



An Examination of Bureaucratic Motivation Focusing on the Federal Agency of the Environmental Protection Agency

Robert McMahon, New College, Oxford, TT96



**Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of M.Phil. in Politics in
the Faculty of the Social Studies at the University of
Oxford**



Acknowledgements

My greatest debt of gratitude must go to my supervisor Dr.Nigel Bowles for his careful reading of my thesis and his helpful criticism. I owe sincere thanks to Professor Byron Shafer for his help and valued advice; to Rich for proof reading everything twice; to Martin and Em for their help and support; and to my parents for everything.

The errors and arguments in this thesis remain my sole responsibility.

Abstract

The primary aim of this thesis is to examine the question:

What is it that motivates bureaucrats?

This thesis tests four models of bureaucratic motivation against data obtained during interviews conducted at the headquarters of the Environmental Protection Agency in Washington DC and the field offices in Wheeling, West Virginia. Each of the models assumes that bureaucratic motivation can be explained by a characterisation of bureaucrats as rational self-interested maximisers. The four chapters in this thesis examine what is meant by motivation and rationality and assess what it is that motivates bureaucrats in the EPA. The argument in this thesis is that non-rational accounts of motivation are essential to an understanding of the motivations of EPA officials. The conclusion assesses why it is that the data in this thesis can be interpreted as supporting the argument presented in the following work.

INTRODUCTION

The question examined in this thesis is:

What is it that motivates bureaucrats?

The four models of bureaucratic motivation assessed in this thesis do not examine non-rational accounts of motivation. The argument presented in this thesis will show that such accounts of motivation are essential to an understanding of bureaucratic motivation in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

This thesis examines four models of bureaucratic motivation and tests them against a randomly selected case study in order to ascertain whether rationality alone is sufficient to explain the findings of the case study. Four theoretical models of bureaucratic motivation are analysed and compared to the findings of the case study. The models employed are those of:

Anthony Downs

Patrick Dunleavy

Herbert Simon

William Niskanen¹

Each model employs a criterion of rationality integral to their explanations of motivation. In analysing the explanatory power of these models in relation to the question of what

¹ Hereafter referred to as the models.

motivates bureaucrats, an implicit question is raised, namely: can a criterion of rationality explain the data obtained in the case studies? As Chapters Three and Four will suggest, a rationality criterion is a useful, but incomplete, explanation of bureaucratic motivation, with non-rational accounts of such motivation being essential to a fuller understanding of what it is that motivates bureaucrats. The case study used in this thesis compares the EPA at Washington and field office levels², with the aim being to assess the extent to which these theoretical models can explain the behaviour described in this case study, and to assess whether theory and observation are congruent.

The thesis question is situated in a larger meta-political question, concerning methodological and definitional issues (examined in Chapter 1), as well as questions of methodology and the prospective goals and philosophical underpinnings of the methodology one employs. Two issues in particular immediately raise methodological and philosophical problems. Firstly, analysis is not objective but rather is the result of the intersubjective interaction between the interviewer and the interviewed. The context of all analysis is that created by the subjective meanings employed by the researcher. This is true both for social and natural sciences (terms which are problematic in themselves) but it is argued here that the unavoidable subjectivity of such qualitative research must be addressed directly as a methodological issue, rather than being left to implication, or simply failing to be addressed.

² EPA offices in Wheeling, West Virginia.

The philosophical question raised in this thesis is generated by the employment of concepts, namely: *rationality and motivation*. The central importance of the concept of rationality to this thesis stems from the integral role that this concept plays in all four of the theoretical models, each of which employ some form of rationality which underpins the account of bureaucratic motivation that exist in each. The concept of motivation is ontologically prior to that of rationality because rationality is posited as one account of motivation, but is not equivalent to motivation *per se*. Motivation may be explained in terms of rationality, but an account of what is understood by the term motivation is required. Chapter One provides such an account.

In all four of the theoretical models rationality is posited as constituting all, or part of, the basis of motivations, and is seen as the mechanism by which motivational goals are pursued. Rationality provides an account of how actors move from goals (preferences, desires) to outcomes (what one does, what one achieves). The important point here is that rationality is a logical process, a mechanism in which an individual moves from holding a preference to achieving, or failing to achieve, that preference by the optimal and most logical route.

Given the centrality of rationality to the four models examined in this thesis, each can be located within the Rational Choice paradigm. Of the four Models, two of them approach the type of rational choice found in microeconomics³, and in much quantitative statistical

³ Downs (1967); Niskanen (1971).

research. Two of the models assume what I term *pure* rationality; that is, perfect information, complete logical reasoning, and motivations based on self interest with little if no regard for what Dunleavy describes as '*other-regarding motives*'. One model (Simon)⁴ modifies this account of rationality by abandoning the axiom of perfect information for the more realistic axiom of finite information, with bureaucrats motivated to *satisfice* rather than *maximise*. In other words, their actions and decisions are not based on complete information and, therefore, their rationality is *bounded*. The Dunleavy model remains within the rational choice approach but attributes some altruistic (other-regarding) motives to actors, and seeks to include in its analysis possible motivations which do not fit easily into a narrow construction of rationality based solely on self interest.

These four models provide very different approaches to the question of bureaucratic motivation yet all are imbued with a theory of rationality integral to their explanations and evaluations of bureaucratic motivation. In seeking to re-examine the question of what motivates bureaucrats, and in examining four models based on assumptions of rationality, this thesis will attempt to examine the explanations of motivation given in these models in the context of the data obtained from the case studies. Further, it will ask whether there are useful insights to be gained from looking at non-rational accounts of bureaucratic motivation. However, the methods employed in answering the thesis question are not unproblematic. The adoption of models based on the Rational Choice approach generates many difficulties which are described briefly in the outline of the chapters given below.

⁴ *Administrative Behaviour* (1957).

Outline of the Chapters

Chapter One

Discusses the methodology employed in this thesis and the definitions of the concepts of rationality and motivation.

Chapter Two

Examines Weber's ideal-type characterisation of bureaucracy and compares this model with the American Federal bureaucracy.

Chapter Three

Focuses on the case study data, and analyses the particular institutional and political contexts of the EPA at head office (Washington) and field office (West Virginia) levels.

Chapter Four

Compares the data to the explanations of bureaucratic motivation contained in the four theoretical models. This chapter argues that the data support the claim that a greater emphasis on non-rational motivations would allow a better understanding of what it is that motivates bureaucrats in the EPA.

Chapter Five

Provides an explanation of why it is that the data suggest the need for more emphasis on non-rational accounts of bureaucratic motivations, and examines some further implications of the argument presented in this thesis. Further, this chapter highlights some of the problems with the Rational Choice approach to bureaucracy and bureaucratic motivation.

Chapter 1

Questions of methodology and definitions of concepts

This thesis asks the question: *What is it that motivates bureaucrats?*

Any answer to this question must begin by attempting to give an explanation of what is meant by the term *motivation*, and further should address the question of what methodology is, or methodologies are, appropriate in providing one answer to this question. This chapter focuses on the methodological question of how one can best conduct political science research, before turning to the question of how one can define and use the term rationality when discussing motivation. The larger contexts of both questions is connected to the debates within political science regarding questions of how research should be conducted, and Rational Choice's importance to an understanding of political behaviour. This work offers an answer to neither of these questions; it does seek to provide a description of how one particular methodology is used in this thesis to answer a particular question, and then analyses this approach's in answering it. With respect to the philosophical question of how to define motivation and rationality, the thesis offers one definition and then analyses the data in terms of it. This work makes no generalisations about its results but rather offers one way of approaching the question and provides a particular set of conclusions based upon it.

Thus the thesis is split into two parts, the first tackling the methodological issue, the second focusing on some of the definitional problems. The first section of this chapter defines the

scientific approach propounded by King, Keohane, and Verba (KKV), and gives some reasons for its adoption here. The second part of the chapter seeks to explain the usage of the terms rationality and motivation as they are employed here in order to make explicit the meanings attributed to these terms throughout this work. KKV refer to such an endeavour as ‘maximising concreteness’.

This chapter provides a discussion of the methodological and definitional problems encountered in this thesis. It examines the nature of political science, before asking whether this discipline is indeed scientific. The ‘divide’ (Almond, 1990) in political science between quantitative and qualitative research is examined, and KKV’s attempt to create a unified logic of inference in political science to bridge this divide is discussed, as are some of the criticisms of this scientific approach.

The second section of this chapter seeks to provide one way of understanding the concepts of motivation and rationality. The merits and demerits of the Rational Choice model as a means of understanding and explaining bureaucratic motivation are discussed, and other potentially useful approaches to this question highlighted (the Political Culture and Weberian approaches). This focus on rationality as an explanation of motivation is central to the four theoretical models studied in this approach and, therefore, to an explanation of the argument presented in this thesis.

The Methodological Question

In assessing the utility of the scientific approach as a means of tackling the question of what motivates bureaucrats, one can begin by asking the question of what is meant by the term political science. This chapter focuses on one aspect of the larger debate that asks whether political science research can be scientific. In *The Limits of Political Science*, Nevil Johnson argues that political science is not truly scientific, but rather is a:

'courtesy title, shading from direct view the difficulty which arises when we try to state what kind of science it is.'

As Johnson argues, there is a difficulty involved if trying to state what kind of science political science is. The most common yardstick for comparison is the methods of the natural sciences. In these disciplines results are testable, falsifiable, and repeatable. Critics of the claim that political science is scientific argue that political science fails to meet the standards established by the natural sciences. Other scholars have argued for a distinction to be drawn between quantitative research, which they argue meet many of the criteria of science, and qualitative research which is not viewed as being scientific in its research. Qualitative research is not seen to be repeatable, testable, or falsifiable; therefore it cannot make a legitimate claim to be scientific. In order to assess the validity of the drawing of a distinction between qualitative and quantitative research, I posit one model of research that claims to represent a scientific approach. This will provide a reference point from which one can examine this so-called divide within political science. The scientific model is then put forward as a means of bridging this divide and the problems involved in the adoption of this methodology are then discussed.

It would be intellectually rigorous to place my research within a methodological framework comparable to the Deductive-Nomological (D-N) model, in which:

'to explain something is to exhibit it as a special case of what is known in general.'

This is achieved when the particular case is deduced from a more general covering law that covers similar cases. This model emphasises why it is that generalisations play such an important part in deductive explanations. The explanatory power of the D-N model derives from the fact that deduction from covering laws logically necessitates that which is deduced. The main problem arises, however, in the case of laws that appear to have exceptions, as often happens in political science. This approach is an ideal type of scientific research, moving from particular instances to inferred regularities and providing falsifiable, testable, repeatable results. A major element in the D-N approach is its emphasis on the search for regularities and general covering laws that allow one to move from the particular to the general. Quantitative research in political science is often seen as providing such general laws: for example, one such law might state that all bureaucrats pursue their goals in a rational way. Such a claim would be testable and would therefore meet at least one of the criterion of science. Quantitative researchers in political science will often claim that their research is scientific because it posits a theory and then sets about testing it against large sets of data which are subjected to statistical analysis and mathematical techniques of many forms. Qualitative research on the other hand is viewed by many researchers as lacking the rigour of the natural sciences, as focusing on small data sets that do not permit the researcher to draw wider generalisations about the data, as not being scientific. This divide within the political science discipline is discussed below.

Gabriel Almond describes political science as a '*discipline divided*' between the qualitative and the quantitative camps. This polarisation is an incomplete representation of the complexity of the divisions but it highlights one of the most prominent of these divisions. Almond's characterisation posits polar categorical alternatives, and fails to pay sufficient attention to what Peter Evans (*World Politics*, 1995) refers to as '*the eclectic messy centre*' of political science. Researchers may dogmatically adhere to qualitative or quantitative methods, but most political scientists occupy a position between these extremes, and it is this position between extremes which is the eclectic messy centre. This centre represents a mix of both qualitative and quantitative methods of research and, Evans argues, will continue to dominate research in politics because:

'Particular cases are the building blocks for general theories, and theories are lenses to identify what is interesting and significant about particular cases.'

Evans accepts that researchers often use particular cases, but argues that for them to be useful they have to be potentially separable from the settings in which they were originally derived. In my case study this would mean that the findings drawn from the EPA in Washington and West Virginia would be generalisable such that they could be applied to other agencies. Almond's divided discipline represents a problem inherent in the natural sciences as well as in political science, that of constructing a research design, generating hypotheses, obtaining data, and drawing conclusions. Further, there is the problem of establishing causality in the process, of showing that conclusions are logically deduced from the premises, and that the data have not been distorted in order to ensure that the deductive process works.

Given the nature of its subject, political science can never do more than approximate to natural science methods. Generalisations about people are not comparable to predictions made about carbon or the interaction of two chemical compounds. However, many political scientists attempt to emulate the methods of the natural sciences as far as possible. In this they adhere as strictly as possible to the quantitative polar extreme within the discipline. Qualitative researchers, on the other hand, have often eschewed such an approach in favour of those theories described as '*more thickly descriptive*' (Geertz, 1973). The approach adopted in this thesis represents an attempt to pursue a scientific methodology while noting the limitations imposed on political science by its subject matter. Further, this approach seeks to apply the rigour of the natural sciences to the qualitative, small-n study of a limited data set on bureaucratic motivation.

By placing this study in the *eclectic messy centre*, this thesis avoids a dogmatic adherence to either polar extreme; it is an attempt to undertake research underpinned by an approach which represents a synthesis between the scientific and qualitative approaches, utilising a methodology which mixes the qualitative and quantitative methods. Such an approach allows one to test whether or not a valid chain of causal inference has been established that leads from motivation to observed outcomes via a rational process. Political science then, in this context, represents an attempt to apply the methods of the natural sciences to questions that are political in nature. The thesis compares the theoretical models of Niskanen, Downs, Dunleavy, and Simon with the observed data obtained from the case study using the Scientific methodology (KKV). However, the thesis seeks neither to be a dogmatic advocate of the scientific approach *per se* nor to make any prediction about the findings; rather the aim is to assess existing theories and ask whether the rationality criterion contained in all of the four models is congruent with the data obtained.

This discussion of the place of science in political science attempts to show how political science can be viewed as an examination of '*actual political structures*' (Panitch, NLR, 1985), tested against theories/models. These structures, it is hoped, will be captured in the data obtained through research. The research methods appropriate to a particular set of structures can be found on a continuum which ranges from quantitative to qualitative research, with most research lying in the '*eclectic messy centre*.' This thesis uses a methodology which is qualitative in its approach and yet which is scientific and vigorous in its method. It is not the case that qualitative research need be descriptive but incapable of generating causal hypotheses which can be tested. This thesis adopts a qualitative approach which has the professionalism of quantitative work and which can generate testable theories, for this reason it occupies a position in the eclectic messy centre for the reason that it does not adhere to either polar extreme, thus missing out much that is useful in the alternative approaches.

The four theoretical models of bureaucratic motivation in this thesis correspond to the lenses (theories) described by Peter Evans that identify what is interesting and significant about particular cases, as well as serving to emphasise the importance and interest of rationality to any explanation of bureaucratic motivation. The case study is the building block upon which the general theories must stand or fall. Although one case study is not enough to corroborate a theory (in Popper's terminology (1959)), it is sufficient to disprove one, and even given the limits imposed by having only one case study, this thesis may still aim to suggest, at least, that one or all of these theories are of less general application than some researchers have claimed. Whether or not the data suggest that rational self-interest explains bureaucratic motivation will remain an empirical question. However, the question of whether such a process can be scientific must depend not on empirical observation, but on the definition of a scientific approach.

Johnson argues that to view political science as being capable of being scientific is to be mistaken about what politics actually is. He argues that political science relies on the sampling of data viewed as a representative sample, which allows some form of measurement to occur. Such a process, he argues, produces only general truisms via a method that relies on the demonstration of correlations to approximate to causal explanation. Johnson maintains that theories are tested against hypotheses of limited range, and are underpinned by truisms and generalisations about human nature. If Johnson is correct then there is little which can emerge as a theoretically confirmed foundation, acceptable in the manner of findings in the natural sciences as a conclusive starting point for further inquiry. What is achieved is only the confirmation of truisms. Johnson explains such a point in terms of a circularity where the construction of the test itself usually presupposes the relationship it seeks to establish.

Johnson overstates his objections to the attempt by political science to be scientific. It may indeed be a fallacy to posit '*misplaced generalisability*' from a few cases, yet one can avoid the circularity he describes by employing a rigorous methodology. As this chapter will conclude, the construction of a scientific methodology, even allowing for the problems found in employing this model, does offer the potential to judge the validity of inferences drawn from a given data set. The qualitative approach does not offer the mathematical sophistication of the methods found towards the quantitative polar extreme of the political science continuum, where researchers employ mathematics, modelling and the testing of hypotheses against formal models. At this polar extreme, research is ultra-professional at the methodological level¹, deploying a formidable array of scientific methodologies, deductive, statistical and experimental. Yet this

¹ Econometrics would be an example of such research, employing complex analytical devices and seeking to be rigorous and scientific in its methods.

approach can make no more claim to be scientific than the more descriptive, small-n approach of the qualitative end of the continuum, since both methods, or neither, may employ a rigorous methodology.

When considering the question of bureaucratic motivation, a quantitative approach is insufficient to explain the behaviour of actors in the '*operational milieu*' of a bureaucracy (Almond, p8 of notes). As Almond argues, the complexities of human and social reality are such that the explanatory strategy of the natural sciences has only a limited application to the social sciences.

The quantitative approach constructs:

'Models, procedures, and methodologies created to explore a world that looked for determinate results [that] will capture only a part of the much richer world of social and political interaction.' (Almond)

Almond maintains that the search for regularities, characteristic of the physical sciences, will not explain social outcomes, but only some of the conditions affecting them. Understanding political reality requires that we focus on more than its determinate aspects and pay attention to the creative, adaptive, and problem-solving aspects of actors that is what I term the '*essentially human property*' which constitutes the major difference between inquiry in the physical and social sciences. This difference in essence with respect to the subject being studied in politics as opposed to the natural sciences suggests that to understand social reality one cannot adopt a methodological stance identical to that employed in the natural sciences. This thesis, therefore, cannot follow the description of a 'scientific' model as advocated by Frohock which states that:

'Science is concerned with establishing causal relations and general laws. To do this the social scientist must concentrate on systematic patterns of human conduct. Only if an event is a recurring instance of a general class can it be treated scientifically' (1979).

Such a description of science does indeed fit with the D-N model put forward at the beginning of this chapter as a paradigm case of scientific research, yet this construction must be seen as an ideal type and not as a blueprint for dealing with the actual political structures that constitute the subject matter of politics. Therefore, regularities are not the only important objects of scientific political inquiry, and to focus on them in isolation is to ignore the whole qualitative approach to political science research, an approach essential to any study of bureaucratic motivation. Through single, qualitative case studies, the researcher will not easily establish a general covering law of political behaviour; but this may not be the objective. Rather, such an approach can supplement quantitative work which postulates general theories, by incorporating into such theories that which I have described as the essentially human property of political science research. Only by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches can one avoid the pitfalls of a dogmatic adherence to either of these polar extremes of political science.

