

Proxenia:
**Inter-Polis Networks and Relations in the Classical and
Hellenistic World**

William Joseph Behm Garner Mack

Corpus Christi College
University of Oxford

Doctor of Philosophy in Ancient Greek History

Hilary 2013

ABSTRACT

Proxenia: Inter-Polis Networks and Relations in the Classical and Hellenistic World

William Joseph Behm Garner Mack

D.Phil. Ancient Greek History

Corpus Christi College

Michaelmas 2012

This thesis examines the Greek institution of *proxenia* and uses it to explore how inter-*polis* institutions functioned in shaping the behaviour of both individuals and communities in the ancient world. In response to continuing debate concerning the nature of *proxenia*, I demonstrate that, throughout the Classical and Hellenistic periods, it was defined as an honorific status by the practical intermediary role which it performed in facilitating interactions between different *poleis*. As such *proxenia* was a central element of a broader system of inter-*polis* institutions which constituted the dominant interstate discourse in the ancient Mediterranean. This thesis shows that *Proxenia* with its particularly rich epigraphic record allows us to explore how *poleis* made use of this institutional language of status and legitimacy to assert membership of an interstate system which was conceived of as a society of *poleis*.

In Chapter 1 I propose a new model for reconstructing how *proxenia* was understood based on the expectations – of what *proxenoi* should be and do – which *poleis* communicated in their stereotypical descriptions of honorands in proxeny decrees. Chapter 2 then explores how this abstract understanding of *proxenia* worked in practice in the political realities of elite competition in the Greek *poleis*. In Chapter 3 I use proxeny lists to reconstruct the perspective of the *polis* on *proxenia* – in the networks of hundreds of *proxenoi* which even small *poleis* amassed as a result of constant interaction. Chapter 4 explores the role of *proxenia*, within a broader system

of institutions, in the construction of communal identity within an anarchic interstate system. In Chapter 5 I develop quantitative methods to explore the epigraphic record for proxeny's decline, arguing that *proxenia*, along with the other inter-*polis* institutions, disappeared because the Roman authorities at the centre replaced inter-*polis* connections as the source of communal identity and prestige.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors, Charles Crowther and John Ma, for their encouragement and guidance throughout the research and writing of this thesis. It was John, as my undergraduate tutor in Ancient History, who set me on this path by introducing me to the history of the ancient world. I would also like to thank Lisa Kallet who supervised my MPhil thesis on proxeny lists and helped to shape this project. This thesis has benefitted from discussion with many in Oxford, and I would especially like to express gratitude to Cordula Bachmann, Boris Chrubasik, Simon Day, Lisa Eberle, Aneurin Ellis-Evans, Ben Gray, Jonathan Prag, Rosalind Thomas, Peter Thonemann, and Guy Westwood, for their help and suggestions. I regret that I can no longer thank Simon Price, who gave encouragement and advice at an important stage in the thesis. Roberta Fabiani, Gary Reger, and Ian Rutherford permitted me to see unpublished material and were generous in discussing it. Klaus Hallof, Daniela Summa, and Jamie Curberra provided access to and photographs of squeezes in the collection of *Inscriptiones Graecae* in Berlin. Michael Athanson and Edouard Chiricat kindly gave expert assistance with maps and Greek names.

The munificence of the William Edwards Trust, the Classics Faculty, and the Arts and Humanities Research Council enabled me to complete my graduate work free from financial worries. This research could not have been completed without the resources of the Sackler and Bodleian libraries. For the last eight years Corpus Christi College has provided me with a second home in Oxford and I am grateful to the fellows, staff, and students there.

My greatest debts are to my family. My father, Peter, read the whole thesis and gave much shrewd advice. He and my mother, Vicki, have been unfailing in their love and support. My sisters, Johanna, Emily and Rosy, and extended family, especially

Bill, helped me in too many ways to list. Most of all I need to thank my wife, Naomi, for her love and for reading this thesis many times. She has shared my life for the last ten years and this thesis for the last two, and has been a constant reminder of the important difference between the two.

Table of Contents

<i>Abstract</i>	i
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	iii
<i>Table of Contents</i>	v
<i>List of Figures</i>	vii
<i>List of Maps</i>	viii
<i>Abbreviations</i>	ix
Introduction	1
1 Scholarship on <i>Proxenia</i> : Narratives of Decline	3
2 The Sources for <i>Proxenia</i>	8
3 Selective Inscription: The Epigraphic Record of Proxeny Decrees	13
4 Methodology: Approaching <i>Proxenia</i>	16
5 Chapter Breakdown	18
Chapter 1 The Anatomy of an Ancient Institution: The Paradigm of the <i>Proxenos</i>	22
1 Formulaic Descriptions of <i>Proxeno</i> i in Proxeny-Decrees	26
1.1 Charmion son of Eumaridas	29
1.2 The Defining Characteristics of the <i>Proxenos</i> -Paradigm	32
1.3 The <i>Proxenos</i> as <i>Euergetes</i>	39
1.4 The Specificity of the <i>Proxenos</i> -Paradigm	45
2 The Services Associated with <i>Proxenia</i>	50
2.1 Generic Descriptions of the Services Performed by <i>Proxeno</i> i	51
2.2 The Communal Contexts of <i>Proxeno</i> i	53
2.3 The Occupations, Activities, and Milieux of <i>Proxeno</i> i	61
2.4 The Services Associated with <i>Proxenia</i>	67
2.5 Services for <i>Poleis</i> , their Representatives and Citizens	68
2.6 <i>Proxeno</i> i in Apollodoros' speech against Kallippos	80
3 Institutional Isomorphism and the Longevity of the <i>Proxenos</i> -Paradigm	85
Conclusion	91
Chapter 2 Proxeny in its Political Contexts: Competition and Prestige	92
1 <i>Proxenia</i> in the Granting <i>Polis</i> : the Proposal and Contestation of Grants	94
1.1 Proxenies Contested and Cancelled	95
1.2 Prestige and Plurality: Proposers of <i>Proxeno</i> i at Oropos	103
2 <i>Proxeno</i> i at Home and at Court	108
2.1 <i>Proxeno</i> i at Home	109
2.2 The Perils of Proxeny	120
2.3 <i>Proxeno</i> i at Court	124
3 <i>Poleis</i> and their Foreign <i>Proxeno</i> i	128
3.1 'And all other Honours Given to <i>Proxeno</i> i'	129
3.2 The Ideology of the <i>Proxenos</i>	136

3.3 The Limits of Identification	141
4 Miscarriage and Manipulation: Alcibiades the <i>Proxenos</i>	146
Conclusion	150
Chapter 3 Proxeny Networks: The Horizons of <i>Poleis</i>	153
1 Sources for Proxeny Networks	158
1.1 Case Study 1: The Chronological Proxeny List of Histiaia	163
2 Proxeny Networks Compared	167
2.1 The Size of Proxeny Networks	169
2.2 Rates and Rhythms of Granting	172
2.3 Diachronic Trends in Proxeny Networking	176
3 Regional Patterns of Distribution: The Horizons of <i>Poleis</i>	180
4 Case Study 2: The Proxeny Networks of Karthaia	190
Conclusion	194
Chapter 4 ‘All the World’s a Stage’: <i>Proxenia</i> and the Performance of <i>Polis</i>-Identity in Inter-<i>Polis</i> Society	195
1 Theoretical Frameworks: State Identity and Anarchy	197
1.1 State Identity/ <i>Polis</i> Identity	197
1.2 Interstate Anarchy	202
2 <i>Proxenia</i> and other Institutions in the Performance of <i>Polis</i> Identity	208
2.1 <i>Proxenia</i> within the System of Inter- <i>Polis</i> Institutions	208
2.2 Interstate Institutions and the Performance of <i>Polis</i> -Identity	212
3 The Nuances of Institutional Scripts: <i>Proxenia</i> in Performance	215
3.1 <i>Isopoliteia</i> and Federation: <i>Proxenia</i> as a Performance of Separateness	217
3.2 <i>Polis</i> -Performance, <i>Proxenia</i> , and Dependency	223
3.3 <i>Proxenia</i> and <i>Polis</i> Recognition	236
4 Inter- <i>Polis</i> Institutions and State Identity: Non- <i>Polis</i> Actors	239
Conclusion	243
Chapter 5 The Disappearance of <i>Proxenia</i> and the Domination of Rome: Interstate Hierarchy from Anarchy	244
1 The Disappearance of <i>Proxenia</i> : Interrogating the Epigraphic Record	246
1.1 Corroborating the Decline of <i>Proxenia</i>	256
1.2 Functional Obsolescence as an Explanation of Proxeny’s Decline	262
2 Changes in Inter- <i>Polis</i> Interaction and the End of the Greek World	268
2.1 <i>Theoria</i> and <i>Theorodokia</i>	268
2.2 Treaties and Statuses	273
2.3 Interstate Arbitration	277
2.4 Foreign Judges	281
3 From Anarchy to Hierarchy: the Transformation of the Greek World	285
3.1 The End of Peer-Polity Interaction?	293
Conclusion: The End of the Age of Proxeny	297
Conclusion	298
Bibliography	304

List of Figures

Figures

1. Graph showing the chronological distribution of proxeny decrees. 247
2. Graph showing the number of communities attested inscribing their own grants of *proxenia* during each period. 248
3. Graph comparing the differing quantities of proxeny decrees at Oropos inscribed on purpose-hewn *stelai* and pre-existing statue-bases for each period. 250
4. Graph comparing the number of proxeny decrees surviving for Oropos with those preserved for the rest of Boiotia. 251
5. Graph comparing the chronological distribution of Athenian inscribed decrees for internal honorands (citizens) and external honorands (*xenoi*). 253
6. Graph comparing the chronological distribution of inscribed Athenian decrees for foreigners granting *proxenia* with those granting *politeia*. 253
7. Graph showing the chronological distribution of the individuals called 'Proxenos.' 260
8. Graph showing the chronological distribution of the individuals called 'Theōros.' 273
9. Graph showing the chronological distribution of decrees honouring foreign judges. 283

List of Maps

Maps

1. <i>Proxenoï</i> appointed by Histiaia in the year 264/3 BC	165
2. The Proxeny Network of Astypalaia	183
3. The <i>Proxenoï</i> of Eresos	184
4. <i>Poleis</i> at which <i>Proxenoï</i> appointed by Delphi from 197/6 to 175/4 BC	186
5. The Fourth-Century Proxeny-Network of Karthaia	191
6. The Hellenistic <i>Proxenoï</i> of Karthaia	192

Abbreviations

For literary sources I follow the guidance given in *LSJ*. All abbreviations of journals follow *L'année philologique*.¹ For inscriptions I follow *SEG* apart from the exceptions noted below.² For papyri I follow J. F. Oates, R. S. Bagnall, and S. J. Clackson, *Checklist of Greek, Latin, Demotic and Coptic Papyri, Ostraca and Tablets*.³ Unless otherwise stated, all dates are BC.

<i>APF</i>	J. K. Davies, <i>Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300 B.C.</i> Oxford, 1971.
<i>BE</i>	<i>Bulletin Épigraphique</i> in <i>Revue des Études Grecques</i>
<i>CAH</i>	<i>The Cambridge Ancient History</i>
<i>FD</i>	<i>Fouilles de Delphes</i>
<i>FGrHist</i>	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> . Berlin and Leiden, 1923-62.
<i>IAphr2007</i>	J. Reynolds, C. Roueché, and G. Bodard, <i>Inscriptions of Aphrodisias</i> (2007): http://insaph.kcl.ac.uk/iaph2007
<i>I.Thasos</i>	J. Pouilloux and C. Dunant, <i>Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos vol. 2</i> . Paris, 1954.
<i>IC</i>	M. Guarducci, <i>Inscriptiones Creticae</i> . Rome, 1935-50.
<i>ID</i>	F. Durrbach, <i>Inscriptions de Délos</i> . Paris, 1926-37.
<i>IosPE</i>	V. Latyshev, <i>Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Pontis Euxini Graecae</i> . Leningrad, 1885-1901.
<i>LGPN</i>	<i>A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names</i>
<i>LSJ</i>	H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> , revised by H. Stuart Jones and R. McKenzie
<i>HCP</i>	F. W. Walbank, <i>A Historical Commentary on Polybius</i> (3 vols.). Oxford, 1957-79.
<i>HCT</i>	A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, <i>A Historical Commentary on Thucydides</i> (5 vols.). Oxford, 1945-81.

¹ http://www.annee-philologique.com/files/sigles_fr.pdf (accessed 31 October 2012).

² <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/supplementum-epigraphicum-graecum/abbreviations-aabbr> (accessed 31 October 2012).

³ <http://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/scriptorium/papyrus/texts/clist.html> (accessed 31 October 2012).

- ML* R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, rev. edn. Oxford, 1988.
- OMS* L. Robert, *Opera Minora Selecta, I-VII*. Amsterdam, 1969-1990.
- RO* P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscription, 404-323 B.C.* Oxford, 2003.
- SEG* A. Chaniotis et. al, *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*. Leiden, 1923-.
- StV II²* H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, 2nd edn. Munich, 1975.
- StV III* H. H. Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*. Munich, 1969.
- Tod* M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 2 vols. Oxford, 1933-48.

Introduction

L'étude? Ou je me trompe, ou il n'y a rien d'intéressant à trouver de nouveau sur la proxénie. C'est une question réglée, et, Deo gratias, nous savons ce que c'est, nous pouvons l'expliquer aux débutants. Si le livre de Monceaux est épuisé, il n'ya a qu'à le reproduire photographiquement. À mon avis, il n'y a, pour la proxénie, que la place d'un chapitre dans un manuel d'institutions grecques.

The study? If I am not mistaken there is nothing new of interest to discover concerning proxeny. It is a question which has been solved and, thank goodness, we know what it is, we can explain it to novices. If Monceaux's monograph is out of print it can be reprinted lithographically. In my opinion there is no place for *proxenia* other than as a chapter in a handbook on Greek institutions.¹

Proxenia was a comparatively straight-forward institution. It was an honorific status bestowed by *poleis* on non-citizens who thereby became their *proxenoi*. The grant of *proxenia* expressed a formal relationship of friendship between *polis* and *proxenos*, based on the gratitude of the *polis* for the intermediary services which the *proxenos* performed for its citizens within his own political community, services that enabled them to access local civic institutions and networks there. On one level it is thus not surprising that Louis Robert felt, in 1970, that there was nothing more of interest to be said on the subject. However, in the scholarship which followed his letter to Biagio Virgilio, even the basic content of *proxenia* has been contested and how it worked in particular is still not well understood. More importantly, *proxenia* has a much broader

¹ A letter of Louis Robert, written 1 March 1970, to Biagio Virgilio, who reprints it in an appendix to a recent volume (Virgilio 2011, 269-70). Robert published similar but briefer comments on Virgilio's planned but abandoned project (a corpus and introductory study of all extant proxeny decrees) in *BE* (1970), no. 114.

significance for the study of the ancient Greek world, its institutions and structural dynamics, which has not yet been explored.

Proxenia is the best attested element of a broader system of interstate institutions which the Greek *poleis* used to construct relations with each other. In this thesis I use *proxenia* as a case study to understand how institutions shaped the behaviour of different sorts of actors in the ancient world. I argue that the social dynamics which underlay the operation of civic euergetism of the sort delineated by Veyne (1990) and Gauthier (1985) are crucial for understanding how institutions operated within but most importantly between *poleis*. *Proxenia*, because it constituted a relationship between a *polis* and an individual non-citizen, allows us to explore how both these actors' motivations and their means of pursuing them were constrained at a variety of different levels.

At the same time as using *proxenia* as a case study, however, and placing it in the context of the other institutions to which it was related, throughout this thesis I illuminate the importance of *proxenia* in its own right. It was the most wide spread and frequently used element of the broader system of interstate institutions. Grants of *proxenia* both reflected and facilitated the full range of different sorts of inter-*polis* interaction, public and private, from diplomatic negotiations to economic transactions and inter-city pilgrimage – and thus allow us to see how cities related themselves to each other. As I show in my study of *proxeny* networks, even small *poleis* routinely maintained very substantial networks of hundreds of *proxenoi* which linked them to a wide range of other *poleis*. *Proxenia* thus emerges as the characteristically Greek form of inter-*polis* networking and was, I argue, closely bound up with ideas of what it meant to be, and to be seen to be, a *polis*.

This thesis concentrates on elucidating *proxenia* during a five-hundred year period, from c. 500 to c.1 BC, using a synchronic approach. Despite the changing trends in the production and survival of different sorts of source material, I argue that our rich and varied evidence produces a strikingly homogenous picture of *proxenia* and the way in which it was used and understood throughout this period. The upper chronological limit of this study is an artefact of the evidence, which only begins to be available in quantity during the fifth century BC. The discontinuity, however, which I identify as occurring about the time of Augustus, when *proxenia* as it was previously understood disappears, stresses the strong continuity which characterized the interstate dynamic of the Greek world prior to that point – it was an age defined by inter-*polis* networking, by *proxenia*.

1 Scholarship on *Proxenia*: Narratives of Decline

The monograph by Paul Monceaux, *Les proxénies grecques*, published in 1886, represented the culmination of a series of major nineteenth-century works on proxeny.² The earliest of these, by Franz Wolfgang Ullrich (1822), established the lexicographical interest found in much later scholarship, exploring, in particular, the relation of *proxenia* (public hospitality) to other forms of *xenia* (hospitality). The German philologist Moritz Meier wrote the first major study (1843) which laid the foundation for later work on *proxenia* in its comprehensive collation of literary testimonia and systematic consideration of the epigraphic documents which August Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (first volume 1828) had begun to make accessible. Charles Tissot consolidated Meier's work in a systematic treatment (1863) which explored the limits of the analogy, made at least as early as Doukas'

² For a lucid account of the earlier, more isolated scholarship on *proxenia*, see Virgilio (1969).

commentary on Thucydides, between *proxenia* and the modern institution of the consulship (Tissot himself was the French consul at Edirne).³

Robert concentrates on Monceaux in the quote used as the epigraph for this chapter partly because, at the time at which he was writing, it constituted the most systematic study – treating, in thirty-eight brief chapters, a very wide range of regional and thematic case studies of *proxenia*. Robert’s emphasis, however, also reflects his dissatisfaction with the central concerns of subsequent scholarship. In the eighty years which intervened between Monceaux’s account and Robert’s letter to Virgilio, the study of proxeny was characterised by increasing scepticism concerning the functional nature of *proxenia*. Scholars, beginning with Emile Szanto (1892), began to see a contradiction between the understanding of *proxenia* as a quasi-contractual office, involving the obligation to perform particular duties, with the honorific aspect of this status, which seemed prominent in the rapidly expanding epigraphic record of proxeny decrees for the Hellenistic period. In its most influential form this was constructed as a narrative of the functional decline of *proxenia* which was part of a wider historiographic trend, the more general contemporary belief in the decline of the Greek *polis* at the end of the Classical period. According to Walther Schwahn (1931), Hans Schaefer (1932), and Gunther Klaffenbach (1966), among others, *proxenia*, as their nineteenth-century predecessors had understood it, as a consul-like institution, could only be identified in the sources, especially literary, for proxeny in the Classical period.⁴ Thereafter, or, according to some versions of events, in the course of the fourth century, as *proxenia* came increasingly to be granted in purely honorific contexts to multiple individuals within the same *polis* and even, on

³ Doukas (1805) on Thuc. 2.29; see Tissot (1863), 101.

⁴ Schwahn (1931), 108-112; Schaefer (1932), 28; Klaffenbach (1966), 83-5.

occasion, to women, to minors, whole communities, and metics, it lost its functional content altogether, becoming an empty honour devoid of practical significance.⁵

Later in his letter Robert signals his own rejection of this simplistic narrative of post-Classical decline (as he repeatedly rejected the wider historiographic belief in the ‘death’ of the post-Chaeronean *polis*) by citing with approval one work produced in this period – Adolf Wilhelm’s lengthy article of 1942. In this extremely learned but difficult work Wilhelm sought to undermine the arguments of Schwahn and Schaefer by adducing numerous examples, extending to the late Hellenistic period, of *proxenoi* still apparently performing services as they had in the Classical period. However, in spite of the evidence marshalled by Wilhelm, narratives of proxeny decline remained dominant.⁶

Ironically, in the period immediately following Robert’s dismissive statement, research on *proxenia* entered a far more active phase. A continuous stream of important articles, extended studies, and monographs on both *proxenia* more broadly and particular sets of material began and has continued to this day.⁷ Many of the most important of these works, however, despite Wilhelm’s work and the criticisms of Robert, have continued to be influenced by or at least framed in response to the same

⁵ On these narratives see also Marek (1984), 2-3, and Gauthier (1985), 131-6; Klaffenbach (1966), 83-4, for references to these instances. Marek (1985), 129-30, collects the isolated grants for women and children.

⁶ So Klaffenbach (1966), 83-5; Ehrenberg (1960), 104-5; Guarducci (1969), 29-30; Walbank (1981), 73. Virgilio (1969), 498, although accepting Wilhelm’s assertion that *proxenoi* continued to serve a precise function as fundamentally correct, found his examples unconvincing.

⁷ Major works: Gschnitzer (1973); Marek (1984). Gauthier (1985) contains a substantial section on *proxenia*. On early forms of and evidence for *proxenia*, see Wallace (1970), Gauthier (1972), 27-61, but also Zelnick-Abramovitz (2004). On the proxeny decrees of Athens, see Walbank (1978) and Reiter (1991) in addition to Meiggs (1949) on the fifth-century material, and Culasso-Gastaldi (2004) and (2005) on the fourth century. See Knoepfler (2001a) on the decrees from Eretria; Fabiani (forthcoming a) and (forthcoming b) on those from Iasos; Gavazzi (1951) on the material from Thessaly; Huybrechs (1959) and Mosley (1971b) on proxeny at Sparta. Habicht (2002) provides an important discussion of the package of honours granted to *proxenoi*. Moggi (1995) and Perlman (1958) provide good discussions of the political importance of *proxenia* in relation to the literary evidence for the Classical period.

narrative of decline. In particular Fritz Gschnitzer's 100-column article on *proxenia* in *RE*, published in 1973, proposed another version, albeit more nuanced, of the proxeny decline narrative. In it he identified honour and function as two different components of *proxenia*, present from the start but subject to different trajectories of decline:⁸ the practical aspect of *proxenia* disappeared first, partly as a result of the development in the Hellenistic period of other institutions which usurped the services performed by *proxenoi* (e.g. the development of inns obviated the need for *proxenoi* to provide hospitality), with the result that *proxenia* came to serve principally as an honour without these sorts of practical implications; finally, by the end of the first century BC, even this honorific function came to be compromised as *proxenia* was devalued as a result of having been granted too widely – and *proxenia* disappeared entirely.

Phillipe Gauthier, in his 1985 monograph on euergetism and the Greek *polis*, followed in the footsteps of Wilhelm by offering a lengthy and persuasive rebuttal of these sorts of narrative of decline in general and Gschnitzer's account in particular. Gauthier firmly restated the inherently functional nature of *proxenoi*, pointing decisively to the fact that even in the high Classical period *poleis* were frequently attested as possessing multiple *proxenoi* in the same *polis*. However, at the same time, he also allowed more latitude as to precisely what this function consisted of, and the possibility for it to evolve as the conditions of the Greek world did.⁹

Christian Marek, conversely, in the most recent major monograph devoted to *proxenia* (derived from his doctoral thesis and published in 1984) sought to circumvent entirely what he saw as an unprofitable deadlock between scholarship emphasising honour (and decline) and scholarship stressing function. Instead in his

⁸ Gschnitzer (1972), col. 643-63.

⁹ Gauthier (1985), 131-49, esp. 137-45.

comprehensive collection of the epigraphic material he adopted an approach which consisted of dividing, as far as possible, the recipients of *proxenia* into different types according to their known activities – as kings and dynasts, courtiers, military officers, federal officials, ship-owners, bankers, foreign judges, doctors, and poets.¹⁰ On the basis of this analysis, Marek identified a number of different regional and diachronic trends in the uses to which *proxenia* was put. However, the result of this approach, which, rather than considering these individuals as *proxenoi* recognised a series of widely varying sorts of category, was the loss of a sense of *proxenia* as a specific institution. Instead of moving beyond the dichotomy between honour and function, Marek’s monograph thus served to reinforce the understanding of *proxenia* as an entirely flexible and thus essentially empty honour.¹¹

The opposition between narratives of decline and scholarship emphasising the continuing functional nature of *proxenia* has been fuelled in no small part by the very substantial but seemingly contradictory historical record for *proxenia* – capable of supplying examples which support the argument of either side. In this thesis I argue that a more nuanced analysis of the trends and biases of this record is necessary to understand the evidence for *proxenia* which it provides. On the basis of this I propose a new model for interpreting *proxenia* and understanding the complex relationship between proxeny’s honorific and symbolic functions and the practical services associated with it. This model is based on the identification of a coherent and stable set of expectations that informed the way in which contemporaries conceived and made use of this role – a *proxenos* paradigm. In this I build on the work of Wilhelm and Gauthier who argued that utility was central to *proxenia*, but show that this utility

¹⁰ Marek (1984), 3-4 and 333-85.

¹¹ See also Culasso Gastaldi (2005), 75, where *proxenia* for similar reasons is described as ‘senza personalità sua propria.’

was expected to manifest itself in particular ways, especially in intermediary services performed by *proxenoi* to facilitate interaction between different *poleis*. I argue that it was, in fact, this highly specific content, not its absence, which invested *proxenia* with symbolic meaning and made it useful in other instances for constructing relations, on occasion, with individuals and even groups who were atypical *proxenoi*.

2 The Sources for *Proxenia*

L'importance des proxénies grecques est une des révélations de l'épigraphie.¹²

There can be little doubt of the importance of proxeny as an epigraphic phenomenon and, since Monceaux wrote, the rich epigraphic record on which he based his study has grown ever greater. The vast majority of this record consists of proxeny decrees, inscribed texts recording, in concise and formulaic language, the decree by which a particular *polis* bestowed on a non-citizen the formal status of *proxenos* in recognition of his services. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that each year has brought to light new proxeny decrees and there is no sign of this steady stream of material drying up. This thesis is based on a database of more than two and a half thousand securely identified proxeny decrees and I am aware of perhaps a thousand other partially preserved inscriptions of which the majority are very probably also proxeny decrees – making *proxenia* by far the best attested of all inter-*polis* institutions. These inscriptions also represent a very wide cross section of the *poleis* of the Greek world, and a substantial proportion of the one thousand *poleis* identified by the Copenhagen

¹² Monceaux (1886), v.

Polis Project.¹³ The decrees these inscriptions contain were promulgated by more than one hundred and eighty different *poleis*, stretching from the Black Sea to Sicily.¹⁴ In addition, although *proxenia* was and, as I show, was conceived of as, an institution of the *polis*, a number of other sorts of authority are represented by grants of *proxenia* which they made and inscribed on stone. Super-*polis* entities like federations are particularly well attested, but we also possess proxeny decrees from petty kings and dynasts as well as associations of merchants and Dionysiac artists.¹⁵

The proxeny decree, however, is not the only context in which *proxenia* is attested epigraphically. In particular in this study I argue that as important for understanding this institution and how it was used are the much less numerous inscribed lists and catalogues of *proxenoi* with which *poleis* advertised their proxeny networks *en masse*. In addition, a wide range of other, more marginal types of epigraphic monument give us a sense of the significance and pervasiveness of this ancient institution, illustrating facets of particular proxeny grants and relationships with great vividness: burial monuments erected for and by *proxenoi*;¹⁶ inscriptions collecting the different grants of *proxenia* bestowed on a particular individual;¹⁷ a probable reverse proxeny catalogue from Narthakion – listing all the *proxenoi* other cities recognised there;¹⁸ stone theatre seats inscribed as *belonging* to specific

¹³ Hansen and Nielsen (2004), with 1035 entries for certain or probable *poleis* in the Archaic and Classical periods; Hansen (2008) now identifies 1040.

¹⁴ This number includes not only *poleis* which are represented by the decrees they themselves inscribed (166 *poleis*) but also *poleis* whose decrees of *proxenia* were inscribed by other *poleis* (as in the honorific dossier recording all decrees passed in honour of Nikomedes of Kos, which was inscribed at his home *polis*).

¹⁵ On these, see Chapter 4, below, 239-43.

¹⁶ See below, Chapter 1, 59 n.112.

¹⁷ So-called *Ehrentafeln*. One of the very best examples is *IG XII 4 129-130*; see below, Chapter 2, 112.

¹⁸ *IG IX 2 90*; see below, Chapter 2, 119-20.

proxenoi;¹⁹ dedications made by *proxenoi*;²⁰ references to *proxenoi* giving or lending money to the *poleis* to which they were linked – and even engaging in judicial processes there;²¹ a unique inscription which marked the house and status as *proxenos* of the Thessalian *koinon*, of a Pergamene physical trainer;²² and an enquiry, inscribed on lead, made by a community of the oracle at Dodona as to whether they should bestow *proxenia* on a particular individual.²³ In addition we also possess a rich onomastic record for *proxenia*, of individuals given the name ‘Proxenos’ or called after the *polis* from which their father had received proxeny (e.g. ‘Samios’ or ‘Korinthios’). These forms of proxeny attestation are important for nuancing and enlivening our understanding of what *proxenia* meant to individuals and how it was exploited by them. They require careful interpretation to understand in what sense these isolated and less obviously uniform attestations are more broadly significant and how they are exceptional – but, as I argue, similar questions also need to be asked of the record of proxeny decrees which is too often taken as straightforwardly representative.

Alongside the extraordinarily substantial epigraphic record for *proxenia*, it is perhaps unsurprising that the literary evidence, on which the earliest commentators heavily relied, has been emphasised less in some treatments.²⁴ However, even accepting its Athenian bias, the literary record is still remarkably rich and diverse and offers an essential complementary perspective to the view of *proxenia* provided by

¹⁹ See below, Chapter 2, 132 n.139.

²⁰ *I.Lindos* II 130; *IG* II² 3882; *SEG* 14 455; Maiuri (1925), n.8.

²¹ On gifts, see Chapter 1, below. For loans see, e.g., *IG* XII 9 900A; *I.Oropos* 303. *Proxenoi* in the Athenian *phialai* inscriptions: *IG* II² 1570 l.22; *SEG* 18 36 B l.17-21; on which, see Chapter 1, 77 n.159, below.

²² *Praktika* (1930), 35 (with ph. 34).

²³ Lhôte (2006), no.15 (*SEG* 56 663) with Chapter 2, 100 n.25.

²⁴ Marek (1984), esp. 482.

our documentary evidence. Whereas, proxeny decrees, in their very nature, deal with *proxenoi* only at the point at which they are named as such, our historiographical sources principally present us with *proxenoi* in action. The Attic orators, conversely, allow us to explore examples of how *proxenoi* could be presented in political discourse – crucial given the fact that *proxenoi* were, in essence, the creations of political speech-act. Attestations of *proxenia* in other sources – such as the plays of the Athenian dramatists or the odes of Pindar – help to reveal the significance of this institution before we possess widespread epigraphic *testimonia* of it and its importance as a source of prestige.

These different types of material, literary and epigraphic, present us with contrasting perspectives on proxeny, illuminating different themes and, to an extent, different periods. The interpretation of these differences has been central to the persistence of narratives of the decline of *proxenia* – which have drawn much of their force from the contrast in the material available for the Classical as opposed to the Hellenistic period. For the Classical period, in addition to the limited epigraphic material, focussed on Athens (whose interest in the use of *proxenia* as a practical tool of imperial control seemed clear),²⁵ historians were confronted with literary accounts of *proxenoi* in which the importance of the relationship of *proxenia* in shaping the actions of individuals was constantly stressed. In relation to the Hellenistic period, conversely, in considering *proxenia* scholars have been principally faced with an expanding number of more or less concise, highly monotonous and formulaic decrees in which individuation (the reference to particular concrete deeds) is relatively rare. For scholars hoping to learn the reasons why a particular grant of *proxenia* was made to a specific individual, the formulaic language which the framers of these decrees

²⁵ Meiggs (1949).

used unsurprisingly rings hollow and empty without the reassurance of strong literary representations of functional *proxenoi*.²⁶

Gauthier, in his rebuttal of Gschnitzer's argument, revealed some of the flaws in this interpretation and stressed, especially in relation to the literary sources, the importance of taking the nature of the evidence into account. He pointed out that the principal reason why we do not have many post-Classical accounts of active *proxenoi* is that the volume of surviving contemporary historiography declines dramatically, at the same time as those historians whose works survive structured their narratives around the Romans.²⁷ One of the central aims of this thesis is to arrive at a similarly nuanced understanding of the much larger and more complex epigraphic record of proxeny decrees. Because of the numbers in which they survive and have been published, proxeny decrees represent an excellent means of exploring the functions which honorific epigraphic monuments played and the significance of the recurrent formulae which the proposers and composers of decrees felt that it was important to include. This richness also makes *proxenia* an important case study for analysing and interpreting trends and trajectories in the epigraphic record and their significance for the institutions which this record attests. A fundamental requirement for all of these studies, however, is an understanding that the inscription of decrees was always partial – that processes of selection were involved in singling out particular decrees and particular proxeny decrees for inscription, the biases of which have left us with what is, despite its reassuring size, a very unrepresentative record of *proxenoi*.

²⁶ e.g. Klaffenbach (1966), 84-5, noting a particularly striking example – an inscribed Delian decree in which the names of the original proposer and honorand were erased and overwritten, but the formulaic description of the honorand left unchanged (*IG XI 4 777*).

²⁷ Gauthier (1985), 136. Polybius' contemptuous aside 'καὶ μὴν ὁ τὰς ὀπισθοδόμους στήλας καὶ τὰς ἐν ταῖς φλιαῖς τῶν νεῶν προξενίας ἐξευρηκῶς Τιμαίος ἐστίν' (Plb. 12.13) suggests that Timaeus made far more use of this sort of material.

3 Selective Inscription: The Epigraphic Record of Proxeny Decrees

The fact that Greek cities did not inscribe all of their decrees has long been remarked upon in scholarship on the ancient world.²⁸ The publication clauses contained by so many of the extant texts attest to the necessity of taking a positive decision to inscribe a particular decree – and at almost all *poleis* only a vanishingly small proportion of the decrees which were passed would ever have been committed to stone.

Proxeny decrees – for all that they constituted the single largest category of inscribed decree – were no exception to this general principle of selective inscription. It probably is the case that proxeny decrees were more likely to be inscribed than other sorts of decree – as one of the most important functions which the act of inscription served was honorific and proxeny decrees are likely to have been the most frequently promulgated form of honorific decree. However in only a handful of cases is it at all likely that *poleis* routinely inscribed all their decrees granting *proxenia*. Third-century Delphi, late third-century Oropos, independent Delos, and, perhaps, fourth-century Athens are the only likely candidates and these four *poleis* account for more than half of the proxeny decrees which have been published.

Elsewhere, however, at almost all *poleis* most of the time, inscription remained very much the exception and there was never any necessity to inscribe grants of *proxenia*. We can get a sense of how unrepresentative our data collectively are likely to be by working from our evidence of complete proxeny networks. Lists and catalogues of *proxenoi*, for all that they have been neglected in previous studies of *proxenia*,²⁹ provide us with invaluable information concerning the size and distribution of *poleis*' networks of *proxenoi* at particular moments in time. The rich,

²⁸ Wilhelm (1909), 271-5; Klaffenbach (1966), 70-1; Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 525.

²⁹ Marek devotes only four pages to this important category of inscription (Marek 1984, 134-7); Gschnitzer offers the most complete treatment (Gschnitzer 1973, col. 695-700).

contextualised datasets which they represent clearly highlight the shortcomings of the epigraphic record of individually inscribed proxeny decrees. Even the most insignificant *poleis* are represented by much more substantial networks of *proxenoi* at particular moments in time by proxeny catalogues than we could possibly guess from the evidence of decrees – for instance Karthaia, one of four minor *poleis* on the Aegean island of Keos, is attested as having possessed a network of in excess of 86 *proxenoi* at a particular moment in the first half of the fourth century. By contrast fewer than 20 per cent of the *poleis* attested in our dataset for inscribing proxeny decrees are represented by more than 10 proxeny decrees. If we use Karthaia's network – which emerges as small on the basis of comparisons with other proxeny networks of minor *poleis* – to calculate crudely the scale of proxeny networking, we arrive at a very conservative estimate of the total number of grants made during the five hundred years proxeny thrived of 1.2 million, of which our sample of 2,500 decrees would represent an exiguous 0.2 per cent.³⁰

Our sample of inscribed proxeny decrees is clearly partial, but it is also unrepresentative for reasons which have nothing to do with low rates of archaeological recovery. This is because the inscription of a particular *proxenos*' decree was usually an additional honour, over and above the particular package of honours this status conveyed, involving the *polis* in certain expense (which few of the other honours granted did). The inscription of proxeny decrees was thus not merely partial, it was also usually selective – an honour more likely to be granted to precisely

³⁰ In this calculation I assume an average network size of 80 *proxenoi* for the 1,000 *poleis* counted by the Copenhagen Polis Centre, renewed three times a century from 500 to 1 BC (a rate of 1.2 proxeny grants per *polis* per year). Clearly this calculation glosses over an enormous degree of variation, but, as my comparative analysis of proxeny networks in Chapter Three shows, even allowing for this, these are very conservative figures. Many, much larger networks would have been renewed more frequently than this. See Knoepfler (2001a), 425-30, for a valuable discussion of these difficulties in relation to the surviving proxeny decrees of Eretria.

those honorands who were exceptional for some reason or of particularly high status. In aggregate, this bias towards unusual *proxenoi* has the effect of seriously distorting the material presented by individually inscribed decrees on which, for instance, Marek draws in his prosopographical analysis of decrees. Moreover, the c.750 individuals Marek was able to categorise by profession/status/occupation, which he used as the basis of his analysis, represent a sample that is unrepresentative even of these selectively inscribed decrees in that the individuals he was able to pigeonhole were those sufficiently important to be attested elsewhere or those who had their status and/or actions detailed in the decrees honouring them (in contrast with the lack of individuation which is otherwise the rule).

The proxeny decrees of Priene vividly illustrate both how selective the decision to inscribe a proxeny decree could be and the effects of this on our sample of material. Despite the richness of the public epigraphy of Priene in many other areas, we possess only five proxeny decrees. All five honour *proxenoi* who are obviously exceptional or unusual: one is for Alexander the Great's general, the future king, Antigonos Monophthalmos (*I.Priene* 2); another includes the grant of an honorific statue – an honour which very few *proxenoi* ever received (*I.Priene* 3); a third gives the honorand a plot of land along with *proxenia* – a gift with only one other parallel in our record of inscribed decrees (*I.Priene* 6);³¹ another is not properly a proxeny decree at all – but rather a re-inscription of a proxeny decree for an individual who was important enough for his decree to be targeted for destruction by the tyrant who reigned briefly at Priene (*I.Priene* 12);³² the last of the known proxeny decrees does not honour individuals so much as Priene's connections with other *poleis*, granting

³¹ *IG XII 9* 196, with Knoepfler (2001a), 180-1.

³² On this decree, see below, Chapter 2, 98.

proxenia to foreign judges from Phocaia, Astypalaia, and Nisyros (*I.Priene* 8). These would in no sense have been typical of the proxeny decrees which Priene would have passed, year on year – they were inscribed precisely because the honorands in question, especially in the first four cases, merited exceptional honours. In these decrees *proxenia* played an important role in defining the position of these honorands, but these particular decrees were not really about *proxenia* in any narrow sense. The Prienean material represents a particularly good case study because the markers of exceptional status in these decrees are so clearly delineated. In many other proxeny decrees particularly important individuals, or honours granted for particularly exceptional services, are not necessarily so clearly marked, except, perhaps, by the decision to inscribe the decree in question in a context in which few others were ever inscribed. In this connection it is worth noting that more than 70 per cent of *poleis* attested in my database as inscribing decrees are, like Priene, represented by only five or fewer proxeny decrees throughout their entire histories, and 60 per cent are represented by fewer than three.

4 Methodology: Approaching *Proxenia*

The question, then, is how to proceed to analyse the complex record for *proxenia* which is unrepresentative in these crucial respects. Central to my approach is analysis of material – in particular the surviving lists and catalogues of *proxenoi* – which allows us to arrive at a more accurate understanding of the parameters of ancient proxeny networking. This material provides a crucial background for exploring *poleis*' patterns of interaction and contextualising other material, to explore the place which *proxenia* had in the life of *poleis*, and the broader functions which this and other institutions played.

At the same time, however, I also identify ways in which even the record of individually inscribed decrees, for all its biases, can be used to illuminate *proxenia* more broadly. In particular in the first chapter I concentrate on precisely that aspect of proxeny decrees which has been ignored because it fails to individuate and is non-specific – the recurrent, highly stereotyped formulae used in decrees to describe the recipients of grants of *proxenia*. In this, the epigraphic record of individually inscribed decrees provides an unrivalled resource for understanding how an ancient institution could be invested with a particular content and meaning, a paradigm of proper *proxenos* – and *polis* – behaviour.

Literary sources provide an important alternative perspective on this paradigm, the way it functioned in practice – and their interpretation is, in turn, informed by our study of proxeny networks. The quantitative indications which we glean from analysis of lists and catalogues of *proxenoi* reveal how common grants of *proxenia* were so that it becomes likely that the majority of individuals prominent enough to be mentioned particularly in our historiographical sources were *proxenoi* of one or more *polis*. The fact that these links are so infrequently mentioned by authors confirms the sense we get from analysing their occurrence in context – that references to *proxenia* are never merely incidental, that this relationship is central to the interpretation of the passages in question, and thus that these passages are important evidence which need to be taken into account in any attempt to understand this institution.

In this thesis I am also interested in delineating the trends which the epigraphic record of proxeny decrees underwent by exploring my database of 2,500 securely identified proxeny decrees using quantitative probability distribution, which allows the chronological occurrence of insecurely dated artefacts to be compared in a much more useful way. My aim in doing so is to understand the complex relationship

between the practice of inscribing some proxyen decrees, which arose and spread very widely, and the institution of *proxenia* more broadly.

To interpret this material, which is not new but has never been examined systematically in these ways before, as well as to explore what it can tell us both about *proxenia* more narrowly and the world of Greek *poleis* in which this and other institutions were used, I draw on a number of complementary theoretical frameworks developed in other fields. Thus models for understanding institutional innovation and adoption created by New Institutional scholars in the field of Organizational Studies are useful in the first chapter for understanding the spread and stability of *proxenia*, and directing our attention to what this says about the organizations (*poleis*) responsible.³³ Terminology used in Social Network Theory is similarly helpful both in describing the features of ancient networks of *proxenoi* and characterising them more generally.³⁴ Finally, I have also drawn on social theories of interstate relations, especially those developed by Alexander Wendt, for interpreting the motivations of Greek *poleis* in engaging in interactions with each through a specific set of inter-*polis* institutions involving *proxenia*.³⁵

5 Chapter Breakdown

In the first half of this thesis my central interest is in establishing a firm basis for understanding *proxenia* as an inter-*polis* institution and how it functioned. In the first chapter (Anatomy of an Ancient Institution: The Paradigm of the *Proxenos*) I begin by developing a specific interpretative model based on the *proxenos* paradigm which was expressed by the stereotypical descriptions of the recipients of proxyeny which

³³ e.g. March and Olsen (1989).

³⁴ e.g. Kadushin (2012).

³⁵ Wendt (1992), (1999).

recur in inscriptions. I then collect the evidence we possess for the specific activities of *proxenoi* from literary and epigraphic sources to explain how the more general descriptions of *proxenoi* relate in the *proxenos*-paradigm to the performance of particular intermediary services. The remarkable stability and coherence of the central elements of this paradigm, attested from the fifth century to the end of the first BC wherever proxeny is found, reflect the importance of the function performed by *proxenia*, broadly to connect *poleis* and facilitate inter-*polis* interaction. At the same time, however, this stability also reveals the strength of the isomorphic forces acting on *poleis* in their relations with each other – compelling them, before an audience of their peers, to conform to and reproduce established norms.

In the second chapter (Proxeny in its Political Contexts: Competition and Prestige) I examine how this abstract paradigm of *proxenia*, with its idealizing assumptions, played out in relation to individual *proxenoi* in the reality of factional politics in the Greek city. In particular I explore a wide range of different sorts of material, especially from the epigraphic record and Attic oratory, to explore what motivated individuals to perform the functions associated with *proxenia*, arguing that it was the prestige value of this institution in the context of elite competition within their own *poleis*. In this we see the essential symbiosis of honour and function which was the foundation of *proxenia* and other inter-*polis* institutions – with individual elite members needing to publicly perform as *proxenoi* in order to capitalize on the prestige which this honorific connection to an external *polis* conveyed.

In the third chapter (Proxeny Networks: The Horizons of *Poleis*) I broaden out this study, and explore this institution from the perspective of *poleis* which viewed their *proxenoi en masse*, as geographically distributed networks. Using proxeny lists to illuminate the potential range of sizes of proxeny network, and their rhythms and

rates of granting, I exploit this material to illuminate different patterns of inter-*polis* interaction and explore how proxeny grants functioned on a symbolic level in constructing the position of a *polis* relative to its peers.

In the fourth chapter (All the World's a Stage: *Proxenia* and the Performance of *Polis*-Identity in Inter-*Polis* Society) I develop this insight into the symbolic function of *proxenia*, and use this institution as a case study to explore the functions performed by the wider system of inter-*polis* institutions including *asylia*, *syngeneia*, and *theoria*. I draw both on John Ma's seminal article on peer-polity interaction (Ma 2003) and theoretical frameworks developed recently in International Relations Studies (most notably Wendt 2000) to explain why *poleis* invested time and institutional effort in these sorts of interactions. I argue that so much effort was expended on engaging with these different international institutions within the anarchical system of the Classical and Hellenistic world because this was the way in which *poleis* constructed their identity in relation to each other as *polis*-actors.

In the final chapter of the thesis (The Disappearance of *Proxenia* and the Domination of Rome: Interstate Hierarchy from Anarchy) I explore the importance of the role played by *proxenia* within the Greek world by analysing the evidence and explanations for its disappearance around the time of Augustus and what this tells us about how the structural dynamic of the Greek world changed. I argue that, although the massive quantitative reduction evident in our record of individually inscribed decrees cannot be taken as direct evidence that *proxenia* ceased to be granted, this reduced monumental emphasis reflects a more general shift apparent in our evidence for other institutions during this period. However, rather than representing the effectiveness of Rome as a central authority in repressing these sorts of activity, I argue that this is a product of a wider, *polis*-centred process of reorientation in which

relations with the Roman authorities at the centre replaced inter-*polis* connections as the source of communal identity and prestige.

Chapter 1

The Anatomy of an Ancient Institution:

The Paradigm of the *Proxenos*

Institutions are historically contingent social constructions which shape human action and behaviour. How they do this depends on their precise content and meaning in context – the reasons why they are relevant to individual actors in a particular society and persist in a particular form. The institution of *proxenia* was no exception.

However, what *proxenia* meant, how far and when its meaning changed, and what functions it therefore performed, are issues which remain contested today.¹ In this chapter I therefore propose a new model for understanding how *proxenia* was used and understood, and how it could both be honorific and at the same time oblige the recipient to perform certain sorts of service for the granting *polis*.² I argue that *proxenia*, as an institution, derived meaning from a widespread and stable understanding of what *proxenoi* should be and do, a model of proper *proxenos* behaviour which I term the *proxenos*-paradigm.

In this I draw on modern theories developed under a renewed interest in institutions – New Institutionalism – which offer ways of explaining how institutions operate, as well as the dynamics underlying their evolution, stability, and spread. New Institutionalism is, in part, a reaction against the extremes of rational-actor theory and its emphasis on the selfish pursuit of maximal gain. Instead it concentrates on the role

¹ See Introduction, 3-8.

² Thus Marek (1984), 143-46, rightly dismisses the suggestion of Monceaux (1886), 13-14, that *proxenoi* were contractually obliged to perform particular duties, but, rather than seeking alternative mechanisms by which this could work, rejects the idea that there could be particular functions associated with *proxenia* at all.

played by institutions in shaping actors' motivations and directing their pursuit of them.³ New Institutionalism is represented in a diverse range of fields, of which the most influential strand for the study of ancient history has so far been New Institutional Economics.⁴ Here, however, I draw on theoretical tools developed in the New Institutionalism in Organizational Studies, especially the concept of the 'logic of appropriateness.' Expounded most influentially by March and Olsen, the 'logic of appropriateness' emphasises the way in which individuals, while participating in different sorts of institutions, self-consciously perform socially defined roles and make decisions by using as a primary criterion the appropriateness of a particular action to the role or roles in question (e.g. as jurors, members of a Parent-Teacher Association, or, indeed, as 'customers').⁵ The concept of the 'logic of appropriateness' is useful in explaining how *proxenoi* could be expected to perform particular sorts of function without the necessity of invoking quasi-contractual constraints. *Proxenia* was defined by a set of assumptions which both *poleis* and *proxenoi* shared of this role – the *proxenos*-paradigm. Social expectations rather than legal compulsion underwrote the obligations which *proxenoi* were felt to have.

I argue that the central characteristics of this *proxenos*-paradigm can be identified in the inscribed proxeny decrees in the descriptions which they give of the individuals they honour. These descriptions are concise and highly formulaic. Their function was not to identify or differentiate honorands. Instead they evoke the *proxenos*-paradigm as a stereotype to justify the grant of *proxenia* to particular recipients. In these decrees *proxenoi* are appointed on the basis that they behave as

³ Powell and DiMaggio (1991); Keohane (1988), 382.

⁴ Douglass North is the central figure in New Institutional Economics, see North (1990); for an overview of the recent work in this field, see Brousseau and Glachant, eds. (2008). Bresson (2007-8) is the fullest treatment of these themes in relation to the ancient world, but see also Ober (2010).

⁵ March and Olsen (1989), 160-2; (2006).

proxenoi should. They reveal that the *proxenos* was understood as the non-citizen friend of the *polis* in an external community who proved his affection for it over a prolonged period by performing services for its citizens. Although the services which *proxenoi* could be expected to perform are not precisely defined in the concise descriptions found in proxeny decrees, I argue that the structural function of *proxenia* is made clear in these texts. The *proxenos* is defined as an intermediary figure who could be expected to help visitors from his client city negotiate any difficulties or barriers at his own political community which their status as strangers and non-citizens there caused.

Proxenia derived its meaning from this *proxenos*-paradigm, and from *proxenoi* who acted in accordance with it. However, because it constituted the most widely granted and understood form of privileged status, *proxenia* could also on occasion be used more broadly to express relations of friendship with atypical honorands. The most extreme examples of this are provided by the occasional collective grants of *proxenia* made by *poleis* under great strain to large groups of individuals *en masse*, extending and adapting their pre-existing repertoire of honorific symbols to express their gratitude to and continuing reliance on groups of mercenaries stationed there or even entire communities.⁶ The generic descriptions in proxeny decrees reveal, however, that as a group *proxenoi* took their character from recipients who did conform to the *proxenos*-paradigm, performing specific sorts of intermediary service in the context of their own communities.

⁶ The cardinal example of this is the mass grant made by the *polis* of Lilaia to nearly three hundred mercenaries sent for their defence by King Attalus (*FD* III 4 132-5). Similarly striking manipulations of this symbolic language include the Delphic decree declaring that the city of Delphi would collectively act as *proxenos* for the Sardians (*Syll.*³ 548), the Molossian grant of *proxenia* to the Akragantines (*Syll.*³ 942), the grant made by the *koinon* of the Aterargoi to the Pergamioi (*SEG* 15 411), and the famous decree of Mausollus declaring all the Knidians his *proxenoi* (*RO* 55). On these and other examples see Gschnitzer (1973), col. 672-6, with bibliography.

None of the elements of this *proxenos*-paradigm would have surprised Wilhelm who wrote on *proxenia* in the 1940s, or even Meier, writing in the 1840s. The approach which I adopt here, however, allows us to explore the functions which the language found in proxeny decrees performed and the relation of the stereotypical descriptions they contained to depictions of *proxenoi* in the literary sources. Although honorific language has, in recent years, received more attention than formerly, comparatively little work has been done on the stereotypical descriptions of *proxenoi* which are the focus of this chapter.⁷ By concentrating on the language of *proxeny* decrees, we can explore and compare representations of *proxenoi* from a large number of *poleis* during different periods. This comparison illuminates the intended meaning and significance of the potentially ambiguous words and phrases used and allows us to get a much more detailed and accurate understanding of how *proxenoi* were conceived.

What is striking is that the same basic *proxenos* characteristics, and the same services associated with *proxenia*, define the use of this institution wherever it is found. The first inscribed decrees we possess, from fifth century Athens, reveal essentially the same *proxenos*-paradigm as the decrees we possess from the period when proxeny inscription was much more widespread – from the fourth to first centuries BC, from the Black Sea to the western Mediterranean. When this precise *proxenos*-paradigm arose is unclear, but literary sources from the fifth century BC, some of which predate the earliest inscribed decrees, suggest that it was then fully

⁷ These terms receive only very brief mention in Marek (1984), 333-34. Much of the work which has been done has focussed on Attic oratory (e.g. Dover 1974; Ober 1989, 248-92) or the language of Athenian inscriptions (Whitehead 1983; 1993; Veligianni-Terzi 1997; Kralli 2000). See now also, on the decrees of Iasos, Fabiani (forthcoming b). Gauthier (1985), esp.140-5, takes a broader, comparative approach which I develop here.

developed and widespread.⁸ The reasons for this extraordinary homogeneity and stability shed light on the structure of this world of *poleis*. *Proxenia* thus represents an important case study for exploring the importance of the honorific system of inter-*polis* intercourse which characterised the Greek world. It also allows us to explore the fundamental change in dynamic which this world underwent when it came firmly under the control of the Roman Emperor, and *proxenia* disappeared.

In this chapter I therefore begin by analysing the way in which those appointed as *proxenoi* are described, the connection between this description and communal expectations of their future behaviour, and the central characteristics and specificity of this *proxenos*-paradigm. In the second half I then seek to identify the services which were part of this paradigm, arguing that they need to be understood in the context of the *proxenos*' assumed context for action – his own *polis* or another political community external to the granting *polis* in which he fulfilled an intermediary role. Finally, I argue that the essentials of this *proxenos*-paradigm can be identified as remaining consistent and stable until the end of the first century BC and draw on theories of institutional isomorphism developed by New Institutionalists scholars to understand this stability and what it says both about *proxenia* and the world in which it operated.

1 Formulaic Descriptions of *Proxenoi* in Proxeny-Decrees

The highly stereotyped language of decrees granting *proxenia* is familiar to anyone who has ever leafed through an epigraphic corpus. Although the rigidity of these

⁸ Although other, distinct uses of the term *proxenos* and its cognates have been identified in a few of our earliest sources, so Gauthier (1972), 17-61, these can in fact be understood as broadly compatible with the more specific understanding of *proxenia* which characterises all later epigraphic attestations (see Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004). For the earlier literary attestations, with judicious discussion, see Wallace (1970).

formulae even within the decrees of a single city should not be overstated, they are, because of this repetitive quality, among the most easily and confidently restored of inscriptions. It is perhaps because of this apparent familiarity that the significance of these descriptions of the honorand has been largely overlooked. As authoritative representations of *proxenoi*, describing the qualities and the activities that made an individual a suitable candidate for the receipt of *proxenia*, they provide our best evidence for the conception and function of this institution. Whereas it is clear that the inscription of decrees was highly selective – and therefore that our surviving sample of *proxenoi* is biased – because they construct a stereotype these formulaic elements of *proxenos*-descriptions can nonetheless be taken as representative evidence of the way in which *proxenia* was conceived.⁹

After invocation, heading, prescript, and enactment formula, but before the award of *proxenia* and whatever attendant honours are granted, in all but the most concise decrees we find a motivating clause, setting out the reasons for which a specific motion was proposed and why therefore it was passed.¹⁰ In longer examples these may be both ‘retrospective’ and ‘prospective,’ setting out both what the honorand had done, did and continued to do for this nomination to be appropriate (introduced by ἐπειδὴ) as well as what those responsible hoped to achieve by this decree (introduced by ἵνα or ὅπως). ἐπειδὴ clauses could be more or less elaborate, sometimes incorporating detailed descriptions of the deeds of the honorand. The basic, invariably present element, however, was a general, stereotypical description of how the honorand behaved towards and what he did for the city in question.

⁹ See Introduction, 13-6.

¹⁰ See Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 4-5, on this structure.

Generic descriptive elements which continually recur in the decrees of different *poleis*, expressed in similar or equivalent phrases, have usually been ignored because they fail to individuate or explain what those commenting on inscriptions are often most eager to learn – the reasons why a particular grant was made at a particular time. In recent scholarship they have sometimes been treated as an empty sham, recording ‘virtual’ (non-existent) benefactions honoured in an attempt to provoke a ‘real’ euergetical response.¹¹ In fact they point to the existence of a ‘*proxenos*-paradigm,’ a set of general and specific expectations of this role in the context of which a given honorand’s actions were analysed. It was important to inscribe these phrases because they reflected, or rather condensed, the language used to discuss and think about this institution in public contexts. These were the terms, as their occurrence in motivation formulae makes clear, in which the proposer of a *proxenos* was expected to discuss his nominee, albeit with greater elaboration and delineation of examples, and it was against the *proxenos*-paradigm which these terms evoked that a candidate was judged.¹²

This language reflected and reinforced citizens’ expectations of their city’s *proxenoi*, but they also shaped his own understanding of his relationship with those

¹¹ Domingo Gygax (2009), 180-3. See similarly, albeit in relation to royal *philoι*, Mitchell (2009), 22: ‘no more than fishing trips for potential benefactors.’ Veyne (1990), 107, discussing the honorific and didactic function of these conventional phrases, is closer to the mark.

¹² No such speech survives in our literary corpus despite the frequency with which they must have been made, but we do possess a model in Hyperides’ parody of the traditional elements of this genre. In the surviving fragments of his speech against Demades for proposing an unsuitable candidate for *proxenia* (Hyp. fr. 76), he lists the ‘services’ against the interests of Athens which Demades should have mentioned in his proposal: ‘[Demades] proposes that it be decreed that he (Euthykrates) be *proxenos* because he speaks and acts in the interests of Philip and as cavalry commander betrayed the Olynthian cavalry to him and through this was responsible for the destruction of the Chalcidians; after the capture of Olynthus he set the ransoms of the prisoners; he worked against our city’s interests concerning Delos and, when the city was defeated at Chaeronea, neither buried any dead nor ransomed any prisoners.’ (δεδοχθαι γάρ φησιν αὐτὸν εἶναι πρόξενον, ὅτι τὰ Φιλίππῳ συμφέροντα καὶ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ, ὅτι γενόμενος ἵππαρχος τοὺς Ὀλυνθίων ἱππέας προὔδωκε Φιλίππῳ, ὅτι τοῦτο πράξας αἴτιος τοῦ Χαλκιδέων ὑπῆρξεν ὀλέθρου, ὅτι ἀλούσης Ὀλύνθου τιμητῆς ἐγένετο τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, ὅτι ἀντέπραξε τῇ πόλει περὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ Δηλίων, ὅτι τῆς πόλεως περὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἠττηθείσης οὔτε ἔθαψε τῶν τεθνεώτων τινὰς οὔτε τῶν ἀλόντων οὐδένα ἐλόσατο).

cities by which he might already have been named *proxenos* and the attitude and actions appropriate if he had any ambitions to become the *proxenos* of another community. Expressed in the continuous present, this paradigmatic description of the individual named *proxenos* also reached into the future. The honorand was named *proxenos* because he did and would continue to behave like one. The connection between this descriptive language and the expectations attached to the role of *proxenos* is made particularly clear in an early second century Athenian decree bestowing *proxenia* on Charmion, from Kydonia in Crete, which also clearly illustrates many of the recurrent characteristics of the *proxenos*-paradigm.

1.1 Charmion son of Eumaridas¹³

En route to Delphi, on an official delegation from Kydonia, Charmion and his fellow *theoroi* disembarked at the Piraeus with the intention of continuing their journey by land.¹⁴ While in Athens, however, Charmion took the opportunity of contacting the civic authorities about obtaining for himself the honorific position of *proxenos* enjoyed by his father:¹⁵

ἐπειδὴ Χαρμίῳν υἱὸς ὄν Εὐμαρίδου τοῦ Κυδωνιάτου προξέ-
νου καὶ εὐεργέτου ὄντος ἄξιον ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζων τῶ[ν]
δεδομένων τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ τιμῶν καταπλεύσας εἰς τὸν
Πειραιᾶ θεωρὸς ἀπεσταλμένος εἰς Δελφοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν
προσαγαγόντων αὐτὸν τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπολελόγισται τεῖ
βουλεῖ τὴν τε πατρικὴν εὐνοίαν καὶ τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πεπρα-
γμένα καὶ εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπαγγέλλεται χρήσιμος ἔσεσθαι

¹³ *IG II²* 84. For the date of this text, see Habicht (1982), 176-77, who puts the archon in question, Phanarchis, in the year 193/2 BC.

¹⁴ On relations between Athens and Kydonia, attested by a remarkable number of texts, see Papazarkadas and Thonemann (2008), re-editing an Athenian decree recognizing *syngeneia* between these two *poleis*.

¹⁵ That he is explicitly said to have given an account of his own conduct – ἀπολελόγισται (1.56) – suggests that the initiative was his. On grants of *proxenia* to the descendants of *proxenoi*, despite the hereditary understanding of this relationship, see Chapter 3, 168 n. 29.

καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινεῖ τοῖς παραγινομένοις εἰς Κρήτην Ἀθηναίων·

Since Charmion, as the son of our *proxenos* and benefactor Eumaridas, who proves himself worthy of the honours given to his father, having sailed into the Piraeus after being sent as *theoros* to Delphi by his fellow citizens, has, having been introduced by the generals, delivered an account of his inherited regard (for Athens) and of the services (for Athenians) which he has performed and *swears that he will also be of service to those of the Athenians who come to Crete whether on public or on private business...*¹⁶

Charmion demonstrated that he was worthy of the honorific position enjoyed by his father, Eumaridas in two ways. Firstly, he delivered an account of the regard for Athens which he had inherited from his father (presumably listing Eumaridas' benefactions) and of the services which he had himself rendered to the Athenians. It is the second part which is most striking, however, a declaration exactly corresponding with descriptions of those granted *proxenia* in other inscriptions, yet placed in the mouth of the would-be-honorand (1.58-60).¹⁷ It shows clearly the connection, present but not so explicit elsewhere, between the way in which the honorand is described as behaving in the motivating clause and the way in which the *polis* expects and/or hopes he will continue to behave after he is named *proxenos*. This declaration also shows an awareness on the part of the would-be-honorand that this sort of practical assistance to private citizens and official delegations from the granting *polis* in the context of his own city was the basis of *proxenia*.

Charmion received the *proxenia* he sought and the way in which the grant was made and monumentalised further reinforces these themes:

...ὕπαρχειν δ' αὐτῶι καὶ τὴν πατρικὴν
[π]ροξενίαν καὶ τοῖς ἐγγόνοις· εἶναι <δ'> αὐτῶι καὶ εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν τῆ[ς]
[ιδί]ας αἰρέσεως ποιουμένωι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν εὐρέσθαι ἀγαθὸν
[π]αρὰ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου ὅτου ἂν φαίνεται ἄξιος εἶναι.

¹⁶ *IG* II² 844 1.52-60.

¹⁷ Other examples of declarations include: *SEG* 38 662 (Potidaia); *I.Byzantion* 1 (Byzantium); and *I.Histriae* 32 (Istria).

... He is to have the *proxenia* which his father had – and his offspring are to have it too – and in the future as he makes demonstrations of his personal predisposition (towards Athens), he is to obtain whatever benefit from the council and people he appears worthy of.¹⁸

Again we see the expectation clearly expressed, this time by the civic authorities, that Charmion will perform further benefactions as *proxenos*, but it is expressed in the context of a future need to reward him in response to these predicted services. In this the identity of *proxenia* as a euergetical institution is clear, involving the creation and manipulation of reciprocal but asymmetric relationships, in which symbols of honour and gratitude answer benefaction. The way in which benefaction is expressed is also important. Here – as we shall see, typically – it is the personal *ἀρεσις*, or preference of the *proxenos* for the honouring city, which is emphasised. This affection is represented as motivating him to perform services for the honouring city and it is this which qualifies him to be named as *proxenos* by the *polis*. The services he performs are also presented as important, however, as constituting proofs of his preference (*ἀπόδειξις*, 1.70) and actually provoking honorific responses on the part of the *polis*.

One of the most striking features of this monument is the prominence of the father of the honorand, Eumaridas, within it. Charmion is introduced in the *ἐπειδή* clause as the son of his father, the *proxenos* and *euergetes* (52-3). It is ‘*τὴν πατρικὴν [π]ροξενίαν*’ which is sought and given and ‘*τὴν τε πατρικὴν εὐνοίαν*’ (56) which takes pride of place in the account delivered by Charmion justifying his claim to *proxenia*. The Athenian authorities accepted this emphasis. They took the extraordinary decision (though it is not recorded in Charmion’s decree) of re-inscribing two decrees in honour of Eumaridas, the father, above that of Charmion,

¹⁸ *IG* II² 844 1.68-71.

his son. In part this relates to the way in which *proxenia* itself was conceived as an inheritable bond, calqued in this respect on *xenia*, with which etymological links continued to be drawn.¹⁹ These decrees must have been inscribed to honour Charmion by honouring his father, especially in the case of the first in which Eumaridas is given very high honours (praise, a gold crown, and bronze statue) for significant services.²⁰ They also, however, recorded a lofty example for the son to live up to and, at the same time, clearly displayed the potential rewards for so doing. The decrees on this monument thus publicised a model of the hereditary *proxenos* relationship – to Charmion of benefaction rewarded in relation to his father, and to other *proxenoi* or would-be-*proxenoi* of a family of faithful *proxenoi*. To a wider audience this stele would have been a symbol of the strength of ties binding the Athenians to their friends, of repeated honorific interchanges, and of the importance of Athens measured in terms of the prominence and resources of its foreign benefactors.

1.2 The Defining Characteristics of the *Proxenos*-Paradigm

From these paradigmatic *proxenos*-descriptions a set of recurrent, overlapping characteristics can be identified which collectively defined the role of *proxenos*: the personal preference of the *proxenos* for the *polis* in question; the manifestation of this preference over an extended period of time; the non-citizen status of the *proxenos* (i.e. their active membership of a different political community); and, finally, the continuing utility of the *proxenos* to the granting city as its benefactor, providing services in the context of his own political community. Analysis of the various ways in which these central concepts were expressed in the decrees of different *poleis*

¹⁹ Herman (1986), 132-8.

²⁰ On these services, see below, 70.

reveals how they interrelated, allowing us to get a much more nuanced appreciation of how this role was understood.²¹ Conversely, close consideration of the language used in decrees in which *proxenia* was not granted reveals the specificity of the *proxenos*-paradigm to *proxenia*.

The different characteristic elements of these descriptions can be clearly identified in a typical Athenian motivation clause for a recipient of *proxenia*:

ἐπειδὴ Θεογένης ὁ Ναυκρατίτης ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶν περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ποεῖ ὅτι δύναται ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἰδίαι τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους καὶ δημοσίαι καὶ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι αὐτοῦ...

Since Theogenes of Naukratis is a good man in relation to the *demos* of the Athenians and does whatever good he can to those (of the Athenians) who come to him (at Naukratis) whether on private or public business, now as formerly, as his forefathers did before him...²²

Theogenes' particular attachment to Athens is asserted by the phrase 'ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶν περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων' and its chronological continuation is asserted by the present tenses (ἐστὶν, ποεῖ) and also explicitly emphasised (καὶ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ), as is its personal and hereditary basis (καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι αὐτοῦ). Though the reference to services performed is general (ποεῖ ὅτι δύναται ἀγαθὸν), the context for the performance of these services is specifically designated – his own community of Naukratis when Athenians arrive both on public and on private business.

These central components recur wherever honorands awarded *proxenia* are described. The precise terms and formulations used to describe *proxenoi* varied quite widely – as did the degree of detail which these *proxenos*-descriptions went into (in

²¹ For considerations of this language in general Dover (1974) is fundamental; Whitehead (1993) is important for focussing on epigraphic examples; Veligianni-Terzi (1997) is a good guide to the classical Athenian epigraphic material.

²² *IG II²* 206 1.7-13.

only the most concise texts – probably less than a quarter of the total corpus – are these descriptions omitted entirely).²³ Analysis of the different terms used, however, makes it clear that this variation in phraseology was not indicative of local divergent *proxenos*-paradigms, or distinct traditions determining how *proxenia* was conceived. The same characteristics and patterns of behaviour are continually evoked. Overlapping in meaning, different terms were used as equivalents, neither more nor less suitable than the alternatives for invoking a shared *proxenos*-paradigm.²⁴ The choice of which of the appropriate terms to inscribe on stone, how much detail to go into, or whether to dispense with a motivation clause at all, was in most cases largely determined by local epigraphic traditions dictating authoritative verbal formulations which the individual drafter of the final inscription usually followed closely, but could, on occasion, vary. Close reading of the different terms attested, which could be used as alternatives but which were not semantically co-extensive, and exploration of the ways in which they were used in combination or to the exclusion of other terms, tells us a great deal about how the qualities which they invoked interrelated. The role of the *proxenos* emerges as something coherent and organic, in which the different characteristics I delineate for the purposes of analysis are not in fact easily separable.

The personal disposition of the *proxenos* with respect to the *polis* is the most regularly described of all the characteristics – in effect it is the basic element of the ἐπειδή clause, present even in decrees in which other characteristics were omitted for brevity. A fairly narrow range of adjectives and adjective combinations is attested introducing the description of the honorand in by far the most common form – either

²³ For omission, see the decrees of Gonnoi in general and many of the decrees of Delphi (e.g. *FD* III 1 18).

²⁴ For this idea, see Dover's comments on synonymy in a similar context, Dover (1974), 62-64 and esp. 71: 'The speaker may look at the same thing in different ways and in a great many contexts it does not actually matter which he chooses.'

with the present copula, ἐστί, or a present participle dependent on διατελεῖ (the present participle ὑπάρχων is sometimes also found as are perfect forms of γίγνομαι, with the same continuous present sense).²⁵ In rough order of frequency, the principle adjectives used in this position are ἀγαθός (often in the conjunction καλὸς κάγαθός),²⁶ εὖνους, πρόθυμος, χρήσιμος, φίλος, εὐχρηστος, and, less commonly (at least in this position), φιλότιμος. That this ‘well-disposedness’ (*eunoia*), or ‘regard’ (*philia*), ‘eagerness’ (*prothumia*), or even ‘usefulness’ (*khresimos/eukrestos*), was directed specifically towards the *polis* in question was almost always explicitly marked with the placement of a reference to the granting city (either *polis*, *demos*, or a collective ethnic) immediately afterwards, either in the dative or in a prepositional phrase (usually following περί or πρὸς).²⁷ This clarifies what is meant by the otherwise seemingly vague description of the *proxenos* as ἀγαθός. It was not the general demeanour or moral quality of the honorand which mattered for the grant of *proxenia* – it was his specific partiality for the *polis* in question which was important, his goodness to that city, which manifested itself in services which he performed for it and its citizens.

A somewhat wider range of terms is used to invoke these qualities in other constructions, using adverbial forms or abstract nouns, almost always after an adjective description with the copula (sometimes understood). All of the terms which occur in the adjectival clauses also occur in other constructions – so we see a *proxenos* described as εὐνόως διακείμενος in Thessaly²⁸ or εὐσεβῶς μὲν διακείμενος ... ποτὶ τὸν Απόλλω τὸν Πύθιον, εὐνοϊκῶς δὲ καὶ ποτὶ τὰν πόλιν (Delphi) or as

²⁵ In the case of γίγνομαι, of course, a perfect tense is logically equivalent with εἰμί (e.g. *Ilias* 53).

²⁶ καλὸς is not attested in this context in the absence of ἀγαθός (even as an intensifier in conjunction with a different adjective; cf. Dover 1974, 73), though ἀγαθός frequently occurs on its own.

²⁷ e.g. ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν π[ε]ρὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων, *IG* II² 26; [ἀ]νὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν καὶ εὖνους τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Τηνίων, *IG* XII 5 829.

²⁸ *SEG* 32 613 l.15.

continually making demonstrations of his *eunoia* (ἐνδεικνύμενος τὴν εὐνοίαν ἣν ἔχων τυγχάνει)²⁹ or *prothumia* for the city (ἐνδεικνύμενος δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον προθυμίαν).³⁰ But we also find different terms referencing similar abstract qualities *spoudē* and *ekteneia*, parallel with *prothumia* – the *proxenos*' zeal.³¹ Similarly, we find the honorand's attachment to the *polis* described using the abstract nouns αἵρεσις and προαίρεσις (personal inclination, in the latter case preference verging on devotion)³² in place of *eunoia*.³³

The affection or personal preference of the honorand for the honouring *polis* – in accordance with the alignment of *xenia* with *proxenia*, his friendship for it – is thus asserted as the basis of the permanent relationship which the *polis* constructed with *proxenia*.³⁴ It was almost invariably the first element of the ἐπειδὴ-clause (at least after the honorand was named with his ethnic), and often an adjectival clause, asserting this amity, was all that there was. First and foremost, then, the *proxenos* was felt to be the formally recognized, non-citizen friend (i.e. *xenos*) of the *polis*. The natural and expected result of this emotional basis, however, was that services would be performed by the honorand for the community in question – and thus the performance of services was, and was treated in this explanatory clause as, evidence of these feelings of friendship. This is what the decrees mean when they talk of the

²⁹ *IG XII 9 218*.

³⁰ ἐνδεικνύμενος δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον προθυμίαν, *IG XII 6 31* (Samos).

³¹ ἂν ἔχει ἐ[κ]τένειαν καὶ σπουδὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλιος ἀμῶν, *FD III 1 153 1.2*. The use of *ekteneia* in proxeny decrees is more or less restricted to a few Delphic inscriptions and a restoration in an Aitolian decree for two Magnesians (*I.Magnesia* 91c + p. 295). Better attested in *proxeny* grants are the adjectival (ἐκτενῆ) and adverbial forms (ἐκτενῶς), found in the Peloponnese (e.g. *IG IV 961*; *IvO 39*), Central and Northern Greece (*IG IX 1 222*; *FD III 1 151*; *SEG 26 677*), Delos (*IG XI 4 166*). *Ekteneia* does not occur juxtaposed with *prothumia*, except as restored in *I.Kallatis 7*, but *prothumia* and *spoude* are attested together, e.g. *SEG 29 1089*. In *I.Priene 53* and *54* their parallel use looks pleonastic.

³² *LSJ*.

³³ The fact that we never find *eunoia* and *hairesis* in conjunction makes it clear that these were thought of as equivalents (an individual displays his *eunoia* or his *hairesis* for the *polis*, never both; similarly he is only ever praised for one or the other) – and this is reinforced in other contexts where they are used in parallel (e.g. *Milet I 3 139C 1.51-2*).

³⁴ For *xenia* as both the etymological and institutional basis of *pro-xenia* – not least because it was a relationship of friendship involving *xenoi* – see Herman (1987), 132-8.

honorand as showing, making clear, or performing *apodeixeis* of his *eunoia* to the city – that he made his affection for the city manifest in the services which he repeatedly performed on its behalf.

The emphasis in these documents on repetition, on continuation, makes it clear that this is the way in which the *proxenos* was expected to behave in the future. This could be expressed with the present tense, or more markedly διατελεῖ with present participles, with the phrase ἐν τῷ πρότερον χρόνῳ and νῦν, or by stressing that the honorand *always* performed services for citizens in need, at *every* opportunity,³⁵ or indeed in the reference to this disposition being inherited (*patrike eunoia*, an inculcated predisposition).³⁶ The assertion that the honorand's *eunoia* has manifested itself continuously was vital in justifying the grant of *proxenia* which, like citizenship, constituted a permanent relationship with the *polis*. It was expected that the honorand would continue to perform services in the future because he was supposed (and in at least one case actively exhorted) to guard or maintain the same feelings of regard for the city from which these actions would naturally spring.³⁷ Utility was thus central to the *proxenos*-paradigm,³⁸ and this aspect was stressed when, as frequently, recipients of *proxenia* were described as χρήσιμος or εὐχρηστος,³⁹ or, indeed, more commonly,

³⁵ e.g. χρείας παρεχόμενοι ἀεὶ τῷ δεομένῳ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐμ παντὶ καιρῷ, *IG VII 10 1.8-10* – both elements also frequently occur on their own.

³⁶ See below, Chapter 2, 138-40.

³⁷ *FD III 2 89* ‘δ[ε]δόχθαι τῷ πόλει ... παρακαλεῖν δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ [λ]οιπὸν διαφυ[λάξ]ειν τὰν αὐτὰν προαίρεσιν.’ The case, like this exhortation, is unusual – the honorand, an Athenian called Apollodorus, had been brought to Delphi to help with an arbitration that did not happen – and this is the only interaction between this individual and Delphi which the inscription records. Perhaps it was used here as Apollodorus had no proven form in maintaining this crucial attitude of amity towards the polis (thus replacing references to previous, frequently expressed affection for the city – exhorting him to behave thus rather than noting that he already tended to).

³⁸ See, on this, Gauthier (1985), 140-5.

³⁹ Interestingly, we never find *chrēstos* in any description. The explanation of Whitehead (1993), 63-64, in relation to the Athenian evidence, suggesting that the ‘class-based connotations... proved too large an impediment in the way of its complete democratization’ hardly explains its absence elsewhere, and overlooks the definitely elite connotations of *kalos kagathos* and *philotimia* which certainly do occur, so Whitehead (1983). cf. Dover (1974), 296-7, on the differences between the ways in which *chrēsimos* and *chrēstos* are used in our sources.

as πρόθυμος – which was roughly equivalent, meaning ‘eager to perform services for the polis,’ as we can see in the ways in which it was sometimes expanded with the infinitive⁴⁰ and used in relation to the other terms.⁴¹

Services performed by *proxenoi*, however, did not just demonstrate the personal emotional commitment of the honorand to the city. These services were also instrumental themselves in establishing or cementing a relationship between the two actors based on reciprocity. The services of the honorand were gifts which *poleis* were obliged to respond to, if not in kind – the gifts of the *polis* were above all honorific in character – in due proportion or measure.⁴² At its heart the relationship implied by *proxenia* was thus euergetical in character. It involved individual benefactors (*euergetai*) performing benefactions (*euergesiai*) which were rewarded, and encouraged, with honours. The benefactions particularly associated with *proxenia* differ from those associated with citizen or royal euergetism, on which the bulk of modern scholarship has hitherto focussed, in that they were primarily non-financial.⁴³ Gift and counter-gift nonetheless created and expressed ties of obligation which each party was obliged to take into account in future interactions with each other. Recent scholarship has emphasised the way in which each party sought to put the other in its debt, obliging them to reciprocate in turn with greater benefactions.⁴⁴ It is important not to focus too closely, however, on individual honorific transactions, extrapolating from isolated rallies of honours and benefactions between particular cities and kings, or to reduce the reciprocity underlying euergetism to a balance sheet of payments.

⁴⁰ For πρόθυμος with the infinitive ποιεῖν, see, e.g., *IG XII 5* 111 l.5 and *II² 134* l.9.

⁴¹ No honorand is described as both χρήσιμος and πρόθυμος in the initial adjectival clause in which most other combinations of the adjectives used are found – which shows that these were felt to be equivalent in function and is the more marked because these decrees do not shy away from redundancy.

