even neurology, and identify six psychological mechanisms that tend to push agents toward collective identification. In so doing, I provide a conceptual foundation for the research design that I develop in Chapter 4.

Part 1: The process of recognition

In 2003 Sebastian Rosato asserted that “democratic peace theorists... cannot tell us when democracies will perceive other states as democratic and when they will not.”¹ Rosato is to a large extent correct. Too many scholars have simply accepted the argument that “it is common knowledge whether a given state is a liberal democracy”² and not inquired into the process through which such recognition occurs.³ In reality, it is not a given that liberals will “perceive each other to be ideologically committed to the liberal prohibition against the use of force to settle disputes”; rather, the question of whether this recognition has occurred should be viewed as an empirical one.⁴ This is a critical problem because without addressing it one cannot claim to have explained the liberal peace. Unfortunately, students of the liberal peace have generally failed to investigate this question in a systematic manner.⁵ In this

¹ Rosato (2003: 592–93).

² Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992: 156). Cf. Russett and Oneal (2001: 54).

³ Muppidi (2001: 47); Williams (2001: 528); Risse-Kappen (1995a: 501-502). This is problematic considering the debate surrounding the conflicting contemporary perceptions of numerous important cases, including the Confederate States of America [Layne (1994)], Imperial and Weimar Germany [Layne (1994) and (2001); Oren (1995); and Wright (2010)], Lebanon [Elman (1997c)], Spain prior to 1898 [Owen (1997a) and (1997b)], and the Boer Republics [Layne (2001)].

⁴ Hermann and Kegley (1995: 514); Kahl (1998: 94-95).

⁵ Hermann and Kegley (1995: 512); Kahl (1998: 100). Work on the related area of perceptions of threats – for example, Rousseau (2006) – is a partial exception to this statement, but it is still quite an under-developed area. Farnham (2003: 411).

section, I seek to alter this situation by providing a general framework for understanding how and when states will perceive other states as trustworthy and when they will not.

I use the term recognition to refer to a process whereby agents identify trustworthy others and differentiate them from untrustworthy ones. I define the quality of trustworthiness as a perception of Agent A, held by Agent B, that A can be trusted. Because trust is always a specific belief, the quality of trustworthiness is also always specific and reducible to a hypothesis concerning the trusted agent's intentions concerning a specific action. Similarly, because trust is always justified by a belief that A possesses an obligation to act in the predicted way, the perception of A as trustworthy requires an assessment by B that A possesses an obligation capable of sustaining the aforementioned prediction. As discussed, beliefs of this sort derive from B's imputation of a particular identity to A. Below I discuss the two-stage process by which these beliefs obtain and how agents come to accept vulnerability on this basis.

The first stage of this process comprises the ways in which agents build confidence in an other's predictability. Confidence is built through the accumulation of 'familiarity'.⁶ Kydd's model of costly signalling is one example of the ways in which agents accumulate familiarity with others, as are a number of the mechanisms discussed in Chapter 1, such as the *Transparency Mechanism*. This confidence-building is important; indeed, the initial possibility of a collective identification is likely often the result of such a process in which a commonality is identified as being shared by two or more agents. Nevertheless, discussed earlier, accounts that rely solely on confidence in predictions cannot, by themselves, explain how trust is produced; some additional arational factor is also required.

⁶ Cf. Mercer (1995: 249); Luhmann (1979: 19).

I argue that ‘in-group bias’ is this critical arational factor and that the second stage of recognition comprises the process by which this bias is activated. Psychologists have long known that humans possess an innate bias in favour of those with whom they perceive themselves as forming an ‘in-group’.⁷ The formation of in-groups – and their corollary ‘out-groups’ – is the result of a psychological process called categorization whereby humans simplify their surroundings by dividing the social world into groups based on perceived similarities and differences.⁸ The similarity on the basis of which a categorization occurs, which I refer to as the salient commonality, can range from the trivial, such as the colour of a shirt, to the profound, such as sharing a religious faith. I refer to the process by which agents come to perceive each other as sharing a salient commonality, and thus sharing membership in an in-group, as ‘collective identification’.⁹

In-groups and the psychological nature of collective identification

At its most basic level, collective identification entails the altering of an agent’s identity through the incorporation of the in-group into the agent’s concept of self. This has a number of psychological effects, with one of the most fundamental being that agents’ definition of their interests begin to align with those of the in-group,¹⁰ even when this seems to go against their ‘objective’ interests.¹¹ Such an alignment is difficult to explain from a Rationalist perspective, thereby highlighting the importance of understanding the unique dynamics of the

⁷ Johnson (2004: 188).

⁸ Hayes (2012a: 67-68).

⁹ Unfortunately, the question of how commonalities achieve salience is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, I bracket this question for most of my analysis and only return to it in my Conclusions chapter.

¹⁰ Mael and Ashforth (2001: 198); Wendt (2003: 505). See also Owen (1997a); Pettigrew (1997: 183); Kahl (1998: 126); Hogg et al. (2004: 254).

¹¹ Hermann and Kegley (1995: 517); Tajfel and Turner (1979: 38-40); Mercer (2005: 95-96); Pinker (2011: 523). Cf. Owen (1997a: 24-25); Dovidio et al. (1997, 402).

psychological processes by which it is generated and its remarkable influences on agents' decision-making.¹²

First and foremost is the way that collective identification enables the short-circuiting of rationality which, in turn, enables the holding of dependable expectations despite the existence of irresolvable uncertainty. Once agents have collectively identified, members of the in-group will no longer seek to determine the predictability of their co-members through 'rational' processes – at least along the dimensions governed by the identity in question. Instead, agents will simply assume that other members of the in-group will act in accordance with the norms that define membership of the in-group.¹³ As is discussed below, trustors essentially put on blinders that largely obscure the possibility that their partners will act contrary to what their in-group membership would suggest.¹⁴

This raises the important question of the source of agents' dependable expectations concerning other in-group members' behaviour, the second key point to take away from the psychology of collective identification. This question is addressed in greater depth below, but for now it is sufficient to note that these expectations derive from the substantive norms, or as I call them narratives, associated with the salient commonality around which collective identification occurred. These narratives can be understood as basically analogous to the 'prototypes' or 'group norms' that social psychologists argue define in-groups, which they describe as "fuzzy sets of interrelated attributes that simultaneously capture similarities and structural relationships within groups and differences between the groups, and prescribe

¹² Pettigrew (1997: 181). The account that follows takes its inspiration from Tajfel and Turner (1979: 40).

¹³ Hogg et al. (2004: 254). C.f. Hopf (2010: 548).

¹⁴ Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 12); Hall (1993, 48); Lascaux (2008: 4 and 14). This argument effectively responds to Greenhill's (2008: 351-352) concerns that processes of inter-group identification are unstable. See also my discussion of trust's 'stickiness' below.

group membership–related behavior.”¹⁵ While most discussions of these narratives, such as Rationalist discussions of agent ‘type’, emphasize their internal logics, narratives can also encode affective predispositions.¹⁶

Regardless of the content of these narratives, a distinct, albeit quite basic, affective in-group bias is also generated by collective identification. This bias results in agents experiencing a limited positive predisposition *vis-à-vis* members of their in-group and corresponding negative predispositions toward members of the out-group.¹⁷ Importantly, these protean dispositions rarely have much independent effect because of the density of additional social factors by which they are mediated. Nevertheless, it is this basic psychological bias that sets the general orientations of agents’ identifications and triggers the psychological switch between a cognitive framework in which a trust-belief does not figure to one in which it does.¹⁸

A third important psychological insight is that, once agents have expanded their own identity to include the in-group, the success of the in-group becomes implicated in individuals’ efforts to maintain their self-esteem and ontological security.¹⁹ Agents vicariously experience the successes and failures of their in-group as their own.²⁰ This has the important knock-on effect of making agents resistant to information that might reduce their positive view of the in-

¹⁵ Hogg et al. (2004: 253-254 and 259); Hogg and Reid (2006: 10).

¹⁶ Khong (1992: 225); Hogg et al. (2004: 248); Crawford (2000: 119). Cf. Hall (2011: 535).

¹⁷ Hogg et al. (2004: 253-254); Hogg and Reid (2006: 10). These inclinations derive from the comparative nature of categorization and agents’ attempts to maximize their differentiation from out-groups as a means of enhancing their own self-esteem. Hogg et al. (2004: 257-258); Hayes (2012a: 67-68).

¹⁸ Hopf (2010: 548 and 554) characterizes this as the elimination of uncertainty. I maintain that uncertainty remains due to its ‘objective irresolvability’, and that it is only the perception of uncertainty that is eliminated.

¹⁹ Tajfel and Turner (1979: 40). See also Pinker (2011: 140); Hogg et al. (2004: 255-256); Mael and Ashforth (2001: 199); Kahl (1998: 127). Cf. Zehfuss (2001: 326); Mercer (2005: 86); Hall (1993: 49); Wendt (1999: Chapter 7).

²⁰ Mael and Ashforth (2001: 205 and 215).

group, or in-group members, because it would represent an indirect attack on them.²¹ One of the most important implications of this is that it renders collective identification – and the trust-beliefs it enables – ‘sticky’. By sticky, I mean that once an identification has been established it should require a higher threshold of disconfirming evidence to alter the identifying agent’s expectations than if this agent held the same expectations based solely on a similar level of rationally generated confidence.²²

A final key insight is that agents are implicated in numerous collective identifications simultaneously.²³ This is important because it raises the question of salience. When a particular commonality achieves salience – and usually only one can at any one time²⁴ – it means that that commonality, and the specific cognitive framework it helps to constitute, becomes the primary lens through which an agent interprets events.²⁵ As mentioned earlier, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to address the question of when a particular identification becomes salient; for the moment it is sufficient to note that the commonality that achieves salience can shift²⁶ and that this possibility forms one of the sources of irresolvable uncertainty.

The process of collective identification

²¹ Kahl (1998: 124-127); Mael and Ashforth (2001: 205 and 215); Hermann and Kegley (1995: 517); Owen (1997a: 26-27); Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 8); Mitzen (2006: especially 360-363); Hogg and Reid (2006: 10-12).

²² Haidt (2012: 68); Mercer (2005: 96-97). Stickiness is also likely a product of confirmation bias, “the tendency to seek out and interpret new evidence in ways that confirm what you already think.” [Haidt (2012: 79-80)] or ‘perseverance’ [Khong (1992: 37-39)]. Also see Snyder and Klein (2005). Cf. Mercer (2010: 9-10 and 25); Pierson (2004: 39).

²³ Smith (2004: 302).

²⁴ Hogg et al. (2004: 252). A cluster of closely related and interpenetrated identifications can likely all be salient simultaneously as well.

²⁵ Hogg and Reid (2006: 12).

²⁶ Hogg et al. (2004: 252). See Farnham (2003: 406-407) for an example of how Roosevelt’s view of Stalin shifted as different aspects of his character became salient.

While the effects of in-group identification are well known, the processes by which they are created are relatively under-studied – at least in IR. As such, theorization of these processes also represents one of the most important holes in the theorization of the liberal peace. This is somewhat surprising, as the focus of so much IR scholarship, the nation-state, is in fact one of the most successful types of in-group ever created. In this section I seek to ameliorate this lack of attention by building a conceptual framework for understanding the processes of collective identification by which these in-groups are formed. At its most basic level, collective identification is propelled by agents' psychological bias toward those things that they perceived as similar and familiar,²⁷ though, as we shall see, these foundations can take a number of more developed forms. Collective identification is critical to the eventuation of trust because it is collective identification that completes the process of recognition needed to make trust reasonable.

For many years, the nation-state has served as one of, if not the, most important *locus* of collective identification. This convergence of expectations on the state occurred for many reasons,²⁸ but central to this success was the nation-state's ability to induce "patriotism ("affective attachment" to one's country or nation) and nationalism (an "us first" competitive and evaluative national orientation)."²⁹ However, the mere fact of the nation-state's relative success *vis-à-vis* other potential *loci* of collective identification should not distract us from the complexity of individuals' identities and the possibility that other identifications can also achieve salience.³⁰ Indeed, much of the nation-state's success as a form of socio-political organization stemmed from its ability to associate itself with other identifications at higher and lower levels, identifications that could, theoretically, also be used by collectivities

²⁷ Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2007: 317); Hermann and Kegley (1995: 517).

²⁸ See Ringmar (1996).

²⁹ Duckitt and Parra (2010: 238).

³⁰ See Barnett and Adler's (1998: 436) argument about thinking the unthinkable, community at the international level.

defined at these other levels.³¹ Regardless, insights from scholarship on nationalism and national collective identifications represent an important source of inspiration for my approach.³²

While collective identification has not formed an important focus of research in IR, there have been some notable exceptions that offer inspiration, most notably Alexander Wendt and his framework of four ‘master variables’ (interdependence, common fate, homogeneity, and self-restraint), which he argues are capable of pushing agents toward collective identification.³³ Wendt’s research in this area has clear affinities with research on the liberal peace and offers “the promise of a more far-reaching synthesis between the two perspectives”, which make his work ideal as a conceptual starting point.³⁴ Nevertheless, Wendt’s framework suffers from two important limitations.

First, Wendt’s analysis is pitched at a very abstract level.³⁵ The result is that his framework lacks specificity and fine-grained engagement with the micro-processes that instantiate the higher level variables he identifies, rendering their operationalization difficult. This is not necessarily a flaw as Wendt’s project is largely a conceptual one. However, as one of the aims of my project is to develop an operationalizable model of collective identification, it does represent an important limitation. Additionally, by neglecting the micro-level, Wendt misses some important theoretical nuances, namely what I argue is an important

³¹ Linklater (1990: 149); Taylor (2004: 178-179); Vucetic (2011: 3 and 51).

³² See, for example, Anderson (1991). Smith (2004: 303) suggests such an approach. Jackson (2003: 238) similarly notes that the manner in which NATO was formed bore a striking resemblance to the formation of a nation-state.

³³ Wendt (1999: Chapter 7). In a later writing (2003), Wendt posits three additional variables: common memory, the ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy’, and the desire for recognition. I incorporate common memory in my discussion of shared experience and the ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy’ in my discussion of homogeneity. I do not directly address the desire for recognition here as it seems to operate in a different register from the other variables. Wendt (2003: 523-524). Nevertheless, I do discuss it further in Chapter 8.

³⁴ Harrison (2004: 530).

³⁵ Adler and Barnett’s (1998b, 1998c) and Barnett and Adler’s (1998) analysis is similarly abstract.

differentiation between ‘collective identification’ proper and what is more accurately termed ‘positive collective identification’.³⁶ I argue that collective identification should simply refer to the process by which an agent integrates other members of the in-group into their concept of self. While this process will always include some basic in-group bias,³⁷ this bias will be modulated by more specific social overlays. Consequently, as demonstrated by the aforementioned medieval monarchs who collectively identified but still fought wars against each other, one cannot assume that this bias will, by itself, be enough to support any specific dependable expectations. By conflating the form of collective identification with a particular instance of it, conceptualizations like this occlude the critical role played by the specific content of the narratives around which collective identifications crystallize. This point has important implications, which are discussed further below.³⁸

The second problem with Wendt’s framework is that the order by which it proceeds is confused. Wendt argues that agents only collectively identify once they believe that they can rely on their potential partners to exercise self-restraint in their interactions.³⁹ By making collective identification dependant on the prior holding of dependable expectations, Wendt makes it impossible for collective identification to provide the justification for the holding of these expectations. This might not be a problem if Wendt provided a compelling alternative justification, but, unfortunately, his framework essentially relies on the same flawed predictive conceptualizations of trust critiqued earlier.⁴⁰ Thus, for the reasons detailed in my

³⁶ Cf. Kahl (1998: 119) for a similar conception.

³⁷ Hayes (2012a: 67-68).

³⁸ While significant work establishing the importance of narratives, not only in abstract but also of the specific logics of particular narratives insofar as agents’ decision-making is concerned, has already been done – see, for example, Crawford (2002), Campbell (1998), Doty (1996), Jackson (2003), Vucetic (2011), and Weldes (1999) – the recognition of the importance of the specificities of these logics and of analyzing the often complex and contingent ways in which this substantive narrative content can influence agents’ decision-making has been largely lacking from the study of the liberal peace.

³⁹ Wendt (1999: 357-363). Adler and Barnett (1998b: 45-46) adopt a similarly problematic approach.

⁴⁰ Wendt (1999: 357-363). Adler’s (1997: 257-259) and Kupchan’s (2010: Chapter 2) efforts at explaining the formation of liberal security communities and stable peace stumble in a similar way. I suspect that in both cases

earlier critiques, Wendt's framework is not capable of accounting for how agents hold dependable expectations despite irresolvable uncertainty.

My account of collective identification proceeds as follows. The process begins with an agent gathering information about another agent. As the information-gathering process proceeds, the first agent will become increasingly familiar with the second agent and *vice versa*. As familiarity grows, it will translate into confidence on the part of the agents that they can reliably predict each other's intentions. If, in the course of this process, the two agents identify a salient commonality, a potential for collective identification will exist. In order for this identification to occur, however, a sufficient level of positive affect must also be experienced by each agent for the other.⁴¹ There are a number of ways that this positive affect can be built, six of which I explore below. If the levels of familiarity and positive affect reach a sufficiently high level, these two factors will react and result in collective identification between the two agents on the basis of this aforementioned salient commonality.⁴² I should emphasize that both are required; if information gathering yields familiarity but nothing generates positive affect between agents, or *vice versa*, collective identification will not occur.

All of this goes to providing an abstract answer to Rosato's earlier challenge through the introduction of a theoretical framework that enables analysts to predict when agents will and will not collectively identify. With this abstract understanding in place, our focus can now shift to providing more specific accounts of the mechanisms capable of generating the sense of familiarity and positive affect needed for collective identification to occur. Because they

this is the result of the authors' failure to clearly define and conceptualize trust, a failure that is also repeated by Adler and Barnett (1998a).

⁴¹ Hopf (2010: 553) agrees.

⁴² C.f. Pinker (2011: 490); Ross (2006: 204); Mercer (2010: 6).

are already discussed in the Rationalist accounts of trust in Chapter 2 and my review of the liberal peace generating mechanisms in Chapter 1, I forgo discussion of the ways in which these mechanisms generate familiarity and focus on the much less researched mechanisms by which positive affect is generated. I have identified six such mechanisms: (1) mere exposure; (2) intergroup contact; (3) homogeneity; (4) shared experiences; (5) common fate; and (6) altercasting.⁴³ Below I review the conceptual logic of each of these mechanisms and highlight the ways in which they are understood to generate positive affect. Note that to ensure as clear a presentation as possible I delay a discussion of how I operationalize these mechanisms until the discussion of my research design in Chapter 4.

Finally, note also that as this list has been constructed through an extensive, but necessarily non-exhaustive, consultation of the social psychological and behavioural economics literatures, I am not suggesting that it is comprehensive. Moreover, it is also important to note that these mechanisms refer to psychological tendencies and not automatic relationships.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, I maintain that understanding how these processes tend to push agents toward collective identification is essential to understanding the conditions that favour the emergence of trust in international politics.

Mere exposure

The ‘mere exposure’ effect refers to the simple psychological finding that “mere repeated exposure of the individual to a stimulus [an object or individual] is a sufficient condition for

⁴³ All of these mechanisms are ideal-types that I isolate for the sake of clarity. In the real world they are likely to overlap with each other and the mechanisms by which familiarity is built.

⁴⁴ Naturally, these tendencies will not come to fruition in every case, but research suggests that when the prerequisites are in place, agents will tend to act accordingly. Cf. Johnson (2004: 179-180).

the enhancement of his attitude toward it”.⁴⁵ Agents “encountered more frequently seem to elicit greater feelings of attraction”,⁴⁶ meaning that the more an individual is exposed to another, the more positive affect that individual will tend to experience for them.⁴⁷ Similarly, ‘mere exposure’ to agents perceived as members of another group tends, *ceteris paribus*, to promote identification between agents from the two groups within an aggregate identity inclusive of both of them.⁴⁸ Reviewing a laboratory experiment, Edward Glaeser and his collaborators conclude that their “results support the idea that repeated play in dense social networks facilitates trust”.⁴⁹ Physiologically, this result is at least partially explained by the fact that familiarity and a history of positive interactions stimulates the release of a hormone called oxytocin, which has been identified as a key chemical contributor to trusting and other pro-social behaviour.⁵⁰

There is also significant anecdotal evidence to support the applicability of this finding to international politics. For example, French Prime Minister Georges Clémenceau is reported as having said that: “If Monsieur A. has Herr B. and Signor C. to dinner – even a bad dinner – several times a year, the tone of the diplomatic correspondence between those three statesmen (to say nothing of their conversation) undergoes a change.”⁵¹ Similarly, the emergence of influential collective identifications between European diplomats and officials who interact regularly is an important, if sometimes neglected, finding of studies of European

⁴⁵ Pierce et al. (1996: 11). The related propinquity effect is, for our purposes, subsumed under the ‘mere exposure’ effect. Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2007: 307-308).

⁴⁶ Pierce et al. (1996: 11).

⁴⁷ Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2007: 307-309); Zebrowitz, White, and Wieneke (2008); Haidt (2012: 56); Pierce et al. (1996: 10-11); Back et al. (2008: 439).

⁴⁸ Dovidio et al. (1997: 403); Kahl (1998: 117); Haidt (2012: 267); Mercer (2010: 5).

⁴⁸ Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2007: 451).

⁴⁹ Glaeser et al. (2000: 814).

⁵⁰ Zak and Kugler (2011: 144); Pinker (2011: 579-580); Mercer (2010: 6).

⁵¹ Quoted in Marks (2003: 42).

integration.⁵² This result is also one of the goals of the ‘seminar diplomacy’ employed by organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.⁵³

Intergroup Contact

Intergroup contact refers to the finding that contact with members of an ‘out-group’ increases the likelihood that the contacting individual will conceptualize the contacted individual as an individual, that is, as another human with a complex identity instead of as a stereotypical one-dimensional embodiment of another out-group.⁵⁴ The conceptualization of others as individuals is more likely to produce positive affect in the perceiving individual⁵⁵ and can also contribute to the perception of sharing membership in an overarching group.⁵⁶ This contact has the knock-on effect of increasing the likelihood that the contacting individual will begin to view other members of the contacted individual’s group as individuals as well, thereby reducing stereotypes and prejudice towards the other members of that out-group.⁵⁷

Critically, this tendency toward positive affect is strongest when the following conditions obtain between the perceiving and perceived individuals’ groups: (1) mutual interdependence; (2) the existence of a common goal; (3) equal status; (4) the contact is interpersonal and informal; (5) the contact occurs with multiple members of the opposite group; and (6) social norms of equality are operative during the contact.⁵⁸ If these conditions

⁵² Smith (2000); Nuttall (1997: 3); Hoffman (2006: 99). Cf. Dembinski et al. (2004: 545).

⁵³ Adler (1998: 138). See Hall and Yarhi-Milo’s (2012) discussion of the interactions between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev for another example.

⁵⁴ Allport (1954); Pettigrew (1997: 181). My thanks to Gillian Langor for pointing me towards this mechanism.

⁵⁵ Pettigrew (1997: 181).

⁵⁶ Dovidio et al. (1997: 403); Hermann and Kegley (1995: 516).

⁵⁷ Pinker (2011: 588).

⁵⁸ Pettigrew (1997: 173) provides a slightly different list: (1) equal status, (2) common goals, (3) no competition between groups, and (4) authority sanction for the contact.

obtain, contact is most likely to produce positive affect; if they do not obtain, or only some do, the effect will tend to be less strong.⁵⁹

Homogeneity

In his initial writing on the subject, Wendt argued that homogeneity contributed to collective identification primarily in a passive sense, that is, through the absence of potential sources of conflict capable of blocking the positive processes associated with other variables, such as cultural differences that might result in misunderstandings between agents.⁶⁰ However, Wendt also argues later that ‘objective’ homogeneity can actively push agents towards collective identification through ‘the civilizing force of hypocrisy’, which provides a motivation for the extension of the treatment of agents already recognized as part of an in-group to others who come to be perceived as being similar. Because of this, Wendt argues that agents will become unable to sustain differentiated treatment of agents that are perceived as basically the same.⁶¹

While Wendt sees homogeneity having its effect through ‘rational’ processes, I argue that it also has important affective components. Agents tend to experience positive affect when exposed to others who they perceive as being similar to them.⁶² This contention is supported by a large body of research that stretches from the finding that infants prefer interacting with individuals of the same race and possessing the same accents as their parents,⁶³ to subjects

⁵⁹ Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2007: 451).

⁶⁰ Wendt (1999: 353-357).

⁶¹ Wendt (2003: 523-524). This relies on what I termed the ‘gravity’ theory of knowledge, according to which beliefs gradually tend to converge toward reality. Mercer (2010: 8). See Hermann and Kegley (1996: 442) on how perceptions follow objective reality and Ringmar (1996: 456) on how the Czech communist narrative eventually failed because it failed to correspond to reality. Cf. Jackson and Nexon (2002: 6).

⁶² Zak and Kugler (2011: 144); Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2007: 310-312); Dovidio et al. (1997: 404); Haidt (2012: 210).

⁶³ Pinker (2011: 523). See also Duckitt, Callaghan, and Wagner (2005: 643).

who return less money to partners of a different race or nationality in Trust Game experiments,⁶⁴ to findings that agents feel less positively and are less likely to profess generalized trust in environments that are characterized by ethnic fractionalization,⁶⁵ to the finding that agents prefer interacting with agents who share their interests, values, and experiences.⁶⁶

All this is not to say that the ‘narcissism of minor differences’ cannot be used to great effect by political entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the quantity and quality of the differences between, for example, sects within a religion should, *ceteris paribus*, tend to be less significant than between different religions. Correspondingly, collective identification will be more likely to occur between individuals who are ‘objectively’ more similar than those who are less so.⁶⁷ This argument is supported by research that shows that characteristics such as shared religion, language, race, and history are the critical determinants of the construction of national collective identifications.⁶⁸ An important part of this tendency toward collective identification between objectively similar agents seems to derive from the fact that these agents will tend to have a greater set of shared understandings, which will enable them to communicate more effectively than objectively more heterogeneous agents.⁶⁹ This argument is

⁶⁴ Glaeser et al. (2000: 834-836).

⁶⁵ Pinker (2011: 523).

⁶⁶ Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2007: 310-313); Duckitt, Callaghan, and Wagner (2005: 643).

⁶⁷ Pinker (2011: 582). See, for example, Vucetic’s (2011) arguments about how racial similarity was critical to the generation of solidarity within the ‘Anglosphere’.

⁶⁸ Kupchan (2010: 282 and 411); Cohen (1994: 212); Henderson (1998: 470); Rousseau (2006: 65). Concomitantly, a lack of commonality along these dimensions is also cited as a break on identification and even a potential source of conflict. See Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002: 594). Cf. Henderson (1998: 466); Hurrell (1990: 190).

⁶⁹ The sharing of “... identities, values, and meanings’ which enable the component entities of the community to understand one another and be able to describe social reality in a mutually intelligible and *resonant* way” represents one of the three required components of Adler and Barnett’s (1998b: 31) definition of community. My emphasis. Cf. Ringmar (1996: 455); Gartzke (1998: 6); Kahl (1998: 128-129); Crawford (2002: 6).

supported, for example, by the finding that higher levels of ‘linguistic fractionalization’ are correlated with reduced levels of trust in communities.⁷⁰

Shared experiences

Shared experiences refer to the tendency of individuals who have shared experiences to experience positive affect for those with whom they shared these experiences.⁷¹ Stephen Pinker argues that the processes that trigger this mechanism are similar to, and are often purposefully engineered to resemble, the experiences associated with growing up together, including “commensal meals, myths of common ancestry, essentialist intuitions of common flesh and blood, the sharing of rituals and ordeals, physical resemblances (often enhanced by hairdressing, tattoos, scarification, and mutilation), and metaphors such as *fraternity*, *brotherhood*, *family*, *fatherland*, *motherland*, and *blood*.”⁷² This effect can be most clearly seen in the tight affective bonds forged between individuals who have shared intense experiences, such as comrades-in-arms.⁷³ Many veterans recognize that “the experience of communal effort in battle... has been the high point of their lives... Their “I” passes insensibly into a “we,” “my” becomes “our,” and individual fate loses its central importance...”⁷⁴ Modern militaries recognize that this bond is the critical motivator when in combat, and organize their combat units accordingly.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Leigh (2010: 143). Controlling for linguistic fractionalization causes ethnic fractionalization to lose significance in studies that measure the effect of both on trust. My thanks to Amy King for bringing this finding to my attention. See also Alesina and La Ferrara (2002).

⁷¹ Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2007: 312-313).

⁷² Pinker (2011: 355). Note also that the so-called ‘trust molecule’ oxytocin is highly associated with familial relationships. Pinker (2011: 579-580).

⁷³ Mosse (1986: 495).

⁷⁴ Haidt (2012: 222). Cf. Mael and Ashforth (2001: 204) and Mosse (1986: 494).

⁷⁵ Pinker (2011: 355).

While intense experiences like these may be the most obvious, this mechanism does not require intense activity to be engaged; indeed, the corralling of often quite disparate individuals into routines of fairly banal shared experiences by the bureaucratic state has historically been one of the foundations of national collective identification.⁷⁶ As Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder point out “[e]ven in a country with a long and venerable history such as France, it was only the shared experiences in the late nineteenth century – common military service, national railways, standardized education, and mass democracy – that completed the process of forging a culturally diverse peasantry into self-conscious Frenchmen.”⁷⁷

Interestingly, these shared experiences can actually be separate experiences that are only *imagined* as shared.⁷⁸ I use the term *imagined* as Benedict Anderson does, and not to suggest that these experiences are any less ‘real’ for being imagined.⁷⁹ Anderson’s account of how newspapers and popular literature helped generate the powerful collective identifications that are modern nationalisms is an example of the importance of these forms of shared experiences;⁸⁰ it was only when groups of individuals were able to tell themselves stories about themselves as a group that they could imagine themselves as such.⁸¹ Again, the psychological literature suggests that not actually experiencing an event is not a bar to imagining oneself as having experienced it: studies show that people often blend fictional and actual experiences in their memory.⁸² In fact, the construction of intense experiences that are

⁷⁶ Strayer (1966).

⁷⁷ Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 10-11). See also Weber (1976).

⁷⁸ Mael and Ashforth (2001: 198 and 201).

⁷⁹ See also Taylor (2004:183).

⁸⁰ See Anderson (1991: especially chapters 2 and 4).

⁸¹ See Ringmar (1996: 451) on the importance of the self as narrative.

⁸² Pinker (2011: 588-590).

imagined as shared is exactly the goal of much of the commemorative activity promoted by governments through national days of remembrance and war memorials.⁸³

Common Interests

As before, Wendt traces the effect of perceptions of common interest primarily along a rational route.⁸⁴ My argument differs in that I argue that perceptions of common interest will also engage a psychological tendency on the part of agents to expand their sense of self to include others perceived as facing the same situation.⁸⁵ This also coincides with humans' bias toward reducing cognitive dissonance: if an agent is collaborating with another agent out of necessity, there will be a tendency to perceive this partnership as one that is not only required, but also desirable.⁸⁶ In both cases, these perceptions activate much of the same psychological machinery as do shared experiences: agents perceive other agents as sharing an important similarity with them, thereby triggering agents' bias toward those things they perceive as similar. The critical difference between sharing common interests and experiences is that common interests imply an orientation to the future while shared experiences are oriented toward the past.⁸⁷

Again, this argument is supported by findings from social psychology. In a series of studies, Henri Tajfel and John Turner found that common interests, in the context of competition

⁸³ Goebel (2001); Winter (1998); Forner (2002: especially 513-515 and 546-547); Pickford (2005). I see Wendt's (2003: 523) concept of collective memory as part of the shared experiences mechanism. See also Puchala (1968: 52); Taylor (2004: 177); Ross (2006: 214); Zehfuss (2003); and Mosse (1986).

⁸⁴ Wendt (1999: 349-353). Cf. Adler (1997) in which he argues that the failure of the OSCE was due to too much focus on expanding conceptions of the self and insufficient generation of an actual we-feeling.

⁸⁵ Dovidio et al. (1997: 402-404); Kahl (1998: 121).

⁸⁶ Mercer (2010: 9).

⁸⁷ See Ringmar (1996: 459) on how groups need an attractor placed somewhere in the future in order to give them coherence.

between groups, increased the cohesion of the agents within each group.⁸⁸ A similar story is told by Anderson in his recounting of the rise of American nationalism as a reaction to Imperial Spanish discrimination against Americans in favour of the *penninsulares*.⁸⁹ This particular form of common interest, the identification of a common enemy, is especially consequential because of the way that the definition of an ‘other’ represents such a critical component of agents’ conceptions of self – a conception that can remain even after the original threat disappears.⁹⁰

Altercasting

I use the term altercasting to refer to the psychological phenomenon in which agents’ behaviour is significantly influenced by the expectations others hold of them, as manifested in their interactions. Building on symbolic interactionist literature and experimental evidence, this argument holds that if an agent is ‘cast’ by an interlocutor as one who is trustworthy, then the agent being trusted will be more likely to act accordingly.⁹¹ Similarly, social psychologists argue that one of the most important determinants of whether an agent experiences positive affect for another is whether or not the first agent perceives the second as experiencing positive affect for them.⁹² At a physiologically level, experiments have found that individuals who behave trustingly toward an other induce higher levels of the

⁸⁸ Tajfel and Turner (1979: 33).

⁸⁹ Anderson (1991: 53-61). Deutsch and colleagues argued that the formation of a security community shared much with the processes by which a state was formed. Adler and Barnett (1998c: 8).

⁹⁰ Tajfel and Turner (1979: 40); Kahl (1998: 115).

⁹¹ Wendt (1992: 421); Kahl (1998: 123); Hopf (2010: 541-542); Glaeser et al. (2000: 830). See also Dovidio et al. (1997: 405 and 416).

⁹² Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2007: 312).

aforementioned hormone oxytocin in the individual being trusted, which will tend to bias the other toward reciprocating.⁹³

Numerous students of trust have noted the importance of ‘leaps of faith’,⁹⁴ ‘leaps of trust’,⁹⁵ or ‘leaps in the dark’.⁹⁶ Many of them suggest that these ‘leaps’ demonstrate an already existing trust; I maintain that while they may also demonstrate trust, leaps are more interesting in the way that they can help expand agents’ trust portfolios through altercasting.⁹⁷ Because of how these leaps open the ‘leaper’ to significant vulnerability, they also cast the recipient in a positive and trusting light, thereby encouraging a reciprocal response. Moreover, the power of a particular instance of altercasting can be greatly magnified if it is perceived as possessing a high level of novelty or a dramatic character. For instance, Anwar Sadat’s flight to Jerusalem and his address to the Knesset was an extremely dramatic event which, while it was also important as a costly signal,⁹⁸ was actually more important as an instance of altercasting: by coming to Jerusalem, Sadat cast Israeli decision-makers as individuals with whom it was worth speaking and negotiating. In so doing, Sadat’s action helped provoke the exact behaviour in the Israelis (a willingness to negotiate) that his action seemed to presuppose.⁹⁹

Part 2: Identities, Narratives, and Liberalism

⁹³ Haidt (2012: 234). A similar basis for this phenomenon can be found in mirror neurons, which cause humans to empathize with an other with whom they are interacting. See also Haidt (2012: 236 and 244); Hall and Yarhi-Milo (2012: 562).

⁹⁴ Barnett and Adler (1998: 414).

⁹⁵ Wheeler (2010: 319); Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010b: 79).

⁹⁶ Booth and Wheeler (2008: 234-235). See also Edkins (2004: 253-254).

⁹⁷ Cf. Kupchan (2010: 20) argues that what he calls ‘unilateral accommodation’ precedes trust.

⁹⁸ Pinker (2011: 544).

⁹⁹ Wheeler (2010: 325-326) shares a similar analysis.

With this new understanding of how recognition of trustworthy others, and their differentiation from untrustworthy others, is achieved through processes by which familiarity and positive affect are generated and, in turn, generate collective identification, we have made a major advance in accounting for how trust eventuates in the context of international politics. In fact, in terms of answering the three questions posed at the end of Chapter 1, all that now remains is the need to develop a similar understanding of the salient commonality that serves as the focus of collective identification and the role it plays in building trust. As I have already suggested, narratives, and the identities that narratives combine to define, serve as the most common and powerful focus for identification in international politics,¹⁰⁰ and so it is to the elaboration of the role played by narratives that we now turn.

In Chapter 2, I argued that because of the ways that narratives and identities motivate, guide, enable, and constrain agents, understanding how these factors have these effects is crucial to developing a coherent conceptualization of trust. Specifically, I argued that the eventuation of trust required the possession by the trustor of an identity that encoded a narrative capable of both enabling and justifying the specific trust-belief in question. Thus, in order to provide an account of the type of trust required by the liberal peace, one needs to provide a specification of the liberal narrative and show how it endows agents with a cognitive framework within which trusting another liberal makes sense. To enable the giving of such an account, however, I must first describe: (1) what is required of an agent's cognitive framework for it to be capable of enabling the holding of dependable expectations; (2) what about such a framework it is – that is, what indicators or markers does it display – that enables other agents to recognize *ex ante* an other as possessing such a framework; and (3) the indicators that analysts can look to for the same purpose as in (2).

¹⁰⁰ For example, see Pinker (2011: 508-509) on the power of ideologies.

The abstract roles of narratives

I use the term narrative to refer to knowledge structures that encode sets of principles, orderings of values, assumptions about the world, emotional predispositions, and understandings about the ways in which these elements relate to each other.¹⁰¹ Narratives that are internalized by agents – that is, that agents accept as normatively legitimate or as accurate descriptions of reality – combine to constitute that agent’s identity and define their interests.¹⁰² Understanding how this occurs is essential to any explanation of trust and its influence on international politics.¹⁰³

I argue that narratives influence agents’ behaviour in three ways.¹⁰⁴ First, narratives provide agents with accounts of how their fundamental – but basically indeterminate – preferences can and ought to be realized.¹⁰⁵ Thus, narratives encode the parameters according to which agents can be understood to act purposively.¹⁰⁶ In this respect, narratives play a central role in determining whether agents will come into conflict with other agents. For instance, Revolutionary France was an aggressive state not just because it felt threatened by its

¹⁰¹ My approach here largely parallels Freedman’s (1996: especially Chapters 1 and 2) work on concepts and ideologies. Despite representing a more general form of knowledge structure, I see narratives playing a similar role to the one assigned to analogies by Khong (1992: Chapter 2). My narratives would also likely fall within Jackson’s (2003: 235) concept of ‘culture’. On emotional predispositions see Crawford (2002: 36).

¹⁰² Vucetic (2011: 10). Cf. Goldstein’s and Keohane’s (1993: 9-11) and Smith’s (2004: 304) similar conceptualizations of the functions of ideas. Interestingly, Mercer (2010: 5) points out that, in terms of the physiological processes involved, there is no difference between beliefs concerning normative legitimacy and descriptive accuracy.

¹⁰³ Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 23) agree, as does Kahl (1998: 95). See also Vucetic (2011: 5).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Kahl’s (1998: 107) and Khong’s (1992: Chapter 2) similar conceptualizations.

¹⁰⁵ Hogg and Reid (2006: 13). Mercer (2010: 11-12) points out how this can include an emotional component.

¹⁰⁶ Mercer (2005: 83) argues that without knowledge of an agent’s beliefs it is impossible to know what they desire. See also Freedman (1996: 108).

neighbours, but also partly because the narratives to which it subscribed caused it to identify its interests with the aggressive spreading of its values.¹⁰⁷

Second, by providing agents with a lens through which to view the world, narratives filter the infinite complexity of reality such that uncertainty is reduced and reality is rendered amenable to strategic analysis.¹⁰⁸ This filtering is achieved through the postulation of a logic that serves to highlight only certain aspects of reality and to organize an agent's observations into comprehensible patterns. Consequently, narratives offer a selective picture of the world.¹⁰⁹ This filtering is also achieved through the provision of a conceptual vocabulary for the interpretation of an agent's observations. For example, agents can only perceive others as trustworthy if they already possess the concept of a trustworthy agent.

Third, narratives structure agents' interactions by defining how agents' make sense of, and anticipate, others' behaviour. By imputing adherence to specific narratives to others, agents model others' decision-making.¹¹⁰ This enables agents to make predictions about others' future behaviours, which allows them to plan their own future behaviours strategically. For example, if a Jewish agent concludes that a second agent's behaviour is best explained by imputing to them an adherence to an anti-Semitic narrative, the Jewish agent will understand this agent as threatening and plan accordingly.¹¹¹

Rationalists tend to be quite limited in their treatment of the substantive aspects of narratives, often recognizing only two possible, and very static, 'identities' in international politics:

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Ringmar (1996 and 2002).

¹⁰⁸ See Wendt (1992 and 1999) on the construction of reality and Luhmann (1979) for the potentially debilitating consequences of complexity. See also Hogg and Reid (2006: 13) and Khong (1992: 221).

¹⁰⁹ Haidt (2012: 97 and 282).

¹¹⁰ And, by extension, assess the validity of their models. Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010a: 23-24).

¹¹¹ Rousseau (2006: 5). Cf. Jervis (1970).

security-seekers and revisionists.¹¹² Because of this, Rationalists fail to account for the much more extensive universe of narratives that exist and, by extension, many of the numerous ways in which they interact and influence agents' behaviours.¹¹³ This is a problem because the substantive aspects and internal logic of a narrative are vital to understanding exactly how a narrative will influence an agent's decision-making in a specific instance,¹¹⁴ a point whose critical implications many scholars of the liberal peace have missed. For example, Hermann and Kegley suggest that, like democracies, autocracies are also less likely to fight among themselves because they will recognize each other as fellow autocrats and form an in-group.¹¹⁵ While autocrats could do so, this argument fails to recognize that the critical generator of peace between liberal states is not the simple fact that they are similar, but rather that their collective identification triggers an in-group bias *that is then also modulated by the pro-peace content of liberalism* that defines this in-group, content unlikely to be reproduced in an in-group defined simply by 'autocracy'.

It is essential to recall that trust is always a specific belief, that is X trusts Y to do Z. In-group bias enables the dependable expectations that enable X to trust Y, but it does not provide the Z; it is the salient commonality and its associated narratives that provide this part of the equation. In recognition of this importance, I spend the remainder of this section exploring the generic narrative contents required for trust to be possible and by building a substantive account of the liberal narrative that is both faithful to commonly held understandings of liberalism and capable of generating the conditions of possibility required for the liberal peace.

¹¹² Pierson (2004: 61) makes a similar argument.

¹¹³ Cf. Hurrell (1998: 232).

¹¹⁴ Jackson and Nexon (2002: 13). Crawford's (2002) work on ethics and decolonization is an apt example of analysis that recognizes the impact of substantive content on actions.

¹¹⁵ Hermann and Kegley (1995: 518).

The liberal narrative

Mark Peceny argues that a key aspect of any investigation into the liberal peace must be “an analysis of the intersubjective consensus that binds liberal states together in their pacific union.”¹¹⁶ For whatever reason, Rationalist theories like Kydd’s and Lipson’s have not engaged sufficiently in this type of analysis. Alternatively, by identifying liberalism as an ‘institutional identity’ that provides agents with a ‘travel guide’ for choosing their objectives and a ‘map’ for how to get there, Owen implicitly accepts this requirement.¹¹⁷

My analysis provides us with two generic requirements that any narrative must include if it is to provide a basis for trust. First, the narrative in question must contain a conceptual vocabulary that enables the holding of certain dependable expectations – in the case of the liberal peace, expectations of dependable reciprocation of non-violence. To return to my example from the last chapter, agents must know the *en passant* rule in order to be able to make the *en passant* move. Implicit in this idea of a conceptual vocabulary is the related idea of justification – simply knowing that a move is possible is insufficient; a narrative must also provide a potential justification for such an action. With *en passant*, the justification is to win the game, an objective often assisted in chess by capturing an opponent’s pieces, something that the use of *en passant* can aid if used appropriately. The second generic requirement is that the narrative from which trust emerges must provide indicators that enable agents to differentiate, *ex ante*, those they can trust from those they cannot. These indicators are also very useful from the perspective of the analyst who can use them to forecast whether there exists a possibility for the development of a trusting relationship.

¹¹⁶ Peceny (1997: 417); Kahl (1998: 109); Vucetic (2011: 5). Jackson and Nexon (2002) and Jackson (2003) make this point more broadly.

¹¹⁷ Owen (1997a: 19).

Doyle argues that “there is no canonical description of liberalism” and that “what we tend to call *liberal* resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics” including “individuals’ freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity”.¹¹⁸ While I agree with Doyle in general, I also believe that a ‘hard core’ of liberalism can be defined, namely a commitment to the upholding of the autonomy of the individual insofar as this autonomy does not unfairly impinge on the autonomy of others.¹¹⁹ This commitment necessarily entails a corollary commitment to the non-violent resolution of disputes between (liberal) individuals.¹²⁰ This corollary is essential for the type of trust on which the liberal peace depends because it is needed to justify liberals’ reliance on each other’s non-violence: if I believe you are a liberal (and you reciprocate this belief), it is reasonable for me to expect our interactions to be non-violent.¹²¹ This belief can be transposed into the international context fairly easily where, because war represents the ultimate form of coercion, liberal states count on each other to interact non-violently, thereby enabling their relationship to transcend the security dilemma.¹²²

This injunction against the use of violence between liberals is critical for the liberal peace because it provides a justification for employing, and expecting reciprocation of, non-violence between liberals. Unfortunately, it is analytically unhelpful to guarantee the non-violent resolution of disputes between liberals by simply imposing a definitional requirement for liberals to possess a commitment to non-violent dispute resolution with other liberals. If

¹¹⁸ Doyle (1986: 1152).

¹¹⁹ Cf. Owen (1997a: 32). While I argue that this commitment to autonomy – which parallels Freedén’s concept of non-constraint – represents the hard core of liberalism, I also agree with Freedén that this concept cannot, by itself, constitute liberalism and thus requires ‘decontestation by other adjacent concepts’. Freedén (1996: 63).

¹²⁰ Note that liberalism does not suggest that liberals’ are pacifists or have interests that are completely harmonized. Kahl (1998: 112). Indeed, liberalism arguably leaves open numerous possible justifications for war against non-liberals. Consequently, any explanation for the liberal peace must also be able to explain why liberal states fight the wars they do fight. Reiter and Stam (1998: 388); Muller (2004: 495); Hayes (2012b: 779); Kahl (1998: 139).

¹²¹ See Pinker (2011: 291) for a similar analysis.

¹²² Kahl (1998: 112).

this is the extent of one's definition of liberalism, one's theory tends toward tautology as we have seen with Owen.¹²³ Because it is impossible for agents to read others' minds, agents must always depend on others' actions to reveal – albeit imperfectly – other's identities. While actions can reveal much, records of past actions will always be of limited value because of the way that they only rarely provide evidence that points exclusively to the possession of just one identity. What are needed are additional indicators – what Colin Kahl calls 'microtranslations',¹²⁴ – that can licence greater confidence in agents' evaluations by allowing them to triangulate between many different pieces of evidence.¹²⁵

Thankfully, liberalism can provide such indicators.¹²⁶ In addition to the commitment to non-violence, I submit that liberalism also comprises at least the following six additional commitments, namely to: (1) economic freedom – which basically means a free market and free trade – even though this commitment may be conditioned by acceptance of some forms of state intervention; (2) the elected, representative, and responsible character of at least those elements of government vested with responsibility for making war; (3) a constitutionally entrenched separation of powers between at least the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government; (4) the recognition of the basic equality of all rational autonomous individuals; (5) the rule of law; and (6) an open society characterized by what we recognize as the core civil and political rights, including freedom of the press, speech, religion, and assembly.¹²⁷

¹²³ Gartzke (2000: 195-196) makes a similar criticism of Russett and Oneal.

¹²⁴ Kahl (1998: 135 and 138).

¹²⁵ George and Bennett (2005: 58). Methodologically, these can be understood as additional implications of an agent's adherence to liberalism. Rathbun (2011b: 8) adopts a similar approach. Cf. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 110).

¹²⁶ Kahl (1998: 130-131).

¹²⁷ Hayes (2012a: 68). My approaches to defining liberalism, as well as my actual definition, are consistent with Freedman's (1996). See Chapters 1-3 for his method – especially page 48 – and Chapters 4-7 for this definition – especially 178 and 276. Cf. Danilovic's and Clare's (2007: 399) and Kahl's (1998: 111) similar definitions. Naturally, I recognize that all of these commitments might be temporarily compromised in extraordinary situations by otherwise liberal states.

Recognizing that perfect adherence to these commitments is impossible,¹²⁸ the extent to which they are embraced by a state's population and instantiated in its institutional structures represent the best indicators of a polity's liberal character and of whether this character will be translated into policy.¹²⁹ Unfortunately, it is probably not possible for analysts to be able to draw a line that clearly separates those states that possess a sufficient commitment to liberalism to enable the liberal peace from those that do not; the unavoidable contingency of state decision-making is such that analysts will probably always need to make probabilistic predictions in this regard. That said, in Chapter 4, I do develop a number of indicators designed to measure the extent to which the six additional commitments obtain. Developing a better understanding of the levels of these indicators that correlate with a sufficient level of liberalism to enable the liberal peace will require much comparative work, but this is a project that this study seeks to initiate.