The examination of bureaucratic motivation in this thesis assesses whether the four theoretical models employed can explain the behaviour observed in the case study. The general hypotheses in these models are applied to a particular case study in an attempt to test their explanatory power. The methodology employed is scientific to the extent that it establishes its research design, tests data, and examines variables, in a manner which emulates as far as possible the methods of the natural sciences. However, this scientific methodology is applied not to quantitative but rather to a qualitative analysis of bureaucratic motivation. The adoption of such

a methodology in the thesis is an attempt to employ the methods of the natural sciences in conjunction with the essentially human element captured in the interactions characteristic of qualitative research. This attempt at presenting and using a unified methodology is described below.

KING, KEOHANE, AND VERBA: BRIDGING THE QUALITATIVE/QUANTITATIVE DIVIDE

King, Keohane, and Verba (KKV, (1994)) argue that there is a '*unified logic of inference*' which underpins both qualitative and quantitative political science research. Their goal is to allow causal inferences to be drawn in qualitative research by following certain rules of research design. They argue that non-statistical research will produce more reliable results if researchers pay more attention to the rules of scientific inference, which they argue to be more clearly stated in quantitative research. They aim not at certainty as the goal for political science research, but rather at a method of arriving at valid inferences through the systematic use of well established procedures of inquiry, thus improving, they hope, reliability, validity, and integrity of research. The goal of their research design is inference: the making of descriptive explanatory inferences on the basis of empirical information. Scientific research adheres to a set of rules of inference on which its validity depends. For KKV, the content of science is primarily the methods and rules,

not the subject matter under examination, because the adherence to these rules will allow the researcher to study ‘*virtually anything*’ (KKV).

A detailed account of KKV’s methodology is given in section 1 of my methodology thesis. This chapter provides a brief account of the KKV approach as it bears on the research design adopted in this thesis. This section examines KKV’s approach to:

1) Research design:

the research question;

theory;

data;

use of data.

2) The selection of the case studies:

3) Selection bias:

4) Maximising concreteness:

These factors constitute only a part of the KKV approach; however, they represent the most relevant aspects of this methodology as it bears on the thesis question (of what motivates bureaucrats). The problems with this approach are discussed briefly at the end of the section.

The Scientific Approach: King, Keohane, and Verba

1) Research design:

Should not be a blueprint for mechanical data collection and should permit of revisions when needed. Conclusions may not follow from data in the manner posited by the D-N model as data will often upset the theory. In such an event, the researcher must re-examine the theory and consider a reconstruction of the research design, and perhaps an adaptation, or even the abolition, of the theory itself. This thesis analyses the research designs of four models of bureaucratic motivation, and compares them to the data obtained from the case study. The question posed is whether any or all of the research designs require adaptation or abolition. The research question should be important in the real world and should make a contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by:

'Increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific explanation of some aspect of the real world' (KKV).

2) The Theory:

Should be a reasoned and precise speculation about the answer to a research question, and should include a statement about why the proposed answer is likely to be correct. Further theories must be consistent with prior evidence about a research question. To this end, we should begin by first choosing theories that could be wrong to be able to say what we would need to convince us that that they are wrong. KKV argue that if we cannot answer this question then we do not have a theory. Further, KKV maintain that the theory should be falsifiable and should

generate as many observable implications as possible, with precision increasing the scope for falsification.

To relate this to the thesis question:

1) *research design*: the design in this thesis is given by the four theoretical models of bureaucratic motivation: those of Downs, Simon, Niskanen and Dunleavy.

2) *the research question*: asks whether the motivation of bureaucrats is explained in terms of rationality;

3) *the theory*: that motivation cannot be explained solely in terms of rationality.

The next steps in the research design are Data, and Use of data.

3) Data:

To improve data quality the process by which the data are generated should be reported and recorded. So allowing one to determine whether the data will produce biased inferences. Only by knowing the process of data generation can one produce valid causal inferences. One can maximise the validity of one's measurement, in KKV's schema, by adhering to the data and not allowing unobserved or unmeasurable concepts to make less clear what it is that the researcher is doing in her research design and what inferences she is drawing from the data.

4) Use of data:

The data should be used to generate unbiased inferences. For example, to use only those data that were found to accord with one's theory would be to generate a biased inference. The

avoidance of such selection bias must relate, therefore, to the question of choosing the case studies.

5) Selecting the Case Studies:

One may first ask the question: why choose a case study at all? One answer is that framing a case study around an explanatory question may lead to a more focused and relevant description, even though the study may be ultimately thwarted in the attempt to yield even a single causal inference. By using a case study that looks at bureaucratic motivation in the context of a federal agency, and by asking trenchant, well-specified questions to which answers will be relatively unambiguous (accepting that all answers are subject to the interpretation of a given researcher), and by following up on remarks made in interviews, qualitative research may suggest relevant hypotheses. Case studies are essential to description and hence to social science, as KKV maintain, because it is pointless to seek to explain what we have not described with a reasonable degree of precision. Ideally, the use of case studies would yield valid causal inferences by meeting universally applicable standards, with a systematic approach being fundamental (i.e. a structured focused comparison). Case studies should conform to what George and McKeown (1985, p41) call the congruence procedure, where the investigator:

'Defines and standardises the data requirements of the case study ..by formulating theoretically relevant questions to guide the examinations of each case.. and uses controlled comparison of a small-n that follows a procedure of systematic data compilation.'

The choice of the EPA as the case study employed in this thesis is an example of random selection, where the agency is not known to support any of the hypotheses examined in this thesis. The case study tests the four theoretical models, rather than ‘proves’ them to be correct (inductively), or even to corroborate them (deductively). This thesis asks what motivates bureaucrats, and asks whether the answers are explained with reference to some form of rationality. It does not describe four Rational Choice models and then proceed to prove them via selection bias in the choosing of the case study. This would not meet the criteria established in KKV’s approach to research design.

Potential Problems with the KKV Approach

The testing of the concept of rationality as an explanation of bureaucratic motivation, requires the employment of an ‘unobserved’ concept, namely rationality itself. As a process, rationality is observed only indirectly, which produces problems with respect to the drawing of causal inferences based on rationality as an explanatory variable. The data may suggest ‘rationality is the cause’, but it may equally suggest other possible explanatory variables. KKV’s framework seems to reach a limit here, due to the impossibility of making certain concepts observable. What the researcher must do is seek to define the concept in such a way that it is as ‘concrete’ (KKV) as possible, and complemented by a transparent research design that permits of replication and falsification by other researchers.

KKV's notion of maximising concreteness does beg the philosophical question of whether it is meaningful to say that concepts can, or indeed should, be made concrete. This thesis does not go as far as KKV do in suggesting that political science should adopt a common language, with commonly agreed upon definitions of concepts (problems with such a view are discussed below). However, this study does aim to explain how concepts are employed in this context, which, although perhaps not leading to concreteness in the sense that KKV use the term, should, it is hoped, allow other researchers to understand what is intended by such concepts as rationality and motivation. By establishing what is meant by these concepts, one can evaluate the concept with respect to one's case study, thus providing a clearer account of what the concepts are taken to mean in this thesis and avoiding some of the ambiguities which may result from the failure to make concepts as concrete as possible.

David Laitin (APSR, June 1995) criticises KKV's requirement that all researchers should share a common vocabulary and common standards for evaluation of evidence in the light of a theory. This can be linked to a problem encountered with KKV's request that concepts be made concrete. It may be the case that concepts such as rationality cannot be made concrete, or be standardised in their meaning across all research. As Bakhtin (APSR, June 1995) argues, such linguistic assimilation is never neutral and may lock us all into a cultural framework. Once locked into such a framework researchers may exhibit biases that operate at what Bakhtin calls the 'hegemonic' level. KKV argue that:

'Concepts must be part of a research agenda that seeks to identify their systematic implications, revealing their link in a causal chain.'

Bakhtin believes that the requirement that researchers make concepts concrete and a part of their research agenda may lead to the undervaluing of the crucial role of conceptual formation in social inquiry. For example, one cannot account for how the concept of rationality fits into a causal explanation of bureaucratic motivation and must look at the concept itself, and how and why it was formed in a particular way. This is not to reject the discipline of the KKV approach but is to supplement it by way of clarifying the concepts that are employed in a given research design. This is the aim of the rest of this chapter.

Motivation and Rationality

The models of Downs, Niskanen, Simon and Dunleavy employed in this thesis all utilise a criterion of rationality in their explanations of bureaucratic motivation. The use of the concept of rationality requires explanation if one is to understand that, rationality is not motivation *per se*, but is instead a process through which a bureaucrat moves from the holding of a motivational goal to an active state in which an attempt is made to attain this goal. Motivation is the force that underpins the desire to attain a given goal, whereas rationality is the process by which one moves towards this goal.

The aim of this section is to present a discussion of the concepts of motivation and rationality. The difficulties encountered when employing these concepts are discussed, with the problem that I describe as circularity being considered in some detail. This problem of circularity is the difficulty of establishing any kind of causality when looking at motivation. Niskanen explains that bureaucrats are motivated to maximising budgets for personal gain (Chapter 3). The motivating goal is a larger departmental budget, and the process by which this goal is achieved

is, according to Niskanen, rational. Bureaucrats rationally calculate their own self-interested goals and then calculate how to attain them. The problem I identify is that rationality seems to precede the holding of these motivational goals. It is therefore difficult to establish which is prior, the rational calculation or the holding of the motivational goal. Motivation could collapse into rationality, with all goals being the culmination of calculations which maximise rational self-interest. Rationality would precede motivation, with rationality then re-entering the process as the means by which this goal is then achieved. It is the aim of this section to show how the concepts of rationality and motivation can be separated. This section further seeks to establish the basis of the claim, made in this thesis, that rationality alone, construed as rational self-interest, cannot account for all of the goals held by bureaucrats. Further, this section argues that non-rational factors may be important to explanations of bureaucratic motivation.

Motivation

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines *Motivation* as:

'The action or act of motivating something or someone...the (conscious or unconscious) stimulus, incentive, motives, etc., for action towards a goal, esp. as resulting from psychological or social factors; the factors giving purpose or direction to behaviour.'

We could look also at one of the definitions given of *Motive*:

'An inward or spiritual impulse or prompting...A factor or circumstance inducing a person to act in a certain way...an emotion, reason, goal etc. influencing or tending to influence a person's volition.'

As defined here, the concept of motivation involves some form of force of desire, or compulsion, which leads an agent to act in order to obtain specific ends. It is the desire to attain these ends that, in the absence of coercion, explains why an individual behaves in one way rather than another, seeking to fulfil one wish or desire, while ignoring other possible attainable ends. Motivation is that impetus which moves an actor from a state of desiring an end to a state of pursuing, if not necessarily achieving, this end. Motivation, then, is an active process involving agency in the pursuit of a particular goal or end-state. The choice of the end-states themselves can be what the OED describes as an inward or spiritual prompting, or an emotion or goal that influences behaviour. The point I wish to highlight here is the absence of any reference to the motives held being arrived at in all circumstances through some process of rational thought. It is possible that motives to act can be the result of emotional mind-states, thus allowing for the holding of motives based on what I have described as *non-rational* (as opposed to irrational) processes. This assertion is highlighted in order to show that it is possible for bureaucrats to hold motivational goals that are not the result of rationality of thought in some form or another.

This is not to eliminate totally any hint of rationality, since it can still exist (within the terms of the definitions I have employed) as an act or motivation that may be a '*conscious or unconscious*' stimulus or incentive. If it were the case that rationality were hard-wired into the brain then all motives to action, even those that appeared to be based on emotions, could still be based on a criterion of rationality. This is a possibility I do not deal with here. The intention here is to draw a distinction between rationality and motivation and I hope that my discussion of the concept of rationality will suggest that the two are analytically distinct.

Rationality

The OED defines rationality as:

'The quality of being rational...of possessing reason. The fact of being based in reason.'

The word rational is defined as:

'Having the faculty of reasoning; endowed with reason.' (With reason defined as: *'The mental faculty which is used in adapting thought or action to some end...A fact or circumstance forming a motive sufficient to lead a person to adopt or reject some course of action.'*)

These definitions suggest that rationality is a conscious process of reasoning based in logical thought processes, rather than being based in emotional or subconscious processes. This enables a contrast to be drawn with motivation, which can be based on emotional responses or a *'conscious or unconscious act'* (OED) and not just on pure rational thought. If one is permitted to exclude the possibility that our emotional responses are also logical and rational (without necessarily being conscious), then a contrast can be drawn between rationality and motivation: rationality is always based in conscious reasoning, motivation may be based on emotional or subconscious responses. The point here is that there is scope for many bureaucratic motives to action to be based on what I term *non-rational* thought processes, rather than on some criterion of rationality. This belief underpins the work found in the rest of the thesis; with this study examining models of motivation based in rationality and then proceeding to ask whether non-rational explanations of this motivation have any place in research on bureaucracy. The case study is designed to examine both the rational and the non-rational accounts of bureaucratic

motivation. Whether the attempt succeeds may be judged through the examination of the data and analysis presented in the rest of this work. The remainder of the present chapter focuses on some of the criticisms of those approaches based on rationality.

Rationality in Political Science

In the social sciences, rationality is often identified with behaviour that maximises the satisfaction of preferences. The holding of a preference can be seen as similar to having a motivation to act, with the difference being that a preference need not require an act (agency) on the part of an actor. A preference may express a preference of X over Y, or Y over Z. It may reflect a transitive ordering, or a preference for more of X rather than less of it. A motivation to X, however, will entail that the agent will pursue the goal X, whereas a preference of X need not entail this agency. Rational Choice seeks to analyse human behaviour on the assumption that humans are capable of maximising their preferences at the lowest possible cost to themselves. Analysing motivation in terms of maximising behaviour is an example of actors viewed as rational self-interested maximisers.

Rational Choice models are viewed by their proponents as rigorous, capable of technical sophistication and the generation of powerful explanations across a wide range of situations on the basis of a few simple theoretical assumptions. However, as Elster (1986) argues, action is not always rational but yet:

'...explanations in terms of optimisation remain the paradigmatic case of intentional explanation in the social sciences outside of psychology.'

For Elster, then, all other cases of intentional explanation are to be understood as departures from this paradigmatic norm.

Rational Choice as an analytical approach has many advocates who reject the charge of this model suffering from a lack of realism. As Riker (1962) argues, although the rational self-interest assumption may waver at the individual level, in the context of a fiduciary, client based relationship, as exists in a government bureaucracy (where the legislature is the client, and the bureaucracy the trustee), the assumption will hold because the trustee is obliged to maximise the interests of the client. Therefore, at the aggregate level, the self-interest assumption is seen to hold.

As will be seen in the chapter dealing with the theoretical models, many scholars adapt the self-interest assumption. Downs (1957), for example, qualifies the self-interest assumption by saying:

'In reality, men are not always selfish even in politics. They frequently do what appears to be individually irrational because they believe it to be socially rational...[altruism is necessary in explanation]. Nevertheless, general theories of social action always rely heavily on the self interest maxim...because it tends to be realistic. (p9)'

A better construction of rationality, when dealing with explanations of bureaucratic motivation at least, would replace the assumption that actors maximise material self-interest with a rational maximising assumption that relates to any kind of goal or end. Such an approach would allow

that actors could be motivated by any end, and states that rationality entails the most efficient means to realise that end, but may also be the explanation of why a bureaucrat pursues particular motivations in the first place. If the bureaucrat is indeed a rational self-interested maximiser, then the motivation she holds will be determined by how she can best maximise her own gains and personal goals. For the Rational Choice theorist then, bureaucratic motivations are often seen as based on self-interest; the empirical task of this thesis is to ascertain what these motivations are and to examine whether the attempt to satisfy them is rational also. All four theoretical models in this thesis employ some criterion of rationality. Before turning to these models it is worth noting some of the criticisms of the Rational choice approach.

One powerful criticism made by Almond (1990) is that the Rational choice model has tended to avoid drawing on the knowledge and insights of those aspects of social science that deal with value and culture. Insights from sociology, psychology, and anthropology are often absent from Rational Choice theories, as are explanations of structural and cultural, as well as institutional factors. In seeking to explain the data of the case study, this thesis will not eschew the use of explanations drawn from outside the Rational Choice approach. This is evident in the attempt to place the case study used in this thesis within an institutional and cultural context.

One noticeable omission in much of the Rational Choice literature is the failure to pay attention to the work of Max Weber. According to Almond, Weber's '*great achievement*' was:

'An analysis of modern civilisation and culture in terms of rationality and rationalism.'

Weber provided typology of motivations which included goal-oriented behaviour based on rational self-interest (Zweckrationalitat). However, he also included in his typology absolute goal-oriented behaviour, traditional behaviour, and impulsive behaviour (Werrationalitat).

The essential point here is that an emphasis on rational self-interest may capture only a part of social reality. To understand and explain the motivations of bureaucrats, as this thesis seeks to do, one cannot have a narrow focus looking only at self-interest. To exclude non-rational explanations, or those based on institutions or culture, is to promote a research design that fails to consider many variables which may be of use in explaining the dependent variable of bureaucratic motivation. This study aims to avoid this criticism by placing its case study in both an institutional and cultural context. While it does not posit a 'new' theory of bureaucratic motivation based on political culture, or a new institutional approach, it does seek to emphasise the paucity of an approach which focuses on individuals only, ignoring their situational placement and contextual embeddedness.

Barry Hindess (1988) argues that the Rational Choice approach, despite its being seen by many to yield powerful and determinate results, yet yields results that depend on an implicit structural determination of the forms of thought employed by political actors. He argues:

'The assumption of actors rationality tells us that there will be a certain consistency in their behaviour, but it tells us nothing about the substance of these concerns.'

In placing individuals as ontologically prior to social structures, the Rational Choice model ignores the importance of context to an understanding of bureaucratic motivation. As the case study will suggest, it is at least possible that factors other than self-interest could explain the

motivations of the bureaucrats examined in the case study. It may be that rational choice, as Almond suggests, can at most capture only a part of social reality. It is the aim of this thesis to cast the theoretical net as widely as possible in asking the question of what motivates bureaucrats, and to ascertain as much as possible about the explanatory variables that lead to these motivations being held. In testing the four models, an examination of rationality as an explanatory variable is focused on, but in keeping with the scientific approach of KKV, this thesis assesses existing theories in order either to corroborate or refute them. To do this requires that one looks beyond rationality to other potential explanations of bureaucratic motivation.

Chapter 2

The US Federal Bureaucracy, Weber, and Ideal Types

Introduction

This chapter places the methodological and definitional discussion of the first chapter in the specific context of bureaucracy as an organisational form. Political science examines agents whose *essentially human properties* require an examination of causes as well as outcomes in order to provide a more complete explanation of political and social behaviour. An understanding of bureaucratic motivation requires an examination of the institutional embeddedness of an agent, as well as a focus on individual accounts of motivation. This chapter examines the relevance of this institutional context to an understanding of bureaucracy and motivation. The first task here is to explain what is meant by the term *bureaucracy*, with Weber's *Ideal Type* analysis being employed to help with the term's explanation.