⁴² *Poleis* are frequently concerned to assert that they grant ‘worthy honours’ (e.g. *FD III 1* 152 l.8); see Mitchell (1997), 18-21.

⁴³ Bringmann (1993); Gauthier (1985), 140-5.

⁴⁴ Mitchell (2009), 21-2.

Benefaction and reciprocation expressed a relationship, unlike that of creditor and debtor, which was not cancelled when a response was made, but deepened by the cumulative history of mutual interactions.

1.3 The *Proxenos* as *Euergetes*

The *polis*' understanding of *proxenia* as a euergetical relationship is explicitly signalled by the fact that individuals were almost always formally named *euergetai* (benefactors) at the same time as they were pronounced *proxenoi*. This connection with another well-defined *polis* institution provides an important insight into how *proxenia* was conceived. However, cases where the title *euergetes* was used in isolation, in particular contexts in which *proxenia* was apparently not appropriate, highlights the particular content of *proxenia* – the specificity of the *proxenos*-paradigm.

The importance of euergetism for understanding *proxenia* is emphasized by the fact that it was enough, in some of the more concise decrees, instead of giving a full motivation clause, to simply state that an honorand was granted *proxenia* for being a *euergetes* or for performing *euergesiai* (εὐεργέτη ὄντι; κατ' εὐεργεσίαν).⁴⁵ On other occasions individuals who are explicitly named only as *proxenoi* appear to have been thought of as *euergetai* as well, when it is decreed that they should receive all of the honours given to other *euergetai*.⁴⁶ The granting of *euergetes* as a title, and especially inscribing it on stone had the explicit force of asserting the permanence of these different roles – the individual honorand as perpetual benefactor and *polis* as

⁴⁵ *Gonnoi* 3; *Milet* I 3 111. cf. *IG* II² 373 1.23-4.

⁴⁶ Thus we sometimes find individuals who are named simply *proxenos* but granted 'all else given to *euergetai*' (e.g. *I.Eph* 1459; *IG* IX 1 222).

continually grateful recipient of benefaction.⁴⁷ It communicated the expectation of an on-going relationship requiring each party to act in accordance with their designated roles – the *proxenos* to provide benefactions, the *polis* to express gratitude.⁴⁸

The use of the title, *euergetes*, to honour *proxenoi* and encourage continued benefaction in this way sharply differentiated *proxenoi* from citizens honoured in civic decrees. In contrast with the universal use of the title in relation to *proxenoi*, in almost all cities in the Classical and Hellenistic periods *euergetes* was considered an unsuitable honorific for citizens (excluding outsiders who were granted citizenship at the same time as they were named *euergetai*).⁴⁹ The issue here is that while it was useful to use this title, drawn from interpersonal relations, to establish permanent relationships with outsiders, the permanent obligation on the part of the *polis* to the individual which was implied by ‘*euergetes*’ did not seem compatible with a citizen’s membership of the community.⁵⁰ Likewise, while decrees inscribed in honour of citizens do often draw on the same language of praise as we see used in proxeny decrees, generalizing descriptions of the citizen honorand, the norm for *proxenoi*, tend to be avoided. Most decrees focus instead on describing the specific benefactions performed by the honorand (often his performance of magistracy).⁵¹ Where, in the

⁴⁷ In our literary sources the act of inscribing someone as an eternal benefactor, clearly expressing this symbolic force, is well attested – Hdt. 8.85; Pl. *Grg.* 505c (μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ’ ἔμοι ἀναγεγράφη). In Thuc. 1.129, although the title *euergetes* is not explicitly given, the reference to *euergesia* inscribed for all time is the same (κείσεται σοι εὐεργεσία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ ἐς αἰεὶ ἀνάγκραπτος). On these see Gauthier (1985), 20-1.

⁴⁸ This did not necessarily mean that new honours had to be provided in response to every service performed as, once granted, pre-existing privileges continued to assert the gratitude of the *polis*, especially when the *proxenos* made use of them, see below, Chapter 2, 129-36.

⁴⁹ cf. Gauthier (1985), 10-16, on the almost universal restriction of this title to citizens. *ID 77* in which an individual designated as a ‘Delian’ was made a benefactor of the Delians looks superficially like an exception (and it has not been noted). In fact, however, it seems probable that the individual in this case was not a Delian by birth. This is an honorific status, which is why Delian citizenship was mentioned in an internal decree, where citizens never otherwise receive ethnics, probably a resident (could this be the reason why *proxenia*, as the usual complement of *euergesia*, was considered unsuitable here?) being granted a subsequent honour (*ateleia*).

⁵⁰ Similarly Engen (2010), 148.

⁵¹ e.g. *IG II² 487* (an official in charge of inscription) or *Agora 15 71* (a board of *prytaneis*).

most elaborate decrees honouring the greatest citizen benefactors – such as Boulagoras of Samos and Protogenes of Olbia – these generalizing descriptions are used, it is striking that rather than using the continuous present of the *proxeny* decrees, these tend to be firmly placed in the past.⁵² Like the avoidance of the title, *euergetes*, this communicates a desire to avoid constructing a new permanent relation of obligation, elevating one citizen to the position of perpetual benefactor to (and over) the whole community.

Although all *proxenoi* seem to have been at least thought of as *euergetai* (and most were formally designated as such), not all *euergetai* were *proxenoi*. Before exploring the particular reasons for these exceptions – and what they tell us about what was not thought compatible with *proxenia* – it is important to establish the relation, and difference, between these two titles. Early scholarship proposed understanding these two titles as belonging to a rigid hierarchy of different honours.⁵³ Wilhelm, conversely, argued that both *proxenia* and *euergesia* entitled those who received them to particular privileges but, whereas *euergesia* represented the recognition of the existence of a service, *proxenia* also involved the recipient in certain future duties and tasks.⁵⁴ On the basis of this Gauthier suggested more recently that benefactors only received the title of *euergetes* in isolation if they were unable or unwilling for various reasons to be *proxenoi* – with the significance of *euergetes* being *polis*-internal whereas *proxenos* had a primarily external implication, of

⁵² Thus a wide range of decrees in Athens (II² 657, for the poet Philippides), Thessaly (*IG* IX 2 1103), Paros (*SEG* 32 825), and further afield (including the decrees for Menippos of Colophon, *SEG* 39 1243, and Protogenes of Olbia, *IosPE* P² 32) regularly use the perfect form of *diatelo* (διατετέλεκεν), which is only known in three decrees granting *proxenia* (*FD* III 1 480; *SEG* 3 468; *IG* XII 7 388). The use of present continuous description in the Boulagoras decree (XII 6 11 1.49-52), however, shows that this aversion was not as strong or marked as the use of the title *euergetes*.

⁵³ Keil (1899), 184-5, proposed reading this as a rigid tripartite system – praise, *euergetes*, and *proxenos* – with the earlier prerequisite for the latter; Francotte (1910), 194-6, likened *euergesia* and *proxenia* to two heraldic orders, higher and lower.

⁵⁴ Wilhelm (1942), 36-7; cf. Monceaux (1886), 97.

interactions with citizens of the granting *polis* when they were abroad.⁵⁵ This seems likely to be correct but requires some modification. As the power to grant these titles lay with the *polis* rather than the honorand, it is important to stress that the decision to name an honorand simply *euergetes* rather than *proxenos and euergetes* reflects its assessment of him and the inappropriateness in particular instances of the specific implications which were conveyed by *proxenos*, as a more specialized subcategory of *euergetes*. While both titles anticipate that future *euergesiai* will be performed by the recipient, the title *proxenos* in general involves the expectation that these are likely to take certain forms, above all aid to citizens of the granting *polis* in the context of the *polis* of the recipient.

The well known and consistent class of exception – of individuals honoured as *euergetai* but not *proxenoi* – were the Hellenistic kings.⁵⁶ In this case the utility for *poleis* of the title *euergetes* was clear. It allowed them to recast the relationship between ruler and ruled in terms which offered advantages to both parties – of perpetual benefactor versus grateful recipient. The king thereby secured consent for his rule, strengthened by the moral framework by which recipient was bound to benefactor. The *polis*, for its part, was thereby able to maintain an outward show of independence – subservience became gratitude – and was able using this same framework to exert moral pressure in return on the king to behave as a benefactor (as gratitude required something to be grateful for).⁵⁷ The absence of the title *proxenos* in this context must relate to its specific content as an institution. Marek argued that the relationship of permanence and exclusivity implied by *proxenia* was inappropriate to the position of the king who did not serve the interests of any particular community

⁵⁵ Gauthier (1985), 23.

⁵⁶ Marek (1984), 335-9, collects grants for lower ranking monarchs and dynasts.

⁵⁷ Veyne (1990), 102-3; Bringmann (1993), 17-23; Ma (2002), 202-6.

but was instead a universal benefactor and there may be something in this, although individual *poleis* were keen to refer in their decrees to the particular fondness which individual kings had for them.⁵⁸ It also seems likely, however, that the sort of political services expected of *proxenoi* in the context of their own communities, while appropriate enough in relation to civic elites and, by extension, even members of royal courts, seemed ridiculous in connection with a king who was himself the source of political power. In comparison with the gifts a king could grant in his own right, including recognition of status (freedom, autonomy, or *asylia*), substantial resources, or funds and protection,⁵⁹ the services expected of and associated with *proxenoi* were decidedly mediocre – at most consisting of help securing these more substantial benefactions from civic or royal authorities.

There are other instances also where it seems probable that the title of *proxenos* was specifically withheld rather than simply not used, where individuals were appointed *euergetes* in an epigraphic context in which most individuals were named both *proxenos* and *euergetes*. At Thera it seems that we may be able to identify geographical factors as significant in inscribed lists naming three individuals on two separate occasions as simply *euergetai* in the context of much longer lists naming others both *proxenoi* and *euergetai*. Unlike the other honorands, who come from the Aegean world, the individuals singled out as *euergetai* originate in the west, with one individual from Syracuse and two, if they are read correctly, from Calabria (Καλαβ[ροί]).⁶⁰ It seems likely that the services which they performed for the Therans had little to do with their origins – and it may be that either they themselves had ceased to have much to do with their native communities, or, more probably, that

⁵⁸ Marek (1984), 337.

⁵⁹ Bringmann (1993).

⁶⁰ The only alternative Καλαβ[ατιανός], a minor community in Asia Minor (Zgusta 1984, no.411), would be overlong; the names also support a western origin.

these were places with which Therans had little to do and where, therefore, the specific, future *euergesiai* expected in the case of *proxenia* made little sense (a lack of interest in their native political communities may also be implied by the regional ethnic ‘Kalabroi’).⁶¹ We can find a likely parallel for these sorts of scruples concerning *proxenia* in an early Oropian decree which names an individual from the Carian city of Theangela as *euergetes* (but not *proxenos*), at roughly the same time as two decrees granting, in contrast, both *proxenia* and *euergesia* to two Macedonians.⁶²

In the few other cases which we have, however, it is often difficult to identify the reasons why the title *proxenos* appeared inappropriate, and, indeed, the rarity of the use of the title *euergetes* on its own in honorific decrees suggests that it was something of a marginal phenomenon.⁶³ In other contexts, under strain, cities seem to have little difficulty in making wider symbolic use of *proxenia* than the narrower *proxenos*-paradigm, which seems to have impeded its grant in these cases, strictly suggested.⁶⁴ However, against this more permissive background, it is significant that on occasion these sorts of scruples did find expression and other honorific forms were sought and used as alternatives, reflecting the perceived specificity of the *proxenos*-paradigm.

⁶¹ The roughly contemporary grant of *proxenia*, to individuals from the city of Rome, which was in fact more distant, does not contradict this picture, as Theran interests in Rome, at the time of these lists (c.100 BC), would be of a very different kind.

⁶² *I.Oropos* 3 with Knoepfler (2001a), 367-89, dating these to the brief period of Oropian independence, 338-335 BC. To these examples should be added Skirtias in *IC* II x 1, on whom, see n.95, below.

⁶³ See also *IG* II² 351+ 624 – it is unclear whether the honorand was not named *proxenos* because the nature of his benefaction was primarily financial and took place within the context of Athens, did not make him the appropriate recipient of this honour, or because, as a Plataian, he already had citizen rights. Whitehead (1977), 29-30, thought him likely to be a metic because of his participation in this *epidosis*. Other examples may include *IG* II² 81 and 845 (both heavily restored), as well as XII 4 75 1.49 (an individual given this title in an *epidosis* list from Kos). *IG* I³ 1454 is a related case (a particular individual, his sons – but also the *koinon* of the Eteokarpathians – are inscribed as the *euergetai* of the Athenians).

⁶⁴ See above, n.6.

1.4 The Specificity of the *Proxenos*-Paradigm

This specificity was strongly expressed through the stereotypical descriptions of *proxenoi*. Although the component adjectives, nouns, and verbal phrases from which these descriptions were constructed were not restricted to decrees granting *proxenia*, belonging instead to a wider honorific vocabulary used in decrees for other citizen and non-citizen honorands, the way in which they were used together in proxeny decrees was in fact highly specific to grants of *proxenia*. When we examine substantial series of honorific decrees from particular *poleis*, a very strong link emerges between the description of the particular characteristics which I have delineated – the *proxenos*-paradigm – and the grant of *proxenia*.

In particular, in the more than sixty relevant honorific decrees from Samos, in only two cases is it clear that the typical Samian *proxenos* description was used in relation to honorands who were not then named *proxenoi* (both were in fact granted citizenship).⁶⁵ In the more than seventy honorific decrees known from Iasos there is only one instance in which the forms of *proxenos* description used there were applied to an individual who was not granted *proxenia* and he was probably already an Iasian *proxenos*.⁶⁶ At Oropos and Delos this holds over even more substantial sets of data. In only one of the nearly three-hundred honorific decrees of Oropos known is an honorand described in *proxenos*-terms without the grant of *proxenia*.⁶⁷ Of the hundreds of honorific decrees from Delos, only five use the full formulaic *proxenos* description without a concomitant grant of *proxenia* – and in some of these cases it is

⁶⁵ IG XII 6 24 and 43; these stand against some 28 decrees where both the grant of *proxenia* and the *proxenos*-paradigm are securely attested (from no Samian proxeny decree is this paradigm known to have been absent).

⁶⁶ At Iasos it is striking that the only foreign individual honoured whose ethnic is certainly omitted is one of only two granted *politeia* and not *proxenia* (*I.Iasos* 47). By contrast, while the priest of Labraunda, honoured in Maddoli (2007) no. 20B, is described in proxenic terms this is presumably because he already possessed *proxenia*, so P. Fröhlich *BE* (2009), n. 451.

⁶⁷ *I.Oropos* 307 – the honorand in question may already have been a *proxenos*.

possible that the reason why *proxenia* was not granted was because it was already held.⁶⁸ In all of these instances it is difficult to explain the exceptions, which probably relate to particular circumstances, but the rule, the strong correlation between these particular sorts of *proxenos*-description and the grant of *proxenia*, is clear. This correlation is further strengthened by considering decrees which did not grant *proxenia*. Where these texts contain motivation clauses they tend to avoid generalising description of the honorand and instead set out in concrete detail the specific benefactions he performed – something *proxeny* decrees do comparatively rarely and almost never to the exclusion of generalising description.

On the surface material from Athens and Ephesus appears to complicate this picture. Although at Athens there is a very strong correlation between the use of these specific, formulaic descriptions and the granting of *proxenia*, elements of these descriptions are sometimes also found in relation to individuals granted Athenian citizenship instead.⁶⁹ In the material record from Ephesus, moreover, exceptions to this correlation appear to be the rule, with these forms of description instead associated with grants of citizenship (of the 60 honorific decrees which use these sorts of *proxenos*-descriptions, only five explicitly grant *proxenia*, the rest are citizenship grants). In both of these cases, however, I would argue *proxenia* remained the model underlying these grants. At Athens *politeia* was granted to particular foreign benefactors as a more marked honour to outsiders who might otherwise receive *proxenia*. Whereas at Samos and Iasos *proxenia* and *politeia* were conceived of as complimentary means of establishing a permanent relationship and almost always granted together, at Athens there seems to have been a stricter sense of hierarchy.

⁶⁸ *IG XI 4* 542 (Damaratos, king of Sparta); 559 (Philokles, king of Sidon); 646; 705; 784. In *IG XI 4* 600 is another example where the reason for the absence is made clear by the publication clause, which references an earlier decree of *proxenia*.

⁶⁹ e.g. *IG II²* 495 1.10-16; 654 1.21-5.

There *politeia*, granted much more sparingly,⁷⁰ expressed a stronger relationship between *polis* and individual which seems to have been felt to obviate any need for a grant of *proxenia* because it superseded it (*proxenia* was never granted at the same time as *politeia* or to individuals who already possessed it, but *politeia* was sometimes given to *proxenoi*).⁷¹

In the decrees of Ephesus it is striking that these descriptions are similarly used predominantly in decrees granting *politeia* as an honour to individuals who were apparently not expected to settle at Ephesus.⁷² Even though these grants of citizenship were always formally ‘activated’, with tribe and *chiliastys* automatically assigned, it is clear from the descriptions that these are not grants of citizenship to immigrants but to outsiders expected to continue to be active, and useful, in their own communities – like the two Milesians who are described, in the continuous present, as aiding citizens who come to Miletus (*I.Eph* 1411) or the Akarnanian at the court of king Prepelaos specifically praised for aiding a recent embassy there in addition to his general services to citizens (*I.Eph* 1449). In particular it is striking that the only citizenship decrees for individuals who certainly were expected to settle permanently at Ephesus are also the only decrees which do not describe the honorands in these *proxenos* terms but, like the motivating clauses of non-proxenic decrees from elsewhere, describe only particular actions of the honorand.⁷³ Was the use of these euergetical terms

⁷⁰ Although, after the end of the fourth century, decrees of citizenship are in fact more abundant than those of *proxenia* in the Athenian epigraphic record, this reflects a tendency for inscription to be granted less frequently, as a more marked honour (thus granted more frequently alongside *politeia*, the higher honour). See Chapter 5, 252 and 253 (Fig. 6).

⁷¹ There is only one Athenian decree in which both *proxenia* and *politeia* were granted, *IG* II² 19, in which an original proposal of *proxenia* was upgraded in a rider to include *politeia*. Though Mitchell (1997), 40, is correct, in reference to this decree, that *proxenia* was not ‘incompatible with citizenship,’ *contra* Osborne (1981-3), D 7, given the lack of other Athenian decrees granting both, *politeia* probably was conceived in this case as superseding rather than augmenting.

⁷² This is presumably the reason that Marek included these decrees as an addendum in his catalogue of Ephesian *proxenoi*, Marek (1984), 105.

⁷³ *I.Eph* 1415 for a young metic boxer who proclaimed Ephesus his hometown on winning at the

inappropriate, or at least less desirable, in relation to individuals who were actually expected to become citizens? In this case it is possible that, within this east Greek context in which *proxenia* and *politeia* were often routinely granted together,⁷⁴ an explicit grant of *proxenia* came to be felt as redundant. Indeed it may even have been felt in some sense to be implied by the honorific grant of *politeia*, in much the same way as the title *euergetes* often was.⁷⁵

Two series of Athenian decrees for particular individuals highlight the ways in which these inscribed descriptions worked – and how they were specifically related to grants of *proxenia*. The first is a monument for Herakleides of Salamis, comprising of five separate decrees in his honour. The four earlier decrees, for all that they grant substantial honours including gold crowns, do not grant *proxenia*. Instead, like other honorific decrees from elsewhere which do not invoke this permanent honorific relation, they simply describe the specific benefactions of Herakleides which prompted the honours granted in each case – specifically offering grain at a cheaper price despite being the first merchant to bring his ship in (and thus otherwise in the position to extort a high price). It is only in the last of these decrees, which does grant *proxenia*, that Herakleides is described in more general, *proxenos*-appropriate terms, as habitually performing services for the Athenians – διατελεῖ φιλοτιμούμενος πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ποιῶν ὅτι δύναται ἀγαθὸν – with the earlier, specific honorific decrees inscribed beneath to substantiate this assertion.⁷⁶ This sort of

Nemea (ἰσοτελής καὶ κατοικῶν] ἐν Ἐφέσῳ) and *I.Eph* 1420 for two Athenian potters who promised to complete a dedication for the god whose citizenship is explicitly made contingent on their residence at Ephesus and completion of their task.

⁷⁴ Including, earlier, at Ephesus, *I.Eph* 1389.

⁷⁵ At Ephesus, despite the fact that the title *euergetes* is not explicitly granted by these decrees, the honorands are often granted *politeia* as given to other *euergetai* (*I.Eph* 1442). That *proxenia* was also implied is perhaps indicated by the use of an analogous phrase ‘what is provided for the other *proxenoi*’ in a decree granting citizenship but not *proxenia* (*I.Eph* 1422 – the citizen grant is restored, but securely, on the basis of the closing citizenship-grant formula).

⁷⁶ *IG* II² 360 (*RO* 95).

description was felt appropriate for Herakleides only when he was being considered for a grant of *proxenia* – and this strongly emphasises the way in which these stereotypical descriptions were conceived, as expressing a paradigm of specifically *proxenos* behaviour.

The second set of honorific decrees from Athens, three decrees for Euenor the Akarnanian doctor, reveals how these *proxenos*-descriptions could be deployed in relation to a probably atypical *proxenos*, deliberately downplaying his divergence from the *proxenos*-paradigm. In the first of these, in which he is named *proxenos*, Euenor is purposefully described in stereotypical *proxenos* terms, which deliberately assimilate him to other *proxenoi* – ἐ[πειδ]ή Εὐή[νωρ] Ἀκαρνάν πρόθυμός ἐστι[ν] περὶ [τ]ὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ποεῖ ὅτ[ι] δύναται ἀγαθόν (IG II² 373 1.4-6). In the next decree in which he is honoured, inscribed under the first, Euenor's status as *proxenos* is mentioned and, although there is a reference, unusual for a *proxenos*, to his taking care of tasks imposed by the *demoi*, there is again no overt mention of his profession as a doctor.⁷⁷ It is only in the last of these decrees (inscribed on a separate stone), in which Euenor is named an Athenian citizen and his *proxeny* is unrecorded, that he ceases to be described exclusively in these generic, *proxenos* appropriate terms and his medical vocation and activities are explicitly described at all ([Εὐήνωρ ὁ ἰατρὸς [χρήσιμον ἑαυτὸν πα]ρέσχηκεν **κατὰ τὴν τέχνην** τοῖς δεομένοις], 1.4, 6-7). The first two decrees in this sequence thus appear to represent an attempt to use an honorific status in relation to an honorand, Euenor, whom it did not perfectly fit – presumably because the services for which he was honoured as *proxenos* differed markedly from those expected of *proxenoi*, both in their nature (medical) and in the place (i.e. within

⁷⁷ [ἐπ]ειδὴ δὲ Εὐήνωρ Εὐηπίου δι' εὐεργεσίαν πρόξεν[ο]ς ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἅπαντα ὅσ[α] προσέταξεν αὐτῷ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινεῖ ἐπιμέλεται (IG II² 373 1.23-6).

Athens) where they were performed. The grant of *politeia*, by contrast, emerges as expressing a less specific sort of relationship – one for which Euenor’s activities at Athens can be more appropriately cited.

2 The Services Associated with *Proxenia*

The way in which these stereotypical descriptions were deployed in our corpus of honorific decrees thus strongly supports the suggestion that they were felt to evoke a coherent and specific *proxenos*-paradigm, emphasising in particular the emotional basis and content of this relationship. At the same time, however, utility, from the perspective of the *polis*, the usefulness of the *proxenos*, was also conceived of as being central.⁷⁸ In this section I argue that, although the descriptions of this usefulness in our decrees appear very general, in fact, when considered in the context of other assumptions concerning the *proxenos* expressed in our decrees, above all his communal context, it is possible to identify a specific range of types of service particularly associated with *proxenia*. These collectively amounted to an intermediary role, allowing individuals from one city access to the institutions and networks of their *proxenos*’ *polis*. I begin therefore by examining the generic descriptions of the ways in which *proxenoi* were useful, before going on to argue that the ways in which *proxenoi* were described in decrees conveyed the basic assumption that the *proxenos* was and would continue to be active in his own *polis*.

⁷⁸ Gauthier (1985), 140-5.

2.1 Generic Descriptions of the Services Performed by *Proxenoi*

The services performed by *proxenoi* were usually described in a number of generic ways – the most common type resembling closely the following formula frequently used at Tenos:

διατελεῖ χρείας παρεχόμενος καὶ κοινεῖ τῇ πόλει καὶ ἰδίαι Τηνίων τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν αὐτῶι

He lives his life performing services publicly to the *polis* and privately to those of the Tenians who come to meet him.⁷⁹

Although the precise wording did vary (e.g. with a present tense of *παρέχομαι* used in place of *διατελῶ* with the participial form), this conjunction of elements is absolutely characteristic. Moreover the second part of this phrase – that these services were performed both for the public benefit of the city and the private benefit of Tenian citizens ‘who met with him’ – is crucial to understanding *proxenia*. The *proxenos* is one who, because of his regard for a *polis*, aids not merely those of its citizens whom he encounters working for its collective interests, but even those pursuing private advantage because of their membership of this community. This joint emphasis on interactions between *proxenos* and *polis* on both public and private levels is also one of the most potentially interesting issues in the study of *proxenia*. It hints at the possibility that these official, public relationships may provide us with information about otherwise unattested private relationships and interactions.⁸⁰

The nature and context of these interactions, public and private, are questions which have been vigorously debated. In particular it has been doubted, especially in

⁷⁹ *IG XII 5 798*; cf. 816 and 819.

⁸⁰ I explore this issue more fully in Chapter 3.

individual cases, how far the interactions in question are likely to have been economic and the extent to which the *polis* indicated by the ethnic of the *proxenos* can be assumed to represent the context in which these took place. One difficulty here is the generic nature of these inscriptions of services rendered. Where the specific services of particular *proxenoi* are mentioned by decrees, not only is it likely that this is because they are exceptional in kind or degree, they also seem to be ‘public’ in character, performed for the community as a whole (which should not surprise given that these inscriptions were concise, public monuments). These formulaic descriptions are intentionally broad. Talk of the *proxenos* ‘providing services’ (χρείας παρεχόμενος),⁸¹ ‘doing whatever good he can’ (ποιῶν ὅ τι δύναται ἀγαθόν),⁸² of ‘forever being the cause of benefits’ (ἀεὶ τινος ἀγαθοῦ παραίτιος γινόμενος),⁸³ and ‘making himself useful at every opportunity, both to the polis and privately to those of the citizens who meet him’ (αὐτὸν εὐχρηστον ἐμ παντὶ καιρῶι παρασκευάζων κοιναῖ τε τῆ πόλει καὶ καθ’ ἰδίαν τοῖς ἐντυγχανόντοισι τῶν πολειτῶν)⁸⁴ is designed to encourage and recognise a broad range of benefaction on the part of the *proxenos*. Even recurrent references to the *proxenos* ‘saying and doing things in the interest of (the people)’ (λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ συμφέροντα)⁸⁵ – apart from emphasising the importance of speech as a form of service (especially in public contexts) – do little to communicate any expectations which the *polis* might have of the specific sorts of services which their citizens could expect to receive from their *proxenos*.

This does not, however, mean that such expectations did not exist. Frequent references occur throughout our epigraphic evidence to appeals made by distressed

⁸¹ e.g. *IG* XII 5 798.

⁸² e.g. *IG* XI 4 639.

⁸³ e.g. *IG* IX 2 219.

⁸⁴ e.g. *FD* III 4 56.

⁸⁵ e.g. *I.Oropos* 22.

citizens of the honouring *polis* to their *proxenos* (εἰς ἃ ἂν ἕκαστος παρακαλεῖ: εὐχρηστον παρέχεται αὐτοσαυτὸν ἐπὶ τὰ παρακαλείμενα; χρείας διατελεῖ παρεχόμενος οὗ ἂν τις αὐτὸν παρακαλεῖ)⁸⁶ and to the honorand performing services to citizens who make requests or are in need (τοῖς δεομένοις; εὐνοῦν καὶ πρόθυμον ἑαυτὸν παρέχεται εἰς τε τὰς τοῦ δήμου χρείας καὶ ὧν ἂν τις ἰδία τῶν πολιτῶν δεόμενός του τύχη; τοῖς χρείαν ἔχουσιν; τυγχάνωσι χρείαν ἔχοντες).⁸⁷ These requests for aid, though they are set out in similarly non-specific terms, imply more specific notions about what a *proxenos* could be expected to do, and thus an association between *proxenoi* and the sorts of service they provided most regularly. Later in this chapter I will explore the evidence we have for the sorts of service particularly associated with the *proxenos*. However, all of these points depend on the extent to which the *proxenos* was expected to perform these services in the context of his own community.

2.2 The Communal Contexts of *Proxenoi*

In early scholarship it was generally assumed that the ethnic recorded in the proxeny-decree was significant for the grant – in particular that trade-links between *poleis* could be read from these decrees.⁸⁸ In response to this it has rightly been pointed out that the primary context for the contact implied by a proxeny grant may often not have been the *proxenos*' *polis* of origin at all.⁸⁹ There are cases where an honorand receiving *proxenia* was demonstrably resident in the granting *polis* at the

⁸⁶ *IG* XI 4 681 (Delos); *I.Oropos* 147 (Oropos); *FD* III 2 91 (Delphi); XII 9 900A (Chalcis).

⁸⁷ *I.Oropos* 125 (Oropos); *IG* VII 9 (Megara); XII 6 30 (Samos); *SEG* 30 533 l.18 (Magnesia); *IG* XI 4 776 (Delos).

⁸⁸ e.g. Wilhelm (1942), 51; Rostovzeff (1941), 245; Durrbach (1921-2), 57-8; Shear (1978), 30-1 (Delos).

⁸⁹ So Reger (1994), 67-9; Archibald (2001), 261-3.

time of his nomination.⁹⁰ More frequently decrees themselves make clear that particular honorands were appointed for services performed (and to perform future services) in the context of a position at a royal court or as commander of a body of soldiers, rather than in their native *poleis*.⁹¹ Individuals were even honoured for professional skills exhibited in the context of the granting *polis* – as doctors, perhaps, or poets.⁹² This sort of mobility – which is thought to be more characteristic of the Hellenistic than Classical Greeks – has been woven into narratives about the way in which this institution changed between periods. The hereditary *proxenoi* of the Classical epoch, during which a family of *proxenoi* might perform services for their granting *polis* over a number of generations within the same city, it is suggested, became less common in the Hellenistic, when continuity of residence could not be assumed.⁹³ However, we must set aside, for a moment, the various examples given in support of these sorts of narratives of decline – and the many counterexamples which might be given in contradiction of them.⁹⁴ *Proxenia* was, as I have already said, an institution capable of encompassing non-typical cases. The important question, however, is, whether there were more specific, expected norms. I argue that *proxenia* was and continued to be primarily conceived as an inter-*polis* institution.

The expectation, communicated by the formulaic descriptions of honorands in proxeny inscriptions, seems to have been that the primary context of the *proxenos*, the place in which he would most likely perform the services referred to and interact with citizens of the granting *polis*, was the *polis* designated by his ethnic. That an

⁹⁰ See below, 58-9 with n.108, and above, 48-50.

⁹¹ Robert (1963), 66-7: 'Il faut penser que ces proxènes peuvent être des gens vivant loin de leur patrie, et d'abord comme officiers d'une monarchie, et que des villes honorent non point à cause de leur origine ethnique, mais à cause de leur situation.'

⁹² e.g. *I.Oropos* 63 – a poet; *IG IX 2* 69, a decree for the horse doctor, Metrodorus, is a particularly good example. For collections of examples, see Marek (1984), 359-79. For the material relating to doctors, see now also Samama (2003).

⁹³ Marek (1984), 387-8.

⁹⁴ See Introduction, 4-7.

individual was likely to retain strong ties with his *polis* of origin – the ethnic of which he used to identify himself – would not be a surprising assumption for a *polis* to make, especially in relation to the sort of high-profile, influential individual likely to receive *proxenia*. Although we have to allow for the possibility that the affiliation indicated by an ethnic might not be significant in a particular case, we should certainly not assume that it was not – and nor did *poleis*.

Above all this expectation, not of immobility, but of primary residence or even simply continued activity of the individual at his native community, is signalled by the importance of the *proxenos*' ethnic in the epigraphic monument recording his grant, which is almost invariably featured prominently in the text of the grant itself.⁹⁵ The *proxenos*' ethnic was often also indicated in a heading inscribed over it or by a relief depicting a symbolic representation of the *polis* in question.⁹⁶ Inscriptions, which make reference to the fact that decrees are initiated by the reports of citizens

⁹⁵ In our entire corpus of c.2,500 inscriptions there are very few exceptions to this rule (excluding Romans identified instead by their *tria nomina*) and those there were predominately relate to individuals who were well known in their own right: from Eretria *IG XII 9 221* (=Knoepfler (2001a), no.VIII), for Aristonous, bodyguard of Alexander, and Knoepfler (2001a), no.15; *IG XII 5 1004*, from Ios for Zenon (sent to Ios by the nesiarch Bacchon); *XI 4 613*, from Delos for a Mytilenean peripatetic philosopher; Dimitrova (2008), no. 5.79-80, from Samothrace, registering two *theoroi* from king Attalus as *proxenoi*; *IErythrai 6* identifies the famous Athenian general simply as 'Konon.' See also Aristoboulos, son of Persaios, *IG XII 1187 l.31* (Hestiaia) discussed in Chapter 3, 164 n.24 below. In *Tit.Cal.* 1A and B there are two further examples of individuals who are not given ethnics (in 1B alongside another individual, a Delphian, who is) for reasons which are unclear. The omission of ethnic in *I.Oropos 303* is easier to explain – it relates to the singular nature of this text (which had little to do with *proxenia*, except as an inducement), a decree offering *proxenia* with its attendant privileges to any individual willing to loan more than a talent to Oropos for the construction of a defensive wall. In the bizarre Kydonian list of *proxenoi* granted the use of certain lands, *IC II x 1*, Skirtias, instead of an ethnic, is identified as *euergetes* – in this context probably indicating that he was not a *proxenos* at all, reinforcing rather than undermining the significance of the ethnic for *proxenoi*. *I.Thrac.Aeg.* 400 is not an example because the ethnic of the honorand was superfluous in this decree set up in his home community. See also Knoepfler (2001a), no.15, with discussion of this phenomenon at 279-81.

⁹⁶ Headings: e.g. *II² 63*, *I.Priene 6*; *BCH 57* (1933), 492. Relief sculpture (especially civic badges – *parasema*): Lawton (1995), on the Athenian examples (his no. 29, 30, 42, 68, 79, 87, 158, and perhaps 11 and 114) to which now add *IG II² 267* (=II³ 1 495) with Mack *ap.* Lambert (2012), 402. For the material outside Athens, see Ritti (1969); Zagdoun, *FD IV 6*, p.61-75; Lawton (1995), 21-2 n.89; Knoepfler (2001a), 30, with the addition of *SEG 47 1659* and Killen (2008). Antigonos of Karystos, the third-century writer and bronze-worker, introduces the *parasemon* of Krannon in Thessaly as something depicted on inscribed proxeny grants (ἐπὶ τῶν προξενιῶν τῶν ἀναγραφομένων τὸ παράσημον τῆς πόλεως, καθάπερ ἐστὶν ἔθμιον πᾶσι προσπαρατιθέναί, ὑπογράφονται δύο κόρακες..., *Mir.* 15a 1.1).

returning from abroad (especially traders and ambassadors)⁹⁷ or which make provision for the despatch of ambassadors to deliver the decree to the honorand,⁹⁸ reinforce this sense of the *proxenos* as useful in an external context. Other inscriptions construct the *proxenoi* of a *poleis* as a geographically distributed network, including decrees appointing *proxenoi* in relation to pre-existing *proxenoi*⁹⁹ and lists which present an ordered catalogue of all *proxenoi* organised by city and, often, by region as well.¹⁰⁰ In one unusually forthcoming inscription, the motivation for passing an honorific decree is explicitly given in these terms – ‘...concerning *proxenoi*, so that there will be, in Kyrene, individuals who will take care of the Athenians who arrive there.’¹⁰¹

The assumed importance of the *proxenos*' ethnic is also clearly communicated by the frequent need for additional information to be given where this expectation, that the ethnic indicated the context of the *proxenos*, was not met. Thus when an individual was honoured for performing the services of a *proxenos* in a different context – a royal court or military command – this was often explicitly stated: ‘since Eumenides the Athenian performs services for citizens while *spending time at the court of the king*’ (διατριβῶν παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ) or ‘*having been put in command of a garrison*’ (τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς...).¹⁰² *Proxenia*, primarily an inter-*polis* institution, had to be explicitly adapted to deal with these different sorts of political community, royal court and military camp. The intermediary functions performed by the honorands within this community were the same, or sufficiently similar that the

⁹⁷ e.g. *IG* II² 343, 785; *FD* III 1 152; *I.Byzantion* 1.

⁹⁸ e.g. *IG* XII 7 388 (Minoan decree for a citizen of Aigiale); *I.Lampsakos* 7 (= *I.Thasos* 171; decree of Lampsacus for Thasian). See Marek (1984), 372-3 and 376-9.

⁹⁹ μετὰ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος προξένο τῶν πόλι ἐν Ἀβύδωι, *IKnidus* 603 1.9-13; μετὰ τῶν [ὑπ]αρχόντων π[ροξ]ένων Ἀθήνησι, *IG* XII 5 1000 1.6-7.

¹⁰⁰ On these see Chapter 3, 158-60.

¹⁰¹ [περὶ δὲ] προξένων ὅπως ἂν [[ᾧσιν ἐν Κυρήνη], οἵτινες ἐπιμελήσ[ο]||νται Ἀθηναίων τ[ῶν] ἀφικνομένων, *IG* II² 176 1.17-19.

¹⁰² e.g. *IG* II² 495; XII 6 30.

same set of formulaic expressions could be used to describe them, but the ethnic of the honorand, which usually indicated the context in which these services had predominately taken place and would continue to do so, often needed to be supplemented.¹⁰³ In much the same way, in a rather smaller collection of examples, when individuals resident in cities other than their native *poleis* are named as *proxenoi*, this is explicitly given as the context for the services they provide.¹⁰⁴

There are apparent exceptions, cases where we infer that an honorand was appointed *proxenos* for reasons that had little to do with the *polis* to which he belonged although the decree in question contains no supplements of this sort. The most obvious examples are where non-polis, regional ethnics were used of individuals. The most well-known of these is Μακεδών. Those Macedonians, whose community of origin is not further described,¹⁰⁵ frequently receive *proxenia* explicitly as the courtiers or officers of kings but there is also a significant number for whom no such additional designation is given, where it is unclear in what context the Μακεδών had functioned and was expected to function in future as *proxenos*. Perhaps some of these were atypical *proxenoi*, for whom such a grant signified a bond of friendship not conceived of as a link to any other community. As I argue, *proxenia* as an institution

¹⁰³ In the case of *I.Oropos* 175 and *IG XII* 6 118, the analogous nature of the functions performed in each context is made particularly clear – the honorands in question are described in terms which make it clear they performed as *proxenoi* in both city and court. On the force of *diatribo*, see Savalli-Lestrade (1998), 256-7.

¹⁰⁴ The earliest example may be *I.Lindos* 16 (but against the suggestion that it names an Aiginetan *proxenos* at Naukratis, see Bresson 1980, 302-7); *IEph* 1447 (the Ephesians honour four *Kerameis* on Rhodes); *IG XI* 4 588 (the Delians honour a Naxian who aids their citizens at Alexandria); *IC IV* 218 (the Gortynians honour an individual resident at Messene); *SEG* 2 332 (the Delphians honour four Pergamenes resident in an unknown third *polis*); *IGUR I* 2-3 (the Akragantines and Maltese separately honour a Syracusan resident in Rome).

¹⁰⁵ Like other regional ethnics individuals bearing this ethnic are often further identified as the members of specific *poleis*, e.g. Μακεδών ἐξ Ἀνφιπόλεως (*IG XII* 6 19), in which case the expected civic context for interactions is even more strongly marked. The contrast is particularly clear in the list of *proxenoi* appointed in a single year from Histiaia (*XII* 9 1187), where we find three Macedonian nominees for whom an additional *polis* designation is given (one from Aigai; two from Thessalonike) and one recorded simply as a Μακεδών. On these expanded ethnics in general, see Frazer (2009), 119-42.

could be used in such non-typical cases by analogy. However, in this concise epigraphic genre it is also probable that in many cases it was not thought necessary to give supplementary information – such as a particular Macedonian’s place at the king of Macedon’s court, service in a royal army, or residence in a third city – which was common knowledge in the town making a particular grant.¹⁰⁶ In other words, although the regular recurrence in these brief inscriptions of such pieces of supplementary information, where an ethnic was not thought sufficiently informative, does strongly suggest that the community indicated by an ethnic was usually thought important, the absence of this information in other cases where it might be relevant does not support the reverse argument.

The other class of exception mentioned most frequently in the scholarship which might complicate this picture are metic *proxenoi*.¹⁰⁷ If metics, permanently resident in a *polis*, were regularly granted *proxenia* this might make it more difficult to argue that this was conceived of as an intermediary institution enabling interaction with an external community. There is, however, no evidence that proxeny was regularly granted to individuals expected to permanently reside at the granting *polis*.¹⁰⁸ At Athens, the *polis* where metic-*proxenoi* have been most confidently identified, there existed another well-defined honorific status for resident foreigners, distinct from *proxenia*, *isoteleia*, along with a different, standard set of appropriate accompanying privileges (including the right to march with the citizen rather than

¹⁰⁶ On the omission of ethnics, see above, n. 95.

¹⁰⁷ Identified by Clerc (1893), 218-20, and accepted, at least in the case of the Akarnanian doctor Euenor (*IG II² 373-4*) by Wilhelm (1942), 58. On Euenor, see above, 49-50.

¹⁰⁸ The grant of *enktesis*, used by Clerc to identify metic *proxenoi* (1893, 218-20), in fact had no such implication of residence. See below, Chapter 2, 132-3. On the difficulty otherwise of identifying metic *proxenoi*, see Whitehead (1977), 13, 30 and 63-2. Whitehead positively identified only four proxeny decrees for metics – *IG II² 360, 373, 786 and 835*. On 360 and 373 – atypical decrees – see above, 49-50, and below, n.111. *IG XI 4 789* is one of the few clear-cut cases in our corpus.

alien contingents in the Athenian army).¹⁰⁹ The fact that *proxenia* and *isoteleia* were granted together only very rarely is evidence of the emphasis of *proxenia* on external political context.¹¹⁰ The few decrees which do grant both are clearly exceptions, probably made either because it was unclear where the individual would settle, or because it seemed likely that he would spend extended periods in both contexts.¹¹¹ It is striking that, in comparison with the numerous gravestones for *isoteleis*, only three are known for *proxenoi* or their families at Athens (and perhaps only two elsewhere).¹¹² *Proxenoi*, for the most part, lived, and indeed died where they were expected to, in political contexts external to the granting *polis*.

In some decrees the language used in the generic descriptions of services performed by the honorand often makes it clear that the ethnic of the honorand indicates the context in which these took place. The citizens of the honouring *polis* whom the honorand is described as helping are frequently described using the participles ἀφικνούμενος and παραγενόμενος, as *coming to* the *proxenos*, interacting with him where he normally resides – the *polis* indicated by his ethnic, court, or camp if this is explicitly mentioned. Even when other verbs are used (most commonly ἐντυγχάνων but sometimes ἀπαντῶν) which are on the surface more ambiguous about

¹⁰⁹ Those honoured with *isoteleia* tend to be described in quite different terms – instead of reference to the continual performance of services for individuals they encounter, the emphasis is on ordinary and extraordinary financial contributions (the payment of *eisphorai*; participation in *epidoseis*) as well as marching out in support of the Athenian army.

¹¹⁰ *IG II²* 83 and perhaps 287 and 288 (if we are right to restore *proxenia* in the former case and *isoteleia* in the latter). 360 should probably also be taken as an example (although *isoteleia* is not granted *per se*, it is presumably encompassed by the rights to march alongside and pay the same *eisphorai* as the Athenians which are).

¹¹¹ *contra* Pečírka (1966), 33, who held that *isoteleia* implied residence, Whitehead (1977), 63 n. 26, pointed to the existence of clauses which limited the grant of *isoteleia*, requiring residence (e.g. *IG II²* 287). The dual grants of *proxenia* and the rights of *isoteleia* to Herakleides of Salamis on Cyprus, who as a merchant would not have been expected to be resident all year round at Athens, is a particularly clear example of this (*IG II²* 360).

¹¹² Funerary monuments mentioning *isoteleia* (29 from Athens): *IG II²* 7862-81, 8652; *Agora* 18 384-5; *SEG* 18 112-3; 21 940; 26 311-2; 57 228. Funerary monuments mentioning *proxenia* (3 in Athens; 2 outside): *IG I³* 1154 (erected at public expense); *IG II²* 9304 (for the wife and daughter of a Megarian *proxenos*); *SEG* 56 75. Outside Athens: *ML* 4 (the famous Corcyrean *mneme* of their *proxenos* lost at sea); *Clara Rhodos* 2 (1932), 219 no.61.

where such interactions have and are expected to take place, it is nonetheless often made clear, because the honorand's place of residence is explicitly mentioned when it differs from the *polis* of his ethnic, that it was this external political community rather than the granting *polis* which was at issue.¹¹³ It is also significant that the citizens in these meetings are always described as the active party, the subject of the verb or participle – it is they who are said to *meet* or *come to meet* the *proxenos*, rather than the other way round.¹¹⁴

The picture of the typical *proxenos* conveyed by these generic descriptions is thus of an individual in general providing services to the honouring *polis* and to citizens from it in the context of another community – usually assumed to be that indicated by his ethnic. However, before we consider, on the basis of these generic descriptions, what the services most commonly expected from and associated with *proxenoi* were likely to be, it is necessary to first consider the material which Marek placed at the heart of his account of the functions of *proxenoi* – the information known ‘über den Beruf, die Tätigkeit oder das Milieu der Proxenoi.’¹¹⁵

¹¹³ e.g. [παρ' Ἀντ]ιγόνωι καὶ Δημητρίωι δι[ατρίβων χρ]ήσιμον ἑαυτὸν παρέχε[ται καὶ κοιν]ῆι τῆι πόλει καὶ ἰδίαι το[ῖς ἐντυγχά]νουσι τῶν πολιτῶν (*IG XII 6 20*); διατρίβων παρὰ βασιλεῖ Σκυθῶν Κανίται εὔνουν καὶ πρόθυμον ἑαυτὸν τῶι δήμωι διατελεῖ [παρεχόμενος] καὶ ἰδίαι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν αὐτῶι τῶν πολιτῶν (*IGBulg I² 41 l. 4-8*).

¹¹⁴ This is highlighted in *IG XII 7 5* – a very rare exception to this rule – in which the *proxenos* is the subject of this verb because the citizens he came across (περιέτυχεν) and freed had been captured in warfare and therefore could not come to meet him in this active sense. The verb *entunchanō* is used in this way almost exclusively of non-citizens who are usually to be understood as operating in a context external to the *polis*, but when, very rarely, it is used of resident foreigners or citizens, its significance is unclear – whether indicating the fact that they also operated outside the *polis* (Knoepfler 2005, 292-4) or emphasising social distance (Ma 2012b, 156). This verb probably also had overtones of ‘petition’ and ‘appeal’ which are prominent at least in Hellenistic use (e.g. *Plb.* 4.76.2; in *S. fr.* 88.8 it seems to mean ‘obtain an audience,’ *LSJ*).

¹¹⁵ Marek (1984), 333.

2.3 The Occupations, Activities, and Milieux of *Proxenoí*

In response to what he saw as an inappropriately juristic model of *proxenia* in which *proxenoí* had ‘duties’ or ‘tasks’ which they were expected, almost as if by contract, to fulfil, Marek argued for an approach to interpreting the functions of *proxenoí* based on the collection, categorisation, and analysis of *proxenoí* according to their other known activities.¹¹⁶ The different spheres of activity thus represented – political, cultural/social, and economic – according to Marek accurately reflect the interests of *poleis* in making specific grants and give us, because a relatively high proportion of honorands can be so categorised (up to a quarter of Marek’s estimate of over 3,000 attested *proxenoí*), a representative sense of the different sorts of honorands singled out and services sought with the grant of *proxenia*.¹¹⁷

This sort of approach presents us with long series of different categories, in contrast with the coherent and cohesive inter-communal mediating institution depicted by the language of these decrees. In place of *proxenoí* we find: kings and dynasts; royal functionaries; military officers; federal officers; political envoys; political partisans and agents; ship-owners and merchants; bankers and lenders; builders; foreign judges; doctors; philosophers, scholars, poets, and artists; *theorodokoi* and *theoroi*; priests, religious donors, and functionaries.¹¹⁸ The diversity thus represented is illuminating, but it is also potentially deceptive. The suggestion that a royal official was appointed *proxenos* because of his position, a doctor because of his profession, or a banker because of his financial activities and resources – each for services he performs and is expected to perform in these capacities – may seem plausible.¹¹⁹

However, it obscures what is important about the way in which grants are made and,

¹¹⁶ Marek (1984), 143-6, *contra* Monceaux (1886), 13-14.

¹¹⁷ Marek (1984), 333-4.

¹¹⁸ Marek (1984), 333-81.

¹¹⁹ Gauthier (1985) 143.

presenting us with the illusion that, if we had enough information, all *proxenoi* could be categorised and thus explained, it falsely ascribes an equal significance to these different sorts of category. This sort of analysis also makes the mistake of assuming that the information we happen to know about a particular individual is the relevant fact for explaining a particular grant of *proxenia*. Herakleitus, son of Asklepiades, may well have been the ‘Halikarnassian guest’ and fellow poet, whose fate Callimachus famously lamented, but his receipt of *proxenia* from Histiaia and Chios is more likely to relate to his importance in relation to the Ptolemaic court or as a citizen of his native *polis*.¹²⁰

There is, of course, a difference between using the information about honorands provided by specific decrees to interpret their grants and drawing prosopographical connections to infer motives about which the decrees remain silent.¹²¹ However, even setting this issue to one side, there is good reason to think that these categorised cases, which Marek places at the heart of his explanation of *proxenia*, are atypical. At various points his account relies heavily on material from Delos and Delphi – places likely to be unusual – and both under-estimates the typical scale of *proxenoi*-networks and over-estimates the degree to which the material we have is likely to be representative. As I argued in the Introduction, these sorts of *proxenoi*, which Marek places at the heart of his interpretative scheme, are probably greatly over-represented in proportion to the whole.¹²²

It is also necessary to distinguish the specific context in which a grant was made, the benefactions which the *proxenos* is credited with from the context in which future interaction is expected between *polis* and *proxenos*, and services the latter is

¹²⁰ See Swinnen (1970).

¹²¹ Of the 37 proxeny decrees for medics collected by Marek (1984), 372-3, in 11 no specific reference to either their identity as doctors or medical activities is made.

¹²² See Introduction, 14-16.

expected to provide. Activities which were not considered characteristic of *proxenoi* – like a medic’s period of professional residence at a *polis* – might nonetheless be interpreted, in the way they were conducted, as revealing the same *eunoia* for the granting polis which was the fundamental basis of the relationship of *proxenia* and the predictor of future benefactions.¹²³ That the grant of *proxenia* made to such individuals was often made at the point of their departure – as they returned to their home community or went on to another – made good honorific sense, marking the close of the particular act for which they were being honoured.¹²⁴ But it also agreed closely with the way in which *proxenia* was used to identify and strengthen links with individuals in other communities beyond the honouring *polis*.

This sort of grant is closely paralleled in grants made to the official representatives of other communities – ambassadors (both secular and religious) and arbitrators and foreign judges invited to settle internal disputes. Their enthusiastic participation in these tasks, again, could be represented as an act of benefaction towards the honouring *polis* which made plain their friendship for it. The consequent grant of *proxenia* sought to strengthen this relationship, as a tie with both the individual and the *polis* of which he was an active member. It asserted the continuation of contact between the two *poleis* and with the honorand there in particular, and thus of this relationship in the future. The activities of these individuals which brought them into contact with other *poleis* – professional in the case of the

¹²³ Gauthier (1985), 142, discusses one particularly good example of this, a decree for Diokleidas, who delivered a royal letter to Minoa, exhorted the Minoan demos to cease from civil strife and pledged himself in the future to do whatever good he could for them – receiving a grant of *proxenia* for his pains (*IG XII 7 221 b*). Domingo-Gygax (2009), 179, takes this as an example of proleptic honours according his model, given in the hope of prompting future benefaction. In fact, Diokleidas’ services – in delivering the letter, exhorting the Minoans to make internal peace, and pledging his own future aid – are real, revealing very vividly his own feelings of amity to the *polis* (so Gauthier), making him in truth a deserved and not simply opportunistic nominee for *proxenos*.

¹²⁴ *FD III 3 119*, a Delphic honorific decree for a teacher, with its past tenses, implies that this period of residence and service has expired; cf. *IG XI 4 666*.

medic, public in the case of the *polis*' representatives – far from hindering their position as active members of their own *poleis*, or other communities, probably augmented or translated into personal prestige. In at least one Samian decree for a Koan doctor it is made clear that an active medical practice could go hand in hand with the activities in which a prominent citizen might engage. Philistos, son of Nikarchos, in two parallel sections of the ἐπειδή clause is explicitly praised not only for providing his professional services to the citizens of the honouring *polis* who came to Kos on public and private business and fell sick, but also for providing the same services to these citizens at Kos that any other *proxenos* would be praised for providing.¹²⁵

It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the different categories used by Marek – in particular those grants which indicate the professional activities of certain individuals, which may or may not be relevant to the context in which they are active, from those made to members of non-*polis* communities, to members of royal courts and the officers of armies. In the latter case the information given about a particular recipient was clearly intended to differentiate him from the other recipients, who represented the assumed norm, active in their own *poleis*. However, the position of these individuals was in fact modelled on that of their peers established in *poleis* – and the intermediary services which they are likely to have been called on to perform – were probably in many cases very similar, even if the community in question was a court or garrison rather than a *polis*.¹²⁶ Moreover, such royal friends or mercenary

¹²⁵ IG XII 4 138: ἐπειδὴ Φίλιστος Νικάρχου Κῶιος ἰατρὸς ὢν πᾶσαν χρεῖαν διατελεῖ π[αρεχόμενος] κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην κα[ὶ] πλείονας τ[ῶν] πολιτῶν ἐπιδημήσαντα[ς] ἐν Κῶι, τοὺς] μὲν κατὰ θεωρίαν ἀποσταλ[έντας] ὑπὸ το]ῦ δήμου, τοὺς δὲ καθ' ἰδίαν εἰς Κῶ παραγε]γομένους, ἐμπεσόντας [εἰς ἀρρωστίας ἐπικι]γδύνους διέσωσεν [μετὰ πάσης φιλοτιμί]ας, *vac.* τοῖς τε ἄλλο[ις] τοῖς παραγινομένοις] τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς Κῶ π[ολλὰς] παρέχεται χρεῖ]ας, οὐθὲν ἐλ<λ>είπων π[ροθυμίας] τὰ καλῶς ἔ]χοντα συγκατασκευάζ[ειν] αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀε]λι ὑπακούων εἰς πᾶν περὶ ὧν ἄν τις [αὐτὸ]ν παρακαλῆι·

¹²⁶ For armies as political communities, see Hornblower (2004); these similarities are further brought

chiefs were not necessarily thought of as being any more permanently sundered from the *poleis* to which they belonged by birth than any of the other individuals who moved for the sake of their economic pursuits. In a Samian decree, two royal *philoï* of Ptolemy are honoured for the services they continually provide for Samians coming to Lampsacus, their native *polis*, and there is no reason to suppose that this sort of activity could not take place after or before even demanding royal appointments.¹²⁷ Allowing for mobility in the Hellenistic period ought to mean allowing for the continuation and constant renewal of ties to *poleis* – and not just movements away from them. Indeed when the citizens of Paros honoured Apollodorus of Kyzikos for the regard he had shown them as nesiarch of the League of Islands, it was to the city of Kyzikos that the Parians despatched the decree honouring him, asking for permission to erect a statue of the honorand there. In other words, despite the (extended) royal office which provided the context for these services (and the fact that this individual apparently continued to rent property on Delos), this was still conceived of as being an inter-*polis* interaction – and Kyzikos was still the context in which, the Parians felt, Apollodorus would wish to be honoured.¹²⁸

There is also the difficulty of how we use the information we glean from the identity of the *proxenoi* to discuss the interests of the honouring *polis*. Marek argued on the basis of the paucity of traders explicitly attested in proxeny-grants against the then dominant hypothesis that trade was one of the most important factors in the appointment of *proxenoi*. For the same reason he also argued that trade was likely to

out in the honorific decrees from Rhamnous.

¹²⁷ *IG* XII 6 118 1.4-7, '[φίλ]οι ὄντες τοῦ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου ἔν τε τοῖς πρό[τε]ρον χρό[νοις] εὔνοι [κ]αὶ πρόθυμοι καὶ ἰδία τοῖς ἀφι[κ]νουμέν[οι]ς εἰς Λ[ά]μ[ψ]α[κ]ον χρήσιμοι ὄντες διετέλουν καὶ χρε[ία]ς...']²

¹²⁸ Michel 534 (= *CIG* 3655), recording the text of the answering Kyzikene decree; the Parian decree honouring Apollodorus is simply placed in the public records – εἰς τὰ δημόσια γράμματα (26). As the Kyzikene decree records only those honours for which the Kyzikenes needed to grant consent, the other honours granted by the Parians are not mentioned (they are likely to have included *proxenia*). Reger (1991) on the identity of this Apollodorus.

be a less important factor in mobility than others, better epigraphically attested – the movements of armies, artists, *theoroi*, and judges – suggesting that these motivations should be assumed, before trade, for the interactions with the areas implied by the honorand's ethnic.¹²⁹ It seems implausible, however, that a large proportion of movement in the Hellenistic world was not to some degree motivated by economic considerations. Whatever intermediary services *proxenoi* were expected to provide, citizens travelling to take part in economic interactions (in trade, in contracts, and, as a result, in disputes and difficulties) seem likely to have often been those individuals most in need of them. This need is clearly articulated in two Athenian decrees awarding *proxenia* where the *polis*-authority proclaims that a particular award is made because of services either performed for or reported by its citizen merchants and ship-owners.¹³⁰ However, these needs did not disappear even if the grain shortage was eased which had made them a matter of public concern when these decrees were inscribed.

In any case these sorts of services would certainly not have required the experience or resources of *proxenoi* who were themselves heavily involved in trade. Instead the ability of a *proxenos* to provide these sorts of assistance would have depended principally on his status and prominence as a citizen of the community in question. It is thus not surprising that merchants should be comparatively invisible as recipients of *proxenia*, except in special cases when they performed particularly urgent services for the *polis* as a whole which were relevant to their professional activities (e.g. as corn dealers in time of food shortage or as money lenders during a financial crisis). In general as far as the Greek *poleis* were concerned, the *proxenos*

¹²⁹ Marek (1984), 359.

¹³⁰ Both in *IG II² 416 fr.b* (= *SEG 45 77*; associated with the grain shortages in Athens 331-c.320 BC); *IG II² 343*.

provided services to citizens who came to his community on public or on private business (almost all trade would have been resolutely considered a private affair), and a network of *proxenoi* was sustained and enlarged for this general reason. But this does not mean that the city collectively had any sort of public policy relating to developing trade –¹³¹ except in that its members with interests in trade were aware of and successful in promoting them in the context of the public assembly.

2.4 The Services Associated with *Proxenia*

In our corpus of *proxeny* decrees, in addition to the ubiquitous, generic descriptions of honorands providing services, a fairly wide range of specific sorts of benefaction are also found. It is important, however, to identify which sorts of service were thought characteristic of *proxenoi* and which were mentioned precisely because they were extraordinary. It is not that any form of benefaction was thought incompatible with *proxenia* or the *proxenos*-paradigm. However, whereas some services were regularly recurrent and could therefore be expected (even confidently requested) of any *proxenos*, others were not – for all that they might be taken as evidence of the attachment of *proxenos* to *polis* and thus identify the individual in question as a suitable *proxenos*. Gifts by *proxenoi* of money probably fall into this latter category, as do gifts of corn, and professional and cultural contributions to the honouring *polis* – all are attested of *proxenoi*, but, comparatively, very infrequently.¹³² Similarly, when foreign judges were granted *proxenia* it was probably not to secure their services in

¹³¹ *contra* Marek (1985).

¹³² Financial benefactions: *IG* VII 2418; II² 360; 835; [Dem] 40.36; *SEG* 43 448. It is striking how few *proxenoi* are attested in the *epidosis* lists (only, as far as I am aware, one, see Migeotte 1992, 158) – which suggests that this is an important respect in which ideas of what it was to be a good citizen differed from the behaviour expected of a *proxenos*. For gifts relating to corn provision, see above. See also *IG* XII 6 52 for a grant for an Aiginetan actor.

this regard for the future but the detailed knowledge of the *polis* and its citizens which they would have gained by performing this role made them particularly suitable *proxenoi* when they returned to their own cities.

The key to understanding these conventional or stereotypical services is the context in which they took place. This was the community, usually the *polis*, to which the honorand belonged. Citizens of the granting *polis* who travelled to another *polis* or community regularly encountered the same obstacles and sought the same aid of their *proxenoi* in their need. These difficulties were structural, due to the political fragmentation of the Mediterranean world in the Classical and Hellenistic periods. As a result the citizen of one city was at a great disadvantage both legally and practically outside his own community. These needs could be as basic as hospitality or accommodation – the provision of which was fundamental to the relationship of *xenia* (a private institution which similarly circumvented these inherent limitations on external intercourse) on which *proxenia*, to an extent, continued to be calqued. The sorts of service, however, which loom largest in our evidence relate to the ability of the *proxenos*, as citizen, to access and influence local legal and administrative structures, as well as his knowledge of local conditions, his local network of friends, and personal prestige or authority – and in general his ability, as the active member of one *polis*, affiliated by *proxenia* grant to another, to act as an official connection between the two.

2.5 Services for *Poleis*, their Representatives and Citizens

Our evidence for the services which *proxenoi* habitually performed for *poleis* and their representatives, consisting of references to the actions of *proxenoi* in the ancient historians and orators and a select number of more descriptive inscriptions, has not

substantially changed since Gschnitzer collected it for his 1973 *RE* article. It is surprisingly sparse and patchy for such a significant institution, in no small part because so many of the activities of *proxenoi* were too mundane to be worth specifically describing epigraphically, or to rate much of a mention in our narrative histories. However, from these actions, which were thought sufficiently exceptional or important to be explicitly recorded, or are mentioned in connection with events that were, it is possible to get a sense of the innumerable habitual services which lie in their shadow.

According to our stereotypical descriptions of *proxenoi*, the *proxenos* was one who always said and did what was advantageous to the *demos* (λέγων καὶ πράττων ἀεὶ τὰ συμφέροντα τῷ δήμῳ),¹³³ who worked to secure its interests. For the most part this seems to have equated to political acts and political speech, working within the power structures of the community to which the individual in question belonged. In *poleis* this meant both its assemblies and magistrates, through which the collective power of the community was formally mediated and expressed. At the royal court such power technically resided not in the *demos* but in the person of the king. However, in its ability to shape and direct the decisions of the king, the court served an analogous function to that of the assembly and magistrates in the *polis*.¹³⁴ In each case, success in promoting the interests of the client *polis* thus depended on the *proxenos*' capacity, within his community, to persuade, and thus the political prominence of a *proxenos* was directly related to his usefulness. Sometimes the *proxenos* might be able to operate, at least in part, independently, as an important

¹³³ e.g. *IG XII 9 221* (the phrase and its equivalents are very widely attested).

¹³⁴ The explicit reason which Thucydides gives for the nomination of Nymphodorus from Abdera as *proxenos* of the Athenians despite the previous hostility towards themselves which the Athenians imputed to him was his influence at the court of his brother-in-law, the Thracian king Sitalces (Thuc. 2.29).

magistrate or military commander. However, such appointments were usually temporary, and ultimately devolved or depended on the power or resources of a *polis* or royal court.

Inscribed decrees for Eumaridas the Kydonian and Neoptolemos the Aitolian, both honoured for services they performed as *proxenoi*, explicitly describe some of these services which, though perhaps exceptional in degree, were surely characteristic of this intermediary role *proxenoi* in general played, promoting the interests of one community in the context of another.¹³⁵ Neoptolemos, once he had been apprised by the ambassadors of Erythrae of their mission (to overturn a fine levied by the Amphictyony against Erythrae), συνεβούλευέν τε καὶ συνέπραττεν φιλοτίμως – he advised and worked alongside them, and suggested, moreover, that they should send an embassy to the Aitolian Koinon about this fine.¹³⁶ Eumaridas of Kydonia is similarly honoured for publicly serving as advocate on behalf of the interests of Athens – συνηγόρησεν εἰς τὸ πάντα πραχθῆναι τὰ συμφέροντα – in support of the ambassadors' requests for the preservation of friendly relations between the Athenians and Cretans and, specifically, the annulment of any right of plunder (presumably against Athenian property and territory) granted by the *polis* of Kydonia.¹³⁷ Eumaridas, moreover, took a personal part in this embassy when it progressed to another city, Knossos, and recruited the support of his friends in a third, Gortyn. This is a striking example in which the potential influence of the *proxenos*, and his personal network of friends, extended beyond the bounds of the *polis*. But what is

¹³⁵ Neoptolemos is explicitly referred to as the *proxenos* and fellow citizen of the Erythraeans (of Ionia), *Syll.*³ 412. In contrast no mention is made in either of the two Athenian honorific inscriptions for Eumaridas of his *proxenia*, which is mentioned only when it (*patrike proxenia*) is renewed for his son. Nonetheless, as he is not nominated as *proxenos* in either of the two reproduced honorific decrees (which confer very substantial honours, rarely given without a previous grant of *proxenia*), it seems clear that this grant must already have taken place.

¹³⁶ *Syll.*³ 412.

¹³⁷ For this interpretation, with bibliography, see Pritchett (1991), 144-7.

described here must also reflect the situation within the *polis*. The *proxenos* threw his personal political weight behind the requests of these delegates, and that could include mobilising the network of friends and supporters from which his political influence in part derived. As the decrees themselves often assert, the *proxenos* strove zealously alongside the ambassadors sent by the *polis* (τοῖς τ[ε πεμ]πομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πρεσ[βε]υταῖς συναγωνιζόμε[νος ἐκτ]ενῶς, *IG* II² 945) and made himself a champion in his political arena of the interests of the *polis* (πρόθυμόν τε αὐτοσσωτὸν ἀγωνιστὰν παρασκευάζει ὑπὲρ τῶν τᾶι πόλει συμφερόντων, *FD* III 1 152). In the context of royal courts this role remained the same – *proxenoi* are described as making speeches on behalf of the interests of the *polis* at the court of the king (καὶ νῦν παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ Πτολεμαίωι πολλ[οὺς καὶ] συμφέροντας λόγους ποιεῖται ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεω[ς], *I.Oropos* 175).

Numerous examples can be found for this sort of active political support given by *proxenoi* (or those subsequently nominated *proxenoi*) to representatives of *poleis* who sought a range of different concessions from the cities and royal courts where these individuals were active. These could take the form of requests for expressions of friendship or, as described in the Samian exiles' decrees, advocacy before king Alexander of the Samian right to return to their city.¹³⁸ We also have at least one attestation of aid given by two individuals (one of whom was a *proxenos*), probably both at that time *bouleutai*, to an official delegation of *ekdikoi* from Karthaia, sent to plead on behalf of two citizens in the Athenian courts.¹³⁹ This example should probably stand for many more cases where aid was given to official delegations in the context of local legal institutions – with the aid given, and qualifications needed,

¹³⁸ *IG* XII 6 28; XI 4 765 describes, though in general terms, a Pergamene's efforts to aid Delians who came to obtain concessions at the court of the king.

¹³⁹ *IG* XII 5 528 and 538 + add. p.319 and 321, with Mack (2011), 338-9.

probably resembling closely better attested aid in the context of assemblies. In the light of this expectation of aid, it is not surprising that at Klazomenai, *proxenoi* were forbidden from sitting as jurors on cases which involved citizens of their client *poleis* – in much the same way that they were forbidden cases involving their close relatives.¹⁴⁰

What is apparent is a fundamental understanding of the *proxenos* as a conduit, an official link, capable of facilitating interaction – not least by being able, officially, to confirm the identity of visitors from the *polis* to which he was affiliated (either by knowing them personally, or being able to relate them to others he did know). The *proxenos*, at least in theory, was someone whose word carried weight in both communities, capable of standing surety for the identity of private visitors, and especially public delegates, and introducing them to the relevant authorities. When, after the battle of Corinth, Agesilaus pointedly ignored the Theban ambassadors who had come to treat with him, ‘*even though Pharax, their proxenos [at Sparta], was standing by to introduce them,*’ what was noteworthy was not the fact that a *proxenos* attempted to perform this function, but the rebuff which he and his clients received, despite his own considerable importance at Sparta.¹⁴¹ This was a service which other *proxenoi* would have been called on to perform whether at royal courts in relation to kings or at cities in relation to important magistrates and the local council or assembly.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ *SEG* 29 1130bis B 1.35-41 for the jurors’ oath. A similar prohibition is known from a treaty between Chaleion and Oeantheia in western Greece (*IG IX 1² 717*) – if the *xenodikai* fail to reach a decision, the *xenos* may choose anyone he likes as judges, other than his *proxenoi* or personal friends (*idioxenoi*); for this interpretation see Zelnick-Abramovitz (2004), 95.

¹⁴¹ ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίλαος μάλα μεγαλοφρόνως τούτους μὲν οὐδ’ ὀρᾶν ἐδόκει, καίπερ Φάρακος τοῦ προξένου παρεστηκότος αὐτοῖς, ὅπως προσαγάγοι (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.6). The importance of Pharax is reflected in the numerous other references made to him (*Hell.* 6.5.33; *Hell. Oxy.* 2.1; D.S. 14.63.4, 79.4-5).

¹⁴² The lexicographical sources refer to this as one of the characteristic functions of the *proxenos*: Pollux 3.59; <πρόξενος> δὲ ὁ ...προσάγει τὰς πρεσβείας οὗτος πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον (Ael. Dion. *iota.2.2*).

The *proxenos*, although ostensibly appointed only by one community to serve as their contact in his own city, was, in practice, a potentially bi-directional link. *Poleis* made use of citizens who were the *proxenoi* of other cities to establish official contacts between the two, frequently sending them as representatives to the *poleis* with which they were affiliated.¹⁴³ *Proxenoi*, after all, were known at the other community, and possessed both personal contacts and an official status there, qualifications which must have made them appear likely to be more effective ambassadors and, particularly, more persuasive speakers (in the speeches attributed to *proxenoi* their *proxenia* is certainly emphasised in this way).¹⁴⁴ The importance of this potential of the *proxenos* to serve as a trustworthy link between *poleis* seems to have increased when the two cities themselves were in a state of war and other ties were severed – in looking after the welfare of and facilitating the ransoming of prisoners¹⁴⁵ as well as in serving on the first embassies seeking peace.¹⁴⁶ The right of access to the council or assembly widely granted to *proxenoi* by the granting *polis* (*prosodos/ephodos*) – a right which non-citizens did not possess by default – certainly facilitated this use of *proxenoi* as a bi-directional link, and was perhaps granted in part with this intention.

The provision of hospitality to individuals sent by the client *polis* was a practical instantiation of this intermediary function and one which emphasised the nature of *proxenia* as a public form of *xenia* – but which surely also served to

¹⁴³ The Rhodian *proxenos* at Delphi was sent to Rhodes to recruit arbitrators (*FD* III 3 383); the Spartans sent the Byzantine *proxenos* at Sparta to bring that city over (*Xen. Hell.* 1.1.35; but see the sequel 1.3.15-9 for the most inappropriate behaviour of this *proxenos*; cf. *Thuc.* 8.8, 80; *D.S.* 14.12); Neapolitan *proxenoi* at Tarentum were sent (along with the most notable Tarentines) to Naples (*Dion. Hal.* 15.5.2). See Perlman (1958), 187, but note that some of the references in his n.1 are wrong.

¹⁴⁴ See below, Chapter 2, 137-8; three of the six references to *proxenia* in Xenophon are made by *proxenoi* seeking to persuade their client *polis*, in each case Sparta.

¹⁴⁵ See below, 75-7.

¹⁴⁶ Care for the Spartiate captives from Sphacteria was one of the means Alcibiades used in seeking to renew his family's proxy of the Spartans (*Thuc.* 5.43). For the use of *proxenoi* in peace negotiations in particular, see Chapter 2, 123 n.104 and 147.

strengthen the personal ties of the *proxenos* to leading members of the *polis* he represented. This function is frequently mentioned in a number of the definitions of *proxenia* given in the lexicographical sources¹⁴⁷ and the evidence for it in other contexts, although sparse, is highly suggestive. When, during the uproar caused by Sphodrias' attempt on the Piraeus, three Spartan ambassadors were seized, they were staying at the house of Kallias, their *proxenos* (or, more properly, one of their *proxenoi*).¹⁴⁸ That this was a norm, at least at this time, is shown by the defence these ambassadors made of themselves. They argued that if the attack made by Sphodrias had been officially sanctioned, and had they known about it beforehand, they would hardly have placed themselves in the power of the Athenians, and they would certainly not have stayed with their *proxenos* – that is where they would be expected and easily found. Though we have other evidence for elite members of a *polis* staying with their *proxenos* (were they always on public business?)¹⁴⁹ we do not know whether less politically prominent traders or tradesmen felt they could expect to receive the hospitality of their *proxenos*, although it seems probable that many had private arrangements with their friends and formal *xenoi* at *poleis* to which they regularly went.¹⁵⁰

An even more important and useful aspect of the *proxenos*' role as intermediary than the provision of hospitality, was as a source of information for both public and private visitors concerning local conditions, as well as of access to his own network of local friends and contacts. When in Aristophanes' play, *The Birds*, the first

¹⁴⁷ e.g. Pollux 3.59; Ael. Dion. *iota*. 2.2; *Schol in. Dem.* 15.7; see Meier (1843), 2-3 n.8, for more material. Pollux also makes reference to *proxenoi* arranging the provision of *proedria* for ambassadors, cf. Aesch. 2.110.

¹⁴⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.22.

¹⁴⁹ 'πρόξενος δ' εἶ καὶ κατάγονται ἀεὶ παρὰ σοὶ οἱ κράτιστοι αὐτῶν,' Xen. *Symp.* 8.34; Ion of Chios *FGrHist* 392 fr.6 (Athenaeus 13. 603e-f); 'δεῦρ' ἀφικνούμενοι παρὰ σοὶ κατέλυον, Αἰσχίνη, καὶ σὺ προῦξένεις', Dem. 18.82; Aeschines here probably put up the ambassadors as *proxenos* of Oreus, so Hennig (1997), 355-6; see Chapter 2, 111 n.55.

¹⁵⁰ See Hennig (1997), collecting the material on public hospitality in general.

words out of the mouth of the Athenian *episkopos* are ‘where are the *proxenoi*?’ (ποῦ πρόξενοι;), he does not just represent the attitudes and needs of a functionary of the Athenian Empire. His need for information on the local political conditions prevailing in Cloudcuckooland – and advice for how to proceed in his mission – was the same that any other representative of a city had, and he, naturally, relied on his city’s *proxenoi*. This dependence is quite neatly illustrated by a story told by Thucydides – how Alcibiades purported to give the delegation from Sparta, the *polis* of which his forebears had been *proxenoi*, tactical advice in presenting their case before the assembly.¹⁵¹ That Alcibiades in fact sought to sabotage this alliance rather than promote it does not detract from the underlying assumption that this is precisely the sort of help that delegations were used to receiving – and expected from their *polis*’ *proxenoi*. However, this does not mean that *proxenia* ever developed into an organised system of intelligence gathering agents, working to promote the interests of other *poleis* over what they perceived to be the interests of their own communities – and systematic exploration has failed to find any evidence of such a fundamental change or specialization.¹⁵²

Because of their intermediary position between two *poleis*, *proxenoi* were also well placed to facilitate the ransoming of captives – both those taken as a result of inter-*polis* public warfare¹⁵³ and through private (though perhaps publicly sanctioned) piratical raids.¹⁵⁴ Thucydides gives a particularly good example of how *proxenoi*

¹⁵¹ Thuc. 5.43-5. On the interpretation of this incident, see Chapter 2, 146-50.

¹⁵² The collection of material presented in Gerolymatos (1986) is far from convincing as the author of the recent monograph, *Information Gathering in Classical Greece*, and others, have found: Russell (1999), 76-83; Marek (1988); Lewis (1996), 82; Culasso Gastaldi (2004), 13.

¹⁵³ Pritchett (1991), 245-97, presents a particularly rich collection of literary and epigraphic examples of ransoming, despite which he downplays its prevalence, in particular arguing that the 40 inscriptions specifically mentioning ransom, usually in an honorific context, reveal the rarity of ransom. In fact, in quantity and chronological spread, along with the literary evidence, this material strongly argues for the common occurrence of ransom.

¹⁵⁴ *IG* XI 4 1054; XII 8 159; *SEG* 25 539. Ransom was to the advantage of both pirates and the

might be expected to involve themselves in the first of these. The Corcyreans taken prisoner in the sea battle with the Corinthians at Epidamnos are allowed to return under the pretext of a large ransom, for which their *proxenoi* at Corinth stood surety, but in reality because the Corinthians have succeeded in turning them.¹⁵⁵ The way in which this story is framed, as a persuasive ruse, suggests that *proxenoi* could be expected to play this role – for which they would be admirably suited – enabling prisoners to be freed without the ransom necessarily being paid in advance (which might be difficult, given the large sums of ready cash required). Standing security themselves to their own state for the sum, *proxenoi* would have had a much better chance of recovering what was in effect a loan to the captives from their client city because of their honorary and often explicit legal standing within the *polis* of the prisoners.¹⁵⁶ Walbank has suggested that *proxenoi* played a similar role when the Aitolian ambassadors agreed to and stood surety for the level of their own ransom at the hands of the Epirotes (Plb. 21.26 with Walbank, *HCP ad loc*). We also have numerous references to honorands in proxeny decrees having freed, released, and ransomed captives taken in war and Hyperides’ parody of a proposal to confer *proxenia* makes reference to the fact that, among Euthykrates’ various deeds, rendering him unsuitable for this nomination, was his failure in the aftermath of the Athenian defeat at Chaeronea to either bury any Athenian dead or ransom any

community – the pirates obtaining a much higher price which reflected the value of the captives as individuals in their community rather than as a commodity; the community receiving its members back in return – see de Souza (1999), 65.

¹⁵⁵ The sum mentioned seems improbably large – 800 talents for about 250 men (even allowing for the fact that they were of the first rank) – and so the emendation, proposed as early as Valla (1452), to ὀγδοήκοντα, may well be correct. The ‘turning’ of these prisoners is one of the wonders of Thucydides – who suggests that it was envisaged from the start as an aim (1.55). They were presumably obliged for kindnesses to the Corinthians and their personal assessment of their own interests (and perhaps by extension of Corcyra also) brought into alignment with those of Corinth – not least as a result of the ascendancy of their political opponents at Corcyra.

¹⁵⁶ Gerolymatos (1986), 65-7, wrongly suggests that the *proxenoi* here are Corinthian *proxenoi* at Corcyra – rather than the Corcyrean *proxenoi* at Corinth, on whom Corcyreans would naturally rely for aid.

