

# The Crusade against the Staufer in Germany, 1246-51



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## Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	1
Short Abstract 316 words.....	2
Long Abstract.....	14
Abbreviations.....	15
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Historiography, Sources, and Method .....</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Chapter 1: Problematizing the Crusade against the Staufer.....</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>Chapter 2: Henry Raspe’s Crusade, 1246-7 .....</b>	<b>142</b>
<b>Chapter 3: William of Holland’s Crusade, 1247-51 .....</b>	<b>243</b>
<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>254</b>
<b>Appendix.....</b>	<b>254</b>
1.) Key events in Chronicles and Annals.....	254
2.) Timeline Letters and Propaganda 1239-1250 .....	256
3.) Henry Raspe’s military campaigns in Germany, 1246-7 .....	259
4.) William of Holland’s military campaigns in Germany, 1247-51.....	260
5.) The military activities by the archbishop of Cologne, 1246-51 .....	261
6.) The military activities by the archbishops of Mainz, 1246-51 .....	262
7.) The military activities by the archbishop of Trier, 1246-51.....	263
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>264</b>
Primary Sources.....	264
Secondary Material.....	276
<b>Image.....</b>	<b>302</b>
Tombstone Effigy of Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz (1195-1249).....	302
<b>Maps .....</b>	<b>303</b>
1246 – 16 February 1247: Locations Henry Raspe & Conrad IV .....	303
16 February – 31 December 1247: Locations William of Holland & Conrad IV .....	304
1248: Locations William of Holland & Conrad IV .....	305
1249: Locations William of Holland & Conrad IV .....	306
1250: Locations William of Holland & Conrad IV .....	307
1251: Locations William of Holland & Conrad IV .....	308
1246-51: Locations Dominican & Franciscan Convents.....	310

## **Short Abstract**

In the conflict between Holy Emperor Frederick II and Pope Innocent IV, the papal argument that this change of power was a crusade and thus a holy war with an important spiritual dimension largely failed to take hold in Germany. Instead, the way the crusade unfolded in practice was determined by the logic of attaining royal power in Germany, while the political and legal necessities for Frederick II's deposition determined how Pope Innocent IV chose to phrase the justification for war. Politics drove religious ideology in a way that made it distinct from other crusades. Thus, the crusade against the Staufer merits description as a 'political crusade.'

The analysis is based on thirteenth century chronicles and annals, mainly produced in Germany but also beyond, as well as charters issued by protagonists of the conflict. Most chronicles and annals did not report the military campaigns by using language typical of crusading. Hence chronicles create a dissimilar picture of the same events to papal letters, which are often prescriptive. The difference in language between the sources has shaped the historiography on the crusade until this day.

The crusade was shaped by the prerequisites of becoming the new King of the Romans, and of putting rulership into practice. Henry Raspe conceptualised his military strategy as a direct fight to overthrow Conrad IV, while William of Holland strengthened his rule after his coronation by conquering imperial lands and property, especially royal palaces. Juxtaposing their strategies highlights their different approaches to affecting a change of power in Germany.

By addressing this hitherto neglected subject, the thesis contributes to two disciplines: to crusader studies by analysing the crusade against the Staufer in its German context, and to German history by explaining the role the crusade played in the conflict between Emperor Frederick II and the papacy.

## **Long Abstract**

The thesis offers new insights into the balance between the religious and political aspects of the crusade against the Staufer in Germany. It argues that Pope Innocent IV's arguments in favour of Frederick II's deposition, his reasoning for deploying a crusade, as well as his actions leading up and during the military campaigns were shaped by political necessity and not by the requirements of crusading as a spiritual endeavour or holy war. While to a certain degree this was true for most crusades, the extent to which political and legal requirements determined the line of argument in this conflict were unique to the crusade against the Staufer. The overt manner in which it took place and the particular chain in which the events of the conflict unfolded seem to have undermined the spiritual nature of the crusade as a holy war for some contemporaries, based on the language and terms contemporary chronicle writers used to describe, and sometimes reflect upon, the events of the conflict in chronicles and annals.

Chronicles and annals produced in Germany and further afield reported the conflict and military campaign almost exclusively in political and 'secular' language that was markedly devoid of terms typically associated with crusading and holy war. This thesis argues that the absence of the language of crusading reflects a perception of the crusade as especially political and 'secular' among contemporaries that was unique to this crusade. The terms used to describe the conflict in chronicles and annals stand in noticeable contrast to the language of papal propaganda, which was emphatically spiritual and sometimes apocalyptic, but which has received preferential treatment by previous studies. Thus, the crusade against the Staufer in Germany should be understood as a 'political crusade', which through its especially strong political component is distinct from other crusades that took place in Europe at the time, such as the Albigensian Crusade.

Furthermore, a step-by-step analysis of the crusade against the Staufer can shed further light on how much politics was in the religion and how much religion in the politics. The way

in which the crusade unfolded in Germany has received little attention in the context of the conflict between Frederick II (1194-1250) and Pope Gregory IX (1227-41) and Pope Innocent IV (1243-54). The military campaigns by two successive royal candidates, Henry Raspe (1246-7) and William of Holland (1247-51), have never been systematically analyzed before, nor has the preaching of the cross been contextualized within the military campaigns in Germany between 1246 and 1251. The thesis argues that the royal candidates pursued different strategies in how they changed power in Germany. Their different approaches were informed by anxieties surrounding legitimacy, political power, and military opposition by Frederick's son Conrad IV. The disparity between them rose from the unique requirements of attaining royal power in Germany, hence the crusade against the Staufer can only be understood in its German context.

Parts of the thesis were inspired by a notable difference between crusader historiography and historiography on thirteenth century Germany. Crusade historiography lists the crusade against the Staufer in the same breath as other inner-European crusades, but upon closer inspection previous studies fail to provide a coherent definition of the crusade's most important characteristics. Rivalries between 'traditionalist' and 'pluralist' research schools often have reduced historiographical debate to the questions whether the conflict between Frederick II and the popes truly was a crusade, and whether it should be categorized as a crusade against heretics, Christians, or political enemies. In contrast, German historiography has a very different perspective on the same events. It discusses the struggle between Frederick II and the popes almost exclusively in 'secular' political categories and as part of the political history of Germany's Interregnum (1245-73).

There are several reasons why there has not been a more intensive exchange of ideas between the two strands of historiography. Knowledge of crusading features of the conflict have largely been forgotten among German historians. While crusade historiography has been shaped by an unbroken Anglo-Saxon tradition of military history, German historiography

struggled with the field in the second half of the twentieth century due to the legacy of National Socialism. Moreover, crusader research is often published in English, while detailed studies on thirteenth-century Germany or on German local history are mainly conducted in German; to a certain degree, the language barrier still hinders the free flow of ideas from German research into crusade historiography.

Furthermore, the divergent perspectives in historiography can be explained to a large extent by the different sources used by historians studying crusades and Germany. Crusade historians often depend on papal sources, while German historians draw upon chronicles and charters from Germany. Contemporary perspectives in papal and German sources differ greatly; papal sources often reference crusading practices and use language associated with crusading, such as 'preaching the word of the cross' or 'taking the cross'. In contrast, German sources rarely do so. The choice of sources therefore generates a direct line from the impression the language creates to the outcome of the analysis, which permeates all research on the crusade against the Staufer.

The thesis is founded on a detailed analysis of contemporary charters and chronicles, mostly from the German parts of the Holy Roman Empire, but also from places further away. It includes information from 38 chronicles and annals, of which 19 are German, six are Italian, four are French, three are Austrian, two respectively are Dutch and English, and one is from Bohemia. 33 chronicles were written in the thirteenth century, four in the fourteenth century; 34 are in Latin, three in vernacular languages. In addition, the analysis incorporated contemporary charters by all members of the papal party, as well as papal registers. However, no sources produced by crusaders against the Staufer, such as charters, letters, or wills, seem to be extant. Nor are there any sermons preached against the Staufer in the context of crusader recruitment that are known to have survived.

The thesis analyzes how the crusade against the Staufer in Germany was organized, justified, and financed, what response it achieved, and how it was regarded by contemporaries. The research method combined details on relevant individuals in Germany from charters with information from chronicles between 1246 and 1251. Charters provided precise dates and locations, while chronicles supplied detailed content about their actions. Information was collected on Henry Raspe, William of Holland, the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, Trier, papal legates, and the Dominicans and Franciscan orders. In addition, papal mandates to the apostolic legates and mendicant friars pertaining to crusader recruitment were tracked, as well as letters of propaganda. This allowed to construct a cohesive narrative that makes sense of the crusade in Germany beyond the military campaigns at its center.

The short-term starting point of the crusade against the Staufer lies in 1239, when Pope Gregory IX excommunicated Frederick II for the second time in the emperor's lifetime. Gregory IX tried to organize a crusade to defeat Frederick, but the pope died in 1241 before the military campaign was fully under way. The emperor had a history of personal and political clashes with successive popes, including Gregory IX. However, the long-term root cause of the crusade lay in the long history of conflict between popes and emperors based on irreconcilable strategic interests of the Holy Roman Empire and the papal state, as well as with regards to the status of the Kingdom of Sicily.

As a result of the power struggle originating in Frederick II's excommunication, Gregory IX's successor Pope Innocent IV began to consider removing Frederick II and the Staufer dynasty from power permanently. He deposed Frederick as Holy Roman Emperor at the Council of Lyon in 1245. This gave Innocent IV the necessary legitimacy to proclaim a crusade, even though the charges of heresy and the validity of the deposition were strongly contested among contemporaries.

Although much of the conflict took place in Italy, Innocent IV began to consider his political options in Germany. It was here that a new *Rex Romanorum* could be raised, who could replace Frederick's son Conrad IV (1228-54) as king. Young Conrad IV's position as king was weak. He ruled in Germany on his father's behalf, since Frederick II dethroned his first son Henry (VII). Moreover, he was only elected, but not crowned as king, as Frederick II wanted to curtail the king's power after the episode with Henry (VII). Thus, Innocent IV tried to raise a new King of the Romans, who could eventually become the new Holy Roman Emperor.

The chapter 'Problematizing the Crusade against the Staufer' shows that the way Pope Innocent IV conceptualized the crusade differed significantly from how it was represented in chronicles and annals from Germany and beyond. Most chronicles and annals described the military campaign exclusively in secular terms. All 38 chronicles and annals analyzed in this thesis were supportive of Pope Innocent IV, but only seven reported the military campaigns by using language typical for crusading. This is especially pertinent because most chronicle writers were ecclesiastics, and as such more likely predisposed to embrace the pope's point of view. From the seven chronicles that referenced crusader terms, five came from Germany, where they were written in locations close to centres of archiepiscopal power. These chronicle writers were therefore more likely to encounter the practical organisation of crusader recruitment and to mirror the language that the archbishops used. Two chronicles using the language of crusading were written in England and likely brought news from Germany with them on transport routes. This indicates that crusading features, though widely apparent, often were not seen as key elements in how contemporaries made sense of the conflict.

Norman Housley explicitly stated that the Italian Crusades should not be considered a 'political crusade' because the papacy did not distinguish between its 'religious' and 'political' motivations. This thesis argues that the gap between the papal mindset and the reality of war

as it was perceived by many contemporaries showed that Pope Innocent IV's explanation failed why a crusade against the Staufer was justified. Thus, the papacy's authority to assign significance to events in accordance with papal ideology found its limit with the crusade against the Staufer in Germany in the middle of the thirteenth century. The analysis of the crusade under Henry Raspe and William of Holland crusade will demonstrate this in more detail.

The two chapters on Henry Raspe's and William of Holland's crusades show that the function of their respective military campaigns was to enable them to become king and to enact their rule. To establish themselves as king, royal candidates ideally were elected and then crowned as King of the Romans. They followed numerous steps in a complex process. Skipping a step may not immediately have halted the entire undertaking, but it had the potential to cause problems, such as challenges by secular princes over whether the royal candidate was a legitimate king. To substantiate his claim to the throne, the newly elected king had to implement his rule. Henry Raspe's and William of Holland's different strategies were determined by the changing situation in Germany. The differences in their strategies reflected the requirements of becoming King of the Romans in Germany in an unsteady political environment.

The chapter 'Henry Raspe's Crusade, 1246-7' demonstrates that by the 1240s, it was not yet clearly defined which German princes elected the *Rex Romanorum*. Henry Raspe was only elected by ecclesiastics, which added to his nickname as *Rex Clericorum*. During his crusade, he primarily focused on destroying Staufer power directly through a military defeat. He tried to force a quick decision by confronting Conrad IV at the battle of Frankfurt on 5 August 1246. The papal party bribed certain members of the Swabian nobility to betray Conrad IV and abandon him during battle. Even though Henry Raspe was victorious, the victory was not decisive enough to incapacitate Conrad IV politically and militarily. Due to the

unpredictable outcome and the high-risk battles entailed, it remained the only pitched battle of the conflict.

At a court day in Frankfurt, Henry Raspe deposed Conrad IV as duke of Swabia. This mimicked Pope Innocent IV's deposition of Frederick at the Council of Lyon in a remarkable parallel. To implement the deposition, Henry Raspe invaded the duchies of Swabia and Bavaria. The duchy of Swabia was Conrad's IV heartland; the duchy of Bavaria belonged to Conrad's IV father-in-law, Duke Otto of Bavaria. Conrad IV's deposition and his struggles with certain Swabian and Bavarian nobles, who established ties with the papal party, bound the military and political energies of the Staufer party in Swabia and Bavaria over the next years. However, Henry Raspe only had nine months to act as the new king before he died in February 1247.

The chapter 'William of Holland's Crusade, 1247-51' shows that William of Holland adopted a different strategy from his predecessor, in reaction to the experience of the previous year. Instead of directly trying to defeat Conrad IV like his predecessor, William of Holland tried to build up his kingship to overpower Staufer rule. William did not receive the same level of financial support as his predecessor, because the papal treasury had run out of money. By conquering royal palaces (*Pfalzen*), he amassed a material power base that supplied him with resources in men, money, and victuals. The royal palaces also had a symbolic use, as William of Holland tried to emulate the Staufer rule. This was remarkable in the face of papal propaganda that painted Frederick II as a heretic and even the anti-Christ. Apparently, the damage to the reputation of the Staufer was insufficient to deter William of Holland from trying to create a direct line between their rule and himself.

Royal candidates had to take possession of the lands and property, and as well as the goods, tithes, and privileges connected to them, that were associates with his office. These lands and goods could belong to the Holy Roman Empire, the king, or be held as 'private'

property by his family (*Reichsgut, Krongut, Hausgut*). They were the material and symbolic base on which the King of the Romans built his rule and determined his financial and 'feudal' potency. If the king's lands and property were diminished, it seriously reduced his potential to enact his kingship in Germany. During the crusade against the Staufer both Conrad IV and the royal candidates lost critical amounts of lands and property, which would reduce the power and prestige of the *Rex Romanorum* until the end of the thirteenth century.

Like his predecessor, William of Holland's election as King of the Romans showed significant weaknesses. Although his electors included the duke of Brabant, who was his uncle, some of the most important temporal princes were still missing. William of Holland intended to meet the requirements of legitimacy through his coronation. The coronation of the king traditionally took place in Aachen, and William of Holland did everything he could to ensure his coronation took place there. He laid siege to Aachen from April to October 1248 and was crowned there on 1 November 1248. In the following months, he tried to continue his conquest of as many royal palaces as possible, but consistently suffered from a lack of troops. He tried to compensate for this with retinues by the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier, as well as other bishops and nobles, but was bound by constrictions in their willingness to serve his military campaigns.

As a result of several problems, among them a chronic lack of troops, William of Holland's kingship began to stall. Between October 1249 and June 1250, William of Holland's military campaign was interrupted because he was preoccupied with a struggle with Countess Margaret of Flanders. Direct military contact with Conrad IV only occurred late during William of Holland's campaign. It was forced by Conrad IV in summer 1250, because he felt that he had gained the military strength to confront William. It is unclear whether William or Conrad IV would have succeeded, because the military campaign was cut short by Frederick's II death in December 1250. This was a turning point because it destroyed Staufer power in Germany.

Over the next year, the focus of William of Holland's kinship shifted from a military campaign to trying to build new relationships with those willing to make alliances in the absence of a viable Staufer alternative.

The military support by the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier was critical to both Henry Raspe and William of Holland. Each archbishop provided crucial support to the royal candidates, but they all came with their own difficulties. Archbishop Conrad of Cologne focused on his own political projects, especially when he became the apostolic legate, and was often absorbed by his difficult relationship with the citizens of Cologne. When Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz died in March 1249, he was succeeded by Christian of Bolanden as archbishop of Mainz. However, Archbishop Christian turned out to be imprudently peaceful; within two years, he was replaced with the more bellicose Gerhard of Dhaun. Archbishop Arnold of Trier seemed to have been a stable source of support, but many of his actions remain unclear due to a lack of charters.

The papal legates combined in their hands to threads to many tasks crucial to the crusade. They were usually the main organizers of crusader recruitment. They personally preached the word of the cross and worked with the mendicant friars to ensure crusader recruitment in all areas of Germany and the Holy Roman Empire. In addition, they used spiritual measures to persecute Staufer supporters, both lay people and ecclesiastics, and to reward those loyal to the papal party.

However, the papal legates also acted as chaperones to the royal candidates and other members of the papal party. Legate Philip of Ferrara, who was present for Henry Raspe's rule, and legate Peter Capocci, who was in Germany until William of Holland's coronation, ensured that the members of the papal party did not stray too far from the papal vision for Germany. This changed when the role of apostolic legate passed first to Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz and then to Archbishop Conrad of Cologne. Especially the later neglected crusader recruitment

and used the office of legate to further his own political interests to a degree that threatened to destabilize William of Holland's kingship.

Following an in-depth analysis of the campaigns of both Henry Raspe and William of Holland, the thesis returns to the question of crusading in its conclusion. A push and pull relationship took place between the military campaigns and crusader recruitment. Henry Raspe and William of Holland only were able to raise sufficiently large armies for their military campaigns because they framed their campaigns as crusades. The crusading apparatus allowed them to use tried and tested methods of recruitment, while the indulgences functioned as a currency that replaced traditional bonds of loyalty. Due to the interdependence between the military campaign and crusader recruitment, there was also push and pull relationship between military and political events during the crusade. Examples of this were Henry Raspe's victory at the battle of Frankfurt, which considerably weakened Conrad IV over the next years, and William of Holland's successful siege of Aachen, which enabled his coronation.

On the one hand, the royal candidates' military campaigns showed many of the hallmarks of a crusade: a call to arms was proclaimed by Pope Innocent IV, recruitment was organised by preaching the word of the cross, and crusaders received plenary indulgences for the remission of their sins. On the other hand, the military campaigns and many political aspects of the conflict were far removed from any notion of holy war. To those close to the military campaigns and political manoeuvring in Germany, Henry Raspe's and William of Holland's respective aspiration to the throne may have often appeared as so political that they outweighed Innocent IV's religious arguments in significant ways.

This contradiction can be explained by distinguishing between the 'front end' of the crusade, how it was presented by contemporaries who experienced it in Germany, and the 'back end', how the crusade was conceived by theorists such as Pope Innocent IV, his canonists, and ecclesiastic scholars. The existence of such a marked difference in how the same events were

presented in the sources indicates that the papal vision of the crusade did not manifest in the experience of contemporaries in Germany, even if they were papal-friendly and in line with Innocent IV's ideology. Instead, the military campaigns and the political events in Germany seem to have been experienced in such a profoundly 'secular', political way that aspects of crusading moved into the background. The chasm that emerged between papal ideal and experienced reality on the ground manifested in the sources.

The thesis concludes that acceptance of the papal narrative that the change of power in Germany was part of a holy war was not, in fact, necessary for the military campaign to be successful in the short-term. It was enough to initiate the destabilization of Staufer rule in Germany, first through Frederick II's deposition, then through the royal candidates' political and military campaigns, to achieve provisional success.

The difference between the papal vision as presented in papal sources and the apparent experience at the receiving end of the crusade presented in contemporary chronicles and annals has implications for further research. It indicates that for crusades in which the papacy is one of the belligerents, historiography should move away from using papal sources as the main basis of analysis, because it has the effect of amplifying the papal point of view to the detriment of all others. For the crusade against the Staufer in particular, it skews any analysis in favour of the papal narrative if papal sources dominate too much. For crusader historiography more widely, it has the effect of preventing a full understanding of conflicts in which the pope is one of the affected parties.

Further research into the crusade against the Staufer could illuminate several aspects of the conflict in more breadth and depth. More detailed research should go into the German princes, both temporal and ecclesiastical. Whether they were connected to the crusade or opposed it, the princes acted as important nodes in the network of power in Germany. In

addition, the crusade should be juxtaposed with a systematic study of Conrad IV's military and political activities.

Evidence in the chronicles and annals suggests that many people accepted the papal narrative; foremost those who became crusaders against the Staufer. However, not every crusader may have necessarily agreed with every aspect of the papal argument. Motivation is complex and practical factors, such as the proximity of the military campaign, may have played an important role. In addition, the increased uptake of the cross by the Frisians under William of Holland suggests that recruits were not only motivated by pious zeal or the legal protection the crusader status offered, but also by cultural affiliation. Yet these motivations are not mutually exclusive.

Based on the chronicles and annals, which are so often silent on crusading matters, it is possible to suggest that a silent majority did not think about the military campaigns by the royal candidates as crusades. Norman Housley and Elizabeth Siberry were correct to point out, though, that almost none of the little extant criticism of the crusade against the Staufer was based on a notion that this particular crusade tainted the idea of crusading. For many contemporaries, this crusade may have been a crusade simply because it had been proclaimed by the pope, whose prerogative it was to do so.

When the crusade against the Staufer is placed in the context of the long-term struggle between *imperium* and *sacerdotium*, it appears as a particular reiteration of the conflict that tied together dominant ideas of the day. Examples of ideas that shaped key concepts of the conflict include the appeal the use of a crusade held for the papacy against a non-Saracen enemy in Europe and the use of anxieties surrounding heresy in the legal argument for Frederick II's deposition.

## **Abbreviations**

**CCCOGD:** Corpus Christianorum Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Generaliumque Decreta

**Ep Saec XIII:** Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum selecta, Volumes II-III

**LexMA:** Lexikon des Mittelalters

**MGH:** Monumenta Germaniae Historica

**MGH Con:** Constitutiones et Acta Publica Imperatorum et Regum, Volume II

**MGH Dt Chron:** MGH Deutsche Chroniken

**MGH SS:** MGH Scriptores (in Folio) SS

**MGH SS rer Germ:** MGH Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi

## Introduction

From the early thirteenth century onwards, crusades against a variety of enemies in Europe became increasingly common.<sup>1</sup> In the first half of the thirteenth century, crusading ideology and rhetoric could easily be transferred from the Holy Land and applied to internal political conflicts within Christendom. The case for a crusade that was not strictly focused on the liberation of Jerusalem had developed from at least the twelfth century onward with the crusade against Markward of Anweiler. It led to crusades against such varied targets as the Albigensians, Stedinger, or Drenther.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, popes systematically began to elaborate crusader privileges and to integrate them into a system of penance and quotidian evangelization.<sup>3</sup> By the 1240s, crusading in Western Europe was well-established, but the crusade against the Staufer intensified this process to a degree that had never been seen before. It would become one of the most notorious crusades, and one where the application of a crusade against Christian political enemies had some of its most severe effects.

The military campaign against Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II (1194-1250) and other members of the Staufer dynasty formed part of protracted and unresolved conflict between emperors and popes, whose opposing interests can be traced all the way back to the Investiture Contest.<sup>4</sup> In 1239, Pope Gregory IX (1227-41) excommunicated Frederick II, for the second time in the emperor's life.<sup>5</sup> The pope tried to organise a crusade against Frederick II, but died in 1241 before it was fully under way. His successor, Pope Innocent IV (1243-54),

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<sup>1</sup> C. Tyerman, *The World of the Crusades* (New Haven/London, 2019), pp. 599-637.

<sup>2</sup> *Idem*, pp. 631-3.

<sup>3</sup> For renewed crusader privileges at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, see *1215 Lateranense IV*, CCCOGD, ed. A. Giuseppe and A. Melloni (November 2020), [internetsv.info/LateranenseIV.html](http://internetsv.info/LateranenseIV.html).

<sup>4</sup> See B. E. Whalen, *The Two Powers: The Papacy, The Empire, and the Struggle for Sovereignty in the Thirteenth Century* (Philadelphia, 2019), C. Zey, *Der Investiturstreit* (Munich, 2017), and S. Weinfurter, *Canossa. Die Entzauberung der Welt* (Munich, 2006).

<sup>5</sup> G. Althoff, 'Päpstliche Autorität im Hochmittelalter', in H. Seibert et al (eds), *Autorität und Akzeptanz. Das Reich im Europa des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Ostfildern, 2013), pp. 253-66 and T. C. Van Cleve, *Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. Immutator mundi* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 427-530.

deposed Frederick as Holy Roman Emperor at the Council of Lyon in 1245. Like his predecessor, Innocent IV initially struggled to organise a crusade against Frederick.<sup>6</sup> However, Frederick's deposition as emperor gave the endeavour the political and legal legitimacy that Innocent IV needed, even though its validity was strongly contested among contemporaries.<sup>7</sup>

While Frederick was active in Italy, Innocent IV also took Germany into his focus. Germany was ruled by Conrad IV (1228-54) on his father Frederick's behalf. Conrad IV's position as king was weak, though, because of his young age, the damage done to the royal majesty by his father's recent deposition of his brother Henry (VII), and the fact that Conrad IV, though elected as king, was not crowned.<sup>8</sup> In Germany, Innocent IV got to the root cause of Staufer rule. Here new Kings of the Romans were made; from here, they could eventually become the new Holy Roman Emperor. Therefore, the thesis analyses Henry Raspe's and William of Holland's crusade against the Staufer in Germany.

The thesis refers to Henry Raspe and William of as 'royal candidates' as opposed to 'anti-kings.' 'Anti-king' is a translation of the German term 'Gegenkönig', which has the disadvantage that it does not reflect that the candidates were aspiring to be king, and that whether or not they were recognized as such was at the heart of their struggle. To lead the military campaigns, the royal candidates collaborated with the three archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier, and the legates sent by the Apostolic See, of which the two most influential ones were Philip of Ferrara and Peter Capocci. They also worked closely with mendicant friars of the Dominican and Franciscan Orders. Together they formed what will be referred to as 'the papal party' in Germany. The boundaries of the core period of warfare from 1246 to 1251 are set by Henry Raspe's election as king in May 1246 and Conrad IV's departure from Germany

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<sup>6</sup> W. Stürner, *Friedrich II., 1194-1250* (Darmstadt, 2009), pp. 555-63.

<sup>7</sup> F. Kempf, 'Die Absetzung Friedrichs im Lichte der Kanonistik', in J. Fleckenstein (ed), *Probleme um Friedrich II.* (Sigmaringen, 1974), pp. 345-60.

<sup>8</sup> M. Kaufhold, 'Konrad IV. Königliches Handeln in einer Zeit des Wandels', in K-H. Ruess (ed), *Konrad IV. (1228-1254). Deutschlands letzter Stauferkönig* (Göppingen, 2012), pp. 10-25.

in October 1251. After Conrad IV left Germany for the Kingdom of Sicily in October 1251, the number of crusade campaigns in Germany plummeted and slowly petered out over the next five years.

This thesis argues that Pope Innocent IV used the crusade against the imperial Staufer family in Germany as a tool to facilitate a change of power in the Holy Roman Empire. As a result of the conflict with Frederick II, Innocent IV decided to accomplish the election of a new *Rex Romanorum* to remove the Staufer dynasty from power in the Holy Roman Empire. The goal of the crusade against the Staufer was to lay the military and political foundations to build up a new King of the Romans and to defeat Conrad IV as the main representative of Staufer power in Germany. This would allow Innocent IV to replace Conrad IV with a new King of the Romans, whom the pope could crown emperor, thus replacing Frederick II as Holy Roman Emperor. Therefore, the thesis will analyse the military campaigns in combination with the political and legal considerations that determined the royal candidates' military strategies to overthrow and replace Staufer rule.

The thesis further argues that without framing the military campaign as a crusade, the royal candidates' attempts to become the new King of the Romans would have immediately collapsed, or not even been able to take off the ground. Henry Raspe and William of Holland were able to reinforce their original retinues with crusaders of German and international origin and from the retinues of the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier. They could also use funds that they received from Pope Innocent IV for recruitment. It was only through crusader recruitment that the new royal candidates were able to enlarge their armies sufficiently even to attempt to change power in Germany. Hence the thesis will analyse the military campaign in relation to measures for recruitment for the crusade.

The crusade did not take place in isolation from all other religious, political, and military measures the pope and Church could employ. Winning the conflict was not as

straightforward as a military defeat; the crusade was one among several measures in a war fought with many weapons. Crusade measures formed only part of a much wider range of actions – both religious and secular – that the papal party took in Germany. Thus, the military campaigns and crusader recruitment will be analysed together with the multi-faceted support by the archbishops, papal legates, and mendicant orders. Their supplementary actions could take various forms, for example raising and spending funds, making alliances, and imposing ecclesiastical censure. While they were crucial for the overall outcome of the conflict, they will only be discussed if they touched the military sphere of the crusade. Overall, the crusade against the Staufer in Germany must be conceptualized in a comprehensive manner as part of the bigger picture of a change of power in the Holy Roman Empire. As such, it played a pivotal, but hitherto underappreciated role in the conflict.

This thesis considers two different historiographical debates to understand how historians attempted to define the crusade against the Staufer. The crusade against the Staufer is a particularly fine example of the problem of different strands of historiography emphasizing different aspects of the same topic, because there is enormous difference in how mainly Anglophone crusader research and mainly Germanophone ‘national’ research on Germany in the thirteenth century treat the conflict between Frederick II and the popes. The marked difference in perspective between crusader historians and German historians is so strong that it becomes a block to understanding fully the nature of the conflict. Crusader historiography largely describes the military campaigns against the Staufer as a crusade, whereas German historiography mostly describes it as a ‘secular’ war. The reason for this goes all the way back to the sources of the thirteenth century, as will be discussed later in more detail.

The first historiographical debate problematizes different definitions of crusading, which will provide categories to think about the military campaigns against the Staufer. The understanding of the crusade against the Staufer has been complicated by the struggle among

crusader historians to come to a universally accepted, general definition for what constitutes a crusade. Surveys of crusading often revert to a descriptive approach; they simply list the war against the Staufer as ‘the crusade against the Staufer.’ Crusader historians list it with other crusades without any apprehension. It has routinely been named in one breath with the Albigensian, Baltic/Northern, or Stedinger crusade, without ever questioning this classification.<sup>9</sup>

The crusade against the Staufer has been sorted into various subclusters of crusades, such as ‘political crusades’,<sup>10</sup> ‘crusades against secular powers in the West’,<sup>11</sup> ‘crusades against Christian lay powers’,<sup>12</sup> ‘crusades against heretics’,<sup>13</sup> ‘crusades against Christians’,<sup>14</sup> ‘crusades against political enemies’,<sup>15</sup> ‘internal crusades’,<sup>16</sup> ‘crusading in the thirteenth century’,<sup>17</sup> or simply ‘crusade against Frederick II’.<sup>18</sup> The lack of a common name reflects that this understudied cluster is currently positioned at the fringe of crusader studies. The partially overlapping, but incomplete definitions emphasize different aspects of the conflicts out of which they emerged, but rivalries between different crusader ‘schools’ often coagulated into

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<sup>9</sup> See J. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades. A History* (London, 2014), pp. 7-8 and R. Rist, *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198-1245* (London, 2009), pp. 235-40.

<sup>10</sup> As chapter titles in Riley-Smith, *The Crusades. A History*, pp. 554-63 and idem, *The Crusades. A Short History* (New Haven, 1987), pp. 167-72. Rist used the term ‘political crusades’ prolifically in *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198-1245*, pp. 12-5/171-4/196-218. First use of the term seems to have been by J. R. Strayer, ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, in R. L. Wolff and H. W. Hazard (eds.), *A History of the Crusades. Volume II. The Later Crusades, 1189-1311* (Madison, 1969), pp. 343-5.

<sup>11</sup> J. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?* (Houndmills, 2002), pp. 21-2.

<sup>12</sup> C. Tyerman, *The World of the Crusades* (New Haven/London, 2019), p. 599 and N. Housley, *The Italian Crusades. The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers, 1254-1343* (Oxford, 1982), p. 1.

<sup>13</sup> Rist, *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe*, pp. 3-11, Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?* (Houndmills, 2002), pp. 18-20. See also Riley-Smith, *The Crusades. A History*, p. 839 for a bibliography in which he combined heretics and opponents of the Church into ‘Crusades against heretics and Opponents of the Church.’

<sup>14</sup> N. Housley, *The Later Crusades. From Lyons to Alcazar 1274-1580* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 2-5/234-66.

<sup>15</sup> Rist, *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe*, pp. 175-89.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., especially pp. 235-40, also pp. 62-80/125-139/147-170. For the term *crux cismarina* see Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, pp. 62-6.

<sup>17</sup> Riley-Smith also uses the term ‘crusading reaching maturity’, see idem, *The Crusades. A Short History*, pp. 152-78.

<sup>18</sup> G. Raccani, ‘The Crusade against Frederick II: A Neglected Piece of Evidence’, *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 67 (2016), pp. 721-4.

reductive debates over deciding into which category the crusade against the Staufer should be sorted.<sup>19</sup>

In contrast, German historiography has a very different and almost entirely secular perspective on the same events. Recent research discussed the conflict in the context of biographies of Frederick II or the Interregnum, which has commonly been dated from Frederick's deposition in 1245, or death in 1250, to the beginning of Rudolf of Habsburg's rule as King of the Romans in 1273.<sup>20</sup> The year of Frederick II's death in 1250 has been stylised into a strong cesura as it has often been picked as a boundary to distinguish between the High and Late Middle Ages; though a recent trend has been to supersede this division and to emphasize the arbitrary nature of most periodisation.<sup>21</sup>

Although there are passing references to the preaching of the cross against the Staufer, the most recent studies on the protagonists of the conflict in Germany never frame the conflict as a crusade. Even Nikolaus Jaspert and Stefan Tebruck, who edited the latest German-speaking work on crusading practices in Germany in the thirteenth century, did not reference the crusade against the Staufer.<sup>22</sup> It is also completely absent from German 'national' research, for example by Martin Kaufhold, Bernd Schneidmüller, and Hubertus Seibert, on the thirteenth century.<sup>23</sup> Germanophone historiography produced so little output on the crusade against the

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<sup>19</sup> This is exemplified by how only some, and sometimes none, of these crusades are included in overview guidebooks to the field. For example, Jonathan Phillips in his handbook *Holy Warriors. A Modern History of the Crusades* barely mentions the crusade against the Staufer, despite discussing the Children's Crusade, the Albigensian Crusade, the Barons' Crusade, as well as crusading in Spain and the Baltic. See J. Phillips, *Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades* (London, 2009), p. 77/83-4/166/239-42.

<sup>20</sup> Martinus Polonus used the term 'interregnum' in his *Chronicon summorum pontificum et imperatorum Romanorum*, ed. J. F. Böhmer, *Fontes Rerum Germanicarum. Geschichtsquellen Deutschlands, Volume II* (Stuttgart, 1843). See also M. Kaufhold, *Interregnum* (Darmstadt, 2007) and idem, *Deutsches Interregnum und europäische Politik. Konfliktlösungen und Entscheidungsstrukturen 1230–1280* (Hannover, 2000).

<sup>21</sup> For example, P. Dinzelsbacher, *Europa im Hochmittelalter 1050-1250. Eine Kultur- und Mentalitätsgeschichte* (Darmstadt, 2003).

<sup>22</sup> N. Jaspert, N. and S. Tebruck (eds.), *Die Kreuzzugsbewegung im römischdeutschen Reich (11.–13. Jahrhundert)* (Ostfildern, 2017), Table of Contents.

<sup>23</sup> Seibert, H. et al (ed.), *Autorität und Akzeptanz. Das Reich im Europa des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Ostfildern, 2013), B. Schneidmüller, *Grenzerfahrung und monarchische Ordnung. Europa 1200–1500* (Munich, 2011), M. Kaufhold, 'Die Könige des Interregnum. Konrad IV., Heinrich Raspe, Wilhelm, Alfons, Richard (1245–1273)', in B. Schneidmüller and S. Weinfurter (eds.), *Die deutschen Herrscher des Mittelalters, Historische Porträts von Heinrich I. bis Maximilian I.* (Munich, 2003).

Staufer that the knowledge that Innocent IV employed a crusade against the Staufer seems to have been temporarily lost. Most analyses fail to realize that the crusade against the Staufer was an integral part of the conflict between Frederick II and the papacy and there seems to be a question as to whether this was a crusade at all.<sup>24</sup>

Yet the crusade against the Staufer was not always forgotten in German historiography; in the last decade of the nineteenth and in the first decade of the twentieth century several dissertations focused on isolated aspects of the crusade against the Staufer. A possible explanation of why the awareness of this work has been eroded is that military history largely fell out of fashion in German research after World War II, which gradually led to the crusade against the Staufer being hidden by the sediment of other research areas of the conflict. Moreover, a certain language barrier still seems to persist between research published in English and German. This is mixed with different academic attitudes to military history, as crusade historiography is shaped by an unbroken tradition of military history, which could not continue in Germany in the same way after World War II. However, both German and crusader historiography fall short of providing an adequate framework for the crusade against the Staufer in one way or another. Both fail to acknowledge the nuance in the other, namely – to put it simply – how much politics was in the religion and how much religion in politics.

The marked difference between the two traditions of historiography goes all the way back to the sources. The divergent perspectives are based to a large extent on the different sources crusader and German historians use. Crusader historians disproportionately rely on papal sources, while German historians mostly focus on a more diverse range of sources written in Germany. As will be seen, only seven chronicles in total use terms associated with crusading; five from Germany and two from England.

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<sup>24</sup> Niklaus Jaspert confirmed in a phone call on 5 November 2019 that he and Stefan Tebruck had not been aware of the crusade against the Staufer in Germany, when they worked on *Die Kreuzzugsbewegung im römisch-deutschen Reich*.

Another reason for a more general awareness of the connection between crusading and the conflict between the Staufer and the papacy in Germany among anglophone historians may lie in the fame of Matthew Paris' *Chronica Majora*. It is one of the few chronicles that mentions the crusade against the Staufer in Germany. It is a widely known work and subject to prolific study, unlike the five German chronicles that referenced crusading practices, which were often concerned with local matters and do not hold the outstanding position of the *Chronica Majora*. This may have contributed to the heightened awareness of crusader practices against the Staufer in Germany among English-speaking historians in general and crusader historians in particular.

Furthermore, some of the difference between the papal and non-papal sources also has to do with the fact that papal charters were preoccupied with the logistics of the crusade, such as recruitment and paying off crusader oaths. However, current crusader historiography often over-relies on prescriptive sources, often with a legal function.<sup>25</sup> Many historians based their arguments on the writings of canon lawyers, men educated in the ecclesiastical legal thought of the time.

The lack of information about military affairs in a mostly oral warrior culture skews the picture towards a legal or constitutional analysis of the conflict. As a result, much of the research on the crusade against the Staufer has been confined to the theoretical claims staked by the papal and imperial camp instead of political realities. It is time to move away from the exclusive focus on the papacy and intellectual history, because it limits our understanding of how political reality played out practically. The sole focus on papal sources presumes that the theoretical conceptions which defined a crusade as political and legitimate were exactly adopted into political reality, but reality often did not match theoretical expectations.

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<sup>25</sup> See J. Riley-Smith, *The Oxford History of the Crusades* (Oxford, 1999) and R. Rist, 'The Medieval Papacy, Crusading, and Heresy, 1095-1291', in K. Sisson and A. A. Larson (eds.), *A Companion to the Medieval Papacy. Growth of an Ideology and Institution* (Leiden, 2016), pp. 309-32.

Hence, this thesis looks at charters and in chronicles and annals produced in Germany and beyond. It makes extensive use of administrative information contained in charters issued by members of the papal party. In addition, it analyses how the conflict was described and constructed in chronicles. However, the documentary record in Germany is so fractured that it poses specific problems for the crusade against the Staufer. No chronicle provided an overarching narrative of political events that was sanctioned by either side. The lack of a coherent narrative might also partially explain the dearth of studies into the crusade against the Staufer. Accounts in chronicles are strongly localized, sometimes superficial, and almost always fragmentary. Some chronicles and annals were written by contemporaries who were not directly part of either party. Certain chronicle writers aligned themselves with one side or the other, but they did not form a constituent part of either the papal or imperial party.

There was a big difference between the language used in papal sources and contemporary chronicles written in Germany. Papal charters framed the conflict as a crusade, German chroniclers almost comprehensively did not. While the papal sources consistently employed the language of crusading, the German sources did not; importantly, the papal and German sources also did not talk to each other. This conflict had strong religious implications, hence much of the difference between papal sources and German chronicles was due to a contrasting perception of the conflict as a crusade and thus as a holy war.

The degree to which the German princes, *ministeriales*, and cities subscribed to the popes' and the curia's narrative of a holy war, or whether they perceived the conflict in more secular terms, made a crucial difference to their decisions and actions. Contemporary perspectives in papal and German sources differed strongly, yet the distinct sets of sources do not reflect how differently the other side interpreted the same conflict.

This difference in perspective already divided contemporaries, and via the divergent research strands of crusader historiography and historiography on Germany in the thirteenth

century travelled all the way into the field of the crusade against the Staufer as it stands today. A more detailed analysis of this within the specific context of Germany in the middle of the thirteenth century will follow in the chapter 'Problematizing the Crusade against the Staufer', but this is the main reason that led to the division in German historiography on the conflict between Frederick II and Popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV, and crusader historiography on the crusade against the Staufer.