The second task of this chapter is to analyse how a Weberian Ideal Type analysis fits into a study of bureaucratic motivation, and how it can be viewed as compatible with the KKV approach advocated in Chapter 1. This chapter maintains that the two approaches are

complementary, and indeed, essential for a full understanding of the forces which explain bureaucratic motivation. This chapter moves from an emphasis on conceptual and methodological discussions to one which focuses on the details of the US Federal bureaucracy as it exists today in order to highlight the actual institutional context in which bureaucrats are embedded. This exposition is followed by an examination of the case study itself (Chapter 3) described in some detail.

The exegesis of Weber's Ideal Type analysis as presented in this chapter forms part of a *two-stage argument*¹ given in the remaining chapters of this work. The first stage involves the attempt to analyse the US Federal bureaucracy in general terms and the EPA in detail, in order to show how the case study does not resemble the formulation of bureaucratic organisation found in Weber's Ideal Type analysis. Such an illustration is intended to show why institutional context should not be taken as a given, or assumed to be based on some form of rational organising principle. This chapter is concerned with stage one of the argument, and attempts to examine the US Federal bureaucracy in terms of an ideal type, before the EPA itself is examined in the next chapter. The data from the case study are discussed both in this chapter and the next to illustrate the lack of congruence between models of rationality and actual bureaucratic reality. Stage two of the argument examines the four theoretical models and focuses on the fit between explanations of individual motivation and data obtained and is discussed in chapters Four and Five.

¹ This term is intended to refer to an argument which aims to put forward two main points, where there is no necessary interdependence between each part of the argument. It is not used in the way that political theorists employ the term (for example see Brian Barry, *Theories of Justice* (1989), and John Rawls *A Theory of Justice* (1972)).

Weber and Ideal Types

The Weberian approach to social sciences can be seen to mirror in many ways the approach of KKV. Like KKV, Weber notes that the subject matter of political science is imbued with what I have described as the *essentially human nature* of political science research. Weber argues that approaches used in the natural sciences cannot be employed without first adapting such tools for use with the 'ideal' or 'spiritual' (Weber) phenomena of politics where subject matter is unlike that of the subjects of study in the natural sciences. Both Weber and KKV assert that any distinction between subject and object does not require the sacrifice of objectivity in the social sciences, or require intuition to replace causal analysis. In presenting bureaucracy as an ideal type a clearer account of what is meant by bureaucracy is achieved, with deviations from the ideal type highlighting the paucity of the assumption that rationality is a sufficient explanation of motivation.

The Weberian approach to the analysis of bureaucracy is capable of being consistent with the KKV approach to political science research, with its ideal-type framework complementing empirical research. The ideal-type guides the researcher towards those aspects of an organisation which may help to explain how far a bureaucracy operates along legal-rational lines. The ideal-type is more than a conceptual schema which posits only generalisations about the relationships that characterise bureaucracies; rather, the relationships described by the ideal-type can be tested against empirical evidence. One can look for a strict hierarchical ordering, of promotion based on merit, or perhaps the presence of a commonly pursued collective rationality. The Weberian and KKV approaches can be made consistent when the researcher moves from the generation of untestable hypotheses to posited relationships which are susceptible to empirical analysis, with hypotheses modified according to data obtained.

We are, then, dealing not with generalisations but with prevailing tendencies in bureaucratic organisations.²

Weber is highly relevant to this study because of his emphasis on bureaucracy as a *rational* organisational form. His is the precursor of later models of bureaucracy which emphasise rationality, as do all four of the theoretical models in this thesis. His ideal type account of bureaucracy is based on a legal-rational model in which bureaucracy is hierarchical, formalistic, impersonal, with abstract rules, specialisation of work tasks, and promotion based on seniority but also on achievement. These are some of the main characteristics of his legal-rational account, with the aim of this structure being administrative efficiency. Yet this account raises immediately the problem encountered in those models based on a criterion of rationality: namely, that one is asked to accept the axioms of rationality as accurate, with examination proceeding from this assumption. One may ask whether utilising Weber's approach will result in what Giddens (1971) refers to as a '*rationalist bias*'. The Weberian account largely ignores the possibility of bureaucratic motivations, or efficiency, being explained by non-rational factors, but the case study data suggest that such factors may be important in explaining these motivations.³

² Weber's use of the ideal-type framework is rooted in a Kantian general epistemological framework which views concepts as incapable of direct observation, with all observation being dependent on subjective interpretations.

³ Carl Friedrich (in Merton (Ed), 1952, *A Reader In Bureaucracy*) objects to Weber's use of ideal-types as applied to non-ideal forms such as bureaucracies as if they were ideal. If they '*were ideal...they would not be types*' Friedrich argues, since types derive their from the empirical reality which they typify. Friedrich criticises Weber's ideal-types on the grounds that they do not process by empirical observation and analysis. Rather, ideal-types are used as mental constructs not derived by deductive reasoning from higher concepts, or built up from empirical data via relevant inference. Giddens (1971) defends the use of ideal-types (as discussed in the text), noting that they were not intended to supplant empirical observation, but to supplement it.

The questions asked in the structured interviews were designed to establish the extent to which bureaucrats are indeed rational and detached from the policies on which they work. The ideal type, legal-rational, formulation of bureaucracy provides a yardstick by which one can assess deviations from pure rationality as it bears on motivation. Although each of the four theoretical models employs a rationality criterion, Weber did not suppose all bureaucrats to be capable of unerring rationality in decision-making. For Weber, it is the form of organisation which maintains his legal-rational framework; if individual actors made rational decisions independently of organisational structure then they would not require the imposed discipline of the bureaucratic form created through the following of rules and regulations, as well as norms of behaviour established by bureaucratic hierarchy and by peers. The legal-rational form of organisation, lest it undermine employee motivation, is tempered with incentives to encourage effort. Further, personnel policies are designed to cultivate organisational loyalty and to provide for promotion on the basis of merit. The importance consequence of this form of organisation in the Weberian schema is that the motivational goals of bureaucrats within such an organisation are the same as the organisation's *collective rationality*.

Bureaucracy in this ideal-typical form generates full rationality through organisational structure. However, the case-study data will show that bureaucrats do not always act in a manner consistent with the behaviour of agents whose motivations are congruent with the collective rationality of the organisation in which they are embedded. An examination of institutional form alone is insufficient to explain, even in part, the complex motivations that constitute bureaucratic behaviour. To understand more completely the institutional context which will shape, at least in part, the motivations held by bureaucrats one must examine both

individual explanations of motivation (Chapters 4 and 5) and the particular relationships that characterise a specific organisational form.

The relationships within a bureaucracy, both formal and informal, can be essential ingredients in any explanation of bureaucratic motivation. As Peter Blau (1955) argues:

‘bureaucracies are complex systems of co-ordinated human activities. The understanding of these social structures require a knowledge of the patterns of social interaction within them.’

Blau conducted a case study which examined two US Federal agencies, focusing in particular on the interpersonal relations that developed within these formal organisations, and how these relations influenced bureaucratic operations. This thesis cannot examine the findings of Blau’s study in detail but it does attempt to mirror his approach considering the importance of interpersonal relationships within a bureaucracy, as well as examining how these relationships contribute to, or detract from, a process of rational decision-making. To quote Blau again:

‘By taking pains with details, we [social scientists] hope to acquire the systematic knowledge needed for the scientific analysis of the important problems of modern society.’

In using interview data based on a single case study this thesis aims to place the data within a framework of relationships, both formal and informal, within the agency. This thesis does not claim to explain all forms of bureaucratic motivation; it aims to provide an explanation of motivation based on a sound methodological approach, using the ideal-type framework as the benchmark by which one can assess non-rational explanations of motivation that deviate from

the paradigm case of the legal-rational bureaucratic form. To provide one account of these relationships this work gives a description of the bureaucratic form of the US Federal bureaucracy, before focusing on the organisation of the EPA (Chapter 3). This analysis is combined with the findings obtained in the case-study in an attempt to assess the impact of both institutional context and individual accounts of motivation.

The US Federal Bureaucracy-An Ideal-type?

The present form of the US Federal bureaucracy has its roots in the spoils system which was prevalent in the 19th century and in the constitutional organisation of the government which facilitated its development. The constitutional separation of powers, and the relationship between the legislature and the executive, created a system in which appointments to the senior levels of the bureaucracy were made as political appointments; appointees of the previous political incumbents were dismissed to make way for the President's political friends. Such a system lasted until 1883 when the Pendleton Act⁴ established a civil service recruited on merit and the spoils system persists to the present day despite the reforms of the last hundred years. US presidents, as Bowles argues (1993, p233), cannot rely on civil service neutrality as does the British Premier, and must compete for influence in a separated and Federal system where the bases of political power are diverse, and a strong central state absent. The US bureaucracy is:

⁴ The nineteenth century saw Congress move against the President's use of the spoils system, with the introduction of the Tenure of Office Act (1867), and the Pendleton Act (1883) which Theodore Roosevelt enforced vigorously as Civil Service Commissioner.

'...complicated, dispersed, decentralised...both within Washington and throughout the country. Its key organisational units are usually not departments but the semi-autonomous agencies or bureaux within them. [These] agencies are ...islands of separately authorised functional power.'

The US Federal bureaucracy is not an ideal type legal-rational organisation in the Weberian sense, rather it is like a *'holding company'* (Bowles, 1993), with departments as the holding company and the *'multiple, semi-autonomous, agencies ...each separately created by Congress.'* existing under the umbrella of the holding company. The agencies rely on their Congressional 'parents' for appropriations, therefore:

'little collective authority inheres in the Federal government ...[with] public administration thoroughly politicised.' (Bowles, 1993)

As the following chapters demonstrate, the assumption of bureaucratic neutrality is an inaccurate description of the Federal bureaucracy. Within the EPA there are large divergences in attitudes and motivations in relation to policies. The ideal type does not capture the essence of the Federal agencies and their autonomy from a weak central state. (The importance of this autonomy to an understanding of the operation of the field office in West Virginia is explored in the next two chapters.)

Skowronek (1982) argues that the US federal bureaucracy is not defined coherently. Political oversight of the bureaucracy was characterised by parallel sets of controls which served to pull the bureaucracy in inconsistent and contrary directions. Constitutional and political struggles were an *'invitation to struggle'* for the Federal bureaucracy. Almost every part of the bureaucracy is, according to Skowronek, the result of a unique institutional skirmish, with the

result being a bureaucracy which is composed of a collection of Federal personnel systems formally joined together but which, in practice, enjoy a high degree of effective autonomy. Moe (1989, p268) argues that the '*American bureaucracy is not designed to be effective.*' It does remain true that the functioning of the bureaucracy is conditioned by the wider environment of the political system, and the organisation and processes of bureaucracy which, in Moe's argument, are '*...immediately shaped by the politics of structural choice.*' (1989, p268)

These structural choices have major implications for the content and direction of policy, with administrative organisation and procedure affected by the struggle between contending political interests that extend beyond the scope of public policy. This results in a Federal bureaucracy that has been built incrementally through a combination of Congressional compromises and downwards pressure from the White House. The result, in the case of the EPA at least is that an agency is frequently endowed with:

'...organisational designs entirely ill-suited to the effective pursuit of policy goals.' (Moe, 1989, p305)

The US Federal bureaucracy is far removed from the ideal-typical formulation provided by Weber. As Wilson (1989) argues, many agencies fail to apply general rules to specific cases, and positively resist any effort to set forth their policies in the form of clear and general rules. Further, whether one accepts or rejects the Iron Triangles (Cater, 1965) or Issue Networks (Heclo, 1977) accounts of the relations between the various branches of government, it remains the case that in some agencies members whose authority rests on the offices they hold

are being eclipsed in power and significance by the members whose authority derives from the professional training they have received.

Wilson suggests that explanations of bureaucratic motivation based on examinations of formal structures ignore the importance of informal structures to an account of such motivations. Often it is the context of a particular decision procedure which will explain particular outcomes (Wilson calls this context the '*critical environmental problem*'). Factors including a bureaucrat's prior experience, her personal beliefs, the expectations of peers, the array of interests in which an agency is embedded, all influence the motivations pursued by bureaucrats and the decisions that are taken. This list is far from extensive but it is illuminating because bureaucratic motivation must rest, at least in part, on explanations based on institutional context, the culture of the agency, as well as on reasons based on rational self-interest. The two stage argument in this thesis will:

- 1) *assess the importance of institutional and cultural factors;*
- 2) *examine the relevance of those explanations based on rational self-interest and account that take the individual as the starting point for research.*

This will provide an assessment of non-rational accounts of motivation which can be compared to those explanations which assume rationality as an explanatory criterion. This focus on the critical environmental problems faced by bureaucrats will help to elicit an organisational culture, that is: '*a distinctive way of viewing and reacting to the bureaucratic world...*' which shapes the decisions made by bureaucrats.

Understanding the institutional context in which US bureaucrats are embedded requires an understanding of the institutional forces that impinge on each bureaucrat. In the US, the Weberian separation of politics and bureaucracy is blurred, with political appointees thrust into government agencies, bringing with them their own agendas and altering the institutional environment according to the demands of political necessity and expediency. The notion that bureaucrats can remain free from considerations of self-interest while pursuing the collective rationality of the organisation is more ideal than real. Often, bureaucrats are placed in a position of power in virtue of their having experience which is lacking in new political appointees and must learn from others.

The goals held by political appointees may differ from the aims of a given agency; for example, the EPA is empowered by Congress to regulate the environment in the public interest. However, agencies have agenda of their own that need not be consonant with those tasks specified in their constitutional gambit of power. Further, individual bureaucrats can have agenda of their own. Matters are made more complex by the relationships which characterise the interactions of agencies, legislature, executive and interest groups, with agencies often representing many diverse constituencies, all of whom may have very different interests. Because motivational goals do not exist in an institutional vacuum, any explanation of bureaucratic motivation will be aided by an examination of the complex institutional relationships which are a characteristic of the American political system. Whether these goals are explained with reference to a form of rational self-interest, as opposed to non-rational explanations remains an empirical question, yet one can go some way towards describing some of the relationships which may constitute the institutional context of the US Federal bureaucracy.

The next chapter presents the case-study and the findings of the structured interviews in an attempt to ascertain what underpins bureaucratic motivation. However, such small-n studies are limited and, as Peter Blau (1955) notes in his study of two Federal bureaux:

'...the findings of such studies are not representative. How typical the processes are of US bureaucracies cannot be ascertained by this method. Moreover, the focus on a small segment within each bureaucratic structure makes it impossible to determine systematically the functional significance of all observed practices for the larger organisation.'

My structured interviews may help to elicit how informal relations influence bureaucratic motivation. The case-study of the EPA, focusing more on the formal, institutional structures, may aid in clarifying the relationship between institutional organisation and bureaucratic motivation.

Chapter 3

The EPA: External Constraints, Internal Schism

The first chapter of this thesis established the methodological groundwork which underpins the case-study data and the structured interview technique. Chapter 2 comprised an argument that any study of bureaucratic motivation should be placed within an institutional context which recognises that motivations are explained, at least in part, by the embeddedness of an agent in a particular organisational structure. This is the argument found in Weber's ideal-type analysis, which maintains that discipline, administrative efficiency, and rationality in decision making are fostered by the Weberian form of bureaucratic organisation. This chapter will show that the ideal-typical characterisation is not a realistic representation of the EPA. Weber's argument that institutional form is important remains valid however. In the context of the thesis question, institutional form is important to an explanation of bureaucratic motivation.

The aim of this chapter is twofold: the first section examines the case study in terms of its organisational structure, focusing on external and internal factors which affect bureaucratic motivation. The EPA is characterised by internal schism and external

pressure from the three branches of government, the effects of which, as they bear on motivation, are examined in this chapter. In analysing the relationships which characterise the EPA, it will be possible to assess how far deviations from Weber's ideal-type (legal-rational) model lead to an agency in which bureaucratic motivation is based less on rationality than it is propagated by structural form. This section corresponds to Stage 1 of my two-stage argument: that the EPA is not an ideal-typical, legal rational organisation and, in consequence, bureaucratic motivations cannot be explained solely in terms of rationality as imposed by structural form, *contra* Weber.

The second section of this chapter examines the data obtained from the structured interviews of EPA officials. The questions which formed the backbone of the interviews are presented, with the reasoning underpinning each of the questions explained. This section presents data in the manner posited in the KKV methodology; as such, the case study is made clearly visible (concrete), allowing other researchers to test, repeat, criticise, and falsify the methods, findings, and evaluations drawn from the case study.

This chapter will show that non-rational motivations are present in the EPA, as it will be demonstrated that such non-rational motivations derive from institutional structure, both within the EPA (what I term *internal structural variables*) and external to it in the larger governmental system of the US (*external structural variables*).

The data obtained from the structured interviews are employed in this chapter to support the claim made in regard to the often non-rational influences of organisational

form on bureaucratic motivation. The EPA will be shown to deviate from the Weberian ideal-typical form and, from this premiss, the argument is that by undermining the claim that a bureaucracy is a paradigm case of rational organisation, one can question the contention that bureaucratic motivation is characterised by some form of rationality. The second stage in my *two-stage argument* analyses the question of *what motivates bureaucrats*, analysed from the perspective of individual, as opposed to institutional, explanations¹. This is the task of Chapter Four, which examines the accounts of bureaucratic motivation provided by Downs, Niskanen, Dunleavy and Simon, examined against the context of the data drawn from the EPA.

The EPA: External Constraints, Internal Schism

The fundamental schism in the professional ranks of the Agency is a product of its differing views about the regulatory goals of the agency, the proper organisation and purpose of a regulatory system, and the appropriate instruments for achieving environmental policy objectives. This schism is discussed below in order to explain how institutional factors affect the motivations pursued.

¹ Such a perspective is in keeping with the methodological individualism of the Rational Choice approach to political science research. The paucity of such an approach, when used in isolation, is one of the reasons why a focus on institutions and organisational culture is utilised in stage one of the present argument.

The EPA was created in 1970² when fifteen programmes from nine departments were merged under a single administrator. The EPA was not created as a commission³, having as its task the responsibility for the whole of the environment rather than a single industry. The idea underpinning such a design was the avoidance of agency capture by an industry, a phenomenon described as regulatory capture. The status granted to the EPA⁴ by Congress was intended to reduce the risk of an agency abusing its power and discretionary authority, with this authority very carefully bounded in its scope. Unlike many other agencies, the EPA was given deadlines for the attainment of pollution standards and had a clear timetable as well as clear overarching goals.

The EPA was an experiment in regulatory reform that had been called for many times by scholars who criticised the vague language of the older regulatory statutes. It was hoped that the EPA would avoid regulatory capture by having clear standards of implementation which would be proposed by Congress. However, contrary to President Nixon's stated goal of creating a '*single interrelated system for dealing with the environment*', an agency was created which had a diverse inheritance with activities that were numerous and fragmented. The President's plan for comprehensive management could not have been implemented as long as the EPA was divided into programs with separate requirements. Nixon wanted an agency concerned with the

² Much of the pressure to create the EPA came from the publication of two reports on the environment which capitalised on the feelings evoked by the Earthday demonstration of April 1970. These reports put pressure on congressmen, and especially on one senator-Edward Muskie (Dem: Maine), who was the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water at this time.

