The Prolegomena begin by pointing out the present lack of detailed, critical work on Plotinus. Then, after a résumé of the events of Plotinus' life, the problem of the date of composition of V 1, and its title, are discussed. Space is devoted to discussion of the purpose of the treatise, which, despite its title, is protreptic, to lead the soul to the Intelligible World and beyond by reminding it of its high status. The methodology of the Commentary is outlined, and a list of passages is given in which textual readings have been proposed which differ from those in the text of Henry and Schwyzer. The Prolegomena conclude with a detailed analysis of the contents of the treatise, included in order to show that the treatise is not a mere random collection of thoughts.

There follows a translation which aims not so much to be stylish - for Plotinus was no stylist - but to give an accurate idea of what Plotinus actually wrote.

The bulk of the thesis is taken up with the Commentary. The Commentary is exegetical, discussing difficulties in the treatise line by line. Since by the time Plotinus wrote his philosophical ideas were already formulated, it contains as many cross-references as possible to other treatises in the Plotinian corpus. Each chapter begins with a short introduction, and, in the body of the work, textual difficulties and the readings of previous editors, as well as difficulties of philosophical interpretation, are fully discussed. The translations of Ficino, Bréhier, Harder, Cilento and MacKenna are taken into account. Among the longer notes might be mentioned the note on 3,6 on the meaning of logos, that on the relationship between the reasoning and the descending soul (on 3,13), and the treatment of the difficult passages 6,17-19 and 7,11-17.

The thesis concludes with a full bibliography.
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Oxford

M.J. Atkinson
St. John's College
1978
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REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS

References to the Enneads are to the editio maior of Henry and Schwyzer. V 3,2,1 means Ennead V, treatise 3, chapter 2, line 1. References to V 1 are written without the Ennead and treatise number, except where confusion might result from such a practice. Where references to passages in the same treatise are made consecutively, the repetition of the Ennead and treatise number is avoided. Thus, V 3,2,1. 4,9 means V 3,2,1 and V 3,4,9.

References to other ancient authors are to the standard editions and are abbreviated according to the abbreviations listed in Liddell and Scott. References to Plato and Aristotle are to the line numbers in the Oxford Classical Texts. Albinus is referred to in the edition of P. Louis and Numenius in the edition of E. des Places. Porphyry's Vita Plotini is abbreviated to V.P. and is referred to by the line numbers in vol. I of Henry and Schwyzer's edition.

Abbreviations for periodicals follow the system of Marouzeau's L'Année Philologique, but the titles of all articles cited are given in full in the Bibliography.

In the commentary, P. means Plotinus throughout. Other abbreviations are listed in the Bibliography.
The writing of a commentary on a treatise of Plotinus needs perhaps little justification. Although now recognised as an important thinker, not only because of his influence on later philosophers and theologians, but also in his own right, he has yet received little in the way of detailed, critical study.\(^1\) That this is so is the more disturbing in view of the acknowledged difficulty of his Greek, and the terseness of his style.\(^2\) Among his contemporaries, the distinguished Platonist Longinus, although full of respect for his ideas, could not understand the language in which they were expressed, and thought, wrongly, that he was in possession of faulty manuscripts.\(^3\) The difficulty is more acute for us who live some seventeen hundred years later. Of his treatises, only a few have received close attention;\(^4\) and while Harder's edition and commentary on the first twenty-one treatises, continued after his death for the rest of the Enneads by R. Beutler and W. Theiler, is useful in numerous passages, its limited scope leaves many difficulties unexplained. The aim of this commentary is to help towards a clear understanding of the important treatise V 1.

It is useful to try to place the treatise within the context of Plotinus' literary output. Practically all our evidence for his life comes from the biography of him written by his pupil Porphyry in A.D. 300, i.e. 30 years after Plotinus' own death in 270.\(^5\) This work is unusual among ancient biographies not
only for its lack of sensationalism, but also for the detailed information which it gives about the chronology of Plotinus' writings.

Plotinus was born in Lycopolis in Upper Egypt (modern Assiut),⁶ and after a late conversion to philosophy at the age of 27, and a period of eleven years spent at the school of Ammonius in Alexandria,⁷ he set out in 242 with the emperor Gordian III on his expedition to Persia in search of the wisdom of the East.⁸ After Gordian's defeat, Plotinus escaped to Antioch, and finally established himself in Rome at the age of 40. From 244-253 he wrote nothing. In the next ten years, he composed the first twenty-one treatises, which were already written by the time Porphyry arrived in Rome in 263 at the age of 30. The next seven years saw an increase in activity, and by the time Plotinus died in February 270 at the age of 66, he had written a total of fifty-four treatises.⁹

V i is tenth in Porphyry's chronological order: this means that it was written at some time between 253 and 263.¹⁰ It seems to me fruitless to speculate as Igal does on the exact date of composition of each of the first twenty-one treatises.¹¹ His date of 259/260 for V i depends on the assumption that Plotinus' annual rate of production remained uniform, and of this we have no evidence.

Porphyry thinks that the first twenty-one treatises lack forcefulness, that Plotinus reached his acme in the middle twenty-four and that the last nine reveal a decline in his
powers.\textsuperscript{12} This is somewhat arbitrary. Although \textit{V 1} is simpler than some of the more technical treatises, it deals forcefully enough, it seems to me, with some of the more difficult and important problems of Neoplatonism.\textsuperscript{13} Its attraction for readers of Plotinus is that it provides a good introduction to the whole of the Plotinian system, for it deals in turn with each of the hypostases, the One, Intellect and soul. (For this reason it greatly appealed to the early Greek fathers, who saw in it an exposition of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.\textsuperscript{14})

It is worth remembering that Plotinus did not begin his literary activity until he was 49 in A.D. 253. By then most of his philosophical ideas were already formed.\textsuperscript{15} Consequently, it is not too misleading to say that each treatise takes for granted the whole of his philosophy. Hence, passages from much later treatises may quite legitimately be used to explain earlier passages. In the commentary, I have tried to make as much use as possible of cross-references to other parts of the \textit{Enneads}, where they help to explain passages in \textit{V 1}.

Both the direct and indirect traditions agree on the form of the title \textit{Φιλοσοφία τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν ὑποστάσεως}.\textsuperscript{16} We know, however, that Plotinus himself wrote no titles, at least for the first twenty-one treatises, and, one may suspect, for the others as well.\textsuperscript{17} Porphyry added to each treatise the name by which it was generally known.\textsuperscript{18} Since it was he who was responsible for the development of the word \textit{ὑποστάσεις} as
a technical term,\textsuperscript{19} it is possible that he suggested to Plotinus the title of V 1 and that his influence led to its being commonly accepted. His placing of the treatise at the head of the fifth Ennead, which deals ostensibly with Intellect, the One and soul's intellect,\textsuperscript{20} suggests at least that he thought it a useful introduction to the three hypostases.

However, as both Bréhier and Harder remark in their introductions, the treatise is not primarily intended as an exposition of the nature of the three hypostases. Plotinus himself says in 1,22 ff. that the purpose of the treatise is protreptic, to lead men upwards towards the Intelligible World by teaching and reminding soul of its parentage and intrinsic worth. The protreptic nature of the treatise is emphasised by the frequent use of imperatives,\textsuperscript{21} and consideration of its contents shows that it is the nature of soul which is Plotinus' primary concern, particularly its closeness to the higher hypostases, and its ability to fulfil itself by turning back towards them and by uniting with them. Discussion of the nature of soul leads on to discussion of the nature of Intellect, with which soul can be joined,\textsuperscript{22} and thence to a discussion of Intellect's cause the One. Plotinus wants to emphasise the continuity of his metaphysics and the possibility of soul's movement, as an integral part of the Intelligible World, into its higher reaches. The two chapters of doxography (Chapters 8 and 9) are then followed by three chapters which argue that the three hypostases can be found 'in' the human soul, and can be grasped
by the soul in view of its exalted nature. Thus, it can be seen that the delineation of the nature of the hypostases is, as it were, incidental to the intention of the treatise - to show soul that its ancestry is sufficiently superior to the material world that it should direct its activity upwards.

In earlier treatises the high rank of soul has been taken for granted, but even in IV 7, 10, 24-27 (νῦν ἔτη πολλὰ ἑλλειμμάτων τὴν ἐν τοῖς πλέον ἀρχήν ἐρείπεσκε οὕτως ὡς πεί Θείον οὐί ὡς πεί ἀθανάτου ἐχείρατος διανοούμεναι), second in Porphyry's chronological order, he seems to see the need for a more detailed discussion. This discussion is provided by V l.

When thinking of writing this commentary, I soon decided that to prepare an edition of the text would be otiose. The work done on the manuscripts by Henry and Schwyzer makes further research on them unnecessary, and the critical apparatus of the editio maior of the Enneads provides the commentator with a full conspectus of the manuscript readings. However, no two scholars are likely to agree on the final version of a text, particularly on that of an author as difficult as Plotinus.

Plotinus' Greek was considered idiosyncratic by his contemporaries. Porphyry describes his method of composition. He never went over or reread anything which he had written and he paid no attention to niceties of syllable division or spelling; and he wrote exactly as if he were copying from a
The result is a style which has no parallels in Greek. Oddities of grammar and syntax abound, and sometimes the language is so abrupt that it seems as if it is only a reflexion of the thought which it is supposed to express. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Plotinus' works were edited by Porphyry, and edited presumably for a wider public than had been possible before. I take it for granted that the revised manuscripts, if not readily understandable in view of the difficulty of the thought, were at least written in what passed for grammatical Greek, in so far as that was compatible with Plotinus' own way of writing. Consequently, where I have been quite unable to make sense of Henry and Schwyzer's text, I have not been afraid to assume that the text is corrupt. I have argued fully in the commentary for each change which I adopt; furthermore, I have noted all the discrepancies between the text of Henry and Schwyzer and that of the other editors of Plotinus. I append below a list of the passages where I would change Henry and Schwyzer's text.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H-S</th>
<th>Preferred Readings</th>
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<tr>
<td>2,17</td>
<td>ἀμηλίνων</td>
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I have not recorded instances where I differ only in punctuation from Henry and Schwyzer's text. Those readings marked with an asterisk are printed in H-S². In the translation I have translated my own preferred text rather than the text of Henry and Schwyzer.

In interpretation of the Greek, I have been helped most of all by Ficino's Latin translation, which is usually both accurate and perceptive, and by Harder, both by his commentary and by his translation. But I have also taken account of the translations of Brehier, Cilento and Stephen MacKenna. Of these, Brehier's is marred by his poor text, Cilento's by his excessive
verbosity and MacKenna's by its inaccuracy in matters of detail; this is not to deny the service which these scholars have done in bringing Plotinus to a larger public. I have tried to record in the commentary the main points in which they differ from my interpretation.

My aim in the commentary has been to explain Plotinus' thought. To this end I include an analysis of the contents of VI. Porphyry says that Plotinus worked out in his mind his train of thought before writing it down; and so organised was he, that he could break off his thought in the middle and resume it again as if nothing had happened.\(^{32}\) This should warn us against thinking his works random collections of ideas. As Dodds says of him, Plotinus 'still knew how to think in an age which was beginning to forget what thinking meant.'\(^{33}\)
ANALYSIS

Introduction: Chapter 1.

A. 1,1-3 Question: what is the cause of soul's ignorance of God?

B. 1,3-22 Answer.

I. 1,3-15 Preliminaries: the causes of separation.

1,3-5 The first stage: initial separation and desire for self-possession.

1,5-10 The second stage: excessive indulgence of free-will leads to great separation and ignorance of themselves.

1,11-15 The third stage: separation leads to wonderment at earthly things, which in turn leads to as much separation as possible.

II. 1,15-17 Answer proper: reverence for earthly things and lack of respect for themselves are the causes of their ignorance.

III. 1,17-21 Justification of answer: lack of self respect makes knowledge of God and his power impossible.

C. 1,22-35 Remedy.

1,22-29 There are two methods of leading souls up to Intellect and the One, one which points out the worthlessness of what soul at present respects, and one which reminds soul of its parentage and its excellence.

1,29-35 Our concern is with the second, since soul as the searcher must know if it is capable of the search; otherwise it need not bother.
Part One: the nature of soul (Chapter 2).

A. 2,1-9 Statement of soul's activity.

2,1-6 Soul gives life, movement and organisation to the whole universe.

2,7-9 Soul is more valuable than the objects on which its activity is bestowed.

B. 2,10-51 Argument.

I. 2,10-42 The life-giving and organisatory role of soul.

2,10-11 What is the manner of soul's bestowal of life?

(2,11-17 The investigator of the activities of the world soul must be the purified individual soul, in a state of stillness and peace.)

2,17-27 Figurative description of the life-giving activities of soul.

2,27-42 Detailed description of the manner of ensoulment which is the cause of unity and divinity in the cosmos.

II. 2,42-44 Soul must be a higher god than what it gives divinity to.

III. 2,44-51 Conclusion.

2,44-49 Our soul is of the same nature as the world soul, and is of more value than anything bodily.

2,49-51 Wonder therefore at yourself.
Part Two: the nature of Intellect (Chapters 3 - 4).

A. 3,1-23 Nature of Intellect from the point of view of its relationship with soul.

I. 3,1-4 Transition: knowing the nature of soul have confidence and advance.

II. 3,4-23 Soul and Intellect.

3,4-12 Soul is the image of Intellect and its logos, the product of its activity: double-activity theory explained.

3,12-15 Soul is intellectual and its perfection comes from Intellect.

3,15-20 Conclusion: the proper activities of soul are intellectual.

3,20-23 Nothing is between Intellect and soul other than their difference; Intellect acts as form to soul's matter.

III. 3,24-4,1 Transition to B.

B. 4,1-25 The fulness and perfection of the Intelligible World.

4,1-10 The sensible world with all its variety is only an image of the Intelligible World which is the golden age of Cronus whose name means 'satiety' and 'Intellect'.

4,10-12 Intellect contains everything in a state of rest.

4,12-14 No change, not even increase, is possible for it since it is the acme of perfection.
4,14-16 All its contents are perfect and it possesses then as objects of its thought.

4,16-17 Its happiness is internal to it since its contents are in eternity.

(4,17-21 Digression on time and eternity: time is concerned with soul.)

4,21-25 Eternity is an eternal present.

C. 4,26-43 The internal life of Intellect.

I. 4,26-4,33 Intellect and Being: the reciprocal relationships between them.

II. 4,33-43 The Platonic genera.

4,33-34 Otherness and sameness are aspects of Intellect's life.

4,35-36 The primary genera: Intellect, Being, sameness, otherness, movement and rest.

4,36-41 The functions of movement and rest, otherness and sameness.

4,41-43 Primary genera produce quantity and quality and other Forms.

Part Three: the nature of the One (5,1-7,27).

A. 5,1-6 Introduction.

5,1-2 Transition from part two: soul can be joined to Intellect.
5,3-4 Question: having approached Intellect soul asks who its father is.

5,4-6 Answer: the hypostasis prior to plurality, the maker of number.

B. 5,6-19 Relationship between Intellect and the One in terms of Platonic number.

I. 5,6-13 Statement.

5,6-9 Dyad is secondary and when defined by the One becomes number in the sense of substance.

(5,9-13 Soul is a number too: even in semen it is the invisible number and logos which is important.)

II. 5,13-19 Explanation.

5,13-16 Intellect and the Forms are number when they have been defined by the One.

5,16-18 Intellect is defined in two senses, by itself and the One.

5,18-19 Comparison of fully-formed Intellect to actualised sight.

C. 6,1-41 The genesis of Intellect.

I. 6,1-8 The problem of the method of derivation. That plurality comes from the one is accepted; but how does it do so?

II. 6,8-15 Introduction.
6,8-11 We must stretch out towards God in prayer.

6,12-15 We must look at the first appearance outside the One's temple (i.e., the Indefinite Dyad).

III. 6,15-41 The genesis of Intellect.

6,15-27 No movement is involved.

(i) 6,15-19 Movement is end-directed, and since the One has nothing beyond it, no movement can be involved in the genesis of Intellect. In fact, it is Intellect which turns towards the One.

(ii) 6,19-22 Genesis does not occur in time.

(iii) 6,22-27 No movement or inclination of will is involved.

6,27-28 Question: how does Intellect arise and in what form?

6,28-30 Answer: an emanation (ἔμανεν), like sunlight from the sun, arises.

6,30-39 Reasons for emanation,

(i) 6,30-37 The double activity theory, with exx. drawn from natural phenomena.

(ii) 6,37-40 Everything which is perfect begets something less than itself.

6,39-40 Question: what is the product of the most perfect?

6,40-41 Answer: Intellect is greatest after the One and secondary to it.

D. 6,41-7,4 Relationship between the One and its product.

6,41-44 Intellect looks forward to the One (because
it is secondary), and it is greater because all other creation is subsequent to it.

6,44-49 Intellect's relationship with the One is explained in terms of soul's relationship with Intellect.

6,50-53 Begetter and begotten are necessarily together separated only by otherness.

7,1-4 Intellect is an image of the One: meaning of this remark.

E. 7,4-26 Interruptions, and restatement of problem of Intellect's genesis.

I. 7,4-5 Objection: the One is not Intellect; how is it Intellect which is created?

II. 7,5-8 Answer.

7,5-6 By the turning back of inchoate Intellect towards the One.

7,6-8 Comparison of Intellect to a circle, and of the One to its centre.

III. 7,8-9 Objection: the centre of the circle is not divisible.

IV. 7,9-26 Answer.

7,9-10 The One, unlike the centre of the circle, is the potentiality of all things.

7,10-17 Explanation of the reversion: inchoate Intellect is aware of its own power, and of the One's part in its own creation.
7,17-20 Fully-formed Intellect sees that everything comes from the One, because the One is not one of the 'everything' but merely a unity.

7,20-23 The One could not be one of the 'everything', but must be their cause.

7,23-26 Definition and shape are necessary for the 'everything', since this gives them separate existence.

Part Four: synthetic conclusion of Chapters 2 - 7 (7,27-49).


7,27-30 Intellect is born from the One and begets with itself all the Intelligible World.

7,30-35 Hesiodic myth of Cronus used to illustrate Intellect's fulness.

II. 7,35-49 Soul.

7,35-38 Cronus myth applied to creation of soul by Intellect.

7,38-42 Product of Intellect is less than its producer and needs definition from it.

7,42-49 Product of Intellect is soul, joined on one side to Intellect, and on the other to the sensible world, which it in its turn creates.

Part Five: doxography (Chapters 8 - 9).

A. 8,1-14 Plato.
I. 8,1-9  Doctrine.
   8,1-4  The three principles of Ep. II.
   8,4-9  Interpretation of Ep. VI and other Platonic writings.

II. 8,9-14  Conclusion: Plato knows of the theory of three hypostases, and the present writings are not new but interpretative.

B. 8,14-27 Parmenides.

I. 8,14-23  Parmenides the Presocratic, who touched on Plotinian doctrine.
   8,14-17  Interpretation of DK. B. 3.
   8,17-23  Interpretation of DK. B. 8.


C. 9,1-7  Other Presocratics who believed in 'the One'.

I. 9,1-3  Anaxagoras: interpretation of DK. B. 12.

II. 9,3-5  Heraclitus: interpretation of DK. A. 1.

III. 9,5-7  Empedocles: interpretation of DK. B. 26.

D. 9,7-27  Critique of Aristotle.

I. 9,7-9  Self-thinking mind cannot be primary.

II. 9,9-27  Arguments concerned with the plurality of Movers.
Aristotle introduces many Movers, relying on plausibility rather than necessity for the truth of the system; but is it even plausible?

Movers are either (i) derived from a single principle or (ii) each is a principle.

(i) Derived from a single principle: if this is the case, then an analogy with the sensible world holds; a similar system of subordination will exist, and the Movers will contain many things within them.

(ii) Each a separate principle: if this is the case, then their union will be a chance affair, and there could be no unity in the cosmos.

Why should the sensible movements be equal to the Movers?

How can the Movers be different without matter to separate them?

Conclusion.

Those who sided with Pythagoras knew most about the One.

Some published their theories, others dealt with them in unrecorded seminars.

Part Six: The hypostases are 'in' the soul and may be grasped by us (Chapters 10 - 12).

Recapitulation of the theory of three hypostases.
B. 10,5-10 The hypostases exist 'in us', in the inner man.

C. 10,10-30 Soul.

10,10-13 Our soul is of a divine nature, but is only perfect when it contains intellect of which there are two sorts, the soul's intellect, and Intellect the second hypostasis.

10,13-24 The soul's intellect (the undescending soul).

(i) 10,13-18 The soul's intellect is independent of the body and in the Intelligible World.

(ii) 10,18-21 It is outside space, which is the realm of body.

(iii) 10,21-24 Plato knew of the undescending soul in the Timaeus.

10,24-30 The meaning of Plato's 'separation'; the lower soul must be led up away from the body.

D. 11,1-7 Intellect.

11,1-4 If the soul reasons about whether something is just, the Form of justice, from which the reasoning derives, must exist in us.

11,4-7 If the reasoning is intermittent, there must be something in us whose reasoning is not intermittent; this is Intellect.

E. 11,7-15 The One.

11,7-8 Intellect's cause is also in us, but not as something divisible.
It is present in many things wherever each is able to receive it in some degree.

Analogy of circle and its centre; we too are able to apprehend the One by means of our own centre.

F. 12,1-20 Apprehension of the hypostases.

I. 12,1-3 Question: why do we not receive the activities of the hypostases?

Answer. 12,3-12

They are eternally active; but not everything is apprehended by 'us' until it reaches 'perception' or the whole soul: we are the whole soul.

The parts of the soul are always active but we do not always apprehend them.

III. 12,12-20 The method of apprehension.

We must turn inwards. 12,12-14

Analogy with the apprehension of sensible sounds: we must keep our ear unsullied, ready to hear the sounds from above. 12,14-20
NOTES

1. There are, however, some useful more general works: in particular the books of Armstrong, Rist and Wallis should be mentioned (see Bibliography).

2. See V.P.14.1-2; Macrobius In Somnium Scipionis II.12.7: 'Plotinus magis quam quisquam parcus verborum'.

3. V.P.19.24 ff.

4. See Schröder on I 8, Wolters on III 5, Beierwaltes on III 7 and Cilento on III 8, V 8, V 5 and II 9.

5. The most recent study of Porphyry's Life of Plotinus is by J. Igal, La Cronología de la Vida de Plotino de Porfirio (Universidad de Deusto, 1972). Igal's careful analysis of the chronology supersedes the studies of H. Oppermann, 'Plotins Leben', Orient und Antike 7 (Heidelberg, 1929) and M. J. Boyd, 'The Chronology in Porphyry's Vita Plotini', CPh 32(1937), pp. 241-257. Igal's conclusions seem to me convincing, except where he tries to give individual dates for the composition of each treatise. I follow his dating for the events in Plotinus' life.

6. Eunapius VS III.1.2 (Giangrande); David in Porph. 91.24-25 (Busse); Suda s.v. Πλωτίνος. F. Zucker, 'Plotin und Lycopolis', Sitz. der Deut. Akad. der Wiss. zu Berlin, Kl. für Spr., Lit. und Kunst (1950), gives as much information as is known about the town in Plotinus' time.

8. Bréhier's theory that Plotinus' thought was strongly influenced by Oriental philosophy (put forward in La Philosophie de Plotin (Paris, 1928)) is now generally rejected.

9. The number 54 had magical significance for Porphyry, being the product of $3 \times 2$ and $3 \times 3$. To achieve this number Porphyry had to divide up some of the longer treatises (III 2-3; IV 3-5; VI 1-3; VI 4-5; III 8, V 8, V 5, II 9; each of these groups was originally a single work. On the last see Harder, Hermes 71(1936), pp.1-10.).

10. V.P.4.9-14.


12. V.P.6.30-37.

13. The derivation of plurality from the One, for example, discussed in Chapters 5-7, and the doctrine that the hypostases are 'in' the human soul (Chapters 10-12).

14. Note the citations of V 1 by the fathers listed in Henry, Etats, pp.420-421.

15. One notable instance of Plotinus changing his ideas can be found in III 9,1, which is a commentary on Pl. Ti. 39e 7-9; his later view can be found in II 9,1,25 ff..

16. The omission of τῶν in the manuscripts of Cyril is due to scribal error (see Henry, Etats,p.20).

17. V.P.4.16-18.
18. V.P.4.18-19.


20. V.P.25.32-35.

21. See 2,1; 2,11; 2,17; 2,51; 3,3; 3,4; 4,6.

22. 5,1-2.

23. See on 1,2-3

24. See their great editions, both major and minor, and in particular Henry's Manuscrita and Etats.

25. See note 3 above.

26. V.P.8.1 ff..

27. See Schwyzer, RE 512.15 ff. on Plotinus' 'Sprache'.

28. Cf. V.P.14.1-4

29. V.P.24.2 ff..

30. I am not convinced by H-S's theory of a Eustochian edition used by Eusebius in his citation of V 1, put forward in their introduction to t.I pp.ix ff. and to t.II pp.ix ff.. For convincing refutation of this theory see P.Kraus, RHR 113(1936), pp.207-218, and M.van der Valk, Mnemosyne 9(1956), pp.112-134. Within limits, of course, the indirect tradition has great value.

31. See Bibliography for these editions and translations.
32. V.P.8.8 ff.

33. CQ 22(1928), p.142.
In the translation I have tried to be as accurate as possible, so that the reader may have a clear idea of what Plotinus actually wrote. Plotinus was no stylist, and the meaning of some of his remarks is obscure. Obscurities in the Greek are, for the most part, allowed to remain obscure in the translation, though I try to explain all obscurities in the commentary.

Of the hypostases, 'Intellect' and 'the One' have been written with capital letters. I have not used a capital letter for 'soul', since, as the bridge between the sensible and Intelligible Worlds, soul is very much involved with the human body. Thus, the word 'soul' often refers to the human soul, and in this sense it can be used in the plural. The use of a capital letter for this meaning of 'soul' seemed to me odd. It should be remembered, however, that strictly speaking all 'soul' is a unity (IV 9 passim).
1. Whatever is it, then, that has caused souls to forget God their father, and, although sharing in that world and belonging completely to him, to be ignorant both of themselves and of him?

The beginning of their wickedness was their audacity, their birth, the first 'otherness' and the wish to belong to themselves. When they had appeared in this world, they took pleasure in their free will and made much use of their self-movement. They ran along the opposite path and put a very great distance between themselves and God. Thus, they were unaware that they too were from that world. Like children who have been dragged away from their fathers at birth and who have been brought up for a long time apart, they know neither themselves nor their fathers. Thus, no longer seeing him nor themselves, they showed no respect for themselves through ignorance of their ancestry; they respected other things and admired everything else more than themselves, and stunned by them and amazed and dependent on them, they cut themselves off as far as they could, showing no respect for what they had rejected. Consequently, their respect for these things and their lack of respect for themselves turn out to be the cause of their complete ignorance of him. For no sooner is something extraneous pursued and admired than the admirer and pursuer admits himself to be inferior; and if he assumes himself to be inferior to what comes to be and
passes away and considers himself the most contemptible and perishable of all that he respects, he can never 'lodge in his heart' either the nature of God or God's power.

Therefore, two lines of argument must be presented to people in this state, if they are to be turned towards what is in the opposite direction, the Primaries, and are to be led upwards as far as the highest, the One, the Primary. What, then, is each of these? One points out the lack of value in what soul now respects, and this we shall expound more fully elsewhere. The other teaches and reminds the soul of what we might call its ancestry and its worth; it is prior to the first and when elucidated will clarify that as well. This is the subject of our present enquiry, for it is close to our goal and a useful preliminary to the other; for the searcher is soul and must know what it, the searcher, is, so that it may first discover itself and may know whether it has the power for this kind of search, whether it has an eye capable of seeing, and whether it is right for it to search. For if it is seeking things alien to it, why should it bother? But if they are related to it, then it is right for it to search and discovery is possible.

2. First, therefore, let every soul reflect on the fact that it is soul itself which made all living creatures by breathing life into them, everything which earth and
sea nourish, everything in the air, and all the divine stars in heaven. Soul itself made the sun, soul itself this great universe; and soul itself organised it, soul itself leads it in its ordered circuit. It is a different nature from what it organises, what it moves and what it causes to live; and it must be worthy of more respect than these, since these come to be and are destroyed whenever soul abandons them or else bestows life upon them, whereas soul itself is eternal since 'it does not abandon itself'.

Let soul reason as follows on the manner of its bestowal of life both on the whole universe and on individuals. Let the investigation of the great soul be undertaken by another soul, of no mean stature once it has become worthy of the investigation by ridding itself of deceit and the charms which have bewitched other souls and by achieving a condition of stillness. Let not only the body which surrounds it and 'body's flood' be still, but its whole environment as well; let the earth be still, let the sea and the air and the very higher heaven itself be still. Let it imagine soul rushing in, as it were, from every side into the stationary universe from the outside, pouring in, coming in from every side and illuminating it. Just as shafts of sunlight when they have lit up a dark cloud give it a golden appearance and make it shine, so too soul, having come into the body of the universe, gave it life, gave it immortality and woke it as it lay inert.
Moved with eternal movement under the wise leadership of soul it became a being of life and happiness; the universe acquired value when soul took up its abode within it, being before soul a dead body, earth and water, or rather the darkness of matter, non-being, an 'abomination to the gods', as the poet says.

Its power and nature would become clearer and more evident, if we were to consider at this point how soul embraces and leads the universe according to its own wishes. It gave itself to the whole extent of this mass and every intervening space, be it large or small, has been ensouled, even though bodies are situated in different places, one here, one there, some facing, others separated from each other in different ways. But this is not the case with the soul. It is not cut up into pieces, giving life to each thing with a part of itself; rather everything lives by means of the whole soul, and the entire soul is present everywhere, resembling its father who produced it both in its unity and in its ubiquity. And the universe, although plural and spatially divided, is united through its power; this world of ours is a god because of it. The sun too is a god because it is ensouled, and the other stars, and we too for this reason, if we are at all godlike; 'for corpses are more fit to be cast out than dung'.

The cause of gods' divinity must be a more important god than they. Of the same nature as this is our soul too,
and when you take it and investigate it in a purified state without accretions you will find the same thing to be worthy of respect, namely what we have described as soul, and worthy of greater respect than anything bodily. For 'everything is earth'. Even if it is fire, what would be its burning power? The same goes for the compounds of these, even if you add water to them, or air. But if what is ensouled will be the object of pursuit, why do people neglect themselves and pursue something else? If you are amazed at the soul in something else, be amazed at yourself.

3. Since the soul is so valuable and divine a thing, straightaway confident that such a thing will approach God, with such a principle go up towards him. Certainly you will not be shooting from a distance, nor will the intermediaries be many.

Consider, then, what is more divine than this divine being, soul's upper vicinity, its prior and its source; for even though it is a thing such as our discussion has described it, it is an image of Intellect. Just as a spoken expression is an image of the expression in soul, so soul itself is an expression of Intellect and the whole activity and life which it sends out to form another independent entity. For instance, in the case of fire there is one heat remaining within it, and another which it dispenses. But in the Intelligible World, one must
realise that the activity does not ebb away, but rather that the internal activity remains, while the other becomes an independent entity.

Coming from Intellect, then, soul is intellectual and its own intellect is involved in reasonings, and its perfection comes from Intellect too, as from a father who has reared a child whom he has produced imperfect in relation to himself. Therefore, both its independent existence comes from Intellect, and its power of expression becomes active when Intellect is seen by it; for when it looks intently at Intellect, the objects of its thought and activity come from within it and are appropriate to it. And these alone should be called psychic activities, namely the intellectual activities from within itself. The lower activities are from elsewhere, and are experiences of a soul conditioned in that way.

Intellect, then, makes soul even more divine, both by being its father and by being present. Nothing is between them other than the fact of their difference, soul, however, as next in order and as the receiving substrate, and Intellect as the form. But even the matter of Intellect is beautiful as it is like Intellect and simple.

The nature of Intellect is clear from this repeated point, that it is better than soul which is as we have described it; but it can also be seen from the following.
If anyone wonders at this sensible world, looking at its size and its beauty and the order of its eternal motion, and at the gods in it, some seen, some even unseen, and at the spirits, the living beings and all the plants, let him go up to its archetype, to what is truer, and there let him see all the Intelligibles with their self-given eternity, in the sort of awareness and life appropriate to them; and let him see 'unsullied' Intellect, their champion, unfathomable wisdom, and the real age of Cronus, a god whose name means 'satiety' (κόπος) and 'Intellect' (νοῦς). For it contains within itself all the immortals, every Intellect, every God, every soul at rest eternally. Why should it seek to change in this happy state? Where should it seek to change to, when it has everything within itself? It does not even seek enlargement since it is completely perfect. Therefore, all its contents too are perfect, so that it may be completely perfect, having nothing which is not perfect, having nothing within itself which it does not think; and it thinks not by seeking its objects, but by possessing them. And its blessedness is not acquired, but it is all things in eternity. (It is the true eternity which time imitates as it runs alongside soul, leaving some things behind and moving on to others. Indeed, there is a succession of things involved with soul, at one moment Socrates, at another a horse, always one particular thing, whereas Intellect is all things.)
Intellect, then, has all things resting in eternity; it 'merely is' and this 'is' is eternal, and the future is non-existent - for it 'is' then too - and there is no past - for nothing there has passed - but all things are eternally present, since they are identical and are delighted, as it were, to be as they are.

Each of them is Intellect and Being, and the whole is the sum of Intellect and the sum of Being, Intellect with its thinking establishing Being, and Being, by being thought, giving to Intellect its thinking and its Being. The cause of the thinking is something else, which is also the cause for Being; so something else is the cause of both, since they are together and exist inseparably and do not abandon each other, although two, forming this integrated unity Intellect and Being, the thinker and what is thought, Intellect ranged with the thinker, Being with what is thought. There could be no thinking were there not 'otherness' and 'sameness'. Thus, the primaries are Intellect, Being, otherness and sameness; and one must also add 'movement' and 'rest'. There must be movement if Intellect thinks, and rest so that the objects of its thought may be identical. There must be otherness so that there may be a thinker and that which is thought; if you remove otherness, unity and silence will result. But the objects of thought must also be different in relation to each other. There must be identity, since Intellect is one with itself, and
since there is also some common factor among all its objects; and the difference between them is otherness. These primaries by their plurality make number and quantity; and quality is the individuality of each of them. From these, as from first principles, the rest evolve.

5. This god, then, above the soul is plural; and the soul can be among these, joined to them, should it not wish to fall away. Therefore, having approached Intellect and having become, as it were, one with it, soul asks who it was that producedIntellect. He who is simple, prior to such multiplicity, the cause both of its being and of its being plural, the maker of number.

For number is not primary. Indeed, prior to the Dyad is the One; the Dyad is a secondary, and having arisen from the One has that as its definer, while being per se indefinite. Whenever it is defined, it immediately becomes a number, a number in the sense of a substance. The soul too is a number. The Primaries are not masses or magnitudes—these gross things which sensation thinks real are secondary. (Furthermore, not even in semen is it the moist part which is valuable, but the invisible part, which is number and creative expression (logos).) The number, then, and Dyad, of which we speak in the Intelligible World, are creative expressions and Intellect. But the Dyad is indefinite when taken as identical with what we might call Intellect's substrate, whereas the number from the Dyad and the One is
a Form in each case. Intellect has been shaped, as it were, by the Forms which have arisen in it; but it is shaped in one way by the One, and in another by itself, as happens with actualised sight; for the act of thought is a vision which sees, and both are one.

6. How, then, does it see, and whom, and how in any case did it become an independent entity and has arisen from the One so that it can see at all? The soul now accepts the necessity that these Forms exist, but yearns to know in addition the answer to this question much asked by ancient philosophers too, how from a unity such as we say the One is did anything become an independent entity, whether a multiplicity, a dyad or a number. Why did it not remain on its own, but such a great multiplicity flowed out from it, which is seen in the world and which we claim to refer back to it?

Let what follows be our answer: but let us first call upon God himself, not with the spoken word, but stretching ourselves out by means of our soul in prayer towards him, since this is the way in which we are able to pray to him, alone to the Alone. While he, then, is on his own in the inner temple, as it were, remaining in stillness, beyond all things, the beholder must look at what might be called the stationary images which are already external to him — or rather at the first image to have appeared, manifesting itself as follows.
In the case of every moving thing, there must be something towards which it moves. Since the One has nothing, let us not affirm that it moves; rather that if anything arises after it, this must have arisen by its own continual turning towards the One. (Let us discount genesis in time, since we are discussing eternal entities; when in our discussion we predicate 'birth' of them we shall be giving them some part in the hierarchy of causation.) We must say, then, that what arises from the One arises without its having moved; for if anything were to arise as a result of its having moved, what arose would be a third term after it, subsequent to the movement, and not a second term. Therefore, the One must be unmoved, and if anything is secondary and subsequent to it, this must have become a separate entity without the One's having inclined its attention, exercised its will, or moved in any sense.

How then does this happen? And what must we conceive of in the vicinity of the One as it remains unmoved? A halo of light comes from it, but from it while it remains unmoved, like the bright light around the sun which, as it were, circles around the sun, produced from it while it remains always unmoved. All entities, while they remain, necessarily produce from their own substance, in virtue of the power present in them, an independent entity which stays around them near their outer perimeter, attached to them, an image of what we might call the archetypes from
which it stemmed. Fire produces the heat which comes from it; and snow does not merely keep its cold within it. Sweet smelling things confirm this point most of all; so long as they exist, they send out something from themselves in their own vicinity which the bystander enjoys as independent entities. Furthermore, everything which is already perfect produces. What is eternally perfect produces eternally an eternal entity, and produces something inferior to itself. What, then, ought we to say about the most perfect? Nothing is produced from him except the greatest entities subsequent to him. The greatest entity subsequent to him and secondary to him is Intellect.

Indeed, Intellect sees the One and needs him alone, whereas he has no need of Intellect. What is produced from something mightier than Intellect must be Intellect, and Intellect is mightier than everything else because other things are subsequent to it. For example, the soul is an expression of Intellect and an activity, just as Intellect is an activity of the One. But the expression in soul is dim, for it is a reflexion of Intellect; for this reason also soul must look towards Intellect. Similarly, Intellect must look towards the One, so that it may be Intellect. It sees him without being separated from him, since it is subsequent to him and nothing is in between, just as is the case with soul and Intellect. Everything longs for its producer and loves it, particularly when the producer
and the product are alone; and when the best hypostasis
is the producer, the product necessarily associates with
him, so that it is separated from him by 'otherness' alone.

7. We say that Intellect is an image of the One — for
we must speak more clearly — first because the product
must be a 'One' in some sense and must preserve many of
its features, and because there must be a similarity
with it, as is the case with light from the sun. 'But
the One is not Intellect. How on earth, then, does it produce
Intellect?' The One produces it because through its reversion
Intellect was looking towards it; this act of seeing was
Intellect. For what perceives anything else is either
sense-perception or Intellect. Sense-perception is like
a straight line, Intellect like a circle, and the One
like the centre of the circle. 'But the circle can be
divided, whereas this is different.' Well, yes, in the
case of the analogy there is certainly a unity, but the
One is the potentiality of all things. The act of thought
separates off, as it were, from the potentiality the items
of this potentiality and sees them (otherwise it would
not have become Intellect), since it has already an intrinsic
awareness, as it were, that it has the power to create
substance — at any rate, by itself it actually defines
its being for itself by means of the One's power; it is
also aware that substance is, as it were, an item of the
One's contents and comes from it, and that itself, inchoate
Intellect, is strengthened by the One and is perfected into substance by it and comes from it. It realises that from the One as 'indivisible', as it were, comes to it as 'divisible' life, thinking and everything, since he is no part of the 'everything'; everything came from him because he was not held down by any shape. The One is unity alone; if it had been everything it would have been included among Intelligible Reality. Hence it is none of the contents of Intellect, but from it comes everything. And so these contents are, in fact, substances, for each has already been defined and has shape, as it were. Being must not, as it were, hover in indeterminacy, but must be fixed by being limited and by being stationary. For the Intelligibles, 'being stationary' means having definition and shape, by means of which they also achieve independent existence.

'This is the family' of the Intellect which we have described, worthy of Intellect most pure - to be born from no other source but the First Principle, and once having arisen to produce all the Beings in its company, all the beauty of the Forms, all the Intelligible Gods. Being full of what it produced, and as if having swallowed them down again by keeping them inside itself, and by not letting them fall out into matter and be brought up with Rhea — as the mysteries and the stories about the gods hint, saying that Cronus, the wisest god, before Zeus
appears, holds back within himself what he produces, so that he is full and Intellect in satiety. Afterwards, so they say, he produces Zeus when already sated; for Intellect produces soul, since Intellect is perfect. Indeed, since it is perfect, it had to produce; such a great power could not be barren. But it was not possible in this case either for the product to be mightier, but being less it had to be a reflexion of it, undefined in the same way until defined and, as it were, 'informed' by its producer.

The product of Intellect is a creative expression, an independent entity, the ratiocinative soul. This is what moves around Intellect, the light of Intellect, its trace dependent on it, on one side attached to Intellect and hence full of it, enjoying it and sharing in it and thinking, and on the other side in touch with what is subsequent to it - or rather itself producing what must be inferior to soul. (We must discuss this later.) This is the extent of the divine Beings.

8. This is the reason also for Plato's three principles - 'everything is about the king of everything' (he means the Primaries), 'the second is about the secondaries, and about the tertiaries is the third'. He says too that there is 'the father of the cause', signifying by 'cause' Intellect, since Intellect is his demiurge; he says that this makes soul in that mixing bowl of his. Since the 'cause' is Intellect, he means by 'father' the Good, what
is beyond Intellect, 'what is beyond substance'. (In many places he calls Being and Intellect 'Form'.) Accordingly, Plato knew that from the Good comes Intellect, and from Intellect soul. Thus this discussion of ours is not new or begun now; it was held in the past but not explicitly. Our present discussion is an explanation of that previous one confirming by the evidence of the writings of Plato himself that these doctrines of ours are ancient.

Parmenides previously touched on such a doctrine in so far as he identified Being and Intellect, and did not place Being in the sensible order, saying 'for thinking and Being are the same thing'. But he also says that the latter is 'unmoved' — although he adds thinking to it — removing all bodily movement from it so that it may remain as it is, and comparing it to a spherical mass because it keeps everything held within it and because its thinking is not external to it but takes place within itself. But although he speaks of 'one' in his own writings, he was criticised since this one is found to be many.

Plato's Parmenides, speaking more precisely, distinguishes from each other the primary One, which is 'one' in a more exact sense, and the secondary one, which he calls 'one-many', and the tertiary 'one and many'. In this way he too is consonant with the doctrine of three natures.

9. Again, Anaxagoras, in calling Mind pure and unmixed, is affirming the Primary as simple and the One as transcendent,
but because of his antiquity he has neglected precision. And Heraclitus knows that the One is eternal and Intelligible, since bodies are always coming to be, and are 'in flux'. For Empedocles, 'Strife' divides, 'Love' is the One - he too makes this incorporeal - and the elements serve as matter.

Aristotle later on makes the Primary transcendent and 'Intelligible', but by saying that it 'thinks itself' on the contrary he causes it not to be the Primary; and by positing many other Intelligibles (as many as there are spheres in the universe, so that each Intelligible may move one sphere) he describes the region of the Intelligibles differently from Plato, introducing plausibility since he has no necessity at his disposal. But one might wonder whether his theory is, in fact, plausible. It would be more plausible that all the spheres, since they contribute to one system, should look towards one thing, i.e., the Primary. One might also ask whether for him the many Intelligibles spring from one Primary Intelligible, or whether the principles in the region of the Intelligibles are many. And if they spring from one, there will be an obvious analogy with the spheres in the sensible world in which one contains another, but the single external sphere dominates. Consequently, there too the Primary would contain the others, and there will be an Intelligible Cosmos. And just as here the spheres are not empty, but the first
sphere is thick with stars, and the others have stars too, so there also the Movers will have many things within them, and the truer world will be there. If, on the other hand, each Mover is a principle, the principles will be a chance affair. And why will they work together and unite in purpose for a single task, the harmonious arrangement of the whole universe? How is it that the sensible objects in the universe are equal in number to the Intelligibles, the Movers? Again, how can they be many as he says, yet incorporeal, without matter to separate them.

So, of the ancients, it is those who sided most with the doctrines of Pythagoras and his successors who busied themselves with this nature. But whereas some of them elaborated their doctrine in their own published works, others expounded it not in treatises, but in unrecorded seminars.

10. It has now been established that we must believe as follows: that there is that which is beyond Being, the One (our discussion intended to describe it in so far as anything can be established on these matters), that there is next Being and Intellect, and that third is the nature of soul.

Just as these three things we have mentioned exist in nature, so we must believe that they are in us also. I do not mean in the sensible order - for these are transcendent - but above the sensible order, outside it,
and outside it in the same way as they are outside the whole universe; and in the realm of the individual I mean what Plato meant by 'the inner man'.

Now, our soul too is something divine and of another nature, the same as that of the totality of soul. But the soul which possesses intellect is perfect. One intellect is reasoning intellect, the other provides the reasoning. This reasoning part of the soul, then, which needs no bodily organ for its reasoning, but keeps its activity pure so that it may also reason purely, is separate and unmixed with body; if you were to set it in the Intelligible World, you would not be wrong. We must not look for a place in which to position it, but it must be put outside all place; for the expressions 'by itself', 'outside' and 'immaterial' apply to it only when it is alone, possessing nothing from the nature of body. Thus, in the case of the universe, Plato says 'and furthermore from outside' he put the soul around it, referring to that part of the soul which remains in the Intelligible World. In our case, hiding his meaning, he has spoken of it 'at the top of the head'. And the exhortation to 'separate' is not meant spatially, for this is naturally separate, but he means separation achieved by avoiding inclination, by not using imagination and by alienation of soul and body, in the hope that the remaining part of the soul as well might be led above and taken upwards, even the part of it positioned here, which is the
mere craftsman and moulder of body and has its dealings with body.

11. Since, then, there is soul which reasons about just and beautiful things, its reasoning enquiring whether this is just and this beautiful, there must also be some unchanging Justice, from which the reasoning in the soul actually arises. Otherwise, how could it reason? And if soul sometimes reasons about these things and sometimes does not, there must be in us that Intellect which does not reason but which always possesses Justice. And there must also be in us Intellect's principle, its cause, God, which is not divisible but remains whole; and although it does not remain whole in any place, nevertheless it is seen in many things, wherever each thing is able to receive it as something different from what it actually is, just as the centre of a circle is independent, but each component of the circle has a point in it, i.e., the radii bring to this centre their individual points. By a similar terminus in ourselves, we too are attached to, associate with and are dependent on the One. We find our abode there if we converge on it.

12. How is it, then, that possessing such great things we do not grasp them, but for the most part are idle in the activities we have mentioned - indeed, some of us do not exercise them at all.

They are continually active with their own activities,
Intellect and Intellect's prior continually remaining in itself; and soul too, 'the continual mover' is in this state. Not everything which is in soul is immediately perceptible, but it reaches 'us' only when it reaches sense-perception. Whenever something is active and does not communicate with the faculty of perception, it has not yet permeated the whole soul. So we have no knowledge as yet, since we are involved with the sense-faculty, and are not a part of soul, but the whole soul. Furthermore, each of the parts of the soul lives continually and is active continually in its own independent activity, but there is recognition only when communication and perception takes place.

Thus, if there is to be perception of what we have described as present, the perceiving part of soul must turn inwards and must be made to attend there. Just as a man listening for a voice which he particularly wishes to hear stands aside from the other voices and pricks up his ears for the preferable sound, waiting for it to arrive, so too in this case, perceptible noises must be left aside, except in so far as is necessary, and the soul's power of perception must be kept pure and ready to hear the sounds from above.
The first chapter is introductory: the reasons for the souls' forgetfulness of their father Intellect are outlined, and the purpose of the treatise is set out.

1,1-3 Τι προτέλ...καὶ ἐκφύνον: P. begins with the question that is answered in 1,3-22. The answer requires the remedy which our treatise provides.

The technique of beginning with a question is a very common one in P. (I 1, I 3, I 4, I 5, I 7, II 2, II 6, II 8, III 3, III 8, IV 4, IV 8, IV 9, V 1, V 3, V 5, V 7, VI 4, VI 6 and VI 8 begin with a direct question; II 4, III 5, III 6, IV 5, IV 7 and VI 2 begin with an indirect question; and in I 2, I 6, II 5, II 7, III 2, VI 3, VI 7 and VI 9 an introductory statement is followed by a question.) It probably reflects the fact that most of the treatises arose from the discussion sessions which were the staple of P.'s philosophical teaching (cf., e.g., the incident described in V.P. 13.10 ff.).

1,1 τὰς ψυχὰς: These souls are clearly individual souls. Only individual souls are encumbered with birth (1,4) and with too close involvement with the body (cf. IV 8,4,10 ff.): the world soul stays above body and governs it by a sort of remote control (IV 8,2,14-16.2,26 ff.). On the relationship between world and individual souls see on 2,44.
1,1-2

πατέρος θεοὶ: Although πατὴρ and θεὸς can be used both of Intellect and of the One, the phrase πατέρος θεοὶ probably refers here to Intellect (cf. 2,37; 3,14; 3,21), soul's immediate prior (cf. V 8,13,1-2 where Intellect is the god whose son is soul). The aim of the treatise, however, is to take soul beyond Intellect to the One (1,23-25).

πατέρος: On the image of 'father' in P., and exhaustive references to its usage, see Images, pp. 76-80. The image was common in Platonic philosophy, its most obvious connotation being that of procreation. Plato's demiurge is called the ποιητής and πατὴρ of the universe (Pl. Ti. 28c 3). The interpretation of this phrase had a considerable history (see Procl. in Ti. I.303.24-317.20 (Diehl)). For P., as for many Platonists, the demiurge was Intellect (see 8,5 and introduction to Chap. 2), the creator of soul (cf. 2,37 τῷ γεννησαντί πατρί); hence, πατὴρ was used to refer to Intellect and πατέρος to the Intelligible World (I 6,8,16; 8,21; V 9,1,21). Of course, the One, at the head of the περιόδος (see on 5,3-4), and thus the fountain-head of all creativity, could also be referred to by the word πατὴρ (see V 8,1,3), and P. could also find justification for this usage in Plato (see, e.g., Pl. Hp. Ma. 297b 6-7; ibid. Ep. VI 323d 3-4).

The word had some currency in Neopythagorean circles, e.g., in Numenius (ap. Procl. in Ti. I.303.27 ff.); Sthenidas (ap. Stob. IV.271.2 (Wachsmuth and Hense)); and Diogenes (ap. Stob. IV.270.7)

Θεὸς is another word with a long philosophical history. 

J. M. Rist in an interesting article ('Theos and the One in
some Texts of Plotinus', MS 24 (1962), pp. 169-180) discusses P.'s use of the word to refer both to Intellect and to the One. He suggests that P. was trying to create a technical vocabulary in which ὁ θεός (note the definite article) = the One. The connection of the word with νοῦς was common in Platonic philosophy (see Dodds's note on Procl. El.Theol. 128-129).

In VI 9,8,8-9 P. says that whatever is attached to the One is a god. Thus both soul (2,43) and Intellect (5,1) are gods; cf. 7,48-49 καὶ μὴ τῶν τινῶν τι θεία. We too are gods in some way (2,41) by virtue of our higher souls. The aim of P.'s philosophy is to bring back the god in us to the divine in the All (V.P. 2.26-7).

1,2 ῤηθηθεθεθαι: 'Forgetfulness' is mentioned in Pl. Phdr. 248c7 as one of the reasons for the soul's descent (λήθης τι καὶ κακίας πληθυνοί βασιλεύω). P. refers to this passage at IV 3,15,5-7 αἷς (sc. ψυχαίς) ἡ δύναμις σὺν ἡκίσκεσιν ἔρχεται ἑκατέρων διὰ βεβαιώσεων καὶ λήθην πολι χειρισμένως. This Platonic reminiscence is not noticed by H-S. Λήθη was also a Pythagorean term for the 'forgetfulness of the soul's divine origin' (see Dodds on Plato's Gorgia 493c). P. mentions the idea again at II 9,4,7-8 τι βʹ ἦνεψσε (sc. ἡ ψυχή), πῶς ἔπειθότι δηλονότι πῶς ἦνεψσε. (cf. VI 5,2,19 ff.: when talking of the Intelligible World one should grasp its principles μὴ παραβιάνων ὅπως ἐπιθελημένος ἐπ' ἀληθὴν φίλαν). The aim of V 1 is to remind the soul of its ancestry (1,27); the notion that soul is to be made aware of its true nature by means of its memory is reminiscent of the Platonic doctrine of ἀνάμνησις.
The theory that the soul belonged completely to the Intelligible World was firmly upheld by P. even to the extent that he maintained, contrary to his contemporaries, that the soul never completely descended (IV 8,8,1 ff.). For other references to the divine nature of soul in the early treatises see 10,11; I 6,2,7-8.6,14-15; IV 8,5,24-25. See further on 4,11 and 10,6-9.

Between self-knowledge and knowledge of the divine is expressed by Plato (or pseudo-Plato) in Alc. I 133ol ff., where the ratio-cinative faculty of the soul (Τούτῳ καὶ τὸ γλυῖνα τὸ καὶ φελονίν ἵστιν) is considered closest to god. Therefore, knowledge of the most divine part of the soul includes knowledge of god and of oneself. P. puts the same idea negatively; if one is ignorant of oneself, one remains ignorant of god (cf. 1,19-22).

The Delphic proscription γνῶθι σεαυτόν is discussed by G. J. P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973), pp. 7-19. It held an important place in the philosophical tradition from Socrates onwards (for references see Theiler's introduction to V 3 (t.Vb pp. 368-369) and for its use by later Platonists, P. Courcelle, 'Le "Connais-toi toi-même" chez les Néo-Platoniciens Grecs', Le Néoplatonisme, pp. 153-166).
P. distinguishes three moments, as it were, in the alienation of soul from Intellect: first, the τόλμα, γίνομεν etc. (1,4-5); secondly, the pleasure in free-will after birth resulting in παλιώσις ἀπόστρασις (1,5-10); and thirdly, the continued wonderment at the physical world which causes as much separation to souls as is allowed to them (1,11-15).

Much of the language of these lines is Neopythagorean in tone (see individual notes), though it is unlikely that any particular Neopythagorean is P.'s source. Philosophers of P.'s age shared a common vocabulary.


Τόλμα was a semi-technical term in two different metaphysical systems, that of the Pythagoreans, and that of the Gnostics.

Whether the word occurred in early Pythagoreanism is not certain, and too much weight should not be put on Lydus' evidence (Mens. II.7 p. 24.12-13 (Wuensch)) that Pherecydes referred to the dyad as τόλμα; but in Neopythagoreanism the identification of the dyad and τόλμα was fairly common (H-S collect the evidence ad loc. and add to the list in t.III p. 346 in 'Fontes Addendi'). The dyad separates itself from the monad; hence the word τόλμα is associated with notions of separation (διαχωρισμὸς [Theol. Ar.] 9.5 (de Falco);
For P., as for the Pythagoreans, the idea of separation was uppermost. Note the use of ἀποστάσις (1,4) and ἀποστάσις (1,7-8). Τόλμα and τολμηρός occur elsewhere in P. - see V 2,2,5-7 where the part of soul which reaches as far as the vegetable world is τολμηρότατον because it has gone forward to that point; and VI 9,5,29 where Intellect is described as ἄποστατον ... πως τὸν ἐν τολμηρός. Note, however, that P. does not actually call the dyad itself τόλμα; rather τόλμα is the misplaced desire which causes separation. Furthermore, τόλμα may be used both of Intellect and of the soul.

The Gnostic notion of τόλμα is discussed by Armstrong in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 243 ff. and by H. Puech in his discussion of Baladi's paper (op. cit.). In the Valentinian system, Sophia, through its τόλμα, tries to unite itself to the highest principle νοῦς. This abortive attempt leads to the creation of the demiurge and of the material world. Thus, the initial movement of Sophia is an upward rather than a downward movement, and, in this respect, Gnostic and Pythagorean τόλμα differ. Furthermore, the Gnostics never suggested, as P. does by his use of the word to describe the separation of Intellect from the One in VI 9,5,29, that the creation of the Intelligible World (their πλῆθωμα) could be the result of τόλμα. And even in other Gnostic systems, where Sophia breaks away from the higher powers, τόλμα bears little resemblance to its Plotinian namesake.
P. refers to Gnostic τὸλμα in II 9,11,21-22. His use of the word in our present passage, however, owes more to the Greek philosophical tradition than to Gnosis. Common to both traditions is the idea that τὸλμα is the result of free-will. This idea is stressed in our present passage by the use of τὸ βουληθηνατ and τὸ αὐτίκουσιν in 1,5. Numerous other passages in P., however, (e.g., 6,30 ff.; IV 8,6,7 ff.; V 4,2,26 ff.) stress the necessary and involuntary nature of the procession from the One. There is a difficulty here in P.'s thought, a difficulty which he tries to explain in IV 8,5. The difficulty is most clearly seen in his theory of matter; if the procession is necessary, how can its final term, matter, be the cause of evil?

Dodds suggests (Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 24-26) that after the split with the Gnostics marked by the anti-Gnostic treatises III 8, V 8, V 5 and II 9, P. changed his mind about the sinfulness of the soul's descent, i.e., the emphasis moved away from the voluntary nature of the procession as represented by τὸλμα , τὸ βουληθηνατ, τὸ αὐτίκουσιν etc. to its necessary and involuntary nature. He points to I 1,12,24 ff. where the soul's illumination of body is said to be no more sinful than the casting of a shadow, and IV 3,13,17 ff. where the natural necessity of soul's descent is mentioned.

But while it is true that τὸλμα is not found in any treatises later than II 9, it is not clear that the disappearance of the term from P.'s vocabulary marks a split with the Gnostics.
All the treatises in the fourth Ennead, which deals with soul (with the exception of the technical treatise IV 6), and most of the fifth Ennead dealing with Intellect, are earlier than the anti-Gnostic treatises. Thus, by the time P. came to write the anti-Gnostic treatises he had finished most of his writing on the nature of soul and Intellect, and so had little occasion to use the word τόλματον again.

Furthermore, I am not convinced that P.'s view of the awkward problem of the descent of the soul ever showed any real development. IV 3,13,17 ἐλεύθερος (sc. αἰτιολογικὸς) δὲ οὐ κατὰ ἱκανότατα ὁμοίως is not much different from the treatment given in IV 8,5,10 ff.; the emphasis on the natural, instinctive descent in the later treatise is paralleled by IV 8,5,11 φύσιμον νόμιμον. Even in III 8,8,34 ff., in one of the anti-Gnostic treatises, he speaks of Intellect unfolding from the One παντα ἕλιμος Θεός — ὡς βελτιώθην ἐκ αὐτῶν μὴ ἡθικήν τούτο (III 8,8,34-35).

η γέννησις: 'Birth' is a word also connected with the procession from the One (cf. 6,19 and the title of V 2 μετὰ γεννήσεως καὶ πᾶσιν τῶν μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον). For Neo-pythagoreans it was also one of the names of the dyad (Theol. Ar. 8.2 (de Falco)). In the context of the descent of the soul, the πρῶτη γέννησις of Phdr. 248d1-2 and id. Ti. 41ε3 is presumably meant. In IV 8,1,24,1,37 ἀφέσεις refers to the same concept.

Theiler (t.VI p. 174) would prefer to read η γεννησις. He compares I 1,12,23 (cf. also 10,26 and note on 10,26-27).
He objects to \( \gamma\omega\nu\sigma\iota\varsigma \) on the grounds that it is the effect rather than the cause of the soul's birth. This objection seems to me unnecessarily fussy.

\( \eta\ \pi\epsilon\omega\nu\mu\nu\tau\iota\varsigma\epsilon\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma:\ \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma\varsigma \) is perhaps another Neopythagorean term. Nichomachus Ar. 110.15 (Hoche) calls the dyad \( \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\kappa\iota\kappa\iota\kappa \) (cf. ibid. 109.5).

Sextus Empiricus (M. 10.261) speaks of the Pythagoreans believing that the monad created the Indefinite Dyad when it was conceived \( \kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma\varsigma \). P., however, is quite clear that 'otherness' is not to be found in the One (VI 9,8, 33-34). Rist, in an interesting article in Le Neoplatonisme, pp. 77-87 ('The Problem of "Otherness" in the Enneads'), notes (pp. 81-82) that 'otherness' is closely connected with motion, particularly motion away from the One. Thus, in II 4,5,30 the 'primal movement' is paired with 'otherness'. 'Otherness' is a characteristic of all entities subsequent to the One, and it is in virtue of this 'otherness' that they exist as individuals (VI 9,8,31-32). The composite life of Intellect contains 'otherness' because of the distinction within it of the subject and object of thought, and because of the plurality of Forms within it (VI 4,4,25-26 \( \nu\omega\alpha\varsigma\ \rho\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\varsigma\ \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma\varsigma \); cf. IV 3,5, 7-8 and 4,37-38 with note on 4,34). Thus, there is a connection between the 'primal otherness' of our present passage and the 'otherness' of 4,34 ff.; in each case the word suggests separation and distinct individuation. It is interesting, though, that \( \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma\varsigma \) here is used to describe the formation of soul from Intellect; presumably this \( \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\varsigma\varsigma \) is only \( \pi\epsilon\omega\nu\mu\nu\tau\iota\varsigma \) from the
point of view of the soul.

See further on 2,6; 3,3-4; 3,21-22; 4,34 and 4,41.

1,5

τὸ βουνθῆγαν... ἐαυτῶν εἶναι: P.'s view of the procession as in some way voluntary has already been mentioned in the note on 1,4.

Pic.'s 'quia volunt sui iuris esse' is a bit weak.

When the soul forgets its father it revels in its own individuality and its 'otherness'. P. uses similar language to describe the soul's descent in III 7,11,15-16 καὶ ἀξίων αὐτῆς βουλομένης καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς; IV 4,3,1-2 καὶ οὐκ ἀνασχομένη τὸ ἔν, τὸ ἐς αὐτὴς ἀσπασμένη καὶ οὗτον ἐθελήσασα εἶναι; and IV 8,10-11 μεταβάλλουσα εἰς ἐκ τοῦ δόλου εἰς τὸ μέρος τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἐαυτῶν.

This sort of explanation is akin to that of narcissism as a reason for the κάθodos (cf. IV 3,12,1 ff. and IV 6,3,9-10).

Where the emphasis is on the turning back towards one's source (ἐπιστροφή: see on 3,13-14), self-possession is a desideratum (cf. VI 5,1,18-19 τοῦτο γὰρ ἵστο, τὸ ἐκαθόν τῇ μὲ ταύτῃ φύσιν τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς).

1,5-6

πῆ δὴ αὐτοκηρύσσω... ἡθελεὶν: All translators except Ha. take ἐφάνησαν closely with ἡθελεὶν - e.g.,

Cf. 'ebbre, visibilimente, di quella loro autodeterminazione'.

They take ἐφάνησαν ἡθελεῖν either as the equivalent of ἐφανήσαν ἡθελεῖν, which is certainly possible - see LSJ s.v. φάενω B.II.1 - or as a periphrastic construction where ἐφάνησαν means little more than ἐδεικνύω (on this use with φαίνεσθαι see O. Björck, ἩΝ ΔΙΆΣΚΕΙΝ -
die Periphrastische Konstruktionen im Griechischen (Uppsala, 1940), p. 111).

However, against this view is the position of ἡμῖν, which is usually first word in its clause; and, more important, the fact that P. is trying to distinguish between birth, the 'beginning of wickedness', and what happens after birth. He makes it quite clear in IV 8 that souls are not harmed by their contact with the body if it is superficial and if they escape as soon as they can (καὶ ὁμοίως θὴττον φαύνη, οὐδὲν βεβλαμμένον IV 8,5,27-28). It is only when they 'sink deep into body' (IV 8,4,21) and overdo their eagerness (IV 8,7,9-10) that they suffer lasting ill-effects. It is over-involvement with the body to which P. is alluding in our present passage - note ποια ὁ τῶν κινεσθεν (1,6) and παράκτης ἀποστασιν (1,7-8). Souls could have escaped if they had retreated back to Intellect after the 'beginning of wickedness'. But instead, after their birth (ὡς ἡμῖν ἐφανερών), they ran in the opposite direction, away from the Intelligible World (1,7).

Henry ('La Liberte chez Plotin', Rev. Néoscol. de Phil. 33 (1931), p. 69, n.1) notes, probably correctly, that ἀντικεύσεως takes from its context a pejorative sense here. It is a common synonym for ἴκονσιος, used frequently in IV 8, P.'s study of the nature of free-will. It is used again in a psychological context in IV 8,5,26 (ὡς ἡμῖν ἀντικεύσεως).

It has been suggested by Festugière (La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste III (Paris, 1953), p. 210, n.3) that the phrase τῶν ἀντικευσίων ἡφθασε is an indication that P. was using
Albinus here as a source. Iamblichus, ap. Stobaeus, speaking of the reason for the soul's descent, mentions P.'s ἐνεργήματα (Stob. I.375.5-6 (Wachsmuth and Hense)), and then adds that according to Albinus ἦ τοµι αὐτὴς οὑσίων δημιουργίας κείσις was the cause of τὰ καταγωγὰ ἐνεργήματα (ibid. 375.10-11).

The use of the same word αὐτούς οὑσίς in Albinus and in 1,5 is certainly striking. But R. E. Witt (Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge, 1937), p. 137) maintains that Iamblichus is untrustworthy and himself draws on P. Besides, it is not clear to what Albinus' δημιουργίας κείσις refers. In Stob. I.380.12-13 Iamblichus mentions the descent of the soul ἐνί δινὴ καὶ κείσιν; there he seems to be referring to reincarnation rather than to the first descent. It is possible that Iamblichus has joined together in the same sentence two explanations which in fact refer to different descents - P.'s which refers to the first descent and Albinus' which refers to reincarnation. If this is the case, then P. in our present passage cannot have been using Albinus, since το αὐτούς οὑσίς in 1,5 surely refers to the first descent, or at least to a period immediately subsequent to it.

There is no way of deciding whether Iamblichus is to be trusted or not. P. certainly thought that both the first descent and reincarnation were in some sense voluntary (see IV 8,5,26 and IV 8,5,17 ff. where the type of reincarnation undergone depends on the voluntary actions done here on earth). There is, of course, no a priori reason why Albinus should not have held the same view.
This phrase explains how the souls express their free-will (cf. III 2,4, 36-38) ta te eis auta ekonta kinein autokourosen kai eisone an ote min prois ta platera, ote te prois ta xivew). Origen, who may have been a fellow pupil with P. at the school of Ammonius (Ens. AM vi.19), gives a similar explanation of the angels' and souls' separation from God; through misuse of their free-will they move away from Him (see H. Jonas, ThZ 4 (1948), p. 105). The word pollok is important as only much movement causes too close involvement with the body (see on 1,5-6). Br. is wrong to omit it.

For P. the soul (both world and individual soul) is the source of life and movement (cf. IV 7,12,4 and 2,5-6 of the world soul). But soul's movement is closely connected to its lower creative activity. Hence, movement is concerned with what for P. is the less desirable part of the soul's life. The creative activities of Intellect and the One take place while they remain unmoved (III 4,1,1 movonou inavov) but soul creates when it is in motion (IV 2,1,18-19 h te oiw movnesota movi, alla movn- ylina xiviva xivwov). And in III 7,11,15 ff. this movement is bracketed with the soul's poluperoymasynn (cf. IV 8,4,15) and wish for self-rule (cf. 1,5).

The doctrine that the soul was the source of movement for others while itself being self-moved, the autokouros was a conventional doctrine in ancient philosophy. According to Aetius (ap. DK Thales A.22) the theory originated with Thales, but perhaps the most famous statement of it is Pl. Phdr. 245c 5 ff.. There was doubt in antiquity about whether Plato's proof
was to be applied to the world soul, individual souls or to
η μνήμη ψυχής ἔστιν (see Herm. in Phdr. 102.10 ff.
(Couvreur)). In Lg. 896al-2, however, Plato defines soul
in general as τὴν ἐναρκτὴν αὐτῆς αὐτῆς κινήσεως.

But although the connection of movement and the life of
the soul was strong in the Platonic tradition, there is at
least a possibility that in speaking of soul's restlessness
P. also had in mind what he thought to be Heraclitus' ex-
planation of the soul's descent. In IV 8,1,12 ff., in a
doxographical excursus containing the philosophical explanations
of the descent, he mentions as Heraclitus' doctrine ἀμοιβᾶς
to ἀναγκαία (τεθέμενος) ἦν τῶν ἐναρκτῶν, ὅπως τε ἀνα
κατὰ τίτων καὶ μεταβάλλειν ἀναπαύεται καὶ κάμπτως
ἐστι τοῦτον αὐτοῖς μοχθὲν καὶ ἀχρισθαί. As H-S remark
ad loc., P. wrongly thought that τοῖς αὐτοῖς referred to
the Intelligible World, i.e., the Forms. What P. understood
Heraclitus to mean emerges from a passage of Iamblichus (ap.
Stob. I.378.21 ff.). Iamblichus, probably copying P. (see
Festugière, La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste III (Paris, 1953),
p. 210, n.1), gives as Heraclitus' answer to the problem of
the soul's descent ὅ ποὺς ἐφ' ὅποις ἐναρκτῶν κάμπτως
εἶναι (sc. ἀπολύοντες), ὅ ἐπι μεταβάλλειν φέρειν
ἀναπαύσεως (Stob. I.378.24-25), i.e., boredom with
being in the same part of the Intelligible World causes the
souls to move. Thus P. believed that it was Heraclitus' view
that movement and change were essential components of the
behaviour of the soul as it descended into body. That Heraclitus
was in P.'s mind here is further suggested by the definite Heraclitean reminiscence in 1,7 (see note ad loc.).

1,6 παρ’ αὐτῶν: Παρ’ αὐτῶν is, of course, reflexive. This use of αὐτός was uncommon in the classical period (see KG II.1.564, n.3), but in the Roman period there was no difference in pronunciation between αὐτός and ἀὑτός, so that the distinction between the two words became blurred (see Mayser, Grammatik der Griechischen Papyri aus der Ptolemäerzeit (Berlin and Leipzig, 1938), I.2.69, p. 65, n.1). All editors apart from H-S change the smooth to a rough breathing wherever the smooth breathing occurs.†

1,6 τὴν ἡμετρίαν (sc. δοῦν): The ὅδος ἀνῶ καὶ τω was a famous Heraclitean catch-phrase (DK Heraclitus A.1). This suggests that P. was thinking of Heraclitus here. P. uses the same phrase (of the opposite direction) in VI 9,11,36 near the end of the treatise which immediately precedes V 1 in chronological order (cf. 1.23 τὰ ἡμετρία). Compare also V 2,1, 20 ff. where ἡμετρία is coupled with κίνησις and this 'movement' refers to the creative activity of soul.

1,7-8 τυπέων ... τιμωμένων: Ἀποστάσις is the opposite of ἱστηρόφη (cf. Iamb. Comm. Math. 46.5-6 (Pesta) where the two words are paired as opposites). On ἱστηρόφη see on 3,13-14. Ἀποστάσις is one of the words P. uses when he talks about evil; e.g., in I 8,7,17 ff. it is said that the nature of evil can be grasped by imagining Ἀποστάσις from the Good, and in VI 6,1,1 ff. multiplicity and ἀποτύχεια or

† This difference between H-S and other editors is not subsequently mentioned in the commentary.
evil are described as types of ἀπόστασις from the One.
The objects of sense-perception have the furthest ἀπόστασις (VI 7,42,23-24). In V 8,11,24-25 τὸ ἐκατον ἀποστῆναι (the opposite of τὸ ἐκατὸν ἀνατριχίαν) is the result of concentrating on sense-perception rather than on the objects of Intellect.

It is, in fact, slightly odd that ἀπόστασις and movement away from the One should be the result of the exercise of free-will. The main conclusion of VI 8 is that it is only life in accord with Intellect and the One that is really free. And what applies to human actions and choices applies a fortiori to the higher hypostases. The One is completely free because it exists in accord with itself; it is its own ἐνέσχημα (VI 8,16,17). Lack of free-will, τὸ ἀκοῦσθεν, is an ἀπαγωγή ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (VI 8,4,15). The same idea is expressed in IV 8,5,8 ἀπὸ ... ἵνα ὁ θεός ἀρχηγὸς ἀκοῦσθεν. The souls in our present passage are definitely going to what is worse; P. says that their descent is evil (1,3-4). So presumably the descent of the souls ought to be involuntary.

It has been remarked in the note on 1,4, however, that P. stresses in our passage the voluntariness of the descent at the expense of the explanation in terms of necessity which he often uses. The reason for this is that the purpose of V 1 is to turn the soul back to its father. The fact that the descent is voluntary shows that the return to the Intelligible World is also within souls' power and can be achieved by the purified soul.
1,8 καὶ ἔλαμπας: The position of καὶ surely means that it should be taken with ἔλαμπας (= 'they too') rather than with ἡγνώμενα. This point is missed by all translators.

1,8-10 ἡσόντα πάλας... πατέρας: A similar comparison may be found at VI 9,9,34 ff., where the soul involved with the sensible world is compared to a young girl who in the absence of her father contracts a poor marriage and is ill-used. Compare also V 5,12,36-37 καὶ έλκει ... ἡσόντα ἀπ' πατέρας τὸ ἑγνώμενον. Ferwerda, Images, pp. 76-79 notes that the image of the departure and return of children to their father was common among the Gnostics, and is further connected with the Platonic notion of the demiurge as 'Father of the All' (see on 1,1-2). It is also found in Proclus (in Ti. I.208. 12-13 (Diehl)) with which K. Praechter (GGA 167 (1905), p. 524) compares D. Chr. Or. 12.61, an oration supposed to be influenced by Posidonius (see I. Heinemann, Posidonius' Metaphysische Schriften II (Breslau, 1928), pp. 124 ff.). It looks as though the image may have been a common one in literary/philosophical circles.

With the phrase πολιν χρόνον compare IV 8,4,12-13 ὅταν ἀντι τοῦτο διὰ χρόνον προή... Long term separation is harmful.

Εὐθύς (1,9), which is not translated by Br., does not mean 'troppo presto' (Ci.); it means 'straightaway', i.e., at birth.
Note the change from the vocabulary of knowledge and ignorance to that of sight.

P. knew two sorts of perception, ὀνειδησία (perception of the sensible world) and νοησία (perception of the Intelligible World). The vocabulary of sense-perception, however, is often used of Intellect - e.g., in V 4,2 and V 6,1 νοεῖν and ὄραν are used synonymously (cf. J. Dubbink, *Studia Plotiniana - Onderzoek naar eenige Grondgedachten van het Stelsel van Plotinus* (Diss. Nijmegen, 1945), pp. 21 ff.). Dubbink (op. cit. p. 24) thinks that P.'s use of ὄραν in connection with Intellect and the One shows that some sort of real sight was involved in the spiritual anabasis. This seems to me most unlikely.

The aim of V 1 is to remind soul of its own intrinsic value and P. begins to do this in Chap. 2. That soul is τιμωμένος was good Platonist doctrine (see on 1,2-3 and also Pl. *Lg.* 726al ff.).

Ταλλα (1,12) refers particularly to the physical world; nothing physical is more valuable than what is spiritual (cf. Pl. *Lg.* 727el-3; *ibid.* 892a2-7).

P. thinks that these emotions, though sometimes brought on by the physical world in so far as it reflects its divine model, are more properly produced by the Intelligible World (cf. I 6,4,13-15; I 6,5,17 ταῦτα (οὐκ ἐκ κοινῆς χάρις)... ἀγαμάσκων; V 5,12,34-35; also Pl. *Smp.* 211d2 ff.). Souls are filled with wonder at the physical
world because of the images of themselves which they have created there (IV 3,12,1 ff.).