Athenian prisoners – suggesting that these were some of the archetypal deeds of the *proxenos*.¹⁵⁷

In parallel to the sort of aid *proxenoi* were expected to give to official delegations, in accessing the political institutions at their *poleis* (council, assembly, and magistrates), *proxenoi* probably also gave similar support to private citizens in accessing local legal institutions. This function is poorly attested in our evidence because such aid was resolutely ‘private’ in character – and for that reason its importance in Classical and Hellenistic conceptions of *proxenia* has been doubted, most notably by Gauthier.¹⁵⁸ It is likely, nonetheless, to have been among the most significant that *proxenoi* performed. The much cited reason (which is probably to a certain extent true) is that individuals in the Classical and Hellenistic world had little or no formal right of access to the legal institutions of *poleis* in which they were non-citizen *xenoi* – unless this right was formally granted either individually (usually bound up with a recognised status – such as *metoikos*, *isoteles*, *proxenos*, or *euergetes*), or collectively to the *polis* to which the individual belonged.¹⁵⁹ In fact, there were two central issues: possession of this formal right of access to local legal institutions (and the extent to which *xenoi* were excluded surely differed between

¹⁵⁷ Ransoming: *IG* XII 7 5, XII 8 3, II² 284 (and perhaps also 283), Daux *BCH* 52 (1928) 46-50, *IG* IV 756 – all with Bielman (1997). For Euthykrates, see n. 12, above (Hyp. fr.76). Burial: *Anth. Pal.* 13.12 – an epigram for an Abderite shipwrecked on Seriphos cremated and sent home in a bronze urn by his city’s *proxenoi* there; Herodotus also notes a cenotaph erected for the Aiginetans at Plataia by their *proxenos* there, *Hdt.* 9.85

¹⁵⁸ Gauthier (1972), 57-61, who argued that this conception of the *proxenos* – as a trusted intermediary between two strangers – was functionally and lexically distinct from the idea of the *proxenos* as the patron or protector (*prostates*) of foreigners, which predominated in the Classical and Hellenistic use of *proxenia*. This separation, however, is artificial (so Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004, esp. 103-6, reinterpreting the early material). As I argue below, 78-80, a close connection between conceptually overlapping roles of *proxenos*, *prostates*, and *engyos*, continued to be evident and important.

¹⁵⁹ Gauthier (1972), 76-85; Whitehead (1977), 97. See also Cassayre (2010), 185-93, who treats the Athenian maritime courts as an entirely exceptional institution. Even if Cassayre takes what is probably too restrictive a view of the extent to which foreigners without these rights (including metics) could have access to judicial processes for settling disputes, it is probably right that unmediated, direct access required the receipt of certain grants (thus it is striking that the ‘prosecutors’ in the Athenian *phialai* inscriptions – a judicial process whatever its precise identity – are metics, *proxenoi*, *isoteleis*, or from three cities which seem to have been granted special access – Meyer 2010, 15-6, with n.21).

poleis, as indeed it did between different sorts of legal procedure, as we see clearly at Athens);¹⁶⁰ and, more practically, the ability to formally establish the identity of an individual from a different *polis*.

The reality of this latter need is illustrated by the institution of *prostatai* in relation to resident aliens, metics, at Athens and elsewhere. It has been a source of bemusement that although the Athenian metic was obliged, on pain of enslavement, to officially register a *prostates*, we have no record of a metic ever needing, after this registration, to formally act through one.¹⁶¹ Enrolment, however, was the point. The *prostates* was ὥσπερ ἐγγυήτην ὄντα,¹⁶² he was not responsible for anything the metic might do, but rather he was the formal guarantor of his identity as a free metic, and served, in a similar manner to the *proxenos*, as a link between the *xenos* and the citizen body.¹⁶³ The identity of the metic was thus linked to his citizen *prostates*, which is why, according to Isocrates, ‘[we Athenians] judge metics by the *prostatai* they choose’ and presumably why, in one of Herodas’ mimes, a metic speaking in a law case at Kos against another metic, makes much of their respective *prostatai*.¹⁶⁴ The *prostates* was not necessarily needed to speak on behalf of his metic in law, but he might be called on to bear witness to his identity.¹⁶⁵ Named citizen ἐγγύβοι linked with grants of *proxenia* in the decrees of the Aitolians and other western Greek

¹⁶⁰ Thus there were certain sorts of legal procedure at Athens which we are told even a *xenos* could initiate (*probolai?*), and indeed *dikai emporikai* were concerned with ‘the complicated questions of finance, in litigation arising from a written contract providing for transportation of goods to or from Athens... without regard for nationality’ (Cohen 1973, 56-9, with numerous examples).

¹⁶¹ Harrison (1968), 189-93; Whitehead (1977), 90-2; Todd (1993), 197-8; Meyer (2010), 72.

¹⁶² *Lex. Rhet.* 201 p. 189, n.4.

¹⁶³ This function probably explains why metics who could not produce a *prostates* were enslaved – there was no formal guarantee of their free status. On this penalty, see Harrison (1968), 165.

¹⁶⁴ καὶ τοὺς μὲν μετοίκους τοιοῦτους εἶναι νομίζομεν οἷους περ ἂν τοὺς προστάτας νέμωσιν (Isoc. 8.52; trans. Whitehead 1977, 52); Herod. 2.10-15. Aristotle treats this requirement for a *prostates* as a widespread condition for metics, 1275a 12-4.

¹⁶⁵ This is presumably the reason why Aristotle states that metics required a *prostates* in order to go to law (ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι ... νέμειν ἀνάγκη προστάτην, *Pol.* 1275a7-14). Perhaps this took place during the initial ἀνάκρισις which might explain why we do not otherwise hear of it, Harrison (1968), 192-3.

communities probably served a similar function – it was these individuals who would be called on to confirm the identity of a particular *proxenos* (which was eminently practical given how many grants survive).¹⁶⁶ The close connection between the role of *proxenos* and *prostates* is stressed in our lexicographical sources, in which the *proxenos* is very frequently defined as the *prostates* of a *polis*.¹⁶⁷ We do not know whether a *proxenos* could initiate a legal case on behalf of a non-citizen who did not formally possess this privilege (though there may have been ways of working round any obstacles that did exist).¹⁶⁸ It is, however, clear that it would always have been useful to have an official conduit for the formal identification of individuals – a *proxenos* who might provide aid in a specific legal case, but, as a politically prominent individual, could also put pressure on a magistrate to recognise the individual he represented and observe any local legal rights or privileges this individual might possess. This was a function that any citizen could potentially fulfil, it was not peculiar to the *proxenos*, but not all visitors had sufficiently close private connections with prominent citizens to be able to induce them to perform these acts on their behalf. By contrast many more of them will have had access to *proxenoi* of their *polis* to help them in these circumstances.

This need is also illustrated by a list of at least fourteen individuals named *proxenoi* at the same time by Tenos, of which at least nine represent different *poleis* on Crete.¹⁶⁹ This list thus seems to reflect a conscious attempt to recruit *proxenoi* and

¹⁶⁶ On the Aitolian *enguoi*, see below, Chapter 2, 107, and Chapter 3, 172 n.42. The overlap between or even homonymity of the terms *enguos* and *prostates* is clearly evident in the lists of debtors at Thespiai in which both terms are used to refer to guarantors (*prostatai*: *I.Thespiai* 44, 48, 56; *enguoi*: 50-5, 57; both are used together in 47).

¹⁶⁷ This equation is made explicit in the Hellenistic period in Aristophanes of Byzantium's definition: <Πρόξενοι> δὲ καλοῦνται οἱ κατὰ δόγμα πολιτικὸν προστάται πόλεων ὄλων γινόμενοι ... (Ar. Byz., Slater 1986, fr. 301); cf. Hesych. sv 'πρόξενοι'. See Meier (1843), 2-3 n.7 for other examples. On this connection between *prostasia* and *proxenia* see Monceaux (1886), 12-15; Walbank (1978), 4.

¹⁶⁸ See below, 82-4 – one possible explanation of the actions of Kallippos in [Dem.] 52.

¹⁶⁹ *IG XII suppl.* 304; cf. also *XII suppl.* 313.

to obtain wide coverage for Tenos' network of *proxenoi* on Crete (note especially that only one individual from each *polis* is represented). The context for this was surely the contemporary Tenian embassy successfully sent to Crete to acquire *asylia* from its various cities¹⁷⁰ and the aim was presumably to enable Tenian citizens, supported by these local intermediaries, to claim the right of freedom from seizure (*asylia*) which as Tenians they had obtained from the authorities of various *poleis* on Crete. The implication is that without these official intermediaries it would have been difficult for Tenians to make effective use of the rights they possessed – both in proving their entitlement and identity, and approaching (not to mention persuading) the relevant magistrates to implement it.¹⁷¹

2.6 *Proxenoi* in Apollodoros' speech against Kallippos¹⁷²

A common theme connects the different sorts of service attested in this source material which were expected of *proxenoi*. Collectively they amounted to an intermediary function – of facilitating interaction between communities – which was fundamental to the conception of *proxenia*. Unfortunately many of these sources are relatively brief and disconnected. However, one literary source, Apollodoros' speech against the *proxenos* Kallippos, provides a more detailed and context rich account of the activities of different *proxenoi*, which merits a more extended interpretation.

¹⁷⁰ This context was first proposed in Graindor's *ed. pr.* of this text, *MB* 14 (1910), 233-6 n. 25. The *asylia* campaign of the third century is principally known from inscriptions created when renewals were sought in the first half of the second century, Rigsby (1996), 154-163, but note the similar prominence of Cretans here (nos. 56-60, most of the surviving inscriptions). Graindor closely identified this collective grant with *IG* XII suppl. 313 on the basis of lettering and layout, suggesting that this list of foreigners from Magna Graecia was probably a fragment of a Tenian catalogue of *proxenoi*. cf. Brulé (1978), 71; noted by Marek and placed in the context of other grants to Cretans, (1984), 315-6.

¹⁷¹ See also *IG* XII 3 254 – a proxeny decree of Anaphe for a Cretan from Lyttos inscribed on the same stone as, and perhaps connected to, a grant of *asylia* made by the Cretan *koinon*, despite the difference of hand, Robert, *OMS* 2.1040-44.

¹⁷² [Dem.] 52.

The background to this speech is that Apollodorus is being prosecuted by Kallippos, *proxenos* of the Herakleians, concerning a sum of money which Lykon, a citizen of Herakleia, had left on deposit at the bank of Apollodorus's father, Pasion.¹⁷³ The dispute was over what should have happened to the money following the death of Lykon. The usual difficulties pertain in using adversative oratory historically – Apollodorus' speech in fact represents an attempted character-assassination of Kallippos as a *proxenos*. However, careful analysis makes it possible to identify a common conception of *proxenia* – the *proxenos*-paradigm – which this speech presupposes was shared by Apollodorus' audience (we do not have Kallippos' speech, but he would have made much of this status – and certainly Apollodorus in this speech expects him to).

Immediately after the death of Lykon (who was fatally wounded by pirates), Kallippos first came to Pasion's bank. Apollodorus, Pasion's son, purports to reproduce the exchange between Kallippos and Phormion, the slave who managed Pasion's bank:

ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν Κάλλιππος οὕτωσὶ εὐθύς ἐρωτῶν,
 Λύκωνα Ἡρακλεώτην εἰ γινώσκοιεν. ἀποκριναμένου δὲ
 Φορμίωνος τουτουὶ ὅτι γινώσκοιεν, ἄρα καὶ ἐχρῆτο ὑμῖν';
 ἔφη ὁ Φορμίων· ἄλλὰ πρὸς τί ἐρωτᾶς'; πρὸς τί'; ἔφη·
 ἔγώ σοι ἐρῶ. ἐκεῖνος μὲν τετελεύτηκεν, ἐγὼ δὲ προξενῶν
 τυγχάνω τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν. ἀξιῶ δὴ σε δεῖξαι μοι τὰ
 γράμματα, ἵν' εἰδῶ εἴ τι καταλέλοιπεν ἀργύριον· ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 γάρ μοι ἐστὶν ἀπάντων Ἡρακλεωτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.'

This man Kallippos came to the bank, and asked whether they knew Lykon, the Herakleian. Phormion, who is here present, answered that they knew him. 'Was he a customer of yours?' Phormion replied that he was, 'but why do you ask?' 'I will tell you. He is dead and, as it happens, I am *proxenos* of the Herakleians. I demand therefore that you show me your books, that I may

¹⁷³ As Kallippos is linked with Isocrates' circle (14), which had strong connections with the Black Sea region (Moreno 2007, esp. 175-6), it seems most likely that this was Herakleia Pontica, however, on the difficulties of ambiguous ethnics see Frazer (2009), 179-191. On Apollodorus, son of Pasion, see Trevett (1994).

know whether he has left any money; for I must of necessity look after the affairs of all the men of Herakleia.¹⁷⁴

Kallippos' description of his moral duty as *proxenos* of the Herakleians, to take care (*epimeleia*) of all Herakleians, directly corresponds to the stereotypical descriptions of *proxenoi* discussed above. The underlying assumption that this was how a *proxenos* should represent his role – and that this was an appropriate way in which this care should be expressed, chasing up the affairs of a dead citizen of his client *polis*, was taken for granted. Phormion, moreover, is represented as accepting without demur the right of Kallippos as *proxenos* to look into the affairs of Lykon at Pasion's bank.

Kallippos is then said to have seen a note from Lykon instructing the banker that the deposit should be paid to his business partner, another non-citizen (Kephisiades, an inhabitant of Scyros) whom Pasion must rely on Lykon's Athenian friend, Archebiades, to identify (note again the issue of identifying non-citizens).¹⁷⁵ Kallippos, according to this narrative, returned five months later and, after informing Pasion that Lykon had died without sons, instructed him to disregard Kephisiades' claim and give him, as *proxenos*, the sum. Pasion, according to Apollodorus, expressed willingness to do this so long as Lykon's former Athenian friends, and Kephisiades himself consented. In the event Lykon's friends refused to cooperate and Kallippos later filed suit against Pasion, suing him for damages on the basis that Pasion had paid out Lykon's deposit to Kephisiades despite having promised Kallippos he would not.

As ever it is perilous to accept uncritically the version of events, and motivations, presented by only one forensic speech – and as Kallippos' speech has not

¹⁷⁴ [Dem.] 53.5; Loeb trans., adapted

¹⁷⁵ Gauthier (1972), 80-1, on this passage and 76-85 on the issue of identification in general; cf. Lewis (1996), 80-2.

survived we do not know how large the gulf between the two accounts was.¹⁷⁶ We should note, however, that Kallippos had learned of Lykon's death and its circumstances before Pasion, presumably from other citizens of Heraklea with whom he associated. He also somehow learned not only that Lykon was a customer of Pasion (he asks Pasion for confirmation of this information) but also was later able to find out that Lykon had no sons to inherit. Both facts clearly show how a *proxenos* could access, and actively seek, information relating to citizens of the city with which he was affiliated. Within a given *polis* the *proxenos*, probably his house, represented a hub about which citizens from a particular city might gather even if they did not necessarily require any particular service of him, both to meet with fellow citizens and as a clearing house for news of the city in question and its citizens, gathered from them as they passed through the city of the *proxenos*.

The use Kallippos made of this information is also important. I would suggest that in the first instance Kallippos' aim was probably to ensure that Lykon's money, deposited at Athens, would be inherited by any heirs he might have. This would have been the reason Kallippos sought information about Lykon's heirs, and how he discovered that Lykon had, as Apollodorus mentions, no sons (9). This, at any rate, is surely how he represented his actions to the Athenian audience. Indeed the function of Apollodorus' ridiculous caricature of Kallippos the *proxenos*, puffed up with self-importance and pomposity, was to undermine the defence which he expected Kallippos to make of his actions, as being in accordance with the moral obligations of his position. According to Apollodorus' Kallippos was quite clear about the fact that he was seeking the money for himself, but Kallippos may well have been in fact

¹⁷⁶ Even if this were not a general rule, Apollodorus' plea that the jurors should trust the bare facts he presents over the rhetoric he ascribes to Kallippos should give us pause (53.1f.).

acting on behalf of other individuals from Herakleia.¹⁷⁷ He may well have argued that, although Lykon meant his business partner to have access to the money while he was alive, now dead this property should really go to his compatriots (someone at Herakleia surely inherited whatever property Lykon had left there). If this is correct – or was at least how Kallippos justified his own actions – this would be evidence that the *proxenos* might pursue even long-running cases directly for his clients.

There is also another potential example of this sort of service. In Kallippos' speech to Pasion it is reported that Lykon's boat was attacked by pirates as he rounded the gulf of Argos, during which he was wounded, and he and his cargo were taken to Argos.¹⁷⁸ At Argos he went to the house of Strammenos, *proxenos* of the Herakleians at Argos, presumably to be looked after. On his death Lykon gave to his host, presumably out of gratitude, the property which was brought in with him.¹⁷⁹ As well as being a good example of the sort of aid an individual might receive from his *proxenos*, this story also poses a difficult question: how was Lykon able to give to his *proxenos* the property which presumably the pirates held? It is possible that Strammenos, as well as looking after Lykon, managed to regain for him his property, either through the courts or with the help of magistrates – a very useful service for a merchant to be able to call on in a world in which the practice of *syle* was widespread.

Apollodorus, in attempting to demonstrate that Lykon did not make use of Kallippos and thus minimise the importance of the relationship implied by his proxy, also lists the ways in which a *proxenos* could be expected to aid his client.¹⁸⁰ Apollodorus alleges that Lykon did not call on Kallippos for aid when he went to law with two Athenians over an aborted business venture he had lent money for – but

¹⁷⁷ See, similarly, Welles (1970), 808.

¹⁷⁸ [Dem.] 53.5.

¹⁷⁹ [Dem.] 53.9.

¹⁸⁰ ὡς οὐδ' ἐχρήτη Λύκων τῷ Καλλίππῳ, [Dem.] 53.20.

rather his two Athenian friends, one of whom mediated a settlement in the case.¹⁸¹ He further points out that if Lykon had wanted to give Kallippos the money, he could have deposited with him from the first, in the certainty that he could recover it from his friend and *proxenos* on his return,¹⁸² and that, moreover, Lykon never even stayed with Kallippos. The impression which Appollodorus thus seeks to create may or may not be correct. Certainly it was not the only side of the story, as Apollodorus states that the *only* evidence of Lykon's attachment to himself which Kallippos has *not* claimed is that Lykon stayed with him.¹⁸³ What is clear, however, is that these sorts of intermediary functions could be performed by individuals other than *proxenoi*. As a general possibility this rings true. I would note, however, that while at Athens, where Lykon frequently did business, he may have developed and used a network of private friends, at Argos where the same was probably not true (and where he had not intended to go), wounded and robbed by pirates of his merchandise, it was to the house of his city's *proxenos* that he went and received aid.

3 Institutional Isomorphism and the Longevity of the *Proxenos*-Paradigm

We can reconstruct this *proxenos*-paradigm from close consideration of the formulaic descriptions of *proxenoi* and the different types of service which they are attested as being expected to perform. Close concentration on stereotypical descriptions also allows us to go further, however. Because these descriptions reveal how *proxenia* was conceived, analysis of them can allow us to resolve the long-running controversy concerning the extent to which *proxenia* changed – how far and when after the end of

¹⁸¹ The verb used here, 'παρακάλεσε,' is significant – it is exactly the same verb used in decrees of *proxenia* to describe the action of individuals who call on the honorand for aid, which he provides.

¹⁸² This argument conveniently overlooks the fact that this sum was at Pasion's bank in the first place as the balance of their transactions, [Dem.] 53.2.

¹⁸³ [Dem.] 53.22.

the Classical period it lost its functional significance. The continued incidence of familiar sorts of *proxenos*-description referencing elements of the same underlying *proxenos*-paradigm clearly shows that *proxenia* continued to be understood and used in more or less the same way until the end of the first century BC. By exploring this evidence through the lens of theoretical models for understanding institutional growth and change, developed under the impetus of New Institutionalism, it is also possible to explain the mechanisms underlying proxeny's remarkable stability.

The concept of institutional isomorphism was developed by scholars working in Organizational Studies to explain the processes through which particular institutions and structures tended to be replicated throughout an organizational field – for instance how company hierarchies in a particular industry come to be more or less identical. DiMaggio and Powell in particular identified what they saw as three different sorts of institutional isomorphism: coercive (externally imposed); mimetic/competitive (copying the institutional innovations of *poleis* believed to be successful in order to get or make up a competitive advantage); and normative (adopting institutions as indicators of group membership).¹⁸⁴ Although our evidence does not reveal the processes by which *proxenia* (and a shared *proxenos*-paradigm) came to be universal among Greek *poleis* because proxeny grants only began to be inscribed relatively late in the history of proxeny and much of the early evidence is difficult to interpret, two of these forms of isomorphism, mimetic and normative, represent good ways of understanding the processes involved. Proxeny clearly did offer advantages to *poleis* which adopted it and, at least in time, as I show in the

¹⁸⁴ DiMaggio and Powell (1983); for normative isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) talk of 'professionalization' in relation to individuals, an analogous process. In the anarchic system in which *poleis* operated coercive isomorphism – that is institutions imposed through governmental regulation – does not seem to have been at issue (the pursuit of institutional legitimacy invoked in this connection by DiMaggio and Powell is here subsumed under the heading of normative isomorphism).

fourth chapter of my thesis, it also came to be one of the most important ways in which cities asserted in relation to each other that they were *poleis*. New Institutional models explaining the inherent conservatism of institutions (‘path dependency’) and the ways in which innovation arises are also useful in understanding the development of *proxenia* in the long-term. First, however, it is necessary to identify what this development consisted of.

According to traditional scholarly narratives, the institution of *proxenia* had lost much of its functional significance by the early Hellenistic period declining to an empty honour – something held to be evident in the massive inflation of the number of decrees preserved. In these narratives the swift reduction in the number of *proxenoi* decrees known from the mid second century BC onwards was identified as the last stage of this process, of its final failure as an honour.¹⁸⁵

As I will show in the concluding chapter of this thesis, the relationship between the number of proxeny decrees inscribed and the number of grants of *proxenia* made is not straightforward. However, analysis of the stereotypical descriptions of recipients of *proxenia* offers an important means of making concrete progress in this area and moving beyond conflicting examples of ‘functional’ and ‘honorific’ grants to consider the normative assumptions of granting communities. Despite the enormous reduction in the number of decrees inscribed by granting communities in the first century BC, the texts which do survive show that, far from being moribund in this period, in general *proxenia* remained both functional and vital.¹⁸⁶ These decrees clearly exhibit the central elements of the same *proxenos-*

¹⁸⁵ See Introduction, 4-6.

¹⁸⁶ *contra* Knoepfler (2001b), 1365.

paradigm attested as underpinning *proxenia* in inscriptions and texts from the fifth century onwards.

In particular four proxeny decrees from different *poleis* (Lampsacus, Assos, Rhodes, and Samothrace) for two brothers, all inscribed at their home community of Thasos during the period 80-70 BC, clearly attest that the same functional use and understanding of *proxenia* was still widespread.¹⁸⁷ All four of these texts, using local variants of familiar honorific formulations, reference the same characteristics which defined the *proxenos* and the relationship of *proxenia* in earlier decrees, and the letter from Rhodes in particular, with its specific reference to his aid given to an embassy *en route*, confirms that these generic descriptions still signified the same sorts of intermediary service. A wide range of other decrees attest the traction and stability of the same *proxenos*-paradigm elsewhere down to the end of the first century BC. One particularly explicit decree from Messene honours Democharis the Lakedaimonian in detail for his services as a *proxenos* – for standing by and acting as an advocate for ambassadors sent by the *polis*, working always to obtain what was in its interest, and making himself useful to all of the citizens who came and appealed to him.¹⁸⁸ A Thessalian proxeny decree from the mid first century describes the honorand at length in familiar formulaic phrases, but also characterises this role in unusual but revealing terms – explicitly calling on the honorand from Gyrtion, now *proxenos*, to maintain his *prostasia* for the city in the future.¹⁸⁹ Another inscription from Methana in the Peloponnese attests a very late continuation of this same *proxenos*-paradigm. Dating from 1 BC, it describes in unusual detail the honorand concerned performing precisely

¹⁸⁷ *I.Thasos* 169-72.

¹⁸⁸ παριστάμεν[ος καὶ] παρακλητεύων διὰ παντὸς τοῖς ἀποσσελλομένοι[ς παρὰ] τῆς πόλεως ἀμῶν πρεσβευταῖς κατεργασζόμενος [ἀεὶ τὰ] συμφέροντα τῆ πόλει τοῖς τε παραγεινομένοις ποτ' αὐτὸν [πολείτα]ς παρεχόμενος εὐχρηστον ἑαυτὸν ἔν τε παρακλ[ήσεσι], *SEG* 11 974 1.2-7. See now also *SEG* 57 369, a Messenian proxeny decree from the late first century BC.

¹⁸⁹ *IGBulg* I² 43.

those services always associated with *proxenia* – welcoming visiting magistrates and ordinary citizens, working for the interests of the granting *polis* with embassies, and providing services for those in need.¹⁹⁰

The consistency with which these scattered decrees reproduce the characteristic features of the established *proxenos*-paradigm clearly indicates that, despite the large overall reduction in the number of proxeny decrees inscribed, *proxenia* continued to be used and understood by Greek *poleis* as it had been previously. In contradiction of modern critical narratives describing the degeneration of this institution, the frequent references which these texts make to the sorts of services traditionally associated with *proxenia* emphasise that utility did not cease to be central to the way in which the role of the *proxenos* was conceived until the end of the first century BC. Indeed these and other examples make it clear that honour and function were and remained fundamentally inter-dependent within *proxenia*. The consistency and stability of the *proxenos*-paradigm are striking. According to these examples, in essentials it continued to be understood and used in the same way at different ends of the Mediterranean over some five hundred years, despite significant changes which the Greek world as a whole underwent with the rise of the Hellenistic kings and Rome.

New Institutional models for understanding institutional development illuminate some of the reasons for which *proxenia* was so remarkably resistant to change. In particular, the functions fulfilled by *proxenia* continued to be much needed in a Mediterranean world that remained politically fragmented – and this political fragmentation also made it difficult for significant innovation to arise or spread at the local level. *Proxenia* was an explicitly inter-*polis* institution, functioning only in

¹⁹⁰ IG IV 853.

relation to individuals outside the granting city, and it depended for its function on the fact that both *polis* and *proxenos* shared the same understanding of what it entailed. Local innovation which would have had any sort of effect on the fundamentals of this institutional relationship would thus have been precluded because it could not benefit the innovating *polis*. Moreover, the need for such innovation may also have been obviated by the potential flexibility of this institution, which could be used to honour atypical honorands and on occasion express different sorts of relationship by analogy. Perhaps the only form of change which would have been possible would have been alterations imposed from above (coercive isomorphism) – and during this period there was no single, central authority capable of imposing such changes universally, at least until the domination of Rome.

Fundamental change was thus rendered unlikely but the degree of conservatism which we see was not the product simply of inertia. On the contrary, both the consistency across space and the stability across time of this institution were the result of a continuous effort which is reflected in the constant re-communication of the *proxenos*-paradigm attested in our proxeny decrees. In regularly making new grants of *proxeny* the citizens of *poleis* not only reminded themselves of the definition and content of this role – they also performed their awareness of it in front of an external audience of their peers. This was a continuous process of normative isomorphism, of asserting a shared Greek *polis*-identity. The terms in which *poleis* described *proxenoi* made sense and were stable because they and the specific concepts which they referenced were shared, calqued on other shared, stable institutions like *xenia* and euergetism. But grants of *proxenia* did not just reflect and rely upon a broader Greek cultural homogeneity – they were instrumental in its continuous creation.

Conclusion

These are ideas which I explore in more detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis, through the different but related lens of International Relations theory. It is important to note here, however, that *proxenia* did eventually disappear, as I show in my final chapter. The reasons why and way in which it did disappear illuminate the change the Greek world as a whole underwent at this point, which was more profound than the transition from Classical to Hellenistic, and this helps us to further understand the importance of the role which *proxenia* – and the *proxenos*-paradigm – played before.

Chapter 2

Proxeny in its Political Contexts:

Competition and Prestige

In the previous chapter I argued that *proxenia*, throughout the five hundred years in which it flourished as an institution, was based on a shared understanding of the *proxenos* as the official friend of another city who performed certain sorts of intermediary function within the context of his own political community. The existence of this sort of abstract *proxenos*-paradigm, however, raises the question of how it worked in practice. It is one thing to be able to show, on the basis of descriptions of *proxenoi* in decrees, that *proxenia* continued to be conceived of as an institution with a specific function until the end of the first century BC – but how, from the perspective of individual actors, did honour and function interrelate? What motivated individuals, within their own *poleis*, as the proposers of grants of *proxenia* for outsiders and as *proxenoi* in relation to external *poleis*, to participate in this institution? In this chapter I draw on a wide range of evidence illustrating *proxenia* in practice and show that this diverse material can be structured into a coherent account of how proxeny, as an honorific institution, shaped interactions between individuals and between individuals and cities. I argue that the same structural dynamics can be identified, despite the different political contexts and historical circumstances involved – the pursuit of prestige and elite status within a *polis*-based context.

The three principal sections of this chapter examine, in turn, the main contexts in which *proxenia* operated. The first section explores how decrees of *proxenia* functioned in the context of the *poleis* in which they were made and how, as an institution, with its claims to construct universal civic ties, it functioned in the highly competitive and often factional political processes frequently attested. In the second section I consider why this relationship was actively sought, even initiated by individuals whose primary interests were in their own political communities, rather than the *poleis* which granted them *proxeny* – considering the two structurally distinct cases of *proxenoi* active in *poleis* and in royal courts. The third section of this chapter concentrates on the position of the *proxenos* in relation to the external *polis* which honoured him and explores the function of the different honours and titles which were granted at the same time as *proxenia* in constructing and encouraging a particular sort of emotional relationship. In particular I consider the ways in which the behavioural norms expected of *proxenoi* were communicated and to what extent the *proxenos*-paradigm can be shown to have been internalized by *proxenoi*. Finally, I conclude by using Alcibiades' relationship with the Spartans – an instance in which the relationship involved in this institution miscarried – to revisit some of the central themes of this chapter. In all of these different instances *proxenia* represents an important case-study for understanding the role which civic honours and honorific institutions played between and among different political communities in the ancient world, both their potential for and their limitations in shaping the actions of honorands, in the context of competing personal interests and other institutional roles.

1 *Proxenia* in the Granting *Polis*: the Proposal and Contestation of Grants

Inscribed civic decrees tend to provide us with a very partial view of the decision-making processes of *poleis*. As a rule they suppress the role of political controversy and contestation which, our other sources reveal, were common both before and even after the decisions they represent were made.¹ This was, in fact, one of the functions of the inscribed decree, to present the decision of the *polis* as authoritative, collective and final and to emphasise, retrospectively, the order, regularity and tranquillity of the decision-making process.² However, in order to understand how *proxenia* functioned as an institution, it is necessary to examine the realities of politics in the *polis* and the role played by competitive, factional cliques and individuals.

In particular it is important to ascertain how far internal competition coloured grants of *proxenia* – theoretically a universal civic tie – given that the ability to successfully propose honours could be a marker for personal prestige and both individual and factional influence. If Gabriel Herman is right and ties of personal friendship (in particular *xenia*) usually preceded and motivated the proposal of *proxenoi*, does this contradict the assertions of honorific decrees themselves, that *proxenoi* were the friends of the *polis* as a whole and performed services for all its citizens?³ The central issue here is the relationship of the rhetoric of the proxeny decrees to reality, and the function, from the point of view of proposer and *polis*, of the decrees that were inscribed.

To resolve these questions, it is necessary to ascertain how forcefully grants of *proxenia* were contested, and on what grounds. I therefore begin by exploring the evidence we have for the contestation of grants of *proxenia*. I argue that, although

¹ Hansen (1974), 62.

² Thomas (1992), 71; Ma (2002), 20-1. Inscribed decrees gloss over the fact of victory – and defeat – (Loraux 2001, 22) and depoliticize (Osborne 1999, 343). The dedication of decrees for the gods was also one way of asserting their finality as communal decisions, see Bresson (2005), 163-6.

³ Herman (1987), 138-42.

certain recipients of *proxenia* are frequently represented as being unworthy in speeches of the Athenian orators, in practice real factional opposition and civic strife concerning proxeny grants was relatively rare, both before and after they were made, especially by comparison with honorific decrees for citizens. To explain how these political dynamics played out in the case of *proxenia*, individual grants need to be placed in the context of the large overall numbers that were made, often to multiple individuals within a single *polis*. I therefore conclude this section by analysing, as a case study, the substantial corpus of decrees from Oropos dating from the period 250-200 BC. In these texts we can clearly identify both the prestige associated with successfully proposing an outsider for *proxenia* but also the plurality inherent in this institution.

1.1 Proxeny Contested and Cancelled

Within Greek *poleis* honourific grants were frequently contested because they gave communal validation to the actions of particular, prominent citizens, serving to mark out both the policy of a *polis* and the ascendancy of certain figures within it. Our evidence for the prosecution of individuals at Athens for having proposed unconstitutional decrees (*graphē paranomōn*) reveals, comparatively, how liable to contestation honorific decrees were, even after they were passed. Of the 33 prosecutions attested for which the content of the original proposal is known, no fewer than twenty (61%) were made in relation to proposals which were honorific.⁴ Against this background it might not seem surprising if proxeny decrees also regularly served as focal points for similar expressions of bitter factionalism, not least because

⁴ In six further cases we know nothing of the decree being contested. See Hansen (1974), 62; Johnstone (1999), 39-40; Liddel (2007), 162-3.

they could be read as signalling the foreign policy of the *polis*,⁵ and drew the political community as a whole into permanent relations of moral obligation with particular outsiders.

The surviving Attic oratory yields evidence, in the form of certain recurrent rhetorical tropes, that proposed proxeny grants could meet with opposition. In the surviving Athenian orations descriptions of *proxenoi* as unsuitable or unworthy, or as having been appointed improperly, are relatively frequent. Thus Demosthenes is accused separately by both Deinarchus and Hyperides of having been bribed to propose grants of *proxenia*.⁶ Demosthenes himself states as a fact that proxenies were procured by bribery⁷ and that many who were unworthy – rogues (*mastigioi*) and, surely hyperbolically, slaves (*douloi*) – had also become *proxenoi* through the agency of prominent politicians.⁸

In at least one case we have a much fuller example of this rhetoric, developed into an extended critique of a candidate for proxeny, in Hyperides' retrospective prosecution of Demades for proposing an unconstitutional proxeny decree for Euthykrates (a *graphē paranomōn*). In this Hyperides parodies the conventional form and content of the *proxeny*-proposal to show that Euthykrates had been made *proxenos* despite doing the opposite of what a *proxenos* should.⁹ It is not clear whether Hyperides publicly opposed this and other grants for Philip's friends using this sort of rhetoric when they were first proposed by Demades and others. These, however, are the terms in which proxeny grants are likely to have been opposed in

⁵ For an example of this sort of reading of proxeny decrees, see Arnush (2000).

⁶ Dein. 1.45; Hyp. 5.24 with Whitehead (2000), *ad loc.*

⁷ διὰ τοὺς μισθοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα γράφοντας, Dem. 20.132.

⁸ πρόξενοι μέντοι πολλοὶ διὰ τῶν πολιτευομένων γεγονάσι παρ' ὑμῖν τοιοῦτοι, ὧν εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ Λυκίδας... καὶ τινες ἄλλοι δοῦλοι καὶ μαστιγῖαι, Λυκίδας καὶ Διονύσιος, Dem. 20.132.

⁹ Hyp. fr. 76. This should now be read in the context of Hyperides' assertion, in his newly recovered speech against Diondas, that Philip had secured Athenian honours for a number of his friends who had actively opposed Athenian interests previously – Carey et al (2008), 1.24-31.

general – with arguments that the individuals in question did not, in fact, fit the paradigm of the *proxenos* which, here, is given quasi-judicial significance.

However, evidence of rhetorical tropes used to oppose grants of *proxenia* before they were made does not prove that these grants were as potentially or frequently controversial as other sorts of decree. It is important that, of the twenty prosecutions known for illegally proposed honorific decrees, Hyperides' prosecution of Demades is the only example we have in which a proxeny decree was at issue. From this dataset it is clear that it was civic honours for citizens which were most contentious before and after they were granted – constituting 15 of these 20 instances (75%).¹⁰ Moreover, excluding Hyperides' prosecution of Demades, all of the prosecutions relating to honours for non-citizens concern the granting of citizenship, and, in particular, the granting of citizenship to individuals who were likely to settle at Athens – in other words grants which would alter the composition of the Athenian citizen body.¹¹ Our epigraphic evidence, from Athens and elsewhere, similarly suggests that grants of *proxenia* were rarely as potentially or actually controversial as honours for citizens or grants of citizenship. In particular our evidence for the destruction of *stelai* inscribed with proxeny grants – i.e. the subsequent repudiation of grants – suggests that grants of *proxenia* became sufficiently contentious to be repudiated only in the most exceptional circumstances, usually involving revolution.¹² The only clear instances of destruction clearly attested – of a series of decrees at Athens and of a single stele at Priene – both took place in the context of revolution.¹³

¹⁰ Hansen (1974), 62.

¹¹ Hansen (1974), nos. 15 and 16 to individual exiles; 4 and 27 to metics and even slaves.

¹² The only literary example of which I am aware is Arthmios of Zeleia, who regularly recurs in Attic oratory of the late fourth century as an example of a traitor punished by the Athenians (Dem. 9.41-3; 19.271; Aesch. 3.258; Din. 2.25). He is said to have been declared *atimos* and an enemy of the Athenians in a decree attributed both to Themistocles and Cimon for distributing Persian gold in the Peloponnese, but only Aeschines records that he was a *proxenos* of the Athenians. On Arthmios, see Meiggs (1972), 508-12, with Wallace (1970), 200-2, and Moggi (1995), 147-8.

¹³ A third instance is implied by an instruction inscribed at Paros that a number of Chians are to be

In the case of the destruction of at least nine *stelai* inscribed with proxeny decrees at Athens by the Thirty tyrants in 404/3,¹⁴ it has been suggested that what we see is the violent, monumental expression of a new foreign policy, cutting links with certain regimes and certain sorts of individuals.¹⁵ It seems likely, however, that oligarchic ideology also played a vital role. As the privileges which *proxenoi* received were to an extent modelled on the rights citizens possessed, it is hard to believe that this action was unrelated to the well-documented activities of the Thirty in restricting citizenship and civic participation, including the targeting of non-citizen residents.¹⁶ The example from Priene appears exceptional in other respects. The original inscribed decree of Euandros of Larissa was apparently destroyed during the reign of the tyrant Hieron at Priene.¹⁷ *I.Priene* 12 is the re-inscription of this grant, preceded by the decree of the re-established demos which authorises this, granting a further privilege with the addition of an ‘entrenchment clause,’ by which any future attempt to rescind Euandros’ honours is declared invalid. In this case it seems very likely that this destruction related to the relationship of Euandros to those exiled under the regime of the tyrant. Certainly he is significant for reasons other than his *proxenia* – as the fact that an honorific decree was inscribed for him at Priene at all clearly shows.¹⁸

Our other evidence indicates that even after a political revolution, the cancellation of proxenies was an unusual and highly marked act. Because honorific

inscribed as *proxenoi* as they were before (*IG* XII 5 111 1.9-11). It is tempting to relate this to another Parian text which, as restored by Hiller, records a public debt owned by Parians to Chian *proxenoi*. Wilhelm (1939), esp. 9-12, reconstructs a dispute and settlement under the Second Athenian League (*RO* 29), but caution is advisable, see Migeotte (1984), 213-5.

¹⁴ References to the destruction have been preserved in nine decrees, some of which certainly are and others of which probably are re-inscribed proxeny grants: *IG* II² 6; I³ 227; II² 52; I³ 229; *SEG* 14 40 (=II² 66 fr.c); *Agora* 16 37, 39 and 45; *SEG* 28 48.

¹⁵ Shear (2011), 172. Honours were also apparently rescinded under the oligarchic government imposed on Athens in 322, but the examples (e.g. *IG* II² 448) tend to concern citizenship primarily.

¹⁶ *Xen. Hell.* 2.3.18-20; *Ath. Pol.* 36.2, 37.2. See Gray (2011), 96-106, on the intellectual and ideological justifications underlying these attempts to more narrowly define the civic body.

¹⁷ The original suggestion is Hiller’s and has been accepted as probable by subsequent commentators: Robert, *OMS* 3.9-10; Crowther (1996), 205-16; Habicht (1998b), 84.

¹⁸ On inscription of proxeny decrees as an exceptional honour at Priene, see Introduction, 15-6.

decrees explicitly recorded the existence of an obligation, rescinding a decree could be represented as defaulting on one's debts.¹⁹ Although it was possible to argue that if a *polis* underwent sufficient constitutional change (especially involving widening or narrowing of participation) then the result was a new *polis*, free from obligations incurred by the government of the old, in practice, given continuity of place and population, this was unsatisfying.²⁰ Indeed the restored democracy in 403/2 famously undertook to repay even the debt the Thirty incurred for the Spartan garrison of Athens to safeguard their oligarchic regime.²¹ *IG I³ 98* paints a vivid picture of honorific continuity, despite the political vicissitudes of late fifth-century Athens. Pythophanes, already *proxenos* of Athens, was recognised by the oligarchic regime of the Four Hundred (or Five Thousand) which granted him additional honours including the inscription of the original decree granting him *proxenia*, presumably immediately above this decree on the stone. Subsequently, after democratic and then oligarchic rule, in 399/8 the democracy, once again in power, added yet another decree in his praise, which was inscribed below the oligarchic one.²²

The almost complete absence of entrenchment clauses from the nearly three thousand inscribed proxeny decrees suggests that proxeny, more generally, was rarely subject to this degree of political, factional controversy. Entrenchment clauses were inserted by the proposer to pre-empt later attempts to rescind a decree, and suggest that a specific piece of legislation was actually or potentially controversial or contested enough for such attempts at cancellation to be a possibility. Apart from the

¹⁹ The close connection between financial debts and these debts of honour is emphasised by both Demosthenes, in his speech against Leptines (e.g. Dem. 20.36 and 133-4), and in Antigonos Monophthalmos' letter to the Teians regarding their projected synoicism with the Lebedeans (where provisions regarding the continued recognition of each sort of public debt are juxtaposed, *RC* 3, 1.19-24).

²⁰ Arist., *Pol.* III 1276^a6 -1276^b13.

²¹ *Ath. Pol.* 40.3; Isoc. 7.67-9; Dem. 20.11-2.

²² *ML* 80 with commentary on the deeper-cut letters of the final decree.

entrenchment clause contained in the decree of Euandros, exceptional for reasons discussed above, very few of these clauses occur in contexts relating to *proxenia*.²³ The instances of which I am aware – in two decrees of Thasos (*IG XII 8 267*; *XII suppl. 358*), a decree of Ilion for four Tenedian brothers (*Syll.*³ 355), and the Athenian decree for Sthorys of Thasos of 394/3 BC (*IG II² 17*) – occur in decrees granting additional, more controversial honours to pre-existing *proxenoi* and do not relate to the grant of *proxenia* itself.²⁴ Other related sorts of protective clause suggest that in particular cases individual proxeny proposals could on occasion be extremely controversial. For instance a proxeny decree from Pherai contains a heavily (perhaps dubiously) restored clause threatening retribution if anyone should remove or steal the decree (*SEG 23 424*). Similarly a Dodonan oracular consultation by an unknown city concerning whether or not it should grant *proxenia* to a man named Kleolas, perhaps reflects an attempt to obtain a divinely sanctioned decision as a way of circumventing factional deadlock.²⁵ Such indications are, however, very unusual and presumably

²³ As collected by Gschnitzer (1973), col.705, with the addition of *IG II² 17*.

²⁴ The Thasian decrees granted citizenship. The decree of Ilion granted *ateleia*, the right to conduct *syle* from Ilion, and also includes a fine for those who tried to collect taxes despite this grant (suggesting that not all would be pleased). The Athenian decree for Sthorys was probably controversial because it granted him citizenship – for similar controversies surrounding citizenship proposals in this period, see *Ath. Pol.* 40.2; [Plut.] *X Or.* 835F-836A. The controversy of this motion perhaps explains a further oddity of it – the fact that the main decree is introduced by a subsequent bouleutic decree which provides for the inscription of the original decree on two separate *stelai* (the first decree only explicitly allowed for one). Osborne (1981-3), 47, explained this away as a clarification, obtained by Sthorys from the boule of an ambiguity in the original decree – an explanation which Gauthier found unconvincing (*BE* 1996, no. 126). I wonder whether the inscription ordered by the original decree might not have been delayed because the motion was controversial (a fact indicated by the entrenchment clause included by the proposer of the decree) as a result of which Sthorys brought the matter up with the council, which, out of embarrassment because of this delay, or perhaps out of a desire to emphasise the finality of this grant, reiterated Sthorys' deserts and ordered that these decrees be inscribed twice. *IC II v 35* is perhaps another example, but this fragmentary decree is very difficult to understand.

²⁵ *SEG 56 663* (= Lhôte 2006, no.15). *contra* Lhôte, the honorand in this text (dative Κλεολαει) was not a woman by the name of Κλεολαϊς (paradigm Κύπρις), for which the dative form would probably be Κλεολαϊ or Κλεολαϊδι. Instead what we probably have is a hypercorrect dative form of the masculine name Κλεόλας, attested five times in the *LGN*, with ει substituted for ι (i.e. Κλεόλαι) as it also is in the spelling of *proxenia* in this text, προξενει[ταιν...]. I am very grateful to Edouard Chiricat of the *LGN* for his expert assistance with this name. On the deferral of politically difficult decisions to oracles, see Parker (1985), 300.

have more to do with the particular circumstances in question than the fact that *proxenia* was being granted.

The surviving lists of *proxenoi* similarly suggest that it was rare for cities to subsequently repudiate individual *proxenoi*, whether as a result of changing relations with them, or the ascendancy of a faction opposed to their appointment in the first place. In the extensive surviving fragments of proxeny-catalogues and lists of proxeny-grants, which preserve records of more than 700 *proxenoi* in total, there is no sign that any *proxenos* has been erased, as we might expect if grants of *proxenia* were regularly overturned.²⁶ If the arguments which I have made elsewhere about the context for the erection of the Karthaian list of *proxenoi* are correct – and it was established in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Keian federation, with the Karthaians keen to cooperate with the Athenians – it is significant that this list included individuals who are likely to have received *proxenia* in the context of the earlier Keian revolt from Athens.²⁷ The absence of erasures in the more than two-thousand individually inscribed proxeny decrees also provides important supporting evidence.²⁸ This failure to cancel honours for outsiders should perhaps not surprise us. If Demosthenes is to be believed, the Chians did not cancel the extraordinary honours they had granted to the Athenian general Conon, even when he later led the armies of

²⁶ The one erasure of which I am aware, in *IG XII 5 542*, was made to correct an initial mis-inscription of the first element of a *proxenos*' name. Scholten (2000), 89 n.105, is mistaken in reading an erasure in lines 125-30 of an Aitolian list of *proxenoi* (*IG IX 1² 17*) – as the edition makes clear this is probably just a worn part of the stone.

²⁷ Specifically the Knidian, grouped (uniquely) in the section otherwise devoted to Boiotians probably because he was nominated in the context of Epameinondas' flotilla (the occasion for the Keian revolt) – otherwise attested in a recently published Knidian decree of *proxenia* for Epameinondas himself – see Mack (2011), 328.

²⁸ I know of only two possible examples. The name, patronymic, and ethnic of the honorand of *IosPE I² 21* are said by the editors to have been chiselled from the stone, but it is striking that part of the name of the granting city of Olbia has also been lost. In the case of *FD III 4 377* there is a deep erasure – but after the honorand's name, in a position which makes it look likely, to me, that a subsequent mistake was being removed. The closest we in fact come is *IG XI 4 777* from which the proposer and honorand were erased to facilitate the reuse of this stone for a new honorand.

Athens against Chios.²⁹ It does, however, contrast with our evidence for the fate of decrees for citizens within the *polis* which were vulnerable both to later official repudiation and jealous private attacks – as we see in the speech for Euxitheus in which he accuses his rivals of chiselling out a decree passed in his honour by his fellow demesmen.³⁰ It is striking that the only decree granting *proxenia* I know of in which the name of one of its honorands was erased is a decree of Eretria for foreign judges erected at their home city of Miletus – perhaps the dikast in question fell publicly out of favour.³¹

Thus while we probably do have evidence attesting to the existence of political opposition to specific proposals of *proxenia*, it appears that in general decrees of *proxenia* were rarely the focus of particularly violent contestation. There were, I would suggest, two reasons for this. The first is that honours for outsiders, although they could reflect the prominence or ascendancy of a particular politician or faction, were not as highly charged or potentially as politically involved as honours for citizens often were. The other reason is the plurality which was inherent in – and essential to – this system. Decrees of *proxenia* were not unimportant, and as we shall see shortly it seems likely that in some cases the ability to successfully propose individuals as *proxenoi* could serve as a marker of political influence and prestige. However, since grants were continually made, often to multiple individuals from a single *polis*, very few individual grants were likely to serve as a focus for serious political factionalism within the granting city. Moreover, while it was for the assembly to decide whether an individual had performed a *euergesia* for its benefit, none disputed the moral imperative of responding with honours to benefactions that had been performed. The question of whether an individual had performed a

²⁹ Dem. 20.81.

³⁰ Dem. 57.64; Liddel (2007), 162.

³¹ *Milet* I 3 154 l.14-5.

benefaction might be subject to dispute, and the rhetoric I identified above suggests that on occasion it was, but, when recognised, the decree of honours was an undisputed consequence.³²

1.2 Prestige and Plurality: Proposers of *Proxenois* at Oropos

The corpus of proxeny decrees from Oropos provide a unique case study for exploring the importance of political competition and prestige in relation to proposers' nominations of *proxenois*. We possess more than two hundred proxeny decrees from Oropos, the vast majority inscribed on a number of pre-existing statue bases during a fifty-year period (250-200BC). This concentrated sample of relatively lengthy decrees, and the fact that we can understand the spatial relation of these texts, enables us to examine the ideology of proposers in ways that are not possible elsewhere.³³

One of the most striking features of this material is the prominence of proposers of individual decrees – the name of the proposer of the proxeny decree is always included in the inscription of it. When, as often, dating formulae are omitted,³⁴ the proposer's name literally introduces the decree and is arguably given more prominence than the name of the *proxenos* honoured. It is hard to escape the conclusion that these inscriptions commemorate the successful proposer of the decree as well as the honorand – and this is further reinforced by the way in which these monuments are distributed over the monumental topography of the Amphiareion. In

³² Dem. 20. 57 on the inability of the *polis* to choose which benefactors it wanted to honour. The frequent formula in decrees from a wide range of *poleis* 'so that the polis may be seen to honour with worthy thanks those who perform benefactions,' is also an expression of this moral obligation to recognise and be seen to recognise benefactions with honours.

³³ See Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 491-7, for a comparative study of proposers in decrees. Often the formal proposal of decrees was entrusted to particular officials who would often not have been responsible for the initiative in the first instance; elsewhere the names of the proposers were frequently omitted entirely. The inscription of such a large number of detailed proxeny decrees at Oropos was facilitated by the decision, taken at some point in the mid third century BC, that pre-existing statue bases could be used as an alternative to purpose-hewn stelai for inscription. On this, see Chapter 5, 249-51 with Fig.5-6.

³⁴ Perhaps up to half of the decrees of Oropos are undated – e.g. *I.Oropos* 113-5; 140-146.

particular, decrees, often from different years, were grouped on the same statue base according to the individual who proposed them. Thus one particular statue base, for Ptoion and his wife (*I.Oropos* 418-9), received three decrees from three different years proposed by Oropodoros, son of Theozotes (*I.Oropos* 151-2; 174), and three decrees from two different years proposed by Kleomachos, son of Meilichios (*I.Oropos* 176; 186-7) – and there are many other examples.³⁵ Decrees proposed by members of a single family are also grouped in this way. On one statue base five decrees were inscribed proposed by two brothers prominent at Oropos, Python (*I.Oropos* 111; 114; 117) and Aristandros (*I.Oropos* 113; 115), the sons of Kalligeiton. These statue bases were used as monuments of the proposers of these decrees, communicating personal and familial prestige within public space. This is particularly clear in the juxtaposition on one particular statue-base of three decrees proposed by two brothers, Hermodorus and Theoteles. All explicitly dated to the year in which their father served as the priest of the Amphiareion, these texts seem intended to mark the importance of this family in this year.³⁶

However, for all that these inscriptions express claims to prestige, apparently pursued in a competitive context, what is also strongly evident is plurality. While there are one or two individuals and families who propose comparatively large numbers of decrees – like Oropodoros (5)³⁷ or Plutarchides (5)³⁸ or Sophilos and his sons (8)³⁹ or, above all, Python (13)⁴⁰ – of the 83 proposers I have collected for this period more than half (47) propose only one decree. Stretched over a period of up to

³⁵ Another is inscribed with three different decrees by Ariston, son of Nikostratos (*I.Oropos* 196; 204-5), and two different decrees, dated to different years, proposed by Paramythos, son of Kratinos (*I.Oropos* 184; 202); for further examples see *I.Oropos* 72; 73; 128.

³⁶ On inscribed decrees as monuments for their successful proposers at Athens, see Liddel (2007), 163.

³⁷ *I.Oropos* 69; 135; 151; 152; 174.

³⁸ *I.Oropos* 112; 156; 168; 169; 170.

³⁹ *I.Oropos* 53; 68; 77; 140-3.

⁴⁰ *I.Oropos* 97-8; 103-5; 111; 114; 116-7; 160; 164; 192; 208.

fifty years, at three surviving per year, it is still not clear that it was possible for just any Oropian to make a successful proposal and have his name inscribed.⁴¹ However, a relatively large proportion of citizens at the small *polis* of Oropos apparently could and, at least on occasion, did propose decrees which were inscribed.⁴² Pluralism is also evident in the prominence of honorands from particular *poleis* – above all the nearly fifty Athenians honoured with *proxenia* in this narrow period, a third of the overall total. The duplication of *proxenoi* at cities with which contacts were most frequent probably meant that the theoretical problem of individuals needing the help of a *proxenos* whose appointment they had opposed rarely arose in practice. It would also have had the effect of reducing the burden of services expected of any given *proxenos* at those cities. The potential for a *polis* to possess multiple *proxenoi* at particular cities, rather than a sign of the degeneration of this institution, thus seems likely to have been important for its function.

The material from Oropos also allows us to examine the role which private relationships played in the operation of *proxenia* as an institution. In one case, Kleomachos, the prominent son of Meilichios, proposed in the same year, probably on the same occasion, proxeny decrees for two Elateians, Gennaios and Kallias (*I.Oropos* 186 and 187), and, on another occasion, was himself created *proxenos* by the *polis* of the Elateians (*IG XI 1 100*) in the year in which the same Gennaios was archon at Elateia.⁴³ It seems reasonable to infer that a personal relationship existed between Gennaios and Kleomachos – perhaps it was even ritual *xenia*, which Herman claims underlay most grants of *proxenia*.⁴⁴

⁴¹ This sample, of course, despite being very large, is not complete – though whether this is simply because some inscribed decrees have been lost or, as is also possible, not all proxeny decrees were inscribed, is impossible to know. On these issues, and for rates of granting, see Chapter 3, 172-8.

⁴² See the earlier analysis of Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 123, of the number of proposers then known.

⁴³ Foucart *BCH* (1886), 361; Paris (1892), 62 + *add.* p. 318.

⁴⁴ Herman (1987), 138-42.

Although this is the only case where such reciprocal grants of *proxenia* can be identified – and, indeed, only in relatively few other cases can we positively identify connections between proposer and nominee – this is a reflection of the difficulty of proving personal connections rather than the rarity of them in proxeny grants.⁴⁵ The granting of honours was, and was certainly always constructed as being, reactive, in response to benefactions already performed. Except in cases where the interaction in question occurred in the context of the granting community (e.g. if an individual was honoured for his performance in a public delegation from his own community to the granting *polis*), the honorand's contact would have been with individual members of the community initially rather than the community as a corporate whole. The benefactions in question would, in the first instance, have been services performed for individuals (even when they were present representing the *polis*). In this sense a personal relationship is likely to have motivated the original proposer of the honorific decree – and the proposal of public honours would thus be, in part, an expression of his own personal gratitude.

The proxeny networks of *poleis* were in fact heavily dependent on private networks. For the most part the *proxenoi* of a *polis* would have been comprised of the private connections of its citizens appropriated and transformed into a public network. Individuals, in creating these links and in putting them forwards for proxeny, played an essential role which was sometimes recognised in the decrees themselves. They probably also played an important continuing role in maintaining these ties – as the personal contacts of these individuals in the granting city. This seems to be reflected in western Greece in the very widespread practice, when appointing *proxenoi*, to

⁴⁵ Usually the closest we can come is identifying patterns of activity – like the single Athenian who proposed grants for two different Syracusans and thus probably had a connection with this community, Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 28. On the difficulties caused by proposal by magistrates, see above, n.33, and Mitchell (1997a), 33, on the prevalence of *probouleusis* at Athens.

simultaneously name *enguoī tes proxenias* – ‘guarantors of the proxeny’ – whose significance is indicated by the fact that they are listed even in extremely concise decrees where no other details are given. The issue here was not citizens being liable to their *polis* for the performance of a *proxenos*, or even standing surety to a *proxenos* for the honours their *polis* granted him –⁴⁶ instead it was of establishing or authenticating the identity of the *proxenos*.⁴⁷ Although visitors to the *polis* of the *proxenos* would have little difficulty in identifying their *proxenos* by asking his fellow townsmen, the *polis* as a whole (even more so the *koinon*) would have been in a much more difficult position in relation to a visiting *proxenos*. Mutual recognition was, however, a *sine qua non* for the sort of permanent relationship which was claimed and for enacting the privileges promised. The western *poleis* apparently solved the problem of this structural asymmetry by formally devolving this responsibility on private individuals who knew the *proxenoi* – who may often have been identical with the proposers of the decrees.⁴⁸ Elsewhere other *poleis* probably also continued to rely on the friends of the *proxenos* to facilitate this aspect of their relationship.

In this context the formulaic description of the honorand in the proxeny-decree played a crucial role in reconstituting the relationship. It converted what was often, perhaps usually, a fundamentally private relationship into a public one by suppressing specific details of interactions with individuals except as citizens and emphasising, as the basis of the relationship, the affection of the honorand for the honouring *polis* as a whole. It is not that this language was a fraud or sham – it was performative instead of

⁴⁶ The explanations offered by Meier (1843) and Boeckh (at *CIG* 1776), which dominated subsequent scholarship (Gschnitzer 1973, col. 689; both were rightly rejected as early as Tissot 1863, 89-90).

⁴⁷ So Gschnitzer (1973), col. 690-2, rightly relating *enguoī* to the tokens (*symbola*) which private individuals used to establish identity. On *symbola*, see Herman (1987), 62-7.

⁴⁸ The proxeny lists of Aitolia, which always list *enguoī*, provide a good case study. In these lists there is considerable variation in the number of *enguoī* for each *proxenos* – presumably reflecting the number of individuals connected or willing to connect themselves to a particular honorand. At Hypata the magistrates were obliged to fulfil this function (thus *IG IX 5b* – the last *enguoī* may have proposed the decree). The sporadic attestation of magistrates as *enguoī* in the Aitolian decrees, by contrast, perhaps reflects their involvement in proposing or supporting particular grants of *proxenia*.

simply being descriptive, just as the decree of *proxenia* itself was. Moreover the package of honours granted with the decree was intended to facilitate and encourage frequent interaction – and the attachment of *proxenos* to *polis*.⁴⁹ The success of the attempt which this language represents may be judged from evidence, examined in the third section of this chapter, of *proxenoi* internalising this description and ideology. First, however, I consider the reasons why *proxenoi* participated with this institution – the value of *proxenia* within the *polis* of the *proxenos*.

2 *Proxenoi* at Home and at Court

Proxenoi performed useful services for cities and their citizens. They did not, however, do this out of narrow self-interest, as part of the symmetrical reciprocity of hospitality which characterized private *xenia*, serving as *proxenos* of an individual in their own community in return for the other's services as *proxenos* in the corresponding city. The *proxenos* was explicitly the friend of an entire city, of individuals most of whom he knew little of and who perhaps knew personally next to nothing of him.⁵⁰ Indeed, many of the intermediary services I have identified as particularly associated with the *proxenos* were of a kind that the *proxenos* himself had no need of in the city which recognised him as such, where he was not simply an undistinguished *xenos* but a *proxenos* who had official status and legal standing. What, then, was in it for the *proxenos*? Why did individuals not only allow themselves to be appointed as *proxenoi* with obligations which they might be called on to perform, but even actively seek it, taking the initiative in performing services which they then asked a *polis* to recognise by decreeing this permanent relationship?

⁴⁹ See below, 129-36.

⁵⁰ This is stressed in the second part of the definition of *proxenia* given by the Hellenistic scholar, Aristophanes of Byzantium, where he states that those (sc. of the relevant city) who do not know the *proxenos* by sight, ask for and make enquiries after him (<Πρόξενοι> ... οὓς καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες ταῖς ὄψεσι διαπυνθάνονται καὶ ἐπιζητοῦσι, Ar. Byz., Slater 1986, fr. 301).

Our evidence suggests that the title, *proxenos*, was sought by individuals because it, and the relationship with an external *polis* which it signified, was a prestigious symbol in the context of elite citizen-competition within their own *poleis*. In order to capitalize on this award, which was one of the means of asserting elite status, individuals had to advertise their *proxenia* to their fellow citizens. This was complicated, however, by the active interest which *poleis* as political communities had in controlling and monopolising the expression of honours in civic space. In the first part of this section I therefore explore some of the different ways in which individuals were able to circumvent such restrictions – especially in their self-conscious performance of their duties as *proxenoi*. I then explore the corollary of the advertisement of these links in public space – the ways in which they could be used to attack the *proxenos*. In the second part of this section, by contrast, I explore why *proxenia* apparently also worked in a political context which was, structurally, very different from the *polis* – the royal court. I argue that *proxenia* continued to function as an object of prestige in relation to royal friends and courtiers because many of them continued to maintain strong links with, and compete in the context of, the *poleis* from which they came. In this section my concern is establishing how honours and honorific institutions worked internationally, in the space between political communities.

2.1 *Proxenoi* at Home

Poleis granted other honours with *proxenia* – indeed it was normal for a community to define, by law or practice, a specific set of honours and privileges to which *proxenoi* were entitled by virtue of their *proxenia*.⁵¹ These could include *enktesis* (the

⁵¹ Marek (1984), 142-4; see 129-30.

right to own land in the granting community), *proedria* (prominent seating at civic performances), *ateleia* (freedom from taxation), *politeia* (citizenship), and in certain areas *epinomia* (rights to pasture on land belonging to the community), as well as things like crowns or, very commonly, expressions of praise. It would be perverse to argue that none of these privileges had an economic value and that the desire for them did not motivate certain individuals to seek *proxenia*. However, since *proxenoi*, as I have argued, were generally envisaged as being politically active within their own *polis*, and these grants mostly concern the rights of the *proxenos* within the honouring *polis*, they will not on their own explain why *proxenoi* in general actively cooperated with this institution. In the next section I argue that these grants had a symbolic function – in defining the status of the *proxenos* with regard to the *polis* and cementing their relationship – which was primary.⁵²

There can be no doubt that *proxenia* was itself both attractive and actively sought. Decrees granting *proxenia* were, as I have argued, always constructed as reactive, in response to benefactions. Individuals knew what sort of services were expected of *proxenoi* and performed them in anticipation of, and in order to prove themselves worthy for, the award of *proxenia*, which we know they sometimes then openly requested of the *polis* in question.⁵³ The desire to acquire such grants – and thus their value – is illustrated in our oratorical sources by accusations of bribery made in connection with them, in particular the sixty talents which Demosthenes and Demades were each said to have made out of ‘decrees and *proxenies*’⁵⁴ and also in an accusation made of Aeschines and his fellow ambassadors that they abandoned their

⁵² See below, 129-36.

⁵³ Athenian and non-Athenian examples are collected and discussed in two appendices in Gauthier (1985), 181-195.

⁵⁴ Hyp. 5.25.

duty and instead sought to obtain proxenies for themselves at Oreus (προξενίας κατασκευαζόμενοι).⁵⁵

A passage in Aeschines' speech against Ktesiphon reveals the prestige-value such external appointments had within the context of the *proxenos*' native *polis*, as well as one important example of how grants could be converted into symbolic capital – in the theatre at Athens on the occasion of the tragic contests. Formerly, with the whole city watching (and, Aeschines explicitly states, all the other Greeks), individuals who had acquired *proxenia* had had this proclaimed without special permission, along with the crowns that they were often granted in addition. For Aeschines this was the most invidious manifestation (ὁ δ' ἦν ἐπιφθονώτατον) of a general tendency to undermine the control of the *demos* and *boule* over the expression of honours within civic space, and he applauded the action of a lawgiver who clamped down on this abuse, allowing the proclamation of foreign honours – grants of *proxenia* and crowns – only when an embassy from the granting *polis* obtained prior permission.⁵⁶ This not only illustrates the real prestige-value of such awards, it also reveals the tension between the interest which individuals had in maximising this by publicising awards to an audience of their fellow citizens as well as the interest of the community in controlling such displays, in part because of the *phthonos*, the envy, which they engendered in the wider citizenry.⁵⁷ This is brought out in Pindar's fourth Isthmian ode in a particularly striking way, in the description of the honorand's family:

⁵⁵ Aeschin. 2.89; Hennig (1997), 355-6, is surely right that Dem. 18.82 is a reference to actions performed by Aeschines as *proxenos* of Oreus.

⁵⁶ "Ὁ δ' ἦν ἐπιφθονώτατον, προξενίας εὐρημένοι τινὲς ἐν ταῖς ἔξω πόλεσι, διεπράττοντο ἀναγορεύεσθαι ὅτι στεφανοῖ αὐτοὺς ὁ δῆμος, εἰ οὕτω τύχοι, ὁ τῶν Ῥοδίων ἢ Χίων ἢ καὶ ἄλλης τινὸς πόλεως ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας." (Aeschin. 3.42).

⁵⁷ Whitehead (1983), esp.56-60, on the potential negative connotations of *philotimia* – ambition for honours; see also Osborne (1999), 355-6, connecting such proclamations with athletic victory; on the similar connection between athletic victory and *phthonos* in Pindar, Kurke (1991), 195-224.

τοὶ μὲν ὧν Θήβαισι τιμάντες ἀρχᾶθεν λέγονται
 πρόξενοι τ' ἀμφικτιόνων κελαδενναῖς τ' ὄρφανοί
 ὕβριος...

But from the beginning they are said to have been honoured in Thebes as *proxenoi* of their neighbouring peoples and free of loud-voiced arrogance...⁵⁸

The connection here between the long-term elite status of this family and their identity as *proxenoi* of nearby communities is clearly expressed. The assumption implicit in Pindar's statement that the Kleonymidai are 'free of loud-voiced arrogance' is similarly clear – these symbols of status were things which individuals could, under normal circumstances, be expected to preen themselves on, in ways that might be harmful to civic harmony.⁵⁹

Decrees of *proxenia* frequently made provision for public proclamation at festivals in the *polis* of the *proxenos*, illustrating the reality of Aeschines' concern – but this was only one of the ways in which these awards could be publicised within the *proxenos*' community.⁶⁰ One of the means which is now most visible to us was the erection of monuments inscribed with copies of the external honorific decrees a citizen received – so called *Ehrentafeln*, of which the monuments of Nikomedes of Kos (30 decrees inscribed c.300 BC),⁶¹ Nikon of Seleukeia (172 BC),⁶² Cassander of Alexandria (c. 165),⁶³ and Sosos of Rhodes (post 88 BC)⁶⁴ are the most impressive examples. However, in the same way that the Athens of Aeschines had restricted public proclamations at the city's dramatic festivals, *poleis* in general seem to have been effective in restricting the public inscription of such honours by private

⁵⁸ Pindar *Isth.* 4.7-9, trans. Loeb, adapted.

⁵⁹ On proxeny in Pindar, see Currie (2005), 340-3. On amphictyonies, 'those dwelling around,' as competitive contexts, see Parker (1998), 22.

⁶⁰ e.g. in decrees from different cities inscribed at Kos, *IG* XII 4 139; 141-3; 147.

⁶¹ *IG* XII 4 129-130.

⁶² *Syll.*³ 644-5.

⁶³ *Syll.*³ 475.

⁶⁴ Maiuri (1925), n. 18.

individuals for the same reason, the desire to exert authority over honorific expression in public space.⁶⁵ With the exception of external decrees honouring foreign judges or other official representatives, which *poleis* did frequently inscribe, because they honoured the city itself as much as they honoured particular individuals, very few examples of monuments of this sort are known.⁶⁶

There were, however, other ways in which individuals could communicate their possession of *proxenia* within their *polis*, and thereby derive benefit from its prestige-value, which was essential to the functioning of this institution. One means, which is likely to have been more important than we will ever know, was private display, the placement of visible honorific monuments within the house of the individual citizen. We are told, for instance, by Aeschines of the retention of civic crowns in the houses of citizens by the recipients and their descendants as memorials (the word used is ὑπόμνημα), and the context dictates that the same was expected of crowns awarded by other states.⁶⁷ It is likely that the copies (*antigrapha*) of honorific decrees which cities explicitly ordered to be given to honorands were also frequently displayed in this way – whether the medium was bronze, papyrus or painted board – and this practice of giving copies seems likely to be much more common than the relatively infrequent epigraphic references would suggest.⁶⁸ Indeed the erection of monuments such as *Ehrentafeln* in the *proxenos*' home *polis*, inscribed with multiple

⁶⁵ This is made particularly clear in a Koan decree honouring a citizen which explicitly grants him permission, having inscribed the decree on a stone stele, to set it up in the sanctuary of Asclepius, *IG* XII 4 59 1.43-5; cf. 57 1.27-9.

⁶⁶ A few honorific decrees were erected at the explicit request of the granting *polis*, especially at Delos (perhaps because of the international character of the shrine? – e.g. *IG* IX 4 1054-5) and Kos (e.g. XII 4 138-48 – mostly for medics and/or officers despatched by the Koans). The instances which we have, moreover, were not infrequently constructed as interactions between the granting city and that of the honorand (especially as letters between *poleis* e.g. IX 2 11; XII 3 338; *I.Thasos* 169-71). Where one *polis* sufficiently dominated another, it could also simply order honorific decrees inscribed at the subordinate *polis*, as in the case of Delos under the Athenians – e.g. *ID* 88 or *IG* I³ 156. The Lindians could instruct an individual to set up their decree for a resident of Naucratis in the Panhellenion there presumably because of the peculiar structure of this city, *Syll.*³ 110 n.4.

⁶⁷ Aeschin. 3.47.

⁶⁸ e.g. *Syll.*³ 715; *IGUR* 2-3; and *IG* XII 5 599 with Marek (1984), 141 and n. 116 on this.

honorific decrees from different cities which do not themselves explicitly mention the giving of *antigrapha*, strongly suggests that *proxenoi* were generally given, or could easily acquire, copies of these texts. Private display seems to be explicitly attested in the case of the two bronze tablets, inscribed with proxeny decrees for Diodorus of Syracuse by Akragas and by Malta, which were discovered together in Rome. They were presumably set up together at the house of Diodorus in that city where he welcomed delegations and citizens from these cities, as the Akragantine bronze explicitly states (it also explicitly references itself as a *ὑπόμνημα*).⁶⁹ The audience for these monuments, although it was of course much narrower in this domestic context, would also have been more select, likely to consist of members of the social stratum to which the *proxenos* (and indeed *proxenoi* in general) belonged, with whom he most directly competed. Such monuments did not have to be public or permanently visible to continue to communicate and articulate the prestige of the honorand – his peers who saw, or heard of such monuments would continue to be aware of them.

Within their native *poleis proxenoi* could also, however, communicate and derive prestige from their honorary position more actively. This was by publicly performing the role of the *proxenos*, by interceding with magistrates, introducing visiting delegates, defending their clients' interests in court, and ostentatiously providing hospitality. This is the face of the *proxenos* we see above all in Apollodorus' portrait of Kallippos, *proxenos* of the Herakleians – arriving at Pasion's bank and successfully demanding, as *proxenos*, to be shown the accounts of a deceased Herakleians, and later warning Pasion to beware of injuring so weighty a person as a *proxenos*.⁷⁰ The picture may, as I have already argued, be overblown, as Apollodorus stands to gain from making his opponent ridiculous. However, the

⁶⁹ *IGUR* 2-3.

⁷⁰ Kallippos: 'if anyone wishes to defraud me, let him know he is defrauding one who is a proxenos' (καὶ εἴ τις με βούλεται ἀφελέσθαι, πρόξενον ὄντα ἀφαιρεθῆναι, [Dem.] 52.5).

responses in this narrative – Phormion submissively showing Kallippos the ledger, Pasion agreeing that he would have to be mad to want to cross a *proxenos* – reinforce the sense conveyed of the essential prestige inherent in *proxenia*. It is striking here again how the symbiosis of honour and function was fundamental to the institution of *proxenia*, as the individual needed to perform the functions associated with *proxenia* within his own community to capitalize there on the honour of being *proxenos*. Conversely, *proxenia*'s dark-side was that the *proxenos* exposed himself to shame if, when called on publicly by citizens of his client city in the manner which our inscriptions mention, he did not act as he was supposed to do.

The same desire to capitalize on the prestige inherent in proxeny by communicating this status can also be identified in wide-spread Greek patterns of naming. In particular the popularity of the use of 'Proxenos' as a personal name, attested 134 times in the published volumes of the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*, is likely to have been due to the elite status associated with this honorific role (just as names containing 'hippos' had definite aristocratic connotations).⁷¹ When a *proxenos* named his son 'Proxenos' this action reflected the conception of the role as hereditary and the aspirations of the father for the social position of his child.⁷² At the same time, however, it would also have been intended to make claims for the father's own social position and was another means of publicizing the honorific position he held. Individuals also commemorated and advertised specific links to the *poleis* of which they were *proxenoi* in the names of their sons, by naming them after the ethnic of that city. Thus Cimon, the great fifth-century Athenian statesman, *proxenos* of the

⁷¹ Ar. Nu. 60-74, signalling in this case elite aspirations rather than status; on these names, see Dubois (2000).

⁷² In a few instances we even find individuals called Proxenos (or their sons) receiving grants of *proxenia*: IG I³ 91, 181; I.Oropos 35; SEG 16 373. SEG 56 1710 is another example (the published text should be corrected from the photo to read Ἡρόδοτος Προξένου from Ἡρόδοτος ὁ Ξένου – a fact I am grateful to Charles Crowther for pointing out).

Spartans, famously named his son Lakedaimonios.⁷³ The large number of names derived from ethnics in the *LGN* makes it clear that this was a common means of proclaiming links with external communities – but it is also important to note that these names made most sense in the context of the home city, distinguishing a prominent family from its rivals.⁷⁴

This emphasis on the native *polis* as the context in which individual *proxenoi* were most interested in communicating this award begs the question of what, from the point of view of the *proxenos*, was the point of decrees inscribed not in his home city, but in the granting *polis* (i.e. the vast majority of the inscriptions we have).⁷⁵ Just as monuments in private space could effectively convert external honours into symbolic capital, so too monuments in external public spaces could, under certain circumstances, perform the same function. Individuals competing within a *polis* could have an awareness of the monuments, honouring their peers, in other *poleis* – though of course this would be most effective when they existed in cities which were comparatively accessible, regularly visited anyway by citizens of the *proxenos*' native *polis*. We can imagine without too much difficulty (we have no explicit sources) visitors proudly pointing out inscriptions erected in honour of themselves or jealously, grudgingly (but not without interest and curiosity) looking to identify monuments they know to have been erected in honour of their neighbours and fellow citizens.

In this connection the utility of a monument erected in a city never or rarely visited by fellow citizens from the honorand's *polis* would have been relatively slight.

⁷³ Plut. *Cim.* 16.1; *IG* I³ 364 l.8; see also Connor (1967), 67-71.

⁷⁴ Chalkideus, Eretrieus, Thespieus, Korinthios, Megareus, Messenios, Mantineus, Samios, Thasios, Rhodios, Ephesios, and Milesios are some of the ethnic-names with at least five attestations. Athenaios is attested more than 250 times, but this is complicated by the fact that Athenaios was understood as a theophoric name as well as an ethnic, which is why, unlike other ethnic-derived names, it is attested at the city itself (144 times at Athens).

⁷⁵ That there was a point is clearly shown by the fact that the honorand sometimes supplemented the public money allocated to ensure a more lavish monument or paid the entire cost themselves – e.g. *IG* I³ 95; 107; 155; 156; cf. Low (2005), 103; Clinton (1996).

Major cities, panhellenic sanctuaries, those places where most generally was inscribed, were the places where such monumentalization would have been most valuable, and served as external sites in which fellow citizens could directly compete.⁷⁶ In particular the Amphiareion at Oropos, even during its independence, seems to have served as a major subsidiary arena for Athenian competition and display. During the second half of the third century upwards of forty Oropian awards of *proxenia* were inscribed for Athenians, between a quarter and a third of the overall total. This fact clearly communicates the desire of Athenians in particular to be honoured in this space in which their peers had previously been commemorated, probably reflected in a greater general eagerness to perform suitable services for Oropians in pursuit of *proxenia*.⁷⁷ Delphi seems to have functioned similarly as an external space for competition between members of the same *polis*, to judge from the way in which decrees were located according to the *polis* of the honorand on the monumental topography of the shrine. Thus decrees for Megarians are concentrated on the so-called wall of the Megarians,⁷⁸ and so on for the bases of the Argives,⁷⁹ Arkadians,⁸⁰ Aetolians,⁸¹ and Boiotians.⁸² Often the monuments in question had a pre-existing connection with the community of the honorands and, as such, were likely to have been specifically visited by individuals from these communities – as in the case of the base of the Tarentines (originally a Tarentine victory monument)⁸³ and the

⁷⁶ This is what Marek meant when he used the term ‘Repräsentationszentrum’ of Delos in the third century and Delphi under the Aetolians, Marek (1984), 263.

⁷⁷ These sorts of competitive dynamics are also probably visible in the proxeny list of Delphi, in the tendency for different individuals from the same *polis* to be named *proxenos* shortly after each other, see Chapter 3, 175 with n. 56.

⁷⁸ *FD III* 1 155-196, only excepting 158; 164; 171; 176; 178-9; 183; and 195-6.

⁷⁹ *FD III* 179-88, only excepting 84-5.

⁸⁰ *FD III* 1 12-46.

⁸¹ *FD III* 1 142-54.

⁸² *FD III* 3 77-116.