³ Until the creation of the EPA the dominant form of organisation in the field of regulation had been the independent regulatory commission, which was responsible for a narrow area of regulation, often only one or a few industries. The EPA had a sphere of power which covered the environment as a whole.

⁴ The creation of the EPA came out of Reorganisation Plan number 3 of 1970, stated on December 2nd, which brought together close to 6000 employees from 15 government programmes located in three departments (HEW, Agriculture, and Interior). Many of these employees were scattered around the country in field offices, laboratories and regional offices.

total environment, the result was an agency in which bureaucrats had little reason to be concerned about the total environment and focused instead on their specific statutory requirements.

The description given above provides a brief background to the creation of the EPA, discussing the institutional malaise in which it must operate, and from which its inception can be traced. After having examined the external and internal constraints which affect motivation in the agency, the primary data drawn from the structured interviews are considered as a means of testing the hypotheses that relate to the description given of the external and internal structure of the agency. The interviews were conducted at Washington and field office level⁵ with the choice of location reflecting an attempt to capture some of the differences between bureaucrats at head office and field office levels.

External constraints

To give some indication of the myriad of external pressures impinging on the EPA one can consider the relationship between professionals within the agency and those in the same professions outside of the agency. For example, EPA scientists were judged by the standards of their academic counterparts outside of the agency; agency lawyers contended with corporate attorneys; its economists contended with the economists in the Commerce Department. Although this point is both an internal and an external factor, it is important to note how the '*outward looking*' (Wilson, 1989)

⁵ EPA office, Region 3, Wheeling, West Virginia.

character of these professional groupings made them less than obedient servants to Congressionally established guidelines. The influence of professional norms on the motivations of bureaucrats within the EPA is examined further in the section on *Internal Schism* which looks at the internal factors affecting motivation in the EPA.

Another external factor which affects the institutional context in which EPA bureaucrats pursue their motivations is the Judiciary. The courts, like Congress itself, also check bureaucratic behaviour, restricting EPA freedom by deciding issues on a case-by-case basis. From an administrative perspective, the courts interpret the law using different principles at varying times. The Judiciary compels the EPA to achieve statutory deadlines, but EPA bureaucrats often lack the time to gather and analyse the information needed to issue these guidelines. One very important constraint imposed by the courts was generated by a conflict in which EPA officials were engaged in what was often lengthy analysis required to determine the *best practicable* and *best achievable* technology, as outlined in EPA statutes. However, the courts compelled the EPA to issue guidelines before adequate information had been collected and evaluated.

The EPA does not conform to Weber's model of legal-rational bureaucracy which is not to argue that the EPA is therefore an irrational organisation; rather it is to suggest that the assumption that it is a rational organisational form is not a complete explanation, given that there is evidence which favours an interpretation incorporating non-rational elements when seeking to explain bureaucratic motivation. Motivation is affected by environment and organisational form; from this one can suggest that the

many forces affecting the agency do not add up to a single coherent whole which propagates rational decision making in all situations. As the next section shows, there does not appear to be a single motivational goal held by all bureaucrats in the agency that one can identify unequivocally; the internal schism that characterises the agency prevents such an overarching goal from existing, assuming that it were possible for such a phenomenon to exist. Thus, it is the argument of this chapter that institutional organisation can explain the failure of rationality to account for all bureaucratic motivations pursued. And, further, that institutional explanations play an important part in accounting for the motivations pursued, and the reasons underpinning this choice of motivations.

This brief outline explains the context in which the agency is embedded by focusing on the institutional malaise in which the agency must operate. The next task of this chapter is to examine the internal organisation of the EPA in an attempt to highlight further deviations from the Weberian ideal-type model of bureaucracy as a legal-rational form. This analysis of the organisational form of the case study will form the background to the comparison between the case study data obtained in the structured interviews and the description of the EPA provided above, and the bearing which these data has on the question of what motivates bureaucrats.

Internal Schism

From its inception, the EPA has been divided along lines which closely follow the professional groupings of its members. The agency is populated with many lawyers, scientists and economists; the number of lawyers increased considerably under

William Rucklehaus, the administrator during the Nixon presidency and himself a lawyer by training, attracted many new young and ambitious lawyers to the agency. Rucklehaus⁶ altered the internal structure of the EPA considerably, moving away from the characteristic of the pre-EPA pollution authorities with their abundance of scientists, to an agency which had a large proportion of lawyers who emphasised the EPA's enforcement duties as opposed to its research responsibilities.

The lawyers were wedded to decisive action and legal standards, which was not the case for the agency's economists who were engaged in efforts to realise economic well-being. As Wilson (1989) stresses, they:

'communicated scarcity and choice [emphasising] that goals could not be met simultaneously.'

Most economists were hired to work in Washington in the Office of Planning and Evaluation, where they devised a regulatory review process which provided the administrator with the cost information needed to justify agency decisions to the White House. Prior to the creation of this process, Rucklehaus had had trouble from Commerce Department economists, and therefore created a process which would regain EPA autonomy from the White House. At the same time, this regulatory review sought to bring internal agency differences into the open.

The different factions within the agency, lawyers, economists, and scientists, can be seen to be affected by external constraints. For example, economists are constrained

⁶ Rucklehaus had been a Justice Department official; and as such he was accustomed to managing attorneys.

by White House demands and lawyers by the decisions of the courts. In spite of the schism between the factions which constitute the EPA, all are subject to external factors which affect EPA bureaucrats at both field office and headquarters levels. An important question to be examined in the next section is whether these external factors produce any commonalities across factions in terms of similarities between accounts of motivation.

The example of agency economists illustrates the force of the term schism. Although only a small percentage of EPA employees, and a much smaller percentage than the lawyers, the economists, as the managers of regulatory decision making process, could have the agency examine many alternative policies in an attempt to get the least costly options. However, the task of regulating 200,000 diverse polluters overloaded the bureaucracy in general and the economists in particular with more work than they could handle⁷. Further, this workload frustrated the efforts of many economists who were not able to take responsibility for the drafting of the many new regulations.

The last professional group I will examine here is that of the research scientists. This group can be subdivided into i) public health specialists; and ii) engineers. Public health specialists generally belonged to organisations (for example, the American Public Health Association) that advocated a strong health basis for standard setting and enforcement. The main task of this group is to perform research on pollution hazards. Engineers had the task of building and testing technological solutions to environmental problems. However, there is a very different time horizon between

⁷ This is the case for Washington rather than a field office such as Wheeling.

research scientists and engineers on the one hand, and lawyers and economists on the other. Unlike lawyers and economists, who had immediate regulation and enforcement responsibilities, research scientists and engineers had more distant goals and aspirations with many believing that their purpose was to undertake pure, state of the art, research and make a contribution to knowledge. Thus, they were wedded to their academic disciplines and were closely linked to academia. Further, they were less constrained by statutory timetables than were either lawyers or economists. The organisation of research scientists and engineers was disparate, with these scientists spread out in labs across the country and communicating with other agency mainly through mail. They had viewed the 1970 and 1972 pollution control acts as unrealistic, and felt little responsibility to meet congressional goals and deadlines.

As Cook (1988) describes, regulatory agencies such as the EPA have provoked worries about the '*private use of public resources*'. The research approach provided in this chapter follows Cook's approach whereby the internal characteristics of an agency, as well as its external environment, are examined. In his own analysis of the EPA, Cook notes that there were competing bureaucratic objectives or missions within the EPA. There is always the chance that a new administrator, or changes to other high-ranking personnel, will alter the sense of mission within the agency. For Cook, a '*regulatory battle*' was waged within the agency for the '*professional heart and soul of the agency*.' Cook's analysis of the EPA⁸ suggests that beneath the quarrels over legality, technique, and administrative practice lay sharp ideological

⁸ Cook's case study can be found in Cook, Bureaucratic Politics and Regulatory reform, 1988 (Greenwood Press Inc)

differences regarding the development of policy⁹. That an organisational schism was believed to exist by many, often high-ranking, officials in the EPA is illustrated in the following quotation taken from a senior agency official¹⁰:

'One side was this intellectual side that...I considered much more macho, kind of "God damn it, we'll clear up those lakes!"...I think that there were just two sides and two kinds of people in the Agency so there [were] always these struggles for the heart and soul, and the mind of the administrator.'

It was argued at the beginning of this section that the schism in the professional ranks of the EPA is the result of differing views about agency mission, the proper organisation and purpose of a regulatory system, and the appropriate instruments for achieving environmental policy objectives. This organisational form diverges from the Weberian ideal-typical form and, as such, does not generate bureaucratic motivations based on rationality propagated by institutional organisation alone, if at all. Rather, the structure of the EPA evokes different motivations for different professional groups. Not all motivations pursued are in the interests of the Agency first and foremost, many motivations are driven by the position of a bureaucratic in a given professional context which leads to the pursuit of motivations that are not congruent with any overarching Agency rationality. Further, many of the motivations pursued by bureaucrats in the

⁹ Marcus (1980b) traces a *bifurcation* in views about agency mission to the founding of the agency. He argues that the novel design of the EPA, with its single administrator and close accountability to both the President, and Congress, differs greatly from the regulatory commission model. The latter provides for a more deliberative board or commission policy-making structure, substantial policy autonomy and, most importantly, protection from direct influence from either the President or Congress. In contrast, the EPA, according to Marcus, lacks autonomy from either of these branches, with the result being that the agency is pulled in conflicting directions. Such a structure deviates from the Weberian form, with structure providing no clear sense of what it is that constitutes the rationality of the agency. Thus, the question is raised of what are the individual motivations that are pursued by bureaucrats. This is the question asked in Chapter 4.

¹⁰ All quotations given remain confidential as requested by the majority of those who were interviewed.

EPA include other-regarding motives not explained by rational self-interest. Of course, the rational choice theorist will incorporate such motivations into the utility function of the individual, thus returning the reader to motivations explained solely by rational self-interested utility maximisation. This thesis seeks to avoid this method by describing such motivations as non-rational in the sense of not based solely on the self-interest of the individual. The next section examines the data to further explain the non-rational elements in motivation, as well as to highlight the relationship between structural form and bureaucratic motivation.

The Data: The Schism in the EPA and its Effects on Motivation

This description of the EPA in terms of both internal and external factors should serve to illustrate that the agency is not a legal-rational form in the Weberian sense. Further, the (secondary) case-study data reveal no collective rationality in the agency taken as a whole. The subdivisions within the agency make the notion of an agency permeated by a single mission which drives all motivations unrealistic; indeed, such a proposition is refuted by the data. This is not to say that all bureaucrats are motivated by rational self-interested utility maximisation. As the primary data suggests, non-rational motivations, with other-regarding elements, are present in the accounts of motivation provided by the bureaucrats interviewed. Many felt a strong commitment to the agency and a sense of loyalty, and pride in working for the 'country', or the 'public interest'. The schism in the EPA generates a lack of agreement about what this

mission is and how it should best be attained, with no obvious motivational goal generated by agency form which affects the behaviour of all bureaucrats within the agency.

The EPA does not generate a clear, distinctive, empirically testable, collective rationality which determines the motivations held by bureaucrats. The evidence of the external and internal factors affecting the motivations of agency bureaucrats does not suggest evidence of a single bureaucratic mission, but rather many variants of such a mission. The institutional form creates an agency with two masters: the single administrator, who establishes a mission for the agency as favoured by the White House; and Congress, which determines the agency's sphere of authority, and its purposes. The influence of both the White House and Congress, coupled with the impact of the courts on regulatory decision making, results in an agency situated in an institutional context in which it must constantly juggle the often competing demands of the three branches of government. This point is evidenced further by the nature of political appointments to senior administrative positions (outlined in Chapter 2). Such appointments will have a direct bearing on the content of the regulatory goals pursued by the agency, which can become secondary to the demands of the political agenda established by the White House. The supposed collective rationality of the agency can often become no more than a series of competing demands on the agency members, who are required to balance these demands as best they can, while paying attention to their own motivational goals as well as those goals generated by the three branches of government. Such a situation may constrain rational self-interested action on the part of bureaucrats, but it may also facilitate the bureaucrat in her wish to further her own

attainment of motivational end-states. In sum, institutional form, as described here, has no definite uni-directional effect on bureaucratic motivation. The bureaucratic form is not Weberian, in that it does not create rationality in decision-making via structural form.

Prominent in studies of bureaucratic motivation, agency mission forms much of the focus for the structured interviews (described in the next section). However, although the secondary data described above do suggest that no single all-encompassing agency mission exists, mission, defined as commitment to the public interest, cannot be discarded as an explanation of bureaucratic motivation. This point is visible in the primary data obtained from the structured interviews, which suggest that a sense of mission is present in *all* accounts of motivation, and is determined by the particular context of the bureaucrat, her professional background, the effects of internal agency organisation, and external pressures. The non-rational organisational form impinges on bureaucrats and shape their desire to attain specific motivational goals. Essential to this argument is the evidence that much of this motivation is other-regarding, with references made in the data to '*mission*', '*public interest*', or '*public service*', and '*the needs of the nation.*'¹¹

One noticeable omission from the secondary case study data on bureaucratic motivation is the general failure to compare explanations of motivation *across* agencies at the field office and Washington levels. My data suggest that there are considerable differences in accounts of motivation between the field office and

¹¹ All of these phrases are extracts from the primary interview data obtained from one interview with a senior official in the Wheeling field office, WV.

Washington levels, with very different sets of answers being generated by the same questions. The data presented below expose some of these differences which themselves reflect differences in the context in which bureaucrats are embedded. The pressures in play at Washington and field office levels are often very different, but it remains true to say that it is internal and external factors which influence the motivations pursued, and not simply the rational self-interest of a utility maximiser who, for example, desires to maximise her pecuniary rewards.

The Structured Interview Data

The questions presented below represent only an extract from the full interview questionnaire; the full questionnaire is presented in the following chapter. The questions described below are those which relate to aspects of motivation that may be affected by institutional and structural factors, as well as those factors that are related to professional identification and educational background. The interview questions should be viewed as an attempt to put to the test the methodological approach advocated by KKV in their book *Designing Social Inquiry*. As such, the research design is not a blueprint for mechanical data collection, although the researcher may form expectations about what the data will suggest. Nevertheless, the data are not made to fit the theory. Rather, the theory presented in this chapter, with its emphasis on internal schism along lines of profession, and external pressure from the branches of government, should be seen as being consonant with the data while not fitting completely. There are overlaps across professional groupings in terms of some other-regarding motivations and, as mentioned already, a sense of mission remains

pervasive across the entire agency, at both field office and Washington levels. Thus, as KKV note, data *'has a way of upsetting the theory...'* and my data challenge the view that motivations can be explained solely in terms of rationality with no reference to other-regarding motivations, or the situational context of a bureaucrat.

To recap briefly, I will restate the preferred research design of KKV to explain the format of the rest of the chapter. KKV have four elements to their research design:

- 1) the research question;
- 2) the theory;
- 3) the data;
- 4) the use of data.

The research question has been stated throughout the first three chapters, the theory, in the form of my two-stage argument, presented in chapters 2 and 3. The data are now presented, and an analysis given as the data are used to corroborate the two-stage argument. The questions asked and the reasoning behind them is now given, thus making the research design more transparent to other researchers, and more easily subject to replication and falsification.

A Selection of the Questions Asked

1) Could you tell me about your education, and the qualifications needed to do your job?

4) Does your agency have close links to those industries that you regulate?

5) How important are Interest Groups to this process of regulation. That is do they play an important role in influencing the shape of policy?

6) With what Interest Groups do you deal in your agency?

7) How does the government of the day affect your agency, and its policies?

8) Would you say the agenda of the government affects the agenda of your agency?

9) Do the actions of the government affect the degree of motivation you feel about your job?

18) Do interest groups or the governments 'interfere' with the way you conduct your work?

Why They Were Asked

KKV state that the researcher should '*record and report the process by which the data are generated*' which is the aim of this section. Question 1 is an attempt to find out whether there was any relationship between a person's educational background and her or his feelings of motivation. Questions 4 through 9, and 18, focus on the institutional context in which bureaucrats are embedded in order to ascertain whether there is any kind of relationship between the external forces impinging on the

bureaucrat, the internal forces affecting the bureaucrat, and the motivations expressed by her in the structured interviews. It is apparent that these questions (an extract of the full interview questionnaire) attempt to test the secondary case study evidence on the EPA analysed in this chapter; further, that the data obtained will show how there is no reluctance in this thesis to suggest that more importance needs to be given to the context in which a bureaucrat must operate. The data presented shows that context affects the details of motivation, and that rational self-interest fails to capture all of the picture drawn by the data, accepting that the picture one sees is always guided by the subjective Kantian spectacles through which all phenomena is viewed.

What Was Said

Officials interviewed requested that their names be withheld; I have, accordingly, decided to adopt a policy of confidentiality for all answers given. The important issue for the reader is whether the answer to a question came from an EPA official in Wheeling or Washington.

1) Could you tell me about your education, and the qualifications needed to do your job?

In answer to this question, all of those interviewed at EPA headquarters in Washington were lawyers who had had experience practising law in private firms prior to moving to the agency. All were academic in approach: beginning their answer with a clarification relating to what I meant by my question, or how I defined the terms I was employing. Further, these officials pitched their answers mostly at a

conceptual, rather than emotive level, explaining themselves in general terms which closely followed the textbook answers to many questions, such as those questions I asked relating to their sense of mission. The situation in Wheeling was very different with those working there coming from varied academic and educational backgrounds. For example, one of the senior officials interviewed in Wheeling had been a research chemist prior to joining the EPA soon after its birth in the early seventies. Others had worked in private industry of various sorts, often having grown up in the locality and knowing many of the other EPA officials from schools or college. Their circumstances contrast sharply with the impersonal nature of the Washington headquarters, where officials are more likely to be united by common professional and educational status than by ties of locality or common background.

With regard to motivation, the data on background show that, motivations it matters whether an official is subject to the professional pressures created by those peers in his or her own profession outside of the agency, as witnessed in the schism within the EPA along lines of profession. Further, and importantly, there is a difference in the answers obtained in my study when one compares the answers of Washington and Wheeling bureaucrats which are correlated with, if not necessarily causally related to, the educational and professional differences between the two levels. These postulated differences, to be given more credence, should be placed within the context described above, as captured in the notion of external pressures and internal schism. The twelve questions described in this section have a common purpose underlying their inclusion at this juncture: all attempt the relationship between the context of a bureaucrat in a non ideal-typical structure, with its concomitant internal and external pressures, and

these bureaucrats' motivations. Educational background in itself is not the most important factor in explaining bureaucratic motivations; rather my argument is that it is the context of the bureaucrat, treated in conjunction with factors such as education, which account for motivations, and those factors explaining the pursuit of non-rational motivations. Most importantly, an account of why the pursuit of other-regarding (non-rational) motivations were more prevalent at the field office, as opposed to the Washington, level will be provided.