εις ητητητικαν των : Ἀγαθός is used by Aristotle in Metaph. 1072b14 to describe the dependence of creation on the Prime Mover. Following him, P. uses εγερόθαι and ὀπταγματα to describe the hierarchical relationship between the hypostases. Wolters, in his note on III 5,2,30, gives a fairly full list of references, to which may be added IV 3,11,16; IV 4,29,10; V 2,1,28; VI 8,18, 5 ff.. That which is 'attached' to its prior has the same relationship to it as a branch does to the whole plant (IV 4,11,9-11); thus soul is 'attached' to Intellect, and Intellect, in its turn, is 'attached' to the One (VI 7,42,21-24). Everything in the long run is thus dependent on the One (I 7,1,21).

To say that something is 'attached' to something else implies that it depends for its existence on that to which it is 'attached'.

In view of this, our present passage presents a difficulty. Souls are not 'attached' to the physical world in this sense; in fact, the reverse is true, since physical objects are dependent on soul for their existence (VI 7,42,23-24).

Translators of our present passage have either taken the view that εις ητητητικα is being used in a rare sense as an equivalent of ἀγαθός (Pic.: 'admirabundae pendentes'; Br.: 'tout ... les passionne et les tient suspendues'; Ci.: 'trasalirono, attonite, di fronte a loro e ne furono avvinte') or that the word is being used metaphorically but in its
usual sense (Ha: 'hängten sich daran'; MK: 'clinging to this'). MK and Ha. are right. Like ἣμαμήθην, ἱκπλήτην and ἀγαθα, ἐκήρυκαί is only properly used in contexts which deal with the Intelligible World. P. is being ironic.

Τούτων provides an object both for ἀγαθωθίαν and ἐπερημέναι both of which usually take the genitive.

1,15 ἰών ἀριστεράφησαν: On ἀριστερά see on 1,7-8. Fic.'s 'disinunxerunt (sc. se) a patre atque seipsis' is nowhere to be found in the Greek.

1,15-17 ὁστε συμβαίνει ... σείκα: The question asked at the beginning of the chapter is answered. Respect for earthly things together with lack of respect for themselves are the causes of the souls' ignorance. But these are also the results of their ignorance (see 1,11-14); hence the importance for P. of putting the souls on the right path.

1,17 ἀμα γὰς διόκτεν τὸ ἄλλο: P. begins the justification of his answer; knowledge of god is impossible for souls in the state described.

Progress in the Intelligible World is not achieved by pursuit but by remaining quiet (V 5,8,3 ἡτίμητ μόνοι; cf. 2,14 ff.). Pursuit is normally associated with something external, in this case, the external image which soul imprints on matter (cf. V 8,2,32 ff. esp 34-35 ὁσακέ αὐν ἐν τῷ τῷ άδώλον αὐτῶ βλέπων ἀγνοιῶν οὕπερ ηκκα ἐνίνο δικκοι ). Pursuit of the wrong ends is, of course, a topos in philosophy:
compare the difference between the newly initiated and his opposite at Pl. Phdr. 250el ff. and the difference between those who have seen only shadows and those who have seen reality in Pl. R. 514al ff..

1,18-19 καὶ...χρόνον εἶναι: Pursuit is directed towards a τέλος. For P. a τέλος is on a higher level than that which moves towards it.

1,19 τιθήμενον: Dodds’s τιθήμενον (Select Passages Illustrative of Neoplatonism (London, 1924), p. 48) is preferable to the τι θίμενον of earlier editors. Not only is the pronoun τι superfluous, but the aorist participle seems odd alongside the present ὑπολαμβάνων (1,20-21).

1,19-20 γιγνομένων καὶ ἀπολλαμένων: This is a common Platonic phrase describing the physical world in contrast-distinction to the world of Forms (see e.g., Pl. R. 527b5-6; id. Ti. 28a3 (quoted by P. at IV 7,8,48); id. Smp. 211al; id. Prm. 163d 1-2). Compare also 2,7-8 γιγνομένων...

1,20 θυτοτατον: θυτοτατον is a hapax legomenon; see Schwzyzer (RE 513.10): 'häufig erscheinen neugebildete Komparative und Superlative'.

1,21 οὕτω θεον...δύναμιν: A similar phrase is found at 2,28.

As in 1,2, θεον here refers to Intellect. Although the One at the head of the procession is the source of all
power, the \( \delta \iota \nu \alpha \mu \mu \nu \pi \alpha \nu \eta \nu \nu \) (see on 5,3-4 and cf. 7,9-10; III 8,10,1; V 4,1,36), the other hypostases, as the results of the One's power, have an inferior but nevertheless considerable power of their own (see 7,38 of Intellect; and 2,28 of soul).

1,21-22

\( \varepsilon \nu \ \theta \iota \mu \mu \nu \ \beta \alpha \lambda \iota \iota \tau \rho \) ; For the Homeric phrase see e.g., II. 15.566; ibid. 20.195-6; cf. II. 10.447; ibid. 13.82.

It is sometimes used in tragedy (see A.Pr. 706; S. O.T. 975).

On the thought - that there are certain intellectual positions which must be adhered to, since otherwise intellectual progress is impossible - see VI 9,5,1 ff., and V 8,2,43 ff.

In both passages P. says that his philosophy is not for everyone. Porphyry remarks (V.P. 4.14) that the first 21 treatises were \( \varepsilon \kappa \delta \iota \omega \omicron \mu \nu \niota \ \omicron \lambda \iota \gamma \omicron \omicron \) .

1,22

\( \delta \iota \tau \tau \omicron \nu \ldots \tau \nu \ \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \) ; With the methodology - the suggestion of two methods of which one is chosen - compare I 3,1,12 ff.

In VI 9,4,31 one of the reasons for the failure in the spiritual anabasis is the lack of a \( \pi \alpha \delta \alpha \gamma \gamma \gamma \omega \nu \nu \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \) (cf. V 9,2,11-12). The \( \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \) must clarify the intellectual assumptions which are necessary prerequisites for progress.

It is sometimes personified as a \( \pi \alpha \delta \alpha \gamma \gamma \gamma \omega \gamma \omicron \omicron \) (cf. I 3,3,3). But it is only necessary for part of the way (I 6,9,24); the vision of the Good is experienced by the seer on his own, without assistance. On the importance of good \( \pi \alpha \delta \alpha \gamma \gamma \gamma \omicron \omicron \) for the soul see Pl. R. 491el ff.
1,22-23 τοις ὑπὸν διανοητικοῖς: Note the changes of subjects and genders in this section of the chapter. From 1,5-14 ψυχαῖ is the subject of the feminine participles. In 1,18 the subject becomes neuter; and the neuter participles are picked up by the masculine διανοητικὸς. This tendency to move from souls to persons reflects P.'s doctrine that man's true self is his higher soul (IV 4,18,14-15; cf. I 1,7, 16-17; IV 7,1,22-23; VI 8,12,11-12). The lower part of the soul, however, can sometimes be included in the definition of a person (I 1,10,5 ff.; cf. 12,9-10 and note on 12,8-10).

1,23-25 εἰπεῖ τις ... καὶ πρῶτον: Ἑπιστρεφένς is the opposite of ἀποστρεφένς (1,15). On Ἑπιστρεφόμεν see on 3,13-14.

Ἑναψία picks up τὴν ἐναντίαν (so. ὅδε) in 1,7. Τὰ πρῶτα here refers to Intellect and the Forms, which are primary in the sense that the Intelligible World is the archetype of the physical world. In 5,10 τὰ πρῶτα probably includes soul (cf. V 3,9,27-28.9,35). Τὸ πρῶτον in the singular normally refers to the One.

On the upward ascent see on 3,3.

On the change of mood from the future Ἑπιστρεφόμεν to the optative ἀνάγω see Schwyzer in RE 518.23 ff.. The mss. tradition for the optative is overwhelmingly strong and Schwyzer quotes as parallels I 2,3,15 and III 7,5,7.

1,26 ὅν ἐν ἄλλοις ... ἐπιστέησαι: Where? H-S cite II 4 and III 4, Ha. VI 4 and III 6. This difference of opinion shows that there is no very clear reference at hand. It is
a basic tenet of P.'s philosophy, as it was of Plato's, that the Intelligible World and its contents are on a higher level than the physical world. P. often mentions the superiority of soul over body (III 4,5,7; VI 4,4,39). He talks of sensible objects as ἀσέων (III 4,2,13), and compares body unfavourably to soul because of body's passivity (III 6 passim; cf. VI 4,15,18 ff.; VI 8,2,11 ff.). But there is no long passage which deals particularly with the worthlessness of the objects that the soul honours. It is difficult to agree with P. that he treats the subject elsewhere 'more fully'.

Ha. remarks ad loc. that P. was working according to a plan, but that how and whether the plan was fulfilled we cannot tell. The evidence of Porphyry's Life does not support his view. Not only was the course ἀρταξίας πληγής (V.P. 3.37), but the subjects of the treatises were taken τικ προσκαλέων προσβλημάτων (V.P. 5.60-61). Furthermore, references which look forward to later treatises are comparatively rare (I can find only six - II 7,3,15 which refers either to VI 7,6,11-12 or to V 3,3,41-42; IV 3,29,36 which refers to IV 6,3; V 1,7,48 which refers to II 4; V 9,14,5. 14,12 which refer to V 4; V 6,6,29 which refers to V 5,4; and IV 4,22,42 where the promise τοῦτο ... ὄκλαστον ἀκτίζων is never fulfilled). If P. was working to a plan, one might reasonably expect more forward references in the complete Plotinian corpus. I doubt whether P. had carefully mapped out the exact subjects of his future philosophical activity. Where it is difficult to find an exact reference, as here, the pointer might be to
school discussion rather than to written works. Not everything that P. taught was written down.

1,26-28 οδ' . . . τε λάμβας : The second method is the method pursued in our present treatise. (See prolegomena.)

Οегодня is not translated by MK. Fic. and Ha. assume that it introduces an indirect question; Br. and Ci. that it is to be taken with ἄναμμοντινν meaning 'as it were'. Neither, it seems to me, is right. ὡδε adds a note of apology to γίνοις and λάμβας. It is noteworthy, though, that the metaphor of γίνοις was used without qualification in 1,12.

The second argument is is logically prior (προτόχος) because the subject of the first argument (τὰ ψυχὴ)

Περίωσα) involves knowledge of the meaning of the concept 'soul'.

1,29-30 ἡγημὸς ἔθε . . . πρὸς ἢκλινον: Τοῦ θαυμασίου could be either masculine or neuter. It is true that the One is Ἰ

θαυμασίου in the sense that it is the goal of the soul to be united with it; but τὸ θαυμάσιον is commonly used to refer to the aim which a treatise has in view (e.g., I 8, 14, 26; II 1, 4, 1; III 6, 2, 7; IV 3, 21, 19; IV 6, 1, 14).

Ἐκλίνον (1, 30) refers to the argument to be expounded elsewhere (cf. ἢκλινον (1, 28) and καλέκλινον (1, 29)). Br. wrongly takes the pronoun to refer to τὸ θαυμασίον. Fic.'s 'atque illi (sc. sermoni) opportune praeponitur' and MK's 'is its natural preliminary' both obscure the fact that πρὸς θαυμασίου means 'useful'. The argument of V 1 is a useful
preliminary to the other argument in that understanding of the soul's high status makes the relative worthlessness of the physical world obvious.

The soul must learn its own nature so that it can decide whether it is able to succeed in its search (cf. IV 3,1,10-11 ἔργων τι ἄλλα καὶ εἰρήνη τουλάχιστον ἤκαν τοῦ ἔργων τί ποιεῖ ἵνα τοῦτο ἔργων.).

P. maintains that soul is the traveller, as it were, in the Intelligible World, moving upwards and downwards within it (cf. IV 3,12,18); soul is the interpreter between that world and the world of sense-perception (IV 3,11,19-20), and can ascend in its travels as far as the One (IV 7,12,7-8). In this conception of the nature of soul he followed Plato; in Pl. Simp. 210a4 ff. soul is involved in the journey from external beauty to the Form of Beauty, and in Pl. Phd. 65a9 ff. it is soul which achieves knowledge of the Forms. Both writers believed that soul could 'experience' higher realities because there was a 'kinship' (συγγίνημα) between soul and the objects of its attention. There had to be this kinship because both philosophers believed in the theory that like was known by like.

This theory was one of the two theories of perception prominent in antiquity (see Thphr. Sens. 1). Who originated the theory is not known. Sextus Empiricus (M. 7.116 ff.) mentions Democritus, Empedocles and Plato, and elsewhere (ibid. 1.305) Pythagoras or (ibid. 7.92 ff.) Posidonius and
Philolaus. The best-known expression of the doctrine is in Empedocles (DK B.109): 

> γαῖη μὲν γὰς γαῖαν ὀπλαπὶ, ὑδατί δ' ὀδος/ αἴδες δ' αἴθερα διόν, ἀπε 
> πεί πὲ αἵδηλον, ὁς αἴθη; νείκως δὲ τὶ 
> νεῖκτι ἠμεῖ. Here it is purely a physiological theory; everything consists of the four elements plus φιλία (or στοργή) and νείκως. The soul is composed of the same ingredients; hence it is able to perceive the world through the corresponding elements in itself. (For Aristotle's arguments against this theory see de An. 409b23 ff.) By Plato's time the theory of vision was more sophisticated. Vision took place when an emanation of light from the eye coalesced with the light around the eye and formed as it were an exterior (physical) extension to the eye (Pl. Ti. 45c2 ff.; cf. Plu. Quaest. Conviv. 626c ff.). But the basic presupposition was still that perception was only possible when two similar substances came together (ἐμπίπτων ὁμοίων πεῖς ὁμοίων Pl. Ti. 45c3-4).

Plato seems to have been the first to apply the theory to immaterial principles. In Ti. 37a2 ff. Plato explains how knowledge takes place by means of the contact between the immaterial ingredients of the soul and the cognitive objects. Soul can know the Forms because it is συγγένες with them (R. 490b4; ibid. 611e ff.; cf. id. Lg. 899d7; id. Phd. 79d3). Plato's innovation was wholly original (see A. Schneider, 'Der Gedanke der Erkenntnis des Gleichen durch Gleiches in Antiker und Patristischer Zeit', Beit. zur Ges. der Phil. des Mittelalters Suppl. II (Festsgabe Clemens Baumker) 1923, pp. 67-68.
P.'s originality stems from the new meaning which he gave to the concept of 'likeness', and its related concept of 'kinship'. Instead of accepting the principle that like is known by like as merely descriptive of the act of vision, P. made it prescriptive: τὸ μὲν ὑπάρχον πρὸς τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναμφισβήτων διὰ ἰσιμβάλλου ἡ θέα, ἡ γὰρ ἀν πᾶσιν πάντως ἀναπτύσσει ἐν τῷ ἐμφανίζεται μὴ γιγαντιαίος, οὐδὲ τὸ καλὸν ἀν ἑαυτῆς ψυχῆς μὴ καλὴ γιγαντιαίος (I 6,9,29-32). The soul had to become like the Intelligible World if it wanted to see the Intelligible World; without this kinship vision or knowledge was impossible. And if no kinship existed, the soul had to set about creating one. When Plato said that the eye was the most sun-like of the organs of perception (R. 508a7) he probably meant this in a physical sense. The eye was able to perceive sunlight because it contained within itself a source of light. But P. moved from physics and physiology to metaphysics and ethics when he insisted on the soul becoming like the object of its visions. And the kinship involved was a strong one. The soul had (in some sense) actually to become Intellect (VI 6,8,8 νοεῖν μὲν Θεωρητέον; VI 7,35,4-5 καίτοι νοεῖ γιγαντιαίον (ὅτι ηῆς ψυχῆς) αὐτῇ Θεωρητέον νοεῖ νοεῖν; VI 9,9,58 Θεοῦ γιγαντιαίου, μᾶλλον δὲ ὀντα γ’; on the nature of the union involved see on 5,3, and on the part of the soul in which technically the vision takes place see on 12,5-7). The principle was applicable at all levels of knowledge and ascent. Soul had to become like the One in order to know or see it
Similarly in order to know matter, the soul had to become \textit{δοξιστή} (II 4,10,17 \textit{τὰ τῶν μετὰ γνώμην τῶν ποι σύνον ἄνοιγ}) \textit{εὐδαιμόνετη}. Thus \textit{ευςεῖσθαι} (see on 3,13-14), the turning to face a higher principle and eventually the One was achieved by \textit{ὁμοίωσις} at each level (cf. Procl. \textit{Pl. Theol.} 32). Hence the importance for the Neoplatonists of the \textit{ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ} of \textit{Pl. Thet.} 176b1-2.

P., then, with this dynamic concept of 'likeness' in mind (cf. J. de Fraine, 'Het Princiep der Dynamische Gelijkheid in de Kennisleer van Plotinos', \textit{Tijdschrift voor Phil.} 5 (1943), pp. 487-514), asks whether the soul is akin to its object. If it were \textit{ἀλλότριος} to Intellect, then knowledge would be impossible (cf. III 7,7,3-4). In fact, as a member of the Intelligible World (see on 1,2-3) both Intellect and the One are akin to it.

The phrase \textit{ψυχῆς ὧμα} (1,32) is Platonic (see \textit{R}. 533d2 and \textit{Sph.} 254a10).

Ha. notes in his introduction the 'starke Klangmittel' of the repetition of parts of \textit{γνῶμη} in these lines. Forceful expression is in keeping with the protreptic purpose of the treatise.
CHAPTER TWO

Chapter two is the first approach to the aim of pointing out to the soul its worth and gives the answer to the problem of identity sketched at the end of Chap 1. The world soul is the principle of life, organisation and unity in the universe and our individual souls have a similar nature to it.

The creative activity of soul described in this chapter approaches closely to the activity attributed in Plato's Timaeus to the demiurge. In view of this, it is worthwhile to investigate the relationship between the demiurge and the world soul.

The world soul's activity is demiurgic (ἡμιούργιος IV 7,13,8) and P. admits (following Pl. Phlb. 30d1-2) that the name 'Zeus' can be applied correctly either to the demiurge or to the world soul (IV 4,10,1 ff.). Yet in spite of this, P. also maintains in several places (8,5; II 1,5,5; II 3,18,15; V 9,3,26) that Plato's demiurge is not soul but Intellect. He even seems to criticise the Gnostics for equating a νοῦς διανοούμενος and a ψυχή ἡμιούργων (II 9,6,21-22). But if Intellect is the demiurge, yet there are obvious differences between the job of the demiurge in the Timaeus and the role of Intellect in P..

The demiurge creates body as well as soul for the sun, the moon and the planets (Pl. Ti. 38c7; cf. ibid. 69c3-5); yet while Intellect may be said to create soul (see the use of γίνομαι in 2,37), even though only figuratively (for the procession from the One works by necessity (V 4,2,29 σὺ... ἀνάγκης)), it has nothing to do with the creation of body, which is formed by the shaping of indeterminate matter by ψυχή, the lowest phase of soul's activity. Furthermore, it is
not Intellect but, as in our present passage, soul which is the principle of life and organisation in the cosmos. This organising role is assigned in the *Timaeus* to the demiurge.

Why, then, does P. identify the Platonic demiurge and Intellect, while apparently giving the truly demiurgic tasks to the world soul, and why does he say that the same name 'Zeus' may be used of Intellect and the soul? The answer lies, I think, in the Plotinian notion of soul as a bridge between the Intelligible World and its sensible imitation. Soul is the ultimate expression of Intellect and the Forms (IV 6,3,5-6 λόγος ἔσχατος ... τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ). Situated at the boundary between the two worlds (IV 4,3,11 μεθ' ὁμοιον οὐκα ...) soul has contacts both with Intellect and with the physical world (7,44 ff.; IV 4,3,11-12 ἐπ' ἁμω ψειτεν ; IV 6,3,8 ff.). Soul is the medium through which the contents of the Intelligible World are expressed in the sensible world (IV 3,11,19 οἰδὼν ἐμπνευσμένη γνωμήν). Intellect uses soul to carry on its own demiurgic activity (IV 7,13,17-18 μίνοντος (sc. τοι νοι) καὶ διὰ ψυχῆς πάντα καλῶν πληροῦντος καὶ διακοσμοῦντος); it gives to soul the λόγοι (see on 3,8) which soul then transmits to the sensible world (V 9,3,30-31). Through the gift of these, Intellect ensures that the physical world is as alike as possible to the Intelligible World. Because soul gets its being from Intellect, and, more important, derives its activity from Intellect, all the creations of soul are νοητοὶ ἀνηρτουμέναι, so that everything contains a trace of Intellect and its activity (V 3,7,30 ff.). Thus, working through the medium of soul, it is Intellect which is the real creator and demiurge (V 9,3,26), since it is the ultimate reference of the physical world, which is its image. P. sums up in
The extent of the three hypostases is that of a μῆκος ἐκτεθεισά (V 2,2,26-27). Soul interprets one level of this life at another level; it is the active expression of the differentiated yet undifferentiated unity of Intellect (VI 9,5,16). Of course, the One, as 'creator' of the Intelligible World, is in the final analysis responsible for the sensible world. In practice, P. avoids stating this; he does not call Intellect the logos of the One (on this see on 3,8).

2,1-9 ἐνθυμιζόμεν... ἐγνώρι: P. begins with a statement of the life-giving activity of soul, which he elaborates in 2,10 ff..

2,1 ἐνθυμιζόμεν: A. Eon (RIPh 92 (1970), pp. 260-261) suggests that ἐνθυμιζόμεν is closely connected with the concept of ζεύγος and refers to 'un acte d'attention porté sur une donnée immédiate et intérieure'. Thus, when the soul is asked to 'reflect' on its creative activity, it is being asked to concentrate on the actualisation through use of its memory of knowledge which it already possesses. Eon is probably right to see ἐνθυμιζόμεν in our present passage as an example of the use of ἐνθυμιζόμεν which he notices, but it would be wrong to take ἐνθυμιζόμεν wherever it occurs in this special sense; in VI 9,9,39, e.g., it means much the same as λογισθαῖ.
introduces the general statement of soul's activity which is dealt with in more detail by the reasoning faculty (λογισθεῖσθαι — 'un acte de raisonnement sur cette donnée primitive' (Eon, loc. cit.)) in 2,10 ff. (cf. 3ινοπηθίνη in 2,29).

The distinctions between the different words used to describe the processes of thought are overlooked by all translators, except perhaps by Ha.

2,1

πάντα ψυχή : Br. takes this to be a reference to Pl. Phdr. 245c5 and adds, cryptically, 'qui met chaque âme au niveau de l'âme du monde'. His reference to Plato is not helpful.

2,1-2

ἱς αἴμη μὲν... πάντα : Ha. notes in his introduction the repetition of αἴμη in 2,2-5. It is another example of P.'s 'starke Klangmittel'.

As the context here shows, P. is speaking of the world soul, ἡ μυκλή ψυχή (2,11). Following Plato (Pl. Phdr. 245c5 ff.; id. Lg. 896e8 ff.), P. maintains that the soul is the source of movement and of life in the universe. As the principle of life, possessing life intrinsically (IV 7,9,8 παρ' εἰμινής cf. IV 7,9,11 πρῶτος ὑπόσα ), it can give life to whatever does not possess it (IV 7,3,16 χορηγός τῆς εἰμινής ), though the life which it gives is only an image of the life which it has itself (IV 3,10,39-40). As head of the πρῶτος, however, the One may be said to be the source of all life including that of the soul (VI 9,9,49-50).

The life-giving activity of soul is sometimes attributed to its lowest phase φύσις (IV 4,20,15-16; cf. IV 4,13,2 ff.).
This does not conflict with P.'s remarks in our present passage since all soul is a unity (see IV 9 passim). On the difficulties involved in maintaining this view, though, see on 2,44.

2.2 ἐμπνεύσασα αὐτὸς ζωῆς: This evocative image is used of the One in VII 7,23,23-24 (ἐμπνεύσας νους, ἐμπνεύσας ζωῆς). Its roots are Homeric. Ἐμπνεύσασα is used in Homer of gods breathing strength into mortals (Ili. 20. 110; Od. 9.381). The metaphor is particularly appropriate here because of the connection in Greek thought between soul as the principle of life, and breath. The dying gasp of a hero signalled the release of his soul (Simonides 48 (Poetae Melici Graeci, ed. Page)). Compare also Genesis 2.7.

2.2-4 ὁ τύχε... ἀστέρα θυσία: For the four classes see Pl. Ti. 39e10 ff. The divisions probably correspond to the Empedoclean divisions of fire, air, water and earth. For a similar enumeration of the parts of the universe see III 2,3,25-28.

2.3-4 ὁ τίνι ὀθέασε... ἀστερά θυσία: On the various meanings of ὀθέασε see Arist. Cael. 278b9 ff. The fixed stars were in the outermost heaven with the sun, the moon and the planets immediately below them. It is unlikely, however, that ὀθέασε here has a technical meaning. In 2,5 and 2,22 ff. it is used as a synonym for κόσμος; P. is not being precise here.

The beginning of man's belief in God is traced back by Plato (Pl. Cr. 397c8 ff.) to his observation of the ordered
workings of the heavens. It was commonly believed that the stars were divine. For Plato, this was because they had been made by the demiurge and had been given souls by him (see Pl. Ti. 380a ff.; cf. id. Ph. 508a θεον ἀνάψωμεν θεον). For mention of the visible gods in other philosophical writings see Arist. Metaph. 1026a18; Epict. III.22.22; D. Chr. 12.60; M. Ant. 12.28; Porph. Abst. 166.14 (Nauck).

P. endorsed the common belief (see 4,3-4 and note) and criticised the Gnostics for suggesting that they were not divine (II 9,8,30-32; cf. II 9,5,9 ff.). The stars' bodies were made of fire (and only the subtlest sort of fire was found in the heavens - see II 1,4,11-13.7,33 ff.); consequently, their souls were almost free from contact with matter and were in continual contemplation of Intellect (IV 3,11,23 ff.; IV 4,7,1 ff.; cf. Pl. Phileb. 98e4-6 θεόν γένος ημέρων σώματος μίαν τοιχον καλλίτου, ψυχής δὲ υιοθεμονωσάμης τι καὶ ἀριστον).

2,4-5 αὐτὴ δὲ ἡμῶν... ὀφελοῦν: The verb ἔστησε must be supplied with these accusatives. Pio. wrongly supplies ἐκόσμησε from the following line.

2,5 καὶ αὐτὴ... ἐν τῇ κοσμάγμα: For soul as the ordering principle of the universe see IV 3,7,14-15; IV 4,10,25; IV 8,2,53. Τὸ καὶ κόσμημα are the visible expressions of soul's presence. The soul wishes to organise the cosmos according to the principles which it saw in Intellect (IV 7,13,4 ff.)
soul is pregnant, as it were, with these logoi. The order which it produces is an imitation of the 'wisdom' (φρόνησις) of the Intelligible World (IV 4,10,11-13; see on 2,24). The circular movement of the heavens in II 2 (which partly constitutes this Παράσι) is the outward sign of soul's circular movement around Intellect and the One. Note, once again, that soul is acting as an interpreter of Intellect.

2,6

φώς ὁδε ἑρωδία: Since the cause is not immanent in its effects (on this see on 7,19-20 and 7,20-23) ἀλλ'...

to πρότυπον ἑρωδίαν τοῦ Ἰμπέρου (III 8,5,19). Thus Intellect is different from soul (V 9,4,2), soul from the impression which it gives to matter (IV 3,20,39), and the One from all subsequent entities (V 3,11,18; V 4,1,6). Each hypostasis is the external activity of its prior, resembling it but different from it (V 4,2,28-30).

This principle - that the cause is different from its effects - is closely related to the principle that it is greater than its effects (see on 2,7).

2,6

ὃν κοιμή... ἐν νομί: On soul as the source of movement see on 1,6-7. Movement and life are conceptually connected (cf. Pl. Phdr. 245c6-7).

Ci. puts a stop after κοιμή and a comma after πολι: ;

'il distacca mi sembra necessario perché solo l'ultima idea viene ripresa dopo: ἀπολύτην ἡ χολής το ἱππον'.

This reasoning is unconvincing. ἀπολύτην ἡ χολής is more likely to have been suggested by γιγνόμενον... καὶ φθορομένων (2,7-8) than by ἅ ἐν νομί . Furthermore, with Ci.'s
punctuation, θαύτην \(^{1}\) (2,7) would have to refer only to ἐν καινὴ καὶ σὲ κηνὴ. The καὶ before it would strongly emphasise this. Yet the other function of soul, that of giving order to the universe (ἐν κοσμῷ 2,6), is as important as the other two. As Ha. says, Ci.'s punctuation breaks up the sequence of thought.

Ha., following the text of Cyril (PG 76.921c) omits ἃ before κηνὴ. The change of case from genitive to accusative is certainly odd, but not so impossible that a change is necessary. See Henry, Etats, p. 125.

2,7 καὶ θαύτην... Τιμιωτέραν; On the principle that the cause is greater than its effects, an important principle in Neoplatonism, see A.C.Lloyd, Phronesis 21 (1976), pp. 146-156. Each level of the procession from the One is not only different from each other level, but is more perfect and the cause of what comes after it (cf. 6,37-39; 7,37-39; V 2,2,1 ff.). This is usually considered as self-evident (cf. V 5,13,37-38; VI 1,25, 17-18; VI 7,17,4-6), though some justification is sought in the theory of the 'double activity' (see on 3,9-10). Proclus in El. Theol. 7 makes the principle part of the Neoplatonic canon.

2,7-8 ψυχοφόρων... φθειροφόρων; Cf. 1,19-20. Vo., Br. and Ha., following Cyril (PG 76.921c), insert μὲν after ψυχοφόρων. Henry (Etats, p. 125) points out that this is unnecessary. Ha. gives no reasons except his own preferences for following the indirect tradition.
2,8-9 οὖν αὕτη ... τοῦ κράτους: Vo. and Br. read η ... χρησις in 2,8, readings attested by a minority of the mss.. M. van der Valk (Mnemosyne 9 (1956), p. 129 n.4) rightly points out that

On soul as the χρησις of life see 2,10 and IV 7,3,15 ff.; of movement IV 7,9,6; of the contents of Intellect IV 8,7,30.

The use of χρησις and its cognates emphasises the interpretative nature of soul. Just as the literal χρησις is the medium by means of whose money the play is produced, so the soul is the means of the presence of Intellect in the sensible world.

2,9 αἰσθήσεις ... ἀπολύσεων ξαναπήγειν: This is Platonic: the last half of the phrase is a direct reminiscence of Pl. Phdr. 245c7-8 (not of 245c9 as H-S note). The self-mover, since it never leaves itself, never ceases to move; and what never ceases to move never ceases to live.

2,10-51 ἦν γὰρ ... σκέψεως ἀγαπαί: After the plain statement of the life-giving activity of soul, P. begins a more detailed examination, signalled by the use of λογίζωσθαι (2,11) and σκέψεως (2,29), words particularly associated with reasoning.

This examination is interrupted, though, by a digression on the nature of the investigator (2,11-17) and a figurative description of the arrival of the soul into the body of the universe (2,17-27).

2,10-11 ἦν γὰρ ... ὅσιον λογίζωσθαι: Although the mss. tradition is unanimous in reading ἦν γὰρ τρέφοντος, Ki. and Mu. read ἦν and Br. ἦν διὰ τρέφοντος, a reading perhaps
derived from Basil's paraphrase in PG 29.769a. Δη is perfectly acceptable; an emphatic particle is not out of place, as P. moves to a closer consideration of the actual manner of soul's working on the universe. (On δη in an indirect question see Deniston, pp. 211 ff.). In view of the strong mss. support for the omission of the definite article, no change either should be made in Τίς ... τροπος.

2,11-12 οὐ διάφορον δὲ ... οὐ σφραγιζόμενον: Κί., Μά., Βο., Βρ. and Ha. read δη instead of the mss. δε in 2,11. Δη as an ordinary connective makes good sense. Pic.'s 'itaque' in 2,11 (he prints 'autem' in 2,10) is therefore wrong.

The 'great soul' is the world soul, and the 'other soul' the human soul; on the relationship between them see on 2,44. In II 1,8,4 ff. the human soul, said to be different from the world soul, is also described as 'no small causal principle' (ἀληθὶς οὐ σφραγισμένη ἀόρατη).

2,13-14 ἀπελαύνων ... πᾶς ἄλλας; The notions of 'deception' and 'bewitchment' have their roots in Plato (see Pl. Phd. 83a4-5; ibid. 81b3-4) though no doubt in origin they might be traced back to Orphico-Pythagorean doctrines. The imagery is found in P.'s earliest treatise, where soul's escape from things earthly is compared to Odysseus' flight from Circe or Calypso (I 6,8,18 ff.).

The reason for the souls' enchantment by the world of sense is the image of soul which body contains. They are deceived by the likeness of themselves which they see in physical objects (IV 6,3,9-10) and by the reflection of themselves, seen, as it
were, in the mirror of Dionysus (IV 3,12,1 ff.; cf. V 8,2,34-35). They are deceived not by the truth but by what resembles it (IV 4,44,25 ff.). Thus, only soul's higher activity is ἄγογτυς (IV 4,44,1); and a preliminaries for the exercise of this activity and hence for the ἔστρεφη is purification (see on 2,44-45).

The world soul, because of its lack of involvement with the body, does not need to be purified. Our soul, however, to appreciate its kinship with the world soul, must become like it. Hence, the realization of soul's ancestry involves purification and return towards its source.

2,14-17 ηφυκ... οἰδον ἀμίλων: Ἡφυκος means here not merely 'quiet' but - more generally - 'still'. 'Stillness is the traditional response of nature to a divine epiphany' (Dodds on Euripides' Bacchae 1084-5); cf. Mesomedes Sol. (ap. Mus. Script. Gr. X.7) and P. Mag. vii.321 ff. where the formula for the direct vision of god is being given. The inspiration, then, for most of 2,14-17 - that part dealing with the stillness of earth, sea and air - is purely traditional. What is not traditional is P.'s demand that the soul be still. Stillness in the soul is the antithesis of the flux of the physical world. The world soul, because of its detachment from body, and the purified soul are already still (VI 4,15,18-20; cf. I 4,12,6 - the good man has a ηφυκος κατάστασις). The trouble with the individual soul is that it has a δύναμις ὑφ ηφυκος within it (III 7,11,21) which, if not quelled, prevents the soul's advance.

Lack of stillness is equated with μελημαχονγος (VI 3,23,4; cf. I 3,4,17-18), and being busy with creative activity
is characteristic of the lower part of the soul which involves itself with the physical world (IV 8,4,15 πολυβραγμωνία; cf. V 3,3,17). Intellect is the realm of stillness (VI 9,5,14-15) and stillness is the sign of its self-centred activity. Its stillness is not incompatible with its characteristic movement, for this movement, being circular, is a movement at rest (see on 4,34-37). Stillness in Intellect is a mark of its self-sufficiency (V 3,7,13-15 ἅλλα μὴ ἡσυχία αὐτοῦ νοεῖ ἐστιν ἐμόστασις, ἅλλ' ἐστιν ἡσυχία τοῦ νοοῦ σχέσιν ἀγομενα τῶν ἄλλων ἑνίγματα), and it is through stillness that it contemplates the One and creates the Forms (VI 9,9,18-19). The One itself is still (I 7,1,15). Thus, on the theory that like is known by like (see on 1,30-35), the One can only be experienced by a soul in the same state (cf. VI 9,11,12 ff.). Similarly, just as a reflection can only appear on the surface of a mirror when the mirror is undisturbed, so the reflections of Intellect and the higher soul can only be present to the whole soul when it remains still (I 4,10,10 ff.); the further it advances towards the One, the stiller its contemplation becomes (III 8,6,14 ff.).

Note how P. has given the traditional concept of 'stillness' a new application.

2,15 ὁ τοῦ συγκεκριμένος καλὸν: Another Platonic reminiscence; see Pl. Ti. 43b5-6. The image may also have been used by Numenius (fr. 33) to describe the sensible world.

2,16 πῶς τὸ πνεύμα: Τὸ πνεύμα does not have here the technical meaning which it has in some of the Presocratics (see,
e.g., Anaxagoras, DK B.2). Here it simply means 'environment'
and is explained by what follows (cf. II 3,14,16; III 1,2,6,5,25).

σὐγκὸς ἀμύνων: A well known crux. The mss. are
divided between the senseless ἀμύνων and ἄμβινον.
'Ἀμύνων' is retained by Perna, Creuzer, Br., Ci. and H-S.
Br. translates: '... le ciel même, supérieur aux autres éléments'
and Ci. gives: 'e il cielo stesso ch'è più buono di lei (sc. the
souls)'. Both these interpretations flounder, it seems to me,
because they require that ἄμβινον be taken predicatively.
The word is used predicatively in IV 3,17,3-4 καὶ γὰρ σὐγκὸς
ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τούτοις ἄμβινον, καὶ ἐν πρωτῷ ἃν νοητῶν
τῶν ἑσχατῶν which is cited by H-S as a parallel. In our
present passage, however, the word cannot be predicative since
we already have a predicative adjective, viz. ηῦμης,
available.

If ἄμβινον, then, is not predicative, and the reading
is retained, there are two possibilities: (a) that it is clear
from the context what the universe is better than; but whereas in
II 1,4,8 (another possible parallel) it is clear that the 'better
bodies' are the stars in contrast with earthly bodies, this is
not the case in our present passage where the addition of ἄμβινον
is somewhat abrupt. Or (b) that σὐγκὸς ἄμβινον is a common
phrase used in a semi-technical sense which would be readily
understood. This would presuppose that P. or one of his pre-
decessors had somewhere distinguished the σὐγκὸς ἄμβινον
from the σὐγκὸς ἐλάττων or σῦματα ἐλάττων; but
there is no evidence for this, and the phrase σὐγκὸς ἄμβινον
recurs only in IV 3,17,3.

Of emendations proposed there are two types: (i) those that substitute for ἀριστίνον an adjective used predicatively, (a) an adjective synonymous with θόνη (Ki. and Mü. read ἀκήραν (cf. I 6,5,15)), or (b) a participle, ἀμη μίνων (Dodds, CQ 16 (1922), p. 96) or ἀναμίνεν (Sleeman, CQ 22 (1928), p. 30). Both Dodds and Sleeman think that the use of τοῦτος (sc. οὐρανόν) in 2,18 suggests that P. is already thinking of a sleeping universe ready to be illuminated by soul; but this thought does not begin, it seems to me, until νοεῖν ὑ' in 2,17.

(ii) Creuzer, in his second Paris edition, followed Jahn's suggestion (Basilius Magnus Plotinizans (Bern, 1838), p. 12) of the colourless attributive adjective ἀμήνων; the word is not used elsewhere in P.

Fic. and MK omit the word from their translations, Vo. from his text. The Arabic paraphrase omits it too.

It seems to me that the corruption has not been satisfactorily explained; with Ha., I would mark the word with an obelisk.

2,17-18 νοεῖν ὑ' ... τοῦτος: Νοεῖν here seems to be used like ἐνοῦσαι = 'to imagine' (cf. IV 3,9,18; VI 3,13,21), as the passage describing the ensoulment of the universe which follows is purely imaginary. Br. ('qu'elle imagine'), and Ha. ('stelle sie sich vor') notice this point. Note the contrast between the stationary state of the universe before soul's arrival and its movement after ensoulment.
2,18 ἐπὶ ὑπὸν: In Plato's *Timaeus* the soul is described as embracing body 'from the outside' (Pl. *Ti.* 34b4; ibid. 36e3). Body is inside soul rather than vice versa (Pl. *Ti.* 36d9-36e1), a point picked up by P. (cf., e.g., IV 3,9,36 ff.), so that the image of soul coming into body from outside is figurative; in fact, there never was a time when body was not ensouled (IV 3,9,15-16).

The word ἐπὶ ὑπὸν contrasts with the notion of 'entry', a notion emphasised by the repetition of the prepositional prefix ἐπί - in 2,18-19.

2,18-23 τρίχωται ... κυάνων: On P.'s use of the imagery of light and colour see *Images*, pp. 46-61. The involvement of soul with the body and matter is often compared to the effect of light on its objects; light remains impassive though illuminating whatever comes into contact with it (I 1,4,15-16,7,4,12,24-25; I 8,14,38-39; II 9,3,1-2; III 6,9,9-11; IV 3,4,19-21,14,2; VI 4,3,22-23,15,14-16; VI 5,8 passim).

The particular image of soul as a ray of sunlight illuminating the dark cloud of body is Gnostic in origin; see W. Bousset (RE vii. :1519,42 ff.): 'und in den hilflos am Boden liegenden Leib ist dann aus der oberen Welt der göttliche Funke hineingekommen'. The Gnostics, though apparently not the Valentinians (see A. Orbe, *Gregorianum* 35 (1954), p. 53 n.96), took this literally: the souls were separate emanations from a source which remained constant. P. criticises this literal interpretation in his treatise against the Gnostics (II 9,11,1 ff., 12,3 ff.; VI 4,3,3 ff.). For him the whole of soul is present everywhere (2,37).
2.19

*Εισλάμπων* *is a rare word; apart from our present passage, LSJ cite only Thphr. *Ch* 2.7.4 and *Plu.* 2.929c. The usual Gnostic word was *Εισλάμπων* (Hippol. *Haer.* V.19.4 and X.11.3 (GCS)) also used by P. in *II 9* (see references to *II 9* in the preceding note), and elsewhere in non-polemical contexts (*I 1,12,25; I 8,14,38-39; VI 4,3,22-23; VI 5,8 passim*).

*Εισλάμπων* *is preferred in our present passage because of the prepositional prefix* (see on 2.18).

2.20

*Ελών βολάι* : The language is drawn from tragedy (*S. Ai.* 877; *E. Or.* 1259). Hippolytus in the passages cited in the preceding note uses *ἀμή* instead of *βολή* ; in *VI 4,3,4* , in what is almost certainly a Gnostic context, P. speaks of the (Gnostic) theory that the souls are *βολάι* .

2.21

*Χρυσοΰη* ... *ποιούσα* : Perhaps a reminiscence of *Pl. Phd.* 110c4 where the 'true earth' is described as *Χρυσούη* .

*ποιούσα* : The single mss. variant is *διαλούσα* .

Henry (*Etats*, p. 188) prefers *ποιούσα* , Schwyzer (*RhM* 86 (1937), p. 367 n.16) *διαλούσα* . H-S¹ print *ποιούσα* , H-S² *διαλούσα* . The choice between the two variants is difficult. The reading *ποιούσα* could perhaps be a corruption due to the proximity of *ποιούσα* , but Henry remarks (loc. cit.) that the repetition of *ποιούσα* is a 'bel example d'un négligence du style plotinien'. Since the corrections in the mss. (in A and C) give *διαλούσα* , while an original *διαλούσα* is never corrected into *ποιούσα* , I would be inclined on balance to read *διαλούσα* following Creuzer, Vo., Br. and Ha.. Ha. does not explain why *διαλούσα* follows 'dem sachlichen Erfordernis'.


Body alone, of course, is perishable, but by the presence of soul it acquires another nature (II 1,8,5-6). The problem of immortality of the universe is discussed in II 1,2-4. There P. comes to the conclusion that the flux of the body of the universe is a flux within itself (II 1,3,2-5). This seems to be due to the nature of the body of the universe which is more prone than human bodies to comply with the guidance of soul; hence its immortality (II 1,3,9 ff.).

Compare VI 7,22,14 ff. where the soul is described as being wakened into life by the warmth which it receives from the Intelligible World. The same image can be found in Albinus (X.3 p. 59 (Louis) and XIV.3 p. 81). In VI 8, 16,30 ff. the One's activity is called a state of \( \text{εγερθείς} \) where the awakener is the One itself.

The soul is the source of movement, and by continually drawing the universe towards it it keeps it in perpetual motion (II 2,1,45 ff.). II 2, which deals with the movement of the universe, is discussed by P. Merlan, 'Plotinus Enneads II 2', TAPA 74 (1943), pp. 179-191: he sees 'the cyclical motion of the heavens as a spatial equivalent of the non-spatial ubiquity of soul' (op. cit. p. 189).

In Pl. Ti. 36e4 the life of the world soul is described as 'unceasing' and \( \text{ενεφέω} \).
However, for P. it is the life of Intellect which is \( \epsilon\varphi\beta\nu\nu \) par excellence (V 3,17,1). The soul, being a reflection of Intellect (see on 3,7), has a life which merely reflects that of Intellect. Thus the ordering principle in soul (\( \tau\alpha\varsigma \)) is a reflection of the \( \phi\rho\omicron\nu\varsigma\sigma\varsigma \) which is to be found at the higher level (IV 4,10,11-13). \( \tau\alpha\varsigma \) is the expression of the soul's attempt to copy the life of the Intelligible World; the movement of the heavens which constitutes it is \( \nu o\alpha\ \mu\mu\nu\nu\nu\ \kappa\kappa\kappa\kappa\mu\nu\mu\nu \ \pi\epsilon\iota \tau\alpha\iota\omega\nu^{'}, \text{aei} \) III 2,3,30-31; cf. IV 7,6,8 \( \iota\omicron\rho\rho\omicron\lambda\nu\omicron\omega\beta\alpha\iota \ \epsilon\varphi\beta\nu\nu\nu ; \) in Pl. Ti. 34a2 this movement is described as \( \pi\epsilon\iota \ \nu o\alpha\ \kappa\alpha i \ \phi\rho\omicron\nu\varsigma\sigma\varsigma \). The \( \phi\rho\omicron\nu\varsigma\sigma\varsigma \) properly to be found in Intellect is sometimes ascribed to soul (e.g., IV 2,2,44-45 \( \mu\mu\nu\kappa\alpha i \ \phi\rho\omicron\nu\varsigma\sigma\varsigma \ \alpha\mu\iota \)). \( \phi\rho\omicron\nu\varsigma\sigma\varsigma \), though, is not associated with the One.

Fic., followed by Creuzer in both his editions, reads \( \epsilon\varphi\beta\nu\nu \), the reading of A. and E. This is not noticed by H-S.

2,24 \( \xi\omicron\nu \ \epsilon\iota\delta\alpha\iota\mu\nu\nu \ \iota\gamma\nu\nu\nu ; \) Compare Pl. Ti. 34b8-9 where the universe is called a \( \epsilon\iota\delta\alpha\iota\mu\nu\nu \ \Theta\iota\omicron\varsigma \). This is quoted by P. at III 5,5,8. Compare also Pl. Ti. 92c6 where it is called a \( \xi\omicron\nu \ \delta\epsilon\alpha\tau\omicron \). This notion was taken over by the Stoics (cf. D.L. vii.139: the cosmos is a \( \xi\omicron\nu \ \ldots \ \epsilon\varphi\beta\nu\nu \kappa\alpha i \ \lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\kappa\omicron \)).

2,25-26 \( \nu o \ \pi\epsilon\iota \ \phi\chi\omicron\varsigma \ \sigma\omicron\mu\alpha \ \nu\mu\nu\nu \nu \) : In V 4,2,43 and VI 9,2,24-25 P. contrasts the 'corpse' with Intellect, the realm of life and intelligence. Only what has life and intelligence ceases to be a corpse. Thus, while matter in the Intelligible World has a
'defined and intellectual life', the matter of this world, when it has been shaped by the lower part of the soul, becomes only a 'decorated corpse' since it is not 'living or thinking' (II 4,5,15-18). After the arrival of the rest of soul part of which remains in the Intelligible World - this holds for human beings and for the cosmos - what was a 'decorated corpse' becomes fully ensouled.

Vitringa's before σώμα (Annotationes Criticæ in Plotini Enneadum Partem Priorem (Deventer, 1876)) is quite unnecessary.

2,26

γῆ καὶ υδάτες: Ha. thinks that P. means by these words not the elements but 'den Schlamm des Chaos'. This is unlikely; P. is under no obligation to mention all the elements by name. Basil, with his Christian notion of hell, writes γῆ καὶ σάλπιγγος (PG 29.769b; see Henry, Etats, p. 189).

2,26-27

μᾶλλον δὲ... μηδὲν: Since body is, strictly speaking, matter and a trace of soul (III 8,2,25 ff.; IV 7,2,22 ff.), to call the universe before soul's arrival 'earth and water' is misleading; without soul there is pure matter, non-being (II 4,16,3). 'Darkness' is what is left at the end of the procession from the One (cf. IV 3,9,25); in I 8 and II 4 P. often uses σκοτία and its cognates to describe matter. Darkness is, of course, the opposite of the light associated with soul and the Intelligible World. There is no darkness there (V 8,4,4-6; and see on 6,46).
2,27 καὶ ὁ ... φησὶ τις: A quotation of II. 20.65 describing the halls of Hades; the line is quoted by Plato as one of the lines to be deleted from Homer (Pl. R. 386d2).

2,27-42 γένοιτο δ' ἂν ... ἐκβηλητήτησιν: P. finally begins the detailed discussion of the organising role of soul as the principle of unity in the cosmos. The use of διανοιγόμενοι points back to that of λογικοῦμαι in 2,11. Λογισμός and διάνοια both involve reasoning; there is perhaps a contrast here between the reasoning faculties of the soul and its imaginative faculties (cf. νοεῖται 2,17).

Ενταῦθα, as Ha. remarks, means 'at this point' (see Wolters on III 5,8,6).

2,29-30 ὡς περίκειται ... τὸν οὐρανόν: Soul's function of holding body together (IV 2,2,44 πάντα περιλαμβάνει τίμια) has not yet been explicitly mentioned, though it is closely related to its function of organising the circular motion of the universe (see on 2,5). P. often uses words like κατέχομαι, σωνίζων or κρατῶν when speaking of soul (see, e.g., II 1,3,22,4,19 ff.; II 2,1,18). By holding the universe together soul acts as the principle of unification - note that in II 2,1,12 πυρήνητικον and ποιεῖται τι are paired. Compare also Pl. Leg. 896e6 ff. ἀγα μὲν ἐκ γυμνῆς πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανόν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλαταν ταῖς αἰκίς κυνῆσιν, αὐτοὶ οὖν ὁμοίως ἑστὶ βούλλειον, ὑπομελείον...

2,31 οὕτως ἐστὶν: Vitrunga's οὕτως is unnecessary: P. is thinking of οὐρανός which is masculine.
2,31-32 καὶ πᾶν διάστημα... ἰσμήτων: Ηα. following
Heintz (ap. Ha.) inserts κατά between καὶ and πᾶν in 2,31, reading καὶ κατὰ πᾶν διάστημα; he takes οὐγανός (to be understood from the context?) as the subject of ἰσμήτων, and wrongly claims to find a similar change of subject in Ch. He maintains that it makes no sense to speak of soul 'ensouling an interval'. But in VI 4,1,9 P. writes of soul that it fills τὸ διάστημα πᾶν, a clear parallel with our passage.

Διάστημα seems to have been used as a technical term in Aristotle (see Arist. Ph. 209b7) as well as in Stoicism and Epicureanism (Them. in Ph. 113.8 ff. (Schenkl)). The word and its cognates are used in P., as here, in the context of the sensible world. Separation and space in the sensible world are contrasted with the omnipresence of the contents of the Intelligible World. Beierwaltes, in a note on III 7,11,41, gives a useful collection of uses of the words. He cites II 9,17,7; III 2,2,5, 2,24 ff.; IV 3,20,24; IV 4,7,12 ff.; VI 5,3,25. 4,22,5,7. 10,39.. 11,1. 11,16. (11,25 ff. - whose relevance escapes me); VI 9,1,32.
One might also add IV 2,1,19, 1,39, 1,58.

2,32-33 ἀλλὰ μὲν ἄλλη... ὅπις ὀντός: All the mss. read Κεφαλίνων in 2,32, but Cyril (PG 76.924a) reads Κινομίνων. Henry (Etats, p. 127) calls both readings 'acceptables', while Dörrie (OCA 200 (1938), p. 528 n.1) thinks that Κινομίνων is the only reading possible.

It is perfectly true that, like all body, the body of the universe is in flux (II 1,2,5-6), although the world-body is
perfect and self-sufficient (IV 8,2,14 ff.) and flows within itself (II 1,3,3); in fact, the life of body is movement (II 2,1,14). But the movement of body is not the point here. P. is contrasting the mode of body's presence in the universe with the mode of soul's presence in body, both the body of the universe and the human body. Bodies, being primarily separable (IV 2,1, 11 ff.), are spatially separate from each other (see previous note). This characteristic of body - that it is spatially separate - is emphasised by the two pairs of genitive absolutes in 2,33-34.

And P. sums up the whole section in 2,38-39 by saying that the universe is Σωλής and ἀλλός ἀλλ' . In view of the context, therefore, and the emphasis on the spatial nature of body, reference to movement would be quite out of place.

2,34

τῶν ὑ' ἀλλόν ... ἵχόνπνον : Henry (States, p. 127) writes 'tous les manuscrits de Plotin même E ont ἀλλόν, faute probable de l'archétype, due à l'influence de τῶν ὑ' ; le contexte paraît exiger ἀλλον'.

P. is making a contrast between the two limbs of the genitive absolute. As H-S note, ἀνάφην (and its cognates) always convey the notion of separation in P., and not that of relationship, on which see LSJ s.v. I (see III 3,4,8; IV 3,12,20; V 2,1,22; VI 3,8,23; VI 6,1,17; VI 7,2,38). Therefore, if ἀλλόν is retained, the contrast must be focused on ζυγοτίας and ἀνάφης alone. M. van der Valk (Mnemosyne 9 (1956), p. 130) tries to defend the reading ἀλλόν, and translates 'when some objects are placed over against one another, whereas the others are detached from another' (sic). But 'over against'
means 'in full view of' and there is hardly a contrast between what is in full view of something and what is separate from it; the former implies the latter. Allo is almost certainly right; some objects face each other, some are separated in different ways.

Of editors and translators, Fie., reading ἀλλον, translates 'alia vero connexa, invicemque connexa', which involves the mistranslation of ἀπερχείσθαι. Vo., Br., Ci., Ha. and MK read ἀλλον, but Br.'s translation 'et ils sont séparés l'un de l'autre, qu'ils soient ou non dans des régions contraires' is mere paraphrase.

2,35-36 ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐὰν φυγῇ ... Κεχρόν ποιεῖ: Ἐξεύ must be supplied with the first part of this sentence. Bodies are spatially distinct; but soul is present everywhere as a whole, and carries on its life-giving and controlling functions without being split up into distinct parts.

The thought is clear enough, but the text is difficult.

First, Vo. and Br. are wrong to change the reflexive αὐτής of the mss. to ταυτῆς in 2,35. A more important problem concerns the repetition of the two phrases concerning the soul. H-S¹ suggest that μένα αὐτής should be construed with κατακερματισθεῖσα and that μοίων φυγῆς should be taken with Κεχρόν ποιεῖ. The second suggestion makes good sense but it is not at all clear how μένα αὐτής can be taken with κατακερματισθεῖσα. The natural way to take both phrases is to treat them as instrumental datives with Κεχρόν ποιεῖ. But in that case the repetition of μένα αὐτής and
μορίων ψυχής is otiose, and the use of ψυχής four words after the pronoun αὐτῆς is jarring. Accordingly, Br. proposed to delete ψυχής and to take ἐκάστην ... μορίων to refer to the sensible world - surely very difficult here where μέν has been used in 2,35 to refer to the soul. Henry suggested (Etats, p. 191) that μορίων ψυχής was an ancient gloss (it is omitted in Basil's paraphrase in PG 29.769c) and in H-S the phrase is deleted, rightly in my view.

Ha. keeps the two phrases μέν αὐτῆς and μορίων ψυχής and claims that the difficulties vanish if ἐκαστὸν is read in 2,35 in place of ἐκάστην. He argues that μέν αὐτῆς corresponds to τῇ ὅλῃ in 2,37, while if we read ἐκάστην there is nothing to correspond to τὰ πάντα in 2,36. He therefore suggests ἐκαστὸν as the object of ἔτιν ποτὲ. This certainly avoids the great difficulty involved in taking ἐκάστην as a dative of advantage as H-S suggest. But while ἐκαστὸν is attractive, it is false to maintain that the difficulties involved in the phrases μέν αὐτῆς and μορίων ψυχής disappear if this single change is made.

With some editorial eclecticism, I prefer to read οὐδὲ μέν αὐτῆς ἐκαστὸν κατακεκαμάθθησαν ζην ποτὲ. This has a Plotinian ring. For the separation of the object and verb by the participle compare 2,44-45 καὶ ὅταν ἀνεμ τῶν προσεδότων σκοτής λαβοῦν κεκαθαριζόντων, and for other examples of hyperbaton see RE 521.52 ff.

With the exception of ΜΚ, whose translation is an inexact paraphrase, all translators give the sense of this vexed passage.
2,36-37 ἀλλὰ τὰ ... πάντα: Vo. and Br. following Cyril (PG 76.924a) omit the definite article before πάντα. There is no justification for this; cf. VI 9,1,17).

P. investigates the mode of presence of the soul in the body in IV 2. He makes there a four-fold distinction. The physical world, σώματα, is primarily divisible, in contrast with the Intelligible World which is outside division (IV 2,1,11 ff.). Between these two extremes are two other natures, first that of qualities, which is closer to the nature of bodies, and secondly that of soul, which preserves its unity of substance even in spatially distinct bodies (IV 2,1,29 ff.; VI 4,1,17 ff.). The 'division' of soul is in fact a πάθημα of body, since body cannot receive soul in any other way (IV 2,1,75-76). P. sums up by saying in IV 2,2,52-53 that soul is ἐν καλὶ πολλά because its unity is a real unity in a plurality of bodies.

P. briefly repeats in our present passage the conclusions of his earlier treatise (IV 2 is fourth in Porphyry's chronological order). Compare also II 2,1,39-40 παντάχως οὐσά ἡ ὑφικὴ ὑλή; IV 4,19,15 ἐν παντὶ ὑλῇ τῶ σώματι οὐσᾶ; IV 9,1,2 παντάχως τῶν σώματος ὑλῆ πάρεστι.

2,37-38 τῷ γυνήσαντι ... κατὰ τὸ πάντη: Soul's father is Intellect which, in a figurative sense, begets it. Pic. omits γυνήσαντι from his translation.

'Ομοιωμένη (2,37) means that soul is like Intellect in the sense that soul is its image (see on 3,7); it further calls to mind the Platonic tag of ὑμοίως θεῷ (Pl. Tht. 176b1-2).
Soul imitates Intellect by being a unity (though its unity is less than that of Intellect which is a \( \textit{πολυς} \) (see 8,26 and note on 6,23-26)) and by being omnipresent; for the omnipresence of Intellect see \( V \) 8,4,7, 9,27-28; \( V I \) 4-5.

\( \text{Τὸ \ πάντα} \) means 'being on every side' or 'everywhere'; Pic. and MK give the wrong sense.

2,38-40 \( \text{καὶ \ πολὺς \ ἕν ... κόσμος \ ὅτι} \) : Body does not have an intrinsic unity (IV 7,3,27-28); the universe is not 'really one' (III 2,2,2 \( \text{i.f.} \)). Degrees of unity possessed depend on closeness to the One. Intellect gives unity to soul which in its turn transmits it to body (VI 9,1,42-43; cf. VI 9,1-2).

On the universe as \( \text{θεὸς} \) see Pl. \( \text{Τί.} \) 92c7 (\( \text{θεὸς \ αἰσθητός} \)) and on P.'s use of the word see on 1,2. In fact, it is only in virtue of their higher souls that divinity can be predicated of the planets (II 3,9,45-47).

2,40-41 \( \text{οὐκ \ εἶ \ καὶ ... ἀλλὰ \ ἀγαῖα} \) : On the divinity of the stars and planets see on 2,3-4 and 4,3-4. Their souls are in continual contemplation of Intellect, for in them the higher soul is predominant (see preceding note).

2,41-42 \( \text{καὶ \ ἡμεῖς ... διὰ \ τοῦτο} \) : On the idiom of \( \text{εἰτῆς} \) with an indefinite pronoun or adverb see Denniston, p. 489.

The question is, what is the force of \( \text{Tt} \)? Is P. saying that we, if we are anything, are what we are in virtue of soul (so MK, Ci. and Ha.)? Or is \( \text{Tt} \) to be taken adverbially? Then the meaning would be: 'and we are gods, if we are gods in any way, in virtue of soul' (so Pic. and Br.).
The second alternative seems to me most convincing. In the normal way of things we are not thought of as gods. However, it is our aim to become gods and to unite with Intellect (I 2,6,2-3; VI 9,9,58). P.'s last words were an injunction to reassociate the god within us with the divine in the universe (V.P. 2.25-27). Thus we might be said to be a god 'in some way'.

The god in us is the higher soul. In VI 7,5,21 ff. the higher man is said to have a ψυχή ἅγια θεοτέρα which does not leave the Intelligible World. However, man's involvement with body hinders perception of the working of that soul. Only by purification can he become his real, divine self (cf. 2,45-46 εἰσίν το...τίμον, ὅ ἐν ψυχῇ ). When free from body, man can join the world soul in its painless administration of the universe (IV 3,12,10-12; IV 8,2,19 ff.). The world soul divinises the universe (II 3,9,45-46) so one can assume that man too has become divine when he acts according to his higher soul and is on the same level as the world soul.

2,42 νίκεις γὰς ... ἐκβιβασμένοι : A quotation of Heraclitus (DK B.96). E. Roussos, 'Ο Ἡράκλειτος στὶς Ἐννίαβρος τοῦ Πλωτίνου (Athens, 1968), p. 69 ff. gives a full list of the places in ancient literature where this fragment is found. The γας seems to be part of the actual quotation, but its logical force is suitable here. The sequence of thought is: it is our souls which divinise us, since our bodies are worthless.

2,42 ἰδιον δὲ : Ki., Vo., Br. and Ha. follow the reading of A and the editio princeps and print ἰδιον . Ha.'s stated reason
is not compelling. A new step in the argument is being introduced, picking up the statement made earlier in 2,7-9. The adversative τοί makes perfect sense.

2,43 ἐπερβάτησα τοῖν: For τοῖν as feminine see Pl. Lg. 899e7; for the thought see on 2,7. Vo. and Br. unnecessarily delete the word.

Προσβάτησα can mean either 'older' (Pic., Br. and MK) or 'more important' (Cii.: 'più veneranda'; Ha.: 'e/würdiger'). I prefer the latter.

2,44 ὄμοσφίς: The problem of the relationship between the world soul and the individual soul is a vexed one, well discussed by H.J. Blumenthal in Le Néoplatonisme ('Soul, World-Soul and Individual Soul in Plotinus') pp. 55-63. He points out that P. is guilty of serious inconsistency.

We are often told that the existence of many souls presupposes the existence of one soul from which the many derive (III 9,3,4; IV 8,3,10 ff.; IV 9,4,15 ff.); and P. insists that this single soul is that from which the world soul and the individual soul both derive (IV 3,4,14 ff.). Thus, P. seems to conceive of a triangular relationship between Soul (= the third hypostasis), world soul and individual soul, with the Hypostasis-Soul at the apex and the other souls along the base. This fits well with passages like the present where the world soul and the individual souls are called ὄμοσφίς (cf. IV 3,6,1; cf. ἄδελφας II 9,18,16; IV 3,6,13).
On the other hand, it is clear that the world soul and individual souls in fact behave very differently. The world soul does not associate itself with the body, but controls it without trouble (IV 8,8,13 ff.) and is not actually in the body of the universe (III 4,4,4 ff.). (Contrast with this view, though, the 'dwelling of the world soul in the universe' mentioned at II 9,18,23-24). Individual souls are disturbed by too close an association with the body (though, as Blumenthal points out (op. cit. p. 60), this ought not to happen since all the bodies are prepared for the individual souls by the world soul (IV 3,6, 13-15; VI 7,7,8 ff.), so that there ought to be no difference between bodies when the individual souls arrive). Furthermore, it is the ideal for the individual soul to join the world soul in the administration of the universe (IV 3,12,10-12; IV 8,2,19 ff.).

These obvious differences of function between the individual souls and the world soul suggest that there is a corresponding difference in their nature and relative superiority. It is difficult to be convinced by P.'s assertion that they are ἐκμετάλλευσις, or by his insistence that all soul is a unity (IV 9 passim).

Our particular passage might be explained if ἡ θυμότερα (2,44) could be referred to our higher soul, which like the world soul, never descends into body. But this interpretation is precluded by the rest of the sentence; the higher soul does not need purification.
2,44-45 καὶ ὄταν... καθαρσίν: P. follows Plato in maintaining that purification meant separation (Pl. Phd. 67c5 ff.) - for his interpretation of this see on 10,24-26 - and that the virtues were purifications (Pl. Phd. 69b6 ff.), sometimes using the myth of Glaucus from Ῥ. 611c7 ff. as an example of what purification entails; the image is also found in I 1,12,13 ff.. He comments on the theory that virtues consist in purifications in I 2 (see on this, E. Bréhier, 'APETAI ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΙΣ', REA 42 (1940), pp. 53-58), and on purification being the equivalent of separation at III 6,5,13 ff.. The acquisition of virtue is a preparation for separation, which is achieved by turning away from the sensible world inwards and upwards towards intellect and the One. Thus purification and the ἐπιστροφή are closely related (cf. I 2,4,15 ff.); on the connection between purification and prayer see on 6,7, and, in general, G. Carrière, 'La κάθαρσις Plotinienne', Divus Thomas 28 (1951), pp. 197-204.

2,45-46 εἰκόνας... ὁ ἡ̄̄ ψυχή: Perhaps a verbal reminiscence of Pl. Ῥ. 611c4 καὶ πολὺ γε κἀλλιον αὐτὸ εἰκόνα. H-S's reference to the previous line (Pl. Ῥ. 611c3)is an apparent error. In place of τὸ αἰττότιμον (2,45-46) Dodds suggests τὸ αἰττότιμον (in letters to H-S) presumably on a parallel with αἰττομαχόν (I 8,13,8.13,10.13,11); αἰττομαχώτητα (V 9,13,2.14,18;VI 7,4,17); αἰττομαχόμενον (II 4,7,16); αἰττόγη (VI 7,11,35); αἰττομαχία (VI 6,14,49); αἰττομαχία (I 2,6,16-17); αἰττομαχία (I 8,13,10.13,11); αἰττομαχία (I 8,13,9); αἰττόν (V 3,12,52); αὐτοκτονήση (V 8,4,40); αὐτοκτόνος (III 8,8,12); αὐτοδοξία (VI 8,12,8);
altonous (V 9,13,3); altoostasis (III 7,2,36); and altosynthesis (V 9,13,3,13,5,13,7). These compounds of altos- though, are generally used to refer to the Forms - e.g. altosynthesis is the Form of knowledge (although alton seems to be an exception to this). The notion of Absolute altonov seems out of place here.

Only Pic. and Ci. give a good translation of this part of the sentence. To alto = 'the same thing', altonov is predicative, and de yin ynik is in apposition to to alto. 'You will find the same thing of value (sc. both in the individual and in the world soul), namely what we have described as soul'. On the past tense yin see R. D. Hicks on Arist. de An. 412b11.

2,46-47 kal ymiwtevov... yin : Compare Pl. Smp. 210b6-7 and id. Lg. 727d8 ff.

2,47-49 yin yin panta... kan adpe : The first three words are a quotation from Arist. Metaph. 989a9-10 panta yin einai phai (sc. oi pollai twn anthrwmov ) yin . Everything which is somatikon consists of one or more of the four elements plus a trace of soul. P. devotes more space in his argument to fire than to the others because Heraclitus (see Arist. Metaph. 984a7-8) made fire his first principle, and, more particularly, the Stoics (SVF 1,120; 1,157; Cic. ND 2.24 - following Cleanthes according to F. Solmsen, Cleanthes or Posidonius? The Basis of Stoic Physics, Med. der Kon. Ned. Akad. 24,9 (1961)) posited fire as the creative principle in the
universe. Fire to them was material and so for P. could never
usurp any of the functions of the immaterial soul, though in a
curious passage in I 6,3,19 ff., perhaps based on Arist. GC
335al8-21, he comes near to giving fire immaterial status. See
on 3,10-12.

2,49-50 ἐὰν ὁ δὲ ὁ πυρὸς ἀλλοι διωκεῖ: Having demonstrated the
pre-eminence of soul, P. adds the rider that the proper object
of pursuit is man's own soul.

All mss. read ἀλλοι in 2,50, though not all translators
translate the word in a personal sense (cf. Fic.'s: 'aliud
quicquam'). Ha. changes ἀλλοι to ἀλλο. He is surely
right; the point is not that soul pursues someone else, but that
it chases after whatever contains soul (i.e. τὸ σωματικὸν ),
deceived by the image of itself which it sees there. Compare 1,17
ἐὰν... διωκεῖν ἀλλο.

2,50 ἄγασσε: This word is rightly taken as an imperative by all
translators other than Ha.. Why the imperative 'den Gedankengang
verfehlt' Ha. does not explain.
CHAPTER THREE

Having pointed out that the soul is not worthless (Ch. 1) and having given his reasons (Ch. 2), P. turns in this chapter to the relationship between soul and Intellect, through which soul's full potentialities are assured of their complete expression. The last lines (3, 24-25) act as a bridge between Chapters 3 and 4.

3,1 οὕτως δὴ τιμήν ... τῆς ψυχῆς: Cf. IV 2,1,68-69 θινόν τὸ Χειρήμα τιμήν ... καὶ τῶν ἀπειρ ὑπὸ Χειρήματα φύσεων (for the pun on Χειρήμα cf. Pl. Lg. 727e ff.); IV 7,10,26-27.

Basil reads κορά (PG 29.772b; cf. Henry, Etats, p. 193), perhaps influenced by Pl. Lg. 728c. Χειρήμα is undoubtedly the right reading; see besides the references above 3,6; IV 7,10,49. 11,1.

3,2 πιστιωτας Ἰη... Θεὸν μυτίναι: For the construction see LSJ s.v. πιστιωτός I.4. Τὸ τοιαῦτα is not instrumental (all translators except for Br. who is inexact at this point), but is the subject of the infinitive μυτίναι, which is probably future (Pic., Ci. and Ha.) rather than present (MK) (Br. is again inexact). Translate: 'believing that such a thing as soul will approach God' (cf. Pl. Phdr. 248a2 (ψυχή)... Θεὸν ἐπιφάνεια). An instrumental dative would be otiose alongside μὲ τοιαῦτα αἰρέται.

The position of Ἰη suggests that it should rather be taken with πιστιωτας (as Pic., Ci. and Ha.) than with μυτίναι (MK). Br. omits the word from his translation.
The god of 3,2 is Intellect (cf. 1,2, and the refs. to 'father' in 2,37; 3,14 and 3,21). Self-confidence, however, is important even at the level of Intellect (I 6,9,22-24). The soul must become Intellect and entrust itself to it before it can reach the One (VI 9,3,22-27).

3,2-3 μὴ τοιαύτης αἰτίας : This means 'with the help of such a causal principle.' P. has dealt with the causal role of soul in Ch. 2. Translators miss the force of αἰτία.

3,3 ἀνάβασις πρὸς ἐνώπιον : The upward path; on the history of the image of 'ascent' towards a god see RLAC s. 'Erhebung des Herzens'. The image may have originated from the physical fact that the sanctuary or altar at which prayers were offered was often at a higher level than its environments (see RLAC s. 'Aufwärts-abwärts').

The image is common in Plato especially in the myth of the cave in R. VII (ἀναβάλλειν 515e8; ἀναβάσσως 515e6; etc.). But note also Phdr. 246a2 ff., where the myth of the winged soul necessarily entails the notion of upward and downward movement, and the description of the dialectical ascent towards Beauty in Smp. 211b7 ff.

Words signifying upward movement are common in the Enneads, e.g., 'ἀναβάλλειν in I 4,7,16; I 6,7,1. 9,23-24; I 8,13,12; IV 7,12,8; V 9,2,10; VI 9,3,21; ἄναψω in I,24; 10,28; ἀνατειχὼν in VI 9,9,14; ἀναφέρων in V 9,2,5. But for P. the ascent is not merely an ascent towards knowledge as it was for Plato. It is the spiritual ascent through purification towards
union with the One, and this involves unification with Intellect (VI 9,3,22-23). On purification see on 2,44-45 and 6,11; and on the degree of union involved on 5,3.

3,3-4 οὐ πόθεν βαλίς... τὰ μίατε : Br. adopts Vo.'s correction ἕπιβαλίς for βαλίς (cf. I 6,2.2 where Vo. changes the simple noun βολή into the compound ἔπιβολή).

Seidel (De Usu Praepositionum Plotiniano Quaestiones (Nissen, 1886), p. 39) justifies the use of the simple verb by comparing III 8,10, 32 καὶ βαλίν πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ταξίν and II 4,5,10 ὀφθαλμοὶ ψυχοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ φῶς βαλίν (where Vo. suggests βλέπων; see Kraef. I.xvii). P. does sometimes use the compound, e.g., V 9,7,18 and VI 5,12,9, but the simple βαλίς is perfectly acceptable. See also Henry, Etats, p. 193. Βαλίν means here 'to shoot'. The metaphor is taken from warfare.

Pic.'s 'vagaturus' is quite wrong.

P.'s remarks here are directed against the belief which he associated with the Gnostics that there were more than three hypostases. For his detailed arguments against this position see II 9,1-6.

Πόθεν is used here in a figurative sense. In the Intelligible World all physical relations such as 'near' and 'far' are excluded (VI 4,2,46; VI 5,8,7-8), since such relations are attributes of body. What separates the hypostases is 'difference' (ἡφαίστης or διάφορος) (VI 9,8,30-32; cf. 3,21-22 and note; 6,53; IV 3,11,21; VI 4,4,23-24. 11,9 ff.). 'Difference' specifically provides against spatial separation. On this see R. Arnou, 'La Séparation par Simole Alterité dans la "Trinité"

3,4 λαμβάνει τὸ ἐστὶ, τὸν τὸν τό : As Dr. points out (ad loc.), the article is necessary if τὸ ψυχῆς is to be read in 3,5. It is omitted by Ki., Hm., Vo. and Dr.

3,5 Θεότερον... γινόμενα : Because soul comes after Intellect in the περιστάσεις (cf. 3,5-6 μὴ δ' ἐκλ. ἀφ' οὐ ἡ ψυχή), it is different and less divine than it (see on 2,7). Dr. does not realise that τοῦ Θείου τοῦτου (3,4-5) is a genitive of comparison.

The use of γινόμενα and its cognates emphasises the closeness of the Intelligible entities to each other (see on 3,3-4). Ha. (in a note on I 2,5,24) compares with this use P.'s use of ἐφάπτεσθαι in VI 4,2,45, of οἷς ἀπεργηθη in IV 3,9,30 and of ὁμογένεια in IV 8,7,7. He emphasises the connection between soul as the 'neighbour' of Intellect and soul as its 'interpreter' (ἐμνημοσύνη γινομένη ΙV 3,11,19; see introduction to Ch. 2). P. believed that γινόμενα had an effect upon the parties involved (I 2,5,25-27). Thus, whatever borders on soul shares in soul's logos (IV 3,9,27; for the meaning of logos see on 3,8); consequently body, because it is soul's 'neighbour', enjoys a trace of soul (III 9,3,2; VI 4,15,14-15). Similarly, soul borders on Intellect and becomes like it. So ultimately, this likeness is passed on to the physical world.

H-S think that the use of the word γινόμενα indicates a verbal quotation from Pl. Lg. 705a4. This view is apparently
held only by Henry, since in *RE* 551.20 ff., and *Entr.* p. 89, Schwyzzer denies that actual quotations from the *Laws* can be found in the *Enneads* (cf. Harder in *Entr.* p. 92). In the *Laws* passage which H-S quote, Plato is talking of the sea, which he calls ἀλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν γυτόνημα. This phrase is itself partly a quotation from Alcman (Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci*, fr. 108 ἀλμυρὸν τὸ γυτόνημα). The word γυτόνημα is only found before P. in the Platonic/Alcmanic passage and quotations of it; but this evidence is not sufficient to prove that P. was explicitly referring to Plato here, especially in view of the frequent use of the metaphor of 'neighbouring'. (Besides γυτόνημα, P. uses γυτονικεῖν in I 2,5,25; γυτονικεῖος in I 2,5,26; and γυτονικαί in VI 4,15,14). The use of a single non-technical word cannot prove direct verbal quotation from another author.

