Adapting Diaspora to Asia's Cold War: Republic of China Overseas Chinese Policy in Southeast Asia, c. 1945-65

Adrian Kwong (Chun Hei Adrian Kwong)

Trinity College

University of Oxford

Thesis for Doctor of Philosophy in History

Submitted Trinity 2025 / Approved Hilary 2026

Table of Contents

Table of Abbreviations 4

Acknowledgement 5

Note 6

Introduction 9

Part One: Diaspora Policy in Pursuit of Regional Power, 1945-9 42

Chapter One: Overseas Chinese Citizenship and Postwar China's Ambitions of Regional Leadership, 1945-9 43

Chapter Two: Extending State Authority over Overseas Citizens in the Malayan Emergency and First Indochina War, 1948-9 70

Part Two: A Diaspora Policy for a Cold War State, 1949-1965 97

Chapter Three: Changing Imperatives of Diaspora Policy: The 1952 Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference and its Legacies 98

Chapter Four: Encouraging Good Transnationality: Incorporating Diaspora Policy into Anti-Communist International Cooperation, c. 1954-63 134

Chapter Five: Restricting Bad Transnationality: Policies towards Chinese Political Participation and the Overseas KMT, c.1950-65 167

Part Three: Taipei, Saigon and Vietnam's Chinese in Anti-Communist Asia, 1954-63 201

Chapter Six: Diplomacy and Diaspora's Changing Boundaries: The ROC-RVN Nationality Law Dispute, 1955-7 202

Chapter Seven: Intertwining Nation-State Building, Anti-Communist Diplomacy, and Diasporic Transnationality: The Free Villages in Saigon, 1954-61 235

Conclusion 268

Bibliography 290

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the supervision of Prof.s Rana Mitter and Jennifer Altehenger, the guidance of my examiners Prof.s Henrietta Harrison and Su Lin Lewis, my fellow postgraduates at Oxford University and elsewhere, and the many academics, archivists, and librarians at institutions across the world who have supported this dissertation and my professional development as a historian.

I would like to thank Professor Valerie Worth, retired Senior Tutor of Trinity College, for securing and coordinating the 'The David & Keira Simon Scholarship', and the donors of this opportunity; and my parents for their similarly generous financial support of my studies. I am also grateful to Gregor Aubrey and his family for providing room and board during my fieldwork at the National Archives in Kew, Richmond, and transit from overseas conferences.

The emotional and personal support of my late grandmother, my friends, and particularly the faith community of Wesley Memorial Church, Oxford were an indispensable part of my personal journey before, during, and after my doctorate.

Table of Abbreviations

Asian People's Anti-Communist League	**APACL**
Association of Southeast Asian States	**ASEAN**
Central News Agency	**CNA**
Chinese Communist Party	**CCP**
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	**DRV**
Free China Relief Association	**FCRA**
Kuomintang	**KMT**
Kuomintang Archives	**KMTA**
Malayan Chinese Association	**MCA**
Malayan Communist Party	**MCP**
Overseas Chinese Affairs Council	**OCAC**
People's Republic of China	**PRC**
Republic of China	**ROC**
Republic of Vietnam	**RVN**
Secretariat for Chinese Affairs	**SCA**
Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation	**SEATO**
State of Vietnam	**SOVN**
United Malays National Organisation	**UMNO**
United States	**US**
United States Information Service	**USIS**

Note

For ease of reference, this thesis provides the Chinese names of individuals, organisations, and specific terms in Chinese characters when they are mentioned for the first time, with the exception of well-known terms, such as Chinese Communist Party or Guangdong Province. It refers to diasporic Chinese individuals and groups by locally used romanisations if available in the sources used, or if they are still commonly referred to using such romanisations in the present day, such as Tan Cheng Lock or Lee Kuan Yew. For individuals from Mainland China and Taiwan, non-standard romanisations are used for well-known individuals and organisations such as Chiang Kai-Shek or Kuomintang. Otherwise, Standard Hanyu Pinyin is used, with Chinese characters for names and organisations provided in all cases where they could be found, in simplified form for groups and individuals from the People's Republic of China (PRC), and traditional for those that do not. Vietnamese words are rendered without diacritics for the ease of readers. Many of the sources consulted in this thesis romanise and refer to the same individuals by different names: effort has been made to ensure consistency in the names of the individuals where possible.

This thesis applies the principle of differentiating between political regimes that claimed the entirety of geobodies that they only partially governed, and the geographical region and society that actually came under their rule. Therefore, the terms 'ROC' or 'Taipei' are used to refer to the political regime that governed Taiwan and its adjoining islands after 1949, while the terms 'Taiwan' and 'Taiwanese' refer specifically to the geographic region and society its control. The same principle is applied to the other bifurcated states of Asia: People's Republic of China/Beijing/Mainland China, Democratic Republic of Vietnam/Hanoi/North Vietnam. Republic of Vietnam/Saigon/South Vietnam, and Republic of Korea/Seoul/South Korea.

Among the diversity of terms that has been applied to those practising aspects of Chinese language and culture outside of China, this thesis generally uses terms that were subjectively meaningful for the actors it studies. For example, discussions of the ROC's perspective will primarily use the term 'overseas Chinese' in an indication of the policy's imagined subjects, while discussions of local politicians' views will refer to 'Malayan' or 'Vietnamese' Chinese as the constituencies those elites imagined. 'Chinese', 'overseas Chinese' and 'ethnic Chinese' are used interchangeably when this thesis refers to the Chinese communities in a neutral context.

For ease of reference, Chinese characters are provided for author, title, and publisher names for Chinese-language secondary sources in footnotes and the bibliography. In most cases, Standard Hanyu Pinyin romanisations are used to refer to titles and publishers. However, some Chinese-language sources have official English translations for article, journal or publisher titles, which are used where available. Otherwise, the author's English translations for sources are provided in the main text where necessary. Due to the prevalence of common Chinese last names, the full names of Chinese individuals and scholars, regardless of the language they write in, are reproduced in all footnotes. Names of historical figures are produced in the text in the Chinese format of last name-first name, and authors of both primary and secondary texts are produced in the footnotes in the academic format of first name-last name. For example, 蔣介石 would be written Chiang Kai-Shek in the text and footnotes for primary sources he produces such as diaries, but Kai-Shek Chiang in a footnote referencing his published writings. The simplified script is used for names and other specific nouns originating from the PRC, while the traditional script is used for those from Republican China, Taiwan, and all other contexts including overseas.

Fonds, sub-fonds, and page references have been included for archival sources as far as possible. Titled sources such as reports and minutes have their full Chinese-name titles reproduced in the footnotes, while untitled sources including savingrams 快郵代電 and telegraphs 電報 are rendered in English as 'Savingram/Telegram from Sender to Receiver' with the original language they were written in provided in parentheses.

The English name of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Council 僑務委員會 is currently the Overseas Community Affairs Council. The change in name is applied to current sources, such as the official website of that ministry, and not retroactively to materials from the historic OCAC.

Introduction

'We need an Asian President,' said stand-up comedian Ronny Chieng 錢信伊 in his 2019 Netflix special *Asian Comedian Destroys America*. Chieng, who had spent his childhood in Malaysia and Singapore before emigrating to the US, went on to say, 'Imagine harnessing the power of Asian people in government… all the Asians just going down the list of broken things, fixing it, one by one, with no agenda, just pure logic.' He compared his hypothetical 'Asian President' favorably to the prevailing Congressional gridlock in the US, suggesting that 'with Asian people in charge, we don't shut down for anything!' Chieng went on to compare Asian American politicians to restaurants in Chinatown, which were 'affordable, delicious and open!' and would 'work while you're eating.'[1] If there was any doubt that his discourse on 'Asians' centred the Chinese, Chieng stoked controversy in 2022 by suggesting on *The Daily Show* that his 'pals in Dim Sum Palace' did not feel then-UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak to be truly Asian.[2]

In a 1961 book titled *A Brief History of Overseas Chinese Development* 華僑發展簡史, then-Republic of China (ROC) Deputy Minister of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Council 僑務委員會 (OCAC) Li Pusheng 李樸生 expressed similar sentiments. Born in 1895 in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), Li migrated to China in his teens.[3] He later became a functionary of the Republic of China government under the Kuomintang (KMT), which retreated to Taiwan

[1] Ronny Chieng, "Ronny Chieng on why we need an Asian President," posted May 18 2021 by Netflix. Accessed Apr 26 2025 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5RCeS1SVFNo.
[2] Ibid, "Don't call Rishi Sunak the UK's first Asian PM in front of Ronny Chieng," posted Oct 25 2022 by The Daily Show. Accessed Apr 26 2025 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CWUey_rB9Gc.
[3] Yu Gong 愚公, "Zhongguo tongzijun zhi yuanlao Li Pusheng 中國童子軍之元老李樸生, " *Guangdong Wenxian* 廣東文獻 19, no.4 (1989), reproduced without page references in Taiwan Dalu tongxianghui wenxian shujuku 台湾大陆同乡会文献数据库. Accessed Sep 1 2023 at https://www.tongxianghuicn.com/article/937129.jhtml?libId=.

after the Chinese Communist Party's 1949 victory in the Civil War. Li explained that Chinese who lived overseas would not lose their identities after naturalising as citizens in their countries of residence, because 'lower cultures cannot assimilate higher cultures'.[4] Citing the accomplishments of Chinese American scientists and politicians, he suggested that Chinese had 'outstanding administrative ability, and a responsible and loyal approach to their official positions', and were 'dominant' in the sciences.[5] Even more uncannily, he ended on the note that overseas Chinese must 'promote Chinese philosophy and politics to the world much as they did Chinese cuisine', so that the 'totalitarian [Communist] authorities' would be 'abandoned by their people'.[6]

One might dismiss these parallels as unremarkable, as narratives of ethnic Chinese migrants abroad as diligent and enterprising have been globally prominent since around the late-nineteenth century. Yet, as this introduction will show, this familiar discourse was actually being deployed in the two contexts to sharply different purposes. Chieng was satirising a 'model minority' discourse in North America that had, since the mid-twentieth century, been adopted by Asian American business and professional elites to promote their integration into the social establishment. Li Pusheng, by contrast, was writing as part of the ROC's response to political questions around citizenship and the state-diaspora relationship that were proliferating across the world in the mid-twentieth century, and particularly relevant to the Chinese state with its large co-ethnic population abroad. On one hand, the parallels between these two texts invite us to place the ROC's relationship with the ethnic Chinese abroad not only within the historical context of the KMT's programmes on the Mainland and the subsequent retreat to Taiwan, but the histories of different social and political Chinesenesses beyond China. On the other, clear contrasts also exist between the content and contexts of the two sources. Li's text,

[4] Pusheng Li, *Huaqiao fazhan jianshi* 華僑發展簡史, (Haiwai wenku chubanshe 海外文庫出版社, 1961), 19.
[5] Ibid, 20.
[6] Ibid, 28.

in particular, demonstrates how forces other than domestic social change—namely, Taipei's changing policies in a time of nation-state boundary-making, decolonisation, and the Cold War—aspired to inflect on overseas Chinese society and politics.

This thesis examines the Republic of China's relationship with the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia in the mid-twentieth century. Its central argument is that ROC officials adapted their relationship with the Chinese diaspora and diasporic transnationality to serve their changing state needs. A postwar diaspora policy founded on ambitions of regional leadership, frequently understood in racial terms, gave way to a focus on Cold War diplomacy after the retreat to Taiwan. ROC officials represented Taipei's diaspora policy to allies as a sphere of anti-Communist cooperation, but also adapted narratives of Chinese diasporic nationalism to reconcile political legitimacy with this newfound focus on intrastate relations. Other top-down state logics, such as political and military security, were also prominent in ROC officials' boundary-making around transnational connections.

This argument makes three principal contributions to the historiography. First, it corrects existing impressions of the ROC's Cold War-era diaspora policy as motivated primarily by diaspora nationalism to reinforce its political legitimacy. Instead, it highlights the centrality of diplomatic relations to ROC officials' relationship with the ethnic Chinese. It examines the ROC's relationship with two Southeast Asian societies—Malaya and Vietnam—where the imperatives of diplomatic relations and strong links to the diaspora often existed in tension. While ROC officials symbolically preserved the latter, it was considerations around the former which often dominated their policymaking and led to significant, if sometimes informal, concessions on overseas Chinese nationality and pro-ROC political transnationalism. Taipei's

governance of diasporic transnationality had significant similarities with Beijing, the latter having been the focus of much recent historiography.

Secondly, it situates ROC overseas Chinese policy within the mid-twentieth century history of Asian nation-states' boundary-making, examining it as a case where multiple top-down political logics played out within a racialised anti-Communist Cold War context. Historians of twentieth-century Asian and Global South nation-states' governance of transnationality have often focussed on the simultaneous advance of Third-World intrastate solidarity and the subordination of transnational connections to a state-centric order. This thesis focusses on how the ROC state on Taiwan answered these questions of nation-statehood when it participated in the anti-Communist bloc, which often understood the Cold War in Asia through Sinophobic terms; this was a context distinct from many Afro-Asian internationalisms that have been extensively researched. Furthermore, diasporic transnationality was an interface between nation-states that was far removed from the major events of Third World solidarity, such as the Bandung Conference. In contrast to the high-political ideologies that were central to the latter, these answers could often be uneven, inconsistent, and messy, as they were shaped by multifaceted, if still primarily state-driven, logics. Principally, these included postwar China's quest for regional geopolitical power and later Taipei's participation in the Cold War; other state needs of legitimacy, security and development, and the interests of different officials and ethnic Chinese who interacted with the ROC state, also played a role.

Finally, it highlights the development of conservative, anti-Communist politics within a global Cold War context as a thread in the twentieth-century history of Chineseness beyond China. A central research question in this area has been how the construction of ethnic Chinese identities outside of the contemporary People's Republic of China (PRC) was shaped by struggles over

diplomatic, political and social power. This thesis situates the ROC's relationship with overseas Chinese within this context. It argues that the direct effect of ROC policies on the development of Southeast Asian Chinese political identities was limited, and often more significant in their ruptures and disconnects than active intervention. Yet, this itself reflects how the overseas Chinese's changing loyalties to Chinese and local states should be understood alongside the equally important development of strengthening, anti-Communist political conservatism; even ROC officials were often more interested in pursuing their interests within this conservative hegemony than promoting diaspora nationalism. It also demonstrates how the global Cold War played a significant role in the development of Southeast Asian Chinese identity; Taipei's actions and inactions were frequently shaped not only by bilateral or diaspora-affairs considerations, but regional and Taipei-Washington diplomatic dynamics. This introduction will examine the thesis' relationship to each of these three principal fields of enquiry, before discussing its sources and methods, and outlining the key arguments of each chapter.

Chinese State and 'Diaspora' since the Nineteenth Century

This thesis argues that Taipei's assumed insistence on the political loyalty of its diaspora as overseas nationals, in contrast to the PRC's willingness to rupture its ties with overseas Chinese to promote its diplomatic interests, was overstated. To the contrary, top-down state diplomatic and political needs often motivated ROC officials to prioritise intrastate diplomacy above a close relationship with the Chinese in Southeast Asia. As a considerable historiography has highlighted, Chinese state and social elites' visions of migrants abroad and their descendants as members of the nation and subjects of state policy developed in response to European imperialism. Historian Shelly Chan discusses that Qing imperial efforts to emphasise their state equality to the European powers led to a change in erstwhile views of Chinese emigrants as

traitors who were irrelevant to the Chinese state. Over the nineteenth century, the Qing developed a modern diplomatic apparatus, including passports and consular protection for overseas nationals, culminating in the *jus sanguinis* nationality law of 1909.[7] Equally significant was the development of political consciousness among business elites and literate audiences, and to a lesser extent other strata like labourers, in cities such as Singapore and Penang. Chinese revolutionary and reformist movements drew on these communities as a base for political mobilisation.[8] These efforts were the precursor of subsequent and current configurations of Chinese state-diaspora relations.

Parallel to Chinese state authorities' and revolutionary movements' burgeoning relationships with migrants abroad were the new understandings of diaspora amongst Chinese intellectuals, from the late nineteenth century and especially the early twentieth century onwards. As scholars such as Shelly Chan and Rachel Leow have shown, from such race-thinking developed China's intellectual traditions of diaspora studies by the 1930s, the Nanhai and Jinan schools. These traditions frequently framed China's diaspora abroad as symbols of the superiority of the Chinese race, and a peaceful Chinese equivalent to European colonialism. They also associated diasporic Chineseness with economic success and racial superiority in the societies of their migration.[9]

Historians have often understood the ROC as inheriting and strengthening this connection between the Chinese state's relationship with the ethnic Chinese abroad, and its pursuit for parity with Western powers. By contrast, the PRC is typically interpreted as renouncing claims

[7] Shelly Chan, *Diaspora's Homeland: Modern China in the Age of Global Migration*, (Duke University Press, 2018), 17-47.
[8] Eg Ching-Hwang Yen, "Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya 1877–1912," *Modern Asian Studies* 16, no. 3 (1982): 397–425.
[9] Shelly Chan, *Diaspora's Homeland,* 48-74; Rachel Leow, "The Patriarchy of Diaspora: Race Fantasy and Gender Blindness in Chen Da's Studies of the Nanyang Chinese," *Twentieth-Century China* 47, no. 3 (2022): 243–65.

over the overseas Chinese to engage Southeast Asian states, and other destinations of their migration, on an equal footing as territorial nation-states. As the historian Ying-Hui Lee has studied, the KMT institutionalised diaspora policy as a sphere of the Chinese state's policies during the Nanjing Decade (1927-37). Examples included *jus sanguinis* nationality laws in continuity with the Qing, the establishment of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Council 僑務委員會 (OCAC), reserved seats for the overseas Chinese in the legislature, and policies ranging from consular protection to education and investment-attraction.[10] Moreover, the KMT advanced close ties with its supporters abroad, particularly in Singapore, the major cities of Malaya, and other urban centres in Southeast Asia, and in parts of the Americas, such as San Francisco in the US.[11]

Recent scholarship on the two Chinese states' relationship to the diaspora in the mid-twentieth century have portrayed the PRC as altering this trajectory and adopting a diaspora policy that emphasised intrastate solidarity above intervention in overseas Chinese affairs. Historian Taomo Zhou's study of the two Chinas' relationship with Indonesia has been particularly significant. While Taipei maintained close ties with pro-KMT overseas Chinese and even acted to destabilise Sukarno's government, China's premier Zhou Enlai 周恩來 agreed with Indonesia that ethnic Chinese must naturalise as Indonesian citizens or return to China in the 1954 Sino-Indonesian treaty.[12] Similarly, Philip Hsiaopong Liu's study of the relationship between Beijing and Lee Kuan Yew before he came to power demonstrates that China prioritised the national independence of Third World states above embracing ethnic Chinese as

[10] Ying-Hui Lee 李盈慧, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzu zhuyi* 華僑政策與海外民族主義, (Academia Historica 國史館, 1997).
[11] Eg Chin Fatt Yong, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912-1949*, (National University of Singapore Press, 1990), 83-105; Ying-Xian Tan 陳穎賢, "Gaizu hou Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang paixi zhizheng dui Meizhou dangbu de chongji: yi Sanfanshi zongzhibu weili 改組後中國國民黨中央派系之爭對美洲黨部的衝擊（1924-1927）：以三藩市總支部為例," *Shiyun* 史耘, 18 (2017): 81–110.
[12] Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War*, (Cornell University Press, 2020), 52-71.

their nationals.[13] Closely connected to the renunciation of claims to the political loyalty and citizenship of the overseas Chinese was Beijing's efforts to downplay its potential as a propagator of international Communist revolution. With the partial exception of Vietnam, the ethnic Chinese formed the backbone of Communist parties in Southeast Asia.[14] Beijing's assurances mitigated regional states' views of itself and its diaspora as a geopolitical and ideological threat. By contrast, the historiography has often suggested that Taipei adhered to an outdated and impractical Mainland-era overseas Chinese policy that espoused an expansive diaspora nationalism claiming overseas Chinese as loyal ROC nationals. Joan Wang, for example, argues that ROC officials maintained an extensive relationship with the overseas Chinese 'in the name of legitimacy' through education, propaganda, culture, and citizenship law.[15] More recently, Chien-Wen Kung's study of the ethnic Chinese in the Philippines focusses on the two states' joint governance of the ethnic Chinese community and the anti-Communist, pro-ROC political culture that took root as a consequence.[16]

Yet, the efficacy of these arguments are limited by the cases and sources they have focussed on, and challenged by historical enquiry into how ROC officials approached conflicts between diplomatic interests and diasporic transnationality in their policymaking. Indonesia's Sukarno, as discussed by Zhou, had a tense relationship with the ROC government due to factors such as Sinophobic violence during the National Revolution, Sukarno's recognition of Beijing, and his anti-Western diplomatic alignment.[17] Taipei's continued claims of citizenship over the Chinese in Indonesia, and pro-KMT elements' hostility towards Sukarno, demonstrated efforts

[13] Philip Hsiaopong Liu, "Love the Tree, Love the Branch: Beijing's Friendship with Lee Kuan Yew, 1954–1965," *China Quarterly* 242 (2020): 550–72.
[14] One recent examination of the relationship between Communist radicalism in Southeast Asia and Chinese-speaking sociocultural connections is Anna Belogurova, *The Nanyang Revolution: The Comintern and Chinese Networks in Southeast Asia, 1890–1957*, (Cambridge University Press, 2019).
[15] Joan Wang, "In the Name of Legitimacy: Taiwan and Overseas Chinese during the Cold War Era," *China Review* 11, no. 2 (2011): 65–90.
[16] Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors: Nationalist China, Anticommunism, and the Philippine Chinese 1930s-1970s,* (Cornell University Press, 2022).
[17] Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution*, 28-30 and 67-71.

to mobilise diasporic transnationality against a regime towards which it held great animosity.[18] By contrast, the Philippines and the ROC on Taiwan enjoyed a close diplomatic partnership. As Kung highlights, Cold War diplomatic affinities prompted Manila to delegate sovereignty over some of the ethnic Chinese to Taipei. Up to the 1970s, strong ties between the ROC and the Chinese in the Philippines promoted rather than impeded this partnership within the 'intra-Asian, anti-Communist ecumene'.[19] Each of the two cases sheds light on an important aspect of the ROC's relationship with the Chinese diaspora. However, neither truly demonstrates, as Zhou's study of Indonesia does for the PRC, how ROC officials navigated the tensions between intrastate diplomacy on one hand, and their efforts to maintain a relationship with overseas nationals on the other.

This thesis focusses on how ROC officials navigated these dynamics in Malaya and Vietnam, two countries where this tension asserted itself in contrasting ways. The development of Malayan Chinese political identity after 1945 has often been discussed through a domestic-political lens of localisation. Scholars have focussed on how China-oriented political loyalties, including a substantial pro-KMT movement, were succeeded by a Malayan identity co-produced by British rulers stabilising the colony before their retreat, Chinese business elites looking to preserve their economic status after Malaya's independence, and Malay nationalists who viewed non-Malays' political integration as a necessity to the nation-state.[20] Yet, less is known about how ROC officials understood and approached their relationship with the rapidly declining KMT movement, the Malayan Chinese, and their changing role in postcolonial political arrangements. The burgeoning historiography of postcolonial intra-Asian diplomacy

[18] Ibid, 61-4.
[19] Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors*, 2.
[20] The third section of the literature review will discuss the historiography of Malayan Chinese political identity in greater detail. Works that have examined the construction of Malaysian nationalism as a product of the British colonial state's decolonisation efforts, and the pact between Chinese and Malay elites, include James Ongkili, *Nation-Building in Malaysia, 1946-1974*, (Oxford University Press, 1985); Boon Kheng Cheah, *Malaysia: The Making of a Nation*, (ISEAS Publishing, 2002).

and international connections in Southeast Asia, such as recent work by Joseph Scalice, has equally opened the question of Kuala Lumpur's relationship to the two Chinese states.[21]

Diplomatic historians of the ROC on Taiwan, such as Hsiao-Ting Lin, have primarily studied the Saigon-Taipei relationship through the high-political lens of the alliance between two anti-Communist states at the peak of the Cold War. Although such studies make some reference to disputes over the citizenship and rights of the Chinese in Vietnam, less attention has been paid to the tension between Ngo Dinh Diem's ethnic nationalism, which was often far more assertive than its equivalent in Malaysia, and the ROC's own nationalist claims over the diaspora.[22] Historians such as Jessica Elkind, Jessica Chapman, and Edward Miller have sought to engage with the Republic of Vietnam's (RVN) history as the pursuit of an autonomous path to economic development and political order by leaders such as Ngo Dinh Diem.[23] A similar perspective is evident in recent histories of Republican China and Taiwan. Scholars such as Rana Mitter have examined how postwar ROC diplomats sought regional leadership in Asia while cooperating with the US.[24] Historians of Taiwan such as Hsiao-Ting Lin, Hao Chen, and James Lin have stressed the ways in which the KMT regime developed and represented its own policies to promote its domestic and international legitimacy.[25] Yet, little is known about how

[21] Joseph Scalice, "A Region in Dispute: Racialized Anticommunism and Manila's Role in the Origins of Konfrontasi, 1961–63," *Modern Asian Studies* 57, no. 3 (2023): 1004-26. Another case study focussing on Singapore's relations with the two Chinas is Zijie Joshua Lim, "Resolving Away a China Problem: The Issue of Chinese Representation in the Singapore-Republic of China Relationship, 1965-1971," *International History Review* 44, no. 3 (2022): 613–32.

[22] Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Taiwan, the United States, and the Hidden History of the Cold War in Asia: Divided Allies*, (Routledge, 2022), 159-60.

[23] Examples of recent perspectives include Edward Miller, *Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam*, (Harvard University Press, 2013); Jessica Chapman, *Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam*, (Cornell University Press, 2016); Jessica Elkind, *Aid under Fire: Nation Building and the Vietnam War*, (University Press of Kentucky, 2017); Van Nguyen-Marshall, *Between War and the State: Civil Society in South Vietnam, 1954-1975*, (Cornell University Press, 2023).

[24] Ruicong Duan 段瑞聰, "Chiang Kai-Shek's Postwar Vision as Formed During the Early Period of the Pacific War 太平洋戰爭前期蔣介石的戰後構想 (1941-1943)," *Guoshiguan Guankan* 國史館館刊 no. 32 (2012): 121–52; Helena Lopes, "Smooth Transition? Dismantling and Accommodating Colonial Rule in Late 1940s South China," *Cold War History* 25, no.4 (2023): 505-28; Rana Mitter, *China's Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism*, (Harvard University Press, 2022).

[25] Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Accidental State: Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan,* (Harvard University Press, 2016); Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Taiwan, the United States, and the Hidden History of the Cold War in Asia*; Hao Chen, "Resisting Bandung? Taiwan's Struggle for 'Representational Legitimacy' in the Rise of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League,

the Chinese in Vietnam, who laid at the intersection between official visions of nation-statehood in both Saigon and Taipei, affected the relationship between the two governments.

Secondly, existing studies of ROC policies towards the Chinese diaspora, with exceptions such as Zhou and Kung, have largely focussed on formal pronouncements and OCAC initiatives within Taiwan to understand post-1949 ROC diaspora policy. Scholars such as Joan Wang have highlighted the ROC's insistence on *jus sanguinis* nationality law until the 2000s, which theoretically claimed almost all ethnic Chinese abroad as ROC nationals. Other studies have examined the discourses that ROC officials made regarding the loyalty of ethnic Chinese who migrated to Taiwan. For example, sojourning students from Southeast Asia were dubbed 'overseas Chinese compatriot students 僑生', and in the 1950s, the OCAC and Taiwan's KMT-controlled media often emphasised the loyalty of overseas Chinese towards Taipei through events such as the annual Overseas Chinese Festival 華僑節.[26] This state embrace of the diaspora also carried a dark side of repression for those ethnic Chinese in Taiwan who held foreign nationalities, but were targeted by security forces as ROC nationals on suspicion of Communist sympathies.[27] These studies are valuable in establishing the importance of political legitimacy to the ROC's symbolic embrace of the Chinese diaspora. Yet, they tell us little about how ROC officials understood questions of policy such as the future of the overseas KMT, Taipei's connections to ethnic Chinese political elites, or the citizenship of the ethnic Chinese. Moreover, an extensive focus on Chinese-language propaganda, particularly sources directed at Taiwanese audiences, tells us little about how ROC officials represented themselves to their

1954-57," *International History Review* 43, no. 2 (2021): 244–63; James Lin, *In the Global Vanguard: Agrarian Development and the Making of Modern Taiwan,* (University of California Press, 2025).

[26] Eg Chih-chi Weng 翁智琦, "Patriotic Voyage and Reconstruction of Overseas Chinese"; Tao-chi Lee 李道緝, "To Construct a New 'National State' -- Overseas Chinese Adminstration during the Zheng Yen-Feng Period 建構新「祖國」 鄭彥棻時期(民國39-47 年)的僑務工作," *National Central University Journal of Humanities* 中央大學人文學報 31 (2007): 181-208.

[27] Jin-Xuan Toh, *Xuetong de yuanzui : Bei yiwang de Dongnanya Baisekongbu shouhaizhe* 血統的原罪：被遺忘的東南亞白色恐怖受害者, (Taiwan shangwu 台灣商務, 2020).

superpower patron, namely the US, and their Asian allies on overseas Chinese issues. Indeed, as this thesis will argue, it even belies the nuance that ROC officials could adopt when communicating with diasporic audiences. Domestic propaganda and embrace of some overseas nationals were unquestionably major features of the ROC's Cold War-era relationship with the diaspora. However, this thesis focusses on primary archival sources on ROC diplomacy and statecraft to place these tenets alongside other pragmatic adaptations.

An analogy can be drawn between this thesis' argument and recent histories of change and continuity in the Republic of China's ruling ideology as it transitioned from the Mainland to Taiwan. Historians such as Brian Tsui have analysed how the KMT's ruling ideology between the Nanjing Decade and 1949 illustrated an effort to develop an alternative Asian modernity to the Western model. Leaders such as Chiang Kai-Shek 蔣介石／蔣中正 envisioned China as exhibiting an alternative, Asian modernity to the West, founded on fascist ideas of collectivism and order, and Asian regional diplomatic leadership.[28] With the retreat to Taiwan, such ambitions were no longer tenable, as the ROC became a Cold Warrior state reliant on US patronage. Yet, the KMT regime was loathe to abandon the intellectual and ideological symbols that had sustained their rule, such as Sun Yat-Sen 孫逸仙/孫文's Three Principles of the People. The result was a substantial reinterpretation of ROC ruling ideologies to serve the state's changing needs. For example, the Principle of People's Welfare now denoted adherence to the US-led welfare-capitalist developmental model, rather than socialism or authoritarian economic collectivism.[29] Likewise, the ROC's expansive diaspora nationalism was increasingly challenged in the mid-twentieth century, not only by its retreat to Taiwan and increasing reliance on the US, but by the proliferation in Southeast Asia of nation-states deeply

[28] Brian Tsui, *China's Conservative Revolution*; Craig Smith, *Chinese Asianism, 1894-1945*, (Harvard University Asia Center, 2022).
[29] Brian Tsui, "Resetting China's Conservative Revolution: 'People's Livelihood' in 1950s Taiwan," in Reto Hofmann and Max Ward (eds.), *Transwar Asia: Ideology, Practices and Institutions, 1920-1960*, 125-46, (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022).

inimical to diasporic allegiances to China. This thesis thus applies a similar perspective to ROC overseas Chinese policy; it examines the relationship between a nominally unchanging ideology of overseas Chinese as loyal ROC nationals, and ROC officials' changing connections with elite and ordinary overseas Chinese, the representations they made to allied governments, and their discourses to diasporic audiences.

The Boundaries of Diaspora in the Age of Decolonisation and the Cold War

This thesis situates the ROC's mid-twentieth century diaspora policy within the broader history of nation-states' changing relationship with transnationality during decolonisation and the Cold War. It argues that a range of primarily top-down political logics governed the ROC state's boundary-making around diasporic transnationality in a context where diplomacy and statecraft were heavily structured by racialised anti-Communism. One particularly useful characterisation of the Chinese in Southeast Asia can be drawn from Itty Abraham's analysis of boundary-making by the Indian nation-state; while the ethnic Chinese were the 'insiders without' of the Chinese state, they were the 'outsiders within' of the Southeast Asian countries they lived in.[30] Abraham points out that the territorial borders of the state, and the citizenship of the nation, can never be entirely coterminous with the complex societies they govern. This creates the twin problems of 'insiders without', who are imagined as part of the nation but reside outside of the country, and 'outsiders within', who reside inside state borders but are not considered (full) nationals. State leaders in turn perceive an imperative to define and enforce boundaries, whether around physical territory or the legal definition of citizenship.[31] A considerable historiography has examined the relationship between the political transnationalism that was central to decolonisation, and its subsequent subordination to a

[30] Abraham, *How India Became Territorial*, 16.
[31] Abraham, *How India Became Territorial.*

political system comprised of nation-states. This thesis broadens this literature by examining the ROC's governance of diasporic transnationality within a racialised, anti-Communist Cold War international relations system.

Historians of political transnationalism in Asia have extensively studied the transition from cosmopolitan, transnational anti-imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century, to their subordination to nation-state imperatives in the second. As scholars such as Su Lin Lewis, John Sidel, and Tim Harper have detailed, the transnational flow of anti-imperialist ideas was central to anti-colonial politics in the time of European rule over Southeast Asia.[32] Anna Belogurova's work on the 'Nanyang Revolution' specifically argues for the importance of socialist, Chinese-speaking (Sinophone) connections, by focussing on the role of China's revolutionary ideologies and the Communist Party's networks among ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian political history.[33] Yet, as the nation-state became the dominant form of political organisation in decolonising Asia, these transnational connections became mediated through state authorities. The 1947 Asian Relations Conference provides an early example in the postwar period. Governments such as India supported the renunciation of citizenship claims over ethnic Indians abroad as part of their commitment to equality with postcolonial Southeast Asian states.[34] Similarly, the Bandung Conference of 1955 was a key part of the context for the

[32] John Sidel, *Republicanism, Communism, Islam: Cosmopolitan Origins of Revolution in Southeast Asia*, (Cornell University Press, 2021); Tim Harper, *Underground Asia: Global Revolutionaries and the Assault on Empire*, (Penguin Books, 2020); Su Lin Lewis, *Cities in Motion: Urban Life and Cosmopolitanism in Southeast Asia, 1920-1940*, (Cambridge University Press, 2016). For perspectives on comparable developments across the Third World more broadly see Jonathan Derrick, *Africa's "Agitators": Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West, 1918-1939*, (Columbia University Press, 2008), Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*, (Princeton University Press, 2019), and Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism,* (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[33] Anna Belogurova, *The Nanyang Revolution*, 83-154.
[34] Sunil Amrith, "Struggles for Citizenship around the Bay of Bengal," in Gyan Prakash, Michael Laffan and Nikhil Menon (eds.), *The Postcolonial Moment in South and Southeast Asia*, (Bloomsbury Press, 2018), 107–120; Deborah Sutton, "Divided and Uncertain Loyalties: Partition, Indian Sovereignty and Contested Citizenship in East Africa, 1948-1955," *Interventions* 9, no. 2 (2007): 276–88.

PRC's renunciation of claims over overseas Chinese citizenship to its allies, and its emphasis on respecting nation-state sovereignty rather than inciting Communist revolution.[35]

Events such as Bandung reflected and mobilised a genuine popular enthusiasm across Asia and Africa to pursue autonomy and development independent of the Global North's control. At the same time, nation-states sought with great success to harness such transnational political energy for their own diplomatic and developmental purposes. Conferences and other international initiatives around questions of social liberation and development saw formerly fluid formations of activism give way to a new framework of nation-states as the unit of political organisation, and nation-state policy programmes as central to agency and development. Intervention in other states' politics, including through the mobilisation of diasporas, became a taboo in the Global South.[36] For example, Sunil Amrith has traced how logics of singular belonging to nation-states, and state-based modes of political participation, reformulated the cross-border sociocultural circuits of the Indian Ocean world.[37] Examples from elsewhere in the postcolonial world, such as Byrne's study of Algeria and Roberts' examination of Tanzania, demonstrate how Global South states interpreted Third World solidarity to emphasise absolute respect for each other's authority, rather than as a source of instability to their rule over territory and people.[38]

The ROC's role in the history of Afro-Asian internationalism has only recently been explored, chiefly because of its assumed unimportance in comparison to the PRC. Yet, as China was one

[35] Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Age of Revolution*, 64-7.
[36] See eg Dipesh Chakrabarty, "The Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of Culture," in Christopher Lee (ed.), *Making a World After Empire,* (Ohio University Press, 2010), 45–68; Yasser Nasser, "Asia as a Third Way? J. C. Kumarappa and the Problem of Development in Asia," in Carolien Stolte and Su Lin Lewis (eds.), *The Lives of Cold War Afro-Asianism*, (Leiden University Press, 2022), 121-42.
[37] Sunil Amrith, *Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The Furies of Nature and the Fortunes of Migrants*, (Harvard University Press, 2013), 212-49.
[38] George Roberts, *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar Es Salaam: African Liberation and the Global Cold War, 1961-1974*, (Cambridge University Press, 2022); Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order*, (Oxford University Press, 2016).

of the few Global South polities that stayed independent throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, historians are not unfamiliar with the attempts of ROC authorities to reconcile transnationality to top-down state purposes. As early as the 1990s, Prasenjit Duara wrote of the 'domestication' of transnational ideologies; as they spread across early twentieth-century Asia, Republican Chinese authorities appropriated tenets that were conducive to a state-centric order, but suppressed those that did not.[39] Nevertheless, the ROC's postwar years and rule of Taiwan have not attracted historians of the same themes until more recently, when they have contested notions of postwar China and ROC-ruled Taiwan's diplomatic marginalisation by drawing attention to its agency in ordering international connections.

One observation that demonstrates the necessity of understanding the ROC's agency in diplomacy, even during its rule of Taiwan, is that Taipei did not face continuous diplomatic de-recognitions until the even greater frustration of UN Resolution 2758. Rather, it reached a historic high of 70 countries with diplomatic relations in 1969 before its diplomatic recognitions fell below those of Beijing in 1971.[40] Thus, recent historiography has challenged the assumption in international-relations and historical scholarship that Taipei's diplomacy was marred by its reliance on US support and insistence on itself as the only legitimate government of China.[41] Historians such as Hao Chen and Yui Chim Lo situate Republican Chinese participation in events and international organisations such as the Asian Relations Conference and Asian People's Anti-Communist League (APACL) within their challenges to this narrative.

[39] Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945," *The American Historical Review* 102, no. 4 (1997): 1030–51.

[40] Gang Huang 黃剛. *Shijie geguo yu Taihai liang'an zhengfu zhi shiling huo shiji guanxi yanbian shicheng, 1949-2003* 世界各國與臺海兩岸政府之使領或實質關係演變時程, 1949~2003*, (*Guoli Zhengzhi Daxue Guoji Shiwu Xueyuan Guoji Faxue Yanjiu Zhongxin 國立政治大學國際事務學院國際法學研究中心, 2020). Precise calculations may vary.

[41] Examples of such older scholarship include Richard Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942*, (Routledge, 2015). 86-123; Philip Hsiaopong Liu, "Dual Representation: Reviewing the Republic of China's Last Battle in the UN," *Issues and Studies* 47, no. 2 (2011): 87–118; Joel Atkinson, *Australia and Taiwan: Bilateral Relations, China, the United States, and the South Pacific*, (Brill, 2012); Adam Liff, "Japan, Taiwan and the 'One China' Framework after 50 Years," *The China Quarterly* 252 (2022): 1066–93.

As Chen has highlighted, both Mainland- and Taiwan-era ROC officials asserted their own vision of development through cooperation with the West, in contrast to the radical revolutionary discourses of Beijing, when engaging potential allies in Asia and Africa.[42] Lo has argued that ROC overseas Chinese policies in the Mainland period were nevertheless coloured by Chinese chauvinism, as evidenced by the racist views that ROC officials held of Chinese migrants and local ethnicities.[43] Apart from such growing scholarship, little is known about how ROC officials, or domestic and diasporic communities, understood and practised these diplomatic visions. This thesis examines these questions in relation to overseas Chinese affairs as an aspect of transnationality that was particularly interesting because it intersected with the ROC's intrastate diplomacy in Asia.

Furthermore, this thesis' subject matter draws out the importance of two strands of the history of Asian nation-state boundary-making that are obscured in an exclusive focus on Third World intrastate internationalism as understood through events such as Bandung. The first is the Asian diplomatic context of racialised anti-Communism by the US and UK, as well as Southeast Asian states, that Taipei worked within. As historians such as Wen-Qing Ngoei have suggested, race was central to Anglo-American officials' understanding of Asian geopolitics. Having understood the Second World War as an Asian (Japanese) challenge to white supremacy over the continent, perceptions of geopolitical conflict as racial struggle persisted in their interactions with the postwar ROC and later the PRC.[44] The ROC first sought to engage with the colonial powers ruling Southeast Asia, namely Britain and France, on an equal footing as

[42] Hao Chen, "Resisting Bandung? Taiwan's Struggle for 'Representational Legitimacy' in the Rise of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, 1954-57," *International History Review* 43, no. 2 (2021): 244–63; Ibid., "An Alternative Decolonisation: The Republic of China in the 1947 Asian Relations Conference," *Cold War History* 25, no.4 (2023): 529-551.
[43] Yui Chim Lo, "Between Equality and Prejudice: Chinese Planning on the Postwar Status of the Chinese Diaspora, 1940–9," *Journal of Contemporary History* 57, no. 4 (2022): 975–96.
[44] Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment: Britain, the United States, and Anticommunism in Southeast Asia*, (Cornell University Press, 2020),17-44.

a victor of the Second World War.[45] However, after the retreat to Taiwan it became reliant on US security and developmental support. ROC diplomats adapted their diaspora policies at a time when the anti-Communist bloc remained highly hostile to the ethnic Chinese as a source of Communist political subversion emanating from the PRC. Furthermore, as historians such as Anthony Reid have highlighted, the nation-states of Southeast Asia which Taipei sought to cooperate with were also often highly Sinophobic. Anti-Chinese sentiment in Southeast Asian nationalisms, regardless of ideological alignment, arose from the concentration of Chinese capital and labour in the modern sectors of the colonial political economy, and the early twentieth-century rise of modern mass nationalism among ethnic Chinese that established them as a convenient political 'Other'.[46]

Taipei's diplomatic alliances with the US and the anti-Communist states of Southeast Asia meant that its leaders acted within this structure of racialised Asian international relations, where anti-Communism and Sinophobia reinforced each other. Recent histories have highlighted the influence that anti-Communist Cold War international relations had on the trajectory of Asia's decolonisation, from international organisations such as the APACL to the region's territorial contours and domestic policies.[47] Moreover, race and ethnicity have received less attention by historians of Third World internationalism as a source of tension between Asian nation-states, in comparison to questions such as alignment in armed conflicts, or the extent of respect for nation-state sovereignty.[48] Where questions of race have been

[45] Eg Ruicong Duan, "Chiang Kai-Shek's Postwar Vision as Formed During the Early Period of the Pacific War (1941-1943)".
[46] Anthony Reid, *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia*, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 49-80.
[47] Mattias Fibiger, *Suharto's Cold War: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the World*, (Oxford University Press, 2023); Christopher Goscha and Christian Ostermann (eds.), *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962*, (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009); Cheng Guan Ang, *Southeast Asia's Cold War: An Interpretive History*, (University of Hawai'i Press, 2018).
[48] Eg Lorenz Luthi, "The Non-Aligned: Apart from and still within the Cold War," in Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska (eds.), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung – Belgrade*, 133-153; Matthieu Rey, "Fighting Colonialism' versus 'Non-Alignment': Two Arab Points of View on the Bandung Conference," in ibid, 212-235.

discussed, they have often been related to the role that ideas of racial equality and overturning white supremacy played, at least nominally, in uniting non-aligned and socialist internationalisms.[49] The dynamic within the Asian anti-Communist bloc, however, was racialised suspicion of the Chinese diaspora as politically subversive and disloyal. This thesis demonstrates how the ROC adapted its diaspora policy to this diplomatic context, highlighting the latter's importance to postwar Asian histories of high diplomacy and politics, as well as statecraft and state-society interfaces.

Secondly, this thesis joins the growing academic literature that examines boundary-making around transnationality through the territorial and social interfaces between different nation-states. Such literature, focussing on geographical borderlands or social intersections between states such as diasporic communities, has often challenged impressions of Global South states' statecraft gleaned only from high-political sources and methods. For example, scholars such as Taylor Sherman and Kalyani Ramnath have challenged the impression of postcolonial India as having ruptured its ties with its diaspora by highlighting the multifaceted struggles over the livelihoods and political status of ethnic Indians abroad.[50] The academic literature on borderlands often dissects the multiplicity of political logics at work in statecraft, beyond singular factors such as the Cold War or Third-Worldism. As Qingfei Yin shows of the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands, state efforts to impose legibility, governability and national unity over diverse societies; social struggles over ethnicity, economic status, or gender; and tensions between different levels and spheres of state bureaucracy were all important to understanding

[49] Eg Torsten Weber, "Alternative Internationalisms in East Asia," in Stephen Legg, Mike Heffernan, Jake Hodder and Benjamin Thorpe (eds.), *Placing Internationalism: International Conferences and the Making of the Modern World*, (Bloomsbury, 2021), 199-215; Itty Abraham, "Prolegomena to Non-alignment: Race and the International System," in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War*, 109-130.

[50] Kalyani Ramnath, *Boats in a Storm: Law, Migration, and Decolonization in South and Southeast Asia, 1942-1962*, (Stanford University Press, 2023); Raphaëlle Khan and Taylor Sherman, "India and Overseas Indians in Ceylon and Burma, 1946–1965: Experiments in Post-Imperial Sovereignty," *Modern Asian Studies* 56, no. 4 (2022): 1153–82.

borderland statecraft.[51] In addition to Yin's case study, recent studies of Indonesia's Konfrontasi conflict with Malaysia and the territorial disputes over Sabah in the 1960s all demonstrate the limitations of Third-Worldism or socialist internationalism as explanatory frameworks for politics and social life on borderlands. Shifting alliances within diplomatic blocs and domestic nation-state building programmes were frequently far more operative.[52] This thesis examines the causes and nature of ROC overseas Chinese policy as one particular case of boundary-making that took place within unique circumstances, but also within a broader history of nation-state building in Asia. In particular, it argues that transnational connections with the diaspora shifted from a matter of Chinese state equality to the Western powers in the postwar period, to a matter of diplomatic relations, security and legitimacy after the 1949 retreat to Taiwan.

In doing so, it will also draw on the recently proliferating literature of the ROC's statecraft in the postwar period and on Taiwan. As already discussed, the ROC's diplomacy saw efforts to assert itself as a world power in the postwar period, and to preserve its diplomatic recognition and geopolitical stability on Taiwan. Turning to its domestic statebuilding programmes, scholars such as Rana Mitter and Tehyun Ma have examined how postwar ROC elites and officials sought to promote modern Republican Chinese citizenship in the populace it governed through social and institutional reforms.[53] These imperatives changed substantially after the

[51] Qingfei Yin, *State Building in Cold War Asia: Comrades and Competitors on the Sino-Vietnamese Border*, (Cambridge University Press, 2024).
[52] David Saunders, *Chasing Archipelagic Dreams: The Expansion of Foreign Influence in Sabah amid the End of Empire, 1945–1965*, (Cornell University Press, 2024); Noboru Ishikawa, *Between Frontiers: Nation and Identity in a Southeast Asian Borderland*, (Ohio University Press, 2010). Other studies in this genre include Bérénice Guyot-Réchard, *Shadow States: India, China and the Himalayas, 1910-1962,* (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Wasif Sulmaan Khan, *Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China's Cold War and the People of the Tibetan Borderlands,* (University of North Carolina Press, 2016).

[53] Rana Mitter, "Classifying Citizens in Nationalist China during World War II, 1937-1941," *Modern Asian Studies* 45, no. 2 (2011): 243-75; Ibid, "State-Building after Disaster: Jiang Tingfu and the Reconstruction of Post-World War II China, 1943–1949," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 61, no. 1 (2019): 176–206; Tehyun Ma, "'The Common Aim of the Allied Powers': Social Policy and International Legitimacy in Wartime China, 1940–47," *Journal of Global History* 9, no.2 (2014): 254-75.

retreat to Taiwan. After it was transferred from the Japanese colonial empire in 1945, Taiwan's status as a former colony and Han settler society distinct from the Mainland meant that ROC officials sought to impose anti-Communist Republican Chinese nationalism on what they saw as a culturally and politically wayward populace.[54] Julia Strauss has argued that ROC officials sought to implement a bureaucratic, developmentalist approach to statebuilding to maintain political stability and mobilise societal resources for development, particularly as Taiwan became their only territory after 1949.[55] Historian Michael Szonyi has analysed the militarised, geopoliticised authoritarian high-modernism that structured the state-society relations of KMT-ruled Taiwan.[56] This thesis will argue that these state political logics, especially those that understood diasporic transnationality as a matter of legitimacy and political security, asserted themselves alongside diplomatic factors in the ROC's relationship with the overseas Chinese.

Finally, the Chinese in Southeast Asia were one of many imagined communities in twentieth-century Asia that experienced decolonisation as a disillusioning and unempowering experience. The establishment of nation-states through national self-determination was an ambivalent development for the lives and livelihoods of many Chinese in Southeast Asia. One significant study of the relationship between decolonising nation-statehood and social diversity has been Rachel Leow's study of Malaya, which uses language as a lens for these themes. As she argues, new nation-states did not accept preexisting social diversity and hybridity in sociocultural life, but rather regarded them as threatening to society's legibility and

[54] Bi-yu Chang, *Place, Identity, and National Imagination in Post-War Taiwan*, (Routledge, 2015); Allen Chun, "From Nationalism to Nationalizing: Cultural Imagination and State Formation in Postwar Taiwan," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 31, no. 31 (1994): 49–69; Tehyun Ma, "Making Taiwan Chinese, 1945-60," in Alan Baumler (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Revolutionary China*, (Routledge, 2020), 202–16.
[55] Julia Strauss, *State Formation in China and Taiwan: Bureaucracy, Campaign, and Performance,* (Cambridge University Press, 2019).
[56] Michael Szonyi, *Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line*, (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

governability, as was true of the colonial era, and subversive to nationalist political narratives.[57] Marginalisation due to projects of nation-state homogenisation and centralisation was perhaps a common condition to the geographies and communities that nation-states deemed to be their borderlands, as they were subject to often coercive and undemocratic boundary-making. Examples include not only diasporic communities such as the Chinese and Indians of Southeast Asia, but regions that were excluded from the international framework of national self-determination and became the peripheries of new nation-states. Recent examples have included Emma Kluge's study of West Papua and David Saunders' study of Sabah.[58] Rather than politics that framed their inhabitants, at least nominally, as agents of their own future, these territories often had their futures negotiated between local elites, state rulers, and sometimes global powers. In a similar vein, this thesis analyses how the Taipei state intersected with the designs of other state and communal elites to inflect on the political and social lives of many ethnic Chinese. Specifically, it argues that the ROC's willingness to compromise with its allies on the citizenship and rights of the diaspora accelerated the integration of ethnic Chinese as citizens of the Malayan and Vietnamese nation-states. Furthermore, ROC officials' efforts to promote intrastate relations and support for itself through diaspora policy reinforced the anti-Communist, elite-driven character of ethnic Chinese politics in these countries.

Taiwan and the Overseas Chinese in the Global Transformations of Chineseness, c. 1945-70s

An emerging scholarship has examined Chinese sociocultural and political identities outside the contemporary PRC not as the results of apolitical processes of social change, but rather

[57] Rachel Leow, *Taming Babel: Language in the Making of Malaysia,* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
[58] Saunders, *Chasing Archipelagic Dreams;* Emma Kluge, "West Papua and the International History of Decolonization, 1961-69," *International History Review* 42, no. 6 (2020): 1155–72.

historically produced struggles over domestic and geopolitical power. This thesis argues that the ROC's relationship with the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia illustrates one central historical theme in the twentieth-century history of Chineseness beyond China; namely, the entrenchment of anti-Communist, conservative visions of Chineseness as a product of not only local and regional, but global Cold War dynamics. First, it considers the ROC's intervention in overseas Chinese communities in relation not only to its own diaspora-facing nationalism, but the political changes within those Chinese communities. It demonstrates that the officials of Taipei were often interested in promoting top-down state interests within the anti-Communist political structures of the overseas Chinese communities, rather than espousing a narrow Chinese nationalism. At the same time, the role of Taiwan in these conservative transformations of overseas Chinese political identity shows how these changes were shaped by Cold War struggles as a world-historical force.

A growing historiography has demonstrated how Chinese social identity in postcolonial Southeast Asia was not merely a product of temporal change or apolitical, economic-minded cultural characteristics among the Chinese, but historically produced struggles over economic and political power. Early scholarship such as Wang Gungwu discusses these themes implicitly, pointing to how historical moments of 'Strong China' and 'Weak China'— the latter dominant between the mid-nineteenth and late-twentieth centuries— altered the balance of power between different strands of overseas Chinese social belonging.[59] Wang describes both the 'Group B' of Chinese chiefly interested in preserving their livelihoods and cultural identity, but not necessarily political loyalties towards China, and the more locally-oriented 'Group C' as the political mainstream as Southeast Asia decolonised in contrast to the China-oriented 'Group A'.[60] More recent scholarship has sought to ground this dynamic more firmly within

[59] Wang Gungwu, "Greater China and the Chinese Overseas," *The China Quarterly* 136 (1993): 936-7.
[60] Ibid, 940.

the regional political economy of Southeast Asia since Chinese capitalists built their presence in the region in the sixteenth century. Historical sociologists such as John Sidel and historians including Melissa Macauley have all highlighted the centrality of partnerships between ethnic Chinese capitalists and local states—precolonial, colonial, or postcolonial—to the region's politics.[61] Changing state approaches towards Chinese culture and identity, including the political repression of Chinese-nationalist or left-wing radical movements among middle-class and proletarian Chinese in the twentieth century, coexisted with reliance on business elites who dominated the modern sectors of the regional economy.

We can extend this argument to suggest that an exclusive historiographical focus around assimilation versus preservation of Chinese cultural identity obscures a more significant theme; namely, the hegemony of political conservatism, opposed to Communism and other forms of anti-establishment politics, in the ethnic Chinese politics of Southeast Asia in the mid-twentieth century. For example, Malaya/Malaysia and Thailand have conventionally been discussed as contrasting cases of Chinese communal identity being preserved and assimilated respectively by Southeast Asian nation-states. Yet, recent scholarship by scholars including Choo Chin Low, Michael Nonini, Kee Howe Yong, and Keat Gin Ooi have argued that the racial-political contract in Malaysia can also be understood as an anti-Communist compact. The communal basis of Malaysian politics as an intra-ethnic compromise between the Chinese and Malays, and to a lesser extent other ethnicities, stood in opposition to the Malayan Communist Party's discourses of class struggle.[62] The colonial counterinsurgency and nation-state building efforts

[61] Melissa Macauley, *Distant Shores: Colonial Encounters on China's Maritime Frontier*, (Princeton University Press, 2021); John Sidel, "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Revisited: Colonial State and Chinese Immigrant in the Making of Modern Southeast Asia," *Comparative Politics* 40, no. 2 (2008): 127–47.

[62] Choo Chin Low, "The Malayan Emergency and the Desinicization of the Malayan Chinese," in Jeremy Taylor and Lanjun Xu (ed.s), *Chineseness and the Cold War: Contested Cultures and Diaspora in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong*, 45–65; Keat Gin Ooi, "Between left and right: Chinese politics in Malaya/Malaysia, 1920s–1990s," in Keat Gin Ooi (ed.), *Malaysia and the Cold War Era*, (Routledge, 2020), 21-95 ; Kee Howe Yong, *The Hakkas of Sarawak: Sacrificial Gifts in Cold War Era Malaysia*, (University of Toronto Press, 2017).

of the 1950s associated overt assertions of Malayan Chinese identity, such as knowledge of Mandarin or certain Chinese topolects, or innate characteristics such as birthplace, with Communist subversion.[63] Subsequently, acceptable Chinesenesses in the Malaysian public sphere could express neither affinity to the PRC nor any form of radical left-wing politics. Rather, the politics of the Chinese community was dominated by business elites, particularly those in the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and communal issues such as citizenship and education became the central political concerns.[64] Although Thailand is traditionally seen as a contrasting case, the royalist, assimilationist Sino-Thai identity arguably arises from a similar political pact. Wasana Wongsuwarat draws attention to the centrality of the 'crown-capitalist' alliance to modern Thai politics. The collaboration between the Siamese/Thai monarchy's royal nationalism, and Chinese business elites who downplayed their ethnic identity in exchange for political patronage, hastened the decline of Chinese culture and their naturalisation as Siamese/Thai citizens.[65] In both of these countries with contrasting historical trajectories, Chinese business elites succeeded in cooperating with local state elites to ensure that support for their alliance remained hegemonic in Chinese communal politics.

This understanding of Chinese social identity in Southeast Asia as the product of political and economic struggles calls for a reappraisal of the ROC's role in such developments. The ROC in the postwar and Taiwan period is typically depicted as pursuing unrealistic dreams of the overseas Chinese as natural allies and loyal citizens, which made their diaspora policy out of touch with the ethnic Chinese's changing conditions and relegated it to insignificance. Older studies of Malayan Chinese politics including Chin Fatt Yong, Fujio Hara and Pek Koon Heng

[63] Karl Hack, *The Malayan Emergency: Revolution and Counterinsurgency at the End of Empire*, (Cambridge University Press, 2021), 128-34.
[64] Donald Nonini, *Getting by: Class and State Formation among Chinese in Malaysia*, (Cornell University Press, 2015), 36-59; Yong, *The Hakkas of Sarawak*, 111-52.
[65] Wasana Wongsurawat, *The Crown and the Capitalists: The Ethnic Chinese and the Founding of the Thai Nation*, (University of Washington Press, 2019).

have emphasised the declining support for ROC loyalties, such as the Double Tenth National Day, and the transition of formerly pro-KMT Chinese elites to Malayan loyalties in the 1950s.[66] Similarly, Wongsuwarat writes of events such as the 1945 Yaowarat incident that demonstrate the state's low regard for the postwar ROC and its supporters.[67] Another related perspective focusses on the diplomatic conflicts caused by Taipei's efforts to maintain a strong relationship with the overseas Chinese. For example, historians of British Hong Kong have often examined the colonial state's efforts to govern their subjects' ties with Taiwan in spheres such as propaganda and education, for fear of its political and diplomatic consequences.[68]

Contesting these notions of the ROC as irrelevant or conflictual, however, is a focus on how ROC officials' overseas Chinese policy reflected meaningful engagement with and adaptation to political change in overseas Chinese communities. Chien-Wen Kung's study of the Philippines points out that pro-Taipei alignments in that country were not anachronistic, but rather self-interested choices of Chinese business elites in a xenophobic, anti-Communist political establishment.[69] This thesis argues that ROC officials adapted to changes in the ethnic Chinese's political loyalties, often recognising the infeasibility of sustaining loyalty to Taipei and the practicality of cultivating informal relationships to promote intrastate diplomacy. In Malay(si)a, these changes entailed the emergence of a racial-political compact with a substantial role for ethnic Chinese, and in South Vietnam, a more exclusionary ethnic nationalism increasingly took root under Ngo Dinh Diem's Republic of Vietnam (RVN) regime.

---

[66] Pek Koon Heng, *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association*, (Oxford University Press, 1988); Fujio Hara, *Malayan Chinese and China: Conversion in Identity Consciousness, 1945-1957*, (National University of Singapore Press, 2003); Chin Fatt Yong, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya*.

[67] Wasana Wongsurawat, "Beyond Jews of the Orient: A New Interpretation of the Problematic Relationship between the Thai State and Its Ethnic Chinese Community," *Positions : Asia Critique* 24, no. 2 (2016): 569-74.

[68] Priscilla Roberts, "Cold War Hong Kong: Juggling Opposing Forces and Identities," in Priscilla Roberts and John Carroll (eds.), *Hong Kong in the Cold War*, (Hong Kong University Press, 2017), 26-59.

[69] Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors*, esp. 75-99.

The consolidation of conservative politics in ethnic Chinese communities was not an exclusively domestic or regional process, but rather took place within a wider framework of global-historical change. To apply the analytical framework of anthropologist Heonik Kwon, the overseas Chinese were one of the major global diasporas that experienced 'the Other Cold War' most strongly; the confrontation between Communism and anti-Communism structured not only high politics but different dimensions of social life.[70] Examples of this perspective can arguably be found in the historiography of Chinese American identity in the mid-twentieth century, which has dedicated particular attention to how domestic change intersected with Cold War dynamics to produce changes in social identity. Cindy I-Fen Cheng has pointed to how the US' Cold War narratives of democracy and racial equality led its diplomatic and political elites to emphasise the social integration of Asian communities in public discourse.[71] Meredith Oyen and Madeline Hsu have traced the lives of Cold Warrior Chinese whose anti-Communist efforts in Asia advanced their status in the US, and immigrants who gained opportunity and acceptance through Taipei-Washington diplomatic ties and their own pragmatic self-fashionings.[72] As Hsu and Ellen Wu have suggested, these dynamics intersected with domestic social changes in the US that emboldened Asian American elites to present themselves as 'model minorities' to win acceptance in the postwar political system.[73]

In contrast to existing analyses that focus on the ROC's bilateral relations with Chinese communities and local governments, this thesis thus emphasises the role of global Cold War

[70] Heonik Kwon, *The Other Cold War*, (Columbia University Press, 2010).
[71] Cindy I-Fen Cheng, *Citizens of Asian America: Democracy and Race during the Cold War*, (New York University Press, 2013).
[72] Madeline Yuan-Yin Hsu, *The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority*, (Oxford University Press, 2017) ; Meredith Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).
[73] Madeline Yuan-Yin Hsu, *The Good Immigrants;* Ellen Wu, *The Color of Success: Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority*, (Princeton University Press, 2017).

dynamics in shaping Taipei's diaspora policy, and by extension the historical trajectories of the overseas Chinese. It places Taiwan within the relational view of the global Cold War posed by scholars such as Odd Arne Westad, which focusses on the interaction between superpowers with designs of global transformation, and the Third World actors inviting their intervention.[74] By contrast, present literature on ROC diaspora policy in North America has focussed on the ROC as the 'Free China' government that maintained ties with traditional constituencies of supporters such as Chinatown business leaders up to around the 1950s.[75] Histories of Taiwan and Southeast Asia such as Kung similarly highlight the trilateral interactions between Taipei, Manila, and the Philippine Chinese.[76] Yet, histories of other aspects of Taiwan's diplomacy remind us that Taiwan's foreign policies during the 1950s-70s were often substantially shaped by calculations of their effects on the relationship with Washington. The latter factor influenced its decisions from incursions across the Taiwan Strait and in Southeast Asia, to relations with allies including Japan, the Republic of Vietnam, and other Asian states.[77] This thesis argues that the decisionmaking and effects of ROC overseas Chinese policy were affected not only by bilateral relations but rather the Cold War as a world-historical force structuring international relations and sociopolitical imagination. Specifically, US racial-geopolitical considerations were often significant to Taipei's intra-Asian diaspora policy.

In doing so, this thesis hopes to contribute to the study of Taiwan, the overseas Chinese, and other communities practising Chinese language and culture beyond the PRC Mainland, such as Hong Kong, which have all garnered considerable public and academic attention. Academic controversies around efforts to understand them in an integrative light, such as Shu-Mei Shih's

[74] Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times,* (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[75] Ellen Wu, *The Color of Success*, 111-144.
[76] Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors*, 1.
[77] Eg Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Taiwan, the United States, and the Hidden History of the Cold War in Asia*.

concept of the 'Sinophone' arising from the field of cultural studies, illustrate the need for a historically grounded approach to understanding Chineseness beyond China. Shih understands the 'Sinophone' as a counter-hegemonic space of resistance to the PRC's hegemony.[78] Yet, as other scholars such as Flair Donglai Shi have pointed out, it was anti-Communism that became politically hegemonic in many mid-twentieth century Chinese communities beyond China. Additionally, it was anti-Communist societies such as Taiwan and Hong Kong that dominated the representation of Chineseness to the Global North and anti-Communist bloc, not the socialist Mainland.[79] As this literature review has already highlighted, neither was Shih's injunction to 'become local' an autonomous choice for most ethnic Chinese, but rather a historical process shaped by top-down state policies, communal power struggles, and individual agency. This thesis follows the intervention of Rachel Leow to examine Chineseness beyond China applying a 'mycelial' perspective, that focusses on how historical processes produce different Chinese communities with diverse and open-ended relationships to Chinese and local identities.[80] In particular, it argues that the Cold War as a global-historical force affected the development of the ROC's official discourses of anti-Communist diasporic Chineseness, as well as alternatives supported by other state and social elites, in two countries with contrasting experiences of the Cold War. As a connected history, the experiences it studies can be placed in a comparative framework alongside other histories of what it meant to be Chinese outside of China. For example, apart from the themes that have already been surveyed, historians of societies such as Hong Kong have highlighted the effect that the changing nature of colonial rule had on social and political identity.[81] Moving from the peak of the Asian Cold

[78] Shu-mei Shih, "Against Diaspora: The Sinophone as Places of Cultural Production," in Jing Tsu and David Der-Wei Wang (eds.), *Global Chinese Literature: Critical Essays* (2010), 25-48.
[79] Flair Donglai Shi, "Reconsidering Sinophone Studies: The Chinese Cold War, Multiple Sinocentrisms, and Theoretical Generalisation," *International Journal of Taiwan Studies* 4, no. 2 (2021): 316-22.
[80] Rachel Leow, "Beyond Diaspora's Horizons: Mass Deportations to China and an Alternative to the Diaspora Paradigm," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 24, no. 4 (2023): 605.
[81] Eg Wing-Sang Law, *Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of the Hong Kong Chinese*, (Hong Kong University Press, 2009) and Florence Mok, *Covert Colonialism: Governance, Surveillance and Political Culture in British Hong Kong, c. 1966-97*, (Manchester University Press, 2023).

War and nation-state building into the age of capitalist globalisation, another proliferating literature has focussed on the transformation of Chineseness after the 1980s by the East Asian economic miracle and China's market reforms.[82]

Sources and Chapter Outline

This thesis primarily examines the perspectives and policies of senior ROC officials in the Republican Chinese/Taiwan party-state, including the KMT leadership, OCAC, and Foreign Ministry.[83] It relies primarily on the fonds of these ministries in the Academia Historica (AH), National Archives Administration (NAA), and KMT Archives (KMTA) in Taiwan. To understand the perspectives of Southeast Asian states, the Western European powers of the UK and France, and the US, I have drawn on the National Archives (TNA) of the United Kingdom, as well as published volumes and digitised databases of diplomatic documents relating to France, the US, and the RVN. To examine ROC officials' efforts to communicate with diasporic audiences, I rely on a corpus of ROC booklets and historical gazettes produced about overseas Chinese issues and/or directed as diasporic audiences. Furthermore, although the archival sources surveyed by this thesis primarily cover the ROC's diplomacy and state directives towards the diaspora, they record some interactions between overseas Chinese and the ROC state. Examples include intelligence reports and applications for migration to travel between Southeast Asia and Taiwan. Lastly, I use memoirs and writings of officials in the OCAC to understand their own accounts of OCAC policies, and how interactions with overseas Chinese affected their thinking. These sources are imperfect in answering broader questions

[82] See eg Nonini, *Getting By*; Ming-Sho Ho, *Working-Class Formation in Taiwan: Fractured Solidarity in State-Owned Enterprises, 1945-2012*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)*;* Peter Hamilton, *Made in Hong Kong: Transpacific Networks and a New History of Globalization*, (Columbia University Press, 2021); Eugene Tan, "Re-Engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic and Cultural Imperatives of Nation-Building in Singapore," *The China Quarterly* 175, (2003): 751–74.

[83] The full name of the ROC government ministry in charge of diplomatic relations is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 外交部 [MFA]; this is abbreviated to 'Foreign Ministry' in the text while MFA is used in footnotes.

such as how the Chinese in Malaya and Vietnam understood the ROC and its policies, and their connections with Taiwan beyond high-political interactions. Yet, they provide a sense of ROC narratives to overseas Chinese society; the approach to state-diaspora interactions that characterised key ministries of the Taipei state; and how ROC officials' personal experiences and understandings of the diaspora shaped their policy.

This thesis begins at the end of the Second World War, when ROC officials formulated their relationship to the Chinese diaspora amidst broader state efforts to realise China's status as a victorious power. In Southeast Asia, colonial powers faced both constitutional debates over citizenship, and Communist and nationalist insurgencies; the Chinese communities of Malaya and Vietnam stood at the intersection of these developments. The first Part of this thesis argues that ROC officials' diaspora policy between 1945 and 1949 largely reflected ambitions of regional geopolitical power. Their policies and views frequently reflected notions of both Chinese racial superiority to local ethnicities, and the aim of attaining equality to the colonising European powers. The first chapter argues that, as Britain and France began to develop late-colonial citizenship arrangements, ROC diplomats tried to secure both Chinese nationality and rights of local residence for ethnic Chinese in Malaya and Vietnam. The second chapter examines the continuities in overseas Chinese policy from 1947 to 1949 as the ROC entered the last stages of its Civil War with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the Mainland and as Communist insurgencies broke out across Southeast Asia. It argues that ROC officials prioritised protecting their nationals in these conflicts above anti-Communism. However, this programme of diaspora protection largely failed amidst the ROC's declining diplomatic prestige and state resources as its position deteriorated on the Mainland.

The second Part argues that, after their retreat to Taiwan, ROC officials adapted both their ideology and practice of diaspora policy to their 'accidental statehood', decolonisation in Southeast Asia, and the emergence of an often Sinophobic, US-led Asian anti-Communist bloc. The third chapter argues that the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference in Taipei in 1952 marked these new imperatives of ROC diaspora policy on Taiwan. ROC officials constructed diasporic loyalty as a symbol of their legitimacy. Yet, they simultaneously made efforts to minimise diplomatic conflicts over overseas Chinese issues and to govern diasporic connections in the interests of new state needs of development and security. ROC officials also attempted, but largely failed, to mobilise overseas Chinese against the CCP/PRC without jeopardising Taipei's diplomatic relations.

Chapters four and five argue that ROC officials domesticated their transnational connections with the Chinese diaspora to benefit their Cold War diplomatic interests, and state visions of unregulated transnationality as threatening to political security. The fourth chapter focusses on the efforts of ROC officials to promote 'good' transnationality, that is, to render diaspora policy a sphere of Cold War intrastate cooperation with their allies, including Malay(si)a, the RVN, and the US. Examples included joint initiatives in propaganda and political warfare. Yet, ROC officials also increasingly understood migration from Southeast Asia as a security and diplomatic threat in the context of the Cold War. The fifth chapter argues that ROC officials acted to restrict forms of 'bad' transnationality that conflicted with intrastate relations with the leaders of Saigon and Kuala Lumpur. Despite an initial moment of optimism after 1949 about the prospects of the overseas KMT, ROC officials recognised by the mid-1950s the unfavourable views by local governments of the KMT. Consequently, they downplayed and curtailed organisational and financial ties with the branches of the overseas KMT. Furthermore,

they increasingly reformulated their ties with political elites in both countries, ethnic Chinese or otherwise, to focus on promoting intrastate relations.

The third and final Part examines the role that issues around the overseas Chinese played in relations between the Republics of China and Vietnam, to elucidate how ROC officials resolved tensions between diaspora policy and Cold War Asian diplomacy in the latter's favour, and adapted the former to serve other state imperatives. The sixth chapter examines ROC responses to Ngo Dinh Diem's law of compulsory naturalisation in 1957, which affected most of the country's ethnic Chinese. It argues that ROC officials prioritised diplomatic relations with the RVN and the US above diaspora protection, although they downplayed these concessions in Chinese-language propaganda abroad. While ROC officials attempted to maintain informal ties with Chinese in Vietnam, particularly its elites, they regarded the return migration of Chinese who refused to naturalise with suspicion and ambivalence. The final chapter examines refugee settlements for the ethnic Chinese among the migrants from northern Vietnam to south after the 1954 Geneva Accords. It argues that these Free Villages were both exceptional to, and microcosmic of, this thesis' key arguments. Cold War diplomatic cooperation led the ROC government to briefly exercise co-sovereignty with the RVN in a time when the same diplomatic considerations largely led ROC officials to make concessions on diaspora issues. Yet, consistent with their overarching approach to overseas Chinese policy, ROC officials largely prized the propaganda value of the settlements above actual governance of the villagers, or encouraging their migration to Taiwan. Furthermore, as had been their approach in the other chapters of this thesis, ROC officials ultimately adopted a concessionary attitude when Saigon moved to assimilate the villages in its programme of nation-state building.

Part One: Diaspora Policy in Pursuit of Regional Power, 1945-9

Chapter One: Overseas Chinese Citizenship and Postwar China's Ambitions of Regional Leadership, 1945-9

ROC officials' efforts to secure rights of residence and citizenship in the post-Second World War years reflected the incorporation of their relationship with the Chinese diaspora into the pursuit of regional geopolitical power. This embrace of the 'insiders without' of the Chinese nation to elevate China's status in the world was marked by two key features. On one hand, ROC officials demanded equal treatment of Chinese nationals abroad as part of China's parity with the European colonial powers, a key aim of their postwar diplomacy. On the other, the Chinese diaspora was also understood as an agent of Chinese regional leadership and recipient of Chinese state patronage that were racially superior to other, local Asians. This chapter studies the efforts of ROC officials to pursue rights of residence and political participation for Chinese living in Malaya and Vietnam, while preserving their Chinese nationality. This development was particularly pronounced in the early postwar years from 1945 to 1947, before the tide of the Chinese Civil War turned against the KMT, and ROC officials were increasingly unable to intervene in diplomatic disputes abroad.

While the rights of the ethnic Chinese in Malaya and Vietnam became significant to ROC officials for different reasons, the latter devised a similarly assertive policy towards the citizenship rights of the overseas Chinese in both countries. As postwar Vietnam had a large Chinese military presence in the north, the rights of the Chinese diaspora were seen by KMT and Foreign Ministry officials not only through the perspective of state parity with France, but also through the lens of racialised geopolitics. Chinese diplomats pursued the right for the Chinese to continue their livelihoods in Vietnam as 'most-favoured nationals' while retaining their Chinese nationality, in the hope of making postwar Vietnam's politics more favourable

to ROC diplomatic interests. For diaspora affairs, KMT, and to a lesser extent Foreign Ministry officials, Malaya was important because of the large share of the population the ethnic Chinese constituted, and the Chinese community's strong historic relationship to the KMT. The ROC government attempted initially to press for dual Chinese/Malayan nationality for the Malayan Chinese, and rights of residence for Chinese who fell outside the definition of Malayan citizenship. By 1948 to 1949, ROC officials ambivalently navigated their relationship with the emergence of local, Malaya-oriented politics in the Chinese community.

The Emergence of Chinese Citizenship Issues in Postwar Malaya and Vietnam

With the end of the Second World War, the citizenship and residence rights of the ethnic Chinese in Malaya and Vietnam became increasingly problematic for colonial state elites. European powers like Britain and France devised new schemes of citizenship for their colonies, often ostensibly as preparation for eventual self-rule, but to resume and consolidate control in the short term.[84] The victorious powers in Europe were chiefly concerned with the problem of statelessness.[85] Yet, citizenship arrangements in Southeast Asia created a contrasting issue of dual nationality for the Chinese. Under Chinese nationality law since 1909, anyone of ethnic Chinese patrilineage was a Chinese national regardless of birthplace or residence, with limited recourse to renunciation.[86] While Chinese residents abroad were, regardless of citizenship, also subject to local colonial authority, their citizenship status in these late-colonial constitutional arrangements came into question. It was questionable whether they would be able to retain their livelihoods and rights while retaining their Chinese nationality; or whether they would

[84] Randall Hansen, "The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act," *20th Century British History* 10, no. 1 (1999): 67–95; James Genova, "Constructing Identity in Post-War France: Citizenship, Nationality, and the Lamine Guèye Law, 1946-1953," *International History Review* 26, no. 1 (2004): 56–79.
[85] Mira Siegelberg, *Statelessness: A Modern History* (Harvard University Press, 2020).
[86] Chutung Tsai, "The Chinese Nationality Law, 1909," *The American Journal of International Law* 4, no. 2 (1910): 404–11.

have to choose between naturalisation, repatriating to China, or living as an alien national with limited rights.