There has never been a systematic study of the papal party's military campaigns in Germany from 1246 to 1251. Some attempts have been made to place the crusade against the Staufen within a wider history of crusading, but they only focused on the propagandistic and legal output and did not take into account the protagonist's actions on the ground. The conflict between the emperor and the papacy has been closely examined, often within the context of Frederick's biography. Yet while the legality of the deposition and the installation of a new king in Conrad's IV stead have been discussed, the military campaign that enabled the popes to attempt this have not yet been analysed. Furthermore, crusader recruitment organized by the papal party for the crusade against the Staufer has never been contextualized within the military campaigns.

While the Introduction sheds light on the differences between crusader and German historiography and the underlying causes in the sources, the following chapter on 'Historiography, Sources, Method' looks in more detail at aspects of the crusade against the Staufer that already have been illustrated. It explains to what extent crusaders sources were extant, which charters and chronicles were chosen and how they complement each other. This provides the context in which to ask deeper questions about the ideas and the developments that defined the crusade in the chapter 'Problematizing the Crusade against the Staufer.'

The chapter 'Henry Raspe's Crusade' traces Raspe's military campaign 1246-7, while the chapter 'William of Holland's Crusade' follows Holland's military campaign 1247-51. The

two chapters will amalgamate a discussion of the activities of many of the most relevant protagonists of the papal party, such as the duties of the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier, the mendicant orders, and the ever-shifting role of the papal legates, with various activities beyond the military campaigns, such as crusader recruitment, the raising and distribution of funds, spiritual punishments and rewards, the forging of alliances, and diplomatic manoeuvres like marriage dispensations.

Where the chronology of the crusade was tangled because the information in sources is so fractured, this thesis works step-by-step to sort out the events before analysing them. The length of the respective chapters reflects the fact that William of Holland's chapter analyses five years as opposed to Henry Raspe's nine months.

## **Historiography, Sources, and Method**

This chapter contains three parts. The first section on historiography analyses in greater depth individual aspects of the crusade against the Staufer. The second section on sources argues that the source transmission for the crusade against the Staufer in Germany was quite unusual in comparison to other crusades, because almost no sources survive that were produced directly by crusaders. Only few sources make any mention of the crusade at all. To compensate for the dearth, the thesis mainly bases its analysis on charters, chronicles and annals, in addition to some papal sources. The third section on method explains how the sources were used to construct the arguments of the thesis.

Most references to crusading are confined to papal letters, but they are missing almost completely from sources produced in a German context. Comparing papal and non-papal sources reveals that Pope Innocent IV's stipulation of what he was doing with the crusade was not always received in the way he envisioned. Neither the silence nor the disconnect of vision in the sources have ever been explicitly addressed by historians, even though the conflict between Frederick II and the popes was one of the most politically impactful wars in the thirteenth century. This exemplifies the problematic nature of the crusade against the Staufer as a 'political crusade.' The sections on the limitations of the sources and method therefore lay the groundwork for a more in-depth discussion in the chapter 'Problematizing the Crusade against the Staufer.'

To analyse the military campaigns in as comprehensive a manner as possible, a military itinerary for Henry Raspe, William of Holland, the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, Trier, and the papal legates combine the precise dates and locations from their charters with the more detailed information on their actions in chronicles and annals. The section on method discusses the different considerations behind the approach and chapter structure. The missing language of crusading influences how the information extracted from the charters and chronicles is

analyzed. It also determines the chapter structure, as this chapter shows how closely connected crusader recruitment was to Henry Raspe's and William of Holland's military campaigns.

## 1. Historiography on the Crusade against the Staufer

The only previous study that formed a comprehensive picture of the crusade against the Staufer in Germany was Christine Öhlinger's dissertation on papal indulgences.<sup>1</sup> Although it is among the most relevant works on recruitment for the crusade against the Staufer, it is relatively unknown. More commonly, individual aspects of the conflict have been examined. The Staufer in particular, and Germany in the thirteenth century in general, were the subjects of a prolific research output in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which contrasts sharply with a marked decline in interest after World War II that lasted into the first decade of the twenty-first century.

These earlier studies covered many of the basics of the conflict that laid the groundwork for later research, focusing for example on the usage of indulgences<sup>2</sup> as well as papal and imperial propaganda during the crusade.<sup>3</sup> However, many studies are now dated, because they reflect the religious tensions of the nineteenth century. When the division of state and church was still in progress, some Catholic, Protestant, and 'secularist' historians constructed a dichotomy between an allegedly evil ecclesiastical and a supposedly righteous imperial party that reflected the religious partisanship of their day.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, some assessments of the

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<sup>1</sup> Öhlinger, C., *Die Kreuzzugspredigt gegen die Staufer. Ein Beitrag zum politischen Kreuzzug des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna, 1975).

<sup>2</sup> Wilhelm Köster specifically addressed how crusader indulgences were used during the crusade, but he hardly devoted any attention to the response in Germany, idem, *Der Kreuzablass im Kampfe der Kurie mit Friedrich II* (Münster in Westfalen, 1913), U. Schwerin, *Die Aufrufe der Päpste zur Befreiung des Heiligen Landes von den Anfängen bis zum Ausgang Innozenz IV.: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der kurialen Kreuzzugspropaganda und der päpstlichen Epistolographie* (Berlin, 1937), and E. Kestner, *Der Kreuzzug Friedrichs II* (Göttingen, 1873).

<sup>3</sup> K. L. Hampe, *Ein frühe Verknüpfung der Weissagung vom Endkaiser mit Friedrich ii. und Konrad iv.* (Heidelberg, 1917), F. Graefe, *Die Publizistik in der letzten Epoche Kaiser Friedrichs II.: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Jahre 1239-1250* (Heidelberg, 1909), and G. F. Philippi, *Zur Geschichte der Reichskanzlei unter den letzten Staufern Friedrich ii., Heinrich vii. und Konrad iv.* (Münster, 1885).

<sup>4</sup> F. Baethgen, 'Der Anspruch des Papsttums auf das Reichsvikariat: Untersuchung zur Theorie und Praxis der potestas indirecta in temporalibus', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* 54 (1920), pp. 168-268

relationship between Frederick II and Innocent IV were coloured by the yearning for a dominant king, especially in the long-term context of relations between the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy.<sup>5</sup> A powerful leader who unified the *Reich*<sup>6</sup> would lead to the imagined homogeneous nation state in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century.<sup>7</sup>

Most German historians of the immediate post-war period overlooked the history of thirteenth century Germany in favour of the twelfth century. One of the only works was Karl Demandt's arrestingly titled *Endkampf* of the Staufer.<sup>8</sup> One may speculate whether studies of collapsing imperial greatness and disappointed aspirations of world domination were too close to home after the defeat of the Third Reich. Maybe the interest in the twelfth century also stemmed from the desire to purify the Staufer name from tainting associations with National Socialism through references such as 'Operation Barbarossa'.<sup>9</sup>

The political protagonists of the conflict are well investigated, despite the varying quality and quantity of evidence. Though the great absentee of this thesis, Frederick II proved to be a popular research subject, as the supposed archetypical 'great man before his time'.<sup>10</sup> Numerous biographies of him have been written, for example by David Abulafia, more recently by Wolfgang Stürner, and many others.<sup>11</sup> When Carl A. Willemsen compiled his bibliography

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and V. Domeier, *Die Päbste als Richter über die deutsche Könige, von der Mitte des 11. bis zum Ausgang des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Breslau, 1897).

<sup>5</sup> C. Köhler, *Das Verhältnis Kaiser Friederichs II. zu den Päpsten seiner Zeit: mit Rücksicht auf die Frage nach der Entstehung des Vernichtungskampfes zwischen Kaisertum und Papsttum* (Breslau, 1888) and U. Tammen, *Kaiser Friedrich II. und Papst Innozenz IV. in den Jahren 1243-1245* (Leipzig, 1886).

<sup>6</sup> G. Egelhaas, 'Die Schlacht bei Frankfurt am Main am 5. August 1246', *Württembergische Vierteljahreshefte für Landesgeschichte* 31 (1922-1924), pp. 45-53, J. Maubach, *Die Kardinäle und ihre Politik um die Mitte des XIII. Jahrhunderts unter den Päpsten Innocenz IV., Alexander IV., Urban IV., Clemens IV. (1243-1268)* (Bonn, 1902), C. Rodenberg, *Über wiederholte deutsche Königswahlen im 13. Jahrhundert* (Breslau, 1889), idem, *Innocenz IV. und das Königreich Sicilien 1245-1254* (Halle, 1892), and A. Busson, *Die Doppelwahl des Jahres 1257 und das römische Königthum Alfons x. von Castilien* (Münster, 1866).

<sup>7</sup> G. Schäfer-Hartmann, *Literaturgeschichte als wahre Geschichte: Mittelalterrezeption in der deutschen Literaturgeschichtsschreibung des 19. Jahrhunderts und politische Instrumentalisierung des Mittelalters durch Preussen* (Frankfurt am Main, 2009) and H. Obermair, 'Der Staufer Friederich II. und die Geschichtsschreibung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts', *Concilium medii aevi* 11 (2008), pp. 79-100.

<sup>8</sup> K. Demandt, 'Der Endkampf des staufischen Kaiserhauses im Rhein-Maingebiet', *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte* 7 (1957), pp. 102-64.

<sup>9</sup> See K. Görlich, *Die Staufer. Herrscher und Reich* (Munich, 2006), pp. 9-19.

<sup>10</sup> E. Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich II.* (Berlin, 1927).

<sup>11</sup> D. Abulafia, *Frederick II. A medieval emperor* (London/New York, 1988) and W. Stürner, *Friedrich II., 1194-1250* (Darmstadt, 2009).

on Frederick II and the last Staufer in 1986, he found more than 2000 works; numerous titles have been added since then.<sup>12</sup> Frederick II's biographies usually traced his whereabouts in Italy and, with the exception of Stürner, did not focus on German affairs. Pope Innocent IV's reign has been well chartered.<sup>13</sup>

Henry Raspe was studied in a volume edited by Matthias Werner that covered many of the most important themes of his life, while other aspects had been examined previously.<sup>14</sup> William of Holland, however, does not seem to have any Dutch or German monographs dedicated exclusively to him; his reign has been discussed in the wider context of German politics.<sup>15</sup> This owes much to the fragmented sources.

In comparison, the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier are well researched.<sup>16</sup> The papal legates Philip of Ferrara<sup>17</sup> and Peter Capocci<sup>18</sup> have each been evaluated in their role, and there have been many studies on legates in canon law.<sup>19</sup> Recently there has been more

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<sup>12</sup> C. A. Willemsen, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte Friedrichs II. und der letzten Staufer* (Munich, 1986).

<sup>13</sup>For example, G. Althoff, "Selig sind, die Verfolgung ausüben": Päpste und Gewalt im Hochmittelalter (Darmstadt 2013) and M. Pacaut, 'L' autorité pontificale selon Innocent IV', in M. Pacaut (ed.), *Doctrines politiques ecclésiastiques dans l'Occident medieval* (London, 1985), pp. 85-119.

<sup>14</sup> W., Matthias (ed.), *Heinrich Raspe – Landgraf von Thüringen und römischer König (1227–1247)* (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), and, for example, W. Mägdefrau, *Thüringen im Mittelalter. Von den Ludowingern zu den Wettinern* (Jena, 2010).

<sup>15</sup> R. De Graaf, *Oorlog om Holland 1000-1375* (Hilversum, 2004), M. A. Pollock, *Scotland, England and France After the Loss of Normandy, 1204-1296* (Suffold/Rochester 2015), and M. Toch, 'Germany and Flanders: Welfs, Hohenstaufen and Habsburgs', in D. Abulafia (ed.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History 5* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 375-404.

<sup>16</sup> R. Schäfer, *Die Herren von Eppstein – Herrschaftsausübung, Verwaltung und Besitz eines Hochadelsgeschlechts im Spätmittelalter* (Nassau, 2000), R. Prössler, *Das Erzstift Köln in der Zeit des Erzbischofs Konrad von Hochstaden: organisatorische und wirtschaftliche Grundlagen in den Jahren, 1238-1261* (Cologne, 1997), H. Cardauns, *Konrad von Hochstaden, Erzbischof von Köln, 1238-1261* (Cologne, 1880), I. Bodsch, *Burg und Herrschaft. Zur Territorial- und Burgenpolitik der Erzbischöfe von Trier im Hochmittelalter bis zum Tod Dieters von Nassau (gest. 1307)* (Boppard am Rhein, 1989), and B. Arnold, *Count and Bishop in Medieval Germany. A Study in Regional Power, 1100-1350* (Philadelphia, 1991).

<sup>17</sup>O. Canz, *Philipp Fontana. Erzbischof von Ravenna. Ein Staatsmann des XIII. Jahrhunderts 1240-1270* (Leipzig, 1910). The same monograph was also published under the title *Philipp Fontana im Dienste der Kurie unter den Päpsten Gregor IX. und Innocenz IV.* (Leipzig, 1910).

<sup>18</sup> F. Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci. Ein Staatsmann und Feldherr des XIII. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1933).

<sup>19</sup>E. Wermke, *Die päpstlichen Legaten in Deutschland unter Innozenz IV. und Alexander IV. (1243-1261)* (Königsberg/Preussen, 1920) and, for example, R. C. Figueira, 'Subdelegation by Papal Legates in thirteenth-Century Canon Law: Powers and Limitations', in S. B. Bowman and B. E. Cody (eds.), *In Iure Veritas. Studies in Canon Law in Memory of Schafer Williams* (Connecticut, 1991) pp. 56-79.

interest in papal legation, though without specific reference to the crusade against the Staufer.<sup>20</sup> Finally, with regards to the mendicant orders, noticeably more relevant studies have been published on the Dominicans than on the Franciscans, perhaps because well-educated Dominican preachers have been perceived to be closer to a culture of producing written sources.<sup>21</sup>

Isolated aspects of the conflict that were relevant to the crusade against the Staufer have been analysed, such as Christoph Maier's analyses of crusade preaching in the thirteenth century.<sup>22</sup> Graham Loud pointed out that the mendicant friars killed by the imperial party were not venerated as martyrs by the Church.<sup>23</sup> There has also been some new treatment of the papal-imperial relationship in the thirteenth century by Brett Whalen.<sup>24</sup> Peter Herde analysed the language of imperial and papal propaganda; in addition, he examined the literary activities of the imperial and papal chanceries and papal letters of justice during the struggle.<sup>25</sup> Bernd Ulrich Hucker dissected emperor Frederick's understanding of his rule as world domination.<sup>26</sup> Jürgen Miethke explored the relationship between church and state in the late Middle Ages.<sup>27</sup> Research

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<sup>20</sup> K. R. Rennie, *The Foundations of Medieval Papal Legation* (New York, 2013) and M. P. Alberzoni and C. Zey (eds.), *Papal Legates, Delegates and the Crusades/Legati, delegati e l'impresa d'Oltremare (secoli XII-XIII)* (Mailand, 2012).

<sup>21</sup> For example, U. Overhage, *Konflikt und Konsens. Die Gründungen der Dominikanerklöster in der Teutonia* (Münster, 2014), A. Wesjohann, *Mendikantische Gründungserzählungen im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert: Mythen als Element institutioneller Eigengeschichtsschreibung der mittelalterlichen Franziskaner, Dominikaner und Augustiner-Eremiten* (Berlin, 2012), R. Sickert, *Wenn Klosterbrüder zu Jahrmarktsbrüdern werden: Studien zur Wahrnehmung der Franziskaner und Dominikaner im 13. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2006), and J. B. Freed, *The Friars and German Society in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977).

<sup>22</sup> C. T. Maier, *Crusade propaganda and ideology: model sermons for the preaching cross* (Cambridge, 2000) and idem, *Preaching the Crusades: mendicant friars and the Cross in the thirteenth century* (London, 1994).

<sup>23</sup> G.A. Loud, 'The Case of the Missing Martyrs: Frederick II's War with the Church 1239-1250', *Studies in Church History. Volume 30: Martyrs and Martyrologies* (1993), pp. 141-52.

<sup>24</sup> Whalen, *The Two Powers*, pp. 154-225.

<sup>25</sup> For example, P. Herde, 'Friedrich II. und das Papsttum. Politik und Rhetorik', in M. Fansa and K. Ermete (eds.), *Kaiser Friedrich II. (1194-1250). Welt und Kultur des Mittelmeerraums* (Mainz, 2008), pp. 53-65 and idem, 'Literary Activities of the Imperial and Papal Chanceries during the Struggle between Frederick II and the Papacy' in W. Tronzo (ed.), *Intellectual Life at the Court of Frederick II Hohenstaufen* (Washington, 1994.), pp. 227-39. For a more recent study, see T. Broser, *Kuriale Briefkultur im späteren Mittelalter: Gestaltung - Überlieferung - Rezeption* (Cologne, 2015).

<sup>26</sup> B. U. Hucker, 'Der Weltherrschaftsgedanke bei Kaiser Friedrich II.', in M. Fansa and K. Ermete (eds.), *Kaiser Friedrich II. (1194-1250). Welt und Kultur des Mittelmeerraums* (Mainz 2008), pp. 93-103.

<sup>27</sup> J. Miethke, *Kaiser und Papst im Konflikt. Zum Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche im späten Mittelalter* (Düsseldorf, 1988).

approaches could be legalistic and quite narrowly focused on canon law, which limited their perspective and removed it from the situation in the German kingdom.<sup>28</sup>

Several studies focus on the Italian theatre of war. Norman Housley extended his study of *The Italian Crusades* into the fourteenth century.<sup>29</sup> David Abulafia's treatment of the crusade in his biography of Frederick II also focused on events in Italy.<sup>30</sup> In one of the only recent contributions to the crusade against the Staufer, Gianluca Raccagni concentrated on Northern Italy, where he analysed the impact of the early phase of the crusade.<sup>31</sup> Overall, even in the context of the whole Holy Roman Empire, there has been only little discussion of crusading in the conflict between the Staufer and the popes, let alone with a special focus on Germany.

Historians of the Holy Roman Empire in the thirteenth century, especially if they published in German, have often only devoted a few lines to the preaching of the cross against the Staufer, sometimes altogether omitting crusader activity in their analyses.<sup>32</sup> The thesis fills the gap that has been left by the research on the wider conflict between Frederick II and the popes by providing the first detailed narrative of the events of the crusade in Germany, which produces a new way of interpreting the dynamics of the political conflict.

## 2. Sources

The thesis is mainly based on charters issued by the people at the heart of the crusade, on chronicles and annals, mainly of German but also other origins, as well as papal sources. The choice of charters and chronicles allows three things. First, to construct and analyse a narrative of the military campaigns led by the royal candidates, which confirmed that they were at the

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<sup>28</sup> F. Kempf, 'Die Absetzung Friedrichs im Lichte der Kanonistik', in J. Fleckenstein (ed.), *Probleme um Friedrich II.* (Sigmaringen, 1974), pp. 345-60.

<sup>29</sup> N. Housley, *The Italian Crusades. The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers, 1254-1343* (Oxford, 1982).

<sup>30</sup> See Abulafia, *Frederick II*, pp. 375-407.

<sup>31</sup> G. Raccagni, 'The Crusade against Frederick II: A neglected piece of Evidence', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 67 (2016), pp. 721-40. His study 'The second Lombard League and the Italian crusades, 1226-1300' is forthcoming.

<sup>32</sup> Stürner, *Friedrich II.*, pp. 548-92 and Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich II.*, pp. 476/522.

helm as their military leaders. Second, to highlight that Henry Raspe and William of Holland both pursued the political goal of changing power in Germany, but that they followed different methods for their military campaigns. Third, to notice the widespread absence of crusader language in the German sources. Almost all references to people taking the cross were confined to crusader recruitment in the context of the papal registers of Innocent IV. As already laid out in the introduction, two noticeable features dominate the sources for the crusade against the Staufer: the papal and German sources each produce a one-sided picture of the conflict as a crusade or a secular conflict, and the baffling, almost complete absence of any material regarding to people who took the cross against the Staufer.

## 2.1. Crusader Sources

No sources that could reflect the motivations to take the cross against the Staufer, such as charters, letters, or wills, have been found so far. Nor have any sermons that preached the cross against the Staufer been discovered, even though there was ample preaching activity.<sup>33</sup> Archives in Cologne, Mainz, Trier, Aachen, and Worms do not seem to hold material on the crusade against the Staufer.<sup>34</sup> There were no crusader songs and only scant criticism of crusaders. The reasons for this can only be speculated about; maybe the sources did not survive because of gaps in transmission, or noticeably fewer of them were produced in the first place because of fighting on a smaller scale. Instead, this thesis must judge the crusade against the Staufer based on sources concerned with military and political actions produced in environments mostly external to the crusade.

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<sup>33</sup> No sermons survived by the Dominican masters Raymond of Pennafort (1238-40), Johannes Teutonicus (1241-52), and Humbert of Romans (1254-63). Closest come the model sermons by Humbert of Romans, see Maier, *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology*, pp. 210-30.

<sup>34</sup> In a conversation in Zurich on 30 June 2019, Christoph Maier confirmed that he did not find any unedited sermons against the Staufer in archives in Southern Germany and Switzerland.

The dearth of information not only poses a further challenge for any analysis of whether this really was a crusade, which follows in the next chapter. It made it almost impossible to identify and name specific individuals who took the cross. This is why it is difficult to determine the ratio between crusaders and non-crusaders in the armies of Henry Raspe and William of Holland, and to pass judgment on whether a strict distinction can be drawn in this case between those who took the cross, those who were compelled by feudal obligations, and those who were paid. All in all, this leads to a conspicuous absence of crusaders in a thesis on the crusade against the Staufer.

## 2.2. Charters

The thesis makes use of a wide range of contemporary charters. The analysis of the charters zooms in on the military campaigns of the years 1246 to 1251, but it is informed by knowledge of the period from 1239 to 1268. A new edition of the charters of Henry Raspe was published as recently as 2014.<sup>35</sup> William of Holland's charters appeared in a Dutch collection from 1977 that included archives in the Netherlands, but missed some of the charters assembled in an eighteenth century collection.<sup>36</sup> Most charter editions still date back to the collections the MGH assembled in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, which are thorough, but old-fashioned.<sup>37</sup> This also applies to the editions of charters by the papal legates Philip of Ferrara and Peter Capocci, as well as other papal envoys and legates who were sent to Germany.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> *Die Urkunden der Markgrafen von Meissen und Landgrafen von Thüringen. Vierter Band 1235-1247. Codex Diplomaticus Saxoniae. Erster Hauptteil Abteilung A*, ed. T. Graber and M. Kälble (Peine, 2014), *Regesta Imperii V. Jüngere Staufer 1198-1272*, ed. J. F. Böhmer et al (Innsbruck, 1881-1901).

<sup>36</sup> *De oorkonden en de kanselarij van de graven van Holland tot 1299*, ed. J. G. Kruisheer ('s-Gravenhage-Harlem, 1971), *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Willhelms von Holland, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Königsurkunde im 13. Jahrhundert*, ed. D. Hägermann (Cologne/Vienna, 1977). *Geschiedenis van Graaf Willem van Holland, Roomsche Koning*, ed. J. Meerman (Graavenhaage, 1797),

<sup>37</sup> A commission by the MGH has been editing the charters of Frederick II since the late 1990s, but the edition of his charters from the 1230s and 1240s has been delayed. See W. Koch 'Das Projekt der Edition der Urkunden Kaiser Friedrichs II.', in A. Esch and N. Kampf (eds), *Friedrich II. Tagung des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom im Gedenkjahr 1994* (Tübingen, 1994), pp. 87-108.

<sup>38</sup> *Acta imperii inedita saeculi XIII et XIV: Urkunden und Briefe zur Geschichte des Kaiserreichs und des Königreichs Sizilien*, ed. E. A. Winkelmann (2 vols, Innsbruck, 1885).

Henry Raspe's rule was short (from May 1246 to February 1247), so he issued considerably fewer charters than William of Holland did in the period from October 1247 to November 1251. The location of Henry Raspe at a specific date between 1246 and February 1247 is extant in 21 edited charters, from which his presence at specific locations can be pinpointed on 17 different occasions. The location of William of Holland at specific dates between October 1247 and November 1251 is extant in 158 edited charters.

Although this only represents the relationship between information extracted from charters that contained both date and location, it was not the case that Henry Raspe issued many more charters that had to be excluded from the itinerary because they missed either a date or location. Rather it appears indicative of a wider trend, namely that the relative administrative output of William of Holland was also greater than that of Henry Raspe. There seems to have been a stark difference in administrative productivity between the chanceries of Henry Raspe and William of Holland, even though there remains an element of speculation due to the arbitrariness of historical transmission.

Hardly any new archival material pertaining to the papal legates and the archbishops of Mainz,<sup>39</sup> Cologne,<sup>40</sup> and Trier<sup>41</sup> has been discovered in recent decades by historians, even though the edited charters by the archbishops of Mainz were first published as late as 1966.

Between 1246 and 1251, there were three different archbishops of Mainz in just five years. Their presence in specific locations can be identified on a total of 69 occasions, based on the same number of charters which they issued containing a date and location. The presence of the Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz between May 1246 and March 1249 can be identified on

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<sup>39</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe. Band 2, Von Konrad I. bis Heinrich II. 1161-1288*, ed. C. Will (2 vols, Aalen, 1966).

<sup>40</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe von Köln*, ed. R. Knipping (Bonn, 1909-1913), *Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte des Niederrheins oder des Erzstifts Cöln, Jülich und Berg, Geldern, Meurs, Cleve und Mark, Reichsstifte Elten, Essen und Werden*, ed. Theodore Lacomblet (Düsseldorf, 1846). See also *Regesten der Reichsstadt Aachen*, ed. W. Mummenhoff (Bonn, 1961).

<sup>41</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe zu Trier*, ed. A. Goertz (Aalen, 1984).

38 occasions; the presence of Archbishop Christian of Mainz between May or June 1249 and June 1251 on 27 occasions; and the presence of Archbishop Gerhard of Mainz between July and November 1251 on four occasions. The presence of the Archbishop Conrad of Cologne can be identified on a total of 144 occasions and that of Archbishop Arnold of Trier on 21 occasions between May 1246 and November 1251, based on the same number of charters containing a date and location that they issued.

Hence, relative to their time in office, the presence of the Archbishop Conrad of Cologne can be identified most and that Archbishop Arnold of Trier least often. The results for the archbishops of Mainz are in between the two. Among the archbishops of Mainz, Archbishop Siegfried's location can be identified most often, but this steadily declines for his two successors.

The thesis excludes charters issued by certain individuals and institutions, in accordance with its focus on the protagonists of the crusade. Most importantly, it does not include charters by Conrad IV<sup>42</sup> and Frederick II,<sup>43</sup> because their charters rarely pertain directly to the papal party's actions. The thesis also excludes direct references to the charters by all 59 other bishops of Germany,<sup>44</sup> members of the nobility, unfree nobles known as *ministeriales*, and 34 German cities, though it remains aware of the significant roles they played in the conflict.

### 2.3. Chronicles and Annals

None of the recent historical individual studies on the military campaigns by Henry Raspe and William of Holland, or on the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier systematically studied

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<sup>42</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, pp. 796-849.

<sup>43</sup> *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi Friderici II*, ed. J-L-A. Huillard-Bréholles (Paris, 1852) and *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, ed. A. Potthast (Berlin, 1874).

<sup>44</sup> See E. Gatz, *Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches 1198 bis 1448: ein biographisches Lexikon* (Berlin, 2001).

all contemporary chronicles produced in the German kingdom. In the thirteenth century, no centralised tradition of chronicle writing emerged, because no German capital existed and no chronicles seem to have been produced at the itinerant courts of Frederick II or Conrad IV. I surveyed editions by the MGH and others, and it appears that German chronicles and annals were exiguous for between the 1240s and the 1260s, at least when compared to the chronicle writing during the beginning and end of the century. The sharp decrease in chronicle writing from the late 1240s onwards may have been an effect of the collapse of political order after Frederick's II deposition; a judgement corroborated by Heinrich Hohenleutner.<sup>45</sup> The chronicle that came closest to constructing a dominant political narrative for Germany in the thirteenth century was the *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, which was probably produced by a canon in the intellectual environment of Archbishop Conrad of Cologne; as such, it is heavily biased against the Staufer.<sup>46</sup>

This thesis identifies and systematically analyses 38 chronicles and annals, mostly written in the Holy Roman Empire in the thirteenth century, that contain relevant information pertaining to the crusade against the Staufer in Germany. Out of the 38 chronicles and annals, 36 were written in the Holy Roman Empire. Two chronicles are from England,<sup>47</sup> where their writers benefited from St Alban's location on one of the main routes from London to the North, leading an exceptionally well-informed network of travelers who carried news to the abbey.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> K. Jacob and H. Hohenleutner (eds), *Quellenkunde der Deutschen Geschichte im Mittelalter (bis zur Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts)* Vol. 2 (3 vols, Berlin, 1906 - 1968), pp. 88-9.

<sup>46</sup> See C. A. Lückcrath, 'Coloniensis ecclesia, Coloniensis civitas, Coloniensis terra. Köln in der *Chronica regia Coloniensis* und der *Chronica S. Pantaleonis*', *Jahrbuch des kölnischen Geschichtsvereins* 71 (2000), pp. 1-41, in reply to M. Groten, 'Klösterliche Geschichtsschreibung: Siegburg und die Kölner Königschronik', *Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter* 61 (1997), pp. 50-78.

<sup>47</sup> *Matthaei Parisiensis, monachi Sancti Albani, Chronica majora*, ed. H. R., Luard (7 vols, London, 1872-1884) and *Excerpta ex Chronica Thomae Wikes*, ed. J. F. Böhmer, Hermannus Altahensis Und Andere Geschichtsquellen Deutschlands Im 13. Jahrhundert. Band 2 (Stuttgart, 1845), pp. 449-57.

<sup>48</sup> E. Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 13-4.

Out of the 36 chronicles written in the Holy Roman Empire, the majority were written in the German kingdom.<sup>49</sup> 19 chronicles are from locations that now lie in Germany, six from Italy,<sup>50</sup> four from France,<sup>51</sup> three from Austria,<sup>52</sup> two from the Netherlands,<sup>53</sup> and one each from Belgium<sup>54</sup> and Bohemia.<sup>55</sup> Within Germany, five chronicles originated from Erfurt,<sup>56</sup> three from Cologne,<sup>57</sup> two each from Mainz,<sup>58</sup> Worms,<sup>59</sup> and Speyer,<sup>60</sup> as well as one each from

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<sup>49</sup> For more information on the borders around and the legal entities within the Holy Roman Empire, see P. Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire* (London, 2016), as well as G.A. Loud and J. Schenk (eds), *The Origin of the German Principalities, 1100-1300* (Abingdon, 2017).

<sup>50</sup> *Annales Parmenses Maiores*, ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH SS 18, *Annales aevi Suevici*, (Hannover, 1893), *Annales Placentini Gibellini*, ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH SS 18, *Annales aevi Suevici*, (Hannover, 1893), *Bartholomei Scribae Annales*, ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH SS 18, *Annales aevi Suevici* (Hannover, 1863), *Cronica fratris Salimbene de Adam ordinis Minorum*, ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH SS 32, *Cronica fratris Salimbene de Adam ordinis Minorum* (Hannover, 1984), *Johannis Codagnelli Annales Placentini*, ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH SS rer. Germ. 23 (Hannover, 1901), *Thomae Tusci Gesta imperatorum et pontificum*, ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH SS 22, *Historici Germaniae saec. XII. 2* (Hannover, 1872).

<sup>51</sup> *Annales Argentinenses*, ed. G. H. Pertz MGH SS 17, *Annales aevi Suevici*, (Hannover, 1861), *Notae Historicae Argentinenses 1132-1338*, ed. J. F. Böhmer, *Martyrium Arnoldi archiepiscopi Moguntini und andere Geschichtsquellen Deutschlands im zwölften Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1853), *Annales Colmarienses*, ed. G. H. Pertz MGH SS 17, *Annales aevi Suevici*, (Hannover, 1861), *Annales Maurimonasteriensis*, ed. J. F. Böhmer, *Fontes Rerum Germanicarum. Geschichtsquellen Deutschlands. Volume III* (Stuttgart, 1853).

<sup>52</sup> *Annales Sancrucenses*, ed. as *Continuatio Sancrucensis II*, ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH SS 9, *Chronica et annales aevi Salici* (Hannover, 1851), *The Annals of Herman of Niederaltaich, 1236-60*, trans. G.A. Loud (from Hermannus Altahensis *Annales*, MGH SS 7, pp. 392-402, Johannes Victoriensis, *Cronica Romanorum* (Kärnten, 1960).

<sup>53</sup> *Rhymed Chronicle of Melis Stoke*, ed. J. F. Böhmer, Hermannus Altahensis Und Andere Geschichtsquellen Deutschlands Im 13. Jahrhundert, Band 2, (Stuttgart, 1845), pp. 416-32 and *Excerpta ex Chronica Johannis de Beka*; ed. J. F. Böhmer, Hermannus Altahensis Und Andere Geschichtsquellen Deutschlands Im 13. Jahrhundert. Band 2 (Stuttgart, 1845), pp. 432-49.

<sup>54</sup> *Annales Florefffe*, ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH SS 16, *Annales aevi Suevici*, (Hannover, 1859).

<sup>55</sup> *Excerpta ex chronica Martini Poloni una cum continuatio*, ed. J. F. Böhmer, Hermannus Altahensis Und Andere Geschichtsquellen Deutschlands Im 13. Jahrhundert. Band 2 (Stuttgart, 1845), pp. 457-64.

<sup>56</sup> *Annales Erfordiensis fratrum praedicatorum*, ed. as *Chronicon Erphordense*, ed. J. F. Böhmer, *Fontes Rerum Germanicarum. Geschichtsquellen Deutschlands, Volume II* (Stuttgart, 1845), *Annales Erphordensis*, ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH SS 16, *Annales aevi Suevici*, (Hannover, 1859), *Cronica Minor Minoritae Erphordensi ab Urbe condita*, ed. O. Holder-Egger, SS rer. Germ. 42, *Monumenta Erphesfurtensia saec. XII. XIII. XIV.* (Hannover, 1899). *Cronica S. Petri Erfordensis moderna*, ed. O. Holder-Egger, SS rer. Germ. 42, *Monumenta Erphesfurtensia saec. XII. XIII. XIV.* (Hannover, 1899), *Chronici Saxony continuatio (Thuringia) Erfordiensis; Sächsische Welchronik*, ed. O. Holder-Egger, SS rer. Germ. 42, *Monumenta Erphesfurtensia saec. XII. XIII. XIV.* (Hannover, 1899).

<sup>57</sup> *The Royal Chronicle of Cologne 1238-49*, trans. G.A. Loud (from *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, ed. as *Annales Sancti Pantaleonis Coloniensis maximi*) (2009; 2013), *Annales Sancti Pantaleonis Coloniensis maximi*, ed. G. Waitz, MGH SS rer. Germ. 18, *Chronica regia Coloniensis* (Hannover, 1880), *Leveldi de Northof Catalogus apud Colonense*, ed. C. L. P. Tross, *Leveld's von Northof Chronik der Grafen von der Mark und der Erzbischöfe von Cöln* (Hamm, 1859), *Cronica presulum et archiepiscoporum ecclesie Coloniensium*, ed. G. Eckertz, *Annalen des Historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein 4* (1857), pp. 508-581.

<sup>58</sup> *Annales Moguntinenses*, ed. G. H. Pertz MGH SS 17, *Annales aevi Suevici*, (Hannover, 1861), *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, ed. J. F. Böhmer, Hermannus Altahensis Und Andere Geschichtsquellen Deutschlands Im 13. Jahrhundert. Band 2, (Stuttgart, 1845), pp. 253-71.

<sup>59</sup> *Chronicon Wormatiense*, ed. D. S. Bachrach (Farnham, 2014) and *Annales Wormatienses*, ed. H. Boos, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Worms* (Berlin, 1886-1893).

<sup>60</sup> *Annales Spirenses*, ed. J. F. Böhmer, ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH SS 17, *Annales aevi Suevici*, (Hannover, 1861) and *Chronica Praesulum Spirensium*, ed. J. F. Böhmer in *Fontes Rerum Germanicarum. Geschichtsquellen Deutschlands. Volume IV* (Stuttgart, 1868).

Trier,<sup>61</sup> Reinhardsbrunn (Thuringia),<sup>62</sup> Reutlingen (Baden-Württemberg),<sup>63</sup> Stade (Lower Saxony),<sup>64</sup> Elsass,<sup>65</sup> and Saxony.<sup>66</sup> 33 chronicles were written in the thirteenth century, four date from the fourteenth century.<sup>67</sup> 34 chronicles are in Latin, two in Middle High German,<sup>68</sup> and one in Middle Low German.<sup>69</sup> 24 chronicles are anonymous, for 13 the author is known.<sup>70</sup>

Chronicle writing in cities, already common in Northern Italy, was just emerging in Germany in this period.<sup>71</sup> 31 chronicles were written in an ecclesiastical environment, such as a monastery, abbey, or episcopal church, while 7 chronicles stemmed from an urban environment. At least five chronicles were written by mendicant friars, two by Dominicans and three by Franciscans.<sup>72</sup> Urban chronicles were an expression of towns' emerging political power and with increased self-awareness and self-esteem, citizens of growing cities also expressed their evolving civic identities in writing.<sup>73</sup> However, the mendicant orders often combined an ecclesiastical with an urban environment. The new social class of citizens and the

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<sup>61</sup> *Gesta Treverorum*, ed. J. Wytttenbach and M. F.J. Müller (Trier, 1836) and *Gesta Arnoldi*, ed. as part of the *Gesta Treverorum continuatio quinta*, ed. Societas Aperiendis Fontibus Rerum Germanicarum Medii Aevi, MGH SS 24, *Annales aevi Suevici* (Supplementa tomorum XVI et XVII). *Gesta saec. XII. XIII.* (Supplementa tomorum XX–XXIII) (Hannover, 1879).

<sup>62</sup> *Annales Reinhardbrunnenses*, ed. K. Wenck, *Die Entstehung der Reinhardsbrunner Geschichtsbücher* (Halle 1878).

<sup>63</sup> *Hugo de Rutlingen*, ed. J. F. Böhmer *Fontes Rerum Germanicarum. Geschichtsquellen Deutschlands. Volume IV* (Stuttgart, 1868).

<sup>64</sup> *Annales Stadenses*, ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH SS 16, *Annales aevi Suevici* (Hannover, 1859).

<sup>65</sup> *Elssatian continuation of the Sächsische Weltchronik*, ed. as *Bayrische Fortsetzung der Sächsischen Weltchronik*, ed. O. Holder-Egger, SS rer. Germ. 42, *Monumenta Erphesfurtensia saec. XII. XIII. XIV.* (Hannover, 1899).

<sup>66</sup> *Chronica anonyma Ordinis Fratrum Minorum provinciae Saxoniae*, ed. L. Carey, *Analecta Franciscana sive Chronica Aliaque Varia ad Historiam Fratrum Minorum Spectantia, Volume I* (Quaracchi, 1885).

<sup>67</sup> The chronicles written in the fourteenth century are *Hugo de Reutlingen*, *Iohannes Victoriensis' Cronica Romanorum*, *Bartholomei Scribae Annales*, and the *Rhymed Chronicle of Melis Stoke*.

<sup>68</sup> *Chronici Saxony continuatio (Thuringia) Erfordiensis* and the *Elssatian continuation of the Sächsische Weltchronik*.

<sup>69</sup> *The Rhymed Chronicle of Melis Stoke*.

<sup>70</sup> The known authors are Archbishop Christian of Mainz, Hermann of Niederaltaich, Hugo of Reutlingen, Albert of Stade, *Iohannes Victorienses*, Martin Poloni, Thomas Tusci, Bartholomew the Scribe, Salimbene de Adam, Melis Stoke, *Johannis de Beka*, Matthew Paris, and Thomas Wykes. None of the known authors used a female name.

<sup>71</sup> F. J. Schmale, *Funktion und Formen mittelalterlicher Geschichtsschreibung: eine Einführung* (Darmstadt, 1985), p. 138.

<sup>72</sup> H-W. Goetz, *Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsbewusstsein im hohen Mittelalter* (Berlin, 2008), pp. 175-80.

<sup>73</sup> H. Grundmann, *Geschichtsschreibung im Mittelalter* (Göttingen, 1965), pp. 64-71.

mendicant orders found a new operational environment, in which they started to write their own chronicles and histories.<sup>74</sup>

Of course, chronicles did not just record events, but sought to present a particular narrative. This determined which information was included and how it was presented.<sup>75</sup> Many chronicles presented events in accordance with their political agenda and values; to counteract this, the thesis mostly avoids references to German ‘public opinion’ because the reception of messages was often discrete from the intentions of those who presented the information.

Among the 38 chronicles containing relevant information on the military campaigns that are included in the analysis, none was supportive of Emperor Frederick II or Conrad IV. All were consistently supportive of the royal candidates and the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier. As mentioned before, some of this is due to the proximity of some chronicles to the archbishops. However, this implies that those chronicles that were friendly towards the Staufer tended to not discuss the details of the conflict or pass over it altogether.

Their weapon of choice seems to have been silence, not criticism. It is worth speculating whether this meant that they struggled to defend Frederick II and Conrad IV’s claim to be king, even though they did not wish for a change of power in Germany. It is also worth speculating that ecclesiastical chronicle writers, and also canonists and decretalists concerned with legal thought, might have been more predisposed to represent the papal perspective than writers in less ecclesiastical contexts. The propagandistic narrative of the crusade may have convinced fewer authors who wrote in a more secular, maybe urban, environment. Yet many of their voices are lost to us.

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>75</sup> A systematic analysis of chronicles and annals that were conspicuously silent on the conflict between Frederick II and the popes would be worthy of future study. By making sense of events, chronicles also shaped their memories. This could be related to existing work on the memory of the later Staufer, see for example O. B. Rader, ‘Die Kraft des Porphyrs: Das Grabmal Kaiser Friedrichs II. als Fokus europäischer Erinnerungen’ in K. Buchinger et al (eds), *Europäische Erinnerungsräume* (Frankfurt/New York, 2009).

