

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V 1. COMMENTARY WITH PROLEGOMENA AND
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
The Prolegomena begin by pointing out the present lack of detailed, critical work on Plotinus. Then, after a résumé of the events of Plotinus' life, the problem of the date of composition of V 1, and its title, are discussed. Space is devoted to discussion of the purpose of the treatise, which, despite its title, is protreptic, to lead the soul to the Intelligible World and beyond by reminding it of its high status. The methodology of the Commentary is outlined, and a list of passages is given in which textual readings have been proposed which differ from those in the text of Henry and Schwyzer. The Prolegomena conclude with a detailed analysis of the contents of the treatise, included in order to show that the treatise is not a mere random collection of thoughts.

There follows a translation which aims not so much to be stylish - for Plotinus was no stylist - but to give an accurate idea of what Plotinus actually wrote.

The bulk of the thesis is taken up with the Commentary. The Commentary is exegetical, discussing difficulties in the treatise line by line. Since by the time Plotinus wrote his philosophical ideas were already formulated, it contains as many cross-references as possible to other treatises in the Plotinian corpus. Each chapter begins with a short introduction, and, in the body of the work, textual difficulties and the readings of previous editors, as well as difficulties of philosophical interpretation, are fully discussed. The translations of Ficino, Bréhier, Harder, Cilento and MacKenna are taken into account. Among the longer notes might be mentioned the note on 3,8 on the meaning of logos, that on the relationship between the reasoning and the undescending soul (on 3,13), and the treatment of the difficult passages 6,17-19 and 7,11-17.

The thesis concludes with a full bibliography.

Plotinus: Ennead V 1
Commentary with Prolegomena
and Translation



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REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS

References to the Enneads are to the editio maior of Henry and Schwyzer. V 3,2,1 means Ennead V, treatise 3, chapter 2, line 1. References to V 1 are written without the Ennead and treatise number, except where confusion might result from such a practice. Where references to passages in the same treatise are made consecutively, the repetition of the Ennead and treatise number is avoided. Thus, V 3,2,1. 4,9 means V 3,2,1 and V 3,4,9.

References to other ancient authors are to the standard editions and are abbreviated according to the abbreviations listed in Liddell and Scott. References to Plato and Aristotle are to the line numbers in the Oxford Classical Texts. Albinus is referred to in the edition of P.Louis and Numenius in the edition of E.des Places. Porphyry's Vita Plotini is abbreviated to V.P. and is referred to by the line numbers in vol. I of Henry and Schwyzer's edition.

Abbreviations for periodicals follow the system of Marouzeau's L'Année Philologique, but the titles of all articles cited are given in full in the Bibliography.

In the commentary, P. means Plotinus throughout. Other abbreviations are listed in the Bibliography.

PROLEGOMENA

The writing of a commentary on a treatise of Plotinus needs perhaps little justification. Although now recognised as an important thinker, not only because of his influence on later philosophers and theologians, but also in his own right, he has yet received little in the way of detailed, critical study.¹ That this is so is the more disturbing in view of the acknowledged difficulty of his Greek, and the terseness of his style.² Among his contemporaries, the distinguished Platonist Longinus, although full of respect for his ideas, could not understand the language in which they were expressed, and thought, wrongly, that he was in possession of faulty manuscripts.³ The difficulty is more acute for us who live some seventeen hundred years later. Of his treatises, only a few have received close attention;⁴ and while Harder's edition and commentary on the first twenty-one treatises, continued after his death for the rest of the Enneads by R. Beutler and W. Theiler, is useful in numerous passages, its limited scope leaves many difficulties unexplained. The aim of this commentary is to help towards a clear understanding of the important treatise V 1.

It is useful to try to place the treatise within the context of Plotinus' literary output. Practically all our evidence for his life comes from the biography of him written by his pupil Porphyry in A.D. 300, i.e. 30 years after Plotinus' own death in 270.⁵ This work is unusual among ancient biographies not

only for its lack of sensationalism, but also for the detailed information which it gives about the chronology of Plotinus' writings.

Plotinus was born in Lycopolis in Upper Egypt (modern Assiut),⁶ and after a late conversion to philosophy at the age of 27, and a period of eleven years spent at the school of Ammonius in Alexandria,⁷ he set out in 242 with the emperor Gordian III on his expedition to Persia in search of the wisdom of the East.⁸ After Gordian's defeat, Plotinus escaped to Antioch, and finally established himself in Rome at the age of 40. From 244-253 he wrote nothing. In the next ten years, he composed the first twenty-one treatises, which were already written by the time Porphyry arrived in F 263 at the age of 30. The next seven years saw an increase in activity, and by the time Plotinus died in February 270 at the age of 66, he had written a total of fifty-four treatises.⁹

V 1 is tenth in Porphyry's chronological order: this means that it was written at some time between 253 and 263.¹⁰ It seems to me fruitless to speculate as Igal does on the exact date of composition of each of the first twenty-one treatises.¹¹ His date of 259/260 for V 1 depends on the assumption that Plotinus' annual rate of production remained uniform, and of this we have no evidence.

Porphyry thinks that the first twenty-one treatises lack forcefulness, that Plotinus reached his acme in the middle twenty-four and that the last nine reveal a decline in his

powers.¹² This is somewhat arbitrary. Although V 1 is simpler than some of the more technical treatises, it deals forcefully enough, it seems to me, with some of the more difficult and important problems of Neoplatonism.¹³ Its attraction for readers of Plotinus is that it provides a good introduction to the whole of the Plotinian system, for it deals in turn with each of the hypostases, the One, Intellect and soul. (For this reason it greatly appealed to the early Greek fathers, who saw in it an exposition of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.¹⁴)

It is worth remembering that Plotinus did not begin his literary activity until he was 49 in A.D. 253. By then most of his philosophical ideas were already formed.¹⁵ Consequently, it is not too misleading to say that each treatise takes for granted the whole of his philosophy. Hence, passages from much later treatises may quite legitimately be used to explain earlier passages. In the commentary, I have tried to make as much use as possible of cross-references to other parts of the Enneads, where they help to explain passages in V 1.

Both the direct and indirect traditions agree on the form of the title *περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων*.¹⁶ We know, however, that Plotinus himself wrote no titles, at least for the first twenty-one treatises, and, one may suspect, for the others as well.¹⁷ Porphyry added to each treatise the name by which it was generally known.¹⁸ Since it was he who was responsible for the development of the word *ὑπόστασις* as

a technical term,¹⁹ it is possible that he suggested to Plotinus the title of V 1 and that his influence led to its being commonly accepted. His placing of the treatise at the head of the fifth Ennead, which deals ostensibly with Intellect, the One and soul's intellect,²⁰ suggests at least that he thought it a useful introduction to the three hypostases.

However, as both Bréhier and Harder remark in their introductions, the treatise is not primarily intended as an exposition of the nature of the three hypostases. Plotinus himself says in 1,22 ff. that the purpose of the treatise is protreptic, to lead men upwards towards the Intelligible World by teaching and reminding soul of its parentage and intrinsic worth. The protreptic nature of the treatise is emphasised by the frequent use of imperatives,²¹ and consideration of its contents shows that it is the nature of soul which is Plotinus' primary concern, particularly its closeness to the higher hypostases, and its ability to fulfil itself by turning back towards them and by uniting with them. Discussion of the nature of soul leads on to discussion of the nature of Intellect, with which soul can be joined,²² and thence to a discussion of Intellect's cause the One. Plotinus wants to emphasise the continuity of his metaphysics and the possibility of soul's movement, as an integral part of the Intelligible World, into its higher reaches. The two chapters of doxography (Chapters 8 and 9) are then followed by three chapters which argue that the three hypostases can be found 'in' the human soul, and can be grasped

by the soul in view of its exalted nature. Thus, it can be seen that the delineation of the nature of the hypostases is, as it were, incidental to the intention of the treatise - to show soul that its ancestry is sufficiently superior to the material world that it should direct its activity upwards.

In earlier treatises the high rank of soul has been taken for granted,²³ but even in IV 7,10,24-27 (νῦν δὲ πολλὰ καὶ λεπτοβημένῃ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ψυχὴν ὀρῶντες οὕτε ὡς περὶ θείου οὕτε ὡς περὶ ἀθανάτου κλήματος διανοοῦνται), second in Porphyry's chronological order, he seems to see the need for a more detailed discussion. This discussion is provided by V 1.

When thinking of writing this commentary, I soon decided that to prepare an edition of the text would be otiose. The work done on the manuscripts by Henry and Schwyzer²⁴ makes further research on them unnecessary, and the critical apparatus of the editio maior of the Enneads provides the commentator with a full conspectus of the manuscript readings. However, no two scholars are likely to agree on the final version of a text, particularly on that of an author as difficult as Plotinus.

Plotinus' Greek was considered idiosyncratic by his contemporaries.²⁵ Porphyry describes his method of composition. He never went over or reread anything which he had written and he paid no attention to niceties of syllable division or spelling; and he wrote exactly as if he were copying from a

book.²⁶ The result is a style which has no parallels in Greek. Oddities of grammar and syntax abound,²⁷ and sometimes the language is so abrupt that it seems as if it is only a reflexion of the thought which it is supposed to express.²⁸ Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Plotinus' works were edited by Porphyry,²⁹ and edited presumably for a wider public than had been possible before.³⁰ I take it for granted that the revised manuscripts, if not readily understandable in view of the difficulty of the thought, were at least written in what passed for grammatical Greek, in so far as that was compatible with Plotinus' own way of writing. Consequently, where I have been quite unable to make sense of Henry and Schwyzer's text, I have not been afraid to assume that the text is corrupt. I have argued fully in the commentary for each change which I adopt; furthermore, I have noted all the discrepancies between the text of Henry and Schwyzer and that of the other editors of Plotinus. I append below a list of the passages where I would change Henry and Schwyzer's text.

	<u>H-S</u>	<u>Preferred Readings</u>
2,17	ἀμύνων	† ἀμύνων †
2,20	ποιοῦσαι	διδόουσαι *
2,35	ἐκάστω	ἐκαστον
2,36	μορίῳ ψυχῆς	[μορίῳ ψυχῆς] *
2,50	ἄλλον	ἄλλο
4,7	παρ' αὐτῷ	παρ' αὐτῶν
4,18	παραθέων	παραθέων
4,21	[ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ]	ἐν αὐτῷ
4,22	αὐτῷ	αὐτῶν
4,40	ἐν	ἐν

5,3	ζη αἰ	ζητεῖ
5,14	δυνας	δυνας <ὡς ταῦτόν>
6,21	αἰτίας	αἰτίας <τε>
6,29	αὐτό	αὐτόν
6,48	ἀλλ'	[ἀλλ']
7,3	τὸ γινόμενον	τὸ γεννώμενον
7,20	ο	εἰ*
7,27	ἀξίον δέ	ἀξίας *
7,32	ἐκπεσεῖν	ἐκπεσεῖν <ἐάν>
8,17	ἔστι	ἔστιν
8,19	ἐξαιρῶν	ἐξαιρῶν
9,12	ἔχον	ἔχων
9,24	συνέπονται	συνεργήσει
9,28	αἱ	[αἱ]
9,29	καὶ Φερικίδους δέ	[καὶ Φερικίδους δέ]
9,30	αὐτοῖς	τοῖς
9,32	ἢ ὅπως ἀφείσαν	[ἢ ὅπως ἀφείσαν]
10,8	αἰσθητῶν	αἰσθητοῖς
10,17	πρώτῃ	[πρώτῃ]
10,26	ταῖς	ταῖς <μή>

I have not recorded instances where I differ only in punctuation from Henry and Schwyzer's text. Those readings marked with an asterisk are printed in H-S². In the translation I have translated my own preferred text rather than the text of Henry and Schwyzer.

In interpretation of the Greek, I have been helped most of all by Ficino's Latin translation,³¹ which is usually both accurate and perceptive, and by Harder, both by his commentary and by his translation. But I have also taken account of the translations of Bréhier, Cilento and Stephen MacKenna. Of these, Bréhier's is marred by his poor text, Cilento's by his excessive

verbosity and MacKenna's by its inaccuracy in matters of detail; this is not to deny the service which these scholars have done in bringing Plotinus to a larger public. I have tried to record in the commentary the main points in which they differ from my interpretation.

My aim in the commentary has been to explain Plotinus' thought. To this end I include an analysis of the contents of V 1. Porphyry says that Plotinus worked out in his mind his train of thought before writing it down; and so organised was he, that he could break off his thought in the middle and resume it again as if nothing had happened.³² This should warn us against thinking his works random collections of ideas. As Dodds says of him, Plotinus 'still knew how to think in an age which was beginning to forget what thinking meant.'³³

ANALYSIS

Introduction: Chapter 1.

A. 1,1-3 Question: what is the cause of soul's ignorance of God?

B. 1,3-22 Answer.

I. 1,3-15 Preliminaries: the causes of separation.

1,3-5 The first stage: initial separation and desire for self-possession.

1,5-10 The second stage: excessive indulgence of free-will leads to great separation and ignorance of themselves.

1,11-15 The third stage: separation leads to wonderment at earthly things, which in turn leads to as much separation as possible.

II. 1,15-17 Answer proper: reverence for earthly things and lack of respect for themselves are the causes of their ignorance.

III. 1,17-21 Justification of answer: lack of self respect makes knowledge of God and his power impossible.

C. 1,22-35 Remedy.

1,22-29 There are two methods of leading souls up to Intellect and the One, one which points out the worthlessness of what soul at present respects, and one which reminds soul of its parentage and its excellence.

1,29-35 Our concern is with the second, since soul as the searcher must know if it is capable of the search; otherwise it need not bother.

Part One: the nature of soul (Chapter 2).

A. 2,1-9 Statement of soul's activity.

2,1-6 Soul gives life, movement and organisation to the whole universe.

2,7-9 Soul is more valuable than the objects on which its activity is bestowed.

B. 2,10-51 Argument.

I. 2,10-42 The life-giving and organisatory rôle of soul.

2,10-11 What is the manner of soul's bestowal of life?

(2,11-17 The investigator of the activities of the world soul must be the purified individual soul, in a state of stillness and peace.)

2,17-27 Figurative description of the life-giving activities of soul.

2,27-42 Detailed description of the manner of ensoulment which is the cause of unity and divinity in the cosmos.

II. 2,42-44 Soul must be a higher god than what it gives divinity to.

III. 2,44-51 Conclusion.

2,44-49 Our soul is of the same nature as the world soul, and is of more value than anything bodily.

2,49-51 Wonder therefore at yourself.

Part Two: the nature of Intellect (Chapters 3 - 4).

- A. 3,1-23 Nature of Intellect from the point of view of its relationship with soul.
 - I. 3,1-4 Transition: knowing the nature of soul have confidence and advance.
 - II. 3,4-23 Soul and Intellect.
 - 3,4-12 Soul is the image of Intellect and its logos, the product of its activity: double-activity theory explained.
 - 3,12-15 Soul is intellectual and its perfection comes from Intellect.
 - 3,15-20 Conclusion: the proper activities of soul are intellectual.
 - 3,20-23 Nothing is between Intellect and soul other than their difference; Intellect acts as form to soul's matter.
 - III. 3,24-4,1 Transition to B.
- B. 4,1-25 The fulness and perfection of the Intelligible World.
 - 4,1-10 The sensible world with all its variety is only an image of the Intelligible World which is the golden age of Cronus whose name means 'satiety' and 'Intellect'.
 - 4,10-12 Intellect contains everything in a state of rest.
 - 4,12-14 No change, not even increase, is possible for it since it is the acme of perfection.

4,14-16 All its contents are perfect and it possesses them as objects of its thought.

4,16-17 Its happiness is internal to it since its contents are in eternity.

(4,17-21 Digression on time and eternity: time is concerned with soul.)

4,21-25 Eternity is an eternal present.

C. 4,26-43 The internal life of Intellect.

I. 4,26-4,33 Intellect and Being: the reciprocal relationships between them.

II. 4,33-43 The Platonic genera.

4,33-34 Otherness and sameness are aspects of Intellect's life.

4,35-36 The primary genera: Intellect, Being, sameness, otherness, movement and rest.

4,36-41 The functions of movement and rest, otherness and sameness.

4,41-43 Primary genera produce quantity and quality and other Forms.

Part Three: the nature of the One (5,1-7,27).

A. 5,1-6 Introduction.

5,1-2 Transition from part two: soul can be joined to Intellect.

5,3-4 Question: having approached Intellect soul asks who its father is.

5,4-6 Answer: the hypostasis prior to plurality, the maker of number.

B. 5,6-19 Relationship between Intellect and the One in terms of Platonic number.

I. 5,6-13 Statement.

5,6-9 Dyad is secondary and when defined by the One becomes number in the sense of substance.

(5,9-13 Soul is a number too: even in semen it is the invisible number and logos which is important.)

II. 5,13-19 Explanation.

5,13-16 Intellect and the Forms are number when they have been defined by the One.

5,16-18 Intellect is defined in two senses, by itself and the One.

5,18-19 Comparison of fully-formed Intellect to actualised sight.

C. 6,1-41 The genesis of Intellect.

I. 6,1-8 The problem of the method of derivation. That plurality comes from the one is accepted; but how does it do so?

II. 6,8-15 Introduction.

6,8-11 We must stretch out towards God in prayer.

6,12-15 We must look at the first appearance outside the One's temple (i.e., the Indefinite Dyad).

III. 6,15-41 The genesis of Intellect.

6,15-27 No movement is involved.

(i) 6,15-19 Movement is end-directed, and since the One has nothing beyond it, no movement can be involved in the genesis of Intellect. In fact, it is Intellect which turns towards the One.

((ii) 6,19-22 Genesis does not occur in time.)

(iii) 6,22-27 No movement or inclination of will is involved.

6,27-28 Question: how does Intellect arise and in what form?

6,28-30 Answer: an emanation (*περίλαμψις*), like sunlight from the sun, arises.

6,30-39 Reasons for emanation,

(i) 6,30-37 The double activity theory, with exx. drawn from natural phenomena.

(ii) 6,37-40 Everything which is perfect begets something less than itself.

6,39-40 Question: what is the product of the most perfect?

6,40-41 Answer: Intellect is greatest after the One and secondary to it.

D. 6,41-7,4 Relationship between the One and its product.

6,41-44 Intellect looks forward to the One (because

it is secondary), and it is greater because all other creation is subsequent to it.

6,44-49 Intellect's relationship with the One is explained in terms of soul's relationship with Intellect.

6,50-53 Begetter and begotten are necessarily together separated only by otherness.

7,1-4 Intellect is an image of the One: meaning of this remark.

E. 7,4-26 Interruptions, and restatement of problem of Intellect's genesis.

I. 7,4-5 Objection: the One is not Intellect; how is it Intellect which is created?

II. 7,5-8 Answer.

7,5-6 By the turning back of inchoate Intellect towards the One.

7,6-8 Comparison of Intellect to a circle, and of the One to its centre.

III. 7,8-9 Objection: the centre of the circle is not divisible.

IV. 7,9-26 Answer.

7,9-10 The One, unlike the centre of the circle, is the potentiality of all things.

7,10-17 Explanation of the reversion: inchoate Intellect is aware of its own power, and of the One's part in its own creation.

- 7,17-20 Fully-formed Intellect sees that everything comes from the One, because the One is not one of the 'everything' but merely a unity.
- 7,20-23 The One could not be one of the 'everything', but must be their cause.
- 7,23-26 Definition and shape are necessary for the 'everything', since this gives them separate existence.

Part Four: synthetic conclusion of Chapters 2 - 7 (7.27-49).

- I. 7,27-35 Intellect.
 - 7,27-30 Intellect is born from the One and begets with itself all the Intelligible World.
 - 7,30-35 Hesiodic myth of Cronus used to illustrate Intellect's fulness.
- II. 7,35-49 Soul.
 - 7,35-38 Cronus myth applied to creation of soul by Intellect.
 - 7,38-42 Product of Intellect is less than its producer and needs definition from it.
 - 7,42-49 Product of Intellect is soul, joined on one side to Intellect, and on the other to the sensible world, which it in its turn creates.

Part Five: doxography (Chapters 8 - 9).

- A. 8,1-14 Plato.

- I. 8,1-9 Doctrine.
 - 8,1-4 The three principles of Ep. II.
 - 8,4-9 Interpretation of Ep. VI and other Platonic writings.
- II. 8,9-14 Conclusion: Plato knows of the theory of three hypostases, and the present writings are not new but interpretative.

B. 8,14-27 Parmenides.

- I. 8,14-23 Parmenides the Presocratic, who touched on Plotinian doctrine.
 - 8,14-17 Interpretation of DK. B. 3.
 - 8,17-23 Interpretation of DK B. 8.
- II. 8,23-27 Plato's Parmenides who is more precise: interpretation of Pl. Prm. 137c 4 ff..

C. 9,1-7 Other Presocratics who believed in 'the One'.

- I. 9,1-3 Anaxagoras: interpretation of DK B. 12.
- II. 9,3-5 Heraclitus: interpretation of DK A. 1.
- III. 9,5-7 Empedocles: interpretation of DK. B. 26.

D. 9,7-27 Critique of Aristotle.

- I. 9,7-9 Self-thinking mind cannot be primary.
- II. 9,9-27 Arguments concerned with the plurality of Movers.

- 9,9-14 Aristotle introduces many Movers, relying on plausibility rather than necessity for the truth of the system; but is it even plausible?
- 9,15-25 Movers are either (i) derived from a single principle or (ii) each is a principle.
- (i) 9,16-23 Derived from a single principle: if this is the case, then an analogy with the sensible world holds; a similar system of subordination will exist, and the Movers will contain many things within them.
- (ii) 9,23-25 Each a separate principle: if this is the case, then their union will be a chance affair, and there could be no unity in the cosmos.
- 9,25-26 Why should the sensible movements be equal to the Movers?
- 9,26-27 How can the Movers be different without matter to separate them?

E. 9,27-32 Conclusion.

- 9,27-30 Those who sided with Pythagoras knew most about the One.
- 9,30-32 Some published their theories, others dealt with them in unrecorded seminars.

Part Six: The hypostases are 'in' the soul and may be grasped by us (Chapters 10 - 12).

A. 10,1-4 Recapitulation of the theory of three hypostases.

B. 10,5-10 The hypostases exist 'in us', in the inner man.

C. 10,10-30 Soul.

10,10-13 Our soul is of a divine nature, but is only perfect when it contains intellect of which there are two sorts, the soul's intellect, and Intellect the second hypostasis.

10,13-24 The soul's intellect (the undescending soul).

- (i) 10,13-18 The soul's intellect is independent of the body and in the Intelligible World.
- (ii) 10,18-21 It is outside space, which is the realm of body.
- (iii) 10,21-24 Plato knew of the undescending soul in the Timaeus.

10,24-30 The meaning of Plato's 'separation'; the lower soul must be led up away from the body.

D. 11,1-7 Intellect.

11,1-4 If the soul reasons about whether something is just, the Form of justice, from which the reasoning derives, must exist in us.

11,4-7 If the reasoning is intermittent, there must be something in us whose reasoning is not intermittent; this is Intellect.

E. 11,7-15 The One.

11,7-8 Intellect's cause is also in us, but not as something divisible.

11,8-10 It is present in many things wherever each is able to receive it in some degree.

11,10-15 Analogy of circle and its centre; we too are able to apprehend the One by means of our own centre.

F. 12,1-20 Apprehension of the hypostases.

I. 12,1-3 Question: why do we not ~~per~~ceive the activities of the hypostases?

II. 12,3-12 Answer.

12,3-10 They are eternally active ; but not everything is apprehended by 'us' until it reaches 'perception' or the whole soul: we are the whole soul.

12,10-12 The parts of the soul are always active but we do not always apprehend them.

III. 12,12-20 The method of apprehension.

12,12-14 We must turn inwards.

12,14-20 Analogy with the apprehension of sensible sounds: we must keep our ear unsullied, ready to hear the sounds from above.

NOTES

1. There are, however, some useful more general works: in particular the books of Armstrong, Rist and Wallis should be mentioned (see Bibliography).
2. See V.P.14.1-2; Macrobius In Somnium Scipionis II.12.7: 'Plotinus magis quam quisquam parvus verborum'.
3. V.P.19.24 ff.
4. See Schröder on I 8, Wolters on III 5, Beierwaltes on III 7 and Cilento on III 8, V 8, V 5 and II 9.
5. The most recent study of Porphyry's Life of Plotinus is by J.Igal, La Cronología de la Vida de Plotino de Porfirio (Universidad de Deusto, 1972). Igal's careful analysis of the chronology supersedes the studies of H.Oppermann, 'Plotins Leben', Orient und Antike 7 (Heidelberg, 1929) and M.J.Boyd, 'The Chronology in Porphyry's Vita Plotini', CPh 32(1937), pp.241-257. Igal's conclusions seem to me convincing, except where he tries to give individual dates for the composition of each treatise. I follow his dating for the events in Plotinus' life.
6. Eunapius VS III.1.2 (Giangrande); David in Porph.91.24-25 (Busse); Suda s.v. Πλωτῖνος . F.Zucker, 'Plotin und Lycopolis', Sitz. der Deut. Akad. der Wiss. zu Berlin, Kl. für Spr., Lit. und Kunst (1950), gives as much information as is known about the town in Plotinus' time.
7. Very little is known about Ammonius. See J.Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London, 1977), pp.380-383, and Dodds in Entr.pp.24-32.

8. Bréhier's theory that Plotinus' thought was strongly influenced by Oriental philosophy (put forward in La Philosophie de Plotin (Paris, 1928)) is now generally rejected.
9. The number 54 had magical significance for Porphyry, being the product of 3 x 2 and 3 x 3. To achieve this number Porphyry had to divide up some of the longer treatises (III 2-3; IV 3-5; VI 1-3; VI 4-5; III 8, V 8, V 5, II 9: each of these groups was originally a single work. On the last see Harder, Hermes 71(1936), pp.1-10.).
10. V.P.4.9-14.
11. Igal, op.cit., pp.95-98.
12. V.P.6.30-37.
13. The derivation of plurality from the One, for example, discussed in Chapters 5-7, and the doctrine that the hypostases are 'in' the human soul (Chapters 10-12).
14. Note the citations of V 1 by the fathers listed in Henry, Etats, pp.420-421.
15. One notable instance of Plotinus changing his ideas can be found in III 9,1, which is a commentary on Pl. Ti. 39e 7-9; his later view can be found in II 9,1,25 ff..
16. The omission of $\tau\omega\nu$ in the manuscripts of Cyril is due to scribal error (see Henry, Etats, p.20).
17. V.P.4.16-18.

18. V.P.4.18-19.
19. See H.Dörrie, NAWG (1955), p.73.
20. V.P.25.32-35.
21. See 2,1; 2,11; 2,17; 2,51; 3,3; 3,4; 4,6.
22. 5,1-2.
23. See on 1,2-3
24. See their great editions, both maior and minor, and in particular Henry's Manuscripts and Etats.
25. See note 3 above.
26. V.P.8.1 ff..
27. See Schwyzer, RE 512.15 ff. on Plotinus' 'Sprache'.
28. Cf. V.P.14.1-4
29. V.P.24.2 ff..
30. I am not convinced by H-S's theory of a Eustochian edition used by Eusebius in his citation of V 1, put forward in their introduction to t.I pp.ix ff. and to t.II pp.ix ff.. For convincing refutation of this theory see P.Kraus, RHR 113(1936), pp.207-218, and M.van der Valk, Mnemosyne 9(1956), pp.112-134. Within limits, of course, the indirect tradition has great value.
31. See Bibliography for these editions and translations.

32. V.P.8.8 ff..

33. CQ 22(1928), p.142.

TRANSLATION

In the translation I have tried to be as accurate as possible, so that the reader may have a clear idea of what Plotinus actually wrote. Plotinus was no stylist, and the meaning of some of his remarks is obscure. Obscurities in the Greek are, for the most part, allowed to remain obscure in the translation, though I try to explain all obscurities in the commentary.

Of the hypostases, 'Intellect' and 'the One' have been written with capital letters. I have not used a capital letter for 'soul', since, as the bridge between the sensible and Intelligible Worlds, soul is very much involved with the human body. Thus, the word 'soul' often refers to the human soul, and in this sense it can be used in the plural. The use of a capital letter for this meaning of 'soul' seemed to me odd. It should be remembered, however, that strictly speaking all 'soul' is a unity (IV 9 passim).

1. Whatever is it, then, that has caused souls to forget God their father, and, although sharing in that world and belonging completely to him, to be ignorant both of themselves and of him?

 The beginning of their wickedness was their audacity, their birth, the first 'otherness' and the wish to belong to themselves. When they had appeared in this world, they took pleasure in their free will and made much use of their self-movement. They ran along the opposite path and put a very great distance between themselves and God. Thus, they were unaware that they too were from that world. Like children who have been dragged away from their fathers at birth and who have been brought up for a long time apart, they know neither themselves nor their fathers. Thus, no longer seeing him nor themselves, they showed no respect for themselves through ignorance of their ancestry; they respected other things and admired everything else more than themselves, and stunned by them and amazed and dependent on them, they cut themselves off as far as they could, showing no respect for what they had rejected. Consequently, their respect for these things and their lack of respect for themselves turn out to be the cause of their complete ignorance of him. For no sooner is something extraneous pursued and admired than the admirer and pursuer admits himself to be inferior; and if he assumes himself to be inferior to what comes to be and

passes away¹ and considers himself the most contemptible and perishable of all that he respects, he can never 'lodge in his heart' either the nature of God or God's power.

Therefore, two lines of argument must be presented to people in this state, if they are to be turned towards what is in the opposite direction, the Primaries, and are to be led upwards as far as the highest, the One, the Primary. What, then, is each of these? One points out the lack of value in what soul now respects, and this we shall expound more fully elsewhere. The other teaches and reminds the soul of what we might call its ancestry and its worth; it is prior to the first and when elucidated will clarify that as well. This is the subject of our present enquiry, for it is close to our goal and a useful preliminary to the other; for the searcher is soul and must know what it, the searcher, is, so that it may first discover itself and may know whether it has the power for this kind of search, whether it has an eye capable of seeing, and whether it is right for it to search. For if it is seeking things alien to it, why should it bother? But if they are related to it, then it is right for it to search and discovery is possible.

2. First, therefore, let every soul reflect on the fact that it is soul itself which made all living creatures by breathing life into them, everything which earth and

sea nourish, everything in the air, and all the divine stars in heaven. Soul itself made the sun, soul itself this great universe; and soul itself organised it, soul itself leads it in its ordered circuit. It is a different nature from what it organises, what it moves and what it causes to live; and it must be worthy of more respect than these, since these come to be and are destroyed whenever soul abandons them or else bestows life upon them, whereas soul itself is eternal since 'it does not abandon itself'.

Let soul reason as follows on the manner of its bestowal of life both on the whole universe and on individuals. Let the investigation of the great soul be undertaken by another soul, of no mean stature once it has become worthy of the investigation by ridding itself of deceit and the charms which have bewitched other souls and by achieving a condition of stillness. Let not only the body which surrounds it and 'body's flood' be still, but its whole environment as well; let the earth be still, let the sea and the air and the very †higher† heaven itself be still. Let it imagine soul rushing in, as it were, from every side into the stationary universe from the outside, pouring in, coming in from every side and illuminating it. Just as shafts of sunlight when they have lit up a dark cloud give it a golden appearance and make it shine, so too soul, having come into the body of the universe, gave it life, gave it immortality and woke it as it lay inert.

Moved with eternal movement under the wise leadership of soul it became a being of life and happiness; the universe acquired value when soul took up its abode within it, being before soul a dead body, earth and water, or rather the darkness of matter, non-being, an 'abomination to the gods', as the poet says.

Its power and nature would become clearer and more evident, if we were to consider at this point how soul embraces and leads the universe according to its own wishes. It gave itself to the whole extent of this mass and every intervening space, be it large or small, has been ensouled, even though bodies are situated in different places, one here, one there, some facing, others separated from each other in different ways. But this is not the case with the soul. It is not cut up into pieces, giving life to each thing with a part of itself; rather everything lives by means of the whole soul, and the entire soul is present everywhere, resembling its father who produced it both in its unity and in its ubiquity. And the universe, although plural and spatially divided, is united through its power; this world of ours is a god because of it. The sun too is a god because it is ensouled, and the other stars, and we too for this reason, if we are at all godlike; 'for corpses are more fit to be cast out than dung'.

The cause of gods' divinity must be a more important god than they. Of the same nature as this is our soul too,

and when you take it and investigate it in a purified state without accretions you will find the same thing to be worthy of respect, namely what we have described as soul, and worthy of greater respect than anything bodily. For 'everything is earth'. Even if it is fire, what would be its burning power? The same goes for the compounds of these, even if you add water to them, or air. But if what is ensouled will be the object of pursuit, why do people neglect themselves and pursue something else? If you are amazed at the soul in something else, be amazed at yourself.

3. Since the soul is so valuable and divine a thing, straightaway confident that such a thing will approach God, with such a principleⁿ go up towards him. Certainly you will not be shooting from a distance, nor will the intermediaries be many.

Consider, then, what is more divine than this divine being, soul's upper vicinity, its prior and its source; for even though it is a thing such as our discussion has described it, it is an image of Intellect. Just as a spoken expression is an image of the expression in soul, so soul itself is an expression of Intellect and the whole activity and life which it sends out to form another independent entity. For instance, in the case of fire there is one heat remaining within it, and another which it dispenses. But in the Intelligible World, one must

realise that the activity does not ebb away, but rather that the internal activity remains, while the other becomes an independent entity.

Coming from Intellect, then, soul is intellectual and its own intellect is involved in reasonings, and its perfection comes from Intellect too, as from a father who has reared a child whom he has produced imperfect in relation to himself. Therefore, both its independent existence comes from Intellect, and its power of expression becomes active when Intellect is seen by it; for when it looks intently at Intellect, the objects of its thought and activity come from within it and are appropriate to it. And these alone should be called psychic activities, namely the intellectual activities from within itself. The lower activities are from elsewhere, and are experiences of a soul conditioned in that way.

Intellect, then, makes soul even more divine, both by being its father and by being present. Nothing is between them other than the fact of their difference, soul, however, as next in order and as the receiving substrate, and Intellect as the form. But even the matter of Intellect is beautiful as it is like Intellect and simple.

The nature of Intellect is clear from this repeated point, that it is better than soul which is as we have
4. described it; but it can also be seen from the following.

If anyone wonders at this sensible world, looking at its size and its beauty and the order of its eternal motion, and at the gods in it, some seen, some even unseen, and at the spirits, the living beings and all the plants, let him go up to its archetype, to what is truer, and there let him see all the Intelligibles with their self-given eternity, in the sort of awareness and life appropriate to them; and let him see 'unsullied' Intellect, their champion, unfathomable wisdom, and the real age of Cronus, a god whose name means 'satiety' (*κόρος*) and 'Intellect' (*νοῦς*). For it contains within itself all the immortals, every Intellect, every God, every soul at rest eternally. Why should it seek to change in this happy state? Where should it seek to change to, when it has everything within itself? It does not even seek enlargement since it is completely perfect. Therefore, all its contents too are perfect, so that it may be completely perfect, having nothing which is not perfect, having nothing within itself which it does not think; and it thinks not by seeking its objects, but by possessing them. And its blessedness is not acquired, but it is all things in eternity. (It is the true eternity which time imitates as it runs alongside soul, leaving some things behind and moving on to others. Indeed, there is a succession of things involved with soul, at one moment Socrates, at another a horse, always one particular thing, whereas Intellect is all things.)

Intellect, then, has all things resting in eternity; it 'merely is' and this 'is' is eternal, and the future is non-existent - for it 'is' then too - and there is no past - for nothing there has passed - but all things are eternally present, since they are identical and are delighted, as it were, to be as they are.

Each of them is Intellect and Being, and the whole is the sum of Intellect and the sum of Being, Intellect with its thinking establishing Being, and Being, by being thought, giving to Intellect its thinking and its Being. The cause of the thinking is something else, which is also the cause for Being; so something else is the cause of both, since they are together and exist inseparably and do not abandon each other, although two, forming this integrated unity Intellect and Being, the thinker and what is thought, Intellect ranged with the thinker, Being with what is thought. There could be no thinking were there not 'otherness' and 'sameness'. Thus, the primaries are Intellect, Being, otherness and sameness; and one must also add 'movement' and 'rest'. There must be movement if Intellect thinks, and rest so that the objects of its thought may be identical. There must be otherness so that there may be a thinker and that which is thought; if you remove otherness, unity and silence will result. But the objects of thought must also be different in relation to each other. There must be identity, since Intellect is one with itself, and

since there is also some common factor among all its objects; and the difference between them is otherness. These primaries by their plurality make number and quantity; and quality is the individuality of each of them. From these, as from first principles, the rest evolve.

5. This god, then, above the soul is plural; and the soul can be among these, joined to them, should it not wish to fall away. Therefore, having approached Intellect and having become, as it were, one with it, soul asks who it was that produced Intellect. He who is simple, prior to such multiplicity, the cause both of its being and of its being plural, the maker of number.

For number is not primary. Indeed, prior to the Dyad is the One; the Dyad is a secondary, and having arisen from the One has that as its definer, while being per se indefinite. Whenever it is defined, it immediately becomes a number, a number in the sense of a substance. The soul too is a number. The Primaries are not masses or magnitudes - these gross things which sensation thinks real are secondary. (Furthermore, not even in semen is it the moist part which is valuable, but the invisible part, which is number and creative expression (logos).) The number, then, and Dyad, of which we speak in the Intelligible World, are creative expressions and Intellect. But the Dyad is indefinite when taken as identical with what we might call Intellect's substrate, whereas the number from the Dyad and the One is

a Form in each case. Intellect has been shaped, as it were, by the Forms which have arisen in it; but it is shaped in one way by the One, and in another by itself, as happens with actualised sight; for the act of thought is a vision which sees, and both are one.

6. How, then, does it see, and whom, and how in any case did it become an independent entity and has arisen from the One so that it can see at all? The soul now accepts the necessity that these Forms exist, but yearns to know in addition the answer to this question much asked by ancient philosophers too, how from a unity such as we say the One is did anything become an independent entity, whether a multiplicity, a dyad or a number. Why did it not remain on its own, but such a great multiplicity flowed out from it, which is seen in the world and which we claim to refer back to it?

Let what follows be our answer: but let us first call upon God himself, not with the spoken word, but stretching ourselves out by means of our soul in prayer towards him, since this is the way in which we are able to pray to him, alone to the Alone. While he, then, is on his own in the inner temple, as it were, remaining in stillness, beyond all things, the beholder must look at what might be called the stationary images which are already external to him - or rather at the first image to have appeared, manifesting itself as follows.

In the case of every moving thing, there must be something towards which it moves. Since the One has nothing, let us not affirm that it moves; rather that if anything arises after it, this must have arisen by its own continual turning towards the One. (Let us discount genesis in time, since we are discussing eternal entities; when in our discussion we predicate 'birth' of them we shall be giving them some part in the hierarchy of causation.) We must say, then, that what arises from the One arises without its having moved; for if anything were to arise as a result of its having moved, what arose would be a third term after it, subsequent to the movement, and not a second term. Therefore, the One must be unmoved, and if anything is secondary and subsequent to it, this must have become a separate entity without the One's having inclined its attention, exercised its will, or moved in any sense.

How then does this happen? And what must we conceive of in the vicinity of the One as it remains unmoved? A halo of light comes from it, but from it while it remains unmoved, like the bright light around the sun which, as it were, circles around the sun, produced from it while it remains always unmoved. All entities, while they remain, necessarily produce from their own substance, in virtue of the power present in them, an independent entity which stays around them near their outer perimeter, attached to them, an image of what we might call the archetypes from

which it stemmed. Fire produces the heat which comes from it; and snow does not merely keep its cold within it. Sweet smelling things confirm this point most of all; so long as they exist, they send out something from themselves in their own vicinity which the bystander enjoys as independent entities. Furthermore, everything which is already perfect produces. What is eternally perfect produces eternally an eternal entity, and produces something inferior to itself. What, then, ought we to say about the most perfect? Nothing is produced from him except the greatest entities subsequent to him. The greatest entity subsequent to him and secondary to him is Intellect.

Indeed, Intellect sees the One and needs him alone, whereas he has no need of Intellect. What is produced from something mightier than Intellect must be Intellect, and Intellect is mightier than everything else because other things are subsequent to it. For example, the soul is an expression of Intellect and an activity, just as Intellect is an activity of the One. But the expression in soul is dim, for it is a reflexion of Intellect; for this reason also soul must look towards Intellect. Similarly, Intellect must look towards the One, so that it may be Intellect. It sees him without being separated from him, since it is subsequent to him and nothing is in between, just as is the case with soul and Intellect. Everything longs for its producer and loves it, particularly when the producer

and the product are alone; and when the best hypostasis is the producer, the product necessarily associates with him, so that it is separated from him by 'otherness' alone.

7. We say that Intellect is an image of the One - for we must speak more clearly - first because the product must be a 'One' in some sense and must preserve many of its features, and because there must be a similarity with it, as is the case with light from the sun. 'But the One is not Intellect. How on earth, then, does it produce Intellect?' The One produces it because through its reversion Intellect was looking towards it; this act of seeing was Intellect. For what perceives anything else is either sense-perception or Intellect. † Sense-perception is like a straight line, Intellect like a circle, and the One like the centre of the circle. † 'But the circle can be divided, whereas this is different.' Well, yes, in the case of the analogy there is certainly a unity, but the One is the potentiality of all things. The act of thought separates off, as it were, from the potentiality the items of this potentiality and sees them (otherwise it would not have become Intellect), since it has already an intrinsic awareness, as it were, that it has the power to create substance - at any rate, by itself it actually defines its being for itself by means of the One's power; it is also aware that substance is, as it were, an item of the One's contents and comes from it, and that itself, inchoate

Intellect, is strengthened by the One and is perfected into substance by it and comes from it. It realises that from the One as 'indivisible', as it were, comes to it as 'divisible' life, thinking and everything, since he is no part of the 'everything'; everything came from him because he was not held down by any shape. The One is unity alone; if it had been everything it would have been included among Intelligible Reality. Hence it is none of the contents of Intellect, but from it comes everything. And so these contents are, in fact, substances, for each has already been defined and has shape, as it were. Being must not, as it were, hover in indeterminacy, but must be fixed by being limited and by being stationary. For the Intelligibles, 'being stationary' means having definition and shape, by means of which they also achieve independent existence.

'This is the family' of the Intellect which we have described, worthy of Intellect most pure - to be born from no other source but the First Principle, and once having arisen to produce all the Beings in its company, all the beauty of the Forms, all the Intelligible Gods. Being full of what it produced, and as if having swallowed them down again by keeping them inside itself, and by not letting them fall out into matter and be brought up with Rhea - as the mysteries and the stories about the gods hint, saying that Cronus, the wisest god, before Zeus

appears, holds back within himself what he produces, so that he is full and Intellect in satiety. Afterwards, so they say, he produces Zeus when already sated; for Intellect produces soul, since Intellect is perfect. Indeed, since it is perfect, it had to produce; such a great power could not be barren. But it was not possible in this case either for the product to be mightier, but being less it had to be a reflexion of it, undefined in the same way until defined and, as it were, 'informed' by its producer. The product of Intellect is a creative expression, an independent entity, the ratiocinative soul. This is what moves around Intellect, the light of Intellect, its trace dependent on it, on one side attached to Intellect and hence full of it, enjoying it and sharing in it and thinking, and on the other side in touch with what is subsequent to it - or rather itself producing what must be inferior to soul. (We must discuss this later.) This is the extent of the divine Beings.

8. This is the reason also for Plato's three principles - 'everything is about the king of everything' (he means the Primaries), 'the second is about the secondaries, and about the tertiaries is the third'. He says too that there is 'the father of the cause', signifying by 'cause' Intellect, since Intellect is his demiurge; he says that this makes soul in that mixing bowl of his. Since the 'cause' is Intellect, he means by 'father' the Good, what

is beyond Intellect, 'what is beyond substance'. (In many places he calls Being and Intellect 'Form'.) Accordingly, Plato knew that from the Good comes Intellect, and from Intellect soul. Thus this discussion of ours is not new or begun now; it was held in the past but not explicitly. Our present discussion is an explanation of that previous one confirming by the evidence of the writings of Plato himself that these doctrines of ours are ancient.

Parmenides previously touched on such a doctrine in so far as he identified Being and Intellect, and did not place Being in the sensible order, saying 'for thinking and Being are the same thing'. But he also says that the latter is 'unmoved' - although he adds thinking to it - removing all bodily movement from it so that it may remain as it is, and comparing it to a spherical mass because it keeps everything held within it and because its thinking is not external to it but takes place within itself. But although he speaks of 'one' in his own writings, he was criticised since this one is found to be many.

Plato's Parmenides, speaking more precisely, distinguishes from each other the primary One, which is 'one' in a more exact sense, and the secondary one, which he calls 'one-many', and the tertiary 'one and many'. In this way he too is consonant with the doctrine of three natures.

9. Again, Anaxagoras, in calling Mind pure and unmixed, is affirming the Primary as simple and the One as transcendent,

but because of his antiquity he has neglected precision. And Heraclitus knows that the One is eternal and Intelligible, since bodies are always coming to be, and are 'in flux'. For Empedocles, 'Strife' divides, 'Love' is the One - he too makes this incorporeal - and the elements serve as matter.

Aristotle later on makes the Primary transcendent and 'Intelligible', but by saying that it 'thinks itself' on the contrary he causes it not to be the Primary; and by positing many other Intelligibles (as many as there are spheres in the universe, so that each Intelligible may move one sphere) he describes the region of the Intelligibles differently from Plato, introducing plausibility since he has no necessity at his disposal. But one might wonder whether his theory is, in fact, plausible. It would be more plausible that all the spheres, since they contribute to one system, should look towards one thing, i.e., the Primary. One might also ask whether for him the many Intelligibles spring from one Primary Intelligible, or whether the principles in the region of the Intelligibles are many. And if they spring from one, there will be an obvious analogy with the spheres in the sensible world in which one contains another, but the single external sphere dominates. Consequently, there too the Primary would contain the others, and there will be an Intelligible Cosmos. And just as here the spheres are not empty, but the first

sphere is thick with stars, and the others have stars too, so there also the Movers will have many things within them, and the truer world will be there. If, on the other hand, each Mover is a principle, the principles will be a chance affair. And why will they work together and unite in purpose for a single task, the harmonious arrangement of the whole universe? How is it that the sensible objects in the universe are equal in number to the Intelligibles, the Movers? Again, how can they be many as he says, yet incorporeal, without matter to separate them.

So, of the ancients, it is those who sided most with the doctrines of Pythagoras and his successors who busied themselves with this nature. But whereas some of them elaborated their doctrine in their own published works, others expounded it not in treatises, but in unrecorded seminars.

10. It has now been established that we must believe as follows: that there is that which is beyond Being, the One (our discussion intended to describe it in so far as anything can be established on these matters), that there is next Being and Intellect, and that third is the nature of soul.

Just as these three things we have mentioned exist in nature, so we must believe that they are in us also. I do not mean in the sensible order - for these are transcendent - but above the sensible order, outside it,

and outside it in the same way as they are outside the whole universe; and in the realm of the individual I mean what Plato meant by 'the inner man'.

Now, our soul too is something divine and of another nature, the same as that of the totality of soul. But the soul which possesses intellect is perfect. One intellect is reasoning intellect, the other provides the reasoning. This reasoning part of the soul, then, which needs no bodily organ for its reasoning, but keeps its activity pure so that it may also reason purely, is separate and unmixed with body; if you were to set it in the Intelligible World, you would not be wrong. We must not look for a place in which to position it, but it must be put outside all place; for the expressions 'by itself', 'outside' and 'immaterial' apply to it only when it is alone, possessing nothing from the nature of body. Thus, in the case of the universe, Plato says 'and furthermore from outside' he put the soul around it, referring to that part of the soul which remains in the Intelligible World. In our case, hiding his meaning, he has spoken of it 'at the top of the head'. And the exhortation to 'separate' is not meant spatially, for this is naturally separate, but he means separation achieved by avoiding inclination, by not using imagination and by alienation of soul and body, in the hope that the remaining part of the soul as well might be led above and taken upwards, even the part of it positioned here, which is the

mere craftsman and moulder of body and has its dealings with body.

11. Since, then, there is soul which reasons about just and beautiful things, its reasoning enquiring whether this is just and this beautiful, there must also be some unchanging Justice, from which the reasoning in the soul actually arises. Otherwise, how could it reason? And if soul sometimes reasons about these things and sometimes does not, there must be in us that Intellect which does not reason but which always possesses Justice. And there must also be in us Intellect's principle, its cause, God, which is not divisible but remains whole; and although it does not remain whole in any place, nevertheless it is seen in many things, wherever each thing is able to receive it as something different from what it actually is, just as the centre of a circle is independent, but each component of the circle has a point in it, i.e., the radii bring to this centre their individual points. By a similar terminus in ourselves, we too are attached to, associate with and are dependent on the One. We find our abode there if we converge on it.

12. How is it, then, that possessing such great things we do not grasp them, but for the most part are idle in the activities we have mentioned - indeed, some of us do not exercise them at all.

They are continually active with their own activities,

Intellect and Intellect's prior continually remaining in itself; and soul too, 'the continual mover' is in this state. Not everything which is in soul is immediately perceptible, but it reaches 'us' only when it reaches sense-perception. Whenever something is active and does not communicate with the faculty of perception, it has not yet permeated the whole soul. So we have no knowledge as yet, since we are involved with the sense-faculty, and are not a part of soul, but the whole soul. Furthermore, each of the parts of the soul lives continually and is active continually in its own independent activity, but there is recognition only when communication and perception takes place.

Thus, if there is to be perception of what we have described as present, the perceiving part of soul must turn inwards and must be made to attend there. Just as a man listening for a voice which he particularly wishes to hear stands aside from the other voices and pricks up his ears for the preferable sound, waiting for it to arrive, so too in this case, perceptible noises must be left aside, except in so far as is necessary, and the soul's power of perception must be kept pure and ready to hear the sounds from above.

COMMENTARY

CHAPTER ONE

The first chapter is introductory: the reasons for the souls' forgetfulness of their father Intellect are outlined, and the purpose of the treatise is set out.

1,1-3 τί ποτε . . . καὶ ἐκείνον : P. begins with the question that is answered in 1,3-22. The answer requires the remedy which our treatise provides.

The technique of beginning with a question is a very common one in P.. (I 1, I 3, I 4, I 5, I 7, II 2, II 6, II 8, III 3, III 8, IV 4, IV 8, IV 9, V 1, V 3, V 5, V 7, VI 4, VI 6 and VI 8 begin with a direct question; II 4, III 5, III 6, IV 5, IV 7 and VI 2 begin with an indirect question; and in I 2, I 6, II 5, II 7, III 2, VI 3, VI 7 and VI 9 an introductory statement is followed by a question.) It probably reflects the fact that most of the treatises arose from the discussion sessions which were the staple of P.'s philosophical teaching (cf., e.g., the incident described in V.P. 13.10 ff.).

1,1 τὰς ψυχάς : These souls are clearly individual souls. Only individual souls are encumbered with birth (1,4) and with too close involvement with the body (cf. IV 8,4,10 ff.): the world soul stays above body and governs it by a sort of remote control (IV 8,2,14-16.2,26 ff.). On the relationship between world and individual souls see on 2,44.

1,1-2 *πατὴρ θεῶν* : Although *πατήρ* and *θεός* can be used both of Intellect and of the One, the phrase *πατὴρ θεῶν* probably refers here to Intellect (cf. 2,37; 3,14; 3,21), soul's immediate prior (cf. V 8,13,1-2 where Intellect is the god whose son is soul). The aim of the treatise, however, is to take soul beyond Intellect to the One (1,23-25).

πατὴρ : On the image of 'father' in P., and exhaustive references to its usage, see Images, pp. 76-80. The image was common in Platonic philosophy, its most obvious connotation being that of procreation. Plato's demiurge is called the *πονητής* and *πατήρ* of the universe (Pl. Ti. 28c 3). The interpretation of this phrase had a considerable history (see Procl. in Ti. I.303.24-317.20 (Diehl)). For P., as for many Platonists, the demiurge was Intellect (see 8,5 and introduction to Chap. 2), the creator of soul (cf. 2,37 *τῷ γυνήσαντι πατρί*); hence, *πατήρ* was used to refer to Intellect and *πατὴρ* to the Intelligible World (I 6,8,16. 8,21; V 9,1,21). Of course, the One, at the head of the *πρόσδος* (see on 5,3-4), and thus the fountain-head of all creativity, could also be referred to by the word *πατήρ* (see V 8,1,3), and P. could also find justification for this usage in Plato (see, e.g., Pl. Hp. Ma. 297b 6-7; ibid. Ep. VI 323d 3-4).

The word had some currency in Neopythagorean circles, e.g., in Numenius (ap. Procl. in Ti. I.303.27 ff.); Sthenidas (ap. Stob. IV.271.2 (Wachsmuth and Hense)); and Diotogenes (ap. Stob. IV.270.7)

θεός is another word with a long philosophical history. J. M. Rist in an interesting article ('Theos and the One in

some Texts of Plotinus', MS 24 (1962), pp. 169-180) discusses P.'s use of the word to refer both to Intellect and to the One. He suggests that P. was trying to create a technical vocabulary in which δ^{ς} $\theta\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ (note the definite article) = the One. The connection of the word with $\nu\omicron\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ was common in Platonic philosophy (see Dodds's note on Procl. El.Theol. 128-129). In VI 9,8,8-9 P. says that whatever is attached to the One is a god. Thus both soul (2,43) and Intellect (5,1) are gods; cf. 7,48-49 $\kappa\alpha\iota \mu\acute{\iota}\chi\rho\epsilon \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\nu \tau\grave{\alpha} \theta\epsilon\acute{\alpha}$. We too are gods in some way (2,41) by virtue of our higher souls. The aim of P.'s philosophy is to bring back the god in us ~~to~~ the divine in the All (V.P. 2.26-7).

- 1,2 $\epsilon\pi\iota\lambda\alpha\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\theta\alpha\iota$: 'Forgetfulness' is mentioned in Pl. Phdr. 248c7 as one of the reasons for the soul's descent ($\lambda\eta\theta\eta\varsigma \tau\epsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma \pi\lambda\eta\sigma\theta\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha \beta\alpha\rho\acute{\upsilon}\nu\theta\eta$). P. refers to this passage at IV 3,15,5-7 $\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ (sc. $\psi\upsilon\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma$) $\eta \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\kappa \eta\epsilon\kappa\omega\sigma\epsilon\nu \acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\iota \acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\theta\epsilon\nu \delta\iota\alpha \beta\acute{\alpha}\rho\upsilon\nu\sigma\iota\nu \kappa\alpha\iota \lambda\eta\theta\eta\nu \pi\omicron\lambda\acute{\upsilon} \acute{\epsilon}\phi\epsilon\lambda\kappa\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota\varsigma$. This Platonic reminiscence is not noticed by H-S. $\Lambda\eta\theta\eta$ was also a Pythagorean term for the 'forgetfulness of the soul's divine origin' (see Dodds on Plato's Gorgias 493c). P. mentions the idea again at II 9,4,7-8 $\epsilon\acute{\iota} \delta'\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\mu\sigma\epsilon$ (sc. $\eta \psi\upsilon\chi\eta$), $\tau\acute{\omega} \epsilon\pi\iota\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\theta\alpha\iota \delta\eta\lambda\omicron\nu\acute{o}\tau\iota \tau\acute{\omega}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}$. (cf. VI 5,2,19 ff.: when talking of the Intelligible World one should grasp its principles $\mu\grave{\eta} \pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\kappa\beta\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\nu \acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon \epsilon\pi\iota\lambda\epsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\pi' \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta\nu \phi\acute{\omega}\sigma\iota\nu$). The aim of V 1 is to remind the soul of its ancestry (1,27); the notion that soul is to be made aware of its true nature by means of its memory is reminiscent of the Platonic doctrine of $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$.

- 1,2-3 μοίρας ἐκείθεν...ἐκείνου : Moíras...oúras is a Platonic phrase repeated often by P.; see Pl. Phdr. 230a5-6 and ibid. 248e4 and compare IV 2,1,5; IV 7,4,4-5; IV 8,1,3.7,6 (cf. also IV 7,10,14-15 τῆς φύσεως ἐκείνης).

The theory that the soul belonged completely to the Intelligible World was firmly upheld by P. even to the extent that he maintained, contrary to his contemporaries, that the soul never completely descended (IV 8,8,1 ff.). For other references to the divine nature of soul in the early treatises see 10,11; I 6,2,7-8.6,14-15; IV 8,5,24-25. See further on 4,11 and 10,6-9.

- 1,3 ἀγνοῆσαι...καὶ ἐκείνον : The conceptual connection between self-knowledge and knowledge of the divine is expressed by Plato (or pseudo-Plato) in Alc.I 133cl ff., where the ratiocinative faculty of the soul (τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἶδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἴστιν) is considered closest to god. Therefore, knowledge of the most divine part of the soul includes knowledge of god and of oneself. P. puts the same idea negatively; if one is ignorant of oneself, one remains ignorant of god (cf. 1,19-22).

The Delphic proscription γνῶθι σεαυτὸν is discussed by G. J. P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973), pp. 7-19. It held an important place in the philosophical tradition from Socrates onwards (for references see Theiler's introduction to V 3 (t.Vb pp. 368-369) and for its use by later Platonists, P. Courcelle, 'Le "Connais-toi toi-même" chez les Néoplatoniciens Grecs', Le Néoplatonisme, pp. 153-166).

- 1,3-15 ἀρχὴ μὲν... ἀτιμάσασαι : P. distinguishes three moments, as it were, in the alienation of soul from Intellect: first, the τόλμα, γένεσις etc. (1,4-5); secondly, the pleasure in free-will after birth resulting in πλείστη ἀπόστασις (1,5-10); and thirdly, the continued wonderment at the physical world which causes as much separation to souls as is allowed to them (1,11-15).

Much of the language of these lines is Neopythagorean in tone (see individual notes), though it is unlikely that any particular Neopythagorean is P.'s source. Philosophers of P.'s age shared a common vocabulary.

- 1,4 ἡ τόλμα : On the meaning of this word see N. Baladi, 'Origine et signification de l'audace chez Plotin', Le Néoplatonisme, pp. 89-97, and the illuminating remarks of Rist, HSCP 69 (1965), pp. 340-342.

Τόλμα was a semi-technical term in two different metaphysical systems, that of the Pythagoreans, and that of the Gnostics.

Whether the word occurred in early Pythagoreanism is not certain, and too much weight should not be put on Lydus' evidence (Mens. II.7 p. 24.12-13 (Wuensch)) that Pherecydes referred to the dyad as τόλμα ; but in Neopythagoreanism the identification of the dyad and τόλμα was fairly common (H-S collect the evidence ad loc. and add to the list in t.III p. 346 in 'Fontes Addendi'). The dyad separates itself from the monad; hence the word τόλμα is associated with notions of separation (διεχώρισεν [Theol. Ar.] 9.5 (de Falco);

ἀπόστασις and πρόοδος Herm. in Phdr. 128.4-5 (Couvreur)).

For P., as for the Pythagoreans, the idea of separation was uppermost. Note the use of ἐξέροτης (1,4) and ἀπόστασις (1,7-8). Τολμᾶν and τολμηρός occur elsewhere in P. - see V 2,2,5-7 where the part of soul which reaches as far as the vegetable world is τολμηρότατον because it has gone forward to that point; and VI 9,5,29 where Intellect is described as ἀποστήναι ... πῶς τοῦ ἑνὸς τολμήσας . Note, however, that P. does not actually call the dyad itself τόλμα ; rather τόλμα is the misplaced desire which causes separation. Furthermore, τόλμα may be used both of Intellect and of the soul.

The Gnostic notion of τόλμα is discussed by Armstrong in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 243 ff. and by H. Puech in his discussion of Baladi's paper (op. cit.). In the Valentinian system, Sophia, through its τόλμα , tries to unite itself to the highest principle νοῦς . This abortive attempt leads to the creation of the demiurge and of the material world. Thus, the initial movement of Sophia is an upward rather than a downward movement, and, in this respect, Gnostic and Pythagorean τόλμα differ. Furthermore, the Gnostics never suggested, as P. does by his use of the word to describe the separation of Intellect from the One in VI 9,5,29, that the creation of the Intelligible World (their πλήρωμα) could be the result of τόλμα . And even in other Gnostic systems, where Sophia breaks away from the higher powers, τόλμα bears little resemblance to its Plotinian namesake.

P. refers to Gnostic τόλμα in II 9,11,21-22. His use of the word in our present passage, however, owes more to the Greek philosophical tradition than to Gnosis. Common to both traditions is the idea that τόλμα is the result of free-will. This idea is stressed in our present passage by the use of τὸ βουληθῆναι and τὸ αὐτεξούσιον in 1,5. Numerous other passages in P., however, (e.g., 6,30 ff.; IV 8,6,7 ff.; V 4,2,26 ff.) stress the necessary and involuntary nature of the procession from the One. There is a difficulty here in P.'s thought, a difficulty which he tries to explain in IV 8,5. The difficulty is most clearly seen in his theory of matter; if the procession is necessary, how can its final term, matter, be the cause of evil?

Dodds suggests (Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 24-26) that after the split with the Gnostics marked by the anti-Gnostic treatises III 8, V 8, V 5 and II 9, P. changed his mind about the sinfulness of the soul's descent, i.e., the emphasis moved away from the voluntary nature of the procession as represented by τόλμα, τὸ βουληθῆναι, τὸ αὐτεξούσιον etc. to its necessary and involuntary nature. He points to I 1,12,24 ff. where the soul's illumination of body is said to be no more sinful than the casting of a shadow, and IV 3,13,17 ff. where the natural necessity of soul's descent is mentioned.

But while it is true that τόλμα is not found in any treatises later than II 9, it is not clear that the disappearance of the term from P.'s vocabulary marks a split with the Gnostics.

All the treatises in the fourth Ennead, which deals with soul (with the exception of the technical treatise IV 6), and most of the fifth Ennead dealing with Intellect, are earlier than the anti-Gnostic treatises. Thus, by the time P. came to write the anti-Gnostic treatises he had finished most of his writing on the nature of soul and Intellect, and so had little occasion to use the word *τόλμα* again. Furthermore, I am not convinced that P.'s view of the awkward problem of the descent of the soul ever showed any real development. IV 3,13,17 *ἴασι (sc. αἱ ψυχαὶ) δὲ οὐτε ἔκοῦσαι οὐτε πεμφθεῖσαι* is not much different from the treatment given in IV 8,5,10 ff.; the emphasis on the natural, instinctive descent in the later treatise is paralleled by IV 8,5,11 *φύσει νόμῳ*. Even in III 8,8,34 ff., in one of the anti-Gnostic treatises, he speaks of Intellect unfolding from the One *πάντα ἔχον θέλων — ὡς βέλτιον ἦν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθελήσαι τοῦτο* (III 8,8,34-35).

1,4

ἡ γένεσις : 'Birth' is a word also connected with the procession from the One (cf. 6,19 and the title of V 2 *περὶ γενέσεως καὶ τάξεως τῶν μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον*). For Neopythagoreans it was also one of the names of the dyad ([Theol. Ar.] 8.2 (de Falco)). In the context of the descent of the soul, the *πρώτη γένεσις* of Pl. Phdr. 248dl-2 and id. Ti. 41e3 is presumably meant. In IV 8,1,24.1,37 *ἀφίξις* refers to the same concept.

Theiler (t.VI p. 174) would prefer to read *ἡ γὰρ νύξις*. He compares I 1,12,23 (cf. also 10,26 and note on 10,26-27).

He objects to γένεσις on the grounds that it is the effect rather than the cause of the souls' birth. This objection seems to me unnecessarily fussy.

1,4

ἡ πρώτη ἐτερότης : 'Ετερότης is perhaps another Neopythagorean term. Nichomachus Ar. 110.15 (Hoche) calls the dyad ἐτερότητος καταρκτική (cf. ibid. 109.5). Sextus Empiricus (M. 10.261) speaks of the Pythagoreans believing that the monad created the Indefinite Dyad when it was conceived καθ' ἐτερότητα . P., however, is quite clear that 'otherness' is not to be found in the One (VI 9,8, 33-34). Rist, in an interesting article in Le Néoplatonisme, pp. 77-87 ('The Problem of "Otherness" in the Enneads'), notes (pp. 81-82) that 'otherness' is closely connected with motion, particularly motion away from the One. Thus, in II 4,5,30 the 'primal movement' is paired with 'otherness'. 'Otherness' is a characteristic of all entities subsequent to the One, and it is in virtue of this 'otherness' that they exist as individuals (VI 9,8,31-32). The composite life of Intellect contains 'otherness' because of the distinction within it of the subject and object of thought, and because of the plurality of Forms within it (VI 4,4,25-26 νοῦς πολλῆς ἐτερότητι ; cf. IV 3,5, 7-8 and 4,37-38 with note on 4,34). Thus, there is a connection between the 'primal otherness' of our present passage and the 'otherness' of 4,34 ff.; in each case the word suggests separation and distinct individuation. It is interesting, though, that ἐτερότης here is used to describe the formation of soul from Intellect; presumably this ἐτερότης is only πρώτη from the

point of view of the soul.

See further on 2,6; 3,3-4; 3,21-22; 4,34 and 4,41.

- 1,5 τὸ βουληθῆναι... ἑαυτῶν εἶναι : P.'s view of the procession as in some way voluntary has already been mentioned in the note on 1,4.

Fic.'s 'quia volunt sui iuris esse' is a bit weak.

When the soul forgets its father it revels in its own individuality and its 'otherness'. P. uses similar language to describe the soul's descent in III 7,11,15-16 καὶ ἄρχιν αὐτῆς βουλομένης καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς ; IV 4,3,1-2 καὶ οὐκ ἀνασχομένη τὸ ἐν, τὸ δὲ αὐτῆς ἀσπασαμένη καὶ ἕτερον ἐθελήσασα εἶναι ; and IV 8,4,10-11 μεταβάλλουσαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰς τὸ μέρος τε εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτῶν .

This sort of explanation is akin to that of narcissism as a reason for the κάθοδος (cf. IV 3,12,1 ff. and IV 6,3,9-10). Where the emphasis is on the turning back towards one's source (ἐπιστροφή : see on 3,13-14), self-possession is a desideratum (cf. VI 5,1,18-19 τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῇ μὲ ταύτῃ φύσει τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς).

- 1,5-6 πῶς δὲ αὐτεξουσίῳ... ἡσθεῖσαι : All translators except Ha. take ἐφάνησαν closely with ἡσθεῖσαι - e.g., Ci. 'ebbre, visibilmente, di quella loro autodeterminazione'. They take ἐφάνησαν ἡσθεῖσθαι either as the equivalent of ἐφάνησαν ἡσθῆναι , which is certainly possible - see LSJ s.v. φαίνω B.II.1 - or as a periphrastic construction where ἐφάνησαν means little more than ᾗσαν (on this use with φαίνεσθαι see G. Björck, HN ΔΙΔΑΣΚΩΝ -

die Periphrastische Konstruktionen im Griechischem (Uppsala, 1940), p. 111).

However, against this view is the position of ἐπιδήμιε which is usually first word in its clause; and, more important, the fact that P. is trying to distinguish between birth, the 'beginning of wickedness', and what happens after birth. He makes it quite clear in IV 8 that souls are not harmed by their contact with the body if it is superficial and if they escape as soon as they can (κὰν μὲν θᾶπτον φύγη, οὐδὲν βέβλαπται IV 8,5,27-28). It is only when they 'sink deep into body' (IV 8,4,21) and overdo their eagerness (IV 8,7,9-10) that they suffer lasting ill-effects. It is over-involvement with the body to which P. is alluding in our present passage - note πολλῶ τῷ κινεῖσθαι (1,6) and πλείστην ἀπόστασιν (1,7-8). Souls could have escaped if they had retreated back to Intellect after the 'beginning of wickedness'. But instead, after their birth (ἐπιδήμιε ἐφάνησαν), they ran in the opposite direction, away from the Intelligible World (1,7).

Henry ('La Liberté chez Plotin', Rev. Néoscol. de Phil. 33 (1931), p. 69, n.1) notes, probably correctly, that αὐτεξουσίος takes from its context a pejorative sense here. It is a common synonym for ἐκωσίος, used frequently in IV 8, P.'s study of the nature of free-will. It is used again in a psychological context in IV 8,5,26 (ῥόπη αὐτεξουσίῳ).

It has been suggested by Festugière (La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste III (Paris, 1953), p. 210, n.3) that the phrase τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ ἡσθεῖναι is an indication that P. was using

Albinus here as a source. Iamblichus, ap. Stobaeus, speaking of the reason for the soul's descent, mentions P.'s πρώτη ἵερότης (Stob. I.375.5-6 (Wachsmuth and Hense)), and then adds that according to Albinus ἡ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου διημερημένη κρίσις was the cause of τὰ καταγυγὰ ἐνελγήματα (ibid. 375.10-11).

The use of the same word αὐτεξούσιος in Albinus and in 1,5 is certainly striking. But R. E. Witt (Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge, 1937), p. 137) maintains that Iamblichus is untrustworthy and himself draws on P. Besides, it is not clear to what Albinus' διημερημένη κρίσις refers. In Stob. I.380.12-13 Iamblichus mentions the descent of the soul ἐπὶ δίκῃ καὶ κρίσει ; there he seems to be referring to reincarnation rather than to the first descent. It is possible that Iamblichus has joined together in the same sentence two explanations which in fact refer to different descents - P.'s which refers to the first descent and Albinus' which refers to reincarnation. If this is the case, then P. in our present passage cannot have been using Albinus, since τὸ αὐτεξούσιον in 1,5 surely refers to the first descent, or at least to a period immediately subsequent to it.

There is no way of deciding whether Iamblichus is to be trusted or not. P. certainly thought that both the first descent and reincarnation were in some sense voluntary (see IV 8,5,26 and IV 8,5,17 ff. where the type of reincarnation undergone depends on the voluntary actions done here on earth). There is, of course, no a priori reason why Albinus should not have held the same view.

1,6-7

πολλῷ τῷ κινεῖσθαι ... κεχρημέναι : This phrase explains how the souls express their free-will (cf. III 2,4, 36-38) τὰ δὲ δι' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα κίνησιν αὐτεξούσιον ἡψα ῥέπει ἀν' ὅτι μὲν πρὸς τὰ βελτίω, ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ χείρω). Origen, who may have been a fellow pupil with

P. at the school of Ammonius (Eus. EH vi.19), gives a similar explanation of the angels' and souls' separation from God; through misuse of their free-will they move away from Him (see H. Jonas, ThZ 4 (1948), p. 105). The word πολλῷ is important as only much movement causes too close involvement with the body (see on 1,5-6). Br. is wrong to omit it.

For P. the soul (both world and individual soul) is the source of life and movement (cf. IV 7,12,4 and 2,5-6 of the world soul). But soul's movement is closely connected to its lower creative activity. Hence, movement is concerned with what for P. is the less desirable part of the soul's life. The creative activities of Intellect and the One take place while they remain unmoved (III 4,1,1 μωόντων ἑκείνων) but soul creates when it is in motion (V 2,1,18-19 ἡ δὲ οὐ μένουσα ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινηθεῖσα ἑγὼνα εἰδωλον). And in III 7,11,15 ff. this movement is bracketed with the soul's πολυπραγμοσύνη (cf. IV 8,4,15) and wish for self-rule (cf. 1,5).

The doctrine that the soul was the source of movement for others while itself being self-moved, the αὐτοκίνητον was a conventional doctrine in ancient philosophy. According to Aetius (ap. DK Thales A.22) the theory originated with Thales, but perhaps the most famous statement of it is Pl. Phdr. 245c 5 ff.. There was doubt in antiquity about whether Plato's proof

was to be applied to the world soul, individual souls or to

ἢ πάντα ψυχὴ ἀπλῶς (see Herm. in Phdr. 102.10 ff.

(Couvreur)). In Lg. 896a1-2, however, Plato defines soul

in general as τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴ αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν .

But although the connection of movement and the life of the soul was strong in the Platonic tradition, there is at least a possibility that in speaking of soul's restlessness P. also had in mind what he thought to be Heraclitus' explanation of the soul's descent. In IV 8,1,12 ff., in a doxographical excursus containing the philosophical explanations of the descent, he mentions as Heraclitus' doctrine ἀμοιβὰς τε ἀναγκαίας (τιθέμενος) ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὁδὸν τε ἄνω κάτω εἰπὼν καὶ μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται καὶ κάματος ὥστε τοῖς αὐτοῖς μοχθεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι . As H-S remark ad loc., P. wrongly thought that τοῖς αὐτοῖς referred to the Intelligible World, i.e., the Forms. What P. understood Heraclitus to mean emerges from a passage of Iamblichus (ap. Stob. I.378.21 ff.). Iamblichus, probably copying P. (see Festugière, La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste III (Paris, 1953), p. 210, n.1), gives as Heraclitus' answer to the problem of the soul's descent τὸ μὲν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιμένει κάματον εἶναι (sc. ὑπείληφε), τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλειν φέρει ἀνάπαυσιν (Stob. I.378.24-25), i.e., boredom with being in the same part of the Intelligible World causes the souls to move. Thus P. believed that it was Heraclitus' view that movement and change were essential components of the behaviour of the soul as it descended into body. That Heraclitus

was in P.'s mind here is further suggested by the definite Heraclitean reminiscence in 1,7 (see note ad loc.).

- 1,6 παρ' αὐτῶν : Παρ' αὐτῶν is, of course, reflexive. This use of αὐτός was uncommon in the classical period (see KG II.1.564, n.3), but in the Roman period there was no difference in pronunciation between αὐτός and αὐτός, so that the distinction between the two words became blurred (see Mayser, Grammatik der Griechischen Papyri aus der Ptolemäerzeit (Berlin and Leipzig, 1938), I.2.69, p. 65, n.1). All editors apart from H-S change the smooth to a rough breathing wherever the smooth breathing occurs.¹

- 1,6 τὴν ἑναντίαν (sc. ὁδόν) : The ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω was a famous Heraclitean catch-phrase (DK Heraclitus A.1). This suggests that P. was thinking of Heraclitus here. P. uses the same phrase (of the opposite direction) in VI 9,11,38 near the end of the treatise which immediately precedes V 1 in chronological order (cf. 1.23 τὰ ἑνάντια). Compare also V 2,1, 20 ff. where ἑνάντιος is coupled with κίνησις and this 'movement' refers to the creative activity of soul.

- 1,7-8 πλείστην ... πεποιημέναι : Ἀπόστασις is the opposite of ἐπιστροφή (cf. Iamb. Comm. Math. 46.5-6 (Festa) where the two words are paired as opposites). On ἐπιστροφή see on 3,13-14. Ἀπόστασις is one of the words P. uses when he talks about evil; e.g., in I 8,7,17 ff. it is said that the nature of evil can be grasped by imagining ἀπόστασις from the Good, and in VI 6,1,1 ff. multiplicity and ἀπειρία or

1. This difference between H-S and other editors is not subsequently mentioned in the commentary.

evil are described as types of ἀπόστασις from the One. The objects of sense-perception have the furthest ἀπόστασις (VI 7,42,23-24). In V 8,11,24-25 τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀποστήναι (the opposite of τὸ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφειν) is the result of concentrating on sense-perception rather than on the objects of Intellect.

It is, in fact, slightly odd that ἀπόστασις and movement away from the One should be the result of the exercise of free-will. The main conclusion of VI 8 is that it is only life in accord with Intellect and the One that is really free. And what applies to human actions and choices applies a fortiori to the higher hypostases. The One is completely free because it exists in accord with itself; it is its own ἐνέργημα (VI 8,16,17). Lack of free-will, τὸ ἀκούσιον , is an ἀπαγωγὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (VI 8,4,15). The same idea is expressed in IV 8,5,8 πᾶν ... ἰὸν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀκούσιον . The souls in our present passage are definitely going to what is worse; P. says that their descent is evil (1,3-4). So presumably the descent of the souls ought to be involuntary.

It has been remarked in the note on 1,4, however, that P. stresses in our passage the voluntariness of the descent at the expense of the explanation in terms of necessity which he often uses. The reason for this is that the purpose of V 1 is to turn the soul back to its father. The fact that the descent is voluntary shows that the return to the Intelligible World is also within souls' power and can be achieved by the purified soul.