Γυτόνημα itself means, of course, 'neighbourhood' rather than 'neighbour'. Br. and MK get this wrong.

3,5-6 μὲθ' ὃ καὶ ἄφ' ὃ ἡ ψυχή : With μὲθ' ὃ cf. VI 2,22,20 - 21 νοεῖ... ἐκ τοῦ μὲθ' ἐλατὸν ψυχήν.

'Αφ' ὃ ἐκατερομένη emphasizes the causal relationship between Intellect and soul, μὲθ' ὃ their position in the Intelligible hierarchy.

3,6-7 εἶπον ἐκατερομένος ὁ λόγος : The 'logos' (= 'discussion') was in Ch. 2. For other reference to logos used in this way, see E. Fruchtel, *Der Logosbegriff bei Plotin - eine Interpretation* (Diss. München, 1955), p. 13 n. 1. On the meaning of logos in 3,8 see note ad loc.
3,7 οικών τις ητοι νοη : Because of the closeness of the hypostases to each other (3,5), each assimilates some of the qualities of its prior. Thus, soul is like Intellect which in turn is like the One. This relationship is expressed by P. here by the word οικών (cf. also 7,1; II 9,4,25; V 8,7,12-16 coupled with ημιονία ; V 8,8,20); but he also uses ένωσιν in 6,46-47; V 4,2,26; VI 8,18,35; ένώσις in VI 7,40,19; VI 8,18,26-27; μέμημα /μέμησις in V 3,16,41; V 4,2,25; V 5,5,22; ένωσις in 7,44; III 8,11,19; VI 7,17,39, 18,5; or ένωσ in V 2,1,15.

Strictly speaking the close relationship between Intellect and soul exists only for the higher ratiocinative soul (διανοητικόν), whose intellectual activity mirrors the non-discursive thought of Intellect (see on 3,17). P. makes this point clear in several passages. In V 3,4,20 ff. it is the ratiocinative soul (τὸ διανοητικόν ) which is described as 'second after Intellect and its image'; and the points of resemblance are explained in V 3,8,46 ff.. The lower functions of soul (φύσις, αισθήσις, τὸ ἐνθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοῦσις ) are specifically excluded from this close relationship since they are directed towards what is mortal (V 3,9,2 ff.). Compare also V 9,6,15 ff. where the vegetative soul (φύσις ) is described as the image not of Intellect but of 'another higher soul' where the 'higher soul' is presumably the ratiocinative soul; and 7,42-43.

Soul's function as a bridge between the Intelligible and sensible worlds necessitates its having diverse functions, and this very diversity tends to make soul into a composite entity;
thus, only that part of soul which is like Intellect in its activity resembles it sufficiently to be called its image. But since P. firmly believed that soul was in fact a unity (see IV 9, passim), the close relationship to Intellect is sometimes extended even to soul's non-intellectual activities (see V 3,7,30-34 καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἑάναις ὀμοίως θεωτεὶ καὶ ποιοῦσα εἶδη ποιεῖ, οἷον νοητικὰ ἀπεξερομένας, ἵνα τὰ πάντα εἶναι ἐν οὐσίᾳ νοητοῖς καὶ νοῆ... μυθομαχίας τῶν μὴ ἐνηχθᾶς μᾶλλον, τῶν δὲ ἐνάχθαις ἀμβλύκατον ἀποστολοῦντα ὑπόνοια) Thus, although only the higher soul is properly the image of Intellect, all soul's activities from highest to lowest are in the last analysis dependent on Intellect, and reflect it in some way. Soul is Intellect's logos (see on 3,8).

3,7-8 οἷον λόγος ὁ ἐν προφητείᾳ... τοῦ ἐν φυσικῇ: The concept of 'image' is elaborated by means of the concept of 'logos'; as the logos in expression is the image of the logos in the soul, so the soul is the logos of Intellect. One is led to expect some sort of image relationship between the logos in soul and the logos in Intellect. But instead P. asserts a closer relationship, probably because speech does not merely image, but actually expresses thought; soul is the logos (= expressed content) of Intellect.

The distinction between the προφητεύω and ἰνδιάθετος logos is repeated by P. in a similar context in I 2,3,27 ff. (see on 3,8); cf. also III 8,6,22 διάτοθῇ... προφητεύει. The language of προφητεύω and ἰνδιάθετος seems to have been introduced by the Stoics (cf. SVF II.135), and to judge
from Porphyry, Abst. 187.20 (Nauck) the distinction itself was assumed to be a Stoic invention. But although the Stoics may have developed it, the distinction can be found in both Plato and Aristotle. In Thet. 189e4 ff. Plato defines διάνοια as the logos ὃν αὐτὴ πέρος αὐτὴν ἡ φυσικὴ διείσχεται πετὺ ὑπὸ ἀν ὀκονθι; and in Sph. 263e3 ff. he distinguishes between the logos which is ἐν τῆς φύσει περὶ αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φυσικῆς γνωμόνες (= διάνοια) and the expressed word λόγος μετὰ φθοράς (cf. Phil. 38d1 ff. and Ti. 37b3 ff. with Proclus' note on the passage, especially in Ti. II.308.18 ff. (Diehl)). Aristotle in APo. 76b24 ff. makes a similar distinction - between the external logos and the logos in the soul. As H. P. Müller points out (AGPh. N.F. 23 (1916), p. 40) the distinction is merely that between 'oratio' and 'ratio'. It was widely adopted by Philo (e.g., Vit. Mos. II.127; De Special. Leg. IV.69).

3,8 οὕτω τοι καὶ αὐτῇ λόγοι νου.: Because of its different meanings and its adaptability, logos is one of the most difficult words in Greek of which to give a philosophical definition. A useful compilation of the occurrences of this word in the Enneads has been made by J. Wolf, Der Gottesbegriff Plotins (Diss. Freiburg, 1927), pp. 20-25; see also E. Fruchtel, op. cit. in note on 3,6-7.

The best way to begin is to look at the later passage in which P. uses the λόγοι προφορικὸς /λόγος ἰδιάθετος contrast.
First, it is clear from this passage that there are logoi in Intellect as well as in the soul. And we are told in II 7,3,14-15 that these logoi are transcendent (cf. IV 3,5,18; V 8,2,18-19). P. also says that there is one logos which includes all the other logoi within it (VI 2,21,29-30). Similarly (cf. 4, 26-27), there is one Intellect although its contents (each one called an Intellect) are many. These examples seem to show that when P. speaks of the logoi of Intellect he means its contents, i.e., the Forms, which like the logoi are transcendent. At the level of Intellect, logos and logoi seem to be ways of referring to Intellect itself and to the Forms. (Contrast, however, V 8,3, 8, and, for further contrast, II 4,5,8) But logoi in the soul are not the same as the logoi in the Intellect; they are μετεξερμίνοι, further removed from unity although they derive from the logoi above them (cf. V 9,3,30-31 Ταύτη (sc. η ψηλή των χρησίων των λόγων γνώσεως (sc. φύσις)). What Intellect gives to soul is 'near the truth' (V 9,3,35-36).

The logoi of soul, since they come from Intellect and thus resemble Intellect's logoi, constitute as it were the ψεύδος or μορφή of soul. They are the presence of Intellect in soul, although, from another viewpoint, Intellect as the provider of these logoi is like the workman who provides the οίκος (V 9,3,33 ff.; see note on 3,22-25); i.e., Intellect gives logoi to soul which are like the logoi in itself. Finally, there are what P. calls the
logoi 'in matter' (II 7,3,12; VI 1,29,11; VI 7,11,10). These seem to be the same as the immanent forms. In II 7,3,11-12 body is described as matter and immanent logos (cf. also II 6,2,15 and VI 7,4,19). Thus, there seems to be a threefold logos – (a) logoi in Intellect = the Forms, (b) logoi in soul, and (c) logoi in matter = the immanent forms. It is through the immanent forms that the physical world resembles its Intelligible archetype; and it is through the soul as ζεύγων that the immanent forms are introduced into matter. Thus the activity of soul takes place through logoi, since it is the logoi in itself which become the logoi in matter. It is the logoi which are active (cf. III 8,2,27-28 ὁ γὰρ σημαίων ὁλῷ μικρὸν τὸν ἐν τοῖς  ἐκ ὑπὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσιν τοὺς λόγους ὀνειρὲς τοὺς ποιούντας ; II 3,16,19-20 - the soul contains λόγοι ψυχον-ητικοί ). Thus, when P. calls soul the logos of Intellect he means soul as the active interpreter or bridge between the Intelligible and sensible worlds. (For other passages where soul is called logos of Intellect see 6,44-5; IV 3,5,8 ff.) Soul acts by activating the logoi within itself. Note how in our present passage logos is coupled with 'activity' ( ἐνέγματο ). But it is emphasised that Intellect is the source of logoi in the soul and their subsequent activity (V 9,3,30-32 - Intellect is the ξυγιῶν ; III 2,2,15 - Intellect gives a part of itself to matter; III 2,2,23 - the sensible universe ultimately derives from Intellect and the logos which comes from it). Soul is the intermediary through which Intellect is present in the physical universe.
In view of all this, we must ask whether it is possible to call Intellect the logos of the One, as has been generally supposed (Bréhier, note on V 1,6,53; Entr. p. 98 (Henry): 'Le Logos est chaque fois un reflet de l'hypostase précédente'; ibid. p. 99 (Theiler): 'auf jedem Niveau der Niveauunterschied ausgedrückt wird durch λόγος '; W. Beierwaltes, Über Ewigkeit und Zeit (Enneade III 7) (Frankfurt a. M., 1967), p. 50; A. Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics (Leiden, 1972), p. 35: 'Plotinus would even say that intelligence is the λόγος of the One'; R.T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London, 1972), p. 68).

First, it seems to me that if P. did call Intellect the logos of the One, by doing so he would trace the hierarchy of logoi not back to Intellect but back to the One. Thus, he might be expected to speak of the presence of the One in the physical world, since it would be through logoi that all the hypostases and their products would be related. P., however, does not do this. He calls Intellect the 'true maker and demiurge' (V 9, 3, 26); it is Intellect which fills the sensible world with beautiful things through soul's intermediacy (IV 7, 13, 17-18); it is Intellect, not the One which gives 'something of itself' to matter (III 2, 2, 15). Intellect is not the logos of the One in the sense that it expresses the content of the One in some other sphere in the way that the content of Intellect is expressed in the physical world by soul.

J. M. Rist, who rightly opposes the view of Bréhier, Henry etc. (Plotinus: the Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 84 ff.) cites two passages on which such a view could be based. The first
is 6,44-45 οἶον καὶ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἐνέγκυμα τις, ὀσποτε αὐτὸς ἐλεινόν. As Rist points out, it is not clear from this passage whether ὀσποτε αὐτὸς ἐλεινόν goes with the whole of what precedes or whether it should be taken merely with the last part; i.e., it is possible to understand ὀσποτε αὐτὸς ἐλεινόν only with ἐνέγκυμα τις.

(There is no problem about Intellect being an ἐνέγκυμα of the One; see on 3,9.) Consequently, this passage cannot be used on its own as evidence that P. calls Intellect the logos of the One. In the other passage which Rist mentions (VI 4,11,16), and which he takes to be the one clear passage in which P. does call Intellect the One's logos, P. is talking of the Intelligible World (or Intellect) and calls it a logos ὁι καὶ πολύς.

First, it is to be noted that Intellect is not actually called a logos of anything, but merely a logos, and in view of the wide application of the term 'logos', this is important. And since the logoi in Intellect are identical with the transcendent Forms, P. is probably saying no more by the phrase λόγος ὁι καὶ πολύς than that the single Intellect contains the individual Forms (or νόης) within it. As he says elsewhere (e.g., VI 7,13,1 ff.), Intellect is not a simplex but a differentiated complex. Consequently, I disagree with Rist's view that VI 4,11,16 is a clear instance of P.'s calling Intellect the One's logos. P. makes his position clear in VI 7,17,41-42, quoted by Rist op. cit. p. 85, where he says that if per impossible the One were an ὁιός (a transcendent Form), then Intellect would have been its logos (since it is the world of Forms which is expressed by the logoi.
in the world of matter).

To sum up, then; although P. can and does call soul the logos of Intellect, it is most unlikely that he would call Intellect the logos of the One. The concept of 'logos' is a complex one, but the key notion is that of 'expression'. Hence the word comes to be used both of the subject of the 'expressing' (i.e., Intellect and soul), and of the objects 'expressed' (the logos in soul and in matter). In trying to elucidate what P. means the danger is to be more precise than the language which he uses allows.

3,8-9 καὶ ἡ πᾶσα ἐνέγμα: Ἡ πᾶσα ἐνέγμα must be taken closely with προϊκαὶ in 3,9. Soul is not the whole of the activity of Intellect, since on the double-activity theory (see on 3,9-10) one of the activities of Intellect is directed inwards. Soul is the product only of Intellect's external activity. See VI 2,22,26-28 soul is ... ἢ ἐνέγμα ἡς αὐτώ (τοῦ νοῦ). οὗτος μὲν γε ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέγμεν, τὰ ἐνέγματα οἱ ἀλλοι νοῷ, ὥστε ἐν αὐτῶ, ψυχῇ .

3,9 καὶ ἣν προϊκαὶ ἑωθυν: Vo. and Br. read καθ᾽ ἦν , a reading unsupported by any mss. authority. No change of text is necessary; the external activity of Intellect actually is the life of soul. P. regularly associates ἐνέγμα and ἑωθυν; e.g., II 5,3,38 ff.; III 2,16,17 ff.; III 8,10,3; VI 5,6,27 ff.; IV 5,7,13 ff.; cf. also Arist. Metaph. 1072b26-27 ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέγμα ἑωθυν . From these passages, it is clear that life is an activity. If so, there is no abruptness in ἐνέγμα
followed by καὶ ἢν... ἦν. The καὶ is explanatory in force (see Wolters on III 5,2,42), and should not be omitted.

The subject of προῖται is νοῦς rather than ψυχή. E. R. Dodds, with Vo.'s text translates in his private copy, '... the whole activity by which she (ψυχή) projects life into other things.' He compares 2,2 αὐτὴ μὲν ἔσω ἐναέρῳ πάντα ἐμπνεύσασα αὐτὸς ἦν. But ἑνδότασις in 3,9 almost certainly has the meaning 'separate existence' (see following note) in view of the fact that P. is dealing with the working of the procession from the One by the double-activity theory. In this case, only νοῦς can be the subject of προῖται.

For Intellect as responsible for soul's life see V 3,8,27 ff.

3,9-10 εἰς ἄλλον ἑνδότασιν... τὴν περίχειν: "Ἐνδότασις was not a technical term when P. wrote. His pupil Porphyry was responsible for the word's technical development (H. Dörrie, "Ἐνδότασις", Wort und Bedeutungsgeschichte', NAWG Phil. Hist. Kl. (1955), p. 73.). P. does not restrict the word to what we call the hypostases; he can talk of the hypostasis of time (IV 4,15,3), of the category of the relative (VI 1,6,3), of wisdom (I 4,9,18-19); in III 5 ἑνδότασις is a synonym for ὀνάσια (see Wolters on III 5,2,23), and marks the contrast between Intelligible Reality and the flux of the sensible world. It is found in the context of the creative activity of the πρόοδος, as here (cf. III 5,2,35 ff.; V 4,1,37 ff., 2,34-36; note the criticisms in V 3,12,17 ff., and see on 6,34-37). Entities have a separate existence (ἐκμιν or λαμβανόν ἑνδότασιν: see IV 7,8,26; V 4,2,35; V 6,3,11; V 9,5,46) when they have been defined by their prior.
In view of the connection of the word with the Intelligible World and with the procession from the One it is easy to see how the word acquired the technical meaning which it later had. Strictly speaking the One is ζητός ὑποστάσεως (VI 8,10,35 ff.), but nevertheless P. speaks of the One as the πρώτη ὑποστάσεις in VI 8,15,28 (cf. VI 8,13,43-44 ἢ δὲ τῆς ἀμαθείας ὑποστάσεως).

When P. wants to refer to the particular status of the One, Intellect or soul instead of the word ὑποστάσεως he regularly uses the word φύσις (see 8,27 ταῦτα φύσιν ταῖς ἡμῖν and Wolters on III 5,1,45; he cites II 9,6,34; III 2,2,8; V 5,2,12. 3,1. 3,3. 6,14. 6,17. 6,34; V 8,1,34. 9,42; see further V 5,7,18; VI 8,11,14. 11,16).

The theory of the double- ἰνέχεια explains the genesis of the hypostases. P. explains the theory most fully in V 4,2, 27-30 ἰνέχεια ἡ μία ἢ ἢ ἡ ἢ σοῦ ἢ οὐσίας, ἢ δὲ ἢ ἢ σοῦ ἢ οὐσίας ἡ ἡ ἢ ἢ σοῦ ἢ οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἢ ἢ σοῦ ἢ οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἢ ἢ σοῦ ἢ οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἢ ἢ σοῦ ἢ οὐσίας αὐτοῦ. He illustrates the theory, as here, by the image of fire. One heat constitutes the οὐσία of fire, the other (external) heat derives from the first and is only possible when the first is active. P. continues (V 4,2, 32-37) οὕτω δὴ καλέο... ἐν ἡς ἐν αὐτῷ τελεσίτην καὶ ομοίωσις ἰνέχειας ἢ ἀργοθεῖν ἰνέχεια ὑπόστασιν λαβοῦσ... εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν ἕλθαν. The theory is mentioned again, though more briefly, in II 9,8,22 ff., where it is applied to Intellect; and in IV 3,10,31 ff., where it is applied to soul.
Further references can be found at 6,30 ff.; III 5,3,3 ff.; IV 5,7,17 ff.; V 2,1,16 ff.; V 3,7,19 ff.; VI 2,22,26. 22,29; cf. III 2,4,13-16; IV 5,6,23-25.

P. stresses that of the two activities the internal one is the most important. In fact, the external activity is dependent on the internal for its existence (V 3,7,20-22 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἥμισυ τῷ αὐτῷ, τὸς αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμνύσῃ. ἐάν γὰρ ἐπεμένον ἐν ἐμνύσῃ, ἑτα καὶ ἐς ἄλλο ). Again P. uses fire as an image; the internal activity of the fire which constitutes its ὀνείρια is a necessary precondition for any external effect which the fire might have.

The connection of the primary internal activity with ὀνείρια is derived from Aristotle (see Bonitz, Index, 251a15, where references are given to passages in which ἐνέχεια is used synonymously 'cum iis nominibus quae formam significant ἐαυτῷ, λόγος, τῷ τῇ ὑπὸ συναχεῖ, ὀνείρια, ὃπερ τῷ'. Cf. C. Rutten, H Philos 146 (1956), p. 102.). But the way in which P. connects the two concepts is most un-Aristotelian. Internal activity is the exercise of contemplation (θυμία) or ὑποτροφία (see on 3,13-14) towards what comes above the subject of the activity. Until this ὑποτροφία takes place, the contemplating subject is undefined (see on 5,6-19 and 6,17-19), and has no ὀνείρια. Only by ὑποτροφία does Intellect become Intellect; see V 3,11,12-16 δῶρον οἶν ὤν νοῦς ὑπεβαλεῖ μὲν ἐνέχειαν (sc. τῷ εἴπε), λαβών τις ἐγάνειον νοῦς ... καὶ γνώριμον καὶ νοῦς καὶ ὀνείρια καὶ νόησις, ὅτε ἐνόησε· περὶ γὰρ τούτου οὐ νόησις ἡν το νοητὸν οὐκ ἔχων

1. Ἡ-5' om. ἐν
Similarly, the soul owes its power to 'the vision of what comes before it' (II 9,2,15) (cf. R. Arnou, Ἐπίστημη καὶ Θεωρία (Paris, 1921), p. 76; also 3,16: soul's logos becomes active when soul sees Intellect). Thus, the external activity of the higher hypostasis becomes the internal activity of the lower hypostasis.

But since each of the hypostases is a causal principle, a σύνεργος with causal power, the external activity which each produces may be called its effect. And on the transmission theory of causation which P. inherited from Plato and Aristotle (see Pl. Phd. 100d3 ff.; Arist. Metaph. 993b 24-26) the effect is less in respect of the property caused than the cause (see on this A. C. Lloyd, Phronesis 21 (1976), pp. 146-156).

For P., fire was the commonest illustration of the two-fold activity (see on 6,34-37 for refs.). Aristotle also used fire as an illustration of the causal theory (Arist. Metaph. 993b 25-26).

In GC 330b 26, Aristotle defined fire as a ὑπερβολὴ θερμοῦτος (cf. id. Meteor. 340b 23 - fire is a 'boiling over' (χύσις) - quoted with approval by P. at II 1,4,11 ff.). This definition may well have influenced P.'s language when in V 2,1,6-9 he describes the genesis of Intellect from the One as follows: ὁ οὖν ὑπερβλέπη καὶ τὸ ὑπερτέλεις αὐτῷ πυρόμην ἀλλο. P. is thinking here of the One's external activity, which, after definition, becomes Intellect.
Fire is material, and, therefore, passive. Its external activity marks a diminution in the power of its internal activity, whereas P. insists that by the procession from the One (and *oiχά* pace Br., means 'in the Intelligible World') the efficiency of the hypostases is not reduced. In one passage, however, he does seem to give fire a peculiar status: ἐγγικ *ἐν τούτῳ ἀσωμάτῳ, μόνον δὲ αὐτῷ οἷς οἰκοδείκτων τὰ ἄλλα, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα διέχειν αὐτῷ. Θερμάζεται γὰρ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὐ ψυχῆς δὲ τούτῳ (I 6,3,21-24.). But this passage, based on Arist. *GC* 335a 18-21, is unparalleled (see A. H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1940) p. 55), and P.'s usual view, the view which he tacitly adopts here, puts fire firmly among the material elements. The fact that the internal activity is independent and unaffected by the external activity shows that P. is not a pantheist. Although the lower hypostases reflect the One in varying degrees, they are each distinct existences as the word 'hypostasis' suggests. The One is not divided out amongst its products (VI 9,9,5 ff.). It remains permanently at the head of the θεοφόρος (cf. V 3,12,19 μίνουτος... ἐκλίνων ἀνψθοι). Like the One, Intellect too remains unchanged when soul is engendered (III 4,1,1-3; V 2, 1,17-18). Only the soul is said to produce whilst in motion (κινομένη - III 4,1,2; cf. V 2,1,18). This is because soul, as a result of its freewill and of its peculiar position as mediator between the divine and human spheres, can move either towards good or evil (see on 1,6-7); thus it can become affected
by the body which it creates by becoming too closely involved with it. The aim of philosophy is to lead the soul away from the seduction of the body and to place it securely in the Intelligible World, from which, in P.'s view, a part of it can never be removed.

Fic. translates τὴν δὲ ἀλλὰν υἱωτάτην (= the other activity taking on a distinct existence) wrongly.

3,12-13 οὖσα φῶς ἀπὸ νοτὰ νοσεῖ ἑστιν: Since soul, or, more particularly, the higher part of soul, διάνοια, is an image of Intellect (see on 3,6-7), διάνοια is intellectual (cf. V 3, 6,19-20 τότε τῇ ψυχῇ δὲ νοσεῖν τὸς διανοητήσιν αὐτὸς τεθημένος). This state of soul is the direct result of the πέρας (ΠΠ 9,1,31-33 καὶ λόγος ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ εἰς ψυχὴν ψυχὴν νοσεῖν ποιῶν, οὐκ ἀλλὰν τινὰ μικρόν νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσιν; cf. V 3,8,22-23; VI 7,17,37-39). For other references to soul as νοσεῖ see I 1,13,5 ff., and V 6, 4,16-17. In IV 8,4,1 ff. the νοσεῖ ὁφέλεις of souls is connected with their turning towards Intellect and is contrasted with their attention towards the physical world. Thus, it is through διάνοια that the soul's spiritual progress is made possible; only διάνοια is 'winged for the intellectual act' (V 3,4,13-14; cf. IV 8,3,21 ff.).

3,13 ἐν λογισμῷ δὲ νοῦς αὐτὴς: By the phrase ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς, P. makes a distinction between the soul's intellect and Intellect the second hypostasis. This distinction is quite common; e.g., in V 3,2,22 P. contrasts the soul's intellect with 'pure' Intellect; in I 8,2,7 ff. νοῦς περ' ἡμῖν is compared
with Intellect proper; and the same distinction is made in slightly different terms in 10,12 ff. and V 3,3,21 ff.. In the first of these latter passages he speaks of two 'intellects' - one a νοῦς λογισμόνινος (the soul's intellect), and the other a νοῦς ... λογισμόθαν παράχων (Intellect the second hypostasis). In the second passage he speaks of Intellect as 'ours' (ἡμέτερος), and says that it is ἀλλον τοι διανοομένου καὶ ἱπάνω βεβηκότα. Soul's intellect is its νοῦς οἰκίες (V 2,2,9), although unlike Intellect proper its intellect is 'imported' (ἐπακτός) (V 6,4,16; V 8,3,10).

It is quite clear, then, that, although like Intellect proper, intellect in the soul is quite distinct; it also seems clear that intellect in the soul is another way of referring to what P. elsewhere calls τὸ λογιστικὸν (cf. the passages in which soul's intellect and λογισμός (= 'reasoning') are mentioned together; e.g., the present passage; 10,34; I 8,2,7 ff.; note also Arist. de An. 432b 26 τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ (epexegetical) δ καλονύμινος νούς .). And it is the characteristic of λογισμός which distinguishes the soul's intellect from Intellect proper (cf. I 8,2,7 ff.; VI 7,1,29), and makes soul's intellect its own.

We must now consider the relationship between τὸ λογιστικὸν and τὸ διανοητικὸν or διάνωσια, to see whether both terms are alternative ways of referring to the soul's intellect. It has been held by A. E. Chaignet (Psychologie des Grecs IV (Paris, 1893), p. 221) and more recently by Schwyzer (Enchr. pp. 366 and 390) that τὸ διανοητικὸν is a higher faculty of
soul than τὸ λογιστικόν. This view has been opposed by H. J. Blumenthal, Plotinus' Psychology (The Hague, 1971), pp. 100 ff.

First, in Aristotle's system, λογισμός and διάνοια are the same (de An. 415a 8), and νοῦς ὁ ἐνυκά τοῦ λογισμοῦ: (= λογισμός) is a νοῦς πρακτικός not a νοῦς θεωρητικός (ibid. 435a 14 ff.). P. seems to use Aristotle's terms to distinguish between the two 'intelligents' at V 3,6,35 ff., so it is probable that like Aristotle P. would also identify λογισμός and διάνοια. In fact he does so. I 1,9,18 ff. deals with the nature of διάνοια and P. says there that διάνοια makes an ἐπίκεισις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῶν, whilst at the same time contemplating the Forms. Διάνοια deals with the similarities between external impressions and internal knowledge (I 1,9,22-23 καὶ τῶν ἐξω πολλάκις πρὸς τάνδον ὀμοιότης καὶ κοινωνία). When he deals with the function of τὸ λογιστικόν P. uses very similar terms - τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῇ λογισμὸν πριν τῶν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως φαντασμάτων περακμοίνοις τὴν ἐπίκεισιν ποιούμενον καὶ συνάγον καὶ διαφερόν ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ νοοῦ ἔντων ἐφοβή ὁδὸν τοῖς τάποις... καὶ σώζει τῆς προσαυλαμβάνει ἐπίτη ἐπιγινώσκειν καὶ ἐφανερότοις ἐν αὐτῇ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τάποις τοῖς νέους καὶ ἄφτῃ ἕκοντας (V 3,2,7-13). From these passages it emerges that the role of τὸ λογιστικόν and διάνοια is the same - to mediate between the world of sense and the world of Forms. Furthermore, in the same chapter in which P. has been speaking of τὸ λογιστικόν (V 3,2,7 τὸ δ' ἐν
he sums up his argument by saying οὖν το τοίνυν το διανοητικόν τῆς ψυχῆς . . . ἐν δὲ κατα
τάπαν σώματι ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα ὑπερὶ (V 3,2,23-25). This is
the same function which θ. in the earlier part of the chapter has
associated with τὸ λογιστικὸν , and which, as we have seen,
is elsewhere attributed to διάνοια . Thus it seems clear that
λογισμός and διάνοια are synonymous. In V 3,3,20-21 where
they are mentioned side by side, they are synonyms, not alter­
natives. And both are the equivalent of the soul's intellect.

But we must also see whether the soul's intellect is the
same as the undescending soul which never leaves the Intelligible
World (IV 8,8,3 ἐστιν τι αὐτῇ ἐν πῷ νοημῷ ἀεί ). This
view has been advanced by W. Himmerich, Πυθαγόρεια, Τί η Λειτουργία του Πλοτίνου (Würzburg, 1959),
pp. 76 ff., but it cannot be adopted without qualification.

We are told quite clearly that there is no 'reasoning'
( λογισμός ) in the Intelligible World (VI 7,1,29; cf. V 8,6,7,
7,43; VI 2,21,28), since if Intellect needed to reason its self-
sufficiency would be impaired (IV 3,18,4; cf. V 8,6,7 - there is
no ἐκπλήξον there either). Reasoning is conceptually connected
with time, since reasoning moves from one premise to another in
order to reach its conclusion. III 7 is at pains to point out
that time is created by soul's desire for self-expression (III 7,
11,15 ff.); the realm of Intellect is the realm of eternity. If,
then, the transcendent soul really remains in the Intelligible
World, it can have no truck with reasoning. This conclusion is
confirmed by II 9,2,10 ff. where P. is describing the undescending
The homonymous soul is ὑμὴ ἡμῶν, μηδὲ ἐστὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐν τῷ μέσῳ.

In II 9,2,13-15 he says μάζι τε ἀπεφαγμένας αὐτῇ ὅμως ἐν διάνοιας δικαιομένας οἷς τε διερευνήσῃ, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰς τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς θεὰ κατακοσμώνονα δινάμει θαμμαστῇ.

Similarly, the world soul administers 'without the reasoning which we need, but by means of "intellect"' (IV 8,8,15). Διάνοια or λογισμός (the soul's intellect) seems to be a faculty which is human; hence P.'s theory that it is at this level that our personality is found (I 1,7,16-17 ἡ γὰρ ἡμεῖς μάλιστα).

Furthermore, we have seen that it is the function of Διάνοια to make a judgement (ἐπικύρωσις), and presumably this judgement can be mistaken. P. describes such a mistake made by logos (here meaning 'reasoning') in VI 5,2,1 ff. (cf. also III 6,2,22 ff.).

But the Intelligible World is not subject to error (I 1,9,13).

From all these passages it seems that neither the undescending soul nor the world soul could have λογισμός or Διάνοια (as we have so far defined them).

On the other hand, V 1,10 does identify soul's intellect and the transcendent soul. V 1,11 deals with Intellect the second hypostasis, the 'intellect' which P. has described in V 1,10,13 as the νοῦς... λογιμοσθαι παρέχων (cf. V 1,11,3-4 ἄρ' ὡς καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς πρὶν ψυχὴν γίνεται), while V 1,10 deals with what P. has called 'reasoning intellect' (νοῦς λογιμοσομος), which I have said is the same as the soul's intellect. And this intellect is said to be ἐν τῷ περίτε νοητῷ (V 1,10,17). In V 1,10, then, the reasoning intellect seems to be the same as the undescending soul. We have also seen from IV 8,8,15...
that the world soul does not administer by reasoning but by
'intellect'. What sort of intellect is this? Not Intellect proper,
since P. definitely says that although Intellect proper is ours
(ἐγκριτικός) it should not be numbered among the parts of soul
(V 3,3,25-29) and it appears that in IV 8,8,15 P. is speaking of
a faculty of the world soul. Yet it cannot be the soul's intellect
to which P. is referring, since this obviously involves reasoning.
We are told in II 3,9,32 ff. that the world soul transcends body,
i.e., the world soul is undescending; and this undescending soul
works not with reasoning but with some sort of intellect. It is
our aim to be united with the world soul and to join with it in
its administration of the cosmos (IV 3,12,10-12) by governing
according to this intellect. It seems, then, that the transcendent
soul is neither Intellect proper, nor yet the reasoning with which
we have been dealing, which judges and aligns the impressions which
come both from the world of Forms and from the world of sensation.
It remains, then, for the undescending soul to be something above
reasoning and below Intellect proper.

P. does not make his position clear. I would tentatively
suggest that the undescending soul is that part of ἔλανων
which deals with the higher world alone. In V 1,10,16 P. speaks
of the pure reason of the higher soul (εἴναι καὶ λογικὰν
καθορίζοντας οὗν τῆς ἀγαθῶν), and at the beginning of V 1,11
he describes this reasoning as being ἐν ἐκάλων καὶ καλῶν
...ὑπότικος ἐν τούτῳ ἐκάλων καὶ ἐν τούτῳ καλῶν. (On the
detailed working of ἔλανων see on 11,1-3.) Perhaps this
activity is what P. describes in V 3,2,9 ff. as the overseeing
of the τάσει which come from Intellect. In V 3,3,11 ff. he calls that part of soul which receives the traces of Intellect the pure part of soul (see Wolters on III 5,2,23; μαθήματος is often used as an alternative to χωρίς τοῦ). Since this part of soul is so close to Intellect, he asks why we do not call it Intellect, and reserve the name 'soul' for the rest of the soul. The answer is ψυχήν δι' ἐν λογισμῷ εἶναι. One of the defining characteristics of soul (descended or undescending) is that it should be able to reason. Thus, even if soul is partly in the Intelligible World, it is there qua reasoning soul. In the Intelligible World soul has its power of reasoning as a διάθωσι καὶ ἵνα ἱστηκαν καὶ οἶνον ἐφασών (IV 3,18,11-12).

It may not have to use this faculty, and, indeed, P. probably did not consider the reasoning directed towards eternal objects as reasoning at all (cf. I 1,9,18 ff. where διάνοια makes a judgement of sense-impressions, but contemplates the Forms); but it nevertheless possesses it. In V 9,7,1 ff. P. seems to describe the same distinctions in terms of ἐπιστήμην. In the reasoning soul are two sorts of 'knowledge', one concerned with sensible objects which might more correctly be termed opinions, and the other concerned with Intelligible objects which come from Intellect into the reasoning soul; these contain Intellect and its act within them (cf. IV 7,10,40-42).

Lastly, I am further led to think of the undescending soul as in some way a part of διάνοια because P. never admits to the existence of anything else in between διάνοια and Intellect. Διάνοια is the image of Intellect (see on 3,7); it is second
after Intellect (V 3,4,20).

But however P. envisaged the transcendent soul and however he conceived its relationship to the rest of soul, (particularly to the Hypostasis-Soul; see on 2,44) and to Intellect (on this see H. J. Blumenthal, Accad. Naz. dei Lincei, Probl. Attuali di Sc. e di Cultura, Quad. No. 198 (1974), pp. 203-219, who points out the difficulties and inconsistencies in P.'s attempts to demarcate between Intellect and soul), he was quite certain of its existence which guaranteed that a spiritual anabasis to Intellect and beyond was possible (see J. M. Rist, AJPh 88 (1967), 'Integration and the Undescended Soul in Plotinus', p. 417).

Note the difference between P.'s 'intellect' and that of Plato.

For Plato 'intellect' was dependent upon the soul (see Ti. 30b 3 νον τ' αι δε ψυχης ψυχης άκανατον παραγεννυθαι τη)

Although 'intellect' was the 'helmsman' of soul (Phdr. 247c 7), it had no place outside soul. For Plotinus intellect in the soul is a mere reflection of the higher hypostasis.

3,13-14 καὶ ἡ τελειώσις... πάλιν: Ἀν' αὐτῶ refer to Intellect proper not to the soul's intellect which P. has just mentioned.

In the act of sight, the act itself is perfected by its object (III 8,11,6-7 ἡ τελειώσις παρὰ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ ἡ σώ̂ν τελειώσις ). Similarly, the act of thought is completed by its object (V 4,2,4 ff.). This theory had special relevance for P. since the act of 'reversion' ( ἐπιστρεφθεῖ ) was as important in his system as the procession from the One.
'Επιστευθή is one of the key words in P.'s philosophy. On its history see P. Aubin, Le Problème de la 'Conversion' (Paris, 1965), pp. 161-179. Two stages of ἐπιστευθή or ἐπιστευθή may theoretically be distinguished. The first is that turning back of the undefined product of emanation towards its prior, by which the undefined product acquires definition and becomes a hypostasis (see V 4,2,3 ff.; and notes on 5,6-19 and 6,17-19), and the second is that act of contemplation which leads soul upwards through the spiritual hierarchy. Definition of the first sort is a continuous process (see on 6,41-43). When the soul 'turns back' in the second sense, however, it performs a voluntary act, and tunes in, as it were, to the continual process of definition with which it is involved. And because of the presence of Intellect and the One within it (see on 10,5-6) it can 'grasp' these higher hypostases; this 'turning-back' takes place through purification (see on 12,12-14) and our present treatise seeks to show the soul that such a turning-back is possible.

P. is not explicit about what sort of 'perfection' he refers to in our present passage; what is important for the aims of this Chapter is that he makes it clear that soul is dependent on Intellect both for its existence and for its characteristic activity. The Stoic theory that νοῦς is created by a perfect soul is condemned by P. in IV 7,83,8 ff., and V 9,4,3 ff. By turning towards Intellect, soul approaches the unity which everything multiple stands in need of (VI 9,6,19 ff.). For Plotinus there was a conceptual connection between perfection and unity (cf. R. Arnou, op. cit. in note on 3,9-10, p. 62). As soul
approaches the One, it becomes more of a unity and more perfect. The One is \textit{telios} \((6,39; \text{V 4,1,34}; \text{but note 4,13-14})\) where \textit{telios} is predicated of Intellect. The One perfects Intellect (III 8,11,17), Intellect perfects soul, and soul in its turn perfects matter by the imprinting of its logos upon it (cf. III 4,1,14 ff.; VI 3,2,19. 4,30).

P. uses \textit{πάλιν} in 3,13 because not only soul's perfection comes from Intellect, but its being as well (see on 3,15-16).

3,14-15 \(ο'\ ίν \ \piατρός \ldots \ εγέννησεν: \) Cf. \text{V 9,4,8-10} \(τά \ \ άτελή \ \δοτις \ \άπ', \ \κειόμεν \) \((\text{sc. πώς πρώτως})\), \textit{telios} \(\mathrm{έκμενα} \ \ δὲ \ \ παρ' \ \ αὐτῶν \ \ τῶν \ \ γίγνομενικών \ \ δίκην \ \ πατέρων \ \ τελειώσαται, \ \ α' \ \ καθ' \ \ αὐτή \ \ εγέννησαν \) P. plays on the fact that one of the meanings of \textit{τέλειος} is 'adult' (see LSJ s.v. \textit{τέλειος} 2a in fine, and cf. 6,57-38 and 7,37); thus children are always \(άτελες \) in relation to their parents. Galen (\textit{de Marcore, iii. 677(Kuhn)}) defines \(τό \ \ τέλειον \) as \(οὗ \ \ μηδεμιά \ \ τῶν \ \ οίκειων \ \ ένεργίων \ \ ἀπολύεται\). As P. explains in the following sentence, when soul is perfect all its potentialities are actualised by Intellect.

On Intellect as 'father' see on 1,1-2. Fic., perhaps reading \(\textodh\) for \(\textodn\) in 3,14, translates: 'hanc'.

3,15-16 \(\textodn \ \ τῆς \ \ ἀπόστασις... \ \δρωμῖνω\). P. sums up what he has been saying and explains it more fully. That soul's hypostasis comes from Intellect has been stated in 3,6 ff.; and the second half of the sentence explains the effect of \textit{telios} upon the soul, and is amplified by 3,16-17. When the soul contemplates
Intellect, its logoi (which are a reflection of the logoi in Intellect - see on 3,8) become active. And since they are γνωστοί (II 3,16,19-20) they engender, and the logos of soul penetrates the darkness of matter. All action (πρᾶξις) was for P. a result of contemplation (III 8,1,14-15 καὶ πρᾶξις πᾶσα εἰς θεωρίαν τὴν σπουδὴν ἐχειν (sc. κινούμενοι); cf. III 8,6,1), although action points to a weakness in contemplation. P. explains soul's activity in III 8,6. The primary logoi are the logoi in Intellect, which are the Forms (cf. III 8,6,23 οἱ γὰς πνεύμων σύνε (sc. τῶν λόγων ἡ ψυχή); see also on 3,8), and the true activity of Intellect is contemplative self-thought. Since soul only contains imperfect logoi, it cannot engage in Intellect's activity. Consequently, it is forced to express what it contains through creative activity, just as the spoken word expresses the unspoken word. Soul's logos becomes active through contemplation, but because soul is different from Intellect the results of its contemplation are different.

For other references to soul's activity as the result of contemplation see II 9,2,15. 4,8 ff.; II 5,3,1 ff. - the birth of Eros.

Pic. and Ci. give unconvincing translations of the second part of this passage.

3,17 ἐνδοθεὶς ἐχει ... ἐνεγερ̣: The perfect form of contemplation is the contemplation of Intellect where there is complete unity of the subject and object of thought. Soul can only imitate this kind of contemplation because of the difference of its
contents. There is some unity of subject and object in its contemplation (III 8,8,4-6 πρὶς τὸ αὐτὸ τῶν ἑποκεφάλων ἵνα ἵνα ἑποκεφάλων, ἀπὸ τὸν θεοῦ νομοθετῆσαι), but the objects of thought can only remain ὀίκεία for soul qua soul. As the contemplation becomes more intense as Intellect is approached, the θεωρία become even more ὀίκεία (III 8,8,3-4 καὶ ἐκ οἰκονομῶν ἔτη θεωρίας καὶ ἑποκεφάλων τοῖς θεωρεῖν). In the case of Intellect, however, the word ὀίκεία is inappropriate (III 8,8,6-8). Soul must become Intellect if it is to enjoy Intellect's contemplation (VI 6,8,8 νολὼν νῦν θεωρεῖν; VI 7,35,4 σὺν νομοθετήσα). When subject and object of contemplation are fully united, what results is a 'living contemplation' (III 8,8,11 θεωρία ἑμείσα), and this is the very expression of the life of Intellect. (The One, of course, is above contemplation because contemplation involves the exercise of intellection (νόησις) which requires an object for its fulfilment; and fulfilment implies need, and therefore imperfection. The One is πελεμότατος.)

Br. is wrong to take θεωρεῖν intransitively. With θεωρεῖν c. acc. cf. 12,11; IV 8,1,4.

3,18-19 ὀόσα νοοῖσι καὶ ὀόσα οἴκοισι: Following Arist. de An. 403a 3 ff., P. explains in I 1,9,15 ff. that the activities which are particular to soul are those which do not require the cooperation of the body for their exercise (cf. also Pl. Phd. 83a 1 ff.). These are the operations of the higher soul which are akin to those of Intellect. Presumably, P. would class under this head only
the working of that part of the reasoning soul which deals with
the τάστοι from the Forms. The 'sense-impressions which come
upon the living being', which P. calls νοητή in I 1,7,10-12
are in the final analysis dependent on αισθησις which needs
the cooperation of the body.

3,19-20 τὰ δὲ χρήμ... τῆς τοιαύτης : In de An. 403a 2 ff.,
which P. seems to have in mind here, Aristotle includes νοητή
(and αισθάνομαι) among the πάθη of soul. P., however,
restricts πάθη to those activities for which the body is essential.
The πάθη of soul have no effect on διάνοια (cf. IV 4,18,9 ff.).
Τῆς τοιαύτης means τῆς χείρονος. Br. omits the
words from his translation.

3,20 ἔν πάλλον θεοτέραν ποιεῖ : For other examples of πάλλον
with the comparative see Ha. ad loc. and cf. Bonitz, Index.402b
53-59; 444b 59-60. For ἐν πάλλον see Ha. ad loc..

The higher soul is called θεοτέρα again at IV 3,27,2.
Intellect is both the efficient (μαχη) and the formal
(μαχέστε) cause of this 'divinity'.

3,21-22 οὐάν γὰρ μεταξὸς ἢ τὸ ἐκεῖσος Γίναι : Cf. II 9,1,32-33.
It is most important that there should be nothing in between
Intellect and soul, since, if there were, soul would be derived
not from Intellect but from the intermediary. And there would be
no possibility of ἀποστεφή (cf. II 9,1,57 ff.; if there
were a (Gnostic) logos between Intellect and soul ἀποστεφθεὶν
τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν νοητῶν... καὶ ὅλως οὐκ ἐξερήσει νοήματα ὅλως νοηματικά ; cf. also 6,48-49 ἔρη (sc. δ νοεῖ)
compare also the use of ἠφανεῖσθαι and ἀναφανέσθαι to describe the relationship of the hypostases to each other in IV 3,11,16; VI 7,42,21 ff.; and VI 8,18,20).

On ὧν ἐγείροντο ἑώρακα see on 3,3-4 and 2,6. In the anabasis this difference disappears (cf. IV 4,2,27-29; VI 7,34, 13-14).

3,22-23 ὡς ἐφεξῆς...ὡς ἀδιός: P. explains what he means by 'different'. Soul is different for two reasons (which Br. conflates) - (a) because it is next in order to Intellect (ἐφεξῆς) (cf. V 3,4,20 ὡς ἀνάγεται μετά νοῦν) and (b) because its relationship to Intellect is that of matter to form. The relationship is described in similar terms in 7,38-42 (see note ad loc.) and in the early treatise V 9. It is one way of looking at the process by which every hypostasis (and matter as well) is perfected and defined by what comes immediately above it in the Intelligible hierarchy. Just as matter loses its formlessness when the logos from soul perfects it so Intellect and soul lose their formlessness when defined by their priors. In V 9,3,20 ff. Intellect is said to be the form of soul in two senses - (a) in the sense that the shape of the bronze statue is its form, and (b) in the sense that soul's form actually comes from Intellect just as the statue's shape is 'given' to it by the sculptor. Intellect both provides and is the form of soul. The fact that this is so explains why soul is 'intellectual' and why its characteristic activities are
intellectual. By Intellect, soul is led ζωὴς ὕλος βίωτον (II 4.3.5 cf. also V 9.3.33).

A similar distinction between matter and form in the soul is made by Aristotle in de An. 430a 10 ff., where he distinguishes ὑλή from τὸ αἷτων καὶ ποιητικὸν, which he then identifies with νοῦς χωρεῖτος.

Ki., in a misguided attempt to make P. sound like Demosthenes, quite unjustifiably reads τὸ μὲν ὑσ ὑγροίνου, τὸ δὲ ὑσ ὕλος.

καὶ δὲ ὠν νοῦ ὑλή ... ἄστη : Cf. II 4.3.1 ff. - not everything which is undetermined should be avoided as evil. The undefined emanation from Intellect which becomes soul is beautiful because it is like Intellect. The Intelligible Matter, which is the substrate of the Forms in the Intelligible World has a ἀληθὴς ὑβρισμίσθη καὶ νοσεῖν (II 4.5.16). (On Intelligible Matter see in general II 4.2-5, and in its numerical guise as the Indefinite Dyad see on 5.6-19.) Presumably, the undefined emanation only remains 'simple' until it is defined. A fortiori, if Intellect is σῶν θεός and μοῖνος (cf. on 5.1), so is soul.

According to H-S t.III p. 419 νοοεύθης is a new coinage in V 3.8.48.

These lines connect Chap. 5 with the next chapter. Br. puts a comma after ἄστη a stop after νοῖς, and adopts Ki.'s δὴ for the mss. δὲ. He translates: 'Étant la matière de l'Intelligence, elle est belle, intelligente et simple comme l'Intelligence même.' This is very
weak. His text implies that Intellect is itself \( \nuουτικός \) and simple. The first implication is tautologous (cf. Ha. ad loc.), and the second false (see on 5,1). It is better to take the phrase \( \sigmaδον \ldots \delta \nuούς \) as an indirect question introduced by \( \delta ηλον \), and to put a stop after \( \alpha ική \).

The mss. are unanimous in reading \( \delta \epsilon \) against Ki.'s \( \delta η' \), (3,24). An adversative particle is necessary here since P. is moving his attention from the soul and its relationship to Intellect back to Intellect alone. This change of attention is marked by the use of \( \delta ι \). (\( \Delta η' \) is printed by Ki., Mi., Vo. and Br.)

The mss. \( τοίτη \) is altered by Ki. to \( \alphaλτή \), and he is followed by the same editors. But \( τοίτη \ldots \tauούτη \) which is picked up by the following phrase \( \delta ηι \; κρίττον \; πυχή \; τοίκοστή \; \οίκής \), has a further reference back to the beginning of the chapter, where the idea with which P. concludes the chapter is first found; cf. 3,6 \( καίπε \; \gammaε \; οίνος \; \χημα \; \οίδον \; \δέλαίκον \; \δ μοχος \; \υμιν \; τισ \; ιστι \; νού \). P. is resuming what he has already said. Mi. and Vitrinja place a colon after \( \δηλον \) and insert \( \delta \epsilon \) after \( \delta ι \); but this alteration obscures the reference of \( τοίτη \ldots \tauούτη \).

The further change of \( κρίττον \) to \( κρίττων \) by all editor except Ha. and H-S is quite unnecessary; see Schwyzer, \( \text{RH} \) \( \text{M} \) 86 (1937), p. 368, n. 19. He mentions P.'s 'Vorliebe für das Neutrum dort, wo er eine Eigenschaft ins Allgemeine heben möchte.' He compares IV 7,10,16 and IV 3,11,3.

\( \tauοῐκοστή \; \οῐκης \) means 'as we have described it'.
CHAPTER FOUR

P. suggests another way of realising the excellence of Intellect. Since on Platonic principles (Pl. Ti. 37c 6 ff.; ibid. 92c 7; note also VI 7,12, 1-2 ἵππη γάρ φανερός οὗν παράσιμπρα ἱκεῖται τὸ πᾶν ἴων where φανερόν probably means, as often we Platonists - see further II 9,4,6; VI 3,6,8; VI 7,25,27) the sensible and Intelligible Worlds are related as image to archetype, and since on Neoplatonic principles the product is always less than the producer (see on 2,7 and note III 3,3,31 ff. where the principle is applied to the relationship between the two worlds), an understanding of the sensible world will lead to an understanding of the supra-sensible beauty of its archetype, especially as the product imitates the producer as far as it can (cf. IV 8,6,28; V 8,12,15). P. traces his own form of argument by comparison back to Plato's Timaeus. In his commentary on Pl. Ti. 37c 6 ff. in V 8,8,7 ff., he says that when he makes the demiurge approve of his creation Plato means to show the beauty of the sensible world's Intelligible archetype πάν γάρ τὸ καλόν οὖν τις θαυμάζει εἰς ἱκέταιν ἐκ τοῦ θεαμα, καθ' ὁτι οὕτως Μεθυμησάνων V 8,8,11-13. This is true even if the man who wonders is not aware of the real object of his wonder.

In the present chapter, P. discusses the contents and perfection of Intellect (4,1-25) and then its internal life and its relationship to its contents (4,26-43).

4,1 ἵστο δὲ τοῖς ...πῶς : The deletion of δὲ proposed by Vitringa and accepted by MH. is only necessary if MH.'s text and punctuation are adopted. He attaches ἵστο ...ἐκ πῶς to the final phrase of Chapter 3 ὥστε ...τοῖςδὲ οὕσης, which he separates from what precedes by putting a stop after Σηλὸν and inserting δὲ
before $\kappa\rho\varepsilon\omega\tau\rho\omicron\nu$ in 3,24. This seems to me quite wrong.

In Chapter 3 P. has not only described the nature of Intellect but also its excellence in relation to the soul; the first part of Chapter 4 reaches the same conclusions by different arguments. That Intellect is $\kappa\rho\varepsilon\omega\tau\rho\omicron\nu$ than soul (3,24) is, therefore, not a new point, as Mil.'s punctuation and text suggest.

Size and beauty are naturally associated (cf. Od. 18.219; Pl. Alc. 1 123e 4; id. Crit. 115d 2; Arist. Rh. 136a 7; cf. VI 6,1,23. 7,11-12).

$\mu\acute{y} \gamma \theta \omicron$ means 'spatially extended magnitude' (cf. VI 2, 13,11 ff. where $\mu\acute{y} \gamma \theta \omicron$ is expanded by $\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\mu\iota\xi\iota\sigma$ $\mu\acute{y} \gamma \theta \omicron$ (VI 2,13,13-14)); hence, $\mu\acute{y} \gamma \theta \omicron$ is composite ($\sigma\mu\theta\omicron\omicron\omicron$ VI 2,13,11). The size of the physical world is denigrated in VI 6, 1,23 ff., and is associated with ugliness (VI 6,1,28-29). In the Intelligible World, however, of which the $\mu\acute{y} \gamma \theta \omicron$ of the sensible world is a mere reflection, $\mu\acute{y} \gamma \theta \omicron$ is not quantitative or ugly at all. It is a $\mu\acute{y} \gamma \theta \omicron$ of power. Nothing can surpass or even equal the $\delta\nu\dot{a}m\upsilon$s of the Intelligible World (II 9,17, 9-10; VI 7,32,19-20).

P. is passionately convinced that the close relationship between the Intelligible World and the sensible world is the guarantee that the latter is the most beautiful world possible. If the Intelligible World were not $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \dot{w}t\epsilon\gamma\mu\alpha\lambda\omicron$, what could be more beautiful than the sensible world, he asks in V 8,8,21-22 (cf. III 2,12,3-4). His defence of the physical world is mainly concentrated in the anti-Gnostic treatises, especially in II 9 where he attacks the Gnostics precisely for their denigration of
the visible universe (II 9,4,26. 8,18 ff.). Following Plato
(e.g. Pl. Ti. 29a 2 ff.) he believes in a καλὸς κόσμος which
is nevertheless only an image or shadow of the Intelligible
Universe and Intelligible Beauty (III 8,11,29-30). But the
sensible world is beautiful because of its relationship to its
archetype; appreciation of sensible beauty can therefore lead to
an appreciation of Intelligible Beauty.

4,2-3
τὴν παλιν...τὴν ἄδιόνυ : On the movement and order of
the heavens see II 2, and notes on 2,23 and 2,24. Note that
heavenly movement is only an imitation of the movement of Intellect.

4,3-5 καὶ θεῶν...φυτε τε πάντα : For the contents of the
physical universe see II 9,9,29 ff. and especially the speech of
the cosmos at III 2,3,23-25 πάντα ἐν ἑμῶι καὶ φυτὰ
cαὶ ζώα καὶ συμπλήρωμα τῶν γεννητῶν φώσι καὶ θεῶν
πολλῶν καὶ βασιλέων δῆμοι καὶ φυλαὶ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ ἄνθρωπο
ὀρθῇ ἀλήθειᾳ. In our present passage, man is perhaps included
in the class of ζωῶν . P. does not mention souls because he
wants to emphasise the divine and non-terrestrial nature of soul
(he includes soul in Intellect in 4,11; but see note ad loc.).
Soul is present in the world as an outsider (cf. 1,2 and note).

4,3-4 καὶ θεῶν...ἀφανείς οὐντας : P. makes a similar
distinction among the gods of the physical world at V 8,2,12-13.
The visible gods are the star gods identified with the 'visible
gods' of Pl. Ti. 40d 4 (cf. Pl. Epin. 984d 5-6 θεῶν ὁμοί ὁμοί
tοὺς ἡρακλείς...τοὺς προστάς τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φώσιν
ἀληθεύ ; cf. 2,3-4 and note). The visible gods are ontologically
related to the Intelligible Gods which are the Forms (see III 5,6,21-24 καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ πᾶς μὲν ἔσχεν ἡγεῖται ὁ θεὸς τῶν ἐκατόνθες θεῶν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἐκέεναι καὶ κατ’ ἐκέεναι τῶν νοτῶν, ἐκεῖνων ἐκεῖνων, ὡσπερ αὐτὴν πετεὶ ἐκατόν ἀστέρον. In II 9,9,30 the hierarchy is more fully explained - good men, good spirits, the visible gods, the world soul, the Intelligible Gods and the King of the Intelligible World.

Since the world is full to bursting with ἵππῳ and ἀθάνατα (II 9,8,29-30), there must be gods which we cannot see - presumably star gods which are too far removed from us to be visible.

καὶ δαίμονας: A belief in the existence of spirits was part and parcel of the Platonic tradition. Plato defines τὸ δαίμονιον in Σμπ. 202d 13 ff. as μετὰ ἕνθεον ... θεῶν περὶ καὶ θεὸν ... ἐμπνευσάμενον καὶ διαποθεμένων θεόν τὰ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώπως τὰ περὶ θεῶν ... ὡστε τὸ πάν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἀριστεῖν. Plato's theory was not rooted in Greek popular belief (Wilamowitz, Der Glaube der Hellenen I (Berlin, 1931), p. 367) but had a very great influence on later philosophers, especially on the Neoplatonists with their numerous intermediaries between the parts of the Intelligible and physical worlds (cf. Sallustius xiii, p. 26.9-12 (Nock)). In P.'s system they play only a minor role. They exist only in the sublunary world (cf. Χενοκράτες fr. 15 p. 165.4 (Heinze); III 5,6,19-20) and they are distinguished from the gods by the fact that they are subject to πάθη (III 5,6,9 ff.; IV 4,43,12-13). P. defines them as the trace of every soul which has entered the world (φυσικὸν: in
κόσμου γνωριμίας τὸ ἀριστερὴς ἱκνός III 5,6,24-25). They exist at an intermediate level between corporeality and incorporeality, because although not members of the Intelligible World they share in Intelligible Matter. (Note Armstrong's justifiable surprise at this statement in his note on III 5,6, 46 in the Loeb edition). P. is trying to explain Plato's μεταφύ... θεοῦ τι καὶ θυρίου by this strange theory. It is generally the case that P.'s concern with spirits only emerges when he is dealing with particular Platonic problems. Most of our information about them comes from III 5,6, where he is explaining the significance of the Eros myth from Plato's Symposium, and from III 4 where he discusses the Platonic theory of guardian spirits (cf. Pl. Ti. 90a 3-4; id. Phd. 107d 5 ff.). P.'s demonology is only incidental to his metaphysics. It is a feedback from the Platonic tradition in which he was immersed. (For more detailed information on the spirits see Wolters' notes on III 5,6 passim.)

4,5-6 τὸ ἀνεξίmutable αὐτοῖς: ἀνεξίmutable is the converse of τικών (on which see on 3,7), and like τικών or τιούματος has a wide sphere of application. Each of the hypostases is related to each of the others as τικών to ἀνεξίmutable (cf. 6,33-34). In the sense that the Intelligible World is the archetype of the physical world (III 2,1,24-25), the ἀνεξίmutable is the equivalent of the παράδειγμα of Plato's Timaeus (cf. Ti. 29b 1 ff.; ibid. 48e 5).
Truth is conceptually linked with knowledge. Like Plato, P. believed that the Intelligible World was the seat of true knowledge; its truth and its reliability separated it off from the changing world of sense-perception. But in P.'s system, the demand that truth be found in Intellect is also a demand of internal consistency. If Intellect thinks itself and is its own object, if it contains everything, and if each part of Intellect embraces the whole, then Intellect is the paradigm of self-consistency; there is no room for falsehood since it is a self-contained whole, both metaphysically and epistemologically. But metaphysics and epistemology merge, since the activity which constitutes the essence of Intellect is thought. As P. says in V 5,1,65-67, if truth were not to be found in Intellect, Intellect would not exist, since its presuppositions would be meaningless. On any correspondence theory of truth, where the subject and object of thought are identical, anything thought must be true, since there is no possibility of the correspondence breaking down. See V 5,2,18-20 ὥστε καὶ ἡ ὑπάρχον ἀλήθεια ὑπὸ συμφωνοῦσα ἄλλη ἄλλ' ἐκαμή, καὶ ὁμιλέν πη' αὐτ' ἐν λύγι, καὶ ἰστι, καὶ ὁ ἰστι, τοῦτο καὶ λύγι; cf. also V 3,5,21 ff. and III 7,4,11 with Beierwaltes' good note ad loc.). Thus, νοῦς, τὸ ὑπὸ ἀλήθεια are synonymous (V 5,3,1-2). Intellect and Being signify the subject and object of thought, truth the relationship between them. These distinctions, however are merely conceptual. Intellect is a 'one-many'.
4,6 ἄναβας : See on 3,3.

4,7 καὶ πατὴρ' ἀνθρώπος ἡμῖν : ἄνθρωπος or ἀνθρώπων? Enneadic mss. read ἀνθρώπος without the subscript, those of Eusebius (who quotes the passage in PG 21.889a) ἀνθρώπων. The editors are equally divided between ἄνθρωπος and ἀνθρώπων. Ki., Mi., Vo., Ha. and MK prefer ἀνθρώπων (or ἀνθρώπος) while Perna, Creuzer, Br., Ci. and H-S prefer ἄνθρωπος. Either reading is doctrinally possible, but it seems to me that ἀνθρώπων is better from the point of view of the nuances of the text. If we read ἄνθρωπος, the first καὶ in 4,7 must emphasise πατὴρ' ἀνθρώπος. The sense would then be that when the νοηταὶ are with Intellect (πατὴρ' ἀνθρώπος) they are eternal. This implies that if they had been anywhere else, they would not have been eternal, which is nonsense. That the νοηταὶ are intrinsically eternal is more to the point (cf. IV 7,9,1 τῇ ἡ ἐπέκτασις φύσις, ἢ πατὴρ' ἀνθρώπος ἑκομενα τῇ ἐννεα ; IV 7,9,13-14).

4,7 ἡμῖν ... καὶ ἑκομενα : We find here the division of primary Being into being (ἡμῖν), thought (σώματος) and life (ἑκομενα) which became standard in later Neoplatonism (see e.g., Procl. El. Theol. 101-102). On this topic see P. Hadot, 'Être, Vie, Pensee chez Plotin et avant Plotin', Extr. pp. 107-141. The order we have here is repeated at VI 6,8,17-18, an exegesis of Pl. Ti. 39e 7-8. As Dodds pointed out in his note on Proclus (loc. cit.), this distinction is ultimately derived from Pl. Sph. 248e 6 ff. where movement, life, soul and intelligence (φλονήσις) are ascribed to τὸ πάντως ὦν. For P. these three components, as it were, of Intellect are identical and not in
any way causally linked, though P. has some difficulty, it seems to me, in maintaining this (see V 2,1,11-13; V 9,8,11 ff.; and note on 4,27-28). The being of Intellect is its life (cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 1072b 26-27), and its life is identical with its thought.

P. was no doubt further influenced by what he read in the *Timaeus* where the παράδυναμα is described as a living being (Ti. 37d 1; ibid. 39e 1 ff.); a living being is naturally associated with life and thought (cf. of the sensible universe Ti. 30b 6 ff.). As for its eternity, the 'eternal gods' of Ti. 37c 6 were interpreted by P. as the Forms rather than as star gods; in II 9,3, 15-16 the *Timaeus* passage is quoted with νοητόι substituted for ἔλεει (cf. I 8,7,15-16).

That real Being, i.e., the Forms, is eternal is a common-place in Plato (see, e.g., Pl. *Ti.* 27d 6 ff.) although Plato's concept was almost certainly that of a durational eternity and not of a non-durational eternity like that of P. (see J. Whittaker, 'The Eternity of the Platonic Forms', *Phronesis* 13 (1968), pp. 131-144).

On the history of σώσις and related words, and their use by P., see Schäfer, 'Bewusst und Unbewusst bei Plotin', *Entr.* pp. 374-378. Σώσις is twice used by P. alongside σωαίσθησις (III 8,4,19; V 8,11,23). And the σωαίσθησις of Intellect seems indistinguishable from its characteristic activity of self-thought (V 8,11,21-24 εἰ δὲν δεικνύει τοῖς εἰρωμένοις δοξάσων μὲν οὖν δὲν εἶναι ἡ σωφροσύνη, ὡς παρά τοῦ δεικνύει τούτου δι' ὀπον σώσις καὶ σωαίσθησις αὐτοῖς). Σώσις in our
present passage means this characteristic activity. It is ὀκκεία because it involves the perfect identity of subject and object of thought, which the contemplation of soul can only imitate (see on 3,17).

The belief that the Intelligible World was alive can be traced back to Plato's Sophist and Timaeus (loc. cit.) and to Arist. Metaph. 1072b 26-27. P. characteristically develops what he found in Plato and Aristotle. His world is boiling with life (VI 5,12,9; VI 7,12,23); every Form has a life of its own (VI 7,11,48 of the Form of fire; VI 7,12,20 of the Form of water). There is nothing in Intellect which is not alive (VI 7,13,15). Unlike the life of the physical universe, however, the life of the Intelligible World is stationary (III 2,4,12-13; VI 7,12,10-11). If there was no life there, there would be no activity, and since the activity of Intellect is self-constituting, there would be no Intellect.

4,8

τὸν ἀκηρατὸν νοῦν προστάτην : Plato speaks of the purity of Intellect in his etymological remarks about Cronus in Cra. 396b 6-7 (see on 4,9-10). This etymology is used again by P. at III 5,2,19 ff. where the world soul is said to be ἀκηρατός and sprung from an ἀκηρατὸς νοῦς . With Intellect as προστάτης cf. Pl. Phdr. 241a 2-4 τὸν ὅτι οἶν ψυχήν, μεταβαλὼν ἀλίους ἐκεῖνα ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ προστάτην, νοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἀνυπ έγνωτό καὶ μανίας . Note the mixture of Platonic reminiscences. The notion of the purity of Intellect, however, can be traced back ultimately to Anaxagoras.
(DK B.12). With Intellect presiding over the Intelligible World cf. I 6,5,16-17.

4,8-9 καὶ σοφίαν ἀνώτατον: In his note on III 5,7,24 Wolters remarks that P. uses the word ἀνώτατον eleven times. In five of these cases he is quoting the Platonic phrase ἀνώτατον κάλλος (R. 509a 6; Smp. 218e 2). The phrase σοφία ἀνώτατον occurs twice, here and at II 9,8,14-15, where the life of the sensible world is described as showing the infinite wisdom of its organisation, hence of Intellect. It is tempting to think that we might be dealing with another Platonic quotation. But the phrase only occurs once in Plato, at Euthydemus 275c 7, where Socrates is sarcastically describing the achievements of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus οὐ γὰρ ομιλήσαν τῷ ἔγον δίκαιον ἀναλαβέν δείξοντα σοφίαν ἀνώτατον δύναμις. It is unlikely that our present reference can be traced back to that passage.

Σοφία is the life of Intellect, that perfect state of knowledge which is characterised by the truth of the Intelligible World. It is actually identified with Intellect at V 8,5,15 ff. (cf. Pl. Phlb. 30c 6).

4,9-10 καὶ ἄνω ... όντος: In Op. 111 ff. Hesiod describes the reign of Cronus as the golden age of mankind. The phrase ἐκ τῆς κλέος or ἐ ἐκ τῆς κλέος βίος soon became proverbial like its Latin equivalent 'Saturnia regna' (cf. Arist. Ath. Pl. 16.7; Pl. Hipparch. 229b 7; Plu. Arist. 24.3; id. Cim. 10.7; and see Pohlenz, RE xi. 2006.63 ff.). P. uses here the
proverbial phrase but adds to it the etymological definition
of Cronus which is found in Pl. Cra. 396b 6-7, where Plato derives
Cronus from κόρος and νοῆς.

κόρος is a polyvalent word. Plato specifically rejects
the meaning 'child' (LSJ s.v. B) and interprets the word as an
adjective from κορίν = to sweep, defining it as τὸ καθαρὸν
καὶ ἀκήρατον τοὺς νοῦς. As we have seen, P. seems to
accept this interpretation in 4,8. But here κόρος has another
and more usual meaning, that of 'satiety' (LSJ s.v. A), although
Fic. mistranslates the word by 'prorsus immaculatus'. P. goes on
to explain the fulness of Intellect by saying that it contains all
Intelligible Reality within it (note the explanatory γαί in 4,10).
And he bolsters this interpretation later in the treatise (7,33 ff.)
where the myth from Hesiod's Theogony (Th. 453 ff.) of Cronus
devouring his children is used as an illustration of Cronus' fulness.
This interpretation of κόρος is not mentioned by Plato, who must
be assumed therefore to reject it, but it was widely used by the
Stoics (see Cic. ND 2.25.14). P. uses κόρος to mean 'satiety'
or 'fulness' in all its other occurrences in the Enneads (III 5,9,
18 νοῦς... ἐσμέντων ἵχον ἐν κόρῳ; III 8,11,39-41 (sc.
νοῦς) κόρον καλὸν καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ διόν’
ψυχόμενον κόρον; V 8,13,4 κόρον ἵχοντι καλὸν;
V 9,8,8 ἵχων ἐσμένῃ καλὸν... κόρος ἀεί; VI 7,35,26
ἀπλωθεὶς τίς ῥυπάθθειαν τοῦ κόρου).

The etymology of Cronus as κόρος and νοῆς was only
one of several (cf. Pohlenz, op. cit. 1986.49 ff.). Pohlenz is,
however, misleading, since he does not distinguish between the
different meanings of κόρος or κόρος, as the adjective is accented; he should have at least eight subheadings rather than six). No doubt it was accepted that Platonists would accept the derivation of the word from Cratylus. But not all followed P.'s interpretation of κόρος as satiety. Proclus, for example, in In Cra. 56.24 ff. (Pasquali) specifically rejects this interpretation as ἕροτική, and adheres to the strictly Platonic interpretation of τὸ κόρον as 'purity' (cf. also his scholion on Hes. Op. ill). Note how P. shows his independence of the conventional Platonic interpretation. He accepts that κόρος = καθαρός in 4,8, but is not afraid of also adopting a Stoic interpretation which Plato implicitly rejects.

On P.'s use of myth and allegory, see J. Pépin, *Mythe et Allegorie* (Paris, 1958), pp. 190 ff.. Pépin points out (pp. 203 ff.) that P.'s favourite allegory is that involving the triad Cronus, Uranus and Zeus to represent the hypostases. One or all of them are mentioned in 7,33-36; III 5,2,19 ff.; IV 4,10,1 ff.; V 5,3,21; V 8,12,3 ff.,13,1-2 where θεός = Cronus and πατέρας = Zeus, besides in our present passage. Usually Uranus refers to the One, Cronus to Intellect and Zeus to the soul (cf. Pl. Phlb. 30d 1 ff. and IV 4,9,1 ff.). In IV 4,10,1 ff., however, P. admits that the name Zeus may be applied to the demiurge of the *Timaeus* whom he elsewhere identifies with Intellect (see introduction to Chapter 2).

4,10-11 πάντα υα... πείθει : Compare Pl. Ti. 30c 7-d1
ofa te alla theonmatas svinostheiv deita; ibid. 31a 4-5 to ge perieichon pantas opoia neta zize mev, eton (sc. oivanei) evaitheon oik an pot 'etia;
of. also 4,6-7 pantas... neta. P. often refers to the all-embracing nature of Intellect in Platonic language - with πειλοκιν or Ιχν at V 8,10,19-20 (soul at the level of Intellect); V 9,6,1-2. 6,9-10; VI 6,7,2. 7,15-19; VI 7,8,27-29.
17,27-29; VI 9,5,15; and with πειλαμβανον at 8,21;
III 8,11,28-29; V 9,14,1; VI 6,7,2. It is unlikely that Plato meant by το παντελε Ιχων or το δ' Ιστην Ιχων the whole Intelligible World, i.e. the world of Forms. He thought of it rather as the Form of the living being (and, therefore, presumably quite low in the hierarchy of Forms). Note how in Ti. 39e 10 ff. he explains the contents of το δ' Ιστην Ιχων as the four sorts of living being (each one corresponding to one of Empedocles' four elements). But the fact that the physical world was a living being (see on 2,24) and the fact that sensible reality was often contrasted with the unchanging world of Forms, soon effected the identification of the νοητον Ιχων of the Timaeus with the Intelligible World.

Following, then, his own interpretation of Plato, P. maintained that his κοσμον νοητος / παντελε Ιχων contained all Intelligible Reality within it. There were several reasons why this should be so. First, if the sensible world contains all sensible reality, then the Intelligible World, by analogy, must contain all Intelligible Reality. Secondly, if Intellect is
defined as τὰ ὄντα, everything which exists must exist in Intellect; if it did not contain everything, what it did not contain would exist independently of it. Thus there would be another ground of existence apart from Intellect and this to P. is impossible. Thirdly, since Intellect is the home of truth and true knowledge (σοφία; see on 4,6 and 4,8-9), all the objects of knowledge, i.e., the Forms, must be found there (V 5,2,4 ff.). Intellect is a πάντα, perfect not in Plato's sense of being the archetypal (though it is this too), but perfect in the sense of being complete.

4,11 νοάν πάντα... πάσαν : P. explains what he means by πάντα τὰ ἀθανάτα. Νοάν πάντα: 'omnem intellectum' Fic.; 'toute intelligence' Br.; 'ogni spirito' Ci.; 'den ganzen Geist' Ha.; 'nothing here but is divine mind' MK. MK can hardly be right; the progression νοάν πάντα, θεόν πάντα, ψυχήν πάσαν is spoiled if the first two occurrences of πάντα are neuter plural (πάσαν can agree with nothing but ψυχήν). Νοάν πάντα probably means 'every Intellect' (Fic.) rather than 'the whole of Intellect' (Ha.), since although it is true that the whole of Intellect is contained in the Intelligible World, it is difficult to make sense of θεόν πάντα, where πάντα presumably means the same as it does in νοάν πάντα. Ha. translates θεόν πάντα as 'die ganze Gottheit'. The use of θεός as a collective noun is not common. There is one parallel in P. at V 5,3,2-3, but in that passage P.'s language is purposefully striking as he calls Intellect not a god but μᾶς θεός. No such striking language is apparent here. Furthermore, the use of πάντα... τὰ ἀθανάτα
('all the immortals' 4,10) suggests that Θεῶν πάντα should mean 'every god'.

There is, in fact, a difference between every Intellect and the whole of Intellect. The whole of Intellect contains every particular Intellect in a γίνεσθαι / ἐθάνασθαι relationship (IV 8, 9,6 ff.; V 9,6,9 ff.) and the whole according to P. is distinct from the sum of the parts (VI 7,8,28-29). But on the other hand, since Intellect is identical with itself, each of its parts is the whole. The individual Intellects are the individual Forms (see on 4,26-27).

Θεῶν πάντα : Intellect contains 'all the Intelligible Gods' (7,30), so presumably P. does not mean us to understand under Θεῶν πάντα those gods who he said in 4,3 were members of the sensible world. These visible gods are only secondary (III 5,6,22).

Ψυχήν πάσαν : On an analogy with νοῦν πάντα and Θεῶν πάντα, ψυχήν πάσαν ought to mean 'every soul' (Fic. and Br.) rather than 'the whole of soul' (Ci. and Ha.); MK ('this is the place of soul') is imprecise. This presents some difficulty. P. distinguishes (e.g. in IV 8,8,2-3) between the undescending soul which never leaves the Intelligible World and the soul which descends into bodies. To say that every soul is in Intellect seems to contradict this theory, unless ψυχή in 4,11 is taken to refer to the undescending soul - and it is not clear from the context that this is the case. In III 3,5,17-18 P. says that in the Intelligible World one can find Intellect and pure soul (ψυχή καθαρά), which implies that there are some souls, e.g., impure souls, which are not to be found there (cf. II 5,3,32-33 where P. distinguishes
between soul 'in matter' and soul \( \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \).