The situation for liberal agents is somewhat simpler. For liberal agents, the liberal peace will be enabled to the extent that recognition in the form of collective identification occurs. Of course, while there will probably be a tendency for perceptions to move into congruence with objective reality over time,¹³⁰ at any one time it is quite possible that agents' subjective perceptions of other agents' adherence to liberalism will not match 'objective' reality.¹³¹ Regardless, once the psychological switch, that is in-group bias, is flipped, the 'objective' impossibility of knowing for certain whether the other state is sufficiently liberal becomes irrelevant as subjective perceptions take over. Like with liberalism, it should be possible to

¹²⁸ Danilovic and Clare (2007: 403). Cf. Kahl (1998: 142).

¹²⁹ Doyle (1986: 1152); Kahl (1998: 130-131 and 139); Hayes (2012a: 68).

¹³⁰ Hermann and Kegley (1996: 442) argue that perceptions will tend to correlate with 'objective' measures of democracy like Polity IV. See also Hall (1993: 50) and Kydd (2005: 18-19). Again, this falls under the 'gravity' theory of knowledge.

¹³¹ Peceny (1997: 417); Oren (1995); Cumings (2001); and Muppidi (2001: 52) all remind us of this important fact.

construct indicators that can give analysts a reasonable sense of the likelihood of collective identification occurring by measuring the values of these indicators. Again, this will take careful research design and empirical work, but it is a problem that I begin to tackle in Chapter 4.

One might argue that this does not represent much of an advance on the methods employed by Owen. To the extent that this is true, it is simply a reflection of the unpredictability of empirical agents, an unpredictability that is further discussed in Chapter 4, and the need for more rigorous and comparable qualitative empirical research – a *lacuna* that I begin to fill in the empirical part of this work. By defining recognition as something that occurs at the moment of collective identification, however, my argument does make an important theoretical advance which it is worth pausing for a moment to consider. The reader will recall that one of the central flaws in Owen's explanation was that he was unable to provide a non-tautological definition of a liberal state. By introducing trust as an intervening variable between liberalism and peace my model is able to solve this problem by providing a non-tautological theoretical test of whether recognition between two states has occurred. If an agent trusts an other – something that can be measured by identifying instances when the agent accepted vulnerability to the other on the basis of the narratives defining their collective identification – then recognition can be understood to have occurred. If trust does not exist then, for the purposes of the theory at least, recognition should be understood to have not occurred.

More important, however, is the way that this equation of recognition with collective identification is able to provide empirical agents with a prospective test for whether they can rely on an other to reciprocate non-violence, thereby filling another critical *lacuna* in Owen's

model. Under my conceptualization, instead of asking themselves whether an other is liberal or not – a question that could only be answered *retrospectively* according to Owen and thus could not license the *prospective* holding of dependable expectations of the reciprocation of non-violence on which the liberal peace depends – agents are able to ask themselves whether they trust the other to act like a liberal or not – a question agents are able to answer prospectively and one that can license the prospective holding of the essential expectations. Because of this, agents are able to overcome irresolvable uncertainty and transcend the security dilemma in a way that they simply could not in Owen’s conceptualization, thereby clearing the way for the liberal peace’s eventuation. Additionally, my model – which sees the objective liberal status of the other as important but only one part of a larger process not only mediated by agents’ imperfect abilities to reveal and perceive information but also influenced by agents’ emotions – is one that corresponds more closely with what we know of how empirical agents’ decision-making actually works than other models of the liberal peace like Owen’s.

Finally, many theorists point out that conceptions of liberalism have varied across time and suggest that this fact undermines the coherence of the concept of liberalism and, by extension, calls into question the existence of the liberal peace.¹³² While it is true that liberalism’s variability does make it more difficult for *analysts* to predict whether collective identification will occur, if one accepts my trust-based argument, this variation need not undermine the empirical functioning of the processes that generate the liberal peace. Recall that the liberal peace is enabled by a transcending of the security dilemma that is itself enabled by the holding of dependable expectations of the reciprocation of non-violence. While the six additional commitments enumerated above are helpful for agents in recognizing

¹³² Rendall (2004); Chan (1993: 210); Schafer and Walker (2006: 564). Cf. Elman (1997b: 52-53); Peceny (1997: 421).

other liberals and differentiating them from non-liberals, adherence to the core commitment to non-violence does not require a perfect adherence to these other commitments, and neither does recognition by other liberal states. Ultimately, identities that include non-violence have the potential to generate the liberal peace, and those that do not, do not.¹³³ Thus, while variations in agents' conceptions of liberalism may make it more difficult both for analysts to predict whether collective identification will occur and for empirical agents to recognize their shared adherence to liberalism, so long as both states possess the critical commitment to non-violence between liberals, collective identification and, by extension, liberal trust and the liberal peace are still possible. Thus, while theorists are correct to suggest that variations in liberalism may make the achievement of the liberal peace empirically more difficult, they are wrong to suggest that it renders its achievement theoretically problematic.

Toward a comprehensive theory of the liberal peace

With this elaboration of the role played by narratives complete, my model for how trust is generated is now also complete. To summarize, I have argued that trust is the result of an interaction between three elements, namely familiarity, positive affect, and the perception of a salient shared commonality. I have argued that familiarity is generated by a variety of mechanisms including those specified by Rationalist theories such as costly signalling or some of the various mechanisms described in Chapter 1. While the means by which familiarity has been generated have been well-discussed by other scholars, the ways that positive affect is generated have been neglected. In an attempt to ameliorate this situation, I identified six mechanisms capable of generating this essential element of collective

¹³³ For example, while an identity might be related to liberal democracy, as arguably was the French 'radical democracy' highlighted by Matthew Rendall (2004), because 'radical democracy' did not include the core requirement of non-violence, its narrative content could not support the liberal peace. Indeed, Danilovic and Clare (2007: 397 and 408) find evidence that the liberal peace only obtains between liberal democracies.

identification. Finally, I devoted the second half of this chapter to outlining how the narratives around which collective identifications crystallize influence agents' behaviours and form the basis for the holding of trust-beliefs.

The attentive reader will have noted that by arguing that the liberal peace is the result of agents collectively identifying on the basis of a shared liberal identity, I have advanced an explanation with clear similarities to explanations that see the liberal peace as a form of security community. This idea is not a new one and has been suggested by a number of scholars.¹³⁴ In fact, even the important role played by trust in generating security communities and 'stable peace' has been recognized by many scholars.¹³⁵ For example, Michael Barnett and Emanuel Adler suggest that the "[d]ependable expectations of peaceful change, the confidence that disputes will be settled without war," which they see as constituting the subject of their landmark study *Security Communities*, represent "unarguably the deepest expression of trust possible in the international arena..."¹³⁶ What sets my analysis apart from these existing works, and indeed pushes scholarship in this area forward, however, is its novel focus on the central role played by trust, clarifying of the processes by which trust is produced, and the illumination of trust's specific characteristics.

The goal of this thesis is, ultimately, the explanation of how liberal states have managed to transcend the security dilemma and essentially eliminate war from their relations with each other. While I have presented a theoretical framework that I believe is coherent, strongly supported by evidence gleaned from a variety of sources, and capable of supporting an explanation of how the liberal peace is created, in order to demonstrate the plausibility of a

¹³⁴ See for instance suggestions by Chan (1993: 209), Kydd (2005: 21), Kahl (1998: 132), and Cederman (2001a: 476).

¹³⁵ Booth and Wheeler (2008: Chapter 9) are particularly important in this regard, but see also Kupchan (2010: 36) in addition to those like Lipson and Owen we have already discussed.

¹³⁶ Barnett and Adler (1998: 414).

trust-based explanation of the liberal peace and illuminate those aspects of my conceptualization of trust in need of refinement it is now essential to expose my thinking to empirical evaluation, a task that I begin preparing for in Chapter 4 and carry out in Chapters 5,6, and 7. Before proceeding to this task, however, it makes sense to conclude this chapter by explicitly stating the comprehensive explanation of the liberal peace that has motivated this inquiry into the nature of trust and which the aforementioned now makes possible.

After all this theorizing, my explanation for the liberal peace is remarkably easy to summarize. I argue that the liberal peace is the result of a network of liberal security communities within which members trust each other to resolve disputes with each other non-violently. These security communities are the result of collective identifications between liberal states that have generated an in-group defined by a shared adherence to the liberal narrative and enabled by humans' psychological bias toward others they see as sharing membership in their in-group. These collective identifications are the product of a reaction between sufficiently elevated levels of both familiarity and positive affect between liberal agents who recognize the possibility that they share an adherence to liberalism. When it occurs, collective identification converts the aforementioned possibility of a shared liberal identity to a certainty in the minds of the agents in question. Once others have been recognized as co-members of a liberal in-group, the non-violent dispute resolution mechanism encoded within the liberal narrative will be activated and violence within the in-group will be rendered 'unthinkable'. In so doing, subjective uncertainty regarding others intentions (at least insofar as violence is concerned) is eliminated, thereby enabling agents to transcend the security dilemma and establish the liberal peace.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have addressed the second and third problems identified at the conclusion of Chapter 1. First, I provided an account of the way in which liberal agents recognize other liberal agents through a dual process of building familiarity and positive affect, which results in collective identification. In this account, I identified six new mechanisms capable of pushing states toward collective identification. While these mechanisms are capable of generating both familiarity and positive affect, in this chapter I emphasized the currently under-researched ways in which these mechanisms generate positive affect. These abstract accounts will be further expanded in Chapter 4.

Second, I provided accounts of both the generic ways in which narratives influence agents' cognitive frameworks, and how the liberal narrative specifically enables the holding of the dependable expectations of non-violence required for the liberal peace to obtain. The critical point to take away from this analysis is that by providing a justification for non-violence and by positing the possibility of the existence of liberals, liberalism makes it reasonable for liberals who recognize each other as such to trust each other to act like liberals and to resolve disputes non-violently, thereby enabling them to transcend the security dilemma and create the liberal peace.

I concluded my analysis by arguing that the liberal peace is the result of a network of liberal security communities. While this idea is not new, what is novel in my analysis is the solidity of the theoretical foundation that I deploy to support it. By identifying trust as the critical variable in this explanation and developing a new conceptualization of how trust is generated that draws on insights from both Cognitivist and Constructivist scholarship – insights that previously have too often been conflated, confused, and under-developed – I have provided a

solution to the problem that felled both Lipson's and Owen's analysis, namely the way in which liberals manage to banish uncertainty concerning other's intentions and transcend the security dilemma. Nevertheless, this new conceptualization will only be useful to the extent that it can be related to forces and events in the real world, and it is to ensuring that this can be done that I now turn.

Chapter 4

Operationalizing Trust

Introduction

This thesis has two linked purposes. The first, the success of which depends on the success of the second, is to solve a number of the problems that have bedevilled DPT and, in solving them, provide a comprehensive explanation of the liberal peace. With the outlining of my explanation at the conclusion of Chapter 3, this first task is now largely complete. The second, more fundamental, purpose of the thesis is the development of a conceptualization of trust appropriate to the study of international politics. In the course of the first three chapters, I have developed a conceptualization that has, at least at a deductive level, completed the first task. However, while this conceptualization has been assembled from components derived from empirical research, its plausibility has not yet been evaluated empirically.¹ Until this occurs, my comprehensive theory of the liberal peace will necessarily remain provisional due to the still incipient concept of trust on which it is based.² Thus, it is to the evaluation and refining of my new conceptualization of trust, my second purpose, that the remainder of this thesis is devoted.

Fortunately, I am not the first to study trust empirically and a number of other scholars have already made important contributions in this area. Unfortunately, many of these efforts have either been limited to initial exploratory attempts, have been hampered by poor conceptual or theoretical foundations, or have operationalized trust in ways that make replicability and comparison across cases difficult, thereby limiting their rigour and our ability to accumulate

¹ See Trachtenberg (2012: 42) on the importance of empirical testing, even of highly theoretical concepts.

² King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 12).

knowledge in this area.³ Frankly, measuring trust turns out to be very difficult,⁴ a reality which may help explain IR scholarship's previously limited engagement with the concept. With this in mind, my aim for the remainder of this project is to help advance scholarship on trust in three ways: (1) by adding to the growing store of empirical scholarship on specific instances of trust that, *inter alia*, might be used for further refinement of my theory; (2) to build a research procedure based on a clear, rigorous, and replicable operationalization of trust capable of enabling meaningful comparisons across cases; and (3) to undertake some initial case studies using the procedure referred to in (2) as a means of illustrating the arguments advanced earlier and accomplishing (1). In this chapter I attempt the task laid out in (2), while the challenges represented by (1) and (3) are tackled in the subsequent empirical chapters.

This chapter proceeds accordingly: I begin by erecting the final few pieces of conceptual scaffolding needed to support my operationalization of trust and the mechanisms that generate it, namely my conceptualization of agency and state decision-making. Next, I distill the conceptual framework developed in the first part of this thesis into a clear and rigorous research procedure. More concretely, I describe the methods by which I propose to identify instances of trust and determine whether these instances were generated and operated along the lines envisioned by my theory. To do so, I have developed a five step research procedure for use in case studies which I describe below. In so doing, I also introduce the five categories of indicators which I propose to use as measures for the operation of the trust enabling mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3. Once I have elaborated this procedure, I close the chapter with a discussion and justification of the cases I have selected for study in the subsequent three chapters.

³ See King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 26) on the importance of reliability.

⁴ Zak and Kugler (2011: 137).

Research design

This thesis is, first and foremost, an exercise in theory development. Much of the labour in this respect is purely deductive and has already been completed through my identification of the logical incoherence of existing explanations of the liberal peace and my demonstration of how a better conceptualization of trust could reduce this incoherence. Much of the analysis used to conceptualize trust was borrowed from research in social psychology and other related fields. This research is especially useful because it derives from research agendas that are totally independent of the biases and incentives which structure scholarship on international politics. That it is experimentally based is also helpful because it provides a strong foundation for its reliability. Thus, the fact that this research supports the earlier theoretical analysis saves me from having to empirically verify many of the theoretical claims advanced in those chapters.⁵ What this research does not do, however, is demonstrate the applicability of the theoretical framework I have developed to international politics.⁶

Given the nature of the claims I am advancing, and the stage of development at which the framework currently stands, it is not currently practical to attempt a full test of my theory – by attempting to falsify my hypothesis. Not only is the space available in this thesis insufficient for such an exercise, the new conceptualization of trust being offered is not yet sufficiently developed for such a test to be meaningfully attempted. Instead, the best step to take next is to probe the plausibility of the theoretical claims that I am advancing, use the information gathered in this test to further refine the conceptualization, and use this probe as a means of further developing the methodological tools needed for the more comprehensive

⁵ Khong (1992: 27-28 and 40).

⁶ Khong (1992: 32).

testing that will follow in later work. In so doing, I will also be generating information that can be used to begin evaluating my secondary argument that the liberal peace is actually better conceptualized as a network of liberal security communities.

The first step in carrying out this plausibility probe involves one final bout of theorizing, namely the theorization of the location of agency – that is, an account of who is doing the trusting – and the manner in which beliefs like trust can come to influence state behaviour.

The second step in preparing this plausibility probe is the development of a method for applying the theoretical framework to the real world events of international politics. I set out such a method in the research procedure that is outlined below. The format of this analysis will basically be a process tracing one. That is, in my case studies I will seek to evaluate the extent to which the events and features of the historical case studies conform to the expectations of my trust model.⁷ To the extent that the case studies do not conform, this empirical analysis will serve to provide information to inform the refinement, or even the potential abandonment, of the model.

The importance of agency

In a recent article Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas Wheeler note an important caveat for the applicability of insights from other disciplines to the study of trust in IR, namely that most of this research “operates at the level of interpersonal relationships.” Consequently, Ruzicka and Wheeler argue that finding a way to validly transfer “these insights into the much more complicated arena of international politics” is of critical importance for the advancement of

⁷ Rosato (2003: 585–586); Rosato (2005: 471).

IR research on trust.⁸ Basically, Ruzicka and Wheeler are calling on scholars to identify who can accurately be described as trusting – the individual? the group? the state? – and develop a means of embedding this unit within our larger theoretical understandings of international politics. This is important because the identification of the unit capable of trusting – that is, where the theory locates agency – both ties into a central debate in modern IR (the agent-structure debate), and has profound implications for how one measures trust and identifies the mechanisms by which it is generated.

Unfortunately, the debate over the nature of agency is a complicated one with which I do not have the space to properly engage here. Fortunately, it is sufficient for the moment to say that I reject the argument that states can meaningfully be considered agents in and of themselves.⁹ Instead, I agree with Colin Wight who argues that while it may be useful to speak *as if* states were agents from time to time, collectivities such as states are incapable of acting in ways that do not reduce to the actions of individual human beings.¹⁰ This does not mean, however, that individuals – say state leaders – can be understood as all-powerful entities that control their states like puppets. While individuals are always capable of acting on their own volition, it is also true that structures like the state play a very important role in constituting individuals' agency. Thus, while they cannot trust, it is important to recognize that states are not uninvolved in the processes through which trust is generated.

While states themselves may not possess agency, students of IR are rightly interested in decisions and actions taken *on behalf of states*. Thus, to be useful for IR, any account of agency needs to provide direction in terms of the agents on whom empirical research should

⁸ Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010b: 72). Hayes (2012b: 783) makes a similar argument. A more general version can be found in Jackson and Nexon (2002: 1).

⁹ Wendt (2004).

¹⁰ Wight (2006: Chapter 5); Hermann and Kegley (1995: 515 and 528).

focus and an account of how the decisions taken by these agents influence the actions taken on behalf of a state, and how the particular structures of a state influence the agency of those who act on behalf of the state. Wight advances a tripartite conception of agency that fulfills both these criteria. He sees agency comprising three separate aspects: agency₁, agency₂, and agency₃. Agency₁ relates to what Wight calls the ‘freedom of subjectivity’, that is, the essential unpredictability of humans that derives from their ability to behave in unexpected ways and to creatively pursue unexpected options.¹¹ Even those less individualistic aspects of agency discussed below under the headings of agency₂ and agency₃ are never totally determinative; not only do they rely on individual agents for their reproduction, they are also always open to some form of interpretation by empirical agents, and thus represent fields of possibility open to particularistic adaptations and not rigid comprehensive protocols.¹² Indeed, agents always maintain some space for creativity and this creativity plays a large role in underwriting the often underestimated importance of the individual in international politics.¹³ As is discussed later, agential characteristics like charisma can, given the right environment, have significant impacts on larger political events. Finally, so-called ‘Cournot effects’ – that is, accidental and random conjunctures that are essentially unpredictable and place particular agents at critical junctures where their simple presence or absence can be particularly influential – can also have important effects.¹⁴

Alternatively, agency₂ refers to the way that agents become agents *of something else*, in particular the social structures within which they are embedded. The focus on class consciousness and its implications for the actions of individuals displayed by many Marxist theories is an example of a pre-occupation with this aspect of agency. Crucially, agency₂

¹¹ See also Jackson (2003: 237-238).

¹² Jackson (2003: 237).

¹³ Pinker (2011: 262, 343). This creativity is an important source of irresolvable uncertainty.

¹⁴ Pierson (2004: 57).

should be understood as referring to the ways in which structures both enable and constrain: without agency₂ much of what actors do would be impossible because the significance of their actions lies in the meanings they possess, meanings that only exist in relation to these structures.¹⁵

For example, the rules of chess, it is impossible to play chess, and anyone who tried would simply be moving blocks of wood around without meaning.¹⁶

Finally, agency₃ refers to the ‘positioned-practice-places’ that agents inhabit within the social structures that surround them. For example, because of their specific ‘positioned-practice-places’, the agency₁ of Presidents of the USA is very different from that of average individuals. This differentiated agency manifests in a number of ways, but because the office of the President is itself a creation/feature of the structure known as the USA, this differentiated agency is most visible in relation to the other parts of this structure. For example, there exists a panoply of actions, from ordering the launch of a nuclear strike, to pardoning individuals convicted of a federal felony, to vetoing laws passed by the US Congress, that only Presidents are empowered by the structure called the USA to undertake.¹⁷

This abstract discussion of agency provides us with a strong foundation for designing our empirical analysis. Because individuals are the decision-making units imbued with agency₁, our analysis needs to focus first and foremost on identifying the individuals of consequence

¹⁵ Pouliot (2008: 282); Kahl (1998: 103 and 107); Jackson (2003: 237). Cf. Weldes (1999: 11-12).

¹⁶ Jackson (2003: 234) goes so far as to point out that it is these structures that actually create agents insofar as they are social agents.

¹⁷ The human tendency to construct ever larger collectivities with at least some forms of decision-making power vested in a single individual is another way in which an important individual influence is preserved in international politics. Cf. Pinker (2011: 216).

for the decisions in question and on illuminating the reasons that exist for the decisions they take.¹⁸

However, because individuals are implicated in larger social structures, in order to carry out this primary task we also need to examine how specific agents' decision-making is enabled and constrained by the particularities of the specific structures in which they are implicated. Thus, any researcher hoping to explain a particular decision needs to understand the influences of all three aspects of agency involved and the specific ways in which they interact in the episode under examination.¹⁹

The research procedure

With these final bits of conceptual scaffolding in place, it is now possible to elaborate a research procedure that lays out the critical steps required for the investigation of trust. This procedure can be summarized as follows:

1. Identify opportunities for trusting behaviour by identifying opportunities – either accepted or rejected – for states to voluntarily accept vulnerability to each other.
2. Identify and describe the relevant agents and the 'distributions of meaning' and 'power' implicated in the decision to accept or reject this vulnerability.
3. Evaluate alternative non-trust-focused explanations for the agent's behaviour.

¹⁸ Naturally, it is important to not attempt to psychoanalyze leaders from a distance. Providing the type of detailed portrait necessary to really access such intimate influences on an agent is the function of biography, not IR. To avoid engaging in such analysis I limit my analysis of a particular agent's agency₁ to the effects of more easily observed agential characteristics, such as their charisma – characteristics that are quite personal, but that are also easily and replicably observable.

¹⁹ Pierson (2004: 102) makes a similar recommendation.

4. Hypothesize what collective identifications and attendant forms of trust could justify a trusting acceptance of vulnerability in such circumstances and evaluate whether agents' behaviour is consistent therewith.
5. Evaluate whether the conditions theorized as enabling such a trusting acceptance of vulnerability obtained.

By integrating evidence from all five parts of this research procedure, I am able to demonstrate *consilience*, that is, a convergence of evidence from different sources and perspectives that together support an argument more robustly than if supported from any single source.²⁰ Below, I provide explanations of each of these five steps and explain how they fit together to provide a coherent procedure.

Step 1: Identify opportunities for acceptances of vulnerability

The first step in my research procedure is the identification of possible instances of trust through the identification of opportunities for the voluntary acceptance of vulnerability between states. This is important because trust-beliefs are not directly observable. While not all acceptances of vulnerability involve trust, all trusting behaviour involves the acceptance of vulnerability, making the identification of instances where a state has the opportunity to accept vulnerability to an other state the best way to identify potential instances of trusting behaviour.

Acceptance of vulnerability can take a number of forms, but the essence of a voluntary acceptance of vulnerability is that an agent grants an other a measure of influence or control

²⁰ Cf. Kahl (1998: 136) on 'triangulation'.

over their future well-being that they could have avoided granting.²¹ Thus, identifying an opportunity for the acceptance of vulnerability involves identifying instances when a state was presented with a decision as to whether to allow another state a measure of influence or control over their future well-being or take action to avoid allowing this influence or control to eventuate. For our purposes, it is important that an acceptance of vulnerability be voluntary – that is, non-coerced – because, if it is not and this vulnerability is imposed on the agent in question by another, then there is no actual decision on the part of the vulnerable agent to explain, and thus no possibility of trust.

Importantly, agents themselves need not always understand their actions as an acceptance of vulnerability because trust beliefs might influence their cognitive frameworks in ways that would obscure the vulnerability-enhancing aspects of their actions or their subjective uncertainty over the potential trustee's intentions.²² This can make identifying such instances difficult, as the analyst is forced to make a judgement concerning whether an agent 'objectively' accepted vulnerability or not. 'Objective' vulnerability is obviously a slippery concept, but I use it to indicate situations where similarly positioned agents, possessed of average intelligence but not of the same positive beliefs concerning their partner, would recognize an action as an acceptance of vulnerability. This is not an ideal approach, but it is unavoidable, and the best thing an analyst can do is to research the situation thoroughly and present their judgement and justifications for this judgement in as clear and transparent a manner as possible.²³

Step 2: Identify relevant agents and map the relevant 'distributions of meaning' and 'power'

²¹ Hoffman (2002: 386-393) has developed an illustrative typology of forms of acceptance of vulnerability.

²² Keating and Ruzicka (2014). See also Luhman (1979). Cf. Hopf (2010: 554).

²³ Cf. Johnson (2004: 53-54) who adopts an analogous approach.

Earlier, I argued that only individuals are capable of trusting. Simultaneously, however, I argued that while only individuals could trust, the tendency of these individuals to trust, and the manner in which they might do so, will unavoidably be mediated by the structures that constitute their agency₂ and agency₃. Naturally, agents are always embedded in a number of such structures concurrently and in order to understand the aggregate impact of these structures on an agent's decision-making, it is necessary to have a good understanding of the impact of these structures – such as narratives (agency₂) and the hierarchies of positioned-practice-places such as bureaucracies (agency₃). Consequently, it is necessary to map all or, more realistically, the most influential structures in which agents are embedded so that a picture of the aggregate impact can be adduced.²⁴ I refer to the product of these mapping exercises as the 'distribution of meaning' (agency₂) and the 'distribution of power' (agency₃). Most scholarship that examines particular historical episodes or case studies already incorporates such a mapping exercise to a greater or lesser extent in the form of an introduction or historical context section. However, these analyses are often not rigorously designed or clearly organized and risk missing important information. Helping to ameliorate this shortcoming is the main added value of this step in the research procedure, and of the earlier identification of agency₂ and agency₃.

The mapping of the distribution of power is the easier of the two tasks. The most effective way of accomplishing this task is to determine the structure of authority (bureaucratic, traditional, etc) relevant to the acceptance of vulnerability in question and identify those position-practice-places, and the particular individuals who occupy them, whose assent is required by the decision in question.²⁵ Owen argues that the critical decision-makers in liberal states can be grouped into what he calls an interested elite, a group separate from the

²⁴ Smith (2004: 308).

²⁵ Rajagopalan (1998: 1265). The analysis suggested by Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s (1999) 'selectorate' theory is a good example of this sort of mapping at work.

general population, that he suggests only influences foreign policy in exceptional circumstances. Owen's analysis also includes an implicit third grouping separate from the interested elite, however, namely those who are actually empowered to make decisions, commit states to actions, and actually act on behalf of states. Since this seems an important difference given the contingency represented by agency₁ and the limited determinacy of many knowledge structures when faced with highly specific decision-making situations characterized by limited information, I argue that a tripartite division of society into decision-makers, an interested elite, and a general population represents a better template and starting point for this sort of analysis.²⁶

The mapping of distributions of meaning is a slightly more complicated enterprise, but equally essential.²⁷ Recall that the vast majority of human action is social. Social actions can only be understood with reference to the discursive milieu in which they occur.²⁸

Consequently, mapping the distribution of meaning that provides this discursive backdrop is essential to understanding how agents are enabled and constrained.²⁹ This mapping is achieved through the specification of the discursive influences on agents as well as the discursive raw materials available to agents for the interpretation of their environment and the making of meaning through their actions. I use the term discursive raw materials to refer to intersubjectively produced knowledge structures that possess a high level of acceptance with some discrete audience and some stability in meaning at a particular time.³⁰ These knowledge structures can be fairly direct emanations of physical facts, such as the existence of a high level of trade between states, or they can be more obviously socially constructed, such as

²⁶ Naturally, in illiberal societies the ways in which this influence is operationalized changes and researchers should follow the internal logic of the case, but I suspect that the tripartite division remains largely valid.

²⁷ Jackson (2003: 239). Cf. Hayes (2012a: 65) for a similar argument.

²⁸ Taylor (2004: 183); Crawford (2004: 14).

²⁹ Kahl (1998: 136-137); Smith (2004: 301); Vucetic (2011: 11); Jackson (2003: 234); Jackson and Nexon (2002: 16); Weldes (1999: 9).

³⁰ Jackson (2003: 238).

whether this high level of trade is considered a good or bad thing. The narratives around which I have argued that collective identification occurs, such as liberalism, represent another example of a knowledge structure that could serve as a discursive raw material. These knowledge structures influence agents' decision-making because of the ways in which they can bias agents toward certain interpretations of events, provide legitimizing logics to certain means-ends understandings, and, in so doing, rationalize and legitimize certain actions as commonsensical while constraining and delegitimizing others.³¹

Understanding the knowledge structures that comprise the discursive milieu in which agents are embedded is critical because the narratives around which collective identification occurs cannot be expected to be the sole influences on agents' decision-making; these narratives are simply too limited and agents' discursive surroundings too rich. Moreover, while I have sought to keep various narratives like liberalism separate for the purposes of analytical clarity, these knowledge structures are never so neatly discrete; rather, the normal situation is one of constant shifting, blending, and interpenetration between knowledge structures. In order to understand how a particular narrative, like liberalism, will influence an agent, it is essential to understand the other narratives of importance to that agent's decision-making, and their likely interactions with the trust-enabling narrative.³² Some narratives will be inherently complementary, for example, the complementarity identified by Max Weber between Protestantism and capitalism, while others will be inherently opposed. This is not to say that interpretations of the meanings cannot vary as political entrepreneurs seek to bend them to their own purposes, but it is to say that not every interpretation will be persuasive.³³ By illuminating the likely compatibilities or irreconcilabilities between narratives, researchers

³¹ Jackson (2003: 235). See also Weldes (1999 : 11-12); Crawford (2002: 7). Cf. Pouliot (2008: 282).

³² Crawford (2002: 27).

³³ Vucetic (2011: 12). I discuss what might make a narrative more or less persuasive in the Conclusions chapter.

can shed light on the contours of the discursive landscape and, in so doing, shed light on the relative likelihood of specific decisions and actions.³⁴

What does this analysis actually entail? Mapping the distribution of meaning entails identifying the internal logics and assumptions of the various knowledge structures that comprise the discursive milieu in which agents are embedded. This requires the application of interpretive, historical, and ethnographic methods.³⁵ As we have already discussed, a key problem with Rationalist accounts is not so much that they ignore this step, but rather that they assume fairly one-dimensional distributions of meaning that fail to take into account all the critical agency₂ influences on agents' decision-making. I rely primarily on secondary sources to provide this information and focus on presenting only those aspects of the milieu that are significant for the decision-making in question. Additionally, and contrary to the situation in other steps in this procedure, in this case agents' public statements can be just as useful as agents' private ones in supplementing the secondary sources. This is because agents intervene in public debates in the way they do because they think that doing so will produce a certain result. In so doing, agents reveal their understandings of the discursive and power contexts in which they are acting. The success, or lack thereof, of their intervention provides information that can help the analyst construct their maps.³⁶

Finally, it is important to note that in the empirical analyses that follow it will be impossible to present comprehensive accounts of the discursive milieu in which decision-makers are embedded and by which they are being influenced. Instead, I present accounts in which I sketch the critical contours of the larger discursive features of these societies most applicable

³⁴ See Taylor (2004: Chapter 8) and King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 36-37).

³⁵ Smith (2004: 309); Crawford (2002: 9).

³⁶ Jackson (2003: 236-238); Risse-Kappen (1995b: 37); Muller (2004: 497). Cf. Freedman (1996: 269); Hayes (2012a: 72).

to the decision-makers and decisions in question. These sketches will naturally be limited in their content, but in all cases they are based on more extensive research and my carefully weighed judgement – judgement that is grounded in well-accepted, if not standard or consensus, views of scholars and area/period experts, as represented in the secondary literatures.

Step 3: Evaluate alternative explanations

Any explanation of a phenomenon in international politics that postulates an unobservable variable like trust playing a causal role must meet a high bar in terms of superior explanatory power in order to justify its potentially reduced parsimony and the necessarily more complicated process required for falsification. A critical step in meeting this requirement is the identification of problems with existing explanations in order to establish those areas where a new explanation might add value.³⁷ The fundamental intuition undergirding this exercise is that the best way to know if a narrative is influencing an agent's decision-making in the critical ways discussed in Chapter 3, is to see if this narrative aligns with an agent's actions better than the narratives or logics that alternative explanations posit agents as following.³⁸ This is especially important for trust-based explanations because of their need to compensate for their less straightforward operationalizations.

This step is fairly simple to operationalize, as most acceptances of vulnerability already have numerous existing explanations. If the case is a historical one, there are often historical accounts that provide fairly specific explanations; if the events are more recent, journalistic or policy-community produced assessments can provide functionally similar accounts.

³⁷ Cf. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 28) on 'efficiency' or leverage.

³⁸ Kahl (1998: 139).

Sometimes there may even be existing studies that seek to show how these events can be explained within a particular IR theoretical framework. If no such accounts exist, they can be constructed by the analyst.

Whatever the source of such competing explanations, it is important to interrogate their plausibility both in terms of their logical coherence (internal validity) and their empirical support (external validity).³⁹ The analysis of Lipson and Owen's theories undertaken in Chapter 1 provides a good example of the former. In the case of the latter, not only is it important to determine whether the independent, intervening, and dependent variables were present or absent as expected by the theory, but also that the mechanisms specified by the theory operated as expected. For example, explanations that depend on Rationalist assumptions and that argue that agents will reach a decision on the basis of a weighing of the costs and benefits need to produce evidence that such a weighing occurred in order to be supported. Similarly, accounts that postulate that a decision was taken on the basis of a pre-existing habit cannot be supported if evidence suggests that the decision was the result of a weighing of costs and benefits.⁴⁰ If an account fails either the test for internal or external validity, this provides a basis for comparison with other explanations. In such cases, it is these failures that a trust-focused explanation must address, in addition to the areas that these theories already explain, in order to demonstrate its superior leverage.

Step 4: Elaborate a trust-based explanation

³⁹ King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 100).

⁴⁰ Hopf (2010: 550-552). Evaluations of this sort are generally referred to as process tracing. See Khong (1992: 40); Vucetic (2011: 19-20); King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 227). On the importance of tracing processes over a long period of time, see Pierson (2004: 140).

The fourth step in my procedure focuses on linking a particular acceptance of vulnerability with the specific beliefs that enable it. Focusing on specific beliefs is important for a number of reasons. Mercer argues that it is only in the discrete belief, as opposed to broader background dispositions and cognitive frameworks, that the full range of possible mental influences on agents' decision-making is distilled into a unit that actually influences a specific decision in a way amenable to meaningful analysis.⁴¹ More practically, in order to sustain a trust-based hypothesis, researchers must be able to identify a salient commonality – and its associated narrative – around which a collective identification could take place that would justify the acceptance of vulnerability in question given the agent's cognitive framework.⁴² Finally, doing so also provides a means of addressing the critique that Constructivist work in IR fails to persuasively connect ideas and actions.⁴³

Articulating the specific trust belief at issue is not always easy, however, and can require the researcher to infer beliefs to agents that they may only allude to in indirect ways. For example, a researcher may need to infer the holding of a trust belief to an agent when they refer to another as a 'friend' because, in the mind of the trusting agent, friendship includes trust without it needing to be expressly articulated.⁴⁴ While the language used may not match exactly, if the meaning is the same, it is reasonable for the analyst to infer the holding of a belief than has been identified by a different name.⁴⁵ While this is unfortunate, it is in some ways unavoidable as, for example, it is nonsensical to expect agents to always clearly justify their failure to think thoughts that have been rendered unthinkable by trust by expressing their underlying taken-for-granted assumptions.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Mercer (2010: 13); Khong (1992: 254).

⁴² Mercer (2010: 2 and 25).

⁴³ Kahl (1998: 109); Moravcsik (1999).

⁴⁴ Pouliot (2008: 278-279) makes a similar point about the reasons an agent might trust.

⁴⁵ Kahl (1998: 136-137); Hoffman (2002: 387).

⁴⁶ See Keating and Ruzicka (2014); Jervis (1988: 680).

Thankfully, it is possible to support such analysis in other ways as well. By clearly articulating the specific trust-belief in question, the analyst is able to relate this belief to the elements of an agent's cognitive framework that licensed it.⁴⁷ Doing so is important for two reasons: (1) it is through these narratives that trust-beliefs can be shown to be reasonable from an agent's perspective, and (2) it is in identifying these narratives that the analyst is able to identify the additional beliefs discussed in Chapter 3 from which she can derive 'microtranslations', that is, additional hypothesis concerning agents' behaviour. These microtranslations are important because it is the testing of them that allows the analyst to adduce additional evidence as to whether agents hold the beliefs out of which trust is theorized as potentially emerging.⁴⁸

This additional evidence comes in both quantitative and qualitative forms. For example, in addition to non-violence, liberals can also be expected to support things like political and economic freedoms as discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, indicators such as the Polity IV database and the Freedom House database can be used to establish the extent to which a polity is governed liberally.⁴⁹ Neither database perfectly matches my definition of liberalism, but they are the best quantitative resources currently available.⁵⁰ At the economic level, the best way to make this determination lies in situating a state within the context of its time. For example, in the post-1945 period, whether a state was a member of the GATT/WTO represents a good, if broad, indicator of a society's relative level of economic liberalism. Before 1945 it is necessary to rely more exclusively on secondary sources.

⁴⁷ This situation highlights the importance of the analysis undertaken in Step 2.

⁴⁸ Kahl (1998: 135).

⁴⁹ Doyle (1983: 209-212).

⁵⁰ See Danilovic and Clare (2007: 404; footnote 10) for a discussion of the limitations of Polity IV. Danilovic and Clare (2007: 405) prefer Freedom House as a measure of civil liberties.

These measures provide a general picture of a society's adherence to liberalism. However, while the general character of a polity does have an important influence through agency₂ and agency₃, this general character does not always match the character of those acting on behalf of a state. Thus, determining the extent to which the interested elite, and especially state decision-makers, adhere to a liberal narrative is key, something that requires a more qualitative approach. Discourse analysis of a representative sample of newspapers and periodicals is one way of measuring elite opinion, as is consultation of secondary sources. Similarly, once the critical decision-makers have been identified, establishing the extent to which they adhere to liberalism is best done by examining documents that reveal, albeit imperfectly, agents' mental states, such as their public remarks, diaries, correspondence, published works, and minutes of meetings. Biographic, autobiographic, and secondary sources can also be very useful, especially insofar as they report any of the sources just discussed.⁵¹

Step 5: Identify evidence for collective identification

The final step in my research procedure involves providing positive evidence supportive of the explanation proposed in Step 4. While it is impossible to observe trust directly, one can show that the conditions theorized as capable of generating the collective identification required for trust were in place in advance of the acceptance of vulnerability in question. Drawing on the analysis developed in Chapter 3, I have developed a set of five trust-enabling factors that can be expected to produce the familiarity and positive affect required to generate the collective identification necessary for trust. They are: (1) interactivity, (2) homogeneity,

⁵¹ Kahl (1998: 136). One of the best ways to measure the influence of public opinion on decision-making will be in the justifications that decision-makers and interested elites provide for their decisions. More often than not, public opinion will be effective because of how it is perceived by the interested elite and decision-makers. Thus, the qualitative methods outlined for examining the decision-making of decision-makers may actually be the most fruitful place to locate this influence.

(3) common interests, (4) shared experiences, and (5) altercasting.⁵² Recall that, since it is the aggregate familiarity and positive emotion experienced by an agent that is important, it is the aggregate effect of all these factors that is of interest, not the presence or strength of any single one.⁵³ If a researcher is able to show that these factors were present in advance of an acceptance of vulnerability, this should be understood as evidence in favour of a trust-based explanation of this acceptance. Correspondingly, demonstrating that these factors were not present in periods preceding failures to accept vulnerability also supports my general argument.

Below I describe a number of indicators that I have developed to evaluate the presence of the five trust-enabling factors. This sort of empirical work is the least developed area of trust scholarship, and thus an area in which my research can make a significant contribution. One of the goals of this thesis is to improve the quantitative indicators available to scholars for the study of trust, specifically the factors that generate the required familiarity and positive affect. Currently, too much trust scholarship is limited to essentially idiosyncratic case studies that, whatever their merits, are difficult to replicate and compare across cases, thereby limiting their rigour and the accumulation of knowledge in this area.⁵⁴ Thus, I have attempted to develop a number of quantitative indicators that not only describe the features of individual relationships, but are also constructed so as to be comparable across case studies. Even when this is not possible due to problems of data availability, where data is available for a single

⁵² These five factors parallel the six mechanisms capable of generating positive affect identified in Chapter 3 with the exception that I have subsumed the empirically difficult to differentiate ‘mere exposure’ and ‘intergroup contact’ mechanisms under the heading of interactivity. Moreover, while the discussion of these mechanisms in Chapter 3 largely focused on their ability to generate positive affect, it should be noted that these factors are also capable of generating familiarity in ways discussed below.

⁵³ Other scholars like Kupchan (2010) and Adler and Barnett (1998a) tend to overcomplicate this point and develop intricate and extensive sequences with numerous and often confusing required components. The simplicity of my model is one of its strong points.

⁵⁴ See King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 45) on the importance of comparability even in small-*n* studies.

case it is still useful for effectuating comparisons within cases and for describing the evolution of the relationships under investigation.⁵⁵

Interactivity

By measuring interactivity between polities, my aim is to capture the operation of the processes of communication and transaction by which agents build familiarity with each other, such as trade and migration. Note also that, due to the increased exposure that polities have to one another through increased interactivity, the mechanisms identified in Chapter 1 capable of revealing information about a liberal polity, such as the *Transparency*, *Commitment*, and *Transnational Enmeshment Mechanisms*, will all have an increased effect. On the positive affect side, greater interactivity between polities can engage the “mere exposure” and “group contact” mechanisms between a multiplicity of agents across national boundaries.⁵⁶

Interactivity is the trust-enabling factor most amenable to systematic quantitative measurement, at least at a broad level. Unlike in some existing scholarship, however, my focus is not on comparing State A’s absolute interactivity with State B to A’s absolute interactivity with State C, or even the level of interactivity between A and B relative to A’s total interactivity with all other states. Rather, I focus on describing the level of interactivity that exists between A and B in terms of the levels of interactivity that constitute *A itself as a community* and using this as a basis for comparison.

⁵⁵ One of the difficulties I have faced in this project has been the startling lack of, or lack of access to, comparable historical statistics that would allow rigorous quantitative comparisons across case studies. This has limited the progress I have been able to make in this area.

⁵⁶ Kahl (1998: 120-121).

Implicit in this comparison is the idea that states and the groups formed by states, such as security communities, are different entities in degree and not in type. This approach derives partially from Karl Deutsch's transactional theory of community formation. Deutsch's theory has been correctly criticized on a number of fronts, but it did recognize an important fact: communities, that is, populations that share "values, preferences, life-styles, common memories, aspirations, loyalties, and identifications,"⁵⁷ do not exist as static things, but rather must be constantly reproduced by the agents that constitute them. Communities can be identified by the fact that they "communicate with one another (i.e., transact) frequently, rapidly, clearly, and effectively, in balanced manner, over multiple ranges of social, economic, cultural, and political concerns," and, critically, "communicate between themselves much more frequently... than they communicate with peoples of other communities, so the 'boundaries' of their community are marked by relative discontinuities of transaction flow."⁵⁸

If we accept the thrust of this argument, it becomes possible to identify the likely relative level of identification of agents with their various communities by examining the clustering and relative proportion of an agent's universe of transactions associated with each community. The best way of capturing this clustering is to track the proportion of a polity's universe of interactions, for example economic transactions, accounted for by interactions with another polity and compare that proportion against another cluster of interactions. Given the pre-eminent status of identification with the state in terms of importance for international political activity, the proportion of a state's interactivity that is domestic offers an ideal

⁵⁷ Puchala (1970: 742) citing Deutsch.

⁵⁸ Puchala (1970: 742-743) citing Deutsch. Puchala (1970: 743) is at pains to point out that interactivity does not create communities, but rather simply represents evidence of their existence. In so doing, Puchala goes too far and fails to recognize that while transactions do not by themselves create communities, for the reasons outlined in Chapter 3, they do contribute to their formation.

baseline comparator because of how it enables us to compare a polity's identification with its state, and its identification with communities formed at a higher level.

While not all polities can automatically be assumed to be constituted by identical levels of identification, this national identification does provide as good a common baseline as we are likely to find for the purposes of comparing differing levels of intensity of interactivity that exist in international politics. More specifically, because agents can identify with many communities simultaneously, the measurement of inter-polity interactivity, in terms of a polity's intra-polity interactivity, provides a value expressed in terms that render comparisons within and across cases possible and meaningful. For example, while State A's trade with State B could account for 50% of its foreign trade, if this foreign trade accounted for only 5% of State A's economic activity, the relative importance of the *interactions* represented by this trade would be much less than if State A's foreign trade with State B represented only 40% of its total foreign trade, but 25% of its total economic activity. Consequently, the interactions in the latter case would be more likely to influence its behaviour than the interactions in the former.⁵⁹

The measures that I have constructed to capture interactivity in this way are listed below. As alluded to earlier, due to reasons of data availability, I have not been able to construct these indicators for every case study, but where data of reasonable quality exist, I have presented them.

- *Bi-lateral trade*: a yearly measure of the nominal value of State A's exports to, and imports from, State B as a percentage of State A's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

⁵⁹ Cf. Gartzke (2007: 174) who constructs a similar measure of a state's overall trade dependence, but does not make it relationship specific.

- *Bi-lateral investment*: a yearly measure of the nominal value of State A's new investment in State B as a percentage of the total amount of new investment made in State A in that year as measured by Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF).
- *Bi-lateral migration flows*:
 - 1) a yearly measure of the number of migrants between States A and B as a percentage of State A and B's total population.
 - 2) a yearly measure of the number of individuals born in States A and B resident in the other state, as a percentage of the states' total populations.

These indicators are pitched at the level of the entire society. While doing so is essential in order to be able to capture the background realities, that is, the distributions of meaning and power, which constrain elites and decision-makers, these measures cannot tell the whole story. Indeed, these measures actually represent influences on the *longue durée* and cannot be expected to dependably influence the smaller groups of people who comprise a polity's elites and decision-makers at any one time. I aim to capture the influence of these interactions through more qualitative measures derived primarily from secondary sources. These qualitative measures focus on the interactivity that takes place between members of the elite and decision-making segments of a polity. This involves examining the regularity and frequency with which members of these segments, but especially decision-makers, interact, and the extent to which these interactions occur under conditions that meet the criteria for the intergroup contact effect to be engaged – for example, whether the interactions occurred under conditions of equality. It also involves attending to the importance that these agents attached to these interactions.

Homogeneity

Homogeneity refers to how the perception of sameness between agents licenses greater confidence in agents' predictions – and, in so doing, largely replicates the logic of the *slow mobilization/no surprise attack mechanism* – and triggers psychological biases that favour others perceived as similar. Drawing on research on nationalism and the formation of unions in international politics, I have identified the following indicators as ways of accessing those objective similarities and differences between societies that tend to have a strong influence on processes of collective identification.⁶⁰

- *Political similarity*: a yearly measure of the difference between the two states' scores in the Polity IV and Freedom House databases.
- *GDP per capita*: a yearly measure of the smaller state's GDP per capita expressed as a percentage of the larger state's GDP per capita.
- *Primary religious cleavage*: a yearly comparison between the distributions of religious affiliations along the primary internal religious cleavage if this cleavage is shared between the two states.

Differences in (dominant) language spoken is also worth examining at the polity level, but this tends to be a fairly binary comparison. When it is not, a more qualitative examination is warranted.⁶¹ Other qualitative comparisons that I employ include comparisons of states' legal systems and investigations of the extent to which the two states share important cultural and intellectual heritages. Here I rely largely on secondary sources.

Common Interests, shared experiences, and altercasting

⁶⁰ See Anderson (1991); Kupchan (2010); Deutsch (1963); and Adler and Barnett (1998a).

⁶¹ See Smith (2004: 306) for a discussion on how using language in this way can be useful.

Interactivity and homogeneity are the most easily quantifiable of the factors I have identified, in large part because they capture phenomena that have their effect more or less ‘objectively’, that is, they have an effect regardless of whether the agents involved recognize the presence of the factor or not.⁶² For common interests, shared experiences, and altercasting, however, this is not the case. With these factors, familiarity is generated subjectively by a sense that the other is the same as the self. It is this same sense of similarity that also sparks the emergence of positive affect. Because of this subjective character, short of using public opinion data, it is very difficult to generate quantitative measures of these factors’ presence. Thus, while public opinion data is useful when available, I rely primarily on secondary sources to measure the presence of these three factors, as well as on first-hand accounts and other primary sources that reveal, even if imperfectly, the state of mind of those making the critical decisions during the episodes in question.

At a more specific level, the most important qualitative indicator of common interests that I use is the degree to which states share intelligence. The sharing of intelligence, and the manner in which it is shared, is an excellent indicator of a perception of common interests because of the secrecy and unverifiable character of intelligence operations.⁶³ When states perceive their interests to be common, however, they share intelligence nonetheless, on the assumption that what advances one of their partner’s interests will also advance their own.⁶⁴ I also examine the extent to which states fought in the same wars on the same sides and

⁶² They may also have a secondary subjective effect as discursive raw materials, but this is analytically distinct and better analyzed in Step 2.

⁶³ Richelson and Ball (1985: 304).

⁶⁴ Richelson and Ball (1985: 305) note that during the Cold War, many intelligence operatives came to identify ‘the West’ and its common interests as the primary focus for their loyalty, often above their particular states.

participated in the same alliance structures.⁶⁵ As detailed in Chapter 3, when agents commemorate such cooperation, many of these indicators can be used, though retrospectively instead of prospectively, to indicate that agents perceived that they had shared experiences with others.