- 1,8 καὶ ἑαυτὰς : The position of καί surely means that it should be taken with ἑαυτὰς (= 'they too') rather than with ἡγνόησαν . This point is missed by all translators.
- 1,8-10 ὥσπερ παῖδες... πατέρας : A similar comparison may be found at VI 9,9,34 ff. where the soul involved with the sensible world is compared to a young girl who in the absence of her father contracts a poor marriage and is ill-used. Compare also V 5,12,36-37 καὶ ἔλκει ... ὥσπερ ἀπὸ πατρὸς τὸ ἐρώμενον . Ferwerda, Images, pp. 78-79 notes that the image of the departure and return of children to their father was common among the Gnostics, and is further connected with the Platonic notion of the demiurge as 'Father of the All' (see on 1,1-2). It is also found in Proclus (in Ti. I.208. 12-13 (Diehl)) with which K. Praechter (GGA 167 (1905), p. 524) compares D. Chr. Or. 12.61, an oration supposed to be influenced by Posidonius (see I. Heinemann, Posidonius' Metaphysische Schriften II (Breslau, 1928), pp. 124 ff.). It looks as though the image may have been a common one in literary/philosophical circles.

With the phrase πολὺν χρόνον compare IV 8,4,12-13 ὅταν δὴ τοῦτο διὰ χρόνον ποιῇ ... Long term separation is harmful.

Εὐθύς (1,9), which is not translated by Br., does not mean 'troppo presto' (Ci.); it means 'straightaway', i.e., at birth.

- 1,11 οὐτ' οὖν ... ὁρᾶναι : Note the change from the vocabulary of knowledge and ignorance to that of sight. P. knew two sorts of perception, αἰσθησις (perception of the sensible world) and νοήσις (perception of the Intelligible World). The vocabulary of sense-perception, however, is often used of Intellect - e.g., in V 4,2 and V 6,1 νοεῖν and ὁρᾶν are used synonymously (cf. J. Dubbink, Studia Plotiniana - Onderzoek naar eenige Grondgedachten van het Stelsel van Plotinus (Diss. Nijmegen, 1945), pp. 21 ff.). Dubbink (op. cit. p. 24) thinks that P.'s use of ὁρᾶν in connection with Intellect and the One shows that some sort of real sight was involved in the spiritual anabasis. This seems to me most unlikely.
- 1,11-12 ἀτιμάσασαι ... τιμήσασαι τὰλλα : The aim of V 1 is to remind soul of its own intrinsic value and P. begins to do this in Chap. 2. That soul is τίμιος was good Platonist doctrine (see on 1,2-3 and also Pl. Lg. 726a1 ff.).
- τὰλλα (1,12) refers particularly to the physical world; nothing physical is more valuable than what is spiritual (cf. Pl. Lg. 727e1-3; ibid. 892a2-7).
- 1,13-14 θαυμάσασαι ... ἀγαυοθεῖσαι : P. thinks that these emotions, though sometimes brought on by the physical world in so far as it reflects its divine model, are more properly produced by the Intelligible World (cf. I 6,4,13-15; I 6,5,17 ταῦτα (sc. τὰ εἶδη) ... ἀγάμενοι ; V 5,12,34-35; also Pl. Smp. 211d2 ff.). Souls are filled with wonder at the physical

world because of the images of themselves which they have created there (IV 3,12,1 ff.).

1,14

ἐξηγημέναι τούτων : *Ἀρτᾶσθαι* is used by Aristotle in Metaph. 1072b14 to describe the dependence of creation on the Prime Mover. Following him, P. uses *ἐξαρτᾶσθαι* and *ἄνωαρτᾶσθαι* frequently to describe the hierarchical relationship between the hypostases. Wolters, in his note on III 5,2,30, gives a fairly full list of references, to which may be added IV 3,11,16; IV 4,29,10; V 2,1,28; VI 8,18, 5 ff.. That which is 'attached' to its prior has the same relationship to it as a branch does to the whole plant (IV 4,11,9-11); thus soul is 'attached' to Intellect, and Intellect, in its turn, is 'attached' to the One (VI 7,42,21-24). Everything in the long run is thus dependent on the One (I 7,1,21). To say that something is 'attached' to something else implies that it depends for its existence on that to which it is 'attached'.

In view of this, our present passage presents a difficulty. Souls are not 'attached' to the physical world in this sense; in fact, the reverse is true, since physical objects are dependent on soul for their existence (VI 7,42,23-24). Translators of our present passage have either taken the view that *ἐξηγημέναι* is being used in a rare sense as an equivalent of *ἀνασθεῖσαι* (Fic.: 'admirabundae pendentes'; Br.: 'tout ... les passionne et les tient suspendues'; Ci.: 'trasalirono, attonite, di fronte a loro e ne furono avvinte') or that the word is being used metaphorically but in its

usual sense (Ha.: 'hängten sich daran'; MK: 'clinging to this'). MK and Ha. are right. Like *θαυμάζειν*, *ἐκπλήττειν* and *ἀγασθαι*, *ἐξαρτᾶσθαι* is only properly used in contexts which deal with the Intelligible World. P. is being ironic.

Τούτων provides an object both for *ἀγαθεύσαι* and *ἐξηγημέναι* both of which usually take the genitive.

1,15 *ὧν ἀπεστράφησαν* : On *ἀπόστασις* see on 1,7-8. Fic.'s 'disiunxerunt (sc. se) a patre atque seipsis' is nowhere to be found in the Greek.

1,15-17 *ὥστε συμβαίνει... αἰτία* : The question asked at the beginning of the chapter is answered. Respect for earthly things together with lack of respect for themselves are the causes of the souls' ignorance. But these are also the results of their ignorance (see 1,11-14); hence the importance for P. of putting the souls on the right path.

1,17 *ἅμα γὰρ διώκεται ἄλλο* : P. begins the justification of his answer; knowledge of god is impossible for souls in the state described.

Progress in the Intelligible World is not achieved by pursuit but by remaining quiet (V 5,8,3 *ἡσυχῇ μένειν* ; cf. 2,14 ff.). Pursuit is normally associated with something external, in this case, the external image which soul imprints on matter (cf. V 8,2,32 ff. esp 34-35 *ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸ εἶδωλον αὐτοῦ βλέπων ἀγνοῶν ὅθεν ἤκει ἐκείνο διώκοι*). Pursuit of the wrong ends is, of course, a topos in philosophy;

compare the difference between the newly initiated and his opposite at Pl. Phdr. 250e1 ff. and the difference between those who have seen only shadows and those who have seen reality in Pl. R. 514a1 ff..

- 1,18-19 καὶ... χεῖρον εἶναι : Pursuit is directed towards a τέλος . For P. a τέλος is on a higher level than that which moves towards it.
- 1,19 τιθέμενον : Dodds's τιθέμενον (Select Passages Illustrative of Neoplatonism (London, 1924), p. 48) is preferable to the τι θέμενον of earlier editors. Not only is the pronoun τι superfluous, but the aorist participle seems odd alongside the present ὑπολαμβάνον (1,20-21).
- 1,19-20 γιγνομένων καὶ ἀπολλυμένων : This is a common Platonic phrase describing the physical world in contradiction to the world of Forms (see e.g., Pl. R. 527b5-6; id. Ti. 28a3 (quoted by P. at IV 7,8⁵,48); id. Smp. 211a1; id. Prm. 163d 1-2). Compare also 2,7-8 γιγνομένων ... καὶ φθειρομένων .
- 1,20 θνητότατον : Θνητότατον is a hapax legomenon; see Schwyzer (RE 513.10): 'häufig erscheinen neugebildete Komparative und Superlative'.
- 1,21 οὕτε θεοῦ ... δύνανται ; A similar phrase is found at 2,28.

As in 1,2, θεοῦ here refers to Intellect. Although the One at the head of the procession is the source of all

power, the δύνανται πάντων (see on 5,3-4 and cf. 7,9-10; III 8,10,1; V 4,1,36), the other hypostases, as the results of the One's power, have an inferior but nevertheless considerable power of their own (see 7,38 of Intellect; and 2,28 of soul).

- 1,21-22 ἐν θυμῷ βάλλοιτο : For the Homeric phrase see e.g., Il. 15.566; ibid. 20.195-6; cf. Il. 10.447; ibid. 13.82. It is sometimes used in tragedy (see A.Pr. 706; S. O.T. 975).

On the thought - that there are certain intellectual positions which must be adhered to, since otherwise intellectual progress is impossible - see VI 9,5,1 ff., and V 8,2,43 ff.. In both passages P. says that his philosophy is not for everyone. Porphyry remarks (V.P. 4.14) that the first 21 treatises were ἐκδοσμένα ὀλίγοις .

- 1,22 διττὸν...τὸν λόγον : With the methodology - the suggestion of two methods of which one is chosen - compare I 3,1,12 ff..

In VI 9,4,31 one of the reasons for the failure in the spiritual anabasis is the lack of a παιδαγωγῶν λόγος (cf. V 9,2,11-12). The λόγος must clarify the intellectual assumptions which are necessary prerequisites for progress. It is sometimes personified as a παιδαγωγός (cf. I 3,3,3). But it is only necessary for part of the way (I 6,9,24); the vision of the Good is experienced by the seer on his own, without assistance. On the importance of good παιδαγωγία for the soul see Pl. R. 491e1 ff..

1,22-23 τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους : Note the changes of subjects and genders in this section of the chapter. From 1,5-14 ψυχαί is the subject of the feminine participles. In 1,18 the subject becomes neuter; and the neuter participles are picked up by the masculine διακειμένους . This tendency to move from souls to persons reflects P.'s doctrine that man's true self is his higher soul (IV 4,18,14-15; cf. I 1,7,16-17; IV 7,1,22-23; VI 8,12,11-12). The lower part of the soul, however, can sometimes be included in the definition of a person (I 1,10,5 ff.; cf. 12,9-10 and note on 12,8-10).

1,23-25 εἴπερ τις ... καὶ πρώτου : Ἐπιστρέφειν is the opposite of ἀποστρέφειν (1,15). On ἐπιστροφή see on 3,13-14.

Ἐνάντια picks up τὴν ἐναντίαν (sc. ὁδόν) in 1,7.

Τὰ πρῶτα here refers to Intellect and the Forms, which are primary in the sense that the Intelligible World is the archetype of the physical world. In 5,10 τὰ πρῶτα probably includes soul (cf. V 3,9,27-28.9,35). Τὸ πρῶτον in the singular normally refers to the One.

On the upward ascent see on 3,3.

On the change of mood from the future ἐπιστρέψει to the optative ἀνάγοι see Schwyzer in RE 518.23 ff.. The mss. tradition for the optative is overwhelmingly strong and Schwyzer quotes as parallels I 2,3,15 and III 7,5,7.

1,26 ὃν ἐν ἄλλοις ... ἐπιπλέον : Where? H-S cite II 4 and III 4, Ha. VI 4 and III 6. This difference of opinion shows that there is no very clear reference at hand. It is

a basic tenet of P.'s philosophy, as it was of Plato's, that the Intelligible World and its contents are on a higher level than the physical world. P. often mentions the superiority of soul over body (III 4,5,7; VI 4,4,39). He talks of sensible objects as *εἶδωλα* (III 4,2,13), and compares body unfavourably to soul because of body's passivity (III 6 passim; cf. VI 4,15,18 ff.; VI 8,2,11 ff.). But there is no long passage which deals particularly with the worthlessness of the objects that the soul honours. It is difficult to agree with P. that he treats the subject elsewhere 'more fully'.

Ha. remarks ad loc. that P. was working according to a plan, but that how and whether the plan was fulfilled we cannot tell. The evidence of Porphyry's Life does not support his view. Not only was the course *ἀταξίας πλήρης* (V.P. 3.37), but the subjects of the treatises were taken *ἐκ προσκαίρων προβλημάτων* (V.P. 5.60-61). Furthermore, references which look forward to later treatises are comparatively rare (I can find only six - II 7,3,15 which refers either to VI 7,6,11-12 or to V 3,3,41-42; IV 3,29,36 which refers to IV 6,3; V 1,7,48 which refers to II 4; V 9,14,5. 14,12 which refer to V 4; V 6,6,29 which refers to V 5,4; and IV 4,22,42 where the promise *τοῦτο . . . σκεπτόν ὥστερον* is never fulfilled). If P. was working to a plan, one might reasonably expect more forward references in the complete Plotinian corpus. I doubt whether P. had carefully mapped out the exact subjects of his future philosophical activity. Where it is difficult to find an exact reference, as here, the pointer might be to

school discussion rather than to written works. Not everything that P. taught was written down.

1,26-28 ὁ δὲ . . . τῆς ἀξίας : The second method is the method pursued in our present treatise. (See prolegomena.)

Οἶον is not translated by MK. Fic. and Ha. assume that it introduces an indirect question; Br. and Ci. that it is to be taken with ἀναμνησκων meaning 'as it were'. Neither, it seems to me, is right. Οἶον adds a note of apology to γίνωσ and ἀξίας . It is noteworthy, though, that the metaphor of γίνωσ was used without qualification in 1,12.

The second argument is logically prior (πρότερος) because the subject of the first argument (τὰ ψυχῇ τιμώμενα) involves knowledge of the meaning of the concept 'soul'.

1,29-30 ἔγγως γὰρ . . . πρὸς ἑαυτὸν : Τοῦ ζητούμενου could be either masculine or neuter. It is true that the One is ὁ ζητούμενος in the sense that it is the goal of the soul to be united with it; but τὸ ζητούμενον is commonly used to refer to the aim which a treatise has in view (e.g., I 8, 14,26; II 1,4,1; III 6,2,7; IV 3,21,19; IV 6,1,14).

ἑαυτὸν (1,30) refers to the argument to be expounded elsewhere (cf. ἑαυτὸν (1,28) and καὶ ἑαυτὸν (1,29)). Br. wrongly takes the pronoun to refer to τὸ ζητούμενον . Fic.'s 'atque illi (sc. sermoni) opportune praeponitur' and MK's 'is its natural preliminary' both obscure the fact that πρὸ ἔργου means 'useful'. The argument of V 1 is a useful

preliminary to the other argument in that understanding of the soul's high status makes the relative worthlessness of the physical world obvious.

1,30-35 τὸ γὰρ... δύναται εὐρεῖν : The soul must learn its own nature so that it can decide whether it is able to succeed in its search (cf. IV 3,1,10-11 *ζητεῖν τε τὰ ἄλλα καὶ εὐρεῖν βουλόμενοι δικάως ἂν τὸ ζητοῦν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο ζητοῦμεν*).

P. maintains that soul is the traveller, as it were, in the Intelligible World, moving upwards and downwards within it (cf. IV 3,12,18); soul is the interpreter between that world and the world of sense-perception (IV 3,11,19-20), and can ascend in its travels as far as the One (IV 7,12,7-8). In this conception of the nature of soul he followed Plato; in Pl. Smp. 210a4 ff. soul is involved in the journey from external beauty to the Form of Beauty, and in Pl. Phd. 65a9 ff. it is soul which achieves knowledge of the Forms. Both writers believed that soul could 'experience' higher realities because there was a 'kinship' (*συγγένεια*) between soul and the objects of its attention. There had to be this kinship because both philosophers believed in the theory that like was known by like.

This theory was one of the two theories of perception prominent in antiquity (see Thphr. Sens. 1). Who originated the theory is not known. Sextus Empiricus (M. 7.116 ff.) mentions Democritus, Empedocles and Plato, and elsewhere (ibid. 1.303) Pythagoras or (ibid. 7.92 ff.) Posidonius and

Philolaus. The best-known expression of the doctrine is in Empedocles (DK B.109): γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαρεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ / αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ περὶ πᾶρ αἰόηλον, / στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νείκος δέ τι νείκει λυγρῷ. Here it is purely a physiological theory; everything consists of the four elements plus φιλία (or στοργή) and νείκος. The soul is composed of the same ingredients; hence it is able to perceive the world through the corresponding elements in itself. (For Aristotle's arguments against this theory see de An. 409b23 ff.) By Plato's time the theory of vision was more sophisticated. Vision took place when an emanation of light from the eye coalesced with the light around the eye and formed as it were an exterior (physical) extension to the eye (Pl. Ti. 45c2 ff.; cf. Plu. Quaest. Conviv. 626c ff.). But the basic presupposition was still that perception was only possible when two similar substances came together (ἐκπίπτειν ὁμοιον πρὸς ὁμοιον Pl. Ti. 45c3-4).

Plato seems to have been the first to apply the theory to immaterial principles. In Ti. 37a2 ff. Plato explains how knowledge takes place by means of the contact between the immaterial ingredients of the soul and the cognitive objects. Soul can know the Forms because it is συνγενής with them (R. 490b4; ibid. 611e1 ff.; cf. id. Lg. 899d7; id. Phd. 79d3). Plato's innovation was wholly original (see A. Schneider, 'Der Gedanke der Erkenntnis des Gleichen durch Gleiches in Antiker und Patristischer Zeit', Beit. zur Ges. der Phil. des Mittelalters Suppl. II (Festgabe Clemens Baeumker) 1923, pp. 67-68

P.'s originality stems from the new meaning which he gave to the concept of 'likeness', and its related concept of 'kinship'. Instead of accepting the principle that like is known by like as merely descriptive of the act of vision, P. made it prescriptive *τὸ γὰρ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ ὁρώμενον συγγενὲς καὶ ὅμοιον ποιησάμενον δεῖ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ θέᾳ. οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὲς μὴ γεγεννημένος, οὐδὲ τὸ καλὸν ἂν ἴδοι ψυχὴ μὴ καλὴ γνωσμένη* (I 6,9,29-32). The soul had to become like the Intelligible World if it wanted to see the Intelligible World; without this kinship vision or knowledge was impossible. And if no kinship existed, the soul had to set about creating one. When Plato said that the eye was the most sun-like of the organs of perception (R. 508a7) he probably meant this in a physical sense. The eye was able to perceive sunlight because it contained within itself a source of light. But P. moved from physics and physiology to metaphysics and ethics when he insisted on the soul becoming like the object of its visions. And the kinship involved was a strong one. The soul had (in some sense) actually to become Intellect (VI 6,8,8 *νοῦν νῶ θεωρητέον* ; VI 7,35,4-5 *καίτοι νοῦς γενομένη* (sc. ἡ ψυχὴ) *αὐτὴ θεωρεῖ οἷον νοηθεῖσα* ; VI 9,9,58 *θεὸν γινώμενον, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄντα* ; on the nature of the union involved see on 5,3, and on the part of the soul in which technically the vision takes place see on 12,5-7). The principle was applicable at all levels of knowledge and ascent. Soul had to become like the One in order to know or see it

(VI 7,35,44). Similarly in order to know matter, the soul had to become ἀοριστία (II 4,10,17 ταῦτόν πως γνωμένη τότε πῶς ὁ οἶον ὀρεῖ). Thus ἐπιστροφή (see on 3,13-14), the turning to face a higher principle and eventually the One, was achieved by ὁμοίωσις at each level (cf. Procl. El. Theol. 32). Hence the importance for the Neoplatonists of the ὁμοίωσις θεῶ of Pl. Tht. 176b1-2.

P., then, with this dynamic concept of 'likeness' in mind (cf. J. de Fraine, 'Het Princiep der Dynamische Gelijkheid in de Kennisleer van Plotinos', Tijdschrift voor Phil. 5 (1943), pp. 487-514), asks whether the soul is akin to its object. If it were ἄλλοτριος to Intellect, then knowledge would be impossible (cf. III 7,7,3-4). In fact, as a member of the Intelligible World (see on 1,2-3) both Intellect and the One are akin to it.

The phrase ψυχῆς ὅμοια (1,32) is Platonic (see R. 533d2 and Sph. 254a10).

Ha. notes in his introduction the 'starke Klangmittel' of the repetition of parts of ἑπτῶν in these lines. Forceful expression is in keeping with the protreptic purpose of the treatise.

CHAPTER TWO

Chapter two is the first approach to the aim of pointing out to the soul its worth and gives the answer to the problem of identity sketched at the end of Chap 1. The world soul is the principle of life, organisation and unity in the universe and our individual souls have a similar nature to it.

The creative activity of soul described in this chapter approaches closely to the activity attributed in Plato's Timaeus to the demiurge. In view of this, it is worthwhile to investigate the relationship between the demiurge and the world soul.

The world soul's activity is demiurgic (δημιουργεῖ IV 7,13,8) and P. admits (following Pl. Phlb. 30d1-2) that the name 'Zeus' can be applied correctly either to the demiurge or to the world soul (IV 4,10,1 ff.). Yet in spite of this, P. also maintains in several places (8,5; II 1,5,5; II 3,18,15; V 9,3,26) that Plato's demiurge is not soul but Intellect. He even seems to criticise the Gnostics for equating a νοῦς διανοούμενος and a ψυχὴ δημιουργοῦσα (II 9,6,21-22). But if Intellect is the demiurge, yet there are obvious differences between the job of the demiurge in the Timaeus and the role of Intellect in P..

The demiurge creates body as well as soul for the sun, the moon and the planets (Pl. Ti. 38c7; cf. ibid. 69c3-5); yet while Intellect may be said to create soul (see the use of ψυνοῦσαν in 2,37), even though only figuratively (for the procession from the One works by necessity (V 4,2,29 οὐ ... ἔξ ἀνάγκης)), it has nothing to do with the creation of body, which is formed by the shaping of indeterminate matter by φύσις, the lowest phase of soul's activity. Furthermore, it is

not Intellect but, as in our present passage, soul which is the principle of life and organisation in the cosmos. This organising role is assigned in the Timaeus to the demiurge.

Why, then, does P. identify the Platonic demiurge and Intellect, while apparently giving the truly demiurgic tasks to the world soul, and why does he say that the same name 'Zeus' may be used of Intellect and the soul? The answer lies, I think, in the Plotinian notion of soul as a bridge between the Intelligible World and its sensible imitation. Soul is the ultimate expression of Intellect and the Forms (IV 6,3,5-6 λόγος ἔσχατος ... τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν πῶ νοητῶ). Situated at the boundary between the two worlds (IV 4,3,11 μεθόριον οὖσα) soul has contacts both with Intellect and with the physical world (7,44 ff.; IV 4,3,11-12 ἐπ' ἀμφω φέρεται ; IV 6,3,8 ff.). Soul is the medium through which the contents of the Intelligible World are expressed in the sensible world (IV 3,11,19 οἶον ἐρμηνευτικὴ γινωσκύη). Intellect uses soul to carry on its own demiurgic activity (IV 7,13,17-18 μένοντος (sc. τοῦ νοῦ) καὶ διὰ ψυχῆς πάντα καθῶν πληροῦντος καὶ διακοσμοῦντος); it gives to soul the λόγοι (see on 3,8) which soul then transmits to the sensible world (V 9,3,30-31). Through the gift of these, Intellect ensures that the physical world is as alike as possible to the Intelligible World. Because soul gets its being from Intellect, and, more important, derives its activity from Intellect, all the creations of soul are νοήσεις ἀπηρτισμένα , so that everything contains a trace of Intellect and its activity (V 3,7, 30 ff.). Thus, working through the medium of soul, it is Intellect which is the real creator and demiurge (V 9,3,26), since it is the ultimate reference of the physical world, which is its image. P. sums up in

II 3,18,14-16 ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ νοῦς δημιουργός, ὅς καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ
 τῇ μετ' αὐτὸν δίδωσι ὧν ἴχνη ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ (= the
 creative and lowest phase of soul which actually comes into contact
 with matter).

The extent of the three hypostases is that of a ζωνὴ μακρὰ
 εἰς μῆκος ἐκταθεῖσα (V 2,2,26-27). Soul interprets one level
 of this life at another level; it is the active expression of the
 differentiated yet undifferentiated unity of Intellect (VI 9,5,16).
 Of course, the One, as 'creator' of the Intelligible World, is in the
 final analysis responsible for the sensible world. In practice, P.
 avoids stating this; he does not call Intellect the logos of the One
 (on this see on 3,8).

2,1-9 ἐνθυμεῖσθαι... ἑαυτήν : P. begins with a statement of
 the life-giving activity of soul, which he elaborates in 2,10 ff..

2,1 ἐνθυμεῖσθαι : A. Eon (RIPh 92 (1970), pp. 260-261) suggests
 that ἐνθυμεῖσθαι is closely connected with the concept of
 εἴννοια and refers to 'un acte d'attention porté sur une donnée
 immédiate et intérieure'. Thus, when the soul is asked to 'reflect'
 on its creative activity, it is being asked to concentrate on
 the actualisation through use of its memory of knowledge which
 it already possesses. Eon is probably right to see ἐνθυμεῖσθαι
 in our present passage as an example of the use of ἐνθυμεῖσθαι
 which he notices, but it would be wrong to take ἐνθυμεῖσθαι
 wherever it occurs in this special sense; in VI 9,9,39, e.g.,
 it means much the same as λογίζεσθαι .

$\epsilon\nu\theta\upsilon\mu\iota\sigma\theta\omega$ introduces the general statement of soul's activity which is dealt with in more detail by the reasoning faculty ($\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\zeta\iota\sigma\theta\omega$ - 'un acte de raisonnement sur cette donnée primitive' (Eon, loc. cit.)) in 2,10 ff. (cf. $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\eta\theta\upsilon\eta$ in 2,29).

The distinctions between the different words used to describe the processes of thought are overlooked by all translators, except perhaps by Ha.

- 2,1 $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha \psi\upsilon\chi\eta$: Br. takes this to be a reference to Pl. Phdr. 245c5 and adds, cryptically, 'qui met chaque âme au niveau de l'âme du monde'. His reference to Plato is not helpful.
- 2,1-2 $\ddot{\omega}\varsigma \alpha\upsilon\tau\eta \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \dots \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$: Ha. notes in his introduction the repetition of $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta$ in 2,2-5. It is another example of P.'s 'starke Klangmittel'.

As the context here shows, P. is speaking of the world soul, $\eta \mu\epsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta \psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (2,11). Following Plato (Pl. Phdr. 245c5 ff.; id. Lg. 896e8 ff.), P. maintains that the soul is the source of movement and of life in the universe. As the principle of life, possessing life intrinsically (IV 7,9,8 $\pi\alpha\rho' \epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\varsigma$ cf. IV 7,9,11 $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omega\varsigma \zeta\omega\sigma\alpha$), it can give life to whatever does not possess it (IV 7,3,16 $\chi\omicron\sigma\epsilon\eta\gamma\omicron\varsigma \tau\eta\varsigma \zeta\omega\eta\varsigma$), though the life which it gives is only an image of the life which it has itself (IV 3,10,39-40). As head of the $\pi\rho\acute{o}\delta\omicron\varsigma$, however, the One may be said to be the source of all life including that of the soul (VI 9,9,49-50).

The life-giving activity of soul is sometimes attributed to its lowest phase $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (IV 4,20,15-16; cf. IV 4,13,2 ff.).

This does not conflict with P.'s remarks in our present passage since all soul is a unity (see IV 9 *passim*). On the difficulties involved in maintaining this view, though, see on 2,44.

- 2,2 ἔμπνεύσασα αὐτοῖς ζῶν : This evocative image is used of the One in VI 7,23,23-24 (ἔμπνιον νοῦν, ἔμπνιον ζῶν). Its roots are Homeric. Ἐμπνεῦν is used in Homer of gods breathing strength into mortals (Il. 20. 110; Od. 9.381). The metaphor is particularly appropriate here because of the connection in Greek thought between soul as the principle of life, and breath. The dying gasp of a hero signalled the release of his soul (Simonides 48 (Poetae Melici Graeci, ed. Page)). Compare also Genesis 2.7.
- 2,2-4 ἅ τε γῆ... ἅσπερα θύα : For the four classes see Pl. Ti. 39e10 ff.. The divisions probably correspond to the Empedoclean divisions of fire, air, water and earth. For a similar enumeration of the parts of the universe see III 2,3,25-28.
- 2,3-4 ἅ τ' ἐν οὐρανῷ ἅσπερα θύα : On the various meanings of οὐρανός see Arist. Cael. 278b9 ff. The fixed stars were in the outermost heaven with the sun, the moon and the planets immediately below them. It is unlikely, however, that οὐρανός here has a technical meaning. In 2,5 and 2,22 ff. it is used as a synonym for κόσμος ; P. is not being precise here.

The beginning of man's belief in God is traced back by Plato (Pl. Cr. 397c8 ff.) to his observation of the ordered

workings of the heavens. It was commonly believed that the stars were divine. For Plato, this was because they had been made by the demiurge and had been given souls by him (see Pl. Ti. 38c3 ff.; cf. id. R. 508a4 τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν). For mention of the visible gods in other philosophical writings see Arist. Metaph. 1026a18; Epict. III.22.22; D. Chr. 12.60; M. Ant. 12.28; Porph. Abst. 166.14 (Nauck)).

P. endorsed the common belief (see 4,3-4 and note) and criticised the Gnostics for suggesting that they were not divine (II 9,8,30-32; cf. II 9,5,9 ff.). The stars' bodies were made of fire (and only the subtlest sort of fire was found in the heavens - see II 1,4,11-13.7,33 ff.); consequently, their souls were almost free from contact with matter and were in continual contemplation of Intellect (IV 3,11,23 ff.; IV 4, 7,1 ff.; cf. Pl. Epin. 981e4-6 θεῶν γένος ἀστέρων σώματος μὲν τυχὸν καλλίστου, ψυχῆς δὲ εὐδαιμονωτάτης τε καὶ ἀρίστης).

2,4-5 αὐτὴ δὲ ἥλιον... οὐρανόν : The verb ἐποίησε must be supplied with these accusatives. Fic. wrongly supplies ἐκόσμησε from the following line.

2,5 καὶ αὐτὴ... ἐν τάξει περιάγει : For soul as the ordering principle of the universe see IV 3,7,14-15; IV 4,10,25; IV 8,2,53. Τάξις and κόσμησις are the visible expressions of soul's presence. The soul wishes to organise the cosmos according to the principles which it saw in Intellect (IV 7,13,4 ff.)

soul is pregnant, as it were, with these logoi. The order which it produces is an imitation of the 'wisdom' (φρόνησις) of the Intelligible World (IV 4,10,11-13; see on 2,24). The circular movement of the heavens in II 2 (which partly constitutes this τὰ ζῷα) is the outward sign of soul's circular movement around Intellect and the One. Note, once again, that soul is acting as an interpreter of Intellect.

- 2,6 φήσιν οὖσα ἑτέρα : Since the cause is not immanent in its effects (on this see on 7,19-20 and 7,20-23) αὐτὴ ... τὸ πρότερον ἔτερον τοῦ ἑστέρου (III 8,5,19). Thus Intellect is different from soul (V 9,4,2), soul from the impression which it gives to matter (IV 3,20,39), and the One from all subsequent entities (V 3,11,18; V 4,1,6). Each hypostasis is the external activity of its prior, resembling it but different from it (V 4,2,28-30).

This principle - that the cause is different from its effects - is closely related to the principle that it is greater than its effects (see on 2,7).

- 2,6 ὧν κοσμεῖ ... ζῶν ποιεῖ : On soul as the source of movement see on 1,6-7. Movement and life are conceptually connected (cf. Pl. Phdr. 245c6-7).

Ci. puts a stop after κοσμεῖ and a comma after ποιεῖ ; 'il distacca mi sembra necessario perché solo l'ultima idea ζῶν viene ripresa dopo: ἀπολείπει ἢ χορηγεῖ τὸ ζῶν '. This reasoning is unconvincing. Ἀπολείπει ἢ χορηγεῖ is more likely to have been suggested by γιγνομένων... καὶ φθειρομένων (2,7-8) than by αὐτὸ ζῶν ποιεῖ . Furthermore, with Ci.'s

punctuation, $\tauούτων^1$ (2,7) would have to refer only to $\bar{\omega}\nu\ \kappaινῶ\ καὶ\ \bar{\alpha}\ \{\eta\bar{\nu}\ \piολιῶ$. The $\kappaαί$ before it would strongly emphasise this. Yet the other function of soul, that of giving order to the universe ($\bar{\omega}\nu\ \kappaοσμῶ$ 2,6), is as important as the other two. As Ha. says, Ci.'s punctuation breaks up the sequence of thought.

Ha., following the text of Cyril (PG 76.921c) omits $\bar{\alpha}'$ before $\{\eta\bar{\nu}\ \piολιῶ$. The change of case from genitive to accusative is certainly odd, but not so impossible that a change is necessary. See Henry, Etats, p. 125.

2,7 $\kappaαὶ\ τούτων\ \dots\ τιμωτέραν$: On the principle that the cause is greater than its effects, an important principle in Neoplatonism, see A.C.Lloyd, Phronesis 21 (1976), pp. 146-156. Each level of the procession from the One is not only different from each other level, but is more perfect and the cause of what comes after it (cf. 6,37-39; 7,37-39; V 2,2,1 ff.). This is usually considered as self-evident (cf. V 5,13,37-38; VI 1,25, 17-18; VI 7,17,4-6), though some justification is sought in the theory of the 'double activity' (see on 3,9-10). Proclus in El. Theol. 7 makes the principle part of the Neoplatonic canon.

2,7-8 $\gammaιγνομένων\ \dots\ φθαρμένων$: Cf. 1,19-20. Vo., Br. and Ha., following Cyril (PG 76.921c), insert $\acute{\mu}\acute{\omega}\nu$ after $\gammaιγνομένων$. Henry (Etats, p. 125) points out that this is unnecessary. Ha. gives no reasons except his own preferences for following the indirect tradition.

2,8-9 εἴταν αὐτὰ ... τὸ ζῆν : Vo. and Br. read εἴ ... ἡ ...

χορηγεῖ in 2,8, readings attested by a minority of the mss.. M. van der Valk (Mnemosyne 9 (1956), p. 129 n.4)

rightly points out that ἀπολείπει ἢ χορηγεῖ corresponds to γιγνομένων ... καὶ φθινομένων .

On soul as the χορηγός of life see 2,10 and IV 7,3,15 ff.; of movement IV 7,9,6; of the contents of Intellect IV 8,7,30.

The use of χορηγός and its cognates emphasises the interpretative nature of soul. Just as the literal χορηγός is the medium by means of whose money the play is produced, so the soul is the means of the presence of Intellect in the sensible world.

2,9 αὐτὴ δὲ ... ἀπολείπειν ἑαυτήν : This is Platonic: the last half of the phrase is a direct reminiscence of Pl. Phdr. 245c7-8 (not of 245c9 as H-S note). The self-mover, since it never leaves itself, never ceases to move; and what never ceases to move never ceases to live.

2,10-51 τίς δὲ ... σεαυτὸν ἀγασαι : After the plain statement of the life-giving activity of soul, P. begins a more detailed examination, signalled by the use of λογίζεσθαι (2,11) and διανοηθεῖν (2,29), words particularly associated with reasoning. This examination is interrupted, though, by a digression on the nature of the investigator (2,11-17) and a figurative description of the arrival of the soul into the body of the universe (2,17-27).

2,10-11 τίς δὲ ... ὥδε λογίζεσθαι : Although the mss. tradition is unanimous in reading τίς δὲ τρόπος , Ki. and Mu. read δὲ and Vo. and Br. τίς δὲ ὁ τρόπος , a reading perhaps

derived from Basil's paraphrase in PG 29.769a. $\Delta\eta'$ is perfectly acceptable; an emphatic particle is not out of place, as P. moves to a closer consideration of the actual manner of soul's working on the universe. (On $\delta\eta'$ in an indirect question see Deniston, pp. 211 ff.). In view of the strong mss. support for the omission of the definite article, no change either should be made in $\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \dots \tau\rho\acute{o}\pi\omicron\varsigma$.

2,11-12 σκοπεῖσθω δέ... οὐ σμικρὰ : Ki., Mñ., Vo., Br. and Ha. read $\delta\eta'$ instead of the mss. $\delta\epsilon'$ in 2,11. $\Delta\tau'$ as an ordinary connective makes good sense. Fic.'s 'itaque' in 2,11 (he prints 'autem' in 2,10) is therefore wrong.

The 'great soul' is the world soul, and the 'other soul' the human soul; on the relationship between them see on 2,44. In II 1,8,4 ff. the human soul, said to be different from the world soul, is also described as 'no small causal principle' ($\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\eta\varsigma \text{ οὐ σμικρᾶς οὐσίας}$).

2,13-14 ἀπαθλαγεῖσα... τὰς ἄλλας ; The notions of 'deception' and 'bewitchment' have their roots in Plato (see Pl. Phd. 83a4-5; ibid. 81b3-4) though no doubt in origin they might be traced back to Orphico-Pythagorean doctrines. The imagery is found in P.'s earliest treatise, where soul's escape from things earthly is compared to Odysseus' flight from Circe or Calypso (I 6,8,18 ff.).

The reason for the souls' enchantment by the world of sense is the image of soul which body contains. They are deceived by the likeness of themselves which they see in physical objects (IV 6,3,9-10) and by the reflection of themselves, seen, as it

were, in the mirror of Dionysus (IV 3,12,1 ff.; cf. V 8,2,34-35).

They are deceived not by the truth but by what resembles it

(IV 4,44,25 ff.). Thus, only soul's higher activity is ^{ἀγότητος}

(IV 4,44,1); and a preliminary for the exercise of this activity

and hence for the ^{ἐπιστροφή} is purification (see on 2,44-45).

The world soul, because of its lack of involvement with the body,

does not need to be purified. Our soul, however, to appreciate

its kinship with the world soul, must become like it. Hence, the

realization of soul's ancestry involves purification and return

towards its source.

2,14-17 ^{ἡσυχῇ} ... οὐρανὸς ἀμύνων : ^{ἡσυχος} means here not merely 'quiet' but - more generally - 'still'. 'Stillness is the traditional response of nature to a divine epiphany' (Dodds on Euripides' Bacchae 1084-5); cf. Mesomedes Sol. (ap. Mus. Script. Gr. X.7) and P. Mag. vii.321 ff. where the formula for the direct vision of god is being given. The inspiration, then, for most of 2,14-17 - that part dealing with the stillness of earth, sea and air - is purely traditional. What is not traditional is P.'s demand that the soul be still. Stillness in the soul is the antithesis of the flux of the physical world. The world soul, because of its detachment from body, and the purified soul are already still (VI 4,15,18-20; cf. I 4,12,8 - the good man has a ^{ἡσυχος} κατάστασις). The trouble with the individual soul is that it has a ^{δύναμις} οὐχ ^{ἡσυχος} within it (III 7,11,21) which, if not quelled, prevents the soul's advance.

Lack of stillness is equated with ^{πολυπραγματούς} (VI 3,23,4; cf. I 3,4,17-18), and being busy with creative activity

is characteristic of the lower part of the soul which involves itself with the physical world (IV 8,4,15 *πολυπραγμονεῖ* ; cf. V 3,3,17). Intellect is the realm of stillness (VI 9,5,14-15) and stillness is the sign of its self-centred activity. Its stillness is not incompatible with its characteristic movement, for this movement, being circular, is a movement at rest (see on 4,34-37). Stillness in Intellect is a mark of its self-sufficiency (V 3,7,13-15 *ἀλλὰ νῦν ἡσυχία οὐ νοῦ ἐστὶν ἐκστασις, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡσυχία τοῦ νοῦ σχολὴν ἄγουσα πῶν ἄλλων ἐνέργεια*), and it is through stillness that it contemplates the One and creates the Forms (VI 9,9,18-19). The One itself is still (I 7,1,15). Thus, on the theory that like is known by like (see on 1,30-35), the One can only be experienced by a soul in the same state (cf. VI 9,11,12 ff.). Similarly, just as a reflection can only appear on the surface of a mirror when the mirror is undisturbed, so the reflections of Intellect and the higher soul can only be present to the whole soul when it remains still (I 4,10,10 ff.); the further it advances towards the One, the stiller its contemplation becomes (III 8,6,14 ff.).

Note how P. has given the traditional concept of 'stillness' a new application.

2,15 *ὁ τοῦ σώματος κλύδων* : Another Platonic reminiscence; see Pl. Ti. 43b5-6. The image may also have been used by Numenius (fr. 33) to describe the sensible world.

2,16 *πᾶν τὸ πείχον* : *Τὸ πείχον* does not have here the technical meaning which it has in some of the Presocratics (see,

e.g., Anaxagoras, DK B.2). Here it simply means 'environment' and is explained by what follows (cf. II 3,14,16; III 1,2,6.5,25).

2,17 οὐρανὸς ἀμείνων : A well known crux. The mss. are divided between the senseless ἀμείνω and ἀμείνων .
 Ἀμείνων is retained by Perna, Creuzer, Br., Ci. and H-S.
 Br. translates: '... le ciel même, supérieur aux autres éléments' and Ci. gives: 'e il cielo stesso ch'è piú buono di lei (sc. the souls) '. Both these interpretations flounder, it seems to me, because they require that ἀμείνων be taken predicatively. The word is used predicatively in IV 3,17,3-4 εἰ γὰρ οὐρανὸς ἐν τῇ αἰσθητῇ τότῃ ἀμείνων, εἴη ἂν πρσιχῆς τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς ἰσχύουσιν which is cited by H-S as a parallel. In our present passage, however, the word cannot be predicative since we already have a predicative adjective, viz. ἡσυχος , available.

If ἀμείνων , then, is not predicative, and the reading is retained, there are two possibilities: (a) that it is clear from the context what the universe is better than; but whereas in II 1,4,8 (another possible parallel) it is clear that the 'better bodies' are the stars in contrast with earthly bodies, this is not the case in our present passage where the addition of ἀμείνων is somewhat abrupt. Or (b) that οὐρανὸς ἀμείνων is a common phrase used in a semi-technical sense which would be readily understood. This would presuppose that P. or one of his predecessors had somewhere distinguished the οὐρανὸς ἀμείνων from the οὐρανὸς ἑλάντων or σώματα ἑλάντονα ; but there is no evidence for this, and the phrase οὐρανὸς ἀμείνων

recurs only in IV 3,17,3.

Of emendations proposed there are two types: (i) those that substitute for ἀπείρων an adjective used predicatively, (a) an adjective synonymous with ἡσυχος (Ki. and Mü. read ἀκίνητος (cf. I 6,5,15)), or (b) a participle, ἄρα μένων (Dodds, CQ 16 (1922), p. 96) or ἀναμένων (Sleeman, CQ 22 (1928), p. 30). Both Dodds and Sleeman think that the use of ἔστωτα (sc. οὐρανόν) in 2,18 suggests that P. is already thinking of a sleeping universe ready to be illuminated by soul; but this thought does not begin, it seems to me, until νοῦτω δέ in 2,17.

(ii) Creuzer, in his second Paris edition, followed Jahn's suggestion (Basilii Magnus Plotinians (Bern, 1838), p. 12) of the colourless attributive adjective ἀπύρρον; the word is not used elsewhere in P..

Fic. and MK omit the word from their translations, Vo. from his text. The Arabic paraphrase omits it too.

It seems to me that the corruption has not been satisfactorily explained; with Ha., I would mark the word with an obelisk.

2,17-18 νοῦτω δέ ... ἔστωτα : Νοῦιν here seems to be used like ἐπινόειν = 'to imagine' (cf. IV 3,9,18; VI 3,13,21), as the passage describing the ensoulment of the universe which follows is purely imaginary. Br. ('qu'elle imagine'), and Ha. ('stelle sie sich vor') notice this point. Note the contrast between the stationary state of the universe before soul's arrival and its movement after ensoulment.

2,18 ^{2/6}ἐξωθεν : In Plato's Timaeus the soul is described as embracing body 'from the outside' (Pl. Ti. 34b4; ibid. 36e3). Body is inside soul rather than vice versa (Pl. Ti. 36d9-36e1), a point picked up by P. (cf., e.g., IV 3,9,36 ff.), so that the image of soul coming into body from outside is figurative; in fact, there never was a time when body was not ensouled (IV 3,9,15-16).

The word ^{2/6}ἐξωθεν contrasts with the notion of 'entry', a notion emphasised by the repetition of the prepositional prefix εἰς- in 2,18-19.

2,18-23 εἰσπρῶσαν... κίμῳον : On P.'s use of the imagery of light and colour see Images, pp. 46-61. The involvement of soul with the body and matter is often compared to the effect of light on its objects; light remains impassive though illuminating whatever comes into contact with it (I 1,4,15-16.7,4.12,24-25; I 8,14,38-39; II 9,3,1-2; III 6,9,9-11; IV 3,4,19-21.14,2; VI 4,3,22-23.15,14-16; VI 5,8 *passim*).

The particular image of soul as a ray of sunlight illuminating the dark cloud of body is Gnostic in origin; see W. Bousset (RE vii. 1519.42 ff.): 'und in den hilflos am Boden liegenden Leib ist dann aus der oberen Welt der göttliche Funke hineingekommen'. The Gnostics, though apparently not the Valentinians (see A. Orbe, Gregorianum 35 (1954), p. 53 n.96), took this literally: the souls were separate emanations from a source which remained constant. P. criticises this literal interpretation in his treatise against the Gnostics (II 9,11,1 ff.. 12,3 ff.; VI 4,3,3 ff.). For him the whole of soul is present everywhere (2,37).

- 2,19 εἰσάμπουσιν : Εἰσάμπειν is a rare word; apart from our present passage, LSJ cite only Thphr. CP 2.7.4 and Plu. 2.929c. The usual Gnostic word was ἐλάμπειν (Hippol. Haer. V.19.4 and X.11.3 (GCS)) also used by P. in II 9 (see references to II 9 in the preceding note), and elsewhere in non-polemical contexts (I 1,12,25; I 8,14,38-39; VI 4,3,22-23; VI 5,8 passim). Εἰσάμπειν is preferred in our present passage because of the prepositional prefix (see on 2,18).
- 2,20 ἡλίου βολαί : The language is drawn from tragedy (S. Aj. 877; E. Or. 1259). Hippolytus in the passages cited in the preceding note uses ἀκτίς instead of βολή ; in VI 4,3,4, in what is almost certainly a Gnostic context, P. speaks of the (Gnostic) theory that the souls are βολαί .
- 2,21 χλωσυνδῆ ... ποιοῦσαι : Perhaps a reminiscence of Pl. Phd. 110c4 where the 'true earth' is described as χλωσυνδῆς .
- ποιοῦσαι : The single mss. variant is διδοῦσαι . Henry (Etats, p. 188) prefers ποιοῦσαι , Schwyzer (RhM 86 (1937), p. 367 n.16) διδοῦσαι . H-S¹ print ποιοῦσαι , H-S² διδοῦσαι . The choice between the two variants is difficult. The reading ποιοῦσαι could perhaps be a corruption due to the proximity of ποιοῦσι , but Henry remarks (loc. cit.) that the repetition of ποιεῖν is a 'bel exemple d'un négligence du style plotinien'. Since the corrections in the mss. (in A and C) give διδοῦσαι , while an original διδοῦσαι is never corrected into ποιοῦσαι , I would be inclined on balance to read διδοῦσαι following Creuzer, Vo., Br. and Ha.. Ha. does not explain why διδοῦσαι follows 'dem sachlichen Erfordernis'.

- 2,22 ἔδωκε δὲ ἀθανασία : Compare II 1,4,19-20 ἄτοπον γὰρ τὴν καὶ ὀποσονοῦν χρόνον δυνηθεῖσαν συνέχειν (i.e. τὴν ψυχὴν) μὴ καὶ ἀεὶ ποιεῖν τοῦτο . Body alone, of course, is perishable, but by the presence of soul it acquires another nature (II 1,8,5-6). The problem of immortality of the universe is discussed in II 1,2-4. There P. comes to the conclusion that the flux of the body of the universe is a flux within itself (II 1,3,2-5). This seems to be due to the nature of the body of the universe which is more prone than human bodies to comply with the guidance of soul; hence its immortality (II 1,3,9 ff.).
- 2,23 ἡγύρε δὲ κύμειον : Compare VI 7,22,14 ff. where the soul is described as being wakened into life by the warmth which it receives from the Intelligible World. The same image can be found in Albinus (X.3 p. 59 (Louis) and XIV.3 p. 81). In VI 8, 16,30 ff. the One's activity is called a state of ^{being awake} (ἐγρηγόρεσις) where the awakener is the One itself.
- 2,23 ὁ δὲ κινηθεὶς κίνησιν αἰδίον : The soul is the source of movement, and by continually drawing the universe towards it it keeps it in perpetual motion (II 2,1,45 ff.). II 2, which deals with the movement of the universe, is discussed by P. Merlan, 'Plotinus Enneads II 2', TAPA 74 (1943), pp. 179-191: he sees 'the cyclical motion of the heavens as a spatial equivalent of the non-spatial ubiquity of soul' (op. cit. p. 189).
- 2,24 ψυχῆς ἐμφρόνως ἀγούσης : In Pl. Ti. 36e4 the life of the world soul is described as 'unceasing' and ἐμφρων .

However, for P. it is the life of Intellect which is *ἐμφρων* par excellence (V 3,17,1). The soul, being a reflection of Intellect (see on 3,7), has a life which merely reflects that of Intellect. Thus the ordering principle in soul (*τάξις*) is a reflection of the *φρόνησις* which is to be found at the higher level (IV 4,10,11-13). *Τάξις* is the expression of the soul's attempt to copy the life of the Intelligible World; the movement of the heavens which constitutes it is *νοῦν μνησὶ κύκλῳ περὶ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ* III 2,3,30-31; cf. IV 7,8¹,8 *ἐπιμελῆσθαι ἐμφρόνως* ; in Pl. *Ti.* 34a2 this movement is described as *περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν* . The *φρόνησις* properly to be found in Intellect is sometimes ascribed to soul (e.g., IV 2,2,44-45 *μετὰ φρονήσεως ἀγχι*). *Φρόνησις* , though, is not associated with the One.

Fic., followed by Creuzer in both his editions, reads

ἐμφρονος , the reading of A. and E. This is not noticed by H-S.

2,24 *ζῶον εὐδαιμον ἐγένετο* : Compare Pl. *Ti.* 34b8-9 where the universe is called a *εὐδαιμόνων θεός* . This is quoted by P. at III 5,5,8. Compare also Pl. *Ti.* 92c6 where it is called a *ζῶον ὁρατόν* . This notion was taken over by the Stoics (cf. D.L. vii.139: the cosmos is a *ζῶον ... ἐμφυχον καὶ λογικόν*).

2,25-26 *ὡν πρὸ ψυχῆς σῶμα νεκρόν* : In V 4,2,43 and VI 9,2,24-25 P. contrasts the 'corpse' with Intellect, the realm of life and intelligence. Only what has life and intelligence ceases to be a corpse. Thus, while matter in the Intelligible World has a

'defined and intellectual life', the matter of this world, when it has been shaped by the lower part of the soul, becomes only a 'decorated corpse' since it is not 'living or thinking' (II 4,5,15-18). After the arrival of the rest of soul part of which remains in the Intelligible World - this holds for human beings and for the cosmos - what was a 'decorated corpse' becomes fully ensouled.

Vitringa's $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ before $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ (Annotationes Criticae in Plotini Enneadum Partem Priorem (Deventer, 1876)) is quite unnecessary.

2,26 $\gamma\eta\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \psi\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\varsigma$: Ha. thinks that P. means by these words not the elements but 'den Schlamm des Chaos'. This is unlikely; P. is under no obligation to mention all the elements by name. Basil, with his Christian notion of hell, writes $\gamma\eta\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \sigma\pi\acute{o}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ (PG 29.769b; see Henry, Etats, p. 189).

2,26-27 $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \dots\ \mu\grave{\eta}\ \acute{\omicron}\nu$: Since body is, strictly speaking, matter and a trace of soul (III 8,2,25 ff.; IV 7,2,22 ff.), to call the universe before soul's arrival 'earth and water' is misleading; without soul there is pure matter, non-being (II 4,16,3). 'Darkness' is what is left at the end of the procession from the One (cf. IV 3,9,25); in I 8 and II 4 P. often uses $\sigma\kappa\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma$ and its cognates to describe matter. Darkness is, of course, the opposite of the light associated with soul and the Intelligible World. There is no darkness there (V 8,4,4-6; and see on 6,46).

- 2,27 καὶ ὁ ... φησί τις : A quotation of Il. 20.65 describing the halls of Hades; the line is quoted by Plato as one of the lines to be deleted from Homer (Pl. R. 386d2).
- 2,27-42 γένοιτο δ' ἂν ... ἐκβλητότεροι : P. finally begins the detailed discussion of the organising role of soul as the principle of unity in the cosmos. The use of διανοεῖσθαι points back to that of λογίζεσθαι in 2,11. Λογισμός and διάνοια both involve reasoning; there is perhaps a contrast here between the reasoning faculties of the soul and its imaginative faculties (cf. νοεῖται 2,17).
- Ἐνταῦθα , as Ha. remarks, means 'at this point' (see Wolters on III 5,8,6).
- 2,29-30 ὅπως περιέχει ... τὸν οὐρανόν : Soul's function of holding body together (IV 2,2,44 πάντα περιλαβοῦσα ἔχει) has not yet been explicitly mentioned, though it is closely related to its function of organising the circular motion of the universe (see on 2,5). P. often uses words like κατέχειν , συνέχειν or κρατεῖν when speaking of soul (see, e.g., II 1,3,22.4,19 ff.; II 2,1,18). By holding the universe together soul acts as the principle of unification - note that in II 2,1,12 περιληπτικόν and ποιοῶν ἔν are paired. Compare also Pl. Lg. 896e8 ff. ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν ταῖς αὐτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ...
- 2,31 ὅσος ἔστιν : Vitringa's ὅσον is unnecessary: P. is thinking of οὐρανός which is masculine.

2,31-32 καὶ πᾶν διάστημα ... ἐψύχεται : Ha. following Heintz (ap. Ha.) inserts *κατὰ* between *καί*¹ and *πᾶν* in 2,31, reading *καὶ κατὰ πᾶν διάστημα* ; he takes *οὐρανός* (to be understood from the context?) as the subject of *ἐψύχεται* , and wrongly claims to find a similar change of subject in Ci.. He maintains that it makes no sense to speak of soul 'ensouling an interval'. But in VI 4,1,9 P. writes of soul that it fills *τὸ διάστημα πᾶν* , a clear parallel with our passage.

Διάστημα seems to have been used as a technical term in Aristotle (see Arist. *Ph.* 209b7) as well as in Stoicism and Epicureanism (Them. *in Ph.* 113.8 ff. (Schenkl)). The word and its cognates are used in P., as here, in the context of the sensible world. Separation and space in the sensible world are contrasted with the omnipresence of the contents of the Intelligible World. Beierwaltes, in a note on III 7,11,41, gives a useful collection of uses of the words. He cites II 9,17,7; III 2,2,5. 2,24 ff.; IV 3,20,24; IV 4,7,12 ff.; VI 5,3,25. 4,22.5,7. 10.39. 11,1. 11,16.(11,25 ff. - whose relevance escapes me); VI 9,1,32. One might also add IV 2,1,19. 1,39. 1,58.

2,32-33 ἄλλον μὲν ἄλη... ὡς δὲ ὄντος : All the mss. read *κειμένου* in 2,32, but Cyril (PG 76.924a) reads *κινουμένου* . Henry (*Etats*, p. 127) calls both readings 'acceptables', while Dörrie (*GGA* 200 (1938), p. 528 n.1) thinks that *κινουμένου* is the only reading possible.

It is perfectly true that, like all body, the body of the universe is in flux (II 1,2,5-6), although the world-body is

perfect and self-sufficient (IV 8,2,14 ff.) and flows within itself (II 1,3,3); in fact, the life of body is movement (II 2,1,14). But the movement of body is not the point here. P. is contrasting the mode of body's presence in the universe with the mode of soul's presence in body, both the body of the universe and the human body. Bodies, being primarily separable (IV 2,1,11 ff.), are spatially separate from each other (see previous note). This characteristic of body - that it is spatially separate - is emphasised by the two pairs of genitive absolutes in 2,33-34. And P. sums up the whole section in 2,38-39 by saying that the universe is *πολύς* and *ἄλλος ἄλλῃ*. In view of the context, therefore, and the emphasis on the spatial nature of body, reference to movement would be quite out of place.

2,34 τῶν δὲ ἄλλῃν ... ἔχόντων : Henry (Etats, p. 127) writes 'tous les manuscrits de Plotin même E ont ἄλλων, faute probable de l'archétype, due a l'influence de τῶν δέ ; le contexte paraît exiger ἄλλῃν'.

P. is making a contrast between the two limbs of the genitive absolute. As H-S note, ἀπαρτῶν (and its cognates) always convey the notion of separation in P., and not that of relationship, on which see LSJ s.v. I (see III 3,4,8; IV 3,12,20; V 2,1,22; VI 3,8,23; VI 6,1,17; VI 7,2,38). Therefore, if ἄλλων is retained, the contrast must be focused on ἐξ ἐναντίας and ἀπαρτησὺν alone. M. van der Valk (Mnemosyne 9 (1956), p. 130) tries to defend the reading ἄλλων, and translates 'when some objects are placed over against one another, whereas the others are detached from another' (sic). But 'over against'

means 'in full view of' and there is hardly a contrast between what is in full view of something and what is separate from it; the former implies the latter. ἄλλη is almost certainly right; some objects face each other, some are separated in different ways.

Of editors and translators, Fic., reading ἄλλων, translates 'alia vero connexa, invicemque connexa', which involves the mistranslation of ἀπάρτησιν. Vo., Br., Ci., Ha. and MK read ἄλλην, but Br.'s translation 'et ils sont séparés l'un de l'autre, qu'ils soient ou non dans des régions contraires' is mere paraphrase.

2,35-36 ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ... ζῆν ποιεῖ : Ἐχῃ must be supplied with the first part of this sentence. Bodies are spatially distinct; but soul is present everywhere as a whole, and carries on its life-giving and controlling functions without being split up into distinct parts.

The thought is clear enough, but the text is difficult. First, Vo. and Br. are wrong to change the reflexive αὐτῆς of the mss. to ἑαυτῆς in 2,35. A more important problem concerns the repetition of the two phrases concerning the soul. H-S¹ suggest that μέρι αὐτῆς should be construed with κατακερματισθεῖσα and that μορίῳ ψυχῆς should be taken with ζῆν ποιεῖ. The second suggestion makes good sense but it is not at all clear how μέρι αὐτῆς can be taken with κατακερματισθεῖσα. The natural way to take both phrases is to treat them as instrumental datives with ζῆν ποιεῖ. But in that case the repetition of μέρι αὐτῆς and

μορίῳ ψυχῆς is otiose, and the use of ψυχῆς four words after the pronoun αὐτῆς is jarring. Accordingly, Br. proposed to delete ψυχῆς and to take ἑκάστῳ ... μορίῳ to refer to the sensible world - surely very difficult here where μέν has been used in 2,35 to refer to the soul. Henry suggested (Etats, p. 191) that μορίῳ ψυχῆς was an ancient gloss (it is omitted in Basil's paraphrase in PG 29.769c) and in H-S² the phrase is deleted, rightly in my view.

Ha. keeps the two phrases μέν αὐτῆς and μορίῳ ψυχῆς and claims that the difficulties vanish if ἑκάστον is read in 2,35 in place of ἑκάστῳ. He argues that μέν αὐτῆς corresponds to τῇ ὅλῃ in 2,37, while if we read ἑκάστῳ there is nothing to correspond to τὰ πάντα in 2,36. He therefore suggests ἑκάστον as the object of ζῆν ποιῆ. This certainly avoids the great difficulty involved in taking ἑκάστῳ as a dative of advantage as H-S suggest. But while ἑκάστον is attractive, it is false to maintain that the difficulties involved in the phrases μέν αὐτῆς and μορίῳ ψυχῆς disappear if this single change is made.

With some editorial eclecticism, I prefer to read οὐδὲ μέν αὐτῆς ἑκάστον κατακερματισθεῖσα ζῆν ποιῆ. This has a Plotinian ring. For the separation of the object and verb by the participle compare 2,44-45 καὶ ὅταν ἄντι τῶν προσελθόντων σκοπῆς λαβὼν κεκαθαρμένην, and for other examples of hyperbaton see RE 521.52 ff..

With the exception of MK, whose translation is an inexact paraphrase, all translators give the sense of this vexed passage.

2,36-37 ἄλλα τὰ ... πανταχοῦ : Vo. and Br. following Cyril
(PG 76.924a) omit the definite article before πάντα . There
is no justification for this; cf. VI 9,1,17).

P. investigates the mode of presence of the soul in the
body in IV 2. He makes there a four-fold distinction. The
physical world, σώματα , is primarily divisible, in contrast
with the Intelligible World which is outside division (IV 2,1,11 ff.).
Between these two extremes are two other natures, first that of
qualities, which is closer to the nature of bodies, and secondly
that of soul, which preserves its unity of substance even in
spatially distinct bodies (IV 2,1,29 ff.; VI 4,1,17 ff.). The
'division' of soul is in fact a πάθημα of body, since body
cannot receive soul in any other way (IV 2,1,75-76). P. sums up
by saying in IV 2,2,52-53 that soul is ἓν καὶ πολλά because
its unity is a real unity in a plurality of bodies.

P. briefly repeats in our present passage the conclusions of
his earlier treatise (IV 2 is fourth in Porphyry's chronological
order). Compare also II 2,1,39-40 πανταχοῦ οὕσα ἡ ψυχὴ ὅλη ;
IV 4,19,15 ἓν παντὶ ὅλη τῷ σώματι οὕσα ; IV 9,1,2
πανταχοῦ τοῦ σώματος ὅλη παρέσσι .

2,37-38 τῷ γεννήσαντι ... κατὰ τὸ πάντη : Soul's father is
Intellect which, in a figurative sense, begets it. Fic. omits
γεννήσαντι from his translation.

ὁμοιομενία (2,37) means that soul is like Intellect in
the sense that soul is its image (see on 3,7); it further calls
to mind the Platonic tag of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ (Pl. Tht. 176b1-2).

Soul imitates Intellect by being a unity (though its unity is less than that of Intellect which is a $\epsilon\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ (see 8,26 and note on 8,23-26)) and by being omnipresent; for the omnipresence of Intellect see V 8,4,7. 9,27-28; VI 4-5.

$\tau\omicron\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\eta$ means 'being on every side' or 'everywhere'; Fic. and MK give the wrong sense.

2,38-40 $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\eta}\varsigma\ \acute{\omega}\nu\ \dots\ \kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\omicron}\delta\epsilon$: Body does not have an intrinsic unity (IV 7,3,27-28); the universe is not 'really one' (III 2,2,2 ff.). Degrees of unity possessed depend on closeness to the One. Intellect gives unity to soul which in its turn transmits it to body (VI 9,1,42-43; cf. VI 9,1-2).

On the universe as $\theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ see Pl. Ti. 92c7 ($\theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$) and on P.'s use of the word see on 1,2. In fact, it is only in virtue of their higher souls that divinity can be predicated of the planets (II 3,9,45-47).

2,40-41 $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \dots\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\epsilon\alpha$: On the divinity of the stars and planets see on 2,3-4 and 4,3-4. Their souls are in continual contemplation of Intellect, for in them the higher soul is predominant (see preceding note).

2,41-42 $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \eta\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \dots\ \delta\iota\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$: On the idiom of $\epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon$ with an indefinite pronoun or adverb see Denniston, p. 489. The question is, what is the force of $\tau\omicron$? Is P. saying that we, if we are anything, are what we are in virtue of soul (so MK, Ci. and Ha.)? Or is $\tau\omicron$ to be taken adverbially? Then the meaning would be: 'and we are gods, if we are gods in any way, in virtue of soul' (so Fic. and Br.).

The second alternative seems to me most convincing. In the normal way of things we are not thought of as gods. However, it is our aim to become gods and to unite with Intellect (I 2,6,2-3; VI 9,9,58). P.'s last words were an injunction to reassociate the god within us with the divine in the universe (V.P. 2.25-27). Thus we might be said to be a god 'in some way'.

The god in us is the higher soul. In VI 7,5,21 ff. the higher man is said to have a *ψυχὴ ἥδη θεοτέρα* which does not leave the Intelligible World. However, man's involvement with body hinders perception of the working of that soul. Only by purification can he become his real, divine self (cf. 2,45-46 *εὐχόμενος τὸ...τίμιον, ὃ ἦν ψυχὴ*). When free from body, man can join the world soul in its painless administration of the universe (IV 3,12,10-12; IV 8,2,19 ff.). The world soul divinises the universe (II 3,9,45-46) so one can assume that man too has become divine when he acts according to his higher soul and is on the same level as the world soul.

2,42 *νέκυες γὰρ ... ἐκβλητότεροι :* A quotation of Heraclitus (DK B.96). E. Roussos, Ὁ Ἡράκλειτος στὸν Ἐννιάδην τοῦ Πλωτίνου (Athens, 1968), p. 69 ff. gives a full list of the places in ancient literature where this fragment is found. The *γὰρ* seems to be part of the actual quotation, but its logical force is suitable here. The sequence of thought is: it is our souls which divinise us, since our bodies are worthless.

2,42 *τὴν δέ :* Ki., Vo., Br. and Ha. follow the reading of A and the editio princeps and print *δή* . Ha.'s stated reason

(' δὴ ist sehr erwünscht, hier wo der Schluss gezogen wird')
 is not compelling. A new step in the argument is being introduced,
 picking up the statement made earlier in 2,7-9. The adversative
 δέ makes perfect sense.

2,43 προβυτέρων θιόν : For θιός as feminine see Pl. Lg.
 899b7; for the thought see on 2,7. Vo. and Br. unnecessarily
 delete the word.

Προβύτερος can mean either 'older' (Fic., Br. and MK)
 or 'more important' (Ci.: 'piú veneranda'; Ha.: 'erwürdiger').
 I prefer the latter.

2,44 ὁμοιότης : The problem of the relationship between the
 world soul and the individual soul is a vexed one, well discussed
 by H.J. Blumenthal in Le Néoplatonisme ('Soul, World-Soul and
 Individual Soul in Plotinus') pp. 55-63. He points out that P.
 is guilty of serious inconsistency.

We are often told that the existence of many souls presupposes
 the existence of one soul from which the many derive (III 9,3,4;
 IV 8,3,10 ff.; IV 9,4,15 ff.); and P. insists that this single soul
 is that from which the world soul and the individual soul both
 derive (IV 3,4,14 ff.). Thus, P. seems to conceive of a triangular
 relationship between Soul (= the third hypostasis), world soul
 and individual soul, with the Hypostasis-Soul at the apex and
 the other souls along the base. This fits well with passages like
 the present where the world soul and the individual souls are
 called ὁμοιότης (cf. IV 3,6,1; cf. ἀδελφαί II 9,18,16;
 IV 3,6,13).

On the other hand, it is clear that the world soul and individual souls in fact behave very differently. The world soul does not associate itself with the body, but controls it without trouble (IV 8,8,13 ff.) and is not actually in the body of the universe (III 4,4,4 ff.). (Contrast with this view, though, the 'dwelling of the world soul in the universe' mentioned at II 9,18,23-24). Individual souls are disturbed by too close an association with the body (though, as Blumenthal points out (op. cit. p. 60), this ought not to happen since all the bodies are prepared for the individual souls by the world soul (IV 3,6,13-15; VI 7,7,8 ff.)), so that there ought to be no difference between bodies when the individual souls arrive). Furthermore, it is the ideal for the individual soul to join the world soul in the administration of the universe (IV 3,12,10-12; IV 8,2,19 ff.).

These obvious differences of function between the individual souls and the world soul suggest that there is a corresponding difference in their nature and relative superiority. It is difficult to be convinced by P.'s assertion that they are *ὁμοειδῆς*, or by his insistence that all soul is a unity (IV 9 passim).

Our particular passage might be explained if *ἡ ἡμετέρα* (2,44) could be referred to our higher soul, which like the world soul, never descends into body. But this interpretation is precluded by the rest of the sentence; the higher soul does not need purification.

2,44-45 καὶ ὅταν... κεκαθαρμένην : P. follows Plato in maintaining that purification meant separation (Pl. Phd. 67c5 ff.) - for his interpretation of this see on 10,24-26 - and that the virtues were purifications (Pl. Phd. 69b8 ff.), sometimes using the myth of Glaucus from R. 611c7 ff. as an example of what purification entails; the image is also found in I 1,12,13 ff.. He comments on the theory that virtues consist in purifications in I 2 (see on this, E. Bréhier, 'ΑΡΕΤΑΙ ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΙΣ', REA 42 (1940), pp. 53-58), and on purification being the equivalent of separation at III 6,5,13 ff.. The acquisition of virtue is a preparation for separation, which is achieved by turning away from the sensible world inwards and upwards towards intellect and the One. Thus purification and the ἐπιστροφή are closely related (cf. I 2,4,15 ff.); on the connection between purification and prayer see on 6,7, and, in general, G. Carrière, 'La κάθαρσις Plotinienne', Divus Thomas 28 (1951), pp. 197-204.

2,45-46 εὐερέους ... ὃ ἦν ψυχὴ : Perhaps a verbal reminiscence of Pl. R. 611c4 καὶ πολὺ γε κάλλιον αὐτὸ εὐερέει . H-S's reference to the previous line (Pl. R. 611c3) is an apparent error.

In place of τὸ αὐτὸ τίμον (2,45-46) Dodds suggests τὸ αὐτοτίμον (in letters to H-S) presumably on a parallel with αὐτοαγαθόν (I 8,13,8.13,10.13,11); αὐτοάνθρωπος (V 9,13,2.14,18; VI 7,4,17); αὐτοάπειρον (II 4,7,16); αὐτογῆ (VI 7,11,35); αὐτοδεκάς (VI 6,14,49); αὐτοδικαιοσύνη (I 2,6,16-17); αὐτοκαλόν (I 8,13,10.13,11); αὐτοκακόν (I 8,13,9); αὐτόεν (V 3,12,52); αὐτοεπιστήμη (V 8,4,40); αὐτοζῆν (III 8,8,12); αὐτοουσία (VI 8,12,8);

αὐτονοῦς (V 9,13,3); αὐτοστάσις (III 7,2,36); and αὐτοψυχή (V 9,13,3.13,5.13,7). These compounds of αὐτοσ-, though, are generally used to refer to the Forms - e.g. αὐτοεπιστήμη is the Form of knowledge (although αὐτοῖν seems to be an exception to this). The notion of Absolute τιμίον seems out of place here.

Only Fic. and Ci. give a good translation of this part of the sentence. Τὸ αὐτό = 'the same thing', τιμίον is predicative, and ὃ ἦν ψυχὴ is in apposition to τὸ αὐτό. 'You will find the same thing of value (sc. both in the individual and in the world soul), namely what we have described as soul'. On the past tense ἦν see R. D. Hicks on Arist. de An. 412b11.

2,46-47 καὶ τιμιώτερον... ἦ : Compare Pl. Smp. 210b6-7 and id. Lg. 727d8 ff..

2,47-49 γῆ γὰρ πάντα... καὶ αἴρα : The first three words are a quotation from Arist. Metaph. 989a9-10 πάντα γὰρ εἶναι φασι (sc. οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων) γῆν .

Everything which is σωματικόν consists of one or more of the four elements plus a trace of soul. P. devotes more space in his argument to fire than to the others because Heraclitus (see Arist. Metaph. 984a7-8) made fire his first principle, and, more particularly, the Stoics (SVF 1.120; 1.157; Cic. ND 2.24 - following Cleanthes according to F. Solmsen, Cleanthes or Posidonius? The Basis of Stoic Physics, Med. der Kon. Ned. Akad. 24,9 (1961)) posited fire as the creative principle in the

universe. Fire to them was material and so for P. could never usurp any of the functions of the immaterial soul, though in a curious passage in I 6,3,19 ff., perhaps based on Arist. GC 335a18-21, he comes near to giving fire immaterial status. See on 3,10-12.

2,49-50 *εἰ δ' ὅτι... ἄλλον διώκει* : Having demonstrated the pre-eminence of soul, P. adds the rider that the proper object of pursuit is man's own soul.

All mss. read *ἄλλον* in 2,50, though not all translators translate the word in a personal sense (cf. Fic.'s: 'aliud quicquam'). Ha. changes *ἄλλον* to *ἄλλο*. He is surely right; the point is not that soul pursues someone else, but that it chases after whatever contains soul (i.e. *τὸ σωματικόν*), deceived by the image of itself which it sees there. Compare 1,17 *εἰ ἀπὸ... διώκεται ἄλλο*.

2,50 *ἀγαθὰ* : This word is rightly taken as an imperative by all translators other than Ha.. Why the imperative 'den Gedankengang verfehlt' Ha. does not explain.

CHAPTER THREE

Having pointed out that the soul is not worthless (Ch. 1) and having given his reasons (Ch. 2), P. turns in this chapter to the relationship between soul and Intellect, through which souls' full potentialities are assured of their complete expression. The last lines (3,24-25) act as a bridge between Chapters 3 and 4.

- 3,1 οὕτω δὲ τιμίου ... τῆς ψυχῆς : cf. IV 2,1,68-69 θεῶν
τὸ χεῖμα αὐτῆς ... καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ χεῖματα φύσεων
(for the pun on χεῖμα cf. Pl. Lg. 727e3 ff.); IV 7,10,26-27.

Basil reads κῆμα (PG 29.772b; cf. Henry, Etats, p. 193), perhaps influenced by Pl. Lg. 728c9. χεῖμα is undoubtedly the right reading; see besides the references above 3,6; IV 7,10,49. 11,1.

- 3,2 πιστεύσας ἤδη... θεὸν μετέναι : For the construction see LSJ s.v. πιστεύω I.4. Τῷ τοιοῦτῳ is not instrumental (all translators except for Br. who is inexact at this point), but is the subject of the infinitive μετέναι, which is probably future (Fic., Ci. and Ha.) rather than present (MK) (Br. is again inexact). Translate: 'believing that such a thing as soul will approach God' (cf. Pl. Phdr. 248a2 (ψυχῇ)... θεῷ ἐπομένῃ). An instrumental dative would be otiose alongside μετὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας.

The position of ἤδη suggests that it should rather be taken with πιστεύσας (as Fic., Ci. and Ha.) than with μετέναι (MK). Br. omits the word from his translation.

The god of 3,2 is Intellect (cf. 1,2, and the refs. to 'father' in 2,37; 3,14 and 3,21). Self-confidence, however, is important even at the level of Intellect (I 6,9,22-24). The soul must become Intellect and entrust itself to it before it can reach the One (VI 9,3,22-27).

- 3,2-3 *μετὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας* : This means 'with the help of such a causal principle.' P. has dealt with the causal role of soul in Ch. 2. Translators miss the force of *αἰτία*.
- 3,3 *ἀνάβαινε πρὸς ἐκεῖνον* : The upward path; on the history of the image of 'ascent' towards a god see RLAC s. 'Erhebung des Herzens'. The image may have originated from the physical fact that the sanctuary or altar at which prayers were offered was often at a higher level than its environments (see RLAC s. 'Aufwärts-abwärts').

The image is common in Plato especially in the myth of the cave in R. VII (*ἀναβλέπειν* 515c8; *ἀναβάσιν* 515e6; etc.). But note also Phdr. 246a2 ff., where the myth of the winged soul necessarily entails the notion of upward and downward movement, and the description of the dialectical ascent towards Beauty in Smp. 211b7 ff.

Words signifying upward movement are common in the Enneads, e.g., *ἀναβαίνειν* in I 4,7,16; I 6,7,1. 9,23-24; I 8,13,12; IV 7,12,8; V 9,2,10; VI 9,3,21; *ἀνάγειν* in 1,24; 10,28; *ἀνατρέπειν* in VI 9,9,14; *ἀναφύγειν* in V 9,2,5. But for P. the ascent is not merely an ascent towards knowledge as it was for Plato. It is the spiritual ascent through purification towards

union with the One, and this involves unification with Intellect (VI 9,3,22-23). On purification see on 2,44-45 and 6,11; and on the degree of union involved on 5,3.

3,3-4 *ὡς πόρρω βαλεῖς... τὰ μεταξύ* : Br. adopts Vo.'s correction *ἐπιβαλεῖς* for *βαλεῖς* (cf. I 6,2,2 where Vo. changes the simple noun *βολή* into the compound *ἐπιβολή*). Seidel (De Usu Praepositionum Plotiniano Quaestiones (Nissen, 1886), p. 39) justifies the use of the simple verb by comparing III 8,10, 32 *καὶ βαλὼν πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ τυχῶν* and II 4,5,10 *ὁφθαλμὸς φωτεινὸς ὢν πρὸς τὸ φῶς βαλὼν* (where Vo. suggests *βλέπων* ; see Praef. I.xviii). P. does sometimes use the compound, e.g., V 9,7,18 and VI 5,12,9, but the simple *βαλεῖς* is perfectly acceptable. See also Henry, Etats, p. 193. *βάλλειν* means here 'to shoot'. The metaphor is taken from warfare. Fic.'s 'vagaturus' is quite wrong.