The citizenship and rights of the overseas Chinese stood at the intersection between Chinese state officials' intention to create modern, loyal citizens, and their efforts to establish equality with Euro-American world powers. For the US and victorious European powers, interwar arrangements of group rights for minority nationalities were no longer tenable because of the role that ethnic irredentism had played in causing the Second World War. Their solutions to these problems of dual nationality and ethnic heterogeneity were highly coercive; over 10 million Germans were expelled by Allied leaders and postwar Eastern and Central European governments in 1944 to 1946.[87] In Asia, up to 3 million Japanese, as well as Taiwanese settlers abroad who were later reclassified as ROC citizens, were repatriated from formerly Japanese-controlled territories.[88] The emerging postwar consensus on the right of all individuals to *a* nationality did little to provide an internationally agreeable framework to approach the nationality of the Chinese in Southeast Asia.[89]

Citizenship for the ethnic Chinese in Malaya and Vietnam was particularly contentious with the escalating racial-political conflict in Southeast Asia. Both the colonial powers and local ethno-nationalist leaders viewed ethnic Chinese demands for equal rights and citizenship with suspicion. As historians like John Dower and Gerald Horne have highlighted, the Anglo-American war effort against Japan was in one sense a race war against Asian (Japanese)

[87] Philipp Ther, "Ethnic Cleansing," in Dan Stone (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History*, (Oxford University Press, 2012), 152-8.
[88] Shu-Min Chung 鍾淑敏, *Rizhi shiqi zai Nanyang de Taiwanren* 日治時期在南洋的台灣人, (Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History 中央研究院臺灣史研究所, 2022); Lori Watt, "Imperial Remnant: The Repatriates in Postwar Japan," in Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (eds.), *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies*, (Taylor & Francis, 2005), 245-7.
[89] Mark Mazower, "The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950," *The Historical Journal* 47, no. 2 (2004): 379–98.

domination of the continent.[90] A growing historiography has highlighted the continuities of these racialised dynamics in international relations after the end of the Second World War. As historians such as Yui Chim Lo and Hao Chen have highlighted, Chiang Kai-Shek and other senior ROC diplomats sought to establish China as the leader of a postcolonial Asia that would chart its own path to modernity while cooperating with the West.[91] However, as Wen-Qing Ngoei has shown, officials in the US never fully lost the suspicion that a strengthened China, much like militarist Japan before it, might challenge Anglo-American dominance in Asia with the aid of the Chinese diaspora.[92]

Secondly, Southeast Asia's Second World War intensified racial hostilities between the Chinese and other local ethnicities. Two features of local nationalism in twentieth-century Southeast Asia meant that the ethnic Chinese were particularly problematic 'Others'. First, arrangements under colonial rule concentrated Chinese and other Asian migrants in the modern urban and commodity sectors of the economy, while native ethnicities were relegated to the agrarian sector.[93] Local nationalism in Southeast Asia stood in opposition to the resulting colonial and social perception that local ethnicities, such as Malay-speaking peoples in Indonesia and Malaya or Kinh (ethnic Vietnamese) in Vietnam, were 'lazy natives'.[94] Secondly, local nationalism in maritime Southeast Asia developed in the early twentieth century as Chinese nationalism asserted itself in the vernacular presses and mass politics of the Chinese diaspora, making the ethnic Chinese the main 'Other' to their imagined nations.[95] In

[90] Gerald Horne, *Race War: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire*, (New York University Press, 2004); John Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War,* (Pantheon Books, 1986).
[91] Yui Chim Lo, "Imagining the Continent's Future: China, India, and Post-War Asia, 1937-1949," (DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford, 2022); Hao Chen, "An Alternative Decolonisation: The Republic of China in the 1947 Asian Relations Conference".
[92] Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment*, 17-44.
[93] See eg Adam McKeown, "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 58, 2 (1999): 306–37; Wang Gungwu, "Greater China and the Chinese Overseas," *The China Quarterly* 136 (1993): 926–48.
[94] Syed Hussein Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism,* (Cass, 1977), 166-203.
[95] Anthony Reid, *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia,* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 49-80.

the case of Vietnam, a tension between cooperating with and resisting Chinese geopolitical, economic, and cultural influence preceded the colonial era, and could be politically mobilised for modern mass nationalism.[96] The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia intensified these divides by disproportionately repressing the ethnic Chinese while cooperating with collaborationist local nationalists, and weakened the ideological and material foundations of colonial rule.[97] In the postwar period, the future status of the Chinese community became more salient and more bitterly contested as racism intensified the geopolitical and ethnic conflicts in Southeast Asia, and colonial rule became increasingly challenged.

In postwar Malaya, colonial constitutional reforms brought the issue of Chinese nationality to significance. There were small numbers of Peranakans, ethnic Chinese of multigenerational, sometimes multiracial local descent, while most of the Chinese in Malaya and Singapore were born either in China or to more recent migrants. Consisting primarily of labourers but also of other social strata, the Chinese constituted around half of the population of Malaya and Singapore combined.[98] Colonial authorities extended British subjecthood only to the locally-born Chinese of the Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca, and Singapore.[99] However, in 1931, they devised a status of 'British Protected Person' for the Chinese who had been born in the rest of Malaya, which was under indirect rule through Malay sultans. This provided colonial authorities with legal authority over these Chinese, without extending British or Malayan citizenship to them. Lastly, those Malayan Chinese born in China remained Chinese nationals.[100] As the Whitehall government mooted the gradual withdrawal of colonial rule, a

[96] King Chen, *Vietnam and China, 1938-1954*, (Princeton University Press, 1969), 12.
[97] Gregg Huff, *World War II and Southeast Asia: Economy and Society under Japanese Occupation*, (Cambridge University Press, 2020), 48-83 and 399-422.
[98] Charles Hirschman, "Demographic Trends in Peninsular Malaysia, 1947-75," *Population and Development Review* 6, no. 1 (1980): 103–25.
[99] Albert Lau, "Malayan Union Citizenship: Constitutional Change and Controversy in Malaya, 1942–48," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 20, no. 2 (1989): 217.
[100] Ibid, 219.

new definition of Malayan citizenship was needed to square the desire of non-Malays, particularly the Chinese but also others like the Indians, to remain in Malaya and attain equality, with the views of Malay nationalists who saw these communities as unwelcome outsiders. As historians such as William Roff have pointed out, these different strands of Malay nationalism were variously predicated on the defense of traditional rulers' authority, efforts to reform Islamic faith, or secular nationhood not only from British colonial rule but from the demographic clout and political claims of the Chinese.[101]

In Vietnam, the status of the Chinese community formed part of an anti-colonial conflict with major implications for Asian geopolitics, rather than a mere constitutional debate. The ethnic Chinese of Vietnam were allowed to apply for subjecthood or protected person status under French Indochinese rule, but were not classified collectively as French subjects.[102] As in Malaya, the Chinese in Vietnam were divided between groups who had settled for longer, in the earliest cases dating back to the Ming dynasty, and more recent arrivals. However, even combined they amounted to only 10% of the population in total and so did not constitute a racial 'other' as visibly or to the same extent as in Malaya.[103] The status of overseas Chinese came onto the negotiating table when Republican Chinese forces occupied northern Vietnam in October 1945. Although Chinese occupation in the north and British occupation in the south ended Ho Chi Minh's nationalist August Revolution, Allied withdrawal was soon followed by renewed conflict between the Viet Minh and the French, turning into all-out war at the end of 1946.[104] Despite the friction between various Vietnamese nationalist movements and Chinese

[101] William Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism, 1900-1941*, (Yale University Press, 1967), 305 and 323-8.
[102] Chung-Ting Huang 黃宗鼎, "Dierci Shijie Dazhan hou Yuenan zhi Huaren zhengce 第二次世界大戰後越南之華人政策 (1945-2003)," (Master's Thesis, National Chengchi University, 2009), 34-5.
[103] Ibid, 32-3 and 35.
[104] Christopher Goscha, *The Road to Dien Bien Phu*, (Princeton University Press, 2022), 17-36.

in Vietnam, the former also had to be mindful of the need to secure Chinese support– from both the KMT and the CCP– for their aims.[105]

Racialised Geopolitics and National Status: ROC Demands for Chinese Nationality in Postwar Vietnam

Within this context, ROC officials envisioned the large populations of Chinese nationals abroad as part of their regional geopolitical power. KMT party cadres and OCAC officials, with their closer connections to ethnic Chinese living abroad, frequently saw expansive rights for the Chinese diaspora as part of China's dominance of Asia. They frequently connected the rights of the Chinese diaspora to China's state interests, and understood the overseas Chinese as racially superior and natural allies of Chinese state power abroad. On the other hand, the officials of the Foreign Ministry were more concerned with asserting China's parity to the European powers through securing equal treatment for overseas Chinese to French metropolitan nationals.

In their discussion of the future of the Chinese minority in postwar Vietnam, some officials in the KMT saw the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam through a racial-geopolitical lens; racial prejudice overlapped strongly with ambitions of regional diplomatic leadership. Among the countries of postwar Southeast Asia, Republican China arguably held the most sway over Vietnam because of its direct military presence there. In late August 1945, the Yunnan clique warlord Lu Han 盧漢 led a large ROC force to occupy the territories north of Tonkin.[106] Lu wanted to

[105] Min Luo, "Chiang Kai-Shek and Vietnam's Post-World War II Status," *Journal of Modern Chinese History* 9, no. 1 (2015): 26–45; King Chen, *Vietnam and China, 1938-1954*, 99-210; Xiaorong Han, "Revolution Knows No Boundaries? Chinese Revolutionaries in North Vietnam during the Early Years of the First Indochina War," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 52, no. 2 (2021): 246–74.
[106] King Chen, *Vietnam and China*, 120.

immediately install a pro-ROC Vietnamese nationalist government in the occupied territories; Chiang Kai-Shek hoped to use this newfound leverage to end the concessions France enjoyed in China and in Sino-Vietnamese cross-border trade, while moving gradually towards Vietnamese independence.[107] Although the relationship and consequences between these different policy directions are historiographically contested, both the KMT national government and Lu's forces substantially aided Vietnamese nationalists, including both their clients the Viet Quoc, and, partly inadvertently, Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh.[108]

As Chinese forces occupied northern Vietnam, the Foreign Ministry understood the protection of ethnic Chinese primarily through the lens of equality with French nationals. In September 1945 officials in the Foreign Ministry met with KMT leaders in Vietnam; a leader of the KMT in Vietnam named Lin Zechen 林澤臣 raised the issues of releasing the 'arrested party (KMT) and national-salvation activists'[109] and the Chinese's 'right to purchase land'.[110] Another participant named Chen Yiqiang 陳毅強 called for 'abolition of the head tax'.[111] As a condition for the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnam, the 1946 Sino-French agreement established the principle of 'most-favoured nationals' for the two governments' treatment of each other's citizens.[112] The multitude of proposed objections to these different restrictions on the ethnic Chinese reflected the position that China's status as a postwar power meant its nationals must be treated equally to European colonisers.

[107] Ibid, 118-9.
[108] Ibid, 117-32; Goscha, *The Road to Dien Bien Phu*, 60-6 and 91-104.
[109] Gaishan Yuenan qiaobao diwei wenti yantaohui 改善越南僑胞地位問題研討會, Sep 13 1945. Yuenan wenti 越南問題 (3), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Department of Asian and Pacific Affairs (DAPA), AH. 020-011001-0030, 67.
[110] Ibid, 68.
[111] Ibid, 69.
[112] [In Chinese] Letter from MFA to Executive Yuan, Feb 13 1946. Zhong-Fa qianding pingdeng xinyue an 中法簽訂平等新約案, Executive Yuan (EY), AH. 014-020200-0026, 24; Weizhen Yang, "Postwar Sino-French Negotiations about Vietnam, 1945– 1946," in Diana Lary, Hans van de Ven, and Stephen MacKinnon (eds.), *Negotiating China's Destiny in World War II*, (Stanford University Press, 2020), 205–19 for the analysis of other clauses of the agreement.

By contrast, some cadres of the KMT intelligence agency Zhongtong 中統 believed the ROC's relationship with the diaspora went beyond an assertion of Chinese equality to European powers, and was a racial-political instrument of Chinese political control over Vietnam. One example was Tan Kok Chor 陳國礎, a Vietnam-born businessman, owner of a pro-KMT newspaper, and KMT activist who oversaw the activities of KMT branches in Southeast Asia before and during the Second World War. After the Japanese invasion of Vietnam, he fled to China where he advised the KMT leadership on overseas affairs.[113] In a November 1945 report addressed to Chiang Kai-Shek through the Zhongtong intelligence agency, Tan described Vietnam as China's former 'tributary and buffer' (*pingfan*) [114] who had long regarded China as 'masters of their country (*guozhu*)', and only 'forgot their roots (*wangzu*)' because of French and Japanese incitement.[115] Tan adopted a racist doctrine of the ethnic Chinese as powerful allies who could help make Vietnam a Chinese protectorate in all but name. According to Tan, the Minh Huong 明鄉—a Vietnamese term that traditionally referred to Chinese who had intermarried with Vietnamese, but which also denoted locally-born Chinese more broadly—were 'by virtue of their bloodline, more outstanding than the natives (*turen*)'. They needed to be 'reconciled (*huairou*)' into the Chinese-led order, a term in Chinese history typically used to describe a state's generous treatment of wayward tributaries or minorities. They should be 'invited to travel back to China to learn of their motherland's greatness' and 'subsidised to study there to bathe them in the motherland's culture'. Their role was to 'turn Vietnam into a tributary in all but name, and a buffer', and were 'key to our designs for the entire century'.[116]

[113] Bowei Jiang 江柏煒, "Zuiyi aiguo Huaqiao Chen Guochu 追憶愛國華僑陳國礎," *Kinmen Ribao* 金門日報, Jul 23 2023. Accessed Jan 1 2024 at https://www.kmdn.gov.tw/1117/1271/1275/557015/.
[114] [In Chinese] Letter from Tan Kok Chor to Chiang Kai-Shek, Dec 11 1945. 020-011001-0030, 162.
[115] Ibid, 166.
[116] Ibid, 168.

For the 'Chinese compatriots', the focus was on ensuring that their 'more favorable treatment than other alien nationals' could continue.[117]

In contrast to these more bellicose geopolitical ambitions, most ROC officials appeared to focus on the near-term goals of making diaspora policy serve Chinese geopolitical ambitions in Vietnam. The Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnamese Nationalist Party, Viet Quoc) was a nationalist party inspired by the KMT in China, which occupied a few territories in northern Vietnam briefly in the period 1945-7 with the support of Chinese forces, before they were suppressed and marginalised under Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic.[118] In June 1946, the KMT Central Committee wrote to the Foreign Ministry on behalf of Viet Quoc leader Vu Hong Khanh. The latter had complained that some Chinese in Lao Cai cited 'instructions relayed through the Consulate from the Chinese military headquarters' to not pay tax. Moreover, the Chinese in Lao Cai and two adjoining regions, after being 'permitted to set up autonomous local committees' by the Chinese occupation forces, now 'hoisted the Chinese flag'. They 'claimed Vietnam to be a part of China's territory'. According to the KMT Central Committee, this was detrimental to the Viet Quoc, which had long received the 'patronage' of the KMT.[119] Communicating its response to the Foreign Ministry, the Military Affairs Commission 軍事委員會 clarified it was responding to the 'unprecedented' taxes levied by the Viet Quoc to raise revenue for itself.[120] The Military Affairs Commission evidently saw a need to protect the ethnic Chinese from its own clients, and made little concrete response on the question of pro-Chinese annexation sentiments. Like their counterparts in the Foreign Ministry and KMT

[117] Ibid, 168-9.
[118] King Chen, *Vietnam and China*, 1-3.
[119] [In Chinese] Letter from KMT Central Executive Committee Secretariat 國民黨中央委員會秘書處 to MFA, Jun 14 1946. Yuenan Huaqiao nashui 越南華僑納稅 (1), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011007-0122, 36.
[120] [In Chinese] Letter from Military Affairs Commission General Staff to MFA, Jun 29 1946. Ibid, 48.

leadership, they were primarily interested in ensuring that protection of the ethnic Chinese and the ROC's geopolitical clout in northern Vietnam did not conflict with each other.

The withdrawal of Lu Han's forces in February 1946, finishing by August, meant that the ROC government no longer had tangible military threats to support its demands to colonial authorities.[121] Yet, ROC diplomats still saw a strong connection between the status of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam within the colonial racial hierarchy, and China's efforts to assert its equality to France and other European powers in the international system. In one December 1945 report to his superiors, Consul to Saigon Yin Fengzao 尹鳳藻 outlined his work improving on the preferential treatment Chinese received as 'non-Vietnamese Asians' in the prewar colonial order, as they should now receive 'most-favoured nation' status equal to the French.[122] Yin's perspective that overseas Chinese nationals' rights were a matter of parity between China and European powers like France was made clear in several issues he raised. The first was the treatment of prisoners, as Yin detailed how Chinese prisoners were treated worse than the 'native' prisoners. They allegedly had the same 'housing and food' as the latter but were in the minority in the prisons and therefore prone to Kinh attacks and abuse by guards. He said there was a difference of 'heaven and earth' in their treatment compared to the 'European and American prisoners', and that the Foreign Ministry should ensure the latter was the standard for Chinese prisoners.[123]

The second was fingerprinting. Like many other societies in the postwar world, colonial authorities in French Indochina associated the restoration of political control with identifying and controlling population movements, particularly given its increasing state of instability and

[121] King Chen, *Vietnam and China*, 145-53.
[122] [In Chinese] Letter from Yin Fengzao to MFA, nd. Zhong-Fa guanyu Zhong-Yue guanxi zhi xieding 中法關於中越關係之協定(2), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011002-0015, 193.
[123] Ibid, 212.

war.[124] Zhongtong took issue with these new regulations; in May 1946, its Vietnam station complained that the treatment of Chinese entrants into Vietnam was degrading. Chinese entering Vietnam now had both their fingerprints taken, a treatment supposedly fit only for common criminals and 'people of a fallen country (*wangguo zhi guomin*)'.[125] Yin Fengzao's response illustrates the centrality of parity with Western powers in his thinking. In his December 1945 brief for the Sino-French negotiations, he described the fingerprinting of one hand's fingerprints in the coolie houses for Chinese migrants as a 'degrading' treatment.[126] Yet, Yin now suggested that fingerprinting of both hands was unproblematic because it was imposed for all arrivals into Vietnam, including the British and French, who lacked identity papers, and waived for those with valid passports.[127] The importance of intrastate parity to Yin's considerations was seen in how the egalitarian wording, if not the substance, of the fingerprinting policy satisfied him. Yin devoted little attention to the fact that many Chinese had lost their identity papers during the Second World War; while this was also true of some Europeans in Asia such as refugees, it would almost certainly not have applied to French colonial and military officials.

In particular, the Minh Huong nationality dispute of 1946-8 saw Chinese officials approach Chinese nationality disputes with the aim of extending citizenship to ethnic Chinese as an instrument of diplomatic power. Their proposal of 'free selection' reflected a symbolic concession to the French while allowing most of the ethnic Chinese to become Chinese nationals. By contrast, as this thesis will argue, the discourse of free selection would serve a reverse purpose by the 1950s after the ROC retreated to Taiwan. In June 1946, French

[124] For the broader international context to migration controls see eg John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*, (Cambridge University Press, 2018).
[125] [In Chinese] Letter from Zhongtong to MFA, May 18 1946. 020-011007-0122, 20.
[126] [In Chinese] Savingram from Yin Fengzao to MFA, nd. 020-011002-0015, 208.
[127] [In Chinese] Savingram from Yin Fengzao to MFA, Apr 23 1946. 020-011007-0122, 25.

authorities proposed naturalising the Minh Huong as French Indochinese citizens as voters for the upcoming elections for the Associated States of Indochina. According to the ROC Foreign Ministry, this was merely a pretense to expand the scope of colonial subjecthood and to reduce the number of Chinese nationals, who might be protected by the ROC government; here, the term 'Minh Huong' extended to anyone born in Vietnam to Vietnamese matrilineage.[128]

In their communications with the Foreign Ministry, Vietnam's KMT leaders advocated ROC intervention on the grounds that the Chinese diaspora was an arm of ROC geopolitical clout that must be defended. Hanoi branch Standing Committee members Zhang Yiwen 張以文 and Feng Shufang 馮樹芳 wrote to Foreign Minister Wang Shijie 王世杰 that the Chinese in Vietnam were 'a key component of China's outer fence' (*pingfan*) of geopolitical influence. They claimed that diaspora (*qiaomin*) was the 'outer lifeline' of a country and a 'focus of struggle on the world stage', comparable to the situation of ethnic Germans in the Sudetenland and western Poland, and the Balkan nationality question.[129] These analogies with the ethnic conflicts that had caused World War One and Two showed that Zheng and Feng understood Chinese nationality in Vietnam as part of China's assertion of racial and national supremacy in Asia.

While the officials of the Foreign Ministry and OCAC did not espouse similar rhetoric, they devised a counter-proposal to the French authorities of free selection of nationality that, in practice, would extend ROC nationality to most Chinese in Vietnam. On October 16 1946, a meeting was conducted between representatives of the KMT Overseas Affairs Department 國

[128] Mingxiang guoji wenti zuotanhui jilu 明鄉國籍問題談話會記錄, Oct 17 1946. Yuenan Mingxiang wenti ji Huaqiao guoji 越南明鄉問題及華僑國籍(1), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011007-0073, 28-30.
[129] [In Chinese] Letter from Zhang Yiwen and Feng Shufang to Wang Shijie, nd. Ibid, 15.

民黨海外部, Foreign Ministry, OCAC and Legislative Yuan. Chinese envoy to Vietnam Ling Qihan 凌其瀚 suggested that free selection had been agreed upon during the Sino-French negotiations and was supported by the ethnic Chinese. Ling suggested to the KMT Overseas Affairs Department, which was curious about how the Chinese would exercise their choice, that he anticipated naturalisation numbers to be low because the Sino-French agreement gave Chinese nationals rights equal to the French, and therefore above the Vietnamese.[130] This response satisfied all the attending officials, who also agreed those who chose Indochinese subjecthood could have their renunciation of nationality expedited. However, Interior Minister Zhang Lisheng 張厲生, a veteran party leader of the KMT, emphasised that the Foreign Ministry could make clear that the case of the Minh Huong was 'exceptional', as free selection should only be implemented by intrastate agreement.[131] The geopolitical basis for a favourable negotiation with France did not exist in the other sites of Chinese migration, where it might be much more difficult to develop or enforce a 'most-favoured national' agreement.

The OCAC's position reflected genuine confidence that the ethnic Chinese recognised the prestige and benefits of Chinese nationality. In late 1946, when China's retreat from Vietnam was still comparatively recent, French colonial authorities appeared less prone to aggravate the ROC with forced naturalisation. It was only in 1948 to 1949, when the KMT's international prestige deteriorated alongside its position on the Mainland, that colonial measures to compel naturalisation became bolder. At this point, local consulates documented numerous incidents of forcible reclassification of the status of ethnic Chinese.[132] Another common colonial tactic was the imposition of various administrative charges when Chinese nationals requested

[130] Mingxiang guoji wenti zuotanhui jilu. Op. cit., 29.
[131] [In Chinese] Letter from Zhang Lisheng to MFA, Nov 9 1946. Ibid, 95-6.
[132] [In Chinese] Telegram from Yunnan Provincial Government to MFA, Sep 29 1948. Yuenan Mingxiang wenti ji Huaqiao guoji 越南明鄉問題及華僑國籍 (2), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011007-0074, 42-3; [In Chinese] Telegram from General Consulate in Hanoi to MFA, Nov 17 1948. Ibid, 102-110.

documentation for their alien status.[133] By mid-1948, the French High Commission was sufficiently confident of the ROC government's weakness that it simply rejected the proposal for free selection outright. It also claimed that clause for equal treatment of Chinese and French citizens in the 1946 agreement merely meant Chinese equality to French Indochinese *subjects*.[134]

The absence of voices from ethnic Chinese, whether recent migrants or Minh Huong, in the ROC archives makes it difficult to ascertain their views of the nationality law. At least from Chinese consular sources, however, it appears that most Chinese were resistant to the colonial naturalisation programme. One September 1948 report from the Yunnan Provincial Government under Lu Han, whose forces had briefly occupied northern Vietnam, suggested that 'twenty-eight Chinese compatriots' in the border town of Lao Cai had their 'Chinese compatriot nationality documents confiscated'. They were issued instead with 'Minh Huong ethnicity identification cards', and the Chinese 'broke down in tears upon hearing of this'.[135] This predicament extended to 'one hundred thousand' individuals who could be classified as Minh Huong, which the French authorities now defined as anyone born in Vietnam before 1931 with non-Chinese matrinilineage.[136] A similar incident of Chinese in the jurisdiction of the Haiphong Consulate being forced to receive 'Nguoi Nung classification', another ethnic identity denoting naturalisation, was reported by Consul-General to Hanoi Jiang Shuoqing 江碩慶 to the Foreign Ministry in May that year.[137] According to Chinese consular reports, Chinese nationality was also apparently coveted by some ethnic Vietnamese. In May 1948,

[133] Telegram from General Consulate in Hanoi to MFA, Oct 5 1948. MFA, DAPA, AH. Yuenan Huaqiao nashui 越南華僑納稅 (3). 020-011007-0124, 7-9.

[134] MFA Department of European Affairs (DEA) Second Section 外交部歐二科. Mingxiang guoji wenti 明鄉國籍問題, Jun 1 1948. 020-011007-0074, 30.

[135] Yunnan Provincial Government to MFA, Sep 29 1948. Ibid, 42.

[136] Ibid, 43.

[137] [In Chinese] Savingram from Jiang Shuoqing to MFA, May 26 1948. Ibid, 60.

Jiang described how a Vietnamese woman in Hanoi with a Chinese-national husband had 'taken a [Chinese] alias' to make a fraudulent claim for Chinese nationality earlier in the year.[138] It appeared that many continued to prefer the benefits of consular protection and rights for Chinese nationals, however unevenly they were respected.

From Dual Nationality to Local Political Participation: Changing ROC Attitudes to Malayan Chinese Citizenship

In Malaya, the ROC government pursued dual Chinese and Malayan nationality for the Chinese as the colony approached decolonisation. Like their counterparts involved in Chinese diaspora affairs in Vietnam, ROC officials often asserted both Chinese claims of intrastate equality to Britain and the racial superiority of the Malayan Chinese above other ethnicities. In addition, the Malayan Chinese's demographic clout and longstanding ties to the KMT in China meant that Malaya was home to one of the most organised overseas KMT movements. While the ROC military and security forces had no real capacity for force projection in Malaya, the OCAC had strong links with overseas Chinese leaders, including in Malaya, and sought to protect the interests of the ethnic Chinese.[139] The two OCAC Ministers in the postwar period, Chen Shuren 陳樹人 (1932-47) and Liu Weichi 劉維熾 (1947-8), both had extensive connections to overseas KMT activism. Chen was a prominent painter who had been a close ally of Sun Yat-Sen and an overseas KMT activist in Japan and Canada in the 1910s-20s.[140] During World War Two, he headed up the fundraising effort targeting overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.[141] Liu's

[138] Ibid, 58.
[139] Ying-Hui Lee, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzu zhuyi* provides an institutional and policy history of the OCAC; see Chin Fatt Yong, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya,* for specific discussion of Malaya.
[140] Chushu He 何初树, *Jinjian yujie: Chen Shuren xiaozhuan* 金坚玉洁:陈树人小传, (Lingnan meishu chubanshe 岭南美术出版社, 2015), 26-7.
[141] Ibid, 49-59.

involvement with the KMT began as a student in Hawaii, and he was the head of the KMT's Overseas Department during World War Two.[142] To them, Chinese nationality was central to the political relationship between the Malayan Chinese and China. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry also paid close attention to the constitutional structure of Malaya as it approached decolonisation.

Liu's wartime writings in the *Huaqiao Xianfeng* 華僑先鋒 (Overseas Chinese Vanguard) and *Xinshenglu Yuekan* 新生路月刊 (New Life Monthly), two journals associated with the KMT and its overseas affairs apparatus, showed how aspirations to both a modern citizenry and Chinese state power in postwar Asia shaped his view of diaspora policy. The two ambitions intersected with each other in his claims that overseas Chinese must be treated equally as the nationals of European powers, while simultaneously accepting and following the ROC's policies on the Mainland. For example, in 1943 he penned an article named 'Encouragement of Our Overseas Compatriots Regarding the Abolition of Unequal Treaties' in *Huaqiao Xianfeng*. Liu suggested that agreements between China and the UK and US signified 'fundamental resolution of our hundred-year entrapment and pain of our people' and a 'new epoch' of Chinese history.[143] Because it was finally on a footing of 'equality' and 'friendship' with other world powers, China would be able to 'intervene and correct, one by one', the 'unreasonable constraints of immigration laws' and 'legal discrimination in countries of residence' for the overseas Chinese.[144] In other pieces, he exhorted the overseas Chinese to reciprocate with political loyalty to the KMT and ROC. In one piece on the 'Review and Future of Overseas Work since the Anti-Japanese War', Liu exhorted the overseas Chinese to unite

[142] OCAC. 'Liren shouzhang jianjie 歷任首長簡介', *OCAC*, nd. Accessed Oct 29 2024 at https://web.archive.org/web/20110516112633/http://www.ocac.gov.tw/public/public.asp?selno=5024&no=5024&level=C#a2.
[143] Weichi Liu, "Wei quxiao bupingdeng tiaoyue mianli haiwai qiaobao 為取消不平等條約勉勵海外僑胞," *Huaqiao Xianfeng* 5, no. 2 (1943): 5.
[144] Ibid, 6.

under 'the leadership of the highest leader [Chiang] and the 'Three Principles of the People'[145]; Liu repeated similar remarks in the *Xinshenglu Yuekan* in 1947 after his appointment.[146]

The first British attempt to resolve the questions around citizenship in the postwar period, the Malayan Union proposal, was developed in October 1945 and announced in January 1946. The Malayan Union proposal deviated from the prewar colonial state's favourable treatment of the Malays, by promising Malayan citizenship on a *jus soli* basis to all those born in Malaya or Singapore, and those who had lived in Malaya for ten years or more. Many ethnic Chinese business elites regarded this proposal with ambivalence as they were reluctant to give up their Chinese nationality, while the left-wing Malayan Communists viewed the Malayan Union as a distraction from decolonisation.[147] More importantly, the scheme was almost immediately opposed by right-wing Malay nationalists such as the United Malays National Organisation, who opposed increased rights for who they saw as alien minorities.[148] For the officials of the OCAC and Foreign Ministry, the Malayan Union proposal was primarily objectionable because it would deprive the Chinese in Malaya of their nationality, and by extension their equality with British nationals. According to the European Affairs department of the Foreign Ministry, the 1943 Sino-British Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights in China promised equal treatment for each country's nationals in territories governed by the other. That dual Chinese-Malayan nationality was not explicitly recognised in the Malayan Union proposal, while dual British-Malayan nationality was allowed, 'was not without contravention' of this agreement.[149] As in with the Sino-French negotiations over Indochina, rights for the

[145] Weichi Liu, "Kangzhan yilai haiwai gongzuo de huigu yu qianzhan 抗戰以來海外工作的回顧與前瞻," *Huaqiao Xianfeng* 5, no. 7 (1943): 61.
[146] Weichi Liu, 'Dui qiaobao qiwang yu qiaobao zeren 對僑胞期望與僑胞責任,' *Xinshenglu Yuekan* 13, no. 4 (1947): 2.
[147] [In Chinese] Savingram from General Consulate in Singapore to MFA, Aug 25 1946. Malaiya (Malaixiya) lianbang 馬來亞（馬來西亞）聯邦 (1), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-010601-0006, 86-7.
[148] Albert Lau, "Malayan Union Citizenship," 227-30.
[149] MFA DEA First Section 外交部歐一科. Wei Malaiya gongmin yu feigongmin butong zhi dian chaocheng youguan tiaowen yi hedui you 為馬來亞公民與非公民權利不同之點抄呈有關條文以核對由, May 29 1946. Ibid, 28.

overseas Chinese were understood through the lens of wartime agreements that promised equality between China and the European powers. OCAC Minister Chen Shuren also suggested that 'our country's diplomacy … economy, and the future of our millions of Chinese compatriots' were at stake.[150]

The ROC Foreign Ministry was even more strongly opposed to the Federation of Malaya citizenship plan, which was devised in 1947 in response to Malay-nationalist demands. The new citizenship regime imposed greater restrictions on Malayan citizenship, which effectively excluded most of the Chinese who were born in the Malay states (that is, excluding Penang and Malacca), and most of those born outside Malaya.[151] For the OCAC and Foreign Ministry, not only the ban on dual nationality but the limited citizenship rights for the Chinese were particularly problematic. On December 5 1947, representatives of the OCAC and Foreign Ministry agreed to advocate for measures to make Malayan citizenship more accessible to the Chinese. These included an oral rather than written Malay or English language test, a *jus soli* regime for all non-Malays born in Malaya, and demands for citizenship law to be legislated through a democratic Malayan legislature.[152] Some ROC officials were alarmed by the exclusion of Singapore from the Malayan Union, although the OCAC and Foreign Ministry agreed that this matter was 'the autonomy of the local government in administrative subdivisions' and not for them to interfere.[153] However, in June 1948 Consul-General to Kuala Lumpur Li Qin 李琴 suggested, largely correctly, that 'our compatriots were most numerous in Singapore, and its exclusion from the Federation of Malaya [by the British] serves only to

[150] [In Chinese] Letter from Chen Shuren to MFA, Jul 13 1946. Ibid, 56.
[151] Albert Lau, "Malayan Union Citizenship," 239-40; General Consulate in Singapore to MFA, Aug 25 1946, op. cit.
[152] Hansong Malaiya xinxianfa cao'an duice huiyi jiulu xi chazhao you 函送馬來亞新憲法草案對策會議紀錄希查照由, Dec 5 1947. Malaiya (Malaixiya) Lianbang xinxianzhi 馬來亞（馬來西亞）聯邦新憲制 (1), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-010601-0008, 56-8.
[153] Ibid, 58.

weaken their clout'. This would pave the road to 'discrimination' and 'high-handed treatment' for the overseas Chinese.[154] The organisation of Malaya as a Malay-majority polity excluding Chinese-majority Singapore later allowed a Malay-nationalist political arrangement to take root in the former.

In response to the Federation proposal, the Chinese consulates in Singapore and Malaya covertly mobilised pro-KMT Chinese groups against the citizenship plan in a general strike on November 5 1947, which engaged many of the Chinese in Malaya and Singapore.[155] The remarks that OCAC Minister Liu Weichi gave on the day of the strike to the ROC's mouthpiece, *Central Daily News* 中央日報, illustrated that he understood the political status of the Malayan Chinese as connected to the Chinese state's clout over Malaya. Liu described the ROC's relationship to the Chinese in Malaya in national-citizenship, racial, and political terms. He described them as 'overseas Chinese compatriots', and objected not only to the citizenship scheme, but also the under-representation of Chinese in the Legislative Assembly, the transfer of immigration powers to the Malay Sultans, and the separation of Singapore from Malaya which. He claimed that while the latter measures were 'ostensibly unrelated to the Chinese compatriots', in practice they would 'make the Chinese in Malaya a minority nationality'. He further invoked narratives of the Chinese as pioneers in Malaya, lauding their 'world-recognised and great contributions'. He emphasised that the constitutional arrangements of the Malayan Union were vital not only to the Malayan Chinese themselves, but rather the 'Chinese nation' as well.[156] The Malayan Chinese were simultaneously portrayed as ROC nationals, a component of Malayan society that should hold more political power, and a virtuous and diligent ethnicity that was integral to Malaya's development.

[154] [In Chinese] Letter from Li Qin to MFA, Jun 2 1948. Ibid, 76.
[155] [In Chiense] Telegraph from DEA First Section to Consulate in Singapore, Aug 11 1947. Ibid, 8.
[156] "Malai Lianbang xianzhang dui woqiao buli 馬來聯邦憲章對我僑不利," *Central Daily News,* Nov 5 1947. Malaiya (Malaixiya) Lianbang 馬來亞（馬來西亞）聯邦 (2), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-010601-0007, 5.

Liu's hardline position was further illustrated by his intransigence in the face of critical comments from ethnic Chinese in Singapore, and even from the Foreign Ministry. Lee Kong Chian 李光前, Tan Kah Kee 陳嘉庚's son and leader of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, slammed Liu's remarks as external comments on Malaya's internal affairs, and not to be conflated with the views of Chinese leaders in Malaya.[157] When the Foreign Ministry tried to rein in Liu's remarks, Liu further elaborated on his understanding that all ethnic Chinese had an obligation of loyalty to China. Liu depicted British influence and Communist agitation as equally threatening to ROC interests in Malaya.[158] Although Liu ceased to make incendiary remarks in public, he emphasised to the Foreign Ministry that his critics were disloyal to China. He described Lee Kong Chian as a 'loyalist to an alien regime' with 'no sense of nation'. He attacked the Malayan Democratic Union, a party of Anglophone, left-wing Malayan Chinese which had also criticised him, as having 'forgotten its roots and collaborating with foreign forces' to 'divide the overseas Chinese from their government'.[159] They were supposedly both 'under the thumb of the Malayan Communist Party' and trying to 'curry favour with the British authorities'.[160]

The November general strike failed to change the Federation citizenship plan and accelerated Malayan Chinese elites' efforts to secure citizenship rights in Malaya, rather than maintain relations with China.[161] This development was understood by ROC officials and leaders with ambivalence. When briefed on the Malayan nationality issue in January 1948, Chiang Kai-Shek suggested in his personal papers that the Malayan Chinese need not oppose the Federation

[157] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Wu Bosheng to MFA, Nov 14 1947. AH, 020-010601-0008, 16-8.
[158] [In Chinese] Letter from MFA to OCAC, Nov 17 1947. Ibid, 13.
[159] [In Chinese] Letter from Liu Weichi to MFA, Dec 15 1947. Ibid, 50.
[160] Ibid, 51.
[161] Richard Stubbs, "The United Malays National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association, and the Early Years of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1955," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 10, no. 1 (1979): 77–88; Hara, *Malayan Chinese and China*.

citizenship plan, but should rather participate in local politics and advance their 'rights and welfare' there.[162] From the distribution of archival material about overseas Chinese issues, it can be seen that Chiang and other senior ROC leaders were rarely closely involved in the ROC's diplomacy towards Malaya. Chiang seemed unenthused about pursuing the dead end of dual nationality, and largely positive about the prospect of Malayan Chinese advancing their communal interests through participating in local politics. ROC consuls in Malaya and Singapore seemed to gravitate similarly between encouraging the increasing local focus of Malayan Chinese politics, and regarding ethnic Chinese political organisations as an arm of ROC influence abroad. This uncertainty deepened in 1949 with the KMT's setbacks on the Mainland, and the intensification of colonial Malayan counterinsurgency measures targeting the Chinese.

Some ROC consuls appeared to regard the growing movement of Malayan Chinese to secure political rights as a positive alternative to the untenable option of preserving Chinese nationality. In January 1948, Consul-General to Kuala Lumpur Kuang Da 鄺達 pointed out that 'interference by Nanjing' was now regarded unfavourably by the Chinese in Malaya who were striving for equal citizenship.[163] Instead, the future laid in different ethnic political elites' cooperation to build a multicultural, democratic Malaya.[164] One of the key figures who represented this strand of Chinese politics was Tan Cheng Lock 陳禎祿, a UK-educated, fifth-generation Peranakan Chinese and a leader in the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action which organised the November strike. While Consul to Penang Li Nenggeng 李能梗 and Wu Bosheng 伍伯勝 were critical of his leftist leanings, which they regarded as adjacent to the

[162] Jiang Zhongzheng zhuchi Guowu huiyi 蔣中正主持國務會議. Chiang Kai-Shek's Collections: Chronological Events 蔣中正總統文物事略稿本, Minguo sanshiqi nian yiyue 民國三十七年一月 (2), AH. 002-060100-00233-008, 1.
[163] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Kuang Da to MFA, Jan 1 1948. AH, 020-010601-0008, 76.
[164] Ibid, 73-81.

Malayan Communist Party, both spoke positively of his efforts to promote a political order based on racial equality.[165] Wu also suggested in 1948 that while the decision of business elites and civil servants to give up Chinese nationality was a 'sacrifice', naturalisation would nevertheless bring them more benefits in the future.[166]

In contrast to the role that it had played in ROC officials' analyses just one or two years ago, racial prejudice against so-called 'lazy natives' was now invoked to suggest that because the ethnic Chinese were superior, they did not require active intervention by the ROC to prosper. In a May 1948 report to the Foreign Ministry, Li Qin suggested that the Malays were 'low in intellect', and 'reliant on British patronage for political power'. [167] Yet, it was precisely the racial superiority of the Chinese that meant they would be able to thrive without Chinese nationality or the patronage of China. Li suggested that because of the Malays' 'laziness, stupidity, and lack of skills', even economic policies to promote Malay ownership of the economy would only result in arrangements that preserved Chinese ownership in practice.[168]

At the same time, the same ROC diplomats still sometimes held on to the idea of Malayan Chinese politics as an extension of China's national interest, even as the KMT's hold on the Mainland entered its final stages in 1949. In response to the increasingly high-handed British colonial response to the Malayan Emergency, as well as the ongoing citizenship dispute, Chinese business elites formed the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in February 1949. At this stage, it was envisioned as a non-Communist ethnic organisation revolving primarily around the protecting Chinese from Emergency excesses rather than a political party, but still

[165] [In Chinese] Wu Bosheng to MFA, Nov 13 1947. AH, 020-010601-0007, 17-9; [In Chinese] Savingram from Li Nenggeng to MFA, Jan 5 1948. AH, 020-010601-0008, 122-8.
[166] [In Chinese] Letter from Wu Bosheng to MFA, Feb 23 1948. Ibid, 204.
[167] [In Chinese] Savingram from Kuang Da to MFA, May 12 1948. Malaiya (Malaixiya) Lianbang xinxianzhi 馬來亞（馬來西亞）聯邦新憲制 (2), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-010601-0009, 78.
[168] Ibid, 81.

represented the first major attempt at uniting Chinese across ethnicity, region, and dialect group to pursue equitable treatment.[169]

Kuala Lumpur Consul-General Li Qin appeared to respond to the MCA's formation with a mix of expectation that it could serve China's interests, and acceptance that it represented the increasingly local orientation of Malayan Chinese politics. In his speech on Feb 27 at the MCA's founding conference, Li stated that although the Malayan Chinese saw Malaya as their home of permanent residence, they should not forget 'the motherland's limitless concern for … sojourning compatriots overseas';[170] the loss of the motherland to the Chinese Communist Party could only mean loss of status for both local- and China-born Chinese.[171] However, Li also counselled the Foreign Ministry that the MCA was nothing like traditional Chinese diaspora associations, as it saw Malaya as a 'second homeland'[172] and targeted Chinese who wanted to stake out their livelihood in Malaya over the long term.[173] It would be unwise to expect too much out of the MCA. The uncertainty and ambivalence amongst ROC diplomats in Malaya was further demonstrated by the more active approach taken by other consuls to support the MCA. The papers of Tan Cheng Lock, a founding leader of the MCA, show that Consul in Ipoh Ibrahim Ma (Ma Tianying 馬天英) urged the local Chinese leaders he knew to support Tan's efforts.[174]

[169] For a more detailed examination of the MCA's trajectory from organisation protecting Chinese in the Emergency to a political party see Pek Koon Heng, *Chinese Politics in Malaysia*; Fujio Hara, *Malayan Chinese and China*.
[170] [In Chinese] Savingram from Li Qin to MFA, Mar 11 1949. Zuzhi Malai Huaren Gonghui 組織馬來華人公會, MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-010607-0047, 18.
[171] Ibid, 19.
[172] [In Chinese] Savingram from Li Qin to MFA, Feb 25 1949. Ibid, 25.
[173] Ibid, 22.
[174] K. G. Tregonning, "Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan Nationalist," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 10, no. 1 (1979): 60.

Conclusion

Republican Chinese officials envisioned Chinese nationality for co-ethnics in Southeast Asia as part of their struggle for China's parity with the world powers, forming part of the growing historiography of postwar Republican Chinese statebuilding and diplomacy. ROC diplomats frequently advocated for equal treatment of Chinese nationals on the grounds of wartime treaties of intrastate equality. On the other hand, they also demonstrate the importance of racial prejudice and ambitions of Chinese leadership over Asia to postwar Republican China's relationship with the world. The Chinese in Southeast Asia were frequently understood as instruments of ROC power abroad, and discourses of Chinese as intelligent and hardworking pioneers who deserved greater political clout than 'lazy natives' were accepted and propagated. Such designs were ultimately brought to an end as the ROC's international prestige diminished with its defeats on the Mainland in late 1948 to 1949. The Hanoi Consulate suggested in November 1948 that although the ROC government could insist that those who had been classified as Minh Huong by the French authorities were still Chinese nationals, this would be ineffectual in practice.[175] Similarly, Chinese consuls in Malaya suggested that one of their last recourses to British Malayan citizenship schemes would be to refuse recognition of the renunciations of Chinese nationality made by applicants to Malayan citizenship. Yet, they acknowledged that this objection would not be much more than symbolic.[176]

The nationality policies of ROC officials regarding the Chinese diaspora in Vietnam and Malaya were shaped by an expansive, state-centric view of diasporic transnationality. Cadres in the overseas KMT, the military and intelligence services often held a racialised view of the Chinese diaspora as a geopolitical fifth column in Southeast Asia. ROC and KMT officials

[175] General-Consulate in Hanoi to MFA, Nov 17 1948. Op. cit., 149.
[176] [In Chinese] Telegraph from DEA Second Section to Consulate in Singapore, Aug 11 1947. AH, 020-010601-0008, 8.

often employed metaphors and expressions that unwittingly echoed those used by Cold War-era Sinophobic regional and Anglo-American officials to negatively portray the Chinese diaspora's influence. For example, the idea of the Chinese diaspora in Singapore and Malaya as Communist China's 'Sudetenland', as said by the KMT leaders of the Chinese in Vietnam in this chapter, was used in the 1960s by Southeast Asian critics of the formation of Malaysia.[177] Officials like Tan Kok Chor of Zhongtong and KMT voiced similar perspectives that were feared in contemporaneous Anglo-American strategic considerations.[178] The Chinese state's embrace of diasporic insiders abroad as citizens and geopolitical allies was, furthermore, mirrored by ethno-nationalist statecraft since at least the nineteenth century if not before, which had already been profoundly felt by many of China's 'outsiders within' or domestic non-Han minorities.[179] By contrast, most senior officials in the OCAC and Foreign Ministry were less interested in mounting immediate, racial-geopolitical challenges to the European powers than establishing a measure of 'multi-layered sovereignty', as Raphaelle Khan and Taylor Sherman have said of India, to protect ethnic Chinese and their state's parity with the West.[180] In the words of Prasenjit Duara, efforts to codify preferential rights of residence in postwar constitutional arrangements formed part of their 'domestication' of diasporic transnationality.[181]

As an important caveat to this chapter's argument, ROC policies towards the overseas Chinese were only part of a broader pursuit of regional-powerdom in postwar Southeast Asia that

[177] Joseph Scalice, "A Region in Dispute: Racialized Anticommunism and Manila's Role in the Origins of Konfrontasi, 1961–63," 1013.
[178] Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment*, op. cit.
[179] For contrasting perspectives see eg, Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, (Stanford University Press, 1992); Edward Rhoads, *Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928*, (University of Washington Press, 2000); Xiaoyuan Liu, *Recast All under Heaven: Revolution, War, Diplomacy, and Frontier China in the 20th Century*, (Bloomsbury, 2010); Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Modern China's Ethnic Frontiers: A Journey to the West*, (Routledge, 2011).
[180] Khan and Sherman, "India and Overseas Indians in Ceylon and Burma, 1946–1965: Experiments in Post-Imperial Sovereignty," 1153.
[181] Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945".

engaged local societies and elites as well as the diaspora. The case of Vietnam shows that diaspora policy formed part of broader efforts to support pro-ROC political elites in the region. Notwithstanding their diplomats' frequent negative remarks about the non-Chinese ethnicities of Southeast Asia, the Foreign Ministry also made overtures towards them in the hopes of orienting their politics towards Republican China. In 1947, the Ministry's Asian Affairs Department planned a visit by Chinese Muslim leaders to Malaya and Indonesia to relieve ethnic antipathy and to improve China's reputation with the local public, although this was hampered by a growing lack of funds.[182] The next chapter explores the ROC's assertive diaspora protection efforts in regional conflicts which saw Communist insurgency and anti-Communism intersect with the dynamic of decolonisation.

[182] Eg Paixian Huijiao fangwentuan qianwang Yinni, Malaiya fangwen 派遣回教訪問團前往印尼、馬來亞訪問, MFA, DAPA, AH, 020-010802-0035 contains records of a proposed programme for the Foreign Ministry to organise a goodwill tour of Chinese Muslim leaders to the Islamic societies of Southeast Asia.

Chapter Two: Extending State Protection over Overseas Citizens in the Malayan Emergency and First Indochina War, 1948-9

The previous chapter examined the efforts of Republican Chinese officials to secure rights of residence and Chinese nationality for the overseas Chinese in Malaya and Vietnam as part of their assertion of postwar regional geopolitical power. By 1947 to 1948, European decolonisation from Asia, which spurred these conflicts around the status of the ethnic Chinese, increasingly intersected with the escalation of the Cold War in the region. ROC diaspora protection efforts in the Malayan Emergency and First Indochina War showed how the ROC's relationship with the diaspora continued to be shaped by ambitions of regional power, even into its last days on the Mainland. Ethnic Chinese abroad were primarily seen as overseas nationals whose rights must be protected as part of China's parity to the European powers, rather than subjects of international anti-Communist cooperation. Furthermore, even as ROC officials' actual capacity to intervene in Southeast Asian geopolitics waned, they continued to understand the ethnic Chinese as agents of their power whose political clout needed defense from what they saw as artificial and harmful local ethnic nationalism.

In mid-1948, the decision of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to embrace armed struggle led to a declaration of Emergency by the British Malayan colonial government. The ensuing insurgency resulted in both MCP violence and high-handed colonial repression against Malayan Chinese. In their response, ROC officials prioritised the protection of Malayan Chinese from both MCP and colonial violence. ROC officials saw themselves as *against* the MCP, but what they were *for* was a Malaya led by pro-ROC leaders and the Malayan Chinese, that should be decolonised and brought into the ROC orbit. This differed from the Kuala Lumpur government's own aims of a gradual, pro-British decolonisation process. ROC

officials' approach contrasted with developments after 1949, which will be explored in the latter two Parts of this dissertation, of growing enmeshment into Taipei's pro-American, anti-Communist international relations.

The declining fortunes of the KMT on the Mainland diminished its international prestige, which meant that colonial authorities became increasingly indifferent or hostile to their efforts at diaspora protection in Malaya. The KMT's impending defeat hurt not only its international status, but its material resources and institutional capacity; this chapter draws on ROC diaspora protection efforts in the First Indochina War to make a complementary point about the effects of declining state capacity on diaspora protection. In Malaya, diaspora protection efforts were largely a matter of intervention with the state authorities, but the First Indochina War (1946-54) brought political fragmentation across that territory. ROC efforts to protect ethnic Chinese there were therefore hampered not only by its low diplomatic status, but its limited capacity to extend state strength abroad into Vietnam.

The Malayan Emergency as Cold War, Decolonisation, and Civil Conflict

The Malayan Emergency was a conflict that could be understood in several different dimensions, each of which intersected with the lives and experiences of the Malayan Chinese community. The first was the MCP's struggle for national independence under Communist arrangements, fought against the colonial state. As the historian Anna Belogurova highlights, MCP leaders and cadres often held a vision of dual political loyalty to support Communist-nationalist revolutions in both Malaya and China to bring about racial and class equality, and China's national liberation.[183] The Malayan Emergency saw colonial authorities crack down

[183] Belogurova, *The Nanyang Revolution*, 191-7 and 222-3.

on Chineseness and the Chinese population; the former saw disloyalty within the latter as obstructing the transfer of power to pro-British leaders. After the declaration of the Emergency in June 1948, British security forces launched a campaign of screening and destroying Chinese villages with perceived Communist sympathies.[184] This was followed months later by High Commissioner Gurney's policy of deporting suspected Communists to China and restoring control over rural areas, and in 1951 by Templer's plan to intern large numbers of Chinese in New Villages.[185] Colonial representations of the conflict with the MCP as a fight against extremist ethnic Chinese also distanced the Malay majority from the Communist movement.[186]

Like many other conflicts at the end of colonial empire, the Malayan Emergency was also a civil war amongst the Malayan and particularly the Malayan Chinese population. As historian Tim Harper suggests, the Malayan Emergency was a culmination of a deeper-rooted postwar social crisis within Malaya. Many rural Chinese labourers who turned to the MCP had been displaced during the Japanese invasion of Malaya and particularly affected by food shortages and state efforts to control their labour and settlement.[187] Malayan Chinese society became militarised as arms circulated through anti-Japanese guerrillas, triads (Chinese secret societies), and youth and welfare groups that were associated with the MCP and KMT.[188] The KMT movement in Malaya took advantage of the ROC's status as a victor in World War Two to demand a reversal of the 1931 Lampson-Wang Agreement, which had curtailed their activities.[189] A considerable portion of MCP violence targeted other Chinese, including KMT leaders, small-plantation owners, and labour contractors.[190] Third, the Malayan Emergency was

[184] Hack, *The Malayan Emergency*, 120-3.
[185] Ibid, 128-34 and 191-3.
[186] Joshua Gedacht and Amrita Malhi, "Coercing Mobility: Territory and Displacement in the Politics of Southeast Asian Muslim Movements," *Itinerario* 45, no. 3 (2021): 330–44.
[187] Tim Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya*, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 67-70.
[188] Ibid, 94-103.
[189] Chin Fatt Yong, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya*, 199-225.
[190] Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya*, 109-111.

part of regional Cold War international relations in Asia. MCP leaders' perceptions of Soviet support for international armed struggle likely played a major role in their escalation of the insurgency in mid-1948.[191] For their own part, the British colonial state's response to the Malayan Emergency also linked Malaya into international anti-Communist efforts, which had already become increasingly regionally networked in interwar Southeast Asia.[192]

ROC Foreign Ministry and OCAC officials were particularly alarmed by the first dimension of the conflict, and particularly the high-handed colonial measures against the Malayan Chinese. They saw an affront to the newly established postwar equality between China and its nationals, and Britain and its colonial state in Malaya. In contrast to the MCP's vision of socialist-nationalist revolution in Malaya and China in tandem, ROC officials held onto their mirroring vision of a pro-ROC, postcolonial Malaya. The precedence of diaspora protection over anti-Communism was evident in how ROC officials extended their diaspora protection to both pro-KMT Chinese and those it regarded as innocent victims of colonial violence. ROC diplomats connected their interventions in the Malayan Emergency to equality between China and Britain, and were ambivalent on anti-Communist cooperation with the British colonial authorities. While they sometimes cooperated with the latter to fight the MCP, they also frequently saw its anti-Communist measures as coercive and unjust.

From Support to Criticism: ROC Responses to the Malayan Emergency, 1948-9

When the colonial state declared a state of emergency in Malaya in June 1948, the Foreign Ministry's initial response to the Malayan Emergency reflected their understanding of the

[191] Hack, *The Malayan Emergency*, 29-35.
[192] Alexandre Barthel and Wasana Wongsurawat, "The Origins of the Cold War in Southeast Asia: Pre-Second World War Siamese Cooperation with Foreign Powers against Communism," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 52, no. 4 (2021): 658–76.

conflict as a concern for ROC regional power more than one of anti-Communism. They understood the Malayan Chinese as nationals whose rights must be protected as part of China's assertion of equality to Britain. Furthermore, they envisioned the Malayan Chinese as agents of the ROC's future leadership over postcolonial Malaya who would be loyal to both states. The overlap they drew between ROC state influence over Malaya and the power of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia was evidenced in their negative understanding of Malay political power during the Emergency. Responding to communications from its Singapore consulate about the MCP killings of 4 pro-KMT Chinese labour contractors in Johor in June 1948, the Foreign Ministry instructed it on June 21 to report on the culprits' deportation, so they could be arrested and tried on arrival.[193] At a Foreign Ministry meeting in July to discuss the 'protection of compatriots in Malaya', the European Affairs Department suggested that Chinese consulates in Malaya and Singapore encourage the Chinese community to oppose the Communists and 'defend liberty and democracy', in cooperation with the British colonial government. They also devised a slew of measures to protect the Chinese both from Communist insurgents and colonial reprisal. The Chinese missions in Malaya were asked to take up a register of damages and casualties suffered by the Chinese, ask for compensation from the colonial government for the Chinese who had died at Communist hands, and take a census of rural Chinese who might be at risk of Communist violence. The most ambitious suggestion was that the local Chinese, coordinated by 'local consulates' and 'without arousing British suspicion', could organise anti-Communist militias 'on a local basis, without a national command'.[194]

[193] [In Chinese] Telegraph from MFA to Wu Bosheng, Jun 21 1948. Malaiya (Malaixiya) Gongdang huodong 馬來亞（馬來西亞）共黨活動 (1), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-010609-0008, 14-5.
[194] DEA. Ouzhousi taolun baohu Malai qiaobao huiyi jilu 歐洲司討論保護馬來僑胞會議記錄, Jul 12-13 1948. Ibid, 20.

In their opposition to the politics of the MCP, Foreign Ministry officials painted a mirroring goal of Chinese dual loyalty to a postcolonial, pro-ROC Malaya and the ROC state itself. In a report to the Foreign Ministry, Kuala Lumpur Consul-General Li Qin described the MCP as a 'centrifugal movement' (*lixin yundong*),[195] against the 'centripetal movement' (*xiangxin yundong*) he promoted.[196] According to him, China's government protected all those who did not deviate from the 'country and nation' and worked with the Malayan Chinese to promote the 'welfare and progress of Malaya'. Yet, the MCP was attempting to lure the Chinese away from KMT leadership with its false promise of 'anti-imperialism'. In contrast to the ROC's approach of encouraging cooperation between 'all races', the MCP was trying to rally Chinese and Indians against its accusations of 'foreign, Indonesian-led' Malay nationalism. While he praised the colonial government for finally ending its policy of 'appeasement', he warned the new approach of 'suppression' (*kanluan* 戡亂*,* the same term for Chiang's martial rule in China and later Taiwan) might harm the Chinese.[197] Li's understanding of Chinese loyalty to Malaya and China as mutually complementary, and Republican China as both protector of the Malayan Chinese and a power leading Malaya, aligned with prewar Nanjing ROC government's prewar Asianist thinking on Southeast Asia.[198] Li endorsed Malaya's gradual decolonisation as the best way to fight Communism. While he and the other ROC consuls urged Chinese cooperation with the British authorities in the Emergency, they also highlighted the responsibility of colonial misrule for Communist insurgency. The KMT mouthpiece in Malaya *Chung Shing Jit Pao* 中興日報 urged at the start of the Emergency that colonial rule should end as soon as possible, although its readers should still obey the local government's instructions, as Communist struggle would not bring about 'freedom and democracy'.[199] Despite their

[195] [In Chinese] Letter from Li Qin to MFA, Jul 7 1948. Ibid, 104 and 107.
[196] Ibid, 107.
[197] Ibid, 104.
[198] Belogurova, *The Nanyang Revolution*, 157-60.
[199] Telegraph from Wu Bosheng to MFA, Jun 19 1948. Malaiya (Malaixiya) Gongdang huodong 馬來亞（馬來西亞）共黨活動 (2), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-010609-0009, 33-4.

ideological differences with their foes, the MCP, ROC/KMT officials espoused a mirror vision of Chinese loyalty to both China and Malaya, and Malaya becoming aligned with China ideologically and diplomatically.

One factor that might have made Republican Chinese diplomats in Malaya and Singapore particularly amenable to associating the interests of the Malayan KMT with those of the ROC state was their personal connections to the overseas KMT. Since the late Qing, China's consular postings in Malaya and Singapore had been tied to Chinese elites who were friendly with the incumbent government.[200] The postwar Republican Chinese Foreign Ministry appointed many diplomats to Malaya and Singapore who represented the historical relationship between the overseas KMT and the ROC government. Li Qin was educated in the KMT's party school, the Central Political School 中央政治學校, before he became a diplomat.[201] Wu Bosheng, the Consul-General in Singapore, was a descendent of diasporic KMT revolutionaries. His father, from Taishan in Guangdong, had served as a National Assembly representative for his Xinhai-era revolutionary activities in British Hong Kong.[202] The Malayan KMT itself was subject to the tutelage of representatives from the Chinese party-state. Tan Kok Chor, the Zhongtong operative whose views on Vietnam were discussed in the previous chapter, was dispatched by the KMT in Chongqing to Singapore in 1946.[203] These personal experiences might have reinforced ROC officials' understanding that the Malayan Emergency was not a justified fight against Communism, but also a potential threat to the Malayan Chinese and the KMT movement.

[200] Ching-Hwang Yen, "Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya 1877–1912".

[201] 'Li Qin' in Guoming Liu 刘国铭, *Zhongguo Guomindang bainian renwu quanshu* 中国国民党百年人物全书, (Tuanjie chubanshe 团结出版社, 2005), 813.

[202] Dunren Liu 劉敦仁, *"*Fengguang yu qingcao bei yiwang de da shengyuejia Wu Bojiu 風光與情操 被遺忘的大聲樂家伍伯就*,"* nd*, uMedia* 優傳媒. Accessed January 24 2023, from https://umedia.world/news_details.php?n=202012252327228278.

[203] Bowei Jiang, "Zhuiyi Aiguo Huaqiao Chen Guochu," op. cit.; Chin Fatt Yong, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya,* 206.

Despite their initial focus on condemning Communist violence and rallying support for the colonial government against the MCP, the Foreign Ministry officials soon turned their attention to protecting innocent Chinese from colonial violence. ROC consuls in Malaya called on colonial authorities to moderate their Emergency measures as a matter of intrastate equality, while anti-Communism only featured as a complementary rationale. In July 1948, Li Qin liaised with the Malayan government to release innocent detainees as soon as possible.[204] The Foreign Ministry's European Affairs Department instructed its missions in Malaya and Singapore in September to ensure that the British observed the 1943 treaty's clause of equal treatment for each other's nationals. The treaty again featured in a September 9 1948 meeting between Consul-General to Singapore Wu Bosheng and Commissioner-General for British South East Asia Malcolm MacDonald. Wu promised the ROC's support for the anti-Communist effort, in exchange for MacDonald's agreement that information about Chinese arrests and visitation rights would be provided to the consulates.[205]

The Chinese consuls continued to challenge the new emergency measures into late 1948, when colonial counterinsurgency efforts became more bureaucratised. In November, the Foreign Ministry in Nanjing wrote to the British Embassy, at Li Qin's request, demanding that Malayan authorities implement their promises to protect Chinese detainees' consular visitation rights more fully, again citing the 1943 treaty.[206] In December 1948, Wu Bosheng criticised to his superiors 'the involuntary relocation of our compatriots and indiscriminate razing of their property and assets'. He wrote to Malcolm MacDonald, the High Commissioner for British South East Asia, for 'an end' to such security operations and 'relief and compensation' for the

[204] [In Chinese] Letter from Li Qin to MFA, Jul 7 1948. Ibid, 102-20.
[205] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Wu Bosheng to MFA, Sep 8 1948. AH, 020-010609-0009, 86-8.
[206] [In English] Letter from MFA to British Embassy in Nanking, Nov 2 1948. Malaiya (Malaixiya) Gongdang huodong 馬來亞（馬來西亞）共黨活動 (3), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-010609-0010, 158-60.

Chinese.[207] In January, Li Qin urged local Chinese to 'relocate from areas where the [MCP] thugs were operating', but also called on the security forces to adopt 'moderate measures' in response to colonial attacks on villages thought to be pro-MCP. He also attempted to coordinate aid from Chinese associations for the villagers' relocation.[208] The colonial Chinese Affairs Secretariat did not regard the Chinese consuls as uncooperative or threatening, describing them as helping anti-Communist efforts 'in a clumsy way' in January 1949.[209] However, they were also quite dismissive of Chinese consuls' requests and rarely offered substantial concessions.[210]

ROC consuls frequently also perceived the Emergency as an opportunity for the British to transfer power to the supposedly undeserving Malays, as opposed to the Chinese. They portrayed the Malayan Chinese as possessing demographic clout and a superior socioeconomic position, which would give them political power in postcolonial Malaya. Malay nationalist politics were viewed as a colonial anti-Chinese divide-and-rule strategy which was inherently flawed due to racial inferiority. Early at the start of the insurgency, Li Qin suggested that while decolonisation for Malaya would defeat the Communist threat more effectively, the British response was to add to the Malayan Chinese predicament by granting more power to the Malays.[211] The reach of racial prejudice against Malays was also evidenced in their hold on the thinking of Ibrahim Ma, who was himself a Chinese Muslim. Ma had began his involvement in politics protesting Islamophobia in Republican China, and served as an envoy rallying the Islamic world to support China's war effort during the Second World War.[212] In his consular

[207] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Wu Bosheng to MFA, Dec 24 1948. Op. cit., 24.
[208] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Li Qin to MFA, Jan 19 1949. Ibid, 184.
[209] British Malaya Chinese Affairs Secretariat (BMSCA). Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs, January 1949. Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs no.s 29-42, January to December 1949, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and predecessors (FCO), Migrated Archives: Malaya (MA:M), The National Archives (TNA), London. FCO 141/7625, 7.
[210] [In Chinese] Letter from Li Qin to MFA, Feb 9 1949. AH, 020-010609-0011, 94-7; [In Chinese] Telegraph from Li Qin to MFA, Aug 26 1949. Ibid, 114-5.
[211] Li Qin to MFA, Aug 26 1948. AH, 020-010609-0008, op. cit.
[212] Yueli Zheng 鄭月裡, *Ma Tianying yu Malaixiya* 馬天英與馬來西亞*, 1939-1982*, (Academia Sinica Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies 中研院亞太區域研究專題中心, 2003) provides his detailed biography.

role, he was active in promoting cultural understanding between the Chinese and Malays, trying to 'please everyone' as the more skeptical colonial profiles of him put it.[213] Yet, in line with the 'lazy native' narratives that were so prevalent among the Malayan Chinese, Ma's affinity for the Malays extended only to cultural friendship, rather than their political status. Like Li, he suggested that the Chinese were 'happy to promote the lot and the political equality of the Malays'. However, the latter were 'stupid and ignorant', 'lazy to a fault', and adopted anti-Chinese politics once in power.[214] He envisioned a leading political role for the Chinese, who were supposedly both politically and socioeconomically more advanced than the Malays, which was put in jeopardy by colonial anti-Chinese measures during the Emergency.

'Good', 'Innocent', and 'Bad' Chinese in ROC Diaspora Protection

ROC designs for Malaya's decolonisation became increasingly untenable by late 1948 with the CCP's victories in northeastern China. However, the Malayan Chinese continued to be seen as nationals by ROC diplomats; the protection of their rights frequently took precedence above ideological confrontation with Communism, as evidenced in their continued diaspora protection efforts. Republican Chinese consuls' diaspora protection encompassed not only pro-KMT Chinese who were targeted by the MCP, but Chinese who they deemed wrongfully harmed and deported by colonial violence. Chinese consuls frequently saw not only the MCP, but colonial failures of protection, as responsible for killing of pro-KMT Chinese during the Emergency. ROC consular reports often valorised KMT Chinese victims of the MCP as morally upstanding and politically loyal Chinese nationals. A report compiled by the Singapore General Consulate on five victims of MCP violence in July 1948, based on information from the Johor KMT Branch, exhibited such emotively charged language. The five victims were

[213] BMSCA. Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs, February 1949. FCO 141/7625, 24.
[214] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Ma Tianying to MFA, Apr 9 1949. AH, 020-010609-0011, 112.

described as 'devout believers' (*duxin*) in the Three Principles of the People, and having various positive traits such as a 'loyal disposition', 'passion for public affairs', 'uprightness', and 'bravery'. They had their involvement in different KMT branches listed, and the report also highlighted the financial despondence of their dependents to emphasise their 'martyrdom'.[215]

Chinese consuls also faulted the colonial state for being more interested in protecting their own political control over Malaya, than protecting ordinary Malayans– especially Chinese– who opposed Communism. In July, the European Affairs Department suggested that the missions in Malaya must ask the British authorities to step up their protection of KMT members, whom the MCP violence targeted in killings of owners and strike-breaking workers, and attacks against Chinese who 'celebrated President Chiang's election'.[216] In June 1948, Consul to Penang Li Nenggeng reminded the local British authorities to step up protection of KMT members, after MCP killings in the states of Kedah and Johor.[217] He was explicitly concerned with the differential treatment of Chinese and British nationals when writing about the assassination of a Penang Straits Settlements Legislator, Ong Chong Keng 王宗鏡, in September. He stressed that Ong was a British subject with his 'true loyalties' in London's direction, which might lead the Kuala Lumpur authorities to act seriously against the MCP's attacks on anti-Communist Chinese.[218] The implication was that colonial authorities had often been indifferent because these victims of MCP violence were Chinese nationals. Li continued to criticise the colonial security forces for their inadequate protection of Malayan Chinese in 1949, when the immediate threat of MCP violence had been brought under control by colonial security forces. On April 20 1949, Li Qin wrote to his superiors to criticise *Straits Times* reports

[215] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Wu Bosheng to MFA, Jul 17 1948. AH, 020-010609-0009, 52.
[216] DEA. Malaiya baodong shijian jieyao 馬來亞暴動事件節要. AH, 020-010609-0008, 25.
[217] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Li Nenggeng to MFA, Jun 21 1948. Ibid, 44-5.
[218] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Li Nenggeng to MFA, Sep 2 1948. Ibid, 82.

on successful MCP grenade attacks on MCA leaders in Ipoh. He suggested that the quasi-official newspaper was trying to blame Chinese onlookers for 'not putting a finger' on the culprits and insinuating that the Malayan Chinese were pro-Communist, rather than criticising what Li saw as the 'incompetence' of the security forces.[219]

ROC diplomats often asserted that the Chinese in Malaya were Chinese nationals who should enjoy ROC state protection, and that diaspora protection was part of Sino-British intrastate equality, in their efforts to protect Chinese victims of colonial violence. This was particularly evident in ROC consuls' intervention in cases of colonial violence against rural Chinese. Republican Chinese diplomats claimed them as nationals whose rights should be protected through direct diplomatic interventions, although they were accused of Communist sympathies and often far removed from pro-KMT Malayan Chinese circles. Between December 1948 and January 1949, the colonial counter-insurgency effort entered a more organised but also more systematically repressive phase. As the KMT suffered increasing defeats on the Mainland and the fate of ROC consulates abroad became increasingly uncertain, after February 1949 the MCA eventually replaced the Chinese consulates as the main protector of Malayan Chinese in the Emergency.[220] Still, the cases taken up by Chinese consuls were numerous and varied, ranging from colonial security forces killing or assaulting rural Chinese to demands by forcibly dislocated Chinese for compensation and improved resettlement, although many of these requests were unheeded.[221] Two cases of diaspora protection early in the Emergency are particularly illustrative of how Chinese consuls sought to protect ordinary ethnic Chinese, and associated their efforts with demands for Sino-British state equality.

[219] [In Chinese] Savingram from Li Qin to MFA, Apr 20 1949. Malaiya (Malaixiya) Gongdang huodong 馬來亞（馬來西亞）共黨活動 (5), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-010609-0012, 75.
[220] For the role of the advisory committees see Hack, *The Malayan Emergency*, 128-34.
[221] Eg Wu Bosheng to MFA, Dec 24 1948, op. cit.; [In Chinese] Telegraph from Li Qin to MFA, May 19 1949. Ibid,169-72; [In Chinese] Telegraph from Li Qin to MFA, May 28 1949. Ibid,156-8; [In Chinese] Telegraph from Ma Tianying to MFA, May 26 1949. Ibid, 163-6; [In Chinese] Telegraph from MFA to Ma Tianying, Jun 10 1949. AH, 020-010609-0012, 21; [In Chinese] Telegraph from Ma Tianying to MFA, Jul 30 1949. Ibid, 50-3.

Li Qin's response to the Batang Kali massacre saw him take on the role not only of defender of the legal rights of disaffected Chinese, but an investigator of colonial atrocities when the British had failed to do so. One of the more well-studied colonial atrocities in the Emergency, the Batang Kali killings in December 1948 saw the deaths of 24 (by some accounts 23 or 25) Chinese villagers at the hands of the Scots Guards.[222] The sole survivor and the families of the deceased reached Li through the Guangxi hometown association leader Tan Meitang 覃美堂. Li directed his staff to interview the wives and children of the deceased, and the rubber worker Chong Hong (Chen Lai 陳來), the only male survivor. In these interviews, a woman eyewitness claimed that the security forces only began their killings after Chong Hong was taken aside privately to be interrogated, and later brought back unharmed. Chong claimed that the security forces had long caught word of MCP infiltration through a nearby 'Malay' and when questioning other workers, some of whom they shot. Chong 'fainted' multiple times during the interview when confronted with these discrepancies by the consular staff.[223]

Li Qin took direct action to demonstrate the consulate's willingness to protect all Chinese nationals wrongfully subjected to colonial violence by having the consulate publish a factual account of these findings in the pro-KMT newspaper *China Press* 中國報 on December 22.[224] By portraying the ROC mission as an impartial investigator, Li could minimise the possibility of souring relations with the colonial government, while putting pressure on the colonial government for its opaque handling of the atrocity. The *China Press* was owned at the time by pro-KMT leader and colonial legislator Lee Hau Shik 李孝式; a founder and leader of the

[222] Anthony Short, "The Malayan Emergency and the Batang Kali Incident," *Asian Affairs* 41, no. 3 (2010): 337–54.
[223] "Zhu Long zonglingguan fabiao Xingumao junjing jibi qiaomin jiashu baogao 駐隆總領館發表新古毛軍警擊斃僑民家屬報告," *China Press*, Dec 22 1948. AH, 020-010609-0011, 166.
[224] Ibid.

MCA, Lee had longstanding family ties to the KMT and had been a Colonel in the ROC military.[225] His newspaper took care to render the characters 'military and police' (*junjing*) in smaller, partially faded font while the rest of the article was clearly printed. Although Li's pressure had little direct effect, in January 1949, the colonial government did revise its procedures for security forces to issue warnings before firing. Other historians' research of British sources does not point to ROC pressure being a major cause of the colonial decision.[226]

Another shooting of a Malayan Chinese youth in September 1948 handled by Consul to Ipoh Ibrahim Ma illustrates his effort to communicate directly with victims of colonial violence and advocate on their behalf, despite their marginalised social status and the improbability of success. Ma took up the shooting of Yin Chien Yoon 尹建潤 in a village near Kampar, Perak at the request of Yin's family, who contacted the consulate. Yin's father was a Chinese immigrant from Guangdong, making Chien Yoon a Chinese national under ROC law. During a security force raid on their village, two British soldiers made him face the wall of his own home, searched and questioned him, and one of the soldiers shot him as they were leaving.[227] Ma unsuccessfully appealed the lenient treatment for John Hunter, the soldier who shot Yin, who was sentenced to 18 months in prison. He also wrote to the Kuala Lumpur government to request increased compensation for Yin.[228] The colonial government denied that it had any legal obligation of compensation. This was because, as John Hunter was acting unlawfully during the killing, the state could not be liable.[229] The colonial government's lack of detailed reasoning for this claim shows its indifference, perhaps chiefly due to their low and decreasing regard for the ROC government. In the end, Ma successfully got the commander of the local

[225] Kee Beng Ooi, *As Empires Fell: The Life and Times of Lee Hau-Shik, the First Finance Minister of Malaya,* (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore, 2020), 153.
[226] Karl Hack, *Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1968,* (Routledge, 2014), 110-4.
[227] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Ma Tianying to MFA, Jul 11 1949. AH, 020-010609-0012, 55.
[228] Ibid, 56.
[229] [In English] Letter from AD Claims and Hirings to Ma Tianying, 21 Mar 1949. Ibid, 62.

British forces to offer an oral apology and increased compensation in September 1949. The commander explained this was because of the 'disgraceful' circumstances of the incident, 'pathetic' plight of the deceased's family, and Ma's 'reasonable' attitude.[230]

A seemingly insignificant incident during the trial further demonstrates the strong connections that ROC consuls drew between diaspora protection, and equality between China and Britain. In his reports to his superiors, Ibrahim Ma mentioned that he attended John Hunter's trial on January 25 to 26, expecting to be seated next to the judge as per 'international custom'. However, the staff shuffled him between several observers' seats, which he called 'rude' and 'deliberately being difficult', and he left the court in protest.[231] Yet, the Kuala Lumpur Chinese Affairs Secretariat seemed confused about the incident when they recounted it in monthly reports of Chinese affairs for senior colonial officials. They described him as having 'walked out in disgust' following several transfers of seats, quoting him as saying that 'in China foreign consuls were always given seats of dignity in the courts of law'.[232] They did not mention that British diplomats in China were among the 'foreign consuls' who had enjoyed these privileges.