My data do not show that rationality is the wrong explanation of motivation, or conversely, that all is explained by context and structure. To turn to examples, two lawyers interviewed in Washington had avoided taking positions in field offices in favour of working at the EPA headquarters. One lawyer interviewed suggested that he anticipated moving back to a private law firm in a few years (he had been at the EPA for six years and was 35 years old). This bureaucrat appeared to be a rational utility maximiser with respect to his career; he chose to work in Washington because there were greater opportunities to ascend the promotion ladder. However, as will be suggested in the next chapter, factors such as the collegiality of the office, and the chance to work with those from the same professional background, were also very important factors in explaining why a bureaucrat was motivated to work in one area rather than another. Further, non-rational accounts of motivation underpin some aspects of the choice to locate at Washington or field office level.

The attitude to location, and the choice to locate at field office level presented by those interviewed in Wheeling differs markedly from the accounts received in

Washington. For example, one senior official in Wheeling, who has responsibility for liaising with the Region 3 headquarters in Philadelphia, and often visits Washington as part of his work, explained why he had chosen to work in Wheeling, when many of his peers (in terms of professional background) were situated in Washington. Ray¹² was a research chemist by training and had worked in private industry until 1972, when he moved to the EPA. Although the discussion of his reasons for choosing to work in Wheeling, and his accounts of motivation, are reserved until the next chapter, it should be noted that Ray did not follow the pattern described in this chapter by pursuing his professional peers into Washington. His motivations appear to fit with what I call a non-rational explanation of motivation in this instance insofar as it is an other-regarding motive which explains Ray's reasons to work in Wheeling. The details of these motivations are discussed in some detail in the next chapter.

4) Does your agency have close links to those industries that you regulate?

5) How important are Interest Groups to this process of regulation? That is do they play an important role in influencing the shape of policy?

6) With what Interest Groups do you deal in your agency?

18) Do interest groups or the governments 'interfere' with the way you conduct your work?

¹² I will refer to this official as Ray in order to facilitate my discussion and allow the reader to follow more easily who it is that I am referring to at a given point.

These questions are an attempt to shed light on the context in which EPA bureaucrats must operate, with reference to the effects on motivation, if any, of interest groups. The details of such effects were found to be important to bureaucrats in both Wheeling and in Washington, but the way these groups affected motivations differed between the two localities. Most officials interviewed in Washington suggested that interest groups had an impact on the policy which was formulated; nevertheless, those interviewed rarely had direct dealings with members of interest groups in their everyday work. The prominence of interest groups in DC was acknowledged by all Washington officials; all denied, however, that their decisions were affected by these groups' activity. The data do not corroborate the answers suggested by much of the literature, whether one considers iron triangles, or issue networks, or another formulation which seeks to explain the relationship between interest groups and the bureaucracy. A small-n case study is insufficient to allow any general extrapolations to be made; but the data show that the effects of interest groups on bureaucratic motivation are not clear cut. Factors such as peer pressures, both socially and professionally, are more important to explanations of motivation than are those focusing on the external effects of interest groups. This may not be a finding which lends itself to a more general application across agencies, but it emerges strongly from the results gathered in this study.

The lawyers interviewed in Washington asserted that they did not shape the direction of policy and their own motivations were not affected by the activities of interest groups. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's) were cited as being of slightly more importance to the lawyers I interviewed, but these NGO's, as with interest

groups, were not cited as affecting the motivation of these bureaucrats. The officials interviewed in Washington did not appear to benefit (in terms of pecuniary rewards or greater influence over policy for example) from close links with interest groups and, therefore, one can assert that their motivations are not affected to any considerable extent by their relationships with interest groups. One question that can be asked of the IAD (International Activities Division) lawyers is whether their motivations appear rational on a first reading of the data. All of the Washington lawyers interviewed (in the IAD) had a clear view of their career's development, and pursued goals which they hoped to achieve within a clearly specified time period; such motivations are rational, by the definition in Chapter 1, insofar as these officials do seem to choose a logical process to achieve a specified end. Two of those interviewed in Washington specified reasons for having moved from the private sector to the EPA, but, importantly, these reasons had much to do with a sense of mission: for example, one lawyer educated at Yale and working in DC stated that he had:

'an interest in the environment, and I wanted to work on projects that let me combine my skills with this interest.'

All of those interviewed in Washington, despite exhibiting rational processes of formulating and pursuing their motivational goals, seemed to pursue many other-regarding motives. These motivations are essential to this argument, because they show that many motivations held, while rational in the sense that their attainment may maximise utility, do not follow the Rational Choice argument. This view asserts that motivations can be explained in terms of rational self-interest. The argument presented here states that there are motivations held which are non-rational insofar as they contain other-regarding motivations. It is hoped that evidence of such

motivations can establish that an account of motivation couched solely in terms of rationality (as self-interest) is insufficient to explain fully the motivations found in my case-study.

There was a sharp contrast between Wheeling and Washington in terms of the expression and content of the replies to my interview questions. With respect to interest groups, much of the literature suggests that Washington is permeated by many groups impinging on government, but the data suggest that in the case of EPA lawyers in Washington at least, groups were not the primary explanatory variable with respect to motivation. In Wheeling the impact of groups on bureaucratic motivation was very different. Of the officials I interviewed in Wheeling, many work for the State Liaison Officer for Region 3, who has responsibility for pioneering many new initiatives, and is given quite a wide gambit of power in which to pursue policy directives issued from DC. The most senior bureaucrat in the Wheeling offices stated that:

'...our office has a lot of latitude...we can choose what we focus on...a lot of our focus here [in West Virginia] is on abandoned coal mines.'

Although an emphasis on mines should not be viewed as a free choice, it is important to note the recurrent theme in the Wheeling interviews with officials believing they had much latitude over policy, allowing the development of close links with the local community and success of those policies emanating from the EPA and applied to the local constituency. As the staff of the State Liaison Officer testified, it is often necessary for officials out in the field offices to take further the directives issued from Washington. One EPA official in Wheeling described the relationship between Federal directives and actual policy implementation:

'Congress, or the Federal government, would establish standards for...regulation and insist that standards should not vary between states. But states can go beyond this federal standard. If we can show that we can enforce the federal requirements, that we have the political resolve to do what has to be done, we can take over the Federal prerogative, and the agency at Washington becomes more of an overseer and less involved in our day-to-day business.'

An important question here is what such responsibility and freedom at field office level means in relation to interest groups and their effects on the policy making process in general and bureaucratic motivation in particular. The proximity of officials to the constituency they serve, and to the local interest groups affected by the policies they implement, has important affects on motivations with non-rational motivations being more prevalent, according to my two-stage argument, because the specific context of the officials in the Wheeling field offices generates a desire to serve a visible and defined public interest. The responsibility and freedom of field office officials in Wheeling, then, lead to the development of close links with interest groups not found in the Washington offices, and officials who are very concerned with the content and results of the policies they implement, and who desire to serve the public interest successfully.

All of the Wheeling officials interviewed stated that their motivational goals were not shaped to any great extent by the pressures coming from Washington (see questions 7, 8, and 9 below), but more by pressures stemming from the needs of the local community in which they were embedded. This is to suggest that what I have termed external factors are very important in shaping the motivational goals pursued by

bureaucrats, with pressure from local interest groups/lobby groups having a considerable impact on the way in which policy is formulated. Although I reserve a discussion of why the officials interviewed joined the EPA until the next chapter, it is worth noting here that all of those working in Wheeling whom I interviewed had grown up in West Virginia and felt passionately about the policies in which they were involved. This is very different to what I term the professional indifference of the EPA lawyers working at the Federal headquarters. In Washington, the effects of policies were not usually witnessed directly, with the policy tasks performed being more akin to an academic exercise insofar as the work was an intellectual task, or a problem to be solved, rather than an emotional issue. In Wheeling, the policy effects were directly observable in many instances, with many of those interviewed stating that much of their motivation stemmed from the satisfaction they gained from seeing a policy implemented which had visible (beneficial) effects.

One further effect on motivation not mentioned directly in my interviews was the desire, or perhaps requirement, to appease local interest groups. In Wheeling the links between groups and the EPA field office is very strong. For example, the State Liaison Staff, who occupy an anomalous position within the agency as a whole, represent a formalisation of the hitherto informal and unofficial relationship which exists between bureaucracy and interest groups in the US political system. In Wheeling there is not so much a fluid issue network but rather a formal apparatus in place which maintains the link between local groups and the EPA field office. As one official explained:

'I think it is a part of the EPA philosophy that we want to deal with all kinds of groups...'

The bureaucrats in Wheeling are in close contact with groups and are also close to the sources of the issues about which the groups campaign, and as such external factors are very important in explaining some aspects of bureaucratic motivation.

Plainly, therefore, the Wheeling EPA is not an ideal-type anymore than are the Washington offices. The Weberian formulation of a rational bureaucracy is not found in the Wheeling offices where many forces determine bureaucrats' motivations. The significance for the present argument is that it is the context of the agency, and the embeddedness of the officials that accounts, at least in part, for the motivations held by bureaucrats. It does not follow that Wheeling is a less rational bureaucratic form than is Washington, but rather the argument here is that the motivations described by those bureaucrats in Wheeling appeared to contain a stronger other-regarding content than did the motivations described by those officials in Washington. The point of this assertion is to highlight the argument that motivations are not based solely on calculations of rationally self-interested utility maximisation, nor can the bureaucratic structures in which bureaucrats operate generate such rationality on the part of its constituent members. Often, the structural form of the bureaucracy is such that it does not permit of a clear cut avenue facilitating the pursuit of pure rational self-interest; there are too many contradictory structures, or rules and regulations, with no obvious route by which an agent with bounded rationality (since complete rationality is too unrealistic an assumption, even in an hypothetical argument) can maximise those motivations that are driven by this rational self-interest.

From the data obtained in Wheeling, one finds that the structural forms that come into being are often the result of a series of measures put in place to deal with particular problems peculiar to that locality. The State Liaison Officer in the Wheeling field offices described an example which relates directly to the impact of interest groups on the motivations of bureaucrats, which involves a program implemented in Wheeling in 1978, which came not from Washington, but rather was created within the field office and which then received approval from Washington. The new role of a State Co-ordination Official was created, providing an official who would work out of the regulatory offices and who would focus on state relations with the EPA and its policies. One official in the EPA field office argued that the relations between groups, industry, and bureaucrats who one never met, was not conducive to successful negotiations. This lead Governor Rockefeller (now Senator) to ask for a change in these methods of negotiation and as a result, the State Co-ordinator and State Liaison Officer's positions were created. As another Wheeling liaison officer stated:

'I can use outreach opportunities that other bureaucrats don't have, it lets me get close to the natives, I even do a TV show here in Wheeling, where we meet with the local interest groups, members of the state legislature, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Manufacturing Association.'

West Virginia is unique in that it holds a twice yearly meeting of the Environment Round Table, where members of the EPA speak to, and listen to, members of the local interest groups, and all who wish to voice an opinion. From the testimonies of the officials involved in these enterprises it was apparent that motivations were affected

by these meetings, which generated close and personal links to interest groups. This is not the case in Washington, where officials can more easily avoid direct contact with groups, with there being less need to match one's personal motivational goals with those of the constituency in which one is embedded. Again, this is not to make any grand general claim, but seeks to show that it is the context of the agency, and how this affects the structure of the organisation that is very important in shaping motivations. There does seem to be a strong other-regarding content in the motivations expressed by the Wheeling officials, and this can be explained, at least in part by referring to the context in which these motivations are held, and the internal and external pressures which impinge on these officials¹³.

The data corroborate my argument that external factors are very important in determining motivations, with EPA officials in Washington driven by criteria of success which are often shaped by peers in their professions outside of the agency (internal factors), and less by the need to appease the interest groups and public interest lobbyists. In West Virginia, the situation is somewhat different with motivations affected very strongly by the needs and goals of the local community, as well as by the close involvement, and level of emotional commitment, of field office bureaucrats to the policies on which they work. Although there are insufficient data to posit a conclusive interpretation, the data corroborate my argument that policies have a more instrumental and detached reception in Washington, where officials are

¹³ At the present time two-thirds of the regional offices now have a state co-ordination role. Unlike in Washington, the officials in Wheeling would be directly involved with local interest groups and would attempt to find a balance between federal demands established in Washington and the needs of the local community, as well as the wishes of interest groups (although the wishes of groups and the needs of the community need not always coincide).

distanced from the effects of their policies, than is the case in Wheeling, where officials are closer to the policy effects and the constituencies affected by these policies. The claim here is that there is a strong other-regarding element at both the Washington and West Virginia levels. Further, the bureaucratic forms found in the EPA at both of these levels do not generate rational decision making in all circumstances as a means of alleviating the need for officials to gather huge amounts of information from which to calculate how best to maximise their self-interest. This is stage one of my argument: to show that one can undermine the notion that bureaucratic forms will generate motivations based on rationality. Stage two will show that motivations are not always explained by referring to some form of rational utility maximisation; this is attempted by focusing on four important models of motivation.

7) How does the government of the day affect your agency, and its policies?

8) Would you say the agenda of the government affects the agenda of your agency?

9) Do the actions of the government affect the degree of motivation you feel about your job?

The purpose of asking these questions is to explore further the relationship between external factors which affect the EPA and their bearing on bureaucratic motivations. Some of the effects of interest groups on bureaucratic motivation have now been discussed and the relationship between the White House and bureaucratic motivations

is now examined¹⁴. Turning first to the interviews conducted in Washington, one official described the:

'importance of Browner to us here in DC [Carol Browner is the administrator of the EPA, and reports to the White House as a political appointee]. We get directives coming down from the top that are usually saying what the President or the Congress say that the public interest is...I believe that the President knows better than I do what is in the public interest, and wouldn't say he interferes. His responsibility is to clarify the goals we pursue.'

Of those interviewed in Washington, some spoke of the EOP, OMB, and NSC as having an impact on the direction of policy, with the directions favoured by the President having a considerable impact, largely because the President has the support of the senior EPA officials, and the Administrator, herself, a political appointee. Those in Washington are in close contact with the upper echelons of the agency and as such experience first hand the pressures to attain that demanded by the White House. Two of the bureaucrats interviewed in Washington argued that their agendas were the same as the agenda of the White House, and talked in terms of responsiveness of civil servants to the government of the day. The answers given echoed an answer from an academic textbook, and, in agreement with the rational choice approach on this point, the data show that a bureaucrat does not pursue an agenda with no regard to personal interests, with individual motivational goals wholly in keeping with those goals identified with the agency as a whole.

¹⁴ The relations between the bureaucracy and Congress, though of immense importance in understanding fully what it is that motivates bureaucrats, is not dealt with in detail here for reasons of limiting the size of this work, and of limiting the areas it attempts to cover.

When asked question nine, which refers to the relationship between individual motivations and the agenda pursued by the White House, all of those questioned in Washington stated that their motivations did change in intensity according to whether they agreed or disagreed with the policies they were asked to deal with. However, there was an insistence that they would not attempt to subvert policy directives, or replace the President's agenda with their own. This is not surprising as an answer, but the intensity with which those interviewed argued that they would always pursue the agenda of the administration, or the Congress, was unexpected. Referring again to internal and external constraints on bureaucratic behaviour, it did seem that in Washington EPA officials were constrained in how far they could deviate from the agendas established by their superiors. It appeared that success in carrying out policies to the letter was very important for success in the EPA headquarters. Notably, two Washington interviewees said that their motivations were shaped in large part by their desire to implement a policy successfully and accurately.

Again, the situation was somewhat different in Wheeling with the attitude to the impact of the White House being quite different. One Wheeling official described the relationship between his office and the White House thus:

'...the administration gives us a philosophy...which we tailor according to local needs.'

One interesting comment made by a bureaucrat in Wheeling confirmed the widespread sentiment that there were too many political appointees in the EPA. As Ray argues:

'...my immediate superior in the Philadelphia office [regional office for region three] is the lowest political appointee that I have had dealings with...in twenty years here. I have to keep adjusting to new people, many of whom don't know how to do their jobs when they arrive... they often have their own ideas about how things should be done here [Wheeling]...though they know nothing about the area.'

When asked whether the agenda of the White House affects the motivations felt by those officials in Wheeling, most of the answers I received suggested that the way in which the administration affected them was sporadic, with there being little involvement in the day-to-day running of the Wheeling office by the administration, although sometimes a policy would be imposed from above which did affect motivations. One example which was cited frequently was that of Superfund (see Chapter 4) which many of the EPA officials in Wheeling felt to be misguided, unnecessarily expensive and wasteful, often involving a duplication of effort. Such policies do affect bureaucratic motivations. It is not the case that bureaucrats simply attempt to budget maximise, or increase their utility, calculated on a rational self-interest basis. Rather, policies can determine motivations, with some policies failing to generate a motivation to pursue a given objective. One possible explanation is that bureaucrats pursue motivational goals which are other-regarding and, therefore, involve a desire to attain certain policy objectives and not others. It is not the case that the structure of the EPA can prevent officials pursuing some policies more vigorously than others. Bureaucrats may be rational in how they achieve their preferred policy goals, but this is not to say that rationality explains these motivations, since one needs

to understand the content of these motivations and why they are held in the first place. To understand this one must accept that motivations are shaped by the interests of others, the interest groups, the local constituency needs and demands, as well as the often competing demands imposed by the various branches of government.

The reason for focusing on these questions in this chapter is to allow for the assessment of the importance of internal factors such as the structure of the agency, and external factors, for example, the impact of the judiciary or the White House on the motivations pursued by bureaucrats. This chapter has shown that a focus on structures, and on the context in which a bureaucrat is embedded can help to explain the motivational goals held by bureaucrats within the EPA. Further, this chapter has shown that other-regarding motives play an important part in accounting for what it is that motivates bureaucrats. To focus on rationality alone as a means of explaining bureaucratic motivation is to ignore a rich explanatory resource, namely the effects of internal structures, and external forces on the motivations held by bureaucrats within a government agency. Of importance also, are the differences highlighted by the data which suggest that motivations will differ according to where one looks. Explanations for these variances are the differences in the context of bureaucrats in different locations, as well as the divergence between external forces impinging on an agency in a given location.

The next chapter focuses on the remainder of the interview data, and looks at four models of bureaucratic motivation, all of which employ some form of rationality criterion. These models are tested against the data, with the findings analysed in detail

to facilitate an examination of the utility of rationality as a means of accounting for bureaucratic motivation.

Chapter 4: The Models

Niskanen, Downs, Dunleavy, Simon

In Chapter 3 the first of the two stages of my argument was presented in order to show the effects of internal and external constraints on motivations in Wheeling and Washington. This chapter focuses on stage two, comparing the case study data with the four theoretical models named above. It is argued here that these models pay insufficient attention to non-rational elements in explanations of bureaucratic motivation, and so need to allow for those motivations not explained in terms of rational maximising accounts. Further, it is argued not that the models are wrong, but that they need to be supplemented by an account which accommodates non-rational factors and the importance of the embeddedness of an agent within an institutional context (Chapter 3). Taken together, these two elements represent my two-stage argument.

As the first chapter described, the Rational Choice approach to bureaucratic motivation characterises man as a rational self-interested maximiser. As Alan Ware (1975, p5) says of this approach:

‘Politics is seen as a “market” activity...one which serves as an extension of the economic market.’