P.'s remarks here are directed against the belief which he associated with the Gnostics that there were more than three hypostases. For his detailed arguments against this position see II 9,1-6.

Πόρρω is used here in a figurative sense. In the Intelligible World all physical relations such as 'near' and 'far' are excluded (VI 4,2,46; VI 5,8,7-8), since such relations are attributes of body. What separates the hypostases is 'difference' (*ἑτερότης* or *διαφορά*) (VI 9,8,30-32; cf. 3,21-22 and note; 6,53; IV 3,11,21; VI 4,4,23-24. 11,9 ff.). 'Difference' specifically provides against spatial separation. On this see R. Arnou, 'La Séparation par Simple Alterité dans la "Trinité"

Plotinienne', Gregorianum 11 (1930), pp. 181-193. Paradoxically it emphasises the closeness of the hypostases.

- 3,4 *λαμβάνει τούτων το* : As Ha. points out (ad loc.), the article is necessary if *τὸ ψυχῆς* is to be read in 3,5. It is omitted by Ki., Mtl., Vo. and Br..
- 3,5 *θεώτερον... γειτόνημα* : Because soul comes after Intellect in the *πρόοδος* (cf. 3,5-6 *μεθ' ὃ καὶ ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ψυχὴ*), it is different and less divine than it (see on 2,7). Br. does not realise that *τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου* (3,4-5) is a genitive of comparison.

The use of *γειτόνημα* and its cognates emphasises the closeness of the Intelligible entities to each other (see on 3,3-4). Ha. (in a note on I 2,5,24) compares with this use P.'s use of *ἐφάπτεσθαι* in VI 4,2,45, of *οὐκ ἀπετμήθη* in IV 3,9,30 and of *ὁμοιος* in IV 8,7,7. He emphasises the connection between soul as the 'neighbour' of Intellect and soul as its 'interpreter' (*ἐρμηνευτικὴ γινώμηνη* IV 3,11,19; see introduction to Ch. 2). P. believed that *γειτονία* had an effect upon the parties involved (I 2,5,25-27). Thus, whatever borders on soul shares in soul's logos (IV 3,9,27; for the meaning of logos see on 3,8); consequently body, because it is soul's 'neighbour', enjoys a trace of soul (III 9,3,2; VI 4,15,14-15). Similarly, soul borders on Intellect and becomes like it. So ultimately, this likeness is passed on to the physical world.

H-S think that the use of the word *γειτόνημα* indicates a verbal quotation from Pl. Lg. 705a4. This view is apparently

held only by Henry, since in RE 551.20 ff., and Entr. p. 89, Schwyzer denies that actual quotations from the Laws can be found in the Enneads (cf. Harder in Entr. p. 92). In the Laws passage which H-S quote, Plato is talking of the sea, which he calls ἄλμυρόν καὶ πικρὸν γειτόνημα. This phrase is itself partly a quotation from Alcman (Page, Poetae Melici Graeci, fr. 108 ἄλμυρόν τὸ γειτόνημα). The word γειτόνημα is only found before P. in the Platonic/Alcmanic passage and quotations of it; but this evidence is not sufficient to prove that P. was explicitly referring to Plato here, especially in view of the frequent use of the metaphor of 'neighbouring'. (Besides γειτόνημα, P. uses γειτονεῖν in I 2,5,25; γειτνίασι in I 2,5,26; and γειτονία in VI 4,15,14). The use of a single non-technical word cannot prove direct verbal quotation from another author.

Γειτόνημα itself means, of course, 'neighbourhood' rather than 'neighbour'. Br. and MK get this wrong.

3,5-6 μεθ' ὧ καὶ ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ψυχὴ : With μεθ' ὧ cf. VI 2,22,20-21 νοῦς ... ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἑαυτὸν ψυχὴν .

Ἀφ' οὗ emphasises the causal relationship between Intellect and soul, μεθ' ὧ their position in the Intelligible hierarchy.

3,6-7 οἶον ἔδειξεν ὁ λόγος : The 'logos' (= 'discussion') was in Ch. 2. For other reference to logos used in this way, see E. Früchtel, Der Logosbegriff bei Plotin - eine Interpretation (Diss. München, 1955), p. 13 n. 1. On the meaning of logos in 3,8 see note ad loc..

3,7 εἰκὼν τίς ἐστὶ νοῦ : Because of the closeness of the hypostases to each other (3,5), each assimilates some of the qualities of its prior. Thus, soul is like Intellect which in turn is like the One. This relationship is expressed by P. here by the word εἰκὼν (cf. also 7,1; II 9,4,25; V 8,7,12-16 coupled with γειτονία ; V 8,8,20); but he also uses εἶωλον in 6,46-47; V 4,2,26; VI 8,18,35; ἰνδαλμα in VI 7,40,19; VI 8,18,26-27; μύμημα / μύμησις in V 3,16,41; V 4,2,25; V 5,5,22; ἵχνος in 7,44; III 8,11,19; VI 7,17,39. 18,5; or εἶδος in V 2,1,15.

Strictly speaking the close relationship between Intellect and soul exists only for the higher ratiocinative soul (διάνοια), whose intellectual activity mirrors the non-discursive thought of Intellect (see on 3,17). P. makes this point clear in several passages. In V 3,4,20 ff. it is the ratiocinative soul (τὸ διανοητικόν) which is described as 'second after Intellect and its image'; and the points of resemblance are explained in V 3,8,46 ff.. The lower functions of soul (φύσις , αἰσθησις , τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν , τὸ θυμοειδές) are specifically excluded from this close relationship since they are directed towards what is mortal (V 3,9,2 ff.). Compare also V 9,6,15 ff. where the vegetative soul (φύσις) is described as the image not of Intellect but of 'another higher soul' where the 'higher soul' is presumably the ratiocinative soul; and 7,42-43.

Soul's function as a bridge between the Intelligible and sensible worlds necessitates its having diverse functions, and this very diversity tends to make soul into a composite entity;

thus, only that part of soul which is like Intellect in its activity resembles it sufficiently to be called its image. But since P. firmly believed that soul was in fact a unity (see IV 9, *passim*), the close relationship to Intellect is sometimes extended even to soul's non-intellectual activities

(see V 3,7,30-34 καὶ γὰρ καὶ πράττουσα ὅπως θεωρεῖ καὶ ποιοῦσα εἶδη ποιεῖ, οἷον νοήσεις ἀπηρτισμένας, ὥστε πάντα εἶναι ἔχνη νοήσεως καὶ νοῦ ... μιμουμένων τῶν μὲν ἐγγὺς μᾶλλον, τῶν δὲ ἱσχυάτων ἀμυδρὰν ἀποσώζοντα εἰκόνα) Thus, although only the higher soul is properly the image of Intellect, all soul's activities from highest to lowest are in the last analysis dependent on Intellect, and reflect it in some way. Soul is Intellect's logos (see on 3,8).

3,7-8 οἷον λόγος ὃ ἐν προφορᾷ... τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ : The concept of 'image' is elaborated by means of the concept of 'logos'; as the logos in expression is the image of the logos in the soul, so the soul is the logos of Intellect. One is led to expect some sort of image relationship between the logos in soul and the logos in Intellect. But instead P. asserts a closer relationship, probably because speech does not merely image, but actually expresses thought; soul is the logos (= expressed content) of Intellect.

The distinction between the προφορικός and ἐνδιάθετος logos is repeated by P. in a similar context in I 2,3,27 ff. (see on 3,8); cf. also III 8,6,22 διατεθῆ... προφέρει . The language of προφορικός and ἐνδιάθετος seems to have been introduced by the Stoics (cf. SVF II.135), and to judge

from Porph. Abst. 187.20 (Nauck) the distinction itself was assumed to be a Stoic invention. But although the Stoics may have developed it, the distinction can be found in both Plato and Aristotle. In Th. 189e4 ff. Plato defines *διάνοια* as the logos *ὅν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται πρὸς ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ*; and in Sph. 263e3 ff. he distinguishes between the logos which is *ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γινόμενος* (= *διάνοια*) and the expressed word *λόγος μετὰ φθογγου* (cf. Phlb. 38d1 ff. and Ti. 37b3 ff. with Proclus' note on the passage, especially in Ti. II.308.18 ff. (Diehl)). Aristotle in APo. 76b24 ff. makes a similar distinction - between the external logos and the logos in the soul. As H. F. Müller points out (AGPh. N.F. 23 (1916), p. 40) the distinction is merely that between 'oratio' and 'ratio'. It was widely adopted by Philo (e.g., Vit. Mos. II.127; De Special. Leg. IV.69).

3,8 οὕτω τοι καὶ αὐτὴ λόγος νοῦ : Because of its different meanings and its adaptability, logos is one of the most difficult words in Greek of which to give a philosophical definition. A useful compilation of the occurrences of this word in the Enneads has been made by J. Wolf, Der Gottesbegriff Plotins (Diss. Freiburg, 1927), pp. 20-25; see also E. Früchtel, op. cit. in note on 3,6-7.

The best way to begin is to look at the later passage in which P. uses the *λόγος προφορικός / λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* contrast.

Ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μέλημα τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ μέλημα τοῦ ἐν ἔργῳ. ὥς οὖν μεμε-

ισμῆνος ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ πρὸς τὸν ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ
ἑρμηνεύς ὡς ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ (I 2,3,27-30).

First, it is clear from this passage that there are logoi in Intellect as well as in the soul. And we are told in II 7,3,14-15 that these logoi are transcendent (cf. IV 3,5,18; V 8,2,18-19). P. also says that there is one logos which includes all the other logoi within it (VI 2,21,29-30). Similarly (cf. 4, 26-27), there is one Intellect although its contents (each one called an Intellect) are many. These examples seem to show that when P. speaks of the logoi of Intellect he means its contents, i.e., the Forms, which like the logoi are transcendent. At the level of Intellect, logos and logoi seem to be ways of referring to Intellect itself and to the Forms. (Contrast, however, V 8,3, 8, and, for further contrast, II 4,5,8.) But logoi in the soul are not the same as the logoi in the Intellect; they are

μεμεισμένους, further removed from unity although they derive from the logoi above them (cf. V 9,3,30-31 ταύτῃ (sc. τῇ ψυχῇ) νοῶν χορηγὸν τῶν λόγων γινούναι (sc. φῆσαι)). What Intellect gives to soul is 'near the truth' (V 9,3,35-36).

The logoi of soul, since they come from Intellect and thus resemble Intellect's logoi, constitute as it were the εἶδος or μορφή of soul. They are the presence of Intellect in soul, although, from another viewpoint, Intellect as the provider of these logoi is like the workman who provides the εἶδος (V 9,3,33 ff.; see note on 3,22-23); i.e., Intellect gives logoi to soul which are like the logoi in itself. Finally, there are what P. calls the

logoi 'in matter' (II 7,3,12; VI 1,29,11; VI 7,11,10). These seem to be the same as the immanent forms. In II 7,3,11-12 body is described as matter and immanent logos (cf. also II 6,2,15 and VI 7,4,19). Thus, there seems to be a threefold logos - (a) logoi in Intellect = the Forms, (b) logoi in soul, and (c) logoi in matter = the immanent forms. It is through the immanent forms that the physical world resembles its Intelligible archetype; and it is through the soul as *ἐρμηνεύς* that the immanent forms are introduced into matter. Thus the activity of soul takes place through logoi, since it is the logoi in itself which become the logoi in matter. It is the logoi which are active (cf. III 8,2,27-28 *ὁ γὰρ σημείον οὐ μικρόν τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύτοις τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς ποιοῦντας* ; II 3,16,19-20 - the soul contains *λόγοι γεννητικοί*). Thus, when P. calls soul the logos of Intellect he means soul as the active interpreter or bridge between the Intelligible and sensible worlds. (For other passages where soul is called logos of Intellect see 6,44-5; IV 3,5,8 ff..) Soul acts by activating the logoi within itself. Note how in our present passage logos is coupled with 'activity' (*ἐνέργεια*). But it is emphasised that Intellect is the source of logoi in the soul and their subsequent activity (V 9,3,30-32 - Intellect is the *χορηγός* ; III 2,2,15 - Intellect gives a part of itself to matter; III 2,2,23 - the sensible universe ultimately derives from Intellect and the logos which comes from it). Soul is the intermediary through which Intellect is present in the physical universe.

In view of all this, we must ask whether it is possible to call Intellect the logos of the One, as has been generally supposed (Bréhier, note on V 1,6,53; Entr. p. 98 (Henry): 'Le Logos est chaque fois un reflet de l'hypostase précédente'; *ibid.* p. 99 (Theiler): 'auf jedem Niveau der Niveauunterschied ausgedrückt wird durch λόγος'; W. Beierwaltes, "Über Ewigkeit und Zeit (Enneade III 7) (Frankfurt a. M., 1967), p. 50; A. Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics (Leiden, 1972), p. 35: 'Plotinus would even say that intelligence is the λόγος of the One'; R.T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London, 1972), p. 68).

First, it seems to me that if P. did call Intellect the logos of the One, by doing so he would trace the hierarchy of logoi not back to Intellect but back to the One. Thus, he might be expected to speak of the presence of the One in the physical world, since it would be through logoi that all the hypostases and their products would be related. P., however, does not do this. He calls Intellect the 'true maker and demiurge' (V 9,3, 26); it is Intellect which fills the sensible world with beautiful things through soul's intermediacy (IV 7,13,17-18); it is Intellect, not the One which gives 'something of itself' to matter (III 2,2,15). Intellect is not the logos of the One in the sense that it expresses the content of the One in some other sphere in the way that the content of Intellect is expressed in the physical world by soul.

J. M. Rist, who rightly opposes the view of Bréhier, Henry etc. (Plotinus: the Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 84 ff.) cites two passages on which such a view could be based. The first

is 6,44-45 οἶον καὶ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἐνέργεια
 τις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου . As Rist points out, it is not
 clear from this passage whether ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου goes
 with the whole of what precedes or whether it should be taken
 merely with the last part; i.e., it is possible to understand
 ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου only with ἐνέργεια τις .

(There is no problem about Intellect being an ἐνέργεια of
 the One; see on 3,9.) Consequently, this passage cannot be used
 on its own as evidence that P. calls Intellect the logos of the
 One. In the other passage which Rist mentions (VI 4,11,16), and
 which he takes to be the one clear passage in which P. does call
 Intellect the One's logos, P. is talking of the Intelligible
 World (or Intellect) and calls it a logos εἰς καὶ πολὺς .
 First, it is to be noted that Intellect is not actually called
 a logos of anything, but merely a logos, and in view of the wide
 application of the term 'logos', this is important. And since the
 logoi in Intellect are identical with the transcendent Forms, P.
 is probably saying no more by the phrase λόγος εἰς καὶ πολὺς
 than that the single Intellect contains the individual Forms (or
 νόεῖς) within it. As he says elsewhere (e.g., VI 7,13,1 ff.),
 Intellect is not a simplex but a differentiated complex. Con-
 sequently, I disagree with Rist's view that VI 4,11,16 is a
 clear instance of P.'s calling Intellect the One's logos. P.
 makes his position clear in VI 7,17,41-42, quoted by Rist op. cit.
 p. 85, where he says that if per impossible the One were an εἶδος
 (a transcendent Form), then Intellect would have been its logos
 (since it is the world of Forms which is expressed by the logoi

in the world of matter).

To sum up, then; although P. can and does call soul the logos of Intellect, it is most unlikely that he would call Intellect the logos of the One. The concept of 'logos' is a complex one, but the key notion is that of 'expression'. Hence the word comes to be used both of the subject of the 'expressing' (i.e., Intellect and soul), and of the objects 'expressed' (the logoi in soul and in matter). In trying to elucidate what P. means the danger is to be more precise than the language which he uses allows.

3,8-9 καὶ ἡ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια : 'H πᾶσα ἐνέργεια must be taken closely with προίεται in 3,9. Soul is not the whole of the activity of Intellect, since on the double-activity theory (see on 3,9-10) one of the activities of Intellect is directed inwards. Soul is the product only of Intellect's external activity. See VI 2,22,26-28 soul is ... ὡς ἐνέργεια ἐξ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ νοῦ). ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνεργεῖ, τὰ ἐνεργούμενα οἱ ἄλλοι νοῖ, ὅτε δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ψυχὴ .

3,9 καὶ ἡν προίεται ζωήν : Vo. and Br. read καθ' ἣν , a reading unsupported by any mss. authority. No change of text is necessary; the external activity of Intellect actually is the life of soul. P. regularly associates ἐνέργεια and ζωή ; e.g., II 5,3,38 ff.; III 2,16,17 ff.; III 8,10,3; VI 5,6,27 ff.; IV 5,7,13 ff.; cf. also Arist. Metaph. 1072b26-27 ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή . From these passages, it is clear that life is an activity. If so, there is no abruptness in ἐνέργεια

followed by καὶ ἦν ... ζῶν . The καί is explanatory in force (see Wolters on III 5,2,42), and should not be omitted.

The subject of προίεται is νοῦς rather than ψυχή . E. R. Dodds, with Vo.'s text translates in his private copy, ' ... the whole activity by which she (ψυχή) projects life into other things.' He compares 2,2 αὐτὴ μὲν ζῶσα ἐποίησε πάντα ἐμπνέουσα αὐτοῖς ζῶν . But ὑπόστασις in 3,9 almost certainly has the meaning 'separate existence' (see following note) in view of the fact that P. is dealing with the working of the procession from the One by the double-activity theory. In this case, only νοῦς can be the subject of προίεται .

For Intellect as responsible for soul's life see V 3,8,27 ff.

3,9-10 εἰς ἄλλου ὑπόστασιν ... ἦν παρέχει : 'Υπόστασις was not a technical term when P. wrote. His pupil Porphyry was responsible for the word's technical development (H. Dörrie, 'Υπόστασις, Wort und Bedeutungsgeschichte', NAWG Phil. Hist. Kl. (1955), p. 73.). P. does not restrict the word to what we call the hypostases; he can talk of the hypostasis of time (IV 4,15,3), of the category of the relative (VI 1,6,3), of wisdom (I 4,9,18-19); in III 5 ὑπόστασις is a synonym for οὐσία (see Wolters on III 5,2, 23), and marks the contrast between Intelligible Reality and the flux of the sensible world. It is found in the context of the creative activity of the πρὸδος , as here (cf. III 5,2,35 ff.; V 4,1,37 ff.. 2,34-36; note the criticisms in V 3,12,17 ff., and see on 6,34-37). Entities have a separate existence (ἔχου or λαμβάνειν ὑπόστασιν : see IV 7,8⁴,26; V 4,2,35; V 6,3,11; V 9,5,46) when they have been defined by their prior.

In view of the connection of the word with the Intelligible World and with the procession from the One it is easy to see how the word acquired the technical meaning which it later had.

Strictly speaking the One is *πρὸ ὑποστάσεως* (VI 8,10,35 ff.), but nevertheless P. speaks of the One as the *πρώτη ὑπόστασις* in VI 8,15,28 (cf. VI 8,13,43-44 *ἐν δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὑποστάσει*).

When P. wants to refer to the particular status of the One, Intellect or soul instead of the word *ὑπόστασις* he regularly uses the word *φύσις* (see 8,27 *ταῦτε φύσιν ταῖς τρισίν* and Wolters on III 5,1,45; he cites II 9,6,34; III 2,2,8; V 5,2,12. 3,1. 3,3 . 6,14. 6,17. 6,34; V 8,1,34. 9,42; see further V 5,7,18; VI 8,11,14. 11,16).

The theory of the double-*ἐνέργεια* explains the genesis of the hypostases. P. explains the theory most fully in V 4,2, 27-30 *ἐνέργεια ἥ μὲν ἐστὶ τῆς οὐσίας, ἥ δ' ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἑκάστου· καὶ ἥ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἑκάστου, ἥ δ' ἄπ' ἐκείνης ἣν δεῖ παντὶ ἐπεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέραν οὐσαν αὐτοῦ*. He illustrates the theory, as here, by the image of fire. One heat constitutes the *οὐσία* of fire, the other (external) heat derives from the first and is only possible when the first is active. P. continues (V 4,2, 32-37) *οὕτω δὲ καλεῖ... ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τελειότητος καὶ συνουσίας ἐνεργείας ἥ γυνηθεῖσα ἐνέργεια ὑπόστασιν λαβοῦσα... εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν ᾗ ἔστιν*. The theory is mentioned again, though more briefly, in II 9,8,22 ff., where it is applied to Intellect; and in IV 3,10,31 ff., where it is applied to soul.

Further references can be found at 6,30 ff.; III 5,3,3 ff.; IV 5,7,17 ff.; V 2,1,16 ff.; V 3,7,19 ff.; VI 2,22,26. 22,29; cf. III 2,4,13-16; IV 5,6,23-25.

P. stresses that of the two activities the internal one is the most important. In fact, the external activity is dependent on the internal for its existence (V 3,7,20-22 καὶ γὰρ εἴ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, τῷ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. εἶδε γὰρ πρῶτον ἐν¹. ἑαυτῷ, εἴτα καὶ εἰς ἄλλο). Again P. uses fire as an image; the internal activity of the fire which constitutes its οὐσία is a necessary precondition for any external effect which the fire might have.

The connection of the primary internal activity with οὐσία is derived from Aristotle (see Bonitz, Index, 251a15, where references are given to passages in which ἐνέργεια is used synonymously 'cum iis nominibus quae formam significant εἶδος μορφή, λόγος, τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι, οὐσία, ὅπῃ τι'. Cf. C. Rutten, R Philos 146 (1956), p. 102.). But the way in which P. connects the two concepts is most un-Aristotelian. Internal activity is the exercise of contemplation (θεωρία) or ἐπιστροφή (see on 3,13-14) towards what comes above the subject of the activity. Until this ἐπιστροφή takes place, the contemplating subject is undefined (see on 5,6-19 and 6,17-19), and has no οὐσία. Only by ἐπιστροφή does Intellect become Intellect; see V 3,11,12-16 οὗτος οὖν ὁ νοῦς ἐπέβαλε μὲν ἐκείνῳ (sc. τῷ ἐνὶ), λαβὼν δὲ ἐγένετο νοῦς... καὶ γνωόμενος καὶ νοῦς καὶ οὐσία καὶ νόησις, ὅτε ἐνόησε· πρὸ γὰρ τούτου οὐ νόησις ᾗν τὸ νοητὸν οὐκ ἔχων

1. H-S' om. ἐν

οὐδὲ νοῦς οὕτω νοήσας . (Note the connection in this passage between νοῦς , νόησις , and οὐσία ; cf. V 3,6,5 ff.)

Similarly, the soul owes its power to 'the vision of what comes before it' (II 9,2,15) (cf. R. Arnou, ΠΡΑΞΙΣ et ΘΕΩΡΙΑ (Paris, 1921), p. 76; also 3,16: soul's logos becomes active when soul sees Intellect.) Thus, the external activity of the higher hypostasis becomes the internal activity of the lower hypostasis.

But since each of the hypostases is a causal principle, a δυνάμεις with causal power, the external activity which each produces may be called its effect. And on the transmission theory of causation which P. inherited from Plato and Aristotle (see Pl. Phd. 100d3 ff.; Arist. Metaph. 993b 24-26) the effect is less in respect of the property caused than the cause (see on this A. C. Lloyd, Phronesis 21 (1976), pp. 146-156).

For P., fire was the commonest illustration of the two-fold activity (see on 6,34-37 for refs.). Aristotle also used fire as an illustration of the causal theory (Arist. Metaph. 993b 25-26). In GC 330b 26, Aristotle defined fire as a ὑπερβολὴ θερμότητος (cf. id. Meteor. 340b 23 - fire is a 'boiling over' (ξέσις) - quoted with approval by P. at II 1,4,11 ff.). This definition may well have influenced P.'s language when in V 2,1,8-9 he describes the genesis of Intellect from the One as follows: οἶον ὑπερρελήν καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλήρες αὐτοῦ πεποικῶν ἄλλο . P. is thinking here of the One's external activity, which, after definition, becomes Intellect.

3,10-12 δεῖ δὲ ... ἄλλην ὑφισταμένην : Omnis comparatio claudicat.

Fire is material, and, therefore, passive. Its external activity marks a diminution in the power of its internal activity, whereas P. insists that by the procession from the One (and ἐκείνῃ pace Br., means 'in the Intelligible World') the efficiency of the hypostases is not reduced. In one passage, however, he does seem to give fire a peculiar status: ἐγγὺς ὂν τοῦ ἀσωράτου, μόνον δὲ αὐτὸ οὐκ εἰσδεχόμενον τὰ ἄλλα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα δέχεται αὐτό. θερμαίνεται γὰρ ἐκείνα, οὐ ψύχεται δὲ τοῦτο (I 6,3,21-24.). But this passage, based on Arist. GC 335a 18-21, is unparalleled (see A. H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Cambridge, 1940) p. 55), and P.'s usual view, the view which he tacitly adopts here, puts fire firmly among the material elements. The fact that the internal activity is independent and unaffected by the external activity shows that P. is not a pantheist. Although the lower hypostases reflect the One in varying degrees, they are each distinct existences as the word 'hypostasis' suggests. The One is not divided out amongst its products (VI 9,9,5 ff.). It remains permanently at the head of the *πρόσδος* (cf. V 3,12,19 *μῶνοντος... ἐκείνου ἀπλοῦ*). Like the One, Intellect too remains unchanged when soul is engendered (III 4,1,1-3; V 2,1,17-18). Only the soul is said to produce whilst in motion (*κινουμένη* - III 4,1,2; cf. V 2,1,18). This is because soul, as a result of its freewill and of its peculiar position as mediator between the divine and human spheres, can move either towards good or evil (see on 1,6-7); thus it can become affected

by the body which it creates by becoming too closely involved with it. The aim of philosophy is to lead the soul away from the seduction of the body and to place it securely in the Intelligible World, from which, in P.'s view, a part of it can never be removed.

Fic. translates τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ὑφισταμένην (= the other activity taking on a distinct existence) wrongly.

3,12-13 οὕσα οὖν ἀπὸ νοῦ νοερά ἐστιν : Since soul, or, more particularly, the higher part of soul, διάνοια, is an image of Intellect (see on 3,6-7), διάνοια is intellectual (cf. V 3, 6,19-20 τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς δ' νοερόν πως διανοητικὸν αὐτὸ τίθιναι). This state of soul is the direct result of the πρόσδος (II 9,1,31-33 καὶ λόγος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς ψυχὴν ψυχὴν νοεράν ποιῶν, οὐκ ἄλλην τινὰ μεταξὺ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσιν; cf. V 3,8,22-23; VI 7,17,37-39). For other references to soul as νοερά see I 1,13,5 ff., and V 6, 4,16-17. In IV 8,4,1 ff. the νοερά ὄρεξις of souls is connected with their turning towards Intellect and is contrasted with their attention towards the physical world. Thus, it is through διάνοια that the soul's spiritual progress is made possible; only διάνοια is 'winged for the intellectual act' (V 3,4,13-14; cf. IV 8,3,21 ff.).

3,13 ἐν λογισμοῖς ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς : By the phrase ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς, P. makes a distinction between the soul's intellect and Intellect the second hypostasis. This distinction is quite common; e.g., in V 3,2,22 P. contrasts the soul's intellect with 'pure' Intellect; in I 8,2,7 ff. νοῦς παρ' ἡμῶν is compared

with Intellect proper; and the same distinction is made in slightly different terms in 10,12 ff. and V 3,3,21 ff.. In the first of these latter passages he speaks of two 'intellects' - one a νοῦς λογίζόμενος (the soul's intellect), and the other a νοῦς ... λογίξασθαι παρέχων (Intellect the second hypostasis). In the second passage he speaks of Intellect as 'ours' (ἡμέτερος), and says that it is ἄλλον τοῦ διανοουμένου καὶ ἑπάνω βεβηκότα. Soul's intellect is its νοῦς οἰκίῳς (V 2,2,9), although unlike Intellect proper its intellect is 'imported' (ἑπακτός) (V 6,4,16; V 8,3,10).

It is quite clear, then, that, although like Intellect proper, intellect in the soul is quite distinct; it also seems clear that intellect in the soul is another way of referring to what P. elsewhere calls τὸ λογιστικόν (cf. the passages in which soul's intellect and λογισμός (= 'reasoning') are mentioned together; e.g., the present passage; 10,34; I 8,2,7 ff.; note also Arist. de An. 432b 26 τὸ λογιστικόν καὶ (epexegetical) ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς .). And it is the characteristic of λογισμός which distinguishes the soul's intellect from Intellect proper (cf. I 8,2,7 ff.; VI 7,1,29), and makes soul's intellect its own.

We must now consider the relationship between τὸ λογιστικόν and τὸ διανοητικόν or διάνοια , to see whether both terms are alternative ways of referring to the soul's intellect. It has been held by A. E. Chaignet (Psychologie des Grecs IV (Paris, 1893), p. 221) and more recently by Schwyzer (Entr. pp. 366 and 390) that τὸ διανοητικόν is a higher faculty of

soul than τὸ λογιστικόν . This view has been opposed by H. J. Blumenthal, Plotinus' Psychology (The Hague, 1971), pp. 100 ff..

First, in Aristotle's system, λογισμός and διάνοια are the same (de An. 415a 8), and νοῦς ὁ ἐνὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ (= λογισμός) is a νοῦς πρακτικός not a νοῦς θεωρητικός (ibid. 433a 14 ff.). P. seems to use Aristotle's terms to distinguish between the two 'intellects' at V 3,6,35 ff., so it is probable that like Aristotle P. would also identify λογισμός and διάνοια . In fact he does so. I 1,9,18 ff. deals with the nature of διάνοια and P. says there that διάνοια makes an ἐπίκρισις τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τύπων , whilst at the same time contemplating the Forms. Διάνοια deals with the similarities between external impressions and internal knowledge (I 1,9,22-23 καὶ τῶν ἔξω πολλάκις πρὸς τὰνδον ὁμοιότης καὶ κοινωνία). When he deals with the function of τὸ λογιστικόν P. uses very similar terms - τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῇ λογισζόμενον παρὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως φαντασμάτων παρα-κειμένων τὴν ἐπίκρισιν ποιούμενον καὶ συνάγον καὶ διαιρούν· ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ ἰόντων ἐφορᾷ οἷον τοὺς τύπους... καὶ σύνεσιν ἔτι προσλαμβάνει ὥστε ἐπι-γινώσκον καὶ ἐφαρμόζον τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τύποις τοὺς νέους καὶ ἄρτι ἥκοντας (V 3,2,7-13). From these passages it emerges that the role of τὸ λογιστικόν and διάνοια is the same - to mediate between the world of sense and the world of Forms. Furthermore, in the same chapter in which P. has been speaking of τὸ λογιστικόν (V 3,2,7 τὸ δ' ἐν

αὐτῇ λογισμὸν) he sums up his argument by saying τοῦ-
 το τοῖνυν τὸ διανοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς . . . ὧν δέχεται
 τύπων σῶσειν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα ἴσχει (V 3,2,23-25). This is
 the same function which P. in the earlier part of the chapter has
 associated with τὸ λογιστικόν , and which, as we have seen,
 is elsewhere attributed to διάνοια . Thus it seems clear that
 λογισμός and διάνοια are synonymous. In V 3,3,20-21 where
 they are mentioned side by side, they are synonyms, not alter-
 natives. And both are the equivalent of the soul's intellect.

But we must also see whether the soul's intellect is the
 same as the undescending soul which never leaves the Intelligible
 World (IV 8,8,3 ἔστι τε αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ αἰεί). This
 view has been advanced by W. Himmerich, Eudaimonia, Die Lehre des
 Plotin von der Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen (Wurzburg, 1959),
 pp. 76 ff., but it cannot be adopted without qualification.

We are told quite clearly that there is no 'reasoning'
 (λογισμός) in the Intelligible World (VI 7,1,29; cf. V 8,6,7.
 7,43; VI 2,21,28), since if Intellect needed to reason its self-
 sufficiency would be impaired (IV 3,18,4; cf. V 8,6,7 - there is
 no δειξάντος there either). Reasoning is conceptually connected
 with time, since reasoning moves from one premise to another in
 order to reach its conclusion. III 7 is at pains to point out
 that time is created by soul's desire for self-expression (III 7,
 11,15 ff.); the realm of Intellect is the realm of eternity. If,
 then, the transcendent soul really remains in the Intelligible
 World, it can have no truck with reasoning. This conclusion is
 confirmed by II 9,2,10 ff. where P. is describing the undescending

soul - ἢ μὴ μέρος, μηδὲ ἥς ἡμεῖς εἴμι μέρος.

In II 9,2,13-15 he says μένει τε ἀπραγμόνως αὐτὴ
οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας διοικοῦσα οὐδέ τι διορθουμένη,
ἀλλὰ τῇ εἰς τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς θεῇ κατακοσμοῦσα δυνάμει θαυμαστῇ.

Similarly, the world soul administers 'without the reasoning which we need, but by means of "intellect"' (IV 8,8,15). Διάνοια or λογισμός (the soul's intellect) seems to be a faculty which is human; hence P.'s theory that it is at this level that our personality is found (I 1,7,16-17 ἐνθα δὲ ἡμεῖς μένομεθα). Furthermore, we have seen that it is the function of διάνοια to make a judgement (ἐπίκρισις), and presumably this judgement can be mistaken. P. describes such a mistake made by logos (here meaning 'reasoning') in VI 5,2,1 ff. (cf. also III 6,2,22 ff.). But the Intelligible World is not subject to error (I 1,9,13). From all these passages it seems that neither the undescending soul nor the world soul could have λογισμός or διάνοια (as we have so far defined them).

On the other hand, V 1,10 does identify soul's intellect and the transcendent soul. V 1,11 deals with Intellect the second hypostasis, the 'intellect' which P. has described in V 1,10,13 as the νοῦς ... λογίζεσθαι παρέχων (cf. V 1,11,3-4 ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς περὶ ψυχὴν γίνεται), while V 1,10 deals with what P. has called 'reasoning intellect' (νοῦς λογίζομενος), which I have said is the same as the soul's intellect. And this intellect is said to be ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ νοητῷ (V 1,10,17). In V 1,10, then, the reasoning intellect seems to be the same as the undescending soul. We have also seen from IV 8,8,15

that the world soul does not administer by reasoning but by 'intellect'. What sort of intellect is this? Not Intellect proper, since P. definitely says that although Intellect proper is ours (*ἡμῶν*) it should not be numbered among the parts of soul (V 3,3,25-29) and it appears that in IV 8,8,15 P. is speaking of a faculty of the world soul. Yet it cannot be the soul's intellect to which P. is referring, since this obviously involves reasoning. We are told in II 3,9,32 ff. that the world soul transcends body, i.e., the world soul is undescending; and this undescending soul works not with reasoning but with some sort of intellect. It is our aim to be united with the world soul and to join with it in its administration of the cosmos (IV 3,12,10-12) by governing according to this intellect. It seems, then, that the transcendent soul is neither Intellect proper, nor yet the reasoning with which we have been dealing, which judges and aligns the impressions which come both from the world of Forms and from the world of sensation. It remains, then, for the undescending soul to be something above reasoning and below Intellect proper.

P. does not make his position clear. I would tentatively suggest that the undescending soul is that part of *διάνοια* which deals with the higher world alone. In V 1,10,16 P. speaks of the pure reason of the higher soul (*εἶνα καὶ λογ-
ίζεσθαι καθαρῶς οἶόν τε ἦ*), and at the beginning of V 1,11 he describes this reasoning as being *περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν* ... *(ζητούντος εἰ τοῦτο δίκαιον καὶ εἰ τοῦτο καλόν)*. (On the detailed working of *διάνοια* see on 11,1-3.) Perhaps this activity is what P. describes in V 3,2,9 ff. as the overseeing

of the $\tau\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\alpha$ which come from Intellect. In V 3,3,11 ff. he calls that part of soul which receives the traces of Intellect the pure part of soul (see Wolters on III 5,2,23; $\kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ is often used as an alternative to $\chi\omega\rho\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$). Since this part of soul is so close to Intellect, he asks why we do not call it Intellect, and reserve the name 'soul' for the rest of the soul. The answer is $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\acute{\nu}\ \delta\epsilon\iota\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\mu\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$. One of the defining characteristics of soul (descended or undescending) is that it should be able to reason. Thus, even if soul is partly in the Intelligible World, it is there qua reasoning soul. In the Intelligible World soul has its power of reasoning as a $\delta\iota\alpha\theta\omega\iota\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\gamma\mu\alpha\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\omega\sigma\alpha\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \omicron\iota\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\mu\phi\alpha\sigma\iota\nu$ (IV 3,18,11-12). It may not have to use this faculty, and, indeed, P. probably did not consider the reasoning directed towards eternal objects as reasoning at all (cf. I 1,9,18 ff. where $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ makes a judgement of sense-impressions, but contemplates the Forms); but it nevertheless possesses it. In V 9,7,1 ff. P. seems to describe the same distinctions in terms of $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\alpha\iota$. In the reasoning soul are two sorts of 'knowledge', one concerned with sensible objects which might more correctly be termed opinions, and the other concerned with Intelligible objects which come from Intellect into the reasoning soul; these contain Intellect and its act within them (cf. IV 7,10,40-42).

Lastly, I am further led to think of the undescending soul as in some way a part of $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ because P. never admits to the existence of anything else in between $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ and Intellect. $\Delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ is the image of Intellect (see on 3,7); it is second

after Intellect (V 3,4,20).

But however P. envisaged the transcendent soul and however he conceived its relationship to the rest of soul, (particularly to the Hypostasis-Soul; see on 2,44) and to Intellect (on this see H. J. Blumenthal, Accad. Naz. dei Lincei, Probl. Attuali di Sc. e di Cultura, Quad. No. 198 (1974), pp. 203-219, who points out the difficulties and inconsistencies in P.'s attempts to demarcate between Intellect and soul), he was quite certain of its existence which guaranteed that a spiritual anabasis to Intellect and beyond was possible (see J. M. Rist, AJPh 88 (1967), 'Integration and the Undescended Soul in Plotinus', p. 417).

Note the difference between P.'s 'intellect' and that of Plato. For Plato 'intellect' was dependent upon the soul (see Ti. 30b 3 νοῦν δ' αὖ χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τῷ). Although 'intellect' was the 'helmsman' of soul (Phdr. 247c 7), it had no place outside soul. For Plotinus intellect in the soul is a mere reflection of the higher hypostasis.

3,13-14 καὶ ἡ τελείωσις . . . πάλιν : Ἄπ' αὐτοῦ refers to Intellect proper not to the soul's intellect which P. has just mentioned.

In the act of sight, the act itself is perfected by its object (III 8,11,6-7 ἡ πλήρως παρὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἡ οἶον τελείωσις). Similarly, the act of thought is completed by its object (V 4,2,4 ff.). This theory had special relevance for P. since the act of 'reversion' (ἐπιστροφή) was as important in his system as the procession from the One.

'Επιστροφή is one of the key words in P.'s philosophy.

On its history see P. Aubin, Le Problème de la 'Conversion' (Paris, 1963), pp. 161-179. Two stages of ἐπιστροφή or τελευσις may theoretically be distinguished. The first is that turning back of the undefined product of emanation towards its prior, by which the undefined product acquires definition and becomes a hypostasis (see V 4,2,3 ff.; and notes on 5,6-19 and 6,17-19), and the second is that act of contemplation which leads soul upwards through the spiritual hierarchy. Definition of the first sort is a continuous process (see on 6,41-43). When the soul 'turns back' in the second sense, however, it performs a voluntary act, and tunes in, as it were, to the continual process of definition with which it is involved. And because of the presence of Intellect and the One within it (see on 10,5-6) it can 'grasp' these higher hypostases; this 'turning-back' takes place through purification (see on 12,12-14) and our present treatise seeks to show the soul that such a turning-back is possible.

P. is not explicit about what sort of 'perfection' he refers to in our present passage; what is important for the aims of this Chapter is that he makes it clear that soul is dependent on Intellect both for its existence and for its characteristic activity. The Stoic theory that νοῦς is created by a perfect soul is condemned by P. in IV 7,8³,8 ff., and V 9,4,3 ff.. By turning towards Intellect, soul approaches the unity which everything multiple stands in need of (VI 9,6,19 ff.). For Plotinus there was a conceptual connection between perfection and unity (cf. R. Arnou, op. cit. in note on 3,9-10, p. 62). As soul

approaches the One, it becomes more of a unity and more perfect.

The One is *τελειότατος* (6,39; V 4,1,34; but note 4,13-14 where *τελειότατος* is predicated of Intellect). The One perfects Intellect (III 8,11,17), Intellect perfects soul, and soul in its turn perfects matter by the imprinting of its logos upon it (cf. III 4,1,14 ff.; VI 3,2,19. 4,30).

P. uses *πάλιν* in 3,13 because not only soul's perfection comes from Intellect, but its being as well (see on 3,15-16).

3,14-15 οἷον πατρὸς ... ἐγέννησεν : Cf. V 9,4,8-10 τὰ δὲ ἀτελῆ ἕστια ἀπ' ἐκείνων (sc. τῶν πρώτων), τελειοῦμενα δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν γεγεννηκότων δίκην πατέρων τελειούντων, ἃ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀτελῆ ἐγέννησάν. P. plays on the fact that one of the meanings of *τέλειος* is 'adult' (see LSJ s.v. *τέλειος* 2a in fine, and cf. 6,37-38 and 7,37); thus children are always *ἀτελεῖς* in relation to their parents. Galen (de Marcore, iii . 677(Kuhn)) defines τὸ τέλειον as ὃ μὴ μεμιά τῶν οἰκείων ἐνεργειῶν ἀπολείπεται. As P. explains in the following sentence, when soul is perfect all its potentialities are actualised by Intellect.

On Intellect as 'father' see on 1,1-2. Fic., perhaps reading ἧν for ὅν in 3,14, translates: 'hanc'.

3,15-16 ἧ' τε οὖν ὑπόστασις... ὁρῶμενον . P. sums up what he has been saying and explains it more fully. That soul's hypostasis comes from Intellect has been stated in 3,6 ff.; and the second half of the sentence explains the effect of *τελείωσις* upon the soul, and is amplified by 3,16-17. When the soul contemplates

Intellect, its logoi (which are a reflection of the logoi in Intellect - see on 3,8) become active. And since they are *γεννητικοί* (II 3,16,19-20) they engender, and the logos of soul penetrates the darkness of matter. All action (*πράξις*) was for P. a result of contemplation (III 8,1,14-15 *καὶ πράξις πάντα εἰς θεωρίαν τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχειν* (sc. *κινδυνεύει*); cf. III 8,6,1), although action points to a weakness in contemplation. P. explains soul's activity in III 8,6. The primary logoi are the logoi in Intellect, which are the Forms (cf. III 8,6,23 *οὐ γὰρ πρῶτως εἶχε* (sc. *τοὺς λόγους ἢ ψυχὴ*); see also on 3,8), and the true activity of Intellect is contemplative self-thought. Since soul only contains imperfect logoi, it cannot engage in Intellect's activity. Consequently, it is forced to express what it contains through creative activity, just as the spoken word expresses the unspoken word. Soul's logos becomes active through contemplation, but because soul is different from Intellect the results of its contemplation are different.

For other references to soul's activity as the result of contemplation see II 9,2,15. 4,8 ff.; II 5,3,1 ff. - the birth of Eros.

Fic. and Ci. give unconvincing translations of the second part of this passage.

3,17 *ἐνδοθεὶς ἔχει ... ἐνεργεῖ* : The perfect form of contemplation is the contemplation of Intellect where there is complete unity of the subject and object of thought. Soul can only imitate this kind of contemplation because of the difference of its

contents. There is some unity of subject and object in its contemplation (III 8,8,4-6 *πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἰόντων τῶν ἐγνωσμένων, ὅτε εἰς νοῦν σπενδόντων*), but the objects of thought can only remain *οἰκία* for soul qua soul. As the contemplation becomes more intense as Intellect is approached, the *θεωρία* become even more *οἰκία* (III 8,8,3-4 *καὶ αὖ οἰκειότητων τῶν θεωριῶν γιγνομένων καὶ ἔνοουμένων τοῖς θεωροῦσι*). In the case of Intellect, however, the word *οἰκίος* is inappropriate (III 8,8,6-8). Soul must become Intellect if it is to enjoy Intellect's contemplation (VI 6,8,8 *νοῦν νῷ θεωρητῆον* ; VI 7,35,4 *οἶον νοωθεύσα*). When subject and object of contemplation are fully united, what results is a 'living contemplation' (III 8,8,11 *θεωρία ζῶσα*), and this is the very expression of the life of Intellect. (The One, of course, is above contemplation because contemplation involves the exercise of intellection (*νόησις*) which requires an object for its fulfilment; and fulfilment implies need, and therefore imperfection. The One is *τελειώτατος* .)

Br. is wrong to take *ἐνεργεῖν* intransitively. With *ἐνεργεῖν* c. acc. cf. 12,11; IV 8,1,4.

3,18-19 *ὅσα νοερῶς καὶ ὅσα οἰκοθεῖν* : Following Arist. de An. 403a 3 ff., P. explains in I 1,9,15 ff. that the activities which are particular to soul are those which do not require the cooperation of the body for their exercise (cf. also Pl. Phd. 83a 1 ff.). These are the operations of the higher soul which are akin to those of Intellect. Presumably, P. would class under this head only

the working of that part of the reasoning soul which deals with the *τύποι* from the Forms. The 'sense-impressions which come upon the living being', which P. calls *νοητά* in I 1,7,10-12 are in the final analysis dependent on *αἰσθησις* which needs the cooperation of the body.

- 3,19-20 *τὰ δὲ χεῖρω... τῆς τοιαύτης* : In de An. 403a 2 ff., which P. seems to have in mind here, Aristotle includes *νοεῖν* (and *αἰσθάνεσθαι*) among the *πάθη* of soul. P., however, restricts *πάθη* to those activities for which the body is essential. The *πάθη* of soul have no effect on *διάνοια* (cf. IV 4,18,9 ff.).
Τῆς τοιαύτης means *τῆς χείρονος*. Br. omits the words from his translation.

- 3,20 *ἐπὶ μᾶλλον θεοτέραν ποιεῖ* : For other examples of *μᾶλλον* with the comparative see Ha. ad loc. and cf. Bonitz, Index, 402b 53-59; 444b 59-60. For *ἐπὶ μᾶλλον* see Ha. ad loc..

The higher soul is called *θεοτέρα* again at IV 3,27,2. Intellect is both the efficient (*πατήρ*) and the formal (*πᾶντι*) cause of this 'divinity'.

- 3,21-22 *οὐδὲν γὰρ μεταξὺ ἢ τὸ ἐτέριον εἶναι* : Cf. II 9,1,32-33. It is most important that there should be nothing in between Intellect and soul, since, if there were, soul would be derived not from Intellect but from the intermediary. And there would be no possibility of *ἐπιστροφή* (cf. II 9,1,57 ff.; if there were a (Gnostic) logos between Intellect and soul *ἀποστρεφόμεν* τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ νοεῖν... καὶ ὅπως οὐκ εἰδήσει νοῦν οὐδέ ὅπως νοήσει ; cf. also 6,48-49 *ὅρα* (sc. *ὁ νοῦς*)

αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν ἓνα) οὐ χωρισθεὶς, [ἀλλ] ὅτι μετ' αὐτὸν
καὶ μεταξὺ οὐκ ἐν, ὡς οὐκ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ νοῦ ;

compare also the use of ἐξαρτᾶσθαι and ἀναρτᾶσθαι to
describe the relationship of the hypostases to each other in
IV 3,11,16; VI 7,42,21 ff.; and VI 8,18,20).

On τὸ ἑτέροις εἶναι see on 3,3-4 and 2,6. In the
anabasis this difference disappears (cf. IV 4,2,27-29; VI 7,34,
13-14).

3,22-23 ὡς ἐπεξήης... ὡς εἶδος : P. explains what he means by
'different'. Soul is different for two reasons (which Br. conflates)
- (a) because it is next in order to Intellect (ἐπεξήης) (cf.
V 3,4,20 δεύτερον μετὰ νοῦν) and (b) because its relation-
ship to Intellect is that of matter to form. The relationship is
described in similar terms in 7,38-42 (see note ad loc.) and in
the early treatise V 9. It is one way of looking at the process
by which every hypostasis (and matter as well) is perfected and
defined by what comes immediately above it in the Intelligible
hierarchy. Just as matter loses its formlessness when the logos
from soul perfects it so Intellect and soul lose their formlessness
when defined by their priors. In V 9,3,20 ff. Intellect is said
to be the form of soul in two senses - (a) in the sense that the
shape of the bronze statue is its form, and (b) in the sense that
soul's form actually comes from Intellect just as the statue's
shape is 'given' to it by the sculptor. Intellect both provides
and is the form of soul. The fact that this is so explains why
soul is 'intellectual' and why its characteristic activities are

intellectual. By Intellect, soul is led εἰς εἶδος βέλτιον (II 4,3,5 cf. also V 9,3,33).

A similar distinction between matter and form in the soul is made by Aristotle in de An. 430a 10 ff., where he distinguishes ἡλή from τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, which he then identifies with νοῦς χωριστός.

Ki., in a misguided attempt to make P. sound like Demosthenes, quite unjustifiably reads τὸ μὲν ὡς δεχόμενον, τὸ δὲ ὡς εἶδος.

3,23 κατὰ δὲ ἡ νοῦ ἡλή... ἀπλή : Cf. II 4,3,1 ff. - not everything which is undetermined should be avoided as evil. The undefined emanation from Intellect which becomes soul is beautiful because it is like Intellect. The Intelligible Matter, which is the substrate of the Forms in the Intelligible World has a ζῶν ἡρισμένην καὶ νοεράν (II 4,5,16). (On Intelligible Matter see in general II 4,2-5, and in its numerical guise as the Indefinite Dyad see on 5,6-19.) Presumably, the undefined emanation only remains 'simple' until it is defined. A fortiori, if Intellect is σάνθετος and πολὺς (cf. on 5,1), so is soul.

According to H-S t.III p. 419 νοουδής is a new coinage of P.'s. It is used againⁱⁿ V 3,8,48.

3,24-25 οἶον δὲ... οὐσίης : These lines connect Chap. 3 with the next chapter. Br. puts a comma after ἀπλή a stop after νοῦς, and adopts Ki.'s δὴ for the mss. δέ. He translates: 'Étant la matière de l'Intelligence, elle est belle, intelligente et simple comme l'Intelligence même.' This is very

weak. His text implies that Intellect is itself νοουδης and simple. The first implication is tautologous (cf. Ha. ad loc.), and the second false (see on 5,1). It is better to take the phrase οἶον ... δ νοῦς as an indirect question introduced by δηλον , and to put a stop after ἀπλῆ .

The mss. are unanimous in reading δέ against Ki.'s δη' , (3,24). An adversative particle is necessary here since P. is moving his attention from the soul and its relationship to Intellect back to Intellect alone. This change of attention is marked by the use of δέ . (Δή is printed by Ki., Mū., Vo. and Br..)

The mss. ταῦτῳ is altered by Ki. to αὐτῳ , and he is followed by the same editors. But ταῦτῳ...τούτῳ which is picked up by the following phrase ὅτι κρείττον ψυχῆς τοιαῦδε οὕσης , has a further reference back to the beginning of the chapter, where the idea with which P. concludes the chapter is first found; cf. 3,6 καίπερ γὰρ οἷσα χεῖμα οἶον εἰδείξεν δ λόγος, εἰκὼν τίς ἐστὶ νοῦ . P. is resuming what he has already said. Mū. and Vitringa place a colon after δηλον and insert δέ after ὅτι ; but this alteration obscures the reference of ταῦτῳ...τούτῳ .

The further change of κρείττον to κρείττων by all editors except Ha. and H-S is quite unnecessary; see Schwyzer, RhM 86 (1937), p. 368,n. 19. He mentions P.'s 'Vorliebe für das Neutrum dort, wo er eine Eigenschaft ins Allgemeine heben möchte.' He compares IV 7,10,16 and IV 3,11,3.

Τοιαῦδε οὕσης means 'as we have described it'.

CHAPTER FOUR

P. suggests another way of realising the excellence of Intellect. Since on Platonic principles (Pl. Ti. 37c 6 ff.; *ibid.* 92c 7; note also VI 7,12, 1-2 ἐπὶ γὰρ φαμεν πρὸς οὗτον παράδειγμα ἑκείνου τόδε τὸ πᾶν εἶναι where φαμεν probably means, as often 'we Platonists' - see further II 9,4,6; VI 3,6,8; VI 7,25,27) the sensible and Intelligible Worlds are related as image to archetype, and since on Neoplatonic principles the product is always less than the producer (see on 2,7 and note III 3,3,31 ff. where the principle is applied to the relationship between the two worlds), an understanding of the sensible world will lead to an understanding of the supra-sensible beauty of its archetype, especially as the product imitates the producer as far as it can (cf. IV 8,6,28; V 8,12,15). P. traces his own form of argument by comparison back to Plato's Timaeus. In his commentary on Pl. Ti. 37c 6 ff. in V 8,8,7 ff., he says that when he makes the demiurge approve of his creation Plato means to show the beauty of the sensible world's Intelligible archetype πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κατ'ἀλλο ποιηθὲν ὅταν τις θαυμάσῃ ἐν' ἑκείνῳ ἔχει τὸ θαῦμα, καθ'ὃ ἔστι πεποιημένον V 8,8,11-13. This is true even if the man who wonders is not aware of the real object of his wonder.

In the present chapter, P. discusses the contents and perfection of Intellect (4,1-25) and then its internal life and its relationship to its contents (4,26-43).

4,1 ἴδου δ' ἂν τις... πῶνδε : The deletion of δέ proposed by Vitringa and accepted by Mii. is only necessary if Mii.'s text and punctuation are adopted. He attaches ἴδου ... ἐκ πῶνδε , to the final phrase of Chapter 3 ὅτι ... τοιαῦτα οὕτως , which he separates from what precedes by putting a stop after δὴλον and inserting δέ

before *κρείττον* in 3,24. This seems to me quite wrong.

In Chapter 3 P. has not only described the nature of Intellect but also its excellence in relation to the soul; the first part of Chapter 4 reaches the same conclusions by different arguments. That Intellect is *κρείττον* than soul (3,24) is, therefore, not a new point, as M^U. 's punctuation and text suggest.

4,2 *εἰς τε ... καὶ τὸ κάλλος* : Size and beauty are naturally associated (cf. *Od.* 18.219; *Pl. Alc.* 1 123e 4; id. *Criti.* 115d 2; *Arist. Rh.* 1361a 7; cf. *VI* 6,1,23. 7,11-12).

Μέγεθος means 'spatially extended magnitude' (cf. *VI* 2, 13,11 ff. where *μέγεθος* is expanded by *τὸ συνεχὲς μέγεθος* (*VI* 2,13,13-14)); hence, *μέγεθος* is composite (*σύνθετον* *VI* 2,13,11). The size of the physical world is denigrated in *VI* 6, 1,23 ff., and is associated with ugliness (*VI* 6,1,28-29). In the Intelligible World, however, of which the *μέγεθος* of the sensible world is a mere reflection, *μέγεθος* is not quantitative or ugly at all. It is a *μέγεθος* of power. Nothing can surpass or even equal the *δύναμις* of the Intelligible World (*II* 9,17, 9-10; *VI* 7,32,19-20).

P. is passionately convinced that the close relationship between the Intelligible World and the sensible world is the guarantee that the latter is the most beautiful world possible. If the Intelligible World were not *τὸ ὑπέροκτον*, what could be more beautiful than the sensible world, he asks in *V* 8,8,21-22 (cf. *III* 2,12,3-4). His defence of the physical world is mainly concentrated in the anti-Gnostic treatises, especially in *II* 9 where he attacks the Gnostics precisely for their denigration of

the visible universe (II 9,4,26. 8,18 ff.). Following Plato (e.g. Pl. Ti. 29a 2 ff.) he believes in a *καλὸς κόσμος* which is nevertheless only an image or shadow of the Intelligible Universe and Intelligible Beauty (III 8,11,29-30). But the sensible world is beautiful because of its relationship to its archetype; appreciation of sensible beauty can therefore lead to an appreciation of Intelligible Beauty.

- 4,2-3 *τὴν τάξιν... τῆς αἰδίου* : On the movement and order of the heavens see II 2, and notes on 2,23 and 2,24. Note that heavenly movement is only an imitation of the movement of Intellect.
- 4,3-5 *καὶ θεοὺς... φυτὰ τε πάντα* : For the contents of the physical universe see II 9,9,29 ff. and especially the speech of the cosmos at III 2,3,23-25 *πάντα ἐν ἑμοὶ καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα καὶ συμπάντων τῶν γεννητῶν φύσις καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ δαιμόνων δῆμοι καὶ ψυχαὶ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀρίστη εὐδαίμονες*. In our present passage, man is perhaps included in the class of *ζῶον*. P. does not mention souls because he wants to emphasise the divine and non-terrestrial nature of soul (he includes soul in Intellect in 4,11; but see note ad loc.). Soul is present in the world as an outsider (cf. 1,2 and note).
- 4,3-4 *καὶ θεοὺς... ἀφανεῖς ὄντας* : P. makes a similar distinction among the gods of the physical world at V 8,2,12-13. The visible gods are the star gods identified with the 'visible gods' of Pl. Ti. 40d 4 (cf. Pl. Epin. 984d 5-6 *θεοὺς δὲ δὴ τοὺς ὁρατοὺς... τοὺς πρῶτους τὴν τῶν ἀστέρων φύσιν λεκτέον*; cf. 2,3-4 and note). The visible gods are ontologically

related to the Intelligible Gods which are the Forms (see III 5,6,21-24 καὶ αὖ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τοὺς μέχρι σελήνης θεοὺς τοὺς ὁρατοὺς θεοὺς δευτέρους μετ' ἐκείνων καὶ κατ' ἐκείνων τοὺς νοητοὺς, ἐξηγημένους ἐκείνων, ὥσπερ αἴγλην περὶ ἕκαστον ἄστρον . In II 9,9,30 the hierarchy is more fully explained - good men, good spirits, the visible gods, the world soul, the Intelligible Gods and the King of the Intelligible World.

Since the world is full to bursting with ζῶα and ἀθάνατα (II 9,8,29-30), there must be gods which we cannot see - presumably star gods which are too far removed from us to be visible.

4,5

καὶ δαίμονας : A belief in the existence of spirits was part and parcel of the Platonic tradition. Plato defines τὸ δαιμόνιον in Smp. 202d 13 ff. as μεταξὺ ... θεῶν τε καὶ θνητόν ... ἐρμηνεύον καὶ διαπορθρεύον θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν ... ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ δίδωθαι . Plato's theory was not rooted in Greek popular belief (Wilamowitz, Der Glaube der Hellenen I (Berlin, 1931), p. 367) but had a very great influence on later philosophers, especially on the Neoplatonists with their numerous intermediaries between the parts of the Intelligible and physical worlds (cf. Sallustius xiii, p. 26.9-12 (Nock)). In P.'s system they play only a minor role. They exist only in the sublunary world (cf. Xenocrates fr. 15 p. 165.4 (Heinze); III 5,6,19-20) and they are distinguished from the gods by the fact that they are subject to πάθη (III 5,6,9 ff.; IV 4,43,12-13). P. defines them as the trace of every soul which has entered the world (ψυχῆς ἐν

κόσμου γενομένης τὸ ἀπ' ἐκάστης ἰχνοῦ III 5,6,24-25).

They exist at an intermediate level between corporeality and incorporeality, because although not members of the Intelligible World they share in Intelligible Matter. (Note Armstrong's justifiable surprise at this statement in his note on III 5,6, 46 in the Loeb edition). P. is trying to explain Plato's μεταξὺ... θροῶν τε καὶ θνήσκον by this strange theory. It is generally the case that P.'s concern with spirits only emerges when he is dealing with particular Platonic problems. Most of our information about them comes from III 5,6, where he is explaining the significance of the Eros myth from Plato's Symposium, and from III 4 where he discusses the Platonic theory of guardian spirits (cf. Pl. Ti. 90a 3-4; id. Phd. 107d 5 ff.). P.'s demonology is only incidental to his metaphysics. It is a feedback from the Platonic tradition in which he was immersed. (For more detailed information on the spirits see Wolters' notes on III 5,6 passim.)

4,5-6 τὸ ἀρχέτυπον αὐτοῦ : Ἀρχέτυπον is the converse of εἰκὼν (on which see on 3,7), and like εἰκὼν or εἰδωλον has a wide sphere of application. Each of the hypostases is related to each of the others as εἰκὼν to ἀρχέτυπον (cf. 6,33-34). In the sense that the Intelligible World is the archetype of the physical world (III 2,1,24-25), the ἀρχέτυπον is the equivalent of the παράδειγμα of Plato's Timaeus (cf. Ti. 29b 1 ff.; ibid. 48e 5).

4,6

τὸ ἀληθινώτερον : Truth is conceptually linked with knowledge. Like Plato, P. believed that the Intelligible World was the seat of true knowledge; its truth and its reliability separated it off from the changing world of sense-perception. But in P.'s system, the demand that truth be found in Intellect is also a demand of internal consistency. If Intellect thinks itself and is its own object, if it contains everything, and if each part of Intellect embraces the whole, then Intellect is the paradigm of self-consistency; there is no room for falsehood since it is a self-contained whole, both metaphysically and epistemologically. But metaphysics and epistemology merge, since the activity which constitutes the essence of Intellect is thought. As P. says in V 5,1,65-67, if truth were not to be found in Intellect, Intellect would not exist, since its presuppositions would be meaningless. On any correspondence theory of truth, where the subject and object of thought are identical, anything thought must be true, since there is no possibility of the correspondence breaking down. See V 5,2,18-20 ὥστε καὶ ἡ ὄντως ἀλήθεια οὐ συμφωνοῦσα ἀλλή ἀλλ' ἑαυτῇ, καὶ οὐδὲν παρ' αὐτήν, ἀλλ' ὃ λέγει, καὶ ἔστι, καὶ ὃ ἔστι, τοῦτο καὶ λέγει ; cf. also V 3,5,21 ff. and III 7,4,11 with Beierwaltes' good note ad loc.). Thus, νοῦς , τὸ ὄν and ἀλήθεια are synonymous (V 5,3,1-2). Intellect and Being signify the subject and object of thought, truth the relationship between them. These distinctions, however are merely conceptual. Intellect is a 'one-many'.

4,6 ἀναβάς : See on 3,3.

4,7 καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ αἰδία : Αὐτῷ or αὐτῶν ? Enneadic mss. read αὐτῷ without the subscript, those of Eusebius (who quotes the passage in PG 21.889a) αὐτῶν . The editors are equally divided between αὐτῷ and αὐτῶν . Ki., Mū., Vo., Ha. and MK prefer αὐτῶν (or αὐτῶν) while Perna, Creuzer, Br., Ci. and H-S prefer αὐτῷ . Either reading is doctrinally possible; but it seems to me that αὐτῶν is better from the point of view of the nuances of the text. If we read αὐτῷ , the first καί in 4,7 must emphasise παρ' αὐτῷ . The sense would then be that when the νοητά are with Intellect (παρ' αὐτῷ) they are eternal. This implies that if they had been anywhere else, they would not have been eternal, which is nonsense. That the νοητά are intrinsically eternal is more to the point (cf. IV 7,9,1 ἡ δὲ ὑπέρα φύσιν, ἡ παρ' αὐτῆς ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι ; IV 7,9,13-14).

4,7 αἰδία ... καὶ ζῶη : We find here the division of primary Being into being (αἰδία), thought (σῶνσις) and life (ζῶη) which became standard in later Neoplatonism (see e.g., Procl. El. Theol. 101-102). On this topic see P. Hadot, 'Être, Vie, Pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin', Entr. pp. 107-141. The order we have here is repeated at VI 6,8,17-18, an exegesis of Pl. Ti. 39e 7-8. As Dodds pointed out in his note on Proclus (loc. cit.), this distinction is ultimately derived from Pl. Sph. 248e 6 ff. where movement, life, soul and intelligence (φρόνησις) are ascribed to τὸ παντελὲς ὄν . For P. these three components, as it were, of Intellect are identical and not in

any way causally linked, though P. has some difficulty, it seems to me, in maintaining this (see V 2,1,11-13; V 9,8,11 ff.; and note on 4,27-28). The being of Intellect is its life (cf. Arist. Metaph. 1072b 26-27), and its life is identical with its thought.

P. was no doubt further influenced by what he read in the Timaeus where the *παράδειγμα* is described as a living being (Ti. 37d 1; ibid. 39e 1 ff.); a living being is naturally associated with life and thought (cf. of the sensible universe Ti. 30b 6 ff.). As for its eternity, the 'eternal gods' of Ti. 37c 6 were interpreted by P. as the Forms rather than as star gods; in II 9,8, 15-16 the Timaeus passage is quoted with *νοητοί* substituted for *αἰθεριοί* (cf. I 8,7,15-16).

That real Being, i.e., the Forms, is eternal is a commonplace in Plato (see, e.g., Pl. Ti. 27d 6 ff.) although Plato's concept was almost certainly that of a durational eternity and not of a non-durational eternity like that of P. (see J. Whittaker, 'The Eternity of the Platonic Forms', Phronesis 13 (1968), pp. 131-144).

On the history of *σύνεσις* and related words, and their use by P., see Sch^witzer, 'Bewusst und Unbewusst bei Plotin', Entr. pp. 374-378. *Σύνεσις* is twice used by P. alongside *συναίσθησις* (III 8,4,19; V 8,11,23). And the *συναίσθησις* of Intellect seems indistinguishable from its characteristic activity of self-thought (V 8,11,21-24 *εἰ οὖν ὁραοῖς τοῦ ἐξῆς, ὁραοῖς μὲν οὐ δεῖ εἶναι ἢ οὕτως, ὡς ταῦτόν τῳ ὁρατῷ. τοῦτο δὲ οἶον σύνεσις καὶ συναίσθησις αὐτοῦ*). *Σύνεσις* in our

present passage means this characteristic activity. It is *οἰκία* because it involves the perfect identity of subject and object of thought, which the contemplation of soul can only imitate (see on 3,17).

The belief that the Intelligible World was alive can be traced back to Plato's Sophist and Timaeus (loc. cit.) and to Arist. Metaph. 1072b 26-27. P. characteristically develops what he found in Plato and Aristotle. His world is boiling with life (VI 5,12,9; VI 7,12,23); every Form has a life of its own (VI 7,11,48 of the Form of fire; VI 7,12,20 of the Form of water). There is nothing in Intellect which is not alive (VI 7,13,15). Unlike the life of the physical universe, however, the life of the Intelligible World is stationary (III 2,4,12-13; VI 7,12, 10-11). If there was no life there, there would be no activity, and since the activity of Intellect is self-constituting, there would be no Intellect.

4,8 τὸν ἀκήρατον νοῦν προστάτην ; Plato speaks of the purity of Intellect in his etymological remarks about Cronus in Cra. 396b 6-7 (see on 4,9-10). This etymology is used again by P. at III 5,2,19 ff. where the world soul is said to be ἀκήρατος and sprung from an ἀκήρατος νοῦς . With Intellect as προστάτης cf. Pl. Phdr. 241a 2-4 τότε δὲ δέον ἐκτείνεν, μεταβατὴν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ προστάτην, νοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἀντ' ἐρωτος καὶ μανίας . Note the mixture of Platonic reminiscences. The notion of the purity of Intellect, however, can be traced back ultimately to Anaxagoras

(DK B.12). With Intellect presiding over the Intelligible World cf. I 6,5,16-17.

- 4,8-9 καὶ σοφίαν ἀμήχανον : In his note on III 5,7,24 Wolters remarks that P. uses the word ἀμήχανος eleven times. In five of these cases he is quoting the Platonic phrase ἀμήχανον κάλλος (R. 509a 6; Smp. 218e 2). The phrase σοφία ἀμήχανος occurs twice, here and at II 9,8,14-15, where the life of the sensible world is described as showing the infinite wisdom of its organisation, hence of Intellect. It is tempting to think that we might be dealing with another Platonic quotation. But the phrase only occurs once in Plato, at Euthydemus 275c 7, where Socrates is sarcastically describing the achievements of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ ἔργον δύνασθαι ἀναλαβεῖν διεξίοντα σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὅσῃν . It is unlikely that our present reference can be traced back to that passage.

Σοφία is the life of Intellect, that perfect state of knowledge which is characterised by the truth of the Intelligible World. It is actually identified with Intellect at V 8,5,15 ff. (cf. Pl. Phlb. 30c 6).

- 4,9-10 καὶ τὸν . . . νοῦν ὄντος : In Op. 111 ff. Hesiod describes the reign of Cronus as the golden age of mankind. The phrase ἐπὶ κρόνου or ὁ ἐπὶ κρόνου βίος soon became proverbial like its Latin equivalent 'Saturnia regna' (cf. Arist. Ath. Pl. 16.7; Pl. Hipparch. 229b 7; Plu. Arist. 24.3; id. Cim. 10.7; and see Pohlenz, RE xi.2006.63 ff.). P. uses here the

proverbial phrase but adds to it the etymological definition of Cronus which is found in Pl. Cra. 396b 6-7, where Plato derives Cronus from *κόρος* and *νοῦς*.

Κόρος is a polyvalent word. Plato specifically rejects the meaning 'child' (LSJ s.v. B) and interprets the word as an adjective from *κορεῖν* = to sweep, defining it as *τὸ καθαρόν ... καὶ ἀκέραιον τοῦ νοῦ*. As we have seen, P. seems to accept this interpretation in 4,8. But here *κόρος* has another and more usual meaning, that of 'satiety' (LSJ s.v. A), although Fic. mistranslates the word by 'prorsus immaculatus'. P. goes on to explain the fulness of Intellect by saying that it contains all Intelligible Reality within it (note the explanatory *γὰρ* in 4,10). And he bolsters this interpretation later in the treatise (7,33 ff.) where the myth from Hesiod's Theogony (Th. 453 ff.) of Cronus devouring his children is used as an illustration of Cronus' fulness. This interpretation of *κόρος* is not mentioned by Plato, who must be assumed therefore to reject it, but it was widely used by the Stoics (see Cic. ND 2.25.64). P. uses *κόρος* to mean 'satiety' or 'fulness' in all its other occurrences in the Enneads (III 5,9, 18 *νοῦς ... ἑαυτὸν ἔχων ἐν κόρῳ*; III 8,11,39-41 (sc. *νοῦν*) *κόρον καλὸν καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ* (sc. *τοῦ ἐνός*) *γινώμενον κόρον*; V 8,13,4 *κόρον ἔχοντι καλῶν*; V 9,8,8 *ἔχων ἑαυτὸν ... κόρος ἂν*; VI 7,35,26 *ἀπλωθεὶς εἰς ἐμπόθειαν τῷ κόρῳ*).

The etymology of Cronus as *κόρος* and *νοῦς* was only one of several (cf. Pohlenz, op. cit. 1986.49 ff.). Pohlenz is, however, misleading, since he does not distinguish between the

different meanings of *κόρος* or *κορός*, as the adjective is accented; he should have at least eight subheadings rather than six). No doubt it was accepted that Platonists would accept the derivation of the word from Cratylus. But not all followed P.'s interpretation of *κόρος* as satiety. Proclus, for example, in In Cra. 56.24 ff. (Pasquali) specifically rejects this interpretation as *ὑβριστική*, and adheres to the strictly Platonic interpretation of *τὸ κόρον* as 'purity' (cf. also his scholion on Hes. Op. 111). Note how P. shows his independence of the conventional Platonic interpretation. He accepts that *κόρος* = *καθαρός* in 4,8, but is not afraid of also adopting a Stoic interpretation which Plato implicitly rejects.

On P.'s use of myth and allegory, see J. Pépin, Mythe et Allégorie (Paris, 1958), pp. 190 ff.. Pépin points out (pp. 203 ff.) that P.'s favourite allegory is that involving the triad Cronus, Uranus and Zeus to represent the hypostases. One or all of them are mentioned in 7,33-36; III 5,2,19 ff.; IV 4,10,1 ff.; V 5,3,21; V 8,12,3 ff..13,1-2 where *θεός* = Cronus and *παῖς* = Zeus, besides in our present passage. Usually Uranus refers to the One, Cronus to Intellect and Zeus to the soul (cf. Pl. Phlb. 30d 1 ff. and IV 4,9,1 ff.). In IV 4,10,1 ff., however, P. admits that the name Zeus may be applied to the demiurge of the Timaeus whom he elsewhere identifies with Intellect (see introduction to Chapter 2).

4,10-11 πάντα γὰρ ... περιέχει : Compare Pl. Ti. 30c 7-d1
 τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ὥς πάντα (sc. τὸ ὅ ἐστιν ὥς) ἐν
 ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὼν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὅς ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς

ὅσα τε ἄλλα θείματα συνέστηκεν ὁρατά ; ibid.

31a 4-5 τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα ὅποσα νοητὰ ζῶα μεθ' ἑτέρου (sc. οὐρανοῦ) δεύτερον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη ;

cf. also 4,6-7 πάντα ... νοητά . P. often refers to

the all-embracing nature of Intellect in Platonic language - with

περιέχειν or ἔχειν at V 8,10,19-20 (soul at the level of

Intellect); V 9,6,1-2. 6,9-10; VI 6,7,2. 7,15-19; VI 7,8,27-29.

17,27-29; VI 9,5,15; and with περιλαμβάνειν at 8,21;

III 8,11,28-29; V 9,14,1; VI 6,7,2. It is unlikely that Plato

meant by τὸ παντελὲς ζῶον or τὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ζῶον the

whole Intelligible World, i.e. the world of Forms. He thought of

it rather as the Form of the living being (and, therefore, pre-

sumably quite low in the hierarchy of Forms). Note how in Ti. 39e

10 ff. he explains the contents of τὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ζῶον as

the four sorts of living being (each one corresponding to one of

Empedocles' four elements). But the fact that the physical world

was a living being (see on 2,24) and the fact that sensible

reality was often contrasted with the unchanging world of Forms,

soon effected the identification of the νοητὸν ζῶον of the

Timaeus with the Intelligible World.

Following, then, his own interpretation of Plato, P. main-

tained that his κόσμος νοητός / παντελὲς ζῶον contained

all Intelligible Reality within it. There were several reasons

why this should be so. First, if the sensible world contains

all sensible reality, then the Intelligible World, by analogy,

must contain all Intelligible Reality. Secondly, if Intellect is

defined as τὰ ὄντα, everything which exists must exist in Intellect; if it did not contain everything, what it did not contain would exist independently of it. Thus there would be another ground of existence apart from Intellect and this to P. is impossible. Thirdly, since Intellect is the home of truth and true knowledge (σοφία; see on 4,6 and 4,8-9), all the objects of knowledge, i.e., the Forms, must be found there (V 5,2,4 ff.). Intellect is a παντελής ὥον, perfect not in Plato's sense of being the archetypal ὥον (though it is this too), but perfect in the sense of being complete.

4,11 νοῶν πάντα... πᾶσαν : P. explains what he means by πάντα τὰ ἀθάνατα. Νοῶν πάντα : 'omnem intellectum' Fic.; 'toute intelligence' Br.; 'ogni spirito' Ci.; 'den ganzen Geist' Ha.; 'nothing here but is divine mind' MK. MK can hardly be right; the progression νοῶν πάντα, θεὸν πάντα, ψυχὴν πᾶσαν is spoiled if the first two occurrences of πάντα are neuter plural (πᾶσαν can agree with nothing but ψυχὴν). Νοῶν πάντα probably means 'every Intellect' (Fic.) rather than 'the whole of Intellect' (Ha.), since although it is true that the whole of Intellect is contained in the Intelligible World, it is difficult to make sense of θεὸν πάντα, where πάντα presumably means the same as it does in νοῶν πάντα. Ha. translates θεὸν πάντα as 'die ganze Gottheit'. The use of θεός as a collective noun is not common. There is one parallel in P. at V 5,3,2-3, but in that passage P.'s language is purposefully striking as he calls Intellect not a god but πᾶς θεός. No such striking language is apparent here. Furthermore, the use of πάντα... τὰ ἀθάνατα

('all the immortals' 4,10) suggests that θεὸν πάντα should mean 'every god'.