Ma's indignation illustrates that diaspora protection was not only a matter of Chinese nationals' lives and livelihoods. In his mind, it was also a matter of asserting that the Chinese state was equal in status to Britain. What Ma initially understood as a universal custom was a feature of extraterritoriality arrangements, such as those in prewar China. In offering a seat to Ma as an observer, the colonial court staff tried to give Chinese consuls equal respect to other foreign diplomats. Ironically, however, extraterritoriality had become so normalised in China until it was abolished in wartime treaties that Ma associated equal treatment with arrangements that

[230] [In English] Letter from Ipoh Consulate to DAD Claims and Hearings, 2 Jun 1949. Ibid, 70;
[In English] Letter from DAD Claims and Hearings to Ipoh Consulate, 13 Jun 1949. Ibid, 71-2.
[231] Ma Tianying to MFA, Jul 11 1949. Op. cit, 56.
[232] BMSCA. January 1949: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. FCO 141/7625, 8.

were a product of China's *in*equality to Britain and other Western powers. Conversely, the surprise of colonial officials at Ma's request showed either ignorance or indifference regarding Ma's understanding of international inequality.

Foreign Ministry officials' responses towards the British Malayan deportation of Chinese detainees illustrated how diaspora protection extended not only to wrongful deportees who needed to be resettled, but the right for deportees to remain in Malaya and the protection of those who the colonial state deemed MCP supporters. While the colonial government saw in the Communist insurgency a need to discipline the Chinese community into compliance with its directives, ROC Foreign Ministry officials understood Chinese cooperation with the MCP as a product of MCP violence and colonial ineptitude which could not be resolved by coercion. This contrasts in particular with the post-1949 ROC government's growing suspicion and hostility towards politically-motivated diasporic migration to Taiwan, as the following Parts of this thesis will argue.[233]

As with other colonial counterinsurgency measures, the initial response of Foreign Ministry officials to colonial deportations was relatively receptive. On June 21 1948, the Foreign Ministry's European Affairs Department instructed Consul-General Wu Bosheng to arrange for MCP deportees to be arrested after arriving in China.[234] In July, the consulates were told to cooperate with their local British authorities on deportations. As many Chinese from Southeast Asia had taken refuge in China during wartime, the OCAC and customs were to prevent Communist infiltrators with forged paperwork from reentering Malaya.[235] The ROC's

[233] Choo Chin Low, "Banishment of Anti-Communist Chinese to Formosa: The British as Effectual Mediators in Malaya," *International Journal of China Studies* 7, no. 3 (2016): 351–72.
[234] [In Chinese] Telegraph from MFA to Wu Bosheng, Jun 21 1948. AH, 020-010609-0008, 14-5.
[235] DEA. Ouzhousi taolun baohu Malai qiaobao huiyi jilu, Jul 12-13, op. cit.

repressive approach towards MCP members is corroborated by these deportees' accounts of arrest and torture by KMT authorities, as other historians have highlighted.[236]

However, by August, the Foreign Ministry increasingly prioritised the right of innocent Chinese to remain in Malaya above punishing pro-MCP Chinese. According to the European Affairs Department, ROC consuls should negotiate with the local British authorities on whether expulsion was the best treatment for arrested Chinese. If deportation was decided upon, information about deportees' ties to the CCP or China Democratic League 中國民主同盟 should be provided to the consulates. The Foreign Ministry would then liaise with other ministries to decide their treatment, and give these orders to the local governments.[237] The accounts of MCP members' persecution on arrival suggests that the Foreign Ministry may have been concerned about corrupt local authorities releasing Communists. Yet, the Foreign Ministry's instructions for consuls to protect the detainees' continued residence in Malaya where possible suggests another opposite, potentially equal concern. Local authorities might indiscriminately see all the deportees as Communists whereas the Foreign Ministry knew this was not the case.

Unjustified deportations increasingly concerned Chinese diplomats in late 1948 and early 1949, when Gurney extended his measures to include not only MCP members but Chinese who were suspected of aiding the MCP. ROC diplomats like Li Nenggeng and Li Qin seemed to view all Malayan Chinese, not only those with ROC passports, as falling within the scope of diaspora protection; they also suggested that only those who had voluntarily participated in the MCP should be deported. In November, Li Nenggeng complained to his superiors of the extension

[236] Rachel Leow, "Beyond Diaspora's Horizons: Mass Deportations to China and an Alternative to the Diaspora Paradigm," 594.
[237] DEA. Malaiya baodong shijian yu wo baoqiao cuoshi 馬來亞暴動事件與我保僑措施, Aug 5 1948. AH, 020-010609-0008, 34-6.

of colonial deportation regulations to encompass both British protected subjects (Chinese born in the Malay states) and British subjects (born in the Straits Settlements).[238] Li appeared to believe that even these ethnic Chinese, who might lack ROC passports, might require his concern. Similarly, Li Qin criticised the arbitrary and indiscriminate nature of colonial deportations in January 1949, adding that the policy targeted 'entire villages' and that interventions by Lee Hau Shik had gone unheeded.[239] Both tried to mitigate these measures; in January, Li Qin 'discussed with the authorities' to devise 'relocation plans' and 'relief' for the Chinese whose villages were to be cleared by the security forces.[240] In March 1949, Li Nenggeng wrote of the need to 'agitate local compatriot groups' to 'call on the authorities to end to boundless, unreasonable measures'. Li referred to the colonial measures as targeting 'so-called "bandit-controlled areas (*feiqu* 匪區)"'.[241] *Feiqu*, which Li used to refer to MCP-controlled zones, denoted their equivalence to CCP-controlled territories on the Mainland; yet, the use of quotation marks and the descriptor 'so-called' showed Li's view that colonial measures were often unjustified. Similar efforts to prevent unjust deportations occupied the ROC missions in Malacca, Ipoh and Singapore.[242] The colonial government refused to change its deportation programme, which it saw as central to the counterinsurgency effort and even expanded in early-mid 1949. It continued to provide notice to the Chinese consulates but did not change the existing procedure around detainees which gave them a nominal right of appeal to Chinese Advisory Committees, but not the consulates.[243]

[238] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Li Nenggeng to MFA, Nov 24 1948. Ibid, 99-100.
[239] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Li Qin to MFA, Jan 14 1949. AH, 020-010609-0011, 46.
[240] Ibid, 47.
[241] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Consulate in Penang to MFA, Mar 12 1949. Ibid, 84.
[242] [In Chinese] Monthly Report from Consulate in Malacca to MFA, Mar 1949. AH, 020-010609-0012, 9-20; [In Chinese] Telegraph from MFA to Consulate in Ipoh, Apr 8 1949. Ibid, 68-71; [In Chinese] Telegraph from Wu Bosheng to MFA, Dec 24 1948. AH, 020-010609-0011, 24-5.
[243] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Li Qin to MFA, Apr 1 1949. AH, 020-010609-0012, 98-109.

Furthermore, although the Republican Chinese government was no doubt highly repressive towards those deportees it identified as genuine Communists, it regarded the rest of the deportees with sympathy. On March 31 1949, the Guangdong Provincial Government wrote to the Foreign Ministry condemning the 'ravishment of the Chinese compatriots in Singapore and elsewhere by the colonial government'. The deportees had reported their villages being razed to the ground, and being robbed of their possessions. The Guangdong government suggested that it could work out a support plan for the deportees with the Foreign Ministry.[244] Xue Yue 薛岳, provincial chairman of Guangdong at the time, was not a political waverer who was hedging his bets, but rather a KMT general who eventually chose to follow Chiang Kai-Shek to Taiwan.[245] Similarly, in April 1949, overseas Chinese groups in Xiamen complained through the OCAC office there of the 'shock and horror' of deportees' treatment, as a group of 89 had arrived there without families or productive work.[246] The OCAC worked to relocate them and requested that the Foreign Ministry lodge a 'strong complaint' with the colonial authorities.[247] Unfortunately, detailed discussion of these incidents are scarce in the annals of overseas Chinese history published by PRC local governments.[248] However, the ROC's assistance for these non-MCP deportees would not have lasted much longer than a few months, as southeastern China fell to the CCP in October 1949.

However, while ROC officials envisioned most ethnic Chinese in Malaya as nationals to be protected from either colonial violence within Malaya or deportation, they remained respectful of colonial hostility to direct political or military intervention. The case of KMT militias in

[244] [In Chinese] Savingram from Guangdong Provincial Government to MFA, Mar 31 1949. Ibid, 42.
[245] National Chengchi University (NCCU). 'Xue Yue,' ROC Government Post Database 中華民國政府官職資料庫. Accessed Apr 4 2024 at https://gpost.lib.nccu.edu.tw/view_career.php?&name=%E8%96%9B%E5%B2%B3.;
[246] [In Chinese] Telegraph from OCAC to MFA, Apr 7 1949. 020-010609-0011, 79.
[247] Ibid, 80.
[248] Author's perusal of the Overseas Chinese volumes of 4 provincial-level and 18 municipal/county-level local history gazettes, of notable regions of overseas Chinese origin (*qiaoxiang*), such as Guangdong, Fujian, Xiamen and Shantou. Accessed May and June 2023 at Wanfang Data 萬方數據, https://fz.wanfangdata.com.cn/index.do, and Bodleian Library, Oxford.

Emergency-era Malaya demonstrates that Chinese diplomats ensured that their diaspora protection efforts did not provoke colonial fears of armed intervention in Malayan politics. Originally mobilised to fight the Japanese occupation of Malaya during World War Two, some pro-KMT guerillas remained in the postwar Malayan countryside. British colonial security forces were concerned by these guerillas' links to the Chinese government, developed in their wartime cooperation with the KMT intelligence apparatus.[249] The colonial Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs in April 1948 stated that a raid of pro-KMT guerillas in northern Perak had revealed unspecified communications between the guerillas and the Chinese consulates in Malaya and Singapore.[250] In September 1948, another Special Branch report on the KMT's influence in Malaya emphasised that pro-KMT newspapers and Chinese consulates were pressing for the state recognition of these guerillas in Perak. This was portrayed as particularly concerning as it could be a precursor to the ROC organising its own military to fight the MCP in Malaya.[251] Ironically, historian Karl Hack has suggested these British crackdowns created a vacuum of armed authority in northern Perak which created favourable conditions for the MCP to set their armed struggle into motion.[252]

Contrary to these anxieties, however, Chinese diplomats largely saw the pro-KMT militias in rural Malaya only as requiring consular protection to adjust to peacetime life. When Li Qin discussed the guerillas with the Foreign Ministry in June 1948, he regarded the guerillas' letters to him with skepticism. He said that these forces engaged in 'illegal activities' while 'claiming the causes of anti-Communism and protection of compatriots'. Helping the guerillas receive legal recognition as an anti-Communist security force, as they requested, would contradict 'the

[249] Chee Seng Tan, "Kuomintang Man Behind Special Force: Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942-1945," in *Malaysia and the Cold War Era*, 96-119.
[250] BMSCA. April Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. Malaya: review of Chinese Affairs, Colonial Office (CO), TNA. CO 537/3750.
[251] Special Branch of Federation of Malaya. The Present Policy of the Kuomintang in Malaya, 30 Sep 1948. The Kuomintang in Malaya, CO, TNA. CO 537/4252.
[252] Hack, *The Malayan Emergency*, 26-35, 58-9, and 73-8.

colonial policy of firmly eradicating all illegal elements' and might cause 'an Anglo-Chinese misunderstanding'.[253] Instead, he asked the Malayan KMT leader Lau Pak Khuan 劉伯群 to assist the eighty-something guerillas' resettlement. Li also helped issue them with identity papers to help them avoid deportation.[254] A proposal for the Foreign Ministry to preventively arm the Chinese to protect them from the MCP similarly did not develop into reality. Although a proposal was brought up on October 9 by the Foreign Ministry to the Executive Yuan to deploy Chinese military officers to work with British officers, it was not put into practice in the end.[255] The British suspicion of foreign-supported militias in Malaya meant that the consuls only encouraged the Chinese to join the colonial Auxiliary Police units.[256]

Failure of State Capacity: ROC Diaspora Protection in the First Indochina War

The Malayan Emergency showed how the ROC government's declining fortunes on the Mainland diminished European powers' regard for its programmes of diaspora protection. By contrast, ROC diaspora protection in the First Indochina War demonstrates how Republican China's relationship with the diaspora was fractured by the decline of its state capacity during its final years on the Mainland. In contrast to its ambivalence and opposition to British Malayan repression of the Chinese during the Emergency, ROC policies were more overtly anti-Communist in the case of Indochina. As the Viet Minh was primarily composed of Kinh members, the Chinese were not criminalised and associated with Communism by colonial authorities to nearly the same extent as they were in Malaya.[257] Second, while ROC forces did

[253] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Li Qin to MFA, Jun 10 1949. Malaiya (Malaixiya) gedi jinji faling 馬來亞（馬來西亞）各地緊急法令, MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-010699-0038, 137.
[254] Ibid, 138.
[255] [In Chinese] Savingram from MFA to Executive Yuan. Oct 9 1948. AH, 020-010609-0008, 123-4.
[256] [In Chinese] Telegraph from MFA to Li Qin, Aug 7 1948. Ibid, 37-8.
[257] See Thomas Engelbert, "Vietnamese-Chinese Relations in Southern Vietnam during the First Indochina Conflict," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 3, no. 3 (2008): 191–230; Xiaorong Han, "Revolution Knows No Boundaries?" for relationship between the Chinese community and the Viet Minh movement.

initially contribute to Ho Chi Minh's rise to power, by 1948 there was increased Sino-French cooperation in fighting the Viet Minh and CCP on the Sino-Vietnamese border.[258] Accordingly, ROC officials attempted to rein in the anti-colonial tendencies of the KMT in Vietnam. For example, the Foreign Ministry's European Affairs Department instructed the San Min Chu Yi Youth Corps 三民主義青年團 in Vietnam, the youth wing of the KMT, to rein in the 'radical rhetoric' of its 'anti-French editorials' in February 1946. [259] KMT cadres sent from the Mainland to lead the Corps' branches in Vietnam also instructed them to refrain from working with Ho Chi Minh.[260]

Yet, the breakdown in political order in Indochina demonstrated the limitations that the ROC's declining military and institutional capacity posed for diaspora protection. The extent to which Vietnamese society was disrupted by armed conflict far exceeded that in Malaya, where colonial security forces relegated MCP insurgency to a rural guerrilla movement.[261] Among the Southeast Asian countries where Chinese settled in large numbers, Indochina's situation was more comparable to Indonesia. In the latter, the ROC government had even less direct geopolitical clout, and Chinese responded to the conflicts of decolonisation by organising militias to protect themselves.[262] Similarly, in Indochina, diaspora protection was a matter of extending state coercive force to shelter Chinese from the impact of war rather than mere diplomatic intervention. With its recent history of occupying northern Vietnam, the Yunnan

[258] Zhong-Fa huijiao Gui Yue bian feidang xieding **中法會勦桂粵邊匪黨協**定, Department of European Affairs (DEA), MFA, AH. 020-040802-0005 contains the records of the Franco-Chinese (ROC) cooperation against the Viet Minh/CCP.
[259] [In Chinese] Savingram from MFA to Central Executive Committee of SMCY Youth Corps, Feb 6 1946. Yuenan gemingdang **越南革命黨** (6), DEA, MFA, AH. 020-011001-0026, 118.
[260] [In Chinese] Savingram from Central Executive Committee of SMCY Youth Corps to MFA, Dec 11 1945. Ibid, 20; [In Chinese] Telegraph from Ling Qihan to MFA, Jan 24 1946. Ibid, 91-3; [In Chinese] Telegraph from Ling Qihan to MFA, Jan 26 1946. Ibid, 119-21.
[261] See Shawn Frederick McHale, *The First Vietnam War: Violence, Sovereignty, and the Fracture of the South, 1945-1956*, (Cambridge University Press, 2023); Christian Lentz, *Contested Territory: Điện Biên Phủ and the Making of Northwest Vietnam*, (Yale University Press, 2019); Goscha, *The Road to Dien Bien Phu*, for detailed historiography of First Indochina War.
[262] Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution*, 17-51.

government under Lu Han took a keen interest in protecting the ethnic Chinese there. On May 10 1947, Viet Minh representatives alerted the local government of the Yunnan border town of Hekou 河口 that Chinese might be caught in the wartime crossfire. Accordingly, the Yunnan government suggested to the Foreign Ministry that a safe zone to protect the Chinese from hostilities be set up in the city of Lao Cai.[263] By May 17, the Foreign Ministry reported that the French government had agreed to respect the proposed safe zone, while the Viet Minh took the proposal 'under consideration'.[264]

Despite their initial sympathy, in July 1947 both warring parties backtracked on their promises. On July 5, the High Commissioner for French Indochina Émile Bollaert rebuffed the Chinese Foreign Ministry and stated that present conditions in Lao Cai precluded the establishment of a safe zone.[265] The Viet Minh government also rejected the request, stating that their struggle for independence was 'much like China's resistance to Japan' and hence that damage to Chinese lives and property might be inevitable.[266] In southern Vietnam, the proposal for safe zones initially attained more success with French agreement. On January 12 1948, the Consul-General in Saigon, Yin Fengzao, reported that he had reached an agreement with the High Commission to establish safe zones to register and protect Chinese there.[267] The safe zones totalled 12 by March 10.[268] Still, respect for them was incomplete. The Viet Minh sometimes obstructed the Chinese from leaving their controlled territories, as they were suspicious of French plans.[269] Chinese consuls' cooperation with the French apparently incensed the Viet Minh forces into further aggression against the Chinese. On March 2 1948, French warplanes

[263] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Yunnan Provincial Government to MFA, May 10 1947. Yuenan Laojie, Nanqi anquanqu 越南老街、南圻安全區, MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011007-0070, 8-9.
[264] [In Chinese] Savingram from MFA to Yunnan Provincial Government, May 14 1947. Ibid, 17.
[265] [In Chinese] Letter from French Embassy in China to MFA, Jul 5 1947. Ibid, 48-9.
[266] [In Chinese] Letter from Special Representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to MFA, Jul 21 1947. Ibid, 55.
[267] [In Chinese] Savingram from Yin Fengzao to MFA, Jan 12 1948. Ibid, 133-4.
[268] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Yin Fengzao to MFA, Mar 10 1948. Ibid, 175-6.
[269] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Yin Fengzao to MFA, Apr 7 1948. Ibid, 197-8.

also killed two groups of 3 and 7 Chinese nationals respectively despite the display of ROC flags when the Chinese were evacuating.[270]

The failure of the Chinese safe zones shows the limitations that the KMT's deterioration posed to the Foreign Ministry's Chinese diaspora protection efforts in Vietnam. Just two years ago, Chinese forces had occupied northern Vietnam. Yet, by 1947 their capacity to intervene in Indochina had become sharply limited. With their military capacity sharply curtailed, all that remained of their occupation was residual tension with both the High Commission and the Viet Minh. The previous chapter has already highlighted the conflicts China had on diaspora protection but also other disputes like economic concessions and Chinese occupying forces' abuses, with both the French and the DRV.[271] The KMT regime now had little to offer either side for them to respect the safe zones. Accordingly, this proposal fell apart in the north, and even in the south, and was sometimes violated by both sides.

This decline in material state capacity was matched by an institutional decline in the Foreign Ministry's ability to implement its initiatives effectively in Vietnam. In Malaya, political order remained relatively stable even in the worst days of the Emergency. In addition, diplomacy was conducted primarily through the Foreign Ministry, which had some institutional continuity throughout the retreat to Taiwan. Neither of these conditions was true of Vietnam. The war in Indochina brought with it opportunities for diplomats there to enrich themselves. Yin Fengzao, for example, had a dispute with the local KMT for allegedly enriching himself through doing business with the Viet Minh.[272] Further, the Yunnan clique and not only the ROC national government held geopolitical sway on the Yunnan-Vietnam border. The actual ability of the

[270] [In Chinese] Savingram from Yin Fengzao to MFA, Mar 2 1948. Ibid, 166-7.
[271] Martin Shipway, *The Road to War: France and Vietnam, 1944-1947*, (Berghahn Books, 2003), 150-76; King Chen, *Vietnam and China*, 99-154; Min Luo, "Chiang Kai-Shek and Vietnam's Post-World War II Status".
[272] Engelbert, "Vietnamese-Chinese Relations in Southern Vietnam during the First Indochina Conflict," 209.

KMT government to control developments on the border was increasingly limited. Provincial government chairman Lu Han was frequently at odds with Chiang's government, officially breaking with it in February 1949 and later defecting to the CCP.[273]

Conclusion

ROC officials' approach towards both the Malayan Emergency and First Indochina War demonstrated the ambitions they had for their postwar relationship with the diaspora, and the limitations that their diaspora policy faced due to ROC defeats on the Mainland. ROC officials understood overseas Chinese as nationals who should receive equal treatment to Europeans, and potential agents of Chinese geopolitical clout in Southeast Asia, in part because of ideologies of Chinese racial superiority. Therefore, diaspora protection often took precedence above anti-Communist cooperation in ROC officials' responses to the two conflicts. As the literature review has highlighted, a growing body of scholarship has examined the conflict in Malaya as a struggle over Chineseness. The colonial government saw the ethnic Chinese, particularly first- or second-generation immigrants, as requiring coercive control and discipline to make them anti-Communist and loyal only to Malaya. ROC officials' analyses of the Emergency showed that they upheld an alternative, anti-colonial and nationalist diasporic Chineseness. While they opposed the Communism of their ideological foe, the MCP, they were perhaps equally encouraging of dual political loyalty to both China and Malaya. At the same time, they subscribed to the 'lazy native' narratives that were prevalent among the Malayan Chinese and European colonial states. Consequently, they were sharply opposed to an increased role for the Malays in Malayan politics, instead regarding the Chinese as central to the politics of a postcolonial, pro-ROC Malaya.

[273] Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Accidental State*, 109-118.

This Part of the thesis has highlighted the effort of the postwar ROC government to construct a relationship of patronage and leadership over the ethnic Chinese living in Malaya and Vietnam, who they saw as their overseas nationals and 'insiders without'. As ROC leaders' planning of postwar international relations and diaspora policy turned out to be mostly illusory, their treatment of a seemingly peripheral group of 'outsiders within' would become unexpectedly important after the retreat to Taiwan. As the end of World War Two brought Taiwan out of the Japanese colonial empire and into Republican Chinese administration, social crisis and resentment of the occupying power characterised the island, not unlike postwar Malaya. Following the 1947 February 28 social conflict, the ROC/KMT state responded with a violent crackdown against not only Communist insurgents, but the local Taiwanese public and elites. ROC officials were hostile towards the Taiwanese, whom they regarded as doubly under the influence of Japan, their former colonial masters, and that of Communist agitators.[274] Ironically, this mirrored the British Malayan state's hostility towards Chineseness, which associated the ideological threat of Communism with diasporic loyalty to the Chinese state. The contrast of ROC policies in these two conflicts demonstrates the importance that officials' nationalist ambitions of Republican China's status and power played in ROC postwar diaspora policies.

Mid-1948 marked the beginning of profound uncertainty for the ROC government on the Mainland, which led to crisis for much of its diplomatic infrastructure. September 1948 saw cascading KMT military defeats starting with the Liaoshen campaign, and the ROC

[274] See Tse-Han Lai, Ramon Myers and Wei You, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*, (Stanford University Press, 1991) and George Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, (Houghton Mifflin, 1965) for general discussion of the February 28 Incident and KMT crackdown in Taiwan.

government initiated its retreat to Taiwan around the same time.[275] CCP advances in south China ruled out the possibility of a KMT remnant state on the Mainland by late 1949.[276] As the case of Chinese safe zones in the First Indochina War shows, not only the diminishing international status, but the material and institutional collapse of the KMT government curtailed its diplomatic activities. The UK's recognition of the PRC in January 1950 ended ROC diplomats' diaspora protection efforts in the Malayan Emergency, while much of the ROC diplomatic network in Malaya disintegrated on the spot. Some consuls, such as Li Nenggeng, decided to resign and settle in Malaya or Singapore.[277] Others, like Wu Bosheng, left for the US.[278] While France still recognised the ROC, it instructed the Associated State under Bao Dai, which administered Vietnam under its tutelage, not to do so, restricting the jurisdiction of ROC diplomats in Vietnam.[279]

From mid-1948 onwards, the US lowered its levels of material support for the KMT's war effort.[280] Yet, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 led to an increase in ROC-US security cooperation that would eventually reduce the uncertainty of the ROC state's survival in Taiwan.[281] By the early 1950s, the changing conditions of Taiwan's standoff with the Mainland and its growing reliance on US security assistance led ROC officials to understand diaspora policy in new terms. In the next chapter, we will examine the changing aims and practices of the ROC on Taiwan's new diaspora policy, through the 1952 Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference.

[275] Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China*, (Harvard University Press, 2009), 385-90.
[276] Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Accidental State*, 106-18.
[277] Nenggeng Li, *Waijiao quannei ershinian* 外交圈內二十年, (Xinwen tiandishe 新聞天地社, 1966), 419-20.
[278] Dunren Liu, 'Fengguang yu qingcao', op. cit.
[279] Jianli dui Baoda zhengfu waijiao guanxi 建立對保大政府外交關係, MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011002-0037 provides the detailed records of ROC Foreign Ministry efforts to build relations with the Bao Dai government.
[280] Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Accidental State*, 67-71.
[281] Ibid, 170-2.

Part Two: A Diaspora Policy for a Cold War State, 1949-1965

Chapter Three: Changing Imperatives of Diaspora Policy: The 1952 Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference and its Legacies

In October 1952, the ROC government convened an Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference 僑務會議 in Taipei, gathering around 300 primarily male leaders of Chinese chambers of commerce, dialect group associations, and Chinese-language schools and newspapers from across the world. Over the course of the ten-day Conference, the delegates listened to speeches from Chiang Kai-Shek and other senior officials, passed motions proposed by the ROC government and by themselves, and were taken to tour Taiwan.[282] The Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference signified and enunciated ROC officials' new diaspora policy as they adapted to rump-statehood on Taiwan, and decolonisation and Cold War dynamics in Asian diplomacy. The historian Shelly Chan has examined the cruciality of diaspora moments of 'transnational exchange and return' which 'erupt and recur when diaspora time interacts with other temporalities and produces unexpectedly wide reverberations'.[283] In contrast to this understanding of moments of connection to the homeland creating diasporic identity, historians such as Taomo Zhou and Rachel Leow have respectively analysed diaspora as multidirectional, and bounded by conceptions of the non-diasporic or local.[284]

For the vast majority of ethnic Chinese, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference could hardly be described as a meaningful 'diaspora moment'. The reliance of ROC diaspora-affairs officials on elite-centric and bureaucratic modes of engagement with the diaspora limited the extent to which the ROC's appeals reached ethnic Chinese beyond pro-KMT, primarily elite circles. At

[282] Qiaowu Huiyi shilu bianji weiyuanhui 僑務會議實錄編輯委員會 (Bianji weiyuanhui), *Qiaowu Huiyi shilu* 僑務會議實錄, (Bianji weiyuanhui, 1953), 1-30.
[283] Shelly Chan, *Diaspora's Homeland*, 13.
[284] Taomo Zhou, "The Multidirectional Diaspora: Writing Chinese Migration History in a Time of Global Racial Reckoning," *The Historical Journal* 67, no. 1 (2024): 178–86; Rachel Leow, "Beyond Diaspora's Horizon."

the same time, the Conference was a moment in which the goals and scope of ROC diaspora policy were reformulated and redefined from the expansive ambitions of the postwar years. These often *anti*-diasporic ruptures and concessions were important to the ROC's relationship with the Chinese diaspora and the political status of the Chinese in postcolonial Southeast Asia, no less than significant interactions of exchange and return. Rather than uniformly promoting or restricting diasporic connections, ROC officials adapted their diaspora policy to the changing needs of the state, namely political legitimacy and diplomatic relations. Sympathies for the ROC were no longer constructed as a real political alternative to integration into anti-Communist nation-states, but rather portrayed as largely complementary with cooperation with local governments. As the Conference and subsequent ROC propaganda showed, pro-Taipei sentiment was reframed as abstract sympathy for the ROC/KMT, rather than diplomatically destabilising overt loyalties, in opposition to support for the PRC/CCP. Thus, the ROC's changing relationship with overseas Chinese communities hastened and reinforced the latter's historical dynamic of growing integration into the political, social, and economic order of the new nation-states. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference also exhibited and reinforced the culturally Chinese, ideologically anti-Communist character of the ROC's own rule over Taiwanese society.

The Conference also demonstrated ROC officials' adaptation of their diaspora policy to the emergence of US-led anti-Communist international relations in Asia. Leaders in the Foreign Ministry, as well as the KMT and other ROC government departments, faced an increasingly unfavourable environment for ROC citizenship claims amidst the emergence of Southeast Asian nation-states. They encouraged overseas Chinese to naturalise and cooperate with local authorities; responding to laws across Southeast Asia targeting the Chinese as economically exploitative middlemen, they encouraged overseas Chinese to adapt by transitioning into

primary and secondary industries. ROC knowledge production and propaganda favorably portrayed assimilation of the Chinese diaspora as a mark of racial superiority and flexible adaptation. Instead of envisioning them as overseas nationals, ROC officials increasingly drew on the ethnic Chinese as agents of friendship between their countries of residence and the ROC, and sources of overseas investment.

The ROC State-Diaspora Relationship in Domestic and International Transition

OCAC Minister Zheng Yanfen 鄭彥棻 organised the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference at a time of domestic and international transition in the ROC's status. In April 1952, Zheng succeeded George Yeh 葉公超, concurrently Foreign Minister, as OCAC Minister.[285] At the time of his appointment, the ROC had begun to consolidate its new status under US security protection as a state confined to Taiwan, as it had been since the June 1950 outbreak of the Korean War.[286] By 1952, Taiwan's military position was shored up by advisors from the US and Japan.[287] The April 1952 peace treaty between the Japanese government, newly reorganised after the end of Allied occupation, and the ROC was an important step in the formalisation of Taipei's cooperation with the anti-Communist bloc. Japan, which would become the US' most important ally in East Asia, gave its *de facto* recognition of ROC sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu.[288] This provided a template for the subsequent US guarantee of mutual defense in the December 1954 security pact, which covered the same areas.[289]

[285] NCCU. 'Zheng Yanfen,' ROC Government Post Database. Accessed 1 Jan 2024 at https://gpost.lib.nccu.edu.tw/display.php?&q=name:%E9%84%AD%E5%BD%A5%E6%A3%BB.
[286] Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Accidental State*, 170-3.
[287] Ibid, 163-4 and 219-221.
[288] Ibid, 179-80.
[289] Ibid, 235-6.

Between 1950 and the Conference in 1952, the KMT leadership's policies on the overseas KMT increasingly reflected Taiwan's enmeshment into this US-led security cooperation in Asia. Formerly a Guangdong provincial government official, Zheng Yanfen had almost no direct involvement with diaspora affairs until he was placed on the KMT's Central Reform Committee 中央改造委員會 in October 1950 by Chiang Kai-Shek to lead the overseas KMT. In the two years of the Central Reform Committee's activities, Zheng travelled extensively in Asia and the Americas to reassure overseas Chinese leaders of the ROC/KMT's vitality, and sent KMT cadres abroad to reorganise shuttered or moribund branches.[290] Under his leadership, the overseas KMT's geographical scope adapted to the ROC's new geopolitical conditions. Before 1949, the overseas KMT's strength broadly matched the contours of overseas support for Chinese nationalist revolutionary movements since the Tongmenghui.[291] For example, the previous Part of this thesis has pointed to the importance of Malaya, a historic centre of pro-KMT activity. Zheng and the Central Reform Committee's policies, however, adjusted the geographical foci of the overseas KMT, such as financial support and visits from Taipei officials, to be in line with Taiwan's Cold War diplomatic networks. Avowed anti-Communist states like Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines were designated as key regions for the overseas KMT, while societies were local governments were hostile like Malaya were excluded from this priority list despite their previous importance.[292] The main exceptions were Hong Kong and Macau, which were geopolitically crucial due to their proximity to the Mainland; and Indonesia, where KMT activities were part of Taipei's active hostility to the postcolonial government.[293]

[290] Tao-chi Lee 李道緝, "To Construct a New 'National State' -- Overseas Chinese Adminstration during the Zheng Yen-Feng Period 建構新「祖國」 鄭彥棻時期(民國39-47 年)的僑務工作," *National Central University Journal of Humanities* 中央大學人文學報 31 (2007): 187-9.
[291] Chuan-Rui Yeh 葉川睿, "Development of Kuomintang's Overseas Movements 中國國民黨海外黨務發展 (1950-1962)," (Master's Thesis, National Jinan International University, 2011), 7.
[292] Ibid, 71.
[293] Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution*, 27.

Zheng's efforts to convene an Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference came into being around the same time as the PRC reformulated its own overseas Chinese policy. There were few direct mentions of PRC diaspora policy in the official documents of the OCAC or Zheng Yanfen's 1972 memoirs; positive references to Beijing's diaspora policy in either would, presumably, have been politically taboo. ROC archival records after 1952 demonstrate that the Taipei government gathered intelligence on PRC diaspora policy, particularly its furtive efforts to conduct a similar conference in 1953, although their knowledge of PRC actions cannot be extrapolated back into 1952 with certainty.[294] Earlier in 1952, the PRC government announced major changes to its own diaspora policy in its 'Instructions Concerning Overseas Compatriot Work'. This directive suggested that China would 'defend the rightful interests' of 'Chinese nationals living abroad' while instructing them 'not to participate in activities to overthrow the local government'.[295] *De jure* if not always in practice, those Chinese who chose to naturalise were placed outside the scope of PRC diaspora policy. However, because of the rarity in ROC sources of direct admissions that Taipei's policy was taking cues from Beijing, the precise extent how much Taipei's policies were developed with direct reference to Beijing remains uncertain.

Zheng's changes to diaspora policy took place within a broader context of the ROC's reformulation of statecraft and governance in the first years of their retreat to Taiwan.[296] After

[294] Examples include Zhonggong ni zhaokai "Huaqiao daibiao huiyi" 中共擬召開「華僑代表會議」. MFA, DEA, AH. 020-042602-0013.

[295] Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu haiwai qiaomin gongzuo de zhishi 中共中央关于海外侨民工作的指示. Yuqing Liu 刘裕清 (ed.), *Zhonggong Dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao* 中共党史教学参考资料, Vol. 19, (Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Guofang Daxue Dangshi Dangjian Zhenggong Jiaoyanshi 中国人民解放军国防大学党史党建政工教研室,1986), 429.

[296] Recent examinations of changes in other, more domestic policy areas include Tzong-Ho Bau, Denus Simon and Marilyn Young (eds.), *Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle*, (Routledge, 1993); Denny Roy, *Taiwan: A Political History*, (Cornell University Press, 2003); Megan Greene, *The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization* (Harvard University Press, 2009); James Lin, *In the Global Vanguard*.

the loss of the Mainland, the ROC regime faced the need to reorganise the basis of its rule and political legitimacy on Taiwan. As the historian Brian Tsui points out, KMT leaders were loath to formally abandon Sun Yat-Sen's intellectual heritage, the Three Principles of the People, as the ROC's guiding ideology. However, in ROC official discourse from the 1950s onwards, the Three Principles no longer denoted an alternative Asian modernity as it had in the Nanjing era, but rather a developmental agenda based on US assistance.[297] For the society of Taiwan, these changes remained a top-down imposition that came from their need to mobilise its resources for defense and later economic development.[298]

Zheng's ministerial portfolio saw a similar dynamic of reformulating the *raison d'etre* of diaspora affairs policy, as the Mainland-era goal of incorporating diaspora affairs into Republican China's regional-powerdom became untenable. In his memoirs, Zheng described the Conference as a response to the sentiments of 'insecurity' in overseas Chinese society since the CCP's victory in the Civil War.[299] Weeks before the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference, the KMT Party Congress had also included overseas delegates for the first time since 1949.[300] The OCAC's notice to convene the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference, written in Zheng's name, presented diasporic loyalty as an important symbol of the political legitimacy on the ROC on Taiwan. It suggested that the Conference was a response to the ROC's 'new situation' of the 'anti-Communist and anti-Russian era'. Delegates of the Conference would 'build relations' with the 'people and military of our country' in the 'anti-Communist and anti-

[297] Brian Tsui, "Resetting China's Conservative Revolution: 'People's Livelihood' in 1950s Taiwan."
[298] For an examination of Taiwanese political history from the perspective of state authority imposed onto local society see Strauss, *State Formation in China and Taiwan*; Wakabayashi Masahiro 若林正丈, *Zhanhou Taiwan zhengzhishi: Zhonghua Minguo Taiwanhua de licheng* 戰後台灣政治史：中華民國台灣化的歷程, trans. Yuru Hong 洪郁如, (NTU Press, 2016); Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity," *The China Quarterly* 165 (2001): 102–29. For historical and anthropological studies of the effects of KMT rule on identity formation see eg Bi-yu Chang, *Place, Identity, and National Imagination in Post-War Taiwan*; Ming-Sho Ho, *Working-Class Formation in Taiwan.* For a discussion of political culture see Allen Chun, "From Nationalism to Nationalizing".
[299] Yanfen Zheng, *Wangshi yishu* 往事憶述, (Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe 傳記文學出版社, 1972), 120.
[300] BMSCA. Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs, October 1952. Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs nos. 59-70, January to December 1952, FCO, MA:M, TNA. FCO 141/7775, 6.

Russian base' of Taiwan. The Conference would also make a 'complete and honest assessment' of the shortcomings of past diaspora affairs policies, and unite the 'overseas compatriots' to 'contribute to our country'.[301]

Loyalty Coexisting with Naturalisation in the Organisation and Proceedings of the Conference

Although ROC officials such as Zheng Yanfen aimed to mobilise the overseas Chinese in support of the KMT/ROC against the CCP/PRC through the Conference, these ambitions were largely unfulfilled as the Conference remained a largely elite-centric event. Nevertheless, it illustrated a substantive shift in the ROC's diaspora policy: overseas Chinese loyalty to the ROC was no longer linked to ROC state patronage of the diaspora and leadership of Asia. Instead, support for Taipei was portrayed as compatible and even complementary with naturalisation and cooperation with local governments, while the CCP was depicted as the main foe of the overseas Chinese. Zheng Yanfen's remarks in his memoirs showed high hopes that the 'loyalty of overseas compatriots' meant that they would give 'enthusiastic support' to initiatives from Taipei.[302] In practice, the selection of Conference delegates largely rallied only existing pro-KMT Chinese elites who often provided a symbolic show of diasporic loyalty to Taipei rather than broad-based popular support. While the Taipei government faced suspicions from many governments and ethnic Chinese elites at the time were often preoccupied with their own countries' politics, their outdated reliance on older, elite-centric modes of state-diaspora relations were equally at fault.

[301] OCAC. Qiaowu Weiyuanhui zhaokai Qiaowu Huiyi tonggao 僑務委員會召開僑務會議通告, Jul 30 1952. Qiaowu Huiyi 僑務會議 (1), MFA, DEA, AH. 020-049910-0081, 4.
[302] Yanfen Zheng, *Wangshi yishu*, 122.

The OCAC's initial suggestions in their notice to convene the Conference to ROC diplomatic missions abroad were that 'OCAC Councilors, overseas Chinese group representatives, experts in diaspora affairs and relevant individuals' should be invited to the Conference regardless of their 'wealth, partisan affiliation, and class'.[303] During the Conference, Zheng suggested in his address to the delegates that diaspora policy should transition 'from the elites to the masses'.[304] The frequent use of the Chinese term *qunzhong* 群眾 to denote the 'masses' was, significantly, used much more commonly across the Strait in the CCP's official communications than in Taiwan. Although it was primarily Zheng Yanfen and not other ROC officials who used this term, this potentially points to Zheng's observation that the CCP's successful mobilisation of domestic and overseas support might be something to be emulated.

Despite these intentions, however, the selection of delegates remained heavily reliant on the leaders of pro-KMT Chinese groups and ROC diplomatic missions. The initial Notice for the Conference suggested that 'general and representative loyal overseas Chinese groups' should send delegates, reflective 'of the distribution of region, hometown, occupation and gender', and who 'should ideally include leaders of commerce and industry, culture, and youth and women's leaders'.[305] Yet, the attention to representativeness became scant in a follow-up set of OCAC guidelines for the missions in July 1952, which suggested that '[ROC] missions abroad', 'OCAC Councilors' or overseas Chinese groups and 'leaders designated by the OCAC' should nominate delegates.[306] Apart from these elite-centric channels, several of the groups that the initial Notice identified were left out; 'class' and wealth, which Zheng Yanfen had mentioned, were absent in the second set of guidelines. Another register of delegates'

[303] Qiaowu Weiyuanhui zhaokai Qiaowu Huiyi tonggao, op. cit.
[304] Bianji weiyuanhui, *Qiaowu Huiyi shilu*, 64.
[305] OCAC. Qiaobao Huiyi zuzhi guicheng 僑胞會議組織規程, Jul 30 1952. AH, 020-049910-0081, 5.
[306] Qiaowu Huiyi qiaotuan daibiao tuixuan yingxing zhuyi shixiang 僑務會議僑團代表推選應行注意事項, Jul 30 1952. Ibid, 6.

particulars included columns for occupation, age, and hometown (*jiguan*), but neglected to include a category for gender.[307] Because of shortness of funds, delegates also had to cover their own travelling expenses, meaning that the Conference was mostly the preserve of pro-KMT business leaders.[308] Presumably for the same reason, there were also few mentions of accompanying family members of Conference delegates in the sources surveyed.

A few case studies of the delegations show that the Conference succeeded only in rallying the elite Chinese in countries which continued to recognise the ROC and allow a public role for the KMT, and fell short of even this limited mobilisation of pro-KMT elites elsewhere. From French Indochina came a 23-strong group consisting of KMT and dialect group association leaders, and school principals and teachers from four major cities.[309] The situation was even more bleak in the British colonies. Monthly reports for senior colonial officials prepared by the British Malayan Secretariat of Chinese Affairs on the Conference, despite their concerns of KMT interference in Malayan affairs, said it was 'hardly… that the Chinese in Malaya will be well represented in Taiwan, or that the delegates selected are influential in Malaya'.[310] Their records also showed that amongst the seven Malayan delegates (and four more from Singapore from the Taipei records), only one was a woman, a school principal named Kwang Siew Chee 鄺少智. This limited representativeness was corroborated by Taipei's records, which listed the Malayan delegates as leaders of low-level hometown associations or state-level MCA offices, and businessmen with no standing in the chambers of commerce.[311] British Hong Kong was another example. The public Conference proceedings described control over labour

[307] Diyijie quanqiu Qiaowu Huiyi gedi chuxi qiaotuan daibiao mingce ji chuxi renyuan meiri pinbao biao 第一屆全球僑務會議各地出席僑團代表名冊及出席人員每日彙報表, Office of the President 總統府 (PO), AH. 011-030800-0060.
[308] Qiaowu Huiyi qiaotuan daibiao tuixuan yingxing zhuyi shixiang, op. cit.
[309] Author's compilations and calculations of biodata listed in AH, 011-030800-0060, 10, 12, 16 and 18-9. Calculations author's own.
[310] BMSCA. Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs, October 1952. FCO 141/7775, 5-6.
[311] Ibid. and AH, 011-030800-0060, 13, 19-20, 24, and 31-2.

organisations there as a key front of the struggle against the CCP.[312] Yet, the Hong Kong delegation included only one trade unionist while there were twelve businessmen.[313] Further, the scarcity of available delegates meant that some delegates were merely ROC officials chosen for their past overseas connections.[314] As historians such as Taomo Zhou have shown for countries such as Indonesia, overseas Chinese sympathy for Taipei was not necessarily confined to elites.[315] Yet, the delegates rallied in the Conference remained unrepresentative of these bases of popular support. The practice of selecting delegates who had quite homogenous political and social backgrounds did not even yield the expected benefit of finding attendees who would be politically loyal. In April 1954, Zheng Yanfen told the Foreign Ministry of OCAC reports that one selected delegate for Vietnam, Fu Linying 符林英, was in fact a Communist. He was not a spy but rather had pleaded unsuccessfully that his mother was ill to get out of attending the Conference.[316]

Despite these limitations, the organisation and proceedings of the Conference allowed ROC officials to construct a public narrative of diasporic loyalty, while at the same time encouraging the ethnic Chinese to naturalise and cooperate with local governments. The *Official Proceedings* of the Conference show that ROC officials constructed a narrative of diasporic loyalty to the ROC, in which the overseas Chinese supported the KMT in its fight against the CCP. This was evident in the grandstanding 'Instruction' (*xunci*) was given by President Chiang Kai-Shek at the opening of the Conference. Chiang welcomed the delegates back to their 'motherland', before exhorting the overseas Chinese to back him against the CCP.[317] A

[312] Bianji weiyuanhui, *Qiaowu Huiyi Shilu*, 77-8.
[313] Zhonghua Minguo Qiaowu Huiyi Xianggang daibiaotuan minglu 中華民國僑務會議香港代表團名錄.AH, 020-049910-0081, 208-19.
[314] AH, 011-030800-0060, 14 and 20.
[315] Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution*, 77-9.
[316] [In Chinese] Savingram from Zheng Yanfen to MFA, Apr 22 1954. Yuenan daibu Gongdang xianyi Huaqiao 越南逮捕共黨嫌疑華僑, MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011007-0161, 74-6.
[317] Bianji weiyuanhui, *Qiaowu Huiyi shilu*, 1.

special exhibit that the delegates were invited to tour near the end of the Conference further elucidated the OCAC's official narrative of overseas Chinese society. Three KMT party elders were brought in to speak to the delegates. Among them, Li Shizeng 李石曾 had studied in France in the 1910s after his early engagement with the Tongmenghui and was then living in Switzerland, and Wu Tiecheng 吳鐵城 had led the KMT's World War Two-era clandestine operations in Southeast Asia. This was followed by a display of overseas Chinese martyrs in the Xinhai Revolution and donations to Sun Yat-Sen, displays of overseas Chinese livelihoods and their gifts to Chiang and the ROC government, Chinese books published abroad, and pictures of the Conference itself.[318]

In turn, the delegations made declarations of steadfast loyalty to the ROC. One example from the Malayan Chinese delegation demonstrates how the delegates expressed the issues that ethnic Chinese faced in the language of overseas compatriots' loyalty to Taipei. They stressed how 'overseas Chinese education (*Huaqiao jiaoyu*)' in Malaya and Singapore followed 'the [Chinese] domestic system'.[319] This differed from the dominant position of Chinese-language advocates in late-colonial Malaya, that the Chinese community and Chinese languages should have equality as part of the postcolonial Malayan nation-state.[320] Towards the end of the Conference, the delegates presented a list of gifts to Chiang Kai Shek, heavily reminiscent of tributary gifts from the dynastic era. A 'ginseng' was presented by the delegation from Korea and a 'tin set with the words "give us our country back" (*huanwo heshan*) engraved' given from Indonesia.[321] The special attention devoted to the former two presents— each occupying about a paragraph in the *Official Proceedings*, before a longer list of other delegations'

[318] Ibid, 134-41.
[319] Ibid, 71.
[320] Ming Chee Ang, *Institutions and social mobilization: the Chinese education movement in Malaysia, 1951-2011*, (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2014), 38-70.
[321] Bianji weiyuanhui, *Qiaowu Huiyi shilu*, 126.

monetary or symbolic gifts—[322] subtly demonstrated the dual expectations in the ROC's views of the overseas Chinese. On one hand, the high praise for the local specialties from these delegations demonstrated ROC officials' tacit encouragement for the Chinese to continue participating in the society and economy of their residence. On the other, symbolic loyalty to Chiang and the ROC was still to be lauded, as seen in the attention given to the slogans inscribed on the gifts.

In public, Chiang and other officials spoke of the 'overseas compatriots' as almost unanimously loyal to Taipei. Yet, the officials of the Foreign Ministry and OCAC took the opportunity of the Conference to encourage overseas Chinese to naturalise and cooperate with their host governments. A month before the Conference, the OCAC convened a meeting attended by Foreign Ministry and Interior Ministry officials. The OCAC's representative reiterated their support for former OCAC Minister George Yeh's policy of 'encouraging the overseas Chinese to take up local citizenship as soon as possible'.[323] The Interior Ministry, which was responsible for citizenship, deferred to the Foreign Ministry and OCAC citing the 'unwieldy' nature of the present, *jus sanguinis* citizenship laws. Yuan Zijian 袁子健, head of the European Affairs department at the Foreign Ministry, elaborated that 'in response to global trends, we should adopt a new attitude and not be bound to the old views of retaining Chinese nationality'. 'Secret discussions' of these views with the delegates should be conducted in recognition of their 'possible reactions' and to prevent 'pre-emptive responses' from foreign governments.[324]

About three weeks later, Yuan's department provided a two-page memorandum on the new citizenship policy to 'print and publicise as necessary' for the OCAC and delegates, while

[322] Bianji weiyuanhui, *Qiaowu Huiyi shilu*, 126-8.
[323] Gejiguan duiyu Qiaowu Huiyi lianxi xiezhu shiyi di'erci huiyi jilu 各機關對於僑務會議聯繫協助事宜第二次會商紀錄, Sep 20 1952. AH, 020-049910-0081, 101.
[324] Ibid, 102.

'other aspects of policy which cannot be publicised now' would be discussed if they came up. This report suggested that 'the people are an important foundation of the country, and nationality law exists to differentiate nationals from foreigners'. Nationality 'provides for the loyalty of the people towards the country' and 'prompts them to contribute to the prosperity and growth of their nation'. The report then reiterated the conundrum in Southeast Asia of the ROC having *jus sanguinis* citizenship laws and the local states having *jus soli* arrangements. This meant that 'dual nationality exists in practice'.[325] The ROC government had always prioritised 'the protection of the overseas compatriots'. Only to preserve the interests of the overseas Chinese did it 'apply the principles of nationality flexibly'. Further, naturalisation did not imply renunciation of Chinese nationality, which was a separate procedure with the Interior Ministry. Additionally, the ROC was a signatory of the 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws. Article 4 of the Convention states that 'a State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a state whose nationality such person also possesses'. The report claimed that the ROC had 'stated its reservations' to this Article, and issued 'instructions to its diplomatic missions' to offer diplomatic protection to its naturalised citizens. Lastly, appeal to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) was brought up as a possible remedy for assimilatory laws.[326]

This document showed that elaborate rhetoric emphasising the importance of overseas Chinese nationality was accompanied by ROC efforts to coax the delegates, and by extension the local Chinese in their countries, towards naturalisation. As chapter six will elaborate in greater detail, Foreign Ministry officials came to adopt the view by the late 1950s at the latest that naturalisation amounted, in practice, to the loss of ROC nationality. Claims that the ethnic

[325] MFA. Qiaowu Huiyi guoji xinzheng baogao 僑務會議國籍新政報告. Ibid, 181.
[326] Ibid, 182.

Chinese had not formally renounced their nationality would simply be disregarded by host governments even if Taipei contested the matter. The role of the 1933 treaty in the ROC's explanation is particularly noteworthy. As the previous chapters have shown, the ROC Foreign Ministry's approach to postwar nationality disputes was not recourse to this treaty, but rather specific agreements with Britain and France. The 1933 treaty had received limited uptake when it was first drafted, and its legal power was by then further diluted by the fact that new postcolonial states had not ratified it.[327] Neither the treaty's restrictions on dual nationality, nor reservations from Nanjing (as it then was), changed the basic fact that citizenship disputes were determined by interstate relations. In the language of the PRC legal historian Neil Diamant, the reference to the 1933 treaty in this memorandum was a kind of 'useful bullshit'.[328] On one hand, it distracted from the responsibility of Taipei's low international status for failed diaspora protection, by suggesting that it faced international law constraints. At the same time, the reservations to the Treaty and the potential appeal to the UNCHR suggested an international-institutional recourse to nationality disputes that was largely illusory.

On matters that were less sensitive than citizenship, the ROC government officials spoke more openly to encourage the delegates to cooperate with the laws of their local governments. Although ROC officials like Zheng Yanfen criticised the 'narrow nationalism' of the newly independent nation-states, they urged the Chinese that compliance with those states was the better part of valor. In his address, Zheng tried to flatter his audience by quoting a 'Japanese parliamentarian' who praised the Chinese for being 'trustworthy', leading to their great success in commerce. As Taiwan was just re-developing its relationship with Japan at the time, Zheng's remarks alluded to ROC officials' ability to broker economic ties between overseas

[327] "Convention on Certain Questions Related to the Conflict of Nationality Laws." *Refworld: Global Law & Policy Database.* Accessed Apr 18 2024 at https://www.refworld.org/legal/agreements/lon/1930/en/17955.
[328] Neil Diamant, *Useful Bullshit: Constitutions in Chinese Politics and Society* (Cornell University Press, 2022),13-4.

Chinese elites and Japan. Zheng then paraphrased the Japanese politician as suggesting that overseas Chinese should extend their success to 'industry' in the spirit of 'progress' and 'cooperation'.[329] At the time, anti-Chinese laws in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia often banned them from their traditional economic niches in trade and commerce, reflecting ethno-nationalist images of the Chinese as economically exploitative middlemen.[330] Zheng appeared to suggest that complying with these laws and channeling capital into secondary industries, as local governments often wanted, might both make overseas Chinese more prosperous and undo negative prejudices. In a telling illustration that ROC officials envisioned these policy changes primarily as a top-down announcement to the diaspora, the ROC sources surveyed did not record the delegates' responses on either citizenship or economic policy.

State-Centric Aims of Diplomacy and Development: Changing Priorities of Resolution Implementation

The responses of the ROC government toward the motions passed by Conference delegates served a new set of state priorities in their diaspora policy. Compared to the postwar years, diaspora protection and assertion of the ROC state's international power were no longer central. By contrast, Taipei's new state needs, namely cooperation with anti-Communist allies and mobilisation of diasporic capital for economic development, took centre stage. This state-centric vision of diaspora policy took precedence above ideologies of diaspora nationalism. In contrast to their narratives of diasporic loyalty in public, ROC officials tempered their political mobilisation of the diaspora due to resource and diplomatic considerations.

[329] *Qiaowu Huiyi shilu*, 64.
[330] See eg Philip Kuhn, *Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times*, (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 283-320 for some country- and region-level discussion of Sinophobic economic policies in Southeast Asia.

ROC officials' efforts to engage overseas Chinese business elites in their diaspora policy demonstrated a concern not only with attracting investment to develop the economy, but to utilise the overseas Chinese's economic clout for Taipei's diplomatic needs. For example, one effort by the two ministries to implement delegates' proposals for an 'economic alliance' between the ROC, Japan, and Southeast Asia through their diaspora policy was particularly illustrative.[331] Japan was a major US ally and Asian economy that had recently stabilised its ties with Taipei through the April 1952 peace treaty, and ROC officials demonstrated a strong interest in bolstering the Taipei-Tokyo relationship through the economic dimensions of their diaspora policy. Overseas Chinese economic elites were to promote trade between Southeast Asia, Japan, and Taiwan. Furthermore, Taipei state media demonstrated the importance of strengthening the economic and political relationship with Japan in their reportage. The state-controlled *Central Daily News* 中央日報 in Taiwan and pro-ROC, anti-Communist Hong Kong newspaper *Kung Sheung Daily News* 工商日報 both prominently reported the attention that the Conference received from Japanese journalists.[332] Conversely, ROC officials also emphasised the importance of their diaspora policy to the Japanese economy; one Conference resolution that was passed threatened an economic boycott of Japan if it were to trade with the PRC.[333]

Furthermore, ROC officials emphasised how their support of overseas Chinese business leaders would mitigate the potential of ethnic Chinese issues to cause domestic and regional political discord in Southeast Asia. As the previous chapters have discussed, colonisers and ethnic

[331] OCAC. Cujin Dongnanya diqu jingji maoyi zuotanhui jilu 促進東南亞地區經濟貿易座談會紀錄, Oct 31 1952. Qiaowu Huiyi 僑務會議 (2), MFA, DEA, AH. 020-049910-0082, 7.
[332] "Ribao jizhe baodao Qiaowu Huiyi zhongda chengjiu 日報記者報導僑務會議重大成就," *Central Daily News*, Nov 2 1952, 1 ; "Zhonggong baozheng canhai Huaqiao tongbao Huaqiao fenkai feichang zengqiang fan'gong yizhi 中共暴政殘害華僑同胞 華僑憤慨非常 增強反共意志," *Kung Sheung Daily News,* Oct 22 1952, 1.
[333] "Qiaowu Huiyi fabiao shengming, Riben shangren ruoyu Zhonggong maoyi, Huaqiao ji jujue yu Riben hezuo 僑務會議發表聲明 日本商人若與中共貿易 華僑即拒絕與日本合作," *Wah Kiu Yat Pou* 華僑日報, Oct 27 1952, 2.

Chinese's 'lazy native' narratives in Southeast Asia were often opposed by ethnic nationalisms that portrayed the Chinese as economically exploitative. By the time of the Conference, ROC officials responded to such prejudice not by equally racist rhetoric, as they had in the postwar years, but by efforts to mitigate the impact of Sinophobic nationalism and even accepting its assumptions. He Yiwu 何宜武, the OCAC official in charge of economic policy, gave a summary of his department's work in a 1959 volume of *Essays of Overseas Chinese Issues* 華僑問題論文集, published by the OCAC-affiliated China Diaspora Affairs Academic Society 中國僑政學會. He's analysis of the Chinese in Southeast Asia partially accepted Sinophobic discourses of Chinese business elites as exploitative middlemen; the article stated that overseas Chinese should 'understand that the *comprador* (*maiban*) model is no longer popular' as the 'colonial economic model has changed with the times'.[334] They had to give greater consideration to the needs of the local economy for industrialisation and development, as Chinese enterprises and the economies they operated within were an 'organic whole'.[335]

Despite the intentions of ROC officials, the concrete effects of ROC diaspora policies on both the economies of the overseas Chinese and other ethnicities' perceptions thereof appeared limited. He Yiwu only listed several examples of ROC officials assisting ethnic Chinese-owned businesses that were extremely limited in scale. These included supplying 'fishing boats and staff' to a 'Singaporean Chinese' and 'machinery and technological cooperation' for a 'cement factory' in Malaya.[336] The effort to attract diasporic trade and investment was more fruitful. In the 1950s, the absolute amount of overseas Chinese investment was limited, but formed a significant proportion of investment in Taiwan's fledgling economy. The scale of economic

[334] Yiwu He, "Huaqiao jingji shiye fazhan de xinfangxiang 華僑經濟事業發展的新方向," *Huaqiao Wenti Lunwenji* 華僑問題論文集 6, (1959): 56-65 reproduced in Bangli He 何邦理, *He Yiwu yu Huaqiao jingji* 何宜武與華僑經濟, (Duli zuojia chubanshe 獨立作家出版社, 2015), 191.
[335] Ibid, 190.
[336] Ibid, 193.

ties with the diaspora rose, albeit to a lesser extent than links to other foreign economies, as Taiwan transitioned into an export-oriented economy in the late 1950s.[337]

The newfound centrality of diplomatic relations to ROC diaspora policy was further evidenced in the Foreign Ministry's passive response to motions calling for diaspora protection, except where opportunities to strengthen its alliances through diaspora policy presented themselves. For example, the delegates from Japan raised a series of complaints ranging from restrictions on Chinese-owned businesses using 'oral instructions or legal loopholes' and unfair 'ambiguities' in taxation regulations, to difficulties in ascertaining loans and other 'discriminatory and repressive' measures. [338] Yet, the Embassy to Japan simply clarified that no action would be taken because these allegations were found to have 'no basis in fact' following 'confidential enquiries and discussions' with 'compatriots across Japan'.[339] Officials in the Foreign Ministry also responded to Conference motions with the aim of minimising future conflicts over Chinese naturalisation. The Interior Ministry initially thought favorably of a proposal that would allow Chinese communal associations to pass out forms to register ROC nationals abroad on behalf of the ROC government. The Foreign Ministry stalled them on several occasions before finally announcing that there would be no change to the existing procedure of registration through diplomatic missions only.[340] The Foreign Ministry did not detail its considerations to the Interior Ministry, but diplomatic run-ins over naturalisation might escalate if more ethnic Chinese registered themselves with ROC missions or Chinese associations, rather than staying in an existing, ambiguous limbo. The time, money, and administrative costs of registration at an embassy could limit the number of registrations.

[337] Tao-Chi Lee, "To Construct a New 'National State', " 200-2; Bangli He, *He Yiwu yu Huaqiao jingji,* 136-8.
[338] [In Chinese] Savingram from Embassy in Japan to MFA, nd. AH, 020-049910-0082, 84.
[339] Ibid, 85.
[340] Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference Motion Implementation Working Group, OCAC. Qiaowu Huiyi'an zhixing xiaozu di'erci huiyi 僑務會議案執行小組第二次會議, Dec 24 1952. AH, 020-049910-0082., 35-7.

By contrast, the Foreign Ministry made a promise to aid exiles from Mainland China who could not be classified as refugees, which had been dispersed in 'Hong Kong and Macau, India and Pakistan, Vietnam, Burma, and other places'. The Foreign Ministry stated that it would 'work with the US to offer relief' to these individuals, and those with 'special skills or who were intellectuals' would be organised by the quasi-official Free China Relief Association 中國大陸災胞救濟總會 (FCRA) into a 'Chinese Exiled Intellectuals' Relief Association' for 'priority in relief'.[341] The Foreign Ministry saw an opportunity to bolster these exiles as potential allies in the fight against the CCP, and to work with the US to influence the opinion of overseas Chinese. The proposal required only financial assistance and was not thought to contain the possibility for diplomatic conflict with anti-Communist allies. Although the exiled intellectuals' association was not put into practice, as historians like Meredith Oyen have discussed, refugee resettlement did become a significant sphere of Washington-Taipei cooperation in the 1950s and 1960s.[342]

Although the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference saw public displays of overseas Chinese support for the ROC's support for anti-Communism, in practice, ROC officials often adapted anti-Communist political mobilisation to be compliant with their diplomatic needs. The Conference saw the resolution of an 'Overseas Chinese Anti-Communist National Salvation Charter 海外華僑反共救國公約'. Despite the boisterous political rhetoric in the charter title, concerns of diplomatic sensitivity loomed large in ROC instructions to the delegates. The Charter would be billed as an 'Overseas Chinese Anti-Communist Anti-Russian Charter' or 'Overseas Chinese National Salvation Charter' 'in accordance with local political conditions',

[341] Qiaowu Huiyi'an zhixing qingxing yilanbiao 僑務會議議案執行情形一覽表. AH, 020-049910-0082, 282.
[342] Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration*, 154-84.

presumably in countries with a more ambivalent diplomatic stance.[343] ROC government departments were often also reluctant to spend their limited resources on anti-Communist initiatives targeting the overseas Chinese, as few new funds were allocated to these purposes. In internal discussions after the Conference, the Education Ministry reported that it could afford to distribute booklets and textbooks to schools abroad, but not to subsidise Chinese schools abroad directly. Similarly, the KMT propaganda department could send books overseas, but did not have the resources to subsidise overseas newspapers regularly.[344] Rather, one principal legacy of the Conference was merely to beget similar junkets. A 1960 OCAC booklet detailed no less than four conferences held on different themes of overseas Chinese issues between 1954 and 1957, during Zheng Yanfen's term.[345]

Furthermore, not only were the anti-Communist organisations after the Conference often only existing pro-KMT leaders in a new garb, ROC diplomats were frequently more interested in containing their potential for diplomatic fallout than expanding their popular support. A few years on, they had been founded in most countries which had sent delegations to the Conference by the OCAC's count. However, sources from Malaya and the RVN showed the limitations to these associations. According to the monthly colonial reports on Chinese affairs, in the largest Malayan state of Selangor, 'the bigger Associations were unwilling to sponsor' March 1953 celebrations for Chiang Kai-Shek's resumption of the Presidency, during which the pro-KMT Chinese signed the Anti-Communist National Salvation Pact. While 'similar celebrations' were held in other states, their locations and scale were generally unreported, suggesting that they may have been equally unsuccessful.[346]

[343] Bianji weiyuanhui, *Qiaowu Huiyi shilu,* 100.
[344] Qiaowu Huiyi'an zhixing qingxing yilanbiao, op. cit, 221, 230-2, 298-9.
[345] OCAC. *Shinianlai de haiqai Qiaobao* 十年來的海外僑胞*,* (Haiwai chubanshe 海外出版社, 1960), 23-35.
[346] BMSCA. March 1953 Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs Nos 71-82, January to December 1952, FCO, MA:M, TNA. FCO 141/7629, 7.

In the RVN, one of Taiwan's closest allies in Southeast Asia, the Foreign Ministry was often more concerned with preventing pro-ROC associations from provoking conflict with local authorities, even when Zheng Yanfen's OCAC wanted to bolster their scale. In November 1955 Zheng Yanfen wrote to the Foreign Ministry that he had learnt of a 39-year old from Jiangsu named Feng Guodong 馮國棟 setting up an 'Overseas Chinese Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps 南越華僑青年反共救國團' to provide intelligence to both Taipei and Saigon.[347] The response soon came that the 'name and purpose' of the association was 'unsuitable' and that Feng should bring any intelligence or proposals for activities to either the local consulate or the KMT branch.[348] This was apparently not because the existing anti-Communist groups in Vietnam were fit for purpose. In 1955, Zheng Yanfen was told that the local KMT was branded the 'exploiters' party' (*guamindang* 刮民黨) by the Chinese there for its efforts to extort the Chinese in the name of collecting anti-Communist funds.[349] In 1956 the charge d'affaires to Saigon clarified to the *Bao The Gioi* 世界報, the main Chinese newspaper in the city, that those who had 'not joined the anti-Communist societies' because of 'economic reasons' were 'also patriotic'.[350] The case of the National Salvation Associations shows that ROC efforts to mobilise the ethnic Chinese in favour of Taipei were often conducted through ROC diplomats abroad, who had lukewarm, skeptical responses to pro-KMT activity like Feng's proposal. Despite its differences with the Foreign Ministry, the OCAC's bureaucratic peripherality gave it little authority to override the local mission's discretion.

---

[347] [In Chinese] Savingram from Zheng Yanfen to MFA, Nov 25 1955. Yuenan zajuan 越南雜卷 (1), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011099-0023, 146-9.

[348] Shangtao Feng Guodong Liao Chunxin deng zai Yuenan zuzhi Nanyue Huaqiao Qingnian Fan'gong Jiuguotuan zuotanhui 商討馮國棟廖春歆等在越南組織南越華僑青年反共救國團座談會. Ibid, 152.

[349] [In Chinese] Savingram from Zhang Yanyuan to Zheng Yanfen, Aug 8 1955. Yuenan zajuan 越南雜卷 (3), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011099-0024, 91.

[350] "Jiang Daiban wei zhengqiu fan'gong huiyuan, fabiao zhongyao shumian tanhua: yi ruhui de guwei rexin fenzi, yin jingji wei ruhui de yishu aiguo 蔣代辦為徵求反共會員 發表重要書面談話：已入會的故為熱心份子 因經濟未入會的亦屬愛國," *Bao The Gioi*, Jul 20 1956. Ibid, 96.

Failures of Mutual Understanding: Exchanges between Overseas Chinese, the ROC on Taiwan, and Outside Observers

The top-down, state centric nature of the Conference, and by extension the relationship ROC officials sought to cultivate with the overseas Chinese, was further evidenced in the interactions between the delegates and ROC officials. The latter portrayed Taiwan to the delegates as a space where an official vision of nation-state building was successfully implemented, rather than a society that could develop organic connections to the ethnic Chinese abroad. Conversely, the Conference delegates' elite-dominated backgrounds limited how far they could relay useful intelligence about ethnic Chinese communities to Taipei; nor were ROC officials always interested or competent in ascertaining the sentiment of non-elite Chinese. In addition to other states' constraints on pro-ROC activities abroad, the cumulative result of these failures of mutual understanding was that the Conference yielded few substantial effects on the politics of most overseas Chinese, particularly those outside pro-KMT elite circles.

ROC officials attempted to gauge the opinions of the overseas Chinese during the Conference through informal consultation and surveillance of the delegates. The accuracy of such reports might have been marred by platitudes; one report, made by the Executive Yuan Secretariat 行政院秘書處 to the Foreign Ministry, made frequent references to delegates' positive comments on 'stability and progress' of Taiwan, the 'industriousness' of its officials and wishes for 'the health of the President'. Yet, the biggest problem was apparently not with the willingness of ROC ministers to hear bad news, but the ability of the delegates to reflect it with a useful degree of analysis and detail. The report was candid in suggesting that most delegates reflected that the ROC's 'overseas propaganda work [was] suboptimal'. However, their suggestions for

improvement were often vague or absent. Often, the more specific pieces of intelligence from the delegates to the Secretariat appeared to be about interpersonal, elite disputes. For example, the Chilean delegation complained of the local Ambassador 'having a bad attitude' and 'disappointing the loyal compatriots' in responding to 'Communist-leaning organisations'.[351] The delegates, perhaps owing to their elite-dominated makeup, did not offer particularly detailed analyses of what might make the ROC illegitimate or questionable to different groups of overseas Chinese, least of all the groups that Zheng Yanfen referenced in his writings such as youth, women, or workers.

The OCAC's confidence in the ability of the delegates and the Conference to bring word overseas of Taipei's support for the Chinese diaspora was similarly misplaced. Ultimately, the Conference seemed to be a small footnote in the ongoing propaganda battle in overseas Chinese communities. In the first instance, the extent to which local societies knew of the conference was limited by local governments' hostility towards the KMT. According to Taipei, laudatory films about the Conference were shown to as many as tens of thousands of people in ardently anti-Communist countries like Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the ensuing year. However, other regions that had recognised the PRC, like Indonesia and the British colonies in Asia, banned the film.[352] Furthermore, it appeared that even newspaper editors of both pro-ROC and pro-PRC persuasions regarded the Conference as of tangential importance to their readership. In Hong Kong, which had a larger population of recent refugees and immigrants from China, the overseas Chinese policies of both Beijing and Taipei garnered attention. Yet, the focus was not Taipei's policy initiatives but rather the treatment of diasporic returnees to China; pro-Beijing newspapers often represented these returnees' lives positively while the

[351] Executive Yuan Secretariat. Qiaoqing pinbao 僑情稟報. AH, 020-049910-0081, 271.
[352] Bianji weiyuanhui, *Qiaowu Huiyi shilu,* 143-56.

pro-Taipei outlets alleged that they were maltreated and persecuted.[353] In Singapore and Malaya, politics had a more local tenor because of debates over the Emergency and decolonisation, and the China pages were quite slim altogether. Newspapers of a more moderate non-Communist inclination in all of these societies, including the *Sing Tao Daily News* 星島日報 in Hong Kong, and the *Sin Chew Jit Poh* 星洲日報 and *Nanyang Siang Pao* 南洋商報 in Singapore, largely reproduced brief factual reports from Taiwan.[354]

Much as the reach of the Conference was largely limited, the top-down approach of ROC officials to diaspora policy also meant that Conference delegates had less experience of Taiwan as a society than a geopolitical and industrial space under the state's tutelage. In the early years of the ROC's retreat, senior ROC leaders largely understood Taiwan as a space to be transformed through military and industrial modernization.[355] In the shadow of the 1947 mass killings and ongoing White Terror, they treated Taiwan's own history and culture with ignorance at best, and hostility at worst. This attitude permeated into the OCAC's portrayal of Taiwan to the Conference delegates. The *Proceedings* of the Conference meticulously documented the experiences of the delegates, down to the laundry and barbershop facilities that were provided for them.[356] Yet, any affinity that delegates felt to Taiwan as a place and society, as opposed to the ROC state, was either so limited that it did not feature in these reports or deemed too insignificant to be included. The tours for the delegates highlighted the KMT's

[353] Based on brief assessments of the distribution of articles in the China pages of each of these newspapers between Oct 21 and 31 1952 by the author. Eg "Guiqiao shenghuo de xingfu: ji Yinni guiqiao Wei Jin tanhua 歸僑生活的幸福：記印尼歸僑魏金談話," *Ta Kung Pao* 大公報, Oct 21 1952, 2;
"Gang Ao qiaobao liu Sui jiashu tezao gunzhi: guiding meizhou baodao yici jiantao sixiang 港澳僑胞留穗家屬突遭管制：規定每週報到一次檢討思想," *Kung Sheung Daily News,* Oct 21 1952, 3.

[354] Eg "Gang Ri Huaqiao daibiao zuojun dida Taibei Qiaowu Huiyi minggao kaimu 港日華僑代表 昨均抵達台北 僑務會議明告開幕," *Sing Tao Daily News,* Oct 20 1952, 2*; "*Taibei zhaokai Qiaowu Huiyi 臺北召開僑務會議*," Nanyang Siang Pau,* Oct 28 1952, 3; *"*Tai Qiaowu Huiyi kaimu Jiang zhici huyu tuanjie 台僑務會議開幕將 蔣致詞呼籲團結*," Sin Chew Jit Poh*, Oct 22 1952, 1.

[355] Szonyi, *Cold War Island* offers a specific discussion of the concepts of geopoliticisation and militarisation as they apply to ROC-controlled territories in Taiwan and its outlying islands.

[356] Bianji weiyuanhui, *Qiaowu Huiyi shilu,* 24.

successful reform programme on Taiwan in schools, factories, and military bases. To the extent that Taiwan's history featured in the itinerary, it was to provide a parallel for Chiang's current project of national salvation. When visiting the southern city of Tainan, the delegates were taken to pay tribute to the 'national hero Zheng Chenggong', or Koxinga 鄭成功／國姓爺.[357] In the post-1949 ROC regime, Koxinga was valorised as a historical parallel to Chiang Kai-Shek and later Chiang Ching-Kuo. They were cast as heroes fighting against the odds to restore the rightful Chinese government from the base of Taiwan.[358] This deployment of Taiwan's heritage reinforced ROC state leaders' militarised, geopoliticised narrative of Taiwan.

The treatment of the Hokkien language was particularly illustrative of ROC officials' largely superficial understanding of the opportunities for stronger connections between Taiwan and Southeast Asian Chinese communities. Hokkien (Minnan) was the predominant variety of Chinese spoken in Taiwan, and the *lingua franca* of many Southeast Asian Chinese communities. After the Conference, the Foreign Ministry agreed, cost permitting, to hire more officers of Guangdong and Fujian origin who spoke the 'dialects' of the diaspora, or to train officers who were not proficient.[359] By contrast, the recruitment of *benshengren* Taiwanese into the Foreign Ministry was seemingly never raised. Zheng Yanfen's own provincialism was perhaps partially responsible for this mentality. In the 1950s, Zheng's detractors in the dissident *Free China* 自由中國 periodical accused him of favoring his Cantonese co-ethnic cronies.[360] However, the underlying cause was arguably that early 1950s ROC foreign and diaspora affairs officials simply did not understand– or care about– Taiwan's society, history, and culture enough to usefully incorporate it into their policies. Zheng Yanfen sometimes opined in his

[357] Bianji weiyuanhui, *Qiaowu Huiyi shilu,* 117-25.
[358] Tonio Andrade, "Koxinga's Conquest of Taiwan in Global History: Reflections on the Occasion of the 350th Anniversary," *Late Imperial China* 33, no. 1 (2012): 122–40 provides a brief summary of the different politicisations of Koxinga's history.
[359] Qiaowu Huiyi'an zhixing qingxing yilanbiao. AH, 020-049910-0082, 258.
[360] Nainan Qiao 喬迺南, "Dangqian qiaowu de jiantao yu cejin 當前僑務的檢討與策進," *Free China* 自由中國 19, no. 8 (Oct 16 1958), 21-4.

writings that most overseas Chinese had little connection to Taiwan, and all he had to go on was their loyalty to the ROC and to anti-Communism.[361] Yet, Taiwan's invisibility as a society to ROC officials and their allies in the diaspora was itself something of a self-fulfilling prophecy, resulting from ROC officials' portrayal of Taiwan to the delegates largely as a military base and site of investment. In the late 1950s, representations of Taiwan to the overseas Chinese took on greater nuance, as other historians have highlighted.[362] This developed in tandem with ROC officials' own acculturation to their territory. In settling returning Chinese from Indonesia in the late 1950s, for example, OCAC official He Yiwu worked with counties with large Hakka-speaking populations, as Hakka was the dominant dialect in Indonesia.[363] These changes, however, remained partial and instrumental in nature. He, a Fuzhouese, tellingly remarked in an interview after his retirement that he learned Hokkien because 'many overseas Chinese were Cantonese or Minnan', without reference to the fact that Hokkien prevailed in Taiwan itself.[364]

Janus-Faced Diasporic Loyalty: Post-Conference OCAC Knowledge Production

After the 1952 Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference, the OCAC and its associated bodies produced a large body of knowledge that advanced a Janus-faced understanding of the overseas Chinese. The latter should promote the ROC's relations with the countries they lived in and support its struggle against the CCP, in return for limited concrete guarantees of protection from the 'motherland'. At the same time, they should welcome naturalisation in their respective countries and cooperate with local policies. The new needs of Taipei's state meant that the role of racial prejudice contrasted sharply with the postwar years. ROC knowledge production

[361] Tao-Chi Lee, "To Construct a New 'National State," 187.
[362] Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors*, 152-80.
[363] Bangli He, *He Yiwu yu Huaqiao jingji*, 124.
[364] Ibid, 47.

continued to portray the Chinese diaspora as loyal nationals and often as racial superiors to other Asians. Yet, these essentialist and racist narratives were instrumentalised to justify the ROC's new policy of making concessions to allies on the citizenship and rights of the ethnic Chinese.