For information on the military campaigns, the thesis relies more on some chronicles and annals than others, as representations of the conflict took a prominent place in some, but not all of them. Furthermore, not all chronicles that touched upon the subject provided the same level of detail in representing the conflict, and their attention to military events varied considerably. The different ways chronicles described the military campaigns and any references to crusading is discussed in the next chapter ‘Problematizing the Crusade against the Staufer’.

The best-informed German chronicles and annals were produced in the vicinity of members of the papal party, especially the mendicant orders and the archbishops. A large number of chronicles were associated with the Dominican Order in Erfurt, which belonged to the archdiocese of Mainz. The three chronicles that contain the most extensive information on the military campaigns all feature one of the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, or Trier as their protagonists. The *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum* was written personally by Archbishop Christian of Mainz, the *Royal Chronicle of Cologne* frequently put a spotlight on Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, and the *Gesta Arnoldi*, also edited as the *Gesta Treverorum*, specifically focused on the deeds of Archbishop Arnold of Trier.

On the one hand, such close proximity to the protagonists of the papal party adds valuable detail to the archbishops’ charters. On the other hand, these narratives are slanted in favour of their protagonists. They may have omitted or changed information that distorts the image of an ideal archiepiscopal hero. We lack Rhenish chronicles and annals that would provide us with a point of view sympathetic to Frederick II and Conrad IV. Overall, chronicles by authors who were not directly involved in the conflict mostly contain less relevant and useful information. This may also be read as an indication of the localized nature of the conflict, not only in terms of geography, but also in terms of networks of people.

Thus, chronicles and annals fulfil two roles in this thesis: first, they provide information on the military actions by the people who led the crusade. Information from chronicles forms some of the key building blocks for the chapters centering around Henry Raspe, William of Holland, and the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier. Their second function is to highlight the great disconnect between the papal vision of the crusade and its reception preserved in pages of chronicles that do not reflect the crusader elements of the military campaign.

The chronicles richest in detail are exactly those written in the vicinity of the archbishops. Not only did they have easy access to news and information on a practical level, but they were also more likely to be predisposed to embrace and reflect the papal narrative of the conflict. In contrast, the chroniclers who were not active in the close vicinity of the papal party propagated an opposing narrative that has hitherto remained unnoticed in crusader historiography. Crucially, this also applies to pro-papal writers; even those who took positions against the Staufer did not choose to describe the war in terms of crusading.

#### **2. 4. Papal Sources**

Papal bulls and letters from the registers of Pope Innocent IV were added to the charters and chronicles.<sup>76</sup> The charters most relevant to a discussion of crusader recruitment are privileges addressed to Innocent's most important contacts in Germany, the apostolic legates and the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier. While he sent letters of admonition, praise, and instruction to all, his main line of communication was with the most senior among the archbishops; this first was Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz, and then Archbishop Conrad of Cologne. He only sent comparatively few letters directly to Henry Raspe and William of

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<sup>76</sup> *Les Registres d' Innocent IV*, ed. E. Berger (Paris, 1884-1920), *MGH Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis Pontificum Romanorum selectae II* (Berlin, 1883-1894), *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, and Fieschi, Sinibaldo, *V Decretalium libros necnon in Decretales per eundem Innocentium editas commentaria Apparatus in quinque libros Decretalium* (Frankfurt/Venice, 1570).

Holland, but during certain phases of crusade he sent orders directly to the masters of the Franciscan and Dominican Orders, as will be discussed in their respective chapters.<sup>77</sup>

Sometimes the differences that emerge when comparing Pope Innocent's IV letters to his legates and the archbishops to the charters and chronicles produced in Germany reflect the divergence between the papal will and the actions of his addressees; the papal party in Germany did not always act in the way Innocent IV wanted them to. This important distinction, which has not always been sufficiently upheld, can only properly be addressed by focusing on sources produced outside the papal curia, such as charters and chronicles from Germany.

### **3. Method**

The period from May 1246 to October 1251 formed a narrow core period of crusader warfare in Germany. To understand the wider picture of the 30-year conflict, the crusade needs to be placed in the period 1239 to 1268. One option is to divide the conflict into phases defined by key events: 1239-45, 1246-51, 1251-56, and 1256-68.

In 1239, pope Gregory IX excommunicated Frederick – it was the emperor's second excommunication. In 1241, shortly after the emperor's excommunication, the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz invaded the so-called Wetterau, the Staufer heartland in Germany. Frederick's deposition at the council of Lyon took place in 1245, which enabled the crusade against the Staufer in Germany 1246-51. This period overlaps with the interspersed presence of the influential papal representative Albert of Behaim in Germany 1239-47. Conrad IV permanently departed Germany for Sicily in October 1251. On 7 December 1254, Pope Innocent IV died, and on 28 January 1256 the Frisians killed William of Holland, probably before recognizing him as king. The double election of Richard of Cornwall and Alfonso X of

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<sup>77</sup> No charters have been collected for the Franciscans or the Dominicans, but the Dominican Master Raymond of Pennafort compiled decretals. The statutes of the Dominican order have been included where they proved to be relevant. See G. R. Galbraith, *The constitution of the Dominican Order, 1216 to 1360* (Manchester, 1925).

Castile dominated the years 1256 and 1257. Finally, in 1268, Conradin (the last legitimate male heir of the Staufer dynasty, grandson of Frederick, and son of Conrad IV) died in Italy.

The source material identifies Henry Raspe, William of Holland, the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier, and to a lesser degree the papal legates as the persons at the heart of the crusade. However, the evidence from chronicles and annals pertaining to these persons for the years 1246 to 1251 is extremely fragmented. To create their itineraries, this thesis pairs two types of information, extracted from charters and chronicles. Charters provide exact dates and locations, which are combined with the content-rich information from the 38 chronicles and annals. Some of the remaining gaps are filled by mendicant sources.

All information on the protagonists in the conflict has been selected, paying special attention to actions of warfare. To achieve the best possible overview, I created one spreadsheet for each of the six protagonists and the office they filled. Combining charters and chronicles visually in spreadsheets highlights both gaps and clusters of information, while cross-referencing them exposes hitherto obscure connections. This identifies crusader recruitment and the activities of the papal legates as the most important areas to combine with the military campaigns. It also highlights that fields of responsibility shifted among members of the papal party in a way that is important in understanding the dynamic of the crusade.

To link the crusading aspects to the secular political aspects of the conflict, the chapters on the military campaigns by Henry Raspe and William of Holland also address the activities by the archbishops and papal legates. This shows in which area, either crusader recruitment or military action, each of the protagonists was active, how they influenced each other, and how their responsibilities shifted over time. There was no clear distinction between areas of activity, even though one might have expected the royal candidates to engage exclusively in military leadership and command, while the archbishops constrained their actions to recruitment and preaching the word of the cross. Instead of following the actions of single people, the chapters

trace how the various threads of crusader recruitment came together in the hands of various individuals, and how these organizational threads changed hands over time. To a certain degree these chapters also focus on the activities of the mendicant orders, as crusader recruitment was the area where they had the greatest impact. However, there is little information on mendicant preaching except for papal orders. This leads back to the problem that, in thirteenth-century crusading, theory did not always translate neatly into practice. There are some methodological problems for the historian, because some sources illustrate the practice of crusading, while other sources illustrated the prescriptive theory of what Pope Innocent IV intended to happen. The situation was at times much more fluid than initially assumed, in a way that was typical for crusades.

## Chapter 1: Problematizing the Crusade against the Staufer

Hitherto, the crusade against the Staufer has mainly been assessed in its Italian context. Norman Housley argued in *The Italian Crusades* that it should be understood as a crusade against a “Christian lay power.”<sup>1</sup> He took position against the term ‘political crusade’, arguing that it was a “misnomer,” because the papacy made no discernable distinction between its ‘religious’ and ‘political’ motivations.<sup>2</sup> However, Housley remained too papal-centric in his analysis of the Italian Crusades. He disproportionately accepted the justifications by successive popes, probably because he mainly relied on papal sources.<sup>3</sup> Once non-papal sources are taken into consideration, a more temporal impression of the conflict on contemporaries emerges.

Housley mainly argued against a position held by Steven Runciman and others, who contended that the Italian Crusades, and other crusades against Christian rulers, fundamentally alienated contemporaries.<sup>4</sup> Allegedly, contemporaries saw crusades against fellow Christians as a perversion of the ‘true spirit’ of the institution of crusading, which alienated them to such a degree that it led to the decline of the crusader movement after 1250 and contributed to the loss of the last Christian stronghold in the East by 1291.<sup>5</sup> Housley disputed this; instead he emphasized the broad assent such crusades saw among Christian contemporaries.<sup>6</sup>

Some of Housley’s opposition in 1982 was also directed against the definitions of ‘political crusades’ by Elizabeth Kennan and Joseph Strayer from the 1960s.<sup>7</sup> In 1963, Elizabeth Kennan defined political crusades as having a ‘purely political’ goal from the outset.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, pp. 35-70.

<sup>4</sup> See Runciman, S., ‘The Decline of the Crusading Idea’, in *Relazioni del X Congresso internazionale di Scienze storiche. vol. 3; Storia del medioevo* (Florence, 1955), p. 645.

<sup>5</sup> See Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, pp. 4-8/252-4 and Tyerman, C., *The Debate on the Crusades* (Manchester/New York, 2011), pp. 193-9.

<sup>6</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> E. T. Keenan, ‘The Political Crusades’, in J. M. Powell (ed), *Innocent III. Vicar of Christ or Lord of the World* (Washington 1963, 1994), pp. 135-49.

This stood in contrast to the crusades to the Holy Land, which mainly had spiritual goals. According to Kennan, the crusades to the Holy Land were primarily spiritual weapons, whose political consequences were not the main focus of the Church.<sup>9</sup>

In 1969, Joseph Strayer acknowledged that in a certain sense every crusade was political, because they all aimed at conquest and at the replacement of one ruler with another.<sup>10</sup> However, he still contended that for the crusades to the Holy Land, political means were used for religious ends, while the political consequences were not part of the primary plan of the Church. In contrast, Strayer argued, for political crusades, political means were used for political ends, and neither their means nor ends had any direct connection with the spiritual objectives of the Church. Whereas crusades against heretics, such as the Albigensian Crusade, were waged for “the good of Christendom” as the pope understood it, the crusade against the Staufer was waged “to protect the states and the political authority of the papacy.”<sup>11</sup>

Strayer’s and Kennan’s judgments, though, were based on an outmoded understanding of what constituted a ‘political’ goal. The crusade against the Staufer in Germany held a unique blend of religious and political components. Calling the crusade ‘political’ should not mean to apply a modern, entirely ‘secular’ understanding of religion to the thirteenth century. A strict dichotomy between the religious and political would be ill-posed, because they were not mutually exclusive, as Norman Housley already pointed out. Moreover, as wars, all crusades were *ipso facto* political, so every crusade had both religious and political elements.

For Pope Innocent IV, to protect the states and the political authority of the papacy was waged precisely for the good of Christendom as he understood it. Innocent IV used political means to religious ends, and religious means to political ends. For the crusade against the

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 135.

<sup>10</sup> J. R. Strayer ‘The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century’, in R. L. Wolff and H. W. Hazard (eds), *A History of the Crusades II. The later Crusades 1189-1311* (Madison, Milwaukee/London 1969), pp. 343-5.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, pp. 344-5

Staufer, the question was – to put it simply – how much politics was in the religion and how much religion in the politics.

Nevertheless, acceptance that the papacy's religious motives were genuine, and that its religious and political motivations were not mutually exclusive, do not automatically discredit any notion of the crusade against the Staufer as 'political.' While it is correct that the crusade against the Staufer was a response to what the papacy considered to be attacks on its temporal possessions and rights, the question whether or not the papacy was sincere in its assertions about its spiritual anxieties – Innocent IV certainly was – does not have to remain the sole factor that defines the crusade against the Staufer in Germany. One does not have to turn one's back on the "open-mindedness" so vigorously defended by Norman Housley, or to return to the definitions by Elizabeth Kennan and Joseph Strayer, to call the crusade against the Staufer in Germany a political crusade. It is possible to accept fully Norman Housley's argument on the papal viewpoint, but to identify other factors that determine one's assessment of the nature of the crusade against the Staufer in Germany.

Three areas will be considered when assessing how much politics was in the religion and how much religion in the politics with regards to the crusade against the Staufer in Germany. Most importantly, the papal narrative of crusading failed to take hold in Germany. The language of crusading did not come to dominate how chronicle writers in Germany and beyond made sense of the conflict. Nor did the charge of heresy that Innocent IV leveraged against Frederick II make its way into the chronicles and annals. Instead, non-papal sources, both chronicles and charters, reveal a much more temporal picture than the papal registers. Furthermore, once papal reasoning for the Italian Crusades was applied to the situation in Germany, Innocent IV's arguments start to show significant cracks. It was difficult for the papacy to argue that the crusade against the Staufer in Germany was a necessary precursor for the crusade to the Holy Land in the same way it did for the Italian Crusades. Finally, there were

several instances in preparation for the crusade against the Staufer when political motives drove religious ideology instead of vice-versa. The decisive factors in how events unfolded were often personal interests that hid behind papal policy, while Innocent IV's rhetoric created a justification for their political actions.

### **The Language of Crusading**

Typical for the formulaic language associated with the crusades were expressions like 'being signed with the cross' (*cruce signari*) and 'taking up the cross' (*crucis assumptio*).<sup>12</sup> Crusaders were described as 'pilgrims' (*peregrinis*) who received 'remission of their sins' (*in remissionem peccaminum* [sic]).<sup>13</sup> Indulgences were fixed in papal mandates that rewarded the preaching of the cross, such as in this example by Innocent IV:<sup>14</sup>

The minister of the provinces of the order of the brothers minor for Germany shall preach the cross, and make it to be preached by his brothers suitable for this, against Frederick and his supporters throughout the kingdom of Germany, upon the advice of William, King of the Romans; the same remission of sins and immunities shall be given when they assume the cross as to those who have been ferrying in help of the Holy Land, such as was granted at the general council.<sup>15</sup>

In contrast to the language laid out above, however, most German chroniclers exclusively used 'secular' political categories when they discussed the events and actions intended to replace the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>16</sup> For example, the papal-friendly Franciscan chronicle

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<sup>12</sup> For examples, see *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, pp. 291/294 and É. Doublier, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden im 13. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2017), p. 127.

<sup>13</sup> *Idem* and *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 293.

<sup>14</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, pp. 28-9, no 4265.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*: "Minister provincialis ordinis fratrum Minorum per Alamaniam contra Fredericum et fautores ejus de consilio Willelmi regis Romanorum per regnum Alamaniae crucem praedicet et per fratres suos ad hoc idoneos faciat praedicari, eam peccatorum veniam et illas immunitates assumentibus crucem hujusmodi concessurus, quae transfretantibus in Terrae Sanctae subsidium in generali concilio sunt concessae."

<sup>16</sup> See *Appendix*, '1.) Key Events in Chronicles and Annals', pp. XX.

*Cronica Minor Minoritae Erfurt* only reported: “Heinricus langravius in regem electus anno Domini 1246 in odium Friderici.”<sup>17</sup>

Strikingly, only seven out of the 38 chronicles and annals that contained information on the conflict explicitly referenced the crusade against the Staufer by using language associated with crusading.<sup>18</sup> These are the *Royal Chronicle of Cologne* (edited as *Chronica regia Coloniensis* and *Chronica Sancti Pantaleonis*), the *Gesta Treverorum* (also known as the *Gesta Arnoldi*), the *Annales Erfordiensis fratrum praedicatorum* (also known as *Chronicon Erphordense*), the *Notae Historicae Argentinenses*, the *Annales Stadenses*, Matthew Paris’ *Chronica Maiora*, and Thomas Wykes’ *Chronicon*.

From the seven chronicles that use the language of crusading, five are from Germany. All of them either directly originate from epicentres of pro-papal archiepiscopal power or had close connections to them: Cologne, Trier, and Strasbourg were cities under the power of the papal-friendly archbishops; Erfurt was part of the archdiocese of Mainz, and Stade part of the archdiocese of Bremen. Due to their proximity to the archbishops, their writers were more likely to embrace the narrative of crusading that the archbishops put forward.

Most examples of the language of crusading cited above were confined to a single chronicle from Cologne, the *Royal Chronicle of Cologne*. It was produced in the vicinity of Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, who was the strongest proponent of the papal party. Examples are a description of crusaders as pilgrims (*multis peregrinis de Brabantia, de Flandria et de Picardia cruce signatis*)<sup>19</sup> and a mention of crusaders who took the cross against the Staufer at the siege of Aachen (*crucem ibi assumunt*) in the *Royal Chronicle of Cologne*.<sup>20</sup> A curious example of the language of crusading can be found in the *Gesta Arnoldi* from Trier. In an insert that can only be found in the version of the text edited as the *Gesta Arnoldi*, but not in the

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<sup>17</sup> *Cronica Minor Minoritae Erfurt*, p. 662.

<sup>18</sup> See Appendix, ‘1.) Key Events in Chronicles and Annals’, pp. XX.

<sup>19</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 293.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 291.

edition known as the *Gesta Treverorum*, an undated incident describes an attack on William of Holland during which he was accompanied by crusaders (*cruce signatis*).<sup>21</sup>

In addition to archiepiscopal proximity, both Strasbourg and Erfurt had a strong Dominican presence. The Dominicans, or preaching friars as they were known, played a crucial role in the recruitment of crusaders against the Staufer. The Dominican chronicle *Notae Historicae Argentinenses* from Strasbourg reported that the cross was preached against Frederick II and his supporters in 1248 (*crux predicata est contra Fridericum imperatorum et suos fautores*).<sup>22</sup> Another set of Dominican annals, the *Annales Erfordiensis fratrum praedicatorum*, explicitly reasoned that men sworn with the cross acted in defence of the Catholic Faith (*cruce signabantur ad catholice fidei defensionem*).<sup>23</sup> Maybe the frequent use of the language of crusading in Dominican chronicles reflects the order's focus on learning and preaching, which may have made Dominicans preachers more acutely aware of the necessity of a theological argument to underpin the military action of the crusades.

In contrast, only one Franciscan chronicle used the language of crusading. Although the Franciscan order was just as important in the fight against the Staufer in Germany as the Dominicans, most Franciscan chronicles justified the conflict in exclusively 'secular' expressions. While this may be a coincidence of transmission, it could be speculated whether this difference was already reflected in chronicle writing. As will be seen, the Franciscans were useful because just so many of them were available; there was a particularly high number of Franciscans houses throughout Germany and in other parts of Europe.<sup>24</sup> The Dominicans, in comparison, seem to have been well-trained specialists, whose fine rhetorical skills intended

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<sup>21</sup> *Gesta Arnoldi/Gesta Treverorum*, p. 412. The insert is missing from the edition on which Emil Zenz based his frequently used German translation.

<sup>22</sup> *Notae Historicae Argentinenses*, p. 114.

<sup>23</sup> *Annales Erfordiensis fratrum praedicatorum*, p. 100.

<sup>24</sup> See this thesis, *Maps*, '1246-51: Dominican & Franciscan Convents', pp. 298-306.

to convince people through high quality preaching. These practical differences may have seeped into the pages of their respective chronicles.

The only Franciscan chronicle that used the language of crusading, the *Annales Stadenses*, was written by Albert of Stade. It reported that the cross was preached by the archbishop of Mainz (*crux contra omnes infideles a Moguntino sollempniter praedicatur*) and that crusaders (*cruce signati*) laid siege to Aachen, though it gave the year 1249 instead of 1248.<sup>25</sup> It is the only chronicle that specifically referred to Staufer supporters as heretics (*heretici*) and even unbelievers (*infideles*).<sup>26</sup>

Albert of Stade did not start his clerical career as a Franciscan; he initially tried to reform his abbey according to Cistercian rules before joining, and possibly founding, the Franciscan abbey of St John in Stade. He was also a canon at the cathedral chapter of Bremen. This connected him to Archbishop Gerhard II of Bremen, who led a crusade against the Stedinger from 1232 to 1234. This was the first crusade against Christians based on the charge of heresy in Germany.<sup>27</sup> In this capacity, it may have acted as a blueprint for the crusade against the Staufer.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that out of only seven chronicles that used the language of crusading, two were from England. This likely reflected that the bearers of the news were associated quite closely with the crusade against the Staufer in Germany. Matthew Paris' *Chronica Maiora* thrice references crusaders against the Staufer. Twice he describes how numerous crusaders participated in the siege of Aachen (*in finitibus legionibus de Frisia, de Gotia, de Euscia, de Dacia, et de partibus Germaniae et Germaniae conterminis, cruce signatis*).<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> *Annales Stadenses*, p. 372.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 371.

<sup>27</sup> See J. Schmeyers, *Die Stedinger Bauernkriege. Wahre Begebenheiten und geschichtliche Betrachtungen. Zur Erinnerung an die Schlacht bei Altenesch am 27. Mai 1234* (Lemwerder, 2004), B. Gloger, *Kreuzzug gegen die Stedinger 1233/34* (Berlin, 1980), and R. Köhn, 'Die Verketzerung der Stedinger durch die Bremer Fastensynode', *Bremisches Jahrbuch* 57 (Bremen, 1979), pp. 15-85.

<sup>28</sup> *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, pp. 25-7.

He also reports that crusaders against the Stauffer received the same remission of sins as crusaders to the Holy Land, even though it was a less arduous journey (*pro retributione mirab[ili] eis omnium peccatorum remissionem, ampliorem videlicet quam pro peregrinatione in Terram Sanctam facienda*).<sup>29</sup> In a similar way, Thomas Wykes also remarked that crusaders were directed against Aachen.<sup>30</sup>

The great majority of chronicles and annals, 31 out of 38, did not employ the language of crusading to report the conflict between Frederick II and the papacy in Germany.<sup>31</sup> About 18 of the chronicles explicitly provide information on the military campaigns in secular terms. Of these, 16 chronicles are of German and two of English origin; representative examples are the *Annales Argentinenses*, *Cronica S Petri Erfordensis Moderna*, and the *Chronicon Christiani Mogunti*. Contemporary Italian chronicles after 1240 also fail to explicitly report crusading practices. Most of the Italian chronicles were written by laymen, in direct contrast with the German situation.<sup>32</sup> This was “despite the emphasis that Innocent IV placed on the crusade.”<sup>33</sup>

Gianluca Raccagni put forward two possible explanations why Italian chronicles do not report crusading practices; either the poor coverage reflected the low prominence of crusading features, or chronicle writers encapsulated crusader practices in expressions that denoted the defence of the Church in a more general manner, such as *pars*, *fideles*, *coadiutores ecclesie*, *adherentes ecclesie*, and *ecclesie filii bellatores strenui*.<sup>34</sup> If this was the case, this may suggest much more fluid boundaries between crusading and other measures in defence of the Church than modern scholars have understood.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., pp. 259-60.

<sup>30</sup> *Chronicle of Thomas Wykes*, p. 449.

<sup>31</sup> See *Appendix*, ‘1.) Key Events in Chronicles and Annals’, pp. XX.

<sup>32</sup> See Raccagni, ‘Neglected piece of evidence’, p. 740.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 736.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 736-8.

Among the members of the papal party in Germany, only the extant charters by Archbishop Conrad of Cologne make reference to the crusade.<sup>35</sup> No charters by Archbishop Arnold of Trier and the archbishops of Mainz explicitly use any terms associated with crusading, though they may not be extant. Neither of the two royal candidates Henry Raspe and William of Holland mentioned the crusade in any of their extant charters. They never referred to the crusaders in their armies or to taking the cross, not even at their election as King of the Romans.<sup>36</sup> At Henry Raspe's election as king, many of those present took the cross against Frederick II, but it is noteworthy that there is no reference to the royal candidate himself doing the same.<sup>37</sup> Neither did he mention crusading in his letter to the Milanese notifying them of his election, although it would have given him an opportunity to present himself as a crusader king.<sup>38</sup> Equally, William of Holland did not mention anything related to taking the cross or crusading in his charters, despite his close collaboration with the papal legate for crusader recruitment.<sup>39</sup>

To a certain degree, this may be indicative of a practical division of duties. If the administration of the recruitment lay in the hands of ecclesiastics such as the archbishops and the papal legate, they were less likely to appear in charters by the royal candidates. In all sources, except the practical papal ones, the political aspect of the military campaigns was predominantly represented. Thus, even in the environment of the papal party in Germany the language of crusading was in practice restricted to a very narrow sphere.

A starkly contrasting vision emerges from papal bulls and letters. Documents produced in the papal chancery regularly used expressions related to crusading, such as 'preaching the

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<sup>35</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 181, no 1253.

<sup>36</sup> *Regesten Kaiserreich Heinrich Raspe*, pp. 911-7.

<sup>37</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, pp. 273-99.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, no 4866.

<sup>39</sup> *Regesten Kaiserreich Willhelm*, pp. 919-87.

word of the cross' against Frederick (*adversus eum verbum crucis praedicit*).<sup>40</sup> Anyone who resists Frederick's perfidy should be 'signed with the [small] sign of the cross' (*adv[ersus] eund[em] F[ridericum] omnes fautores ipsius crucis signaculum de devino et [ver]o (?) sperantes auxilio assumatis*).<sup>41</sup> Mirroring the phrase 'business of the cross' (*negotium crucis*) that denotes crusading, he employs the expression 'the business of the empire' (*negotium imperii*).<sup>42</sup>

The evidence from the chronicles and annals can be seen as an indication that in the eyes of many contemporary chronicle writers, the crusade in Germany appeared in so profoundly a political and temporal context that it became difficult to describe this project in the terms of a crusade. If the chroniclers knew about the crusading aspects of the conflict, they chose not to address them. Maybe there was a practical element to this too, as exposure to any kind of crusader activity may have been minimal because the geographical extent of the military campaigns was limited.

Crucially, there was no discernible correlation between sympathy for either the papal or imperial party and how the conflict was constructed on the page, though it remains difficult to differentiate between perception and representation. The ecclesiastical authorship of most chronicles is especially noteworthy, as it implies that not even all members of the clergy were convinced. If even a small step out of the epicenter of papal thought into the landscape of ecclesiastical chronicle writers made such a difference, it can only be assumed how far the perception among secular people would differ from the papal narrative.

There was silence in the chronicles and annals on the crusade against the Staufer in Germany, and there was no indication that it led to disillusionment with the idea of crusading in principle. The papal and non-papal sources paint two divergent pictures of the conflict in a

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<sup>40</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 450, no 2999. For more information on the rhetorical tradition the chancery drew on, see Herde, *Literary Activities*, pp. 227-39.

<sup>41</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 296, no 1993.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 295, no 1988.

way that distinguishes it from other crusades; even those that took place in Europe. Usually the language of crusading prevailed in most sources for a crusade, despite the political implications all crusades had. Nor does it explain why not more chroniclers wrote about the large-scale preaching of the cross that took place in extensive areas, which may mean that for many crusading was not a relevant mode of thinking about the conflict, even among parts of the clergy. This suggests that in Germany, Pope Innocent IV's attempt to transform ordinary military campaigns into a crusade failed at the level of theological and juridical thought. To a certain degree, the attention spiritual aspects in the conflict between Frederick II and the papacy received in Anglophone crusader historiography may be traced to a coincidence of transmission, as the perception of the conflict among Anglophone crusader historians has been shaped by the exceptionally well-informed chronicle of Matthew Paris.

One of the reasons why the papal narrative failed to take hold in Germany might be the clash of three mutually unintelligible mentalities and attitudes. The intellectual world of the papacy was dominated by canon law. In addition, many of the most influential figures at the curia experienced statehood in the context of northern Italian city states, which came into conflict with Frederick II's desire to emulate the Roman emperors of Antiquity. These two programmes clashed with the mindset of a nobility whose rule was shaped by the less urbanised and more thinly populated landscape of Germany. The main interest of German nobles was to consolidate or expand the influence of their family clans in their lands that were often cobbled together in vast territories. The crusade also fell into a time of quick change within secular law, as exemplified by the *Sachsenspiegel*, the first book of law in which the law was codified in the vernacular tongue between 1220 and 1235.<sup>43</sup> This might also be an explanation why negotiations to resolve the conflict ultimately failed. At least, it points to a public relations failure by the papacy; at most the language of the non-papal sources tells the story where the

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<sup>43</sup> See Eike von Repgow, *Sachsenspiegel*.

ideology of crusading reached its boundaries with regards to its ability to convince people in the thirteenth century.

### **The origins of the conflict**

The almost 30-years long conflict between the Staufer and successive popes opened another chapter in the political and constitutional struggle between *imperium* and *sacerdotium* in the thirteenth century.<sup>44</sup> Some of the forces at work in the conflict went all the way back to the Investiture Contest in the eleventh century and paralleled those in the power struggle between Emperor Henry IV and Pope Gregory VII.<sup>45</sup> The papacy wanted to protect the sovereignty of the papal state as a guarantee of independence and income and had been fearful of being surrounded by the Staufer dynasty since at least the 1190s. The Staufer wanted to unite their inherited lands in the Holy Roman Emperor and the Kingdom of Sicily. The strategic goals of the Holy Roman Empire and the Patrimony of Peter were mutually incompatible and remained unresolved.<sup>46</sup>

The *raison d'être* of the crusade against the Staufer in Germany was to replace Frederick II as Holy Roman Emperor with a new king. This reason preceded the decision to use a crusade to accomplish this goal. In practice, the religious and political motives why the papacy wanted to replace Frederick mainly expressed themselves in protection of the sovereignty of the papal state. However, this was not considered enough of a reason to start a war. Hence Pope Innocent IV was compelled to find a way of presenting his cause to create an acceptable case for launching a crusade, to avoid the setbacks that had befallen his predecessor Gregory IX.

This thesis analyses three instances that shed light on how Innocent IV tailored his actions to present an acceptable cause for a crusade, though more could be discussed. First,

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<sup>44</sup> See Whalen, *The Two Powers*, pp. 4-8.

<sup>45</sup> See Zey, *Der Investiturstreit*, pp. 50- 111 and Van Cleve, *Frederick II*, pp. 194-236.

<sup>46</sup> Abulafia, *Frederick II*, pp. 56/135-163.

Pope Gregory IX initially attempted to replace Frederick II and Conrad IV with a new king, by instigating an election in Germany without a crusade. When his initial, purely ‘secular’ attempts at replacing Frederick failed, he switched methods. Second, when Innocent IV charged Frederick II with heresy to depose him, the requirements of the deposition and the need for a crusade dictated that Innocent IV chose to focus on heresy, not vice versa. Third, Innocent IV chose his arguments for Frederick’s deposition at the Council of Lyon in a manner that they could also justify a future crusade. The discussion whether the protection of the sovereignty of the papal state equalled the defence of the faith remained unresolved among contemporaries. Regardless of the legal debates, practical action overtook theoretical considerations. Other examples of moments to be examined could be, among others, the implications of Innocent IV’s claim that as King of Sicily Frederick II was a papal vassal, how the Council of Lyon influenced perceptions of papal plenitude of power, or what role papal approbation and coronation had in making an emperor.<sup>47</sup>

### **A new king**

After Frederick II’s excommunication on 20 March 1239, Pope Gregory IX’s attempt to replace Frederick II and Conrad IV with a royal candidate in Germany by purely secular measures failed. Gregory IX probably considered replacing Frederick II as Holy Roman Emperor as a realistic option because he knew that royal power in Germany was considerably weakened.

Frederick II had deposed his rebellious eldest son Henry (VII) as *Rex Romanorum* on 4 July 1235. This considerably undermined royal power, in reaction to which Frederick II passed a law for public peace (*Landfriedensgesetz*) at the diet of Mainz on 25 August 1235. He arranged for his younger son Conrad IV to follow him on the throne, and Conrad IV was elected

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<sup>47</sup> For the kingdom of Sicily, see Baethgen, ‘Der Anspruch des Papsttums’, pp. 168-268 and Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, pp. 47-8. For the Council of Lyon, see Berger, *Saint Louis et Innocent IV*, pp. 115-38.

king in Vienna in February 1237.<sup>48</sup> Conrad IV joined his father as co-ruler when he was just about to turn nine years old, so Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz became his guardian and political administrator.<sup>49</sup> If it was not a father deposing his son, temporal princes commonly deposed a king indirectly through the election of an anti-king. Roman law provided little intellectual support or procedural guidance for the removal of a king.

Between 1239 and 1241, Pope Gregory IX tried to depose Frederick by offering the imperial crown to three candidates in succession. Although they would have acted in accordance with papal interest if they accepted the offer, none of them, nor their supporters, took the cross against the Staufer. All three candidates could have been serious contestants; they were all sons of kings, two from neighbouring kingdoms, and one a descendant from the rival Welf dynasty. They were sufficiently wealthy to autonomously sustain an army, which would not be the case for later royal candidates. Many may have considered the idea of installing a new King of the Romans in Germany to take over the Holy Roman Empire to be fairly ludicrous, especially without financial support from the papal treasury. It may have appeared as preposterous as being offered the moon.<sup>50</sup> The subsequent military successes of the royal candidates made it look like a change of power was possible, even though the project failed in the long-term.

The efforts to make Count Abel of Schleswig, son of King Waldemar II of Denmark, new *Rex Romanorum* went the furthest.<sup>51</sup> His election almost came to a head at the diet of Eger on 1 June 1239, but eventually his party of supporters collapsed.<sup>52</sup> The diet of Eger shows in an exemplary manner which factors influenced the process.<sup>53</sup> Frederick II's delegation

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<sup>48</sup> *MGH Const* 2, pp. 439-41, no 329.

<sup>49</sup> Stürner, *Friedrich II.*, pp. 305/333.

<sup>50</sup> See the response attributed to Richard of Cornwall, who turned down Innocent IV's offer of the Kingdom of Sicily without papal financial support: 'It is as though someone said "I will sell or give you the moon, go up and take it."' *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, p. 361.

<sup>51</sup> Van Cleve, *Frederick II*, p. 436.

<sup>52</sup> *Regesten Kaiserreich Conrad IV*, p. 257 and *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 254, no 324.

<sup>53</sup> See Schirmacher, F. W., *Albert von Possemünster, genannt der Böhme, Archidiacon von Passau* (Weimar, 1871), pp. 33-44.

officially announced his excommunication to the German nobles, but many princes refused to break their oath of fealty upon the request of papal representative Albert of Behaim.<sup>54</sup> Prominent nobles such as the dukes of Brunswick and Saxony sought reconciliation between the parties instead.

Most German princes wanted Pope Gregory IX to reconcile with the emperor. In spring 1240, they sent the Master of the Teutonic Order, Conrad of Thuringia, brother of Henry Raspe, to Rome with letters begging the pope to reach a settlement. These appeals described the discord in Germany that the excommunication and preparation for a crusade had already caused. They argued that Gregory IX's strife with Frederick was damaging the Church and prevented a crusade to the Holy Land, but a reconciliation would allow everyone to prioritize aid to the Latin East.<sup>55</sup> The Mongol threat of 1241 emphasized the need for concord.<sup>56</sup> Some German poets exhorted the pope to make peace so that German pilgrims could travel to the Holy Sepulchre to expiate their sins.<sup>57</sup>

Gregory IX rejected the princes' request and offered the imperial crown to Duke Otto I of Brunswick.<sup>58</sup> He was the nephew of Emperor Otto IV, who had been elected king against Frederick II's uncle Philip of Swabia in 1198.<sup>59</sup> Gregory IX hoped to tap into the old Welf

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<sup>54</sup> *Die aventinischen Exzerpte aus den Akten des Albert von Beham. Albert von Beham und Regesten Pabst Innocenz IV.*, ed. C. Höfler (Stuttgart, 1847), pp. 3-11 and *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, ed. L. Auvray and L. Carolus-Barré (Paris, 1955). Vol III, pp. 200-6.

<sup>55</sup> *MGH Const 2*, pp. 225-32.

<sup>56</sup> P. Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410* (London, 2018), pp. 63-73.

<sup>57</sup> Freidank, 'Von Åkers', *Vridankes Bescheidenheit*, ed. W. Grimm, *Bescheidenheit* (Göttingen 1884), pp. 157/159/162, Walther von der Vogelweide, *Elegie. Owê, war sint verschwunden: Die Elegie Walthers von der Vogelweide: Untersuchungen, kritischer Text, Kommentar*, ed. B. Volkmann (Göppingen, 1987), Bruder Wernher, *Gregorie, bâbest, geistlicher vater, wache und brich abe dînem slaf*, ed. U. Zuckerschwerdt, *Bruder Wernher: Sangsprüche: transliteriert, normalisiert, übersetzt und kommentiert* (Berlin, 2014).

<sup>58</sup> *Chronica Albrici Trium Fontium*, ed. H. Pertz, *MGH SS 23*, Herbordi Dialogus de vita Ottonis episcopi Babenbergensis (Hannover, 1868), p. 949 and *Gesta Abbatum Horti Sanctae Mariae*, ed. Societas Aperiendis Fontibus Rerum Germanicarum Medii Aevi, *MGH SS 13*, Supplementa tomorum I–XII, pars I, (Hannover, 1881), p. 595.

<sup>59</sup> See T. Frenz, 'Das Papsttum als der lachende Dritte? Die Konsolidierung der weltlichen Herrschaft der Päpste unter Innozenz III.', in W. Hechberger and F. Schuller (eds), *Staufer und Welfen. Zwei rivalisierende Dynastien im Hochmittelalter* (Regensburg, 2009), pp. 190-201 and W. Stürner, 'Die Söhne Friedrichs II. und das Ende der Staufer' in W. Stürner (ed), *Staufer und Welfen. Zwei rivalisierende Dynastien im Hochmittelalter* (Cologne, 2012), pp. 202-215.

rivalry with the Staufer. But Duke Otto did not consider himself to be in a sufficiently strong position to make a realistic bid for the crown; he said that he “did not wish to die in the manner of his uncle.”<sup>60</sup>

Finally, the pope offered the crown to Count Robert I of Artois, younger brother to King Louis IX of France.<sup>61</sup> King Louis IX rejected the offer on his brother’s behalf.<sup>62</sup> In a letter to Gregory IX, Louis IX laid out the reasons for his decision, which highlight some of the legal and political problems that dominated the conflict.

On a legal level, Louis IX strongly rejected the idea that Frederick II could be deposed as emperor by the pope alone. He insisted that even if Frederick was found guilty – which he had not by this point –, he could only be deposed through the decision of a general council.<sup>63</sup> A general council was composed of temporal and spiritual princes and acted independently. The German princes claimed that since it was they who elected the *Rex Romanorum*, no king could not be deposed without their agreement. However, Pope Gregory IX tried to do so out of his own power. It is unclear whether he expected the German princes and international kings to accept his decision, and was surprised by their refusal to do so, or whether he was aware that this could overreach his power and gambled.<sup>64</sup>

On the political level, Louis IX was conscious that he and Robert did not have the military power to defeat Frederick. Moreover, if the two crowns were held in the same family, this could lead to the unification of the Holy Roman Empire with the Kingdom of France. Such a super-state would have an order of magnitude similar to Charlemagne’s empire, which would significantly shift the order of Christian Europe. Gregory IX’s offer to the French king raised

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<sup>60</sup> *Chronica Albrici Trium Fontium*, p. 949.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* and *Matthew Paris’ Chronica Maiora*, p. 242. The chronicle by Albricus and Matthew Paris are the only evidence for this. See Le Goff, *Saint Louis*, pp. 151-2.

<sup>62</sup> *Matthew Paris’ Chronica Maiora*, pp. 624-6.

<sup>63</sup> See Graefe, *Publizistik*, pp. 26-9.

<sup>64</sup> H. M. Schaller, ‘Das letzte Rundschreiben Gregors IX gegen Friedrich II’, in H. M. Schaller (ed), *Stauferzeit. Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Hannover, 1993), pp. 369-85.

the question whether the pope was willing to contemplate a potentially very powerful replacement the Stauffer at such an early stage of the conflict. If the pope was willing to contemplate in earnest such a significant change to the political organisation of the Holy Roman Empire and France, this could be seen as an indication that Gregory IX's motivation was focused in a very narrow manner on the sovereignty of the papal state.

### **Frederick II's deposition at the Council of Lyon**

Although the theoretical claim to the right to depose a monarch had existed for longer, by the time Innocent IV deposed Frederick II, the intellectual, legal, and political environment shifted in a way that allowed for Frederick II's deposition to take place. The popes' theoretical claim to a right of deposition turned from an indirect into a direct one in the first half of the thirteenth century.<sup>65</sup> This change was based on the popes' interactions with canonists of their time, but Innocent IV also put his own thoughts into an extensive commentary of papal decretals.<sup>66</sup> The popes' claim to the right to depose a monarch was especially pertinent to the Holy Roman Emperor, based on theories about the translation of the empire (*translatio imperii*).<sup>67</sup>

Pope Innocent IV was a typical representative of the 'lawyer popes' of the thirteenth century, almost all of which were thoroughly educated in canon law. He studied law, probably at the University of Bologna, and served as Vice-Chancellor and cardinal under Gregory IX, so he had been close to the conflict from the start. Through his studies, Innocent IV had at hand the precise and structured legal language necessary to translate these ideas into action.<sup>68</sup> Many

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<sup>65</sup> J. Miethke, 'Geschichtsprozeß und zeitgenössisches Bewußtsein: Die Theorie des monarchischen Papats im hohen und späteren Mittelalter', *Historische Zeitschrift* 226 (1978), pp. 564-599.

<sup>66</sup> See Fieschi, Sinibaldo, *V Decretalium libros*.

<sup>67</sup> W. Ullmann, *A short History of Papacy in the Middle Ages*, 2nd edn (London, 1972; repr London/New York, 2003), pp. 201-226 and G. Barraclough, *The Medieval Papacy*, 2nd edn (New York, 1979), p. 112.