⁸³ *FD III* 1 129-135.

treasuries of the Cyreneans.⁸⁴ In the case of the treasury of the Athenians, the frequent use of internal designations (demotics and phyletics) further emphasises the identity of this as an external site for the continuation of internal competition beyond the ability of Athens to regulate or control.⁸⁵

The numbers of individuals from the same city attested on these monuments draws our attention to an apparent paradox – that the honorific position of *proxenos* remained prestigious despite being potentially obtainable (and probably held) by a large proportion of the elite. At classical Athens most members of the political elite (and all prominent politicians) were probably *proxenoi* of one or more external *polis*. This is something which only our epigraphic evidence, particularly lists of *proxenoi*, can give us a sense of – as our literary and historical sources only mention an individual's status as *proxenos* when it is relevant to the issue at hand (not least because so many individuals were *proxenoi*).⁸⁶ For instance, on its catalogue of *proxenoi*, the minor *polis* of Karthaia recognised no fewer than fifteen prominent Athenians as *proxenoi* at some point in the mid fourth century. Even allowing for the fact that the ties between Athens and this *polis* on Keos were particularly strong, this suggests a huge number of *proxenoi* active at Athens.⁸⁷ Although it seems probable that the total number of citizens who were *proxenoi* was lower in other cities, the evidence preserved by the proxeny-lists of Karthaia, Chios, and later Eresos and Astypalaia clearly show that the numbers appointed at even minor communities were likely still to be substantial, especially as expressed as a proportion of the citizen

⁸⁴ *FD III 3* 158-178 are inscribed on the treasury – nos. 163, 165, 166, 169 are proxeny decrees for Cyreneans.

⁸⁵ *FD III 2* 71-97 with only 75, 83-4, 88 attesting non-Athenians.

⁸⁶ See Introduction, 17.

⁸⁷ See Mack (2011), 329-30, on these *proxenoi*: all of those whose names can be read are attested as belonging to the liturgical class or are closely related to others who are.

population.⁸⁸ I argue that *proxenia* remained prestigious, not so much because it was particularly difficult for elite members to obtain (the typical services considered above were things a prominent citizen could do without incurring too much trouble or expense – which might, in fact, have discouraged its pursuit), but because it served as an important marker for status, a means of identifying those belonging to the elite.⁸⁹

Just as the value of inscribed honours varied according to the context of inscription, so too the prestige value of grants of *proxenia* also varied depending on the importance of the granting *polis* among a particular civic elite. The *proxenos*, who, through the practical functions he performed, represented citizens of a particular *polis*, could thus come in some contexts to stand symbolically for it. By virtue of his *proxenia*, the *proxenos* acquired prestige and importance in relation to the position and importance of the *polis* with which he was associated. Indeed this association was on occasion extended to the point where stereotyped national character traits of a particular community could be imputed to its *proxenos*.⁹⁰ In the same way that the inscriptions created by the *polis* to honour its *proxenoi* mapped its relations with other cities onto civic, monumental space, its citizens who had been appointed *proxenoi* of other *poleis* could symbolize, internally, these external communities. Thus Plato has the Spartan Megillus relate how, as the son of an Athenian *proxenos*, other boys would blame or praise him for the actions of ‘his’ *polis*.⁹¹

A unique monument from the minor *polis* of Narthakion, in the Malian gulf, from the mid second century BC, represents an attempt to map such foreign

⁸⁸ *IG XII 5 542* (Karthaiia); also from the fourth century, Vanseveren (1937), 329-30, with a large new fragment to be published by Georgia Malouchou (Chios); *IG XII Suppl. 127* + Hodot, *EAC 5* (1976), 60-65 and Mack (2012) (Eresos); *IG XII 3 168* + *I.Dor.Ins.* 82 and 97 Astypalaia). See Chapter 3, 169-71.

⁸⁹ See Veyne (1990), 121-2 and 129-31, discussing the function of honours in constructing class distinctions.

⁹⁰ Plut. *Cim.* 14.

⁹¹ *Laws* 642 b-c, on which, see below, 138-40.

connections onto the citizenry of Narthakion – listing the *proxenoi*, or perhaps *theorodokoi*, whom other communities had nominated among the elite of this community.⁹² The intention was surely not to keep a public record of these potentially traitorous connections or to inform visitors from these communities of their representatives, for which civic archives would be much better suited.⁹³ It was instead to present a view of the world as connected to this small community, to advertise the number and importance of the communities who thought it worthwhile to maintain links with Narthakion, including Miletus and Magnesia on the Maeander.

2.2 The Perils of Proxeny

Proxenia was sought as a source of personal prestige and the link which it embodied seems to have been emphasised in order to benefit from the status inherent in this role. However, it could also under certain circumstances be a political liability for the individual, a basis for his political opponents to attack the motivation of his public actions. In one notable passage, Aeschines, commenting on the disastrous consequences of the alliance with Thebes, represents Demosthenes' *proxenia*, his care for the interests of Thebes, as *prodosia*, a betrayal of the interests of Athens.⁹⁴ When the needs of the two cities diverged – or could be represented as diverging – a prominent politician might expect his *proxenia* of the other community to be brought up against him. As I show in the third section of this thesis, the extent to which the institution of *proxenia* could actually take precedence over the institutional

⁹² *IG IX 2 90*, ed. pr. Latycheff, *BCH* 6 (1882), 580, n.2 (c.f. Monceaux 1886, 180; Michel, 657); Marek (1984), 136-7.

⁹³ Two of the three reasons suggested by Gschnitzer (1972), 699-700, and accepted by Marek (1984), 136-7.

⁹⁴ τότε ἀπώλοντο αἱ πράξεις οὐ δι' ἐμέ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν σὴν προδοσίαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους προξενίαν (Aeschin. 2.141). Harris's arguments, that Demosthenes' *proxenia* may simply be an invention of Aeschines, cannot stand, Harris, (1995), 199 n.15. The Athenian audience would have known which communities a prominent politician like Demosthenes was *proxenos* of.

expectations and models of behaviour bound up with citizenship – that *proxenoi* became, in truth, foreign agents – is questionable. It is clear, however, that such accusations were a commonplace and seem to be closely connected to similar tropes of political invective based on bribery and friendship.⁹⁵ It is for this reason that Demosthenes is keen, in another speech, to stress the fact that he is advocating an alliance with the Rhodians on the basis of the benefits it would bring the Athenians rather than the Rhodians – stating that he has no reason to promote the Rhodians’ interests being neither their *proxenos*, nor a *xenos* of any of their citizens privately.⁹⁶

According to Plutarch, the fifth-century Athenian statesman, Cimon, drew on the connection between *xenia*, *proxenia*, and bribery in an even more interesting way. Defending himself in court, probably at his *euthunai*, against an accusation that he had been bribed by king Alexander of Macedon to refuse to invade Macedon, he replied that he did not ‘serve as *proxenos* of either the rich Ionians or Thessalians, as others did, performing services and taking bribes.’ Instead, he was *proxenos* of the Lacedaimonians, whose moral purity and austerity he imitated, and consequently only took wealth from the enemy and used it to adorn the city.⁹⁷ The context is presumably that he was accused of being bribed as the friend, *xenos*, of Alexander,⁹⁸ which would make him, because Alexander was a king and his friends therefore were the public friends of Macedon, the equivalent of the *proxenos* of a *polis*,⁹⁹ and for this reason he raises the topic of others paid off as *proxenoi*, in contrast with his own relationship with the Spartans. It is tempting to suppose that when he refers to Athenians who

⁹⁵ For the ubiquity of the accusation, see Harvey (1985), esp. 89-102 and 114-17; see also Perlman (1976) and Mitchell (1997a), 181-6.

⁹⁶ Dem. 15.15.

⁹⁷ Plut. *Cim.* 14.

⁹⁸ For the double meaning of *dōrodokia* depending on perspective – accepting gifts from a friend and accepting a bribe – see Herman (1987), 73-8; and Mitchell (1997a), 181-6.

⁹⁹ This is also evident in the treatment of the Thebans after the destruction of Thebes – the friends of Philip and Alexander and *proxenoi* of the Macedonian cities are spared, articulating again this equivalence (Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.9).

serve as *proxenoi* of Ionians and Thessalians he has in mind specific candidates who have been attacked with this sort of accusation, whose identities would occur to members of his audience, and that he is not just generally referencing stereotypes (though he is, of course, doing this as well). At the least this manner of reference suggests that such accusations were a fact of political life, especially as a large proportion of the political elite of Athens would, as I argue, have been *proxenoi* of one or more *polis* at any one time.

The function of this rhetoric was, in most cases, like accusations of bribery, to cast doubt on one's opponents' motives and muddy the water. In some instances, however, we see it developed further, alongside accusations of 'Lakonizing,' 'Boiotizing,' or, from other perspectives, 'Atticizing,' that is in connection with an intensification of the association of the *proxenos* with a particular *polis*. In a number of cases, when the political situation was sufficiently charged, the result was exile for the individuals concerned. This was the fate of Cimon (albeit in the moderated form of ostracism) and of at least 34 Thasians, including one Athenian *proxenos*, exiled, so the Athenian inscription holds, [ἐπ' ἄ]ττικισμῶι (which was surely a strategic simplification by the Thasians concerned of a complex political event to elicit Athenian gratitude).¹⁰⁰ In the case of Cimon it is clear from the sayings preserved by Plutarch, in which admiration for Sparta is the most prominent theme, that this association was to a large extent self-constructed. His exile, in the aftermath of a Spartan snub of Athenian aid with which Cimon was closely identified, was both a punishment of the man but more than that a symbolic internal expression of the Athenian foreign policy response (just as Cimon's early recall to Athens was intended

¹⁰⁰ *IG II² 33* 1.6-7; cf. *Dem* 20.52 (ref to those ὧν ἔνιοι διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εὐνοίαν στέρονται τῆς πατρίδος). The *proxenos* (who is not distinguished on this list) is Amyntor, son of Apemantos, *IG II² 33* 1.26, the eldest(?) of the sons of this *proxenos* whose own grant was reinscribed in *IG II² 6*.

to both promote, and signal, Athenian *rapprochement* with Sparta).¹⁰¹ Cimon illustrates the dangers of being out of step with the prevailing political mood, allowing oneself to become an internal symbol of an external power which was or had become the focus of hostility.

In the same period the grandfather of Alcibiades sought to avoid a similar fate by publicly renouncing his *proxenia* with the Spartans – a charged gesture in this same symbolic vocabulary. The attempt failed and the Athenians, rejecting his attempt to disassociate himself from Sparta, decided to ostracize him nonetheless.¹⁰² Recent analysis of the speeches of Demosthenes has shown how careful he was in his public oratory, despite being (or becoming) *proxenos* of the Thebans, to reflect wider Athenian hostility towards them (this, of course, did not stop Aeschines from accusing Demosthenes of placing Theban interests above Athenian).¹⁰³

Like the repudiation of grants of *proxenia*, such persecution of citizens serving as *proxenoi* for other communities was probably comparatively rare, apparently arising in specific political situations in which a *proxenos* was associated too closely with a *polis* that was hostile or fell into disfavour. Much more common rhetorical invective signalled the existence of, and attempt to capitalise on, a potential tension between an individual's duty as a citizen and external identification as a *proxenos*. However, the fact that a large proportion of a given city's elite would have been named *proxenoi*, and especially the frequent use of such citizens on sensitive missions to the cities of which they were *proxenoi*,¹⁰⁴ shows clearly that this tension was often

¹⁰¹ Andoc. 3.3; Aeschin. 2.172.

¹⁰² Thuc. 5.43.2 and Hornblower (1991-2008), *ad loc.* with bibliography.

¹⁰³ Trevett (1999), 184-202; see above, 120.

¹⁰⁴ *Poleis* suspicious of the loyalties of citizens who were *proxenoi* are hardly likely to have trusted them to look after their interests in the difficult business of negotiating alliances or peace – and yet in our literary sources they frequently recur – Cimon, recalled specially from banishment to negotiate with the Spartans (Andoc. 3.3; Aeschin. 2.172); the Spartans twice sent Lichas the *proxenos* of the Argives to Argos to negotiate peace (Thuc. 5.22 and 76). cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35; 6.3.2-4; Aeschin. 2.141-3 (Demosthenes sent to negotiate an alliance with the Thebans, whose *proxenos* he was). Instead cities

more apparent than real, insufficient, at any rate, to counteract the allure of *proxenia* in this competitive context.

2.3 *Proxenoï* at Court

The ‘friends of the king,’ those ‘spending time with the king,’ the individuals ‘placed in charge of’ some military or geographic division – a number of different designations were used in decrees granting *proxenia* to explicitly identify individual honorands as operating in a non-*polis* context.¹⁰⁵ Although many of these individuals were not necessarily physically ‘at court,’ that is, with the king,¹⁰⁶ either absent on royal service, or indeed serving or associating with those who were, the court was in a very real sense a political context to which they belonged, a competitive environment, centred on the ruling king, which shaped their actions and aspirations. They were, in short, active members of a wider ‘court society,’ perhaps better a ‘court culture.’¹⁰⁷ In this context the sort of good relations with Greek cities indicated by grants of civic honours and honorific relations like *proxenia* could be an asset, easing the performance of their royal duties. However, it is not clear whether – or how – *proxenia*, along with other civic honours, could usefully serve as objects of prestige in this context, and thus motivate the recipients to participate with these civic institutions. This is because, despite certain superficial similarities, city and court had fundamentally different competitive structural dynamics. The elite members of the

sought themselves to take advantage of the good relations which these individuals had with the cities they represented. The fact that at Plataia a Spartan *proxenos* was one of the few to remain until the bitter end of the siege – surely to negotiate if the need came (he was in fact one of the two interlocutors used) Thuc. 3.52 – is a case in point, his loyalty to the *polis* of Plataia first and foremost cannot have been in any doubt. See Perlman (1958), 186.

¹⁰⁵ On these descriptions, see Chapter 1, 56-8; on court titulature and its development in general see Savalli-Lestrade (1998), 251-87.

¹⁰⁶ For this abstraction of the term, see Plb. 4.77 and 5.81, the king’s ‘*aule*’ on the battlefield, with Herman (1997), 204-5.

¹⁰⁷ On the theory of court dynamics Elias (1983) remains fundamental; for the ancient world see Herman (1980), Herman (1990), Paschidis (2008), and now Ma (2011). On attempts to distinguish ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ court members in ancient courts, not always wholly successful, Spawforth (2007).

polis, who competed amongst themselves, were, at least conceptually, equals – and grants of *proxenia* served as a source of prestige in this competition because they were authoritative, externally derived symbols of status. By contrast the court was a rigidly hierarchical institution in which status and the symbols which communicated it were internally derived, a function of proximity and access to, as well as the condescension of, higher powers (the king, above all, but also prominent courtiers).¹⁰⁸ Within the competitive context of the court, why, therefore, did individuals such as Nikomedes, son of Aristandros, or Aglaos, son of Theokles, both of Kos, not only act in such a way as to be named *proxenoi* in the first place (especially by aiding embassies to their kings), but continue to conform to the same paradigm, to perform as *proxenoi*, as both are recorded as having done?¹⁰⁹

The difference between these two political cultures, city and court, however, is significant only if we assume an unwarranted degree of separation between them. Each had an interest in asserting its own claims over individuals, and this often found its expression in official constructions of the identity of individuals: in the case of the court in omitting ethnic and patronymic, often substituting court titlature;¹¹⁰ in the case of the city, in stressing the primacy of these elements, especially the ethnic indicating *polis*-belonging, over court affiliation which was often indicated using phrases in διατρέβω, describing current activity rather than identity.¹¹¹ Both the court and the *polis*, however, stood to gain by making use of these individuals who were active in both spheres. Although there might be an on-going tug-of-war between conflicting attempts to claim their loyalties and influence their actions (attempts to *de-*

¹⁰⁸ Herman (1997), 216.

¹⁰⁹ *IG XII 4 129* decree V; *ID 1517*.

¹¹⁰ J. and L. Robert (1983), 114-15.

¹¹¹ Ma (2002), 210-1; cf. Savalli-Lestrade (1998), 277, distinguishing between the usage of free and subject cities. Ethnics are occasionally omitted for individuals very deeply embedded in court service, see Chapter 1, 55 n.95.

socialize and *re-socialize*, to adapt the terminology of Ma, emphasis dependent on perspective),¹¹² their value was precisely as intermediary figures.¹¹³ At the interface between these two political cultures, *proxenia* functioned as a marker for status in part because its recipients often continued to compete with peers in the context of *poleis* where it conveyed prestige.

Recent work has in fact emphasised the extent to which members of courts retained strong links with their *poleis* of origin, often being simultaneously active (even regularly physically present) in both political contexts.¹¹⁴ Moreover, in the same way that even absent monuments played a part in elite competition within the *polis*, individuals absent at court or in royal service did not necessarily cease to belong to the elite of their city or to compete for status there. The status at court of citizens – and their importance for their *polis* as a conduit for relations – would itself have been a source of prestige, which the individuals themselves might attempt to capitalize on, and on which members of their family, still present at their *polis*, certainly would have done. Like the *proxenoi* of cities, the citizen-*philo*i of the king stood for and symbolically represented the external reality of the royal court within the *polis*.¹¹⁵ Access to royal resources gave increased opportunities for personal aggrandisement and the augmentation of political influence within the *polis*.¹¹⁶ Access to the court – to the king and influential figures around him – materially enhanced the ability of the individual to perform, and be ostentatiously rewarded for, benefactions to cities.

¹¹² Ma (2002), 206-211.

¹¹³ Davies (2002), 11-12, describes them evocatively as ‘the human hinges of Hellenism, not just channels of communication but basic, load-bearing components of the system.’ See also Paschidis (2008), esp. 483-6.

¹¹⁴ Paschidis (2008).

¹¹⁵ Paschidis (2008), 482-3.

¹¹⁶ Plb. 20.5, for the example of ‘the house of Neon and Brachylles,’ strengthened by Antigonid aid, with Paschidis (2008), 477-81.

In the previous chapter I showed that it was the assumption of *poleis* that individuals in court service continued to maintain strong links with their cities of origin. In one instance in particular we have material which allows us to explore what, for one, middle ranking official in the Ptolemaic hierarchy, the maintenance of these sorts of ties meant. Correspondance surviving from the archive of Zenon the Kaunian, *oikonomos* in the service of the *dioiketes* Apollonios, vividly attests to the interest which he maintained in the affairs of his own and neighbouring *poleis*. We possess a letter in which Zenon is sent news of a recent political scandal at Halikarnassos¹¹⁷ and a number of requests for the application of his influence in relation to both the royal administration and the cities of the addressees in question.¹¹⁸ In one of these a delegation from Kaunos represents it as Zenon's duty, along other citizens in important positions outside the *polis*, to continue to further the interests of his native *polis* and fellow citizens.¹¹⁹ In return the delegates promise to report his aid to the *demos* of Kaunos – that is, presumably, to propose a decree in his honour.¹²⁰

Zenon, of course, as a citizen of Kaunos, his native *polis*, could not be its *proxenos* (although it is striking that, as here, in other honorific decrees for citizen courtiers their services for fellow citizens at court are described in the same terms as those of *proxenoi*).¹²¹ Other evidence, however, suggests that the assumption made by cities – that courtiers continued to want to compete in their own civic space – was not necessarily unfounded in relation to *proxenia*. In particular we possess the striking fourth-century monument of Nikomedes of Kos, consisting of two large

¹¹⁷ *P.Cair.Zen.* I 59037.

¹¹⁸ *P.Cair.Zen.* III 59341a-b contains two appeals from different citizens of Kalynda – an epigraph by Zenon shows that he was moved to help his cousin in the latter case. See also *P.Mich.* I 23.

¹¹⁹ ... νομίζοντες ἐπιβάλλειν σοι καθάπερ το[ῖς λο]γοῖς πολίταις τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίστου πολιτερομένοις φρον[τί]ζειν τούτων (*P.Col.Zen.* 1 11 l.5-7).

¹²⁰ τῶι τε δῆμ[ωι] ἀντεμφανιοῦμεν *P.Col.Zen.* 1 11 l.10. The base verb, *emphanizo*, is frequently used in motivation clauses of decrees to describe the report of behaviour initiating a decree.

¹²¹ e.g. *IG XII* 4 32 – for a citizen doctor at the Ptolemaic court; cf. *XII* 7 36.

opisthographic *stelai* bearing at least thirty decrees of Greek states, most of which probably conferred *proxenia* (to judge from the fragments that survive). The erection of this monument in Nikomedes' home *polis* stresses that, during and despite his service under the Antigonids, Kos remained the relevant competitive context for these grants.¹²² A similar dossier of proxeny decrees inscribed for Eudemus, son of Nikon, at his home city of Seleukeia in Cilicia, attests a comparable interest in his social standing there.¹²³

Although these monuments are comparatively unusual, the concerns which they reveal would have been much more generally shared and *poleis* certainly assumed that they were. Of course, not all courtiers would have been preoccupied to the same extent with their status in a specifically *polis*-based context when they participated with these *polis*-based institutions. However, *proxenia*, and other civic honours, could still have functioned as objects of prestige in these instances, at least below the highest rank of courtiers, because royal courts were so closely intertwined with *poleis*. They would have been largely composed of individuals for whom such grants were inextricably linked with elite status – with whom even those entirely unconnected with *poleis* would have sought to compete.

3 *Poleis* and their Foreign *Proxenoi*

In this section I argue that *poleis* actively sought to foster and cement the emotional basis of this relationship by granting, along with *proxenia*, a concomitant package of honours which collectively articulated the regard of the city for its *proxenoi*, encouraging them in different ways to form an attachment by defining a privileged status for them at the *polis*. How effective this attempt was in general is difficult to

¹²² *IG XII 4* 129-130. For statue bases in a related family monument: Paton and Hicks (1891), no. 221 and 227, and Herzog (1942).

¹²³ *Syll.*³ 644/5.

say but the evidence which we have does allow us to begin to explore the use that *proxenoi* made of this ideology and how some seem to have internalized it.

3.1 ‘And all other Honours Given to *Proxenoï*’

In the same way that *poleis* differed in the precise language which they used in decrees to communicate what was essentially the same *proxenos*-paradigm, the specific content of packages of honours associated with *proxenia* could vary greatly between *poleis*. Thus cities of the Peloponnese and Central and Northern Greece commonly granted the right of pasturage (*epinomia*) on their extensive publicly-owned pasturelands – which was elsewhere all but unknown.¹²⁴ Similarly grants of citizenship (*politeia*) emerge as a characteristic of *proxeny* decrees in many of the cities of the eastern Aegean (e.g. Samos and Iasos), but at others they were rarely made, and never became part of this defined package of honours, especially in the west.¹²⁵

Identifying precisely what constituted the standard set of honours and privileges at a given *polis* is often difficult. In a number of cases we have references to the fact that this was formally defined, the subject of a *proxenikos nomos* or similar regulation, of which we possess the texts for two cities, prefacing catalogues of *proxenoi* from Karthaia (*eisplous/ekplous*, *prosodos*, and either *ateleia* or *proedria*) and Kalchedon (*politeia*, *isoteleia*, *eisplous/ekplous*, and inscription on the stele).¹²⁶ Elsewhere we possess only vague references to honorands receiving ‘all that is given to *proxenoi*,’ which may imply the existence of either a specific law of this kind or possibly just that a conventional set of honours had arisen in practice. It is often

¹²⁴ Chandezon (2003), 351-89, esp. fig. 13 p. 382, for the precise distribution of cities granting *epinomia* alongside *proxenia*.

¹²⁵ Habicht (2002), 13-30.

¹²⁶ *IG XII 5 542* Karthaia, from the mid fourth century BC with Mack (2011); *I.Kalch.* 4 Kalchedon, from the second century BC. The Eresian catalogue (*IG XII Suppl.* 127) may well have been prefaced with a similar decree, see Mack (2012), 220.

difficult to ascertain which of the honours specifically delineated in a particular decree form part of this package and are therefore conferred even in proxeny decrees which do not specifically mention them, and which were granted in addition, reflecting the *polis*' view of the particular merits of an individual, and/or his specific requests. This is particularly true since exceptional decrees granting additional honours (of which inscription was often one) are likely to be overrepresented in our evidence.¹²⁷ Nonetheless it is possible to distinguish between honours which regularly formed part of this standard set, and those that tended to be distinct, rewarding subsequent or exceptional services – like crowns (especially of gold), statues, and public maintenance, as well as extremely rare gifts of real property.¹²⁸ The honours that cities habitually granted to *proxenoi* had a long-term symbolic value in defining the relationship between *polis* and *proxenos* which, from the point of view of the *polis*, went above and beyond any immediate economic advantages they might confer. In the following part of this section I will explore the continuing interplay between symbolism and function in the most common of these grants.

A number of the honours most regularly granted to *proxenoi* represent abstractions of, or were calqued on, rights which citizens exercised by virtue of their citizenship – indeed it seems probable that such grants were crucial for the development, communication, and continuing definition of concepts of citizenship and what it entailed. In this category belong *enktesis*, access to the boule and/or assembly (*synodos/ephodos*), freedom from taxes which non-citizens were expected to pay (*ateleia*), or the right to pay at a lower, citizen rate (*isoteleia*),¹²⁹ and, of course, citizenship itself (*politeia*). Granted to a *proxenos*, these privileges assimilated him, at

¹²⁷ See Introduction, 13-6.

¹²⁸ Habicht (2002), 29-30.

¹²⁹ Marek (1984), 159; on the importance of this as a mark of civic belonging at Athens, see Liddel (2007), 181-2.

least partially, to the status of the citizen. They allowed him, in the case of *enktesis*, the ‘right, which Athenians (i.e. citizens) possess, of owning property, both land and houses’ as our earliest *ad hominem* grant states,¹³⁰ or to ‘take part in all things other citizens do,’ as grants of *politeia* and *isopoliteia* frequently assert.¹³¹

Some scholars have seen a fundamental contradiction between the activities associated with *proxenoi* in their own communities, and grants of citizenship and *enktesis* in particular which, it is argued, they could only have made use of (i.e. converting them from potential to actual grants) if they permanently migrated to the city in question, thereby ceasing to function as *proxenoi*.¹³² Indeed the routine grant of *politeia* with *proxenia*, which we clearly see in the standard package of honours from Kalchedon in the second century BC, has been taken as evidence of the degeneration of *proxenia* to an empty title.¹³³ In the first case the contradiction has been rightly challenged – the honorand was the *proxenos* of another city in the context of his own, its citizen when he visited the second *polis*.¹³⁴ These honours were intended to function under normal circumstances, and not just if an individual was exiled from his native community. In practice it is not likely that many *proxenoi* served as magistrates or participated in deciding law cases – two of the central, but onerous features of the Aristotelian definition of citizenship (which, in fact, excludes many citizens born and

¹³⁰ [καὶ ἐγκτεσι]ν εἶναι αὐτοῖς ὄμπερ | Ἀθηναίους, [καὶ γεπέδο]ν καὶ οἰκίας, *IG* I³ 103 1.30-1. In addition the honorand is also granted *oikesis* (the right of residence) which is not granted later, presumably because it was not thought necessary, as *enktesis* became a more familiar concept, which illustrates the novelty of *enktesis* at this date.

¹³¹ e.g. *I.Priene* 47 1.18-9 (πολιτείαν καὶ μετουσίαν πάντων ὧν καὶ Βαργυλιῆται μετέχουσιν); *I.Iasos* 51.12-4 (δοθῆναι δὲ αὐτῶι κα[ι] πολιτεία μετέχοντι πάντων ὧν καὶ τοῖς ἄ[λ]λοις πολίταις μέτεστιν); cf. Szanto (1892), 12.

¹³² Szanto (1892), 14-7; Francotte (1910), 199-200; Osborne (1981-3), 3.45, ‘*proxenia*, a privilege clearly incompatible with the citizenship.’ On *enktesis*: Baslez (1989), 351-2, suggesting that *enktesis* indicates that foreigners were coming to reside; for an overview of the evidence for foreigners owning real property, see Hennig (1994).

¹³³ Schwahn (1931), esp. 108-112.

¹³⁴ Wilhelm (1942), esp. 44-50; 77-78; Marek (1984), 152-53; Mitchell (1997a), 39-40.

brought up under more oligarchic constitutions).¹³⁵ There were, however, other ways, perhaps more appealing and certainly more compatible with visiting, in which the inclusion of the honorand in the citizen community would have been expressed.¹³⁶ In particular, civic feasts and festivals in which the whole population partook, and was, thereby, defined, were probably more effective in promoting a sense of belonging in those *proxenoi* who came to participate, as many, especially from local *poleis*, could quite easily have done.¹³⁷ The significance of these occasions is underlined by the explicit grant of *proedria* frequently made to *proxenoi* – preferential seating at performances.¹³⁸ *Proedria* was a privilege the *proxenos* shared with members of the civic elite and his seat, among the magistrates, important priests, and citizen-benefactors, emphasised the importance of the *proxenos* within the broader community looking on.¹³⁹

The symbolic significance of *enktesis* grants similarly lay in the ideological importance attached to land ownership in the Greek *poleis*, which was frequently linked, actually or ideally, to citizen participation.¹⁴⁰ The grant of *enktesis* by a community to an honorand was a complement, an unequivocal statement of its estimate of his worth. However, if the *proxenos* (the most frequent recipient) was in

¹³⁵ Aristotle *pol.* 1275a-b. Marek (1984), 155, is quite right to note that just because we have no evidence that *proxenoi* did participate in these ways, this does not mean they were conscious of being barred.

¹³⁶ So Marek (1984), 154-5.

¹³⁷ On ‘religious citizenship,’ see de Polignac (1995), 79-8; Parker (2011), 151-52. For an example which makes clear that participation in magistracies and religious rites were two parallel and complementary methods of constructing citizen-identity, see *I.Priene* 12 ‘[μετουσίαν] ἱερῶ[ν] καὶ ἀρχ[ε]ίων ὧν καὶ Πριηνεῖς οἱ ἄλλο[ι].’

¹³⁸ *I.Ilion* 24.

¹³⁹ In a first-century BC decree from the Messenian city of Thuria this is made explicit: εἶναί τε[ε α]ὐτῶ ἐν ταῖς τῶν μυσσηρίων ἀμέραις προεδρείαν| [καὶ] προπομπήαν μετὰ τῶν ἀμετέρων ἱερομαμόνω|ν], *SEG* 11 974. The status implications of *proedria* are brought out when it occurs in descriptions of courtiers and their specific standing with the king – for examples, see Savalli-Lestrade (1998), 268 n. 71-2. *Proedria* is given a particularly concrete meaning in the two seats recovered at Olympia from the sixth and fifth centuries for two Spartan *proxenoi* of the Eleans (*LSAG* 199.15; *SEG* 26 476).

¹⁴⁰ e.g. in the property qualifications which frequently determined the degree of political participation; *Politics* 1329b 37, for the ideal of the restriction of these most important rights to ‘τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων’; Migeotte (2009), 78-9.

practice excluded from such ownership by the expectations attached to his performance of *proxenia* this gesture would have rung rather hollow.¹⁴¹ In fact, there seems little reason to accept that *proxenoi* were in general excluded in this way. The Attic Stelai, recording the sales of property confiscated from citizens at the end of the fifth century, make it clear that it was perfectly possible to own and derive profit from property overseas – even to farm it directly rather than lease it out – and give us a glimpse of the complexity of property holding possible for the elite.¹⁴² The very few extant provisions limiting the exercise of *enktesis* to residence either reflect the extraordinary, temporary nature of a grant or – like other limitations on *enktesis* especially of value and location – local, often highly specific sensitivities.¹⁴³ There is no reason, therefore, to assume that this privilege could not be used by a *proxenos* who remained normally resident and active in his own *polis*. Indeed it seems probable that, from the point of view of the *polis*, a grant of *enktesis* more effectively fulfilled its function if the invitation which it constituted *was* taken up. It involved investment on the part of the individual of his own resources in the community he served as *proxenos*, in which he thereby took a material stake and aligned his interests more

¹⁴¹ The reconstruction by Marek (1984), 158, on the basis of *IG XI 4 543*, of a necessary secondary decree activating a grant of *enktesis* and further defining its limits, is also very dubious. This inscription is not an activation of this grant, but a response to a specific request made by this *proxenos* that any property of his on Delos should not be liable for seizure to repay public debts – perhaps reflecting his own knowledge of the Delian public finances or simply the economic realities of *polis* life (cf. *IG XII 7 67* in which Praxikles the Naxian is promised as security all property in Arkesine, including that of non-citizens, which he has the right to foreclose on in the event of the city defaulting on its debt).

¹⁴² The cardinal example is the property portfolio of Adeimantos which included land at both Thasos (*IG I³ 426 1.44-50*) and Ophryneion (430 1.10-12). The sale of crops from the latter suggests that it was farmed by Adeimantos rather than leased out. Note also the properties which Leukon, king of the Bosporos is later said to have owned at Athens (Dem. 20.40).

¹⁴³ Other than *IG II² 237* to a group of Akarnanians whose exile, it is anticipated, will not be permanent – a special case (Pečírka 1966, 139-40) – *IG V 1 4* is the only example I have been able to find of *enktesis* being made conditional on settlement. It is tempting to link this to the emphasis placed in this inscription on the role of the honorand in requesting honours. The only other non-Athenian example of limitations on *enktesis* is the Prienean decree for an Ephesian (*I.Priene 3*) which limits the value of land he can acquire (though, at 5 talents, it is not very limiting) and specifies that it must not be too close to the border Priene and Ephesus share.

closely with those of his client *polis*, deepening his identification and intensifying his interactions with it.

Even privileges like freedom from taxes which non-citizens were liable for had a symbolic significance that was arguably central, especially where freedom from import duty was granted only on goods for personal consumption, and thus involved neither a substantial cost to the *polis* nor great profit to the *proxenos*.¹⁴⁴ This was a significance which would have been strengthened and regularly renewed by the actual use of the privileges involved. Paying citizen dues on goods, or none at all, explicitly differentiated the *proxenos* from other foreign visitors, especially on entering and leaving the city, and as such was a mark of belonging. The importance of what imposts one paid in a specific community for personal identity is communicated particularly clearly by the replacement of ethnics by the designation *isoteles* at Athens, even in personal funerary monuments, when the individual in question was fortunate enough to obtain this status.¹⁴⁵ Similarly access to faster and preferential legal institutions (e.g. *prodikia* or the court of the polemarch at Athens), as well as having practical advantages for someone not intending to remain at the polis in question for very long, also had the effect of clearly and publicly distinguishing the *proxenos* from other visiting *xenoi*.¹⁴⁶

Many of these grants, indeed, seem to have been intended to encourage and ease the interactions of the *proxenos* and the city, to facilitate the habitual and

¹⁴⁴ As at Odessus (*IGBulg* I² 42), Eretria (*IG* XII 9 198), Thera (XII 3 1290), Samothrace (XII 4 148), Chios (*RPh* 1949, 9-13 n. 2), Magnesia (*I.Magnesia* 6), Priene (*I.Priene* 2), Ephesus (*I.Eph* 1453 1.1-20), Alexandria in the Troad (*I.Alexandria Troas* 2), Kios (*I.Kios* 1); cf. Marek (1984), 157-8. This restriction is not the norm, but rather, like other restrictions (which include or exclude taxes to be paid on agricultural land – or explicitly state that it is only valid for taxes controlled by the city) express local conditions and concerns. It is phrased with absolute clarity in a decree from Abdera ‘εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν χρεῖαν καὶ μὴ κατ’ ἐμπορίαν’ (*I.Thrac.Aeg.* 8).

¹⁴⁵ *IG* II² 7862-7881; *Agora* 16 232; 17 384-5; *SEG* 18 112-3; 21 940; 26 311-2.

¹⁴⁶ As well as Delphi, *prodikia* is also attested in western (e.g. *IG* IX 1 308) and northern Greece (e.g. *SEG* 23 420), Thrace (*IGBulg* I² 37), and the Aegean (Delos: *IG* XI 4 547; Lesbos: XII suppl 139; Andros: XII 5 715).

emotionally involved relationship described by the decrees.¹⁴⁷ The explicit right of direct access to the authoritative bodies of the *polis* of which he was the official friend – *prosodos* and *ephodos* – was one expression of this. Nothing, however, communicates this more clearly than the explicit right, very frequently granted to the *proxenos*, of sailing to and from the city freely and safely, regardless of whether a state of peace or war existed with his native *polis*, and without fear of seizure (*syle*).¹⁴⁸ That is to say, he (unlike other, undistinguished *xenoi*) was not to be held responsible for any wrongs which his fellow citizens, individually (hence *syle*) or collectively (in war), perpetrated against citizens of the granting *polis*. The *proxenos* is thus cast as a true intermediary figure, whose individual identity is recognised by the granting *polis* and relationship with the *polis* given precedence, from its perspective, over his membership of his own *polis*.

As well as privileges like these, encouraging the *proxenos* to visit, to strengthen the emotional tie identified by the *polis* as the basis of his action as *proxenos*, in many proxeny decrees *poleis* themselves expressed a care for the interests and well-being of their *proxenos*. This was the counterpart to the care the *proxenos* was expected to exert for the city's interests and citizens. Given the collective nature of the *polis* (as contrasted with the *proxenos*), this care was expressed in the form of instructions to the city's officers and magistrates – to ensure that an honorand could enjoy his honours and to take more generalized care of him.¹⁴⁹ We do in fact have some examples of how this care, which again assimilated the *proxenos* to the citizen,¹⁵⁰ could manifest itself: the releasing without ransom of

¹⁴⁷ On association (*koinonia*) as the foundation of friendship, see Mitchell (1997a), 7.

¹⁴⁸ This is a paraphrase, but it crystalizes the sense of the many different ways in which this grant was framed. On *syle* and *asylia* in general, with bibliography, see Lintott (2004).

¹⁴⁹ e.g. *IG* II² 19 1.10-11; IX 4 613 1.12-16; *I.Magnesia*. 48 1.29-30.

¹⁵⁰ καὶ γὰρ πόλεις προδεδωκῶς φαίνεται, καὶ προξένους καὶ πολίτας ὑμετέρους ἡδικηκῶς, *Lys.* 28.1.

proxenoi taken in wars with their native *poleis*;¹⁵¹ delegations seeking the release of *proxenoi* captured by others or to revenge their deaths;¹⁵² and funeral honours and monuments for *proxenoi* who died at their client city.¹⁵³

The Athenian demos of the fifth century expressed this care in an otherwise unparalleled form – so-called harm clauses which state that, if the *proxenos* is killed in one of the cities controlled by the Athenians, the punishment will be the same as if an Athenian citizen has been killed, involving a fine of five talents levied against the city concerned. Like other honours this assimilated the *proxenos* to the citizen, extending a protection enjoyed by the latter. Meiggs saw the collective aspect of this punishment as a ‘sure sign of developed imperialism.’¹⁵⁴ In fact it is an extension of the pre-existing practice of *syle*. What is imperialistic here is the ability to impose a fine – which they of course only do, ‘in the cities over which [they had] control’ which is why this phrase occurs in relation to these clauses in proxeny decrees.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ In both Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.2.16) and Polybius (5.95) different cities are noted for having freed *proxenoi* captured in war, ἄνευ λύτρων, without ransom. The interpretation of τὸν γὰρ Πελληνέα πρόξενον has been disputed, however, as Xenophon refers to this as a praiseworthy act – with *proxenos* interpreted both as a personal name (revived in a recent translation of the Hellenica, Strassler 2009, *ad loc*), or, emended, as a reference to the fact that the individual was *proxenos* of their enemies (Knoepfler 2002 – in which case freeing him would be an inexplicable act). The difficulty of this phrase has been greatly overstated. It is closely paralleled in Xenophon and elsewhere – e.g. Xen. *Anab.* 5.4.2, Τιμησίθεον τὸν Τραπεζούντιον πρόξενον ὄντα τῶν Μοσσυνοίκων. There is no further qualification whose *proxenos* the Pellenean is, because it is obvious in context. It is the situation of the Phleiasians which make this action notable – in spite of their great financial difficulties (καίπερ πάντων σπανιζόμενοι) they did their duty to ‘their Pellenean *proxenos*’ (so Pritchett (1991), 259 with n.373). Relevant also is Alexander’s act in sparing only his own *philoï* and the *proxenoi* of the Macedonians after the sack of Thebes (Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.9).

¹⁵² Demosthenes reports that the Athenians sent three embassies to Philip seeking the release of their *proxenos*, a Karystian, whom Philip instead killed and even refused to allow them to bury (Dem. 7. 38). Revenge: *RO* 39 1.27-40 (an Antipater condemned to death for killing a *proxenos*, presumably in the first stage of the Keian revolt against Athens).

¹⁵³ *ML* 4; *IG* I³ 1154, προξενίας ἀρετῆς τε χάριμ προ<γ>όνων τε καὶ αὐτὸ ἐνθάδ Ἀθηναῖοι Πυθαγόρην ἔθεσαν; cf. Dem. 7.38 with the preceding note.

¹⁵⁴ Meiggs (1949); de Ste Croix (1961), 268.

¹⁵⁵ Other authorities describe the territories which they ruled as spheres in which they could make particular grants in similar ways, especially in relation to grants of *ateleia* – so Pherai (*SEG* 23 418; now with Graninger 2011), and Maussolus (*RO* 55). These phrases serve the same function as clauses in later decrees limiting grants of *ateleia* to taxes which the authority in question controlled (usually excluding royal taxes which they did not), e.g. ἀτέ[λ]εια ἐγ Κασσοσῶν ὧν ἂν Κασσοσ[σε]ῖς κύριοι ᾧσιν, *I.Mylasa* 942.

More conventional sanctions – like *syle* – might be expected in cases of citizen- and *proxenos*-slaying in cities over which the Athenians did not have this sort of control.

3.2 The Ideology of the *Proxenos*

Civic decrees thus both communicated the *polis*' understanding of what *proxenia* entailed (the *proxenos*-paradigm) and embodied the active steps which it took to establish the relationship implied. This begs the question – how did individuals, as *proxenoi*, respond? In this section I explore how the expectations attached to this institution seem to have influenced the behaviour of *proxenoi* – how far *proxenoi* reproduced ‘the the manner of thinking and feeling characteristic’ of the *proxenos* (the ideology of the *proxenos*).¹⁵⁶ I argue that although we have some evidence of *proxenoi* not merely verbalizing this ideology but even internalizing it (or being represented as doing so), *proxenoi* cannot be understood as the ‘agents’ or ‘henchmen’ of their client *poleis*, acting against the interests of their own, as they were accused in ancient oratory. To explain why, it is necessary to explore how this ideology was communicated to *proxenoi* as well as how *proxenia* related to other institutional roles within the city and the different ways in which individuals possessed agency to pursue their own interests within this framework of institutions.

Proxenoi are frequently attested voicing this ideology in interactions with the authoritative bodies of their client cities. In decrees honouring both new and pre-existing *proxenoi* we find references not only to the proposer's description of the honorand's regard for the city, but the honorand's own proclamation of his personal disposition towards the *polis*.¹⁵⁷ More striking, however, is the material from our

¹⁵⁶ ‘A system of ideas concerning phenomena, esp. those of social life; the manner of thinking characteristic of a class or individual,’ *Shorter OED*³ sv ‘Ideology’ no. 3; on this use of the term, see Whitehead (1977), 3.

¹⁵⁷ e.g. Eumaridas, *IG* II² 844.

literary sources. Thucydides and Xenophon record no fewer than four speeches given by foreigners before the Spartans in which the speaker draws attention to their identity as *proxenos* and the conventional emotional dimension of this role. In each of these cases the function is explicitly persuasive – the Spartans should listen, because as *proxenos* the speaker is *eager* to benefit them, as Jason of Pherae states ταῦτα δ', ἔφη, ἐγὼ προθυμοῦμαι, σῶσαι ὑμᾶς βουλόμενος διὰ τε τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φιλίαν πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὸ προξενεῖν ὑμῶν.¹⁵⁸ Similarly, in Herodotus Alexander, king of the Macedonians, is recorded as beginning his speech with a reference to his *eunoia* for the Athenians (Alexander had been sent by Mardonius as a persuasive interlocutor because he was *proxenos* of the Athenians).¹⁵⁹ The use of this rhetoric reveals an awareness of how a *proxenos* should speak – and feel.

In other cases it does not seem fanciful to talk of *proxenoi* actually internalizing this ideology. This is certainly how the *proxenos* Kallippos is represented – even by his enemy, Apollodorus – as he is made to say ἐξ ἀνάγκης γάρ μοί ἐστιν ἀπάντων Ἡρακλεωτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.¹⁶⁰ Care, *epimeleia*, here corresponds to and reciprocates the care which *poleis* expressed for their *proxenoi*, the emphasis of ‘ἀπάντων’ echoing directly the assertion of proxeny decrees that this was a relationship with the entire citizen population. The most striking element of this pronouncement, however, is the forceful character of this duty of care, presented as a strongly felt obligation, a necessity even, by the phrase ‘ἐξ ἀνάγκης.’

¹⁵⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.24, in addition to 6.1.4 (Polydamas of Pharsalus, warning the Spartans of Jason!) and 6.3.4 (Kallias of Athens). Alcibiades’ presentation of his *proxenia* in his address of the Spartans in Thucydides (6.89) is necessarily more complex, see below, 149-50.

¹⁵⁹ Hdt. 8.136; 140. The Athenians similarly make use of conventional moral language in their reply, Hdt. 8.144: οὐ γάρ σε βουλόμεθα οὐδὲν ἄχαρι πρὸς Ἀθηναίων παθεῖν, ἐόντα πρόξενόν τε καὶ φίλον. Alorcus ‘publice Saguntinis amicus atque hospes’ (Livy 21.12; i.e. a Saguntine *proxenos*) begins his speech to the Saguntines attempting to persuade them to accept Hannibal’s terms in the same way (21.13.2-3). See Chapter 4, n.133

¹⁶⁰ [Dem.] 52.5.

In Plato's *Laws* the potential personal emotional basis of this relationship from the point of view of the *proxenos* is asserted even more clearly and convincingly – expressed as a general rule by the *proxenos* of Athens, the Spartan Megillus:¹⁶¹

ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς παισίν, ἐπειδὴν ἀκούσωσιν ὅτι τινός εἰσιν πόλεως πρόξενοι, ταύτη τις εὐνοία ἐκ νέων εὐθύς ἐνδύεται ἕκαστον ἡμῶν τῶν προξένων τῇ πόλει, ὡς δευτέρα οὔση πατρίδι μετὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πόλιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ νῦν ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἐγγέγονεν. ἀκούων γὰρ τῶν παίδων εὐθύς, εἴ τι μέμφοιντο ἢ καὶ ἐπαινοῖεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίους, ὡς “Ἡ πόλις ὑμῶν, ὦ Μέγιλλε,” ἔφασαν, “ἡμᾶς οὐ καλῶς ἢ καλῶς ἔρρεξε” – ταῦτα δὴ ἀκούων, καὶ μαχόμενος πρὸς αὐτὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἀεὶ πρὸς τοὺς τὴν πόλιν εἰς ψόγον ἄγοντας, πᾶσαν εὐνοίαν ἔσχον, καὶ μοι νῦν ἢ τε φωνὴ προσφιλεῖς ὑμῶν...

Probably all children, when they hear that they are the *proxenoi* of some city, conceive an affection for that state from infancy, as being a second fatherland after their own city. So indeed this very thing has happened to me. For hearing this from the first from other boys, whenever the Lakedaimonians were blaming or praising Athenians, how they said ‘that city of yours, Megillus, has treated us badly’ or ‘has done well’ – hearing these things indeed, and constantly fighting on your behalf against those who were blaming your city, I acquired a complete affection for it, and even now your accent is very pleasing to my ears...¹⁶²

The context is crucial here. This is not a highly charged public oration in which the speaker attempts to capitalize on the conventional emotional content of a relationship he happens to have with the assembly he is seeking to persuade, as is the case in the speeches preserved by our historiographical sources. Instead Megillus delivers this monologue in response to the latter's recent, accurate characterization of Sparta, and himself, as βραχύλογος (which he comically confirms, remaining all but silent throughout the rest of the dialogue). Megillus reassures the Athenian speaker that he will listen willingly to the rest of his speech because of the affection for all things Athenian (including Attic Greek) which, as hereditary *proxenos*, he has conceived from boyhood. Moreover, couched as a general rule – surely included in this section of the *Laws* because of Plato's concentration on education there – it rings true,

¹⁶¹ For the identification of this Megillus with a Spartan recorded as having been sent to Athens on an embassy along with Endios (*FGrHist* 324 fr. 44), see Parke (1957).

¹⁶² Plat. *Laws* 642 b-c

explaining the role of peers' projections onto an individual in the formation of personal identity. It illustrates the complexity of the different influences involved. The *polis* which granted *proxenia* to an individual communicated its *proxenos*-paradigm in the decree which honoured him, and with the honours that it granted encouraged the *proxenos* to engage himself actively and emotionally in this relationship. However, in most cases it was probably the *proxenos*' own *polis* – his interactions with his peers and their assumptions – which most effectively instilled this *proxenos*-ideology in him and, as here, fostered his emotional attachment. This process surely operated with adults named *proxenoi* as well. Indeed the evidence we have for rhetorical attacks based on grants of *proxenia*, considered above, illustrates its function in 'grown-up' civic contexts (Megillus explicitly states that he was continually defending the Athenians – a process that began, but did not conclude with his youth). Nonetheless, stress here on the particularly formative influence of hereditary proxeny is striking – and it is probably for this reason that such emphasis was placed on inherited proxeny in our evidence. This process was probably even more intense when the *proxenos* in question actually bore the ethnic of the city with which he was connected – and grew up in Sparta being called 'the Olynthian,' 'the Samian,' 'the Chalkidian,' or even 'the Boiotian' – to mention a few of the examples attested there.¹⁶³

This *proxenos*-ideology perhaps finds a particularly full expression in the description of the actions taken by one *proxenos*. Towards the end of his final book, Thucydides narrates a story about his namesake, the Pharsalian *proxenos* of the Athenians, in which the internalization of *proxenos* ideology is clearly implied.¹⁶⁴ In 411, in the context of mass hysteria when the older men were only with difficulty restraining the Athenians of the city from attacking the Athenians in the Piraeus,

¹⁶³ *Olyntheus*: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33; *Chalkideus*: RE 'Chalkideus'; *Samios*: Hdt. iii 55.2 and Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.1; D. S. 14.19.4-5; *Boiotios*: Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.2.

¹⁶⁴ On the identity of this individual see Hornblower (1991-2008) on this passage and Thuc. 2.22.

Thucydides the *proxenos* is credited by the historian with playing a decisive part in preventing the outbreak of civil war:

...μόλις δὲ τῶν τε πρεσβυτέρων διακωλύοντων τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἄστει διαθέοντας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα φερομένους καὶ Θουκυδίδου τοῦ Φαρσαλίου τοῦ προξένου τῆς πόλεως παρόντος καὶ προθύμως ἐμποδῶν τε ἐκάστοις γιγνομένου καὶ ἐπιβωομένου μὴ ἐφεδρευόντων ἐγγὺς τῶν πολεμίων ἀπολέσαι τὴν πατρίδα, ἡσύχασάν τε καὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀπέσχοντο.’

Only with difficulty were the older restraining those in the city who were running around and going for their arms (to attack those in the Piraeus) when Thucydides the Pharsalite, *proxenos* of the Athenians, who happened to be present in Athens, eagerly put himself in the way of each of them and invoked them not, with their enemies lying nearby in wait, to bring about the destruction of the fatherland. The Athenians quietened down and refrained from attacking each other.¹⁶⁵

This ‘noble and urgent plea’ of Thucydides the *proxenos*,¹⁶⁶ and the way it is framed by Thucydides the historian, who very deliberately mentions his namesake’s *proxenia*, emphasises the relationship between these actions and the *proxenos*-paradigm. The ideology of the *proxenos* is evident in the eagerness and energy, the *prothumia* (a key characteristic of the *proxenos*) with which he delivers this plea.¹⁶⁷ Thucydides does not urge them to save Athens or *their* fatherland – but *the* fatherland, in which he himself, as *proxenos*, is emotionally invested.

3.3 The Limits of Identification

There were, however, limits to the extent to which *proxenoi* in general identified with – and indeed were expected to identify with – their client *polis*, above all when its interests conflicted with the interests of their native community. In as much as there was a hierarchy of obligations, the duty of a citizen was never conventionally

¹⁶⁵ Thuc. 8.92.8. Thucydides’ precise syntax is difficult to render in English but the narrative force is clear enough: Thucydides saved the day.

¹⁶⁶ Rood (1998), 195, fn.6, on the highly marked verb used here.

¹⁶⁷ For *prothumia* in the interests of the granting *polis* as a hallmark of the *proxenos*, see Chapter 1, 35-6.

subordinated to his duty as *proxenos*. In Plato's *Laws* Megillus states that although potentially strong the attachment of *proxenos* to his client *polis* was as for a *second* fatherland, *after* his own (ὡς δευτέρα οὔση πατρίδι μετὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πόλιν). This was also expressed even when *poleis* honoured their foreign benefactors,¹⁶⁸ often by explicitly praising the honorand for acting in the best interests of his own fatherland (usually mentioned first) *and* the honouring *demos*.¹⁶⁹ This is hardly surprising. In making honorific grants communities were communicating values to their members even more than to the honorand, and it was in no *polis*' interest to encourage disloyalty in citizens by setting *proxenia* above *politeia*.

Nonetheless some modern scholars, following ancient rhetoric in which *proxenia* could be represented as *prodosia*, have described certain *proxenoi* as 'henchmen,' as first and foremost the agents of the *poleis* with which they were affiliated.¹⁷⁰ Such interpretations have been effectively challenged before,¹⁷¹ but it is important to explore instances in which *proxenoi* appear to be acting against the interests of their own *poleis* because they reveal how divisive the question of what constituted the interests of the community was.

The relationship expressed by *proxenia* remained fundamentally based on friendship (rather than employment and dependence),¹⁷² expressed by foreign cities with members of a civic elite who were primarily motivated by interests which they attributed to the *polis* and themselves in the context of that *polis*. The nature of this link did not apparently change, even under the Athenian empire at the end of the fifth

¹⁶⁸ Thus the city of Alexandra Troas honoured an Ilian δευτέραν εἶν[αι] νομ[ίζων πατ]ρίδα τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν (*I.Ilion* 68 with the Roberts, *BE* (1976), 566) – that this inscription was erected at Ilion suggests that the force of this 'δευτέραν' was clear.

¹⁶⁹ e.g. *IG* II² 467, λ[έγων καὶ πράττων τὰ συμφέροντα τῆι τε αὐτοῦ π[[ρ]]α[τρίδι {πατρίδι} καὶ τῶι δήμῳι τῶι Ἀθ]ηναίων', honouring a pre-existing *proxenos*.

¹⁷⁰ Papazarkadas (2009), 78-9; Gerolymatos (1986), esp. 93-103.

¹⁷¹ Marek (1988) in reviewing Gerolymatos (1986); Reiter (1991) on the Athenian examples, 321-8; Russell (1999), 76-83; Culasso-Gastaldi (2004), 13, with n.8-9.

¹⁷² See Chapter 1, 36-7 with n.34.

century. However, when the communities linked by *proxenoi* were particularly unequal in terms of strength and resources, or subject to an unequal power relation (e.g. between hegemonic and subordinate *poleis*) the position of link, of *proxenos*, became much more highly charged. This was particularly true in the broader context of internal factional and ideological polarization in alignment with wider, binary conflict, which we see in the case of the second Peloponnesian war.

Three cases illustrate this particularly well: the *proxenoi* of Mytilene, who betrayed to the Athenians the plans of their fellow citizens to synoicize Lesbos and rebel;¹⁷³ Peithias the *etheloproxenos* of the Athenians at Corcyra who sought to bring his *polis* into alliance with them and was, in the end, assassinated himself;¹⁷⁴ and, from the first years of the fourth century, Xenias of Elis, *proxenos* of the Spartans and *xenos* of their king, who took the opportunity of a Spartan-lead invasion of the territory of Elis to attempt to eliminate his political rival, Thrasydaios, and thereby gain control of Elis.¹⁷⁵

Interpretation, then as now, depended largely on perspective. From the perspective of members of the opposing faction, these actions were surely interpreted (and represented) as a betrayal of the *polis* and its interests as they conceived them. From the point of view of the dominant *polis*, actions of this sort performed by their *proxenos*, especially where successful, were likely to be received as valuable services requiring thanks, as evidence of his regard for their interests. Conversely, as our narrative histories all make clear, from the perspective of the individual *proxenos*, actions of this sort (as distinct from other specific sorts of service, performed in his capacity of *proxenos*) were primarily performed for his own political gain, for

¹⁷³ Thuc. 3.2.

¹⁷⁴ Thuc. 3.70.

¹⁷⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26-31; Paus. 3.8.3-5 recording, unlike Xenophon, Xenias' Spartan *proxenia* and personal *xenia* with king Agis – dubiously?

interests which were his, but which coincided, in his view, with the interests of his *polis* (or what he thought they should be). He was the friend – rather than the agent – of a great external power, a position he sought to manipulate for his own ends. In the case of the Mytilenean informers, Thucydides' description makes these priorities clear:

Τενέδιοι γὰρ ὄντες αὐτοῖς διάφοροι καὶ Μηθυμναῖοι καὶ αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν, πρόξενοι Ἀθηναίων, μηνυταὶ γίνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις.

For the Tenedians, who were at variance with the Mytileneans, and the Methymnians, as well as, privately, some of the Mytileneans themselves who happened to be *proxenoi* of the Athenians and were motivated by factional strife, all became informants to the Athenians (concerning the activities of the Mytileneans).¹⁷⁶

These private Mytileneans were acting, in Thucydides' estimation, first and foremost as the political opponents of those advocating synoicism and revolt from Athens.

Their relationship of *proxenia* with the Athenians was relevant in that their interests, and probably, according to their sincere assessment, their *polis*' , were bound up in the continuation of the alliance with Athens. This relationship also probably made them the most persuasive messengers to send, on behalf of what must have been a larger community of opinion at Mytilene (as Thucydides' 'κατὰ στάσιν' implies).¹⁷⁷ It is made clear, however, that these beliefs were not simplistically determined by their position as *proxenoi* by the fact that one of these *proxenoi* was successfully persuaded to go on a second embassy, on behalf of the dominant party working against the Athenian alliance, to counteract the first (perhaps persuaded that events had now gone too far). Faction is clearly presented as the decisive factor in the other two narratives also – and each author emphasizes the initiative of the *etheloproxenos* and *proxenos* respectively, making opportunistic use of the situations they were presented with and

¹⁷⁶ Thuc. 3.2

¹⁷⁷ Wilhelm (1942), 43.

the courses of action *proxenia* made possible.¹⁷⁸ The Athenians themselves were clearly used to local players, both internal *polis* factions and nearby external enemies (here the Tenedians and Methymnians), attempting to manipulate and channel Athenian resources for their own ends. Here, exhausted by plague and war, the Athenians, recognising the motives of the informants, chose to disbelieve the substance of their reports.¹⁷⁹

The importance of perspective is brought out clearly in the case of the Mytilenean stasis by an alternative account of this sequence of events, preserved by Aristotle (acquired through his close contacts with a number of Lesbians?), which presumably derives from claims made by the political opponents of the faction of the Athenian *proxenoi*. Instead of a public policy disagreement between two factions concerning the Athenian alliance, a single individual, Doxandros, a *proxenos*, is represented as calling in the Athenians simply because of his own frustration as a result of his failed attempts to marry off two wealthy heiresses to his sons.¹⁸⁰ Glossing over any potential moral ambiguity, this tradition, and the contemporary claims which underlie it (which perhaps influenced the Athenians in their rejection of the Mytilenean *proxenoi*'s embassy), represent Doxandros' actions in the worst light.

Victory in factional stasis was obtained through the dominance of a particular perspective – concerning the identity of the *polis*, its interests, and therefore the actions of opponents (informed by a different perspective) in opposition to these, which were thereby characterised as betrayal of the *polis* and punished with death or

¹⁷⁸ Opportunism is particularly prominent in Xenophon's account – 'since the territory was being ravaged and an army was at Kyllene, Xenias' faction wished to make the city over to the Spartans ἴthrough their own efforts?ἴ' (δηουμένης δὲ τῆς χώρας, καὶ οὔσης τῆς στρατιᾶς περὶ Κυλλήνην, βουλόμενοι οἱ περὶ Ξενίαν ... ἴδι' αὐτῶνἴ προσχωρήσαι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, 3.2.27). It is striking that Agis makes no efforts on behalf of Xenias, when his political rival came to terms. Personal initiative is also clearly explicit in the fact of Peithias's *etheloproxenia*, Thuc. 3.70.

¹⁷⁹ Thuc. 3.3.

¹⁸⁰ Arist. *Pol.* 1304a9.

exile. The prosecution of Peithias the *etheloproxenos* at Corcyra for trying to enslave Corcyra to the Athenians was nothing less than an attempt by his opponents to make authoritative their own view of his actions. The attempt failed and Peithias responded in kind (the fact that his opponents were prosecuted for other offences does not mean that anyone failed to realise that what was at stake was the political direction of Corcyra – and the political destruction of an opposing faction) and he was successful. Even these authoritative judgements, however, were not received as final, and in the event Peithias was murdered by his opponents. Exiles, even working openly against the interests of their city (by encouraging foreign invasion etc.), were able to represent themselves still as true patriots, rejecting the claims of authority and validity made by those in control of their city.¹⁸¹

4 Miscarriage and Manipulation: Alcibiades the *Proxenos*

Proxeny patterned the behaviour of individuals. In pursuit of prestige, individuals conformed to the paradigm of the *proxenos* – but in ways which were limited, defined by the specific and not too taxing services associated with *proxenia*, and conventionally circumscribed by the greater claims of their native *poleis*. The relationship which *proxenia* embodied could, however, also miscarry and fail, despite the efforts of participants. This potential for failure is best illustrated by Thucydides' account of Alcibiades' interactions with the Spartans between the Peace of Nicias and the Athenian alliance with the Argives (422/1 BC), which highlights the themes of prestige and elite competition discussed in this chapter. Alcibiades is introduced in a complex passage in Thucydides' histories as a frustrated and embittered would-have-been *proxenos* of the Spartans:

¹⁸¹ The best example is Alcibiades, Thuc. 6.92.

Κατὰ τοιαύτην δὴ διαφορὰν ὄντων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οἱ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις αὖ βουλόμενοι λύσαι τὰς σπονδὰς εὐθὺς ἐνέκειντο. ἦσαν δὲ ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, ἀνὴρ ἡλικία μὲν ἔτι τότε ὦν νέος ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος· ὃ ἐδόκει μὲν καὶ ἄμεινον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους μᾶλλον χωρεῖν, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονικῶν ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς σπονδὰς, ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τε τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν προξενίαν ποτὲ οὔσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἦν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διενοεῖτο ἀνανεώσασθαι.

Since the Spartans were now thus at variance with the Athenians, those at Athens who wished to dissolve the treaty began immediately to exert themselves. Alcibiades, the son of Kleinias, was one of these. He would have been then still a youth in another city, but had a prominent position at Athens because of the reputation of his forebears. To him the alliance with Argos really did seem the better course, but this course of action also agreed with his own emulous pride, because the Spartans had acted through Nicias and Laches in establishing this treaty, and had passed him over because of his youth and had not honoured his ancestral *proxenia*, which had been renounced by Alcibiades' grandfather, but which Alcibiades himself was trying to renew by caring for the Spartan prisoners captured on the island.¹⁸²

In his own estimation Alcibiades had behaved, especially in relation to the Spartan prisoners taken at Pylos, in the manner expected of a *proxenos*, out of a desire to renew this connection which had been defunct for a generation (that is he wished to be formally named Spartan *proxenos*).¹⁸³ He was frustrated, however, by the failure of Spartan delegations to treat him as their *proxenos* and make use of him in conducting negotiations – turning instead to Alcibiades' competitors within the *polis*, individuals whom he is later made to describe as his political enemies. The Spartans' reason for their neglect of him was his youth – and Thucydides, in his authorial persona, makes it clear that their assumption that being a *neos* would render him incompetent in this context was reasonable, even if it did not hold because of the special circumstances prevailing at Athens in Alcibiades' case. This neglect ruptured

¹⁸² Thuc. 5.43-5

¹⁸³ Daux (1937) minimizes the importance of this formal act of recognition.

the nascent relationship. From Alcibiades' perspective it constituted a crucial breakdown in reciprocity. Thucydides nicely observes Alcibiades' double motivation in preferring an Argive alliance – his apparently sincere assessment of what was best for Athens which coincided with and, Thucydides' syntax slyly suggests, was shaped by his personal pique at this perceived Spartan insult against himself.¹⁸⁴ The emphasis on Alcibiades' pride and competitiveness in this passage (φρονήματι φιλονικῶν) highlights the reasons he sought appointment as Spartan *proxenos* in the first place – because of the prestige within Athens that being the Spartans' main conduit there would bring. In this competitive context, this Spartan failure to reciprocate was felt as a public dishonour (Alcibiades is later made to describe it as a mark of *atimia*).¹⁸⁵

The sequel to this episode illustrates the degree to which this relationship could miscarry (Thuc. 5.45). When the Spartans, made anxious by the proposed Athenian alliance with Argos, despatched new envoys more amenable to the Athenians and fully empowered to negotiate, Alcibiades intervened. He promised to obtain for them what they most wanted – the return of Pylos – on the condition that they obeyed him in their negotiations (specifically that they did not announce to the assembly that they were able to agree terms). In other words, Alcibiades acted ostensibly as their *proxenos*, promising results, to detach them from their pre-existing relationship with Nicias, and apparently offering tactical instruction. On this occasion, unlike the former, the Spartan envoys accepted his performance of the role of *proxenos* (it may have helped that one of the envoys, Endios, was Alcibiades' *xenos*). In the event, however, Alcibiades is described as betraying their trust to devastating effect, denouncing them for bad faith before the assembly for acting as he had

¹⁸⁴ Hornblower (1991-2008), *ad loc.*

¹⁸⁵ Thuc. 6.89.

instructed them to, and, as a result, derailing the negotiations for peace and cementing the Athenian preference for an Argive alliance.¹⁸⁶

Alcibiades – or rather Thucydides’ version of him – is emblematic in that he reveals the extent to which the *proxenos*-paradigm, as well as constituting an ideology which could be internalized, also represented a script capable of being manipulated. This is clearly evident in the speech which Alcibiades later delivers before the Spartan assembly in which he artfully misrepresents the events as they are presented in Thucydides’ direct account, against which this speech must be read. Like other speakers before the Spartan assembly in our historians (and presumably life), Alcibiades begins by making reference to his claim to *proxenia* and, hence, the persuasiveness which this, as evidence of his concern for Spartan interests, should confer. Unlike other speakers, however, Alcibiades must deal with the fact that the relationship has hardly been felicitous for the Spartans.

Ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διαβολῆς πρῶτον ἐς ὑμᾶς
εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ χειρὸν τὰ κοινὰ τῷ ὑπόπτῳ μου ἀκροάσησθε.
τῶν δ’ ἐμῶν προγόνων τὴν προξενίαν ὑμῶν κατὰ τι ἔγκλημα
ἀπειπόντων αὐτὸς ἐγὼ πάλιν ἀναλαμβάνων ἐθεράπευον ὑμᾶς
ἄλλα τε καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκ Πύλου ξυμφορὰν. καὶ διατελοῦντός
μου προθύμου ὑμεῖς πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καταλασσόμενοι τοῖς
μὲν ἐμοῖς ἐχθροῖς δύναμιν δι’ ἐκείνων πράξαντες, ἐμοὶ δὲ
ἀτιμίαν περιέθετε. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δικαίως ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ πρὸς
τε τὰ Μαντινέων καὶ Ἀργείων τραπομένου καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα
ἐνηντιούμην ὑμῖν ἐβλάπτεσθε·

It is necessary first of all to speak to you about the prejudice against me so that you may not, through suspicion of me, give a less favourable hearing to matters of public concern. When my ancestors on account of some complaint had renounced their office of *proxenia*, I myself, seeking to revive the relationship, performed services for you in other matters and especially in regard to your misfortune at Pylos. And while I was continually zealous towards you, in making peace with the Athenians through my personal enemies you conferred power upon them and brought dishonour on me. For

¹⁸⁶ Herman’s reading of this episode, Herman (1987), 147-49, takes the *xenia* between Alcibiades and Endios as the key, arguing that this enabled Alcibiades to persuade the Spartan envoys to betray their city’s interests. However, as an account of the envoys’ motivation it is unconvincing and contradicts Thucydides’ assertion that Alcibiades plotted against and tricked them by promising something he had no interest in delivering. See Hornblower (1991-2008), *ad loc.*

these reasons the injuries which you suffered at my hands when I turned to aid the interests of the Mantineans and the Argives and in the other matters in which I opposed you, you did not receive unjustly.¹⁸⁷

Alcibiades here paints himself, and his grandfather, as faithful *proxenoi*, drawing directly on the language of the *proxenos*-paradigm – διατελοῦντός μου προθύμου – to emphasise his own commitment to the role. He skates over his own betrayal and championing of an alternative Argive alliance, and his grandfather's renouncement of his *proxenia* in the anti-Spartan political climate of 462-60, by placing the blame for the rupture in both cases firmly on the Spartans themselves. In his own case he emphasises the Spartan decision not to negotiate through him, describing it in highly charged terms, and omitting reference to his subsequent machinations and betrayal; in that of his grandfather he does this by referencing a vague (certainly fictional) offence of the Spartans as the reason for the rupture.¹⁸⁸ In his actions, Alcibiades was not a typical *proxenos*, but he is important as an example of how the relationship involved could fail and illustrates the agency which individuals retained, working within the institutional structures and language of *proxenia*.

Conclusion

Together these studies – of proxeny grants in *poleis*, *proxenoi* in their own *poleis*, and *proxenoi* of other *poleis* – add up to an explanation of how *proxenia* functioned, of why members of these communities actively participated at different levels in reinforcing and performing the role expected of the *proxenos*. *Proxenia* enabled cities to reach beyond the limits of their own citizenry to establish and encourage strong links with outsiders as liminal figures who were simultaneously both (quasi-)citizens

¹⁸⁷ Thuc. 6.89

¹⁸⁸ κατά τι ἔγκλημα covers this up for a Spartan audience, Andrewes, *HCT*, *ad loc.*; Hornblower (1991-2008), *ad loc.*

with established identities and privileges in relation to the honouring *polis* and citizens resident and active in their own political communities. In many cases these links surely were derived from interpersonal relations between the honorands and individual citizens, but they were deliberately transformed by the rhetoric of the honouring *polis* in its authoritative descriptions of the honorands and the privileges it granted them.

The transformation was successful, as we can see in a number of cases where individuals retained relations with a succession of different regimes, because the role of the *proxenos*, the *proxenos*-paradigm, its expectations and obligations, was so well defined and understood. In this, although the decrees of the honouring city had their established part to play in constructing and communicating the relationship, it was the home-*polis* of the *proxenos* which was most effective in inculcating the ideology of proxeny. It was in his own city that the *proxenos* (or the individual hopeful of becoming one) came most frequently and directly into contact with ideas about what *proxenoi* should be like or do as he took part in the assembly in which grants of *proxenia* were so frequently proposed and debated. Similarly it was within his own political community that most was probably made of his association with another city as, in the competitive, often factional process of *polis*-politics, *proxenoi* within a *polis* could in certain circumstances come to symbolize internally the other *poleis* with which they were connected.

This context for the communication of *proxenos* ideology is also important for understanding why *proxenoi* were not the foreign agents they were sometimes in hostile speeches accused of being – *poleis* were aware that they were communicating primarily internally, and emphasis was therefore frequently placed, in praising *proxenoi*, on the primacy of the *proxenos*' own *polis*. The attraction of *proxenia* is

also best understood in the context of the *proxenos*' home *polis*, as a source of prestige which marked him as a member of the elite of his city, part of a broader trans-civic elite (*hoi proxenoi kai euergetai; hoi politeuomenoi*).¹⁸⁹ This prestige, which individuals sought to capitalize on by communicating their position, arose from their status as intermediary figures, individuals formally able to facilitate and mediate interactions between members of different communities because of their standing in each. They derived personal importance and status from being connected to, or rather connecting different groups and communities, in much the same way as the old, heavily aristocratic *xenoi* had derived prestige, and the kings' *philo*i continued to do so.¹⁹⁰

In the next chapter I explore how, at a collective, communal level, *poleis* themselves used and monumentalized their *proxenoi* in the same way to advertise their membership of and status within a competitive society of *poleis*, through the sum of links which they had with other *poleis* – through their networks of *proxenoi*.

¹⁸⁹ See Herman (1987), 162-5.

¹⁹⁰ Herman (1987), 34-40.

Chapter 3

Proxeny Networks:

The Horizons of *Poleis*

Individual *poleis* viewed their *proxenoi en masse* as geographically distributed networks. This wider perspective is crucial not just as a context for interpreting individual grants but for understanding how *proxenia* worked on this inter-*polis* level – the focus of the two chapters which follow. The best evidence for this perspective, despite the usually fragmentary state of their preservation, are the lists which *poleis* inscribed of all their *proxenoi*, which I use in this chapter to reconstruct the parameters of proxeny networking. From these lists, which have not been systematically considered before, it becomes clear that the proxeny networks of even very small *poleis* could be extremely large and wide ranging, and that all networks were in constant need of renewal. At the same time, however, we also see an enormous degree of variation in local rhythms of granting and patterns of distribution which complicate any attempt to read simplistic narratives into this material. Proxeny lists present us with an extraordinarily dynamic picture of what this stereotypical honorific institution meant in the world of the Greek cities, and how it resulted, despite the fixed and narrowly defined content of *proxenia*, in vibrant, *polis*-specific networks. The scale of activity these texts reveal, however, also raises questions concerning the broader function of proxeny networking and these forms of inter-*polis* honorific interchange – questions which I explore in more detail in the next chapter.

Grants of *proxenia* were not made in a vacuum, but were the result of services performed in the context of interaction. Networks of *proxenoi* can therefore also be read as an index of *polis*-interaction, vividly illustrating the density and frequency of inter-*polis* contacts of different sorts. Moreover, although proxeny networks are explicitly constructed as reactive, they were not simply reflective of interaction, they were also the products of self-conscious processes of selection. As the principal institution by which *poleis* sought to mediate and facilitate interaction with each other, networks of *proxenoi* were the most important means by which *poleis* understood and constructed their connectivity, emphasising their links with particular *poleis* and regions and their own position in relation to them. This complicates but also enriches our readings of proxeny networks, and especially the way in which they were organized and presented on monumental lists of *proxenoi*. In the ebb and flow in annual rates of proxeny granting which these fragmentary lists reveal we see both the hum and the buzz of the Mediterranean world with its constant Brownian motion of interaction and the deliberate efforts of *poleis* to assert their position within it.¹

Since the study of proxeny lists is central to this chapter, I begin with an introduction on this epigraphical genre which examines the different varieties of proxeny list which we possess, and their potential and limitations. Then, after a prefatory case study of the proxeny network of Histiaia which illustrates the main themes of this chapter, I present a series of comparative studies exploring the size of ancient networks of *proxenoi* and their patterns of creation and regional distribution. Together these studies and the material on which they are based allow us to visualise the remarkable extent of proxeny networking in the ancient Mediterranean and understand certain of its structural dynamics. At the same time, however, it is

¹ Hum and buzz: J. and E. Fentress (2001), 217, reviewing Horden and Purcell (2000). Brownian motion: Horden and Purcell (2000), 142 and 150.

important to recognise the significance of proxeny networks from the perspective of the *poleis* which maintained them, and the highly specific and idiosyncratic ways in which they could be used to present the identity of the *polis*. I therefore conclude by recontextualising this broader quantitative picture of proxeny with a second case study of the particularly well preserved proxeny catalogue of Karthaia.

Before I begin, however, it is necessary to explain the theoretical frameworks which I use to study ancient networks of *proxenoi*. In recent years scholars of the ancient world have increasingly turned to theoretical approaches developed in social network analysis to identify and understand the structural dynamics of networks in the ancient world.² A number of these concepts and descriptive categories emerge as useful in relation to networks of *proxenoi*. In particular, Mark Granovetter's work illuminating the distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' ties in networks encourages us to concentrate on the structural role performed by *proxenoi*.³ In this context the strength of a tie is understood as a function of the time invested in it, its emotional intensity, intimacy, and the nature of reciprocal services involved.⁴ Strong ties, unsurprisingly, are understood as exerting a greater influence on the actors involved, but weak ties are paradoxically more important in spreading information throughout a network in that they act as 'bridges' between otherwise distantly connected 'clusters.' In this scheme, *proxenoi* represent archetypally weak ties, bridging clusters of individuals bound by mutual strong ties (that is groups of citizens collectively constituting different *poleis*). Part of the value of this, however, is the contrast which it draws out with the way in which proxeny decrees seek to construct, or rather

² A range of different approaches can be found in Malkin, Constantakopoulou, and Panagopoulou (2009); see also Ober (2008), 134-51; Malkin (2011); on social networks and religious change, Collar (2008).

³ Granovetter (1973); (1983); Kadushin (2012), 30-1.

⁴ Granovetter (1973), 1361.

reconstruct these links – in terms of a history of interaction, emotional content, and reciprocal services – as stereotypically strong ties.

There are, however, problems relating both to the nature of our data and the institution of *proxenia* itself which limit the application of the quantitative methods which are central to social network analysis. The most intractable difficulty is the fact that quantitative analysis requires complete data on the relevant relations of all actors in the network, or at least of a representative sample – a rarity in ancient history.⁵ For *proxenia*, for only a handful of *poleis* can we confidently reconstruct even the basic structure of their networks of *proxenoi* at a particular moment in time – much less the networks of all relevant *poleis* at that point (which, given the way in which these networks overlap, would swiftly become all *poleis*). In addition the asymmetric nature of this relationship – involving two different kinds of actor, *poleis* and *proxenoi* – makes it unlikely even if we had a complete dataset that many of the more interesting structural properties which quantitative analysis can reveal would emerge in relation to proxeny networks. Analysed as a link between *poleis*, *proxenia* was an unidirectional, non-reciprocal tie (the fact that A named a citizen of B its *proxenos* was unlikely to provoke B to grant *proxenia* to a citizen of A).⁶ Moreover, this idiosyncratic combination of different types of actors with a highly specific institutional content meant that it was very unlikely that the *proxenoi* of different *poleis* could combine to provide a path between communities which were not directly connected. In other words, unlike links of private friendship, links of proxeny between *poleis* A and B and B and C did not provide an indirect path from A to C. Thus the proxeny relations of different *poleis* are unlikely to reveal the interesting structural

⁵ Wasserman and Faust (1994), 33-5; Kadushin (2012), 17; Malkin (2011), 25; Graham (2006) is an analysis of an unusually complete ancient dataset.

⁶ Wasserman and Faust (1994), 72-3.

properties – in particular the influence and importance of particular actors in serving as indirect links between different clusters – which the quantitative methods of network analysis are particularly useful for elucidating.⁷ Although the categories and insights of network theory are valuable in informing the approach adopted to dealing with networks here – and are indirectly important through their influence on other theoretical frameworks which I make use of in the next chapter – the peculiarities of *proxenia*, and nature of our evidence for it, oblige us to devise specific analytic tools to explore the structural features of proxeny networks.

One analytic category is particularly useful in bringing out the similarities between proxeny networks as well as the important differences which they exhibit as well as their relation with the landscapes in which they were self-consciously embedded. I label this category the ‘local region of primary interaction.’ In relation to proxeny networks I define this as the region in which either the majority or the largest minority of the *proxenoi* of a *polis* were located – which is understood as, in part, a reflection of its pattern of interactions. As such, this category is indebted to work which has been done on economic regions as the areas within which the bulk of economic activity is understood as taking place –⁸ and the attempts of scholars to identify particular regions on the basis of the records of economic transactions or the archaeological distribution of certain sorts of coin or pot.⁹ As a category, however, ‘local region of primary interaction’ allows us to explore and compare the full range of interactions which *proxenia* reflected and was used to facilitate – both private and public, as the decrees themselves positively assert, and political and cultural as well as

⁷ For an introduction to different ways of measuring the structural importance of nodes (degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality) see Jackson (2008), 37-43.