Although intelligence reports and Conference motions nominally spurred the OCAC to produce more books, comics and films for overseas Chinese audiences, Zheng Yanfen's memoirs depict his own initiative as the main motivation to produce these books. A former Dean of the Law School of the National Zhongshan University 國立中山大學 before he entered the Guangdong provincial government, Zheng held a view of 'the bureaucratic organisation taking after the school' (*jiguan xuexiaohua*).[365] He was proud to have received a 'bookshelf's worth' of the OCAC's published books from his colleagues when he left his post.[366]

The books produced following the Conference by the OCAC and KMT's Overseas Work Group included booklets of the OCAC and records of Cheng's speeches and essays, presumably targeted at ROC bureaucracies and friendly overseas Chinese leaders; academic texts including annals and edited volumes, which had both a bureaucratic and an academic audience; and lastly, short readers and pamphlets meant for general and youth audiences.[367] The Overseas Books Publisher 海外文庫出版社, responsible for the booklets targeting the general audience, offered to 'subsidise' the costs of reproduction by schools and 'other individuals interested in education' in the prefaces of the books.[368] The extent of circulation of

[365] Yanfen Zheng, *Wangshi yishu*, 74.
[366] Ibid, 129.
[367] Author's categorisation of titles listed in *Haiwai shukan mulu* 海外書刊目錄, (Haiwai chubanshe, 1958). Although Haiwai wenku chubanshe (Overseas Books Publisher 海外文庫出版社) and Haiwai chubanshe were both ROC/KMT-controlled, they were organisationally distinct.
[368] Ibid, 72.

these books cannot be ascertained precisely, but appeared to be a function primarily of Taipei's foreign relations. Chien-Wen Kung, for example, has pointed to the texts' prevalence in the Philippines' Chinese-language education system.[369] By contrast, a digital search in the online databases of the Hong Kong and Singapore public library systems failed to turn up most of the books, suggesting that their circulation in British South East Asia might have been more limited. One speculative exception to this development may have been the Chinese independent high schools of Malaysia which are autonomously run by the Chinese community and educate a minority of Malayan Chinese youth.[370] Notably, these texts have been significant to the academic study of overseas Chinese issues, as many copies can be found in university libraries around the world.

The makeup of the editorial committee of the *Gazette of the Overseas Chinese* 華僑志 shows that these books were produced under close OCAC control to ensure that it served Taipei's policy aims. Few of the authors had much academic engagement with overseas Chinese issues before their posting. Instead, the editorial committee of the *Gazette* was chaired by Li Pusheng, the Deputy Minister of the OCAC. Li was a Cantonese who moved to Guangdong from the Dutch East Indies as a teenager and had been a KMT functionary in his adulthood.[371] Three section editors were OCAC or KMT officials, while another two had been local officials in Guangdong before the retreat to Taiwan.[372]

---

[369] Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors*, 136-42.
[370] Suggested to the author by Dr Allan Pang at Hong Kong History Workshop, University of Bristol, November 2024.
[371] Yu Gong, "Zhongguo tongzijun zhi yuanlao Li Pusheng 中國童子軍之元老李樸生".
[372] He Yiwu xiansheng zishang weiyuanhui 何宜武先生治喪委員會. He Yiwu xiansheng shengping shilue 何宜武先生生平事略, *FCU Weekly* 逢甲週報. Accessed Sep 1 2023 at https://www.fcu.edu.tw/fcuweekly/news/2002011609/ ; NCCU. 'Deng Feipeng 鄧飛鵬,' ROC Government Post Database. Accessed Sep 1 2023 at https://gpost.lib.nccu.edu.tw/display.php?&q=name:%E9%84%A7%E9%A3%9B%E9%B5%AC; NCCU. 'Zhu Xiuxia 祝秀俠,' ROC Government Post Database. Accessed Sep 1 2023 at https://gpost.lib.nccu.edu.tw/display.php?&q=name:%E9%84%A7%E9%A3%9B%E9%B5%AC; "Dong Shifang shishi huifou yingxiang Aomen Guofu Jinianguan yequan? 董世芳逝世會否影響澳門國父紀念館業權？," *Journal San Wa Ou* 新華澳報, Jan 19 2002. Accessed Sep 1 2023 at https://www.waou.com.mo/2002/01/19/%E8%91%A3%E4%B8%96%E8%8A%B3%E9%80%9D%E4%B8%96%E6%9C%83%E5%90%A6%E5%BD%B1%E9%9F%BF%E6%BE%B3%E9%96%80%E5%9C%8B%E7%88%B6%E7%B4%80%E5%BF%B5%E9%A4%A8%E6%A5%AD%E6%AC%8A%EF%BC%9F%20%E8%91%A3%E4%B8%96%E8%8Ab/.

One expected feature of these books was to portray the overseas Chinese as loyal citizens of the ROC. The organisation of Taipei's *Gazette* presented the citizenship of the overseas Chinese as just as important a symbol of ROC legitimacy as its control of Taiwan. They were organised not by place of ancestry– Guangdong, Fujian, Chaozhou and so forth– as they have been in contemporary China's local history annals, but rather by country of residence. There were separate annals for countries like Vietnam and Malaya, and even places as small as the island of Reunion.[373] The implication was that the overseas Chinese, dispersed in countries the world over, remained citizens of the ROC. The children's readers also highlighted the ROC as the subject of overseas Chinese support; these included compilations of Sun Yat-Sen's letters and speeches overseas, and biographies of overseas Chinese among the martyrs of the 1911 Huanghuagang 黃花崗 uprising.[374]

Yet, the more interesting feature of these books was their subtle approval of naturalisation and adaptation to host societies' policies. In a booklet written briefly after the Conference, Zheng Yanfen outlined the new focus of diaspora affairs as anti-Communism. His account of protecting the overseas Chinese did not include questions of political participation or citizenship, but rather focussed on promoting Chinese education, culture, and enterprises.[375] In 1955, Cheng wrote a second pamphlet that encouraged the overseas Chinese to take up local nationality and defend their rights and welfare by working with the locally born overseas Chinese and the local society.[376]

---

[373] Huaqiao zhi bianji weiyuanhui 華僑志編輯委員會[HBW], *Huaqiao zhi: Malaiya* 華僑志：馬來亞, (HBW, 1959), *Huaqiao zhi: Yuenan* 華僑志：越南, (Ibid, 1958), and *Huaqiao zhi: Liuniwang* 華僑志：留尼旺, (ibid, 1966).

[374] Haiwai chubanshe (ed.), *Guofu dui haiwai qiaobao de yijiao* 國父對海外僑胞的遺教, (Haiwai chubanshe, 1953); Yunzhang Sui 眭雲章, *Qishi'er lieshi zhong de Huaqiao* 七十二烈士中的華僑, (Haiwai chubanshe, 1958).

[375] Yanfen Zheng, *Dangqian qiaowu zhi renshi ji qi nuli zhi fangxiang* 當前僑務之認識及其努力之方向, (Haiwai chubanshe, 1952), 30-5.

[376] Yanfen Zheng, *Qiaowu wenti de xin renshi* 僑務問題的新認識, (Haiwai chubanshe, 1953), 117-26.

OCAC officials and the intellectuals who worked with them responded to this tension by invoking discourses of Chinese racial superiority to justify Taipei's concessions on Chinese diasporic issues. One example was the Republican Chinese museologist and educator Li Shizeng 李石曾's discourse of overseas Chinese as a moral and racial category, rather than an identity defined by political citizenship. For an edited volume *Essays on Overseas Chinese Problems* in 1958, Li gave an opening address at a seminar on what he called 'kiaologie' (*qiaoxue*).[377] Zheng Yanfen regarded Li as his closest partner in his efforts to promote academic understanding of overseas Chinese issues.[378] Li defined the character *qiao* as connoting 'enthusiasm and progress', and 'improvement and upwards movement', as opposed to the 'Latin term' (presumably *diaspora*) which suggested 'denigration and exile'.[379] According to him, the diaspora (*qiaomin*) of China were '90% virtuous' whereas the 'immigrant', which referred to migrants from the rest of the world, was only '10% virtuous'. The *qiao* gave 'a good impression on the locals' and promoted 'righteous causes in their countries of residence'.[380] Li espoused Chinese racial superiority above other cultures, but his racialised views belied another key reason why the OCAC promoted views like his. They justified the OCAC's existing rationale of diaspora policy while distancing it from controversial *jus sanguinis* claims to citizenship and state authority over Chinese who lived abroad.

In 1961, OCAC Deputy Minister Li Pusheng asserted a similar discourse which, in comparison to Li Shizeng's, was more overtly concerned with encouraging naturalisation and defending Taipei's changes in diaspora policy. Li claimed was precisely because of the overseas Chinese's racial superiority and primordial links to China that they did not need the ROC's

[377] Shizeng Li, "Qiaoxue de jianli 僑學的建立," *Huaqiao Wenti Lunwenji* 華僑問題論文集 4 (1957): 1-6.
[378] Yanfen Zheng, *Wangshi yishu,* 127-9.
[379] Shizeng Li, ‚Qiaoxue de jianli', 1.
[380] Ibid, 2.

intervention to stake out a good living and equal status. He explained in outright racist terms why the 'ethnic Chinese' would have a bright future after their naturalisation. While Li criticised Diem's recent nationality laws, he dispelled any notion that Chinese would lose their cultural identities after naturalising because 'lower cultures cannot assimilate higher cultures'.[381] He gave the example that the Manchus had been assimilated into 'higher culture' after the Qing conquest of China. Further, ethnic Chinese were good politicians because of their 'outstanding administrative ability, and responsible and loyal approach to their official positions', and were also 'dominant' in the sciences.[382] Li then compared the Chinese to Jewish people, who 'despite having great material wealth had a very regrettable spiritual life without a homeland' and so 'established Israel at great cost'.[383] Li did not immediately exhort the Chinese to contribute to the ROC as the Jews did Israel but rather said speculatively that '*if* [italics added] the ROC liberates the Mainland, it will be a great encouragement to the Chinese compatriots and ethnic Chinese everywhere'. He then stressed that the task of the overseas Chinese was now 'to promote Chinese philosophy and politics to the world much as they did Chinese cuisine'. Li stressed that the overseas and ethnic Chinese alike must understand that 'their relationship with the local country was most central to their lives', and concern themselves with local politics, economy, and culture. The 'support' of the motherland was already guaranteed the ROC 'did not differentiate between *huaqiao* and *huaren*'.[384] Therefore, citizenship and patronage from the ROC should not occupy the diaspora's attention.

The *General Gazette*'s section on the overseas Chinese economy, edited by He Yiwu, demonstrated a similar instrumentalisation of racist 'lazy native' narratives to encourage ethnic Chinese to cooperate with xenophobic economic policies. The Chinese were 'innately

[381] Pusheng Li, *Huaqiao fazhan jianshi*, 21.
[382] Ibid, 22.
[383] Ibid, 27-8.
[384] Ibid, 28.

intelligent, honest, thrifty and good savers, nothing like the local people and could do what the natives could not'. They 'peacefully dealt with the natives, winning their respect and cooperation, resulting in smooth development and forming a powerful force'.[385] Chinese migration was founded 'on the individual's quest for survival and development', whereas the settler colonialism of the Iberian powers and Britain was supported by 'the planning, encouragement, incentives of the government and backed up by force'. Therefore, the Chinese 'suffered the most' from exclusionary policies.[386] Yet, this racialised portrayal of Chinese success was not to condemn the Sinophobic economic policies in Southeast Asia. Of five different reasons raised for these policies, the first was the more innocuously phased 'misunderstanding of national economic independence' while the strongest charge of 'racial prejudice' followed at the very end.[387] In response, the overseas Chinese should 'win the support of local people rather than arouse conflict', and 'respond to local needs and transfer commercial capital into industries in accordance with local laws'.[388] The supposed superiority of the overseas Chinese meant that they could adapt smoothly to newly imposed economic restrictions to the mutual benefit of themselves, local societies and the ROC, without diplomatic or financial support from Taipei.

The ROC's project of knowledge production on the overseas Chinese reconciled its officials' policy needs with their public claims of racial superiority and diasporic loyalty. However, it fell short on aiding ROC officials in their aim of political mobilisation of the overseas Chinese. Broadly speaking, Zheng Yanfen's OCAC advocated a particular configuration of hybrid identity. The overseas Chinese should contribute to their countries of residence in return for equal status while retaining some form of cultural Chinese identity and, more importantly,

[385] HBW, *Huaqiao zhi: zongzhi* 華僑志：總志, (HBW, 1956), 138.
[386] Ibid, 137.
[387] Ibid, 244.
[388] Ibid, 248.

promoting their country's relations with the ROC. Yet, OCAC officials seemed incapable of imagining what these identities looked like in social life and subjective experience.

Despite its centrality to their expectations of the overseas Chinese, the writers of the *General Gazette* seemed to be at a loss when discussing their political participation. The chapter 'Contributions to the Motherland and the World' produced a detailed account of overseas Chinese contributions to the KMT's various political campaigns and the development of their hometowns. Yet, discussion of their contributions to foreign countries primarily focussed on the economic and cultural spheres. There were only brief mentions of Chinese participation in 'anti-aggression movements' including the Second World War,[389] and the Chilean, Cuban and Philippine Wars of Independence.[390] Domestic political activities were relegated to a brief section of the chapter on culture. According to it, 'elections', 'assemblies', 'petitions', and 'lawsuits' arose from the need of the Chinese to protect 'their own interests' as they were otherwise 'uninterested in politics'.[391] In a further demonstration of this topic's perceived unimportance, it was placed at the end of the chapter behind a section on 'entertainment' that discussed, among other things, horseracing and cabarets.[392]

The *General Gazette* was particularly vague when it discussed the groups that Zheng was trying to mobilise, such as youth, women, and workers. This illustrated how ROC officials were largely unable to move beyond the limitations placed on their thinking by the wider tradition of Chinese knowledge production on the diaspora since the 1930s. As historians such as Rachel Leow have shown, these intellectual currents frequently understood the Chinese diaspora

[389] Ibid, 456.
[390] Ibid, 500.
[391] Ibid, 451.
[392] Ibid, 442-3.

chiefly through a patriarchal lens of elite, male experiences.[393] For example, one of the few references to Chinese labourers was a historical account of the coolie trade, which was described a 'shame for the relations between China and the West', while the workers appeared only as abused victims.[394] Discussions of women were limited to topics such as fashion and wedding ceremonies.[395] The youth were discussed primarily only through a chapter dedicated to the topic of education.[396] The Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference ostensibly spurred the production of knowledge about the overseas Chinese, yet the latter remained marred by the former's tendency to prioritise performed political loyalty over actual engagement.

Conclusion

In one sense, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference in 1952 was a failed diaspora moment that failed to achieve ambitious goals for links between Taipei and the ethnic Chinese abroad to bolster Taipei's political legitimacy and mobilise the Chinese against the CCP. Despite the hopes of ROC officials like Zheng Yanfen, the limited resources and diplomatic recognition of the ROC state in Taiwan ultimately limited their mass mobilisation of the overseas Chinese. Equally important was the reliance of ROC officials on Mainland-era, elite-centric patterns of state-diaspora relations. The rule of the ROC on Taiwan in the 1950s has variously been discussed as either demobilisational and administrative, or mobilisational but centred on near-term aims rather than nationalist ideology.[397] The proceedings of the Conference, and the slew of pacts and associations that followed, showed a measure of mobilisational governance to support the KMT against the CCP. Yet, the aftermath of the Conference showed it was the

[393] Rachel Leow, "The Patriarchy of Diaspora".
[394] HBW, *Huaqiao zhi: zongzhi*, 97.
[395] Ibid, 405-6 and 417.
[396] Ibid, 299-308.
[397] Strauss, *State Formation in China and Taiwan*, 1-33, cf Tehyun Ma, "Making Taiwan Chinese, 1945-60".

administrative mentality that prevailed. Officials in the Foreign Ministry prioritised diplomatic considerations above mobilising the overseas Chinese, and the economic and education ministries were similarly preoccupied with cost-effectiveness. Not only were the OCAC's aims dependent on the cooperation of these departments, OCAC officials themselves largely reverted to a bureaucratic approach in implementing the proclamations of the Conference. This contrasted with the more wide-reaching 'diaspora moments' originating from the PRC in the same period, in which PRC cadres often reached into more areas of overseas Chinese social life despite their similarly state-centric policy goals.[398]

At the same time, the Conference demonstrates how the ROC's changing diaspora policy, which was adapted in service of new state needs, was significant to the overseas Chinese not only or primarily in interventions and connections, but also ruptures and concessions. Although the Conference served as a set-piece for ROC narratives of the overseas Chinese as loyal citizens who supported Taipei in its fight against the CCP, ROC officials downplayed Mainland-era claims to the political status and rights of the overseas Chinese. Instead, ROC officials mobilised discourses of the Chinese diaspora's racial superiority to encourage the ethnic Chinese to comply with often Sinophobic political arrangements. These features of the ROC's changing diaspora policy were significant precisely because they were *anti*-diasporic, as overseas Chinese could no longer rely on Taipei's patronage on questions such as citizenship and Sinophobic legislation. This reinforced their integration into the local political order. Similarly, the connections that ROC officials fostered with the overseas Chinese sought to bolster Taipei's role within Asian anti-Communist international relations, but did little to alter the communal political status of overseas Chinese. Business elites remained the principal interlocutors of ROC diaspora policy; the primacy of diplomatic considerations was illustrated

[398] See Shelly Chan, *Diaspora's Homeland*, 107-183 for a detailed historical study of PRC interactions with the diaspora in the Maoist period, especially at the level of local state and party cadres.

in ROC efforts to connect to build trilateral ties with them and with Japan, which was just developing its relationship with Taipei. By contrast, the importance of diasporic political support to Taipei's officials, and efforts to intervene in the mass politics of overseas Chinese, were ultimately limited. As this chapter has shown, changing understandings of state interests led to a redefinition of the aims and scope of ROC diaspora policy by different branches of the ROC state. The following two chapters focus on how ROC officials developed diaspora policy in the 1950s concerning 'good' and 'bad' diasporic transnational connections respectively.

Chapter Four: Encouraging Good Transnationality: Incorporating Diaspora Policy into Anti-Communist International Cooperation, c. 1954-63

The previous chapter assessed the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference as a moment in which ROC officials reformulated their diaspora policy to complement the practical imperatives of their state. In the 1950s, Taiwan's geopolitical position became more secure as an 'accidental' Cold War state under US protection, particularly with the 1954 US-ROC security pact.[399] Growing US leadership of anti-Communist international relations in Asia intersected with the emergence of post-independence states which often regarded Chinese diasporic loyalty to either Chinese government, if not the Chinese communities themselves, with suspicion.

This chapter argues that as the ROC on Taiwan joined the US-led security system in Asia, its officials emphasised anti-Communist political obligations to the Chinese diaspora while relegating Chinese diasporic nationalism to a largely symbolic link between the diaspora and Taipei. ROC officials portrayed their diaspora policy to both their superpower patron, namely the US, and regional allies as facilitating anti-Communist cooperation rather than inciting political disloyalty. The first section of this chapter discusses ROC Foreign Ministry officials' efforts to assuage US concerns that Taipei's interventions on diaspora issues would provoke regional instability by emphasising transnational connections that could serve anti-Communist cooperation. These included cultural and educational exchange, as well as support for ethnic Chinese integration into their countries of residence. It then discusses a furtive effort by the diplomats and leaders of Taiwan and Malaysia to cooperate on fighting Communist subversion amongst the ethnic Chinese in 1963. The ROC's self-representation as a state promoting anti-

[399] Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Accidental State*, 234-40.

Communist Chineseness was not only a source of intrastate friction as other historians have highlighted, but also an efficacious diplomatic strategy.

ROC officials' efforts to establish diaspora policy as a sphere of regional and client-superpower cooperation contrasted with their Mainland-era views of diaspora protection as central to the Chinese state's relationship to the diaspora, and more broadly its quest for geopolitical power. As part of this transition, their Mainland-era receptiveness to the transnational connections of the Chinese diaspora, particularly in the realm of migration, was replaced by skepticism and even hostility. ROC officials also increasingly saw the option of 'return' to Taiwan as infeasible both for Chinese they saw as wrongly targeted by anti-Communist repression, and those whose anti-Communist activities were seen as diplomatically threatening. Cumulatively, these changes in Taipei's relationship to the overseas Chinese reinforced the anti-Communist character of Chinese politics in the Malayan and South Vietnamese public sphere.

Situating ROC Diaspora Policy in Anti-Communist Asian International Relations

In the 1950s, the ROC's overseas Chinese policy in Southeast Asia was formulated amidst two principal geopolitical changes. First, anti-Communist states in Asia became integrated into the US-led security umbrella, with a receding role for the former colonial metropoles. The second was the efforts of newly independent governments to integrate their multiethnic societies, and particularly their Chinese communities, into postcolonial nation-states. These two forces intersected in Vietnam and Malaya with contrasting effects on both diplomatic relations with Taipei, and their Chinese communities. ROC officials adapted their diaspora policy in both countries to serve the needs of anti-Communist intrastate relations, while Chinese nationalist elements were downplayed or adapted for these purposes.

In Vietnam, US superpower support for its client, Ngo Dinh Diem, overlapped with and reinforced Diem's authoritarian nation-building. After the Geneva Accords, anti-Communist security cooperation in the Indochinese peninsula was increasingly led by Washington. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu led to its security presence becoming minimal with the establishment of the Bao Dai state (State of Vietnam, SOVN) after the 1954 Geneva Accords, and later the rise to power of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955.[400] The SOVN/RVN's transition from a French neo-protectorate to the US' closest client state in Southeast Asia completed with the rise of power of Ngo Dinh Diem as Prime Minister (1954-5) and later President (1955-63).[401] The two Communist superpowers, Beijing and Moscow, also formalised their involvement in Southeast Asian geopolitics with their own security guarantees for the North.[402] In this respect, Saigon's diplomatic condition was similar to that of Chiang's regime on Taiwan, which became equally reliant on US security guarantees after the 1954 treaty. US support for Diem's regime supercharged his authoritarian programme of nation-state building. Scholars like Odd Arne Westad and Heonik Kwon have already drawn attention to how superpower assistance during the Cold War provided both ideological inspiration and material support for highly authoritarian state projects of modernisation.[403] The RVN evidenced this phenomenon as Diem established a highly authoritarian political system and took on his opponents, the religio-political sects and later the Buddhists, with US support.[404]

[400] Cheng Guan Ang, *Southeast Asia's Cold War*, 52-85; Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History*, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 58.
[401] Lawrence, *The Vietnam War,* 57-8.
[402] Ibid, 48-53 provides a discussion of PRC and USSR attitudes in the Geneva Accords.
[403] Westad, *The Global Cold War* sets out the discussion for the effect of the Cold War dynamic on Global South state elites and their designs on society. Kwon, *The Other Cold War* builds an interpretation of the Cold War as social and cultural conflict in the Global South. Examples of studies of Cold War political imaginations and its relationship to inter-bloc statebuilding include Szonyi, *Cold War Island*; Taylor and Xu, *Chineseness and the Cold War*; Patrick Major and Rana Mitter (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History*, (Routledge, 2012).
[404] Jessica Chapman, *Cauldron of Resistance*; Edward Miller, *Misalliance* are political histories of how Diem's regime evolved with US backing, while Van Nguyen-Marshall, *Between War and the State,* partially revises the extent of political authoritarianism in Diem's Vietnam.

In this process, the Chinese community, already a far weaker social force than Diem's opponents, was marginalised. Diem's programme of nation-building attempted to subordinate the cultural and political identity of the Chinese in Vietnam to Vietnamese nationalism, and to appropriate their economic prowess for RVN economic development.[405] Between 1955 and 1956, he moved to restrict Chinese nationals from operating in 11 sectors of the economy where they were concentrated, and imposed assimilationist measures in the education system.[406] This was followed in 1957 by a nationality law to impose compulsory naturalisation on the locally-born Chinese, which will be covered in chapter six in detail, and the imposition of state control over Chinese guilds and associations.[407] This extension of state control into the Chinese community was not accompanied by greater political inclusion of the ethnic Chinese, with partial exceptions like militias of Chinese who fought the Viet Minh.[408] While historians like Mei-Feng Mok have highlighted the vibrancy of their social life, the Chinese community in South Vietnam lacked the political clout to assert its own equality or to contest other aspects of Diem's politics.[409]

Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore charted a contrasting path after its successful suppression of the Communist insurgency, which entered a low-intensity phase in the mid-1950s with the state of emergency concluded by 1960. Although the governments of Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore firmly repressed Communist movements in their domestic politics, they were more circumspect on complete public alignment with US diplomacy than Saigon or Taipei. After the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency in 1947, the British approach was to maintain internal

[405] Chung-Ting Huang, "Yuenan Gongheguo zhi Huaren zhengce 越南共和國之華人政策," *Guoshiguan Xueshu Jikan* 國史館學術季刊 11, (2007): 189-249.
[406] Ibid, 200-4 and 207-8.
[407] Ibid, 192-3 and 223.
[408] Ibid, "1945-70 niandaichu Nanyue Huaren de zhengzhi jingkuang 1945－70年代初南越華人的政治**景況**," *Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies* 南方華裔研究 4 (2010): 202-14.
[409] Mei Feng Mok, "Negotiating Community and Nation in Cho Lón: Nation-Building, Community-Building and Transnationalism in Everyday Life during the Republic of Viêt Nam, 1955-1975," (DPhil Thesis, University of Washington, 2016) provides a social history of the Vietnamese Chinese in Saigon-Cholon.

security and transfer power to friendly leaders in its Southeast Asian colonies.[410] London officials often saw themselves as holding back the most bellicose tendencies in US diplomacy; the former's priorities were to contain Communism to Indochina, while favouring an economic and political rather than military approach to engagement with China.[411] The postcolonial leaders succeeding British rule, Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malay(si)a (Prime Minister from 1957) and Lee Kuan Yew 李光耀 of Singapore (Prime Minister from 1959), often continued this approach. Despite their support for US intervention in Vietnam and their alignment in the pro-US orbit, both the Tunku and Lee balanced other factors like their continued cooperation with the UK, their personal anti-colonial views, and efforts to maintain cordial relations with Beijing. They adopted quite measured, hedging positions on engagement with China, sometimes calling for recognition of the PRC.[412]

Furthermore, in place of anti-Communism, political discourse in post-independence Malaysia was structured by the relatively multiracial and plural political consensus charted by its nationalist leaders. In the early 1950s, the colonial counterinsurgency effort was highly coercive and violent, with hundreds of thousands of Chinese interned in New Villages.[413] Yet, by the mid-1950s, the successful suppression of the MCP meant that the transfer of power to nationalist leaders took centre stage in politics. The 1952 formation of the Alliance Party, consisting of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), saw a political compromise in which Malay nationalists would have a leading role in politics, but the Chinese would preserve their civil and educational rights, and

[410] Hack, *Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia*, 22-9 and 48-50.
[411] Ibid, 92-5, 179-186, 247-250 and 268 for the evolution of this policy prerogative in the late 1940s and early 1950s, mid-1950s, and 1960s respectively.
[412] Zijie Joshua Lim, "Resolving Away a China Problem: The Issue of Chinese Representation in the Singapore-Republic of China Relationship, 1965-1971," provides a discussion of Singapore's ambiguous policy towards recognising the Chinese governments, while chapter 6 of this thesis will briefly discuss Kuala Lumpur's shifting position on Chinese recognition.
[413] Karl Hack, "Detention, Deportation and Resettlement: British Counterinsurgency and Malaya's Rural Chinese, 1948–60," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 43, no. 4 (2015): 611–40.

economic status.[414] With the successful suppression of Communism, communal issues became the main basis for political challenges against the prevailing political compromise.

At the same time, Malaya and Singapore's relatively plural political climate meant that the establishment of diplomatic relations with China was more of a real possibility between 1957 and 1963 than it was in Manila or Saigon. Although Communist parties were circumscribed in both territories, left-wing, non-Communist parties were allowed to operate in Singapore and Malaya, albeit under quite restrictive political conditions. Before he came to power in 1959, Lee Kuan Yew publicly expressed affinity with the PRC and hinted that Singapore under his rule would become closer to Beijing.[415] The Tunku also espoused sentiments at times that were sympathetic to the non-aligned movement.[416] The leading left-leaning opposition parties or alliances in the early 1960s, named the Socialist Front (Barisan Sosialis in Malay) in both Malaya and Singapore, were more explicit in their endorsement of democratic socialism and non-alignment. Owing to these parties' Maoist language and frequent admiration of China, although perhaps also to political opportunism in seeking Western patronage, the Tunku and Lee depicted them domestically, and to their Washington and London backers, as Communist fronts under Beijing's thumb. Both Anglo-American powers and Malayan/Singaporean officials portrayed these parties as dominated by ethnic Chinese, representing a transnational threat emanating ultimately from Beijing.[417] In 1963, Lee's Operation Cold Store crackdown against the Barisan Sosialis (Singapore) ahead of the merger with Malaya stamped out, for the

[414] Boon Kheng Cheah, *Malaysia*, 27-39; James Ongkili, *Nation-Building in Malaysia*, 126-36 provide analyses of this political bargain in Malaya/Malaysia.
[415] Michael Barr, *Singapore: A Modern History*, (I.B. Tauris, 2017), 110-5.
[416] Ito Mitsuomi, "The Path to Malaysia's Neutral Foreign Policy in the Tunku Era," *Sarajana* 30, no. 2 (2015), 71-9.
[417] Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment*, 124-9.

medium term, Singaporean and Malaysian alliance with Beijing.[418] The counterpart organisation in Malaysia also fell apart in 1966 due to its own internal divisions.[419]

Winning US Support as a Goal of ROC Overseas Chinese Policy

As US security support structured the diplomacy of anti-Communist Asian states, ROC officials presented Taipei's overseas Chinese policy as an asset in fighting Communist subversion amongst the Chinese diaspora, and attempted to downplay concerns that diaspora policy would be a source of regional diplomatic friction. Although these efforts could not alter the basic preference of US officials for the Chinese to be loyal to their local governments, they succeeded in brokering US-ROC cooperation on overseas Chinese culture and education, and developing ties with mid-level US officials.

In contrast to their allied governments, US officials were more accepting of ROC and KMT activities amongst the Chinese community in Southeast Asia. As the introduction has highlighted, officials in the US government were not without suspicion of the Chinese diaspora as an extension of Chinese state power, whether the Republican China of the postwar years, or the Beijing regime of the Cold War. Still, US officials had the benefit of relative distance from the conflicts on the ground that state authorities in Southeast Asia had with Chinese communities, and their real or perceived transnational ties. Unlike Britain or France, they had not actually held territory in Southeast Asia since the independence of the Philippines in 1946. As historians such as Madeline Hsu and Ellen Wu have suggested, both anti-Communist

[418] Ibid, 129-34.
[419] Kankan Xie, "Contesting Equality: A History of the Malayan People's Socialist Front, 1957-1965," (Master's Thesis, Cornell University, 2012) provides a comprehensive account of the Socialist Front. See 3-5 for discussion of PRC influences on the Malayan left.

Chinese American leaders at home and activists who the State Department worked with to propagandise the diaspora in Southeast Asia emphasised their dual US-ROC loyalties.[420]

A memorandum describing the ROC Foreign Ministry's proposals for overseas Chinese policy, titled 'Joint United States - Free China Program to Organize Overseas Chinese against Communism', is particularly illustrative of ROC officials' self-portrayal. They positioned Taipei as a regional partner in the fight against Communist subversion, particularly amongst the Chinese diaspora.[421] Despite the best efforts of myself and the National Archives Administration where the document was found (which gave a wide window of 1950-60), the report could not be precisely dated. References to major regional events are sometimes vague in the document; there is a reference to the Colombo Plan (devised 1951), but not the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), the Geneva Accords (both 1954), or Bandung Conference (1955). Anti-Chinese laws in Cambodia legislated in 1956 and education policies that began in 1954 were discussed in the memorandum, but not the 1955 RVN anti-Chinese laws.[422] Furthermore, Singapore was described in the document as insufficiently anti-Communist, possibly a reference to the inaugural Chief Minister, David Marshall, who was succeeded by the anti-Communist Lim Yew Hock 林有福 in June 1956. The document was thus most likely conceived around 1956, during the peak period of Taipei-Washington security cooperation.

The memorandum's English language suggested that it was most likely submitted to the State Department as an assessment of existing anti-Communist initiatives and a proposal for closer

[420] Ellen Wu, *The Color of Success*,112-143; Madeline Yuan-Yin Hsu, *The Good Immigrants,* 131-165.
[421] [In English] Memorandum 'Joint United States - Free China Program to Organize Overseas Chinese against Communism'. CCOP jihua CCOP 計劃, MFA, NAA, Taipei. A303000000B/0040/414.3/13, 25-35.
[422] Guotu Zhuang 庄国土, "Erzhan yilai Jianpuzhai Huaren shehui diwei de bianhua 二战以来柬埔寨华人社会地位的变化," *Nanyang Wenti Yanjiu* 南洋问题研究119, (2004): 1-7.

cooperation. In their proposal, Foreign Ministry officials advanced a 'reverse domino theory' in contrast to the racialised domino theory of the US and UK at the time. In the thinking of some US State Department officials, the Communist geopolitical threat in Asia spread via the diasporic links between overseas Chinese and the PRC.[423] By contrast, the ROC Foreign Ministry suggested that it was the anti-Communist Chinese who could promote anti-Communism and resolve the causes of Communist subversion through economic development and cultural exchange. At its outset, the report claimed that the central aims of ROC diaspora policy were to stop 'the Chinese Communists' from 'using the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia as tools in … subversive activities'. As a counterbalance, Taipei would promote the 'prestige of and support for' the ROC government amongst the overseas Chinese, while sensitive vocabulary like loyalty or citizenship went unused.[424]

The Foreign Ministry's officials portrayed their own focus on anti-Communism as more reliable and efficacious for the pro-US bloc's geopolitics than what they saw as other regional states' ethnic prejudices against the Chinese and pro-KMT activities. Of Britain, then the US' junior military partner in Southeast Asia, it said that Malayan anti-KMT policies meant 'anti-Communist Chinese have not been given due protection'. Although the colonial government was grooming its preferred anti-Communist leaders for the region at the time, the Malayan KMT was regarded as politically disloyal and faced restrictions. Other Southeast Asian governments, such as the Philippines and Thailand, were closer to Taipei than were the British colonial authorities. However, the memorandum also criticised Philippine, Thai and Cambodian policies restricting Chinese-owned businesses as 'an obstacle for the development of anti-Communist efforts'.[425] It suggested that Washington should offer financial subsidies,

[423] Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment.,* 39-44.
[424] 'Joint United States - Free China Program to Organize Overseas Chinese against Communism', op. cit., 25.
[425] Ibid, 25.

the ‘cooperat[ion]’ of local embassies and the United States Information Service (USIS) for the support of these initiatives.[426] It should also exert ‘influence’ over local governments for them to ‘support’ Taipei and end these ‘restrictive measures’.[427]

The final target of Taipei’s ire was the Third Force, the dissident intellectuals and politicians who opposed both the KMT and CCP. The CIA had worked with them as a possible alternative to the Chiang regime up to around 1954, which added to Taipei-Washington diplomatic friction.[428] The report suggested that US funding for anti-Communist films be moved from Hong Kong to Taiwan, because ‘most motion picture studios in Hongkong [sic] have been heavily infiltrated and subsidized by Communists’. The remainder were in a state of ‘financial crisis.’[429] This coincided with the ROC’s cuts to funding for Hong Kong film studios around the time, which they suspected to be pro-leftist or insufficiently loyal to the ROC.[430]

Despite these attacks, the Foreign Ministry’s proposals for cooperation with the US focussed on initiatives in education and culture, while avoiding reference to direct political intervention. The memorandum suggested that the Overseas Chinese Book Company, the OCAC and KMT overseas department’s publisher, could be made a joint endeavour to supply ‘anti-Communist books and other reading materials’. ‘Appropriately camouflaged’ ROC personnel could be sent into countries that did not recognise the ROC to ‘assist’ the local Chinese in their ‘anti-Communist work’. However, these operatives would cooperate with rather than contradict the efforts of local governments to promote economic development and nation-state building. According to this memorandum, they should also promote ‘closer cooperation with the

[426] Ibid, 26.
[427] Ibid, 27.
[428] Roger Jeans, *The CIA and Third Force Movements in China during the Early Cold War*, (Lexington Books, 2017), 167-78.
[429] ‘Joint United States - Free China Program to Organize Overseas Chinese against Communism’, op. cit., 28.
[430] Grace Yan-Yan Mak 麥欣恩, “Cong Lengzhan jiaodu huigu Dianmao Gongsi fazhan Xianggang/Taiwan dianying mailuo de qianzou: *Qiu Jin*, *Bixue Huanghua*, *Guanshanxing* 從冷戰角度回顧電懋公司發展香港/臺灣電影脈絡的前奏：《秋瑾》、《碧血黃花》、《關山行》,” *Taida Zhongwen Xuebao* 台大中文學報 72, (2021): 245–55.

indigenous people' and 'the participation of the overseas Chinese in local economic enterprises' to 'contribute to the local economy'. [431]

In a further demonstration of the ROC's efforts to demonstrate to the US their hold over ethnic Chinese populations abroad, Taipei's consulates abroad often mobilised ethnic Chinese to turn out for visiting US diplomats. The colonial Singaporean Secretariat for Chinese Affairs (SCA) reported that when the US Assistant Secretary of State, Allison, visited Singapore in October 1952, Taipei asked the local KMT to 'impress upon him the support of the overseas Chinese for its rule', through welcoming parties, press declarations and similar.[432] Lest such a case be dismissed as mere colonial paranoia, the ROC diplomatic mission organised a similar initiative a few years later. During John Foster Dulles' visit to Saigon in 1956, the Legation there 'agitated' the Chinese to show up and show their loyalty to both the ROC and Republic of Vietnam. It coordinated letters and editorials from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and major newspapers that lambasted the CCP as the source of the suffering of the overseas Chinese and their families, and called on Dulles to continue US recognition of the ROC.[433]

At the highest levels of US state policy, Taipei's appeals through both policy documents and shows of diasporic support appeared to produce at best sympathetic sentiments from US leaders without major policy changes. In the 1955 SEATO Conference, the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles attempted to persuade Thailand and the Philippines against radical changes to existing arrangements of ethnic Chinese citizenship, for fear of giving the Communists an opportunity for subversion.[434] In 1958 the Operations Coordinating Board, jointly attended by

[431] 'Joint United States - Free China Program to Organize Overseas Chinese against Communism', op. cit., 28.
[432] Report from Secretary for Chinese Affairs to Chief Secretary, 27 October 1952. Singapore: use of Kuomintang (KMT) adherents to assist the Government, FCO, Migrated Archives: Singapore (MA:S), TNA. FCO 141/14555/77.
[433] [In Chinese] Savingram from Legation in Vietnam to MFA, Mar 16 1956. AH, 020-011099-0023, 206-7.
[434] Premiere Seance du Conseil du SEATO, Feb 23 1955. *Documents diplomatiques français. 1955,* Vol. 1, *(*Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français, 1987), 213.

the major US defense, intelligence and diplomatic organs, agreed that diasporic support for the ROC government was an acceptable secondary alternative to successful Chinese integration.[435] These US positions, unaccompanied by substantive measures to pressure the ROC and US' mutual allies, were limited and mild in nature. Still, they were a substantial improvement on the tendency, as in London or parts of the State Department in the postwar era, to view any political transnationalism between the Chinese diaspora and the Chinese state as threatening.

At the meso-level of individual policy initiatives between Taipei and Washington, ROC officials' self-representation yielded more success. US propaganda officials cooperated with ROC organs in British Malaya, viewing Taipei as an ally in the fight against Communist influence among the Malayan Chinese. Historian Ting-Hong Wong has already drawn attention to the education of overseas Chinese students in Taiwan as a project of Cold War cooperation between the US State Department and aid agencies, and the KMT, Education Ministry and OCAC.[436] Similarly, the US Information Service (USIS) and ROC government worked together to target the Malayan Chinese despite British Malayan opposition. In 1952, according to the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, the USIS' offices in Malaya supported 'the Nationalist Government in Formosa' through 'libraries… cinema shows… books and magazines' that targeted the 'Communist government in China … in support of the KMT'. They urged the Chinese to 'free China', in accordance with Taiwan's standoff with the Mainland, but made no mention to 'free Malaya from the Communist terrorists' which Kuala Lumpur saw as more important.[437] In May and August, the Chinese Affairs Secretariat of Penang and its adjoining states similarly complained of 'unsuitable' USIS material that 'extol[led] the Government in

[435] Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board: Operations Plan for Vietnam. Edward C. Keefer and David W. Mabon (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vietnam,* Vol. 1, (United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 44.
[436] Ting-Hong Wong, "College Admissions, International Competition, and the Cold War in Asia: The Case of Overseas Chinese Students in Taiwan in the 1950s," *History of Education Quarterly* 56, 2 (2016): 331-357.
[437] BMSCA. May 1953 Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs, Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs Nos 71-82, January to December 1953, FCO, MA:M, TNA. FCO 141/7629, 7.

Formosa' and described Taiwan in 'glowing colours'.[438] In response, Malcolm MacDonald mooted a ban on USIS propaganda, only to be discouraged by the head of Malaya's own Information Service, Peterson.[439] Cooperation between ROC officials and the USIS persisted into the late 1950s. One report from Zheng Yanfen to Chiang Kai-Shek noted that the USIS in Kuala Lumpur remained sympathetic to Taipei as late as 1959. Its operative Lin Shou'e 林瘦鶚, described as a 'proactive… patriot', used his department's funds to purchase books and periodicals from the Overseas Publisher and made speeches to encourage Chinese students to study in Taiwan.[440]

ROC officials successfully established many aspects of their diaspora policy as a sphere of cooperation between Washington and Taipei. However, the tangible effects of these initiatives on the politics of the overseas Chinese were perhaps more limited. Despite incidents of friction between the USIS and the British Malayan government, the USIS generally sought to cooperate with the colonial authorities on the direction of their propaganda. According to the literary scholar Mei-Hsiang Wang, by the mid-1950s, a consensus between the UK and US generally emerged that the USIS would encourage the Chinese to be loyal to a non-Communist Malaya, while the Kuala Lumpur government would focus on the Malays.[441] Additionally, a lot of US propaganda in this period was subtle in nature, and focussed on genres such as literature which portrayed the CCP/PRC unfavorably.[442] In the absence of direct control by ROC cadres or the

[438] BMSCA. Report on 'Overseas Chinese Problem' to Commissioner-General of British South East Asia, 1952. Malaya: report on Overseas Chinese by Secretary of Chinese Affairs (SCA). TNA, MA:M, FCO 141/7537/2A.
[439] Letter from Peterson to Malcolm MacDonald, 22 Sep 1953. Malaya: Malayan Chinese Association, FCO, MA:M, TNA. FCO 141/7478.
[440] [In Chinese] Memorandum from Zheng Yanfen and Tang Zong 唐縱 to Chiang Kai-Shek, Feb 16 1959. Zongcai piqian [Papers signed by Chiang Kai-Shek] 總裁批簽, KMT Archives (KMTA), Taipei. CKS 49/0030.
[441] Mei-Hsiang Wang 王梅香, "The Literary Field in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia under the U.S. Aid Literary Institution A Case Study of the Book Publication Program of *Story Paper* 美援文藝體制下的台、港、馬華文學場域," *Taiwanese Journal of Sociology* 臺灣社會學刊 102 (2016): 38.
[442] See eg Mei-Hsiang Wang, "Literature, Power and American Propaganda in Hong Kong and Taiwan During the Cold War 權力與冷戰時期美國在臺港的文學宣傳（1950-1962）," *Taiwanese Journal of Sociology* 57 (2015) : 1-51. and Ibid, "The Literary Field in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia under the U.S. Aid Literary Institution", op. cit. For detailed discussion of how the USIS exerted influence over the cultural production it sponsored.

wholehearted agreement of USIS officials, it was questionable how far Taipei's expectations of the overseas Chinese were received and understood, let alone supported, by their audience.

ROC officials also failed in establishing themselves as the only partner of USIS cooperation, as the latter continued to spread its resources across offices in Hong Kong, Taipei, and Southeast Asia. Some of the intellectuals and anti-Communists they worked with had a sometimes uneasy relationship with Chiang's rule in Taipei.[443] The success of the overseas Chinese education programmes in Taipei is similarly hard to ascertain. In the mid-1950s when the first overseas Chinese students came to Taiwan to be educated, Taipei still enjoyed widespread diplomatic recognition. However, by the early 1970s, when the students were still relatively early in their careers, most countries in Southeast Asia had already turned towards engaging the PRC. Moreover, few of the region's political elites openly espoused their Chinese ethnicity (except in Singapore or Malaysia) or their links to either Beijing or Taipei. To indicate that one cannot necessarily draw a causal connection between education in Taiwan and pro-Taipei inclinations, one of the earliest Malaysian Chinese students in Taiwan who became a politician, Chian Heng Kai 陳慶佳, was later a stalwart of the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP).[444] The DAP was actually a party espousing racial equality that was tarred, in the eyes of Taipei officials in the 1960s, by its social-democratic leanings.[445]

[443] Mei-Hsiang Wang, "The Literary Field in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia under the U.S. Aid Literary Institution A Case Study of the Book Publication Program of *Story Paper*, " 8-9; Grace Yan-Yan Mak, "Cong Lengzhan jiaodu huigu Dianmao Gongsi fazhan Xianggang/Taiwan dianying mailuo de qianzou," op. cit. For the evolving relationship between anti-Communist filmmakers in Hong Kong and the Taipei regime.

[444] Jin-Xuan Toh, "Beipiao Taiwan: Naxienian, cong Taiwan biyhehou huiji "qiaojudi" chengwei zhengzhi renwu de Malaixiya liutaisheng 《北漂台灣》：那些年，從台灣畢業後回「僑居地」成為政治人物的馬來西亞留台生," *The News Lens* 關鍵評論, Jun 7 2022. Accessed Aug 1 2024 at https://www.thenewslens.com/article/167698.

[445] Ibid, "Zhulu baodao: Mahua Gonghui yu Xingdongdang de Taiwan zhanchang 逐鹿寶島：馬華公會與行動黨的台灣戰場," *Contemporary Review* 當代評論. Accessed Aug 1 2024 at http://contemporary-review.com.my/2020/10/19/1-306/.

Adapting Representations of Diasporic Chineseness to Diplomatic Needs

If US security support was the elephant in the room that determined the basic condition of anti-Communist Asia's international relations, bilateral relations with regional allies were a direct and immediate concern when ROC officials crafted their propaganda for overseas Chinese. Hence, ROC officials often developed nuanced narratives of overseas Chineseness to fit their diplomatic needs. Their portrayals of overseas Chinese in the RVN focussed on encouraging dual loyalty to both Taipei and Saigon. This had the effect of assuaging impressions that diaspora policy might conflict with anti-Communist cooperation, given the Diem regime's ethno-nationalist leanings. In Malaya and Singapore, no formal relations with Taipei yet existed. The focus of materials about these territories was to downplay the ROC's past claims to the citizenship and political loyalties of the Malayan Chinese. In both cases, they encouraged ethnic Chinese to naturalise, cooperate with their governments' directives, and contribute economically to their countries. Importantly, the previous chapter has established that these materials were prepared by the OCAC and KMT overseas affairs department. Even without the formal diplomatic experience of their counterparts in the Foreign Ministry, these bureaucrats adapted their representations of the overseas Chinese to diplomatic realities.

Because of the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Taipei and Kuala Lumpur, the publications about Malaya regarded Malayan Chinese political participation cautiously. They encouraged the ethnic Chinese to oppose Communism and participate in local politics, accepting that they were now citizens of Malaya rather than the ROC. The question of Malayan-ROC relations was integrated into the broader topic of promoting Malaya's anti-Communist alignment. *Malaya and China*, published before Malaya's independence in 1957, referred to the ethnic Chinese Cabinet ministers of Malaya as 'overseas Chinese' and *huaji*, which could

refer to either Chinese nationality or racial classification. It suggested that these politicians would 'lean to our side' with their 'loyalty'.[446] The expectations made of independent Malaya included establishing 'relations with our country', 'treating all races (*minzu*) equally in domestic life' and being a 'loyal and reliable friend' to the 'international front of freedom and anti-aggression'.[447]

The booklets became increasingly cautious in their wording after Malaya's independence in 1957 and Chiang Kai-Shek's public encouragement for the Chinese there to become Malayan citizens.[448] *Kuala Lumpur*, published in 1958, used the term 'overseas Chinese' (*Huaqiao*) to refer to historic Chinese contributions to that city's development.[449] However, it exclusively used the term 'ethnic Chinese' (*Huaren*, connoting naturalisation) in discussions of current affairs. According to it, Malaya was a 'new country with the ethnic Chinese participating in its founding', and that the 'cooperation of all races within its borders' would build a 'bright future' for all.[450] Between these subtle changes of wording and the different aspirations expressed for Malaya, the ROC's de-facto renunciation of Malayan Chinese citizenship claims was ambiguous. However, it was clear that these texts expected the Malayan Chinese to consider themselves citizens of Malaya and contribute to its development, while advancing Malaya's friendship with the ROC where possible.

By contrast, the readers discussing Vietnam expressed explicit expectations for the Chinese to have dual political loyalties. *Saigon & Cholon* and *Hanoi & Haiphong*, both written by the same author, respectively praised Ngo Dinh Diem's efforts to 'realise freedom and democracy,

[446] Sumin Tang 唐蘇民, *Malaiya yu Zhongguo* 馬來亞與中國, (Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1956), 25.
[447] Ibid, 27.
[448] Haiwai chubanshe (ed.), *Jiang Zongtong dui haiwai qiaobao de zhishi* 蔣總統對海外僑胞的指示, (Haiwai chubanshe, 1958), 28.
[449] Degui Chen 陳德規, *Jilongpo* 吉隆坡, (Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1958), 1-9.
[450] Ibid, 40.

get rid of corruption … [and] strive for national unity', [451] and claimed that the Chinese in Vietnam enthusiastically supported the 'Free Chinese government's anti-Communist anti-Russia policies'.[452] In their support of Diem's government, they downplayed the severity of the nationality dispute of 1957; a subsequent booklet named *Vietnam and China* suggested this had become 'milder with time and not as serious'. The 'improvement of relations' between the two countries would soon yield a more mutually acceptable solution.[453]

These texts also valorised historical overseas Chinese figures who could be portrayed as parallels to Taipei's contemporary diplomatic goals. The portrayal of Malayan Chinese leaders, for example, stressed moral virtue and successful integration into Malaya over political loyalties to China. The booklet on Yap Ah Loy 葉德來, about a nineteenth-century Chinese pioneer in the development of Kuala Lumpur, criticised Yap's letter to the Qing court proposing that Kuala Lumpur be recognised as a Chinese tributary state. Although the Qing's dismissal of such a proposal was described as 'unforgiveable' from the standpoint of 'diaspora protection', it was also praised as an illustration of 'China's Kingly way (*wangdao*)' of 'never invading others' land', [454] and a precursor to Sun Yat-Sen's opposition to imperialism.[455] While Yap was faulted for his inability to nurture suitable youths to succeed him, his unwillingness to make his Captaincy a hereditary position was praised as selfless and 'righteous', despite its ultimate consequence of the British seizing control of Kuala Lumpur and its Chinese community.[456] The four booklets about Singapore and Malaya glossed over the topic of the Tongmenghui and overseas KMT activism in Malaya, in the context of the local authorities' contemporary hostility towards the KMT. There was only brief discussion in the booklet

[451] Zi Su 蘇子, *Henei yu Haifang* 河內與海防, (Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1955), 32.
[452] Ibid, *Xigong yu Ti'an* 西貢與堤岸, (Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1956), 41.
[453] Yunying Zhu 朱雲影, *Yuenan yu Zhongguo* 越南與中國, (Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1958), 44.
[454] Yujing Sun 孫毓經, *Ye Delai* 葉德來, (Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1956), 23.
[455] Ibid, 24.
[456] Ibid, 27.

Historical Stories of the Chinese Compatriots in Malaya that faulted the British colonial authorities, but notably not the nationalist leaders who were coming into power, for their hostility to the ROC's connections to the overseas Chinese despite their contribution to the anti-Japanese war effort in World War Two.[457]

By contrast, the texts' discussion of Vietnam often valorised historical parallels to the dual loyalty that ROC officials sought to promote. The *Historical Stories* of Vietnam lauded two grassroots individuals, a hawker named Huang Jingnan 黃景南 and a water-fetcher named Guan Tang 關棠, for giving their lifetime savings to the Tongmenghui.[458] *Hanoi and Haiphong* elaborated on the Tongmenghui's branch in Vietnam.[459] The search for such figures went further back into dynastic China; *Vietnam and China* told the story of Weng Zhong 翁仲, a Vietnamese who, legend held, had served Qin Shihuang 秦始皇, the first emperor of China, as a general fighting the Xiongnu barbarians.[460] *Hanoi & Haiphong* chronicled the life and times of Liu Yongfu 劉永福, a former Taiping Rebellion general who escaped to Vietnam, fought for the Emperor of Vietnam against the French from 1869 to 1885, and then for the Qing in the 1885 Tonkin War and 1894 Sino-Japanese War.[461] Notably, Liu's participation in the Taiwanese pro-Qing resistance state to Japan in 1894, the Republic of Formosa 台灣民主國, was glossed over as 'assisting in the defense of Tainan'.[462] Presumably, any references to Taiwanese independence were considered completely taboo for a general audience to consider.

[457] Sumin Tang, *Malaiya Huaqiao shihua* 馬來亞華僑史話, (Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1956), 27-33.
[458] Yunying Zhu, *Yuenan yu Zhongguo,* 24-6.
[459] Zi Su, *Henei yu Haifang,* 30-2.
[460] Yunying Zhu, *Yuenan yu zhongguo*, 44-50.
[461] Zi Su, *Henei yu Haifang,* 29.
[462] Quotation from ibid; for discussion of the Republic of Formosa see eg Stephane Corcuff, "The Taiwan Republic of 1895 and the Failure of the Qing Modernizing Project," in Corcuff (ed.), *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan* (Routledge, 2002), 29–50.

Anti-Communist Security Cooperation to Foster Informal Relations

As ROC officials increasingly represented themselves as partners in their Southeast Asian allies' anti-Communist efforts, this yielded tangible and direct benefits for its diplomacy. One example of a furtive discussion between Malaya/Malaysia and the ROC for Taiwan's security advisors to assist in the former's political warfare in 1963 is particularly instructive. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, such as Singapore, Taiwan's experience in military technology and organisation served as the basis for informal relations in the absence of diplomatic recognition.[463] Taiwan's technological and medical programmes, too, have come under increasing attention as platforms of Cold War diplomatic cooperation.[464] Yet, Taipei's ideological self-representation as a fighter of Communist influence in the Chinese diaspora was also an unexpected asset in helping its diplomats engender informal intrastate cooperation.

The ROC and Malaya/Malaysia never established full diplomatic relations before Kuala Lumpur formally recognised the PRC in 1974, although consular relations were established in 1964. On May 9 1963, Tunku Abdul Rahman met with the ROC Ambassador to Thailand, Hanh Lih-wu 杭立武. The Tunku asked for advisors in political warfare and internal security from Taiwan to work in the soon-to-be-formed country of Malaysia, 'without notifying the UK'.[465] First, the 'most complicated parts of the Malaysia plan' were the incorporation of Singapore and Sarawak. Cadres from the ROC's National Security Bureau 國家安全局 could

[463] Hong-Yu Chen 陳鴻瑜, *Jiemi: Lengzhan shiqi Taiwan yu Dongnanya guojia zhi junshi guanxi* 揭密：冷戰時期台灣與東南亞國家之軍事關係, (Taiwan xuesheng shuju 台灣學生書局, 2022), 221-3.
[464] Eg Po-Yi Hung, "Interlacing China and Taiwan: Tea Production, Chinese-Language Education and the Territorial Politics of Re-Sinicization in the Northern Borderlands of Thailand," *The China Quarterly* 250 (2022): 417–39; Leo Chu, "The Abundant, Free Supply of Radiant Energy: Taiwan, Green Revolution, and Cropping System Research in Southeast Asia, 1962-1982," Presentation at Southeast Asia and Taiwan Conference, University of Washington April 25-6 2024; Shinyi Hsieh, "Pluralizing Postcoloniality from a Standpoint of Margins: A Historical Detour of Global Health and Imperial Regimes in Postwar Taiwan through the Traces of the Marginalized," (DPhil Thesis, UC San Francisco, 2023).
[465] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Hanh Lih-wu to MFA, May 13 1963. Xieban Gongdang siyingpai fenzi zaijiaoyu 協辦共黨死硬派分子再教育, MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0052/4/2, 4.

come to Malaysia and familiarise themselves with the Malaysian situation before travelling to Sarawak, while work in Singapore would have to wait because of the 'complex' situation there. Secondly, he wanted the ROC to send experts from Taiwan to Malaya to aid the 're-education' of 'diehard communists'.[466]

The Tunku's proposal took place amidst a broader backdrop of Asian anti-Communist security cooperation, as he asked for a 'Deputy Chief Gao' who was then 'stationed in Vietnam'.[467] His need for security assistance in Sarawak stemmed from the Communist insurgency there, which in turn formed part of the Konfrontasi conflict there backed by Indonesia. Although the Sarawak Communist insurgency was multiracial in makeup, the Chinese population was seen by the British security forces as the backbone of the threat.[468] Although Singapore was also feared by the Tunku and his London and Washington backers for its potential left-leaning tendencies, weeks ago Lee Kuan Yew had already cracked down on the socialist opposition in Operation Cold Store.[469] The situation there may have been too uncertain for the Tunku to entertain radical political intervention there.

The other plank of the Tunku's proposal, the 're-education' of detainees, tapped ROC intelligence operatives' perceived ability to deal with ethnic Chinese Communist sympathisers. The detainees in prison identified for 're-education' were almost certainly entirely Chinese given the ethnic makeup of detainees during the Emergency. In turn, the experts proposed by the ROC National Security Bureau were presumably fluent in Mandarin and other varieties of Chinese.[470] According to former prisoners of the prison they were drawn from, the Taiwan

[466] Ibid, 5.
[467] [In English] Letter from Osman bin Hj Mohd Yassin to Hanh Lih-Wu, 12 Jan 1964. Ibid, 26.
[468] Kee Howe Yong, *The Hakkas of Sarawak: Sacrificial Gifts in Cold War Era Malaysia*, (University of Toronto Press, 2017), 50-67.
[469] Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment*, 121-5.
[470] Fu Malaiya renyuan jianlibiao 赴馬來亞人員簡歷表. NAA, A303000000B/0052/4/2,16 and 21.

Provincial Experimental Education Centre in Tucheng, Taipei, these officers were skilled in psychological pressure and inducements to inculcate compliance in prisoners. Former prisoners, mostly those deemed minor offenders by the KMT regime, recounted hard labour, 'thought inspections', 'surveillance' and 'encouraging prisoners to inform on each other'.[471] As an aside, Hanh's usage of the term 're-education' (*zaijiaoyu* 再教育) does not necessarily imply adaptation or awareness of the PRC's internment policies. In the 1950s and early 1960s, *zaijiaoyu* was sometimes used in ROC documents to describe the political conversion of disloyal populations or even mundane social policies.[472]

The Tunku proposed to rely on the linguistic and political competence of operatives from Taiwan as his own state lacked these skills. At this point, UK forces were still involved in Malaysia and Singapore's defense, but had largely abdicated internal security responsibilities to Malaya after independence in 1957, while retaining a role in East Malaysia.[473] Despite its efforts to train their officials, primarily of British origin, in Chinese languages, the colonial state was frequently unsuccessful in its attempts to persuade members and sympathisers against Malayan Communism.[474] Equally, the Malay-dominated Malaysian security forces presumably had little knowledge of Chinese. Assistance from Taiwan on political warfare and incarceration would help the Malaysian state literally speak to the Chinese community, which it associated

[471] Historical Sites of Injustice Archive 不義遺址網站. 'Taiwansheng Shenchan Jiaoyu Shiyansuo 台灣省生產教育實驗所,' *Historical Sites of Injustice Archive*. Accessed Aug 29 2023 at https://hsi.nhrm.gov.tw/nhrm/zh-tw/sadkfaljgkajgra/125703.; Ibid. Yuan Taiwansheng Shengchan Jiaoyu Shiyansuo (Tucheng Qingshui) 原台灣省生產教育實驗所（土城清水）, ibid. Accessed Aug 29 2023 at https://hsi.nhrm.gov.tw/nhrm/zh-tw/whiteterror/735893.

[472] See eg Susan Carruthers, "'Re-Education': The Imperial Pre-History and Afterlives of a Pedagogical Conceit," *International History Review* 46, no. 3 (2024): 271–90 for a broader discussion of the history of 'reeducation' as a term and concept. Riben renmin zaijiaoyu wenti 日本人民再教育問題, MFA, NAA, A303000000B/0034/076.6/0001 refers to the 'zaijiaoyu of the Japanese people' after the Second World War, and Shuitu Baochi Shishi Jihua: Wei Zhanghua xian beipai canjia shuitu baochi zaijiaoyu renyuan yi'an fuqing chazhao 水土保持實施計劃/為彰化縣被派參加水土保持再教育人員一案復請查照, Taiwan Provincial Government, NAA, A375000000A/0049/E025/1223/5/022 refers to *zaijiaoyu* regarding 'soil and water conservation'. After 1968, *zaijiaoyu* does not appear in the title line of archival fonds until 1979, after the end of the Maoist period.

[473] Hack, *Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia*. 267-73; David Phillips, "Confrontation and Insurgency in Borneo, 1960–90," *Journal of Contemporary History* 54, no. 3 (2019): 594–618.

[474] Rachel Leow, *Taming Babel,* 135-76.

with Communist subversion. The Tunku's suggestion to Hanh that the proposal must be kept secret from London points to his effort to secure possible alternative allies in Malaysia's internal security efforts. As Malaysia became embroiled in the Asian Cold War in the Konfrontasi conflict with Indonesia, Malaysian leaders Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew attempted to find new partners that assist in both material military support and political warfare.[475]

The Tunku mooted this proposal against multiple sources of ideological suspicion he harboured against the ROC and KMT. In several public speeches, he remarked that the KMT in Malaya had a foreign political loyalty to Taipei, and was therefore just as bad as the CCP.[476] Moreover, he personally held an ambivalent view of the status of ROC rule on Taiwan, sometimes publicly suggesting a two-China solution of recognising the PRC while the ROC should refashion itself as an independent Taiwan.[477] His view of the KMT's rule in Taiwan, which was far more repressive than the political arrangements he set up in Malaysia, was also an open question. He had an acquaintance in the exiled Taiwanese independence activist Thomas Liao Wenyi 廖文毅, who caused a brief diplomatic stir by attempting to attend Malaya's independence day celebrations in 1957 without an invitation by calling himself Tunku's guest.[478] The Tunku's willingness to put this proposal forward showed that he saw the practical benefits of ROC assistance as superseding past conflicts with Taipei over the political loyalties of the ethnic Chinese. In turn, ROC diplomats and internal security officials departed from past conflicts with Kuala Lumpur authorities over the Chinese diaspora. Instead, they looked to cultivate an

[475] Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment*, 135-40.
[476] Report from Consulate in Tamsui to Far Eastern Department, July 8 1957. Political Relations between Formosa and Malaya, Foreign Office (FO), TNA. FO 371/127481.
[477] Central News Agency 中央通信社 (CNA). "Malai Zongli Laman zhuzhang chengren 'liangge Zhongguo' 馬來總理拉曼主張承認「兩個中國」, " Oct 21 1960. Zhong-Ma jianjiao 中馬建交, MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0049/12.1/2, 52; [In Chinese] Savingram from Consulate in Kuala Lumpur to MFA, Oct 4 1964. Ibid, 343-9.
[478] Yong-Jian Tan 陳勇健. "Liao Wenyi chuxi Malaiya duli qingdian 廖文毅出席馬來亞獨立慶典," *Master Insight* 灼見名家, Aug 12 1952. Accessed Sep 1 2023 at https://www.master-insight.com/%E5%BB%96%E6%96%87%E6%AF%85%E5%87%BA%E5%B8%AD%E9%A6%AC%E4%BE%86%E4%BA%9E%E7%8D%A8%E7%AB%8B%E6%85%B6%E5%85%B8

informal diplomatic relationship with Kuala Lumpur built on ROC support for Malaysia's own statebuilding project, notwithstanding its coercive treatment of ethnic Chinese insurgents.

However, the 1963 proposal never came to fruition. Nothing became of the operation in Sarawak after the official who the Tunku asked for was unavailable due to his posting in Vietnam.[479] The Malaysian Police also later lost interest in the prisoner re-education proposal with no further explanation, informing Hanh in January 1964 that 'earlier pressing commitments' meant that they were all but unable to move forward.[480] Yet, very similar programmes of security and military exchange, encompassing military technology and training as well as internal security and psychological warfare, were finally agreed upon by Kuala Lumpur and Taipei in 1968 and again in 1974.[481] In the absence of sources from Malaysia, the reasons why the Tunku's scheme was first abandoned and picked up again cannot be determined conclusively. It is possible that Kuala Lumpur's fears of Taipei as inspiring disloyalty amongst the Chinese initially discouraged them from carrying the project forward but subsided later in the 1960s. However, it is equally or even more likely that the discussion of practical obstacles should be taken at face value. The Tunku remained Prime Minister until 1969, by which time the first Malaysian-ROC agreements had already been reached, and he was succeeded by Abdul Razak who was even more of a Malay nationalist, but nevertheless organised similar initiatives.[482]

One speculative point is whether Malaysian leaders were mindful of how closer ties with Taiwan would escalate hostilities with Indonesia and push the latter closer to the PRC when they decided to delay their cooperation with Taipei. In April 1963, Sukarno warned the PRC's

[479] [In Chinese] DAPA. Untitled Memorandum, May 15 1963. NAA, A303000000B/0052/4/2, 7-9.
[480] [In English] Osman bin Hj Mohd Yassin to Hanh Lih-wu, 12 Jan 1964, op. cit.
[481] Hong-Yu Chen, *Jiemi*, 317-22.
[482] Boon Keng Cheah, *Malaysia*, 121-2.

Liu Shaoqi 劉少奇 of ROC security forces being stationed in Malaysia en masse. Taomo Zhou, who writes of this incident, suggests that 'the PRC's attitude towards Malaysia hardened due to the collaboration between the Tunku and Taiwan'.[483] It was perhaps equally significant that Indonesia's representations of its foreign threats to Beijing mirrored those that Taiwan and Malaysia made to their allies. As this chapter has argued, Taipei often represented Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia as extensions of the CCP's threat when they attempted to court US support for their diaspora policy. Although Sukarno was a non-aligned rather than Communist leader, Malaysia worked with anti-Communist states like the ROC and the UK between 1963 and 1965 as a counterweight against Sukarno's friendship with Beijing.[484] Indonesia's representations of Malaysia as closely working with Taiwan, including a fanciful claim of 'seventy thousand people from Taiwan' fighting Malaysia's war according to its Ambassador to Beijing, had a comparable effect of inviting Beijing's support for Sukarno's ambitions.[485]

Growing Unimaginability of Diasporic 'Return' in ROC Diaspora Protection

ROC officials' adaptation of their overseas Chinese policy to their diplomatic needs led to a growing skepticism of transnational connections that were not sanctioned by state authorities, a key example of which was transnational migration. The first Part of this thesis has discussed ROC officials' efforts to protect the rights of ethnic Chinese to migrate and live abroad, and to return to their ethnic homeland of China. In some cases, the right of return even encompassed those who had been born abroad or had only lived in China in their childhood. Significantly,

[483] Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution,*137.
[484] Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment*, 137-48 offers a discussion of Malaysian diplomacy during the Konfrontasi; Malaysia did not fully align itself with the anti-Communist bloc and attempted to rally the support of non-aligned states, but its security was certainly dependent on UK military support.
[485] Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution,* 138.

the openness to diasporic return was not true of ROC policies in postwar Taiwan itself. As the latter was increasingly regarded as a geopolitical base for the ROC's retreat, migration, including from the Mainland, was viewed with suspicion as a security concern.[486] With the ROC's new status as a Cold Warrior state on Taiwan, postwar permissiveness on diasporic Chinese migration gave way to a new understanding of migration as politically and diplomatically threatening. This section discusses two cases of ROC diaspora protection for ethnic Chinese in Indochina, the first concerning Chinese wrongly ensnared by colonial anti-Communist repression, and the second involving anti-Communist Chinese fighting against the PRC. Taipei officials' self-representation as a Cold War partner to other anti-Communist states allowed them to mitigate the anti-Chinese political violence of states that had not yet recognised them. Yet, as a militarised Cold Warrior state that saw diasporic migration as threatening, ROC officials became increasingly hostile to the prospect of political migration to Taiwan as a solution to xenophobic repression.

Despite their limited recognition in Indochina, security cooperation between Taipei's representatives and local governments gave room for ROC consuls to intervene on diaspora protection. France recognised the ROC until 1963, but the Associated States it established in 1949 did not extend recognition to either Beijing or Taipei. French Indochina High Commissioner Leon Pignon told the French Foreign Ministry in November 1949 that the 'exceptional status' enjoyed by the ethnic Chinese and the Chinese government must be 'abrogated' by the Associated States if the latter were to enjoy full independence.[487] In 1954, British diplomats in Paris also told their superiors that the Associated States governments enjoyed the benefit of being able to 'bully' the Chinese 'colonies' there, by claiming to be

[486] Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang 楊孟軒, *The Great Exodus from China: Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Modern Taiwan,* (Cambridge University Press, 2020), 64-5.
[487] Note Pour le Haut Commissaire de France en Indochine, Feb 26 1949. *Documents diplomatiques Français. 1949,* Vol. 1*, (*Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français, 1999), 349.

sovereign states that were not obliged to recognise the ROC consuls recognised by France, or the Sino-French treaties in the Nanjing and postwar era.[488]

Yet, informal contact persisted between the Associated States and ROC consulates in fighting Communist subversion in Chinese communities. Consul to Hanoi Liu Jiaju 劉家駒 used these arrangements of anti-Communist protection to facilitate diaspora protection when over a hundred Chinese were arrested on suspicion of support for Communism in 1953. In October 1953, Liu met the head judge of the Hanoi courts, Le Bonheur, to suggest that those found innocent could 'take oaths to rehabilitate themselves' while underage suspects with minor offenses could be bailed out by their parents.[489] The Consulate could keep those who refused rehabilitation 'under close surveillance'. He objected to deporting the suspects as this would merely furnish the Chinese Communist Party with more ammunition for its propaganda, while harming genuine innocents.[490] Only 'bona fide criminals and communists' should be deported, and only after notifying the Consulate. Here, he was referring to deportation to the Mainland and not Taiwan, as he suggested that diehard Communists would merely re-infiltrate Vietnam after being repatriated.[491]

Although most of the detainees were released after the November meeting, in February 1954 the Hanoi police told him that 28 Communists or at least 'leftists' remained detained. In response, Liu suggested that 'prolonged stays in prison would only strengthen the [Communist] convictions of the youth'. His sympathy for the prisoners exceeded even some of their parents, as he 'mediate[d]' with the latter to sign confirmations of their children's innocence, which

[488] Letter from British Embassy in Paris to Foreign Office, Jan 14 1954. Proposal for establishment of diplomatic relations between Vietnam and Nationalist Chinese: French opposition to the move 1954, FO, TNA. FO 375/110227, 11.
[489] [In Chinese] Savingram from Liu Jiaju to MFA, Dec 17 1953. Yuenan daibu Gongdang xianyi Huaqiao 越南逮捕共黨嫌疑華僑, MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011007-0161, 53.
[490] Ibid, 54.
[491] Ibid, 55.

they were initially hesitant to do.[492] By this point, colonial pessimism about their prospects in the First Indochina War seemed to make local authorities increasingly halfhearted and ineffectual in their anti-Communism. The Hanoi police said that more releases would be forthcoming as there was no longer room in the prisons for any more detainees.[493]

Liu Jiaju's efforts showed that Taiwan's anti-Communist cooperation with Southeast Asian authorities offered some protection for those Chinese ROC diplomats deemed innocent of Communist convictions. Liu did not risk direct conflict with the Hanoi authorities in justifying his diaspora protection efforts through claims of nationality or human rights, but only appealed to them on a pragmatic basis with some degree of success. At the same time, return migration to the ROC's territories of Taiwan appeared to be outside the scope of ROC consuls' understanding of diaspora protection. Liu Jiaju never mentioned relocation to Taiwan as a possible alternative to detention or deportation of the Chinese arrestees in Hanoi. In Malaya, the site of much more substantial round-ups and deportations of politically suspect Chinese, ROC officials were equally steadfast in rejecting most applications for relocation by either detainees themselves or the colonial authorities.[494] As the ROC transitioned into a Cold War state on Taiwan, concerns of political security replaced Mainland-era acceptance of ethnic Chinese targeted by Southeast Asian countries' anti-Communist state violence.

A contrasting case of anti-Communist Chinese guerrillas in Laos shows that alongside political security, concerns of diplomatic embarrassment also motivated ROC diplomats' reluctance to accommodate migration to Taiwan. In October 1956, National Security Bureau chief Zheng Jiemin 鄭介民 informed the Foreign Ministry that several 'guerrillas' in Laos had been

[492] [In Chinese] Savingram from Liu Jiaju to MFA, Feb 15 1954. Ibid, 66.
[493] Ibid, 67.
[494] Choo Chin Low, "Banishment of Anti-Communist Chinese to Formosa: The British as Effectual Mediators in Malaya".

detained by local authorities.[495] The twenty-odd guerrillas were initially described as 'unrecognised' by the ROC, and remnants of the warlord Lu Han's forces in Yunnan alongside several Mainland Chinese disaffected by Maoist rule.[496] A second report, compiled by the Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Department a few weeks later for the intelligence, foreign affairs, and KMT overseas departments, suggested that some of the guerrillas were clandestine ROC fighters. The total figure of 'twenty-six' detainees was apparently a combination of both unrecognised guerrillas, and members of Li Mi 李彌's forces who had 'mistakenly crossed into Laos when buying pigs for military use'.[497] In contrast to Lu Han's remnants, ROC military general Li Mi was at the time leading clandestine forces against the CCP on China's southwestern border.[498] They were in danger of deportation to the Mainland, as they had already been 'handed over to left-leaning Chinese compatriots (*zuoqing Huaqiao*)'.[499] In December, the Defense Ministry's Intelligence Bureau 國防部軍事情報局 further suggested that the first batch of 'unrecognised fighters' were, rather, 'anti-Communist people (*fan'gong renmin*)' who had been 'militarily organised' by the French and then come under the command of the Laotian government. However, it offered no information as to how this culminated in the fighters' arrest.[500] The commonality between these differing assessments was that these guerrillas had been involved in fighting the CCP while ROC officials had no intention to publicly avow their support for these efforts.

[495] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Zheng Jiemin to MFA, Oct 4 1956. Yongzhen Faji saoshe wojun ji fan'gong youjidui beiju 永珍法機掃射我軍及反共游擊隊被拘, MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011203-0001, 35.

[496] FCRA. Liu Liaoguo Baixi qiaobao shibaren ge'an diaocha 留寮國百細僑胞十八人個案調查, Mar 8 1957. Ibid, 65-9.

[497] [In Chinese] Telegraph from DAPA to Legation in Saigon, Oct 15 1956. Ibid, 40.

[498] See Enze Han, "The Chinese Civil War and Implications for Borderland State Consolidation in Mainland South-East Asia," *China Quarterly* 241 (2020): 214–35; and Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Modern China's Ethnic Frontiers*, 115-9 for discussion of Taipei-sponsored operations on the southwestern Chinese border.

[499] Telegraph from DAPA to Legation in Saigon, Oct 15 1956, op. cit.

[500] [In Chinese] Letter from Zhang Yanyuan 張炎元 to George Yeh, Dec 3 1956. Ibid, 48-9.

The two plans that Zheng Jiemin suggested to the Foreign Ministry demonstrated his efforts to minimise the diplomatic embarrassment caused to the ROC by the guerillas. First, the Foreign Ministry could 'arrange for Laos to release them on the spot with freedom of exit'. This was because a 'negative effect on foreign relations' might result if Laos deported the guerrillas to Taiwan. Although these effects were unspecified, they would presumably colour Taipei as a regional troublemaker destabilising the PRC and the Southeast Asian countries bordering it. Another option was to classify them as 'Mainland people (*Dalu renmin*) arrested by foreign countries' who should 'join the embrace of our government (*huanwo zhengfu huaibao*). In this event, it would be 'more appropriate' for this relocation to be arranged by the Free China Relief Association (FCRA).[501] As the final chapter of this thesis will discuss, the FCRA, ostensibly a non-governmental organisation in Taiwan, was founded in 1950 by KMT leaders including Chiang Kai-Shek's wife Soong Mei-Ling 宋美齡. This would avoid the implication that the ROC was protecting the guerrillas, but rather position its quasi-official arm as acting in a humanitarian capacity.