Man is viewed here as *homo economicus*, a rational self-interested maximiser as found in neo-classical economics. This chapter questions the notion that bureaucratic motivation is explained by viewing officials as rational maximisers. In his book *Cages of Reason* (1993)

Silberman gives three main reasons for bureaucrats being understood as rational in this way: system needs/co-ordination; bounded rationality; and natural selection/ecological reasons. The first reason is that given by Weber (Chapter 2), where legal-rational bureaucratic forms are a natural response to system needs for stability and survival, and where the desire to co-ordinate arises from the individual's conflation of her interests with those of the organisation. The second approach combines the bounded rationality of the decision maker with environmental uncertainty to explain motivations (the approach favoured by Simon and described below). However, as Chapter 3 argued, the EPA as a bureaucratic form does not generate rationality in those instances where individuals cannot acquire sufficient information to make rational decisions; that is, the EPA cannot perform in the manner attributed to ideal type bureaucracies. Silberman argues that given the bounded rationality of bureaucrats, agents seek to maintain their power and status by resorting to the utilisation of rules governing decision-making that are presented as rational and objective, stemming, that is, from organisational not personal necessity. Bureaucrats maximise the security of their position by emphasising the necessity for hierarchical discretion and obedience to organisational rules as the most efficient means for arriving at decisions and for achieving goals. This approach is used both by Weber and Simon, with bureaucratisation being the result of the limitations imposed by environmental uncertainty, and the bounded rationality of decision makers. Here, agents aim at utility maximisation at the level of the organisation, with individual interests assumed to be synonymous with the interests of the organisation. Natural selection/ecological explanations view bureaucracy as the outgrowth of historical conditions, both cultural and structural, conducive to such growth, with some environments emerging to the point where they possess values and social structural characteristics which make it possible for rational-legal forms to emerge. The natural selection approach views adaptation of organisational structures as a

function of the interdependent relations between individual choice, strategic choice and external constraints.

Silberman views the explanation of bureaucratic motivation as a dichotomy with decision makers constrained by utility maximisation or '*environmental demands which enforce systematic maximisation of utility*' (Silberman, 1993). However, these elements should be viewed as complementary elements in an explanation of bureaucratic motivation, with the argument in this thesis emphasising the importance of non-rational elements to both of these factors. Silberman focuses only on the question of how these factors contribute to organisational rationality, but my argument extends the analysis to ask how environmental and personal factors may include non-rational elements which affect motivation. The answer to this question is the objective of the two-stage argument given in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. By choosing too narrow a focus, Silberman misses much that is useful. This thesis examines how environmental context can affect bureaucratic motivations, focusing on those systematic deviations between environments which account for differences of motivation. Again, to quote Silberman:

'...the criticism that all one has said is that different environments produce different modes of institutionalisation ...does not tell us what factors vary systematically so as to produce different [motivations].'

Chapter 3 has shown how motivations vary between Washington and Wheeling, and examined how different environmental constraints might have affected these findings. This chapter focuses on individual explanations of motivation and, taken together, Chapters 3 and 4 show that explanations based on environmental, cultural and historical factors can

supplement those individualist accounts based on the Rational Choice approach. An emphasis on these environmental and cultural factors will highlight the importance of non-rational factors in accounts of motivation.

William Niskanen

‘...there is nothing inherent in the nature of bureaux and our political institutions that leads officials to know, seek out, or act in the public interest.’

Niskanen rejects the relevance of non-rational motivations to an understanding of bureaucratic motivation which is explained in his work in terms of rationally self-interested utility maximisation, where the maximand is the largest possible budget. In the work of Niskanen personal preferences are primary. He argues:

‘Any theory of the behaviour of bureaucrats that does not incorporate the personal preferences of bureaucrats ...will be relevant only in the most rigidly authoritarian environments.’

In this view then, budget maximisation is a major motivational goal of bureaucrats; while Niskanen does allow that structure can affect motivations, rational budget maximisation remains the primary motivating force for bureaucrats.

In brief, Niskanen’s argument relies on a theory of bureaucratic oversupply of public goods, resulting from the maximisation of budgets by bureaucrats. Each bureau has a single sponsor which gives it its budget in return for a block of outputs, and bureaux here have four advantages over their sponsors. First is that those judging bureaucratic performance are a specialist audience who have a vested interest in expanding budgets, since budgets cuts will

lead to a loss of confidence in those politicians responsible for the policy area in question, as well as a drop in interest group co-operation. The second is the standing of department heads, of committees, and ministries are viewed in terms of their success in committing public resources to their policy areas. Third is that only bureau personnel know the costs and benefits of different output levels. Budgets given for blocks of output minimise the amount of information that is revealed. Fourthly, the relationship is a bilateral monopoly with the sponsor dependent on a single bureau for all its outputs, allowing bureaux to enter budget negotiations on a take-it-or-leave-it basis¹.

In Niskanen's account, bureaucrats cannot directly observe the public interest, or constituency demands for an agency's outputs. A bureaucrat may appeal to the constituents of its sponsor in an attempt to increase the sponsor's demand for its services but it is not the preferences of the constituents that are important to the bureau but their influence on the revealed preferences of its sponsor. It is not the public interest *per se* which is important, but the interests of the sponsor that are primary. Bureaucrats may seek to serve the public interest on this account, but cannot because of the excessive informational demands this would entail. Bureaux have:

'one person who serves his personal interests of a differing perception of the public interest, because of the limitations of his information, and the conflicting interests of others, regardless of his personal motivations.'

Thus, the most selfless bureaucrat must choose a feasible, lower-level goal with the result being the development of expertise in a narrow field. Such an argument is tested against the case study data in the second section of this chapter, and the data will show that bureaucrats can and do act altruistically, pursuing non-rational motivational goals, *contra* Niskanen.

¹ Dunleavy argues that such a bargaining stance is not feasible, because top officials in the bureau would risk being replaced were the threat of non-supply realised.

Robert Goodin (*Public Administration*, 1982) supplements Niskanen's argument by including a commitment to mission, and the possibility of goals being other-regarding. In this account, mission-committed rational politicians and bureaucrats join in a policy making oligopoly, run internally on the basis of trust, and externally on the basis of the manipulation of information. The result is bureaucratic *skewing* (rather than simple oversupply) of public (bureaucratic) goods and services. Goodin examines the relevance of Simon's satisficers in his account, viewing satisficing as a *special case* of rational maximising behaviour, subject to the constraints of imperfect and costly information. Central to this account is an explanation of how agency goods are distributed, with those goods with benefits concentrated narrowly and costs widely dispersed being oversupplied, with the converse true also. Goodin allows, unlike Niskanen, that politicians and bureaucrats may actually care about the policies on which they work, and may be '*mission-committed*' (Margolis, 1975) to agency goals. For Goodin, politicians and bureaucrats may be allies to a far greater extent than Niskanen allows; indeed, such a view is suggested by the case study data. Bureaucratic skewing results when one has an oversupply of those policies that are relatively well entrenched in terms of an agency or party ideology and historical commitments. Similarly, policies with well-defined benefits for an identifiable constituency are equally likely to be oversupplied. Whether such bureaucratic skewing occurs is examined in the second part of this chapter.

Anthony Downs²

² In his *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Harper and Row, New York, (1957) Downs argues that agents are rational, that is, they know their own ends and the best way to attain them. In most analyses of rationality and bureaucratic motivation, rational is applied to an agent's means and not to his ends. In the Downsian account, despite its pluralistic approach, psychological explanations are ignored, with the focus being on rationality narrowly construed as economic and political self interest. Non-rational motivations do not figure in the Downsian account.

In the Downsian approach to bureaucratic motivation, bureaucrats are:

‘...significantly, though not solely, motivated by their own interests. Bureaucrats attain their goals rationally. Their goals are complex and include power, income, prestige, security, convenience, loyalty (to an idea, institution of the nation), pride in excellent work, and a desire to serve the public interest.’

It is unclear whether Downs’s account allows for non-rational motivations, or whether all motivations are attributed to some form of rationality. Motivations here are ‘*complex*’, and ‘*though rational* [bureaucrats] *have limitations upon their rationality.*’ Bureaucrats, pursue goals in common with other workers but need not give equal weight to common, as opposed to personal, goals. Each bureaucrat pursues goals connected with her own self-interest which are different to the goals others pursue. The divergence between personal goals and the goals which would be held by those pursuing organisational goals generate ‘*biases*’ (Downs) which result from the divergence between personal and organisational goals. Downs argues that every organisation has formal goals with bias being the divergence between these goals and personal goals based on self-interest. Formal goals result from a compromise between officials who agree to adopt a set of goals not identical with the personal goals of any of them.

Downs’s account offers a more sophisticated account of bureaucratic motivation than that provided by Niskanen insofar as it does not exclude other-regarding motives to action; bureaucrats have both private and social motivations derived from private maximands and those goals arrived at through formal organisational constraints. However, Downs excludes the possibility that these two sets can ever be coincident. While not going as far as to examine non-rational motivations, Downs does allow for a plurality of motivational forces, with self-interest not viewed as the sole motive to action. As Downs argues:

'...the motives of bureaucrats are multiple...they [can be] power, money, income, prestige, convenience, security, personal loyalty, pride in proficient performance of work, desire to serve the public interest...commitment to a specific program of action.'

Downs allows that bureaucrats may be motivated to serve the public interest, but not that non-rational (that is non utility maximising) accounts can explain the motivations pursued. For Downs, bureaucrats can and do serve the public interest, as they perceive it, but it does not follow that they are privately motivated solely, or even primarily, by a desire to serve the public interest *per se*. Rather, it is the creation of the '*correct social institutions*' which lead to the coincidence of private and social motives, the overlap of personal goals and the public interest.

Downs provides a typology of bureaucrats based on five categories; they are: zealots; advocates; climbers; conservers; and statesmen. Briefly, zealots are strongly committed to specific programs, which become '*sacred policies*' (Downs). They embrace changes which expand bureau responsibilities, and allow the pursuit of favoured policies, but are uninterested in acquiring broader functions or roles unless it advances their programs. Advocates have a more general idealistic orientation to maximise the power of the agency, to pursue its mission, or better serve its client groups. They identify their personal loyalty with their organisation, or their clients. Advocates may take an even handed view of internal affairs but to the outside world appear enthusiastically partisan, in search of wider roles and more resources. Climbers want to maximise their own power, income and prestige. Senior climbers may over-commit to the organisation and push through radical changes which foster their individual aggrandisement. Conservers want a quiet life and a stable future. They maximise convenience and security, and may want to marginally upgrade their existing levels of power, income and

prestige. Conservers resist almost all radical changes to the agency, including major agency growth or functional expansion. Statesmen take a broad view of the general welfare, seeking power in order to further this welfare. Thus statesmen approximate to the model of altruistic civil servants set out in older textbooks on administrative theory.

The Downsian account allows for a plurality of bureaucratic types, and does not assume bureaucrats are homogeneous in their motivations. However, the approach favoured by Downs does not allow for an account of bureaucratic motivation which includes non-rational motivations. This chapter will show that such an omission results in research which ignores a vital component of any account of motivation.

Herbert Simon

Simon examines bureaucratic motivations from the viewpoint of administrative theory, with the importance of the relationship between the individual and the organisation emphasised. In Simon's account, man is important to an organisation, but organisational environments are needed to provide much of the force that moulds and develops personal qualities and habits in man. Organisations determine the environment of information in which decisions are taken; as such, the behaviour of the bureaucrat is a function of his organisational situation. Of rationality, Simon argues that although human behaviour in organisations is not wholly rational it at least attempts to be. Much behaviour in organisations is, he argues, task-oriented and rational, and any psychological account of human behaviour must also incorporate rational behaviour. Simon focuses on the border between rational and non-rational aspects of human social behaviour, emphasising *bounded rationality*, whereby bureaucrats satisfice because they lack the information needed to maximise. In keeping with most Rational Choice

accounts, Simon construes rationality as a means-end relationship, but ends themselves are often instruments to more final objectives. Therefore, Simon maintains, one can conceive of a hierarchy of ends. Rationality, in this account has to do with the construction of means-ends chains. As Simon argues:

'...through the hierarchical structure of ends, behaviour attains integration and consistency, for each member a set of alternatives are weighed in terms of a comprehensive scale of alternatives-the ultimate ends.'

The structure of conscious motives is a tangled web or disconnected collection of elements only weakly tied together.

Simon maintains that a single bureaucrat cannot attain any high degree of rationality since the number of possible alternative actions is too great, the information requirements too large, and objectivity unobtainable. Individual choice takes place in an environment of givens: premises that are accepted by the subject as bases for his choice, with behaviour adaptive only within the limits set by these givens. Motivations are affected by psychological factors, and the anticipation of consequences under limited information. Simon supports the argument in Chapter 3 that motivational goals are formed with respect to organisational objectives which become internalised by the individual over time, and are incorporated into the psychology and attitudes of the individual. The subjection of the individual to organisationally determined goals leads the individual to acquire an *organisational personality*. Once the system of values which is to govern an administrative choice has been specified, there is one and only one "best" decision which is determined by the organisational values and situation, not by the personal goals of the decision-maker. Once an individual, on the basis of personal motives, decides to recognise organisational objectives, his further behaviour is determined not by his

personal motives, but by the demands of organisational efficiency. Simon places limits on the proposition that organisational goals are internalised, arguing that there is an area of acceptance within which the individual will behave “organisationally”. When organisation demands fall outside this area, personal motives reassert themselves, and the organisation, to that extent, ceases to exist.

Of motivation, Simon argues that the term can mean whatever it is that causes an agent to pursue a given course of action; therefore, every action is motivated, by definition. But in most human behaviour the relation, in Simon’s account at least, between motives and action is not simple, but is mediated by a whole chain of events and surrounding conditions. The connection between action and goal is viewed as complex with their intervening between them a means-end chain, an expectation, and a social belief supporting this expectation. The relation between the action and the ultimate goal has become highly contingent, even in this simple case. Simon allows that the line of demarcation between personal and professional interests is not a sharp one, with personal satisfactions often arising from the pursuit of goals congruent with organisational goals. However, such satisfaction may be explained in terms of rational maximisation, even in this instance. Yet, as Chapter 3 has suggested, much of a bureaucrat’s behaviour can be explained in terms of a non-rational account. Simon maintains that individuals can shift from one role to another as a function of the environment in which they are situated, with environment, and the role an agent occupies, explaining the incidence of bureaucrats internalising organisational goals. In Simon’s words:

‘...the goals and constraints approximate to the role become a part of the decision making program, stored in his memory, that defines his role behaviour.’

Organisational and personal goals are not viewed here as wholly separate as the data in this chapter will show. The data suggest that Simon is correct in his view that organisational and personal goals are not wholly separate, though this is not to accept automatically all of Simon's account. After examining the approach favoured by Dunleavy, this chapter will examine the case-study data within the theoretical framework established in the four models described here.

Dunleavy

In his book *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice* (1991), Patrick Dunleavy argues that public choice models capture only a part of political reality, viewing man as *homo economicus*, a rational actor who is an '*abstract and shadowy figure [who] lurks in the assumptions*' rather than being explicitly described (Hollis and Nell, 1975). Dunleavy criticises public choice models for not allowing diversity in the decision procedures followed by actors. Both Downs and Niskanen are criticised in Dunleavy's account. The Downsian approach is seen to have an excessively loose definition of bureaucratic utility functions, which Dunleavy argues are:

'...simply illegitimate within a public choice perspective.' Downs has a typology of bureaucrats which Dunleavy views as unclear in terms of whether the five types are all allowable variants of utility-maximisers, since their utility functions mix other-regarding and selfish elements. Downs's five types do appear to present a continuum of motivations, from self-regarding rational bureaucrats to the pure altruism of the statesmen. If so, his is not a pure economic model but a mixed public choice/sociological model.

Dunleavy defines an alternative model of bureaucratic motivations based upon a more plausible set of official objectives, which explain observed behaviour with more precision, or over a wider range of situations, than is covered by the models described in this chapter. Dunleavy's model is one based on *bureau-shaping*, with motivations driven by a desire to achieve a favoured organisational form. Dunleavy contends that the maximand of welfare-maximising officials in policy-making ranks is to have congenial work and a valued work environment; he argues:

'Compared with their counterparts in private companies, senior government officials are likely to find that budget-maximisation is a remarkably frustrating activity in terms of near-pecuniary utility pay-offs.'

Work-related utilities are viewed here as a major continuing influence on the ways in which officials behave within the public sector. For Dunleavy, rational bureaucrats oriented primarily to work-related utilities pursue a bureau-shaping strategy designed to bring their bureau into a progressively closer approximation to staff rather than line functions, with a collegial atmosphere, and a central location. Rational bureaucrats concentrate on bureau-shaping designed to bring their agency into line with an ideal configuration conferring high status and agreeable work tasks within the budgetary constraints contingent on the existing and potential shape of the agency activities.

One strength that Dunleavy's argument has over the other models examined here is that he questions the assumptions of the rational actor model in which agents have determinant preferences which are easily ranked, and transitively ordered; that actors do not become satiated with consumption and hence continuously maximise; that actors are basically self-regarding and instrumental in their behaviour. As Dunleavy argues, only if these stages hold,

and if decision makers are unitary actors, will they behave rationally, making choices so as to maximise benefits net of costs. Each of these stages can be plausibly questioned in political contexts. Important here, and noted by Dunleavy, is the fact that bureaucrats may behave altruistically in important respects. As in the Downsian discussion, Dunleavy allows that bureaucrats often do not act like unitary actors, and can choose to invest in either individual or collective modes for improving their welfare, and are likely to encounter collective action problems if they pursue budget-maximising strategies. He argues that senior officials always confront a choice between budget-maximising and bureau-shaping strategies, with the mix of actions depending on the rank of officials, and associated individual options for welfare maximisation. What is important for the argument in this thesis is that Dunleavy allows that officials may be motivated to pursue other-regarding (non-rational) motivations, and emphasises the relevance of institutional constraints on the abilities of bureaucrats to pursue maximands based on self-interest. He argues that:

‘...people may behave altruistically in important respects...’ An important criticism of the public choice approach made by Dunleavy is that policy-level bureaucrats do not act like the unitary actors that typify the public choice approach, and may engage in both individual and collective modes of improving their welfare. This allows for the possibility that bureaucrats may be motivated by goals consonant with the interests of their constituency, or even the public interest broadly defined.

The chapter will now examine the interview data, examining how these data bear on the explanations of bureaucratic motivation generated in the models. The answers obtained in the study are compared to the arguments found in the models in order to highlight the gaps in the models, and particularly the lack of emphasis on non-rational accounts of motivation. The

order in which the questions are arranged here follows a pattern that was deliberately avoided when the questions were first asked. The original questionnaire layout had no obvious link between the topic of one question and those that immediately followed it but the layout presented below groups the questions according to subject.