For altercasting, there are two categories of indicators on which I focus. First are those actions discussed earlier that Rationalists would refer to as ‘costly signals’. These actions often constitute a small acceptance of vulnerability that is offered strategically as a means of kick-starting a deeper process of trust-building. These actions both generate familiarity as Rationalists suggest, but also provoke positive affective responses. Second are the less spectacular ways in which agents interact, especially in institutional settings, and the forms that these interactions take.⁶⁶ By analyzing these forms and identifying the assumptions that they encode – for instance by examining how positions in a joint institution are distributed between nationals of the member states and the expectations in terms of the relationships between these positions that this distribution implies – it is possible to describe how states altercast each other in much more mundane, but more common and perhaps influential, circumstances.

Case Study Design

So far I have elaborated a model of trust whereby a confluence of factors, including familiarity, positive affect, and a shared commonality, can result in collective identification

⁶⁵ Both of these indicators could potentially be quantified but, due to the rareness of these occurrences and the significant variation in the importance of formally similar events, a qualitative approach is easier when dealing with such a limited number of cases and much more valid. See Gartzke (2006) on how the costly and strategic nature of alliances limits the usefulness of common alliance portfolios as a measure of common interests – at least in large-*N* statistical analysis.

⁶⁶ Crawford (2002: 10).

between two agents. This collective identification entails the formation of a psychological in-group characterized by a fundamental in-group bias, but also a pattern of behaviour defined by the narrative associated with the shared commonality on which it is based. It is the interaction between this psychological bias, which has the effect of short-circuiting an agents' rationality by occluding certain possibilities from consideration, and the tenets of this narrative that enable the generation of specific trust-beliefs.

In the context of the liberal peace, this means that increased familiarity and positive affect, generated by the five factors just discussed, combine with a shared adherence to a liberal narrative to produce an in-group in which the use of violence as a means of resolving disputes between members is no longer thinkable. This collective identification, and the set of factors that combine to generate it, represents my independent variable. Once this collective identification has taken place, the members of the in-group trust each other to resolve any disputes they might have with each other non-violently. This trust-belief represents the intervening variable in my model. Finally, the presence of this trust enables the formation of a liberal security community that, in turn, enables the transcendence of the security dilemma. The state of peace that results represents the dependent variable.⁶⁷

With this understanding in place, the next step in my analysis is to determine the extent to which this model is supported by empirical evidence. As this model has emerged out of an attempt to resolve problems in DPT, I have selected my cases in such a way as to also help further our understanding of the liberal peace. That said, on the understanding that any analysis that helps support the plausibility of my general trust model is also helpful in advancing my more specific argument that the liberal peace is a result of a network of

⁶⁷ Cf. Johnson (2004: 36) for a formally similar model.

trusting liberal security communities, some of the empirical analysis that follows does not bear directly on the liberal peace.

Case Selection

My research design comprises three case studies brought together to form a structured, focused comparative study.⁶⁸ By focusing on a limited number of cases, and by tracing the chains through which causation is, or is not, transmitted, I am able to conduct a more in-depth and fine-grained examination of the operation of the causal mechanisms theorized as generating the liberal peace. The focused comparison of cases and sub-cases enables me to observe the influence of changes in the dependent variable within and across these cases and to begin to determine whether or not these changes are correlated with the types of changes my conceptualization of trust would expect.⁶⁹

Basically, each of the cases represents an independent ‘plausibility probe’.⁷⁰ Thus, the purpose of these case studies is to gather evidence and evaluate whether my conceptualization of trust corresponds to real world processes and, in so doing, also help generate ideas for the model’s refinement.⁷¹ That said, the cases were also selected in conjunction so that, as a set, they capture a wide cross-section of bilateral relationships ranging from possibly the most trusting bilateral relationship in the world (Canada and the USA), to a case that has remained one of the most distrusting (India and Pakistan), to a

⁶⁸ George and Bennett (2005: 18-19 and chapter 3) argue that single case studies can be especially valuable for theory development.

⁶⁹ George and Bennett (2005: 23) advocate the use of comparisons between cases in this way, even if asymmetric. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 48) agree.

⁷⁰ Eckstein (1975: 108-113); George and Bennett (2005: 75). King, Keohane, and Verba’s (1994: 22) arguments in favour of the use of ‘pilot projects’ make most of the same points.

⁷¹ George and Bennett (2005: 19) argue that this is one of the strengths of case studies. A secondary purpose is to determine if my conceptual framework can improve our understanding of the events that comprise these case studies.

relationship that has moved from being one of the most antagonistic to one of the most trusting (France and Germany). Additionally, by selecting at least one sub-case in each case study focused on nuclear weapons acquisition, the cases are given a substantive commonality that helps improve the comparability between cases.

The aim of this selection method is to gain insight into what differentiates trusting from non-trusting relationships, and also into what can help move a relationship from non-trusting to trusting. I recognize that in so doing I am selecting cases on the basis of the dependent variable. Since this is primarily an exercise in theory building, however, such a selection is not a problem.⁷² Indeed, the selection of cases that offer a significant diversity of outcomes actually provides a much better chance to evaluate the functioning of the theorized mechanisms.⁷³

Another important aspect of my research design is my examination of these relationships over time. This allows an engagement with the crucial details of specific sub-cases, while still preserving an understanding of the significance of these details in the larger sweep of the relationship.⁷⁴ This approach helps the analyst manage the difficulties presented by the fact that evidence of trust is often to be found in non-events that are difficult to rigorously identify.⁷⁵ It also helps avoid the selection bias that invariably arises when scholars select on a particular outcome – wars and crises – when they are actually seeking to study what causes a lack thereof.⁷⁶ Indeed, my approach is a significant improvement over much existing

⁷² See George and Bennett (2005: 23).

⁷³ King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 141 and 199).

⁷⁴ George and Bennett (2005: 59 and 81) see these as among the strongest controls available in qualitative methods. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 201-202) largely agree.

⁷⁵ Indeed, George and Bennett (2005: 59 and 74) argue that this sort of relationship focus is exactly the ‘next step’ needed to push research on the liberal peace forward. My design corresponds to their idea of a ‘longitudinal’ study. Cf. Keohane and Nye (1989: 165).

⁷⁶ King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 24 and 28) make a similar argument. Cf. Johnson (2004: 49).

‘institutional’ scholarship on the liberal peace in which some scholars argue that theories of the liberal peace are “not applicable” to explaining situations when there is no conflict.⁷⁷ Naturally, I cannot comprehensively investigate the entirety of any of these relationships. However, by focusing on the evolution of key factors over the *longue durée* of the relationship and by isolating specific trust-beliefs through the careful analysis of critical episodes embedded within these wider relationships, I am able to evaluate whether potentially ‘slow moving’ factors, which might not be easily discerned in shorter examinations, had an effect.⁷⁸

Each of my three empirical chapters comprise a case study of a relationship between two polities and, more specifically, the decision-making of the objectively weaker of the two states within this relationship, namely Canada, France, and Pakistan.⁷⁹ Each case study comprises two sub-cases. These sub-cases were selected on the basis of their individual merits and for their joint ability to track the evolving nature of the trust present in the relationship. In so doing, the use of two sub-cases in each case study allows me to largely control for potentially confounding factors specific to the relationship and therefore likely present in both sub-cases.⁸⁰

Each sub-case was selected because of how its unique circumstances and dynamics enable the isolation of the role played by trust and the observation of the consequences and modalities of its influence on agents’ decision-making. However, these episodes have also

⁷⁷ This problem afflicts Huth’s and Allee’s (2002: 756) analysis for instance.

⁷⁸ Pierson (2004: Chapter 3 and page 134). Such an approach also helps avoid missing the role of threshold effects (2004: 86), mistakenly identifying catalysts for causes (2004: 141) and provides analysts with a better chance at spotting path dependence and situations where sequencing is important (2004: 16).

⁷⁹ Focusing on the weaker states enables me to more easily isolate instances when vulnerability is being accepted.

⁸⁰ King, Keohane, and Verba (1994: 201-202) suggest that this research design reduces the problems associated with a lack of unit homogeneity. That said, because sub-cases are not completely independent of each other, our ability to generalize from them is limited (1994: 222).

been selected for the way that they provide a window onto important trends and structures present in the wider relationship, and for how they track the evolution, and help illuminate the contours, of the portfolio of trust-beliefs that exist between the two polities. In other words, both episodes help illuminate critical aspects of a single trajectory of trust.

My first case study represents a ‘most likely’ case for the presence of trust. The logic driving this selection is that if I am unable to observe trust in this relationship, it is unlikely I will be able to observe it anywhere, and thus ought to return to the drawing board immediately.⁸¹

Moreover, assuming that trust does exist between Canada and the USA, observing this trust and its characteristics can provide useful, and usefully clear, benchmarks for comparison with examples of trust in other cases. The two sub-cases I examine are Canada’s decision not to acquire nuclear weapons when it had the opportunity to do so after the Second World War and Canada’s refusal to acquiesce to the USA’s request to raise the alert status of its military for three days during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. This second sub-case also includes a further bifurcation such that I examine the decision-making of both the political and military leaderships during this period.

For my second case, I examine the relationship between India and Pakistan. I have selected both my second and third cases with an eye to introducing variation in both the explanatory and dependent variables.⁸² The first sub-case I examine is Pakistan’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons that culminated in 1998 and the second is Pakistan’s decision to launch the Kargil War against India in 1999. Again, the second sub-case is further bifurcated by separate examinations of the decision-making of the political and military leaderships. Because both of these decision occurred while Pakistan and India received scores of seven or more on the

⁸¹ George and Bennett (2005: 80) argue that ‘most likely’ cases are especially useful for theory building.

⁸² George and Bennett (2005: 49-50) approve of such an approach.

Polity IV index, this case represents a ‘hard case’ and explaining such a case successfully would provide significant support for the plausibility of my model.⁸³ This case is also valuable for two other reasons. First, it represents a relationship between two distinctly non-Western, developing states, thereby providing a useful contrast to the two other cases that will help to illuminate if there are any qualities associated with being either Western or developed that a focus on liberalism is masking. Finally, the fact that these two states have fought a war, despite both possessing nuclear weapons, helps to control for the argument that the liberal peace is actually a ‘nuclear peace’.⁸⁴

For my final case, I examine the Franco-German relationship, a relationship in which we have an arguably consistent explanatory variable (in this case, joint liberalism) at key points throughout the period under examination but appear to have variation on the dependent variable. The first sub-case, France’s 1923 decision to use force against Germany by occupying the Ruhr valley, appears to be another ‘hard case’ for my theory as the French took this decision despite the arguable existence of joint liberalism beginning in 1920.⁸⁵ The second sub-case, France’s decision to share nuclear secrets with Germany in 1956-1958, provides a remarkable counterpoint to the first and sheds some light on the processes by which a non-trusting relationship can be transformed into a trusting one. This episode also provides a useful comparison with the nuclear weapons sub-cases in both the Canada-USA

⁸³ Since the Polity IV database bases its scores on a state’s political system at the end of a year, it can be misleading. The *coup d’état* by General Pervez Musharraf that deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif occurred on 12 October 1999. This is important because of how a superficial reading of the database would obscure the fact that the same ‘democratic’ system that had largely been in place since 1988 was still in place at the time of the Kargil War in May-July 1999. Thus, this case also arguably represents a ‘deviant case’ for DPT, and thus an ideal case for the deriving and validating of new theories and for delimiting the scope conditions of theories. George and Bennett (2005: 24, 75, and 56-57).

⁸⁴ Examining nuclear weapons, the highest of the high politics, is also very helpful for the clarity it brings to the decision-makers logics and the way that it minimizes the importance of intervening and confounding factors. Cf. Trachtenberg’s (2012: 6) analogous argument for why great power crises represent optimal opportunities for judging the role of audience costs.

⁸⁵ With the advent of the Weimar constitution, both Germany and France are coded as ‘democracies’ by the Polity IV database. Marshall et al. (20011).

and India Pakistan cases, insofar as many of the same issues surrounding nuclear weapons obtain in all three cases. Finally, and as is also true for the first case, both sub-cases pre-date the advent of DPT, thereby ensuring that these cases are free of contamination from academic discourse.⁸⁶

Conclusions

This chapter acts as something of a hinge for this thesis, in that it completes the first, theoretical, portion of this work and also marks the beginning of the second, empirical, part. Building on both the conceptual framework for understanding trust elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3, as well as the conceptualization of agency and the attendant theory of state decision-making advanced at the outset of this chapter, the bulk of this chapter was devoted to developing a research procedure that faithfully operationalized critical conceptual components of my theory of how trust is formed and how trust influences decision-making. This five-part research procedure should enable the researcher to determine whether or not trust was present in a particular instance based on whether or not a consilience of supportive evidence obtains while the clarity of the research procedure should enable greater and more reliable cross-case comparisons in future research, and thus greater rigour.

In the case studies that follow, I employ this research procedure to demonstrate the usefulness of, and the empirical support for, seeing trust as an important and influential phenomenon in a series of significant decision-making processes. More specifically, in a number of the sub-cases I demonstrate this importance by showing how an understanding of the role played by trust represents a necessary component of any explanation of the liberal peace, both because

⁸⁶ Cf. Hayes (2012a: 73).

of the way in which it helps explain instances of peace, but also because of how it helps explain cases in which peace did not obtain. In the course of this research, I also seek to identify other aspects of the processes by which collective identification and trust are built or not built with the aim of using these findings to help refine and improve my theory. Once these empirical case studies are complete, I summarize and discuss my findings in Chapter 8.

Chapter 5

The Quintessence

Introduction

The Canada-USA relationship is generally seen as one of the most trusting in the world. In this chapter, I investigate the extent to which this characterization is accurate by examining two sub-cases, namely, Canada's non-acquisition of nuclear weapons in the immediate post-war era (1945-1957)¹ and Canada's response to the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. These two episodes each highlight a clear opportunity for Canada to accept vulnerability to the USA, thereby presenting excellent opportunities to evaluate the extent to which trust influenced agents' decision-making. In the first episode, I argue that Canadian decision-makers accepted this opportunity because they trusted their US counterparts to act like liberals and resolve any disputes they might have in the future non-violently, thereby freeing them from the need to consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons. I argue that with the events of the first sub-case we find strong evidence that a Canada-USA liberal security community had been established.

In the second episode, I argue that, while still trusting US decision-makers to act like liberals, the Canadian political leadership did not trust US decision-makers to look out for Canada's best interests and, thus, declined to accept the vulnerability that ceding control of Canada's defences to the USA during the crisis implied. Simultaneously, by secretly but effectively accepting this vulnerability on Canada's behalf, I argue that Canada's military leadership demonstrated their belief that the USA could be trusted. By examining the origins of this

¹ 1945-1957 is when Canada's nuclear weapons policy was largely set. See Richter (2002); Buckley (2000); and Maloney (2007).

bifurcation in trust-beliefs, we can learn much about how agents' differentiated exposures to the trust-enabling factors identified earlier and adherence to different narratives correlate with agents holding differing portfolios of trust beliefs.

Each of the two sub-cases is organized along the lines specified in my research procedure.

After introducing the episode, I begin my analysis by clearly specifying how one state accepted vulnerability to another. Second, I identify the critical agents involved in this decision-making process, and map the distribution of power through which this decision progressed as well as the distribution of meaning in which these agents and their decisions were embedded. Third, I present alternative explanations for these decisions and evaluate them. Fourth, I propose a trust-focused analysis which I argue improves on these alternative explanations. Fifth, I evaluate the extent to which positive evidence for my trust-focused explanation exists by examining the presence of the five trust-enabling factors. At the end of the chapter, I draw some preliminary conclusions regarding the case as a whole.

Episode 1: Canada's non-acquisition of nuclear weapons

Canada was one of three states directly involved in the creation of nuclear weapons.

Although limited, Canada's contribution to the Manhattan Project was significant.²

Moreover, just after the end of the Second World War, ZEEP (Zero Energy Experimental Pile), the world's first nuclear reactor outside of the USA, went critical at Chalk River near

Ottawa.³ ZEEP was followed in 1947 by NRX (National Research – Experimental), which

was, for a time, the world's most powerful reactor.⁴ Indeed, by 1945, Canadian scientists had

² Thompson and Randall (2008: 167); Holmes (1979: 202); Richter (2002: 19).

³ Bothwell (1988: 61).

⁴ Bothwell (1988: 125).

overcome all of the theoretical and many of the technical obstacles standing in the way of producing a nuclear weapon. Consequently, Brian Buckley argues that it would be difficult to describe Canada in this period as anything other than a “threshold nuclear state.”⁵

Nevertheless, the Canadian government seems to have never even actively considered acquiring nuclear weapons.⁶

This lack of interest in acquisition did not spill over into related areas, however. Canada began assisting Britain in its quest for the bomb in 1947. As early as autumn 1947, Canadian decision-makers were advocating participation in a trilateral weapons production system involving the USA and Britain.⁷ Canada also participated in a Western alliance system whose strategy implied a heavy reliance on nuclear weapons. For example, Canada acquiesced in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s revision, between its summit in Lisbon in February 1952 and its Paris meeting of 1954, of its strategic doctrine to greatly increase reliance on tactical nuclear arms. This dependence became even more complete in December 1956 when NATO accepted the US offer to put stockpiles of nuclear arms at NATO’s disposal in Europe. And in December 1957, Canada’s new Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, endorsed a plan that “implied his acceptance of American nuclear weapons for Canadian air and land forces in Europe.”⁸ With this, Canadian forces in Europe could be called upon by the US commander of NATO to employ tactical nuclear arms in the case of a war with the Soviets.⁹

⁵ Buckley (2000: 9-10 and 69); Maloney (2007: 78).

⁶ Two incidences have been interpreted as indicating that a cabinet-level decision had been taken, notably (1) a cabinet meeting on 17 November, 1945 and (2) Minister of Munitions and Supply, C.D. Howe’s, response to a question in the House of Commons on 5 December, 1945. Buckley (2000: 48-50) describes how both have been misinterpreted. Maloney (2007: 2 and 68) notes that there may have been some low-level discussion in the Department of External Affairs and the military, but agrees that this discussion never reached high levels. See also Bothwell (1984: 169) and (1988: 74).

⁷ Buckley (2000: 70-71); Maloney (2007: 9).

⁸ Lennox (2009: 59); Nash (1991: 78).

⁹ Levitt (1993: 28 and 69); Richter (2002: 80-81); Thompson and Randall (2008: 209-210); Buckley (2000: 129). While Canada did accept nuclear weapons for its forces in Europe, and eventually accepted nuclear

Acceptance of vulnerability

Canada's non-acquisition of nuclear weapons represents a clear instance of one state accepting vulnerability to another, and as such presents something of an enigma to scholars of IR. By foregoing acquisition, Canada abstained from exploiting an unprecedented opportunity to ameliorate the massive imbalance in capabilities that existed between it and the USA.¹⁰ Consequently, this decision poses problems for some of IR's most influential theories, such as Realist and Rationalist theories, but also Constructivist theories postulating a Hobbesian or Lockean culture of anarchy. All these theories suggest that a rational state in Canada's situation ought to take those steps available to it to remedy this imbalance.¹¹ It is true that Canada's non-acquisition does fit an historical pattern of Canada neglecting its defences *vis-à-vis* the USA. Initially, this pattern can be ascribed to Britain's guarantee of its security and, subsequently, the impossibility of defending its enormous territory against the USA.¹² Canada's decision to forego acquisition is more difficult to explain, however, as acquisition represented an unprecedented opportunity to meaningfully reducing this imbalance in capabilities at a reasonable economic and political cost.

Significantly, not only did Canada eschew acquisition; it seems acquisition was never even seriously considered.¹³ The closest that decision-makers seem to have come was in late 1945.

The Deputy Chief of the Canadian General Staff had commissioned a report entitled *The*

warheads for the BOMARC missile system, these were all tactical or defensive weapons systems never solely under Canadian control and thus do not represent an independent strategic nuclear capability.

¹⁰ Paul (2000: 17).

¹¹ Lennox (2009: 57); Buckley (2000: 6).

¹² Paul (2000: 70).

¹³ Buckley (2000: 43 and 137) states: "[n]one of the primary and secondary material that I have reviewed ... contains any direct or indirect evidence that the military case for the acquisition of an independent atomic arsenal was ever seriously debated, publicly or privately, in any of the major policy-making mechanisms of government". This assessment is supported by the recollections of Holmes (1979: 219). Richter (2002: 20) also agrees. See also Bothwell (1988: 74) and Paul (2000: 64).

Atomic Bomb: Effect of its Discovery on Canadian Army Strategic Planning – Preliminary

Considerations. In forwarding the report to the Chief of the Canadian General Staff (CGS),

the Deputy added the following note:

This seems to lend emphasis to the urgent necessity ... of ensuring that the secret of the manufacture of the AB [atomic bomb] itself is known to us or to the UK so that we may have the advantage of the use of this super-powerful explosive in the event that we may be required to engage in war without the assistance of the US.¹⁴

The CGS apparently forwarded the report to the Minister of National Defence with the recommendation that a high level committee be struck to consider it. This does not appear to have occurred. Later, Canada appears to have even declined an offer that would have seen the USA provide its neighbour with nuclear weapons. In 1951, a US official suggested to the head of Canada's Defence Research Board that Canada might welcome some US nuclear bombs for its own control and use: "... Dr Solandt reported that Mr Arneson had thrown out a suggestion which he might or might not have meant to be taken seriously, that the Canadian government might wish to have bombs stored in Canada for its own use."¹⁵ Even if this offer was not serious, that it was apparently never explored is striking and suggests a genuine lack of interest.

Key Agents, Distributions of Power and Meaning

While Canada was clearly a liberal democratic polity during this period, nuclear policy in this era was almost completely the domain of the cabinet and the upper reaches of the bureaucracy. John Holmes states that even "Parliament accepted that atomic matters had to be left in the hands of the prime minister with little protest" and that there "has rarely been such evidence of the docility of the Canadian public as during the period on atomic questions."¹⁶

¹⁴ Buckley (2000: 42-43).

¹⁵ Donaghy, (1996: 1521-1524).

¹⁶ Holmes (1979: 222-224). See also Bothwell (1988: 75).

Given this state of affairs, I restrict the focus of my analysis to the Canadian cabinet, especially the prime ministers, ministers of defence and external affairs, and the upper echelons of the Canadian military and the department of external affairs.

That said, while high-level Canadian decision-makers managed to exercise a relatively free hand during this period, they were embedded in a distribution of meaning which, *inter alia*, comprised two narratives critical to understanding their decision-making. I refer to these two narratives as ‘Loyalism’ and ‘Continentalism’. Loyalism refers to a system of belief whose central tenet is the importance of Canada remaining a separate political entity from the USA. For much of its history, the continued independent existence of Canada was by no means certain. The 1775 invasion of Canada was the first major military operation launched by the Continental Army during the US War of Independence, and Canada was again invaded by the USA during the War of 1812. The termination of the US Civil War in 1865 – which left the Union with an enormous military capability – played a significant role in enabling both the Fenian raids of the 1866-1871 period and provided much of the impetus for the consolidation of the British North American colonies into the self-governing Dominion of Canada in 1867.¹⁷ This, suspicion of the USA and its intentions, while it has taken on many permutations, has remained an important part of the Canadian identity. Loyalism therefore represented a potential justification for Canada to acquire its own nuclear weapons.

While both narratives are compatible with liberalism, Loyalism is defined by its focus on the differences between the two communities, while Continentalism downplays the importance of this division, is less suspicious of US intentions, and focuses on the benefits to be had from Canada and the USA working cooperatively and selectively integrating. Continentalism

¹⁷ Roussel (2004: 16); Thompson and Randall (2008: 38-39).

points to beneficial examples of cooperation, such as how over the course of the nineteenth century Britain/Canada and the USA resolved numerous border disputes through the use of bi-national commissions composed of experts, a process which depoliticized the conflicts and allowed resolutions to be crafted on the basis of compromise and technical considerations.¹⁸ The first third of the twentieth century saw an important evolution in the Canada-USA relationship away from the hostility of Loyalism and toward the amity of Continentalism. As late as 1903, US President Theodore Roosevelt threatened to use force against Canada to ensure that his preferred resolution of the Alaska boundary dispute obtained.¹⁹ In 1911, the Conservative Party, under the slogan of “No truck or trade with the Yankees”, defeated the pro-free trade Liberal government in a bruising election filled with vituperative anti-USA sentiment. These sentiments and fears were not without foundation as during the campaign Champ Clark, Speaker-designate of the US House of Representatives, said, “I am for it [free trade], because I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British-North American possessions clear to the North Pole.”²⁰

Nevertheless, even as Loyalism was reaching its zenith with the 1911 election, the notion of a ‘North American Way’ of settling disputes pacifically was emerging and became an increasingly popular idea in the decade beginning in 1910.²¹ Buttressed by the ‘100 years of peace’ that had been achieved between Canada and the USA by 1915, many of these elites began to argue for North America to be conceived of as a uniquely pacific political unit with common interests, distinct from warlike Europe.²² This idea resonated with elites who had already been exposed to the older and wider idea that the English-speaking peoples shared an

¹⁸ Willoughby (1979: 6). One of these commissions also disposed of 115 private claims. See also Roussel (2004: 134); Shore (1998: 353).

¹⁹ Stacey (1977: 97).

²⁰ Stacey (1977: 147).

²¹ Roussel (2004: 136).

²² Shore (1998: 347-348 and 253); Stacey (1977:153).

important ‘racial’ affinity that rendered violence between them “unnatural,” “fratricidal,” “absurd,” a “horror,” and a “crime against the laws of God and man.”²³ To those who subscribed to this narrative, the English race was understood to share “the traditions and glories of the Anglo-Saxon race from which we have obtained the spirit of conciliation...”²⁴ After the war, these ideas gained wide acceptance among the elite and even the general population and, in so doing, transformed the previously somewhat taken-for-granted peaceful state of affairs into a celebrated institution.²⁵ References to a “North American community” deriving from a homogeneous political, social, racial, cultural, and linguistic heritage proliferated.²⁶

The First World War, or at least the US entry into the war, represented a critical turning point for Canadians. Not only did the USA side with the Allies, but its justification for doing so, to “make the world safe for democracy”, resulted in many North Americans abandoning their old intra-liberal suspicions and embracing each other as homogeneous cognate democracies.²⁷ In the language of earlier chapters, the differences between the two polities lost salience, while the similarities, their shared adherence to liberalism particularly, gained salience. This turn of events greatly reduced the resonance of Loyalism’s suspicions of the USA and significantly increased the resonance of Continentalism’s focus on cooperation, even among conservatives.²⁸ Indeed, the war altered the ideational landscape such that afterward, while Loyalism retained its suspicion of the USA, even Loyalists ceased seeing the USA as a military threat and recast their suspicions into other, less existential, forms.

²³ Vucetic (2011: 29, 33-34).

²⁴ Vucetic (2011: 34).

²⁵ Roussel (2004: 131); Stacey (1977: 153); Shore (1998: 335).

²⁶ See for instance Vucetic (2011: 3 and Chapter 2).

²⁷ Stacey (1977: 234-235); Roussel (2004: 123-125, 130-131, and 169). Many Canadians had previously seen US republicanism as demagogic and potentially illiberal.

²⁸ Stacey (1977: 101, 203, 227-228 and 335); Thompson and Randall (2008: 16, 24, and 100); Roussel (2004: 128, 152, and 232-233); Shore (1998: 335); Vucetic (2011: 77); Nash (1991: 316). C.f. Doran (1984: 29).

Alternative Explanations

Despite IR scholarship's relative neglect of this episode, three categories of explanation offer themselves fairly readily: (1) Canada's lack of foreign and security policy autonomy; (2) the poor cost-effectiveness of acquisition; and (3) the normative distaste for nuclear weapons felt by many powerful Canadian decision-makers. The first 'lack of autonomy' explanation suffers from two critical flaws. First, while not wholly inaccurate, the implications of this argument are overdrawn. Lester Pearson captured it precisely when he opined that "no country can have complete independence today in its foreign policy, because no country can guarantee its own security by its own actions" while simultaneously arguing that "that doesn't mean we have to be subservient to every aspect of United States policy."²⁹ Indeed, Canada's willingness to defy the USA in costly ways surfaces regularly, even in matters of high security such as during the Cuban missile crisis.³⁰ Second, Buckley argues that he found "no evidence at all that... the United States... ever sought to discourage Canada from pursuing the nuclear option."³¹

The second, cost-effectiveness, explanation is driven by two main arguments. First, following the Second World War, the Canadian government was keen to cut military spending in favour of popular social programs.³² Second, the USA, out of its own self-interest, was committed to protecting Canadian territory. Thus, Canadian decision-makers had little incentive to expend resources developing an expensive *and redundant* capability.³³ While both arguments have some validity, this explanation is still flawed in three important ways. First, while Canada's

²⁹ Levitt (1993: 64).

³⁰ See Haydon (1993) and the second part of this chapter.

³¹ Buckley (2000: 130); Paul (2000: 64 and 73).

³² Buckley (2000: 134); Bothwell (1984: 165).

³³ Lennox (2009: 58).

military budget was under pressure in 1945, this was only because Canadian decision-makers perceived no immediate threat to Canada's security,³⁴ a perception in need of explanation given the capabilities imbalance between Canada and the USA. Second, the empirical record does not support the cost-effectiveness argument. Cost-effectiveness models are based on a rational-actor model in which agents weigh possible costs and benefits and I have found no evidence that any serious weighing of this sort occurred.³⁵ Finally, the Canadian government's failure to explore the US's apparent 1951 offer also undermines this argument as it could have presented a cost-effective means of acquisition.

There is some support for the third explanation according to which decision-makers felt a strong moral revulsion for nuclear weapons, or at least expected the public to feel one, thereby inhibited even the consideration of acquisition.³⁶ For instance, it was well known that Prime Minister Mackenzie King considered the atomic bomb to be a "Frankenstein" that could destroy civilization. Consequently, it is understandable that those who favoured acquisition did not press their case while King was prime minister. Lester Pearson, who probably had the most influence over Canadian nuclear weapons policy once King retired in 1948, held broadly similar views.³⁷ Nonetheless, while it is clear that this moral distaste influenced Canadian decision-makers, it is also clear that this influence was not definitive. Despite working towards nuclear disarmament, Canada simultaneously played a crucial supporting role in the expanding US nuclear program, assisted Britain in its acquisition, planned to participate in a tri-lateralized weapons production system, and agreed to arm those

³⁴ Richter (2002: 20).

³⁵ Cf. Hopf (2010: 552).

³⁶ Lennox (2009: 57). C.f. Tannenwald (1999).

³⁷ This is the explanation favoured by Buckley (2000: 53 and 139-140). See also Eayrs (1972: 275 and 278); Eayrs (1980: 251 and 265-266); and Bothwell (1988: 16). On Pearson's views see Pearson (1972: 258-263) and Pearson, Munro, and Inglis (1973: 83). On Pearson's influence see Levitt (1993: 43, 67 and 70), and English (1992: 49).

of its forces under NATO command with tactical nuclear arms.³⁸ Thus, Canada's anti-nuclear stance must be understood as at least ambiguous; if decision-makers saw nuclear weapons as evil, they were a necessary evil, thereby making it difficult to believe that this distaste alone could have blocked Canadian acquisition.³⁹

The best explanation for Canada's non-acquisition is one that includes elements of both the cost-effectiveness and moral distaste explanations. Canadian decision-makers were cost-sensitive and not interested in acquisition unless they perceived a compelling need; this disinclination was reinforced by a basic, but not categorical, distaste for these weapons. Thus, while acquisition was not ruled out *ex ante*, a compelling argument would need to be made for even a discussion of acquisition to be worthwhile. Since no such argument was made, acquisition did not occur.⁴⁰ Critically, however, I argue that Canada's material inferiority and vulnerability to the USA ought to have at least forced a discussion. Nevertheless, no such discussion seems to have occurred, leaving a significant hole in even this combined explanation.

A trust-focused analysis

I realize that arguing that Canada should have considered acquiring nuclear weapons to defend against the USA may sound a little absurd. But, from a Realist perspective, such an argument is actually quite obvious. Naturally, expectations that agents will adopt such an Olympian perspective are perhaps unrealistic and decision-makers will inevitably be

³⁸ Eayrs (1980: 236); Bothwell (1988: 111 and 142); Lennox (2009: 57). Between 1947 and 1962, \$1.37 billion worth of uranium was exported from Canada to the USA for the purposes of producing US nuclear weapons. Nash (1991: 144).

³⁹ Richter (2002: 21-22); Nash (1991: 144); Bothwell (1998: 349).

⁴⁰ Paul (2000: 6-8).

influenced by their social context. But this does not excuse scholars from the need to explain what it is about this social context which makes this 'obvious' option seem absurd.

The best way to fill the gaps just identified is to recognize that Canadian decision-makers trusted US decision-makers to not use force to resolve disputes with Canada. Such an explanation is compatible with the cost-effectiveness and moral distaste explanations, while also solving the problem on which both founder, namely, the question of why the USA was not perceived as threatening. It is also supported by the fact that there are good indications, such as Canada's suspension of active war planning against the USA in 1928,⁴¹ that Canada and the USA had collectively identified as liberals.⁴² Nevertheless, it is not until Canada's non-acquisition that we have clear evidence that liberal trust had been established between the two states.

There exists significant evidence that by 1945, and likely earlier, both Canada and the US self-consciously embraced the key tenets of liberalism, thereby further supporting this argument. Economically, both embraced a series of measures designed to create a liberal international economic system in the postwar period in the form of the Bretton Woods institutions and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In terms of more political measures, both Canada and the US receive Polity IV scores of 10 from 1921 onward, indicating that both states enjoyed a fully liberal democratic authority structure.⁴³ More importantly and as discussed earlier, both polities seem to have recognized each other as liberals by the end of the First World War, as exemplified by the aforementioned shift in the content of Loyalism at this time. More specifically, all major Canadian decision-makers like Prime Ministers Mackenzie King (1921-1926, 1926-1930, and 1935-1948) and Louis St.-

⁴¹ Eayrs (1964: 167 and 76).

⁴² Shore (1998: 335); Thompson and Randall (2002: 100); C.f. Doran (1986: 29).

⁴³ See Figure 5.6.

Laurent (1948-1957), Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton (1946-1954) and Minister of External Affairs Lester Pearson (1948-1957) had, by 1945, come to see Canada and the US as being partners in the larger 'free world' whose relations were based on a common Western, liberal heritage.⁴⁴

The five factors

The final step in my research procedure involves providing evidence that the five trust-enabling factors were active in the run-up to and during the decisions in question. Overall, this evidence supports the argument that sometime between the end of the First World War and the beginning of the Great Depression, collective identification with the USA on the basis of shared liberalism became the norm among Canadians. While there was some retrenchment in these factors during the depression, the stickiness of trust would have likely neutralized the impact of such a transitory development. While these foundations are important to understanding the history of the trust relationship between Canada and the USA, more important to this particular inquiry are the more proximate events of the Second World War and the immediate postwar era. It is these events, discussed below, that (re)produced the liberal trust between Canada and the USA during the critical period when acquisition was possible, and which enabled Canadian decision-makers to assume that the USA posed no military threat and that they therefore had no reason to acquire nuclear weapons.


Interactivity

⁴⁴ Roussel (2004: 198 and 210); Thompson and Randall (2008: 188-190). For an analysis of King and his political philosophy please see Neatby (1969); for Louis St. Laurent, see Thomson (1969), for Lester Pearson see English (1989: 122-139) and English (1992); for Brooke Claxton, see Bercuson (1993).

Below, I present three quantitative indicators of interactivity that help illuminate the larger context in which the decision-makers, on whom I focus more tightly subsequently, were operating. They are: the percentage of Canadian economic activity represented by trade with the USA (Figure 5.1); the percentage of investment in Canada (as measured by Gross Fixed Capital Formation [GFCF]) that had US origins (Figure 5.2); and migration between the two states (Figure 5.3). Recall that the purpose of these measures is not to compare Canada's interactivity with the USA to any other bilateral relationship, but rather to compare Canada's interactivity with the USA and the domestic interactivity through which Canada is itself constituted.

In Figure 5.1, note that from 1910-1929, trade with the USA represented a historical high of over twenty percent of Canada's economic activity, with this measure reaching thirty percent during the First World War. This is important because it indicates that for twenty years between one-fifth and one-third of all of Canada's economic activity involved a US counterparty, implying a high level of interactivity *even when compared to the level of interactivity that existed between Canadians*. If one accepts my argument that the clustering of connections within a network helps (re)produce community, then this sustained period of high interactivity is suggestive.


Figure 5.1: Canadian trade with the USA as a percentage of Canadian GNP, 1873-1960 (with linear trend line)



Source: Green and Urquhart (1987); Mitchell (1998a) Series E-2, J-1.


In Figure 5.2 the data are less complete for the pre-1945 period, resulting in a more volatile picture. Nevertheless, a similar surge in interactivity in the years between 1910 and 1930 – that peaks at fifty percent in 1921 – is clearly apparent.

Figure 5.2: New US investment in Canada as a proportion of Canadian GFCF, 1900-1960



Source: Green and Urquhart (1987); Mitchell (1998a) Series J-1; Statistics Canada (1988), Table 11.

In Figure 5.3 the key features are the relatively high levels of US immigration to Canada and the relatively high levels of Canadian emigration to the USA during roughly the same period. Note that in 1912, the population of Canada was 7,389,000, meaning that immigrants arriving from the USA that year alone represented 1.6 percent of the population. In 1925, the population of Canada was 9,294,000; over two percent of the Canadian population emigrated to the USA that year.



As these data demonstrate, historically elevated levels of interactivity obtained between the Canadian and US polities during the 1910-1930 period. But as one approaches the critical years for acquisition decision-making, it is the qualitative evidence that stands out as most supportive of the trust hypothesis. During the Second World War, interactivity between Canadian and US bureaucrats and decision-makers greatly intensified. This interactivity grew out of the small advances made in the first half of the century, such as the establishment of the International Joint Commission. These early advances are important not only because their early years coincided with the important 1910-1930 period, but also because they set a pattern that was followed as this sort of institutionalized interactivity expanded subsequently. And with the advent of the Second World War, it was this pattern that was replicated in organizations like the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) and the five joint economic commissions set up to coordinate wartime cooperation.⁴⁵

This wartime cooperation increased interactivity in a variety of ways. One of the most important was how it fostered individual level connections between Canadian and US decision-makers. The connections which Canadian CGS Charles Foulkes formed with US officials provide a good illustration of the types of relationships that developed in this

⁴⁵ Note that these organization marked a progression from temporary and more rudimentary commissions used during the 19th century. Willoughby (1979: 6-7); Roussel (2004: 134-136).

context. During the war, Foulkes became close friends with US General Walter Bedell Smith, later Director of Central Intelligence (1950-1953), as well as Alfred M. Gruenther, who became Supreme Allied Commander (Europe), from 1953-1956. In addition to these personal connections, Canadian and US officials were constantly meeting to coordinate policies and operations. For example during his term as the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (1953-1957), Admiral Arthur Radford met with Foulkes more than any other allied military leader.⁴⁶

Similar relationships existed between important decision-makers on the civilian side, such as the strong relationships that developed between Hume Wrong, who would serve as Canada's ambassador to Washington from 1946 to 1953, and US Secretary of State Dean Acheson;⁴⁷ Lester Pearson and Acheson; and Mackenzie King and US President Franklin Roosevelt. For example, John English notes that “[i]f Ottawa was a capital whose corridors of power brimmed with old friends and acquaintances, so were London and Washington, where young diplomats Mike [Pearson] had come to know in the 1930s and early 1940s had risen to positions of influence and eminence.”⁴⁸

During the Cold War this interactivity continued and was further encouraged by a number of agreements and institutional changes such as the signing in 1947 of an agreement on equipment standardization and officer exchanges. The agreements that produced NATO and the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) soon followed. These agreements drew the two states' respective militaries together by creating institutional structures which required constant interaction. As a result, shared experiences proliferated, resulting in the

⁴⁶ Maloney (2007: 15 and 26).

⁴⁷ English (1992: 60).

⁴⁸ English (1992: 10).

formation of tightly knit trans-governmental networks defined by collective identities.⁴⁹

Similar patterns are observable on the civilian side as well. For example, Canadian and US officials cooperated intensely in their efforts to revive Europe and construct a new international system centred on the United Nations (UN), and eventually against the Soviets.


Homogeneity

There are also important increases in this period in those aspects of homogeneity that can be measured quantitatively. Below, I present a comparison of Canadian and US gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Figure 5.4), the percentage of the two states' populations born in the other state (Figure 5.5), and the two states' Polity IV scores (Figure 5.6). While certainly not comprehensive, these indicators map nicely onto the economic, social, and political aspects of the two polities respectively.

Figure 5.4 shows historically high levels of similarity between Canadian and US GDP per capita – which I define as Canadian values above seventy per cent of US values – between 1904 and 1922 and again for all but four of the years between 1930 and 1957. Note especially the peak of convergence between 1912 and 1920.

⁴⁹ Roussel (2004: 206 and 212); Thompson and Randall (2008: 199); Haydon (1993: 206). On transnational coalitions see Bow (2009).


Figure 5.4: Canadian GDP per capita expressed as a percentage of US GDP per capita, 1870-1960 (with linear trend line)



Source: Maddison (2008).


In Figure 5.5, there are two bulges which begin at similar times. In Canada, this surge peaks in 1921 at about 4.25%. In the USA, the peak is earlier (1900) but is somewhat more stable and remains relatively elevated until the 1930s. The number of Canadians born in the USA is important for the way that the mixing homogenizes and connects the two polities.

Figure 5.5: Percentages of Canadian and US populations born in the other state, 1870-1960




Source: Carter (2006) Table Ad 354-443; Leacy (1983) Series A 297-326.

Figure 5.6 shows the Polity IV scores of both states. Note that convergence at 10 (the highest possible value) occurs quite early.



The major religious cleavage within both Canadian and US societies has been between Protestants and Catholics. However, while the Catholic character of Canada was an issue of concern at the founding of the USA, given the mixed nature of the two states populations (see Figures 5.7 and 5.8) the religious composition of the two states no longer figured as an important cleavage between the two polities in the 20th century.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ The values presented in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 involved some estimation. The operations performed to arrive at these estimations are detailed in Appendix A.



Another critical aspect of the gradual increase in homogeneity between the two polities lies in the shared use of English as each country's primary language. After the British conquest of Québec, a steadily increasing percentage of the population of what would become Canada spoke English as its mother tongue. While exact figures are difficult to find, by around 1850 the population of Upper Canada (mainly English-speaking) exceeded that of Lower Canada (mainly French-speaking) for the first time. By 1931, 57% of the Canadian population were anglophones, compared to 27% francophones, signalling a decisive shift toward homogeneity with the predominantly English-speaking US.⁵¹

More qualitatively, the languages spoken in each polity also correlate with a larger package of broader cultural assumptions and a shared conceptual vocabulary. Thus, as Canada grew increasingly anglophone, the two countries likely started thinking more similarly. This is certainly the case with the law, as the legal systems of English Canada and the USA were both largely inherited from English common law and shared important fundamental assumptions about how society should be organized. These ideas began to be progressively

⁵¹ Leacy (1983: Series A185-237). These percentages would remain basically at the same level throughout this episode.

applied to relations between the two states, as can be seen with the aforementioned establishment of institutions like the International Joint Commission in the early 1900s.

This idea can also be expanded to include the basic liberal premises that underpin both societies, an intellectual identity again inherited largely from 18th century Britain.⁵² And while many Canadians were initially suspicious of US forms of republican democracy; after 1918, and certainly by 1945, Canadians generally saw the USA as standing for the same political, economic, and moral values as themselves.⁵³ The fact that an enormous percentage, if not the majority, of the mass media consumed by Canadians during this period was US-produced only reinforced this trend.⁵⁴ Overall, as was the case with Anglo-USA relations around the turn of the century, the increasingly shared Anglo-Saxon identity of Canada and the USA helped generate a *rapprochement* between the two countries.⁵⁵

Common Interests

One can also discern a trend toward an increasingly common definition of interests between these two states. Prior to Confederation, Canadian interests were largely defined by British interests. After Confederation, Canadian governments began increasingly to formulate their own interests. For much of this period, these interests can be summarized as a need to keep relations between Britain and the USA as good as possible.⁵⁶ And since US interests during much of the pre-First World War period were best served by a gradual rapprochement with Britain, Canadian and US interests increasingly aligned. This reached an apogee with the

⁵² Roussel (2004: 139). Roussel argues that this shared conception of the place of the law played a key role in encouraging the bureaucratic interactivity which helped generate the strong record of cooperation on border disputes and arms control.

⁵³ Holmes (1979: 162).

⁵⁴ Vipond (2011).

⁵⁵ Vucetic (2011: 25).

⁵⁶ Eayrs (1972: 260).

USA's entry into the war in 1917. And while Canada joined the League of Nations and the USA did not, as in the USA there was a strong current of isolationism in Canada which manifested itself in what might be termed very "American" behaviour at the league.⁵⁷

The Second World War pushed this common definition of interests even further.⁵⁸ After the war, two Canadian officials concluded that: "[i]n short, the United States trusted us, liked us, understood us, had no reason to fear us, and shared with us the common objective of defeating the enemy."⁵⁹ This common definition of interests is most strikingly demonstrated by the cooperation that developed in the extremely sensitive area of intelligence. During the war, a high level of cooperation developed between the states of the so-called 'Anglosphere'; namely the USA, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The fact that William Stephenson, a Canadian, headed the British intelligence operation in the USA during the war and was integral to the creation of the US Office of Strategic Services – the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – is illustrative of the highly integrated, and trusting, character of the early intelligence community.⁶⁰ So too is the fact that Stephenson trained many of the CIA's future directors at a camp in Whitby, Ontario during the war.

This cooperation continued during the post-war period with the signing of the UKUSA agreement which divided signals intelligence collection duties for the entire world between the Anglosphere states on the understanding that this intelligence would be shared. Among other things, the "UKUSA Agreement also provides that the participating agencies... 'standardize their terminology, codewords, intercept-handling procedures, and indoctrination

⁵⁷ Roussel (2004: 198).

⁵⁸ While I consider it in the altercasting section below, Canada and the USA's responses to the worsening situation in Europe in the late 1930s could also be analyzed as evidence of common interests.

⁵⁹ Holmes (1979: 167).

⁶⁰ Stafford (1987).

oaths, for efficiency as well as security.”⁶¹ The relationship that has developed between these states constitutes “a truly multinational community, with its numerous organizations and agencies bound together by an extraordinary network of written and unwritten agreements, working practices and personal relationships.”⁶²

The onset of the Cold War played an important role in increasing the two states’ common definition of interests and led Pearson, then Minister of External Affairs, to argue that the defence of North America could only be undertaken in partnership with the USA. In fact, the 1949 Defence White Paper in which Minister of National Defence Claxton outlined Canada’s strategy for the post-war era, explicitly stated that “the only kind of war which would involve Canada would be a war in which Communism was seeking to dominate the free nations...” and that the government “assumes that our armed forces will be used in association with those of friendly powers.”⁶³ Andrew Richter suggests that this White Paper “revealed that Canada viewed its security as indivisible from that of its allies...”⁶⁴ Indeed, confronting this new enemy produced a level of intimacy between Canada and the USA that even the war against Fascism had never demanded, as can be seen in the effort to trilateralize weapons production in the late 1940s, in the creation of NORAD, and in military and diplomatic cooperation more generally.⁶⁵

Shared Experiences

In terms of shared experiences, the two world wars defined both Canada and the USA’s experiences of the first half of the 20th century, and both brought them closer together. Before

⁶¹ Richelson and Ball (1985: 143).

⁶² Richelson and Ball (1985: 301).

⁶³ Richter (2002: 18).

⁶⁴ Richter (2002: 18).

⁶⁵ Thompson and Randall (2008: 184); Keohane and Nye (1989: 171 and 211) make a similar argument.

the First World War, many in Canada saw the USA, if not as a potential enemy, then at least as a country against which it had to be on guard. Recall that the USA had threatened Canada with a use of force as late as 1903.⁶⁶ The shared experience of the First World War transformed the USA into a comrade-in-arms, however, unleashing a considerable rapprochement.⁶⁷

The Second World War greatly deepened this rapprochement as the two states undertook an unprecedented level of military and economic cooperation. Unlike the mainly symbolic cooperation of the First World War, the bureaucratic integration which was created during the Second continued to profoundly influence the relationship after 1945.⁶⁸ And once the USA entered the war, cooperation intensified, forging links between Canadian and US officials. One of those officials, A.F.W. Plumptre said that “[i]t [negotiations on the IMF and IBRD] was in large measure an American, British, and Canadian affair, but so were a lot of other things in Washington until the end of hostilities...”⁶⁹ Louis Rasminsky, one of Canada’s negotiators at the Bretton Woods Conference, noted that: “... countries have become used to working together closely during the war. It will require less psychological adjustment to extend these close wartime relationships for peacetime purposes now than would be required five or ten years after the war has ended.”⁷⁰

Altercasting

To appreciate the altercasting mechanism, contrast some of the most visible examples of altercasting from before the First World War with those that occurred after it. Theodore

⁶⁶ Stacey (1977: 97).

⁶⁷ Stacey (1977: 203).

⁶⁸ Doran (1984: 30-31); Thompson and Randall (2008: 96); Holmes (1979: 169).

⁶⁹ Holmes (1979: 33).

⁷⁰ Holmes (1979: 57).