There is, in fact, a difference between every Intellect and the whole of Intellect. The whole of Intellect contains every particular Intellect in a γένος / εἶδος relationship (IV 8, 3,6 ff.; V 9,6,9 ff.) and the whole according to P. is distinct from the sum of the parts (VI 7,8,28-29). But on the other hand, since Intellect is identical with itself, each of its parts is the whole. The individual Intellects are the individual Forms (see on 4,26-27).

Θεὸν πάντα : Intellect contains 'all the Intelligible Gods' (7,30), so presumably P. does not mean us to understand under θεὸν πάντα those gods who he said in 4,3 were members of the sensible world. These visible gods are only secondary (III 5,6,22).

Ψυχὴν πᾶσαν : On an analogy with νοῦν πάντα and θεὸν πάντα, ψυχὴν πᾶσαν ought to mean 'every soul' (Fic. and Br.) rather than 'the whole of soul' (Ci. and Ha.); MK ('this is the place of soul') is imprecise. This presents some difficulty. P. distinguishes (e.g. in IV 8,8,2-3) between the undescending soul which never leaves the Intelligible World and the soul which descends into bodies. To say that every soul is in Intellect seems to contradict this theory, unless ψυχή in 4,11 is taken to refer to the undescending soul - and it is not clear from the context that this is the case. In III 3,5,17-18 P. says that in the Intelligible World one can find Intellect and pure soul (ψυχὴ καθαρὰ), which implies that there are some souls, e.g., impure souls, which are not to be found there (cf. II 5,3,32-33 where P. distinguishes

between soul 'in matter' and soul $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\hat{\omega}$).

On the other hand, P. does maintain that the Hypostasis-Soul, like the whole of Intellect distinct from its particular parts, is in the Noetic World (cf. III 9,3,1 ff. where individual souls are said to move up and down between Intelligible and sensible reality, while the Hypostasis-Soul stays where it is). P. seems to mean this Soul when he talks of $\acute{\eta}\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ($\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ quite frequently refers to a hypostasis - see on 3,9-10); $\acute{\eta}\ \dots\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\hat{\omega}$ (VI 3,1,23-24) although it is $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\chi\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\hat{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\hat{\omega}$ (IV 6,3,5-6; cf. IV 4,2,16-18; V 1,10,12). But if $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\hat{\nu}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\iota$ means the Hypostasis-Soul, then the parallelism demands that $\nu\omicron\hat{\omega}\nu\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ and $\theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ be translated as 'the whole of Intellect' and 'the whole of god', and I have said above why I think that this is impossible. (Furthermore, P. always seems to put the adjective $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$ or $\acute{\omicron}\lambda\eta$ before the noun when he wants to refer to the Hypostasis-Soul; cf. III 9,3,1; III 2,4,10-11; VI 4,4,4. 14,6-7.) $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta\hat{\nu}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\iota$, then, must be translated 'every soul'.

The difficulty already mentioned about the inclusion of every soul in Intellect is resolved if we realise that what P. means is that every soul ought to be included in Intellect (cf. IV 8,7,2 $\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\iota\upsilon\omicron\nu\ \mu\acute{\iota}\nu\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\hat{\nu}\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\hat{\omega}\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$) and is there in so far as it chooses to remain there. Its nature is such, however, that it gives itself to sensible reality, since it has a middle rank ($\mu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\eta\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \omicron\lambda\acute{\omicron}\sigma\iota$ IV 8,7,5) as interpreter between the two worlds (see introduction to Chap. 2). Thus, soul is a member of the Intellectual World but has the power to leave

that world behind; in fact, souls do leave Intellect, although theoretically they still belong to it. Soul is a resident alien in the sensible world (VI 3,1,28); even when in that world they may be said to be in the other world too. The task of our present treatise is to remind souls of their true home.

4,11-12 ἑστῶτα αἰΐ : Compare 4,21-22 ἔχει οὖν... πάντα ἑστῶτα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ . The opposite of τὸ ἐστάναι is not so much κίνησις as μεταβολή (4,12). Κίνησις (and στάσις) are integral aspects of the life of Intellect (see notes on 4,33 ff. and 4,34-47), but this life or activity remains the same (II 9,1,29-30 ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἔστι νοῦς αἰὲν ὡσαύτως ἐνεργείᾳ κείμενος ἑστῶση). The stationary life of Intellect, a life which is internally dynamic, distinguishes Intellect from the sensible world (V 6,6,15-16; cf. also III 2,1,35-36 and III 7,3,34-36).

4,12 τί γὰρ ἵηται... εἰ ἔχων : Two ideas are superimposed here. The first is the contrast between the permanence of Intellect and the flux of the sensible world (for change as a mark of the latter see Arist. Metaph. 1069b 3 ἡ δ' αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή and II 4,6,3; VI 1,28,7: this Heraclitean notion is common in Plato - see on 1,19-20). Thus Intellect is μεταβολῆς κατ' οὐσίαν ἀρνούμενον οὔτε γινόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον (IV 7,9,15-16; see also the refs. in the previous note). The second idea is that Intellect is internally self-sufficient. It is perfect (4,13-14) and change would imply imperfection. This perfection means that it does not move outside itself in its act of thinking since it is identical with its object of thought (cf. Arist. Metaph. 1074b 25-27; IV 4,2,

20-22 ἡ οὐδὲ μεταβολὴν λεκτέον γίνεσθαι, ὅταν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ' ἑαυτόν, καὶ ὅταν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα). Soul is only ἀμετάβλητος when it reaches the level of Intellect (IV 4,2,24-25). Of course, these two ideas are closely aligned, since the unchanging activity of Intellect, which constitutes its essence and separates it from the sensible world, is an activity of unchanging self-thought.

Note the play on ^δῆλον in 4,12 and 4,13. P. returns to the subject of Intellect's happiness in 4,16-17.

4,12 ποῦ δὲ μεταθεῖν : Vo. and Br. read ποῦ ; but see RE 516.17: 'statt ποῦ steht regelmässig ποῦ (wie allgemein hellenistisch)'. Schwyzer quotes V 2,2,12; V 3,10,19; V 5,10,20.

The point of the question is that since Intellect is reality, there is nothing outside of it into which it could change.

4,13-14 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὐξάνειν ... ὧν ; All the editors up to H-S, except for Perma and Ci., prefer Cyril's αὐξήν (PG 76.929c). It is not so much the difficulty of the infinitive after ἔργου (as Henry, Etats, p. 130 seems to think) which has brought about the change, but the fact that αὐξάνειν in its other occurrences in P. is transitive (see e.g., II 1,3,4; IV 7,5,7 ff.; VI 1,20,20-21) whereas in our present passage it must be intransitive. Αὐξάνειν however, can be used intransitively in the active (LSJ s.v. III). In view of the strong mss. support for the infinitive, I would be inclined to keep it and to pardon P.'s inconsistency.

Aristotle (Ph. 226a 31) defines αὐξήσις as κίνησις εἰς τὸ τέλειον μέγεθος . P.'s τελειότατος suggests

that he may have had Aristotle's definition in mind (though see below). His language implies that if Intellect was to be subject to any change, αὐξήσις would have been the most likely. But Intellect has no perfection to aim at since it is already perfect.

The next lines (4,14-25) explain and amplify the perfection of Intellect (4,17-21 are a digression on the relationship of time to eternity). For other references to the perfection of Intellect see 7,37; V 6,6,17-18; VI 7,8,26-27. It is slightly surprising to find Intellect called 'most perfect' here, since the One is called 'most perfect' at V 4,1,24 and VI 8,20,12 ff.. That which is most perfect is most self-sufficient and only the One is completely self-sufficient. Intellect needs itself as an object of thought (V 3,13,16 ff.) and to this extent lacks perfect self-sufficiency. But perhaps P. was thinking of the παράδειγμα of Plato's Timaeus which is called κατὰ πάντα τέλει in Ti. 30d 2 (cf. τελειώτατος of its copy in Ti. 92c 8).

4,14-16 διὸ καὶ ... ὃ μὴ νοεῖ : The sequence of thought is that since Intellect is most perfect, all its contents separately, as well as Intellect as a whole, should be perfect. The complete perfection of Intellect is then further explained by two clauses, which to a large extent repeat what P. has already said:

- (i) Intellect contains nothing which is not perfect (οὐδὲν ἔχων ὃ τι μὴ τοιοῦτον)
- (ii) οὐδὲν ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὃ μὴ νοεῖ .

The problem is (a) whether (ii) should be taken as an explanation of (i), illustrating how the individual contents of Intellect are perfect, or (b) whether (ii) should be a separate

reason for the perfection of Intellect as a whole. In the first case (a), the subject of the second relative clause will be δ' and the clause will be translated: 'Intellect contains nothing within it which does not think', i.e., everything in Intellect is perfect because it is alive with thought. This view is taken by MK: 'holding nothing that is less than intellectual', and by Br. 'il n'a en lui rien qui ne pense.' But if (b) is right, then the subject of the relative clause must be Intellect, and the point then is that Intellect is perfect because none of its objects of thought is external to it. This view is taken by Ha. who translates: 'er nichts in sich hat was er nicht denkt', although he remarks in his note that one would have expected $\delta\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu\ \nu\omicron\omega\iota\ \delta'\ \mu\eta\ \epsilon\chi\epsilon\ \epsilon\nu\ \epsilon\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\omicron}$. The translations of Fic. and Ci. are as ambiguous as the Greek.

Although both (a) and (b) are doctrinally sound (for the contents of Intellect as living and intelligent beings see 4,6-7 and V 5,2,11-12, and for Intellect containing (in thought) nothing but its objects V 6,1,8-11), it seems to me that (b) must be the correct interpretation, if for no other reason, than because one would expect the subject of $\nu\omicron\omega\iota^1$ to be the same as the subject of $\nu\omicron\omega\iota^2$ in 4,16 ($\nu\omicron\omega\iota\ \dots\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda'\ \epsilon\chi\omega\nu$). The subject of $\nu\omicron\omega\iota^2$ can be nothing but Intellect.

The insertion of $\delta\epsilon'$ after $\delta\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu^2$ in 4,15 seems to rest on the mistaken assumption of Vo. (Praef. II.xxx) that $\delta\epsilon'$ is found in the text of Cyril (see Henry, Etats, p. 130). Vo.'s addition is printed by Br..

4,16 νοεῖ δὲ ... ἔχων : See Arist. Metaph. 1072b 22-23

τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ
δὲ ἔχων . Ross, in his note ad loc., correctly points out

that Aristotle is explaining how potential intellect becomes
actualised. This happens when it possesses its objects of

contemplation. Ἐχων in Aristotle has a temporal sense;

it is the equivalent of ὅτε ἔχει (sc. τὰ νοητὰ). P.'s

interpretation of this passage is not Aristotle's (or Ross's).

The distinction between actual and potential intellect does not

interest him here; consequently, ἔχων loses its temporal over-

tones. The point P. is making is that the activity of Intellect

is internal and not external. The phrase οὐ ζητῶν ἀλλ'

ἔχων explains how Intellect thinks - by turning within

itself; the difference between ζητεῖν and ἔχειν is the

difference between Intellect and λογισμός or διάνοια (cf.

IV 4,12,9-10 ζητεῖ γὰρ μαθεῖν ὁ λογιστικός ὅτι οὐ ἤδη

ἔχων φρόνιμος ; for φρόνησις as a characteristic of Intellect

see on 2,24). Λογισμός deals with objects outside itself; its

knowledge is obtained by a search. In Intellect, however, the

subject and object of thought are the same. Διάνοια knows that

there is something more valuable than itself which does not search

but possesses (V 3,4,14 ff.). (For further references to ἔχειν

used in connection with Intellect's thought see IV 4,16,26; V 3,10,

9-10. 16,25; V 5,2,10; V 6,1,10-11; V 9,7,9-10; VI 6,7,8-9).

Λογισμός deals with premises and conclusions (see on 3,13) whereas

Intellect deals with its unchanging self. It is the aim of the soul

to join it in its self-contemplation (V 8,10,35 ff.). The One

transcends both the searching of λογισμός and the possession of Intellect (V 2,1,7-9).

4,16-17 καὶ τὸ μακάριον... ἐπὶ κτήτων : On the use of εὐδαιμόνων in Plato and Aristotle to characterise the life of the higher realities see Beierwaltes' on III 7,4,33 ff.. He points out the connection of the word with self-sufficiency. Εὐδαιμόνων is used synonymously with μακάριος (Pl. R. 354a1; Arist. EN 1101a 7 with Gauthier-Jolif's note). P. frequently uses the word to describe the members of the Intelligible World (II 9,9,32; III 2,1,40 ff.; III 7,4,33 ff.; III 8,11,30-31; IV 7,9,13; V 5,2,12). In our present passage, its use picks up εὖ ἔχων from 4,12. If happiness was extraneous to Intellect, this fact would mark a deficiency in it, and Intellect has already been described as 'most perfect' (cf. I 4,3,24 ff.).

4,17 ἅλα' ἐν αἰῶνι πάντα : The sequence of thought is that Intellect has nothing, not even happiness, which is imposed upon it from outside, but is (contains) everything eternally. The eternal life of Intellect is a new point which is developed in the next three lines which constitute something of a digression. The words νοῦς ἔστι must be supplied with ἐν αἰῶνι πάντα and with ὁ ὧντως αἰών . Br., Ci. and Ha. give faultless translations. With the phrase νοῦς ἔστι πάντα compare 4,21 where ἔστι must be supplied and I 8,2,15-16; III 7,4,14; V 9,9,15-16.

- 4,17-18 καὶ ὁ ὄντως αἰὼν : For the identification of Intellect and eternity see III 7,4,1-2 οὐκ ἔβωθεν δὲ δεῖ συμβεβηκίαι νομίσαι τοῦτο (sc. τὸν αἰῶνα) ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει (sc. τῷ νῷ), ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης καὶ σὺν ἐκείνῃ with Beierwaltes' notes. No strict identity is intended; such an identity is specifically denied in III 7,2,2 ff.. Rather, eternity is another name for the life of Intellect (III 7,3,36-38). As in III 7,4,1-2, the sort of identity which P. is trying to describe (οὐκ ἔβωθεν... ἐξ ἐκείνης... σὺν ἐκείνῃ) is clear from the context (cf. ἐν αἰῶνι πάντα ; and cf. further III 7,11,59 ff.). If Intellect existed in time it would lack self-sufficiency in so far as future time would exist independently of it (III 7,4,15 ff.).
- 4,18 ὃν μεμῆται χρόνος : Compare III 7,11,20 and V 8,12,17. The expression is Platonic (Pl. Ti. 37d 5-7). On P.'s development of Plato's theory and its use by the rest of the Platonist tradition see Beierwaltes' note on III 7,11,20.
- 4,18 περιθῶν ψυχὴν : Περιθῶν means 'to encircle'. In all of P.'s other uses of the word, with the exception of V 5,1,45 where the word is used very loosely while P. pours scorn on the notion that the Forms might be found outside Intellect, the thing encircled is of a higher ontological value than the encircling subject. Thus, in 6,29 sunlight is said to encircle its source, and the image is used as an illustration of the dependence of the lower hypostases upon their prior; in II 2,2,13-14 the soul encircles god (= Intellect); in VI 4,2,34-36 the sensible universe is described as being content to encircle the Intelligible Universe; in VI 7,

42,6-9 the lower levels of Intelligible Beings are said to encircle those at a higher level; in VI 8,18,25 ff. Intellect is said to encircle the One; and in VI 9,3,52-53 P. speaks of us encircling the One. Most significant for our present passage is VI 5,11,14 ff. where P. is discussing the relationship between time and eternity; he illustrates it by comparing it to the relationship of radii to the centre of a circle: the radii are attached to the centre (ἀνηλετημένης) and encircle it (περι αὐτὸ θωήσης) (VI 5,11,19). It is odd, then, to find time in our present passage described as encircling soul, since time and soul are not related as higher to lower hypostasis. Time bears the same relation to soul as eternity does to Intellect. It is the life of soul (III 7,11,45 ff.); it is περι ψυχῆν (meaning 'conceptually related to soul' (see on 4,19)) in IV 4,15,2; and its substance is closely established with soul (III 7,11,59-62). In view of these passages, it seems to me that the ontological relationship between time and soul is wrongly described by the phrase περιθίων ψυχῆν . (I assume that in compound words the preposition could not have its intensive meaning of 'conceptually related to' (see on 4,19)); as far as I can see, περιθεῖν just means 'to encircle'.)

I would suggest, then, that the text is corrupt and that the correct reading is παραθίων ψυχῆν . P. uses this word (παραθεῖν) of time in III 7,9,55 ff. where he criticises Aristotle's theory that time is the measure of movement. In a series of questions and answers he suggests that Aristotle means that time is the number which runs alongside movement and measures it by the

sequence of 'before' and 'after' (*ὅς κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τῆς κινήσεως παραθεῖν ἐμέτησεν*). Although P. uses the word absolutely in this passage, it is used with the accusative in other authors (see LSJ s.v. I). P. also uses *παραθεῖν* in VI 6,3,25, but there *παραθείουσι* means 'pass by' rather than 'run alongside of'. In III 7,9,19-23 P. uses *συνθεῖν* as a synonym for *παραθεῖν* ; and in VI 7,13,31-33 substances (= the Forms) are said to 'run with Intellect's wanderings' (*συνθεωώσων τῶν ὁμοιωμάτων ταῖς αὐτοῦ πλάναις*). Intellect and the Forms are ontologically coordinate just as time and the soul are.

Thus, there would be nothing unusual in P.'s using *συνθεῖν* or *παραθεῖν* of time and soul; and *παραθεῖν ψυχὴν* gives a much better description of their relationship than the mss.

περιθεῖν ψυχὴν . It is not to be denied that the movement of time is circular in imitation of the movement of Intellect. But it is a movement around eternity as a centre, not around soul (see Beierwaltes on III 7,11,20, in the last paragraph of his note). Time may be said to run alongside of soul, but hardly to move around it.

4,18-19 *τὰ μὲν ... ἐπιβάλλων* : Time lets some things go (the past), and moves on to new things (the future). With *ἐπιβάλλων* compare III 7,12,13-14; P. is talking of soul in the realm of eternity - *ποῦ δ' ἂν ἔτι ψυχὴ ἐπιβάλλοι εἰς ἄλλο ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι*. Ha. translates the last phrase of our present passage: 'und das andere auf sich zukommen lässt'. This is wrong; the point is not that time waits for the future, but that it creates it by its

movement from one thing to another. His mistranslation is surprising, since in his note he gives a correct interpretation: 'sich einem neuen zuwenden'.

4,19 καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα ... ψυχῆν : P. explains 4,18-19 by 4,19-20.

On the idiom ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος ('now one, now another') see Wolters on III 5,7,33, and his comprehensive list of examples.

The idiom is sometimes used to contrast the discursive thought of soul with the quiet and non-discursive thought of Intellect (III 8,8,9-10; IV 3,25,19; IV 4,17,4; V 3,17,23-24). This is not the point here. P. is contrasting the 'division' of soul which necessarily takes place when soul descends into spatially separate body (cf. II 4,3,9-10) and the eternal presence of everything as a unified whole in Intellect. (On the 'division' of soul see on 2,36-37.) Soul is individuated in body (cf. IV 4,16,1 τὸδε μετὰ τὸδε), although in fact it is the same soul in which all individuals participate.

On the meaning of περί in περί ψυχῆν see Beierwaltes on III 7,2,2-3 and Wolters on III 5,7,52. In this intensive sense, περί means 'conceptually related to'; it sometimes even approaches the meaning 'con-substantial with'. See Beierwaltes (loc. cit.): 'περί anzeigt, dass etwas eigentlich in einem Anderen, nicht äusserlich an oder um in unwesentlicher Beziehung auf etwas hin ist'. Fic.'s 'circa animam' and Ci.'s 'vorticano sull'Anima' miss this point. A succession of individuals is conceptually related to soul in so far as it is soul's function to undergo division (ἔχει δὲ φύσιν μερίζεσθαι IV 1,8-9).

4,20 ποτε γὰρ ... τῶν ὄντων : Μέν , the reading of the single ms. B, is printed by Creuzer in place of γὰρ . But besides being the reading of the majority of the mss., γὰρ is necessary to provide the connection with 4,19.

Socrates is one of Aristotle's stock examples of ἀνθρώπος τις (see Bonitz, Index, 741b 45 ff.). P. uses 'Socrates' in this way here and in II 5,2,17; III 2,15,59; IV 3,5,3-4; IV 4,2,3; V 3,3,5; V 7,1 passim; V 9,12,3; VI 1,13,15-16; VI 2,1,24; VI 3,4,14. 5,13-22. 6,18-22. 7,10. 9,27-30. 15,31-34. Similarly, ἄνθρωπος is a common Aristotelian word for ζῷον τι (although this is not noticed by Bonitz) - see Cat. 1b 4; ibid. 1b 28; ibid. 2a 13-14; ibid. 2b 25; id. Int. 18a 19; ibid. 18a 22; id. Ph. 185a 24; id. Metaph. 1088a 9. ἄνθρωπος is found in this sense in later authors; see e.g., S.E. M. 10.263; Theo Sm. 19.18-20 (Hiller); Albimus IV 5, p. 15 (Louis). P. again uses the word in this way at e.g., II 3,12,3; III 1,6,2; III 6,16,6; VI 6,9,15; VI 7,7,2 ff.; VI 7,8,1 ff..

τῶν ὄντων : see Wolters' note on III 5,9,22. Ταὶ ὄντα can mean all reality including sensible reality (as here); it can mean the Forms only; or it can mean everything belonging to the Intelligible World including soul.

4,21-22 ἔχει οὖν ... ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ : The οὖν is resumptive after the digression of 4,17-21.

The mss. text reads ἔχει οὖν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πάντα ἕστῳτα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. The repetition of ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ is difficult and suggests a mistake in the archetype. Ki., Mü., Vo., Br. and

Ci. delete the $\tau\hat{\omega}$ and read $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\hat{\omega}$ (or $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\hat{\omega}$).

H-S follow Ha. in deleting the first occurrence of the phrase as an example of dittography.

It seems to me, however, that the second $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\hat{\omega}$ is also difficult. Although the phrase $\acute{\mu}\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\hat{\omega}$ is quite common (III 7,3,16. 3,20-21. 11,52; VI 5,11,16. 11,22) possibly because of its similarity to Pl. Ti. 42e 5-6 $\acute{\mu}\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\upsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\upsilon$ (sc. τοῦ δημιουργοῦ) $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\hat{\omega}\ \eta\theta\epsilon\iota$, I can find no example of $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota$ followed by $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\hat{\omega}$. On the other hand in VI 6,18,36 the sentence $\acute{\epsilon}\omega\tau\eta\kappa\epsilon\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \alpha\acute{\iota}\omega\upsilon\iota\ \tau\grave{\alpha}\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha$ occurs. I would suggest that $\alpha\acute{\iota}\omega\upsilon\iota$ is the correct reading in 4,22; from the palaeographical point of view, $\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\hat{\omega}\iota$ and $\alpha\acute{\iota}\omega\upsilon\iota$ are close.

If $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \alpha\acute{\iota}\omega\upsilon\iota$ is the correct reading in 4,22, then the corruption in 4,21 is easily explained. I prefer Ki.'s $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\hat{\omega}$, presumably changed to $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\hat{\omega}$ by dittography of the corrupt $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\hat{\omega}$ in 4,22. The text should be $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\ \acute{\omicron}\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\hat{\omega}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \alpha\acute{\iota}\omega\upsilon\iota$. This picks up the argument of 4,17, and is further explained by what follows.

4,22-25 $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\upsilon\omicron\ \dots\ \tau\grave{\alpha}\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha$: The explanation of eternity as the eternal present is Platonic (see Pl. Ti. 37e 5-38a 2 $\acute{\lambda}\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\mu\epsilon\upsilon\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \acute{\omega}\varsigma\ \eta\acute{\nu}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\upsilon\ \tau\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$, τῇ δὲ (sc. τῇ αἰδίῳ οὐσίᾳ) τὸ $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\upsilon$ μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει, τὸ δ' $\eta\acute{\nu}$ τό τ' $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γένεσιν ἰοῦσαν πρέπει $\acute{\lambda}\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\theta\alpha\iota$. P.'s language here, as H-S note, reflects Plato's (cf. also III 7,3,20 ff., esp. 3,20-23

and 3,34-36. P. derives αἰών from αἰὲν ὧν in III 7,4,42-43, but advises against subsequent misinterpretation in III 7,6,32 ff.). If it were possible for there to be a past or a future in Intellect, this would mean that the being of Intellect was not intrinsic (σύμφυτον) to it (III 7,4,22-24). Therefore, the eternal present which the contents of Intellect enjoy is yet another sign of its perfection.

In 4,23 οὐδαμοῦ means 'non-existent' (cf. Pl. Phd. 70a 2). In the same line, Mü. arbitrarily deletes ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τότε . This aside, however, parallels the aside in 4,24 (οὐ γὰρ τι ἐκὼ παρελήλυθεν) and is found in all the mss..

In 4,24 ἐνέστηκεν means 'are present' as Ha. notes (see LSJ s.v. B III.2 and cf. IV 3,13,7. 13,27). Ci., Ha.¹ and MK. miss this point. The subject of the verb is presumably πάντα supplied from 4,21.

Since the contents of Intellect are the same - P. explains in the next sentence that each of them is Intellect and Being - there is no room for change, since time is necessary for change. But in Intellect there is no time, only an eternal present. The sameness of Intellect's contents does not prevent there being qualitative differences between the Forms (see 4,39 and V 9,6,3. 6,7 ff.).

4,25 οἶον... οὕτως ἔχοντα : For ἀγαπᾶν with the participle see LSJ s.v. III 2. Ἀγαπᾶν picks up the idea of μακάριον in 4,16-17.

1. In his translation.

4,26-27 $\epsilon\acute{\kappa}\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu\ \delta\epsilon\ \dots\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \acute{\omicron}\nu$: The identification of Intellect and Being is a new point introduced to explain Intellect's sameness. P. develops the point in the rest of the chapter, explaining its internal life and the relationship between Intellect and its objects by means of the Platonic genera.

P. traces back the identification of Intellect and Being to Parmenides DK B.3 ($\tau\acute{o}\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\ \nu\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}\ \acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\ \tau\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$) which he quotes in 8,17; I 4,10,6; III 8,8,8; V 9,5,29-30 (see on 8,15-18). $\text{No}\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ ($\nu\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}$) and $\acute{\omicron}\nu$ ($\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$, $\tau\acute{o}\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\acute{o}\nu$) are identified implicitly or explicitly in III 5,7,50-51; V 3,5,26 ff.; V 4,2,43-44; V 5,3,1; V 6,6,21-22; V 9,5,13; VI 7,41,12. In our present passage each Intellect is described as Being, and the whole of Intellect as the whole of Being. Compare V 9,8,2-4 $\theta\acute{\upsilon}\ \acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \nu\omicron\acute{\upsilon}\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\eta\ \acute{\iota}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\alpha$, $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda'\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\eta\ \nu\omicron\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$. $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\omicron}\lambda\omicron\varsigma\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \acute{\omicron}\ \nu\omicron\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma\ \tau\grave{\alpha}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$, $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu\ \delta\epsilon\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma\ \nu\omicron\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$.

The relationship between the individual Intellects and the whole of Intellect is explained most vividly in V 9,6,10 ff. where he compares Intellect to a seed and the individual Intellects to the creative powers ($\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\iota$) contained within it (cf. III 6,1,10-11; III 2,2,18 ff.; III 7,11,23 with Beierwaltes' note). In the seed the powers are undistinguished ($\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\omicron\gamma\eta\tau\alpha$); yet each power has its own responsibility, one for the growth of the hand, another for the growth of the foot etc. so that each power is distinct. In V 9,8, 5 ff. he compares Intellect to a science ($\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\acute{\mu}\eta$) and the individual Intellects to the theorems which constitute it. Each theorem can be made explicit by thought, but remains implicit in the science as a whole (cf. VI 2.20,1 ff. and IV 9,5,7 ff. for a

similar relationship between souls). Both these comparisons ultimately fail, because P. wants to hold the paradoxical position that although the individual Intellects are distinct, each is at the same time identical with the whole of Intellect. Such paradox is the price of philosophical synthesis. If the Intelligible World is to be the Platonic archetype of the sensible world, it must be the source of its variety; hence, each Form must be different. But if, on the other hand, the Intelligible World and Aristotelian *voûs* are co-extensive, then no part of that *voûs* can differ from any other part or from the whole, since *voûs* is a self-thinking unity.

4,27-28 ὁ μὲν νοῦς ... καὶ τὸ εἶναι : P. tries to explain the relationship between Intellect and Being by means of the dualism required by the act of thought; Intellect is the subject of thought and Being its object. He gives the impression in these lines, esp. in 4,27 (ὁ μὲν νοῦς κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν ὑφ' ὧς τὸ ὄν) that Intellect by its thought is responsible for the creation of Being (cf. VI 7,40,10-12 ἡ δὲ ... νόσις ... ὑποστήσασα τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἀφ' οὗ ἐγένετο; VI 7,41,18-19 καὶ νῦν (sc. ἡ νόσις καλὸν) ὅτι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ ταῦτόν, καὶ ἡ νόσις πεποίηκεν αὐτόν). Yet in V 9,8,8 ff. he expressly rejects this interpretation and states that Being is conceptually prior to Intellect (τὸ ὄν τοῦ νοῦ προπρινούειν ἀνάγκη). Note also V 2,1,11 ff. where he says that the στάσις of the One's undefined product near the One creates Being, whilst the act of

looking towards the One creates Intellect. Since, then, P. continues, the One's undefined product stood near the One so that it could see it, Intellect and Being exist together (ὁμοῦ). But this conclusion does not follow from the argument, since the standing which creates Being is prior to the seeing; until the standing had taken place there was no possibility of seeing (cf. further VI 6,8,17 ff.). P.'s anxiety to uphold the primacy of Being is perhaps due to his wish to follow Aristotle in the latter's remarks about the priority of the category of οὐσία (Arist. Metaph. 1028a 32-33).

Properly speaking, of course, P. ought not to make any distinctions at all between Intellect and Being, since Intellect thinks itself. He does say in V 9,8,19 ff. that conceptual distinctions of this sort are due to human shortcomings. No doubt he would explain his own contradictory remarks in this light. Properly speaking, no factor of the relationship could exist independently; Intellect could not exist if there were no objects of thought (4,28) and the objects of thought could not exist if there was no Intellect to think them.

4,29 τοῦ δὲ νοῦν . . . τῷ ὄντι : Compare I 6,7,11-12 (ὥς
γὰρ αἰτίος καὶ νοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι (sc. τὸ ἀγαθόν)).

The point is that although in one sense the existence of the objects of thought gives Intellect its being (4,28), in another sense the source of Intellect and Being is the One, from which both derive (see 5,3-4; 5,17-18 and notes).

4,30-31 ἅμα μὲν γὰρ... ἀλλήλα The καὶ before συνυπάρχει

is probably explanatory and introduces the explanation of the way in which Intellect and Being are together (ἅμα). Along with MK, I take there to be three clauses in these lines, and would supply ἵστί with ἅμα ... ἑκείνα .

The phrase οὐκ ἀπολείπει ἀλλήλα is Platonic (Pl. Phdr. 245c 7-8) and points to the eternal coexistence of Intellect and Being (see 2,9 where the phrase is used of soul).

4,33-34 ὁ μὲν νοῦς... νοούμενον ; A repetition of 4,27-28.

4,33 ff. The Platonic Genera. Before discussing the genera or categories individually, it is worth making some general remarks about the role of the categories in P.'s philosophy. He deals with the Intelligible Categories most fully in VI 2, and this treatise is admirably discussed by G. Nebel, Plotins Kategorien der Intelligiblen Welt (Tübingen, 1929). See also O. Hoppe, Die Gene in Plotins Enn. VI 2 (Diss. Göttingen, 1965).

It is well known that P.'s list of categories, with the exception of quality and quantity in 4,42 (see note ad loc.), come from Plato's Sophist 245b 8 ff. (cf. also Pl. Prm. 145e 7 ff.). First, it should be noticed that in the Sophist Plato is not attempting a systematic explanation of the structure of the Intelligible World of Forms (Nebel, op. cit., p. 9); he shows that he does not intend his list to be exhaustive by saying that he is dealing with only some of the so called μέγιστα γένη (τῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων ἅρτα Pl. Sph. 254c 3-4). Later interpreters of Plato seem to have ignored this (e.g., Plu. de E ap. Delph.

391b; id. de Def. Orac. 428c). Secondly, the μέγιστα γίνη
are all Forms with a great capacity for mutual participation
(κοινωνία). It is because of this capacity that the Forms
which Plato mentions are called μέγιστα.

Like any other Platonist of his time, P. accepted Plato's
genera as part of his philosophical heritage. He could not ignore
them or fail to defend them against what he thought were rival
systems (Aristotelian and Stoic categories). He had to try to
align his own views with Plato's (τὰ δοκοῦντα ἡμῖν περὶ μέγιστον
εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνάγκην δοῦναι VI 2,1,4-5). But Plato's
categories emphasise the divisions within the world of Forms rather
than its unity. Plato's Intelligible World is a collection of
self-contained Forms each with a different capacity for participation.
It is what P. might have called a composite unity (σύνθετον εἶναι).
But P. carefully maintains that not even soul and a fortiori not
Intellect is a composite unity (VI 2,4,31). Thus, P. could not
allow Plato's genera to enjoy the same self-sufficiency which they
had in Plato's system, since the unity of the Intelligible World
was as important, if not more important, than the plurality which
the life of Intellect necessarily demanded. His solution was to
make the genera aspects of the life of Intellect which we separate
out because of our inability to grasp its unity (ἡμᾶς τε οἷον
μοίρας αὐτοῦ προφέροντας ταύτας ἐν ἑκάστῳ τίθεσθαι
καὶ γένος λέγειν ἀγνοοῦντας ὅτι μὴ ὅλον ἅμα εἶδμεν
VI 2,3,26-28; cf. P. Hadot, Entr. p. 111: 'les genres de l'être
du Sophiste ... apparaissent comme les différents aspects sous
lesquels notre intelligence morcelante saisit la vie unique de

l'intelligence'; he adduces VI 2,7,1-8. 7,48). For Plato each $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ was a $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ (VI 2,3,27); but it is doubtful whether for P. each of the primary genera was even a Form.

Being, for example, is certainly not a Form as it was for Plato; it is identical with Intellect, not one of the many Forms which constitute Intelligible Reality. Movement and rest, like sameness and otherness are both aspects of the act of thinking which is itself the activity of Intellect. The Platonic genera, once fitted into the schema of the Aristotelian self-thinking mind, are not Forms in the sense that they are included among Intellect's objects; they rather illuminate the way in which Intellect engages in its activity. They describe $\nu\acute{o}\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ not $\tau\acute{o}\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\acute{o}\nu$.

As Nebel remarks (op. cit. p. 44), the categories were not of primary importance for P. Outside of VI 1-3, P. mentions them in our present passage; II 6,1,1 ff.; III 7,3,7 ff.; V 3,10,21 ff.; V 3,15,39 ff.; V 9,10,10 ff.; VI 6,9,3 ff.; VI 7,8,25 ff.; VI 7,13,4 ff.; VI 9,3,41 ff. (see Hoppe, op. cit. pp. 12-40). However, he does not always give complete lists and sometimes joins Aristotelian and Platonic terms without distinction.

4,34 $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\tau\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \mu\eta\ \dots\ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\tau\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}$: Note the emphasis which P. places on the concepts of otherness and sameness. He devotes only two lines to movement and rest and at least five to otherness and sameness. This is because otherness and sameness explain further the identity and at the same time the difference between Intellect and Being, the subject and the object of thought, with which P. has been concerned since 4,26. Movement and rest are variants

for them (Hoppe, op. cit. p. 21). In Plato it is movement and rest which appear first, both in Sph. 254d 4 ff. and in Prm. 145e 7 ff.. Otherness and sameness are then derived from Being, movement and rest. P. follows Plato's order and method more closely in VI 2,7-8 where otherness and sameness are derived from the conceptual distinctions between movement and rest. The Platonic order is followed also in II 6,1,1-3; III 7,3,9-11; VI 6,9,3 ff.; cf. VI 7,13,4 ff..

Otherness here is the principle of distinction which separates Intellect from its object (4,37-38 $\text{ἵν' ᾗ νοῶν καὶ νοούμενον}$), while sameness ensures that Intellect and its object are at the same time one. Without otherness there would be no thought, since there would be no object of thought (V 3,10,23-25; VI 7,13,11-12). The unity of Intellect demands sameness, its activity otherness (VI 2,15,14-15 $\text{εἰ δὲ πολλά, καὶ ἑτερότης, καὶ εἰ ἐν πολλά, καὶ ταυτότης}$).

On otherness see also J. M. Rist, Le Néoplatonisme, pp. 77-87 and note on 1,4.

4,34-37 γίνεται οὖν τὰ πρῶτα ... τὸ αὐτό ; Τὰ πρῶτα here means 'the primary genera' and not as in 1,24 'Intellect and the Forms': cf. VI 2,9,1. Note that in 4,35 P. adds Intellect to the Platonic list.

Whereas otherness makes thought possible by providing it with an object, movement describes or rather is the activity of thought itself. Otherness wakes Being into life (VI 7,13,11-12) and movement is the life which results (VI 2,7,35-36 ζῶη τις αὐτοῦ

καὶ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι).

But since Intellect thinks itself, this movement is always directed to the same object which is stationary. Thus, the στάσις of τὸ ὄν complements the κίνησις of νοῦς .

On εἶνα τὸ αὐτό in 4,37 see Wolters on III 5,1,58.

He compares the phrase with the elliptical εἶνα τί ; and cites as other examples II 1,8,16; III 8,6,7; VI 7,3,14-15.

4,38-39 ἐν γνώμενον ... σιωπῆσεται : Otherness is responsible for the activity of Being (see preceding note); with no activity, only silence results.

4,39-40 δεῖ δὲ καὶ ... ἄλληλα εἶναι : The καὶ shows that this is a new point. Not only must there be otherness within Intellect as a whole, there must also be otherness within its objects. In this way, the Intelligible World can be a true archetype for the variety of the sensible world. Compare V 3,10,26-29 καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἕκαστον τῶν νοουμένων συνεκφέρει τὴν ταυτότητα ταύτης καὶ τὴν ἑτερότητα. ἢ τί νοήσῃ, ὃ μὴ ἔχει ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο; V 3,10,39-41 δεῖ τοίνυν τὸ νοοῦν ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον κατανοούμενον ὃν ποικίλον εἶναι .

Otherness creates Intelligible Matter (II 4,5,28-29) which then receives different shapes according to the differences between the Forms (II 4,4,4 ff.).

Fic. inserts τοῖς νοοῦσι after δεῖ in 4,39 ('quae intelligunt') and is followed by the corrector of R., who changed his text in accordance with Fic.'s translation (see Henry, Manu-
scripts, p. 127). Fic.'s insertion cannot be right; not only does

it repeat what 4,37-38 imply, but the parallel sentence which follows in 4,40 shows that τοῖς νοούσιν is wrong. Just as there is otherness in Intellect as a whole and in its objects so there is unity in the two 'parts' of Intellect.

Vitringa's conjecture ἐτερότητα for ἑτέροις in 4,39, adopted by Vo. and Br., avoids the construction of δεῖ with the dative. On this, see W. S. Barrett's note on Euripides' Hippolytus 940. Although rare, the construction is used in classical Greek. It is paralleled in P. at IV 7,8,34 σωφρονεῖν δεῖ τί δεῖ πνεύματι ;.

4,40 ταῦτόν δέ ... ἐν πᾶσι : There are two levels of otherness within Intellect (see preceding note); similarly, there are two levels of sameness - (a) Intellect and Being are identical since Intellect thinks itself, and (b) κοινόν δέ τί ἐν πᾶσι . This last phrase (b) must refer to unity among the objects of Intellect. (Ha. refers πᾶσι to τὰ πρῶτα ; but this breaks up the parallelism between the two sentences in 4,39-41. I do not understand why he thinks that any interpretation but his own makes the ἐτερότης of 4,41 'nicht verständlich'. On his punctuation of this passage see following note.)

The subject of (b) is, I think, κοινόν... τί , not Intellect as is suggested by Schwyzer (RhM 90 (1941), p. 230). I do not see that 'das κοινόν δέ τί ἐν' präzisiert das vorher gemante ἐν' (loc. cit.). The καί in 4,40 introduces a co-ordinate clause; it is not explanatory. The κοινόν... τί is not that all the objects of thought are Intellect (although this is perfectly

true), but simply that they are all objects of the thought of Intellect which thinks them all (cf. 4,15-16 οὐδὲν ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὃ μὴ νοεῖ). Because of this function which they share in common (viz. being thought by Intellect), they have something in common among themselves; and there is a unity in Intellect as a whole, since Intellect and its objects are identical.

All editors since Ki., except for Ci. and H-S, have changed the second ^{c/}ἐν into the preposition ²ἐν . Either reading leaves the sense of the passage unchanged, but I would prefer to read ²ἐν since ^{c/}ἐν seems to me pleonastic. If there is something in common with all the objects of thought, then obviously it is this which unites them. If Intellect were the subject of (b), then ^{c/}ἐν might be more acceptable, but I have said above why I prefer to take κοινὸν ... τι as the subject. Ha. who reads ²ἐν aptly compares II 4,4,2-3 εἰ οὖν πολλὰ τὰ εἶδη, κοινὸν μὲν τι ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη εἶναι .

4,41 καὶ ἡ διαφορά ἑτερότης : The difference referred to is the difference between the objects of thought. Ha. reads ²ἡ and takes διάφορα as neuter plural. But there seems to me to be no difference between 'qua-different, the objects of thought (or in his case τὰ πρῶτα) contain otherness' and 'the difference between the objects of thought is otherness'. The mss. reading is perfectly acceptable.

His punctuation of the whole of 4,37-41 needs some discussion. He brackets 4,38-40 ἡ ... ἀληθῆ εἶναι , puts a semicolon after ἑαυτῷ in 4,40, and a comma after παντι , so that

κοινὸν δέ τι ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ ἡ διάφορα ἑτερότης go
together (πᾶσι, as we have seen, he refers to τὰ πρῶτα).

He is right from the point of view of the sense to bracket 4,38
up to σωπῆσεται in 4,39. But the rest of 4,39 up to εἶναι
in 4,40 is very much part of the argument. To parallel the two
levels of otherness, P. introduces two levels of sameness; therefore,
καὶ κοινὸν δέ τι κτλ. must be joined to what precedes
rather than to what follows.

4,41-43 ταῦτα δὲ ... τᾶλλα : Ταῦτα (4,41) refers to the
primary (Platonic) genera.

Quantity and quality are Aristotelian categories, next in
priority to substance. (For the usual order see Arist. Cat. 1b 25-
27; id. Top. 103b 21-23.) Although neither of these is a primary
genus (VI 2,15,18) - although P. wavers about the status of quantity
(VI 2,13,28-29) - they exist in the Intelligible World as Forms,
and are mentioned alongside the Platonic genera particularly when
P. wants to illustrate the variety of Intellect. Thus, in V 9,10,
6 ff. the two systems intermingle, and in V 9,10,10 ff. the Platonic
list is concluded by οὐσία and ποσόν. In VI 9,3,41 ff.,
where P. denies to the One any of the attributes of τὰ πάντα,
quantity and quality are denied to it along with movement and rest.
And in the late treatise V 3, at V 3,15,39-40, P. describes Intellect
as a duality and then as a plurality, and as an illustration of
that plurality adds καὶ γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ ταῦτόν ἥδη
καὶ ποῖόν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Our present passage is similarly
concerned with the plurality of Intellect (note the change from

δύο in 4,31 to πλείω in 4,41 to πλῆθος in 5,1); hence, the Aristotelian categories fit in well with the context.

One might compare with our present passage VI 2,21,6 ff. where P. is discussing the generation of the individual Forms within Intellect. After number (VI 2,21,6) he mentions quality (VI 2,21,13) and the whole of quantity (VI 2,21,15). As here, the later Forms (τὰ λεγόμενα ἐφεξῆς VI 2,21,2-3) seem to be produced from conceptual distinctions between the primary genera (τούτων in 4,42; Br. wrongly takes this to mean 'des êtres').

In the last phrase ἐξ ὧν ... τὰλλα, all editors and translators except MK take as the antecedent of the relative pronoun the primary genera plus quantity and quality. MK, however, takes as the antecedent only the Platonic genera, referred to by τούτων in 4,42. The natural sense of the Greek is, I think, to take as antecedent all the genera so far mentioned. Although quantity and quality are not primary genera (aspects of the life of Intellect) they can nevertheless serve as principles for τὰλλα. (On the relationship between genera and principles see VI 2,2,14 ff. and Hoppe, op. cit. pp. 42..) Τὰλλα refers to what P. calls in VI 2,21,2-3 τὰ λεγόμενα ἐφεξῆς i.e., the Forms.

CHAPTER FIVE

Having dealt with the soul and with Intellect, P. moves on to consider the One, which he discusses in the next three chapters. Chapter 5 deals with the relationship between Intellect and the One, mainly in terms of the Platonic theory of Intelligible Number. It is remarkable for its terseness and obscurity, and Br. (Notice, pp. 10-11) thinks that 5,7-18 (δυνάμενον ... παρ' αὐτοῦ) along with the first sentence of Chapter 6 should be omitted from the text. His reasons for this relate partly to style ('son style et sa manière') and partly to internal cogency and construction ('l'ensemble du développement'). Br.'s first point seems to me to carry little conviction. We know from Porphyry's Life that P. cared little for niceties of language or rhetoric; he wrote as he thought and as if he was copying from a book (V.P. 8.4-11). Compression of style indicates a corresponding compression of thought. Consequently, change of style cannot be used as a criterion for rearrangement of the text.

Br.'s second point - that the sequence of thought in 5,7-18 is disturbed - needs more serious consideration. It can, however, be shown by careful analysis that Br.'s remarks (p. 21 of his edition, note 1) that 5,7-18 is an 'exposé assez confus, où le nombre est considéré tour à tour comme formant la substance intelligible (1.9), puis l'âme (ibid.), tandis que les lignes 15-18 indiquent assez vaguement que le nombre est comme un intermédiaire entre l'Un et les intelligibles' reflect only his own misunderstanding of the passage (see individual notes). Ha. well remarks in his introduction that from the point of view of the thought, the passage is quite coherent. His particular argument against Br.'s

theory however, - 'es ist kein Einschub, 6,1 ist nicht mehr die Seele subjekt wie 5,5, sondern der Geist' - does not take account of the fact that Br. adds the first sentence of Chapter 6 to the passage of Chapter 5 which he regards as corrupt.

5,1-6 πολὺς ... ποιῶν ; These lines act as the introduction to 5,6-19, the main section of the Chapter.

5,1 πολὺς οὖν ... θεός ; The οὖν picks up the discussion of the categories which closed Chapter 4. The plurality of Intellect was illustrated by this discussion (see on 4,41-43). Unity and plurality are both indispensable to it (cf. VI 7,13, 1-2 ἔστι γὰρ οὔτε νοῦς ἀπλοῦν, οὔτε ἡ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ψυχὴ, ἀλλὰ ποικίλα πάντα ὅσω ἀπλᾶ). For other references to Intellect as πολὺς see, e.g., V 3,10,10. 10,20. 11,1. 11,26; VI 8,17,13. The idea is common in P.

On θεός see on 1,2.

5,1-2 πολὺς οὖν ... ἐθέλει : The mss. text gives 5,1-2 without punctuation and with τῇδε in 5,1 where H-S print τῇ δε All editors before Ci. follow the mss. text. Ha. remarks that the sense of τῇδε is extremely difficult, as the emphatic demonstrative has no obvious reference. It cannot refer to the earthly as opposed to the world soul (as one might have expected) since there is no point in such a reference here. A second difficulty presents itself with the infinitive εἶναι (5,2) which is dependent on ὑπάρχει (5,1). One might expect ἐν τοῦτοις to be taken with εἶναι, but this is awkward if οὗτος ὁ θεός is the subject because of

συνάφθῃ (5,2), which agrees with ψυχῇ and must be construed with ἐν τούτοις ; for otherwise, there would be no way of telling what the soul was joined to.

Dodds (according to H-S) reads ἐπὶ δέ for ἐπὶ in 5,1. Presumably he puts a stop after θεός (5,1). But the sentence must end at ἐθέλοι (5,2) because of the position of οὖν in 5,3. But in this case, where is the main clause? Best is Ha.'s suggestion adopted by H-S to place a stop after ψυχῇ (in this he followed Ci.) and to read τῇ δέ .

5,1 ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ : Ἐπὶ here means 'above' (so all translators except for Fic. and Br.). Ha. aptly compares VI 2,7,17 where ἐπὶ is used as the opposite of ὑπὸ , and II 3,18,13-15. One might also compare e.g., V 9,4,1; VI 7,5,21. 25,27 and see also Arndt-Gingrich s.v. ἐπὶ II α .

5,2 ἐν τούτοις ... ἐθέλοι : Τούτοις can refer either to τὰ νοητά or to τὰ αἰσθητά . Br., H-S and MK refer it to the former, and Fic. and Ci. to the latter. Fic. and Ci. are almost certainly wrong. P.'s other uses of the word συνάπτειν refer to the joining of one hypostasis to another through ἐπιστροφή (VI 9,8,8-9 θεὸς γὰρ τὸ ἱκεῖν (sc. τῷ ἐνὶ) συννημένον ; VI 9,8,18 ff. - the joining of the centre of the soul to the centre of all centres - and VI 6,15,26-27; cf. J. M. Rist, Plotinus - the Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), p. 222. Ha. also compares VI 4,14,15-16 τὸ δὲ γινόμενον πελάζει καὶ συνάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ ; compare further Procl. in Euc. 21.2 (Friedlein) - the study

of mathematics $\eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \sigma\omega\nu\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\epsilon\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$). Secondly, P. uses the word $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ to refer either to the separation of a lower entity from a higher (IV 3,11,23-24; V 5,4,9-10) or, in the case of Intellect, with the negative to refer to its ranging over the whole of Being, generally with a further reference to Pl. Prm. 144b 2 (III 6,6,12 $\tilde{\omega}\ \mu\eta\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\tilde{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$; V 3,16,30; V 5,9,22; VI 4,5,4-5; VI 5,3,20-21. 9,39). He nowhere uses the word to describe the separation of a higher entity from a lower. Consequently, $\tau\omicron\upsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$ in 5,2 must refer to $\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$.

A difficulty, however, seems to arise with the sentence which follows. Why, if he has spoken of the soul as joined to the Intelligible World, does P. continue in 5,3 by talking of its progress from sensible to Intelligible Reality? The difficulty is resolved if we see 5,1-2 ($\tau\eta\ \delta\epsilon\ \dots\ \acute{\epsilon}\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon$) as a general remark about the nature of souls. By their very nature they are members of the Intelligible World (see on 4,11) and can remain there, provided that they do not exercise their free-will and descend into human bodies. (Of course, from another point of view, souls cannot remain there, since the $\pi\rho\acute{o}\sigma\delta\omicron\varsigma$ has to work itself out according to the laws of nature (cf. e.g., IV 8,6,7 ff.). Descent from this point of view is no worse than casting a shadow (I 1,12,24 ff.). P. never fully reconciles the voluntary and involuntary aspects of soul's descent.)

H-S and Beutler-Theiler (in index of 'Antike Autoren und Stellen' t.VI) think that $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ in our present passage is a reminiscence of Pl. Prm. 144b 1-2 $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\grave{\iota}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$

πολλὰ ὄντα ἢ οὐσία νενέμηται καὶ οὐδένος ἀποστατεῖ
τῶν ὄντων. But ἀποστατεῖν in Plato is used to describe
the fact that οὐσία and τὰ ὄντα are conceptually
connected (cf. the similar use in P. in III 6,6,12; V 5,9,22;
VI 5,9,39). I doubt whether the different use of a single word
in our present passage could be said to be a conscious reference
to Plato.

- 5,3 πελάσαντα οὖν ... γενομένη : The soul approaches Intellect
(VI 4,14,15; VI 9,9,47-48) and becomes, as it were, one with it.
At each stage of the spiritual ascent, soul or Intellect becomes
one with the object of its search. The question is, what sort of
identification did P. mean? There are clearly two sorts, a whole-
sale identification in which the lower hypostasis completely loses
its identity in the higher, and a weaker sort of identification in
which some degree of unity, but not a state of total absorption,
is reached. The problem of identification is discussed by M. Burque
(Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa 10 (1940), sect. spéc. pp. 141-
176) and by Rist (Plotinus - the Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967),
in his chapter on mysticism pp. 213-230). Both authors are pri-
marily concerned with the identification of soul and the One, but
necessarily touch on the union of Intellect and soul.

The οἶον added by P. in our present passage suggests that
the union is of the weaker sort, and the references collected by
Burque confirm this. In IV 4,2,25 ff. P. says that soul, pre-
sumably through the imaginative faculty (see on 12,5-7), in the
ἐπιστροφή must be united with Intellect (εἰς ἑνωσιν ἔλθωιν

τῷ νῷ ἀνάγκη). Then he continues: at this point there is nothing between Intellect and soul; soul is fitted into Intellect and ἀρμολογῶσα ἥνεται, οὐκ ἀπολλυμένη καὶ ἐν ἑστίν ἀμφω καὶ δύο . The use of ἀρμόζειν (and the use of συναπτειν : see on 5,2) suggests that there are two components in the unified product - Intellect and soul. The phrase οὐκ ἀπολλυμένη bears out this conclusion. Soul does not lose its individuality; even though P. can speak of Intellect and soul as one, they are also two (ἐν ἑστίν ἀμφω καὶ δύο). Note, however, that in IV 4,2,32 P. says of soul ὡς ἐν ἑνῇ τῷ νοητῷ ταῦτόν γενομένη . This might suggest a strict union, but the rest of the chapter precludes such an interpretation. Consequently, even if P. omits a qualifying word like οἶον , we have no right to interpret statements of unity as statements of identity. (Qualifying words are omitted at the following places: VI 6,8,8; VI 9,9,58. Οἶον is, however, included in VI 7,35,4-5)

5,3-4 $\xi\eta\acute{\alpha}\iota \dots \gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\sigma\alpha\varsigma$: The mss. reads $\xi\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}\iota$ where H-S print Seidel's conjecture $\xi\eta\acute{\alpha}\iota$ De Usu Praepositionum Plotiniano Quaestiones (Nissa, 1886), p. 78). If the mss. reading is retained, two alternatives are possible: (a) to place a strong stop after $\xi\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}\iota$ like Perna, Ki., Mu. and Vo.. In this case an object must be supplied for $\xi\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}\iota$ and presumably this would be Intellect. This gives a ridiculous sense as Vo. has the honesty to note (Praef. II . xxxi). How can the soul be one, as it were, with Intellect and still be in search of it?

(b), the second alternative, is to place a comma or a semicolon after $\xi\eta\tau\hat{\iota}$ and take $\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \sigma\hat{\omega}\nu\ \dots\ \gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\eta\sigma\alpha\varsigma$ as an indirect question dependent on $\xi\eta\tau\hat{\iota}$. This is done by the remaining editors and translators. (Br. places a strong stop after $\xi\eta\tau\hat{\iota}$ but translates as though it was weak one.)

To alternative (b) there are two possible objections. The first is the position of $\sigma\hat{\omega}\nu$ in 5,3, but Ha. rightly quotes as a parallel for $\sigma\hat{\omega}\nu$ in an indirect question Pl. Pro. 322c 3-4 $\xi\omega\tau\hat{\alpha}\ \sigma\hat{\omega}\nu\ \epsilon\epsilon\mu\eta\varsigma\ \Delta\iota\acute{\alpha},\ \tau\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\ \sigma\hat{\omega}\nu\ \tau\rho\acute{o}\pi\omicron\nu\ \delta\omicron\upsilon\eta\ \delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\eta\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \alpha\acute{\iota}\delta\omega\ \alpha\acute{\nu}\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$. (On the use of $\sigma\hat{\omega}\nu$ in indirect questions in Plato see E. des Places, Études sur quelque Particules de Liaison chez Platon (Paris, 1929), p. 40, quoted by Wolters on III 5,2,11.) The construction is paralleled at III 5,2,11 and IV 4,10,6-8. A second objection is voiced by Schwyzer (RhM 90 (1941), p. 230 repeated in Museum Helveticum 26 (1969), p. 258): 'nur stört, dass die Seele gerade dann forschen soll, wenn sie mit dem νοῦς Eins geworden'. But $\xi\eta\tau\hat{\iota}$ is surely being used here figuratively. One might compare III 8,11,35-38 $\sigma\acute{\omega}\tau\omega\ \chi\epsilon\eta\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\ \kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\nu\ \acute{o}\varsigma\ \epsilon\theta\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\tau\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\theta\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha\sigma\epsilon\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \kappa\epsilon\kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\acute{\eta}\nu\ \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\ \acute{o}\ \tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\pi\omicron\sigma\eta\sigma\alpha\varsigma\ \xi\eta\tau\hat{\iota}$ where, incidentally, $\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ parallels $\sigma\hat{\omega}\nu$ in our present passage; and VI 7,16,1-4 $\chi\epsilon\eta\ \delta\epsilon\ \mu\acute{\eta}\delta\ \acute{\alpha}\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \epsilon\nu\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\omega}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\acute{\omega}\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\omega}\ \mu\epsilon\nu\epsilon\nu\ \text{(i.e. } \epsilon\nu\ \nu\acute{\omega}\text{)},\ \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\beta\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\nu\ \delta\iota\acute{\epsilon}\tau\iota\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\acute{\iota}\zeta\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\ \dots\ \theta\alpha\nu\mu\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\ \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \acute{o}\ \gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\eta\sigma\alpha\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{o}\pi\omega\text{:}$ cf. also VI 7,37,19-22. In the second parallel the wondering soul has already become Intellect, as it has in our present passage. But in none of the passages is any literal 'seeking' or 'wonder'

involved. P.'s language is vivid, because he wants to draw attention to the fact that Intellect is not the source of the progression from the One.

Seidel's conjecture is thus proved unnecessary. Its one recommendation, however, is that some reference to eternal life is found in the Arabic paraphrase - hence Vo.'s proposal $\xi\eta\tau\epsilon\kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omega\varsigma\ \eta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$. But reference to eternal life is quite out of place here, especially in view of the emphasis which would be placed on it owing to the emphatic position of $\xi\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\iota}$ at the end of one sentence before the start of another beginning a new idea ($\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \omicron\acute{\alpha}\nu$ etc.). Furthermore, the Arabic paraphrase is a doubtful ally. Section 130 which begins: 'if anyone asks: Who set the mind in this state...' gives support to the mss. $\xi\eta\tau\epsilon\kappa\alpha\iota$. This gives good sense, although Henry's argument for accepting it - that it parallels the verb $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\iota$ in Basil (PG 29.773a) - is rightly rejected by Schwyzer (RhM 90 (1941), p. 230).

On the use of $\gamma\omega\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu$ to describe the relationship between the hypostases see on 1,1-2. The use of the word here emphasises that the One at the head of the procession is the efficient cause of Intellect. P.'s argument for this causal role of the One needs some discussion. In VI 9 he argues as follows: each thing needs unity in order to exist (VI 9,1,1-2; III 8,10,20 ff.), and the unity is different from that to which it is applied; it is not soul (VI 9,1,36 ff.) or Intellect (VI 9,2,21 ff.), for example, since each of these involves plurality; there must, then, be some pure unity which is the $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$ of the unity of everything else.

Anything which is a plurality presupposes the One (III 9,4,7).

The One's unity is so pure that it is beyond the predication of unity (V 3,16,14-15). If it was in the least degree plural, its plurality would suppose some higher unity (V 3,16,13-14; VI 7, 17,42-43). If plurality exists then the One must exist.

But the One is not only the ἀρχή of plurality in the sense that it is at the head of a series of lesser unities; it is also ἀρχή in the further sense that it is the cause of plurality. Its causal efficacy rests on its infinity of power; and if its power is infinite, then its effects will be infinite. The One is the δύνάμις τῶν πάντων (III 8,1,10; V 4,1,36. 2,38; cf. VI 8,9,44). On this see J. M. Rist HSCP 69 (1965), pp. 340 ff.. Everything else is related to it either directly, as in the case of Intellect, or through intermediaries (V 4,1,1-4; cf. VI 7,42,21-24). Thus, even the physical world ultimately owes its existence to the One.

5,4-6 ὁ ἀπλοῦς ... ἀριθμὸν ποιῶν : Editors vary in their punctuation here. All except Creuzer and H-S include these lines inside the question, and treat the question as rhetorical. But rhetorical or not the question would then contain its own answer since ὁ ἀπλοῦς ... ποιῶν can be nothing but the answer to 4,3-4 τίς ... ὁ τοῦτον γινώσκας ; . It is better with Creuzer and Ha. to treat ὁ ἀπλοῦς ... ποιῶν as a separate answer to the question about the source of Intellect.

5,4 ὁ ἀπλοῦς ... τοιοῦτον πλῆθους : Intellect is πολὺς (5,1) and therefore a πλῆθος since πλῆθος is defined in

VI 6,13,17-18 as *πλείων ἑνός* . But because of its proximity to the One it is a *πλήθος συντεταγμένον* (VI 8,17,15), i.e., not completely a *πλήθος* (cf. VI 6,3,4-5 *ἢ ὅτι ἑνῶνται τὸ πλήθος καὶ κεκώλυται πάντῃ πλήθος εἶναι ἐν ὃν πλήθ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐλαττοῦται τοῦ ἑνός, ὅτι πλήθος ἔχει*). For further references to the *πλήθος* of Intellect see V 3,12 passing The One, on the other hand, is *ἁπλοῦς* and *ἁπλοῦστατον ἁπάντων* (II 9,1,8; III 8,9,17; V 3,13,34-35; V 4,1,5; cf. VI 2,10,20: Numenius called his first god *ἁπλοῦς* (fr. 11) Note especially V 3,16,14-16 *συστηῖναι οὖν δεῖ εἰς ἓν ὄντως πλήθους ἔγω καὶ ἁπλότητος ἡστυνοσοῦν, εἴπερ ὄντως ἁπλοῦν* . This seems to mean that the One is not simple in the sense that it is a member of the class of *ἁπλᾶ* . The One is beyond the grasp of predication.

There is a slight problem over the correct reading in this line where H-S print *ὁ πρὸ τοιούτου πλήθους* . The mss. readings are of two sorts: (a) those that include the word *πλήθους* (i) without the definite article before *τοιούτου* (the majority of the Enneadic mss; this reading is accepted by Perna, Fic., Creuzer, Ki., MU., Ha. and H-S), or (ii) with the definite article (the single Enneadic ms. J). Or (b) those that omit *πλήθους* and read (i) *τοῦ τοιούτου* (the majority of the Eusebian mss.; this reading is printed by Vo. and Br.) or merely (ii) *τοιούτου* (the single Eusebian ms. N, followed by Ci.).

There seems to be no difficulty about the inclusion of the word *πλήθους* , since the fact that Intellect is a *πλήθος*

follows from its being πολὺς . The best attested reading
 περὶ τοιούτου πλήθους is perfectly acceptable. With the
 omission of the article before τοιούτου compare III 8,11,
 37-38.

5,4-5 ὁ αὐτίος ... εἶναι τοῦτον : Since Intellect comes from
 the One through the procession, the One is ultimately responsible
 for everything relating to it. Since it both is and is not plural,
 the One, although itself above being and plurality, and perfectly
 simple, must be the cause of the being and plurality of Intellect.
 For the One as the cause of its being see V 3,15,28. 17,9 ff.;
 VI 6,9,31-32; VI 7,16,22-23. 23,22-24. 32,1-2. 42,11 and as the
 cause of plurality V 3,12,9-10. 16,12-13; VI 2,10,20; VI 7,15,20.
 In V 3,15,31 ff. P. explains that the contents of Intellect are in
 the One ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα while they are διακεκριμένα
 in Intellect. This explanation is, however, unparalleled in P..
 For the more usual account of the creation of plurality see V 3,11
 and VI 7,15-17 and note on 5,15-16. The question of the one and
 the many was still being discussed in the sixth century when the
 Academy was closed by Justinian (Agathias 130.16 (Niehbuhr)).

5,5-6 ὁ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ποιῶν : Compare III 8,9,3-4 and V 3,12,9-10
 where the sequence of thought is similar. Plurality derives from
 unity and this leads on to the mention of number, since 'in all
 numerical series, the unit is the first' (MK's translation of
 V 3,13,10).

5,6-19 ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ... ἀμφω τε εἶναι : The next section of
 Chapter 5 (5,6-19) contains an application of Plato's theory of

number to the procession from the One.

It is well known that Aristotle in the Metaphysics (e.g., Metaph. 987b 14 ff.; ibid. 1081a 14 ff.) describes as Plato's a theory of the derivation of number from the One and the Indefinite Dyad, which he also calls the Great and the Small (for other references to this doctrine see K. Gaiser, Platons Ungeschriebene Lehre (Stuttgart, 1963), Anhang, Testimonia Platonica nos. 49-55). Aristotle also identifies Plato's numbers with the Forms. This number theory is nowhere found in the written dialogues though Porphyry (ap. Simp. in Ph. 453.31 ff. (Diels)) derives it from Philebus 23c 9 ff. where Plato treats of the effect of Limit on the Unlimited. The Unlimited is called that which admits of τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἧττον (Pl. Phlb. 24a 7 ff.). Τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἧττον is close enough from the point of view of language to τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν but it is not clear that the concepts referred to are the same. The publication of the more fully developed theory has been traced back to Plato's lecture 'On the Good', at which Aristotle along with Speusippus and Xenocrates was present (see Simp. in Ph. 151. 6 ff.). It would be outside our present scope to venture into the controversy about whether Aristotle misinterpreted what Plato said (see H. Cherniss, The Riddle of the Early Academy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945)). What is important for our purposes is that Plato's successors and through them the Middle Platonist tradition believed that the theory of the One and the Dyad was Platonic (cf. Xenocrates fr. 15 (Heinze); Plu. Plat. Quaest. 1002a; Numenius fr. 11). P. was no exception; but there is one important

difference between his interpretation and that of his Platonic predecessors.

For Plato and his successors it is quite clear that the One and the Dyad were two separate principles. Simplicius (in Ph. 151.6 ff.), quoting Alexander, says that all who were present at the Lecture on the Good preserved the doctrine that there were these principles (i.e. the One and the Dyad) - *ταύταις αὐτὸν ἀρχαῖς χεῖσθαι λέγουσι* (in Ph. 151.11). Sextus Empiricus (M. 10.282) specifically contrasts this two principle philosophy with monism. For P., however, there was no question of dualism. The Infinite Dyad derived from the One and was the undefined emanation which later became Intellect.

Evidence for a similar number monism before P. has been collected by Rist (HSCP 69 (1965), pp. 329-244 'Monism: Plotinus and some Predecessors'). Most significant is the first century BC Pythagorean Alexander Polyhistor quoted in DL 8.25, who maintains the the principle of all things is the Monad (see J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London, 1977), pp. 342-344). From then on, Neopythagoreanism gradually became monistic, though in no extant writings before P. do we find a systematic attempt to explain how plurality evolved.

One must ask next how important this number theory was for P. As already noticed, there are two parts, as it were, to the theory; one is the derivation of number from the One and the Indefinite Dyad, and the other is the identification of the numbers so formed with the Forms. (This last theory is described as Plato's by Aristotle, though Theophrastus (Metaph. 6b 11-14) suggests that

Plato placed numbers above the Forms in the ontological hierarchy.)

First, that each hypostasis is defined by its prior and acquires separate existence is an important Plotinian doctrine. Intellect is defined by the One, just as soul is defined by Intellect. But there are several ways in which P. describes this process. He sometimes uses Platonic words based on the root $\delta\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ (i.e. $\delta\lambda\iota\phi\epsilon\nu$, $\delta\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\eta\varsigma$, $\delta\omicron\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ e.g., II 4,5,31 ff.; VI 7,17,15), but he can use $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\omicron\upsilon$ and its cognates (e.g., 7,16; III 8,11,17; V 4,2,5; cf. 3,13) or $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\omicron\upsilon$ (V 2,1,10. 1,20; VI 7,16,16 ff.). Only twice does he specifically refer to this process in terms of the One and the Indefinite Dyad - in our present passage, and in V 4,2,4 ff. where V 4,2,7-8 are clearly an afterthought and a quotation from Arist. Metaph. 1081a 13-15 (cf. ibid. 987b 20 ff.). The paucity of reference suggests that the actual numerical theory was unimportant and merely provide him with an alternative vocabulary for describing the process of generation. There is no reference to the Indefinite Dyad in VI 6, the treatise specially devoted to numbers.

Secondly, how far is the identification of Forms and numbers an integral part of P.'s system? P. believed that it was Plato's view that Intelligible Number was a substance (VI 6,4,20 ff.), so that he was to that extent committed to explaining Plato. Number is prior to $\tau\alpha\ \delta\omicron\nu\tau\alpha$, because they are individuals whereas the concept 'number' is a universal. The universal 'number' is, however, closely associated with the universal 'Being' ($\tau\omicron\ \delta\omicron\nu$) (VI 6,9,37 $\epsilon\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \delta\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\hat{\omega}\ \delta\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$). So Number

along with Being makes τὰ ὄντα explicit (VI 6,9,36
 συγγενῶν αὐτὰ (sc. τα εἶδη) ; VI 6,15,24-25 μεθ' οὗ
 (τοῦ ὄντος) τὰ ὄντα γινῶσθαι). Τα ὄντα can therefore
 be called an ἀριθμὸς ἐξηγησμένος (VI 6,9,29-30). The
 association of numbers with each of the Forms guarantees that
 each Form should have its own individuality (see on 5,8-9).
 Numerical concepts, then, can be used to describe the structure
 of Intellect (VI 6,9,29-31), but P. did not believe that Number
 was a separate entity in the ontological hierarchy as Plato
 apparently did (although the precise relationship between the Good
 of the Republic, the One of 'the Lecture on the Good', and Numbers
 remains unclear). Number for P. is rather an aspect of the life of
 Intellect, bearing something of the same relationship to it as
 eternity does (see on 4,17-18). The One is not called the One
 primarily because it is the first principle of number, but because
 it is ἀπλούστατος. To conceive of the One purely in numerical
 terms would be to ignore its position at the head of the procession
 as the δύνανται πάντων to which all hypostases return. In
 our present passage, P. is very careful to explain precisely how
 he wants the numerical vocabulary to be understood (see 5,9; 5,13-16).
 This all suggests that the passage is a way of illustrating the
 Plotinian procession in language borrowed from a related metaphysic.

5,6 ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ πρῶτος: Compare III 8,9,3-4 πλήθος
 ἑνὸς ὑστερον· καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ οὗτος. This was a commonplace
 of Pythagorean theory (cf. Nicom. Ar. 13.7 (Hoche) and Aristox.
 ap. Stob I.20.10-11 (Wachsmuth and Hense)).

5,6-7 καὶ γὰρ ... τὸ ἓν : The mss. of Eusebius, who quotes this passage (PG 21.889a), include the definite article before δυάδος ; they are followed by Vo. and Br.. In view of the lack of article in 5,7 (δεύτερον δὲ δυάς) there seems no reason to include it here. It is, however, included in 5,13.

It is difficult to know whether τὸ ἓν , found twice in 5,7 should be translated as 'the One' or as 'unity'. In view of the fact that P. goes on to talk about number in the sense of substance (5,9 and note) it is, I think, the One which P. has primarily in mind (so Fic.(?) and Ha.).

5,7-8 δεύτερον δὲ ... ἀόριστον παρ' αὐτῆς : The One has the function of placing a limit on the unlimited or Indefinite Dyad. Note that P. speaks of the Indefinite Dyad as derived from the One (παρὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς γεγεννημένη). The process of emanation is described in 6,15 ff. (see notes ad loc.); on the One's creative activity see on 5,3-4.

The phrase ἀόριστος δυάς is Platonic (see Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford, 1924), pp. lvii-lviii). According to Aristotle it was conceived as ποσοποιόν (Metaph. 1083a 13) i.e., as the creator of plurality. Hence, Plato called it μέγα καὶ μικρόν , which Aristotle wrongly interpreted as two separate principles (Metaph. 987b 20-21; cf. Rist, 'Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus', CQ 12 (1962), p. 100). The number two, the Dyad, is thus the first product of the One's defining activity. P. sometimes refers to this process of definition, when he applies the numerical theory to the Intelligible World, in terms of the

definition of sight by its object. Like the Indefinite Dyad sight is similarly undefined until it is limited by its object (V 4,2,4 ff. and cf. V 3,11,4 ff.) (see further on 5,14-15). With *δυνάμειον* compare 6,41.

In 5,8 *αὐτή* is read by all editors and translators except Creuzer (in his Oxford text), Ci. and H-S. (MK's translation makes certainty about his text impossible.) The mss. on the other hand are unanimous in reading *αὐτή*. Although the accents and breathings of an ancient ms. are of little value for textual criticism the mss. reading is probably right here; it gives a neat parallel with *ἐκεῖνο* in 5,7.

5,8-9 *ὅταν δὲ ... ὡς οὐσία* : The number formed by the action of the One on the Indefinite Dyad is a particular. Number is thus the guarantee of particularity and individuality for the constituents of the Intelligible World (see IV 3,8,22-24 *καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐστάναι δεῖ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ νοητὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἑκάστων ἐν ἀριθμῷ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ τὸ τόδε* ; for number as a particular see Arist. *Cat.* 6a 20 ff.). The number mentioned here is number in the sense of substance since substance too is something defined (cf. Arist. *Cat.* 3b 33-34 *δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἐπιδέχισθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον*). P. seems to follow Aristotle's conception of substance in V 5,6,5-6 where he says that the One is not substance because it is not a *τόδε τι* or *ὠρισμένον*. To approach the One the soul must lose its particularity as it approaches that which is without form and definition (VI 9,3,4 ff.).

Although the physical world has its numbers too (VI 6,16, 45-46 of σῶμα), Br. is probably right to note here (p. 21 n. 1 of his edition) that οὐσία here refers to 'substance intelligible'. Οὐσία can, of course, refer to the physical world; see G. Nebel, 'Terminologische Untersuchungen zur οὐσία und ὄν bei Plotin', Hermes 65 (1930), pp. 422-445.

5,9 ἀριθμὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ : Xenocrates' theory that the soul was a self-moving number, based on Plato's Timaeus 36e (cf. Ti. 36e 6-7 λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας ψυχὴ) was much quoted in antiquity (see refs. in Xenocrates fr. 60 (Heinze)); H-S's reference to Arist. Top. 140b 2 which was irrelevant, is now discarded (see t. III p. 346). P. explains Plato in VI 6,16, 42 ff.. The number which is within us is the number of our substance (οὐσία). The soul shares in number and harmony and is number and harmony. It is not a body or extended magnitude. Then, P. continues, ἀριθμὸς ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ, εἴτερ οὐσία i.e., the fact that soul is an οὐσία means that it is a number just as the fact that body is an οὐσία means that body has its own number in a bodily sense (VI 6,16,45-46).

The sequence of thought in our present passage is similar. P. has said in 5,8-9 that the product of the One and the Indefinite Dyad is number in the sense of being οὐσία . He now says by way of an afterthought that soul too is a number and one must supply the reason - because it is οὐσία . Soul is also called a number in IV 3,8,22 where it is contrasted as something defined and particular with what exists at random. Further reference to the

doctrine can be found at III 6,1,31 and VI 5,9,13-14.

Br., then, is wrong to see inconsistency in P.'s thought in 5,9 (p. 21, n. 1 of his edition). P. wants us to take number and substance almost as synonyms. Anything which is a substance is a number.

5,10-13 οὐ γὰρ... λόγος : In the next three lines P. contrasts the number/substance of the Intelligible World (= τὰ πρῶτα in which soul is here included: see note on 1,23-25) with the ὄγκοι and μεγέθη of sensible reality which is only an imitation of its Intelligible counterpart (VI 3,8,32). He then adds the rider that even in the world of sense what is important is what derives from elsewhere viz. from the Intelligible. The lines are parenthetical in tone.