The questionnaire

Group 1: Goals

- 10) What do you consider to be the goals of this agency?*
- 11) Are these the goals you would choose to pursue if you could determine your own goals?*
- 12) Are there other goals that you feel would increase your feelings of motivation? What are they?*
- 13) Does the government create goals for your agency that are unrealistic, or not feasible?*
- 15) Do the goals you pursue make you feel motivated?*

Group 2: Discretion

- 16) Do you have enough/ too little/ too much responsibility?*
- 17) Are you given a large degree of freedom to pursue objectives in the manner you think best?*

Group 3: Hierarchical Relationships

- 14) Do your superiors set unrealistic targets?*

20) *What effect does the appraisal of your work by your superiors have on your feelings of motivation?*

Group 4: Mission

19) *Do you feel that your agency has a mission according to which your goals are established?*

Group 5: Budgets

21) *Is the budget of your agency too small/ too big/ sufficient?*

32) *Are there noticeable winners and losers from agency budget changes? Who are they?*

33) *How does a budget cut in your agency affect your agency?*

34) *Is there a lot of pressure to meet certain budget targets?*

35) *Who exerts this pressure?*

Group 6: Changes

23) *Are any major (‘radical’) changes needed in your agency? What are they?*

31) *Do you often encounter officials who are resistant to change?*

24) *Are you more or less motivated in your work when it involves ‘political’ or ‘contentious’ issues?*

39) *Do your political views affect the way you deal with the policies you work on?*

25) Which is more important to you, a higher rank in the organisation, or better monetary rewards?

29) Do you have enough power to influence the implementation of policies? Would you welcome greater power and influence?

40) Are factors such as personal loyalty, pride in your work, being good at your work, as important to you, or more important, than power, money, prestige...etc..?

Group 7: Bureau Shaping

26) If you had the chance, how would you change the shape and structure of your agency?

30) Does the present structure of your agency hinder your efforts to do your job?

36) Do you feel that your work environment is friendly, informal or intimate?

37) Is this a desirable organisational design?

Responses

The questions above represent an attempt to ascertain the attitude of bureaucrats on issues chosen to highlight that behaviour predicted by the theoretical models. The major finding that must be emphasised here is that bureaucratic motivations did not completely match any of the models, though models and the data do coincide at times. The data suggest bureaucrats are far from being uniformly rational in the motivations they hold. The rest of this chapter compares what was said with the arguments put forward in the models.

Group 1: Goals

These questions were designed to establish which goals bureaucrats felt the agency pursued, and which goals they would like to pursue. These questions also examine the link between goals pursued and the feeling of motivation with respect to these goals.

The answers provided by the lawyers in Washington DC were quite short and direct, with the goals of the EPA being explained as though they were being recited straight from the textbook. The agency's goals were described as the maintenance and improvement of the total environment; the regulation of industries who pollute the environment; ensuring that environmental standards are met; and that the best available technologies are employed in dealing with the environment. When asked whether there were other goals that would increase one's motivation, one IAD lawyer replied that there were subsidiary goals which he felt deserved more emphasis, though he insisted that the major thrust of policy was correct and, as such, he felt '*sufficient motivation*' in the pursuit of these goals. None of those interviewed in Washington expressed a wish to become involved in a particular policy, nor did anyone express major dissatisfaction with the policies and goals being pursued by the EPA. The general answer received seemed to be that motivations did not vary greatly across policies. This was a somewhat surprising answer given that I was expecting the interviewees to be policy sensitive with respect to motivation.

The Washington officials did exhibit some non-rational motivations, but were quite detached from the policies on which they worked, and were concerned to work according to established standards, rather than being emotively motivated by the policies they implemented. This seems to conform to Silberman's argument that bureaucrats maintain their power and status

by resorting to the utilisation of rules governing decision-making that are presented as rational and objective, stemming, that is, from organisational not personal necessity. Bureaucrats maximise the security of their position by emphasising the necessity for hierarchical discretion and obedience to organisational rules as the most efficient means for arriving at decisions and achieving goals. Such an account is similar to the detached professionalism encountered in Washington. Bureaucrats in the EPA offices in Washington appeared to follow rules in order to promote their chances of moving upwards through the agency, and gave policies only secondary importance. However, as Chapter 3 has suggested, the original reason for joining the agency was, in most cases, a sense of mission and a concern for the environment. This sense of mission and concern for the environment could be explained by incorporating such an interest into a rational maximisers utility function. However, the explanation preferred in this thesis maintains that it is the environmental context of EPA officials in Washington, with the peer pressures from other professionals both within and outside the agency, as well as the distance between bureaucrats and the effects of the policies they implement, which explains the attitude of these officials. Silberman posed the question ‘...*is the constraining force utility maximisation of decision makers, or environmental demands which enforce systematic maximisation of utility?*’ The data suggest that the Federal officials in Washington are constrained by a desire to maximise their utility to the extent that they act to promote the prospect of promotion and pecuniary success. However, environmental constraints acting upon the agency do not enforce the maximisation of utility as such, but rather lead bureaucrats to follow the formal goals of the organisation because of the scrutiny they receive from their peers in Washington. Agents are constrained as Silberman argues, but they pursue their goals also because of non-rational motivations stemming from a sense of mission and a desire to

serve the public interest. The behaviour of federal officials in Washington cannot be explained without reference to such motivational goals.

In Wheeling, West Virginia, officials gave detailed answers which expressed strong emotions in relation to the policies they implemented, which was in stark contrast with the responses obtained in Washington. EPA officials in Wheeling described the goals of the EPA in similar terms to those in Washington but discussed how goals change depending on the administration. As one official in Wheeling described:

'Reagan had a dramatic impact on the agency...he took the political opportunity he had to dismantle the agencies...which led to a public backlash. Bush didn't interfere too much, Clinton is a strong supporter of the environment. If today's debate in Congress [27th September 1995] goes badly we could see a 34% cut in our budget, and have 18 riders [legislative amendments] added to existing EPA programmes...which would be a legislative straitjacket.'

When interviewed, EPA officials in Wheeling were most concerned about this Congressional debate; the general sentiment in the Wheeling offices appeared to be one of anticipation and concern. When questioned about their goals, EPA officials stated that they had a greater level of motivation if allowed to pursue policies that were not subject to budget cuts; further, many expressed the sentiment that Washington did not understand what was needed to implement policies properly in the regions. The Wheeling data suggest that bureaucrats are very motivated to pursue certain policies, and are affected in their motivations by changes in budgets, and policies emanating from Washington. For example, one EPA official in Wheeling (Ray) noted with resentment that:

'...two of the agencies in my consortium are going to disappear next week...the Bureau of Mines is going next week, sacrificed to save the National biological Survey...another agency with the total ecosystem, big picture, approach. Other people will get buried in agencies that don't want them.'

The account of bureaucratic goals given in Wheeling is very different from those obtained in Washington; in Wheeling, policies appear to resemble the 'sacred cows' discussed by Downs in relation to his zealots. Bureaucrats see the results of their policies and wish to pursue those goals that will yield visible effects. As one official in Wheeling stated:

'...before the EPA was formed we had raw sewage in the Ohio River right outside here; you couldn't see through the water even if you had it in a glass. It was common to see black skies in Pittsburgh...young people have never seen the pollution that we grew up with. I have seen the results of my work, and my goal is to carry on cleaning up until I cannot do any more...sometimes Washington does get in the way but we generally pull in the same direction.'

Officials in Wheeling expressed a similar sentiment to those in Washington in one respect: when asked about goals, bureaucrats in both areas claimed they had achieved most of their statutory requirements. For example, in Wheeling the rivers are now 'contact and recreation safe.' One EPA official in Wheeling expressed doubts about the risk-assessment procedures used in Washington, arguing that they were not based on a clear understanding of local circumstances with the result being that goals were set which did not achieve the desired standards, or which were not feasible in their present form.

Group 2: Discretion

The questions in this group attempted to assess whether bureaucrats wanted more or less responsibility to pursue specific policies, or ideas which they felt would be of benefit (either to the public or perhaps themselves). The lawyers in the IAD³ stated that they had enough responsibility and did not require any further responsibilities in order to execute their tasks effectively. All of those interviewed in Washington asserted that they had sufficient freedom to implement policies in the most efficient manner and did not require more responsibility in order to undertake their work tasks. I had asked whether more responsibility was desired, but the answers I received stated that it was not required; again, the answers were couched in terms relative to what was needed rather than what was desired.

In Wheeling the answers obtained suggested that the bureaucrats there were content with the amount of discretion they had. The existence of the State Liaison Office meant that Wheeling had created its own unique institutional form and could operate with little interference from Washington. Many of the answers obtained in Wheeling resembled those pertaining to those on the role and success of the State Liaison Office. The main factor discussed in answer to these questions was the ability of EPA officials in Wheeling to liaise with the local community to establish local needs and to meet the demands of the public and to see policies working by direct observation. To implement policies, and to witness their effects was cited by many of the Wheeling officials as evidence of their having sufficient responsibilities. To be able to implement the directives emanating from Congress or the White House was seen as sufficient responsibility by those in Washington. Whether the questionnaire did illuminate the true feelings of the bureaucrats interviewed is, however, a question which cannot be answered

³ International Activities Division, a department within the EPA headquarters in Washington DC.

here. The questions did elucidate the differences between Washington and Wheeling in terms of how officials perceive the motivations they pursue, and how they feel about the level of discretion they have. Attitudes towards discretion and motivations are shaped by proximity to the effects of policies, and the relationship to superiors. In Washington, the impact of the White House on an official's perception of their goals and responsibilities was much more prominent than in Wheeling, suggesting that the influences of different constituencies has a significant impact on views of goals and responsibilities.

Group 3: Hierarchical Relationships

One bureaucrat in Washington was defensive about the targets established by superiors, arguing that the administration in the White House knew what targets were achievable and did not set unreachable ones. The appraisal of superiors was deemed to be very important to all those interviewed in Washington, and the close links between professional groupings in Washington seemed to place pressure on officials to please their superiors. Deviations from the initiatives established by Congress or the White House were visible to superiors in the IAD and, therefore, bureaucrats sought to perform their tasks in the manner expected by their superiors, with little scope for the pursuit of a personal agenda.

In Wheeling bureaucrats complained about the targets set for them in Washington, many of which were viewed as being based on a lack of detailed knowledge about the needs of the constituency. The appraisal of immediate superiors in Wheeling was very important but as one bureaucrat explained:

'...we work as a team, we don't really have a strong sense of who decides what must be done...we all know what must be done, and work together to meet our objectives.'

There is a hierarchy of grades in Wheeling but there are only thirty employees so the hierarchy is not extensive; the result of such a structure is that the hierarchy of grades is not as prominent as it is in Washington. It is not so much appraisal as criticism which is important in Wheeling, as one official explained :

'...what really affects how you feel about your work is if you come in for criticism...it is bad if others find out about it, that can really make a big difference to how you feel.'

In Washington, positive appraisal is encouraging to workers who care about how they appear to peers and superiors who can affect their promotion chances and such like. In Wheeling it is negative appraisal which has a big effect on motivations because failure and criticism are often visible, and therefore most bureaucrats strenuously avoid being the target of criticism.

Group 4: Mission

Two of those interviewed in Washington claimed that they believed themselves to be following a mission, defined as the collectivity of goals pursued by the agency. One EPA official in Washington stated that:

'Generally we do have a mission which we follow, and we are all pretty clear about what it is, but sometimes bosses step in and change the direction of that mission...but they are warranted in doing so because they are privy to more information than we are.'

This suggests that bureaucrats may conform, in one sense at least, to the notion that rationality is bounded, which would account for bureaucrats following the imperatives emanating from above. As one lawyer explained (Chapter 3), the White House and Congress will know better

than he what it is that constitutes the public interest. Most of those interviewed in Washington felt their mission was that which Congress and the Presidency deemed it to be.

In Wheeling the agency's mission was couched much more in terms of direct responsibility for improving specific aspects of their local environment, notably the Ohio River, or the pollution from abandoned coal mines. The answers relating to mission obtained in Wheeling were long and detailed accounts of what had been achieved in the local constituency, and what could be achieved. The term 'public interest' was repeatedly employed in conversation, with a sense of public service and visible achievements being prominent in all answers. In Washington reference to the direct effects of policies were not present. What is important here is that non-rational accounts of mission were much more prominent in Wheeling than was the case in Washington, with EPA officials in DC defining their mission largely according to the agenda established by their politically appointed masters, with this agenda changing according to the requirements of political expediency. Washington officials did discuss service to the public, and the desire to improve the environment, but discussed their own agendas, notably the wish to obtain promotion by obeying rules. The EPA officials in Wheeling were much more prepared to work less according to guidelines and more according to the requirements of each specific policy as applied to West Virginia. In Wheeling the utility of members of their constituency affected the motivations of bureaucrats and their sense of mission. As Ray argued:

'...yes, we do serve the public interest, but the public for me are the people in West Virginia, they are the people who I help...my mission is the same as the EPA as a whole, we all serve the public and work to improve the environment. That is what we all do.' In Washington, EPA officials do not meet those people affected by EPA policies. This is not the case in Wheeling,

where the close links with the local constituency imbues the EPA officials there with a strong sense of commitment to the policies they administer.

Group 5: Budgets

Of all the questions, these are perhaps the most closely related to a particular theoretical model, that propounded by Niskanen. However, the intention was to test more than whether bureaucrats maximised budgets; these questions sought also to test the effects of budget changes on motivation, and whether budgets and motivations were in any way correlated. Looking first at Washington, what was noticeable was that the terms ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ were rejected by those in DC as being applicable to budget changes. One EPA official in Washington argued that:

‘The only losers are those who pursue pointless red-tape, or projects that just are not worthwhile doing.’

None of the lawyers in the IAD felt they were very much affected by budget cuts for the simple reason that:

‘we are a small staff and our functions are so clear that there is little scope for waste and so no room for cutbacks.’

One official in Washington argued that budget cuts in the EPA headquarters did filter down to his level, putting pressure on everyone to be more cost conscious, with scrutiny from superiors being more prevalent in times of cuts. Such scrutiny affected motivation by creating a feeling that there was less confidence in the ability of an official to be efficient, generating an increased need for scrutiny from above. Another Washington official complained that such scrutiny was unwelcome and unnecessary, since his department was already efficient. He further argued that:

'...the balkanisation of the agency means that we are in competition with other parts of [the agency] to be efficient and get results. There is often pressure to cut budgets, but I think that this damages us and how well we can do our jobs.'

The view of those interviewed in Washington was that there was scope for increases in efficiency, but that the department of the person interviewed was not one of those that could provide such efficiency gains, since their fiefdom was viewed as functioning optimally.

The answers obtained in Wheeling suggested that there were definite winners and losers resulting from changes in budget. At the time of interviews the cuts threatened by Congress (discussed in Chapter 3) were prominent in the minds of the EPA officials in Wheeling; the sentiment there seemed to be one of resentment towards Washington and the imposition of cuts on an agency which could not sustain its current level of service in the face of cuts in its budget. One official argued that some changes in budget benefited those in Washington, and politicians in particular, at the expense of the public. One example of this perceived bias which was quoted more than once was the creation of Superfund, established to deal with the storage and treatment of hazardous chemicals, which had caused many serious problems such as birth defects believed to be the result of deposits of barrels of toxic waste in areas including Kentucky and the Niagara Valley. The main criticism of Superfund discussed in Wheeling was that only a few sites would accept deposits of such waste, with many difficulties involved in trying to obtain a licence to make such deposits. Further, in all cases huge amounts of money were involved in depositing these drums, with it not being unusual for the EPA to pay upwards of \$15000 per barrel. West Virginia has spent \$50 000 000 on a dumping site no larger than one block of a city. As one Wheeling official recounted:

'...attorneys and consultants see Superfund as a gravy train. The cost of the same research work in West Virginia jumped up from \$170 000 to \$300 000 under Superfund, so it seems that someone in Washington does like bigger budgets and more red-tape.'

In this instance it was not a budget cut in itself which affected bureaucrats in Wheeling but the change in budgets which led to the creation of Superfund. This change meant that there was more scrutiny from Washington, and less flexibility in how a bureaucrat could do her job. Most of the EPA officials in Wheeling interviewed expressed frustration at the imposition of guidelines from DC which they viewed as unnecessary. The main pressure felt in Wheeling was not to meet budgets so much as to ensure that tasks were carried out according to the guidelines established under such creations as Superfund. The result seemed to be frustration as bureaucrats could see better ways of meeting a target than the methods espoused in Washington. From this limited number of questions it is suggested that budgets are not the primary maximand of federal bureaucrats, but rather freedom to pursue policies in the way they believe is the best, without being bombarded with directives from Washington. This evidence is enough to suggest that Niskanen has not explained the whole picture of bureaucratic motivations. What is missing from Niskanen's account is an explanation of how the impact of budgets on a bureaucrat's maximand changes according to the type of environment in which an agent is embedded, as well as the proximity of an agent to the policies on which she works. In Wheeling officials are much closer to the effects of their policies than is the case in Washington, and this does seem to affect how important budgets are to an agent's motivations. Further implications of these data are discussed in the concluding chapter.

Group 6: Changes

The questions in this section relate to attitudes towards agency change: policies which are political (in the sense of being contentious and emotionally charged, and which generate debate); how money and other rewards affect motivation; how particular policies affect motivation; attitudes to power and influence over the policy process; and to pride in one's work and how this relates to motivations driven by pecuniary rewards. It will be apparent that these questions are testing the Downsian typology, but the intention in asking the questions was not to categorise those interviewed into five types but to allow that these bureaucrats may not fit easily into any of these types. The data suggest that one bureaucrat can appear to fit into different types according to what it is one is questioning them about. The data cannot be used to reject Downs's approach, but it does suggest that crossovers between types is a phenomenon which occurs and this is something not dealt with in Downs's work.

In terms of radical changes, none of those interviewed in Washington felt that '*radical changes*' (Q.23) were needed. In Wheeling most bureaucrats asserted that Superfund should be amended or abolished, and that officials of the EPA in Washington should pay closer attention to the needs of those areas served by regional offices. With respect to officials being resistant to change (Q.31), two officials in Washington argued that there was sometimes resistance to change, which, as one of them explained:

'...comes up from the states, and there are some people in the field who don't like it when things change.'

None of those interviewed in Washington believed that change was resisted within the upper ranks in the EPA headquarters because, as one official stated:

'We make the new policies here, we carry out the will of the President and Congress, we have no reason to resist change.'

One EPA official in Washington did note that radical changes could result from a change of administration, which could affect an official's level of motivation. This official asserted that goals could often be political (Q.24 and Q.39) and that a change in administration could result in goals being set which did not agree with one's own political views. He asserted that one was still obliged to pursue the goals of the new administration, but that the motivations felt would alter depending on whether one agreed with the policies. EPA officials in Wheeling echoed this view, also citing the importance of changes of administration on the motivation one felt towards specific policies.

Two officials interviewed in Wheeling stated quite candidly that they would resist changes which they felt to be misguided, while still operating according to agency rules. They explained that Washington occasionally would require something to be done which was not realistic, or was not:

'...in the interests of the people of West Virginia.'