Roosevelt's threat to use force against Canada in 1903 implied that the USA did not see Canada as a fellow member of a liberal in-group against whom the use of force was unthinkable. Similarly, Canadians' support for the Conservative Party in the 1911 election showed that many Canadians were not interested in engaging in that quintessentially liberal activity, free trade, with the USA. The First World War represented an important reversal of this trend with the USA siding with the Allies and characterizing the war as a fight for democracy, thereby altercasting Canada as a fellow democracy.

Prior to the Second World War, this sort of altercasting was repeated even more emphatically by US President Franklin Roosevelt. In a series of speeches, Roosevelt argued that "the United States and Canada, and, indeed all parts of the British Empire, share a democratic form of government which comes to us from common sources. We have adapted these institutions to our own needs, and our special conditions, but fundamentally they are the same." Roosevelt went on say that "[t]he Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire."⁷¹

By again siding with Canada during the Second World War, the USA re-affirmed its evaluation of Canada as a fellow democracy, thereby reinforcing their collective identification. And after the war, the proliferation of alliances and organizations in which Canada found itself cooperating served to altercast Canada and the USA as each other's friends and trusted allies. Recall that NATO was the first permanent alliance into which the USA had entered as a sovereign state, a significant new development which reinforced the significance of this action, as well as the esteem in which Canada was held by the USA. All

⁷¹ Stacey (1981: 226). Two days later, King made a reciprocal statement.

of these agreements – NATO, NORAD, and the others discussed in the section on interactivity – represented more limited examples of trust in-and-of-themselves, and as such can be understood as examples of altercasting.

But perhaps the most important instance of altercasting, the one which played the largest role in solidifying the liberal collective identification between the two states, was the USA's willingness to include Canada in the Manhattan project. As Brian Buckley points out, Canada's laboratory at Chalk River "gave little real advantage to the Americans with their enormous plants in their own country" and was "essentially a post-war project ... barely within the terms of collaboration agreed at Quebec." This US support was extremely generous and, without it, Canada's nuclear programme would have been impossible.⁷² The fact that the USA was willing to share the secrets of the atom with Canada, and help Canada develop the ability to build the ultimate weapon when it did not need to, represented an incredible opportunity that was being essentially gifted to Canada by the USA. Canadian decision-makers were not unaware of the gravity and significance thereof and this likely provoked significant positive affect on their part.⁷³

Episode 2: The Cuban missile crisis

The Cuban missile crisis is often cited as the pinnacle of the Cold War. And while the crisis consisted primarily of a stand-off between the USA and USSR, its impact ramified throughout the international system. One corner of the system that was particularly impacted was the Canada-USA relationship where the larger crisis touched off a sub-crisis when Prime Minister John Diefenbaker refused a US request to align the alert status of Canada's military

⁷² Buckley (2000: 31).

⁷³ Buckley (2000: 30).

with that of the USA's. This decision produced an unprecedented breakdown in Canadian military decision-making when the Canadian military leadership ignored Diefenbaker's decision and secretly acquiesced to the US request. This bifurcated response represents a serious puzzle for students of Canadian foreign policy decision-making. What caused the political and military leaderships to respond so differently? I argue that the answer lies in a divergence in the trust-beliefs held by these two groups.

The roots of this divergent Canadian decision-making need to be understood in the context of contemporary Canadian politics. In 1957, Diefenbaker led the Progressive Conservative Party to victory, ending almost twenty-two years of uninterrupted rule by the Liberals. Despite Diefenbaker's anxiety over US dominance of Canada, he and US President Dwight Eisenhower managed to maintain a friendly relationship during Diefenbaker's first years in power.⁷⁴ However, the election of John Kennedy in 1960 produced a dramatically different relationship. Even before Kennedy's election, Diefenbaker had developed a dislike for him, believing that he would be too "activist" and "too rash" in his foreign policy.⁷⁵ In March of 1962, Diefenbaker told a journalist that, "[h]e's a hothead. He's a fool – too young, too brash, too inexperienced, and a boastful son of a bitch!... Mark my words, he'll get us all in trouble with his arrogance and presumptions."⁷⁶

Suggestively, some Diefenbaker aides ascribe much of the bad blood that developed between the two to the lack of homogeneity between the two leaders. Tommy Van Dusen suggested that Kennedy "was everything Diefenbaker wasn't... rich, young, a silver spoon in his mouth. Diefenbaker always had an irresistible urge to put the guy in his place."⁷⁷ Indeed,

⁷⁴ Robinson (1989: 167-168).

⁷⁵ Nash (1991: 60).

⁷⁶ Nash (1991: 11); Robinson (1989: 166).

⁷⁷ Nash (1991: 12). See also Robinson (1989: 165)

Diefenbaker quite explicitly characterized himself as looking out for ‘the little guy’, fighting tirelessly on his behalf against the privileged who Diefenbaker so greatly resented.⁷⁸ And it is difficult to think of a more privileged figure than John F. Kennedy. Diefenbaker also once told his cabinet, “I just don’t trust the Kennedys”, a comment that seems to have been prompted by Joseph Kennedy’s anti-British views.⁷⁹

Nevertheless, much of the active mutual dislike between Diefenbaker and Kennedy stemmed from their second meeting, which took place in 1961. After a meeting with Diefenbaker, Kennedy accidentally left a briefing memo outlining points on which he was meant to “push” Diefenbaker behind in his office.⁸⁰ Diefenbaker found the memo and eventually threatened to use it as proof that Kennedy was “arrogantly” trying to “push Canada around.” Knowlton Nash reports that in a meeting with the US ambassador, Diefenbaker, “[i]n a head-shaking frenzy... attacked Kennedy personally and charged the president with trying to get rid of him and make [Liberal opposition leader Lester] Pearson prime minister.” Kennedy’s response to these events when they were related to him “was the strongest of them all. ‘Jeezus Christ!’... Kennedy talked about ‘cutting his balls off’ in an expletive-filled roar of vituperation; he called Diefenbaker ‘a prick,’ ‘a fucker,’ ‘a shit,’ and other salty characterizations.” Eventually, Kennedy would decide that he would never see or speak to Diefenbaker again,⁸¹ believing that he “could not safely deal with the man.”⁸² Thus, by the time the Cuban missile crisis erupted, relations between the two leaders were extremely bad.⁸³

Acceptance of Vulnerability

⁷⁸ Newman (1973: 180-183); Robinson (1989: 17).

⁷⁹ Nash (1991: 60). Diefenbaker was a strong defender of Canada’s British connection.

⁸⁰ Nash (1991: 120-121).

⁸¹ Newman (1973: 267).

⁸² Nash (1991: 159-161); Robinson (1989: 270); Smith (1995: 437).

⁸³ Haydon (1993: 62).

Diefenbaker's refusal to grant the US request to raise the military's alert status represents a refusal to accept vulnerability to the USA because it would have effectively ceded control of Canada's defences to the USA during the crisis, thereby leaving Canada reliant on the USA's discretion for the furtherance of its interests.⁸⁴ Minister of External Affairs Howard Green justified Canada's refusal to do so by arguing that if the government acceded to the request "we'd be their [the USA's] vassals forever."⁸⁵ Simultaneously, the decision of the Canadian military leadership to secretly defy Diefenbaker and effectively acquiesce to this request represents an acceptance of this vulnerability. This military defiance is especially remarkable and raises "profound questions about civil control of the military in Canada, and about whether the Canadian defence establishment was following the political authority of its own government or that of the United States."⁸⁶

The crisis itself began on 16 October when President Kennedy was informed that the Soviets were installing ballistic missiles in Cuba. Between 16 and 22 October, Kennedy and his advisors debated their response. Once the decision to 'quarantine' Cuba had been reached, diplomats were sent to brief US allies.⁸⁷ The US decision-makers assumed Canada would go along with their decisions insofar as was required for their joint commands, specifically NORAD, to function.⁸⁸ So far the USA had "ignored Canada, its closest ally, during what it believed to be the gravest crisis of the cold war",⁸⁹ despite the importance of NORAD to the

⁸⁴ Haydon (1993: 183).

⁸⁵ Quoted in Newman (1973: 337).

⁸⁶ John J. Kirton quoted in Lennox (2009: 49).

⁸⁷ Nash (1991: 187).

⁸⁸ Haydon (1993: 123).

⁸⁹ Thompson and Randall (2002: 224).

situation, the requirement for consultation contained in the NORAD treaty, and previous assurances that such consultation would occur.⁹⁰

Diefenbaker, Green, and Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness were briefed by a US envoy on 22 October, two hours before the televised address in which Kennedy announced the discovery of the missiles. Diefenbaker felt that this briefing did not constitute ‘consultation,’⁹¹ and would later say that “Canada certainly had the right to expect notice longer than two hours, if military measures were to be involved.” Diefenbaker also complained that “[i]t was obvious that Canada was not to be consulted but was expected to accept without question the course to be determined by the President.”⁹² This lack of consultation unsurprisingly piqued traditional Loyalist concerns about the USA’s lack of respect for Canadian sovereignty.⁹³

Later that evening, NORAD headquarters requested that Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) units under NORAD command raise their alert status to DEFCON 3 (Defence Condition 3). Minister of Defence Harkness was inclined to do so,⁹⁴ but called on the prime minister for authorization. Diefenbaker refused, arguing that cabinet should discuss the matter.⁹⁵ Nash suggests that Diefenbaker was angered by the presumption that Canada’s NORAD forces would move to DEFCON 3 simply because US forces had done so and that his refusal was his way of puncturing this presumption.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, Harkness returned to his office and instructed the chiefs to discreetly raise the alert status anyway.⁹⁷ Harkness later said: “I

⁹⁰ Robinson (1989: 20-21, 23, and 201); Smith (1995: 292).

⁹¹ Lennox (2009: 45).

⁹² Quoted in Nash (1991: 186). See also Haydon (1993: 37).

⁹³ Haydon (1993: 41).

⁹⁴ Haydon (1993: 123).

⁹⁵ Nash (1991: 191); C.f. Newman (1973: 337).

⁹⁶ Nash (1991: 190).

⁹⁷ Haydon (1993: 128).

decided I would put the troops on alert without making any announcement... I told them we'll go ahead and do this anyway, but do it quietly."⁹⁸

On 23 October, Harkness again proposed raising the alert status, this time to the cabinet. Diefenbaker and Green opposed him and, after some debate, Harkness' proposal was defeated.⁹⁹ Diefenbaker later explained that "I knew... the President thought he had something to prove in his personal dealing with Khrushchev..."¹⁰⁰ Diefenbaker believed that Kennedy "was perfectly capable of taking the world to the brink of thermonuclear destruction to prove himself the man for our times, a courageous champion of Western democracy."¹⁰¹ Kennedy called Diefenbaker later in the day and, *inter alia*, again requested that Canadian forces raise their alert status. Diefenbaker refused and reproached Kennedy for his lack of consultation.¹⁰²

The following day, another cabinet meeting was held. After acrimonious debate, the meeting dissolved without reaching a decision. Harkness returned to his office and learned that parts of the US military had raised their alert status to DEFCON 2, meaning that an imminent attack was now expected. Harkness returned to the prime minister's office and confronted him with this news, at which point Diefenbaker relented and allowed Canadian forces to raise their alert status.¹⁰³

Key Agents, Distributions of Power and Meaning

⁹⁸ Quoted in Nash (1991: 192).

⁹⁹ Newman (1973: 337).

¹⁰⁰ Nash (1991: 186).

¹⁰¹ Nash (1991: 186). Diefenbaker was not alone in this opinion. Smith (1995: 457).

¹⁰² Lennox (2009: 48).

¹⁰³ Nash (1991: 200); Haydon (1993: 133).

The key agents during this crisis were Diefenbaker, and to a lesser extent his cabinet, on the one side, and Harkness and the service chiefs on the other. As we have seen, it was Diefenbaker who made the original decision not to raise the alert status, and it was he who led the arguments against acquiescing to the US request in the two cabinet meetings, even going so far as to threaten resignation should the cabinet disagree with him.

Harkness led the other side of the argument. Despite lacking the legal authority to respond to the US request officially, he and the service chiefs did so unofficially. He was, however, unable to convince enough of his cabinet colleagues to oppose Diefenbaker and 'ratify' his secret decision. There was some discussion in Parliament and the media regarding the government's response, but given the limited information even the elite had access to during the crisis, not to mention the misleading information being provided by Diefenbaker to Parliament, this discussion had little impact. Thus, the wider distribution of power enabled by constitutional liberalism was not effectively engaged in this episode.

As discussed in the last case, from at least 1945 onward, Canada trusted the USA not to resolve any of their disputes with force. This is not to say, however, that traditional Loyalist suspicion of the USA had been banished from the distribution of meaning in which Canadians were embedded. While the USA was no longer seen as posing a military threat, the idea that the USA did not respect Canada's sovereign equality remained and manifested in concerns about US penetration of the Canadian economy, US dominance of Canadian culture, and increasing Canada-USA military integration.¹⁰⁴ For example, even the largely Continentalist Mackenzie King had, while Prime Minister, refused to approve a draft free trade agreement negotiated with the USA in 1948 because he believed "that the long

¹⁰⁴ Haydon (1993: 40).

objective of the Americans was to control this Continent.”¹⁰⁵ By the time that he became Prime Minister, Diefenbaker had already been warning for years that US domination of the Canadian economy would render Canada “a virtual economic forty-ninth state.”¹⁰⁶ It is unsurprising then that ensuring that Canada retained its independence in international affairs formed one of the centrepieces of Diefenbaker’s premiership.¹⁰⁷ Peter C. Newman argues that it was in building a Canadian nationality “that would become powerful enough to withstand the absorption attempts by the United States... [that] Diefenbaker saw his place in history.”¹⁰⁸

The perspective of the military leadership was quite different. Faced with an expanding Soviet strategic threat, the RCAF and the United States Air Force (USAF), in particular, believed that a successful defence of each country could only emerge from an effective partnership. Correspondingly, the Canadian military placed a much greater importance on ensuring US cooperation in defence than worrying about US encroachment on Canadian sovereignty.¹⁰⁹ The Continentalist logic undergirding this analysis was perhaps best articulated in 1962 by Dr. R.J. Sutherland of the Canadian Defence Research Board when he suggested that “[i]f the United States is bound to defend Canada, it is also true that Canada can never, consistent with her own interests, ignore the requirements of American security; because, in the final analysis, the security of the United States is the security of Canada.”¹¹⁰

Alternative Explanations

¹⁰⁵ Stacey (1981: 423).

¹⁰⁶ Nash (1991: 35-36 and 47).

¹⁰⁷ Haydon (1993: 189).

¹⁰⁸ Newman (1973: 184).

¹⁰⁹ Haydon (1993: 55).

¹¹⁰ Quoted in Haydon (1993: 55).

Diefenbaker's refusal of the US request is remarkable in that it defied the will of Canada's closest ally in the midst of the Cold War's most acute crisis. That the military leadership felt compelled to defy Diefenbaker's decision itself testifies to the remarkableness of Diefenbaker's decision. Explanations of Diefenbaker's decision have traditionally focused on his personality – for example, his supposed inability to make difficult decisions¹¹¹ – and his enmity toward Kennedy. By implication, the decisions taken by the military leadership are generally presented as rational. Alternatively, Patrick Lennox argues that both Diefenbaker and the military leadership responded rationally to conflicting structural pressures with the contradictory result an inevitable consequence of Canada's positioning in the international system. Both of these explanations have strengths but both also possess important flaws.

Most theories would predict that, given Canada's reliance on the USA for security, the USA's overwhelming power preponderance, Canada's formal alliances with the USA, the threat posed to Canada by the missiles, and Canada's inability to independently affect the outcome of the crisis, Canada should have cooperated with the USA immediately. Thus, Diefenbaker's refusal is often written off as irrational and investigated no further. Moreover, many claim that this traditional argument is strongly supported by “memos, memoirs, recollections, and diaries” which show “that the personal animosity between Kennedy and Diefenbaker played a significant role in Ottawa's decisions – or lack of them – during the Cuban Missile Crisis.”¹¹²

Simply suggesting Diefenbaker's actions were irrational and leaving it at that is problematic for two reasons, however. First, such an ‘explanation’ is analytically unsatisfying if one accepts my argument that arational factors represent an integral part of agents' decision-making and thus need to be integrated into our explanations instead of something

¹¹¹ Haydon (1993: 176, 189, and 216).

¹¹² Nash (1991: 187).

extraordinary and basically unexplainable.¹¹³ Second, suggesting that Diefenbaker's assessment of the situation was irrational is not uncontroversial.¹¹⁴ Diefenbaker's motivations for not agreeing to raise the alert status appear to have been that he felt that doing so would contribute to an escalation of the crisis and would undermine Canada's voice in international affairs.¹¹⁵ While Diefenbaker likely did allow his prejudices against Kennedy to inform his decision-making,¹¹⁶ it is not obvious that his concerns were unwarranted. For example, his concern that raising Canada's alert status was overly provocative was similar to the concerns of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, French President Charles de Gaulle, and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Lauris Norstad, all of whom agreed to not extend the alert to Europe on that basis.¹¹⁷ Additionally, Diefenbaker's belief that Kennedy recklessly escalated the situation at least partially in an attempt to recover his prestige is not outside the mainstream historiography of the crisis.¹¹⁸ Finally, Diefenbaker's complaint that Kennedy was making decisions for Canada without undertaking the consultations required by NORAD is also accurate.¹¹⁹

Lennox presents an alternative explanation that holds that, because of its position within a USA-dominated hierarchical sub-system, Canada's foreign policy is driven by an imperative to demonstrate its subservience to the USA while, due to its simultaneous membership in an anarchic international system, it is concurrently compelled to demonstrate its independence.¹²⁰ Thus, Lennox suggests that Diefenbaker's decisions derived from Canada's need to demonstrate its independence from the USA, while the military leadership's decisions

¹¹³ Cf. Hall (2011: 529) how makes a similar point.

¹¹⁴ Haydon (1993: 10, 194, and 201).

¹¹⁵ Haydon (1993: 128).

¹¹⁶ Haydon (1993: 179).

¹¹⁷ Haydon (1993: 195).

¹¹⁸ Thompson and Randall (2002: 224); Schwarz (2013); Haydon (1993: 193-194); Stern (2012: 4, 16, and 18). Cf. Welles (1999).

¹¹⁹ Lennox (2009: 48-49).

¹²⁰ Lennox (2009: Chapter 1).

derived from Canada's need to demonstrate its subservience. The key problem with Lennox' explanation is that it does not explain how the structural pressures he identifies actually influence agents' decisions. Basically, Lennox cannot explain why Diefenbaker was pushed in one direction and the military leadership in the other and not *vice versa*, or why they were pushed in this instance and not others. Without specifying how structural forces are translated into decisions and how agents are differentially influenced by these structures, the theory is left indeterminate and incapable of providing a coherent explanation of these events.

Thus, both explanations have important flaws. However, with some modification, the traditional explanation can be provided a more rigorous structure while still maintaining its admirable specificity. The critical change that must be made is to stop dismissing Diefenbaker as irrational, and instead inquire into the reasons for his decisions. As discussed, this also requires developing an explanation for the military leadership's decision-making, an analysis often elided because their decisions were simply assumed to be rational given Diefenbaker's supposed irrationality.

A trust-focused Analysis

A trust-focused explanation of this episode must not only explain how the trustors were able to justify their trust-beliefs, but also why there was divergence in the trust-beliefs held by the military and political leaderships. Note that while adherence to liberalism does require liberals to solve their disputes with other liberals non-violently, it does not require that the members of the liberal community look out for each other's best interests and it was this latter point that concerned Canadian decision-makers in this sub-case. Thus, I argue that the

divergent behaviour of the military and political leaderships resulted from the fact that the former trusted the USA to look out for Canada's best interests while the latter did not.

While both sides accepted that the USA was a fellow liberal polity that could be trusted to resolve disputes non-violently, the two sides' cognitive frameworks were constituted differently from each other's by the additional narratives to which they adhered. This resulted in the two sides holding different trust-beliefs beyond the basic liberal trust already examined. Diefenbaker's view that the USA could not be trusted to protect Canada's best interests was consistent with his adherence to an updated Loyalist narrative. The opposite situation prevailed for the Canadian military leadership who did trust their US counterparts to look out for their best interests. In so doing, the military leadership adopted a Continentalist analysis which saw the defence of both states as indivisible, thereby encouraging the development of a collective identification with their US military counterparts on the basis of this belief.

The five factors

The evidence that I present below supports the argument just advanced because of how it shows a significantly differentiated exposure by the political and military leaderships to the five trust-enabling factors. Unsurprisingly, Diefenbaker was not exposed to nearly the same level of these factors as was the military leadership. Note also that I restrict my presentation to three of the five factors because all the critical developments insofar as the two polities' homogeneity and shared experiences are concerned were already discussed in the analysis of the last sub-case or in the introduction to this sub-case.

Interactivity

The measures of economic and financial interactivity presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show that both of these measures, while not as high as in the 1910-1930 period, were relatively elevated in the twenty years preceding 1962. More qualitatively, interactivity continued to grow in other areas less amenable to quantification during this period leading to the growth of “clearly discernible, mainly nongovernmental, continental subsystems” in areas ranging from entertainment to education.¹²¹

While these population-wide measures are useful for discerning large trends, they are less useful when identifying influences of particular importance to smaller groups like military and political decision-makers. For this, a more fine-grained perspective is required. Of particular interest is how, during the postwar period, interactivity and integration between the armed forces increased dramatically. A number of important agreements punctuated and sustained this trajectory, beginning with the 1946 Canada-United States Basic Security Plan (BSP). This was followed by the 1947 agreement to begin standardizing equipment and to institute officer exchanges.¹²² This was followed by the establishment of NATO and its integrated command structure in the early 1950s. More important, however, was the establishment of NORAD in 1957 which, for continental defence purposes, essentially merged operational control of the two states’ air forces. Finally, the ratification of the Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) in 1958 effectively created a defence production system rationalized at the continental level.

¹²¹ John H. Redekop quoted in Thompson and Randall (2002: 323-324).

¹²² Roussel (2004: 204); Holmes (1982: 89).

Overall, these agreements created unprecedented levels of military integration. Moreover, this increased interactivity, and the reinforcement of existing inter-service and inter-bureaucratic relationships that it implied, was consciously pursued.¹²³ By 1962 “[e]quipment, ammunition, and even operational tasks had become interchangeable” between the two militaries¹²⁴ and the related staff and operational liaison often resulted in lasting friendships.¹²⁵ In fact, during the postwar era, cooperation grew so close that coordination outside of the two states’ defence hierarchies became increasingly less necessary as the two sides “developed concepts of operations and logistic support unfettered by political constraint”.¹²⁶

Crucially, Diefenbaker and his ministers were largely unexposed to this interactivity. Indeed, between 1935 and 1957, when so much of this critical cooperation was occurring, the Conservatives had been shut out of government. And while it would not be surprising if Harkness was converted to the trusting perspective of the military because of his exposure to this interactivity in his role as Minister of Defence, this would likely not have been the case for his colleagues. In fact, the Prime Minister’s pronounced disinterest in military affairs, and his distrust of the permanent bureaucracy,¹²⁷ led him to actively isolate himself from the few channels through which the effects of this interactivity might have been able to influence him.¹²⁸

Common Interests

¹²³ Bow (2009: 62).

¹²⁴ Haydon (1993: 206).

¹²⁵ Haydon (1993: 70).

¹²⁶ Haydon (1993: 206).

¹²⁷ Haydon (1993: 217).

¹²⁸ Haydon (1993: 71, 185, and 198-199) For example, under Diefenbaker, both the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Cabinet Defence Committee fell into disuse.

Clearly, the onset of the Cold War generated strong perceptions of Canada and the USA sharing common interests. Indeed, confronting this new enemy produced a new level of intimacy between these two states, as can be seen in the extraordinary plan to trilateralize nuclear weapons production in the late 1940s,¹²⁹ and in military and diplomatic cooperation more generally.¹³⁰ The aforementioned Dr. R.J. Sutherland of the Defence Research Board suggested that this cooperation derived from a “fundamental community of interest between the two nations.”¹³¹

And indeed, by 1962, Canada’s formerly safe geographic position was no more. One Canadian official stated that “[a]viation has made us a buffer state... In the air world we are the cock-pit of North America.”¹³² The DPSA – and the abandonment of military-industrial independence it entailed – was made acceptable by the knowledge that Canada could not defend itself against the USSR.¹³³ This realization was probably most influential in the RCAF and the USAF which came to see the political constraints imposed by their countries’ separate sovereignties as an obstacle to the accomplishment of their shared mission. Stéphane Roussel suggests that this common perception generated “a channel of transgovernmental exchange that looked to be autonomous and could, on occasion, even short-circuit regular decision-making processes”,¹³⁴ the appearance of which he dates to the beginning of the 1950s.¹³⁵ Indeed, NORAD was largely a product of lobbying by the RCAF and USAF.¹³⁶

Diefenbaker did not subscribe to this analysis as much as did the military leadership, or even most senior bureaucrats.¹³⁷ Rather, some in the political leadership believed the linkage

¹²⁹ Buckley (2000: 70-71); Maloney (2007: 9).

¹³⁰ Thompson and Randall (2002: 184); Keohane and Nye (1989: 171 and 211) make a similar argument.

¹³¹ Quoted in Haydon (1993: 55).

¹³² Grant Dexter quoted in Holmes (1979: 61).

¹³³ Buckley (2000: 111); Levitt (1993: 66); Lennox (2009: 60).

¹³⁴ Roussel (2004: 212). My emphasis.

¹³⁵ Roussel (2004: 212).

¹³⁶ Roussel (2004: 212); Nash (1991: 70).

¹³⁷ Haydon (1993: 4).

between the two militaries rendered the RCAF an “indentured servant of SAC [the US Strategic Air Command]”.¹³⁸ Many of these critics also felt that the strong identification between the two militaries threatened Canada’s independence.¹³⁹ Diefenbaker’s distrust of the military brass only exacerbated these concerns,¹⁴⁰ as exemplified by his extraordinary feud with the military over the BOMARC issue. In this dispute, senior military officials became so frustrated with Diefenbaker that they organized an unofficial lobbying campaign against the government.¹⁴¹ Diefenbaker later referred to this as “a supra-governmental relationship between the Canadian military, in particular the Royal Canadian Air Force, and the Pentagon” and argued that “[n]ever has there been anything in history to equal [it].”¹⁴²

Diefenbaker and Kennedy’s poor relationship also stemmed partially from an incompatible definition of interests, one which manifested clearly during the crisis. Kennedy interpreted the Cuban missiles as a threat to the USA, and indeed the free world. Already suspicious of Kennedy’s motives and judgement, Diefenbaker identified the crisis as more of a political threat to Kennedy than an existential one for Canada or the USA. That the Canadian military, which by 1962 was increasingly distrusted by Diefenbaker, subscribed to a similar threat perception as Kennedy, likely only reinforced Diefenbaker’s assessment.

Altercasting

This case includes some strong instances of altercasting, specifically the ways in which institutional structures can pre-dispose agents embedded in them to hold certain beliefs. For

¹³⁸ Haydon (1993: 73).

¹³⁹ Haydon (1993: 204).

¹⁴⁰ Haydon (1993: 54).

¹⁴¹ Nash (1991: 144-146). This campaign included tours of NORAD headquarters for members of the Canadian elite and the feeding of anti-government stories to journalists by US diplomats.

¹⁴² Quoting Diefenbaker’s memoirs. Nash (1991: 145).

example, by supporting agreements like the 1947 military cooperation agreement, the DPSA, and NORAD; the two militaries altercast each other as reliable partners who could be trusted to assist each other in the accomplishment of their missions. Critically, the structures which these agreements put in place – such as, integrated commands – meant that, especially for the Canadian military, its objectives could not be met without relying on US personnel. For example, NORAD always had a US commander and a Canadian deputy commander. On the Canadian side, having a US officer in command of the defence of Canada's airspace would pre-dispose officers serving under this commander to trust him or her to look out for Canada's interests, if only to reduce the scope for cognitive dissonance. Moreover, the fact that the USA was willing to create an institutional structure under which a Canadian deputy commander was often left in charge of defending the USA's airspace while the commander was absent, effectively represented an instance of the USA altercasting the Canadian military as trustworthy, thereby likely inducing just such a form of trustworthiness in the Canadian deputy and other Canadian NORAD officers.

Again, however, we see a striking contrast with the political leadership. By failing to consult him during the crisis, Kennedy spectacularly altercast Diefenbaker as someone not trustworthy enough to consult. Bunny Pound, Diefenbaker's secretary, claimed that this snub contributed to Diefenbaker's decision-making during the crisis.¹⁴³ Prior to the crisis, the USA's support for the aforementioned BOMARC lobbying effort also altercast Diefenbaker in a very negative way. While the Canadian military was itself the primary anti-Diefenbaker actor in this campaign, the US government aided the effort by assisting with the organization of tours of NORAD headquarters for Canadian "[j]ournalists, business and labour leaders, educators, and other professionals" who were "persuasively massaged" with pro-BOMARC

¹⁴³ Nash (1991: 187).

messages.¹⁴⁴ The US NORAD commander, General Laurence Kuter, made speeches in Canada in which he undermined Diefenbaker's anti-BOMARC arguments and through which he attempted to "shape public opinion" and "force Diefenbaker into acceptance" of the missiles.¹⁴⁵ Basically, the RCAF and USAF were collaborating to sap public support for Diefenbaker.¹⁴⁶ In Ottawa, US diplomats – including the US ambassador – began briefing journalists in an effort to correct the "misinformation and misinterpretation" they argued was being propounded by Diefenbaker on the issue.¹⁴⁷ Actions of this sort clearly altercast Diefenbaker as someone the US government did not trust to further its interests.

Earlier, I detailed a number of incidents in which Kennedy altercast Diefenbaker in such a way as to provoke a negative response. There is one final episode that highlights a critical aspect of why Diefenbaker came to so dislike Kennedy. In late April 1962, just before Diefenbaker was to call an election, he learned that Kennedy was hosting a lavish dinner party at the White House for all the Nobel Prize winners of North America. Pearson, a Peace Prize laureate who was then the Leader of the Opposition in Canada, was invited.

Diefenbaker interpreted this dinner, and the positive attention it would garner Pearson, as additional evidence of the larger plot mentioned earlier by which he believed Kennedy was attempting to undermine his government and install Pearson as Prime Minister.¹⁴⁸ Thus, from Diefenbaker's perspective, Kennedy's holding of the dinner again altercast Diefenbaker as Kennedy's less-than-preferred partner, further solidifying Diefenbaker's negative view of Kennedy.

¹⁴⁴ Nash (1991: 144-145).

¹⁴⁵ Nash (1991: 144-145).

¹⁴⁶ Nash (1991: 145).

¹⁴⁷ Nash (1991: 146).

¹⁴⁸ Nash (1991: 156-158). While suggesting that there was an active Kennedy-Pearson conspiracy to remove Diefenbaker goes too far, it is clear that Kennedy was much happier when Pearson became prime minister in the subsequent 1963 election, and it is also clear that Kennedy's administration did intervene in that election in an attempt to aid Pearson in defeating Diefenbaker (1991: 302).

Conclusions

The results of the foregoing analysis appear to confirm that trust is influential in international politics by demonstrating how important gaps in existing explanations are best filled by the addition of trust. Moreover, by demonstrating that the conditions and factors surrounding the presence and absence of trust in these episodes generally align with what would be predicted by my theory (see Table 5.1), I have generated support for understanding trust in accordance with my model. Additionally, however, this analysis has also raised some important questions of emphasis – such as the roles played by dramatic events like the First World War and the relative importance of institutionalized collaboration for trust building – which will require further analysis and perhaps refinement of the theoretical framework.

| Table 5.1 | Nuclear Weapons | Cuban Missile Crisis | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Trust-enabling Factors | Cdn. Decision-makers | Diefenbaker | Military Leadership |
| Compatible Narratives | Yes | Mixed | Yes |
| Interactivity | Yes | No | Yes |
| Homogeneity | Yes | Mixed | Yes |
| Common Interests | Yes | Mixed | Yes |
| Shared Experiences | Yes | No | Yes |
| Positive Altercasting | Yes | No | Yes |
| Trust | Yes | No | Yes |

Given these findings, it is fairly unsurprising that the relationship between Canada and the USA contains a strong element of trust. More surprising, however, is the limited character of this trust in certain specific respects. Canada's non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the acceptance of vulnerability it entailed, provides a clear signal that Canadian decision-makers trusted the USA not to use force as a means of resolving disputes with Canada. This is a critical finding because it supports the presumption that a liberal security community existed

between these two states, at least beginning in 1945. That said, Diefenbaker's refusal to raise the alert status of Canada's military during the Cuban missile crisis demonstrates his lack of trust in Kennedy to take Canada's best interests into account – this despite the strong trust possessed by the Canadian military leadership *vis-à-vis* their US counterparts in this regard. While this second result will be surprising to many, it is supported by my analysis which suggests a significant divergence in exposure to the trust-generating factors between Diefenbaker and the military leadership. Thus, even in this episode that is strikingly defined by a *lack* of trust, a trust-focused analysis can help to explain Canada's schizophrenic actions. Finally, this result is also important because it highlights the limits of the impact of the existence of a liberal security community, thereby helping to provide additional specificity to this important concept.

Chapter 6

Eating Grass

Introduction

Unlike the Canada-USA case study which examined two episodes in which a significant baseline of liberal trust prevailed throughout, this case study comprises two episodes from a relationship characterized by a persistent lack of liberal trust, namely the India-Pakistan relationship. In the first sub-case, I examine Pakistan's decision to acquire nuclear weapons. This decision – which actually comprised a series of decisions beginning in the 1970s and that culminated in Pakistan's decision to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998 – constitutes a decision not to accept vulnerability to India. I argue that this decision is understandable given the lack of any basis on which prudent Pakistani decision-makers could have trusted India. In fact, one of the most remarkable aspects of both sub-cases is the extent to which the distributions of meaning in which Pakistani decision-makers were embedded predisposed them toward anti-Indian positions. As is discussed, when these predispositions are combined with the minimal occurrence of the five trust-enabling factors that prevailed, it is unsurprising that this case reveals a distinct lack of liberal trust.

A similar pattern prevails in the second sub-case: Pakistani decision-makers eschewed vulnerability to India by responding to an Indian peace initiative by infiltrating insurgents into Indian-held Kashmir, thereby precipitated the Kargil War of May-July 1999. Again, this decision is also best explained as a pursuit of security by prudent Pakistani agents with no basis on which to trust their Indian counter-parts. As in the second episode of the Canada-USA case, however, a closer examination of this case reveals an instructive, if incipient,

division between the decision-making of the Pakistan military and political leaderships with each group's decision-making being influenced by different narrative conceptions of Pakistan's identity. Additionally, the Pakistan political leadership appears to have been exposed, albeit to a limited extent, to the five trust enabling factors to a greater extent than the military leadership. Consequently, this case study provides a strong contrast to the Canada-USA case while still providing some interesting similarities for comparison and, in so doing, helps to illuminate the obstacles that can block the eventuation of trust.

Episode 1: Pakistan's Nuclear Acquisition

Pakistan's decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 represents the final link in a chain of decisions through which it acquired nuclear weapons. Pakistan's nuclear programme began in 1956 with the establishment of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Initially, there was no military dimension to the PAEC's work¹ but, over time, advocates for the acquisition of nuclear weapons emerged.² One of the most prominent was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who, as Foreign Minister, famously stated that, "[i]f India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own."³ Nevertheless, it was not until early 1972, when Bhutto – by then Chief Martial Law Administrator – convened a meeting of Pakistan's top nuclear scientists and challenged them to build Pakistan a nuclear weapon,⁴ that a Pakistani nuclear weapons programme was born.⁵

Bhutto did not live long enough to see the programme produce a weapon, however, as he was deposed by General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq in a *coup d'état* on 5 July, 1977. Zia remained

¹ Armstrong and Trento (2007: 21).

² Ahmed (1999: 182).

³ Armstrong and Trento (2007: 27).

⁴ Hassan Khan (2011: 269).

⁵ Bennett Jones (2009: 185). It seems likely that Bhutto was aware of India's programme at this point.

Pakistan's leader until 1988 and remained a strong supporter of acquisition throughout, even despite significant anti-acquisition pressure from the USA in the late 1970s.⁶ It was during Zia's presidency that Pakistan made the critical steps toward acquisition.⁷ While the exact timeline of acquisition is disputed,⁸ by 1987 General Zia began publicly stating that Pakistan could produce a nuclear bomb whenever it wanted to.⁹ Five years later, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan declared that Pakistan possessed "all the elements which, if hooked together, would become a (nuclear) device",¹⁰ likely signalling Pakistan's arrival as a *de facto* nuclear power.¹¹

Thus, by the mid-1990s, all that remained was for Pakistan to announce its nuclear status. On 11 and 13 May 1998, India detonated a series of nuclear devices providing Pakistan with a pretext for such an announcement. After India's tests were complete, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee held a news conference and announced that India was now a fully-fledged nuclear weapons state. This test created a great deal of alarm in Pakistan,¹² and created enormous pressure on Pakistani decision-makers to respond with their own tests. Initially, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who was concerned by the economic costs of a test, hesitated.¹³ However, once Indian decision-makers began making bellicose statements,¹⁴ the military opinion in favour of a test solidified. At this point, Sharif appears to have bowed to pressure from the military leadership and ordered the tests to go ahead, though

⁶ Armstrong and Trento (2007: 78 and 85); Ganguly (2002: 107).

⁷ Armstrong and Trento (2007: 157).

⁸ Bennett Jones (2009: 189); Armstrong and Trento (2007: 141); Shaikh (2002: 31-32); Chakma (2002: 898).

⁹ Armstrong and Trento (2007: 155); Ahmed (1999: 188).

¹⁰ Ahmed (1999: 190).

¹¹ Bennett Jones (2009: 190).

¹² Hussain (2011: 325).

¹³ Ahmed (1999: 194).

¹⁴ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 129).

it's not clear that he actually needed much convincing – or had much choice.¹⁵ On 28 May, Sharif announced that “[t]oday, we have settled a score.”¹⁶

Acceptance of vulnerability

Pakistan's decision to acquire nuclear weapons represents a clear failure to accept vulnerability to India. By acquiring nuclear weapons, an acquisition clearly taken in response to India's, Pakistan demonstrated that it did not trust India to resolve future disputes with it non-violently and thus perceived a need to match India's capabilities. From a Realist perspective this is fairly understandable. Indeed, the history of this relationship is one of persistent conflict and confrontation. Prior to 1998, Pakistan and India had fought three wars: (1) in 1947-1948, over the disputed state of Kashmir; (2) in 1965, again over Kashmir; and (3) in 1971, when India intervened in a civil war between East and West Pakistan which resulted in the secession of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) from Pakistan. The two states have also come to the brink of war on numerous other occasions, such as during the Brasstacks crisis in 1986-1987.

In addition to this history of conflict, there also exists a significant imbalance in capabilities that has informed Pakistani perceptions of India. In 1950, India's population totalled about 360 million people compared to Pakistan's 85 million. In 1999, India's population of 986 million dwarfed Pakistan's population of 142 million by an even greater degree. Similarly, India's economy in 1950 was almost five times larger than Pakistan's, a difference that had widened to just over seven times by 1999.¹⁷ Indeed, in recent years, with close to a million men under arms, India's regular military is almost twice as large as Pakistan's.¹⁸ Together,

¹⁵ Bennett Jones (2009: 197); Ganguly (2002: 107-108); Ahmed (1999: 178).

¹⁶ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 124). Cf. Wolpert (2010: 72).

¹⁷ Maddison (2009).

¹⁸ Talbot (2012: 22).

these components of latent power create a situation in which Pakistan is objectively vulnerable to India. Interestingly, prior to 1965, while recognizing Pakistan's numerical military inferiority, Pakistan's leaders believed that Pakistan's conventional military capabilities were superior in quality and were confident that because of this Pakistan could triumph in any conflict with India.¹⁹ However, with India's victories in 1965 and 1971, this confidence was greatly shaken. From this moment forward, Pakistani decision-makers were focused on preventing a repetition of 1971 and further dismemberment of their country.²⁰

In this context, it is not surprising that the further widening of the capabilities gap that occurred when India tested a 'peaceful' nuclear device in 1974 caused Bhutto to declare that a "more grave and serious event has not taken place in the history of Pakistan."²¹ Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme was meant to provide it with the security that its conventional forces were incapable of providing.²² Once India conducted its nuclear tests in 1998, many Pakistani decision-makers argued in favour of Pakistani tests saying that "[w]e will never be able to remove the nuclear imbalance if we do not follow suit with our own explosion."²³ More specifically, Army Chief Jehangir Karamat feared that if Pakistan did not respond with a test, India would attempt a military solution in Kashmir.²⁴ In the longer term, the military feared that a failure to test would degrade Pakistan's 'existential' deterrent,²⁵ and could conceivably lead to a renewed Indian attempt to splinter Pakistan and undo the partitioning of the sub-continent.²⁶

¹⁹ Wolpert (1993: 186); Ganguly (2002: 40-41).

²⁰ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 123).

²¹ Armstrong and Trento (2007: 39-40).

²² Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 45).

²³ Ahmed (1999: 194) quoting an anonymous senior Pakistani military officer.

²⁴ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 131); Yasmeen (1999: 55); Wheeler (2010: 326-327).

²⁵ Yasmeen (1999: 49).

²⁶ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 129).

Key Agents, Distributions of Power and Meaning

Nuclear decision-making in Pakistan was tightly concentrated among high-level decision-makers. From its beginnings in 1972 until his removal by General Zia, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto exercised predominant control over the direction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Once Bhutto was removed, the military leadership took control and did not relinquish it during the period under examination.²⁷ This was the case even after Zia's death and the return of electoral democracy in 1988, as the country's unelected President and Army Chiefs not only maintained exclusive control over security and nuclear policy,²⁸ but also the ability to dismiss civilian governments at their discretion.²⁹ Hasan Askari Rizvi, a leading scholar of the Pakistani army, argues that the military considered any issue of 'strategic national importance' to be its domain, a category which includes nuclear weapons.³⁰ Indeed, when US President Bill Clinton urged Sharif not to test in 1998, the Prime Minister plausibly replied that the decision was "out of [his] hands".³¹

Given the military's predominance in nuclear weapons decision-making,³² it is unsurprising that the form taken by the distribution of power in Pakistan is highly illiberal, despite Pakistan receiving a Polity IV score of 7 – the lowest value usually accepted as indicating a liberal democracy – between 1956-1957, 1973-1976, and 1988-1999 (see Figure 6.3).³³ According to the Freedom House rating system that begins in 1973, Pakistan is rated as 'Partly Free' for the entire period except from 1980 to 1985 when it is rated as 'Not Free'

²⁷ Bennett Jones (2009: 221).

²⁸ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 84); Talbot (2012: 147); Weaver (2002: 191); Ahmed (1999: 189-191).

²⁹ Ahmed (1999: 186, 191); Bennett Jones (2009: 221). Each of the first three 'constitutional' coups was preceded by an infringement of the army's interests by the elected political leadership. Talbot (2012: 146 and 149).

³⁰ Bennett Jones (2009: 284).

³¹ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 130).

³² Ahmed (1999: 202).

³³ Recall that Polity IV scores are at best a useful first cut in identifying liberal states: while all liberal states will have high Polity IV scores, not all states with high Polity IV scores are necessarily liberal.

(see Figure 6.4)³⁴. Indeed, many observers point out that even under civilian rule, Pakistani democracy – let alone liberal democracy – is skin deep and that Pakistan remains a praetorian state.³⁵ Acknowledging a widely known fact, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto once responded to a journalist’s question concerning whether she intended to cut the defence budget by saying: “[n]ot unless we want the army to take over again.”³⁶ Moreover, even setting aside the obstacles to the enactment of a liberal programme that this military dominance presents, none of the elected leaders in the period examined – that is, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif – demonstrated a meaningful commitment to liberalism or a willingness to abide by its tenets if doing so came into conflict with their own interests.³⁷

One of the reasons that the military has so dominated Pakistani politics and is as popular as it is is because of the particular distribution of meaning that structures Pakistani politics and society. In particular, Pakistan’s history has been greatly influenced by ambiguity over the country’s purpose.³⁸ Pakistan’s existence derives from the ‘Two Nation’ theory, which held that Hindu and Muslim South Asians represented two distinct nations. When combined with the doctrine of national self-determination, proponents of Pakistan, like Muhammad Ali Jinnah, argued that British India needed to be divided into two separate national homelands upon decolonization. The founders of India, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, rejected this claim arguing that the India they envisaged was a secular one based on a civic, not ethnic,

³⁴ I interpret only the Freedom House score of ‘Free’ as indicating a liberal democracy.

³⁵ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 132); Talbot (2012: 140-141). Bennett Jones (2009: 226) describes this conclusion as indisputable. Ganguly (2000: 3) blames this situation on Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s and the Pakistan Muslim League’s resistance to the democratization of the original Pakistani independence movement.

³⁶ Bennett Jones (2009: 241).

³⁷ Weaver (2002: 53-54); Talbot (2012: 5); Bennett Jones (2009: 234). For Zulfikar Ali Bhutto see Wolpert (1993: 227); Bennett Jones (2009: 231-233); Talbot (2012: 5). For Benazir Bhutto see Talbot (2012: 145). For Nawaz Sharif see Talbot (2012: 145); Weaver (2002: 17).

³⁸ Ahmed (2002: 20) actually calls Pakistan an ‘unimagined’ country.

nationalism thereby rendering separate homelands unnecessary.³⁹ Consequently, the two states' founding narratives can easily be interpreted as mutually exclusive and threatening.⁴⁰

The irreconcilability of these two narratives was bloodily affirmed in the human catastrophe of Partition,⁴¹ which left lasting marks on many Pakistanis and Indians and initiated a self-perpetuating spiral of hostility between the two states.⁴² The trauma of Partition predisposed the Pakistani population to support a strong role for the military in government and provided a readymade anti-Indian thread for politicians to weave into Pakistan's politics.⁴³ Since then the continuing history of conflict, especially over Kashmir and the secession of Bangladesh,⁴⁴ has been interpreted by many Pakistanis as evidence that the Indian leadership has never accepted Partition and desires to reverse it and re-establish *Akhand Bharat* (undivided India).⁴⁵ Periodic statements by Indian leaders describing Partition as a tragedy and reiterating the natural unity of the subcontinent have further stoked these fears.⁴⁶

Much of the aforementioned ambiguity in Pakistan's purpose was the result of the secession of Bangladesh and the way that this event undermined the 'Two Nations' theory by creating a second Muslim majority South Asian state. Upon assuming power in the aftermath of this disaster, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's response to this problem was to de-emphasize the 'Two Nations' theory as a whole, and replace it with a more singular emphasis on the anti-Indian

³⁹ Ganguly (2002: 2).

⁴⁰ Ganguly (2002: Preface, 5); Weaver (2002: 255); Sridharan (2005a: 114); Shaikh (2002: 35).

⁴¹ 14.5 million persons displaced, perhaps 1 million killed, 75,000 women raped. Talbot (2012: 25); Ahmed (2002: 9).

⁴² Ahmed (1999 : 180); Talbot (2012: 9-10); Ahmed (2002: 9); Jalal (1987: 298); Wolpert (2010: 17); Hussain (2011: 324). For an example see Musharraf (2006).

⁴³ Talbot (2012: 64).

⁴⁴ Talbot (2012: 16).

⁴⁵ Chakma (2002: 885-886); Ganguly (2002: 101-102,105); Bennett Jones (2009: 94); Misra (2001: 106).

⁴⁶ Hussain (2011: 323).

aspects of Pakistan's identity.⁴⁷ After all, had India not revealed its intentions to destroy Pakistan when it helped to split the country in the 1971 civil war and did this not call for righteous opposition to Indian aggression?⁴⁸ This shifting of emphases proved popular,⁴⁹ and powerful enough, at least in moments of crisis, to unite Pakistan's usually fractious sectarian divides.⁵⁰ This securitization of Pakistani politics had an important side effect, however, as it provided military leaders with an important political advantage as the natural defenders of Pakistan.⁵¹ Indeed, despite the army's repeated failures to solve any of Pakistan's major challenges,⁵² significant sections of Pakistani society continue to view the army as the state's most efficient institution,⁵³ likely because its effectiveness is evaluated under an anti-Indian security rubric.

Finally, in addition to helping legitimize the military's dominance of politics, the perception of a constant Indian threat also incentivized attempts by Pakistani decision-makers to achieve parity with India, making success in this endeavor a key criterion for their legitimacy.⁵⁴ Nuclear weapons, as the ultimate weapon, served as a perfect vehicle for decision-makers to demonstrate their effectiveness in achieving parity with India. Indeed, General Zia used the military's continuation of Bhutto's programme in exactly this way.⁵⁵ It is unsurprisingly then that when India conducted its tests in 1998 and called on the international community to admit it to the exclusive club of nuclear weapons states, Pakistani decision-makers' –

⁴⁷ Ahmed (2002: 27); Jalal (2011: 14); Ganguly (2002: 5-6, 72); Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 49); Bennett Jones (2009: 43).

⁴⁸ Ganguly (2002: 52). And while undoing Partition is too strong an intention to impute to India, it is clear that India was happy to weaken Pakistan and remove a potential second front by assisting in the birth of Bangladesh. See also Jalal (2011: 11); Talbot (2012: 96-97).

⁴⁹ Talbot (2012: 104, 107).

⁵⁰ Misra (2001: 110-111).

⁵¹ Paul (2006: 614).

⁵² Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 205).