On the other hand, P. does maintain that the Hypostasis-Soul, like the whole of Intellect distinct from its particular parts, is in the Noetic World (cf. III 9,3,1 ff. where individual souls are said to move up and down between Intelligible and sensible reality, while the Hypostasis-Soul stays where it is). P. seems to mean this Soul when he talks of \( \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \ga...
that world behind; in fact, souls do leave Intellect, although theoretically they still belong to it. Soul is a resident alien in the sensible world (VI 3,1,28); even when in that world they may be said to be in the other world too. The task of our present treatise is to remind souls of their true home.

4,11-12 έστιν ἀλλ': Compare 4,21-22 ἄξιον δὲν... πάντα
έστιν γαρ ἀλλ': The opposite of τὸ ἐστίναι is not so much κίνησις as μεταβολή (4,12). Κίνησις (and στάσις) are integral aspects of the life of Intellect (see notes on 4,33 ff. and 4,34-47), but this life or activity remains the same (II 9,1,29-30 ἐστὶ γὰρ ὡς ἐστὶ νοῦς ἀλλὰ ωσαίνως ἐνεργείᾳ κείμενος ἐστῶσι). The stationary life of Intellect, a life which is internally dynamic, distinguishes Intellect from the sensible world (V 6,6,15-16; cf. also III 2,1,35-36 and III 7,3,34-36).

4,12 τί γὰρ τοῦτο... ἐξ ἐκαν.: Two ideas are superimposed here. The first is the contrast between the permanence of Intellect and the flux of the sensible world (for change as a mark of the latter see Arist. Metaph. 1069b 3 ἢ δ' αἰσθητὴν οὐσία μεταβολὴν and II 4,6,3; VI 1,28,7: this Heraclitean notion is common in Plato - see on 1,19-20). Thus Intellect is μεταβολὴν καὶ οὐσίαν ἀναγκοῦσα ὑπὸ γενόμενον ὑπὸ ἀποκαλύμμενον (IV 7,9,15-16; see also the refs. in the previous note). The second idea is that Intellect is internally self-sufficient. It is perfect (4,13-14) and change would imply imperfection. This perfection means that it does not move outside itself in its act of thinking since it is identical with its object of thought (cf. Arist. Metaph. 1074b 25-27; IV 4,2,
Soul is only \( \text{αμαρταύης} \) when it reaches the level of Intellect (IV 4,2,24-25). Of course, these two ideas are closely aligned, since the unchanging activity of Intellect, which constitutes its essence and separates it from the sensible world, is an activity of unchanging self-thought.

Note the play on \( \text{όσων} \) in 4,12 and 4,13. P. returns to the subject of Intellect's happiness in 4,16-17.

4,12
\[ \text{ποι \, \,} \text{μεταβολήν} \, \text{σπούδαι, \, όταν \,} \text{από} \, \text{τῶν} \, \text{σαμων \,} \text{εφ' \,} \text{σαμων, \, καί \, όταν \,} \text{αφ' \,} \text{σαμων \,} \text{επὶ} \, \text{τὰ} \, \text{ἀλλα \,}. \]

The point of the question is that since Intellect is reality, there is nothing outside of it into which it could change.

4,13-14
\[ \text{ἐν' \,} \text{οἷδ' \,} \text{αὐχεῖν ... \,} \text{ν' \,}. \]

All the editors up to H-S, except for Perna and Ci., prefer Cyril's \( \text{αὐχεῖν} \) (PG 76.929c). It is not so much the difficulty of the infinitive after \( \text{γηρά} \) (as Henry, Etats, p. 130 seems to think) which has brought about the change, but the fact that \( \text{αὐχάνειν} \) in its other occurrences in P. is transitive (see e.g., II 1,3,4; IV 7,5,7 ff.; VI 1,20,20-21) whereas in our present passage it must be intransitive. \( \text{Αὐχάνειν} \) however, can be used intransitively in the active (LSJ s.v. III).

In view of the strong mss. support for the infinitive, I would be inclined to keep it and to pardon P.'s inconsistency.

Aristotle (Ph. 226a 31) defines \( \text{αὐχεῖς} \) as \( \text{κύης} \) \( \text{εἰς} \, \text{τὸ} \, \text{τέλευ} \, \text{μύηδος} \). P.'s \( \text{τελεστάτος} \) suggests
that he may have had Aristotle's definition in mind (though see below). His language implies that if Intellect was to be subject to any change, \( \omega \eta \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \lambda \eta \varsigma \) would have been the most likely. But Intellect has no perfection to aim at since it is already perfect.

The next lines (4,14-25) explain and amplify the perfection of Intellect (4,17-21 are a digression on the relationship of time to eternity). For other references to the perfection of Intellect see 7,37; V 6,6,17-18; VI 7,8,26-27. It is slightly surprising to find Intellect called 'most perfect' here, since the One is called 'most perfect' at V 4,1,24 and VI 8,20,12 ff. That which is most perfect is most self-sufficient and only the One is completely self-sufficient. Intellect needs itself as an object of thought (V 3,13,16 ff.) and to this extent lacks perfect self-sufficiency. But perhaps P. was thinking of the \( \pi \alpha \delta \delta \lambda \gamma \nu \rho \alpha \) of Plato's \textit{Timaeus} which is called \( k\alpha \alpha \iota \nu i \pi \alpha \eta \tau \alpha \iota \) \( \nu \tau \rho \nu \) \( \iota \iota \iota \) in Ti. 30d 2 (cf. \( \tau \rho \lambda \iota \iota \iota \) of its copy in Ti. 92c 8).

The sequence of thought is that since Intellect is most perfect, all its contents separately, as well as Intellect as a whole, should be perfect. The complete perfection of Intellect is then further explained by two clauses, which to a large extent repeat what P. has already said:

(i) Intellect contains nothing which is not perfect (\( \omicron \lambda \iota \iota \iota \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsig...
reason for the perfection of Intellect as a whole. In the first case (a), the subject of the second relative clause will be \( \phi \) and the clause will be translated: 'Intellect contains nothing within it which does not think', i.e., everything in Intellect is perfect because it is alive with thought. This view is taken by MK: 'holding nothing that is less than intellectual', and by Br. 'il n'a en lui rien qui ne pense.' But if (b) is right, then the subject of the relative clause must be Intellect, and the point then is that Intellect is perfect because none of its objects of thought is external to it. This view is taken by Ha. who translates: 'er nichts in sich hat was er nicht denkt', although he remarks in his note that one would have expected \( \delta i \upsilon i \nu \nu o \nu i \nu \delta i \nu \mu \gamma \) \( \epsilon \chi i n \tau e \alpha n i \nu \). The translations of Fic. and Ci. are as ambiguous as the Greek.

Although both (a) and (b) are doctrinally sound (for the contents of Intellect as living and intelligent beings see 4,6-7 and V 5,2,11-12, and for Intellect containing (in thought) nothing but its objects V 6,1,8-11), it seems to me that (b) must be the correct interpretation, if for no other reason, than because one would expect the subject of \( v o i \lambda \) to be the same as the subject of \( v o i \lambda \) in 4,16 (\( v o i \lambda . . . \alpha i i \) \( \epsilon \chi i n \)). The subject of \( v o i \lambda \) can be nothing but Intellect.

The insertion of \( \delta i \) after \( o i \delta i \nu \) in 4,15 seems to rest on the mistaken assumption of Vo. (Praef. II.xxx) that \( \delta i \) is found in the text of Cyril (see Henry, Etats, p. 130). Vo.'s addition is printed by Br..
See Arist. *Metaph.* 1072b 22-23

Ross, in his note ad loc., correctly points out that Aristotle is explaining how potential intellect becomes actualised. This happens when it possesses its objects of contemplation. *ἐχν* in Aristotle has a temporal sense; it is the equivalent of ὅτι ἐρει (sc. πᾶ νοητά). P.'s interpretation of this passage is not Aristotle's (or Ross's).

The distinction between actual and potential intellect does not interest him here; consequently, *ἐχν* loses its temporal overtones. The point P. is making is that the activity of Intellect is internal and not external. The phrase ὰν ᾧν ἔλεγεν ἄλλα *ἐχν* explains how Intellect thinks - by turning within itself; the difference between ᾧν and *ἐχν* is the difference between Intellect and λογισμὸς or διάνοια (cf. IV 4,12,9-10 ἡταλ γὰρ μεθαν ὅ λογισμὸς ὅπερ ὃ ἦν *ἐχν* φέροντος; for φέροντος as a characteristic of Intellect see on 2,24). Λογισμὸς deals with objects outside itself; its knowledge is obtained by a search. In Intellect, however, the subject and object of thought are the same. Διάνοια knows that there is something more valuable than itself which does not search but possesses (V 3,4,14 ff.). (For further references to *ἐχν* used in connection with Intellect's thought see IV 4,16,26; V 3,10, 9-10, 16,25; V 5,2,10; V 6,1,10-11; V 9,7,9-10; VI 6,7,8-9).

Λογισμὸς deals with premises and conclusions (see on 3,13) whereas Intellect deals with its unchanging self. It is the aim of the soul to join it in its self-contemplation (V 8,10,35 ff.). The One
transcends both the searching of \( \lambda \gamma \iota \sigma \mu \omicron \) and the possession of Intellect (V 2,1,7-9).

4,16-17  \( \kappa \alpha \lambda \tau \omega \mu \alpha \kappa \alpha \gamma \iota \omicron \nu \) . . . \( \epsilon \pi \iota \kappa \iota \tau \omicron \) : On the use of \( \epsilon \iota \delta \alpha \iota \omicron \nu \) in Plato and Aristotle to characterise the life of the higher realities see Beierwaltes' on III 7,4,33 ff. He points out the connection of the word with self-sufficiency. \( \epsilon \iota \delta \alpha \iota \omicron \nu \) is used synonymously with \( \mu \alpha \kappa \alpha \gamma \omicron \) (Pl. R. 354a; Arist. EN 1101a 7 with Gauthier-Jolif's note). P. frequently uses the word to describe the members of the Intelligible World (II 9,9,32; II 2,1,40 ff.; III 7,4,33 ff.; III 8,11,30-31; IV 7,9,13; V 5,2,12). In our present passage, its use picks up \( \epsilon \iota \delta \alpha \iota \omicron \nu \) from 4,12. If happiness was extraneous to Intellect, this fact would mark a deficiency in it, and Intellect has already been described as 'most perfect' (cf. I 4,3,24 ff.).

4,17  \( \alpha \lambda \lambda \alpha \ ) \in \alpha \iota \omicron \nu \iota \nu \iota \tau \alpha \) : The sequence of thought is that Intellect has nothing, not even happiness, which is imposed upon it from outside, but is (contains) everything eternally. The eternal life of Intellect is a new point which is developed in the next three lines which constitute something of a digression. The words \( \nu \omicron \iota \iota \ tau \iota \iota \ ) must be supplied with \( \in \alpha \iota \omicron \nu \iota \nu \iota \tau \alpha \) and with \( \delta \omicron \nu \tau \alpha \iota \omicron \nu \) . Br., Ci. and Ha. give faultless translations. With the phrase \( \nu \omicron \iota \iota \ tau \iota \iota \ ) compare 4,21 where \( \iota \iota \tau \iota \ ) must be supplied and I 8,2,15-16; III 7,4,14; V 9,9,15-16.
4,17-18 καὶ ὤντως αἰών: For the identification of Intellect and eternity see III 7,4,1-2 ὁμοιοῦσθαι ἐν ὑμῖν οὐκ ἔχειν τούτῳ (οἷον αἰώνα) ἐκείνην τῇ φύσιν (οἷον τῷ νῦν), ἀλλὰ ἐκείνην καὶ ἐκείνης καὶ σῦν ἐκείνην with Beierwaltes' notes. No strict identity is intended; such an identity is specifically denied in III 7,2,2 ff. Rather, eternity is another name for the life of Intellect (III 7,3,36-38). As in III 7,4,1-2, the sort of identity which P. is trying to describe (οἷον ἐκείνην... ἐκείνης... σὺν ἐκείνην) is clear from the context (cf. ὁν αἰών τὰ πάντα ; and cf. further III 7,11,59 ff.). If Intellect existed in time it would lack self-sufficiency in so far as future time would exist independently of it (III 7,4,15 ff.).

4,18 ὁν μεριμναὶ χέανος: Compare III 7,11,20 and V 8,12,17. The expression is Platonic (Pl. Ti. 37d 5-7). On P.'s development of Plato's theory and its use by the rest of the Platonist tradition see Beierwaltes' note on III 7,11,20.

4,18 συμβαίνων ψυχήν: Πρέπει ψυχήν means 'to encircle'. In all of P.'s other uses of the word, with the exception of V 5,1,45 where the word is used very loosely while P. pours scorn on the notion that the Forms might be found outside Intellect, the thing encircled is of a higher ontological value than the encircling subject. Thus, in 6,29 sunlight is said to encircle its source, and the image is used as an illustration of the dependence of the lower hypostases upon their prior; in II 2,2,13-14 the soul encircles god (= Intellect); in VI 4,2,34-36 the sensible universe is described as being content to encircle the Intelligible Universe; in VI 7,
42,6-9 the lower levels of Intelligible Beings are said to encircle those at a higher level; in VI 8,18,25 ff. Intellect is said to encircle the One; and in VI 9,3,52-53 P. speaks of us encircling the One. Most significant for our present passage is VI 5,11,14 ff. where P. is discussing the relationship between time and eternity; he illustrates it by comparing it to the relationship of radii to the centre of a circle: the radii are attached to the centre (ἀπειρεμένης) and encircle it (πείραι ἀπειρεμένης) (VI 5,11,19). It is odd, then, to find time in our present passage described as encircling soul, since time and soul are not related as higher to lower hypostasis. Time bears the same relation to soul as eternity does to Intellect. It is the life of soul (III 7,11,45 ff.); it is ἀνατελλόμενον (meaning 'conceptually related to soul' (see on 4,19)) in IV 4,15,2; and its substance is closely established with soul (III 7,11,59-62). In view of these passages, it seems to me that the ontological relationship between time and soul is wrongly described by the phrase περιτείχον ἐμφάνισι. (I assume that in compound words the preposition could not have its intensive meaning of 'conceptually related to' (see on 4,19); as far as I can see, περιτείχον just means 'to encircle'.)

I would suggest, then, that the text is corrupt and that the correct reading is περαθέν ψυχήν. P. uses this word (περαθέν) of time in III 7,9,55 ff. where he criticises Aristotle's theory that time is the measure of movement. In a series of questions and answers he suggests that Aristotle means that time is the number which runs alongside movement and measures it by the
sequence of 'before' and 'after' (δὲ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἐστερον τῆς κακοσμίας παραθημίως ἐφίπτερον). Although P. uses the word absolutely in this passage, it is used with the accusative in other authors (see LSJ s.v. I). P. also uses παραθημίως in VI 6,3,25, but there παραθήκη means 'pass by' rather than 'run alongside of'. In III 7,9,19-23 P. uses σωμόκα σαν a synonym for παραθήκη; and in VI 7,13,31-33 substances (= the Forms) are said to 'run with Intellect's wanderings' (σωμόκασως τῶν οὐσίων παρά αὐτῶν παλάνας). Intellect and the Forms are ontologically coordinate just as time and the soul are.

Thus, there would be nothing unusual in P.'s using σωμόκα or παραθημίως of time and soul; and παραθήκη gives a much better description of their relationship than the mss. παραθήκη. It is not to be denied that the movement of time is circular in imitation of the movement of Intellect. But it is a movement around eternity as a centre, not around soul (see Beierwaltes on III 7,11,20, in the last paragraph of his note).

Time may be said to run alongside of soul, but hardly to move around it.

4,18-19 τῷ μὲν ... ἐμπᾶδην: Time lets some things go (the past), and moves on to new things (the future). With ἐμπᾶδην compare III 7,12,13-14; P. is talking of soul in the realm of eternity - ποῦ εἰς ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἐμπᾶδην εἰς ἀλλα γιὰ ἐν ἡ ἐν ἔστι. Na. translates the last phrase of our present passage: 'und das andere auf sich zukommen läs'st'. This is wrong; the point is not that time waits for the future, but that it creates it by its
movement from one thing to another. His mistranslation is surprising, since in his note he gives a correct interpretation: 'sich einem neuen zuwenden'.

P. explains 4,18-19 by 4,19-20.

On the idiom ἀλλος καὶ ἀλλος ('now one, now another') see Wolters on III 5,7,33, and his comprehensive list of examples. The idiom is sometimes used to contrast the discursive thought of soul with the quiet and non-discursive thought of Intellect (III 8,8,9-10; IV 3,25,19; IV 4,17,4; V 3,17,23-24). This is not the point here. P. is contrasting the 'division' of soul which necessarily takes place when soul descends into spatially separate body (cf. II 4,3,9-10) and the eternal presence of everything as a unified whole in Intellect. (On the 'division' of soul see on 2,36-37.) Soul is individuated in body (cf. IV 4,16,1 τόδε μετὰ τόθα), although in fact it is the same soul in which all individuals participate.

On the meaning of πεί in πεί ψυχή see Beierwaltes on III 7,2,2-3 and Wolters on III 5,7,52. In this intensive sense, πεί means 'conceptually related to'; it sometimes even approaches the meaning 'con-substantial with'. See Beierwaltes (loc. cit.):

'πεί anzeigt, dass etwas eigentlich in einem Anderen, nicht äußerlich an oder um in unwesentlicher Beziehung auf etwas hin ist'. Pic.'s 'circa animam' and Ci.'s 'vorticano sull'Anima' miss this point. A succession of individuals is conceptually related to soul in so far as it is soul's function to undergo division (εἰς ἑ κ ἑ φύσιν πείζεσθαι IV 1,8-9).
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4,20 ποτε γέ... τῶν ὄντων: Μέν, the reading of the single ms. B, is printed by Creuzer in place of γέ. But besides being the reading of the majority of the mss., γέ is necessary to provide the connection with 4,19.

Socrates is one of Aristotle's stock examples of ἀνθρωπος (see Bonitz, Index, 741b 45 ff.). P. uses 'Socrates' in this way here and in II 5,2,17; III 2,15,59; IV 3,5,3-4; IV 4,2,3; V 3,3,5; V 7,1 passim; V 9,12,3; VI 1,13,15-16; VI 2,1,24; VI 3,4,14; 5,13-22; 6,18-22; 7,10. 9,27-30; 15,31-34. Similarly, ἔρως is a common Aristotelian word for ἐρωτεύον τι (although this is not noticed by Bonitz) — see Cat. 1b 4; ibid. 1b 28; ibid. 2a 13-14; ibid. 2b 25; id. Int. 18a 19; ibid. 18a 22; id. Ph. 185a 24; id. Metaph. 1088a 9. Ἐρως is found in this sense in later authors; see e.g., S.E. M. 10.263; Theo Sm. 19.18-20 (Hiller); Albinus IV 5, p. 15 (Louis). P. again uses the word in this way at e.g., II 3,12,3; III 1,6,2; III 6,16,6; VI 6,9,15; VI 7,7,2 ff.; VI 7,8,1 ff.

Τῶν ὄντων: see Wolters' note on III 5,9,22. Τά ὄντα can mean all reality including sensible reality (as here); it can mean the Forms only; or it can mean everything belonging to the Intelligible World including soul.

4,21-22 ἐξαίη... ἐν τῷ αἰτή: The οὖν is resumptive after the digression of 4,17-21.

The mss. text reads ἐξαίη ἐν τῷ αἰτή πάντα ἐστίνα ἐν τῷ αἰτήν. The repetition of ἐν τῷ αἰτή is difficult and suggests a mistake in the archetype. Ki., Mī., Vo., Br. and
Ci. delete the τὴν and read ἐν αἰσθή 
(or ἐν αἰσθή . )

H-S follow Ha. in deleting the first occurrence of the phrase as an example of dittography.

It seems to me, however, that the second ἐν τῷ αἰσθῆ is also difficult. Although the phrase μένειν ἐν τῷ αἰσθῆ is quite common (III 7,3,16. 3,20-21. 11,52; VI 5,11,16. 11,22) possibly because of its similarity to Pl. Ti. 42e 5-6 μένενος ἐκείνων (sc. τοῦ δημοσίου) ἐν τῷ αἰσθῆ ἦπει , I can find no example of ἐστάνα τις followed by ἐν τῷ αἰσθῆ . On the other hand in VI 6,18,36 the sentence ἐστήκε δι ἐν αἰῶν τὰ ὄντα occurs. I would suggest that αἰῶν is the correct reading in 4,22; from the palaeographical point of view, αἰσθῆ and αἰῶν are close.

If ἐν τῷ αἰῶν is the correct reading in 4,22, then the corruption in 4,21 is easily explained. I prefer Ki.'s ἐν αἰσθῆ , presumably changed to ἐν τῷ αἰσθῆ by dittography of the corrupt ἐν τῷ αἰσθῆ in 4,22. The text should be ἐκείνῳ ἐν αἰσθῆ πάντα ἐστὶ ἐν τῷ αἰῶν . This picks up the argument of 4,17, and is further explained by what follows.

4,22—25 καὶ ἐστὶ μόνον... τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα : The explanation of eternity as the eternal present is Platonic (see Pl. Ti. 37e 5-38a 2 λόγῳ γὰρ ὡς ὅτι Ἆστιν τε καλ ἦσται, τὴν δὲ (sc. τὴν αἰσθήναν ὀνάσας) τοῦ ἐστὶν μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθὴ λόγον προσήκει, τὸ δ' ἣν τὸ τῆς ἦσται περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεται ὀνόματι περίπτω ὁμοιόθεν . P.'s language here, as H-S note, reflects Plato's (cf. also III 7,3,20 ff., esp. 3,20-23
and 3,34-36. P. derives αἰων from αἰών in III 7,4,42-43, but advises against subsequent misinterpretation in III 7,6,32 ff.). If it were possible for there to be a past or a future in Intellect, this would mean that the being of Intellect was not intrinsic (σύμφωνως) to it (III 7,4,22-24). Therefore, the eternal present which the contents of Intellect enjoy is yet another sign of its perfection.

In 4,23 οὐδαμῶν means 'non-existent' (cf. Pl. Pha. 70a 2).
In the same line, Mi. arbitrarily deletes έστι γε καὶ τότε. This aside, however, parallels the aside in 4,24 (οὐ γε τί ἐκείνος ἀρχήλαυτος) and is found in all the mss.

In 4,24 ἐνίστημεν means 'are present' as Ha. notes (see LSJ s.v. B III.2 and cf. IV 3,13,7, 13,27). Cf., Ha. and MK miss this point. The subject of the verb is presumably πάντα supplied from 4,21.

Since the contents of Intellect are the same - P. explains in the next sentence that each of them is Intellect and Being - there is no room for change, since time is necessary for change. But in Intellect there is no time, only an eternal present. The sameness of Intellect's contents does not prevent there being qualitative differences between the Forms (see 4,39 and V 9,6,3, 6,7 ff.).

4,25 οἷον... πάντας ἐκατοντά : For ἀγαπᾶν with the participle see LSJ s.v. III 2. Ἀγαπᾶν picks up the idea of μακάβιον in 4,16-17.

1. In his translation.
The identification of Intellect and Being is a new point introduced to explain Intellect's sameness. P. develops the point in the rest of the chapter, explaining its internal life and the relationship between Intellect and its objects by means of the Platonic genera.

P. traces back the identification of Intellect and Being to Parmenides DK B.3 (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοσῶν ἑστὶ περὶ καὶ ἐνναὶ) which he quotes in 8,17; I 4,10,6; III 8,9,8; V 9,5,29-30 (see on 8,15-18). Νοσῶς (νοσῶν) and ὄν (τὸ ἐνναὶ, τὸ νοσῆν) are identified implicitly or explicitly in III 5,7,50-51; V 3,5,26 ff.; V 4,2,43-44; V 5,3,1; V 6,6,21-22; V 9,5,13; VI 7,41,12. In our present passage each Intellect is described as Being, and the whole of Intellect as the whole of Being. Compare V 9,8,2-4 οὐ εἶσπρα τὸν νοσὴν ἐκάστην ἔσει, ἀλλ' ἐκάστην νοσὲ. καὶ ὅλος μὲν δὲ νοσὴ τὰ πάντα ἔσει, ἐκαστὸν δὲ ὅλος νοσὶς ἐκαστὸς.

The relationship between the individual Intellects and the whole of Intellect is explained most vividly in V 9,6,10 ff. where he compares Intellect to a seed and the individual Intellects to the creative powers (λόγοι) contained within it (cf. III 6,1,10-11; III 2,2,18 ff.; III 7,11,23 with Beierwaltes' note). In the seed the powers are undistinguished (ἀνικάτερα); yet each power has its own responsibility, one for the growth of the hand, another for the growth of the foot etc. so that each power is distinct. In V 9,8,5 ff. he compares Intellect to a science (ἐπιστήμη) and the individual Intellects to the theorems which constitute it. Each theorem can be made explicit by thought, but remains implicit in the science as a whole (cf. VI 2,20,1 ff. and IV 9,5,7 ff. for a
similar relationship between souls). Both these comparisons ultimately fail, because P. wants to hold the paradoxical position that although the individual Intellects are distinct, each is at the same time identical with the whole of Intellect. Such paradox is the price of philosophical synthesis. If the Intelligible World is to be the Platonic archetype of the sensible world, it must be the source of its variety; hence, each Form must be different. But if, on the other hand, the Intelligible World and Aristotelian nous are co-extensive, then no part of that nous can differ from any other part or from the whole, since nous is a self-thinking unity.

4,27-28 ὃ μὲν nous ... καὶ τὸ γίγνεται: P. tries to explain the relationship between Intellect and Being by means of the dualism required by the act of thought; Intellect is the subject of thought and Being its object. He gives the impression in these lines, esp. in 4,27 (ὃ μὲν nous καὶ τὸ nous ἑφιστάται τὸ ὄν ) that Intellect by its thought is responsible for the creation of Being (cf. VI 7,40,10-12 η γίγνεται ... νόησις ... ἐποιήσασε τὴν οὐσίαν οἷκ ἄν δύναιτο ἐν οἰκὼν γίγνεται ἑφ' οὐ εἰρήκτηρ; VI 7,41,18-19 καὶ νῦ (sc. η νόησις καλὸν) ὅτι τὸ γίγνεται αὐτῷ ταὐτόν, καὶ η νόησις ποιήσωσιν αὐτὸν ). Yet in V 9,8,8 ff. he expressly rejects this interpretation and states that Being is conceptually prior to Intellect (τὸ ὄν τού νου προσποιοῦν ἀνάγκη ). Note also V 2,1,11 ff. where he says that the στάσις of the One's undefined product near the One creates Being, whilst the act of
looking towards the One creates Intellect. Since, then, P.
continues, the One's undefined product stood near the One so
that it could see it, Intellect and Being exist together (ὁμοῦ).
But this conclusion does not follow from the argument, since the
standing which creates Being is prior to the seeing; until the
standing had taken place there was no possibility of seeing
(cf. further VI 6,8,17 ff.). P.'s anxiety to uphold the primacy
of Being is perhaps due to his wish to follow Aristotle in the
latter's remarks about the priority of the category of ὑbris
(Arist. Metaph. 1028a 32-33).

Properly speaking, of course, P. ought not to make any
distinctions at all between Intellect and Being, since Intellect
thinks itself. He does say in V 9,8,19 ff. that conceptual
distinctions of this sort are due to human shortcomings. No
doubt he would explain his own contradictory remarks in this light.
Properly speaking, no factor of the relationship could exist
independently; Intellect could not exist if there were no objects
of thought (4,28) and the objects of thought could not exist if
there was no Intellect to think them.

The point is that although in one sense the existence of the objects
of thought gives Intellect its being (4,28), in another sense the
source of Intellect and Being is the One, from which both derive
(see 5,3-4; 5,17-19 and notes).
The particle before 

is probably explanatory and introduces the explanation of the way in which Intellect and Being are together ( 

). Along with 

MK, I take there to be three clauses in these lines, and would supply 

with 

... 

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The phrase 

is Platonic (Pl. Phdr. 245c 7-8) and points to the eternal coexistence of Intellect and Being (see 2,9 where the phrase is used of soul).


The Platonic Genera. Before discussing the genera or categories individually, it is worth making some general remarks about the role of the categories in P.'s philosophy. He deals with the Intelligible Categories most fully in VI 2, and this treatise is admirably discussed by G. Nebel, Plotins Kategorien der Intelligiblen Welt (Tübingen, 1929). See also O. Hoppe, Die Gene in Plotins Enn. VI 2 (Diss. Göttingen, 1965).

It is well known that P.'s list of categories, with the exception of quality and quantity in 4,42 (see note ad loc.), come from Plato's Sophist 245b 8 ff. (cf. also Pl. Parm. 145e 7 ff.). First, it should be noticed that in the Sophist Plato is not attempting a systematic explanation of the structure of the Intelligible World of Forms (Nebel, op. cit., p. 9); he shows that he does not intend his list to be exhaustive by saying that he is dealing with only some of the so-called 

( 

Pl. Sph. 254c 3-4). Later interpreters of Plato seem to have ignored this (e.g., Plu. de E ap. Delph.
are all Forms with a great capacity for mutual participation (κοινωνία). It is because of this capacity that the Forms which Plato mentions are called μίγη.

Like any other Platonist of his time, P. accepted Plato's genera as part of his philosophical heritage. He could not ignore them or fail to defend them against what he thought were rival systems (Aristotelian and Stoic categories). He had to try to align his own views with Plato's (τὰ δοκεῖνται ἡμῖν περιέχοντας τὰς τῆς Πλάτωνος ἀνάγιν θοῦκέν VI 2,1,4-5). But Plato's categories emphasise the divisions within the world of Forms rather than its unity. Plato's Intelligible World is a collection of self-contained Forms each with a different capacity for participation. It is what P. might have called a composite unity (σύνθεσις εἰν). But P. carefully maintains that not even soul and a fortiori not Intellect is a composite unity (VI 2,4,31). Thus, P. could not allow Plato's genera to enjoy the same self-sufficiency which they had in Plato's system, since the unity of the Intelligible World was as important, if not more important, than the plurality which the life of Intellect necessarily demanded. His solution was to make the genera aspects of the life of Intellect which we separate out because of our inability to grasp its unity (ἡμᾶς τὸ δὲν μοίρας ἄνωθεν περιέχοντας ταῖται ἐν ἑαυτοῦ περισσαὶ καὶ γίνος λείγεν ἀνυφάντας ὁτι μὴ δὲν ἀμα εἰδόμεν VI 2,3,26-28; cf. P. Hadot, Enfr. p. lll: 'les genres de l'être du Sophiste ... apparaissent comme les différents aspects sous lesquels notre intelligence morcelante saisit la vie unique de
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l'intelligence'; he adduces VI 2,7,1-8, 7,48). For Plato each 
γίνοι was a ὁ ἰκαστον (VI 2,3,27); but it is doubtful 
whether for P. each of the primary genera was even a Form. 
Being, for example, is certainly not a Form as it was for 
Plato; it is identical with Intellect, not one of the many Forms 
which constitute Intelligible Reality. Movement and rest, like 
sameness and otherness are both aspects of the act of thinking 
which is itself the activity of Intellect. The Platonic genera, 
were not Forms in the sense that they are included among Intellect's 
objects; they rather illuminate the way in which Intellect engages 
in its activity. They describe νόησις not ὁ νοητόν.

As Nebel remarks (op. cit. p. 44), the categories were not 
of primary importance for P. Outside of VI 1-3, P. mentions them 
in our present passage; II 6,1,1 ff.; III 7,3,7 ff.; V 3,10,21 ff.; 
V 3,15,39 ff.; V 9,10,10 ff.; VI 6,9,3 ff.; VI 7,8,25 ff.; VI 7,13, 
4 ff.; VI 9,3,41 ff. (see Hoppe, op. cit. pp. 12-40). However, he 
does not always give complete lists and sometimes joins Aristotelian 
and Platonic terms without distinction.

Note the emphasis which 
P. places on the concepts of otherness and sameness. He devotes 
only two lines to movement and rest and at least five to otherness 
and sameness. This is because otherness and sameness explain further 
the identity and at the same time the difference between Intellect 
and Being, the subject and the object of thought, with which P. 
has been concerned since 4,26. Movement and rest are variants
for them (Hoppe, op. cit. p. 21). In Plato it is movement and rest which appear first, both in *Soph.* 254d 4 ff. and in *Prm.* 145e 7 ff.. Otherness and sameness are then derived from Being, movement and rest. P. follows Plato’s order and method more closely in VI 2,7-8 where otherness and sameness are derived from the conceptual distinctions between movement and rest. The Platonic order is followed also in II 6,1,1-3; III 7,3,9-11; VI 6,9,3 ff.; cf. VI 7,13,4 ff..

Otherness here is the principle of distinction which separates Intellect from its object (4,37-38 ἱν’ ἵνα νοοῦν καὶ νοοῦν - μένοιν), while sameness ensures that Intellect and its object are at the same time one. Without otherness there would be no thought, since there would be no object of thought (V 3,10,23-25; VI 7,13,11-12). The unity of Intellect demands sameness, its activity otherness (VI 2,15,14-15 εἰ δὲ πολλά, καὶ ἕξιος, καὶ εἰ δὲ πολλά, καὶ ταὐτός).

On otherness see also J. M. Rist, *Le Néoplatonisme*, pp. 77-87 and note on 1,4.

4,34-37 γίνεται οἷν τὰ πειρα... τὸ αὐτὸ ; Τὰ πειρα here means 'the primary genera' and not as in 1,24 'Intellect and the Forms': cf. VI 2,9,1. Note that in 4,35 P. adds Intellect to the Platonic list.

Whereas otherness makes thought possible by providing it with an object, movement describes or rather is the activity of thought itself. Otherness wakes Being into life (VI 7,13,11-12) and movement is the life which results (VI 2,7,55-36 ἐκὼ τῆς αὐτοῦ
But since Intellect thinks itself, this movement is always directed to the same object which is stationary. Thus, the ἄγαμος of τὸ ὑπ' complements the νέμεις of νοῦς.

On ίνα τὸ αὐτὸ in 4,37 see Wolters on III 5,1,58.

He compares the phrase with the elliptical ίνα τί; and cites as other examples II 1,8,16; III 8,6,7; VI 7,3,14-15.

4,38-39 έν γινόμενον ... συμπάθεται: Otherness is responsible for the activity of Being (see preceding note); with no activity, only silence results.

4,39-40 καὶ δὲ καὶ ... ἄλληλα σίναι: The καὶ shows that this is a new point. Not only must there be otherness within Intellect as a whole, there must also be otherness within its objects. In this way, the Intelligible World can be a true archetype for the variety of the sensible world. Compare V 3,10,26-29 καὶ πάλιν ἀλλ' ἐκατον τῶν νοούμενων συνειρρέων τὴν ταυτότητα πάσην καὶ τὴν ἑκατέραν. ἢ τί νοεῖται, ὅ μήν ἔχω άλλο καὶ άλλο; V 3,10,39-41 δὲ τοῖνος τὸ νοούν ἐσχέθη καὶ ἐσχέθη λαβόντων καὶ τὸ νοούμενον κατανοοόμενον ἐν ποιήλον σίναι. Otherness creates Intelligible Matter (II 4,5,28-29) which then receives different shapes according to the differences between the Forms (II 4,4,4 ff.).

Pic. inserts τοῖς νοοῖς after έν in 4,39 ('quae intelligunt') and is followed by the corrector of R., who changed his text in accordance with Pic.'s translation (see Henry, Manuscripts, p. 127). Pic.'s insertion cannot be right; not only does
it repeat what 4,37-38 imply, but the parallel sentence which follows in 4,40 shows that τοῦς νοοῦσι is wrong. Just as there is otherness in Intellect as a whole and in its objects so there is unity in the two 'parts' of Intellect.

Vitrunga's conjecture ἐπεζωητὰ for ἐπάλος in 4,39, adopted by Vo. and Br., avoids the construction of ὅτι with the dative. On this, see W. S. Barrett's note on Euripides' Hippolytus 940. Although rare, the construction is used in classical Greek. It is paralleled in P. at IV 7,8,34 ὁμφλονίαν ὅτι τί ὅτι πνεῦματι ;

4,40 τα labore δὲ ... ἐν πάσῃ ; There are two levels of otherness within Intellect (see preceding note); similarly, there are two levels of sameness - (a) Intellect and Being are identical since Intellect thinks itself, and (b) κοινὸν δὲ τί ἐν πάσῃ . This last phrase (b) must refer to unity among the objects of Intellect. (Ha. refers πᾶσι to τὰ προστά , but this breaks up the parallelism between the two sentences in 4,39-41. I do not understand why he thinks that any interpretation but his own makes the ἐπεζωητὰ of 4,41 'nicht verständlich'. On his punctuation of this passage see following note.)

The subject of (b) is, I think, κοινὸν... τί , not Intellect as is suggested by Schwizer (Rhd 90 (1941), p. 230). I do not see that 'das κοινὸν δὲ τί ἐν präzisiert das vorher gemante ἐν' (loc. cit.). The καὶ in 4,40 introduces a co-ordinate clause; it is not explanatory. The κοινὸν ... τί is not that all the objects of thought are Intellect (although this is perfectly
true), but simply that they are all objects of the thought of Intellect which thinks them all (cf. 4,15-16 οὐδ' ἐγίνετο τὰ μὴ νοεῖται). Because of this function which they share in common (viz. being thought by Intellect), they have something in common among themselves; and there is a unity in Intellect as a whole, since Intellect and its objects are identical.

All editors since Ki., except for Ci. and H-S, have changed the second εἰν into the preposition ἐν. Either reading leaves the sense of the passage unchanged, but I would prefer to read ἐν since εἰν seems to me pleonastic. If there is something in common with all the objects of thought, then obviously it is this which unites them. If Intellect were the subject of (b), then εἰν might be more acceptable, but I have said above why I prefer to take κοινὸν ... τά as the subject. Ha. who reads ἐν aptly compares II 4,4,2-3 εἰ σῶμεν πολλά τὰ ἑαυτοῖς, κοινὸν μὴν τά ἐν αὐτοῖς ἁπάντως εἶναι.

4,41 καὶ ἡ διάφορα ὑφήγη : The difference referred to is the difference between the objects of thought. Ha. reads ἡ and takes διάφορα as neuter plural. But there seems to me to be no difference between 'qua-different, the objects of thought (or in his case τά πρῶτα) contain otherness' and 'the difference between the objects of thought is otherness'. The mss. reading is perfectly acceptable.

His punctuation of the whole of 4,37-41 needs some discussion. He brackets 4,38-40 ἡ ... ἐναντίον εἶναι, puts a semicolon after ἑαυτῶ in 4,40, and a comma after πολλά, so that
He is right from the point of view of the sense to bracket 4,38 up to συντήρησιν in 4,39. But the rest of 4,39 up to εἴναι in 4,40 is very much part of the argument. To parallel the two levels of otherness, P. introduces two levels of sameness; therefore, καὶ κοινὸν δὲ τὸ κτῆμ. must be joined to what precedes rather than to what follows.

4,41-43 τὰῦτα δὴ... τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ: Τὰῦτα (4,41) refers to the primary (Platonic) genera.

Quantity and quality are Aristotelian categories, next in priority to substance. (For the usual order see Arist. Cat. 1b 25-27; id. Top. 103b 21-23.) Although neither of these is a primary genus (VI 2,15,18) – although P. wavers about the status of quantity (VI 2,13,28-29) – they exist in the Intelligible World as Forms, and are mentioned alongside the Platonic genera particularly when P. wants to illustrate the variety of Intellect. Thus, in V 9,10, 6 ff. the two systems intermingle, and in V 9,10,10 ff. the Platonic list is concluded by σώμα and ποσὸν. In VI 9,3,41 ff., where P. denies to the One any of the attributes of τὰ πάντα, quantity and quality are denied to it along with movement and rest. And in the late treatise V 3, at V 3,15,39-40, P. describes Intellect as a duality and then as a plurality, and as an illustration of that plurality adds καὶ γάς ἐπεξεργάζεται καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποσὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Our present passage is similarly concerned with the plurality of Intellect (note the change from
in 4,31 to πατάω in 4,41 to πατάθος in 5,1); hence, the Aristotelian categories fit in well with the context.

One might compare with our present passage VI 2,21,6 ff. where P. is discussing the generation of the individual Forms within Intellect. After number (VI 2,21,6) he mentions quality (VI 2,21,13) and the whole of quantity (VI 2,21,15). As here, the later Forms (τὰ λογότυπα ἐφεξῆς VI 2,21,2-3) seem to be produced from conceptual distinctions between the primary genera (τούρων in 4,42; Br. wrongly takes this to mean 'des êtres').

In the last phrase ὁ ἐκ τῶν ... τῶν, all editors and translators except MK take as the antecedent of the relative pronoun the primary genera plus quantity and quality. MK, however, takes as the antecedent only the Platonic genera, referred to by τούρων in 4,42. The natural sense of the Greek is, I think, to take as antecedent all the genera so far mentioned. Although quantity and quality are not primary genera (aspects of the life of Intellect) they can nevertheless serve as principles for τῶν. (On the relationship between genera and principles see VI 2,2,14 ff. and Hoppe, op. cit. pp. 42.) Τῶν refers to what P. calls in VI 2,21,2-3 τὰ λογότυπα ἐφεξῆς i.e., the Forms.
CHAPTER FIVE

Having dealt with the soul and with Intellect, P. moves on to consider the One, which he discusses in the next three chapters. Chapter 5 deals with the relationship between Intellect and the One, mainly in terms of the Platonic theory of Intelligible Number. It is remarkable for its terseness and obscurity, and Br. (Notice, pp. 10-11) thinks that 5,7-18 (διάμετρον ... πας' ρύτοι) along with the first sentence of Chapter 6 should be omitted from the text. His reasons for this relate partly to style ('son style et sa manière') and partly to internal cogency and construction ('l'ensemble du développement'). Br.'s first point seems to me to carry little conviction. We know from Porphyry's Life that P. cared little for niceties of language or rhetoric; he wrote as he thought and as if he was copying from a book (V.P. 8.4-11). Compression of style indicates a corresponding compression of thought. Consequently, change of style cannot be used as a criterion for rearrangement of the text.

Br.'s second point - that the sequence of thought in 5,7-18 is disturbed - needs more serious consideration. It can, however, be shown by careful analysis that Br.'s remarks (p. 21 of his edition, note 1) that 5,7-18 is an 'exposé assez confus, où le nombre est considéré tour à tour comme formant la substance intelligible (l.9), puis l'âme (ibid.), tandis que les lignes 15-18 indiquent assez vaguement que le nombre est comme un intermédiaire entre l'Un et les intelligibles' reflect only his own misunderstanding of the passage (see individual notes). Ba. well remarks in his introduction that from the point of view of the thought, the passage is quite coherent. His particular argument against Br.'s
theory however, - 'es ist kein Einschub, 6,1 ist nicht mehr
die Seele subjekt wie 5,5, sondern der Geist' - does not take
account of the fact that Br. adds the first sentence of Chapter
6 to the passage of Chapter 5 which he regards as corrupt.

5,1-6

These lines act as the introduction
to 5,6-19, the main section of the Chapter.

5,1

The σάν picks up the discussion
of the categories which closed Chapter 4. The plurality of
Intellect was illustrated by this discussion (see on 4,41-43).

Unity and plurality are both indispensable to it (cf. VI 7,13,
1-2 ἐστι γάρ θεῖς κόσμῳ ἀνδράν, ὠνίς η δ' αὐτοῦ ψυχή,
ἀλλὰ ποικίλα πάντα οὖν ἡμῖν). For other refer­
ences to Intellect as σῶν see, e.g., V 3,10,10. 10,20.
11,1. 11,26; VI 8,17,13. The idea is common in P.

On Θέος see on 1,2.

5,1-2

The ms. text gives 5,1-2 without
punctuation and with τό 6κτ in 5,1 where H-S print τό 6ο'.

All editors before Ci. follow the ms. text. Ha. remarks that
the sense of τό 6κτ is extremely difficult, as the emphatic
demonstrative has no obvious reference. It cannot refer to the
earthly as opposed to the world soul (as one might have expected)
since there is no point in such a reference here. A second
difficulty presents itself with the infinitive εἶναι (5,2)
which is dependent on ἐπάθειμ (5,1). One might expect
ἐν τούτωι to be taken with εἶναι, but this is
awkward if ὁ Θεός is the subject because of
which agrees with \( \psi v w \) and must be construed with \( \zeta w \) \( \tau w o t \) for otherwise, there would be no way of telling what the soul was joined to.

Dodds (according to H-S) reads 'πτι' \( \delta \) for 'πτι' in 5,1. Presumably he puts a stop after \( \theta i o s \) (5,1). But the sentence must end at '\( \theta i o s \) (5,2) because of the position of \( \sigma w \) in 5,3. But in this case, where is the main clause? Best is Ha.'s suggestion adopted by H-S to place a stop after \( \psi v w \) (in this he followed Ci.) and to read 'πτι' \( \delta \) .

\( \text{In } \tau w o t \) ... '\( \theta i o s \) : \( \tau w o t \) can refer either to \( \tau \) \( \nu o r t a \) or to \( \nu \) \( \alpha i s \theta e t a \) . Br., H-S and MK refer it to the former, and Fic. and Ci. to the latter. Fic. and Ci. are almost certainly wrong. F.'s other uses of the word \( \sigma w a t p e w \) refer to the joining of one hypostasis to another through '\( \nu w o r t o f \) (VI 9,8,8-9 \( \theta i o s \) \( \gamma ^{\prime} \) \( \tau \) \( \nu k w \) \( \varsigma c r r \) \( \tau \) \( \nu w \) \( \varsigma \) \( \nu n n p a w \) ; VI 9,8,18 ff. - the joining of the centre of the soul to the centre of all centres - and VI 6,15,26-27; cf. J. M. Rist, Plotinus - the Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), p. 222. Ha. also compares VI 4,14,15-16 \( \tau \) \( \xi \) \( \gamma i \) \( \nu w \) \( \rho e \) \( \pi l a x i k a \) kai \( \sigma w a t p e w \) \( \delta o k e \) ; compare further Procl. in \( \pi w k \) 21.2 (Friedlein) - the study
of mathematics ημερί μεγαλωτή τούς νοητούς). Secondly, P. uses the word άναπτυξάτων to refer either to the separation of a lower entity from a higher (IV 3,11,23-24; V 5,4,9-10) or, in the case of Intellect, with the negative to refer to its ranging over the whole of Being, generally with a further reference to Pl. Prm. 144b 2 (III 6,6,12 ὁ μηνίν άναπτυξάτων τοῆς χάλας; V 3,16,30; V 5,9,22; VI 4,5,4-5; VI 5,3,20-21. 9,39). He nowhere uses the word to describe the separation of a higher entity from a lower. Consequently, τοιχούς in 5,2 must refer to τοŶς νοητούς.

A difficulty, however, seems to arise with the sentence which follows. Why, if he has spoken of the soul as joined to the Intelligible World, does P. continue in 5,3 by talking of its progress from sensible to Intelligible Reality? The difficulty is resolved if we see 5,1-2 (τῇ δὲ ... ἐθελούσι) as a general remark about the nature of souls. By their very nature they are members of the Intelligible World (see on 4,11) and can remain there, provided that they do not exercise their free-will and descend into human bodies. (Of course, from another point of view, souls cannot remain there, since the ηγείται has to work itself out according to the laws of nature (cf. e.g., IV 8,6,7 ff.). Descent from this point of view is no worse than casting a shadow (I 1,12,24 ff.). P. never fully reconciles the voluntary and involuntary aspects of soul's descent.)

H-S and Beutler-Theiler (in index of 'Antike Autoren und Stellen' t.VI) think that ἀναπτυξάτων in our present passage is a reminiscence of Pl. Prm. 144b 1-2 ἐνὶ πάντῃ ἀρα.
The soul approaches Intellect (VI 4,14,15; VI 9,9,47-48) and becomes, as it were, one with it. At each stage of the spiritual ascent, soul or Intellect becomes one with the object of its search. The question is, what sort of identification did P. mean? There are clearly two sorts, a wholesale identification in which the lower hypostasis completely loses its identity in the higher, and a weaker sort of identification in which some degree of unity, but not a state of total absorption, is reached. The problem of identification is discussed by M. Burque (Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa 10 (1940), sect. spéc. pp. 141-176) and by Rist (Plotinus - the Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), in his chapter on mysticism pp. 213-230). Both authors are primarily concerned with the identification of soul and the One, but necessarily touch on the union of Intellect and soul.

The οὐν added by P. in our present passage suggests that the union is of the weaker sort, and the references collected by Burque confirm this. In IV 4,2,25 ff. P. says that soul, presumably through the imaginative faculty (see on 12,5-7), in the ἡμιστροφή must be united with Intellect (ὡς ἡμιστροφή ἡθικήν
Then he continues: at this point there is nothing between Intellect and soul; soul is fitted into Intellect and ἀμοσθενία γνώμα, οἷς ἀπολλυμίνη καὶ ἐν ὑστιν ἀμφὶ καὶ διό. The use of ἀμοσθενία (and the use of σωματικόν, see on 5,2) suggests that there are two components in the unified product - Intellect and soul. The phrase οἷς ἀπολλυμίνη bears out this conclusion. Soul does not lose its individuality; even though P. can speak of Intellect and soul as one, they are also two (ἐν ὑστιν ἀμφὶ καὶ διό). Note, however, that in IV 4,2,32 P. says of soul ὅποις ἐκ τοῦ ποτήρι ταλαν γινομένη. This might suggest a strict union, but the rest of the chapter precludes such an interpretation. Consequently, even if P. omits a qualifying word like οἷς, we have no right to interpret statements of unity as statements of identity. (Qualifying words are omitted at the following places: VI 6,8,8; VI 9,9,58. οἷς is, however, included in VI 7,35,4-5)

5,3-4 ἐν ἄλλ... γιννήσας: The mss. reads χήτης, where H-S print Seidel's conjecture χήτης like Perna, Kl., Mtl. and Vo. In this case an object must be supplied for χήτης and presumably this would be Intellect. This gives a ridiculous sense as Vo. has the honesty to note (Praef. II.xxxi). How can the soul be one, as it were, with Intellect and still be in search of it?
(b), the second alternative, is to place a comma or a semicolon after ἃματι and take τίς ὅν ... γεννηθας as an indirect question dependent on ἃματι. This is done by the remaining editors and translators. (Br. places a strong stop after ἃματι but translates as though it was weak one.)

To alternative (b) there are two possible objections. The first is the position of ὅν in 5,3, but Ha. rightly quotes as a parallel for ὅν in an indirect question Pl. Pro. 322c 3-4 ἃματι ὅν 'Εμῦ Δία, τίνα ὅν τερότον δοῦ ἄματα καὶ αληθεύματα. (On the use of ὅν in indirect questions in Plato see E. des Places, Études sur quelque Particulaires de Liaison chez Platon (Paris, 1929), p. 40, quoted by Wolters on III 5,2,11.) The construction is paralleled at III 5,2,11 and IV 4,10,6-8. A second objection is voiced by Schwyzer (RHM 90 (1941), p. 230 repeated in Museum Helveticum 26 (1969), p. 258): 'nur stört, dass die Seele gerade dann forschen soll, wenn sie mit dem νοεῖ Eins geworden'. But ἃματι is surely being used here figuratively. One might compare III 8,11,35-38 οὖν ξεγ καὶ τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον ὃς ἐθεῖασα καὶ ἐνει καὶ ἐθαύμασε τὸν κακίστου πονηρὸν τίς ἢ ἐν τοιοῦτον ὑποστήριξα ἃματι where, incidentally, ἃμα parallels ὅν in our present passage; and VI 7,16,1-4 ξεγ δὲ μὴ ἄκα ἐν τῷ πολλῷ τοιῷ καὶ τῆς μάνων (i.e. ἐν νῷ), μεταβάνειν δ' ἐν πρὸς τὸ ἀν ἀγαντα...θαυμάσαντα τίς ὤν γεννηθας καὶ ὅπως ὅτως cf. also VI 7,37,19-22. In the second parallel the wondering soul has already become Intellect, as it has in our present passage. But in none of the passages is any literal 'seeking' or 'wonder'
involved. P.'s language is vivid, because he wants to draw attention to the fact that Intellect is not the source of the progression from the One.

Seidel's conjecture is thus proved unnecessary. Its one recommendation, however, is that some reference to eternal life is found in the Arabic paraphrase - hence Vo.'s proposal. But reference to eternal life is quite out of place here, especially in view of the emphasis which would be placed on it owing to the emphatic position of at the end of one sentence before the start of another beginning a new idea ( etc.). Furthermore, the Arabic paraphrase is a doubtful ally. Section 130 which begins: 'if anyone asks: Who set the mind in this state...' gives support to the ms. This gives good sense, although Henry's argument for accepting it - that it parallels the verb in Basil (PG 29.773a) - is rightly rejected by Schwyzer (RhM 90 (1941), p. 230).

On the use of to describe the relationship between the hypostases see on 1,1-2. The use of the word here emphasises that the One at the head of the procession is the efficient cause of Intellect. P.'s argument for this causal role of the One needs some discussion. In VI 9 he argues as follows: each thing needs unity in order to exist (VI 9,1,1-2; III 8,10,20 ff.), and the unity is different from that to which it is applied; it is not soul (VI 9,1,36 ff.) or Intellect (VI 9,2,21 ff.), for example, since each of these involves plurality; there must, then, be some pure unity which is the of the unity of everything else.
Anything which is a plurality presupposes the One (III 9,4,7). The One's unity is so pure that it is beyond the predication of unity (V 3,16,14-15). If it was in the least degree plural, its plurality would suppose some higher unity (V 3,16,13-14; VI 7, 17,42-43). If plurality exists then the One must exist.

But the One is not only the ἄρχη of plurality in the sense that it is at the head of a series of lesser unities; it is also ἄρχη in the further sense that it is the cause of plurality. Its causal efficacy rests on its infinity of power; and if its power is infinite, then its effects will be infinite. The One is the ἑώραμα τῶν πάντων (III 8,1,10; V 4,1,36. 2,38; cf. VI 3,9,44). On this see J. M. Rist HSCP 69 (1965), pp. 340 ff. Everything else is related to it either directly, as in the case of Intellect, or through intermediaries (V 4,1,1-4; cf. VI 7,42,21-24). Thus, even the physical world ultimately owes its existence to the One.

5,4-6 ὁ ἄρχων ... ἄρχων ποιῶν: Editors vary in their punctuation here. All except Creuzer and H-S include these lines inside the question, and treat the question as rhetorical. But rhetorical or not the question would then contain its own answer since ὁ ἄρχων ... ποιῶν can be nothing but the answer to 4,3-4 τίς ... ὁ ποιῶν γεννήσας; It is better with Creuzer and Ha. to treat ὁ ἄρχων ... ποιῶν as a separate answer to the question about the source of Intellect.

5,4 ὁ ἄρχων ... ποιῶν πάθησις: Intellect is πάθησις (5,1) and therefore a πάθησις since πάθησις is defined in
VI 6,13,17-18 as πλήθος ενός. But because of its proximity to the One it is a πλήθος συνταγμάτων (VI 8,17,15), i.e., not completely a πλήθος (cf. VI 6,3,4-5 η δὲ ημών τὸ πλήθος καὶ καλωσάμενα πάντη πλήθος εἶναι εἰν δὲ πλήθος καὶ δὲ τοιαύτα ἔκαστα πού ἔνος, ὡς πλήθος ἐκείνο). For further references to the πλήθος of Intellect see V 3,12 passing The One, on the other hand, is ἁπλός and ἀπλούστατον ἁπάντων (II 9,1,8; III 8,9,17; V 3,13,34-35; V 4,1,5; cf. VI 2,10,20: Numenius called his first god ἁπλός (fr. 11).

Note especially V 3,16,14-16 σωφρόνως οὖν δεῖ νέον διὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἐπί καὶ ἀπλότητος ητενοισόμεθα ἐπί γενεσίᾳ ἁπλόων. This seems to mean that the One is not simple in the sense that it is a member of the class of ἁπλός. The One is beyond the grasp of predication.

There is a slight problem over the correct reading in this line where H-S print ὅ περ τοιούτου πλήθος. The mss. readings are of two sorts: (a) those that include the word πλήθος (i) without the definite article before τοιούτου (the majority of the Enneadic mss.; this reading is accepted by Perna, Pic., Creuzer, Ki., Mt., Ha. and H-S), or (ii) with the definite article (the single Enneadic ms. J). Or (b) those that omit πλήθος and read (i) τοιοῦτον (the majority of the Eusebian mss.; this reading is printed by Vo. and Br.) or merely (ii) τοιοῦτον (the single Eusebian ms. N, followed by Ci.).

There seems to be no difficulty about the inclusion of the word πλήθος, since the fact that Intellect is a πλήθος.
follows from its being πολύς. The best attested reading πολύ τοισίτων πολύθων is perfectly acceptable. With the omission of the article before τοισίτων compare III 8,11, 37-38.

5,4-5 ὁ αὐτὸς... ἢ μὲ ἡ τοιοῦτον: Since Intellect comes from the One through the procession, the One is ultimately responsible for everything relating to it. Since it both is and is not plural, the One, although itself above being and plurality, and perfectly simple, must be the cause of the being and plurality of Intellect. For the One as the cause of its being see V 3,15,28. 17,9 ff.; VI 6,9,31-32; VI 7,16,22-25. 23,22-24. 32,1-2. 42,11 and as the cause of plurality V 3,12,9-10. 16,12-13; VI 2,10,20; VI 7,15,20. In V 3,15,31 ff. P. explains that the contents of Intellect are in the One ὡς µὴ διακρίθηνα while they are διακρίθηνα in Intellect. This explanation is, however, unparalleled in P.

5,5-6 ὁ τὸν ἄρθρον ποιεῖν: Compare III 8,9,3-4 and V 3,12,9-10 where the sequence of thought is similar. Plurality derives from unity and this leads on to the mention of number, since 'in all numerical series, the unit is the first' (MK's translation of V 3,13,10).

5,6-19 ὁ γὰρ ἄρθρος... ἀρρ. φι. θ. τιν: The next section of Chapter 5 (5,6-19) contains an application of Plato's theory of
number to the procession from the One.

It is well known that Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* (e.g., *Metaph.* 987b 14 ff.; ibid. 1081a 14 ff.) describes as Plato's a theory of the derivation of number from the One and the Indefinite Dyad, which he also calls the Great and the Small (for other references to this doctrine see K. Gaiser, *Platons Ungeschriebene Lehre* (Stuttgart, 1963), Anhang, Testimonia Platonica nos. 49-55). Aristotle also identifies Plato's numbers with the Forms. This number theory is nowhere found in the written dialogues though Porphyry (ap. Simp. *in Ph.* 453.31 ff. (Diel 13)) derives it from *Philebus* 23c 9 ff., where Plato treats of the effect of Limit on the Unlimited. The Unlimited is called that which admits of τὸ μείλλον τὸ καὶ λίττερον (Pl. *Phlb.* 24a 7 ff.). Τὸ μείλλον τὸ καὶ λίττερον is close enough from the point of view of language to τὸ μία καὶ μικρὸν but it is not clear that the concepts referred to are the same. The publication of the more fully developed theory has been traced back to Plato's lecture 'On the Good', at which Aristotle along with Speusippus and Xenocrates was present (see Simp. *in Ph.* 151. 6 ff.). It would be outside our present scope to venture into the controversy about whether Aristotle misinterpreted what Plato said (see H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945). What is important for our purposes is that Plato's successors and through them the Middle Platonist tradition believed that the theory of the One and the Dyad was Platonic (cf. Xenocrates fr. 15 (Heinze); Plu. *Plat. Quaest.* 1002a; Numenius fr. 11). P. was no exception; but there is one important
difference between his interpretation and that of his Platonic predecessors.

For Plato and his successors it is quite clear that the One and the Dyad were two separate principles. Simplicius (in Ph. 151.6 ff.), quoting Alexander, says that all who were present at the Lecture on the Good preserved the doctrine that there were these principles (i.e. the One and the Dyad) - ταύτας αὐτὸν ἄξιον ἥγησαν ἄγωνοι (in Ph. 151.11). Sextus Empiricus (M. 10.282) specifically contrasts this two principle philosophy with monism. For P., however, there was no question of dualism. The Infinite Dyad derived from the One and was the undefined emanation which later became Intellect.

Evidence for a similar number monism before P. has been collected by Rist (HSCP 69 (1965), pp. 329-244 'Monism: Plotinus and some Predecessors'). Most significant is the first century BC Pythagorean Alexander Polyhistor quoted in DL 8.25, who maintains the the principle of all things is the Monad (see J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London, 1977), pp. 342-344). From then on, Neopythagoreanism gradually became monistic, though in no extant writings before P. do we find a systematic attempt to explain how plurality evolved.

One must ask next how important this number theory was for P. As already noticed, there are two parts, as it were, to the theory; one is the derivation of number from the One and the Indefinite Dyad, and the other is the identification of the numbers so formed with the Forms. (This last theory is described as Plato's by Aristotle, though Theophrastus (Metaph. 6b 11-14) suggests that
Plato placed numbers above the Forms in the ontological hierarchy.

First, that each hypostasis is defined by its prior and acquires separate existence is an important Plotinian doctrine. Intellect is defined by the One, just as soul is defined by Intellect. But there are several ways in which P. describes this process. He sometimes uses Platonic words based on the root ἀτος (i.e. ἀτοματικός, ἀτοματικός, ἀτοματικός e.g., II 4,5,31 ff.; VI 7,17,15), but he can use τονόματιν and its cognates (e.g., 7,16; III 8,11,17; V 4,2,5; cf. 3,13) or πληνόματιν (V 2,1,10. 1,20; VI 7,16,16 ff.). Only twice does he specifically refer to this process in terms of the One and the Indefinite Dyad - in our present passage, and in V 4,2,4 ff. where V 4,2,7-8 are clearly an afterthought and a quotation from Arist. Metaph. 1081a 13-15 (cf. ibid. 987b 20 ff.). The paucity of reference suggests that the actual numerical theory was unimportant and merely provide him with an alternative vocabulary for describing the process of generation. There is no reference to the Indefinite Dyad in VI 6, the treatise specially devoted to numbers.

Secondly, how far is the identification of Forms and numbers a integral part of P.'s system? P. believed that it was Plato's view that Intelligible Number was a substance (VI 6,4,20 ff.), so that he was to that extent committed to explaining Plato. Number is prior to τὸ ὅντα, because they are individuals whereas the concept 'number' is a universal. The universal 'number' is, however, closely associated with the universal 'Being' (τὸ ὅν) (VI 5,9,37 ὅν τὸ ὅντα καὶ μέτα τὸν ὅντα). So Number
along with Being makes τὰ ὄντα explicit (VI 6,9,36

σωματικά αὐτὰ (sc. τὰ ὑπη) ; VI 6,15,24-25 μεθ’οὐ (τὸ οὐτος) τὰ ὄντα γίνεται ). Tα ὄντα can therefore be called an ἀριθμὸς ἐξηκτιμημένος (VI 6,9,29-30). The association of numbers with each of the Forms guarantees that each Form should have its own individuality (see on 5,8-9).

Numerical concepts, then, can be used to describe the structure of Intellect (VI 6,9,29-31), but P. did not believe that Number was a separate entity in the ontological hierarchy as Plato apparently did (although the precise relationship between the Good of the Republic, the One of 'the Lecture on the Good', and Numbers remains unclear). Number for P. is rather an aspect of the life of Intellect, bearing something of the same relationship to it as eternity does (see on 4,17-18). The One is not called the One primarily because it is the first principle of number, but because it is ἀριθμωται. To conceive of the One purely in numerical terms would be to ignore its position at the head of the procession as the σωματικος πάντων to which all hypostases return. In our present passage, P. is very careful to explain precisely how he wants the numerical vocabulary to be understood (see 5,9; 5,13-16). This all suggests that the passage is a way of illustrating the Plotinian procession in language borrowed from a related metaphysic.

5,6 ὣ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ πρῶτος: Compare III 8,9,3-4 πάθος

ἐνὸς ἑστερον καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ ὄντος . This was a commonplace of Pythagorean theory (cf. Nicom. Ar. 13.7 (Hoche) and Aristox. ap. Stob I.20.10-11 (Wachsmuth and Hense)).
5,6-7 καὶ γὰρ ... τὸ ἕν : The mss. of Eusebius, who quotes this passage (PG 21.889a), include the definite article before δυάδος; they are followed by Vo. and Br.. In view of the lack of article in 5,7 (δυάτερον ἐκ δυᾶς) there seems no reason to include it here. It is, however, included in 5,13.

It is difficult to know whether τὸ ἕν, found twice in 5,7 should be translated as 'the One' or as 'unity'. In view of the fact that P. goes on to talk about number in the sense of substance (5,9 and note) it is, I think, the One which P. has primarily in mind (so Pic. (?) and Ha.).

5,7-8 δυάτερον ἐκ ... ἀρχήν παρὰ αὐτῆς : The One has the function of placing a limit on the unlimited or Indefinite Dyad.

Note that P. speaks of the Indefinite Dyad as derived from the One (παρὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς γεννημένη). The process of emanation is described in 6,15 ff. (see notes ad loc.); on the One's creative activity see on 5,3-4.

The phrase ἀρχήν παρὰ δυᾶς is Platonic (see Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford, 1924), pp. lvii-lviii). According to Aristotle it was conceived as ποσοστοιόν (Metaph. 1083a 13) i.e., as the creator of plurality. Hence, Plato called it μέγα καὶ μικρόν, which Aristotle wrongly interpreted as two separate principles (Metaph. 987b 20-21; cf. Rist, 'Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus', CQ 12 (1962), p. 100). The number two, the Dyad, is thus the first product of the One's defining activity. P. sometimes refers to this process of definition, when he applies the numerical theory to the Intelligible World, in terms of the
definition of sight by its object. Like the Indefinite Dyad sight is similarly undefined until it is limited by its object (V 4.2.4 ff. and cf. V 3.11.4 ff.) (see further on 5.14-15). With οὐσιάν compare 6.41.

In 5.8 οὐσία is read by all editors and translators except Creuzer (in his Oxford text), Ci. and H-S. (MK's translation makes certainty about his text impossible.) The mss. on the other hand are unanimous in reading οὐσία. Although the accents and breathings of an ancient ms. are of little value for textual criticism the mss. reading is probably right here; it gives a neat parallel with ἐνικέω in 5.7.

5.8-9 οὔταν δὲ ... ὡς οὐσία: The number formed by the action of the One on the Indefinite Dyad is a particular. Number is thus the guarantee of particularity and individuality for the constituents of the Intelligible World (see IV 3.8.22-24 καὶ γὰρ ἀδ' ἑστάναι δὲ τὰ ὀντα, καὶ τὰ οὐσία τὰ νοοτρικὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἑκατόν ἐν ἐξελλήσσε ἐνικέω· οὕτω γὰρ τὸ τὸδε; for number as a particular see Arist. Cat. 6a 20 ff.). The number mentioned here is number in the sense of substance since substance too is something defined (cf. Arist. Cat. 3b 33-34 οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ ἢ οὐσία οἷα ἐπεξεργάσθαι τὸ μὲν ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ τὸ ἡμέραν). P. seems to follow Aristotle's conception of substance in V 5.6.5-6 where he says that the One is not substance because it is not a τὸδε τὰ or ὑερμένων. To approach the One the soul must lose its particularity as it approaches that which is without form and definition (VI 9.3.4 ff.).
Although the physical world has its numbers too (VI 6,16, 45-46 of σώμα), Br. is probably right to note here (p. 21 n. 1 of his edition) that ὀυσία here refers to 'substance intelligible'. ὀυσία can, of course, refer to the physical world; see G. Nebel, 'Terminologische Untersuchungen zur ὀυσία und ὀν bei Plotin', Hermes 65 (1930), pp. 422-445.

Xenocrates' theory that the soul was a self-moving number, based on Plato's Timaeus 36e (cf. Ti. 36e 6-7 λογισμὸς δὲ μικρότερα καὶ ἀρμονίας ψυχή) was much quoted in antiquity (see refs. in Xenocrates fr. 60 (Heinze); H-S's reference to Arist. Top. 140b 2 which was irrelevant, is now discarded (see t. III p. 346). P. explains Plato in VI 6,16, 42 ff. The number which is within us is the number of our substance (ὀυσία). The soul shares in number and harmony and is number and harmony. It is not a body or extended magnitude. Then, P. continues, ἀρεθυνός ἀρα ἡ ψυχή, οὐσία i.e., the fact that soul is an ὀυσία means that it is a number just as the fact that body is an ὀυσία means that body has its own number in a bodily sense (VI 6,16,45-46).

The sequence of thought in our present passage is similar. P. has said in 5,8-9 that the product of the One and the Indefinite Dyad is number in the sense of being ὀυσία. He now says by way of an afterthought that soul too is a number and one must supply the reason - because it is ὀυσία. Soul is also called a number in IV 3,8,22 where it is contrasted as something defined and particular with what exists at random. Further reference to the
Br., then, is wrong to see inconsistency in P.'s thought in 5,9 (p. 21, n. 1 of his edition). P. wants us to take number and substance almost as synonyms. Anything which is a substance is a number.

5,10-13 οὐ γὰρ... λόγος: In the next three lines P. contrasts the number/substance of the Intelligible World (= τὰ πρωτά in which soul is here included: see note on 1,23-25) with the ὑμνοι and μεγεθη of sensible reality which is only an imitation of its Intelligible counterpart (VI 3,8,32). He then adds the rider that even in the world of sense what is important is what derives from elsewhere viz. from the Intelligible. The lines are parenthetical in tone.

5,10 οὐ γὰρ... παχύτατα: All ὑμνοι are μεγεθη extended magnitudes — (II 4,11,3). Μέγθος is associated with the physical world (VI 3,8,12-13; cf. VI 9,3,27 ff.). What is great in power in the Intelligible World is great in mass in the physical world (II 9,17,9-10).

Παχύς, used here of the physical world, seems to have pejorative overtones. By the time of the fifth century Greek fathers it was commonly used as the opposite of 'spiritual' (see Lampe s.vv. παχύς and παχύτης). We can perhaps in our present passage see the beginning of this use. The word is similarly used by P.'s successors, e.g., Porphyry (Antr. 64.16 (Nauck) - Porph. uses παχύνων) and Marius Victorinus (Explan. in Rhet. M. Tulli Ciceronis ap. Rhet. Lat. Min. (Halm) p. 155,31 and 160,16).
Victorinus translates παχύς and παχύτης by 'crassus' and 'crassitudo'.

5.11-12 οὐδὲ ἐν οὐσίασιν ... δεύμων: Ha. rightly remarks that the seed referred to is animal seed or semen. In a comparable passage in V 9,6,15 ff. P. divides semen into a material element, moisture, and logos which is responsible for the shaping and forming of matter. It was a common biological theory that semen could be analysed in this way (according to Galen Phil. Hist., xix. 322 (Kühn) this was the view taken by Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle.) The important part of the semen was the soul-principle (Aristotle calls it πνεύμα (GA 735b 37-38), Galen ἀ μνων νοῶς (loc. cit.) and P. 'logos' (e.g. 5,13) which though immaterial used the material moisture as a vehicle for its transmission. Theoretically, no material element at all needed to pass between the male and the female for conception to take place (see C. Singer, Greek Biology and Greek Medicine (Oxford, 1922), pp. 32 ff.). The moisture of semen is ἀπέξυμα (Arist. GA 739a 8). (On the influence of biology on P. see P.-M. Schuhl (RPh 160 (1970), pp. 77-78. Note that he numbered several doctors among his friends (Paulinus of Scythopolis, Eustochius of Alexandria and Zethus (V.P. 7.5 ff.)).

P. uses the example of semen to illustrate the point that the unseen logos in Intellect or in the soul is similarly more important than the matter through which and on which it works. The presence of logoi in semen becomes visible as the limbs for which each logos is responsible is formed, i.e., the logoi of
of Intellect are finally expressed by soul in the physical world (cf. IV 8,6,7-10 οἶκαίσθυ φύσι τοῦτο ἕνερτι ... ἐξελάττεσθαι οὖν σπέρματος ἐκ τινος ἀμεροῦς ἀρχής εἰς τίνος τὸ αἰσθήταν οἰκὺς ; see on 3,8). But these logoi belong higher up the ontological scale and consequently are more important than the end product in which they at last become visible. In V 3,8,3 ff. P. says that the logoi in semen which produce colour and shape are not themselves the same as the colour and shape which they produce. And the logoi in seed are invisible. Intellect, therefore, from which they ultimately derive must be even more invisible. On the belief that the more important things are the more invisible see S.E. Μ. 10.250 where Sextus states that the first principles of τὰ φαινόμενα must be principles which are ἀφανή. For οὖν followed by δὲ see Wolters on III 5,8,13-14.

5,12-13 τὸν δὲ ... καὶ λόγος : Number and logos are also linked at II 4,15,3 and III 6,1,31. For the meaning of logos see on 3,8. It is noticeable that P. sometimes uses the same language in treating of these concepts. For example in VI 6,9,29-30 τὰ ὄντα are called οὐκελθηκόντων ἀριθμῶν ; ἐξελάττεν is used of logos in III 7,11,23 ff. of the logoi of seed (cf. IV 8,6,8) and in VI 7,9,38 of the έννάμεν of Intellect which are its logoi. Number and logos both seem to extend equally down the scale of Being. But whereas to speak of the Forms or of soul as logoi emphasises their dynamic or creative aspects, to speak of them as numbers emphasises partly the individuality which they enjoy by virtue of being separate substances and therefore numerically distinct,
and partly their close connection to the source of number, the One.

5,13-19 οδιν ... αμφω τε οδιν: These lines explain more carefully the exact application of the numerical theory.

5,13-14 οδιν ἐκεῖ ... καὶ νοεῖ: The οδιν is resumptive after the digression of 5,9-13. The number and logos in semen were the life-giving principles of soul; the number and Dyad in the Intelligible World (ἐκεῖ) are Intellect and the Intelligible logoi (= Forms) which Intellect passes on to soul (V 9,3,30-31) and soul to the semen. For the equation of numbers and Forms see V 4,2,7-8. The Dyad mentioned here is defined; in what sense one is to understand the definition P. goes on to explain in the next sentence.

5,14-15 ἀλλ’ ἀφετος ... λαμβανομένη: The Greek here is difficult.

It is perhaps best to begin by saying what it cannot mean.

'Αποκινήνων is used in at least two senses by P. It can mean the logical subject as opposed to the logical object (e.g., in III 8,8,4-5 καὶ ἰνὴ ὁμοιαίας φιλής πρὸς το αὐτό τοῦ ἀποκινήνων ἰόντων τῶν ἱγνωσίμων) or it can mean substrate in the Aristotelian sense as the equivalent of ὑλή (e.g., II 4,4,6-7 ζητεῖν ἡρῴ ἡ ὑλή ἡ τῆν μορφήν δεχόμενη καὶ ἀλλ’ τὸ ἀποκινήνων). It seems to me extremely unlikely that ἀποκινήνων can mean anything but 'substrate' or 'matter' here, not only because of the subsequent reference to shape in 5,16-17 which supposes a substrate on which the shape can be put, but also because the Platonic Indefinite Dyad was generally considered as the material principle which produced number by its definition by the One (see Arist. Metaph. 987b 20 ff.; id. Ph. 187a 17 ff.; Simp.)
in Ph. 151.14 ff.). Br., then, cannot be right when he translates: 'il y a d'abord la dyade indéfinie qui est reçue par ce qui est comme le substrat des intelligibles'. The Indefinite Dyad is not received by the substrate of Intellect; it is the substrate of Intellect. Br.'s interpretation is (wrongly in my opinion) followed by H-S who note in their apparatus that ἀναλογόν in 5,15 should be translated by 'recepta' and not by 'concepta'.