⁸ e.g. Migeotte (2004), 616; Reger (2011), 368.

⁹ Reger (1994); (2011); cf. Vlassopoulos (2007), 167-8.

economic. All the proxeny networks which I explore in this chapter exhibit a marked local region of primary interaction, but different networks vary significantly in the extent to which they are confined to that region, and the way in which they reach outside it. This category also encourages us to explore the way in which very different regions were shaped both consciously and unconsciously by the actions of individual cities, in response to but not determined by their geographical setting – with all the potential for different, even conflicting views of regions which that entailed.¹⁰

1 Sources for Proxeny Networks

Unlike individually inscribed decrees, which represent a problematic and often unrepresentative sample of the decrees which were made, proxeny lists provide a firm foundation for the study of proxeny networks.¹¹ Whereas individual decrees were inscribed selectively, the rhetoric and *raison d'être* of proxeny lists was completeness. Thus, even though many lists of *proxenoi* are fragmentary, after identifying the ordering principles of each inscription, the rich, contextualized datasets which these present can be used to explore different *poleis'* networks of *proxenoi* in great detail. There are two principle types of proxeny list with different principles of layout and organisation, which shed complementary light on proxeny networks – proxeny catalogues and chronological lists of *proxenoi*.

The purpose of proxeny catalogues was to list all of the *proxenoi* recognized by a particular *polis* at a particular time. In other words they were intended to present a structured account of an entire network of *proxenoi*. Even though these catalogues are preserved only in fragments, by identifying the organizing principles of the

¹⁰ For the importance of study of processes of region formation, see Vlassopoulos (2007), 166-8 – but his interest is primarily in regions as an alternative unit of analysis to the *polis*, whereas proxeny networks reveal regions as they are constructed by and of *poleis*.

¹¹ See Introduction, 12-17.

original monuments we can obtain crucial evidence of the size and regional distribution of different cities' proxeny networks. Thus, in the case of the proxeny catalogue of Eresos, we can conservatively estimate the original network at some 175 *proxenoi* – a far from unparalleled figure – and observe that, more unexpectedly, probably two fifths of these *proxenoi* were appointed at Eresos' neighbouring cities on Lesbos.¹² The form and ordering principles of catalogues tend to be consistent and clear: the names of *proxenoi* are always grouped according to their *polis* of origin, listed together in the nominative case with their patronymics, one after another, usually beneath their ethnic used as a heading in the nominative plural. The organization of these different *polis*-groupings amongst themselves seems usually to be geographic, with *poleis* of the same region – from the perspective of the granting *polis* – grouped together.

Chronological proxeny lists, by contrast, were intended to collect and present not all the *proxenoi* of a *polis* at a particular moment in time, but rather all *proxenoi* appointed by the *polis* within a particular administrative period – usually a year (sometimes six months). In function they thus closely resemble individual decrees, and this is reflected in the grammatical case used of the *proxenoi* listed, either in the accusative (x is to be *proxenos*) or dative (the recipient of a grant of *proxenia*).¹³ Unlike individually inscribed decrees, however, chronological lists provide us with complete sets of data for the period in question. Although chronological lists do not usually allow us to estimate the total size of networks at a given moment, as catalogues do, they nonetheless give us snapshots of proxeny networks in motion. In providing us with accurate data for annual rates of granting, chronological lists reveal

¹² Mack (2012), 224.

¹³ The only certain exceptions to this usage are the lists of *theoroi* from different cities who became *proxenoi* for whom the nominative is used: e.g. Dimitrova (2008), no. 1-13 (Samothrace); *SEG* 37 388 (Boiotia).

the rhythms of proxeny networks, and their inherent year-on-year variability.

Chronological lists, unlike most catalogues, often also allow us to distinguish between grants given to individuals and grants made to groups – and thus to begin to unpick the different sorts of interaction which contributed to the continual renewal of proxeny networks. For instance, in the great chronological lists of Delphi, which give us 22 years' worth of chronological lists, divided by half year, it is possible to identify a number of groups of *theoroi* dispatched by their *poleis* to Delphi and honoured there with *proxenia*.

Although the distinction between these two categories, chronological list and catalogue, is useful, there was often a significant overlap. In order to remain complete, catalogues had to be updated over time, and this could take the form of a subsequent chronological list (as at Karthaia), or the insertion of additional *proxenoi* in spaces left in the original text of the catalogue. The catalogues of Chios, and especially Eresos, take on a palimpsest-like quality as a result of these successive phases of inscription, revealing, in the case of Eresos, a striking continuity of contact with distant Karystos – evidenced by four distinct grants stretched over a period of perhaps thirty years.¹⁴ The latest insertions in the Eresian proxeny list, indeed, in the accusative case of the grant rather than the nominative of the catalogue, show the transformation of this monument from ordered catalogue to a place simply to record new appointments of *proxenoi*.¹⁵ Similarly a sequence of chronological lists maintained for a sufficient period of time (i.e. a generation or more) would come to represent, like catalogues, a virtually complete record of a *polis*' network of *proxenoi*.

Proxeny lists – both catalogues and chronological lists – vividly illuminate the proxeny networks of their respective *poleis*. The question, however, is – how far were

¹⁴ Mack (2011), 221.

¹⁵ Mack (2011), 218.

these networks of *proxenoi* representative of the proxeny networks of *poleis* in general? Is the decision to inscribe proxeny lists of these kinds itself an indication that the network in question was unusual (i.e. exceptionally large) in a way which should prevent us from using it as the basis for a discussion of proxeny networks more generally? The decision to construct and inscribe a catalogue in particular was a marked and context specific act. Even chronological lists, for all that they represented a cheaper form of publication than individual decrees, need not and usually were not inscribed at all. However, the significant number of *poleis* attested inscribing lists clearly shows that this was not an exceptional practice in itself, especially given how much more vulnerable these individual monuments would have been, collectively, to loss and destruction than the much more numerous individually inscribed decrees. In particular, fragments of fully-fledged proxeny catalogues are preserved from Kleitor, Karthaia, Astypalaia, Chios, Eresos, and Kalchedon.¹⁶ Chronological lists are known for Epidaurus, Aitolia, Delphi, Histiaia (and perhaps another city in central Greece), Thera, Anaphe, Tenos, Samothrace, Gortyn, and perhaps Miletus.¹⁷ In addition, references in other decrees attest to the existence of lists (probably catalogues, being subsequently supplemented) at Megara, Lakonian Epidaurus Limne, Assos, Gryneion,

¹⁶ *IG* V 2 368 (Kleitor); XII 5 542 with Mack (2011) (Karthaia); XII 3 168 + *I.Dor.Ins.* no. 82, 97 and, perhaps, 98 (Astypalaia); Vanseveren (1937), 325-32 in addition to a substantial new fragment of the fourth-century catalogue which will be published by G. E. Malouchou (Chios); *IG* XII suppl. 127 + Hodot (1976), 60-65 with Mack (2012) (Eresos); *I.Kalch.* 4 (Kalchedon). *IG* XII suppl. 313 (Tenos) is probably also an example.

¹⁷ Perlman (2000), 184-197 E.3-E.6 (Epidaurus); *IG* IX I² 1 13, 17, 21, 24, 25, 29, 31 (Aitolia); *Syll.*³ 585 (Delphi); *IG* XII 9 1187 (Histiaia); XII 3 332/1297, 333/1298, 334, 1299-1300 (Thera); XII 3 250-2 + XII 3 suppl. p.279 (Anaphe); XII 5 1073 + II² 2455 with Mack (2011), 333-7 (Karthaia); XII suppl. 304 (Tenos); *IC* IV 206 (Gortyn); *Milet* I 3 95-8 (Miletus); *GIBM* 1154 (unknown city in central Greece/Euboia); Dimitrova (2008) n.1-13 (Samothrace) – on which see chapter 5, 272 n.50, below; Bardani (1987), 75-77 (*SEG* 37 388; Central Greece). Vanseveren (1937), 327-8, may be a list of *proxenoi* appointed in a single year (Chios); *I.Tralleis* 33, *contra* Marek (1984), 110, with its high concentrations of Thessalians and Macedonians without *polis* specification, looks more like a list of mercenaries than of *proxenoi*; see also Jones (1992) eliminating another candidate from Rhodes.

Bargylia, and Kyzikos.¹⁸ The very wide range of *poleis* represented here – in terms of material resources and circumstances as well as size – should give us confidence that this material does at least reflect the range of possibilities open to different *poleis*. In any case, ‘the average proxeny network’ is likely to prove just as elusive and hard to identify as ‘the average *polis*.’

Nonetheless, at the same time as reading these lists of *proxenoi* for the quantitative information they contain, it is important to be aware that they function as statements rather than simply as records. The very fact that catalogues of *proxenoi* could be assembled at different *poleis* from which we see little or no evidence of systematic inscription of individual decrees clearly shows that archival records of proxeny grants were regularly maintained and accessible, and probably even that there was some record kept of which *proxenoi* were still alive and active. Although the particular circumstances in which each monument was erected are obscure, their symbolic force would have been clear. Such monuments asserted the importance of the *polis* which produced them, by stressing the number of important individuals who had sought to befriend and aid the city, as well as the cities to which these *proxenoi* linked the granting *polis*. In creating these inscribed monuments, cities were self-consciously mapping their social world, but, most of all, emphasising the central place they occupied within it.

¹⁸ *IG* VII 5 (Megara); Heberdey and Wilhelm (1896), 115-6 no.186-7 (Kyzikos); *I.Iasos* 608 and [612] (Bargylia); *IG* XII 4 129 XI, 1.80-81 (Gryneion); *I.Assos* 11a 1.13-16 (Assos); *IG* V 1 932 (Epidauros Limne). Other references to the archiving of proxeny decrees and decrees in general include *I.Magnesia* 34 (Phocian league) and, on whitened boards, *IG* I³ 155 (Athens) and XII 4 129-130 no. XII 1.95 (Phokaia). There are also references to a proxeny list at Eresos from the latter part of the second century BC which attests a subsequent list, XII suppl. 139 1.92-4. So also *RPh* (1949), 9-13 no. 2 (Chios).

1.1 Case Study 1: The Chronological Proxeny List of Histiaia¹⁹

The chronological list of Histiaia, recording 32 grants of *proxenia* made in a single year, represents a compact case study, a proxeny network in miniature, which emphasises many of these points and illustrates the way in which proxeny lists can be used to understand how grants functioned in context. This list clearly attests to the wide possible range of contacts which a *polis* might have. It allows us to identify Histiaia's local region of primary interaction, and distinguish between different sorts of contact with cities which took place within and outside it and shows how proxeny networks, in the communal horizons which they reveal, define *poleis*.

On the map illustrating Histiaia's proxeny list (Map 1) what is immediately striking is the distribution of *proxenoi*, attesting to a remarkable range of contacts for this *polis* on the northern tip of Euboea – as far west as Syracuse and Tarentum, as far east as Sidon and Kalchedon, and as far south as Cyrene. Nonetheless, even within this far-reaching set of proxeny grants it is notable that almost two-thirds of these grants (up to 20 of these 32) were made to individuals from a relatively narrow geographic area, roughly comprising of central and northern Greece. This, I would argue, constituted Histiaia's local region of primary interaction, the area within which most of its interactions with other *poleis* occurred. This region, however, is not just visible in the clustering of *proxenoi* in this list, it is also defined by the sort of grants which it attests to there – the distribution of 'group grants' versus 'individual grants.'

The majority of grants in this list – the majority of proxeny grants in general – were made to individuals for reasons which it is very hard to identify. Indeed, the specific service which prompted a proxeny grant may have been only the last in a series of deeds which, together, were felt to make him worthy of this honour. A

¹⁹ *IG XII 9 1187*.

significant minority of grants, however, were made to groups of individuals together. While some of these individuals may have been personally responsible for services in the past, the immediate reason for the grant would have been their participation on an embassy or mission from their home *polis*, or their support, within their own city, for a mission from a granting *polis*. In other words, these group grants indicate a particularly intense form of public contact between two communities.

Although all of the recipients of *proxenia* in this Histiaian inscription are listed individually, careful reading allows us to identify a number of probable group-grants. In particular, since it can be observed that grants in this list have not been arranged by ethnic but, almost certainly, in the order in which they were made, it becomes highly likely that individuals from the same *polis* who are juxtaposed in it were appointed together.²⁰ Working on this principal it is possible to identify five different group grants in this list – to three citizens of Echinus (a *polis* on the mainland, opposite Histiaia),²¹ to three Amphictyonic *hieromnemes* in their year of office,²² to two Athenians,²³ and to two different groups of Macedonians – probably from the court of king Antigonas Gonatas.²⁴ All five of these group grants were thus made within

²⁰ In particular the Aitolian, Locrian, and Herakleian juxtaposed in l.21-3 were clearly appointed at the same time in the context of their service as *hieromnemes* of the Delphic Amphictyony in 264/3 BC – presumably the year of this list, see below, n. 28.


²¹ l.8-10; note that an individual grant of *proxenia* was thus also made to a separate citizen of Echinus in the same year, l. 28.

²² l.21-3, see n.20.

²³ l.12-3.

²⁴ The two Macedonians from Thessalonike in l.37-8 (perhaps accompanied by a Macedonian without a civic reference, l.39) probably represent contact with the Antigonid court, but could conceivably represent inter-*polis* contact instead or as well. The other pair, l. 30-1, can only reflect an official interaction with the court, comprising as it does of a Macedonian from Aigeai (the Antigonid seat) and an individual without an ethnic, Aristoboulos, son of Persaios. Knoepfler suggests that we understand this entry as a mason's error (a misinscription of a similar name in l.29, Knoepfler 2001a, 280 n.58) – but why would it not have been erased? The reason for this omission of *polis* ethnic must be that the Persaios in question was Persaios of Kition, the philosopher, a highly influential courtier of king Antigonos (*RE* (1); Diog. Laert. 7.36; for Persaios' influence at court (and interest in Euboeia) at about this time see Diog. Laert. 2.143 where he is credited with dissuading the king from restoring democracy to Eretria. Persaios was clearly too famous for his permanent position at court for his now

Histiaia's local region of primary interaction and illustrate the restricted geographic range of the sorts of intense political contacts which they attest.



Map 1 *Proxeno*i appointed by Histiaia in the year 264/3 BC (IG XII 9 1187; 32 *proxeno*i). *Proxeno*i apparently appointed individually are represented by dots; *proxeno*i appointed as part of a group, according to my analysis, represented by joined squares. The inset maps shows Histiaia's region of primary interaction. To aid interpretation I give the origins of the *proxeno*i appointed in the order in which they are listed on the stone: Echinus (a group of three); Sidon; Athens (a group of two); Phokis; Syracuse; Phaselis; Samos; Tenedos; Tarentum; Cyrene; Aitolia, Locris, and Herakleia (three Dephic *hieromnemo*nes, a group); Halikarnassos; Herakleia; Halikarnassos; Kytinion; Echinus; Kalchedon; Aigeai in Macedonia and Aristoboulos, son of Persaios (a group of two, Antigonid courtiers); Kyzikos; Tenedos; Aigeira in Achaia; Erythrai; Larissa in Phthiotic Achaia; Thessalonike and Macedonia (a group of three).

The pattern of distribution of *proxeno*i outside of this local region is suggestive in other ways. Louis Robert, in a well-known article, compared the wide distribution of Histiaia's *proxeno*i with the distribution of its coinage, arguing that

irrelevant ethnic (which would not, however, have been the most distant listed here) to be thought either necessary or helpful in this reference to his son. For discussion of the other examples of the omission of ethnics in proxeny grants when the individual was involved in court service, or too famous to require it for identification, see Chapter 1, 55 n.95. On the remarkable Persaios, see now Erskine (2010).

both reflected the reach and interest of the Histiaians in trade.²⁵ Although the comparison between coins and *proxenoi* is not convincing,²⁶ the distribution of *proxenoi* attested in this list does strongly suggest that long distance trade was frequently the decisive factor – especially those stretched out along the major sea route from the Black Sea (where *IG XII 9 1186* attests Histiaians as having established trade interests) to Cyrene. In particular, the separate grants which seem to have been made on different occasions to individuals – especially the two Tenedians (the gateway to the Propontis and Black Sea) – appear to reflect frequent rather than politically intense interactions, which would, again, be more characteristic of trade.²⁷

This striking contrast in the proxeny list of Histiaia, between the types of proxeny granting and thus interaction characteristic within and outside its local region of primary interaction, characterise Histiaia's interactions as a *polis*. This case study shows how a detailed reading of a proxeny list can illuminate the function and importance of networks of *proxenoi*. But this also reveals what we lose by examining networks in isolation. Paradoxically, by studying this text on its own we lose sight of its extraordinariness – of the exceptional activity of the Histiaians which it represents in this year. The thirty-two individuals it collects do not just represent a large number

²⁵ Robert (1951).

²⁶ Not because of the geographical mismatch between the distribution of *proxenoi* and tetradobols in coin hoards, *contra* Marek (1977), but because the large issues of tetradobols which Robert studied were minted nearly a century later, to pay soldiers in the context of the third Macedonian war, reflecting the military rather than commercial importance of Histiaia at that time – so Ashton (2000), 103-4.; see already the doubts of Wallace (1962), 21-2.

²⁷ Tenedos: I.18, 33 – on the importance of Tenedos, see also 190, below. On this list there are also two separately appointed *proxenoi* from Halikarnassos: I.24, 27. By extraordinary coincidence both Halikarnassians are otherwise attested: the first was the relation of a number of other Halikarnassians attested receiving grants of *proxenia* (*FD III 1 440*; *I.Thessaly I 51*) and performing euergetical activities (building a small stoa – *I.Thessaly I 52*) elsewhere in central Greece – perhaps a family with trading interests in the region, so Miller (1974); the second is attested as the subject of a statue base in Oropos (*I.Oropos 415*), dedicated by his brother, and as the recipient of a grant of *proxenia* in the proxeny lists of Chios (Vanseveren 1937, 325-7 no. 6 B.11-13). This individual may even have been the Halikarnassian *xenos* at the news of whose death Callimachus wept, *C. Ep.* 36, so Swinnen (1970). In this last case it is impossible to know whether the grant was related to services performed at Halikarnassos (i.e. probably on trade) or on a public – i.e. Ptolemaic – mission.

of *proxenoi* for a *polis* to appoint in a particular year – this is the highest rate of granting that we know of for any *polis* in any year. Similarly, the degree to which the Histiaians reached outside their local region in this year, to express ties with a wide range of distant communities, is brought out in sharp relief when we compare this to other attested patterns of distribution. Given the presence on this list of three *hieromnemes* of the Delphic Amphictyony, which situate it in the context of the year in which the Histiaians gained firm control of Euboia’s previously rotating Amphictyonic seat, it is tempting to read this inscription as a memorial of the remarkable range of contacts which they forged during a notable year.²⁸

2 Proxeny Networks Compared

The proxeny list of Histiaia illustrates the importance and potential interest of proxeny networks, but also the limitations inherent in analysing them in isolation. In order to interpret networks of *proxenoi* and understand the functions which they performed, it is therefore necessary to compare all available *testimonia* to establish common parameters and the degree to which there was variation – in terms both of the scale of networks of *proxenoi* and their patterns of regional distribution. These comparisons reveal that the size of a *polis*’ network, and, more importantly, its reach, were not necessarily correlated to its size or material resources but rather reflected the horizons of the community and interests of its citizens.

The first part of this section concentrates on establishing the scale of proxeny-networking. I begin by identifying the size of different networks of *proxenoi* at particular moments in time, primarily on the basis of fragments of proxeny

²⁸ For a reconstruction of the history and relations of Histiaia, Eretria, and Chalkis, and on the dating of these *hieromnemes* to 264/3 (they are also attested in *FD* III 1 476, 4 359 and *Syll.*³ 483.34-9), see Knoepfler (1995), 157; cf. Scholten (2000), 246.

catalogues. I then explore our evidence for the annual rates and rhythms of proxeny granting using chronological lists of *proxenoi* which vividly reveal that networks of *proxenoi* were never static, but needed to be constantly renewed or recreated in response to the constant attrition of *proxenoi*, as individuals died off. This is because, although most grants of *proxenia* were theoretically hereditary, in practice, like links of *xenia*, they needed to be renewed at each generation to effectively maintain this reciprocal relationship.²⁹

In order to make best use of the small number of samples which we have, these studies are necessarily synchronic. However, I follow on by exploring the extent to which it is also possible to identify diachronic trends in this material. In particular, in the record of individually inscribed decrees previous scholars have identified a massive increase in proxeny-granting at the beginning of the Hellenistic period – and posited this as both evidence for and a cause of proxeny’s degeneration.³⁰ The surviving proxeny lists, which are much more reliable indicators of network size and the scale of granting, support the suggestion that the average size of networks of *proxenoi* increased over time. However, they also reveal that the picture was much more complex than simplistic narratives allow and that the potential for variation which existed at every point, between the networks of different cities and between rates of granting in individual years, probably mattered far more.

²⁹ The case of Alcibiades, Chapter 2, 146-50, underlines this need for reciprocity and illustrates the potential consequences of its failure. cf. Marek (1984), 161; Herman (1987) on *xenia*, 58-72; on *proxenia*, 138. We possess a number of proxeny grants explicitly described as renewals of grants given to previous family members or references to their earlier possession of this status, especially from Athens and Delphi: *IG II*² 13; 86; 172; 206; 365; 844; *Agora* 16 59; *FD III* 1 86; 359; 2 193; 4 20; 225; 403; 406; *SGDI* 2600; *BCH* (1958), 88; *IG IX* 1² 1 71; XI 4 593; 887; 1049; *IDor.Ins.* 62 is perhaps another example. On the similar case of *patroneia*, theoretically hereditary, in practice in need of renewal, see Eilers (2002), 81-3.

³⁰ Introduction, 6.

2.1 The Size of Proxeny Networks

Catalogues of *proxenoi* make it clear that proxeny networks in general were surprisingly large and that a *polis* of small size could possess a substantial network. Our earliest catalogue shows a very minor *polis* in possession of a considerable network of *proxenoi*.³¹ According to this inscription, Karthaia, which was only one of four *poleis* on the small and far from wealthy Aegean island of Keos, possessed a network of at least 86 *proxenoi* in the first half of the fourth century BC.³² A fragment of another catalogue illuminates the network of Eresos, a larger, but still definitely mid-ranking *polis* more than a century later. On the basis of this fragment, dating to perhaps c.230 BC, Eresos, which was similarly one of five *poleis* but on the much larger island of Lesbos, can be conservatively estimated as possessing a network of c.175-250 *proxenoi* when this catalogue was first inscribed.³³ The surviving fragments of the late second-century proxeny catalogue of Astypalaia, an island-*polis* in the Dodecanese, suggests that this city maintained a network of c. 250-400 *proxenoi*.³⁴ None of these were particularly large or important *poleis* and comparison of their estimated territorial extent suggests that the size of their networks was not simply determined by their resources: Karthaia's territory was doubtless the smallest, at c.67 km², as indeed was its network, but in the case of Eresos and Astypalaia, the relationship between network size (175-250: 250-400) and territorial extent (c.225

³¹ *IG XII 5 542*.

³² Keos as a whole is attested as paying four talents in tribute to the Athenians in the mid fifth century (*IG I³ 263 IV 1.21*). However, to judge from the fact that when, in 451/0, the Koressians separately paid 2.25 talents, the other three *poleis* of Keos, including Karthaia, paid 1.2 talents (*IG I³ 262 I 1.21; V 1.21*), Karthaia's material resources were only a relatively small fraction of what this would imply for Keos as a whole, at least at this time.

³³ Mack (2012), 223-4.

³⁴ Exceptionally, the *polis*-groupings of *proxenoi* in this list were ordered alphabetically (but only as far as the first letter). The nearly one hundred *proxenoi* we have, from *poleis* beginning with 'A' (34 whose specific civic ethnic is preserved; 19 uncertain) and 'K' (at least 25) and either 'K' again or 'I' (c.20) reveal the scale of this list – the 59 *proxenoi* whose origins we know are unlikely to constitute less than a quarter of the original total.

km²: 97 km²) was inverted.³⁵ All three of these *poleis*, of course, were island *poleis*, but the proxeny catalogue of Kleitor clearly shows that even an entirely landlocked *polis* in Arkadia was capable of accumulating a substantial network of *proxenoi*: at least 136 *proxenoi*, though not all from the same phase of inscription, can be identified on the three partially preserved sides of this monument, originally inscribed on all four sides.³⁶

Extended series of chronological lists, such as we possess for Delphi and Epidauros, can provide us with further points of comparison.³⁷ Although these do not present us with complete networks, it is possible, given the continual need of *poleis* to renew their networks, to get some sense of the proxeny networks which they could have maintained. Since most *proxenoi* would have been appointed in maturity, proxeny networks were probably renewed generationally – at most 25-35 years.³⁸ Thus, if we can suppose that the 52 grants collected by Perlman (2000), E.3 for Epidauros constitute a complete record of the grants made during this fifteen year period, these would have supported a network of c.85-120 *proxenoi*.³⁹ Similarly the

³⁵ All estimates of territorial extent taken from Hansen and Nielsen (2004).

³⁶ IG V 2 368.

³⁷ The chronological lists of Epidauros list the recipients of *theorodokia* and *proxenia*. Within them, *proxenia* appears to be the base award with recipients normally divided into two sections per year – those named both *theorodokoi* and *proxenoi* contrasted with those simply named *proxenoi* (usually a shorter list, often preceded by the heading ‘Πρόξενοι’). In a few cases, however, in the grants of a particular year the first of these groups of recipients, that is those honoured more highly, is simply headed ‘Θεαροδόκοι’ – e.g. Perlman (2000), E.5 l.6. Given the way in which this heading (omitting explicit reference to *proxenia*) occurs in inscriptions alongside these more honoured groups specifically appointed both *theorodokoi* and *proxenoi* in other years (e.g. Perlman (2000), E.5 l.28-37), it seems probable that a concomitant grant of *proxenia* was implied or understood in these cases.

³⁸ See above, n. 29.

³⁹ The difficulty here is that all of the decrees are dated to the month of Apellaios and were apparently passed on the same assembly, Perlman (2000), 84. Given the number of decrees involved, I suspect that what is at issue here is that this was the assembly in which all proposals of *proxenia* made during the rest of the year had to be resubmitted for ratification – the ‘final/authoritative’ (*teleia*) assembly of the year (the month Apellaios was the last in the calendar), as the decrees themselves perhaps describe it Perlman (2000), 87-8. Other two-stage procedures for decreeing honours are attested elsewhere – Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 497-8. Often these processes involved higher honours but they are also attested in relation to *proxenia*. In particular we possess a set of four decrees from Rhodes from the

twenty-two years of proxeny grants recorded by the chronological lists of Delphi (121 individual *proxenoi*) for 197/6-175/4 BC would have sustained a proxeny network of approximately 135-189 *proxenoi*, again assuming network renewal over 25-35 years. Given the international importance of Delphi – and the degree to which it was connected, institutionally, with a wide range of other Greek cities –⁴⁰ this total is low in comparison with the networks of other apparently much more insignificant *poleis* which we have noted.

It is of course true that larger cities, and those more interested in maritime trade, are more likely to have had larger proxeny networks. The new fragment of the fourth-century proxeny catalogue of Chios, containing 15 *proxenoi* at only three cities in the Propontis, suggests – unsurprisingly – that the Chian proxeny network was larger than the roughly contemporary Karthaian one.⁴¹ These examples clearly show, however, that the networks created by small communities were not necessarily small, even by the standards of much larger and more important cities. The comparatively equal institutional ability of *poleis* large and small to create and maintain substantial proxeny networks which this attests to is also reflected in the rates of granting which I discuss in the next section. Altogether this indicates a remarkable intensity of proxeny networking in a world which was largely made up of small *poleis*, and an interest in expressing these sorts of links which does not simply reflect the practical functions they served.

early second century BC all concerning the grant and subsequent ratification of *proxenia* for Nikon the Seleukid (*Syll.*³ 644-5 decrees *a-d*), with the form of decrees *b* and especially *c* (the subsequent confirmation) very closely resembling our Epidaurian texts.

⁴⁰ See Plassart (1921) for Delphi's very large network of *theorodokoi*.

⁴¹ Malouchou (forthcoming), A 1.4-20.

2.2 Rates and Rhythms of Granting

When we consider the maximum rates of granting to which chronological lists attest, the total size of these networks is not surprising. The proxeny list of Histiaia, which names 32 *proxenoi* appointed in a single year, provides us with the highest annual total which we know for a *polis*, but it is itself eclipsed by a chronological list of the Aitolian league, coincidentally dating within the same decade as the Histiaian list (c.270-260 BC), which collects no fewer than 61 grants.⁴² Other *poleis* also come surprisingly close to the Histiaian total: the Epidaurians appointed 27 *proxenoi* in a single year;⁴³ the Therans, at least 25;⁴⁴ a new text from central Greece lists 23;⁴⁵ in two separate years the Samothracians named 30 and 29 individuals *proxenoi*;⁴⁶ in one particular year the Tenians named 14.⁴⁷ Moreover, two further lists of foreigners from central Greece and Chios, if they are chronological lists of *proxenoi*, would similarly attest to rates of 22 appointed in a year and 16.⁴⁸ The fact that such large numbers of *proxenoi* could be appointed in particular years – even by minor *poleis* – helps to explain why *poleis* possessed a relatively equal capacity to make proxeny grants. The institutional ‘cost’ of granting proxeny (e.g. in terms of assembly time) was more or less the same regardless of *polis* size.

⁴² *IG IX 1² 17*; the identification of this as a list of the recipients of *proxenia* (rather than *politeia*) is guaranteed by the regular appointment of at least one *engouos* for each recipient. In all the grants of *proxenia* which the Aitolians inscribed there is only one recipient for whom no *engouos* is inscribed (12 l. 25-35); by contrast of all the decrees which grant *politeia* without *proxenia* for only two are *engouoi* listed (9 (an unusual grant for a woman) and 30 l.10-17; 17 l.131-134 should probably be restored as a proxeny grant –[προξεν]v[ι]α[v] would be a perfect fit for the traces reported in l. 131). This is in comparison with the 12 other grants of citizenship known for which *engouoi* are omitted, often inscribed alongside proxeny decrees where they are present. Where both *proxenia* and *politeia* are granted together we often see the further specification ἔγγυος τῶς προξενίας which can leave no room for ambiguity about what the function of these *engouoi* was conceived of as being. On the function of these *engouoi*, see Chapter 2, 107.

⁴³ Perlman (2000), E.5.

⁴⁴ *IG XII 3 1300*.

⁴⁵ *ed.pr.* Bardani (1987), 75-77 (=SEG 37 388).

⁴⁶ Dimitrova (2008), no.5.2, 9.

⁴⁷ *IG XII suppl.* 304.

⁴⁸ *GIBM* 1154; Vanseveren (1937), 327-8.

If these rates of granting were at all close to the average, we would expect proxeny networks to be even larger than they appear above. However, where we have sufficiently long sequences of lists to calculate reliable averages, these tend to be much lower. In fact the range and variability of rates of granting are just as striking as these maximal rates – and, for our purposes, even more important. Thus in the five-year sequence of lists in which the Epidaurians are attested as appointing 27 *proxenoi* in one year, in the preceding year they appointed only one – and the average rate of granting (inflated by the particularly active last year) was c. 11 *proxenoi*.⁴⁹ At Delphi, conversely, just over five *proxenoi* were appointed per year on average or 3.5 distinct grants (counting individually grants made at the same time to groups from the same city or families) – but the numbers of *proxenoi* appointed in a particular year varied enormously, ranging from none in 193/2 to 18 in 188/7. Although our evidence elsewhere is less rich, everything suggests that this degree of fluctuation in annual rates of granting was characteristic of proxeny networks more broadly.

Within this variation it is possible to identify certain relatively regular rhythms of granting, particularly in relation to the festivals which cities held at fixed intervals, inviting official delegations from other *poleis* to attend. Group grants of *proxenia* were frequently made to visiting representatives (*theoroi*) and these contributed to particularly high totals of *proxenoi* which certain *poleis* named in certain years. In fact the Samothracian lists, recording as many as thirty grants in a single year, were composed only of *theoroi* – ‘the following became *proxenoi* of the *polis* when they visited as *theoroi*’ as these texts were introduced.⁵⁰ The new first-century list from

⁴⁹ Perlman (2000), E.5. with n. 37, above.

⁵⁰ οἷδε πρόξενοι τη[ς πόλε]ως ἐγένοντο θεω[ροὶ πα]ραγενόμενοι, Dimitrova (2008), no.6 1.19-21. Presumably they visited a particular festival, but what festival is unclear (the substantial numbers of *poleis* listed at a time are otherwise hard to explain). Other Samothracian proxeny decrees for

central Greece describes the circumstances for the appointment of 23 *proxenoi* from 11 cities in similar terms – as delegates sent to the first celebration of a contest and sacrifice (i.e. a festival) of Herakles.⁵¹ Similarly in the long sequence of chronological lists from Delphi a number of group grants can be identified – surely reflecting *theoroi* – which were made during the year in which the Pythian games took place, and this is also surely the explanation of some of the group grants in the Epidaurian lists.⁵² This sort of theoric pattern of proxeny granting may also be detectable in the list of 24 *proxenoi* inscribed on a doorpost at Thera.⁵³

Regular theoric rhythms were thus significant, but they seem to have caused, and allow us to account for, only part of the year on year variation in proxeny granting. In particular, *theoria* does not seem to have any detectable role to play in the proxeny list of Histiaia, unlike other lists which name nearly as many *proxenoi*, and this emphasises the exceptional scale and range of contacts which it reveals. Perhaps surprisingly festival *theoria* also seems to play a very modest role in the *proxeny* lists at Delphi. In the 22 years covered by the Delphian lists, only eight delegations of *theoroi* can be confidently identified, fewer than two for each of the Pythian games held in this period – surely far fewer than would actually have been sent by *poleis*.⁵⁴ This presumably reflects a conscious selection on the part of the Delphians – on what basis? – which is, however, useful for us in that it throws the other sorts of grants in these lists into greater relief. The largest group grants were not made to groups of

individuals are known – though none have been discovered on Samothrace itself (*I.Thasos* 169; *IG XII* 4 148).

⁵¹ [τὰ Ἡράκλεια οἱ τῶν Ἡρακλείων τὸ πρῶτον, πρόξενοι καὶ εὐεργέ[ται ἐξαποσταλέν]τες ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὴν θ[υσίαν ὄϊδε], *SEG* 37 388 1.2-4.

⁵² *Syll.*³ 585, see Pomtow's note on *proxenoi* 3-6.

⁵³ In an earlier list of *proxenoi* from Ios, Melos and Gortyn prefigure further *proxenoi* from these *poleis* in the later list (*IG XII* 3 1300 1.31-9; 40-69) – in the case of Gortyn taking the form of a group of six *proxenoi*. One possibility is that the *proxenoi* in the first list were appointed for their help given to the *theoria*, those in the second for serving as *theoroi* to Astypalaia themselves.

⁵⁴ Masilia (no. 3-6), Lamia (no. 20-22), Thespiiai (no. 42-44), Lebadeia (twice: no. 74-6 and 80-1), Koroneia (twice: no. 91-3 and 109-111), and Sikyon (no. 116-118).

theoroi coming to the Pythian games, but rather to a group of 13 Alexandrians in 188/7, presumably a delegation sent by Ptolemy Epiphanes (responsible for the spike in this year of 18 *proxenoi*),⁵⁵ and to nine Rhodians in 180/79, requested by the Delphians to arbitrate a boundary dispute with their neighbours. Definite public initiatives – by Delphi and other state actors in relation to Delphi – are thus also responsible for some of this variation which we see. As another example of this, it is also worth mentioning the list of 14 grants made in a single year by the Tenians – which seem to reflect a desire to improve the coverage of its proxeny network in relation to Crete in this year. We also, however, should not discount the possibility of private initiatives and motivations – both on the part of citizens of the granting city and would be recipients – in causing this variation in rates of granting. It is possible that we can isolate these sorts of non-Delphian private initiatives in these lists as well, in the marked tendency which we see for individuals to be appointed *proxenoi* shortly after the appointment of others from the same *polis* or region.⁵⁶ A possible explanation of these clusters is that the grant of *proxenia* to one individual in a *polis* made his peers there more likely to actively seek appointment themselves, in competition with their fellows.

In the variation of *proxeny* granting we thus see some structures – in particular a regular, but sometimes faint, *theoric* rhythm. Private and economic activities are also likely to have contributed to this clustering of proxeny granting in particular years, as relations between individuals based on mutual interactions over a longer period reached a particular point, resulting in a grant of *proxenia*, or especially

⁵⁵ no. 52-63 and 65 with Pomtow, *ad loc.*

⁵⁶ Thus we see separate grants in consecutive years for Naupaktians (no. 64, 70), Elateians (3 grants, 3 years: no. 113, 115, 120), Lebadeians (no. 74-6, 80-1), and Chians (3 grants, 3 years: no. 77, 86, 87-8), and grants for two or more individuals from Corinth (no. 95, 108) and Chersonesus Taurus (no. 9, 23-4) within three years of each other – constituting the vast majority of repeated grants for individuals from particular *poleis* on this list.

marked services provoked the proposal of grants more quickly. But the irregularity of granting was also a reflection of the changeable speed of events in the Mediterranean, at least from the perspective of the individual *polis*, of a particularly high level of activity one year, caused by a conjunction of external circumstances and internal responses and initiatives, perhaps followed by a lull in the next.

2.3 Diachronic Trends in Proxeny Networking

Despite the considerable fluctuation which characterised rates of proxeny granting year by year, it seems probable that we can detect certain long term trends. In particular our evidence seems to suggest that from the late Classical period onwards *proxeny* networks were more likely to include larger multiples of *proxenoi* at particular *poleis* – and be larger as a result.

This trend can be crudely represented by the proxeny catalogues of Karthaia (mid fourth-century), Eresos (mid to late third-century), and Astypalaia (late second-century). The first and earliest comprised of fewer *proxenoi* apparently spread much more thinly between different *poleis* than the last, which incorporated many more in much higher concentrations at particular *poleis* (in this Eresos would represent something of a midpoint in terms of both network size and the strength of its concentrations). Thus, where Karthaia seems to have recognized relatively few *proxenoi* at any given *polis* (in many cases probably only one), almost all of the cities encompassed by the Astypalaian network tend to be represented by at least six *proxenoi* (or 11 or more in the case of larger *poleis*). In this case these networks are surely also a reflection of the differing situation and outlook of Karthaia and Astypalaia, but this trend, towards appointing substantial groups of *proxenoi* at particular *poleis*, seems to be well represented in our other evidence. In part it seems

to be driven by a tendency to make more group grants, in particular to panels of *theoroi* and foreign judges, which seems to become more common from the late third century onwards (the period in which most of the examples discussed in the previous section originate).

However, although we can probably thus identify an overall increase in the total average size of proxeny networks, it is clear that the local trends which fed into this picture were far more complex. Two third-century chronological lists from Epidaurus, separated by perhaps fifty years, seem to show a particularly swift increase in the average number of *proxenoi* appointed. The first, a record of 15 years from c.260-40 BC, yields an average of 3.5 proxeny grants per year;⁵⁷ the second, a record of five years from c.220-200 BC, yields an average of c.11 grants – or 7.5 even if we exclude the last year in which 27 *proxenoi* were appointed.⁵⁸ This large and relatively sudden increase – of two hundred to three hundred per cent in the space of fifty years – illustrates how *polis*-specific individual patterns of granting are likely to be. The material from Delphi complicates this narrative still further. The complete list of *proxenoi* which we have for the first part of the second century attests to an average rate of just over five grants per year (5.4), whereas the 180 individual proxeny decrees which we possess for the 35 year period 315-280 BC attest to a rate which is only slightly lower (5.14).⁵⁹ Since it is extremely unlikely that we possess a complete sample of individually inscribed decrees for 315-280 BC (as we do in our list for 197/6-175/4 BC), it appears that, after a period which witnessed a large increase in

⁵⁷ Perlman (2000), E.3, c.260-40 BC.

⁵⁸ Perlman (2000), E.5 – I begin at 1.4 as it is unclear whether the previous list belongs to a separate year or not.

⁵⁹ The numbers of individually inscribed decrees are drawn from Marek's study of the Delphic decrees, and rely on his dating, Marek (1984), 165-7; see 217-246 for his complete chronology.

proxeny granting at Epidaurus, the rate of granting at Delphi was, if anything, lower than it had been before.

The importance of the overall quantitative trend which can be observed – towards larger proxeny networks composed of larger groups of *proxenoi* at particular *poleis* – should not be overstated. As I showed in my first chapter, *proxenia* continued to be understood as an institution associated with particular sorts of practical function. Indeed, although the appointment by cities of multiple *proxenoi* at particular *poleis* and the simultaneous appointment of groups of individuals have both been taken as signs of degeneration,⁶⁰ both practices can be identified much earlier. The recognition by a *polis* of multiple *proxenoi* at another *polis* is in fact well attested in the fifth century –⁶¹ and, as I have already argued, this potential for multiplicity was in fact vital for the function of proxeny. Similarly, although mass grants of *proxenia* to groups became more common in the later Hellenistic period, it is a practice that can be traced as early as the mid fourth century. In particular, although the proxeny network of Karthaia is much more thinly scattered in general than that of Astypalaia, this early network illustrates both phenomena: in addition to four *proxenoi* at Tenedos, who apparently received their grants of *proxenia* individually, we also see a group of at least two *proxenoi* appointed at the same time at Kios.⁶² Similar clusters can be observed in the fourth-century Chian network of *proxenoi*. The biggest concentration attested in the Karthaian network, at Athens, however, consisted of no fewer than 15 *proxenoi*, of whom six were appointed as a group at the same time – making it almost as large as the largest attested in the Astypalaian network (17 *proxenoi* at Halikarnassos). In this case the strength and intensity of the interactions

⁶⁰ Gschnitzer (1973), col. 676-7, 657.

⁶¹ Gauthier (1985), 137-40.

⁶² *IG XII 5* 542 l. 50-3, 58 with Mack (2011).

attested between Keos and Athens,⁶³ and the high status of the individuals appointed *proxenoi* there,⁶⁴ provides us with the context we lack in other cases for understanding how so many *proxenoi* at a particular place could be useful.⁶⁵ In general, the potential for the possession of groups of *proxenoi* at particular *poleis* will have lightened the load for the individual *proxenos* – and also created incentives in the form of competition between the *proxenoi* of a city.⁶⁶ However, it is important to recognise also that while so many *proxenoi* certainly could be functional, practicality was not the only concern. The grant of *proxenia* to groups of *theoroi*, for instance, illustrates that *proxenia* was also being used to perform other sorts of function as well, to do with the construction of inter-*polis* relations, which I will explore in greater detail in the next chapter.

While long term trends can plausibly be identified, they thus represent more of an amplification of certain possibilities which were already and probably always available to *poleis* in using *proxenia* rather than any sort of fundamental change. Given the more or less equivalent capacity of *poleis* to grant *proxenia*, what mattered more than the absolute size of a given *polis*' network of *proxenoi* was the relative

⁶³ All of the different cities of Keos belonged to both the Delian league in the fifth century and the Second Athenian Confederacy in the fourth (*RO* 22). The settlements imposed after their attempted secession from the Second Athenian Confederacy in 364/3, shortly before this text, are documented in *RO* 39. From about the same period we also possess a set of decrees, *RO* 40, which the Athenians persuaded at least three of the cities on Keos to make (Karthaiia, Koresia, and Ioulis), instituting an Athenian monopoly on the export of *miltos* (ochre or ruddle) from the island – attesting to the economic importance of this island for the Athenians. The strength of this connection, however, is probably most eloquently revealed in the large number of Keians attested in inscriptions at Athens (21+, excluding the numerous Keians mentioned in *RO* 39-40), for which see Mendoni (2007b).

⁶⁴ Mack (2011), 329-30.

⁶⁵ In particular it is clear that the prominent politician Aristophon, son of Aristoboulos, (along with five other Athenians) was appointed when he was sent to Keos as *strategos* in 362/3 BC after an attempt to overturn Chabrias' settlement (Chabrias may himself have been appointed the previous year); the decree which Aristophon proposed after his return explicitly praised the Karthaiians (*RO* 39, 1.54-5). See Mack (2011), 329.

⁶⁶ The Alcibiades narrative also illustrates this dynamic, see Chater 2, 147-8.

distribution of its grants, both chronologically (marking the distinction between particularly proactive and quiet years) and geographically.

3 Regional Patterns of Distribution: The Horizons of *Poleis*

Absolute figures – for the size of proxeny networks, and the variation in annual rates of granting – present us with a general vision of proxeny as both vital and dynamic. However, for all that this view draws our attention to the possibility of chronological variation at particular *poleis*, it elides the differences between different networks and *poleis*. In this section, by contrast, I argue that the fact that even small *poleis* were able to make large numbers of proxeny grants does not mean that all *poleis*' networks were the same, or that in their relations with each other they were equal. As I show, the proxeny networks of different cities – or rather the different patterns of relative distribution of *proxenoi* within them – reveal distinct, *polis*-specific patterns of interaction and engagement with other *poleis* and regions. Proxeny networks, and especially the proxeny catalogues into which they were self-consciously organized, in delineating the horizons of a *polis* and its position in relation to a range of other *poleis*, defined that *polis* in an important way.

The identity and nature of a *polis*' local region is particularly important for understanding its regional engagement. Some of these 'local regions,' as they emerge from proxeny networks – the origin of the majority or largest minority of *proxenoi* within it – appear to be relatively straightforward geographical units of the sort which we tend to use unquestioningly: the local region of Kleitor's proxeny network is the Peloponnese; for both Thera and Anaphe it is probably the Cycladic Islands. Other examples, however, show that while these networks of interactions were constructed in response to geography, they were not straightforwardly determined by it. These

regions instead represent the perspective of a particular *polis*, its pattern of interactions and the choices it made about which connections to privilege and honour. Indeed different cities could have contrasting or even contradictory ways of constructing the local region of which they were part. The local region of Chios consisted of the *poleis* strung out along the coast of Asia Minor and the nearby islands, to judge from a fragment of its catalogue from the mid third century BC, whereas the catalogue of Eresos – a *polis* which would have fallen within Chios’ local region – reveals a much more narrowly defined local region, excluding Chios. It apparently consisted of just the four other *poleis* on the island of Lesbos on which it was situated.⁶⁷ By contrast the proxeny catalogue of Karthaia, which, like Eresos, was located on an island with three other *poleis*, reflects a much larger local region (and indeed seems to omit the other three *poleis* on Keos entirely, see Map 5).⁶⁸

Proxeny networks also differed greatly – and defined their respective *poleis* – in the degree to which they were limited to this ‘local region of primary interaction.’ The extent to which a *polis* recognised *proxenoi* only within this zone, or reached beyond to express relations with individuals at *poleis* outside it, reveals how wide its horizons were, how interested its citizens were, collectively, in interacting at and establishing permanent connections with *poleis* which lay beyond its immediate circle of proximate *poleis*. Although the precise distribution of each *polis*’ network of *proxenoi* was unique and subject to continual evolution, it is possible to identify a set of types which define the spectrum of different proxeny networks which *poleis* are attested possessing.

The first type is the particularly narrow network, encompassing relatively few *proxenoi* outside a *polis*’ local region of interaction. A good example of this is the

⁶⁷ Mack (2012), 224.

⁶⁸ Mack (2011), 330.


network of Kleitor. Of the 106 *proxenoi* whose ethnics can be read from the catalogue no fewer than 65 are from Peloponnesian *poleis*, with a further 25 from mainland Greece. In this case it is tempting to relate this narrow focus, and especially the lack of maritime *poleis*, to the landlocked position of Kleitor, located in the centre of Arkadia. The network of Epidauros, which was on the seaboard, however, appears even more parochial: setting aside Cretans (of whom there are 15), of the 130 *proxenoi* whose ethnics are known from these different chronological lists only about ten percent originated in *poleis* outside central Greece and the Peloponnese, and the only Aegean islands represented are Kos and Astypalaia. It is striking that, of the networks we can analyse in detail, perhaps the most heavily restricted to its local region was that of Astypalaia – an island (Map 2). Of the cities confidently identified in the alphabetical catalogue, all but one come from within a relatively narrow radius of the island and it is noticeable that the only *polis* attested outside this radius – Aspendus – is represented by only two *proxenoi*, in comparison with the much larger multiples at other *poleis*. Other examples of this sort of pattern of distribution include the proxeny lists of Thera and Anaphe – both heavily restricted to establishing connections with other Aegean islands. None of these civic networks was entirely restricted in its appointment of *proxenoi* to cities within its ‘local region of primary interaction.’ However, in comparison with the networks of other *poleis*, it is striking how circumscribed and exclusive they are, despite the considerable effort which they reveal these cities put into proxeny networking. This tells us a great deal both about the interactions and interrelations of these particular *poleis*, and the comparatively narrow collective limits of their communal horizons – of the interactions and relations their citizens had and were keen to express.



Map 2 The proxeny network of Astypalaia (*IG XII 3 168 + IDor.Ins. no. 82 and 97*). Small but representative sample of 59 *proxenoi* of Astypalaia's network (probably 250-400 *proxenoi*) monumentalized in an alphabetical catalogue c.100 BC. *Proxenoi* depicted from *poleis* whose names begin with 'A-' (Arkesine, Aigiale, Anaphe, Aspendos and Halikarnassos) and 'K-' (Knidos and Kos).

In the second type of proxeny network, in addition to a well-defined local region, there is also a particularly strong engagement with well-defined secondary regions represented by significant numbers of *proxenoi* from a number of *poleis* within them. This pattern can be clearly seen in relation to the fourth-century network of Karthaia on Keos which, in addition to incorporating *proxenoi* at a substantial range of *poleis* within its local radius, also recognised a large and distinct group of at least sixteen *proxenoi* around the Hellespont and Propontis – more than the Karthaians possessed in the Cycladic Islands (Map 5). The relations implied by these *proxenoi* also appear to have been remarkably stable and long-lasting, as we can see from the fact that a substantial proportion of the proxeny grants attested on a mid third-century stone were also made to individuals from that area (3 of 14; Map 6). To

judge from its third-century proxeny catalogue, Eresos possessed a comparable, long-distance connection with Karystus, Megara, and Aigina on the Greek mainland which seem to have continued, and been renewed, over a period of perhaps some thirty years (Map 3).⁶⁹ Whereas local regions seem to reflect a wide range of different sorts of interaction – on political, economic, religious, and even social levels – these more distant clusters probably reflect a narrower range of interaction. The most plausible interpretation of these sorts of stable, long-term relationships is that they relate to established links of long-distance trade which regularly brought Karthaians to the Hellespont and Eresians to central Greece.




Map 3 The *proxenoi* of Eresos (*IG XII suppl. 127* with Mack 2012). A partial and geographically biased sample of this network of *proxenoi* derived from a complex monument upon which *proxenoi* were inscribed in three successive phases, on which see Mack 2012. This monument would originally have borne many more *proxenoi* on Lesbos than this map shows. The extant fragment reveals that *proxenoi* were appointed at Karystos in all three phases and at Aigina in two. This map omits two *proxenoi* appointed at Rome and one at Hymesseis (location unknown).

⁶⁹ Mack (2012), 222-3.

Our material reveals a third type of proxeny distribution – networks which reached well beyond the *polis*' local region of primary interaction and, instead of focusing on a secondary region, articulated links with a much wider geographic range of *poleis*. This is the pattern which we see in the long chronological lists from Delphi and, particularly dramatically, in the list of *proxenoi* appointed in a single year from Histiaia. Of the 121 *proxenoi* appointed by Delphi in 78 separate grants, just over half (62 *proxenoi*; 31 grants) were made outside its local region (consisting of central Greece, including Athens and Euboia and the Northern but not the southern Peloponnese) – to individuals from Alexandria, Asia Minor, the Propontis, and Western Greece (see Map 4 for the distribution of *poleis* represented). In this context the reach of Histiaia is even more extraordinary and surprising. Of the 24 grants made in a single year (32 *proxenoi*), half came from beyond its local region representing all of these far-flung corners of the Greek world (Map 1). Moreover, while in the case of the Delphic list it seems likely that a substantial proportion of those honoured had come to Delphi, the pattern of distribution which we see in the case of Histiaia suggests Histiaian contacts abroad.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ For most of the Delphic *proxenoi* we simply cannot tell what the context for contact was. A rare exception is provided by the grant of *proxenia* for Titus Quinctius Flaminius (*Syll.*³ 585 no. 46), which, because it is dated to 189/8 BC, the year of his censorship in Rome, must relate to his activities there. Presumably he aided the Delphians in their petition before the senate in that year for freedom, *autonomia*, *ateleia* and *asylia* (*Syll.*³ 612) – in other words performing in much the same way as *proxenoi* were generally expected to.



Map 4 *Poleis* at which *proxenoi* appointed by Delphi from 197/6 to 175/4 BC (*Syll.*³ 585).

Both the desire and the capacity to articulate connections – to network – seem to have been shared by all *poleis*, but these were not channelled in the same way in each case. None of these different patterns of distribution represented the norm for networks of *proxenoi*. Instead they constitute a set of tendencies which contributed, in different measures, towards the shape of particular *poleis*' networks. By recognising the spectra of size and patterns of distribution attested on these fragmentary lists of *proxenoi* it is possible to begin to imaginatively repopulate the Greek world with its vibrant proxeny networks – to visualise the tens or even hundreds of thousands of unidirectional proxeny links which would have criss-crossed the Mediterranean at any one time, connecting *poleis* to their peers – and then to look beyond them, to appreciate the

intensity and frequency of inter-*polis* interaction which these links both implied and facilitated.⁷¹

The variables involved in this sort of modelling are complex, and admit too many unknowns and uncertainties to be extrapolated mechanically to produce a ‘connectivity graph’ for the world of *poleis* as a whole which we might then explore using the powerful quantitative tools of social network analysis. Nevertheless we can still do much to understand the fabric and structural dynamics of these networks *en masse* by considering what the recurrent patterns which we can identify at the level of the individual *polis*-network would mean in aggregate. In particular, where *poleis*’ local regions of primary interaction coincided with each other to a greater extent, the result will have been particularly dense, structurally cohesive clusters consisting of numerous and reciprocal proxeny links between most of the actors involved. The Peloponnese, Thessaly, or perhaps the Cyclades seem likely to have been good examples of this phenomenon, but in all of these instances the formation of regional cliques will have been moderated and blurred by the considerable ties which many of the *poleis* concerned will have maintained with others outside – and especially by *poleis* whose interactions and visions of their relations cut across regions as they were conventionally understood or experienced (as in the case of Karthaia, below).

At the same time, the increased likelihood that *poleis* would appoint *proxenoi* – and more *proxenoi* – at *poleis* they deemed more important would have contributed to a much more uneven, variegated structure both within these more densely networked regional clusters and between them. We see this tendency clearly in the catalogues of Karthaia and Astypalaia in the comparatively high concentrations which these *poleis* had at more significant but distant *poleis* (the Karthaians had 15 *proxenoi*

⁷¹ A very low estimate of average proxeny network size, say 50, over the 1,000 *poleis* identified by the Copenhagen Polis Centre would yield 50,000 proxeny links.

at Athens, more than in all the islands of the Cyclades; the Astypalaians had c.6 *proxenoi* at local island *poleis*, but 11+ at more major cities like Kos, Knidos, and 17 at Halikarnassos). These concentrations of *proxenoi* – and thus the two *poleis*' estimation of the importance of a link – were not necessarily reciprocal (the Athenians will not have had fifteen *proxenoi* at Karthaia; they might, however, have had a similar number at Sparta as the Spartans had at Athens). But, because these sorts of value judgements of different *poleis* will often have coincided, the result will have been that these asymmetries coalesced, constructing hierarchies in the connectivity of the Mediterranean despite the relative equality of participation in proxeny networking – singling out particular *poleis* to which the others were particularly keen to connect (e.g. Athens, Byzantium, or Rhodes). In social network terms *poleis*, at least potentially, despite their differences in size, often had a similar out-degree centrality in relation to other *poleis* (the number of proxeny grants they made) – i.e. they could be equally gregarious. However, they differed greatly in their in-degree centrality (the number of proxeny grants other *poleis* made to their citizens, especially other *poleis* with highly scored in-centrality) – that is in their popularity or status within the network.⁷²

The inscription from Narthakion – probably a catalogue of other *poleis*' *proxenoi* there – offers us the rare chance, despite the impossibility of near complete proxeny data for any period, of seeing how these structural asymmetries played out for a minor Greek *polis* on the Malian gulf.⁷³ Narthakion was linked-to by more than 27 *poleis*, a reasonably respectable number for its importance at this point in the mid second century BC. However, in this age of plural *proxenoi*, only one of these *poleis*

⁷² Scott (2000), 69; Kadushin (2012), 31-2. Instead of 'popularity' Wasserman and Faust (1994), 174-5, speak instead of 'prestige' and 'status.'

⁷³ *IG IX 2 90*.

apparently set sufficient store by its links to Narthakion to appoint more than one *proxenos* there.⁷⁴

In visualising networks of *proxenoi* in this way, as links within a network of *poleis*, we get a sense of the multiplicity of this world, the way in which it was understood as being comprised of many *polis* actors interacting with a large number of their peers, and the hubs and hierarchies that resulted. This emphasis on establishing links with particular *poleis* – especially by appointing multiple *proxenoi* there and making group grants to delegations from these communities – also draws our attention to functions which grants of proxeny performed between *poleis*, which I pursue in the next chapter of this thesis. However, although this sort of analysis of the information contained in proxeny lists does allow us to get some sense of the variation between proxeny networks, and the overall network dynamics which resulted, the cost of accommodating multiple *polis*-perspectives in this way is to lose sight of the point of view of the individual city in relation to its network of *proxenoi* – and its self-conscious construction with it of its particular position in relation to other *poleis*. Fortunately, one comparatively well preserved proxeny catalogue from the minor *polis* of Karthaia allows us a rare corrective case study. The Karthaian proxeny network, and the way in which it was carefully presented in this inscription, reminds us that, while we can reconstruct rather crudely the rough outlines of proxeny networking, we need to be aware that we have almost completely lost not only the nuances of nearly all *poleis*' regional engagement, but also the idiosyncratic ways in which they used their proxeny networks, collectively, to represent and understand their connections and social position.

⁷⁴ *IG IX 2 90* 1.16-7, excluding brothers (1.15, 22, and 28) who surely reflect single acts of granting (probably to a father).

4 Case Study 2: The Proxeny Networks of Karthaia⁷⁵


The proxeny catalogue of Karthaia is not only our earliest substantial proxeny list, dating from the first half of the fourth century, it is also the inscription which allows us to reconstruct a network of *proxenoi* in its entirety with greatest precision. This is because, although we only possess half the width of the stele, the *proxenoi* which it lists were organized into a number of self-contained regional groupings which we can identify and accurately calculate the size of. In order of their appearance on the stone, these were: Eubolia (10 *proxenoi*); the Peloponnese (18 *proxenoi*); Boiotia and Malian gulf (17 *proxenoi*); Athens (15 *proxenoi*); the Cycladic islands (10 *proxenoi*); the Hellespont/Propontis (16+ *proxenoi*). The result is a map of Karthaian orientations, of intensity of Karthaian contact, constructed by the Karthaians themselves – in the first instance by the appointment of *proxenoi*, and, secondarily, on our stele, by listing them deliberately in this way.

This comparative index of interest and interaction holds a number of surprises in relation to any assumptions we might have of Karthaia's relations with nearby *poleis*. In particular the relative unimportance of the Cycladic Islands is striking – with the Karthaians recognising only as many *proxenoi* there as they did on Eubolia, and far fewer than in any other area (far too few, in fact, to achieve anything like comprehensive coverage of the Cycladic *poleis*). Instead, despite its position on the eastern coast of Keos, Karthaia looked predominately west – and first and foremost to Athens, but also to Eubolia and central Greece in the north, and south to Sparta and the eastern coast of the Peloponnese.⁷⁶ The concentration of *proxenoi* in the Propontic region (16+) is also striking, especially in comparison, again, with the rather smaller

⁷⁵ *IG XII 5 542* with Mack (2011).

⁷⁶ Étienne and Dourlot (1996), 24-5, note the general, and in the context of the Cyclades, unusual, orientation of Karthaia towards the continent.

Cycladic cluster, suggesting a well-established connection, probably of trade, of which we would otherwise have only very meagre evidence.⁷⁷



Map 5 The fourth-century proxeny network of Karthaia (*IG XII 5 542+* Mack 2012). 86+ *proxenoi* in c. 360 BC. Karthaia marked with a cross; known *proxenoi* marked with dots; regions into which network grouped on catalogue marked with circles and total size of each regional group given.

However, as well as indicating how unexpected the orientation of a *polis*' proxeny network could be, the material from Karthaia also illustrates the remarkable extent to which it could change over time. Comparison between the comprehensive view of Karthaia's regional engagement presented by the mid fourth century catalogue and two fragments of a chronological list from a century later reveals how Karthaia responded to the changing dynamic in the Mediterranean between the Classical and Hellenistic periods.⁷⁸ The only region well represented in both is the Propontis – suggesting that the long-distance economic interests of Karthaians in that

⁷⁷ See Mendoni's prosopography of Keians abroad, Mendoni (2007b), no.108, is a fifth-century honorific decree of the Olbiapolitans (= *SEG* 28 657 = *IosPE* I² 164).

⁷⁸ *IG XII 5 1072/3* and *II² 2455* with Mack (2011), 333-7 and 342.

zone were particularly durable. Otherwise, as the figure comparing these two networks shows, the Karthaians reacted to the new realities of the Hellenistic world. Karthaia's horizons remained broad, and indeed broadened, but, if this effectively random sample of 14 *proxenoi* is in any way representative of its network in general, its interests and the emphasis it placed on particular relations shifted dramatically. The appearance of Macedon and Thessaly, both previously absent, surely reflects their new importance as centres of political gravity, and the attestation of *poleis* on the western and eastern sea routes (especially to southern Asia Minor), again both apparently neglected in the previous network, reveals the increased significance of these routes for the third-century Karthaians.



Map 6 The Hellenistic *proxenoi* of Karthaia (*IG* XII 5 1072/3 and II² 2455 with Mack (2011), 333-7 and 342). 14 *proxenoi* of the mid third century BC from two surviving fragments of an opisthographic stele inscribed with a chronological list (incomplete compound ethnics approximately placed); inscribed in a number of different hands. Contrast distribution with Map 5.

The fourth-century catalogue of Karthaia, however, is perhaps most important for the attitude to and use of the *polis*' proxeny network which it reveals. It was

erected at some point in the mid fourth century, probably shortly after the Athenians quelled the abortive revolt of Keos and enforced a break-up of the island's federation.⁷⁹ The monumental function of this catalogue, quite apart from defining the privileges which proxeny conveyed, seems likely to have been to advertise the size and extent of the proxeny network of this *polis* – to assert the importance of Karthaia by listing its prominent, official friends. In this context the unusual way in which these *proxenoi* are listed seems significant. Unlike the catalogues of other *poleis* which tend to begin by collecting the *proxenoi* from their local region of primary interaction,⁸⁰ the Karthaian catalogue is not obviously ordered in a way which associates this city with any particular region. Instead, by ordering the regional groups of *proxenoi* on two axes which meet at Keos – north-south (Euboeia, the Peloponnese) and then west-east (Boiotia, Athens, the Cyclades, then the Hellespont) – it seems to construct Karthaia as a cross-roads between distinct regions rather than a part of one region. In this it reflects the broader function which proxeny networks in general served, and the catalogues in which they were presented – to emphasise the centrality of the *polis* in question which thereby advertised its links with other communities where individuals had thought it important enough to actively aid its interests. The singular ordering of the Karthaian catalogue reflects the idiosyncratic perspective of the Karthaians on this function – emphasising the central, connected position which they occupied in relation to other *poleis*.

⁷⁹ Mack (2011), 332-3.

⁸⁰ In the case of the Eresian catalogue, this is the *poleis* of Lesbos, Mack (2012), 224; in the case of the Astypalaian catalogue an alphabetic ordering principle was chosen – presumably because the *proxenoi* it collected, as they were almost all from its local region, could not be usefully organised regionally.

Conclusion

This material shows that the networks of *proxenoi* of minor *poleis* were as capable of being remarkably large, widely spaced and vital as those of more historically important *poleis*. Analysis also allows us to paint a vivid picture of inter-*polis* interaction in all its different kinds as continual and intense from the point of view of the Mediterranean as a whole, but, from the perspective of individual *poleis*, subject to sometimes extreme fluctuations as well as regular rhythms. These studies also suggest that although proxeny networks had a functional basis and were rooted in patterns of regional interaction, they were also the product of a desire to establish connections with other *poleis* and assert a central position and identity in relation to them. In the next chapter I develop this consideration of the symbolic function which *proxenia* and proxeny grants were used to serve in inter-*polis* interaction in the context of the other interstate institutions to which *proxenia* was related.

Chapter 4

‘All the World’s a Stage...’

Proxenia and the Performance of *Polis*-Identity in Inter-*Polis* Society

Proxeny networks and the fragmentary lists on which they survive allow us to see the density and intensity of inter-*polis* contacts. However, while my analysis of proxeny lists reveals the functional basis of proxeny networks, as both reflecting and facilitating interaction, it also shows that, on its own, this sort of practical function is an insufficient explanation for *poleis*’ use of *proxenia*. In particular, the large multiples of *proxenoi* which cities appointed at certain *poleis* and the group-grants they made to delegations from *poleis* suggest that *proxenia* also played a broader, symbolic role which is crucial for understanding the importance of this institution. In this chapter, therefore, I explore how *proxenia* operated at this level, as a central element within a wider system of inter-*polis* institutions which, together, defined the fabric of the Mediterranean world as an interstate society composed of *poleis*. I show that, in the context of interstate anarchy, *proxenia* was used by cities to assert their identity as legitimate *polis*-actors both internally and before an audience of their peers.

In order to understand what interstate anarchy meant for the Greek cities, I turn to the highly developed theoretical frameworks of modern International Relations Studies which are well equipped for exploring the particular issues of authority and state identity which the use of these institutions raises. This chapter also builds on

work done by John Ma in a seminal article in which he demonstrates the usefulness of the concept of peer-polity interaction developed by archaeologists for understanding the history and institutions of the Greek city.¹ Ma shows convincingly that the Greek *poleis* should be understood as a self-supporting network of competing, equipollent actors who continually constructed their interrelations through a series of concrete and symbolic interactions. I draw on both of these complimentary conceptual frameworks to look in detail at the role of this one inter-*polis* institution, proxeny, to understand its specific force and identify what, precisely, it communicated as a component in a system of interstate institutions. I argue that, although *proxenia* is all but absent from Ma's account, it was in fact one of the most important institutions which *poleis* used to communicate their status and membership of interstate society.

In the first half of this chapter I concentrate on establishing a general model for understanding inter-*polis* relations in the Greek world and the role of *proxenia* within a broader system of interstate institutions in the context of this. I begin by setting out and discussing theories of state-identity and anarchy before arguing that the Greek cities self-consciously constructed the world which they inhabited as a society of *poleis*, advertising their participation in a system of shared institutions and norms to claim status and prestige in relation to their peers. I then explore how *proxenia* related to these other institutions as one of the most important and probably the most frequent means of asserting *polis* identity in relation to external actors. I argue that *proxenia* could be used to both construct relations with other *poleis* and express the separateness of the granting *polis* from them. In the second half of the chapter I nuance this understanding of the role of *proxenia* by exploring in a series of case studies the evidence which we have for its use and avoidance in different

¹ Ma (2003); Renfrew (1986). See also Arafat and Morgan (1994).

marginal and loaded contexts – especially in relation to federations and dependent communities – in which the meaning of *proxenia* appears more clearly because its use was more highly charged.

1 Theoretical Frameworks: State Identity and Anarchy

Modern theories of state identity and interstate anarchy offer a starting point for any attempt to reconstruct the world of the ancient Greek *polis*. Although the applicability of particular concepts and terms may be open to challenge, as involving expectations or assumptions which are inadmissible in relation to the conditions of the ancient world,² International Relations Studies represents the most fully developed engagement with ideas of what it means to function as a state actor in the absence of any sort of single over-arching authority.

1.1 State Identity/*Polis* Identity

The issue of sovereignty has been central to debates concerning the extent to which modern ideas of statehood, and therefore theories of state interaction and identity relying on them, are useful for the ancient world.³ This debate has been bound up with how we understand ancient references to *autonomia* in relation to *poleis* – variously understood as autonomy, sovereignty, and independence – and the extent to which we understand *autonomia* as a necessary condition for *polis* status. One of the most important recent contributions, that of Mogens Herman Hansen, makes a distinction between internal sovereignty (equated with the Greek term *kyrios*) which he argues

² On sovereignty: Hinsley (1986), 27-36; Davies (1994); Ober (1996), 30 and 107-122. On state: Osborne (1985), 6-10.

³ e.g. Giovannini (1994), 269.

was integral to the concept of the *polis*, with external sovereignty (identified with *autonomia*) which he argues should be dissociated from it.⁴

There is a problem, however, with this sort of maximal definition of *autonomia* as ‘an unqualified independence in one’s own affairs.’⁵ It obscures the ambiguity inherent in this term which was central to the way in which it was used to both perform and negotiate power relations.⁶ Absolute independence of course could not have been fundamental to the conception of the *polis*. Such a requirement would exclude, as Hansen rightly points out, *poleis* which were part of federations or close-knit/hegemonic alliances, which clearly were thought of as such. However, Hansen overlooks the fact that there was a degree of dependence (a lack of *autonomia*) which was thought incompatible with *polis* identity, which suggests that *polis* status was somehow bound up with state identity.⁷

Two contrasting theories of state identity from international law, developed to deal with a similar difficulty of identifying modern states, provide a more profitable approach than questions of sovereignty to the issue of the relationship between *polis* status and state identity. The first is constitutive. The theory of recognition maintains that states become persons under international law if, and only if, they are formally recognized as such by other states.⁸ The second is declarative. This definition of statehood, as it is inscribed in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of

⁴ Hansen (1998), 52-83.

⁵ Hansen opposes to this the ‘negative and restricted sense [of *autonomia*] of ‘self-government which is willing to accept subordination to superior powers in some matters’ (quoting Ostwald 1982, 29, and citing Bickerman 1958, 327).

⁶ Goldhill (1996) sums this up brilliantly in a review of an early volume from the Copenhagen Polis Centre: ‘In particular, recent work on ancient and modern political language has made it much harder to avoid the way in which each and every use of ‘*autonomia*’ by a Greek writer is not just describing how things are, but it is also staking out a political position and negotiating a set of power relations... *Autonomia* functions not just as the description of an objective state of affairs but also as a performative in the agonistic system of power plays that makes up Greek political life and its rhetoric.’

⁷ Thebes on Mykale was one such dependent, non-*polis* community – so Mack (forthcoming); see also Fröhlich (2010), 660-7.

⁸ Grant (1999), 2-4

States (1933), asserts that ‘the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states,’ and gives instead as its definition the following:⁹

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.

Neither of these definitions is wholly satisfactory or complete in itself. One troubling consequence of constitutive theory is that it places the power to grant statehood in the hands of other states, resulting in the apparent contradiction that some states (e.g. Northern Cyprus) are recognized as such by some but not all states.¹⁰ Conversely, classic declarative theory overlooks the existence of other sorts of state actor – such as governments-in-exile in the Second World War or modern Palestine – which, although they do not meet its criteria for statehood, are capable of acting as states in certain external contexts because they are treated as such. What is striking in both of these approaches, however, is their common ground. In each account states are defined as entities which are treated as such by other states. State identity thus appears to be externally constructed through their interactions and relations with other states, whether this is simply a necessary potential capacity (as in the case of declarative theory) or the sufficient condition (as under constitutive theory).

The use of these two theories in combination, without attempting to iron out their contradictions – which reflect the inherent contestability of state identity –¹¹ provides a productive approach to the question of the external construction of *polis* identity in the ancient world.¹² In this combined model, statehood is understood as being constituted within a particular state system, with both an underlying,

⁹ Grant (1999), 5-8

¹⁰ On this see Craven (2010), 243-6.

¹¹ Vincent (1987), 42-3.

¹² For a theoretically nuanced approach to the internal status of the *polis*, see Anderson (2009).

characteristic state type, but also the potential for other forms of state actor to be recognised and thus perform as such.¹³ According to this understanding, despite the diversity of state and quasi-state actor in the ancient system, including kings, federations, leagues, *ethne*, associations, and amphictyonies, which have been stressed in recent accounts,¹⁴ the pre-Roman Mediterranean should be understood as a state system constituted primarily by *poleis* (in contrast with nation states which characterize the state system of the modern world). Hansen's *Inventory of Archaic and Classical Greek Poleis* collects more than a thousand *poleis* which gives it a strong claim to being considered the most populous state-system in recorded history, dwarfing the barely two-hundred states comprising the modern global state-system.¹⁵ The vast majority of interstate interactions which occurred were thus carried out between *poleis* and these in fact assumed that they were primarily dealing with other *poleis*.¹⁶ As a result, the highly developed system of interstate language and institutions which was evolved to express relations between state actors was heavily *polis*-orientated.

An important question remains, however – did *polis* identity in this ancient system play a comparable role to state identity in the modern system? Within the ancient world the formal recognition of other states, or rather *poleis*, did not develop as a widespread institution, even a 'duty' of the state, as it has been framed by certain theorists of International Relations.¹⁷ The closest we come to this is the *granting* of

¹³ Wendt (1999), 11-2.; see also Reus-Smit (2012), 70-1: 'A deep politics of identity... undergirds international society, determining its membership.'

¹⁴ Brock and Hodkinson (2000), 21-9; Low (2007), 256; and Vlassopoulos (2007), 55, among others.

¹⁵ From a list of UN member-states: <http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml> (accessed 12 July 2012).

¹⁶ e.g. *RO* 22.1.78 (Second Athenian Naval Confederacy – headed 'these *poleis* were allied to the Athenians,' although the lists includes, in addition to 44 *poleis*, 3 rulers, two federations as well as one 'splinter community...', see Dreher (1995), 174-81; cf. Thuc. 2.9.1 similarly purporting to list allied *poleis* but also including other sorts of state.

¹⁷ Lauterpacht (1947); on recognition in general, see Talmon (1998).

polis status or *autonomia*, which, represented as a gift (usually by a king), instead was about enforcing a hierarchical relation between the two.¹⁸ There are, however, instances in which we can clearly see that being a *polis* mattered because it meant statehood within the interstate system of the ancient world. This emerges most clearly when this status was denied in our inscriptions, when, rather than referring to a community with a *polis* ethnic, the actor in question used a circumlocution to avoid the implication that they accepted it as a *polis*. Thus a Gortynian decree from the second century BC, in imposing terms on a dependent community, refers to the members of this community consistently not as ‘the Kaudians’ (emphasising their existence as a *polis*) but ‘those inhabiting Kaudos.’¹⁹ In a similar way, as Angelos Chaniotis has shown, the Nagideis, a *polis* in southern Asia Minor, chose to refer to a community at Arsinoe as ‘those inhabiting...’ rather than using their ethnic, the Arsinoeis. It was only after they formally granted this community the territory on which it stood that the Nagideis switched to using the Arsinoeis’ *polis* ethnic to refer to them.²⁰

Viewed in the context of the declarative theory of state identity, *polis* ethnics were important in that they encapsulated the claims of the community to be a *polis*/state, which in fact closely correspond to the qualifications of the state as set down in the Montevideo convention. The *polis* ethnic asserted the existence of a political community (which was both (a) a permanent population and (c) a government) which was rooted in and derived its identity from (b), a particular territory. In both of the two examples considered above the deliberate non-use of

¹⁸ e.g. *SEG* 47 1745.

¹⁹ τὰδε ἐπεχώρησαν οἱ Γορτύνιοι τοῖς τὰν Κα[ῦ]δων φοικίονσι, *IC* IV 184 with Chaniotis (1996), 407-20.

²⁰ For a similar shift to the use of an ethnic, this time after the formal grant of *polis* status, see *SEG* 47 1745 (Toriaion) with Svalli-Lestrade (2005), 10-15.

ethnics constituted a studied denial of *polis* identity – of their statehood: in relation to Kaudos this was, perhaps, because this status would have conflicted with the Gortynian desire to control this community clearly expressed by this document; in relation to Arsinoe because, for Nagidos, this would have meant renouncing claims to own its territory (as in fact they did before using this ethnic).²¹ Conversely in the ancient world we also see *polis* ethnics used to assert *polis*/state-identity in contexts where the actor in question did not meet the criteria of declarative theory. The most obvious example of this is ‘*poleis*’ which other *poleis* continued to recognise in particular contexts in relation to international institutions despite the fact that they had lost their territory and been physically destroyed – *poleis* in exile.²²

1.2 Interstate Anarchy

The use of these theories of statehood allows us to shed light on the nature and importance of *polis* identity in the pre-Roman world. In the same way International Relations Studies also possesses theories concerning the structural properties of the sort of world which these *polis* states inhabited, which help us focus on how this shaped their actions, relations, and engagement with interstate institutions. In International Relations terms, before the domination of Rome the interstate system of the ancient Mediterranean was characterized by anarchy. This is defined as the absence of a single, central authority capable of enforcing norms and monopolising the exercise of legitimate force within the system, in contrast with the internal

²¹ Chaniotis (1993), 36-7.

²² Two examples of continued recognition, as *polis* actors, of exiled groups: the ‘*demos* of the Zacynthians in the Nellos,’ who were admitted to the fourth-century Athenian confederacy, *RO* 22 I.131-4 were probably one such exiled group, so Seibert (1979), 117, and Gehrke (1985), 198; citizens of Phthiotic Thebes were also permitted to serve as *hieromnemes* in 204/3 and 202/1, during which period they were probably in exile, Walsh (1993), 41-5. For discussion of other examples of exiled communities acting and being accepted as *poleis*, see Gray (2011), 180-226, esp. 196-211.

organization of the state which made it up.²³ One ancient historian, Arthur Eckstein, has drawn extensively on dominant, neo-realist theories of anarchy in an attempt to illuminate the rise of Rome in this context.²⁴

Neo-realist theories, formulated most influentially by Kenneth Waltz, attribute a quasi-determinative significance to interstate anarchy. States, according to this understanding, are primarily self-regarding. Although states may have different aims and motivations, these differences disappear as important factors, edged out by the aggressive pursuit of survival against potential threats ('self-help') which the inherent structural dynamic of anarchy selects in favour of and inculcates.²⁵ The only important variable allowed for in Waltz's account is the relative distribution of 'capabilities,' by which he means power resources (especially military and economic). In this model, 'capabilities' define the positions that different actors occupied within the system and their motivations, and thus shape the outcomes which result.²⁶ The most important consequence of all this is an international system in which war is normal and cooperation made difficult and rare as a result of pessimism and ignorance. This interpretative framework claims to be based on unchanging human drives and systemic dynamics and thus to be a-temporal (indeed it takes Thucydides' histories as its foundational text). According to Eckstein 'the systems of warlike and aggressive states that existed in the ancient Mediterranean conformed from the beginning to the grimmest and most unforgiving of Realist paradigms.'²⁷

The flaw in this sort of account, however, is that it attaches little importance to the existence of specific interstate institutions or norms at all and, concentrating

²³ Bull (2002), 44.

²⁴ Eckstein (2006); (2008).