<sup>68</sup> See T. Wetzstein, 'Die Autorität des ordo iuris. Die Absetzung Friedrichs II. und das zeitgenössische Verfahrensrecht', in H. Seibert et al (eds.), *Autorität und Akzeptanz. Das Reich im Europa des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Ostfildern, 2013), pp. 149-82.

of his legal and theological arguments can also be found in his letters, pamphlets, and encyclicals.<sup>69</sup>

The bull of deposition from 17 July 1245 reflects the latest developments in canon law with regards to the deposition of a monarch.<sup>70</sup> The structure of the text shows how Innocent IV developed the arguments of his predecessor Gregory IX.<sup>71</sup> The letter of excommunication from 20 March 1239, and the encyclical in which Gregory IX expanded the accusations against the emperor shortly thereafter, cited Frederick II's rebellion against the papacy, the emperor's attempt to expel the pope and clergy from the city of Rome, as well as the physical damage to certain churches in Rome and the Kingdom of Sicily, which in effect restricted the liberty of the Church.<sup>72</sup> By accusing the emperor of hindering the papal legate in the corroboration of the Catholic Faith in the Albigensian lands, Gregory also made reference to Frederick's heresy.

In his bull of deposition, Innocent IV developed these accusations into a legal argument that laid the argumentative groundwork for Frederick II's deposition. Innocent IV argued not just with Frederick II's rebellion against the papacy and the damage to lands and property that may or may not have restricted the liberty of the whole church, but with moral charges.<sup>73</sup>

According to Innocent IV, for an emperor to be deposed, he had to be guilty of several grave crimes. Thus, Innocent IV took great care to list Frederick's crimes in the bull of deposition: perjury, breaking the peace, sacrilege through the notorious arrest of the prelates on their way to the council in 1241, and, most importantly, heresy.<sup>74</sup> Incidentally, even this line of argument made Innocent IV still less extreme than other contemporary canonists, such as

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<sup>69</sup> See *Appendix*, '2.) Timeline Letters and Propaganda, 1239-1250', pp. XX.

<sup>70</sup> Ep Saec XIII 2, pp. 88-95.

<sup>71</sup> *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, pp. 283/426/615, *Acta Imperii inedita*, pp. 565/566/716, and *Regesta Imperii*, no 3543.

<sup>72</sup> For the letter of excommunication from 20 March 1239, see *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, VI, p. 289. For the encyclical from 7 April 1239, see *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, III, p. 200-206. Auvray titled this section "Litterae de Excommunicatione Friderici Imperatoris" but he did not include the letter of excommunication that was preserved in Frederick II's register as edited by Huillard-Bréholles. Apparently only the additional encyclical from 7<sup>th</sup> April, but not the letter of excommunication from 20<sup>th</sup> March were added to Pope Gregory IX's registers.

<sup>73</sup> *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, p. 289 and Berger, 1367.

<sup>74</sup> *Regesta Pontificium Romanorum*, pp. 88-95.

Hostiensis, who argued that having committed a grave sin was in itself sufficient to depose an emperor.<sup>75</sup>

After a short summary of the failed peace negotiations from 1244,<sup>76</sup> which were intended to demonstrate the Church's sincere but vain commitment to peace, the bull first sought to discredit Frederick's reputation by recalling the many occasions the way in which the accused did not keep his oaths. This reached back to when Frederick was still King of Sicily, when he thrice swore and broke an oath of loyalty to Innocent III and Honorius III, thereby committing treason against the popes' majesty (*crimine maiestatis*).<sup>77</sup> In the section on perjury, the Bull also mentioned the letter Frederick sent to the body of cardinals just before his excommunication in 1239.<sup>78</sup> Frederick tried to incite the cardinals to challenge Pope Gregory's IX absolutist rule, but the letter was intercepted. Innocent IV built a case that the attempted attack on papal authority through the College of Cardinals formed an act of treason by Frederick.

Innocent IV specifically tried to argue that the charges he brought against Frederick II for his deposition did not just concern him in a personal capacity or in his function as bishop of Rome, but that they threatened the liberty of the Church as a whole. Damage to the lands and rights of the papacy did not automatically mean that contemporaries accepted it as a threat to the liberty of the Church of all of Christendom; it could be seen as a problem of the pope in his capacity as bishop of Rome. This argument would become pivotal after the Council of Lyon, when Innocent IV attempted to militarily implement Frederick II's deposition through a crusade. The charge of heresy would also come to play a central role in anticipation of the arguments required to justify the use of a crusade.

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<sup>75</sup> Fieschi, Sinibaldo, *V Decretalium libros*, f. 90v.

<sup>76</sup> Tammen, *Kaiser Friederich II.*, pp. 20-35.

<sup>77</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, p. 90.

<sup>78</sup> *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, pp. 295/327.

The structure of the bull's text also reflects the latest developments with regards to the persecution of heresy.<sup>79</sup> Anxiety about heresies was widespread in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century; accusations of heresy were common. The combat of heresy was high on the political agenda of ecclesiastical and temporal rulers alike. Latest innovative laws aimed against heretics as well as against temporal rulers who failed to persecute them.

This formed the basis of the papal right to depose princes based on heresy. The Fourth Lateran Council from 1215 discussed the procedure and penalties against heretics and their protectors. According to Canon 3, if those suspected of heresy neglected to prove themselves innocent, they were to be excommunicated. If the suspects continued in the excommunication for twelve months, they were to be condemned as heretics. Canon 47 stated that excommunication may be imposed only after warning in the presence of suitable witnesses and for manifest and reasonable cause.<sup>80</sup> Princes were to be admonished to swear that they would banish all whom the Church pointed out as heretics. If the term was applied in a broader sense, every person who remained excommunicated for more than a year – as Frederick did – or committed other crimes, could be suspected of heresy.

This paved the way for the decretalists to argue that by using the accusation of sins, and especially heresy, the pope had the right to depose a temporal ruler *ratione delicti*.<sup>81</sup> “By stressing moral charges, the papacy sought to bring him entirely under his jurisdiction, and to move away from the political issues, which contemporaries tended to see as a matter for compromise and diplomacy.”<sup>82</sup> Thus, Innocent IV could depose Frederick based on his *plentitudo potestatis, ratione haereseos aliorumque delictorum*.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> See S. Ragg, *Ketzer und Recht: die weltliche Ketzergesetzgebung des Hochmittelalters unter dem Einfluss des römischen und kanonischen Rechts* (Hannover, 2006), pp. 93-4 and A. Patschovsky, ‘Heresy and Society. On the Political Function of Heresy in the Medieval World’, in C. Bruschi and P. Biller (eds.), *Texts and the Repression of Medieval Heresy* (Suffolk/Rochester, 2003), pp. 23-42.

<sup>80</sup> *1215 Lateranense IV*.

<sup>81</sup> Kempf, ‘Die Absetzung Friedrichs im Lichte der Kanonistik’, pp. 354-5.

<sup>82</sup> Abulafia, *Frederick II*, p. 372.

<sup>83</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, no 1367 and *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, pp. 88-95.

Frederick II specifically made a name for himself as a persecutor of heretics through legislation in the Holy Roman Empire, as well as in the Kingdom of Sicily, between 1220 and 1239.<sup>84</sup> Nonetheless, this did not protect him from becoming the target of accusations of heresy himself.<sup>85</sup> The accusation of heresy against Frederick II stands out as an example of how the practical and legal necessities drove the way Innocent IV picked the canon law arguments to charge Frederick with crimes sufficiently grave to merit his deposition. While the attempted replacement with a new king failed under Gregory IX, Innocent IV's legal justifications at the Council of Lyon made Frederick II's deposition viable.

The different function the accusation of heresy played was the main reason why Norman Housley distinguished between the Italian Crusade as a crusade against Christian lay powers and the Albigensian Crusade as a crusade against heretics: "The crucial difference lies in the fact that, whereas in the crusade against heresy the involvement of secular authorities was incidental to, and arose from the determination of the Church to stamp out heretical beliefs, in the crusade against lay powers political opposition to the Church was the primary reason for the crusade."<sup>86</sup> Arguments regarding heresy were made in both instances, but the political function of the accusation was more central in the crusade against the Staufer.

### **Reception of the accusation of heresy in Germany**

There is only little evidence from the chronicles and annals that Pope Innocent IV succeeded in connecting the fight against heresy with the crusade against the Staufer in Germany. The representation the charge of heresy against Frederick II saw in the chronicles and annals acts as a fulcrum between the crusade against the Staufer and the wider conflict between Frederick II and the papacy in Germany. Calling Frederick II a heretic was necessary to add to the

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<sup>84</sup> See K-V. Selge, 'Die Ketzerpolitik Friedrichs II.', in G. Wolf (ed), *Stupor Mundi. Zur Geschichte Friedrichs II. von Hohenstaufen* (Darmstadt, 1982), pp. 449-93 and Ragg, *Ketzer und Recht*, pp. 93-4.

<sup>85</sup> See *Appendix*, '2.) Timeline Letters and Propaganda, 1239-1250', pp. XX.

<sup>86</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, p. 1.

legitimacy of the case for a crusade.<sup>87</sup> The accusation of heresy was not only important to delegitimise Staufer rule, but also for the recruitment of crusaders, as it gave preachers a cause to rally those who wanted to take up the cross. However, it may have been difficult to put this case forward against a monarch who was an assiduous persecutor of heretics and who legislated against heresy in Germany as late as 1239.<sup>88</sup>

Only a few chroniclers seem to have accepted the connection between the Staufer and heresy.<sup>89</sup> Out of 38 chronicles, 35 did not make any reference to heresy by Frederick II or Staufer supporters. Only one chronicle reported heretical activity in Germany in detail, even though most chronicles were highly critical of Frederick II. Maybe this was a coincidence of transmission, or the topic was too dangerous to address. The three chronicles that mentioned heresy were the *Annales Stadenses*, the *Cronica S Petri Erfordensis Moderna*, and Hugo of Reutlingen.

The *Annales Stadenses* reported an incident in Schwäbisch Hall in Swabia in 1248, from which certain developments and circumstances can be inferred.<sup>90</sup> Albert of Stade reported that certain pro-Staufer clergy preached and held mass in Schwäbisch Hall despite the prohibition, as the city was under the interdict. They reasoned that no one, neither pope nor bishop, had the authority to put anyone under the interdict.<sup>91</sup> Hence the indulgences they distributed were true and their activities justified.<sup>92</sup> Furthermore, they claimed that the pope

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<sup>87</sup> See S. Ragg, *Ketzer und Recht: die weltliche Ketzergesetzgebung des Hochmittelalters unter dem Einfluss des römischen und kanonischen Rechts* (Hannover, 2006), pp. 93-4.

<sup>88</sup> *MGH Const 2*, p. 284.

<sup>89</sup> Doublier, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, p. 131. “Verketzerung” means the process of turning someone into a heretic or something into a heresy. Frederick II complained in a letter about the mendicant orders to the German princes in July 1240 that the pope called him a heretic; Friedrich von Raumer translated this as “verketzert”, idem, *Kaiser Friedrich II., der Hohenstaufe und seine Zeit* (1823-25), p. 344. The German expression was then taken up by F. Schirrmacher, *Kaiser Friedrich II. und die letzten Hohenstaufen* (1874), p. 72, from where it entered common usage in German historiography. See for example R. Köhn, ‘Die Verketzerung der Stedinger durch die Bremer Fastensynode’, *Bremisches Jahrbuch 57* (Bremen 1979), pp. 15-85.

<sup>90</sup> *Annales Stadenses*, pp. 371-2.

<sup>91</sup> “Item quod nullus vivens, nec papa nec episcopi, nec aliqui alii possint interdicere divina, et qui pro [sic] hiberent, essent heretici et seductores.” *Annales Stadenses*, p. 371.

<sup>92</sup> “Indulgentium, quam damus vobis, non damus fictam vel compositam ab apostolico neque de episcopis, sed de solo Deo et ordine nostro.”, *Annales Stadenses*, p. 372.

was a heretic, who did not have the authority to bind and to loosen. Neither did bishops and prelates have this authority; they were Simonites and heretics, and just as bad as the pope. Priests were unable to forgive sins, even in the hour of death. Finally, everyone who was pro-papal lied, including the Dominicans, Franciscans, and Cistericans.<sup>93</sup>

The alleged utterances quoted by Albert of Stade almost universally must have been perceived to be heretical by the theological standards of the time. Most of the theological arguments that Frederick II and pro-Staufer canonists presented were orthodox, yet Albert of Stade indicated that sometimes pro-Staufer members of the local clergy in Germany argued along much more radical lines.<sup>94</sup> It is possible that he exaggerated the quotes, or even invented them, though nothing in the chronicle passage supports such an assumption.

The episode in the *Annales Stadenses* suggests that the split between pro-Staufer and pro-papal clergy persisted regardless of the comprehensive legal arguments Pope Innocent IV presented for Frederick II's deposition at the Council of Lyon. Both pro-papal and pro-Staufer clergy vied for attention and support among lay people through preaching. Pro-Staufer clergy influenced lay people, both nobility and the rural population, as Albert of Stade specified.<sup>95</sup> Thereby they aggravated the situation in the eyes of those who were genuinely concerned for the orthodoxy of the faith.

Furthermore, two chronicles cited a passage lifted from Innocent IV's encyclical *Ascendit de mari* that was intended to serve as evidence for Frederick's heresy. The *Cronica S Petri Erfordensis Moderna* and Hugo of Reutlingen included an alleged comment by Frederick II that was supposedly overheard by one of the future royal candidates, Henry Raspe: "Three men seduced the entire world: Moses the Hebrews, Jesus the Christians, and Mohammed the Saracens. For that reason, if the princes agree with my instructions, I shall order a much better

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<sup>93</sup> *Annales Stadenses*, p. 371.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 371-2.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 371.

way of life and belief for all peoples.”<sup>96</sup> It was no coincidence that two papal-friendly chronicles chose to include this plump example of a heretical utterance. Not only did the alleged quote illustrate Frederick’s heresy in a straightforward manner, it also implied that one of the future royal candidates was rightfully motivated to become king by justified outrage at heresy that he directly overheard.

Even the *Annales Stadenses* did not argue that political support for the Staufer *per se* made someone a heretic. Instead, Albert of Stade reported heretical utterances made by Staufer supporters as they justified their actions. If pro-Staufer clergy argued along heretical lines because of their opposition to the pope, it made it in turn easier for papal supporters to argue that they and their cause were heretical. It is difficult to establish how common this was though. Presumably, Albert of Stade reported the incident because of their unusual and shocking nature. Nevertheless, Frederick II’s “Verketzerung” seems to have been unsuccessful in Germany, as many chroniclers did not seem convinced that heresy could not only denote heterodox dogmatic teaching, but also any Staufer-friendly or even anti-papal attitude.<sup>97</sup> Thus, the papal chancery mostly lost the narrative on Frederick as a heretic in the chronicles and annals that discuss the conflict in Germany.

### **Why a crusade?**

Innocent IV’s decision to use a crusade against the Staufer was dictated just as much by practical needs for how to raise an army, as by theoretical considerations which of his arguments would be most difficult to refute. On a practical level, to declare a crusade enabled any pope to raise an army using the preaching of the cross and indulgences of sins. Pope Gregory IX had been aware of his need for an army against the Staufer since Frederick II’s first

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<sup>96</sup> “Tres seduxerunt totam mundum: Moyses Hebreos, Jesus Christianos, Mahumet Sarracenos. Quam ob rem si principes institutionibus meis assentirent, ego multum meliorem modum vivendi et credendi cunctis nationibus ordinarem.”, *Cronica S Petri Erfordensis Moderna*, p. 245 and *Hugo of Reutlingen*, p. 129.

<sup>97</sup> Doublier, *Abläss, Papstum und Bettelorden*, pp. 131-2.

excommunication in 1227.<sup>98</sup> Popes did not have a private army, though, nor sufficient funds to hire mercenaries on an appropriately large scale.<sup>99</sup>

During the military conflict with Frederick II from 1228 to 1230, and in several Northern Italian episodes in the 1230s, Gregory IX did try to make use of a crusade.<sup>100</sup> Instead, Gregory IX experimented with *clavigeri*, papal troops marked with the sign of the keys; hence the name ‘War of the Keys’ that has sometimes been applied to this part of the conflict.<sup>101</sup> One of the main reasons the pope did not preach a crusade against the emperor then was that the military forces constituted of Italian and Sicilian inhabitants whom Gregory IX considered his vassals. They were supposed to heed feudal obligations to be levied and not to require the added reward of indulgences.<sup>102</sup>

Gregory IX for the first time tried to organize a crusade against Frederick II between 1239 and 1241, after Frederick II’s second excommunication. The earliest stirrings of crusader activity by the papal legate Gregory of Montelengo in Milan may have taken place as quickly as April 1239, only one month after Frederick’s excommunication.<sup>103</sup> In addition, when Gregory IX was threatened by Frederick in Rome in February 1240, he carried the relics of the cross and the apostles Peter and Paul in a procession to the Church of St Peter.<sup>104</sup> This set an important precedent for the conflict, in which the display of religious devotion and spiritual humility dramatically changed his desperate situation. In Italy, there may have been positive responses to early recruitment efforts because opposition to the Staufer had already coagulated and was well organised.

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<sup>98</sup> See Abulafia, *Frederick II*, pp. 164-201.

<sup>99</sup> Köster, *Kreuzablass*, p. 17.

<sup>100</sup> Raccani, ‘Neglected piece of evidence’, pp. 723-7.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 724.

<sup>102</sup> G. A. Loud, ‘The Papal ‘Crusade’ against Frederick II in 1228–1230’, in M. Balard (ed.), *La Papauté Et Les Croisades / The Papacy and the Crusades: Actes Du VIIe Congrès de la Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East/ Proceedings of the VIIth Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East* (Avignon, 2011), p. 99.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 728-32.

<sup>104</sup> Stürmer, *Friedrich II.*, p. 488.

Some of at the first recruitment efforts for the crusade against the Staufer did not target new recruits who wanted to take the cross against Frederick II, but redirected pre-existing crusaders. Pope Gregory IX ordered abbot Sabordowitz near Brünn the order to announce in the diocese of Ölmütz that crusaders who took the cross against pagans in Prussia or to go to the Holy Land were forbidden under pain of excommunication from departing.<sup>105</sup> Instead they were to wait until they were directed against Frederick II. Maybe the pope sent these first orders to Prussia because he wanted to commence recruitment in an area that was quite a long distance away from the Italian departure points for the passage to the East.

While certain German princes still worked towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, Gregory IX tried to begin crusader recruitment in Germany. He ordered Albert of Behaim to organise the preaching of the cross against Frederick II in the city and diocese of Passau in March 1240.<sup>106</sup> Albert, who had already been active at the diet of Eger in June 1239, also appeared in Landshut in the diocese of Regensburg during the second half of 1240.<sup>107</sup> However, reactions of the German clergy to his endeavours were overwhelmingly negative.<sup>108</sup> Bishop Rüdiger of Passau even slapped a member of Albert of Behaim's entourage and trampled the letter of excommunication on 5 June 1240.<sup>109</sup> However, Gregory IX died on 22 August 1241, before the efforts for a crusade could come to full fruition.

With regards to the theoretical case for the crusade, the crusade could be used to give additional legitimacy to the idea of a new king in Germany. This already happened during the process of organization and not only once the crusade was successfully completed. By becoming crusaders against the Staufer, new recruits at least nominally accepted the papal

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<sup>105</sup> Höfler, *Albert von Beham*, p. 10.

<sup>106</sup> *Regesta Imperii V*, p. 1247, no 7286 and 'Urkundenbeilage. Zur Geschichte Kaiser Friedrich II. in den Jahren 1239 bis 1241', ed. E. Winkelmann, *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte 12* (Göttingen, 1872), pp. 292-4.

<sup>107</sup> Höfler, *Albert von Beham*, pp. 5-26. See also *Das Brief- und Memorialbuch des Albert Behaim*, eds. T. Frenz and P. Herde (Munich, 2000), pp. 5/27 and *Annales Stadenses*, ed G. H. Pertz, MGH SS 16, *Annales aevi Suevici* (Hannover, 1859), p. 365.

<sup>108</sup> Schirmacher, *Albert von Possemünster*, pp. 47-55.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 55-7.

version of events. The local clergy and the mendicant orders preached sermons against the Staufer, thereby propagating the papal narrative into the local population.

After Frederick's deposition in 1245, Innocent IV was able to construct a more compelling case for a crusade. He did so by applying the concepts of 'just war' and 'just cause,' as filtered through the writings of Augustine.<sup>110</sup> The idea of the 'just cause' came from Roman law and was consequent of one party breaking an agreement (*pax*, peace, derived from Latin *pangere*, meaning to enter into a contract) or injuring the other. To this was added the Aristotelian idea of 'just war', a war conducted by the state for peace against a public enemy.<sup>111</sup> Augustine posed three criteria for a just war: Proper authority to command the war, a just cause, and the correct intention, which was charitable.<sup>112</sup> When Thomas Aquinas discussed the concept of 'holy war', he referred back to these three criteria.<sup>113</sup> Just war could therefore be waged for the recovery of rightful possessions of territory and property, the defence of the 'patrimony of Christ', or punishment, provided it was sanctioned by legitimate authority.<sup>114</sup>

However, there was contention over who was such a legitimate authority. Many canonists endowed the Church with the authority to judge matters of justice, hence the pope with the ability to declare war. From this, "it was only a small step to a justification of holy war as a defensive action against treats to the faith."<sup>115</sup> Although most canonists were more nuanced in their discussions, it could be argued that, by definition, such wars were just because they were waged on ecclesiastical authority.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> For the rediscovery of Aristotle in the twelfth century, and his influence on thirteenth century thinking after Thomas Aquinas, see G. Grebner, 'Der *Liber Introductorius* des Michael Scotus und die Aristotelesrezeption: der Hof Friedrichs II. als Drehscheibe des Kulturtransfers', in M. Fansa and K. Ermete (eds.), *Kaiser Friedrich II. (1194-1250). Welt und Kultur des Mittelmeerraums* (Mainz, 2008), pp. 250-7.

<sup>111</sup> Aristotle coined the phrase 'just war' to describe war conducted by the state for peace in the fourth century BC, see C. Tyerman, *Fighting for Christendom. Holy War and the Crusades* (Oxford, 2004), p. 101.

<sup>112</sup> R. Cox, 'The ethics of war up to Thomas Aquinas', in H. Frowe and S. Lazar (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War* (Oxford/New York, 2018), p. 8.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 16-8.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 15-6 and Tyerman, *Fighting for Christendom*, p. 101.

<sup>115</sup> Cox, 'Ethics of War', p. 15.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

In political practice, it was unclear whether what was initially the Roman state was now replaced by the general council at Lyon or only Pope Innocent IV out of his *plenitudo potestas*. Innocent IV was keen to advance his claim to absolute supremacy. He insisted that he alone deposed the emperor and that he acted only with the assent of the council.<sup>117</sup> Although the formulation explicitly counteracted the claims made by the German princes and King Louis IX of France, it showed nevertheless that Innocent IV wanted to make sure that he covered his case against all procedural challenges.<sup>118</sup>

Gregory IX had not fully developed a legal argument based on his arguments for Frederick's excommunication that justified a crusade as a 'just war' with a 'just cause'.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, Gregory IX's attempt at a crusade when Frederick was just excommunicated remained largely an ambition, while after Frederick's deposition, Innocent IV was successful in organizing a crusade in Germany. The contrast suggests that the deposition was crucial in providing legitimacy for the crusade and its goal. Therefore, the deposition and the crusade interacted in a cycle of mutually reinforcing legitimacy.

Other factors also played a role in enabling the crusade. As time passed during the conflict, the German princes could get used to the idea of Frederick's rule coming to an end. A further key aspect that prepared the ground for these choices by Popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV was a certain diversification of the targets of crusading. Crusades were used against more diverse enemies than ever before. They also took place in a wide array of geographical locations; hence crusaders became more familiar with being recruited for campaigns in Europe.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, pp. 88-95.

<sup>118</sup> J. Miethke, 'Politisches Denken und monarchische Theorie. Das Kaisertum als supranationale Institution im späten Mittelalter', in J. Ehlers (ed), *Ansätze und Diskontinuitäten Deutscher Nationsbildung im Mittelalter* (Sigmaringen, 1989), pp. 121-44.

<sup>119</sup> M. Aurell, *Des chrétiens contre les croisades (XIIe-XIII siècle)* (Paris, 2013), pp. 32-51 and M., Tamm, 'How to justify a crusade? The conquest of Livonia and new crusade rhetoric in the early thirteenth century', *Journal of medieval history* 39/4 (2013), p. 437.

<sup>120</sup> See Jaspert/Tebruck, *Kreuzzugsbewegung*, pp. 1-11.

Thus, Innocent IV constructed the crusade against the Staufer in Germany as a ‘just war’ to replace Frederick II as Holy Roman Emperor, based on the ‘just cause’ of his heresy. However, Innocent IV combined the charge of heresy for Frederick’s deposition at the Council of Lyon with the crusade only in the light of Gregory IX’s three failed attempts to instigate the princes to elect a new king. The old way of doing politics was through raw military power, the new way was to presentationally use a more legalistic approach. The crusade represented elements of both approaches; it could only begin in Germany once Frederick’s deposition had given it legal legitimacy, but it was also the old-fashioned way of creating new realities on the ground.

### **The papal state and the defence of the faith**

The papal state was central to the papacy’s ability to fulfill its spiritual office.<sup>121</sup> It protected the physical safety of the pope and the papal court. It also defended the administrative apparatus that was intrinsic to his ability to fulfill his office.<sup>122</sup> The city of Rome, where the vicar of Christ resided, had a symbolic function as the heartland of Christendom.<sup>123</sup> A political and military threat to the papal state, like that to Pope Gregory IX in 1240, had the potential to radiate throughout Christendom.<sup>124</sup> As the papal state was central to the papacy’s temporal authority, Pope Innocent IV therefore also saw it as integral to the defence of the faith.<sup>125</sup>

Successive popes argued that the Italian Crusades happened in defence of the faith.<sup>126</sup> Crucially, though, the defense of the sovereignty of the papal state and the Church of Rome were not automatically sufficiently grave reasons to declare a crusade. Contemporaries did not

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<sup>121</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, pp. 62-5.

<sup>122</sup> M. Parker, ‘Papa et pecunia: Innocent III’s combination of reform and fiscal policy to finance crusades’, *Mediterranean Historical Review* 32/1 (2017), pp. 1-23.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 40-6.

<sup>124</sup> Stürmer, *Friedrich II.*, pp. 480-8.

<sup>125</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, pp. 62-5.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

automatically see every threat to lands over which the pope possessed political and jurisdictional authority as sufficient to justify a crusade. An attack on the papal state only made a unified response mandatory if it represented an attack on the whole Church and all Christians. While the sovereignty of the papal state was key to the pope's ability to function, "the cause of the church of Rome was not automatically felt to be that of the Church as a whole. Respect for the office of the pope and full acceptance of his authority within the Church was often tempered by skepticism about the wider significance of his policies in Italy."<sup>127</sup>

In order for a crusade to be justified, the liberty of the whole Church had to be at risk. A pope was expected to proclaim a crusade in defence of the faith and all Christians. Hence there was a lot of pressure on Pope Innocent IV to put forward a case that his actions were aimed at the defence of the faith and defence of all of Christendom. The nature of the papal defence was one of the cruxes of the matter. Without the argument that he proclaimed the crusade in defense of all Christians, Innocent IV was missing a key component to legitimize the use of the ecclesiastical machinery of administration for the crusade against the Staufer. If the pope gave the impression that he fought on behalf of unworthy reasons rather than for the Christian faith, he undermined his cause and the honour of his office.<sup>128</sup>

Thus, all of Innocent IV's arguments were geared towards this goal. The arguments that Innocent IV brought forward at the Council of Lyon did not just evolve from those by his predecessor to ensure that it lay the argumentative groundwork for Frederick II's deposition, but also to ensure that they laid the groundwork for the deposition's military implementation in the form of a crusade. In every future mandate Innocent IV issued during the crusade against

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

the Staufer in Germany, he would painstakingly argue that he arranged for a new king to be raised in defence of the faith and for the liberty of the Church.<sup>129</sup>

### **Crusading priorities**

Pope Innocent IV consistently gave priority to the Italian Crusades over Louis IX's crusade to the Holy Land. No amount of problems and criticism, such as bad news of military defeats from the East or mounting pressure from the French and English crown, made a difference to Innocent IV's priorities.<sup>130</sup> As Norman Housley put it: "Rarely can any great power have adhered to a chosen policy as rigidly as the papal Curia clung to its order of priorities on the crusades."<sup>131</sup>

Innocent IV maintained that the danger the Church faced from Frederick II forced him to give priority to the protection of the papal state.<sup>132</sup> The nearest danger was most urgent, hence it should be dealt with first. Furthermore, he argued, the Italian Crusades were a necessary precursor for the crusade to the Holy Land. A stable political situation in central and southern Italy enabled safe departure for crusaders over the sea.<sup>133</sup>

There were several reasons why Innocent IV continued the policy of giving priority to the crusade against the Staufer in Italy. On the practical side, the popes genuinely believed that the Italian Crusades quickly would be successful. Their crusades in Italy were more convenient to manage than those to the Holy Land. The political objective of removing the Staufer from power could be achieved more easily than bringing the entirety of the Holy Land back under Christian control. They were less expensive, and it was easier for the papacy to remain in

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<sup>129</sup> See for example *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, Vol 2*, p. 1032, no 12187, *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, p. 433, and K. A. C., Höfler, *Kaiser Friedrich II.: Ein Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Ansichten über den Sturz der Hohenstaufen* (Munich, 1844), p. 374, no 28.

<sup>130</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, pp. 76-7.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.

control. Importantly, on the policy side, the Italian Crusades also contributed directly to papal power and authority, as the triumph would restore the papal see's prestige.<sup>134</sup>

Once successfully concluded, the Italian Crusades would increase the papacy's revenue, decrease its commitments, and free up again crucial resources in money and men for the Holy Land. However, the plan for the Italian Crusades did not quite work out as Innocent IV and his successors hoped. They were to experience similar problems as they had with the Stauffer when Charles of Anjou became ruler of Sicily and Naples.<sup>135</sup>

In contrast, Innocent IV's policy of prioritizing the crusade against the Stauffer in Germany was slightly different. With regards to recruitment, Innocent IV avoided a repeat of his predecessor Pope Gregory IX's policy, who had redirected crusaders from Prussia and the Holy Land to the crusade against the Stauffer in Germany in 1240.<sup>136</sup> From 1246 onwards, Innocent IV tried not to give priority to recruitment for the crusade against the Stauffer in Germany over recruitment for the crusade to the Holy Land. As will be seen in the following chapters, Innocent IV allowed recruits destined to the Holy Land to be redirected to Germany only on two occasions during Henry Raspe's military campaign. Under William of Holland, a more permanent shift in papal policy took place from October to November 1247 onwards.

In a letter to Cardinal Gregory Montelengo from November 1247, Innocent IV explicitly stated that it was more acceptable to God and Jesus Christ at the moment that they gave support to William of Holland than that they prioritized support for the Holy Land, because Frederick II wanted to annihilate the Church and all its supporters.<sup>137</sup> The aid they could have provided at this moment in November 1247, Innocent IV reasoned, would not be useful for those who fought for the kingdom of Jerusalem in any case because of the military

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<sup>134</sup> Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>135</sup> Tyerman, *Fighting for Christendom*, p. 69 and P. B. Baldwin, *Pope Gregory X and the Crusades* (Woodbridge, 2014), pp. 104-36.

<sup>136</sup> Höfler, *Albert von Beham*, p. 10.

<sup>137</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 328, no. 456.

and political situation in the Holy Land. Moreover, the Holy Land could still be supported against the Saracens in the future.<sup>138</sup>

### **Germany – how essential a preliminary for the crusade to the Holy Land?**

There were several reasons why the papal rationale for the crusade against the Staufer started to show cracks when it was applied to Germany. All were connected to a wide-spread perception in the chronicles and annals that the political goal of the crusade was several steps removed from Innocent IV's reasoning for the Italian Crusades.

Geographically, it was more challenging to argue that the crusade against the Staufer in Germany was an equally essential preliminary to the crusade to the Latin East. Germany could not be linked to Louis IX's forthcoming general passage, because it was not as essential as a place of departure. Its harbors were not as strategically relevant to sail to the Holy Land, and unlike Italy, Germany was not routinely used as a forum for recruits to assemble before their departure. As it was more difficult to present the crusade against the Staufer in Germany as a means to help the Eastern Christian kingdoms, the two were never locked together in papal policy as the Italian Crusades were with the Latin East.<sup>139</sup>

The *negotium fidei* and the crusade against the Staufer remained distinct in Germany, unlike in Italy, where they were indistinguishable. In Germany, the royal candidates did not fight on behalf of an "identifiable Guelf cause."<sup>140</sup> The term 'Guelf' combined a multitude of political and religious convictions into one identity – nothing similar was available in Germany. Instead in Germany, there were princes and their families who had historically been in close proximity to the ruler and his court, as well as regions that were traditionally closer or further removed to royal power (*königsnah* or *königsfern*).

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<sup>138</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, p. 106.

<sup>139</sup> Baldwin, *Pope Gregory X*, pp. 40-74.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 131/142.

The lack of connection between the crusade to the Holy Land and the crusade against the Staufer threw into sharp relief Innocent IV's other argument, the defense of the papal state. Regardless of how accepted the integrity of the papal state may have been as a reason for the Italian Crusades, it was still difficult to apply to Germany. Although both Germany and Italy were part of the Holy Roman Empire, the military and political situation on either side of the Alps differed greatly. The direct military threat by Frederick II was greatest in Italy, where he was present in person, not in Germany. Germany was ruled by Conrad IV, Frederick II's son, and imperial power was weak even without any intervention by Pope Innocent IV.

If Innocent IV could not openly argue with the defence of papal state, then surely it was even more uncomfortable to publicly argue for a crusade in Germany to replace the Staufer dynasty – especially when it was at the cost to the Holy Land. It may also have led to uncomfortable connections between the use of the crusade and the need to strip Frederick II of his imperial title in the context of the conflict between the two powers. So Innocent IV had to rely heavily on the charges of heresy, facing the risk that they were constructed as overtly political. However, as has been seen before, the papacy lost the narrative of Frederick II's heresy in Germany. Thus, Pope Innocent IV failed to connect the political opposition to the Church with heresy, and he was unable to associate the significance of the crusade against the Staufer in Germany with the passage to the Latin East, or even just the defense of the papal state, in the same way as he did in Italy.

Norman Housley emphasized how conservative the papal justification of the Italian Crusades was, “which was dictated by the conservatism of public opinion.”<sup>141</sup> The evidence of the chronicles and annals suggests that ‘conservative public opinion’ could not be won over in a comprehensive manner. If “the popes looked at the wider significance of the Italian wars as

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<sup>141</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, p. 69.

something to be proved, not assumed,” then the success of their mission in Germany was at best patchy.<sup>142</sup>

### **Criticism of crusading**

Contemporary criticism seems to have fallen into three categories. First, criticism that redirecting crusaders and resources against the Staufer harmed the crusade to the Holy Land.<sup>143</sup> Second, criticism based on unwillingness to pay for the crusade against the Staufer. Third, criticism in principle, whether it was scruples over shedding Christian blood or contention whether the danger from schismatics at home was greater than that from Saracens across the sea. However, different types of criticisms cannot easily be separated neatly; most often they were expressed as a mixture of concerns.

The first type of criticism surrounding anxiety about the success of the crusade to the Holy Land was expressed by Count Theobald IV of Champagne. He was a crusader planning to travel East when Frederick II was excommunicated. In a poem composed shortly before his departure from Lyon, he urged men to hasten to the aid in Syria, but he also lamented that he saw “excommunicated those who have most right on their side.”<sup>144</sup> Although Count Theobald seems to have mainly been concerned with the success of the crusade to the Holy Land, this also indicates that he disapproved of the political consequences of Frederick’s excommunication for the Staufer.

When Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz was still loyal to the Staufer, he explicitly argued with the success of the crusade to the Holy Land. On 20 April 1241, Archbishop Siegfried wrote to Pope Gregory IX and asserted that the crusade to the Holy Land was suffering because

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<sup>142</sup> Ibid., p. 70

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>144</sup> ‘An tans plein de felonie’, *Chansons de croisade*, pp. 181-2.

of the pope's war with Frederick II, hence he beseeched the pope to work strenuously towards peace with the emperor.<sup>145</sup>

The second type of criticism surrounded financial concerns. Matthew Paris, Roger of Wendover, the rectors of Berkshire, and the counsellors of Henry III were all united in their concerns for their own purses or those of their master. Famously reported by Matthew Paris, there was bitter resistance among the English clergy against the subsidy they were to pay in combination with a fifth of revenues of foreigners beneficed in England.<sup>146</sup> Matthew Paris, like Roger of Wendover before him, regarded Frederick as a fellow victim of papal avarice.<sup>147</sup> The tax-paying clergy also strongly objected to the duplicity practised by the Curia in diverting crusade tenths and subsidies. Henry III's counsellors begged him to reject the papal demand.<sup>148</sup>

Interestingly, extant examples of unwillingness to pay taxes often combined monetary objections with more principle-based criticism to the crusade against the Staufer. According to Matthew Paris, people in England were confused by the ferocity of the papal attack on Frederick II, while at the council of London, the assembled clergy denounced the proposed expedition on the grounds that it would result in the spilling of Christian blood.<sup>149</sup> The rectors of Berkshire also pointed out that the Church's wealth was intended for charitable purposes, not to finance wars, particularly if they were directed against fellow Christians. Furthermore, Matthew Paris and Roger of Wendover stressed the harm wrought by papal interference, which ended up supporting Frederick II's Saracen enemies.<sup>150</sup> However, it is difficult to establish whether scruples to attack Frederick II as a fellow Christian were mainly harnessed to mask financial self-interest or whether these scruples already existed and were only transmitted in writing in the context of financial concerns.

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<sup>145</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 259, no 358.

<sup>146</sup> Matthew Paris, *Chronica Maiora*, iv, pp. 9-11.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, iii, pp. 173-6.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, iv, pp. 35-8.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, iii, p. 609 and iv, pp. 37/40.

<sup>150</sup> Sibbery, *Criticism of Crusading*, pp. 177-8

The third type of criticism of the crusade against the Staufer took various expressions, but they often centred around the worry of attacking a fellow Christian. According to the *Summa Aurea*, when Hostiensis accompanied the papal legate to Germany in 1251, he encountered critics of the crusade against the Staufer who considered it wrong to preach the cross against the Staufer.<sup>151</sup> While they considered the crusades against infidels and heretics to be both justified and just, they doubted that a crusade against Christians could be the same. In addition, Hostiensis considered them “simpletons,” because they perceived a crucial difference between the crusades into the Holy Land (*crux transmarina*) and the crusade against the Staufer (*crux cismarina*).<sup>152</sup> Hostiensis interpreted both the criticism of a crusade against Christians as well as the differentiation between the *crux transmarina* and the *crux cismarina* as a rejection of the all-encompassing authority of the pope as the Vicar of Christ.

According to Hostiensis, more vigour should be used in preaching the crusade against the Staufer in Germany.<sup>153</sup> The Staufer and their supporters were schismatics closer to home, hence the crusade against them was aimed at the preservation of ecclesiastical unity. In his opinion, attacks on the unity of the church were far more dangerous than loss of land, however holy, overseas. In an interesting addendum, he juxtaposed land acquisition with the repentance of sin: Jesus, the son of God, did not come into the world or suffer the cross “to acquire land” but “to redeem the captive and to recall sinners to repentance.”<sup>154</sup> Thus, Hostiensis painted the crusade to the Holy Land as an endeavour to gain land, whereas the *crux cismarina* served the more noble purpose of preserving ecclesiastical unity and to recall sinners to repentance. It should be kept in mind though that Hostiensis’ position represented the more extreme end of the spectrum of opinion on papal supremacy. The silence in the chronicles and annals seems to

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<sup>151</sup> Hostiensis, *Summa Aurea*, III, *De Voto*, pp. 1141-2.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1141.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.* p. 1142.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

suggest that the nuance of this argument did not filter through the whole ecclesiastical sphere, let alone beyond.

Notable criticism of papal policy came from Brother Elias, Minister-General of the Franciscan Order from 1232 until 1239. In addition, he accused Pope Gregory IX of wrathfully attacking the rights of the empire and asserted that he had ‘employed fraudulently the money collected for the Holy Land.’<sup>155</sup> He even went as far as to promote an abortive plot to hand over Assisi to the Ghibellines.<sup>156</sup> It is noteworthy though that Brother Elias’ idea of a political attack on ‘the rights of the empire’ was independent from the notion that all crusades against Christians were a perversion of the crusading ideal.

Further criticism came from several Provençal troubadours. Peire Cardenal and Guilhem Figueira appealed to the pope to make peace with the emperor and to send aid to the Holy Land.<sup>157</sup> Austorc d’Aurillac blamed the failure of Louis’ IX army on the “false clergy” and, strikingly, asked for a counter-crusade to be launched against Rome.<sup>158</sup> Boniface de Castellane asserted that the “false clergy” also sought “to disinherit Conrad [IV] in order to make gifts to their illegitimate children.”<sup>159</sup> Under the recent impression of the Albigensian crusade, Provençal troubadours were particularly receptive and weary of papal abuses of power.<sup>160</sup> However, they had no personal vested interest in the launch of any crusade, whether to the East or in the Holy Roman Empire, apart from a general set of values what constituted right and wrong.

Finally, Frederick II criticised the crusade against himself by expressing fears that it damaged to the crusade to the Holy Land. During Louis IX’s campaign, he asserted in several

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<sup>155</sup> Brooke, R. B., *Early Franciscan Government* (Cambridge 1959), pp. 174-5, in Sibbery, *Criticism of Crusading*, pp. 178-9.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> Sibbery, *Criticism of Crusades*, p. 180, fn 126.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., p. 180, fn 127.

<sup>159</sup> Boniface de Castellane, *Era pueis yverns es el fil*, ed. A. Parducci, A., ‘Bonifazio di Castellane’, Romania 46 (1920), p. 496.