5,10 οὐ γὰρ... παχέα ταῦτα : All ὄγκοι are μεγέθη - extended magnitudes - (II 4,11,3). Μέγεθος is associated with the physical world (VI 3,8,12-13; cf. VI 9,3,27 ff.). What is great in power in the Intelligible World is great in mass in the physical world (II 9,17,9-10).

Παχύς, used here of the physical world, seems to have pejorative overtones. By the time of the fifth century Greek fathers it was commonly used as the opposite of 'spiritual' (see Lampe s.vv. παχύς and παχύτης). We can perhaps in our present passage see the beginning of this use. The word is similarly used by P.'s successors, e.g., Porphyry (Antr. 64.16 (Nauck) - Porph. uses παχύνειν) and Marius Victorinus (Explan. in Rhet. M. Tulli Ciceronis ap. Rhet. Lat. Min. (Halm) p. 155.31 and 160.16).

Victorinus translates *παχὺς* and *παχύτης* by 'crassus' and 'crassitudo'.

- 5,11-12 οὐδὲ ἐν σπέρμασι ... δρώμενον : Ha. rightly remarks that the seed referred to is animal seed or semen. In a comparable passage in V 9,6,15 ff. P. divides semen into a material element, moisture, and logos which is responsible for the shaping and forming of matter. It was a common biological theory that semen could be analysed in this way (according to Galen Phil. Hist., xix. 322 (Kühn) this was the view taken by Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle.) The important part of the semen was the soul-principle (Aristotle calls it *πνεῦμα* (GA 735b 37-38), Galen *ὁ κινῶν νοῦς* (loc. cit.) and P. 'logos' (e.g. 5,13) which though immaterial used the material moisture as a vehicle for its transmission. Theoretically, no material element at all needed to pass between the male and the female for conception to take place (see C. Singer, Greek Biology and Greek Medicine (Oxford, 1922), pp. 32 ff.). The moisture of semen is *ἄχρηστον* (Arist. GA 739a 8). (On the influence of biology on P. see P-M. Schuhl (RPh 160 (1970), pp. 77-78. Note that he numbered several doctors among his friends (Paulinus of Scythopolis, Eustochius of Alexandria and Zethus (V.P. 7.5 ff.)).

P. uses the example of semen to illustrate the point that the unseen logos in Intellect or in the soul is similarly more important than the matter through which and on which it works. The presence of logoi in semen becomes visible as the limbs for which each logos is responsible is formed, i.e., the logoi of

of Intellect are finally expressed by soul in the physical world (cf. IV 8,6,7-10 ἐκάστη φύσει τοῦτο ἐνέστι... ἐξελίττεσθαι οἶον σπέρματος ἐκ τινος ἀμεροῦς ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἰούσης ; see on 3,8). But these logoi belong higher up the ontological scale and consequently are more important than the end product in which they at last become visible. In V 3,8,3 ff. P. says that the logoi in semen which produce colour and shape are not themselves the same as the colour and shape which they produce. And the logoi in seed are invisible. Intellect, therefore, from which they ultimately derive must be even more invisible. On the belief that the more important things are the more invisible see S.E. M. 10.250 where Sextus states that the first principles of τὰ φαινόμενα must be principles which are ἀφανῆ .

For οὐδέ followed by δε see Wolters on III 5,8,13-14.

5,12-13 τοῦτο δε... καὶ λόγος ; Number and logos are also linked at II 4,15,3 and III 6,1,31. For the meaning of logos see on 3,8. It is noticeable that P. sometimes uses the same language in treating of these concepts. For example in VI 6,9,29-30 τὰ ὄντα are called an ἐξηγητικὸς ἀριθμὸς ; ἐξελίττεν is used of logos in III 7,11,23 ff. of the logoi of seed (cf. IV 8,6,8) and in VI 7,9,38 of the δυνάμεις of Intellect which are its logoi. Number and logos both seem to extend equally down the scale of Being. But whereas to speak of the Forms or of soul as logoi emphasises their dynamic or creative aspects, to speak of them as numbers emphasises partly the individuality which they enjoy by virtue of being separate substances and therefore numerically distinct,

and partly their close connection to the source of number, the One.

5,13-19 ὁ οὖν ... ἀμφω τε ἐν : These lines explain more carefully the exact application of the numerical theory.

5,13-14 ὁ οὖν ἐνὶ ... καὶ νοῦς : The οὖν is resumptive after the digression of 5,9-13. The number and logos in semen were the life-giving principles of soul; the number and Dyad in the Intelligible World (ἐκείνῃ) are Intellect and the Intelligible logoi (= Forms) which Intellect passes on to soul (V 9,3,30-31) and soul to the semen. For the equation of numbers and Forms see V 4,2,7-8. The Dyad mentioned here is defined; in what sense one is to understand the definition P. goes on to explain in the next sentence.

5,14-15 ἀλλ' ἀόριστος ... λαμβανόμενη : The Greek here is difficult.

It is perhaps best to begin by saying what it cannot mean.

ὑποκείμενον is used in at least two senses by P. It can mean the logical subject as opposed to the logical object (e.g., in III 8,8,4-5 καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σπουδαίας ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἰόντων τῶν ἐγνωσμένων) or it can mean substrate in the Aristotelian sense as the equivalent of ἕλη (e.g., II 4,4,6-7 ἐστὶν ἄρα ἡ ἕλη ἢ τὴν μορφὴν δεχομένη καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑποκείμενον). It seems to me extremely unlikely that ὑποκείμενον can mean anything but 'substrate' or 'matter' here, not only because of the subsequent reference to shape in 5,16-17 which supposes a substrate on which the shape can be put, but also because the Platonic Indefinite Dyad was generally considered as the material principle which produced number by its definition by the One (see Arist. Metaph. 987b 20 ff.; id. Ph. 187a 17 ff.; Simp.

in Ph. 151.14 ff.). Br., then, cannot be right when he translates: 'il y a d'abord la dyade indéfinie qui est reçue par ce qui est comme le substrat des intelligibles'. The Indefinite Dyad is not received by the substrate of Intellect; it is the substrate of Intellect. Br.'s interpretation is (wrongly in my opinion) followed by H-S who note in their apparatus that λαμβανόμενη in 5,15 should be translated by 'recepta' and not by 'concepta'.

The general purport of these two lines must be to identify the Indefinite Dyad with Intelligible Matter. Other editors and translators have taken them this way. Ha., for example, translates: 'indes ist die Zweiheit unbestimmt da sie gleichsam als zugrundeliegenden Stoff begriffen wird'. This is clearly what P. is saying but the mss. text cannot give such a sense. The difficulties are, in the main, two. First, if λαμβανόμενη is to mean 'conceived as' it must have some introductory particle to make this clear; in the active, λαμβάνειν can be used with a double accusative without a particle, although according to LSJ such a construction is rare. I doubt whether a particle could be omitted with the verb in the passive. Secondly, οἷον τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ cannot mean ταῦτόν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ. Consequently, Sleeman's suggestion (CQ 22 (1928), p. 30) νῶ οἷον ὑποκείμενον is not wholly satisfactory because there is nothing to connect ὑποκείμενον and λαμβανόμενη. By far the best is Dodds' suggestion to insert ὡς ταῦτόν before τῷ in 5,14. There is no need to make the object of ὑποκείμενον explicit by some reference to Intellect since it is clear that P. is dealing with the derivation of Intellect from the One. One slight difficulty is that

λαμβάνειν in P. is often used to mean 'perceive' (like αἰσθάνεσθαι ; see IV 6,1,15 with αἰσθησις ; IV 6,1,29; V 5,7,10 with αἰσθησις ; V 3,1,7 καταλαμβάνειν with αἰσθησις) rather than 'conceive as'. But the word did have this later sense in Greek (see LSJ s.v. I 9.c). 'Αλλ' ἀόριστος ἡ δυνὰς ὡς ταῦτόν τῷ^{οἶον} ὑποκειμένῳ λαμβανομένη gives good and easy sense. For ὡς meaning 'in the sense of' compare II 4,5,27; VI 3,5,11-12. 7,19. The οἶον adds a note of apology. There is matter in the Intelligible World but it does not share all the characteristics of the physical substrate. Note the similar οἶον in 5,16.

P. deals with Intelligible Matter in II 4,2-5, but he avoids there the numerical vocabulary of the One and Indefinite Dyad. He calls matter ἀόριστος (e.g. II 4,3,1) but prefers the terms ἑτερότης (II 4,5,30) or πρώτη κίνησις (ibid.) to δυνὰς . In VI 7,15-17 the process of definition is described by the vocabulary of sight or life (VI 7,16,14-15 ἀλλ' ἐβλεπεν ἀνοήτως ἢ φατέον ὡς οὐδ' εὔρα πώποτε , ἀλλ' εἴη πρὸς αὐτό) and this life becomes defined when it becomes Intellect (VI 7,17, 25-26 ὁρισθεῖσα γὰρ ψυχὴ νοῦς). Again in V 3,11 and V 4,2 it is the vocabulary of sight which is preferred. Undefined Intellect is ἐφείσις μόνον καὶ ἀτύπωτος ὄψις (V 3,11,12) or ἀόριστος ὄψις (V 4,2,6). The vocabulary of the One and Indefinite Dyad is only one possible vocabulary in which the process of definition can be described. What is important is not the language but the concept of definition itself. The One is

responsible for the very existence of Intellect in its characteristic form.

5,15-16 ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ... εἶδος ἕκαστος : The result of this definition by the One is the formation of Intellect and the Forms. P. elaborates in VI 7,15,20-22. Intellect is unable to grasp in its entirety the power which emanates from the One, but splits up that power (συνείθραυε) and treats it as a plurality (cf. VI 7,16,10-13 ἄρα, ὅτε εἴρα πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐνός ὡς πολλὰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ... μερίτων αὐτὸν παρ' αὐτῷ πῶ νοεῖν μὴ ὅλον ὁμοῦ δύνασθαι). A similar description is given in the late treatise V 3. In V 3,11,4 ff. P. says ἡρμήσει μὲν ἐπ' αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ ἐν) οὐχ ὡς νοῦς, ἀλλ' ὡς ὅψω οὕτω ἰδοῦσα, ἐξήλθε δὲ ἔχουσα ὅπερ αὐτὴ ἐπλήθυνεν. (On these passages see H. J. Krämer's illuminating commentary in Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik (Amsterdam, 1964), pp. 315 ff. .) The plurality of Intellect, then, comes about because Intellect is unable to grasp the pure unity of the One.

ἕκαστος (5,16) is the reading of all the mss. and if right must agree with ἀριθμός (5,15). Sleeman (CQ 22 (1928), p. 30) thinks that P. may have written ἕκαστον for which one might compare VI 7,16,4-5 ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν εἶδος, ἕκαστον καὶ ἴδιος οἶον τύπος but Schwyzer defends the mss. reading in RhM 90 (1941), p. 231, rightly in my opinion, and translates: 'die Zahl aber aus ihr und dem Einem ist Form eine jede (nämlich eine jede Zahl)'. (There is, in fact, little difference in sense

between Sleeman's suggestion and the mss. reading.) By calling each of the Forms a number, P. marks their individuality. Number is no more than the οἰκία μορφή of II 4,4,5 or the ἴδιος τύπος of VI 7,16,5. For the association of number with particularity see on 5,8-9.

For discussion of Vitringa's ἐκάστου, which must be taken with μορφωθέντος, see the following note.

5,16-18 οἶον μορφωθέντος ... παρ' αὐτοῦ: The subject of μορφωθέντος can be either (a) ἐκάστου, (b) τοῦ ὑποκειμένου or (c) τοῦ νοῦ.

(a): ἐκάστου for the mss. ἐκάστος (5,16) was suggested by Vitringa and is printed by Mñ., Vo., Br. and Ha.. Vitringa's text was that translated by MK in his first edition (London, 1926) but not in subsequent editions. The translation of this text must be: 'each Form is shaped by the Forms which come to be in it'. This is nonsense. No Forms come to be in other Forms. It does not help to take ἐν αὐτῷ in 5,16-17 as ἐν ἀριθμῷ, as Br. does. P. has equated numbers and Forms. What does it mean to say 'toute chose (= ἐκάστων εἶδος) est informée par des formes qui sont nées dans le nombre'? Ha. wants to refer ἐκάστου to the Categories dealt with at the end of Chapter 4. This is quite impossible; the subject matter of Chapter 5 is far removed from that of Chapter 4. MK in his first edition translated: 'for all of them (sc. the later Existents) take shape, so to speak, from the ideas rising within this (sc. their forming idea)'. I cannot understand what MK means.

(b): Dodds wants to supply τοῦ ὑποκειμένου with μορφωθέντος . Μορφοῦν and its cognates are certainly used by P. in connection with substrate or matter (cf. for example I 6,2,17; II 4,4,6). But the subject of μορφωθέντος must be the same as the subject of μορφοῦται in 5,17. In the second part of the sentence (5,17-18) P. divides whatever is the subject of μορφοῦται into a formal and a material principle (see note ad loc.); it would be nonsense to speak of matter being divided in this way, since matter is the material principle.

Accordingly I would prefer solution (c). Harder complains however that it is difficult to supply νοῦ from the context. W. Theiler (Isonomia, Studien zur Gleichheitsvorstellung im Griechischen Denken (Berlin, 1964), p. 106) suggests possibly rightly that νοῦ should be inserted before ^{οἶον}μορφωθέντος . For the use of μορφοῦν of a hypostasis rather than matter see II 4,3,4 - soul is shaped by Intellect and logos. And if hypostases can be 'defined' or 'brought to perfection', there is no reason why they cannot be shaped. On οἶον see on 5,14-15.

P. says, then, that Intellect has been shaped by the Forms which have come to be in it. This allusive remark is clarified by his descriptions of the genesis of Intellect in V 3,11,4 ff., VI 7,15,20-22 and VI 7,16,10-13 (quoted on 5,15-16). Intellect, in its undefined state, cannot grasp the One in its entirety, but sees the One as a plurality, and splits up its unity so that what it receives from the One is definition in terms of the Forms within it. The One is seen by Intellect, as yet undefined, as the Forms.

The result of this vision is fully formed Intellect and its contents, the Forms. The Forms are Intellect's defining characteristics, its shape; compare the description in V 9,3,20 ff. of the soul's intellect as the soul's defining characteristic
 ὡς εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸν (sc. νοῦν) κατὰ τὴν μορφήν
 (V 9,3,33).

P. now explains in more detail Intellect's emergence (5,16-18). There are, in fact, two causes of Intellect's genesis, the One and itself. Note that now that the genesis of Intellect is being mentioned the tense of the verb changes. Fully formed Intellect is described by the past tense (μορφωθέντος); its genesis by the present (μορφοῦται). The context of these lines make it clear that they pick up the thought of 5,15 where the One and the Indefinite Dyad are described as the source of the Forms/numbers. Thus, παρ' αὐτοῦ (5,18) must refer to Intellect in its inchoate state, νοῦς οὕτω νοήσας (V 3,11,16). The One is the formal cause of Intellect, its own undefined state, the Indefinite Dyad, the material cause.

A similar point is made in VI 7,16,31-35 which Beutler-
 Theiler (in their note ad loc.) rightly compare with our present passage. The text runs πληρούμενος μὲν οὖν ἐγένετο, πληρωθεὶς δὲ ἦν, καὶ ὁμοῦ ἀπετελείσθη καὶ εὐρα. ἀρχὴ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνο τὸ πρὶν πληρωθῆναι ἦν. ἑτέρα δὲ ἀρχὴ οἷον ἐξῶθεν ἢ πληροῦσα ἦν, ἀφ' ἧς οἷον ἐτυποῦτο πληρούμενος. The first phrase ἐκείνο τὸ πρὶν πληρωθῆναι is translated correctly by all editors except for Br. e.g., by MK 'that state of not yet having been filled'. This state of unfulfilment is

the state of emanation from the One, that of being Intellect which is not yet Intellect (VI 7,16,13) - i.e., Intelligible Matter. The second cause is the One, which fills Intellect with the Forms (ἡ πληροῦσα), which imparts εἶδος and definition to Intellect as it comes to be. A further parallel may be found in 7,11-17, a difficult passage discussed in detail in the note ad loc..

Παρ' αὐτοῦ (5,18) is correctly interpreted (with or without the change of smooth to rough breathing) by all editors and translators except Br. who interprets it as παρ' ἀριθμοῦ . His interpretation is hardly surprising when we remember that he incorrectly thinks that 5,15-18 'indiquent assez vaguement que le nombre est comme un intermédiaire entre l'Un et les intelligibles' (p. 20 of his edition).

5,18 οἶον ὄψις ... ἐνέργειαν : The sequence of thought is almost exactly paralleled in III 8,11,1-8 ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἔστιν ὄψις τις καὶ ὄψις ὁρῶσα, δύναμις ἔσται εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθοῦσα. ἔσται τοίνυν τὸ μὲν ἕλη, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτοῦ — οἶον καὶ ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὄρασις — ἕλη δὲ ἐν νοητοῖς· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ὄρασις ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διπλὸν ἔχει· πρὶν γοῦν ἰδεῖν ἦν ἐν... τῇ μὲν οὖν ὄρασις ἡ πληρωσις παρὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἡ οἶον τελευτῶσις, τῇ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ὄψει τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πληροῦν.

In our present passage P. similarly compares the fully formed and defined Intellect with actual (as opposed to potential) seeing.

Both sight and Intellect contain elements of matter and form (or, in Sleeman's language (CQ 22 (1928), p. 30) 'Voûs like vision

in act is determined by subject and object'). On the theory of sight here referred to see J. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition (Oxford, 1906), p. 228: 'the sensory faculty is nothing but a faculty until confronted by its object. It is something which exists only potentially until the object stimulates it. By this stimulation it acquires actuality' (see Arist. de An. 416b 32 ff.). P. refers to the potentiality of sight at III 6,2,34; V 3,11,5 ὁψις οὕτω ἰδοῦσα ; V 3,11,12 ἀτύπωτος ὁψις ; V 4,2,6 ἀόριστος ὁψις .

Br. is quite wrong to suggest a lacuna after παρ' αὐτοῦ in 5,18. The thought of this passage is compressed but coherent. There is matter and form in Intellect just as there is matter and form in the actual act of sight. Defined Intellect is like ὁψις ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν . On ὁψις see following note.

5,18-19 ἔστι γὰρ ... τὸ ἐν ; P. amplifies the comparison between Intellect and sight. He follows Aristotle's distinctions between ὁψις and ὄρασις . Ὀψις is the faculty of vision which is potential until actualised; ὄρασις is the exercise of this faculty (Arist. de An. 426a 13-14 ὄρασις γὰρ λέγεται ἢ τῆς ὁψews ἐνέργεια ; ibid. 428a 6-7 αἰσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἦτοι δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὁψις καὶ ὄρασις . In 5,18 P. compares Intellect to the active faculty of vision. Now he continues the comparison by comparing its characteristic activity (νόησις) with the activity of ὁψις ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν (i.e. ὄρασις). Νόησις is a sort of ὄρασις ὁρῶσα since Intellect is an ἰδοῦσα ὁψις (V 3,11,10-11).

^εὄρασις takes place when ^δόψις is actualised; similarly, when Intellect is actualised it becomes οὐσία and νόησις . Prior to actualisation it was not νόησις , since νόησις cannot take place without an object, and before definition by the One Intellect had no objects since it was not yet Intellect (V 3,11,14 ff.). The very substance of Intellect is a form of ^εὄρασις (V 3,10,12; see also on 1,11). There is no need, then, with Vitringa to place a lacuna after ἐνέγκειαν in 5,18, since there is no difficulty in the transition from ^δόψις ἢ κατ' ἐνέγκειαν to ^εὄρασις ὁρῶσα .

The last three words of the chapter in all the mss. are ἀμφὺ τὸ ^εν which, although kept by Perna and Creuzer, have neither construction nor sense, and Ki. and Mii. change ἀμφὺ to ἀμφί . But νόησις is not 'around the One'. It is either of the One (in the sense that the One is the νοητόν), or of the contents of Intellect (in the sense that Intellect thinks itself).

Vo. followed by Br. reads καὶ ἀμφὺ τὸ ^εν and translates in accordance with the Arabic paraphrase 'sind die beide (sc. der Geist und das Erfasste) Eins' (Praef. II.xxxi); but as Schwyzer remarks (RhM. 90 (1941), p. 232) 'man sähe ^εν (weil hier nicht das metaphysische gemeint ist) lieber ohne Artikel'. Sleeman's second suggestion in CQ 22 (1928), p. 30 of ἀμφὺ τε ^εν (his first was καὶ ἀμφὺ τὰ δύο ^εν), which is adopted by Ci., Ha. and H-S, gives the same sense as Vo.'s καὶ ἀμφὺ τὸ ^εν with only a slight change of the mss. text. It is certainly the best of the proposed emendations.

The question is what two things P. is treating as identical. Vo., Br., Ci., Ha. and MK think that ἀμφω must refer to the subject and object of Intellect i.e., to Intellect and the Forms. And certainly ἀμφω ἓν is quite a common phrase in this sense (III 8,8,6. 8,10; IV 6,2,23-24; V 6,1,5-6. 1,11-12; V 9,8,16; VI 9,10,13). However, Intellect's characteristic of self intellection is not the point here, and it is difficult to supply νοῦς and τὰ εἶδη as the antecedents of ἀμφω. It is better, therefore, to understand ἀμφω as referring to νοῦς and νόησις. Νοῦς is the subject of 5,17-18 and νόησις the subject of 5,18-19. Νόησις is the same as ὁρασις ὁρώσα or ὅψις ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, which has been identified in 5,18 with a fully developed Intellect. It is good Plotinian doctrine that νοῦς and νόησις are the same (see e.g., V 3,5,28. 6,7. 11,14).

CHAPTER SIX

This chapter continues the discussion of the One begun in Chapter 5. The problem of the identity of the father of νοῦς (τίς οὖν ὁ τοῦτον γεννήσας 5,3-4) is followed by discussion of the method of the genesis (6,15-41) which is explained in terms of emanation and reversion, emanation being explained by means of the double-activity theory (6,30-37); note the similar arrangement in V 4,1,23 ff. and V 4,2,26 ff. where questions about Intellect (πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ; and πῶς μένοντες ἐκείνου γίνονται ;) lead on to the double-activity theory. The final section of the chapter (6,41-53) treats of the relationship between the newly-formed Intellect and the One, and continues into Chapter 7.

The genesis of Intellect is not an entirely new topic - it was discussed in numerical terms in Chapter 5 - but it is here treated more fully and explicitly than in the previous chapter.

- 6,1 πῶς οὖν ... τίνα ; : The subject is νοῦς (from ἀμφω in 5,19) and τίνα is masculine, though Fic., Br. and MK translate it as though it were neuter.
- 6,1-2 καὶ πῶς ... γέγονεν : On ὑπόστασις see on 3,9-10. The phrase ἐξ ἐκείνου stresses the connexion between the hypostasis and the external activity of its prior (cf. 6,4-5; V 3,16,16).
- 6,2 ἵνα καὶ ὁρᾷ ; : Ha. correctly translates καί by 'überhaupt' ('at all'); see his note on this usage at I 9,2 and compare also VI 6,10,30-31 ἐν δὲ οἷς συμβέβηκε τὸ ἀγαθὸν (sc. λέγει), δεῖ εἶναι φέσιν ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα καὶ ἄλλοις συμβεβήκη...

This nuance is missed by Br. and MK. On the vocabulary of

perception see on 1,11.

6,2-3 $\nu\acute{\upsilon}\nu \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \dots \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota : \acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\eta\nu \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ is common in Hellenistic Greek (among both pagan and Christian authors) to express obligation (see Arndt-Gingrich s.v. $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\eta$ I). But to translate our present passage by 'the soul must be these things' would be to write nonsense. P. is obviously referring to the soul's conviction of the existence of plurality and of its dependence on the One. Ha. is probably right to note (ad loc.) that $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota$ is 'merkwürdig prägnant verwendet im Sinne inneren Besitzes und Wissens.' The meaning is that soul accepts the necessity that this is the case (cf. VI 4,4,4-5).

Editors vary on how they take $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\alpha$ in 6,3. Ha. paraphrases it by 'die genannten Prinzipien des Geistes' which are presumably the Intelligible Categories. Ci. translates '... le real[iz]tà dello spirito dovevano esistere, così come abbiām detto.' MK ('these Beings') apparently thinks that $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\alpha$ means the other hypostases (apart from the One), while Br. ('il en est ainsi nécessairement') and probably Fic. ('necessitatem ipsam, per quam haec fiant') take $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\alpha \acute{\epsilon}\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota$ as the equivalent of $\acute{\omicron}\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$.

Ha. can hardly be right. P. finished with the categories in Chapter 4, although Ha., reading $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ for $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ in 5,16, tried to introduce a reference to them there. MK's 'these Beings' is also unsatisfactory because soul, the subject of the sentence, would hardly refer to Intellect and itself by $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\alpha$. The interpretation of Fic. and Br., that $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\alpha \acute{\epsilon}\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota$ =

οὕτως ἔχειν , is attractive, except for the fact that the synonymy of the phrases is difficult to parallel. Ci. with his 'realità dello Spirito' is on the right lines. The paradox is that the One has engendered the rich variety of Intellect.

Ταῦτα refers vaguely to this plurality. Its probable grammatical reference, I think, is to the Forms of 5,16.

- 6,3-4 ἔπιποθεῖ δὲ ... δὴ τοῦτο : The soul is intuitively sure that Intellect comes from the One, but wants to know the rational explanation for this fact as well. Note the force of ἔπι- in ἔπιποθεῖ . For ἐπιποθεῖν meaning 'to want to know the answer to' see Pl. Prt. 329d 1-2.

Mss. vary in their spelling of *θεωλούμενον* (with one or two λ s). According to Dindorf's note in Stephanus s.v. *θεῶντος* , the word and its cognates should be spelt with a single λ (see also Eustathius on Homer Il. 23.396 (vol. iv. 294.23-24 (Stallbaum)) ταῦτα δὲ ἡ πλείων χεῖς δὲ ἑνὸς λ οἶδε προφέρειν). The 'correct' spelling with a single λ is retained in our present passage by Vo. and Br. (ignored by H-S). But we know that P. cared little for orthography (V.P. 8.4 ff.). *Θεωλούμενον* should certainly be kept.

- 6,4 καὶ παρὰ τοῖς παλαι σοφοῖς : For this use of *παρὰ* meaning 'apud', see LSJ s.v. B.II.4, and Wolters' note on III 5,8,6-7. He compares 8,24 and II 9,6,42.

The ancient philosophers referred to are presumably the Presocratics mentioned in Chapters 8-9, whom, together with Plato, P. saw as the precursors of his own philosophy. Compare VI 1,1,1-2

where οἱ πάντες παλαιοί similarly refer to the Presocratics. Since they were committed to belief in a single ἀρχή, they too, like P., had to explain the provenance of plurality.

6,4-6 πῶς ἐξ ἑνὸς τοῦτου... ἀριθμός : This question is often repeated by P. (cf. III 8,10,14-15; III 9,4,1; V 2,1,3-4; V 3,15,1 ff.. 16,16 ff.; V 4,1,23; V 9,14,2 ff.), though the answers which he gives are not always the same. In the early treatises V 1, V 2 and V 4, P. answers by referring to the theory of double-activity (see on 3,9-10). In III 9,4, however, (13th in Porphyry's chronological order), the omnipresence of the One is given as the reason for the existence of plurality while its being nowhere ensures its transcendence. In the late V 3,15 (49th according to Porphyry), the One is said to be able to produce plurality because it contains it potentially. These different answers do not point to development in P.'s thought; they are merely different ways of looking at the process of generation. The theory of double-activity explains its method, omnipresence and the theory of V 3 the suppositions behind it.

In οἶον λέγομεν τὸ ἓν εἶναι in 6,5, the reference can hardly be to any part of V 1, for P. has not yet given much information about the One. Λέγομεν might mean 'we Platonists' (cf., e.g., II 9,4,6 φαμέν; VI 2,2,10 λέγομεν; VI 7,25,27 φαμέν; VI 7,37,18 ὁμολογοῦμεν) or alternatively, P. might be using plural for singular, and λέγομεν might refer to his own views on the nature of the One, to be found, e.g., in VI 9, the previous treatise. Either alternative is plausible; and

since P. believed that he was merely an interpreter of Plato, perhaps there is little difference between them.

On ὑπόστασιν ἔχει see on 6,1-2.

6,5 picks up the terms used in Chapter 5; πλήθος (5,4), δυνάς (5,6 ff.), ἀριθμός (5,5 ff.).

6,6-7 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔμεινεν ... ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ : Compare V 4,1,26-36
 ὅτι δ' ἂν τῶν ἄλλων εἰς τελευτὴν ἴη, ὁρῶμεν γεννῶν
 καὶ οὐκ ἀνεχόμενον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένειν ... πῶς οὖν τὸ
 τελευτάτον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν ἐν αὐτῷ σταίη ὥστε φθονῆσαι
 ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἀδυνατῆσαν; cf. IV 8,6,1 ff.. In this passage and in our
 present passage P. connects τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένειν with
 inactivity. And the only reasons for inactivity would be lack
 of power which is impossible for the One (see on 5,3-4) or envy,
 which Plato expressly denied of anything good (Ti. 29e 1-2 ἀγαθῷ
 δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος ; see
 on 6,37-38). More often, the concept of μένειν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ
 is readily attributed to the One and Intellect because it guarantees
 them against being affected by their productive activity, and thus
 safeguards P. against the charge of pantheism. Only the soul pro-
 duces whilst moving (III 4,1,2) since it can move away from
 Intellect and become affected by the body. Both these meanings of
 μένειν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ can be found in Chapter 6. Compare our
 present passage with 6,12-13 ἐκείνῳ ἐν τῷ εἶσι οἷον νῦν ἐφ'
 ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, μένοντος ἡσυχου ὑπέκτα πάντων .
 The same is true of V 4. In V 4,1,34-36, 'remaining in itself' is
 connected with φθόνος , yet in V 4,2,12-13, the One is described

as ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένων καὶ οὐκ ὄν ἐνδεής, and no notion of envy is involved.

6,7

τοσοῦτον... ἐξέρρηγῃ :

In 3,11 P. denied emanation

(ἐκρεῖν) of Intellect and by implication of the One (see on 3,10-12). However, in that passage it was a material or quantitative emanation of the substance of Intellect which he denied, since the external activity of Intellect does not affect its internal activity in the same way as the internal activity of fire is affected by the production of heat (i.e. fire gets colder). Here, however, the point of view is different; the internal activity of the One is not explicitly under discussion. The emanation concerned is the external activity, which - as P. explains in 6,30 ff. - mimics a natural process. The use of a word, usually found in material contexts - Aristotle, for example, uses ἐκρεῖν of rivers, blood, air and hair - with a non-material meaning is common in P. in his explanation of the procession, which is after all a material process adapted to an immaterial philosophy (note V 2,1,8-9 οἷον ὑπερέρρηγῃ καὶ τὸ ὑποπλήρης αὐτοῦ πεποιήκεν ἄλλο ; note also the use of προχεῖν in III 8,10,4 and V 2,1,14-16; and of ἐκχεῖν in VI 8,18,20 and VI 9,9,3).

6,7-8

ὃ ὁράται... ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς ; τὰ ὄντα is here being used in its widest extension to include the physical world (cf. 6,30). The πλῆθος of the physical world presupposes the existence of the One.

Ci. correctly notes that Br. omits to translate 6,7-8 (τοσοῦτον... οὐρανοῖς) in his edition.

- 6,8 ἀνάγειν δὲ αὐτὸ ... ἀξιοῦμεν : The use of the first person plural ἀξιοῦμεν raises the same problem as that of λέγομεν in 6,5 (see note ad loc.). With ἀνάγειν compare V 4,1,1-4.
- 6,8-15 ὦδε οὖν ... τὸν τρόπον : These lines serve as an introduction to the main topic of Chapter 6, the description of the genesis of Intellect (6, 15-41).
- 6,8-10 ὦδε οὖν λεγέσθω ... ἐκείνον : P.'s attitude towards prayer and invocation can best be discussed under two heads; first, the use of invocation as an artifice of style, and secondly, the meaning and method of philosophical prayer.

P. invokes God only rarely, in fact, only four times - in our present passage; in III 7,11,6 ff. where he mentions the possibility of calling on the Muses to recount to him the birth of time, only to dismiss it on the grounds that the Muses did not yet exist; in IV 9,4,6-7, where he prefaces his discussion of the unity of soul with λέγομεν οὖν θεὸν συντήπτορα ἡμῶν γινέσθαι παρακαλέσαντες; and in V 8,9,13 ff. where he describes how to form an impression of the Intelligible World, and then adds a prayer for the epiphany of the God whose impression the soul has.

In the first three passages, the appeal to God prefaces an attempt to answer a difficult problem - the derivation of plurality from unity in V 1, the genesis of time in III 7 and the unity of the soul in IV 9. This stylistic use of prayer as an introduction to a new and difficult discussion is at least as old as Homer. The catalogue of ships at Iliad 2.494 ff. is prefaced by an appeal to

the Olympian Muses, for example. P.'s more immediate inspiration, however, was probably Plato; in Ti. 27c 1 ff., for example, Timaeus begins his speech by an appeal to the gods and goddesses to assist him; or in Lg. 893b 1 ff. the Athenian stranger calls upon the gods when he is about to attempt an explanation of their own existence (cf. also Phlb. 25b 8-10 and 61b 11 ff.; id. Epin. 980c 1 ff.). Invocation of the gods, then, as a preface to discussion is merely a convention of style, and as such is imitated by later Neoplatonists. (References have been collected by A. Brinkmann, Alexandri Lycopolitani Contra Manichaei Opiniones Disputatio (Leipzig, 1895), p. 9; see also H. P. Esser, Untersuchungen zu Gebet und Gottesverehrung der Neuplatoniker (Diss. Köln, 1967), p. 21 and Saffrey and Westerink, Proclus. Théologie Platonicienne (Paris, 1968) I p. 7, n. 4.)

Thus, from the stylistic point of view, the invocation in our present passage is conventional. But P. goes on to describe the method of prayer, and this prayer emerges not as prayer in any religious sense, which played only a minor role in his philosophy (see e.g. IV 4,26,1 ff.. 30,1 ff.), but prayer in the sense of the ἐπιστροφή, the turning back towards unification with Intellect and the One.

In the philosophical traditions of P.'s time, prayer was considered not as a request (αἶτησις) but as a ὁμιλία with God (cf. Max. Tyr. 63.10-13) (Hobein) ἄλλα οὐ μὲν ἡγεῖ τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου εὐχὴν αἶτησιν εἶναι πῶν οὐ παρόντων, ἐγὼ δὲ ὁμιλίαν καὶ διάλεκτον πρὸς τοὺς θεούς; cf. Clem. Al.

Strom. VII. VII. 39.6). This ὥμῆα was to take place through quiet contemplation, on the grounds that stillness was fitting for the divine. Apollonius of Tyana, for example (ap. Porph. Abst. 163.20-22 (Nauck)), says that God should be worshipped εἰς... σιγῆς καθαρᾶς καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ καθαρῶν ἐννοιῶν ; cf. Procl. in R. I. 85.3 (Kroll); Iamb. Myst. VIII. 3). Silence was considered as a sign of mystic prayer (see H. Schmidt, 'Veteres Philosophi Quomodo Iudicaverint de Precibus', Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 4 (1907) Heft I, p. 68; O. Casel, 'De Philosophorum Graecorum Silentio Mystico', Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 16 (1919) Heft II, p. 114). Silence, of course, precludes the spoken word, the λόγος προφορικός of the Stoics (on which see on 3,7-8). Λόγος γερωνός in our present passage is synonymous with λόγος προφορικός (Philo uses the two phrases as alternatives; see De Fug. et Inv. 92; De Abr. 83; De Vit. Mos. II. 127); but for P. prayer does not involve the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος either. As he explains in 6,10, it involves the stretching out of self, through the soul, towards God, whom we can now identify as the One.

The phrase ἐκτείναντες ἑαυτοὺς (6,10) is couched in the language of religious worship. The stretching out of one's hands to the gods was a common accompaniment of prayer. The word used to describe this gesture was sometimes ἐκτείνειν (although examples of this are late; see, e.g., Philoponus De Opificio Mundi 49.12 (Reichardt)), more usually ἀνατείνειν (see C. Sittl, Die Gebärden der Griechen und Römer (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 174 ff. 'die Gebärden des Gebetes'). Ἐκτείνειν, however, is used of the

soul in Stoic contexts to describe the ability of the soul to reach out to God (Sen. Ep. 92.30; M. Ant. XI. 1.2). In P.'s adaptation, the soul must stretch itself out in prayer; but this means that the soul must ascend towards the One, and it can only do this by means of the other hypostases - i.e., through the reversion by which it must become united with Intellect and subsequently with the One. The method is hinted at in V 8,9, 13 ff. in which P. prays for the epiphany of Intellect when the soul has formed an impression of the Intelligible World by the abstraction of ^{2'}ὄγκος from an impression of the physical world; i.e. when it has disposed itself so that it is able to receive Intellect, then it can pray for it to come. When the soul is like Intellect it can approach it. Similarly when the soul is alone it can approach the Alone (see on 6,11). Note the use of ἀφαιρῆν in V 8,9,11; cf. V 3,17,38 ἀφελὲ πάντα .

The soul's prayer is an approach towards the unity of the One. It is more than a ὁμιλία , if ὁμιλία means the association of two distinct things. Prayer is unification, the φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον (VI 9,11,51).

Ἐπικαλεσάμενους (6,9) is a dative of agent. KG give no example of its use with any tense except perfect and pluperfect outside Homer (KG II. 1.422c.). Examples can be found, however, in papyri (see Mayser, Grammatik, II. 2. 273.1 ff.).

With the phrase τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκτείνασιν (6,10) compare Max. Tyr. 20.9-10 (Hobein) δύνανται... ἀνατεινόμενοι τῇ ψυχῇ τῷ θεῷ ἐντυγχάνειν and with the dative τῇ ψυχῇ

III 7,5,1. Creuzer's $\gamma\epsilon\gamma\omega\nu\acute{o}\tau\epsilon$ for $\gamma\epsilon\gamma\omega\nu\acute{\omega}$ (6,9) is quite wrong.

6,11 $\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\chi\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota \dots \mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu$: On the formula ' $\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu$ ' and similar instances of juxtaposition see E. Peterson, 'Herkunft und Bedeutung der ΜΟΝΟΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΜΟΝΟΝ — Formel bei Plotin ,' Philologus 88 (1933), pp. 30-41. Peterson points out that the juxtaposition of $\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ in different terminations was a common trick of style (op. cit. p. 34; see also E.R. Dodds in Entr. p. 17). P. uses the 'formula' four times — in our present passage; in I 6,7,9 ($\alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega \mu\acute{o}\nu\omega \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omicron \mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu$); in VI 7,34,7-8 ($\mu\acute{o}\nu\eta \mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu$); and in VI 9,11,51 ($\phi\upsilon\gamma\eta \mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\upsilon \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu$) — but for him the stylistic effect of the phrase is secondary. The meeting of the alone and the Alone is the aim of philosophical prayer, and the state of being alone is achieved only by purification. P. stresses this in all the passages in which the formula occurs except our own. For example in I 6,7,4 ff. P. describes how the soul must strip off the accretions of the lower world, so that by an anabasis it can see God. Similarly he says in VI 7,34,5-8 $\text{οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἔχοντά τι ἄλλο καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα περὶ αὐτὸ οὔτε ἰδεῖν οὔτε ἐναρμονεῖναι. ἂν δὲ μήτε κακὸν μήτ' αἰ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἄλλο πρόχειρον ἔχειν, ἵνα δέξῃται μόνῃ μόνον}$. And the flight of the alone to the Alone at the end of VI 9 consists in an $\alpha\pi\alpha\rho\lambda\lambda\alpha\gamma\eta$ $\tau\omega\nu \tau\eta\delta\epsilon$. From these passages it becomes quite clear how our present passage should be understood. Prayer for P. is purification, and purification is the method of reversion towards

the head of the *πρόοδος*. Only when the soul is like God in being unfettered by the accretions of plurality is unification, the goal of P.'s philosophy, attainable.

The *μόνος μόνον* formula also occurs in Numenius (fr. 2.12; cf. fr. 19.7) and Arnou thinks (*Désir de Dieu* (2nd ed. Rome, 1967), p. 53) that P. may have been stimulated to use it by him. Numenius is speaking of association with the Good: οὕτως δεῖ τινα ἀπελθόντα πόρρω ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὁμιλῆσαι πρὸς ἀγαθῷ μόνῳ μόνον. Peterson, however, discounts Arnou's view (op. cit., p. 37) on the grounds that the ὁμιλῆσαι μόνῳ μόνον 'nicht das Ergebnis eines Aufstieges ist bei dem der Mensch selber ein *μόνος* wird, der so dem *μόνον* begegnet.' But it seems to me that Numenius may have been thinking of an 'Aufstieg'. How is one to get πόρρω τῶν αἰσθητῶν except by some method of purification? P. develops this idea much more fully than Numenius, but the possibility that the idea of using the formula occurred to P. from reading Numenius cannot be discounted. Dodds is right to note, however, (loc. cit.), that in view of the fact that *μόνος μόνον* is tolerably common, no certainty on this matter is possible.

6,12-15 δεῖ τοίνυν θεατῆν... τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον : The transition from prayer to the imagery of the temple is easy and natural. In VI 9,11,16 ff. the One is similarly compared to the experience enjoyed within the sanctuary and Intellect to the surrounding statuary; ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἤδη ὑπερθέων, ὑπερβὰς ἤδη καὶ τὸν πῶν ἀρετῶν χόρον, ὥσπερ τις εἰς τὸ εἶσω τοῦ

ἀδύτου εἰσὶς εἰς τοῦπίσω, καταλιπὼν τὰ ἐν τῷ νεῷ ἅγα
 ἃ ἐξελθόντι τοῦ ἀδύτου πάλιν γίνεται πρῶτα μετὰ τὸ ἐν
 θέαμα καὶ τὴν ἐκεῖ συνουσίαν πρὸς οὐκ ἄγαθον οὐδὲ
 εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ αὐτό . Ha. suggests in his note to this

passage that P. was thinking of worship in an Egyptian temple.

Certainly, he knew about Egyptian temples (cf. ἐν τοῖς

ἱεροῖς V 8,6,6-7) and Egyptian temples did contain an inner

sanctuary and a surrounding courtyard in which statues of gods

were placed (see H. W. Fairman, Worship and Festivals in an

Egyptian Temple (Manchester, 1954). But such a lay-out is also

found in the temple at Eleusis (see G. E. Mylonas, Eleusis and the

Eleusinian Mysteries (Princeton and London, 1961); the anaktoron

(op. cit. p. 84) was inside the telesterion in which the cult-stat

of Demeter and other deities were put (op. cit. p. 189)) and it

is the type of religion which P. had in mind which is important

(reference in V 5,11,12 ff. to festivals where certain people

are excluded because of their γαστρεπαγία is probably a

reference to Eleusis; see E.R. Dodds, JRS 37 (1947), p. 58, n. 33)

This is certainly some sort of mystery religion, in which the

culmination of the initiation was the opening of the inner shrine

and the display to the initiates of the cult objects of the god

or goddess. In VI 9,11,1-2, P. specifically refers to τὸ πῶν

μυστηρίων πῶνδε ἐπίταγμα which can leave us in no doubt

that the example which follows also refers to a mystery cult.

In our present passage, P. has in mind the same thing. The phrase

μόνον πρὸς μόνον introduces the notion of purification (see

note on 6,11), and purification was an essential part of the initiation process. Following on from Plato (cf. Phd. 69c 8 ff.; Smp. 210a 1 ff.; Phdr. 250b 5 ff.) P. saw spiritual progress as analogous to initiation in a cult. Only through purification could the soul reach the One. Consequently, his philosophy is not for everyone, since not everyone is capable of such purification (cf. V 8,2,43-45 ὥστε μάτην ἂν οὕτως ἔχων [ῥητοῖς ἐκείνο· αἰσχεῖ γάρ καὶ οὐ καθαρῷ ῥητήσεως. διὸ οὐδὲ πρὸς πάντας οἱ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγοι]).

The stages of initiation correspond to the stages of the soul's journey through the hypostases. The aim is the vision of the One who inhabits the inner shrine (οἶον ἔνδον ἐν ἁγίοις ἱεροῖς μένον οὐδὲ προϊὼν εἰς τὸ ἔξω I 6,8,2-3) and the One can only be seen by the fully purified. The images outside the shrine (i.e. Intellect and the Forms) are only reflections of the splendour of the One.

P. uses a similar but this time non-religious image at VI 7,35,7 ff., where he compares Intellect to a beautiful house and the One to its owner. Wonder at the beauty of the images inside the house is eclipsed by the wonder aroused by the sight of the owner. Note also the quotation from Pl. Phlb. 64c 1 at V 9,2,24-27 νοῦς δὲ προέστηκε μὲν ἀρχῆς τῆς πρώτης ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἐν προθυρίῳ τὰγαθοῦ ἐπαγγελίων ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, ὥ περ ἐκείνου τύπος μᾶλλον ἐν πηθεῖ ἐκείνου...μένοντος (cf. further I 6,9,37-39). In our present passage P. is careful to apologise for his image by the use of οἶον (6,12-13).

6,12-13 ἐκείνου ... ἐπέκυνα πάντων : On ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ and μένειν see on 6,6-7. Here there is no connotation of φθόρος. Ἐπέκυνα (6,13) can hardly fail to call to mind Plato's description of the Good in R. 509b 9 as ἐπέκυνα τῆς οὐσίας. But the One for P. is not only beyond οὐσία, but beyond all predication whatsoever (V 4,1,10-12; VI 7,41,38), since as final cause of it is none of the things of which it is the cause (see V 5,6,9 ff. οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ὃν μόνον ἂν λέγοιτο ἐπέκειν τούτων· ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὸ ὄν ; cf. V 4,1,5; VI 7,42,12-13). For other references to ἐπέκυνα and ἐπέκυνα τῆς οὐσίας see 8,7-8; I 7,1,19-20; III 8,9,2; V 3,13,2-3. 17,13-14; V 4,1,10; V 6,6,29-30; VI 6,5,37; VI 7,40,26-27; VI 8,16,34; VI 9,11,42.

On the ἡσυχία of the One see on 2,14-17.

6,13-14 τὰ οἷον ... ἑστῶτα : With the position of ἡδὴ compare IV 5,7,52-53 οἷαν ἐλέγομεν τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκίαν ἡδὴ ζωήν. No separate translation is needed; it merely serves to emphasise the contrast between the external (Intellect) and the internal (the One).

The ἀγάλματα are the 'contents' of Intellect, the Forms. Note how in the following phrase P. prefers the singular term (ἀγάλμα τὸ πρῶτον) to the plural. This first appearance is presumably the undefined emanation which after definition becomes Intellect.

ἑστῶτα has a double meaning. It has a spatial sense - the statues are standing πρὸς τὰ ἔξω (note that Vitringa

perhaps rightly suspects τὸ) - and it also picks up ἡσυχίου in 6,13. The contents of νοῦς are also 'still' (see on 2,14-17).

- 6,15 πεφηνὸς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον : Fic. translates this phrase: '(imo vero statuat primo effulgentem) hoc modo, quo naturaliter inspicere potest, (inspicere sc. oportet).' This translation suggests that he read (or conjectured) πεφικὸς instead of πεφηνός . There is no trace of πεφικὸς as a mss. variant, and the sense it gives is quite out of place. Πεφηνὸς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον introduces the forthcoming discussion of the genesis of Intellect. All other translators give acceptable versions, e.g. Ha.: 'auf die folgende Weise erscheint.'

- 6,15-17 παντὶ τῷ κινουμένῳ ... κινεῖσθαι : 6,15-41 discuss in detail the genesis of Intellect; P. begins his explanation by a general statement.

The idea that every movement is end-directed is found often in Aristotle. See for example Ph. 219a 10-11 τὸ κινούμενον κινεῖται ἐκ τινος εἰς τι (cf. ibid. 224b 1; ibid. 241b 10; Cael. 288b 29-30; Metaph. 999b 10). Movement of the One could be of two sorts. It could be a movement actually made by the One to bring about the birth (for πρῶξις as κίνησις see Arist. Metaph. 1022b 5; id. EE 1220b 27; cf. id. Metaph. 1022a 7) or it could be the movement caused by the One's mere intention to produce, since every thought is a movement (V 6,5,8-9 καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶ νοεῖν κίνησις πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐπίμενον ἐκείνου; VI 7,35,2-3 τὸ νοεῖν κίνησις τις ᾗν ; cf. 6,26-27). No

sort of movement is applicable to the One because the One, being perfectly self-sufficient, has no end outside itself to which it might be directed. On the contrary, the One is the object of the desire and movement of everything else (V 5,12,5-8; VI 9,9,33; cf. V 3,15,10-11). As P. has explained, it remains ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ... ἐπέκεινα πάντων .

6,17-19 ἀλλ' εἴ τι μετ' αὐτὸ ... γιγνέναι : The interpretation of this passage has caused great difficulty. The problem, however, is quite simple, and basically concerns the reference of ἐκείνου and αὐτό in 6,18. Either (a) ἐκείνου refers to the One and αὐτό is reflexive or (b) ἐκείνου refers to the subject of 6,17-18 (τὸ μετὰ τὸ εἶν) and αὐτό to the One. A useful list of the adherents of the two main views may be found at the end of H-S III in the addenda ad textum to V 1,6,18. To this list should be added J. Igal (Emerita 39 (1971), p. 135) and A. Graeser (Gnomon 44 (1972), p. 824, n. 2) who support (a); and P. Aubin (Le Problème de la "Conversion" (Paris, 1963), pp. 161 ff. and Beutler-Theiler (t. vi. p. 110) who support (b). Note that H-S have now revised the opinion which they put forward in the apparatus to our present passage.

Discussion of the problem must begin by a consideration of P.'s use of the words ἐπιστροφή and ἐπιστρέφειν when he is dealing with the genesis of Intellect from the One. V 2,1,7 ff. gives a clear statement of his views. There are two moments in the creation of Intellect - first, the One gives off an emanation and then this emanation (τὸ γινόμενον) turns towards

the One and is filled by it (εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπιστρέφῃ καὶ ἐπληρώθῃ καὶ γίνετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπων καὶ νοῦς οὗτος V 2,1,9-11). Similarly, in VI 7,16,14 ff. the undefined emanation is said to turn towards the One (ἐπέστραπτο πρὸς αὐτό VI 7, 16,15-16) and P. continues ἡ κίνησις αὕτη πληρωθεῖσα ... οὐκέτι κίνησις ἦν μόνον, ἀλλὰ κίνησις διακορῆς καὶ πλήρης (VI 7,16,16-18). Similar references to ἐπιστροφή can be found at I 7,1,23 (δεῖ οὖν μένειν αὐτό, πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπιστρέφειν πάντα); V 4,2,4-5 (νόησις δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὁρῶσα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπιστρεφείσα καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου οἶον ἀποτελουμένη) and at VI 7,37,21 (ἐπιστρεφέν (sc. τὸ ἐξ ἄλλου) ἐν τῇ θείᾳ καὶ γνωρίσαν, νοῦν ἤδη δικαίως εἶναι). Thus it seems quite clear that the ἐπιστροφή intimately connected with the genesis of Intellect is the ἐπιστροφή of Intellect towards the One, and not the ἐπιστροφή of the One towards itself. The single passage which seems to throw some doubt on this conclusion is V 1,7,5-6 (πῶς οὖν νοῦν γεννᾷ; ἢ ὅτι τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ εἴ- ρα). But the ambiguity in this passage is the same as that in our own. What is the reference of αὐτό and the subject of εἴρα ? V 1,7,5-6 cannot be adduced in favour of either interpretation.

One must agree, it seems to me, that the usual ἐπιστροφή is the ἐπιστροφή of Intellect towards the One, and that it is prima facie unlikely that P. would try to explain the genesis of Intellect by an ἐπιστροφή of the One towards itself, especially since this latter view is not the view of the immediately subsequent treatise V 2. Furthermore, ἐπιστροφή is explicitly called a movement

in VI 7,16,16 (ἥ δὲ κίνησις αὐτῇ) and P. is particularly anxious in our present passage to avoid connecting movement of any sort with the creative activity of the One (see 6,17 μὴ τιθώμεθα αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι ; 6,22 οὐ κινηθέντος ; 6,25 δεῖ οὖν ἀκινήτου ὄντος ; 6,26-27 οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος). If an ἐπιστροφή πρὸς αὐτό is to be the cause of the birth of Intellect, then this ἐπιστροφή must be motionless. Hadot (RHR 164 (1963), p. 94) thinks that ἐπιστροφή πρὸς αὐτό means the same as 'repos en soi-même' and he compares V 4,2,19 ff. (εἴτε οὖν μένοντος αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γίνεται κτλ.). But it is paradoxical, to say the least, to think of self-ἐπιστροφή and μονή ἐν ἑαυτῷ as synonymous. Aubin (op. cit. pp. 162-163) thinks that self-ἐπιστροφή is denied of the One explicitly in V 3,1,3-4 (ὥς τοῦ ἀπλοῦ παντάπασιν ὄντος οὐ δυναμένου εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφειν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ κατανόησιν). Τ' ἀπλοῦν in this passage, however, is associated with Intellect and not with the One, for P. goes on to say that self-κατανόησις is associated with Intellect yet does not prevent it from being ἀπλοῦν (V 3,1,12 ff.). However, it is perhaps implicit that what is asserted of Intellect should be denied of the One.

But if there are objections to interpreting the passage to refer to the One's self-ἐπιστροφή, as many have been brought against the opposite interpretation. First among them is the objection on linguistic grounds (see Schwyzer in Mus. Hel. 26 (1969), p. 260; and Igal (loc. cit.)). The reference of ἐκείνῳ in 6,17, 6,24 and 6,28 is clearly to the One; but if interpretation

(b) is correct the reference of ἐκείνου in 6,18 must be to 'whatever comes after the One' i.e. Intellect presumably in its undefined state. This change of reference is admittedly awkward but note a similar change in the reference of αὐτό in 6,26 and 27. Schwyzer makes a second point about the genitive absolute. If undefined Intellect is the subject of the sentence, one would expect ἐπιστροφὴν αὐτὸ ἐκείνο ... γυγνέναι. This objection is not compelling, however; on the use of the genitive absolute where a participle in another case is possible see KG III.110 and Schwyzer himself in RE 518.53 ff..

More important are the philosophical objections. Hadot (loc. cit.) makes two points; first, that these lines of Chapter 6 are in a context which deals with the immobility of the One, so that mention of the ἐπιστροφή of Intellect would be otiose; and secondly, that if it is to turn towards the One, Intellect must already be engendered, which is absurd, if the passage is supposed to explain its genesis; compare Schwyzer (Mus. Hel. 26 (1969), p. 260): 'der Geist nicht entstehen kann, wenn er sich schon zu jenem aufgemacht hat'.

Both these objections can, I think, be answered. To take the second first: P. makes it quite clear (e.g. in VI 7,16,13 ff.) that the subject of the ἐπιστροφή towards the One is undefined; it is what he calls an Intellect which is not yet Intellect (ἀλλ' οὕτω νοῦς ᾧν ἐκείνο βλέπων; cf. V 3,11,16 νοῦς οὕτω νοησας). And in a sense it is its definition which is the cause of its being. P. stresses that only when it sees the One

and is as it were filled by it does the emanation become Intellect. Note the use of $\eta\delta\eta$ in VI 7,16,20 ($\nu\omicron\omega\varsigma \eta\delta\eta \eta\nu$) and VI 7,37,21 ($\nu\omicron\omega\nu \eta\delta\eta$) to mark this change of station. Only through the $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\rho\phi\eta'$ does Intellect become Intellect. Until the moment of $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\rho\phi\eta$ Intellect is still in a state of 'coming-to-be'. Note the very careful use of language in VI 7,16,31-32 $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \omicron\omega\nu \epsilon\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\tau\omicron$, $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\omega\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma \delta\epsilon \eta\nu$. Full existence is not possible without definition by the One; only after the $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\rho\phi\eta'$ is the undefined emanation from the One fully Intellect. Hadot and Schwyzer are wrong to notice an inconsistency in P.'s saying that the $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\rho\phi\eta'$ of Intellect results in its genesis. The Intellect in question is a $\nu\omicron\omega\varsigma \omicron\omega\pi\omega \nu\omicron\eta\varsigma\alpha\varsigma$ (which P. sometimes merely calls $\nu\omicron\omega\varsigma$, without the addition of any qualifying adjective - e.g., in V 3,11,12); only by $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\rho\phi\eta'$ towards the One by which it searches for its $\omicron\omega\varsigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (VI 7,37,20) does this Intellect become fully recognizable as Intellect the second hypostasis.

Bearing in mind P.'s careful use of language in VI 7, we must now look at the context of our present passage and see if the $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\rho\phi\eta'$ of the undefined Intellect really is out of place, as Hadot suggests. 6,16-17 assert that no movement is to be involved in the One's creative activity. The rest of the sentence continues: "Suppose something does come to be after the One; it must have to come to be ($\gamma\epsilon\gamma\omicron\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$) by an eternal $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\rho\phi\eta'$ towards the One", i.e. although it is derived ultimately from the One, it does not fully become Intellect until it has turned

back towards the One; and this ἐπιστροφή¹ is a movement not of the One but of the One's product, the undefined Intellect. Thus the movement involved in genesis (for genesis is a μεταβολή¹ according to Aristotle and therefore a κίνησις : see e.g. Arist. GC 320a 12-13; Cat. 15a 13) is a movement not of the One itself but of its product.

Theiler (RIPh 92 (1970), p. 296) is quite right to notice that P. is distinguishing in this passage 'zwischen dem Zustandekommen des vorläufigen (unbestimmten) Geistes, und der Vollendung zum eigentlichen νοῦς durch Hinwendung.' After the parenthesis on γένεσις ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ (6,19-22, which refers to the whole process of emanation and ἐπιστροφή¹), P. concentrates on the emanation from the One, i.e. undefined Intellect. Note the use of the present participle in 6,23. Τὸ οὖν γινόμενον ἐκείθεν means 'that which is still in the state of coming-to-be from the One' (cf. 6,18 γίνεται). He then goes on to show that this emanation is the result of a natural, non-intentional activity, which resembles the activity of fire which emits heat, or of snow which emits cold (6,25-37).

What is surprising about our present passage is that the ἐπιστροφή¹ is mentioned before the undefined emanation. In V 2,1,9 ff. the order of description is much more usual. The 'overflowing' of the One is the cause of the emanation and the emanation is subsequently defined by looking towards its source. No careful distinctions are drawn here between νοῦς γινόμενος and νοῦς γεγενημένος, as I think P. intends to draw in our

present passage. In V 2 the emanation is called simply τὸ
 γινόμενον . The inversion of ideas in V 1,6 is probably
 due to the context. P. has emphasised that there is no motion
 involved in the activities of the One. But the concept of genesis
 which he introduces in 6,11-18 (εἴ τι μετ' αὐτὸ γίνεται)
 brings with it the concept of motion, since genesis involves motion.
 To avoid imputing this motion to the One, P. suddenly introduces
 the ἐπιστροφή of undefined Intellect, so that the motion can
 be explained. Ἐπιστροφή , as P. says in VI 7,16,16, is a
 κίνησις . Thus νοῦς comes to be through its own movement,
 and not through movement from the One. P. tries to make himself
 clear by the careful use of tenses.

(It is perhaps worth noting that this interpretation is
 supported by the Arabic paraphrase.)

6,19-22 ἐκποδῶν ... ἀποδῶσαν : These three lines are parenthetical
 and Br. is right to bracket them in his edition. Since genesis is
 a movement, and movement takes place in time (cf. Arist. Ph. 235a
 11), and since time belongs to the realm of soul and not of Intellect
 (III 7,11,15 ff.), P. must be careful to explain the exact sense
 which he wants the genesis of Intellect to have.

τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντων (6,20) refers to Intellect and the One,
 since it is they to whom αὐτοῖς in the next line refers.
 Strictly speaking, of course, the One is beyond eternity as Intellect
 is beyond time.

This sort of warning - about the literal application of
 language - is common when P. is talking about the One (e.g. VI 8,

13,47-50 δεῖ δὲ συγχωρεῖν τοῖς ὀνόμασι, εἴ τις περὶ ἐκεί-
 λῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνδείξεως ἕνεκα αὐτοῖς χρήται, ἃ
 ἀκριβείᾳ οὐκ ἐῷμεν λέγεσθαι· λαμβανέτω δὲ καὶ
 τὸ οἶον ἐφ' ἑκάστου; see also V 5,6,23 ff.).

The next sentence (τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ... ἀποδώσειν) presents certain problems. The mss. are unanimous in reading ἀποδώσει in 6,22 where H-S print ἀποδώσειν . This reading is retained by Perna and Creuzer, but gives no sense (even if with Creuzer τις is understood). Fic.'s translation ('et si quando inter loquendum generationem eis attribuiamus, ratione causae ordinisque cuiusdam generationem in medium adducentibus') bears little relation to the mss. text, and is itself difficult to construe. All subsequent editors (including Vitringa) except H-S have changed ἀποδώσειν to ἀποδόσει , a reading already suspected by Creuzer. The general sense of the passage is quite clear. P. is maintaining that talk about the genesis of Intellect from the One is a way of showing various relationships between the two hypostases. But ἀποδόσει can be nothing but a dative of agent, and the sentence would have to be translated: 'we apply the word γένεσις to νοῦς and the One by giving them a causal relationship and a relative position (αἰτίας καὶ τάξεως)'. This is nonsense. Consequently all the translators in fact translate ἀποδόσει as though it has a final sense (i.e. as though it were ἐπ' ἀποδόσει); thus Br. gives: 'afin de'; Ci.: 'per assegnar ...' and Ha.: 'um damit ... zu'. (MK's translation does not disclose his Greek text.) Since ἀποδόσει on its own cannot have this

final sense, it seems to me unacceptable. A further difficulty is that its acceptance would necessitate the joining of 6,20-22 ($\pi\omega \dots \acute{\alpha}\rho\theta\acute{o}\sigma\epsilon\iota$) to 6,22-23 ($\tau\acute{o} \sigma\acute{\omega}\nu \gamma\iota\nu\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu \dots \gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$) so that $\phi\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ could become the main verb. This is possible (on the position of $\sigma\acute{\omega}\nu$ see Denniston, p. 429) though I do not find the $\sigma\acute{\omega}\nu$ quite to 'vortrefflich' as Ha. seems to. It seems to me better to begin a new sentence with $\tau\acute{o} \sigma\acute{\omega}\nu \gamma\iota\nu\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$, which picks up the $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$ of $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\rho\alpha\phi\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\omega\varsigma$ in 6,18. (Br., incidentally, reads $\acute{\alpha}\rho\theta\acute{o}\sigma\epsilon\iota$, and puts a stop after it, which makes the Greek nonsensical.)

Accordingly, I prefer H-S's $\acute{\alpha}\rho\theta\acute{o}\omega\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu$. For a similar omission of a final ν in the mss. see VI 4,3,37 and cf. I 4,1,17 and 18. The transition to an accusative and infinitive construction without an introductory verb is common in P. (see RE 520.62 ff.); there is thus no need for Vitringa's $\pi\rho\sigma\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omicron\nu\tau\alpha$ for $\pi\rho\sigma\acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma$ in 6,21. The only difficulty is the future infinitive where one would expect the present. But the future may be colloquial. One might paraphrase: 'by applying the word $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ to them, we shall give them various mutual relationships' (cf. KG II.1.171.3).

But even if $\acute{\alpha}\rho\theta\acute{o}\omega\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu$ is right, I cannot believe that $\alpha\acute{\iota}\tau\iota\alpha\varsigma \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota} \tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ means 'ordinis quoque causas' as H-S translate in their apparatus. It seems much more normal to take $\alpha\acute{\iota}\tau\iota\alpha\varsigma$ and $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ together, both as genitives, especially since the concept of genesis involves the concept of causation, and hence, on Neoplatonic principles, of $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$. But the

genitives cannot be governed by ἀποδῶσιν which can never govern partitive genitives as, for example, μεταδιδόναι can. Consequently, I suspect that an object of ἀποδῶσιν has dropped out, and I would be inclined to add τι after αἰτίας. Haplography would account for the omission. The text would then read τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τὴν γένεσιν προσάπτοντας αὐτοῖς αἰτίας τι καὶ τάξιν αὐτοῖς ἀποδῶσιν.

The repetition of αὐτοῖς should cause no difficulty. The first αὐτοῖς (6,21) is construed with προσάπτοντας and the second (6,22) with ἀποδῶσιν. Vitringa, Vo. and Br. are wrong to delete the second.

6,22-25 τὸ οὖν γινόμενον... δεύτερον : The οὖν is resumptive after the digression and pace Ki., Mū. and Vo. marks the beginning of a new sentence; it is wrong to change it to γοῶν with Mū., Vo. and Br., or to delete it with Ki.. Τὸ γινόμενον is the undefined Intellect, the emanation from the One which is emitted without movement on the One's part. P. explains this paradox in 6,28 ff.. He clearly does not consider the actual process of emission a movement.

The argument that movement intervenes between the producer and its product and thus separates them is repeated in V 3,12,28-30, where προθυμία is treated as a movement οὐ γὰρ οἶον προθυμίας νοῦν γενέσθαι (sc. τὸ ἐν), εἴτα ἐγένετο νοῦς, τῇ προθυμίας μεταξὺ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ γυννηθέντος νοῦ γενομένης. This argument is not totally convincing, since if P. were consistent, he would have to maintain that Intellect

did not immediately result from the undefined emanation but was $\tau\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\omicron\nu \acute{\alpha}\pi' \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\nu$, since the $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\rho\omicron\phi\acute{\eta}$ (which is a $\kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$, VI 7,16,16) would intervene between the undefined and defined Intellect. However, P. would probably deny that undefined and defined Intellect were separate entities. Emanation, $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\rho\omicron\phi\acute{\eta}$, and definition are states of existence of a single being.

6,26-27 $\omicron\acute{\upsilon} \dots \kappa\epsilon\nu\eta\theta\acute{\iota}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$: $\Pi\rho\acute{o}\sigma\nu\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ and $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ are both sorts of movement. $\Pi\rho\acute{o}\sigma\nu\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is a rare word (cf. V 3,3,42); the uncompounded $\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$, however, is sometimes used to describe the Gnostic theory of creation by the soul (see II 9,4,6 ff.. 12,40, and see further on 10,26-27). P.'s use of $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\epsilon\omega$ here may reflect a wish to avoid the application of any Gnostic theories to the One.

There is no difficulty with $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\iota}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ in 6,26, and, therefore, no need to change it (with Taylor ap. Creuzer iii, p. 276) to $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\acute{\iota}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$. The One's creative activity is involuntary because it is purely natural. In V 5,12,43-49 P. says that the One would not have cared if Intellect had never existed.

6,27-28 $\pi\acute{\omega}\varsigma \omicron\acute{\upsilon}\nu \dots \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$; : Editors vary in their punctuation after $\pi\acute{\omega}\varsigma \omicron\acute{\upsilon}\nu$. Ki., Mii., Vo. and Br. add a question mark, while the other editors run on without a break to the next question beginning with $\tau\acute{\iota}$. Ci. remarks that the question mark is not 'opportuno', but does not support his judgement with any reasons. The sense is, of course, the same whichever punctuation is chosen, but the extra question mark adds a certain liveliness to the text

(see MK's translation). I prefer to follow Ki..

More important is the punctuation and interpretation of the rest of the sentence. Ha. puts a question mark after νοῦσα in 6,27, and his next sentence runs from περὶ ἐκείνο to μένοντος in 6,30, to which he adds the Eusebian δὲ (see PG 21.889b). Instead of μένον in 6,28 he reads μὲν ὅν. In the first place it seems to me that the most natural meaning of the sentence καὶ τί δεῖ νοῦσαι ; on its own would be 'and what must one think' (sc. on this matter)? and not 'als was muss man es (sc. das Zweite) sich denken?' Consequently the transition to περὶ ἐκείνο μὲν ὅν would be very abrupt, if not impossible. Secondly, although it is true that the περίληψις of the One is in the vicinity of the One (περὶ ἐκείνο... ὅν) I do not see that this is relevant here. The important concept is that of immobility, and as P. has stressed since 6,16, it is the One who remains immobile. Μένον is surely the right reading. (How is μὲν ὅν 'sprechender'?) And μένον agrees with ἐκείνο (the One) (so all translators except Ha.), and not with τί as H-S suppose. It is in fact true that the emission remains attached to its source, and this is particularly true of sunlight (see Wolters on III 5,2,31-32 and cf. V 3,9,12) but once again this is not the point here. P. emphasises almost ad nauseam that the One is unaffected by its creative activities. Note that this notion is further stressed in 6,28 (μένοντος) and in 6,30 (μένοντος). MK translates correctly: 'what must we conceive

of as rising in the neighbourhood of that immobility?'

Περί can have here its normal meaning of 'in the vicinity of'; but P. may intend the further connotation of 'conceptually related to', a meaning of περί noticed in 4,19. The ambiguity is probably deliberate.

6,28-30 περίλαμψιν... μένοντος : On the image of sunlight radiating from the sun see Wolter's excellent note on III 5,2,31-32. He notes how P. combines two images, the image of the sun and its light, and the image of the circle and its centre. The combined image is again applied to the relationship between the One and Intellect in V 3,12,39-44 and V 3,15,6 (for its application to Intellect and the higher soul see III 5,2,30 ff.. 6,23-24; V 3,9,7 ff.; and to the higher and lower soul IV 4,29,9 ff.). The new image required new vocabulary. Περίλαμψις (used again in V 3,15,6) is only found in Plutarch before Plotinus (De Fac. in Orb. Lun. 931a-b) and there it denotes not the halo of light which surrounds the sun, but the sun's circular movement around the moon by which the moon is illuminated.

In 6,28 the accusative περίλαμψιν depends on νοῦσαι .

In 6,29 H-S are surely wrong to retain the mss. αὐτό which must refer to the sun. As in V 3,9,9 the phrase οἶον ἡλίου introduces the comparison. The fact that the sun is compared to the One does not mean that the neuter is possible particularly in view of the close proximity of the phrase οἶον ἡλίου . Only Perna, Creuzer (who thought that αὐτόν might be right) and H-S retain the mss. reading. Ki.'s αὐτόν should be read.

In 6,29 in place of the Enneadic ὥσπερ περιθίων the Eusebian tradition (see PG 21.889b) has φῶς περιθίων and this is the reading printed by Ki., Mü., Vo. and Br., and preferred though not printed by Creuzer. Henry (*Etats*, p. 131) notes that the reading φῶς is more easily explained as a corruption of ὥσπερ than vice versa. It is also worth noting that λαμπρὸν φῶς ἡελίου is a Homeric phrase (see *Il.* 1.605; *ibid.* 5.120; *ibid.* 8.485), which may account for the insertion of φῶς here. (Τὸ λαμπρὸν is found absolutely at Pl. *Sph.* 254a 9 and Pl. *Ti.* 46b 3.) Palaeography apart, it seems to me that ὥσπερ adds a much needed note of apology to περιθίων. Περιθίων is not a word normally associated with light, which either rushes away from its source, or stays immobile around it. In neither case does περιθίων give a literal description of the facts. Its figurative use, however, on which see on 4,18 emphasises the ontological dependence of light on the sun (cf. IV 4,29,9 ff.). This connotation of περιθίων is picked up by ἐξηγητήρων in 6,33.

In 6,30 δὲ after μένοντος (from Eusebius) is quite unnecessarily printed by Harder. The word γεννώμενον intervenes in the phrase ἐξ αὐτοῦ ... μένοντος, but hyperbaton is common in P. (see *RE* 521.52 ff.).

Ἄν can be construed either with μένοντος (Fic., Br. and MK) or γεννώμενον (Ci., Ha.). Either interpretation gives good sense, but since it is the immobility of the One which P. is stressing here, I prefer the former.

6,30-34 καὶ πάντα . . . ἐξέφη : P. explains the meaning of περίληψις by the theory of the double-activity (on which see 3,9-10).

Here the internal activity is not explicitly mentioned, though it is the same as the οὐσία of 6,31 and the δύναμις of 6,32. Note how P. picks up the previous sentence by the clause εἰς μέν (6,30-31).

The application of the double-activity theory to πάντα τὰ ὄντα is something of an exaggeration. Note how the illustrations of the theory are carefully chosen (see 6,34-37 and note on 3,9-10). P. treats the theory as a natural law. If it is a law, then there is no need to worry about whether the producer produces intentionally, since what happens is governed by natural necessity.

The interpretation of 6,31-33 ἐκ τῆς . . . ὑπόστασιν presents a slight problem. There are three alternatives. Either (a) ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας and ἐκ τῆς παρούσης δυνάμεως both depend on δίδωσι, and αὐτῶν² (6,32) goes with ἐξηγητήν (so Fic.); or (b) ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας goes with δίδωσι and ἐκ τῆς παρούσης δυνάμεως . . . αὐτῶν with ἐξηγητήν (so all other translators except MK); or (c) ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας goes with δίδωσι, αὐτῶν² with ἐξηγητήν and ἐκ τῆς παρούσης δυνάμεως is an explanatory phrase. On this use of ἐκ see LSJ s.v. III.6. MK translates: 'All existences produce from their essence, in virtue of the power which must be in them some necessary hypostasis continuously attached to them.'

Of these I prefer the last. Neither (a) nor (b) is heterodox. But it is more natural to see power as the reason for the emanation ((a) and (c)) than as that to which the resulting hypostasis is attached ((b)) (cf. II 9,8,25-26 *ἐνέργεια δὲ θαυμαστὴ ἐκείνου* · ὥστε καὶ ἐργάσατο ; IV 8,6,14-17). (c) also avoids the slight awkwardness of construing both *ἐκ*-phrases with *δίδωσι* .

Note the tension in this sentence between attachment and separation. Each new hypostasis is 'around' its source and attached to it (*ἐξηγητήριον*), yet it is at the same time *πρὸς τὸ ἐξω* and a separate entity (*ὑπόστασις*). P.'s metaphysical world is a single unity, but it contains the different hypostases within it (e.g. V 2,2,26-29 *ζωὴ μακρὰ... ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐφεξῆς, συνεχὲς δὲ πᾶν αὐτῷ, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῇ διαφορᾷ, οὐκ ἀπολλυμένον ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τὸ πρότερον*).

On the meaning of *περί* in 6,31 and 6,36 see on 6,27-28, and on the use and occurrences of *ἐξαρτᾶν* to describe the dependence of the lower hypostasis on the higher see on 1,14.

On *εἰκόνα* (6,33) see note on 3,7. P. apologises for the use of the *εἰκών* / *ἀρχέτυπον* image here (with *οἶον*) because it is odd to call, for example, a rose the archetype of the smell which it emits. *Εἰκών* and *ἀρχέτυπον* are much more closely related than rose and smell. Soul, for example, is like Intellect (V 3,9,48). In what sense is smell like the rose or cold like the snow? On the difficulties of the *εἰκών* /

²
ἀρχύτων relationship see VI 4,10 (compare VI 7,18,2 ff.).

6,34-37 πῦρ μὲν ... ὁ πλησίον : Fire is the commonest example P. chooses with which to illustrate the ἐνέργεια theory (see 3,9-10; IV 3,10,30 ff.; V 3,7,23 ff.; V 4,1,31 ff.. 2.30 ff.). Snow is used again in V 4,1,31 but the example of smell is not found elsewhere. Aristotle (Pr. 906a 24; cf. ibid. 907a 33 and 906b 24) describes smell as an ἀπόρροια ; and the ἀπόρροια is immaterial (ὅν σωματώδης ibid. 907b 6-7). These physical properties of smell help to explain P.'s choice of smell as an illustration. On the reasons for the choice of fire as the prime example see on 3,9-10.

In 6,36 only Perna, Creuzer, Ci. and H-S retain τοῦτο the reading of the mss.. All other editors read τοῦτω from Eusebius (PG 21.889b). Henry remarks (Etats, p. 132) that though both readings are equally possible, the usual construction of μαρτυρεῖν when its object is a thing, is with the accusative. His judgement is corroborated by LSJ s.v. I.3 (though cf. VI 4,5,18-20).