²⁵ Waltz (1979), 91-2

²⁶ Waltz (1979), 97-9.

²⁷ Eckstein (2006), 10.

narrowly on power and war, can do little to explain the effort expended on them or the emphasis which they received.²⁸ As Eckstein comments, and others have noted before, declarations of *asylia*, inviolacy, offered little practical protection, even for shrines – so why, to cite one spectacular example, did the city of Magnesia on the Maeander dispatch at least twenty teams of *theoroi* to Greek cities across the Mediterranean to obtain this grant, inscribing the obliging responses of more than two-hundred *poleis* to their request?²⁹ Similarly, proxeny networks clearly show that constant contact and interaction – the desire to network – was one of the most characteristic features of the interstate system of *poleis* in the ancient Mediterranean. Eckstein, in discounting the importance of these institutions, overlooks this evidence of ties to the extent that he describes the ‘limited institutional ability and even limited desire of ancient states to communicate continually with each other.’³⁰

Recent scholarship on international relations, in particular the work of Alexander Wendt, has questioned the assumptions on which this realist paradigm was constructed, offering a much more productive approach to the structural dynamics of interstate anarchy in the ancient world. In place of the determinism of the neo-realist view, Wendt stresses the role of discourse and identity in the construction of state interests and interactions to argue that ‘anarchy is what you make of it.’³¹ In his model, motivations are not simply ahistorical material givens but culturally specific; interests are ideas, often responding to specific material conditions, but constituted within a particular interstate system on the basis of its history of previous

²⁸ Eckstein (2006), 81 – quoting and dismissing as inappropriate for the Hellenistic world Bull (2002), 13; see also on specific institutions Eckstein (2006), 59 n.96 (and sv index ‘*Proxenois*, ... ineffectiveness of’) and 99 (stating ‘it is unlikely that our Hellenistic sources have passed over many successful negotiations that by true mutual compromise defused crises between significant states...’).

²⁹ Eckstein (2006), 80; Rigsby (1996), 13-29.

³⁰ Eckstein (2008), 13.

³¹ Wendt (1992); (1999), 92-138.

interactions.³² ‘Self-help’ exists but as a cultural construct, as one, but only one, of the possible discourses which may shape deliberation and action within a state of anarchy. This account, as a consequence, recognises a much broader range of state motivation: ‘self-esteem,’ the ‘need to feel good about [oneself]’ within a social context, the need for ‘honor, glory, achievement, recognition..., power, group membership.’³³ This framework allows us to take account of the interest which emerged in relation to proxeny networks – the interest *poleis* had in their social position in relation to other *poleis*.

For Classical Greece, Polly Low’s recent monograph provides a useful starting point for understanding what the Greek *poleis* made of anarchy. Drawing heavily on work done within the so called ‘English School’ in International Relations, Low argues forcefully that the dominant discourse in interstate relations had as its basis reciprocity – and, as such, was an extension of the discourse used of social relations between individuals.³⁴ Building on this, I argue that in the vast number of epigraphic monuments which *poleis* inscribed in the Hellenistic period they explicitly construct the world they inhabit as an ‘anarchic society,’ a society of peer-polities, sharing common norms, institutions, and concerns.³⁵ Relations with individuals and communities external to the *polis* are represented as permanent, as based on the concepts of friendship, kinship, mutual regard, and mutual moral ‘goodness,’ as well as the recognition of benefaction and mutual obligation.³⁶

Epigraphic texts, moreover, are explicitly framed as deliberate performances of these qualities in front of an interstate audience. Decrees honouring non-citizens

³² Wendt (1999), 92-138.

³³ After Wendt (1999), 132.

³⁴ Low (2007), esp. 129-74; see also, Mitchell (1997b).

³⁵ Bull (2002), 13; Ma (2003); for this concept of ‘a society of *poleis*,’ see already Giovannini (1994), 284.

³⁶ On the use of these terms, see below, 210-2.

and other states are inscribed ‘in order that others may know that the *demos* knows how to give thanks to its benefactors.’³⁷ In other texts these motivation clauses are dissociated from publication clauses and the decreeing of honours itself is presented as a performance of gratitude before a wide audience – ‘in order that it is clear to all that the *demos* of the Akragantines knows how to give worthy thanks to those disposed to perform benefactions for them,’³⁸ ‘in order that all may know...,’³⁹ or ‘in order that the city may be seen to give worthy thanks.’⁴⁰ In communicating the need to be seen to comply with interstate norms of reciprocity, these recurrent phrases reveal the existence of a broader social context and a concern for interstate opinion – that is the standing of the *polis* within it. Furthermore, at the same time as these honorific acts were conceived of as performances in front of an external, even universal audience, they would also have served as performances before the internal citizen body of the *polis*. Played out in the physical context of the city’s theatre where so many assemblies met, the proposal and granting of decrees of *proxenia* were ostentatious performances of conformity on behalf of the whole community to the norms of inter-*polis* society which they thus collectively recognised.⁴¹ Similarly, at the same time as the publication of decrees on stone and the announcement of honours at major civic festivals could be constructed as performances in front of a wider audience – ‘so that all may know that the *demos* of the Prieneans knows how to give thanks to those who do well by it’ – the primary and most attentive audience would have been the citizens of the city concerned, keen to see their *polis* being seen to do

³⁷ ὅπως [ἀ]ν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ὁ δῆμο[ς] ἐπίστα[τα]ι χά[ριτας ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς εὐεργέ]τ[αις, IG II² 579 1.16-8; XII 5 653 1.56-8.; XII 6 1 150.

³⁸ ὅπως <ς> πᾶσι φανερόν ἦ ὅτι ὁ δᾶμος τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων ἐπίσταται χάριτας ἀπονέμειν καταξίας τοῖς εὐεργετῆιν προαιρουμένοις αὐτόν, IGUR I 2.

³⁹ ὅπως ἂν πάντες εἰδῶσιν, IG XII 9 211.

⁴⁰ ὅπως δὲ καὶ ἂ πόλις καταξίαι φαίναται χάριτες ἀνταποδιδῶσα τοῖς αὐτῶν εὐεργέταις, InO 39.

⁴¹ Kolb (1981), esp. 88-91, but see Hansen and Fischer-Hansen (1994), 48-53; on the theatricality of public life in the Hellenistic period, see Chaniotis (1997).

the gracious and grateful thing.⁴² These are the social dynamics responsible for the ‘normative institutional isomorphism’ which I identified in the first chapter as responsible for the remarkable stability of the institution of *proxenia* over five hundred years – the desire, even need, to be seen within the broader society of *poleis* to conform with its norms.

Realist critics can, of course, point to examples of the flagrant violation of these norms – not least the surprise attack on Apollonia which the Kydonians carried out, entirely obliterating this community despite the treaty of *philia* and *sympoliteia* which bound the two *poleis*.⁴³ Such readings, however, overlook the moral framework in which such acts were set by other communities – Polybius describes this as a *πρᾶγμα δεινὸν καὶ παράσπονδον ὁμολογουμένως* – and thus the importance of these acts themselves in the restatement of inter-*polis* norms.⁴⁴ These non-realist inter-*polis* ties could also have important practical influence on communal actors. In the same way that *proxenoi* were induced to perform services for their client *poleis* for the sake of the prestige and social capital which they accrued from the performance of *proxenia*, *poleis* can be seen engaging in certain institutions (the sending of *theoroi* or *dikasts*) for the same reason – social position in the *polis* system. The honorific decrees which the Samians and Entellans inscribed after their return – in gratitude to the individuals and communities who had preserved them in exile and worked for their refoundation – illustrates how important these sorts of ideas within *polis* society could be for the actual survival of *polis* communities.⁴⁵ The best example, however, is the action of the *polis* of Stymphalos, who took in the citizens of Elateia after the

⁴² τὰς δὲ δω[ρεὰς] τὰς δεδομένας αὐτῶι ἀνα[γγ]εῖλαι τὸν κήρυ[κα τοῖς] Διονυσίοις, ὅπως εἰδῶσι πᾶ[ν]τες ὅτι δύναιται ὁ [δῆμος] ὁ Πριηνέων ἀπο[δ]ιδόναι χάρι[τας] τοῖς εὖ ποιούσιν [αὐτόν], *I.Priene* 3 1.24-7. The *polis/demos* as *eucharistos*: *IG* XI 4 772; XII suppl. 137.

⁴³ *P1b*. 28.14.4-5; so Eckstein (2006), 102.

⁴⁴ *P1b*. 28. 14.4-5

⁴⁵ *IG* XII 6 17-40; *SEG* 30 1117-1123.

destruction of their *polis*, providing them with farmland on favourable terms and a long sequence of other services, both in terms of resources and diplomatic initiatives pursued on the Elateians' behalf. In performing these extraordinarily generous acts of benefaction the citizens of Stymphalos were apparently influenced by a mythological connection which they believed placed them in a kinship relation with the Elateians (the eponymous founder of Stymphalos was understood to be the son of the eponymous founder of Elateia, Elatos).⁴⁶

2 *Proxenia* and other Institutions in the Performance of *Polis* Identity

This understanding of the way in which *poleis* conceived of the interstate world of which they were part – as a society of *poleis* – is vital for interpreting the symbolic importance attached to the use of inter-*polis* institutions in general and *proxenia* in particular. These institutions were woven into a fabric of shared concepts which stressed the communality and homogeneity of this world. However, this system of institutions also constituted a set of scripts, which were endowed with meaning and authority because they remained both consistent and stable over long periods of time (as we saw in the case of *proxenia* in Chapter 1). As I shall argue in this section, *poleis* performed these scripts to assert their status as *poleis*, their relations with other *poleis*, and their position in *polis*-society.

2.1 *Proxenia* within the System of Inter-*Polis* Institutions

The Greek *poleis* possessed a wide range of concepts and institutions, including *proxenia*, for expressing different sorts of relationship with each other. Collectively

⁴⁶ Stymphalos and Elateia (*SEG* 25 445; Paus. 8.4.5-6; 10.34.2) with Habicht (1998b), 67-9. The genealogical relations underlying this kinship claim are attested as early as the mid fourth century (*FD* III 1 3-11 – a statue group – with Paus. 10.9.6).

these constituted a remarkably stable, self-supporting system which needs to be analysed as a whole to understand the place of individual institutional elements within it. Therefore, after briefly considering the ways in which *proxenia* could be used to assert or establish links between communities, I go on to explore how the other central concepts and institutions which made up this system operated in this regard also.

Proxenia was the most commonly granted status that we know of. It was, of course, a status granted primarily to individual non-citizens but, as I have already argued, *proxenoi* were conceived of as links to communities. Its use as an explicitly inter-*polis* institution is apparent in other ways also. Particular grants of *proxenia* to the official representatives of *poleis* or their magistrates were made to express relations with these communities as much as, or more than, with the individual honorands themselves. Thus, when the Delphians granted *proxenia* to Chrysis on the occasion of the great Athenian procession to Delphi, they did so to express relations with and honour the Athenian *polis* as a whole, which she, as the priestess of Athena Polias, represented.⁴⁷ On other occasions *poleis* deviated from the narrow script of *proxenia* even further in performance, granting it in exceptional circumstances to whole communities rather than individuals – signalling their gratitude, but also emphasising the permanence of the relationship and implying continued service and goodwill.⁴⁸ However, while *proxenia* communicated close relations, because this was a grant exclusively made to non-citizens it also stressed the division between granting *polis* and recipient, emphasising, as I will argue, the distinct *polis* identity of the community which made the grant.

⁴⁷ *Syll.*³ 711.

⁴⁸ Mausollos to the Knidians (*RO* 55); the Molossians to the Akragantines (*Syll.*³ 942); the Atergaiioi to the Pergamioi (*SEG* 15 411); the Delphians to all the Dionysiotechnitai in Athens (*FD* III 2 48); the *demos* of Mylasa is named *proxenos* of the Cretan *koinon* (*SEG* 13 489). A decree from Lilaia, conversely, named 300 mercenaries sent by King Attalus *proxenoi* (*FD* III 4 132). See Gschnitzer (1972), col 672-6.

Proxenia, however, did not exist in a conceptual vacuum. As I have argued, one of the reasons for its stability was that it remained closely related to another ancient institution, *xenia*, which was itself a complex function of concepts of friendship (*philia*) and kinship (*syngeneia*).⁴⁹ Both friendship and kinship (*syngeneia*, as well as other, more specific familial terms, including *metropolis* and *oikeiotes*) are also found playing central roles in the vocabulary of terms with which *poleis* constructed their mutual relations, as indeed are concepts of *eunoia*, *arête*, and *euergesia*, already very familiar from our study of honorific language in decrees of *proxenia*. Some of these constituted formal statuses in their own right which cities could mutually grant and recognise (*philos*, *syngenes*, *euergetes*).⁵⁰ Collectively these were also used as the basis for the exchange of other honours and honorific statuses, either as statuses formally recognised by earlier decree or simply as terms used in descriptions justifying the worth of the honorands in question for the honours or practical assistance they were given.

Other honours and honorific statuses, which were explicitly located within this same conceptual framework, were granted more commonly than *proxenia* to whole *poleis* as well as to individuals. These included, of course, citizenship (*politeia*), often granted to entire communities, not infrequently in the form *isopoliteia*, which clearly shows that this was primarily a symbolic gesture and not seriously expected to lead to a mass influx of immigrants.⁵¹ Grants of *politeia* and *isopoliteia* expressed a particularly strong claim to a close relationship between the two communities. Unlike grants of *proxenia* they purposefully elided the distinction between the two as political communities, with implications of a quasi-kinship relation given the popular

⁴⁹ Herman (1987) 16-31 and 132-42.

⁵⁰ *philia*: Mitchell (1997b) and Panessa (1999); *syngeneia*: Curty (1995) and Jones (1999).

⁵¹ On *isopoliteia* see Gawantka (1975), esp. 81-91 and, below, Chapter 5, 275.

understanding of the city as a descent group.⁵² Other grants of rights which citizens by default possessed, some of which I have already explored (e.g. *ateleia*, *enktesis*, *asylia*, and *epigamia*),⁵³ fulfilled a similar symbolic function, asserting the existence of strong inter-*polis* relations to partially overcome the ‘identity-gulf’ which separated the members of these different communities.⁵⁴

One of the most distinctive institutional features of the Greek interstate world was the dispatch and receipt of official delegations of different sorts. In addition to ambassadors sent to make requests and negotiate treaties, representatives were also sent to announce or visit particular festivals or seek recognition of the inviolacy or sacredness of a shrine, to reconcile and judge cases which local legal systems had proved unable to cope with, and arbitrate inter-*polis* disputes. At first sight these may appear qualitatively distinct from the other elements of the institutional system outlined above. However, such delegations represented the most direct possible form of contact between different *poleis*, short, at least, of warfare, and, as such, were of particular importance in constructing relations between them. The dispatch or arrival of a delegation constituted a regular and highly charged context for the deployment of the language and institutions of inter-*polis* relations, and represent the occasions on which we can most clearly see how these were used to create links on different levels with delegations as both individuals and the physical embodiment of the *polis* they represented. Thus, when a panel of dikasts, dispatched at the request of one city, successfully resolved disputes there, this was treated as a service which simultaneously revealed the *eunoia* of both the dikasts and the *polis* which sent them.

⁵² Gawantka (1975), 110-3 – rightly stressing the conceptual relation between *isopoliteia* and *syngeneia*; cf. Loraux (2001), 197-213.

⁵³ Chapter 2, 129-35.

⁵⁴ Chapter 1, 77-9.

Both were praised and honoured – the dikasts with *proxenia*, the *polis* with a crown.⁵⁵ Similarly, when a city dispatched a *theoria* to announce their festival it might honour both the individuals who offered hospitality and support to their delegation in other cities (with *theorodokia* and/or *proxenia*) and the *theoroi* who were sent by these cities to their festival as a result (with *proxenia*).⁵⁶ Delegates sent out by *poleis* to ask other cities to recognise their shrines as holy and inviolate (*hieros kai asylos*) might be themselves honoured as *proxenoi* – praised along with the city which sent them for the goodwill which they showed to the honouring city in their decision to seek its assent and for the nice things they said about the relations between the two cities in making their request.⁵⁷

2.2 Interstate Institutions and the Performance of Polis-Identity

These examples involving the use of delegations in particular bring out the transactive quality of the inter-*polis* system of institutions. Participation in this common institutional framework involved engaging in collaborative performances using shared scripts which permitted *poleis* to both assert claims to *polis* status and have their claims recognized by other *polis*-actors. However, at the same time as asserting a community's membership of *polis* society, this institutional framework could be used competitively, to differentiate a *polis* from its peers, establishing its particular social position within it.

By participating in this system of inter-*polis* institutions, by being seen to do what *poleis* could and were meant to (not least by granting *proxenia*), *poleis* performed their identity as fully-fledged *polis*-states. This was not, of course, the only

⁵⁵ *IG XII suppl.* 137.

⁵⁶ e.g. *Syll.*³ 604.

⁵⁷ e.g. *I.Magnesia* 36.

means by which state identity could be performed in interstate relations. It was not even the most emphatic, which was surely war, especially border wars waged against neighbours that forcefully expressed the territorial identity of *poleis*. However, participation in this institutional system did allow *poleis* to express relations with, and assert and have their identity confirmed in relation to, a much larger number and much wider geographic range of *poleis*. In particular, by making grants of *proxenia*, by sending out delegations to other *poleis*, inviting them to recognize or send representation to particular festivals, or create treaties or exchange honours with them, *poleis* declared they were *polis*-states. Conversely, by receiving and responding appropriately to delegations from other states – which by no means meant necessarily acceding to their requests – they were not only themselves recognized as state actors, they also explicitly recognized the claims and status of the cities which had sent these delegations out, reaffirming the ability of both to do what *poleis* could do, and thus confirming their mutual membership of *polis* society. As such this institutional framework, especially *proxenia*, served both declarative and constitutive functions within *polis* society. This basic external equality of status – ‘equipollence’ to use the language applied by Ma⁵⁸ – was expressed through the more or less equivalent capacity which I identified that *poleis* had to engage in this institutional system, and in particular to make grants of proxeny, as I argued in the previous chapter.

The importance of this function of interstate institutions is highlighted in the case of communities whose ability to participate in this system was specifically limited. In particular, in the provisions which Antigonus Monophthalmos sent to Teos and Lebedos, to regulate their proposed synoicism, the Lebedeians were to be permitted to continue to send a *theoros* to the Panionion – and thus to be seen to

⁵⁸ Ma (2003), 15.

continue to participate as a community in this festival, which was central for the construction of *polis* identity in Ionia.⁵⁹ The restrictions imposed on this performance of identity, however, were stringent and precise. The Lebedean *theoros* was to act alongside and share accommodation with the Teians and, in fact to be formally identified as a Teian.⁶⁰ Together these would have constituted an unambiguous performance of the new status of Lebedos, as an internal subdivision of Teos, no longer able to perform independently as a *polis* in its own right. The attention given to these details, which occur at the start of this document, before more practical matters like housing arrangements, stresses the importance invested in such performances of *polis* identity.

Although both the actors and therefore the status relations were theoretically permanent (especially kinship) – in much the same way that proxeny grants were theoretically hereditary – in practice inter-*polis* relations needed to be regularly renewed. Collectively the use of these institutions continually recreated this society of states, its norms and the individual and general relations which made it up. Like *proxenia*, however, which served a similarly constitutive function within the *polis*, marking out members of civic elites, this broader system of inter-*polis* institutions also had a potentially competitive function within this society of *poleis*. Participation asserted and involved recognition of a community's claims to being a *polis*-state, but at the same time, as a source of prestige, these sorts of relations and connections could also be engaged in by communities to distinguish themselves from each other – to compete. Thus it seems that the remarkable *asylia*-campaign of Magnesia on the Maeander which I mentioned above, and the decision to publish it extensively on

⁵⁹ RC 3 1.2.

⁶⁰ 'ὠϊό]μεθα δεῖν [πράττειν πάντα τὰ κο]ινὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, σκηνοῦν δὲ τοῦτον καὶ πανηγυράζειν μετὰ τῶν παρ' [ὕμῶν ἀπεσταλμέ]νων καὶ καλεῖσθαι Τηϊῶν', RC 3 1.2-4; see also Rutherford (forthcoming), 223-4.

stone, represented a claim to self-importance which must, at least in part, be seen in its local context, as a response to a similar campaign waged by the Milesians (who themselves were perhaps responding to – even as they apparently denied – an earlier, more restricted Magnesian campaign).⁶¹ Similarly, as I have argued, the decision the Karthaians took to inscribe a complete catalogue of their *proxenoi*, which offers a view of a world literally centred on Karthaia, is probably best understood as an expression of communal importance invested in these links collectively in the aftermath of the break-up of the Keian federation.⁶²

3 The Nuances of Institutional Scripts: *Proxenia* in Performance

By using the various different elements which made up this system of interstate institutions, communities performed *polis* status before an external audience of their peer *poleis*. *Proxenia*, as the rates of granting in our inscriptions attest, was the most frequently used element of this system. Proposals for proxeny grants consequently constituted the most regular occasions on which the civic community collectively considered and expressed links with the outside world. In a sense, proxeny stands for the broader institutional system of which it was part, representing the Greek desire to network in its most general form, to construct links with other *poleis*. The wealth of material which survives for *proxenia* allows us to explore in detail the symbolic function and significance of this as a specific institutional script and its capacity for the performance of different sorts of inter-communal relations. In this section in a series of case studies I examine how *proxenia* was used by communal actors in marginal contexts which complicated the assertion of separate *polis*-identity which it

⁶¹ See Thonemann (2008), unpicking the events and dynamics.

⁶² Mack (2011), 332-3.

communicated and consider what it meant when *proxenia* was *not* granted to citizens of a particular *polis* or *poleis*.

Some of the sensitivities which *poleis* exhibited in granting *proxenia* were general, reflecting the (in/)appropriateness of central key elements of this institutional script in particular situations. We see this in the widespread reluctance of *poleis* to grant *proxenia* to the adjudicators who arbitrated their disputes with other *poleis*. In this case the partiality which was the basis for *proxenia* conflicted with the impartiality demanded of the arbitrators, potentially undermining the authority of their verdict.⁶³ In other instances the decision to grant *proxenia* seems to have been governed by consideration of the actions of other nearby actors the *polis* situated itself in the context of – its local region of primary interaction. For example, it is notable in the inscribed responses to the Magnesian *asylia* campaign that, while virtually all of the attested cities of western Greece granted *proxenia* to the Magnesian *theoroi*, very few others did.⁶⁴ This distribution reflects the fact that these performances using institutional symbols were competitive, about asserting social identity in relation to particular circles of peers. The granting of *proxenia* had clearly become a part of the appropriate response for *poleis* in this area to the Magnesian request for recognition of the *asylia* of their shrine.

These dynamics are important for our understanding of the way in which grants of *proxenia* – and participation more broadly in the system of inter-*polis*

⁶³ It is striking that the only cases where *proxenia* was granted were when the arbitration was unsuccessful or, as in the case of the Delphian honours for would-be Rhodian adjudicators in the early second century, when it failed to take place - *FD* III 3 383. The arbitration was between Delphi and Amphissa, and the profuse expressions of gratitude made by the Delphians have lead one modern commentator to wonder how impartial the Rhodian panel would have been had the Amphissans gone ahead (as it was they did not show up), Ager (1996), 314-7 no. 117.

⁶⁴ Rigsby (1996), 179-279 no. 77, 81-2, 84-6, 95-6. It is possible that proxeny grants were also made by island states of the Aegean – both Eretria (no. 98) and Paros (no. 100) certainly granted *proxenia*, but Chalcis (no. 99) did not and it is unclear if the other eighteen cities inscribed beneath the Parian decree in particular as having passed similar decrees made grants of *proxenia* as well.

institutions – functioned. In the case studies which follow, however, I concentrate on exploring more marginal, ambiguous contexts, especially where relations between *poleis* were particularly closely knit or intense, in which the use of *proxenia* as more highly charged and different communities took idiosyncratic decisions about whether and how to grant *proxenia*. I begin by exploring the case of communities bound by mutual grants of *isopoliteia*, examining the extent to which, in different contexts, these symbolic acts, the function of which was to elide the identity gulf, and thus the distinction between two *poleis*, contradicted the assertion of separate *polis* identity which *proxenia* made. I then pursue this thread further by considering how *proxenia* functioned within federations which, with their developed structures and in their use of inter-*polis* institutions (especially *proxenia*), potentially challenged the claims to statehood and *polis*-identity of the *poleis* which made them up. In the next case study I explore how the use of *proxenia* was deliberately limited, or carefully nuanced, in the context of relations between dominant and heavily dependent communities. Finally, I conclude this chapter by considering examples of other sorts of communal actors who drew on this language of legitimacy and status, because it was the dominant discourse of statehood in the ancient Mediterranean world.

3.1 *Isopoliteia* and Federation: *Proxenia* as a Performance of Separateness

Grants of *isopoliteia* expressed a particularly close relationship between *poleis* which seems to have been felt incompatible in certain contexts with granting *proxenia* between them to individual citizens. In particular Denis Knoepfler has argued that the absence of *proxeny* decrees between Eretria and Oropos, despite their extensive epigraphic records, is because these two *poleis* were bound together by a treaty of

isopoliteia.⁶⁵ By way of contrast – to show how marked this absence in fact is – in the more than two hundred Oropian decrees, there are at least nine proxeny decrees for Chalkidians, which was much less strongly connected than Eretria with Oropos, and more than fifty for Athenians.

This phenomenon, of a striking absence of proxeny decrees between closely tied cities which otherwise possess rich epigraphic records, can also be clearly identified within certain federations. In particular, in the numerous proxeny decrees of the Boiotian cities we possess only two grants made for fellow members of the league and these, because of this general rule, are in fact attributed to the period after the dissolution of the Boiotian federation in 171 BC.⁶⁶ Similarly, the probable absence of citizens from other *poleis* on Keos from the Karthaian catalogue of *proxenoi* is likely to be another instance of this phenomenon, given the fact that this monument was constructed in the aftermath of an extended period of Keian federation.⁶⁷ By contrast the proxeny catalogue of Eresos shows how numerous grants to citizens of other *poleis* sharing the same island could be – up to two fifths of the perhaps 175 *proxenoi* recognised by the Eresians in this list were from the other cities on Lesbos.⁶⁸ This contrast suggests that cities faced a choice in how they constructed their relations with cities with which they were particularly close – to make a comparatively large number of grants or avoid granting altogether.

These examples seem to suggest that there was a degree of closeness between cities which was thought incompatible with grants of *proxenia* between them, especially where the cities in question symbolically shared a single citizen identity.

⁶⁵ Knoepfler (2001a), 23 and 251.

⁶⁶ Perdrizet *BCH* (1899), 94 no. IV.1; Migeotte (1984), no. 10. On these texts see Müller (2005), 99-105 with discussion and bibliography. On the issue of proxeny granting and federations in general, see Gschnitzer (1973), col. 667-70, and Gauthier (1985), 145 n.42bis.

⁶⁷ Mack (2011), 332-3.

⁶⁸ Mack (2012), 223-4.

This was because *proxenia*, as it was defined by the honorific language used and the concomitant package of honours and privileges, was a grant of quasi-citizen or, in some cases, explicitly full-citizen status. Decrees of *proxenia* thus emphasized the non-citizen identity of the recipients. They implied an ‘othering’ of the recipient community, or rather made a distinction between two states that appeared incompatible with particularly close relations, especially where the citizen bodies of two states were either co-extensive (i.e. where they had granted citizenship *en masse* to the other community) or shared a federal citizen identity. *Proxenia*, which functioned as a declaration of individual and independent state identity, was inappropriate in this context. It would have been a performance of separateness to an audience with whom they held themselves inextricably connected, and whom they did not consider, in this sense, a wholly separate *polis* community.

However, although this phenomenon is quite clearly evident in these particular instances, some *poleis* do not seem to have observed this practice or the scruples underlying it. Instead they are attested granting *proxenia* to individuals from cities to which they were linked by mutual *isopoliteia* treaty or grant, or even federated. Thus the Karthaian proxeny catalogue lists *proxenoi* in Eretria, to which, as members of the Keian federation, they would have been joined to by treaties of isopolity prior to the construction of this catalogue.⁶⁹ We even have instances in which *poleis* named individuals as *proxenoi* at the same time as they made mass grants of *politeia* or *isopolitia* to their *poleis* of origin.⁷⁰ We can now also adduce the evidence from a recently published cache of eighteen *proxeny* decrees from Kallipolis in Aitolia from the first half of the second century BC.⁷¹ This prominent player within the Aitolian

⁶⁹ *IG* XII 542 1.8; *StV* II² 232 (isopolity with Eretria).

⁷⁰ e.g. Rigsby (1996), no.155, 156, 159, and 160.

⁷¹ *ed. pr.* Rousset (2006) (= *SEG* 56 581-98).

league is revealed to have made numerous grants of *proxenia* to the citizens of other *poleis* belonging to the league. Indeed, all but two of the decrees for which the honorand's ethnic is known (or plausibly restored) honour individuals from other cities which are known to have been members of the Aitolian league.⁷²

Examination of these apparent exceptions reveals the very real differences in the ways in which these relationships were perceived and allows us to nuance our understanding of the symbolic content of *proxenia*. The first thing to note is that grants of *politeia* and *isopoliteia* can serve very different functions depending on the context in which they are made. Between geographically close – especially territorially contiguous – *poleis*, which already had an extremely high rate of interaction, such grants and their exploitation blurred the boundaries between different *poleis*, rendering the use of *proxenia* inappropriate.⁷³ Xenophon describes the processes involved. His speaker warns the Spartans that the result of citizenship barriers being lowered between cities in the Chalkidike, notably concerning the rights to own real property within the territory of another city and of intermarriage, will be that it will soon be impossible to separate these cities again.⁷⁴ Although not territorially contiguous, Eretria and Oropos were separated only by the narrow Euboian gulf and their strong ties apparently date from the foundation of Oropos by Eretria.⁷⁵ Other mass grants of *politeia* and *isopoliteia*, conversely, lacked this sort of context which lent these grants particular importance and consequently eroded, or rather purposefully elided, the distinctions between *polis*-states. In these cases, even where the actual assumption of citizenship was automatic and not regulated, as was

⁷² *SEG* 56 584 (for a Chaironeian) and 585 (for an individual from the Achaian city of Ascheion) are the only certain exceptions.

⁷³ See Gawantka (1975), 81-91, on this distinction between sympolity and isopolity.

⁷⁴ *Xen. Hell.* 5.2.19.

⁷⁵ On which, see Knoepfler (2001a), 251-2 n.976.

often the case, in ways which maintained the distinction between the two *poleis*, grants of *isopoliteia* or *politeia* asserted a closeness which was not matched by the frequency of contact or strength of connections between them. This was a strong gesture in a symbolic language, but it did not necessarily reflect or therefore always signal, a degree of mutual identification which would jar with the granting of *proxenia*.⁷⁶

Our evidence for proxeny granting within the Aitolian league is, on the face of it, more surprising and problematic. The Aitolian league had a concept of shared citizenship as well as the institutional apparatus, a common assembly in addition to magistracies, to grant this Aitolian citizenship (alongside *proxenia*) to outsiders. Nonetheless, it was appropriate for the citizens of Kallipolis, one of the cities which had always been at the heart of the league, to make grants of *proxeny* to the citizens of fellow league members (including one Trichonian, from one of the other core cities).⁷⁷ The reasons for this may partially relate to the geographic size and structure of the Aitolian league, not to mention its significant expansion – in contrast with the relative stability and homogeneity of the Boiotian and Keian federations.⁷⁸ It is nonetheless striking that, as in this case, federal structures did not necessarily monopolise inter-*polis* relations within a league and that, independent of these, it was possible for at least some *poleis* to express relations with other individuals and cities belonging to it in the same way that *poleis* continued to with other cities which lay outside their league.

This potential inconsistency in practice highlights the tension inherent in an interstate system in which both federal leagues, and the *poleis* which made them up,

⁷⁶ Gawantka (1975), 92-164.

⁷⁷ *ed. pr.* Rousset (2006), 381-434 (*SEG* 56 581-98).

⁷⁸ The maps provided by Scholten (2000), maps 3, 4, and 8, illustrate this remarkable expansion.

were able to assert claims to being equivalent state actors by using these international institutions. This use could, of course, be complementary, with honorific initiatives and grants made at the *polis* level reinforced at the level of the federation. Thus the Keian league responded to a specifically Naupaktian grant of citizenship by granting *politeia* to the entire league of the Aitolians, which then reciprocated by granting the Keians Aitolian *asylia*.⁷⁹ Similarly, if it is permissible to compare the geographical distribution of the third-century Aitolian grants of *proxenia* with those surviving from Kallipolis in the early second century, it appears that the two are largely operating in different spheres. The Kallipolitan decrees operated at a very local level (largely Aitolian-internal) in comparison with the Aitolian decrees which, made to honorands from Sicily and Italy to the Black Sea and Syria, as well as individuals in neighbouring regions, represent a performance of identity in front of a wider audience. This pattern, in its general outlines, may well also be partially replicated for the Boiotian federation, with local links more likely to dominate the proxeny networks of the Boiotian *poleis*.⁸⁰

Nonetheless, although participation in interstate institutions at these different levels, of *polis* and federation, could be complementary, it is important to recognize that the assertions of cities within leagues and league structures over them could clash. Hansen sought to iron out this conceptual contradiction between *polis* status and federal membership by minimizing the importance of external sovereignty in his definition of the *polis*.⁸¹ I think it is better, however, to recognise the reality of this

⁷⁹ *StV* III 508; see also *IG* V 2 367 in which a federal proxeny grant reinforces a *polis*' awards for foreign judges.

⁸⁰ The contrast between the two levels is not as marked as some individual *polis* actors, notably Oropos and Tanagra, possessed links also with more distant *poleis*. How far this picture is distorted by selective inscription, however, which might have favoured the monumentalization of more distant ties, is difficult to say.

⁸¹ Hansen (1998), 46-7.

paradox – that the theoretical equality of status between actors within anarchical interstate society could sit uneasily with the participation of *poleis* in larger, hierarchical federal structures which themselves asserted corporate membership of interstate society. This paradox finds its expression in the disputes over membership and authority which took place between cities and federal structures in ancient leagues, as well as the rhetoric of *autonomia* denied, invoked both by external powers seeking to break up federations but also by dissatisfied members of them.⁸² The fundamental issue which is played out is this contradiction between the identity of *polis* communities as states and as constituent, subordinate parts of states. *Poleis* within leagues, in participating within this system of international relations at two distinct but potentially overlapping levels, sought to paper over this contradiction, but nonetheless reveal the potential for tension inherent in these relationships.

3.2 Polis-Performance, Proxenia, and Dependency

Evidence for the restricted granting of *proxenia* between closely linked cities and within leagues illuminates the connection between the use of this and other interstate institutions and the performance of *polis*-state identity. However, this function of *proxenia* in particular, and participation in the system of inter-*polis* institutions in general, emerges more clearly in contexts where close relations between political communities were more heavily asymmetric and characterized by domination and dependence. In the most extreme cases, by arrogating to themselves the exclusive right to engage in honorific interactions with external states and especially by explicitly restricting their dependencies from these performances of statehood,

⁸² In relation to the Boiotian league, see Xen. *Hell.* 3.18; 4.8.15; 5.1.32; on attempts to secede from the Achaian federation in the second century BC, Plb. 23.9.12.

dominant communities asserted their own status as *polis* and also their control of these communities as sub-*polis* entities. Such restrictions were not the only way in which these institutions were used to signal relations of dependence, however. In other cases, where these institutions were less strongly monopolised, dependent communities could themselves use and adapt honorific grants of *proxenia* in relation to individual honorands from the dominant *polis* to acknowledge the claims of that community at the same time as asserting their own *polis* status.

Unfortunately, cases where we can see evidence for the restriction of dependent communities from participating in this system of international institutions are difficult to identify – not least because such restrictions would mostly mean a complete absence of epigraphic evidence, and epigraphic silence is notoriously difficult to interrogate. In certain specific cases absence, in the context of otherwise substantial epigraphic records, does appear suggestive. In particular, the correlation of the decrees of Oropos granting *proxenia* with its fourth-century period of independence may be significant. Similarly the disappearance of inscribed decrees of *proxenia* from Delos after their loss of independence to Athens in 167 BC, in contrast with its earlier abundance, appears important. The Oropian material is difficult to use, however, because the dating of this cluster of decrees (*IOrop* 1-3) is in part based on assumptions of what it meant to be part of, and independent from, the Boiotian league at this time, and this places us in danger of circular reasoning, whatever the other merits of the case. Knoepfler, indeed, takes the absence of evidence for the inscription of proxeny decrees by other members of the Boiotian league at this time as an indication that league membership – i.e. Theban hegemony – precluded the granting

by individual *poleis* of *proxenia*.⁸³ This argument would reinforce the general suggestion of the importance of proxeny as an expression of communal identity – as a claim to status which could conflict with the control of the dominant power. The paucity of the epigraphic record in general for *proxenia* before the end of the fourth century, however, makes it difficult to set any store by the absence of material from the Boiotian *poleis* in this period as an indicator that they were unable to grant proxeny.⁸⁴ The relatively sudden cessation of proxeny inscription at Delos, by contrast, after a fertile epigraphic period, does seem more significant. However, in the context of a change of political population implied by the imposition of an Athenian cleruchy, this seems to be a different sort of phenomenon.⁸⁵

In one set of material absence can be taken as evidence of these sorts of restrictions – in the decrees of demes, political communities which were fully integrated parts of larger *poleis*, from which they derived their identity in external contexts (e.g. as Rhodians or Athenians). In all our evidence demes never grant *proxenia* or *politeia* and only rarely honour non-members of the community at all.⁸⁶ On the few occasions on which they do honour outsiders (including fellow citizens belonging to other demes) they do so in relation to the activities of these individuals within the deme – as the inhabitants of the Athenian deme of Eleusis do, in honouring two resident Thebans, or similarly Brykos, one of the demes of Rhodes in the Hellenistic period, in honouring a Samian doctor for his services performed amongst

⁸³ Knoepfler (2001a), 367-89, esp. 373

⁸⁴ The attestation of the personal name Θεσπιεύς in Athens during the fifth century (e.g. *IG I³ 32*) perhaps suggests that other Boiotian *poleis* were in the habit of granting *proxenia* earlier at least.

⁸⁵ A parallel instance would be provided by *IG XII 8 2*, a proxeny decree of Myrina on Lemnos, dated to the period of independence of this community from Athens between 404-387 BC. The reasoning here is dangerously circular, however, as Graham (1964), 186, saw, and, in fact, the grant of *ateleia* in this text qualified by ἀπάντων ὧν Μυρινναῖοι κύριοί εἰσι, l.10-1, clearly shows that there was some sort of higher power involved – probably the fifth-century Athenians (and their post 413 harbour tax?), see Salomon (1997), 63-6.

⁸⁶ Rhodes (1995), 102-9; (1997), 500.

them.⁸⁷ This makes these the most inward looking, and thus least outwardly assertive or performative, of externally orientated decrees. In the case of the decree of Brykos, moreover, the subordinate authority of this community, a former *polis* on the island of Karpathos, now part of the Rhodian *polis*, is strongly stressed by the referral of the award of the gold crown, and the question of inscription in the shared sanctuary, to the ‘whole demos.’⁸⁸ Although demes were not typical of the sorts of community which the term ‘dependent communities’ is usually used to refer to, their rights and activities were an important model for *poleis* in constructing their relations with dominated communities. Demes thus represent one extreme of this discourse of state identity, the tension, in relations between states, between separation and integration, which we have already considered in the context of the relation of *poleis* within federations.

The inability of demes to make grants of *proxenia* illustrates the identification of the use of this institution with *polis*-identity. However, the material which best illustrates the desire of dominant communities to restrict the participation of their dependencies in this system of inter-*polis* institutions does not relate directly to *proxenia*. But it does allow us to see how the same interest which the dominant *polis* had in restricting unmediated interactions with other *poleis* worked in the case of related institutional elements. In particular, we are fortunate in possessing inscriptions from Megara and Mantinea which provide us with rare glimpses of dominant communities structuring their relationships with heavily dependent communities.

⁸⁷ *IG* II² 1186; XII 1 1032.

⁸⁸ ὁ δὲ αἰρεθεὶς αἰ[τ]η[σ]άσθω ἐν τῷ σύμπαντ[ι] δ[ί]α μωὶ τὰν δόσιν τοῦ στεφάνου καὶ ὥστε ἀναθέμειν εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν, *IG* XII 1 1032 l.32-4. Gabrielsen (1994) is surely right that Rhodian demes and associations were competent to pass internal enactments as long as they contravened no *polis* law without specific ratification from the *polis* authorities (*contra* Swoboda 1890, 21) – but, by concentrating on the necessity of the *polis* authorising inscription in centrally administered shrines, Gabrielsen downplays central control over the granting of crowns, which is even better attested in these texts.

A decree from Megara, *IG VII 1*, illustrates directly these sorts of restrictions on the institutional capacity of dependent non-*poleis* to use inter-*polis* institutions to interact directly with representatives from external communities – in this case in relation to *politeia*, which represents a close model for *proxenia*. This decree, attributed to 306 BC, records a request made by the Aigosthenitans that the Megarians honour Zoilus, son of Kelainos, a Boiotian officer of Demetrius Poliorcetes placed in charge of the garrison at Aigosthena, for his own good conduct and for keeping his troops under control.⁸⁹ The Megarians duly accede the request, naming him ‘a citizen of the *polis* of the Megarians,’ granting him ‘*proedria* in all the contests which the *polis* puts on’ and ordering that the decree be inscribed, ‘so that all may know that the *demos* of the Megarians honours those who do good in speech or act on behalf of the *polis* or on behalf of the *komai*’.⁹⁰

In the subsequent history of this community, the Aigosthenitans are attested as a *polis* both in the Boiotian and Achaian leagues granting *proxenia* to the citizens of other *poleis* and establishing relations directly with them.⁹¹ Indeed, in one of the earliest of these decrees the Aigosthenitans use the Boiotian dialect which seems calculated, as Peter Liddel has recently suggested, to stress Aigosthena’s new identity as a *polis*, separate from Megara.⁹² By contrast, at the date of the Megarian decree for Zoilus, although constituting, as τοὶ Αἰγοστενῖται[ι], a political community capable of making the decision to initiate this request – presumably by passing a decree themselves – the Aigosthenitans were aware that they could not or, perhaps, had better not attempt to establish a permanent honorific relationship with Zoilus themselves. In

⁸⁹ On the identity of this individual see Marasco (1983), 221-2.

⁹⁰ ὅπως εἰδῶντι πάντες ὅτι ὁ δᾶμος[ὁ Μ]εγαρέων τιμῆ τοὺς ἀγαθόν τι πράσσοντας ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ ὑπὲρ τᾶς πόλιος ἢ ὑπὲρ τᾶν κομῶν, l. 15-7.

⁹¹ *IG VII* 207, 208, 213, 219, 223; *SEG* 49 500. Four other, newly discovered decrees from Aigosthena will be published by Yannis Kalliontzis.

⁹² *IG VII* 207 with Liddel (2009), 427.

this they co-operated with the Megarian construction of Aigosthenitan communal identity, as simply one of the Megarian *komai*, making clear the association between the inability to grant *politeia* (and also, it is probably safe to assume, *proxenia*), and this sub-*polis* status. In fact, I would argue, this is something which the Megarians are particularly keen to emphasize in inscribing this decree, making a great show of their own ability, as a (repeatedly) self-proclaimed *polis*, to perform as an interstate actor on behalf of their territorial possession, which could not.⁹³ It is also important to note, in relation to this subordinate status, that the interaction which led to the Aigosthenitan request for this grant, like those which prompted the deme decrees I discussed above, took place within Aigosthena – which similarly illustrates the limited extent to which this community was able to be active within interstate society at this point in time.

If Louis Robert is right in his reconstruction of a later document found at Pagai, Megara retained these sensitivities.⁹⁴ As restored this document is a decree of the Megarians, issuing honours, in this case *proxenia*, on behalf of one of its other *komai*, Pagai, rewarding advocates who came from Sicyon, a fellow member of the Achaian league to which the Megarians belonged, and served as advocates on behalf of Pagai in a territorial dispute. What is striking here, however, is that the Pagaians, despite the fact that they are unable to act as a *polis* in honouring their benefactors, are nonetheless able to act as contestants in this dispute – a curious mixture of recognition

⁹³ The Megarians refer to themselves as a *polis* on no fewer than four occasions in this brief text – *IG* VII 1 1.9, 12, 14 – making the contrast explicit at the last of these, ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλιος ἢ ὑπὲρ τῶν κομῶν, 1.17. This desire to stress the subordinate position of the Aigosthenitans may owe something to the fact that Aigosthena looked very like a *polis* at this period (so [Skylax] 39.2) and had a remarkably impressive defensive wall which Megara is unlikely to have been responsible for building, whether it should be attributed to Athens (Ober 1983, 391-2) or the Boiotian league (Cooper 2009, 161-3 and 181-3 with bibliography on this question). See Flensted-Jensen and Hansen (2007), 210, plausibly emending this corrupt passage of Pseudo-Skylax so that Aigosthena is the only *polis* listed within the section followed by ‘Pagai (a fort) and Geraneia (a mountain)’ – overlooked by Graham (2011), 118.

⁹⁴ *SEG* 13 327. For an alternative interpretation, arguing that this text concerned instead a dispute between Kassope and Thyreion, see Wacker (1996).

of Pagai as a political community (with a territory) and a determination to exert control over it. If this reconstruction is correct it may be that what is going on here relates to the identity of the other protagonist in this dispute, Aigosthena. Perhaps the Megarians' treatment of this as a territorial dispute not between itself and another *polis* but as between two *komai* represents a studied contempt of the new *polis* status of Aigosthena, formerly a Megarian dependency.

The famous treaty between Mantinea and Helisson is even more open in its interest in *polis* (and non-*polis*) status – and connects the ability to participate in this system of interstate institutions with *polis* status in an even more explicit way.

[θεός]ς· τύχα [ἀγα]θά.
 [σύ]νθεσις Μα[ντ]ινεῦσ[ι] καὶ Ἐλισφασίοις [ι]ν ἅμα[τα]
 [πά]ντα. ἔδοξε τοῖς Μαντινεῦσιν καὶ τοῖς Ἐλισφασίοι[ς]· τὸς [Ἐ]λ[ι]-
 [σ]φάσιος Μαντινέας ἦναι ᾤσος καὶ ὕμοιος, κ[ο]ινάζοντα[ς πάν]-
 των ὅσων καὶ οἱ Μαντινῆς, φέρ[ο]ντας τὰν χώραν καὶ τὰν π[ό]λιν
 ἰμ Μαντιν[έ]αν ἰν τὸς νομὸς τὸς Μαντινέων, μινόνσας τᾶς [πό]-
 λιος τῶν Ἐλισφασίων ὅσπερ ἔχε[ι] ἰν πάντα χρόνον, κώμα[ν] ἔα-
 σαν τὸς Ἐλισφάσιος τῶν Μαντινέων — θεαρὸν ἦναι ἐξ Ἐλισφά[ν]-
 τι κατὰπερ ἐς ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλινσι — τὰς θυσίας θύεσθαι τὰς ἰν Ἐ-
 λισόντι καὶ τὰς θεαρίας δέκεσθαι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.

Agreement between the Mantineans and Heliswasians, all things in good faith. It seemed good to the Mantineans and the Heliswasians: The Heliswasians are to be Mantineans, equal and the same, sharing in all things even as the Mantineans, bringing their territory and *polis* to Mantinea to the laws of the Mantineans, and, while the *polis* of the Heliswasians is to remain as it is for all time, they are to be a *kome* of the Mantineans. There shall be a *theoros* from Helisson as from the other *poleis*; they are to make sacrifices in Helisson and receive *theoria* as before/as is their ancestral custom.⁹⁵

Collectively this ‘agreement’ amounted to a sort of ‘gobbling up’ sympolity – the Heliswasians were to be wholly absorbed as a political community by the Mantineans,

⁹⁵ SEG 37 340 1.1-10 (= RO 14).

losing the use of their own laws even amongst themselves.⁹⁶ The question which this document raises, therefore, is – in what sense the Heliswasians were to remain a *polis* (‘for all time,’ as the agreement emphatically states) despite becoming a *kome*, an internal civic subdivision of the *polis* of Mantinea, both in theory and, by becoming Mantineans, in fact? For Mogens Herman Hansen this is evidence that there was no contradiction in *poleis* being dependent – in this most literal case lacking *autonomia* and being a *kome*.⁹⁷ Peter Rhodes, by contrast, argues that the word *polis* is being used in different, distinct senses here:

I take this to mean that the *polis* = political unit of Helisson is to be absorbed into the *polis* = political unit of Mantinea, and to become a *kome* of Mantinea, but the *polis* = urban centre of Helisson is to remain as it was, i.e. that the word *polis* denotes a political unit at its first occurrence but not at its second.⁹⁸

However, given how interested this inscription is in ideas of what it means to be a *polis*, it is difficult to accept that these sorts of distinctions were really intended, especially given the pains which are taken in the syntax of this inscription to juxtapose and contrast *polis* and *kome* with the insertion of the genitive absolute phrase: μινόνσας τᾶς [πό]-λιος τῶν Ἑλισφασίων ὥσπερ ἔχε[ι] ἐν πάντα χρόνον.

In fact, this text reads as a carefully negotiated surrender on the part of the Heliswasians. It represents a strictly defined compromise – a fudge – between the Heliswasians’ desire to retain the status of and continue, in some contexts, to assert their identity as, a *polis*, and the Mantineans’ very definite wish that they be absorbed and become a *kome* of Matinea.⁹⁹ In the clauses which immediately follow the

⁹⁶ *contra* Hansen (1995a), 39 – the clear implication of the clause which sets out that contracts agreed amongst the Heliswasians before the sympolity are to continue ‘to be valid according to the laws which they had when they entered Mantinea’ (καὶ τὸς νόμος τὸς αὐτοὶ ἤχον ὅτε ἔβλωσκον ἐμ Μαντινέαν) is that in other cases the Heliswasians were to be obliged to use Mantinean laws even between each other.

⁹⁷ Hansen (1995a), 39.

⁹⁸ Rhodes (1995), 96-7.

⁹⁹ cf. Frölich (2010), 663-4.

declaration that the *polis* of the Heliswasians will remain, the sense in which they will be allowed to retain *polis* identity is set out: they will be permitted to contribute a *theoros* ‘as the other poleis do’ – a phrase which explicitly marks the connection between this action and the retention of *polis* status – and, secondly, to make sacrifices and receive *theoriai* as they formerly did. The function of the second of these rights is clear enough. The Heliswasians are to continue to perform their festivals and, as part of this, to receive formal delegations from other *poleis* to witness and participate in them. In other words, they are to be permitted to continue to perform as a *polis* in this specific institutional inter-*polis* context.

At first sight it seems probable that the *theoros* which the Heliswasians are permitted to contribute should be understood similarly, as a delegate sent out to represent the *polis* of Helisson at other *poleis*’ festivals – to perform their *polis* identity in front of an audience of their peers. The explanation which has been preferred, given the existence of a specific board of officials at Mantinea and other *poleis* called *theoroi*, attested in Thucydides administering an oath, is that the Heliswasians were to be represented in this magistracy.¹⁰⁰ However, juxtaposed as they are with a reference to *theoria*, it seems perverse to dissociate the *theoroi* here completely from a theoric function and thus it is probably better to see this as a perhaps annual board which in some sense replaced the *ad hoc* appointment of *theoroi* at other states (a reasonable course of action given how regularly, and predictably, *theoroi* would have been required), which as a result of this role, as external representatives of the *polis*, accumulated additional administrative functions and importance. If this explanation is accepted, this clause constituted a limited

¹⁰⁰ Thuc. 5.47; see Nielsen (2002), 359-61, for this interpretation, especially at n. 251 collecting the Arkadian evidence for this magistracy.

concession – allowing the Heliswasians to continue to perform as a *polis*, in a sense, at external festivals, but in the context of a wider Mantinean board of *theoroi* – which would be closely paralleled by the continued but limited participation envisaged for the Lebedeians after their proposed synoicism with Teos.¹⁰¹

As the case of Helisson reveals, although for dominant *poleis* limiting the ability of their dependent communities to interact with other *poleis* through inter-*polis* institutions was an abiding concern, the restrictions which they placed on the use of these institutions were not necessarily absolute. In other examples it becomes apparent that certain dependent communities felt able to make honorific grants to individuals, especially officials, from the *poleis* which dominated them, using them to express a more complex, nuanced relationship between the two. From fourth-century Delos, under the Athenians, and late third-century Myous, which belonged to Miletus, come examples of honorific decrees which both assert the ability of the community, as a *polis*, to grant *proxenia* at the same time as they recognize the particular claims of the dominant community.

Thus, after their sympolity with the Milesians, the Myousians are found collectively honouring one Apollodorus, son of Metrophanes, on the occasion of his dedication of four silver *phialai* to Apollo Termintheus.¹⁰² The honorand is probably the Milesian *stephanephoros* of the year 212/1,¹⁰³ making an official dedication in his year of office.¹⁰⁴ Omitting his ethnic, which suggests that he was a citizen of the community, but honouring him in terms which make it clear that he is not a member

¹⁰¹ There is a final sting in the tail. Given the importance in this document of the precise terms used to refer to Helisson, it cannot be an accident that, in the clauses detailing the sense in which Heliswasians were to be permitted to assert *polis* identity, Helisson is referenced not with an ethnic but with a toponym – θεαρὸν ἦναι ἐξ Ἑλισσό[ν]τι... τὰς θυσίας θύεσθαι τὰς ἐν Ἑλισόντι... (1.8-10) – a reference more appropriate for a *kome* than a *polis*.

¹⁰² *SEG* 36 1047, dated by the original editor to the late third century BC on the basis of lettering.

¹⁰³ *Milet* I 3 124.27, but see Wörrle (1988) for the chronology.

¹⁰⁴ So J. and L. Robert, *BE* (1966), n.375.

of the Myousian community (and probably built up to a grant of *proxenia*),¹⁰⁵ the Myousians both acknowledge their closer relationship with Miletus at the same time as they stress their own, distinct *polis* status. We do not, unfortunately, know in this case whether the Myousians, in this position of dependence, felt able to grant honorific statuses to individuals from other *poleis*. It is, however, probably significant that this was a grant that they chose to inscribe at Myous which thus continued to perform their status specifically in relation to the dominant Milesians before an audience of Myousians.¹⁰⁶

Two Delian decrees for Athenians work in a similar way, expressing particularly close ties with the city of Athens and the citizens who made it up by using demotics – an almost exclusively internal means of designation – to refer to the Athenians they honour, in one case in addition to the individual’s ethnic (*ID 75*) in another to the exclusion of it (*ID 74*). This use of an explicitly internal designation blurs the boundaries between these two communities in an even more explicit way, representing Delos as, in a sense, part of Athens, at the same time as these grants of *proxenia* (like others made to non-Athenians, e.g. *ID 76*, for an individual from Ios) stress the *polis* status of this community.¹⁰⁷ It is also striking that at least one of these Athenians is praised in terms, *andragathia* and *dikaiosune* (the virtues of an internal public official), which make it clear that he was acting with authority as an Athenian

¹⁰⁵ see Mackil (2004), 494-7; ‘[ἐπειδὴ] Ἀπολλόδοωρος Μητροφάνου προαιρ[ο]ύμενος... τῷ δῆ[μ]ῳ ἔν τε τοῖς πρότερον χρόνοις εὖνου[ν] ἑαυτὸν διε[τέλ]ει παρεχόμενος κοινῇ τε καὶ ἰδίαι τοῖς ἀπαντῶσιν αὐτῷ Μυησίων’ (*SEG 36 1047* l.1-4) is typical of formulae honouring outsiders.

¹⁰⁶ For the *ed.pr.*, see Herrmann (1965). A *pierre errante*, the stone itself was found at Miletus, the block on which it was inscribed transported from Myous. On the other fragments of the temple of Apollo Terminus, see Koenigs (1981).

¹⁰⁷ For a nuanced account of the relations between Delos and Athens (which treated the former administratively as an Athenian shrine), see Chankowski (2008), but note that she probably underrates the significance of the two anti-Athenian episodes attested violence against the Athenian amphictyons in 377 (*ID 98* l.24-30) and a Delian appeal for freedom against Athenian control in 345/4 or 343/2 (Plut. *X Or.* 840e, 850a).

magistrate within Delos.¹⁰⁸ This tendency to honour the officials sent by the dominant polis as a way of constructing relations is probably also in evidence in the Myousian example, and it is tempting to compare it with the proxeny decrees made on a number of occasions by the Delphians to the *epimeletai* sent to them by the Aitolians.¹⁰⁹ By constructing these relations with, and asserting their own status, with regards to, these official delegates, these communities were simultaneously negotiating more broadly their status in relation to the communities these individuals stood for and represented.¹¹⁰

That *proxenia* could be used as a way of performing relations of dependency may appear to jar with the declarative function which I earlier explored – of grants of *proxenia* as staking claims for the identity of a community as a polis, a state actor – and which seem to be supported by restrictions limiting the actions of certain dependent communities. However, it was because *proxenia* had these associations of statehood and state-identity, that it could be used in this fashion, to negotiate the complexities of real relations between political communities.

In this context it is worth considering one other evidentiary lacuna which has been thought highly significant by a modern scholar in relation to dependency. This is the complete absence of honorific decrees for Athenians from poleis of the Athenian empire in the fifth century BC, in contrast with the more than ninety Athenian grants (attested in both literature and epigraphy) collected by Walbank.¹¹¹ Polly Low sees this absence not as the result of these communities' loss of liberty, but rather of an Athenian desire for a one-way flow of honours (and thus obligations), honours which

¹⁰⁸ *ID* 75; *ID* 79, again referring to these, the virtues of an *internal* public official, should certainly be taken as another Athenian with this ethnic, or an Athenian demotic, restored in line 3.

¹⁰⁹ *FD* III 1 451; 4 175; *Syll.*³ 534; 534B.

¹¹⁰ For a similar use of civic honours in relation to royal officers, 'to proclaim distance,' see Ma (2002), 207.

¹¹¹ Walbank (1978).

the Athenians give rather than receive.¹¹² The evidence, however, cannot support this sort of argument. Our sample of inscribed honorific decrees granting *proxenia* from the mid to late fifth century from outside Athens is extremely exiguous – with only Iasos, Lindos (and, after synoicism, Rhodes), Eretria, and perhaps Myrina, of the hundreds of *poleis* listed on the tribute lists positively attested inscribing grants of *proxenia* during the second half of the fifth century (and none of these are represented by more than a couple of inscribed grants).¹¹³ It is hardly surprising if a sample this small fails to register any Athenians among the known honorands. This is simply a reflection of the fact that the inscription of proxeny decrees had not really become common outside of Athens before the late fifth century, not that grants of *proxenia*, or grants of *proxenia* to Athenians, were rare under the fifth-century empire. A passage in the Old Oligarch in fact presupposes that Athenians were frequently honoured – both representatives (the examples given are generals, trierarchs, and ambassadors) sent out by the Athenians, and others for their services in the contexts of lawsuits at Athens.¹¹⁴ Although we have little positive evidence, the way in which all of our literary sources treat references to *proxenia* suggests that, as an institution, it was probably already as universal and nearly as frequently used, in the early fifth century as it is later positively attested as being.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Low (2007), 242-8.

¹¹³ *SEG* 36 982 (Iasos), placed by their original editors in the first half of the fifth century – certainly too early – *contra* Frei and Marek (1997), 56 n.134 who downdate this text to the beginning of the fourth – possible, but perhaps a little late; *I.Lindos* 15 (Lindos), 16 (Rhodes); *IG* XII suppl. 549A and XII 9 187A (Eretria). On XII 8 2 (Myrina), see above, n. 85. See Lambert (2011), 203-4, similarly pointing out the precocity of Athenian epigraphic practice (and relating it specifically to the architectural development of the Acropolis in this period).

¹¹⁴ [Xen.] 1.18.

¹¹⁵ The frequent references to *proxenia* in Pindar, especially *Isth.* 4.7-9, are particularly suggestive, see Currie (2005), 340-3. Wallace (1970) collects and discusses the early material which gives the impression that *proxenia* was very common and widespread before it became well attested epigraphically.

3.3 *Proxenia* and *Polis* Recognition

So far I have emphasised the declarative function which *proxenia* played, as a way of performing (and, with a constant stream of grants, continuing to perform) the status of the granting community as a *polis* with links to other *poleis* – and I think this is particularly important. It is also worth briefly considering what a decree of *proxenia* signalled on the part of the granting *polis* about the status of the community referenced with the ethnic of the honorand. *Proxenoï* were conceived of primarily as links to other *poleis*. To what extent, therefore, did grants of *proxenia* to individuals perform a constitutive function, recognising the honorand's community as a *polis*?

Apart from cases where *proxenia* was granted to official representatives sent by another *polis* (where, as a reciprocating symbol in this inter-*polis* transaction, recognition is clearly implied), this sort of function is often quite hard to pin down. This is not least because, as these grants established relations with individuals in the first instance, it is usually difficult to be sure how far a particular decree expressed relations with the *polis* of his city ethnic as well. The city ethnic was, after all, part of the identity of the individual *proxenos* who was thus likely to have a greater investment in this precise designation than the honouring *polis*, although examples where the same individual is designated in different ways in different communities – as a Ioulietan in one *polis* (his *polis* ethnic), a Keian in another (his island ethnic) – suggest that it is more complex than this would imply.¹¹⁶ Nonetheless, when we see no fewer than three of the Spartan perioikic communities attested in the fourth-century Karthaiian catalogue of *proxenoï*, this probably does suggest that the Karthaiians did not view these communities as being sufficiently dissimilar from the

¹¹⁶ *IG* XI 4 693 contrast XII 5 820. The fact that this individual was a doctor, and thus the services for which he was honoured took place at the *polis* in question, helps to explain why the distinction between the *polis* and island ethnic was less important.

other *poleis* to which they were connected by their proxeny network to make the use of *proxenia* inappropriate in these cases as well.¹¹⁷ At the same time, this context strongly suggests that these grants were not marked assertions that these communities were *poleis*, challenging the hegemonic claims of post-leuctran Sparta. On this basis I would suggest that what is unusual about a comparable fifth-century proxeny grant made by Argos for another *perioikos*, Gnosstas of Oinous, was survival of the bronze plaque on which it was inscribed.¹¹⁸ The grant is more likely to reflect the sort of regular interactions which otherwise characterized the relations between nearby communities than an attempt to interfere with the *perioikoi* more broadly, and we are certainly not justified in seeing the use of this individual's ethnic (*Oinountios* rather than *Lakedaimonios*) 'as a deliberate affront to Sparta.'¹¹⁹

However, in a few instances it appears that something stronger was being asserted by the use of both *proxenia* and *polis* ethnics. Grants of *proxenia*, which symbolically established a permanent link between two *poleis*, were particularly pointed when they were made to individuals whose *poleis* had been physically destroyed. Such grants signalled recognition by the granting *polis* of the continuing existence of the destroyed *polis* in question as an interstate *polis* actor. Thus the probable Athenian decree of *proxenia* for a Plataian, after the destruction of Plataia in 427 but before its refoundation in 386, would thus represent a clear assertion that Plataia, from the Athenian perspective and despite the comprehensive destruction visited by the Spartans and Thebans, continued to exist as a *polis*.¹²⁰ In 324/3 the Delphians issue a renewal of *proxenia* for a family of Thebans, that is after the

¹¹⁷ *IG* XII 5 542 l.20-3.

¹¹⁸ *SEG* 13 239.

¹¹⁹ Cartledge (1979), 216.

¹²⁰ *IG* II² 2 with Fossey (1985) for the restoration of the ethnic. See *SEG* 32 38 and Tracey (2003), 353, on the standard date (403/2 BC), contra Walbank (1982). The other possible archon years similarly fall in the period of the Plataians' exile, see Gray (2011), 207 n.135.

destruction of that *polis* by Alexander in 335.¹²¹ The later physical refoundation of both of these cities is a testament to the potential practical consequences of this sort of continued recognition. To these two examples we can now add a third, an Akraiphian grant of *proxenia* to a citizen of Haliartos. Since both of these cities were members of the Boiotian league, this text dates to after 171 and the dissolution of the league and thus also after the destruction of Haliartos at the hands of the Romans (in fact, as Habicht shows, it can be placed c.140-120 BC).¹²² Although there was little prospect of refoundation in this case, this text constitutes an act of communal solidarity by the Akraiphians for this lost *polis*, long after its destruction.

In other instances, although physical destruction is not at issue, we see *proxenia* granted to an individual whose *polis*, as an independent actor capable of granting proxeny in its own right, has ceased to exist. Thus the Athenians made a grant of *proxenia* to a Ialysian after that community synoicised into Rhodes (something which the Athenians may not have welcomed, given their general approach to disaggregating local power blocs in the Aegean).¹²³ Similarly the Tenians appear to have made a grant of *proxenia* to a citizen of Minoa while Minoa was under Samian control.¹²⁴ In these cases, both in the decision to name these particular individuals as *proxenoi* and in the public inscription of the ethnics which they still claimed, the honouring *polis* cooperated with the honorand in asserting the continuing existence of the political community in question as a legitimate *polis*, despite their incorporation into, or subjugation to, other *poleis*.

¹²¹ *FD* III 1 356 see Daux (1943), 16; Marek (1984), 219; Arnush (2000), 302 with n.32, on the interpretation of this anti-macedonian gesture in the context of a number of others from this period.

¹²² Perdrizet (1899), 94 no.IV.1; cf. Feyel (1936), 27, attributing this text to c.150 BC and Habicht (1993), 39-43, placing them, more firmly, in 140-20 BC on prosopographical grounds. See also Müller (2005), 99-101, and Ma (2005), 173-5.

¹²³ *SEG* 28 48; on the interest of the Athenians in encouraging the segmentation and disaggregation of their allies, see Ma (2009), 134-5.

¹²⁴ *IG* XII 5 821 with Reger (1992), 381 n.89.

4 Inter-Polis Institutions and State Identity: Non-Polis Actors

In this chapter as a whole I have argued that *proxenia*, as one of the most frequent and important ways in which cities interacted with external individuals and communities, was central to the assertion of external *polis* status within an interstate system which was defined by, and conceived of as, a society of *poleis*. In fact, *polis* identity was so bound up with the idea of state identity in this system, and with performance as a legitimate interstate actor on this world stage, that a number of non-*polis* state and quasi-state actors can be observed adopting these institutions to assert their status within interstate society. In the heart of the Greek world we see this in the use of *proxenia* by associations, like the association of Dionysiac artists, and even in the much more widespread use of this *polis* based institution by federations and *ethne*, and this is brought out even more clearly when we also see *proxenia* used in this way by non-Greek actors, as well as dynasts and petty kings.

Given the restrictions placed on the ability of dependent communities to participate in this system of inter-*polis* institutions, it may seem surprising that such performances by definitely non-*polis* actors, like associations and synods, were not apparently contested. Indeed, on a number of occasions Greek cities were perfectly willing to deal with the Dionysiac artists as though they comprised a *polis* – even seeking, in the case of the Magnesians, their recognition of *asylia* and the status of a festival.¹²⁵ In the case of the synod of merchants and ship-owners the Athenian *boule* even granted them permission to erect an honorific image which they had voted for their *proxenos*, a portrait of him painted ἐν ὄπλῳ.¹²⁶ This active cooperation contrasts

¹²⁵ Rigsby (1996), 245-7 no.103. For the *proxeny* decrees of the Dionysiac artists, see Marek (1984)118 and Le Guen (2001).

¹²⁶ *IG II²* 1012.

starkly with the restrictions clearly imposed on the external relations of dependent communities, their frequent inability, which must in some sense have been imposed from above, to grant statuses like *proxenia* and *politeia*. The context for the use of *proxenia* in these cases is clearly vital. In relation to heavily dependent communities, the unrestricted use of inter-*polis* institutions to create connections with other *poleis* was problematic because this use performed claims to *polis* status which conflicted with the control which dominant communities asserted over them, by acting as a *polis* on their behalf within the community of *poleis*. By contrast, when these institutions were used by synods or associations, whose activities did not constitute a challenge of this sort to particular political communities, these issues simply did not arise.

The symbolic importance of *proxenia* emerges even more clearly when we see it being adopted by non-Greek communities and actors as a means of engaging in interactions within, and asserting membership of, the wider community of states dominated by *poleis*. This is striking when we see obviously non-Greek communities making use of this *polis*-based institution – for instance in the bilingual proxeny decree of Kaunos from the late fourth or early third century BC,¹²⁷ or the proxeny decree inscribed on bronze from Malta from the second or first century BC.¹²⁸ These sorts of performances are even more remarkable, however, when they involve non-communal actors attempting to pass themselves off as *poleis* not only by granting *proxenia*, but in the decree-like form in which they make these grants. In particular, a number of dynasts and petty kings are attested granting *proxenia* – Maussolus, Satrap of Caria, the Bosporan Kings,¹²⁹ the dynast of Paphlagonian Korylas,¹³⁰ and Korris, the priest-prince of Labraunda.

¹²⁷ *I.Kaunos* 1.

¹²⁸ *IGUR* I 3.

¹²⁹ *CIRB* 1-5.

In the decrees of Mausolus of Caria and Korris this imitation is particularly clear, involving the adaption of formulae developed for *polis* institutions to very different structures. Thus the decree of Mausolus is prefaced ‘it was decided by Mausolus and Artemisia’ ([ἔ]δοξε Μανυσώλλωι καὶ [Ἀρτε]μισίηι).¹³¹ The grant made by Korris, priest at Labraunda, begins similarly: ‘It was decided by the *priest* Korris and the relations of Korris’ (δεδόχθαι τῶι ἱε[ρ]εῖ Κόρριδι καὶ τοῖς [συ]γγενέσ[ι] τοῦ] [Κόρρ]ιδος; also set up at Labraunda) .¹³² Both mimic the standard bipartite structure of the Greek decree formula (‘It was decided by the *demos* and the *boule*’). What is remarkable in these cases is that these individuals, by granting *proxenia* in these terms, opted for this civic status rather than the alternative, more kingly, model of royal friends, which might, on the face of it, have appeared more immediately appropriate (this is particularly striking in the case of the decree of Korris, produced in the last half of the third century BC, by which point systems of royal friends were highly developed and widespread – although perhaps the usage of Mausolus’, commemorated at Labraunda, was also important here). This clearly shows the dominance of the *polis*-model, and the institutional system which went with it, for the performance of state identity in the interstate society in which they sought to assert their position.

Certain state actors did not, of course, participate in this *polis*-orientated system of institutions in the same way that others did. In particular, Hellenistic kings of the first rank neither granted nor received *proxenia*. The explanation in this case seems to be that they had little interest in asserting *polis*-like status within the interstate system. Instead of equality with *poleis*, they insisted on recognition of their

¹³⁰ Xen. *Anab.* 5.6.11.

¹³¹ *I.Labraunda* II 40 (= *RO* 55).

¹³² *ILabraunda* I 11-12.

superiority. This does not mean, however, that they were entirely able to avoid the influence of this *polis*-based and -biased system of institutions. As recent studies have clearly shown, in their interactions with cities kings had little choice but to draw on the language of this institutional system.¹³³ Rome appears on first glance to have been another exception. However, the Roman institution of *hospitium publicum*, although an extension of a pre-existing Roman *hospitium*, may well have been developed in imitation of *proxenia* – or even as a translation of it (in the works of Livy and Cicero, for instance, *hospitium publicum* is in fact the regular means of rendering grants of *proxenia* in Latin and is functionally difficult to distinguish from it).¹³⁴ It is striking in particular that in its first attested occurrence, in 394 BC, this institution was used in relation to a Greek magistrate at the *polis* of Lipara who, in working on behalf of Roman ambassadors captured by the Liparans on their way to Delphi, acted in a manner which could have been calculated to procure a grant of *proxenia* from a Greek *polis*.¹³⁵ It is not difficult to see why the Romans might have adopted this institution which was both the normal means, within the world they inhabited, of establishing links with outsiders and a potent symbol for the construction of identity within this interstate society of *poleis*.¹³⁶

Conclusion

¹³³ Ma (2002); (2003), 30; Billows (2008), 303-6.

¹³⁴ Cic. *Ver.* 2.4.145; Livy 21.12-13. Nichols (2011), 424, is right to recognise the similarities between *proxenia* and *publicum hospitium* but wrong to argue that ‘the Romans tended to treat this kind of relationship more formally and legally than did the Greeks.’ In Appian the ambassador of Perseus to the senate speaks of ‘your *philos* and *proxenos*, Erennius of Brundisium’ (*Hist. Mac.* 11.7).

¹³⁵ Livy 5.28.4-5 with Ogilvie (1965), 690; cf. D.S. 14.93 who, unlike Appian, interestingly avoids retranslating *publicum hospitium* as *proxenia*.

¹³⁶ For the wider context of the Roman use of Greek institutions, see Gruen (1984).

Even in relation to non-*polis* actors, the structure of this Greek Mediterranean world was defined by the dense and incessant interactions which *poleis* engaged in with each other. These studies of *proxenia* and other elements of the specific institutional framework through which *poleis* constructed their interrelations clearly reveal that this was a world of peer polity interaction, a society of networking *poleis*. What was distinctive about this system, however, was the way in which peer-polity interaction was bound up with questions of state identity. Interstate anarchy, as I have argued, invested these general relationships, and thus the institutional framework through which they were expressed, with particular importance because authority was distributed throughout the interstate system. By making use of elements of this framework, constructing relations with other communities, and reproducing the shared norms in which they were embedded, *poleis* and the other actors who imitated them were engaging in performances before their peers, asserting their own identity and competing for status. With the domination of Rome, however, and the consolidation of power in the hands of an emperor, interstate anarchy became hierarchy. In the next chapter I therefore explore what the consequent changes in this system of interstate institutions – and in relation to *proxenia* – tell us about how *poleis*' perception of their relations with each other, their reasons for engaging in interactions, changed as a result, and unpick the relation between the symbolic and practical functions which participation in these inter-*polis* institutional systems served.

Chapter 5

The Disappearance of *Proxenia* and the Domination of Rome: Interstate Hierarchy from Anarchy

Grants of *proxenia* were one of the most important means by which Greek cities sought to establish their identity in relation to each other as *poleis*, as full participants in this international society of city-states. There were, as I have shown in the previous chapter, other related institutions which served a similar function, but proxeny decrees, because of the frequency with which they were made and the numbers in which they were inscribed, represent the best attested element of this institutional system. *Proxenia* stands more broadly for this system of honorific intercourse which shaped how Greek cities thought about and sought to construct interaction with each other. However, to understand the significance of the role of *proxenia* it is necessary to consider the counterfactual case: what would the absence of *proxenia* imply about relations between *polis* actors? In fact, we can cast this question in historical terms: why, after five hundred years of relative stability, did *proxenia* apparently disappear during the early Roman principate? The answer, I argue, relates to the profound transformation which the world of the Greek cities underwent in the late Republic and early Empire, from interstate anarchy to imperial hierarchy. In examining the particular reasons for the disappearance of *proxenia* and other institutions, we not only get a better sense of the significance of *proxenia* and what it was used to express,

we are also forced to confront what empire meant for the Greek cities individually and collectively – how it changed their capacity and motivations for entering into relations with each other.

The first section of this chapter explores the evidence we possess relating to the decline and disappearance of *proxenia*, focussing particularly on trends which can be identified in the epigraphic record. Although it is difficult to identify the disappearance of specific institutions from partial material records, the rich and varied material which we have for the decline of *proxenia* allows us to develop an account of its demise. This section then considers the extent to which proxeny's decline can be explained in relation to the replacement by Roman institutions of functions traditionally associated with it (e.g. legal aid, intermediary services). The next section of the chapter argues that *proxenia* instead needs to be placed in the context of the evidence we have for the disappearance, decline, or transformation of the other institutions related to *proxenia* – *theorodokia*, *theoria*, foreign judges, arbitration, reciprocal grants of *isopoliteia*, requests for the recognition of the status of a shrine or a festival – all the institutions by which cities asserted that they inhabited a world of *poleis*. The final section concludes by considering the different explanations which have been advanced in relation to the decline in elements of this institutional framework, such as interference from Rome and the loss of democracy. I argue that this decline reveals a profound shift in the external orientation of *poleis* reflected in a significant reduction in the emphasis which they placed on establishing and maintaining relations with each other. This was not simply because these institutions lost functionality, but because status, including *polis* status, and prestige ceased to be derived from inter-*polis* connections and instead came from interactions with Rome at the centre, and specifically the person of the Roman emperor. The evidence for these

institutions thus offers us a differently periodized perspective on antiquity from the point of view of the Greek city, an age of *polis*-networking, of *proxenia*, encompassing traditional periods – late Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic (both High and Low), and even the ‘long fourth century’ – and then passing and disappearing into the age of Empire, during the course of the first century BC.¹

First, however, it is necessary to consider how, methodologically, we can go about identifying decline or disappearance. In particular, a recurrent theme in this chapter is the relation between the epigraphic record, its trends and trajectories, and the fortunes of the institutions it attests. In this context, even when we have apparently substantial sets of data, how far can we take quantitative decline (i.e. relative absence of evidence) as evidence of reduction or absence? With its particularly rich source material, *proxenia* is a useful case study in exploring how far, and in what particular ways, trends in the epigraphic record can illuminate the institutions they relate to – and, more clearly than any other element of this institutional framework, reveals the effect of the transformation of the Mediterranean from interstate anarchy to hierarchy.

1 The Disappearance of *Proxenia*: Interrogating the Epigraphic Record

When dealing with numbers of inscriptions as large as we have for *proxenia*, graphs represent the best way to convey an accurate sense of the epigraphic record. I have therefore compiled a database of the proxeny decrees which have been published, by *polis*, region, and period (I have opted for a fifty year interval, using quantitative probability distribution).² The epigraphic record of proxeny inscription in the

¹ On ‘High’ and ‘Low’ periods in Hellenistic history, see first Robert, *OMS* 2.841; for the concept of the ‘long fourth century,’ see Ma (2000a); Gray (2011), 6 n.4.

² On quantitative probability distribution – according to which objects dated with ranges which cross the periods used (e.g. ‘fourth century BC’ or ‘375-325 BC’) are divided fractionally between them rather than assigned according to the mid-point of the dating range – see Wilson (2009), 219-227.

Mediterranean world, thus represented, reveals a striking decline, with the inscription of proxeny decrees by the granting *polis* all but disappearing in the first century BC.




Fig. 1 Graph showing the chronological distribution of proxeny decrees per fifty-year period (excluding those which were not inscribed by the *polis* responsible for the decree).

A note on the dataset:

For the purposes of this dataset I have specifically counted proxeny decrees inscribed on stone or bronze at the community which passed them. This has meant excluding some classes of material, in particular ‘travelling decrees’ (decrees inscribed by another community or at sites beyond the administrative control of the granting community), ‘re-inscriptions’ (decrees clearly inscribed sometime after they were formally passed, especially to replace monuments destroyed in the meantime), and catalogues of *proxenoi* – all of which seem to me to be distinct epigraphic phenomena. I have included inscribed lists of the *proxenoi* appointed in a particular year or administrative period, as the act of inscription is difficult to separate from the inscription of individual decrees, but in these cases I have counted not each *proxenos* or act of granting (which would have skewed the dataset) but each distinct list (i.e. each discernible act of inscription).³ Incomplete inscriptions not preserving direct reference to the grant of *proxenia* have been included only where the restoration of *proxenia* appears all but certain. As a result of the application of this rule the dataset, at 2,436 texts, is smaller by perhaps a third than it would have been had all potential – or even likely – proxeny decrees been included (in which case it might have numbered c.3,500) and my figures for particular, individual sites, such as Delos, are also substantially lower than others’, but it should also represent a much more secure basis for conclusions concerning proxeny inscription.⁴ This dataset has been loosely based on Marek’s catalogue, supplemented with the best available dates⁵ and augmented to include decrees not preserving the ethnic of the honorand (excluded by Marek), inscriptions published since his work, and also missed inscriptions (some material erroneously included by him has also been excluded). We probably have

³ Thus for the great proxeny-list of Delphi (*Syll.*³ 585) I count the 34 subsections in which the *proxenoi* are divided, representing the appointments for particular half-year periods, rather than the 77 distinct grants actually made.