By December, it appeared that the Foreign Ministry and Zheng Jiemin agreed on the proposal for the FCRA to reclassify the individuals as 'refugees', thereby defusing their sensitive status as fighters against the PRC.[502] In March 1957, FCRA officials Yu Chaoying 余超英 and Zhao Qiming 趙啟明 were sent to meet the detainees in Laos. In their reports to the Foreign Ministry, Yu and Zhao made no mention of whether they brought up the prospect of relocation to Taiwan, or what the detainees thought of this. Instead, they suggested the guerrillas espoused a wish to 'freely make their own living in Vientiane', where they might be able to 'make a discreet return

[501] Zheng Jiemin to MFA, Oct 4 1956, op. cit.
[502] [In Chinese] Letter from Zhang Yanyuan to MFA, Dec 12 1956. Ibid, 58.

to their base' afterwards'.[503] Although the FCRA supported the guerrillas with monetary subsidies, it took no further steps to relocate them after this meeting.[504] A few of the guerrillas were reported to have escaped successfully back to Li Mi's bases in northern Thailand, but others appeared again in 1958 ROC documents as being stuck in limbo after the Thai government refused their application for entry.[505] The centrality of intrastate relations to the FCRA, Foreign Ministry and intelligence officials' considerations meant that Taipei officials were reluctant to offer the anti-Communist guerrillas resettlement in Taiwan, or to be seen as supporting activities that were diplomatically threatening.

Conclusion

Taipei adapted its diaspora affairs policy to its diplomatic interests within the US-led security structure in Asia, in the process altering its relationship with the Chinese in Malaya and Vietnam. ROC officials emphasised the anti-Communist character of their diaspora policy, suggesting that their transnational connections could bolster their role as partners of both the US and Asian anti-Communist states. In doing so, they reinforced the anti-Communist political hegemony in the two countries' Chinese communities.

In contrast to other policy areas, ROC officials largely prevented diaspora policy from turning into a major source of conflict with the US, and even cultivated spheres of cooperation in the fight against Communist subversion in the Chinese diaspora. In part, this was due to the relative peripherality of diaspora affairs to both the diplomacy and legitimacy claims of Taipei. As historians like Hsiao-Ting Lin have discussed, issues that the Chiangs understood to be of great

[503] [In Chinese] Savingram from Legation in Vietnam to MFA, Mar 28 1957. Ibid, 61.
[504] [In Chinese] Savingram from Gu Zhenggang to Embassy in Laos, Jul 22 1958. Ibid, 75.
[505] [In Chinese] Savingram from Embassy in Thailand to MFA, Aug 30 1958. Ibid, 79-81.

symbolic importance, such as the status of Tibet and Mongolia or two-China representation in the United Nations, were prone to cause friction between the US and Taiwan.[506] ROC diaspora affairs officials, whether in the professional diplomatic apparatus or OCAC and KMT bureaucracies, largely averted comparable challenges through narratives of diasporic Chineseness that instrumentalised notions of Chinese racial superiority and primordial ties to China. Ethnic Chinese were encouraged to facilitate Taipei's intrastate relations, while their positions on Chinese naturalisation and political loyalty were ambiguous or conciliatory to both allies and the ethnic Chinese themselves.

Equally, Taipei's governance of diasporic transnational connections shared with its counterpart regime in Beijing an underlying, and at least partially successful, tendency to prioritise intra-Asian diplomacy over connections with overseas Chinese. As the introduction to this thesis has made clear, the PRC generally encouraged ethnic Chinese integration into the countries they lived in to serve post-1949 diplomatic needs and commitment to Third-Worldism. While ROC officials were sometimes more willing to cultivate cultural and education connections and to temper allies' Sinophobic policies, they similarly reformulated diaspora affairs as a sphere of intrastate cooperation. These developments formed part of a broader ROC mobilisation of transnational connections for its diplomacy, such as the Asian People's Anti-Communist League.[507] The 1963 Malaysian-ROC proposal for cooperation on internal security demonstrates their partial success; ROC officials built informal ties with Malaysia by establishing the latter's political control of the Chinese as a field of diplomatic cooperation. ROC officials portrayed themselves as aiding Malaysia's own nation-state building project,

[506] Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Taiwan, the United States, and the Hidden History of the Cold War in Asia*, 133-44 and 86-94.
[507] Hsiao-Ting Lin, "Taiwan's Cold War in Southeast Asia," *Cold War International History Project,* Apr 7 2016. Accessed Sep 1 2023 at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/taiwans-cold-war-southeast-asia ; Hao Chen, "Resisting Bandung?".

developing a tentative role in Malaysian internal security not unlike that of the US when it propagated repressive tactics to Third World allies.[508]

The integration of diaspora policy into anti-Communist diplomacy meant that ROC officials were as concerned with rupturing politically sensitive ties with the diaspora as developing new connections. Recent scholarship has highlighted how ethnic Chinese leaders in Taipei's closest allies, like the Philippines and the US, joined an imagined, transnational anti-Communist political community with Taipei and local officials.[509] These international networks came with a dark side of transnational repression. Social dissidents in the Philippines and overseas Chinese students in Taiwan were just two examples of individuals ensnared in the repressive side of Taiwan's networked anti-Communist diplomacy and politics.[510] In contrast, many of the ethnic Chinese affected by the policies discussed in this chapter experienced ROC diaspora policies as a rupture of their ties with the ROC on Taiwan. The focus on diplomatic relations led to a reconceptualisation of diasporic Chineseness in OCAC-produced propaganda away from overt loyalty to the ROC. Furthermore, concerns of political security and diplomatic embarrassment limited officials' acceptance of diasporic migration to Taiwan.

Yet, both the new interventions and ruptures in the ROC's relationship with the Chinese diaspora in Malaysia and Indochina reinforced the anti-Communist character of these communities' politics. In contrast to the postwar period, the propaganda and diplomatic initiatives of the ROC espoused support for the prevailing political arrangements in these societies, seeking to counteract suspicions of Taipei as a source of political disloyalty. Even

[508] Jeremy Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation Building in the American Century*, (University of Massachusetts Press, 2012).
[509] Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors*; Madeline Yuan-Yin Hsu, *The Good Immigrants*; Ellen Wu, *The Color of Success*.
[510] Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors*, 182-213; Jin-Xuan Toh, *Xuetong de yuanzui*.

the repression of Malaysian Chinese students in Taiwan was grounded in Taipei's claims to the ROC citizenship only of those Chinese who had migrated or sojourned to Taiwan. ROC officials promoted a diasporic Chineseness that largely endorsed the anti-Communist nationalisms of the states they cooperated with, if one that was somewhat more amenable to Taipei's intrastate diplomacy. This is equally evident in the ruptures that ROC officials implicitly established in their connections to the diaspora. The 1963 ROC-Malaysian proposal makes clear that Taipei's tacit abandonment of Mainland-era claims over diasporic loyalty and citizenship was a key precursor for intrastate cooperation on Communist subversion amongst the overseas Chinese. ROC officials were also increasingly unwilling to sacrifice material resources or political security to accommodate the overseas Chinese on issues such as migration to Taiwan. This newly restrictive view of diasporic political transnationalism further weakened the potential for pro-ROC loyalties to be a real alternative to the extant political hegemonies of Southeast Asian states.

Chapter Five: Restricting Bad Transnationality: Policies towards Chinese Political Participation and the Overseas KMT, c.1950-65

The previous chapter argued that ROC officials encouraged new configurations of 'good' transnationality through their diaspora policy in Southeast Asia, as part of intrastate, anti-Communist cooperation in the early 1950s-mid-1960s. This chapter examines the reverse side of the above development, ROC officials' restriction and de-emphasis of diasporic political connections that were harmful to their diplomatic relations. As the Malayan and RVN governments both became inhospitable to overseas Chinese political loyalty towards Taipei, ROC officials minimised the role of the overseas KMT when it became a source of diplomatic friction. Instead, they cultivated ties with political leaders who could promote intrastate friendship, particularly as part of their countries' Cold War diplomatic alignment. In contrast to how non-aligned and socialist states in the Global South resolved comparable disputes around nationality and political transnationalism, Taipei's approach relied on informal policy shifts and concessions. ROC officials were more reluctant to make formal changes to their diaspora policy which would officially renounce their claims to diasporic loyalty. Yet, these ROC policies similarly reinforced the consolidation of the nation-state order in Southeast Asia as a determining condition for the political lives of the region's ethnic Chinese.

This chapter focusses on two dimensions of ROC-Chinese diasporic political transnational connections. The first is the overseas KMT; Taipei officials relegated the overseas KMT to a largely symbolic role in countries that were hostile to their operation, while winding down organisational and financial support. Second was the political relationship between ROC officials and ethnic Chinese elites. From the 1950s to the early 1960s, ROC officials largely abandoned the goals of loyalty towards the ROC or advancing the status of the ethnic Chinese

in their approach to Chinese political participation in Malaya and Vietnam. Instead, the focus was to support Chinese leaders, and increasingly those of the two countries' majority ethnicities, who could improve relations with the ROC, particularly as part of their countries' broader Cold War alignment.

Gradual De-Emphasis of the KMT in Malaya, c. 1950-65

In response to the late-colonial British Malayan state's hostility to the KMT movement in Malaya, ROC officials scaled back their organisational and financial support of the KMT in Malaya and encouraged pro-KMT Chinese there to cooperate with local authorities. Officials in both the British Malayan colonial government and London viewed the cultivation of ethnic Chinese loyalty to Malaya, rather than China, as a principal policy goal. Subsequently, they were often hostile to the KMT's presence in Malaya. As early as 1952, the Far Eastern Department of the UK Foreign Office had informed the Commissioner-General for British South East Asia that any 'anti-Communist' efforts from Taipei were actually reflective of 'pro-KMT' inclinations that would undermine attachment to host countries.[511] A report prepared by the Malayan Secretariat of Chinese Affairs in 1956 similarly called the Kuomintang supporters in Malaya and Singapore 'stumbling blocks' to the project of orienting Malayan Chinese towards the local state.[512]

Ironically, but perhaps unsurprisingly, these fears of the KMT movement in Malaya as disloyal and threatening were most true between 1950 and 1952, in the initial phase of Taipei officials'

[511] Minute from Far Eastern Department to Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia, 9 Jun 1952. Problems of overseas Chinese in South East Asia; complaints about treatment of overseas Chinese families in Kwangtung; Nationalist drive to win support of the overseas Chinese; conferences in Taipeh and Canton; study of China's population, FO, TNA. TNA, FO 371/99376/32.
[512] BMSCA. Extent of KMT Influence amongst the Overseas Chinese in South East Asia, Aug 24 1956. Use of KMT adherents to assist government, FCO, MA:M, TNA. TNA, FCO 141/14555/92.

reorganisation of the overseas KMT. Before they fully recognised the diplomatic and political constraints they acted within, the KMT Central Reform Committee initially attempted to rally the Chinese in Malaya to support Taipei's efforts to retake the Mainland. According to the colonial Malayan Secretariat of Chinese Affairs' monthly reports, former KMT Secretary-General Wu Tiecheng met with 'four important KMT men' including Tan Kok Chor, Ong Keng Seng 王景成, and Lau Pak Khuan in the Philippines in April 1950.[513] Wu only held a sinecure after the retreat to Taiwan, but he loomed large in the overseas KMT movement because of his previous leadership of overseas Chinese resistance to Japan in World War Two.[514] In September 1951, Tan Kok Chor was also instructed by Zheng Yanfen's KMT Overseas Affairs department to reorganise the KMT in Malaya and Singapore through new organisations such as the 'Anti-Communist Anti-Russia Committee'.[515] Even in 1950, before US-ROC security cooperation was formalised, a significant part of Tan's work was to court US support for Taipei's propaganda initiatives; he attempted to secure USIS funding for pro-KMT newspapers like the *Chung Shing Jit Pao*.[516] In January 1950, former Consul to Singapore Wu Bosheng also tried to persuade the newspaper magnate Aw Boon Haw to install a pro-KMT editor in his *Sin Chew Jit Poh.* Although Wu emigrated to the US several years later, his employment in the Foreign Ministry was still very recent at this point. While Aw had taken up pro-CCP views during the Communist ascendancy in the Civil War, he was driven into the pro-Taipei camp after the CCP expropriated his businesses and properties on the Mainland.[517]

Even within the context of comparatively assertive mobilisation of the overseas KMT, the pro-KMT activities and proposals that most incensed colonial authorities often emanated from pro-

[513] BMSCA. Apr 1950: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs Nos 43-48, January to October 1950, FCO, MA:M, TNA. FCO 141/7626, 9.
[514] Chee Seng Tan, "Kuomintang Man Behind Special Force: Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942-1945".
[515] Extract from PMR 9/1951. The strength and activities of the Kuomintang in Singapore, Colonial Office (CO), TNA. CO 537/7292.
[516] BMSCA. Apr 1950: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. TNA, FCO 141/7626, 9.
[517] Ibid. Feb/Mar 1950 : Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. TNA, FCO 141/7626, 7.

KMT Chinese themselves, rather than Taipei. This illustrated an important continuity with the postwar years, where ROC consuls remained mindful of breaching colonial taboos on foreign political intervention despite their hardline positions on diaspora protection. In November 1950, Koh Cheng Hong 許清風, a former fighter in the anti-Japanese resistance, suggested that over 100 'ex-members of the KMT Army' who had been trained in the Central Military Academy or Central Police Training School could be organised into a Malayan Mobile Army.[518] Internal Security Secretary JC Barry, to whom Koh raised his proposal, initially agreed that while the KMT's 'first loyalty is to China', they were 'willing to be an active ally' against the MCP.[519] Singapore's Chinese Affairs Secretary, CW Lyle, rebutted that despite its current weakness, the KMT was a 'revolutionary party' with 'at all times an anti-British flavour'. Because of its 'potential power… to involve the Chinese in overseas commitments', an 'open alliance with the KMT' was entirely out of the question.[520] The head of the Special Branch in Singapore, Morris, similarly described Koh's suggestion as an 'absurd' one of organising a 'Chinese Special Branch' to the Commissioner of Police. He wrote that only to prevent future allegations that he had ignored the proposal did he pass on Koh's proposal to his counterpart in Kuala Lumpur.[521]

By around 1952, however, ROC officials began to establish a policy of encouraging the Chinese to cooperate with local authorities, and scaling back the attention it paid to the KMT in Malaya and Singapore. As the previous chapters have highlighted, these changes took place in a context of OCAC and KMT leaders like Zheng Yanfen recognising the hostility of local authorities to ROC support for the overseas KMT. In a few years, the membership of the KMT

[518] Memorandum from NG Morris to Commissioner of Police, Jun 26 1950. TNA, FCO 141/14555/1.
[519] Memorandum from JC Barry to CW Lyle, Nov 18 1950. TNA, FCO 141/14555/2.
[520] Memorandum from CW Lyle to JC Barry, Nov 27 1950. TNA, FCO 141/14555/7.
[521] Memorandum from NG Morris to Commissioner of Police, Jun 26 1950, op. cit.

in Malaya dwindled to just over two thousand from 60,000.[522] In his August 1952 reports to the Executive Council, Lyle suggested that the Malayan KMT's 'morale' was declining after London's recognition of the PRC, their support dwindling particularly amongst the youth, and was altogether a 'busted flush'.[523] With a lack of organisational and financial support from Taipei, the KMT branches of Malaya and Singapore slowly faded into obsolescence. In 1960, the KMT Overseas Affairs Department compiled a published volume *The KMT Overseas* that summarised its work over the past decade. Despite an open invitation from all KMT branches to submit accounts of their history and present operations, nearly a dozen branches in Malaya and Singapore were listed as not having responded in time.[524] The only exceptions were branches in Malacca and Perak. Even then, they provided only detailed historical accounts of their Tongmenghui and anti-Japanese activities,[525] while alluding to 'great difficulties' in the 'present period' restricting their activity.[526]

However, these efforts from Taipei were frequently understood by colonial authorities as disingenuous. Despite Taipei's reassurances that their officials would urge the Malayan Chinese to cooperate with local authorities, colonial officials continued to restrict the movement of KMT leaders and ROC officials between Taiwan and Singapore and Malaya. In September 1952, the Commissioner-General for British Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, rejected OCAC Minister Zheng Yanfen's proposed visit to Singapore and Malaya on the grounds that it would undermine the promotion of 'common loyalty and citizenship'. He refused to believe Zheng's assurance, relayed through the British consul in Tamsui, that

[522] Chen-Tao Huang 黃辰濤, "Winning Overseas Support: Diplomacy, Party Affairs, Overseas Chinese Policy of R.O.C in Malaya and Singapore 爭取海外力量：中華民國外交、僑務、黨務在新馬的運作 (1945-57), " (Master's Thesis, National Chi Nan University, 2009), 85-8.
[523] SCA Memorandum to Executive Council: Policy towards the KMT. 8 Aug 1952. TNA, FCO 141/14555/63.
[524] KMT Central Committee Third Group 中國國民黨中央委員會第三組, *Zhongguo Guomindang zai haiwai* 中國國民黨在海外, Vol 2, (KMT Central Committee Third Group, 1961), 369-70.
[525] Ibid, 342.
[526] Ibid, 368.

Taipei's policy was to urge 'cooperation' and not 'separation'.[527] The Foreign Office sided with MacDonald, adding the possibility for 'undesirable interpretation' by Beijing.[528] In July 1954, the Malayan Secretariat of Chinese Affairs' monthly reports stated that Dong Shifang, Vice-Chairman of the KMT Central Committee and an OCAC official, was similarly 'refused an entry permit'.[529]

ROC officials' responses to these colonial restrictions demonstrated a mixture of genuine concessions to improve relations with Kuala Lumpur, particularly by the professional diplomatic apparatus, and efforts to retain clandestine political ties with the KMT. In July 1952, a visiting delegation to Taiwan led by Ong Chin Siong 王振相 was infiltrated by an 'informant' planted by the Malayan Special Branch. An unnamed delegate from Selangor was reported to have suggested, with the support of another representative, that the party should call not on ROC Foreign Minister George Yeh but rather the British Consul in Tamsui because of their status as British Protected Persons. Yet, by the colonial report's own admission, the ROC Foreign Ministry deemed the matter highly sensitive after learning of the row; it responded by calling off all meetings with the delegation altogether.[530] At the same time, the Foreign Ministry's cautious approach coexisted with a more cavalier attitude from the KMT. From the KMT's published compilations on its overseas activities, it appeared that some of its officers dispatched to Malaya and Singapore clandestinely entered and left without being recorded on the colonial Chinese affairs reports.[531]

[527] Telegraph from Malcolm MacDonald to Foreign Office, 9 Sep 1952. Refusal of entry to Malaya for Formosa Director of Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs Cheng Yen Fen; report on Ceylon-China Friendship Association, FO, TNA. FO 371/101234/3.
[528] Foreign Office. Entry of Cheng Yen Fen to Malaya. Ibid, FO 371/101234/4.
[529] BMSCA. Jul 1954: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs Nos 83-94, January to December 1954, FCO, MA:M, TNA. FCO 141/7630, 28.
[530] Office of the Secretary of Chinese Affairs in Malaya. 'The Malayan Chinese mission to Taiwan,' 29 Jul 1952. TNA, FCO 141/14555/70.
[531] Kuomintang Central Committee Third Group, *Zhongguo Guomindang zai haiwai*, Vol. 1, 263-6.

Furthermore, pro-KMT leaders and newspapers increasingly encouraged Malayan Chinese to contribute to Malaya and oppose the MCP by around mid-1954. As these shifts were evident not only in the de-emphasis, but the re-interpretation, of pro-ROC political symbols, it can be speculated that the ROC's official pronouncements were a significant consideration for the changing attitudes of pro-KMT Chinese elites. The Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall celebration of the ROC's Youth Day, on March 29, saw a speech from its President, a little-known 'figurehead', ask the Chinese to see Malaya as their '"First Homeland"' while also praising Chiang Kai-Shek. The *Kwong Wah Jit Poh* 光華日報 stressed that the Three Principles of the People was an ideology suited to Malaya that could be celebrated by non-KMT members, and therefore that pro-KMT celebrations should not necessarily be seen as expressions of loyalty towards Taipei.[532] In April, celebrations of Chiang's reelection as President were accompanied by similar, measured colonial observations about the political loyalties of the Chinese in Malaya. The pro-KMT leader Tso Yew Fai 曹堯輝 opined at a 'well attended' celebration in Selangor that the Chinese should 'look upon Malaya as their home' and participate in the 'affairs of their country as Malayan citizens'.[533] However, these shifts were not regarded by the SCA as genuine. Even in 1956, the Malayan Secretariat for Chinese Affairs suggested that the pro-KMT Chinese who 'look[ed] to China– at the moment Formosa' were 'not interested in local affairs' except when instructed to do so by Taipei. The words '"co-operating"' were even rendered in quotation marks.[534]

Three endings to the threads of KMT influence in Malaya after independence further demonstrate how far ROC officials reduced and restricted the transnational connections of the KMT by the late 1950s. In the early 1950s, the Overseas Anti-Communist Struggle Committee

[532] Mar 1954: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. TNA, FCO 141/7630, 9.
[533] Apr 1954: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. Ibid, 6.
[534] BMSCA. 'Extent of KMT Influence amongst the Overseas Chinese in South East Asia,' Aug 24 1956. FCO 141/14555/92.

海外對匪鬥爭工作統一指導委員會 (Overseas Committee) had funded a pro-KMT mouthpiece in Singapore named the *Chung Shing Jit Pao* 中興日報 that nevertheless suffered from limited readership and poor financial health for much of its existence.[535] The Committee was a body consisting of the leaders of the KMT's overseas affairs department, the Foreign and Defense ministries, and security forces, that coordinated the ROC/KMT's covert overseas operations. In April 1956, Chiang met three members of the newspaper's Board of Governors to praise them for their 'loyalty to party and country'.[536] Yet, a year later, the newspaper closed down partly for want of funding from Taipei.[537] Instead of Malaya, where the local political environment strongly discouraged diasporic support of the ROC/KMT, the Committee concentrated its support for newspaper outlets in Southeast Asian countries with better diplomatic relations with Taipei. The RVN, whose experience of the overseas KMT will be discussed in the following section, was initially one such country.

The second bookend concerns the KMT party organisation and pro-KMT groups in Malaya. In January 1966, a draft telegram from the Foreign Ministry to the Consulate in Kuala Lumpur noted that 'our Party's comrades', Sim Mow Yu 沈慕羽, Tan Kee Gak 陳期岳 and Song Ting Ping 宋庭濱, had organised the Chinese groups of Malacca to agitate for the Chinese-language education system. The Ministry stated that this 'will surely arouse the suspicion of the Malaysian government towards us', and so the consulate should 'pay attention and must not interfere'.[538] The use of pro-KMT organisations in Malaysia to change Kuala Lumpur's state policies, particularly in areas that had nothing to do with intrastate diplomacy, was clearly

[535] Ibid.
[536] [In Chinese] Memorandum from Zhang Lisheng and Zheng Yanfen to Chiang Kai Shek, Apr 28 1956. Zongcai piqian, KMTA. CKS 45/0069.
[537] Chen-Tao Huang, "Winning Overseas Support," 97-100.
[538] [In Chinese] Savingram from MFA to Consulate-General in Kuala Lumpur, Jan 12 1966. Malaixiya Huaren shetuan 馬來西亞華人社團, MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0053/62.2/1, 6-7.

regarded as unimaginable by the Foreign Ministry at this point. Deputy OCAC Minister Li Pusheng's memoirs in 1969 further that former KMT leaders largely maintained only informal interpersonal contact with OCAC officials. He wrote that in a visit to Malacca in 1963, Tan Kee Gak compared the Malayan Chinese to 'daughters soon to be married off' in discussing their support for the ROC football team, when the Tunku invited them to come and play Malaya.[539] According to Tan Kee Gak, it was only because the Chinese were soon to become Malayan citizens that they harboured residual affinity for the ROC. To Li's approval, Tan remarked that such patriotism meant after naturalising, the Chinese would be 'loyal citizens' and might even 'martyr' themselves for Malaysia when called for.[540] Recounting the same visit, Li also mentioned that Tan Kok Chor welcomed him in Singapore and was now a 'Manager'.[541] He offered few concrete details about Tan's role; perhaps he had taken up a career in business like the de-recognised ROC consuls in Malaya.

The third window is provided by another of the chronologically last documents about Malaya in the KMT archives. The previous paragraphs traced Ong Keng Seng's political allegiances from a close friend of the KMT leadership in 1950 to keeping largely quiet on his relationship to the ROC by 1954. One possible reason for this was stated in the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs' monthly reports in 1953. In January that year, Ong was convicted of perjury by the Penang courts for statements he made about a 'bus used by a Girls School', placing his role as 'school Manager' in doubt. In April, the Education Department decided to make use of Ong's 'anti-Communist outlook', and pressured him to support the British Malayan policy of governmental control and a Malayanised curriculum, over pro-KMT leaders' preferred vision of school autonomy.[542] In 1963, Chiang Kai-Shek agreed to send condolences in his name for

[539] Pusheng Li, *Wo bushizi de muqin* 我不識字的母親, (Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe 傳記文學出版社, 1969), 179.
[540] Ibid, 180.
[541] Ibid, 176.
[542] BMSCA. Apr 1953: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. TNA, FCO 141/7629, 10.

Ong's death, as Ong had been a veteran of the Tongmenghui and KMT, and Chairman of the *Kwong Wah Jit Poh*.[543] In the 1950s, the relationship between the ROC state and individuals like Ong, who were archetypal 'loyal compatriots', became increasingly symbolic. This was the product of both Taipei officials' increasing caution and the personal interests of Chinese leaders like Ong, who recognised that cooperation with colonial authorities and the Malaya-oriented Chinese elites would serve them best. Finally, with the death of Ong's generation, even that symbolic role began to dissipate.

Abrupt Scaling Back of the KMT in Vietnam, 1959-64

Although the RVN ban on the local KMT originated from a contrasting set of reasons to British Malaya, the response of ROC officials was ultimately similarly conciliatory. In response to an abrupt ban on the KMT in 1959, driven chiefly by ethno-nationalist politics, the Embassy to the RVN initially downplayed the severity of Saigon's actions and worked with the local KMT to assuage the concerns of the Saigon authorities. The latter saw the KMT largely as a symbol of the failure of the ethnic Chinese to integrate into the RVN nation-state, rather than a concrete political threat along the lines of the KMT in Malaya. A final settlement between Saigon and Taipei preserved the KMT's existence as an organisation but largely acceded to RVN demands to limit its activities.

In contrast to the long, multipolar tug-of-war on the Malayan KMT's rights between the colonial state, the ROC government (pre- and post-1949), and local Chinese elites, the RVN's ban on the KMT was an abrupt act of Diem's government. In the early 1950s, Vietnam had

[543] [In Chinese] Memorandum from Tang Zong and Ma Shuli 馬樹禮 to Chiang Kai-Shek, Mar 14 1963. Zongcai piqian, KMTA. CKS 52/0023.

been deemed a focal point of the overseas KMT by Zheng Yanfen and the rest of the KMT's Central Reform Committee, with initial increases in its organisational footprint. Up to 1954, a new party branch had been established in Hue, with additional branches in Vinh Long and Da Nang having 'reestablished contact' with the KMT leadership after the retreat to Taiwan, according to *The KMT Overseas*.[544] The initial development of the KMT in Vietnam contrasted with its decline in Malaya. Compared to the constellation of state directives and Chinese elites' interests that favoured the emergence of Malaya-oriented politics amongst the Malayan Chinese, late- and post-colonial state authorities in South Vietnam were initially more amenable to a role for the overseas KMT.

In September 1959, ROC Ambassador to the RVN Yuan Zijian informed his superiors that the RVN Foreign and Interior Ministries had told him of a ban on the local KMT and its activities. The abruptness of the ban suggested that, rather than longer-term social and political changes as in Malaya, ethno-nationalist sentiments of RVN leaders may have been a more important cause. According to Yuan, their principal reason was that having a 'foreign political party' operate on Vietnamese territory was 'detrimental to sovereignty'. Further, as most Chinese in Vietnam were now 'Vietnamese citizens of Chinese descent (*Huayi*)', they should participate in local political parties instead. A supplementary justification was that the KMT and the Anti-Communist National Salvation Congress, organised after the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference, were incompetent and lacked manpower. The RVN government suggested that the KMT and the ROC Embassy continue to operate in 'overseas Chinese' (*Huaqiao*) communities through friendly influential leaders.[545] Despite their political and demographic insignificance, the RVN government regarded KMT activities by the naturalised Chinese as detrimental to

[544] Kuomintang Central Committee Third Group, *Zhongguo Guomindang zai haiwai*, Vol 1, 251-2.
[545] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Yuan Zijian to MFA, Sep 8 1959. Guomindang Xiti zhibu beifeng yu jiaqiang dui Yue gongzuo 國民黨西堤支部被封與加強對越工作, MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011099-0004, 30.

national sovereignty and unity. They proposed that only limited ROC authority could be preserved for the few Chinese who had registered as ROC nationals after the 1957 naturalisation laws.

Zheng Yanfen, by that time former OCAC Minister but still chief of the KMT's overseas department, initially voiced strong opposition to Foreign Minister Huang Shaogu 黄少谷. Zheng criticised that the RVN, an ally, had banned the KMT, which had long been 'in accordance with [RVN] national policy' as its 'work was centred around anti-Communism'. He stressed that the KMT in Saigon-Cholon 'had long decided to avoid public activities'. Rather, it 'cooperated with local anti-Communist propaganda' by participating in marches, and 'assisted local security forces' to arrest Communist 'spies'. Its weekly 'commemorations of Sun Yat-Sen' had always been allowed by local police. As the third chapter of this thesis has highlighted, Ambassador Yuan Zijian had been a strong proponent of Chinese naturalisation as an official in the Foreign Ministry. Perhaps because of these past run-ins with the OCAC, Zheng was particularly suspicious that Yuan might make excessive concessions on the KMT ban, and suggested that Yuan 'need not make any binding commitments yet' when liaising with the RVN authorities.[546]

ROC officials ultimately adopted a largely conciliatory attitude about the KMT's operations. In part, this was because Foreign Ministry officials like Yuan Zijian had a greater say in the ROC's diaspora policies on the ground in South Vietnam than did the OCAC and KMT. After receiving orders from the RVN Interior Ministry, the KMT branch in Saigon-Cholon discussed with Yuan Zijian to comply with the ban until a solution could be brokered. This involved 'suspending its public activities' and 'making secret preparations' before a solution could be

[546] [In Chinese] Letter from Zheng Yanfen to Huang Shaogu, Sep 17 1959. Ibid, 31.

reached, and KMT leaders promising compliance with the ban to local police.[547] Even Zheng Yanfen's attitude veered between moderation and protests to the RVN government. In September 1959, he wrote to Chiang Kai-Shek to suggest that regardless of Saigon's final decision, the KMT there should go 'completely underground'.[548] When the term 'underground' was used in a Malayan context by ROC officials such as the Overseas Committee, it did not primarily refer to the KMT becoming a covert political force. Although former KMT members would join these new covert organisations such as social clubs, the extent of their activities was usually only to organise anti-Communist events but not to challenge local governments.[549]

In December 1959, the RVN government reached an agreement with the Embassy. Although ROC officials did not provide detailed records of how they negotiated this agreement, they mentioned pursuing backchannels through influential personalities in Vietnam, who might have prompted the Interior Ministry to backtrack. The first set of liaisons was taken up by Yuan Zijian, who targeted the cultural exchange organisations that had been set up out of Taipei-Saigon friendship. He mediated through 'Hoang Nam Hung of the Hoi Viet Hoa 越華會, Raymond de Jaegher of the Free Pacific Communications Agency, and Confucian Society 孔學會 Vice-President Nguyen Trac'.[550] Hoang Nam Hung, in particular, had worked with ROC-backed factions in the Bao Dai government.[551] De Jaegher was a Catholic priest who had fought against the CCP in the Chinese Civil War, and now served as an advisor to Ngo Dinh Diem.[552] Zheng Yanfen and his contacts in the KMT in Vietnam made informal interventions of their

[547] Central News Agency. Yuenan mingling wo zhu Xiti zhibu tingzhi huodong 越南命令我註西堤支部停止活動, Sep 5 1959. Ibid, 56-7.
[548] [In Chinese] Memorandum from Tang Zong and Zheng Yanfen to Chiang Kai-Shek, Sep 21 1959. KMTA, 48/0158.
[549] Chung-Ting Huang, "Winning Overseas Support," 85-88.
[550] CNA. Yuenan mingling wo zhu Xiti zhibu tingzhi huodong, Sep 5 1959, op. cit.
[551] [In Chinese] Memorandum from Zhang Qijun 張其昀 and Zheng Yanfen to Chiang Kai-Shek, Jun 12 1952. KMTA, 41/0209.
[552] Raymond De Jaegher, *The Enemy within; an Eyewitness Account of the Communist Conquest of China*, (Umi Press, 1994) provides his full biography.

own. In a memorandum to Chiang Kai-Shek, he suggested that two officials in the intelligence department of Diem's Presidential office, Tran Vang Soi 陳金線 and Vu Minh Duc 武明德 (names transliterated from Chinese characters), had been 'vital' to the decision because they had long been 'sympathetic' to the KMT. Unfortunately, as Zheng was only writing to request a 'portrait' from Chiang to each of these two to show the ROC's gratitude, he did not detail the role they had played.[553]

Arguably out of the latter's ethno-nationalist politics, the agreement between Taipei diplomats and RVN authorities saw a symbolic concession from the KMT that perhaps exceeded the KMT's practical adjustments in importance. As a condition of their reinstatement, Yuan stated that the KMT in Saigon-Cholon had been told to 'refrain from public activities', 'focus on anti-Communism' and 'combat Communist infiltration'. He passed on to the local authorities, with seemingly no guarantee of success, the KMT members' request to hold public anti-Communist activities. He clarified that the branch's membership would be restricted to 'overseas compatriots'.[554] This group only numbered around 1,600 according to the Embassy in September 1959.[555] With the exception of restrictions on the KMT's membership criteria, these measures differed little from the developments that Zheng Yanfen had described to Huang Shaogu as already in place before the ban. It appeared that for the RVN government, the suppression of the KMT was less about its actual political threat, which was minimal, than removing symbols of the now-naturalised Chinese having foreign loyalties. Indeed, Zheng suggested that for a time, KMT leaders' and the Embassy's concessions led to a measure of renewed tolerance by Saigon of KMT activities. In January 1960, he reported to Chiang Kai-Shek that the Saigon-Cholon branch was allowed public commemorations of Sun Yat-Sen's

[553] [In Chinese] Memorandum from Tang Zong and Zheng Yanfen to Chiang Kai-Shek, Apr 5 1960. KMTA, CKS 0049/0059.
[554] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Yuan Zijian to MFA, Dec 24 1959. AH, 020-011099-0004, 73.
[555] Chung-Ting Huang, "Dierci Shijie Dazhanhou Yuenan zhi Huaren zhengce (1945-2003)," 80.

achievements and the ROC Youth Day. This was done on the condition that participants could not demonstrate their open support for the incumbent ROC government and KMT branches elsewhere in Vietnam could no longer operate publicly.[556]

After the two governments arrived at an initial *modus vivendi*, the KMT overseas affairs department attempted to expand the scope of KMT activities with the RVN's new legal limits, only to be met with foot-dragging from Yuan Zijian. In June 1960, the KMT overseas department under Zheng Yanfen devised a 'Work Plan for Party and Diaspora Affairs in Vietnam'. Regarding the KMT, the report advocated an approach of 'utmost confidentiality', in accordance with the demand of avoiding public activities.[557] The KMT branch in Saigon-Cholon and the smaller branches in other parts of Vietnam were to be regrouped into a new General Branch (*zongzhibu*) in Vietnam, which would be directly run by a representative from Taiwan.[558]

This administrative initiative of reorganisation and reform seemed to belie a growing indifference, or even pessimism, as to the actual membership and operations of the KMT in South Vietnam. An Overseas Committee summary of KMT activities in Saigon-Cholon in 1957 included 'agitating Saigon-Cholon overseas Chinese youth' to participate in Double Tenth celebrations, 'assisting' overseas Chinese youth to serve in the military in Taiwan, and funding the newspaper *Yuehua Wanbao* 越華晚報. It was also responsible for liaising with the Presidential Office of Ngo Dinh Diem about Communist infiltration in the Chinese community and providing advice to the ROC-loyalist banks and hospitals.[559]

[556] [In Chinese] Memorandum from Tang Zong and Cheng Yan-Fen to Chiang Kai Shek, May 11 1960. KMTA, CKS 49/0085.
[557] KMT Central Committee Third Group 中國國民黨中央委員會第三組. Yuenan diqu dangqian dangwu qiaowu gongzuo fang'an (cao'an) 越南地區當前黨務僑務工作方案（草案）. AH, 020-011099-0004, 78.
[558] Ibid, 78-81.
[559] Yuenan diqu duifei douzheng gongzuo xiaozu 越南地區對匪鬥爭工作小組, Sep 1957. Ibid, 156.

Most of these activities appeared to dissipate after Taiwan's reorganisation. In 1961, the newly-reorganised KMT branch in Saigon-Cholon was given cash grants for its activities, including a '500 USD' grant to celebrate the Double Tenth National Day. Apart from this, however, the implementation of the Work Plan seemed to stall as 'no meetings had been held'.[560] In 1961, the Overseas Committee faulted Ambassador Yuan Zijian for 'ignoring' his task.[561] Yuan's experience as a career diplomat, his past support for Chinese naturalisation, and Zheng Yanfen's suspicion of him gives rise to the speculation that he was not merely lazy and incompetent, but may have been rather skeptical of the KMT's value to diplomatic relations. Further, while the Overseas Committee was initially displeased by his behaviour, the extent of their action was limited to written reminders. Yuan's superior, Foreign Minister Shen Changhuan 沈昌煥, appeared to regard Yuan's non-compliance as a matter of offending his colleagues and not of diplomatic or political import. In 1963, after more letters from the Overseas Committee,[562] he wrote to Yuan that the latter's foot-dragging was 'not understood by the [Party] leadership and interested parties, who have criticised our Ministry'.[563] It was not until 1964, months before Yuan was reassigned to Turkey, that he started organising these meetings.[564] The absence of communication between the KMT in Saigon and Taipei leaders was matched by its insignificance in Saigon-Cholon society. *The KMT Overseas* stated that the Saigon-Cholon branch had a mere '122 members' with 'Chinese compatriot classification (*Huaqiao shenfen*)' by 1960. After 'twenty-four return[ed] to Taiwan, … only ninety-eight comrades had not changed their nationality'. 'Secret liaison' was the only option left for the

[560] Overseas Committee. Benhui zai haiwai gedi gongzuo xiaozu yu huibao gongzuo gaikuang jiantao yijian qingbao 本會在海外各地工作小組與會報工作概況檢討意見清表. Ibid, 204.
[561] [In Chinese] Letter from Overseas Committee to Shen Changhuan, Aug 21 1961. Ibid, 168.
[562] [In Chinese] Letter from Overseas Committee to Shen Changhuan, Feb 21 1962. Ibid, 188; [In Chinese] Letter from Overseas Committee to Shen Changhuan, Jun 14 1962. Ibid, 190.
[563] [In Chinese] Letter from Shen Changhuan to Yuan Zijian, Apr 8 1963. Ibid, 194-5.
[564] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Yuan Zijian to MFA, May 29 1964. Ibid, 217.

KMT organization, whose 'target audience was narrowing by the day', and further faced 'the greatest difficulties' of the 'rampant Viet Cong'.[565]

The largely symbolic, and dissolving, relationship between the KMT in Saigon-Cholon and the ROC government was further demonstrated by the nature of those communications that did take place between KMT members in Vietnam and Chiang Kai-Shek by the 1960s. On the KMT ban, Chiang gave few substantial replies to Zheng Yanfen and his other ministers. However, he was occasionally asked to give gifts and audiences to the KMT veterans of Vietnam. In 1960, he agreed to meet Chen Liju 陳立炬, a 'Disciplinary Committee member' of the KMT in Vietnam who had never visited Taiwan before despite his old age.[566] In 1961, he had 'someone write on [his] behalf… the Chinese character *shou* (longevity)' to an 80-year old named Sha Huanbin 沙煥彬, who had joined the KMT since 1911.[567] Curiously, another of the elderlies Chiang's assistants wrote to in 1960 was named Pan Guangdan 潘光旦. Pan, described as a 'patriotic and dedicated' 72-year-old KMT member, appeared unrelated to either the PRC social scientist or the RVN opposition politician (Phan Quang Dan) who shared his name.[568]

Supporting 'Anti-Communists' Against 'Leftist' Chinese in Malaya

ROC officials' rupturing of organisational connections with the overseas KMT took place alongside a change in the nature and aims of the ties they cultivated with overseas Chinese

[565] Kuomintang Central Committee Third Group, *Zhongguo Guomindang zai haiwai*, Vol 2, 226.
[566] [In Chinese] Memorandum from Tang Zong and Zheng Yanfen to Chiang Kai-Shek, Nov 16 1963. Zongcai piqian, KMTA, CKS 50/0159.
[567] [In Chinese] Memorandum from Tang Zong and Zheng Yanfen to Chiang Kai-Shek, Mar 31 1962. Ibid, KMTA, CKS 51/0033.
[568] [In Chinese] Memorandum from Tang Zong and Zheng Yanfen to Chiang Kai-Shek, Oct 18 1960. Ibid, KMTA, CKS 50/0141.

elites. In the 1950s, ROC officials understood Malayan and Singaporean Chinese politics as a conflict of 'anti-Communists', or those who might promote closer ties with Taipei, versus 'leftists' who might be open to engagement with the PRC. Amidst this shift, past tendencies towards active interventions in Malayan Chinese politics were not fully abandoned, least of all by officials in the KMT. Nevertheless, even in these unsuccessful manoeouvres, the promotion of Kuala Lumpur-Taipei diplomatic relations rather than the pro-ROC loyalty of the Malayan Chinese became the main goal. Furthermore, Chinese political leaders in Malaya were no longer the primary target of ROC persuasion efforts, as in the Mainland era. Rather, the importance of Malayan Chinese politics increasingly ran parallel to the effort to build ties with the Malay political elite.

The Overseas Committee's documents illustrated the growing focus of ROC officials on encouraging opposition to both Chinese and Malayan Communism by the time of Malaya's independence in 1957. Whereas in the postwar period, Republican Chinese officials had aimed both to elevate the status of the Malayan Chinese and to cultivate pro-ROC politics in Malaya, ROC officials now accepted the Malayan rather than Chinese political orientation of the ethnic Chinese leaders. The establishment of relations with Taipei was chiefly understood as part of Malaya and Singapore's pro-Western diplomatic alignment, rather than on the grounds of either their Chinese communities or Asian solidarity. One October 1957 report on 'Problems in Malaya' stressed that post-independence Malaya was at the 'frontline' between the 'Free World' and the 'so-called non-aligned bloc'. The report downplayed the role of pro-KMT loyalists in Malaya, suggesting that reliance on the 'no more than two or three' 'patriots' (*aiguozhe*) in Malaya to 'fight the Communists' would 'result in certain failure'. Instead, the ROC government should appoint representatives to 'assist compatriots in claiming political

power through the MCA' and 'liaise with high-ranking [Malayan] officials'.[569] Despite the rhetoric of claiming political power, the principal aim was to win over Malaya's state diplomacy to the pro-Western bloc and Taipei through friendly Malayan Chinese elites.

Taipei officials' understanding of 'leftist' influence in Malaya differed from those of their counterparts in London and Kuala Lumpur, as their concerns largely revolved around postcolonial Malaya's recognition of the ROC. Leaders that were trusted by British officials and Malay nationalists as anti-Communist were frequently suspected by Foreign Ministry officials as pro-Communist. An individual named Wu Nairen 吳乃任 wrote to the Foreign Ministry in 1957 on the state of ethnic Chinese politics in Malaya. Little existed in the records surveyed about Wu; he appeared to be a Malayan Chinese providing intelligence to the Foreign Ministry, as in the late 1950s ROC sources identified him as having taken on a new job as politician Lim Chong Eu 林蒼佑's personal assistant.[570] Wu wrote in his departmental reports that a middleman, 'Huang Tanshun 黃譚順 of the Chinese Democratic League', had been trying to win over the MCA's leadership, including Tan Cheng Lock, his son Tan Siew Sin 陳修信, and Ong Yoke Lin 翁毓麟 for the CCP. Huang had supposedly procured donations from the Bank of China in Malaya (which recognised Beijing) to Tunku Abdul Rahman to curry favour with him, alongside individuals like Tan Siew Sin.[571] The same charges of Tan Siew Sin as 'left of centre' and 'surrounded by the bandits' representatives', and Ong Yoke Lin was

[569] Overseas Committee. Malaiya youguan wenti baogao 馬來亞有關問題報告, Oct 4 1957. Zhou Haitong jilu duifei douzheng 周海通記錄對匪鬥爭, MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0046/818.11/0009, 14.
[570] Hong-Yu Chen, *Jiemi*, 213-5.
[571] Wu Nairen. Cujin Zhong-Ma chengli bangjiao zhi chuyi 促進中馬成立邦交之芻議. Malaiya zhengqing ji qiaoqing 馬來亞聯合邦在野黨. Malaixiya zhengqing ji qiaoqing 馬來亞西政情及僑情, MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0046/1/27, 57.

'unreliable and pro-Communist', were repeated in November 1957 by the Overseas Committee.[572]

It was questionable how much truth these suspicions held. British Malayan authorities at times considered Tan Cheng Lock to be radically anti-colonial and politically untrustworthy. In 1954, the colonial Secretariat of Chinese Affairs voiced their trust for his rival Lee Hau Shik over him, as Lee '[did not attack] the British'.[573] Tan also adopted a somewhat opportunistic position on Chinese recognition, officiating at a 'Free China photography exhibition' in 1951 but later discouraging celebrations of the ROC in Malaya.[574] Furthermore, the absence of colonial intelligence on contact between Beijing and Chinese elites does not necessarily mean that these exchanges were Taipei's fabrication. For example, recent studies have uncovered Lee Kuan Yew's early covert engagement with China in the 1950s-60s.[575] Regardless, incumbent MCA leaders largely abided by the colonial state's reluctance to engage with either Beijing or Taipei. In the late 1960s, Tan Siew Sin worked with Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in stepping up security cooperation with Taiwan as postcolonial Malay(si)a's Finance Minister.[576]

ROC officials' understanding of their allies equally showed a central preoccupation with pro-Anglo-American diplomacy and recognition of Taipei, and adaptation to the shifting political loyalties of most Malayan and Singaporean Chinese political elites. This owed to the actions of the colonial government and the ROC's own shift of policy direction, as the previous chapter made clear, as well as the self-interested calculations of Chinese leaders. In February 1953,

[572] Overseas Committee. Malaiya ge zhengdang gaikuang jiqi xinzhengfu renshi diaocha fenxi 馬來亞各政黨概況及其新政府人事調查分析. Nov 29 1957. NAA, A303000000B/0046/818.11/0009, 52.
[573] BMSCA. June 1954: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. TNA, FCO 141/7630, 5.
[574] BMSCA. May 1951: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs Nos 49-58, February to December 1951, FCO, MA:M, TNA. FCO 141/7627, 30.
[575] Philip Hsiaopong Liu, "Love the Tree, Love the Branch: Beijing's Friendship with Lee Kuan Yew, 1954–1965".
[576] Hong-Yu Chen, *Jiemi*, 319.

colonial reports on Chinese affairs suggested that Leong Yew Koh 梁宇皋 had now 'identified himself with this country' although he was 'looked on by the KMT as one of their leaders'.[577] By 1955, Lee Hau Shik, who had in 1950 supported Double Tenth National Day celebrations in opposition to Tan Cheng Lock, had also 'lost the support of the KMT' when he made 'biting criticism' of its shortcomings and failures.[578]

Yet, the Overseas Committee and Foreign Ministry relied on these individuals as brokers of communication between Taipei and Kuala Lumpur. ROC officials' shifting views of Lee Hau Shik provide a strong example. In 1957, Wu Nairen said of Lee's request for support in the MCA's leadership elections that he was 'not necessarily on our side', particularly because he did not want his past allegiances to damage his current position. However, he was 'certainly anti-Communist'.[579] The November 1957 report on Malayan personalities described Lee Hau Shik as 'anti-Communist and pro-British'.[580] A conspicuous gap in these character profiles was their prior engagement with the KMT on the Mainland, although these reports often included rudimentary biographical details in the expectation of reader ignorance. Lee Hau Shik's father had worked with Sun Yat-Sen, and Lee himself supported the pro-KMT groups in World War Two-era Malaya, even meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek in 1942.[581] For ROC officials, Lee's value was no longer in sentimental ties with China and the KMT, which he now de-emphasised, but rather his pro-Western and anti-Communist political stance. Similarly, Li Pusheng's 1969 memoirs remembered Leong Yew Koh as 'a fighter on the frontlines of anti-Communism', who caused 'fear' in the hearts of Communist insurgents and opposed in Parliament 'a proposal

[577] Feb 1953: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. TNA , FCO 141/7629, 2.
[578] Sep 1950: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs. TNA, FCO 141/7626, 6 for celebrations in 1950;
September 1955 Federation of Malaya Monthly Political Report. Federation of Malaya: monthly political intelligence reports, CO, Federation of Malaya (FM), TNA. CO 1030/245/98 for 1955 remarks.
[579] Cujin Zhong-Ma chengli bangjiao zhi chuyi, op. cit., 60.
[580] Malaiya ge zhengdang gaikuang jiqi xinzhengfu renshi diaocha fenxi, op. cit., 56.
[581] Kee Beng Ooi, *As empires fell*, 33-4, 44-52 and 80-1.

for the Communist bandits to establish consulates'.[582] Like Lee Hau Shik, Leong was similarly lauded chiefly for his anti-Communism and hostility to the PRC after independence. In line with these pragmatic analyses, ROC officials drew on these relationships with Chinese elites to gain access to the Malayan state leadership. In April 1957, Special Representative to Singapore and Malaya Chen Qingwen 陳清文 reported to the Foreign Ministry that with the mediation of Leong, Lee, Ong Yoke Lin, and Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry Too Joon Hing 朱運興, he managed to meet with Tunku Abdul Rahman. He unsuccessfully proposed sending an official delegation to Malaya's independence.[583]

Taipei officials' support for leaders who were not aligned with the overseas KMT but were rather anti-Communist and open to recognising Taipei gave them a new set of allies in Malayan and Singaporean politics. At the same time, the ROC's historically interventionist tendency in Malayan Chinese society and politics asserted itself in these new connections, resulting in efforts to support those allies that produced negligible and sometimes counterproductive results. Such interventions could be seen in both Singapore and Malaya. From 1957 to 1959, the ROC leadership including Chiang Kai-Shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo worked with the US to support the incumbent government of Singapore, the Singapore People's Alliance under Lim Yew Hock, in opposition to Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party.[584] Taipei's support of Lim Yew Hock was noteworthy because of Lim's prior hostility towards KMT influence in Malaya and Singapore, including criticisms of the KMT in his parliamentary speeches.[585] Yet, by 1957, it was his opposition to pro-Beijing inclinations in Lee Kuan Yew and his party that mattered.

[582] Pusheng Li, *Wo bushizi de muqin,* 190.
[583] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Chen Qingwen 陳清文 to MFA, Apr 19 1957. Zhong-Ma jianjiao 中馬建交, MFA, DAPA, NAA. A303000000B/0045/12.1/1, 62.
[584] Philip Hsiaopong Liu, "Opportunist: Britain, America, Taiwan and Lee Kuan Yew's Road to Prime Minister, 1955-1959," *Issues and Studies* 61, no. 1 (2022): 145–85.
[585] CNA. Zhongyangshe zhu Xinjiapo tepaiyuan wuyue yiri canxun 中央社駐新加坡特派員五月一日參訊, May 1 1953. Xin Ma qiaowu zajuan 星馬僑務雜卷 (3), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-010599-0004, 205-6.

The results of this ROC adventure were negligible. The UK and US' contemporaneous suspicion towards Lee Kuan Yew meant that Taipei did not incense its superpower backers by supporting Lim Yew Hock, but nevertheless, these efforts did little to prevent Lee from coming to power. Lim Yew Hock, a former foe of the KMT in Malaya, did become a friend of Taipei. As late as March 1963, Lim continued to supply intelligence to ROC officials about Malaya/Malaysia's position on Chinese recognition, while requesting additional funding for his party.[586] Yet, little appeared in Taipei's records to suggest that his intelligence or political clout was truly significant.

In 1959, the ROC government also succeeded in helping defeat the MCA faction that they believed to support recognition of Beijing. Yet, not only did they create a potential cause for intrastate friction, these efforts failed to promote Malaya's recognition of Taipei. In the 1958-9 leadership elections of the Malayan Chinese Association, the ROC funded Lim Chong Eu, Lee Hau Shik, and Too Joon Hing's faction against the incumbent leadership of Tan Cheng Lock, Tan Siew Sin and Ong Yoke Lin. In the first instance, Taipei lacked the clout to meaningfully influence Malayan Chinese politics over the long term; Tan Siew Sin soon made a comeback to defeat Lim Chong Eu in 1959. [587] Additionally, it appeared that in their adventurism, ROC operatives in Malaya and Singapore had considerable naivete or ignorance about the leaders they backed. After his defeat within the MCA, Lim Chong Eu organised a succession of opposition parties advocating racial equality for the non-Malays. He vastly downplayed his erstwhile KMT links, only recounting in his memoirs in the 1980s that he had served as a physician to the ROC's Chen Cheng 陳誠 during World War Two.[588] ROC officials

[586] [In Chinese] Letter from Chen Daqing 陳大慶 to MFA, Mar 18 1963. NAA, A303000000B/0049/12.1/2, 90.
[587] Chen-Tao Huang, "Winning Overseas Support," 37.
[588] See Kian Cheah 謝詩堅. "1946 nian cong Ri shouzhong jieguan Taiwan, Lin Cangyou daibiao Guomindang qianming 1946年從日手中接管台灣 林蒼佑代表國民黨簽名," *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, Oct 30 2010. Accessed Sep 1 2024 at https://www.sinchew.com.my/20101030/谢诗坚：1946年从日手中接管台湾%EF%BC%8E林苍佑代表国/.

also gave little consideration to the backlash that their interventions might provoke in the Kuala Lumpur government and among right-wing Malay nationalists. The peripherality of Chinese elites in Malaya's diplomacy meant that the concrete importance of even a pro-ROC MCA leadership would be limited, while intervening in the MCA's internal politics was a politically risky breach of Malaya's sovereignty as a nation-state.

Other ROC officials, particularly in the Foreign Ministry, adapted to the new focus on intrastate relations through the more efficacious angle of winning over Malay elites and downplaying their former concentration on the views of Chinese leaders. This was evident in a proposal for the Foreign Ministry leadership's consideration raised by Chen Fuxiong 陳富雄 and Yang Xiuqing 楊秀清, two officials in the Ministry's Department of European Affairs. They emphasised the need to promote Malays' and Taiwanese society's relations with each other and not only focus on the ethnic Chinese. For example, ROC journalists in Singapore and Malaya should report on 'the Malays' sweat and toil to build their country', and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) mouthpiece *Utusan Melayu* could send journalists to do the converse in Taipei.[589] They spoke positively of two Malay students who had recently received university-level scholarships to study in Taiwan, suggesting that the initiative could be expanded; moreover, diplomats posted to Malaya should ideally be Muslim.[590] Another August 1957 report from the same department pointed out that while the British had tolerated the ROC's link to its diaspora, decolonisation meant that the 'role and status of the ethnic Chinese' needed to be reformulated. Most radically, they suggested that the Tunku and UMNO saw the OCAC and KMT abroad as 'neocolonial' and sometimes 'worse than Communist agitation'. Therefore, the OCAC, as the 'Chinese equivalent of the British Colonial Office',

[589] Chen Fuxiong and Yang Xiuqing. Zhong-Ma jianjiao wenti 中馬建交問題, nd. NAA, A303000000B/0045/12.1/1, 188.
[590] Ibid, 189.

should be abolished in the interests of relations with Southeast Asia. [591] Instead, the ethnic Chinese in Malaya should naturalise and avoid further diplomatic conflicts.[592]

Although their contentious suggestion of abolishing the OCAC floundered, ROC efforts to build ties with Malay political elites ultimately yielded successes comparable to, or even exceeding, ROC officials' efforts to sway Malayan Chinese elites. Proposals for Taiwanese universities to educate Malay Muslim students did not receive much traction, nor were more Muslims appointed to ROC posts in Malaya or other parts of the Islamic world. However, ROC governmental bodies did step up exchanges and visits involving Malay political elites. Of principal importance was the Chinese Muslim Association, then led by former Guangxi clique warlord Bai Chongxi 白崇禧; the role of its Islamic cultural diplomacy to Taiwan's international relations has already been discussed by historians such as Kelly Hammond.[593] In the case of Malaya, its success was illustrated by the visit of Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Abdul Razak's delegation of 6 in 1960, to visit the Taipei Grand Mosque at its grand opening. This was followed by Agriculture Minister Abdul Aziz Ishak shortly after.[594] Only several years later did Malaysian Chinese politicians, such as Housing Minister Khaw Kai Boh 許啟謨, begin visiting Taiwan.[595]

[591] Malaiya duli yu Huaqiao wenti 馬來亞獨立與華僑問題. A303000000B/0046/1/27, 48.
[592] Ibid, 48-9.
[593] Kelly Hammond, "Cold War Mosque: Islam and Politics in Nationalist Taiwan," *Twentieth-Century China* 47, no. 2 (2022): 171–93.
[594] Chen Fuxiong. Zhong-Ma guanxi 中馬關係, Jun 27 1960. NAA, A303000000B/0045/12.1/1, 231-3.
[595] Hong-Yu Chen, *Jiemi,* 314.

Chinese in the Republic of Vietnam as Agents of Cultural Diplomacy

In the RVN, the close relationship between the Saigon and Taipei governments meant that the role of the ethnic Chinese in promoting diplomatic relations was quite limited. Instead, Taipei officials reframed their connections to the RVN Chinese as part of a broader project of cultural and public diplomacy, targeting the Kinh majority. Unlike Malaya, the RVN public sphere was resolutely anti-Communist due to Diem's authoritarian rule, and there were no salient non-aligned or pro-Communist political forces. The focus of Taipei policies thus focussed on the role of the Chinese not in supporting anti-Communism against sympathisers of the PRC, but in promoting cultural affinity between the Republics of Vietnam and China.

Observations from the OCAC and the ROC's Central News Agency demonstrated the ROC government's increasing acceptance of Chinese participating in the RVN political system. Reports from both agencies on the RVN parliamentary elections in September 1959– concurrent to Saigon's ban on the KMT– reflected largely passive attitudes to Chinese participation in the local political system. In August 1959, the OCAC reported on the elections to the KMT overseas affairs and mainland affairs departments, Foreign Ministry, and National Security Bureau. It focussed on the newly established branch of Ngo Dinh Diem's electoral machine, the National Revolutionary Movement, in Cholon. On one hand, the report described the naturalised Chinese who ran the branch as morally suspect and disloyal opportunists. The branch leader was described as a 'French speaker' who had 'aided the Japanese' during World War 2, and of 'bad conduct and reputation' with no 'sense of loyalty towards the free homeland'.[596] At the same time, it advocated that Taipei should 'adapt to these arrangements

[596] OCAC. Yuenan ge hefa zhengdang gailue ji Huayi gongmin canjia zuida zhizhengdang chengli Ti'an qubu shimo 越南各合法政黨概略暨華裔公民參加最大執政黨成立堤岸區部始末. Yuenan qiaowu 越南僑務 (5), MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011007-0172, 198.

and design our strategy accordingly, to promote Sino-Vietnamese cooperation'.[597] A Central News Agency internal report, also circulated to decisionmakers in Taipei, took a more optimistic view that Chinese political participation in the RVN would promote Taipei-Saigon relations as this would benefit the political interests of Vietnamese politicians. It argued that the 'value of the Chinese had increased tenfold' in the RVN elections after their naturalisation, because politicians needed to curry favour with them to win election in the electoral districts with large ethnic Chinese populations. [598] It described how campaign communications in the Cholon constituency were all in Chinese, and how the pro-Diem candidate Nguyen Phuong Thiep advertised his 'past trips to Free China', 'participation in the Asian People's Anti-Communist League' and 'meetings with [APACL President] Gu Zhenggang'.[599] Thiep was also described as supporting close cooperation with the ROC and believing that Chinese culture was an important source of Vietnamese culture.[600] While the OCAC and CNA assessments differed in tone and attitude, they both suggested Chinese political participation under Diem's authoritarian regime to be largely inevitable and should be accepted by ROC officials.

Accordingly, the 1960 Work Plan on diaspora affairs in Vietnam focussed on the ethnic Chinese as a means of Taipei's efforts to promote state friendship with Saigon. The Foreign Ministry played a particularly important role in minimising the extent of intervention in the Chinese community, against the suggestions of the KMT overseas affairs department under Zheng Yanfen. This was evident in the two departments' negotiation on the issues of Chinese-language education and political mobilisation of the Chinese in the RVN, both of which gave rise to considerable consternation from Saigon. The Foreign Ministry objected to the KMT's

[597] Ibid, 199.
[598] CNA. Cong Yuenan Guohui xuanju zhong Yueji Huaren shenjia taigao 從越南國會選舉中 越籍華人身價抬高, Sep 5 1959. AH, 020-011007-0172, 206.
[599] Ibid, 207.
[600] Ibid, 208.

suggestion of a stance of 'active intervention' (*jiji jiaoshe*) on the issue of 'compatriot education' (*qiaojiao*). Instead, it suggested that the ROC should only aim to 'make promotion efforts' (*shefa tuidong*). This was because it would be 'difficult' for the ROC to take up the cause of Chinese-language education after the naturalisation of the Chinese. Instead, only 'compatriot leaders of Chinese descent' (*Huayi qiaoling*) or 'legislators representing the Chinese constituencies' should be asked to intervene from 'the standpoint of a national minority (*shaoshu minzu*) and practical effects on education'. Moreover, the aim should be to 'preserve Chinese-language education' in some form, and not to 'maintain the compatriots' schools' as the KMT overseas department suggested.[601] Thus, the Foreign Ministry would only offer extremely limited intervention on the question of Chinese-language education and the Chinese community's autonomy over education, versus Saigon's aims of cultural assimilation and state control.

The Foreign Ministry took a particularly strong objection to the suggestion that the ROC government should maintain its strong political ties with the RVN Chinese, which might stoke Saigon's fears of Taipei promoting ethnic Chinese disloyalty. The KMT overseas affairs department suggested that the Embassy could 'secretly identify overseas Chinese youths, regardless of their citizenship, to strengthen connections with them', and organise them through 'trips to Taiwan' and 'study groups' before encouraging them to participate in 'local anti-Communist struggle and political activities'. Vietnamese Chinese students in Taiwan should even be encouraged to join the KMT after returning to Vietnam. Yet, the Foreign Ministry objected to the 'extremely unfavorable implications' should documents to this effect fall into Vietnamese hands, and suggested that these measures need not be detailed. Instead, the only

[601] MFA. Yuenan diqu dangqian dangwu qiaowu gongzuo fang'an (cao'an) xiuding yjian 越南地區當前黨務僑務工作方案（草案）修訂意見. AH, 020-011099-0004, 123.

reference to these goals that remained in the final draft was for them to 'participate in local anti-Communist … political activities'.[602]

Yuan Zijian's long delay in implementing the Work Plan suggests that even these moderate suggestions were probably carried out only to a relatively small extent. As with the case of Malaya, however, the de-emphasis of ties with the Chinese was accompanied by increasing attention to the Kinh ethnic majority. The Work Plan's raised many suggestions to bridge the Kinh and ethnic Chinese societies, such as a 'press office… to promote local propaganda work' and an effort for Chinese newspapers in Saigon-Cholon to be published in Vietnamese.[603] Little appeared in the records surveyed to suggest extensive implementation of most of these measures; yet, ROC efforts to promote the Hoi Viet Hoa and Confucian Society were substantial and successful. As historians like Jason Lim have highlighted, the language of Confucian cultural solidarity provided a unifying language to buttress the two states' international cooperation against Communism, in contrast to the conflicting nationalisms of both Taipei and Saigon's statecraft. Cultural diplomacy emphasised the shared heritage between the ROC and RVN, and narratives of Confucian culture that supported the ruling state authorities of both Saigon and Taipei.[604] Importantly, the role of individuals who could be cast by Saigon as aliens and outsiders was quite limited in this cultural diplomacy. It was rather coordinated chiefly by ROC academics based in Taiwan, like Kong Decheng 孔德成, and Diem's personal allies in the Saigon-Cholon Chinese community.[605] In the context of occasional tension over ethnic Chinese rights and territorial claims, these groups remained a platform for friendship between Taipei and Saigon.

[602] Yuenan diqu dangqian dangwu qiaowu gongzuo fang'an (cao'an) xiuding yjian, op. cit, 125.
[603] Overseas Committee. Yuenan diqu dangqian gongzuo gangyao 越南地區當前工作綱要, Ibid, 148.
[604] Jason Lim, "Confucianism as a Symbol of Solidarity: Cultural Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of Vietnam, 1955-1963," *Issues and Studies* 50, no. 4 (2014): 119–56.
[605] Ibid, 145.

Conclusion

Parallel to their promotion of diasporic connections that served Cold War intrastate diplomacy, ROC officials restricted pro-KMT political transnationalism that they regarded as unhelpful to their diplomatic relations. While the former encouragement of 'good' transnationality strengthened the anti-Communist political hegemony of overseas Chinese communities, the curtailment of 'bad' transnationality reinforced the integration of the ethnic Chinese into the new nation-states. Given their hostility to either Chinese government's intervention in the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia, the leaders of both Kuala Lumpur and Saigon imposed their top-down visions for the postcolonial status of the ethnic Chinese: integration into a Kinh-centric nation-state and cooperation with the Diemist regime in the Republic of Vietnam, and participation in politics as a minority whose role in the nation was nevertheless secondary to the Malays in Malay(si)a.

In response to these changes, ROC officials understood that without acceptance of the emerging racial-political compacts in Southeast Asia, ethnic Chinese who sympathised with Taipei or had KMT organisational ties would be obstacles rather than assets to their countries' friendship with the ROC. Consequently, they ruptured most of their pre-1949 connections with the overseas KMT by the early 1960s. Similarly, while Republican Chinese diplomats had once seen the ethnic Chinese as integral to their leadership of Asia, these ambitions of dual loyalty were replaced by a more limited focus on finding allies to promote intrastate relations. They cultivated connections with Chinese elites regardless of their past views of the KMT, and devoted increasing attention to Kinh and Malay elites, who were far more crucial to their countries' foreign policy. Despite elements of naïve adventurism or hawkishness amidst these policy shifts, such as interventions in Malayan and Singaporean politics, ROC officials largely

worked within rather than against the new political conditions of the ethnic Chinese. In Malay(si)a, this was the emergence of Chinese politics demanding communal rights within the nation-state through ethnic parties such as the MCA; these groups could be useful conduits to Malay-nationalist ruling elites but could not challenge the latter's cruciality to matters of high diplomacy. In the RVN, the ethnic Chinese were mobilised to support the Diemist programme and largely unable to demonstrate overt loyalty to China or defend their public life from state encroachment; only the cultural affinities between the Chinese and Vietnamese were emphasised by the Taipei and Saigon states as symbols of their alliance.

As this Part of the thesis has shown, the ROC's approach to diasporic transnationality contrasted significantly with those taken by non-aligned and socialist Asian and African states. Yet, Taipei, like these states, faced and sought to resolve the same underlying incongruence between transnational connections and social diversity on one hand, and the claimed identity between nation, state, and territory made by nation-states on the other. Existing scholarship of how anti-colonial political *trans*nationalism gave way to a state-centric Global South *inter*nationalism has revolved around events such as the Bandung Conference. From around the 1920s to the 1950s, anti-colonialism was as much a transnational movement that captured the political imagination of elites and literate publics in the Global South as it was a series of geopolitical events.[606] However, the emergence of postcolonial states in Asia and Africa saw a transition to the mediation of these transnational connections through sovereign nation-states. The notion of Third World nation-states having co-ethnic communities in each other's territory, distinct from their ruling authorities in social and political loyalty, was a source of tension to the political discourse of international solidarity. Around the 1955 Bandung Conference, both Zhou Enlai of China and Nehru of India made public pronouncements to their diasporas and

[606] Su Lin Lewis, "Conferencing: The Global South as Public and Counterpublic," *The American Historical Review* 129, no.2, (2024): 587–594.

allies to encourage naturalisation and integration into local nation-states.[607] Third World states' interventions in other states' politics was even more of a taboo. Scholars such as Jeffrey James Byrne and George Roberts have pointed at how anti-colonial political transnationalisms, such as pan-Africanism or pan-Arabism, were subordinated to the new order of nation-states that each respected each other's sovereignty as an almost absolute norm. [608] As the introduction has made clear, both China and India possessed substantial co-ethnic populations in Southeast Asia, and violations of these norms had particular potential for diplomatic fallout.[609]

Taipei's response to these political dilemmas contrasted with these states' approaches in the coexistence of informal concessions and overtures with continued public claims to diasporic loyalty, particularly in its domestic political sphere. Tellingly, in a time when Asian and African governments and national liberation movements participated in conferences where participation was organised in state- or territory-based delegations, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference in 1952 embraced participants, at least nominally, as the ROC's loyal nationals. Taipei's continued claims to diasporic loyalty, made as part of domestic-political discourses of legitimacy, contrasted with other states' formal renunciation of claims over their diasporas. Similarly, its restrictions on overseas KMT branches and subtle encouragement of overseas Chinese to naturalise were unaccompanied by formal claims in either propaganda or diplomacy to promote loyalty to a single nation-state in a context of intrastate solidarity.

Yet, ROC officials saw in the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia the same tension with the postcolonial national-state order, and by extension their diplomatic relations with those states, as their counterparts in Beijing or New Delhi. While the statecraft and diplomacy that ROC

[607] Abraham, *How India Became Territorial;* Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution.*
[608] Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution*; Roberts, *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar Es Salaam.*
[609] For the Indian case, see eg Amrith, *Crossing the Bay of Bengal*, 212-76.

officials practised was different to nonaligned or socialist African and Asian states, the underlying effort to reformulate its relationship to transnational connections for top-down state needs was similar. In contrast to claims of Third-Worldist solidarity, ROC officials presented Taipei as an ally to both US and intra-Asian efforts to combat Communist subversion in the Chinese diaspora. This domestication of Taipei's transnational connections for state diplomatic interests was comparable to other contemporaneous Asian and African states, and indeed marked a continuity with the Mainland period.[610] Taipei's inconsistent, informal, and partial shifts in policy were by no means exclusive to its own statecraft. As historians such as Qingfei Yin have suggested, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the PRC itself exhibited comparable tendencies when they governed their geographical borderlands in interaction with each other.[611] Thus, Taipei's changing relationship with its diaspora formed an important part of the broader history of Asian and Global South efforts to bring transnational connections into conformity with the emerging system of nation-states, beyond headline events such as Bandung.

The final Part of this thesis examines the role that overseas Chinese policy played in Taipei's relationship with the RVN. As this Part of the thesis has shown, the diplomatic question of both PRC and ROC diaspora policy slowly faded into insignificance in Malaya and Singapore as the two countries approached independence. During the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, the society and politics of the ethnic Chinese of these polities came to be shaped by the racial-political compromises that emerged domestically. Yet, a contrasting, particularly sharp tension between ROC and RVN policies towards the ethnic Chinese emerged during Ngo Dinh Diem's rule between 1955 and 1963. Although Saigon's diplomatic alignment allowed a greater role for

[610] Duara, "Domesticating Transnationality".
[611] Qingfei Yin, *State Building in Cold War Asia: Comrades and Competitors on the Sino-Vietnamese Border*, (Cambridge University Press, 2024).

ROC intervention in the Chinese community in the mid-1950s, this soon clashed with the sharp ethno-nationalism of Diem's regime. The following chapter argues that Taipei officials navigated this conflict by prioritising diplomatic interests over ties with the Chinese diaspora, with a study of the 1957 naturalisation law controversy.

Part Three: Taipei, Saigon and Vietnam's Chinese in Anti-Communist Asia, 1954-63

Chapter Six: Diplomacy and Diaspora's Changing Boundaries: The ROC-RVN Nationality Law Dispute, 1955-7

When the Republic of Vietnam announced a nationality law in 1957 to naturalise most of the ethnic Chinese living in southern Vietnam, Taipei's anti-Communist diplomacy and claims over Chinese diasporic nationality came to a conflict. Diem's law reflected his effort to compel the ethnic Chinese to become loyal citizens; this in turn presented Taipei with the question of what to do about this group, which they nominally claimed as citizens. ROC officials responded by prioritising the former and reformulating their diaspora policy towards Chinese in the RVN to focus on attracting investment and improving Saigon-Taipei relations, while keeping their renunciations of Chinese citizenship ambiguous.

The ROC Foreign Ministry's approach to the nationality law dispute mirrored that of its counterpart regime on the Mainland, as it conceded on overseas Chinese citizenship in the interests of relations with allies. Unlike the PRC, Taipei officials were reluctant to make formal concessions on overseas Chinese citizenship because it might damage their claims of continuity with the pre-1949 Mainland government. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry did not take a hardline position on Chinese citizenship, as it was mindful of damaging relations with both regional allies and the US. Therefore, Taipei officials first tried to make informal concessions on the nationality of the Chinese. After the outbreak of open confrontation in 1957, they worked to manage the fallout for their relations with the RVN and their mutual patron, the US.

This renunciation of citizenship claims was accompanied by the development of a new diaspora policy that drew on the Chinese in Vietnam for diplomatic ties and economic development. While ROC officials disavowed themselves of citizenship ties with RVN Chinese, they only

made such renunciations clear to their allies, while keeping them ambiguous in their communications with overseas Chinese communities. Furthermore, ROC officials welcomed the return of Chinese who wanted to relocate from Vietnam only in their public claims. In practice, they regarded such return migration, which complicated the new diaspora policy, with ambivalence, and preferred them to naturalise instead.

This chapter then discusses the contrasting case of Chinese nationality and diaspora issues in Malaya(si)a's relations with the ROC, c. 1957-64. Taipei's concessions on diaspora issues contributed to the establishment of consular relations between the two countries. However, far more important were developments within the politics of the Malayan Chinese community itself, and particularly Malaysia's changing diplomatic alignment after the outbreak of the Konfrontasi conflict with Indonesia. The commonalities between the RVN and Malay(si)an cases show how ROC diplomats made concessions on diaspora policy to remove nationality issues as a stumbling block to diplomatic relations, despite occasional tensions that remained. This allowed Cold War considerations to take precedence as a source of improvement for the two countries' relations with Taipei.

Taipei's Initial Overtures on Chinese Nationality in Indochina, 1953-5

From 1953 to 1956, ROC diplomats made overtures to resolve nationality issues in Indochina, so they could build good diplomatic relations with their allies. Their moderate posture took place in the context of a trio of developments. The first was the emergence of new nation-states in Southeast Asia, among which Diem's regime after 1955 was particularly ethno-nationalist and hardline towards the Chinese minority. The previous Part of the thesis highlighted the success of the intra-racial political pact in Malaya, where most Chinese and Indians took up

Malayan citizenship largely willingly. Although other Southeast Asian countries developed their citizenship policies with more xenophobic aims, they avoided overt diplomatic conflicts with the ROC. For example, Thailand incentivised Chinese naturalisation and restricted the rights of aliens without formally altering postwar citizenship treaties with Republican China.[612] The Philippines had discriminatory laws against Chinese nationals, while some Chinese business elites were able to naturalise with ordinary Chinese living largely as ROC nationals until the late 1960s.[613] Diem's government in Saigon adopted Sinophobic policies that were comparable in nature and effects. Yet, as its ban on the KMT and the naturalisation law indicate, the symbolic threat of Chinese in Vietnam having foreign political loyalties also held great importance for parts of Diem's government. This contrasted with the relatively relaxed or even encouraging position of governments like the Philippines on the Chinese diaspora's loyalty to Taipei.

The second dynamic ROC diplomats grappled with was China's 'bifurcated international sovereignty', as Enze Han has suggested, between the Taipei and Beijing regimes.[614] As historians like Sebastian Gehrig have highlighted, bifurcation in countries like Germany presented states with the choice of establishing a claim to separate legal personhood, or continuity with the past.[615] The ROC largely opted for the latter, as seen by the lack of formal changes to its constitution until Taiwan's democratisation. Both diplomatic relations, and accusations from their counterpart regimes of betraying the diaspora, were concerns for the regimes in Beijing and Taipei. As the previous chapters have highlighted, China's divided

[612] Xiong Liu 刘雄, "Lengzhan gejuxia Taiguo Huaqiao zhengce de yanbian 冷战格局下泰国华侨政策的演变 (1964-1965)," *Journal of Overseas Chinese History Studies* 华侨华人历史研究, no. 2 (2022): 24-6.

[613] Guotu Zhuang, "Feilubin Huaren zhengzhi diwei de bianhua 菲律宾华人政治地位的变化," *Dangdai Yatai* 当代亚太, no. 2 (2004): 12-6.

[614] Enze Han, "Bifurcated Homeland and Diaspora Politics in China and Taiwan towards the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45, no. 4 (2019): 577–94.