In 6,37 translators and editors differ in thier interpretation of the clause ὧν ... ὁ πλησίον . Ci. and Ha. take ὧν to refer to τὰ εὐώδη , whilst Fic. and Br. take it to refer to the singular τὸ in 6,36, i.e. to the emanation. (MK's 'something is preceived wherever they are present' seems to be a paraphrase rather than a translation.) Ci. defends his interpretation by saying that 'il semplice "esistere" è, per Plotino, emanare e creare' (note ad loc.); i.e. when P. speaks of the neighbour's enjoying the existence of sweet-smelling things, he means, in fact, the

enjoying of the smells, since the very existence of the sweet-smelling things creates the smells. This is very contrived. I enjoy the smell, not its source. And surely this is P.'s point here. The smell is derived from the sweet-smelling thing but exists separately from it (just as Intellect is derived from the One but is nevertheless a distinct hypostasis); the man who enjoys the smell enjoys it in its own right, i.e. as a smell and not as a sweet-smelling thing. The use of the word ὑποστάτων emphasises the separate existence of its reference (see on 3,9-10 and cf. V 4,1,38 τῶν ἄλλων παρ' αὐτοῦ... ὑποστάτων). Consequently, I prefer to follow Fic.. On the change from the singular τι to the plural ὧν compare II 1,3,10-12 ὧν δὲ ἔγωγε μὴδὲν, οὐκ ἀσύμφωνος ἂν τοῦτων ἢ σώματος φύσις πρὸς τὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ζῶον καὶ αἰεὶ μένον .

Ἀπολαύει (6,37) is being used in the sense of sensuous enjoyment. It is more natural that it should have a personal subject. The masculine ὁ πλησίον is better, therefore, than the Eusebian ὁ τι πλησίον (see PG 29.889b) although all editors (except Perna, who reads ὁ πλησίων, Creuzer in his Oxford edition and H-S) print the latter. Henry (Etats, p. 132) thinks that both readings are possible. The Arabic has 'the living being'.

6,37-38 καὶ πάντα ... γεννᾷ : Compare 7,37-38; V 2,1,7-9; V 4,1,26 ff. (quoted on 6,6-7). This idea probably stems from the Greek notion that creation is the natural function of whatever is mature (see Arist. de An. 415a 26-28 φυσικώτατον γὰρ πῶν ἔργων

τοῖς ἥτοις ὅσα τέλεια ... τὸ ποιῆσαι ἔτιον οἶον αὐτό).

Of course, τέλειος here means 'adult' and not 'perfect', but P. has already made use of the double meaning of the word in 3,14 (see on 3,13-14). Since the One is τελευτάτος (6,39-40) it cannot help but create. Failure to do so would mean that the One begrudged its power, and on Platonic grounds, this is impossible (Ti. 29e 1-2 cf. II 9,17,16-17; IV 8,6,12-13; V 4,1,34-36). Perfection is seen by P. in terms of power, since it is power which makes creation possible (cf. IV 8,6,12 ff.). The One as the δύνάμις πάντων is the creative source of the whole Plotinian system (see on 5,3-4).

On creation by what is τέλειος see also III 8,5,6 ff., where πηγὴς is used as an alternative word.

6,38-39 τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ... γυνῶ : In 6,30 Vo. and Br. prefer the of the Eusebian tradition (see PG 21.889b), to the δέ of the Enneadic mss.. The difference between καὶ ... δέ and καὶ ... δὴ is merely one of emphasis (see Denniston, p. 199 and p. 255). Henry (Etats, p. 132) is right to call them 'variantes indifférentes'. There is no need to alter the reading of the direct mss. tradition.

Mi.'s transposition of καὶ ἑλάττω δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γυνῶ to a position after the first γυνῶ in 6,38 is quite pointless.

On the principle that the producer is greater because more perfect than its product see on 2,7.

- 6,40 τὰ μέγιστα μετ' αὐτόν : Ki., Mü., Vo. and Br. change the αὐτόν of the Enneadic tradition to αὐτό which is found in Eusebius (PG 21.889b). See, however, Ci.'s note (ad loc.) and Schwyzer in RE 515.1 ff.; change between masculine and neuter is common in references to the One. Those who read αὐτό here also read it incorrectly in 6,41; 6,48; and 6,49. They also read ἐκείνο in 6,42 and 6,48.
- 6,41 μέγιστον ... καὶ δεύτερον : Since there is no middle term between Intellect and the One (6,23-25), and since Intellect derives from the One, it is δεύτερον (cf. 5,7). It is also the most powerful after the One (cf. V 4,1,40-41 δεῖ δὲ καὶ τιμωτάτον εἶναι τὸ γινώμενον καὶ δεύτερον ἐκείνου τῶν ἄλλων ἁπλῶς εἶναι). But because it is δεύτερον (note the γάρ in 6,41) it needs the One.
On αὐτό for αὐτόν see the preceding note.
- 6,41-43 καὶ γὰρ δεῖ ... κεχωρίσθαι : These lines treat of the relationship between the One and its newly formed product and should, I think, begin a new paragraph: they continue into Chapter 7.
- 6,41-43 καὶ γὰρ δεῖ ... οὐδέν : On the sight of Intellect see on 5,18. Fully actualised, Intellect is an ὄψις κατ' ἐνέργειαν (III 8,11,2), and since sight is actualised by its object, Intellect must continually look towards the One if it is to remain fully active. Only in this way can it continue its creative activities, since only what is fully-developed (τέλειως) can create. Thus

the process of definition is not something which takes place only once. Intellect is being eternally regenerated, as it were, by the vision of the One. In VI 7,35,25 P. calls this upward activity of Intellect the activity of νοῦς ἐρῶν . A lover needs the object of his fulfilment. Similarly Intellect needs the One. But it also needs the One in the sense that whatever is not simple (ἀπλοῦς) needs what is simple, since simplicity and self-sufficiency are intimately connected (cf. V 3,13,15 ff.; V 4,1,13 ff.). The One has no need of Intellect - it would not have cared if Intellect had never existed (V 5,12, 40-44 - because it is perfectly self-sufficient (cf. V 6,4,1 ἀνεκδεής).

On Ki.'s ἐκείνο (twice in 6,42) see on 6,40.

6,43 καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον... εἶναι : Compare V 4,2,2-3 ἐπεὶ δεῖ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ τὸ γεννῶν, νοῦν εἶναι ἀνάγκη . The infinitive εἶναι is dependent on an unexpressed verb of obligation (see Schwyzer, RE 520.62 ff.).

6,44-45 οἶον καὶ ... ἐκείνου : On the interpretation of this passage and the meaning of λόγος see on 3,8. In ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου P. is not saying that Intellect is the λόγος of the One. ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου should only be taken with the immediately preceding phrase καὶ ἐνέργειά τις . All the translators miss this point. (For Intellect as ἐνέργεια of the One see VI 7,25,31.) This sentence illustrates P.'s previous remark that everything except the One comes below Intellect in the hierarchy of reality (τὰ ἅλα μετ' αὐτόν (6,44)). Soul, for

example, comes lower than Intellect because it is its λόγος .
On the καί in the phrase οἶον καί see Denniston, p. 296.

6,46 ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς . . . λόγος : Ha. translates this phrase well by 'der Gedanke in der Seele'. The λόγος of soul is not the expression of soul (in the physical world) in the sense in which the λόγος of Intellect in 6,45 was its expression. Ψυχῆς λόγος means the λόγος from Intellect which actually is the soul. The λόγος of Intellect in soul is 'dim' because it is a step further away from reality than Intellect. It is only 'near the truth' (V 9,3,35-36); compared to Intellect it lacks unity (cf. μεμελεσμένος in I 2,3,29). But even this λόγος becomes dimmer as it is transmitted to the physical world to become the λόγος ἑνώπιος (see VI 1,29,11-12; VI 7,11,10). What the body receives is only an imitation of what the soul gives (V 9,3,36-37).

Ἄμυδρός is contrasted by P. with ἐναργής (III 8,4,27-28; VI 7,7,29-31) and τρανής (I 4,3,21-22). Light and clarity are characteristic of the Intelligible World (cf. V 8,4,4-6) as darkness and dimness are characteristic of matter (II 4,10,30) and the physical world (VI 6,18,24). The degree of dimness varies as the ultimate point, matter, is approached. Thus λόγος in the soul is not as dim as what comes after it, nor as bright as what comes before it.

Μέν is not answered by δέ ; on this see the following note.

6,46-47 ὥς γὰρ εἶδωλον ... δεῖ : All editors and translators except H-S treat these lines as one sentence. Ha., for example, translates: 'denn er ist gleichsam nur ein Nachbild des Geistes, und darum muss sie auf den Geist blicken.' H-S put the phrase ὥς γὰρ εἶδωλον νοῦ in a parenthesis. This means that they take the dimness of soul's λόγος rather than the fact that soul is an image (εἶδωλον) of Intellect as the reason for soul's vision of it. Both punctuations are acceptable from the point of view of orthodoxy, since ἀμυδρὸς and εἶδωλον are merely different words to describe the same relationship between the higher and lower hypostases. But both, it seems to me, are precluded by the καί in the phrase ταύτῃ καί. As is clear from the abrupt change in ideas which a translation of ὥς = 'because' would give, ὥς is not being used here as a causal conjunction. But if this is so, then καὶ ταύτῃ cannot pick up the phrase ὥς γὰρ εἶδωλον νοῦ, as ταύτῃ presumably means 'for this reason.' Other attempts to take ὥς γὰρ ... βλέπειν δεῖ as one sentence fail, as Ha.'s translation shows, because they involve the assumption that ταύτῃ καί is equivalent to καὶ ταύτῃ (see Ha.'s 'und darum'). H-S's punctuation fails also, and for the same reason: ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν ἀμυδρὸς ὁ λόγος ... ταύτῃ καί ... is not Greek.

It is best, therefore, to treat the sentence as logically unfinished. P. begins with a μὲν-clause, breaks off in a parenthesis, and then instead of returning to the main sentence with a δεῖ-clause, carries on independently of it.

Ταύτη... δεῖ is neither the complement of the sentence beginning ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς ἀμυδρὸς ὁ λόγος (so H-S) nor of that beginning ὥς γὰρ εἶδωλον νοῦ (all other translators and editors). The correct punctuation is ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν ἀμυδρὸς ὁ λόγος — ὥς γὰρ εἶδωλον νοῦ · ταύτη καὶ ('for this reason too', i.e. because it is the εἶδωλον, as well as the λόγος and activity of Intellect) εἰς νοῦν βλέπειν δεῖ . P. continues his discussion of the vision of Intellect until the end of 6,49.

Soul must look towards Intellect because Intellect is soul's archetype (on εἶδωλον see on 3,7), and therefore a truer and more real version of what soul itself is. Similarly, when it reaches the level of Intellect, it must look towards the One, since Intellect, in its turn, is only an image of its prior.

6,47-48 νοῦς δὲ ὡσαύτως ... εἶνα ᾧ νοῦς : Intellect looks towards the One because the One is its archetype; but it also depends for its very existence on this act of sight, which perfects it and makes it fully what it is (on this see on 3,13-14 and 5,6-19). Unlike Intellect, the One depends on nothing outside itself for its existence οὐ γάρ τι ἔχει εἶνα ᾧ, οὐδ' εἶνα ἐν ᾧ ... οὐ παρ' ἄλλων ἔχει ὅ ἐστι VI 9,6,26-28). On Ki.'s ἐκείνο (the reading of ms. R) see on 6,40.

6,48-49 ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτὸν ... καὶ νοῦ : Compare 6,53 ὥς τῇ ἑτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι . P. is not speaking of the mystical union here, but of the regenerative sight of the One by Intellect which results in its creative activity (see on 6,41-43).

P. has already explained that there is no middle term between Intellect and the One in 6,23-25.

The Greek of this sentence is odd as Harder's literal translation shows: 'Er sieht ihn aber nicht als von ihm getrennter, sondern weil er unmittelbar nach Jenem ist und nichts dazwischensteht, wie auch nichts zwischen Seele und Geist.' The ^εὅτι -clause explains why Intellect sees the One ^{οὐ} χωρισθῆναι ; but why introduce the explanation with the adversative ^ἀλλὰ ? There is surely no contrast between an explanation and that which it explains. Translators (except for Fic. and Ha.) gloss over the difficulty, most of them by leaving out ^ἀλλὰ . If ^ἀλλὰ is right it must introduce a contrast not with the ^εὅτι -clause but with the phrase ^{οὐ} χωρισθῆναι . Perhaps some phrase such as οἶον ἡνωμένον has dropped out. It is perhaps better to delete the ^ἀλλὰ as the majority of the translators have tacitly done. Its introduction could easily have been due to a scribe expecting a contrast after the negative phrase ^{οὐ} χωρισθῆναι .

On Ki.'s αὐτό in 6,48-49 see on 6,40.

6,50-51 ποθεῖ δὲ πᾶν... γεγεννημένον : On the addition of γεγεννημένον or γεννηθέν after γεννήσαν (6,50) printed by Vo. and Br. see Henry, Etats, pp. 135-136 and Manuscripts ,p. 147. No change is necessary. (Furthermore, Br.'s translation involves a difficult hyperbaton, in which πᾶν must be taken with γεγεννημένον .) All things desire the One (VI 7,20,18). There would be no motive for the ἐπιστροφή if this were not the case. Love is yoked to the soul, so that soul necessarily

loves the Good (VI 9,9,25-27); compare V 5,12,7-9 (where H-S² now prefer the reading εἶναι to εἰδέναι in 1.9). The love of the soul for the Good is like the love of a child for its father (VI 9,9,33-34). Everything desires that which is ontologically prior to it (VI 7,25,18-21), since the closer it gets towards unity, the more fully it exists; everything needs the One (cf. VI 9,6,19-20).

- 6,51 εἴταν ὥσε ... γεγεννημένον : Cyril's εἴν ὥσε is due to the demands of Christian dogma (see Ci. ad loc.), Vitringa's ὥσε μόνα to the demands of Greek grammar. But the grammatical oddity is supported by both the direct and indirect traditions. For examples of similar solecisms see RE 515.29 ff.

On the meaning of μόνοι see on 6,11. Superimposed is the figurative sense, as P. moves to the imagery of ἔλως (see following note); lovers are happiest when they are alone.

- 6,51-53 εἴταν δὲ ... κεχωρισθαι : Compare VI 9,9,44-45 ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐγώμενον, ᾧ ἐστὶ καὶ συνεῖναι μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁὕτως ἔχοντα . Note the play on the sexual connotations of συνεῖναι (LSJ s.v. II.1). A double entendre is quite in place in our present passage especially since πόθος can be used of sexual longing (see Aristophanes Ra. 53-56). For similar use of erotic language to describe contact between the hypostases see VI 7,31-35 passim. From the philosophical point of view, συνέστιν αὐτῷ means that Intellect and the One are never separated from each other in the way that soul is separated from Intellect by its involvement with body. One of

the two activities of Intellect is to look towards the One (VI 7,35,19 ff.), and this activity is called the activity of $\nu\omicron\hat{\alpha}s \ \acute{\iota}\rho\hat{\alpha}\nu$. This is the activity with which we are dealing here.

On 'otherness' see on 1,4; 2,6; 3,3-4; 3,21-22; 4,34; and 4,41. $\acute{\epsilon}\Omega s$ should here be taken as a consecutive conjunction.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Compressed thought and textual problems make Chapter 7 the most difficult Chapter in V 1. It continues and concludes P.'s treatment of the One and the genesis of Intellect. But it differs from Chapter 6 in stressing not the first stage of this process, the emanation from the One, but the second stage, the return of Intellect to its maker so that it might become fully formed. 7,4-26, which deal with this, take the form of answers to the imaginary objections of an opponent of P..

7,27 (ταύτης τοῦ γενεᾶς κτλ.) marks a new and easier section. The mechanics of generation are left behind, and in the rest of the chapter P. ranges over various topics which he has already touched on. 7,27-49 act as a conclusion to Chapters 2 - 7.

7,1-4 εἰκόνα ... τοῦ ἡλίου : These lines continue the discussion of the relationship between Intellect and the One which concluded Chapter 6.

7,1 εἰκόνα δὲ ... τὸν νοῦν : Just as soul is an image of Intellect, so Intellect is an image of the One (cf. 6,46-48). P. goes on to explain that this is because of the various similarities between Intellect and the One. The thought is quite common in P. though εἰκών is not the only word used to describe the relationship. The parallel passages cited by Ha. (in his note ad loc., viz. V 4,2,12 ff. and V 9,2,23 ff.) do not seem to me to be particularly helpful. On the use of the first person λέγομεν see on 6,4-6.

Editors from Ki. onwards (with the possible exception of Ci.,

who gives no indication of his text here) adopt the transposition which is found in the mss. of Eusebius (see PG 21.892a) and Theodoret (see PG 83.852b) of εἶναι λέγοντες for λέγοντες εἶναι . Even if Theodoret is not dependent on Eusebius the unanimity of the Enneadic mss. in reading λέγοντες εἶναι makes it quite likely that λέγοντες εἶναι is the right reading (see Henry, Etats, p. 137).

- 7,1-2 δεῖ γὰρ σαφέστερον λέγειν : Br.'s translation ('mais il faut parler plus clairement') is wrong. His adversative 'mais' suggests that P. is apologising in what follows for the imprecise image conveyed by the word εἰκών whereas in fact the opposite is the case. The use of the εἰκών - expression and its explanation is itself the increase in clarity.

The clause is parenthetical, and is marked as such by all editors except Perna and Creuzer.

- 7,2-4 πρῶτον μὲν ... πρὸς αὐτό : These lines explain why the εἰκών - expression is an appropriate description of the relationship between the One and Intellect. The πρῶτον μὲν of 7,2 is not answered by a correlative particle, since the train of argument is interrupted by 7,4-5 (ἀλλὰ ... γεννᾷ). J. Igal, in Emerita 39 (1971), p. 130, n. 2 thinks that the argument is resumed in 7,35 (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κτλ.). But this is wrong; see on 7,35-37.

In 7,2 Vo., Br., and MK read Vitringa's ἐκείνου in place of the mss. ἐκείνο . MK translates: 'there is a certain

necessity that the first should have its offspring' (= *γεννώμενον*). The sentiment is Plotinian (cf. 6,36-37) but beside the point here. Ha. is quite right (note ad loc.) to remark that what is under discussion is the 'Abbildverhältnis' with its stress on the similarity between producer and product. But if *ἐκείνο* is correct, the phrase *ὅτι γινόμενον* (or *γεννώμενον*; see below) should not be translated 'primum quidem oportere id genitum esse' (Fic.) but '...weil das Erzeugte in gewissem Sinne ein 'Jenes' sein (muss)' (Ha. followed by Ci.). The notion that the product is in some sense a copy of its prior is a biological commonplace (see Arist. *de An.* 415a 28 *τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἶον αὐτό*; *ibid.* 415b 6-7; *ibid.* 416b 24 *τὸ γεννῆσαι οἶον αὐτό*; *id.* *GA* 721b 20-21; *ibid.* 766b 9-10; compare also Arist. *Pol.* 1252a 30 and V 2,1,13-14 *οἷτος οὖν* (sc. *ὁ νοῦς*) *ὥν οἶον ἐκείνος τὰ ὅμοια ποιεῖ*).

The choice between the variant readings *γινόμενον* (H-S) and *γεννώμενον* (all other editors) in 7,3 is difficult. *Γινόμενον* can obviously mean 'that which has come to be from the One' in the sense of Intellect (cf. 6,2 *γίγονεν* and V 3, 16,16, although *τὸ γινόμενον* in 6,22 (cited as a parallel passage by H-S in their apparatus) refers not to Intellect proper, but to Intellect in its inchoate state). *Γινώσκων* on the other hand is used four times at the end of Chapter 6; so it is possible that it should be used again here. On the whole I prefer *γεννώμενον*.

The fact that Intellect retains many characteristics of the One (7,3) explains why it is *ἐνοσιδής* (VI 9,5,26) and

ἀγαθοειδής (III 8,11,16; V 3,16,18-19; V 6,4,5. 5,13;
VI 2,17,28; VI 7,15,23; cf. Pl. R. 509a 3.)

Note that in 7,3-4 (καὶ εἶναι... αὐτό), the subject changes from τὸ γινώμενον / γεννώμενον to ὁμοιότητα.

- 7,4 ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ φῶς τοῦ ἡλίου : Compare VI 8,18,32 ff. where Intellect is compared to light diffused from a source. The diffused light is not of a different sort from its source; similarly Intellect is not different in kind from the One (οὐ μὲν ἀποριδὲς τὸ σκεδασθὲν εἶδωλον ὁ νοῦς VI 8,18,36). For the One as the sun and Intellect as its light see I 7,1,24-28; V 3,12,40; and see on 6,28-30. The relationship between sun and sunlight is used as an analogy for the relationship between the Good and what it causes in Pl. R. 508e 6 ff..
- 7,4-26 ἀλλ' οὐ... λαμβάνει : These lines constitute the main section of Chapter 7 and deal further, in lively form, with the genesis of Intellect.
- 7,4-5 ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς... νοῦν γεννᾷ : The next 31 lines (7,4-35) are discussed in detail by J. Igal in Emerita 39 (1971), pp. 129 ff. in a stimulating article ('La genesis de la Inteligencia en un pasaje de las Eneadas de Plotino (V 1,7,4-35)'). He notes first that our present passage is an objection by an imaginary opponent of P. which interrupts the flow of P.'s previous argument. P.'s answer to this objection begins in 7,5 with ἦ. The conjunction of ἀλλά and ἦ is quite common in contexts of question and answer. Igal adduces seven examples from I 1 alone; see op. cit.

p. 130, n. 4 and note also 7,8-9.

The point of the objection is, I think, missed by Hadot (RHR 164 (1963), p. 95) who says that the question $\pi\omega\varsigma\ \sigma\acute{\omega}\nu\ \nu\omicron\acute{\omega}\nu\ \gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\acute{\alpha}$ is a request for the elaboration of the similarities and resemblances between Intellect and the One which P. mentioned in the preceding sentence. Hadot thinks that if sufficient resemblances could be shown to exist, the difficulties about the genesis of Intellect would vanish. And he sees these resemblances made explicit in 7,5-6 ($\eta\ \acute{\omicron}\tau\iota\ \dots\ \nu\omicron\acute{\omega}\varsigma$) which he interprets as meaning that the One's self- $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\phi\eta$ actually is Intellect.

It seems to me, however, that the tone of the objection is more polemical than Hadot suggests. The objector shrugs aside the previous talk about similarity and resemblance, and returns to the old question of Chapter 6. How can plurality derive from unity? Whatever the resemblances which exist between Intellect and the One in virtue of their image/archetype relationship, the One is nevertheless not Intellect, but, on the contrary, apart from all plurality. How, then, can it be the cause of plurality?

Igal (op. cit. p. 130) and Beutler-Theiler (t. vi. p. 110) are probably right to see in the phrase $\pi\omega\varsigma\ \sigma\acute{\omega}\nu$ not so much a demand for information (although I think that P.'s reply does give information) as for the solution to a difficulty. Perhaps the colloquial English: 'How on earth?' gives the flavour of the original.

7,5-6 $\eta\ \acute{\omicron}\tau\iota\ \dots\ \sigma\theta\alpha\varsigma\iota\varsigma\ \alpha\acute{\upsilon}\tau\eta\ \nu\omicron\acute{\omega}\varsigma$: This passage has been the cause of great difficulty. Its problems are similar to those of

6,18-19 (ἐπιστραφέντος ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι γυγνέναι). Is the subject of the reversion (a)

the One or (b) Intellect? In the former case αὐτό will be reflexive, and in the latter case it will refer to the One.

In t.III p. 397 H-S have again listed the adherents of these alternative interpretations. To this list may be added besides those mentioned in the note on 6,17-19 O. Becker, Plotin und das Problem der Geistigen Aneignung (Berlin, 1940), p. 27 who supports interpretation (a), and G.J.P.Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973), pp. 71-72 who supports (b). Once again H-S have changed from the view put forward in their apparatus. They now believe that the One is the subject of the sentence and that αὐτό is reflexive. All those who take 6,18-19 to refer to the One's self-ἐπιστροφή take a similar view of our present passage. The only exceptions are Fic., Bouillet and Igal (who is not mentioned by H-S). Igal thinks that he is justified in taking the two passages differently because he believes that their contexts are distinct (op. cit. p. 135). He thinks that 6,18-19 refers to the first phase of Intellect's genesis - the emanation from the One - whilst our present passage refers to the definition of Intellect by its vision of the One. I do not agree with his interpretation of 6,18-19. In my note on 6,17-19 I have given reasons why I think that the reversion of Intellect towards the One is meant by P. in that earlier passage. The same reversion is under discussion here.

The reasons for taking our present passage to refer to the

reversion of the (inchoate) Intellect towards the One are particularly strong. Igal correctly notes (op. cit. p. 132) that the use of the demonstrative αὐτή makes it quite certain that ὁραῖς picks up the subject of the verb εἶδρα. This means that if the One's ἐπιστροφῇ is in question P. must be saying that the actual self-vision of the One is Intellect. This would imply that Intellect is something internal to the One, and this in turn contradicts the important Plotinian law that each of the three hypostases is distinct and separate from its cause, and is the external activity of its producer (see on 3,9-10). Furthermore, Intellect's sight of the One is regularly associated with Intellect's genesis as it becomes fully actualised (see 5,18; III 8,11,1 ff.; V 3,11,10; VI 7,15,16. 16,10 ff.). In our present passage the use of the imperfect εἶδρα, contrasted with the word ὁραῖς, emphasises the transition of Intellect in its inchoate state to the fully actualised Intellect which is the second hypostasis; for ὁραῖς is fully actualised ὄψις (see Arist. de An. 426a 13-14 and note on 5,18-19). The One's product was looking towards the One by turning towards it. The actualised vision which resulted from this looking was Intellect. Compare the similar conjunction of tenses at VI 7,16,31-32 πληρούμενος μὲν οὖν ἐγένετο, πληρωθεὶς δὲ ἦν.

The self-vision of the One is in fact mentioned in VI 8,16, 19-21 where P. identifies it with the One's 'being' (καὶ τὸ οἶον εἶναι τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπειν). This vision, however, is qualified by the word οἶον (VI 8,16,19-20) and is

in any case an internal activity of the One. It is nowhere associated with the genesis of Intellect.

It seems certain, then, that Intellect's vision of the One is the subject of our present passage. Objections to this interpretation, however, have been made by Hadot (RHR 164 (1963), pp. 95-96) who is followed by Schwyzer (Mus. Hel. 26 (1969), p. 260). Hadot's linguistic objection is the same as that made against the analogous interpretation of 6,17-19 - viz. the change of subject, in this case, from τὸ εἶν (the subject of πῶς οὖν νοῦν γινῶ in 7,5) to τὸ γινόμενον / γινώμενον (the subject of εὔρα). But the subject change becomes less harsh, when we remember that 7,4-5 (ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς ... γινῶ) are an interruption. The answer to the interruption has the same subject as the sentence before it.

Hadot's philosophical objections begin with a repetition of the objection made against 6,17-19: to turn towards the One Intellect would have to be already engendered, so that the passage could hardly explain Intellect's genesis. But P. makes it quite clear that the subject of the ἐπιστροφή is undetermined (see on 6,17-19), and he emphasises this by his use of the imperfect in our present passage. It is true, though, that the meaning of τὸ γινώμενον has undergone some change, since in 7,3 τὸ γινώμενον refers to fully-actualised Intellect, whereas in 7,5 it must mean Intellect in its inchoate state. Note, however, the similar alternation in the meaning of νοῦς in V 3,11. In V 3,11,12 οὐτος... ὁ νοῦς refers to the inchoate product

of the One, whereas νοῦς in V 3,11,13 is fully actualised Intellect. Hadot also thinks that 7,5-6 give no answer to the question πῶς οὖν νοῦν γιννᾶ; . But on the meaning of πῶς οὖν see on 7,4-5; and furthermore, since the ἐπιστροφή accounts for the formation of the fully formed Intellect, it is hard to see why Hadot thinks that these lines give no information of the method of Intellect's genesis. Thirdly, Hadot says: 'on ne comprend pas la précision: "cette vision, c'est l'Intelligence", si "Intelligence" est déjà sujet de εἶρα . On ne voit pas comment le second membre de phrase s'oppose au premier'. If we see, however, that the subject of the ἐπιστροφή is undefined and note that ὁρασις means actualised sight (see above), this difficulty vanishes. On Hadot's further point that πῶς οὖν νοῦν γιννᾶ is a request for explanation of the resemblances between the One and Intellect (cf. 7,2-4) see on 7,4-5.

Finally, it seems to me that the suggestion of Wallis (CR 84 (1970), p. 183) that the One is the subject of εἶρα and that the whole passage is an 'undigested relic of Numenius' πρόσχησις ' is quite wrong. Numenius' theory (see fr. 22) was that the first and second gods moved down to a lower metaphysical level by making use of the gods subordinate to them. Thus, the first god 'thinks' (νοεῖν) by making use of the second god whose characteristic activity νοεῖν is (see Dodds in Entr. p. 14). In our present passage, however, there is no question of the One's making use of Intellect; it is the genesis of Intellect which is under discussion.

7,6-7 τὸ γὰρ καταλαμβάνον ... νοῦς : All the translators and editors with one exception understand these lines as a general point about perception; perception can be of two kinds, visual perception (αἴσθησις) or intellectual perception (νοῦς). The exception is Ha. who takes 7,4-5 to refer to the self-vision of the One, and thinks that τὸ ... καταλαμβάνον (7,6-7) means the subject of this vision, i.e., 'das Eine und sein "Sehen"'. He translates: 'denn was dies Auffassen tätigt, ist etwas anderes als Wahrnehmung oder Geist'. But since the ὅρασις of 7,6 is the vision of the One by Intellect, Ha.'s suggested interpretation is impossible. The point of these lines is to illustrate P.'s remark in the previous sentence – note the γὰρ. Since perception has taken place (ὅρασις in 7,6), the subject of perception can only be αἴσθησις or νοῦς. And since it is perception of the One, the subject must be νοῦς, since visual perception is a faculty of the soul.

That αἴσθησις and νοῦς are the two types of perception is a commonplace. They are compared and contrasted at e.g. III 2,1, 3; V 3,1,19-20; V 4,2,44-45; VI 3,18,8 ff.; VI 9,3,29-32.

7,7-8 αἴσθησιν ... τὰ ἄλλα : These words have no grammatical links with their context, nor any internal construction. Their general drift, however, can be gathered from what follows, where κύκλος (7,8) and the indivisible τοῦτο (7,8-9) seem to refer to and develop the geometrical imagery which αἴσθησιν γραμμὴν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα presumably introduced. Of all editors after Creuzer, only Ha. and Igal think that the words may stand in the text without

emendation. The onus of proof lies with them.

Ha. thinks that the words constitute what he calls a 'Notiz' meant not for the reader but for P.'s own use. In his note on IV 7,3,2-5 he cites II 4,7,21 ff. and VI 9,8,15 ff. as other examples of 'notes' in the Enneads. He translates *καὶ τὰ ἄλλα* as 'und so weiter'. Igal (op. cit. p. 141), while agreeing with Ha. about his 'note'-theory, thinks that he is wrong to see the 'note' as intended for P.'s own use. Porphyry says (V.P. 8.1-4) that P. never reread anything he had written. Consequently, Igal argues, P. would hardly have included in his writing a note intended for his own use. Igal thinks that the notes were intended for the select circle of disciples to whom P.'s works were distributed.

First, however, none of the passages cited by Ha. as examples of similar 'notes' is as elliptical as our present passage. And secondly, it seems to me that the whole theory of 'notes' is suspect. Porphyry tells us that P. entrusted him with the task of editing and correcting his works (V.P. 7.51 *ὃν καὶ διορθοῦν αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα ἡξίου*), and presumably this editorial activity extended to the twenty-one treatises which P. had already written before Porphyry's arrival in Rome (see V.P. 4.66-67). If Porphyry's edition was intended to disseminate P.'s work to a larger public than had previously been possible, it seems improbable that he would have left in the new edition notes which the larger public could hardly be presumed to understand. Ha. and Igal think that the short 'note' is readily understandable because its contents

have been dealt with more expansively in the previous treatise in VI 9,8. But VI 9,8 does not mention αἴσθησις at all, and the circular movement of souls (VI 9,8,3 ff.; cf. Pl. Phdr 247d 4 ff.) cannot be the same as the κύκλος of V 1,7,8. Furthermore, if P. had wanted to refer back to a previous treatise he could have done so much more obviously by adding εἴπεται or a similar phrase. And finally, since the geometric imagery is developed in 7,9 ff., P. would without doubt have tried to make the point of the image clear in its original exposition.

I prefer to regard the passage, then, as corrupt. The next problem is its putative sense. Fic., in a translation of which H-S approve, gives: 'comparari vero solet sensus quidem lineae, quod vero reliquum est in cognoscendo, circulo'. But the κύκλος in 7,8 is contrasted with something indivisible (τοῦτο 7,8) and in the context of the circle this is most probably the centre of the circle. So, besides γραμμή, 7,7-8 ought to introduce some reference to the circle and its centre. This latter image is quite common in P. (see D. Mahnke, Unendliche Sphäre und Allmittelpunkt (Halle, 1937), p. 223 and Images, pp. 30-34). Most often the centre is the One (11,10 ff.; I 7,1,23 ff.; IV 3,17,12 ff.; IV 4,16,23 ff.; VI 4,7,22 ff.; VI 8,18,3 ff.; VI 9,8,10) in which case it is natural to see Intellect as the circle revolving around it (cf. Pl. Lg. 898a 3 ff. - though Schwyzer doubts (RE 551.30) whether this reference is intended here), although it can be an image of Intellect (IV 2,1,24 ff.; VI 5,5,1 ff.) or even of the Aristotelian κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον

(IV 7,6,11 ff. and Arist. de An. 427a 2 ff.. Aristotle's linear image was transformed into a circular image as early as Alexander of Aphrodisias; see his commentary on Arist. in Suppl. Aristotelicum II, part II (Berlin, 1892), p. 96.14 ff. (Bruns)). In view of the context of our present passage, with its discussion of the derivation of Intellect from the One, the circle must be an image of Intellect and the centre of the One. But if this is right, how does the visual perception (αἰσθησις) as a γραμμή fit in? In the context of the circle γραμμή usually means 'radius' for which the Greeks did not have a technical term (T. L. Heath, The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements (Cambridge, 1926), I. p. 199; cf. I 7,1,24; IV 2,1,25; VI 8,18,10). But this can hardly be its meaning here since radii are parts of the circle and P. is trying to distinguish in our present passage between αἰσθησις and νοῦς (the circle). Γραμμή must here indicate linear motion (cf. Pl. Ti. 43b 5 ff. where the motions of the soul are called αἰσθησις), in contrast to the circular motion of Intellect. The full image which 7,7-8 fail to make explicit is that sensible perception can be seen as a straight line and Intellect as a circle of which the One is the centre. Igal paraphrases the Greek as follows (op. cit. pp. 140-141): αἰσθησιν γραμμὴν λαβέ, νοῦν κύκλον, τὸ ἐν δὲ κέντρον . The mss. text as it stands, however, is no equivalent of Igal's paraphrase.

Only Mii. has ventured to print his conjectures in this corrupt passage, and only Fic. and Br. get the sense of the corrupt Greek wrong.

7,8-9 ἀλλ' ὁ κύκλος ... οὐχ οὕτως : These lines are extremely well discussed by Igal (op. cit. pp. 142-144). 'Ἀλλ' introduces an objection by P.'s imaginary opponent, which is answered in 7,9 by the sentence beginning ἢ καί . Note the similar conjunction of particles in 7,4-5. Br. alone of the translators realises this and marks the sentence off from the context by dashes. Igal notes (p. 142) that in H-S's system of printing ἀλλ' should be printed with a capital alpha.

But what is the point of the objection? The circle, P. says, is divisible; but this is not in this state. The reference of τοῦτο must be to something within the geometric image. And in this context the only thing which is indivisible is the centre of the circle. P.'s opponent phrases his objection in the language of the image which P. has just used. Consequently, Igal is right to note that τοῦτο refers directly to the centre of the circle and only indirectly to the One. All translators miss this nuance by assuming that τοῦτο refers directly to the One. (In the mss. text τοῦτο has no apparent reference. This seems to me further proof that the text of 7,7-8 is corrupt.)

P.'s objector returns to the point of his first objection (ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς ἐκεῖνο . πῶς οὖν νοῦν γινῶσκει ; 7,4-5) and in doing so once again interrupts the flow of P.'s argument. In the corrupt passage (7,7-8) P. has compared visual perception to a straight line, Intellect to a circle, and the One to the centre of the circle. But the objector retorts that even if the analogy holds, the genesis of Intellect still presents difficulties because

the circle is divisible (i.e., in some sense compound) and the centre of the circle is not. Intellect looks towards the One in order to become fully actualised, but the object of its vision is something entirely without parts. How could what is partless pluralise the inchoate Intellect? The old question about the derivation of unity from plurality is translated into the geometrical terms which P. has introduced in 7,7-8.

7,9-10 ἡ καὶ ἐνταῦθα... πάντων : These lines begin P.'s answer to the objection of his opponent. The μὲν -clause makes him some sort of concession and the ἀλλὰ -clause qualifies this concession. The explanation then continues down to ἐξ ἐκείνου in 7,17.

The first problem concerns the reference of the simple phrase καὶ ἐνταῦθα . Those who give a merely literal translation (Fic., Ci., and Ha.) leave it most unclear what 'here' refers to. Br. is more forthright - 'dans l'Intelligence aussi il y a unité' - and MK with his 'here, to be sure, is a unity, but there is the unity which is the potentiality of all existence' seems to understand the phrase as marking a distinction between the sensible and the Intelligible worlds. Igal (op. cit. p. 145) thinks that καὶ ἐνταῦθα marks the transition from the world of geometric imagery back to the (real) world which the images represent. He would paraphrase our present passage as follows: 'yes, you are right to imply in your objection that the One which the centre of the circle represents is a unity. But it is not any sort of unity; it is a unity which is potentially

everything.' For this view of the meaning of *καὶ ἐνταῦθα* ('in the real world, too') he gives four references - V 5,5,10; V 8,3,16; VI 8,18,22 *οὕτως ἔκει* (misquoted as VI 8,12,22) and VI 9,7,8. But in all these cases the fact that a transition is being made from image to reality is emphasised by the use of *οἶον* or *ὥσπερ* followed by *οὕτως* (e.g., in V 5,5,7 ff., P. writes *καὶ ὥσπερ ἔκει ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ... οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα...*). It seems to me unlikely that *καὶ ἐνταῦθα* alone could perform the same function as the correlatives *οἶον / ὥσπερ ... οὕτως*. But *καὶ ἐνταῦθα* can mean 'in this case' (see, e.g., VI 8,12,13; VI 9,5,30) and most naturally refers to the same context as *τοῦτο* in 7,8 - i.e., to the geometric image of the circle and its centre.

Igal's interpretation of this passage involves the further difficulty of taking the phrase *δύναμις πάντων* in apposition to *τὸ ἓν* and not as a predicate, with *ἐστὶ* understood. He translates (op. cit. p. 146): 'sí, también aquí el centro es uno, pero el Uno-Potencia de todas las cosas.' I think that P. is making a contrast in 7,9-10 between the geometric centre of the circle (the *τοῦτο* of 7,8) which is certainly a unity (note the omission of the article) and the One, which the geometric circle represents. The concession which P. makes to his opponent is that it is quite true that the centre of a circle is a unity; but he qualifies his former comparison of the One to a centre by adding that unlike the geometric centre the One is the potentiality of all things, and therefore, as he goes on to explain, there is

not the same difficulty about the derivation of plurality from unity as there would be if the comparison was literally exact. I would translate: 'Yes, in the case of the geometric centre, too, there is a unity, but the One is the potentiality of all things.' The One is the *δύναμις πάντων* both in the sense that it contains the objects of Intellect potentially (V 3,15,31) and in the sense that it is an immensely active power responsible for the very existence of the procession from the One (VI 9,5,36-37 *δύναμιν γεννᾶσαν τὰ ὄντα* ; VI 9,6,7-8 *μέγιστον γὰρ ἐπ' πάντων οὐ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ δύναμις*). Ha.'s 'Vermögen und Möglichkeit aller Dinge' captures this double meaning well. See further on 1,21 and 5,3-4.

7,10-11 *ὧν ὅλν . . . οὐκ ἂν ἦν νοῦς* : For the punctuation of 7,10-17 see the end of the following note.

P. now explains how Intellect is pluralised by the vision of the One. *Νόησις* sees the items of the One's power/potentiality separately, and so provides itself with an object of vision. Theiler (RIPh 92(1970), p. 295) is right to note that *νόησις* here means the same as it does in V 4,2,4 ff. where it is the inchoate Intellect. Note, however, how P. has shifted the meaning of *νόησις* since the end of Chapter 5 where it was specifically identified with a *ὄρασις ὁρῶσα* - i.e., fully actualised Intellect. The sense of our present passage is that if the inchoate Intellect had not been defined by its vision of the One, Intellect properly speaking would never have existed.

Scholars vary in their interpretation of *σχιζομένη* (7,11), here as Igal notes (op. cit. p. 147) the equivalent of *ἀποσχιζομένη*, which can be either middle or passive. Igal (loc. cit. n. 3) has a useful collection of the different translations. Either the inchoate Intellect is separated from the One when it sees its pluralising object (so Bouillet, Br., Ci., Trouillard, Ha., Volkmann-Schluck and Hadot) or it separates out the objects of its vision from the One (so Becker, MK, Rist and Igal). Fic.'s 'haec ab ipsa potestate velut partita intelligentia conspicit' is ambiguous.

Although the first of these interpretations makes sense, since the inchoate Intellect is separated from the One - it is its external activity, fully separated from it when it has been fully defined by it - I prefer to take *σχιζομένη* as middle. First, in VI 7,15,20-22 the genesis of Intellect is described as taking place by a splitting up of the power of the One (ἐν γὰρ ἐνομήζετο δύναμιν ἀδυνατῶν ἔχειν συνέθεσθαι καὶ ποτὰ ἐποίησε τὴν μίαν). *Συνέθεσθαι* and *σχιζομένη* (in a middle sense) have an obvious similarity. The fact that *σχίζειν* has no middle voice attested in LSJ is unimportant since *ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως... σχιζομένη* is the equivalent of *ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως... ἀποσχιζομένη* (Igal op. cit. p. 147) and *ἀποσχίζειν* can be used in the middle (see LSJ s.v.); in view of this, it is not important that *σχίζειν* in its other occurrences in P. at III 3,7,15 and VI 6,15,30-31 is used in the passive. Secondly, the use of the middle voice emphasises the

important role of νόησις in its own creation. It separates off for itself the contents which the One as δύναμις πάντων possesses, and sees them as its own objects. P. further explains this role in the next sentence of which the subject is Intellect and not the One as H-S suggest (see the following note).

The vision of νόησις makes explicit the items of the One's power. As the One is the δύναμις πάντων so the fully defined Intellect is πάντα (4,21 ὁ δὲ νοῦς πάντα).

Νόησις sees the One as many, and so provides itself with its own objects of thought.

7,10-12 are paralleled by III 8,8,31 ff.. Intellect, in its attempt to see the One, pluralises itself; otherwise there would be no Intellect. This description is followed by a description of the pluralisation of the circle into its various components, though in this passage the circle rather than its centre is seen as the source of the pluralisation.

7,11-17 ἐπεὶ καὶ ... ἐξ ἐκείνου : These lines are extremely difficult, and have been variously interpreted. One thing, however, seems clear. The ἐπεὶ -clause, however far it extends, is retrospective in force; it helps to explain P.'s previous statement that νόησις in order to have become Intellect must have split up the contents of the One and have seen them as its own contents (though see Wolters on III 5,3,25).

The first problem regards the subjects of εἶναι and δύναται in 7,12 and 13. Igal (op. cit. p. 149-150) once again collects the opinions of scholars. Becker, Ci., Ha. and

Hadot take the One as subject of both verbs, as do H-S, although in Entr. p. 387 Henry thinks that Intellect should be the subject of $\epsilon\chi\upsilon$. Henry's view is followed by Rist and Deck while Fic., Bouillet, Br., Volkmann-Schluck, Trouillard and Igal himself take Intellect as the subject of both verbs.

To this list may be added G.J.P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973) who thinks that the $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\varsigma$ referred to is that of the One (op. cit. p. 71).

I think that it is most unlikely that the subject of $\epsilon\chi\upsilon$ is anything other than Intellect, this Intellect being the inchoate Intellect or $\nu\acute{o}\eta\varsigma$ of 7,10-11. If the force of $\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota$ (7,11) is retrospective, the introduction of the One as subject would make the transition of thought from the previous sentence very odd. How would the fact of the One's awareness of (presumably) its own power help to explain why $\nu\acute{o}\eta\varsigma$ split up the contents of the One in order to become fully actualised Intellect? Secondly, if the One were the subject of $\epsilon\chi\upsilon$ the change of subject in 7,13 ($\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ $\gamma\omicron\upsilon\lambda\upsilon$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$), where $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$ can only refer to Intellect, would be very abrupt. And finally what would be the point of $\eta\delta\eta$ (7,12)? If Intellect is the subject, this last-mentioned difficulty disappears. The phrase $\pi\alpha\rho' \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ emphasises the independence of $\nu\acute{o}\eta\varsigma$ vis-à-vis the One, and $\eta\delta\eta$ means 'at this stage', i.e., while Intellect is still in its inchoate state as $\nu\acute{o}\eta\varsigma$. Some have thought that the qualification of the word $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\varsigma$ by the addition of $\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$ shows that it is the One's $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\varsigma$ which is under

discussion. (On the self-awareness of the One see V 4,2,15-19 and contrast V 6,5,2-5.) But as Igal points out (op. cit. p. 152), *συναίσθησις* is only properly predicated of the fully-formed Intellect; the inchoate *νόησις* possesses only an indistinct self-awareness. Compare V 3,11,4 ff. where the inchoate Intellect is said to have only a vague notion of the object of its desire - *ἀορίστως ἔχουσα ἐπ' αὐτῇ φάντασμα τι* V 3,11,6-7. Br.'s reference here to Stoic 'sympathy' is quite out of place.

It seems to me that the subject of *δύναται οὐσίαν* is also Intellect. The sentence beginning *αὐτὸς γοῶν* (7,13 ff.) introduces a further explanation of the first limb of the *ἐπεὶ*-clause - on the use of *γοῶν* see Denniston, p. 451 - and this sentence certainly refers to the part which Intellect plays in its own creation (nb. 7,13-14 *καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ*). The phrases *οὐκ ἔστι τὸ εἶναι* and *δύναται οὐσίαν* are sufficiently close to suggest that they refer to the same process. I, therefore, think that by *τῆς δυνάμεως* P. means the power of Intellect and that this power is the power of Intellect to create substance. If this is right, however, note the change in the reference of *δύναμις*. In 7,10 *δύναμις* refers to the power of the One; in 7,12 to the power of Intellect; and in 7,14 to the power of the One. In the latter case, the change of reference is marked by the addition of *παρ' ἐκείνου*.

In the lines which we have been discussing, then, (7,11-13), P. says that Intellect even in its inchoate state is aware of its own power to create substance (i.e., itself as the Forms). This

function of Intellect is quite frequently mentioned in the Enneads. The inchoate Intellect is itself said to be responsible for the pluralisation of the One's unity (V 3,11,5 $\delta\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\iota\tau\eta\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\ (\text{sc. } \delta\psi\iota\varsigma\ \sigma\acute{\alpha}\mu\omega\iota\varsigma\ \iota\delta\omicron\omega\sigma\alpha)\ \epsilon\pi\eta\lambda\theta\alpha\nu\epsilon\nu$; V 3,11,7-8 $\mu\omicron\lambda\lambda\eta\ \mu\omicron\lambda\lambda\eta\sigma\alpha\sigma\alpha$). Intellect itself brings plurality from the One (VI 7,15,15-16 $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \sigma\acute{\alpha}\mu\omega\iota\varsigma\ \delta\ \mu\omicron\lambda\lambda\eta\sigma\alpha\varsigma\ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\ \epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\kappa\epsilon\iota\acute{\nu}\omicron\upsilon$) and is even said to be the creator of that plurality (VI 7,15,17); and finally, as we have noted earlier (see on 7,10-12), Intellect itself separates the items of the One's potentiality from the One (cf. VI 7,15,21-22 $\sigma\omega\nu\epsilon\theta\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \mu\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \epsilon\pi\omicron\iota\eta\sigma\epsilon\ \tau\eta\nu\ \mu\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu\ (\text{sc. } \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma)$). This act of Intellect is the act of self-creation. Thus 7,11-13 do help to explain P.'s earlier remark that if this separation of the contents of the One from the One itself had not taken place, $\nu\omicron\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ would never have become $\nu\omicron\omega\varsigma$.

Fic., Creuzer and (seemingly) Ci. adopt an idiosyncratic punctuation of these lines. They place a comma after $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ (7,13) and take $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\mu\omega\iota\varsigma$ (7,13) in apposition to $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\mu\omega\iota\varsigma\ \sigma\omega\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\nu$ (7,12). This punctuation makes the construction almost impossibly difficult, and gives a weird sense. Awareness of its own power can hardly be the substance either of the One (Ci.) or of Intellect (Fic. and Creuzer (?)).

The next lines (7,13-14 $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \gamma\omicron\omega\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \dots\ \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$) give the pro tanto evidence for P.'s assertion that Intellect has an awareness of its own power and form a parenthesis. The change of $\gamma\omicron\omega\acute{\alpha}\nu$ (7,13) to $\gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu$ (Vitringa, Mû., Vo. and Br.) obscures the connection of thought and necessitates the further

change of $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\epsilon\iota$ (7,13) to $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon$. H-S cite VI 8,18, 15-16 and Arist. Pol. 1341a 23 as examples of $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ used with the simple accusative and further note for what it is worth that all the mss. mark a pause after $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\alpha\upsilon$ (7,13). Compare further Pl. Phlb. 23d 9-10 with R.G. Bury's note. The phrase $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\epsilon\iota$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ is translated by the same editors as 'ob seipsum'. I agree with Igal, however, that 'per seipsum' would be more correct. This is the normal meaning of the phrase (see e.g. Pl. R. 367b 4; it is parallel to $\pi\alpha\rho'\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ in 7,12). If Igal is right the $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ before $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\epsilon\iota$ (7,13) cannot be correlative to the $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ before $\xi\acute{\omega}\nu\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ in 7,15 (as H-S further suggest) since $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\epsilon\iota$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ can only be taken with $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\epsilon\iota$ and not with the verbs $\xi\acute{\omega}\nu\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ and $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ which are qualified by the phrase $\pi\alpha\rho'\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\upsilon$ (7,16 twice). The $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ of 7,13 is, I think, merely emphatic; on this see Denniston, pp. 320-321. P. adds the phrase $\tau\eta\ \pi\alpha\rho'\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\upsilon$ $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\epsilon\iota$ (7,14) because the definition of Intellect takes place when it looks towards the One, so that the One's power as well as the so-to-speak independent action of $\nu\acute{\omicron}\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ in turning towards the One are both responsible for the creation of the fully-formed Intellect.

The remainder of this troublesome section presents further problems. Mü., Vo., Br., MK and Igal take the $\acute{\omicron}\tau\iota$ -clause of 7,14-17 as parallel to the $\acute{\omicron}\tau\iota$ -clause of 7,13 ($\acute{\omicron}\tau\iota$ $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\tau\alpha\iota$ $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\alpha\upsilon$) - i.e., they suppose them both to depend on $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota$ $\sigma\omega\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\eta\iota\varsigma$. All except Igal have this interpretation forced on them by their readings $\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\iota$ and $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\xi\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon$ in 7,13. Igal

(op. cit. p. 154) puts *αὐτὸς ... ἐνέργει* in parenthesis and thinks that the two *ὅτι*-clauses are parallel on the grounds that the vague awareness of the ability to produce substance implies a similarly vague awareness of the fact that substance itself is, as it were, one of the One's contents and products (7,14-15), and that Intellect is perfected by the One (7,15-17).

This interpretation is attractive. As we have already seen, the whole of the *ἐν*-clause must help to explain P.'s statement in 7,10-11 that *νοῦς* would never have become Intellect if it had not split off from the One the items of the One's potentiality. The first *ὅτι*-clause explains the generation of Intellect in terms of Intellect's own power (*ὅτι δύναται οὐσίαν*), the second in terms of the One's power, since substance is *οἶον μέρος ἐν τῇ τῶν ἐκείνου καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου*, and Intellect is perfected into substance and strengthened by the One. (With Ha. and MK I think that the subject of *ῥώννυται... ἐκείνου* (7,15-17) is Intellect.) Intellect must be aware of both moments in its creation.

These moments are the same as those already referred to in 5,16-18, where P. said that Intellect's shaping took place from the One and from itself. The first point - that Intellect is shaped by itself - is made in the first *ὅτι*-clause (7,12-14 *συναίσθησιν... ὅτι δύναται οὐσίαν (αὐτὸς ... ἐνέργει)*) and the second in 7,14-17 (*ὅτι οἶον μέρος... ἐξ ἐκείνου*). In our present passage, however, the points are made with the

emphasis on Intellect's own awareness of the creative process.

There is an obvious tension in the passage. Intellect creates substance by its own pluralising activity, and yet because Intellect is itself one of the One's products, it is perfected by the One through its reversion (ἐπιστροφή) towards it. Thus, both Intellect and the One create substance.

Substance is said to be a part of the One's contents because the One is the 'potentiality of all things' (see on 7,9-10). On the role of the One in the perfection of the inchoate Intellect see on 5,6-19.

The phrase ἐξ ἐκείνου (7,17) is not otiose; in 7,14-15 it was substance which was said to be ἐξ ἐκείνου whereas here the same is said of Intellect. Translators miss this.. Of course, strictly speaking, substance and Intellect are here identical.

The punctuation of the whole passage which is variously dealt with by different editors (7,10-17) should I think be as follows:- ὣν οὖν ἐστὶ δυνάμεις, ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως οἷον σχιζομένη ἢ νόησις καθορᾷ (ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν νοῆς), ἐπεὶ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχει ἡδὴ οἷον συναίσθησιν τῆς δυνάμεως ὅτι δύνάται οὐσίαν (αὐτὸς γὰρ δι' αὐτὸν (reflexive) καὶ (= actually) ὀρίξει τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ (refl.) τῇ παρ' ἐκείνου δυνάμει) καὶ ὅτι οἷον μέρος ἐν τι πῶν ἐκείνου καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἢ οὐσία, καὶ (sc. ὅτι) ῥώννυται παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ τελειοῦται εἰς οὐσίαν παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου.

7,17-19 $\delta\epsilon\alpha\hat{\iota}$ $\delta\epsilon$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\hat{\iota}$... $\tau\omega\hat{\nu}$ $\pi\alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\hat{\nu}$; As Igal remarks (op. cit. p. 151) $\delta\epsilon$ is used here as a continuative connective and not as an adversative particle (see Denniston, pp. 162 ff.) and although $\delta\epsilon\alpha\hat{\iota}$ has not the quasi-literal sense of $\kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\hat{\iota}$ in 7,11 as he supposes, I would also agree with him that the fully formed Intellect rather than the inchoate $\nu\acute{o}\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ has now become the subject of the sentence. The meaning of the sentence is that Intellect (when fully defined) sees (rather than has a presentiment) that life, thought and indeed everything (for Intellect is everything - see 4,21) comes from the One, because the One is nothing of the things of which it is the source. This paradox is explained in the following lines.

The phrase $\sigma\acute{\iota}\phi\omega\hat{\iota}$ $\mu\epsilon\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\omega\hat{\iota}$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\alpha\mu\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\omega\hat{\iota}$ (7,17-18) harks back to the geometric imagery of 7,8 ff. (Igal, op. cit. p. 155), where Intellect was associated with the divisible circle and the One with its indivisible centre. $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\alpha\mu\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\omega\hat{\iota}$ picks up $\epsilon\kappa\upsilon\theta\omega$ (7,17). Ha. seems to think that Intellect itself is both divided and undivided ('mit sich selbst nun als einem das gleichsam abgeteilt ist aus sich, dem dabei Ungeteilten sieht Es das Leben, das Denken und alle Dinge...') and Ci.'s 'ma lo Spirito vede bene che da quella fonte in lei - che è, vorrei dire, un divisibile derivato da un indivisibile - si riversa e il vivere e il pensare e ogni altra cosa...' gives the impossible sense that Intellect's source in the One is something divisible derived from something indivisible.

Usually Intellect is described as $\alpha\mu\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\omega\hat{\iota}$ (III 9,1,32;

IV 1,5-6; IV 2,1,29; cf. Pl. Ti. 35a 1); here it is *μεγιστός* because of the foregoing image.

With *ἐκείνο* in 7,18-20 (printed by Ki., Mü., Vo. and Br.) compare 6,40-41, 6,48-49 and see note on 6,40. Masculine and neuter can both be used of the One.

7,19-20 *ταύτη γὰρ ... ἐν ἐκείνῳ* : The cause is not immanent in its effects (V 3,11,16-17; see the following note); therefore, it is different from its effects (see on 2,6). But according to the Neoplatonic theory of causation, it is also superior to its effects in respect of that which it causes (see on 3,9-10). Thus, if Intellect is *τὰ πάντα* (4,21; VI 9,2,43 ff.), the One must be different from and superior to *τὰ πάντα*. The One is, therefore, not a member of the class of *τὰ πάντα*, but is *ἐπέκεινα τῶν πάντων* (V 4,2,39-40) and as cause of them is *δύναμις τῶν πάντων* (see on 7,9-10).

But paradoxically, the only way in which the One can be the cause of the attributes of Intellect is not by having those attributes to a greater degree (for if they were predicated of the One, the One would 'be' something, i.e., it would be a member of the class of *τὰ πάντα*, and would not be different from them), but conversely by having none of them. Consequently, since Intellect contains or is every *εἶδος* (V 5,6,3-4), the One itself must be without any *εἶδος* or *μορφή* so that it may be *ἀεχὴ τῶν πάντων* (VI 9,3,15). The One is *ἀνείδρον* (V 5,6,4-5; VI 7,32,9. 33,21; VI 9,3,43). Anything which has shape implies a shaper (VI 7,33,14-16). Shape is merely a reflection of what has no shape (VI 7,33,30).

With $\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu\gamma\alpha\rho\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron$ compare IV 2,2 in fine.

Note that in another sense, though, as $\theta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu$ the One can be called $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ (V 2,1,1 ff.; VI 7,32,12-14).

7,20-23 $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \dots [\omicron\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \acute{\eta}\nu]$: These lines further explain the One's not being $\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$. If it were $\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$, or one of them, it would be numbered among them and thus would be no more than a part of them ($\tau\grave{\iota}\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omega\nu\ \acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\epsilon\ \acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ VI 7,32,5-6). Thus it could only differ from the rest of $\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ by an individual characteristic, at the same time having some common characteristic with them in virtue of being one among many parts (V 5,13,20 ff.). Thus, the One would be composite and no longer a unity - which is impossible. Furthermore, it would not then fulfil the requirement of being both superior to and different from its effects.

All editors except Perna, Creuzer and H-S have thought the text of 7,20-21 ($\kappa\alpha\iota\ \dots \acute{\eta}\nu$) unsatisfactory. Mü., following Vitringa, deletes the whole sentence and Ki., Vo. and Br. suppose lacunae, Ki. after $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ (7,21) and Vo. and Br. after $\acute{\eta}\nu$ (7,21). To judge from his translation Br. follows Fic. in thinking that the subject of the sentence is Intellect in contrast to the $\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu\gamma\alpha\rho\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron$ of 7,20. (Fic. translates:- 'illud enim unum est duntaxat, intellectus autem in ordine rerum est omnia'.) The translation of the sentence ought to be: 'that which is everything would have been classed among (a member of) Reality (i.e. the Forms'; see H-S's note in their apparatus on 7,20-21. The problem is whether $\acute{\omicron}\ \dots\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ can stand as an ellipse of

ὅ... πάντα ὧν (the ὧν is actually supplied by Dodds).

Although P. can twist language so far that he calls Intellect a ἐν πολλὰ (e.g., VI 7,14,11-12) I doubt whether ὁ πάντα would be possible in Greek. The solution to the problem is Ha.'s excellent ὅ, which supposes an easy ellipse of ἧν. Ci. and H-S² follow Ha.'s suggestion.

The last words of the next sentence (ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ὧν ἧν) are deleted by all editors except Perna, Creuzer and Mü. (who deletes only the words ὧν ἧν) on the grounds that they are a repetition of 7,21 (which Mü. deleted). The repetition is senseless, but I do not agree with Ha. that πάντα (7,22) should be included in the deletion. The phrase εἰς αὐτοῦ δέ requires a subject.

One final linguistic point. Note that the particle μὲν in 7,21 is nowhere answered by a correlative.

The sequence of thought, then, in 7,20-23 is as follows: 'if the One had been everything, it would have been classed among τὰ ὄντα. (But this is not the case.) Therefore, the One cannot be Intellect (which is everything) but is its source.'

Διὰ τοῦτο should be taken only with 7, 20-21 and not with the whole section of 7,17-21 as H-S's punctuation suggest.

7,23-24 διὸ καὶ ... ἑκάστων ἔχει: Διὸ is retrospective. Since the One is not constrained by any shape (7,19-20), and since as cause of τὰ πάντα the One must be different from them (cf. 7,20-23), the products of the One must be defined and limited and therefore substances. On the connection between definition and substance

see V 5,6,5-6 (τόδε γάρ τι δεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι · τοῦτο δὲ ὤρισμένον) and note on 5,8-9. Οὐσία in its widest sense can include sensible reality, but in our present passage P. probably has in mind only the Intelligible Forms. The association of number with each Form is the guarantee of its particularity, and the number is the individual shape which separates each Form from every other.

7,24-26 τὸ δὲ ὃν... λαμβάνει : Ci. prefers δὴ' to the mss. δέ' , but nothing would be gained by the change. Δέ' as a continuative connective is quite adequate.

Heintz's colourful αἰωρεῖσθαι (ap. Ha.) for the mss. θεωρεῖσθαι in 7,24 is very attractive. I am not sure, however, that ἐν ἀσρίσῃ... θεωρεῖσθαι is as awkward as Ha. suggests. But the addition of οἶον does suggest that some metaphorical word should follow. Αἰωρεῖσθαι is used of the movement of infinity in VI 6,3,24, and is found elsewhere in P. (e.g., II 1,4,6; IV 3,24,13). Αἰωρεῖσθαι is probably right. It contrasts well with πεπῆχθαι in the following line.

The στάσις of 7,25 is not precisely the category of στασις which ensures that the objects of Intellect's thought are always the same (see on 4,33 ff.), but stresses rather the unchanging individuality of each of the Forms. Beutler-Theiler on VI 6,3,19 note that according to Eudemus Phys. fr. 60 (Wehrli) Plato associated the concepts of movement and indeterminacy. Conversely, rest would be associated with definition and shape. So the thought probably has its roots in Plato (cf. Pl. Sph. 249b 12-cl). What

is undefined has no hypostasis, since it has not the individuality required of a hypostasis. On the connection of the word and its cognates with the concept of self-sufficient existence see on 3,9-10.

7,27-49 *ταύτης ... τὰ θεῶα* : These lines serve as the conclusion of Chapters 2-7. P. moves from discussion of Intellect's genesis to the nature of Intellect (7,27-35) and then on to its creation of soul, the bridge between the Intelligible and sensible worlds (7, 35-49). The form of this section is synthetic as P. moves downwards from the One, to Intellect and finally to soul.

7,27-30 *ταύτης τοι ... νοητοῦς* : The phrase *ταύτης τοι* *γενεᾶς* (7,27) is Homeric (*Il.* 6.211; *ibid.* 20.241). But it is also found in Plato (*R.* 547a 4-5) where it is interesting to note that all the Platonic mss. have, like the Plotinian mss., *γενεᾶς* instead of the Homeric *γενεῆς*. It thus seems likely that P. took his quotation directly from Plato and only indirectly from Homer. (This confirms Schwyzer's remark in *Entr.* p. 314 'aber selbst Homer, den er doch wohl präsent gehabt hatte, bezieht er manchmal aus Platon'.)

The mss. text of 7,27-28 runs as follows - *ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς ὁ νοῦς οὗτος ἀΐας νοῦ τοῦ καθαρωτάτου μὴ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς φῆναι*. This text has no construction and is retained only by Perna and Creuzer. Fic.'s translation which is printed in Creuzer's edition does not correspond to the Greek text. Ki. followed by Mü., Vo. and Br. omit *νοῦ* before *τοῦ* (7,27) and read *μηδε* in place

of $\mu\eta$ (7,28). These changes make $\tau\omega\kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\omega\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\upsilon$ refer to the One, and as Br.'s translation shows, this interpretation makes P. repeat the same idea twice ('...est digne d'être engendrée par le plus pur des principes et de ne pas naître d'ailleurs que du premier principe.') Ha. and Dodds both read $\acute{\alpha}\zeta\iota\omicron\nu$ (for $\acute{\alpha}\zeta\iota\omicron\varsigma$ in 7,27) Ha. inserting $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ after it, with a stop after $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$, and Dodds inserting $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ before it. Both emendations give reasonable sense, but by far the best is that of Igal (Emerita 39 (1971), pp. 155-6) who makes the single change of $\acute{\alpha}\zeta\iota\omicron\varsigma$ to $\acute{\alpha}\zeta\iota\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$, places a comma after $\kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\omega\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\upsilon$ (7,26-27) and takes the infinitives $\phi\acute{\omega}\nu\alpha\iota$ (7,28) and $\gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\eta\sigma\alpha\iota$ (7,29) as epexegetic. The infinitival clauses each refer to a different stage in the genesis of Intellect with which P. has been dealing in Chapters 6 and 7 - $\mu\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\theta\epsilon\nu\ \eta\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\varsigma\ \phi\acute{\omega}\nu\alpha\iota$ to the emanation of the undefined Intellect from the One (see 6,27 ff.) and $\gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \eta\delta\eta\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \sigma\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\ \gamma\epsilon\nu\nu\eta\sigma\alpha\iota$, $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\omega\nu\ \kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ to Intellect's own part in its own creation (see 7,10 ff.). Thus, the whole section of 7,27-30 is retrospective in that it recapitulates the themes of these two chapters. Note that both in Homer and Plato $\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\iota\ \gamma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ is similarly retrospective; in both authors it occurs at the end of a description. Ha.'s $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ after $\acute{\alpha}\zeta\iota\omicron\nu$ falsely suggests that what follows in the two clauses are new points (see Igal, op. cit. p. 156). Igal's emendation is accepted by H-S².

7,27-28 νοῦ τοῦ καθαρωτάτου : Something as pure as Intellect could only derive from the One. For the purity of Intellect see, e.g., IV 7,9,25; V 3,6,39; VI 2,8,5-6; VI 9,3,34-35. In the last passage cited P. adds that the One is even purer. With the use of a superlative adjective applied to Intellect compare the use of τελειότατος in 4,13-14.

7,28-30 γινόμενον δὲ . . . νοητοῦς : Intellect is perfected into being by its reversion towards the One (7,16). The transition from inchoate to fully formed Intellect is thus instantaneous with the formation of Intellect's contents, since νοῦς and τὰ ὄντα are identical. Compare VI 7,17,33-34 ὁ δὲ γινόμενος νοῦς αὐτὰ ἀνεφάνη τὰ πάντα ; cf. also V 2,1,11-13, and see on 4,27-28.

On the beauty of the Intelligible World see on 4,2. In I 6,9,34 ff. this beauty is, as here, specifically associated with the Forms.

On the Intelligible Gods see 4,11 and note. A more explicit list of the contents of Intellect can be found in 4,10-12.

7,30-34 πλήρη δὲ ὄντα . . . ἐν κόσμῳ : Πληροῦν and its cognates are used by P. as alternatives for εἰςέειν (see on 5,6-19). When Intellect is full, therefore, it is fully defined. Note that it is full of what it has itself produced (ἐγώνησε 7,31). Intellect brings forth its own contents by its turning towards the One (see 7,11-17 and note).

P. goes on to illustrate the fulness of Intellect by identifying it with the god Cronus, whose name he takes to be derived from

κόρος (= satiety) and νοῦς . This Platonic etymology has already been mentioned in 4,9-10 (see ad loc.). The context of this earlier passage is the same as that of our present passage. The fulness of Intellect, in each case illustrated by an account of Intellect's contents, is compared to the 'satiety' of Cronus. Here, however, the κόρος -image is further developed by the addition of the Hesiodic myth (Hes. Th. 453 ff.) of Cronus' devouring of his children. This follows on well from the epic tag πάντης τοῦ γυνῆος in 7,27.

The main difficulty is with the grammatical construction of these lines, though this is glossed over by translators. An accusative and infinitive construction follows on naturally after the epexegetic infinitives φῶναι (7,28) and γυνῆσαι (7,29). The accusative is quite clear (πλήρη ὄντα (7,30) and καταπιόντα (7,31)) but where is the infinitive of which the accusative is the subject? None of the infinitives in the clause τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχειν μηδὲ ἐκπεσεῖν εἰς ἕλην μηδὲ ἐκτραφῆναι παρὰ τῇ 'Ρέα will fill the bill, because all these infinitives must be taken together and must be construed with the article τῷ (7,31), since they serve to explain the meaning of καταπιόντα . At this point (7,33) the sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis (ὥς τὰ μυστήρια καὶ οἱ μῦθοι κτ.) and the infinitive ἔχειν (in 7,35) depends on αἰνίττονται in 7,33. The grammatical flow of the sentence is never resumed after the parenthesis, and the accusatives πλήρη ὄντα and καταπιόντα are left hanging. The reason

for this incoherence is that even in 7,30-32 P.'s mind was already focussed on the Hesiodic myth; note the use of the Hesiodic *καταπίνειν* (see *Th.* 459 ff. *τραφήναι* ; cf. *τραφέμεν* *ibid.* 480) and the mention of Cronus' wife Rhea. We have a very good instance of P.'s writing exactly mirroring the jumps in his thought.

Within the anacolouthon itself, there is a further difficulty over the subjects of the infinitives *ἔχειν* , *ἐκπεσεῖν* and *τραφήναι* in 7,32. The subject of *ἔχειν* is clearly Intellect, but the subject of the other two infinitives must be the contents of Intellect - i.e., *τὰ ὄντα* the offspring - and not Intellect itself. *Ἐκπεσεῖν* cannot be translated as 'herausstürze' (Ha.). Other translators introduce a word of permission or prevention with the last two infinitives (viz., 'sinat' Fic.; 'les empêche' Br.; 'non farli precipitare'; 'lest they fall away' MK). It seems to me quite likely that a verb of this sort has dropped out. I propose the insertion of *ἴαν* after *ἐκπεσεῖν* in 7,32. The sentence would then read *ὥς πε καταπίνοντα πάλιν τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχειν μηδὲ ἐκπεσεῖν ἴαν εἰς ἑλὴν μηδὲ τραφήναι παρὰ τῇ Ῥέᾳ* . The omission of *ἴαν* is easily explained palaeographically by haplography due to the similarity of the termination - *ειν* of *ἐκπεσεῖν* to *ἴαν* . Its addition makes Intellect the subject of the three verbal phrases which illustrate the meaning of *καταπίνοντα*.

In *παρὰ τῇ Ῥέᾳ* (7,32) note the double meaning of the word 'Rhea'. 'Rhea' is the name of the wife of Cronus, but

the word also has Heraclitean connotations of flux and instability. A Heraclitean interpretation of the proper name is found also in Pl. Cra. 402a 4 ff. (Proclus, however, in Cra. 80.16 ff. (Pasquali)) thinks that to interpret Plato in this way is unworthy of Plato's thought). The contrast in our present passage is between the stability of Intellect and the impermanence of the physical world.

$\text{A}\lambda\iota\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\iota\sigma\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$ in 7,33 is one of the technical terms of allegorical writing (see J. Pépin, Mythe et Allégorie (Paris 1958), p. 497). P. commonly uses the word of the riddling language of myth and mystery religions (I 6,6,3. 8,19; III 4,5,4; III 6,19,26; IV 3,14,5; IV 8,1,21; V 8,4,26; VI 9,9,31. 11,27). P. followed Plato (see R. 377a 4 ff.) in believing that myths in some degree mirrored reality. In fact, his quotations of Plato are mainly drawn from those dialogues which offer a mythical interpretation of philosophy (i.e. Republic, Phaedrus, Symposium and Timaeus). The exception to the rule is Parmenides which P. regularly cites. P.'s use of myth, however, can be very selective. Note how in our present passage he omits to mention the denouement of the Hesiodic story (Hes. Th. 495 ff.) - how Zeus in fact recovers all the offspring of Cronus, by forcing him to regurgitate them. Unlike Cronus, the Plotinian Intellect never can lose its state of fulness and satiety.

In (7,34) Fic., MK and Ha. take $\text{O}\rho\omega\nu \dots \gamma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ closely together, and think that P. is saying that before the birth of Zeus Cronus was the wisest god - the implication being

that when he was outwitted by Zeus, Cronus lost his wisdom. It is better to follow Br. and Ci. in associating Cronus' wisdom with the fact that he kept his offspring within himself, i.e., to take the phrase *πρὸ τοῦ Δία γινώσθαι* with what follows rather than with *σοφώτατον*. P. would never say that Zeus (i.e. soul) became wiser than Cronus (i.e., Intellect). He never mentions Zeus' trick by which Cronus was deceived.

All the Enneadic mss. read *Δία* (7,34), but only Perna, H-S, Ha. and Ci. keep this reading in their editions. *Δία* is certainly right, the accusative being the subject of the infinitive *γινώσθαι*, which is construed with the article *τοῦ*. With this reading there is no need for the lacunae and additions after *γινώσθαι* which the majority of editors have to suppose, or for the addition of *τε* after *αὐτῷ* in 7,34 which was proposed by Seidel (*De Usu Praep.*, p. 35). A return to the mss. reading was suggested by Bury (*CQ* 39 (1945), p. 86).

In 7,35 *ἢ καὶ πλήρης ... ἐν κόρῳ* should be taken closely with the preceding phrase *ἀ γυνῆ πάλιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν*. Ci. is wrong to translate it as though it summed up all the reasons from 7,30 onwards why Intellect is full and sated ('per tutto questo, allora,...etc.).

P. mentions the myth of Cronus' eating of his children in V 8,12,3 ff., although in that passage Cronus is not mentioned by name and the etymology of *κρόνος / κόρος* is avoided. The birth of Zeus (the soul) is used as an example of the splendour

of the father (ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ὑστάτου πατρὸς ὄντος ἔστιν ἰδεῖν οὕτω
ἐξ εἰκόνας τινὸς αὐτοῦ, ὅσος δὲ πατὴρ ἔκεινος V 8,12,9-11).

7,35-37 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα... τέλος : Igal (Emerita 39 (1971),
p. 130 n. 2) contends that 7,35 continues the main argument
of Chapter 7 which the objection of 7,4 interrupted ('Las
palabras πρώτον μὲν de la línea 2 auguran un segundo
miembro. Pero la objeción de 4-5 (ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς ἔκεινο .
πῶς οὖν νοῦν γεννᾷ ;) interrumpe bruscamente el hilo del
argumento, cuyo curso no se reanuda hasta la línea 35 ss. (μετὰ
δὲ ταῦτα κτλ.)'). This is nonsense. The δὲ of 7,35
picks up the μὲν of 7,34 and introduces the second stage of
the myth (φασί 7,36), the birth of Zeus.

The interpretations of the phrase κόρον ἤδη ὄντα
in 7,36 vary. Fic., Ci. and Ha. take the accusative phrase to
agree with Δία (7,36) and think that κόρος here has its
alternative meaning 'son' (see LSJ s.v. B) as well as the more
usual meaning 'satiety'. This interpretation is quite wrong.
First, it would be most odd if P. were suddenly to change the
meaning of κόρος when he has taken so much trouble to associate
it with fulness. Secondly, 7,36-37 (ψυχὴν γὰρ γεννᾷ νοῦς,
νοῦς ὡν τέλος) makes the κόρος = son interpretation
quite impossible. The γὰρ shows that these lines explain what
precedes. Thirdly, the ἤδη in the phrase κόρον ἤδη ὄντα
only makes sense when applied to Cronus. Cronus is full only
when he has swallowed his children. (What does Fic.'s 'puerum

iam existentem' mean?) In view of all this, *κόρον ἡδὴ*
ὄντα must agree with the subject of the infinitive
γεννᾶν, which is understood from 7,33. Br.'s translation
 'mais ensuite une fois rassasié, on dit qu'il engendre Zeus' is
 excellent.