⁴ Contrast the 239 decrees which I have counted in which reference to *proxenia* is preserved with the figure of over 500 quoted in Marek (1984), 247, and the 467 claimed in Habicht (2002), 15.

⁵ These were most often supplied by the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* which is a remarkably useful resource in this regard.

enough data to be confident that it presents a reasonably representative sample for this phenomenon overall – not of grants made, but grants inscribed.

The picture presented by this graph seems unambiguous. From a peak in the second half of the third century BC the record apparently enters a steep decline. By the first half of the first century BC, the number of proxeny decrees inscribed has fallen to almost nothing outside Delphi. Later, apart from a small trickle of material from Delphi (and a few decrees from the Black Sea), the inscription of proxeny decrees appears more or less extinct. This picture is corroborated, and refined, if we examine the same dataset from the point of view of the number of communities attested as inscribing a grant in each fifty-year period.




Fig. 2 Graph showing the number of communities attested inscribing their own grants of *proxenia* during each period. This graph, derived from the same underlying dataset as the previous, shows the number of communities represented by at least one inscribed proxeny decree in the fifty-year period in question to show how widespread proxeny inscription was at any given time. In cases where a community only registers 0.5 of a decree in a particular period in my dataset, as a result of the method adopted here of quantitative probability distribution, that community receives a similar weighting (0.5) for each period in this graph. No community is counted as more than 1 for any period from which an inscribed *proxeny* decree is known. 186 different political communities are represented (166 *poleis* and 20 non-*poleis* actors including federations, associations, and dynasts).

Whereas the dataset underlying the first graph is heavily dominated by a relatively small number of prolific *poleis*, the next graph (Fig. 2) allows us to chart how widespread the inscription of *proxenia* was at a particular moment in time. By comparing the two we can see that, although the absolute peak in the number of proxyen decrees inscribed occurred in the second half of the third century before decreasing significantly in the first half of the second, the inscription of proxyen grants was, if anything, more widespread in the first half of the second century. Although, according to this dataset, the absolute volume of material decreased during the second century BC, it was only going into the first century that the number of *poleis* inscribing proxyen decrees seems to have declined – and dramatically at that.

Given the large quantity of material that we have for *proxenia* and the number of communities from which it comes, it is tempting to believe that it can be taken as a representative sample of the decrees passed, and therefore that this downward trajectory in inscribing proxyen decrees reflects a similar decline in the number of grants of *proxenia* that were actually made. In effect this cessation in granting *proxenia* would have meant the disappearance of networks of *proxenoi* from the Greek world, since they required constant renewal. Even if, as I discussed in the Introduction, proxyen inscription was inherently selective and only a small proportion of the grants made were inscribed on stone, as long as that proportion remained roughly constant then the near complete disappearance of inscribed proxyen grants would still be a strong indicator that grants of *proxenia* were greatly reduced.

However, at the level of the *polis* or even region, this assumption that the proportion of proxyen decrees inscribed remained constant can be proved false. When we analyse local epigraphic traditions it swiftly becomes apparent that they can arise, spread, change, and disappear for reasons which have little to do with actual rates of

granting and which may seem historically trivial. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than at Oropos where a tenfold increase in the number of proxeny decrees inscribed from the first half of the third century BC to the second half correlates with (and clearly depended upon) the Oropians identifying a new, more cost-effective means of publication – pre-existing statue bases rather than purpose-hewn *stelai* (Fig. 3).




Fig. 3 Graph comparing the differing quantities of proxeny decrees at Oropos inscribed on purpose-hewn *stelai* and pre-existing statue-bases for each period.

Moreover, if we set this material in its regional context it becomes clear that both the sudden increase in proxeny decrees inscribed and their subsequent rapid decline are paralleled in the epigraphic tradition for Boiotia as a whole. It is apparent that in the second half of the fourth century it became more important for Boiotian *poleis* to publish decrees granting proxeny on stone – an epigraphical fashion which at some other *poleis* was similarly facilitated by inscription on pre-existing surfaces.⁶ It is not

⁶ As at Thespiiai or Tanagra (the only other *poleis* attested represented by more than ten proxeny decrees in this period).

at all clear, however, that this expression of a desire to publicise one's *proxenoi* in any way correlates with, or can be used as evidence for, actual rates of granting (Fig. 4).




Fig. 4 Graph comparing the number of proxy decrees surviving for Oropos with those preserved for the rest of Boiotia.

In any case, the first two graphs depicting overall trends in the inscription of proxy decrees (Fig. 1-2) do not give an accurate picture of early patterns of proxy granting. The epigraphic habit, or rather specific epigraphic traditions involving the regular inscription of proxy decrees, did not originate at the same time as *proxenia*, but were a later, distinct development. Although the practice may have been foreshadowed by earlier inscription of proxy decrees on bronze,⁷ the inscription of significant numbers of proxy decrees on stone appears to have been an Athenian innovation of the last half of the fifth century BC.

The decline of proxy inscription, by contrast, is a more revealing phenomenon, at least in relation to the fortunes of *proxenia* as an institution. Ceasing to inscribe grants of *proxenia* on stone does seem to be more significant than the

⁷ We possess only one certain example, the Argive proxy decree for Gnosstas of Oinous (*SEG* 13 239).

failure of communities to inscribe before inscription became an issue. However, epigraphic traditions at particular communities can have their own internal trajectories which may reveal relatively little about the fortunes of that particular institution there. At Athens, where we have enough material to be able to trace trends over centuries, the long-term decline in the inscription of decrees granting proxeny seems to reflect changing attitudes to inscription rather than a dramatic reduction in the number of proxeny grants made. After the end of the fourth century many fewer honorific decrees in general were inscribed and, of those that were, decrees honouring citizens constituted the largest proportion – a marked break with earlier practice (Fig. 5). Even of the decrees honouring non-citizens which were inscribed, decrees in which *proxenia* was granted constitute a much smaller proportion of the total than that of those granting citizenship (Fig. 6). This pattern, along with a tendency for the texts to increase in length, probably reflects a tendency for inscription itself to be considered a more marked and substantial honour, granted less frequently and more commonly to individuals receiving grants of citizenship, which had a higher symbolic value at Athens than grants of *proxenia*.




Fig. 5 Graph comparing the chronological distribution of Athenian inscribed decrees for internal honorands (citizens) and external honorands (*xenoî*).




Fig. 6 Graph comparing the chronological distribution of inscribed Athenian decrees for foreigners granting *proxenia* with those granting *politeia*.

Mediterranean-wide trends in inscription are likely to be more significant than the local trajectories of particular *poleis* – especially the widespread shift which we see away from the inscription of proxy decrees. Figures 1-2 illustrate how the choice to inscribe a decree of *proxenia* came to be taken increasingly infrequently by fewer communities until it ceased to be a realistic possibility at all. Care, however, is

required here in weighing the significance of this wider epigraphic phenomenon. On the basis of the first graph (Fig. 1), which shows that from 99 to 50 BC proxeny decrees had all but ceased to be inscribed by the *poleis* which made them, we might expect proxeny to be moribund in this period. In fact other types of inscription reveal that it was still a vital and strongly functional institution at this time. The first chapter demonstrated how a number of proxeny texts from the first century BC closely adhere to the *proxenos*-paradigm delineated in that chapter and refer to specific intermediary services characteristic of *proxenia*. In particular, two sets of inscribed proxeny decrees found at Thasos and Rome – neither, significantly, recovered from the sites of the granting community – show that, during the first half of the first century at least, a significant number and wide range of *poleis* were still routinely granting *proxenia* both in the Aegean and even the western Mediterranean.⁸

From Thasos we possess four stelai inscribed with decrees from different communities: three, from Assos, Lampsacus, and Rhodes honouring Dionysodorus, son of Pempides, and a fourth, probably from Samothrace, honouring his brother Hestiaios.⁹ In three of these Dionysodorus or his brother are granted *proxenia* for their efforts while the decree from Rhodes honours Dionysodorus for services he performed in his role as their *proxenos*.¹⁰ From Rome two bronze *tabulae* were recovered in excavations, both naming the same individual, Demetrius, son of Diodotus, from Syracuse, *proxenos* for his services as an intermediary in Rome itself to visitors from the granting cities of Akragas and Malta.¹¹ The number and range of different communities represented in the decrees at Thasos for individuals from a single family clearly show that grants of *proxenia* were still prevalent in the Aegean

⁸ Sicily and Magna Graecia, because of the rarity with which decrees were inscribed on stone there in any period, are otherwise hugely underrepresented in our evidence. For Sicily, see Prag (2002), 24.

⁹ *I.Thasos* n. 169-172.

¹⁰ *I.Thasos* n.169-71; n. 172.

¹¹ *IGUR I* 2-3.

(and the reference to a local list of *proxenoi* at Assos makes it clear that this was in no way a one-off grant). Similarly if in c.100 BC, a community like Malta, which still shows evidence of influence from its Phoenician heritage down to the late republic, could grant *proxenia*, it is hard to believe that this institution was anything other than vital in the west at that time.¹² A further set of honorific decrees, this time from a coherent monument erected at Delphi in honour of the prominent citizen Diodorus, son of Dorotheos, extends our material attesting to the fairly widespread continuation of this institution to the second half of the first century BC. Among the fragmentary remains of this monument we find proxeny decrees from Thespiiai, the *koinon* of the Dorians, a community whose name is not preserved, and another decree, likewise from an unknown community, probably recording the renewal of a proxeny grant.¹³

The marked reduction which we see, both in terms of the numbers of decrees inscribed and the numbers of communities inscribing decrees, cannot therefore be interpreted directly as evidence for the disappearance of *proxenia*. Instead it reflects the changing monumental priorities of Greek communities. Inscribing proxeny decrees was probably always a marginal activity – in most communities, most of the time, proxeny decrees were inscribed only as the result of a conscious decision made by the authority responsible, singling out the honorands of particular decrees for this marked honour. However great the variation or narrow the selection, the epigraphic record – which ought to give us a representative sample of the decrees inscribed if not granted – clearly reveals that the decision to inscribe was regularly made by a large number of communities, and therefore open to many more, until the second half of the second century BC. By the end of the first century BC, the inscription of decrees

¹² For an overview of the Phoenician material from Malta, see Bonanno (2005), 51-123 and 137-63. For the numismatic evidence see also Coleiro (1971) and Perassi and Novarese (2006).

¹³ *FD III* 1 490; *I.Thespiiai* 28; *FD III* 1 491; 494. If we possessed more of this monument, it is probable that we would find more proxeny decrees.

granting *proxenia* was apparently no longer a realistic possibility anywhere. Cities were no longer interested in the same way in inscribing this sort of monument for outsiders. This reduced interest in monumentalizing proxeny grants is evidence of how proxeny as an institution had come to be viewed by *poleis* – along with the relationships and links with other *poleis* which it embodied.

1.1 Corroborating the Decline of *Proxenia*

The disappearance from the epigraphic record of proxeny decrees cannot be taken as strong evidence for the disappearance of this institution as it was understood by both *poleis* and *proxenoi* in the Classical and Hellenistic periods. We do, however, have other evidence that *proxenia* did indeed disappear at some point in the early imperial period, or, at least, that it changed out of all recognition, losing the specific, functional paradigm which had constituted a stable basis for *proxenia* for a five hundred year period.

At Delphi a continuous record of proxeny decrees runs into the second century AD. However, at some point in the early first century AD the format of these decrees changes in a way which clearly shows that *proxenia* has ceased to be a distinct and well-defined institution. In the traditional format, exhibited in decrees up to this point (the latest dated in Marek's sequence is attributed to c.23 AD), *proxenia* is presented as defining the relationship between the honorand and Delphi. It comes first in the list of honours granted and is presented as determining the package of privileges which the individual received – καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα [καὶ] τοῖς ἄλλοις προξένοις καὶ εὐεργέ[τ]αις ἃ πόλις φιλόανθρωπα καὶ [τ]ίμια δίδωσιν.¹⁴ In the new format, conversely, it occurs as an undistinguished, probably antiquarian, honorific title without particular content or

¹⁴ e.g. *FD* III 2 160; 4 59 with Marek (1984), 245.

significance. *Proxenia* is simply an extra item in the list of honours, occurring after not only *politeia* but even *promanteia* or *proedria* (a sure sign that it no longer signified a particular relationship). In these later decrees *proxenia* is no longer presented as a status defining a specific package of honours – instead of the earlier catch-all clause we find a much less specific phrase: καὶ τᾶλλα τείμια ὅσα τοῖς καλοῖς κάγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν δίδονται.¹⁵ *Proxenia* here is probably only granted at all because of its historic identification with honours granted to outsiders and it is striking that the individuals honoured with it in these decrees are overwhelmingly identified as philosophers and artists, rewarded for their activities at Delphi rather than for playing the role of *proxenos* in their own communities. *Proxenia*, now devoid of the specific content which had previously defined its use, was apparently understood as a means of designating honorific decrees for outsiders (especially involving a grant of citizenship), as we see in a reference to πολιειτήαν... τὴν κοινήν, προξενίας ἢ τιμ[ῆ]ς εἴνεκεν (‘the common form of citizenship grant, because of proxeny or honour’) in a text from the mid first century AD.¹⁶

A similar transformation in the signification of *proxenia* is visible in decrees from the only other region which continued to inscribe references to this institution, the Black Sea. From the late first and second centuries AD we see a string of grants made by the city of Chersonesus Taurus of *proxenias politeia*.¹⁷ *Proxenia* here in the genitive is clearly dependent on *politeia*. It no longer references any sort of distinct institution and only serves to further qualify or explain the grant of citizenship which is the substantive concern of these decrees. After Gschnitzer we should probably

¹⁵ e.g. *FD III* 4 34. These elements of the new format are found in all decrees subsequent to *FD III* 2 160 in Marek’s chronology (to which add the absent *FD III* 4 35 and 74 and *BCH* 70 (1946), 253 n. 7, as other decrees in this form; correct 3 107 to 4 107 on p. 246) – see Marek (1984), 194 and 245-6. See also Wilhelm (1942), 58-9, and Gschnitzer (1972), col. 662. The fragmentary *FD III* 3 105 – with *proxenia* in second place in the list of honours, but retaining the traditional catch-all formulation (ἄλλοις προξένιοις) perhaps represents a transitional example between the two formats.

¹⁶ *FD III* 4 442.

¹⁷ *IosPE* I² 357; 359; 364 (cf. *SEG* 56 875); *SEG* 56 871-77.

understand something like what we see in the last Delphic case, as *politeia* προξενίας εἵνεκεν – as primarily a way of stressing the explicitly honorific character of these grants of citizenship.¹⁸ This is presumably the sort of proxeny, in essence a designation for honorific citizenship or external honours, which we are dealing with in Dio of Prusa (38.22) when, in c.100 AD, he mentions the proxenies (rather than *proxenoi*) which linked the two propontic cities of Nikomedia and Nikaia in the context of stressing their various common ties (καὶ προξενίας δὲ ἔχομεν).

In an honorific decree of Byzantium dated to the mid first century AD (inscribed at the honorand's *polis* of Olbia) we are perhaps presented with an intermediary stage in this disappearance of the institutional content of *proxenia*. In *IosPE* I² 79 Orontas, son of Ababos, is honoured for services which would be typical of the *proxenos*-paradigm, although using formulae that are very different from anything we see in our earlier decrees:¹⁹

πολλὰ δὲ καὶ Βυζαν-
τίων πόλει κατὰ τε τὰς δαμοσίας χρήας καὶ
τῶν εἰς τὸ ἐνπόριον πλεόντων προστα-
σίας γενομένου ὠφελίμου, καὶ αὐτὸς ὥσ-
περ τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ πατρός, οὕτως τὰν ποτὶ τὸν
δᾶμον εὐνοίαν καὶ προξενίαν διαδεξά-
μενος, ὑπὸ πάντων μὲν μαρτυρεῖται τῶν
εἰσπλεόντων εἰς τὸν Πόντον πολειτᾶν
ἐπὶ φιλανθρωπίαι καὶ π<ρ>ονοίαι.

...since (he performs) many services for the *polis* of the Byzantines according to its public needs and is useful in the care which he gives to those (of the Byzantines) who sail to the emporion, and does other things as his father did, inheriting both his *eunoia* and *proxenia* to the *demos*, and all of the citizens sailing to the Pontus bear witness to his benevolence and care...²⁰

¹⁸ Gschnitzer (1973), col. 721, *contra* Wilhelm (1942), 49; cf. Marek (1984), 154.

¹⁹ For bibliography on this decree, see *I.Byzantion* 3.

²⁰ *IosPE* I² 79 1.7-15.

Proxenia here is still in a sense connected with the performance of particular services. However, referenced in parallel with *eunoia* (τὰν ποτὶ τὸν δᾶμον εὖνοιαν καὶ προξενίαν διαδεξάμενος), it is strongly distanced from the formally granted title of *proxenos* and instead presented as a personal attribute motivating Orontas' actions. The emphasis on inheritance in this text does seem to relate to the earlier tradition of proxyeny as a hereditary institution, but again it is striking that Orontas is named citizen rather than *proxenos*. Earlier it would have been normal for the son of a *proxenos* who was himself honoured by the city in question to be named *proxenos* in his own right – or at least for the grant to be ‘renewed’ (even in cases where *proxenia* was explicitly granted to the father as a hereditary office). In fact, as Gschnitzer argues, it is entirely possible that the father had not been formally named *proxenos* in the proper sense of the term either. *Proxenia* here may simply be a short-hand, encapsulating the services described in detail in the case of the father in relation to his son – and thus a reason for granting honours, but no longer an honorific status in its own right.²¹

Important supporting evidence for the change which *proxenia* underwent at the end of the first century BC is also provided by the attestations of the name ‘Proxenos’ and its variants in the database of the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*. If we analyse the 134 occurrences of the name ‘Proxenos’ which occur in the database (and the 32 occurrences of other names in ‘Proxen-’), and, to correct for the different sample-sizes, compare them as a proportion of the total number of names for each period, the graph which results looks remarkably similar to that which we have for the inscription of proxyeny decrees. After the beginning of the phenomenon we find

²¹ Gschnitzer (1973), col. 662-3.

centuries of comparably high levels of activity, declining to practically nothing by the start of the first century AD.




Fig. 7 Graph showing the chronological distribution of the individuals called 'Proxenos'. Compared with the total number of those attested with names using the root 'Proxen-' (e.g. Proxenia, Proxenion, Proxenides); both expressed as a percentage of the total sample of named individuals for each period. Based on 154 attestations in total.

What significance should we attach to this evidence? Firstly, although Greek naming traditions tended to be conservative in the short and medium term, with sons named after grandfathers and family names in some cases persisting for generations, it is striking that in the longer term names do fall out of use in connection with the fortunes of the concepts, divinities, and, in this case, institutions, with which they are connected. If a name loses the meaning and associations which caused it to be chosen in the first place, and does not gain other associations, over time it is likely to be selected against and decline if not disappear. In my second chapter I argued that 'Proxenos' was used relatively commonly as a name in the Classical and Hellenistic periods because of the prestige and status associated with it, *proxenoi* were usually

members of the civic elite and sought *proxenia* in part to signal this standing. The near-complete disappearance of this name from our onomastic record between 100 BC and AD 100, in parallel with a similar decline in the epigraphic record, reflects, I would suggest, a significant perceived decline in the importance of and status associated with this institution.

This varied material presents us with a complex, nuanced picture of the decline of *proxenia*. The different pieces of evidence do not precisely coincide because they illustrate different but related phenomena. In the case of the epigraphic record what we see appears to be a general, long-term shift by *poleis*, beginning in the late Hellenistic period, away from commemorating monumentally these links with other *polis*-communities (a shift which is apparent for other institutions in the epigraphic record). The onomastic material, conversely, presents us with the perspective of individuals, their reaction to this communal reorientation visible in the monumental evidence. The reduction in the use of ‘Proxenos’ names reflects an awareness of the reduced honorific emphasis placed on proxeny and thus a similar reduction in the claims to prestige and status capable of being communicated by this sort of reference to it. Finally the material from Delphi and the Black Sea shows *proxenia*’s eventual loss of integrity as an institution – its transformation from well-defined status-relation to an honorific title, largely empty of specific content but worth making at Delphi and in the Black Sea because of the long association between the title of *proxenos* and honours for outsiders. The fact that this final transformation of *proxenia* lagged behind the other changes which we can observe is not surprising. It is an expression of institutional conservatism, of the same forces which contributed to the stability of this institution over its lifetime. As I have argued, *proxenia* depended for its function on

universal compatibility, on participants in widely dispersed communities understanding the expectations involved and sharing a common set of assumptions, and this made *proxenia* resistant to change. It was only after this institution had ceased to be used in practice by most *poleis* that innovation could arise at a local level, reshaping the remnants of *proxenia* according to its now limited role at particular communities, and it took time for these changes to find expression in inscribed decrees in the face of the cumulative weight of traditional, highly conservative formulae.

1.2 Functional Obsolescence as an Explanation of Proxeny's Decline

The picture we are presented with by our evidence for the decline of *proxenia* is thus unusually rich and informative. The question remains, however, of why *proxenia* declined at all. The timing of the different processes which I have identified as contributing to this development clearly correlate with the transformation of the Greek world effected by Rome. The Roman Empire, however, is not a sufficient explanation in itself for the decline of *proxenia*. What was it about Rome, or the structural changes which it caused to the world of the *poleis*, which brought about proxeny's demise? Since, as I have argued, the practical functions which *proxenoi* fulfilled were the basis for the long-term stability of this institution, it makes sense to consider first what difference Roman imperial administration and institutions would actually have made to the sorts of intermediary services performed by *proxenoi*.

Like other services performed by *proxenoi* on behalf of private individuals, aid given in enabling access to local legal institutions and in providing direct legal support (perhaps as advocate) is rarely directly attested. However, as I argued in my first chapter, the law would certainly have been one of the contexts in which the

services of a *proxenos* were most important. Jurisdiction was also probably the area of Greek civic life which the Roman Empire intervened most directly in.²² The Roman governor constituted the highest legal authority within his province, determining jurisdiction, establishing courts, and hearing cases. In addition to a patchwork of specific rights of jurisdiction granted to particular communities and individuals which expressed the authority of Rome over jurisdiction,²³ for some provinces there were also more comprehensive regulations which would have effectively eliminated the utility of *proxenoi* in this context. In particular, the provisions of the *lex Rupilia* entrust jurisdiction in Sicily to the legal institutions of cities over cases restricted to co-citizens, but refer to an external panel, composed probably of Sicilians, those cases arising between the citizens of different cities.²⁴ Cases arising between Sicilians and non-Sicilians without Roman citizenship are not explicitly mentioned, but are presumably among the ‘other cases’ in which ‘judges are accustomed to be selected from the *conventus* of Roman citizens.’²⁵ In each instance the concern appears to be for establishing neutral courts for both litigants: in the first case a panel of Sicilians heard the case (rather than the court of one of the litigants’ cities) to circumvent any bias on the part of the jurors or legal institutions themselves in favour of fellow citizens; in the second, presumably a panel of Roman citizens was used to avoid any preference Sicilians might have in favour of fellow islanders against an outsider. With such a system there would have been no need for *proxenoi* to facilitate access to local courts for outsiders, Sicilian or non-Sicilian – and arguably these probably less-biased

²² Fournier (2010) and Kantor (2011) represent the most recent significant works on the problem of jurisdiction under the Roman Empire in the eastern provinces and Sicily.

²³ Grants to communities: e.g. Colophon (*SEG* 39 1243-4); Aphrodisias (*IAphr2007* 8.27). Grants to individuals: e.g. *CIL* VI.viii.3 40890.

²⁴ Cic. *Ver.* II 2.32 with Kantor (2011), 188.

²⁵ *Ceterarum rerum selecti iudices ex conuentu ciuium Romanorum proponi solent*, Cic. *Ver.* II 2.32.

courts, backed by Roman authority, would have represented a more attractive prospect than the local judicial systems *proxenoi* could have opened up.

How far the provisions of the *lex Rupilia* were typical of the judicial regulations of other provinces is difficult to say. Cicero as governor of Cilicia had more scope than this would have allowed to permit the use of panels of foreign judges (presumably in deciding cases arising within cities), following the precedent of the famous jurist, Scaevola.²⁶ Georgy Kantor is probably right to stress the untidiness in general of the situation outside Sicily in the Late Republic, with a range of potentially conflicting judicial privileges granted to different individuals and communities – an untidiness which would have had the effect of intensifying Roman intervention, as the imperial power was forced to rule on conflicts between grants.²⁷ Nonetheless it would not be surprising if outsiders regularly sought to circumvent local – biased – legal systems entirely by seeking access to external (and more authoritative) Roman courts, whether or not they possessed *proxenoi*.

In the area of jurisdiction it is particularly easy to see how the role performed by the *proxenos* in facilitating local judicial access for individuals from his client city could have diminished or in some areas been largely superseded under the Roman Empire. Some other contexts for *proxenos* activity, on behalf of the client *polis* as a whole, would have been eliminated entirely – in particular warfare between *poleis* which might involve *proxenoi* in facilitating the ransom of prisoners, ensuring burial for the dead, or acting as knowledgeable (and persuasive) envoys to their client cities to negotiate the cessation of hostilities.

In other contexts the functions which *proxenoi* tended to perform were probably comparatively unaffected by the domination of Rome. There is little reason

²⁶ Cic., *Att.* VI.1 1.15.

²⁷ Kantor (2010). 194-200.

to believe that private (especially economic) activities between the citizens of Greek cities ceased to be important or very frequent, and the problems of establishing identity, and the usefulness to visitors of local knowledge, would have persisted. There is also no evidence to suggest that the provision of hospitality ceased to be an issue in the Roman period any more than it had done in the Hellenistic.²⁸ In *IG IV* 853, probably the last proxeny decree we have clearly expressing the *proxenos*-paradigm inscribed by a granting *polis* (dated to 1 BC), the hospitality of Lucius Licinius Anteros, the Corinthian, for magistrates and ordinary citizens visiting from Troizen is listed prominently among the deeds which made him worthy of being named *proxenos*. Hospitality is also one of the most prominent services performed by Iunia Theodora, a Roman resident of Corinth (κατοικοῦσα ἐν Κορίνθῳ), for officials and private citizens of both the Lycian league and its constituent *poleis* (three of the decrees on this monument at Corinth mention her services in this regard).²⁹ This need had not disappeared by the mid first century AD, where this text is best placed, although *proxenia* is no longer associated with it – it is conspicuously absent among the honours granted Iunia Theodora.³⁰

Similarly, the services for which the honorand of the ‘transitional’ proxeny decree of Byzantium, discussed above, is honoured, though different from those we find in our earlier decrees, strongly suggest a continuity of functional need – referencing ideas of utility (both on public and private levels) and intermediary

²⁸ On hospitality in general and its chronological development, see Hennig (1997) who flags up the fact that hospitality to Roman officials could be particularly burdensome (Hennig 1997, 363-8).

²⁹ *SEG* 18 143, esp. l. 27-8, 58-9 and 74-6 with Hennig (1997), 357.

³⁰ Behrwald (2000), 120-8, argued for a date shortly after the foundation of the colony at Corinth in the mid-first century BC, but the mid-first century AD date is more persuasive (Jones 2001, 166-7). Gschnitzer (1973), col. 663, on this omission (and the disappearance of *proxenia*).

function which were earlier central to the *proxenos*-paradigm (here made particularly explicit with the use of the term *prostasia*).³¹

These needs did not disappear – and nor was *proxenia* simply superseded, as Paul Monceaux suggested, by the institution of patronage, adopted by the Greek cities from Rome.³² *Patroneia*, as it was cast in Greek, was used only in relation to Rome and represented an attempt to co-opt a Roman institutional language which could communicate more effectively to particular Roman addressees the sense of permanent relationship, involving mutual obligation, inherent in Greek *proxenia*. Between Greek cities, however, nothing replaced *proxenia* (indeed, we find a Greek – the Syracusan Diodotos – honoured by two communities for his services as *proxenos* in Rome). Moreover, among the Greek cities of the east *patroneia* itself did not long survive *proxenia* – and arguably declined as the result of the same loss of plurality, with the establishment of an emperor.³³

Other institutions were probably used in different contexts to perform private services analogous to those offered by civic networks of *proxenoi* during and after the decline of this institution. In particular, it seems likely that, in the economic sphere, private associations operated to lower transaction costs between individuals from different communities in a similar way, sharing local knowledge and personal networks (functions which private networks of friends, where individuals possessed them, had always continued to perform alongside *proxenoi*).³⁴ These arrangements may have become more important after the decline of *proxenia*. However, like earlier judicial *symbola* or the Athenian *dikai emporikai*, which existed alongside *proxenia*,

³¹ *IosPE I*² 79 1.7-10.

³² Monceaux (1886), 315. On Patronage, see Eilers (2002); Ferrary (1997).

³³ Eilers (2002), 161-81.

³⁴ On the economic role of associations in the Hellenistic period, see Gabrielsen (2001); (2007); on Hellenistic and Roman Delos, Rauh (1993).

they did not supersede it, but rather reflected similar structural needs of interaction within the urbanized Greek world which remained.

As an explanation for the decline of *proxenia*, the obsolescence of its functions is thus insufficient, at least in relation to ‘private’ contexts for the services of *proxenoi* for individuals from the client city, on which Roman administration may have had more impact.³⁵ This should probably not surprise us. Proxeny decrees themselves explicitly focus on the services of *proxenoi* for the *polis* as a whole in facilitating *public* interaction, especially in aiding official delegations sent by the granting *polis*, or for their own performance on delegations sent to it.³⁶ It is possible that the decline in *proxenia* and its commemoration could be related to a reduced need for the functions of *proxenoi* in these public contexts, and thus also reduced opportunities for individuals to perform services of this kind, if the number of delegations sent – the amount of official inter-*polis* interaction – declined. In our evidence for the first century BC we do see a remarkable shift, in parallel with the disappearance of *proxenia*, in which the other institutional and honorific forms of interaction between *poleis* which characterised the pre-Roman Greek world vanish from our sources. It is not, however, that *proxenia* disappeared simply *because* these other institutions did. Rather the disappearance of *proxenia* needs to be understood in the context of the degeneration of this wider self-supporting system of institutions as a whole, which indicates a profound change in the structural dynamic of the world of the Greek *poleis* at this time.

³⁵ The only attestation of *proxenoi* providing legal assistance in a proxeny decree of which I am aware is the fourth-century Karthaian decree, honouring a pre-existing *proxenos*, *IG XII 5 528*.

³⁶ See Chapter 1, 52, 66; on the function of the suppression of details of specific private interactions, see Chapter 2, 107-8.

2 Changes in Inter-*Polis* Interaction and the End of the Greek World

In the fourth chapter of this thesis I explored the position of *proxenia* within this broader system of interstate institutions.³⁷ By the end of the first century BC, however, the principal elements of this well-developed system, after being highly visible in the epigraphic record of the Classical and Hellenistic periods, more or less completely disappear. In this section I look at the evidence for a number of these different elements – *theoria* and *theorodokia*, the exchange of treaties and statuses (*isopoliteia* and *asylia*), as well as interstate arbitrations and foreign judges. None of these elements can lay claim to a material record as rich as that of *proxenia*, which also stands for and represents honorific interaction in general to a far greater extent. However, the explanations which emerged from considering the more copious evidence for *proxenia* highlight and invite us to ask similar questions of the evidence for these other institutions. Moreover, precisely because they are more specifically focused, the other parts of this system illuminate more brightly particular aspects of the change which the Greek world of *poleis* underwent as a whole.

2.1 *Theoria* and *Theorodokia*

One of the most important means by which *poleis* expressed and symbolically maintained their connections with each other was the institution of *theoria* – the official delegations, composed of *theoroi*, which *poleis* despatched to each other to announce or attend festivals, consult oracles, or visit and make dedications at particular shrines.³⁸ Sending a delegation of *theoroi* to the festival of another *polis*, especially in response to an invitation issued by a representative of that city, performed a similar constitutive function to the inter-*polis* interchanges I discussed in

³⁷ Chapter 4, 208-12.

³⁸ Rutherford (forthcoming), 3, for an exhaustive list.

the previous chapter, as each *polis* recognised the other and in turn had its own identity as a *polis* recognised. However, as well as these bilateral exchanges, the institution of *theoria* allowed for more multilateral performances of *polis*-identity, when multiple *theoriai* representing different *poleis* converged at the festival of the same *polis* – whether in front of a very wide audience (as at a panhellenic shrine such as Delphi) or a more local one. It is thus not surprising that in these contexts we see concerns expressed over how more marginal communities are allowed to identify themselves. A particularly good example of this is the Lebedeians considered above who, when synoicized into the *polis* of Teos, were required by the regulations from king Antigonos to be part of the Teian delegation and identify themselves as Teians when participating in the festival of the Panionion.³⁹

The importance and frequency of *theoria* in the Classical and Hellenistic periods is probably difficult to over-estimate. Like internal civic festivals, these external festivals both at major panhellenic and regional shrines, and on a more parochial level, between neighbouring communities, are likely to have been the major events of the *polis* calendar. Some sense of the scale of this phenomenon is reflected in proxeny granting – certainly in the great lists of *theoroi* named *proxenoi* at Samothrace but also in the patterns of grants inscribed at Delphi and possibly Thera.⁴⁰ The sheer volume of *proxenoi* at local cities known from Astypalaia or Eresos probably also reflects the receipt of delegations, a significant proportion of which are likely to have been *theoroi*. For particular sanctuary-orientated *poleis* the reach and variation of these theoric connections can also be traced through inscribed records of their networks of *theorodokoi*. *Theorodokia* as an institution was a very close parallel

³⁹ Rutherford (forthcoming), 223-4; *RC* 3 1.1-4. See Chapter 4, 213-4.

⁴⁰ Dimitrova (2008), n.1-13; *Syll.*³ 585; *IG* XII 3 1300; see Chapter 3, 173-4.

for *proxenia*, except that the context for the intermediary services implied here was much narrower, limited to visits of festival-announcing public delegations (*theoriai*).⁴¹

At some *poleis* these two civic networks – of *proxenoi* and *theorodokoi* – were separately maintained, in parallel (as, apparently, at Delphi, though there was some overlap even here);⁴² at other cities both institutions were used together (at Epidaurus, *theorodokia* and *proxenia* were two overlapping titles; *theorodokia* apparently conferred more prestige and was made in conjunction with *proxenia* so frequently that it implied it).⁴³ Given that the functions associated with *theorodokia* could easily be encompassed within the broader institution of *proxenia* it is difficult to explain why the former developed at all, leading to apparent institutional redundancy. However, it surely persisted because it had simply become *de rigueur* for communities possessing significant shrines; to maintain networks of both *proxenoi* and *theorodokoi* and this highlights the importance of their symbolic value.

After relatively high visibility from the Classical period onwards, like *proxenia*, *theoria*, as a form of direct official contact between communities in cultic contexts, declines sharply in the epigraphic record in the early first century BC. In particular in the case of *theorodokia*, although the inscriptions relating to this institution are not sufficiently homogenous in type or numerous enough to produce a useful graph as we can for *proxenia*, a similar pattern in inscribed grants is clearly visible. The last known grants of *theorodokia* date from the second century BC and the very last reference we have to this specific institution was inscribed on a stone dating from the mid first century BC.⁴⁴ Because we possess no later evidence relating to *theorodokia*, we cannot positively prove that it disappeared, or, like *proxenia*, lost

⁴¹ Perlman (2000), 18-22, with bibliography.

⁴² Perlman (2000), 28-9.

⁴³ See above, Chapter 3, 170 n. 37. For the Delphic network of *theorodokoi*, see Plassart (1921) with Robert, *OMS* 1.327-44 on lines 58-77.

⁴⁴ Perlman (2000), 26-7.

its content and function as an institution. However, it seems unlikely, given that *proxenia* did disappear, that the much more specialised *theorodokia* continued, as it was never granted by nearly as many *poleis* and was closely tied up with *proxenia*. If *theorodokia* had continued in any significant way to be granted or even if it retained honorific value much beyond the middle of the first century BC, we might expect to see some trace of it in the honorific decrees of Delphi, which did continue.

The disappearance of *theorodokia* indicates a waning of interest on the part of significant shrines in maintaining civic networks with explicitly religious connotations and fits into a wider picture of theoric decline, although the evidence here is somewhat more ambiguous. Given how deeply embedded particular shrines were and continued to be in Greek religious culture, it would be very surprising if these sorts of *polis* delegations disappeared entirely. It is striking, however, how little material we have relating to *theoria* from the imperial period, especially as, in other respects, Greek festival life appears to have flourished.⁴⁵ The post-Augustan material for *theoria* contributes only six entries in Ian Rutherford's compendious catalogues (excluding the material from Claros).⁴⁶ Unsurprisingly a significant proportion of the examples we do have reflect the continuation of very long established theoric links – between Athens and Delphi (*FD* III 2 65), Athens and Delos (*ID* 2535), and Keos and Delos (*ID* 2539, perhaps significantly, explicitly casting this as a renewal – after a long interruption?). It is noticeable also that in our later epigraphic record the attestations we do have mention *theoria* on monuments erected to honour one's own citizens rather than to emphasise links between cities.⁴⁷ Where we do have particularly rich epigraphic sources, these seem to reflect a very different sort of

⁴⁵ See, for example, *I Aph* 2007 15.330.

⁴⁶ Rutherford (forthcoming), 430-8.

⁴⁷ Thus *I Eph.* 891-6, honours for a series of female *theoroi* to the Olympic games (on which see Robert, *OMS* 5.669-74); *IG* XII 5 946, from the third century AD, notes that the honorand served as *architheoros* four times without mentioning any of the external *poleis* to which he was sent.

phenomenon, as at Claros.⁴⁸ The way in which these interrelations were restructured under the Roman empire emerges particularly clearly in the case of the civic delegations sent to Ephesos (attested by dedications they made there), for which the context was the first *neokoria* of that city – that is provincially organized, imperial cult.⁴⁹

As in the case of proxeny inscription, the epigraphic record for honorific decrees is unlikely to map exactly on patterns of the use of the institution. It is striking, for instance, that the last of the lists of *theoroi* inscribed at Samothrace as receiving *proxenia* are dated to the first century BC, whereas we find a later example of a Samothracian grant of *proxenia* to Kaunian *theoroi* inscribed at Kaunos in the early twenties AD.⁵⁰ What the epigraphic record directly attests is that the decision to inscribe public decrees attesting to links of *theoria* was much less frequently taken from the first century BC onwards. However, as with *proxenia*, it seems highly likely that this reduced monumental emphasis corresponded to a reduction in the effort devoted to the institution of *theoria* and the formal links which it constructed.⁵¹

This is partially corroborated by the fact that *theoroi* also disappear from our epigraphical record of inscriptions of other sorts, including, notably, dedications, which unlike decrees honouring visiting *theoroi* reflect the commitment and interest of the cities despatching *theoroi* – and, perhaps, the *theoroi* themselves. Thus, again at Samothrace, although dedicatory inscriptions and inscribed records of initiates do not

⁴⁸ On the material from Claros, see Robert, *OMS* 6.540-8; (1969), 299-312; J and L Robert (1989), 3-6. For an overview and detailed chronology of these texts, many as yet unpublished, see Ferrary (2005). In particular the absence of older *poleis* and the prominence of *coloniae* is striking.

⁴⁹ *I.Eph.* 232-241; 1498; 2048; on these see Heller (2006), 245-54 and 163-237.

⁵⁰ Dimitrova (2008), no.4 (see also p.18), states that this text was attributed on the basis of letterforms to the first to second century AD by Friedrich, *IG XII* 8 168. Friedrich's date, however, 'litteris a. ±100 insculptis,' should in fact be understood as c.100 BC (which is where these plain letterforms belong) – and this is how Dimitrova herself has understood the equivalent phrase 'litteris a. ±100 incis' (*IG XII* suppl. 171) for her n.6, plausibly preferring in this case a second-century BC date. None of the lists of *theoroi* named *proxenoi* can in fact be plausibly attributed to later than the first century BC.

⁵¹ Rutherford (forthcoming), 31-2.

disappear, *theoroi* cease to be recorded in either capacity after the end of the first century BC. This reduced monumental – and honorific – emphasis on *theoria* is perhaps also reflected in trends in the attestation of names related to this institution. Although we possess a sample that is significantly smaller than that which we have for the name ‘Proxenos’ and one which is also much more distorted, heavily dominated in particular by Athens (from which about two thirds of the sample comes), the disappearance of ‘Theōros’ as a personal name after the end of the first century BC is similarly marked, and probably reflects the response of individuals to the reduction in prestige associated with links between communities of this kind.




Fig. 8 Graph showing the chronological distribution of the individuals called ‘Theōros’ alongside the total number of those attested with names using the root ‘Theōr-’ (e.g. Theōris, Theōrikos), expressed as a percentage of the total sample of named individuals for each period. Based on 68 attestations in total.

2.2 Treaties and Statuses

In the Greek world, cities directly engaged with each other by agreeing treaties, engaging in the mutual exchange of honours and privileges, or granting or recognising particular statuses which other cities laid claim to (e.g. *asylia*). This overlapping set of

institutions represented a series of gestures which, if they were not necessarily performed as frequently as acts of *theoria* or grants of *proxenia*, were nonetheless more highly marked individually and played a central role within the broader system of interstate institutions. Even allowing for this, however, and partial as it is, our evidence paints a very vivid picture of interstate activity. The standard modern collections, which draw on literary as well as epigraphic sources and thus privilege the more powerful states, collect some 435 bilateral treaties attested for the ancient world for the five hundred year period between 700 and 200 BC (so far omitting 200-100 BC, a particularly productive period) – of which the vast majority involve at least one Greek *polis* (the majority were between two).⁵² ‘Treaty’ does not really do justice to this range of gestures, and is sometimes stretched to breaking-point in these collections – as in the case of *StV* III 508 which, rather than being a bilateral agreement, is really a series of reciprocal privilege-grants, a very common form of interstate interaction otherwise uncollected in these volumes. Specialised works, such as Gawantka (1975) on treaties and inter-communal grants of *isopoliteia* and Rigsby (1997) on *asylia*, contribute to filling this gap, and show (especially in the case of Rigsby’s work) how numerous and widespread the interactions which a single community might enter into could be.⁵³

The familiar trend recurs here as well. During the first century BC practically all of these institutional forms of contact, by which poleis sought to construct relations with each other, disappear from our sources. In the case of relations like alliance (*symmachia*), this disappearance, at least under the Principate, is hardly surprising. Under the *Pax Romana* interstate warfare was no longer among the competencies of the Greek city and therefore military alliances (*symmachia*) would have been frowned

⁵² *StV* II² and III; Chaniotis (1996) collects a further 38 treaties for second-century Crete alone.

⁵³ Gawantka (1975), esp. catalogue, 206-20.

upon.⁵⁴ It is also possible that the disappearance of grants of *isopoliteia* to entire communities, whether mutual or one-directional, may reflect a Roman desire to divide those they ruled.⁵⁵ Although these sorts of grants, especially between non-contiguous communities, did not result in the creation of larger *poleis*, the claims to closeness, even unity, which they expressed may perhaps have seemed to the Greek cities incompatible with the Roman insistence in other contexts on maintaining the divisions between cities: in Bithynia there is evidence for this in the Pompeian prohibition on citizenship grants to citizens of other Bithynian *poleis*; in relation to Macedonia, we know of the decision to partition the kingdom into four separate administrative zones in the aftermath of the third Macedonian War, the boundaries between which were reinforced by a prohibition on intermarriage between regions and the ownership of property in more than one.⁵⁶ Alongside, or even discounting this sort of evidence of Roman opposition, we should also allow for the probability that, for the cities themselves, expressing links like this, or commemorating them on stone, ceased to seem worthwhile. In other cases, as when the diplomatic language, based on concepts from personal relations, of friendship (*philia*) and kinship (*syngeneia*) all but vanishes, the disappearance is more apparent than real. It is not that these concepts ceased to be meaningful – these were still the terms which communities used to think about their relations with each other. Instead this was a secondary phenomenon,

⁵⁴ Kallet-Marx (1995), 192-3, is surely correct that earlier the power vacuum which the Romans left in the east made life more uncertain for Greek *poleis* – but even in this context, as he points out, the treaties which *poleis* were keenest to acquire and inscribe in this period were treaties with Rome.

⁵⁵ Jones (1940), 172; Gawantka (1975), 199; Jones (1978), 83-4 and 88-9 clearly shows that *homonoiia* coinages under the Roman Empire do not reflect either alliances or treaties of *isopoliteia*. Some *sympolitias* (the merging of contiguous communities), conversely, may well have gone ahead in Lykia under the influence of Rome, perhaps for administrative reasons: Zimmermann (1992), 140; Schuler (2010), 396. For Augustus' promotion of *koina* as intermediary administrative units, see Bowersock (1965), 91-100.

⁵⁶ Jones (1940), 172; the Pompeian law was, however, a dead-letter by Pliny's day (was it ever enforced?) – Pliny *ep.* 10.114-5; Livy 45.29.

merely a function of the marked disappearance of records of the other interstate institutions in relation to which this language was used.⁵⁷

More revealing is the evolution of the Greek institution of *asylia*, involving delegations sent out to obtain recognition of the sacredness or inviolacy of a city's shrine. These *theoroi*, often dispatched to distant and widely spaced cities and kings, were not, for the most part, primarily aimed at securing shrines from pillaging by pirates or in war.⁵⁸ Rather they reflect the prestige value associated by these communities with obtaining extensive recognition, by other *poleis* and royal and imperial powers, of the status of their shrine and perhaps also of an associated competition.⁵⁹ As I argued in the previous chapter, *asylia*-campaigns very clearly show how important a community's social position in relation to its peer-*poleis* was in motivating its engagement in interactions with them. The role of *asylia*, and the way in which it was sought, continued despite Roman domination in the early second century BC, at least initially without significant change. Rome's acknowledgement of the *asylia* of Stratonikeia's shrines may have been of most value in c.80 and c.40 BC, but it was still worth obtaining and inscribing the acquiescence of at least seventy other cities in the first instance (a fragmentary list with seven surviving ethnics perhaps relates to the second).⁶⁰ Before long, however, this ceased, and *asylia* came to be something that only Rome could meaningfully give or recognise. Under the influence of Rome this nebulous symbol became a concrete privilege, the right of asylum from Roman law, and granting it also became a Roman monopoly. *Asylia*

⁵⁷ Jones (1999), 106-121; for imperial examples see Curty (1995), no.69-88.

⁵⁸ Rigsby (1996), 13-25, esp. 22-5. See, however, the case of the Tenian *asylia* campaign, Chapter 1, 79-80.

⁵⁹ The Magnesians explicitly ask for their festival – and thus a victory there – to be recognised as of equal standing to the Pythian games, resulting in the same awards of civic honours for citizen victors as these other festivals. By granting these honours to citizen victors, *poleis* signalled the degree to which they collectively set store by a citizen victory at a particular set of games, and thus its importance. On stephanitic status, see Slater and Summa (2006).

⁶⁰ Rigsby (1996), 418-27.

continued to be prestigious within the context of competition between cities. Indeed, like other titles which came to be granted by the Romans, its prestige probably increased precisely because it was more rigidly controlled (it seems likely, that after the claims to *asylia* were reviewed by the Senate in 22 AD, very few further grants of any of this status were made).⁶¹ This development, however, reveals the fundamental change of the system – from one in which prestige originated in interactions between peers, to one in which it derived from and continued to be dependent on hierarchical relations with the imperial power – and ultimately the person of the emperor.

2.3 Interstate Arbitration

Interstate arbitration and foreign judges were two distinct but overlapping international institutions aimed at enabling the resolution of disputes by facilitating the provision of neutral, external judges for adjudication or, preferably, mediation. Both are extremely well attested, especially in the Hellenistic period, and have been extensively studied.⁶² Explicitly intended to circumvent recourse to violence at the different levels at which they operated, they represent two of the most important institutions which defined the fabric of the Hellenistic world.

Interstate arbitration, by which two states seek mediation and/or arbitration of a dispute from a third state actor, appears to be culturally non-specific and the motivations of disputes certainly are (territory, transport routes, economic resources, and the control of shrines).⁶³ In the Greek world, however, the practice seems to have been especially widespread with highly developed procedures from an early period:

⁶¹ Rigsby (1996), 29, suggests that a formal prohibition on further grants of this status was in fact instituted in this year.

⁶² Interstate arbitration: Tod (1913) is foundational; Piccirilli (1973) on the archaic and classical examples, down to 338, continued by Magoni (1997) to 200 BC and Ager (1996) to 90 BC respectively. Foreign Judges: Robert, *OMS* 5.136-54; Gauthier (1972); Crowther (1992); (1993); (1995); (1999).

⁶³ Tod (1913), 169-172; Ager (1996), 7. See Roebuck (2001) for the comparative perspective.

our earliest documentary source dates from the mid fifth century and the historical references, both literary and epigraphic, have been collected in catalogues of 61 items down to 338 BC and 171 for 337-90 BC.⁶⁴ In our historians, moreover, we see mediation embedded, from an early stage, in moral language concerning the act of going to war. Peace treaties frequently established arbitration as the necessary means of dispute resolution and offers to go to arbitration (sometimes explicit challenges to accept arbitration) between would-be belligerents clearly represented an important preliminary to war, at the least an effort to displace responsibility for beginning hostilities if not always a serious attempt to avert them.⁶⁵

What is particularly striking in our evidence for the Greek world, however, is the eagerness of third parties to arbitrate and/or mediate the disputes of others. We find numerous unsolicited offers – which on at least one occasion had seriously adverse consequences for the would-be mediator, Rhodes –⁶⁶ and even where arbitration was sought by disputing parties it involved prominent citizens from the arbitrating *polis* spending a possibly prolonged (and certainly unremunerated) period away from home. Furthermore, they were unlikely to be compensated for their efforts with civic honours which would have a prestige value in their own community – the usual reward of external benefactors. The losing city would be unlikely to reward judges who had rejected their claims, and the city which benefited most would hardly wish to cast doubt on the impartiality and thus authority of the verdict, leaving it vulnerable to future challenge, by granting honours which asserted the partiality of the judges. The only cases in which such honours were granted, indeed, was when the

⁶⁴ Piccirilli (1973); Ager (1996).

⁶⁵ Thuc. 1.145 (cf. 140.2); see Low (2007), 105-8. The arbitration provisions in treaties were not always particularly detailed, apparently assuming goodwill, but some were more so than others, see Ager (1996), 7-8.

⁶⁶ Plb. 21.29.10-19.

attempt to arbitrate failed.⁶⁷ The most likely explanation is that performing these functions was a source of prestige in itself, both for the *poleis* which sent representatives to arbitrate a dispute and the arbitrators themselves. For a Greek city being known as having rendered an impartial verdict in a dispute between other *poleis* – especially being known to have been asked to perform this function – was of value in itself, important for the construction of its identity in this social world of cities. The precise value, of course, depended on the status of the states in dispute – the more exalted they were, the greater the prestige to be gained from successfully mediating between them (one of the reasons, perhaps, that the Rhodians were particularly keen to intercede between the Romans and Antiochus III). For the individual arbitrator, successful participation in this activity which brought honour to his own city is likely to have been a source of prestige for himself within it.

When states sought an arbitrator, conversely, while the most important criterion was neutrality, there also seems to have been a preference expressed for arbitrators who were powerful in their own right, whose position would lend most authority to the eventual judgement and leave it least open to challenge. In the Hellenistic period this often meant kings. After the domination of Rome, from c. 200 BC, it was the senate which was most frequently requested to mediate, with all the most intractable cases reaching Rome.⁶⁸ This process is important for understanding how the interstate structure of the Mediterranean world changed in that it was not simply top-down, but rather reflected the initiative of the Greek cities in seeking to involve the Romans in their disputes.⁶⁹ However, even if the Roman magistrates and

⁶⁷ Would-be Rhodian arbitrators were honoured by only the Delphians, after the Amphissans failed to turn up, *FD* III 3 383 (=Ager 1996, n. 117); Magnesians were honoured by both parties after the breakdown in the arbitration, *I.Magnesia* 65a +75; 65b + 76 (=Ager 1996, n.127).

⁶⁸ The ‘repeaters’ – Melitaia and Narthakion, Samos and Priene, and Sparta and both Messene and Megalopolis – were finally settled by Rome, Ager (1996), 28.

⁶⁹ So Gruen (1984), 97-131.

senate rarely intervened directly in cases themselves, at least in the early period, by delegating the task of arbitration to other communities, they nonetheless participated in having their authority, and their dominant position, recognised.⁷⁰ Roman domination did not preclude other instances of interstate arbitration which were not remitted to Rome – from the epigraphic point of view, the second century BC constituted a high point in the number of arbitrations attested in general. Even provincialization apparently did not prevent cities within a province turning to other *poleis*, as Priene and Miletos did in calling on Erythrai and Sardis in c.91/0 BC.⁷¹ As in the case of other institutions in this study, however, the first century BC does appear to have been a turning point after which interstate arbitration rapidly ceases to be attested – and it is clear that the practice itself was transformed.

Territorial disputes between cities continued under the Roman Empire and they continued to be resolved. On occasion a third community might even be called on to do the legwork.⁷² However, as the Roman presence became permanent, Roman governors or officers sent specially by the emperor increasingly took on the task of resolving these disputes themselves.⁷³ There came a point when it was no longer a question of cities agreeing on a third community to settle their differences – probably when the use of violence to attempt to resolve them ceased to be a realistic possibility. Authority in these disputes no longer resided with the communities themselves, to be delegated to a third community for resolution, it belonged to Rome (as did the decision that arbitration of a dispute was required). By the time we see examples of the resolution of territorial disputes in the high imperial period, international arbitration – ‘voluntary submission to the verdict of a neutral tribunal’ – is no longer

⁷⁰ Kallet-Marx (1995), 148-83, for this important nuance.

⁷¹ Ager (1996), no.171 (=I.Priene 111, 120, 121).

⁷² e.g. IG IX 2 261.

⁷³ Ager (1996), 28 n.73.

at issue.⁷⁴ Dispute resolution was one of the functions performed by the imperial hierarchy – and it was probably performed quite well – but it represents another way in which the world of the Greek *polis* was transformed.

2.4 Foreign Judges

In the Hellenistic period the institution of foreign judges similarly represented a solution to the problem of finding neutral means of settling disputes. In this instance the issue was finding courts which were equally acceptable to individuals – whether because one litigant was a non-citizen, or because the city in question was too small to be able to empanel a jury which would not contain individuals bound by ties of obligation to one of the citizen litigants. For this problem foreign judges represented an ingenious and distinctly Greek solution. Brought in from another *poleis*, often one at some remove from the particular city or cities, and thus unconnected to any of the litigants in question, a relatively small panel could work through even a large judicial backlog.⁷⁵ Ideologically the use of this institution, which developed towards the end of the fourth century, presented some difficulties as, ideally, jurisdiction within a *polis* was a citizen monopoly.⁷⁶ This difficulty is reflected in the emphasis which the surviving texts frequently place on reconciliation as the primary function of foreign judges, with actual adjudication represented as a regrettable recourse to be pursued only when reaching a negotiated settlement agreeable to both parties proved impossible.⁷⁷ Despite these ideological problems, which perhaps diminished with the passage of time, because of its effectiveness this institution was very widely used

⁷⁴ Tod (1913), 182.

⁷⁵ Such backlogs often reflected, and constituted, social crises, Robert, *OMS*, 5.146-7.

⁷⁶ So Aristotle, *Pol.* 1275a19-b22; cf. *Syll.*³ 647 l.10-18 and 28-34.

⁷⁷ *IG XII 6 95* is a particularly good example in which reconciliation is much more prominent than judgement. See Robert, *OMS* 5.145.

indeed, as the substantial epigraphic record, which incorporates 250 decrees honouring foreign judges, shows.⁷⁸

As in the case of *proxenia*, of course, the institution of foreign judges could only fulfil this useful function because the cities involved were successful in co-opting outsiders to perform the roles set out for them. The inducement was the same – prestige – but, in contrast with *proxenia*, it functioned at two levels – both at the level of individual foreign judges and at the level of the *polis* which responded to the request of another city and chose and dispatched a panel of its citizens there. This dual level at which prestige operated is clearly expressed by the honorific decrees which the city receiving foreign judges passed in honour firstly of the city which dispatched them, and then of the judges themselves. The importance which the dispatching cities themselves invested in these marks of honour from other cities is evident in the fact that they so frequently published these decrees honouring themselves. More than half of the decrees for foreign judges (138 of 250) were inscribed by the home *polis* of the judges rather than the *polis* which received them and passed the decree in their honour. By contrast, only a handful of the more than two thousand decrees granting *proxenia* (excluding foreign judges decrees) were inscribed at the *polis* of the *proxenos*.⁷⁹

Like the other institutions which we have considered by which *poleis* constructed honorific links with each other, the epigraphic record for foreign judge decrees attests to a now familiar trend – the quantity of material declines sharply in the first century BC. This reduction is even more marked in the case of foreign judges

⁷⁸ On the development of this institution, see Crowther (1992) 39-40; I am very grateful to Charles Crowther who supplied the comprehensive catalogue of foreign judge inscriptions on which the analysis and graph in this section are based.

⁷⁹ See above, Chapter 2, 112-13 with n.66.

decrees because these reach their peak in the second century BC and are, in fact, far better attested in even the second half of that century than in the preceding period.




Fig. 9 Graph showing the chronological distribution of decrees honouring foreign judges, inscribed by the *polis* granting the honours (which received the judges) and the judges' own city respectively.⁸⁰

It is important to reiterate again that this is direct evidence that the number of decrees inscribed declined rather than for a reduction in the quantity or frequency of the use of this institution. Given the importance for the functioning of this institution of prestige, however, as for the other institutions studied, the fact that inscription was curtailed, which was one of the primary means of by which prestige was expressed, is likely to be important for understanding this institution and its evolution.

We do, in fact, have more evidence for the use of foreign judges in the Roman period than for almost any other Hellenistic institution. Julien Fournier's catalogue of material for foreign judges in this period, although including no honorific decrees, lists some twenty eight separate items, although fifteen of these relate to Mylasa and take the form of dedications made by panels of foreign judges there (AD 100-200, with a further funeral monument known at Paros for an individual who also served as

⁸⁰ See above, n.78.

a judge there).⁸¹ The provision of neutral courts clearly remained an issue in the Roman period, perhaps even beyond the limited areas represented in this material (Lykia and Caria, Thessaly and the Peloponnese). It should not surprise us that, rather than bearing the administrative and financial burden of meeting that need themselves, some later Roman governors who had responsibility for jurisdiction in their provinces made use of this institution in the same way as Cicero as governor in Cilicia had – surely for reasons of practicality as well as its avowed popularity with the Greeks.⁸²

The different sorts of monument which attest foreign judges in the Roman period, however, reveal the way in which this institution was transformed in its use within the Roman system. There is no longer a question of emphasising links between cities or the position of one *polis* in relation to other *poleis*. In all but the dedicatory texts, the purpose of these monuments is to honour individuals within their own cities, who derive prestige from the performance of different duties in relation to this institution – not because of honorific links they thereby had with other communities, but as though for (and in parallel with) their performance of other, *polis*-internal liturgies.⁸³ In these texts honour and prestige are apparently derived by elites not from constituting links to other *poleis*, but from fulfilling functions and liturgies within their own *polis*.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Fournier (2010), 607-9; Kantor (2011) adds a further item, *SEG* 54 1103 (another Mylasan dedication).

⁸² *Graeci vero exsultant quod peregrinis iudicibus utuntur*, *Cic. Att.* VI. 1 1.15.

⁸³ It is noticeable that the majority of honorands attested in this connection are honoured for their services in relation to foreign judges coming to the city – as *dikastagoi*, envoys sent to bring back judges (*IG* V 1 39; 819; *SEG* 11 491; 493; 496) or *epistatai*, responsible for caring for the judges in the city (*TAM* II 420; 583; and 915) or, in one case, for paying them (*I.Stratonikeia* 229). Only in two career inscriptions is actual service as a foreign judge mentioned (*SEG* 11 491, alongside and after service as *dikastagogos*, and *IG* XII 5 305, the Parian funeral epigram).

⁸⁴ This is signalled clearly in the Peloponnesian texts – two specify the cities to which the individuals were sent to bring back jurors, but, indicating that this information was optional, and relatively unimportant, the other three simply specify ‘Asia’ (*SEG* 11 493; *IG* V 1 39; presumably the Roman province), and, probably, ‘Thessaly’ (*IG* V 1 819).

3 From Anarchy to Hierarchy: the Transformation of the Greek World

Together the evidence for these institutions reveals a striking shift away from regularly monumentalizing links with other communities – to the extent that most of the interstate institutions which defined the Greek world of *poleis* vanish completely from the epigraphic record during the first century BC. Although the epigraphic traditions and trajectories of individual communities, or even institutions, may represent an insecure basis for interpretation, as being vulnerable to the vagaries of archaeological recovery, the overall picture here is clear and secure – not only because of the amount of material of different kinds which contributes to it, the wide range of different *poleis* from which it comes, but also because of the way in which the trends exhibited by these different elements coincide. From the mid second century BC onwards, the ‘Low Hellenistic’ identified by Robert as a distinct period, the shift away from inscribing this institutional framework begins.⁸⁵ This is indicative of an increasingly reduced emphasis placed on inter-*polis* connections, reflected in a broader reduction in the frequency of inter-*polis* interactions of these kinds. After this period of transition our evidence for these institutions shows that, relatively early on in the principate, the decline of some of these institutional elements and evolution of others was complete. The dissolution of a system of interstate institutions which had, for hundreds of years, shaped the way in which *poleis* constructed relations with each other, reflects a profound transformation – which I argue relates to a change in orientation of this interstate system, from anarchy to hierarchy, from a world of Greek *poleis* to a Roman world-empire. It is not enough, however, to simply point to the ‘unipolarity’ of this new system.⁸⁶ To understand this change and the role of

⁸⁵ Robert, *OMS* 2.841.

⁸⁶ Wiemer (2010).

individual actors within it is necessary to explore how the position of *poleis* altered along with their capacity for and motivations in interacting with each other.

One important question must be considered first. Did Greek cities' ability to use these institutions change from the point at which the institutions I have studied effectively cease to be attested in the epigraphic record and the point where they seem to genuinely disappear, sometime afterwards? Whereas the wider epigraphic trend probably begins too early – and is too gradual – to represent the consequence of direct Roman intervention, by the time the institutional elements themselves either seem to have been forgotten or transformed, Roman control had long been permanent and invasive. What, therefore, was the role of any active changes which the Romans themselves made by intervening directly in the political organization or actions of *poleis*, or in regulating their activities?

Under the empire, Romans, beginning with Augustus, certainly showed a great willingness to intervene, even in the affairs of those cities to which they had granted the title of 'free.'⁸⁷ We also have examples in which Roman authorities intervened directly to restrict at least one element which had been central to the system of interstate institutions – the granting of citizenship – attesting to both direct intervention in a particular case (Augustus' prohibition on the Athenians selling citizenship) and the promulgation of a general restrictive regulation (Pompey's law prohibiting the cities in Bithynia from granting citizenship to each other's citizens).⁸⁸ In addition to this sort of specific measure, restricting, in these instances, the range of institutions which cities could use to construct relations with each other, it is worth considering a more general development thought to have taken place under Roman hegemony – the domination of authority within *poleis* by the *boule*. The Romans were

⁸⁷ Bowersock (1965), 88, on Augustus' interference in Athens, Sparta, Thessaly, Cyzicus, Tyre, and Sidon.

⁸⁸ Dio 54.7.1; Pliny *ep.* 10.114.

predisposed to favour more oligarchic constitutional arrangements which entrusted the greater part of political power to wealthier elements of the state. As a result, it is argued, they therefore encouraged (or enforced) the establishment within *poleis* of permanent *boulai* which, on the model of the Roman senate, had their basis in a property qualification, and increasingly came to dominate political decision making within the *polis* at the expense of popular assemblies.⁸⁹ These developments have been represented as bringing about ‘the end of democracy,’ introducing an age of political exclusion and apathy.⁹⁰ They have also been held responsible for the reduction in inscribed decrees as well as a decrease in inter-*polis* diplomacy as a result of a ‘loss of communal consciousness.’⁹¹

However, although the general trends underlying this thesis can be plausibly identified in our evidence, we should be careful about extrapolating too far and assuming that the Romans had an active interest in suppressing this sort of inter-*polis* activity. We do see more evidence for the permanent appointment of *bouleutai* in Greek cities from the first century BC onwards, but in some cities annual or even bi-annual appointment remained the norm.⁹² Roman political preferences might be written into local constitutions as a punitive measure, but we have no reason to think they were systematically imposed.⁹³ The Greek cities were too useful in reducing the burden of empire for the Romans to want to attempt to impose constitutions which the Greeks would not accept, or which might impair the administrative efficiency on

⁸⁹ So de Ste. Croix (1981), 518-37, for the material; Jones (1940), 170-2 and 180-91; Magie (1950), esp. 114-5.

⁹⁰ e.g. Lintott (1993), 147, ‘By the end of the Roman republic it must be doubtful if a city assembly remained which was still democratic by classical standards.’ But see Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 531-6, for the flexibility of the term democracy, and 548-9, for its continuation.

⁹¹ Jones (1999), 112-3.

⁹² For nuanced accounts of the processes involved in the Low Hellenistic period, see Hamon (2005) and Heller (2009). Karystus retained a *boule* selected by lot (*IG XII 9 11*); two colleges of *bouleutai* per year remain the norm at Rhodes (e.g. *I.Lindos 707*), but see Heller (2009), 353-4, arguing that these institutional features can be reconciled with elite control of the *boule* in these *poleis* as well.

⁹³ Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 548.

which that usefulness depended.⁹⁴ Moreover, many of the processes involved in the elite capture of the *boule*, although intensified by the structural dynamics of Roman domination and Roman ideological preferences, had their genesis in the earlier Hellenistic *polis*.⁹⁵ In recent scholarship it has also become increasingly apparent that the domination of the *polis* by the *boule* has been overstated.⁹⁶ Although rumoured in relation to the *poleis* allied with Anthony after the battle of Actium, we have little evidence for the abolition of public assemblies.⁹⁷ As far as we can see assemblies continued to represent the norm and, rather than simply rubber-stamping decisions of the *boule*, it is clear in some of our limited sources that they remained a context in which issues of importance to those involved were debated and decided.⁹⁸

In fact, even the attested instances of Roman intervention in elements of the Greek system of interstate institutions – in particular the granting of citizenship – illuminate what continued, and demonstrate the limits of active Roman efforts to regulate in this area. The intervention of Augustus at Athens, couched as a prohibition specifically on the sale of citizenship rather than on granting in general, shows not only the expectation that citizenship, as an honour, had continued hitherto and would continue to be granted – it also clearly reveals that it continued to be perceived as valuable. The Pompeian law relating to the Bithynian cities is even more striking. Again grants of citizenship in general are still permitted (and expected) – it is simply

⁹⁴ Bowersock (1965), 87; even according to more pessimistic accounts, citizenship of a *polis* continued to involve considerably more participation than in a Roman *colonia* or *municipium*: Lintott (1993), 147; cf. Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 549.

⁹⁵ See, *inter alios*, Veyne (1976); Gauthier (1985); Quass (1993); and Hamon (2005).

⁹⁶ See in general Fernoux (2011); de Ste. Croix (1981), 518-37, provides a wealth of material but draws the wrong conclusions; Kuhn (2008), 115-28, explores mechanisms of communal control over the elite and, at 145-6, representations of the *demos* and *boule* as equal partners, capable of conflict; Zuiderhoek (2008) reconciles the evidence for increasingly oligarchic *boulai* with an active assembly. On the picture of active Greek political life painted by the surviving speeches of Dio, especially with regards to the assembly, see especially Ma (2000); Vujčić (2009); and Kuhn (2008). See also, already, Jones (1978), 91-2 and (1971), 111.

⁹⁷ Dio 51.2.1 with Bowersock (1965), 85-6.

⁹⁸ Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 549; Vujčić (2009), esp. 168; Fernoux (2011), 251-322, gives a comprehensive discussion of the different sorts of business they transacted.

grants between Bithynian cities which are prohibited.⁹⁹ Moreover, the fact that by the time Pliny mentions this legislation (and probably long before) it had become a dead letter shows the limitations on the ability of successive governors, and probably their relative lack of desire, to enforce this sort of regulation in the face of Greek resistance.

In short, we have no evidence that any deliberate action taken by the Romans was separately responsible for the dissolution of this system of interstate institutions after its prolonged decline in the epigraphic record. Consideration of a partial parallel for the situation which the Greek cities found themselves in, dominated by Rome, may help illuminate why the Romans were not concerned to intervene heavily in this area. In her book, *Hellenistic Democracies*, Susanne Carlsson suggests a comparison with *poleis* which lost their political independence and came to be absorbed by other *poleis* – the example given is Kalymna which ceases to engage in certain sorts of interstate activity after being integrated, as a deme, within the *polis* of Kos.¹⁰⁰ As Carlsson acknowledges, there are significant differences – *poleis* did not apparently lose their *polis* status as a result of their subordination under the Roman empire. The comparison is nonetheless interesting in that it forces us to explore the contrast between the roles which these sorts of inter-*polis* interactions play in each case. The crucial difference is that, as I have argued in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, dominant *poleis* had a strong stake in restricting their dependent communities from using this institutional language of inter-*polis* interaction because it implied a status which conflicted with the dominant *polis*' claims to own and control. Conversely, within a Roman Empire in which the Greek *poleis* were by that time firmly established as subordinate, the claims which most of these institutions made, with the possible exception of *symmachia* and international arbitration, above all to *polis*

⁹⁹ Pliny *ep.* 10.114.

¹⁰⁰ Carlsson (2010), 284.

status, were not capable of conflicting with Roman claims to rule. It is in fact possible that it was because this institutional language lost this force and potency, that it ceased to be used by *poleis* – now that even *polis* status ultimately depended more on guarantees from Rome than interactions with other *poleis*.

It is striking that when we do see evidence for the extension of Roman influence over the different facets of political life in the Greek *poleis*, the initiative often seems to arise from Greek individuals and cities themselves – underlining their agency in this process. The logic which led Greek cities to seek Roman arbitration, and Greek individuals Roman adjudication – the desire for the most authoritative decisions – also led certain *poleis* on occasion to refer their communal decrees to their Roman governors for confirmation (*epikyrosis*). That this confirmation was not, for the most part, a Roman-imposed requirement is made clear by the fact that the inscribers of most of the surviving decrees saw no need to include any mention of Roman approval. On one occasion the governor's response to a request for his approval explicitly makes this clear as well.¹⁰¹ When asked by the city of Sidyma to ratify their decree to establish a *gerousia*, Pomponius Bassos replied that it was his praise that was called for rather than his ratification (κυροῦσθαι), since their own decision was authoritative.¹⁰² It is an indication of the degree of autonomy that this city still possessed that it was told that it had the authority to make this sort of major constitutional change. It is revealing, however, that the authorities of Sidyma thought it desirable to get the governor to say as much and took the decision to have this confirmation of their decision (which may have been internally contentious), and recognition of their authority, inscribed on stone. Plutarch knew well and aptly

¹⁰¹ Rhodes with Lewis (1997), 547; on these in general see Oliver (1954).

¹⁰² *TAM* II 175.

described the dynamics of the phenomenon involved, and its effect on the political institutions of the Greek cities:

Ποιοῦντα μέντοι καὶ παρέχοντα τοῖς κρατοῦσιν εὐπειθῆ τὴν πατρίδα δεῖ μὴ προσεκταπεινοῦν, μηδὲ τοῦ σκέλους δεδεμένου προσυποβάλλειν καὶ τὸν τράχηλον, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι, καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μείζω φέροντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἐξονειδίζουσι τὴν δουλείαν, μᾶλλον δ' ὅλως τὴν πολιτείαν ἀναιροῦσι, καταπληῖγα καὶ περιδεᾶ καὶ πάντων ἄκυρον ποιοῦντες. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ χωρὶς ἰατροῦ μήτε δειπνεῖν μήτε λούεσθαι συνεθισθέντες οὐδ' ὅσον ἢ φύσις δίδωσι χρῶνται τῷ ὑγιαίνειν, οὕτως οἱ παντὶ δόγματι καὶ συνεδρίῳ καὶ χάριτι καὶ διοικήσει προσάγοντες ἡγεμονικὴν κρίσιν ἀναγκάζουσιν ἑαυτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ βούλονται δεσπότης εἶναι τοὺς ἡγουμένους. αἰτία δὲ τούτου μάλιστα πλεονεξία καὶ φιλονεικία τῶν πρώτων· ἢ γὰρ ἐν οἷς βλάπτουσι τοὺς ἐλάττονας ἐκβιάζονται φεύγειν τὴν πόλιν ἢ περὶ ὧν διαφέρονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ ἀξιοῦντες ἐν τοῖς πολίταις ἔχειν ἕλαττον ἐπάγονται τοὺς κρείττονας· ἐκ τούτου δὲ καὶ βουλή καὶ δῆμος καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ ἀρχὴ πᾶσα τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἀπόλλυσι.

However, the statesman, while making his native state readily obedient to its sovereigns, must not further humble it; nor, when the leg has been fettered, go on and subject the neck to the yoke, as some do who, by constantly referring everything, great or small, to the sovereigns, bring the reproach of slavery upon their country, or rather wholly destroy its constitutional government, making it dazed, timid and powerless in everything. For just as those who have become accustomed neither to dine nor to bath except by the physician's orders do not even enjoy that degree of health which nature grants them, so those who invite the sovereign's decision on every decree, meeting of a council, granting of an honour, or administrative measure, force their sovereign to be their master more than he desires. And the cause of this is chiefly the greed and contentiousness of the foremost citizens; for either in cases in which they are injuring their inferiors, they force them into exile from the State, or, in matters concerning which they differ among themselves, since they are unwilling to occupy an inferior position among their fellow-citizens, they call in those who are mightier; and as a result senate, popular assembly, courts, and the entire local government lose their authority.¹⁰³

As we saw in the case of *asylia* campaigns, the function performed by titles and status-designations was transformed in a similar way. Rome's recognition of city-status came to be sought first as being the most authoritative and prestigious, but later, as Rome's position became more absolute, theirs became the only declaration that was

¹⁰³ Plutarch *Praec. Ger. Reip.* 814E-815A; Loeb trans., adapted.

required. It was no longer that cities were given Roman acknowledgement of the terms they used to describe themselves – the titles granted by the Roman authorities were ones which cities could not otherwise lay claim to. Alongside the evolution of *asylia* into a specifically defined right of *asylum*, under the Roman principate a new set of honorific titles were developed. Although some, like *metropolis*, were derived from terms earlier used between cities to construct relations between each other, these titles only made sense within the Roman provincial system. Cities sought to obtain the designation of *metropolis* or *prōtē polis* of the province, or to be *neokoros*, the province's centre of imperial cult.¹⁰⁴ Cities also frequently emphasised the authority lying behind these titles and their success in obtaining them by adding in their references – ‘according to the decrees of the Senate’ or ‘in accordance with the judgements of emperors.’¹⁰⁵ Moreover, when these titles were granted it was not just the right to use them with reference to the imperial hierarchy that was at issue – cities were now obliged to use these honorific titles in reference to each other.¹⁰⁶ In Dio Chrysostom's speech addressed to Nikomedia on concord with Nikaia we see how bitterly such titlature could be disputed, but this episode also makes clear that these titles depended only on relations with the Roman emperor.¹⁰⁷ The Nikomedians asserted sole right to be inscribed as *prōtos*, a title which they received from Domitian in addition to their earlier title of *metropolis*.¹⁰⁸ It was only, however, when the Nikeians backed Septimius Severus' unsuccessful competitor for the imperial power

¹⁰⁴ Robert *OMS* 6.228; on ‘*metropolis*’ in civic titlature, Bowersock (1985); on *prōteia*, Robert (1969), 287-8; for a detailed account of the significance of these titles, see Helle (2006), 283-338.

¹⁰⁵ Jones (1999), 118.

¹⁰⁶ We possess a letter from Antoninus Pius to Ephesus explaining that the Smyrnians' omission of these titles must have been a mistake – which it surely was not, *Syll.*³ 849.

¹⁰⁷ Other examples of such disputes: Aristid. *Or.* 23; on inter-civic disputes in general, see Heller (2006); Kuhn (2008), 138-44.

¹⁰⁸ Dio 38.28 with Jones (1978), 84. cf. Beroia, which petitioned for the right to be the *only* necorate *polis* in its province (τοῦ μόνην αὐτὴν ἔχιν τὴν νεωκορίαν), *I.Beroia* 117 l.5-6.

that the Nikomedians had their wish and the title *protos* was erased from the titulature of their rival city, Nikeia, and, literally, from its civic monuments.¹⁰⁹

3.1 The End of Peer-Polity Interaction?

When we consider both the epigraphic disappearance and subsequent dissolution of the Greek system of interstate institutions we are dealing with a Greek response – first to the domination of Rome and then to the establishment of the Roman emperor as an absolute authority. Various elements of these institutions had performed valuable functions, but as a whole they relied on the fact that prestige and status, both for individuals within the *polis* and *poleis* amongst themselves, was generated in this interstate system by the creation of honorific connections and relationships between different communities. It was a pluralistic system in which authority was dispersed, albeit never evenly, between the state-actors within it. It was worthwhile, important even, for a *polis* to seek recognition of the *asylia* of its shrine from distant, minor *poleis*, or incorporate apparently inconsequential communities within its network of *theorodokoi* or *proxenoi*. Similarly, for *poleis* and individuals within them, it made sense to perform both concrete and symbolic services for other communities and enter into interactions involving the expenditure of time and resources (e.g. *proxenia* or *theoria*) because standing in *polis*-society was to a significant extent dependent on these links and acts.

Rome's rise to a position of domination first reduced the importance for *poleis* of advertising or commemorating these social networks in that it constituted a higher and more final authority. Eventually, by monopolising authority within the interstate system and thereby symbols of prestige, it also undermined the euergetical basis of

¹⁰⁹ Jones (1978), 87; Robert, *OMS* 6.14-15; texts: Schneider (1938), 45 no. 11 and 46 no. 14-5.

these institutions, breaking the bond between honour and function on which they had relied. In part the process which we see in our evidence was one of displacement. Rome took over, and was asked to assume, some of the functions which these institutions had fulfilled. Rome constituted a new, more authoritative source of prestige and political identity, granting titles and other marks of status and enforcing their use between communities. Some of the institutional effort which cities had previously placed into establishing and maintaining links with peer-polities – in the form of honours and especially delegations – was now redirected to Rome. This is clearly reflected in the very frequent, sometimes more than annual, embassies sent by individual *poleis* to the emperor there.¹¹⁰ It is difficult, however, to deny, when we consider the frequency and intensity of institutional inter-*polis* interaction in the Hellenistic period, that this process also entailed some sort of absolute decline.