⁵³ Talbot (2012: 8).

⁵⁴ Armstrong and Trento (2007: 45); Ahmed (1999: 178-179); Yasmeen (1999: 43-44); Paul (2006: 624). This need for parity derives from Pakistan's founding as an equal Muslim analogue to the Hindu India deserving of the same level of respect. See Shaikh (2002: 44-45).

⁵⁵ Ahmed (1999: 185-188).

especially the military leadership's – legitimacy demanded that they not accept a nuclear stature any less than India's,⁵⁶ even though it is not clear that a test was technically necessary.⁵⁷

Possible Explanations

Three standard explanations have been offered for Pakistan's decision to acquire, and ultimately test, nuclear weapons: (1) security, (2) prestige, and (3) domestic politics.⁵⁸ While all three played a role,⁵⁹ security seems to have been Pakistan's primary motivation.⁶⁰ This is important because if it can be shown that Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons as a means of protecting itself from a perceived Indian threat, this strongly supports the argument that Pakistan did not trust India to resolve their disputes non-violently.

The existential importance of acquisition for Pakistani security as perceived by decision-makers is well illustrated by the high price they were willing to pay for it in other areas.⁶¹ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's decision to prioritize the launching of the programme in the months of chaos following the secession of Bangladesh is illustrative of this importance.⁶² Similarly, despite facing significant internal unrest, Zia and the military were willing to endure the imposition of US sanctions in 1977 and 1979 in order to keep the programme advancing, even though it was still years from producing any results.⁶³ When the first Reagan

⁵⁶ Ahmed (1999: 195); Shaikh (2002: 31).

⁵⁷ This is because Pakistan was using a proven Chinese weapon design. Bennett Jones (2009: 218).

⁵⁸ Sagan (1996-1997).

⁵⁹ Hassan Khan (2011: 267).

⁶⁰ Bennett Jones (2009: 198); Ahmed (1999: 179); Spector (1988: 130 and 145); Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 122); Ahmad (1999: 124); Talbot (2012: 104); Chakma (2002: 873); Cirincione et al. (2002: 208); Khalilzad (1979: 244); Yasmeen (1999: 43); Shaikh (2002: 31 and 42).

⁶¹ Hassan Khan (2011: 271).

⁶² Chakma (2002: 884); Armstrong and Trento (2007: 31); Jalal (2011: 14); Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 45); Ganguly (2002: 101-102); Shaikh (2002: 42); Ahmed (1999: 182-183); Rajagopalan (1999: 1532).

⁶³ Chakma (2002: 893).

administration came to power, Zia made it clear that his assistance in supporting Afghan resistance to the Soviets depended on the US reducing its pressure on his nuclear weapons programme,⁶⁴ a demand to which the USA eventually acquiesced.⁶⁵ After the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan continued to advance toward a weapon, even when it meant paying “tremendous political and diplomatic costs”⁶⁶ such as the activation of US sanctions.⁶⁷ In fact, US opposition to Pakistan’s programme ironically resulted in “virtually every senior Pakistani civilian and military official [internalizing] the criticality of nuclear weapons to national security.”⁶⁸

In 1998, a small group of decision-makers argued for Pakistan not to test claiming that the costs would be too high; namely, foregoing the compensation that states like the USA were offering,⁶⁹ the loss of international diplomatic credit,⁷⁰ the sanctions that would be imposed, and the economic turmoil that these sanctions would spark.⁷¹ Prior to its tests, Pakistan's finance minister predicted that sanctions would cost Pakistan \$1.5 billion annually in lost loans and aid and \$2.5 billion in lost foreign investment and remittances.⁷² And while they did not predict the full extent of the economic crisis of “unprecedented dimensions”⁷³ which followed, Pakistani decision-makers had been warned by the USA that there would be significant costs for conducting a test: for instance, the loss of a “huge conventional arms

⁶⁴ Armstrong and Trento (2007: 117).

⁶⁵ Bennett Jones (2009: 188-189).

⁶⁶ Chakma (2002: 911).

⁶⁷ Bennett Jones (2009: 190).

⁶⁸ Hassan Khan (2011: 270).

⁶⁹ Bennett Jones (2009: 196-197); Ahmed (1999: 194).

⁷⁰ Bennett Jones (2009: 195).

⁷¹ Yasmeen (1999: 50-51).

⁷² Ahmed (1999: 197). The costs were ultimately far worse. See Ahmed (1999: 195-196); Yasmeen (1999: 53-54).

⁷³ Ahmed (1999: 179).

package”.⁷⁴ Even so, many pro-test advocates argued that the security benefits would be worth even the “stiffest international sanctions”.⁷⁵

While security was the most important factor motivating Pakistan’s acquisition, the desire for prestige and the impact that such an acquisition would have on domestic politics were also significant. In both cases, however, this impact was largely a function of how acquisition was perceived as improving Pakistan’s security situation *vis-à-vis* India. Scott Sagan identifies these two factors as distinct in his typology of why states acquire nuclear weapons, but because of how the two factors interpenetrated so thoroughly in this case, I consider them simultaneously.

When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power, he took over the leadership of a traumatized country whose ontological security was acutely threatened. A critical aspect of Bhutto’s efforts to ameliorate this situation was his quest for nuclear weapons and the prestige and self-esteem that the successful conclusion of this quest would bring to Pakistan.⁷⁶ The most important way in which Bhutto’s quest did so was in how it supported his re-assembling of Pakistan’s identity into a simplistically anti-Indian narrative. Given this re-formulation, India’s 1974 tests solidified the importance of Pakistan acquiring its own nuclear capability so as to establish parity with India and neutralize the Indian threat.⁷⁷ The nuclear programme became very popular in Pakistan, largely because of how it allowed Pakistanis to see themselves as the equals of India.⁷⁸ This made opposing the nuclear programme very difficult

⁷⁴ Ahmed (1999: 194); Hussain (2011: 326); Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 130).

⁷⁵ Shaikh (2002: 31). See also Ahmed (1999: 195).

⁷⁶ Ahmed (1999: 183); Armstrong and Trento (2007: 32); Talbot (2012: 104).

⁷⁷ Armstrong and Trento (2007: 45); Ahmed (1999: 178-179); Yasmeen (1999: 43-44); Paul (2006: 624).

⁷⁸ Weaver (2002: 9) reports that when she returned to Pakistan in 2003 after a number of years absence, she was struck by the ubiquitous monuments that had been proudly erected to Pakistan’s successful nuclear weapons programme.

for any political actor and handed the military a major political advantage once it gained control of the program.

These dynamics are well illustrated in the decision-making that surrounded the 1998 tests. As discussed, Pakistan's leadership was initially divided on how to respond to India's tests, with many concerned over the costs associated with a Pakistani test. Despite the validity of these concerns, the Pakistani public was strongly in favour of testing. Sharif himself said: "The pressure was irresistible at home. It was mounting on the government every day, every hour. The world outside is not aware of the emotional feelings of the people of this region. I have been holding on and exercising the utmost restraint."⁷⁹ Sharif's, albeit self-proclaimed, restraint was opposed by the military which sought to manipulate public opinion in favour of testing,⁸⁰ and rendered essentially untenable when Benazir Bhutto, then Leader of the Opposition, opportunistically called on the government to 'immediately respond to the Indian test' with its own.⁸¹

A trust-focused analysis

Pakistan clearly suffers from objective insecurity *vis-à-vis* India, and is thus in a position to either accept or address its vulnerability to India. Subjectively, it is even less surprising that Pakistan perceived India as threatening. Pakistan's history of conflict with India, and the anti-Indian content of Pakistan's identity narrative – especially after 1971 – have resulted in a perception of India as existentially threatening almost by definition. Nuclear weapons promised an unequalled means of defending Pakistan against such a threat and were thus

⁷⁹ Bennett Jones (2009: 197).

⁸⁰ Ahmed (1999: 195).

⁸¹ Hussain (2011: 325).

seized on by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, even at great expense for an impoverished country.⁸² In so doing, Pakistan chose to not accept the vulnerability to India that eschewing the development of nuclear weapons would have represented.

Given this analysis, Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability seems to have been over-determined. Strong arguments can be advanced under all three of the explanations just discussed, and these explanations are also all compatible. Most importantly, all three models are consistent with the absence of a trust-belief according to which Pakistan could rely on India to non-violently resolve any disputes the two states might have. What remains then is to determine whether my trust model is consistent with this non-trusting finding. Below, I argue that it is. Not only does Pakistan not qualify as a liberal state, thereby making it impossible for Pakistan to trust India on the basis of shared liberalism, there is no obvious alternative shared narrative from which a similar trust belief could emerge that might justify forgoing acquisition. Finally, there is little evidence that any of the trust-enabling mechanisms were operational between Pakistan and India. Thus, it seems clear that the conditions required for the trust model to apply, at least insofar as would be necessary for the liberal peace to eventuate, simply do not obtain in this sub-case.

The Five Factors


While there is little likelihood of a liberal trust breaking out between Pakistan and India it is nevertheless useful for comparative purposes to examine the extent to which the five trust enabling factors were present. As is discussed below, none of the five factors seem to have

⁸² Spector (1988: 120-121).

been present to any great extent between these two states during the period under examination.

Interactivity

Given that India and Pakistan possess significant shared history, have many languages and cultural practices that are at least mutually intelligible, and share a border that is 1,000 miles long, the limited level of interactivity that exists between the two states is striking. Indeed, for much of the period in question, it was difficult for nationals of each state to even get permission to visit the other country.⁸³ As Figure 6.1 shows, economic interactivity has been negligible compared to our other cases.⁸⁴



Moreover, over time, economic interactivity between the two states has actually declined.

Between 1948 and 1958, the percentage of Pakistan's exports that went to India dropped from 56% to 4%. At the end of the 1990s, neither country figured as one of the other's main

⁸³ Ahmed (2002: 25).

⁸⁴ Sridharan (2005b: 326).

sources or destinations for imports or exports.⁸⁵ Direct investment and joint ventures between the two states have also been essentially non-existent, and any interactivity of this sort that did exist at independence has been declining, especially after 1965 when a number of companies in each state owned by nationals of the other were confiscated as enemy property.⁸⁶ Indeed, the only major economic cooperation agreement that has been concluded between the two states since 1960 is the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Unfortunately, even the cooperation embodied in this treaty has not spilled-over into other areas, largely because it was specifically designed to minimize the level of cooperation required to operate it.⁸⁷ Indeed, between 1994 and 1999, Pakistan largely held any moves toward economic cooperation hostage to resolution of the Kashmir dispute⁸⁸ at least partially *because* Pakistani elites fear that cooperation might make continuation of the Kashmir conflict more difficult.⁸⁹

Finally, it is true that there have been some interactions between Indian and Pakistani elites and decision-makers, but these have been quite limited and have never been sustained. For example, soon after coming to power, Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi – both newly elected prime ministers who shared a more cosmopolitan outlook and privileged background, were members of a new younger generation, and were not personally marked to the same extent as their predecessors by the conflicts between the two countries – seem to have enjoyed some personal chemistry and together attempted to initiate a rapprochement between the two states. While this initiative did produce a 1988 agreement between the two states not to attack each other's nuclear installations,⁹⁰ the Pakistani military eventually forced Bhutto to abandon the

⁸⁵ Sridharan (2005b: 327-328).

⁸⁶ Sridharan (2005b: 329).

⁸⁷ Sridharan (2005b: 333).

⁸⁸ Sridharan (2005b: 330).


⁸⁹ Sridharan (2005b: 334-335).

⁹⁰ Talbot (2012: 165).

larger rapprochement initiative.⁹¹ A similar pattern repeated itself when Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral sought to kick-start a rapprochement after their meeting at the SAARC conference in Male in 1997⁹² as the Pakistani military promptly commenced heavy shelling of Indian positions in Kashmir soon thereafter.

Homogeneity


In some ways Pakistan and India are relatively homogeneous polities with many of their citizens speaking similar languages and sharing some cultural practices. However, this similarity actually belies the significant differences that exist between the two states in the critical areas of political ideology and religion. Quantitatively, this similarity is most evident in figure 6.2, which shows that India and Pakistan have for much of their history shared a similar level of development, with the final decade prior to Pakistan's nuclear tests representing a period of movement toward parity.




⁹¹ Bennett Jones (2009: 298).

⁹² Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 150). Sharif and Gujral had actually met before in 1994 while Gujral was attending a Track II conference in Pakistan. The two had developed a close friendship, aided by their sharing of Punjabi as a mother tongue. <http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives1999/kashmir19991028a.html>

Politically, India has maintained a Polity IV score of eight or higher for almost all of its post-independence history. Contrariwise, Pakistan has spent the majority of this time under military rule and has only briefly passed the Polity IV democracy threshold on three occasions.



Pakistan's Freedom House score has also consistently been lower than India's with Pakistan never achieving the highest 'Free' ranking.



These divergent trajectories may appear puzzling given that both states ought to have 'benefitted' from the same British colonial heritage. Ian Talbot argues, however, that one of the reasons for this differentiation actually lies with the fact that the British penetration of

what would become the two polities was quite differentiated: whereas the areas of the Raj which became India tended to be much more secure, the areas that became Pakistan formed what he calls the 'British security state'. The result is that those areas were ruled differently and, consequently, the liberal and democratic aspects of British colonialism penetrated what would become Pakistani society to a much lesser extent than was the case in India.⁹³

Mohammed Waseem argues that, as a result, Pakistani democracy was badly compromised at birth as "[r]ecourse to elections was considered suicidal by the migrant-led [i.e. Muslim migrants from India] government at Karachi because there was no way it could win elections and return to power in the Centre. Elections were considered dysfunctional for the political system of Pakistan in the immediate post-independence period."⁹⁴

Similarly, many scholars argue that the root of the India-Pakistan conflict lies in the diametrically opposed worldviews bequeathed to the two societies by their respective religious heritages,⁹⁵ a contention strongly supported by the fact that this difference formed the basis for the division of British India. S.M. Burke argues that "[c]enturies of dedication to such diametrically opposed systems of Islam and Hinduism could not but nurture an utterly different outlook on the outside world among their respective followers."⁹⁶ And while many would dispute whether the specific contents of the two religions have contribute much to the conflict or not, the mere fact of the religious difference and cleavage, by itself, represents an important difference between the two polities and has provided a focal point around which conflict has been mobilized and has been able to crystallize.⁹⁷

⁹³ Talbot (2012: 7).



⁹⁴ Talbot (2012: 57).

⁹⁵ Ganguly (2002: 2).

⁹⁶ Hussain (2011: 323).

⁹⁷ Ganguly (2002: 4-5).

Quantitatively – and as shown in Figure 6.5 – despite possessing one of the world’s largest Muslim populations (over 100 million by 1991), the vast majority of India’s population is Hindu, with Muslims constituting only slightly more than 10% of the population during the 1990s.⁹⁸



While the two states have always had significantly different, even polarized, religious compositions, it is useful to note that this polarization has increased over time, first due to the massive population transfers occasioned by Partition, then by slower immigration of Muslims to Pakistan and Hindus and Sikhs to India during the 1950s,⁹⁹ and finally with the removal of the last major Hindu minority from Pakistan due to the secession of Bangladesh. The result is that from 1971, Pakistan has been a country in which around 95% of the population is Muslim (Figure 6.6).

Not only has Pakistan’s population become more thoroughly Muslim during this period, the qualitative character of Pakistani society has also taken on a more Islamic cast. This is perhaps most evident in the growing number and influence of religious schools (*madrassahs*).

⁹⁸ Note that Figures 6.4 and 6.5 refer to Muslims and ‘Indian Religionists’ the term used by Advani (2003) to refer to religions which originated in India. Thus he includes Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains under this heading. Nevertheless, Hindus represent the vast majority of this group.

⁹⁹ Talbot (2012: 25); Visaria (1969).

Under Zia, the number of *madrassahs* in Pakistan increased from around 900 at the beginning of his rule to around 2,800 by the end of his rule a decade later. After Zia's death, growth continued and by the mid-1990s, there were an estimated 10,000 *madrassahs* in Pakistan.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, Pakistan's legal system also began to take on a more Islamic character through the introduction of Sharia courts at the provincial High Court level and the creation of a Federal Shariat Court in 1980. These changes greatly reducing the earlier similarity the Pakistani legal system had shared with the secular Indian legal system that derived from the two states' shared British colonial heritage.¹⁰¹

Common Interests

There is only limited evidence that the two states have ever perceived each other as sharing common interests. Both have been members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) since its founding in 1983, but SAARC has not proven to be a very meaningful grouping. The two states certainly do not share intelligence, nor do they share membership in any military alliance. The IWT mentioned earlier was the result of a perception of a common interest in developing the Indus watershed, but the form that the treaty took, namely to enable completely separate development of the resource, limits the impact of this perception.

Shared experiences

¹⁰⁰ Hiro (2012).

¹⁰¹ Note, due to the large linguistic diversity in both India and Pakistan, a comparison between the linguistic profiles of both states is not useful for this analysis.

Pakistan and India have shared few experiences. Partition itself could theoretically have been interpreted as a common suffering, but has actually been interpreted in both countries primarily as a trauma inflicted on them by the other.¹⁰²

Early in the relationship there was one area where shared experiences did have a small impact. Many officers in both states' armed forces spent their formative years under British command. These 'British-type' officers often knew each other, or at least possessed many shared experiences (such as training in Britain and fighting in the Second World War), and were furnished with an imaginary within which they could perceive each other as similar.¹⁰³ Examples of the importance of this shared experience abound in discussions of the twenty-five years following Partition. For example, during fighting in 1964 in the Rann of Kutch, the use of airpower would have resulted in widespread casualties on both sides. In order to prevent this unnecessary slaughter, Air Marshal Ashgar Khan of Pakistan contacted his counterpart, Air Marshal Arjan Singh, and the two reached an informal agreement not to use airpower during the conflict.¹⁰⁴ Such an agreement was possible because of the range of personal contacts, professional ties, and shared understandings between military commanders produced by the shared experience of having served as part of Britain's colonial forces.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, as this group of officers grew older and retired, these shared experiences which had previously linked the two sides' militaries disappeared.

Altercasting

¹⁰² Chakma (2002: 885-886).

¹⁰³ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 36-37).

¹⁰⁴ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 36).

¹⁰⁵ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 36).

India has consistently altercast Pakistan as a country that cannot be trusted to resolve disputes non-violently. In response to the military *coup* that brought General Ayub Khan to power in 1958, Nehru stated quite representatively that “[w]herever power is concentrated in an individual, and that individual is a military person, the normal checks which occur in a government or a society are absent... nowhere in the wide world today is there such a naked military dictatorship as in Pakistan... Inherent in such a system are always certain risks and dangers.”¹⁰⁶ Indian intervention in Pakistan’s civil war signalled to Pakistan that India did not recognize it as a state capable of solving its own problems and thus worthy of non-interference, a critical aspect of shared liberalism. Similarly, the not infrequent public statements which prominent Indians make concerning the tragedy of Partition and underlining inherent unity of the subcontinent altercast Pakistan as a state that ought not to exist, and a state which India would be justified in re-absorbing if given the chance.¹⁰⁷

As in the last case, however, decision-making concerning nuclear weapons is perhaps the most significant form of altercasting that has occurred in this relationship. Regardless of whether or not India’s detonation of a ‘peaceful’ nuclear device in 1974 was carried out with its impact on Pakistan in the forefront of India’s decision-making, the test was definitely perceived by the Pakistani leadership as a threat to Pakistan.¹⁰⁸ By building a nuclear weapon, especially given India’s recent support of Bangladesh’s secession, India’s actions were clearly interpreted by Pakistan as altercasting it as an untrustworthy state against which India thought it prudent to prepare for further conflict, thereby helping to illicit a corroborating Pakistani response.¹⁰⁹ This negative altercasting was made even more explicit

¹⁰⁶ Ganguly (2002: 27).

¹⁰⁷ Hussain (2011: 323).

¹⁰⁸ Ganguly (2002: 101-102); Hassan Khan (2011: 269); Chakma (2002: 889); Bennett Jones (2009: 185).

¹⁰⁹ Many Indians claim that India’s nuclear weapons were created with China in mind, not Pakistan. Regardless of the validity of this claim – see Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 121) – since Pakistan’s perceptions are the

in 1998 when India abandoned the pretense that its nuclear programme was peaceful and explicitly donned the mantle of a nuclear weapons state. Moreover, by making the aforementioned comments that argued that the new South Asian nuclear order meant that Pakistan would have to change its behaviour *vis-à-vis* India, India's decision-makers went from passively altercasting Pakistan as an untrustworthy potential enemy to actively doing so.

Episode 2: The Kargil War

Indo-Pakistani relations were greatly damaged by the nuclear tests of 1998.¹¹⁰ Realizing how dangerous the situation had become, however, both sides recognized the need to stabilize the relationship.¹¹¹ It was in this context that, in February 1999, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee re-inaugurated a passenger bus route between the Indian city of Amritsar and the Pakistani city of Lahore that had not operated for fifty-one years.¹¹² On reaching Lahore, Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, held a summit. Indian officials were optimistic about the summit and seemed to believe that Sharif was truly interested in ushering in a newly cooperative Indo-Pakistani relationship.¹¹³

This was a landmark meeting in a number of ways. It produced three agreements aimed at establishing some nuclear-related confidence-building measures and reaffirmed the two sides' wish to resolve the Kashmir dispute through peaceful means.¹¹⁴ It also resulted in secret back-channel negotiations which continued after the summit into April, and made real

critical variable and the Pakistani population has perceived these weapons as aimed at them, negative altercasting has clearly occurred.

¹¹⁰ Hussain (2011: 326).

¹¹¹ Wheeler (2010: 327).

¹¹² Wheeler (2010: 326).

¹¹³ Ganguly (2002: 115).

¹¹⁴ Hussain (2011: 327); Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 151).

progress toward a resolution of the Kashmir dispute.¹¹⁵ Finally, Vajpayee worked very hard to convince the Pakistanis of his sincere desire to build trust and resolve the two states' differences. As such, and as is described at greater length in the section on altercasting, Vajpayee sent a number of symbolically significant messages to his Pakistani interlocutors aimed specifically at addressing some of the underlying tensions in the relationship, such as India's recognition of the validity of Pakistan's existence. These gestures contributed greatly to the constructive 'spirit of Lahore,'¹¹⁶ which was itself credited as being an important contributor to the numerous positive outcomes of the meetings.¹¹⁷

This spirit did not last long, however. Within a few months, the Pakistani military began infiltrating Pakistani-trained Islamist insurgents into Indian-held Kashmir where they occupied a number of strategic locations in the Kargil sector. When the infiltration was discovered in early May, India counterattacked. The intensity of the conflict helped stoke fears that the crisis between the two – now nuclear armed – opponents might escalate.¹¹⁸ Despite a strong Indian offensive, by July, Pakistan retained control of a significant number of key positions.¹¹⁹ This was important because if Pakistan was able to retain these positions into the winter, a winter that was quickly approaching, it would represent a significant achievement and tactical victory.¹²⁰ Despite this strong position, however, Sharif eventually succumbed to international pressure, which was especially strong from US President Bill Clinton, and ordered the withdrawal of the insurgents, thereby ending the war.

Acceptance of Vulnerability

¹¹⁵ Bennett Jones (2009: 114-116).

¹¹⁶ Wheeler (2010: 330).

¹¹⁷ Wheeler (2010: 319).

¹¹⁸ Wheeler (2010: 332).

¹¹⁹ Misra (2001: 110).

¹²⁰ Bennett Jones (2009: 119).

Pakistan's decision to precipitate the Kargil War constitutes a decision not to accept the vulnerability to India that would have resulted from a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute. This rejection of vulnerability can be understood in two ways. First, committing to negotiations implied not taking advantage of any opportunities that might have emerged from India's reciprocal commitment, thus the acceptance of an opportunity cost in security terms. More importantly, to the extent that any commitment to negotiations was genuine, it likely implied an acceptance of a compromise resolution of the Kashmir dispute that would likely leave India in control of part of Kashmir. Such a compromise would have been deeply problematic for many Pakistani decision-makers because of how such a compromise would fail to integrate all of Kashmir into Pakistan, a goal that had been central to much of the anti-Indian rhetoric that had come to define Pakistan's identity.¹²¹ By contradicting this central component of Pakistani identity, such a settlement represented a threat to Pakistan's ontological security. This would be a problem for any Pakistani decision-maker, but would have been especially problematic for a military leadership that depended on the perception that it was the group most capable of defending Pakistan from the Indian threat for its legitimacy and political predominance.

The opportunity cost component can be dealt with quickly. In this case, vulnerability arises from the fact that in order to sustain negotiations, both states would need to abstain from taking advantage of potentially promising strategic opportunities which might arise during the course of said negotiations, thereby rendering them less secure than they would be had they taken advantage of such an opportunity.¹²² In fact, negotiations were uniquely likely to generate such opportunities as they could conceivably lull participants in the negotiations into

¹²¹ Misra (2001: 106); Paul (2006: 611).

¹²² Wheeler (2010: 333).

a false sense of security, thereby causing them to neglect their defences. This is indeed what appears to have occurred, as many in the Indian security bureaucracy seem to have believed Sharif's message of goodwill and assumed that relations were on the mend, thereby presenting the Pakistani military with an opportunity for easier infiltration.¹²³

More important, however, is the significant role played by the conflict over Kashmir in the Pakistani identity described in the last case study. I elaborate this role more fully in the next section; for the moment it is sufficient to note that accepting a solution to the Kashmir conflict that did not amount to complete victory for Pakistan would risk seriously undermining the foundational anti-Indianism of Pakistan's identity and, by extension, the legitimacy of the military leadership's political predominance. Thus, by working to improve relations with India, and especially by initiating negotiations with India aimed at resolving the conflict over Kashmir, Sharif was, according to the Pakistani military's interpretation of Pakistani identity, accepting vulnerability to India.¹²⁴ And while Sharif may have been willing to accept this vulnerability, by initiating the Kargil War the military leadership demonstrated that it was not willing to do so.

Critical agents, distributions of power and meaning

One of the more challenging aspects of examining this episode is the fact that the critical decision-makers are still active in Pakistani politics, and their involvement in the episode still a matter of ongoing political controversy, making any testimony from them concerning the events of this episode suspect. Consequently, it is impossible to analytically disentangle the critical decision-makers from the various potential explanations to the extent that I have done

¹²³ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 153).

¹²⁴ Wheeler (2010: 329). Sharif was attacked by Islamists for his receptivity to Vajpayee on this basis.

in previous analyses. Nevertheless, one can say that the critical decisions were again made by the decision-making segment of society. It is also possible to say that, due to the secret nature of the infiltration, elite and popular opinion was less important than in 1998. Contrariwise, it is impossible to say with certainty whether the operation was launched primarily on the initiative of the military leadership or the political leadership. Thus, I proceed without first establishing who it was that made the critical decisions and instead analyze where responsibility lies and the possible explanations simultaneously, as the two impact each other. Ultimately, I do present an analysis which I believe provides a strong account of what likely occurred.¹²⁵ More generally, the distribution of power remained basically the same as in the last episode, with the military holding a predominant position throughout. Indeed, the fact that the Kargil operation could be launched without greater knowledge than it appears the political leadership possessed is only the most obvious example of their impotence *vis-à-vis* the military.¹²⁶

The Kargil War, and the conflict over Kashmir of which this war is but an episode, derive much of their importance from the way that they are embedded in the distribution of meaning that characterizes Pakistani society. The conflict over Kashmir has its origin in a dispute as to which country should incorporate the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter Kashmir) after Partition.¹²⁷ Prior to Partition, Kashmir's nominal ruler Maharaja Hari Singh was informed by the British that he would be required to choose between which of the two main successor states to the British Raj Kashmir would join. Singh, who was a Hindu despite the majority of his subjects being Muslim, preferred independence to accession to either India or Pakistan and delayed making a choice. Fearing that Singh would opt for India, a rebellion broke out among some of the Maharaja's Muslim subjects. The new government of Pakistan

¹²⁵ Bennett Jones (2009: 120-123) explores the evidence germane to this question in some depth.

¹²⁶ Bennett Jones (2009: 122).

¹²⁷ Talbot (2012: 10).

sent tribesmen to support this rebellion who quickly captured a third of the state. Fearing that he would be forced to accede to Pakistan, Singh sought Indian assistance. Indian Prime Minister Nehru refused to give this assistance until Singh agreed to accede to India, after which Indian forces were dispatched and the rebellion beaten back. After a few months, a stalemate ensued whereby one-third of Kashmir remained in Pakistani hands with two-thirds controlled by India, a division that has remained essentially the same to this day despite two additional general wars and a significant insurgency in Kashmir in the 1990s.

The issue of Kashmir was initially important because of the way that it crystallized the founding narratives of both India and Pakistan in a zero-sum conflict over a territory that is constructed as indivisible by both narratives.¹²⁸ For Pakistan, the inclusion of a Muslim-majority state in India was unthinkable and its accession to Pakistan represented a moral imperative.¹²⁹ Put simply, Pakistan was not complete without Kashmir.¹³⁰ As Zulfikar Ali Bhutto argued: “If a Muslim majority can remain a part of India, then the *raison d’etre* of Pakistan collapses. These are the reasons why India, to continue her domination of Jammu and Kashmir, defies international opinion and violates her pledges. For the same reasons, Pakistan must unremittingly continue her struggle for the right of self-determination of this subject people.”¹³¹ For India, maintaining its hold on Kashmir, the only Muslim-majority state in the country, was essential in order to prove its commitment to, and the viability of, its secular identity.¹³² As Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hargerty state “Kashmir is a zero-sum for each state’s legitimating ideology; one’s validity invalidates the other.”¹³³

¹²⁸ Talbot (2012: 59); Sridharan (2005a: 114); Sridharan (2005b: 325).

¹²⁹ Ganguly (2002: 27).

¹³⁰ Ganguly (2002: 5-6).

¹³¹ Ganguly (2002: 32).

¹³² Ganguly (2002: Preface, 5-6, 28 and 33); Weaver (2002: 255).

¹³³ Ganguly and Hargerty (2005, 204); Muppidi (2001: 62).

Bangladesh's secession undermined the logic of the 'Two Nations' theory within which the centrality of Kashmir to Pakistan was originally articulated. By shifting the definition of Pakistan's identity to a simpler anti-Indianism and by weaving the Kashmiri conflict into this narrative as a prime example of Indian aggressive intent *vis-à-vis* Pakistan, however, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his military successors ensured the continued discursive importance of Kashmir for Pakistan.¹³⁴ After all, if India was able to force Pakistan to accept this illegitimate occupation of territory that was rightfully part of Pakistan, would this not presage the beginning of the end of Pakistan as India was emboldened to complete its dream of undoing Partition? And while some argue that the resonance of the narrative aspects of this conflict had died down by 1999,¹³⁵ one thing that is clear is that these narratives contributed to the creation of a Pakistani distribution of power which put the military at the top and provided it with incentives to prolong the conflict as a means of their maintaining the legitimacy of their political dominance.

Possible explanations

There are three broad categories of possible explanations for Pakistan's initiation of the Kargil War. The first is that the infiltration was meant to improve Pakistan's prospects in the aforementioned back-channel negotiations initiated at Lahore. The second focuses on how the operation was aimed at advancing certain Pakistani decision-makers' objective of dislodging India from Kashmir. The third explanation focuses on how the operation served as a power-play by the military leadership against the political leadership. Because the quality of the available evidence is limited, it is difficult to say definitively which of these explanations is correct. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that the second and third explanations are not

¹³⁴ Jalal (2011: 18); Misra (2001: 106).

¹³⁵ Ganguly (2002: Preface).

mutually exclusive and are supported by existing evidence to a much greater degree than the first. Critically, none of these explanations are consistent with the existence of liberal trust between Pakistan and India.

The logic behind the idea that Pakistan's infiltration of Kargil was an attempt at negotiation support holds that if Pakistan was able to improve its position on the ground, then its bargaining position would be strengthened. The evidence for this explanation comes in the form of the scholarly consensus that both the political and military leaderships supported 'increasing the heat' on India through a military initiative in Kashmir at this time.¹³⁶ Given that doing so ended up scuttling the negotiations, however, one is faced with the question of why things did not go as planned. One answer is that the operation escalated in a way not predicted by the planners.¹³⁷ Given the details of the operation – for instance, its size – this explanation is implausible insofar as the military leadership is concerned: they knew what the operation was about and must have known that it would wreck negotiations. On the political side, this explanation is plausible only to the extent that Sharif was not aware of the operation's details because, had he known, it is difficult to believe that he would not have realized that the operation would provoke the reaction it did.¹³⁸

This presents a problem, however, as it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a shrewd politician like Sharif did not question why the military requested his agreement to 'increase the heat' for an operation that fell within the normal scope of operations in Kashmir, and thus was not one that the military would usually raise with Sharif, given his known lack of interest

¹³⁶ Wheeler (2010: 335); Bennett Jones (2009: 122). Sharif has claimed that he had no advance knowledge of the operation while Musharraf has counter-claimed that Sharif was fully on board. See Bennett Jones (2009: 120-122).

¹³⁷ Wheeler (2010: 335).

¹³⁸ Wheeler (2010: 333-334).

in military details.¹³⁹ A possible explanation is that the political leadership was aware of the scope of the operation but did not object because it felt powerless to stop the military. This possibility is not strongly supported by other evidence, as Sharif had shown himself willing to confront the military when he felt it was necessary, for example, by adopting the Thirteenth Amendment to the Pakistani constitution and sacking Chief of Army Staff Karamat in 1998.

More likely is the more nuanced possibility that Sharif, realizing that the antipathy that existed between him and the army placed him in a precarious position, believed that what was being proposed was not sufficiently important to merit the trouble that would be required to block it. Given that he likely knew the military was planning something exceptional but, equally, was uninformed of the full details and thus the gravity of the operation,¹⁴⁰ this more nuanced explanation ties together all the threads without assuming something extraordinary, such as incompetence on Sharif's part. While, as Nicholas Wheeler suggests, it is difficult to believe that Sharif did not understand that India would react negatively to a use of force in Kashmir while negotiations were ongoing,¹⁴¹ when one recalls that low levels of fighting along the border are normal, it is not difficult to believe that Sharif might not have seen stopping the military as a priority if he was not aware of the full details of the operation.¹⁴² Regardless, what does seem clear is that there was never any thorough high-level discussion of the potential implications of the operation.¹⁴³ All this analysis is further supported by Sharif's decision to abort the operation once the conflict escalated. This decision, which was

¹³⁹ Bennett Jones (2009: 122).

¹⁴⁰ Bennett Jones (2009: 122-123); Wheeler (2010: 333-334). Cf. Hassan Khan (2011: 274); Ganguly (2002: 115).

¹⁴¹ Wheeler (2010: 335).

¹⁴² Bennett Jones (2009: 121).

¹⁴³ Bennett Jones (2009: 123).

not necessary from a strictly military perspective and domestically costly to Sharif, indicates that he was not committed to the operation, and thus likely not its architect.

The military's purpose in launching the operation is not totally clear, but a number of possibilities exist ranging from (1) a tactical probe that escalated beyond its planners' expectations;¹⁴⁴ to (2) a part of a larger strategy of compensating for Pakistan's conventional inferiority by wearing India down through asymmetric warfare;¹⁴⁵ to (3) forcing India to the bargaining table in a weakened state by threatening its northern supply lines;¹⁴⁶ to (4) a strike designed to pre-empt a planned Indian attack;¹⁴⁷ to (5) forcing the Kashmir dispute back into international *fora*, which Pakistan felt would advance its cause¹⁴⁸ – either through a reinvigoration of the insurgency¹⁴⁹ or through the generation of a worrying clash between nuclear-armed rivals.¹⁵⁰ Whatever the operation's objective, clearly the military leadership was uninterested in any potential for progress presented by the negotiations begun at Lahore and were unafraid of scuttling them;¹⁵¹ indeed, these negotiations may have encouraged its decision to do so.¹⁵²

It is not essential to determine which of these objectives was the main motivator as none of them are incompatible and they all share a critical feature, namely their contribution to attempts at evicting India from Kashmir. Moreover, all six demonstrate that Pakistan was willing to use force against India in its efforts to resolve the dispute over Kashmir, a willingness which constitutes a failure to accept the vulnerability to India presented by the

¹⁴⁴ Ganguly (2002: 121-122); Bennett Jones (2009: 122-123).

¹⁴⁵ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 146); Paul (2006: 619).

¹⁴⁶ Bennett Jones (2009: 112).

¹⁴⁷ Musharraf (2006: 98).

¹⁴⁸ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 159); Misra (2001: 111).

¹⁴⁹ Bennett Jones (2009: 112); Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 152); Bennett Jones (2009: 112); Ganguly (2002: 115).

¹⁵⁰ Ganguly (2002: 122); Bennett Jones (2009: 112).

¹⁵¹ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 151-152).

¹⁵² Wheeler (2010: 333).

process initiated at Lahore. This is important because it highlights a difference between the political and military leaderships. If my analysis of Sharif's actions is correct, Sharif was at least open to the possibility of resolving the Kashmir dispute through negotiations that left India in possession of a significant portion of the state. This does not seem to have been an acceptable option for the Pakistani military, for whom only the complete incorporation of Kashmir into Pakistan was acceptable.¹⁵³

In addition to an attempt to dislodge India from Kashmir, it is also possible that the Kargil operation simultaneously constituted a domestic power-play by the military leadership against the political leadership. This explanation is supported by the fact that it matches a pattern according to which both former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's and Sharif's earlier peace initiatives with India were scuttled by seemingly independent military action.¹⁵⁴ In Bhutto's case, her opening to India was undermined by a significant upswing in support by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) for the insurgency in Kashmir in the early 1990s. In Sharif's case, Sharif and Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral had attempted to build some momentum for improved relations in 1997.¹⁵⁵ This momentum was largely dissipated when the Pakistani army promptly began intensive shelling of Indian positions in the Kargil sector, killing a number of Indian servicepeople and civilians.¹⁵⁶

In both cases these actions came as a result of the military's perception that the political leadership was too soft *vis-à-vis* India and likely to betray the military's understanding of Pakistan's interests.¹⁵⁷ This difference in perspectives is important because it suggests that the Pakistani military leadership subscribed to a narrative that is fundamentally incompatible

¹⁵³ Wheeler (2010: 333).

¹⁵⁴ Bennet Jones (2009: 298).

¹⁵⁵ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 149); Ahmed (1999: 192-193).

¹⁵⁶ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 150).

¹⁵⁷ Bennett Jones (2009: 124); Wolpert (2010: 60).

with the holding of the type of trust beliefs required for peace, let alone the liberal peace, to emerge between Pakistan and India, short of India ceding all of Kashmir to Pakistan.

A trust-focused analysis

The negotiations initiated at Lahore represented an opportunity for Pakistan to resolve its dispute with India over Kashmir. Because of how each state's very existence can be interpreted as representing an existential threat to the other, any attempt to end the state of conflict between them that does not result in the elimination – or perhaps transformation – of the other represents an acceptance of ontological vulnerability to the other. At a more practical level, committing to negotiations would have required Pakistan to forgo exploitation of opportunities to improve their strategic position that might have arisen during the negotiations. Thus, Pakistan's rejection of Indian overtures and precipitation of the war represent an attempt to ameliorate Pakistan's insecurity *vis-à-vis* India instead of accepting it, an attempt that reveals, *inter alia*, an absence of the type of trust required for the liberal peace to obtain.¹⁵⁸

Naturally, the cognitive frameworks of Pakistani decision-makers were likely not as monomaniacal as an exclusive adherence to this particular narrative would entail.

Nevertheless, I suggest that the anti-Indian narrative described above was sufficiently strong – largely because of how it has served to enhance the legitimacy of a military leadership which has in turn propagated and reinforced this narrative – to exert significant influence on Pakistani decision-making. Consequently, the military leadership actively resisted efforts at negotiations which might have resulted in both an ontological wounding of Pakistan and a

¹⁵⁸ Misra (2001: 104).

reduction in the legitimacy of their influence. This failure to accept vulnerability would present a problem for my trust model if Pakistan was a liberal state. However, as we have already established, this was not the case. Given this conclusion, an examination of the five trust-enabling factors is not strictly required, but it is one that I undertake for comparative purposes. This examination is also useful because it suggests some possible answers for why the political leadership appears to have been more willing than the military leadership to accept a compromise on the Kashmir issue.

The five factors

Since the Kargil operation occurred so soon after the 1998 nuclear tests, there is not much to add to the analysis of the five trust-enabling factors conducted earlier. Nonetheless, there are a few specific developments worth noting under the interactivity, common interests, and altercasting headings.

Interactivity

The personal chemistry that developed between Vajpayee and Sharif seems to have been a direct result of the two leaders' positive interactions at the SAARC summit in July and on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September, 1998.¹⁵⁹ There was also significant interaction between the two at a meeting that lasted a day-and-a-half during the Lahore summit, including an hour-long private meeting between the two Prime Ministers.¹⁶⁰ India's willingness to let its guard down after the Lahore summit suggests that the Indian leadership

¹⁵⁹ Wheeler (2010: 327).

¹⁶⁰ Wheeler (2010: 330-331).

may have trusted Sharif to the extent that they believed that negotiations would continue in good faith.

Common Interests

One area where there was potential for perceptions of common interests to emerge between India and Pakistan derives from the danger posed by two rivals possessing nuclear weapons. Theoretically, recognition of this danger could generate a perception of common interests in avoiding nuclear catastrophe, something which could potentially spill over into other areas. The *détente* which developed between the two superpowers during the Cold War is a good example of this. In the Indo-Pakistani context, the negotiation of the aforementioned 1988 agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities provides an apt example. However, while this danger seems to have been part of what motivated India in this episode, it seems to have had the opposite effect on the Pakistani military leadership.¹⁶¹

One explanation for why the Pakistani military leadership initiated an operation that risked precipitating a nuclear war is that they believed that India would never escalate the conflict to such a point.¹⁶² And indeed, India did not escalate the conflict horizontally as they had in 1965, suggesting that this prediction was at least partially correct. Similarly, the fact that Sharif ultimately backed down and ordered the unilateral withdrawal of the Pakistani-backed insurgents, at least partially over concerns about further escalation, suggests that recognition of this common interest was not completely absent from the Pakistani political leadership.¹⁶³ This analysis also suggests a divergence between the perceptions of common interests with India held by the Pakistani military and political leaderships that is worth examining in

¹⁶¹ Wheeler (2010: 339).

¹⁶² Ganguly (2002: 108-110).

¹⁶³ Shaikh (2002: 43).

greater detail. Recognition of common interests with India contradicts one of the central threads of Pakistan's post-1971 identity narrative, namely anti-Indianism. That the Pakistani military leadership is less comfortable with embracing such a move than the political leadership should come as no surprise, as it is the military leadership which clearly benefits the most from this thread's centrality to Pakistan's identity. Indeed, "long periods of military dictatorship have ... blurred the distinction between Pakistan's national interest and the corporate interests of its military leaders."¹⁶⁴ A resolution of the conflict could leave the military without one of the most important justifications for its commanding role in Pakistani society.¹⁶⁵

Revealingly, the Indian political leader who went the furthest in accepting significant vulnerability to Pakistan in the context of the Kashmir dispute appears to have been Vajpayee. While not the only potential explanation, the fact is that Vajpayee's Hindu nationalism reduced the integrality of Kashmir for India's identity compared to the position it would occupy for a Congress Party government more wedded to civic nationalism. An analogous situation arguably prevails in Pakistan: a businessman prior to becoming Prime Minister, Sharif seems much less invested in the anti-Indian definition of Pakistan than previous military leaders, or even Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who built much of his personal appeal on the back of virulent anti-Indian rhetoric. Indeed, Sharif, keen on reducing the military's power in Pakistani politics, would likely welcome the removal of Kashmir as an issue, and a larger improvement of relations with India, as a means of both disempowering the military and opening up significant economic opportunities for Pakistan. His pursuit of negotiations with both I. K. Gujral and Vajpayee seem to bear this out.

¹⁶⁴ Shaikh (2002: 48).

¹⁶⁵ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 205); Paul (2006: 603-604).

Altercasting

The one factor which saw major developments between the nuclear tests and the Kargil War was altercasting. Most important of these was Vajpayee's 'bus diplomacy'. Termed a 'leap of trust' by Wheeler, Vajpayee's initiative created significant potential for trust as it altercast Pakistan as a country that India respected as a legitimate potential partner and one which India was not seeking to dismember.¹⁶⁶ At a personal level, Vajpayee's initiative, and the political risk it involved to himself, positively altercast Sharif as an interlocutor with whom he felt he could do business and one who would respond positively.¹⁶⁷ Recall that many Pakistanis see India as having never accepted Partition and see India as inherently threatening. It is in this context that Vajpayee's trip to Lahore, and especially the symbolically significant gestures he made once there, had such importance.¹⁶⁸ Foremost among these was Vajpayee's paying of respects at the *Minar-e-Pakistan*, a monument that commemorates the 1940 call for the creation of Pakistan. In so doing, Vajpayee was interpreted as acknowledging the legitimacy of the Pakistani state.¹⁶⁹ Later that evening at a state banquet, Vajpayee went on to make an even greater gesture of recognition by stating that Pakistan did not depend on his or India's seal of approval and that "Pakistan has its own seal," and that "that seal is recognised in the whole world."¹⁷⁰ Because of how these gestures altercast Pakistan as an equal, and equally legitimate, state with which India was interested in having a positive relationship, these important gestures of recognition had the potential to spark a sympathetic reaction on the part of Pakistan and seem to have done so, at least insofar as Sharif is concerned. Why they did not affect the military in similar fashion is an important question.

¹⁶⁶ Wheeler (2010: 319).

¹⁶⁷ Wheeler (2010: 328).

¹⁶⁸ Wheeler (2010: 331).

¹⁶⁹ Ganguly and Hagerty (2005: 151); Wheeler (2010: 331).

¹⁷⁰ Wheeler (2010: 331).

Conclusion

The events of these two episodes provide two examples of Pakistan not trusting India to resolve their disputes non-violently. In both episodes, I have shown how existing explanations for agents' decision-making demonstrate an unwillingness to accept the vulnerability required for trust to obtain. In the nuclear weapons sub-case, Pakistani decision-makers were unwilling to accept the vulnerability to India that abjuring acquisition would have entailed thereby providing a revealing juxtaposition to the Canada-USA experience. In the Kargil sub-case, Pakistani decision-makers, particularly military decision-makers, were unwilling to commit to negotiations which might have resulted in a compromise on the issue of Kashmir. Both these decisions represent refusals to accept vulnerability to India and clearly signal an absence of the type of trust required for the liberal peace. The absence of trust is not surprising given the circumstances. Neither Pakistani society, nor its state structures, nor the individual decision-makers of consequence in any of the episodes demonstrated a strong adherence to liberalism. And as detailed in Table 6.1 the five trust-enabling factors were also largely absent in both sub-cases.

| Table 6.1 | 1998 Nuclear Tests | 1999 Kargil War | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Trust-enabling Factors | Pakistan Decision-makers | Political Leadership | Military Leadership |
| Compatible Narratives | No | Mixed | No |
| Interactivity | No | Mixed | No |
| Homogeneity | No | No | No |
| Common Interests | No | No (but potential) | No |
| Shared Experiences | No | No | No |
| Positive Altercasting | No | Yes | Mixed |
| Trust | No | No (perhaps incipient) | No |

As discussed, a critical factor in generating these outcomes appears to lie with the distribution of meaning in which the key decision-makers found themselves embedded. Pakistan's

nuclear weapons programme has always been inextricably entwined with Pakistan's position *vis-à-vis* India. In fact, prior to the shattering of the 'Two Nations' theory in 1971, and the concomitant uprooting of Pakistan's identity, Pakistani nuclear weapons were not seen as necessary. Once Zulfikar Ali Bhutto re-defined Pakistan's identity so as to be much more specifically anti-Indian in focus, however, nuclear weapons became a critical aspect of Pakistan's ontological security because of the perceived need for parity with India. A similar ideational importance attaches to Kashmir: Pakistan's military decision-makers perceived Kashmir as integral to Pakistan's identity and any initiative which risked a compromise on this point represented a threat to Pakistan's ontological security, at least insofar as the military defined it. And even if this narrative of integrity is no longer as strong as it once was, the self-reinforcing patterns of behaviours that it bequeathed continue to persist by maintaining those who adhere to them in positions of power, such as the military, while leaving those more open to reconciliation – that is, the political leadership – at a disadvantage.

Chapter 7

Eine Wende

Introduction

The relationship between France and Germany¹ presents an interesting contrast to both the Canada-USA and India-Pakistan relationships. Whereas one might assume that the trusting relationship that existed between Canada and the USA has always been something of an anomaly in international politics, it is almost impossible to forget that the now apparently trusting Franco-German relationship represented a different kind of exemplar more comparable to the Indo-Pakistani relationship not so long ago. Below, I examine two sub-cases: (1) the Reparations crisis of 1918-1923 that resulted in a Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr valley, Germany's industrial heartland; and (2) the French decisions of 1957-1958 to share nuclear secrets and jointly produce nuclear weapons with Germany. By focusing on these two episodes, I illuminate how the transition from a relationship characterized by an absence of liberal trust to one with a great deal of it correlated with the remarkable transformation of a relationship between 'hereditary enemies' to one of the closest and most cooperative in history, and how it did so in a manner consistent with my trust framework.