[615] Sebastian Gehrig, "Cold War Identities: Citizenship, Constitutional Reform, and International Law between East and West Germany, 1967-75," *Journal of Contemporary History* 49, no. 4 (2014): 794–814.

international recognition also gave Southeast Asian states like the Associated States of Indochina the option of recognising *neither* China so they could make policy towards the Chinese with greater impunity. Diem's government initially maintained this approach. In 1956, the Republic of Korea general and diplomat Choi Duk-Shin reported to President Syngman Rhee in a cable that Saigon was wisely moving on its assimilationist policies early to resolve the 'Chinese problem', which was a 'barrier to economic independence', before the diplomatic relationship with Taipei was upgraded further.[616]

A third consideration, that of the Cold War in Asia, entered the fray after the 1954 Geneva Accords. The State of Vietnam established in the Accords handed South Vietnam's leadership over to Emperor Bao Dai, who was swiftly sidelined by Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. By April 1955, Diem's support by the US was apparent as he crushed his foes, the Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religio-political warlords, and installed himself months later as President through a rigged referendum.[617] The ROC and RVN's common anti-Communist, pro-American alignment provided a basis for communication, but also meant Taipei had to be mindful that its relations with Saigon might reflect on ties with Washington.

In this context, ROC diplomats in Indochina were sensitive to the need for concessions on Chinese nationality in Indochina, even before the formal independence of Vietnam. In November 1953, Consul-General to Saigon Yin Fengzao suggest that the Foreign Ministry plan to renegotiate the 1933 Sino-French treaties with the independent governments of Indochina, informally at first and then after the establishment of diplomatic relations to overcome French

[616] Telegraph from Choi Duk-Shin to Syngman Rhee, Sep 13 1956, Cold War International History Project. Accessed May 1 2023 at https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/cds-report-no-18-choi-duk-shin-president-syngman-rhee.
[617] See Miller, *Misalliance*; Chapman, *Cauldron of Resistance*; Nu-Anh Tran, *Disunion: Anticommunist Nationalism and the Making of the Republic of Vietnam*, (University of Hawaii Press, 2022). For a detailed political history of Diem's Vietnam.

efforts to 'obstruct' Taipei's diplomacy in Indochina.[618] US Ambassador to Vietnam Donald Heath made similar remarks to Foreign Minister George Yeh during a meeting in December 1953. Highlighting the role of diaspora issues as a faultline in ROC-Cambodian relations, he suggested to Yeh that he avoid speaking of the 'Chinese compatriots' when engaging with the Associated States governments.[619]

After the 1954 Geneva Accords established the State of Vietnam, Taipei started to prepare its position for the negotiating table with Saigon. In January 1955, Yin's successor Shen Zuxun 沈祖濤 reiterated Yin's suggestion, and reported that Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem had denied that Chinese diaspora issues had come up recently in Vietnamese politics.[620] However, Diem might have been obfuscating his true intentions. Around the same time, US diplomats told the ROC Ambassador to the US, Wellington Koo 顧維鈞, that the Saigon government was indeed considering changes to its ethnic Chinese policy. Koo was told that Saigon had not yet set 'preconditions' on diaspora issues, but a 'solution' to them would nevertheless speed up the establishment of diplomatic relations.[621]

Foreign Minister George Yeh set the tone for the nationality dispute that informal concessions on Chinese nationality were needed without overt changes to ROC nationality laws. The 'present time' – presumably a reference to the ROC's frozen constitution since the retreat to Taiwan and its already-tenuous international political legitimacy – was not suitable for formal revisions to the ROC's nationality law. Instead, he suggested the Foreign Ministry 'coordinate'

[618] [In Chinese] Letter from Yin Fengzao to George Yeh, Nov 18 1953. Wo yu Yue Mian Liao sanbang jianjiao 我與越棉寮三邦建交, MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0042/12.1/2, 190.
[619] Ye buzhang yu Meiguo zhu Yuenan dashi Xisi tanhua jilu 葉部長與美國駐越南大使希斯談話紀錄, Dec 11 1953. Ibid, 229.
[620] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Shen Zuxun to MFA, Jan 16 1955. Wo yu Yue Mian Liao sanbang jianjiao 我與越棉寮三邦建交, MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0042/12.1/5, 9.
[621] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Wellington Koo to MFA, Jan 19 1955. Ibid, 10.

with the OCAC to find a suitable solution. Although the two departments should preserve the rights of the Chinese where possible, they should in any case prioritise relations with Saigon; Yeh mandated that the negotiations should begin from a perspective of 'equality' and 'reciprocity' rather than 'retaining the privileges given to our nationals by the French treaties'. He emphasised that it was now the ROC government's policy to encourage the Chinese living abroad to naturalise. Yeh made a suggestion to bolster Taipei's tactical position that the consulate should not make preemptive concessions, but rather offer to resolve issues around the Chinese after the establishment of Taipei-Saigon relations if Vietnam found this necessary.[622] On Yeh's instructions, Wellington Koo extended these promises to his Vietnamese counterparts in the US.[623]

Taipei's efforts to negotiate a de-emphasis of its postwar pursuit of Chinese diaspora protection and dual nationality, while preserving its nationality law on paper, ended up being largely ignored. In October 1955, the State of Vietnam was renamed the Republic of Vietnam with Diem as the new President. As it had done for most other post-independence countries that it hoped to improve relations with, the Taipei government extended the courtesy of recognising the RVN and congratulating Diem without asking him to reciprocate.[624] Still, the Diem government remained silent on Taipei's suggestion to negotiate the rights and privileges of the Chinese, until the unilateral announcement of a much more hawkish policy months later.

[622] [In Chinese] Telegraph from George Yeh to MFA, Jan 20 1955. Ibid, 13.
[623] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Wellington Koo to MFA, Mar 23 1955. Ibid, 125-7.
[624] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Chiang Kai-Shek to Ngo Dinh Diem. Wo yu Yue Mian Liao sanbang jianjiao 我與越棉寮三邦建交, MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0044/12.1/6, 84.

Concessions and De-Escalation in the Taipei-Saigon Nationality Law Dispute, 1955-7

In December 1955, the Diem regime announced new citizenship laws aimed at compelling the ethnic Chinese of Vietnam to become Vietnamese citizens rather than aliens. The law defined as Vietnamese nationals anyone with dual Chinese-Vietnamese parentage or who was born after 1955 in the territory of Vietnam. While those with other foreign parentage were allowed to renounce their Vietnamese nationality, this option was not open to the Chinese. In August 1956, this was amended to mandate that those with exclusively Chinese parentage who were born in Vietnam– even before 1955– were also to be classified as Vietnamese nationals. Apart from Diem's ethno-nationalist politics, a major motivation for these policies was the effort to bring the substantial economic clout of the ethnic Chinese under Saigon's state control.[625] Without the protection of ROC nationality, their capital could be mobilised more freely for the RVN's developmental purposes, or even extracted in efforts to level the ground with the Kinh. In 1956, for example, the RVN government banned Chinese nationals from owning businesses in 11 key sectors in which they were concentrated, motivating them to transfer ownership to their naturalised children in many cases.[626] A further raft of laws made life as a Chinese national in Vietnam more difficult, even if one fell outside of these categories where naturalisation was compulsory. A number of these targeted the ethnic Chinese community's culture and education, illustrating that ethno-nationalist visions of cultural homogeneity also played a role in the Sinophobic laws. Vietnamese nationality was made a necessary condition for administrators of Chinese-medium schools in 1956.[627]

[625] Chung-Ting Huang, "Yuenan Gongheguo zhi Huaren zhengce," 195-9.
[626] Ibid, 202-3.
[627] Ibid, 200-23.

In response, Taipei officials aimed to preserve their citizenship claims to the Chinese in Vietnam on paper without damaging relations with the RVN. In stark contrast to the postwar years, the language of free choice of nationality was now used to indicate acquiescence in practice to Saigon's assimilationist measures. The impasse on the nationality law dispute led Vice President Chen Cheng to lead an intra-ministerial Vietnam Task Force 越南專案小組 on the nationality law dispute in December 1956. He approved of Foreign Minister George Yeh and Deputy Minister Shen Changhuan's plan of 'free choice'. Yeh and Shen suggested that both 'our purpose' and 'Vietnamese intent' could be satisfied by the RVN providing Chinese with the choice of Chinese or Vietnamese nationality, without altering their other laws against Chinese nationals like the Chinese head tax or bans on occupation choices. Most Chinese would then choose to naturalise, per Diem's wishes, while formally preserving the right for the Chinese to choose ROC nationality. Yeh and Shen suggested that ROC diplomats in Vietnam could encourage the local Chinese to naturalise to dispel notions of Vietnam's 'misunderstanding' that Taipei was a stumbling block to their Chinese policy. Even the 'wording' of free choice could be given up if necessary.[628]

As Chen Cheng and the other cabinet ministers regarded the OCAC as well-meaning but often ignorant on Chinese nationality issues, it was given a limited role in the ROC government's response. OCAC Minister Zheng Yanfen suggested a harder-line policy that the Foreign Ministry must ask for a 'guarantee' (*baozheng*) for both the free choice of nationality, and the right of aliens to keep living in South Vietnam.[629] In response, Shen emphasised that Chiang Kai-Shek and Gu Zhenggang of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League both agreed with the Foreign Ministry. Executive Yuan Councilor 政務委員 (equivalent to minister-without-

[628] Vietnam Task Force. Yuenan zhuan'an xiaozu huiyi jilu 越南專案小組會議紀錄, Dec 19 1956. Yuenan zhuan'an xiaozu huiyi jilu 越南專案小組會議紀錄, MFA, DAPA, AH. 020-011007-0111, 7.
[629] Ibid, 8.

portfolio) Huang Jilu 黃季陸 suggested the Foreign Ministry could explain to Chinese in Vietnam that to join Vietnamese nationality did not entail losing Chinese nationality. Yeh told Huang that the very idea of a 'choice' meant that one could have one nationality or the other, but not both, and that after naturalisation, the Chinese in Vietnam would only be seen as ROC nationals if they were within Taiwan.[630]

Therefore, the Foreign Ministry's approach was largely to rely on informal backchannels to get through to Diem, while adopting a measured tone in its public pronouncements. The task force leaders, including Chen Cheng and George Yeh, unsuccessfully relied on Diem's Catholic co-religionists such as Archbishop Paul Yu (Yu Bin 于斌) and Catholic priest Raymond de Jaegher.[631] Another meeting on April 29 between Chen Xiaowei 陳孝威, a founder of pro-ROC newspapers in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, and Tran Le Xuan (Diem's sister-in-law and a prominent political figure, better known as Madam Nhu), was similarly to no avail.[632] ROC officials also tried stalling tactics. In the task force meeting on February 23 1957, Zheng Yanfen suggested that Taipei could try to 'drag out' the dispute in the hope that it would be difficult to enforce the nationality laws strictly.[633] The Foreign Ministry also discreetly asked Chinese leaders in Vietnam to stall Saigon's own registration efforts. However, according to Ambassador to Saigon Yuan Zijian, these Chinese leaders appeared too cowed by the RVN government to be of much help.[634]

---

[630] Ibid, 9.
[631] Research Committee for the Liberation of the Mainland Taipei District International Relations Team. 光復大陸設計研究委員會台北研究區國際關係組. Yiguozi 170 hao [Report No. 170] 議國字170號, Dec 14 1956. Woguo yu Dongnanya geguo bangjiao: Yuenan Huaqiao guoji 我國與東南亞各國邦交越南華僑國籍問題. Vice President Chen Cheng Collections 陳誠副總統文物 (CC), AH. 008-010601-00015-001, 22; [In Chinese] Letter from Raymond de Jaegher to Chen Cheng, Mar 15 1957. Ibid, 41.
[632] [In Chinese] Letter from Chen Xiaowei to Chen Cheng, 1957 nd. Ibid, 69-72.
[633] [In Chinese] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force, Feb 23 1957. AH, 020-011007-0111, 16-8.
[634] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Yuan Zijian to MFA, Apr 28 1957. Xingzhengyuan di siqisan ci huiyi mimi baogao shixiang 行政院第四七三次會議秘密報告事項, EY, AH. 014-000205-00129-001, 10-11.

The failure to reach an agreement by April 1957 prompted the Foreign Ministry to release a statement of concern about the nationality law, but even this statement was cautiously worded to present Taipei's position as a request for negotiation and equality. The Foreign Ministry criticised the law as 'discriminatory' as it only targeted the Chinese, and 'unilateral and mandatory' in nature. It stressed that only those who naturalised 'of their own volition' would be considered RVN nationals and to have renounced their Chinese nationality. The statement stressed that Saigon would have to bear the 'undesirable consequences' of its actions but stopped short of threatening repercussions.[635] Furthermore, this statement's release was delayed by the attitude of the ROC mission in Saigon; Yuan Zijian's frequent indifference to diaspora policy has already been documented earlier in this thesis. According to a task force meeting in April, Yuan apparently briefly considered resigning rather than issuing the demarche to Saigon, but chose to remain in his post in the end.[636]

Similarly, although ROC diplomats attempted to appeal to the US for diplomatic assistance, they correctly avoided the risk of picking unnecessary fights with Saigon, who they identified as the US' most favored client in Asia. In December 1956, Shen Changhuan asked Karl Rankin, US Ambassador to the ROC, for the US State Department to help mediate between Saigon and Taipei.[637] In March 1957, Shen Changhuan saw a brief window of opportunity in Ngo Dinh Diem's overtures to the non-aligned bloc, which might make the US more willing to apply diplomatic pressure on the RVN. These included the visit of Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, to India, and Diem's recognition of neutralist Laos. Even so, however, Shen stressed that the threat of breaking off ties with Saigon was a last resort that 'the US would not wish to see' and

[635] [In English] Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concerning the Citizenship of Chinese Nationals Born in Vietnam. Yuenan guoji fa'an xuanchuan 越南國籍法案宣傳(1), DAPA, MFA, AH. 020-011007-0105, 8.
[636] [In Chinese] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force, Apr 17 1957. AH, 020-011007-0111, 29-33.
[637] [In Chinese] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force, Dec 19 1956. Op. cit.

a threat worse than the execution.[638] The Foreign Ministry's caution was vindicated by the US' records of the meeting between Ngo Dinh Diem and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on May 9 1957, when Diem visited the US. Dulles' final suggestion that he would only suggest 'Minister Yeh … to consult with President Ngo' validated Yeh and Shen's pessimism about the prospects of US diplomatic intervention.[639]

Two further diplomatic incidents in May and June 1957 provided the immediate impetus for ROC concessions on the nationality dispute, but were also illustrative of the broader geopolitical conditions that led to its conciliatory position on Chinese nationality. At the start of May 1957, there were a series of violent clashes (on April 30, May 4 and May 5) in Saigon-Cholon in which ethnic Chinese attacked the ROC Legation out of frustration of Taipei's inability to intervene on the nationality dispute. The task force's own records blamed 'infiltration from the Communists' for the clashes.[640] Yet, these incidents ultimately added to Diem's bluster that Taipei's opinion need not be considered as it was so unpopular amongst the Chinese community. In his meeting with Dulles, Diem suggested that it was the ROC officials' 'ill-willed' delaying of the alien registration process that led to 'the Chinese … protesting against their own Legation'.[641] In response to the turmoil, the interministerial task force mooted a campaign for clandestine operatives to mobilise the ethnic Chinese to show popular opposition to the nationality law.[642]

Mere weeks later, Taiwan experienced developments that made its relations with the US fraught. The May 24 clashes were a series of riots in which the Taiwanese public reacted

[638] [In Chinese] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force, Mar 30 1957. Ibid, 25-8.
[639] Memorandum of a Conversation, Blair House, Washington, May 9 1957. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vietnam, Vol. 1*, 805.
[640] [In Chinese] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force, Jun 5 1957. AH, 020-011007-0111, 52-5.
[641] Memorandum of a Conversation, Blair House, Washington, May 9 1957. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vietnam,* Vol. 1, 804.
[642] [In Chinese] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force, May 10 1957. AH, 020-011007-0111, 42-4.

violently to the acquittal by court-martial of an American soldier in Taiwan, who had killed an ROC national. The US Embassy and the US Information Service were attacked with 11 US citizens killed. Although it is unclear whether ROC intelligence services had any hand in these developments, the Chiangs swiftly moved to disavow themselves of the violence and to contain the diplomatic damage.[643] The Foreign Ministry was now extremely reluctant to do anything that might lead the ROC to be regarded as uncooperative by Washington. In the task force on June 8, Shen Changhuan stated that the Foreign Ministry would 'no longer actively intervene' on behalf of the Chinese who remained in Vietnam.[644] This was never explained in public but rather became the implicit understanding of Taipei officials. The prospect of clandestine operations in Vietnam was also never brought up again. When the ROC embassy in Saigon was destroyed by ethnic Chinese protesters, the RVN's response was to double down on its claims that the ROC was disliked by the Chinese community. By contrast, when it was the US embassy in Taipei that was attacked, Taipei held off on its requests for US mediation with Saigon. As a post-independence regime that was bent on reversing the colonial racial hierarchy, and a close security partner of the US, the RVN government had the ideological conviction and diplomatic support to see its law through. The ROC on Taiwan, by contrast, was particularly mindful of Diem's close relationship with the US and reluctant to irritate either over the comparatively peripheral disputes of diaspora policy.

[643] Stephen Craft, *American Justice in Taiwan: The 1957 Riots and Cold War Foreign Policy*, (University Press of Kentucky, 2016) provides a complete account.
[644] [In Chinese] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force, Jun 8 1957. AH, 020-011007-0111, 56.

Justifying Taipei's Conciliatory Stance: The Naturalisation Law Dispute in ROC Propaganda

ROC officials' concessions to the RVN on the citizenship of the ethnic Chinese was accompanied by efforts to avoid publicising their implicit changes to the ROC's existing nationality laws. As historians of legal propaganda such as Jennifer Altehenger have highlighted, the social meaning of laws was not only determined by those who wrote them or, in the case of the nationality dispute, the diplomats who made unwritten guarantees about them.[645] During the nationality law dispute, ROC state-affiliated intellectuals attempted to develop a discourse of 'free selection of citizenship' which portrayed the ROC's concessions as consistent with its citizenship laws. Pro-KMT Chinese-language outlets in the US portrayed the Taipei Foreign Ministry as adopting a hawkish stance on the nationality dispute, while ROC diplomats were much more cautious in their remarks to English-language media for fear of diplomatic embarrassment.

The ROC government developed the principle of 'free choice of nationality' to square its reluctance to formally change its citizenship law with assurances to allies of its moderate position on citizenship disputes. The first Part of this thesis established that, in postwar Vietnam where Republican China initially held diplomatic clout, ROC diplomats promoted free selection of nationality as a means of expanding the scope of diasporic citizenship. Yet, for Foreign Ministry officials like George Yeh and Shen Changhuan, the principle of free selection now served an opposite purpose of reducing the number of overseas citizens to avoid conflicts with foreign allies. When communicated to intellectuals and overseas Chinese audiences, the doctrine of free selection was used by ROC officials to gloss over the questions

[645] Jennifer Altehenger, *Legal Lessons: Popularizing Laws in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1989*, (Harvard University Asia Center, 2018).

of dual nationality and Taipei's position on Sinophobic laws in Southeast Asia. When presented in formal international contexts, it served to explicitly deny that the ROC saw naturalised Chinese as its nationals, or that the ROC was trying to obstruct Chinese naturalisation.

A 1957 book titled *The True Solution to the Dual Nationality of the Overseas Chinese* 華僑雙重國籍之治本眞理, written by Qiu Bincun 丘斌存 of the OCAC-affiliated Chinese Diaspora Affairs Academic Society 中國僑政學會, elaborated on the principle of free choice to an assumed audience of Chinese-speaking elites and intellectuals in both Taiwan and abroad. Although Qiu was merely a low-level bureaucrat turned minor academic, his book was published with the support of different ROC departments and included a written prologue in the name of President Chiang Kai-Shek.[646] Therefore, it can be understood at least partly as a reflection of the government's perspective. This booklet identified dual nationality as a problem to be resolved, and glossed over the ROC's position on anti-Chinese laws and whether naturalisation amounted to a renunciation of Chinese nationality. Qiu stated that 'in principle, each person should only have one nationality'; the question of dual nationality arose due to 'the international exchange of people'.[647] Instead of stating Taipei's renunciation of the nationality of the naturalised Chinese explicitly, Qiu suggested that the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws barred the ROC from exercising sovereignty over dual-nationals in countries where they held the local nationality.[648] This echoed the arguments used to persuade overseas Chinese to naturalise during the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference in 1952.

[646] Bincun Qiu, Huaqiao shuangcong guoji zhi zhiben zhenli 華僑雙重國籍之治本眞理, (Xin shidai xueshu zhuanzhu 新時代學術專著, 1957), i-vi.
[647] Ibid, 2.
[648] Ibid, 77-9.

Qiu suggested intrastate negotiations based on 'free choice of nationality' (*ziyou xuanze guoji yuanze* 自由選擇國籍原則) could resolve nationality disputes. However, Qiu had an inconsistent and ambiguous discussion of what it meant to have a 'free choice'. In one section, he appeared to suggest that 'free choice' meant that Chinese could choose their nationality at no detriment to their livelihoods, as existing 'free choice' arrangements in countries like Thailand were 'imperfect' and 'too broad'. This criticised how while the Chinese nominally had a choice of nationality, aliens faced so many restrictions that it was difficult not to naturalise.[649] Yet, in another section specific to Vietnam, Qiu appeared to take the position that 'free choice' could coexist with laws against Chinese aliens. He suggested that if—implicitly, *only* if— the Chinese opted to naturalise, they could enjoy rights like 'joining the public service, choosing their occupations, operating businesses unhindered, and owning land', while listing no material benefits at all to Chinese nationality.[650] Qiu also stressed that the ROC government was not trying to overturn Diem's law, as he sought to prevent similar incidents from occurring in other Southeast Asian countries in the future.[651]

However, when the ROC mission to the UN expressed Taipei's preference for 'free selection' in April 1957, there was no ambiguity regarding topics like dual nationality or the extent of pressure Taipei was placing on Saigon. The Foreign Ministry's public communications to its allies had always been explicit that those who chose to naturalise would no longer be considered ROC nationals.[652] ROC representative to the UN Commission for Human Rights Liu Jinzhang 劉盡章 took care not to be seen as intruding on RVN sovereignty, or paving the way for future troublemaking with other allies. He stressed that the ROC did not seek to make a 'complaint' for the UN to 'pass judgment or to take action', but was rather asking the

[649] Ibid, 95.
[650] Ibid, 74.
[651] Ibid, 110.
[652] Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concerning the Citizenship of Chinese Nationals Born in Vietnam, op. cit.

Commission to consider whether future laws along RVN lines were admissible under the Charter. He suggested that the RVN's laws, which would cause Chinese to lose their nationality, might have violated their human right not to be deprived of nationality under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[653] Nevertheless, none of the member states agreed with Liu's suggestion that their state sovereignty over immigration policy fell within the Human Rights Commission's jurisdiction. Neither the US, with its passive attitude to Chinese nationality in Southeast Asia, nor the Soviet bloc and non-aligned powers which did not recognise Taiwan, spoke up. The representative of the Philippines, who was chairing the meeting, agreed to give Liu time to air his grievances, but did not take his motion further.[654]

The propaganda campaign launched by the Foreign Ministry to rally support for its position further demonstrated Taipei's pragmatic self-representation to the overseas Chinese as a protector of the diaspora, and a measured, responsible actor to the RVN and especially the US. The Foreign Ministry focused its efforts on mobilising Chinese groups outside South Vietnam, particularly in the US, to echo its position on the nationality law. In April, the Foreign Ministry produced a notice instructing the 'public opinion sector' (*yulunjie*) to support the ROC government's intervention, to 'arouse international attention, and prompt Vietnam to enlighten (*juewu*) its stance'.[655] Yet, even these efforts conducted largely in Chinese should indicate that the ROC 'never opposed or obstructed its overseas compatriots from getting local nationality, but could not agree to unilateral and coercive measures'.[656] Similarly, according to Zheng Yanfen's notices to KMT branches overseas, they should be mindful of 'local conditions, and particularly the local government's attitude towards Chinese compatriots, and … articulate

[653] [In English] Provisional Summary Record of the Five Hundred and Seventy Fifth Meeting of the UN Commission of Human Rights, Apr 24 1957. Ibid, 86.
[654] Ibid.
[655] MFA. Xuanchuan tongbao 宣傳通報, Apr 6 1957. AH, 020-011007-0105, 13.
[656] Ibid, 13-4.

[your] longstanding peaceful and law-abiding spirit and wish for fair and reasonable treatment'.[657] The same instructions were provided to the National Salvation Congresses by the Foreign Ministry.[658]

Furthermore, the call for pro-KMT organisations to support the Taipei government's position was ultimately more of a show of diasporic support for ROC diplomacy than it brought diplomatic benefit to the ROC's efforts. The provision that only pro-KMT groups in countries with favourable 'local conditions' should speak up meant that few diaspora groups in Asia echoed the ROC's position. Of the major sites of Chinese migration in Asia, only in Japan, the US' main ally in Asia, and South Korea, where the government had not yet brought in anti-Chinese laws, did KMT branches and Chinese compatriot associations send telegrams of support to Taipei.[659] Even the Embassy in the Philippines, one of Taiwan's closest allies in Southeast Asia, reported that 'unfavorable diplomatic implications' prevented it from following through.[660]

The US was, of course, the most crucial site of the Foreign Ministry agitation efforts. Here public diplomacy had the potential to successfully persuade the State Department to intervene, but much more likely was the risk of backlash and presenting Taipei as picking fights with Saigon. The ROC's missions in the US were primarily led by professional diplomats; Hollington Tong 董顯光, the Ambassador to the US, had played a crucial role in building up the ROC's foreign-propaganda efforts during the Second World War.[661] Even the more junior

[657] Kuomintang Central Committee Third Group. Cedong haiwai gedi qiaotuan qiaobao zhiyuan luyue qiaobao gongzuo zhishi 策動海外各地僑團僑胞支援旅越僑胞工作指示, nd. Ibid, 52.
[658] [In Chinese] Telegraph from MFA to all Overseas Missions, May 2 1957. Ibid, 60.
[659] [In Chinese] Savingram from Embassy in South Korea to MFA, May 29 1957. Ibid, 174;
[In Chinese] Savingram from Consulate in Osaka to MFA, Jun 3 1957. Ibid, 178.
[660] [In Chinese] Savingram from Embassy in the Philippines to MFA, Nov 14 1957. Ibid, 245.
[661] Shuge Wei, "News as a Weapon: Hollington Tong and the Formation of the Guomindang Centralized Foreign Propaganda System, 1937–1938," *Twentieth-Century China* 39, no. 2 (2014): 118–43.

consuls had largely spent their entire careers in different postings in the US.[662] During Diem's visit to the US in from May 5 to May 26 1957, they accepted sharp anti-Vietnamese rhetoric in pro-KMT Chinese-language newspapers, but took care to adopt a measured tone in English presses that might be read by the State Department and US public.

In response to the Foreign Ministry's suggestion that the Embassy in the US make public criticism of Diem's law in a newspaper such as the *New York Times*, Tong likened this on May 1 to 'trying to hit a rat but smashing its surrounding objects (*toushu jiqi*)'. He suggested that Eisenhower's invitation for Diem to visit was to bolster Saigon-Washington ties, and any action to the contrary would only irritate Washington.[663] The mission to the US later arrived at the solution of writing moderately-worded letters to the editor in the name of Taipei's friends rather than the ROC government. The first was written on May 8 for the *San Francisco Chronicle*, as San Francisco was Diem's first stop in the continental United States. Consul Zhang Zichang 張紫常 arranged for the letter to be written in the name of Chinese-language newspaper *Guomin Ribao* 國民日報 editor Liu Boji 劉伯驥. Zhang reported to the Foreign Ministry that he 'took a moderate and especially cautious tone to adhere to our position and avoid errors'.[664] The letter emphasised Saigon and Taipei's 'common defense against Communist aggression' before calling on him to provide a 'favorable adjustment' for his nationality and occupation laws, in the interests of anti-Communist cooperation and 'humanitarian justice'.[665] A similar editorial emphasising the need for 'commonsense and understanding' was printed in the English version of the *Shijie Ribao* 世界日報, a newspaper controlled by pro-KMT Chinese

[662] NCCU. 'Zhang Pingqun 張平羣,' ROC Government Post database. Accessed Sep 1 2023 at https://gpost.lib.nccu.edu.tw/view_career.php?&name=張平羣; Ibid. 'Zhang Zichang 張紫常,' Ibid, accessed Sep 1 2023 at https://gpost.lib.nccu.edu.tw/view_career.php?&name=張紫常.
[663] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Hollington Tong to MFA, May 1 1957. AH, 020-011007-0105, 63.
[664] [In Chinese] Savingram from Zhang Zichang to MFA, May 13 1957. Ibid, 130.
[665] Pui Chi Liu [Liu Boji]. "Chinese in Vietnam," *San Francisco Chronicle,* May 7 1957. Ibid, 131.

leaders.[666] When Diem arrived in New York City, a similar letter was published in the name of Harold Riegelman, a US citizen and legal adviser for the Consulate.[667]

Only in the Chinese-language newspapers in the US, which were far less likely to be picked up by US decisionmakers or Diem's staff, did the ROC diplomats allow a freer rein for hawkish rhetoric that criticised Saigon's intransigence. Liu Boji wrote in the Chinese-language *Guomin Ribao* that the Vietnamese law was 'compelling the Chinese to naturalise', a 'major incident in the history of the overseas Chinese' and 'a rather serious dispute'.[668] In objection to pro-CCP forces' accusations that the ROC was doing too little for the overseas Chinese, Liu implored the overseas Chinese to unite in their support of the Taipei government, to secure maximal concessions from the RVN. His contrasting tone and attitude in the Chinese- and English-language presses illustrated ROC officials' and allies' efforts to preserve both support by Chinese American communities and diplomatic relations with Washington.

Changing Boundaries of Diaspora in ROC Responses to the Naturalisation Law

After the immediate resolution of the nationality law dispute, ROC officials developed a new set of boundaries around the definition of diaspora and the scope of their diaspora policy. Despite their public claims of diaspora protection, Taipei officials were reluctant to accept large-scale return migration from the Chinese in Vietnam. Instead, they focussed on two areas of diaspora policy that would be mutually agreeable to Saigon and Taipei: advancing Taipei-Saigon ties through public diplomacy and attracting investment in Taiwan. As historian Rachel Leow has suggested, the analytical category of diaspora is most illuminating when we examine

[666] Dai-Ming Lee. "Justice for the Chinese in Vietnam," *English Shijie Ribao*, May 7 1957. Ibid, 140.
[667] Harold Riegelman. "Chinese in Vietnam," *New York Times,* May 10 1957. Ibid, 172.
[668] Shi Tao 石濤 [Liu Boji's pen name]. "Zailun Yuenan Huaqiao wenti 再論越南華僑問題*," Guomin Ribao,* May 7 1957. Ibid, 137.

its horizons and boundaries.[669] ROC officials' reorganised boundaries around diaspora illustrated how diaspora policy was reformulated to serve diplomatic relations and, to a lesser extent, political security and economic development.

Officials in the Foreign Ministry emphasised naturalisation as the best option for the Chinese even before Diem's final decision to stand firm on the nationality law. Similarly to the depictions of the overseas Chinese in OCAC and KMT propaganda, Foreign Ministry officials often retained early twentieth-century racial stereotypes of the Chinese as pioneers of Southeast Asia. Yet, recognising that Chinese naturalisation was in Taipei's best interest, they sometimes emphasised the negative side of these caricatures that painted the Chinese diaspora as narrow-minded and selfish. One 1955 Foreign Ministry report to Shen Changhuan suggested that the Chinese were on the one hand 'ashamed to be Vietnamese nationals' in part because they did not want to serve conscription in Vietnam, but often 'clandestinely took up Vietnamese identification' for the 'rights and benefits' it conferred.[670] After June 1957, Taipei's covert support for naturalisation turned to active encouragement, as the task force dispatched KMT and intelligence services operatives to organise a 'whisper campaign' supporting naturalisation. In the discussions in Chen Cheng's task force, the Foreign Ministry's Wu Shiying 吳世英 attributed the reluctance of Chinese leaders in Saigon to naturalise to their 'sense of superiority' during French rule, alongside their 'lack of understanding of world developments and the political environment they were living within'.[671]

[669] Rachel Leow, "Beyond Diaspora's Horizons".
[670] Wo yu Yinzhi sanbang jianjiao guocheng ji Huaqiao liangshi zhi yjian 我與印支三邦建交過程及華僑兩事之意見, Mar 18 1955. Wo yu Yue Mian Liao sanbang jianjiao 我與越棉寮三邦建交, MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0044/12.1/5, 128.
[671] [In Chinese] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force Meeting, Jun 5 1957. AH, 020-011007-0111, 53.

With their acceptance of the naturalisation laws, the intellectuals and officials of the ROC government no longer understood diaspora as a body of overseas citizens, but rather suggested that ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, regardless of citizenship, could advance key goals of the ROC. The first of these aims was public diplomacy. Gan Kechao 淦克超 of the Research and Design Committee for the Liberation of the Mainland 光復大陸設計研究委員會, a think tank-like body reporting to Chen Cheng, suggested in a report that naturalisation would not disrupt the cultural loyalties of the Chinese towards the homeland. Culture was not only a reference to affinities of language or ethnicity. Rather, Jian raised the example that 'Jewish lobbying' in the US had been crucial to US-Israel relations, and that US politicians in New York State would promise support for Israel because 'the Jews were most powerful there'. The Chinese in Vietnam should follow their example as 'there is seemingly nothing wrong about compatriots influencing local politics'.[672]

For Jian, the diasporic connection of 'culture' seemed to begin where the contentious sphere of 'political' or 'citizenship' disputes ended. The growing historiography of RVN-ROC transnational connections demonstrates that this was primarily about dividing not individuals, but aspects of social life, into diasporic and non-diasporic. Even an ordinary, naturalised ethnic Chinese individual, and not only a pro-KMT elite, might take part in these 'cultural' connections; for example, by joining a basketball team that travelled to Taiwan, or listening to a Radio Free China broadcast permitted by the Vietnamese government.[673] On *spheres of life* where Taipei and Saigon conflicted, like citizenship and later Chinese-language education and other colonial-era social institutions such as the Chinese dialect-group associations, the former tried to relinquish them from the scope of diaspora policy.

[672] Research Committee for the Liberation of the Mainland Taipei District International Relations Team. Yiguozi 170 hao, Dec 14 1956. Op. cit., 25.
[673] See eg Mok, "State-Building and Chinese Transnationalism during the Cold War: Chinese Sport in the Republic of Vietnam, 1955-1975."

The second main goal was economic. Within the OCAC, mid-level officials appeared to favour changes to diaspora policy to serve Taipei's diplomatic and economic needs over the occasionally hardline positions that Zheng Yanfen proposed. He Yiwu, head of the OCAC's economic affairs department, recounted to his biographers decades afterward that Deputy Minister Li Pusheng was 'courageous' in his encouragement of Vietnamese Chinese to naturalise when he met them studying or travelling in Taiwan.[674] He Yiwu himself 'won the approval of [Foreign Minister George Yeh and other officials]' during the dispute with his suggestion that 'the children of Chinese compatriots should naturalise and inherit their enterprises'.[675] Liang Ziheng 梁子衡, another OCAC cadre in charge of culture and education, similarly stressed in his 1983 memoirs that 'our government's approach of free choice of naturalisation was extremely correct in hindsight'.[676]

One telling irony in ROC officials' assessment of Chinese naturalisation was how they echoed Diem's justification of the naturalisation law to his US backers. During the May 1957 meeting with Dulles, Diem portrayed the Chinese as economically exploitative and well-off, suggesting that they 'enjoy[ed] a sort of economic dominance' through 'usury'. He also suggested that the 'question of assimilation' of the Chinese was 'not a difficult one', because the Chinese and the Vietnamese 'have a common culture as well as a racial affinity'.[677] The resemblances between the Saigon and Taipei leaders' discussion of naturalisation—that the Chinese were opportunistic in nature and that changes of nationality did not equate to losses of Chinese culture—pointed to how effectively the latter adapted their discourses to diplomatic reality.

[674] Bangli He, *He Yiwu yu Huaqiao jingji*, 287.
[675] Ibid, 122-3.
[676] Ziheng Liang, *Qiaowu wenhuaguan* 僑務文化觀, (Huaxin wenhua shiye zhongxin 華欣文化事業中心, 1983), 15-6.
[677] Memorandum of a Conversation, Blair House, Washington, May 9 1957. Op. cit., 804.

Despite nominally being ROC nationals that the ROC government hoped to protect, the Chinese who refused to naturalise complicated ROC officials' newly restrictive boundary-drawing. They were regarded with ambivalence by the ROC officials in charge of their relocation, because unlike the other ethnic Chinese migrants they accepted, these would-be transplants brought few tangible benefits to Taiwan. The nationality law controversy ultimately ended in the RVN's initial agreement for the ROC government to relocate those Vietnam-born Chinese who were reluctant to naturalise. Originally planned to encompass nearly 45,000 people, only around 3,500 were relocated before the RVN government put an end to the relocation transports after two months.[678] Out of both genuine concern for their welfare, and the need to demonstrate their commitment to its citizenship claims, the ROC government made some provisions to relocate them. Yet, ROC officials regarded these individuals with skepticism. They limited the scale of the relocation and imposed obligations on the migrants because the latter were associated with diplomatic embarrassment, security risks, and heavy costs.

The possibility of large-scale relocation of Chinese from Vietnam to Taiwan was privately regarded by the ROC leadership as harmful to relations with Saigon. In late April 1957, the Executive Yuan agreed to avoid the wording 'withdrawal of compatriots' (*sheqiao*) in diplomatic announcements, and instead iterated their policy as helping those Chinese nationals who wanted to leave Vietnam.[679] Additionally, to limit the scale of the relocation and its potential for diplomatic fallout, the Foreign Ministry set strict limits on eligibility for relocation

[678] Chung-Ting Huang, "Dierci Shijie Dazhanhou Yuenan Zhizhi Huaren Zhengcezhengce (1945-2003).")," 198-9.
[679] Executive Yuan Secretariat. Xingzhengyuan di wulingliu ci mimi huiyi mimi taolun shixaing: (1)Waijiaobu chengbao guanyu Yuenan guoji fa'an zuijin fazhan qingxing bing qingshi yinying fangzhenan 行政院第五○六次秘密會議秘密討論事項：（一）外交部呈報關於越南國籍法案最近發展情形併請示因應方針案, Apr 30 1957, EY, AH. Xingzhengyuan di wulingliu ci mimi huiyi mimi taolun shixaing: (1)Waijiaobu chengbao guanyu Yuenan guoji fa'an zuijin fazhan qingxing bing qingshi yinying fangzhenan 行政院第五○六次秘密會議秘密討論事項：（一）外交部呈報關於越南國籍法案最近發展情形併請示因應方針案, 014-000205-00140-003, 5.

when it was finally implemented in June. George Yeh determined that only the Vietnam-born Chinese, affected by the mandatory naturalisation law, were to be eligible for relocation.[680] This underscored Taipei's position that it opposed mandatory naturalisation, but not Diem's other anti-Chinese laws or the principle of naturalisation. Because of Taiwan's strict controls on migration during the martial-law era, even for Chinese nationals, it was *more* difficult for those Chinese in Vietnam who were born in China to move to Taiwan, or to 'return' to their homeland in the ROC's official language.

The ROC government tried to make it clear that only limited assistance would be provided to the migrants, and that relocation to Taiwan would not automatically improve their livelihoods. Yuan Zijian was instructed to tell teenage transplants that they would only be given priority in schooling in Taiwan if they were already students in Vietnam, and should even then be funded by their families rather than the state. These 'youths in education' would be offered priority in relocation, in an indication of their value to the state's needs. Those who were not in school in Vietnam should not expect public education after moving. The migrants would also receive only one month's food and accommodation before being expected to find their own work.[681] Unspoken fears that migration would lead to the same social conflicts as the Mainlander (*waishengren*) exodus, as discussed in the preceding chapters, asserted themselves overtly in the discussions around the potentially large-scale relocation from Vietnam. Reports from the Justice Ministry's intelligence department 司法行政部調查局 suggested that many politicians and intellectuals in Taiwan were deeply skeptical of the relocation. One Mainlander Legislative Yuan member, Liu Zhanzhou 劉讚周, suggested that preferential treatment for the transplants

[680] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force Meeting, Jun 5 1957. Op. cit., 56.
[681] Ibid.

would provoke 'jealousy' amongst the people of Taiwan.[682] This evoked the threat of renewed conflict, as had been seen in the 1948-9 *waishengren* exodus, between Taiwanese society and newcomers the former deemed to be favoured by the Taipei state.

The issue of conscription further illustrates the tension between ROC officials' nominal acceptance and actual skepticism of the migrants. Proponents for evacuating all the affected Chinese to Taiwan, including Interior Minister Wang Defu 王德溥 and OCAC Minister Zheng Yanfen, suggested that the Chinese in Vietnam made up for their lack of education and capital through sheer numbers. Wang suggested that the thirty to forty thousand young men could be 'vital to national manpower' with Zheng's agreement that the ROC must 'wield the overseas compatriots like a sharp blade'.[683] The intraministerial group decided in June that the returnees should receive 'vetting by the security departments'.[684] All those who were eligible should, after a one-year wait, serve national service.[685] This was not just intended as a demonstration of the migrants' loyalties and integration into the ROC on Taiwan, but also showed a hint of state suspicion about their utility and motives. Ethnic Chinese students and businessmen who came to Taiwan were exempt from conscription both because of their potential return to Sinophobic home countries with legal restrictions against this, and as they served important purposes to Taiwan's society.[686] The requirement of conscription was imposed on the migrants as other Taiwanese precisely as these permanent migrants did not bring the same benefits as other groups of diasporic travellers to Taiwan.

[682] [In Chinese] Report from Justice Ministry Administrative Investigation Department to DAPA, MFA. Jun 27 1957. 020-011007-0106, 26.
[683] [In Chinese] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force Meeting, Apr 29 1957. 020-011007-0111, 37.
[684] [In Chinese] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force Meeting, Jun 24 1957. Ibid, 82.
[685] Minutes of Vietnam Task Force Meeting, Jun 5 1957. 020-011007-0111, op. cit.
[686] See Academia Historica, Guiguo Huaqiao bingyi fagui 歸國華僑兵役法規, MFA, NAA. 020-990600-2697 - 020-990600-2699, for a detailed discussion of ROC conscription policy regarding these groups of overseas Chinese.

Cold War Considerations Above Overseas Chinese Nationality: ROC-Malaya/Malaysia Relations, c.1956-65

While Chinese nationality disputes were less overt sources of conflict in the ROC's relations with Malaya/Malaysia, ROC officials' approach in the latter case indicate a similar willingness to downplay claims of overseas Chinese nationality in the interests of diplomatic relations. While the Diem regime's ethno-nationalist tendencies briefly provoked conflict in 1957, in Malaya Cold War diplomacy came to exceed Taipei's interference in overseas Chinese communities in its importance to diplomatic relations. This was due not only to ROC officials' conciliatory policies, but Malaya/Malaysia's own changing politics. As a country with a relatively stable racial-political compromise, Malaya became independent in 1957 with its internal Communist insurgency largely defeated. Only in 1963, when the Konfrontasi (Confrontation) with Indonesia began, did the Cold War take on renewed importance in Malaya/Malaysia's diplomacy, prompting it to establish closer relations with Taiwan.

As Malaya approached independence in 1957, the major factors affecting its consideration of recognising either Taipei or Beijing were its implications for the state's relationship with the Malayan Chinese, and the CCP's support for the Malayan Communist insurgency. From 1956 onwards, ROC diplomats downplayed claims about the citizenship of the overseas Chinese and emphasised their support for naturalisation in anticipation of improving relations with independent Malaya. ROC diplomats made these reassurances to Malaya through direct communications and intermediaries. In November 1956, Chiang Kai-Shek implored in a media interview the 'compatriots who had gotten Malayan nationality' to be loyal to 'the new nation', while those retaining ROC nationality should support and cooperate with the Taipei

government.[687] As the preceding chapters have discussed, the latter constituted only an extremely small minority in the Malayan population by this time.

The conciliatory approach of the Foreign Ministry could be seen in its efforts to communicate concessions through intermediaries who themselves practised highly Sinophobic politics in their own countries. One example was none other than Ngo Dinh Diem, who agreed in a discussion with the Foreign Ministry in February 1960 to reflect Taipei's concessions on overseas Chinese issues when he met Tunku Abdul Rahman.[688] In a sense, Diem was being trusted to say that even he, a hardline ethnic nationalist who had clashed with Taipei over Chinese nationality a few years ago, trusted that Taipei did not see the Malayan Chinese as their fifth column in local politics. The more moderate Tunku should then have even less of a problem. In 1964 and 1965, the Foreign Ministry's documents continued to emphasise that Taiwan no longer 'had any ambitions as to the Chinese population in Malaya'[689] and worked 'to promote the loyalty of the ethnic Chinese and Chinese compatriots to Malaya', and to mobilise them against Communism.[690]

As the state of emergency in Malaya concluded in 1960, the Tunku's considerations regarding Chinese recognition expanded beyond immediate questions of political stability. Apart from his considerations regarding its effects on the Chinese community, some ethnonationalist members of UMNO also opposed recognition for *any* Chinese government, believing that a diplomatic presence for Beijing or Taipei would incite the Chinese minority towards

[687] Kai-Shek Chiang, *Jiang Zongtong dui Haiwai qiaobao de zhishi*, 28.
[688] [In Chinese] Letter from Huang Shaogu to Zhang Qun 張群, Feb 13 1960. Zhong-Ma jianjiao 中馬建交(1), MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0045/12.1/1, 147-8; [In Chinese] Telegraph from Yuan Zijian to MFA, Mar 2 1960. Ibid, 155; [In Chinese] Telegraph from Yuan Zijian to MFA, Sep 7 1960. Ibid, 46-7.
[689] DAPA. Zhong-Ma jianjiao taolun yaodian 中馬建交討論要點, Apr 4 1964. Ibid, 190.
[690] [In Chinese] Savingram from Consulate in Kuala Lumpur to MFA, Oct 4 1965. Ibid, 347-8.

disloyalty.[691] However, the Tunku's ambiguity on Chinese recognition also reflected his broader visions for Asia. Despite his pro-Western alignment and anti-Communist domestic politics, Tunku's vision for Malaya after independence was not one of incessant international struggle against Communism and domestic battles against foes, unlike Ngo Dinh Diem. Instead, on multiple occasions in the early 1960s, he publicly supported a 'One China, One Taiwan' solution for the ROC to become its own country encompassing only Taiwan, and the PRC to receive international recognition.[692]

Ultimately, it was Cold War geopolitical dynamics that prompted the establishment of a ROC consulate in Kuala Lumpur in 1964. By 1960, Kuala Lumpur's anti-Communist alignment had already been the principal factor holding the Tunku back from recognising Beijing. Around the time of his 'Two China' remarks in public, the Thai government threatened to withdraw its sponsorship of Malaya's condemnation of the Chinese invasion of Tibet in the UN, unless the Tunku stepped back from advocating recognition of the PRC. [693] Alongside Ngo Dinh Diem, the Philippine Foreign Minister also agreed to 'pressure' Malaya to recognise Taipei to the ROC Ambassador to Manila in August 1960.[694] George Yeh, by then Ambassador to the US, told the Foreign Ministry around the same time that the US would 'continue speaking to' the Malayan government to urge recognition of Taipei.[695] Furthermore, it was the immediate diplomatic necessity of Sukarno's Konfrontasi conflict with Malaysia in 1963 that increasingly led Kuala Lumpur to look to the pro-Western bloc for aid, and as a consequence to consider closer ties with Taipei. Sukarno directed low-level conflict in Sarawak with the aim to 'Crush

[691] "Nu Shangyiyuan Aisha Ganni fayan, fandui chengren Taiwan zhengfu, ren jiang dailai yanzhong houguo 女上議員艾莎干妮發言 反對承認台灣政府 認將帶來嚴重後果," *Nanyang Siang Pau*, Dec 22 1965. Ibid, 358.
[692] Malai Zongli Laman zhuzhang chengren "liangge Zhongguo", op. cit.; CNA. "Malaixiya reng weihci "Liangge zhongguo" zhengce 馬來西亞仍維持『兩個中國』政策," Oct 4 1964. Ibid, 135.
[693] [In Chinese] Telegram from Hanh Lih-Wu to MFA, Sep 8 1960. Ibid, 48.
[694] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Duan Maolan 段茂瀾 to MFA, Aug 31 1960. Ibid, 42.
[695] [In Chinese] Telegraph from George Yeh to MFA, Jul 8 1960. Ibid, 13-4.

Malaysia', and Indonesia was a non-aligned power that had cordial relations with the PRC and to a lesser extent the USSR.[696] The formation of Malaysia had led to diplomatic tension not only with Indonesia but with the Philippines due to the territorial dispute over Sabah.[697] ROC diplomats and the US State Department therefore relied on Australia as their principal interlocutor with Malaysia. In February 1964 the ROC's Ambassador to Australia reported that the US State Department had asked Prime Minister Robert Menzies to urge the Tunku to recognise Taipei, and the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia KCO Shann did the same in March.[698] They stressed that US opposition to Indonesia had to be reciprocated by Malaysia's hostility to the PRC.

Within this context of Malaysia's alignment with the pro-Western bloc in Southeast Asia's Cold War, an ROC consulate was finally opened in Kuala Lumpur in 1964. The Malaysian Foreign Ministry suggested that this was because of the economic links between the two countries. [699] Yet, the ROC's National Security Bureau and Foreign Ministry identified Malaysia's pro-Western diplomacy during Konfrontasi as the much more crucial cause.[700] By contrast, concessions in ROC diaspora policy had become relatively inconsequential, as ROC officials now had only a very limited capacity to influence the politics of the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia. Jiang Tingfu 蔣廷黻, who had by then become Ambassador to the US, suggested to his superiors in July 1964 that 'most Chinese were now Malaysian citizens and the Chinese issue was fading with time'.[701] Taipei's conciliatory gestures on diaspora policy were arguably

[696] See Hack, *Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia*, 281-91 for Britain and Malaysia's perspective; Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution*, 132-51 for that of Indonesia and China.
[697] See Scalice, "A Region in Dispute," for an account of Philippine-Malaysia-Indonesia relations in the run-up for the Konfrontasi conflict.
[698] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Chen Zhimai 陳之邁 to MFA, Feb 5 1964. A303000000B/0049/12.1/2, 148; [In Chinese] Savingram from Embassy in Australia to MFA, Mar 13 1964. Ibid, 154-7.
[699] Malaysia's official position from [In English] 'Malaysia Department of Information Press Release: Clarification of Malaysia/Formosa Relations', Dec 4 1965. Ibid, 356.
[700] [In Chinese] Letter from Chen Daqing to MFA, Feb 3 1964. Ibid, 199; MFA. Zhong-Ma jianjiao shi shuotie 中馬建交事說帖, nd. Ibid, 375-9.
[701] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Jiang Tingfu to MFA, Jul 22 1964. Ibid, 217.

necessary to establish relations with Malaysia, but they were never taken entirely at face value by either the colonial or postcolonial government, as the prior chapters have shown. The longer-term development of locally-oriented politics amongst the Malaysian Chinese was equally important in eclipsing ROC intervention in the diaspora as a diplomatic obstacle.

Conclusion

ROC officials' response to the RVN naturalisation law in 1957 illustrated how adaptations in intrastate diplomacy and ideological claims about the Chinese diaspora complemented each other, to prioritise diplomatic relations above connections to the overseas Chinese. Even before the Diem government announced its nationality laws, ROC diplomats made conciliatory overtures on Chinese nationality and the rights of Chinese nationals in Indochina. After the Diem government announced its naturalisation laws, ROC diplomats attempted to resolve the dispute through tacit concessions and took a moderate stance to manage the diplomatic confrontation that eventually arose. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry and diaspora-affairs bureaucracy advocated a legal discourse of 'free selection of nationality' that would serve RVN ends without compromising the ROC's nationality law, and which could preserve the ROC's claims to protect its diaspora in overseas Chinese communities. The boundaries of diaspora were reformulated to serve the ROC state's diplomatic and economic needs. Diaspora policy now focussed on 'culture', which ROC officials identified as ties with the Chinese community that were tolerated by the RVN government, and on attracting investment.

In their concessions, ROC officials adopted a similar approach to the nationality law dispute as their Beijing counterparts in practice. However, because its claim to legitimacy was a conservative one of continuity with the pre-1949 Mainland, its officials did not make formal

changes to Mainland-era nationality laws. Another key factor differentiating Taipei's response from Beijing's was that the former enjoyed far less room to maneouvre because of its security reliance on Washington. While Beijing made its concessions on Chinese nationality partly to make itself the pole of Third World international relations, Taipei did so because its leaders were mindful of aggravating their principal patron and its other clients.

The ambivalence with which ROC officials regarded return migration of the Chinese from Vietnam to Taiwan demonstrates how their governance of diasporic transnationality was driven by top-down perceptions of state needs. Superficially, the ethnic Chinese who refused to naturalise and wanted to move to Taiwan were 'returnees to the homeland' and ROC nationals. Despite this rhetoric, ROC officials regarded them with skepticism and provided little support for their relocation because they provided neither the capital nor the diplomatic benefits of other migrants and sojourners from abroad. Prospects of mass migration also evoked fears of the social instability that had plagued the ROC's rule of Taiwan in the late 1940s. This ambivalence about individuals who complicated state boundaries around diaspora was also a parallel with the PRC on the Mainland, as other historians have documented extensively.[702]

Although the Diem government's ethno-nationalism led to an interregnum of state conflict over diaspora issues, Cold War diplomatic affinity ultimately won out and Taipei-Saigon relations improved considerably after 1957, as the naturalisation dispute's importance faded with time. The contrasting case of Malaysia reinforces the argument that ROC officials made the necessary concessions that Chinese nationality or ROC intervention in Chinese communities was no longer a significant diplomatic obstacle. These concessions were augmented by developments within Malaysian Chinese politics. However, it was the Cold War diplomatic

[702] Qingfei Yin, "From a Line on Paper to a Line in Physical Reality," *Modern Asian Studies* 54, no. 6 (2020): 1905–48; Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution,* 191-210; Shelly Chan, *Diaspora's Homeland*, 107-45.

realities of Konfrontasi that made the establishment of Kuala Lumpur-Taipei consular relations possible in 1964.

Close parallels could be found across the rest of the region. In the Philippines and Thailand, Cold War cooperation led the local regimes to continue their close ties with Taiwan. Chinese business elites disavowed themselves of their cultural identity in public, while forming alliances with political leaders in private.[703] Post-independence Singapore, with its ethnic Chinese majority, concerned itself more with the economic and security implications of Chinese recognition than political loyalty.[704] This dynamic was further consolidated by Suharto's military coup in Indonesia in 1965, which marked the apex of the anti-Communist 'arc of containment' in Southeast Asia. Yet, the RVN itself was an exception that demonstrates this rule, in which ROC governance of the diaspora became closely intertwined with Cold War diplomatic alliances. The confrontation between the RVN government and the NLF/DRV became ever sharper after Diem's assassination in November 1963, followed by a succession of unstable military regimes.[705] Increasingly strapped of resources and prestige, Saigon reversed its earlier assimilationism, and became more accepting of ROC co-governance over the Chinese in the second half or so of its existence. From around 1968 onwards, RVN authorities again encouraged public celebrations of ROC/KMT festivities, centres to promote Chinese culture organised by ROC consulates, and even radio broadcasts of Chinese- and Vietnamese-language programming provided by the ROC government.[706] The Conclusion to this thesis will further analyse the changes in ROC diaspora policy after the end of the high Cold War in Southeast Asia. However, the final chapter of this thesis will first examine a group that was both exceptional to the RVN's assimilationist laws, and even the overarching

[703] Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors*; Wongsurawat, *The Crown and the Capitalists*; Fibiger, *Suharto's Cold War*.
[704] Zijie Joshua Lim, "Resolving Away a China Problem".
[705] Lawrence, *The Vietnam War*, 67-90.
[706] Chung-Ting Huang, "1945-70 niandaichu Nanyue Huaren de zhengzhi jingkuang," 214.

development of Taipei's concessions on diaspora issues; but also microcosmic of the conditions ROC officials faced, and the nature and aims of the diaspora policies they made.

Chapter Seven: Intertwining Nation-State Building, Anti-Communist Diplomacy, and Diasporic Transnationality: The Free Villages in Saigon, 1954-61

The Geneva Accords in 1954 divided Vietnam into Communist and anti-Communist zones, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the north and the State of Vietnam (SOVN), later Republic of Vietnam (RVN), in the south. Around a million people moved from north to south, accompanied by a smaller, parallel opposite movement. Some ethnic Chinese migrants among them were settled in two Free Villages (*ziyoucun* 自由村) near Saigon, where the Taipei government held substantial authority in the period 1954 to 1961. The Free Villages were both an illuminating exception to, and a microcosm of, this thesis' arguments about how ROC diaspora policy intersected with both nation-state building, and intra-Asian anti-Communist cooperation. The settlements were initially established out of humanitarian concern for the ethnic Chinese migrants to South Vietnam, but far more important to their historical trajectories was the intersection of Cold War cooperation with competing ethnic nationalisms. In the Free Villages, unique arrangements of joint sovereignty arose and faded with the intersection of ROC and RVN nation-state building. The RVN sought to extend real, coercive control over its claimed territory and citizenry, while the ROC was largely interested in drawing on diasporic loyalty as a symbol of political legitimacy. Secondly, anti-Communist cooperation between the ROC and RVN structured both statecraft and individual experience in the Villages. Thirdly, while ROC officials portrayed the Free Villages as symbols of diasporic loyalty in their propaganda, their governance of transnational connections with the Villages reflected a cautious and even rupturing approach to transnationality driven by state diplomatic and political considerations.

The Free Villages were both exceptional and microcosmic of this thesis' subject matter, ROC diaspora policy in Cold War Southeast Asia. On one hand, ROC officials exercised an unusual degree of co-sovereignty over their residents because of Cold War diplomatic conditions. On the other, their subordination of diasporic transnational connections to state needs mirrored the other policies this thesis has examined, and those of their counterpart regime in Beijing. To elucidate these points of comparison and contrast, this chapter compares the Free Villages in Saigon with ROC intervention in two other settlements for displaced people in Asia. These were Tiu Keng Leng 調景嶺 (Rennie's Mill) in Hong Kong, and the KMT irregulars in Burma and Thailand.[707]

ROC-RVN Nation-Building Intersects with the Cold War: The Origins of the Free Villages

The migration of ethnic Chinese after the Geneva Accords provided the immediate impetus for the establishment of the Free Villages. Historian Qingfei Yin suggests that the DRV in the north was initially accommodating towards the ethnic Chinese around the time of the Accords on questions of expropriating Chinese-owned land and businesses, and compulsory naturalisation. Yet, such concessions were frequently brief and partial, unnerving ethnic Chinese merchants and landowners.[708] These Chinese were heterogeneous in their command of Chinese dialects and Vietnamese, their residence in the cities, countryside, or borderlands, and the length of their or their clans' settlement in Vietnam, which ranged from centuries to mere years.[709] Moreover, 'around 2000' KMT cadres and militants operated in the Vietnam-

[707] Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, "Tiaojingling: Xianggang xiao Taiwan de qiyuan yu bianqian 調景嶺：香港小台灣的起源與變遷," *Taiwanshi Yanjiu* 台灣史研究, 18, no. 1(2011): 133–83; Enze Han, "The Chinese Civil War and Implications for Borderland State Consolidation in Mainland South-East Asia," 227-30.
[708] Qingfei Yin, *State Building in Cold War Asia,* 57-8.
[709] Xiaorong Han, "Spoiled Guests or Dedicated Patriots? The Chinese in North Vietnam, 1954–1978," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 6, no. 1 (2009): 249-52.

Chinese borderland in the early 1950s, who may have been particularly motivated to protect themselves from DRV repression.[710]

The balance of these different strata in the Free Villages, who constituted up to one to two thousand in populace, cannot yet be ascertained. However, the case of Huang Jinyu 黃瑾瑜, former head of one of the Villages, illustrates how Free Villagers were drawn from both northern Vietnam's long-established ethnic Chinese communities and KMT remnants. Indeed, these groups were often intertwined; Huang said in a 2020 interview that he was born in 1921 in Dong Dang, a Vietnamese town on the border with China, and joined a KMT military academy in Guangxi at the age of 19. Originally stationed in eastern China, he fled first to Guangxi and then back into Vietnam in 1949 following defeats by the CCP.[711]

Among the ethnic Chinese who participated in the 1954 population transfer, many lacked the support networks to resettle successfully on their own. Communications by the ROC's mouthpiece, the CNA, and diaspora leaders estimated that between 35,000-45,000 Chinese migrated from North Vietnam to South in 1954.[712] Humanitarian considerations to resettle the migrants created the initial impetus for the ROC government and Chinese business elites in Saigon-Cholon to establish the Free Villages. According to Chinese diaspora leader Wellington Wang (Wang Juerong 王爵榮), those who lacked strong support networks in the south or their own funds were housed in two Free Villages, the Old Free Village 舊自由村 in Binh Tri Dong and the New Free Village 自由新村 in Phu Lam, both on the outskirts of Saigon-Cholon.[713]

[710] Hsiao-ting Lin, *Taiwan, the United States, and the Hidden History of the Cold War in Asia*, 158-9.
[711] Jianhong Xu 許劍虹, "Xu Jianhong Guandian: Dajiang Dahai you yizhang, touben nuhai de Yuenan Huangpu Junxiaosheng 許劍虹觀點：大江大海又一章 投奔怒海的越南黃埔軍校生," *Storm Media* 風傳媒, Apr 26 2020. Accessed Nov 29 2023 at https://www.storm.mg/article/2550502?page=1.
[712] [In Chinese] Letter from Wellington Wang to FCRA, 15 Sep 1960. Yuenan nanqiao jiuji ji Ziyou xincun jianxiu 越南難僑救濟及自由新村建修, MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0046/63.5/3, 181; CNA. Ziyou tiandi Ziyou cun Beiyue nanbao chongjian xinjiating 自由天地自由村 北越難胞重建新家庭. Ibid, 11-3.
[713] Wellington Wang to FCRA, 15 Sep 1960, op. cit., 181-2.

As an aside, few publicised accounts by Villagers or contemporaneous media reports on the Villages could be found by the author; furthermore, a Vietnamese-speaking colleague attempted to locate sources on the Villages in the former RVN archives with no success.[714] This prompts this chapter to rely primarily on ROC archival sources in Taiwan.

In the Free Villages, ROC diaspora policy intersected with the Cold War statebuilding of Ngo Dinh Diem's government in the Republic of Vietnam, supercharged and intensified by US superpower support. RVN-US cooperation during and after the migration of 1954 crucially shaped Diem's nation-state building. Historian Jessica Elkind argues that the US and RVN governments sought to underscore the tyranny of the DRV for propaganda purposes and consolidate Diem's rule by bringing to South Vietnam a predominantly Catholic and anti-Communist loyalist population.[715] The humanitarian dimension of the resettlement project became closely linked into a US-RVN programme of militarised Cold War statebuilding.[716] Elkind writes that the US gave Diem's government control of aid resources, and the latter mobilised the migrants, particularly Catholics and ethnic Kinhs, to settle and pacify restive regions; the anti-Communist nationalism of the transplants at times provoked animosity and violence with other southern Vietnamese.[717] Yet, not only the US but the ROC became involved in the resettlement of the ethnic Chinese refugees, who counted at least nominally as Taipei's nationals. Like other ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Free Villagers were situated

[714] Conversation with Dr Alvin Bui, Southeast Asia and Taiwan Conference at University of Washington, Seattle, May 2024. The author travelled to Singapore in December 2023 to access the collections of RVN Chinese-language newspapers in the NUS libraries, which were listed in available in recent research guides, but was told they had been destroyed due to vinegar syndrome.
[715] Jessica Elkind, "'The Virgin Mary Is Going South': Refugee Resettlement in South Vietnam, 1954–1956," *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 5 (2013): 990-7.
[716] Andrew Thompson, "Counter-Insurgency Aid and a Seemingly Never-Ending War in Vietnam", working paper, 1 and 18-24.
[717] Elkind, "The Virgin Mary is Going South," 1013-6; Peter Hansen, "Bắc Di Cư: Catholic Refugees from the North of Vietnam, and Their Role in the Southern Republic, 1954–1959," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 4, no. 3 (2009): 173–211; Phi-Van Nguyen, *A Displaced Nation: The 1954 Evacuation and Its Political Impact on the Vietnam Wars*, (Cornell University Press, 2024).

between these conflicting nation-state building projects, if in circumstances that were particularly unique to themselves.

Constructing the Free Villages into Anti-Communist Symbol and Space, 1954-8

Between 1954 and 1958, the officials of the ROC and RVN, and other Asian states and the US, constructed the Free Villages into a symbol and space of intra-Asian anti-Communist joint rule and solidarity. The Free Villages were exceptional in the extent of formal sovereignty that ROC officials enjoyed in governing their residents, even as the settlements remained RVN territory. To apply Fionntan O'Hara's analysis of refugee camps in the Cold War, the initial establishment of the Free Villages had much to do with humanitarian efforts amidst Indochina's population displacements in 1954. Yet, the specific process in which the Villages were established, and the nature of social life within the villages, reflected the dominant importance of Cold War political logic.[718] Central to its administration of the Free Villages was a quasi-official body, the Free China Relief Association (FCRA). The FCRA was founded in 1950 by KMT leaders including Chiang Kai-Shek's wife Soong Mei-Ling and was led by Gu Zhenggang.[719] Gu was formerly the Minister of Social Affairs of the KMT on the Mainland, and held various official positions concurrently with his leadership of the FCRA, including Interior Minister, Deputy Defence Minister, and the ROC representative to the Asian People's Anti-Communist League.[720] As can be seen by the domination of the FCRA's leadership by incumbent ROC and KMT senior officials, it was an agent of the ROC abroad in practice.

[718] Fionntán O'Hara, "Refugee Camps as Spaces of the Global Cold War: Cold War Activism and Humanitarian Action within Refugee Camps in Honduras during the 1980s," *Cold War History*, (2024): 1–17.
[719] Chinese Association for Relief and Ensuing Services (CARES) 中華救助總會, "Introduction," *CARES.* Accessed Aug 8 2024 at https://www.cares.org.tw/CaresPortal/intro/introduction.do. The FCRA was renamed CARES in 2000.
[720] National Library Digital Audio Visual Archive System 國家圖書館數位影音服務系統. "Gu Zhenggang 谷正綱," ibid. Accessed Sep 13 2024 at https://dava.ncl.edu.tw/Home/SecondCategory_EN/115.

The contrast between the FCRA's public role in the Saigon Free Villages and its semi-covert involvement in Tiu Keng Leng illustrates the strength of intra-Asian, anti-Communist ties between the ROC and RVN. Tiu Keng Leng, a settlement for pro-ROC refugees in Hong Kong, was the FCRA's first, and now much more well-known, foray into constructing exclaves of pro-ROC loyalty abroad.[721] In both cases, the FCRA organised committees of philanthropists and businesspeople to raise funds for the settlements. For example, Wellington Wang, who led the Northern Vietnam Compatriot Refugee Relief Committee, was a former hospital president in Shanghai who fled to Saigon after 1949,.[722] Yet, the attitudes of the two states to the overt involvement of the ROC and FCRA in the settlements differed sharply. Historian Dominic Yang writes that the Hong Kong colonial government never formally accepted a role for the ROC government and KMT in the administration of Tiu Keng Leng, and the FCRA's funds had to be routed through the relief committees. The colonial state portrayed Tiu Keng Leng as a matter of social policy, although it tolerated extensive informal penetration of the settlement by KMT supporters and even FCRA representatives.[723] This had much to do with British colonial authorities' policies of equidistance from both Taipei and Beijing, to maintain local political stability and avoid provoking the PRC into military action against Hong Kong.[724]

The Saigon and Taipei governments constructed the Free Villages, both literally and figuratively, into a symbol of international anti-Communist cooperation with the help of their mutual allies. The amount of aid allocated by the RVN to the Free Villages demonstrates the anti-Communist cooperation between Taipei and Saigon officials. Elkind estimates a figure of the US allocating US$56 in aid per refugee in 1955 to the RVN government.[725] Rough

[721] Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, "Tiaojingling", op. cit.
[722] Control Yuan 監察院. "Wang Juerong Jiancha Weiyuan 王爵榮監察委員," *Control Yuan*. Accessed Aug 8 2024 at https://www.cy.gov.tw/IntraGen_detailS1.aspx?n=526&file_id=27867.
[723] Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, "Humanitarian Assistance and Propaganda War: Repatriation and Relief of the Nationalist Refugees in Hong Kong's Rennie's Mill Camp, 1950-1955," *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 10, no. 2 (2014): 177-82.
[724] Roberts, "Cold War Hong Kong: Juggling Opposing Forces and Identities".
[725] Elkind, "The Virgin Mary Is Going South," 1004-13.

calculations using the ROC government's exchange rates between Taiwanese, US and Vietnamese currency in the above documents suggest that South Vietnam's 2 million *dong* spending was equivalent to roughly US$30 per person in the 1,500-strong village. Added to a 3 million *dong* sum in a Saigon bank account owned by the ROC Central Bank, and a 1.3 million sum of the FCRA's own money, the villagers were not too worse off than their Kinh counterparts.[726] FCRA representative Yu Chaoying supervised the tendering process for the village.[727] The extensive cooperation between the anti-Communist states apparently squeezed non-governmental organisations out of a major role in refugee relief. In 1954, a group of Chinese leaders thanked the anti-Communist Catholic Archbishop Spellman of New York, for collecting '1.75 million kilograms of clothes' for the refugees.[728] Otherwise, long-term involvement from non-state organisations in the Villages appeared largely absent.

Both RVN and ROC officials touted their support of the Free Villages when the New Free Village was opened on February 22, 1956. Bui Van Luong, head of the RVN relief agency COMIGAL, stressed that the Chinese villagers had exercised their 'self-determination' in fleeing from the Communist North. They were to be treated no differently by the Vietnamese government than the 'Northern Vietnamese compatriots' which COMIGAL was tasked with welcoming. Chinese community leader Chen Dunsheng 陳敦生, of the Relief Committee and Chinese Chamber of Commerce, called the villages a symbol of the 'everlasting friendship' and 'increasing cooperation' between the two countries. The occasion was lined with flags of

[726] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Consulate-General in Saigon to MFA, Mar 26 1955. 越南難僑救濟及自由新村建修, MFA, NAA. A303000000B/0046/63.5/2, 16.
[727] [In Chinese] Savingram from Legation in Saigon to MFA. Jun 5 1956. NAA, A303000000B/0046/63.5/2, 31-2.; Consulate-General in Saigon to MFA, Mar 26 1955, op. cit.; [In Chinese] Savingram from Legation in Saigon to OCAC, May 10 1956. Ibid, 25-8.
[728] [in Chinese] Letter from Representatives of Chinese refugees from North Vietnam to Archbishop Spellman. 5 Jan 1955. Ibid, 9.

both the ROC and RVN, and the newly-elected village heads praised both Presidents Chiang Kai-Shek and Ngo Dinh Diem for their 'correct leadership' of the 'free bloc'.[729]

The Free Villages were constructed as symbols of not only Taipei-Saigon, but international anti-Communist cooperation. A 'quonset hut' built by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), staffed by Filipino and Taiwanese medics, was used as a clinic in the Village.[730] Representatives from the US Embassy, USAID, and US Information Service attended the opening ceremony, and Chen Dunsheng lauded the governments of Washington and Manila in his remarks.[731] The leaders in the Free Village also consciously situated themselves in an Asian anti-Communist political community, and worked to remind their brethren of this reality. On January 24 1957, Republic of Korea Ambassador to Saigon Choi Duk-Shin was invited to address the Free Villages to commemorate Freedom Day, which marked the choice of prisoners of war in the Korean War to relocate to Taiwan. Choi commended that the Republics of China and Korea shared an identity as 'freedom-loving anti-Communists'.[732] Unfortunately, he did not detail whether the Free Village committee or the Embassy had invited him in his papers.

The initially strong partnership between the ROC and RVN in governing the Free Villages allowed the FCRA and ROC diplomatic mission to claim and govern the villagers as ROC nationals. ROC officials propagated their vision of anti-Communist Chinese nationalism in the everyday life of the villagers. In 1956, ROC officials drafted and released a Residents' Charter to the residents of the New Free Village. As Szonyi writes of Quemoy, while the residents of

[729] 'Nanshe nanqiao hanqing desuo, Jiabin yunji xiqi wanqian 南撤難僑咸慶得所 嘉賓雲集喜氣萬千,' *Daxia Ribao* 大夏日報, Feb 23 1956. Ibid, 40.
[730] [In Chinese] Legation in Saigon to MFA. Jun 5 1956, 36.
[731] Nanshe nanqiao hanqing desuo, Jiabin yunji xiqi wanqian, op. cit.
[732] Telegraph from Choi Duk-Shin to Syngman Rhee, Jan 25 1957. Cold War International History Project. Accessed Apr 18 2025 at https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/cds-report-no-33-choi-duk-shin-president-syngman-rhee.

the Free Villages were trying to live in the 'ordinary' new environment of Saigon, the ROC diplomats and FCRA leaders saw the villages in an 'extraordinary' light as Chinese compatriots on the frontline of the struggle against Vietnamese and international Communism.[733] They attempted to mold residents' daily lives and political enthusiasm for anti-Communism, and to cultivate loyalty to the ROC and its vision of Chinese citizenship. According to the Charter, the FCRA and the RVN government acted as the joint determinants of residence in the Village. The Residents' Charter of the New Free Village laid out its raison d'etre:

'To improve overseas compatriots' (*qiaobao*) law-abiding spirit, to maintain public safety and order in the village; Unity, self-governance, self-respect, self-reliance; to promote fraternity and for all residents to maintain tidiness and hygiene, to strengthen anti-[Communist] banditry measures to reach the aim of common peace, happiness, and welfare.'[734]

Not only the classification of residents as 'overseas compatriots' rather than Vietnamese or refugees, but numerous tenets of the Charter, illustrated ROC officials' aims to build Villagers into ideal nationals. In its regulations, the Charter warned residents against challenging authority in the village, from joining 'secret organisations and political parties' and 'words and publications in favour of the Communists, harboring spies and inciting violence',[735] to 'rumour-spreading', 'destructive behaviour concerning the reasonable decisions of the public', and even 'impoliteness' towards the village leadership and 'playing… around office grounds'.[736] Even the hygiene of individual residents was connected to geopolitical security, as they were in Szonyi's discussion of Kinmen and other politicised spaces in Cold War Asia.

[733] Szonyi, *Cold War Island*, 1.
[734] Yuebei nanche Huaqiao Fulin Ziyou Xincun juzhu guiyue 越北南撤華僑富林自由新村居住規約. A303000000B/0043/63.5/2, 91.
[735] Ibid, 91.
[736] Ibid, 92.