<sup>160</sup> Sibbery, *Criticism of Crusading*, p. 176.

of his circular letters that he was eager to lead or join a crusade to the East, if he was given reasonable peace terms by Pope Innocent IV.<sup>161</sup> After Louis IX defeat at Mansurah in February 1250, Frederick blamed the crusade's failure on Innocent IV, who prevented his support for Louis' expedition. As Housley put it, Frederick found "in the Curia's own policy a stick with which to beat it."<sup>162</sup> While Frederick II did indeed use Louis IX's military defeats in the East to put pressure on Pope Innocent IV, and regardless of how convenient peace with Innocent IV would have been for him, his desire to contribute to a Christian victory in the Holy Land was certainly genuine. Frederick II's criticism that the redirection of crusaders against him did not help Louis IX's campaign is convincing, even though it is difficult to establish whether the emperor's contribution would have made a decisive difference.

### **Countermeasures and resistance to the crusade against the Staufer in Germany**

Between 1239 and 1241, the main opposition to anti-Staufer measures in Germany was organized by ecclesiastics. Some of the most striking opposition was directed against the preacher and papal envoy Albert of Behaim, who was sent to Germany by Pope Gregory IX.<sup>163</sup> Albert of Behaim recorded on 3 August 1240 that the dean of Passau 'publicly preached the Cross against me and gave many people the Cross for their salvation'.<sup>164</sup> By preaching the cross against a representative of the papacy, the dean of Passau and the members of the pro-Staufer party inverted the very weapon of holy war against Pope Gregory IX. They turned the counter-crusade into a public statement about corrupted justice of the papacy and put into practice what the Provençal troubadour Aystorc d'Aurillac only demanded in theory.<sup>165</sup> Even if the gesture was symbolic, the proclamation of such a crusade suggests "that at least the trappings of

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<sup>161</sup> *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, iii 72, v 296, vi 257, vi 351, vi 774.

<sup>162</sup> Housley, *The Later Crusades, 1274-1580*, p. 263.

<sup>163</sup> Höfler, *Albert von Beham*, pp. 3-31.

<sup>164</sup> *Aventinische Exzerpte des Albert von Beham*, pp. 16-7.

<sup>165</sup> Sibbery, *Criticism of Crusading*, p. 180, fn 127.

distinctive language and ceremonial had penetrated contemporary mentalities. The Passau anti-crusade was a back-handed compliment to the effectiveness of promoting the crusade as a panacea for the ills of the established Roman Church.”<sup>166</sup> After the Council of Lyon in 1245, there is no more evidence of organized opposition by ecclesiastics or even a counter-crusade being preached. This suggests that Staufer-friendly ecclesiastics in Germany saw Frederick II’s deposition as a legal event that meant that they could no longer legitimately employ ecclesiastical measures in their opposition.

After Frederick II’s deposition, all evidence for resistance to the crusade against the Staufer in Germany concerns lay people. In the town of Regensburg, resentment against the crusade was so profound that anyone found wearing the cross against the Staufer was condemned to death.<sup>167</sup> The extreme measure of the death penalty, forgoing milder sanctions such as banishment or imprisonment, was a symptom of the escalating split between the pro-Staufer council of citizens and the pro-papal bishop Albert of Regensburg.

In Cologne, there was strong resistance in 1246, when the elite of Cologne (*maiores*) forced a citizen who was closely connected to Archbishop Conrad and took the cross against Frederick II to leave the city.<sup>168</sup> In Colmar, preaching and recruitment activities by Dominican friars aroused considerable resistance in 1247, when the city expelled all Dominican friars from the lands of Thuringia for three years.<sup>169</sup> Such expulsions may have threatened to slow down crusader recruitment by the Franciscans and Dominicans orders, or they may have occurred in the context of already accelerating preaching activity. This may explain why legate Peter

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<sup>166</sup> C. Tyerman, *The Invention of the Crusades* (Basingstoke, 1998), p. 32.

<sup>167</sup> *Annales ecclesiastici*. ed. Raynaldus (37 vols, Lucca, 1747), vol 21, p. 398.

<sup>168</sup> W. Janssen, ‘Niederrhein und Reich am Ausgang der Stauferzeit’, in M. Werner (ed.), *Heinrich Raspe - Landgraf von Thüringen und römischer König (1227-1247)* (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), p. 57 and M. Groten, *Köln im 13. Jahrhundert. Gesellschaftlicher Wandel und Verfassungsentwicklung* (Cologne, 1995), p. 117.

<sup>169</sup> *Annales Colmariensis minores*, p. 190.

Capocci commanded the orders to assist him in crusader recruitment in Germany in December 1247, so that it may progress more swiftly.<sup>170</sup>

As mentioned before, in 1248, pro-Staufer clergy read mass and distributed the sacraments in Schwäbisch Hall, even though the city had been put under the interdict.<sup>171</sup> Pro-Staufer clerics also publicly preached that Conrad IV and Frederick II were “faultless and just” (*perfecti et iusti*) and encouraged citizens to pray for them.<sup>172</sup> Finally, the critics that Hostiensis encountered in Germany in 1251, who voiced their opinion that it was wrong to preach the cross against Christians, may have been part of wider activities for Hostiensis to notice them.<sup>173</sup>

### **Conrad IV**

Frederick II was deposed as emperor, but his son Conrad IV was king in Germany; hence the question arose what the father’s deposition meant for the son. Innocent IV addressed the consequences of Frederick II’s deposition for Conrad IV in an encyclical from spring 1246.<sup>174</sup> The second part of the letter comprises a justification of the legal proceedings before and during the Council of Lyon. To demonstrate Frederick’s general untrustworthiness, Innocent IV stressed the scandalous capture of cardinals, bishops and other delegates on their way to the council in Rome in 1241 as well as the ten-year peace treaty with sultan al-Kamil of Egypt from 1229.<sup>175</sup> Innocent IV argued that the same untrustworthiness must be suspected from Frederick’s offspring, hence he extended the sentence to Conrad IV on 16 April 1248 and other members of the family in 1250.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, pp. 69-70. This was just after Innocent IV gave lasting priority to recruitment for the crusade against the Staufer over the crusade to the Holy Land, see this thesis, ‘Chapter 3: William of Holland’s Crusade, 1247-51’, p. 161.

<sup>171</sup> *Annales Stadenses*, pp. 371-2.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 372.

<sup>173</sup> Hostiensis, *Summa Aurea, III, De voto*, pp. 1141-2.

<sup>174</sup> *Regesta Imperii V*, 7584 and *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, VI*, pp. 391/396. See *Appendix*, ‘2.) Timeline Letters and Propaganda, 1239-1250’, pp. 212-4.

<sup>175</sup> See Abulafia, *Frederick II*, pp. 346-8.

<sup>176</sup> *Regesta Imperii V*, no 7990 and *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, VI*, p. 618.

Conrad IV became the main target of the crusade against the Staufer in Germany. It has commonly been assumed that the cross was only preached against Conrad IV after his father's death in 1250; however, preaching the cross against Conrad IV already started in 1248. Innocent IV's first charters that reference preaching the cross against Conrad date from 5 May 1248,<sup>177</sup> 27 May 1248,<sup>178</sup> and 19 September 1248.<sup>179</sup> The timing followed Innocent IV's renewed excommunication of Frederick on 16 April 1248 and happened in preparation of the siege of Aachen between April and October 1248.<sup>180</sup> Henry Raspe's and William of Holland's military campaigns from 1246 to 1248 were in effect already directed against Conrad IV. One of Henry Raspe's first actions as elected king was to try to depose Conrad IV as duke of Swabia in a manner that echoed Frederick II's deposition, as will be seen in the following chapter.

During the entirety of the conflict, Conrad IV defended Staufer power in his father's absence in Germany. However, he was in a position of weakness and ill equipped to be an effective king at the start of the conflict. The deposition of King Henry (VII) at the hands of their father in 1235 damaged the institution of kingship.<sup>181</sup> In the wake of the disaster with Henry (VII), Frederick pooled all his power within himself. This would come to be a great disadvantage when his son needed to defend Staufer rule in Germany by winning the support of the German princes.

When Frederick was excommunicated four years later after deposing Henry (VII), Conrad IV was still only a child of eleven years. He was too young to rule independently, so guardians ruled in his stead. They were Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz and later landgrave

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<sup>177</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe und des Domkapitels von Salzburg 1247-1343*, ed. F. Martin (Salzburg, 1926), p. 6, no 45.

<sup>178</sup> Christian Kuchimaister, *Niwe Casus Monasterii sancti Galli*, ed. G. Meyer von Knonau (St Gallen, 1881), pp. 44-5/373.

<sup>179</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p.10, no 4166.

<sup>180</sup> Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 25. See this thesis, Chapter 3: William of Holland's Crusade, 1247-51, pp. 173-8.

<sup>181</sup> See R. Gramsch, 'Autorität im Netzwerk der Fürsten. Friedrich II. und Heinrich (VII.) im Anerkennungswettstreit (1231-1235)', in H. Seibert et al (eds) *Autorität und Akzeptanz. Das Reich im Europa des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Ostfildern, 2013), pp. 43-64.

Henry Raspe of Thuringia, who both successively abandoned him to become the leaders of the papal party in Germany.

When Conrad IV grew up during the conflict, the full extent of his power as king and the relationship between emperor and son and was not clearly defined, thereby further decreasing his political clout. Conrad IV had been elected king by the German princes, but he was uncrowned and never achieved his coronation during the crusade. By 1246, Conrad IV was eighteen years old and had been the designated successor of his father for nine years. Nevertheless, he had not been able to build up a sufficient power base to resist his challengers.

Conrad IV took the cross against the Tatars in May or June 1241, incidentally together with Archbishops Siegfried of Mainz and Conrad of Cologne.<sup>182</sup> Some criticism is extant of Conrad IV as the target of the crusade against the Staufer in Germany, though it is sparse. Matthew Paris expressed admiration for Conrad IV and considered Innocent IV responsible for his early death.<sup>183</sup> As mentioned before, Provençal troubadour Boniface de Castellane expressed awareness of the implications the conflict had for Conrad IV's future.<sup>184</sup>

While the imperial chancery of Frederick II regularly sent out circular letters in the propaganda war with the papacy, Conrad IV's chancery remained completely silent.<sup>185</sup> Frederick II's chancellor Petrus de Vineia was head of the Staufer's ideological defence, while Conrad IV's chancery did not seem to have a comparable figure. This could make Conrad IV look like a simple recipient of his father's orders, who was unable to add his own voice. A more positive interpretation could be that the Staufer possessed a streamlined line of communication that was centralized in Frederick II's chancery. It certainly reflected the highly

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<sup>182</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 281.

<sup>183</sup> *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, pp. 459-60.

<sup>184</sup> Boniface de Castellane, *Era pueis yverns es el fil*, ed. A. Parducci, A., 'Bonifazio di Castellane', Romania 46 (1920), p. 496.

<sup>185</sup> See *Appendix*, '2.) Timeline Letters and Propaganda, 1239-1250', pp. XX.

skewed power balance between Frederick II and Conrad IV even with regards to communication of their political programme.

### **Tipping scales**

In the case of the crusade against the Staufer in Germany, the scales of religion and politics tipped in favour of political considerations so often that it can be considered a 'political crusade.' The spiritual nature of the crusade as a holy war was undermined by several features. One of the most important factors that defined the crusade against the Staufer in Germany as 'political' was that the papal narrative that Pope Innocent IV deposed Frederick II because he was a heretic, and hence the war against him was waged mainly for spiritual reasons, did not come to dominate contemporary chronicles and annals. Instead, the crusade that emerged from the pages of the chronicles and annals at points more resembled secular military campaigns of previous pretenders to the German throne than it did to previous crusades.

The evidence from the chronicles suggests that the pope failed to establish the connection between heresy and the goal to replace Frederick II as Holy Roman Emperor in Germany. The charge of heresy connected Frederick II's deposition to the crusade; by legitimising the first, it justified the latter. During the years that preceded the crusade, the way Innocent IV took advantage of the charge of heresy against the Staufer set a precedent of political considerations driving the religious line of argument. Every crusade was political, but this one was a bit more political than others.

Innocent IV tried to achieve his goal of changing power in Germany by secular measures first, before proclaiming a crusade against the Staufer. This likely undermined the notion that the spiritual dimension was integral to the conflict for contemporaries. The need to defend the papal state alone did not automatically equate the defence of the faith. Even the threat to the papal state lost its acuity when applied to the situation in Germany. In addition, it

was too far-fetched to argue that a stable political environment was directly necessary for crusaders to depart safely to the East. The goal of replacing Conrad IV with a new King of Romans in Germany was several steps removed from the argument that all Christians had a duty to defend the faith.

Furthermore, there is evidence that some contemporaries did not consider Frederick II's deposition or the crusade against the Staufer as rightful and just. Even in the limited evidence extant, reasons varied why contemporaries may have held this opinion. Objections to the deposition centred around notions that Frederick II did not deserve to be deposed and that the pope did not have the authority to depose the Holy Roman Emperor. After Innocent IV deposed Frederick II, countermeasures and resistance to the crusade against the Staufer in Germany continued, which indicates that the deposition did not provide sufficient legitimacy to alleviate all doubts and concerns about the justification of the crusade.

Objections to the crusade, for one thing, concerned worries about Innocent IV's policy to give priority to the crusade against the Staufer over Louis IX's passage to the East. For the Italian Crusades, he did so from Frederick II's deposition onwards; in Germany, he switched his approach progressively. Other objections to the crusade centred around reluctance to pay for the military campaign against the Staufer, as well as scruples around the shedding of Christian blood. This led to certain amounts of criticism by contemporaries, though its scale remained small.

The crusade against the Staufer was a particular reiteration of the much older struggle between *imperium* and *sacerdotium*. It encapsulated some of the most intellectually relevant topics of the day. The application of recently developed ideas, such as the use of a crusade in Europe or the charge of heresy, was newly made possible because of developments in the ideological landscape of the Curia in the early thirteenth century. Inner-European crusades became more common in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century. In addition, new

legislation against heresy, which laid the necessary legal foundation for Frederick II's deposition, was also a prominent feature of contemporary thinking. Pope Innocent IV used these particular ideas as tools for his purposes because they were current at the time. Like a chameleon that adjusted its colours to fit its environment, so this reiteration of the protracted conflict between *imperium* and *sacerdotium* reflected some of the intellectual debates of its time.

As a consequence of the papal narrative failing to fully take hold in Germany, papal sources should not remain the exclusive point of reference to understand the crusade against the Stauffer, especially as many papal bulls and letters were of a legal nature and had a prescriptive relationship with reality. Instead, more prominence should be given to how the crusade in Germany unfolded in practice. A closer analysis of the years 1246 to 1251 in the following chapters will show that political necessities overshadowed religious ideology on several occasions during the crusade.

## **Chapter 2: Henry Raspe's Crusade, 1246-7**

The examination of Henry Raspe's (1204-47) military campaign in combination with the recruitment of crusaders will demonstrate that the crusade was directed by a cohesive strategy. The objective of the crusade was to install Henry Raspe as the new *Rex Romanorum*, who could supersede Conrad IV as King of the Romans and eventually replace Frederick II as Holy Roman Emperor.

### **The 'papal party' and the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier**

A recognizable 'papal party' amalgamated in bouts before the crusade, the first between 1239 and 1242. By the time the crusade began in Germany in 1246, the same protagonists had been embroiled in the conflict for seven years. The term 'papal party' has its foundation in contemporary descriptions for supporters of Innocent IV in Germany, such as Matthew Paris' term "papales," but apart from his chronicle, there does not seem to be much evidence of its use.<sup>1</sup> The term is to a certain degree misleading. The archbishops' and royal candidates' attitudes towards the religious and constitutional aspects of the conflict are unknown.

A teleological perspective would obscure the coincidental route its members took to reach the crusade, but the motivations and goals of several members of the papal party changed over the course of the conflict. The term also implies that the archbishops, royal candidates, papal legates, mendicant orders, and others exclusively represented Innocent IV's interests in Germany, which was not the case. Nevertheless, the reference to the pope was nevertheless an indispensable fountain of legitimacy for their actions.

The three archbishops on the Rhine, the archbishop of Cologne (Conrad of Hochstaden, 1238-61), Mainz (Siegfried III of Eppstein, 1230-49), and Trier (Arnold of Isenburg, 1242-59) played a crucial role in the military and political organisation of the crusade against the Staufer.

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<sup>1</sup> *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, p. 284.

Cologne, Mainz, and Trier all lie in the West of Germany, with Cologne and Mainz on the river Rhine and Trier a bit more to the West. They were among the most powerful ecclesiastical princes in the German part of the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>2</sup> This was in part based on their role as ecclesiastical prince electors of the King of the Romans.<sup>3</sup> As such they were among a small body of princes who elected the King of the Romans (*Kurfürsten*, middle high German *kur* or *kure* for election), which found its definite form of seven members in the middle of the thirteenth century. Both the number of electors and who exactly elected the king was still in flux during the crusade, but the three ecclesiastical princes of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier were always among them. The three archbishops were not, however, equally powerful. In the early thirteenth century, the archbishops of Cologne became more powerful than the archbishops of Mainz, whose office had traditionally been the most prestigious in Germany.

Archbishops Conrad of Cologne and Siegfried of Mainz were the two dominating figures, while Archbishop Arnold of Trier was the third of the three electors. Archbishop Conrad was the first archbishop to join the papal camp and became the most constant and formidable enemy to the Staufer in Germany. Cologne was the biggest and most wealthy German city of the thirteenth century. Emperor Frederick II initially hoped to find an ally in such a key office, when he conferred the *regalia* to the newly elected archbishop of Cologne shortly before he was excommunicated in 1239. Archbishop Conrad was relatively young, and known as hotblooded and bellicose (“*vir furiosus et bellicosus*”).<sup>4</sup> He advanced his career by means of force and violence, and in 1237 usurped the office of dean.<sup>5</sup> He also desecrated the church by beating the dean’s representative in the choir and dragging him from the pew by his

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<sup>2</sup> J. Peltzer, *Der Rang der Pfalzgrafen bei Rhein. Die Gestaltung der politisch-sozialen Ordnung des Reichs im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Ostfildern, 2013), pp. 78-103.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 104-17.

<sup>4</sup> *Catalogi archiepiscoporum Coloniensium ed. H. Cardauns. Continuationes at auctaria*, ed. Societas Aperiendis Fontibus Rerum Germanicarum Medii Aevi, MGH SS 24, *Annales aevi Suevici* (Supplementa tomorum XVI et XVII). *Gesta saec. XII. XIII.* (Supplementa tomorum XX–XXIII), (Hannover, 1879), p. 353.

<sup>5</sup> Cardauns, *Konrad von Hochstaden*, pp. 6-8.

hair. As punishment, Pope Gregory IX banned him, “who trusted more in armour than in justice,” from the sacraments.<sup>6</sup>

In contrast, Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz was a senior and well-established figure, who by 1239 had already been in office for eighteen years. The archbishop of Mainz held the most senior office in Germany; he acted as archchancellor and imperial *gubernator*. Thus, he administered the German lands of the Holy Roman Empire in the emperor’s absence and acted as guardian to Frederick II’s sons while they were in their minority.<sup>7</sup> He probably held greater powers than previous governors, because Frederick II reformed the royal rights and prerogatives (*regalia*) when Conrad IV was elected king.

Archbishop Siegfried initially was on the side of the Staufer, and like other German princes, he entreated Pope Gregory IX to make peace with the emperor.<sup>8</sup> He was even excommunicated by the papal representative Albert of Behaim on 26 April 1240, because he refused to abandon his loyalty to Frederick II and to disseminate the news of his excommunication.<sup>9</sup> Conrad IV’s former guardian probably made the pivotal decision to ally himself to Archbishop Conrad of Cologne because of the common political, territorial, and dynastic interests they had; though his unsympathetic successor Archbishop Christian of Mainz claimed he wanted to obtain “papal favour.”<sup>10</sup>

Archbishop Arnold of Trier was only elected in 1242, when Frederick II had already been excommunicated for three years. Archbishops Siegfried and Conrad helped to ensure that the dome chapter elected a candidate who was ideologically loyal to the papacy. He was a cousin of Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz, both descended on the maternal side from the Counts of Wied; more distantly, he was also related to Archbishop Conrad of Cologne. Archbishop

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<sup>6</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, nos 9800 and 10439.

<sup>7</sup> The title was specifically used by Frederick II during the time of Henry (VII) and Conrad IV, Peltzer, *Rang der Pfalzgrafen*, pp. 207-29.

<sup>8</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 259, no 358.

<sup>9</sup> *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, p. 269.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

Arnold's stout loyalty to the papal cause led to opposition by Conrad IV, who supported a rival candidate.<sup>11</sup> He was only consecrated as archbishop of Trier by Archbishops Conrad and Siegfried as well as the bishop of Toul in June 1245, probably in preparation for more active phase of the conflict that was about to come.<sup>12</sup> The royal candidates only joined the archbishops from 1246 onwards.

The archbishop's military and non-military crusader activities were inextricably linked. Their ecclesiastical office amplified the help that they were able to provide to the royal candidates. Not only did the archbishops' office allow them to preach the word of the cross and make use of ecclesiastical structures to raise taxes, but it also increased their leverage in temporal politics, for example when they forged alliances. They went to war both in their capacities as representatives of papal policy and as imperial princes. They accompanied the royal candidates on their military campaigns, which may confirm the contemporary stereotype of German bishops as especially warlike. The German archbishops and bishops had a long tradition of being militarily active, usually by accompanying the Holy Roman Emperor on his Italian expeditions.<sup>13</sup>

In their double capacity as bishops and princes, they 'held both the temporal and spiritual swords.'<sup>14</sup> While Caesarius of Heisterbach (1180-1240) made the argument that German bishops were doomed because they held both the material and spiritual sword, several Church thinkers of the next generation such as Hostiensis (1200-71), Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), and Humbert of Romans (1190s-1277) put forward that the use of ecclesiastical violence could be licit under specific but numerous circumstances, the nuances of which had to be

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<sup>11</sup> *Gesta Treverorum*, p. 59.

<sup>12</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 174, no 1196.

<sup>13</sup> B. Arnold, *Princes and Territories in Medieval Germany* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 53 and idem, *Count and Bishop in Medieval Germany. A Study in Regional Power, 1100-1350* (Philadelphia, 1991).

<sup>14</sup> H-W., 'Goetz, Zwei-Schwerter-Lehre', *Lexikon des Mittelalters* 9 (Munich, 1976), col. 725-6.

carefully distinguished.<sup>15</sup> This new strand in the Church which argued that it was all right, indeed necessary, for clerics to shed blood in protection of the Church gave new legitimacy to an already existing class of warrior bishops north of the Alps.

Yet contemporary chroniclers in Germany do not seem to have minded that their bishops not only levied armies but were actually in the field in person to wound and be wounded. Certain cardinals in Italy fought against pro-Staufer armies, clearly with the knowledge of the pope.<sup>16</sup> There is no evidence in German chronicles, or beyond, that writers were worried about the implications the personal fighting activity had on the body and soul of fighting archbishops. These bishops had been fighting for their individual advancement since the tenth or eleventh century, and at least since Frederick Barbarossa they supported the emperor, who ideally functioned as a protector of the Church. By adding to the glory and power of emperor and empire, the bishops could indirectly also support the Church.

### **Independent military action, 1239-41**

Archbishop Conrad of Cologne became the founding member of the papal party in Germany. His circumstances exemplified that an individual who initially was caught up in the conflict could become a third party who profited at the expense of both powers. Pope Gregory IX tied his confirmation as archbishop of Cologne to the conflict between the Staufer and the papacy. When Pope Gregory IX excommunicated Frederick II in 1239, Conrad had been elected as archbishop of Cologne for almost a year.<sup>17</sup> A recent vacancy in the bishopric of Liège had also

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<sup>15</sup> Cox, 'Ethics of War', pp. 113-7. See also G. Beestermöller, *Thomas von Aquin und der gerechte Krieg. Friedensethik im theologischen Kontext der Summa Theologiae* (Cologne, 1990), and K. Michel, *Das Opus tripartitum des Humbertus de Romanis, O.P.; ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Kreuzzugs-idee und der kirchlichen Unionsbewegungen* (Graz, 1926).

<sup>16</sup> L. G. Duggan, *Armsbearing and the Clergy in the History and Canon Law of Western Christianity* (Woodbridge, 2013), pp. 102-45, and D. S. Chambers, *Popes, Cardinals and War, The Military Church in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe* (London, 2006), pp. 15-20.

<sup>17</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 138, no 920.

been filled, but two candidates were elected, one supported by Pope Gregory IX and one by Emperor Frederick II.

Archbishop Conrad travelled to Rome to meet Pope Gregory IX, as he expected to be confirmed as archbishop, but the timing and the secrecy of the journey suggest that Archbishop Conrad expected Gregory IX to link his confirmation to the conflict. Gregory IX would only confirm Conrad as archbishop of Cologne if he supported his candidate for the bishopric of Liège, to which he agreed.<sup>18</sup> An important corroborating factor for Archbishop Conrad's decision was the heavy debt in which he found his archdiocese. Over the following years, Innocent IV bound the archbishops more tightly to his will by granting them more and more rights to raise church taxes.

Archbishop Conrad's decision to take party for the pope was not without consequences. Sometime between May and the end of 1239, Frederick II found out that he supported the papal candidate for the bishopric of Liège, so two of Frederick's vassals, the duke of Brabant and the count of Jülich, attacked lands belonging to the archbishopric of Cologne.<sup>19</sup> The war between Archbishop Conrad and the two imperial supporters continued on and off over the next two years, but in summer 1240, Archbishop Conrad was forced to make peace with them when he lost the support of his home city of Cologne. Cologne was a crucial base for Archbishop Conrad and when, due to internal politics concerning the city's elite, the city began to support the emperor, the archbishop could not afford to be at war with his own city and the Staufer at the same time.

The archbishops' first combined military action came five years prior to the crusade. Only after Pope Gregory IX's sudden death on 22 August 1241 did the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz take up arms directly against the Staufer. After his death, Archbishop Conrad's

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 141, no 936.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 143-4, no 948.

political position was weak and he was more vulnerable to attacks by the Stauffer party. He turned to archbishop Siegfried of Mainz for assistance and asked him to join the papal camp. On 10 September 1241, they made a contract of mutual assistance.<sup>20</sup> They both swore to aid each other in word and deed in the struggle with Frederick II and not to make peace without the agreement of the other. They invaded and devastated the imperial lands (*terra imperii*) in the Wetterau, near the river Main,<sup>21</sup> where they burned and plundered many villages, but were met with opposition by imperial men.<sup>22</sup> In addition, they now publicly denounced Frederick II as an excommunicate and proclaimed his ban in their dioceses. Previously, they and other bishops suppressed the news in Germany.

Their campaign was financed with the large sums collected for the crusade against the Tatars.<sup>23</sup> Both archbishops had taken the cross against the Tatars in April 1241 when there was a threat of an invasion of the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>24</sup> It is noteworthy though that they preached the cross out of their own initiative before the arrival of the letter with the mandate from Pope Gregory IX.<sup>25</sup> Between their agreement of mutual assistance and their invasion of the Wetterau, the archbishops issued a letter legitimizing their actions. The *Royal Chronicle of Cologne*, otherwise almost universally supportive of Archbishop Conrad, reported it with a certain scepticism:<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, pp. 263-4, no 392, *Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte des Niederrheins*, pp. 131-2, no 257 and *Annales Wormatienses*, p. 47.

<sup>21</sup> The Latin name of the river, 'Mogum' or 'Megun,' was translated as 'Möhne' in the MGH, but no local river matches this name. Possibly, this is a reference to the river Main, which lies south-west between the Wetterau and Mainz. *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 282.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, *Fontes Rerum Germanicarum, vol IV*, p. 478, no 1868, and *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 264, no 393. Demandt, *Endkampf*, p. 116.

<sup>23</sup> Jackson, *Mongols and the West*, p. 67.

<sup>24</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 281 and *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 262, nos 385/386/389.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>26</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 282.

The archbishops put this reason forward as an excuse for themselves, although some people paid little attention to it, that with the Roman see vacant and the election of a pope hindered by the emperor, they themselves, as faithful and influential sons of their mother, the desolate Roman Church, were rendered vulnerable. Thus, they ought properly to take up arms against the emperor, to punish him for the injuries of the Church.<sup>27</sup>

The archbishops argued that they became the main political and military leaders of the papal party to punish the emperor for his injuries to the Church. The *Royal Chronicle of Cologne* implied that the motive of political and military self-defence was an excuse to use the conflict to their advantage, which seemed to be a common opinion. The *Gesta Treverorum* reversed the order of events, which rendered the motive of self-defence less credible. According to the *Gesta Treverorum*, the archbishops only publicly announced Frederick II's excommunication after they had already attacked imperial lands and used temporal as well as spiritual measures against Stauffer supporters.

At that time two archbishops, the ones of Mainz and of Cologne, rose against the power of the emperor and, having passionately used both swords, the spiritual and the secular, they devastated with war and robbery, with fire and plunder, everything they could reach, and the emperor's followers raged against their territory in retaliation no less. Hence, they publicly declared the emperor banished several times; they said they did this by right of a mandate by the apostolic legate.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Ibidem: "Hanc siquidem pro se pretendebant rationem, quibusdam minus attendentibus ipsam, quod, sede Romana vacante et electione pape per imperatorem impedita, ipse tanquam fideles et potentes filii matri sue, ecclesie Romane desolate, compaterentur. Unde se discrimini contra imperatorem merito submittere debebant, iniurias ecclesie prosequendo."

<sup>28</sup> *Gesta Treverorum*, p. 59.

During their first attack in 1241, the archbishops were mainly interested in defending their own lands and political position; only by the time Frederick II was deposed did they fully subscribe to the idea of replacing the Staufer dynasty. Between 1241 and 1245, the papal party continued its military and political activities in Germany. Archbishop Conrad of Cologne conducted independent military activities against Frederick II. In retaliation, Frederick II asked King Wenzel of Bohemia to support him against Archbishop Conrad of Cologne some time between September 1241 and March 1242.<sup>29</sup> The archbishops broadly aligned their goals with those of Innocent IV, but remained independent to varying degrees and did not always obediently executed papal will.

#### **Papal envoy Philip of Ferrara in Germany, August 1245 – May 1246**

Pope Innocent IV sent a succession of envoys and apostolic legates against the Staufer to Germany. His first pick was Philip of Ferrara (unknown-1270), educated in theology and philosophy at the University of Paris.<sup>30</sup> Pope Innocent IV initially sent Philip of Ferrara to Germany without a ‘general legation’ (*generalis legatio*) from the Apostolic See.<sup>31</sup> A general mandate’ (*generale mandatum*) as an apostolic legate fixed the minimal prerogatives held in their office within a clearly specified geographical jurisdiction.<sup>32</sup>

Philip of Ferrara was chosen because his abilities made him the most suitable candidate, but he also only held the position of a deacon, not a cardinal.<sup>33</sup> Innocent IV could have compensated for his comparatively low status by providing him with a ‘general mandate’, but did not. Instead he provided him with individual special mandates (*speciale mandatum*), which signified a more discrete and narrowly defined type of activities.<sup>34</sup> This conscious choice

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<sup>29</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 156, no 1045.

<sup>30</sup> He is also known as Philipp Fontana and Filippo da Pistoia, see Canz, *Philipp Fontana*, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Figuiera, *Canon Law of Medieval Papal Legation*, p. 56.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> See Alberzoni, *Papal Legates, Delegates and the Crusades*, p. 463.

<sup>34</sup> Figuiera, *Canon Law of Medieval Papal Legates*, p. 299.

suggests that he tried to avoid any potential interference with recruitment for other crusades, such as for Louis IX's general passage across the sea.<sup>35</sup>

Philip of Ferrara left Lyon immediately after the council of Lyon, when the plans for Louis IX's crusade to Egypt still overshadowed the crusade against the Staufer in Germany.<sup>36</sup> At the time, Louis IX's crusade was of maximum importance to Innocent IV, so he wanted to direct most of his resources towards it. At the same time, Philip of Ferrara's presence still ensured that he did not lose control over the process of changing power in Germany.

When Innocent IV confirmed a sentence in which he stripped a supporter of Frederick II of his benefice on 4 September 1245, he did not call Philip of Ferrara legate.<sup>37</sup> Philip's first charter regarding German affairs dated from 27 August 1245.<sup>38</sup> He was a general envoy, who received only one 'specific mandate' as papal legate on 20 September 1245 to fulfil a particular task for which he required the powers associated with the office.<sup>39</sup> The need for papal confirmation also showed that Philip of Ferrara's sentence did not yet have the force to stand by itself.

While the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne preached the word of the cross in May 1246, Philip of Ferrara was mainly occupied with preparing the election of Henry Raspe. He tried to win the votes of as many princes for Henry Raspe as possible, both ecclesiastical and temporal, though as will be seen without much success among the temporal princes.<sup>40</sup> Philip of Ferrara was active in Germany for about a year before Innocent IV gave him a general mandate that made him legate *plene legationis officium*.<sup>41</sup> His success with Henry Raspe allowed him to receive additional powers and further develop his influence.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1545, no 10171c.

<sup>36</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, pp. 567-8 and *Regesta Imperii* V, no 7557.

<sup>37</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, I, p. 226, no 1488.

<sup>38</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 10172a, see Canz, *Philipp Fontana*, p. 14.

<sup>39</sup> Berger *Innocent IV*, I, p. 232, no 1526.

<sup>40</sup> Canz, *Philipp Fontana*, pp. 10/12-3.

<sup>41</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 7556-7 and Canz, *Philipp Fontana*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>42</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, pp. 287-8.

## The choice of Henry Raspe as royal candidate, 1245 – May 1246

Henry Raspe could not point to his genealogical origin to become king; he was not from a family with any previous ties to the throne.<sup>43</sup> He also only held the rank of count; the lowest rank of nobility that could be chosen as king, and lower than that of the candidates to whom Innocent IV previously offered the throne.<sup>44</sup> The sons of kings of neighbouring kingdoms as well as the German princes had too much to lose. Whoever antagonized Frederick II and failed, risked their own principalities and base of their power.

Henry Raspe's motivation for wanting to be king was that his family's outlook for dynastic inheritance would have been otherwise poor in Thuringia and Hessa.<sup>45</sup> The knights of the Teutonic Order acted as mediators between Henry Raspe and Innocent IV in the negotiations from 1244 to 1246, as Henry's brother Conrad of Thuringia briefly was the Master of the Teutonic Order until his death in 1240.<sup>46</sup> He was the first prince of high nobility to join the order and created a link between the landgraves of Thuringia and religiously motivated warfare.<sup>47</sup>

When Philip of Ferrara arrived in Germany, he first had to negotiate with Henry Raspe to become the new king around whom future crusaders could rally.<sup>48</sup> Philip left Lyon just after 1 August 1245 and arrived in Cologne in the middle of August, where he met Archbishop Conrad.<sup>49</sup> Under his escort, envoy Philip of Ferrara travelled to Henry Raspe's court in

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<sup>43</sup> See J. Peltzer, 'Idoneität. Eine Ordnungskategorie oder eine Frage des Rangs?', in C. Andenna and G. Melville (eds.), *Idoneität - Genealogie - Legitimation: Begründung und Akzeptanz von dynastischer Herrschaft im Mittelalter* (Cologne, 2015), p. 31.

<sup>44</sup> See S. Weinfurter, 'Idoneität-Begründung und Akzeptanz von Königsherrschaft im hohen Mittelalter', in *ibid.*, pp. 127-38.

<sup>45</sup> H. Dopsch, 'Heinrich Raspe und die Reichsfürsten im Südosten', in M. Werner (ed.), *Heinrich Raspe - Landgraf von Thüringen und römischer König (1227-1247)* (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), p. 88.

<sup>46</sup> R. Gramsch, 'Deutschordensdiplomaten in den Verhandlungen zwischen Innozenz und Heinrich Raspe 1244-1246', in *ibid.*, pp. 317-58.

<sup>47</sup> See J. R. Lyon, *Princely brothers and sisters: the sibling bond in German politics, 1100-1250* (Ithaca, 2013), p. 243.

<sup>48</sup> Alfred, *Landgraf Heinrich Raspe von Thüringen, der Gegenkönig Friedrichs II.*, pp. 36-43.

<sup>49</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V, 7557, Ep Saec XIII*, pp. 567-8, and *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 288.

Thuringia, where they met in late August or September 1245.<sup>50</sup> According to the *Royal Chronicle of Cologne*, Henry Raspe “received him kindly since he himself aspired to the kingdom.”<sup>51</sup>

Henry Raspe had long stood in good favour with Innocent IV; he was the first temporal prince in Germany to whom Innocent IV sent a letter after his election.<sup>52</sup> Although Henry Raspe succeeded Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz as imperial administrator (*Reichsverweser*) in 1241, he switched to the papal party in 1244.<sup>53</sup> Since 1244, the Teutonic Knights also had been acting as mediators between Henry Raspe and Innocent IV.<sup>54</sup> Archbishops Siegfried of Mainz and Conrad of Cologne were in conversation with Pope Innocent IV regarding Henry Raspe as a candidate for election and met him in Lyon respectively in February and April or May 1245.<sup>55</sup> There is no evidence that Archbishop Arnold of Trier was involved in these negotiations.

The negotiations between the papal party and Henry Raspe may have stretched until March 1246 because Henry Raspe did not have sufficient wealth to fund the crusade and was dependent on papal funds.<sup>56</sup> By March 1246, Philip of Ferrara could report to Pope Innocent IV that Henry Raspe agreed to become the royal candidate.<sup>57</sup> The archbishops and Philip of Ferrara were trying to find a new King of the Romans, not the other way round. This highlights that the relationship of power between the new king and his advisors would be inverted often. Although the king nominally held the highest office, his independence was questionable – and was questioned by some contemporaries, as will be seen.

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<sup>50</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 10171-8 and Canz, *Philipp Fontana*, p. 10.

<sup>51</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 288.

<sup>52</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, no 55/57/58 and p. 46, no 63 and Reuling, ‘Von Lyon nach Veitshöchheim’, p. 284.

<sup>53</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 11367, see G. Barone, ‘Die "welfische" Partei in Oberitalien und die Gegner Friedrichs II. in Deutschland’ in M. Werner (ed.), *Heinrich Raspe – Landgraf von Thüringen und römischer König (1227–1247)* (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), pp. 307-15.

<sup>54</sup> Gramsch, ‘Deutschordensdiplomaten in den Verhandlungen zwischen Innozenz und Heinrich Raspe 1244-1246’, pp. 317-58 and Reuling, ‘Von Lyon nach Veitshöchheim’, pp. 285/291.

<sup>55</sup> Reuling, ‘Von Lyon nach Veitshöchheim’, pp. 287-8.

<sup>56</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 10171-8 and Canz, *Philipp Fontana*, p. 10.

<sup>57</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, pp. 287-8.

## How to be(come) king

The process of becoming the new *Rex Romanorum* in Germany was complex. It required several individual steps, with multilateral connections between them, and was the sum of numerous ceremonies, rites, and rituals. The most important ceremonies were the election and coronation (*Krönung* or *Weihe*) as king. The entire process was designed to emphasize the new king's legitimacy and to increase his chances to be recognized by the German princes. The problem was that in the middle of the thirteenth century the exact legal relationship between these rituals was in flux; some parts turned out to be indispensable, while others were just good to have.<sup>58</sup>

One of the defining aspects of the kingship of the *Rex Romanorum* was that he was elected. Frankfurt was one of the most notable places for the election of a king. It was considered to be a traditional place for reconciliation of conflicts, which could also express itself in the election of a king.<sup>59</sup> To be elected in Frankfurt put the royal candidate into a tradition of predecessors, but it was not exclusively the only place where elections took place.

The circumstances of elections were often chaotic. Frederick II's own election was rushed and unusual, insofar as he was directly elected as emperor instead of king at his election in Nuremberg in September 1211.<sup>60</sup> His election was repeated in Frankfurt on 5 December 1212 to give it additional legitimacy.<sup>61</sup> Frederick II's father had already tried to raise his son as co-ruler in 1196, but this was largely ignored by the German princes.<sup>62</sup> Frederick II himself was

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<sup>58</sup> Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, pp. 5/12.

<sup>59</sup> See H-O. Schembs, 'Frankfurt und die Wahl und Krönung der deutschen Könige', in B. Heidenreich and K. Böhme (eds.), *Hessen. Geschichte und Politik* (Stuttgart, 2000), pp. 137-48 and F. Schmieder, "'in terra que dicitur Frankeserde": Die Pfalz Frankfurt vom Ort der Versöhnung und Demonstration von Eintracht hin zur Wahlstadt des Reiches', in E. Brockhoff and M. Matthäus (eds.), *Die Kaisermacher: Frankfurt am Main und die Goldene Bulle, 1356* (Frankfurt am Main, 2006), pp. 14-25.

<sup>60</sup> *Annales Marbacenses*, ed. H. Bloch, SS rer. Germ. 9, *Annales Marbacenses qui dicuntur* (Anhang: *Annales Alsatici breviores*) (Hannover/Leipzig 1907), pp. 83-4.

<sup>61</sup> *Burchard von Ursberg*, ed. O. Holder-Egger and B. von Simons, SS rer. Germ. 16, *Die Chronik des Propstes Burchard von Ursberg* (Hannover/Leipzig, 1916), p. 109.

<sup>62</sup> See W. Giese, 'Ein Zweiter Versuch „Zu Den Designationen Und Mitkönigerhebungen Der Deutschen Könige Des Hochmittelalters', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Germanistische Abteilung* 131 (2014), pp 1-68.

initially more successful in raising a co-ruler, when his oldest son Henry (VII) was elected king in 1220.<sup>63</sup>

In 1235, Henry (VII) unsuccessfully rebelled against his father.<sup>64</sup> Frederick II deposed his defiant son and replaced him with his younger brother Conrad IV. Conrad IV was elected king in Vienna in February 1237, but crucially, remained uncrowned.<sup>65</sup> His father deliberately wanted to avoid a coronation in light of the events with Henry (VII) and curtailed his son's ability to rule independently by reforming the *regalia*.

The successions also caused tension between Frederick II and the German princes over who had more power to raise the next king. The Staufer goal was to ensure the dynastic succession on the throne through inheritance, while the German princes wanted to defend and expand their prerogative to elect their king as freely as possible. Frederick II probably believed that Conrad IV's election in 1237 was sufficient for the moment. However, this turned out to be a fundamental weakness when Staufer rule in Germany was challenged by the royal candidates during the crusade. Although the royal candidates acted upon papal and archiepiscopal instigation, they arranged for their election like other princes before them.