This case study is especially helpful because it shines light on the very different ways that French decision-makers responded to two situations characterized by similar conditions of vulnerability and objective insecurity. In 1923, French decision-makers declined an opportunity to accept vulnerability by attempting to reduce the capabilities gap between

¹ I use the term 'Germany' to refer to the German Empire until its demise after which the term indicates the Weimar Republic until its replacement by the Nazi regime. After the Second World War, I use the term to refer to those areas of Germany under occupation by the western Allies and then those parts of Germany that comprised the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

France and Germany through coercive action. Conversely, in 1957-1958, French decision-makers took the opposite approach and accepted vulnerability by agreeing to share nuclear secrets and jointly produce nuclear weapons with Germany. I argue that this disparity in responses resulted from an absence of trust in the first episode and the presence of trust in the second. This variation in the dependent variable from the first episode to the second, despite important structural similarities across episodes, provides a useful comparative window onto the ways in which the conditions that either disable or enable the trust beliefs that defined these decisions differ and, as such, provide significant support for the plausibility of my trust framework.

Episode 1: The Reparations Crisis

Relations between France and Germany have a long history with some commentators tracing the roots of their repeated clashes as far back as the division of Charlemagne's kingdom in the Treaty of Verdun (843),² or even Roman times.³ Regardless of one's starting point, however, it is clear that once France had evolved into a coherent international actor, it identified the continued political division of the German-speaking lands as a primary security interest.⁴ Thus, Prussia's victory in the Franco-Prussian War and the advent of the German Empire presented France with a problem. Whereas before 1870 France could aspire to continental pre-eminence, it was now faced with a stronger competitor directly across its eastern border. The rivalry which emerged between these two states played a significant role

² Rasler and Thompson (2004: 890).

³ For example, see Binoux (1972: 18).

⁴ Kissinger (1994: 59).

in generating the alliance structure that characterized Europe in the early 1900s and ultimately produced the First World War.⁵

Even after its victory in 1918, France continued to perceive Germany as a threat and sought to solve this problem in the postwar settlement.⁶ And while it did have some success in obtaining the return of Alsace-Lorraine and ensuring that some German territory was transferred to Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Lithuania, and Poland, Germany managed to remain a unified state possessing latent power superior to that of France.⁷ French Prime Minister Georges Clémenceau sought to compensate for this failure to divide Germany in other ways, namely by extracting a security guarantee from the USA and Britain and by saddling Germany with ‘Carthaginian’ reparations obligations that would simultaneously weaken it and aid France’s recovery from the war.⁸ The subsequent collapse of the Anglo-US guarantee forced French decision-makers to focus much more intently on reparations than Clémenceau had originally intended.⁹ In fact, Walter A. McDougall argues that, from France’s perspective, the “only benefit to be salvaged from the wreck of Versailles” was France’s right to enforce the treaty should Germany default on reparations.¹⁰ It was as an attempt to enforce its right to reparations that France would, in 1923, invade and occupy the Ruhr valley.

Acceptance of vulnerability

⁵ Kissinger (1994: Chapter 7).

⁶ Jeannesson (1998: 15).

⁷ McDougall (1978: 33).

⁸ McDougall (1978: 33).

⁹ Fischer (2003: 14-15); Jeannesson (1998: 29).

¹⁰ McDougall (1978: 9).

The French decision to occupy the Ruhr represents an attempt by French decision-makers to coercively redress the gap in latent power that existed between France and Germany and as such represents an instance of France refusing to accept vulnerability to Germany. By occupying the Ruhr, France sought to reduce Germany's latent power,¹¹ either by (1) diverting the resources of the Ruhr away from the German economy and toward the French recovery effort; (2) accomplishing essentially the same thing by forcing Germany to meet its reparations obligations; or (3) weakening Germany by encouraging Rhenish separatism such that an 'independent' Rhenish state that France could dominate would emerge.

From a Realist perspective, France's actions are not surprising. Objectively, France clearly suffered from an important capabilities gap *vis-à-vis* Germany.¹² Despite emerging victorious from the First World War, France was still vulnerable to Germany's superior material capabilities, especially its more positive demographic trends and its greater industrial power.¹³ Even with its post-Versailles loss of territory, Germany still counted more than one-and-a-half Germans for every French person (62,000,000 to 40,000,000), an imbalance that was only increasing.¹⁴ Germany also remained a stronger economic power with an economy that was about forty-four percent larger than France's by 1922.¹⁵ France was also well aware that it had been rescued during the Great War by Britain and the USA, a rescue which might not be repeated in the future.¹⁶

¹¹ Kissinger (1994: 272).

¹² Friend (1991: 10).

¹³ McDougall (1978: 7, 180 and 363); MacMillan (2001: 39 and 214); Kissinger (1994: 228 and 267); Marks (2003: 57); O'Riordan (2001: 6 and 19); Cohrs (2006: 50-51).

¹⁴ Marks (2003: 39); Haglund and Waters (2005: 494-495); MacMillan (2001: 35 and 39).

¹⁵ Maddison (2008).

¹⁶ Marks (2003: 12); Haglund and Waters (2005: 494).

More importantly, France also perceived Germany as threatening:¹⁷ as Marshal Ferdinand Foch remarked at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, “[t]his is not peace; it is an armistice for twenty years.”¹⁸ France’s first real opportunity to counter this threat came at the Paris peace conference in 1919.¹⁹ Here, French decision-makers pursued three related objectives: (1) weaken Germany, (2) strengthen France, and (3) ensure France was supported by external allies.²⁰ Thus, at Versailles, French decision-makers sought to ensure that France would never again need to fight a stronger German opponent²¹ by building a peace “around and against Germany”.²² Essentially, France’s mission was “to redress the imbalance of economic and demographic potentials between France and Germany that had emerged since 1870 and [were] bound to only grow wider unless altered by force.”²³ Once France failed to break Germany into more than one successor state and the Anglo-US security guarantee evaporated, “[r]eparations became the litmus test of German intentions and viability of a compromised peace treaty”.²⁴

Critical Agents, distributions of power and meaning

In this analysis, I focus primarily on the decision-making of Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré and the small group of advisors who surrounded him. Poincaré was the critical figure in the decision to invade the Ruhr.²⁵ Simultaneously, however, it is also clear that France was a liberal democratic state during this period – France scores at least 9 on the Polity IV index through 1918-1923 (see Figure 7.4) – meaning that it was characterized by a

¹⁷ Wright (2002: 3).

¹⁸ Kissinger (1994: 250).

¹⁹ Haglund and Waters (2005: 494).

²⁰ McDougall (1978: 57).

²¹ Cohrs (2006: 49).

²² Cohrs (2006: 36).

²³ Cohrs (2006: 49-50).

²⁴ Fischer (2003: 14-15).

²⁵ Jeannesson (1998: 17-18 and 142).

fairly dispersed distribution of power. However, the elections of 1919 had produced a highly conservative assembly that favoured a confrontational German policy. Those parties that favoured a more conciliatory approach, like the Socialists, were reduced to a small minority while the parties of the right-wing *Bloc national* gained almost two-thirds of the chamber's seats.²⁶ Correspondingly, Poincaré was able to make the decision to invade largely because he was representative of a strong consensus across the French distribution of power that an invasion was necessary.²⁷ Indeed, given what he knew about the mood among decision-makers, Poincaré concluded that “[i]f I do not undertake the operation myself, another will be found to do it, and do it less well.”²⁸

This confrontational stance was at odds with the positions espoused by France's wartime allies. A central reason for why Britain and the USA came to advocate a more accommodative stance *vis-à-vis* Germany was that they saw French strategy as contravening several aspects of the liberal narrative on which the postwar settlement was meant to be based, not the least of which were the liberal preferences for self-determination and democracy.²⁹ Contrary to the aforementioned French consensus, many British and US decision-makers believed that the “German problem” needed to be solved by the democratization of Germany and the reinvigoration of the world economy.³⁰ As discussed further below, it is quite clear that this view found few adherents in France where a more traditional *realpolitik* understanding of international politics, at least insofar as Germany was concerned, continued to hold sway.³¹

²⁶ Duroselle (1969: 5).

²⁷ Jeannesson (1998: 58 and 132); McDougall (1978: 136).

²⁸ McDougall (1978: 235). See also Kissinger (1994: 278).

²⁹ MacMillan (2001: 182).

³⁰ McDougall (1978: 107, 114, and 134); Cohrs (2006: 49).

³¹ Binoux (1972: 25); McDougall (1978: 34).

This difference in perceptions is interesting and the reasons for it will be explored shortly. For now, it is sufficient to say that France's perspective was consistent with its perception of Germany as an illiberal polity led by illiberal leaders. Given this perception, it made no sense to attempt to solve the 'German problem' according to liberal prescriptions. This perception also dovetails nicely with another part of the prevailing distribution of meaning, namely a narrative that I refer to as the 'myth of two Germanies'. This narrative dates back at least to the Prussian annexation of the Rhineland and Westphalia at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. The animating idea is that there exists two Germanies: the first, a western, Catholic, Latin/Celtic, liberal Germany, heavily influenced by the French Revolution and centered in the Rhineland; the second, an eastern, Protestant, Teutonic, feudal/colonial, and reactionary Germany centred in Prussia. Many French thinkers flattered themselves by believing that after the Congress of Vienna the first Germany had become an unwilling captive of the second and would side with France in any struggle that pitted it against its Prussian oppressors.³² This idea drew heavily on the shared Catholicism of France and the Rhineland, and the French military, a bastion of Catholic conservatism in French society, was especially susceptible to it.³³

Alternative Explanations

While the lack of an acceptance of vulnerability by France obviates the need to articulate a narrative capable of justifying the holding of a liberal trust-belief, it is instructive to illuminate the justifications that were provided for France's actions. While Germany's failure to fulfil its reparations obligations served as the formal justification, more important to

³² McDougall (1978: 17, 45, 47, and 91).

³³ McDougall (1978: 118).

French decision-makers was the perceived need to use this fleeting opportunity to improve France's strategic position in the long run.³⁴

Some historians have asked whether Poincaré invaded the Ruhr because it offered a solution to France's short-term reconstruction-associated economic difficulties,³⁵ or because it presented an opportunity to detach the Rhineland from Germany so that it could be brought under French tutelage. Posed more starkly, these historians suggest an opposition between economic and security-focused explanations. Certainly, France was in desperate economic straits: the government had borrowed at unprecedented rates to pay for the war, and continued with high levels of spending to finance reconstruction afterward. French leaders perceived their country as both too weak and undeserving of the burden of the costs of reconstruction and thus sought to 'export' its financial problems to Germany.³⁶ According to this theory, the purpose of the invasion was to expropriate the treasures of the Ruhr to fuel and fund French reconstruction.³⁷

The alternative, security-focused explanation rests on evidence such as General Degoutte's argument that: "Between the mortal danger of a unitary Germany and the rich promise of a federalist Germany, there can be no hesitation. *For some time yet the federalist solution will be possible; let us hasten to profit from it.*"³⁸ Some French decision-makers, intoxicated by the 'myth of two Germanies', believed that any actions taken to 'liberate' the Rhinelanders from Prussian domination would be welcomed.³⁹ The appearance of an indigenous Rhenish

³⁴ Jeannesson (1998: 27 and 48).

³⁵ Jeannesson (1998: 139).

³⁶ McDougall (1978: 100-102).

³⁷ Fischer (2003: 1). Cf. Kissinger (1994: 267).

³⁸ McDougall (1978: 115). Emphasis mine.

³⁹ McDougall (1978: 91 and 118).

‘separatist’ movement only encouraged this belief.⁴⁰ And while, in hindsight, it is clear that Rhenish separatism was never more than a fringe phenomenon, some French decision-makers allowed themselves to think wishfully.⁴¹

Critically, however, economic and security objectives were not really in competition.

Educated as they had been by the totality of the war, French decision-makers could not separate reconstruction issues from questions of French national security.⁴² In fact, both objectives were pursued simultaneously⁴³ and French decision-makers were rarely, if ever, forced to choose between them.⁴⁴ The critical point for the purposes of this study, however, is the fact that both of these motivations are inconsistent with French decision-makers trusting Germany to act like a liberal polity in the future, thus reinforcing the argument that liberal trust did not influence French decision-makers during this episode.

A trust focused analysis

It is clear that by seeking to undermine Germany’s latent superiority in material capabilities by invading the Ruhr, Poincaré declined to accept vulnerability to Germany. In so doing, Poincaré demonstrated a failure to identify Germany as a member of a liberal in-group and by extension demonstrated that he did not trust Germany to act non-violently in its future relations with France. Because Poincaré did not perceive Germany to be a liberal polity, this result is consistent with the trust model outlined earlier.⁴⁵ Since there was no trust, Poincaré’s thinking on how to solve the German problem followed traditional *realpolitik* lines. Given

⁴⁰ McDougall (1978: 41).

⁴¹ McDougall (1978: 91, 118, and 125).

⁴² McDougall (1978: 244 and 363).

⁴³ Jeannesson (1998: 116).

⁴⁴ McDougall (1978: 143).

⁴⁵ Thereby undermining Layne’s (1994) claim that this crisis is an exception to the liberal peace.

that there is no trust belief to explain, I instead focus my analysis in the opposite direction, that is, on determining why a liberal collective identification failed to materialize.

Objectively, the question of whether Germany was a liberal polity in this period is debatable. Between 1919 and 1932, the Weimar Republic receives a Polity IV score of 6 – just below the traditional liberal democracy cut-off (see figure 7.3). Indeed, while the *institutions* of the Weimar Republic were certainly liberal throughout the 1920s, for a number of reasons it is difficult to argue that Germany was a genuine liberal democracy between 1919 and 1923.⁴⁶ One of the main reasons for this was the unstable and violent character of Germany's politics, which one author has described as “tantamount to civil war” during this period.⁴⁷ 1923 was only a few years removed from the events of the German Revolution (1918-1919), in which Communists had sought to violently seize power, and the Kapp Putsch (1920) when right-wing paramilitary units attempted to overthrow the German government.⁴⁸ During this period, political murder was common and several prominent politicians such as Matthias Erzberger and Walter Rathenau were assassinated by anti-regime militants.⁴⁹ Overall, large sections of German society continued to reject important aspects of liberalism,⁵⁰ such as the 10-20% of the electorate that consistently voted for parties which considered the republican constitution illegitimate and supported a return to more reactionary forms of government.

More importantly, French decision-makers clearly perceived Germany as illiberal. During the Paris peace conference the French leadership argued that the emerging German republican order was “little more than ‘a smokescreen designed to moderate Allied terms’, a

⁴⁶ Zakaria (2003: 60-61). Importantly, according to Owen's criteria, Germany should count, and should have been perceived, as a liberal democracy by French decision-makers.

⁴⁷ Brenner (2001: 68); Wright (2002: 167).

⁴⁸ Fischer (2003: 16).

⁴⁹ See Brenner (2001: Chapter 4). In total the extreme right committed 324 political assassinations in Germany between 1919 and 1923. Mosse (1990: 169).

⁵⁰ Mosse (1990: 161)

continuation of the Empire in all but name, and ‘incorrigibly malevolent’.⁵¹ To their minds, militaristic Prussia still dominated Germany, and the old imperial bureaucracy, judiciary, and military remained intact. Thus, even if liberalism could turn Germany into a nation of pacifists, the new Germany was not liberal, and thus it could not be relied upon to be peaceful.⁵² The consensus among French decision-makers was that, whatever its institutional form, the German government only understood the language of force.⁵³ To quote Poincaré “... *il faudra recourir à la force. Seul l’emploi des sanctions pourra provoquer dans l’opinion allemande un mouvement salutaire et permettre aux gens raisonnables de prendre le dessus.*”⁵⁴ French High Commissioner for the Rhineland, Paul Tirard, had “*aucune confiance en la République Weimar, sous les traits de laquelle il croit revoir l’Allemagne bismarckienne, plus forte et centralisée que jamais.*”⁵⁵ Tirard’s military counterpart, General Jean-Marie Degoutte believed that Germany “*ne peut perdurer sous l’artificielle constitution républicaine. Cette Allemagne ne peut, à terme, qu’évoluer soit vers le militarisme et le nationalisme, soit vers la synthèse du national-bolchevisme.*”⁵⁶ Tirard and Degoutte were two of the most influential officials advising Poincaré and regarded Germany, as “irreclaimably malign and militaristic”.⁵⁷ Moreover, their views were representative of a strong consensus amongst the French foreign policy elite,⁵⁸ especially after all other diplomatic options seemed to have been exhausted by the close of 1922.⁵⁹

⁵¹ Fischer (2003: 7). MacMillan (2001: 267) suggests that many Germans did believe that by shifting to a republican constitution they absolved themselves of much of their war guilt.

⁵² McDougall (1978: 114-115).

⁵³ Fischer (2003: 16); O’Riordan (2001: 25).

⁵⁴ “We must resort to force. Only the use of sanctions can provoke a salutary movement in German public opinion and allow reasonable people to take over.” Jeannesson (1998: 54 and 139). All translations are the author’s.

⁵⁵ “... no confidence in the Weimar Republic, under the surface of which he believed he could again see a Bismarckian Germany, stronger and more centralized than ever.” Quoted in Jeannesson (1998: 38). My emphasis.

⁵⁶ “... could not continue under this artificial republican constitution. This Germany could not, over the long term, evolve but in the direction of either militarism or national or the synthesis of national-bolshevism.” Quoted in Jeannesson (1998: 40).

⁵⁷ Fischer (2003: 22); Haglund and Waters (2005: 495); Jeannesson (1998: 36).

⁵⁸ Fischer (2003: 22); Haglund and Waters (2005: 495).

⁵⁹ McDougall (1978: 235).

Even those who believed in the possibility of liberal Germans with whom it would be possible to cooperate, such as Radical leader Édouard Herriot, did not see them as sufficiently strong to influence state policy.⁶⁰ Louis Loucheur, a onetime Minister of Industrial Reconstruction, wrote that: “France is accused of weakening German democracy... or seeking to ‘Turkify’ the Reich and create causes for new wars. But if the democratic government cannot reform itself, then what is wrong with our taking guarantees?”⁶¹ Even French Prime Minister Aristide Briand, who had attempted to find a cooperative solution to France’s insecurity problem when he negotiated the stillborn 1921 Weisbaden agreements,⁶² and who later returned to office and epitomised the collaborative efforts of the second half of the 1920s, had, in 1921, authorized a more limited occupation of the Ruhr for reasons similar to Poincaré’s.⁶³

The five factors

While it seems clear that French decision-makers refused to accept vulnerability to Germany because they did not trust Germany, it is still necessary to explore the extent to which the five trust-enabling factors were present in order to determine if this lack of trust is consistent with my trust model. As the analysis which follows demonstrates, there was a low level of all five trust-enabling factors compared to the levels that existed in the Canada-USA case, but arguably higher levels than existed in the India-Pakistan case.

Interactivity


⁶⁰ Jeannesson (1998: 134 and 218).

⁶¹ McDougall (1978 : 171).

⁶² McDougall (1978: 107, 168, and 209); Duroselle (1969: 21).

⁶³ Wright (2002: 177).

Figure 7.1 shows the percentage of France's GDP accounted for by trade with Germany. Interestingly, while 20-30% of Canada's GDP was always accounted for by trade with the USA, no more than 4.1% of French GDP was ever taken up by trade with Germany during this roughly contemporaneous period. And while trade between the two states did recover beginning in 1919, it never even returned to its prewar levels during this period.



There were other forms of interactivity that prevailed between the two polities that are better studied qualitatively. Specifically, after the war French soldiers occupied the Rhineland thereby providing some opportunities for interactions between parts of the French and German publics. French occupation officials also attempted some 'pacific penetration' by organizing French language courses, publishing a daily newspaper, *Echo du Rhin*, and a bilingual Rhenish review.⁶⁴ These efforts were always subordinated to France's political goals, however, which limited their effectiveness in generating positive affect.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Binoux (1972: 87).

⁶⁵ Binoux (1972: 87).


At a more elite level, prior to the First World War, the levels and quality of the interactivity that existed between the aristocratic decision-making and elite segments of European society was actually fairly elevated.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, in the period after the war but before the Ruhr invasion, while international diplomatic conferences, and hence interactivity, were becoming increasingly common – the so-called ‘casino diplomacy’ – German representatives were excluded from most of these. Moreover, in what was perhaps a representative move, France was the only country to *not* send either its Head of State/Government or Foreign Minister to the 1922 Genoa conference, the conference which was meant to begin welcoming Germany back into regular diplomatic circles.

Homogeneity

As shown in Figure 7.2, French and German GDP per capita remained remarkably similar throughout the period under examination, even despite their fighting against each other in one of the most destructive wars in history. In fact, the similarity in GDP per capita between these two states at their moment of greatest dissimilarity is greater than the similarity that obtained between Canada and the USA through their relationship except for a few brief years during the First World War.

⁶⁶ Kissinger (1994: 276).


Figure 7.2: French GDP per capita expressed as a percentage of German GDP per capita, 1870-1922



Source: Maddison (2008).

That said, in other areas, the levels of similarity between France and Germany are comparatively lower. For instance, while Canada and the USA achieved the same level of institutional democracy at least fifteen years prior to Canada's non-acquisition decision, as shown in Figure 7.3, France and Germany did not reach parity during this episode.


Figure 7.3: French and German Polity IV scores, 1867-1960



Source: Marshall et al. (2011).


The primary religious cleavage that existed in French and German societies was between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. As shown in Figures 7.4 and 7.5, France was primarily a Roman Catholic country during this episode while German was primarily a protestant one.

Figure 7.4: Percentages of the German population that are Roman Catholic and Protestant 1870-1958



Source: Flora et al. (1983), *Population by Religion (State, economy, and society in western Europe 1815-1975)*; author's correspondence with the *Statistisches Bundesamt*, 31 May, 2013. My thanks to Martin Schurig for his assistance.

Figure 7.5: Percentages of the French and German populations that are Roman Catholic 1870 to 1958



Source: Flora et al. (1983), *Population by Religion (State, economy, and society in western Europe 1815-1975)*; Machelon (2006); Sutter (1984); Fourquet (2010); *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques* (2014), T13.

Critically, however, Germany was not uniformly Protestant and Catholics actually formed a majority in the Rhineland. As discussed earlier, this perceived religious homogeneity helped support the ‘myth of two Germanies’. During the First World War, this myth had been revived by a number of French politicians and many respected French historians rushed to support and elaborate the idea of “Franco-Rhenish affinity”.⁶⁷ After the war, a Rhenish separatist movement briefly seemed to have gained some genuine popularity, becoming associated with as powerful a figure as Konrad Adenauer, then Lord Mayor of Cologne, when he seemed to support Rhenish ‘independence’ – within a federal German state.⁶⁸ However, it is important to note the lack of precision concerning what a ‘federal’ solution would entail. These officials sought a form of government which would enfeeble the central government,⁶⁹ and it is unlikely that Adenauer and most of those who supported ‘separatism’ would have supported this idea. Nevertheless, the myth was sufficiently influential “for politicians and journalists to proclaim the Franco-Rhenish dream, for officials and intelligence agents to patronize the dream, for ministers and diplomats to permit it to affect their policies.”⁷⁰

⁶⁷ McDougall (1978: 17).

⁶⁸ Binoux (1972: 82-83).

⁶⁹ McDougall (1978: 115).

⁷⁰ McDougall (1978: 364).

While the data available cannot support a rigorous comparison between this case and the Canada-USA, it has been possible to find some data concerning the number of nationals who originated in the other state who resided in each state during this period. Again, the numbers are much lower in this case than in the Canada-USA case with the number of Germans living in France averaging around 0.25% of the French population during this episode and the number of French people residing in Germany never exceeding 0.05% of the German population.⁷¹ Intuitively, residence would seem a less restrictive parameter than nativity which suggests that the level of social mixing between the populations was even less significant than these already limited numbers suggest – at least compared to the Canada-USA case.

Finally, unlike Canada and the USA, France and Germany do not share a common dominant language, a fact that limits the possibilities of shared understandings and mutual intelligibility that undergird the homogeneity mechanism. Conversely, both states are civil law jurisdictions, which is an important similarity. Beyond the formal similarities, however, the substantive divergence between the German and French legal systems is greater than between the Canadian and US systems, mainly because the points of divergence from their common precursors are more remote.⁷² Thus, while the difference between these two states is not as great as it might be between a pair like France and the UK, neither are the two as similar as two common law jurisdictions would be.⁷³

Common interests

⁷¹ Bunle (1931: 223); Burgdorfer (1931: 387); Author's correspondence with the *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques*, 22 April, 2013.

⁷² Deak and Rheinstejn (1936: 573-574).

⁷³ Hertel (2009).

This episode is distinguished by the failure of French and German decision-makers to perceive significant common interests. Before the First World War, France and Germany perceived few common interests, representing the primary poles around which the increasingly rigid European alliance system was organized. The events of the First World War, and the bellicose sentiments that the war engendered, presented important obstacles to any perception of common interests afterward. Indeed, as was demonstrated by the success of the anti-German *Bloc national* described earlier, the scope for the perception of common interests was quite limited. Nevertheless, there were opportunities for perceptions of common interests. For example, the threat of Bolshevism was one issue that German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann used to create a perception of common interests with great success in the mid-1920s.⁷⁴ However, in the period immediately preceding the Ruhr crisis, this opportunity for crystallizing common interests was dramatically neutralized by the Treaty of Rapallo negotiated between Germany and the USSR in 1922. As British Prime Minister Lloyd George later remarked: “If there had been no Rapallo, there would have been no Ruhr.”⁷⁵

Shared experiences

It's not possible to point to any shared experiences which could have produced positive emotion or familiarity on a significant scale during this period. The shared experience of the horrors of the First World War had some potential in this regard, but it went largely unfulfilled. The *Dolchstoß* – i.e. the myth of the ‘stab in the back’ which held that Germany's armies had never been defeated in the war but had been betrayed by craven non-combatants – represented a critical obstacle in this regard.⁷⁶ In addition to fueling political

⁷⁴ Wright (2002: 159); The Associated Press (1919); Kissinger (1994: 271).

⁷⁵ Quoted in Kissinger (1994: 267). Jeannesson (1998: 137) largely agrees, especially insofar as Poincaré is concerned.

⁷⁶ Kissinger (1994: 270).

violence, instability, and gridlock in Germany,⁷⁷ the *Dolchstoß* inhibited German society's ability to reach a consensus on the meaning of the war.⁷⁸ Consequently, German society had great difficulty accepting and processing its defeat, thus blocking its progress through the collective mourning process needed to enable reconciliation with other societies.⁷⁹ As Omer Bartov puts it: "in Germany, the pain and sorrow of mourning was increasingly oriented to the future, and loss could not be accepted precisely because of the refusal to come to terms with the past."⁸⁰ Indeed, comparative studies have shown that interwar German memorials were more likely to valorize the heroic warrior than were memorials erected in France which tended to thematize mourning and suffering.⁸¹ Consequently, without a shared understanding of the meaning of the war, it was impossible for German and France to identify it as a shared suffering.

Altercasting

While there was significant altercasting between France and Germany during this episode, almost all of it was negative and thus more likely to reduce, rather than create, positive emotion. The most obvious example was in the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles, specifically the way that the treaty was imposed on Germany. This imposition of the treaty altercast Germany as a lesser state not worthy of participation in the negotiations. Moreover, the content of the treaty also contradicted the liberal foundations on which it was supposed to rest. This hypocrisy is most clearly visible in many of the territorial adjustments contained in the treaty which, contrary to the principle of self-determination on which it was based, deprived Germany of territories in which Germans represented a majority and prohibited an

⁷⁷ Forner (2002: 514).

⁷⁸ Mosse (1990: Chapter 8).

⁷⁹ Forner (2002: 514-515); Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker (2000: 202); Winter (1998: 113-116).

⁸⁰ Bartov (2000: 17)

⁸¹ Forner (2002: 515).

anschluss with Austria. This altercasting produced many responses like the following by Hugo Preuss, the drafter of the Weimar constitution: “[t]he policy of the Entente, therefore, can have no conceivable aim other than to prevent forcibly this moral strengthening of the Republic of Germany and to add to the strength of its opponents, since it would make it much easier for them to gain supporters for their claim that German national unity cannot be brought about in Germany except by a military reaction.”⁸²

By clearly deviating from liberal principles, the Allies cast Germany as an inferior state to which liberal principles did not apply, thereby imputing to it qualities of illiberalism and untrustworthiness. Other aspects of the Treaty, such as the limitations on the size and equipment of the Germany military and the forced demilitarization of the Rhineland, can be interpreted in a similar light. Finally, Briand’s 1921 decision to occupy three Ruhr towns for reasons comparable to Poincaré’s sent a similar message: that Germany was an unreasonable state which could only be communicated with through the use of force.

Episode 2 : *Les Accords Chaban-Strauß*

Like Canada’s non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, the French decision to share nuclear secrets and jointly build nuclear weapons with Germany represents a remarkable yet understudied episode that is not only difficult to explain within existing theories of IR, but also illuminates the significant influence that trust can have on agents’ decision-making. In only twelve short years, France and Germany had gone from opposite sides of a seventy-year rivalry between ‘hereditary enemies’ that had culminated in history’s most destructive conflict to a pair of states willing to jointly produce the ultimate weapon. In the analysis

⁸² The Associated Press (1919). Cf. Wright (2010: 27-28).

below, I argue that the best explanation for this incredible reversal is a trusting one according to which France and Germany had come, by 1957, to identify as co-members of a liberal in-group in which the use of force for the resolution of disputes was no longer thinkable.

France's nuclear programme began in October 1945 when General Charles de Gaulle, Prime Minister of France's provisional government, created the *Commissariat à l'énergie atomique* (CEA). Initially the CEA's efforts were limited to fundamental research and differentiating between civilian and military objectives was impossible, a situation which prevailed until 1954 when the programme's increasingly military orientation was gradually accepted.⁸³ Soon thereafter, France and Germany began an increasingly serious military *rapprochement*. One of the first manifestations of this *rapprochement* came in the form of a January 1957 tour of France and Algeria by German Minister of Defence Franz-Josef Strauß. On this tour Strauß visited a number of military installations, including the French nuclear facility at Colomb-Béchar. During his visit, Strauß and his French counterpart signed a protocol which committed the two states to work together on 'new weapons'.⁸⁴

In November of 1957, soon after the launch of Sputnik-1 and almost immediately after the installation of Félix Gaillard as Prime Minister and the appointment of his new cabinet, Gaillard, his Socialist Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, and Gaullist Minister of Defence Chaban-Delmas decided to approach Strauß and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to discuss the possibility of cooperation in the development of nuclear weapons.⁸⁵ Eventually an agreement was signed on 25 November which committed the two states, with Italy as a junior partner, to work cooperatively to develop "*les applications militaires de l'énergie*

⁸³ Duval and Mongin (1993: 32); Soutou (1989a; 317); Ullman (1989: 5). For an in-depth discussion of the early French programme, see Hecht (1998: Chapter 2).

⁸⁴ Conze (1990: 122).

⁸⁵ Schwarz (1992: 302).

nucléaire".⁸⁶ Further discussions followed in January and the partnership was finalized in a protocol signed on 8 April, 1958 which committed the three partners to build an isotope separation facility at Pierrelatte in France for the purpose of enriching uranium for use as fuel for nuclear submarines and the explosive core of a thermonuclear device.⁸⁷ It was only after this agreement was signed that French Prime Minister Félix Gaillard officially ordered the building of a French nuclear weapon.⁸⁸ These decisions were some of Gaillard's last acts before his government fell in summer 1958.⁸⁹ And while *les accords Chaban-Strauß* were abrogated when Charles de Gaulle returned to power a few weeks later, this does not negate the fact that a French government was willing to make such an agreement with France's 'hereditary enemy' only twelve years after the end of the Second World War.

Acceptance of vulnerability

The French decision to share nuclear secrets and jointly produce nuclear weapons with Germany is an example of a French acceptance of vulnerability to Germany because of how these agreements, had they been fulfilled, would have neutralized any improvement to the significant imbalance in latent power between France and Germany that France could have expected to realize through an independent acquisition. This is important because of how this imbalance played a large role in generating the perception of a German threat that motivated France to invade the Ruhr in the last episode. And while France's geostrategic situation after 1945 was different from the one that prevailed after 1918, important parallels exist between France's objective vulnerability in both sub-cases.

⁸⁶ "military applications of nuclear energy". Soutou (1993: 8).

⁸⁷ Schwarz (1997: 323).

⁸⁸ Scheinman (1965: 116).

⁸⁹ Barbier (1993: 112).

While Germany suffered much greater physical devastation after the Second World War than after the first and lost a much greater proportion of its territory and population, even in 1946 Germany was more populous than France counting forty-six million inhabitants to France's forty million. This gap only increased over the course of this episode with Germany reaching fifty-four million inhabitants by 1958, well ahead of France's forty-five million. Furthermore, recall that the division of Germany into two states was not recognized as a permanent reality at this time,⁹⁰ meaning that France's calculations had to make allowances for the possibility of a reunification which could add almost twenty million to Germany's population and increase its territory by almost fifty percent.⁹¹ Moreover, Germany's economy recovered remarkably quickly: by 1950 the size of the FRG's economy had already matched France's, and by 1960, had grown to one-hundred-and-forty-three percent the size of France's.⁹²

While a number of developments, such as the creation of NATO, helped to sooth France's insecurity, none of them solved the fundamental problem. Nothing short of a reduction in Germany's latent power, or an offsetting increase in France's, could eliminate the underlying capabilities gap. Moreover, it is important not to import perspectives adulterated by hindsight. For example, at the time of its founding, it was by no means clear that NATO would prove to be effective or lasting, and indeed France's faith in NATO was undermined throughout this period by various developments. Consequently, significant incentives existed for a French acquisition of nuclear weapons as an independent means of reducing its insecurity *vis-à-vis* Germany.

It was in this context that the Chaban-Strauß agreements emerged. These agreements represented an important acceptance of vulnerability on the part of France because they

⁹⁰ Jackson (2003: 223).

⁹¹ Jackson (2003: 223).

⁹² Wolf et al. (1989: 5).

provided Germany with a means of acquiring nuclear weapons, thereby neutralizing any potential reduction in the capabilities imbalance that an independent French acquisition would have represented. Moreover, by providing for the development and manufacture of these weapons in France, the agreements circumvented the restrictions included in the 1954 Treaty of Paris which forbade Germany from manufacturing nuclear weapons on its own soil, thereby making it much easier for Germany to acquire nuclear weapons than it would have been otherwise.⁹³

Critical agents, distributions of power and meaning

Identifying the critical agents in this episode is a difficult task due to the constantly shifting cast of French decision-makers during the Fourth Republic. As I outline more thoroughly below, I argue that the best way to understand how the decision to share nuclear secrets came to be taken is to recognize how trust accumulated over time through the encoding of a number of trust-enabling biases in a variety of institutional and ideational structures, specifically by the agents who created and sustained these structures. These structures then went on to socialize those who came to power afterward toward accepting and expanding the French portfolio of trust beliefs *vis-à-vis* Germany. This gradual sedimentation of trust-enabling factors reached such a point that by 1957-1958, the decision-makers who ultimately took the crucial decisions, namely Félix Gaillard (Radical Prime Minister who authorized the Chaban-Strauß agreements), Christian Pineau (Socialist Foreign Minister under Gaillard), and Jacques Chaban-Delmas (Gaullist/Social Republican Minister of Defence under Gaillard), had already been largely converted to a trusting posture.

⁹³ Paul (2000: 40).

Importantly, both these structures, and the agents which inhabited them, were liberal democratic ones. As shown in Figure 7.8, between 1946 and 1958, France receives a Polity IV score of 10. Germany receives no score until 1949, at which point it receives a score of 10, which it holds for the rest of the period.⁹⁴ At a more fine-grained level, there is also substantial evidence, much of it presented below, that the critical decision-makers on both sides, such as German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Prime Minister Gaillard, were also thoroughly liberal in their worldviews.⁹⁵ Finally, unlike in the earlier episode, the polity which emerged in Germany after the war did not suffer from the instability or political violence which so severely undermined the Weimar Republic.

A critical shift in the distribution of meaning that occurred between the last period and this one that not only ensured a more thoroughly liberal democratic distribution of power in Germany, but also provided an opportunity for collective identification between French and German Christian democrats, was the decisive confirmation of political Christianity's acceptance of liberal democracy. Whereas many Christian democrats had come to cozy accommodations with Fascism during the interwar period, the negative results of this liaison ensured that the Christian democratic parties that arose in the postwar period were thoroughly liberal democratic.⁹⁶ As discussed below, the aforementioned 'myth of two Germanies' also played an important role in this episode. Finally, so too did the emergence of a consensus among Christian democrats, Radicals, and Socialists on the need to integrate a liberal democratic Germany into a wider like-minded European community as a means of solving the 'German problem', preserving European influence in a world of two superpowers, and defending 'Western civilization' against the communist threat.

⁹⁴ Marshall, Jagers, and Gurr (2011).

⁹⁵ On Adenauer's liberalism see Stern (1958: 2-3, 15, 24) and Schwarz (1995 and 1997). For Gaillard see Cazenave (2011).

⁹⁶ Cornwell (1999: 327-330).

Alternative explanations

Three explanations currently exist for why French decision-makers opted to share nuclear secrets with Germany in 1957-1958. They are: (1) France required German money for what was proving to be an expensive nuclear programme; (2) partnering with Germany increased the pressure on the USA to cooperate with France; and (3) partnering with Germany offered the prospect of an independent continental European nuclear force. This final explanation itself has three overlapping non-mutually-exclusive potential motivations: (a) to enable a re-balancing of influence in NATO;⁹⁷ (b) to provide additional deterrence against the USSR; and (c) to bind the USA more tightly to the defence of Europe.⁹⁸ While each of these explanations has its strengths, they are not sufficient, singly or in concert, to explain France's decision. Moreover, while it is true that validity of any of these explanations would reduce the logical need for a trust-focused explanation to make sense of the French decision, none of these explanations is actually incompatible with a trust-focused one and, in fact, each of them are only strengthened by the additional of a trust component thereto.

Beginning with the first, it is true that French decision-makers were concerned by the cost of developing nuclear weapons independently.⁹⁹ This concern grew as the Algerian War consumed an increasing proportion of France's military budget. Nevertheless, as de Gaulle's ultimate decision to build a French bomb demonstrates, German funds were not essential to a French acquisition. If German funds were not essential, it is hard to understand how a need

⁹⁷ Barbier (1993: 106); Kohl (1968: 81); Duval and Mongin (1993: 25-26); Mendl (1970: 18, 29, and 62); Sagan (1996-1997: 78-79).

⁹⁸ Barbier (1990: 83, 95, 101-103, and 107-108); Conze (1990: 118-119).

⁹⁹ Schwarz (1997: 321).

for them could justify the significant acceptance of vulnerability that enabling a German acquisition represented.

Second, it is not clear why adding Germany to the list of nuclear weapons states was seen as more likely to convince US decision-makers to share their nuclear secrets with France.

Indeed, since the passage of the McMahon Act in 1946, US decision-makers had shown themselves to be keen on limiting proliferation.¹⁰⁰ During the period under consideration, the USA seems to have believed that allied nuclear weapons programmes represented a redundant use of limited allied resources.¹⁰¹ Thus, given that more nuclear weapons states was exactly what the USA was trying to avoid, it seems likely that the USA would have seen a 'European' bomb in even less favourable light than a purely French one, and, in such a scenario, would have been even less inclined to share information.

Given the three overlapping motivations for the creation of a European nuclear force under the third explanation, a slightly more complex analysis is warranted. It is true that the recruitment of Germany and Italy to the cause might have made the French call for a re-balancing of NATO more powerful. Similarly, a nuclear-armed Germany and Italy might have helped deter the USSR. But it is not clear that this larger number of participants would have been meaningfully more effective in either case than what could have been achieved by France alone, a reality that applies equally to the third variant, namely the binding of the USA more tightly to the defence of Europe through the construction of an independent European nuclear tripwire. And again, the ultimate independent French acquisition calls into question just how important these motivations could have been.

¹⁰⁰ Ullman (1989: 5-6).

¹⁰¹ Buckley (2000: 84).

Critically, even if all three of these explanations were true, one must ask, given a Realist perspective, whether any of these possibilities, either alone or in combination, offered gains that were sufficiently important to merit the acceptance of vulnerability that a German acquisition would have represented, especially given the possibility of an independent French acquisition. Given France's history with Germany, it is difficult to argue that this would have been seen as likely. As I discuss below, however, this calculus becomes much easier if one approaches it from a perspective in which France did not perceive a German acquisition as an increase in its insecurity because French decision-makers trusted Germany not to use force to resolve any future disputes between the two states.

Finally, some might argue that de Gaulle's cancellation of the agreements effectively undermines my argument. This assertion is incorrect in two respects. First, the fact that de Gaulle cancelled the agreements does not negate the fact that they had been signed in the first place and that the French government had taken steps and incurred costs to begin implementing them.¹⁰² Second, de Gaulle's rationale for cancelling the agreements had nothing to do with the acceptance of vulnerability that they entailed. Rather, de Gaulle saw them as a political weapon needed for France to restore its *grandeur*, something that could only be accomplished independently.¹⁰³ Thus, de Gaulle's decision does not so much undermine my trust argument as demonstrate a different set of priorities.¹⁰⁴

A trust-focused analysis

¹⁰² Sassoon (1996: 183-184). Breaking faith with Adenauer would have also been costly, especially for a Gaillard government.

¹⁰³ Paul (2000: 40).

¹⁰⁴ Indeed, de Gaulle's cultivation of a close relationship with Adenauer suggests that trust may have existed between these two leaders.

How can one understand this decision whereby France, a country that had been subjected to three devastating German invasions in the preceding ninety years, voluntarily accepted – indeed, engineered – such a massive increase in its vulnerability to Germany? I argue that the best explanation of this decision must include an important role for the existence of a belief on the part of French decision-makers that their German counterparts could be trusted to act like liberals and resolve any future disputes they might have with France non-violently.

By already showing that there are strong justifications for characterizing both France and Germany as liberal states during this period, I have shown that the necessary objective prerequisites for a liberal collective identification were in place. Determining whether France recognized Germany as a liberal state is slightly trickier. Until about 1950, French decision-makers acted in much the same way as they had after the First World War. By manoeuvring to annex or detach the Saarland, to detach the Rhineland and the Ruhr from a future German state, or at least place these areas under international control,¹⁰⁵ France sought to generally constrain Germany's re-emergence as a normal country.¹⁰⁶ This behaviour illustrates how French decision-makers recognized their vulnerability to Germany and continued to perceive it as threatening after the war.¹⁰⁷

By the end of the 1940s, however, French decision-makers began to alter their policies *vis-à-vis* Germany and attempt a more constructive approach.¹⁰⁸ While this shift was partially the result of pressure from France's allies,¹⁰⁹ I argue that its particularly cooperative form – for example, the Schuman plan – was the result of a growing collective identification between French and German decision-makers that grew out of the high levels of interactivity and

¹⁰⁵ Binoux (1972: 154-155).

¹⁰⁶ Hitchcock (1998: 44, 99-103, and 115-116); Willis (1962: 244-145).

¹⁰⁷ Mendl (1970: 22); Willis (1962: 244-145).

¹⁰⁸ Hitchcock (1998: 110).

¹⁰⁹ Hitchcock (1998: 74 and 102).

perceptions of homogeneity and common interests between French and German Christian democrats. These perceptions laid the foundations for the institutionalized collaboration we have come to call the European project. As discussed below, this collective identification was aided in this growth by the gradual accumulation over the 1950s of a number of important shared experiences and cycles of positive altercasting between decision-makers of all political stripes resulting in the emergence of a more general liberal trust between French and German decision makers. These factors even influenced the general population such that “French feelings about West Germany changed qualitatively from hostility ‘to amity between 1955 and 1958...”¹¹⁰ and that “the reductions in international social distance between Frenchmen and West Germans during the 1950’s and early 1960’s are almost phenomenal.”¹¹¹

The five factors


Below I provide evidence that all five factors capable of producing the familiarity and positive emotion required for collective identification were present, and often increasingly so, in the years between 1945 and 1958. Especially when compared to the dearth of these five factors and the lack of liberal trust in the first sub-case, the significant activity catalogued here, when combined with the trust evident in this sub-case, seems to strongly support the plausibility of my trust model.

Interactivity

¹¹⁰ Puchala (1970b: 190).

¹¹¹ Puchala (1970b: 191).

Donald Puchala argues that the 1950s saw “major absolute and proportional increases in the two peoples’ transactions over multiple ranges.”¹¹² This increase is clearly visible in Figure 7.6, though the importance of this increase should not be overstated given the inferiority of this interactivity to earlier times.



Economic interactivity, however, is actually the least impressive increase in interactivity between the two states during this period. Much more interesting is the interactivity that developed between political elites. The increased interactivity among French and German Christian democrats was especially important as these individuals built a series of social networks specifically aimed at enabling cooperation and understanding between France and Germany. For example, in 1946 Georges Bidault, the founder of the French Christian Democratic party – the *Mouvement républicain populaire* (MRP) – arranged for Josef Müller, the founder of the Bavarian Christian Social Union and an ally of Konrad Adenauer’s, to attend the MRP’s party conference.¹¹³ Bidault, who would be France’s Prime Minister when the Schuman Plan was launched, also initiated the ‘Geneva circle’, a transnational group of Christian democrats that met secretly three or four times a year to network and share ideas.¹¹⁴

¹¹² Puchala (1970a: 749).

¹¹³ Kaiser (2007: 193).

¹¹⁴ Kaiser (2007: 205).

Wolfram Kaiser argues that

... party cooperation on the NEI [*Nouvelles équipes internationales* – another Christian democratic network dedicated to advancing European integration founded in 1947] and Geneva circle went much further in creating trust in the form of normative emotional bonds between the transnationally networked party elites... The meeting in the NEI and the Geneva Circle allowed the Christian democrats consistently to communicate their congruent political beliefs and preferences over longer periods. This made their decision-making mutually reliable and calculable
...¹¹⁵

Adenauer used such meetings as *fora* for advocating economic integration as a means of forging peace between France and Germany. Indeed, the fact that Bidault, Schuman, and Adenauer had been discussing variations of what became the Schuman plan for years made taking this great ‘leap into the unknown’ much less of a leap than it appeared to observers.¹¹⁶ By helping to share information, coordinating governmental policy-making, and socializing new members,¹¹⁷ the interactivity which constituted these networks helped build trust.¹¹⁸

As European integration progressed, the interactivity required to work out its details and ensure its advancement was also very important.¹¹⁹ After returning from meetings in Paris where he had been negotiating the details of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Adenauer said that

*plus mon séjour à Paris se prolongeait, plus les visages que je rencontrais devenaient amicaux; l’atmosphère qui m’entourait était cordiale et je me sentais entièrement heureux de ce succès pour notre patrie... C’était la première fois depuis 19 ans que le représentant d’une Allemagne démocratique prenait part à une réunion international à ce niveau...”*¹²⁰

As Jean Monnet, wrote: “*la paix ne peut être fondée que sur l’égalité. Nous avons manqué la paix en 1919 parce que nous y avons introduit la discrimination et l’esprit de supériorité.*”¹²¹

¹¹⁵ Kaiser (2007: 237).

¹¹⁶ Kaiser (2007: 224).

¹¹⁷ Kaiser (2007: 218).

¹¹⁸ Kaiser (2007: 9).

¹¹⁹ For example, for eighteen months Gaillard travelled to Brussels almost every week to work on the Spaak report with a multinational group of colleagues. Cazenave (2011: 128).

¹²⁰ “the more my stay in Paris lengthened, the friendlier the faces I met became; the atmosphere around me was warm and I felt completely happy with this success for our country... It was the first time in 19 years that a representative of a democratic Germany took part in an international meeting at this level...” Quoted in Binoux (1972: 177).

¹²¹ “peace can only be based on equality. We failed to achieve peace in 1919 because we discriminated and acted with a spirit of superiority.” Quoted in Cazenave (2011: 118).

These quotations are important because they emphasize equality between interlocutors, something that is required for interactivity's second mechanism – the 'intergroup-contact' mechanism – to be engaged and for interactivity to have its full trust-enabling effect.

A critical result of all this networking was the transposition of the trusting relationships that developed within these informal networks into formal, institutional ones as patterns of cooperation that had evolved informally were formalized when these leaders took up governmental positions.¹²² These processes were further solidified when the structures of European integration began to take shape,¹²³ a process assisted by the significant stability in the top personnel across the governing centrist parties in France, even in the face of formal governmental instability. This governmental instability was also helpful in that it allowed a technocratic consensus among bureaucrats who largely accepted the need for European integration to further entrench these structures.¹²⁴ Finally, the fact that the Radicals and the Socialists largely agreed with the Christian democrats on the need for integration eased this transposition and further fortified these patterns of cooperation.¹²⁵

Homogeneity

France and Germany were relatively homogenous states at the beginning of this period and only became more so over time. For example, Figure 7.7 shows that by the end of the period Germany had overcome many of the dislocations of the war years and the two states had come to share a similar level of development, as measured by GDP per capita.


¹²² Kaiser (2007: 298).

¹²³ Kaiser (2007: 179).

¹²⁴ Wakeman (2011: 76-77).

¹²⁵ Criddle (1969: 92); Cazenave (2011: 117).


Figure 7.7: French GDP per capita expressed as a percentage of German GDP per capita, 1919-1958



Source: Maddison (2008).

Similarly, as shown in Figure 7.8, both states receive the maximum Polity IV score of 10 from 1950. This was not the case in the earlier episode. Thus, by achieving a similar level of institutional democracy, an important objective basis for differentiation between the two states that played an important subjective role in the last episode was eliminated.

Figure 7.8: French and German Polity IV scores, 1919-1958



Source: Marshall et al. (2011).