A section on conduct requirements of the residents first explained that residents had to 'act properly and love themselves' in their conduct, then detailed a regiment of daily, weekly, and monthly cleaning inspections, with different requirements laid out for each. Pregnant women should be brought to the clinic where their births could be registered, as should those infected with communicable diseases.[737]

To consolidate political control by the ROC diplomatic mission, the Charter devised a complex system of organising households into cell groups of 10-12 named *hu* 戶, which were in turn grouped into *lin* 鄰 and *lu* 閭. The *lin* and *lu* captains would elect a President and Vice President of the Self-Governing Committee. The Charter mandated that the President and Vice-President were to be assisted by two to three Officers appointed by the Embassy.[738] This echoed the system of Wartime Civil Administration in Kinmen, which divided the island's population into groups of households with captains responsible for policing the behaviour of the members.[739]

The monochrome character of the Free Villages' leadership reflects the Embassy's success in establishing political control, although voter tallies suggest that a system of direct elections appears to have been chosen over the convoluted Charter provisions. On March 27 1957, former ROC military officer Huang Jianyu and a slate of former Guangxi teachers and ROC military veterans were elected to lead the New Village. On January 17 1958, Liu Liansheng 劉鍊生, a graduate of Whampoa Military Academy and former ROC army and police officer, led a similar team to victory in the Old Village. Both votes were uncontested, and electoral records from both the Old and New Free Villages were sent to the FCRA, OCAC and Foreign Ministry

[737] Ibid, 91.
[738] Ibid.
[739] Szonyi, *Cold War Island*, 25-8.

for their reference.[740] Furthermore, the Embassy's 'subsidies' for officers and the President of the Self-Governing Association were close in magnitude to Vietnamese lower-middle class wages at the time.[741] This shows how their roles were comparable to those of functionaries of the Embassy and FCRA. The officers received 1,500 *dong* a month; a teacher at the village primary school was paid 1,633. The President and Vice President received 750 each.[742]

Education in the Free Villages was run by ROC officials, who nevertheless took care to comply with RVN policies. The primary school in the New Village, the Free Primary School 自由小學, was opened with the attendance of RVN education officials. In January 1958, the Embassy replaced the existing principal, Wen Xianguang 溫顯光, with a Vietnamese citizen named Zhou Yuying 周玉英 in compliance with new nationwide regulations from the Education Ministry.[743] The students also enjoyed RVN holidays like Ascension Day.[744] Nevertheless, ROC curricula formed the basis of school education; a report on school life in 1956 provided by Principal Ren Bolan 任伯瀾 identified Ren himself and most of the senior teachers as KMT members.[745] The Embassy stressed the school's '[KMT] Party-fying education' (*danghua jiaoyu*) in its proposal to the FCRA for funds to the school construction project.[746] Ren discussed the 'extreme importance' of flag-raising as 'the sacred object' of the country, the 'frequent speeches' he made against the CCP and Mao, and the 'anti-Communist songs from

[740] [In Chinese] Savingram from Phu Lam Free Village Self-Governing Association 越南西貢富林自由新村華僑自治會 to MFA, OCAC and FCRA, Mar 21 1957. A303000000B/0046/63.5/2, 34-8; [In Chinese] Savingram from Third Elections Preparatory Committee of Binh Tri Dong Village 越南嘉定平政郡平治東村第三屆普選籌委會 to Embassy in Saigon. Feb 2 1959. Ibid, 102-4.
[741] Quan Hoang Vuong, "Fledgling Financial Markets in Vietnam's Transition Economy, 1986-2003," working paper, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2004, 5.
[742] Ti'an Ziyou Xuexiao sishisi niandu shangxueqii kaibanfei ji jingchangzichu yusuanbiao 堤岸自由學校四十四年度上學期開辦費及經常支出預算表. A303000000B/0043/63.5/2, 101; Ziyou Xincun banshichu meiyue shouzhi yusuanbiao 自由新村辦事處每月收支預算表. Ibid, 98-100.
[743] [In Chinese] Savingram from Legation in Saigon to FCRA, Jan 23 1958. Ibid, 55-6.
[744] Ti'an Ziyou Xuexiao sishisinian xiaxueqi xingzhengli 堤岸自由學校四十四年下學期行政曆. A303000000B/0046/63.5/3, 104.
[745] Ti'an Ziyou Xincun Ziyou Xuexiao gongzuo baogaoshu 堤岸自由新村學校工作報告書. Ibid, 83.
[746] Qiaomin xuexiao baogaobiao 僑民學校報告表 (1). Ibid, 111.

Taiwan' sung by the choir. The school's instruction was conducted in Mandarin, with Vietnamese not taught until the third grade.[747]

However, the Self-Governing Associations' actual capacity to govern the villages remained limited. The FCRA and Foreign Ministry were ultimately unable to enforce their vision of social order on the villagers or even to make the villages financially self-sufficient. The New Free Village was built on land purchased with and owned by the FCRA, while the land for the Old Free Village was leased to the FCRA free of charge by Relief Committee leaders.[748] Still, continuous donations from the Embassy were needed to keep the village solvent, to pay wages to the village primary school and Self-Governing Association staff, and for routine repairs and upkeep of the village.[749] The most successful revenue-generation effort was an investment by a diaspora leader to build a small factory near the Villages to employ some of the villagers and to dedicate the dividends to the village.[750] By 1960, the FCRA stated that the village was 'almost' self-sufficient.[751]

Yet, self-sustenance remained elusive, not only due to poverty, but because the FCRA and Embassy lacked effective means of coercion to raise revenue from the villages. In some cases, such as tuckshop spaces in the Free Primary School, efforts to generate tax revenue fell short as prospective tenants refused to rent storefronts that they deemed too expensive.[752] However, in January 1958, the Legation also reported to the FCRA that despite being 'legally obligated', the vendors at the wet market in the Free Village did not always pay their taxes when business was bad. The FCRA suggested that the fiscal deficit of the Free Village Primary School could

[747] Ti'an Ziyou Xuexiao jiaodao gongzuo shisi gaikuang 堤岸自由學校教導工作實施概況. Ibid, 109.
[748] [In Chinese] Savingram from Legation in Saigon to FCRA, Jan 23 1958. Ibid, 26-9.
[749] Ziyou Xincun banshichu meiyue shouzhi yusuanbiao, op. cit.
[750] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Legation in Saigon to MFA, Jan 30 1957. Ibid, 25.
[751] MFA. Ziyou Xincun xiushan wenti 自由新村修繕問題. Ibid, 142.
[752] Ti'an Ziyou Xincun Ziyou Xuexiao gongzuo baogaoshu, op. cit.

be alleviated by charging school fees to the parents who had jobs, but the scheme had to be abandoned following heavy opposition from the villagers.[753] The absence of RVN police authority, despite stipulations to that effect in the 1956 Charter, meant the village leadership lacked coercive sanctions to resolve challenges such as revenue collection. In 1960, Ambassador Yuan Zijian stated that the local police had still not established a presence, and that gambling and drugs were becoming increasingly problematic in the villages.[754] ROC officials could gather information on issues like crime and Communist subversion but not bring state power against those problems. One possible reason for the RVN police's inaction is that, as its former leaders have recollected, the police forces were lacking in organisation and professionalism until Diem's National Police reforms in 1962.[755]

Despite these limitations, the Free Villages remained a remarkable symbol of ROC partial sovereignty over the Chinese diaspora. The ROC's control over the Free Villages was more formal than their underground presence in Tiu Keng Leng. It was more complete than in northern Thailand and Burma, where the armed prowess of KMT remnants on the ground precluded absolute obedience to Taipei. Scholars have written of their mercenary allegiances to the Thai government, local warlords, and criminal organisations.[756] Moreover, the status of Free Villages as administrative units that answered to the Embassy, however small and ambiguous in legal status, set them apart from cases like the Philippines, where the ROC enjoyed sovereignty only over individual Chinese nationals.[757] ROC co-sovereignty over the Free Villages arose in the particular intersection of Taipei's claims of diasporic loyalty with

[753] Legation in Saigon to FCRA, Jan 23 1958, op. cit.
[754] Ziyou Xincun xiushan wenti, op. cit.
[755] Minh Cong Tran, "Public Security and the National Police," in Sean Fear and Tuong Vu (eds.), *The Republic of Vietnam, 1955-1975: Vietnamese Perspectives on Nation Building*, (Cornell University Press, 2020), 71-4.
[756] Enze Han, "The Chinese Civil War and Implications for Borderland State Consolidation in Mainland South-East Asia"; Po-Yi Hung, "Interlacing China and Taiwan: Tea Production, Chinese-Language Education and the Territorial Politics of Re-Sinicization in the Northern Borderlands of Thailand".
[757] Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors*, 68-75.

Saigon's anti-Communist state-building. Furthermore, the Villages provided an opportunity for both states to demonstrate their friendship with each other and with other anti-Communist states. Yet, RVN nation-state building would soon erode the conditions that gave rise to these arrangements.

Symbolic Homeland, Ethno-Nationalist State, and Flexible Citizens, 1958-61

Between 1958 and 1961, RVN authorities increasingly integrated the villages into their system of local administration. Faced with Saigon's nationalist intrusions on their authority, ROC and FCRA officials adopted a largely conciliatory attitude that aimed to preserve the Villages as a symbol of diasporic loyalty to Taipei while removing sources of diplomatic friction. The process of integration was hastened by factional disputes amongst the Villagers. Navigating RVN and ROC intervention in their lives, the residents of the Villages displayed parallels to contemporary modes of 'flexible citizenship', in the language of anthropologist Aihwa Ong.[758] They deployed RVN and ROC identities to pursue their personal agendas in the Village. Yet, this reinforced rather than challenged RVN consolidation of authority over the villages, as the ROC ultimately accepted a highly circumscribed form of influence. ROC authority over the Free Villages was quite comprehensive but also had one of the shortest lifespans among sites of ROC authority abroad during the Cold War. This section argues, through a comparison with those cases, that this dynamic resulted from the conflict between RVN and ROC nationalisms.

In 1957, Wellington Wang, described as a friend of Diem's by the Foreign Ministry, approached Diem to request more RVN funding for the Free Villages, but was ignored.[759] In

[758] Aihwa Ong, "Citizenship: Flexible, Fungible, Fragile," *Citizenship Studies* 26, no. 4–5 (2022): 599–607.
[759] [In Chinese] Letter from MFA to Executive Yuan Secretariat, Mar 4 1957. A303000000B/0046/63.5/3, 33.

1958, police near the New Free Village removed ROC flags on public display.[760] In May 1959, *Quan* (county) authorities laid out their expectations for reform of the Free Villages to the Self-Government Associations: the establishment of a Vietnamese Education Ministry-controlled Secondary School with only primary education to remain in local hands; direct collection of local business taxes and rents, in return for direct provision of municipal hygiene services by Vietnamese authorities; and banning individuals affiliated with the FCRA from official roles in the village.[761] In 1960, the Gia Dinh Provincial government had gotten involved and ordered the Chinese-language *paifang* sign in the village reading 'Free New Village' to be replaced with Vietnamese signs renaming the villages to be equivalent Vietnamese local government divisions, *ap*.[762] In 1961, the RVN government finally dissolved the Self-Governing Associations and replaced them with Vietnamese local government elections. It released the wet market spaces that the FCRA had provided preferentially to the villagers to the Saigon-Cholon population at large. According to the Embassy staff, the RVN authorities justified these measures as necessary to bring the villages in line with Vietnam's goals of 'civil defense against Communism'.[763]

Rather than corresponding neatly to the timelines of RVN political developments or RVN-ROC relations, these events reflected the 'noncoherent and nonlinear' advance of RVN nation-state building at the micro-level, as Yin writes of the DRV's borderlands.[764] 1955-c.58 was a period of relative stability in the Vietnamese countryside, as Diem's population transplants, land reform, and Civic Action and Denounce Communists campaigns appeared to produce

[760] [In Chinese] Letter from Overseas Committee to MFA, Dec 16 1958. Ibid, 105.
[761] [In Chinese] Savingram from Phu Lam New Free Village Self-Governing Association 越南堤岸富林自由新村自治會 to FCRA, May 19 1959. Ibid, 128.
[762] [In Chinese] Savingram from FCRA to MFA, Nov 11 1960. Ibid, 192-3.
[763] [In Chinese] Savingram from FCRA to Saigon Embassy, Feb 24 1961. Ibid, 209; [In Chinese] Letter from Saigon Embassy to FCRA, May 29 1961. Ibid, 212-4.
[764] Qingfei Yin, *State Building in Cold War Asia*, 6.

some success.[765] Yet, the NLF's adoption of armed struggle in 1959 and military leaders' attempted coup against Diem in 1960 brought changes in Diem's government to consolidate political control, and to enlist US aid in initiatives such as the 1962 Strategic Hamlets Program.[766] However, neither these fluctuating political campaigns nor the numerous Vietnamese challenges to Diem's rule received much mention in ROC reports of the Free Villages.

Indeed, the special status of the Free Villages was dissolved during a time of rapidly deepening diplomatic cooperation between Taipei and Saigon. The period 1957-9 saw the dampening of earlier tensions over xenophobic measures such as the 1957 law of compulsory naturalisation, and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Diem's state visit to Taipei in January 1960 was followed by a rapid escalation of joint military and economic initiatives.[767] Ironically, the 1960s saw rapid expansion for the ROC's footprint in both Vietnam specifically, and Asia and the Global South more broadly. ROC forces became increasingly involved in the RVN's intelligence and covert warfare operations.[768] Furthermore, ROC initiatives to propagate land-reform practices and agricultural technology to win over Third World allies became particularly expansive in Vietnam.[769] Taiwan had already inspired some US-RVN aid programmes in the 1950s, and by the late 1960s it was increasingly seen by RVN leaders, such as President Nguyen Van Thieu, as a beacon for emulation.[770] Yet, the long-term advance of RVN ethnic nationalism and state authority nevertheless led to the abolition of formal ROC authority over the Villages in favour of local administration.

[765] Miller, *Misalliance,* 195-202.
[766] Ibid, 215-22.
[767] Hsiao-Ting Lin, *Taiwan, the United States, and the Hidden History of the Cold War in Asia,* 159-60.
[768] Ibid, 163-6.
[769] James Lin, "Martyrs of Development: Taiwanese Agrarian Development and the Republic of Vietnam, 1959–1975," *Cross-Currents* 9, no. 1 (2020): 67–106; Ibid, "Sowing Seeds and Knowledge: Agricultural Development in Taiwan and the World, 1925–1975," *East Asian Science, Technology and Society* 9, no. 2 (2015): 127–49,.
[770] Miller, *Misalliance,* 159-61; Simon Toner, "Imagining Taiwan: The Nixon Administration, the Developmental States, and South Vietnam's Search for Economic Viability, 1969–1975," *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 4 (2017): 772–98.

Until around 1960, senior FCRA and KMT officials initially ignored friction in the Free Villages out of confidence in Saigon-Taipei relations. In response to the police removal of ROC flags in 1958, the Overseas Committee, of which Gu Zhenggang was a member, told the Foreign Ministry to regard this as only the 'unreasonable action of local policemen'.[771] Another case of RVN-ROC tension over the Free Villages was seen in a report from the Embassy to the FCRA that a village officer, Zou Yaolong 鄒耀龍, had been arrested on the grounds of nationality law violations. (Unfortunately, the nature of the violation was not detailed.) He had offended 'scoundrels' due to his vigorous anti-smoking and anti-gambling campaigns, who then reported him to the local police.[772]

After 1960, ROC officials became increasingly cognisant of the RVN's insistence on authority over the Free Villages and adopted a conciliatory position. The FCRA's Secretary-General suggested to the Foreign Ministry in a meeting chaired by Gu Zhenggang that there was an 'invisible degree of extraterritoriality' in the Free Villages because the Self-Governing Associations reported to the Embassy. It claimed that such arrangements had 'no precedent' in 'international public law'. Therefore, the Free Villages should be integrated into the Vietnamese system of local administration as the RVN officials asked.[773] Yet, this legal question raised by the FCRA had never appeared in ROC correspondence about the Free Villages, which identified the villagers as 'compatriots' under ROC authority. There was also no suggestion that similar adjustments should also be made to the FCRA's projects in northern Thailand or Hong Kong. The reference to 'international law' was arguably a justification of

[771] [In Chinese] Letter from Overseas Committee to MFA, Dec 16 1958. A303000000B/0046/63.5/3, 105.
[772] [In Chinese] Savingram from FCRA to MFA, Mar 3 1958. Ibid, 67-8.
[773] Yuenan Ti'an xiushan ji renshi yu guanli deng wenti huiyi jilu 越南堤岸修繕及人士與管理等問題會議紀錄, Jul 19 1960. Ibid, 146.

the FCRA's concession rather than a genuine reevaluation of the legal basis of ROC diaspora policy.

These efforts to mitigate conflict were accompanied by some naivete and confusion on the causes of RVN officials' discontent. Despite his involvement in international organisations like the APACL, the FCRA's Gu Zhenggang appeared to have an unclear sense of how and why ROC statebuilding in the Villages irked Saigon. Gu suggested during the meeting that the tutelage of the Embassy should be retained to demonstrate the 'strengths of the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu*)', and Embassy staff regularly visit the Free Villages and school to step up 'oversight and management'.[774] In another document in 1960, the FCRA even suggested that the Embassy appoint village presidents directly, to eliminate the problem of village heads being too lenient on gambling and drugs out of their need to appease villagers.[775] The relationship between these suggestions and the principle of abolishing 'invisible extraterritoriality' was never made clear.

Within this context of advancing RVN assimilation and conciliatory ROC response, the leaders and residents of the Free Villages navigated RVN and ROC national identities for their self-interest. Such machinations eventually favoured the former's extension of direct control. In 1954, the Chinese migrants had portrayed themselves as loyal citizens of both China and Vietnam to would-be donors of aid. In a letter to Archbishop Spellman of New York thanking him for his donation of supplies, seven Chinese leaders described themselves as having 'lived and toiled since [their] great-grandfathers' in North Vietnam and saw Vietnam as their 'second homeland', despite the heterogeneous makeup of the migrant population.[776] Between 1960 and

[774] Ibid, 147.
[775] Ziyou Xincun xiushan wenti, op. cit.
[776] Liste des representantes des Refugies Chinoise du Nord-Vietnam venus tant en leur nom personnel qu'en celui de tous leurs compagnons presenter leurs hommages respectueux. A303000000B/0043/63.5/2, 8.

1961, the village Self-Governing Association Presidents turned to developing two mutually contradictory lines of argument when defending their autonomy from the Gia Dinh provincial government. The first, raised in 1960, was to stress their anti-Communist political orientation and loyalty to the RVN, and the fact that they, as a law-abiding self-help group of refugees in Vietnam, paid taxes on behalf of the village to the government so that no direct intervention from RVN tax collectors was necessary.[777] When this did not satisfy the local officials, they turned to disputing RVN claims that the villagers were their citizens. In 1961, the village heads argued that many of the residents were 'Chinese refugees who had fled to Vietnam' rather than Vietnamese citizens, and so should enjoy exceptions from Vietnamese policy. According to the Embassy, the RVN government rejected this argument on the grounds that most of the residents had taken up Vietnamese nationality since 1957.[778]

When appealing to the FCRA and Embassy for help in factional conflicts, villagers emphasised their identity as anti-Communist Chinese citizens. In 1960, a conflict broke out between the Village Self-Governing Associations, under the Presidents Liu Liansheng of the Old Village and Li Jiyun 李濟雲 of the New Village, and the School Board of the Free Village Primary School led by the Saigon Hokkien dialect group leader Zhang Qidong 張啟東. Liu and Li wrote a letter to the FCRA replete with references to their pro-ROC loyalties. The pair described themselves as 'free, righteous people' who had gathered over 200 villagers' signatures. They claimed that the 'sacred endeavour of free education' must reflect 'humanity' and 'sympathy' to those suffering under Communism.[779] Despite this politicised language, their accusation was merely that Zhang was corrupt and dictatorial: he allegedly named a schoolchild loyal to him

[777] Phu Lam New Free Village Self-Governing Association to FCRA, May 19 1959, op. cit.
[778] [In Chinese] Telegraph from Embassy in Saigon to MFA, Jan 6 1960. Ibid, 208.
[779] [In Chinese] Letter from Embassy in Saigon to FCRA, May 29 1960. Ibid, 111.

as Principal and sold 'expensive textbooks and handbooks' to enrich himself.[780] While Zhang's side of the story was not discussed in ROC sources, Liu and Li claimed that he had accused his critics of 'rioting'.[781] This politically charged allegation echoed the language employed by his opponents. After this letter, the Embassy staff tried unsuccessfully to mediate the conflict; Zhang seemed to have given up on running the school and was nowhere to be found regarding the matter.[782]

Yet, it was RVN authority that proved a much more powerful weight in the villagers' factional rivalries. Apart from Zou Yaolong's deportation, New Village SGA President Li Jiyun invited a similar fate in 1959. Two officers who had some disagreements with him in the association, Nong Shimao 農仕茂 and Xu Guoping 徐國平, sued him in the Vietnamese courts for corruption. The FCRA and Embassy tried to exhort these individuals not to appeal to 'alien forces' for help, so as not to weaken and slander the reputation of the Free Villages. The lawsuit went ahead anyway, although the outcome was not reported.[783] The final success of RVN officials in manipulating disputes to consolidate their authority was seen in Ambassador Yuan Zijian's account of the end of the Free Villages, given for the FCRA's reference. In early 1960, RVN authorities banned Li Jiyun from running for village head. When Nong Shimao, Li's rival but nevertheless a FCRA man in RVN eyes, was elected, Li was co-opted to serve as a village captain to rival him. Next, in May 1960, the Self-Governing Association was dismissed and Nong removed in favour of a candidate handpicked by the local government. Yuan reported that the Vietnamese nationality of most of the residents precluded the Embassy from any action.[784]

[780] Ibid, 112.
[781] Ibid, 114.
[782] [In Chinese] Savingram from FCRA to MFA, Nov 10 1960. Ibid, 230-1.
[783] [In Chinese] Savingram from FCRA to Embassy in Saigon, Jun 7 1960. Ibid, 126.
[784] [In Chinese] Embassy in Saigon to FCRA, May 29 1961. Ibid, 212-4.

With the ROC and FCRA's formal authority removed, and the villages brought into the RVN system of local administration, RVN authorities appeared to be accepting of former village leaders' input on village matters. In the New Village, former village head Huang Jinyu started a Construction Committee to manage minor improvement works, while attempting to show loyalty to both the Embassy and the Vietnamese government.[785] In the Old Village, an Embassy report in October 1960 stated that two relatively unknown individuals with no previous ties to the FCRA agreed to be the leaders of the newly constituted *ap* (village in RVN's local administrative system), while former President Liu Liansheng worked as an 'advisor' behind the scenes. The Vietnamese government also agreed to delay for several years the direct collection of taxes and fees.[786] As late as 1968, these disputes appeared not to be fully resolved.[787]

Nevertheless, the relationship between the Villagers and the ROC government continued to dissipate. Huang Jinyu recollected that he led a civil defense force of anti-Communist Chinese in Saigon until 1974, but this force was not connected to the ROC. After the Communist victory in Vietnam, Huang led a group of Chinese Vietnamese refugees to the Penghu Islands (Pescadores). In the 1970s-80s, the ROC military was very violent towards refugees; in 1987, 19 refugees from Vietnam were shot and killed by ROC soldiers in Lieyu 烈嶼, near Kinmen. According to Huang, he only evaded troubles of this nature by shouting Gu Zhenggang's name through a loudspeaker while stranded, who arranged for their resettlement after hearing about it through the news. Huang was an ROC loyalist who remained in Taiwan even as his counterparts opted for relocation elsewhere, and therefore had little incentive to embellish.[788]

[785] Ibid.
[786] [In Chinese] Savingram from Embassy in Saigon to MFA, Oct 6 1960. Ibid, 226-8.
[787] Chung-Ting Huang, "1945-70 Niandaichu Nanyue Huaren de zhengzhi jingkuang," 213.
[788] Jianhong Xu, "Dajiang Dahai you yizhang, touben nuhai de Yuenan Huangpu junxiaosheng".

As a comparison to other exclaves of ROC authority shows, central to the endgame of the Free Villages was not primarily differing visions of statebuilding, but the growing inability of the ethnic-nationalist RVN to tolerate exceptions to a homogeneous political and cultural order. Just as Szonyi observed that PRC and ROC statebuilding shared commonalities in imposing authoritarian, militarised vision of modernity on their respective societies, the same can be said of the ROV and RVN in the Free Villages. The anti-Communist language of the 1956 Residents' Charter mirrored the RVN provincial government's rationale of 'civil defense' to eventually abolish the village's special status in 1960. Both governments had similar views not only on mundane questions of state authority like wet market hygiene and revenue collection, but even the potential third rail of education. Rather, it was the RVN's anti-Chinese ethnic nationalism that clashed with the ROC's symbolic embrace of the villagers as ROC nationals, and spatial displays of loyalty like ROC flag-flying and Chinese-language signage.

This is underscored by how the British Hong Kong colonial government eventually proved more tolerant of the Tiu Keng Leng settlement than the nationalist governments of Saigon and Bangkok. When the Communist threat in northern Thailand became minimal in the 1970s, the Thai government pacified the guerillas by encouraging sedentary agriculture and demilitarisation. While they drew on ROC technological assistance to help the guerrillas' economic transition, they removed the geopolitical threat of territorial control by a pro-ROC armed force.[789] In contrast to Thailand and the RVN, London had recognised Beijing in 1950, and the Hong Kong colonial state consistently refused to give pro-KMT forces a substantial political role. Yet, as these policies were primarily driven by pragmatic considerations rather than the symbolic threat of pro-ROC Chinese having foreign loyalties, colonial authorities

[789] Po-Yi Hung, "Interlacing China and Taiwan".

showed considerable latitude on issues surrounding Tiu Keng Leng. For example, Dominic Yang discusses very similar incidents to the Free Village disputes in Hong Kong, when Tiu Keng Leng residents complained to the colonial authorities about misappropriations of FCRA funds by the Self-Governing Office (SGO; analogous to the Self-Governing Association in the Free Villages) in 1962. Although colonial welfare and police services coexisted with the FCRA by then, local authorities did not act against the FCRA and SGO, and tolerated for decades the fervent celebrations of the ROC National Day and Chiang Kai-Shek's birthday which so irked the RVN.[790] Only in 1996, one year before Hong Kong's handover to China, was Tiu Keng Leng finally cleared in anticipation of the instatement of PRC rule.[791] Thus, a colonial power that recognised Beijing in 1950 ended up being more tolerant of the ROC flag and the FCRA than the local authorities of the RVN, one of the ROC's closest Cold War allies.

Transnationality in Service of the State: Connections and Ruptures in ROC-Free Village Interactions

ROC officials' governance of transnational connections with the villagers prioritised Taipei's security and propaganda needs. While ROC officials portrayed the Free Villages as a symbol of diasporic loyalty, the Taipei state responded to Villagers' requests for migration with a restrictive approach that showed the boundaries to how it understood diaspora. While these boundaries remained wider and more expansive than they were for the broader population of Chinese in Vietnam, which the previous chapter has discussed, they were animated by the same underlying state logic. ROC discourses of diasporic nationalism coexisted with the rupture of politically inconvenient connections, demonstrating that its diaspora policies were ultimately shaped by diplomatic and political interests like its counterpart in Beijing.

[790] Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, "Tiaojingling," 171-3.
[791] Edward A Gargan, "Remnants of Chiang's Army Are Routed Again," *New York Times*, July 25 1996.

The FCRA and ROC government were more concerned with utilising the Free Villages for propaganda purposes than expending substantial resources on the villages. These symbolic efforts of support were seen in a 1955 legislative motion by Zou Zhifen 鄒志奮, a Legislative Yuan member who was born in Indonesia and a director in the FCRA, for all the legislators to each donate a day's wages to refugee relief that received unanimous support.[792] The support of the ROC government for the resettlement programme could also be seen in the Postal Service's donation campaign for the Taiwanese public to give to the resettlement programme by buying commemorative stamps.[793] More than a million of these stamps were issued.[794] The stamps portrayed migrants with ragged clothes and bags of possessions, choosing 'light' and 'freedom' over the 'darkness' and 'slavery' of Communism in a testament to the 'greatness of human nature'. It emphasised the choice of the Vietnamese migrants as proof of the loyalties of all 13 million 'overseas compatriots'. Tellingly, the description of the stamps never stated where the residents were headed, Taiwan or South Vietnam.[795] Yet, Taiwan's press reports on the Free Villages generally included little discussion of the role that the public's donations played in their construction. It is possible that awareness of the Free Villages was quite low in Taiwan's society, and that the stamps may have been bought by members of the public like students through mobilisation by official institutions like schools; this was commonplace in Taiwan under authoritarian rule.[796]

---

[792] [In Chinese] Letter from Legislative Yuan to MFA, Jun 28 1955. A303000000B/0043/63.5/2, 17; Academia Historica. *Guoshiguan Xiancang Minguo renwu zhuanji shiliao huibian* 國史館現藏民國人物傳記史料彙編, (Academia Historica Press 國史館, 1990), Vol. 3, 433.

[793] [In Chinese] Savingram from FCRA to OCAC, May 2 1956. A303000000B/0043/63.5/2, 29.

[794] Chunghwa Post 中華郵政. "Ci 04 Jiuzhu Yuebei qiaobao fujuan youpiao 慈04救助越北僑胞附捐郵票", *Chunghwa Post.* Accessed Aug 8 2024 at https://www.post.gov.tw/post/internet/W_stamphouse/index.jsp?ID=2803&file_name=E004

[795] Ibid.

[796] Genyuwu 根雨屋, "Bunengji de youpiao haishi yaomai 不能寄的郵票還是要買," *Thinking Taiwan* 想想, Sep 2 2019. Accessed Sep 5 2025 at https://www.thinkingtaiwan.com/content/7838. The author is grateful to Dr Ling-Chieh Chen for pointing this out during an informal discussion in September 2025.

By around 1959 to 1960, a few years after the establishment of the villages, the FCRA presented them as a symbol of the successes of ROC diaspora policy and diasporic support for Taipei. In 1959, the CNA reported on 'Free Life in the Free Village: New Families for Refugee Compatriots from North Vietnam'. The report stressed the 'spirit' and 'institutions' of 'autonomy' that had been set up in the villages, the village-head election system, and the anti-Communism of the occupants.[797] In 1960, the FCRA explained to the Foreign Ministry that the villages were 'exemplary' as a 'demonstration of the cruelty of the Communists' to educate the 'Free World' about Communism's evil, and a 'spiritual bulwark' against Communism. It praised the 'enthusiastic support' of the villagers for 'patriotism'.[798]

The FCRA's portrayal of the Free Villages as a permanent testament to diasporic support for the ROC contrasted with the shoddy, provisional nature of the refugee settlements in the villages. The New Free Village consisted of 12 blocks of 'brick-based, tin-roofed, wooden houses' with kitchen, eating and toilet facilities in common. One particularly hardy feature at the entrance of the village was a 'metal-structured concrete Chinese *paifang*' reading 'New Free Village', a testament to the symbolic role of the village with little practical value.[799] Yet, writing in 1960 to the FCRA, Wellington Wang said that families would share rows of bunks and lacked privacy.[800] Parts of the Old Village had collapsed due to disrepair as it was already unfavorably located and the climate was humid.[801] Gu Zhenggang's main answer to the poor living conditions in the villages was not to spend money on improving the Free Villages, but rather to maintain them as a symbolic fixture while reducing the cost and effort of running the village. Gu did not find it problematic that the village's population was 'dwindling' because

[797] "Ziyou tiandi ziyou cun Bei Yue nanbao chongqian xinjiating," op. cit.
[798] Ziyou Xincun xiushan wenti, 142.
[799] Ibid, 141.
[800] [In Chinese] Letter from Wellington Wang to FCRA, Sep 15 1960. Ibid, 181.
[801] [In Chinese] Legation in Saigon to MFA. Jun 5 1956, op. cit.

people were finding themselves on solid footing and moving out, as he put it himself. To the contrary, he suggested that new inhabitants be prohibited from moving in so that the population of the villages could be kept low.[802]

Yet, ROC officials were highly reluctant to relocate the Villagers, who they nominally claimed to be their own nationals, to Taiwan. This was a wish of many of the inhabitants of the Free Villages, including the President of the Old Free Village Self-Governing Association, Li Jiyun. In 1958 he led a large group of residents in co-authoring a letter that described themselves as loyal ROC nationals requesting the Foreign Ministry help their relocation to Taiwan, because Diem's anti-Chinese policies prohibited them from working in former economic niches.[803] As Taiwan was under martial law in this period, support from ROC officials was required for the villagers to relocate to Taiwan, even if they had ROC nationality. Historian Dominic Yang suggests that for the residents of Tiu Keng Leng, officials both frequently cited budgetary considerations to reject residents' attempts to relocate to Taiwan and colonial state requests for Taipei to take on groups of refugees. However, he suggests this cost consideration was an assumption made by FCRA officials that was rarely explicitly justified in official documents; instead, the officials saw settlements like Tiu Keng Leng as a permanent overseas testament to its legitimacy and were unwilling to consider alternatives.[804] Similarly, with the Free Villages, cost reasons were cited to reject the possibility of mass relocation, without detailed estimates of how resettlement costs compared to continuously funding the villages.[805]

[802] Ziyou Xincun xiushan wenti, op. cit.
[803] [In Chinese] Savingram from Phu Lam Free Village Self-Governing Association and Binh Tri Dong Village Self-Governing Association to MFA, Apr 21 1958. Ibid, 81-4.
[804] Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, "Humanitarian Assistance and Propaganda War," 157-9.
[805] [In Chinese] Letter from FCRA to MFA, Jul 21 1958. A303000000B/0046/63.5/3, 87-8.

The only exceptions existed for clear allies of the ROC with nowhere else to go, or those who served Taipei's propaganda purposes. One example of the former was Zou Yaolong, the village officer tried by the Vietnamese authorities. As he was due to be deported from Vietnam, the FCRA asked the Interior Ministry to make sure that he would be deported to Taiwan and not to Mainland China where he would face Communist persecution.[806] Similarly, in 1960, the FCRA suggested that priority in Taiwan resettlement be given to Mainland youths who had recently fled to Vietnam.[807] Such a group would be very small in number and a useful living demonstration of the atrocities of the Chinese Communist Party. By contrast, those who had lived in Vietnam since 1949 or earlier would not have served these purposes.

The default response to the other requests was to try and settle ethnic Chinese locally. In 1958, the Overseas Committee asked the Foreign Ministry to persuade the Vietnamese authorities to take in a group of fisherpeople who had fled from China. They had 'drifted to Vietnam' because of their economic need but were not firmly 'running towards' the 'freedom' of Taiwan.[808] Szonyi discusses a similar policy in Kinmen of only accepting convinced anti-Communist escapees from the Mainland while deporting other border-crossers back to the PRC.[809] The decisions made by ROC officials illustrate a concern with propaganda and budgetary restraints rather than accommodating citizens' wishes for relocation to Taiwan. The consideration of political security was also important, both in the sense of keeping out suspected Communists and other perceived threats like Third Force elements, and avoiding the tension with the Mainland that might arise from high-profile relocations of escapees.

[806] [In Chinese] Savingram from Legation in Saigon to FCRA, Jan 23 1958. Ibid, 46-9.
[807] FCRA. Jiaqiang jiuzhu liuwang Yue Thai Mian qiaobao yi'an 加強救助流亡越泰緬難胞議案. A303000000B/0043/63.5/2, 147-51.
[808] [In Chinese] Phu Lam New Free Village Self-Governing Association to FCRA, May 19 1959. A303000000B/0043/63.5/3,128.
[809] Szonyi, *Cold War Island,* 92-9.

The indifference of officials like Gu Zhenggang and Yuan Zijian is particularly striking given the similarities between their personal experiences after 1949 and that of many of the villagers who requested relocation. Mainlander officials and intellectuals who had fled to Taiwan after 1949 dominated its government until the 1970s. Recent historiography has explored how these *waishengren* were shaped by their experience of traumatic political dislocation.[810] Their experiences of fleeing Communist rule to a locale of uncertain safety were similar to those of individuals like Li Jiyun and Huang Jinyu. Yet, this does not appear to have affected ROC officials' considerations. The emotive language so prominent in the other governmental sources examined in this article was conspicuously absent when ROC officials considered the villagers' migration. A similar observation can be made of Ngo Dinh Diem, who, like Chiang Kai-Shek and Gu Zhenggang, was born in a part of his country (Quang Binh, in north-central Vietnam) that later fell under Communist rule.[811] He preferentially treated many of the northern Vietnamese transplants, yet was largely unsympathetic to refugees of the 'wrong' religion and ethnicity.

The coexistence with ideological claims to the diaspora with practical restrictions, driven by concerns of diplomatic and political security, marked not only the Free Villages but ROC diaspora policy more broadly. The RVN is a particularly interesting case to examine these developments as the former's policies towards the ethnic Chinese oscillated quite dramatically over time. The Diem government, like most Southeast Asian governments, emphasised the naturalisation of the ethnic Chinese. Yet, the RVN regimes that succeeded him were more amenable towards ROC authority over the Chinese community, much like the Philippines.[812]

[810] Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, *The Great Exodus from China,* 1-8.
[811] Miller, *Misalliance*, 20.
[812] Chung-Ting Huang, "Dierci Shijie Dazhanhou Yuenan zhi Huaren zhengce (1945-2003)," 140-65.

In both periods, the approach of ROC officials was to comply with the boundaries that RVN policies drew around the ethnic Chinese, and stake their claims of diasporic loyalty only in areas deemed permissible by Saigon. Previous chapters have already highlighted the efforts of ROC officials to reconcile their diaspora policy with Diem's assimilatory stance. The revival of pro-KMT activities after the mid-1960s appeared to be a product entirely of RVN leaders' growing cooperation with allies like the ROC, after Diem was overthrown and the war with the DRV intensified.

This approach to diaspora policy had much in common with the PRC's responses to the same issues. Beijing's 1955 treaties with the DRV and Indonesia set the tone of PRC support for Chinese naturalisation in Southeast Asia, and was followed by Beijing's acquiescence to increasingly extractive policies towards the ethnic Chinese. These took the form of socialist reform movements against landowners and merchants by Hanoi, and overtly Sinophobic anti-alien laws by Sukarno's government.[813] However, the 'diplomatic battle' to win over allies by making concessions on overseas Chinese nationality, as Taomo Zhou puts it, was accompanied by a 'communal battle' where the PRC was much more interventionist. In spheres of the Indonesian Chinese's social life such as Chinese associations and newspapers, CCP factions aggressively fought to defeat KMT sympathisers.[814] In the DRV, Beijing's activities also mirrored those of Taipei's representatives in the RVN. Ostensible socialist solidarity between ethnic Chinese, the PRC, and the DRV coexisted with a tug-of-war over the latter's attempts to bring Chinese schools and associations under direct control. While Hanoi moved between spells of tolerance and hostility towards Chinese who refused to naturalise, PRC officials were ultimately unwilling to stoke diplomatic conflict over diaspora affairs.[815] Beijing formally

[813] Ibid, 118-26; Taomo Zhou, *Migration in the Time of Revolution.* 97-114.
[814] Ibid, 52-93.
[815] Chung-Ting Huang, "Dierci Shijie Dazhanhou Yuenan Zhi Huaren Zhengce (1945-2003)," 126-33; Han, "Spoiled Guests or Dedicated Patriots?," 9-20.

renounced its claims over overseas Chinese nationality in a demonstration of anti-imperialist international solidarity; with its tenuous political legitimacy since 1949, Taipei was reluctant to do the same. Yet, the nominal status of 'overseas compatriot' afforded few concrete rights of protection and relocation to either the Free Villagers or other pro-KMT overseas Chinese.

Conclusion

Three different historical forces in Cold War Asia— the ROC's changing relationship with diasporic political transnationalism, anti-Communist international cooperation, and nation-state building— intersected in the Free Villages. In the first instance, the Villages reflected broader features of the two Chinese states' relationship with the ethnic Chinese whom they claimed as their diaspora. The Free Villages can be understood as a 'storm in a teacup' that illustrates how far the ROC had rolled back the aims of its diaspora policy. Demographically, the Free Villages, with their cousins in Hong Kong and northern Thailand thrown in, represented a mere several thousand in the tens of millions-strong overseas Chinese population. ROC officials' emphasis on the exclaves as symbols of their legitimacy implicitly underscored that they no longer actively insisted on authority over other ethnic Chinese abroad.

At the height of the Cold War, the relationship between the ethnic Chinese and the Chinese states—both PRC and ROC— was essentially one of 'domesticating' diasporic transnationality for state prerogatives, as Prasenjit Duara argues of an earlier period.[816] Both PRC diplomats staring down US-led containment, and their counterparts in Taipei insisting on legitimacy over all China, prioritised recognition from their allies above intervention in diasporic communities. When Southeast Asian governments attempted to redefine the status of the ethnic Chinese –

[816] Duara, "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty".

whether through sweeping naturalisation laws, or in special cases like the Villages – they largely accepted these highly restrictive boundaries. This was true even in the absence of direct competition for diplomatic recognition; Diem would probably never have recognised the PRC regardless of what happened in the Free Villages. Instead, both Chinas focussed on areas of diaspora policy which were more amenable to intrastate diplomacy, or those where local states could not draw clearly defined boundaries.

Secondly, the Free Villages show how intra-Asian anti-Communist international cooperation shaped state-building and everyday life in the Cold War. This point is usefully demonstrated through a comparison between the Free Villages and another case of relocation of ethnic Chinese, in far greater numbers, into state-governed settlements, namely the New Villages of Malaya. In the terminology of Nicole Sackley, both types of village were 'Cold War sites', but the Cold War shaped their trajectories in contrasting ways.[817] The New Villages were instated near the start of the Asian Cold War and London officials were wary of stoking geopolitical conflict by connecting the British Malayan counter-insurgency too closely to the US-led diplomatic standoff against the PRC. British efforts to govern the Free Villages and Malayan Chinese often drew on transnational connections within the circuits of its empire, for example through the engagement of intellectuals in Hong Kong in propaganda and education.[818] By contrast, the Taipei-Saigon alliance was part of a wider context of Asian anti-Communist states' cooperation under a US-led security umbrella. Interactions between the two states shaped the resettlement of the Chinese migrants of 1954, and constructed the Villages into militarised, politicised spaces of international Cold War solidarity. In the Free Villages, their cooperation permeated beyond ideology or exchanges of resources and technology, to directly

[817] Nicole Sackley, "The Village as Cold War Site: Experts, Development, and the History of Rural Reconstruction," *Journal of Global History* 6, no. 3 (2011): 481-504.
[818] See eg Jeremy Taylor, "Not a Particularly Happy Expression": "Malayanization" and the China Threat in Britain's Late-Colonial Southeast Asian Territories," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 78, no.4 (2019): 789-808.

inflect on how state officials answered basic questions of statecraft and how villagers lived their everyday lives.

Furthermore, state coercion and governance in the Malayan New Villages was aimed primarily at inculcating first support for the counter-insurgency effort, and later national belonging and anti-Communist citizenship in late- and post-colonial Malaya.[819] In the Free Villages, Taipei and Saigon's authoritarian, top-down visions of anti-Communist nation-state citizenship similarly intersected with Cold War anti-Communism. The dynamic of directly conflicting nationalisms meant that naturalisation to Vietnamese citizenship did not merely overlap with the Cold War or counter-insurgency as it did in Malaya, but was an active choice over allegiance to China that villagers were pressured to make. Crucially, these developments were consolidated and accelerated with Taipei's acquiescence, a role that this thesis argues the ROC also played in other developments of Chinese integration into Southeast Asian nation-states. As their transition from ROC overseas compatriots into RVN citizens hardened, ROC officials closed the door of geographic mobility to most villagers. This would prove fateful for many of them after the DRV's victory in the Vietnam War.

Finally, the Free Villages illustrate how the integration of ethnic Chinese into local nationalism progressed amidst, and persisted beyond, the vicissitudes of the Cold War in Asia. To disaggregate the phrase 'nation-state building', the story of the Free Villages was one of joint *state*-building, followed by the RVN's growing unilateral emphasis on *nation*-building and the ROC's concession. A brief comparison of different Southeast Asian countries shows how this triumph of nationalism transcended contrasting Cold War allegiances and developments. In

[819] For recent works on the social and political history of the New Villages see eg Teng Phee Tan, *Behind Barbed Wire: Chinese New Villages During the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960,* (Singapore: Strategic Information and Development Centre, 2020) and Hack, "Detention, Deportation and Resettlement: British Counterinsurgency and Malaya's Rural Chinese, 1948–60".

Diem's RVN and Sukarno's Indonesia, the international dimensions of the Cold War was central, as the two Chinese states acquiesced to the integrative and frequently Sinophobic policies of their allies. In Malaya, the domestic confrontation between the Communist insurgency and its foes was more important. Departing colonial rulers, Malay nationalists and Chinese business elites coalesced to incorporate the Chinese community into the postcolonial nation, preserving part of its cultural identity and economic clout, during and after the Malayan Emergency.[820] In Thailand, the assimilation of Chinese into the nation had much deeper roots in the partnership between Chinese capitalists and the monarchy since the nineteenth century.[821] With the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement, the moderation of regional tensions further removed ideological cooperation as a rationale for states' tolerance of ethnic Chinese's transnational political loyalties. The regional state most tolerant of ROC diaspora policy, the Philippines, responded to Taipei's marginalised diplomatic role and the weakening Communist insurgency by imposing assimilationist naturalisation policies towards Chinese communities.[822] Similarly, after the DRV's victory in 1974, Hanoi's previous reliance on Beijing soon gave way to expropriations and purges of ethnic Chinese, resulting in their exodus from both formerly RVN-controlled territories and the long-Communist north.[823]

[820] Among the vast scholarship on the incorporation of Malaysian Chinese into the postcolonial nation, noteworthy recent works include Boon Kheng Cheah, *Malaysia*; Kee Howe Yong, *The Hakkas of Sarawak*; and Nonini, *Getting by*.
[821] Wongsurawat, *The Crown and the Capitalists*.
[822] Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors*, 218-23.
[823] Chung-Ting Huang, "Dierci Shijie Dazhanhou Yuenan zhi Huaren zhengce," 137-9.; Xiaorong Han, "Spoiled Guests or Dedicated Patriots?," 21-8.

Conclusion

Between 1945 and 1965, ROC officials adapted their overseas Chinese policy in Malaya and Vietnam in response to the ROC's transition from regional power to a Cold Warrior 'accidental state' on Taiwan, and the dynamics of decolonisation and the Cold War in Asia. In both their interactions with ethnic Chinese communities and intrastate diplomacy, ROC officials adapted their diaspora policy to reflect first the postwar quest for regional power, and later the needs of Cold War diplomacy and statehood. Their governance of transnational connections similarly reflected an effort to domesticate diasporic transnationality to political and diplomatic state needs. In doing so, its diaspora policy had more similarities than differences with that of the PRC, as both states had to reconcile their links with the diaspora to the needs of intrastate diplomacy. It reflected the primacy of different top-down state logics, revolving around diplomatic interest but also legitimacy, security, and economic development, in its boundary-making in a social interface with other, often Sinophobic, anti-Communist states. Additionally, the ROC's relationship with its diaspora formed part of a broader historical narrative of anti-Communism and hostility to political radicalism, as well as growing integration into conservative nation-states, becoming hegemonic in Chinesenesses beyond China.

The first Part of this thesis argued that in the postwar years, ROC overseas Chinese policy in these two countries was often part of Republican Chinese officials' ambitions of regional power. ROC officials attempted to preserve both Chinese nationality and rights of residence for their nationals, reflecting a racialised relationship of ROC patronage for Chinese communities abroad, who in turn were to be instruments of China's diplomatic power. This dynamic persisted into the ROC's last years on the Mainland and the outbreak of Communist

insurgencies in both these countries. Even in these circumstances, diaspora protection frequently took precedence above anti-Communism.

The second and third Parts argued that ROC diaspora policy changed to fulfil their changing state needs after the retreat to Taiwan. As shown by events such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference, official narratives of diasporic loyalty coexisted with encouragement of overseas Chinese to naturalise and cooperate with local authorities. In governing transnational connections such as migration, propaganda, and security cooperation, ROC officials attempted to make overseas Chinese policy a sphere of intrastate cooperation with their Cold War, anti-Communist allies. These efforts sometimes aided their informal diplomacy and consular work with their regional allies, and created opportunities for cooperation with the US. ROC officials also curtailed their past links to the overseas Chinese that were unfavourable to diplomatic relations, such as the activities of the overseas KMT. Apart from diplomatic considerations, domestic security and economic factors gave rise to a cautious, restrictive approach to overseas Chinese migration beyond narrow categories such as students and travelling investors. ROC officials adapted their state-diaspora relationship to the growing integration of overseas Chinese politics into anti-Communist Southeast Asia's emerging nation-state order; yet, their policy changes also had the effect of consolidating and hastening these developments.

In particular, the final Part of this thesis examined these dynamics in the context of the ROC's relations with the Republic of Vietnam, which was both a close regional ally and, under Ngo Dinh Diem, a highly ethno-nationalist regime. The efforts of ROC officials to make subtle concessions on overseas Chinese issues to preserve diplomatic relations was highlighted in the 1957 Nationality Law dispute. The case of the Free Villages demonstrated an 'exceptional' side of ROC overseas Chinese policy that extended sovereignty over overseas Chinese when it

served their anti-Communist international cooperation and narratives of political legitimacy. Yet, the Villages also reflected ROC officials' general ambivalence about governing the diaspora when faced with local state opposition, and their reluctance to accept most Chinese migrants from Southeast Asia.

This conclusion extends this thesis' key findings in three principal directions. First, it discusses the ROC's Cold War-era overseas Chinese policy as a window into how ROC leaders adapt ideological claims to the needs of Taiwan's diplomacy, both historically and in the present. Secondly, it considers ROC diaspora policy in the Cold War as a precursor to currently prevailing arrangements of 'flexible citizenship' in Asia, as Taipei's boundary-making was often marked by flexibility and fluidity to serve state interests. Lastly, it considers this thesis' subject matter within the successive historical developments of anti-Communism's hegemony in the Sinophone world during the Cold War, and Taiwan's political marginality in the Sinophone world with the subsequent rise of the PRC.

Adapting Ideology to State Needs in Taiwan's Diplomacy

The mid-1960s, where this thesis concludes, was a turning point in the development of the Cold War in Asia. Although anti-Communism became politically dominant in East and maritime Southeast Asia after the mid-1960s, the pro-US bloc's victories paradoxically spelt the gradual decline of the political importance of the Cold War standoff. The 1965 military coup in Indonesia and subsequent rise of Suharto marked the US' successful containment of radical anti-Western politics in the region.[824] The formation of the Association of Southeast Asian

[824] Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment*, 152-8; Fibiger, *Suharto's Cold War*, 104-128.

Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 marked strengthening cooperation between the region's anti-Communist states, including the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore.[825]

Yet, the defeat of the Communist threat in Southeast Asia also diminished the importance of ideological confrontation in the region's politics, which was replaced by new dynamics of state elites consolidating their own power and pursuing economic development. After the end of Malaya's first state of emergency in 1960, the Communist insurgency was largely relegated to the border with Thailand in the north.[826] The end of Konfrontasi and the suppression of the socialist parties further consolidated the victory of anti-Communism in Malaysia by the mid-1960s.[827] Singapore similarly quashed the threat of Communist subversion in 1963, with the remnants of the Barisan Sosialis boycotting the parliamentary elections in 1968.[828] Thus, the political threat of Communism in both Malaysia and Singapore became minimal. Another central consideration for both governments was the role of the US, after the latter's defeats in Vietnam after 1968. Malaysia's Abdul Razak, who succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1969, was overtly non-aligned, establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1967 and the PRC in 1973, although he eventually swung back towards pro-Western alignment.[829] While it maintained its anti-Communist diplomatic stance, Singapore also retained and stepped up its informal liaisons with Beijing after the mid-1960s.[830]

The Washington-Beijing rapprochement of 1971 to 1973 then saw the fundamental transition in non-Communist Asia's diplomatic relations from US-led containment of China to growing

[825] Cheng Guan Ang, *Southeast Asia's Cold War*,139-40; Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment*, 150-2.
[826] Hack, *The Malayan Emergency,* 386-94; Cheng Guan Ang, *Southeast Asia's Cold War*, 86-7.
[827] Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment*, 145-8
[828] Cheng Gaun Ang, *Southeast Asia's Cold War*, 144-6.
[829] Ibid, 150-1.
[830] Zijie Joshua Lim, "Resolving Away a China Problem".

engagement with China as part of the regional order.[831] A central consequence of this development was the ROC's diplomatic marginalisation; in 1971, a year before Nixon's visit to China, Taipei was replaced in the UN by the PRC.[832] This set into motion a cascading series of derecognitions of Taipei in Southeast Asia. Malaysia was the first Southeast Asian country in the 'arc of containment' to newly recognise Beijing, and was soon followed by the Philippines and Thailand, although not Singapore until 1990; Suharto did not reverse his predecessor's recognition of the PRC.[833] These recognitions of China were accompanied by Beijing's statements that naturalised Chinese were no longer PRC nationals, and eventually the abandonment of its already-limited support for Communist insurgencies.[834] Taiwan's role as a partner in a Cold War struggle against Beijing and Communist insurgencies acting at its behest became increasingly moot.

This changing political configuration also brought changes to the relationship between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore state elites, and their Chinese communities. Anti-Communist mobilisation was no longer a central focus of the state. In Malaysia, the political cleavage of Malay ethnic nationalism versus Chinese and Indian calls for racial equality replaced the earlier divide between socialist parties and the anti-Communist establishment. In 1969, major gains

[831] Jian Chen, "China and the Cold War after Mao," in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 3: Endings*, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 181–200, for the most concise introduction.
[832] Bush, *At Cross Purposes,* 114-123; Philip Hsiaopong Liu, "Dual Representation: Reviewing the Republic of China's Last Battle in the UN".
[833] A concise summary can be found at Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China, "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo yu geguo jianli waijiao guanxi riqi jianbiao 中华人民共和国与各国建立外交关系日期简表," *Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China*. Accessed Oct 26 2024 at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/2193_674977/200812/t20081221_9284708.shtml.
[834] Cheng Guan Ang, *Southeast Asia's Cold War*, 160-70 for discussion of Southeast Asian diplomacy regarding PRC support for Communist insurgencies; For PRC statements on nationality law see eg "Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the Kingdom of Thailand and the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国和泰王国关于建立外交关系的联合公报," *Law Info China 北大法律英文网*. Accessed Oct 26 2025 at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=7467&lib=tax&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=.; "Joint Communique of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia 中华人民共和国政府和马来西亚政府联合公报," *Law Info China*. Accessed Oct 26 2025 at https://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=7478&lib=tax&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=.

by both non-Malay opposition parties and Islamists in parliamentary elections were followed by the May 13 race riots, and then a period of martial law and the subsequent instatement of the New Economic Policy, which was preferential towards Malays.[835] Struggles over communal rights and racial equality became far more consequential in comparison to the questions of Chinese support for Communism or their loyalty to either Beijing or Taipei.[836] To briefly survey the more complex relationship between the Singaporean state and Chineseness, on one hand the PAP attempted to bring politically restive sections of Chinese-speaking Singapore, such as the Nanyang University 南洋大學, under state leadership through restrictive measures in the 1970s. On the other, the Singaporean government thought reinforcing Singapore's culturally Chinese character to be politically and economically useful, evidenced by its policies such as the Speak Mandarin campaign.[837] As authoritarian developmentalism became the guiding track for the politics of both countries, the political relevance and potency of the ROC's diaspora policy, whatever its nuances on assimilation and integration, became minimal.

The Indochinese peninsula experienced a contrasting end to the Cold War with the victory of Communist parties, but one that nevertheless had key similarities in their consequences and implications for anti-Communist Asia. As Saigon's prospects in the Vietnam War became perilous after the Tet Offensive in 1969, integrating the Chinese into the nation-state became far less of a priority than the existential struggle with the North. Communist victories in Indochina, of course, then put the Republic of Vietnam itself and its cooperation with Taipei to an end. Only in fragments of the Vietnamese Chinese diaspora after 1976, such as the

[835] Boon Kheng Cheah, *Malaysia*, 102-156.
[836] Ibid, 49-75.
[837] Barr, *Singapore*, 193-201 for a brief discussion of the Singaporean state's relationship with Chineseness, and Eugene Tan, "Re-Engaging Chineseness"; Beng Huat Chua, *Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore*, (Cornell University Press, 2017); and Michael Barr, "Lee Kuan Yew: Race, Culture and Genes," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 29, no. 2 (1999): 145–66, for more in-depth discussions of Singaporean state's relationship with racial identity and communitarianism.

recollections of former Free Village leader Huang Jinyu, can one find traces of the former affinities between Vietnamese and Chinese anti-Communist nationalism. Some OCAC officials, in their memoirs in the 1980s, portrayed the enduring strength of the Vietnamese-Chinese identity in its diaspora abroad as a sign of their past successes.[838] More importantly, the Communist victories in Indochina eventually dissolved the Cold War ideological confrontation. Illusions of the Communist bloc as an internally homogeneous, expansionist ideological threat were soon shattered by the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.[839] China's Reform and Opening Up and Vietnam's like-minded Doi Moi policy showed the intentions of both countries' ruling elites to engage with foreign economies to promote economic development.[840] Like their non-Communist counterparts in maritime Southeast Asia, they were by now more interested in protecting their domestic political order than in provoking regional conflict.

This thesis has discussed how ROC officials flexibly adapted the role of Chinese nationalism in their diaspora policy to changing diplomatic needs. In the last years of the Mainland, ROC officials' diaspora policy was marked by an expansive diaspora nationalism that saw the status of the ethnic Chinese and their relationship to Republican China as part of China's quest for regional power. In the Cold War, Chinese nationalism was reformulated to encourage ethnic Chinese to naturalise, cooperate with local authorities and promote their countries' relations with the ROC. It was also downplayed when Taipei interacted with both regional allies and the US, in favour of self-portrayals as an anti-Communist ally. At the same time, ROC officials avoided formal concessions on the nationality and loyalties of the Chinese diaspora to maintain their claims to political legitimacy. Diaspora policy reflected the flexible and pragmatic side of

[838] Ziheng Liang, *Qiaowu wenhuaguan*, 16-8.
[839] Cheng Guan Ang, *Southeast Asia's Cold War*, 170-81.
[840] Christopher Goscha, *The Penguin History of Modern Vietnam*, (Allen Lane, 2016), 183-98; Jian Chen, "China's Prolonged Rise: Legitimacy Challenges and Dilemmas in the Reform and Opening-Up Era," in Geir Lundestad (ed.), *International Relations since the End of the Cold War: New and Old Dimensions*, (Oxford University Press, 2013), 246–68.

the ROC's diplomacy on Taiwan, much more than a doctrinaire insistence on itself as the legitimate government of China.

While neither Chinese nationalism nor anti-Communism occupies a central role in Taiwan's diplomacy or domestic politics anymore, the adaptation and deployment of self-representation narratives to serve changing state needs has remained a significant feature of Taipei's foreign relations. Given Taiwan's uncertain, marginal diplomatic condition since the de-recognitions of the 1970s, an enduring tendency in Taiwan's diplomacy has been the use of these continuously changing narratives to demonstrate its value to its allies. In 1980s-90s Southeast Asia in particular, as anti-Communism lost its diplomatic relevance, Taiwan's role as a regional military and economic power was significant. It maintained informal ties with Southeast Asian countries through military and technological exchange, and later trade and investment.[841] Contemporary narratives invoked by Taiwan's leaders have revolved around diverse themes from its economic value in sectors like semiconductors, to contributions to areas of international development like public health.[842]

One of the most prominent of these narratives is the claim of Taiwan as the only democracy in the Chinese-speaking world, and part of the fraternity of global democracies. These claims have often stressed the coexistence of traditional Sinophone culture, social pluralism, and liberal democracy in Taiwan. These narratives obviously differ from the hierarchical,

[841] Samuel Ku, "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Relations with Southeast Asia: The 'Southward Policy,'" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 17, no. 3 (1995): 282–97; Ho Khai Leong, "New Directions in Taiwan-Southeast Asia Relations: Economics, Politics, and Security," *Pacific Focus* 10, no. 1 (1995): 81–100; Hsiao-Ting Lin, "Taiwan's Cold War in Southeast Asia," *Cold War International History Project.* Accessed Oct 26 2024 at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/taiwans-cold-war-southeast-asia.

[842] MFA, "Taiwan can help and Taiwan is helping!", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Accessed Oct 26 2024 at https://en.mofa.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=2318; For discussion of Taiwan's 'silicon shield' discourse see eg Jieh-Min Hu, "Silicon Shield 2.0: A Taiwan Perspective," *The Diplomat*, Sep 14 2024. Accessed Oct 26 2024 at https://thediplomat.com/2024/09/silicon-shield-2-0-a-taiwan-perspective/; for general discussion of Taiwan's narratives of its strategic and public value see Gary Rawnsley, "Soft Power Rich, Public Diplomacy Poor: An Assessment of Taiwan's External Communications," *The China Quarterly* 232, no. 232 (2017): 982–1001.

authoritarian diaspora nationalism that ROC officials espoused during the Cold War. Yet, both Cold War era and contemporary Taiwan leaders act within the fundamental constraint that intrastate relations and state authorities outweigh transnational solidarity in diplomatic and political importance; the former ultimately has the power to contain the latter. Taiwan's ideological narratives in international relations continue to adapt to these conditions.

For example, Taiwan's diplomats have typically adopted a minimalist definition of democracy, focussing on shared institutional affinities such as the direct election of leaders that allows them to encompass their key allies within the discourse of the 'democratic world'. This has included illiberal but geopolitically important regional powers such as India under the BJP, and also states with limited direct ties to Taiwan but great symbolic value to Washington such as Israel.[843] The analogies to Taipei's efforts to present overseas Chinese policy as beneficial to its ties with Japan in the 1950s, and the reluctance to offend Ngo Dinh Diem because of his status as the US' favourite Asian client, are clear. Conversely, overt opposition to authoritarianism in foreign countries exists largely in the social rather than state sphere in Taiwan. An example includes the 'Milk Tea Alliance 奶茶聯盟' in 2020 in which netizens in Taiwan expressed support for democracy movements in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.[844] The 'Milk Tea Alliance' narrative presents a conflict between Taiwanese-Southeast Asian social solidarity and the autocrats of China, Burma and Thailand, which the Taipei Foreign Ministry has little room to adopt given its diplomatic peripherality. This contrasts with the ability of global powers such as the EU and US to adopt democracy promotion as a formal goal

[843] Eg MFA. "Waijiao Buzhang Wu Zhaoxie fenbie jieshou Yindu zhuliu meiti caifang, qiangdiao minzhu guojia tuanjie hezuo, gongtong weihu Taihai anquan ji Yintai quyu heping wending de zhongyaoxing 外交部長吳釗燮分別接受印度主流媒體專訪，強調民主國家團結合作，共同維護台海安全及印太區域和平穩定的重要性," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs,* Aug 24 2022. Accessed Oct 26 2024 at https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&s=98419; Office of the President 總統府. "Zongtong jiejian 'Yiselie guohui yiyuan fangwentuan' 總統接見「以色列國會議員訪問團」," *Office of the President,* April 15 2024,. Accessed Oct 26 2024 at https://www.president.gov.tw/News/28334.

[844] Austin Horng-En Wang. "Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement," *Wilson Center*, accessed at Oct 26 2024 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Wang_Understanding%20the%20Milktea%20Alliance%20Movement.pdf

of state diplomacy.[845] Instead, the 'Milk Tea Alliance' has only been used by Taiwan's Foreign Ministry to describe the partnership between Taipei and India, whose government is not an antagonist in this narrative.[846] Superficial similarities of milk tea culture and tensions with China were appropriated to emphasise Taiwanese-Indian intrastate friendship, despite the incongruences between India's contemporary politics and pro-democracy movements in the Sinophone and Southeast Asian worlds.

ROC Diaspora Policy as Precursor to Modern-Day 'Flexible Citizenship'

The relationship between the ROC state and the Chinese in Malaya and Vietnam formed a part of the larger history of Global South nation-states' creation and enforcement of boundaries around transnational connections in the twentieth century. The transnational connections of the Chinese in Southeast Asia were regarded by colonial authorities as having great potential for political subversion; added to this were postcolonial rulers' views of the Chinese as outsiders and threats to national unity. This thesis has focussed on how ROC officials regulated those connections to serve their changing state needs in their final years on the Mainland and their rule of Taiwan.

Flexibility and ambiguity were often important to ROC officials' efforts to ensure that diaspora policy served their needs of state diplomacy without resulting in formal concessions that might weaken their political legitimacy. From 1945 to 1949, ROC officials drew expansive boundaries around who counted as an overseas Chinese and the rights to which they were

[845] Thomas Carothers, "Rejuvenating Democracy Promotion," *Journal of Democracy* 31, no. 1 (2020): 114–23.
[846] CNA, "Waijiaobu pi Zhongguo caonong fan Yindu yigong renzhizhan, yu Naicha lianmeng tuanjie 外交部批中國操弄反印度移工認知戰　籲奶茶聯盟團結," *Central News Agency,* Nov 21 2023. Accessed 17 Nov 2024 at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202311210135.aspx.; Ibid, "Zhongguo ganshe Yindu meiti yin fantan, Wu Zhaoxie lian 3 tuiwen zhiyi 中國干涉印度媒體引反彈 吳釗燮連3推文致意, *Central News Agency,* Oct 10 2020. Accessed Nov 17 2024 at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202010100254.aspx

entitled, as part of their designs of regional leadership. An example was the discourse of 'free selection of nationality' put forward by postwar ROC officials, suggesting that wartime treaties of equality between ROC and colonial powers would allow Chinese in Southeast Asia to retain both their Chinese nationality and their existing rights and livelihoods. Another was their ambition that, with Republican China's national ascent as a victorious power, ethnic Chinese in both French Indochina and British South East Asia would rally towards the ROC out of racial affinity regardless of nationality or cultural background.

After the retreat to Taiwan, the same flexibility and ambiguity in ROC officials' policymaking served the contrasting goal of preventing overseas Chinese issues from obstructing Taipei's state diplomacy, while preserving its narratives of diasporic support. Therefore, ROC overseas Chinese policy frequently exhibited both 'diasporic' and 'anti-diasporic' tendencies. On the question of citizenship, for example, the discourse of 'free selection' was a superficial continuity with the Mainland era that in practice served to encourage overseas Chinese to comply with naturalisation laws. ROC leaders' policies on the overseas KMT, particularly after the early 1950s, also focussed on sustaining KMT organisations only in countries that encouraged them, but curtailed them in societies that imposed political restrictions. Taipei's adaptations to Cold War international dynamics hastened the naturalisation of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, at a time when dichotomous categorisations of citizens and aliens took place across the Global South. Both Beijing and Taipei saw a comparable need to make concessions on overseas Chinese nationality, and to assure their allies of their support for the political integration of the Chinese. Although the PRC opted for formal concessions through nationality treaties in contrast to Taipei's implicit and ambiguous renunciations, both regimes ruptured their claims to overseas Chinese nationality in the interest of intrastate relations.

ROC leaders' adaptations also accepted, and in some cases hastened, the demise of pro-KMT political transnationalism in the Chinese-speaking communities of Diem's Vietnam and Malaya. Outside Taiwan, the KMT and the Three Principles of the People lacked the political potency of China's Maoist Communism, or the other Global South political transnationalisms and internationalisms in the mid-twentieth century. This was due both to its ethnic parochialism and lack of coherent ideology, and the recent defeat on the Mainland. In this sense, the domestication of KMT and pro-ROC transnationalism in Southeast Asia was less complex and challenging than other transnational movements of social and political emancipation, such as socialism and women's rights, that have attracted considerable recent scholarship.[847] Rather, it chiefly involved organisational and financial support for KMT branches when faced with hostility from local state authorities. Conversely, ROC officials chiefly encouraged dual loyalty to both the local state and to Taipei in countries which welcomed these political configurations as part of their cooperation with the ROC; the Philippines was the most notable example, with parallel developments in the Republic of Korea, the US, and the post-Diem RVN. The role of the Cold War in rupturing Sinophone political transnationalism also contrasts with the experiences of other regions, like Europe, where they spurred regional integration and eventually the emergence of supra-national political identities.

Yet, there were also important areas where Taipei officials sought to build new, diasporic connections for their state needs; in doing so, their policies exhibited arrangements of state-sanctioned multilayered, 'flexible' citizenship. Events such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference demonstrated the symbolic importance that OCAC officials placed on claims that

[847] Examples of this historiography, particularly within an Asian context, include Su Lin Lewis, "Asian Socialism and the Forgotten Architects of Post-Colonial Freedom, 1952–1956," *Journal of World History* 30, no. 1 (2019): 55–88 and Adeline Broussan, "Résistantes Against the Colonial Order: Women's Grassroots Diplomacy During the French War in Vietnam (1945-1954)," in *The Lives of Cold War Afro-Asianism*, 41-64.

all overseas Chinese were their loyal nationals. In practice, the forms of citizenship that they envisioned for different groups of overseas Chinese were differentiated and uneven. References to overseas Chinese as 'compatriots' and calls for their loyalty in propaganda and knowledge production were frequently accompanied by subtle admissions that the ROC could offer few concrete benefits to most overseas Chinese. Instead, this imagined audience should integrate into their own countries and promote their states' friendship with Taipei; it was frequently implied that the latter should not come at the cost of the former. Preferential benefits of overseas citizenship were accorded to elite Chinese who fulfilled Taipei's needs for state relations and economic development, such as students and business elites. By contrast, Taipei officials frequently associated other Southeast Asian Chinese migration to Taiwan with high costs, security threats, and diplomatic embarrassment, and were reluctant to accept these migrants.

This thesis thus joins a growing scholarship on boundary-making in 1945-60s Asia, highlighting the ambiguities with which Taipei governed citizenship and nationality in an assumed context of nation-states imposing dichotomous classifications on fluid identities. The context of Taipei's diplomatic status within the often Sinophobic anti-Communist bloc, and the specific factors that influenced its relationship with the Chinese diaspora, were unique to this thesis' subject matter. Yet, the dynamic of state elites and private individuals adapting often ambiguous, flexible identities for their own purposes within a top-down, state-dominated framework has numerous points of comparison in historical and contemporary Asia. One can understand them as precursors to the contemporary, prevailing arrangements of 'flexible citizenship' in Asia as Aihwa Ong analyses. By around the 1980s, many nationality disputes from the interwar period (for Europe) and the era of decolonisation (for Asia and Africa) became less politically contested. State authorities increasingly perceived the need to attract

skilled labour, trade and capital investment to position themselves favorably in global economic integration, and found their diasporas abroad useful to those ends.[848] India perhaps provides the best example of how contemporary states have instituted 'flexible-citizenship' arrangements to further their own developmental agenda. In the mid-twentieth century, India was much more explicit and comprehensive in rupturing its ties with overseas Indians than Taipei and arguably even Beijing. Yet, in the 2000s, it instituted new arrangements such as the 'Overseas Citizen' and 'Non-Resident' Indian schemes, which provided preferential benefits to skilled or wealthy co-ethnics abroad.[849]

While neither Taipei nor Beijing has instituted a comparably substantial change to their citizenship laws, extensive scholarship has already detailed the two states' capacity to coexist and thrive with the transnational mobility of capitalists and professionals. In China, preferential terms in investment, trade, and higher education are often extended to both PRC nationals abroad, or 'Chinese compatriots (*huaqiao*)', and naturalised 'ethnic Chinese (*Huayi / Huaren*)'.[850] As dual nationality remains permitted in Taiwan (it remains prohibited in PRC law), there is a substantial diaspora of Taiwanese professionals and capitalists with ROC nationality. Dual Taiwanese-US citizens and permanent residents have, in particular, played an outsized role in Taiwan's culture and economy, as shown by the prominence of individuals like film director Ang Lee 李安 and semiconductor tycoon Jensen Huang 黃仁勳.[851]

[848] For some perspectives for the relationship between neoliberal globalisation, state political interests, and diaspora policy see Latha Varadarajan, *The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations*, (Oxford University Press, 2010); Hein de Haas, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, (Bloomsbury Academic, 2022); Francesco Ragazzi, "Governing Diasporas," *International Political Sociology* 3, no. 4 (2009): 378–97.
[849] Latha Varadarajan, *The Domestic Abroad* focusses specifically on the Indian experience of diaspora policy.
[850] James Jiann Hua To, *Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese*, (Brill, 2014) offers a comprehensive survey of the PRC's relationship with different groups of overseas Chinese.
[851] Eg CNA. "Huang Renxun Taibei xianqi xuanfeng, Lutou: diwei rouyu liuxing juxing 黃仁勳來台掀起旋風路透：地位宛如流行巨星," *Central News Agency,* Jun 5 2024. Accessed Sep 1 2024 at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/202406050427.aspx ; Ibid, "Li An huo Zongtong Wenhuajiang, yi chengwei Taiwan wenhua yifenzi weirong 李安獲總統文化獎以成為台灣文化一份子為榮," Ibid*,* Nov 30 2021. Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202111300299.aspx

Comparing modern-day 'flexible citizenship' in Asia to ROC overseas Chinese policy in the 1950s-60s, we should be mindful of the primacy of political logic to the latter, in contrast to the importance of economics to the former. In the cases examined by this thesis, Taiwan's configurations of flexible citizenship for the diaspora were primarily influenced by its Cold War diplomacy and its standoff with the Mainland. Only to a lesser extent did ROC rulers' efforts to attract investment and trade feature in diaspora policy. In contemporary Taiwan, economic considerations are often at work in producing arrangements of uneven benefits and obligations of citizenship. Southeast Asia has in the past few years taken on great discursive importance in Taiwan, with the New Southbound economic policy and the state's celebration of 'new residents (*xinzhumin* 新住民)' as a symbol of Taiwan's multicultural society.[852] Yet, welcoming attitudes towards flows of capital and political discourses of multiculturalism have coexisted with migration regimes that are often highly exploitative of migrant workers.[853]

It is notable that political conditions remain highly important in how China and Taiwan understand citizenship when the cross-Strait confrontation is concerned, just as they were in the topics surveyed by this thesis. For example, the recent emigrants from Hong Kong since the 2020 National Security Law to the Anglo-American world can be understood as quite ideal members of neoliberal polities, with their stocks of education and capital. Yet, despite their high-profile symbolic support for Hong Kong's protests in 2019, Taiwan officials have imposed many restrictions on their migration, and in fact has no formal legislation for asylum-

[852] Ibid. "Xinzhumin jibenfa sandu, Neizhengbu: jiji tuidong luoshi gexiang gongzuo 新住民基本法三讀 內政部：積極落實推動各項工作," Ibid, Jul 17 2024. Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202407170021.aspx; Ibid. "Cai Zongtong: xianzai de xinzhumin, 400 nianhou yeshi Taiwan de zuxian 蔡總統：現在的新移民 400年後也是台灣的祖先," Ibid, May 4 2022.' Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202205040274.aspx; Ibid. "Chuxi xinzhumin huodong, Lai Qingde: Rentong Taiwan jiushi tudi de zhuren 出席新住民活動 賴清德：認同台灣就是土地的主人," Ibid, Jan 7 2024. Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202401070140.aspx.

[853] Eg One-Forty [No Chinese organisation name]. "Dainikan Taiwan yigong de sanda qunjing: zhengce, fagui yu qishi wenti hejie? 帶你看見台灣移工的三大困境：政策、法規與歧視問題何解？," *One-Forty.* Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://one-forty.org/tw/blog/migrant-issues.

seekers from abroad. One principal official discourse used to justify such restrictions is that Hong Kong migrants and asylum-seekers may contain infiltrators from the CCP.[854] This is similar to how ROC officials handled the migration cases covered in this thesis. Further studies of Taiwan's governance of transnationality could consider other areas where the state and society encountered the transnational: for example, the local governments and universities that interacted with overseas Chinese. More broadly, histories of boundary-making in the mid-twentieth century can adopt a comparative perspective both to contemporaneous developments in different societies, and to regional (Asian) and global integration after the 1980s.

Situating Taiwan within the Conservative Sinophone World, c.1949-present

This thesis began with the resemblances between the stand-up comedy of Ronny Chieng, a contemporary Chinese American comedian born in Malaysia, and the 1961 writings of then-OCAC Deputy Minister Li Pusheng. Most likely, Chieng had never heard of Li Pusheng. Both writers portrayed the politics of the Chinese as essentially conservative in character, helping establishing structures function more effectively. What was uncanny was that both Chieng and Li drew parallels between Chinese cuisine, an economic niche of the Chinese in both Southeast Asia and North America, and their political participation. Of course, while Li was writing to encourage his audience to behave in a way that served Taipei's diplomatic interests, Chieng's

[854] BBC News. "Xianggang yiminchao: Gangren zai Taiwan xian falu, guoan kunju, 'erci yiminchao' shifou luxu youlai 香港移民潮：港人在台灣陷法律、國安困局 「二次移民潮」是否陸續有來," *BBC News*, Jan 20 2023. Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-64316121; Amnesty International Taiwan 國際特赦組織台灣分會, "Shijie Nanmin Ri: 2024 nian tongguo Nanminfa, zhuan'an shencha yao jiasu 世界難民日：2024年通過《難民法》, 專案審查要加速," *Amnesty International Taiwan*. Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://www.amnesty.tw/node/18925.

comedy routine was a lighthearted reflection on domestic racial stereotypes in the US with little bearing on external geopolitics.

At the peak of the Cold War in Asia, US officials and xenophobic Southeast Asian state elites alike understood the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia as a potential conduit of de-territorialised transnational Communist subversion. Yet, by the end of the Cold War, it was *anti*-Communism and hostility to anti-establishment radicalism, integrated into nation-state political orders, that became hegemonic in many Chinese-speaking communities the world over. This thesis has suggested that ROC officials were not always preoccupied with unrealistic expectations of positioning Taipei as a pole of Chinese diasporic loyalty. Rather, they frequently sought to establish a more favourable role for Taipei in this transnational anti-Communist, anti-PRC hegemony in the Sinophone world. ROC officials often saw the integration of ethnic Chinese into nation-state politics as beneficial, or even fundamental, to good relations with anti-Communist Southeast Asian states; their aim was to ensure that their ties with ethnic Chinese communities and elites promoted rather than impeded such intrastate friendship. Superpower-client considerations were also central, as ROC officials downplayed their diaspora nationalism and emphasised their role as an anti-Communist ally in part to court US financial and diplomatic support.

On both counts, ROC officials attained partial success. On one hand, Taipei's concessions could hardly be described as central to the overseas Chinese communities' political transition to domestic ethnic minorities in Southeast Asian nation-states, or ethno-nationalist states' perceptions thereof. However, ROC proposals for cooperation with Malaya/Malaysia and the RVN on combatting Communist subversion in the Chinese diaspora did yield genuine moments of intrastate anti-Communist solidarity. Minimally, despite their mixed success in ambitious targets such as strengthened diplomatic relations, ROC officials often successfully mitigated

the role of diaspora issues as an obstacle to Cold War diplomacy. For their part, Washington never fully accepted Taipei's self-representations as the most reliable and potent force against Communism in Southeast Asia, and instead spread its resources among other anti-Communist actors such as other allied states, or intellectuals and culturists in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, cooperation on overseas Chinese affairs did become part of US-ROC Cold War security cooperation, especially in instances that did not negatively affect the former's relations with the region's other anti-Communist governments.