During the first half of the thirteenth century, one of the most important, but still evolving factors in the process of becoming king was the identity of the prince electors. By the early thirteenth century, the right to elect the king lay with a wide and imprecisely defined group of princes. They were the most important and powerful princes of the empire, but not all of them established their position as prince electors.

Between 1220 and 1235, Eike of Repgow compiled the customary law into the *Sachsenspiegel*, a legal text which recorded that the electoral princes consisted of the Archbishops of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Margraves of

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<sup>63</sup> See H. Schwarzmaier, 'Der vergessene König. Kaiser Friedrich II. und sein Sohn', in A. Bihrer et al (eds.), *Adel und Königtum im mittelalterlichen Schwaben* (Stuttgart, 2009), pp. 287-304.

<sup>64</sup> Stürner, *Friedrich II.*, pp. 305-9

<sup>65</sup> *MGH Const* 2, p. 309, no 224 and pp. 439-41, no 329.

Brandenburg, and the Duke of Saxony. He explicitly excluded the King of Bohemia on the grounds that he was “not German.”<sup>66</sup> However, the *Sachsenspiegel* was a contested authority on the matter. By the late 1240s, it was not yet entirely clear which vote by which prince was crucial to make an election count.

The grey area regarding the prince electors allowed the princes to question the election if it was convenient to them, on the grounds that not all of the most important princes, whose identity was subject to discussion, elected the king. In the face of these challenges, the coronation gained more importance in the middle of the thirteenth century. One of the defining factors for the coronation was its location. The rightful place to be crowned was in Aachen, specifically in the chapel of Charlemagne.

Once a royal candidate had become king, the biggest challenge for him was to be able to implement his rule in practical terms, for example by taking control of property and creating relationships of vassalage with his new subjects.<sup>67</sup> This could be an awkward affair if the process of becoming king had not been brought to its conclusion yet, though continuous military activity was part of a king’s rule.<sup>68</sup> The king’s property was decentralized in Germany, and there was no capital city where political power was concentrated. Hence a royal candidate had to choose which ones among several centres of power he must control first to implement his rule.

### **Crusader recruitment by the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne, March-July 1246**

In the earliest phase of the crusade, the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne organised crusader

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<sup>66</sup> Eike von Repgow, *Sachsenspiegel*, and *Annales Stadenses*, p. 367.

<sup>67</sup> See M. Weber, *Herrschaft* (Tübingen, 2005), and P. Moraw, ‘Herrschaft’ im Mittelalter’, in O. Brunner (ed.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 3* (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 5-13.

<sup>68</sup> Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, p. 689.

recruitment.<sup>69</sup> Archbishop Siegfried preceded to preach the cross against Frederick II some time before Henry Raspe's election, though whether it the election only by some weeks or more remains unclear.<sup>70</sup> He was aided by other bishops, most likely by the suffragan bishops of the archdiocese of Mainz. In May 1246, Archbishop Conrad also preached the cross against Frederick.<sup>71</sup> On the day of Henry Raspe's election, Archbishop Conrad of Cologne preached the cross and immediately after a certain number of attendants were signed with the cross.

Given the small scale of the event, the report in the *Royal Chronicle of Cologne* is to be read with the obligatory pinch of salt: "To assist him many thousands of men were sworn with the cross to the defence of the Catholic Faith, which the aforementioned Frederick, severed from the Church, was feared to be about to attack."<sup>72</sup> After the election, crusader recruitment continued in the diocese of Cologne, probably also in Mainz and elsewhere.<sup>73</sup> They did not only preach the cross in person, but also arranged for it to be preached by the suffragans of the archdioceses of Mainz and Cologne. It seems likely that crusader preaching also took place in the dioceses of Meissen and Regensburg, as "certain nobles and barons" there took the cross against Frederick II.<sup>74</sup> Crusader recruitment therefore broadened from along the Rhine to the East of the German kingdom; which set the pattern for much of future recruitment.

### **Henry Raspe's election as King of the Romans, 22 May 1246**

Henry Raspe was elected in Veitshöchheim near Würzburg on 22 May 1246.<sup>75</sup> Ideally, he would be elected in Frankfurt.<sup>76</sup> However, the citizens of Frankfurt were loyal to Conrad IV and Frederick II in May 1246, which made it impossible to plan for Henry Raspe to be elected in

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<sup>69</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 288 and Canz, *Philipp Fontana*, pp. 12-3.

<sup>70</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 7649.

<sup>71</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 288 and Canz, *Philipp Fontana*, pp. 12-3.

<sup>72</sup> *Annales Erfordiensis fratrum praedicatorum*, pp. 100-1 and Köster, *Kreuzablass*, p. 36.

<sup>73</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 7649.

<sup>74</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 585, no 3862.

<sup>75</sup> C. Hillen, 'Rex Clericorum – Wahl und Wähler Heinrich Raspes', *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Thüringische Geschichte* 55 (2001), pp. 57-76.

<sup>76</sup> Schmieder, 'in terra que dicitur Frankeserde', p. 20.

the city. There was no evidence that Henry Raspe tried to conquer Frankfurt, though it is unclear whether he would have had the military means to do so.<sup>77</sup> Even the location of Veitshöchheim for Henry Raspe's election was a makeshift solution, because initially the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne invited the attendees to a court day in Würzburg on the day of ascension 1246.<sup>78</sup> Würzburg was probably chosen for Henry Raspe's convenience, as it is geographically close to Thuringia.<sup>79</sup> The citizens of Würzburg probably disturbed the preparatory gathering because they were also loyal to the Staufer, so the court day was moved to Veitshöchheim on the following Tuesday.<sup>80</sup> In addition to the change in location, the election now also did not take place on a feast day anymore.

Even more important were the prince electors who gave their vote at the election. Only the spiritual among the greater princes partook in Henry Raspe's election. The princes who elected Henry Raspe were Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz, Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, Bishop Henry of Strasbourg, Bishop Hermann of Würzburg, and Henry of Leiningen, elected bishop of Speyer.<sup>81</sup> Papal envoy Philip of Ferrara was also present. The presence of Archbishop Arnold of Trier and the bishops of Metz and Strasbourg was reported by the *Annales Argentinenses*, but not corroborated by any other chronicle.<sup>82</sup> The lack of further evidence for their presence led Ulrich Reuling to doubt the attendance of Archbishop Arnold and the other bishops, but the question cannot be answered conclusively.<sup>83</sup>

When Henry Raspe was elected king, it was not yet entirely clear which princely vote was essential. The turnout for his election has been described by a modern commentator as

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<sup>77</sup> Klötzer, 'War Frankfurt wirklich stauferfreundlich?', p. 552.

<sup>78</sup> *Annales Stadenses*, p. 369.

<sup>79</sup> U. Reuling, 'Von Lyon nach Veitshöchheim: Die Wahl Heinrich Raspe's zum rex romanorum 1246', in M. Werner (ed.), *Heinrich Raspe – Landgraf von Thüringen und römischer König (1227-1247): Fürsten, König und Reich in spätstauferischer Zeit* (Frankfurt/Berlin, 2003), p. 300.

<sup>80</sup> See Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 38.

<sup>81</sup> Erkens, *Kurfürsten und Königswahl*, pp. 71/110-1 and Hillen, 'Rex Clericorum', pp. 57-76.

<sup>82</sup> *Chronicon Ellenhardi*, p. 121.

<sup>83</sup> Reuling, 'Von Lyon nach Veitshöchheim', p. 300.

‘pitiful’ (“kläglich”).<sup>84</sup> It was, however, clear that both ecclesiastical and temporal princes had to be represented to give the election credible legitimacy and to be accepted by the German nobility. If Henry Raspe was only elected by ecclesiastical princes, it undermined the credibility of his claim to the throne among the temporal princes in Germany. This became evident in his nickname *Rex Clericorum*, which may have been due to his election only by ecclesiastical princes or may have been a wider reflection of negative attitudes to the conflict.<sup>85</sup>

The most important temporal princes who were missing were the Count Palatine of the Rhine, who was also the Duke of Bavaria and allied to Conrad IV, the Duke of Saxony, the Margraves of Brandenburg, and the King of Bohemia. Invitations were also sent out to certain of the lesser temporal princes of the region around Thuringia, Franconia, and the Rhine area, but their attendance carried less weight.<sup>86</sup> Instead some minor nobles who did not hold the rank of princes, such as counts and lords from Thuringia and Hesse, and supporters of the archbishop of Mainz, such as his nephews Gottfried and Gerhard of Eppstein, were present.<sup>87</sup>

The source for Henry Raspe’s election is a charter he issued to Bishop Hermann of Würzburg on the day after his election, 23 May 1246.<sup>88</sup> In the absence of any written evidence, the golden seal attached to the charter is one of few indications how Henry Raspe wished to fashion himself as a ruler.<sup>89</sup> The iconography of the seal is striking, because it shows the heads of the apostles Peter and Paul, which traditionally only occurred on lead seals used by the popes.<sup>90</sup> As Henry Raspe commenced his crusade, he wished to emphasize his proximity to the papacy. Although this supplemented religious propaganda against the Staufer which still

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<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 299.

<sup>85</sup> “Cooperunt interea illi, qui plenum favorem non habebant ad talia, eundem lantgravium regem dicere clericorum.” *Annales Stadenses*, p. 370. See also *Regesten Kaiserreich Heinrich Raspe*, p. 913, no 4865d.

<sup>86</sup> *Annales Stadenses*, p. 369.

<sup>87</sup> *Regesten Kaiserreich Heinrich Raspe*, p. 7 and *Regesta diplomatica necnon epistolaria historiae Thuringiae*, no 1311.

<sup>88</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, no 4868 and Reuling, ‘Von Lyon nach Veitshöchheim’, pp. 299-302.

<sup>89</sup> J. Petersohn, *Heinrich Raspe und die Apostelhäupter oder: Die Kosten der Rompolitik Kaiser Friedrichs II.* (Stuttgart, 2002), pp. 9-10.

<sup>90</sup> For a depiction of the seal, see *ibid.*, p. 36.

circulated in 1246, the subtlety of the message contrasts with the extreme, even apocalyptic language used by the papal chancery.<sup>91</sup>

Overall, Henry Raspe's election as *Rex Romanorum* was a small event that could have easily been thought an unimportant fringe episode. A combination of factors regarding the election, such as its location (not in Frankfurt), electors (only spiritual), and date (not on a feast day, though this was less important), lessened its prestige and legitimacy in Germany. For his next steps, Pope Innocent IV followed a two-pronged strategy in involving himself in the change of power in Germany after Henry Raspe's election as king. He supplied Henry Raspe with the necessary funds to bribe future allies. In addition, the pope tried to separate the connection between the dukedom of Swabia and the king, which interfered with the political structure of royal power in Germany.<sup>92</sup>

### **Deposing Conrad IV as duke of Swabia, June-July 1246**

Innocent IV reacted swiftly to developments in Germany. On 9 June 1246, he confirmed to Archbishop Siegfried that he received the news of that Henry Raspe' was elected king and presented himself accordingly in Germany.<sup>93</sup> With only one month notice since his election, Henry Raspe invited the German princes to a court day in Frankfurt on 25 July 1246.<sup>94</sup> His plans were explosive; he wanted to depose Conrad IV as duke of Swabia and deprive him of all his assets in Germany in the place traditionally associated with judgement and justice.<sup>95</sup> Henry Raspe's plan for his court day illuminates his assessment of Conrad IV's legal position as *Rex Romanorum*, though it seems to bear the mark of Innocent IV's legal mind.<sup>96</sup> It also harks back to Henry (VII)'s deposition as king. When Henry (VII) was dethroned, he was also

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<sup>91</sup> See this thesis, *Appendix*, '2.) Timeline Letters and Propaganda', pp. 251-3.

<sup>92</sup> Zotz, 'Schwaben und das Königtum Heinrich Raspes', pp. 113-4

<sup>93</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV, vol II*, p. 295, no 1989 and Canz, *Philipp Fontana*, p. 15.

<sup>94</sup> Werner, 'Reichsfürst zwischen Mainz und Meissen', pp. 36-40.

<sup>95</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 1377-8, no 8569. See Reuling, 'Von Lyon nach Veitshöchstheim', pp. 299-300.

<sup>96</sup> Zotz, 'Schwaben und das Königtum Heinrich Raspes', p. 113.

deposed as duke of Swabia. His sons were deprived of the succession jointly with him, and Frederick II appointed Conrad IV as duke of Swabia. Henry Raspe did not want to depose Conrad IV as a king, because such an action would have amounted to a recognition of the legitimacy of Conrad IV's election in the first place. Instead, he ignored Conrad IV's claim to the title and only recognized him as duke of Swabia.

The duchy of Swabia was the fulcrum of Staufer rule and at the core of Conrad IV's military and political power.<sup>97</sup> This had legal implications for Conrad IV's claim to rule Germany, but also served the practical purpose of depriving him of the base of his power. By the time of Conrad IV, the duchy was not only indivisible from the Staufer family, but also from the office of king. It had personally been held by Frederick II and Henry (VII), which was in living memory and since Philip of Swabia, the Staufer kings also held the office of duke of Swabia most of the time.<sup>98</sup> This personal union meant that the office of duke of Swabia entailed few legal rights and little direct control over property in the duchy of Swabia. A clear legal distinction between the office of duke and king regarding ownership and rights was impossible.<sup>99</sup>

Furthermore, the Swabian nobles felt that they played an exceptional role as pillars of the duchy of Swabia that went beyond that of nobles in other duchies.<sup>100</sup> In a letter to Henry Raspe's successor, Innocent IV explicitly stated that he acted with the consent of the imperial princes, though it is likely that this was limited to certain members of the Swabian nobility who were hostile to the Staufer. Thus, the dukedom of Swabia was the heartland of Conrad IV's rule and its loss would have driven a stake through his ability to project his power.

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<sup>97</sup> H. Maurer, *Der Herzog von Schwaben. Grundlagen, Wirkungen und Wesen seiner Herrschaft in ottonischer, salischer und staufischer Zeit* (Sigmaringen, 1978), p. 268.

<sup>98</sup> Zotz, 'Schwaben und das Königtum Heinrich Raspes', p. 106-8 and Maurer, *Der Herzog von Schwaben*, pp. 269-70.

<sup>99</sup> Maurer, *Der Herzog von Schwaben*, p. 18.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 288-91.

Henry Raspe's plans for his court day in Frankfurt for the first time brought him into direct contact with opposition by Conrad IV. If Conrad IV knew that Henry Raspe tried to depose him as duke of Swabia, he would do everything in his power to prevent him from gaining access to the city and the court day from taking place. This was especially salient in light of his father's deposition in the previous year. The *Annales Argentinenses* brought forward the same argument: "When the deposed Frederick had his son Conrad IV in Germany, he, desiring to prevent the arranged court in Frankfurt and wanting to hinder it, collected a great army and went to the camps at Frankfurt."<sup>101</sup>

Their rivalry functioned as a two-way route: Henry Raspe tried to defeat Conrad IV as the designated king in Germany and heir to Staufer power, while Conrad IV tried to halt his path to the throne and the implementation of his rule as the new king. Conrad IV's presence in Germany was a constant military and political threat to Henry Raspe's kingship. Thus, Henry Raspe purposefully tried to engineer a swift clash with Conrad IV to force an early decision of the conflict. Contemporary military expectation was that 'real military decisions' were achieved in pitched battle.<sup>102</sup> In much of contemporary imagination, the most successful and efficient military action involved a battle with a clearly designated army of a few hundred to a thousand cavalry and some infantry.<sup>103</sup>

Briefly after Henry Raspe's election, representatives of Pope Innocent IV contacted the Swabian counts, who then in turn voiced an interest in depriving Conrad IV of the dukedom.<sup>104</sup> Counts Ulrich I of Württemberg and Hartmann II of Grüningen came to a secret agreement with Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz, who was authorized by legate Philip of Ferrara and ultimately acted as an agent of papal will.<sup>105</sup> Their main motivation was strategic antagonism

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<sup>101</sup> *Annales Argentinenses*, p. 108.

<sup>102</sup> Toch, *Medieval German City under Siege*, p. 45.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

<sup>104</sup> Zotz, 'Schwaben und das Königtum Heinrich Raspes', p. 114.

<sup>105</sup> *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, p. 567.

to Frederick II in this territorial policy in Swabia.<sup>106</sup> They received 7000 silver marks.<sup>107</sup> Most importantly, once Conrad IV was deposed, the duchy would be split among them. This would entail either just the title, income from property they managed (*Amtsgüter*), or income from their roles as judge, bailiff, and advocate.<sup>108</sup>

After the court day, Henry Raspe left Veitshöchheim to return to Wartburg castle, where he spent most of July, while the archbishops returned to their dioceses.<sup>109</sup> On 20 July 1246, Archbishop Conrad allied himself to his brother-in-law Adolf, son of the duke of Limburg, against Conrad IV, which was likely in preparation for the battle of Frankfurt on 5 August 1246. He probably spent the time between Henry Raspe's election and the battle of Frankfurt in recruitment and military preparations, trying to recruit as many men-at-arm in Cologne as possible.

### **Crusader recruitment for Henry Raspe, June-July 1246**

Between Henry Raspe's election and the battle of Frankfurt lay nine to ten weeks during which recruitment was targeted to provide as many crusaders as possible for the forthcoming battle. It was easiest for Henry Raspe to win the battle if his army was as large as possible, so the pitched battle required larger numbers of men-at-arms than a campaign. This made recruitment even more crucial. Within less than three weeks, despite crusader recruitment taking place, Innocent IV received information that the change of power was not progressing as efficiently as he hoped. Hence he urged Archbishop Siegfried "to pursue the business of the empire quickly and in a manly way" (*viriliter*) and to "stir up the German princes."<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Zotz, 'Schwaben und das Königtum Heinrich Raspes', pp. 109-11.

<sup>107</sup> S. Lorenz, 'Graf Ulrich von Württemberg, die Schlacht von Frankfurt (1246) und der Aufstieg der Grafen von Württemberg', in K-H. Ruess (ed.), *Konrad IV. (1228-1254). Deutschlands letzter Stauferkönig* (Göppingen, 2012), pp. 71-85.

<sup>108</sup> Zotz, 'Schwaben und das Königtum Heinrich Raspes', p. 114.

<sup>109</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 1, no 2-4, and *Regesta Imperii V, Nachträge und Ergänzungen*, ed. P. Zinsmaier, Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs unter Philipp, Otto IV., Friedrich II., Heinrich (VII.), Conrad IV., Heinrich Raspe, Wilhelm und Richard 1198-1272 (Böhlau, 1983), p. 101, no 709.

<sup>110</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 295, no 1989.

On 27 June 1246, Innocent IV ordered Archbishop Siegfried and the suffragan bishops of Mainz to preach the cross in order to recruit an army for Henry Raspe, “especially because there was already another one who had been elevated as Roman king.”<sup>111</sup> This was particularly poignant as Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz had not yet personally assumed the cross against Frederick and his supporters. He had not done so on the day of Henry Raspe’s election, so Pope Innocent IV now ordered him and his suffragan bishops to take the cross. There is no evidence that proves whether he did so, but it seems very likely. In preparation for the forthcoming battle, Innocent IV on the same day also tried to make it more attractive to take the cross against the Staufer by increasing the scale of the remission of sins, when he ordered Archbishop Siegfried to provide those who took the cross against Frederick with the same indulgences as those who went to the Holy Land.<sup>112</sup>

Innocent IV granted the mandate of apostolic legate to Philip of Ferrara on 4 or 5 July 1246. The mandate was an explicit reward for how Philip of Ferrara handled the *negotium imperii* in Germany.<sup>113</sup> Philip also received some limited ecclesiastical benefices in Germany, which otherwise were only granted to cardinal legates, as a financial reward.<sup>114</sup> He had probably been assisting the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne with recruitment for the last months; the mandate came just in time for the final push to recruit crusaders for the battle of Frankfurt.

The archbishops were the main organisers of crusader recruitment until Philip of Ferrara concluded his arrangements for Henry Raspe’s election. On 4 July 1246, Innocent IV ordered him to preach the cross against Frederick II throughout Germany.<sup>115</sup> From then

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 296, no 1993.

<sup>112</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 7649 and *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 288.

<sup>113</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, no 7653 and *Regesta diplomatica necnon epistolaria historiae Thuringiae*, p. 137, no 2921 and pp. 154-5.

<sup>114</sup> *Regesta Imperii* V, 7653 and *Regesta diplomatica necnon epistolaria historiae Thuringiae*, ed. O. Dobenecker (Jena 1896-1939), pp. 154-5.

<sup>115</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 137, no 2921.

onwards, the threads of organising recruitment now most often ran together in the hands of the papal legate. This made a change in the person of papal legate one of the most dominant factors that led to shifts in the patterns of recruitment. Whenever a papal legate left his office, it marked a strong caesura. Their great influence was because Innocent IV chose them individually, based on the current state of the conflict and what he perceived that a legate needed to bring in order to be successful. All legates were noticeably capable men, who shaped the conflict with their expertise and left their mark in the way they applied their powers.

At the same time, the person of legate was not the only factor that changed recruitment patterns. Recruitment for the crusade against the Staufer in Germany had to compete with other crusades, most notably with that of Louis IX to the Holy Land. When the papal legate, cardinal Odo of Châteauroux, organized the preaching of the cross to recruit for Louis IX's crusade to the Holy Land in summer 1246, the response was limited ("presertim cum in illis partibus dicatur nunc esse modicum fructuosa").<sup>116</sup>

On 5 July 1246, Innocent IV secretly ordered legate Odo to suspend the preaching for Louis IX's crusade and to promote the preaching of the cross against Frederick II.<sup>117</sup> He also ordered him to instruct the preachers, including the mendicant friars, in certain parts of Germany to switch from preaching in support of the Holy Land instead to preaching the cross against Frederick II.<sup>118</sup> Legate Odo was to keep this order secret to avoid inevitable outrage from the organizers of Louis IX's crusade, which showed that Innocent IV broke a taboo by prioritizing the crusade against Frederick II.

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<sup>116</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 439, no 2935.

<sup>117</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 161, no 214. Doublier did not seem to have realized that 'Bishop Otto of Tusculum' and 'Odo of Châteauroux' were the same person, see idem, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, p. 126.

<sup>118</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 439, no 2935.

## The mendicant orders

The Dominican and Franciscan orders played a crucial role in recruitment for the crusade against the Staufer by preaching the word of the cross. They had a number of mendicant houses all over Europe and covered outlying areas and regions by itinerant preaching.<sup>119</sup> Pope Innocent IV had a close relationship with the masters of the Dominican and Franciscan orders and made much more use than his predecessors of their centralised structure and sophisticated administrative apparatus to ensure the widest possible spread of propaganda and preaching against the Staufer.<sup>120</sup>

On 21 December 1245, Innocent IV informed every ecclesiastic about Frederick II's deposition at the council of Lyon and ordered them to support the Dominicans in their task to liberally promulgate the sentence of deposition against Frederick II.<sup>121</sup> He also ordered the general master and the provincial priors of the Dominicans to use suitable friars to preach propaganda sermons against the deposed emperor. In this Innocent IV followed the practice set up by Gregory IX, who used the mendicant orders to promulgate Frederick II's excommunication.<sup>122</sup>

From 1246 onwards, Innocent IV seamlessly translated most of his orders from publicizing Frederick II's deposition to recruiting crusaders and preaching the cross. As part of the propaganda against the Staufer, the orders continued to spread the word of Frederick's excommunication and deposition; for example, Innocent IV repeated the order to communicate Frederick's excommunication on 20 March 1247.<sup>123</sup> Between 1246 and 1251, a stream of orders

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<sup>119</sup> Doublier, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, p. 125.

<sup>120</sup> See Innocent IV's letter 'Dei filii qui' from 23 December 1245 in Maier, *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology*, pp. 162-3.

<sup>121</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no 1197 and *Bullarium Ordinis FF. Praedicatorum: Volume 1, Ab Anno 1215 ad 1280*, ed. T. Ripoll and A. Bremond (Mainardus, 1729), p. 158, no 122.

<sup>122</sup> *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi* vol 6/1, p. 143 and Doublier, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, pp. 126-7/131-52/172-3.

<sup>123</sup> *Bullarium Ordinis FF. Praedicatorum*, p. 158, no 173.

to preach the word of the cross flowed from the papal chancery to the Dominicans and Franciscans.

In a simplified manner, one could argue that both orders had their own appeal; the Dominicans specialized in learned sermons and preached in cities, while the Franciscans emphasized poverty and simplicity, which may have set an appealing example when they travelled the land. For the years 1246, 1247, 1248, the general chapter of the Dominicans confirmed their active support for the *negotium ecclesiae* in Germany. The general chapter from 1246 decreed: “And they shall most diligently be careful not to speak against the deeds by the lord pope or of the deposed Frederick in any favourable way.”<sup>124</sup>

Innocent IV favoured the orders in Germany, especially in areas relevant for the crusade against the Staufer. For example, on 10 and 11 July 1246, Innocent IV allowed the Dominicans to incorporate the monasteries St Marcus in Würzburg, St Maria in Offenbach, and St Leonard near Heilligenkreuz into the province Teutonia.<sup>125</sup> He did the same with the monastery St Maria near Bad Homburg on 9 November 1246.<sup>126</sup> This allowed him in return to bind the mendicant orders more closely to the curia through the crusade against Staufer.

The orders had become more independent, and especially in connection with lay piety movements this could be a threat to the curia, so Innocent IV wanted to keep them under as tight control as possible. This also had the advantage of driving a wedge between the orders and Frederick II, who had promoted the mendicant orders when he could, especially to implement his policies against heresy.<sup>127</sup> It distanced the orders from imperial power, albeit at the price of endangering their safety as the crusade progressed and they were seen as more of a threat by the imperial party.

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<sup>124</sup> *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica III. Acta Capitulum Generalium*, ed. B. M. Reichert (Rome, 1898), pp. 37/39/42.

<sup>125</sup> *Bullarium Ordinis FF. Praedicatorum* p. 166, nos 153-4/156 and p. 167, nos 157-9.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 169, no 165-6.

<sup>127</sup> Doublie, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, p. 127, FN 176.

## Crusader sermons and indulgences

The religious dimension of the crusade became most visible in the preaching of the word of the cross, but no sermons for the crusade against the Staufer in Germany are known to be extant.<sup>128</sup>

The closest are the sermons by Odo of Châteauroux, a French theologian, cardinal and papal legate who mainly preached the cross for Louis IX's crusade.<sup>129</sup> He preached a sermon on Frederick's deposition at the council of Lyon in July 1245, and, as will be seen, sometimes also recruited crusaders for the crusade against the Staufer.<sup>130</sup> In the sermons that he delivered to recruit crusaders for Louis' IX crusade to the Holy Land in 1248, Odo of Châteauroux focused on the motives of leaving everything behind, going on a long journey, and providing comfort to those who already fought across the sea.<sup>131</sup> He also argued that the Saracens insulted every Christian, even though on first glance it may look like they were not being harmed by them.<sup>132</sup> The context in which the sermons about taking the cross to go to the Holy Land appeared showed that Odo combined his exhortations to go on crusade to the Holy Land with variations on themes on saints such as Saint George, Thomas Becket, a martyr and saint, and on the relics in Saint Chapelle, often in an especially French context.<sup>133</sup> It can be speculated whether he used similar motives in an adjusted manner in his sermons for the crusade against the Staufer in Germany.

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<sup>128</sup> Despite its name, the collection of seven letters edited by H-J. Beyer and K. Borchardt does not contain sermons: idem., 'Kreuzpredigt gegen Konrad IV. in Augsburg; Spätstauferisches aus Clm 23502', *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 68 (2012), pp. 519-44.

<sup>129</sup> See A. Charansonnet, *L'université, l'Eglise et l'Etat dans les sermons du cardinal Eudes de Châteauroux (1190?-1273)* (Lyon, 2001), pp. 714-90, Tamminen, *Crusade Preaching and the Ideal Crusader*, pp. 294-7, Maier, *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology*, pp. 128-229, and idem, *Preaching the Crusades*, pp. 62-79.

<sup>130</sup> Charansonnet, *Sermons du cardinal Eudes de Châteauroux*, pp. 708-13.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., an invitation to take the cross in October 1245, pp. 714-6; on the conversation of St Paul and an invitation to take the cross on 25 January 1248, pp. 740-8, an invitation to take the cross and comfort those who were already crusaders at the end of August 1248, pp. 753-6. See also Maier, *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology*, pp. 137-40.

<sup>132</sup> Maier, *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology*, pp. 140-3.

<sup>133</sup> Charansonnet, *Sermons du cardinal Eudes de Châteauroux*; on the death of Thomas Becket on 29 December 1247, pp. 733-9, on the relics in St Chapelle on 26 April 1248, pp. 749-52, and on Saint George in a Cypriot church on 24 April 1249, pp. 757-61.

Innocent IV inherited the legal legacy of Innocent III's more precise legal definitions in the constitution *Ad liberandam*, which called on people to become crusaders in person, to help finance crusaders if they could not pay for their own campaigns, to gift money to the campaign, and to pray for people on campaign. One of the consequences of the fact that Innocent III did not define the crusade as an institution of war, but rather as an individual activity was that "he was very thorough in assigning different roles to different people."<sup>134</sup> Innocent III gave the crusade a clearer legal definition in as far as the individual crusader was concerned. During Innocent's pontificate the crusaders' privileges were clearly and comprehensively defined for the first time, from the indulgence to the legal protection of the crusaders' goods and families.<sup>135</sup>

Preachers aimed their words to move the religious feelings of the audience to encourage them to support the papal party. They promoted a participatory model of crusading; audiences could engage in the way that was most appropriate for them. At the end of the papal letters to the Dominicans and Franciscans, there were usually additional indulgences which the mendicant friars could grant to those who listened to a sermon or contributed financially against the Staufer.<sup>136</sup> An example of an order to reward even those who listened to the Dominicans promulgating Frederick II's sentence of deposition with indulgences was Innocent's IV mandate 'Sane cum ordinem' to the master general and the provincial priors of the Dominicans from 20 March 1247."<sup>137</sup>

There are no explicit references to women taking the cross against the Staufer; though it is likely that women were in the audiences that listened to sermons. They most likely then redeemed their oath through a financial contribution. Fighting for the cross in person also excluded all men who were too old, young, or infirm, and whose relatives and social

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<sup>134</sup> Maier, *Pope Innocent III and the Crusades Revisited*, p. 69.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>136</sup> Doublier, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, pp. 127-8.

<sup>137</sup> *Bullarium Ordinis FF. Praedicatorum*, p. 172, no 173.

environment did not allow them to take the cross. Certain men could take up the cross, if they were physically able to fight and their financial and familial circumstances allowed them to do so.

To compensate for exclusion, there was widespread redemption of crusader vows for a fee, which allowed people to take the cross and feel part of a greater project, but still ensured that only those suitable for warfare went on crusade. Further financial contributions were also possible. People could now participate in crusading away from the battlefield, because there were many new ways of acquiring a crusading indulgence. This model of crusading did not just ensure, however, that they were right for the crusade, it also was supposed to ensure that crusading was right for them.

Crusaders were rewarded with indulgences and the remission of their sins (expressed in the formula *in remissionem peccaminum* [sic]). The practice was based on the provisions of the Fourth Lateran council from 1215, which were well established by the 1240s.<sup>138</sup> Audiences who listened to the preaching of sermons announcing Frederick's deposition initially received an indulgence over forty days.<sup>139</sup> Those who were signed with the cross usually received plenary indulgences.<sup>140</sup>

However, when recruitment for the crusade against Frederick II started in 1246, there is evidence that crusaders against the Staufer in Germany did not receive the full remission of sins like crusaders to the Holy Land; only when the recruitment process progressed, crusader recruits started to receive the same indulgences and benefits as crusaders to the Holy Land. In a letter from 27 June 1246, Innocent IV ordered Archbishop Siegfried to provide those who took the cross against Frederick with the same indulgences as those who went to the Holy Land.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> *1215 Lateranense IV.*

<sup>139</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 11975.

<sup>140</sup> Doublier, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, p. 130.

<sup>141</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, 7649 and *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 288.

According to the letter *Cum dilectus filius* by Innocent IV to cardinal legate Peter Capocci from 21 May 1248, at least three years (“triennium”) of military service as a crusader were required to receive a plenary indulgence.<sup>142</sup> However, clearly this did not work. In contrast to Innocent IV’s orders, legate Peter Capocci allowed the Franciscan custos at Konstanz to grant plenary indulgences to those who had served as little as only four months on crusade.<sup>143</sup> As will be seen, pressure to recruit more crusaders due to an urgent need of men-at-arms led to this inflation of indulgences.

### **Temporal and spiritual rewards and punishments**

Although the role of apostolic legates has been described as an ‘alter ego’ of the pope himself, this was only true with regards to his administrative authority, not with regards to his spiritual powers.<sup>144</sup> The tasks of a legate pertained to administration or government.<sup>145</sup> This developed as an administrative device to give papal government direct influence in usually highly localized church structures. Popes could utilize apostolic legates to perform tasks to directly implement their will in the local church, in which otherwise the bishop was responsible in his diocese and the priest in his parish.<sup>146</sup>

The legates’ spiritual jurisdiction included cognizance over cases involving clergy or other “ecclesiastical cases” (*ecclesiasticae causae*), but did not connote any sacramental function.<sup>147</sup> He received ‘no added sacraments, no new ordo, no new “ecclesiastical office” through his mandate.’<sup>148</sup> Pope Innocent IV gave his legate powers for both spiritual and

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<sup>142</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, 01, p. 588, no 3885-6.

<sup>143</sup> Doublie, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, p. 130, FN 185.

<sup>144</sup> Figuiera, *Canon Law of Medieval Papal Legation*, pp. 2/56.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

temporal administrative measures under the same circumstances, as recruiting crusaders for the military campaign against the Staufer was only one aspect of their work.

Recruitment for the crusade against the Staufer went hand in hand with further spiritual and political measures to change power in Germany. The same members of the papal party who recruited crusaders were also involved in many of the measures designed to force people to abandon their loyalty to the Staufer. The papal legate, archbishops, and the mendicant orders mainly had ecclesiastical and administrative tools of reward and punishment at their disposal, while those used by the royal candidates had more of a political and military effect.

To understand the crusade against the Staufer fully, the military campaigns and crusader recruitment should be evaluated together with further measures the papal party took to facilitate a change in power in Germany. To win over allies, they combined spiritual measures, such as excommunication and interdicts, and temporal measures, such as political alliances with secular princes. All their actions were ultimately geared towards the goal of changing power in Germany. For example, Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz tried to persuade abbot Berthold of St Gall to join Henry Raspe by threatening to remove him from his position as abbot and to confiscate the property of the abbey of St Gall (“entsatzte in von er und von guot”).<sup>149</sup> The abbot refused, arguing that the abbey held all its honour from the empire and remained allied to Conrad IV.<sup>150</sup>

During the preparation for the battle of Frankfurt in August 1246, legate Philip of Ferrara intensified his efforts to persecute those who supported the Staufer and to reward those who supported the papal party. Though it was a common occurrence for ecclesiastics to advance political goals with spiritual measures, the use of spiritual measures spiked both in scale and frequency among members of the papal party during the crusade against the Staufer.

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<sup>149</sup> Christian Kuchimaister, *Nüwe Casus Monasterii sancti Galli*, p. 20.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*

Those targeted by Philip of Ferrara were subjected to temporal and spiritual repercussions. One of the consequences of this was that the papal legate used his spiritual powers to affect political change, though it would be reductive to understand this as the only way he used his office.

When legate Philip of Ferrara combined his administrative authority with the spiritual power of his office, religion and politics became so tightly integrated that they fused. As was expected, he issued charters on administrative matters regarding spiritual issues, material transactions, and administrative decisions relevant to the Church. Philip applied punishments to both ecclesiastics and lay people, albeit with different tools.<sup>151</sup> He could suspend prelates who did not support the Church from the dignity of their offices and rescind their benefices.<sup>152</sup>

Pope Innocent IV also allowed legate Philip of Ferrara to excommunicate lay people who openly showed their support of the Staufer.<sup>153</sup> For example, he put Aachen and the whole duchy of Bavaria under the interdict because the city and duke supported the Staufer.<sup>154</sup> The mendicant orders had the same rights. Pope Innocent IV confirmed to the Dominicans the right to excommunicate those whom they wished to punish or to put them under the interdict on 13<sup>th</sup> February 1246.<sup>155</sup>

The last of legate Philip of Ferrara's tasks involved filling vacant sees and reassigning bishoprics under papal reservations, often in the context of forging new alliances.<sup>156</sup> On 9 September 1246, Innocent IV suspended free elections of bishops in Germany in an order to Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz.<sup>157</sup> This curtailed the power of the cathedral chapters and greatly interfered with the freedom of the German Church.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Köster, *Kreuzablass*, pp. 40-1.

<sup>152</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 122, no 161 and Köster, *Kreuzablass*, p. 40.

<sup>153</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, no 7687 and no 7691 and *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, vol 6, p. 319.

<sup>154</sup> *Annales Scheflarienses minores*, p. 344 and Köster, *Kreuzablass*, pp. 43/48.

<sup>155</sup> *Bullarium Ordinis FF. Praedicatorum*, pp. 170-1, no 169.

<sup>156</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, no 367 and no 490-1 and *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, p. 664.

<sup>157</sup> Berger, *Regesten Innocent IV*, I, p. 316, no 2125.

<sup>158</sup> See H. Seibert, 'Autoritätswechsel: Wahlverfahren in Kirche und Reich', in H. Seibert et al (eds.), *Autorität und Akzeptanz. Das Reich im Europa des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Ostfildern, 2013), pp. 107-136 and K. Ganzer, *Papsttum und Bistumsbesetzung in der Zeit von Gregor IX. bis Bonifaz VIII. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der päpstlichen Reservationen* (Cologne, 1968).

There was an integral relationship between partiality to the pope or emperor and local conflicts of interests, hence the lines between the crusade and local feuds were often blurred. Whether a prince joined the papal party or the imperial side often depended on whether he had been on good terms with Frederick II in recent years; changing sides was common. Historians of the twentieth and twenty-first century stressed the princes' cold and rational drive towards territorial expansion at all cost. Recent studies painted the princes as highly purposeful and cunning representatives of their family enterprises, who were always on the prowl for more land and power. This stands in contrast to the previous moral judgement of the princes as 'fickle' and lacking loyalty to their emperor, prevalent in nineteenth-century scholarship.

Yet the role of imperial princes who maintained the 'common good' of the kingdom of Germany was not clearly distinct from their role as individuals.<sup>159</sup> Their networks of power directly influenced their partiality, but so did individual friendship and enmity.<sup>160</sup> Temper and emotion influenced their decision-making process, for example when Duke Otto of Bavaria became Conrad IV's closest ally, he nevertheless maintained his personal friendship with Albert of Behaim.<sup>161</sup> Thus, neither fickleness nor pure rational focus suffice to explain the princes' motives nor their decisions. They were determined by a complex interaction of multiple political, military, ideological, and social factors, which blurred the line between crusader and 'secular' warfare.

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<sup>159</sup> H. Skoda, *Grammars of Violence. Physical Brutality in Northern France, 1270-1330* (Oxford, 2013), p. 26.

<sup>160</sup> See C. Garnier, *Amicus amicis – inimicus inimicis. Politische Freundschaft und fürstliche Netzwerke im 13. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 2000).

<sup>161</sup> See Len Scales on German identity and on the question whether a thirteenth century notion of 'the greater good' or 'public interest' applied to the conflict, idem, *The shaping of German identity: authority and crisis, 1245-1414* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 113-25.

## The Battle of Frankfurt, 5 August 1246

Henry Raspe travelled to Mainz, where he held court on 25 July 1246.<sup>162</sup> He joined his forces with those of Archbishops Siegfried and Conrad, and Bishop Henry of Strasbourg.<sup>163</sup> Bishop Landolf of Worms also received orders to fight for Henry Raspe, but he did not participate, for which Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz fined him 100 marks after the battle.<sup>164</sup> Their combined armies left Mainz in a south-east direction on 25 July and they arrived outside Frankfurt on the same day.<sup>165</sup> The city was loyal to Conrad IV.<sup>166</sup> Archbishop Arnold of Trier did not meet the party in Mainz and seems to have tried to avoid participating in the battle. Legate Philip of Ferrara had to summon him to Frankfurt upon the request of some of those who attended.<sup>167</sup>

The *Gesta Arnoldi*, which usually presents its protagonist in a favourable light, reported “that he was not seen to be motionless, the archbishop was called from the legate of the Apostolic See, as to come in help of the new King Henry.”<sup>168</sup> It also explicitly grounded his attendance in material benefits: “And so the aforesaid archbishop of Trier, not forgetful of the benefices received by the Apostolic See, quickly adjoined himself to the business of this sort like an obedient son.”<sup>169</sup>

The details of how the battle of Frankfurt unfolded show in an exemplary way how religious justification interacted with political calculation, the loyalty expected of a vassal, and papal money. The battle took place either on the north bank of the Main in a spot suitable for the warships from Worms, or adjacent to the city on the south bank of the Nidda, where the

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<sup>162</sup> *Regesten Kaiserreich Heinrich Raspe*, p. 914, no 4867-70.

<sup>163</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 289.

<sup>164</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 291, no 569.

<sup>165</sup> *Regesten Kaiserreich Heinrich Raspe*, p. 914, no 4867-70.

<sup>166</sup> *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, VI, pp. 449-50.

<sup>167</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 4865d and 4869a and *Regesta diplomatica necnon epistolaria historiae Thuringiae* p. 154, no 1355.

<sup>168</sup> “Deinde, ne torpere videretur desidia, vocatus est archiepiscopus a legato sedis apostolice, ut venire in auxilium novi regis Henrici.”, *Gesta Arnoldi*, p. 410.