But again, the most interesting developments during this period are qualitative ones. One of the reasons all the aforementioned networking was initiated, and one reason it was so successful, was because of the inherent homogeneity between many of the critical decision-making agents – Christian democrats being especially important in this regard. Indeed, the early and mid-1950s was a period when decision-makers in France and Germany perceived a

striking level of homogeneity with each other. This included perceptions of shared liberalism, but also included other significant elements discussed below.

The most striking example of homogeneity lies with the Christian democratic leaders who effectuated the turn from a French strategy based on hostility to Germany to one focused on reconciliation: Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer. Schuman was a self-described “*homme de la frontière*”.¹²⁶ While from old Lorraine stock, Schuman was born in Luxembourg and spoke German before he spoke French, a fact that resulted in his speaking French with a German accent. His higher education took place entirely in German universities. After graduation, he began to practice law in Metz while it was still part of the German Empire, served on its city council, and even served in the German army during the First World War.¹²⁷ Paul Binoux argues that because of this biography Schuman understood the German language and mentality perfectly.¹²⁸ Additionally, Schuman was a devout Roman Catholic who believed that Christian teachings compelled Christians to be democrats and to work for equality and peace between believers across national boundaries.¹²⁹

Born in Cologne, Adenauer was also a man of the frontier. As a devout Roman Catholic Rhinelander¹³⁰ with a memory of Bismarck’s *Kulturkampf* and an affinity for Gallic/Latin culture,¹³¹ Adenauer was suspicious of Prussia and the central German government,¹³² going so far as to support ‘federalism’ and seeming to flirt with ‘separatism’ during the 1919-1923 period.¹³³ Adenauer was also one of Germany’s most steadfast advocates of Franco-German

¹²⁶ “man of the frontier” Quoted in Binoux (1972: 168).

¹²⁷ Binoux (1972: 165).

¹²⁸ Binoux (1972: 168).

¹²⁹ Binoux (1972: 168-169).

¹³⁰ Bariéty (1989: 219).

¹³¹ Binoux (1972: 164).

¹³² Schwarz (1995: 18-19).

¹³³ Wighton (1963: 19); Binoux (1972: 164).

cooperation, first promoting the idea of a Franco-German coal and steel pool in the 1920s.¹³⁴ He shared with Schuman the belief that Christianity and democracy were inextricably linked, that Christianity – with its focus on individual dignity – in fact required Christians to be democrats.¹³⁵ Even Charles Wighton, a harsh critic of Adenauer in many respects, allows that “everything he did as German Chancellor was based on the fundamental tenets of Western Christian culture.”¹³⁶

This personal homogeneity between Schuman and Adenauer helped foster a common interpretation of many of the problems confronting France and Germany in the postwar world. One of the most important was their agreement on the importance of integrating Germany into ‘the West’ as a means of defending it against Communism – a belief clearly visible in Adenauer’s policy of *Westbindung* and his prioritization thereof over reunification.¹³⁷ This prioritization proved politically costly for Adenauer and encountered significant resistance in Germany. Wighton argues that Adenauer’s decision to do so derived largely from his Rhenish heritage and his deep-seated distrust of Protestant Prussia.¹³⁸

As was illustrated by Figures 7.4 and 7.5, one of the major changes in wider German society after 1945 was the significant increase in the Catholic character of German society due to the detachment of predominantly Protestant Prussia from the FRG. This translated into a decisively greater level of electoral support for Adenauer and the Christian democrats, which in turn provided the French Christian democrats more homogeneous partners whom they were more inclined to trust. This increased religious homogeneity also helped revive the ‘myth of two Germanies’. This revival enabled an important elision in the minds of

¹³⁴ Binoux (1972: 203).

¹³⁵ Cary (1996: 184-185).

¹³⁶ Wighton (1963: 15); Jackson (2006: 204-206).

¹³⁷ Kaiser (2007: 251); Jackson (2006: ix and 202).

¹³⁸ Wighton (1963: 20).

Germany's French partners, making it easier for them to forgive the 'oppressed' and already preferred 'western' Germany and welcome it back into the 'civilized' fold of western European Christendom,¹³⁹ while most of Germany's sins were assigned to 'eastern' Germany which was now conveniently aligned with the Soviets. The fact that Adenauer openly subscribed to this narrative, and was willing to prioritize *Westbindung* over unification, greatly impressed his French partners.¹⁴⁰

Thus, this homogeneity both motivated and enabled French and German leaders to pursue European integration and an Atlantic alliance by appealing to the shared history and culture of western Christendom. It also created an 'other', the Communist-dominated 'East', against which the 'Western' states could define themselves and which conveniently included those parts of Germany supposedly primarily responsible for Germany's past crimes. Interestingly, this narrative, with its heavy Catholic overtones, led some non-Catholics to fear that the emerging European project would be dominated by Catholics.¹⁴¹ It also provided a cleavage between the emerging Paris-Bonn axis and '*les anglo-saxons*' that would be importantly reinforced by events in the mid-1950s.

Common Interests

Between 1945 and 1958, a strong shift in the manner in which French decision-makers defined their interests is clearly discernible as they came to see their interests aligning increasingly with those of Germany. This was especially the case for Christian democrats who, as Kaiser notes, were

¹³⁹ Kaiser (2007: 215).

¹⁴⁰ Kaiser (2007: 219); C.f. Jackson (2003: 249).

¹⁴¹ Sassoon (1996: 235); Criddle (1969: 99); Marlière (2011: 58).

“[e]mbedded in broadly similar ideological traditions, [and] developed what Markus Jachtenfuchs in his study of the EU’s constitutional history has called a shared *gesellschaftliches Deutungssystem*: a social system for interpreting the world as it was evolving in the early Cold War. This convergence of world-views resulted from a mutually reinforcing combination of structural incentives and their transnational communication...”¹⁴²

The importance of ideology and transnational communication has already been discussed, but it is also important to discuss how structural incentives helped shape a shared perception of common interests.¹⁴³

After 1945, three related interests emerged which French and German decision-makers came to perceive as common: (1) the need to enhance their influence in a world dominated by two superpowers; (2) the need for a solution to the ‘German problem’; and (3) the need to defend western Europe against the Soviets. Christian democratic leaders like Adenauer, Schuman, and Bidault quickly came to interpret their interests as common in the face of these problems, but, critically, so too did others. At the broadest level, many continental Europeans from across the political spectrum, including French Socialists like Leon Blum¹⁴⁴ and French Radicals like Félix Gaillard,¹⁴⁵ saw integration as the only way for Europe to maintain influence in the postwar world.¹⁴⁶

For many of these thinkers, the construction of Europe was also inextricably linked to solving the ‘German problem’.¹⁴⁷ One of the most arresting findings of my research was the extent to which all the parties involved in governing France during this period believed that the solution to the German problem required the democratization of Germany and its integration into a (western) European community that could rehabilitate its people, a view that simply did not prevail in the previous episode. For example, from the beginning, the ECSC was

¹⁴² Kaiser (2007: 240).

¹⁴³ Hitchcock (1998: 5).

¹⁴⁴ Sassoon (1996: 183); Marlière (2011: 54); Criddle (1969: 26).

¹⁴⁵ Cazenave (2011: 72).

¹⁴⁶ Criddle (1969: 1); Cazenave (2011: 72-73); Hitchcock (1998: 204).

¹⁴⁷ Hitchcock (1998: 204).

understood as much more than a coal and steel pool;¹⁴⁸ there was a clear objective of creating a comprehensive entity which would solve the ‘German problem’ through Europeanization.¹⁴⁹

This is not to say that there were not other motivations unconnected with a trust explanation at play, but one must recall that many of the same incentives prevailed in 1918-1923 and failed to produce these outcomes.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, unlike in 1918-1923, many French agents were willing to pay significant costs for integration. Indeed, solving the German problem through European integration was so important to the MRP that the MRP leadership repeatedly acted against its own partisan interest to support it. A prime example of this commitment can be found in their support for German entry into NATO on the strength of German requests, and despite the MRP’s opposition to the idea. Kaiser argues that these actions “reflected the strength of cross-border political integration and the accumulation of substantial social and political trust during the eight years of intensive Christian democratic networking since 1947.”¹⁵¹

This perception of a common interest in integration was further enhanced by a perception of threat shared by all non-Communist western European politicians.¹⁵² According to Adenauer, integration needed to be understood as part of the uniting of western Europe for the purpose of defending it against the military threat posed by the ‘Russians’.¹⁵³ And while somewhat ambivalent at first, the Socialists quickly aligned themselves with this understanding of the European project. Indeed, as the 1950s progressed, the French Socialists and Radicals

¹⁴⁸ Binoux (1972: 175); Kaiser (2007: 302).

¹⁴⁹ Kaiser (2007: 251).

¹⁵⁰ Jeannesson (1998: 109-110, 25).

¹⁵¹ Kaiser (2007: 281).

¹⁵² Soutou (1989b: 227); Kahl (1998: 144).

¹⁵³ Kaiser (2007: 251); Jackson (2006: 209).

revealed themselves to be just as anti-Soviet and pro-NATO as any other French party, thereby aligning their definition of interest with Adenauer's government.¹⁵⁴

Shared Experiences

Clearly, much of the interactivity and homogeneity significant to this story occurred and existed between Christian democrats. Significantly, however, in 1954 the MRP fell from power meaning that the trust required for the sharing of nuclear secrets cannot be explained solely by the trust between Christian democrats alone. In addition to the aforementioned integrative processes which transposed the beliefs of agents like Bidault and Schuman into institutional biases which predisposed those agents embedded within them to trust, shared experiences were especially important in binding other French leaders to Adenauer and the German Christian democrats. This is important because it was decision-makers from these other political backgrounds who were in power during the critical years between 1955 and 1958 when the decisions under examination here were undertaken.

The Suez crisis was one of the most important events of the early Cold War. The US reaction to the Anglo-French-Israeli operation was interpreted by both French and German decision-makers as a warning that the USA could not be trusted to stand up for Europe's interests.¹⁵⁵ Critically, Adenauer was in Paris at the height of the crisis and essentially participated in the deliberations of the French cabinet during its *denouement*.¹⁵⁶ It was in this context that Adenauer reportedly told Mollet "to make Europe your revenge" when the operation ultimately failed.¹⁵⁷ Felix von Eckart, a confidant of Adenauer's, suggests that "[e]ven the

¹⁵⁴ Criddle (1969: 41-42); Cazenave (2011: 72). For example, see Mollet (1954).

¹⁵⁵ Schwarz (1997: 241-242); Vaisse (1989: 254); Kaiser (2007: 295); Vucetic (2011: 149).

¹⁵⁶ Soutou (1993: 2); Conze (1990: 118); Schwarz (1997: 242-244).

¹⁵⁷ Moravcsik (1998: 144); Judt (2006: 292).

hard-boiled must have been touched by the significance of the moment and its symbolism. In the most serious hour France had experienced since the end of the war, the two governments were standing shoulder to shoulder.”¹⁵⁸

The impact of the Suez Crisis on French-decision-makers was significant, and its impact on French Foreign Minister Pineau especially so: Hans-Peter Schwarz argues that Pineau, who had been incarcerated in Buchenwald during the war, only really changed his negative perception towards Germany into a positive one after Adenauer’s support during the Suez crisis.¹⁵⁹ Overall, the crisis triggered a “remarkable intensification of Franco-German co-operation with Mollet’s cabinet, and the following cabinets of the Fourth Republic.”¹⁶⁰

Similarly, the launching of Sputnik-1, which signalled the USSR’s ability to directly threaten the USA, further undermined Europeans’ confidence that the USA would defend them.¹⁶¹ Not only did this situation generate common interests, it also provided both states’ leaders with a common experience of vulnerability. In fact, the Mollet government cited Sputnik-1 when it first approached Adenauer on the subject of joint production of nuclear weapons as part of the justification for their proposal.¹⁶²

Altercasting

Throughout this episode, a gradually increasing spiral of altercasting between French and German decision-makers played a critical role in generating the familiarity and positive affect required for the emergence of liberal trust. Importantly, as late as December 1948, the

¹⁵⁸ Schwarz (1997: 244).

¹⁵⁹ Schwarz (1997: 318).

¹⁶⁰ Schwarz (1997: 245).

¹⁶¹ Bariéty (1989: 220); Conze (1990: 119-120); Schwarz (1997: 313 and 319).

¹⁶² Ahonen (1995: 32-33).

prevailing French view was still that German economic recovery represented a threat to France.¹⁶³ This background is one of the reasons that the Schuman declaration, which marked a significant change in France's approach, proved to be so important. By re-packaging one of Adenauer's old ideas, the Schuman plan altercast Adenauer as a trustworthy partner. In response, Adenauer publicly highlighted that he "*voyait là un geste généreux de la France et de son ministre des Affaires étrangères à l'égard de l'Allemagne.*"¹⁶⁴

Conversely, the controversy that erupted in France around the European Defence Community (EDC) – Julius Weis Friend calls it the greatest ideological debate in France since the Dreyfuss affair –¹⁶⁵ and France's eventual rejection thereof, represented an important setback in Franco-German reconciliation. Nevertheless, the proposal which quickly replaced the EDC, Germany's admission to NATO, was actually more advantageous to Germany, and France's acceptance thereof thus represented its own form of positive altercasting. The fact that, in joining NATO, Germany accepted a command structure which would see its national defence forces ultimately commanded by a US officer, accepted the permanent stationing of allied troops on its soil, and pledged not to manufacture nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons on its territory, represented a critical instance of Germany altercasting France as a country with valid security concerns which Germany was willing to help address. These actions represented significant instances of positive altercasting, and again served as a significant contrast to the situation that had prevailed in 1918-1923 when the German government had not accepted the validity of France's concerns. In so doing, German

¹⁶³ Hitchcock (1998: 110).

¹⁶⁴ "saw in this a generous gesture from France and its foreign minister toward Germany." Quoted in Binoux (1972: 176).

¹⁶⁵ Friend (1991: 22).

decision-makers took a major step toward convincing French decision-makers to accept Germany as a member of the western liberal community.¹⁶⁶

The accession of Germany to NATO was quickly followed by the resolution of another important irritant, namely the Saarland. Wishing to integrate it into its own economy, France had proposed that the Saarland become an autonomous entity under the administration of the Western European Union. When this proposal was put to a referendum, Adenauer, at great political cost to himself, positively altercast the French by supporting the proposal. The Mollet government reciprocated when it quickly accepted the defeat of its proposal as a vote in favour of reunification – even though that option was not on the ballot – and quickly negotiated the return of the Saarland to Germany.¹⁶⁷ This response contrasts sharply with France's position during the early 1920s, and demonstrated that the French now considered Germany a fellow member of their liberal community to whom returning the Saarland and its resources was not a cause for concern.¹⁶⁸

These increasingly significant instances of altercasting helped to put in place the conditions required to enable the most important episode of altercasting of this episode, namely Adenauer's robust support of the French leadership during the Suez Crisis.¹⁶⁹ As we have seen, Adenauer's actions during the Suez crisis altercast the French as his preferred partners, partners with which he associated himself more closely than with the British or the USA. In so doing, Adenauer generated significant positive affect among his French interlocutors and helped solidify the new trusting relationship that was emerging between them.

¹⁶⁶ Paul (2000: 39).

¹⁶⁷ Friend (1991: 25).

¹⁶⁸ Kaiser (2007: 265-266); Binoux (1972: 186). Participants recall that this was "very, very important... in creating trust." Quoted in Moravcsik (1998: 143-144).

¹⁶⁹ Schwarz (1997: 245).

Conclusions

As in the two other case studies, the foregoing analysis paints a picture that is consistent with the expectations of my trust model. In the case of the Reparations Crisis, not only was there strong evidence suggesting that France did not recognize Germany as a fellow liberal state, there was also strong evidence that the five trust-enabling factors were absent as shown in Table 7.1. Given these findings, the clear lack of trust demonstrated by French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré's decision to invade the Ruhr in response to Germany's failure to meet its reparations obligations is not surprising.

| Table 7.1 | Reparations Crisis | Nuclear Weapons |
|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Trust-enabling Factors | French Decision-makers | French Decision-makers |
| Compatible Narratives | No | Yes |
| Interactivity | No | Yes |
| Homogeneity | No | Yes |
| Common Interests | No | Yes |
| Shared Experiences | No | Yes |
| Positive Altercasting | No | Yes |
| Trust | No | Yes |

Conversely, the clear acceptance of vulnerability by the Gaillard government when it negotiated the Chaban-Strauß agreements suggests an instance of trust. Further investigation provides strong support for an explanation which charts a gradually solidifying collective identification as liberals between French and German decision-makers in the 1945-1958 period. As the trust framework would predict, this identification is correlated with a strong increase in the five trust-enabling factors across the period.

As one can see from Table 7.1, the analysis of this case study is even more clearly supportive of the validity of the trust framework than was the analysis of the Canada-USA case study. This is due largely to the radical swing between the findings in the first and second episodes.

This case is also remarkable for the shift from an almost monomaniacal obsession with Germany's inherent illiberalism and latent power by French decision-makers in the first episode, to the adherence, albeit by a new set of French decision-makers, to a complex of narratives more conducive to the emergence of liberal trust in the second. How and why this occurred is a question worthy of further discussion. Also worthy of further consideration are the questions of how it was that particular individuals, notably Schuman and Adenauer, were able to play the outsized roles that they did in the second sub-case and how the important role played by dramatic events in the second episode, such as the Suez crisis, can be best understood.

Chapter 8

Findings and Discussion

Introduction

At an abstract level, all trusting relationships are trusting for exactly the same reason: agents collectively identify on the basis of a shared narrative and the presence of sufficient positive affect and familiarity, thereby triggering the formation of a psychological in-group. In non-trusting relationships, trust fails to obtain for a variety of reasons. In this chapter, I review the findings from the three preceding empirical case studies and what the instances where trust did emerge in these cases can tell us about trust and international politics. I also spend significant time discussing the implications of those instances when trust failed to obtain and how they help shed light on a variety of factors which can contribute to accelerating or impeding the formation of trust beliefs.

I begin the chapter by discussing my primary finding, namely that my empirical analysis has generated support for the plausibility of the trust model developed in the theoretical chapters of this thesis. In so doing, the empirical analysis also provides some initial support for my secondary argument that the liberal peace is the result of the emergence of a network of liberal security communities. My primary finding, that the plausibility of my trust model is supported, is fairly straightforward. Consequently, I move quickly from a discussion of this primary finding to the second part of the chapter where I discuss some additional findings. These additional findings illuminate some areas for improvement in my model, and some areas deserving of additional attention in future research. Once this discussion is complete, I

summarize the critical implications of these findings and set the stage for my final Conclusions chapter.

The primary finding

As discussed earlier, this project is not an attempt to test definitively my theory that the liberal peace is best explained by the existence of a network of liberal security communities. Rather, the purpose of the project is to lay the foundation for such a test by probing the plausibility of my new trust model, a task which must be completed before a true test of the liberal security community theory can be effectuated. Simultaneously, this study was also designed as a means of developing a set of methodological tools that would be required for such a test. It was also hoped that by conducting empirical analyses using these tools, the effectiveness of the tools and the validity of my trust model could be evaluated. Understood in this way, the results generated by the empirical analysis have been encouraging.

In Chapter 4, I listed five factors which I suggested were capable of producing the positive affect and familiarity required to transform a perception of a shared commonality into collective identification. My empirical analysis found that in all three cases, there was significant evidence that the presence of the five trust-enabling factors was correlated positively with acceptances of vulnerability by the weaker state while their absence correlated with a failure to accept vulnerability. In total, I examined eight potential trustors – primarily decision-makers for the weaker states – in six-sub cases. In all three instances where trust appears to have obtained, subscription to a justificatory narrative and the five-trust enabling factors clearly correlated with acceptances of vulnerability (Canadian non-acquisition, the Canadian military leadership in the Cuban missile crisis, and *Les accords Chaban-Strauß*),

thereby suggesting a correlation between these factors and trust. In four other instances (Diefenbaker in the Cuban missile crisis, the Reparations Crisis, Pakistani nuclear acquisition, and the Pakistani military in the Kargil War), the lack of subscription to a justificatory narrative and/or the five trust-enabling factors coincided with a failure to accept vulnerability. In one sub-case (the Pakistani political leadership in the Kargil War), the result is more mixed.

Thus, seven out of eight sub-cases generated results that conform to the expectations of my trust model. Moreover, it would not be a great stretch to interpret the mixed result of the eighth case as supportive as well. Consequently, these results support the plausibility of my trust model. While the generalizability of any inferences derived from the observation of this correlation is limited due to the small number of cases, this result is also supportive of the argument that trust is an influential factor in international politics, and thus provides some initial support for my theory that the liberal peace is the result of the existence of a network of liberal security communities.

Finally, it is also worth taking a moment to discuss the tools that were used to uncover this finding. As discussed in Chapter 4, one of the aims of this project was to help develop a more rigorous and standardized approach for the study of trust and, by extension, the liberal peace. Critical to this aspiration was the development of a set of indicators that could be used for rigorous quantitative comparisons across cases. The ambition behind this aspiration was never the replacement of qualitative with quantitative analysis; as has been clearly demonstrated by the case studies, qualitative analysis is invaluable for the study of a variable like trust, the influence of which depends to such a great extent on the specificities of the form of vulnerability being accepted and of the beliefs justifying this acceptance. However,

there is great scope for increased use of quantitative analysis as a means of measuring and comparing the objective operation of several of the trust-enabling factors which I have identified, such as interactivity and homogeneity.

One of the big questions which remains unanswered after this study concerns the levels of these indicators required to push the agents past the threshold at which familiarity and collective identification trigger the formation of a psychological in-group. Further development of the tools constructed in this inquiry would greatly assist the answering of this question. As I have already discussed, one of the reasons I have been unable to answer this question is due to the limited nature of the easily available historical statistics. Another limitation is simply the size of this study and the need for more case studies using the same method so that a larger database can be assembled in which it might become possible to validly identify some clearer patterns. Finally, and as will be discussed in the Conclusions chapter, this answer is linked inextricably with the answer to the question of when and how particular narratives achieve salience.

Additional Findings

As mentioned earlier, in addition to the primary finding, my empirical analysis also revealed several additional findings which seemed to be particularly important to the generation of trust, and which were not predicted during the initial construction of the trust model. With the plausibility of my trust model now supported, I devote the remainder of this chapter to a discussion of four of the most important of these additional findings: (1) the need for a more nuanced picture of the ways in which agents and structures interact in international politics; (2) the importance of institutionalized collaboration; (3) the need for a greater focus on the

substantive content of narratives in scholarship on the liberal peace; and (4) the surprising roles played by catharses and epiphanies.

Agents and structures revisited

A finding that agents and structures are mutually constitutive and that they both play an important role in international politics would by no means represent a novel contribution to IR scholarship. That my research found this was true is thus not surprising. Nonetheless, my empirical work does provide some revealing illustrations of just how agents and structures interact that can hopefully add additional nuance to this understanding and some flesh to the abstract (meta)theoretical skeletons provided by scholars like Wendt and Wight. For example, the ways in which the agents who created an institution encode their assumptions in that institution's structure, which I discuss below, provide an evocative and fine-grained account of how agents build structures and how these structures then come to constrain other agents in the future.¹

Most striking, however, is how my empirical work has offered other, less descriptive, contributions to this discussion of agents and structures. First among these is the finding that individuals do matter, not just for Foreign Policy Analysis where this idea is already fairly well-accepted, but also for IR more generally. I advance this finding largely on the strength of the observation that because of individuals' importance in the initial construction of structures and because of how the enduring character of these structures results in a great deal of path dependency, individuals can actually exercise significant influence on events, thereby justifying the paying of attention to them. This is a finding that supports an impressive body

¹ Pierson (2004: 39) makes this point for institutions, i.e. distributions of power, but I argue that much the same can be said about distributions of meaning. See also Crawford (2000: 119) and (2002: 6).

of work that has recently developed on path dependence and the windows of opportunity afforded to individuals to have a significant influence at the moments when paths are being chosen initially.²

I began my discussion of agency in Chapter 4 by noting an important point made by Ruzicka and Wheeler regarding the gap between theorizing about trust, located mainly at the level of individuals, and the behaviour most scholars of IR are interested in explaining, namely state behaviour. By taking this point seriously and locating the capacity to trust at the level of the individual, I also accepted the challenge of providing an account of how individual agents transmitted effects up to the level of states. My response to this challenge was to articulate both a conception of agency largely borrowed from Wight, and to erect a rudimentary theory of state decision-making which divided polities into three segments: (1) decision-makers nested within (2) an elite nested within (3) a general population. This division into three groups assisted me in making some useful observations regarding the roles played by each of these three groups.

First among these was my confirmation of the theory that the general public does not tend to directly influence decision-makers, especially during crisis periods. However, I also found that this theory is a little too simplistic and that while they do not usually directly influence decision-makers, publics do set the limits of what is possible for decision-makers to do. A good example of this can be found in the way that the French public expressed its general preference for a hard-line approach to Germany by electing the conservative *chamber bleu horizon*, thereby empowering one faction within the elite at the expense of another. In so doing, the French public set limits on what was possible for French decision-makers and

² Pierson (2004: Chapter 3) for example.

constrained Briand from achieving a reconciliation with Germany in 1921. While it is more difficult to trace a similar influence in less liberal democratic states like Pakistan, the fact that members of the elite expended significant resources attempting to manipulate public opinion suggests that public opinion, and its influence on the distribution of meaning, is still a crucial factor in setting the limits of the possible.³

This finding suggests that Owen's earlier argument requires a qualification: while individual members of the public may not possess significant agency₃, as a group they are probably more powerful than any other group in altering the macro-level structures (agency₂) within which elite agents' agency₂ is embedded. Furthermore, while decision-makers and elites can use their agency₃ to influence the public, thereby shifting the boundaries of the possible over time, during crises it is best to understand the public as having already made their move by setting the boundaries within which the decision-makers must act.⁴ This further supports my earlier argument that understanding the main discourses competing for hegemony in a polity is an important part of determining whether there exists significant trust potential between two states because it tells us what boundaries the public has already set.⁵

My adoption of this trifocal perspective also illuminated a couple of other notable patterns in the mutual constitution of agents and structures. The first is that individuals, previously the atom of international politics, can and should be split by social scientists. Individuals need to be recognized not as rational billiard balls bumping into one another in linear patterns, but as psychological agents with all the complicating non-linear implications thereof. Because structures must flow through individuals to have an effect, theories of how agency relates to

³ This aligns with Chong and Hall's (2014: 28) finding that public opinion is an important player in illiberal regimes. See also Crawford (2002: 33).

⁴ This accords with Hermann's and Kegley's (1995: 515) perspective. Vucetic (2011: 12) also agrees.

⁵ This analysis also responds to Hayes' (2012b: 784) call for better integrating publics into the study of the liberal peace.

structure must take into account the type of agents that individuals are; namely, reasonable agents. Because agents are affected by both rationality and affect, the ways in which structures are reproduced by these agents will be affected by both these aspects of their character.⁶ For example, while some may adhere to a particular religion for rational reasons, many individuals' devotion emerges from a deeply personal experience of the divine. To my mind this seems a profoundly agential attribute not fully ascribable to social structure. Similarly, an individual's competence or charisma, while its effect may be multiplied or stifled by prevailing structures, is an inherently agential quality that can have an important political impact.

Second, structures do not exist without individuals to reproduce them. And just as critically, individuals are not simply neutral and impotent throughputs for structures; individuals have individual properties which influence the ways in which structures are reproduced – agency₁ again. Certainly, some of these properties flow from their roles as nodes in the network of structures in which they are implicated, and the ways in which agents come to creatively embody, enact, and combine these structures, both purposefully and unintentionally. Indeed, it was in providing fine-grained accounts of how agents' nodality actually plays out that the most interesting finding regarding the role of individuals emerged, namely that individuals can play a major role in international politics. But the impact of these agents is also highly dependent on their aforementioned *individual* qualities like charisma and competence. Adenauer provides the most illuminating example in this regard.

I have already described how the 'myth of two Germanies' was essential to enabling reconciliation between France and Germany. Because of who he was, that is, a lifelong

⁶ This work therefore supports the arguments of scholars like Crawford (2000) and Hall (2011) that emotions, which can only be experienced by individuals, need to be accounted for when scholars analyze international politics.

Rhinelander and devout Catholic, Adenauer fit the role of a German leader compatible with this myth in a way that Social Democrat leader Kurt Schumacher – the other individual most likely to have become Germany’s postwar leader – never could. Yet Adenauer could still have failed as a leader if not for his competence, charisma, and staunch moral commitment to liberalism, all profoundly agential characteristics. The basic point here is that while it is only agents that can embody structures, even if they do successfully embody these structures, it is only through their personal qualities that this embodiment can be rendered consequential. In particular, it was only through his charisma, competence, and *gravitas* that Adenauer was able to convert the potential that his embodiment of the ‘good’ German bestowed on him into influence at the national and international levels.

Adenauer’s success largely depended on his effective ‘rhetorical practice’ or what Wendt calls ‘ideological labour.’⁷ Basically, Adenauer was effective because he was a good political entrepreneur and was able to identify and invoke ‘objective’ facts creatively – such as France and Germany’s shared Western heritage – and argue persuasively that these facts required a specific response – for example, collective identification between them. I have already discussed how the homogeneity derived from such a shared heritage objectively generated positive affect and familiarity; what is important here is the subjective response to these facts that Adenauer was able to provoke, a response that went beyond what would have accompanied a solely ‘objective’ operation of the homogeneity mechanism.⁸ In other words, Adenauer was able to multiply the impact of this shared heritage and, in so doing, boost and accelerate the process of collective identification through the subjective impact of his rhetoric and actions. How he was able to do this is worthy of further investigation. While it may not be possible to predict when a person is going to be charismatic or competent, identifying

⁷ Wendt (1994: 391) and (1999: 344-349). Cf. Barnett and Adler (1998: 422) and Cederman (2001b).

⁸ Cf. Kupchan (2010: 282).

when an individual possessing such attributes has an opportunity to exploit them in consequential ways is something that might be possible.

Finally, as is further discussed below, trust and, by extension, the individuals doing the trusting, are exceptionally important in novel situations when established structures do not offer routinized answers to pressing policy questions.⁹ In these cases, well-placed and/or well-suited individuals, such as Adenauer or Bhutto, can be especially influential. These individuals are important not only because of their influence at that particular juncture, but also because of how they are able to use their influence to create new institutions which encode their assumptions, thereby enabling and constraining those who follow them. The French-German case demonstrates this encoding with the importance of a pairing like Adenauer and Schuman. These two were able to build trust with each other for a variety of idiosyncratic reasons described earlier. Critically, however, the institutions that were built on the basis of this trust encoded it, thereby creating structures that would predispose those individuals who participated therein to trust, even after the original agents had been removed from office.¹⁰

Institutionalized collaboration

This discussion of the encoding of assumptions into institutions connects nicely to another one of the most interesting findings that emerged from my empirical analysis, namely a specific pattern of behaviour that was consistently correlated with, and implicated in, the emergence of trust – a pattern that I term *institutionalized collaboration*. By institutionalized

⁹ Pierson (2004: 44); Schafer and Walker (2006: 565).

¹⁰ Puchala (1968: 52) argues that “[g]roups store records of their experiences in their traditions, their customs, their shared histories, their libraries, their universities and their filing cabinets.” I argue they also store them in their institutions.

collaboration I mean a pattern of behaviour in which agents come into persistent and regular contact primarily under the aegis of a formal institution. That this form of collaboration is important is not surprising as its importance has been noted in previous scholarship and is supported by the analysis in the preceding section. What is new here, however, is that my analysis provides a theoretical basis for understanding why institutionalized collaboration can be such a powerful generator of trust. By combining consistently at least a majority of the five trust-enabling factors in self-reinforcing configurations – usually most, or all, of interactivity, common interests, shared experiences, and altercasting – institutionalized collaboration consistently recruits a large proportion of the causal force theorized as capable of generating trust.

This is not to say that all collaboration that takes place in an institutionalized setting will result in agents developing trust for each other. If those who design the institutions do not trust each other then trust-enabling features will be less likely to be encoded into the structure of the institutions.¹¹ Institutions that are designed without a common goal around which a true collaboration can be organized are a good example of such an instance. Nevertheless, the point remains that when a certain level or form of collaboration becomes institutionalized, it can have a significant impact on agents' tendencies to trust their collaborators because of how this institutionalization generates self-reinforcing patterns of positive affect and familiarity generating behaviour – even if the institutions founders did not themselves trust each other originally.¹²

At a conceptual level, the aforementioned assumptions regarding the trustworthiness of an agent's collaborators, and the institutional structures that encode these assumptions, are what

¹¹ See Barnett and Gause's (1998) discussion of the Gulf Cooperation Council for an example.

¹² Barnett and Adler (1998: 431) hypothesize that path dependence of this type would obtain.

often form the environments within which agents are socialized and constitute an important part of the distributions of meaning and power in which they are embedded. If an institution has been constructed by agents who trust their collaborators, these agents' assumptions about the trustworthiness of their collaborators will tend to crystallize in the institutional framework that they have constructed. Institutional structures constructed in this way will in turn incentivize and routinize behaviours that tend to reproduce these assumptions for agents acting within this context and, correspondingly, impute these assumptions to the agents embedded within them.¹³ How this actually predisposes agents to trusting at a more concrete level is best explored by examining the three trust enabling factors most often engaged.¹⁴

As was discussed in Chapter 3, interactivity is actually a combination of two separate psychological mechanisms, namely 'mere exposure' and 'intergroup contact'. It is through the creation of institutional structures which activate these mechanisms that institutionalized collaboration predisposes agents to trust their collaborators. This activation is accomplished in two ways. First, institutionalization tends to create more, more direct, and more regular interaction between agents, thereby increasing the operation of the 'mere exposure' mechanism. Second, institutionalization of interactions also tends to result in interactions that meet the more demanding requirements, such as equal status between agents, needed to engage the operation of the intergroup contact mechanism. Other forms of interactivity, such

¹³ This raises the question of whether trust is a conscious or unconscious phenomenon. Both Pouliot (2008) and Hopf (2010) argue that much of IR scholarship suffers from a representational bias that blocks our ability to recognize, let alone understand, much of what is actually happening in international politics. While I believe that much of the decision-making discussed here derives from consciously held trust-beliefs, I also accept that many of these beliefs likely pass quite quickly from the trustor's consciousness to their unconscious and are subsequently better described as unreflective practice or habit. Jervis (1988: 680) agrees. Once this occurs, agency₁ becomes less important and much of agents' agency can be accounted for by agency₂ and agency₃. This is not to say that agents do not trust, but rather that most routine interactions never test agents' trust beliefs, meaning that trust does not even enter the equation – the 'unthinkability of war' in a security community being a good example. Cf. Pouliot (2008: 279-280); Taylor (2004: 25).

¹⁴ Interestingly, the India-Pakistan case seems to demonstrate a comparable but opposite process of 'institutionalization' – or at least routinization – through the accumulation of incentive structures privileging antagonistic interactions. Cf. Hopf (2010: 552).

as trade, often only weakly engage this second mechanism with the result that the positive affect and familiarity generated by this interactivity are not as significant as they could be.

The institutionalized interactivity between French and German decision-makers that emerged out of the informal interactivity that existed between Christian democratic leaders like Adenauer and Schuman provides an excellent example of these processes at work. Because Adenauer, Schuman, and their colleagues believed that the only way to avoid another war between France and Germany was for these two states to resolve their differences collaboratively and to do so within a broadly liberal framework, they constructed institutions designed to enable such collaboration in accordance with these principles, with the institutions of the European project resulting. The trust between Adenauer and Schuman, which, initially, took both exceptional individuals and dedication to build, was necessary to overcome the obstacles put in place by the generalized distrust and enduring rivalry that had existed between the two countries previously, and needs to be studied on its own terms. But once this trust obtained, these individuals created forms of institutional collaboration which reproduced the trusting relationships between them among a much wider group of French and German decision-makers who were drawn into this process. Other, similar, examples can be found in the run-up to Canada's non-acquisition of nuclear weapons and in relations between the Canadian and US militaries prior to the Cuban missile crisis.

A related observation that is worth noting is that collaboration focused on technical matters seems to have often been the most generative of positive affect and familiarity. This is likely because technical questions are more amenable to integrative problem-solving approaches in which experts are able to work in a truly collaborative fashion and hew more closely to the ideal of the intergroup contact mechanism. In fact, practitioners and scholars have often

pointed to technical bodies and cooperation as important in this regard.¹⁵ Peter Haydon, for example, points out that one of the reasons that there was such a disconnection between the Canadian political and military leaderships during the Cuban missile crisis was that NORAD's technical planning machinery had become largely detached from the political leadership. This left politicians unexposed to the trust-generating processes embedded in this collaboration, while the military leadership was intimately implicated therein.¹⁶ This differentiation contributed to the differentiation in trust beliefs between the Canadian and US militaries on the one hand, and their respective political leaderships on the other.

Institutionalized collaboration also often serves to generate shared experiences. The importance of this aspect of institutionalized collaboration was demonstrated quite clearly during the Suez crisis. By 1956, Adenauer's Christian Democratic partners had lost power in France, and Adenauer was faced with a much more skeptical French cabinet formed primarily of Socialist and Radical politicians. However, by continuing his now regular consultations with his French interlocutors, even during the crisis when he was given many reasons not to, Adenauer ensured that he was present to share the difficult and intense experiences of the final unravelling of the operation with the French leadership. In so doing, Adenauer was able to create a strong affective bond with the new French leadership which helped to win their trust.

Finally, in what is perhaps the most novel aspect of this finding, institutionalized collaboration produces what I call 'institutional altercasting', a new idea that requires some explanation. Institutional altercasting generates trust in two ways. In the first instance, it creates trust beliefs by inducing an emotional response to an acceptance of vulnerability,

¹⁵ Author's observation from discussions with Canadian diplomats while embedded in the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (October 2012-July 2013).

¹⁶ Haydon (1993: Chapter 5).

specifically the type of vulnerability that an agent accepts by investing the time and resources required to create a venue for institutional collaboration. As discussed in Chapter 2, unilateral acceptances of vulnerability of this sort – Rationalists' costly signals – transmit important information between agents. But as discussed under the altercasting heading in Chapter 3, the sending of such a costly signal can simultaneously induce an important emotional response. By casting the recipient in a positive light – for instance, as an agent with whom it is worth the bother of setting up an institution through which to collaborate – the altercasting agent induces positive affect on the part of the recipient as well as a tendency to act according to the role in which they were cast. Thus, if an agent creates an institution whose success relies on participants in the institution possessing a particular character – for example, liberalism – and then invites others to collaborate with them through said institution, this invitation will induce a tendency on the part of the invited agents to act in accordance with the institution's character. The USA's willingness to include Canada in the Manhattan project during the Second World War when it could have developed nuclear weapons easily without Canadian involvement represents a good example thereof.

The second way that institutional altercasting works is similar, but persists throughout the life of the institution. All institutions represent a particular distribution of power and the particularities of this distribution will necessarily incentivize certain behaviours over others. This incentivization will, initially at least, largely reflect the assumptions of those who created the institution. Accordingly, the adoption of these assumptions, such as the trustworthiness of other members of the institution, will often be the best means available to agents for rendering these incentivized patterns of behaviour intelligible. Consequently, agents participating in the institution will be biased to adopt these incentivized assumptions

so as to minimize cognitive dissonance.¹⁷ Moreover, the effects of this incentivization are unlikely to cease unless the practices by which they have been instantiated are themselves altered and will likely persist even if none of the institution's designers or original participants remain.¹⁸ In fact, the results of this altercasting need not even have been the objective of the institution's designers.¹⁹ Rather, the effects can emerge as an unconscious corollary to the character of relations that exist between the agents constructing the institution.

A good concrete example of this sort of institutional altercasting can be found in the fact that NORAD always has a US commander. This generates trust in two ways. First, trust for the US commander is induced in the commander's Canadian subordinates because it does not make sense for these Canadian officers to do anything but assume that the commander who is charged with defending their state from attack can be trusted to do so. Indeed, it is only in so doing that the institutional structures in which these Canadian officers can be rendered intelligible. Second, and perhaps more importantly, by placing a US commander in a position of great responsibility for the defence of Canada and, in the US commander's absence, placing a Canadian officer in charge of the USA's defence, Canada and the USA cast each other as trustworthy, thereby inducing these individual commanders acting on behalf of the two states, to act in a trustworthy manner.

The importance of substantive content

¹⁷ See Hall (2011: 534-535) for a concurring analysis. This process need not even be a conscious one: Pouliot (2008) and Hopf (2010).

¹⁸ Cf. Kahl (1998: 144).

¹⁹ Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 13 and 20-21). Cf. Koh's (1997) argument about how international law is internalized by states. Significantly, institutionalization, which represents one of the pathways to internalization, can also occur at the international level. See Risse-Kappen (1995b: 225).

Institutions, which are a form of distribution of power, are in abstract quite similar to narratives and other distributions of meaning. In both cases, they refer to intersubjectively generated structures which define the environments in which individuals act by enabling certain actions and constraining others, depending on the particularities of the structure. I have just discussed how the particularities of certain distributions of power can be distinctively conducive to the formation of trust because of the way that they trigger certain trust-enabling factors. In this section, I discuss the similar, but previously neglected, role of the particular contents of distributions of meaning.²⁰ While there has been much work done on how specific institutional forms help generate the liberal peace, there has been significantly less work done on the specific influences of particular distributions of meaning, on how these distributions interaction with individuals, their agency₁, their decision-making, and, by extension, on how these influences ultimately generate the liberal peace.²¹

One of my most important findings in this regard is that while shared liberalism is necessary for the formation of a liberal security community, and by extension for the existence of the liberal peace, it is less obvious that shared liberalism is sufficient. There are a number of potential explanations for why liberalism alone may be insufficient and I discuss the two most important here. The first possibility is that there could be a failure of perception, meaning that one side might fail to perceive the other as liberal.²² In such a case of misperception, then the liberalism that is shared at the objective level will not be perceived as shared, and will thus be unable to serve as the basis of a collective identification. This has two important effects. First, without a shared commonality around which collective identification can crystallize, the in-group bias on which security communities depend will

²⁰ Vucetic (2011: 153-154) similarly notes this parallel.

²¹ Thankfully, as noted in Chapter 3, there is scholarship from other areas of IR that can be used as models. See, for example, Crawford (2002), Weldes (1999), Campbell (1998), and Jackson (2003). Vucetic (2011) is a partial exception.

²² See Oren (1995); Hayes (2012).

not obtain. Second, even if agents did collectively identify, this identification would have to occur on the basis of some other shared commonality, and there is no reason to assume *a priori* that the resulting non-liberal in-group would be defined by the non-violent resolution of disputes.²³

In my case studies there seem to have been two factors which modulated ‘misperception’ of the types just described.²⁴ The first of these is an accumulation of enmity whereby agents’ past experiences of others generate negative affect toward them and are interpreted as supporting agents’ subscription to a competing narrative substantively antithetical to the emergence of trust. An example of this might be a history of conflict such as an enduring rivalry and the emergence of a chauvinistic narrative that purports to render this rivalry intelligible.²⁵ In such a case, these negative experiences result in a familiarity with the other agent which predisposes those agents to predict negative outcomes from future interactions with them and interpret these interactions negatively when they do occur.²⁶ As discussed in the section in the Introduction chapter concerning conflicts arising out of the security dilemma, such negative expectations can actually generate conflict on their own. As negative expectations and experiences accumulate, a self-fulfilling prophecy is created: agents invest – both materially, in their patterns of behaviour, and rhetorically in the constitution of their cognitive framework – in the conflict, rendering it self-reinforcing, often in ways unanticipated by those involved.²⁷ Additionally, and as discussed below, the ‘stickiness of

²³ A good example of this was the aforementioned episode in which trust obtained between the Indian and Pakistani commanders during the fighting in the Rann of Kutch in 1964.

²⁴ I say ‘misperception’ because the liberalism of all three cases (Weimar Germany, India, and Pakistan) has been questioned.

²⁵ On enduring rivalries see Goertz and Diehl (1992, 1993 and 1995) and Hensel, Goertz and Diehl (2000). Cf. Hopf (2010: 552).

²⁶ Cf. Crawford (2002: 48) on how one’s beliefs bias one’s interpretation of information.

²⁷ Cf. Pierson (2004: 115).

perceptions' can block the functioning of some of the five trust-enabling factors or even generate countervailing pressures.

The India-Pakistan case provides an apt example. Initially, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto likely used anti-Indianism as a means of rallying the Pakistani population during a chaotic period without really considering how doing so would impair his ability to resolve disputes with India in the long run. Similarly, he likely did not realize how such a narrative would advantage the military in the domestic political sphere *vis-à-vis* civilian leaders. Later, however, after deposing Bhutto, the military leadership seems to have consciously stoked anti-Indianism as a means of exacerbating the conflict with India, at least partially in order to maintain the legitimacy of its dominant position in Pakistani society. Essentially, the Pakistani military developed a dependence on the continuation of the conflict in Kashmir for its legitimacy. Correspondingly, the military continues to invest in the continuation of this conflict by training and supporting Kashmiri insurgents. Thus, the Pakistani military undermines any chance of India recognizing Pakistan as a liberal state and stokes India's enmity in a way that helps the Pakistani military justify its dominant role in Pakistani society, thereby perpetuating a vicious cycle. Incidentally, this pattern of behaviour has also impeded the emergence of liberal democracy in Pakistan.

Subscription to such a confrontational narrative will also tend to trigger, and be reinforced by, the growth of an affective antipathy toward the others in question. Such an antipathy will then tend to generate a bias toward interpreting the disliked others' actions in order to reinforce the negative perception of them already held by the agent and, by extension, a bias against perceiving the other as possessing potentially shared positive qualities, such as adherence to

liberalism.²⁸ This stickiness of perceptions is analogous to the stickiness of identification discussed in Chapter 3. While such stickiness might be rational at one level – those who hurt you previously are probably the most likely to hurt you again – by reinforcing structures of enmity, such biases can also themselves be the cause of greater future conflict. The relations between France and Germany during the Reparations crisis, and the Pakistani military's moves prior to the Kargil War, provide apt examples in this regard.

The second source of misperception that manifests in the case studies is disagreement on the substantive meaning of liberalism, something that is perhaps unsurprising given the tensions inherent in liberalism as a body of thought.²⁹ Agents who fail to perceive each other as liberal due to their different interpretations of liberalism will be unable to identify collectively on the basis of shared liberalism. This was the case in the Canada-USA relationship prior to the First World War where agents on both sides denigrated the other's system of government as illiberal. This did not result in conflict, but it did inhibit collective identification and the emergence of liberal trust. Similarly, if the two sides interpret liberalism in different ways, the contradictions between interpretations can actively push the two sides toward conflict, something that seems to have occurred for at least some agents in the India-Pakistan case. In this instance, each side emphasized a different aspect of liberalism (a neutral secular state *versus* self-determination), thereby creating a situation in which each side's ontological security was threatened by the mere existence of the other. Because the substantive specifics of these two states' founding narratives were so incompatible, any recognition by one side of the validity of the other side's existence was rendered very difficult because of the way that

²⁸ Crawford (2002: 48)

²⁹ See Freedon (1996: Chapters 4-7). Schafer and Walker (2006: 562 and 578) argue that the UK and the USA reacted differently to the Kosovo crisis in 1999 at least partially due to their differing interpretations of liberalism.

doing so would call into question the validity of each side's own founding narrative and existential *raison d'être*.³⁰

How can trust emerge in relationships characterized by such enmity? One pathway already recognized by many scholars involves drama and dramatic events dislodging these sticky perceptions. I outline my contribution to this discussion in the next section. More novel, however, is my finding that the salience of liberalism for agents' decision-making will often need to be boosted by the inter-weaving of liberalism and some other narrative so that together they become sufficiently salient to dislodge, neutralize, or reinterpret the narrative of enmity blocking the logic of liberalism from generating trust.³¹

A good example of how this interweaving can occur can be found in the role played by Christian democracy in helping overcome France and Germany's history of conflict. In this instance, not only did Catholic thought already contain a rhetorical bias toward transnational patterns of organization compatible with the construction of European institutions,³² it was also compatible with the 'myth of two Germanies' which helped to legitimate a rapprochement between France and the 'good' western Germany now that the 'bad' eastern Germany was out of the picture. This postwar form of political Catholicism was also thoroughly liberal, having been shorn of its earlier and now discredited anti-democratic tendencies by the experience of the collaboration of some elements of inter-war political Catholicism with fascist governments. Similarly, as the importance of the Catholic origins of the European project faded with time, the more secular 'European' aspects of the narrative,

³⁰ Muppidi (2001: 62).

³¹ Vucetic (2011) has already suggested race as a narrative that has historically fortified the liberal peace. Again we see a parallel with Pierson (2004: 150) as he argues that complimentary institutions can help to strengthen and stabilize particular trajectories.

³² Kaiser (2007: 10-11).

which were compatible with the cognitive frameworks of Radicals and Socialists in France, grew in importance and enabled collective identification to continue on this basis.