7,37-38 *καὶ γὰρ τέλειον ... εἶναι* : See 6,37-38 and note. Only
 matter is completely without power of creation (cf. III 6,19,29-30;
 VI 3,8,34-35).

7,38-42 *κρείττον δὲ ... εἰδοποιούμενον* : Just as the product of
 the One is less than the One, so soul is less than Intellect.
 (*Οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα* (7,39) means simply 'in the case of the creative
 activity of Intellect'.) This theory has already been mentioned
 in 6,39 (note ad loc. and on 2,7). Because the product is less
 than its prior, it is only an image of it (see on 7,1). The
 theory that the product is at first undefined and is defined by
 its producer (7,40-42) has been dealt with in Chapter 5 with
 reference to the definition of Forms/numbers by the One (5,8.
 ff.; see on 5,6-19) and in 3,13 ff. with reference to the definition
 of the soul by Intellect (see on 3,13-14). Br. translates
ὡσαύτως (7,40) by 'pour la même raison'. The other translators
 are more correct by their simple 'similarly'. *Εἰδοποιεῖν*
 (7,41-42) is first found in Chrysippus (SVF II.148.2) to describe
 the effect of qualities on matter. P. extends its use to cover
 the process of definition at all levels (III 4,1,8-10 *ἢ, ὡςπερ πᾶν,*
ὅσον πρὸ τούτου ἐγεννᾶτο, ἀνόρφωτον ἐγεννᾶτο, εἰδο-
ποιεῖτο δὲ τῷ ἐπιστρέφειν πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν οἶον

ἐκτρέφόμενον, οὕτω καὶ κτλ.). P. apologises for the use of the word in our present passage because what is used properly of matter and form is used only figuratively of the One and Intellect, and Intellect and soul. Compare 3,22-23 where P. describes the relationship between soul and Intellect 'ὡς τὸ δεχόμενον, τὸ δὲ ὡς εἶδος' (see note ad loc.). Because Intellect receives the εἶδος of the One it becomes ἀγαθοειδής and ἐνοειδής (see note on 7,2-4); and soul which receives Intellect's εἶδος is νοοειδής (3,23).

7,42-43 νοῦν δὲ ... τὸ διανοούμενον: Fic. ('vero'), MK ('yet') and Ha. ('aber') are wrong to translate δὲ as an adversative. There is no contrast between these lines and the previous sentence. Δεῖ is used here as a continuative connective.

I agree with Ha., MK and H-S that τὸ διανοούμενον should be taken in apposition to λόγος and ὑπόστασις. P. makes it quite clear (see V 3,4,20 ff.. 8,46 ff., 9,7 ff.) that strictly speaking only the higher part of soul is the image of Intellect (see on 3,7). The λόγος, the ὑπόστασις and the διανοούμενον are one and the same. With soul as the logos of Intellect and as a 'hypostasis' compare 3,8-9 λόγος νοῦν καὶ ἡ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια καὶ ἣν προίεται ζῶν ἐς ἄλλου ὑπόστασιν and see note on 3,8. On the meaning of ὑπόστασις see on 3,9-10.

Τὸ διανοούμενον, the ratiocinative part of soul, is alternately called νοῦς ψυχῆς, τὸ διανοητικόν, τὸ λογιστικόν and simply διάνοια. On its function as the intermediary

between sense-impressions and the *τύποι* that come from Intellect and its relationship with the transcendent soul see on 3,13 and 11,1-3. MK's reference to Pl. *Ti.* 39e is not very helpful.

7,43-44 τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ... ἐκείνου : Compare V 3,9,15-17 ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐκ νοῦ φῶς τι περὶ αὐτὸν γενομένη ἐξήρτηται τε αὐτοῦ καὶ οὕτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνον .

The light which comes from Intellect is analogous to the *πρίλαμψις* which emanates from the One (see on 6,28-30), though in our present passage Intellect and not the One is seen as the sun. For further examples of the sun image used of Intellect see III 5,2,30-32. 6,23-24; IV 3,11,14 ff.; V 3,9,7 ff.). The effect of Intellect's light on the soul is described in V 3,8,22-24; it makes soul intellectual (*νοερός*) i.e., like the upper light (Intellect).

Ἰχνοσ (7,44) picks up *εἰδωλον* of 7,40. On these and other words for 'image' see on 7,1.

On *ἐξαρτάν* see on 1,14; 3,5; and 6,30-34. The close connection between the sun and its light is mentioned in IV 4,29, 10; V 3,9,16. 12,42-44. Intellect and soul, however, are even more closely related (III 5,2,30-32).

7,44-48 κατὰ δάτρεα μὲν... χεῖρονα : On the twofold nature of soul see introduction to Chapter 2. P. treats soul in our present passage as a unity, but he sometimes makes internal divisions within it, i.e., for example, in V 2,1, 19-21 the ratiocinative

soul is said to be responsible for the creation of the lower soul just as the lower soul is responsible for the creation and shaping of matter (cf. II 3,18,12-13 καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς τοῦ παντός ψυχῆς) πρὸς τὸ κάτω τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦτο εἶναι. ποιητῆς οὖν ἔσχατος οὗτος). These distinctions, however, are only conceptual. Properly speaking all souls are one (see IV 9 passim).

The proximity of soul to Intellect results in the noetic activities of the higher soul; (see note on γυτόνια in 3,5). Just as Intellect is defined or filled by the One (see 7,30 and note on 5,6-19) so soul is filled or defined by Intellect and becomes νοερά. The ratiocinative soul is described in II 3,18,14 as τὸ πρῶτως πληρούμενον παρὰ νοῦ (cf. V 2,1, 19-20 ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα, ὅθεν ἐγένετο, πληροῦται).

Ἀπολαῖον and μεταλαμβάνον provide an alternative vocabulary with which to look at this process of fulfilment and resemblance. What is secondary to the One shares in the One (V 5,13,27 ff.) and body shares in the soul (III 9,3,2; IV 7,8⁵,49-50); cf. further IV 4,11,1 ff.. 13,5 ff.. With the use of ἀπολαύειν cf. II 1,7,12; VI 1,12,38; VI 4,2,42. This sharing does not prevent each of the three hypostases from having a separate and autonomous existence. The concept of μετάληψις is Platonic in origin (see Pl. Prm. 130e 6 ff.). The intellectual activity of soul, although described by the word νοοῦν (7,46) is different from the self-concentrated thought of Intellect. Whereas soul's thought must always be ratiocinative (ἐν λογισμοῖς V 3,3,14),

Intellect already possesses its noetic objects, and so does not need λογισμός (see on 4,16).

On ἐφάπτεσθαι (7,46) see Wolters' note on III 5,2,17. He notes that P. often uses the word to denote the attachment of the lower soul to what is bodily or material and cites besides our present passage I 1,3,20; I 4,14,7; I 6,6,31; III 5,2,17; IV 8,4,20; VI 2,22,31. But in virtue of its innate power, soul not only 'grasps' material reality, it actually creates it. On the creative activity of the lower soul (φύσις) see IV 4,14,1 ff..18,4 ff.. The principle that the product is less than the producer (7,47-48) has already been mentioned in 7,38-42.

7,48

περὶ ὧν ἕσπερον λεκτόν : The creative activity of soul is not discussed subsequently in V I. Br., claiming to follow F. Heinemann (Plotin (Leipzig,1921), p. 143) says that P. is referring to III 1 and III 4. But he seems to have misunderstood Heinemann's point. Heinemann maintained that III 4, III 1 and II 4 comprised the third section of P.'s first period of composition. One of his arguments for this view is that our present passage refers to 'das von der Seele Erzeugte' by which he presumably meant matter and material creation. Heinemann obviously thought that ἕσπερον referred to II 4 (περὶ ἑλγος). Along with Heinemann and H-S I think that II 4 is probably the correct reference. There must always, however, be some doubt about this as P. probably did not have an exact programme of his prospective writings.

7,48-49 καὶ μέχρι τούτων τὰ θεῖα : Ha. maintains that one would expect some discussion of the physical world to follow these words, and since there is none, he deletes them as a marginal gloss. But the sentence is retrospective. It closes P.'s discussion of the three hypostases which has occupied him since Chap. 2. Chapter 8 begins a new section of the treatise.

On soul as a member of the Intelligible World (τὰ θεῖα ; cf. II 9,3,19-20) see note on ψυχὴν πᾶσαν in 4,11. With the phrase itself compare V 5,9,16-17 καὶ μέχρι τούτου ὁ θεός .

CHAPTER EIGHT

Chapters 8 and 9 are doxographical and give the evidence for P.'s belief that his philosophy was rooted in antiquity.

His reasons for including a doxography are partly that, imbued like all of his age with the tradition of scholastic orthodoxy, he wished to rebut any suggestion of *κακωτομία* (see Dodds, JRS 50 (1960), pp. 1-2) and partly that the ancients, whom Plato had described as 'living nearer the gods' (Pl. Phlb. 16c 7-8), had a prima facie claim to be respected (cf. III 7,1,13-14; II 9,6,37 ff.. 6,52 ff.). P. wanted to show that his own philosophical beliefs were not inconsistent with their stated doctrines (VI 4,16,4-7), in so far as these were true. Greatest among the ancients was, of course, Plato, for P. thought of himself as a Platonist and of his own philosophy as an exposition of Platonism (see 8,10-13 and note). The value of other philosophies depended on the extent to which they had prefigured or coincided with Platonic doctrine.

P. begins these Chapters with a quotation from Plato. P.'s use of Plato is very selective. The early dialogues, for example, are hardly used at all, and sometimes the same passage is quoted as nearly the only representative of a dialogue; Pl. Tht. 176a-b, for example, provides approximately 76% of the quotations from the Theaetetus. Nevertheless, it seems to me intrinsically unlikely that P. had not read the whole of Plato. Schwyzer suggests (RE 551.52 ff.), possibly rightly, that P. ignored the earlier dialogues because they were too concerned with the value of the city state and ended in *ἀπορία* rather than in doctrine. Certainly, their ethical concerns were not central to P.'s metaphysics. Unless actually commenting

on a Platonic passage P. tends to use Platonic quotations as corroboration of his arguments rather than as integral, logical steps in them; or he introduces them for the sake of reminiscence. He rarely treats them in context. They are for him self-supporting axioms to be used on any occasion to support his own views (cf. Schwyzer, op. cit. 552.9-11).

The same process of cavalier selection is apparent in P.'s citation of the Presocratics and Rist may be right (Plotinus: the Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 177-178) in thinking that P. was familiar with a handbook rather than with the original texts. Certainly, P.'s information about most of them could be found in Aristotle and the doxographical tradition (see individual notes).

P. finishes the doxographical chapters with criticism of Aristotle (9,7-27), whose works, particularly the Metaphysics (V.P. 14,5-7), P. knew thoroughly, and presumably at first hand.

8,1-4 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ... τρίτον :

See Pl. Ep. II 312e 1-4

περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλεία πάντ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα καὶ ἐκείνο αἶτιον ἁπάντων τῶν κατῶν • δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα. The three Platonic

principles βασιλεύς , δεύτερον and τρίτον which P. takes to be evidence of his own One, Intellect and Soul, must be what P. refers to by the word τρίττα (8,1). The Platonic quotation starts, then, with the next words (τὰ πάντα).

Pace H-S, it is not very important that no manuscript punctuates after τρίττα . Like all editors prior to H-S, I prefer a semi-colon after τρίττα ; the Platonic quotation is in apposition to the introductory remark. (Fic. gets this quite wrong.)

It is noticeable that the text of P.'s citation of Plato differs from the established Platonic text. There is nothing surprising about this, for P. is often inaccurate when he quotes from memory (cf. Schwyzer, RE 550.44 ff.), though he quotes Pl. Ep. II more accurately at I 8,2,28-32. In our present passage it is clear that $\phi\eta\sigma\acute{\iota}\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha$ in 8,2 is a gloss by P. on what Plato means by $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ i.e., that $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ refer to what he would call $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha$, the constituents of the Intelligible World (for this meaning of $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha$ see on 1,24) which are centred round the One. Thus $\phi\eta\sigma\acute{\iota}\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha$ should be exempted with or without the $\kappa\alpha\iota$ following $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha$ from the quotation proper (thus Ha. and H-S though I cannot agree with H-S's suggestion that $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha = \tau\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu\ \beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\alpha$). Earlier editors other than Perna and Creuzer assume that $\phi\eta\sigma\acute{\iota}$ introduces a direct statement ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ 8,1 - $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha$ 8,2) or an indirect statement with $\varepsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ understood. Such an interpretation brings with it the omission of $\tau\acute{\alpha}^2$ in 8,1 and the substitution of $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ for $\gamma\alpha\rho$ in 8,2. Both these readings can be found in the indirect (Eusebian) tradition. But as Henry remarks (Etats, p. 137) $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ is an 'expression chère à Plotin', and it would be rash to depart from the consensus of Enneadic manuscripts in a circumstance in which P. is obviously quoting from memory. H-S, though, call $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ 'aeque bonum'. (On $\phi\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota$ meaning 'to signify', 'to mean', cf. $\phi\eta\sigma\acute{\iota}$ in 8,7 and see Arndt-Gingrich s.v. 2 and H. Fournier, Les Verbes "Dire" en Grec Ancien (Diss. Paris, 1946), p. 78. Fic. mistranslates the whole phrase.)

The last part of the quotation is troublesome. Editors of Plato rightly print *περί* with a paroxytone accent, indicating that it governs the preceding rather than the subsequent noun. While this accentuation is open to Plotinian editors in I 8,2,28-32, it is clearly not possible here (pace Dodds, who prefers it) since in 8,3-4 symmetry requires that each of the last two occurrences of *περί* be taken with an analogous noun, and the order of the last phrase is such (*περί τὰ τρίτα τρίτον*) that *περί* can only govern *τὰ τρίτα*. It is at first sight odd that the singular (*δυνάμεον* = Intellect, *τρίτον* = Soul) should be said to be 'around' the plural (*δυνάμεα*, *τρίτα*) rather than vice versa, as *περί* calls to mind the common Plotinian image of the circle and its centre (on this see 7,7-8) and one expects the centre of the circle to be singular. But in view of the intensive meaning *περί* sometimes has in the *Enneads* (where its meaning approaches that of 'conceptually related to' (see on 4,19), it is not too disturbing to find P. saying that Intellect (Plato's *δυνάμεον*) is 'about' *τὰ δυνάμεα* (= the Intelligible World) and that Soul (*τὸ τρίτον*) is 'about' *τὰ τρίτα* (= the area of reality with which soul deals). MK translates *περί* in its last two occurrences as 'containing', i.e., 'a Secondary containing the Secondaries'; this is a bit strong, as is Br.'s 'dans' for its first occurrence.

P. takes the last part of the Platonic quotation, then, (*καὶ δυνάμεον... τρίτον*), as an elaboration of the first more general remark that at the centre of the Intelligible World

is the One. Inside the Intelligible World are Intellect and Soul, each concerned with its own area of reality.

References to Pl. Ep. II 312e are common. Besides our present passage H-S list I 8,2,28-30; III 5,8,8; III 9,7,3; V 5,3,3-4; VI 4,11,9; VI 5,4,21. 4,24; VI 7,42,3-6. 42,9-10. 42,15-20; VI 8,9,18-23. But only in I 8,2,28-30 and in our present passage is the quotation in extenso. P. obviously thought the letter genuine. (On the problem of its authenticity, which need not concern us, see R.S. Bluck, 'The Second Platonic Epistle', Phronesis 5 (1960), pp. 140-151 and N. Gulley, 'The Authenticity of the Platonic Epistles', Entretiens Hardt xviii (1972), pp. 105-130, where refs. to earlier discussions may be found.) In the letter the author says that he is speaking in riddles ($\delta\epsilon\iota'$ $\alpha\iota\nu\upsilon\mu\omega\upsilon\kappa$ 312d 7-8) but presumably the 'king' refers to Plato's highest principle (Plato often uses $\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma$ and its cognates as a high term of approbation; the Good rules the Intelligible world at R. 509d; cf. also Lg. 904a 6; Cra. 396a 8; Phlb. 28c 7), $\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\delta\epsilon\upsilon\tau\epsilon\tau\alpha$ refers to the Forms ($\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\nu\omicron\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}$) and $\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha$ to $\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}$ (see Novotny's note ad loc.). If this interpretation is right P.'s interpretation of the triad as One/Intellect/Soul is quite close to the intention of the author of the letter. On P.'s use of the concept of $\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma$ see H. Dörrie, 'Der König', RIPh 24 (1970), pp. 217-235.

8,4-5 λέγω δὲ καὶ ... νοῦν λέγων : Pl. Ep. VI 323d 3-6 τοῦ
τε ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα κύριον ἐπομνύντας (sc. χεῖ
ἡμᾶς ἀναγνῶναι), ὅν, ἂν ὅντως φιλοσοφῶμεν,

εἰσόμεθα πάντες σαφῶς εἰς δύνανεν ἀνθρώπων
 εὐδαιμόνων . Novotny remarks ad loc.: 'aenigma
 simillimum illi quod 2.312e occurrit et aequae atque illud
 varias habens explanationes'. He thinks that P.'s explanation
 of the 'father of the cause' as the Good/One and of the 'cause'
 as τὰ νοητά / νοῦς is the correct one. But the key words
 'cause' (αἴτιον) and 'father' may also have been suggested
 to P. by Pl. R. 508b 9 ff. where the sun is described as the
 cause of sight, and as the child of the Good (τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
 ἕκγονον) (see J. Whittaker, VChr 23 (1969), pp. 101-102).
 H-S² plausibly suggest that αἴτιον... λέγων (8,4-5) contains
 a further reminiscence of the Anaxagorean reference in Pl. Phd.
 97c 1-2 νοῦς ἔστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος .
 One might also compare Pl. Phlb. 30d 1 and d 10-e 1 where Zeus
 whom P. interprets as Intellect (cf. III 5,8,11-12) is said to
 have powers of causation. The identification of Intellect with
 the αἴτιον is closely associated with the identification of
 Intellect with the Platonic demiurge (see following note).

- 8,5-6 δημιουργός ... κρατῆρι ἐκείνῳ : In Plato's Timaeus the
 demiurge is said to create soul (34b 3 ff.) by mixing its con-
 stituent ingredients in a mixing bowl (for the κρατῆρ see
 41d 4 and cf. 35a 3). In P.'s philosophy soul is the hypostasised
 activity of Intellect, so it is natural that P. should identify
 the demiurge, soul's creator in the Timaeus, with Intellect, the
 'creator' of the third hypostasis. He ignores differences between
 his and Plato's conception - e.g., that the Platonic demiurge

creates body as well as soul for the sun, the moon and the planets. For further references to Intellect as demiurge see II 1,5,5; II 3,18,15; V 9,3,26; and cf. P.'s attack on the ignorance of the Gnostics in II 9,6,22-24.

For a conspectus of the ancient views on the identification of the demiurge see Proclus in Ti. I.303.24-317.20 (Diehl).

(On the ambivalence of the term 'Zeus' in IV 4,10,1 ff. to refer to both the demiurge and the world soul see introduction to Chapter 2.)

8,6-8 τοῦ αἰτίου... ἐπέκυνα οὐσίας : Vo. and Br., with no mss. authority, transpose αἰτίου and δέ in 8,6-7; this is unnecessary - for other examples of postponed δέ see 6,16; IV 5,7,51; VI 4,11,18.

P. continues the argument. If Intellect is the cause, the father of the cause must be the Good. Τοῦ ἐπέκυνα νοῦ and τοῦ ἐπέκυνα οὐσίας are synonyms for the Good. Ἐπέκυνα νοῦ was used by Aristotle in one of his definitions of God (Ross, Fragmenta Selecta, p. 57 ὁ θεός ἢ νοῦς ἐστίν ἢ ἐπέκυνά τι τοῦ νοῦ). For a history of the connection between ἐπέκυνα τῆς οὐσίας and ἐπέκυνα τοῦ νοῦ see J. Whittaker, 'ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΝΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ', VChr 23 (1969), pp. 101-102. Ἐπέκυνα νοῦ can be found again at V 3,11,28. 12,47. 13,2-3. On the last phrase ἐπέκυνα οὐσίας see on 6,12-13.

8,8-9 πολλαχού δὲ ... λέγει : These lines are parenthetical.

Exact references are difficult to find. 'Référence fort vague qui se rapporte plutôt, semble-t-il, à une interprétation de Platon qu'à des textes précis' (Bréhier ad loc.). But the identification is easily derived from Platonic texts. The Forms and the real world are identified in the Republic (cf. e.g., R. 507b 5-7 and 597a 4), and according to P.'s interpretation of Ti. 39e 7-9 νοῦς and the ἰδέαι are the same. Thus the equation $\text{νοῦς} = \text{ἰδέαι} / \text{εἶδη} = \tauὰ \text{ὄντα}$ is reached.

For other vague references to Plato see VI 7,11,44-45 perhaps

a reference to Pl. Epin. 981b-c and 984b-c and IV 8,1,23-25

λείπεται δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ Θεὸς Πλάτων ὅς πολλαί τε καὶ κατὰ περὶ
ψυχῆς εἴπε περὶ τε ἀφίξεως αὐτῆς πολλαχῇ εἶρηκεν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ
λόγοις.

Dodds avoids the problem of referential exactness by unjustifiably

deleting τὴν ἰδέαν . (With the singular ἰδέαν to refer

to the totality of the Intelligible World compare V 8,8,10; VI

7,18,8 and VI 9,2,27-28.) On the identification of Intellect

and the real world of forms see on 4,26-27.

8,9-10 ὥστε ... νοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν : Fic.'s insertion of κατὰ before

Πλάτωνα is misguided. His translation 'quapropter apud

Platonem cognoscere licet ex ipso quidem bono...' shows that he

has to insert 'licet' to govern the infinitive εἶδέναι . His

emendations are unnecessary. Although I can find no examples of

ὥστε used as a co-ordinating conjunction (= 'therefore'; see

LSJ s.v. II.2) with the infinitive, the parallel use of οἶδεν

in 9,4 of which the subject is Heraclitus makes it virtually

certain that Πλάτωνα is the subject of εἰδέναι here.

All editors save Perna have omitted or bracketed the Enneadic τὴν ἰδέαν after νοῦ in 8,10. The words have no construction and the error is due to dittography of the same words from the previous line.

On ἐκ μὲν τὰγαθοῦ τὸν νοῦν (8,9-10) see Plato's comparison of the Good to the sun in R. 508b 9 ff.. The sun is the cause of sight, and is described as having the same relation to sight and visible objects as the Good has to νοῦς and τὰ νοούμενα .

8,10-13 καὶ εἶναι... ἐκείνων γεγονέναι : The accusatives and infinitives are still dependent on ὥστε (8,9).

The references to Plato in the first part of Chapter 8 justify P.'s claim to be a Platonist. For P., Plato was the one ancient philosopher who had discovered the truth. The Gnostics, orthodox in so far as they followed Plato, were 'outside the truth' when they deviated from him (II 9,6,10-12). But like Heraclitus (cf. IV 8,1,11 ff.) Plato did not make everything clear. In V 8,4,51 ff. P. says that Plato's remarks about ἡ ἐκὼ ἐπιστήμη need interpretation, and in IV 4,22,10 ff. that what Plato says about the soul actually increases or at least does not lessen perplexity about the problem. Sometimes Plato appears to be contradictory - e.g., in what he says about the descent of the soul (IV 8,1,27 ff.).

Following hints in Plato (see Diotima's remarks in Smp. 209e 4 ff.) P. believed that Platonism was like a religion and

its practitioners like initiates. Note that in Pl. Phd. 69d 1-2 the initiates in Hades are said to be οἱ πεφιλοσοφηώτεροι ὁρθῶς . Hence, philosophy was not for everyone (cf. Pl. R. 494a 4) and only those with certain preconceptions might be allowed a share in it (cf. Pl. Ep. II 314a 1 ff.; V 8,2,45 διὸ οὐδὲ πρὸς πάντας οἱ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγοι). Because of its similarity to the mysteries, then, Platonism might be expected to present its doctrine in riddles (note δι' αἰνιγμάτων in Pl. Ep. II 312d 7-8). P. uses one of the technical terms of allegorical writing (see J. Pépin, Mythe et Allégorie (Paris, 1958), p. 497) to describe Plato's method of propounding doctrine, ἡνιγμένως in VI 2,22,1 and αἰνιττόμενος in VI 2,22,13. The same word is used in 7,33 or our present treatise to describe the method of myth (see note ad loc.).

P.'s role as ἐξηγητής was to recover the hidden meaning from Plato's philosophy. Ἐξηγητής and ἐξηγησις are also technical terms of the allegorists (Pépin, loc. cit.). On the use of ἐξηγεῖσθαι / ἐξηγητής in contexts of philosophical and religious interpretation see LSJ s.v. ἐξηγητής II.1 and Arndt-Gingrich s.v. ἐξηγέομαι . Proclus (Theol. Plat. I.I. p. 6.16 ff. (Saffrey and Westerink) calls P. an ἐξηγητής τῆς Πλατωνικῆς ὑποπτύας . So P. was the interpreter of the secrets of Platonic doctrine. But although P. thought of himself as a Platonist (see refs. in note on 6,4-6 to passages where φαρὲν or λέγομεν means 'we Platonists') he was no

slavish follower of Plato; he was more than a mere commentator. Porphyry realised how many original and un-Platonic doctrines could be found in P.'s pages (see V.P. 14.14-16 and *passim*). It would be odd if P. himself was unconscious of his own deviations from his mentor. Rist collects (Plotinus: the Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 182 ff.) examples of Plotinian teachings which differ from the tenets of Platonism. But P. never engages in polemic with Plato. Where he disagrees with Plato he passes over the fact in silence, even where the contradiction is blatant. In general on this topic of ἐξηγήσεις see A. Eon, 'La Notion Plotinienne d'Exégèse', RIPh 24 (1970), pp. 252-289.

Ἀναπεπταμένως is a hapax legomenon in P.. Dörrie notes (RIPh 24 (1970), p. 25 n. 9) that behind the word lies the Homeric ἔπεα πτερόεντα : 'ein Wort müsste auffliegen and seine Wirkung tun; das ist in diesem Falle nicht geschehen, Dörrie's note wrongly suggests that the word comes from ἀνατίεσθαι. In fact, it Plotin hat das wirkungslos Daliegende "aufgegriffen". I can come from ἀναπεταννύναι. find no other example of the word in Greek.

8,13-14 μαρτυρίου... Πλάτωνος γράμματα: Only Ci. of modern editors keeps the Enneadic πιστωσασμένους. But he gives no reasons other than palaeographic ones for his reading, and his translation 'con testi che ci garantiscono ...' is surely impossible to get out of the simple μαρτυρίου. Πιστοῦν in the middle voice means 'confirm'; in which case μαρτυρίου is a dative of agent in apposition to τοῖς... Πλάτωνος γράμμασιν (thus, Ha., Br. and MK). The mistake might be due to the proximity of μαρτυρίου (see Henry, Etats, p. 139).

Vo. and Br. follow Eusebius (PG 21.892b) and omit τοῦ (8,14); on this see Henry, Etats, p. 139.

8,14-15 ἦντο μὲν οἶν: Wolters is probably right to see here an example of a prospective μὲν emphasized by οἶν (see his note on III 5,1,46, and for other references see Denniston, pp. 473-475). He suggests that the correlative δέ is to be found in 9,1 (Ἀναξαγόρας δέ); but I see no reason why the δέ in 8,24 should not be assumed to pick up the μὲν. After all, the distinction between Parmenides and Plato's Parmenides is a strong one.

8,15-18 Παρμενίδης ... εἶναι λόγων : P. mentions Parmenides only twice by name (here and in VI 6,18,42) but treats him more fully than the other Presocratics, partly because of his doctrine of the One, and partly, perhaps, because he was greatly respected by Plato (see Tht. 183e 5 ff.). The present quotation (DK B.3) which he uses four times to confirm the identity of Intellect and Being (here; I 4,10,6; III 8,8,8 and V 9,5,29-30; cf. the further reminiscence at VI 7,41,18) is not found in the doxographical tradition: before P. it occurs only in Clem. Al. Strom. VI.II.23.3. This suggests that P. may have found the quotation in a personal reading of Parmenides' poem (note that P. explicitly mentions his writings - συγγράμματα in 8,22). This would be striking proof of the importance he gave to Parmenides; knowledge of the other Presocratics may well be drawn from secondary sources (see individual notes).

In DK B.3 Parmenides did not mean that thinking and Being were identical but that only things which existed could be the object of thoughts - lit.: 'the same thing exists for thinking and for being' (cf. DK B.8.34-36). As in his treatment of Plato, P. cites the quotation with total disregard for its context. Note that Parmenides only 'touched on' Plotinian doctrine. P. does not have the same confidence in him as he does in Plato (see on 8,23-26).

The paragogic nu on ἐστίν in 8,17 is necessary for the scansion of the Parmenides quotation. It seems odd not to write it in here, as P. is apparently trying to be precise in his quotation - note the inclusion of the logically unnecessary γὰρ in 8,17. I would follow Vo., Br. and Ha. in writing ἔστιν ; ἐστίν should also be read in V 9,5,29.

8,18-19 καὶ ἀκίνητον... τὸ νοεῖν ; See Parmenides DK B.8.26-27, his description of Being αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλης ἐν πείρασιν θαρμῶν / ἔστιν ἀνάγκη ἀταύρωτον , though P. could have derived knowledge of this doctrine from Aristotle (Ph. 184b 25-26; cf. ibid. 184a 15-16).

On the integral connection between movement and thought see 4,34-36 and note on 4,34-37. 'Movement' is one of the categories and along with 'rest' is an aspect of the life of Intellect. Both 'sameness' and 'difference' 'movement' and 'rest' were necessary for the peculiar status of a ἐν πολλὰ . P. attributes one of his own insights to Parmenides. Even though Parmenides identified Being and thought (according to P.'s inter-

pretation of DK B.3) he nevertheless called Being 'unmoved'.

Vitringa's addition of οὐκ in 8,18 spoils the sequence of thought, but the καὶ... ὅτι is perfectly sound. One might paraphrase: 'but although εἶναι = νοεῖν and therefore includes 'movement' as well as 'rest', Parmenides also (as well as me) calls Being 'unmoved'.' The ὅτι is wrongly omitted by Ki., Mii., Vo. and Br.. Its omission involves wrong punctuation, and Br.'s mistranslation.

(Mii.'s deletion of τοῦτο (8,18) to προστιθεῖς (8,19) shows his misunderstanding of P.'s train of thought.)

8,19-20 σωματικὴν ... ὡσαύτως: It makes little difference to the sense whether we read ἐξαίρων or ἐξαερῶν in 8,19. Ki., Mii., Vo., Br. and Ha. print ἐξαερῶν, and since this is much more common than ἐξαίρειν meaning 'remove', I suspect that it should be read here. The accentuation of scribes should carry little weight in the establishment of the correct textual reading.

In DK B.8.29 Parmenides calls Being ταῦτόν ἐν ταύτῳ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτοῦ τε κεῖται. Note that by his insistence that by ἀκίνητον Parmenides means that Being has no bodily movement, he leaves the way open for the possibility that 'intellectual movement' ('movement' = the Intellectual category) may be found in Intellect.

On μένειν see on 3,10-12 and 4,11-12. Unlike the οὐσία of sensible objects the οὐσία of Intelligible Beings remains the same (V 6,6,15-16 τὰ μὲν (κ.ὄντα) μένει

ᾧσαύτως τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τὰ δὲ ἔει καὶ οὐ μὲν
 ὅσα ἐν αἰσθήσει). The word ᾧσαύτως is used by
 Plato in Phd. 78d 2 and 6 to describe the permanence of τὰ ὄντα ;
 cf. id. Sph. 248a 12-13. Besides V 6,6,15 see II 9,1,29; V 3,16,
 20; V 8,13,1; VI 2,7,30; VI 5,2,13; VI 7,13,5. The phrase
 ᾧσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα occurs in the Phaedo before it occurs
 in the Sophist. In H-S's index fontium the phrase is always taken
 to be a quotation of the later dialogue. This seems arbitrary.

8,20-22 καὶ ὄγκῳ ... ἐν ἑαυτῷ : Parmenides DK B.8.43 εὐκύκλου
 σφαίρας ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ also quoted by Plato at Sph. 244e 3.
 in his critique of Parmenides. The image of the circle is a common
 one in the Enneads - note the geometric language used in Chapter 7.
 The σφαῖρα νοητή is the image of Intellect and an impression
 of it is achieved by abstracting from the image of a physical
 sphere its physical attributes such as ὄγκος, τόπος and ἔλη
 (V 8,9,7 ff.). It is 'das vollkommenste Symbol der aus der göttlichen
 Einheit entspringenden Ganzheit der Geisteswelt' (D. Mahnke,
Unendliche Sphäre und Allmittelpunkt, (Halle, 1937), p. 219).
 In II 9,4,30-31 the sphere is glossed as τὴν ἐκτὶ τοῦ κόσμου
 τοῦ νοητοῦ περιχθὲν ἐν αὐτῷ . The unbroken
 circumference contains all the contents of the sphere within it,
 just as Intellect contains within it the whole of the Intelligible
 world. On ἔχει περιελημμένα (8,21) see 4,10-11, and note.
 The centre of the Intelligible circle is usually the One (see 7,
 7-8 and note) around which Intellect revolves (cf. VI 5,4,20 ff.).
 The all-embracing Intellect contains its objects within itself

(V 5,2,1), so Intellect, its act and Being are one (V 3,5,43

ἐν ᾧ πάντα ἔσται, νοῦς, νόησις, τὸ νοητόν ; VI 7,41,12).

8,22-23 ἐν δὲ ... εὐρισκομένου : Parmenides DK B.8.5-6 οὐδέ ποτ'

ἦν οὐδέ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, / ἐν,

συνεχές . Parmenides' view that Being is one is criticized

by Plato in Sph. 244-245 where Plato distinguishes between unity

which is predicated of a sum of parts and absolute unity, and by

Aristotle in Ph. I chapters 2 and 3 who argues that the meanings

of 'one' and 'being' are varied and are not recognised to be so

by Parmenides. P. believed that Parmenides was only partly right.

Being as different from what comes before it and from what comes

after it is certainly a unity in a sense (VI 6,18,42-43). But

Intellect has a dynamic life; its characteristic activity of

self-thought requires a subject and object of thought, and the

various aspects of its life described in Chapter 4 by the cate-

gories make it πολλά (cf. VI 9,3,45 ταῦτα (= εἶδος,

κίνησις, στάσις) γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἃ πολλὰ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ).

Intellect is called ποιῆς in 5,1 (see note ad loc.) and see

Chapter 4 passim for a description of the multiplicity of Intellect.

Its unity and simplicity are well described in V 6,1,1 ff..

Εὐρισκομένου (8,23) (sc. ὄντος). On this use of

εὐρίσκειν see Arndt-Gingrich s.v. εὐρίσκω 2. The

reference to the plurality of Intellect points vaguely to Chapter 4.

Note that the negative adjectives in Parmenides DK P.8

(ἀγώητον, ἀνώλεθρον (8,3), ἀτρεπές (8,4)) are never

applied by P. to the One - further proof that he took Parmenides'

'one' to refer to Intellect.

8,23-26 ὁ δὲ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ... καὶ πολλά : Ever since E. R. Dodds's article in 1928 (CQ 22 (1928), pp. 129-142, 'The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic "One"'), it has been a datum of Plotinian scholarship that Plato's Parmenides was the source of P.'s doctrine of Intellect and the One. Following the Neopythagorean interpretation of Moderatus (Dodds, op. cit. p. 137 ff.; Rist, TAPA 93 (1962), pp. 400-401) P. used the Parmenides as evidence for his own metaphysics. Dodds' conclusions have been endorsed with the addition of further evidence by B. Darrell Jackson, JHPh 5 (1967), pp. 315-327. Our present passage is the sole passage in which P. claims that his three hypostases (not just Intellect and the One) can be found in the Parmenides.

Like many subsequent scholars, P. took the Parmenides as something more than a *παιδεία* (Prm. 137b 2) - note the number of citations of the dialogue in H-S's index fontium. In this he prefigures later Neoplatonists. Proclus, for example, quotes Iamblichus with approval as saying that τὴν ὅλην τοῦ Πλάτωνος θεωρίαν ἐν τοῖς δύο τοῦτοις περιέχουσιν διαλόγοις Τιμαίω καὶ Παρμενίδῃ (Procl. in Ti. I.13.15-17). The dialogue's first hypothesis (Prm. 137c 4-142a 7; Cornford's (Plato and Parmenides (London, 1939)) Hypothesis I) P. takes to be evidence for his own One. For linguistic parallels between P.'s description of the One throughout the *Enneads* and Plato see Dodds, op. cit. pp. 132-133, and Jackson, op. cit., pp. 318-320. Intellect, the secondary one, has its origin in Cornford's

Hypothesis II, Pl. Prm. 142b 1-155e 3. The actual phrase ^{εἰς} πολλά (repeated at V 3,15,11. 15,22; V 4,1,21; VI 2,15,14. 15,15; VI 7,14,11-12) comes from Pl. Prm. 144e 5, though in the Platonic phrase (τὸ ὅν ^{εἰς} πολλά) τὸ ὅν ^{εἰς} should probably be construed as the subject, and πολλά (sc. ἑστί) as predicate. P. on the other hand takes ^{εἰς} πολλά as a composite predicate. For references to Hypothesis II in the *Enneads*, see Dodds, op. cit. p. 133 and Jackson, op. cit. pp. 322-325. The citation of the Parmenides as evidence for P.'s belief in soul as the third level of reality occurs only in our present passage though the phrase ^{εἰς} καὶ πολλά occurs at IV 2,2,40. 2,53 and at VI 2,6,13-14, the latter example not marked as a Platonic quotation by H-S. This phrase (^{εἰς} καὶ πολλά = Prm. 155e 5) comes from what Cornford classifies as a corollary to Hypothesis II (Prm. 155e 4-157b 5), though P. has some justification for treating the section as a separate hypothesis since it begins ἔτι δε τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν (Prm. 155e 4). Reminiscences of this hypothesis in the *Enneads* are scarce (see Jackson, op. cit. pp. 325-326) but this is probably because P. could trace his psychological doctrines more easily through the Timaeus (cf. e.g. IV 2, a commentary on Pl. Ti. 35a). Soul is both one and many in the sense that though there are many souls, soul itself is one (see IV 9 passim). Furthermore, individual souls are wholly present in divisible bodies; if they were not nothing could be properly ensouled (IV 2,2,35 ff.). (On the mode of presence of the soul in the body see on 2,36-37.)

P. relied only on the first two and a half Hypotheses of the Parmenides as evidence for his own beliefs. H-S cite only two examples of any reference to the dialogue after 157b 5 where the argument of Hypothesis IIa ends, and both are to 160b, the conclusion of Hypothesis IV; and of these two examples the second (VI 5,1,26 ἐν ᾧ αὖτα πάντα τὰ ὄντα) seems to have no clear reference to Parmenides 160b. (Surely from the verbal point of view VI 5,1,26 is not close enough to πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἐν καὶ οὐδέ ἐν ἐστι .) The reference of V 2,1,1 to Pl. Prm. 160b 2-3 is less opaque, and P. understands this quotation to refer to the One. It is possible, then, that he thought that the whole of Hypothesis IV referred to the One. He may have thought that the hypotheses of the Parmenides subsequent to Hypothesis IIa were elaborations and amplifications of the earlier hypotheses. (For a summary of later interpretations of the dialogue see Procl. in Prm. 1051.34 ff. (Cousin).)

8,27 ταῖς φύσεσι ταῖς τελείν ; For φύσις meaning
'hypostasis' see on 3,9.

CHAPTER NINE

Chapter 9 continues the doxography of Chapter 8. The views of more Presocratic philosophers are mentioned (9,1-7) and interpreted according to the interpretations of Aristotle and the doxographical tradition. Most of the chapter is taken up with criticism of Aristotle's theory of νοῦς (9,7-27).

9,1-3 Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ... τὸ εἶναι : The reference is to DK B.12,

esp. p. 37 ll.18-19 νοῦς δέ ἐστιν ἄτακτον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέγιστα οὐδὲν χρεῖαται, and p. 38 ll.2-3 ἐστὶ γὰρ λεπτότατον τε πάντων χρεαίων καὶ καθαρώτατον.

But P. may well have been unacquainted with the actual text of Anaxagoras. He could have found all that he needed in Aristotle's description of his philosophy in Metaph. 989a 30 ff. and de An. 405a 13 ff.. That he did so is suggested by verbal parallels between P. and Aristotle. The simple καθαρός is preferred in both authors to Anaxagoras' superlative (see Arist. Metaph. 989b 16) and P. like Aristotle uses ἀμυγής (cf. ibid. 989b 15). Furthermore, although the word ἀπλοῦς does not occur in Anaxagoras' fragments, it is found in Aristotle's description in Metaph. 989b 17. Extremely striking is the conclusion Aristotle draws: ἐκ δὲ τούτων συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτῷ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὸ τε εἶναι (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀμυγές) καὶ θάττον (Metaph. 989b 16-17). It is this conclusion, or rather one limb of it, which is used by P.

Although Anaxagoras is only mentioned twice more in the

Enneads by name (in II 4,7,2 and 6), the opening phrase of his book ἔμειν πάντα is cited six times by P. (V 3,15,21; V 8,9,3; V 9,6,3; VI 5,5,4. 6,3; VI 6,7,4) as a description of the Plotinian Intellect. This phrase is taken quite out of context. Similarly, when Anaxagoras called Mind 'most pure' he meant that it was the finest of material things, i.e., completely without admixture; but P., following Pl. Phd. 67c 5 ff. (see on 2,44-45), associates purification with separation from material objects. Thus, purification is particularly associated by him with the life of Intellect (see 4,8 and notes; cf. also IV 7,9,25; V 3,6,39; VI 9,3,34-35) and of the higher soul (cf. 10,16 ἵνα καὶ λογίζεσθαι καθαρῶς οἶόν τε ᾗ and note on 3,13). Hence, although neither Anaxagoras nor Aristotle describe the νοῦς as χωριστός (though in Anaxagoras' case, separation might be inferred - compare DK B.6, where not being ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ is associated with not being separated (χωρίζεσθαι), with DK B.12 where Mind is said to be ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ), the very mention of the concept of purification would imply for P. that of transcendence (see on 2,44-45 and Wolters on III 5,2,23).

On the application of the word ἀπλοῦς in P. see on 5,4. Intellect is a 'one-many' (see on 8,23-26) so in a sense simple, in a sense not (V 6,1,13-14); the One is unity in a more exact sense.

Only Br. mistranslates this section by taking ἀπλοῦν as part of Anaxagoras' actual words agreeing with νοῦν; but as we have seen above, the 'simplicity' of Anaxagoras' Mind seems

to be an inference drawn by Aristotle, albeit a reasonable one.

- 9,2-3 τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς ... παρήκε : Aristotle also thought that Anaxagoras was inaccurate (Metaph. 989b 19 ὥστε λέγει ... οὐτ' ὀρθῶς οὐτε σαφῶς ; de An. 404b 1 Ἀναξαγόρας ἥττον διασαφρίζει περὶ αὐτῶν ; cf. ibid. 405b 21-23). Pease on Cicero ND I.74 has collected exhaustive references to illustrate the ancients' opinion that the Presocratic philosophers were difficult to understand. P. himself was praised by Longinus for his clarity and accuracy (V.P. 20, 72-76; ibid. 21.6-9).
- 9,3-5 καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ... ῥέοντα : Heraclitus was nicknamed ὁ σκοτεινός in antiquity. Whether or not he actually believed in a single supreme principle need not concern us. More important for us is that Aristotle thought that he did. In Metaph. 984a 1 ff. Heraclitus is ranked as a monist alongside Thales and Anaximenes, differing, however, from other Presocratics in that along with Hippasus of Metapontus he posited fire as the primary principle. This view of Heraclitus is followed by all later doxographers (see Diels, Dox. Graec. s.v. Heraclitus) and seems to be endorsed by P. here. Heraclitus' fire is called αἶψον in DK B.30 (cf. πᾶρ αἶψον in Aetius ap. Diels Dox. Graec. 303.8-9 and P.'s αἶψον) and νοερόν (cf. P.'s νοητόν) in Hippolytus ap. Diels Dox. Graec. 559.1-2. But P. is more influenced in his choice of epithets for Heraclitus' One by his citation of Heraclitus' view of the material world which immediately follows. The reference goes back to the doxographical tradition; see esp. DK A.1 (p. 141.19-20) and also Arist. Metaph. 987a 33-34; ibid.

1078b 14-15; id. Cael. 298b 29-33. This Heraclitean doctrine brings to mind for P. the common Platonic distinction, itself based on Heraclitus according to Arist. Metaph. 1078b 12 ff., between the physical world of change and the unchanging world of the Forms (for references see on 1,19-20). Most significant is Pl. Ti. 27d 4-28a 4 where the world of becoming is contrasted with τὸ ὄν αὐτό (cf. αἰετὸν) which is to be grasped only by νόησις μετὰ λόγου (cf. νοητόν). P.'s interpretation of Heraclitus is strongly Platonic.

Strictly speaking, P.'s One is beyond eternity as it is beyond Being and Intellect, though as the object of Intellect's regard it is occasionally called νοητόν (see V 4,2,4; V 6,2,7 ff.).

Although only mentioned by name four times, Heraclitus provides more citations for P. than any other presocratic, though none of the references has the same weight as the important DK B.3 of Parmenides on which see on 8,15-18.

Ha. changes the mss. γίνεται to γινόμενα on the grounds that the sentence is 'unverständlich'. Γινόμενα would certainly provide a good grammatical companion for ὄντα. But it is just possible, it seems to me, to supply ἔστι with ὄντα. I would be inclined to keep the mss. reading.

9,5-7 τῷ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆϊ... ὡς ἔλη: See Empedocles DK B.17.
7-8 = B. 26.5-6 ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότῃ συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓνα κόσμον, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φερόμενα Νείκεος ἔχθρῃ. This fragment is used by P. also at IV 4,40,5-6 and

VI 7,14,19-20, though not in either of these cases as evidence for his belief in the One. However, the general view was that Empedocles was the first pluralist (see Arist. Metaph. 985a 29 ff.) and of his two principles 'love' could be identified with the One; n.b. Arist. Metaph. 1001a 12-15 οἶον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς...λέγει ὅτι τὸ εἷ ἐστίν· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν λέγειν τοῦτο τὴν φιλίαν εἶναι (cf. ibid. 996a 4 ff.). How P. could fit 'strife' into his philosophy is left quite unclear; it is noticeable that he does not make any identification as regards this divisive principle. Empedocles is mentioned five times by P. (here and in II 4,7,1; VI 8,1,17 and 33; IV 8,5,5) and his doctrines are referred to in a handful of places (see H-S's Index Fontium), but his thought had no great influence on the Enneads.

ἀσώματον (9,6). 'Love' and 'strife' are described as if they were material (cf. DK B.17.20 Φιλότης, ἴση μῆκός τε πλάτος τε (sc. τῷ Νείκει)) but they have no perceptible qualities, and Empedocles was no doubt striving towards the apprehension of the abstract (see Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957), p. 330). Aristotle thought of the Empedoclean principles as incorporeal, since he suggests in Metaph. 985a 7-9 that in a sense Empedocles made good and evil (for him incorporeal) his first principles.

That the four elements were matter was also the general view (see Arist. Metaph. 989a 20-21; cf. II 4,7,1-2) and 'love' and 'strife' were the motive forces acting on them (see DK B.17.16-20, and Simplicius' explanation of the doctrine in DK A.28).

In 9,5 Creuzer, Vo. and Br. read τὸ μὲν νῦν rather than the τὸ νῦν μὲν of the mss.. Stylistic symmetry of the kind which they wish to introduce is alien to P.. Henry (Etats, p. 140) compares V 1,8,6 for a similar difficulty over the position of a particle.

Creuzer's ἐνὸς in 9,6 (the correction of Aubert, the editor of Cyril) is demolished by Henry in Etats, p. 140.

9,6 αὐτός or αὐτό (Aubert and Creuzer)? Αὐτός (Henry, Etats, p. 140) is 'seul authentique'.

9,7-27 Ἀριστοτέλης... χωρὶς οὐσίας : The detailed criticism of Aristotle which follows is on a different level from P.'s treatment of the Presocratics. It is based on the criticisms of Theophrastus (Metaph. 5a 14 ff.). For an analysis of P.'s arguments here see W. Jaeger (Aristotle (2nd ed. Oxford, 1948), pp. 351-352.

Polemic against Aristotle is found elsewhere in P. - against his doctrine of soul as an entelechy of the body and of the νοῦς διακείμεν in IV 7,8⁵,1 ff., against his doctrine of categories in VI 1 and VI 3 and against the self-thinking mind as the primary principle here and in VI 7,37,3 ff.. The large number of Aristotelian passages cited or referred to by P. (cf. H-S's Index Fontium) shows the importance of his philosophical views for Plotinus; it seems unlikely that P. had not read him at first hand.

9,7-9 Ἀριστοτέλης... τὸ πρῶτον : Aristotle's theory of the self-thinking mind, the Prime Mover, can be found in Metaph. 1071b 2 ff.. The mind is the ἀρχὴ πᾶν ὄντων and is therefore τὸ πρῶτον (ibid. 1073a 23-24) and it is described as being the cause of movement

in others because it is the object of their desire and thought
 (τὸ ὁρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν *ibid.* 1072a 26). For mind as
 χωριστός P. has to go to *de An.* 430a 17, a description of
 the νοῦς πολιτικός . But cf. *Metaph.* 1073a 4-5 κεχωρισ-
 μένη τῶν ὄντων and *GA* 736b 27-28. P. assumed that the
 mind of the *de Anima* and the mind of *Metaphysics* were the same.
 The doctrine that the divine mind thinks itself can be found in
Metaph. 1072b 19-20.

For P. τὸ πρῶτον meant more than merely 'the primary
 principle', its meaning for Aristotle. Πρῶτος involved the
 notion of unity and hence is often found as a synonym for the One.
 Aristotle's mind could not be τὸ πρῶτον as it could be analysed
 into two components, the subject and object of thought. Thus it
 is a 'one-many' (cf. 8,26). The plurality of P.'s Intellect is
 described in Chapter 4. In our present passage, P. seems to treat
 the validity of his criticism as self-evident; he goes straight
 on to discuss the difficulties involved in the theory that there
 is more than one Mover. For a more detailed discussion of the
 Aristotelian doctrine of mind as τὸ πρῶτον see VI 7,37,10 ff..

9,9-12 πολλὰ δὲ ... τιθέμενος : A new point as the καί shows.

Aristotle's theory of a plurality of Movers is put forward
 in *Metaph.* chapter 8. Much discussion has taken place about the
 authenticity of this chapter of the *Metaphysics* in its context.
 (A useful collection of the views of modern scholars on this topic
 can be found in L. Elders, *Aristotle's Theology* (Assen, 1972), pp.
 57 ff.) Aristotle argues that besides the simple spatial movement

of the universe we can see other spatial movements i.e., movements of the planets which he explains according to his own theory of interacting, homocentric spheres based on the astronomical theories of Eudoxus and Callippus. (On Aristotle's doctrine see J. L. Dreyer, A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler (2nd ed. New York, 1953) pp. 109-122 and T. L. Heath, Aristarchus of Samos (Oxford, 1913), pp. 225 ff.). He concludes that there are either 55 spheres or perhaps 49 (as well as the outer sphere) (47 of the text at Metaph. 1074a 13-14 seems to be due to a mistake in Aristotle's mathematics) needed to explain visible phenomena. Each of these spheres requires a Mover; hence the number of Movers is the same as the number of the spheres.

Aristotle does not claim to be dogmatic in his astronomy. He prefaces his account by saying that his theory merely gives a number for the mind to grasp: he leaves it to the mathematicians to discover the real number (Metaph. 1073b 10-17) and finishes by saying τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω τοσούτον, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους . . . τοσαύτας εὐλογον ὑπολαβεῖν (τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀφείσθω τοῖς ἰσχυροτέροις λέγειν) (Metaph. 1074a 14-17). The parenthesis is recalled by P. in 9,12 τὸ εὐλογον οὐκ ἔχον ἀνάγκην τιθέντος. (For another contrast in P. between what is reasonable and what is necessary see V 3,6,40-42 and cf. VI 5,8,4.)

In 9,12 the mss. variant ἔχων is adopted by all editors except H-S for ἔχον and is described by Ha. as 'notwendig'.

He appeals to Aristotle's own words; it is Aristotle who refuses to posit certainty about the number of Movers. Hence the personal

²/ἐχων is more suitable here. Schwyzer (Rh. M. 86 (1937), p. 377) reading ²/ἐχον translates (n. 36) 'was Wahrscheinlichkeit nicht hat, als Notwendigkeit setzend'. But this interpretation makes the next sentence something of an anti-climax. I prefer ²/ἐχων .

H-S are right, however, to take τὸ εὐλογον as the object of τιθέμενος (against the interpretations of Fic. and Br.).

9,12-13 ἐπιστήσιν δ' ἂν ... εὐλόγως : Br. misunderstands this indirect question; for ἐπίστημι = wonder, see Lampe s.v. 2.

9,13-14 εὐλογώτερον ... πρῶτον βλέπειν : The participial phrase πρὸς μίαν σύνταξιν συντελούσας should be taken causally (pace Ci. and Ha.). Since the universe is one and a unified whole (cf. Arist. Cael. I.8), all the spheres, as part of one system, should focus on the first and primary sphere, the sphere of fixed stars. But as P. goes on to say, the relationship of the Prime Mover to the other Movers is totally unclear (see Ross, Metaphysics, intro. pp. cxxxvi). This problem is adumbrated by Theophrastus, who says that the end to which the motion of the spheres is directed is obscure (Thphr. Metaph. 5a 17); if the Movers are many their harmony as they move in the direction of the best desire is by no means obvious (τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῶν εἰς ὄρεξιν ἰόντων τὴν ἀρίστην οὐδαμῶς φανερόν (ibid. 5a 20-21)) - an objection developed by P. in 9,24-25.

²/Ἐν in 9,5 means 'a unity' (Fic. (?), MK and Ha.) rather than 'the One'; the καί is epexegetical.

9,16-20 καὶ εἰ μὲν ... νοητὸς ἔσται : A fair point. If the homocentric spheres are controlled by the outer sphere, the sphere of fixed stars, then the same relationship ought to exist between the Movers of the spheres as exists between the spheres themselves, since the relationship between the spheres is seen in terms of movement, for which the Movers are responsible. But it might be argued that the fact that one sphere contains the others (περιεχούσης) does not necessarily mean that it controls them (κρατούσης). However, it does seem to have been Aristotle's view that the movements of the lower spheres are somehow subordinate to that of the first sphere, so the use of the word κρατούσης is reasonable (see Arist. Metaph. 1070b 34-35; *ibid.* 1072b 13-14; *ibid.* 1076a 4).

κόσμος νοητὸς ἔσται (9,19-20). Plato's Intelligible World was a κόσμος νοητός in which the lesser Ideas had some sort of subordinate relationship to the Good. For P., of course, Intellect is its contents. On περιεχούσης see on 4,10-11.

9,20-23 καὶ ὥστε ... ἐκεῖ : The analogy continues, but the argument is not convincing. The spheres contain stars (*v. infr.*); but it does not follow that the Movers will contain 'many things' in them, since the Movers and the spheres are not identical. Rather, the Movers are the causes of the spheres' movements, and certainly cannot be said to contain the contents of the spheres in the same way as the spheres themselves do.

In 9,21, the 'first sphere' is the sphere of fixed stars (see Arist. Metaph. 1073b 18-19). In the same line, P.'s statement that

the other spheres also contain stars is not strictly true, as Ha. notes. The spheres, apart from the outer spheres, were introduced to explain planetary motions; and sometimes several interacting spheres had to be supposed to account for the irregular movements of a single planet. On these theories see Arist. Metaph. 1073b 17 ff.. P., however, is equally imprecise in II 9,8,30-32.

On the Intelligible World as the real realm of truth (τὰ ἀληθέστερα ἐκεῖ 9,22-23) see on 4,6.

9,23-25 εἰ δὲ ἐκαστον ... ὁμονοήσου : The alternative supposition is that each of the Movers is mutually independent. If this is the case, then their existence will be a chance affair since there will be no ἀρχή to determine their number or area of activity. The same argument is found in II 4,2,9-10. If Intelligible Matter is eternal, then there will be more than one ἀρχή (the One and Matter) and κατὰ συντυχίαν τὰ πρῶτα . P., in fact, answers this objection in II 4,5,24 ff..

The corollary to the argument follows; if the first principles are independent, then there is no reason why they should work together to effect the harmonious organisation of the universe (cf. 9,13-14). (The same point is made by Theophrastus in Metaph. 5a 19-21.) Note a similar argument in II 3,6,10-20 esp. 14-20: to give independence of action to the stars would destroy the harmony of the cosmos which has a principle and first cause extending over the management of the whole.

Though the thought is clear here the text is difficult. The first problem is with σωζέσθαι in 9,24. Ha. calls it

'schwach and schief' on the grounds that P.'s point is not that the spheres exist together but rather that they work together. He therefore suggests *συνεργήσου* and takes *ὁμονοήσου* (9,25) as a parallel verb. Both verbs would be singular because of the neuter plural subject (sc. *τὰ κινούμενα*). But if *συνέσονται* is retained in 9,24 (and this time *ἄρχαι* must be understood as the subject), it would seem natural to have a plural verb in 9,25; hence Vitringa's *ὁμονοήσουσε*, printed by Mü., Vo. and Br.. If we keep *τὰ κινούμενα* as the subject, it might just be possible to retain *ὁμονοήσου* and take it as a verb; when the subject is neuter plural, P. sometimes changes the number of the verb from singular to plural. But in both examples of this practice mentioned by Schwyzer in RE 514.57 ff. the singular verb precedes the plural rather than vice versa.

Another alternative is to suppose *ὁμονοήσου* to be a noun (as Ci. and H-S) - which seems to me extremely difficult. Moreover, if a noun, it would be a Plotinian neologism.

A solution is proposed by Theiler in DLZ 80 (1959), p. 13, who thinks that *συνέσονται καί* has been inserted owing to dittography; he suggests that *συνέσονται* was the original reading in 9,23 where *ἔσονται* is now read. His text, therefore, runs as follows: *κατὰ συντηχίαν αἱ ἀρχαὶ συνέσονται . καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἑν ἔργον... ὁμονοήσου.*

Like Ha., I find *συνέσονται* difficult. Therefore, I am inclined to follow him and to read *συνεργήσου* in 9,24. The corruption could easily be due to the proximity of *ἔσονται*

in 9,23. *Συνεγγύν* is attested in II 3,8,6 and II 9,13,15. With this reading the awkwardness involved in taking *ἁπονομήσει* as a substantive is avoided, and there is no need to take *καί*² in 9,24 as 'et insuper' as H-S suggest in their apparatus.

Ἐν ἔργον (9,24) means 'one job', not as MK translates; 'that work of unity'. It is interesting that Theophrastus in Metaph. 5a 20 speaks of *τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῶν* (sc. *τῶν κινούντων*) in a passage bringing forward similar criticisms against Aristotle. The similarity of metaphor (*συμφωνία*) makes it possible that P. had Theophrastus directly in mind here.

One very minor point: note that in 10,23 H-S correct the *δ'* of all previous editors and restore the mss. reading *δέ*.

9,25-26 *πῶς δ' ἴσα ... αἰσθητά* : Aristotle gives the reason in Metaph. 1074a 14 ff.. This is explained by Ps-Alexander in in Metaph. 707.28 ff. (Hayduck), who deals with the objection: 'what prevents there being incorporeal entities which move nothing?' His argument runs as follows. Everything which is *ἄριστον* is *ἐφικτόν* and hence causes motion. But the number of motions is finite and preceptible and is explained by the number of spheres; hence the number of Movers is finite and equivalent to the number of spheres. Aristotle's reason, however, would not counter P.'s objection to a plurality of principles.

On the Movers as 'intelligible' see on 9,7-9.

9,26-27 *πῶς δὲ καὶ ... χωριστοῦς* : In Metaph. 1074a 31-38, Aristotle is arguing for the existence of a single heaven. If there were more than one, the Movers would be one in form (*εἴδη*)

but many in number ($\acute{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon\theta\mu\acute{\omega}$). But entities numerically distinct contain matter. The Prime Mover, however, is pure entelechy; therefore, there is only one Mover and one heaven. P.'s objection here is no more than the application of Aristotle's own arguments to his own doctrine. (For a conspectus of the views for and against the genuineness of the Aristotelian passage in its context and attempts to explain it see L. Elders, Aristotle's Theology (Assen, 1972), pp. 240-241.) P.'s argument is convincing.

$\beta\acute{\omega}\tau\omega\varsigma$ (9,27) means 'as Aristotle has described it' - a point not made clear by any of the translators. (Br., Ha. and MK omit the word entirely in their versions.)

9,27-32 $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}\omega\nu\ \dots\ \acute{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\tau\alpha\nu$: As Ha. rightly says: 'In dieser merkwürdigen Zusammenfassung bleibt noch manches ungeklärt.' The introductory $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$ marks the conclusion of the two doxographical chapters; P. implies, therefore, that all the ancient thinkers whom he has mentioned with approval should be classed with Pythagoreans in so far as they posited the One at the head of their metaphysics. The group of thinkers of whom he approves does not include Aristotle, though Merlan (Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness (The Hague, 1963), p. 7) thinks that it does. P.'s criticisms of Aristotle in 9,7-27, however, show that Aristotle did not 'busy himself' with the One. It is never suggested that he believed in a $\acute{\omega}$.

The assumption of such a position does not mean that Pythagoras replaced Plato as the doyen of P.'s philosophical forbears. For P. as, for example, for Moderatus (cf. J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists

(London, 1977), pp. 36-37 and p. 346) the notion of a 'Plato pythagorissans' (see Apuleius Florida 15, p. 23.10-11 (Helm)) was unexceptional. Longinus describes Plotinus' philosophy as the clearest exposition of τὰς Πυθαγορείους ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς Πλατωνικάς (V.P. 20.71-72). But Plato, basing his theories on the premiss that the Good was one, the conclusion of his 'Lecture on the Good' (see on 5,6-19), had developed his philosophy in a far more satisfactory manner than Pythagoras. Thus while Pythagoras may be criticised (e.g., concerning his teaching of the soul as a harmony in IV 7,8⁴), such licence is never extended to Plato. Pythagoras and Pythagoreans are mentioned favourably in P. in V 5,6,27-28 and the Pythagorean authors Cronius and Numenius were read in P.'s school (V.P. 14.11-12).

9,27 οἱ μέγιστα ... Πυθαγόρου : Wilamowitz suggests in the apparatus to DK Pherecydes A.7a that μέγιστα and οἱ should be transposed. But οἱ μέγιστα συντασσόμενοι 'those who particularly sided with....' makes perfectly good sense. (No translation of μέγιστα is offered in Fic. and Br.)

In this line the mss. read αὐτοῖς, which makes no sense, though it is printed by Perna. Creuzer, in the notes to his Oxford edition, suggested αὐτῶν, which is printed by H-S and accepted by Ci.. It seems to me, however, that αὐτῶν is very difficult and cannot mean 'rursus = contra Aristotelem' as H-S suggest. With other editors I would be inclined to read τοῖς alone. With τοῖς one should supply δόγματι : Fic. and Br. miss this.

9,29 καὶ Φερεκύδους δέ : For καὶ... δέ introducing the last item in a series see Denniston, p. 202. But why mention Pherecydes? Pherecydes of Syros flourished around 550 B.C. and was supposed to be the teacher of Pythagoras whom he tended when the latter was ill (cf. DK A.4 = Diod. X.3.4). His name is connected with that of Pythagoras in many tales of miracles and wonder working. He believed in a trinity of Ζάς , Χρόνος , and Χθονίη , and it may be to him that Plato refers at Sph. 242c 8-9 (μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεται μοι διηγέσθαι... ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα). But the context here requires that any philosopher mentioned should have believed in the One like Pythagoras. The fact that Pherecydes is spoken of by Porphyry in De Antro Nympharum 31 and might well have been talked about in Neoplatonic circles (see Ci.'s note ad loc.) is beside the point; as is the fact that the Pythagorean identification of the dyad with τόλμα which P. seems to refer to in 1,4 is attributed to Pherecydes by Lydus De Mens. II.7 = DK B.14. With Mii. and Ha. I take the phrase as a learned gloss and would delete it.

But even if the phrase is retained, Φερεκύδους is surely preferable to Wilamowitz's nominative (ap. DK A.7a); the genitive would be governed by δόγμασι understood.

9,29-30 παρὰ ταύτην... φύσιν : The μὲν seems to be a μὲν solitarium (see Denniston, pp. 380 ff.). Ταύτην... τὴν φύσιν is the One. Of translators only Br. with his 'nature intelligible' gives the wrong impression. On φύσις see on 3,9-10.

9,30-32 ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ... ὅπως ἀφείσαν : P. is making a distinction between those of the ancients of whom he has been speaking who have (a) given a full written explanation of the doctrine of the One and those who have (b) not written down their ideas in treatises (λόγους 9,31) but have discussed the subject in unrecorded seminars (e.g., Plato; see below). There follows the odd clause ἢ ὅπως ἀφείσαν which is apparently a subdivision of (b). The Greek means: 'or who have completely neglected (sc. discussion of the One)'. It might just be possible for a philosopher to be 'concerned with the One' (περὶ ταύτην ... τὴν φύσιν 9,29-30) without mentioning it in published treatises or seminars, but it would be highly unlikely. It seems to me best to delete the last three words of the chapter as another marginal addition wrongly incorporated into the text.

There is a further problem of detail concerning αὐτοῖς in 9,30. Αὐτοῖς here cannot = ipse, for then the article would be required. (None of the passages cited in KG II.I. pp. 628-629, where the article is omitted, is parallel to our own - though the example of a papyrus quoted in Mayser Grammatik II.2. p. 76, n.1 dating from 113 B.C. provides a thread of justification for the Plotinian text, but not enough in my view.) If αὐτοῖς is kept, then, it must be the ordinary third person pronoun, and the translation of the last part of 9,30 would be 'among themselves in (by means of) their own treatises.' But why the emphasis on their working out the doctrine 'among themselves'? Like all

editors from Ki. onwards (with the exception of H-S) I would follow R and read $\tau\acute{o}\iota\varsigma$, assuming the corruption to have taken place because of dittography of the corrupt $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\iota\varsigma$ in 9,28.

In the phrase $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\gamma\acute{\alpha}\phi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \sigma\upsilon\nu\omicron\nu\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota\varsigma$ (9,31-32)

P. is probably thinking of the 'unwritten doctrines' of Plato.

The words were commonly used to refer to them (cf. Philoponus in Ph. . . 515.30 (Vitelli); 521.9-10; Simplicius in Ph. . . 542.9-12 (twice) (Diels)). It is in them that Plato's Pythagoreanism was most evident.

CHAPTER TEN

After the two chapters of doxography which establish an ancient foundation for belief in the three hypostases, P. turns to the human psyche, and in the next three chapters puts forward the view that the hypostases can be found 'in' the human soul and can be grasped by us even though their activities may remain unperceived.

After recapitulation (10,1-4) and a statement of his thesis (10,5-10), P. moves on to a discussion of our possession of the higher, undescending soul.

10,1-4 ὅτι δὲ οὕτω... ἡδη δέδεικται : P. sums up the result of the treatise so far. Cf. 7,27-48, and, for a similarly concise description of the Plotinian system, II 9,1,12-16. On the Platonic ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος see on 6,12-13, and on the difficulty of talking about the One see V 5,6,23 ff., and VI 8,13,47 ff. (quoted in the note on 6,19-22). On τὸ ἐν καὶ νοῦς see 4,26-28 and notes, and on ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσις Chap. 2 (passim).

10,5-10 ὥσπερ δὲ... εἶσω ἄνθρωπον : These lines state the thesis which is explained in the rest of Chapter 10 and in Chapter 11.

The three hypostases exist 'in' us.

10,5-6 ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν τῇ φύσει... ταῦτα εἶναι : Φύσις here has its Platonic meaning of 'real world' (cf. R. 597b 5 where the Form of Bed is called ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὐσα (κλίνη) ; cf. also ibid. 597c 2 and Prm. 132d 1-2 τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα εἶναι ἐν τῇ φύσει). In Phd. 102e5 (cf. 102d 6 ff.) Plato distinguishes between τὸ ἐν φύσει

and τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν . It is this distinction which P. has in mind here and which he wishes to clarify.

The view that man (or his soul) mirrors the structure of reality can be traced back at least as far as Democritus, who believed that man was a μικρὸς κόσμος (DK B.34). This idea was common in Persian thought, and A. Götze (Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik 2 (1923), 'Persische Weisheit in Griechischem Gewande', pp. 95-96) suggests that it reached Greece through the Greek doctors who practised at the Persian court (e.g. Democedes, mentioned by Herodotus in 3.129 ff.). But whereas for Democritus, and, for example, for Aristotle (de An. 430a 10-14) it was the structural analogy which was important - i.e., just as there are beings in the world whose sole function is to rule (τὰ θεῖα), so man has his ruling principle (λόγος) (Democritus loc. cit.) - P. believed, as he quite clearly shows here, that the three hypostases 'in nature' were actually themselves παρ' ἡμῖν . In view of the fact that P. says that we actually are, each of us, an Intelligible World (καὶ ἑστὶν ἕκαστος κόσμος νοητός III 4,3,22) or that an Intelligible World is in our soul (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν III 4,6,22), P. cannot mean by παρ' ἡμῖν what Plato means when he says in Prm. 133c 9-d1 that we possess only 'likenesses' of the Intelligible Forms (τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ... ὁμοιώματα). In Prm. 133c 3 ff. the Forms are specifically said not to be ἐν ἡμῖν .

In what way, then, do we possess this Intelligible World? How can the One which is infinite, albeit in a special sense (VI

9,6,10-11), be possessed by anything?

First it should be stressed that P.'s metaphysical world is a continuum. Nothing separates the hypostases but their difference (for references see on 6,51-53). Thus no hypostasis is cut off from any other, but remains in contact with it, and is its neighbour. P. says in V 2,2,13 ff. that soul is 'in' its principle (cf. Pl. Prm. 145b 6-7 and V 5,9,1 ff.); this remark should be taken in conjunction with the earlier remark in V 2,2,3-4 that each thing becomes the same as what it follows while it follows it (*ἐκαστον μὲντοι ταῦτόν γίνεται ὥς ἂν ἐπίσσηται ἕως ἂν ἐφέσηται*). Provided that soul 'follows' Intellect, it can be said to be 'in' it. P.'s meaning is illustrated by I 7,1,11-13. Things may be said to possess (*ἔχουσιν*) the Good in two senses, *τῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὥμοιωσθαι καὶ τῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ποιῆσθαι*. Note the perfect tense of *ὥμοιωσθαι* . The One is possessed only when soul or Intellect has become like it; and they become like it by the process of abstraction and purification that characterizes the *ἐπιστροφή* , the ascent towards the One. In this state of 'likeness' their activities may be directed towards the One (cf. I 7,2,8 *ἔχει δ' αὖ τὸ ἀγαθόν (sc. ἡ ψυχὴ), εἰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπει*). O'Daly well remarks (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973), p. 54) that the presence of soul in Intellect (and of Intellect in the One is virtual. Soul possesses the other hypostases in the special sense that it is capable of rising to their level, and this because of the continuity of the One, Intellect and soul

(note that P. calls soul and Intellect *ὁμοούσια* in IV 7,10,19). If the soul fails to make use of its powers of *ἐπιστροφή*, its possession of the other hypostases remains virtual. In I 2,4, 25-27 P. says that if soul does not look towards Intellect, Intellect remains *ἄλλότριος* even when present (cf. VI 9,8, 36 ff.). And in V 3,3,28-29 Intellect is said to be ours when we use it, and not ours when we do not.

Passages which deal with the relationships between the hypostases often contain the word *παρεῖναι* (see 12,12). The One is 'present' everywhere, but only to those capable of receiving it (VI 9,4,24-25; cf. VI 9,8,33-35). The One's presence is actualised for the soul (*παρεῖναι φανή*) when the soul verges away from all about it, and makes itself as alike as possible to the One; and the One appears 'in the soul' (VI 7,34,8-14). By its preparation for union the soul actually becomes Intellect - on the nature of the identity involved, see on 5,3 - but the *ἐπιστροφή* is an *ἐπιστροφή* inwards (cf. 12,13-14). In VI 4-5 (passim) *παρεῖναι* is used of the Intelligible World; this world is always 'present' to the soul, but soul is not always capable of appreciating its presence. Thus, although Intellect is *ἐν ἡμῖν* (11, 6), it should not be numbered among the parts of soul (V 3,3,25-26). It is 'in' the topmost part of soul, above the level at which our personalities are to be found (I 1,8,3-6). But it is in it only in so far as it is the topmost part of soul which will be able to become Intellect. Intellect is 'imported' for soul (V 6,4,16) because properly speaking soul is not Intellect. Similarly, in the sense that

the soul, through purification can reach it, the One can be said to be also in the soul (cf. III 8,9,23-24). The capacity for participation ($\muίθρῖς$) increases as purification continues.

P. sometimes uses the image of a circle and its centre as an illustration of the relationship between the One and Intellect, or Intellect and soul (for references see on 7,7-8). The centre is in a sense a part of each radius, yet because each radius has its point of reference at the centre, in that the centre is the source of each radius, the centre is at the same time different from each. In a similar way, the One and Intellect are both 'in' (a part of) and yet outside soul. But the soul has to realize the immanence of the higher hypostases within itself. This realisation is the aim of Plotinian philosophy. (See further on 11,10-13.)

$\piαε' ἡμῖν$ should be translated as 'in us', rather than as 'for ourselves' (MK.).

10,6-9 λέγω δὲ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ... οὐρανὸν εἶω : P. has just said that the three hypostases are $\piαε' ἡμῖν$. He now qualifies this since Plato meant by ἐν ἡμῖν 'in the sensible world' (see preceding note), and this is not P.'s meaning - see III 5,3,25-26; they are not ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς but ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητῶν εἶω . Editors have rightly been troubled by εἶω followed by ἐπὶ . If the mss. text is right, P. must have intended to mark a distinction in sense by the use of two different prepositions within eight words of each other. Translators have translated ἐν and ἐπὶ as though they were the

same (e.g., Ci. 'in noi ... in noi'; Ha. 'in uns ... in uns').

Only Fic. with his 'dico non in rebus ... sed de rebus' attempts to translate the two prepositions differently. But in doing so he changes the parallel structure of the two clauses. His first clause refers to the presence of the hypostases 'in rebus quae sensibus offeruntur', whilst the second, 'sed (dico) de rebus quae sensuum vires excedunt', makes a general remark about the purport of P.'s statements. This is unsatisfactory; and it is

not clear that ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔξω can mean the same as περὶ τῶν αἰσθητοῖς ἔξω (de rebus). Vitranga's

solution, adopted by Vo. and Br., to change ἐν to ἐπί,

runs up against the same difficulty. I can find no example of

ἐπί τινα meaning either περὶ τινος or ἐν τινι.

These difficulties vanish if we read αἰσθητοῖς for αἰσθητῶν

in 10,8 and take ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς to mean 'above the

sensible order', and understand ἔξω in apposition to the whole

phrase. The sequence of thought then runs as follows: the three

hypostases although παρ' ἡμῶν are not in the sensible order

(as we are), but above the sensible order, outside it, and outside

it in the sense that they are outside the whole universe. There

is no difficulty about πάντα (10,7) and καὶ ἐκείνα (10,9)

each referring to the hypostases. Ἐκείνα is used in 10,9

because πάντα would have been ambiguous in view of the proximity

of τὰ αἰσθητά. And for ἐπί c. dat. meaning 'above'

see on 5,1.