<sup>169</sup> “Dictus itaque archiepiscopus, non immemor beneficorum a sede apostolica perceptorum, tanquam filius obediens ad negotium huiusmodi celeriter se accinxit.” *Ibidem*, pp. 410-1.

river was more shallow and easier to cross.<sup>170</sup> The size and detailed composition of Henry Raspe's army are hidden from us, hence it is impossible to estimate whether crusaders formed a majority.

Henry Raspe was accompanied by the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and maybe Trier, as well as Bishop Henry of Strasbourg. The *Royal Chronicle of Cologne* only explicitly mentioned the presence of Archbishops Conrad and Siegfried at the battle of Frankfurt.<sup>171</sup> The only reference for Archbishop Arnold's presence comes from the *Gesta Treverorum* and the *Gesta Arnoldi*. Beyond attesting his presence at the battle, the *Gesta Arnoldi* in its embellished version emphasizes the bravery of Archbishop Arnold: "In this conflict not with the last, but with the first archbishop of Trier merit is to be reckoned, who in the first meeting of enemies potently penetrated the wedges and he persecuted those who turned in right up to the ditches (bank) of the river near Frankfurt."<sup>172</sup> It is impossible to decide whether Archbishop Arnold took part in the battle of Frankfurt, though it is conspicuous that his presence was only reported in the chronicle that just explained his lateness and the explicit aim of which was to glorify his deeds.

Henry Raspe quickly won the battle.<sup>173</sup> Conrad IV was accompanied by nobles of his duchy of Swabia, among them Ulrich I of Württemberg and Hartmann II of Grüningen, abbot Berthold of St Gall, and armed men and warships of Worms. As always, estimation of numbers is difficult, but according to the eyewitness report by Walter of Odra, chancellor of Frederick II, Conrad IV lay on the riverside with about 3000 men-at-arms, consisting of mounted knights, foot soldiers archers, and crossbowmen (*ballistarii*).<sup>174</sup> About 2000 men belonged to the counts of Swabia, while Conrad IV contributed only about 1000 men or one third of his own retinue

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<sup>170</sup> *Annales Wormatienses*, p. 151

<sup>171</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 289.

<sup>172</sup> *Gesta Arnoldi*, p. 411.

<sup>173</sup> Egelhaas, *Die Schlacht bei Frankfurt*, p. 49.

<sup>174</sup> Walter of Odra reported the battle in a letter to King Henry III, *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, pp. 546/567.

to the army. Matthew Paris blamed this on Frederick II, who failed to adequately support his son.<sup>175</sup> Abbot Berthold came with forty horses and men-at-arms to help Conrad IV.<sup>176</sup>

According to Walter of Oera, as the battle commenced, Counts Ulrich I of Württemberg, Hartmann II of Grüningen, Hartmann of Helfenstein, and others rolled up their banners and abandoned Conrad IV's battle line.<sup>177</sup> Although the use of money to ensure loyalties became more common in the thirteenth century, the counts' decision to abandon their leader during a pitched battle due to bribery would have been seen as treason. The counts and their 200 knights and archers joined Henry Raspe's ranks.<sup>178</sup> When a high number of common men-at-arms attacked, they forced Conrad IV to retreat and flee over a bridge into Frankfurt.<sup>179</sup> Frankfurt opened its gates and with the rest of his army, he was able to find shelter in the city.<sup>180</sup>

The battle of Frankfurt on 5 August 1246 was the defining military victory of Henry Raspe's kingship.<sup>181</sup> It was to remain, however, the only battle during the crusade against the Staufer in Germany. The battle failed to end quickly the entire conflict in Germany, as it did not sufficiently damage Conrad IV's military power. Despite his victory on the battlefield, Henry Raspe had been unable to defeat Conrad IV decisively or to capture and kill him. The risk of an unpredictable outcome posed by a pitched battle meant this was not considered to be a prudent course of action for either side. At the same time though, it was a watershed moment because it showed that victory over the Staufer was possible.

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<sup>175</sup> Ibid., p. 616.

<sup>176</sup> Christian Kuchimaister, *Niwe Casus Monasterii sancti Galli*, p. 20.

<sup>177</sup> Matthew Paris' *Chronica Maiora*, p. 545 and Christian Kuchimaister, *Niwe Casus Monasterii sancti Galli*, pp. 18-9.

<sup>178</sup> Christian Kuchimaister, *Niwe Casus Monasterii sancti Galli*, pp. 18-9.

<sup>179</sup> Egelhaas, *Die Schlacht bei Frankfurt am 5. August 1246*, p. 50.

<sup>180</sup> Klötzer, 'War Frankfurt wirklich stauferfreundlich?', p. 552.

<sup>181</sup> See for example *Regesta Imperii V*, p. 819, *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, 6, 451, and *Chronica minor auctore minorita Erphordiensi*, p. 201.

### **Court day outside Frankfurt, August 1246**

Even after Henry Raspe defeated Conrad IV, the city of Frankfurt did not admit him and he was forced to hold the court day outside the gates of Frankfurt on 13 August 1246, while his defeated opponent received shelter inside the city.<sup>182</sup> Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz participated in the court day, Archbishop Arnold of Trier was absent, and there is no evidence whether Archbishop Conrad of Cologne was present.<sup>183</sup>

Henry Raspe deposed Conrad IV from the duchy of Swabia and all his assets in Germany. No direct evidence for this is extant directly from Henry Raspe, but his sentence can be inferred from a reply by Pope Innocent IV, sent to Henry Raspe's successor on 8 February 1253, in which he referenced Henry Raspe's actions at the court day outside Frankfurt. In the light of such high stakes for Conrad IV, it is especially noteworthy that no German chronicle reported this event.<sup>184</sup> The most likely explanation for silence on this matter is that it did not make sense for Henry Raspe to promulgate his sentence before he overturned Staufer power in Germany.

When Henry Raspe deposed Conrad IV as duke of Swabia, the deposition had several political functions. It disqualified completely any of Conrad IV's claims to being king, especially his father's attempt to raise him as the heir to Staufer power in 1237, and underlined Henry's power as king to enfeoff vassals with fiefs. His power as king, including his newly acquired legal power to depose Conrad IV as duke of Swabia, was not yet recognized, and a successful deposition would have done much to create a strong perception of his powerful rule.

In his letter, Pope Innocent IV argued that Henry Raspe and William of Holland could depose Conrad IV because he was a persecutor of the Church and was invested by neither Pope

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<sup>182</sup>*Regesten Kaiserreich Heinrich Raspe*, pp. 9-10, no 6, and Klötzer, 'War Frankfurt wirklich stauferfreundlich?', p. 552.

<sup>183</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 291, no 569.

<sup>184</sup> Orth, 'Frankfurt', pp. 324-5.

Innocent IV nor his predecessor Gregory IX.<sup>185</sup> This argument is ideologically remarkable, because the pope only invested the emperor and there was no tradition that the pope invested the *Rex Romanorum* as king. The binding acts needed to raise a king were the election by the princes and the coronation. This claim, therefore, starkly illustrates Pope Innocent IV's ambition to elevate papal power over the process of becoming the new ruler at every stage.

Henry Raspe's attempt to depose Conrad IV of the dukedom of Swabia turned out to be central for his military campaigns.<sup>186</sup> It emerged as one of the decisive factors for Henry Raspe's military campaign, as the loyalty of the Swabian nobles to their new king enabled Henry Raspe to enter the duchy of Swabia on his military campaign five to six months later.<sup>187</sup>

Furthermore, the events at the battle of Frankfurt also determined Conrad IV's future relationship with the nobles of Swabia. Immediately after the battle, Conrad IV angrily accused the remaining Swabian nobles of betraying him.<sup>188</sup> As nobles of his own duchy, their relationship to Conrad IV was especially close, so the betrayal by some of them must have been disturbing.

The *Annales Argentinenses* reported that Conrad IV misdirected his frustration at the remaining Swabian nobles, who had stayed loyal to him during the battle.<sup>189</sup> However, the writer of the chronicle then proceeded to reverse the causation of events that led to the defeat at the battle, implying that Conrad IV accused the remaining Swabian nobles of treason without evidence and that the remaining Swabian nobles were so enraged by these false accusations that they also joined the papal side. The Swabian counts, who had an obvious interest in the promulgation of a version that absolved them of moral guilt, were directly involved in the propagation of this version of events.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, pp. 1377-8, no 8569.

<sup>186</sup> Zotz, 'Schwaben und das Königtum Heinrich Raspes', p. 105.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>188</sup> *Annales Argentinenses*, p. 121.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>190</sup> Egelhaas, *Die Schlacht bei Frankfurt am 5. August 1246*, pp. 51-2.

The switch of loyalty among certain Swabian nobles was mainly a consequence of Staufer territorial policy in Swabia under Frederick II. During the 1230s, Frederick II's Swabian policies caused a significant loss of territory for certain lords, such as Count Egino V of Freiburg, Lord Henry of Neuffen, and other nobles, which likely resulted in a humiliating sense of defeat.<sup>191</sup> Military actions to fight the Swabian nobles bound Conrad IV's energy in Swabia over the next years and for most of the time prevented him from directly confronting Henry Raspe and his successor.

### **Henry Raspe and papal money**

For his military campaigns, Henry Raspe was in urgent need of extensive funds, to consolidate his military success and to seal his succession to Conrad IV.<sup>192</sup> The dynasty of the Ludowinger, to which he belonged, was not sufficiently wealthy to stem the financial burden, unlike the first three candidates whom Pope Gregory IX approached, who were all royal sons. Hence, he secured financial aid in his prolonged negotiations with Pope Innocent IV in preparation for his election. No accounts for Innocent IV are extant, but a list of expenses survives from a certain magister Hugo, cantor at Erfurt, who distributed papal funds on Henry Raspe's behalf, and several chroniclers also commented on various payments.<sup>193</sup>

According to the *Royal Chronicle of Cologne* and the *Peterschronik* from Erfurt, Henry Raspe received a total 25,000 marks from Pope Innocent IV, which he acquired in two deliveries.<sup>194</sup> He first received 10,000 marks.<sup>195</sup> They directly enabled Henry Raspe to bribe the counts of Swabia to cross to his side during the battle of Frankfurt. Some of the money contributed to his general ability to lead military campaigns. Parts of his army may have been

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<sup>191</sup> Zotz, 'Schwaben und das Königtum Heinrich Raspes', pp. 108-11.

<sup>192</sup> Büttner, 'Nervus rerum', p. 482.

<sup>193</sup> 'Rationes de pecunia papali expensa in commodum Heinrici antiregis', pp. 629-31.

<sup>194</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 289.

<sup>195</sup> Gottlob, *Päpstliche Kreuzzugs-Steuern*, p. 79.

formed by secular men-at-arms, and even crusaders may not have covered all of their costs themselves. Henry also needed money to pay new allies, as was the general practice, to enact royal generosity (*largitas*), to bind them to him more tightly, and to strengthen the power of his rule.<sup>196</sup>

The second delivery of financial aid was transported to Liège by the bishop of Louvain and a certain brother Benevicus on 6 September 1246. Magister Hugo gradually distributed 14,000 marks, in declining order from weighed gold to silver (*aurum et argentum at pondus Coloniense*), to English sterling (*sterlingos ad numerum XII solidorum pro marca*).<sup>197</sup> Between 6 September 1246 and 2 January 1247, he recorded 48 individual payments to Henry Raspe's supporters after the battle of Frankfurt, as well as expenses for his court and servants.<sup>198</sup>

The first payment took place in Liège, the second three months later in Schmalkalden (gold on the first day, coins on the next day), the third payment took place another month later again in Liège. Henry Raspe used the papal money to reward his most important supporters for their efforts. The biggest sums went to Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, who received 3740 marks and Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz, who received 1200 marks, Henry Raspe's creditors, as well as his marshal and chamberlain.

The rest of the sum went to other esteemed ecclesiastical and secular nobles. For example, the burgrave of Nuremberg received 300 marks and the burgrave of Querfurt received 100 marks. It can be speculated whether the lack of payment to Archbishop Arnold of Trier indicates that he did not participate in the battle of Frankfurt or that legate Philip of Ferrara had to summon him specifically. A small part of the money was paid for the organisation of the transport: for messengers, transport, and guards. Henry Raspe had taken up credit, presumably before his election, which he was now able to repay.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Büttner, 'Nervus rerum', pp. 480-1.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> 'Rationes de pecunia papali expensa in commodum Heinrici antiregis', p. 629.

<sup>199</sup> Büttner, 'Nervus rerum', p. 481.

### **Archbishop Arnold of Trier's siege of Thurant castle, September 1246**

After the battle of Frankfurt, Archbishop Arnold spent the rest of August 1246 in preparation for the siege of Thurant castle, on the river Moselle, west of Mainz and Frankfurt.<sup>200</sup> Possession of the castle went back and forth between the archbishops of Trier and Cologne and members of Duke Otto of Bavaria's family of Wittelsbach.<sup>201</sup> The Wittelsbach family was able to claim the castle based on their status as counts palatine of the Rhine. By 1246, after several changes, Thurant had been in the possession of the count palatines of the Rhine and the dukes of Bavaria for twenty years, though the archbishops of Trier and Cologne demanded possession of the castle because of its geographical location.

A Rhenish vassal in the service of Duke Otto of Bavaria, a certain knight called Berlewin, but widely known as Zorno or Zurn ('anger'), held Thurant castle as burgrave. He used it as a base from which he sortied to rob and attack the surrounding territories. This provided justification for Archbishop Arnold to take military action. The *Gesta Arnoldi* deliberately framed Archbishop Arnold's siege as a protective measure for the population, as opposed to a political manoeuvre against the Staufer.<sup>202</sup> Moreover, Zorno acted as a foil to highlight the ungodliness of the Staufer cause.

Burgrave Zorno had been harassing the population who lived around the castle for a while, but the timing of the attack in September 1246 sheds light on Archbishop Arnold's motivation. Conrad IV was in the process of binding himself more closely to Duke Otto of Bavaria. On 1 September 1246, Elisabeth of Wittelsbach, Duke Otto's daughter, married Conrad IV, which made Duke Otto and the Wittelsbach dynasty the strongest ally of the Staufer in Germany. Thus, the need to secure the castle became more urgent when it gained strategic

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<sup>200</sup> Zenz, *Die Taten der Trierer*, p. 63 and *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 294

<sup>201</sup> S. Ulrich, 'Arras, Beilstein, Bernkastel, Cochem und Thurandt. Beobachtungen an einigen Moselburgen', *Burgen und Schlösser. Zeitschrift für Burgenforschung und Denkmalpflege* 49/3 (2008), p. 158.

<sup>202</sup> Zenz, *Die Taten der Trierer*, p. 63.

importance for Henry Raspe's future campaigns against Duke Otto and Conrad IV in Swabia and Bavaria.

By September 1246, Archbishop Arnold arrived at Thurant castle supported by a retinue comprising of his relatives, followers, and friends. Meanwhile, Duke Otto of Bavaria and his supporters tried to support Zorno and to defend the castle in several campaigns.<sup>203</sup> Zorno also reinforced his retinue with nobles and men-at-arms from the upper parts of Lothringia, whom he persuaded "both by prayers and large sums of money", according to the *Royal Chronicle of Cologne*. Those who supported Zorno probably did so despite his bad reputation, in order to support the vassal of Conrad IV's new father-in-law. It is not possible to determine how long Archbishop Arnold was present at Thurant in person, as there is no information regarding his location and actions from October to December 1246. He was attested in Koblenz on 9 January 1247.<sup>204</sup> The castle would absorb the archbishop's energy for the next two years; he was present at the siege of Thurant in September 1246, April 1247, and September 1248.<sup>205</sup>

### **The siege of Nuremberg, December 1246**

Henry Raspe used the next months to prepare thoroughly his next military campaign in the duchies of Bavaria and Swabia. The attack on the duchies would allow him to put into practice Conrad IV's deposition as duke of Swabia and to fight Conrad's IV father-in-law. By establishing himself in Bavaria, he could exploit the rebellion of the Bavarian nobles against Duke Otto and showed his presence close to a centre of Staufer power.<sup>206</sup> Henry Raspe returned to Thuringia in late October or early November 1246 and moved between Wartburg castle and

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<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe zu Trier*, p. 45.

<sup>205</sup> Zenz, *Die Taten der Trierer*, p. 64 and *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe zu Trier*, pp. 45-6.

<sup>206</sup> R. Schieffer, 'Nürnberg: die Kaiserburg als Herrschaftszentrum der Salier und Staufer', in R. Schieffer (ed.), *Schauplätze der Geschichte in Bayern* (Munch, 2003), pp. 90-103 and A. Schmid, 'Vom "fundus Nuorenberg" zur "civitas Nuoremerch". Die Anfänge der Stadt Nürnberg in der Zeit der Salier und Staufer', in H. Neuhaus (ed.), *Nürnberg. Eine europäische Stadt in Mittelalter und Neuzeit* (Nuremberg, 2000), pp. 3-21.

Eisenach city, which it overlooks. This can be inferred from the presence of legate Philip of Ferrara on the Wartburg on 26 October 1246, who was unlikely to have travelled there without Henry Raspe.<sup>207</sup>

The legate also accompanied Henry Raspe during the next months, while the archbishops acted independently. Archbishops Siegfried and Conrad most likely tended to the business of their dioceses, whereas Archbishop Arnold of Trier besieged Thurant castle.<sup>208</sup> In his letter from 30 November 1246, Henry Raspe informed Archbishop Dietrich of Ravenna that he planned to invade Swabia, though when he claimed that most members of the Swabian nobility already “lay at his feet”, he overstated his position.<sup>209</sup>

Beyond the nobles connected to Counts Ulrich of Württemberg and Hartmann of Grüningen, most major cities of Swabia remained stoutly loyal to Conrad IV.<sup>210</sup> Before he could attack Swabia, he advanced into Bavaria. Henry Raspe moved from Schmalkalden in Thuringia into Frankish lands. When he crossed Franconia, Swabian nobles probably joined him.<sup>211</sup> He set up his military camp in Forchheim castle in Bavaria on 15 December 1246, before arriving outside Nuremberg.<sup>212</sup> He pressed ahead with urgency; the military campaign took place in winter, even though the winter of 1246-7 was particularly cold.<sup>213</sup> His goal was to hold a court day in Nuremberg in December 1246.

The death of Archbishop Eberhard of Salzburg on 1 December 1246 may also have contributed to the timing of the siege. Henry Raspe may have wanted to escort his chancellor

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<sup>207</sup> *Regesta diplomatica necnon epistolaria historiae Thuringiae*, 3, p. 1400 and Werner, ‘Reichsfürst zwischen Mainz und Meissen’, p. 247.

<sup>208</sup> There is almost no information about the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne for the rest of 1246 and January 1247, but this can be inferred from two charters from October 1246 and January 1247, when Archbishop Conrad was in Cologne and Bonn and tended to his business as archbishop.

<sup>209</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, pp. 14-5, no 11.

<sup>210</sup> *Bavarian continuation of the Sächsische Weltchronik*, p. 257 and Weller, ‘Konrad IV. und die Schwaben’, p. 122.

<sup>211</sup> Zotz, ‘Schwaben und das Königtum Heinrich Raspes’, p. 121.

<sup>212</sup> *Regesta Imperii V*, p. 2, no 10.

<sup>213</sup> *Annales Ensдорf*, p. 5. See Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 38 and Zotz, ‘Schwaben und das Königtum Heinrich Raspes’, p. 121.

Burkhard of Ziegenhain to ensure that he became the new archbishop of Salzburg. After the death of his predecessor, who was among the most pro-Staufer ecclesiastical princes, the papal party could now fill this important seat with a loyal archbishop.

Henry Raspe first had to conquer Nuremberg before he could hold his court day there.<sup>214</sup> Nuremberg consisted of the city, fortified with a wall, and a castle. The castle was controlled by burgrave Frederick III of the Zollern family, who upon Henry Raspe's arrival outside of Nuremberg, gave up the castle and granted him access to the city.

Burgrave Frederick III of Zollern probably had been loyal to Henry Raspe for the past six and a half months, since he was present at his election on 22 May.<sup>215</sup> He was bribed to switch his allegiance to Henry Raspe, as he received 300 gold marks as papal expenses on 6 December 1246.<sup>216</sup> Perhaps Frederick III was also influenced by his sororal brother-in-law, Duke Otto of Merania, who had switched his loyalty to Henry Raspe sometime earlier in 1246. He probably did so to protect his possessions in Franconia, which he held as a fief from Bishop Henry of Bamberg, who also switched to the papal side in 1246. Local political considerations were once again decisive in choosing important loyalties.

Regardless of the exact timing and circumstances, when burgrave Frederick III from the Zollern family switched sides to Henry Raspe, he saved him a costly and lengthy siege of Nuremberg castle.<sup>217</sup> From within the castle, Henry Raspe staged a brief siege of the city that had been loyal to Conrad IV.<sup>218</sup> The citizens of Nuremberg defended themselves and Henry Raspe was also unsuccessfully opposed by Conrad IV and his army.<sup>219</sup> If Henry Raspe had already taken possession of the castle as the centre of military fortification though, the enemy

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<sup>214</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 37.

<sup>215</sup> Frenken, *Das Interregnum als historische Chance*, p. 1088, FN 79.

<sup>216</sup> 'Rationes de pecunia papali expensa in commodum Heinrici antiregis', pp. 629-31.

<sup>217</sup> See Frenken, *Das Interregnum als historische Chance*, p. 1077, FN 23 and p. 1088, FN 79 and Bosl, 'Das staufische Nürnberg, Pfalzort und Königsstadt', p. 28.

<sup>218</sup> Bosl, 'Das staufische Nürnberg, Pfalzort und Königsstadt', p. 28.

<sup>219</sup> Frenken, 'Das Interregnum als historische Chance', pp. 1069-1175 and Bosl, 'Nürnberg im Interregnum', pp. 29-33.

was already within the city walls and their military position was very disadvantageous. Henry Raspe was able to take the city and opened his court day in Nuremberg on Christmas day. It lasted for the last two weeks of December 1246.<sup>220</sup>

### **Military campaigns in Bavaria and Swabia, January 1247**

Henry Raspe spent January crossing the duchy of Bavaria between Nuremberg and Ulm, accompanied by the Swabian nobles.<sup>221</sup> He fought the troops of Duke of Otto in Bavaria to support the Bavarian nobles who had risen against the duke because of his daughter Elisabeth's marriage to Conrad IV.<sup>222</sup> Information on this campaign is sparse, so it is difficult to discuss it in detail. The only references were in the *Chronicon Erphordiense* ("Heinricus rex dum secundam in Bavariam atque Sueviam fecisset expeditionem") and in a charter by magister Hugo ("mihi eunti in Bavariam").<sup>223</sup> For the first time, Henry Raspe was not successful. His support for the Bavarian nobles failed and Duke Otto was able to maintain control over the duchy of Bavaria.<sup>224</sup>

However, there is evidence that Duke Otto of Bavaria was not as unwavering a supporter of Conrad IV as his military actions suggest. He contacted the papal curia shortly before the attack by his own Bavarian nobles to find a solution to the conflict between the Staufer and Innocent IV.<sup>225</sup> Duke Otto of Bavaria maintained a personal friendship with Albert of Behaim, dean of Passau and papal loyalist, in spite of their opposing loyalties in the conflict.

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<sup>220</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 37.

<sup>221</sup> *Regesta Imperii V*, p. 2, no 11 and no number, between 12 and 13.

<sup>222</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 37.

<sup>223</sup> *Chronicon Erphordiense*, p. 405 and *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 2, no 12.

<sup>224</sup> See M. Spindler and A. Kraus, 'Die Auseinandersetzungen mit Landesadel, Episkopat und Königtum unter den drei ersten wittelsbachischen Herzögen (1180–1253)', in A. Kraus (ed.), *Das Alte Bayern. Der Territorialstaat vom Ausgang des 12. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ausgang des 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1988), pp. 7-52.

<sup>225</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 37.

Albert of Behaim intervened on Duke Otto's behalf at the papal curia; however, the harsh conditions the duke was given made it impossible for him to submit to Innocent IV.<sup>226</sup>

In a letter to Duke Otto, Albert of Behaim suggested three options as to how he could make peace with the pope, though Innocent IV's thoughts are unknown.<sup>227</sup> The first option was to annul the marriage between Elisabeth and Conrad IV and to find a new marriage for her, which would allow for the excommunication and interdict over the duchy of Bavaria to be resolved. The second option was a best-case scenario, in which the marriage between Elisabeth and Conrad IV continued, the pope took the young Staufer back into his protection, and in return Conrad IV gave up the crown and distanced himself from his father Frederick II. The third option was that Frederick II was able to undo his deposition, Conrad IV remained *Rex Romanorum*, and the marriage between him and Elisabeth continued. This, however, Albert of Behaim considered to be the least likely scenario. He warned Duke Otto that if he failed, he too would be excommunicated and deposed.<sup>228</sup>

If even Conrad IV's father-in-law considered abandoning his support, Henry Raspe's endeavour of making an alliance with Bavarian nobles against their lord appeared all the more realistic and promising. Duke Otto's negotiation via Albert of Behaim with the papal curia again showed that even alliances of the highest calibre were fragile and that his support for Conrad IV was not idealistic, but well-calculated.

After leaving Bavaria, Henry Raspe entered the dukedom of Swabia in January 1247, upon the invitation of Counts Ulrich of Württemberg and Hartmann of Grüningen.<sup>229</sup> They joined forces with other Swabian nobles who abandoned their loyalty to Conrad IV, like Count Eginow V of Freiburg and Lord Henry of Neuffens and attacked Conrad IV and his supporters

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<sup>226</sup> *Aventinische Exzerpte des Albert von Behaim*, pp. 118-21.

<sup>227</sup> *Das Brief- und Memorialbuch des Albert Behaim*, pp. 475-80, no 133 and pp. 481-2, no 134.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.* and F. A. W. Schreiber, *Otto der Erlauchte. Pfalzgraf bei Rhein und Herzog von Bayern* (Munich, 1861), p. 273.

<sup>229</sup> *Bavarian continuation of the Sächsische Weltchronik*, p. 257.

around the rivers Danube and Main.<sup>230</sup> It is possible that they were able to conquer certain imperial cities, but they remained unnamed in the sources.<sup>231</sup>

**1247**

### **The siege of Ulm, January-February 1247**

Later in January 1247, Henry Raspe laid siege to the city of Ulm.<sup>232</sup> Due to its political importance, Ulm was probably the main destination of Henry Raspe's military campaign, even though his precise route through Bavaria and Swabia may have developed spontaneously.<sup>233</sup> The city contained a royal palace called *Weinhof*, where the Staufer under Frederick II held court on several occasions.<sup>234</sup> It was also an important centre of commerce, lay on strategically important routes, and held the hospital 'Zum heiligen Geist' next to estates owned by the Teutonic Order.<sup>235</sup>

The Staufer visited the royal palace so frequently that Ulm represented Staufer rule like no other city in Swabia.<sup>236</sup> If Henry Raspe was able to conquer it, he would be able to conquer the entire duchy of Swabia. Conrad IV was under attack by the Swabian nobles, who were able to force him into a defensive position and drove him from city to city in his own duchy.<sup>237</sup> The Swabian cities remained pro-Staufer though, so he would have been able to use their fortifications to shelter his army.<sup>238</sup> The palace was fortified by a wall manned with citizens

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<sup>230</sup> *Annales Argentinenses*, p. 121.

<sup>231</sup> *Annales Schefflariensis maiores*, p. 342.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>233</sup> Zotz, 'Schwaben und das Königtum Heinrich Raspes', p. 108-22.

<sup>234</sup> Schlesinger, 'Pfalz und Stadt Ulm bis zur Stauferzeit', pp. 9-30.

<sup>235</sup> Hohenstatt, *Entwicklung des Territoriums der Reichsstadt Ulm im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert*, p. 9.

<sup>236</sup> Maurer, *Der Herzog von Schwaben*, p. 275.

<sup>237</sup> *Annales Argentinenses*, p. 121.

<sup>238</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 823.

who organized their military according to their guilds.<sup>239</sup> Both the city and the palace were mostly controlled by Conrad IV.<sup>240</sup> Henry Raspe lacked provisions and his siege stalled.<sup>241</sup>

However, in February 1247 Henry Raspe suddenly became ill and was forced to lift the siege. He returned to the Wartburg castle, where he died on 16 February 1247. He was only active as an anti-king for nine months. Without his leadership, military activity by the Rhenish archbishops or other pro-papal supporters ceased in Germany.<sup>242</sup>

### **Appraisal of Henry Raspe's crusade**

The choice of Henry Raspe as royal candidate meant that Pope Innocent IV settled for a candidate of lower nobility than the candidates to whom he initially offered the German throne. The landgrave of Thuringia was also less wealthy, which put a greater burden on the papal treasury in a time when funds were needed for Louis IX's general passage. Innocent IV was aware of this downside, as the lengthy negotiations with Henry Raspe showed, but prepared to accept it. Perhaps the reason was that Henry was well-connected among the German princes; his heartlands in Thuringia and Hesse were located centrally in the kingdom. Through his brother Conrad of Thuringia as Master of the Teutonic Order, the landgraves also had a connection to religious warfare. However, Henry Raspe was only elected by ecclesiastical princes, which undermined the credibility of his claim to the throne among the temporal princes in Germany.

Henry Raspe conceptualized his strategy of power change as a direct military confrontation. His first attempt at direct military confrontation was the battle of Frankfurt. For this, Henry Raspe required as many men as possible, so crusader recruitment saw an upsurge in preparation for the battle of Frankfurt. The battle failed to defeat Stauffer power in Germany

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<sup>239</sup> Fischer, *Geschichte der Stadt Ulm*, pp. 61-2.

<sup>240</sup> Hohenstatt, *Entwicklung des Territoriums der Reichsstadt Ulm im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert*, pp. 3/7.

<sup>241</sup> Toch, *Medieval German City under Siege*, p. 39.

<sup>242</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 823 and Werner, *Reichsfürst zwischen Mainz und Meissen*, pp. 39-40.

once and for all, but it enabled him to depose Conrad IV as duke of Swabia at the court day in Frankfurt. Henry Raspe took advantage of the weak state of kingship due to Frederick II's conflict with Henry (VII), but his actions also mirrored Pope Innocent IV's deposition of Frederick II. To implement the deposition, Henry Raspe and his allies invaded in the duchies of Swabia and Bavaria. The decision was to have not just legal and political, but also decisive military consequences, as it bound the Staufer's military capacity in the duchies of Swabia and Bavaria over the following years.

To raise an army, Henry Raspe could rely on the efficient machinery of crusader recruitment. Before Henry Raspe was elected king, Archbishops Siegfried of Mainz and Conrad of Cologne preached the word of the cross on behalf of the crusade. They were assisted by their suffragan bishops, but their expertise and capacity were limited. Envoy Philip of Ferrara took over recruitment; he was so successful in his handling of the 'business of the empire' (*negotium imperii*) that Innocent IV promoted him to papal legate. He extended the scale of recruitment and made use of the Dominican and Franciscan Orders. The orders had a dense network of foundations in Germany and other kingdoms; the friars preached in cities and travelled the country. Meanwhile, legate Peter distributed spiritual punishments and rewards in support of Henry Raspe's kingship.

In practice, the fact that the military campaigns were part of crusade only made a difference in the realms of recruitment and the provision of papal funds. There, however, it was indispensable. Recruitment for Henry Raspe's military campaign worked because of its specific appeal as a crusade. The indulgences and remissions of sin that recruits received when they assumed the cross functioned as a currency, the wages for military service. They replaced feudal ties and to a certain degree monetary funds, which otherwise would have been necessary for any royal candidate who wanted to recruit an army. Without utilising the appeal of

crusading, Henry Raspe would not have been able to raise a sufficiently large army to attempt to overthrow Conrad IV.

In addition to crusader recruitment, one of the decisive factors for Henry Raspe's military success was his reliance on papal money. Henry bribed Counts Ulrich of Württemberg and Hartmann of Grüningen to change sides during the battle of Frankfurt, which allowed Henry Raspe to depose Conrad IV as duke of Swabia at the court day in Frankfurt. He also bribed burgrave Frederick III of Zollern at Nuremberg castle in December 1246 and his servant magister Hugo made a variety of payments to nobles between September 1246 and January 1247. Military success financed by the papal treasury illustrated how dependent Henry Raspe was on papal support. Papal money opened up certain doors to Henry Raspe in practical terms, but on the ground it undermined his claims to status and independence; it is unclear, though, whether papal money also jarred with the image of a crusader fighting in defence of the faith for the liberty of the Church.

Finally, it is noteworthy that there is only scant evidence for a personal programme of religious propaganda by Henry Raspe. One can point to the golden seal showing iconography traditionally associated with the papacy that he used after his election, his connection through his brother to the Teutonic Order, and his mocking nickname *Rex Clericorum*, but they do not amount to a comprehensive programme. None of the tangible rituals and acts that gave a religious dimension to the military campaigns, such as the veneration of saints and relics or the expectation of miracles and martyrdom, were reflected in the chronicles, even those produced in the vicinity of the archbishops. Even if such rituals took place, they were not important enough to be recorded as an integral part of the crusade. It is possible to argue that the act of taking up the cross and acting as a crusader, as opposed to a secular royal candidate, is in itself the strongest possible mark of spirituality. However, this over-relies on the crusade as a self-explanatory vehicle to carry the papal narrative. It does not reconcile the tension between the

political purpose of replacing Conrad IV as King of the Romans and the spiritual aspirations of a holy war.

### Chapter 3: William of Holland's Crusade, 1247-51

#### Transition period between Henry Raspe and William of Holland, February-October 1247

Even after Henry Raspe's death, Innocent IV does not seem to have considered an alternative to continuing the fight against the Staufer in Germany. Without a temporal ruler around whom they could rally, it was unclear what the future held for crusaders fighting against the Staufer in Germany. Pope Innocent's IV actions suggest that he wished quickly to remedy this situation by replacing his deceased royal candidate with a new champion.

After February 1247, Innocent IV swiftly transferred the office of apostolic legate from Philip of Ferrara to cardinal deacon Peter Capocci (1200-59).<sup>1</sup> Cardinal Peter was greatly experienced and among the group of cardinals whom Innocent IV himself raised to the office in 1244, so the pope could expect a substantial level of loyalty from him.<sup>2</sup> His high status also reflected the increased importance Innocent IV attributed to Germany, by this point in the face of the dangerous escalation of the conflict caused by his first attempt at changing power.<sup>3</sup>

As was typical for cardinals, Peter Capocci came to Germany as a legate *a latere*, as close as if he sprung from the pope's flank.<sup>4</sup> Legates *a latere* were of the highest class and held the full powers of a general mandate.<sup>5</sup> As such, they could perform certain tasks 'by right of legation' (*iure legationis*) purely as a function of their office; through additional 'special mandates' they could even be tasked with duties normally reserved for the pope's jurisdiction alone.<sup>6</sup> Under Peter Capocci's legateship, the role of the apostolic legate tasked with changing

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<sup>1</sup> F. Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci. Ein Staatsmann und Feldherr des XIII. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1933), pp. 1-15 and Canz, *Philipp Fontana*, p. 34.

<sup>2</sup> J. Johrendt, 'Zwischen Autorität und Gehorsam: Papst und Kardinalskolleg im 13. Jahrhundert', in H. Seibert et al (eds.), *Autorität und Akzeptanz. Das Reich im Europa des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Ostfildern, 2013), pp. 65-90 and K. Eubel, *Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi* (Regensburg Monastery, 1913-1923), p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, pp. 16-20 and Figuiera, *Canon Law of Medieval Papal Legates*, p. 270.

<sup>4</sup> Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, pp. 23-5 and Figuiera, *Canon Law of Medieval Papal Legates*, pp. 264/275.

<sup>5</sup> Figuiera, *Canon Law of Medieval Papal Legates*, p. 270.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 296.

power took its fullest manifestation in Germany, and he significantly shaped the crusade against the Staufer.

In preparation for the new royal candidate, Innocent IV ensured that the machinery of changing power did not grind to a halt in Germany. Legate Peter arrived in the kingdom in the second half of March 1247, though it was not always clear whether he would be able to reach his destination.<sup>7</sup> If he found Germany “too dangerous to enter”, he was allowed to divert his course and instead to take action against the Staufer in Poland, Pomerania, Denmark, Cambrai, and the bordering diocese of Reims.<sup>8</sup>

Legate Peter came to Germany armed with at least twenty-five special mandates, mostly dated from 15-17 March 1247, which complemented and sometimes superseded the inherent powers of his general commission.<sup>9</sup> None of them focused on identifying a new candidate to be king though. If his primary task had been to negotiate the conditions under which a new royal candidate joined the papal party, legate Peter would have probably received specific powers pertaining to this task.<sup>10</sup> Instead, the responsibility to find a new royal candidate lay with the archbishops, especially Archbishop Conrad of Cologne. After the death of Henry Raspe, Archbishop Conrad of Cologne travelled to Lyon in the same month, where he and Innocent IV deliberated who should replace Henry Raspe.<sup>11</sup>

Legate Peter carried at least five letters that recommended him to ecclesiastics and the secular nobility in Germany, as well as specifically to ecclesiastics in areas where he was going to preach the cross against Frederick II.<sup>12</sup> The exact nature of the support he could expect from them is difficult to pinpoint, but it did not seem to go as far as marking themselves with the

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<sup>7</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, 2970/2974, 2975, 2987-9 and *Regesta Imperii*, V, 7752.

<sup>8</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, no 2969.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, no 2970/2974-5/2987-8, *Regesta Imperii*, V, 7752, and *Ep Saec XIII*, no 301. See also Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, p. 22 and Figuiera, *Canon Law of Medieval Papal Legates*, p. 299.

<sup>10</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 447, no 2981.

<sup>11</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis* and *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 187, no 1307.

<sup>12</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, 2968-70/2972/2980-1.

cross, and the quotidian impact on most of them probably remained quite small. In accordance with Innocent IV's explicit 'carrot and stick strategy', most of the mandates focused on winning support for the papal party, while simultaneously trying to punish and damage Staufer supporters.<sup>13</sup> One mandate tried to restrict the way clerics could accumulate income from benefices and tithes, which pointed to a sense of duty with regards to proper procedure despite the testing situation of the papal party and the German Church.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, five mandates ensured that he was financially supported by German ecclesiastics.<sup>15</sup>

Crusader recruitment continued in Germany and internationally. On 18 and 20 March 1247, Innocent IV ordered legate Peter to dispatch further prelates to Germany, Denmark, and Poland to preach the cross against Frederick II.<sup>16</sup> To facilitate recruitment in Germany, Innocent IV also allowed legate Peter Capocci to expand his legatine mandate over Danish and Polish crusader recruits who came to Germany.<sup>17</sup> According to Matthew Paris, in March 1247 Innocent IV also dispatched new papal legates to Italy, Spain, and Norway, who were likely to contribute to the crusade against the Staufer in men and money.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, legate Peter's mandates anticipated that he would spend more of his time with the challenge of winning over allies to assemble an army, as opposed to blanket preaching of the cross.<sup>19</sup> Maybe after the first wave of recruitment for William's predecessor, many potential recruits had already taken the cross.

When legate Peter began to recruit crusaders in Germany, his actions were harsher and more coercive than those of his predecessor. The cross was preached in areas that were under the interdict and a letter by legate Peter Capocci to the clergy of Zurich from 12 August 1247

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 2965/2971/2973-7/2982-6/2990-2/2994.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 2993.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 2967/2978-9/2987-8.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 2964/2999/3002, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 12458, and *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 219, no 292, p. 234, no 309, p. 237, no 313.

<sup>17</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, 2965-6.

<sup>18</sup> *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, pp. 612-3.

<sup>19</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, 2964/2966/2970/2974-5/2987-8, *Regesta Imperii*, V, 7752, *Ep Saec XIII*, no 202 and 301.

showed that disobedient ecclesiastics were forced to comply by censure.<sup>20</sup> People who were under the interdict would only receive the sacraments and have their children baptised if they took the cross against the Staufer.<sup>21</sup> Even those dying could not receive the sacraments without providing financial security.<sup>22</sup> Measures to force people to take the cross so that it could not be considered a voluntary act anymore were not new, but legate Peter expanded the scale of these measures in an unprecedented way by implementing them throughout Germany. Between March and October 1247, the mendicant orders also continued to recruit new crusaders, though the task was more difficult without a new royal candidate.<sup>23</sup>

Despite his general tendency to cooperate with his archiepiscopal colleagues, legate Peter did not hesitate to overrule them if he saw it fit to do so. The election of a new bishop of Worms in June 1247 was the first instance when he cooperated with Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz. Bishop Landolf of Worms died on 8 or 11 June 1247.<sup>24</sup> Despite the papal prohibition of free elections, the chapter of Worms initially elected raugrave Eberhard, who was also supported by Archbishop Siegfried.<sup>25</sup> In spite of their decision, Conrad of Dürckheim briefly became the new bishop of Worms. Both candidates supported the papal party, but legate Peter Capocci ignored the chapter's election as well as Archbishop Siegfried's support for their candidate and gave the power to elect Conrad of Dürckheim as bishop of Worms to four canons instead.

If the archbishops were not preoccupied with preparations to continue the change in power in Germany, they tended to the business of their dioceses, though information on their

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<sup>20</sup> *Urkundenbuch der Stadt und Landschaft Zürich, Volume I*, ed. J. Escher et al (Zurich, 1888-1957), no 682 and *Regesta Imperii, V*, no 10194.

<sup>21</sup> Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, p. 68.

<sup>22</sup> Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, pp. 66-8 and Köster, *Kreuzablass*, p. 48.

<sup>23</sup> See Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 65.