Thus, by weaving liberalism into a larger transnational Catholic European package, Christian democrats boosted the attractiveness of liberalism as a narrative, and were able to organize collective identification around this larger package in a way that had been impossible in 1919-1923. Indeed, the fact that some indicators show higher levels of societal interactivity during this earlier non-trusting period than during the ultimately trusting 1950s underlines the importance of narrative factors for collective identification. Simultaneously, it is also important to recognize that when alloyed with another narrative, the tenets of this other narrative will also be important because they will also influence agents' perceptions and decisions. For such an alloying to enable liberal trust successfully – and specifically, dependable expectations of peaceful change – the content of the narrative must be such that it does not contradict the parts of liberalism which enable these dependable expectations. For example, political Catholicism would have been much less amenable to the establishment of the Franco-German liberal security community if it contained an idea that periodic wars were an important part of social renewal, as did some narratives popular prior to the First World War.³³

Catharsis, epiphanies, and the importance of drama

As the two preceding sections have outlined, structures of various sorts can play an important role in both enabling and inhibiting the generation of trust. Structures tend to be constants, however, and are thus not well suited to explaining change. Indeed, as discussed, it was only

³³ Kissinger (1994: 168); Johnson (2004: 64). Cf. Mosse (1986: 492-493)

when collaboration between French and German decision-makers became institutionalized that the process of collective identification really began. Similarly, it was only when the narrative of the USA as a potential aggressor shifted to a narrative that recognized a special 'North American Way' that widespread collective identification between Canada and the USA on the basis of shared liberalism became possible. However, structures conceived in this manner cannot explain these shifts: what was it that inspired an institutionalization of the French-German relationship and why had it not occurred previously? Why did the 'North American Way' suddenly become accepted by Canadian Conservatives as a compelling and accurate description of reality when they had previously resisted it?

In answering these questions I am helping to address a broader weakness in Constructivist theorizing, namely the failure to explain how changes in social structures occur.³⁴ One of the most striking patterns to emerge from my empirical analysis was the important role played by drama and dramatic events. These events dissolved pre-existing patterns of behaviour and belief and enabled significant cognitive re-arrangement in a short period of time. As discussed below, the idea that drama can have such an impact is not new; what is new is the focus I bring to it and my identification of two specific correlates of drama – catharsis and epiphany – which have played critical roles in the emergence of trusting relationships in the empirical case studies.

In my cases studies, drama served two main cognitive functions. In the first case, drama, and the attention that it drew, enabled agents to register their discontent and/or express their anger and other negative emotions in a way that allowed them to cleanse themselves of these negative emotions and to subsequently consider new perspectives. I label this class of event

³⁴ See Jackson and Nexon (2002: 4).

as ‘catharses’ after Aristotle’s concept of purification of emotions through vicarious experience.³⁵ One can find a basis for the importance of this sort of phenomenon in Wendt’s discussion of humans’ desire for recognition.³⁶ Viewed from this perspective, catharsis fulfils an agent’s desire for recognition by another by providing the agent with an opportunity to express their anger and frustrations with an other to that other. By itself, such expression may remove barriers to collective identification by releasing pressure and by providing evidence that the other respects the first agent sufficiently to hear their complaints and, by extension, recognizes them. Moreover, if the other agent responds in a way that communicates that they have registered the complaint, and will respond so as to make amends, this may further accelerate collective identification through the generation of positive affect.

In the second case, dramatic events, usually through their traumatic and unexpected nature, induce an abrupt and discontinuous shift in agents’ perspectives. I refer to these phenomena as ‘epiphanies’ in order to capture the injection of fluidity and openness to new possibilities that they occasion. As discussed earlier, the structures which constitute agents’ agency₂ can come to render their perceptions so sticky that absent such a disjuncture, agents may be unable to recognize disconfirming evidence. Consequently, agents may lose the ability to extract themselves from the patterns of decision-making that these perceptions bias them toward, as seems to be the case in enduring rivalries such as India and Pakistan. While in both the Canada-USA and France-Germany cases I have identified both a catharsis and an epiphany, I do not see any theoretically compelling argument that would require there to always be one of each in order to enable a shift in the prevailing distributions of meaning. Nevertheless, these two different responses seem to tap into two different psychological

³⁵ This idea was inspired by Raymond Aron’s assertion that the 1954 debate on European Defence Cooperation acted as a cathartic experience for the French public and political elite. Quoted in Friend (1991: 23).

³⁶ Wendt (2003: 523-524). Cf. Williams (2001)

pathways toward the openness to new perspectives that is of interest, thereby justifying their isolation as separate phenomena, at least for analytical purposes.

These effects of drama have already been discussed to some extent by theorists who examine phenomena like “shocks, new facts, reality gaps, ruptures,”³⁷ ‘objective crisis,’³⁸ ‘breaches,’³⁹ ‘moments of awe,’⁴⁰ ‘punctuated equilibrium,’⁴¹ ‘concentrated encounters’,⁴² ‘cataclysmic events’,⁴³ ‘perturbations’,⁴⁴ ‘transformative crisis’,⁴⁵ ‘frame-breaking’ moves,⁴⁶ ‘cognitive punches’,⁴⁷ ‘trauma’,⁴⁸ and ‘political shocks’.⁴⁹ My argument differs from some existing accounts in that I see dramatic events not as necessary mechanisms for the generation of trust, but rather as stimuli capable of introducing a temporary and radical flexibility/fluidity into agents’ cognitive frameworks, thereby opening a window of opportunity for major and rapid changes in their perspectives.⁵⁰

To be clear, I am not arguing that drama is necessary for the eventuation of trust in every context. In some cases, trust may emerge as the logical endpoint of the functioning of certain structured patterns of behaviour which emerged much earlier and simply required progression through many steps. But it does seem clear that often relationships are locked into certain

³⁷ Vucetic (2011: 14).

³⁸ Hopf (2010: 546).

³⁹ Kahl (1998: 124).

⁴⁰ Haidt (2012: 228).

⁴¹ Barnett and Adler (1998: 431).

⁴² Khong (1992: 246).

⁴³ Adler and Barnett (1998b: 51-52).

⁴⁴ Jackson and Nexon (2002: 13).

⁴⁵ Kahl (1998: 114).

⁴⁶ Wheeler (2010: 329).

⁴⁷ Shore (1998: 359).

⁴⁸ “Trauma can be seen as an encounter that betrays our faith in previously established personal and social worlds and calls into question the resolutions of impossible questions that people have arrived at in order to continue with day-to-day life...” Edkins (2004: 253). See also Mitzen (2006: 348).

⁴⁹ Goertz and Diehl (1993).

⁵⁰ “Traumatic events produce a moment of openness, often brief and transitory, where things that were considered decided and secure become once more subject to question.” Edkins (2004: 253). See also Zehfuss (2003: especially 520-522).

non-trusting behavioural or ideational configurations characterized by self-reinforcing dynamics which inhibit or slow the operation of the trust-enabling factors I have identified. In such cases, these self-reinforcing dynamics can only be broken by dramatic developments and the reactions they generate. Moreover, it is often the case that the nature of these developments will tend to privilege the emergence of a particular new perspective or the dominance of a new set of agents, although this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, often the impulse for change following a dramatic event will come from the operation of other factors – both structures and agents – which may have been unaffected by the drama themselves. In these cases, the drama simply unblocks or accelerates the impact of these other factors.⁵¹

In both the Canada-USA and France-Germany cases the emergence of a liberal security community, and the trust which helped to constitute it, were preceded by important shifts from one hegemonic understanding/perception of the other to another. In both cases, these shifts were occasioned by a series of dramatic developments. In the Canada-USA case, the victory of the anti-American Conservatives in the vituperative and bruising 1911 election seems to have acted as an important catharsis in which many Canadians registered their discontent with a large store of perceived slights at the hands of the USA that had been accumulating for years.⁵² This was soon followed by an epiphany provoked by the dramatic entry of the USA into the First World War on the side of the Allies, justified by the USA's mission to make the world 'safe for democracy'. Subsequently, the USA moved quite quickly from being a rival against which Canada had to be on guard, to an ally which could potentially be trusted.

⁵¹ Naomi Klein's *The Shock Doctrine* (2008) provides a series of journalistic accounts of how the traumatised publics in states due to exceptional events enabled political entrepreneurs to put into place policies which they would never have been able to enact during 'normal' times.

⁵² Stacey (1977: 102).

In the France-Germany case, the pattern is remarkably similar. While trust may have already been established between the French and German Christian democratic politicians who had inaugurated the European project, both the French Christian democrats and the European project itself were under threat by 1954. That year, the Christian democrats lost power in France and the perceived next step in integration, the EDC, was defeated in the French Assembly. Raymond Aron describes the defeat of the EDC as a ‘cathartic’ moment by which the French population was purified of “resentments accumulated over a century against the ‘hereditary enemy.’”⁵³ This cleansing helped to open the political space necessary for further integration down the road – German accession to NATO being the most immediate and spectacular example. But the problem remained that, while institutional collaboration between France and Germany was expanding, many of the non-Christian democratic French elite still harboured some suspicions of Germany. With the Christian democrats no longer in power, it was this elite that would need to trust the Germans in order for a genuine liberal security community to emerge. As discussed earlier, the key turning point in this regard was Adenauer’s dramatic support of the French government during the disastrous Suez crisis. It was this support, when all of France’s other allies dramatically abandoned it, that provided the epiphany, at least for many previously skeptical French decision-makers, that enabled the necessary shift in perspectives from suspicion to one open to trust.

Of course, not all instances of drama can spark catharsis or epiphany. For example, in the India-Pakistan case there have been a number of dramatic events which seemingly could have induced a catharsis but did not. The Kargil War, for example, was highly dramatic and risked escalating to a nuclear exchange but does not appear to have been cathartic. Pierson picks up on this problem when he argues that current explanations of what he calls ‘critical junctures’

⁵³ Friend (1991: 23).

tend to be idiosyncratic and *post hoc*.⁵⁴ So what can we say about why some events come to represent a catharsis or epiphany and others not?

Colin Kahl argues that the answer to this question lies as much in the particularities of the situation confronted with the drama as it does with the dramatic development itself. He suggests two key determinants of the transformative potential of social situations: (1) the "slack" that exists in the institutionalization present in that situation; and (2) the corporate identity of the polities involved – an idea I interpret as referring to the prevailing distributions of meaning.⁵⁵ Kahl suggests that highly institutionalized relationships might be more difficult to change because institutionalization reduces the space available for new thinking and likely increases the intensity of the drama needed to dissolve these structures. This intuition aligns with my earlier analysis that found that the more institutionalized a particular relationship is, the more likely that self-reinforcing processes will have developed or that legitimating narratives will have passed out of conscious reflection and into habit, thereby making them more difficult to change.⁵⁶ In cases where there is less institutionalization, for example, when a relationship is only beginning, then there is more room for change and thus drama can more easily induce catharsis and epiphany.

In cases where significant institutionalization has occurred, Pierson suggests that it is the qualities of the institutionalization itself which can provide clues as to what sort of event will be required to disrupt the *status quo*.⁵⁷ For instance, if a particular form of institutionalization depends on certain mechanisms for its reproduction, then a dramatic event that disrupted the operation of these mechanisms would be more likely to induce a catharsis or epiphany than

⁵⁴ Pierson (2004: 135).

⁵⁵ Kahl (1998: 114).

⁵⁶ Kahl (1998: 123).

⁵⁷ Pierson (2004: 160).

one that did not.⁵⁸ Following Kahl's second point, I suggest that the same logic can also be applied to distributions of meaning. For instance, the drama of the Cuban missile crisis could be interpreted as having generated an epiphany for both US and Soviet decision-makers that enabled a shift in their thinking about one another by making clear that nuclear war could itself represent a greater threat to both sides than each represented to the other. By illuminating this greater threat, the crisis undermined the logic of the cognitive frameworks according to which each side had previously made decisions, thereby opening up space for a shift in both sides' thinking.

This analysis resembles that of Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon, who argue that in order for new narratives to take the place of old ones, the old narratives must be discredited. Jackson and Nexon suggest this process "occurs when external events defy the expectations produced and the strategies recommended by 'long-held' beliefs." In a similar vein, they argue that the new 'heterodox' ideas that are to take the place of the old ideas must be a better fit with reality and better explain the events which discredited the old ideas.⁵⁹ If this is correct, it means that the realities of the India-Pakistan relationship and its crises have not yet so obviously discredited the narratives by which the conflict is sustained so as to open up sufficient space for new ideas to displace the old ones. This is a depressing conclusion because of what it implies for the type of conflict that would be necessary to discredit these narratives.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, my analysis does suggest that, at least for certain segments of the Pakistani political class, Vajpayee's dramatic actions at the Lahore summit may have already initiated an epiphany. If true, a potential for trust exists already within the Pakistani political

⁵⁸ Pierson (2004: 52).

⁵⁹ Jackson and Nexon (2002: 6).

⁶⁰ Ahmed (2002: 28) worries that this is the case.

leadership, and the path toward trust lies in strengthening this group *vis-à-vis* those elements of the Pakistani elite and society that were not affected by this epiphany.⁶¹

Conclusions

My empirical analysis demonstrates the plausibility of the trust framework by showing that it helps to explain the events examined in the case studies better than would be possible without it. Additionally, this empirical analysis also helps illuminate a number of additional findings which will be helpful in expanding and refining our understanding of trust and its influence on international politics. More abstractly, this analysis and these findings have underlined the importance of drawing on influences from all four IR paradigms in studying the liberal peace, and especially from those paradigms that have been relatively neglected in this area before now, namely Constructivism and, to an even greater extent, Cognitivism. The identification of the importance of drama, and the novel finding in terms of the implication of catharsis and epiphany in the process of collective identification, is a particularly notable example of the importance of recognizing Cognitivist insights. The finding that it is important to integrate analysis of the substantive content of the narratives which define agents' decision-making in our analysis of the liberal peace represents a similar reminder for Constructivist perspectives.

My primary finding has significant implications for DPT because of the way that it further strengthens my argument that the liberal peace is better explained as a network of liberal security communities than by any of the existing explanations. This finding, along with the additional findings just discussed, also has a number of other important implications for the study of IR more generally, for policy-makers who, so far, have managed to do a poor job of

⁶¹ Wheeler (2010: 335-336) presents analysis which is supportive of this view.

transferring insights from the study of the liberal peace to the real world, and finally for the direction of future research that might be undertaken to further advance the insights developed here. It is to a discussion of these final concluding points that I now turn.

Conclusions

Facing the future

Introduction

In the nine chapters that precede this one, I have sought to answer a simple but critical question: how and why have liberal states managed to create a separate ‘zone of peace’ in which they appear to have transcended the imperatives of the security dilemma and found a dependable way of resolving their disputes without recourse to violence? As outlined at the outset, I understood the answer to this question to be important because understanding how liberal states have managed to do so might enable other states to follow suit and further preserve humanity from the scourge of war. However, this question is also important for the less obvious reason that understanding the nature of this phenomenon is essential to ensuring that incomplete understandings thereof do not encourage more disastrous policy decisions than the ones that they already have. Finally, I also see an improved understanding of this phenomenon as a way of shedding light on a number of related questions which represent some of the most important *foci* of attention for the discipline of IR today.

I began my inquiry by examining the voluminous scholarship that already exists on this subject. While this work provided several important insights, for a variety of reasons I found it wanting. In particular, I argued that, despite relying heavily on it, existing scholarship failed to properly conceptualize trust – let alone explain how it enabled liberal states to resolve their differences non-violently, or how it might be produced. Taking this *lacuna* as my starting point, I set out to develop a comprehensive conceptualization of trust. I began this exercise by engaging with the best existing accounts thereof in IR. Finding these accounts

lacking, however, I imported insights from other fields ranging from philosophy and psychology to history and neurology. Building on this research, I developed a model for how a specific form of liberal trust could enable liberal states that perceived each other as liberal to collectively identify as such and, in so doing, transcend the security dilemma. This model recognized the essential roles played by what I termed ‘familiarity’ and ‘positive affect’ in this psychological process and elaborated a list of six mechanisms capable of generating these two critical components of trust.

My next step was to take this theoretical model and use it as a foundation for a rigorous research design. This required developing a model of state decision-making according to which individuals, the only unit I found capable of trusting, could make decisions influenced by trust and have these decisions affect state decision-making and action. This in turn necessitated elaborating a theory of how agents (i.e. individuals) and structures (e.g. states, narratives) interact in international politics. In so doing, I developed the concepts of ‘distribution of meaning’ and ‘distribution of power’.

With these theoretical tasks complete, I turned to operationalizing my trust model in a way that would enable me to evaluate its plausibility through the exposure thereof to empirical case studies. This involved developing a series of empirical indicators for the concepts of critical importance to the model such as acceptances of vulnerability, adherence to liberalism, and the presence of the five factors I had identified as enabling trust. With this task complete, I selected three case studies through which I was able to probe the plausibility of the trust model I had built.

I began my empirical analysis by investigating what is regarded by many as one of the quintessentially trusting relationships in international politics, namely the Canada-USA relationship. This relationship provided a useful example of a clearly trusting relationship and served as a good basis for comparison with the other case studies. It also provided clear illustrations of the workings of a number of the mechanisms by which trust is generated, as well as some of the limits and specificities of liberal trust beliefs. The next case study I examined came from the opposite end of the spectrum, namely a case widely seen as an enduring rivalry utterly lacking in trust. By examining the India-Pakistan case, I was able to analyze a number of the factors, such as incompatible narratives, which can block the emergence of trust. Having examined cases on opposite ends of the trust spectrum, my final case illuminated how one might travel between these two poles. In selecting the France-Germany relationship, I sought to uncover the process by which a relationship characterized by an enduring rivalry, itself notable for repeated destructive conflicts, could shift to one now regarded as intimately cooperative and trusting. This relationship again supported the plausibility of my trust model, but was most noteworthy for the way that it shed light on a number of additional findings that were not initially predicted by my trust model.

After I had completed these empirical analyses, I reported the most important findings I had drawn from them. The primary finding was that my trust model had indeed proven plausible with seven out of eight sub-cases supporting the model's plausibility and one marginally supporting it. This finding also provided some initial support for my argument that the liberal peace is actually better conceived of as a network of liberal security communities. Naturally, this secondary argument requires additional research, a point which I discuss further below. I also reviewed the four most significant additional findings generated by this research. With this review completed, I spend the remainder of this final Conclusions chapter exploring the

importance of these findings by briefly examining: (1) their implications for the field of IR; (2) their implications for policy-making; and (3) the areas in which these findings highlight the need for further research.

Implications for IR

One of the reasons for undertaking this project was that I believed that it offered an ideal vehicle for furthering the study of international politics in a number of important ways. In this section I outline the results of my work in this respect by discussing the implications of my findings for the field of IR and the study of international politics more generally. I organize these comments under the following three headings: (1) the importance of integrating insights from a variety of theoretical perspectives; (2) the central role played by trust in the generation of security communities; and (3) the central importance of good qualitative research.

Accumulation of knowledge from different perspectives

In his 2012 review of the state of research on the liberal peace, Jarrod Hayes concludes by arguing for more ‘big thinking’ in the field. He elaborates by asserting that scholars need to build new connections between the various pieces of research on the liberal peace and think more carefully about how these pieces fit together.¹ A major focus of this work has been to answer this call through the theorization of ways to integrate the various theoretical paradigms currently dominating the field in IR. By building a theoretical framework based on insights from each of the four major paradigms in IR and then executing a research design using methodological tools from a variety of approaches, I am helping to expand the field’s

¹ Hayes (2012b: 784).

boundaries in this respect. I start from the recognition that, while it might not be unavoidable, most states start from a baseline Realist perspective which perceives the international system through a Hobbesian lens. Naturally, there is deviation from what this perspective would expect in the real world, and I recognize the utility of insights from Rationalist theories, many of which I discuss in Chapter 1, in explaining some of these deviations. Nevertheless, I also argue that even the combination of these two perspectives is insufficient and that we still need to integrate other theoretical paradigms in order to understand other aspects of agents' decision-making – most importantly, how they overcome irresolvable uncertainty.

Consequently, the integration of Constructivist and Cognitivist insights into the study of the liberal peace has been a central preoccupation of this thesis. While Constructivist theorizing has moved slowly into the mainstream of IR scholarship over the past twenty years, Cognitivism is still very much on the margins of IR scholarship.² Moreover, as has been highlighted repeatedly in this thesis, even Constructivism's insights have not been sufficiently integrated into the study of the liberal peace.³ In this vein, Pierson argues that: “[t]oo often, contemporary social science simply drops out a huge range of crucial factors and processes, either because our methods and theories make it difficult to incorporate them, or because they simply lead us not to see them in the first place.”⁴ I submit that the failure of scholarship on the liberal peace to fully integrate Constructivist, and especially Cognitivist, insights is illustrative of this problem and has resulted in a failure to recognize or understand the critical role played by collective identification, and by extension trust, in international politics.

² Mercer (2010).

³ Kahl (1998: 109); Hayes (2012b).

⁴ Pierson (2004: 169).

Because collective identification is centered on the formation of an in-group – a decidedly psychological phenomenon – understanding the psychology of what is occurring is critical to understanding the role it plays in international politics. As discussed earlier, a number of scholars have recognized the importance of in-group bias in the past, but have failed to provide a theoretically coherent means of incorporating it into their analysis with the result that it has appeared as an *ad hoc* and theoretically unmotivated addition bolted incongruously onto their models. Moreover, a solely psychological perspective is also insufficient as the impact of the formation of an in-group depends heavily on the substantive content associated with the similarity around which the in-group has coalesced.⁵ Thus, without adding Cognitivist *and* Constructivist perspectives, scholars are not able to answer the central question of liberal peace scholarship, namely, how agents are able to overcome the Hobbesian imperatives of the international environment, or explain much of what it is about certain types of institutions that enable the formation of in-groups and trust.

The central role of trust in the liberal peace, security community, and stable peace

By identifying trust as a critical variable for understanding the liberal peace, this thesis has also provided a link which ought to help integrate research on the liberal peace with research in two other areas: security community and stable peace. Given the large amount of research that has been carried out in these three areas, much of it from different theoretical perspectives, better integration of these research agendas offers scholars a treasure trove of information, the cross-fertilization of which can significantly advance our understanding of these overlapping phenomena. Moreover, by providing a clear and theoretically justified definition and conceptualization of what I argue has emerged as the field's critical variable,

⁵ Haidt (2012: 99) agrees.

trust, I have provided a common ground from which future research can be coordinated and on the basis of which investigators can accumulate knowledge. Below, I explore some of the most obvious ways in which such a cross-fertilization might be beneficial, using Adler and Barnett's work on security communities as an illustrative example.

One of the easiest criticisms to make of work on security communities is that it is overly abstract, vague, and imprecise, thereby rendering it difficult to operationalize and relate to actual behaviours and events. This imprecision has resulted in a proliferation of basically *ad hoc* small-*n* and single case study analyses which, whatever their individual merits, are difficult to aggregate, replicate, and rigorously compare, therefore significantly limiting our ability to generate forward momentum and a strong accumulation of knowledge in this area. By developing a clear and specific definition and conceptualization that clearly locates trust at the level of the individual, by defining trust as a reasonable belief, by laying out a rigorous and replicable research procedure, and by beginning the construction of comparable indicators, my work offers researchers progress toward a solution to this problem.

A good illustration of the benefits my theoretical framework offers can be found in how my trust model allows scholars to better understand the role played by transactions in the generation of security communities, something identified as critically important in Deutsch and colleagues' original research and in Adler's and Barnett's re-launching of the concept. By recognizing the psychological character of trust, my conceptualization enables scholars to better understand what it is about interactions that can be expected to generate dependable expectations of peaceful change, as well as the conditions required for this to occur. For example, by integrating a Cognitivist perspective, we learn that, *inter alia*, interactions generate trust by triggering the 'mere exposure' and 'intergroup contact' mechanisms. This

suggests, for example, that while trade can foster interactions, unless this trade is conducted in a spirit of equality, only one of two trust-enabling mechanisms will be activated with the result that it will be less effective in generating positive affect. This analysis is supported by my analysis of the France-Germany case in which higher levels of economic interactivity prevailed prior to the first episode than the second, but it was only in the second episode, when narratives emphasizing equality obtained, that trust actually obtained. Thus, by illuminating the fine-grained micro-level mechanisms through which the causation which produces this effect actually flows, this insights helps to push this theory forward by helping to differentiate between circumstances that are likely to have an impact on collective identification and those which are not.⁶ More concretely, it provides a potential explanation for why trade is, by itself, often insufficient to foster the development of positive affect – and by extension trust – between states.

A second way in which my more comprehensive conceptualization of trust adds value is its recognition of the importance of engaging closely with the substantive content of the narratives involved, an insight increasingly accepted in other areas of IR but still largely absent from work on the liberal peace. For example, Adler and Barnett explicitly seek to move beyond a focus on liberal states and to inquire into whether non-liberal states are capable of establishing security communities as well. Their conclusion that yes, non-liberal groupings might be able to achieve a security community is quite tentative and ends with a recognition that “[c]learly there is a need for better specification and identification of the role of cognitive structures in the development of trust and a security community.”⁷ My analysis answers this call by differentiating between different forms of collective identification according to the different narratives which define them. This innovation is critical because it

⁶ Barnett and Adler (1998: 416-418).

⁷ Barnett and Adler (1998: 426)

allows me to avoid the trap into which Adler and Barnett, and many others working in this field, fall, whereby they conflate collective identification and the formation of a security community. The problem here is that by doing so, they elide the intermediate step in the process that separates these two developments, namely, the particular form of trust belief which specifically enables dependable expectations of peaceful change. The result is that scholars who make this conflation are left without a clear and theoretically grounded means of differentiating between collective identifications which are clearly different.

This insight is critical for helping to advance Adler and Barnett's goal of making the concept of security community 'travel'. This is because it enables a more precise way of studying and categorizing collective identifications and predicting their impact on agents' decision-making. Non-liberal security communities are certainly possible at a theoretical level, but just because two states collectively identify does not mean that they have formed a *security* community – that is, a community defined by dependable expectations of peaceful change. I suggest that the reason that liberal security communities form such a large proportion of identified security communities is that liberalism seems uniquely well-formulated as a narrative for the production of peaceful communities.⁸ For example, I argue that the delays and difficulties that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has experienced in its progression toward a true security community are telling in this respect. Despite significant effort at developing a common identity and a peaceful system for the resolution of disputes, members of this grouping still maintain active war planning against each other.⁹ Thus, while the ASEAN 'zone of peace' is certainly an accomplishment, it is not clear that it possesses the dependable system for non-violent dispute resolution critical to a security

⁸ Pinker (2011: 691) would suggest this is so. Though I also recognize Barnett and Adler's (1998: 425) argument that a portion of liberalism's success in this regard is its openness – something discussed in Chapter 1 in the review of the *transnational enmeshment mechanism*.

⁹ Acharya (1998: 216).

community, nor is it clear and that its history of peace is due to anything other than *realpolitik*.¹⁰

The value of qualitative research

Two of the episodes examined in this work, namely the Reparations crisis and the Kargil crisis, have been identified elsewhere as exceptions to the liberal peace. In the case of the Reparations crisis, while no war was formally declared, French actions do meet the criteria set out for categorizing a conflict as a war in my Introduction.¹¹ In the Kargil case, the fighting was sufficiently intense to cross the more demanding threshold established by the Correlates of War (CoW) project. Interestingly, however, both of these exceptions are often missed in standard quantitative analyses of the liberal peace and, as such, demonstrate the importance of good qualitative analysis. The invasion of the Ruhr is often overlooked because it did not produce sufficient casualties to qualify as a war under the CoW rubric, while the Kargil case is often missed because the Polity 4 database, the database usually used in large-*N* quantitative studies to identify democracies, codes Pakistan as a non-democracy in 1999 because of a military coup that occurred in October of 1999 – well after the Kargil crisis had concluded.¹²

¹⁰ A similar argument can be made for Kupchan's (2010: 188-201) characterization of the Concert of Europe as a security community. While correctly pointing out that there was peace between the Great Powers between 1815 and 1854, Kupchan fails to provide a rigorous means of differentiating a simple lack of war from positive peace, and is thus unable to offer compelling evidence that this observed lack of war was anything other than the result of power political calculations. On this point, see Kissinger (1994: Chapter 4). Kupchan could perhaps have avoided this problem by focusing more on the role of trust which he does recognize as important elsewhere (2010: 36). Unfortunately, he spends less than a page (2010: 49-50) discussing trust, and fails to recognize the critical role it can play in generating the dependable expectations of peaceful change needed for the eventuation of a security community. Interestingly, because he also fails to take the importance of narratives into account, Kupchan also misses the possibility that a non-liberal security community may have existed for a few decades between the three 'Eastern Courts' based on a shared conservative narrative.

¹¹ Cf. Wright (2010) who concurs.

¹² See footnote 83 in Chapter 4 for a more in depth discussion.

Both these incidents demonstrate the importance of qualitative research in different ways. In the case of the Reparations crisis, the fact that it does not meet the CoW criteria for a war is a function of a decision taken by the initial COW coders that is difficult to square with many of the theoretical frameworks on which many theories of the liberal peace are based, including this one.¹³ By failing to recognize the Reparations crisis as a violation of the liberal peace, one is allowing a statistical artefact to keep important information from influencing one's theory. This information is especially important because this crisis helps illustrate an important theoretical nuance, namely, that the liberal peace only applies when two states recognize each other as liberal. My qualitative analysis demonstrates its importance by helping to unpack the reasons why an agent might not recognize another agent as liberal even if this other agent meets certain, say institutional, criteria. In so doing, I identify one of the key areas where further research is required to advance scholarship in this area, namely on the subject of how beliefs – for instance that another state is a liberal state – compete with each other for salience, a point discussed at greater length below.

Perhaps more important, however, is the way that failing to examine the India-Pakistan relationship from a qualitative perspective undermines the study of the liberal peace because of the way in which it generates a series of false positives. While false negatives, that is, purported exceptions to the liberal peace, have received significant discussion and have actually been the focus of much of the qualitative scholarship that does exist, false positives have been dramatically understudied. As the analysis in Chapter 6 demonstrated, claims that the liberal peace existed between India and Pakistan at any time during the period examined stretches credulity. Pakistan clearly does not meet the criteria of a liberal state under my definition, and any definition under which it does is suspect. Indeed, qualifying the

¹³ See footnote 37 in the Introduction. Cf. Wright (2010: 410)

relationships between India and Pakistan at any time in their history as peaceful verges on rendering the term 'peace' meaningless in many of the ways discussed in the Introduction. Yet the dyad years from this relationship between 1973-1976 and 1988-1998 are generally counted as 'peaceful' by quantitative analyses and thus, by extension, as evidence of the existence of the liberal peace.

This is problematic because it suggests that, if the India-Pakistan relationship is anything but unique, then much of the existing quantitative scholarship on the liberal peace is flawed because it is potentially contaminated by too many false positives to be able to tell us much, if anything, about the phenomenon. Counting these false positives as part of the 'liberal peace' is misleading, and distracts from studying relationships where liberalism and democracy actually have an impact on states' relations and contribute to peace. It is beyond my abilities to suggest whether a better, more precise operationalization of these variables might enable a more valid quantitative analysis. However, the fact that my qualitative analysis has highlighted these problems again demonstrates the value of qualitative scholarship in this area. At the very least, these findings should prompt scholars and policymakers to be more modest in their trumpeting of the liberal peace as a solution to international security problems, and to be more careful in their attempts at expanding it. More ambitiously, these findings should motivate scholars to undertake additional qualitative research in order to provide a more accurate picture of the extent of the liberal peace and the relationship of the variables and indicators I have developed here thereto.

Policy Relevance

One of my reasons for undertaking this project was that I believed that my analysis might yield useful insights for policymakers. Indeed, as alluded to in the Introduction, it is clear that the liberal peace has influenced policymakers to an extent rarely seen in IR. Unfortunately, much of this influence has been negative to date as it has helped provide justifications for what have proved to be disastrous policy initiatives such as the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. While it would be wrong to assign blame to academics for the misuses of their research by others, the failure of the academy to produce a more comprehensive understanding of the liberal peace likely contributed to the ease with which this misuse occurred. Thus, the more comprehensive theory – specifically my argument that the liberal peace is better understood as a network of liberal security communities – and findings which I provide in this work are meant to ameliorate these limitations. I do this in two main ways: (1) by developing a more complete picture of the workings of the liberal peace which reveals its limitations;¹⁴ and (2) clarifying some of the potential knock-on effects of the liberal peace that might not be immediately obvious.

The limits of the liberal peace

One of the implications of the analysis in this work is that the liberal peace is likely a less widespread phenomenon than is generally recognized and is probably closer to being isomorphic to the North Atlantic core in its extent – something that a number of critics have claimed previously.¹⁵ This is not to say that the zone of peace is not real or expanding, but rather, that this recognition should introduce some humility into any prescriptions about how liberal democracy, and the attendant ‘zone of peace’, ought to be spread, and some modesty into our expectations as to the ease with which this task will be accomplished. This may seem

¹⁴ Kahl (1998: 144) makes the same point.

¹⁵ Cohen (1994); Gowa (1999).

an obvious point, but the apparent belief that the invasion of Iraq could transform the country into a model liberal democracy that would serve as a beachhead for reform in the Middle East seems to suggest that this point was not so obvious after all. It also reminds us that encouraging the spread of *liberalism* is the critical requirement for the liberal peace's expansion, not simply the holding of elections. Thankfully, my analysis points toward some additional ideas on how to go about doing so effectively.

Chief among these ideas is the aforementioned need to focus on the substantive content of narratives. As Raymond Duvall and Jutta Weldes point out, it is important to recognize the “historically and systematically variable discourses of democracy that have shaped the possibility of a democratic peace.”¹⁶ As discussed in Chapter 8, liberalism rarely forms the only, perhaps even the main, basis of the liberal peace. Rather, it exists as an important part of a more complicated cognitive framework that often includes other narratives defined by cultural similarities like language, religion, and even racism. The fact that the liberal peace exists largely between developed, Western polities is no simple coincidence; not only do these states share an important adherence to liberalism, they also largely share a critical common cultural and ‘racial’ inheritance. While such a recognition is in no way an endorsement of a rigid Huntingtonian ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis, it should serve as a warning to be attentive to the types of narratives enabled within particular political discourses. While today’s liberal societies may well represent the highest form of social development so far, it would be erroneous to think that they have been conceived immaculately and authored only by the better angels of our nature. Consequently, it behooves scholars to recall that the formation of a larger liberal security community will likely require

¹⁶ Duvall and Weldes (2001: 201).

additional narrative factors beyond the highly intellectual embrace of liberalism. Some of these will likely be the lesser of many evils.

This finding should also force scholars to remember that countries like China and India have vastly different cultures, histories, religious traditions, etc – both from each other and from western democracies meaning that any attempt to build trust, let alone a liberal security community, with these states faces important obstacles and limitations. Western powers cannot rely on a shared history or culture to bind them to these rising powers and so other factors capable of generating familiarity and positive affect will need to be identified and nurtured for a long time before they bear fruit.¹⁷ The same is true for states like Afghanistan and Iraq which have surprised many in the West as particularly recalcitrant and unwilling to transform themselves to meet Western expectations. For instance, the difficulties associated with altering the persistent narratives ingrained in portions of the populations of these countries which sanction the use of violence as an acceptable means of dispute resolution have all too often been underestimated while the focus has been placed on reproducing the outward forms of liberal democracy. While liberal forms like elections are certainly important, they are only viable if the population internalizes the liberal narrative.

Policymakers should recognize that such a process of internalization will take a long time and is one we do not fully understand, a point I return to in the next section.

Unforeseen implications

There are some scholars who argue that the very existence of the liberal peace is problematic because of the way that it creates an exclusive community of liberal states who define

¹⁷ Taylor (2004: 153-154) expands on this point.

themselves by the adherence to liberalism and against everyone else. This criticism echoes throughout discussions of ideas like the need for a ‘League of Democracies’, a proposal most famously endorsed by US Senator John McCain during his 2008 campaign for the US presidency. As this collective identification becomes increasingly salient, it can create a fundamental opposition between liberal and non-liberal states and could even provide ‘justifications’ for the use of violence by liberals against non-liberals.¹⁸ At the most basic level, this argument can be advanced validly based solely on the fact that in-group bias naturally entails a bias against out-groups. While proponents might argue that they have no intention of fanning such flames, as Pierson points out “[a]nyone engaged in empirical research in the social sciences knows that the most instrumental and canny of actors still cannot hope to adequately anticipate all the consequences of their actions” and that concerns over these ‘unanticipated consequences’ should not be simply brushed aside.¹⁹

The possibility of such unanticipated consequences actually becomes an even greater cause for concern, however, when one recognizes that there also exists a potential for the stoking of violence between liberals and non-liberals on the basis of the other narratives that also tend to constitute the collective identifications that generate the liberal peace.²⁰ This is due to the way in which liberals tend to form a psychological in-group on the basis of their liberalism AND some other narrative such as political Catholicism or even racial chauvinism.²¹ Thus, the possibility exists that just as liberalism can influence agents’ decision-making, so too can these other constitutive narratives. This again highlights the need for more research on the critical questions of which of the narratives that constitute an agents’ cognitive framework

¹⁸ Farnham (2003: 398).

¹⁹ Pierson (2004: 115).

²⁰ Dembinski et al. (2004: 544). This critique surfaces frequently in Barkawi’s and Laffey’s (2001) edited volume.

²¹ See Vucetic (2011).

become salient and how, why, and when these particular narratives propagate more successfully than others.

Further Research

Throughout this work, I have identified a number of areas which would benefit from additional research, including the need for more and better historical statistics, for example, better historical migration data and gini-coefficients, and the need to examine how certain narratives and rhetorical practices can multiply or reduce the effect of certain objective trust-enabling mechanisms. I have also found evidence that supports other ideas already proposed by other scholars, such as Wheeler's argument concerning the importance of unified stable government for effective trust-building.²² Unfortunately, limitations of space block me from a full discussion of all these ideas, although I do hope that their identification is at least helpful and can spur further research.

What I do have space to discuss is what I see as the primary area in need of future research. As has become evident in the past few chapters, my research has elucidated one question which has been largely neglected in scholarship on the liberal peace, namely the question of how and when particular narratives become salient while others do not. While it is beyond the scope of this work to answer this critical question, I have been able to draw some insights pertaining to it from my analysis. Below I highlight these insights and suggest how they might be combined with existing findings from other areas of IR to advance research in this area.

²² Wheeler (2010: 333).

To my mind, the most productive way of developing an answer of why, how, and when a particular narrative will be more likely to propagate than others is to approach the question in a structured way. The structure according to which I propose to organize this discussion is the tripartite conception of agency I developed earlier. This suggests that the likelihood of a narrative becoming salient in a particular situation depends on the characteristics of the agent(s) (agency₁) whose cognitive framework is the site of this contestation; the characteristics of the distribution of meaning (agency₂) in which they are embedded; and the characteristics of the distribution of power (agency₃) in which they are operating. I have no sense of whether any one of these three aspects of agency is more or less important in this process, but at the very least this approach provides a way of organizing the numerous insights I have identified as potentially useful. In the space that remains, I present these insights, engage in a brief preliminary analysis, and close by suggesting three axes of future inquiry which I see as particularly promising. In so doing, I hope to lay a foundation for advancing scholarship in this area.

I begin with agency₁. The main lesson to emerge from taking agency₁ seriously is that human beings are ultimately unpredictable, meaning that even as we seek to improve our understanding of when a particular narrative will become salient, this enterprise will always be limited by the inherent unpredictability of humans.²³ Nonetheless, a focus on agency₁ – and particularly on Cognitivist insights in this area – reminds us that agents possess particular qualities that are profoundly agential, such as their charisma and their emotions.²⁴ While it may be difficult to quantify, the charisma of an Adenauer, or a Hitler,²⁵ is not inconsequential

²³ Indeed, Crawford (2002: 36) points to chance as one of the four factors which she argues determine whether an argument will be persuasive

²⁴ Crawford (2002: 26).

²⁵ Kissinger (1994: 288) suggests: “That Germany would emerge from that process [the collapse of the Versailles order] as the strongest nation on the Continent was inevitable; the orgy of killing and devastation that it unleashed was the work of one demonic personality.” He also suggests that Hitler precipitated the Second

and narratives promoted by a charismatic individual are more likely to achieve salience than those that lack such advocates. Similarly, it is also worth noting that another agential characteristic that seems to make a difference is the level of sophistication of the agent *receiving* the message. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder note that narratives which are primarily emotionally compelling, such as national chauvinism, are more likely to achieve salience with less well-educated agents than more intellectually-focused narratives such as liberalism.²⁶ Likewise, as discussed in Chapter 3, narratives that boost agents' self-esteem are more likely to achieve salience than those that do not. Finally, agents who are negatively emotionally predisposed toward an interlocutor are less likely to find said interlocutor persuasive regardless of the content of the message being conveyed.²⁷

As with agency₁, Mansfield and Snyder's work on democratization provides some important insights regarding agency₃. In particular, their argument that liberalism is often marginalized in democratizing states because the implications of the adoption of liberalism threaten the power of those agents who occupy the upper rungs of the distribution of power,²⁸ illustrates how it is important to take into account how a narrative interacts with the distribution of power. While the question of why these powerful agents prefer these narratives may depend on their agency₁ and agency₂, once a particular narrative has become salient for them, their privileged positions in the distribution of power provide them with numerous means of promoting their preferred narratives and influencing other, less-powerful, agents. This power can manifest itself in as explicit a way as powerful agents' ability to influence the population through their control of media organizations, or more subtly through the gloss of legitimacy

World War for the very agential reason that he believed that his life would be a short one, an assumption derived from his family medical history. Again, Kissinger (1994: 290) suggests: "History offers no other example of a major war being started on the basis of medical conjecture."

²⁶ Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 252).

²⁷ Crawford (2002: 26).

²⁸ Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 61).

that attaches itself to the powerful. More generally, Neta Crawford argues that access to those being persuaded, as well as organizational abilities/resources – both common attributes of the powerful – are also two of the most important factors in determining whether an argument will be persuasive.²⁹ To my mind, this underlines clearly the importance of more focused analyses of the distributions of meaning, and the interests that these distributions privilege, than has been typical in analyses of the liberal peace.

The richest collection of insights on how narratives achieve salience, however, falls under the heading of agency₂, meaning that they pertain to how the characteristics of a particular narrative, and how this narrative interacts with the larger distribution of meaning in which it is embedded, influence whether the narrative achieves salience. To begin with, there is already some significant work on this topic in adjacent areas. For example, Crawford argues that “[p]ersuasive arguments often have one or more of the characteristics of being emotionally appealing, accounting for evidence, and addressing the concerns raised by counter-argument.”³⁰ Similarly, in his study of analogies, Yuen Foong Khong argues that analogies become salient for decision-makers on the basis of two main characteristics: (1) availability and (2) representativeness.³¹ Availability refers to the ease with which an agent is able to recall a particular analogy. Khong suggests that the ‘recency’ of the analogous event is a strong factor in determining an event’s availability. He also suggests that the timing of the event, and more specifically, whether the event occurred during that agent’s “coming of political age” – that is, when they were most impressionable – plays an important role.³²

²⁹ Crawford (2002: 36).

³⁰ Crawford (2002: 36).

³¹ Khong (1992: 36-37).

³² Khong (1992: 214). This assertion is supported by research in other areas. See, for example, Howe (2010: 127).

Representativeness refers to the perceived fit between the new situation and the situation providing the analogy.³³ Interestingly, Khong found that even sophisticated decision-makers tend to be impressed by superficial similarities between events and fail to evaluate rigorously the applicability of the event or search for alternatives.³⁴ Khong also suggests that once an analogy has been chosen, agents tend to stick with it even in the face of contradictory evidence.³⁵

Both Crawford and Khong, as well as many other scholars, also identify the ‘cultural congruence’, ‘resonance’, or ‘coherence’ of a narrative with the existing distributions of meaning as an important factor.³⁶ Charles Taylor suggests why this might be important when he argues that the historical trajectory of a society always colours that society’s present understandings.³⁷ This aligns with the arguments advanced earlier about how the salience of liberalism seems to have been boosted by its congruence with other narratives like political Catholicism and the ‘myth of two Germanies’, as well as the shared Anglo-Saxon heritage of Canada and the USA. Because of its compatibility with these other narratives, liberalism ‘resonated’ with them or, in other words, was more easily assimilated into their pre-existing cognitive frameworks. This ease of assimilation is likely the result of the minimal potential for cognitive dissonance and greater prevalence of recognizable ideas and concepts that result from the substantive overlap and similarities between these compatible narratives.

Interestingly, this did not occur in the first France-Germany sub-case, perhaps partially because political Catholicism had not yet decisively shed its illiberal tendencies, thus limiting

³³ Khong (1992: 36).

³⁴ Khong (1992: 35 and 217).

³⁵ Khong (1992: 14). While newer psychological research has added nuance to our understanding of ‘motivated bias’, it remains largely the same. See Hogg et al. (2004: 254-255) for instance.

³⁶ Crawford (2002: 6, 26, and 36); Khong (1992: 34). See also Hayes (2012a: 69; footnote 36); Hogg et al. (2004: 254, 257 and 264).

³⁷ Taylor (2004: 153).

its congruence with liberalism. Similarly, it is not hard to see why liberalism did not easily resonate with a Pakistani society defined so strongly by militant anti-Indianism.

This argument, however, raises the question of how we explain changes in the narratives which have achieved salience when congruence is seemingly so important. The analysis I presented earlier on the importance of drama offers some important insights here. For example, the idea advanced by Jackson and Nexon that real world events do have an impact on the salience of narratives because of the way they support or disprove the narratives' claims is suggestive in this regard.³⁸ Similarly, Rogers Smith argues that what he calls "[e]thically constitutive stories", that is, the stories groups tell themselves to explain why they are a group, tend to be the most likely narratives to maintain salience in political contexts because "they are also harder to discredit via empirical evidence."³⁹ Crawford also recognizes the importance of 'perceived correspondence' between narratives and both 'objective' reality and agents' historical preconceptions,⁴⁰ but points out that these perceptions are biased with the result that it is unusual for events to clearly disprove a particular narrative.⁴¹ Indeed, given the stickiness of perceptions and motivated biases, one wonders to what extent narratives that are currently salient will need to be 'disproven' in order for them to lose their salience, or even how this evaluation occurs.

One way of pursuing this line of inquiry is to look to research on processes of argumentation and contestation for insights. Crawford does exactly this, and points to the importance of how

³⁸ See Johnson (2004: 40-41) for a similar argument.

³⁹ Smith (2004: 309). In addition to non-verifiability, Dominic Johnson lists (2004: 179-180) five other, basically similar, qualities that increase the likelihood that a belief, in this case a 'positive illusion', will achieve salience, namely generality, ambiguity, threat, quality of feedback, and stage of task. Khong (1992: 33) argues that the more abstract an analogy, the more likely it is to have influence, largely because it is more difficult to contradict.

⁴⁰ Crawford (2002: 22).

⁴¹ Crawford (2002: 22); Weldes (1999: 39-40).

an issue is ‘framed’ in determining whether an argument is accepted or not.⁴² In so doing, she reminds us that different types of arguments (practical, ethical, etc) will be evaluated under different rubrics depending on how they are framed, and that these different rubrics will influence how and if a narrative achieves salience in a particular situation. Indeed, Jarrod Hayes’ work on integrating insights from securitization theory into the study of the liberal peace offers an example of how questions in this area might be tackled fruitfully.⁴³ The increasing interest in argumentation that is currently emerging in IR will also no doubt help advance our understanding of this aspect of the problem.⁴⁴

Clearly, there is both a strong foundation for future research in this area and the potential for important gains to be realized. Thus, as I reach the end of this particular work, it seems best to conclude by summarizing the three main axes of inquiry I have just identified as the most fruitful directions for future research in this area. These axes are: (1) a greater integration of Cognitivist insights into the study of the processes by which narratives achieve salience; (2) more investigation into the role played by the distribution of power in determining a narrative’s salience and influence on agents’ decision-making; and (3) expanded research into how processes of collective identification interact with processes of political contestation and argumentation. I expect that more work in these areas will produce good results and help expand our understanding, not just of when and how certain narratives will achieve salience or not, or of the liberal peace, but also of international politics more generally. At the very

⁴² Crawford (2002: 22-23). This also provides some interesting pathways back to the earlier discussions of agency₁ (our willingness to accept charismatic agents’ frames) and agency₃ (the ability of the powerful to impose their frames).

⁴³ Hall (2011) advances a similar argument in which circumstances which generate anger seem to be akin to, or something of a special case of, securitization and appear to trigger a similar response. Johnson (2004: 46-47) similarly notes that comforting illusions are more likely to be held by individuals when they face a threat than when they do not, suggesting that messages which emphasize in-group superiority – and out-group perfidiousness – will be more persuasive during periods when the in-group feels threatened.

⁴⁴ See, for instance, Risse (2000); Crawford (2002); Mitzen (2005); Seymour (2014).

least, these three axes highlight phenomena about which we do not know enough and should therefore keep scholars occupied productively well into the future.

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Appendix A

I estimate the religious composition of the USA by comparing the distribution of adherents to the two primary religious groups (Protestants and Catholics) as detailed in Gaustead (2001 : Figure 2.88) and Gaustead (1962: Figures 95, 96), and comparing this data with the data from the few years during which the General Social Survey (GSS) also provides data. Gaustead's figures are based on church membership figures and not on survey responses and thus, while they may provide a useful baseline, they do not provide a comprehensive picture. To overcome this problem, I calculated the difference between the percentage of the population for each of the two groups as described by Gaustead and by the GSS which began a more accurate survey of religious affiliation in 1948. I then averaged the differences between the values across the years of overlap to produce a convertor term for each of the two groups that transformed the values provided by Gaustead into those provided by the GSS. I then used this convertor (+13.5 for Protestants and -15 for Catholics) to transform the earlier figures provided by Gaustead to produce the estimates that I used. Naturally, this method is not ideal, but the limited reliability of the figures was taken into account during the data's analysis.