The general purport of these two lines must be to identify the Indefinite Dyad with Intelligible Matter. Other editors and translators have taken them this way. Ha., for example, translates: 'indes ist die Zweihheit unbestimmt da sie gleichsam als zugrundliegenden Stoff begriffen wird'. This is clearly what P. is saying but the mss. text cannot give such a sense. The difficulties are, in the main, two. First, if ἀναλογόν is to mean 'conceived as' it must have some introductory particle to make this clear; in the active, ἀναλογόν can be used with a double accusative without a particle, although according to LSJ such a construction is rare. I doubt whether a particle could be omitted with the verb in the passive. Secondly, ὁδὸν τοῦ ἀναλογόν cannot mean ταῦτα τοῦ ἀναλογόν. Consequently, Sleeman's suggestion (CQ 22 (1928), p. 30) νῦν ὁδὸν ἀναλογόν is not wholly satisfactory because there is nothing to connect ἀναλογόν and ἀναλογόν. By far the best is Dodds' suggestion to insert ὅς ταῦτα before τοῦ in 5,14. There is no need to make the object of ἀναλογόν explicit by some reference to Intellect since it is clear that P. is dealing with the derivation of Intellect from the One. One slight difficulty is that
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λαμβάνων in P. is often used to mean 'perceive' (like αἰσθάνομαι; see IV 6,1,15 with αἰσθήσομαι; IV 6,1,29; V 5,7,10 with αἰσθήσεις; V 3,1,7 καταλαμβάνων with αἰσθήσεις) rather than 'conceive as'. But the word did have this later sense in Greek (see LSJ s.v. I 9.c). Ἀλλ' ἀόριστον ὑπὸς ταῦτα τῶν ἀναποκείμενων λαμβανομένης gives good and easy sense. For its meaning 'in the sense of' compare II 4,5,27; VI 3,5,11-12. 7,19. The οὖν adds a note of apology. There is matter in the Intelligible World but it does not share all the characteristics of the physical substrate. Note the similar οὖν in 5,16.

P. deals with Intelligible Matter in II 4,2-5, but he avoids there the numerical vocabulary of the One and Indefinite Dyad. He calls matter ἀόριστον (e.g. II 4,3,1) but prefers the terms ἀνωτέρως (II 4,5,30) or πέρα κίνησις (ibid.) to διάσ. In VI 7,15-17 the process of definition is described by the vocabulary of sight or life (VI 7,16,14-15 ἀλλ' ἐβλήσσων ἀνωτέρως 'ἡ φανέρων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνώπιον τοῦ αὐτοῦ') and this life becomes defined when it becomes Intellect (VI 7,17, 25-26 ἰδρύθησα γὰρ 'ἡ λόγος'). Again in V 3,11 and V 4,2 it is the vocabulary of sight which is preferred. Undefined Intellect is ἵππος μόνον καὶ ἀτυπικός ὑπὸs (V 3,11,12) or ἀόριστος ὑπὸS (V 4,2,6). The vocabulary of the One and Indefinite Dyad is only one possible vocabulary in which the process of definition can be described. What is important is not the language but the concept of definition itself. The One is
responsible for the very existence of Intellect in its characteristic form.

5,15-16 ὁ δὲ ἀλήθεια... ἐκαστὸς ἐκαστὸς: The result of this definition by the One is the formation of Intellect and the Forms. P. elaborates in VI 7,15,20-22. Intellect is unable to grasp in its entirety the power which emanates from the One, but splits up that power (σωμάτευμα) and treats it as a plurality (cf. VI 7,16,10-13 ἀλήθεια, ὅτι ἐνεκα τὸ ἀλήθειαν, ἐνὸς ὡς πολλὰ τὸ ἐν ἐνεκα... μεταξὺν αὐτῶν πρὸς αὐτὴν ποὺ νοεῖν μὴ ὅλον ὅμως δύνασθαι). A similar description is given in the late treatise V 3. In V 3,11,4 ff. P. says ἡμιμονέ μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ (ἐν τῷ ἐν) οὐχ ὡς νοεῖν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὅψε σώματι ἰδοῖνα, ἐπιλθείς δὲ ἐφοιμα ὅπερ αὐτὴ ἐπιλθεῖναι. (On these passages see H. J. Krämer's illuminating commentary in Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik (Amsterdam, 1964), pp. 315 ff.) The plurality of Intellect, then, comes about because Intellect is unable to grasp the pure unity of the One.

Ἐκαστός (5,16) is the reading of all the mss. and if right must agree with ἀλήθεια (5,15). Sleeman (CQ 22 (1928), p. 30) thinks that P. may have written ἐκαστὸν for which one might compare VI 7,16,4-5 ἐκαστὸν μὲν οἶνον ἀδίκος, ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἀδίκος οἴνον τάμος but Schwyzer defends the mss. reading in RhM 90 (1941), p. 231, rightly in my opinion, and translates: 'die Zahl aber aus ihr und dem Einem ist Form eine jede (nämlich eine jede Zahl)'. (There is, in fact, little difference in sense
between Sleeman's suggestion and the mss. reading.) By calling each of the Forms a number, P. marks their individuality. Number is no more than the *οίκως μορφή* of II 4,4,5 or the *εἶδος τάρταρος* of VI 7,16,5. For the association of number with particularity see on 5,8-9.

For discussion of Vitrina's *εικάστον*, which must be taken with *μορφωθήντος*, see the following note.

5,16-18 *οίνον μορφωθήντος ... παρ' αὐτοῖς*: The subject of *μορφωθήντος* can be either (a) *εικάστον*, (b) τοῦ ἀποκαλμένου or (c) τοῦ νοῦ.

(a): *εικάστον* for the mss. *εικάστος* (5,16) was suggested by Vitrina and is printed by Mül., Vo., Br. and Ha.

Vitrina's text was that translated by MK in his first edition (London, 1926) but not in subsequent editions. The translation of this text must be: 'each Form is shaped by the Forms which come to be in it'. This is nonsense. No Forms come to be in other Forms. It does not help to take ἵνα αὐτῷ in 5,16-17 as ἵνα ἄξιον, as Br. does. P. has equated numbers and Forms. What does it mean to say 'toute chose (= εικάστον τῶν ) est informée par des formes qui sont nées dans le nombre'? Ha. wants to refer *εικάστον* to the Categories dealt with at the end of Chapter 4. This is quite impossible; the subject matter of Chapter 5 is far removed from that of Chapter 4. MK in his first edition translated: 'for all of them (sc. the later Existents) take shape, so to speak, from the ideas rising within this (sc. their forming idea)'. I cannot understand what MK means.
(b): Dodds wants to supply τοια υποκυμίνου with μορφωθήνος. Μορφούν and its cognates are certainly used by P. in connection with substrate or matter (cf. for example I 6,2,17; II 4,4,6). But the subject of μορφωθήνος must be the same as the subject of μορφούταται in 5,17. In the second part of the sentence (5,17-18) P. divides whatever is the subject of μορφούταται into a formal and a material principle (see note ad loc.); it would be nonsense to speak of matter being divided in this way, since matter is the material principle.

Accordingly I would prefer solution (c). Harder complains however that it is difficult to supply νοû from the context. W. Theiler (Isonomia, Studien zur Gleichheitsvorstellung im Griechischen Denken (Berlin, 1964), p. 106) suggests possibly rightly that νοû should be inserted before μορφωθήνος.

For the use of μορφούν of a hypostasis rather than matter see II 4,3,4 - soul is shaped by Intellect and logos. And if hypostases can be 'defined' or 'brought to perfection', there is no reason why they cannot be shaped. On οἶνον see on 5,14-15.

P. says, then, that Intellect has been shaped by the Forms which have come to be in it. This allusive remark is clarified by his descriptions of the genesis of Intellect in V 3,11,4 ff., VI 7,15,20-22 and VI 7,16,10-13 (quoted on 5,15-16). Intellect, in its undefined state, cannot grasp the One in its entirety, but sees the One as a plurality, and splits up its unity so that what it receives from the One is definition in terms of the Forms within it. The One is seen by Intellect, as yet undefined, as the Forms.
The result of this vision is fully formed Intellect and its contents, the Forms. The Forms are Intellect's defining characteristics, its shape; compare the description in V 9,3,20 ff. of the soul's intellect as the soul's defining characteristic ἐν ὑμῖν τῆς ψωχῆς, τὸν (ἐκ νοοῦ) κατὰ τὴν μορφήν (V 9,3,33).

P. now explains in more detail Intellect's emergence (5,16-18). There are, in fact, two causes of Intellect's genesis, the One and itself. Note that now that the genesis of Intellect is being mentioned the tense of the verb changes. Fully formed Intellect is described by the past tense (μορφωθέντος); its genesis by the present (μορφοῦται). The context of these lines make it clear that they pick up the thought of 5,15 where the One and the Indefinite Dyad are described as the source of the Forms/numbers. Thus, παρ' αὐτῶν (5,18) must refer to Intellect in its inchoate state, νοῶν ὁμιῶν νοήματα (V 3,11,16). The One is the formal cause of Intellect, its own undefined state, the Indefinite Dyad, the material cause.

A similar point is made in VI 7,16,31-35 which Beutler-... Theiler (in their note ad loc.) rightly compare with our present passage. The text runs πληροῦμενος μὲν οἷς ἔγεινο, πληρωθῆς ἐν ἑν, καὶ ὅμως ἀπιστείλεθη καὶ εἰμε. ἀρχὴ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐκλίνο τὸ πρὶν πληρωθῆναι ἑν. ἐτέρα δὲ ἀρχὴ οἰονικὶ ἐπιθέθη ἀ πληροῦσα ἑν, ἀρ' ὃς ὁμοίως ἐπιστέφοις πληροῦμενοι. The first phrase ἐκλίνο τὸ πρὶν πληρωθῆναι is translated correctly by all editors except for Dr. e.g., by MK 'that state of not yet having been filled'. This state of unfulfilment is
the state of emanation from the One, that of being Intellect which is not yet Intellect (VI 7,16,13) — i.e., Intelligible Matter. The second cause is the One, which fills Intellect with the Forms (ἡ στάσις), which imparts ιδέας and definition to Intellect as it comes to be. A further parallel may be found in 7,11-17, a difficult passage discussed in detail in the note ad loc.

Πέτοι γαρ (5,18) is correctly interpreted (with or without the change of smooth to rough breathing) by all editors and translators except Br. who interprets it as παραγιμεύομαι. His interpretation is hardly surprising when we remember that he incorrectly thinks that 5,15-18 ‘indiquent assez vaguement que le nombre est comme un intermédiaire entre l'Un et les intelligibles’ (p. 20 of his edition).

οὖν ὅψις... ἐνέγματα: The sequence of thought is almost exactly paralleled in III 8,11,1-8 ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ ῥῆκε· ἐντὸς γὰρ ὁ νόμος ἐστὶν ὅψις τις καὶ ὅψις δρᾶσις, δόνως ἐσται ἐς ἐνέγμαν ἐκδοθείσα. ἐσται τοῖνυν τὸ μὲν ἅπα, τὸ δὲ θρός αὐτῶ — οὖν καὶ ἡ καὶ ἐνέγμαν δρᾶσις — ἀληθεύειν. ἤστι καὶ ἡ δρᾶσις ἡ καὶ ἐνεγματικὴ διατύπωσιν ἄρα. πρὶν γὰρ ἄλλως ἢν ἄλλο... τῇ μὲν ὥς δρᾶσιν ἡ πληρωματικὰ παρὰ τοῦ αἰτίατον καὶ ὁ ὁπὸν τελείωσις, τῇ δὲ τοι νοῦ ὅψις τὸ διαβάζον τὸ πληρώσον.

In our present passage P. similarly compares the fully formed and defined Intellect with actual (as opposed to potential) seeing. Both sight and Intellect contain elements of matter and form (or, in Sleeman's language (CQ 22 (1928), p. 30) 'νοῦς like vision
in act is determined by subject and object'). On the theory of sight here referred to see J. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition* (Oxford, 1906), p. 228: 'the sensory faculty is nothing but a faculty until confronted by its object. It is something which exists only potentially until the object stimulates it. By this stimulation it acquires actuality' (see Arist. *de An.* 416b 32 ff.). P. refers to the potentiality of sight at III 6,2,34; V 3,11,5 ὅψις ὁπως ἰδοῦσα; V 3,11,12 ἀνώμωτος ὅψις; V 4,2,6 ἁπέστρωσ ὅψις.

Br. is quite wrong to suggest a lacuna after ἀγ' αλγομ in 5,18. The thought of this passage is compressed but coherent. There is matter and form in Intellect just as there is matter and form in the actual act of sight. Defined Intellect is like ὅψις η ἑαρ' ἵνεγμαν. On ὅψις see following note.

5,18-19 ἵνι τε ἐκ... τε ἐν: P. amplifies the comparison between Intellect and sight. He follows Aristotle's distinctions between ὅψις and ὅρασις. ὅψις is the faculty of vision which is potential until actualised; ὅρασις is the exercise of this faculty (Arist. *de An.* 426a 13-14 ὅρασις γα辔 λήγεται η ης ὅψις ἵνεγμα; ibid. 428a 6-7 αὐτής μὲν γας ὑπο ὅρασις ἴνα ἵνεγμα, οἶνον ὅψις καὶ ὅρασις. In 5,18 P. compares Intellect to the active faculty of vision. Now he continues the comparison by comparing its characteristic activity (νόησις) with the activity of ὅψις η ἑαρ' ἵνεγμαν (i.e. ὅρασις). Νόησις is a sort of ὅρασις ὅρωσα since Intellect is an ἰδοῦσα ὅψις (V 3,11,10-11).
'Опраσις takes place when Ὠψις is actualised; similarly, when Intellect is actualised it becomes οὐσία and νόησις. Prior to actualisation it was not νόησις, since νόησις cannot take place without an object, and before definition by the One Intellect had no objects since it was not yet Intellect (V 3,11,14 ff.). The very substance of Intellect is a form of Ὠπρασις (V 3,10,12; see also on 1,11). There is no need, then, with Vitringa to place a lacuna after ἐνεγκαιν in 5,18, since there is no difficulty in the transition from Ὠψις η καὶ ἐνεγκαιν to Ὠπρασις Ὠμίον.

The last three words of the chapter in all the mss. are ἀμφω τὸ ὤν which, although kept by Perna and Creuzer, have neither construction nor sense, and Ki. and Mi. change ἀμφω to ἀμφί. But νόησις is not 'around the One'. It is either of the One (in the sense that the One is the νογρον), or of the contents of Intellect (in the sense that Intellect thinks itself).

Vο. followed by Br. reads καὶ ἀμφω τὸ ὤν and translates in accordance with the Arabic paraphrase 'sind die beide (sc. der Geist und das Erfasste) Eins' (Praef. II.xxxi); but as Schweizer remarks (Röm. 90 (1941), p. 232) 'man sähe ὤν (weil hier nicht das metaphysische gemeint ist) lieber ohne Artikel'. Sleeman's second suggestion in CQ 22 (1928), p. 30 of ἀμφω τὸ ὤν (his first was καὶ ἀμφω τὰ διὸ ὤν), which is adopted by Ci., Ha. and H-S, gives the same sense as Vo.'s καὶ ἀμφω τὸ ὤν with only a slight change of the mss. text. It is certainly the best of the proposed emendations.
The question is what two things P. is treating as identical. Vo., Br., Ci., Ha. and MK think that ἄμφω must refer to the subject and object of Intellect i.e., to Intellect and the Forms. And certainly ἄμφω ἓν is quite a common phrase in this sense (III 8,8,6. 8,10; IV 6,2,23-24; V 6,1,5-6. 1,11-12; V 9,8,16; VI 9,10,13). However, Intellect's characteristic of self-intellection is not the point here, and it is difficult to supply νοῦς and τὰ ὑπῆρ as the antecedents of ἄμφω. It is better, therefore, to understand ἄμφω as referring to νοῦς and νόης. Νοῦς is the subject of 5,17-18 and νόης the subject of 5,18-19. Νόης is the same as ἄμφω ἀμφοτέρως or ἄμφω ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, which has been identified in 5,18 with a fully developed Intellect. It is good Plotinian doctrine that νοῦς and νόης are the same (see e.g., V 3,5,28. 6,7. 11,14).
CHAPTER SIX

This chapter continues the discussion of the One begun in Chapter 5.

The problem of the identity of the father of θούς (τίς οὖν ὁ τούτων γίγνεται 5,3-4) is followed by discussion of the method of the genesis (6,15-41) which is explained in terms of emanation and reversion, emanation being explained by means of the double-activity theory (6,30-37); note the similar arrangement in V 4,1,23 ff. and V 4,2,26 ff. where questions about Intellect (μέν ἄντι τοῦ ἐγκύκλου; and μέν μείνοντος ἐκείνου γίγνεται;) lead on to the double-activity theory. The final section of the chapter (6,41-53) treats of the relationship between the newly-formed Intellect and the One, and continues into Chapter 7.

The genesis of Intellect is not an entirely new topic - it was discussed in numerical terms in Chapter 5 - but it is here treated more fully and explicitly than in the previous chapter.

6,1 μέν οὖν ... τίνα; : The subject is θούς (from ἄμφω in 5,19) and τίνα is masculine, though Fic., Br. and MK translate it as though it were neuter.

6,1-2 καὶ μέν ... γίγνεται : On ἁπλότητας see on 3,9-10. The phrase ἐξ ἐκείνου stresses the connexion between the hypostasis and the external activity of its prior (cf. 6,4-5; V 3,16,16).

6,2 ἵνα καὶ ὅρει; : Ha. correctly translates καί by 'überhaupt' ('at all'); see his note on this usage at I 9,2 and compare also VI 6,10,30-31 ἐν δὲ οἷς συμβεβήκε τὸ ἀγαθὸν (sc. λέγειν), ὅτι εἶναι φύσιν ἀγαθὸν, ἵνα καὶ ἀλλοις συμβεβήκη...

This nuance is missed by Br. and MK. On the vocabulary of
perception see on 1,11.

6,2-3 ἐπὶ τοῦ γέγονος ψυχῆς ὁ ἀνάγκης ἐχθρὸν is common in Hellenistic Greek (among both pagan and Christian authors) to express obligation (see Arndt-Gingrich s.v. ἀνάγκη I). But to translate our present passage by 'the soul must be these things' would be to write nonsense. P. is obviously referring to the soul's conviction of the existence of plurality and of its dependence on the One. Ha. is probably right to note (ad loc.) that ἐχθρὸν is 'merkwürdig prägnant verwendet im Sinne inneren Besitzes und Wissens.' The meaning is that soul accepts the necessity that this is the case (cf. VI 4,4,4-5).

Editors vary on how they take ταῦτα in 6,3. Ha. paraphrases it by 'die gennanten Prinzipien des Geistes' which are presumably the Intelligible Categories. Ci. translates '... le real tà dello spirito dovevano esistere, così come abbiam detto.' MK ('these Beings') apparently thinks that ταῦτα means the other hypostases (apart from the One), while Br. ('il en est ainsi nécessairement') and probably Fic. ('necessitatem ipsam, per quam haec fiant') take ταῦτα ἐναι as the equivalent of οὖσας ἐχθρον.

Ha. can hardly be right. P. finished with the categories in Chapter 4, although Ha., reading ἐναστος for ἐναστος in 5,16, tried to introduce a reference to them there. MK's 'these Beings' is also unsatisfactory because soul, the subject of the sentence, would hardly refer to Intellect and itself by ταῦτα. The interpretation of Fic. and Br., that ταῦτα ἐναι =
is attractive, except for the fact that the synonymity of the phrases is difficult to parallel. Ci. with his 'realità dello Spirito' is on the right lines. The paradox is that the One has engendered the rich variety of Intellect. 

*Taìta* refers vaguely to this plurality. Its probable grammatical reference, I think, is to the Forms of 5,16.

6.3-4

*ἐπιστήθη δὲ ... ὁ ἱσότα :* The soul is intuitively sure that Intellect comes from the One, but wants to know the rational explanation for this fact as well. Note the force of *ἐπι-* in *ἐπιστήθη*. For *ἐπιστήθη* meaning 'to want to know the answer to' see Pl. Prt. 329d 1-2.

Mss. vary in their spelling of ὕμμυλομένων (with one or two λ's). According to Dindorf's note in Stephanus s.v. Θείλλας, the word and its cognates should be spelt with a single λ (see also Eustathius on Homer II. 23.396 (vol. iv. 294.23-24 (Stallbaum)) ταίτα δὲ ὁ πλήνχειν ξέγος διέτεις λ ὀδει προφέτειν). The 'correct' spelling with a single λ is retained in our present passage by Vo. and Br. (ignored by H-S). But we know that P. cared little for orthography (V.P. 8.4 ff.). ὕμμυλομένων should certainly be kept.

6.4

καὶ πάλι γ νός πάκας σὸφος : For this use of πάλι meaning 'apud', see LSJ s.v. B,II.4, and Wolters' note on III 5,8,6-7. He compares 8,24 and II 9,6,42.

The ancient philosophers referred to are presumably the Presocratics mentioned in Chapters 8-9, whom, together with Plato, P. saw as the precursors of his own philosophy. Compare VI 1,1,1-2.
where οὐκ παρὰ παλαιῷ similarly refer to the Presocratics.
Since they were committed to belief in a single ἀξιὰ, they too, like P., had to explain the provenance of plurality.

This question is often repeated by P. (cf. III 8,10,14-15; III 9,4,1; V 2,1,3-4; V 3,15, 1 ff.; 16,16 ff.; V 4,1,23; V 9,14,2 ff.), though the answers which he gives are not always the same. In the early treatises V 1, V 2 and V 4, P. answers by referring to the theory of double-activity (see on 3,9-10). In III 9,4, however, (13th in Porphyry's chronological order), the omnipresence of the One is given as the reason for the existence of plurality while its being nowhere ensures its transcendence. In the late V 3,15 (49th according to Porphyry), the One is said to be able to produce plurality because it contains it potentially. These different answers do not point to development in P.'s thought; they are merely different ways of looking at the process of generation. The theory of double-activity explains its method, omnipresence and the theory of V 3 the suppositions behind it.

In ὅν λύγομον τὸ ὅν τινα in 6,5, the reference can hardly be to any part of V 1, for P. has not yet given much information about the One. Λύγομον might mean 'we Platonists' (cf., e.g., II 9,4,6 φαμίν; VI 2,2,10 λύγομον; VI 7,25,27 φαμίν; VI 7,37,18 ὁμολογομέν) or alternatively, P. might be using plural for singular, and λύγομον might refer to his own views on the nature of the One, to be found, e.g., in VI 9, the previous treatise. Either alternative is plausible; and
since P. believed that he was merely an interpreter of Plato, perhaps there is little difference between them.

On ἔμβοστασιν ἢμι see on 6,1-2.

6,5 picks up the terms used in Chapter 5: ἀνθρώπος (5,4), ὄνειρος (5,6 ff.), ἔργον (5,5 ff.).

6,6-7 ἀλλ' οἷς ἐμνεῖν ... ἐφ' ἐμνεῖν: Compare V 4,1,26-36 οῦ τι δὲν τῶν ἁλίκων εἰς τελείωσιν ἢ, ὥρμων γεννών καὶ ὥμων ἀνεξομίσων ἐφ' ἐμνεῖν μίνων ... πᾶς οὖν τὸ τελείωσιν καὶ τὸ πέμπτον ἁγαθὸν ἐκ αὐτοῦ σταίρι ποτε ἀποθεότατον ἐμνεῖν ἢ ἀνεξομίσων; cf. IV 8,6,1 ff. In this passage and in our present passage P. connects τὸ ἐφ' ἐμνεῖν μίνων with inactivity. And the only reasons for inactivity would be lack of power which is impossible for the One (see on 5,3-4) or envy, which Plato expressly denied of anything good (Πι. 29e 1-2 ἁγαθὸς ὃς οὖς πρὶς οὖς ὁλίγητε ἐσφηγήσατο θεόν; see on 6,37-39). More often, the concept of μίνων ἐφ' ἐμνεῖν is readily attributed to the One and Intellect because it guarantees them against being affected by their productive activity, and thus safeguards P. against the charge of pantheism. Only the soul produces whilst moving (III 4,1,2) since it can move away from Intellect and become affected by the body. Both these meanings of μίνων ἐφ' ἐμνεῖν can be found in Chapter 6. Compare our present passage with 6,12-13 ἐκλίνων ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου συκοῦ νυν ἐφ' ἐμνεῖν ὄντος, μίνων: θεός ἤτοι μείκον ἢ πάντων .

The same is true of V 4. In V 4,1,34-36, 'remaining in itself' is connected with θήνως, yet in V 4,2,12-13, the One is described
as ἐφ' έαντον μίνων καὶ ὅμη ὑν ἐνδείκνυ, and no notion of envy is involved.

6.7 τοσοῦτον… ἱκεῖην : In 3,11 P. denied emanation (ἡκεῖην) of Intellect and by implication of the One (see on 3,10-12). However, in that passage it was a material or quantitative emanation of the substance of Intellect which he denied, since the external activity of Intellect does not affect its internal activity in the same way as the internal activity of fire is affected by the production of heat (i.e. fire gets colder).

Here, however, the point of view is different; the internal activity of the One is not explicitly under discussion. The emanation concerned is the external activity, which - as P. explains in 6,30 ff. - mimics a natural process. The use of a word, usually found in material contexts - Aristotle, for example, uses ἱκεῖην of rivers, blood, air and hair - with a non-material meaning is common in P. in his explanation of the procession, which is after all a material process adapted to an immaterial philosophy (note V 2,1,8-9 ὁπον ἐπερεῖλη καὶ τὸ ἐποιήματος αὐτῶ πατοίκῳ ἐδέλμο ; note also the use of προεῖν in III 8,10,4 and V 2,1,14-16; and of ἱκεῖην in VI 8,18,20 and VI 9,9,3).

6,7-8 οδ εἴρηται... ἐν τοῖς οἴσι ; Τὰ ἀντα is here being used in its widest extension to include the physical world (cf. 6,30). The προθέσ of the physical world presupposes the existence of the One.

Cf. correctly notes that Br. omits to translate 6,7-8 (Τοσοῦτον... ὁμή) in his edition.
The use of the first person plural \( \alpha \nu \alpha \gamma \mu \nu \) raises the same problem as that of \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \nu \) in 6,5 (see note ad loc.). With \( \alpha \nu \alpha \gamma \mu \nu \) compare V 4,1,1-4.

These lines serve as an introduction to the main topic of Chapter 6, the description of the genesis of Intellect (6, 15-41).

P.'s attitude towards prayer and invocation can best be discussed under two heads; first, the use of invocation as an artifice of style, and secondly, the meaning and method of philosophical prayer.

P. invokes God only rarely, in fact, only four times - in our present passage; in III 7,11,6 ff. where he mentions the possibility of calling on the Muses to recount to him the birth of time, only to dismiss it on the grounds that the Muses did not yet exist; in IV 9,4,6-7, where he prefaces his discussion of the unity of soul with \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \omicron \nu \sigma \iota \nu \sigma \iota \nu \sigma \omicron \eta \mu \nu \gamma \nu \omicron \sigma \theta \omicron \omega \omicron \pi \alpha \rho \alpha \kappa \alpha \lambda \iota \sigma \omega \omicron \tau \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \); and in V 8,9,13 ff. where he describes how to form an impression of the Intelligible World, and then adds a prayer for the epiphany of the God whose impression the soul has.

In the first three passages, the appeal to God prefaces an attempt to answer a difficult problem - the derivation of plurality from unity in V 1, the genesis of time in III 7 and the unity of the soul in IV 9. This stylistic use of prayer as an introduction to a new and difficult discussion is at least as old as Homer. The catalogue of ships at Iliad 2,494 ff. is prefaced by an appeal to
the Olympian Muses, for example. P.'s more immediate inspiration, however, was probably Plato; in Ti. 27c 1 ff., for example, Timaeus begins his speech by an appeal to the gods and goddesses to assist him; or in Lg. 893b 1 ff. the Athenian stranger calls upon the gods when he is about to attempt an explanation of their own existence (cf. also Phlb. 25b 8-10 and 61b 11 ff.; id. Epin. 980c 1 ff.). Invocation of the gods, then, as a preface to discussion is merely a convention of style, and as such is imitated by later Neoplatonists. (References have been collected by A. Brinkmann, Alexandri Lycopolitani Contra Manichaei Opiniones Disputatio (Leipzig, 1895), p. 9; see also H. P. Esser, Untersuchungen zu Gebet und Gottesverehrung der Neuplatoniker (Diss. KölN, 1967), p. 21 and Saffrey and Westerink, Proclus. Théologie Platonicienne (Paris, 1968) I p. 7, n. 4.)

Thus, from the stylistic point of view, the invocation in our present passage is conventional. But P. goes on to describe the method of prayer, and this prayer emerges not as prayer in any religious sense, which played only a minor role in his philosophy (see e.g. IV 4,26,1 ff., 30,1 ff.), but prayer in the sense of the ἔναντίον, the turning back towards unification with Intellect and the One.

In the philosophical traditions of P.'s time, prayer was considered not as a request (αἰτησις) but as a ὀμηλία with God (cf. Max. Tyr. 63,10-13) (Hobein) ἄρα τα μὴ μὴ τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου καθήναι αἰτησιν ἢνα τῶν οὐ παροῦντος, ἢν ἢ ὁ ὀμηλία καί συνεκτον περὶ τούς Θεοὺς; cf. Clem. Al.
This συνέλευσις was to take place through quiet contemplation, on the grounds that stillness was fitting for the divine. Apollonius of Tyana, for example (ap. Porph. Abst. 163.20-22 (Nauck)), says that God should be worshipped εἰς ... σιγή καθαρός καὶ πάν τει αὐτῶ αὐτοῖ καθαρῶν ἐννοιῶν; cf. Procl. in R. I. 85.3 (Kroll); Lamb. Myst. VIII. 3). Silence was considered as a sign of mystic prayer (see H. Schmidt, 'Veteres Philosophi Quomodo Iudicaverint de Precibus', Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 4 (1907) Heft I, p. 68; O. Casel, 'De Philosophorum Graecorum Silentio Mystico', Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 16 (1919) Heft II, p. 114). Silence, of course, precludes the spoken word, the λόγος προφητείας of the Stoics (on which see on 37-8). Λόγος γονιμος in our present passage is synonymous with λόγος προφητείας (Philo uses the two phrases as alternatives; see De Fug. et Inv. 92; De Abr. 83; De Vit. Mos. II. 127); but for P. prayer does not involve the λόγος ενδιάθετος either. As he explains in 6.10, it involves the stretching out of self, through the soul, towards God, whom we can now identify as the One.

The phrase ἐκτίνασιν εὐθείας (6.10) is couched in the language of religious worship. The stretching out of one's hands to the gods was a common accompaniment of prayer. The word used to describe this gesture was sometimes ἐκτίνασιν (although examples of this are late; see, e.g., Philoponus De Opificio Mundi 49.12 (Reichardt)), more usually ἀνατίνας (see C. Sitt1, Die Gebärdener der Griechen und Römer (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 174 ff. 'die Gebärdener des Gебetes'). ἐκτίνασιν, however, is used of the
soul in Stoic contexts to describe the ability of the soul to reach out to God (Sen. En. 92.30; M. Ant. XI. 1.2). In P.'s adaptation, the soul must stretch itself out in prayer; but this means that the soul must ascend towards the One, and it can only do this by means of the other hypostases - i.e., through the reversion by which it must become united with Intellect and subsequently with the One. The method is hinted at in V 8,9, 13 ff. in which P. prays for the epiphany of Intellect when the soul has formed an impression of the Intelligible World by the abstraction of όψ-ος from an impression of the physical world; i.e. when it has disposed itself so that it is able to receive Intellect, then it can pray for it to come. When the soul is like Intellect it can approach it. Similarly when the soul is alone it can approach the Alone (see on 6,11). Note the use of ἀφερεῖν in V 8,9,11; cf. V 3,17,38 ἀφιλεῖ πάντα .

The soul's prayer is an approach towards the unity of the One. It is more than a συμφ. , if συμφ. means the association of two distinct things. Prayer is unification, the φυγή μόνον ηδο μόνον (VI 9,11,51).

Ἑπικαλλομένος (6,9) is a dative of agent. KG give no example of its use with any tense except perfect and pluperfect outside Homer (KG II. 1.422c.). Examples can be found, however, in papyri (see Mayser, Grammatik, II. 2. 273.1 ff.).

With the phrase τῇ φυκῇ ἐνεώστην (6,10) compare Max. Tyr. 20.9-10 (Hobein) δίσεντα ... ἀναστινόμιον τῇ φυκῇ τῷ θεῷ ἑνεώστην and with the dative τῇ φυκῇ
III 7,5,1. Creuzer's γεγονότα for γεγονῦ (6,9) is quite wrong.

On the formula 'μόνος πέρι μόνον' and similar instances of juxtaposition see E. Peterson, 'Herkunft und Bedeutung der ΜΟΝΟΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΜΟΝΩΝ - Formel bei Plotin,' Philologus 88 (1933), pp. 30-41. Peterson points out that the juxtaposition of μόνος in different terminations was a common trick of style (op. cit. p. 34; see also E.R. Dodds in Entr. p. 17). P. uses the 'formula' four times - in our present passage; in I 6,7,9 (αὕτη μόνον αὑτῷ μόνον); in VI 7,34,7-8 (μόνη μόνον); and in VI 9,11,51 (φωνῇ μόνον πέρι μόνον) - but for him the stylistic effect of the phrase is secondary. The meeting of the alone and the Alone is the aim of philosophical prayer, and the state of being alone is achieved only by purification. P. stresses this in all the passages in which the formula occurs except our own. For example in I 6,7,4 ff. P. describes how the soul must strip off the accretions of the lower world, so that by an anabasis it can see God. Similarly he says in VI 7,34,5-8 οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἔχοντα τι ἄλλο καὶ ἐνεγκυώνατα πτερί αὐτῷ οὕτω ὑπὲρ ἐναρκοῦσθαι. ἀ δὲ μὴν καλὸν μὴν 'αἰ αἰ γαθὸν μηδὲν ἀλλο πρόχειρον ἔχειν, ἵνα διηρήσῃ μόνη μόνον. And the flight of the alone to the Alone at the end of VI 9 consists in an ἀναβάλλῃ τῶν τῆς. From these passages it becomes quite clear how our present passage should be understood. Prayer for P. is purification, and purification is the method of reversion towards
the head of the πέπτοσι. Only when the soul is like God in being unfettered by the accretions of plurality is unification, the goal of P.'s philosophy, attainable.

The μόνος μόνον formula also occurs in Numenius (fr. 2.12; cf. fr. 19.7) and Arnou thinks (Désir de Dieu (2nd ed. Rome, 1967), p. 53) that P. may have been stimulated to use it by him. Numenius is speaking of association with the Good:  οὐκ ἐγενεται ἀπερεδετών πόλεως ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐμιλήσαι ποὺ ἀγαθῶς μόνως μόνον. Peterson, however, discounts Arnou’s view (op. cit., p. 37) on the grounds that the ἐμιλήσαι μόνως μόνον ‘nicht das Ergebnis eines Aufstieges ist bei dem der Mensch selber ein μόνος wird, der so dem μόνον begegnet.’ But it seems to me that Numenius may have been thinking of an ’Aufstieg’. How is one to get πόλεως πῶν αἰσθητῶν except by some method of purification? P. develops this idea much more fully than Numenius, but the possibility that the idea of using the formula occurred to P. from reading Numenius cannot be discounted. Dodds is right to note, however, (loc. cit.), that in view of the fact that μόνως μόνον is tolerably common, no certainty on this matter is possible.

6,12-15 ἀν τοῖνυν θεατην... τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον: The transition from prayer to the imagery of the temple is easy and natural. In VI 9,11,16 ff. the One is similarly compared to the experience enjoyed within the sanctuary and Intellect to the surrounding statuary; ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἄγαθον ὑπερθέν, ἑπεξεῖς ἣν καὶ τὸν πῶν ἐφανον χώρον, ὡσπερ τις εἰς τοῦ ἔσω τοῦ
C. suggests in his note to this passage that P. was thinking of worship in an Egyptian temple. Certainly, he knew about Egyptian temples (cf. ἐν τοῖς ἑτέροις V 8, 5, 6-7) and Egyptian temples did contain an inner sanctuary and a surrounding courtyard in which statues of gods were placed (see H. W. Fairman, Worship and Festivals in an Egyptian Temple (Manchester, 1954). But such a lay-out is also found in the temple at Eleusis (see G. E. Mylonas, Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries (Princeton and London, 1961); the anaktoron (op. cit. p. 84) was inside the telesterion in which the cult-stat of Demeter and other deities were put (op. cit. p. 189)) and it is the type of religion which P. had in mind which is important (reference in V 5, 11, 12 ff. to festivals where certain people are excluded because of their γαστρεμαγήδα is probably a reference to Eleusis; see E. R. Dodds, JRS 37 (1947), p. 59, n. 33). This is certainly some sort of mystery religion, in which the culmination of the initiation was the opening of the inner shrine and the display to the initiates of the cult objects of the god or goddess. In VI 9, 11, 1-2, P. specifically refers to τὸ νῦν μνησικόλων πάντα ἑπίταγμα which can leave us in no doubt that the example which follows also refers to a mystery cult.

In our present passage, P. has in mind the same thing. The phrase μόνος πρὸς μόνον introduces the notion of purification (see
note on 6,11), and purification was an essential part of the initiation process. Following on from Plato (cf. Phd. 69c 8 ff.; Smp. 210a 1 ff.; Phdr. 259b 5 ff.) P. saw spiritual progress as analogous to initiation in a cult. Only through purification could the soul reach the One. Consequently, his philosophy is not for everyone, since not everyone is capable of such purification (cf. V 8,2,43-45 ὡστε μάτην ἃν ἑτέρων ἕχων ἑφευρεῖ οἰκίνω. ἔσχες γὰρ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, διὸ οὐδὲ πρὸς πάντας οὐκ ἔτελε τῶν προσώπων λόγοι). The stages of initiation correspond to the stages of the soul's journey through the hypostases. The aim is the vision of the One who inhabits the inner shrine (ὁς ἐνεσθην ἐν ἁγίοις ἑρώις μίνον οὐδὲ πρόσων χάρις ὁ Θεόν I 6,8,2-3) and the One can only be seen by the fully purified. The images outside the shrine (i.e. Intellect and the Forms) are only reflections of the splendour of the One.

P. uses a similar but this time non-religious image at VI 7,35,7 ff., where he compares Intellect to a beautiful house and the One to its owner. Wonder at the beauty of the images inside the house is eclipsed by the wonder aroused by the sight of the owner. Note also the quotation from Pl. Phlb. 64c 1 at V 9,2,24-27 νοις δὲ περιστήθηκε τὰς ἑρώις ἥν περάσας ὡς πρὸς ἄργος, ὡστε ἐν πρωθείων τάγαθος ἐπαγχέλλων ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, ἐνακίνητος μετὰ μαθητῆς ἐφέλθει οἰκίνωμοι καὶ πρὸς Ἥραν (cf. further I 6,9,37-39). In our present passage P. is careful to apologise for his image by the use of ὁς (6,12-13).
6,12-13 οὐλίνων ... ἔτοιμα ἀπόστατων: On ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ and μόνων see on 6,6-7. Here there is no connotation of φθόνος.

Ἐπίκειμα (6,13) can hardly fail to call to mind Plato's description of the Good in Ἄ. 509b 9 as ἔπικειμα τῆς οὐσίας. But the One for P. is not only beyond οὐσία, but beyond all predication whatsoever (V 4,1,10-12; VI 7,41,38), since as final cause of it is none of the things of which it is the cause (see V 5,6,9 ff. οὐλίνων ἐπὶ τούτων ἀν μονὸν ἀν λόγου ἐπίκειμα τούτων. ταῦτα ἐπὶ τὰ δυνά καὶ τὸ ὅν; cf. V 4,1,5; VI 7,42,12-13). For other references to ἔπικειμα and ἔπικειμα τῆς οὐσίας see 8,7-8; I 7,1,19-20; III 8,9,2; V 3,13,2-3, 17,13-14; V 4,1,10; V 6,6,29-30; VI 6,5,37; VI 7,40, 26-27; VI 8,16,34; VI 9,11,42.

On the γεφυρία of the One see on 2,14-17.

6,13-14 τὰ οὖν ... ἐστώτα: With the position of ἡ ἔν compare IV 5,7,52-53 οἷαν ἐλάχιστον τῆν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν ἡ ἔν. No separate translation is needed; it merely serves to emphasise the contrast between the external (Intellect) and the internal (the One).

The ἀγάλματα are the 'contents' of Intellect, the Forms. Note how in the following phrase P. prefers the singular term (ἀγάλμα τὰ περὶ τον) to the plural. This first appearance is presumably the undefined emanation which after definition become Intellect.

Ἐστώτα has a double meaning. It has a spatial sense - the statues are standing περὶ τὰ ἔκει (note that Vitringa
perhaps rightly suspects το' ) - and it also picks up ἡσύχου in 6,13. The contents of νοῦς are also 'still' (see on 2,14-17).

6,15 περιφηνος τουτον τον τρεφον: Pic. translates this phrase: 'immo vero statuam primo effulgentem) hoc modo, quo naturaliter inspici potest, (inspicere sc. oportet). This translation suggests that he read (or conjectured) περικες instead of περιφηνος. There is no trace of περικες as a mss. variant, and the sense it gives is quite out of place. Περιφηνος τουτον τον τρεφον introduces the forthcoming discussion of the genesis of Intellect. All other translators give acceptable versions, e.g. Ha.: 'auf die folgende Weise erscheint.'

6,15-17 παντι μη κινουμενω... κινηθαι: 6,15-41 discuss in detail the genesis of Intellect; P. begins his explanation by a general statement.

The idea that every movement is end-directed is found often in Aristotle. See for example Ph. 219a 10-11 το κινουμενον κινητωσ ει τινως τις τι (cf. ibid. 224b 1; ibid. 241b 10; Cael. 288b 29-30; Metaph. 999b 10). Movement of the One could be of two sorts. It could be a movement actually made by the One to bring about the birth (for πρεσεις as κινητης see Arist. Metaph. 1022b 5; id. 1220b 27; cf. id. Metaph. 1022a 7) or it could be the movement caused by the One's mere intention to produce, since every thought is a movement (V 6,5,8-9 και τουτο ισον νοοιν κινητης περας αμαθον εφεμενον εκεινου; VI 7,35,2-3 το νοοιν κινητης τις την ; cf. 6,26-27). No
sort of movement is applicable to the One because the One, being perfectly self-sufficient, has no end outside itself to which it might be directed. On the contrary, the One is the object of the desire and movement of everything else (V 5,12,5-8; VI 9,9,33; cf. V 3,15,10-11). As P. has explained, it remains

\[ \epsilon \phi ' \epsilon \alpha \mu \tau \omega \]

\[ \epsilon ' \iota \kappa \kappa \iota \alpha \nu \alpha \delta \pi \alpha \tau \tau \nu \nu \] 6,17-19

\[ \alpha \lambda \lambda \acute{\iota} \tau \iota \mu \varepsilon \tau \acute{\alpha} \iota \tau \acute{\omicron} \ldots \gamma \gamma \omicron \omicron \nu \iota \omega \omicron \iota \omicron \nu \] : The interpretation of this passage has caused great difficulty. The problem, however, is quite simple, and basically concerns the reference of \( \epsilon \kappa \iota \gamma \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) and \( \acute{\alpha} \iota \tau \omicron \) in 6,18. Either (a) \( \epsilon \kappa \iota \gamma \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \) refers to the One and \( \acute{\alpha} \iota \tau \omicron \) is reflexive or (b) \( \epsilon \kappa \iota \gamma \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \) refers to the subject of 6,17-18 (\( \tau \omicron \mu \varepsilon \tau \omicron \tau \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) and \( \acute{\alpha} \iota \tau \omicron \) to the One. A useful list of the adherents of the two main views may be found at the end of H-S III in the addenda ad textum to V 1,6,18. To this list should be added J. Igal (Emerita 39 (1971), p. 135) and A. Graeser (Gnomon 44 (1972), p. 824, n. 2) who support (a); and P. Aubin (Le Problème de la "Conversion" (Paris, 1963), pp. 161 ff. and Beutler-Theiler (t. vi. p. 110) who support (b). Note that H-S have now revised the opinion which they put forward in the apparatus to our present passage.

Discussion of the problem must begin by a consideration of P.'s use of the words \( \iota \pi \iota \sigma \tau \varepsilon \theta \omicron \varphi \) and \( \iota \pi \iota \sigma \tau \varepsilon \theta \omicron \varphi \omicron \nu \omicron \nu \omicron \) when he is dealing with the genesis of Intellect from the One. V 2,1,7 ff. gives a clear statement of his views. There are two moments in the creation of Intellect - first, the One gives off an emanation and then this emanation (\( \tau \omicron \gamma \nu \omicron \lambda \mu \omicron \nu \omicron \nu \) turns towards
the One and is filled by it (καί αὐτῷ ἐπιστέραφη καὶ ἐπιληψθῇ καὶ ἔγνωσε πρὸς αὐτῷ βλέπων καὶ νοῦς σῶτος V 2,1,9-11). Similarly, in VI 7,16,14 ff. the undefined emanation is said to turn towards the One (ἐπιστέραφον πρὸς αὐτῷ VI 7, 16,15-16) and P. continues ἡ κίνησις αὐτῇ ὀπληψθείσα ... ὡστε κίνησις ἐν μόνον, ὧδε κίνησις διακοφῆς καὶ πλήξις (VI 7,16,16-18). Similar references to ἐπιστέραφη can be found at I 7,1,23 (ὅτι οὖν διὸν αὐτῷ, πρὸς αὐτῷ δὲ ἐπιστεράφην πάντα ... V 4,2,4-5 (νοσίες δὲ τὸ νοσίου δήσαν καὶ πρὸς τούτο ἐπιστέραφησα καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἑνών ὦν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπιστεράφησα) and at VI 7,37,21 (ἐπιστέραφην ... καὶ γνωρίσαν νοῦν ηὐθὺ δικαίως εἶναι ... Thus it seems quite clear that the ἐπιστέραφη intimately connected with the genesis of Intellect is the ἐπιστέραφη of Intellect towards the One, and not the ἐπιστέραφη of the One towards itself. The single passage which seems to throw some doubt on this conclusion is V 1,7,5-6 (πῶς οὖν νοῶν γιννὲ; ἢ ὡς τῇ ἐπιστέραφη πρὸς αὐτῷ ἐνελε ζα ... V I,7,5-6 cannot be adduced in favour of either interpretation, One must agree, it seems to me, that the usual ἐπιστέραφη is the ἐπιστέραφη of Intellect towards the One, and that it is prima facie unlikely that P. would try to explain the genesis of Intellect by an ἐπιστέραφη of the One towards itself, especially since this latter view is not the view of the immediately subsequent treatise V 2. Furthermore, ἐπιστέραφη is explicitly called a movement
in VI 7,16,16 (ἡ ἐκ κόσμου ἀνυή) and P. is particularly anxious in our present passage to avoid connecting movement of any sort with the creative activity of the One (see 6,17 μὴ τιθημένα αὐτῷ κινεῖσθαι; 6,22 οὐ κινηθεῖτω; 6,25 ὅποι ὁσν ἐκινηθῇ οὖντος; 6,26-27 αὐὰ ὅλως κινηθεῖτω).

If an ἐπιστεφθή ἀντ αὐτοῦ is to be the cause of the birth of Intellect, then this ἐπιστεφθή must be motionless. Hadot (HR 164 (1963), p. 94) thinks that ἐπιστεφθή ἀντ αὐτοῦ means the same as 'repos en soi-même' and he compares V 4,2,19 ff. (τι ὁσν μάντονας αὐτοῖν ἐν αὐτῷ γίνεται κτλ.). But it is paradoxical, to say the least, to think of self- ἐπιστεφθή and μονὴ ἐν ἑαυτῷ as synonymous. Aubin (op. cit. pp. 162-163) thinks that self- ἐπιστεφθή is denied of the One explicitly in V 3,1,3-4 (ὡς τοι ἀπλών πανταγάρσαι οὐτος οὐ διωμένο ὑπὸ ἑαυτῷ ἐπιστεφθέιν καὶ ἢν αὐτοῦ κατανοήσιν). Τὰ ἄπλον ἐν this passage, however, is associated with Intellect and not with the One, for P. goes on to say that self-κατανοήσις is associated with Intellect yet does not prevent it from being ἄπλον (V 3,1,12 ff.). However, it is perhaps implicit that what is asserted of Intellect should be denied of the One.

But if there are objections to interpreting the passage to refer to the One's self- ἐπιστεφθή, as many have been brought against the opposite interpretation. First among them is the objection on linguistic grounds (see Schwyzer in Mus. Hel. 26 (1969), p. 260; and Igal (loc. cit.)). The reference of ἐκινήσι in 6,17, 6,24 and 6,28 is clearly to the One; but if interpretation
(b) is correct the reference of ἰκὺνοι in 6,18 must be to 'whatever comes after the One' i.e. Intellect presumably in its undefined state. This change of reference is admittedly awkward but note a similar change in the reference of αὐτό in 6,26 and 27. Schwyzer makes a second point about the genitive absolute. If undefined Intellect is the subject of the sentence, one would expect ἵππηγαμον ἄλλο ἰκὺνο ... γυνώναι. This objection is not compelling, however; on the use of the genitive absolute where a participle in another case is possible see KG III 110 and Schwyzer himself in RE 518,53 ff.

More important are the philosophical objections. Hadot (loc. cit.) makes two points; first, that these lines of Chapter 6 are in a context which deals with the immobility of the One, so that mention of the ἵππηγαμον of Intellect would be otiose; and secondly, that if it is to turn towards the One, Intellect must already be engendered, which is absurd, if the passage is supposed to explain its genesis; compare Schwyzer (Mus. Hel. 26 (1969), p. 260): 'der Geist nicht entstehen kann, wenn er sich schon zu jenem aufgemacht hat'.

Both these objections can, I think, be answered. To take the second first: P. makes it quite clear (e.g. in VI 7,16,13 ff.) that the subject of the ἵππηγαμον towards the One is undefined; it is what he calls an Intellect which is not yet Intellect (ἀλλ' οὕτω νοῦς βὴν ἰκύλος βλέπων; cf. V 3,11,16 νοῦς οὕτω νοητικός). And in a sense it is its definition which is the cause of its being. P. stresses that only when it sees the One
and is as it were filled by it does the emanation become Intellect. Note the use of ἑλή in VI 7,16,20 ( νοῶς ἑλή 
ην ) and VI 7,37,21 ( νοῶν ἑλή ) to mark this change of station. Only through the ἐπιστηθή does Intellect become Intellect. Until the moment of ἐπιστηθή Intellect is still in a state of 'coming-to-be'. Note the very careful use of language in VI 7,16,31-32 πάθεωμενος μὲν οὖν ἡγεῖνται, πάθεωμενος δὲ ην. Full existence is not possible without definition by the One; only after the ἐπιστηθή is the undefined emanation from the One fully Intellect. Hadot and Schwyzer are wrong to notice an inconsistency in P.'s saying that the ἐπιστηθή of Intellect results in its genesis. The Intellect in question is a νοῶς οὕτω νοῆσαι (which P. sometimes merely calls νοῶς, without the addition of any qualifying adjective - e.g., in V 3,11,12); only by ἐπιστηθή towards the One by which it searches for its ὀνεία (VI 7,37,20) does this Intellect become fully recognizable as Intellect the second hypostasis.

Bearing in mind P.'s careful use of language in VI 7, we must now look at the context of our present passage and see if the ἐπιστηθή of the undefined Intellect really is out of place, as Hadot suggests. 6,16-17 assert that no movement is to be involved in the One's creative activity. The rest of the sentence continues: "Suppose something does come to be after the One; it must have to come to be (γίγονται) by an eternal ἐπιστηθή towards the One", i.e. although it is derived ultimately from the One, it does not fully become Intellect until it has turned
back towards the One; and this is a movement not of the One but of the One's product, the undefined Intellect. Thus the movement involved in genesis (for genesis is a according to Aristotle and therefore a : see e.g. Arist. GC 320a 12-13; Cat. 15a 13) is a movement not of the One itself but of its product.

Theiler (RPh 92 (1970), p. 296) is quite right to notice that P. is distinguishing in this passage 'zwischen dem Zustandekommen des vorläufigen (unbestimmten) Geistes, und der Vollendung zum eigentlichen durch Hinwendung.' After the parenthesis on 

, P. concentrates on the emanation from the One, i.e. undefined Intellect. Note the use of the present participle in 6,23. To means 'that which is still in the state of coming-to-be from the One' (cf. 6,18 ). He then goes on to show that this emanation is the result of a natural, non-intentional activity, which resembles the activity of fire which emits heat, or of snow which emits cold (6,25-37).

What is surprising about our present passage is that the is mentioned before the undefined emanation. In V 2,1,9 ff. the order of description is much more usual. The 'overflowing' of the One is the cause of the emanation and the emanation is subsequently defined by looking towards its source. No careful distinctions are drawn here between and , as I think P. intends to draw in our
present passage. In V 2 the emanation is called simply τὸ γενόμενον. The inversion of ideas in V 1,6 is probably due to the context. P. has emphasised that there is no motion involved in the activities of the One. But the concept of genesis which he introduces in 6,11-18 (καὶ μὲν αὐτὸ γίνεται) brings with it the concept of motion, since genesis involves motion. To avoid imputing this motion to the One, P. suddenly introduces the ἐπιστρέφειν of undefined Intellect, so that the motion can be explained. Εἰσπρόβολον, as P. says in VI 7,16,16, is a κίνησις. Thus νοῖα comes to be through its own movement, and not through movement from the One. P. tries to make himself clear by the careful use of tenses.

(It is perhaps worth noting that this interpretation is supported by the Arabic paraphrase.)

6,19-22 Εὐχαριστῶν ... ἀποδίδοντον: These three lines are parenthetical and Br. is right to bracket them in his edition. Since genesis is a movement, and movement takes place in time (cf. Arist. Ph. 235a 11), and since time belongs to the realm of soul and not of Intellect (III 7,11,15 ff.), P. must be careful to explain the exact sense which he wants the genesis of Intellect to have.

Τῶν αὐτῆς ὀντων (6,20) refers to Intellect and the One, since it is they to whom αὐτοῖς in the next line refers. Strictly speaking, of course, the One is beyond eternity as Intellect is beyond time.

This sort of warning - about the literal application of language - is common when P. is talking about the One (e.g. VI 8,
The next sentence (τὸ δὲ λόγῳ ... ἀποδόσειν) presents certain problems. The mss. are unanimous in reading ἀποδόσειν in 6,22 where H-S print ἀποδόσειν. This reading is retained by Perna and Creuzer, but gives no sense (even if with Creuzer τίς is understood). Pic.'s translation ('et si quando inter loquendum generationem eis attribuamus, ratione causae ordinisque cuiusdam generationem in medium adducentibus') bears little relation to the mss. text, and is itself difficult to construe. All subsequent editors (including Vitringa) except H-S have changed ἀποδόσειν to ἀποδόσις, a reading already suspected by Creuzer. The general sense of the passage is quite clear. P. is maintaining that talk about the genesis of Intellect from the One is a way of showing various relationships between the two hypostases. But ἀποδόσις can be nothing but a dative of agent, and the sentence would have to be translated: 'we apply the word γίνεσις to νοῦς and the One by giving them a causal relationship and a relative position (ἀρίστα καὶ τάξις). This is nonsense. Consequently all the translators in fact translate ἀποδόσεις as though it has a final sense (i.e. as though it were ἔτσι ἀποδόσις); thus Br. gives: 'afin de'; Ci.: 'per assegnar ...' and Ha.: 'um damit ... zu'. (MK's translation does not disclose his Greek text.) Since ἀποδόσις on its own cannot have this
final sense, it seems to me unacceptable. A further difficulty is that its acceptance would necessitate the joining of 6,20-22 (πο... ἀποδοσιν) to 6,22-23 (τὸ οὖν γινόμαι... γινομαι) so that φατίν could become the main verb. This is possible (on the position of οὖν see Denniston, p. 429) though I do not find the οὖν quite to "vortrefflich" as Ha. seems to. It seems to me better to begin a new sentence with τὸ οὖν γινόμαι, which picks up the ἐκκύνον of ἐπιστημοφονον in 6,18. (Br., incidentally, reads ἀποδοσιν, and puts a stop after it, which makes the Greek nonsensical.) Accordingly, I prefer H-S's ἀποδοσιν. For a similar omission of a final ν in the ms. see VI 4,3,37 and cf. I 4,1,17 and 18. The transition to an accusative and infinitive construction without an introductory verb is common in P. (see RE 520.62 ff.); there is thus no need for Vitringa's προσαποντα for προσάποντας in 6,21. The only difficulty is the future infinitive where one would expect the present. But the future may be colloquial. One might paraphrase: 'by applying the word γίνεσθαι to them, we shall give them various mutual relationships' (cf. KGII.171.3).

But even if ἀποδοσιν is right, I cannot believe that αἰτίας καὶ τὰς ὀργανα means 'ordinis quoque causas' as H-S translate in their apparatus. It seems much more normal to take αἰτίας and τὰς ὀργανα together, both as genitives, especially since the concept of genesis involves the concept of causation, and hence, on Neoplatonic principles, of τὰς ὀργανα. But the
genitives cannot be governed by ἀποδομὴν which can never
govern partitive genitives as, for example, μεταδίδοναι can.
Consequently, I suspect that an object of ἀποδομὴν has
dropped out, and I would be inclined to add τι after αὐτίας.
Haplography would account for the omission. The text would then
read τι δὲ λόγῳ τὴν γίνωσιν προσάπτοντος αὐτοῖς αὐτίας
τι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτοῖς ἀποδόμεναν.
The repetition of αὐτοῖς should cause no difficulty.
The first αὐτοῖς (6,21) is construed with προσάπτοντος
and the second (6,22) with ἀποδομὴν. Vitringa, Vo. and Br.
are wrong to delete the second.
6,22-25 τὸ ὅπως γινόμενον... δείκτευν: The ὅπως is resumptive
after the digression and pace Ki., Mi. and Vo. marks the beginning
of a new sentence; it is wrong to change it to γενοῦν with Mi.,
Vo. and Br., or to delete it with Ki.. Τὸ γινόμενον is the
undefined Intellect, the emanation from the One which is emitted
without movement on the One's part. P. explains this paradox in
6,28 ff.. He clearly does not consider the actual process of
emission a movement.

The argument that movement intervenes between the producer
and its product and thus separates them is repeated in V 3,12,28-30,
where προθυμία is treated as a movement οὐ γὰρ ἐδον προθυμία
νοῦν γινείσθαι (sc. τὸ ἐν), εἰτα ἐγίνετο νοῦς, ἡς
προθυμίας μεταχει αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ γινομένου νοῦ
γινομένης. This argument is not totally convincing, since
if P. were consistent, he would have to maintain that Intellect
did not immediately result from the undefined emanation but was \( \text{πε\'ινων \ α\'\' α\'\' κ\'\'ινων} \), since the \( \text{ε\'ικ\'η\'θε\'ρφ\'\'} \) (which is a \( \text{κ\'\'ινησ\'}\) VI 7,16,16) would intervene between the undefined and defined Intellect. However, P. would probably deny that undefined and defined Intellect were separate entities. Emanation, \( \text{ε\'ικ\'η\'θε\'ρφ\'\'} \), and definition are states of existence of a single being.

6,26-27 \( \text{ο\'\'... κα\'\'θε\'\'ρτ\'ωσ\'} : \text{Πε\'\'σ\'\'ν\'\'\'ω\'\'\'ω\'\'... α\'\'\'ν\'\'\'ω\'\'\'ω\'\'ω\'\'...} \) are both sorts of movement. \( \text{Πε\'\'σ\'\'ν\'\'\'ω\'\'\'ω\'\'...} \) is a rare word (cf. V 3,3,42); the uncompounded \( \text{νι\'\'σ\'\'}\), however, is sometimes used to describe the Gnostic theory of creation by the soul (see II 9,4,6 ff., 12,40, and see further on 10,26-27). P.'s use of \( \text{πε\'\'σ\'\'ν\'\'\'ω\'\'\'ω\'\'...} \) here may reflect a wish to avoid the application of any Gnostic theories to the One.

There is no difficulty with \( \text{βου\'\'δ\'\'θκ\'ω\'\'ω\'\'...} \) in 6,26, and, therefore, no need to change it (with Taylor ap. Creuzer iii, p. 276) to \( \text{βου\'\'δ\'\'θκ\'ω\'\'ω\'\'...} \). The One's creative activity is involuntary because it is purely natural. In V 5,12,43-49 P. says that the One would not have cared if Intellect had never existed.

6,27-28 \( \text{πω\'\'... ω\'\'ω\'\'... μ\'\'\'ν\'\'ν\'\'...} \): Editors vary in their punctuation after \( \text{πω\'\'... ω\'\'ω\'\'...} \). Ki., Mi., Vo. and Br. add a question mark, while the other editors run on without a break to the next question beginning with \( \text{Τ\'}\). Ci. remarks that the question mark is not 'opportune', but does not support his judgement with any reasons. The sense is, of course, the same whichever punctuation is chosen, but the extra question mark adds a certain liveliness to the text.
More important is the punctuation and interpretation of the rest of the sentence. Ha. puts a question mark after νοησαμ in 6,27, and his next sentence runs from πει ἐκλίνο to μῦνοντος in 6,30, to which he adds the Eusebian δι' (see PG 21.889b). Instead of μῦνον in 6,28 he reads μὴν ὁν. In the first place it seems to me that the most natural meaning of the sentence καὶ τί δὲν νοησαμ; on its own would be 'and what must one think' (sc. on this matter)? and not 'als was muss man es (sc. das Zweite) sich denken?' Consequently the transition to πει ἐκλίνο μὴν ὁν would be very abrupt, if not impossible. Secondly, although it is true that the πει (lambri) of the One is in the vicinity of the One (πει ἐκλίνο... ὁν) I do not see that this is relevant here. The important concept is that of immobility, and as P. has stressed since 6,16, it is the One who remains immobile. Μῦνον is surely the right reading. (How is μὴν ὁν 'sprechender'? ) And μῦνον agrees with ἐκλίνο (the One) (so all translators except Ha.), and not with τί as H-S suppose. It is in fact true that the emission remains attached to its source, and this is particularly true of sunlight (see Wolters on III 5,2,31-32 and cf. V 3,9,12) but once again this is not the point here. P. emphasises almost ad nauseam that the One is unaffected by its creative activities. Note that this notion is further stressed in 6,28 (μῦνοντος) and in 6,30 (μῦνοντος). MK translates correctly: 'what must we conceive
of as rising in the neighbourhood of that immobility?

πετι' can have here its normal meaning of 'in the vicinity of'; but P. may intend the further connotation of 'conceptually related to', a meaning of πετι' noticed in 4,19.

The ambiguity is probably deliberate.

6,28-30 πετάλωμι... μίμονες: On the image of sunlight radiating from the sun see Wolter's excellent note on III 5,2,31-32. He notes how P. combines two images, the image of the sun and its light, and the image of the circle and its centre. The combined image is again applied to the relationship between the One and Intellect in V 3,12,39-44 and V 3,15,6 (for its application to Intellect and the higher soul see III 5,2,30 ff.. 6,23-24; V 3,9, 7 ff.; and to the higher and lower soul IV 4,29,9 ff.). The new image required new vocabulary. Πετάλωμι (used again in V 3, 15,6) is only found in Plutarch before Plotinus (De Fac. in Orb. Lun. 931a-b) and there it denotes not the halo of light which surrounds the sun, but the sun's circular movement around the moon by which the moon is illuminated.

In 6,28 the accusative πετάλωμι depends on νόησαι.

In 6,29 H-S are surely wrong to retain the mss. αὑτὸ' which must refer to the sun. As in V 3,9,9 the phrase οἴδον ἡμίον introduces the comparison. The fact that the sun is compared to the One does not mean that the neuter is possible particularly in view of the close proximity of the phrase οἴδον ἡμίον. Only Perna, Creuzer (who thought that αὑτὸ' might be right) and H-S retain the mss. reading. Ki.'s αὑτὸ' should be read.
In 6,29 in place of the Enneadic ἕως πετάλων the Eusebian tradition (see PG 21.889b) has φῶς πετάλων and this is the reading printed by Ki., Mi., Vo. and Br., and preferred though not printed by Creuzer. Henry (Etats, p. 131) notes that the reading φῶς is more easily explained as a corruption of ἕως than vice versa. It is also worth noting that λαμπρῶν φῶς ἐπίλυοι is a Homeric phrase (see ll. 1.605; ibid. 5.120; ibid. 3.485), which may account for the insertion of φῶς here. (Τὸ λαμπρῶν is found absolutely at Pl. Snh. 254a 9 and Pl. Th. 46b 3.) Palaeography apart, it seems to me that ἕως adds a much needed note of apology to πετάλων πετάλων is not a word normally associated with light, which either rushes away from its source, or stays immobile around it. In neither case does πετάλων give a literal description of the facts. Its figurative use, however, on which see on 4,18 emphasises the ontological dependence of light on the sun (cf. IV 4,29,9 ff.). This connotation of πετάλων is picked up by ηλιοθεσίαν in 6,33.

In 6,30 ἅρα after μένοντος (from Eusebius) is quite unnecessarily printed by Harder. The word γεννυμαίνω intervenes in the phrase ἡλιοθεσία ... μένοντος, but hyperbaton is common in P. (see RE 521.52 ff.). ἅρα can be construed either with μένοντος (Fic., Br. and ΜΚ) or γεννυμαίνω (Ci., Ha.). Either interpretation gives good sense, but since it is the immobility of the One which P. is stressing here, I prefer the former.
6,30-34 καὶ πάντα ... ἔγραμεν: P. explains the meaning of περιάμφισι by the theory of the double-activity (on which see 3,9-10). Here the internal activity is not explicitly mentioned, though it is the same as the οὐσία of 6,31 and the δύναμις of 6,32. Note how P. picks up the previous sentence by the clause εἰς μίνα (6,30-31).

The application of the double-activity theory to πάντα πάντα is something of an exaggeration. Note how the illustrations of the theory are carefully chosen (see 6,34-37 and note on 3,9-10). P. treats the theory as a natural law. If it is a law, then there is no need to worry about whether the producer produces intentionally, since what happens is governed by natural necessity.

The interpretation of 6,31-33 ἐκ τῆς ... ἀνοστασίν presents a slight problem. There are three alternatives. Either (a) ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας and ἐκ τῆς παρουσίας δύναμις both depend on δύναμις, and αὐτῶν ² (6,32) goes with ἐγκέφαλοι (so Pio.); or (b) ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας goes with δύναμις and ἐκ τῆς παρουσίας δύναμις... αὐτῶν with ἐγκέφαλοι (so all other translators except MK); or (c) ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας goes with δύναμις, αὐτῶν ² with ἐγκέφαλοι and ἐκ τῆς παρουσίας δύναμις is an explanatory phrase. On this use of ἐκ see LSJ s.v. III.6. MK translates: 'All existences ...... produce ...... from their essence, in virtue of the power which must be in them ...... some necessary ...... hypostasis continuously attached to them.'
Of these I prefer the last. Neither (a) nor (b) is heterodox. But it is more natural to see power as the reason for the emanation ((a) and (c)) than as that to which the resulting hypostasis is attached ((b)) (cf. II 9,3,25-26 ἐκάλαμος δὲ θαυμασθεὶ ἐκινθὲν ηὐτὴ καὶ ἐμφάσατο ; IV 8,6,14-17). (c) also avoids the slight awkwardness of construing both ἵνα-phrases with διακόσμησι.

Note the tension in this sentence between attachment and separation. Each new hypostasis is 'around' its source and attached to it (ἐξακρίτη σημεῖα), yet it is at the same time περὶ τῷ ἀνέμῳ and a separate entity (ἐπιστάσεως). P.'s metaphysical world is a single unity, but it contains the different hypostases within it (e.g. V 2,2,26-29 ἐπὶ τοῦ θαυμασθῆν τῶν ἐφύγης, συνεχεῖ δὲ πᾶν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δὲ καὶ ἀλλο ὑπὸ διαφορᾶ, οἷς ἀπολλύσιν ἐν τῇ διάφοραι τῷ περὶ σεβαστον).

On the meaning of περὶ in 6,31 and 6,36 see on 6,27-28, and on the use and occurrences of ἐπαρταῦν to describe the dependence of the lower hypostasis on the higher see on 1,14.

On ἐκατόν (6,33) see note on 3,7. P. apologises for the use of the ἐκκάτων / ἐπαρταῦν image here (with ἐκατόν) because it is odd to call, for example, a rose the archetype of the smell which it emits. ἐκκάτων and ἐπαρταῦν are much more closely related than rose and smell. Soul, for example, is like Intellect (V 3,9,48). In what sense is smell like the rose or cold like the snow? On the difficulties of the ἐκκάτων /
relationship see VI 4,10 (compare VI 7,18,2 ff.).

Fire is the commonest example P. chooses with which to illustrate the ἔντερον theory (see 3,9-10; IV 3,10,30 ff.; V 3,7,23 ff.; V 4,1,31 ff. 2.30 ff.). Snow is used again in V 4,1,31 but the example of smell is not found elsewhere. Aristotle (Pr. 906a 24; cf. ibid. 907a 33 and 906b 24) describes smell as an ἀπορροή ; and the ἀπορροή is immaterial (οὐ σωματικὸς ibid. 907b 6-7). These physical properties of smell help to explain P.'s choice of smell as an illustration. On the reasons for the choice of fire as the prime example see on 3,9-10.

In 6,36 only Perna, Creuzer, Ci. and H-S retain τὸ ὄν the reading of the mss. All other editors read τὸν ὄν from Eusebius (PG 21.889b). Henry remarks (Etats, p. 132) that though both readings are equally possible, the usual construction of ματαιων when its object is a thing, is with the accusative. His judgement is corroborated by LSJ s.v. I.3 (though cf. VI 4,5,18-20).

In 6,37 translators and editors differ in their interpretation of the clause ὅν ... ὁ πενήθον. Ci. and Ha. take ὅν to refer to τὰ τῶν ὀργάνων, whilst Pic. and Br. take it to refer to the singular τὸ in 6,36, i.e. to the emanation. (MK's 'something is .... perceived wherever they are present' seems to be a paraphrase rather than a translation.) Ci. defends his interpretation by saying that 'il semplice "esistere" al per Plotino, emanare e creare' (note ad loc.); i.e. when P. speaks of the neighbour's enjoying the existence of sweet-smelling things, he means, in fact, the
enjoying of the smells, since the very existence of the sweet-smelling things creates the smells. This is very contrived. I enjoy the smell, not its source. And surely this is P.'s point here. The smell is derived from the sweet-smelling thing but exists separately from it (just as Intellect is derived from the One but is nevertheless a distinct hypostasis); the man who enjoys the smell enjoys it in its own right, i.e. as a smell and not as a sweet-smelling thing. The use of the word ὑποστάτων emphasises the separate existence of its reference (see on 3,9-10 and cf. V 4,1,38 πῶν ἀληθῶν παρ' αὐτῶν ... ὑποστάτων). Consequently, I prefer to follow Pic. On the change from the singular τὸ to the plural ὧν compare II 1,3,10-12 ὅς δὲ ἐν τῷ μικρῷ, ὅμως ἀναφέρειν ἄν τοῦ ὅν ἡ σώματος φύσις πεῖ τὸ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνατὶ ὕπον καὶ ἀλλὰ μίνον.

Ἀπολαίη (6,37) is being used in the sense of sensuous enjoyment. It is more natural that it should have a personal subject. The masculine ὅ παθητών is better, therefore, than the Ruseian ὅ τὸ παθητῶν (see PG 29,889b) although all editors (except Perna, who reads ὅ παθητῶν, Creuzer in his Oxford edition and H-S) print the latter. Henry (Etats, p. 132) thinks that both readings are possible. The Arabic has 'the living being'.

6,37-38 καὶ πάντα ... γιννή: Compare 7,37-38; V 2,1,7-9; V 4,1,26 ff. (quoted on 6,6-7). This idea probably stems from the Greek notion that creation is the natural function of whatever is mature (see Arist. de An. 415a 26-28 φυσικά, τῶν γὰρ πῶν ἐγγυν.
Of course, τέλειος here means 'adult' and not 'perfect', but P. has already made use of the double meaning of the word in 3,14 (see on 3,13-14). Since the One is τελευτατός (6,39-40) it cannot help but create. Failure to do so would mean that the One begrudged its power, and on Platonic grounds, this is impossible (Ti. 29e 1-2 cf. II 9,17,16-17; IV 8,6,12-13; V 4,1,34-36). Perfection is seen by P. in terms of power, since it is power which makes creation possible (cf. IV 8,6,12 ff.). The One as the σώματος πάντων is the creative source of the whole Plotinian system (see on 5,3-4).

On creation by what is τέλειος see also III 8,5,6 ff., where ἡλικίας is used as an alternative word.

6,38-39 τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ... γιννᾶ; In 6,30 Vo. and Br. prefer the of the Eusebian tradition (see PG 21.889b), to the δὲ of the Enneadic mss. The difference between καὶ ... δὲ and καὶ ... δὴ is merely one of emphasis (see Denniston, p. 199 and p. 255). Henry (Etats, p. 132) is right to call them 'variantes indifférentes'. There is no need to alter the reading of the direct mss. tradition.

Mii.'s transposition of καὶ ἐξαρτηθὸν δὲ ἐπικτὸν γιννᾶ to a position after the first γιννᾶ in 6,38 is quite pointless.

On the principle that the producer is greater because more perfect than its product see on 2,7.
6,40 γὰρ μην ἔστω μετ' αὐτοῦ: Ki., Mii., Vo. and Br. change the αὐτὸν of the Enneadic tradition to αὐτῷ which is found in Eusebius (PG 21.889b). See, however, Ci.'s note (ad loc.) and Schwyzser in RE 515 ff.; change between masculine and neuter is common in references to the One. Those who read αὐτῷ here also read it incorrectly in 6,41; 6,48; and 6,49. They also read ἐκείνῳ in 6,42 and 6,48.

6,41 μηγιστον ... καὶ δειτερον: Since there is no middle term between Intellect and the One (6,23-25), and since Intellect derives from the One, it is δειτερον (cf. 5,7). It is also the most powerful after the One (cf. V 4,1,40-41 δι' θη καὶ τιμώτατον οἷαν τὸ γνωσμένον καὶ δειτερον ἐκείνῳ τῶν ἁλλων αμεινὸν οἷαν ). But because it is δειτερον (note the γε in 6,41) it needs the One.

On αὐτῷ for αὐτὸν see the preceding note.

6,41-43 καὶ γε οὖθε ... κακωσθαί: These lines treat of the relationship between the One and its newly formed product and should, I think, begin a new paragraph: they continue into Chapter 7.

6,41-43 καὶ γε οὖθε ... οὕλῳ: On the sight of Intellect see on 5,18. Fully actualised, Intellect is an ὦφις καὶ ἐνέγυλν (III 8,11,2), and since sight is actualised by its object, Intellect must continually look towards the One if it is to remain fully active. Only in this way can it continue its creative activities, since only what is fully-developed (πείσμωσ ) can create. Thus
the process of definition is not something which takes place only once. Intellect is being eternally regenerated, as it were, by the vision of the One. In VI 7,35,25 P. calls this upward activity of Intellect the activity of νοῦς ἐεφίν. A lover needs the object of his fulfilment. Similarly Intellect needs the One. But it also needs the One in the sense that whatever is not simple ( ἀπλοῦς ) needs what is simple, since simplicity and self-sufficiency are intimately connected (cf. V 3,13,15 ff.; V 4,1,13 ff.). The One has no need of Intellect - it would not have cared if Intellect had never existed (V 5,12, 40-44 - because it is perfectly self-sufficient (cf. V 6,4,1 ἀναφίκεις ).

On Κί.'s ἐκλίνω (twice in 6,42) see on 6,40.