As ROC diaspora policy formed part of anti-Communist histories in the Sinophone world, they joined a broader arc in its history that was not necessarily about local or China-oriented social identity, but rather the victory of conservative over radical politics. In the twentieth century, discourses of Chineseness beyond China differed in key respects because they emerged from different political and economic conditions. Yet, the unifying thread was the efforts of Chinese communities, and particularly their elites, to preserve or advance their status in a context when, on one hand, xenophobia and anti-Communism were closely intertwined; and on the other, they faced (or once did) left-wing political challenges in their own communities. For example, in contrast to the political quietism of the Malaysian Chinese that this thesis has already examined, Lee Kuan Yew frequently invoked the discourse of Chinese racial superiority to justify his authoritarian rule and the economic and political dominance of the Singaporean Chinese, particularly in the 1980s. His 'Asian Values' discourse in the late twentieth century once held great regional and global currency.[855] The 'model minority' myth in the Anglo-American settler societies arose from a very different political economy of Chinese communities seeking integration into the social establishment from a peripheral socioeconomic position.[856]

[855] Michael Barr, "Lee Kuan Yew and the 'Asian Values' Debate," *Asian Studies Review* 24, no. 3 (2000): 309–34; Tim Harper, "'Asian Values' and Southeast Asian Histories," *The Historical Journal* 40, no. 2 (1997): 507–17.
[856] Madeline Yuan-Yin Hsu, *The Good Immigrants*; Ellen Wu, *The Color of Success*; Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration*.

However, the effort of elites to defend their interests from both xenophobic politics and radical political challengers remained a similarity with the Southeast Asian experience. Future scholarship would do well to apply both comparative and interconnected perspectives to how transformations of Chineseness and Chinese identity in the twentieth century relate to underlying struggles for political and economic power. Considering the mid-twentieth century in particular, the twin historical arcs of nation-state building and the Cold War confrontation were particularly central, as this thesis has demonstrated.

Ironically, this conservative hegemony in the Sinophone world has now proven itself an asset for contemporary China's clout. As we have already seen, the efforts of ethnic Chinese economic elites to maintain their alliances with often xenophobic local state rulers has often been central to the society and politics of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. As China has become an economic powerhouse in Asia, these elites have often found links with the PRC state to be both economically lucrative in its own right, and conducive to their own standing in the local political sphere. These strategies have been favorable for any number of Chinese elites, from recent PRC migrants to well-established local business dynasties, and from small-businesspeople, professionals, and clan-association leaders to major tycoons, in countries across Southeast Asia. Potentially illicit and relatively small-scale examples include Offshore Gaming Operator financiers in the Philippines, and recent PRC migrants in Laos and Cambodia who have established themselves as *qiaoling* (diaspora leaders), advantageous for their dealings with both the Chinese and local government.[857] Alliances between Chinese capitalists, local states and Beijing have also been practised by household names in the Chinese-speaking world, such as Malaysian tycoon Robert Kuok 郭鶴年. Kuok, whose fortune ranges from

[857] Wanjing Chen, "Harden the Hardline, Soften the Softline: Unravelling China's Qiaoling-Centred Diaspora Governance in Laos," *The China Quarterly* 250 (2022): 397–416; Chien-Wen Kung, *Diasporic Cold Warriors*, 210.

commodities to real estate and hotels in Malaysia, China, and many other countries, had close ties with both the Barisan Nasional regime and the Mahathir premiership that succeeded it in 2018. At the same time, his daughter Kuok Hui-Kwong 郭惠光 is part of the 1200-person Committee that selects Hong Kong's Chief Executive and member of the Beijing People's Political Consultative Conference.[858]

Arguably, China's ideological appeals to the Sinophone world can also be understood in relation to longstanding sentiments of Chinese ethnic superiority and racialised affinity between China and its diaspora, and the political authoritarianism that often historically dovetailed with anti-Communism. For example, China has often deployed a discourse of 'global Chinese compatriots and ethnic Chinese (*quanqiu Huaqiao Huaren*)' to imply an equivalence in the desirable political allegiances of ethnic Chinese, regardless of nationality. In 2024, senior Chinese leader Wang Huning 王沪宁 stated at a 'Congress of the *quanqiu Huaqiao Huaren* to Promote Peaceful Chinese Reunification' that all 'children of *Zhonghua*' had the obligation to oppose Taiwanese independence.[859] As this thesis has shown, Taipei and the US were once receptive to mirror-image discourses that kept the relationship between nationality and political loyalty towards the home country, and expectations of sympathy with the ROC, deliberately ambiguous. Observers of pro-CCP sentiment in the Malaysian Chinese community suggest that political quietism and the weakness of social movements after decades

[858] Bhavan Jaipragas, "Hong Kong billionaire Robert Kuok to advise Mahathir during his transition," *South China Morning Post*, May 12 2018. Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2145849/hong-kong-billionaire-robert-kuok-advise-mahathir-during-his; The Malaysian Insight, "Under-fire Robert Kuok gave large amounts to UMNO, MCA," *The Malaysian Insight*, Feb 27 2018. Accessed 27 Oct 2024 at https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/40034; Jinxian Yu 余錦賢, "Jing Hu Yue Zhengxie chulu, dajiazu zhengxiang chaqi 京滬粵政協出爐 大家族爭相插旗," *Hong Kong Economic Journal* 信報, Jan 10 2023. Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://www1.hkej.com/features/article?q=%23%E6%B8%AF%E7%89%88%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%89%E6%B3%95%E6%94%BF%E7%B6%93%E5%B0%88%E6%AC%84%23&suid=1813649337.

[859] Xinhua Net 新华网, "2024 Nian quanqiu Huaqiao Huaren cujin Zhongguo heping tongyi dahui zai Xianggang juban, Wang Huning zhixin zhuhe 2024年全球华侨华人促进中国和平统一大会在香港举办 王沪宁致信祝贺," *Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee* 中共中央台湾工作办公室. Accessed 27 Oct 2024 at http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/m/headline/202408/t20240821_12643988.htm.

of authoritarian rule have contributed to hostility to disruptive protest in Hong Kong and Taiwan.[860] The relationship between Chinese nationalism and popular sympathy for the PRC is particularly evident in Taiwan itself. While the KMT has long lost its anti-Communist character, it continues to draw support from those who identify as Chinese rather than Taiwanese, due to its conciliatory approach on the cross-Strait divide.[861]

Therefore, we should consider the relationship between current, counter-hegemonic struggles for agency in the Sinophone world, and the role the states and societies they involve once played in historical, anti-Communist hegemony. To raise a few examples, how did Southeast Asian Chinese educated in Taiwan's universities or using ROC textbooks respond to the PRC's rise after the 1970s-80s, as they progressed in their lives and careers? How did the KMT's informal connections with parties like the MCA come to be succeeded first by formal intraparty exchange, but then intraparty relations with the CCP?[862] These studies might yield a better understanding of the process by which different states' and societies' participation in anti-Communist hegemony– in this thesis the Taipei government, although this perspective can arguably also be applied to cases such as Hong Kong's society– eventually contributed to their own marginality, provided them with resources for future resistance, or had more nuanced effects altogether.

---

[860] Jin-Xuan Toh, "Weihe tamen ningyuan beima 'Hanjian', ye yao jiang Malaixiya Huaren de qinzhong, zhongzu qishi yanlun fanyi chuqu 為何他們寧願被罵「漢奸」，也要將馬來西亞華人的親中、種族歧視言論翻譯出去," *The News Lens.* Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://www.thenewslens.com/article/135622; Wooi Tee Lim 林韋地, "Lun Malaixiya Huaren 'Dazhonghua minzu zhuyi' de liancheng 論馬來西亞華人「大中華民族主義」的煉成," *The News Lens.* Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://www.thenewslens.com/article/123092

[861] Shelley Rigger, "Kuomintang Agonistes: Party Politics in the Wake of Taiwan's 2016 and 2020 Elections," in June Teufel Dreyer and Jaques deLisle (eds.), *Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-Wen*, (Routledge, 2021), 39–63.

[862] Jin-Xuan Toh, "Zulu baodao"; "Qian beiwanglu da 4 gongshi, Mahua yu Zhonggong shenhua hezuo 签备忘录达4共识 马华与中共深化合作," *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, Jul 24 2014. Accessed Oct 27 2024 at https://www.sinchew.com.my/20140724/%E7%AD%BE%E5%A4%87%E5%BF%98%E5%BD%95%E8%BE%BE4%E5%85%B1%E8%AF%86%EF%BC%8E%E9%A9%AC%E5%8D%8E%E4%B8%8E%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%B1%E6%B7%B1%E5%8C%96%E5%90%88%E4%BD%9C/; International Liaison Department, CCP Central Committee 中共中央对外联络部, "Liu Jianchao huijian Malaixiya Minzhu Xingdongdang Mishuzhang, zhengfu Jiaotong Buzhang Lu Zhaofu 刘建超会见马来西亚民主行动党秘书长、政府交通部长陆兆福," Mar 29 2024, *International Liaison Department, Central Committee of CPC.* Accessed 27 Oct 2024 at https://www.idcpc.gov.cn/bzhd/wshd/202403/t20240329_163599.html

Bibliography

Archives

Academia Historica, Taipei 國史館 :

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 外交部

Guiguo Huaqiao bingyi fagui 歸國華僑兵役法規, 020-990600-2697 - 020-990600-2699

Guomindang Xiti zhibu beifeng yu jiaqiang dui Yue gongzuo 國民黨西堤支部被封與加強對越工作, 020-011099-0004

Jianli dui Baoda zhengfu waijiao guanxi 建立對保大政府外交關係, 020-011002-0037

Malaiya (Malaixiya) gedi jinji faling 馬來亞（馬來西亞）各地緊急法令, 020-010699-0038

Malaiya (Malaixiya) Gongdang huodong 馬來亞（馬來西亞）共黨活動 (1), 020-010609-0008

Malaiya (Malaixiya) Gongdang huodong 馬來亞（馬來西亞）共黨活動 (2), 020-010609-0009

Malaiya (Malaixiya) Gongdang huodong 馬來亞（馬來西亞）共黨活動 (3), 020-010609-0010

Malaiya (Malaixiya) Gongdang huodong 馬來亞（馬來西亞）共黨活動 (5), 020-010609-0012

Malaiya (Malaixiya) Lianbang xinxianzhi 馬來亞（馬來西亞）聯邦新憲制 (1), 020-010601-0008

Malaiya (Malaixiya) Lianbang xinxianzhi 馬來亞（馬來西亞）聯邦新憲制 (2), 020-010601-0009

Malaiya (Malaixiya) Lianbang 馬來亞（馬來西亞）聯邦 (1), 020-010601-0006

Malaiya (Malaixiya) Lianbang 馬來亞（馬來西亞）聯邦 (2), 020-010601-0007

Paixian Huijiao fangwentuan qianwang Yinni, Malaiya fangwen 派遣回教訪問團前往印尼、馬來亞訪問, 020-010802-0035

Qiaowu Huiyi 僑務會議 (1), 020-049910-0081

Qiaowu Huiyi 僑務會議 (2), 020-049910-0082

Xin Ma qiaowu zajuan 星馬僑務雜卷 (3), 020-010599-0004

Yongzhen Faji saoshe wojun ji fan'gong youjidui beiju 永珍法機掃射我軍及反共游擊隊被拘, 020-011203-0001

Yuenan daibu Gongdang xianyi Huaqiao 越南逮捕共黨嫌疑華僑, 020-011007-0161

Yuenan gemingdang 越南革命黨 (6), 020-011001-0026

Yuenan guoji fa'an xuanchuan 越南國籍法案宣傳(1), 020-011007-0105

Yuenan Huaqiao nashui 越南華僑納稅 (1), 020-011007-0122

Yuenan Huaqiao nashui 越南華僑納稅 (3), 020-011007-0124

Yuenan Laojie, Nanqi anquanqu 越南老街、南圻安全區, 020-011007-0070

Yuenan Mingxiang wenti ji Huaqiao guoji 越南明鄉問題及華僑國籍 (1), 020-011007-0073

Yuenan Mingxiang wenti ji Huaqiao guoji 越南明鄉問題及華僑國籍 (2), 020-011007-0074

Yuenan qiaowu 越南僑務 (5), 020-011007-0172

Yuenan zajuan 越南雜卷 (1), 020-011099-0023

Yuenan zajuan 越南雜卷 (3), 020-011099-0024

Yuenan zhuan'an xiaozu huiyi jilu 越南專案小組會議紀錄, 020-011007-0111

Zhong-Fa guanyu Zhong-Yue guanxi zhi xieding 中法關於中越關係之協定 (2), 020-011002-0015

Zhong-Fa huijiao Gui Yue bian feidang xieding 中法會勦桂粵邊匪黨協定, 020-040802-0005

Zhonggong ni zhaokai “Huaqiao daibiao huiyi” 中共擬召開「華僑代表會議」, 020-042602-0013

Zuzhi Malai Huaren Gonghui 組織馬來華人公會, 020-010607-0047

Executive Yuan 行政院

Xingzhengyuan di siqisan ci huiyi mimi baogao shixiang 行政院第四七三次會議秘密報告事項, 014-000205-00129-001

Xingzhengyuan di wulingliu ci mimi huiyi mimi taolun shixaing: (1)Waijiaobu chengbao guanyu Yuenan guoji fa’an zuijin fazhan qingxing bing qingshi yinying fangzhenan 行政院第五○六次秘密會議秘密討論事項：（一）外交部呈報關於越南國籍法案最近發展情形併請示因應方針案, 014-000205-00140-003

Zhong-Fa qianding pingdeng xinyue an 中法簽訂平等新約案, 014-020200-0026

Office of the President 總統府

Diyijie quanqiu Qiaowu Huiyi gedi chuxi qiaotuan daibiao mingce ji chuxi renyuan meiri pinbaobiao 第一屆全球僑務會議各地出席僑團代表名冊及出席人員每日彙報表, 011-030800-0060

Chiang Kai-Shek’s Collections: Chronological Events 蔣中正總統文物事略稿本

Minguo sanshiqi nian yiyue 民國三十七年一月 (2), 002-060100-00233-008

Vice President Chen Cheng Collections 陳誠副總統文物

Woguo yu Dongnanya geguo bangjiao: Yuenan Huaqiao guoji 我國與東南亞各國邦交越南華僑國籍問題, 008-010601-00015-001

Kuomintang Archives 中國國民黨文化傳播委員會黨史館 in National Cheng Chi University Sun Yat Sen Memorial Library, Taipei: Zongcai piqian [Papers signed by Chiang Kai-Shek] 總裁批簽 CKS 45, 49, 50, 52

National Archives Administration 國家檔案管理局, Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collections

CCOP jihua CCOP 計劃, A303000000B/0040/414.3/13

Haitong jilu duifei douzheng 周海通記錄對匪鬥爭, A303000000B/0046/818.11/0009

Malaixiya Huaren shetuan 馬來西亞華人社團, A303000000B/0053/62.2/1

Malaixiya zhengqing ji qiaoqing 馬來亞西政情及僑情, A303000000B/0046/1/27

Wo yu Yue Mian Liao sanbang jianjiao 我與越棉寮三邦建交, A303000000B/0042/12.1/2

Wo yu Yue Mian Liao sanbang jianjiao 我與越棉寮三邦建交, A303000000B/0042/12.1/5

Wo yu Yue Mian Liao sanbang jianjiao 我與越棉寮三邦建交, A303000000B/0044/12.1/5

Wo yu Yue Mian Liao sanbang jianjiao 我與越棉寮三邦建交, A303000000B/0044/12.1/6

Yuenan nanqiao jiuji ji Ziyou xincun jianxiu 越南難僑救濟及自由新村建修, A303000000B/0046/63.5/2

Yuenan nanqiao jiuji ji Ziyou xincun jianxiu 越南難僑救濟及自由新村建修, A303000000B/0046/63.5/3

Zhong-Ma jianjiao 中馬建交, A303000000B/0045/12.1/1

Zhong-Ma jianjiao 中馬建交, A303000000B/0049/12.1/2

The National Archives, London

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Migrated Archives

Malaya: Malayan Chinese Association, FCO, MA:M, TNA. FCO 141/7478.

Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs no.s 29-42, January to December 1949, FCO 141/7625

Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs Nos 43-48, January to October 1950, FCO 141/7626

Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs Nos 49-58, February to December 1951, FCO 141/7627

Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs Nos 71-82, January to December 1952, FCO 141/7629,

Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs Nos 83-94, January to December 1954, FCO 141/7630

Malaya: Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs nos. 59-70, January to December 1952, FCO 141/7775

Singapore: use of Kuomintang (KMT) adherents to assist the Government, FCO 141/14555

Foreign Office

Political Relations between Formosa and Malaya, FO 371/127481.

Problems of overseas Chinese in South East Asia; complaints about treatment of overseas Chinese families in Kwangtung; Nationalist drive to win support of the overseas Chinese; conferences in Taipeh and Canton; study of China's population, FO 371/99376

Proposal for establishment of diplomatic relations between Vietnam and Nationalist Chinese: French opposition to the move 1954, FO 375/110227

Refusal of entry to Malaya for Formosa Director of Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs Cheng Yen Fen; report on Ceylon-China Friendship Association, FO 371/101234

Colonial Office

Federation of Malaya: monthly political intelligence reports, CO 1030/245

Malaya: review of Chinese Affairs, CO 537

The strength and activities of the Kuomintang in Singapore, CO 537/7292

Digital Databases

Cold War International History Project

Telegraph from Choi Duk-Shin to Syngman Rhee, Sep 13 1956. Accessed at https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/cds-report-no-18-choi-duk-shin-president-syngman-rhee.

Telegraph from Choi Duk-Shin to Syngman Rhee, Jan 25 1957. Accessed at https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/cds-report-no-33-choi-duk-shin-president-syngman-rhee.

Law Info China 北大法律英文网

"Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the Kingdom of Thailand and the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国和泰王国关于建立外交关系的联合公报." Accessed at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=7467&lib=tax&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=.

"Joint Communique of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia 中华人民共和国政府和马来西亚政府联合公报." Accessed at https://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=7478&lib=tax&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=.

Refworld: Global Law & Policy Database

"Convention on Certain Questions Related to the Conflict of Nationality Laws." Accessed at https://www.refworld.org/legal/agreements/lon/1930/en/17955.

ROC Government Post Database 中華民國政府官職資料庫

'Deng Feipeng 鄧飛鵬.' Accessed at https://gpost.lib.nccu.edu.tw/display.php?&q=name:%E9%84%A7%E9%A3%9B%E9%B5%AC

‘Zheng Yanfen 鄭彥棻.’ Accessed at https://gpost.lib.nccu.edu.tw/display.php?&q=name:%E9%84%AD%E5%BD%A5%E6%A3%BB.

‘Zhu Xiuxia 祝秀俠.’ Accessed at https://gpost.lib.nccu.edu.tw/display.php?&q=name:%E9%84%A7%E9%A3%9B%E9%B5%AC

‘Zhang Pingqun 張平羣.’ Accessed at https://gpost.lib.nccu.edu.tw/view_career.php?&name=張平羣; Ibid.

‘Zhang Zichang 張紫常.’ Accessed at https://gpost.lib.nccu.edu.tw/view_career.php?&name=張紫常.

Wanfang Data 萬方數據

Collected Primary Sources – Series

Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français (ed.). *Documents Diplomatiques Francaise. 1955, Vol. 1*. (Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français, 1987).

———. *Documents Diplomatiques Francaise. 1949, Vol. 1*. (———., 1987).

Keefer, Edward C. and David W. Mabon (eds.). *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vietnam, Vol. 1*, (United States Government Printing Office, 1985).

Liu, Yuqing 刘裕清 (ed.). Zhonggong Dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao 中共党史教学参考资料, Vol. 19. Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Guofang Daxue Dangshi Dangjian Zhenggong Jiaoyanshi 中国人民解放军国防大学党史党建政工教研室,1986.

Printed Primary Sources -- Newspapers and Periodicals

Central Daily News 中央日報

"Ribao jizhe baodao Qiaowu Huiyi zhongda chengjiu 日報記者報導僑務會議重大成就," Nov 2 1952.

Kung Sheung Daily News 工商日報

"Gang Ao qiaobao liu Sui jiashu tezao gunzhi: guiding meizhou baodao yici jiantao sixiang 港澳僑胞留穗家屬突遭管制：規定每週報到一次檢討思想," Oct 21 1952.

"Zhonggong baozheng canhai Huaqiao tongbao Huaqiao fenkai feichang zengqiang fan'gong yizhi 中共暴政殘害華僑同胞 華僑憤慨非常 增強反共意志," Oct 22 1952.

Nanyang Siang Pau 南洋商報

"Taibei zhaokai Qiaowu Huiyi 臺北召開僑務會議," Oct 28 1952.

New York Times

"Remnants of Chiang's Army Are Routed Again," July 25 1996.

Sin Chew Jit Poh 星洲日報

"Tai Qiaowu Huiyi kaimu Jiang zhici huyu tuanjie 台僑務會議開幕將 蔣致詞呼籲團結," Oct 22 1952.

Sing Tao Daily News 星島日報

"Gang Ri Huaqiao daibiao zuojun dida Taibei Qiaowu Huiyi minggao kaimu 港日華僑代表 昨均抵達台北 僑務會議明告開幕," Oct 20 1952.

Ta Kung Pao 大公報

"Guiqiao shenghuo de xingfu: ji Yinni guiqiao Wei Jin tanhua 歸僑生活的幸福：記印尼歸僑魏金談話," Oct 21 1952

Wah Kiu Yat Pou 華僑日報

"Qiaowu Huiyi fabiao shengming, Riben shangren ruoyu Zhonggong maoyi, Huaqiao ji jujue yu Riben hezuo 僑務會議發表聲明 日本商人若與中共貿易 華僑即拒絕與日本合作," Oct 27 1952.

Libraries

Bodleian Library, Oxford

City University of Hong Kong Library

Chinese University of Hong Kong Library

Hong Kong Baptist University Library

Hong Kong Central Library

Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Hong Kong University Library

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Library

Lingnan University Library

National Library, Singapore

National Taiwan University Library

National University of Singapore Library

Secondary and Published Sources

Abraham, Itty. *How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014.

———. "Prolegomena to Non-alignment: Race and the International System," in Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska (eds.), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung – Belgrade,* 109-30. London: Routledge, 2014.

Academia Historica 國史館. *Guoshiguan Xiancang Minguo renwu zhuanji shiliao huibian* 國史館現藏民國人物傳記史料彙編, Vol 3. Taipei: Academia Historica Press 國史館, 1990.

Alatas, Syed Hussein. *The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism.* London: Cass, 1977.

Altehenger, Jennifer. *Legal Lessons: Popularizing Laws in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1989.* Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2018.

Amnesty International Taiwan 國際特赦組織台灣分會. "Shijie Nanmin Ri: 2024 nian tongguo Nanminfa, zhuan'an shencha yao jiasu 世界難民日：2024年通過《難民法》，專案審查要加速," *Amnesty International Taiwan*. Accessed at https://www.amnesty.tw/node/18925.

Amrith, Sunil. *Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The Furies of Nature and the Fortunes of Migrants*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013.

———. “Struggles for Citizenship around the Bay of Bengal,” in Gyan Prakash, Michael Laffan and Nikhil Menon (eds.), *The Postcolonial Moment in South and Southeast Asia*, 107–120. London: Bloomsbury Press, 2018.

Andrade, Tonio. “Koxinga’s Conquest of Taiwan in Global History: Reflections on the Occasion of the 350th Anniversary.” *Late Imperial China* 33, no. 1 (2012): 122–40.

Ang, Cheng Guan. *Southeast Asia’s Cold War: An Interpretive History*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2018.

Ang, Ming Chee. *Institutions and Social Mobilization: The Chinese Education Movement in Malaysia, 1951-2011*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2014.

Atkinson, Joel. *Australia and Taiwan: Bilateral Relations, China, the United States, and the South Pacific*. Boston: Brill, 2012.

Barr, Michael. “Lee Kuan Yew and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate.” *Asian Studies Review* 24, no. 3 (2000): 309–34.

———. “Lee Kuan Yew: Race, Culture and Genes.” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 29, no. 2 (1999): 145–66.

———. *Singapore: A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2017.

Barthel, Alexandre, and Wasana Wongsurawat. “The Origins of the Cold War in Southeast Asia: Pre-Second World War Siamese Cooperation with Foreign Powers against Communism.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 52, no. 4 (2021): 658–76.

Bau, Tzong-Ho, Denis Simon and Michael Kau. *Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle.* London: Routledge, 1993.

BBC News. “Xianggang yiminchao: Gangren zai Taiwan xian falu, guoan kunju, ‘erci yiminchao’ shifou luxu youlai 香港移民潮：港人在台灣陷法律、國安困局 「二次移民潮」是否陸續有來,” *BBC News*, Jan 20 2023. Accessed at https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-64316121.

Belogurova, Anna. *The Nanyang Revolution: The Comintern and Chinese Networks in Southeast Asia, 1890–1957*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Bradley, Mark Philip, and Marilyn Young (eds.). *Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives*. Cary: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Broussan, Adeline. "Résistantes Against the Colonial Order: Women's Grassroots Diplomacy During the French War in Vietnam (1945-1954)," in Carolien Stolte and Su Lin Lewis (eds.), *The Lives of Cold War Afro-Asianism*, 41-64. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2024.

Bush, Richard. *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942*. London: Routledge, 2015.

Byrne, Jeffrey James. *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Carothers, Thomas. "Rejuvenating Democracy Promotion." *Journal of Democracy* 31, no. 1 (2020): 114–23.

Carruthers, Susan. "'Re-Education': The Imperial Pre-History and Afterlives of a Pedagogical Conceit." *International History Review* 46, no. 3 (2024): 271–90.

Central News Agency. "Waijiaobu pi Zhongguo caonong fan Yindu yigong renzhizhan, yu Naicha lianmeng tuanjie 外交部批中國操弄反印度移工認知戰 籲奶茶聯盟團結," *Central News Agency,* Nov 21 2023. Accessed at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202311210135.aspx.

———. "Zhongguo ganshe Yindu meiti yin fantan, Wu Zhaoxie lian 3 tuiwen zhiyi 中國干涉印度媒體引反彈 吳釗燮連3推文致意." *Central News Agency*, Oct 10 2020. Accessed at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202010100254.aspx.

———. "Huang Renxun Taibei xianqi xuanfeng, Lutou: diwei rouyu liuxing juxing

黃仁勳來台掀起旋風路透：地位宛如流行巨星," *Central News Agency*, Jun 5 2024. Accessed at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/202406050427.aspx.

———. "Li An huo Zongtong Wenhuajiang, yi chengwei Taiwan wenhua yifenzi weirong 李安獲總統文化獎以成為台灣文化一份子為榮," *Central News Agency*, Nov 30 2021. Accessed at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202111300299.aspx.

———. "Xinzhumin jibenfa sandu, Neizhengbu: jiji tuidong luoshi gexiang gongzuo 新住民基本法三讀 內政部：積極落實推動各項工作," *Central News Agency*, Jul 17 2024. Accessed at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202407170021.aspx.

———. "Cai Zongtong: xianzai de xinzhumin, 400 nianhou yeshi Taiwan de zuxian 蔡總統：現在的新移民 400年後也是台灣的祖先," *Central News Agency*, May 4 2022. Accessed at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202205040274.aspx.

———. "Chuxi xinzhumin huodong, Lai Qingde: Rentong Taiwan jiushi tudi de zhuren 出席新住民活動 賴清德：認同台灣就是土地的主人," *Central News Agency*, Jan 7 2024. Accessed at https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202401070140.aspx.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. "The Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of Culture," in Christopher Lee (ed.), Making a World After Empire, 45-68. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010.

Chan, Shelly. *Diaspora's Homeland: Modern China in the Age of Global Migration*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2018.

Chang, Bi-yu. *Place, Identity, and National Imagination in Post-War Taiwan*. London: Routledge, 2015.

Chapman, Jessica. *Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016.

Cheah, Boon Kheng. *Malaysia: The Making of a Nation*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2002.

Cheah, See Kian 謝詩堅. "1946 nian cong Ri shouzhong jieguan Taiwan, Lin Cangyou daibiao Guomindang qianming 1946年從日手中接管台灣 林蒼佑代表國民黨簽名." *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, Oct 30 2010. Accessed at https://www.sinchew.com.my/20101030/谢诗坚：1946年从日手中接管台湾%EF%BC%8E林苍佑代表国/.

Chen, Hao. "Resisting Bandung? Taiwan's Struggle for 'Representational Legitimacy' in the Rise of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, 1954-57." *International History Review* 43, no. 2 (2021): 244–63.

———. "An Alternative Decolonisation: The Republic of China in the 1947 Asian Relations Conference." *Cold War History* 25, no.4 (2023): 529-551.

Chen, Degui 陳德規. *Jilongpo* 吉隆坡. Taipei: Haiwai wenku chubanshe 海外文庫出版社, 1958.

Chen, Hong-Yu 陳鴻瑜. *Jiemi: Lengzhan shiqi Taiwan yu Dongnanya guojia zhi junshi guanxi* 揭密: 冷戰時期台灣與東南亞國家之軍事關係. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 台灣學生書局, 2022.

Chen, Jian. "China and the Cold War after Mao." In Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 3: Endings,* 181-200. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

———. "China's Prolonged Rise: Legitimacy Challenges and Dilemmas in the Reform and Opening-Up Era." In Geir Lundestad (ed.), *International Relations since the End of the Cold War: New and Old Dimensions*, 246–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

———. *Mao's China and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

Chen, King. *Vietnam and China, 1938-1954.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.

Chen, Wanjing. "Harden the Hardline, Soften the Softline: Unravelling China's Qiaoling-Centred Diaspora Governance in Laos." *China Quarterly* 250 (2022): 397–416.

Cheng, Cindy I-Fen. *Citizens of Asian America: Democracy and Race during the Cold War*. New York: New York University Press, 2013.

Chieng, Ronny. "Ronny Chieng on why we need an Asian President," posted May 18 2021 by Netflix.

———. "Don't call Rishi Sunak the UK's first Asian PM in front of Ronny Chieng," posted Oct 25 2022 by The Daily Show.

Chinese Association for Relief and Ensuing Services (CARES) 中華救助總會. "Introduction." *CARES.* Accessed at https://www.cares.org.tw/CaresPortal/intro/introduction.do.

Chu, Leo. "The Abundant, Free Supply of Radiant Energy: Taiwan, Green Revolution, and Cropping System Research in Southeast Asia, 1962-1982." Presentation at Southeast Asia and Taiwan Conference, University of Washington April 25-6 2024

Chu, Yun-han, and Jih-wen Lin. "Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity." *China Quarterly* 165, no. 165 (2001): 102–29.

Chua, Beng Huat. *Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017.

Chun, Allen. "From Nationalism to Nationalizing: Cultural Imagination and State Formation in Postwar Taiwan." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 31, no. 31 (1994): 49–69.

———. "Fuck Chineseness: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity." *Boundary 2* 23, no. 2 (1996): 111–38.

Chung, Shu-Min 鍾淑敏. *Rizhi shiqi zai Nanyang de Taiwanren* 日治時期在南洋的台灣人. Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History 中央研究院臺灣史研究所, 2022.

Chunghwa Post 中華郵政. "Ci 04 Jiuzhu Yuebei qiaobao fujuan youpiao 慈04救助越北僑胞附捐郵票." *Chunghwa Post*. Accessed at https://www.post.gov.tw/post/internet/W_stamphouse/index.jsp?ID=2803&file_name=E004.

Control Yuan 監察院. "Wang Juerong Jiancha Weiyuan 王爵榮監察委員." *Control Yuan*. Accessed at https://www.cy.gov.tw/IntraGen_detailS1.aspx?n=526&file_id=27867.

Corcuff, Stephane. "The Taiwan Republic of 1895 and the Failure of the Qing Modernizing Project." In Stephane Corcuff (ed.), *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, 29–50. London: Routledge, 2002.

Craft, Stephen. *American Justice in Taiwan: The 1957 Riots and Cold War Foreign Policy.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016.

De Jaegher, Raymond. *The Enemy within; an Eyewitness Account of the Communist Conquest of China.* Ann Arbor: UMI Press, 1994.

Derrick, Jonathan. *Africa's "Agitators": Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West, 1918-1939*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

Diamant, Neil. *Useful Bullshit: Constitutions in Chinese Politics and Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022.

Dikötter, Frank. *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.

Dower, John. *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1986.

Duan, Ruicong 段瑞聰. “Chiang Kai-Shek’s Postwar Vision as Formed During the Early Period of the Pacific War 太平洋戰爭前期蔣介石的戰後構想 (1941-1943),” *Guoshiguan Guankan* 國史館館刊, no. 32 (June 2012): 121–52.

Duara, Prasenjit. “Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945.” *The American Historical Review* 102, no. 4 (1997): 1030–51.

Elkind, Jessica. *Aid under Fire: Nation Building and the Vietnam War*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017.

———. *“*The Virgin Mary Is Going South*.” Diplomatic History* 38, no. 5 (2013): 987–1096.

Engelbert, Thomas. “Vietnamese-Chinese Relations in Southern Vietnam during the First Indochina Conflict.” *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 3, no. 3 (2008): 191–230.

Fibiger, Mattias. *Suharto’s Cold War: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023.

Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China. “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo yu geguo jianli waijiao guanxi riqi jianbiao 中华人民共和国与各国建立外交关系日期简表,” *Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China*. Accessed at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/2193_674977/200812/t20081221_9284708.shtml.

Gedacht, Joshua, and Amrita Malhi. “Coercing Mobility: Territory and Displacement in the Politics of Southeast Asian Muslim Movements.” *Itinerario* 45, no. 3 (2021): 330–44.

Gehrig, Sebastian. “Cold War Identities: Citizenship, Constitutional Reform, and International Law between East and West Germany, 1967-75.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 49, no. 4 (2014): 794–814.

Genova, James. “Constructing Identity in Post-War France: Citizenship, Nationality, and the Lamine Guèye Law, 1946-1953.” *International History Review* 26, no. 1 (2004): 56–79.

Getachew, Adom. *Worldmaking after Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019.

Genyuwu 根雨屋. “Bunengji de youpiao haishi yaomai 不能寄的郵票還是要買.” *Thinking Taiwan* 想想, Sep 2 2019. Accessed at https://www.thinkingtaiwan.com/content/7838.

Goebel, Michael. *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Goscha, Christopher. *The Penguin History of Modern Vietnam*. London: Allen Lane, 2016.

———. *The Road to Dien Bien Phu: A History of the First War for Vietnam*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022.

———. and Christian Ostermann (eds.). *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009.

Greene, Megan. *The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Guyot-Réchard, Bérénice. *Shadow States: India, China and the Himalayas, 1910-1962*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Haas, Hein de. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022.

Hack, Karl. *Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore 1941-1968*. London: Routledge, 2014.

———. “Detention, Deportation and Resettlement: British Counterinsurgency and Malaya’s Rural Chinese, 1948–60.” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 43, no. 4 (2015): 611–40.

———. *The Malayan Emergency: Revolution and Counterinsurgency at the End of Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Haiwai chubanshe 海外出版社. *Haiwai shukan mulu* 海外書刊目錄. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1958.

Haiwai chubanshe (ed.). *Guofu dui haiwai qiaobao de yijiao* 國父對海外僑胞的遺教. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1953.

———. *Jiang Zongtong dui haiwai qiaobao de zhishi* 蔣總統對海外僑胞的指示. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1958.

Hack, Karl, and Geoff Wade. "The Origins of the Southeast Asian Cold War." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 40, no. 3 (2009): 441–48.

Hamilton, Peter E. *Made in Hong Kong: Transpacific Networks and a New History of Globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2021.

Hammond, Kelly. "Cold War Mosque: Islam and Politics in Nationalist Taiwan." *Twentieth-Century China* 47, no. 2 (2022): 171–93.

Han, Enze. "Bifurcated Homeland and Diaspora Politics in China and Taiwan towards the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45, no. 4 (2019): 577–94.

———. "The Chinese Civil War and Implications for Borderland State Consolidation in Mainland South-East Asia." *China Quarterly* 241 (2020): 214–35.

Hansen, Peter. "Bắc Di Cư: Catholic Refugees from the North of Vietnam, and Their Role in the Southern Republic, 1954–1959." *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 4, no. 3 (October 2009): 173–211.

Han, Xiaorong. "Revolution Knows No Boundaries? Chinese Revolutionaries in North Vietnam during the Early Years of the First Indochina War." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 52, no. 2 (2021): 246–74.

———. “Spoiled Guests or Dedicated Patriots? The Chinese in North Vietnam, 1954–1978,” *International Journal of Asian Studies* 6, no. 1 (2009): 3-6

Hansen, Randall. “The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act.” *20th Century British History* 10, no. 1 (1999): 67–95.

Hara, Fujio. *Malayan Chinese and China: Conversion in Identity Consciousness, 1945-1957*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2003.

Harper, Tim. “‘Asian Values’ and Southeast Asian Histories.” *The Historical Journal* 40, no. 2 (1997): 507–17.

———. *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

———. *Underground Asia: Global Revolutionaries and the Assault on Empire*. London: Penguin Books, 2020.

He, Bangli 何邦理. *He Yiwu yu Huaqiao jingji* 何宜武與華僑經濟. Taipei: Duli zuojia chubanshe 獨立作家出版社, 2015.

He, Chushu 何初树. *Jinjian yujie: Chen Shuren xiaozhuan* 金坚玉洁:陈树人小传. Guangzhou: Lingnan meishu chubanshe 岭南美术出版社, 2015.

He, Yiwu 何宜武. “Huaqiao jingji shiye fazhan de xinfangxiang 華僑經濟事業發展的新方向,” *Huaqiao Wenti Lunwenji* 華僑問題論文集 Vol.6, (1959): 56-65 reproduced in Bangli He 何邦理, *He Yiwu yu Huaqiao jingji*. Taipei: Duli zuojia chubanshe , 2015.

He Yiwu xiansheng zishang weiyuanhui 何宜武先生治喪委員會. He Yiwu xiansheng shengping shilue 何宜武先生生平事略, *FCU Weekly* 逢甲週報. Accessed at https://www.fcu.edu.tw/fcuweekly/news/2002011609/

Hee, Wai Siam. “Anti-Communist Moving Images and Cold War Ideology: On the Malayan Film Unit.” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 18, no. 4 (2017): 593–609.

Heng, Pek Koon. *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Hirschman, Charles. “Demographic Trends in Peninsular Malaysia, 1947-75.” *Population and Development Review* 6, no. 1 (1980): 103–25.

Ho, Ming-Sho. *Working-Class Formation in Taiwan: Fractured Solidarity in State-Owned Enterprises, 1945-2012.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Historical Sites of Injustice Archive 不義遺址網站. “Taiwansheng Shenchan Jiaoyu Shiyansuo 台灣省生產教育實驗所,” *Historical Sites of Injustice Archive*. Accessed at https://hsi.nhrm.gov.tw/nhrm/zh-tw/sadkfaljgkajgra/125703.

———. “Yuan Taiwansheng Shengchan Jiaoyu Shiyansuo (Tucheng Qingshui) 原台灣省生產教育實驗所（土城清水）,” *Historical Sites of Injustice Archive*. Accessed at https://hsi.nhrm.gov.tw/nhrm/zh-tw/whiteterror/735893

Horne, Gerald. *Race War: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire.* New York: New York University Press, 2004.

Hsieh, Shinyi. “Pluralizing Postcoloniality from a Standpoint of Margins: A Historical Detour of Global Health and Imperial Regimes in Postwar Taiwan through the Traces of the Marginalized.” DPhil Thesis, UC San Francisco, 2023.

Hsu, Madeline Yuan-yin. *The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.

Hu, Jieh-Min. “Silicon Shield 2.0: A Taiwan Perspective.” *The Diplomat*, Seo 14 2024. Accessed at https://thediplomat.com/2024/09/silicon-shield-2-0-a-taiwan-perspective/.

Huang, Chen-Tao 黃辰濤. "Winning Overseas Support: Diplomacy, Party Affairs, Overseas Chinese Policy of R.O.C in Malaya and Singapore 爭取海外力量：中華民國外交、僑務、黨務在新馬的運作 (1945-57). " Master's Thesis, National Chi Nan International University, 2009.

Huang, Chung-Ting. 黃宗鼎, "Dierci Shijie Dazhan hou Yuenan zhi Huaren zhengce 第二次世界大戰後越南之華人政策 (1945-2003)." Master's Thesis, National Chengchi University, 2009.

———. "1945-70 niandaichu Nanyue Huaren de zhengzhi jingkuang 1945－70年代初南越華人的政治景況." *Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies* 南方華裔研究 4 (2010): 202-14.

———. "Yuenan Gongheguo zhi Huaren zhengce 越南共和國之華人政策." *Guoshiguan Xueshu Jikan* 國史館學術季刊 11 (2007): 189-249.

Huang, Gang 黃剛. *Shijie geguo yu Taihai liang'an zhengfu zhi shiling huo shiji guanxi yanbian shicheng, 1949-2003* 世界各國與臺海兩岸政府之使領或實質關係演變時程, 1949~2003. Taipei*:* Guoli Zhengzhi Daxue Guoji Shiwu Xueyuan Guoji Faxue Yanjiu Zhongxin 國立政治大學國際事務學院國際法學研究中心, 2020.

Huaqiao zhi bianji weiyuanhui 華僑志編輯委員會. *Huaqiao zhi: Malaiya* 華僑志：馬來亞. Taipei: Huaqiao zhi bianji weiyuanhui, 1959.

———. *Huaqiao zhi: Yuenan* 華僑志：越南. Taipei: Huaqiao zhi bianji weiyuanhui, 1959.

———. *Huaqiao zhi: Liuniwang* 華僑志：留尼旺. Taipei: Huaqiao zhi bianji weiyuanhui, 1966.

———. *Huaqiao zhi: Zongzhi* 華僑志：總志. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1956.

Huff, Greg. *World War II and Southeast Asia: Economy and Society under Japanese Occupation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Hung, Po-Yi. "Interlacing China and Taiwan: Tea Production, Chinese-Language Education and the Territorial Politics of Re-Sinicization in the Northern Borderlands of Thailand." *China Quarterly* 250 (2022): 417–39.

International Liaison Department, Central Committee of CPC 中共中央对外联络部. "Liu Jianchao huijian Malaixiya Minzhu Xingdongdang Mishuzhang, zhengfu Jiaotong Buzhang Lu Zhaofu 刘建超会见马来西亚民主行动党秘书长、政府交通部长陆兆福," Mar 29 2024, *International Liaison Department, Central Committee of CPC.* Accessed at https://www.idcpc.gov.cn/bzhd/wshd/202403/t20240329_163599.html.

Ishikawa, Noboru. *Between Frontiers: Nation and Identity in a Southeast Asian Borderland.* Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010.

Jaipragas, Bhavan. "Hong Kong billionaire Robert Kuok to advise Mahathir during his transition," *South China Morning Post*, 12 May 2018. Accessed at https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2145849/hong-kong-billionaire-robert-kuok-advise-mahathir-during-his.

Jeans, Roger. *The CIA and Third Force Movements in China during the Early Cold War*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017.

Jiang, Bowei 江柏煒. "Zuiyi aiguo Huaqiao Chen Guochu 追憶愛國華僑陳國礎." *Kinmen Ri Bao* 金門日報, Jul 23 2023. Accessed at https://www.kmdn.gov.tw/1117/1271/1275/557015/.

Jinxian Yu 余錦賢. "Jing Hu Yue Zhengxie chulu, dajiazu zhengxiang chaqi 京滬粵政協出爐 大家族爭相插旗," *Hong Kong Economic Journal* 信報, Jan 10 2023. Accessed at

https://www1.hkej.com/features/article?q=%23%E6%B8%AF%E7%89%88%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%89%E6%B3%95%E6%94%BF%E7%B6%93%E5%B0%88%E6%AC%84%23&suid=1813649337.

Journal San Wa Ou 新華澳報. "Dong Shifang shishi huifou yingxiang Aomen Guofu Jinianguan yequan? 董世芳逝世會否影響澳門國父紀念館業權？," *Journal San Wa Ou*, Jan 19 2002. Accessed at https://www.waou.com.mo/2002/01/19/%E8%91%A3%E4%B8%96%E8%8A%B3%E9%80%9D%E4%B8%96%E6%9C%83%E5%90%A6%E5%BD%B1%E9%9F%BF%E6%BE%B3%E9%96%80%E5%9C%8B%E7%88%B6%E7%B4%80%E5%BF%B5%E9%A4%A8%E6%A5%AD%E6%AC%8A%EF%BC%9F%20%E8%91%A3%E4%B8%96%E8%8Ab/.

Kerr, George. *Formosa Betrayed.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

Khan, Raphaëlle, and Taylor Sherman. "India and Overseas Indians in Ceylon and Burma, 1946–1965: Experiments in Post-Imperial Sovereignty." *Modern Asian Studies* 56, no. 4 (2022): 1153–82.

Khan, Wasif Sulmaan. *Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China's Cold War and the People of the Tibetan Borderlands*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2016.

Kluge, Emma. "West Papua and the International History of Decolonization, 1961-69." *International History Review* 42, no. 6 (2020): 1155–72.

Ku, Samuel. "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Relations with Southeast Asia: The 'Southward Policy.'" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 17, no. 3 (1995): 282–97.

Kuhn, Philip. *Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.

Kung, Chien-Wen. *Diasporic Cold Warriors: Nationalist China, Anticommunism, and the Philippine Chinese 1930s-1970s*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023.

Kuomintang Central Committee Third Group 中國國民黨中央委員會第三組. *Zhongguo Guomindang zai haiwai* 中國國民黨在海外*, Vol 1-2.* Taipei: KMT Central Committee Third Group, 1961.

Kwon, Heonik. *The Other Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

Kuzmarov, Jeremy. *Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation Building in the American Century*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012.

Lau, Albert. "Malayan Union Citizenship: Constitutional Change and Controversy in Malaya, 1942–48." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 20, no. 2 (1989): 216–43.

Lai, Tse-Han, Ramon Myers and Wei You. *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.

Law, Wing-Sang. *Collaborative Colonial Power: the Making of the Hong Kong Chinese*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009.

Lawrence, Mark Atwood. "Explaining the Early Decisions: The United States and the French War, 1945–1954." In Mark Bradley and Marilyn Young (eds.), Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives. Cary: Oxford University Press, 2008.

———. The Vietnam War: *A Concise International History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Lee, Tao-chi 李道緝. "To Construct a New 'National State' -- Overseas Chinese Administration during the Zheng Yen-Feng Period 建構新「祖國」 鄭彥棻時期(民國39-47 年)的僑務工作." *National Central University Journal of Humanities* 中央大學人文學報 31 (2007): 181–208.

Lee, Ying-Hui 李盈慧. *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzu zhuyi* 華僑政策與海外民族主義. Taipei: Academia Historica **國史館**, 1997.

Lentz, Christian. *Contested Territory: Điện Biên Phủ and the Making of Northwest Vietnam.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019.

Leong, Ho Khai. "New Directions in Taiwan-Southeast Asia Relations: Economics, Politics, and Security." *Pacific Focus* 10, no. 1 (1995): 81–100.

Leow, Rachel. "Beyond Diaspora's Horizons: Mass Deportations to China and an Alternative to the Diaspora Paradigm." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 24, no. 4 (2023): 585–605.

———. *Taming Babel: Language in the Making of Malaysia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

———. "The Patriarchy of Diaspora: Race Fantasy and Gender Blindness in Chen Da's Studies of the Nanyang Chinese." *Twentieth-Century China* 47, no. 3 (2022): 243–65.

Lewis, Su Lin. *Cities in Motion: Urban Life and Cosmopolitanism in Southeast Asia, 1920-1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

———. "Conferencing: The Global South as Public and Counterpublic." *The American Historical Review* 129, no.2, (2024): 587–594.

———. "Asian Socialism and the Forgotten Architects of Post-Colonial Freedom, 1952–1956." *Journal of World History* 30, no. 1 (2019): 55–88

Liang, Ziheng 梁子衡. *Qiaowu wenhuaguan* 僑務文化觀. Taipei: Huaxin wenhua shiye zhongxin 華欣文化事業中心, 1983.

Li, Nenggeng 李能梗. *Waijiao quannei ershinian* 外交圈內二十年. Taipei: Xinwen tiandishe 新聞天地社, 1966.

Li, Pusheng 李樸生. *Huaqiao fazhan jianshi* 華僑發展簡史. Taipei: Haiwai wenku chubanshe 海外文庫出版社, 1961.

———. *Wo bushizi de muqin* 我不識字的母親. Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe 傳記文學出版社, 1969.

Li, Shizeng. “Qiaoxue de jianli 僑學的建立.” *Huaqiao Wenti Lunwenji* 華僑問題論文集 (1957), 4: 1-6.

Liff, Adam. “Japan, Taiwan and the ‘One China’ Framework after 50 Years.” *The China Quarterly* 252 (2022): 1066–93.

Lin, Hsiao-ting. *Accidental State: Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016.

———. “Taiwan’s Cold War in Southeast Asia”. Cold War International History Project, accessed at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/taiwans-cold-war-southeast-asia.

———. *Taiwan, the United States, and the Hidden History of the Cold War in Asia: Divided Allies*. London: Routledge, 2022.

———. *Modern China’s Ethnic Frontiers: A Journey to the West.* London: Routledge, 2011.

Lin, James. *In the Global Vanguard: Agrarian Development and the Making of Modern Taiwan.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2025.

Lim, Jason. “Confucianism as a Symbol of Solidarity: Cultural Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of Vietnam, 1955-1963.” *Issues and Studies* 50, no. 4 (2014): 119–56.

Lim, Wooi Tee 林韋地. “Lun Malaixiya Huaren ‘dazhonghua minzu zhuyi’ de liancheng論馬來西亞華人「大中華民族主義」的煉成.” *The News Lens* 關鍵評論, Accessed 27 Oct 2024 at https://www.thenewslens.com/article/123092.

Lim, Zijie Joshua. “Resolving Away a China Problem: The Issue of Chinese Representation in the Singapore-Republic of China Relationship, 1965-1971.” *International History Review* 44, no. 3 (2022): 613–32.

Liu, Dunren 劉敦仁. *"*Fengguang yu qingcao bei yiwang de da shengyuejia Wu Bojiu **風光與情操　被遺忘的大聲樂家伍伯就***."* Nd*, uMedia* 優傳媒. Accessed at https://umedia.world/news_details.php?n=202012252327228278 .

Liu, Guoming **刘国**铭. *Zhongguo Guomindang bainian renwu quanshu* 中**国国民党百年人物全**书. Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe 团结**出版社**, 2005.

Liu, Philip Hsiaopong."Dual Representation: Reviewing the Republic of China's Last Battle in the UN." *Issues and Studies* 47, no. 2 (2011): 87–118.

———. "Love the Tree, Love the Branch: Beijing's Friendship with Lee Kuan Yew, 1954–1965." *The China Quarterly* 242 (2020): 550–72.

———. "Opportunist: Britain, America, Taiwan and Lee Kuan Yew's Road to Prime Minister, 1955-1959." *Issues and Studies* 61, no. 1 (2022): 145–85.

Liu, Weichi 劉維熾. "Dui qiaobao qiwang yu qiaobao zeren 對僑胞期望與僑胞責任." *Xinshenglu Yuekan* 新生路月刊13, no.4 (1947): 2.

———. "Kangzhan yilai haiwai gongzuo de huigu yu qianzhan 抗戰以來海外工作的回顧與前瞻." *Huaqiao Xianfeng* 華僑先鋒 5, no. 7 (1943): 61-3.

———. "Wei quxiao bupingdeng tiaoyue mianli haiwai qiaobao 對僑胞期望與僑胞責任." *Huaqiao Xianfeng* 5, no. 2 (1943): 5-6.

Liu, Xiaoyuan. *Recast All under Heaven: Revolution, War, Diplomacy, and Frontier China in the 20th Century.* New York: Bloomsbury, 2010.

Liu, Xiong **刘雄**. "Lengzhan gejuxia Taiguo Huaqiao zhengce de yanbian **冷战格局下泰国**华侨**政策的演**变 (1964-1965)." *Journal of Overseas Chinese History Studies* 华侨华**人**历**史研究**, no. 2 (2022): 23-33.

Lo, Yui Chim. “Between Equality and Prejudice: Chinese Planning on the Postwar Status of the Chinese Diaspora, 1940–9.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 57, no. 4 (2022): 975–96.

Lopes, Helena. “Smooth Transition? Dismantling and Accommodating Colonial Rule in Late 1940s South China.” *Cold War History* 25, no.4 (2023): 1–24.

Low, Choo Chin. “Banishment of Anti-Communist Chinese to Formosa: The British as Effectual Mediators in Malaya.” *International Journal of China Studies* 7, no. 3 (2016): 351–72.

———. “The Malayan Emergency and the Desinicization of the Malayan Chinese.” In Jeremy Taylor and Lanjun Xu (eds.), *Chineseness and the Cold War: Contested Cultures and Diaspora in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong*, 45–65. London: Routledge, 2022.

Luthi, Lorenz. “The Non-Aligned: Apart from and still within the Cold War,” in Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska (eds.), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung – Belgrade,* 133-153. London: Routledge, 2014.

Luo, Min. “Chiang Kai-Shek and Vietnam’s Post-World War II Status.” *Journal of Modern Chinese History* 9, no. 1 (2015): 26–45.

Ma, Tehyun. “Making Taiwan Chinese, 1945-60,” on Alan Baumler (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Revolutionary China*, 202–16. London: Routledge, 2020.

———. “‘The Common Aim of the Allied Powers’: Social Policy and International Legitimacy in Wartime China, 1940–47.” *Journal of Global History* 9, no.2 (2014), 254-75.

Macauley, Melissa. *Distant Shores: Colonial Encounters on China’s Maritime Frontier*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021.

Major, Patrick, and Rana Mitter (eds.). *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History*. London: Routledge, 2012.

Mak, Grace Yan-Yan 麥欣恩. “Cong Lengzhan jiaodu huigu Dianmao Gongsi fazhan Xianggang/Taiwan dianying mailuo de qianzou: *Qiu Jin*, *Bixue Huanghua*, *Guanshanxing* 從冷戰角度回顧電懋公司發展香港/臺灣電影脈絡的前奏：《秋瑾》、《碧血黃花》、《關山行》." *Taida Zhongwen Xuebao* 台大中文學報 72, (2021): 245–55.

Masahiro, Wakabayashi 若林正丈. *Zhanhou Taiwan zhengzhishi: Zhonghua Minguo Taiwanhua de licheng* 戰後台灣政治史：中華民國台灣化的歷程, trans. Yuru Hong 洪郁如. Taipei: NTU Press, 2016.

Mazower, Mark. “The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950.” *The Historical Journal* 47, no. 2 (2004): 379–98.

McHale, Shawn Frederick. *The First Vietnam War: Violence, Sovereignty, and the Fracture of the South, 1945-1956*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023.

McKeown, Adam. “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949.” *Journal of Asian Studies* 58, no. 2 (1999): 306–37.

Miller, Edward. *Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Taiwan can help and Taiwan is helping!”, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Accessed at https://en.mofa.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=2318.

———. “Waijiao Buzhang Wu Zhaoxie fenbie jieshou Yindu zhuliu meiti caifang, qiangdiao minzhu guojia tuanjie hezuo, gongtong weihu Taihai anquan ji Yintai quyu heping wending de zhongyaoxing 外交部長吳釗燮分別接受印度主流媒體專訪，強調民主國家團結合作，共同維護台海安全及印太區域和平穩定的重要性,” Aug 24 2022, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*,. Accessed at https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&s=98419.

Mitsuomi, Ito. “The Path to Malaysia’s Neutral Foreign Policy in the Tunku Era,” *Sarajana* 30, no. 2 (2015): 71-9.

Mitter, Rana. *China’s Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2022.

———. “Classifying Citizens in Nationalist China during World War II, 1937-1941.” *Modern Asian Studies* 45, no 2 (2011): 243-275.

———. “State-Building after Disaster: Jiang Tingfu and the Reconstruction of Post-World War II China, 1943–1949.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 61, no. 1 (2019): 176–206.

Mok, Florence. *Covert Colonialism: Governance, Surveillance and Political Culture in British Hong Kong, c. 1966-97*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2023.

Mok, Mei Feng. “Negotiating Community and Nation in Cho Lón: Nation-Building, Community-Building and Transnationalism in Everyday Life during the Republic of Viêt Nam, 1955-1975.” DPhil Thesis, University of Washington. 2016.

Nasser, Yasser. “Asia as a Third Way? J. C. Kumarappa and the Problem of Development in Asia”, in Carolien Stolte and Su Lin Lewis (eds.), *The Lives of Cold War Afro-Asianism*, 121-42. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2022.

Ngoei, Wen-Qing. *Arc of Containment: Britain, the United States, and Anticommunism in Southeast Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020.

Nguyen, Phi Vân. “Fighting the First Indochina War Again? Catholic Refugees in South Vietnam, 1954–59.” *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 31, no. 1 (2016): 207–46.

———. *A Displaced Nation: The 1954 Evacuation and Its Political Impact on the Vietnam Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2024.

Nguyen-Marshall, Van. *Between War and the State: Civil Society in South Vietnam,*

1954-1975. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023.

Nonini, Donald. *Getting by: Class and State Formation among Chinese in Malaysia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015.

Office of the President. "*Zongtong jiejian Yiselie guohui yiyuan fangwentuan* 總統接見「以色列國會議員訪問團」," Apr 15 2024, *Office of the President.* Accessed at https://www.president.gov.tw/News/28334.

O'Hara, Fionntán. "Refugee Camps as Spaces of the Global Cold War: Cold War Activism and Humanitarian Action within Refugee Camps in Honduras during the 1980s." *Cold War History*, (2024): 1–17.

One-Forty. 'Dainikan Taiwan yigong de sanda qunjing: zhengce, fagui yu qishi wenti hejie? 帶你看見台灣移工的三大困境：政策、法規與歧視問題何解？,' *One-Forty.* Accessed at https://one-forty.org/tw/blog/migrant-issues.

Ong, Aihwa. "Citizenship: Flexible, Fungible, Fragile." *Citizenship Studies* 26, no. 4–5 (2022): 599–607.

Ongkili, James. *Nation-Building in Malaysia, 1946-1974*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Ooi, Keat Gin. "Between left and right: Chinese politics in Malaya/Malaysia, 1920s–1990s," in Keat Gin Ooi (ed.), *Malaysia and the Cold War Era*, 21-96. London: Routledge, 2021.

Ooi, Kee Beng. *As Empires Fell: The Life and Times of Lee Hau-Shik, the First Finance Minister of Malaya.* Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore, 2020.

Overseas Chinese Affairs Council 僑務委員會. *Shinianlai de haiwai qiaobao* 十年來的海外僑胞. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe 海外出版社, 1960.

Overseas Community Affairs Council 僑務委員會. 'Liren shouzhang jianjie 歷任首長簡介'. Accessed at

https://web.archive.org/web/20110516112633/http://www.ocac.gov.tw/public/public.asp?selno=5024&no=5024&level=C#a2.

Oyen, Meredith. *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016.

Phillips, David. "Confrontation and Insurgency in Borneo, 1960–90." *Journal of Contemporary History* 54, no. 3 (2019): 594–618.

Sin Chew Jit Poh. "Qian beiwanglu da 4 gongshi, Mahua yu Zhonggong shenhua hezuo 签备忘录达4共识 马华与中共深化合作." *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, Jul 24 2014. Accessed at https://www.sinchew.com.my/20140724/%E7%AD%BE%E5%A4%87%E5%BF%98%E5%BD%95%E8%BE%BE4%E5%85%B1%E8%AF%86%EF%BC%8E%E9%A9%AC%E5%8D%8E%E4%B8%8E%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%B1%E6%B7%B1%E5%8C%96%E5%90%88%E4%BD%9C/

Qiaowu Huiyi shilu bianji weiyuanhui 僑務會議實錄編輯委員會. *Qiaowu Huiyi shilu* 僑務會議實錄. Taipei: Qiaowu Huiyi shilu bianji weiyuanhui, 1953.

Qiao, Nainan 喬迺南. "Dangqian qiaowu de jiantao yu cejin 當前僑務的檢討與策進." *Free China* 自由中國 19, no. 8 (Oct 16 1958), 21-4.

Qiu, Bincun. Huaqiao shuangcong guoji zhi zhiben zhenli 華僑雙重國籍之治本眞理. Taipei: Xin shidai xueshu zhuanzhu 新時代學術專著, 1957.

Ragazzi, Francesco. "Governing Diasporas." *International Political Sociology* 3, no. 4 (2009): 378–97.

Ramnath, Kalyani. *Boats in a Storm: Law, Migration, and Decolonization in South and Southeast Asia, 1942-1962*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2023.

Rawnsley, Gary. "Soft Power Rich, Public Diplomacy Poor: An Assessment of Taiwan's External Communications." *China Quarterly* 232 (2017): 982–1001.

Reid, Anthony. *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Rey, Matthieu. "Fighting Colonialism' versus 'Non-Alignment': Two Arab Points of View on the Bandung Conference," in Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska (eds.), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung – Belgrade,* 212-35. London: Routledge, 2014.

Rhoads, Edward. *Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000.

Rigger, Shelley. "Kuomintang Agonistes: Party Politics in the Wake of Taiwan's 2016 and 2020 Elections," in June Teufel Dreyer and Jaques deLisle (eds.), *Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-Wen,* 39-63. London: Routledge, 2021.

Roberts, George. *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar Es Salaam: African Liberation and the Global Cold War, 1961-1974*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.

Roberts, Priscilla. "Cold War Hong Kong: Juggling Opposing Forces and Identities," in Priscilla Roberts and John Carroll (eds.), *Hong Kong in the Cold War*, 26-59. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017.

William Roff. *The Origins of Malay Nationalism, 1900-1941*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.

Roy, Denny. *Taiwan: A Political History*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.

Sackley, Nicole. "The Village as Cold War Site: Experts, Development, and the History of Rural Reconstruction." *Journal of Global History* 6, no. 3 (2011): 481-504

Saunders, David. "Brokering a Postcolonial Malaysia: How Local Elites Shaped the Cobbold Commission, 1961–63." *Critical Military Studies*, 2023, 1–18.

———. *Chasing Archipelagic Dreams: The Expansion of Foreign Influence in Sabah amid the End of Empire, 1945–1965*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2024.

Shi, Flair Donglai. “Reconsidering Sinophone Studies: The Chinese Cold War, Multiple Sinocentrisms, and Theoretical Generalisation.” *International Journal of Taiwan Studies* 4, no. 2 (2021): 316-22.

Shih, Shu-mei. “Against Diaspora: The Sinophone as Places of Cultural Production,” in Jing Tsu and David Der-Wei Wang (eds.), *Global Chinese Literature: Critical Essays*, 29-48. Leiden: Brill, 2010.

Shipway, Martin. *The Road to War: France and Vietnam, 1944-1947.* New York: Berghahn Books, 2003.

Scalice, Joseph. “A Region in Dispute: Racialized Anticommunism and Manila’s Role in the Origins of Konfrontasi, 1961–63.” *Modern Asian Studies* 57, no. 3 (2023): 1004–26.

Short, Anthony. “The Malayan Emergency and the Batang Kali Incident.” A*sian Affairs* 41, no. 3 (2010): 337–54.

Sidel, John. *Republicanism, Communism, Islam: Cosmopolitan Origins of Revolution in Southeast Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021.

———. “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Revisited: Colonial State and Chinese Immigrant in the Making of Modern Southeast Asia.” *Comparative Politics* 40, no. 2 (2008): 127–47.

Siegelberg, Mira. *Statelessness: A Modern History.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020.

Smith, Craig. *Chinese Asianism, 1894-1945*. Leiden: Harvard University Asia Center, 2022.

Strauss, Julia. *State Formation in China and Taiwan: Bureaucracy, Campaign, and Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Stubbs, Richard. “The United Malays National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association, and the Early Years of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1955.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 10, no. 1 (1979): 77–88.

Su, Zi 蘇子. *Henei yu Haifang* 河內與海防. Taipei: Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1955.

———. *Xigong yu Ti'an* 西貢與堤岸 . Taipei: Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1956.

Sui, Yunzhang 眭雲章. *Qishi'er lieshi zhong de Huaqiao* 七十二烈士中的華僑. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1958.

Sun, Yujing 孫毓經. *Wong Nai Siong.* Taipei: Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1958.

———. *Ye Delai* 葉德來. Taipei: Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1956.

Sutton, Deborah. "Divided and Uncertain Loyalties: Partition, Indian Sovereignty and Contested Citizenship in East Africa, 1948-1955." *Interventions* 9, no. 2 (2007): 276–88.

Szonyi, Michael. *Cold War Island : Quemoy on the Front Line*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Tang, Sumin 唐蘇民. *Malaiya Huaqiao shihua* 馬來亞華僑史話. Taipei: Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1956.

———. *Malaiya yu Zhongguo* 馬來亞與中國. Taipei: Haiwai wenku chubanshe, 1956.

Tan, Chee Seng. "Kuomintang Man Behind Special Force: Wu Tiecheng and Force 136, 1942-1945." in Keat Gin Ooi (ed.), *Malaysia and the Cold War Era*, 96-119. London: Routledge, 2021.

Tan, Eugene. "Re-Engaging Chineseness: Political, Economic and Cultural Imperatives of Nation-Building in Singapore." *The China Quarterly* 175, (2003): 751–74.

Tan, Teng Phee. *Behind Barbed Wire: Chinese New Villages During the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960.* Singapore: Strategic Information and Development Centre, 2020.

Tan, Ying-Xian 陳穎賢. "Gaizu hou Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang paixi zhizheng dui Meizhou dangbu de chongji: yi Sanfanshi zongzhibu weili 改組後中國國民黨中央派

系之爭對美洲黨部的衝擊（1924-1927）：以三藩市總支部為例.” *Shiyun* 史耘, no. 18 (2017): 081–110.

Tan, Yong-Jian 陳勇健. “Liao Wenyi chuxi Malaiya duli qingdian 廖文毅出席馬來亞獨立慶典,” *Master Insight* 灼見名家. Accessed at *https://www.master-insight.com/%E5%BB%96%E6%96%87%E6%AF%85%E5%87%BA%E5%B8%AD%E9%A6%AC%E4%BE%86%E4%BA%9E%E7%8D%A8%E7%AB%8B%E6%85%B6%E5%85%B8*

Taylor, Jay. *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Taylor, Jeremy. “Not a Particularly Happy Expression”: “Malayanization” and the China Threat in Britain’s Late-Colonial Southeast Asian Territories.” The Journal of Asian Studies 78, no.4 (2019): 789-808.

The Malaysian Insight. “Under-fire Robert Kuok gave large amounts to UMNO, MCA,” *The Malaysian Insight*, 27 Feb 2018. Accessed at https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/40034.

Ther, Philipp. “Ethnic Cleansing.” In Dan Stone (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History*, 141-62. London: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Thompson, Andrew. “Counter-Insurgency Aid and a Seemingly Never-Ending War in Vietnam.” Working paper.

To, James Jiann Hua. *Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese*. Leiden: Brill, 2014.

Toh, Jin-Xuan 杜晉軒. “Beipiao Taiwan: Naxienian, cong Taiwan biyehou hui ‘yuanjudi’ chengwei zhengzhi renwu de Malaixiya liutaisheng 《北漂台灣》：那些年，從台

灣畢業後回「僑居地」成為政治人物的馬來西亞留台生." *The News Lens* 關鍵評論. Accessed at https://www.thenewslens.com/article/167698

———. 'Weihe tamen ningyuan beima "Hanjian', ye yao jiang Malaixiya Huaren de qinzhong, zhongzu qishi yanlun fanyi chuqu為何他們寧願被罵「漢奸」，也要將馬來西亞華人的親中、種族歧視言論翻譯出去," *The News Lens.* Accessed 27 Oct 2024 at https://www.thenewslens.com/article/135622

———. *Xuetong de yuanzui : Bei yiwang de Dongnanya Baisekongbu shouhaizhe* 血統的原罪：被遺忘的東南亞白色恐怖受害者. Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu 台灣商務, 2020.

———. "Zhulu baodao: Mahua Gonghui yu Xingdongdang de Taiwan zhanchang 逐鹿寶島：馬華公會與行動黨的台灣戰場," *Contemporary Review* 當代評論. Accessed at http://contemporary-review.com.my/2020/10/19/1-306/.

Toner, Simon. "Imagining Taiwan: The Nixon Administration, the Developmental States, and South Vietnam's Search for Economic Viability, 1969–1975." *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 4 (2017): 772–98

Tran, Nu-Anh. *Disunion: Anticommunist Nationalism and the Making of the Republic of Vietnam.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2022.

Tran, Minh Cong. "Public Security and the National Police." in Sean Fear and Tuong Vu (eds.), *The Republic of Vietnam, 1955-1975: Vietnamese Perspectives on Nation Building*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020), 71-80.

Tregonning, K. G. "Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan Nationalist." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 10, no. 1 (1979): 25–76.

Tsui, Brian. *China's Conservative Revolution: The Quest for a New Order, 1927-1949*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

———. “Resetting China’s Conservative Revolution: ‘People’s Livelihood’ in 1950s Taiwan.” In Reto Hofmann and Max Ward (eds.), *Transwar Asia: Ideology, Practices and Institutions, 1920-1960*, 125-46. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022.

Tsai, Chutung. “The Chinese Nationality Law, 1909.” *The American Journal of International Law* 4, no. 2 (1910): 404–11.

Varadarajan, Latha. *The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Vuong, Quan Hoang. *Fledgling Financial Markets in Vietnam’s Transition Economy, 1986-2003.* Working paper, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2004.

Wang, Austin Horng-Eng. ‘Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement’, *Wilson Centre.* Accessed at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Wang_Understanding%20the%20Milktea%20Alliance%20Movement.pdf

Wang, Gungwu. *China and the Chinese Overseas*. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003.

———. “Greater China and the Chinese Overseas.” *China Quarterly* 136 (1993): 926–48.

———. *Nation Building: Five Southeast Asian Histories.* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2005.

Wang, Joan. “In the Name of Legitimacy: Taiwan and Overseas Chinese during the Cold War Era.” *China Review* 11, no. 2 (2011): 65–90.

Wang, Mei-Hsiang 王梅香. “Literature, Power and American Propaganda in Hong Kong and Taiwan During the Cold War (1950-1962) 權力與冷戰時期美國在臺港的文學宣傳.” *Taiwanese Journal of Sociology* 臺灣社會學刊 57 (2015): 1-51.

———. “The Literary Field in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia under the U.S. Aid Literary Institution A Case Study of the Book Publication Program of Story Paper 美援文藝體制下的台、港、馬華文學場域.” *Taiwanese Journal of Sociology*, 102 (2016): 1-40.

Watt, Lori. “Imperial Remnant: The Repatriates in Postwar Japan.” In Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (eds.), *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies*, 243–55. London: Taylor & Francis, 2005.

Weber, Torsten. “Alternative Internationalisms in East Asia.” In Stephen Legg, Mike Heffernan, Jake Hodder and Benjamin Thorpe (eds.), *Placing Internationalism: International Conferences and the Making of the Modern World*, 199-215. London: Bloomsbury, 2021.

Wei, Shuge. “News as a Weapon: Hollington Tong and the Formation of the Guomindang Centralized Foreign Propaganda System, 1937-1938.” *Twentieth-Century China* 39, no. 2 (2014): 118–43.

Weng, Chih-chi 翁智琦. “Patriotic Voyage and Reconstruction of Overseas Chinese: A Study on the Discourses of Overseas Chinese Festival in Newspapers During the Early Stage of Cold War 愛國逆旅.重建華僑:以冷戰前期報紙「華僑節」論述為中心 (1952-1971).” *Taibei Daxue Zhongwen Xuebao* 臺北大學中文學報 33 (2023): 95-142.

Westad, Odd Arne. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Wong, Ting-Hong. “College Admissions, International Competition, and the Cold War in Asia: The Case of Overseas Chinese Students in Taiwan in the 1950s.” *History of Education Quarterly* 56, no. 2 (2016): 331-357.

Wongsurawat, Wasana. *The Crown and the Capitalists: The Ethnic Chinese and the Founding of the Thai Nation*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2019.

———. “Beyond Jews of the Orient: A New Interpretation of the Problematic Relationship between the Thai State and Its Ethnic Chinese Community.” *Positions: Asia Critique* 24, no. 2 (2016): 555-82.

Wu, Ellen. *The Color of Success: Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.

Xie, Kankan. "Ambivalent Fatherland: The Chinese National Salvation Movement in Malaya and Java, 1937–41." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 52, no. 4 (2021): 677–700.

———. "Contesting Equality: A History of the Malayan People's Socialist Front, 1957-1965." Master's Thesis, Cornell University, 2012.

Xinhua Net 新华网. "2024 Nian quanqiu Huaqiao Huaren cujin Zhongguo heping tongyi dahui zai Xianggang juban, Wang Huning zhixin zhuhe 2024年全球华侨华人促进中国和平统一大会在香港举办 王沪宁致信祝贺," *Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee* 中共中央台湾工作办公室. Accessed 27 Oct 2024 at http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/m/headline/202408/t20240821_12643988.htm.

Xu, Jianhong 許劍虹. "Xu Jianhong Guandian: Dajiangdahai Youyizhang, toubin nuhai de Yuenan Huangpu junxiaosheng 許劍虹觀點：大江大海又一章 投奔怒海的越南黃埔軍校生." Storm Media 風傳媒, Apr 26 2020. Accessed at https://www.storm.mg/article/2550502?page=1.

Yang, Dominic Meng-Hsuan 楊孟軒. "Humanitarian Assistance and Propaganda War: Repatriation and Relief of the Nationalist Refugees in Hong Kong's Rennie's Mill Camp, 1950-1955." *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 10, no. 2 (November 2014): 165–96.

———. "Tiaojingling: Xianggang Xiaotaiwan de qiyuan yu bianqian 調景嶺：香港小台灣的起源與變遷." *Taiwanshi Yanjiu* 台灣史研究, no. 18:1 (2011): 133–83.

———. *The Great Exodus from China: Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Modern Taiwan.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Yang, Weizhen. “Postwar Sino-French Negotiations about Vietnam , 1945– 1946.” In Hans Van de Ven, Diana Lary and Stephen McKinnon (eds.), *Negotiating China’s Destiny in World War II*, 205–19. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2020.

Yeh, Chuan-Rui 葉川睿. “Development of Kuomintang’s Overseas Movements (1950-1962) 中國國民黨海外黨務發展 (1950-1962).” Master’s Thesis, National Jinan International University, 2011.

Yin, Qingfei. “From a Line on Paper to a Line in Physical Reality: Joint State-Building at the Chinese-Vietnamese Border, 1954–1957.” *Modern Asian Studies* 54, no. 6 (2020): 1905–48.

———. *State Building in Cold War Asia: Comrades and Competitors on the Sino-Vietnamese Border*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024.

Yong, Chin Fatt. *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912-1949*. Singapore: NUS Press, 1990.

Yong, Kee Howe. *The Hakkas of Sarawak: Sacrificial Gifts in Cold War Era Malaysia*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017.

Yu Gong 愚公. “Zhongguo tongzijun zhi yuanlao Li Pusheng 中國童子軍之元老李樸生, ” *Guangdong Wenxian* 廣東文獻 19, no.4 (1989), reproduced without page references in Taiwan Dalu tongxianghui wenxian shujuku **台湾大**陆**同乡会文献数据**库. Accessed at https://www.tongxianghuicn.com/article/937129.jhtml?libId=.

Zheng, Yanfen 鄭彥棻. *Wangshi yishu* 往事憶述. Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe 傳記文學出版社, 1972.

———. *Dangqian qiaowu zhi renshi ji qi nuli zhi fangxiang* 當前僑務之認識及其努力之方向. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1952.

———. *Qiaowu wenti de xin renshi* 僑務問題的新認識. Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1953.

Zheng, Yueli 鄭月裡. *Ma Tianying yu Malaixiya* 馬天英與馬來西亞*, 1939-1982*. Taipei: Academia Sinica Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies 中研院亞太區域研究專題中心, 2003.

Zhou, Taomo. *Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020.

———. "The Multidirectional Diaspora: Writing Chinese Migration History in a Time of Global Racial Reckoning." *The Historical Journal* 67, no. 1 (2024): 178–86.

Zhuang, Guotu 庄国土. "Erzhan yilai Jianpuzhai Huaren shehui diwei de bianhua 二战以来柬埔寨华人社会地位的变化." *Nanyang Wenti Yanjiu* 南洋问题研究 119, (2004): 1-7.

———. "Feilubin Huaren zhengzhi diwei de bianhua 菲律宾华人政治地位的变化," *Dangdai Yatai* 当代亚太, no. 2 (2004): 12-17.

Zhu, Yunying 朱雲影. *Yuenan yu Zhongguo* 越南與中國. Taipei: Haiwai wenku chubanshe*, 1958.*