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Philosophical 'intuitions' and scepticism about judgement

Abstract:

1. What are called 'intuitions' in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us into conceiving our evidence as facts about our internal psychological states: here, facts about our conscious inclinations to make judgements about some topic rather than facts about the topic itself. But the ...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Humanities Division - Philosophy Faculty
Publisher:
Wiley-Blackwell Publisher's website
Journal:
Dialectica Journal website
Volume:
58
Issue:
1
Pages:
109-153
Publication date:
2004
DOI:
EISSN:
1746-8361
ISSN:
0012-2017
URN:
uuid:910af2ff-2f36-49f8-ab3a-a1a0027b79c7
Local pid:
ora:5678
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:

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