Did this cease to be a peer-polity world, a world in which inter-*polis* interaction no longer mattered? Given the various different ways which research of the last twenty years has clearly demonstrated that particular forms of civic culture continued to flourish – festivals, *koina*, and new forms of interaction, as at Claros – this might seem somewhat difficult to maintain.¹¹¹ Above all the works of Dio Chrysostom arguing in favour of the establishment of *homonoia* between cities, and the disputes over relative status and precedence which they presuppose, clearly show the continued importance of relations and rivalries between *poleis* – and the various *homonoia* coinages allow us to see these processes taking place more broadly.¹¹² The competitive context of the Greek *polis* remained other *poleis* – its peers against whom

¹¹⁰ For a catalogue of the evidence see Souris (1982); see also Millar (1977), 410-34. Some frequent ambassadors to emperors: *OGIS* 494; *IGR* III 628; 982.

¹¹¹ Festivals: on the more high profile festivals, see now *SEG* 56 1359, the new letters of Hadrian to the Dionysiac artists inscribed at Alexandria Troas; for the result of a profusion of festivals at the local level, see *I Aph2007* 15.330. Asserting the continuation of peer-polity interaction into the imperial period, Ma (2003), 37.

¹¹² Jones (1999), 112.

each continued to compare and assert itself. The emphasis, however, had shifted fundamentally. The symbols from which cities derived status were no longer generated by or obtained from links within the network of *poleis*. Instead these were obtained from outside, and were dependent on continuing relations with the authorities of, and ultimately emperor at, Rome who enforced their use between cities. This dependence is exemplified by the well-known delegations sent by cities to each new emperor, on his accession, to obtain assurance of the continuation of their status and privileges.¹¹³

These were titles and privileges, moreover, which made sense only within a Roman imperial conception of the world, where each city's 'region of primary interaction', its primary context for competitive display – which cities had earlier defined for themselves as a result of their own interactions – were now administratively defined provinces. This was no longer a world constructed by the honorific inter-relations of *poleis*. The age of *proxeny* had passed, and, though *poleis* continued to inhabit this world, it was defined by Rome and empire.

A letter sent by the Emperor Hadrian to Naryx in AD 137/8 shows clearly what had stayed the same – and what had changed:

Ἀγαθῆ ἑὺ Τύχη·
 Ἀυτοκράτωρ Καῖσαρ θεοῦ Τραϊανοῦ ἑὺ
 Παρθικοῦ υἱός, θεοῦ Νερούα υἱωνός, Τραϊανός
 Ἀδριανός Σεβαστός, ἀρχιερεὺς μέγιστος,
 δημαρχικῆς ἐξουσίας· τὸ κβ´· αὐτοκράτωρ
 τὸ β´· ὑπατος τὸ γ´, πατὴρ πατρίδος ἑὺ *vacat*
 Ναυκεῖοις ἑὺ *vacat* χαίρειν· *vacat*
 οὐκ οἶμαι ἀμφιζβητήσειν τινὰ πόλιν
 ὑμᾶς ἔχειν καὶ πόλεως δίκαια, ὅποτε καὶ
 εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων συντελεῖ-
 τε καὶ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Βοιω-
 τάρχην παρέχετε καὶ Πανέλληνα αἰρεῖσθε
 καὶ θεγκόλον πέμπετε, καὶ ἐστὶν ὑμῖν καὶ βου-

¹¹³ Millar (1977), 410-8.

λή καὶ ἄρχοντες καὶ ἱερεῖς καὶ φυλαὶ Ἑλληνικαὶ
 καὶ νόμοι Ὀπουντίων, καὶ τελεῖτε φόρον με-
 τὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν · ἐμνήσθησαν δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ
 ποιηταὶ τινες τῶν ἐνλογιμωτάτων καὶ
 Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ Ἑλληγες ὡς Ναρυκεῖον ὀνομά-
 ζουσι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἡρώων τινὰς ἐκ τῆς πόλε-
 ως τῆς ὑμετέρας ὀρμηθέντας· τούτων ἕνεκα,
 εἰ καὶ παραλέλειπται ὑμῖν τὸ γράφειν πρὸς
 τοὺς αὐτοκράτορας καὶ παρ[--- ca. 12 ---]
 σεις λαμβάν[ειν-----]

With good fortune. Emperor Caesar, son of god Traianus Parthicus, grandson of god Nerva, Traianus Hadrianus Augustus, pontifex maximus, with tribunician power for the 22nd time, imperator for the second time, consul for the third time, father of his country, to the Narykians, greetings. I do not think that anyone will dispute that you possess a *polis* and the rights of a *polis*, seeing that you contribute to the League of the Amphictyons and to the League of the Boiotians, you provide a boiotarch, you choose a panhellene, you send a *theêkolos*, and you have a council, magistrates, priests, Greek tribes, and the laws of the Opuntians, and you pay tribute along with the Achaeans. You have also been mentioned by certain of the most famous poets, both Roman and Greek, as ‘Narykians’, and they also name certain of the heroes as having started from your *polis*. For these reasons, even if you have omitted writing to the emperors... ¹¹⁴

Hadrian reassures the Narykeians – no-one ought to be able to doubt their status as a *polis* given all of the ways in which they participate, as a *polis*, alongside other communities with *polis* status: contributing towards the Amphictyony, sending a boiotarch, choosing a panhellene, and sending their own *theokolos* (also to the Panhellenion). They also look like a *polis*, in terms of their political institutions, and are even recognised as such administratively by the Romans in the way they are obliged to pay tribute. It is significant, however, that in this exhaustive list of ‘proofs’ of *polis* status (which the Narykeians themselves probably rehearsed to Hadrian) the emphasis is on the involvement of Naryx in various super-*polis* organizations and there are none of the interstate institutions which I have discussed above, through which cities had previously in the Classical and Hellenistic periods performed their

¹¹⁴ *IG IX 1² 5* 2018; trans. Jones (2006), 152, adapted.

identity as *poleis*. Even the *theokolos* mentioned, which seems to resemble the *theoros* of previous inter-*polis* relations, is sent not to another *polis* or Greek shrine, but the Panhellenion established under Hadrian himself. The most significant point, however, is that none of these ‘proofs’ or performances of *polis* status was sufficient for the Narykeians (or for those who had presumably doubted their status).¹¹⁵ What mattered, what they sought, and got, and then commemorated on stone, was their emperor’s explicit recognition of their status and standing.

Conclusion: The End of the Age of Proxeny

As an institution *proxenia* derived its meaning from practical services which defined the *proxenos* as an intermediary, a link with other *poleis*. When *proxenia* did decline, however, under the Roman Empire, it was not because these practical services had ceased to be useful. Rather it was because the interstate system in which it operated had shifted as a whole so that Rome rather than networks between *poleis* became the focus for authority, prestige, and identity. *Proxenia* was not the only institution to be affected by this change in how *poleis* thought about each other, but in our evidence it is the one which appears to undergo the most profound transformation. What had been a global institution, founded on a shared and uniform *proxenos*-paradigm, all but disappeared. The later evidence suggests that, where it survived, *proxenia* lost its specific content and became fragmented, developing parochial functions within locally defined honorific systems. *Proxenia* was more deeply affected than other elements because it stood for *polis*-networking in its broadest sense.

¹¹⁵ Jones (2006) restores *καὶ παρ’ [αὐτῶν ἢ ἐκείνων βεβαίως] σεις λαμβάν[ειν]* and thus interprets the Narykeian delegation as an embassy seeking a renewal of existing rights of a well paralleled type sent only in this year perhaps because of the poverty of this community. But why now (137/8 AD)? Hadrian’s illness would seem to be a reason for avoiding seeking recognition of status at this point (if the normal pattern, which the Narykeians had failed to observe, was to petition on accession), unless there was a more pressing reason in this year to have it confirmed.

Conclusion

This thesis is both a study of the ancient Greek institution of *proxenia* and a contribution to the study of institutional theory and history more broadly. Having traced the decline and disappearance of *proxenia* in the last chapter, here, at the end of the thesis, it is helpful to revisit its central argument and themes.

In this thesis I developed a new model for understanding how *proxenia* was invested with meaning. I demonstrated that *proxenia* was defined by a coherent set of expectations that Greeks had of their *proxenoi* – the *proxenos*-paradigm – in which the honorific value of ‘*proxenos*’ as a title was directly dependent on its identity as a practical intermediary role. This ideal conception of *proxenia*, which was both universal and stable over five hundred years, operated effectively despite the changing political realities of the Greek cities. Building on this understanding of *proxenia*, as an institution which connected cities, I have explored the scale of the phenomenon and its potential as a source of information for regional and inter-regional interaction. The patterns of proxeny networking which this study has revealed emphasise the symbolic importance of *proxenia* in the context of a wider system of inter-*polis* institutions. *Proxenia*, I argued, played a particularly important role in enabling communities to maintain relations with each other, to assert, and have their status recognised, as *poleis*, within an interstate society which consisted of other *poleis*. Ultimately *proxenia* disappeared not because the intermediary services which formed part of the *proxenos*-paradigm had lost their utility, but because, with the disappearance of the anarchic conditions which had previously characterised the Greek world, *poleis* no longer thought about or valued their relations with each other in the same way.

At the same time as offering a new account of *proxenia* and its functions, this thesis brings out themes which are important for illustrating the role of institutions more broadly in shaping human behaviour at a variety of levels. The first of these themes is the role which institutions play in defining the interests which motivate both individuals and groups to act. For instance, I argue in Chapter 2 that *proxenia* was desirable and sought by individuals as an object in its own right because it functioned as a status symbol, signalling membership of the elite. In Chapter 3, I suggest, we see a similar phenomenon in relation to *poleis*, as collective actors, in their need to possess substantial networks of *proxenoi* to communicate their links with, and status in relation to, other *polis* communities. *Proxenia*, like other institutions, worked by giving specific shape to the social desires and drives which actors, individually and communally, possessed.

Institutions also shaped the means by which these interests were pursued. The *proxenos*-paradigm defined a highly specific role, a set of responses, both verbal and practical, constituting an institutional script which individuals who pursued *proxenia* were expected to perform – and similarly which *proxenoi*, if they wanted to advertise their possession of this status, conformed to. Moreover, we possess such extensive epigraphic evidence of the *proxenos*-paradigm because reproducing it and being seen to reproduce it was important for communities to signal that they shared the norms of inter-*polis* society.

However, while this thesis does bring out the various ways in which institutions could direct actors' outlook and activity, it also makes clear that it would be wrong to assign a deterministic significance to them. *Proxenia* functioned effectively as an institution because, as well as a generalised attitude, of friendship towards the granting *polis*, it involved a highly specific and narrow range of practical

services unlikely to conflict with individuals' other interests. Where it could be represented as conflicting with other institutionalized roles, particularly that of citizen, these often took precedence over *proxenia*. The institutional script of citizenship in particular permitted far more latitude in interpretation, for example in deciding precisely what the interests of the community were, so that even here individual agency remained. *Proxenia* was also capable of miscarrying, as I showed in my second chapter in relation to Alcibiades, the would-be *proxenos* of the Spartans. The case studies I explored in Chapter 4 demonstrated that *proxenia* could be used in idiosyncratic ways by *poleis* to construct specific sorts of relations with particular individuals and communities (e.g. with dominant *poleis* by honouring their officers). *Proxenia*, as an institution, constrained actions, directing them down specific lines in particular situations, but it also created possibilities which both individuals and cities exploited.

The approach taken to *proxenia* in this thesis provides a framework which could usefully be applied to understanding the evolution, adoption, and continuation of others sorts of institution as well – including apparently internal institutions, such as particular deliberative forms or magistracies. Other recent interpretations of institutional innovation concentrate on the pursuit of performance, the lowering of transaction costs, and efficiency gains.¹ In contrast, I would propose that the adoption and use of particular sorts of civic forms, as well as the persistence of local idiosyncratic institutions, should be understood, at least in part, in terms of the normative model of institutional isomorphism explored here – that is in social terms, as communal performances of legitimacy and identity, particularly within specific local or regional contexts.

¹ Ober (2010), 276-8; Bresson (2007-8).

This thesis, however, is also about Greek epigraphy and the interrogation of epigraphic records. In particular, it represents a prolonged engagement with the issue of how to interpret substantial quantities of epigraphic material produced by a large number of different communities while allowing for the processes of selection which, as I argued in my Introduction, shape and distort all samples of epigraphic material. In this thesis I have therefore developed a number of complementary methodologies for interpreting epigraphic traditions: a detailed analysis of how the formulaic language of decrees works (Chapter 1); an examination of surviving material which provides a representative quantitative overview of the phenomenon (Chapter 3); and a method of representing, using quantitative probability distribution, the chronological development of specific epigraphic traditions (e.g. the inscription of proxeny decrees or honorific decrees for foreign judges by the granting *polis*) and interpreting the significance of the trends which they reveal (Chapter 5). These approaches will contribute to future work on institutional history in the ancient world from the epigraphic record, but these studies as they stand will also, I hope, provide useful ways of situating individual monuments and epigraphic traditions within their broader interpretative context.

During this thesis the difficulty of talking about *the polis* has been repeatedly underlined – for example in the multiplicity of perspectives which the epigraphic record yields, and, indeed, in the very nature of *proxenia* as an inter-*polis* institution. The difficulty identified here, however, is not the one which Kostas Vlassopoulos recently argued had a ‘pernicious effect on the study of ancient history’ – namely the failure to recognise that small to middling and hegemonic *poleis* are two completely distinct types of polity.² Rather it is the artificiality of considering a single *polis* in

² Vlassopoulos (2007), 92-6.

isolation. This emerges clearly in Polybius' attempt to do just that, when he describes, in order to clearly explain the basic dynamics of constitutional change, the life-cycle of a sort of petri-dish *polis* apart – arising from a conglomeration of primitive, indeed bestial, men, and, after running the full gamut of constitutional forms, dissolving once more into savage individualists.³ In this thesis I have argued that 'the *polis*' was a system phenomenon – or, better, that we should think in terms of a self-supporting network of *poleis*. To be a *polis* was to be one among other *poleis*. To be a *polis* did not require complete external independence or even necessarily full internal autonomy, but it did require the ability, which, as I showed in my fourth chapter, not all urbanized political communities possessed, to enter into relations with other *poleis*. In short, to be a *polis*, at least before the Roman emperors, was to engage in inter-*polis* interaction.

Throughout their history, impotence and vulnerability to oppression and exploitation was the base state of most Greek urbanized communities.⁴ However, as *poleis*, they constituted the characteristic state type in probably the most populous state-system in recorded history. Even under the Persian Empire and the later Hellenistic kingdoms, *poleis* defined the interstate fabric of the Mediterranean world – as a society of *poleis*. The system of inter-*polis* concepts and institutions, including *proxenia*, which they evolved as a result of continual interaction represented the dominant discourse which would-be interstate actors of other kinds (*ethne*, federations, non-Greek cities, and even dynasts) adopted to assert their legitimacy, and into which even definitely non-*polis* actors (Hellenistic Kings and their courts) were drawn. This illustrates the importance of institutions in shaping the way in which individuals and communities think, their aims and their methods in pursuing them.

³ Plb. 6.5-9.

⁴ Gauthier (1984), 85-7.

Proxenia was both central to and embodied a particularly highly developed, self-perpetuating system of institutions which only the profoundest of interstate transformations unseated.

Bibliography

- Ager, S. (1996) *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337-90 B.C.* Berkeley.
- Alcock, S.E. (1995) 'Pausanias and the *Polis*: Use and Abuse', in *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State*, ed. M. H. Hansen. Copenhagen: 326-44.
- Ampolo, C. and Parra, M. C. (2001) *Da un'antica città di Sicilia: i decreti di Entella e Nakone, catalogo della Mostra*. Pisa.
- Anderson, G. (2009) 'The Personality of the Greek State', *JHS* 129: 1-22.
- Archibald, Z. (2001) 'Making the Most of One's Friends: Western Asia Minor in the Early Hellenistic Age', in *Hellenistic Economies*, eds. Z. Archibald *et al.*, London: 245-72.
- Arnush, M. (1992) 'Ten-Day Armistices in Thucydides', *GRBS* 33: 329-53.
——— (2000) 'Argead and Aetolian Relations with the Delphic Polis in the Late Fourth Century BC', in *Alternatives to Athens*, eds. R. Brock and S. Hodkinson. Oxford: 293-307.
- Arafat, K. and Morgan, C. (1994) 'Athens, Etruria and the Heuneburg: Mutual Misconceptions in the Study of Greek-Barbarian Relations', in *Classical Greece: Ancient Histories and Modern Archaeologies*, ed. I. Morris. Cambridge: 108-34.
- Ashton, R. (2000) 'More Pseudo-Rhodian Drachms from Central Greece: Haliartos (Again), Chalkis, and Euboia Uncertain (?)', *NC* 160: 93-116.
- Austin, J. L. (1975) *How to do Things with Words*, 2nd edn, eds. J.O. Urmson and M. Sbisà. Oxford.
- Bardani, V. (1987) 'Ἐκ Βουωτίας', *Horos* 5: 75-7.
- Baslez, M.-F. (1989) *L'étranger dans la Grèce antique*. Paris.
- Behrwald, R. (2000) *Der Lykische Bund: Untersuchungen zu Geschichte und Verfassung*. Bonn.
- Bickerman, E. J. (1958) 'Autonomia. Sur un passage de Thucydide (I, 144, 2)', *RIDA* 5: 313-43.
- Bielman, A. (1994) *Retour à la liberté: libération et sauvetage des prisonniers en Grèce ancienne: recueil d'inscriptions honorant des sauveteurs et analyse critique*. Paris.
- Billows, R. A. (1990) *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*. Berkeley.

- (2008) ‘International Relations’, in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. Volume 1: Greece, The Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome*, eds. P. Sabin, H. van Wees, and M. Whitby. Cambridge: 303-24.
- Bissa, E. M. A (2009) *Governmental Intervention in Foreign Trade in Archaic and Classical Greece*. Leiden.
- Blümel, W. (1994) ‘Two Inscriptions from the Cnidian Peninsula’, *EA* 23: 157-58.
- Boffo, L. (1995) ‘Ancora una volta sugli ‘Archivi’ nel mondo greco: conservazione e ‘pubblicazione’ epigrafica’, *Athenaeum* 83: 91-130.
- Bommelaer, J. F. (1969) ‘Une nouvelle proxénie de Delphes’, *BCH* 93: 92-6.
- Bonanno, A. (2005) *Malta: Phoenician, Punic, and Roman*. Malta.
- Bouvier, H. (1978) ‘Honneurs et récompenses à Delphes’, *ZPE* 30:101-18.
- Bowersock, G. W. (1965) *Augustus and the Greek World*. Oxford.
- (1985) ‘Hadrian and Metropolis’, in *Bonner Historia-Augusta-Colloquium 1982/1983*, ed. J. Straubb. Bonn: 75-88.
- Braun, T. (2004) ‘Xenophon’s Dangerous Liaisons’, in *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*, ed. R. J. Lane Fox. New Haven: 97-130.
- Bravo, B. (1980) ‘Sulân: Représailles et justice privée contre les étrangers dans les cites grecques’, *ASNP* 10: 675-987.
- van Bremen, R. (1996) *The Limits of Participation: Women and Civic Life in the Greek East in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods*. Amsterdam.
- Bresson, A. (1980) ‘Rhodes, l’Hellénion et le statut de Naucratis (VIe-IVe s. a. C.)’, *DAH* 6: 291-349.
- (2000) *La cité marchande*. Paris.
- (2003) ‘Merchants and Politics in Ancient Greece: Social and Economic Aspects’, in *Mercanti e politica nel mondo antico*, ed. C. Zaccagnini. Rome: 139-64.
- (2005) ‘Les cités grecques et leurs inscriptions’, in *L’écriture publique du pouvoir*, eds. A. Bresson, A. Cocula and C. Pébarthe. Paris: 153-68.
- (2007-8) *L’économie de la Grèce des cités (fin VIe-Ier siècle a.C.)* (2 vols.). Paris.
- Bringman, K. (1993) ‘The King as Benefactor: Some Remarks on Ideal Kingship in the Age of Hellenism’, in *Images and Ideologies: Self-definition in the Hellenistic World*, eds. A.W. Bulloch, et al. Berkeley: 7-25.
- Brock, R., and Hodkinson, S. (eds.) (2000) *Alternatives to Athens*. Oxford.
- Brousseau, E., and Glachant, J.-M. (eds.) (2008) *New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook*. Cambridge.

- Brule, P. (1978) *La piraterie crétoise hellénistique*. Paris.
- Brun, P. (1989) 'L'île de Kéos et ses cités au IV^e siècle av J.C.', *ZPE* 76: 128-38.
 ——— (1996a) 'Problèmes de la micro-insularité en Grèce Égéeenne', *REA* 98: 295-310.
 ——— (1996b) *Les archipels égéens dans l'antiquité grecque (Ve-IIe siècles av. notre ère)*. Paris.
 ——— (2004) 'La datation de IG II² 404, décret athénien concernant les cités de Kéos', *ZPE* 147: 72-8.
- Buckler, J. (1998) 'Epameinondas and the New Inscription from Knidos', *Mnemosyne* 51.2: 192-204.
- Bull, H. (2002) *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd edn. New York.
- Buraselis K. (2004) 'Some Remarks on the Koan *Asylia* (242 B.C.) Against its International Background', in *The Hellenistic Polis of Kos: State, Economy and Culture*, ed, K. Höghammar. Uppsala: 15-20.
- Buzan, B. and Little, R. (2000) *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*. Oxford.
- Carey, C., et al (2008) 'Fragments of Hyperides' *Against Diondas* from the Archimedes palimpsest', *ZPE* 165: 1-19.
- Cargill, J. (1995) *Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century B.C.* Leiden.
- Carlsson, S. (2010) *Hellenistic Democracies: Freedom, Independence, and Political Procedure in Some East Greek City-States*. Stuttgart.
- Carusi, C. (2003) *Isole e peree in Asia Minore: contributi allo studio dei rapporti tra poleis insulari e territori continentali dipendenti*. Pisa.
- Cartledge, P. (1979) *Sparta and Lakonia*. London.
- Cassayre, A. (2010) *La justice dans les cités grecques: de la formation des royaumes hellénistiques au legs d'Attale*. Rennes.
- Chandezon, Chr. (2003) *L'élevage en Grèce (fin Ve-fin Ier s. a.C.): l'apport des sources épigraphiques*. Bordeaux.
- Chaniotis, A. (1993) 'Ein diplomatischer Statthalter nimmt Rücksicht auf den verletzten Stolz zweier hellenistischer Kleinpoleis (Nagidos und Arsinoe)', *EA* 21: 33-42.
 ——— (1996) *Die Verträge zwischen kretischen Poleis in der hellenistischen Zeit*. Stuttgart.
 ——— (1997) 'Theatricality Beyond the Theater: Staging Public Life in the Hellenistic World', *Pallas* 47: 219-59.

- (2005) *War in the Hellenistic World: A Social and Cultural History*. Oxford.
- Chankowski, V. (2008) *Athènes et Délos à l'Époque Classique: Recherches sur l'administration du sanctuaire d'Apollon délien (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome 331)*. Athens.
- Charneux, P. (1953) 'Inscriptions d'Argos', *BCH* 77: 387-403.
 ——— (1956) 'Inscriptions d'Argos', *BCH* 80: 596-618.
 ——— (1958) 'Inscriptions d'Argos', *BCH* 82: 1-15.
- Cherry, J. F., Davis, J. L. and Mantzourani, E. (1991) 'Introduction to the Historical and Epigraphical Evidence', in *Landscape Archaeology as Long-Term History: Northern Keos in the Cycladic Islands from Earliest Settlement until Modern Times*, eds. Cherry, J. F., Davis, J. L. and Mantzourani, E. Los Angeles: 235-43.
- Chroust, A. H. (1973) 'Athens bestows the decree of proxenia on Aristotle', *Hermes* 101: 187-94.
- Clinton, K. (1996) 'Review of Lawton (1995)', *BMCR*, accessed 25 July 2012: <http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/1996/96.09.21.html>
- Clerc, M. (1893) *Les métèques athéniens: étude sur la condition légale, la situation morale et le rôle social et économique des étrangers domiciliés à Athènes*. Paris.
- Cohen, E. E. (1973) *Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts*. Princeton.
 ——— (1992) *Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective*. Princeton.
- Coleiro, E. (1971) 'Maltese Coins of the Roman Period', *NC* 11: 67-91.
- Collar, A. (2008) *Networks and Religious Innovation in the Roman Empire* (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Exeter).
- Condoléon, N. M. (1949) 'Inscriptions de Chios', *RPh* 23: 9-13.
- Connor, W. (1967) 'Two Notes on Cimon', *TAPA* 98: 67-75.
- Constantakopoulou, C. (2007) *The Dance of the Islands: Insularity, Networks, the Athenian Empire, and the Aegean World*. Oxford.
- Cooper, F. A. (2009) 'The Fortifications of Epaminondas and the Rise of the Monumental Greek City', in *City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective*, ed. J. D. Tracy. Cambridge: 155-91.
- Craven, M. (2010) 'Statehood, Self-determination and Recognition', in *International Law*, ed. M. D. Evans, 3rd edn. Oxford: 203-51.
- Crowther, C. V. (1992) 'The Decline of Greek Democracy', *JAC* 7: 13-48.
 ——— (1993) 'Foreign Judges in Seleucid Cities (*GIBM* 421)', *JAC* 8: 40-77
 ——— (1994) 'Foreign Courts on Kalymna in the Third Century B.C.', *JAC* 9: 33-55.
 ——— (1995) 'Iasos in the Second Century BC III: Foreign Judges from Priene',

- BICS* 40: 91-138.
- (1996) ‘*I. Priene 8 and the History of Priene in the Early Hellenistic Period*’, *Chiron* 26: 195-250.
- (1999) ‘Aus der Arbeit der *Inscriptiones Graecae* 4: Koan Decrees for Foreign Judges’ *Chiron* 29: 251-319.
- Culasso-Gastaldi, E. (2004) *Le prossenie ateniesi del IV secolo a.C: gli onorati asiatici*. Alexandria.
- (2005) ‘Per un bilancio comparativo sulle prossenie ateniesi del IV secolo a.C.’ in *Il cittadino, lo straniero, il barbaro, fra integrazione ed emarginazione nell’antichità. Atti del I Incontro Internazionale di Storia antica, Genova, 22-24 maggio 2003 (Serta Antiqua et Mediaevalia 7)*, eds. M. G. Angeli Bertinelli and A. Donati. Rome: 45-75.
- Currie, B. (2005) *Pindar and the Cult of Heroes*. Oxford.
- Curty, O. (1995) *Les parentés légendaires entre cités grecques*. Geneva.
- Daux, G. (1937) ‘Alcibiade, proxene de Lacedemone’, in *Melanges offerts a A.-M. Desrousseaux*. Paris: 117-22.
- (1943) *Chronologie delphique*. Paris.
- Davies, J. K. (1978) ‘Athenian Citizenship: The Descent Group and the Alternatives’, *CJ* 73: 105-21.
- (1984) ‘Cultural, Social and Economic Features of the Hellenistic World’, *CAH²* 7.1: 257-320.
- (1994) ‘On the Non-Usability of the Concept of ‘Sovereignty’ in an Ancient Context’, in *Federazioni e Federalismo nell’Europa antica*, eds. L. A. Foresti, et al. Milan: 51-65.
- (2002) ‘The Interpenetration of Hellenistic Sovereignities’, in *The Hellenistic World: New Perspectives*, ed. D. Ogden. London: 1-21.
- Dimaggio, P. J., and Powell, W. W. (1983) ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, *American Sociological Review* 48:147-60.
- (1991) ‘Introduction’, in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, eds. W. W. Powell and P. J. Dimaggio. Chicago: 1-38.
- Dimitrova, N. M. (2008) *Theoroi and Initiates in Samothrace: The Epigraphical Evidence (Hesperia Supplement 37)*. Princeton.
- Domingo Gyax, M. (2009) ‘Proleptic Honours in Greek Euergetism’, *Chiron* 39: 163-91.
- Doukas, N. (1805) *Θουκυδίδου Ολόρου περί του Πελοποννησιακού Πολέμου βιβλία οκτώ: μεταφρασθέντα, σχολιασθέντα και εκδοθέντα τύποις παρά Νεοφύτου Δούκα* (10 vols.). Vienna.

- Dreher, M. (1995) 'Poleis und Nicht-Poleis im Zweiten Athenischen Seebund' in *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State*, ed. M. H. Hansen. Copenhagen: 171-200.
- Dubois, L. (2000) 'Hippolytos and Lysippos: Remarks on some Compounds in Ἴππο-, ἴππος', in *Greek Personal Names: Their Value as Evidence (Proceedings of the British Academy 104)*, eds. S. Hornblower and E. Matthews. Oxford: 41-52.
- Durrbach, F. (1921-2) *Choix d'inscriptions de Délos*. Paris.
- Eckstein, A. M. (2006) *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War and the Rise of Rome*. Berkeley.
- (2008) *Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230-190 BC*. Oxford.
- Ehrenberg, V. (1960) *The Greek State*. Oxford.
- Eilers, C. (2002) *Roman Patrons of Greek Cities*. Oxford.
- Elias, N. (1983) *The Court Society*, trans. E. Jephcott. Oxford.
- Engen, D. T. (2010) *Honor and Profit: Athenian Trade Policy and the Economy and Society of Greece, 415-307 B.C.E.* Ann Arbor.
- Erskine, A. (2010) 'Between Philosophy and the Court: The Life of Persaios of Kition', in *Creating a Hellenistic World*, eds. A. Erskine and L. Llewellyn-Jones. Swansea: 177-94.
- Étienne, R. (1990) *Ténos II: Ténos et les Cyclades du milieu du IV^e siècle av J.-C. au milieu du III^e siècle ap. J.-C.* Paris.
- Étienne, R., and E. Dourlot (1996) 'Les Cyclades', in *Le Cicladi ed il Mondo Egeo*, eds. E. Lanzillotta and D. Schilardi. Rome: 21-7.
- Fabiani, R. (forthcoming a) *I decreti onorari di Iasos tra cronologia e storia (Vestigia series)*. Munich.
- (forthcoming b) *Der Beitrag Kleinasiens zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte der griechisch-römischen Antike. Tagung der kleinasiatischen Kommission der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*.
- Fentress, J. and Fentress, E. (2001) "'The Hole in the Doughnut", Review of Horden and Purcell (2000)', *P&P* 173: 203-19.
- Fernoux, H. (2011) *Le Demos et la Cité: Communautés et assemblées populaires en Asie Mineure à l'époque impériale*. Rennes.
- Ferrary, J.-L. (1997) 'De l'évergétisme hellénistique à l'évergétisme romain', in *Actes du X^e Congrès International d'Épigraphie Grecque et Latine, Nîmes, 4-9 octobre 1992*, eds. M. Christol and O. Masson. Paris: 199-225.
- (1997) 'The Hellenistic World and Roman Political Patronage', in *Hellenistic*

- Constructs: Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography*, eds. P. Cartledge, P. Garnsey and E. S. Gruen. Berkeley: 105-19.
- (2005) ‘Les mémoriaux de délégations du sanctuaire oraculaire de Claros et leur chronologie’, *CRAI* 149: 719-65.
- Feyel, M. (1936) ‘Nouvelles inscriptions d’Akraiphia’, *BCH* 60: 11-36.
- Figueira, T. J. (1993) ‘Aigina and the Naval Strategy of the Late Fifth and Fourth Centuries’, in *Excursions in Epichoric History: Aiginetan Essays*. Maryland: 325-61.
- Flacelière, R. (1937) *Les Aitoliens à Delphes: contribution à l'histoire de la Grèce centrale au IIIe siècle av. J.-C.* Paris.
- Flensted-Jensen, P. and Hansen, M. H. (2007) ‘Pseudo-Skylax’, in *The Return of the Polis. The Use and Meanings of the Word Polis in Archaic and Classical Sources. Papers from the Copenhagen Polis Centre 8*. Stuttgart: 204-42.
- Forrest, W. G. (1987) ‘A Samian Proxeny Decree’, *Horos* 5: 91-3.
- Fossey, J. M. (1983) ‘The *Proxenia* Decrees of Tanagra’, *Horos* 2: 119-35.
- (1985) ‘Aristoxenos the Boiotian Again’, *LCM* 10: 39-40.
- (1996) ‘The *Proxenia* Decrees of the Aitolian Federation’, *AncW* 27: 158-67.
- Fournier, J. (2010) *Entre tutelle romaine et autonomie civique: l'administration judiciaire dans les provinces hellénophones de l'empire romain 129 av. J.-C-235 ap. J. C.* Athens.
- Francotte, H. (1910) *Mélanges de droit public grec*. Liège.
- Fraser, P. M. (2003) ‘Agathon and Kassandra (*IG IX 1² 4 1750*)’, *JHS* 123: 26-40.
- (2009) *Greek Ethnic Terminology*. Oxford.
- Frei, P. and Marek, C. (1997) ‘Die karisch-griechische Bilingue von Kaunos: eine zweisprachige Staatsurkunde des 4. Jh.s v. Chr.’, *Kadmos* 36: 1-89.
- (1998) ‘Die karisch-griechische Bilingue von Kaunos : ein neues Textfragment’, *Kadmos* 37: 1-18.
- Fröhlich, P. (2010) ‘L’inventaire du monde des cités grecques. Une somme, une méthode et une conception de l’histoire’, *RH* 655: 637-77.
- Gabrielsen, V. (1994) ‘Subdivisions of the State and their Decrees in Hellenistic Rhodes’, *C&M* 45: 117-35.
- Gauthier, P. (1972) *Symbola: les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques*. Nancy.
- (1984) ‘Les cités hellénistiques. Épigraphie et histoire des institutions et de régimes politiques’, in *Πρακτικά του Η' Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου Ελληνικής και Λατινικής Επιγραφικής*. Athens: 82-107.
- (1985) *Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs*. Athens.

- (1989) ‘Grandes et petits cités: hégémonie et autarcie’, *Opus* 6-8: 187-202.
- Gavazzi, C. (1951) ‘Ricerche sulla prossenia nella Tessaglia’, *Epigraphica* 13: 50-86.
- Gawantka, W. (1975) *Isopolitie: Ein Bertrag zur Geschichte der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen in der griechischen Antike (Vestigia 22)*. Munich.
- Gehrke, H.-J. (1985) *Stasis: Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. (Vestigia 35)*. Munich.
- Georgiou, Z. (1908) ‘Epigraphai Chiou kai Erython anekdotoi’, *Athena* 20: 119-354.
- Gerolymatos, A. (1985) ‘Fourth Century Boiotian Use of the Proxenia in International Relations’, in *La Béotie antique*, eds. G. Argoud and P. Roesch. Paris: 307-9.
- (1986) *Espionage and Treason: A Study of the Proxenia in Political and Military Intelligence Gathering in Classical Greece*. Amsterdam.
- (1987a) ‘A Note on Apollonophanes of Kolophon and IG I³ 65’, *Euphrosyne* 15: 227-33.
- (1987b) ‘Ekphantos of Thasos. An example of political use of the Athenian προξενία’, *AncW* 15: 45-8.
- Giddens, A. (1984) *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge.
- Giovannini, A. (1994) ‘Greek Cities and Greek Commonwealth’, in *Images and Ideologies: Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World*, eds. A. Bulloch et al. Berkeley: 265-95.
- Goldhill, S. (1996) ‘Review of M. H. Hansen and K. Raaflaub, eds., (1995) *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*’, *BMCR*, accessed 10 October 2012: <http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1996/96.10.11.html>
- Graham, A. J. (1964) *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*. Manchester.
- Graham, S. (2006) ‘Networks, Agent-Based Models and the Antonine Itineraries: Implications for Roman Archaeology’, *JMA* 19.1: 45-64.
- Graindor, P. (1906) ‘Fouilles de Karthaia (1)’, *BCH* 30: 92-102.
- Grainger, J. D. (1999) *The League of the Aitolians*. Leiden.
- Graninger, D. (2011) “‘In as much land as the Pheraioi rule’”: A Note on *SEG* 23 418’, *Tyche* 26: 87-90.
- Granovetter, M. S. (1973) ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’, *American Journal of Sociology* 107.5: 1143-78.
- (1983) ‘The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited’, *Sociological Theory* 1: 201-33.

- Grant, T. D. (1999) *The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution*. Westport.
- Gray, B. (2011) *Exile and the Political Cultures of the Greek Polis, c.404-146 BC* (unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Oxford).
- Grieb, V. (2008) *Hellenistische Demokratie: politische Organisation und Struktur in freien griechischen Poleis nach Alexander dem Grossen*. Stuttgart.
- Gschnitzer, F. (1958) *Abhängige Orte im griechischen Altertum*. Munich.
 ——— (1973) 'Proxenos', *RE Suppl.* XIII: 629-730.
- Guarducci, M. (1969) *Epigrafia Greca vol.2*. Rome.
- Le Guen, B. (2001) *Les associations de technites dionysiaques à l'époque hellénistique* (2 vols.). Nancy and Paris.
- Günther, W. (1988) 'Milesische Bürgerrechts- und Proxenieverleihungen der hellenistischen Zeit', *Chiron* 18: 383-419.
 ——— (1995) 'Ein Proxenedekret aus Myus', in *Rom und der griechische Osten: Festschrift für Hanno H. Schmitt zum 65. Geburtstag*, eds. C. Schubert and K. Brodersen. Stuttgart: 87-92.
 ——— (1999) 'Funde aus Milet 9: Ein milesisches Proxenie-Dekret des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.', *AA*: 475-9.
- Habicht, Chr. (1982) *Studien zur Geschichte Athens in hellenistischer Zeit*. Göttingen.
 ——— (1993) 'Proxenedekrete von Akraiphia', *GB* 19: 39-43.
 ——— (1997) *Athens from Alexander to Anthony*. Cambridge, MA.
 ——— (1998a) 'Kleine Beiträge zur altgriechischen Personenkunde', *REA* 100: 487-94.
 ——— (1998b) *Pausanias' Guide to Ancient Greece*, 2nd edn. Berkeley.
 ——— (2002) 'Die Ehren der Proxenoi', *MH* 59: 13-30.
- Hall, J. (2007) 'International Relations', in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. Volume 1: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome*, eds. P. Sabin, H. van Wees, and M. Whitby. Cambridge: 85-107.
- Hamon, P. (2001) 'À propos de l'institution du Conseil dans les cités grecques de l'époque hellénistique', *REG* 114: xvi-xxi.
 ——— (2005) 'Le Conseil et la participation des citoyens: les mutations de la basse époque hellénistique', in *Citoyenneté et participation à la basse époque hellénistique. Actes de la table ronde des 22 et 23 mai 2004*, eds. P. Fröhlich and C. Müller. Geneva: 121-44.
- Hansen, M. H. (1974) *The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Public Action against Unconstitutional Proposals*. Odense.
 ——— (1995a) 'Boiotian Poleis – a Test Case', in *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State*, ed. M. H. Hansen. Copenhagen: 13-63.

- (1995b) ‘The “Autonomous City-State”. Ancient fact or modern fiction?’ in *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, eds. M. H. Hansen and K. Raaflaub. Stuttgart: 21-43.
- (1998) *Polis and City-State: An Ancient Concept and its Modern Equivalent*. Copenhagen.
- (2008) ‘Response to J. Rzepka, Reviewing M.H. Hansen, *The Return of the Polis*’, *BMCR*, accessed 29 October 2012: <http://bmc.brynmaur.edu/2008/2008-02-46.html>
- Hansen, M. H. and Fisher-Hansen, T. (1994) ‘Monumental Political Architecture in Archaic and Classical Greek *Poleis*’, in *From Political Architecture to Stephanus Byzantius: Sources for the Ancient Greek Polis*, ed. D. Whitehead. Stuttgart: 23-90.
- Hansen, M. H. and Nielsen, T. H. eds. (2004) *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*. Oxford.
- Harris, E. M. (1995) *Aeschines and Athenian Politics*. Oxford.
- Harrison, A. R. W. (1968-71) *The Law of Athens* (2 vols.). Oxford.
- Harvey, F. D. (1985) ‘Dona ferentes: Some Aspects of Bribery in Greek Politics’, in *Crux. Essays in Greek History presented to G. E. M. de Ste Croix on his 75th Birthday*, eds. P. A. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey. London: 76-117.
- Hasebroek, J. (1933) *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece*. London.
- Heberdey, R. and Wilhelm, A. (1896) *Reisen in Kilikien ausgeführt 1891 und 1892*. Vienna.
- Heller, A. (2006) ‘*Les bêtises des Grecs*’: *Conflits et rivalités entre cités d'Asie et de Bithynie à l'époque romaine (129 a.C.-235 p.C.)*. Bordeaux.
- (2009) ‘La cité grecque d'époque impériale: vers une société d'ordres?’, *Annales (HSS)* 64: 341-373.
- Hennig, D. (1994) ‘Immobilienwerb durch Nichtbürger in der klassischen und hellenistischen Polis’ *Chiron* 24: 305-44.
- (1997) ‘Die Beherbergung von ‘Staatsgästen’ in der hellenistischen Polis’, *Chiron* 27: 355-68.
- Henry, A. S. (1983) *Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees: The Principal Formulae of Athenian Honorary Decrees*. Hildesheim.
- Herman, G. (1980) ‘The Friends of the Early Hellenistic Rulers, Servants or Officials?’ *Talanta* 12-3: 103-49.
- (1987) *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*. Cambridge.
- (1990) ‘Patterns of Name Diffusion within the Greek World and Beyond’, *CQ* 40: 349-63.

- (1997) ‘The Court Society of the Hellenistic Age’, in *Hellenistic Constructs: Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography*, eds. P. Cartledge, P. Garnsey and E. S. Gruen. Berkeley: 199-224.
- Herrmann, P. (1965) ‘Neue Urkunden zur Geschichte von Milet im 2. Jahrhundert v. Chr.’, *MDAI(I)* 15: 71-117.
- Herzog, R. (1942) ‘Symbolae Calymniae et Coae’, *RFIC* 20: 1-20.
- Hinsley, H. (1986) *Sovereignty*, 2nd edn. Cambridge.
- Hitchman, R. (forthcoming) ‘Inchriften von den dorischen Inseln 97: Unanswered Questions.’
- Hodot, R. (1976) ‘Notes critiques sur le corpus épigraphique de Lesbos’, *Etudes d’Archéologie Classique* 5: 17-81.
- Horden, P. and Purcell, N. (2000) *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History*. Oxford.
- Hornblower, S. (1991-2008) *A Commentary on Thucydides* (3 vols.). Oxford.
- (2004) “‘This was Decided” (ἔδοξε ταῦτα): The Army as polis in Xenophon’s *Anabasis* – and Elsewhere’, in *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*, ed. R. J. Lane Fox. New Haven: 243-63.
- Huybrechts, F. (1959) ‘Over de proxenie in Lakonië’, *RBPh* 37: 5-30.
- Jackson, M. O. (2008) *Social and Economic Networks*. Princeton.
- Johnstone, S. (1999) *Disputes and Democracy: The Consequences of Litigation in Ancient Athens*. Austin.
- Jones, A. H. M. (1940) *The Greek City From Alexander To Justinian*. Oxford.
- (1964) ‘The Hellenistic Age’, *P&P* 27: 3-22.
- Jones, C. P. (1971) *Plutarch and Rome*. Oxford.
- (1978) *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*. Cambridge, MA.
- (1992) ‘Foreigners in a Hellenistic Inscription of Rhodes’, *Tyche* 7: 123-32.
- (1999) *Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World*. Cambridge, MA.
- (2001) ‘The Claudian Monument at Patara’, *ZPE* 137: 161-8.
- (2006) ‘A Letter of Hadrian to Naryka (Eastern Locris)’, *JRA* 19: 151-62.
- Kadushin, C. (2012) *Understanding Social Networks*. Oxford.
- Kallet-Marx, R. (1995) *Hegemony to Empire: The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.* Berkeley.
- Kalliontzis, Y. (2007) ‘Décrets de proxénie et catalogues militaires de Chéronée trouvés lors des fouilles de la basilique paléochrétienne d’Hagia Paraskévi’, *BCH* 131: 475-514.

- Kalogéropoulou A. (1974) 'Un nouveau décret de proxénie de Mégare', *AAA* 7:138-48.
- Kantor, G. (2008) *Roman Law and Local Law in Asia Minor 133 B.C.- A.D. 212* (unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Oxford).
- (2010) 'Siculus cum Siculo non eiusdem ciuitatis: Litigation between citizens of different communities in the Verrines', *CCG* 26: 187-204.
- (2011) 'Review of Fournier (2010)', *JRS* 101: 248-9.
- Keil, B. (1899) 'Zur Thessalischen Sotairosinschrift', *Hermes* 34: 183-202.
- Keil, J. (1913) 'Ephesische bürgerrechts- und proxeniedekrete aus dem 4. und 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr', *JÖAI* 16: 231-44.
- Keohane, R. O. (1986) 'Reciprocity in International Relations', *International Organization* 40: 1-27.
- (1988) 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly* 32: 379-96.
- Killen, S. (2008) 'Die Doppelaxt als Parasemon von Tenedos', in *Vom Euphrat bis zum Bosporus: Kleinasien in der Antike: Festschrift für Elmar Schwertheim zum 65. Geburtstag (Asia Minor Studien 65)*, ed. E. Winter. Bonn: 367-72.
- Klaffenbach, G. (1966) *Griechische Epigraphik*, 2nd edn. Göttingen.
- Knoepfler, D. (1978) 'Proxénies béotiennes du IV^e siècle', *BCH* 102: 375-93.
- (1995) 'Les relations des cités eubéennes avec Antigone Gonatas et la chronologie delphique au début de l'époque étolienne', *BCH* 119: 137-59.
- (1997) 'Le territoire d'Érétrie et l'organisation politique de la cité (*dêmoi, chôroi, phylai*)', in *The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community*, ed. M. H. Hansen. Copenhagen: 352-449.
- (2001a) *Eretria XI: Décrets érétriens de proxénie et de citoyenneté*. Lausanne.
- (2001b) 'La cité d'Érétrie et ses bienfaiteurs: réflexions en marge d'un nouveau recueil épigraphique', *CRAI* 145: 1355-90.
- (2002) 'Un proxène malmené (Xénophon, *Hell.* VII 2, 16)', *Ktéma* 27: 71-8.
- (2005) 'La prétendue domination d'Antiochos III sur Kéôs: à propos de deux décrets récemment publiés (*SEG* 48, 1130)', *Chiron* 35: 285-308.
- Koehler, U. (1884) 'Proxenenliste von Keos', *MDAI(A)* 9: 271-8.
- Koenigs, W. (1981) 'Bauteile aus Myus im Theater von Milet', *MDAI(I)* 31: 143-7.
- Kolb, F. (1979) *Agora und Theater, Volks- und Festsammlung*. Berlin.
- Kralli, I. (2000) 'Athens and the Hellenistic Kings (338-261 B.C.): The Language of the Decrees', *CQ* 50: 113-32.
- Kuhn, C. (2008) *Public Political Discourse in Roman Asia Minor* (unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Oxford).

- Kurke, L. (1991) *The Traffic in Praise: Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy*. Ithaca.
- Kvist, K. (2003) 'Cretan grants of *asylia*: violence and protection as interstate relations', *C&M* 54: 185-222
- Labarre, G. (1996) *Les cités de Lesbos, aux époques hellénistique et impériale*. Paris.
- Lambert, S. (2011) 'What was the Point of Inscribed Honorific Decrees in Classical Athens?', in *Sociable Man: Essays on Ancient Greek Social Behaviour in Honour of Nick Fisher*, ed. S. Lambert. Swansea: 193-214.
 ——— (2012) *Inscribed Athenian Laws and Decrees 352/1-322/1 BC*. Leiden.
- Lane Fox, R. J. (2010) 'Thucydides and Documentary History', *CQ* 60: 11-29.
- Latycheff, V. L. (1882) 'Inscriptions de Narthakion', *BCH* 6: 580-90.
- Lauterpacht, H. (1947) *Recognition in International Law*. Cambridge.
- Lawton, C. L. (1995) *Attic Document Reliefs: Art and Politics in Ancient Athens*. Oxford.
- Leaf, W. (1916) 'The Commerce of Sinope', *JHS* 36: 1-15.
- Lehman, C. L. (1994) 'Xenoi, Proxenoï, and Early Greek Traders', *Helios* 21: 9-20.
- Lewis, D. (1962) 'The Federal Constitution of Keos', *ABSA* 57: 1-4.
- Lewis, S. (1996) *News and Society in the Greek Polis*. London.
- Lerat, L. (1934) 'En-tête d'un décret delphique de proxénie', *BCH* 58: 168-72.
- Lhôte, E. (2006) *Les lamelles oraculaires de Dodone*. Geneva.
- Liddel, P. (2007) *Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens*. Oxford.
 ——— (2009) 'The Decree Cultures of the Ancient Megarid', *CQ* 59: 411-36.
 ——— (2010) 'Epigraphy, Legislation and Power within the Athenian Empire', *BICS* 53: 99-128.
- Lintott, A. (1982) *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City 750-330 BC*. London.
 ——— (1993) *Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration*. London.
 ——— (2004) 'Sula: Reprisal by Seizure in Greek Inter-Community Relations', *CQ* 54: 340-53.
- Loughran, C. P and Raubitschek, A. E. (1947) 'Three Attic proxeny decrees', *Hesperia* 16: 78-81.

- Loraux, N. (2001) *The Divided City: On Memory and Forgetting in Ancient Athens*, trans. C. Pache with J. Fort. New York.
- Low, P. (2005) 'Looking for the Language of Athenian Imperialism', *JHS* 125: 93-111.
- (2007) *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power*. Cambridge.
- Luppino E (1981) 'La laicizzazione della prossenia: Il caso di Alcibiade', *CISA* 7: 73-9.
- MacDowell, D. M. (2004) 'Epikerdes of Kyrene and the Athenian Privilege of *Ateleia*', *ZPE* 150: 127-33.
- McLean, B. H. (2002) *An Introduction to Greek Epigraphy of the Hellenistic and Roman Periods from Alexander the Great down to the Reign of Constantine (323 B.C.-A.D. 337)*. Ann Arbor.
- MacMullen, R. (1982) 'The Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire', *AJPh* 103: 233-46.
- Ma, J. (2000a) 'Fighting Poleis of the Hellenistic World', in *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, ed. H. van Wees. Swansea: 337-76.
- (2000b) 'Public Speech and Community in the *Euboicus*', in *Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy*, ed. S. Swain. Oxford: 108-24.
- (2002) *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor*, rev. edn. Oxford.
- (2003) 'Peer Polity Interaction in the Hellenistic Age', *P&P* 180: 9-39.
- (2005) 'The Many Lives of Eugnotos of Akraiphia', in *Studi Ellenistici* 16, ed. B. Virgilio. Pisa: 141-91.
- (2009) 'Empires, Statuses and Realities', in *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, eds. J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas and R. Parker. London: 125-48.
- (2011) 'Court, King, and Power in Antigonid Macedonia', in *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon: Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC - 300 AD*, ed. R. J. Lane Fox. Leiden: 521-43.
- (2012a) 'Honorific Statues and Hellenistic History', in *Imperialism, Cultural Politics, & Polybius*, eds. C. Smith and L. M. Yarrow. Oxford: 230-51.
- (2012b) 'Epigraphy and the Display of Authority', in *Epigraphy and the Historical Sciences*, eds. J. Davies and J. Wilkes. Oxford: 133-58.
- Mack, W. (2011) 'The Proxeny-lists of Karthaia', *REA* 113: 319-44.
- (2012) 'The Eresian Catalogue of Proxenois (*IG* XII suppl. 127)', *ZPE* 180: 217-29.
- (forthcoming) 'Shepherds Beating the Bounds? Territorial Identity at a Dependent Community (*IPriene* 361-3)'.
- Mackil, E. (2004) 'Wandering Cities: Alternatives to Catastrophe in the Greek Polis', *AJA* 108: 493-516.
- (2008) 'A Boiotian Proxeny Decree and Relief in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston and Boiotian-Lakonian Relations in the 360s', *Chiron* 38: 157-94.

- Maddoli, G. (2007) 'Epigrafi di Iasos: Nuovi Supplementi', *PP* 62: 193-372.
- Magie, D. (1950) *Roman Rule in Asia Minor: To the End of the Third Century after Christ*. Princeton.
- Magnetto, A. (1997) *Gli arbitrati interstatali greci. vol.1: Dalle origine al 338 a.C.* . Florence.
- Maiuri, A. (1925) *Nuova silloge epigrafica di Rodi e Cos*. Florence.
- Malkin, I. (2011) *A Small Greek World: Networks in the Ancient Mediterranean*. Oxford.
- Malkin, I., Constantakopoulou, C., and Panagopoulou, K. (2009) *Greek and Roman Networks in the Mediterranean*. London.
- Manganaro, G. (1963) 'Tre tavole di bronzo con decreti di proxenia del Museo di Napoli e il problema dei proagori in Sicilia', *Kokalos* 9: 205-20.
- Marasco, G. (1983) 'Alessandro, i diadochi e il culto dell'eroe eponimo', *Prometheus* 9: 57-63.
- March, J. G., and Olsen, J. P. (1989) *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York.
- (2006) 'The Logic of Appropriateness', in *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*, eds. M. Moran, M. Rein, and R. E. Goodin. Oxford: 689–708.
- Marek, C. (1977) 'Der Geldumlauf der Stadt Histiaia und seine Bedeutung für die Verteilung ihrer Proxenoï', *Talanta* 8-9: 74-9.
- (1984) *Die Proxenie*. Frankfurt.
- (1985) 'Handel und Proxenie', *MBAH* 4: 67-78.
- (1988) 'Review of Gerolymatos (1986)', *Gnomon* 60: 594-8.
- Martínez Fernández, Á. and Markoulaki, S. (2000) 'Decreto inédito de proxenia de Kísamos, Creta', *ZPE* 133: 103-108.
- Matthaiou, A. P. (1983) 'A Naxian Honorary Decree', *Horos* 1: 39-44.
- (1998) 'Τρεῖς ἐπιγραφες Πάρου', *Horos* 10-12: 423-36.
- Mauss, M. (1954) *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*. London.
- Meiggs, R. (1949) 'A Note on Athenian Imperialism', *CR* 63: 9-12.
- (1972) *The Athenian Empire*. Oxford.
- Meier, M. H. E. (1843) *Commentatio de proxenia, sive, De publico Graecorum hospitio*. Halle.
- Mendoní, L. (1990) 'Addenda et Corrigenda as Inscriptiones Ceae', in *POIKILA (Meletēmata 10)*. Athens: 287-307.

- (2007b) ‘Συμβολή στην Προσωπογραφία της Κέας: Κείοι εκτός συνορών’ in *Άμύμονα ἔργα. Τιμητικός τόμος για τον καθηγητή Βασιλή Κ. Λαμπρινουδάκη (Αρχαιολογία Supplement 5)*, ed. E. Semantone-Bournia. Athens: 529-58.
- Mendonni, L., and Mourtzas, N. D. (1990) ‘An Archaeological Approach to Coastal Sites: The Example of the Ancient Harbour of Karthaia’, *Parnassos* 32: 387-403.
- Merritt, B. D. (1977) ‘A Proxeny Decree Restudied (IG I² 85)’, *ZPE* 25: 289-95.
- Merriam, A. C. (1885) ‘Inscribed Sepulchral Vases from Alexandria’, *AJA* 1: 18-33.
- Meyer, E. (2010) *Metics and the Athenian Phialai-inscriptions: A Study in Athenian Epigraphy and Law*. Stuttgart.
- Migeotte, L. (1984) *L'emprunt public dans les cités grecques: Recueil des documents et analyse critique*. Quebec and Paris.
- (1992) *Les souscriptions publiques dans les cités grecques*. Quebec and Geneva.
- (2004) ‘La mobilité des étrangers en temps de paix en Grèce ancienne’ in *La mobilité des personnes en Méditerranée de l'Antiquité à l'époque moderne: procédures de contrôle et documents d'identification*, ed. C. Moatti. Rome: 615-48.
- (2009) *The Economy of the Greek Cities: From the Archaic Period to the Early Roman Empire*. Berkeley.
- Millar, F. (1977) *The Emperor in the Roman World (31 BC – AD 337)*. London.
- (1993) ‘The Greek city in the Roman Period’, in *The Ancient Greek City-State*, ed. M. H. Hansen. Copenhagen: 232-60.
- Miller, S. G. (1974) ‘A Family of Halikarnassians in North-Central Greece’, *AJA* 78: 151-2.
- Misaelidou-Despotidou, V. (1980) ‘Proxenic decree from ancient Pharsalos’, *AD* 35: 226-40.
- Mitchell, L. (1997a) *Greeks Bearing Gifts: The Public Use of Private Relationships in the Greek World, 435-323 BC*. Cambridge.
- (1997b) ‘Φιλία, Εὔνοια and Greek Interstate Relations’, *Antichthon* 31: 28-44.
- (2009) ‘The Rules of the Game: Three Studies in Friendship, Equality and Politics’, in *Greek History and Epigraphy: Essays in Honour of P.J. Rhodes*, eds. L. Mitchell and L. Rubinstein. Swansea: 1-32.
- Moggi, M. (1995) ‘I Proxenoι e la Guerra nel V Secolo A.C.’, in *Les relations internationales: Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg, 15-17 juin 1993*, eds. E. Frézoulas et A. Jacquemin. Paris: 143-59.
- Monceaux, P. (1886) *Les proxénies grecque*. Paris.
- Moretti, L. (1977) ‘Mileto, le sue colonie e l'istituto dell' evergesia’, *RFIC* 105: 5-11.

- Mosley, D. J. (1971a) 'Cimon and the Spartan Proxeny', *Athenaeum* 49: 431-32.
 ——— (1971b) 'Spartan Kings and Proxeny', *Athenaeum* 49: 433-35.
- Müller, C. (2005) 'La procédure d'adoption des décrets en Béotie de la fin du IIIe s. av. J.-C. au Ier s. apr. J.-C', in *Citoyenneté et participation à la basse époque hellénistique. Actes de la table ronde des 22 et 23 mai 2004*, eds. P. Fröhlich and C. Müller. Geneva: 95-119.
- Nichols, J. (2011) 'Hospitality among the Romans', in *The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World*, ed. M. Peachin. Oxford: 422-37.
- Nielsen, T. H. (2002) *Arkadia and its Poleis in the Archaic and Classical Periods (Hypomnemata 140)*. Göttingen.
- North, D. C. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge.
 ——— (1991) 'Institutions', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5: 97-112.
 ——— (1995) 'Five Propositions about Institutional Change', in *Explaining Social Institutions*, eds. J. Knight and I. Sened. Michigan: 15-26.
- Ober, J. (1983) 'Two Ancient Watchtowers above Aigosthena in the Northern Megarid', *AJA* 87: 387-92.
 ——— (1987) 'Early Artillery Towers: Messenia, Boiotia, Attica, Megarid', *AJA* 91: 569-604.
 ——— (1989) *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People*. Princeton.
 ——— (1996) *The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory*. Princeton.
 ——— (2008) *Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens*. Princeton.
 ——— (2010) 'Wealthy Hellas', *TAPA* 140: 241-86.
- Ogilvie R. M. (1965) *A Commentary on Livy Books 1-5*. Oxford.
- Oliver, J. H. (1954) 'The Roman Governor's Permission for a Decree of the Polis', *Hesperia* 23: 163-7.
- Osborne, M. (1981-3) *Naturalization in Athens*. Brussels.
- Osborne, R. (1985) *Demos: The Discovery of Classical Attica*. Cambridge.
 ——— (1999) 'Inscribing Performance', in *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*, eds. S. Goldhill and R. Osborne. Cambridge: 341-58.
- Ostwald, M. (1969) *Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy*. Oxford.
 ——— (1982) *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History*. Chicago.
- Panessa, G. P (1999) *Philiai: l'amicizia nelle relazioni interstatali dei Greci*. Pisa.
- Papazarkadas, N. (2007) 'An Honorific Decree from Classical Siphnos', *REA* 109: 137-46.

- (2009) ‘Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire: Reshuffling the Chronological Cards’, in *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, eds. J. Ma, N. Papzarkadas and R. Parker. London: 67-88.
- Papazarkadas, N. and Thonemann, P. (2008) ‘Athens and Kydonia: Agora I 7602’, *Hesperia* 77: 73-87.
- Paris, P. (1892) *Élatée: la ville, le temple d'Athéna Cranaia*. Paris.
- Parke, H. W. (1957) ‘A Note on the Spartan Embassy to Athens (408/7 B. C.)’, *CR* 7: 106-7.
- Parker, R. (1985) ‘Greek States and Greek Oracles’ in *Crux. Essays in Greek History presented to G. E. M. de Ste Croix on his 75th Birthday*, eds. P. A. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey. London: 298-326.
- (1996) *Athenian Religion: A History*. Oxford.
- (1998) *Cleomenes on the Acropolis: An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 12 May 1997*. Oxford.
- (2011) *On Greek Religion*. Ithaca.
- Paschidis, P. (2008) *Between City and King: Prosopographical Studies on the Intermediaries Between the Cities of the Greek Mainland and the Aegean and the Royal Courts in the Hellenistic Period, 322-190 BC (Meletēmata 59)*. Athens.
- Paton, W. R. and Hicks, E. L. (1891) *The Inscriptions of Cos*. Oxford.
- Payne, M. J. (1984) *APETAΣ ENEKEN: Honors for Romans and Italians in Greece from 260 to 27 BC* (unpublished PhD thesis, Michigan State University).
- Pečírka, J. (1966) *The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions*. Prague.
- Perassi, C. and Novarese, M. (2006) ‘La monetazione di Melita e di Gaulos. Note per un riesame’ in *L’Africa Romana* 16, eds. A. Akerraz, *et al.* (vol. 4): 2377-404.
- Perdrizet, P. (1899) ‘Inscriptions d’Acraephaie (Suite de BCH, XXII, p. 241-260.)’, *BCH* 23, 90-6.
- Perlman, P. (1995) ‘“Theorodokountes en tais polesin”: Panhellenic Epangelia and Political Status’, in *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State*, ed. M. H. Hansen. Copenhagen: 113-64.
- (1996) ‘Polis hypekoos: The Dependent Polis and Crete’, in *Introduction to an Inventory of Poleis*, ed. M. H. Hansen. Copenhagen: 233-87.
- (2000) *City and Sanctuary in Ancient Greece: The Theorodokia in the Peloponnese*. Göttingen.
- Perlman, S. (1958) ‘A Note on the Political Implications of Proxenia in the Fourth Century B.C.’, *CQ* 8: 185-91.
- (1976) ‘On Bribing Athenian Ambassadors’, *GRBS* 17: 223-33.

- Perrin-Saminadayar, E. (2007) *Éducation, culture et société à Athènes: les acteurs de la vie culturelle athénienne (229-88)*. Paris.
- Phillipson, C. (1911) *The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, vol. 1*. London.
- Piccirilli, L. (1973) *Gli arbitrati interstatali greci. vol.1: Dalle origine al 338 a.C.*. Florence.
- Plassart, A. (1921) 'Inscriptions de Delphes: la liste des Théorodoques', *BCH* 45: 1-85.
- Plassart, A. and Blum, G. (1914) 'Orchomène d'Arcadie: Fouilles de 1913: Inscriptions', *BCH* 38: 447-78.
- Pocock, J. G. A. (1973) 'Verbalizing a Political Act: Toward a Politics of Speech', *Political Theory* 1: 27-45.
- Pouilloux, J. (1974) 'Les décrets delphiques pour Matrophanés de Sardes', *BCH* 98: 159-69.
- Prag, J. R. W. (2002) 'Epigraphy by Numbers: Latin and the Epigraphic Culture in Sicily', in *Becoming Roman, Writing Latin? Literacy and Epigraphy in the Roman West*, ed. A. E. Cooley (*JRA Supplement* 48). Rhode Island: 15-31.
- Pridik, A. M. (1892) *De Cei Insulae Rebus*. Berlin.
- Pritchett, W. K. (1991) *The Greek State at War: Part V*. Berkeley.
- Putnam, R. D., with R. Leonardi and R. Nanetti (1993) *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton.
- Quass, F. (1993) *Die Honoratiorenschicht in den Städten des griechischen Ostens: Untersuchungen zur politischen und sozialen Entwicklung in hellenistischer und römischer Zeit*. Stuttgart.
- Rauh, N. K. (1993) *The Sacred Bonds of Commerce: Religion, Economy, and Trade Society at Hellenistic Roman Delos, 166-87 BC*. Amsterdam.
- Reger, G. (1991) 'Apollodorus of Cyzicus and his Delian Garden', *GRBS* 32: 229-37.
 ——— (1992) 'Athens and Tenos in the Early Hellenistic Age', *CQ* 42: 365-83.
 ——— (1994) *Regionalism and Change in the Economy of Independent Delos, 314-167 B.C.* Berkeley.
 ——— (2003) 'Aspects of the Role of Merchants in the Political Life of the Hellenistic World', in *Mercanti e politica nel mondo antico*, ed. C. Zaccagnini. Rome: 165-97.
 ——— (2011) 'Inter-Regional Economies in the Aegean Basin', in *The Economies of Hellenistic Societies, First to Third Centuries BC*, eds. Z. H. Archibald, J. K. Davies and V. Gabrielsen. Oxford: 368-89.

- Reger, G. and M. Risser (1991) 'Coinage and Federation in Hellenistic Keos', in *Landscape Archaeology as Long-Term History*, eds. J. F. Cherry, J. L. Davis, and E. Mantzourani. Los Angeles: 305-17.
- Reiter, H. A. (1991) *Athen und die Poleis des Delisch-Attischen Seebundes : die Proxenoï und Euergetai des attischen Demos in den Poleis des Delisch-Attischen Seebundes im Licht der attischen Proxenie-und Euergesiebeschlüsse des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* Regensburg.
- Renfrew, C. (1986) 'Introduction', in *Peer Polity Interaction and Socio-Political Change*, eds. C. Renfrew and J. F. Cherry. Cambridge: 1-18.
- Reus-Smit, Chr. (2012) 'Constructivism and the English School', in *Theorising International Society: English School Methods*, ed. C. Navari. Basingstoke: 487-509.
- Rhodes, P. J. (1995) 'Epigraphical Evidence: Laws and Decrees', in *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State*, ed. M. H. Hansen. Copenhagen: 91-112.
- Rhodes, P. J., with Lewis, D. M. (1997) *The Decrees of the Greek States*. Oxford.
- Rigsby, K. (1996) *Asyilia: Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World*. Berkeley.
- Ritti, T. (1969) 'Sigle ed emblemî sui decreti onorari greci', *MAL* 14: 259-360.
- Robert, L. (1951) 'La circulation des monnaies d'Histiée', in *Études de numismatique grecque*. Paris: 179-216.
- (1963) *Noms indigènes dans l'Asie-Mineure gréco-romaine*. Paris.
- (1966) *Monnaies antiques en Troade*. Geneva.
- (1969) 'Laodicée du Lycos: Les inscriptions', in *Laodicée du Lycos: Le nymphée: Campagnes 1961-1963*, J. des Gagniers. Paris: 247-389.
- Robert, J. and L. (1983). *Fouilles d'Amyzon en Carie*. Paris.
- (1989) *Claros: Décrets hellénistiques I*. Paris.
- Robinson, D. M. (1905) 'Greek and Latin Inscriptions from Sinope and Environs', *AJA* 9: 294-333.
- (1906) 'Ancient Sinope', *AJP* 27: 125-53; 245-79.
- Roebuck, D. (2001) *Ancient Greek Arbitration*. London.
- Roesch, P. (1966) 'Inscriptions du Musée de Thèbes', *REA* 68: 61-85.
- (1970) 'Inscriptions béotiennes du Musée de Thèbes', *BCH* 94: 139-60.
- (1984) 'Un décret inédit de la ligue Thébaine et la flotte d'Épaminondas', *REG* 97: 45-60.
- (1989) 'Décrets de proxénie d'Orchomène en Béotie', in *Architecture et poésie dans le monde grec: Hommages à Georges Roux*, eds. R. Étienne et al. Paris: 219-24.
- Rousset, D. (2002) 'Inscriptions hellénistiques d'Amphissa', *BCH* 126: 83-95.

- (2006) ‘Les inscriptions de Kallipolis d’Étolie’, *BCH* 130: 381-434.
- Rood, T. (1998) *Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation*. Oxford.
- Rostovzeff, M. I. (1941) *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (3 vols.). Oxford.
- Roussel, P. (1916) *Délos: colonie athénienne*. Paris.
- Ruggeri, C. (2004) ‘Senofonte a Scillunte’, *Athenaeum* 92: 451-66.
- Ruschenbusch, E. (1982) ‘IG XII 5 609: Eine Bürgerliste von Iulis und Koresia auf Keos’, *ZPE* 48: 175-88.
- Russell, F. S. (1999) *Information Gathering in Classical Greece*. Ann Arbor.
- Rutherford, I. (2004) ‘The Keian Theoria to Delphi: Neglected Data from the Accounts of the Delphic Naopoi (CID 2.1-28)’, *ZPE* 147: 107-14.
- (2007), ‘Network Theory and Theoric Networks’, *Mediterranean Historical Review* 22: 23-37.
- (forthcoming) *Theōriā and Theōroi: State-Pilgrimage in Ancient Greece*.
- Samama, E. (2003) *Les médecins dans le monde grec: sources épigraphiques sur la naissance d'un corps médical*. Geneva.
- Salomon, N. (1997) *Le Cleruchie di Atene: Caratteri e funzione*. Pisa.
- Saprykin, S. (1999) ‘Proxenic Decrees of Tauric Chersonesus and the Sea-Routes in Pontus Euxinus’, *OTerr* 5: 31-41.
- Savalli-Lestrade, I. (1995) *Les philoi royaux dans l'Asie hellénistique*. Geneva.
- Schachter, A. and Slater, W. J. (2007) ‘A Proxeny Decree from Koroneia, Boiotia, in Honour of Zotion son of Zotion, of Ephesos’, *ZPE* 163: 81-95.
- Schaefer, H. (1932) *Staatsform und Politik: Untersuchungen zur griechischen Geschichte des 6. und 5. Jahrhunderts*. Leipzig.
- Shiple, G. (2011) *Pseudo-Skylax's Periplus: The Circumnavigation of the Inhabited World*. Exeter.
- Schlaifer, R. (1944) ‘A Fragment of a Proxeny Decree from Ios’, *Hesperia* 13: 22.
- Schneider, A. M. (1938) *Die Stadtmauer von Iznik (Nicea)*. Berlin.
- Scholten, J. B. (2000) *The Politics of Plunder: Aitolians and their Koinon in the Early Hellenistic Era, 279-217 BC*. Berkeley.

- Schuler, C. (2010) 'Sympolitien in Lykien und Karien', in *Hellenistic Karia: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Hellenistic Karia, Oxford, 29 June-2 July 2006*, eds. R. van Bremen and J.-M. Carbon. Bordeaux: 393-414.
- Scott, J. (2000) *Social Network Analysis: A Handbook*, 2nd edn. London.
- Schwahn, W. (1931) 'Das Bürgerrecht der sympolitischen Bundesstaaten', *Hermes* 66: 97-118.
- Seibert, J. (1979) *Die politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten in der griechischen Geschichte: von den Anfängen bis zur Unterwerfung durch die Römer*. Darmstadt.
- Shear, J. (2011) *Polis and Revolution: Responding to Oligarchy in Classical Athens*. Cambridge.
- Shear, T. L. (1978) *Kallias of Sphettos and the Revolt of Athens in 286 B. C. (Hesperia Supplement 17)*. Princeton.
- Sheedy, K. A. (2006) *The Archaic and Early Classical Coinages of the Cyclades*. London.
- Slater, W. J. (ed.) (1986) *Aristophanis Byzantii fragmenta*. Berlin.
- Slater, W. J. and Summa, D. (2006) 'Crowns at Magnesia', *GRBS* 46: 275-99.
- Souris, G. A. (1982) 'The Size of the Provincial Embassies to the Emperor under the Principate', *ZPE* 48: 235-44.
- de Souza, P. (1999) *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*. Cambridge.
- Sourvinou-Inwood, C. (1990) 'What is *Polis* Religion?', in *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander*, eds. O. Murray and S. Price. Oxford: 295-322.
- Spawforth, A. (ed.) (2007) *The Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies*. Cambridge.
- de Ste Croix, G. E. M. (1961) 'Notes on Jurisdiction in the Athenian Empire', *CQ* 11: 94-112.
 ——— (1981) *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests*. London.
- Strassler, R. B. (ed. and trans.) (2009) *The Landmark Xenophon's Hellenika*. New York.
- Swinnen, W. (1970) 'Herakleitos of Halikarnassos, an Alexandrian Poet and Diplomat?', *AnSoc* 1: 39-52.
- Swoboda, H. (1890) *Die griechische Volksbeschlüsse: epigraphische Untersuchungen*. Leipzig.

- Szanto, E. (1892) *Das griechische Bürgerrecht*. Freiburg.
- Talmon, S. (1998) *Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile*. Oxford.
- Thomas, R. (1992) *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge.
- Thonemann, P. J. (2006) 'Neilomandros', *Chiron* 36: 11-43.
 ——— (2011) *The Maeander Valley: A Historical Geography from Antiquity to Byzantium*. Cambridge.
- Tissot, Ch. J. (1863) *Des proxénies grecques et de leur analogie avec les institutions consulaires modernes*. Dijon.
- Tod, M. N. (1913) *International Arbitration Amongst the Greeks*. Oxford.
- Todd, S. C. (1993) *The Shape of Athenian Law*. Oxford.
- Tracey, S. V. (2003) 'A Major Athenian Letter-Cutter of ca. 410 to ca. 380: The Cutter of IG II² 17', in *Gestures: Essays in Ancient History, Literature, and Philosophy Presented to Alan L. Boegehold on the Occasion of His Retirement and his Seventy-fifth Birthday*, eds. G. W. Bakewell and J. P. Sickinger. Oxford: 351-63.
- Traill, J. S. (1968) 'The Bouleutic List of 303/2 B.C.', *Hesperia* 37: 1-24.
- Tréheux, J. (1953) 'Décret de Lampsaque trouvé à Thasos', *BCH* 77: 426-43.
- Trevett, J. (1992) *Apollodorus, the Son of Pasion*. Oxford.
 ——— (1999) 'Demosthenes and Thebes', *Historia* 48: 184-202.
- Tzifopoulos, Y. (2010) 'Proxeny and Citizenship Awards by Sybaritos, Crete', in *Studies in Greek Epigraphy and History in Honor of Stephen V. Tracey*, eds. G. Reger, F. X. Ryan and F. Winters. Paris: 355-68.
- Ullrich, F. W. (1822) *Disquisitionis de proxenia, sive, publico apud Graecos hospitio*. Berlin.
- Vanseveren, J. (1937) 'Inscriptions d'Amorgos et de Chios', *RPh* 63: 313-47.
- Veligianni-Terzi, C. (1997) *Wertbegriffe in den attischen Ehrendekreten der Klassischen Zeit*. Stuttgart.
- Veyne, P. (1990) *Bread and Circuses: Historical Sociology and Political Pluralism*, trans. B. Pierce. London.
- Virgilio, B. (1969) 'Rassegna di studi sulle prossenie greche', *RFIC* 97: 494-501.

- (2011) *Le roi écrit: le correspondance du souverain hellénistique, suivie de deux lettres d'Antiochos III à partir de Louis Robert et d'Adolf Wilhelm (Studi ellenistici 25)*. Pisa.
- Vincent, A. (1987) *Theories of the State*. Oxford.
- Vlassopoulos, K. (2007) *Unthinking the Greek Polis: Ancient Greek History Beyond Eurocentrism*. Cambridge.
- (2011) 'Review of Meyer (2010)', *BMCR*, accessed on 12 September 2012: <http://bmc.brynmawr.edu/2011/2011-02-48.html>
- Vujčić, N. (2009) 'Greek Popular Assemblies and the Discourses of Dio of Prusa', *EA* 42: 157-69.
- Wacker, C. (1996) 'Der akarnanischen Hafenplatz Panormos', in *Akarnanien: Eine Landschaft im antiken Griechenland*, eds. P. Berktold, J. Schmid and C. Wacker. Würzburg: 209-213.
- Walbank, F. W. (1981) *The Hellenistic World*. London.
- Walbank, M. B. (1978) *Athenian Proxemies of the Fifth Century B.C.* Toronto.
- (1982) 'An Athenian Decree Re-considered. Honours for Aristoxenos and Another Boiotian', *EMC* 26: 259-274.
- Wallace, W. P. (1956) *The Euboian League and its Coinage*. New York.
- (1962) 'The Meeting-point of Histiaian and Macedonian Tetrobols', *NC* 2: 17-22.
- Wallace, M. B. (1970) 'Early Greek Proxenoí', *Phoenix* 24: 189-208.
- Walsh, J. J. (1993) 'Bones of Contention: Pharsalus, Phthiotic Thebes, Larisa Cremaste, Echinus', *CP* 88: 35-46.
- Waltz, K. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. New York.
- Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. (1994) *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge.
- Welles, C. B. (1970) 'Review of Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques*', *Gnomon* 42: 804-10.
- Wendt, A. (1992) 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 41: 335-70.
- (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge.
- Whitehead, D. (1977) *The Ideology of the Athenian Metic (Cambridge Philological Society Supplement 4)*. Cambridge.
- (1983) 'Competitive Outlay and Community Profit: φιλοτιμία in Democratic Athens', *C&M* 34: 55-74.

- (1993) ‘Cardinal Virtues: The Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens’, *C&M* 44: 37-75.
- (2000) *Hypereides: The Forensic Speeches*. Oxford.
- Wiemer, H.-U. (2010) ‘Review of Carlsson (2010)’, *Sehepunkte* 10, accessed on 23 October 2012: <http://www.sehepunkte.de/2010/09/16103.html>
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U. von (1909) *Nordionische Steine*. Berlin.
- Wilhelm, A. (1909) *Beiträge zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde mit einem Anhang über die öffentliche Aufzeichnung von Urkunden*. Vienna.
- (1939) *Attische Urkunden IV*. Vienna.
- (1942) ‘Proxenie und Euergesie’, in *Attische Urkunden V*. Vienna: 11-86.
- Will, E. (1979-82) *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique*, 2nd edn. (2 vols.). Nancy.
- Wilson, A. (2009) ‘Approaches to Quantifying Roman Trade’, in *Quantifying the Roman Economy: Methods and Approaches*, eds. A. Bowman and A. Wilson. Oxford: 213-49.
- Wörle, M. (1988) ‘Inschriften von Herakleia am Latmos I. Antiochus III, Zeuxis und Herakleia’, *Chiron* 18: 421-76.
- Zelnick-Abramovitz, R. (2000) ‘The *Xenodokoi* of Thessaly’, *ZPE* 130: 109-20.
- (2004) ‘The *Proxenoï* of Western Greece’, *ZPE* 147: 93-106.
- Zgusta, L. (1984) *Kleinasiatische Ortsnamen*. Heidelberg.
- Ziebarth, E. (1933) ‘Neue Beiträge zum griechischen Seehandel’, *Klio* 26: 231-47.
- Zimmermann, M. (1992) *Untersuchungen zur historischen Landeskunde Zentral-lykiens*. Bonn.
- Zuiderhoek, A. (2008) ‘On the Political Sociology of the Imperial Greek City’, *GRBS* 48: 417-45.
- (2009) *The Politics of Munificence in the Roman Empire: Citizens, Elites and Benefactors in Asia Minor*. Cambridge.