P. applies this notion to the human condition in 10,9-10 - the three hypostases are in us in that they are in the 'inner man'. I do not think that Br., Ci., and Ha. are right to translate $\epsilon\upsilon\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \alpha\iota\sigma\theta\eta\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$ as 'in us as sensible objects'. Ci. even suggests $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$ after each occurrence of $\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$ in 10,7. The application of the general remarks to the human sphere does not take place until 10,9-10.

The three hypostases transcend the sensible order. This is perhaps least obvious in the case of soul with its particular responsibilities for the body. P., however, believed that part of the soul remained undescending and in the Intelligible World, and it is on this that he concentrates (see below on 10,21-23); and since all the parts of soul are a unity (see on 10,27-28) the soul in general can be said to be in the Intelligible World, though at its lowest limit (for references see on 4,11). Souls' seeming lack of transcendence and their individuality stem from the fact that body is so created that it is capable of receiving only part of that which is everywhere present. Division and hence individuation is a $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\mu\alpha$ of body rather than of soul (IV 2,1,75-76).

As in Chapter two, $\sigma\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is used in 10,9 as a synonym for $\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ (cf. 2,38-40 where $\delta\ \sigma\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is picked up by $\delta\ \kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma\ \delta\acute{\omicron}\delta\epsilon$). $\textcircled{\text{O}}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \sigma\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is the same as $\tau\omicron\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$. Ha.'s 'das Weltall' is excellent.

10,9-10 $\sigma\acute{\omega}\tau\omega\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \alpha\acute{\nu}\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\upsilon$... $\alpha\acute{\nu}\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\upsilon$: H-S are right to mark this sentence from what precedes by a semi-colon. An ellipse of $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$ should probably be understood with $\sigma\acute{\omega}\tau\omega$...

ἀνθρώπου . The translation should be: 'and in the realm of the individual I mean what Plato meant by the inner man.'

Τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου refers back to παρ' ἡμῶν of 10,6. Br.'s 'telles sont les parties de l'homme que Platon appelle l'homme intérieur' is quite wrong. The other translators paraphrase, but capture the general sense.

Plato's remarks about the 'inner man' can be found in R. 598a 7 ff. (ὁ ἐντὸς ἀνθρώπου ; P. changes ἐντὸς to εἶσω perhaps because εἶσω is parallel in form to εἶξω), where the inner man is τὸ λογιστικόν , the highest part of Plato's tripartite soul. In Plotinian psychology τὸ λογιστικόν or διάνοια (see on 3,13) is the only part of soul which is winged for the intellectual act (V 3,4,13-14) and which therefore has the capability of advancing beyond itself. Thus it is capable of grasping the presence of Intellect and the One (see on 10,5-6). The hypostases can therefore be said to be in the inner man. (Br.'s reference to Pl. Alc. I 130c is not very helpful.)

The distinction between inner and outer man is also found in III 2,15,59 where ὁ εἶξω Σωκράτης is contrasted with the real Socrates; cf. also I 1,7,20. 10,5 ff. where the 'true man' is opposed to the living body, which P. describes as an animal (θήλειον ; cf. Pl. R. 588e 5). The distinction occurs also in St. Paul and Philo (see G. Kittel, Theologisches Wörterbuch, I. 366.17 ff.). In both secular and non-secular writings the sense is that the inner man is what we really are.

- 10,10-30 ἔστι τοίνυν . . . τοῦτο ἔχον : Τοίνυν marks the change from the introductory remarks to the consideration of the particular sense in which our soul possesses the higher soul. In this passage P. seems to make no distinction between the undescending soul and the Hypostasis-Soul (see on 2,44). It is this which is said to be 'in' us.
- 10,10-12 ἔστι τοίνυν . . . ψυχῆς φύσις : On the divine nature of the human soul see on 1,2; 4,11; and 10,6-9. Because of its involvement with body, soul can be said to leave the Intelligible World behind. Πᾶσα ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις does not refer specifically to the Hypostasis-Soul (ἡ πᾶσα ψυχὴ).
- 10,12 τελεῖα δὲ ἡ νοῦν ἔχουσα : Cf. 3,13-14 and note. Our soul's potentialities are actualized by Intellect. P. makes a functional distinction between the higher and lower soul, the higher being concerned with the realm of Intellect, and the lower with the realm of the body and sense-perception (cf. Alex. Aphr. de An. 91.23-24 (Bruns) τῆς τελείου (sc. ψυχῆς), ἥτις πρὸς τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει). Properly speaking, of course, all the types of soul are one (see on 10,27-28).
- 10,12-13 νοῦς δὲ ὁ μὲν . . . λογίζεσθαι παρέχων : This passage is discussed in the note on 3,13. P. distinguishes here as often between the soul's intellect and Intellect the second hypostasis. That the νοῦς λογίζόμενος is a faculty of the soul is made clear by 11,1-2 where chapter 10 is summed up by the genitive absolute οὕτως ὡς ψυχῆς τῆς λογιστικῆς πρὸς δυνάμιν

καὶ καθῶν . In our present passage P. identifies the soul's intellect with the undescending soul (cf. τὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ μέρει 10,23) which I take to be that part of the soul's intellect which deals with the τύποι which come from the Forms alone (cf. V 3,2,9-10). On its working see on 11,1-3.

10,13-15 τὸ δὲ λογίζμενον τοῦτο... ὀργάνου : Aristotle (e.g., de An. 403a 2 ff.; ibid. 413b 24-27; ibid. 429b 4-5) thought that intellect was the only part of soul which transcended the body, and which therefore did not need the body for its exercise. This view had perhaps been foreshadowed by Plato when in Phd. 65c 5 ff. he maintained that the reasoning of the soul was best when the body and its πάθη were neglected. Through Alexander of Aphrodisias (de An. 84.10 ff. (Bruns)) this idea found its way into Plotinus (cf. I 1,19,15 ff. where διάνοια is said to be one of the ἰδέα of soul; IV 3,19,25-26 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν (sc. λογισμοῦ καὶ νοῦ) οὐ δι' ὀργάνου τελεῖται τοῦ σώματος).

Although the actual exercise of διάνοια does not need the co-operation of any bodily organ, one of the sets of objects of its judgement, the τύποι which come from αἰσθήσεις (I 1,7,10-11. 9,19), is ultimately dependent on the perceptive faculty of the lower soul. By the time that these τύποι get to the level of διάνοια, however, they are νοητά (I 1,7,12), because they have been abstracted from their material surrounds (III 6,18, 26-28). This activity of διάνοια corresponds to the activity of αἰσθήσεις in Aristotle's psychology (de An. 424a 17 ff. esp.

17-19 ἡ μὲν αἰσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δευτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης) and to that of νοῦς in
 Alexander of Aphrodisias (de An. 84.19-21 ποιεῖ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς
 καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ αὐτῷ νοητὰ χωρίζων αὐτὰ τῆς ὕλης
 καὶ τί ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι θεωρῶν). But
 the Plotinian διάνοια also deals with the τύποι which
 come from the transcendent Forms, with which it compares the forms
 which it has abstracted from sensible particulars (V 3,2,7 ff.).
 Soul possesses the Forms as things 'unfolded and separate'
 (ἀνεκμυμένα καὶ οἷον κεχωρισμένα I 1,8,7-8), as things
 'written out' (V 3,4,20 ff.) - it sees them as something distinct
 from itself - and uses them as standards (κανόνες V 3,4,16-17)
 in its activity of judging the τύποι from the sensible world.
 That part of soul which has such close links with the Intelligible
 World is the undescending soul (see on 11,1-3).

10,15-17 τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν ἑαυτοῦ ... σώματι : P. follows Plato
 (Phd. 65c 5 ff.) in associating purification with separation from
 the body. The undescending soul, which needs no bodily co-operation,
 is already separated from the body and therefore 'pure' (cf. V 3,9,
 28-29). But only when the rest of the soul has reached the level
 of purification of the higher soul can the further ascent towards
 Intellect and the One take place.

κράσις is the technical Stoic term to describe the mode
 of the presence of the material soul in the body. P.'s polemic
 against them can be found in II 7 περὶ τῆς δι' ὅλων
 κράσις . (It is interesting to note that Chrysippus (SVF II.

471) in fact distinguishes *κράσις* from *παράθεσις*, *μῆξις* and *σύνχυσις* and takes *μῆξις* to be the correct word to describe the body/soul relationship.) P.'s phrase *κεκραμένον σώματι*, however, carries with it Platonic connotations of purification not associated with the Stoic *κράσις*. Note the phrase *πολλῷ τῷ θανάτῳ κεκραμένην* (I 6,5,36) and cf. *τῷ σώματι συμπεφυμένην* (IV 4,27,14; I 2,3,12) taken from Pl. *Phd.* 66b 5.

Dodds' addition of *ὅν* after *χωριστόν* in 10,16-17 is ingenious but unnecessary.

10,17-18 *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ... ἐν σφαιρίῳ* : MK, Br. and Ha. give literal translations of the phrase *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ νοητῷ*; it is not clear, however, what 'within the first Intellectual' (MK) might mean. Fic., who is more specific, takes *νοητῷ* in apposition to *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ* and translates 'in primo illo rerum scilicet intelligibili gradu', but it seems to me difficult to get this out of the Greek. Ci. gives 'nella sfera più alta dello Spirito'; but it is odd to place soul at the top of the Intelligible World. In virtue of its undescending part it is frequently said to be in the Intelligible World, but only at its outer limit (cf., e.g., IV 4,2,16-17; IV 6,3,5-6; IV 8,7,6-7). It is philosophically awkward, then, to take *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ νοητῷ* as *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ νοητοῦ*. I am sympathetic to Dodds' view that *νοητῷ* is a gloss and should be deleted. The only difficulty is that *τὸ πρῶτον* in the singular is not usually used to refer to the Intelligible World; much more common

in this sense is the plural (cf. 1,24). V 3,5,35 which Dodds adduces in his private text is no real parallel since in that passage τὸ νοητόν is merely said to be ἡ πρώτη οὐσία . The most satisfactory emendation would be the deletion of the intrusive πρώτῳ . For further references to soul ἐν τῷ νοητῷ see 10,23 below; II 5,3,33; IV 1,2; IV 2,1,9-10; IV 5,1,5-6; VI 3,1,23-24.

On this use of τις with a future unfulfilled condition cf. I 2,3,20-21 εἴ τις ὁμοίωσιν λέγει πρὸς θεόν, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι ; IV 3,32,18 τις λέγων . . . ὁρθῶς ἂν λέγοι ; VI 5,2,16-18 λέγων ἂν τις . . . συγγογίξοιτο ἂν εἰκότως .

10,18-19 οὐ γὰρ τόπον . . . ποιητόν : Note the γὰρ . Anything which is not in place (τόπος) but outside it must be in the Intelligible World. Place is the realm of body and becoming, and not of eternal οὐσία (VI 5,2,9 ff.), so that if you want to know where the soul is you must find out where τὸ θεῖον is, and this enquiry cannot be conducted with the physical organs of sense-perception (IV 3,24,23-28). In IV 3,20 P. argues that the soul is not present in the body as in a place. By its creation of body, the soul creates place (IV 3,9,22-23) because body needs somewhere to be (ἐδρωσις) and cannot rest in itself like everything which is immaterial (VI 4,8,2 ff.). If the soul needs no place, a fortiori neither does Intellect nor the One (IV 2,1,19-20; V 2,2,19-20 - of Intellect; VI 9,3,42. 6,30 ff. - of the One). Anything which needs place for its existence is ἐνδεής (VI 9,6,34).

The soul, like Intellect and the One, is present everywhere to whatever is capable of receiving it (see on 10,5-6); but it is only present locally in the sense that the organs which use it have a particular spatial position. Thus the reasoning soul is not present in the brain as a place, but ὅτι τὸ ἐκεί (sc. $\eta\tau\omicron\upsilon\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$) ἀποκἀτα αὐτοῦ (IV 3,23,33-34). In a figurative sense place in the Intelligible World is the place of life (II 5,3,39); but this means no more than that the activity of the Intelligible World is life itself.

10,19-21 $\text{οὕτω γὰρ τὸ καθ' αὐτό ... φήσους}$: Οὕτω looks forward to ὅταν . Only in that state of purity which results from bodily separation (οὕτω) does soul fully possess the qualities of τὸ καθ' αὐτό , τὸ ἔξω etc.. Something like ἔστιν αὐτῷ (sc. $\tau\eta\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) must be understood with the phrase $\text{οὕτω γὰρ ... τὸ αὐτὸν}$. Ci.'s 'solo allora potremo cogliere "ciò che è in sé"... quando...' wrongly introduces a personal subject in 'potremo'. The translations of Fic. and Ha. are excellent, those of Br. and MK not so accurate.

τὸ καθ' αὐτό (cf. Pl. Phd. 67c 7) emphasizes soul's ontological independence of the body, $\text{τὸ ἔξω καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν}$ its transcendence. Unlike body, soul has being and life παρ' αὐτῆς (IV 7,9,1) and ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ (IV 7,11,2).

Note that the soul is referred to in the neuter (μόνον 10,20). This change of gender is no doubt due to the proximity of τὸ καθ' αὐτό , τὸ ἔξω and τὸ αὐτὸν .

10,21-23 διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ... τῷ νοητῷ μένον : Ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός

means 'in the case of the universe' and contrasts with

ἐπὶ ... ἡμῶν in 10,23. This use of ἐπὶ c. gen. is

common in P. - see e.g., VI 4,10,5 ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀρχαίου ;

VI 5,5,5 ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου ; VI 5,8,11 ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν .

H-S differ from Br., Ci., Ha. and MK in citing as the reference of φησὶ Pl. Ti. 36e 3 where the soul is said to encircle the heavens from outside (κύκλῳ τε αὐτὸν ἔξωθεν περικαλύψα). The occurrence of ἔτι, however, which makes little sense if it is not included within the quotation, and which is deleted by Creuzer partly for these reasons, confirms that the passage P. has in mind here is not Ti. 36e 3, but Ti. 34b 4 καὶ ἔτι ἔξωθεν τὸ σῶμα αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ ψυχῇ) περικαλύψεν. Br., Ci., and Ha. are right to mark καὶ ἔτι ἔξωθεν in quotation marks, though in view of the difference between the Platonic τὸ σῶμα αὐτῇ περικαλύψεν and P.'s τὴν ψυχὴν περιέβαλεν, I doubt whether Br. and Ha. are similarly right to take this last phrase as part of the direct quotation.

P. uses this and an adjoining passage of the Timaeus (36d 9 - e 1 μετὰ τοῦτο πᾶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς ἐντὸς αὐτῆς ὑπεκταίνετο) to bolster his novel theory that part of the soul remains in the Intelligible World without descending into the body (cf. IV 8,8,2-3). This theory is based on an interpretation of Plato of the sort that has not appealed to modern commentators. If the soul is said to envelop body from outside, and if body is inside (ἐντός) soul, then soul must be 'larger' than the body which it contains. Thus

there must be a part of soul which always remains outside body. Proclus, commenting on these passages from the Timaeus, acknowledges that they point to the transcendence of the soul (in Ti. II 106.32-33 (Diehl); ibid. 108.28-29), but denies that any part of the soul remains undescending, and brings against this interpretation Ti. 43a 4 ff. where Plato says that the περίοδοι of the immortal soul are fastened in the unstable body, and the description of the passivity of the soul in Ti. 43c 7 ff. (in Ti. III 323.5-6; ibid. 332.23 ff.). It seems to me that Proclus' denial of P.'s doctrine of the undescending soul is truer to the spirit of Plato. But the permanent position of the soul (including the human soul) in the Intelligible World is essential to the dynamic mysticism of Plotinian philosophy. The Intelligible World is within us if we can only realise it, and therefore the mystical ascent is a turning inwards. Because of this, ascent is within the capabilities of each and every one of us. Hence the importance of knowing the answer to the introductory question of V 1.

10,23-24 ἐπὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ... τῇ κεφαλῇ : The mss. read ἐπὶ κρύπτων
for H-S' ἐπικρύπτων and ἄκρα for ἄκρα . Pace earlier
editors and Cilento, ἐπὶ κρύπτων makes no sense, and Fic.'s
translation is a mere paraphrase. Mī., in desperation, deletes
the whole sentence. Vitringa proposed ἀνακίπτειν and this
reading is printed by Vo. and Br. who follow Vitringa in seeing
a reference to Pl. Phdr. 249c 3-4 where the exercise of human
intelligence is described as a memory of what the soul has seen
on its journey above the heavens when it 'looked upwards to the

really real' (ἀνακρίψατα εἰς τὸ ὄν ὅντως). Like Perna and Creuzer they retain the accusative ἄκρα . It is difficult to see how this quotation from the Phaedrus could be used as evidence for P.'s theory that part of the soul remains permanently in the Intelligible World. An upward glance of the soul is hardly a permanent feature of the psychic condition. (The same objection applies to MK's attempt to relate the passage to Phdr. 248e 2-3 where the best soul is said to raise its charioteer's head εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον .) The position of the soul ἐπ' ἄκρα τῇ κεφαλῇ (cf. Pl. Ti. 90a 5 ἐπ' ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι) is, on the other hand, a permanent position, and can at least be used by P. to point to a similarly permanent feature of soul's composition; and ἐπὶ ... ἡμῶν in 10,23 may well pick up παρ' ἡμῶν in Pl. Ti. 90a 2-3. I agree with Ha. and H-S that Ti. 90a 5 is the point of reference here. Note also that the next lines of the Timaeus passage connect soul's spatial position with its power of raising us from the earth to our heavenly kin (πρὸς τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν); this sentiment would appeal to the Plotinian conviction that the position of the soul in the spiritual world made a spiritual anabasis possible.

Ἐπικρύπτων (Heintz ap. Ha.) is an excellent emendation. P. quite obviously believed that Plato did not make himself as explicit as he might have done (see on 8,11-12 μὴ ἀναπνεύσειν ; V.P. 15.3 and III 9,1,23 ἐπικεκρυμένως ; note also the riddling nature of myth in general - see on 7,30-34).

Ha.'s cross-references to IV 3,22,8 ff. and 23,21 ff. give a parallel for the use (in subsequent chapters in IV 3) of the same passages from the Timaeus as P. uses in our present chapter.

In IV 3,12,4-5 P. adapts the Homeric description of Eris (Il. 4.443) as an illustration of the nature of the undescending soul. Presumably he uses Plato's Timaeus in our present passage because he wants references from the same work for both the world soul (Ti. 34b 4) and for the human soul (Ti. 90a 5), though the Homeric reference may have suggested to him the change from σῶμα (Pl. Ti. 90a 5) to κεφάλῃ (cf. Il. 4.443).

Plato's remarks about the position of the soul were probably meant to be taken literally. There were two theories in antiquity about the seat of the soul (the rational controlling centre) in the body. The minority opinion which Plato follows in the Timaeus was that the soul was in the brain (cf. ἐν ἄκρῳ τοῦ σώματος). Rivalry between the two schools of thought ceased after the discovery of the nerves in the third century by the Alexandrians Herophilus and Erasistratus. On this see F. Solmsen, Mus. Hel. 18 (1961), pp. 150 ff., 169 ff..

10,24-26 καὶ ἡ παρακίνησις... κεχωρισμένον : The 'exhortation' can be found in Pl. Phd. 67c where Plato defines purification as τὸ χωρίσεν ὅτι πάντα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν (Phd. 67c 6-7). P. explains that Plato does not mean by this spatial separation of soul and body but rather the leading up of the lower soul. The dative τόπῳ is parallel to the datives in 10,26-27, and is equivalent to κατὰ τόπον . For this use

see Arist. de An. 413b 14-15 χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ
καὶ τόπῳ ; ibid. 427a 5 τόπῳ δὲ καὶ ἀεὶ ἀδιαίρετον .

The parenthesis explains why spatial separation cannot be Plato's meaning; but P.'s meaning is obscured by the allusive reference of τοῦτο . Br., Ci., and MK seem to take it to refer to τὸ χωρίζεσθαι (e.g., Br. 'car cette séparation est établie par la nature'), but it is not clear that (sc. τὸ χωρίζεσθαι) φύσει κεχωρισμένον ἵστίῳ makes any sense. Fic. ('quod enim ita separatum est, naturaliter est seiunctum') understands by τοῦτο τὸ τόπῳ κεχωρισμένον itself understood from τὸ χωρίζεσθαι... τόπῳ . Best is Ha.'s suggestion that τοῦτο refers to that part of the soul which remains in the Intelligible World (τὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ μένον 10,23). Plato's 'separation' cannot mean spatial separation, because the undescending soul is already separate naturally from the body; therefore Plato must mean that we should lead the lower part of our soul upwards according to the methods outlined in 10,26-27.

P. believed that we existed at the level at which most of our psychic activity was concentrated. The dominant part of the soul claimed the leadership of the whole (II 3,9,19 ff.; III 4,2,4-5). Thus, the man who lives entirely at the level of αἰσθησις is totally unaware of the workings of his higher soul, and this unawareness can lead to disastrous effects in his next reincarnation. Hence, P. says in III 4,2,12 ff. (with a reference to Pl. Tht. 176a 8-b 1, a passage quoted side by side with Phd. 67c 6 in II 3,9,19-20) we must flee from the body and escape towards 'the Intelligible and

Intellect and God'. The danger is that we should treat our body and its affections as the most valuable part of us and as the seat of our human personality (IV 4,18,17-19); compare, though, the inclusive notion of personality put forward in 12,6 ff.: on this see on 12,8-10.

10,26-27 ἄλλα τῇ μὴ νύουσι ... πρὸς τὸ σῶμα: The method of separation - cf. III 6,5,24-25 τὸ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι τῇ μὴ ποτὲ νύουσι καὶ τῇ περὶ τὰ κάτω μὴ φαντασίᾳ .
 Νύουσι is a Gnostic term (cf. II 9,4,6-7. 11,13 ff.) which P. uses here in a non-technical sense (cf. also III 6,5,25) to refer to the descent of the soul into the body.

On φαντασία and its meaning, see G. H. Clark, Philosophical Essays in Honour of Edgar Arthur Singer Jr., ed. by F. P. Clarke and M. C. Nahm, (Philadelphia, London and Oxford, 1942), pp. 297-309, H. J. Blumenthal, Plotinus' Psychology (The Hague, 1971) ch. 7, and see on 12,5-7. Clark provides a useful index to the uses of φαντασία and its cognates in Plotinus. As its name suggests, φαντασία is that activity of the soul in grasping its object which results in a pictorial representation of the object concerned. This faculty of the soul has something of the intellectual in it (φανταστικὸν οἶον νοερόν IV 3,23,32) and can sometimes be used to lead the soul upwards. For example, in V 8,9,7 ff., P. explains how to imagine the Intelligible World. First one must imagine a sphere which contains everything within it, and then a similar sphere, but this time one without mass. And then one must pray to God to come, the God who made the world whose image

the soul possesses. In V 6,5,15 P. speaks of an 'imagination of the Good'. But it is quite clear that imagination is only a shadow of the reality which it mirrors. Nevertheless, these passages show that imagination can be a help in the spiritual anabasis. Ha. and MK seem to take our present passage in this positive way (e.g., Ha. '...dass man sich durch Nichthinabneigen, also mit den Vorstellungen vom Leibe trennt').

The difficulty with such an interpretation is that it destroys the parallelism which should surely exist between $\tau\eta\ \mu\eta\ \nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota$, $\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \phi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota\varsigma$ and $\tau\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\tau\epsilon\iota\omicron\tau\eta\tau\epsilon$. $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\tau\epsilon\iota\omicron\tau\eta\varsigma$ and $\eta\ \mu\eta\ \nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ emphasise the negative attitudes that the soul should have towards the body. P. seems to be looking at the body and the material order from the vantage point of the soul which is already clear of the body. And imagination is often seen as something harmful to the soul. It is dependent on bodily states (IV 4,28,35-52) and is described in I 8,15,18 as a $\pi\lambda\eta\gamma\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\alpha\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\phi\omega\theta\epsilon\omega$. It can be the cause of $\pi\alpha\acute{\theta}\eta$ (III 6,4,18-26); it is a midway state between the lowest phase of soul ($\phi\acute{\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma}$) and $\nu\omicron\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (IV 4,13,11-13). It is therefore denied to the pure soul (I 8,15,18-21), and the bad soul is the soul which gives in easily to obscure imaginings (I 8,14,5 $\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \phi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha\nu\ \xi\alpha\delta\acute{\iota}\omega\varsigma$). P. often sees imagination, then, as something to be avoided by the soul which desires purification. It is in this sense that Fic., Br. and Ci. take our present passage. But the Greek text cannot support such an interpretation, since the force of $\mu\eta$

cannot extend beyond the phrase $\tau\eta\ \mu\eta\ \nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota$. The obvious emendation is the insertion of $\mu\eta$ between $\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ and $\phi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota\varsigma$. Not only does $\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \mu\eta\ \phi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota\varsigma$ give excellent sense, but it has a parallel in III 6,5,24-25 (already cited; note $\tau\eta\ \dots\ \mu\eta\ \phi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$). The negative phrase is much more in keeping with the negative tone of $\tau\eta\ \mu\eta\ \nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ and $\tau\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\tau\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\omicron\tau\eta\tau\epsilon$.

$\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\tau\epsilon\mu\omicron\nu$ is the technical Stoic opposite to $\omicron\iota\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$. Since the soul is $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \kappa\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\tau\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \omicron\hat{\alpha}\sigma\iota\nu\ \omicron\hat{\alpha}\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ (I 6,2,7-8) its natural inclinations should be towards the Intelligible World. Body is something $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ to it (VI 4, 15,38), although in one sense, in the sense that our historical personalities make use of an ensouled body, body can be said to be ours and not $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ (IV 4,18,11-12). The trouble is that soul can forget its origin and become too involved with body. The pure soul must have a constant awareness of its difference; and this will help it to remain untainted.

10,27-28 $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\ \pi\omega\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \lambda\omicron\upsilon\pi\omicron\nu\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma\ \dots\ \tau\omicron\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\ :\ \tau\omicron\ \lambda\omicron\upsilon\pi\omicron\nu\ \dots\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ is all of soul except for the undescending soul, which, of course, does not need purification.

$\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ is here used as an alternative to $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$ (cf. I 1,8,19; II 3,18,20-21; IV 7,14,3-4). The soul is often described as made up of parts (e.g., III 6,2,8-9; V 3,3,26), though sometimes P. apologises for the use of $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$ (cf. IV 3,20,1-2 $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \dots\ \lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta$; V 2,2,5 $\omicron\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$; on the meaning of $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$ see IV 3,2,10 ff.). But P. nevertheless believed

that soul was a unity. The 'parts' represent merely the different functions of the soul which correspond to the different functions of the living being. P. sometimes calls these functions *δυνάμεις* rather than *μέγ*. In IV 9,3,17 ff. he compares the powers in the soul to the powers in a seed (cf. the *logoi* in semen in 6,11-12); each power in the seed is separate, yet at the same time the seed is an indivisible unity. The powers in the soul are 'bound together by one chain' (*τῷ ἐνὶ ὥσπερ δεσμῷ συνέχεται* VI 9,1,41-42). Thus in a sense (*τρόπον τινα* V 2,1,23-24) the upper soul reaches down as far as the vegetable world.

On the upward ascent see on 3,3.

10,28-30 *καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα ... ἔχον* : Fic.(?), Br., and MK take the *καί* as explanatory - i.e. they take these lines to refer to *τὸ λοιπὸν ... εἶδος* of 10,27-28. Ha. and Ci. take *καί* to mean 'even' (Ha. 'auch das...was hier...; Ci. 'persino') and this gives better sense. Even the very lowest part of soul must be raised upwards.

Ἐνταῦθα refers to the sensible world - contrasted with *ἄνω* - and *τοῦτο* to body. Even the lowest soul is not literally in the body; it is said to be so only because of its close involvement with it.

The phrase *ὅ μόνον ἐστὶ σώματος δημιουργὸν καὶ πλαστικόν* is a reminiscence of Pl. *Epin.* 981b 7-8 *τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ σχεδόν ὡς μόνον πλάττειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν προσήκει* (see now H-S t.3 p. 346 in 'fontes addendi'); this

passage is also recalled at V 8,2,4-5 τοῦ πλάσαντος αὐτὰ καὶ δημιουργήσαντος and VI 9,1,18 δημιουργοῦσα καὶ πλάτρουσα καὶ μορφοῦσα (unnoticed by H-S):. In the Laws and Epinomis Plato maintains that the soul is responsible for creating the world. In P.'s philosophy this job is performed by φύσις which is an ἰνδάλμα of the world soul rather than of the human soul, and which creates by imprinting its logos on matter (II 3,18,10-13 ; III 8,2,28-30). In the human sphere, φύσις is that part of the soul which maintains life within the human compound of soul and body (see H. J. Blumenthal, Plotinus' Psychology (The Hague, 1971), p. 61). Our present passage is extraordinary in that the job usually associated with the world soul is apparently given to the human soul, but cf. V 3,9,4-5 where the human soul (and soul in general) is said to πλάττειν σῶμα (= body in general).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Chapter 11 continues the discussion of Chapter 10. From the undescending soul (soul's 'intellect') P. moves on to Intellect properly speaking and its source, the One. He argues that both these hypostases can be found 'in' the human soul. 11,1-7 deals with Intellect, and 11,7-15 with the One.

11,1-3 οὕτως οὖν ψυχῆς ... εἰ τοῦτο κατόν : The οὕτως is resumptive, and shows that the description which follows in 11, 1-3 is a description of the working of the undescending soul which 'reasons purely' (10,16) and remains in the Intelligible World (10,23). A comparable account of this activity is given in V 3,3. P. claims in V 3,2,7-11 that the reasoning soul deals both with the sense-perceptible world through the information conveyed to it by sense-perception and with the world of Forms whose 'impressions' (τύποι) it also receives. In the next chapter he gives an example of what he means. Διάνοια reacts to the sense-data of a physical object and identifies it as Socrates (the stock image; see on 4,20); but then he adds the revealing statement that if διάνοια makes a judgement about whether Socrates is good or not, this judgement, although made about a sensible particular, i.e. Socrates, goes beyond the information conveyed to the soul by sense-perception and must therefore be derived from the standard of goodness which the soul (διάνοια) contains within itself (εἰ δέ, εἰ ἀγαθός, λόγοι, εἰς ὧν μὲν ἔγνω δὲ τῆς αἰσθήσεως εἴληκεν, ὃ εἰ εἴληκεν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἥδη παρ' αὐτῆς ἂν ἔχοι κανόνα ἔχουσα τοῦ

ἀγαθοῦ παρ' αὐτῇ (V 3,3,6-9)). This is the judgement which deals with what P. in V 3,2,10 calls the 'impressions' of Intellect. Note that it is a judgement about particulars.

Compare I 6,3,1 ff. where P. is talking about the recognition of a καλὸν σῶμα . After saying that it is recognised by 'the power ordained for the purpose' (i.e. sense-perception) he continues with the statement that 'perhaps the rest of the soul too' (I prefer H-S's αὐτῇ to Ki.'s αὐτή) pronounces judgement by fitting the sense-datum of the beautiful body to the Form in itself and by using this as a standard (τάχα δὲ καὶ αὐτῇ λέγει συναρμόττουσα τῷ παρ' αὐτῇ εἶδει κἀκείνῳ πρὸς τὴν κείσιν χρωμένῃ ὥσπερ κανόνι τοῦ εὐθείου I 6,3,3-5).

In this passage 'the rest of the soul' refers, I think, to διάνοια which applies its own criteria to the physical object (σῶμα).

In view of this, δυνάτων καὶ κατῶν in 11,1-2 must mean 'beautiful and just things' and not 'the right and good' (as MK).

The τοῦτο of 11,2 clearly refers to a particular.

The reasoning of διάνοια , then, contains, as it were, two parts. The first part deals with the apprehension of the physical world, and the second part deals with the apprehension of the Forms, in so far as this is possible, and their application as standards to the physical world. Thus the principles (ἀρχαί) of διάνοια are either sense-perception or Intellect (VI 7,1,21-23); P. describes a mistake by λόγος = λογισμός which results from the use of the wrong principles in VI 5,2,1-6). The ability to apprehend the world of Forms is, it seems to me, the particular

ability of the undescending soul (see on 3,13). Its ability is still a form of reasoning since it applies what it knows to the physical world; but it is a form of 'pure reasoning' (10-16; V 3,9,28-29 τὴν τοιαύτην ψυχὴν ... καθαρῶς νοοῦσαν), since what it receives from sense-perception are already νοητά (I 1,7,12).

The criteria which διάνοια uses in its judgements about sensible particulars are sometimes referred to as κανόνες (I 6,3,5; V 3,3,8. 4,16-17). These are, of course, the Forms which soul possesses, though its manner of possession differs from that of Intellect proper. In the soul the Forms are, as it were, unfolded and separate (ἀνεπτυγμένα καὶ κεχωρισμένα I 1,8,7-8; cf. V 3,9,30-31 of αἰσθησις); in Intellect this element of separation is absent (ἐν δὲ νῷ ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα I 1,8,8) (cf. V 3,4,21-22 ἔχον (sc. τὸ διανοητικόν) ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντα οἷον γεγραμμένα ὡς ἐκεῖ ὁ γράφων καὶ ὁ γράψας). The close relationship between soul and Intellect, however, makes it possible for P. to call διάνοια the image (εἰκὼν) of Intellect. The reasoning of the undescending soul is described in V 3,9,28-29 as a sort of νόησις (τὴν τοιαύτην ψυχὴν ... καθαρῶς νοοῦσαν). This is because Intellect colours the soul and makes it intellectual (V 6,4,16) and because soul manages to retain some of Intellect's light (see on 7,43-44).

For the pairing of δίκαια and κατὰ cf. IV 7,8,24; V 5,1,29-30.

On the distinction between the acquisitive nature of the

reasoning of the soul, and the non-acquisitive knowledge of Intellect see 11,3-4 and note on 4,16. It is a defining characteristic of the soul that it should have the power of reasoning (V 3,3,14-15).

- 11,3-4 ἀνάγκη εἶναι... περὶ ψυχὴν γίνεται : For the Platonic argument see Pl. R. 507b 5-7 καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάντες αὖ κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν ἐκ-
 ἄστου ὡς μᾶς οὐσις τίθεντες, "ὃ ἐστίν" ἑκάστον προσαγορεύομεν ;
 cf. ibid. 596a 6-7. On this theory of predication, the existence of many things called just or beautiful presupposes the existence of the Forms of justice and beauty. These Forms are the ultimate cause of the knowledge of their reflexions in the physical world (cf. Pl. R. 508e 3-4 - the Form of the Good is the cause of knowledge and truth). Since for P. Intellect is the Forms, Intellect itself can be said to be the cause of the deliberations of its image the reasoning soul (cf. λογίζεσθαι παρέχων 10,13).
 And since furthermore in P.'s interpretation of Aristotle (Metaph. 1072b 22 ff.) Intellect's thought is non-acquisitive, Intellect does not have to seek for its knowledge (see on 4,16). Reasoning is for those still engaged in the process of learning (IV 4,12,7-10). Intellect's knowledge of itself takes place in an atmosphere of rest and immobility which contrasts with the flux necessarily associated with the physical world. Thus ἑστάναι and its cognates are often associated with Intellect and the Forms (see 4,12 and note, and especially IV 4,12,28-29 where τὸ ἑστάναι is said to be λογισμοῦ ἕξω ; note also Pl. Parm. 132d 1-2

τὰ εἶδη ἑστάναι... ἐν τῇ φύσει, and cf. P.'s use of the term ἡσυχος (see on 2,14)).

Ci. prefers to read ἑστὸς with B and C, which also read ἑστὸς against the majority reading ἑστῶς in V 9,10,13. Ci.'s reason for preferring ἑστὸς - that Fic. translates the phrase by 'stabile quiddam iustum' - suggests that he did not realise that the neuter participle has an alternative form in -ως. Although generally rarer than the form in -ος, this form is quite common in Plotinus; see Schwyzer RE 513,56-58. ἑστῶς is certainly the right reading.

On the intensive use of περί in περί ψυχῆν see on 4,19. Reasoning and soul are conceptually connected; see I 1,7,23-24; V 3,3,14.

11,4-5 καὶ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ... ὅτε δὲ μή : Cf. Arist. de An. 430a 22 ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. Aristotle is speaking of the ποιητικὸς νοῦς which is in certain features analogous to P.'s Intellect. Note, for example, that the ποιητικὸς νοῦς causes the actualisation of the παθητικὸς νοῦς and compare 10,12-13 νοῦς δὲ ὁ μὲν λογιζόμενος, ὁ δὲ λογίζεσθαι παρέρχων; see also P. Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness (The Hague, 1969), ch. 2 esp. pp. 10-11. The human intellect, of which P. is speaking in our present passage, unlike Intellect proper which is pure ἀνέγχεα is incapable of incessant intellectual activity. But because Intellect proper is 'in' us P. has to explain why we cannot always perceive the workings of the higher Intellect. This he does in chapter 12.

On the permanent activity of Intellect, see V 8,3,10; V 9,2,21-22. 5,4.

Some mss. omit the negative οὐχ in de An. 430a 22 and so make the potential intellect the subject of the sentence (see Ross's app. crit. ad loc.). If this were the correct reading the parallelism between Aristotle and P. would be exact. But Philoponus in his commentary ad loc. cites P. as among those who read οὐχ in the text of Aristotle.

11,5-7 δεῖ τὸν μὴ... ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι : The addition of μὴ is at least as ancient as Ficino, since the corrections of A³ are Ficino's; see Henry, Manuscripts, p. 33. Μὴ should be placed not between δεῖ and τόν (as earlier editors from Creuzer onwards), since then one would expect the addition of a second τόν between ἀλλ' and αὖ (though Fic. and Br. translate τὸ λογισόμενον as though it were a substantive), but between τόν and λογισόμενον. Dodds' text (Select Passages Illustrative of Neoplatonism (London, 1924), p. 52) is followed by Ha. and H-S.

Intellect 'contains' the Form of justice (τὸ δίκαιον) as it contains all the Forms (cf. on 4,10-11) and because it is self-sufficient it does not have to reason in order to possess it (IV 3,18,4-5). Intellect actually is its contents.

Br.'s translation ('l'intelligence qui en nous garde toujours l'idée de justice') gives the wrong emphasis. The point is that since we (or our soul) reason, the cause of the reasoning, i.e., Intellect the second hypostasis, must be in us too, so that our reasoning can have a ground.

On the meaning of ἐν ἡμῖν see on 10,5-6.

- 11,7-15 εἶναι δὲ καὶ ... ἐν εἰ : In the last part of the chapter, P. turns to the One which is also present 'in' us.
- 11,7 εἶναι δὲ καὶ ... καὶ θρόν : If Intellect is 'in us' then its ground must also be 'in us'. Ἀρχή and αἰτία are here used practically as synonyms. Wolters, on III 5,1,15 notes that this usage is quite common in P. (cf. e.g., I 8,4,13; II 3,6, 19-20). The equivocation goes as far back as Aristotle, who in Metaph. 1013a 17 says that all causes are principles (πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰτία ἀρχαί). Of course, the fact that all αἰτία are ἀρχαί does not mean that the converse is true, since an ἀρχή can be merely the first and non-causal term in a series. P. uses ἀρχή in both a causal and a non-causal sense (see on 5,3-4). The One is an ἀρχή both in the sense that it has nothing in front of it (i.e., it is the first term in the ontological hierarchy) and that there is no other principle in which its being might be grounded (V 5,9,7-8 ἀρχὴ δὲ αὐτὴ μὴδὲν ἔχουσα πρὸ αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἔχει ἐν ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ); and in the sense that it is the cause of everything (... ὅτι ἀρχή - ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γὰρ πάντα V 5,10,14).

On P.'s application of θρόν to the One see Rist, MS 24 (1962), pp. 169-180.

- 11,7-10 οὐ μάλιστα ... ἄλλον αὐτόν : The construction here is difficult. It seems to me impossible to take θρόν (11,7) as the subject of θεωρεῖσθαι (as H-S suggest, presumably

understanding $\delta\epsilon$ with the whole clause). $\tau\eta\acute{\nu}\ \nu\omicron\upsilon\acute{\alpha}$
 $\alpha\rho\chi\eta\acute{\nu}\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \theta\upsilon\acute{\omicron}\nu$ go naturally together with $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ in
 11,7 and refer to the One. H-S's interpretation means that $\theta\upsilon\acute{\omicron}\nu$
 is separated from its verb by three genitive absolute clauses.
 It does not make the text any easier to put the three genitive
 absolute clauses in parenthesis.

Br. follows Ml. and Vo. in reading $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu\tau\alpha$ for $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$
 in 11,9, so that the last accusative and infinitive clause starts
 with $\kappa\alpha\iota$ in 11,8, and its subject is $\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\nu$ (i.e., the
 One) understood from $\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\upsilon$ in 11,8. I am inclined, however,
 to leave the mss. reading $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ unchanged, although I agree
 with Br. against Ha. that the last infinitival clause
 begins in 11,8 with $\kappa\alpha\iota$ and not earlier. The genitive (here
 $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\tau\eta\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$) is sometimes used in P. where the accusative
 would be more normal. Note especially in our present treatise
 6,18-19 $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\alpha\phi\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \alpha\tilde{\nu}\epsilon\ \epsilon\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\epsilon\acute{\rho}\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\ \alpha\nu\alpha\gamma\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$
 $\epsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\ \gamma\epsilon\gamma\omicron\nu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota$ and see KG/II.110 and Schwyzer RE 518.53 ff..
 Its use here is fairly easily explained by the proximity of the
 other two genitive clauses. There is no need, then, with Ci. to
 suppose that $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ has either fallen out or should be understood
 after $\alpha\tilde{\nu}$.

The sequence of thought in these lines is as follows. P.
 says in the first two genitive absolute clauses that the One is
 not divisible, but remains (indivisible), and then adds that although
 it does not remain in place, it is (must be) seen reflected
 $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \mu\omicron\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$ some of which, i.e., objects in the physical world,
 are in place.

Ha.'s change of μένοντος to μὲν ὄντος (11,9) on the grounds that 'er bleibt nicht im Raum, sondern ist im Raum' is unconvincing. Μένοντος in 11,9 surely picks up the μένοντος in 11,8. Vitringa's suggestion of ὥστε for αὐ³ in the same line is also unconvincing, because unnecessary.

On the concept of rest (μένειν) see on 3,10-12 and on τόπος see 10,18-19. The One is above the physical world in which τόπος is to be found.

The One is present everywhere but only to whatever is capable of receiving it. Note especially III 8,9,23-26 ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτοῦ· ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅπου μὴ ἔστιν, οἷς ἔστι μετέχειν αὐτοῦ. τῷ (4-S¹ τὸ) γὰρ πανταχοῦ (i.e. τῷ ἐνὶ) παραστήσας ὁποιοῦν τὸ συνάμενον ἔχειν ἔχεις ἐκείθεν and VI 9,4,25-26 ὥστε παρὼν μὴ παρίσταναι ἀλλ' ἢ τοῖς δέχεσθαι συνάμενους (see also on 10,5-6). The capacity to receive the One extends even to the physical world, and examples of its presence there can be found in VI 9,1,4-6. An army, a chorus, a herd of cattle, a house, or a ship all participate in the One. (The examples used in VI 9,1 are Stoic; cf. SVF II nn. 366-368.) The capacity for participation of the discrete body (the chorus) is less than that of the unified body (VI 9,1,32-33), and as the move to the Intelligible World takes place the capacity for participation increases (cf. VI 9,1,33-34 ψυχὴ δὲ ἐστὶ μακρόν κοινωνοῦσα καὶ αὐτῇ). P. implies that our own capacity for participation is great.

Θεὸν ἄλλον αὐτόν (11,10) is a difficult phrase, and translators tend to gloss over it. MK gives 'one of its (sc. the

One's) manifestations', Ci. 'Spirito moltoplicato' and Br. paraphrases 'comme s'il avait des parties différentes'. Ha. gives 'gewissermassen ein zweiter Er.' This line of interpretation is followed by G.J.P.O'Daly (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973), p. 90) who refers to Arist. EN 1166a 31 and thinks that the phrase means 'a second self' in the sense of an 'alter ego'. This is attractive, but does not fit the context. The point is that the One is present in many things (πολλοῖς 11,9) according to their capacity for participation. It is hardly present in each of them (e.g. in an army, or the bodies of the physical world: cf. VI 9,1,4 ff.) as an 'alter ego'. I agree with H-S that αὐτόν should be taken as the object of δέχουσαι and that οἷον ἄλλον most probably means 'as something different' (sc. from what the One actually is). Fic.'s 'velut aliud quiddam praeter ipsa' where 'ipsa' refers to the objects which can receive the One is shown to be unlikely by the comparison which follows where the emphasis is not on the fact that the radii receive something different from themselves but rather on the fact that the centre remains ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, yet nevertheless is the focal point of the radii. Just so the One remains ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ without division (cf. 11,7-8) yet is received in a sense by the lower members of the ontological hierarchy according to their varying capacities. Each of the hypostases mirrors the One. Intellect is ἐν πολλὰ, soul ἐν καὶ ποικίλῃ, the forms immanent in the physical world (i.e., the traces of soul, the logoi) πολλὰ καὶ ἐν and bodies πολλὰ μόνον (IV 2,2,52-55: see Pl.

Prm. 144e 5 and 155e 5; V 1,8,26). Note however that according to VI 9,1,4-6 (see above) even bodies have some participation in the One. The object of the mystical union, however, is to receive the One not as something different from what it in fact is, i.e., according to the capacity of the entity concerned for participation in it, but in all its fulness and entirety.

11,10-13 ὥστε καὶ τὸ κέντρον . . . προφύεται πρὸς τούτων : The One is a hyperontic unity, yet can be seen ἐν πολλοῖς . Just so, the centre of the circle is a unity, yet each of the radii has a terminus there, so that the centre can also be said to be ἐν πολλοῖς . The image of the unity and plurality of the centre of the circle may well derive from Alexander of Aphrodisias, who in commenting on Aristotle's theory of a κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον says (Quaest. 96.14 ff. (Bruns)) that just as the centre of the circle is qua centre of the circle one, yet qua πῆρας of each radius many, so the common organ of judgement is one in the sense that it is the only organ of judgement yet many in the sense that the objects of its judgement are many and varied. Alexander speaks of the difference between the radii (διαφερούσων γραμμῶν ibid. 96.23) and their particularity (... ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ γραμμῇ ibid. 96.25). Note how P. also talks of the individuality of the radii (τὸ ἴδιον (sc. σημείον) 11,12). P. uses this image of the unity and plurality of the centre to describe the complex nature of Intellect in VI 5,5,11 ff. and IV 2,1,24 ff.. In the latter passage the centre is said to be κοινὸν πάντων τῶν ἐπ' αὐτῆς yet at the same time undisturbed by the radii

(ὡς δὲ ἦπτον ἑωσι (sc. αἱ γραμμαὶ) αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένειν IV 2,1,26; cf. ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν 11,10).

P. applies and adapts the image to the relationship between Intellect and the One in VI 8,18,7 ff.. He compares the One to the centre of the circle and Intellect to the circle itself which has the termini of its radii at the centre. But he stresses that the termini of the radii are only similar to the centre to which they are attached (ποιοῦσι (sc. αἱ γραμμαὶ) τὸ πῦρ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ πρὸς ὃ ἠνέχθησαν VI 8,18,11-12). They are shadowy images of the true centre which is on a higher level than the termini (μύθονος ὄντος ἢ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς γραμμὰς καὶ τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν... ἔχνη ἐκείνου VI 8,18,13-15). Thus the presence of the One ἐν πολλοῖς is seen to be the presence of mere ἔχνη of the One, and not the presence of the One itself which remains ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. But the similarity between the terminal centres and the true centre facilitates the mystical appreciation of the centre of all things, since 'likeness' (ὁμοιότης) is one of the prerequisites for spiritual advance (cf. VI 9,4,27 ... καὶ θίγειν ὁμοιότητι).

The phrase ^{ci} ἑκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ (11,11) is an imprecise way of referring to the radii (see below); but Ci. is over fussy when he suggests that ^{ci} ἑκάστη should be read (to agree with γραμμῇ understood from τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ (sc. γραμμῶν) 11,11) or that ^{ci} ἑκαστον refers to τὸ ἡμισὶ τῆς διαμέτρου. Br.'s translation - 'chacun des points du cercle le (sc. le centre) contient en lui' - is off the mark.

Although the centre of the circle is a point (see Euc. Def 16), *σημεῖον* here refers not to the centre but to the *κέντρα* of each individual radius. The radii do not contain the centre, which according to VI 8,18,13-14 is different from the totality of the *κέντρα*, but rather they have a point (their *κέντρα*) in it.

The force of *καί* in 11,12 is, I think, epexegetic. P. explains the rather vague remark that 'each of the components of the circle has a point at the centre'. The radii, he explains, bring each their individual point (their *κέντρα*) to the centre. I agree with Fic. that *σημεῖον* should be understood with *ἴδιον* (11,12). The use of *ἴδιον* implies the usual contrast with *κοινόν* (cf. I 1,8,3-4). The centre of the circle is in a sense common to all the radii (IV 2,1,24), yet taken as the individual terminus of each of them it is particular to each. If we move from the analogy to what it represents, the point which P. is making may be seen to pick up 11,9-10. The lower created beings (the *πολλά* of 11,9) each possess the One individually but only in proportion each to its capacity for participation; and this varies according to the degree of unity of the entity concerned.

11,13-14 *τῷ γὰρ τοιοῦτῳ . . . ἀνηγμένηθα* : P. returns to the human condition. The *γὰρ* explains the point of the geometric imagery. It is by means of an analogous centre in ourselves that we are attached to the One.

On the attachment of the soul to the One see VI 9,8,18-20 *τῷ ἑνὶ μὴ βαπτυνθέντι τῷ σώματι ὑπερέχοντες, τοῦτῳ συνάπτουμεν*

κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῶν κέντρον τῷ οἷον πάντων κέντρῳ . P.'s

key principle is the common Greek one that like is known by like (see on 1,30-34). Note that in VI 8,18,12 the terminus of the radius is said to be like the centre from which it is sprung. This likeness is very important, and explains why P. says, for example, that only the eternal in us can contemplate eternity and the Eternal (i.e., Intellect) (III 7,5,11-12). Thus what is like the One is able to become attached to it; and the more this likeness is actualised, the closer the union which results. The aim of Plotinian philosophy is to actualise the presence of the One within the soul, i.e., to help the soul to move through Intellect to the One until complete union is reached.

On ἐφάπτεσθαι see on 7,44-48. In our present passage, however, the word is used not to signify the attachment of a higher to a lower form of being, but to signify the contrary. In a similar context of like being known by like, Plato (R. 490b 3-4) uses ἀπτεσθαι and ἐφάπτεσθαι of the soul's method of contact with the Forms; cf. also Ti. 45d 1 where ἐφάπτεσθαι is found in a description of the mechanics of physical perception (cf. III 7,7,3 τίς γὰρ ἂν σώσεις γένοιτο μὴ ἐφαπτομένους). P. uses the word in the geometrical context of the centre of a circle again in VI 8,18,4-5 (used with ἐξήχεται). Note also VI 5,10,41 and VI 9,4,27 where the word is used of 'touching the One'. The mystical union is itself a sort of ἐπαφή or θίξις (VI 7,39,19; VI 9,9,19 - ἐπαφή ; VI 9,4,27 - θίγειν ; V 3,10,42 θίξις καὶ οἷον ἐπαφή μόνον ἄρρητος καὶ ἀνόητος ;

on *θιγγάνειν*, used frequently in Aristotle and Theophrastus, see Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness (The Hague, 1963), p. 31). The final touching is non-intellectual; it is "un contact' au delà de la connaissance proprement dite" (J. Trouillard) La Procession Plotinienne (Paris, 1955), p. 46).

P. has already used *συνεῖναι* to describe the relationship between Intellect and the One in 6,52, where the word has sexual overtones which are absent here. *Συνουσία* and *συνγίγνεσθαι* are used in the context of mystical union with the One in VI 9,7, 21-23. For *συνγίγνεσθαι* used in a context similar to our own see VI 9,11,32 where P. is speaking of the epistemological principle that like is known by like.

On *ἀναστᾶσθαι* see Wolters on III 5,2,30 and note on I 14.

11,14-15 *ἐνιδεσθῆναι δὲ ... ἐκεῖ* : (*Ἐν-*)*ἰδεσθῆναι* means 'to be settled in', and carries with it the idea that the goal of the journey has been achieved (cf. I 3,4,9-10 *πάντα δὲ (sc. ἡ διαλεκτικὴ) τῆς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πλάνης ἐνιδεσθῆναι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ* . In IV 8,1,5 the union with the One is described as a 'settling in it' (*ἐν αὐτῷ ἰδεσθῆναι*); cf. VI 7,36,10 *ἰδεσθῆναι* . The convergence on the One which P. speaks of in our present passage marks the culmination of philosophical endeavour.

Ὅτι ἂν συνεύωμεν is the equivalent of the conditional clause *ἐὰν συνεύωμεν* (see Goodwin, Greek Moods and Tenses, 529). Note the vivid present *ἐνιδεσθῆναι* where a future might be expected. *Συνεύναι* is the technical mathematical term to signify 'convergence'; cf. Hero Alexandrinus Definitiones 48.8

(Heiberg); Geminus Elementa Astronomiae 164.3 (Manitius). The latter passage speaks of the convergence of bodies to a centre (cf. Plu. Num. 9; Procl. in Euc. 154.21 (Friedlein)). The use of the word in our present passage in the geometrical context of the circle and its centre is particularly apt (cf. II 2,1,34-35). Like the radii, we must converge on our centre which for us is the One (cf. VI 9,9,11-12 $\mu\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu\ldots\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$). And we find this centre in ourselves (cf. V 6,5,1-2 $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\iota\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\ \pi\omicron\lambda\acute{\iota}\eta\ \xi\eta\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \grave{\alpha}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\theta\acute{\epsilon}\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \grave{\alpha}\nu\ \sigma\upsilon\nu\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \sigma\upsilon\nu\nu\alpha\iota\sigma\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$).

Following the accentuation of some of the mss., Perna and Creuzer read $\acute{\omicron}\hat{\iota}$, which is presumably the relative adverb of place, and would give the meaning 'we settle in that spot in the Intelligible World ($\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\hat{\iota}$) upon which we converge.' But this would break up the sequence of thought. It is attachment to and settlement in the One which is in question. Fic.'s translation 'eatenus illic innititur, atque figimur, quatenus nos illuc intentione conferimus' is impossible even if $\acute{\omicron}\hat{\iota}$ is read. Ha. suggests $\acute{\omega}\hat{\iota}$, but gives no reason in his note ad loc. for his suggestion. Examples of $\sigma\upsilon\nu\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ with the dative, meaning 'to converge' are late (in fact LSJ give none and Stephanus gives only two from the fourth-century astrologer Manetho).

CHAPTER TWELVE

Chapters ten and eleven have demonstrated that the hypostases are to be found 'in' the human soul. P.'s immediate problem (12,1-3) is that their activities - and these are incessant - are not perceived. Chapter twelve attempts to answer this problem by reference to P.'s theory of the subconscious (12,3-12). The chapter ends with an exhortation to the soul to 'turn inwards' so that it may apprehend the activities which exist within it (12,12-20).

12,1-3 πῶς οὖν ἔχοντες . . . ἐνεργοῦσιν : Τὰ τηλικαῦτα denotes the One, Intellect and the undescending soul (see on 10,10-30). On the concept of the soul's possession of these entities see on 10,5-6.

Schwyzler rightly notes that ἀντίληψις is 'ein Oberbegriff für jede Art Erfassen' (Entr. p. 367). He is unjust, however, in his criticism of H. van Zandt Cobb (TAPA 69 (1938), p. xxxii). Cobb's full definition, of which Schwyzler quotes only the first eight words ('the most general expression for consciousness is ἀντίληψις, awareness, or the cognition of an object; αἰσθησις, διάνοια, and νόησις are equally types of ἀντίληψις, differing only in the form in which this awareness occurs and in the degree of truth-value which it represents'), is quite acceptable. Since ἀντίληψις is the most general term for 'apprehension' the sphere of its application is usually mentioned, e.g., in I 4,9,27 ἀντίληψις πῶς αἰσθητικῶς ('by means of...'); and in IV 3, 30,14 ἡ τῆς νοήσεως ἀντίληψις. Ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι is

used in IV 7,8,1-7 in the definitions both of *αἰσθάνεσθαι* and of *νοεῖν* .

With *ἁγνῆν* c. dat. cf. Plu. Cam. 23. The 'activities' to which P. refers are the activities of apprehension (*ἀντίληψις*) of which the soul is capable but which it is likely to leave unactualised (see on 10,5-6). On the (here paradoxical) juxtaposition of *ἁγνῆν* and *ἐνέργεια* see Wolters on III 5,7,34.

The omission of *οἱ μὲν* before *οἱ δέ* in 12,2 is not uncommon. See KG II.II.265. Anm. 4. Those who have no higher activity at all are a small numerical group compared to those who are merely inactive.

12,3-5 *ἐκείνα μὲν ... οὕτως* : Although P.'s reply to a question he has asked himself is often introduced by the particle *ἤ* (cf. 7,5; IV 7,8,12; VI 9,1,20 etc.), the addition of the particle is not absolutely necessary. See e.g., 6,27-28; VI 8,1,21-22. 9,3. Ci., Ha., and H-S are quite right to delete Ki.'s supposititious addition.

Ἐκείνα refers, like *τῆς καὶ ταῦτα* in 12,1, to Intellect, the One and the undescending soul. Reference to the soul is emphatic (note 12,4-5 *καὶ ψυχῇ δέ*); the emphasis interrupts P.'s train of thought, and consequently the *μὲν* of 12,3 is nowhere picked up by a corresponding *δέ* . The continual activity of the hypostases is unaffected by the lower soul's possession of them. This activity is necessary for their very existence, since activity is constitutive of *οὐσία* and of the *νοῦς* itself (see V 4,2,27 and note on 3,9-10). Note the implied contrast between

human laziness (ἀργοῦμεν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσι 12,2)

and the effortless activity of the hypostases.

The internal activity of each hypostasis is directed towards itself and takes place within itself (12,4); cf. (of Intellect)
 V 3,7,19-22 ἑαυτὸν ἄρα νοῶν οὕτω πρὸς αὐτῷ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἵσχει. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, τῷ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. ἴδμε γὰρ πρῶτον ἐν ἑαυτῷ (H-S'om.ἐν) εἶτα καὶ εἰς ἄλλο . This internal, self-directed activity is the primary one.

All editors and translators except for Perna, Creuzer, Ha. and H-S prefer Ki.'s ψυχῇ in 12,4 to the mss. ψυχῇ . They translate ψυχῇ as a possessive dative and take τὸ ἀεικίνητον as an abstract. Ci., e.g., gives ('e in questo senso conviene anche all'Anima il cosiddetto "moto perpetuo"'. In Pl. Phdr. 245c 5, however, from which the phrase τὸ ἀεικίνητον is taken, τὸ ἀεικίνητον does not occur as an abstract quality, and it is perhaps unlikely, therefore, that P. would use it in that way. I prefer to keep the mss. ψυχῇ . In this case τὸ ἀεικίνητον can be taken in two ways, either as Ha. does - 'und in diesem Sinne (i.e., in the sense that the soul is continuously engaged in its own activity) heisst auch die Seele das "ständig Bewegte" - or with H-S as a phrase in apposition to ψυχῇ . Ha.'s interpretation (followed by Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness (The Hague, 1969), p. 7 n. 4) takes οὕτως to explain the sense of the Platonic τὸ ἀεικίνητον . With this interpretation however, it is difficult to make sense

of γὰρ in 12,5, for it is not clear what explanatory connection the following sentence would have with our present passage. I prefer to understand τὸ ἀκίνητον in apposition (with H-S), and take οὕτως to mean 'in this state' (with an ellipse of ἔχει). For this meaning of οὕτως see 7,8-9 τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ οὕτω and II 5,3,32-33 καὶ ψυχὴ δὲ οὕτως, ἥ μὴ ἐν ἑλγῇ ἀλλ' ἐν νῷ νοητῷ. This last passage is particularly close to our own. In II 5,3,31 P. says that τὰ πρῶτα are ἐνέργεια (cf. ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐνεργείαις 12,3-4) and then adds, as he does here, that the same is true of soul, at least of the undescending soul. If this meaning of οὕτως is correct in our present passage, then the passage can be translated 'and soul as well, Plato's "continual mover" is in this state.' The next sentence then explains the paradox. Not everything in soul is immediately perceptible. Hence it is possible for our soul to be in a state of continuous activity without our being aware of it.

Fic. translates this passage: 'sic quoque et anima vim habet immobilem sive perpetuo mobilem.' His translation suggests that he read τὸ ἀκίνητον ἢ before τὸ ἀκίνητον (compare his translation of 6,15 where he seems to have read πεφυκός for the mss. πεφηνός). That the soul is unmoved is bad (Platonic and) Plotinian doctrine. On movement associated with the soul see I,6-7 and note.

Br.'s senseless punctuation - he brackets 12,4 (καὶ ψυχὴ') to 12,7 (ἢ) - should be totally ignored.

12,5-7 οὐ γὰρ πᾶν... εἰς αἰσθησὶν ἵη : The One, Intellect
 and the undescending soul are 'in' the soul in the sense that
 the human soul is capable of apprehending them, and of tuning in,
 as it were, to their incessant activities (see on 10,5-6). Only
 when this act of self-direction, the ἐπιστροφὴ, takes place
 is it possible for the soul to become aware of what was already
 potentially within it, for only then does information regarding
 these activities reach what P. in our present passage calls
 αἰσθησις .

The problem of the perception of the incessant activity of
 elements within the soul was one well known to Aristotelian
 commentators. In de An. 430a 10 ff. Aristotle introduces the
 ποιητικὸς νοῦς which he describes as being continually active
 (ibid. 430a 22). It is not clear whether Aristotle meant the
 ποιητικὸς νοῦς to be thought of as a part of the human soul
 or not, but the commentators who believed that it was a human
 faculty were faced with the problem of explaining why its activities
 were unperceived. P.'s doctrine of the subconscious is mentioned
 by Philoponus (in de An. 535.4 ff. (Hayduck)) alongside the doctrines
 of other philosophers as one possible answer to this Aristotelian
 problem (see on this Merlan, op. cit. in preceding note, pp. 48-50).
 The answer which P. gives to this problem of soul's possession of
 Intellect is, of course, applicable to the similar problems regarding
 the One and the undescending soul.

Our present passage must be compared with a similar passage
 in IV 8,8. This passage is worth quoting in full. P. begins

IV 8,8 with the assertion that there is a part of our soul which is continually in the Intelligible World. He continues (IV 8,8, 3-9) τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ εἰ κρατοῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰ κρατοῖτο καὶ θεωροῖτο, οὐκ ἔα αἰσθῆσιν ἡμῖν εἶναι ὧν θεᾶται τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνω. τότε γὰρ ἔρχεται εἰς ἡμᾶς τὸ νοητὸν, ὅταν εἰς αἰσθῆσιν ἡκῇ καταβαίνον. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ὃ γίγνεται περὶ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ψυχῆς, γινώσκωμεν, πρὶν ἂν εἰς ὅλην τὴν ψυχὴν ἡκῇ.

The verbal similarities between this passage and our present passage are striking. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ ἐν ψυχῇ (12,5) mirrors οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ὃ γίγνεται περὶ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ψυχῆς (IV 8,8,7-8); ἔρχεται εἰς ἡμᾶς (IV 8,8,6) is repeated in 12,6; πρὶν ἂν εἰς ὅλην τὴν ψυχὴν ἡκῇ (IV 8,8,8-9) is close to οὕτω δι' ὅλης ψυχῆς ἐλήλυθεν (12,8). Note also that γινώσκωμεν is found in both passages (IV 8,8,8; 12,8) and that αἰσθήσις is the faculty in both passages (IV 8,8,7; 12,6) to which knowledge of these higher activities is relayed. The treatise IV 8 is sixth in Porphyry's chronological order. These verbal similarities show that while writing our present passage P. almost certainly had the earlier passage from IV 8 before his mind.

Particularly interesting in both passages is the use of the word αἰσθήσις. P. explains in IV 3,30,7 ff. how we become aware of the working of νόησις. The object of the thought (the νόημα) is shown in the faculty of imagination (τὸ φανταστικόν) as in a mirror, and so the apprehension of it takes place (IV 3,30, 9-11). And only when this mirroring takes place do we become aware of the thought, for thinking and awareness of the thinking are not

the same thing. P. adds that the reason why we are not always able to apprehend νόησις is that the imaginative faculty also receives sense-perceptions (αἰσθησις) which presumably disturb its higher activities (IV 3,30,11-16). In I 4,10,6 ff. the same mirror image is found, and line 19 (ἀντιφαντασίας ἢ νόησις) makes it clear that the mirror is once again an image of the faculty of imagination. But as we have seen, the early treatises IV 8 and V 1 both name αἰσθησις as the faculty of the soul which perceives the workings of the hypostases. Yet according to IV 3 and I 4 this faculty ought to be τὸ φανταστικόν. Admittedly φαντασία is often closely associated with αἰσθησις - e.g., in I 4,10,15 the images of Intellect are said to be known in the imaginative faculty οὗτον αἰσθητῶς; in IV 4,17,12 the imagination resulting from desire is said to be an αἰσθησις ἐπαγγελτική; and in III 6,4,45 P. speaks of a φαντασία αἰσθητική. Aristotle also closely connected the two concepts (see de An. 428b 11-12). But it seems to me that the use of φαντασία and φανταστικόν in the later treatises marks a refinement in P.'s psychological thinking and vocabulary. The non-specific αἰσθησις has been replaced by the technical φαντασία.

What is true of the apprehension of Intellect is true of the apprehension of the One. When we have turned inwards towards it and have become like it - for soul must actually become like what it perceives (see on 1,30-34) - we become aware of its presence in us. It is probably technically correct to say that its image is

apprehended inside the imaginative faculty, but it is doubtful whether P. would have wanted to be so precise. As he explains in VI 9,10,11 ff. the experience of the One gives such an intense impression of unity that analysis is difficult. Δύσφραστον τὸ θάμα (VI 9,10,19-20).

ἑμῆς is one of P.'s technical terms for the concept of 'self', and is found in his earliest treatises (III 1,4,21 f.; IV 7,1,1 ff.; see G.J.P.O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973), pp. 20-49). There is no reason to suppose that ἡμᾶς in 12,6 is not being used in a technical sense, especially as this sense is defined by what follows in 12,8-10. Ci. and Ha. are therefore right to mark off the word from its context by inverted commas.

12,7-8 ὅταν δὲ ἐννεγοῶν... ἐκλήλθω : Ci. and Ha. translate ἑκάστον (12,7) as 'una singola parte dell'Anima' and as 'ein einzelner Seelenteil' respectively. These translations are somewhat misleading. It would be odd to call Intellect or the One a part of the soul - this position is specifically denied of Intellect in V 3,3,25-26 - although it is possible in P.'s language to say that these hypostases are 'in' soul or that the soul 'possesses' them. ἑκάστον refers to anything whose activities we can apprehend if we make the effort to do so. Fic.'s 'agens in nobis quodlibet', MK's 'any activity' or Br.'s 'une activité' are much better.

Μεταδίδω (12,7) (cf. μεταδίδους in 12,11) should not be translated as 'give a share in' (Ci. and Ha.). 'To communicate' is one of the attested meanings of μεταδίδοναι (see LSJ s.v. 3

and IV 7,7,7 ff.).

τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ (12,7) is probably the same as τῷ φανταστικῷ (see above on 12,5-7). The imaginative faculty is midway between the higher and lowest phases of soul (IV 4,13,13). Before perception takes place, then, the percept must reach this middle faculty. Note how P. seems to make τὸ αἰσθανόμενον coterminous with the boundary of the ὅλη ψυχὴ (12,8). The existence of the vegetative soul is quietly ignored.

12,8-10 οὕτω οὖν... ψυχὴ ὄντες : P. sums up by giving two reasons why we are not aware of the continual activity of the hypostases. In the first he says that 'we' are involved with the sentient soul (μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ 12,9). He says in I 1,10,5-7 that the notion of self covers two concepts - (a) δαίμονα, the 'real self', plus the ἐνωθὲν σῶμα or (b) the 'real self' alone. Sense-perception is related to the more inclusive definition, for the sphere of sense-perception is the sphere of what P. calls the συνανφοτέρον, which is a compound of the living body and the soul (I 1,7,1-6). The sentient soul, then, is one of the lower phases of soul; yet according to the definition in I 1,7 this phase is included in the more extensive definition of 'self'. Thus 'we' can only perceive the working of the higher phase of soul (the 'inner man' of 10,10 in which Intellect and the One are said to be) when the lower sentient phase of soul becomes aware of it. Anything which does not reach it does not reach 'us'.

The second of P.'s reasons is a corollary of the first. The extensive concept of 'self' which P. adopts here includes the lower

sentient soul. 'We' are not merely that part of the soul in which Intellect and the One are - for according to 12,1 and 12,5 we possess them and they are in the soul - but the whole soul from that higher point downwards. In IV 8,8,7-8 P. speaks of our not knowing everything which takes place *πρὸς ὁτιῶν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς*. In the context of our present passage, the activities of Intellect and the One and the undescending soul could be said to take place *πρὸς μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς*. But since 'we' are not just a part but the whole (including that part which deals with the body) 'we' cannot perceive them until they percolate through to the lower sentient soul. The nature of man is made up of many parts (I 1,7,8; VI 4,14,29-31). 'We' are neither the higher nor the lower.

I agree with MK that the *μέλειον ψυχῆς* of 12,9 is an unspecified higher part. Ci., I think, is quite wrong to understand the phrase as referring to the lowest part of the soul ('una parte di anima - quella più bassa').

Γινώσκον (also used in IV 8,8,8) is hardly different from *ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα* in 12,1. *Γινώσκον* presumably emphasises the cognitive appreciation of the basic perception. But in practice the *ἀντίληψις* of it and the *γνώσις* will hardly ever be separate.

12,10-11 *καὶ ἔτι ἑκάστων... αὐτῶν* : *καὶ ἔτι* shows that P. is making a new point in justification of his previous remarks. Just as the hypostases are in a state of continuous activity without our being aware of it, so each of the parts of the soul (for what

P. means by this see on 10,27-28) is alive and therefore active. Since the soul is the final expression of the life of the Intelligible World, and is, in fact, the principle of life for the sensible world (see 2,2 and note) it is only natural that its 'parts' should also be alive.

I agree with Br., Ci., and Ha. that τὰ ψυχικά is an imprecise way of referring to the various parts of soul. On the details of P.'s psychological divisions, see H. J. Blumenthal, Plotinus' Psychology (The Hague, 1971), pp. 20-44. P. uses both Platonic and Peripatetic divisions depending on his context.

Ζῶν, Fic.'s conjecture for the mss. ζῶων (see Schwyzer, RhM 86 (1937), p. 376) is almost certainly right. It is quite unclear what ψυχικά ζῶα would be. Only Perna prints ζῶων.

On the connection between life and activity see on 3,9.

12,11-12 τὸ δὲ γνωρίζειν... ἀντίληψις : Knowledge of the activities of the parts of soul is relayed to the faculty of imagination (IV 3,30,16; cf. IV 3,29,24-25) and only then does ἀντίληψις take place. Μετάδοσις means 'communication' here (cf. LSJ s.v. I.4 and μεταδίδωμι in 12,7) and Ci.'s 'ma il conoscere si avvera solo quando si abbiamo un oggetto che si partecipi' makes the same mistake as his translation of the earlier passage. Ha.'s 'Mitteilen' is better than his previous 'Anteil gibt'.

On the relations between γνωρίζειν and ἀντίληψις see above on 12,8-10.

12,12-20 δὲ ... τῶν ἄνω : The answer to the problem of perception is given, and soul's ability to learn its own ancestry is finally shown.

12,12-14 δὲ τοίνυν... προσοχὴν ἔχειν : Since the hypostases are present in the soul (on παρῆναι see on 10,5-6), apprehension of them must take place by a turning inwards, so that the soul can 'tune in' to the continuous activity of the higher beings. The ἐπιστροφή takes place by purification (see 12,19) and is the philosophical prayer referred to in 6,10-11 (see notes). Turning inwards is a characteristic of the good man (I 4,11,7-8. 11,16-17). Successful ἐπιστροφή reaches the centre of man's and of all being (cf. VI 9,2,35-36). And it is achieved by cutting the soul off from everything external to itself (VI 9,7,16 ff.; cf. V 3,17,38) and concentrating on the 'inner man'. In this way the soul becomes more like the object of the ἐπιστροφή (see on 10,5-6).

In 12,14 the object of ποιεῖν is τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον understood from the previous line.

12,14-end ὥστε εἴ τις ἀκούσῃ... τῶν ἄνω : Note how this splendid comparison is phrased in the language of sense-perception which P. has been using throughout chapter 12. The comparison combines two closely related ideas. Of these, the first is the general idea that it is impossible to do two things well at the same time (cf. VI 7,34,5-6 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἔχοντά τι ἄλλο καὶ ἐνεργούντα περὶ αὐτὸ οὔτε ἰδεῖν οὔτε ἰσχυροθῆναι ; VI 9,7,6-7 οὐκ ἔστι τι νοεῖν ἄλλο νοούντα καὶ περὶ ἄλλω ὄντα);

thus it is not possible to be interested both in sense-perception and in the Intelligible World. And the second is that the world of sense-perception can actually be an obstacle to the higher perceptive powers of the soul (on this see e.g., IV 8,8,18-21) and thus stands in the way of soul's enquiry into its own parentage and worth which is the subject of our treatise (1,15-16). The soul must stand aside from sense-perception and concentrate in all its purity on the perception of what it is able but often forgets to perceive (cf. Pl. Phd. 83a 1 ff.).

H-S omit to mention that all the other editors print ἔγχεῖ where they print ἔγχεαι in 12,16. Although ἔγχεῖ is the reading of the best mss. (H-S's group w), there is very good support (BRU) for the optative. According to the rules for the sequence of tenses ἔγχεαι ought to be read if προσέλθαι is kept in 12,17. Unfortunately, however, P. does not always comply with these rules (see Schwyzer's examples in RE 518.10 ff.). The choice between the two readings is difficult. Ἐγχεῖ may well be right.

The phrase τὸ οὗτως ἔγχεαι emphasises the fact that the powers of the soul are intrinsic to it but dormant. The soul must turn its virtual possession of the hypostases into a reality. It must 'wake up' to its own potentialities (cf. I 6,8,26-27).

Ὅποτε (12,16) probably means 'until'. See Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, 553.

Ha. compares with this comparison Socrates' remark at Pl. Cri. 54d 2 ff. (to which Ferwerda, Images, p. 119 adds Sen. Ep.

94.59). But it seems to me that the Platonic image is slightly different. Plato's point is not protreptic - that Socrates should concentrate on listening to the sounds which he has heard. Nor is it suggested that everyone should strive to hear what Socrates has heard. And the sound of Socrates' imaginary dialogue with the 'laws' makes it impossible for him to hear anything else. P. does not suggest that the perception of the $\phi\thetaόγγου$ οἱ ἄνω obscures earthly sounds. The contrary is rather the case. The Senecan passage 'necessarium itaque admoneri est, habere aliquem advocatum bonae mentis et in tanto fremitu tumultuque falsorum unam denique audire vocem. Quae erit illa vox...?' is certainly closer, but there is no hint that the apprehension of the 'unam vocem' depends on the purity of the individual soul.

The $\phi\thetaόγγου$ οἱ ἄνω call to mind the music of the spheres which Pythagoras alone of men was supposed to have been able to hear (for an exhaustive conspectus of references to this heavenly music see Pease on Cicero's De Natura Deorum II. p. 1020). But P.'s philosophy is not purely for great men. Each of us possesses the One in his own soul. The ability to apprehend it is innate in us. And it is philosophy which can make us realise our own potentialities. In I.3,1,28 ff. P. speaks of the education of the musician and of how he moves from enjoyment of perceptible sounds to the νοητὴ ἁρμονία which is the source of their attraction. He continues in I.3,1,33-34 καὶ λόγους τοῦ φιλοσοφίας ἐνθετέου· ἀφ' ὧν εἰς πίστιν ἀκτέον ἐν ἀγνοεῖ ἔχων. The aim of V.1 is to dispel this ἀγνοία.

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