The argument that a misguided policy could be resisted was viewed by both officials as legitimate grounds for resisting changes which they did not support, although both were emphatic that they would not intentionally scupper attempts at implementation in cases such as the introduction of Superfund. Rather, they would: *'...alter the way things got done, it's not like I wouldn't do it, I would just do it differently if I could see a better way to.'*

In this case it seems that EPA officials in Washington were right to assert that some resistance did come from the regions when policies emanated from Washington that altered the ways in which tasks were executed.

With respect to the trade-off between money rewards and promotion (Q.25) officials in Washington cited money rewards as being of considerable importance, with no Washington official willing to take a promotion that did not involve pecuniary benefits. In Wheeling, money was given less emphasis than was the case in Washington, with promotion valued because of the increased power that it promised, thus allowing an official to pursue more of those policies about which they felt passionate. Such a motivation to pursue particular policies was not present in Washington. This difference was reinforced in the answers given to Q.29 (do you have enough power...?) with EPA officials in Washington content with the amount of power and influence they had, and most of the EPA officials in Wheeling desiring increased power and influence.

In answer to Q.40 (whether pride in work, or power, money...etc., were more important) two of the officials interviewed in Washington argued that both were important because the two were interdependent, since to perform badly in one's work would lead to a fall in the scope for greater pecuniary rewards. In Wheeling all of those interviewed considered influence over policy and the making of policies that benefited the community to be a major motivational goal. Being good at one's work meant benefiting this community, having more power meant that one could do more to help the community. In the words of one EPA official in Wheeling:

'If the regions were given more influence over policy then we could do a better job than Washington where policies are not made to fit particular areas in the way that we can suit policies to the needs of our area.'

EPA officials in Wheeling seemed to have a stronger sense of pride in their work than was found in Washington, where officials have a more instrumental attitude towards their work and the policies they implement. Officials in Wheeling saw the results of their policies first

hand, and were much more concerned about the effects of policies than in pecuniary benefits. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed in the concluding chapter.

Group 7: Bureau-Shaping

This section assesses Dunleavy's account of bureaucratic motivation, in which the desire to have a collegial agency which conforms to staff rather than line functions (with officials working in teams) is the maximand pursued by bureaucrats. In Washington, officials in the IAD did not feel that their bureau could benefit from a change in design, or '*shape*'. One reason could be that the IAD, as a very small department, populated by lawyers of roughly equal status, already conforms to Dunleavy's posited maximand; that is, the bureau already conforms to a staff rather than line design. It is the case that there is little incentive for EPA officials in Washington to pursue strategies of budget maximising, for example, because they do not stand to gain directly from an increase in budget. As Dunleavy argues, low-ranking officials benefit most from budget increases but, for officials in the IAD, there are no incentives to maximise a budget that will not improve their utility. For these IAD officials, proficiency in work is important, and a larger budget, as one official in the IAD argued, could signify a reduction in efficiency and send unfavourable signals to superiors. Thus, *contra* Niskanen, officials in the IAD have little incentive to maximise budgets, and indeed may seek to keep budget demands at the same level in order to send positive messages to their superiors. What was important to IAD officials was the shape of their bureau. The preferred bureau shape was one with a collegial atmosphere and what one IAD official described as '*an atmosphere of professionalism*.' Another official felt the shape of his office was beneficial to an atmosphere of professionalism because the small, intimate nature of the office meant that there was little scope for shirking of responsibilities and, importantly, inefficiencies would be

visible to colleagues and to superiors. Given the importance attributed to the appraisal of work by superiors, it is understandable that the shape of bureau which is conducive to proficient work was favoured by IAD officials. The maximand posited by Dunleavy is supported by the data obtained from the interviews with IAD officials, with Niskanen's budget maximising hypothesis not supported by the data.

In Wheeling EPA officials have more incentive to maximise budgets because it will allow greater scope for pursuing favoured policies; but a small, collegial, bureau shape was a noticeable maximand of the EPA officials interviewed in Wheeling. These officials commented on the shape of their agency being conducive to a spirit of teamwork and generating a feeling of involvement in all of the policies being worked on in the office. Again, this supports Dunleavy's argument that a collegial, staff bureaucracy, is a goal pursued by bureaucrats. The data suggest that budget size matters, yet the shape of bureau, both in Washington and in Wheeling, was more prominent in the answers given to my questions. For officials in the IAD, bureau shape is conducive to an atmosphere which allows proficiency in work and, hence, the chance of promotion. In Wheeling, bureau shape fostered a collegial atmosphere and a feeling of teamwork which mirrored the attitude of EPA officials towards those groups and constituencies with whom they dealt in the process of implementing their policies. The Wheeling offices are relatively small, with only 30 staff, with hierarchy more prominent in Wheeling than in Washington, with differences of power and responsibility varying more than was the case in Washington. One comment on bureau-shape made in Wheeling, which was echoed by a few officials there, related to power *vis-a-vis* Washington, with one official arguing that he would like to see more responsibilities for the crafting of policy devolved to the regions, rather than having a hierarchy in which policy emanated from

Washington to be implemented by the regional offices. This was the only comment that suggested a desire to change the shape of the bureau, but, as already noted, this could be because both of the bureaux I studied already conform to a staff design in many ways. Officials in both locations confirmed a wish to work in a staff bureaucracy but, importantly, the reasons underpinning this desire were instrumental. A particular bureau shape allowed specific motivations to be pursued, for example, proficiency in work allowing the opportunity for promotion, or a feeling of teamwork with many officials all pursuing the same policy goals to which all are committed. The data support Dunleavy's assertion then, that bureau-shaping is a strategy pursued by bureaucrats.

The concluding chapter draws together the strands of the argument presented in this thesis, illustrating why it is that the data can be viewed as supporting the claim that a greater emphasis must be placed on non-rational accounts of motivation in order to attain a better understanding of bureaucratic motivation. The further significance of this argument for the study of bureaucracy and bureaucratic motivation is also discussed.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

This section shows how the two stages of my argument are corroborated by the data presented in each of the chapters, and examines how this thesis relates to the study of bureaucratic motivation and of bureaucracies in general. The two stages of the argument presented in this thesis have demonstrated that motivations cannot be explained solely in terms of rational maximising behaviour; rather, reference must be made to those non-rational motivations based on other-regarding motives to action. This conclusion will explain how the argument in this thesis is corroborated by the data presented herein, before examining the significance of this research for the larger problem of bureaucratic motivation and the study of bureaucracies more generally.

Chapter One demonstrated the distinction between rationality and motivation in order to show how motivations could include emotions, often unconsciously held, which influence the volition of an individual. In the Rational Choice approach, motivations are explained in terms of rationality and are logical, with the desire to maximise utility being the primary motive to action. This thesis has presented data which suggest that many of the motivations pursued by bureaucrats cannot be explained in terms of maximising behaviour. The two stages in the argument together show that an approach based on rational self-interest as an explanation of motivations misses much that is relevant to an account of what motivates bureaucrats. These two stages are corroborated by the data described in Chapters Three and Four, which give examples of officials pursuing motivations with a strong other-regarding element.

The Rational Choice approach to bureaucratic motivation, based as it is on a model of man as some form of *homo economicus*, ignores the importance of organisational structure and culture to an explanation of such motivation. In the search for generalisable principles of human behaviour, underpinned by axioms which are posited as explaining the behaviour of man in the abstract, Rational Choice approaches fall victim to the criticism of '*misplaced generalisability*' made by Nevil Johnson and discussed in Chapter One. The axioms which underpin the model of man as a rational maximising being assume that man can rationally calculate how best to maximise his utility, and that he can transitively order his preferences in order to generate a ranking which determines which goals are pursued and which are ignored, or deferred. The data presented in this thesis have demonstrated that officials often pursue clearly defined goals but, importantly, illustrated that many of these goals are not based on any conscious calculation of how best to maximise one's utility function. Indeed, the paucity of the Rational Choice approach is exhibited by its propensity to what Johnson calls '*misplaced generalisability and the search for general truisms.*' The argument in this thesis is not that non-rational motivations apply to all situations, or can encapsulate general axioms of human behaviour; rather, the argument, as supported by the data in this work, is that bureaucratic motivations are not sufficiently explained by axioms of rationality based on the assumption that man is a rational self-interested maximiser. The data show that officials are clearly motivated to pursue goals which do not maximise their own utility directly. Further, these data suggest a need to explore the context in which motivations are formulated so that non-rational motives to action, rather than being explained in terms of general truisms underpinned by the assumption of rational maximisation, are examined against a clearly defined organisational and cultural context.

The wider implications of the argument presented in this work should be understood as advocating the need for a greater reliance on political culture explanations to an understanding of bureaucracy and bureaucratic motivation. The data can be interpreted more clearly if the researcher resists the compulsion to adhere to a paradigmatic evaluation of political phenomena viewed from, for example, the Rational Choice or Political Culture frameworks. Further, a superior research design, generating testable data and assumptions, will be generated if researchers do not pursue a quantitative approach at the expense of any consideration of the potential benefits of qualitative analyses, or vice versa. The argument in Chapter One presented one way in which research can bridge the divide between qualitative and quantitative approaches. The argument in Chapters Three and Four, by emphasising the essential interrelationship between motivations and the context in which they are both formulated and pursued, demonstrated the benefit of an emphasis on organisational culture and structure to an understanding of what it is that motivates bureaucrats.

Chapter 2 established that the EPA is not a rational structure in the Weberian sense, suggesting that the informational demands placed on bureaucrats by a rationality criterion are not lessened by the structure of the EPA. Further, the schism within the EPA, and the particular contexts within which EPA officials must work, were shown to place many demands and constraints on bureaucrats which led to the pursuit of motivations not consonant with self-interested rational maximising behaviour. By focusing on the institutional structure and culture of the EPA in Wheeling and Washington, Chapter Two demonstrated how culture and structure can differ widely even within the same agency, generating very different bureaucratic motivations. Motivations must be understood to be context-specific, with no

bureaucrat pursuing motivations that are unaffected by the context in which they are formulated.

The data in Chapter Three illustrate how the internal and external constraints on bureaucratic actions present within the EPA create a complex web of motivations based on much more than a desire to maximise one's utility. These data include many motivations which are non-rational, demonstrating the paucity of an approach which assumes an organisation to be rational (in the sense that it is capable of propagating rationality where informational demands are too great to permit rationality at the level of the individual). EPA officials both in Washington and Wheeling had many different perceptions of agency goals, of the public interest, and of the proper level of discretion. Further, as shown in Chapter Three, no collective organisational rationality exists within the EPA, nor can the present structure of the agency generate such rationality. This is the essence of the first stage of my argument in this work: that it is deviations from the legal-rational bureaucratic form present in the US Federal bureaucracy in general, and the EPA in particular, which explain many of those motivations found to be non-rational (other-regarding). The data obtained from interviews with EPA officials in Wheeling demonstrate the importance of the link between motivations and the proximity of an official to the results of policies implemented. The data show officials in Wheeling to be motivated to pursue goals which benefit their constituency, and which have visible results. Such non-rational motivations are not captured by those accounts of motivation which assume bureaucrats to be rational, self-interested maximisers, proceeding as they do from unrealistic axioms of human behaviour. To understand many of the motivations pursued by officials, it is essential that one examines the complex relationships within which a bureaucrat is embedded, and how these relationships shape the motivations pursued.

Chapter Four analysed four models of bureaucratic motivation, assessing how well these models accounted for the motivations described in the case study data. Each of the models assumed that motivations can be explained in terms of some form of rationality criterion, but the data in this chapter suggest that many of the goals pursued by EPA officials (Questionnaire, Group One) are not capable of being explained in terms of rational self-interest. Many of the motivations expressed by the officials interviewed included a concern for the utility of others, whether it was the local constituency or, more generally, the public interest. All of the bureaucrats interviewed were '*mission-committed*' (Margolis, 1982) insofar as they expressed a desire to achieve all or some of the goals established by their agency. Officials in Wheeling expressed strong opposition to proposed budget cuts but, as Chapter Four shows, this cannot be interpreted in the manner advocated by Niskanen, that is, as an expression of a motivation to maintain the largest possible budgets because in order to maximise individual self-interest; rather, the data suggest that budget cuts would interfere with the ability of officials to pursue those policies about which they felt strongly. The data in Chapter Four corroborate the second stage of the argument: that the four models of motivation do not give sufficient emphasis to explanations which explore those motivations which are non-rational. Further, when taken together, the two stages in my argument demonstrate that it is necessary to explore other-regarding motives to action and, importantly, to assess how such non-rational motivations are affected, even determined, by the embeddedness of a bureaucrat within a particular organisational and cultural context.

In chapter One (p11) it was argued, following Peter Evans, that:

'...particular cases are the building blocks for general theories, and theories...lenses to identify what is interesting about particular cases.'

The argument in this thesis is based on one case study, underpinned by a research design which follows the methodology of King, Keohane, and Verba (Chapter One, p17) that allows research to be replicated, and perhaps falsified, by generating a research design which is transparent, and by employing concepts in a manner which minimises conceptual ambiguity. The argument that bureaucratic motivations may be based on non-rational reasoning has been corroborated by the data in this thesis; of course, this does not prove the argument to be correct but suggests that it may be so. Further research should attempt to assess whether non-rational motivations are present in other bureaucracies; in so doing such research would show whether my findings are corroborated by further research, or are, alternatively, found to be a special case specific to the EPA.

This thesis relates to the larger issue of bureaucratic motivation insofar as it questions the assumption that the Rational Choice approach to bureaucratic motivation, and to the study of bureaucracy in general, accurately captures political reality. This thesis cannot hope to posit a new theory, or to put forward an alternative to the models analysed in this work. It does, however, highlight one aspect of bureaucratic motivation largely ignored by the Rational Choice paradigm: that those motivations which have a strong other-regarding content, and which require an understanding of the organisational and cultural context of the officials who pursue these motivations are not sufficiently explored by existing Rational Choice approaches to the study of bureaucratic motivation and bureaucracy in general. By highlighting this omission this thesis contributes to an understanding of the larger issues of bureaucratic motivation and the study of bureaucracy. Further, this work suggests the need to avoid a

dogmatic adherence to paradigms and to conduct research which makes use of the best approaches to the study of bureaucracy, even where these approaches have hitherto been viewed as mutually exclusive; namely, the qualitative/quantitative divide, and split between advocates of the Rational Choice and Political Culture approaches.

Bibliography

This bibliography lists all books referred to in the main body of the thesis, as well as including books used in the research for this thesis but not referred to in the text.

Almond, Gabriel Abraham, A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science, Sage, Newbury Park, London, 1990.

Ackerman, Bruce, and Hassler, William, Clean Coal / Dirty Air: or how the Clean Air Act became a multibillion dollar bail out for high-sulphur coal producers and what should be done about it, Yale University Press, New Haven, London, 1981.

Bakhtin, Robert, American Political Science Review, Symposium, June 1995

Barry, Brian, and Hardin, Russell, Rational Man and Irrational Society, Sage, Beverley Hills, 1982.

Beetham, David, Bureaucracy, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1987.

Blau, Peter, Bureaucracy in Modern Society, Random House, New York, 1956.

Blau, Peter, The dynamics of Bureaucracy: a study of interpersonal relations in two government agencies, University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Bowles, Nigel, The Government and Politics of the United States, Macmillan Press, Hampshire and London, 1993.

Cater, Douglas, The Fourth Branch of Government, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1959.

Cook, Robert, Bureaucratic Politics and Regulatory Reform, Greenwood Press, New Haven, 1988.

Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Row, New York, 1965.

Downs, Anthony, Inside Bureaucracy, Little, Brown, Boston, 1967.

Dunleavy, Patrick, Democracy, bureaucracy, and Public Choice, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, London, 1991.

Elster, Jon, Foundations of Social Choice Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986

Evans, Peter, World Politics, June 1995

Friedrich, Carl, in Robert K. Merton (ed) A Reader in Bureaucracy, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952.

Frohock, Fred M., Public Policy: Scope and Logic, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1979.

Giddens, Anthony, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: an analysis of the writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Max Weber, CUP, Cambridge, 1971.

Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures: selected essays, Fontana Press, London, 1973.

George, Alexander L., and McKeown, timothy J., "Case Studies and Theory of Organisational Design Making, in Advances in Information Processing in Organisations, 1985, 2: 21, p58

Harris, Richard A., Milkis, Sidney M., The Politics of Regulatory Change: a tale of two agencies, OUP, New York, Oxford, 1989.

Heclo, Hugh, A Government of Strangers: executive politics in Washington, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1977.

Hindess, Barry, Choice, Rationality, and Social Theory, Unwin, Hyman, London, 1988

Hollis M., and Nell E.J., Rational Economic Man, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975

Johnson, Nevil, The Limits of Political Science, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.

Kant, Immanuel, A critique of Pure Reason, Doubleday, New York, 1966.

Katzman, Robert A., Regulatory Bureaucracy, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980.

Kaufman, Herbert, The Administrative Behaviour of Federal Bureau Chiefs, Brookings, Washington D.C., 1981.

King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., Verba, Sidney, M., Designing Social Inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research, Princetown University Press, N.J., 1994.

Laitin, David, in APSR, June 1995

Landy, Marc, Roberts, Marc J., Stephens, R., The Environmental Protection Agency: asking the wrong questions, OUP, New York, Oxford, 1990.

Marcus, Alfred, in Wilson (Ed), 1989.

Margolis, H., Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality: A Theory of Social Choice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982

McLean, Iain, Public Choice: an introduction, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.

McGarity, Thomas O., Reinventing Rationality: the role of regulatory analysis in the Federal Bureaux, CUP, Cambridge, 1991.

Merton, Robert, K., A Reader in Bureaucracy, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952.

Moe, Terry M., The Organisation of Interests: interests and the internal dynamics of the political interest groups, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980.

Morgan, Gareth, Images of Organisation, Sage, Thousand Oaks, London, 1989.

McCann, Michael W., Taking Reform Seriously, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986.

Niskanen, William A., Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine, Atherton, Chicago, 1971.

Niskanen, William A., Bureaucracy and Public Economics, Aldershot, 1994.

Panitch, David, New Left Review, March 1994

Popper, Karl, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchison, London, 1959.

Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972.

Riker, William, The Theory of Political Coalitions, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1962.

Silberman, Bernard A., Cages of Reason: the rise of the rational state in France, Japan, United States and Great Britain, University of Chicago Press, 1993.

Page, Edward, Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power: a comparative analysis, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, London, 1992.

Suleiman, Ezra N., Bureaucrats and Policy Making: a comparative overview, Holmes and Meier, London, 1984.

Simon, Herbert A., Administrative Behaviour: a study of decision making processes in administrative organisations, Macmillan, New York, 1957.

Simon, Herbert A., Economics, Bounded Rationality, and the Cognitive Revolution, Elgar, Aldershot, 1992.

Weber, Max, On Capitalism, Bureaucracy and Religion: a selection of texts, Allen and Unwin, London, 1983.

Wilson, James Q., The Politics of Regulation, Basic Books, New York, 1980.

Wilson, James Q., Bureaucracies: what government agencies do and why they do it, Basic Books, New York, 1989.

Vroom, Victor, Work and Motivation, Wiley, New York, 1964.

Woll, Peter, American Bureaucracy, W. W. Norton, New York, 1963.