6,43 καὶ τὸ γεννυμένον... σῶνε: Compare V 4,2,2-3 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἵπτόμενα νοῦ τὸ γεννυμένον, νοου σῶνε ἀνάγκη . The infinitive σῶνε is dependent on an unexpressed verb of obligation (see Schwyzer, RE 520.62 ff.).

6,44-45 οὖν καὶ... ἐκλίνων: On the interpretation of this passage and the meaning of λόγος see on 3,8. In ὅσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκλίνων P. is not saying that Intellect is the λόγος of the One. ὅσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκλίνων should only be taken with the immediately preceding phrase καὶ ἐνέγχω τὸς . All the translators miss this point. (For Intellect as ἐνέγχω of the One see VI 7,25,31.) This sentence illustrates P.'s previous remark that everything except the One comes below Intellect in the hierarchy of reality ( πάντα μετ' αὐτὸν (6,44)). Soul, for
example, comes lower than Intellect because it is its λόγος.

On the καί in the phrase οὖν καί see Denniston, p. 296.

'Alla ψυχή... λόγος': Ha. translates this phrase well by 'der Gedanke in der Seele'. The λόγος of soul is not the expression of soul (in the physical world) in the sense in which the λόγος of Intellect in 6,45 was its expression. Ψυχής λόγος means the λόγος from Intellect which actually is the soul. The λόγος of Intellect in soul is 'dim' because it is a step further away from reality than Intellect. It is only 'near the truth' (V 9,3,35-36); compared to Intellect it lacks unity (cf. μικρεῖον in I 2,3,29). But even this λόγος becomes dimmer as it is transmitted to the physical world to become the λόγος ζώνος (see VI 1,29,11-12; VI 7,11,10). What the body receives is only an imitation of what the soul gives (V 9,3,36-37).

'Αμαξιστής is contrasted by P. with Ιωάγγης (III 8,4,27-28; VI 7,7,29-31) and Τεανής (I 4,3,21-22). Light and clarity are characteristic of the Intelligible World (cf. V 8,4,4-6) as darkness and dimness are characteristic of matter (II 4,10,30) and the physical world (VI 6,18,24). The degree of dimness varies as the ultimate point, matter, is approached. Thus λόγος in the soul is not as dim as what comes after it, nor as bright as what comes before it.

Μέν is not answered by δέ; on this see the following note.
6.46-47 ὡς γὰρ κατέστησε ... δὲν: All editors and translators except H-S treat these lines as one sentence. Ha., for example, translates: 'denn er ist gleichsam nur ein Nachbild des Geistes, und darum muss sie auf den Geist blicken.' H-S put the phrase ὡς γὰρ κατέστησε ... in a parenthesis. This means that they take the dimness of soul's λόγος rather than the fact that soul is an image (κατέστησε) of Intellect as the reason for soul's vision of it. Both punctuations are acceptable from the point of view of orthodoxy, since ἀμύνεται and κατέστησε are merely different words to describe the same relationship between the higher and lower hypostases. But both, it seems to me, are precluded by the καί in the phrase ταυτά καί. As is clear from the abrupt change in ideas which a translation of ὡς = 'because' would give, ὡς is not being used here as a causal conjunction. But if this is so, then καί ταυτά cannot pick up the phrase ὡς γὰρ κατέστησε ... δὲν, as ταυτά presumably means 'for this reason.' Other attempts to take ὡς γὰρ ... δὲν ... as one sentence fail, as Ha.'s translation shows, because they involve the assumption that ταυτά καί is equivalent to καί ταυτά (see Ha.'s 'und darum'). H-S's punctuation fails also, and for the same reason: ἀλλὰ γνῶσις πᾶν ἀμύνεται ὁ λόγος ... ταυτά καί ... is not Greek.

It is best, therefore, to treat the sentence as logically unfinished. P. begins with a μὲν-clause, breaks off in a parenthesis, and then instead of returning to the main sentence with a δὲ-clause, carries on independently of it.
is neither the complement of the sentence beginning ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς ἀμφότερος ὁ λόγος (so H-S) nor of that beginning ὡς γὰρ ὑπέλεξεν νοῦ (all other translators and editors). The correct punctuation is ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὴν ἀμφότερος ὁ λόγος — ὡς γὰρ ὑπέλεξεν νοῦ — ταῦτα καὶ ('for this reason too', i.e. because it is the ὑπέλεξεν, as well as the λόγος and activity of Intellect) ὡς νοῦν βλέπειν δεῖ. P. continues his discussion of the vision of Intellect until the end of 6.49.

Soul must look towards Intellect because Intellect is soul's archetype (on ὑπέλεξεν see on 3.7), and therefore a truer and more real version of what soul itself it. Similarly, when it reaches the level of Intellect, it must look towards the One, since Intellect, in its turn, is only an image of its prior.

6.47-48 νοῦς γε ὡς γεύματως ... ἢνα ἐκ νοῦς: Intellect looks towards the One because the One is its archetype; but it also depends for its very existence on this act of sight, which perfects it and makes it fully what it is (on this see on 3.13-14 and 5.6-19).

Unlike Intellect, the One depends on nothing outside itself for its existence οὐ γὰρ τι ἐλέγχεται ἐκα ἐκεῖνος, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ἐκα ἐκεῖνος ... οὐκ ἐπὶ ἐλεύθερον ἐκεῖνος ἐκεῖνος. On Ki.'s ζυγίσα (the reading of ms. R) see on 6.40.

6.48-49 δὲ εἰς αὐτον ... καὶ νοῦς: Compare 6.53 ὡς τῇ ἐπεξετῆρι μόνον καθελέσθαι. P. is not speaking of the mystical union here, but of the regenerative sight of the One by Intellect which results in its creative activity (see on 6.41-43).
P. has already explained that there is no middle term between Intellect and the One in 6,23-25.

The Greek of this sentence is odd as Harder's literal translation shows: 'Er sieht ihn aber nicht als von ihm getrennt, sondern weil er unmittelbar nach Jenem ist und nichts dazwischensteht, wie auch nichts zwischen Seele und Geist.' The οτι -clause explains why Intellect sees the One αὐτ ἐπιγνωσθηκές; but why introduce the explanation with the adversative ἀλλά? There is surely no contrast between an explanation and that which it explains. Translators (except for Pic. and Ha.) gloss over the difficulty, most of them by leaving out ἀλλά. If ἀλλά is right it must introduce a contrast not with the οτι -clause but with the phrase αὐτ ἐπιγνωσθηκές. Perhaps some phrase such as ὥστε ἡνωμήνος has dropped out. It is perhaps better to delete the ἀλλά as the majority of the translators have tacitly done. Its introduction could easily have been due to a scribe expecting a contrast after the negative phrase αὐτ ἐπιγνωσθηκές.

On Ki.'s αὖτο in 6,48-49 see on 6,40.

6,50-51 ποθεὶ δὲ πᾶν... γιαγγυνημένων: On the addition of γιαγγυνημένων or γιαγγυθίν after γιαγγυθήσαν (6,50) printed by Vo. and Br. see Henry, Etats, pp. 135-136 and Manuscrits p. 147. No change is necessary. (Furthermore, Br.'s translation involves a difficult hyperbaton, in which πᾶν must be taken with γιαγγυνημένων.) All things desire the One (VI 7,20,18). There would be no motive for the ἀγαπητοφή if this were not the case. Love is yoked to the soul, so that soul necessarily
loves the Good (VI 9,9,25-27); compare V 5,12,7-9 (where H-S now prefer the reading ἄνευ to ἐννέα in 1.9). The love of the soul for the Good is like the love of a child for its father (VI 9,9,33-34). Everything desires that which is ontologically prior to it (VI 7,25,18-21), since the closer it gets towards unity, the more fully it exists; everything needs the One (cf. VI 9,6,19-20).

6,51 ὅταν ἤσε...γεγυμνήσθην : Cyril's ἄνευ ἔσει is due to the demands of Christian dogma (see Ci. ad loc.), Vitringa's ὅταν μόνα to the demands of Greek grammar. But the grammatical oddity is supported by both the direct and indirect traditions. For examples of similar solecisms see RE 515.29 ff.

On the meaning of μόνα see on 6,11. Superimposed is the figurative sense, as P. moves to the imagery of ἀγάπη (see following note); lovers are happiest when they are alone.

6,51-53 ὅταν ἦσε...κακοφώρωσιν : Compare VI 9,9,44-45 ἤκατο ἦσε τὸ ἀδημονὸν ἐγκυμνὸν, ὃ ἐστι καὶ σωματικὸν μεταλαμβάνει αὐτόν καὶ ὄντος ἐχαίνει. Note the play on the sexual connotations of ἐγκυμναί (LSJ s.v. II.1). A double entendre is quite in place in our present passage especially since πρόθος can be used of sexual longing (see Aristophanes Ra. 53-56). For similar use of erotic language to describe contact between the hypostases see VI 7,31-35 passim. From the philosophical point of view, σωματικὸν αὐτῶς means that Intellect and the One are never separated from each other in the way that soul is separated from Intellect by its involvement with body. One of
the two activities of Intellect is to look towards the One (VI 7,35,19 ff.), and this activity is called the activity of νόησις ἕλθεν. This is the activity with which we are dealing here.

On 'otherness' see on 1,4; 2,6; 3,3-4; 3,21-22; 4,34; and 4,41. Δέ should here be taken as a consecutive conjunction.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Compressed thought and textual problems make Chapter 7 the most difficult Chapter in V 1. It continues and concludes P.'s treatment of the One and the genesis of Intellect. But it differs from Chapter 6 in stressing not the first stage of this process, the emanation from the One, but the second stage, the return of Intellect to its maker so that it might become fully formed. 7,4-26, which deal with this, take the form of answers to the imaginary objections of an opponent of P. 7,27 (ταύτης τοι γενέσεως καλ.) marks a new and easier section. The mechanics of generation are left behind, and in the rest of the chapter P. ranges over various topics which he has already touched on. 7,27-49 act as a conclusion to Chapters 2 - 7.

7,1-4 ζικώνα ... τοῦ ἰλίου: These lines continue the discussion of the relationship between Intellect and the One which concluded Chapter 6.

7,1 ζικώνα ὁ ... τὸν νοῦν: Just as soul is an image of Intellect, so Intellect is an image of the One (cf. 6,46-48). P. goes on to explain that this is because of the various similarities between Intellect and the One. The thought is quite common in P. though ζικῶν is not the only word used to describe the relationship. The parallel passages cited by Ha. (in his note ad loc., viz. V 4,2,12 ff. and V 9,2,23 ff.) do not seem to me to be particularly helpful. On the use of the first person λύγματι see on 6,4-6.

Editors from Ki. onwards (with the possible exception of Ci.,
who gives no indication of his text here) adopt the transposition which is found in the mss. of Eusebius (see PG 21.992a) and Theodoret (see PG 83.852b) of \( \text{c} \text{i} \text{n} \text{a} \text{e} \ \text{l} \text{i} \text{g} \text{o} \text{m} \text{i} \text{n} \) for \( \text{l} \text{i} \text{g} \text{o} \text{m} \text{i} \text{n} \ \text{c} \text{i} \text{n} \text{a} \text{e} \). Even if Theodoret is not dependent on Eusebius the unanimity of the Enneadic mss. in reading \( \text{l} \text{i} \text{g} \text{o} \text{m} \text{i} \text{n} \ \text{c} \text{i} \text{n} \text{a} \text{e} \) makes it quite likely that \( \text{l} \text{i} \text{g} \text{o} \text{m} \text{i} \text{n} \ \text{c} \text{i} \text{n} \text{a} \text{e} \) is the right reading (see Henry, Etats, p. 137).

7,1-2 \( \text{c} \text{i} \text{n} \text{a} \text{e} \ \text{g} \text{a} \text{e} \ \text{g} \text{a} \text{f} \text{i} \text{s} \text{t} \text{o} \text{p} \text{e} \text{n} \ \text{l} \text{i} \text{g} \text{o} \text{m} \text{i} \text{n} \ ; \) Br.'s translation ('mais il faut parler plus clairement') is wrong. His adversative 'mais' suggests that P. is apologising in what follows for the imprecise image conveyed by the word \( \text{i} \text{k} \text{i} \text{n} \text{w} \) whereas in fact the opposite is the case. The use of the \( \text{i} \text{k} \text{i} \text{n} \text{w} \) expression and its explanation is itself the increase in clarity.

The clause is parenthetic, and is marked as such by all editors except Perna and Creuzer.

7,2-4 \( \text{p} \text{e} \text{r} \text{w} \text{t} \text{o} \text{n} \ \mu \text{i} \text{n} \ ... \ \nu \text{e} \text{o} \ \alpha \text{i} \text{t} \text{o} \) : These lines explain why the \( \text{i} \text{k} \text{i} \text{n} \text{w} \) expression is an appropriate description of the relationship between the One and Intellect. The \( \text{p} \text{e} \text{r} \text{w} \text{t} \text{o} \text{n} \ \mu \text{i} \text{n} \) of 7,2 is not answered by a correlative particle, since the train of argument is interrupted by 7,4-5 (\( \text{a} \text{d} \text{a} \ ... \ \nu \text{i} \text{v} \text{a} \text{t} \)). J. Igal, in Emerita 39 (1971), p. 130, n. 2 thinks that the argument is resumed in 7,35 (\( \text{mu} \text{t} \text{a} \ \delta \text{e} \ \tau \text{a} \text{i} \text{t} \text{a} \ \kappa \text{a} \text{l} \)). But this is wrong; see on 7,35-37.

In 7,2 Vo., Br., and MK read Vitrina's \( \text{i} \text{k} \text{i} \text{n} \text{w} \text{o} \) in place of the mss. \( \text{i} \text{k} \text{i} \text{n} \text{w} \text{o} \). MK translates: 'there is a certain
necessity that the first should have its offspring* (= \( \gamma\nu\nu\mu\mu\sigma\nu\sigma \)). The sentiment is Plotinian (cf. 6,36-37) but beside the point here. Ha. is quite right (note ad loc.) to remark that what is under discussion is the 'Abbildverhältnis' with its stress on the similarity between producer and product. But if \( \zeta\kappa\kappa\nu\sigma\nu \) is correct, the phrase \( \delta\zeta\gamma\nu\nu\mu\mu\sigma\nu\sigma \) (or \( \gamma\nu\nu\mu\mu\sigma\nu\sigma \); see below) should not be translated 'primum quidem oportere id genitum esse' (Pic.) but '...weil das Erzeugte in gewissem Sinne ein 'Jenes' sein (muss)' (Ha. followed by Ci.).

The notion that the product is in some sense a copy of its prior is a biological commonplace (see Arist. de An. 415a 28 \( \tau\omicron \) \( 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Note that in 7,3-4 (καὶ ἴναι... αὐτῷ), the subject changes from το ὑμνῆσθαι / γιννῆσθαι to ὁμοιότητα.

7,4 ὁσπερ καὶ τὸ φῶς τοῦ ηλίου: Compare VI 8,18,32 ff. where Intellect is compared to light diffused from a source. The diffused light is not of a different sort from its source; similarly Intellect is not different in kind from the One (οὐ μὴν ἀλλοιωθεὶς τὸ σκέλεσθαι ὑπὸ πλαισίον ὁ νοῦς VI 8,18,36). For the One as the sun and Intellect as its light see I 7,1,24-28; V 3,12,40; and see on 6,28-30. The relationship between sun and sunlight is used as an analogy for the relationship between the Good and what it causes in Pl. R. 508e 6 ff..

7,4-26 ἀλλ' ὅτι... λαμπάνει: These lines constitute the main section of Chapter 7 and deal further, in lively form, with the genesis of Intellect.

7,4-5 ἀλλ' ὅτι νοῦς... νοῦν γίνεται: The next 31 lines (7,4-35) are discussed in detail by J. Igal in Emerita 39 (1971), pp. 129 ff. in a stimulating article ('La genesis de la Inteligencia en un pasaje de las Eneadas de Plotino (V 1,7,4-35)'). He notes first that our present passage is an objection by an imaginary opponent of P. which interrupts the flow of P.'s previous argument. P.'s answer to this objection begins in 7,5 with γ'. The conjunction of ἀλλ' and γ' is quite common in contexts of question and answer. Igal adduces seven examples from I 1 alone; see op. cit.
The point of the objection is, I think, missed by Hadot (RHR 164 (1963), p. 95) who says that the question πῶς οὖν νοοῦν γνωντι is a request for the elaboration of the similarities and resemblances between Intellect and the One which P. mentioned in the preceding sentence. Hadot thinks that if sufficient resemblances could be shown to exist, the difficulties about the genesis of Intellect would vanish. And he sees these resemblances made explicit in 7,5-6 (ἡ ὁρ... νοεῖ) which he interprets as meaning that the One's self-ποίησις φυσική actually is Intellect.

It seems to me, however, that the tone of the objection is more polemical than Hadot suggests. The objector shrugs aside the previous talk about similarity and resemblance, and returns to the old question of Chapter 6. How can plurality derive from unity? Whatever the resemblances which exist between Intellect and the One in virtue of their image/archetype relationship, the One is nevertheless not Intellect, but, on the contrary, apart from all plurality. How, then, can it be the cause of plurality?

Igal (op. cit. p. 130) and Beutelen-Theiler (t. vi. p. 110) are probably right to see in the phrase πῶς οὖν not so much a demand for information (although I think that P.'s reply does give information) as for the solution to a difficulty. Perhaps the colloquial English: 'How on earth?' gives the flavour of the original.

7,5-6 ἡ ὁρ... ὁρασίς αὐτή νοεῖ: This passage has been the cause of great difficulty. Its problems are similar to those of
6,18-19 (ἐπιστρέφεις αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι γνωστικά). Is the subject of the reversion (a) the One or (b) Intellect? In the former case ἀυτῷ will be reflexive, and in the latter case it will refer to the One.

In t.III p. 397 H-S have again listed the adherents of these alternative interpretations. To this list may be added besides those mentioned in the note on 6,17-19 O. Becker, *Plotin und das Problem der Geistigen Aneignung* (Berlin, 1940), p. 27 who supports interpretation (a), and G.J.P. O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self* (Shannon, 1973), pp. 71-72 who supports (b). Once again H-S have changed from the view put forward in their apparatus. They now believe that the One is the subject of the sentence and that ἀυτῷ is reflexive. All those who take 6,18-19 to refer to the One's self-ζωογονική take a similar view of our present passage. The only exceptions are Fic., Bouillet and Igal (who is not mentioned by H-S). Igal thinks that he is justified in taking the two passages differently because he believes that their contexts are distinct (op. cit. p. 135). He thinks that 6,18-19 refers to the first phase of Intellect's genesis - the emanation from the One - whilst our present passage refers to the definition of Intellect by its vision of the One. I do not agree with his interpretation of 6,18-19. In my note on 6,17-19 I have given reasons why I think that the reversion of Intellect towards the One is meant by P. in that earlier passage. The same reversion is under discussion here.

The reasons for taking our present passage to refer to the
reversion of the (inchoate) Intellect towards the One are particularly strong. Igal correctly notes (op. cit. p. 132) that the use of the demonstrative ἄμη makes it quite certain that ῥήξις picks up the subject of the verb ἐμφα. This means that if the One's ἱστοποφ is in question P. must be saying that the actual self-vision of the One is Intellect. This would imply that Intellect is something internal to the One, and this in turn contradicts the important Plotinian law that each of the three hypostases is distinct and separate from its cause, and is the external activity of its producer (see on 3,9-10). Furthermore, Intellect's sight of the One is regularly associated with Intellect's genesis as it becomes fully actualised (see 5,18; III 8,11,1 ff.; V 3,11,10; VI 7,15,16,16,10 ff.). In our present passage the use of the imperfect ἐμφα, contrasted with the word ῥήξις, emphasises the transition of Intellect in its inchoate state to the fully actualised Intellect which is the second hypostasis; for ῥήξις is fully actualised ῥής (see Arist. de An. 426a 13-14 and note on 5,18-19). The One's product was looking towards the One by turning towards it. The actualised vision which resulted from this looking was Intellect. Compare the similar conjunction of tenses at VI 7,16,31-32 προσπομένως μὲν δὲν ἐπον ἱστόντο, παρεδόθαι ὑπὲρ ὑμώ

The self-vision of the One is in fact mentioned in VI 8,16,19-21 where P. identifies it with the One's 'being' (καὶ τὸ οἶον εἶναι τὸν ἀὑτὸ ἀὑτὸ τὸ πε dps αὐτὸν βῆμαν). This vision, however, is qualified by the word οἶον (VI 8,16,19-20) and is
in any case an internal activity of the One. It is nowhere associated with the genesis of Intellect.

It seems certain, then, that Intellect's vision of the One is the subject of our present passage. Objections to this interpretation, however, have been made by Hadot (RHR 164 (1963), pp. 95-96) who is followed by Schwyzer (Mus. Hel. 26 (1969), p. 260). Hadot's linguistic objection is the same as that made against the analogous interpretation of 6,17-19 — viz. the change of subject, in this case, from ἡμῶν (the subject of ἐνάνγκαν ὑπὲρ γνώσεως in 7,5) to τὸ γνώσιμον καὶ γνώσαμαι (the subject of ἐν αὐτῷ). But the subject change becomes less harsh, when we remember that 7,4-5 (ἀλλ' ὁν οὖν ὑπὲρ... γνώσεως) are an interruption. The answer to the interruption has the same subject as the sentence before it.

Hadot's philosophical objections begin with a repetition of the objection made against 6,17-19: to turn towards the One Intellect would have to be already engendered, so that the passage could hardly explain Intellect's genesis. But P. makes it quite clear that the subject of the γνωστοφη is undetermined (see on 6,17-19), and he emphasises this by his use of the imperfect in our present passage. It is true, though, that the meaning of τὸ γνώσιμον has undergone some change, since in 7,3 τὸ γνώσιμον refers to fully-actualised Intellect, whereas in 7,5 it must mean Intellect in its inchoate state. Note, however, the similar alternation in the meaning of ὑπὲρ in V 3,11. In V 3,11,12 ὑπὲρ... ὑπὲρ refers to the inchoate product
of the One, whereas νοῦς in V 3,11,13 is fully actualised
Intellect. Hadot also thinks that 7,5-6 give no answer to the
question πῶς ὁ ὅν νοῦν γεννᾷ; . But on the meaning of
πῶς ὁ ὅν see on 7,4-5; and furthermore, since the Ἰεροθεφή'
accounts for the formation of the fully formed Intellect, it
is hard to see why Hadot thinks that these lines give no information
of the method of Intellect's genesis. Thirdly, Hadot says: 'on
ne comprend pas la précision: "cette vision, c'est l'Intelligence",
si "Intelligence" est déjà sujet de ἐγένος . On ne voit pas comment
le second membre de phrase s'oppose au premier'. If we see,
however, that the subject of the Ἰεροθεφή is undefined and
note that ἐμάωσις means actualised sight (see above), this
difficulty vanishes. On Hadot's further point that πῶς ὁ ὅν
νοῦν γεννᾷ is a request for explanation of the resemblances
between the One and Intellect (cf. 7,2-4) see on 7,4-5.

Finally, it seems to me that the suggestion of Wallis (CR
84 (1970), p. 185) that the One is the subject of ἐγένος and
that the whole passage is an 'undigested relic of Numenius'
προσκεφαλής is quite wrong. Numenius' theory (see fr. 22)
was that the first and second gods moved down to a lower meta-
physical level by making use of the gods subordinate to them.
Thus, the first god 'thinks' ( νοῦ ) by making use of the
second god whose characteristic activity νοῦν is (see Dodds
inEntr. p. 14). In our present passage, however, there is no
question of the One's making use of Intellect; it is the genesis
of Intellect which is under discussion.
7,6-7 ἀφ' ἀναλαμβάνων ... νοσ: All the translators and editors with one exception understand these lines as a general point about perception; perception can be of two kinds, visual perception (ἀνωθησις) or intellectual perception (νοσ). The exception is Ha. who takes 7,4-5 to refer to the self-vision of the One, and thinks that ἀφ' ἀναλαμβάνων (7,6-7) means the subject of this vision, i.e., 'das Eine und sein "Sehen"'. He translates: 'denn was dies Auffassen tätig ist, ist etwas anderes als Wahrnehmung oder Geist'. But since the ἀφ' of 7,6 is the vision of the One by Intellect, Ha.'s suggested interpretation is impossible. The point of these lines is to illustrate P.'s remark in the previous sentence - note the ὑπερ. Since perception has taken place (ἐπαναλαμβάνω in 7,6), the subject of perception can only be ἀνωθησις or νοσ. And since it is perception of the One, the subject must be νοσ, since visual perception is a faculty of the soul.

That ἀνωθησις and νοσ are the two types of perception is a commonplace. They are compared and contrasted at e.g. III 2,1, 3; V 3,1,19-20; V 4,2,44-45; VI 3,18,8 ff.; VI 9,3,29-32.

7,7-8 ἀφ' ἀνωθησις ... τὰ ἄλλα: These words have no grammatical links with their context, nor any internal construction. Their general drift, however, can be gathered from what follows, where κύκλος (7,8) and the indivisible τοῦτο (7,8-9) seem to refer to and develop the geometrical imagery which ἀνωθησις ἡμματον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα presumably introduced. Of all editors after Creuzer, only Ha. and Igal think that the words may stand in the text without
emendation. The onus of proof lies with them.

Ha. thinks that the words constitute what he calls a 'Notiz' meant not for the reader but for P.'s own use. In his note on IV 7,3,2-5 he cites II 4,7,21 ff. and VI 9,8,15 ff. as other examples of 'notes' in the Enneads. He translates καὶ τὰ ἀνάθεσις as 'und so weiter'. Igal (op. cit. p. 141), while agreeing with Ha. about his 'note'-theory, thinks that he is wrong to see the 'note' as intended for P.'s own use. Porphyry says (V.P. 8.1-4) that P. never reread anything he had written. Consequently, Igal argues, P. would hardly have included in his writing a note intended for his own use. Igal thinks that the notes were intended for the select circle of disciples to whom P.'s works were distributed.

First, however, none of the passages cited by Ha. as examples of similar 'notes' is as elliptical as our present passage. And secondly, it seems to me that the whole theory of 'notes' is suspect. Porphyry tells us that P. entrusted him with the task of editing and correcting his works (V.P. 7,51 ὅν καὶ πρὸς ὁλοκλήρωσιν αὐτῶν τὰ συγγραμμάτων ἐξέδωκε), and presumably this editorial activity extended to the twenty-one treatises which P. had already written before Porphyry's arrival in Rome (see V.P. 4,66-67). If Porphyry's edition was intended to disseminate P.'s work to a larger public than had previously been possible, it seems improbable that he would have left in the new edition notes which the larger public could hardly be presumed to understand. Ha. and Igal think that the short 'note' is readily understandable because its contents
have been dealt with more expansively in the previous treatise in VI 9,8. But VI 9,8 does not mention \textit{αἰσθητικώς} at all, and the circular movement of souls (VI 9,8,3 ff.; cf. Pl. \textit{Phdr} 247d 4 ff.) cannot be the same as the \textit{κύκλος} of V 1,7,8. Furthermore, if P. had wanted to refer back to a previous treatise he could have done so much more obviously by adding \textit{εἰς τὸν κύκλον} or a similar phrase. And finally, since the geometric imagery is developed in 7,9 ff., P. would without doubt have tried to make the point of the image clear in its original exposition.

I prefer to regard the passage, then, as corrupt. The next problem is its putative sense. Fic., in a translation of which H-S approve, gives: 'comparari vero solet sensus quidem lineae, quod vero reliquia est in cognoscendo, circulo'. But the \textit{κύκλος} in 7,8 is contrasted with something indivisible (\textit{τὸ ὑπό 7,8}) and in the context of the circle this is most probably the centre of the circle. So, besides \textit{γεγραμμένος}, 7,7-8 ought to introduce some reference to the circle and its centre. This latter image is quite common in P. (see D. Mahnke, \textit{Unendliche Sphäre und Allmittelpunkt} (Halle, 1937), p. 223 and \textit{Images}, pp. 30-34). Most often the centre is the One (11,10 ff.; I 7,1,23 ff.; IV 3,17,12 ff.; IV 4,16,23 ff.; VI 4,7,22 ff.; VI 8,18,3 ff.; VI 9,8,10) in which case it is natural to see Intellect as the circle revolving around it (cf. Pl. \textit{Lg.} 898a 3 ff. - though Schwyzer doubts (\textit{RE} 551.30) whether this reference is intended here), although it can be an image of Intellect (IV 2,1,24 ff.; VI 5,5,1 ff.) or even of the Aristotelian \textit{κοινὸν αἰσθητικόν}. 
(IV 7,6,11 ff. and Arist. de An. 427a 2 ff.). Aristotle's linear image was transformed into a circular image as early as Alexander of Aphrodisias; see his commentary on Arist. in Suppl. Aristotelicum II, part II (Berlin, 1892), p. 96,14 ff. (Bruns)). In view of the context of our present passage, with its discussion of the derivation of Intellect from the One, the circle must be an image of Intellect and the centre of the One. But if this is right, how does the visual perception (αἰσθησις) as a γραμμή fit in? In the context of the circle γραμμή usually means 'radius' for which the Greeks did not have a technical term (T. L. Heath, The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements (Cambridge, 1926), I. p. 199; cf. I 7,1,24; IV 2,1,25; VI 8,18,10). But this can hardly be its meaning here since radii are parts of the circle and Π. is trying to distinguish in our present passage between αἰσθησις and νοέω (the circle). γραμμή must here indicate linear motion (cf. Pl. Ti. 43b 5 ff. where the motions of the soul are called αἰσθησις), in contrast to the circular motion of Intellect. The full image which 7,7-8 fail to make explicit is that sensible perception can be seen as a straight line and Intellect as a circle of which the One is the centre. Igal paraphrases the Greek as follows (op. cit. pp. 140-141): αἰσθησιν γραμμὴν λαβόν, νοέων καῦμόν, τὸ εὖ δὲ κίνημα. The ms. text as it stands, however, is no equivalent of Igal's paraphrase.

Only Mil. has ventured to print his conjectures in this corrupt passage, and only Fic. and Br. get the sense of the corrupt Greek wrong.
7.8-9 ἀλλ' ἀν κύκλος ... οὐχ οὐκόως: These lines are extremely well discussed by Igal (op. cit. pp. 142-144). ἀλλ' introduces an objection by P.'s imaginary opponent, which is answered in 7.9 by the sentence beginning ἄν καί. Note the similar conjunction of particles in 7.4-5. Br. alone of the translators realises this and marks the sentence off from the context by dashes. Igal notes (p. 142) that in H-S's system of printing ἀλλ' should be printed with a capital alpha.

But what is the point of the objection? The circle, P. says, is divisible; but this is not in this state. The reference of τοῖς τοῖς must be to something within the geometric image. And in this context the only thing which is indivisible is the centre of the circle. P.'s opponent phrases his objection in the language of the image which P. has just used. Consequently, Igal is right to note that τοῖς τοῖς refers directly to the centre of the circle and only indirectly to the One. All translators miss this nuance by assuming that τοῖς τοῖς refers directly to the One. (In the mss. text τοῖς τοῖς has no apparent reference. This seems to me further proof that the text of 7.7-8 is corrupt.)

P.'s objector returns to the point of his first objection (ἀλλ' ὡς νεώς ἀκτίνως. τοῖς οὖν νοεῖς γινώσκε; 7.4-5) and in doing so once again interrupts the flow of P.'s argument. In the corrupt passage (7.7-8) P. has compared visual perception to a straight line, Intellect to a circle, and the One to the centre of the circle. But the objector retorts that even if the analogy holds, the genesis of Intellect still presents difficulties because
the circle is divisible (i.e., in some sense compound) and the
centre of the circle is not. Intellect looks towards the One
in order to become fully actualised, but the object of its
vision is something entirely without parts. How could what
is partless pluralise the inchoate Intellect? The old question
about the derivation of unity from plurality is translated into
the geometrical terms which P. has introduced in 7,7-8.

7,9-10 ἡ καὶ ἡ ἑντάθα . . . πάντων : These lines begin P.'s
answer to the objection of his opponent. The μὲν -clause
makes him some sort of concession and the ἀλλ' -clause qualifies
this concession. The explanation then continues down to τὸ ἔνδικου
in 7,17.

The first problem concerns the reference of the simple
phrase καὶ ἡ ἑντάθα . Those who give a merely literal
translation (Fic., Ci., and Ha.) leave it most unclear what
'here' refers to. Br. is more forthright - 'dans l'Intelligence
aussi il y a unité' - and MK with his 'here, to be sure, is a
unity, but there is the unity which is the potentiality of all
existence' seems to understand the phrase as marking a distinction
between the sensible and the Intelligible worlds. Igal (op. cit.
p. 145) thinks that καὶ ἡ ἑντάθα marks the transition from
the world of geometric imagery back to the (real) world which
the images represent. He would paraphrase our present passage
as follows: 'yes, you are right to imply in your objection that
the One which the centre of the circle represents is a unity.
But it is not any sort of unity; it is a unity which is potentially
everything.' For this view of the meaning of καὶ ἑνταῦθα ('in the real world, too') he gives four references — V 5,5,10; V 8,3,16; VI 8,18,22 οὐκ εἴκαλ (misquoted as VI 8,12,22) and VI 9,7,8. But in all these cases the fact that a transition is being made from image to reality is emphasised by the use of οὖν or ἐστὶν followed by οὖν (e.g., in V 5,5,7 ff., P. writes καὶ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀνθρωπίν... οὖν καὶ ἑνταῦθα...). It seems to me unlikely that καὶ ἑνταῦθα alone could perform the same function as the correlative οὖν /ἐστιν... οὖν. But καὶ ἑνταῦθα can mean 'in this case' (see, e.g., VI 8,12,13; VI 9,5,30) and most naturally refers to the same context as τὸ ἡμα in 7,8 - i.e., to the geometric image of the circle and its centre.

Igal's interpretation of this passage involves the further difficulty of taking the phrase δύναμις σιντών in apposition to τὸ ἑν and not as a predicate, with τὸ ἑν understood. He translates (op. cit. p. 146): 'sí, también aquí el centro es uno, pero el Uno-Potencia de todas las cosas.' I think that P. is making a contrast in 7,9-10 between the geometric centre of the circle (the τὸ ἡμα of 7,8) which is certainly a unity (note the omission of the article) and the One, which the geometric circle represents. The concession which P. makes to his opponent is that it is quite true that the centre of a circle is a unity; but he qualifies his former comparison of the One to a centre by adding that unlike the geometric centre the One is the potentiality of all things, and therefore, as he goes on to explain, there is
not the same difficulty about the derivation of plurality from unity as there would be if the comparison was literally exact. I would translate: 'Yes, in the case of the geometric centre, too, there is a unity, but the One is the potentiality of all things.' The One is the δύναμις πάντων both in the sense that it contains the objects of Intellect potentially (V 3,15,31) and in the sense that it is an immensely active power responsible for the very existence of the procession from the One (VI 9,5,36-37 δύναμις γινώσκων τὰ ὄντα; VI 9,6,7-8 μόριστον γὰς ἡμάντων οὐ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ δυνάμει). Ha.'s 'Vermögen und Möglichkeit aller Dinge' captures this double meaning well. See further on 1,21 and 5,3-4.

7,10-11 ἂν οἶν... οἷς ἂν ἡ νόημα: For the punctuation of 7,10-17 see the end of the following note.

P. now explains how Intellect is pluralised by the vision of the One. Νόημα sees the items of the One's power/potentiality separately, and so provides itself with an object of vision. Theiler (RTh 92(1970), p. 295) is right to note that νόημα here means the same as it does in V 4,2,4 ff. where it is the inchoate Intellect. Note, however, how P. has shifted the meaning of νόημα since the end of Chapter 5 where it was specifically identified with a ὄφθαλμος ὄφθαλμα - i.e., fully actualised Intellect. The sense of our present passage is that if the inchoate Intellect had not been defined by its vision of the One, Intellect properly speaking would never have existed.
Scholars vary in their interpretation of ςχίςωμεν (7,11), here as Igal notes (op. cit. p. 147) the equivalent of ἀποσχίςωμεν, which can be either middle or passive. Igal (loc. cit. n. 3) has a useful collection of the different translations. Either the inchoate Intellect is separated from the One when it sees its pluralising object (so Bouillet, Br., Ci., Trouillard, Ha., Volkman-Schluck and Hadot) or it separates out the objects of its vision from the One (so Becker, MK, Rist and Igal). Pic.'s 'haec ab ipsa potestate velut partita intelligentia conspicit' is ambiguous.

Although the first of these interpretations makes sense, since the inchoate Intellect is separated from the One - it is its external activity, fully separated from it when it has been fully defined by it - I prefer to take σχίςωμεν as middle. First, in VI 7,15,20-22 the genesis of Intellect is described as taking place by a splitting up of the power of the One (ἢ γὰρ ἐκομίζοντο δύναμιν ἄδιανατῶν έχων συνίδεσαι καὶ συνδέσαι ὑποίσου τὴν μίαν). Συνίδεσαι and σχίςωμεν (in a middle sense) have an obvious similarity. The fact that σχίςειν has no middle voice attested in LSJ is unimportant since ἀπὸ τῆς διωκόμεις... σχίςωμεν is the equivalent of ἀπὸ τῆς διωκόμεις... ἀποσχίςωμεν (Igal op. cit. p. 147) and ἀποσχίςειν can be used in the middle (see LSJ s.v.); in view of this, it is not important that σχίςειν in its other occurrences in P. at III 3,7,15 and VI 6,15,30-31 is used in the passive. Secondly, the use of the middle voice emphasises the
important role of νόησις in its own creation. It separates off for itself the contents which the One as δύναμις πάντων possesses, and sees them as its own objects. P. further explains this role in the next sentence of which the subject is Intellect and not the One as H-S suggest (see the following note).

The vision of νόησις makes explicit the items of the One's power. As the One is the δύναμις πάντων so the fully defined Intellect is πάντα (4,21 ὁ δὲ νοὸς πάντα).

νόησις sees the One as many, and so provides itself with its own objects of thought.

7,10-12 are paralleled by III 8,8,31 ff.. Intellect, in its attempt to see the One, pluralises itself; otherwise there would be no Intellect. This description is followed by a description of the pluralisation of the circle into its various components, though in this passage the circle rather than its centre is seen as the source of the pluralisation.

7,11-17 ἐπὶ καὶ ... ἐστὶ οἰκίσσων: These lines are extremely difficult, and have been variously interpreted. One thing, however, seems clear. The ἐπὶ -clause, however far it extends, is retrospective in force; it helps to explain P.'s previous statement that νόησις in order to have become Intellect must have split up the contents of the One and have seen them as its own contents (though see Wolters on III 5,3,25).

The first problem regards the subjects of ἔσχε and δύνασα in 7,12 and 13. Igal (op. cit. p. 149-150) once again collects the opinions of scholars. Becker, Ci., Ha. and
Hadot take the One as subject of both verbs, as do H-S, although in *Entr.* p. 387 Henry thinks that Intellect should be the subject of *χιν*. Henry's view is followed by Rist and Deck while Fic., Bouillet, Br., Volkmann-Schluck, Trouillard and Igal himself take Intellect as the subject of both verbs.

To this list may be added G.J.P. O'Daly, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self* (Shannon, 1973) who thinks that the *σωμαλοδήσις* referred to is that of the One (*op. cit.* p. 71).

I think that it is most unlikely that the subject of *χιν* is anything other than Intellect, this Intellect being the inchoate Intellect or *νοήσις* of 7.10-11. If the force of *ενυ* (7.11) is retrospective, the introduction of the One as subject would make the transition of thought from the previous sentence very odd. How would the fact of the One's awareness of (presumably) its own power help to explain why *νοήσις* split up the contents of the One in order to become fully actualised Intellect? Secondly, if the One were the subject of *χιν* the change of subject in 7.13 (*αυτός γνών εκλ.*), where *αυτός* can only refer to Intellect, would be very abrupt. And finally what would be the point of *ηὶ ἐγ* (7.12)? If Intellect is the subject, this last-mentioned difficulty disappears. The phrase *παρὰ αὐτοῦ* emphasises the independence of *νοήσις* vis-à-vis the One, and *ηὶ ἐγ* means 'at this stage', i.e., while Intellect is still in its inchoate state as *νοήσις*. Some have thought that the qualification of the word *σωμαλοδήσις* by the addition of *ὅτως* shows that it is the One's *σωμαλοδήσις* which is under
discussion. (On the self-awareness of the One see V 4,2,15-19 and contrast V 6,5,2-5.) But as Igal points out (op. cit. p. 152), \textit{σωφίσθης} is only properly predicated of the fully-formed Intellect; the inchoate \textit{νόησις} possesses only an indistinct self-awareness. Compare V 3,11,4 ff. where the inchoate Intellect is said to have only a vague notion of the object of its desire - \textit{δείκτης} \textit{ἐγγίσμα} \textit{ἐπ' αὐτῷ φάντασμα} τι \ V 3,11,6-7. Br.'s reference here to Stoic 'sympathy' is quite out of place.

It seems to me that the subject of \textit{δυνάμεις} \textit{οὐσίαν} is also Intellect. The sentence beginning \textit{αὐτῶς} \textit{γοὰν} (7,13 ff.) introduces a further explanation of the first limb of the \textit{ὅπερ} -clause - on the use of \textit{γοὰν} see Denniston, p. 451 - and this sentence certainly refers to the part which Intellect plays in its own creation (nb. 7,13-14 \textit{καὶ δείκτης} \textit{τὸ δύναμιν αὐτῷ}). The phrases \textit{δείκτης} \textit{τὸ δύναμι} and \textit{δυνάμεις} \textit{οὐσίαν} are sufficiently close to suggest that they refer to the same process. I, therefore, think that by \textit{τῆς} \textit{δυνάμεως} P. means the power of Intellect and that this power is the power of Intellect to create substance. If this is right, however, note the change in the reference of \textit{δυνάμεως}. In 7,10 \textit{δυνάμεως} refers to the power of the One; in 7,12 to the power of Intellect; and in 7,14 to the power of the One. In the latter case, the change of reference is marked by the addition of \textit{πε' εἰκόνων}.

In the lines which we have been discussing, then, (7,11-13), P. says that Intellect even in its inchoate state is aware of its own power to create substance (i.e., itself as the Forms). This
function of Intellect is quite frequently mentioned in the *Iliad*. The inchoate Intellect is itself said to be responsible for the pluralisation of the One's unity (V 3,11,5 ὁπε συμμορία (sc. ὁψις οὐχὶ ἢ ἐντολα) ἑπτὴθυμίν ; V 3,11,7-8 πολλα ἄνθρωπα ). Intellect itself brings plurality from the One (VI 7,15,15-16 καὶ οὗτος ἐπικρίνει πᾶσα ἔντονος ) and is even said to be the creator of that plurality (VI 7,15,17); and finally, as we have noted earlier (see on 7,10-12), Intellect itself separates the items of the One's potentiality from the One (cf. VI 7,15,21-22 συνεξεύρει καὶ πολλὰ ἐπικρίνει τὴν μᾶν (sc.σύναρμαν)).

This act of Intellect is the act of self-creation. Thus 7,11-13 do help to explain P.'s earlier remark that if this separation of the contents of the One from the One itself had not taken place, ν опыσ would never have become νοῦς.

Fic., Creuzer and (seemingly) Ci. adopt an idiosyncratic punctuation of these lines. They place a comma after σύναρμα (7,13) and take οὐκίσκιν (7,13) in apposition to οἷν συναίσθησιν (7,12). This punctuation makes the construction almost impossibly difficult, and gives a weird sense. Awareness of its own power can hardly be the substance either of the One (Ci.) or of Intellect (Fic. and Creuzer (?)).

The next lines (7,13-14 αὐτοὶ γον...σύναρμα ) give the pro tanto evidence for P.'s assertion that Intellect has an awareness of its own power and form a parenthesis. The change of γον (7,13) to γεννάν (Vitrings, Mü., Vo. and Br.) obscures the connection of thought and necessitates the further
change of ὑπάρξε (7,13) to ὑπέρκυ. H-S cite VI 8,18, 15-16 and Arist. Pol. 1341a 23 as examples of ὑπάρξε used with the simple accusative and further note for what it is worth that all the mss. mark a pause after ὑπάρξε (7,13). Compare further Pl. Phlb. 23d 9-10 with R.G. Bury's note. The phrase δι’ αὐτῶν is translated by the same editors as 'ob seipsum'. I agree with Igal, however, that 'per seipsum' would be more correct. This is the normal meaning of the phrase (see e.g. Pl. R. 367b 4; it is parallel to παρ’ αὐτῶν in 7,12). If Igal is right the καὶ before ὑπάρξε (7,13) cannot be correlative to the καὶ before ὑπάρξε in 7,15 (as H-S further suggest) since δι’ αὐτῶν can only be taken with ὑπάρξε and not with the verbs ὑπάρξε and παράστασε which are qualified by the phrase παρ’ ἐκσίνου (7,16 twice). The καὶ of 7,13 is, I think, merely emphatic; on this see Denniston, pp. 320-321. P. adds the phrase τῇ παρ’ ἐκσίνου δι’ αὐτῶν (7,14) because the definition of Intellect takes place when it looks towards the One, so that the One's power as well as the so-to-speak independent action of νοσησ in turning towards the One are both responsible for the creation of the fully-formed Intellect.

The remainder of this troublesome section presents further problems. Mü., Vo., Br., MK and Igal take the ὑπάρξε -clause of 7,14-17 as parallel to the ὑπάρξε -clause of 7,13 (ὁ ὑπάρξε ὑπάρξε ὑπάρξε) - i.e., they suppose them both to depend on ὑπάρξε. All except Igal have this interpretation forced on them by their readings ὑπάρξε and ὑπάρξε in 7,13. Igal
(op. cit. p. 154) puts ἀντίς ... ἐνώρμα in parenthesis and thinks that the two ὅτι- clauses are parallel on the grounds that the vague awareness of the ability to produce substance implies a similarly vague awareness of the fact that substance itself is, as it were, one of the One's contents and products (7,14-15), and that Intellect is perfected by the One (7,15-17).

This interpretation is attractive. As we have already seen, the whole of the ὅτι -clause must help to explain P.'s statement in 7,10-11 that νοησις would never have become Intellect if it had not split off from the One the items of the One's potentiality. The first ὅτι -clause explains the generation of Intellect in terms of Intellect's own power ( ὅτι δύναμις αἰσθανότα ), the second in terms of the One's power, since substance is ὁδὸν μέγας ἐν τῷ τῶν ἐκφόρου καὶ ἔκφόρου, and Intellect is perfected into substance and strengthened by the One. (With Ha. and KK I think that the subject of ἐνωρμα... ἐκφόρου (7,15-17) is Intellect.) Intellect must be aware of both moments in its creation.

These moments are the same as those already referred to in 5,16-18, where P. said that Intellect's shaping took place from the One and from itself. The first point - that Intellect is shaped by itself - is made in the first ὅτι -clause (7,12-14 συναίσθησιν ... ὅτι δύναμις αἰσθανότα (αὐτοῦ ... ἐνώρμα) ) and the second in 7,14-17 ( ὅτι δίχων μέγας ... ἔκφόρου ). In our present passage, however, the points are made with the
emphasis on Intellect's own awareness of the creative process.

There is an obvious tension in the passage. Intellect creates substance by its own pluralising activity, and yet because Intellect is itself one of the One's products, it is perfected by the One through its reversion ( ἐπιστροφή ) towards it. Thus, both Intellect and the One create substance.

Substance is said to be a part of the One's contents because the One is the 'potentiality of all things' (see on 7,9-10). On the role of the One in the perfection of the inchoate Intellect see on 5,6-19.

The phrase εἰκίνου (7,17) is not otiose; in 7,14-15 it was substance which was said to be εἰκίνου whereas here the same is said of Intellect. Translators miss this. Of course, strictly speaking, substance and Intellect are here identical.

The punctuation of the whole passage which is variously dealt with by different editors (7,10-17) should I think be as follows:- ὅν σὺν ἐστιν δύναμις, ταῦτα ἐκεῖ ἡ δύναμις ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει καθότι ( κ αὐτὸν τὴν οὐδὲν ὑποκειόμενον τῷ οὐδὲν οὐκ ἔχει πρὸς οὐδὲν ἐκαθότι. Τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἐπικοινωνίας τῆς οὐδὲν ἐκκίνησεν τὸ δύναμεν ὁ οὐς τὸν οὐδὲν ἐκκίνησεν. ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει καθότι οὐκ ἐκκινήθη (reflexive) καὶ (= actually) ὅπως τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ (refl.) τῇ παρ' εἰκίνου δύναμις) καὶ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει παρά ὑπὸ τὸν εἰκίνον καὶ ἐκεῖ εἰκίνου ὡς οὖσα, καὶ (ἐκ τοῦ) ἐξώνυμα παρ' εἰκίνου καὶ τεθειθέντα εἰς οὖσαν παρ' εἰκίνου καὶ εἰκίνου.
As Igal remarks (op. cit. p. 151) ὡκε is used here as a continuative connective and not as an adversative particle (see Denniston, pp. 162 ff.) and although ὡκε has not the quasi-literal sense of ὁμωσόμετοι in 7,11 as he supposes, I would also agree with him that the fully formed Intellect rather than the inchoate νόησις has now become the subject of the sentence. The meaning of the sentence is that Intellect (when fully defined) sees (rather than has a presentiment) that life, thought and indeed everything (for Intellect is everything - see 4,21) comes from the One, because the One is nothing of the things of which it is the source. This paradox is explained in the following lines.

The phrase ὅπον μεγεστὸς ὡκε ἀμετρίστων (7,17-18) harks back to the geometric imagery of 7,8 ff. (Igal, op. cit. p. 155), where Intellect was associated with the divisible circle and the One with its indivisible centre. Ἐξ ἀμετρίστων picks up ἑκκαθόρω (7,17). Ha. seems to think that Intellect itself is both divided and undivided ('mit sich selbst nun als einem das gleichsam abgeteilt ist aus sich, dem dabei Ungeteilten sieht Es das Leben, das Denken und alle Dingc...') and Ci.'s 'ma lo Spirito vede bene che da quella fonte in lei - che è, vorrei dire, un divisibile derivato da un indivisibile - si riversa e il vivere e il pensare e ogni altra cosa...' gives the impossible sense that Intellect's source in the One is something divisible derived from something indivisible.

Usually Intellect is described as ἀμετρός (III 9,1,32;
IV 1,5-6; IV 2,1,29; cf. Pl. Ti. 35a 1); here it is μετάτητος because of the foregoing image.

With ικτίνος in 7,18-20 (printed by Ki., Mf., Vo. and Br.) compare 6,40-41, 6,48-49 and see note on 6,40. Masculine and neuter can both be used of the One.

7,19-20

ταύτη γὰρ ... ἐν ικτίνος : The cause is not immanent in its effects (V 3,11,16-17; see the following note); therefore, it is different from its effects (see on 2,6). But according to the Neoplatonic theory of causation, it is also superior to its effects in respect of that which it causes (see on 3,9-10). Thus, if Intellect is τὰ πάντα (4,21; VI 9,2,43 ff.), the One must be different from and superior to τὰ πάντα . The One, therefore, not a member of the class of τὰ πάντα , but is ἰηκίσσων πῶν πάντων (V 4,2,39-40) and as cause of them is δύναμις πῶν πάντων (see on 7,9-10).

But paradoxically, the only way in which the One can be the cause of the attributes of Intellect is not by having those attributes to a greater degree (for if they were predicated of the One, the One would 'be' something, i.e., it would be a member of the class of τὰ πάντα , and would not be different from them), but conversely by having none of them. Consequently, since Intellect contains or is every ὑπόσ (V 5,6,3-4), the One itself must be without any ὑπόσ or μορφή so that it may be ἄειε ὑπὸ πάντων (VI 9,3,15). The One is ἀνυπόσ (V 5,6,4-5; VI 7,32,9, 33,21; VI 9,3,43). Anything which has shape implies a shaper (VI 7,33,14-16). Shape is merely a reflection of what has no shape (VI 7,33,30).
With μόνον γὰρ ἐν ικάνον compare IV 2,2 in fine.

Note that in another sense, though, as διάναμος πάντων the One can be called πάντα (V 2,1,1 ff.; VI 7,32,12-14).

7,20-23 καὶ ὃ μὲν . . . [ὅσιν ἀν ἤν]: These lines further explain the One's not being ἡ πάντα . If it were ἡ πάντα , or one of them, it would be numbered among them and thus would be no more than a part of them (τὰ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐσταὶ μὲν ὁμοία τὰ ἕσταν VI 7,32,5-6). Thus it could only differ from the rest of ἡ πάντα by an individual characteristic, at the same time having some common characteristic with them in virtue of being one among many parts (V 5,13,20 ff.). Thus, the One would be composite and no longer a unity - which is impossible. Furthermore, it would not then fulfill the requirement of being both superior to and different from its effects.

All editors except Perna, Creuzer and H-S have thought the text of 7,20-21 (καὶ ... ἦν) unsatisfactory. Mü., following Vitringa, deletes the whole sentence and Ki., Vo. and Br. suppose lacunae, Ki. after πάντα (7,21) and Vo. and Br. after ἦν (7,21). To judge from his translation Br. follows Fic. in thinking that the subject of the sentence is Intellect in contrast to the μόνον γὰρ ἐν ικάνον of 7,20. (Fic. translates:- 'illud enim unum est duntaxat, intellectus autem in ordine rerum est omnia'.) The translation of the sentence ought to be: 'that which is everything would have been classed among (a member of) Reality (i.e. the Forms); see H-S's note in their apparatus on 7,20-21. The problem is whether ο ... πάντα can stand as an ellipse of
Although P. can twist language so far that he calls Intellect a διά πάντα (e.g., VII 7,14,11-12) I doubt whether διά πάντα would be possible in Greek. The solution to the problem is Ha.'s excellent η' , which supposes an easy ellipse of η' . Cf. and H-S follow Ha.'s suggestion.

The last words of the next sentence (ἐν τοῖς οὐδενὶ ἀν ἦν) are deleted by all editors except Perna, Creuzer and Mii. (who deletes only the words ἀν ἦν) on the grounds that they are a repetition of 7,21 (which Mii. deleted). The repetition is senseless, but I do not agree with Ha. that πάντα (7,22) should be included in the deletion. The phrase ἄνωτέρα δ' requires a subject.

One final linguistic point. Note that the particle ἦν in 7,21 is nowhere answered by a correlative.

The sequence of thought, then, in 7,20-23 is as follows:

'if the One had been everything, it would have been classed among τὰ ἄνωτα. (But this is not the case.) Therefore, the One cannot be Intellect (which is everything) but is its source.'

Διὰ τοῦτο should be taken only with 7, 20-21 and not with the whole section of 7,17-21 as H-S's punctuation suggest.

7,23-24 οὐκ ... ἔκαστον ἡ' : Διὸ is retrospective. Since the One is not constrained by any shape (7,19-20), and since as cause of τὰ πάντα the One must be different from them (cf. 7,20-23), the products of the One must be defined and limited and therefore substances. On the connection between definition and substance
see V 5,6,5-6 (τόδε γὰρ ηὐ δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐναντ. τοῦτο δὲ ἐνεργεῖταιον ) and note on 5,8-9. Οὐσία in its widest sense can include sensible reality, but in our present passage P. probably has in mind only the Intelligible Forms. The association of number with each Form is the guarantee of its particularity, and the number is the individual shape which separates each Form from every other.

7,24-26 τὸ δὲ ὅν ... λαμβάνει: Cl. prefers ἤ to the mss. ἤ, but nothing would be gained by the change. ἡɛ as a continuative connective is quite adequate.

Heintz's colourful ἀκολουθοῖν (ap. Ha.) for the mss. ἀκολουθοῖν in 7,24 is very attractive. I am not sure, however, that ἐν ἀκολούθω ... ἀκολουθοῖν is as awkward as Ha. suggests. But the addition of ὅν does suggest that some metaphorical word should follow. ἀκολουθοῖν is used of the movement of infinity in VI 6,3,24, and is found elsewhere in P. (e.g., II 1,4,6; IV 3,24,13). Αἴσθησις is probably right. It contrasts well with παθητικὰ in the following line.

The στάσις of 7,25 is not precisely the category of στάσις which ensures that the objects of Intellect's thought are always the same (see on 4,33 ff.), but stresses rather the unchanging individuality of each of the Forms. Beutler-Theiler on VI 6,3,19 note that according to Eudemus Phys. fr. 60 (Wehrli) Plato associated the concepts of movement and indeterminacy. Conversely, rest would be associated with definition and shape. So the thought probably has its roots in Plato (cf. Pl. Sph. 249b 12-1). What
is undefined has no hypostasis, since it has not the individuality required of a hypostasis. On the connection of the word and its cognates with the concept of self-sufficient existence see on 3,9-10.

7,27-49 ταύτης ... τα Θεία: These lines serve as the conclusion of Chapters 2-7. P. moves from discussion of Intellect's genesis to the nature of Intellect (7,27-35) and then on to its creation of soul, the bridge between the Intelligible and sensible worlds (7, 35-49). The form of this section is synthetic as P. moves downwards from the One, to Intellect and finally to soul.

7,27-30 ταύτης τοι ... νοητούς: The phrase ταύτης τοι γινεται (7,27) is Homeric (Iliad. 6.211; ibid. 20.241). But it is also found in Plato (Phaed. 547a 4-5) where it is interesting to note that all the Platonic mss. have, like the Plotinian mss., γινεται instead of the Homeric γινεται. It thus seems likely that P. took his quotation directly from Plato and only indirectly from Homer. (This confirms Schwyzer's remark in Entr. p. 314 'aber selbst Homer, den er doch wohl präsent gehabt hatte, bezieht er manchmal aus Platon'.)

The mss. text of 7,27-28 runs as follows - ταύτης τοι γινεται δ νοες οὖν τῶν ἀλλων νοεῖ τοῦ καθάρωτάτου μη άλλοθιν η ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἑξής πρώτῃ φιλον. This text has no construction and is retained only by Perna and Creuzer. Fic.'s translation which is printed in Creuzer's edition does not correspond to the Greek text. Ki. followed by Mü., Vo. and Br. omit νοεῖ before τοῦ (7,27) and read μηיס in place
of μή (7,28). These changes make τοῦ καθαρματίου refer to the One, and as Dr.'s translation shows, this interpretation makes P. repeat the same idea twice ('...est digne d'être engendrée par le plus pur des principes et de ne pas naître d'ailleurs que du premier principe.') Ha. and Dodds both read ἀληθῶν (for ἀλήθειας in 7,27) Ha. inserting ὅτι after it, with a stop after ὀτρός, and Dodds inserting ἦς before it. Both emendations give reasonable sense, but by far the best is that of Igal (Emerita 39 (1971), pp. 155-6) who makes the single change of ἀλήθειας to ἀληθῶν, places a comma after καθαρματίου (7,26-27) and takes the infinitives φύναι (7,28) and γεννηθον (7,29) as epexegetic. The infinitival clauses each refer to a different stage in the genesis of Intellect with which P. has been dealing in Chapters 6 and 7 - μή ἀληθῶν ἦ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου ἀληθῆ φύναι to the emanation of the undefined Intellect from the One (see 6,27 ff.) and γεννήσαντον ὅτι ἦν τὰ ὅντα πάντα σὺν αὐτῷ γεννηθον, πᾶν μὲν τὸ πῶς ἴσως κάλλος, πάντας δὲ θεοῦς νοητοὺς to Intellect's own part in its own creation (see 7,10 ff.). Thus, the whole section of 7,27-30 is retrospective in that it recapitulates the themes of these two chapters. Note that both in Homer and Plato τοῦ τοῦ γεννᾶς is similarly retrospective; in both authors it occurs at the end of a description. Ha.'s ὅτι after ἀληθῶν falsely suggests that what follows in the two clauses are new points (see Igal, op. cit. p. 156). Igal's emendation is accepted by H-S.
7,27-28 νοέ τον καθαρωτάτου: Something as pure as Intellect could only derive from the One. For the purity of Intellect see, e.g., IV 7,9,25; V 3,6,39; VI 2,8,5-6; VI 9,3,34-35. In the last passage cited P. adds that the One is even purer. With the use of a superlative adjective applied to Intellect compare the use of τελευτατος in 4,13-14.

7,28-30 γνώρισμον δι... νοητος: Intellect is perfected into being by its reversion towards the One (7,16). The transition from inchoate to fully formed Intellect is thus instantaneous with the formation of Intellect's contents, since νοεσ and 7α οντα are identical. Compare VI 7,17,33-34 6 δι γνωριμιον νοεσ αυτα ανιφανη τα οντα; cf. also V 2,1,11-13, and see on 4,27-28.

On the beauty of the Intelligible World see on 4,2. In I 6,9,34 ff. this beauty is, as here, specifically associated with the Forms.

On the Intelligible Gods see 4,11 and note. A more explicit list of the contents of Intellect can be found in 4,10-12.

7,30-34 πλην 6 εν οντα... εν κος: Πληνων and its cognates are used by P. as alternatives for δεινω (see on 5,6-19). When Intellect is full, therefore, it is fully defined. Note that it is full of what it has itself produced (γνωρισμα 7,31). Intellect brings forth its own contents by its turning towards the One (see 7,11-17 and note).

P. goes on to illustrate the fulness of Intellect by identifying it with the god Cronus, whose name he takes to be derived from
κόλος (= satiety) and νόης. This Platonic etymology has already been mentioned in 4,9-10 (see ad loc.). The context of this earlier passage is the same as that of our present passage. The fulness of Intellect, in each case illustrated by an account of Intellect’s contents, is compared to the ‘satiety’ of Cronus. Here, however, the κόλος-image is further developed by the addition of the Hesiodic myth (Hes. Th. 453 ff.) of Cronus’ devouring of his children. This follows on well from the epic tag ταίνης τοῖς γυναικῖς in 7,27.

The main difficulty is with the grammatical construction of these lines, though this is glossed over by translators. An accusative and infinitive construction follows on naturally after the epexegetic infinitives φάναι (7,28) and γυνηγαίνει (7,29). The accusative is quite clear (πλήν ὄντα (7,30) and καταπλήντα (7,31)) but where is the infinitive of which the accusative is the subject? None of the infinitives in the clause τοῖς αἵναις ἑκμῖν μησὶ ἐκπομπῶν εἰς ὅλην μησὶ ἐκτραφήναι παλαι τῷ Ρέα will fill the bill, because all these infinitives must be taken together and must be construed with the article τῷ (7,31), since they serve to explain the meaning of καταπλήντα. At this point (7,33) the sentence is interrupted by a parenthesis (ὡς τὰ μυστήρια καὶ οἱ μῦθοι κλ.) and the infinitive ἑκμῖν (in 7,35) depends on ἀνέχονται in 7,33. The grammatical flow of the sentence is never resumed after the parenthesis, and the accusatives πλήν ὄντα and καταπλήντα are left hanging. The reason
for this incoherence is that even in 7,30-32 P.'s mind was already focussed on the Hesiodic myth; note the use of the Hesiodic καταπίνων (see Πτ. 459 ff. τραφήναν; cf. τραφήναν ibid. 480) and the mention of Cronus' wife Rhea. We have a very good instance of P.'s writing exactly mirroring the jumps in his thought.

Within the anacolouthon itself, there is a further difficulty over the subjects of the infinitives έχων, οὐκπισιν and τραφήναν in 7,32. The subject of έχων is clearly Intellect, but the subject of the other two infinitives must be the contents of Intellect - i.e., τὰ δύναμις the offspring - and not Intellect itself. ἔκπισιν cannot be translated as 'herausstürze' (Ha.). Other translators introduce a word of permission or prevention with the last two infinitives (viz., 'sinat' Fic.; "les empêche" Br.; 'non farli precipitare'; 'lest they fall away' MK). It seems to me quite likely that a verb of this sort has dropped out. I propose the insertion of ἔλευς after ἔκπισιν in 7,32. The sentence would then read ἔκπισιν καταπίνοντα πάλιν τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐχων μητέ ἐκπισιν ἔλευς ἕνας ἐν τῇ μητέ τραφήναν παρεὶ τῇ Ἀ. The omission of ἔλευς is easily explained palaeographically by haplography due to the similarity of the termination -άων of ἔκπισιν to ἔλευς. Its addition makes Intellect the subject of the three verbal phrases which illustrate the meaning of καταπίνοντα.

In παρεὶ τῇ Ἀ. (7,32) note the double meaning of the word 'Rhea'. 'Rhea' is the name of the wife of Cronus, but
the word also has Heraclitean connotations of flux and instability. A Heraclitean interpretation of the proper name is found also in Pl. Cra. 402a 4 ff. (Proclus, however, in Cra. 80.16 ff. (Pasquali)) thinks that to interpret Plato in this way is unworthy of Plato's thought). The contrast in our present passage is between the stability of Intellect and the impermanence of the physical world.

*Αἰνίττισθα* in 7.33 is one of the technical terms of allegorical writing (see J. Pépin, *Mythe et Allegorie* (Paris 1958), p. 497). P. commonly uses the word of the riddling language of myth and mystery religions (I 6,6,3. 8,19; III 4,5,4; III 6,19,26; IV 3,14,5; IV 8,1,21; V 8,4,26; VI 9,9,31. 11,27). P. followed Plato (see R. 377a 4 ff.) in believing that myths in some degree mirrored reality. In fact, his quotations of Plato are mainly drawn from those dialogues which offer a mythical interpretation of philosophy (i.e. *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium* and *Timaeus*). The exception to the rule is *Parmenides* which P. regularly cites. P.'s use of myth, however, can be very selective. Note how in our present passage he omits to mention the denouement of the Hesiodic story (Hes. Th. 495 ff.) - how Zeus in fact recovers all the offspring of Cronus, by forcing him to regurgitate them. Unlike Cronus, the Plotinian Intellect never can lose its state of fulness and satiety.

In (7.34) Pic., MK and Ha. take *Θω̃ν ... γίνιττισθα* closely together, and think that P. is saying that before the birth of Zeus Cronus was the wisest god - the implication being
that when he was outwitted by Zeus, Cronus lost his wisdom.

It is better to follow Br. and Ci. in associating Cronus' wisdom with the fact that he kept his offspring within himself, i.e., to take the phrase πεστον θινικεθα with what follows rather than with σοφισταινου. P. would never say that Zeus (i.e. soul) became wiser than Cronus (i.e., Intellect). He never mentions Zeus' trick by which Cronus was deceived.

All the Enneadic mss. read Δια (7,34), but only Perna, H-S, Ha. and Ci. keep this reading in their editions. Δια is certainly right, the accusative being the subject of the infinitive γινικεθα, which is construed with the article τον. With this reading there is no need for the lacunae and additions after γινικεθα which the majority of editors have to suppose, or for the addition of θε in 7,34 which was proposed by Seidel (De Uso Praep., p. 35). A return to the mss. reading was suggested by Bury (CC 39 (1945), p. 86).

In 7,35 τι καπ Πληθυς... ιν κοριτσι should be taken closely with the preceding phrase ι θινικεθα παιδιν ιν Δαυρη γινικεθα. Ci. is wrong to translate it as though it summed up all the reasons from 7,30 onwards why Intellect is full and sated ('per tutto questo, allora,...etc.).

P. mentions the myth of Cronus' eating of his children in V 8,12,3 ff., although in that passage Cronus is not mentioned by name and the etymology of κεόνος / κολεός is avoided. The birth of Zeus (the soul) is used as an example of the splendour
of the father ( αφ' οὖ καὶ οὐστάτου παῖς ὄντως ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ικινόν τινὸς ἀληθῶς, ὡς δὲ παρεγέρχθη ἢκινόνας ς 8,12,9-11).

7,35-37 μὴ γὰρ ταῦτα... τέλευο: Igal (Ezemita 39 (1971), p. 130 n. 2) contends that 7,35 continues the main argument of Chapter 7 which the objection of 7,4 interrupted ('Las palabras περὶ τοῦ μὲν de la línea 2 auguran un segundo miembro. Pero la objeción de 4-5 ( ἀλλ' οὖν νοεῖ ἢκινόν. ποὺς οὖν νοεῖς γιννὰ; ) interrumpe bruscamente el hilo del argumento, cuyo curso no se reanuda hasta la línea 35 ss. ( μετὰ γὰρ ταῦτα κατ. )'). This is nonsense. The μὲν of 7,35 picks up the μὲν of 7,34 and introduces the second stage of the myth ( ἐπεί 7,36), the birth of Zeus.

The interpretations of the phrase κορον ἥτη ὄντα in 7,36 vary. Pic., Ci. and Ha. take the accusative phrase to agree with Διὰ (7,36) and think that κόρος here has its alternative meaning 'son' (see LSJ s.v. B) as well as the more usual meaning 'satiety'. This interpretation is quite wrong. First, it would be most odd if P. were suddenly to change the meaning of κόρος when he has taken so much trouble to associate it with fulness. Secondly, 7,36-37 ( ὑπὲρ γάρ γε γεννᾶ νοεῖς, νοεῖς ἢν τέλευο ) makes the κόρος = son interpretation quite impossible. The γάρ shows that these lines explain what precedes. Thirdly, the ἥτη in the phrase κορον ἥτη ὄντα only makes sense when applied to Cronus. Cronus is full only when he has swallowed his children. (What does Pic.'s 'puerum
In view of all this, ζύγων ζημὴ δεντα must agree with the subject of the infinitive γίνεται, which is understood from 7,33. Br.'s translation 'mais ensuite une fois rassasié, on dit qu'il engendre Zeus' is excellent.

7,37-38 καὶ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ... τινα : See 6,37-38 and note. Only matter is completely without power of creation (cf. III 6,19,29-30; VI 3,8,34-35).

7,38-42 καὶ λέγοντον δὲ ... οὕσωσιν ὡμον : Just as the product of the One is less than the One, so soul is less than Intellect.

(Οὐ δὲ γίνεται (7,39) means simply 'in the case of the creative activity of Intellect'.) This theory has already been mentioned in 6,39 (note ad loc. and on 2,7). Because the product is less than its prior, it is only an image of it (see on 7,1). The theory that the product is at first undefined and is defined by its producer (7,40-42) has been dealt with in Chapter 5 with reference to the definition of Forms/numbers by the One (5,8, ff.; see on 5,6-19) and in 3,13 ff. with reference to the definition of the soul by Intellect (see on 3,13-14). Br. translates ἴδον (7,40) by 'pour la même raison'. The other translators are more correct by their simple 'similarly'. Εἰδοτατέν (7,41-42) is first found in Chrysippus (SVP II.148.2) to describe the effect of qualities on matter. P. extends its use to cover the process of definition at all levels (III 4,1,8-10 ιδίων πρὸς τὸν κινεῖται, ἀριθμοῖς εἰκόνως κινεῖται, ὑποποικίαν δὲ τῷ ἀνεισφέρωμα πρὸς τὸ γεννηθὲν ὁδον...
P. apologises for the use of the word in our present passage because what is used properly of matter and form is used only figuratively of the One and Intellect, and Intellect and soul. Compare 3,22-23 where P. describes the relationship between soul and Intellect 'μόνο τὸ διανοημένον, τὸ δὲ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος' (see note ad loc.). Because Intellect receives the λόγος of the One it becomes ἀγαθοευθείας and ἐνοικίας (see note on 7,2-4); and soul which receives Intellect's λόγος is νουκλησίας (3,23).

7,42-43 νοῦν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ διανοομένου: Fic. (‘vero’), MK (‘yet’) and Ha. (‘aber’) are wrong to translate δὲ as an adversative. There is no contrast between these lines and the previous sentence.

Δὲ is used here as a continuative connective.

I agree with Ha., MK and H-S that τὸ διανοομένον should be taken in apposition to λόγος and ἀποστάσις.

P. makes it quite clear (see V 3,4,20 ff., 8,46 ff., 9,7 ff.) that strictly speaking only the higher part of soul is the image of Intellect (see on 3,7). The λόγος, the ἀποστάσις and the διανοομένον are one and the same. With soul as the logos of Intellect and as a 'hypostasis' compare 3,8-9 λόγοι νοῦ καὶ η ἐπάνω ἐνέγερσαι καὶ ὑποστάσις ἐστὶν ἄλλον ἔμπνευσιν and see note on 3,8. On the meaning of ἀποστάσις see on 3,9-10.

Τὸ διανοομένον, the ratiocinative part of soul, is alternately called νοῦς φυκής, τὸ διανοητικόν, τὸ λογιστικόν and simply διάνοια. On its function as the intermediary
between sense-impressions and the τύποι that come from
Intellect and its relationship with the transcendent soul see
on 3,13 and 11,1-3. ME's reference to Pl. Ti. 39e is not very
helpful.

7,43-44 τοῦτο δ' εἰστὶν... ἐκλίνου: Compare V 3,9,15-17 ἐὰν δὲν ψυχή
ἐν νου φῶς τε περὶ αὐτὸν γνωρίζῃ εἶναι ἀκοὴ τε αὐτῷ
cαὶ ω公报 ἐν ὅλῃ ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκλίνου .
The light which comes from Intellect is analogous to the
πρεσβείας which emanates from the One (see on 6,28-30),
though in our present passage Intellect and not the One is seen
as the sun. For further examples of the sun image used of
Intellect see III 5,2,30-32. 6,23-24; IV 3,11,14 ff.; V 3,9,7 ff.).
The effect of Intellect's light on the soul is described in
V 3,8,22-24; it makes soul intellectual (νοεῖνς ) i.e., like
the upper light (Intellect).

Ἴγνος (7,44) picks up ἀνθρόποι of 7,40. On these
and other words for 'image' see on 7,1.

On Ἐρατῶν see on 1,14; 3,5; and 6,30-34. The close
connection between the sun and its light is mentioned in IV 4,29,
10; V 3,9,16. 12,42-44. Intellect and soul, however, are even
more closely related (III 5,2,30-32).

7,44-48 καὶ θάρσεα μίν... λύσεως . On the twofold nature of
soul see introduction to Chapter 2. P. treats soul in our
present passage as a unity, but he sometimes makes internal
divisions within it, i.e., for example, in V 2,1, 19-21 the ratiocinative
soul is said to be responsible for the creation of the lower soul just as the lower soul is responsible for the creation and shaping of matter (cf. II 3,18,12-13 καὶ τὸ ἵσχαρον αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς) ἐπεὶ τὸ κάτω τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦτο εἶναι. ἤπειροις οὖν ἔσχαρος σύντος). These distinctions, however, are only conceptual. Properly speaking all souls are one (see IV 9 passim).

The proximity of soul to Intellect results in the noetic activities of the higher soul; (see note on γινώσκει in 3,5). Just as Intellect is defined or filled by the One (see 7,30 and note on 5,6-19) so soul is filled or defined by Intellect and becomes νοστή στοιχεία. The ratiocinative soul is described in II 3,18,14 as τὸ πρῶτος πληρούμενον παρὰ νοῶ (cf. V 2,1, 19-20 ἵκελ μὲν οὖν βλέποντα, οὖν ἐγίνετο, πληροῦσαται). Απολαλόω and μεταλαμβάνω provide an alternative vocabulary with which to look at this process of fulfilment and resemblance. What is secondary to the One shares in the One (V 5,13,27 ff.) and body shares in the soul (III 9,3,2; IV 7,85,49-50); cf. further IV 4,11,1 ff., 13,5 ff. With the use of ἀπολαλόω cf. II 1,7,12; VI 1,12,38; VI 4,2,42. This sharing does not prevent each of the three hypostases from having a separate and autonomous existence. The concept of μεταλήψις is Platonic in origin (see Pl. Prm. 130e 6 ff.). The intellectual activity of soul, although described by the word νοεῖν (7,46) is different from the self-concentrated thought of Intellect. Whereas soul’s thought must always be ratiocinative (ἐν λογισμοῖς V 3,3,14),
Intellect already possesses its noetic objects, and so does not need ἀνοιγμὸς (see on 4,16).

On ἐφαρμοσθαι (7,46) see Wolters' note on III 5,2,17. He notes that P. often uses the word to denote the attachment of the lower soul to what is bodily or material and cites besides our present passage I 1,3,20; I 4,14,7; I 6,6,31; III 5,2,17; IV 8,4,20; VI 2,22,31. But in virtue of its innate power, soul not only 'grasps' material reality, it actually creates it. On the creative activity of the lower soul (ϕύσις) see IV 4,14,1 ff.,18,4 ff.. The principle that the product is less than the producer (7,47-48) has already been mentioned in 7,38-42.

πρὶς ἐν ὑποτείγον λιμῖκον: The creative activity of soul is not discussed subsequently in V I. Br., claiming to follow F. Heinemann (Plotin (Leipzig, 1921), p. 143) says that P. is referring to III 1 and III 4. But he seems to have misunderstood Heinemann's point. Heinemann maintained that III 4, III 1 and II 4 comprised the third section of P.'s first period of composition. One of his arguments for this view is that our present passage refers to 'das von der Seele Erzeugte' by which he presumably meant matter and material creation. Heinemann obviously thought that ὑποτέγευον referred to II 4 (πρὶς ὑποτέγευον). Along with Heinemann and H-S I think that II 4 is probably the correct reference. There must always, however, be some doubt about this as P. probably did not have an exact programme of his prospective writings.
καὶ μέχρι τοῦτον τὰ θεῖα: Ηα. maintains that one would expect some discussion of the physical world to follow these words, and since there is none, he deletes them as a marginal gloss. But the sentence is retrospective. It closes Π.'s discussion of the three hypostases which has occupied him since Chap. 2. Chapter 8 begins a new section of the treatise.

On soul as a member of the Intelligible World (τὰ θεῖα; cf. II 9,3,19-20) see note on ψυχήν πάσαν in 4,11. With the phrase itself compare V 5,9,16-17 καὶ μέχρι τούτου ὁ θεός.
Chapters 8 and 9 are doxographical and give the evidence for P.'s belief that his philosophy was rooted in antiquity.

His reasons for including a doxography are partly that, imbued like all of his age with the tradition of scholastic orthodoxy, he wished to rebut any suggestion of καυσότης (see Dodds, JRS 50 (1960), pp. 1-2) and partly that the ancients, whom Plato had described as 'living nearer the gods' (Pl. Phlb. 16c 7-8), had a prima facie claim to be respected (cf. III 7,1,13-14; II 9,6,37 ff., 6,52 ff.). P. wanted to show that his own philosophical beliefs were not inconsistent with their stated doctrines (VI 4,16,4-7), in so far as these were true. Greatest among the ancients was, of course, Plato, for P. thought of himself as a Platonist and of his own philosophy as an exposition of Platonism (see 8,10-13 and note). The value of other philosophies depended on the extent to which they had prefigured or coincided with Platonic doctrine.

P. begins these Chapters with a quotation from Plato. P.'s use of Plato is very selective. The early dialogues, for example, are hardly used at all, and sometimes the same passage is quoted as nearly the only representative of a dialogue; Pl. Thet. 176a-b, for example, provides approximately 76% of the quotations from the Theaetetus. Nevertheless, it seems to me intrinsically unlikely that P. had not read the whole of Plato. Schwyzer suggests (RE 551.52 ff.), possibly rightly, that P. ignored the earlier dialogues because they were too concerned with the value of the city state and ended in ἀριστεία rather than in doctrine. Certainly, their ethical concerns were not central to P.'s metaphysics. Unless actually commenting
on a Platonic passage P. tends to use Platonic quotations as corroboration of his arguments rather than as integral, logical steps in them; or he introduces them for the sake of reminiscence. He rarely treats them in context. They are for him self-supporting axioms to be used on any occasion to support his own views (cf. Schwyzer, op. cit. 552,9-11).

The same process of cavalier selection is apparent in P.'s citation of the Presocratics and Rist may be right (Plotinus: the Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 177-178) in thinking that P. was familiar with a handbook rather than with the original texts. Certainly, P.'s information about most of them could be found in Aristotle and the doxographical tradition (see individual notes).

P. finishes the doxographical chapters with criticism of Aristotle (9,7-27), whose works, particularly the Metaphysics (V.P. 14,5-7), P. knew thoroughly, and presumably at first hand.

8,1-4 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ... τείτον : See Pl. Edf. II 312e 1-4
πει τὸν πάπτων βασιλεία πάντ’ ἓστι καὶ ἐμισσάν εἴνηκα πάντα καὶ ἐκείνο τείτον ἀπόκτων τῶν καλῶν : δεῦτρον δ’ ἔπεσεν τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τείτον πέμπτα τείτον.
The three Platonic principles βασιλεία , δεύτερον and τείτον which P. takes to be evidence of his own One, Intellect and Soul, must be what P. refers to by the word τείτα (8,1). The Platonic quotation starts, then, with the next words ( ἀ πάντα ).

Pace H-S, it is not very important that no manuscript punctuates after τείτα . Like all editors prior to H-S, I prefer a semi-colon after τείτα ; the Platonic quotation is in opposition to the introductory remark. (Fic. gets this quite wrong.)
It is noticeable that the text of P.'s citation of Plato differs from the established Platonic text. There is nothing surprising about this, for P. is often inaccurate when he quotes from memory (cf. Schwyzer, RE 550.44 ff.), though he quotes Pl. Ep. II more accurately at I 8,2,28-32. In our present passage it is clear that φησὶ γε πειθα in 8,2 is a gloss by P. on what Plato means by τὰ πάντα i.e., that τὰ πάντα refer to what he would call τὰ πειθα, the constituents of the Intelligible World (for this meaning of πειθα see on 1,24) which are centred round the One. Thus φησὶ γε πειθα should be exempted with or without the καὶ following πειθα from the quotation proper (thus Ha. and H-S though I cannot agree with H-S's suggestion that τὰ πειθα = τὸν πάντων βασιλέα ). Earlier editors other than Perna and Creuzer assume that φησὶ introduces a direct statement (πάντα 8,1 - πειθα 8,2) or an indirect statement with γεναυ understood. Such an interpretation brings with it the omission of τὰ in 8,1 and the substitution of τὰ for γε in 8,2. Both these readings can be found in the indirect (Eusebian) tradition. But as Henry remarks (Etats, p. 137) τὰ πάντα is an 'expression chère à Plotin', and it would be rash to depart from the consensus of Enneadic manuscripts in a circumstance in which P. is obviously quoting from memory. H-S, though, call πάντα 'aeque bonum'. (On φάναυ meaning 'to signify', 'to mean', cf. φησὶ in 8,7 and see Arndt-Gingrich s.v. 2 and H. Fournier, Les Verbes "Dire" en Grec Ancien (Diss. Paris, 1946), p. 78. Fic. mistranslates the whole phrase.)
The last part of the quotation is troublesome. Editors of Plato rightly print \( \pi\epsilon\iota \) with a paroxytone accent, indicating that it governs the preceding rather than the subsequent noun. While this accentuation is open to Plotinian editors in I 8,2,28-32, it is clearly not possible here (pace Dodds, who prefers it) since in 8,3-4 symmetry requires that each of the last two occurrences of \( \pi\epsilon\iota \) be taken with an analogous noun, and the order of the last phrase is such (\( \pi\epsilon\iota \) \( \tau\alpha \pi\epsilon\iota\alpha \) \( \tau\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu \)) that \( \pi\epsilon\iota \) can only govern \( \tau\alpha \pi\epsilon\iota\alpha \). It is at first sight odd that the singular (\( \delta\nu\iota\nu\iota\nu\iota\iota \) = Intellect, \( \tau\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu \) = Soul) should be said to be 'around' the plural (\( \delta\nu\iota\nu\iota\nu\iota \), \( \pi\epsilon\iota\alpha \)) rather than vice versa, as \( \pi\epsilon\iota \) calls to mind the common Plotinian image of the circle and its centre (on this see 7,7-8) and one expects the centre of the circle to be singular. But in view of the intensive meaning \( \pi\epsilon\iota \) sometimes has in the Enneads (where its meaning approaches that of 'conceptually related to' (see on 4,19), it is not too disturbing to find P. saying that Intellect (Plato's \( \delta\nu\iota\nu\iota\nu\iota \)) is 'about' \( \tau\alpha \delta\nu\iota\nu\iota\nu\iota \) (= the Intelligible World) and that Soul (\( \tau\alpha \tau\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu \)) is 'about' \( \tau\alpha \pi\epsilon\iota\alpha \) (= the area of reality with which soul deals). MK translates \( \pi\epsilon\iota \) in its last two occurrences as 'containing', i.e., 'a Secondary containing the Secondaries'; this is a bit strong, as is Br.'s 'dans' for its first occurrence.

P. takes the last part of the Platonic quotation, then, (\( \kappa\alpha\iota \delta\nu\iota\nu\iota\nu\iota \ldots \tau\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu \)), as an elaboration of the first more general remark that at the centre of the Intelligible World
is the One. Inside the Intelligible World are Intellect and
Soul, each concerned with its own area of reality.

References to Pl. Ep. II 312e are common. Besides our
present passage H-S list I 8,2,28-30; III 5,8,8; III 9,7,3;
V 5,3,3-4; VI 4,11,9; VI 5,4,21. 4,24; VI 7,42,3-6. 42,9-10.
42,15-20; VI 8,9,18-23. But only in I 8,2,28-30 and in our
present passage is the quotation in extenso. P. obviously thought
the letter genuine. (On the problem of its authenticity, which
need not concern us, see R.S. Bluck, 'The Second Platonic Epistle',
Phronesis 5 (1960), pp. 140-151 and N. Gulley, 'The Authenticity
of the Platonic Epistles, Entretiens Hardt xviii (1972), pp. 105-
130, where refs. to earlier discussions may be found.) In the
letter the author says that he is speaking in riddles ( δι'
αίνωμάν τινας 312d 7-8) but presumably the 'king' refers to Plato's
highest principle (Plato often uses βασιλεύς and its cognates
as a high term of approbation; the Good rules the Intelligible
world at R. 509d; cf. also Le. 904a 6; Cre. 396a 8; Phlb. 28c 7), τά
διψάτεα refers to the Forms (τά νοητά) and τά τεύτα
τά λεύθητα (see Novotny's note ad loc.). If this inter-
pretation is right P.'s interpretation of the triad as One/Intellect/
Soul is quite close to the intention of the author of the letter.
On P.'s use of the concept of βασιλεύς see H. Dörrie, 'Der

8,4–5 λύων δ' καὶ ... νοῦν λύων : Pl. Ep. VI 323d 3-6 τοι
τοι γεγομένων καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα κύριον ἐπομνήμασ (sc. χέρ
ημις ἀναγνώρισα), δι', ἂν 'ον τοις φιλοσοφίμων,
Novotny remarks ad loc.: "aenigma simillimum illi quod 2,312e occurrit et aeque atque illud varias habens explanationes". He thinks that P.'s explanation of the 'father of the cause' as the Good/One and of the 'cause' as τὰ νοητὰ / νοûς is the correct one. But the key words 'cause' (αἰτίον) and 'father' may also have been suggested to P. by Pl. R. 508b 9 ff. where the sun is described as the cause of sight, and as the child of the Good (τόν τοῦ ἄγαθον ἐγγονον) (see J. Whittaker, VChr 23 (1969), pp. 101-102). H-S² plausibly suggest that αἰτίον... λόγον (8,4-5) contains a further reminiscence of the Anaxagorean reference in Pl. Phd. 97c 1-2 νοûς ὡς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὲ καὶ πάντων αἰτίοις. One might also compare Pl. Phlb. 30d 1 and d 10-e 1 where Zeus whom P. interprets as Intellect (cf. III 5,8,11-12) is said to have powers of causation. The identification of Intellect with the αἰτίον is closely associated with the identification of Intellect with the Platonic demiurge (see following note).

8,5-6 ἡμιομογεύος... κρατῆς ἐκκύλην: In Plato's Timaeus the demiurge is said to create soul (34b 3 ff.) by mixing its constituent ingredients in a mixing bowl (for the κρατῆς see 41d 4 and cf. 35a 3). In P.'s philosophy soul is the hypostasised activity of Intellect, so it is natural that P. should identify the demiurge, soul's creator in the Timaeus, with Intellect, the 'creator' of the third hypostasis. He ignores differences between his and Plato's conception - e.g., that the Platonic demiurge
creates body as well as soul for the sun, the moon and the
planets. For further references to Intellect as demiurge see
II 1,5,5; II 3,18,15; V 9,3,26; and cf. P.'s attack on the
ignorance of the Gnostics in II 9,6,22-24.

For a conspectus of the ancient views on the identification
of the demiurge see Proclus in Ti. I.303.24-317.20 (Diehl).

(On the ambivalence of the term 'Zeus' in IV 4,10,1 ff.
to refer to both the demiurge and the world soul see introduction
to Chapter 2.)

8,6-8 τοῦ αἰτίου... ἑρμήνευσι καὶ θείαις: Vo. and Br., with no
mss. authority, transpose αἰτίου and ὅ in 8,6-7; this is
unnecessary - for other examples of postponed ὅ see 6,16;
IV 5,7,51; VI 4,11,18.

P. continues the argument. If Intellect is the cause, the
father of the cause must be the Good. Τὸ ἑρμήνευσι νοῦ,
and ἑρμήνευσι καὶ θείαις are synonyms for the Good.
'Ἑρμήνευσι νοῦ was used by Aristotle in one of his definitions
of God (Ross, Fragmenta Selecta, p. 57. ὁ θεός ὁ νοῦς
ἐστιν ἑρμήνευσι τοῦ νοοῦ). For a history of the connection
between ἑρμήνευσι τοῦ νοοῦ and ἑρμήνευσι τοῦ νοοῦ
see J. Whittaker, 'ἘΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΝΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ', VChr 23 (1969),
pp. 101-102. Ὁ ἑρμήνευσι νοῦ can be found again at V 3,11,28.
12,47. 13,2-3. On the last phrase ἑρμήνευσι καὶ θείαις see on
6,12-13.
8,8-9 *σομαχων δ'... λίγα : These lines are parenthetical.

Exact references are difficult to find. 'Référence fort vague qui se rapporte plutôt, semble-t-il, à une interprétation de Platon qu'à des textes précis' (Brehier ad loc.). But the identification is easily derived from Platonic texts. The Forms and the real world are identified in the Republic (cf. e.g., R. 507b 5-7 and 597a 4), and according to P.'s interpretation of Ti. 39e 7-9 νος and the ιδέα are the same. Thus the equation νοσ = ιδέα/ιδη = τὸ ὄντα is reached.

For other vague references to Plato see VI 7,11,44-45 perhaps a reference to Pl. Erin. 981b-c and 984b-c and IV 8,1,23-25 λίπτον de ἡμῖν ὁ θεὸς Πλάτων ὃς συλλα τε καὶ καλὰ πνει ψιχής εἰς τε προς τε ἀρνίς αὐτής πολλαχὶ ὕψιν ἐν τοῖς αὐτώ ἀξίοις.

Dodds avoids the problem of referential exactness by unjustifiably deleting τὴν ιδέαν. (With the singular ιδέαν to refer to the totality of the Intelligible World compare V 8,8,10; VI 7,18,8 and VI 9,2,27-28.) On the identification of Intellect and the real world of forms see on 4,26-27.

8,9-10 ὡστε ... νοσ τὴν ψιχήν : Fic.'s insertion of κατὰ before ἁπλωνμα is misguided. His translation 'quapropter apud Platonem cognoscere licet ex ipso quidem bono...' shows that he has to insert 'licet' to govern the infinitive ἔνικαι. His emendations are unnecessary. Although I can find no examples of ὡστε used as a co-ordinating conjunction (= 'therefore'; see LSJ s.v. II.2) with the infinitive, the parallel use of οὖν in 9,4 of which the subject is Heraclitus makes it virtually
certain that \( \text{πλατώνα} \) is the subject of \( \text{εἰσέ} \text{ναι} \) here.

All editors save Perna have omitted or bracketed the Enneadic \( \eta \nu \, \text{ἰδέ} \text{α} \nu \) after \( \nu \nu \nu \) in 8,10. The words have no construction and the error is due to dittography of the same words from the previous line.

On \( \zeta \, \kappa \, \mu \nu \, \tau \gamma \alpha \, \delta \omega \, \tau \nu \, \nu \nu \nu \) (8,9-10) see Plato's comparison of the Good to the sun in \( \text{R.} \ 508b \ 9 \) ff. The sun is the cause of sight, and is described as having the same relation to sight and visible objects as the Good has to \( \nu \nu \nu \) and \( \tau \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \).

8,10-13 καὶ \( \text{ἐ} \text{νέ} \text{α} \) ... \( \text{ἐκ} \text{λύ} \nu \nu \nu \gamma \text{γο} \text{νε} \nu \nu \nu : \) The accusatives and infinitives are still dependent on \( \text{ἐ} \) \( \text{φο} \text{τυ} \) (8,9).

The references to Plato in the first part of Chapter 8 justify P.'s claim to be a Platonist. For P., Plato was the one ancient philosopher who had discovered the truth. The Gnostics, orthodox in so far as they followed Plato, were 'outside the truth' when they deviated from him (II 9,6,10-12). But like Heraclitus (cf. IV 8,1,11 ff.) Plato did not make everything clear. In V 8, 4,51 ff. P. says that Plato's remarks about \( \eta \, \text{ἐ} \text{κι} \text{ξ} \text{ι} \text{ω} \) \( \text{ἐ} \) \( \text{προττο} \text{μ} \text{η} \text{μ} \text{η} \) need interpretation, and in IV 4,22,10 ff. that what Plato says about the soul actually increases or at least does not lessen perplexity about the problem. Sometimes Plato appears to be contradictory - e.g., in what he says about the descent of the soul (IV 8,1,27 ff.).

Following hints in Plato (see Diotima's remarks in \( \text{Smp.} \) 209e 4 ff.) P. believed that Platonism was like a religion and
its practitioners like initiates. Note that in Pl. *Phd.* 69d 1-2 the initiates in Hades are said to be *οἱ προφητοσοφούσαι* ὤνει. Hence, philosophy was not for everyone (cf. Pl. *R.* 494a 4) and only those with certain preconceptions might be allowed a share in it (cf. Pl. *Ep.* II 314a 1 ff.; V 8,2,45 διὸ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντας οἱ πρῖ τῶν τοιούτων λόγοι ).

Because of its similarity to the mysteries, then, Platonism might be expected to present its doctrine in riddles (note *ὑπ’ αἰνιγμῶν* in Pl. *Ep.* II 312d 7-8). P. uses one of the technical terms of allegorical writing (see J. Pépin, *Mythe et Allegorie* (Paris, 1958), p. 497) to describe Plato's method of propounding doctrine, *γνιγμῶν* in VI 2,22,1 and *αἰνιγμένοι* in VI 2,22,13. The same word is used in 7,33 or our present treatise to describe the method of myth (see note ad loc.).

P.'s role as *ὑπηρέτης* was to recover the hidden meaning from Plato's philosophy. *Ἐκηρύγγης* and *ἐνθύσεις* are also technical terms of the allegorists (Pépin, loc. cit.). On the use of *ἐνθυσία* / *ἐνθύσεις* in contexts of philosophical and religious interpretation see LSJ s.v. *ἐνθυσία* II.1 and Arndt-Gingrich s.v. *ἐνθυσία* . Proclus (*Theol. Plat.* I.II. p. 6.16 ff. (Saffrey and Westerink) calls P. an *ἐνθύσεις* Ἰδρονικής ὑποτεύχας . So P. was the interpreter of the secrets of Platonic doctrine. But although P. thought of himself as a Platonist (see refs. in note on 6,4-6 to passages where *φαρίν* or *λόγιον* means 'we Platonists') he was no
slavish follower of Plato; he was more than a mere commentator. Porphyry realised how many original and un-Platonic doctrines could be found in P.'s pages (see V.P. 14.14-16 and passim). It would be odd if P. himself was unconscious of his own deviations from his mentor. Rist collects (Plotinus: the Road to Reality (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 182 ff.) examples of Plotinian teachings which differ from the tenets of Platonism. But P. never engages in polemic with Plato. Where he disagrees with Plato he passes over the fact in silence, even where the contradiction is blatant. In general on this topic see A. Eon, 'La Notion Plotinienne à l'Exégèse', RITPh 24 (1970), pp. 252-289.

'Ava ausgezogen' is a hapax legomenon in P.. Dörrie notes (RITPh 24 (1970), p. 25 n. 9) that behind the word lies the Homeric 'etwa stehend': 'ein Wort müsste aufliegen und seine Wirkung tun; das ist in diesem Falle nicht geschehen, Plotin hat das wirkungslos Daliegende "aufgegriffen". I can find no other example of the word in Greek.

8,13-14 μετρείος ... Πλάτωνος γράμματα: Only C. of modern editors keeps the Enneadic μετρείον. But he gives no reasons other than palaeographic ones for his reading, and his translation 'con testi che ci garantiscono ...' is surely impossible to get out of the simple μετρείος. Πιστοί in the middle voice means 'confirm'; in which case μετρείος is a dative of agent in apposition to τοι ... Πλάτωνος γράμματος (thus, Ha., Br. and MK). The mistake might be due to the proximity of μετρείος (see Henry, Etats, p. 139).
Vo. and Br. follow Eusebius (PG 21.892b) and omit τοῦ (8,14); on this see Henry, Etats, p. 139.

8,14-15 εἰσερχομαι μὲν ὅιν: Wolters is probably right to see here an example of a prospective μὲν emphasized by ὅιν (see his note on III 5,1,46, and for other references see Denniston, pp. 473-475). He suggests that the correlative δὲ is to be found in 9,1 (Ἀναλόγως δὲ); but I see no reason why the δὲ in 8,24 should not be assumed to pick up the μὲν. After all, the distinction between Parmenides and Plato's Parmenides is a strong one.

8,15-18 Παρμενίδης ... ἔνας ἱγνόν: P. mentions Parmenides only twice by name (here and in VI 6,18,42) but treats him more fully than the other Presocratics, partly because of his doctrine of the One, and partly, perhaps, because he was greatly respected by Plato (see Thet. 183e 5 ff.). The present quotation (DK B.3) which he uses four times to confirm the identity of Intellect and Being (here; I 4,10,6; III 8,8,8 and V 9,5,29-30; cf. the further reminiscence at VI 7,41,18) is not found in the doxographical tradition: before P. it occurs only in Clem. Al. Strom. VI.III.23.3. This suggests that P. may have found the quotation in a personal reading of Parmenides' poem (note that P. explicitly mentions his writings - συγγράμματα in 8,22). This would be striking proof of the importance he gave to Parmenides; knowledge of the other Presocratics may well be drawn from secondary sources (see individual notes).
In DK B.3 Parmenides did not mean that thinking and Being were identical but that only things which existed could be the object of thoughts - lit.: 'the same thing exists for thinking and for being' (cf. DK B.8.34-36). As in his treatment of Plato, P. cites the quotation with total disregard for its context.

Note that Parmenides only 'touched on' Plotinian doctrine. P. does not have the same confidence in him as he does in Plato (see on 8,23-26).

The paragogic nu on εἰσὶν in 8,17 is necessary for the scansion of the Parmenides quotation. It seems odd not to write it in here, as P. is apparently trying to be precise in his quotation - note the inclusion of the logically unnecessary γάρ in 8,17. I would follow Vo., Br. and Ha. in writing ἵστιν ;  ἵστιν should also be read in V 9,5,29.

8,18-19 καὶ ἄμυντον... τὸ νοοῦν: See Parmenides DK B.8.26-27, his description of Being ἀλήθεια ἄμυντον μηδὲν ἐν πολλῷ ἐνομίζων / ἵστιν ἄναρχον ἀναλυόντον, though P. could have derived knowledge of this doctrine from Aristotle (Ph. 184b 25-26; cf. ibid. 184a 15-16).

On the integral connection between movement and thought see 4,34-36 and note on 4,34-37. 'Movement' is one of the categories and along with 'rest' is an aspect of the life of Intellect. Both 'sameness' and 'difference', 'movement' and 'rest' were necessary for the peculiar status of a ἐν πολλῷ. P. attributes one of his own insights to Parmenides. Even though Parmenides identified Being and thought (according to P.'s inter-
pretation of DK B.3) he nevertheless called Being 'unmoved'.

Vitringa's addition of \( \delta \) in 8,18 spoils the sequence of thought, but the \( \kappa \alpha \ldots \theta \) is perfectly sound. One might paraphrase: 'but although \( \tau \nu \alpha \nu = \nu \omega \nu \nu \nu \) and therefore includes 'movement' as well as 'rest', Parmenides also (as well as me) calls Being 'unmoved'. The \( \delta \) is wrongly omitted by Ki., Mii., Vo. and Br.. Its omission involves wrong punctuation, and Br.'s mistranslation.

(Mii.'s deletion of \( \tau \nu \nu \nu \) (8,18) to \( \nu \rho \sigma \tau \theta \nu \nu \nu \nu \) (8,19) shows his misunderstanding of P.'s train of thought.)

8,19-20 \( \sigma \nu \mu \alpha \nu \kappa \lambda \nu \ldots \nu \sigma \mu \alpha \mu \nu \nu \nu \) : It makes little difference to the sense whether we read \( \varepsilon \iota \alpha \iota \varepsilon \iota \nu \nu \nu \) or \( \varepsilon \iota \alpha \iota \varepsilon \iota \nu \nu \nu \) in 8,19. Ki., Mii., Vo., Br. and Ha. print \( \varepsilon \iota \alpha \iota \varepsilon \iota \nu \nu \nu \), and since this is much more common than \( \varepsilon \iota \alpha \iota \varepsilon \iota \nu \nu \nu \) meaning 'remove', I suspect that it should be read here. The accentuation of scribes should carry little weight in the establishment of the correct textual reading.

In DK B.8.29 Parmenides calls Being \( \tau \nu \iota \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \) \( \varepsilon \iota \nu \iota \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \n
The word ὤναίτως is used by Plato in Phd. 78d 2 and 6 to describe the permanence of τὰ ἀπτατα; cf. id. Sph. 248a 12-13. Besides V 6,6,15 see II 9,1,29; V 3,16, 20; V 8,13,1; VI 2,7,30; VI 5,2,13; VI 7,13,5. The phrase ὤναίτως κατὰ ταῦτα occurs in the Phaedo before it occurs in the Sophist. In H-S's index formatium the phrase is always taken to be a quotation of the later dialogue. This seems arbitrary.

In II 9,4,30-31 the sphere is glossed as τὴν ἐκλή τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ νοητοῦ σφαίρην ἐν ἀσπήνῳ. The unbroken circumference contains all the contents of the sphere within it, just as Intellect contains within it the whole of the Intelligible world. On ἐκ τῆς κολλημένα (8,21) see 4,10-11, and note. The centre of the Intelligible circle is usually the One (see 7, 7-8 and note) around which Intellect revolves (cf. VI 5,4,20 ff.). The all-embracing Intellect contains its objects within itself.
(V 5,2,1), so Intellect, its act and Being are one (V 3,5,43 ἐν ἐκ πάντα ὑπτα, νοὐς, νοτος, ὁ νοογόν; VI 7,41,12).

Parmenides DK B.8.5-6 οὖς πορ' ἤν ὁθ' ὑπτα, ἔτην ναν ὑπτι ὁμοι ἔταν, ἐν

σωματις. Parmenides’ view that Being is one is criticized by Plato in Sph. 244-245 where Plato distinguishes between unity which is predicated of a sum of parts and absolute unity, and by Aristotle in Ph. I chapters 2 and 3 who argue that the meanings of 'one' and 'being' are varied and are not recognised to be so by Parmenides. P. believed that Parmenides was only partly right.

Being as different from what comes before it and from what comes after it is certainly a unity in a sense (VI 6,18,42-43). But Intellect has a dynamic life; its characteristic activity of self-thought requires a subject and object of thought, and the various aspects of its life described in Chapter 4 by the categories make it πολλά (cf. VI 9,3,45 πάλα ( = οὗς, κίνης, στάσις) γὰρ προ ἐν ὄν, ἐπολλά αὐτὸ πολλά).

Intellect is called πολλά in 5,1 (see note ad loc.) and see Chapter 4 passim for a description of the multiplicity of Intellect. Its unity and simplicity are well described in V 6,1,1 ff.

Εὐεισκομένου (8,23) (sc. ὄντος). On this use of Εὐεισκομένω see Arndt-Gingrich s.v. Εὐεισκομ. 2. The reference to the plurality of Intellect points vaguely to Chapter 4.

Note that the negative adjectives in Parmenides DK P.8 (ἀγώντον, ἀνάκλεθον (8,3), ἀτερίς (8,4)) are never applied by P. to the One - further proof that he took Parmenides'
'one' to refer to Intellect.

8,23-26 ὁ δὲ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ... καὶ πολλά: Ever since E. R. Dodds's article in 1923 (Co 22 (1928), pp. 129-142, 'The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic "One"'), it has been a datum of Plotinian scholarship that Plato's Parmenides was the source of P.'s doctrine of Intellect and the One. Following the Neopythagorean interpretation of Honderatus (Dodds, op. cit. p. 137 ff.; Rist, TAPA 93 (1962), pp. 400-401) P. used the Parmenides as evidence for his own metaphysics. Dodds' conclusions have been endorsed with the addition of further evidence by B. Darrell Jackson, JHPh 5 (1967), pp. 315-327. Our present passage is the sole passage in which P. claims that his three hypostases (not just Intellect and the One) can be found in the Parmenides.

Like many subsequent scholars, P. took the Parmenides as something more than a ἀράχια (Prm. 137b 2) - note the number of citations of the dialogue in H-S's index fontium. In this he prefigures later Neoplatonists. Proclus, for example, quotes Iamblichus with approval as saying that τὴν ὀδηγὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὀνειρέων ἐν τοῖς διὸ ποιότατος παρὰ αὐτοῦ διάλογος Τιμάου καὶ Παρμνίδη (Procl. in Th. I.13.15-17). The dialogue's first hypothesis (Prm. 137c 4-142a 7; Cornford's (Plato and Parmenides (London, 1939)) Hypothesis I) P. takes to be evidence for his own One. For linguistic parallels between P.'s description of the One throughout the Enneads and Plato see Dodds, op. cit. pp. 132-133, and Jackson, op. cit., pp. 318-320. Intellect, the secondary one, has its origin in Cornford's
Hypothesis II, Pl. **Pra**. 142b 1-155e 3. The actual phrase \( \dot{\chi} \nu \rho \omega \lambda \delta \) (repeated at V 3,15,11, 15,22; V 4,1,21; VI 2,15,14, 15,15; VI 7,14,11-12) comes from Pl. **Pra**. 144e 5, though in the Platonic phrase (\( \tau \delta \dot{\chi} \nu \dot{\chi} \nu \rho \omega \lambda \delta \)) \( \tau \delta \dot{\chi} \nu \dot{\chi} \nu \) should probably be construed as the subject, and \( \rho \omega \lambda \delta \) (sc. \( \dot{i} \nu \dot{\tau} \)) as predicate. P. on the other hand takes \( \dot{\chi} \nu \rho \omega \lambda \delta \) as a composite predicate. For references to Hypothesis II in the Enneads, see Dodds, op. cit. p. 133 and Jackson, op. cit. pp. 322-325.

The citation of the Parmenides as evidence for P.'s belief in soul as the third level of reality occurs only in our present passage though the phrase \( \dot{\chi} \nu \kappa \alpha \iota \rho \omega \lambda \delta \) occurs at IV 2,2,40, 2,53 and at VI 7,14,11-12, the latter example not marked as a Platonic quotation by H-S. This phrase (\( \dot{\chi} \nu \kappa \alpha \iota \rho \omega \lambda \delta = \text{Pra}. 155e 5 \)) comes from what Cornford classifies as a corollary to Hypothesis II (\( \text{Pra}. 155e 4-157b 5 \)), though P. has some justification for treating the section as a separate hypothesis since it begins \( \dot{\chi} \nu \iota \eta \tau \delta \tau \gamma \iota \nu \lambda \iota \gamma \mu \rho \nu \) (\( \text{Pra}. 155e 4 \)). Reminiscences of this hypothesis in the Enneads are scarce (see Jackson, op. cit. pp. 325-326) but this is probably because P. could trace his psychological doctrines more easily through the Timaeus (cf. e.g. IV 2, a commentary on Pl. Ti. 35a). Soul is both one and many in the sense that though there are many souls, soul itself is one (see IV 9 passim). Furthermore, individual souls are wholly present in divisible bodies; if they were not nothing could be properly ensouled (IV 2,2,35 ff.). (On the mode of presence of the soul in the body see on 2,36-37.)
P. relied only on the first two and a half Hypotheses of the Parmenides as evidence for his own beliefs. H-S cite only two examples of any reference to the dialogue after 157b 5 where the argument of Hypothesis IIa ends, and both are to 160b, the conclusion of Hypothesis IV; and of these two examples the second (VI 5,1,26 ἐὰν ἵπτε Πάντα τὰ ὅντα ) seems to have no clear reference to Parmenides 160b. (Surely from the verbal point of view VI 5,1,26 is not close enough to Πάντα τὰ ἱστε τὰ ἐν καὶ ὅντα ἐν ἱστε .) The reference of V 2,1,1 to Pl. Parm. 160b 2-3 is less opaque, and P. understands this quotation to refer to the One. It is possible, then, that he thought that the whole of Hypothesis IV referred to the One. He may have thought that the hypotheses of the Parmenides subsequent to Hypothesis IIa were elaborations and amplifications of the earlier hypotheses. (For a summary of later interpretations of the dialogue see Procl. in Parm. 1051.34 ff. (Cousin).)

8,27 ταὶς φύσεις ταὶς τηροῦν ; For φύσις meaning 'hypostasis' see on 3,9.
Chapter 9 continues the doxography of Chapter 8. The views of more Presocratic philosophers are mentioned (9,1-7) and interpreted according to the interpretations of Aristotle and the doxographical tradition. Most of the chapter is taken up with criticism of Aristotle's theory of νοησις (9,7-27).

9,1-3 Ἀναξαγόρας δέ... τὸ εἴ: The reference is to DK B.12, esp. p. 37 11.18-19 νοησις δὲ ἐστιν ἁπάντων καὶ αὐτοκράτης καὶ μερικῶς οὐλίνι Χρηματικά, and p. 38 11.2-3 ἐστι γὰρ λειτούργειν πάντων Χρηματίων καὶ καθαρίσταιν...

But P. may well have been unacquainted with the actual text of Anaxagoras. He could have found all that he needed in Aristotle's description of his philosophy in Metaph. 989a 30 ff. and de An. 405a 13 ff., that he did so is suggested by verbal parallels between P. and Aristotle. The simple καθαρός is preferred in both authors to Anaxagoras' superlative (see Arist. Metaph. 989b 16) and P. like Aristotle uses ἀμφίς (cf. ibid. 989b 15). Furthermore, although the word ἀνθρώπις does not occur in Anaxagoras' fragments, it is found in Aristotle's description in Metaph. 989b 17. Extremely striking is the conclusion Aristotle draws: ἐν δὲ τοῖς παραβαλλομένοις λίγων αἰσθήσεως τὸ τι εἴ (τὸ ὑπὸ ὁδόντων καὶ ἀμφίς) καὶ θεὰ γένος .... (Metaph. 989b 16-17). It is this conclusion, or rather one limb of it, which is used by P.

Although Anaxagoras is only mentioned twice more in the
Enneads by name (in II 4,7,2 and 6), the opening phrase of his book ὑμῶν πάντα is cited six times by P. (V 3,15,21; V 8,9,3; V 9,6,3; VI 5,5,4. 6,3; VI 6,7,4) as a description of the Plotinian Intellect. This phrase is taken quite out of context. Similarly, when Anaxagoras called Mind 'most pure' he meant that it was the finest of material things, i.e., completely without admixture; but P., following Pl. Phd. 67c 5 ff. (see on 2,44-45), associates purification with separation from material objects. Thus, purification is particularly associated by him with the life of Intellect (see 4,8 and notes; cf. also IV 7,9,25; V 3,6,39; VI 9,3,34-35) and of the higher soul (cf. 10,16 ἵνα καὶ λογίζοντα καθαρὸς ὁ ἄνω τέλος ἀφόατος and note on 3,13). Hence, although neither Anaxagoras nor Aristotle describe the νοῦς as χωρίστος (though in Anaxagoras' case, separation might be inferred - compare DK B.6, where not being ἐφ' ἐμποτῶν is associated with not being separated (χωρίστος ἀφοι), with DK B.12 where Mind is said to be ἐφ' ἐμποτῶν), the very mention of the concept of purification would imply for P. that of transcendence (see on 2,44-45 and Wolters on III 5,2,23).

On the application of the word ἀναλών in P. see on 5,4. Intellect is a 'one-many' (see on 8,23-26) so in a sense simple, in a sense not (V 6,1,13-14); the One is unity in a more exact sense. Only Br. mistranslates this section by taking ἀναλών as part of Anaxagoras' actual words agreeing with νοῦν; but as we have seen above, the 'simplicity' of Anaxagoras' Mind seems
to be an inference drawn by Aristotle, albeit a reasonable one.

9.2-3

... παράγιν... Aristotle also thought that Anaxagoras was inaccurate (Metaph. 989b 19 ἀλήθεια λέγει... ὁντεὶ ἀλήθεια ὁντεὶ σοφία; de An. 404b 1 'Ἀναξαγόρας ὁντεὶ οὐσίαν οὐσίαν πρὸς αὐτὸν; cf. ibid. 405b 21-23). Pease on Cicero ND I.74 has collected exhaustive references to illustrate the ancients' opinion that the Presocratic philosophers were difficult to understand. P. himself was praised by Longinus for his clarity and accuracy (V.P. 20, 72-76; ibid. 21.6-9).

9.3-5

καὶ Ἡράκλειτος... ἔόντα: Heraclitus was nicknamed χαοτικός in antiquity. Whether or not he actually believed in a single supreme principle need not concern us. More important for us is that Aristotle thought that he did. In Metaph. 984a 1 ff. Heraclitus is ranked as a monist alongside Thales and Anaximenes, differing, however, from other Presocratics in that along with Hippasus of Metapontus he posited fire as the primary principle. This view of Heraclitus is followed by all later doxographers (see Diels, Dox. Graec. s.v. Heraclitus) and seems to be endorsed by P. here. Heraclitus' fire is called ἀέων in DK B.30 (cf. πᾶς ἀέων in Aetius ap. Diels Dox. Graec. 303.8-9 and P.'s ἀέων) and νόητον (cf. P.'s νοητὸν) in Hippolytus ap. Diels Dox. Graec. 559.1-2. But P. is more influenced in his choice of epithets for Heraclitus' One by his citation of Heraclitus' view of the material world which immediately follows. The reference goes back to the doxographical tradition; see esp. DK A.1 (p. 141.19-20) and also Arist. Metaph. 987a 33-34; ibid.
1078b 14-15; id. Gae. 298b 29-33. This Heraclitean doctrine brings to mind for P. the common Platonic distinction, itself based on Heraclitus according to Arist. Metaph. 1078b 12 ff., between the physical world of change and the unchanging world of the Forms (for references see on 1,19-20). Most significant is Pl. Ti. 27d 4-28a 4 where the world of becoming is contrasted with τὸ ὄν ἄτομον (cf. ἄτομον) which is to be grasped only by νοησία μὴ τὰ λόγων (cf. νοητὸν). P.'s interpretation of Heraclitus is strongly Platonic.

Strictly speaking, P.'s One is beyond eternity as it is beyond Being and Intellect, though as the object of Intellect's regard it is occasionally called νοητόν (see V 4,2,4; V 6,2,7 ff.).

Although only mentioned by name four times, Heraclitus provides more citations for P. than any other pre-Socratic, though none of the references has the same weight as the important DK B.3 of Parmenides on which see on 8,15-18.

Ha. changes the mss. γίνεται to γίνομαι on the grounds that the sentence is 'unverständlich'. Γίνομαι would certainly provide a good grammatical companion for ἐσόντα. But it is just possible, it seems to me, to supply καὶ with ἐσόντα. I would be inclined to keep the mss. reading.

9,5-7 πτ ζη Ἐσεῖνδομελά... ὡς θησα: See Empedocles DK B.17. 7-9 = B. 26.5-6 ἀλλος μὲν ὕλην ἡμερομέρεις ἡμερομέρεις, ὡς ὡς ἡμερομέρεις. Τὸ δὲ μὲν δὴ ἐκλείπει πειράζει Νεῖκτος καὶ Θα. This fragment is used by P. also at IV 4,40,5-6 and
VI 7,14,19-20, though not in either of these cases as evidence for his belief in the One. However, the general view was that Empedocles was the first pluralist (see Arist. Metaph. 985a 29 ff.) and of his two principles 'love' could be identified with the One; n.b. Arist. Metaph. 1001a 12-15 ὃν Ἔμπεδοκλῆς...λύμεν ὑπ' τῷ ζῷ ἔν τις ζωὴ τῇ θείᾳ γὰρ ἀν λύμεν τῷ νῷ φιλίαιν ἐνα (cf. ibid. 996a 4 ff.). How P. could fit 'strife' into his philosophy is left quite unclear; it is noticeable that he does not make any identification as regards this divisive principle. Empedocles is mentioned five times by P. (here and in II 4,7,1; VI 8,1,17 and 33; IV 8,5,5) and his doctrines are referred to in a handful of places (see E-S's Index Pontium), but his thought had no great influence on the Enneads.

ἀφθαρσί (9,6). 'Love' and 'strife' are described as if they were material (cf. DK B.17.20 Φιλότρος, ἵση μηκός τι πλάτος τι (ἐς τῷ Ζήτου Νἰκή) ) but they have no perceptible qualities, and Empedocles was no doubt striving towards the apprehension of the abstract (see Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957), p. 330). Aristotle thought of the Empedoclean principles as incorporeal, since he suggests in Metaph. 985a 7-9 that in a sense Empedocles made good and evil (for him incorporeal) his first principles.

That the four elements were matter was also the general view (see Arist. Metaph. 989a 20-21; cf. II 4,7,1-2) and 'love' and 'strife' were the motive forces acting on them (see DK B.17,16-20, and Simplicius' explanation of the doctrine in DK A.28).
In 9,5 Creuzer, Vo. and Br. read τὸ μὲν νῦκος rather than the τὸ νῦκος μὲν of the mss. Stylistic symmetry of the kind which they wish to introduce is alien to P. Henry (Etats, p. 140) compares V 1,8,6 for a similar difficulty over the position of a particle.

Creuzer's ξνοι in 9,6 (the correction of Aubert, the editor of Cyril) is demolished by Henry in Etats, p. 140.

9,6 αὐτῷ or αὐτῷ (Aubert and Creuzer)? Αὐτός (Henry, Etats, p. 140) is 'seul authentique'.

9,7-27 Ἀριστοτέλης... χωρίς όνομα: The detailed criticism of Aristotle which follows is on a different level from P.'s treatment of the Presocratics. It is based on the criticisms of Theophrastus (Metaph. 5a 14 ff.). For an analysis of P.'s arguments here see W. Jaeger (Aristotle (2nd ed. Oxford, 1948), pp. 351-352.

Polemic against Aristotle is found elsewhere in P. - against his doctrine of soul as an entelechy of the body and of the νοῦς ὀφελοῦς in IV 7,65,1 ff., against his doctrine of categories in VI 1 and VI 3 and against the self-thinking mind as the primary principle here and in VI 7,37,3 ff. The large number of Aristotelian passages cited or referred to by P. (cf. H-S's Index Pentium) shows the importance of his philosophical views for Plotinus; it seems unlikely that P. had not read him at first hand.

9,7-9 Ἀριστοτέλης... τὸ νεωτοῦν: Aristotle's theory of the self-thinking mind, the Prime Mover, can be found in Metaph. 1071b 2 ff. The mind is the ἄρχη τὸν ὀφελός and is therefore τὸ νεωτοῦν (ibid. 1073a 23-24) and it is described as being the cause of movement.
in others because it is the object of their desire and thought (τὸ δύνατὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν ibid. 1072a 26). For mind as χωρίς πνεύματος P. has to go to de An. 430a 17, a description of the νοητόν πνευματικόν. But cf. Metaph. 1073a 4-5 καὶ ψυχοῦν ηῶν θνῄνων and GA 736b 27-28. P. assumed that the mind of the de Anima and the mind of Metaphysics were the same. The doctrine that the divine mind thinks itself can be found in Metaph. 1072b 19-20.

For P. τὸ ψυχῆτων meant more than merely 'the primary principle', its meaning for Aristotle. Ψυχῆς involved the notion of unity and hence is often found as a synonym for the One. Aristotle's mind could not be τὸ ψυχῆτων as it could be analysed into two components, the subject and object of thought. Thus it is a 'one-many' (cf. 8,26). The plurality of P.'s Intellect is described in Chapter 4. In our present passage, P. seems to treat the validity of his criticism as self-evident; he goes straight on to discuss the difficulties involved in the theory that there is more than one Mover. For a more detailed discussion of the Aristotelian doctrine of mind as τὸ ψυχῆτων see VI 7,37,10 ff.

Πολλά ἢ τίθεμινος: A new point as the καὶ shows.

Aristotle's theory of a plurality of Movers is put forward in Metaph. chapter 8. Much discussion has taken place about the authenticity of this chapter of the Metaphysics in its context. (A useful collection of the views of modern scholars on this topic can be found in L. Elders, Aristotle's Theology (Assen, 1972), pp. 57 ff.) Aristotle argues that besides the simple spatial movement
of the universe we can see other spatial movements i.e., movements of the planets which he explains according to his own theory of interacting, homocentric spheres based on the astronomical theories of Eudoxus and Callippus. (On Aristotle's doctrine see J. L. Dreyer, *A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler* (2nd ed. New York, 1953) pp. 109-122 and T. L. Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos* (Oxford, 1913), pp. 225 ff.). He concludes that there are either 55 spheres or perhaps 49 (as well as the outer sphere) (47 of the text at *Metaph.* 1074a 13-14 seems to be due to a mistake in Aristotle's mathematics) needed to explain visible phenomena.

Each of these spheres requires a Mover; hence the number of Movers is the same as the number of the spheres.

Aristotle does not claim to be dogmatic in his astronomy. He prefaces his account by saying that his theory merely gives a number for the mind to grasp: he leaves it to the mathematicians to discover the real number (*Metaph.* 1073b 10-17) and finishes by saying τὸ μὴν οἷς στάθος τῶν οὐρανῶν ἔστω τασιάτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸς ἀξίας τὰς ἀκροβρασίς... τοσαίτας τούλογον ἀπολαβίειν (τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαίον ἀφίκεσθαι τοῖς ἵσωμεν τέχνησιν) (*Metaph.* 1074a 14-17). The parenthesis is recalled by P. in 9,12 τὸ ἔλογον οἷον ἢγάκην πεθέρων.

(For another contrast in P. between what is reasonable and what is necessary see V 3,6,40-42 and cf. VI 5,8,4.)

In 9,12 the mss. variant ἢγάκην is adopted by all editors except H-S for ἢγακην and is described by Ha. as 'notwendig'.

He appeals to Aristotle's own words; it is Aristotle who refuses to posit certainty about the number of Movers. Hence the personal
is more suitable here. Schwyzer (Rh. M. 86 (1937), p. 377) reading \( \chi \alpha \nu \) translates (n. 36) 'was Wahrscheinlichkeit nicht hat, als Notwendigkeit setzend'. But this interpretation makes the next sentence something of an anti-climax. I prefer \( \chi \alpha \nu \).

H-S are right, however, to take \( \tau \delta \varphi \lambda \alpha \gamma o \) as the object of \( \tau u b \chi \mu \rho \nu o \) (against the interpretations of Pic. and Br.).

9,12-13 \( \epsilon \nu \sigma i \tau o u c u \delta i \alpha n \ldots \tau u b \chi \mu \) : Br. misunderstands this indirect question; for \( \chi \phi \iota \sigma \gamma \mu i \) = wonder. see Lampe s.v. 2.

9,13-14 \( \tau b \lambda o \omega \pi \tau e o n \ldots \pi e \mu o n \beta \lambda i \tau \mu \nu \) : The participial phrase \( \pi e \mu o n \; \mu \alpha \nu \; \sigma \nu \tau \tau i \zeta i \zeta i \nu \; \sigma a t t \lambda o \sigma a s \) should be taken causally (pace Ci. and Ha.). Since the universe is one and a unified whole (cf. Arist. Cael. I.8), all the spheres, as part of one system, should focus on the first and primary sphere, the sphere of fixed stars. But as P. goes on to say, the relationship of the Prime Mover to the other Movers is totally unclear (see Ross, Metaphysics, intro. pp. cxxxvi). This problem is adumbrated by Theophrastus, who says that the end to which the motion of the spheres is directed is obscure (Thphr. Metaph. 5a 17); if the Movers are many their harmony as they move in the direction of the best desire is by no means obvious (\( \tau \delta \; \sigma a t \mu \phi \omega \nu o c o n \; a u t \tau o c n \; \zeta i \; \delta i \iota \iota \Gamma \nu \; \iota n t \mu o n \; \tau a n \) \( \epsilon \phi \iota \gamma \) \( \sigma a t a \mu \mu \mu \) \( \phi a n i \) (ibid. 5a 20-21)) - an objection developed by P. in 9,24-25.

\( \epsilon \nu \) in 9,5 means 'a unity' (Pic. (?), MK and Ha.) rather than 'the One'; the \( \kappa \alpha i \) is epexegetical.
9,16-20 καὶ ὑμῖν ... νοητὸς ὦ ταῖς : A fair point. If the homocentric spheres are controlled by the outer sphere, the sphere of fixed stars, then the same relationship ought to exist between the Movers of the spheres as exists between the spheres themselves, since the relationship between the spheres is seen in terms of movement, for which the Movers are responsible. But it might be argued that the fact that one sphere contains the others (περὶχωρισμὸς) does not necessarily mean that it controls them (κτητοσθενία). However, it does seem to have been Aristotle's view that the movements of the lower spheres are somehow subordinate to that of the first sphere, so the use of the word κτητοσθενία is reasonable (see Arist. Metaph. 1070b 34-35; ibid. 1072b 13-14; ibid. 1076a 4).

κόσμων νοητῶν ὅταν (9,19-20). Plato's Intelligible World was a κόσμων νοητοῖ which the lesser Ideas had some sort of subordinate relationship to the Good. For P., of course, Intellect is its contents. On περὶχωρισμὸς see on 4,10-11.

9,20-23 καὶ ποιητῇ ... ἐκλῆ : The analogy continues, but the argument is not convincing. The spheres contain stars (v. infr.); but it does not follow that the Movers will contain 'many things' in them, since the Movers and the spheres are not identical. Rather, the Movers are the causes of the spheres' movements, and certainly cannot be said to contain the contents of the spheres in the same way as the spheres themselves do.

In 9,21, the 'first sphere' is the sphere of fixed stars (see Arist. Metaph. 1073b 18-19). In the same line, P.'s statement that
the other spheres also contain stars is not strictly true, as Ha. notes. The spheres, apart from the outer spheres, were introduced to explain planetary motions; and sometimes several interacting spheres had to be supposed to account for the irregular movements of a single planet. On these theories see Arist. Metaph. 1073b 17 ff.. P., however, is equally imprecise in II 9,8,30-32.

On the Intelligible World as the real realm of truth (τὰ ἀληθικῶν ἐκεῖ 9,22-23) see on 4,6.

9,23-25 ἐνδεικτῶν... ὅρμωσιν : The alternative supposition is that each of the Movers is mutually independent. If this is the case, then their existence will be a chance affair since there will be no σὲ ἔναν to determine their number or area of activity. The same argument is found in II 4,2,9-10. If Intelligible Matter is eternal, then there will be more than one ἀνάκλη (the One and Matter) and κατὰ συνταχήν τὰ ἠφαίτα. P., in fact, answers this objection in II 4,5,24 ff..

The corollary to the argument follows; if the first principles are independent, then there is no reason why they should work together to effect the harmonious organisation of the universe (cf. 9,13-14). (The same point is made by Theophrastus in Metaph. 5a 19-21.) Note a similar argument in II 3,6,10-20 esp. 14-20: to give independence of action to the stars would destroy the harmony of the cosmos which has a principle and first cause extending over the management of the whole.

Though the thought is clear here the text is difficult. The first problem is with συνεχούσα in 9,24. Ha. calls it
'schwach and schief' on the grounds that P.'s point is not that the spheres exist together but rather that they work together. He therefore suggests σωφρονίζω and takes δρομονήσω (9,25) as a parallel verb. Both verbs would be singular because of the neuter plural subject (sc. τα κυκλίντα). But if σωφρονίζωνται is retained in 9,24 (and this time ἀγχάι must be understood as the subject), it would seem natural to have a plural verb in 9,25; hence Vitringa's δρομονήσων β., printed by Mii., Vo. and Br.. If we keep τα κυκλίντα as the subject, it might just be possible to retain δρομονήσω (as P., sometimes changes the number of the verb from singular to plural. But in both examples of this practice mentioned by Schwyzer in RE 514-57 ff. the singular verb precedes the plural rather than vice versa.

Another alternative is to suppose δρομονήσω to be a noun (as Ci. and H-S) - which seems to me extremely difficult. Moreover, if a noun, it would be a Plotinian neologism.

A solution is proposed by Theiler in DLR 80 (1959), p. 13, who thinks that σωφρονίζωνται καί has been inserted owing to dittography; he suggests that σωφρονίζωνται was the original reading in 9,23 where σωφρονίζω is now read. His text, therefore, runs as follows: κατὰ σωφρονίζων αὐτήν δρομονήσων· καὶ διὰ τὸ πέρος ἐν ζηγων... δρομονήσω.

Like Ha., I find σωφρονίζωνται difficult. Therefore, I am inclined to follow him and to read σωφρονίζω in 9,24. The corruption could easily be due to the proximity of κυκλίντα.
in 9,23. \( \Sigma \nu \gamma \varepsilon \gamma \nu \) is attested in II 3,8,6 and II 9,13,15. With this reading the awkwardness involved in taking \( \delta \rho \nu \gamma \sigma \eta \tau \nu \) as a substantive is avoided, and there is no need to take \( \kappa \alpha \) in 9,24 as 'et insuper' as H-S suggest in their apparatus.

\( \delta ' \) in 9,24 means 'one job', not as MK translates; 'that work of unity'. It is interesting that Theophrastus in \textit{Metaph.} 5a 20 speaks of \( \tau \delta \sigma \mu \phi \rho \nu \sigma \omega \nu \alpha \iota \tau \omega \nu \) (sc. \( \pi \nu \kappa \nu \omega \alpha \nu \tau \omega \nu \) ) in a passage bringing forward similar criticisms against Aristotle. The similarity of metaphor (\( \sigma \mu \phi \rho \nu \sigma \omega \) ) makes it possible that P. had Theophrastus directly in mind here.

One very minor point: note that in 10,23 H-S correct the \( \delta ' \) of all previous editors and restore the mss. reading \( \delta ' \).

9,25-26 \( \mu \delta ' \) \( \varepsilon \sigma \delta \) ... \( \alpha \iota \theta \gamma \tau \alpha \) : Aristotle gives the reason in \textit{Metaph.} 1074a 14 ff.. This is explained by Ps-Alexander in \textit{Metaph.} 707.28 ff. (Hayduck), who deals with the objection: 'what prevents there being incorporeal entities which move nothing?' His argument runs as follows. Everything which is \( \alpha \iota \varphi \sigma \tau \nu \) is \( \psi \varphi \tau \tau \nu \) and hence causes motion. But the number of motions is finite and preceptible and is explained by the number of spheres; hence the number of Movers is finite and equivalent to the number of spheres. Aristotle's reason, however, would not counter P.'s objection to a plurality of principles.

On the Movers as 'intelligible' see on 9,7-9.

9,26-27 \( \nu \delta ' \kappa \alpha \) ... \( \chi \varphi \gamma \iota \zeta \omega \delta \nu \) : In \textit{Metaph.} 1074a 31-32, Aristotle is arguing for the existence of a single heaven. If there were more than one, the Movers would be one in form (\( \tau \delta ' \) \)
but many in number (δύο μικρά). But entities numerically distinct contain matter. The Prime Mover, however, is pure entelechy; therefore, there is only one Mover and one heaven.

P.'s objection here is no more than the application of Aristotle's own arguments to his own doctrine. (For a conspectus of the views for and against the genuineness of the Aristotelian passage in its context and attempts to explain it see L. Elders, *Aristotle's Theology* (Assen, 1972), pp. 240-241.) P.'s argument is convincing.

Θέτει (9,27) means 'as Aristotle has described it' - a point not made clear by any of the translators. (Br., Ha. and MK omit the word entirely in their versions.)

9,27-32 ὁσίς πᾶν ἀρχαιόν ... ἀπτιναν : As Ha. rightly says: 'In dieser merkwürdigen Zusammenfassung bleibt noch manches ungeklärt.'

The introductory ὁσίς marks the conclusion of the two doxographical chapters; P. implies, therefore, that all the ancient thinkers whom he has mentioned with approval should be classed with Pythagoreans in so far as they posited the One at the head of their metaphysics. The group of thinkers of whom he approves does not include Aristotle, though Herlan (*Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness* (The Hague, 1963), p. 7) thinks that it does. P.'s criticisms of Aristotle in 9,7-27, however, show that Aristotle did not 'busy himself' with the One. It is never suggested that he believed in a τὰ ἃ.

The assumption of such a position does not mean that Pythagoras replaced Plato as the doyen of P.'s philosophical forbears. For P. as, for example, for Moderatus (cf. J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*...
(London, 1977), pp. 36-37 and p. 346) the notion of a 'Plato pythagorissans' (see Apuleius Florida 15, p. 23.10-11 (Helm)) was unexceptional. Longinus describes Plotinus' philosophy as the clearest exposition of τὰς Πυθαγορικὰς καὶ τὰς Πλατωνικὰς (V.P. 20.71-72). But Plato, basing his theories on the premiss that the Good was one, the conclusion of his 'Lecture on the Good' (see on 5.6-19), had developed his philosophy in a far more satisfactory manner than Pythagoras. Thus while Pythagoras may be criticised (e.g., concerning his teaching of the soul as a harmony in IV 7.84), such licence is never extended to Plato. Pythagoras and Pythagoreans are mentioned favourably in P. in V 5.6,27-28 and the Pythagorean authors Cronius and Numenius were read in P.'s school (V.P. 14.11-12).

9.27 οἱ μέλιστα ... Πυθαγόρου: Wilamowitz suggests in the apparatus to DK Pherecydes A.7a that μέλιστα and οἱ should be transposed. But οἱ μέλιστα γυνασσόμενοι 'those who particularly sided with.....' makes perfectly good sense. (No translation of μέλιστα is offered in Fic. and Br.)

In this line the mss. read αὐτοίς, which makes no sense, though it is printed by Perma. Creuzer, in the notes to his Oxford edition, suggested αὐτὸς τοῖς, which is printed by H-S and accepted by Ci.. It seems to me, however, that αὐτὸς is very difficult and cannot mean 'rursus = contra Aristotelem' as H-S suggest. With other editors I would be inclined to read τοῖς alone. With τοῖς one should supply δογματίζει: Fic. and Br. miss this.
9,29 καὶ Φερεχέδης ὁ: For καὶ ... ὁ introducing the last item in a series see Denniston, p. 202. But why mention Pherecydes? Pherecydes of Syros flourished around 550 B.C. and was supposed to be the teacher of Pythagoras whom he tended when the latter was ill (cf. DK A.4 = Diod. X.3.4). His name is connected with that of Pythagoras in many tales of miracles and wonder working. He believed in a trinity of Ζάς, Χρόνος, and Θονύχ, and it may be to him that Plato refers at Phl. 242c 8–9 (μὴ δοῦν τινα ζήκανον φαίνεται μοι δηνυμίζοντα ... ἐστὶν ἵππω τὸ οὖντα). But the context here requires that any philosopher mentioned should have believed in the One like Pythagoras. The fact that Pherecydes is spoken of by Porphyry in De Antro Nympharum 31 and might well have been talked about in Neoplatonic circles (see Ci.'s note ad loc.) is beside the point; as is the fact that the Pythagorean identification of the dyad with τὸ ἠμα which P. seems to refer to in 1,4 is attributed to Pherecydes by Lydus De Mens. II.7 = DK B.14. With M. and Ha. I take the phrase as a learned gloss and would delete it.

But even if the phrase is retained, Φερεχέδης is surely preferable to Wilamowitz's nominative (ap. DK A.7a); the genitive would be governed by δογμασι understood.

9,29–30 μή ταύτην ... φίλων: The μή seems to be a μὴ solitarium (see Denniston, pp. 390 ff.). Ταύτην ... τὴν φίλων is the One. Of translators only Br. with his 'nature intelligible' gives the wrong impression. On φίλως see on 3,9–10.
9.30-32 ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡφισάν: P. is making a distinction between those of the ancients of whom he has been speaking who have (a) given a full written explanation of the doctrine of the One and those who have (b) not written down their ideas in treatises (λόγοι 9.31) but have discussed the subject in unrecorded seminars (e.g., Plato; see below).

There follows the odd clause η ὅμως ἡφισάν which is apparently a subdivision of (b). The Greek means: 'or who have completely neglected (sc. discussion of the One)'. It might just be possible for a philosopher to be 'concerned with the One' (περί τῇ ταὐτην... τὴν φύσιν 9.29-30) without mentioning it in published treatises or seminars, but it would be highly unlikely. It seems to me best to delete the last three words of the chapter as another marginal addition wrongly incorporated into the text.

There is a further problem of detail concerning άλητοι in 9.30. άλητοι here cannot = ipse, for then the article would be required. (None of the passages cited in KG II.1. pp. 628-629, where the article is omitted, is parallel to our own—though the example of a papyrus quoted in Mayser Grammatik II.2, p. 76, n.1 dating from 113 B.C. provides a thread of justification for the Plotinian text, but not enough in my view.) If άλητοι is kept, then, it must be the ordinary third person pronoun, and the translation of the last part of 9.30 would be 'among themselves in (by means of) their own treatises.' But why the emphasis on their working out the doctrine 'among themselves'? Like all
editors from Ki. onwards (with the exception of H-S) I would follow R and read τοῖς, assuming the corruption to have taken place because of dittography of the corrupt αὐτοὶ in 9,28.

In the phrase ἐν ἀγράφους σωσικίαις (9,31-32) P. is probably thinking of the 'unwritten doctrines' of Plato. The words were commonly used to refer to them (cf. Philoponus in Ph. 515.30 (Vitelli); 521.9-10; Simplicius in Ph. 542.9-12 (twice) (Diels)). It is in them that Plato's Pythagoreanism was most evident.
CHAPTER TEN

After the two chapters of doxography which establish an ancient foundation for belief in the three hypostases, P. turns to the human psyche, and in the next three chapters puts forward the view that the hypostases can be found 'in' the human soul and can be grasped by us even though their activities may remain unperceived.

After recapitulation (10,1-4) and a statement of his thesis (10,5-10), P. moves on to a discussion of our possession of the higher, undescending soul.

10,1-4 οὕτως δὲ ἔχω ... ἐκεῖνος δὲ λέγωμεν : P. sums up the result of the treatise so far. Cf. 7,27-48, and, for a similarly concise description of the Plotinian system, II 9,1,12-16. On the Platonic ἐπίστασθαι πολὺ ὑνής; see on 6,12-13, and on the difficulty of talking about the One see V 5,6,23 ff., and VI 8,13,47 ff. (quoted in the note on 6,19-22). On τὸ δὲ καὶ νοεῖ see 4,26-28 and notes, and on τὴν ψυχὴν ψιλόν; Chap. 2 (passim).

10,5-10 ὡςπερ δὲ τὸ ... ἄνθρωπον : These lines state the thesis which is explained in the rest of Chapter 10 and in Chapter 11. The three hypostases exist 'in' us.

10,5-6 ὡςπερ δὲ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσις ... τοῖς τάξιν : ἐπίστασθαι here has its Platonic meaning of 'real world' (cf. Ρ. 597b 5 where the Form of Bed is called τὴν ἐν τῇ φύσις όνων (κλίνη) ; cf. also ibid. 597c 2 and Ἰτομ. 132d 1-2 τὰ μὲν ψυχή τὰν τῶν ὡςπερ παραδείγματα ἔσταιν τὸν τῇ φύσιν ; In Phd. 102e5 (cf. 102d 6 ff.) Plato distinguishes between τὸ ἐν ψυχῇ
and τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν. It is this distinction which P. has in mind here and which he wishes to clarify.

The view that man (or his soul) mirrors the structure of reality can be traced back at least as far as Democritus, who believed that man was a μικρὸς κόσμος (DK B.34). This idea was common in Persian thought, and A. Götze (Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik 2 (1923), 'Persische Weisheit in Griechischem Gewande', pp. 95-96) suggests that it reached Greece through the Greek doctors who practised at the Persian court (e.g. Democedes, mentioned by Herodotus in 3.129 ff.). But whereas for Democritus, and, for example, for Aristotle (de An. 430a 10-14) it was the structural analogy which was important - i.e., just as there are beings in the world whose sole function is to rule (τὰ βιαῖα), so man has his ruling principle (λόγος) (Democritus loc. cit.) - P. believed, as he quite clearly shows here, that the three hypostases 'in nature' were actually themselves τοῦ ἡμῖν. In view of the fact that P. says that we actually are, each of us, an Intelligible World (καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν ἐκκατόρτους κόσμους οὐσίας III 4.3.22) or that an Intelligible World is in our soul (ἐν τοῖς ψυχικῶς ἑμῖν ἡμῖν III 4.6.22), P. cannot mean by τοῦ ἡμῖν what Plato means when he says in Parm. 133c 9-ff. that we possess only 'likenesses' of the Intelligible Forms (τὸ τῶν ἡμῖν ἡμῖν ... ἡμικοινώπατα). In Parm. 133c 3 ff., the Forms are specifically said not to be ἐν ἡμῖν. In what way, then, do we possess this Intelligible World? How can the One which is infinite, albeit in a special sense (VI
9,6,10-11), be possessed by anything?

First it should be stressed that P.'s metaphysical world is a continuum. Nothing separates the hypostases but their difference (for references see on 6,51-53). Thus no hypostasis is cut off from any other, but remains in contact with it, and is its neighbour. P. says in V 2,2,13 ff. that soul is 'in' its principle (cf. Pl. Parm. 145b 6-7 and V 5,9,1 ff.); this remark should be taken in conjunction with the earlier remark in V 2,2,3-4 that each thing becomes the same as what it follows while it follows it (ἐκατον μίντων ματίν γίνεται ὡς ἦν ἐκποιηται ὡς ἦν ἐφίκηται). Provided that soul 'follows' Intellect, it can be said to be 'in' it. P.'s meaning is illustrated by I 7,1,11-13. Things may be said to possess (χυν) the Good in two senses, την πελα αυτω ὑμοιωθω και την πελα αυτω την ὑπερμιαν τυτιωθα. Note the perfect tense of ὑμοιωθω. The One is possessed only when soul or Intellect has become like it; and they become like it by the process of abstraction and purification that characterizes the ἐνωτροφία, the ascent towards the One. In this state of 'likeness' their activities may be directed towards the One (cf. I 7,2,8 ἵκον ἐδυν ἄγαθον (σκ. ἑρμην.), εἰ πελα ἐκεῖνο βλέποντο). O'Daly well remarks (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973), p. 54) that the presence of soul in Intellect (and of Intellect in the One is virtual. Soul possesses the other hypostases in the special sense that it is capable of rising to their level, and this because of the continuity of the One, Intellect and soul
(note that P. calls soul and Intellect ὑμοσύσκως in IV 7,10,19). If the soul fails to make use of its powers of ἑνωτροφή, its possession of the other hypostases remains virtual. In I 2,4, 25-27 P. says that if soul does not look towards Intellect, Intellect remains ἄλλοτρος even when present (cf. VI 9,8, 36 ff.). And in V 3,3,28-29 Intellect is said to be ours when we use it, and not ours when we do not.

Passages which deal with the relationships between the hypostases often contain the word ἔμπνευσα (see 12,12). The One is 'present' everywhere, but only to those capable of receiving it (VI 9,4,24-25; cf. VI 9,8,33-35). The One's presence is actualised for the soul (πάρειν παντὶ) when the soul verges away from all about it, and makes itself as alike as possible to the One; and the One appears 'in the soul' (VI 7,34,8-14). By its preparation for union the soul actually becomes Intellect — on the nature of the identity involved, see on 5,3 — but the ἑνωτροφή is an ὑμοτροφή inwards (cf. 12,13-14). In VI 4-5 (passim) ἔμπνευσα is used of the Intelligible World; this world is always 'present' to the soul, but soul is not always capable of appreciating its presence. Thus, although Intellect is ἑν ἐμοί (11, 6), it should not be numbered among the parts of soul (V 3,3,25-26). It is 'in' the topmost part of soul, above the level at which our personalities are to be found (I 1,8,3-6). But it is in it only in so far as it is the topmost part of soul which will be able to become Intellect. Intellect is 'imported' for soul (V 6,4,16) because properly speaking soul is not Intellect. Similarly, in the sense that
the soul, through purification can reach it, the One can be said to be also in the soul (cf. III 8, 9, 23-24). The capacity for participation (μέθοδος) increases as purification continues.

P. sometimes uses the image of a circle and its centre as an illustration of the relationship between the One and Intellect, or Intellect and soul (for references see on 7, 7-8). The centre is in a sense a part of each radius, yet because each radius has its point of reference at the centre, in that the centre is the source of each radius, the centre is at the same time different from each. In a similar way, the One and Intellect are both 'in' (a part of) and yet outside soul. But the soul has to realize the immanence of the higher hypostases within itself. This realisation is the aim of Plotinan philosophy. (See further on 11.2-4, Προτεστ ρηματικά should be translated as 'in us', rather than as 'for ourselves' (MK.).

10.6-9 λίγω δε ούκ ἐν τοῖς αὐθεντοῖς ... ἀναμνετικοὶ τινοι : P. has just said that the three hypostases are ἐν τοῖς ἡμιμεν. He now qualifies this since Plato meant by τινος ἡμιμεν 'in the sensible world' (see preceding note), and this is not P.'s meaning - see III 5, 3, 25-26; they are not τινος αὐθεντοί but ἐν τοῖς ἡμιμεν τινοι ... Editors have rightly been troubled by τινος followed by τινοι'. If the mss. text is right, P. must have intended to mark a distinction in sense by the use of two different prepositions within eight words of each other. Translators have translated τινος and τινοι as though they were the
same (e.g., Ci. 'in noi ... in noi'; Ha. 'in uns ... in uns').

Only Fic. with his 'dico non in rebus ... sed de rebus' attempts to translate the two prepositions differently. But in doing so he changes the parallel structure of the two clauses. His first clause refers to the presence of the hypostases 'in rebus quae sensibus offeruntur', whilst the second, 'sed (dico) de rebus quae sensuum vires excedunt', makes a general remark about the purport of P.'s statements. This is unsatisfactory; and it is not clear that ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ζῷων can mean the same as παντὸς τῶν αἰσθητοῖς ζῷων (de rebus). Vitringa's solution, adopted by Vo. and Br., to change ἐν to ἐνί, runs up against the same difficulty. I can find no example of ἐνί meaning either ἐν ὑποστάσεως or ἐν τοῖς.

These difficulties vanish if we read αἰσθητοῖς for αἰσθητοῖς in 10,8 and take ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς to mean 'above the sensible order', and understand ζῷων in apposition to the whole phrase. The sequence of thought then runs as follows: the three hypostases although μὴ ἡμῖν are not in the sensible order (as we are), but above the sensible order, outside it, and outside it in the sense that they are outside the whole universe. There is no difficulty about τὰν (10,7) and κακινα (10,9) each referring to the hypostases. Ἐκίνα is used in 10,9 because τὰν would have been ambiguous in view of the proximity of τὰ αἰσθητοῖς. And for ἐνί c. dat. meaning 'above' see on 5,1.
P. applies this notion to the human condition in 10,9-10 - the three hypostases are in us in that they are in the 'inner man'. I do not think that Br., Ci., and Ha. are right to translate ὑν τοῖς ἀριστηροῖς as 'in us as sensible objects'. Ci. even suggests αὐτοῖς after each occurrence of τοῖς in 10,7.

The application of the general remarks to the human sphere does not take place until 10,9-10.

The three hypostases transcend the sensible order. This is perhaps least obvious in the case of soul with its particular responsibilities for the body. P., however, believed that part of the soul remained undescending and in the Intelligible World, and it is on this that he concentrates (see below on 10,21-23); and since all the parts of soul are a unity (see on 10,27-28) the soul in general can be said to be in the Intelligible World, though at its lowest limit (for references see on 4,11). Souls' seeming lack of transcendence and their individuality stem from the fact that body is so created that it is capable of receiving only part of that which is everywhere present. Division and hence individuation is a πάθημα of body rather than of soul (IV 2,1,75-76).

As in Chapter two, ὀμοιονός is used in 10,9 as a synonym for κόσμος (cf. 2,38-40 where ὁ ὀμοιονός is picked up by ὁ κόσμος ὅστις). Ὁ τῶν ὀμοιονός is the same as τὸ ἄνδρον. Ha.'s 'das Weltall' is excellent.

10,9-10 αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώπου ... ἀνθρώπου : H-S are right to mark this sentence from what precedes by a semi-colon. An ellipse of λίγῳ should probably be understood with ὁ ἄνθρωπος...
"... The translation should be: 'and in the realm of the individual I mean what Plato meant by the inner man.' 

Ta' toon ἀνθρώπου refers back to πρὸς τοῦτον of 10,6.

Br.'s 'telles sont les parties de l'homme que Platon appelle l'homme intérieur' is quite wrong. The other translators paraphrase, but capture the general sense.

Plato's remarks about the 'inner man' can be found in Ξ. 598a 7 ff. (ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου; P. changes ὄντος to ὄνω, perhaps because ὄνω is parallel in form to ὀμό),

where the inner man is τὸ λογίστικόν, the highest part of Plato's tripartite soul. In Plotinian psychology τὸ λογιστικόν or σύναστα (see on 3,13) is the only part of soul which is winged for the intellectual act (V 3,4,13-14) and which therefore has the capability of advancing beyond itself. Thus it is capable of grasping the presence of Intellect and the One (see on 10,5-6). The hypostases can therefore be said to be in the inner man. (Br.'s reference to Pl. Alc. I 130c is not very helpful.)

The distinction between inner and outer man is also found in III 2,15,59 where ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἱεροῦ is contrasted with the real Socrates; cf. also I 1,7,20. 10,5 ff. where the 'true man' is opposed to the living body, which P. describes as an animal (Θηρίον; cf. Pl. Ρ. 588e 5). The distinction occurs also in St. Paul and Philo (see C. Kittel, Theologisches Wörterbuch, I. 366,17 ff.). In both secular and non-secular writings the sense is that the inner man is what we really are.
10,10-30 ἓν τοὺς ... τοῦτο ἵναν : Τοῦτον marks the change from the introductory remarks to the consideration of the particular sense in which our soul possesses the higher soul. In this passage P. seems to make no distinction between the undescending soul and the Hypostasis-Soul (see on 2,44). It is this which is said to be 'in' us.

10,10-12 ἓν τοὺς ... ψυχῆς φύσις : On the divine nature of the human soul see on 1,2; 4,11; and 10,6-9. Because of its involvement with body, soul can be said to leave the Intelligible World behind. Πάντα ὑπ' ψυχῆς φύσις does not refer specifically to the Hypostasis-Soul (ἡ πάσα ψυχή).

10,12 τελεία δὲ ἡ νοῦν ψυχικά : Cf. 3,13-14 and note. Our soul's potentialities are actualized by Intellect. P. makes a functional distinction between the higher and lower soul, the higher being concerned with the realm of Intellect, and the lower with the realm of the body and sense-perception (cf. Alex. Aphr. de An. 91.23-24 (Bruns) τῆς τολκείας (sc. ψυχῆς), ἡτις πρὸς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τὸν νοὸν ἐγκυμίων). Properly speaking, of course, all the types of soul are one (see on 10,27-28).

10,12-13 νοὺς δὲ ὁ μὲν ... λογισθῶσα παρέχων : This passage is discussed in the note on 3,13. P. distinguishes here as often between the soul's intellect and Intellect the second hypostasis. That the νοὺς λογισθῶσα is a faculty of the soul is made clear by 11,1-2 where chapter 10 is summed up by the genitive absolute διὸ ὅτι ὁ ψυχής ἦς λογισθῶσα πριν γίνεται.
In our present passage P. identifies the soul's intellect with the undescending soul (cf. τὸ ἐν τῷ νοημático μένον 10,23) which I take to be that part of the soul's intellect which deals with the Πνεύμα which come from the Forms alone (cf. V 3,2,9-10). On its working see on 11,1-3.

10,13-15 τὸ δὲ λογικόν τοῦτο... δειγμάτων: Aristotle (e.g., de An. 403a 2 ff.; ibid. 413b 24-27; ibid. 429b 4-5) thought that intellect was the only part of soul which transcended the body, and which therefore did not need the body for its exercise. This view had perhaps been foreshadowed by Plato when in Phd. 65c 5 ff. he maintained that the reasoning of the soul was best when the body and its πνεύμα were neglected. Through Alexander of Aphrodisias (de An. 84,10 ff. (Bruns)) this idea found its way into Plotinus (cf. I 1,19,15 ff. where διάνοια is said to be one of the ἒδα of soul; IV 3,19,25-26 καὶ γὰρ τὸ δειγμα τοῦ εἶδος (sc. λογικοῦ καὶ νοῦ) οὗ δὲ δειγμάτων τελείως τοῦ σώματος).

Although the actual exercise of διάνοια does not need the co-operation of any bodily organ, one of the sets of objects of its judgement, the Πνεύμα which come from αἰσθήσεις (I 1,7,10-11, 9,19), is ultimately dependent on the perceptive faculty of the lower soul. By the time that these Πνεύμα get to the level of διάνοια, however, they are νοημάτων (I 1,7,12), because they have been abstracted from their material surrounds (III 6,18, 26-28). This activity of διάνοια corresponds to the activity of αἰσθήσεις in Aristotle's psychology (de An. 424a 17 ff. esp.)
17-19 ο μὲν αἰσθητικὴς ἐστὶ τῷ ὑμνημονίῳ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὀνομάζειν τὴν ἑλκύσην καὶ τῷ ὑμνημονίῳ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῇ ἑλκύσῃ καὶ τῷ ὑμνημονίῳ τῇ ἑλκύσῃ καὶ τῷ ὑμνημονίῳ τῇ ἑλκύσῃ. But the Plotinian ἔνανον also deals with the τάσοι which come from the transcendent Forms, with which it compares the forms which it has abstracted from sensible particulars (V 3,2,7 ff.).

Soul possesses the Forms as things 'unfolded and separate' (ἀναπληρώθηκα καὶ ὁδὸν κοπροφυμίων I 1,8,7-8), as things 'written out' (V 3,4,20 ff.) — it sees them as something distinct from itself — and uses them as standards (κανόνες V 3,4,16-17) in its activity of judging the τάσοι from the sensible world. That part of soul which has such close links with the Intelligible World is the undescending soul (see on 11,1-3).

10,15-17 τὴν δὲ ἐνέγκαιν ζωτοῦ... σώματι: P. follows Plato (Phd. 65c 5 ff.) in associating purification with separation from the body. The undescending soul, which needs no bodily co-operation, is already separated from the body and therefore 'pure' (cf. V 3,9, 28-29). But only when the rest of the soul has reached the level of purification of the higher soul can the further ascent towards Intellect and the One take place.

Κεῖσις is the technical Stoic term to describe the mode of the presence of the material soul in the body. P.'s polemic against them can be found in II 7 σὺν τῆς δὲ ὀδόνει κεῖσις (It is interesting to note that Chrysippus (SVF II.
in fact distinguishes κεφασις from παραθεσις, μυς and συγκυμνης and takes μυς to be the correct word to describe the body/soul relationship.) P.'s phrase κεφασινον συματε, however, carries with it Platonic connotations of purification not associated with the Stoic κεφασις. Note the phrase πηλιν την θανατη κεφασινη (I 6,5,36) and cf. τη συματι ομαπεφεμηνη (IV 4,27,14; I 2,3,12) taken from Pl. Phd. 66b 5.

Dodds' addition of ον after χωριστω in 10,16-17 is ingenious but unnecessary.

10,17-18 ον τη περιη... ον οφαλησεται: MK, Br. and Ha. give literal translations of the phrase ον τη περιη νοηην; it is not clear, however, what 'within the first Intellectual' (MK) might mean. Fic., who is more specific, takes νοηηη in apposition to ον τη περιη and translates 'in primo illo rerum scilicet intelligibili gradu', but it seems to me difficult to get this out of the Greek. Ci. gives 'nella sfera piu alta dello Spirito'; but is is odd to place soul at the top of the Intelligible World. In virtue of its undescending part it is frequently said to be in the Intelligible World, but only at its outer limit (cf., e.g., IV 4,2,16-17; IV 6,3,5-6; IV 8,7,6-7). It is philosophically awkward, then, to take ον τη περιη νοηηη as ον τη περιη τοη νοηηη. I am sympathetic to Dodds' view that νοηηη is a gloss and should be deleted. The only difficulty is that τοη περιητων in the singular is not usually used to refer to the Intelligible World; much more common
in this sense is the plural (cf. 1,24). V 3,5,35 which Dodds adduces in his private text is no real parallel since in that passage τὸ νοητὸν is merely said to be ἡ νοητὴ ὀνήσια. The most satisfactory emendation would be the deletion of the intrusive προφῆτη. For further references to soul ἐν τῷ νοητῷ see 10,23 below; II 5,3,33; IV 1,2; IV 2,1,9-10; IV 5,1,5-6; VI 3,1,23-24.

On this use of τις with a future unfulfilled condition cf. I 2,3,20-21 τις τις διορισμὸν λίγον πέλας θέων, σῶμα ἀν ἀμεταφάναι; IV 3,32,18 τις λίγων ... ὅεθως ἀν λίγοι; VI 5,2,16-18 λίγων ἀν τις ... συμμοιρίζοντα ἀν εἰκόνος.

10,18-19 ἀν γάρ τούτων ... πονηρόνν: Note the γάρ. Anything which is not in place (τοῦτος) but outside it must be in the Intelligible World. Place is the realm of body and becoming, and not of eternal ὀνήσια (VI 5,2,9 ff.), so that if you want to know where the soul is you must find out where τῷ θέων is, and this enquiry cannot be conducted with the physical organs of sense-perception (IV 3,24,23-28). In IV 3,20 P. argues that the soul is not present in the body as in a place. By its creation of body, the soul creates place (IV 3,9,22-23) because body needs somewhere to be (ἐνεμερωθείς) and cannot rest in itself like everything which is immaterial (VI 4,8,2 ff.). If the soul needs no place, a fortiori neither does Intellect nor the One (IV 2,1,19-20; V 2,2,19-20 - of Intellect; VI 9,3,42. 6,30 ff. - of the One).

Anything which needs place for its existence is ἀνεμερωθείς (VI 9,6,34).
The soul, like Intellect and the One, is present everywhere to whatever is capable of receiving it (see on 10,5-6); but it is only present locally in the sense that the organs which use it have a particular spatial position. Thus the reasoning soul is not present in the brain as a place, but ὃ· τὸ ξίγκα ἔτι (sc. ἡ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμις) ἀπολαμβάνει αὐτοῦ (IV 3,23,33-34). In a figurative sense place in the Intelligible World is the place of life (II 5,3,39); but this means no more than that the activity of the Intelligible World is life itself.

10,19-21 ὁμων γὲ ὅ ᾴ ἐκθ' αὑτὸ... φῶς... ὁμων looks forward to ὥναν. Only in that state of purity which results from bodily separation (ὁμων) does soul fully possess the qualities of ὅ ᾴ ἐκθ' αὑτὸ, ὅ ἐξω etc.. Something like ὑστερ ἀὑτῶ (sc. ἡ ψυχῆ) must be understood with the phrase ὁμων γὲ... ᾴ ἀναλογ. Ci.'s 'solo allora potremo cogliere "ciò che è in sé"... quando...’ wrongly introduces a personal subject in 'potremo'. The translations of Fic. and Ha. are excellent, those of Br. and MK not so accurate.

To ᾴ ἐκθ' αὑτό' (cf. Pl. Phd. 67c 7) emphasizes soul’s ontological independence of the body, ὅ ἐξω καὶ ᾴ ἀναλογ its transcendence. Unlike body, soul has being and life ἐπὶ ἀὑτὴ (IV 7,9,1) and ἐξ ἐμεταφ. (IV 7,11,2).

Note that the soul is referred to in the neuter (μόνον 10,20). This change of gender is no doubt due to the proximity of ὅ ᾴ ἐκθ' αὑτὸ, ᾴ ἐξω and ᾴ ἀναλογ.
10,21–23 διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ νοητὸν μέσον: Ἔπειτα τοῦ παντός means 'in the case of the universe' and contrasts with ἐν ... ἐμόν in 10,23. This use of ἐπεί c. gen. is common in P. - see e.g., VI 4,10,5 ἐπεί τοῦ ἕξωθεν; VI 5,5,5 ἐπεί τοῦ κόσμου; VI 5,8,11 ἐπεί τῶν αἰσθητῶν.

H–S differ from Br., Ci., Ha. and MK in citing as the reference of φιλος Pl. Th. 36e 3 where the soul is said to encircle the heavens from outside (κύκλῳ πάλιν ἔξωθεν προκειμένα). The occurrence of ὑπ' , however, which makes little sense if it is not included within the quotation, and which is deleted by Creuzer partly for these reasons, confirms that the passage P. has in mind here is not Th. 36e 3, but Th. 34b 4 καὶ ὑπ' ἔξωθεν τὸ σῶμα αὐτῆς (ἐκ τῆς φυσῆς) προκειμένα. Br., Ci., and Ha. are right to mark καὶ ὑπ' ἔξωθεν in quotation marks, though in view of the difference between the Platonic τὸ σῶμα αὐτῆς προκειμένα and P.'s τὴν φυσῆ προκειμένα, I doubt whether Br. and Ha. are similarly right to take this last phrase as part of the direct quotation.

P. uses this and an adjoining passage of the Timaeus (36d 9 – εἰ μὲν τοῦτο πᾶν τὸ σωματοσωμία ἵνας ἀλής ὑπερτάκειτο) to bolster his novel theory that part of the soul remains in the Intelligible World without descending into the body (cf. IV 8,8,2–3). This theory is based on an interpretation of Plato of the sort that has not appealed to modern commentators. If the soul is said to envelop body from outside, and if body is inside (ἵνας) soul, then soul must be 'larger' than the body which it contains. Thus
there must be a part of soul which always remains outside body. Proclus, commenting on these passages from the *Timaeus*, acknowledges that they point to the transcendence of the soul (in Ti. II 106.32-33 (Diehl); ibid. 108.28-29), but denies that any part of the soul remains undescending, and brings against this interpretation Ti. 43a 4 ff. where Plato says that the ἀποκαταστάσεως of the immortal soul are fastened in the unstable body, and the description of the passivity of the soul in Ti. 43c 7 ff. (in Ti. III 323.5-6; ibid. 332.23 ff.). It seems to me that Proclus' denial of P.'s doctrine of the undescending soul is truer to the spirit of Plato. But the permanent position of the soul (including the human soul) in the Intelligible World is essential to the dynamic mysticism of Plotinian philosophy. The Intelligible World is within us if we can only realise it, and therefore the mystical ascent is a turning inwards. Because of this, ascent is within the capabilities of each and every one of us. Hence the importance of knowing the answer to the introductory question of V 1.

10,23-24 ἐνὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ... τῇ κεφαλῇ : The mss. read ἐνὶ κεφαλῶν for H-S' ἐνικεφαλῶν and ἀκήρον for ἀκηρον. Pace earlier editors and Cilento, ἐνὶ κεφαλῶν makes no sense, and Pic.'s translation is a mere paraphrase. Mi., in desperation, deletes the whole sentence. Vitzinga proposed ἀναμεμεντήσων and this reading is printed by Vo. and Br. who follow Vitzinga in seeing a reference to Pl. *Phdr*. 249c 3-4 where the exercise of human intelligence is described as a memory of what the soul has seen on its journey above the heavens when it 'looked upwards to the
really real' (ἀνακαίψαται ἃς τὸ ὄν ὄνως). Like Perna and Creuzer they retain the accusative Ἀκές. It is difficult to see how this quotation from the Phaedrus could be used as evidence for P.'s theory that part of the soul remains permanently in the Intelligible World. An upward glance of the soul is hardly a permanent feature of the psychic condition.

(The same objection applies to MK's attempt to relate the passage to Phdr. 248e 2-3 where the best soul is said to raise its charioteer's head ἐὰς τὸν ἔξω τοῦν.) The position of the soul ὑπ' ἄκες ἄκαιρη (cf. Pl. Ti. 90a 5 ὑπ' ἄκες πο σῴματι) is, on the other hand, a permanent position, and can at least be used by P. to point to a similarly permanent feature of soul's composition; and ἵστε... ἡμῶν in 10,23 may well pick up πείρα τῆς ἡμῶν in Pl. Ti. 90a 2-3. I agree with Ha. and H-S that Ti. 90a 5 is the point of reference here.

Note also that the next lines of the Timaeus passage connect soul's spatial position with its power of raising us from the earth to our heavenly kin (η ὅς τὴν ἐν ὁλιγήν ταγγύνων); this sentiment would appeal to the Plotinian conviction that the position of the soul in the spiritual world made a spiritual ana-basis possible.

Ἐπικεκυρίνων (Heintz ap. Ha.) is an excellent emendation. P. quite obviously believed that Plato did not make himself as explicit as he might have done (see on 8,11-12 μὴ ἀναπερ- ταίνωμεν; V.P. 15,3 and III 9,1,23 ἐπικεκυρίνων; note also the riddling nature of myth in general - see on 7,30-34).
Ha.'s cross-references to IV 3,22,8 ff. and 23,21 ff. give a parallel for the use (in subsequent chapters in IV 3) of the same passages from the *Timaeus* as P. uses in our present chapter.

In IV 3,12,4-5 P. adapts the Homeric description of Eris (II. 4.443) as an illustration of the nature of the undescending soul. Presumably he uses Plato's *Timaeus* in our present passage because he wants references from the same work for both the world soul (Ti. 34b 4) and for the human soul (Ti. 90a 5), though the Homeric reference may have suggested to him the change from \textit{Eris} (Pl. Ti. 90a 5) to \textit{μεθανή} (cf. II. 4.443).

Plato's remarks about the position of the soul were probably meant to be taken literally. There were two theories in antiquity about the seat of the soul (the rational controlling centre) in the body. The minority opinion which Plato follows in the *Timaeus* was that the soul was in the brain (cf. \textit{ιόμερος νησιφατι}). Rivalry between the two schools of thought ceased after the discovery of the nerves in the third century by the Alexandrians Herophilus and Erasistratus. On this see F. Solmsen, *Mus. Hel.* 18 (1961), pp. 150 ff., 169 ff.

10,24-26 καί ἡ παλαικλίμων... κακῳρηκίων: The 'exhortation' can be found in Pl. *Phd.* 67c where Plato defines purification as \textit{τῶ κακοπραγματικῶν μία} μείκνυν \textit{πρὸ τῶν σώματος ἑνώς προμηθής} (Phd. 67c 6-7). P. explains that Plato does not mean by this spatial separation of soul and body but rather the leading up of the lower soul. The dative \textit{τῇ ὁμω} is parallel to the datives in 10,26-27, and is equivalent to \textit{κατὰ τῶν ου}. For this use
see Arist., de An. 413b 14-15 χωρίον λόγιον μόνον ἢ καὶ τόσον; ibid. 427a 5 τόσον δὲ καὶ άξιομαθείᾳ αδιαίρετον.

The parenthesis explains why spatial separation cannot be Plato's meaning; but P.'s meaning is obscured by the allusive reference of τοῦτο. Br., Ci., and MK seem to take it to refer to τὸ χωρίον (e.g., Br. 'car cette séparation est établie par la nature'), but it is not clear that (ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου) φύσιν κυκλευρίμων τοῦτον makes any sense. Fic. ('quod enim intra separatum est, naturaliter est sepultum') understands by τοῦτο τὸ τόσον κυκλευρίμων itself understood from τὸ χωρίον... τόσον. Best is Ha.'s suggestion that τοῦτο refers to that part of the soul which remains in the Intelligible World (τὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ μόνῳ 10,23). Plato's 'separation' cannot mean spatial separation, because the undescending soul is already separate naturally from the body; therefore Plato must mean that we should lead the lower part of our soul upwards according to the methods outlined in 10,26-27.

P. believed that we existed at the level at which most of our psychic activity was concentrated. The dominant part of the soul claimed the leadership of the whole (II 3,9,19 ff.; III 4,2,4-5). Thus, the man who lives entirely at the level of ἀναθησις is totally unaware of the workings of his higher soul, and this unawareness can lead to disastrous effects in his next reincarnation. Hence, P. says in III 4,2,12 ff. (with a reference to Pl. Thet. 176a 8-b 1, a passage quoted side by side with Phed. 67c 6 in II 3,9,19-20) we must flee from the body and escape towards 'the Intelligible and
Intellect and God. The danger is that we should treat our body and its affections as the most valuable part of us and as the seat of our human personality (IV 4,18,17-19); compare, though, the inclusive notion of personality put forward in 12,6 ff.: on this see on 12,8-10.

10,26-27 ἐλλὰ τὴν μὴ νιώσῃ ... πρὸς τὸ σῶμα: The method of separation - cf. III 6,5,24-25 ὁ δὲ Χρυσόσολος τὴν μὴ πολλὴν νιώσῃ καὶ τὴν πείρα τὰ κάτω μὴ φαντασθῇ. 

Ἀνίασις is a Gnostic term (cf. II 9,4,6-7. 11,13 ff.) which P. uses here in a non-technical sense (cf. also III 6,5,25) to refer to the descent of the soul into the body.


This faculty of the soul has something of the intellectual in it ( φαντασικὸν σῶμα νοτοφόν IV 3,23,32) and can sometimes be used to lead the soul upwards. For example, in V 8,9,7 ff., P. explains how to imagine the Intelligible World. First one must imagine a sphere which contains everything within it, and then a similar sphere, but this time one without mass. And then one must pray to God to come, the God who made the world whose image
the soul possesses. In V 6,5,15 P. speaks of an 'imagination of the Good'. But it is quite clear that imagination is only a shadow of the reality which it mirrors. Nevertheless, these passages show that imagination can be a help in the spiritual anabasis. Ha. and MK seem to take our present passage in this positive way (e.g., Ha. 'dass man sich durch Nichthinabneigen, also mit den Vorstellungen vom Leibe trennt').

The difficulty with such an interpretation is that it destroys the parallelism which should surely exist between η ὑ μη νουσιν τως φαντασιαις and η ἀληθειον. Ἀληθειος and η μη νουσις emphasise the negative attitudes that the soul should have towards the body. P. seems to be looking at the body and the material order from the vantage point of the soul which is already clear of the body. And imagination is often seen as something harmful to the soul. It is dependent on bodily states (IV 4,28,35-52) and is described in I 8,15,18 as a μη καὶ ἀλογον ἐπειδήων. It can be the cause of πράγμα (III 6,4,18-26); it is a midway state between the lowest phase of soul (φως ) and νόησις (IV 4,13,11-13). It is therefore denied to the pure soul (I 8,15,18-21), and the bad soul is the soul which gives in easily to obscure imaginings (I 8,14,5 τως ἀμαθεις φαντασιαις τιμοεύειν ἐξείδως). P. often sees imagination, then, as something to be avoided by the soul which desires purification. It is in this sense that Fic., Br. and Ci. take our present passage. But the Greek text cannot support such an interpretation, since the force of μή
cannot extend beyond the phrase τῇ μῇ νιώτε. The obvious emendation is the insertion of μῇ between ταῖς and φαντασίαις. Not only does ταῖς μῇ φαντασίαις give excellent sense, but it has a parallel in III 6,5,24-25 (already cited; note τῇ ... μῇ φαντασία). The negative phrase is much more in keeping with the negative tone of τῇ μῇ νιώτε and τῇ ἀλλοτριότητι.

'Ἀλλοτριότητι is the technical Stoic opposite to σκίνων. Since the soul is ἐν τῆς κτέντονος ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὐσίας (I 6,2,7-8) its natural inclinations should be towards the Intelligible World. Body is something to it (VI 4, 15,38), although in one sense, in the sense that our historical personalities make use of an ensouled body, body can be said to be ours and not ἀλλοτριότης (IV 4,18,11-12). The trouble is that soul can forget its origin and become too involved with body. The pure soul must have a constant awareness of its difference; and this will help it to remain untainted.

10,27-28 έ ἐ γι ς καὶ τῷ λοιπὸν ψυχῆς ... τῷ ἀνῷ: Τῷ λοιπὸν... ἔντοις is all of soul except for the undescending soul, which, of course, does not need purification.

Εἴδος is here used as an alternative to μῆς (cf. I 1,8,19; II 3,18,20-21; IV 7,14,3-4). The soul is often described as made up of parts (e.g., III 6,2,8-9; V 3,3,26), though sometimes P. apologises for the use of μῆς (cf. IV 3,20,1-2 τῇ ... λειψάνα μῆ; V 2,2,5 οὖν μῆς; on the meaning of μῆς see IV 3,2,10 ff.). But P. nevertheless believed
that soul was a unity. The 'parts' represent merely the
different functions of the soul which correspond to the different
functions of the living being. P. sometimes calls these functions
συνάρμος rather than μέρη . In IV 9,3,17 ff. he compares
the powers in the soul to the powers in a seed (cf. the logoi in
semen in 6,11-12); each power in the seed is separate, yet at
the same time the seed is an indivisible unity. The powers in the
soul are 'bound together by one chain' ( τις τοις πνευμαί τοις
συναρμάται VI 9,1,41-42). Thus in a sense ( τεύχον τινά
V 2,1,23-24) the upper soul reaches down as far as the vegetable
world.

On the upward ascent see on 3,3.

10,28-30 καὶ το ἄνωθεν . . . ζ' : Fic.(?), Br., and MK take the
καὶ as explanatory - i.e. they take these lines to refer to
το λοιπόν ... χωσ of 10,27-28. Ha. and CI. take καὶ
to mean 'even' (Ha. 'auch das...was hier...; CI. 'persino') and
this gives better sense. Even the very lowest part of soul must
be raised upwards.

'Ενταλθα refers to the sensible world - contrasted with
ἀνω - and τοῦτο to body. Even the lowest soul is not
literally in the body; it is said to be so only because of its
close involvement with it.

The phrase έ μόνον ιστί τόμαρος δημιουργόν καὶ
πλαστικόν is a reminiscence of Pl. Epin. 981b 7-8 τοῦτο
δ' ιστι σχέδον έ μόνον πλάττειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν
προστεθεὶ (see now H-S t.3 p. 346 in 'fontes addendi'); this
passage is also recalled at V 8,2,4-5 ἡν πλάσωντος ἀλής καὶ δημιουργοῦσαντος and VI 9,1,18 δημιουργοῦσα καὶ πλάσωσα καὶ μορφοῦσα (unnoticed by H-S). In the Laws and Epinomis Plato maintains that the soul is responsible for creating the world. In P.'s philosophy this job is performed by φύσις which is an Ἥθαλμα of the world soul rather than of the human soul, and which creates by imprinting its logos on matter (II 3,19,10-13 ; III 8,2,28-30). In the human sphere, φύσις is that part of the soul which maintains life within the human compound of soul and body (see H. J. Blumenthal, Plotinus' Psychology (The Hague, 1971), p. 61). Our present passage is extraordinary in that the job usually associated with the world soul is apparently given to the human soul, but cf. V 3,9,2-5 where the human soul (and soul in general) is said to πλάττων σῶμα (= body in general).
Chapter 11 continues the discussion of Chapter 10. From the undescending soul (soul's 'intellect') P. moves on to Intellect properly speaking and its source, the One. He argues that both these hypostases can be found 'in' the human soul. 11,1-7 deals with Intellect, and 11,7-15 with the One.

11,1-3 ὁ θεὸς ὁ ßοιν ψυχὴς ... ὁ θεὸς καλὸν: The ßοιν is resumptive, and shows that the description which follows in 11, 1-3 is a description of the working of the undescending soul which 'reasons purely' (10,16) and remains in the Intelligible World (10,23). A comparable account of this activity is given in V 3,3. P. claims in V 3,2,7-11 that the reasoning soul deals both with the sense-perceptible world through the information conveyed to it by sense-perception and with the world of Forms whose 'impressions' (τιματικό) it also receives. In the next chapter he gives an example of what he means. Διάνοια reacts to the sense-data of a physical object and identifies it as Socrates (the stock image; see on 4,20); but then he adds the revealing statement that if Διάνοια makes a judgement about whether Socrates is good or not, this judgement, although made about a sensible particular, i.e. Socrates, goes beyond the information conveyed to the soul by sense-perception and must therefore be derived from the standard of goodness which the soul (Διάνοια) contains within itself (ἐὰν δὲ, ἐὰν ἀγαθὸς ἰδὼν, ἐὰν μὲν ἐγνώ ὅτι ἄλλης ἀνθρώπους ἑγέρν, ὅτι ἐγέρν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, χρῆ παρ' αὐτῆς ἃν ἐχαί κανόνα ἑχοῦσα τοῦ
This is the judgement which deals with what P. in V 3,2,10 calls the 'impressions' of Intellect. Note that it is a judgement about particulars.

Compare I 6,3,1 ff. where P. is talking about the recognition of a καλὸν σῶμα. After saying that it is recognised by 'the power ordained for the purpose' (i.e. sense-perception) he continues with the statement that 'perhaps the rest of the soul too' (I prefer H-S's αἴσθησις to K.'s αἴσθησις) pronounces judgement by fitting the sense-datum of the beautiful body to the Form in itself and by using this as a standard (πάθα δὲ καὶ αἴσθησις συναγερμοῦσα τὴν πρὶν αἰτή εἰς βάσιν καλωσίν περὶ τὴν καλὸν χρωμίνῃ ὑπότης κανόνι τοῦ τιθέος I 6,3,3-5).

In this passage 'the rest of the soul' refers, I think, to διάνοια which applies its own criteria to the physical object (σῶμα). In view of this, δικαίων καὶ καλῶν in 11,1-2 must mean 'beautiful and just things' and not 'the right and good' (as MK).

The τοῦτο of 11,2 clearly refers to a particular.

The reasoning of διάνοια, then, contains, as it were, two parts. The first part deals with the apprehension of the physical world, and the second part deals with the apprehension of the Forms, in so far as this is possible, and their application as standards to the physical world. Thus the principles (ἀρχαὶ) of διάνοια are either sense-perception or Intellect (VI 7,1,21-23); P. describes a mistake by λόγος = λογισμὸς which results from the use of the wrong principles in VI 5,2,1-6). The ability to apprehend the world of Forms is, it seems to me, the particular
ability of the undescending soul (see on 3,13). Its ability is still a form of reasoning since it applies what it knows to the physical world; but it is a form of 'pure reasoning' (10-16; V 3,9,28-29 τὴν τοιαύτην ψυχήν... καθάρως νοεῖται), since what it receives from sense-perception are already νοητά (I 1,7,12).

The criteria which ὄνομα uses in its judgements about sensible particulars are sometimes referred to as κανόνες (I 6,3,5; V 3,3,8. 4,16-17). These are, of course, the Forms which soul possesses, though its manner of possession differs from that of Intellect proper. In the soul the Forms are, as it were, unfolded and separate (ἀνιχνητικά καὶ καταλαμβάνα I 1,8,7-8; cf. V 3,9,30-31 of ἀρχής); in Intellect this element of separation is absent (ἐν ὁδὸν ὁμόνω τὰ πάντα I 1,8,8) (cf. V 3,4,21-22 ὁρεί (sc. τὸ ἰδιοστοιχία) ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὰ πάντα ὃν γεγενημένα ἐς ἱκά καὶ γεφύρων καὶ γεφάρας).

The close relationship between soul and Intellect, however, makes it possible for P. to call ὄνομα the image (ἰκών) of Intellect. The reasoning of the undescending soul is described in V 3,9,28-29 as a sort of νοησις (τὴν τοιαύτην ψυχήν... καθάρως νοεῖται). This is because Intellect colours the soul and makes it intellectual (V 6,4,16) and because soul manages to retain some of Intellect's light (see on 7,43-44).

For the pairing of δίκαιον and καλόν cf. IV 7,8,24; V 5,1,29-30.

On the distinction between the acquisitive nature of the
reasoning of the soul, and the non-acquisitive knowledge of Intellect see 11,3-4 and note on 4,16. It is a defining characteristic of the soul that it should have the power of reasoning (V 3,3,14-15).

11,3-4 ἀνάλημα τοῦ... πρὸς ψυχήν γίνεται: For the Platonic argument see Pl. R. 507b 5-7 καὶ οὕτω πρὸς πάντων ἀρτοῦ μὲν πολλὰ ἐνθέμεν, πάλιν αὖ καὶ ἵσταν μᾶν ἐκαστοῦ ὡς μᾶς οὕσες τιθίντες, ἵνα ζωὴ ἐκαστον προσαγορίωσην; cf. ibid. 596a 6-7. On this theory of predication, the existence of many things called just or beautiful presupposes the existence of the Forms of justice and beauty. These Forms are the ultimate cause of the knowledge of their reflexions in the physical world (cf. Pl. R. 508e 3-4 - the Form of the Good is the cause of knowledge and truth). Since for P. Intellect is the Forms, Intellect itself can be said to be the cause of the deliberations of its image the reasoning soul (cf. λογίζομεν περί γνώσεως 10,13). And since furthermore in P.'s interpretation of Aristotle (Metaph. 1072b 22 ff.) Intellect's thought is non-acquisitive, Intellect does not have to seek for its knowledge (see on 4,16). Reasoning is for those still engaged in the process of learning (IV 4,12,7-10).

Intellect's knowledge of itself takes place in an atmosphere of rest and immobility which contrasts with the flux necessarily associated with the physical world. Thus ἐτανάλ and its cognates are often associated with Intellect and the Forms (see 4,12 and note, and especially IV 4,12,28-29 where ἐτανάλ is said to be λογίσμοι ζησω; note also Pl. Parm. 132d 1-2
Ci prefers to read ἕστωτος with B and C, which also read ἕστωτος against the majority reading ἕστως in V 9,10,13. Ci’s reason for preferring ἕστωτος—that Ptc. translates the phrase by ’stabile quiddam iustum’—suggests that he did not realise that the neuter participle has an alternative form in ἕστως. Although generally rarer than the form in -os, this form is quite common in Plotinus; see Schwyzer RE 513,56-58. ἕστωτος is certainly the right reading.

On the intensive use of ἅρμει in ἅρμει φωκημένος see on 4,19. Reasoning and soul are conceptually connected; see I 1,7,23-24; V 3,3,14.

καὶ ἐὰν ὅτε μὲν ... ὅτε δὲ μὴ : Cf. Arist. de An. 430a 22 ἀλλ᾿ ὅτε ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ᾿ οὖν νοεῖ. Aristotle is speaking of the πνευματικὸς νοῦς which is in certain features analogous to P.’s Intellect. Note, for example, that the πνευματικὸς νοῦς causes the actualisation of the πρακτικὸς νοῦς and compare 10,12-13 νοεῖ δ᾿ ὁ μὲν λογικόμενος, ὁ δὲ λογικοῦθαν παράχων; see also P. Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness (The Hague, 1969), ch. 2 esp. pp. 10-11. The human intellect, of which P. is speaking in our present passage, unlike Intellect proper which is pure ὁμοιόμονα is incapable of incessant intellectual activity. But because Intellect proper is ‘in’ us P. has to explain why we cannot always perceive the workings of the higher Intellect. This he does in chapter 12.
On the permanent activity of Intellect, see V 8,3,10; V 9,2,21-22.

5,4.

Some mss. omit the negative ων in de An. 430a 22 and so make the potential intellect the subject of the sentence (see Ross's app. crit. ad loc.). If this were the correct reading the parallelism between Aristotle and P. would be exact. But Philo-ponus in his commentary ad loc. cites P. as among those who read ων in the text of Aristotle.

11,5-7 ὅτι τὸν μὴ... ἐν ἡμῖν ἔσται: The addition of μὴ is at least as ancient as Picino, since the corrections of A3 are Picino's; see Henry, Manuscripts, p. 33. Μὴ should be placed not between ὅτι and τὸν (as earlier editors from Creuzer onwards), since then one would expect the addition of a second τὸν between ὅτι and τὸν (though Pic. and Br. translate τὸ λογικὸν as though it were a substantive), but between τὸν and λογικὸν. Dodds' text (Select Passages Illustrative of Neoplatonism (London, 1924), p. 52) is followed by Ha. and H-S.

Intellect 'contains' the Form of justice (τὸ δικαίον) as it contains all the Forms (cf. on 4,10-11) and because it is self-sufficient it does not have to reason in order to possess it (IV 3,18,4-5). Intellect actually is its contents.

Br.'s translation ('l'intelligence qui en nous garde toujours l'idée de justice') gives the wrong emphasis. The point is that since we (or our soul) reason, the cause of the reasoning, i.e., Intellect the second hypostasis, must be in us too, so that our reasoning can have a ground.
On the meaning of \( \chi \varepsilon \mu \nu \) see on 10,5-6.

11,7-15 \( \chi \varepsilon \nu \alpha \iota \varsigma \kappa \alpha \iota \ldots \iota i \iota i \) : In the last part of the chapter, P. turns to the One which is also present 'in us'.

11,7 \( \chi \varepsilon \nu \alpha \iota \varsigma \kappa \alpha \iota \ldots \kappa \alpha \, \theta \iota \iota \) : If Intellect is 'in us' then its ground must also be 'in us'. \( \alpha \varepsilon \chi \iota \) and \( \alpha \iota \iota \iota \) are here used practically as synonyms. Wolters, on III 5,1,15 notes that this usage is quite common in P. (cf. e.g., I 8,4,13; II 3,6, 19-20). The equivocation goes as far back as Aristotle, who in *Metaph.*, 1013a 17 says that all causes are principles (\( \pi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \, \gamma \dot{\alpha} \tau \, \tau \alpha \, \alpha \iota \iota \iota \, \alpha \varepsilon \chi \iota \)). Of course, the fact that all \( \alpha \iota \iota \iota \) are \( \alpha \varepsilon \chi \iota \) does not mean that the converse is true, since an \( \alpha \varepsilon \chi \iota \) can be merely the first and non-causal term in a series. P. uses \( \alpha \varepsilon \chi \iota \) in both a causal and a non-causal sense (see on 5,3-4). The One is an \( \alpha \varepsilon \chi \iota \) both in the sense that it has nothing in front of it (i.e., it is the first term in the ontological hierarchy) and that there is no other principle in which its being might be grounded (\( V 5,9,7-8 \, \alpha \varepsilon \chi \iota \) \( \delta \zeta \, \alpha \iota \iota \, \mu \rho \delta \iota \iota \, \iota \chi \omega \omega \alpha \, \pi \dot{\alpha} \) \( \alpha \iota \iota \iota \), \( \omega \delta \iota \iota \) \( \gamma \dot{\alpha} \iota \iota \iota \, \delta \iota \iota \iota \, \chi \dot{\alpha} \) \( \) \); and in the sense that it is the cause of everything (\( \ldots \, \delta \iota \iota \, \alpha \varepsilon \chi \iota \) \( \alpha \iota \iota \iota \) \( \gamma \dot{\alpha} \) \( \tau \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \, V 5,10,14 \)).

On P.'s application of \( \theta \iota \iota \) to the One see Rist, *NN* 24 (1962), pp. 169-180.

11,7-10 \( \sigma \mu \iota \iota \sigma \tau \tau \ldots \chi \lambda \iota \iota \iota \alpha \iota \iota \iota \) : The construction here is difficult. It seems to me impossible to take \( \theta \iota \iota \) (11,7) as the subject of \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \rho \varepsilon \tau \omega \theta \) (as H-S suggest, presumably
understanding \( \text{si} \) with the whole clause). \( \text{To} \) \( \nu \omega \) \( \alpha \chi^{ \prime} \nu \) \( \kappa \lambda \) \( \alpha \iota \tau \iota \nu \) \( \kappa \lambda \) \( \Theta i o n \) go naturally together with \( \epsilon \iota \nu \eta \) in 11,7 and refer to the One. H-S's interpretation means that \( \Theta i o n \) is separated from its verb by three genitive absolute clauses.

It does not make the text any easier to put the three genitive absolute clauses in parenthesis.

Br. follows Mi. and Vo. in reading \( \mu \iota \nu \omega \nu \tau \sigma \) for \( \mu \iota \nu \omega \nu \tau \sigma \) in 11,9, so that the last accusative and infinitival clause starts with \( \kappa \lambda \iota \) in 11,8, and its subject is \( \epsilon \kappa \lambda \iota \nu \eta \) (i.e., the One) understood from \( \epsilon \kappa \lambda \iota \nu \eta \) in 11,8. I am inclined, however, to leave the mss. reading \( \mu \iota \nu \omega \nu \tau \sigma \) unchanged, although I agree with Br. against Ha. that the last infinitival clause begins in 11,9 with \( \kappa \lambda \iota \) and not earlier. The genitive (here \( \tau \omicron \nu \tau \) \( \mu \iota \nu \omega \nu \tau \sigma \)) is sometimes used in P. where the accusative would be more normal. Note especially in our present treatise 6,18-19 \( \epsilon \iota \mu \iota \sigma \tau \rho \gamma \iota \iota \nu \tau \sigma \) \( \alpha \iota \) \( \epsilon \kappa \lambda \iota \nu \eta \) \( \nu \delta \) \( \alpha \mu \iota \tau \) \( \alpha \nu \gamma \kappa \lambda \iota \iota \) \( \iota \pi \tau \) \( \gamma \iota \nu \lambda \iota \nu \alpha \iota \nu \) and see KG II,110 and Schwyzer RE 518,53 ff..

Its use here is fairly easily explained by the proximity of the other two genitive clauses. There is no need, then, with Ci. to suppose that \( \alpha \mu \iota \tau \nu \) has either fallen out or should be understood after \( \alpha \lambda \) .

The sequence of thought in these lines is as follows. P. says in the first two genitive absolute clauses that the One is not divisible, but remains (indivisible), and then adds that although it does not remain in place, it is (must be) seen reflected \( \tau \iota \nu \) \( \pi \nu \lambda \rho \omega \) \( \alpha \iota \) some of which, i.e., objects in the physical world, are in place.
Ha.'s change of μυστος to μίν όντος (11,9) on the grounds that 'er bleibt nicht im Raum, sondern ist im Raum' is unconvincing. Μυστος in 11,9 surely picks up the μυστος in 11,8. Vitringa's suggestion of ωστε for αι in the same line is also unconvincing, because unnecessary.

On the concept of rest (μίν όντος) see on 3,10-12 and on τόρος see 10,18-19. The One is above the physical world in which τόρος is to be found.

The One is present everywhere but only to whatever is capable of receiving it. Note especially III 8,9,23-26 ητε γε τι και πρετήμων αιτού. Ἡ δύστον, δύστον, ὥστε ὥστε, μιν ὥστε. τοῦ (4-5 τοῦ) γε πανταχος (i.e. τού οὖν) τελεσθεναι ἐνόων το θεώμενον τίμιον ἐχει ἐκείθεν and VI 9,4,25-26 ὥστε παραὶ τοῦ ἑγείναι ἄλλο τοῖς δοξόδει θεώμενοι (see also on 10,5-6). The capacity to receive the One extends even to the physical world, and examples of its presence there can be found in VI 9,1,4-6. An army, a chorus, a herd of cattle, a house, or a ship all participate in the One. (The examples used in VI 9,1 are Stoic; cf. SVF II nn. 366-368) The capacity for participation of the discrete body (the chorus) is less than that of the unified body (VI 9,1,32-33), and as the move to the Intelligible World takes place the capacity for participation increases (cf. VI 9,1,33-34 ψυχή δε τοι μαθην λοιπον δια και αιτη). P. implies that our own capacity for participation is great.

Οἶον ἵλιον αἴτων (11,10) is a difficult phrase, and translators tend to gloss over it. ΜΚ gives 'one of its (sc. the
One's) manifestations', Ci. 'Spirito moltoplicate' and Br. paraphrases 'comme s'il avait des parties différentes'. Ha. gives 'gewissermassen ein zweiter Er.' This line of interpretation is followed by C.J.P.O'Daly (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973), p. 90) who refers to Arist. EN 1166a 31 and thinks that the phrase means 'a second self' in the sense of an 'alter ego'. This is attractive, but does not fit the context. The point is that the One is present in many things (νοείότοις 11,9) according to their capacity for participation. It is hardly present in each of them (e.g. in an army, or the bodies of the physical world: cf. VI 9,1,4 ff.) as an 'alter ego'. I agree with H-S that αὐτῶν should be taken as the object of ἐκκαινοῦμαι and that δεῦν ἀλλὰ most probably means 'as something different' (sc. from what the One actually is). Fic.'s 'velut alium quidam praeter ipsa' where 'ipsa' refers to the objects which can receive the One is shown to be unlikely by the comparison which follows where the emphasis is not on the fact that the radii receive something different from themselves but rather on the fact that the centre remains ὅπερ ἔστω, yet nevertheless is the focal point of the radii. Just so the One remains ὅπερ ἔστω without division (cf. 11,7-8) yet is received in a sense by the lower members of the ontological hierarchy according to their varying capacities. Each of the hypostases mirrors the One. Intellect is ὁ πνεῦμα, soul ὁ καλὸν πνεῦμα, the forms immanent in the physical world (i.e., the traces of soul, the logoi) πρᾶγμα καὶ ὁ πνεῦμα καὶ ὁ πνεῦμα μόνον (IV 2,2,52-55: see Pl.
Prm. 144e 5 and 155e 5; V 1,8,26). Note however that according
to VI 9,1,4-6 (see above) even bodies have some participation
in the One. The object of the mystical union, however, is to
receive the One not as something different from what it in fact
is, i.e., according to the capacity of the entity concerned for
participation in it, but in all its fulness and entirety.

11,10-13 ὁσπὴ καὶ τὸ κύντρον... ηγοφλίαυμαι περὶ τοῦτον: The
One is a hyperontic unity, yet can be seen ἐν πολλάς. Just
so, the centre of the circle is a unity, yet each of the radii
has a terminus there, so that the centre can also be said to be
ἐν πολλάς. The image of the unity and plurality of the
centre of the circle may well derive from Alexander of Aphrodisias,
who in commenting on Aristotle's theory of a κοινὸν αἰσθητὴν
says (Quaest. 96,14 ff. (Bruns)) that just as the centre of the
circle is qua centre of the circle one, yet qua πρᾶς of each
radius many, so the common organ of judgement is one in the sense
that it is the only organ of judgement yet many in the sense that
the objects of its judgement are many and varied. Alexander speaks
of the difference between the radii (διαφοράς καιν ἔσχατον
ibid. 96.23) and their particularity (ἐν τῇ ἐνδικτῇ ἔσχατον
ibid. 96.25). Note how P. also talks of the individuality of the
radii (τὸ ἱλίον (τις ἡμερίαν) 11,12). P. uses this image of
the unity and plurality of the centre to describe the complex
nature of Intellect in VI 5,5,11 ff. and IV 2,1,24 ff.. In the
latter passage the centre is said to be κοινὸν ἀναπάντων πιὸν
ἐπὶ ἑνίκης yet at the same time undisturbed by the radii
P. applies and adapts the image to the relationship between Intellect and the One in VI 8,18,7 ff. He compares the One to the centre of the circle and Intellect to the circle itself which has the termini of its radii at the centre. But he stresses that the termini of the radii are only similar to the centre to which they are attached (ποιοὶς ἵνα μιᾷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὑπὲρ τὸ νῦν ὅτι θεότητα VI 8,18,11-12). They are shadowy images of the true centre which is on a higher level than the termini (μὲν ὡς ὄντος ἢ κατὰ ταῦτα τὰς γλαρὰς καὶ τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν... ἡνη ἐκλίνω VI 8,18,13-15). Thus the presence of the One ἐν ποιμνοῖς is seen to be the presence of mere ὑπηνή of the One, and not the presence of the One itself which remains ἐφ' ὕμνων. But the similarity between the terminal centres and the true centre facilitates the mystical appreciation of the centre of all things, since 'likeness' (ὁμοιότης) is one of the prerequisites for spiritual advance (cf. VI 9,4,27... καὶ θύμων ὁμοιότητι).

The phrase ἐκλίνων τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ (11,11) is an imprecise way of referring to the radii (see below); but Cf. is over fussy when he suggests that ἐκλίνη should be read (to agree with γλαρη understood from τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ (sc. γλαρᾶς) 11,11) or that ἐκλίνων refers to τῷ ἡμείῳ τῷ στάσματι. Br.'s translation - 'chacun des points du cercle le (sc. le centre) contient en lui' - is off the mark.
Although the centre of the circle is a point (see Buc. Def 16), \( \sigma \eta \mu \epsilon \tau \eta \circ \omega \nu \) here refers not to the centre but to the \( \nu \iota \epsilon \zeta \alpha \) of each individual radius. The radii do not contain the centre, which according to VI 8,18,13-14 is different from the totality of the \( \pi \iota \epsilon \zeta \alpha \), but rather they have a point (their \( \nu \iota \epsilon \zeta \alpha \) in it.

The force of \( \kappa \alpha i \) in 11,12 is, I think, epexegetic. P. explains the rather vague remark that 'each of the components of the circle has a point at the centre'. The radii, he explains, bring each their individual point (their \( \nu \iota \epsilon \zeta \alpha \)) to the centre. I agree with Fic. that \( \sigma \eta \mu \epsilon \tau \eta \circ \omega \nu \) should be understood with \( \iota \iota \omega \nu \) (11,12). The use of \( \iota \iota \omega \nu \) implies the usual contrast with \( \kappa \alpha \iota \nu \) (cf. I 1,8,3-4). The centre of the circle is in a sense common to all the radii (IV 2,1,24), yet taken as the individual terminus of each of them it is particular to each. If we move from the analogy to what it represents, the point which P. is making may be seen to pick up 11,9-10. The lower created beings (the \( \nu \iota \kappa \lambda \) of 11,9) each possess the One individually but only in proportion each to its capacity for participation; and this varies according to the degree of unity of the entity concerned.

11,13-14 \( \pi \iota \nu \gamma \zeta \zeta \tau \omega \iota \circ \zeta \ldots \iota \kappa \eta \iota \tau \eta \epsilon \iota \theta \alpha \) : P. returns to the human condition. The \( \gamma \zeta \) explains the point of the geometric imagery. It is by means of an analogous centre in ourselves that we are attached to the One.

On the attachment of the soul to the One see VI 9,8,18-20 "\( \pi \iota \nu \kappa \nu \tau \theta \alpha \omega \tau \tau \iota \) \( \mu \nu \) \( \beta \alpha \iota \tau \nu \omega \beta \omega \tau \iota \nu \nu \kappa \circ \zeta \alpha \) \( \pi \iota \nu \omega \) \( \sigma \varsigma \mu \kappa \circ \tau \omicron \nu \)"
key principle is the common Greek one that like is known by like (see on 1,30-34). Note that in VI 8,18,12 the terminus of the radius is said to be like the centre from which it is sprung. This likeness is very important, and explains why P. says, for example, that only the eternal in us can contemplate eternity and the Eternal (i.e., Intellect) (III 7,5,11-12). Thus what is like the One is able to become attached to it; and the more this likeness is actualised, the closer the union which results. The aim of Plotinian philosophy is to actualise the presence of the One within the soul, i.e., to help the soul to move through Intellect to the One until complete union is reached.

On ἐφαντυσθησαι see on 7,44-48. In our present passage, however, the word is used not to signify the attachment of a higher to a lower form of being, but to signify the contrary. In a similar context of like being known by like, Plato (R. 490b 3-4) uses ἐπαντυσθησαι and ἐφαντυσθησαι of the soul's method of contact with the Forms; cf. also Ti. 45d 1 where ἐφαντυσθησαι is found in a description of the mechanics of physical perception (cf. III 7,7,3 τὸς γὰρ ἄνω τοῦ κόσμου γνώνητο μὴ ἐφαντυσθησαι). P. uses the word in the geometrical context of the centre of a circle again in VI 8,15,4-5 (used with ἐπαντυσθησαι). Note also VI 5,10,41 and VI 9,4,27 where the word is used of 'touching the One'. The mystical union is itself a sort of ἐπαφή or ὅγες (VI 7,39,19; VI 9,9,19 - ἐπαφή; VI 9,4,27 - ὅγες; V 3,10,42 ὅγες καὶ οἰον ἐπαφή μόνον ἰχθύς καὶ ἄνωτες;

P. has already used συνείλαι to describe the relationship between Intellect and the One in 6,52, where the word has sexual overtones which are absent here. Συνωσία and συγγιγνομαι are used in the context of mystical union with the One in VI 9,7, 21-23. For συγγιγνομαι used in a context similar to our own see VI 9,11,32 where P. is speaking of the epistemological principle that like is known by like.

On ἀναρτάων see Wolters on III 5,2,30 and note on I 14.

11,14-15 ἰνεβεμάθαμαι δε ... ἐκάστου: ( EINA-) ἐθιμοθανεῖ means 'to be settled in', and carries with it the idea that the goal of the journey has been achieved (cf. I 3,4,9-10 πανίσαντα δε (sc. ἡ διακριτικη) τοις προτειντὸς αἰσθητον πλανῆς ἵνα ἐν τῷ νοτίῃ. In IV 8,1,5 the union with the One is described as a 'settling in it' ( ἐν αἰώνι ἰδέμμαθες); cf. VI 7,36,10 ἰδέμμαθο. The convergence on the One which P. speaks of in our present passage marks the culmination of philosophical endeavour.

Οὐ δὲ συνείλων is the equivalent of the conditional clause τῶν συνείλων (see Goodwin, *Greek Moods and Tenses*, 529). Note the vivid present ἰνεβεμάθαμαι where a future might be expected. Συνείλων is the technical mathematical term to signify 'convergence'; cf. Hero Alexandrinus *Definitiones* 48,9.
(Heiberg); Geminus *Elementa Astronomiae* 164.3 (Hanitius). The latter passage speaks of the convergence of bodies to a centre (cf. Plu. *Num.* 9; Procl. *in Euc.* 154.21 (Friedlein)). The use of the word in our present passage in the geometrical context of the circle and its centre is particularly apt (cf. II 2,1,34-35).

Like the radii, we must converge on our centre which for us is the One (cf. VI 9,9,11-12 μᾶς καὶ τοῖς αὐτῷ). And we find this centre in ourselves (cf. V 6,5,1-2 τὰ τὸ πόλις ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐκείνω ἐν συννυφάκι καὶ συνεοθάντος). Following the accentuation of some of the mss., Perna and Creuzer read ὁ, which is presumably the relative adverb of place, and would give the meaning 'we settle in that spot in the Intelligible World (ἡκίλ) upon which we converge.' But this would break up the sequence of thought. It is attachment to and settlement in the One which is in question. Fic.'s translation 'eatenus illic innitimur, atque figimur, quatenus nos illuc intentione conferimus' is impossible even if ὁ is read. Ha. suggests ὁ, but gives no reason in his note ad loc. for his suggestion. Examples of συννυφάκι with the dative, meaning 'to converge' are late (in fact LSJ give none and Stephanus gives only two from the fourth-century astologer Manetho).
Chapters ten and eleven have demonstrated that the hypostases are to be found 'in' the human soul. P.'s immediate problem (12,1-5) is that their activities—and these are incessant—are not perceived. Chapter twelve attempts to answer this problem by reference to P.'s theory of the subconscious (12,3-12). The chapter ends with an exhortation to the soul to 'turn inwards' so that it may apprehend the activities which exist within it (12,12-20).

12,1-3 μὴ οὖν ἵκοντες ... ἐνεγράφην: Τὰ πηλικάτα denotes the One, Intellect and the undescending soul (see on 10,10-30). On the concept of the soul's possession of these entities see on 10,5-6.

Schwyzer rightly notes that ἀντίληψις is 'ein Oberbegriff für jede Art Erfassen' ([Entr. p. 367]). He is unjust, however, in his criticism of H. van Zandt Cobb ([TAPA 69 (1938), p. xxxii]). Cobb's full definition, of which Schwyzer quotes only the first eight words ('the most general expression for consciousness is ἀντίληψις, awareness, or the cognition of an object; αἴσθησις, διάνωσις, and νόησις are equally types of ἀντίληψις, differing only in the form in which this awareness occurs and in the degree of truth-value which it represents'), is quite acceptable. Since ἀντίληψις is the most general term for 'apprehension' the sphere of its application is usually mentioned, e.g., in I 4,9,27 ἀντίληψις τῷ αἰσθητικῷ ('by means of...'); and in IV 3, 30,14 ἡ τῆς νοητῶς ἀντίληψις. Ἀντιληψιν λέγονται is
used in IV 7,8,1-7 in the definitions both of $\alpha\delta\theta\alpha\nu\zeta\theta\vartheta\nu$ and of $\nu\varepsilon\rho\varepsilon\nu\chi\nu$.

With $\delta\varepsilon\gamma\gamma\nu$ c. dat. cf. Plu. Comm. 23. The 'activities' to which P. refers are the activities of apprehension ($\delta\nu\tau\lambda\nu\eta\beta\upsilon\zeta\iota\upsilon\varsigma$) of which the soul is capable but which it is likely to leave unactualised (see on 10,5-6). On the (here paradoxical) juxtaposition of $\delta\varepsilon\gamma\gamma\nu$ and $\nu\nu\zeta\gamma\nu\iota\iota\alpha$ see Wolters on III 5,7,34.

The omission of $\eta\mu\nu$ before $\varsigma\delta$ in 12,2 is not uncommon. See KG II.II.265. Anm. 4. Those who have no higher activity at all are a small numerical group compared to those who are merely inactive.

12,3-5 $\epsilon\gamma\eta\iota\alpha\nu\mu\nu\ldots\theta\omicron\nu\iota\rho\varsigma\varsigma$: Although P.'s reply to a question he has asked himself is often introduced by the particle $\gamma\iota$ (cf. 7,5; IV 7,6,12; VI 9,1,20 etc.), the addition of the particle is not absolutely necessary. See e.g., 6,27-28; VI 8,1,21-22. 9,3. Ci., Ha., and H-S are quite right to delete Ki.'s supposititious addition.

$\epsilon\gamma\eta\iota\alpha\nu\mu\nu$ refers, like $\tau\gamma\mu\iota\kappa\alpha\alpha\tau\alpha$ in 12,1, to Intellect, the One and the undescending soul. Reference to the soul is emphatic (note 12,4-5 $\kappa\alpha\lambda\gamma\nu\chi\gamma\delta\varsigma$); the emphasis interrupts P.'s train of thought, and consequently the $\mu\nu$ of 12,3 is nowhere picked up by a corresponding $\delta\varsigma$. The continual activity of the hypostases is unaffected by the lower soul's possession of them. This activity is necessary for their very existence, since activity is constitutive of $\sigma\alpha\omega\lambda\alpha$ and of the $\eta\nu\zeta\delta\delta\sigma\varsigma$ itself (see V 4,2,27 and note on 3,9-10). Note the implied contrast between
human laziness (ἡμοίοσθ' ταῖς τοιούταις ἡμέραις 12,2) and the effortless activity of the hypostases.

The internal activity of each hypostasis is directed towards itself and takes place within itself (12,4); cf. (of Intellect)

ν 3,7,19-22 ἵστατον ἀξίων οὐν ὡς αὐτῷ καὶ ἦς ἵστατον τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ γὰρ εἰ τι ἐφ' αὐτῷ, τῶς ἰσα αὐτῶν ἐν ἵστατον. ἢ γὰρ πρώτων ἐν ἵστατο (Ἡσθ' ὅμ. ἐν') εἰς καὶ ἰς ἀλλο. This internal, self-directed activity is the primary one.

All editors and translators except for Perna, Creuzer, Ha.
and H-S prefer Ki.'s ψυχή in 12,4 to the mss. ψυχή. They translate ψυχή as a possessive dative and take τὸ ἀκίνητον as an abstract. Cf., e.g., gives 'e in questo senso conviene anche all'Anima il cosiddetto "moto perpetuo"'.

In Pl. Phdr. 245c 5, however, from which the phrase τὸ ἀκίνητον is taken, τὸ ἀκίνητον does not occur as an abstract quality, and it is perhaps unlikely, therefore, that P. would use it in that way. I prefer to keep the mss. ψυχή. In this case τὸ ἀκίνητον can be taken in two ways, either as Ha. does - 'und in diesem Sinne (i.e., in the sense that the soul is continuously engaged in its own activity) heisst auch die Seele das "standig Bewegte" - or with H-S as a phrase in apposition to ψυχὴ. Ha.'s interpretation (followed by Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness (The Hague, 1969), p. 7 n. 4) takes στῶς to explain the sense of the Platonic τὸ ἀκίνητον.

With this interpretation however, it is difficult to make sense
of γας in 12,5, for it is not clear what explanatory connection the following sentence would have with our present passage. I prefer to understand τὸ ἀκινήτων in apposition (with H-S), and take οὕτως to mean 'in this state' (with an ellipse of χειρ). For this meaning of οὕτως see 7,8-9 τοῦτο δὲ οὕν ὀὕτως and II 5,3,32-33 καὶ γηγηγή ση ὀὕτως, η μη ἐν ἑλγο ἄλλα ἐν νῦν νοητῷ. This last passage is particularly close to our own. In II 5,3,31 P. says that τα ηγήτα are ἑνεχείμα (cf. ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἑνεχείμας 12,3-4) and then adds, as he does here, that the same is true of soul, at least of the undescending soul. If this meaning of οὕτως is correct in our present passage, then the passage can be translated 'and soul as well, Plato's "continual mover" is in this state.' The next sentence then explains the paradox. Not everything in soul is immediately perceptible. Hence it is possible for our soul to be in a state of continuous activity without our being aware of it.

Fic. translates this passage: 'sic quoque et anima vim habet immobilem sive perpetuo mobilem.' His translation suggests that he read τὸ ἀκινήτων ηὴ before τὸ ἀκινήτων (compare his translation of 6,15 where he seems to have read πηφανεῖς for the mss. πηφανῶι). That the soul is unmoved is bad (Platonic and) Plotinian doctrine. On movement associated with the soul see 1,6-7 and note.

Er.'s senseless punctuation - he brackets 12,4 (καὶ γηγηγῆ) to 12,7 (η) - should be totally ignored.
and the undescending soul are 'in' the soul in the sense that the human soul is capable of apprehending them, and of tuning in, as it were, to their incessant activities (see on 10,5-6). Only when this act of self-direction, the νενέγγος, takes place is it possible for the soul to become aware of what was already potentially within it, for only then does information regarding these activities reach what P. in our present passage calls αἰσθητόν.

The problem of the perception of the incessant activity of elements within the soul was one well known to Aristotelian commentators. In de An. 430a 10 ff. Aristotle introduces the νοητικὸς νους which he describes as being continually active (ibid. 430a 22). It is not clear whether Aristotle meant the νοητικὸς νους to be thought of as a part of the human soul or not, but the commentators who believed that it was a human faculty were faced with the problem of explaining why its activities were unperceived. P.'s doctrine of the subconscious is mentioned by Philoponus (in de An. 535.4 ff. (Hayduck)) alongside the doctrines of other philosophers as one possible answer to this Aristotelian problem (see on this Merlan, op. cit. in preceding note, pp. 48-50). The answer which P. gives to this problem of soul's possession of Intellect is, of course, applicable to the similar problems regarding the One and the undescending soul.

Our present passage must be compared with a similar passage in IV 8,8. This passage is worth quoting in full. P. begins
IV 8,8 with the assertion that there is a part of our soul which is continually in the Intelligible World. He continues (IV 8,9, 3-9) έδει δὴ ἐν τῷ αἰνηθήρῳ ὑπ’ ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰν δὲ τῇ κρατοῦτο καὶ θορυβώτο, οὐκ ἦδε αἰνηθηρίαμ ὡμίν εἶναι ἡν ἢν. Θιάσαν τὸ γὰρ ψυχήν ἅνω, τότε γὰρ ἤκουσαν εἰς ἑμᾶς τὸ νοηθέν, ὅταν εἰς αἰσθητὰς τήν κατασκεύαν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν δὲ γύνηνας μεῖον ὑπον μέρος ψυχῆς, γυνώσκομεν, πέντε ἤτε εἰς οἶνην τὴν ψυχήν ἡμῖν.

The verbal similarities between this passage and our present passage are striking. Όὔ γὰρ πᾶν, δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ (12,5) mirrors οὔ γὰρ πᾶν δὲ γύνηνας μεῖον ὑπον μέρος ψυχῆς (IV 8,8,7-8); ἤκουσαν εἰς ἑμᾶς (IV 8,8,6) is repeated in 12,6; πέντε ἤτε εἰς οἶνην τὴν ψυχήν ἡμῖν (IV 8,8,8-9) is close to οἴνω δὲ οἶνης ψυχῆς [12,8]. Note also that γυνώσκομεν is found in both passages (IV 8,8,8; 12,8) and that αἰσθητική is the faculty in both passages (IV 8,8,7; 12,6) to which knowledge of these higher activities is relayed. The treatise IV 8 is sixth in Porphyry's chronological order. These verbal similarities show that while writing our present passage P. almost certainly had the earlier passage from IV 8 before his mind.

Particularly interesting in both passages is the use of the word αἰσθητική. P. explains in IV 3,30,7 ff. how we become aware of the working of νόησις. The object of the thought (the νόημα is shown in the faculty of imagination (τὸ φανταστικὸν) as in a mirror, and so the apprehension of it takes place (IV 3,30, 9-11). And only when this mirroring takes place do we become aware of the thought, for thinking and awareness of the thinking are not
the same thing. P. adds that the reason why we are not always able to apprehend νόησις is that the imaginative faculty also receives sense-perceptions (α' θυµίας) which presumably disturb its higher activities (IV 3, 30, 11-16). In I 4, 10, 6 ff. the same mirror image is found, and line 19 (ἀνίου φαντασίας η νόησις) makes it clear that the mirror is once again an image of the faculty of imagination. But as we have seen, the early treatises IV 8 and V 1 both name α' θυµίας as the faculty of the soul which perceives the workings of the hypostases. Yet according to IV 3 and I 4 this faculty ought to be το φανταστικόν. Admittedly φαντασία is often closely associated with α' θυµίας - e.g., in I 4, 10, 15 the images of Intellect are said to be known in the imaginative faculty α' θυµίας; in IV 4, 17, 12 the imagination resulting from desire is said to be an α' θυµίας ἑπαγγελματική; and in III 6, 4, 45 P. speaks of a φαντασία α' θυµίας. Aristotle also closely connected the two concepts (see de An. 428b 11-12). But it seems to me that the use of φαντασία and φανταστικόν in the later treatises marks a refinement in P.'s psychological thinking and vocabulary. The non-specific α' θυµίας has been replaced by the technical φαντασία.

What is true of the apprehension of Intellect is true of the apprehension of the One. When we have turned inwards towards it and have become like it - for soul must actually become like what it perceives (see on 1, 30-34) - we become aware of its presence in us. It is probably technically correct to say that its image is
apprehended inside the imaginative faculty, but it is doubtful whether P. would have wanted to be so precise. As he explains in VI 9, 10, 11 ff. the experience of the One gives such an intense impression of unity that analysis is difficult. Διωφήστον θέαμα (VI 9, 10, 19-20).

Έμμεσε is one of P.'s technical terms for the concept of 'self', and is found in his earliest treatises (III 1, 4, 21 ff.; IV 7, 1, 1 ff.; see G. J. P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon, 1973), pp. 20-49). There is no reason to suppose that έμμεσε in 12, 6 is not being used in a technical sense, especially as this sense is defined by what follows in 12, 8-10. Ci. and Ha. are therefore right to mark off the word from its context by inverted commas.

12, 7-8 έπειν δι έπηγάζεν ... έπηγάζετο : Ci. and Ha. translate έπαιστόν (12, 7) as 'una singola parte dell'Anima' and as 'ein einzelner Seelenteil' respectively. These translations are somewhat misleading. It would be odd to call Intellect or the One a part of the soul - this position is specifically denied of Intellect in V 3, 3, 25-26 - although it is possible in P.'s language to say that these hypostases are 'in' soul or that the soul 'possesses' them.

Έπειστόν refers to anything whose activities we can apprehend if we make the effort to do so. Pic.'s 'agens in nobis quodlibet', MK's 'any activity' or Br.'s 'une activité' are much better.

Μιμητικος (12, 7) (cf. μιμητικος in 12, 11) should not be translated as 'give a share in' (Ci. and Ha.). 'To communicate' is one of the attested meanings of μιμητικος (see LSJ s.v. 3
and IV 7,7,7 ff.):

τὰ μὴν θανόμασθαι (12,7) is probably the same as τὸ φανταστικόν (see above on 12,5-7). The imaginative faculty is midway between the higher and lowest phases of soul (IV 4,13,13).

Before perception takes place, then, the percept must reach this middle faculty. Note how P. seems to make τὸ αἰσθανόμασθαι coterminous with the boundary of the ὁ θανόν (12,8). The existence of the vegetative soul is quietly ignored.

12,8-10 ὁ θανόν ὁ θυμὸν...ψυχήν ὁντος: P. sums up by giving two reasons why we are not aware of the continual activity of the hypostases.

In the first he says that 'we' are involved with the sentient soul (μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ 12,9). He says in I 1,10,5-7 that the notion of self covers two concepts - (a) ἑαυτόν, the 'real self', plus the ὁμοιός ὁ θυμὸν or (b) the 'real self' alone.

Sense-perception is related to the more inclusive definition, for the sphere of sense-perception is the sphere of what P. calls the θανατικόν, which is a compound of the living body and the soul (I 1,7,1-6). The sentient soul, then, is one of the lower phases of soul; yet according to the definition in I 1,7 this phase is included in the more extensive definition of 'self'.

Thus 'we' can only perceive the working of the higher phase of soul (the 'inner man' of 10,10 in which Intellect and the One are said to be) when the lower sentient phase of soul becomes aware of it. Anything which does not reach it does not reach 'us'.

The second of P.'s reasons is a corollary of the first. The extensive concept of 'self' which P. adopts here includes the lower
sentient soul. 'We are not merely that part of the soul in which Intellect and the One are — for according to 12,1 and 12,5 we possess them and they are in the soul — but the whole soul from that higher point downwards. In IV 8,8,7-8 P. speaks of our not knowing everything which takes place ἔόιη πνεῦμα μορφής. In the context of our present passage, the activities of Intellect and the One and the undescending soul could be said to take place ἔόιη πνεῦμα μορφής. But since 'we' are not just a part but the whole (including that part which deals with the body) 'we' cannot perceive them until they percolate through to the lower sentient soul. The nature of man is made up of many parts (I 1,7,8; VI 4,14,29-31). 'We' are neither the higher nor the lower.

I agree with MK that the μορφήν ψυχῆς of 12,9 is an unspecified higher part. Ci., I think, is quite wrong to understand the phrase as referring to the lowest part of the soul ('una parte di anima — quella più bassa').

Γνώσις (also used in IV 8,8,8) is hardly different from ἀντικείμενα in 12,1. Γνώσις presumably emphasises the cognitive appreciation of the basic perception. But in practice the ἀντικείμενα of it and the γνώσις will hardly ever be separate.

12,10-11 καὶ ἐκ γὰρ αὐτῶν... αὐτῶν: Καὶ ἐκ' shows that P. is making a new point in justification of his previous remarks. Just as the hypostases are in a state of continuous activity without our being aware of it, so each of the parts of the soul (for what
P. means by this see on 10,27-28) is alive and therefore active. Since the soul is the final expression of the life of the Intelligible World, and is, in fact, the principle of life for the sensible world (see 2,2 and note) it is only natural that its 'parts' should also be alive.

I agree with Br., Ci., and Ha. that τα ψυχικά is an imprecise way of referring to the various parts of soul. On the details of P.'s psychological divisions, see H. J. Blumenthal, Plotinus' Psychology (The Hague, 1971), pp. 20-44. P. uses both Platonic and Peripatetic divisions depending on his context.

Ζωή, Fig.'s conjecture for the mss. ζωή (see Schweizer, RHM 86 (1937), p. 376) is almost certainly right. It is quite unclear what ψυχικά would be. Only Perna prints ζωή.

On the connection between life and activity see on 3,9.

12,11-12 το έστι γνωσθέντα κ... ψυχικής: Knowledge of the activities of the parts of soul is relayed to the faculty of imagination (IV 3,30,16; cf. IV 3,29,24-25) and only then does ψυχικής take place. Μιστηδόσις means 'communication' here (cf. LSJ s.v. 1.4 and μιστηδόσις in 12,7) and Ci.'s 'ma il conosco se avvera solo quando si abbiamo un oggetto che si partecipi' makes the same mistake as his translation of the earlier passage. Ha.'s 'Mitteilen' is better than his previous 'Anteil gibt'.

On the relations between γνωσθέντα and ψυχικής; see above on 12,8-10.
12,12-20 δι... τῶν ἀνω': The answer to the problem of perception is given, and soul's ability to learn its own ancestry is finally shown.

12,12-14 δι' τοίνυν... περιουσίαν εἰρήν: Since the hypostases are present in the soul (on παρείναι see on 10,5-6), apprehension of them must take place by a turning inwards, so that the soul can 'tune in' to the continuous activity of the higher beings. The ἀναστροφή takes place by purification (see 12,19) and is the philosophical prayer referred to in 6,10-11 (see notes). Turning inwards is a characteristic of the good man (I 4,11,7-8. 11,16-17). Successful ἀναστροφή reaches the centre of man's and of all being (cf. VI 9,2,35-36). And it is achieved by cutting the soul off from everything external to itself (VI 9,7,16 ff.; cf. V 3,17,38) and concentrating on the 'inner man'. In this way the soul becomes more like the object of the ἀναστροφή (see on 10,5-6).

In 12,14 the object of ποιεῖν is τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον understood from the previous line.

12,14-end ἀναστροφή δύο τε ἀκραίᾳ... τῶν ἀνω': Note how this splendid comparison is phrased in the language of sense-perception which P. has been using throughout chapter 12. The comparison combines two closely related ideas. Of these, the first is the general idea that it is impossible to do two things well at the same time (cf. VI 7,34,5-6 ὥσπερ ἔστων ἢ τοντα τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ἢνακοίμησαν παντι ἀλλ' ὄχι ὄλα μὴν ὅτι ἢνακοίμησαν; VI 9,7,6-7 ὥσπερ ἔστω τὰ νοεῖν ἄλλα νοεῶντα καὶ τὰ νοεῖν ἄλλα ὄντα...);
thus it is not possible to be interested both in sense-perception and in the Intelligible World. And the second is that the world of sense-perception can actually be an obstacle to the higher perceptive powers of the soul (on this see e.g., IV 8,8,18-21) and thus stands in the way of soul’s enquiry into its own parentage and worth which is the subject of our treatise (1,15-16). The soul must stand aside from sense-perception and concentrate in all its purity on the perception of what it is able but often forgets to perceive (cf. Pl. Phd. 83a 1 ff.).

H-S omit to mention that all the other editors print ἐγγίζω where they print ἐγνώριζον in 12,16. Although ἐγγίζω is the reading of the best mss. (H-S’s group w), there is very good support (BRÜ) for the optative. According to the rules for the sequence of tenses ἐγνώριζον ought to be read if ηροτόθεον is kept in 12,17. Unfortunately, however, P. does not always comply with these rules (see Schwyzer’s examples in RE 518.10 ff.). The choice between the two readings is difficult. ἐγγίζω may well be right.

The phrase ἓν ὄν ἐγνώριζον emphasises the fact that the powers of the soul are intrinsic to it but dormant. The soul must turn its virtual possession of the hypostases into a reality. It must ‘wake up’ to its own potentialities (cf. I 6,8,26-27).

Ὁτὲρ (12,16) probably means ‘until’. See Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, 553.

Ha. compares with this comparison Socrates’ remark at Pl. Cri. 54d 2 ff. (to which Ferwerda, Images, p. 119 adds Sen. Ep.
But it seems to me that the Platonic image is slightly different. Plato's point is not protreptic — that Socrates should concentrate on listening to the sounds which he has heard. Nor is it suggested that everyone should strive to hear what Socrates has heard. And the sound of Socrates' imaginary dialogue with the 'laws' makes it impossible for him to hear anything else. P. does not suggest that the perception of the \( \phi \theta \delta \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omega \) obscures earthly sounds. The contrary is rather the case. The Senecan passage 'necessarium itaque admoneri est, habere aliquem advocatum bonae mentis et in tanto fremitu tumultuque falsorum unam denique audire vocem. Quae erit illa vox...?' is certainly closer, but there is no hint that the apprehension of the 'unam vocem' depends on the purity of the individual soul.

The \( \phi \theta \delta \gamma \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omega \) call to mind the music of the spheres which Pythagoras alone of men was supposed to have been able to hear (for an exhaustive conspectus of references to this heavenly music see Pease on Cicero's De Natura Deorum II. p. 1020). But P.'s philosophy is not purely for great men. Each of us possesses the One in his own soul. The ability to apprehend it is innate in us. And it is philosophy which can make us realise our own potentialities. In I \( 3,1,28 \) ff. P. speaks of the education of the musician and of how he moves from enjoyment of perceptible sounds to the \( \nu \sigma \eta \gamma \lambda \epsilon \mu \omicron \omicron \iota \alpha \) which is the source of their attraction. He continues in I \( 3,1,33-34 \) και ἰόγους τοις φιλοσοφών. \( \lambda \phi \nu \varsigma \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron 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EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS

**Fic.**

**Perna**
Plotini Platoniorum Facile Coryphaei Operum Philosophicorum Omnium Libri LIV. Cum Latina Marsili Ficini Interpretatione et Commentatione. Ad Perneam Lecythum (Basileae, 1580).

**Creuzer**


**Ki.**
Plotini Opera recognovit A. Kirchhoff (Leipzig, 1856).


**MU.**

**Vo.**


**Br.**


**Ci.**
H-S, H-S¹

Plotini Opera ediderunt P. Henry et H.-R. Schwyzer, 3 vols. (Paris, Brussels, Leiden, 1951-1973). This work is occasionally referred to as H-S¹ in order to distinguish it from the editio minor.

Ha.


Beutler-Theiler


H-S²


Armstrong


MK


COMMENTARIES ON INDIVIDUAL TREATISES AND SELECTIONS


Beierwaltes


Wolters

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<td>Paulys Realencyclopaedie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft von G. Wissowa etc. (Stuttgart, 1893 - ). References without the volume number are to Schwyzer's article 'Plotinus', <em>RE</em> 21.471-592.</td>
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<td><strong>RLAC</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Stephanus</strong></td>
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## OTHER ABBREVIATED REFERENCES

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dox.Graec.</strong></td>
<td>Doxographi Graeci collegit, recensuit, prolegomenis indicibusque instruxit H. Diels (Berlin, 1879).</td>
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<td><strong>Images</strong></td>
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<td>E. Seidel, De Usu Praepositionum Plotiniano Quaestiones (Diss. Neisse, 1886).</td>
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<td><strong>SVF</strong></td>
<td>StoicorumVeterum Fragmenta collegit J. von Arnim (Leipzig, 1905-1924).</td>
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<td><strong>Vitringa</strong></td>
<td>A. J. Vitringa, Adnotationes Criticae (Deventer, 1876).</td>
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