<sup>24</sup> *Chronicon Wormatiense*, p. 102.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. See B. Keilmann, *Der Kampf um die Stadtherrschaft in Worms während des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Worms, 1985), pp. 128-66 and idem, 'Papst Innozenz IV. und die Kirche von Worms', *Archiv für mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte* 40 (1988), pp. 43-66. See K. Ganzer, 'Zur Beschränkung der Bischofswahl auf die Domkapitel in Theorie und Praxis des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* 58 (1972) pp. 166-97.

actions is patchy between February and October 1247. In Lyon in February 1247, Archbishop Conrad and Innocent IV also discussed who should fill the vacant see of Liège.<sup>26</sup> In May 1247, Archbishop Conrad travelled to Liège to arrange for the election of a new bishop.<sup>27</sup> Archbishop Arnold was present at the siege of Thurant castle on 13 April 1247.<sup>28</sup> Meanwhile, some time between February and 4 September 1247, men belonging to Archbishop Siegfried clashed with those of Duke Otto of Bavaria in his duchy at Wallhausen, which can be inferred from a resolution (*Rachtung*) he found with Duke Otto of Bavaria regarding Lorsch monastery on 4 September 1247.<sup>29</sup>

### **The choice of William of Holland as royal candidate**

The choice of William of Holland as the royal candidate (1227-56) reflects the dominance of Archbishop Conrad of Cologne in the papal party. The archdiocese of Cologne, which stretched as far as Liège and Utrecht, lay in close proximity to the county of Holland. Archbishop Conrad was not only familiar with the local nobility, from which a suitable royal candidate could be sourced, he was also keen to find a candidate who was at worst compatible with and at best tactically useful in furthering the political goals Archbishop Conrad held as a prince in the lower Rhine area.<sup>30</sup>

However, William of Holland was not the only potential follower in Henry Raspe's footsteps. Three potential candidates were considered before the choice fell on William: Henry III of Brabant, Count Otto of Gelders, and Richard of Cornwall.<sup>31</sup> All three would stay involved

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<sup>26</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 290 and *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 187, no 1307.

<sup>27</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 188, no 1317.

<sup>28</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe zu Trier*, p. 45.

<sup>29</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 295, no 607.

<sup>30</sup> B. Leying, 'Niederrhein und Reich in der Königspolitik Konrads von Hochstaden bis 1256', *Vestische Zeitschrift* 73/75 (1971/73), pp. 188-90.

<sup>31</sup> For Duke Henry of Brabant, see *Chronicon Ellenhardi*, p. 121. For Count Otto of Gelders, see *Ep Saec XIII*, no 302. For Richard of Cornwall, see *Ex Cronicis Maioribus*, p. 321 and *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, p. 201.

in the conflict over the next years and decades.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, each rejected the offer, citing Henry Raspe's "sudden death" and "sad fate."<sup>33</sup> Henry III of Brabant (1231-61) was slightly too young to be king in 1247, as he was only seventeen or eighteen years old. His father, Duke Henry II of Brabant (1207-48), was about forty years old, born of high nobility, and possessed political influence and wealth. He would have been an ideal candidate because of his connection to the Staufer through his marriage to Maria (1196-1235), daughter of King Philip of Swabia, but perhaps he was already too infirm to become king, since just one year later he died.<sup>34</sup> He probably suggested his nephew William of Holland as royal candidate instead, seeing an opportunity for his family.

The Rhenish archbishops and the apostolic legate Peter Capocci were all involved in the choice of the new royal candidate, but it is difficult to ascertain each individual's exact role in identifying him. It seems likely that Archbishop Conrad led the effort to identify a suitable new royal candidate, because Archbishop Siegfried was in conflict with Duke Henry II of Brabant, uncle to William of Holland.<sup>35</sup> There is, however, no information on the Archbishops Siegfried of Mainz and Arnold of Trier for July and August 1247. The conflict may have been a contributing factor to an attempt by Archbishop Conrad to pacify the lower Rhine region, and Pope Innocent IV ordered legate Peter Capocci to make peace between them.<sup>36</sup> Despite William of Holland's young age (he was only twenty years old in 1247), both Archbishops Conrad and Arnold were convinced that he was suitable for the role.<sup>37</sup> By spring and early summer 1247,

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<sup>32</sup> See R. G. Jahn, 'Die Genealogie, der Vögte, Grafen und Herzöge von Geldern', in J. Stinner and K-H. Tekath (eds.), *Gelre – Geldern – Gelderland. Geschichte und Kultur des Herzogtums Geldern* (Gelders, 2001), pp. 29–50 and A. Neugebauer, et al (eds.), *Richard von Cornwall. Römisch-deutsches Königtum in nachstauferischer Zeit* (Kaiserslautern, 2010).

<sup>33</sup> *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, p. 201, *Ex Cronicis Maioribus*, p. 321, and *Chronicon Ellenhardi*, p. 121. See Janssen, 'Niederrhein und Reich am Ausgang der Stauferzeit', pp. 58-9.

<sup>34</sup> See A. Hessel, *Elsässische Urkunden, vornehmlich des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Strassburg, 1915).

<sup>35</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 295, no 609.

<sup>36</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV, I*, p. 617, no 4063 and pp. 617-8, no 4069, *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, no 1806-1808/1811/1818/1827/1829 and *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 295, no 607.

<sup>37</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 291 and *Gesta Arnoldi*, p. 411.

the archbishop had united the temporal nobles of his region behind his plan to continue the project of changing power.<sup>38</sup>

The negotiations between the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz and William of Holland before his election proceeded very fast, which indicates that financial matters were settled more easily than with his predecessor. Less than eight months lay between Henry Raspe's death on 16 February 1247 and William of Holland's election on 3 October 1247. According to Innocent's IV biographer Nicolaus de Carbio, Innocent IV paid for William of Holland's daily expenses as well as all military necessities and every other thing the king needed.<sup>39</sup> As he pointed out, William of Holland was of high origin, but, like his predecessor, not rich. Pope Innocent IV sent 30,000 marks in one portion to William of Holland close to his election in October 1247.<sup>40</sup> Frederick II tried to prevent the messengers carrying the sums from reaching Germany by guarding all ports, the largest river crossings, and mountain paths.<sup>41</sup>

Innocent IV wanted William of Holland to have the necessary resources to proceed aggressively at the beginning of his military campaign to achieve his coronation as soon as possible. However, some of the sum was already earmarked for paying his predecessor's debts, because Henry Raspe had died before he could compensate the Swabian nobles he bribed at the battle of Frankfurt.<sup>42</sup> Thus, while Innocent IV's financial aid to William of Holland might have looked generous at the beginning of his tenure, surpassing even the total sum Henry Raspe received, the first royal candidate was only active for nine months, whereas William of Holland would have to spend this money over several years.

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<sup>38</sup> See T. Kraus and T. Jülich, *Aachen und das Reich. Studien zur Entstehung der Landesherrschaft der Grafen von Jülich bis zum Jahre 1328* (Aachen, 1987), p. 97, D. Kastner, *Die Territorialpolitik der Grafen von Kleve* (Düsseldorf, 1972), pp. 13-5, and Janssen, 'Niederrhein und Reich am Ausgang der Stauferzeit', p. 58.

<sup>39</sup> Büttner, 'Nervus rerum', p. 482.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Gottlob, *Päpstliche Kreuzzugs-Steuern*, p. 79.

<sup>42</sup> Büttner, 'Nervus rerum', p. 482.

No more money would be forthcoming from the papal purse over the next few years. The coffers of the papal treasury were empty. Nicolaus de Carbio calculated that the papal accounts spent about 200,000 marks in seven years.<sup>43</sup> This would make the payments to the two royal candidates of a total of 25,000 marks one eighth of papal expenses, though exchange rates add some uncertainty to this calculation. Moreover, to avoid the stigma that was attached to Henry Raspe as over-dependent on the pope, Innocent IV interfered less on William of Holland's behalf and ensured that his support was more covert in Germany between 1247 and 1249.<sup>44</sup>

It is possible that the Rhenish archbishops also considered these candidates from noble families of Brabant and Holland because they possessed a fleet.<sup>45</sup> The archbishoprics of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier were based along the rivers Rhine and Moselle, and the county of Holland had a tradition of sea warfare due to its border with the North Sea. There is evidence from the *Gesta Arnoldi* that William of Holland travelled around Germany by ship, though it is difficult to determine how often he made use of it and how important his fleet was for the crusade. What remains unclear is whether William already possessed a fleet or whether he specially hired ships for his military campaign in Germany. If William travelled by ship, he could move rapidly, but his movements were constrained to areas close to rivers. Perhaps William of Holland limited his warfare to the Rhine-Main area over five years because he relied on his fleet.

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<sup>43</sup> Gottlob, *Päpstliche Kreuzzugs-Steuern*, pp. 79-80.

<sup>44</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während dem grossen Interregnum*, p. 47.

<sup>45</sup> See I. Runde, 'Der Rhein als Wirtschafts- und Verkehrsachse', in S. Weinfurter et al (eds.), *Die Wittelsbacher und die Kurpfalz im Mittelalter. Eine Erfolgsgeschichte?* (Regensburg, 2013), pp. 51-66.

### **The election of William of Holland as king, 3 October 1247**

The archbishop of Mainz and the papal legate Peter invited the princes to a provincial council in the city of Cologne on 29 September 1247, which at the same time would serve as the election day for William of Holland.<sup>46</sup> However, the citizens of Cologne switched their loyalty to the Staufer and refused to let the papal group enter the city. Thus, William of Holland was elected in a field near Worringen.<sup>47</sup> In similar circumstances to his predecessor, he was not elected in Frankfurt as the traditional location for elections and reconciliation, though he initially seemed to have considered the place of his election as sufficiently legitimate and he did not immediately attempt to gain access to Frankfurt.<sup>48</sup> There did not seem to be a personal programme of religious propaganda or any other hallmarks of spirituality associated with William's kingship.

In contrast to his predecessor, William of Holland was not exclusively elected by ecclesiastical princes.<sup>49</sup> William was elected by Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, Archbishop Siegfried III of Mainz, the elected Archbishop Gerhard of Bremen and his suffragan bishops, his uncle Duke Henry of Brabant, his cousin Count Otto of Gelders, and Count Arnold III of Loos.<sup>50</sup> Many of the most important German princes of highest nobility were not present for the election, though, such as the Count palatine of the Rhine (still held by Duke Otto of Bavaria); the Duke of Saxony; the Margraves of Brandenburg; the King of Bohemia; and the Dukes of Brunswick and Austria.

The exclusive group of seven prince electors that would emerge over the next decade had not yet fully formed.<sup>51</sup> Only by 1252, with the political landscape in Germany dramatically

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<sup>46</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, pp. 3-5, *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 190, no 1335, and *Gesta Arnoldi*, p. 411.

<sup>47</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 4885e.

<sup>48</sup> See F. Schmieder, 'in terra que dicitur Frankeserde', pp. 14-25 and H-O. Schembs, 'Frankfurt und die Wahl und Krönung der deutschen Könige', pp. 137-48.

<sup>49</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>50</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 4888 and 7903, *The Annals of Herman of Niederaltaich*, p. 394, and *Annales Stadenses*, p. 371.

<sup>51</sup> See Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, pp. 48-9/188-90/652/730-1.

changed, was William of Holland again concerned with the number and identity of his electors, as well as with the place of his election. The northern towns of Lübeck and Goslar refused to recognise William of Holland's authority and argued that his election was not legitimate because neither the duke of Saxony nor the margrave of Brandenburg were present and cast their vote for him, even though they had the right to elect the king.<sup>52</sup> They also stressed that William of Holland had not been raised as Holy Roman Emperor.<sup>53</sup> In reaction, William successfully arranged for the prince electors who had not elected him in Worringen to cast their belated vote for him in a further election in Frankfurt on 25 March 1252.<sup>54</sup> Immediately after William of Holland's election, the archbishops promised to assist William personally with men and supplies on his military campaign.<sup>55</sup>

In October 1247, the papal party was again concerned with the appointment of the new bishop of Worms. William of Holland accompanied Archbishops Siegfried and Conrad to Cologne to consecrate Conrad of Dürckheim as bishop of Worms. Unfortunately, bishop Conrad of Dürckheim died within a matter of weeks, hence the confusion around the succession preoccupied Archbishop Siegfried until November 1247. Back in Mainz, Archbishop Siegfried received a letter from Innocent IV on 17 November 1247, in which he thanked him and his suffragan bishops for their outstanding work in raising William of Holland as king ('sollicitudine in creatione regis Romanorum habuerunt').<sup>56</sup> Legate Peter Capocci installed Richard of Daun as bishop of Worms around 25 December 1247. The stubborn loyalty to the Stauffer by the citizens of Worms and their intensive support of Conrad IV in direct defiance of

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<sup>52</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, 5033c.

<sup>53</sup> K. Zeumer, 'Ein Reichsweisthum über die Wirkungen der Königswahl aus dem Jahre 1252', *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für Ältere Deutsche Geschichtskunde* 30/2 (Berlin, 1905), p. 406.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 409-10.

<sup>55</sup> *Annales Argentinenses*, p. 109 and *Regesta Imperii*, V, pp. 3-5. See B. Arnold, 'German Bishops and their Military Retinues in the Medieval Empire', *German History*, 7/2 (1989), pp. 161-83.

<sup>56</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, I, p. 618, no 4072.

Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz may explain why the papal legate expended such efforts on the small city.

This was one of the few times William of Holland was involved with the filling of episcopal sees. Filling vacant bishoprics with loyal candidates, or outright replacing bishops who showed themselves too loyal to the Staufer continued, but the people who were tasked with it were now more often at the periphery and not at the centre of the papal party. William of Holland's strategic focus shifted from that of his predecessor, hence he made use of new tools to rule as king.

### **William of Holland's strategy to become king**

Two political decisions that the papal party took during Henry Raspe's rule contributed to William's military success of the crusade between 1247 and 1251. One was when the papal party bribed the Swabian nobles to abandon Conrad IV at the battle of Frankfurt, the other was when Henry Raspe deposed Conrad IV as duke of Swabia. Both decisions began a lengthy period of unrest in the duchy of Swabia. This had longstanding military consequences for the crusade that stretched into the period of William of Holland's leadership, because the turmoil in the duchies of Swabia and Bavaria absorbed Conrad IV's attention in the following years and provided an opportunity for both royal candidates to conduct their military campaigns while encountering only intermittent resistance. The turmoil in Swabia and Bavaria also contributed to Henry Raspe's and William of Holland's campaigns in the duchy of Swabia in 1246-7 and 1251.

William of Holland may have studied his predecessor's strength and weaknesses to develop his own strategy; alternatively, the impulse perhaps came from Pope Innocent IV, whose legally trained mind held greater awareness of creating legitimacy through legal procedure. The legal aspect of Henry Raspe's strategy to change power in Germany was

restricted to Conrad IV's deposition as duke of Swabia while he concentrated on the direct military confrontation. Innocent IV may have wanted to expand this aspect when he worked with William of Holland. William followed the 'ideal' path to the crown more closely than his predecessor; he made a concerted effort to fulfil as many criteria as possible to ground his legal claim to the crown in legitimacy created through rituals.<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, he did not take every step future kings may have identified as decisive.

William of Holland's second priority was to target imperial property and lands, with a special emphasis on taking over royal palaces. These were 'universal' signifiers of kingship that would be recognizable to his new subjects and contemporaries.<sup>58</sup> By physically taking possession of these places, William tried to create an unbroken line of continuity between the Staufer dynasty and himself.<sup>59</sup> Although it would have made sense for William of Holland to distance himself from the excommunicated and deposed Frederick II, it seems that the properties and lands upon which he wanted to build his power were not tainted by the association with the Staufer.

For William of Holland, the association of his fledgling kingship with symbols of Staufer power apparently was not awkward; probably because the royal palaces symbolized imperial power instead of representing the discredited person of Frederick II. Moreover, William's choices of how he could rule were limited. There were only a few ways in which a royal candidate could behave like a new king; conquering imperial lands and property was one of them. Therefore, William of Holland's military campaign laid the ground to implement his rule as king. This may have made William of Holland appear more like a king than Henry

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<sup>57</sup> A. Büttner, *Königsherrschaft im Mittelalter* (Berlin, 2018), pp. 1-19.

<sup>58</sup> See W. Stürner, *Peccatum und potestas. Der Sündenfall und die Entstehung der herrscherlichen Gewalt im mittelalterlichen Staatsdenken* (Sigmaringen, 1987) and C. Andenna and G. Melville, *Idoneität-Genealogie-Legitimation. Begründung und Akzeptanz dynastischer Herrschaft im Mittelalter* (Cologne, 2015), pp. 11-5.

<sup>59</sup> See Moraw, 'Herrschaft' im Mittelalter', pp. 5-13 and H. K. Schulze, *Das Königtum. Grundstrukturen der Verfassung im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart, 2011).

Raspe; whereas his predecessor mostly fashioned himself as an opponent to Conrad IV, William of Holland began to create his own majesty as king.

### **Properties and rights: imperial, royal, familial**

After his election, William of Holland tried to bring as much land, property, goods, and rights (*Reichsgut* and *Krongut*) under his control as possible. *Reichsgut* constituted the lands, property, and rights that belonged to the Holy Roman Empire. It was not connected to the person or family of the king or emperor, after his death or deposition, it was inherited by his successor in office.<sup>60</sup> *Reichsgut* can be differentiated into property and rights that were used directly by the king (*Krongut*), property and rights that belonged to the Church (*Reichskirchengut*), and property and rights with which the king or emperor enfeoffed a prince or noble (*Reichslehngut*).<sup>61</sup>

In addition, the Staufer held *Hausgut*, which denotes the lands, property, and rights that the Staufer inherited ‘privately’ as a noble family. In theory, the empire did not have any rights to the *Hausgut*.<sup>62</sup> However, by the time of Conrad IV, *Reichsgut* and *Hausgut*, became mixed in their rights and it was difficult to differentiate exactly between the manner in which they were used.

For the king, the rights connected to the *Krongut* were especially valuable, because this was the property that belonged to the empire that he used directly. Various rights, privileges, and prerogatives (*Hoheits-* and *Herrschaftsrechte*) belonged to the property and land. Rights could be of a fiscal nature over income from markets, coinage, and tolls, but also over people

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<sup>60</sup> A. C. Schlunk, *Königsmacht und Krongut. Die Machtgrundlage des deutschen Königtums im 13. Jahrhundert – und eine neue historische Methode* (Stuttgart, 1988), p. 194 and D. Hägermann, ‘Reichsgut’, *LexMA* 7, cols 620-2.

<sup>61</sup> Hägermann, ‘Reichsgut’, *LexMA* 7, cols 620-2 and K-H. Spiess, ‘Formalisierte Autorität: Entwicklungen im Lehnrecht des 13. Jahrhunderts’, in H. Seibert et al (eds.), *Autorität und Akzeptanz. Das Reich im Europa des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Ostfildern, 2013), pp. 137-48.

<sup>62</sup> Schlunk, *Königsmacht und Krongut*, p. 207.

and jurisdiction. However, each bundle of rights and prerogatives associated with a piece of land or property did not automatically pass into the hands of the person who controlled it. They were part of a complex web of rivalling and supplementing claims that were constantly being renegotiated. The rights over fiefs held by the Church were just as ambiguous as those held by temporal lords.<sup>63</sup>

During William of Holland's crusade, *Reichsgut* and *Krongut* became the vulnerable soft underbelly of Stauffer power. From a practical perspective, the king's personal economic and military power depended on his *Krongut*. In a time when he could not always rely on allies, this personal depository of strength gained importance. From a symbolic perspective, the lands, property, and rights played a pivotal role for a king who wanted to rule. The king's power only remained invested in them if the king was present in regular intervals and enacted his rule in a tangible way. By being at a king's disposal, *Reichsgut* and *Krongut* created his power, while in his absence, it served as a reminder of it.

If royal power remained absent for a prolonged period of time, individual units of land and property often dissipated to rival regional powers.<sup>64</sup> If the king's strength was under attack and his assets diminished, this disturbed the balance between the king and rival regional powers, hence it seriously reduced his ability to rule. This in turn increased the likelihood of a further erosion of his royal power and led to a vicious circle of power loss. Without any outside assistance, this could lead to the collapse of royal power. In addition, Conrad IV's lands and properties in the duchy of Swabia formed the basis of his economic, military, and political power. They consisted of a mix between *Hausgut* and *Reichsgut*, which made it more acceptable for William of Holland to attack them – like the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz did in 1241.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid., pp. 26-7/207.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 194.

<sup>65</sup> See this thesis, 'Chapter 2: Henry Raspe's Crusade, 1246-7', pp. 91-5..

Between 1246 and 1251, the losses of *Krongut* for the Staufer were extreme.<sup>66</sup> Their lands and property were extensive and scattered; its regional distribution varied considerably in Germany.<sup>67</sup> In the 1240s, the Staufer possessed a bit more than half of the *Krongut* in the region of the Upper Rhine in Swabia, followed closely by other regions along the Lower Rhine and Franconia, and a bit less than half in Thuringia and Saxony.<sup>68</sup> As Conrad IV's position of king was ambiguous even before it was contested by the royal candidates, the exact circumstances under which he accessed and used the *Krongut* and *Reichsgut* were complex and subject to disputes.

Actualised power presupposed the potential for power in the form of *Krongut*; a royal candidate could make use of this reciprocal relationship in his military strategy to achieve a change in power in Germany. The loss of *Krongut* began in 1246, when Henry Raspe targeted Staufer possessions when he invaded Swabia and Franconia. Although this strategic element was already present under Henry Raspe, he focused his efforts much more on subduing Conrad IV in direct confrontation. It was under William of Holland that specifically targeting *Krongut* gained momentum as a source of power, income, and legitimacy.

However, during the crusade, most of the *Krongut* that the Staufer lost did not go to the royal candidates. William of Holland was only able to secure a fraction of the *Krongut* in the short term during the crusade, none of which he managed to keep in the long term.<sup>69</sup> William and Conrad IV both haemorrhaged *Krongut* because they tried to stabilize and enlarge their power base by enfeoffing potential allies and supporters with as much land, property, and rights as they could. Their losses mostly went to third parties instead, such as princes, lower nobles,

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<sup>66</sup> Schlunk, *Königsmacht und Krongut*, pp. 194/206, 'Grafik 60: Der Umfang der Krongutverluste in den einzelnen Regionen' and W. Metz, *Staufische Güterverzeichnisse* (Berlin, 2019, reprint from 1964).

<sup>67</sup> Schlunk, *Königsmacht und Krongut*. For Swabia, pp. 59-66, for the upper Rhine, pp. 31-7, for Franconia, pp. 43-50, for the lower Rhine, pp. 38-42, and for Thuringia and Saxony, pp. 51-8.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 206.

<sup>69</sup> Schlunk, *Königsmacht und Krongut*, p. 193, 'Grafik 50'.

*ministeriales*, bishoprics, cities, monasteries, and others, with the princes of high nobility and the *ministeriales* standing out as the greatest beneficiaries.<sup>70</sup>

The losses reached their peak in 1252 after the departure of Conrad IV and carried on until the death of William of Holland in 1256.<sup>71</sup> Many remained permanently lost to the crown. Permanent losses were most extensive in Swabia; only a bit more than half of the *Krongut* was returned to later kings. The region of Thuringia and Saxony also saw significant losses of almost a third of the *Krongut*, while they were considerably smaller along the Rhine.<sup>72</sup> Overall, this diminished the power of future kings after the Interregnum and contributed to their perception as ‘kinglets’.<sup>73</sup>

### **Royal palaces (*Pfalzen*)**

Among the *Krongut*, William of Holland specifically targeted royal palaces because they were especially suitable to implement his rule.<sup>74</sup> A royal or imperial palace was a fortified lodging for the itinerant monarch.<sup>75</sup> They developed because a German king constantly travelled his kingdom; it was a great strain on the resources of local princes to host him and his entourage on a regular basis. If the monarch lodged in a royal palace that was maintained through local services and taxes, expenses could be distributed in a decentralized manner.<sup>76</sup> A palace was often not as strongly fortified as a castle, though a clear distinction is not always possible. For

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 193.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 192.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 206.

<sup>73</sup> Adapted from the expression “kleine Könige”, coined by Peter Moraw. See Moraw, ‘Herrschaft im Mittelalter’, pp. 5-13.

<sup>74</sup> See B. Thissen, ‘Die Königspfalz Nimwegen. Funktion - Topographie – Ausstattung’, in J. Lieven (ed.), *Verortete Herrschaft. Königspfalzen, Adelsburgen und Herrschaftsbildung in Niederlothringen* (2014), pp. 53-106, F. Lutz (ed.), *Pfalzen - Reichsgut - Königshöfe* (Göttingen, 1996), and T. Zotz, ‘Zur Grundherrschaft des Königs im Deutschen Reich vom 10. bis zum frühen 13. Jahrhundert’, in W. Rösener (ed.), *Grundherrschaft und bäuerliche Gesellschaft im Hochmittelalter* (Göttingen, 1995), pp. 76-115.

<sup>75</sup> R. Friedrich, ‘Pfalzgräfliche Burgenanlagen – Herrschaftsmittelpunkte, Amtssitze und Mittel der Burgenpolitik’, in S. Weinfurter et al (eds.), *Die Wittelsbacher und die Kurpfalz im Mittelalter. Eine Erfolgsgeschichte?* (Regensburg, 2013), pp. 67-87, and U. Knapp, *Stätten deutscher Kaiser und Könige im Mittelalter* (Darmstadt, 2008), pp. 7-12/71-106.

<sup>76</sup> R. Schieffer, ‘Von Ort zu Ort. Aufgaben und Ergebnisse der Erforschung ambulanter Herrschaftspraxis’, in C. Ehlers (ed.), *Orte der Herrschaft. Mittelalterliche Königspfalzen* (Göttingen, 2002), p. 11.

example, Kaiserswerth palace contained a keep tower and was surrounded by a wall, but also contained a sumptuous triple-floored main building.

Royal palaces would have been ideal centres to represent royal power because they were preferred venues for court days where the local nobility assembled.<sup>77</sup> However, the use of royal palaces declined rapidly in the middle of the thirteenth century, a process which started before the crusade against the Staufer. This was due to an erosion of royal power in the 1230s, marked by Frederick II's frequent absence in Italy, Henry (VII)'s deposition, and Conrad IV's minority. The Staufer travelled less frequently to their royal palaces, so they started to fall out of use. The buildings of some royal palaces were neglected, and Frederick II did not build any new palaces.<sup>78</sup>

William of Holland tried to reactivate the palaces as centres of royal power. He conquered as many of them as possible, as will be seen, and invested some of his funds into their maintenance. However, he was unsuccessful, and the importance of royal palaces continued to decline.<sup>79</sup> While it is possible that this process occurred independently from the crusade, it seems likely that William of Holland's attempt to make use of royal palaces during his reign was one of the most important factors that accelerated their decline. Like other parts of the *Krongut*, when William of Holland conquered a palace, it did not remain in his possession for long. Instead of passing from Conrad IV to William, most royal palaces landed in the possession of third-party local powers, because William gave them out as fiefs to reward his new vassals. In addition, William was compelled to give away many of the rights and prerogatives associated with the palaces.

The local third parties who received the palaces as fiefs and benefited from their rights often were emerging cities and urban elites. Since the beginning of the thirteenth century, the

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<sup>77</sup> T. Martin, 'Die Pfalzen im dreizehnten Jahrhundert', in J. Fleckenstein (ed.), *Herrschaft und Stand* (Göttingen, 1977), pp. 74-6.

<sup>78</sup> Martin, 'Die Pfalzen im dreizehnten Jahrhundert', p. 281.

<sup>79</sup> Schlunk, *Königsmacht und Krongut*, p. 193, 'Grafik 50'.

habitations around royal palaces had grown into cities; by the 1240s they sought independence from the administrators of the palaces.<sup>80</sup> The dualism between royal palace and city unfolded against the backdrop of the vacuum of royal power. During the crusade against the Staufer, long-standing tensions between the administrators of palatial manors and the surrounding cities erupted in several cases. Examples of this include Oppenheim, Nordhausen, Mühlhausen, Bern, and Zurich.<sup>81</sup> For William of Holland, these tensions made it more difficult to implement his rule as the new king.<sup>82</sup> He did not only have to make a strong case for his claim to the throne, he also had to contest the citizens' newfound independence. The loss of the palaces as part of the *Krongut* meant that even at the peak of his rule, the power of the king had been eroded.

### **William of Holland at Nijmegen palace, October 1247**

One of William of Holland's first actions concerned Nijmegen palace, which illustrates how central palaces were to become for William of Holland's strategy of changing power in Germany. On 8 October 1247, only five days after his election, William enfeoffed Count Otto of Gelders with the castle at Nijmegen.<sup>83</sup> The palace was likely a reward for his election as king, as the count was among William's few temporal electors; though it may have also been part of an agreement to step back as a potential royal candidate because they were cousins. Nijmegen palace was part of the Staufer *Hausgut*. This may have been a case where the rights to possess it started to merge with those to the *Krongut* and William of Holland held the view that as the new king he could incorporate it into his property, or he deliberately attacked Conrad IV in every way available to him.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Martin, 'Die Pfalzen im dreizehnten Jahrhundert', p. 283.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 285.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 277/285.

<sup>83</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, pp. 5-6, no 1, *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 380, and *Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte des Niederrheins* p. 165, no 317.

<sup>84</sup> G. Binding, *Deutsche Königspfalzen: von Karl dem Grossen bis Friedrich II. (765-1240)* (Darmstadt, 1996), p. 247 and B. Thissen, 'Die Königspfalz Nimwegen. Funktion - Topographie - Ausstattung', in J. Lieven (ed.), *Verortete Herrschaft. Königspfalzen, Adelsburgen und Herrschaftsbildung in Niederlothringen* (Bielefeld, 2014), pp. 53-106.

In addition, Nijmegen's location gave the palace strategic importance, as it was situated between the county of Holland and Cologne. It is likely that William of Holland wanted to ensure that a route he would often travel was safe for him and his army. It was also located at the river Waal, the most important distributary towards the Rhine delta, and an important access point for his fleet.

William of Holland issued the charters at Neuss so soon after his election that it seems likely that the palace was already controlled by Count Otto of Gelders. By enfeoffing the count with a palace that he already held, William of Holland entered into a relationship with the count as liege and vassal.<sup>85</sup> Although William only confirmed the pre-existing status quo, the conditions of the fief were so favourable towards his vassal that the emphasis seems to have been more on William of Holland to show his gratitude than on the count paying homage. There was an expectation that the king was the most powerful noble in the kingdom, but in his new position William of Holland was dependent on being recognised in his office through building relationships with vassals. However, this relationship was more reciprocal than that of kings with a greater power base, which further decreased the standing of royal power.

One of William's primary military goals was to acquire as much of Staufer lands and property as possible, so that he could replenish his own possessions while continuing to enfeoff supporters with fiefs to bind them to him more closely. The case of Nijmegen palace is symptomatic of the way in which William of Holland tried to build a network of homage to establish himself, but also had to pay a price in return in the form of a significant erosion of the *Reichsgut*. The 1240s started a period of accelerated loss of *Reichsgut*, which over the next years would start to restrict the growth of his network of power because he failed to conquer new possessions fast enough to stop this development.

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<sup>85</sup> Spiess, 'Formalisierte Autorität', pp. 137-48.

The idea that the Staufer wasted their lands and property during Frederick II's reign was a common trope of nineteenth century German historiography, often called 'Verschleuderung des Hausguts.'<sup>86</sup> While confirming that the Staufer dynasty experienced a great loss of lands and properties, German historians such as Robert Gramsch, who focused on the German princes' role in the empire's political structure in the thirteenth century, recently reevaluated the moral implications which were attributed to it in the nineteenth century. Gramsch contends that even though the German princes allowed this depletion to happen, they did not fail the Staufer or, by extension, the 'greater good' of the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>87</sup> Instead, they pursued their personal interests in a legitimate manner that resulted in a more 'federal' and 'democratic' political structure in Germany.<sup>88</sup> Nevertheless, the extent to which *Reichsgut* and *Krongut* was diminished would significantly impinge on the power of German kings from the second half of the thirteenth century onwards.<sup>89</sup>

### **Priority of crusader recruitment for the Staufer, October-November 1247**

Prior to November 1247, Innocent IV changed his recruitment policy of giving priority to Louis IX's crusade over the crusade against the Staufer in Germany on only two occasions. Both instances occurred when the papal party prepared for potentially decisive military events in Germany, and both were to be carried out in secret.

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<sup>86</sup> See K. Frey, *Die Schicksale des königlichen Gutes in Deutschland unter den letzten Staufern seit König Philipp* (Berlin, 1881), p. 68.

<sup>87</sup> See Gramsch, R., *Das Reich als Netzwerk der Fürsten. Politische Strukturen unter dem Doppelkönigtum Friedrichs II. und Heinrichs (VII.) 1225–1235* (Ostfildern, 2013) and idem, 'Autorität im Netzwerk der Fürsten. Friedrich II. und Heinrich (VII.) im Anerkennungswettstreit (1231-1235)', in H. Seibert et al (eds) *Autorität und Akzeptanz. Das Reich im Europa des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Ostfildern, 2013), pp. 43-64.

<sup>88</sup> I contest that this evaluation stands in opposition to the thirteenth century ideal of a strong king and emperor who unites enough power in his person to rule the kingdom and empire alone. See Len Scales, *The shaping of German identity: authority and crisis, 1245-1414* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 113-25.

<sup>89</sup> See F. Quarthal, 'Königslandschaft, Herzogtum oder fürstlicher Territorialstaat: Zu den Zielen und Ergebnissen der Territorialpolitik Rudolfs von Habsburg im schwäbisch-nordschweizerischen Raum', in E. Boshof (ed.), *Rudolf von Habsburg, 1273-91: eine Königsherrschaft zwischen Tradition und Wandel* (Köln, 1993), pp. 125-38.

The first instance when Innocent IV reversed his policy took place in preparation for Henry Raspe's battle at Frankfurt.<sup>90</sup> On 5 July 1246, Innocent IV ordered his legate in France, Odo of Châteauroux, to suspend the preaching for Louis IX's crusade to the Holy Land in and to promote the preaching of the cross against Frederick II.<sup>91</sup> Though no locations were named in this order, later evidence suggests that legate Odo was active in the Western dioceses of Cambrai, Liège, Toul, Utrecht, and Metz.<sup>92</sup> In his mandate Innocent IV reasoned that preaching was only little productive in the region; regardless of this, legate Odo was to act in secret.<sup>93</sup>

The second instance when Innocent IV secretly gave priority to recruitment for the crusade against the Staufer in Germany took place after William of Holland's election. From October 1247 onwards, William had an increased need for crusaders for his military activities, hence Innocent IV once again ordered legate Odo to prioritise recruitment for the crusade against the Staufer, presumably in the same western dioceses.<sup>94</sup> Although the legate was to hide his preaching, the French king seems to have become suspicious of his activities. In the same month, King Louis IX requested that preaching for the Holy Land in the imperial dioceses on France's eastern border should not be impeded, and that no vows should be commuted there.<sup>95</sup> In the following month, the vows of five French crusaders were commuted to the crusade against the Staufer despite his request, though this was only a small number.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> See this thesis, 'Chapter 2: Henry Raspe's Crusade, 1246-7', p. 110.

<sup>91</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 161, no 214. See Doublier, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, p. 126. Doublier did not seem to have realized that 'Bishop Otto of Tusculum' in the MGH and 'Odo of Châteauroux' were the same person.

<sup>92</sup> Berger *Innocent IV*, I, 459, *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1309, no 7844, *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 297.

<sup>93</sup> "Volumus et presentium tibi auctoritate mandamus, quatinus illis, quibus predicationem crucis per Theotoniam [sic] pro Terre Sancte subsidio commisisti, inuigere non postponas, ut huiusmodi predicationi temporibus istis supersedere procurent, presertim cum in illis partibus dicatur nunc esse modicum fructuosa, et nos in eisdem partibus verbum crucis contra F. quondam Romanorum imperatorem mandaverimus predicari. Volumus autem, ut ista secreto teneas, nulli penitus revelanda." *Ep Saec XIII*, pp. 161-2, no 214.

<sup>94</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, no 2935/3384.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, and Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, p. 81.

<sup>96</sup> Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading*, p. 180 and Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, pp. 81-2.

The events of October 1247 formed the prelude to a more permanent shift in Innocent IV's policy with regards to crusader recruitment.<sup>97</sup> From November 1247 onwards, he switched priorities permanently the crusade against the Staufer in Germany, both with regards to fresh recruits as well as vow commutations. Despite Innocent IV's professed and genuine desire to support the crusade to the Holy Land, he likely felt like military necessity forced his hand under these circumstances.

About six weeks after his election, William of Holland took the initiative as the political and military leader of the crusade in Germany and petitioned Innocent IV to accelerate crusader recruitment in Germany and other territories, as becomes clear from several papal charters issued between 17 and 20 November 1247.<sup>98</sup> The timing and Innocent's rapid compliance suggest that William of Holland quickly realized after his election that he needed more crusaders than were currently at his disposal.

The solution was to recruit more fresh crusaders in Germany. On 19 and 20 November 1247, Innocent IV ordered legate Peter Capocci to organise the preaching of the cross against the Staufer in the whole of Germany.<sup>99</sup> In reaction to William of Holland's request, Innocent IV also adjusted his policy with regards to vow commutations. On 19 November 1247, Innocent IV allowed legate Peter Capocci to commute the vows of almost all crusaders in Germany who had already taken the cross, unless they were going on crusade in the Holy Land.<sup>100</sup>

In general, the papal response was tailored to individual groups of crusaders. Those who had already taken the cross to go on crusade elsewhere than the Holy Land, such as the

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<sup>97</sup> See Maier, who came to the same conclusion, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 65, and Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, p. 69.

<sup>98</sup> William of Holland's request is not extant; only Innocent IV's mandates survive, *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 326 no 453, Berger, *Innocent IV*, I, p. 618, no 4070 and *Regesta Imperii*, V, 7893. See Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 65, who came to the same conclusion.

<sup>99</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, 4062, *Regesta Imperii*, V 7896, *Ep Saec XIII*, no 456.

<sup>100</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 329 no 459.

Baltic, were allowed to commute their vows to the crusade against the Staufer; those who had taken the cross to go to the Holy Land were ringfenced. However, there may have been a few exceptions to this rule. Innocent IV allowed the vows of a group of Hungarians, five nobles from France, and fifteen princes of the Holy Roman Empire to be converted to the crusade against the Staufer.<sup>101</sup> It seems likely that these crusaders had taken the cross to go to the Holy Land, though the charters do not say so explicitly.

Another exception were the Frisians; upon William of Holland's explicit request, they were allowed to commute crusader vows even if they had taken them to go to the Holy Land. On 17 November 1247, Innocent IV ordered his legate, Archbishop Albert of Prussia, to fulfil William of Holland's demand that the oaths of the Frisians be converted from the Holy Land to his crusade against the Staufer in Germany.<sup>102</sup> William of Holland probably requested special provisions for the Frisians because they shared a certain cultural affinity with him. However, there was a trade-off. Innocent IV only allowed indulgences of forty days to be granted by the Dominicans in Frisia.<sup>103</sup> The Frisians were allowed to commute vows others could not have commuted, but in return they received a lesser reward.

Despite his change in priorities, the number of vow commutations remained comparatively low. Innocent IV tried to avoid harming the crusade to the Holy Land too much.

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<sup>101</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV, II*, p. 617, no 4060/4068 and *Regesta Imperii, V*, 7907.

<sup>102</sup> "Ex parte carissimi in Christo filii nostri ... regis Romanorum illustris fuit nobis cum instantia supplicatum, ut cum de comitatu Hollandie ad eum irue hereditario pertinente multi Frisones receperint ad Terre Sancte subsidium signum crucis, eis in auxilium regis crucem huiusmodi commutare ac illam eis peccatorum suorum veniam, ac si transfretassent personaliter, elargiri de benignitate solita curaremus. Quocirca mandamus, quatinus super hoc quod tibi ore tenus diximus de consilio dilecti filii nostri Petri Sancti Georgii ad Velum Aureum diaconi cardinalis, apostolice sedis legati et ipsius regis vel alterius eorundem ordines et disponas." *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 326 no 453. Albert Suerbeer, here addressed as apostolic legate and archbishop of Prussia, had been archbishop of Prussia, Livonia, and Estonia since 10 January 1246. Since 19 March 1247, he was also apostolic legate to Gotland, Holstein, Rügen, later also to Russia. In 1247, he also received the vacant bishopric of Lübeck and became administrator of the bishopric of Chiemsee.

<sup>103</sup> Charter by Innocent IV from 19 November 1247 to the Dominicans in Frisia: "Predicatoribus in Frisia constitutionis. Ex parte carissimi in Christo filii nostri ... regis Romanorum illustris, etc., ut supra, usque: curaremus. Quocirca mandamus quatinus super hoc et aliis ad crucis negotium pertinentibus de consilio dilecti filii nostri Petri Sancti Georgii ad Velum Aureum diaconi cardinalis, legati Sedis Apostolice, procedatis." Berger, *Innocent IV, I*, p. 617, no 4068. See for edit in German by Böhmer, *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 1314, no 7893, as well as Meerman, *Geschied* 5, 15.

Moreover, vow commutations were an inefficient use of resources, as they just reassigned crusaders but did not boost their numbers.

Innocent IV further decreed the same indulgences to be given to crusaders against the Staufer in Germany as to those who were going to the Holy Land.<sup>104</sup> Innocent IV had already given the same order previously in a letter from 27 June 1246.<sup>105</sup> The explicit stipulation implies that at a certain points, crusaders who fought against the Staufer in Germany received more limited indulgences than other crusaders who also did not travel to the Holy Land, but that this could be reversed to attract greater numbers. Maybe William of Holland was concerned that crusaders could have been deterred from changing their plans if they did not receive the same reward.

One of Innocent IV's charters explicitly mentioned that William of Holland acted "according to the advice of the legate Peter."<sup>106</sup> William and legate Peter Capocci both petitioned Innocent IV to prioritize the crusade against the Staufer in Germany over the crusade to the Holy Land on 17 November 1247.<sup>107</sup> The significant role legate Peter played in switching recruitment priorities to the crusade against the Staufer in Germany reveals his ability to influence his superiors. Although intended to be only a tool of papal will, he was able to shape the course of events independently. The role members of the papal party who were based in Germany, such as William of Holland and legate Capocci, played in the process of giving priority to the crusade against the Staufer in Germany must be acknowledged, because it shows that their relationship with Pope Innocent IV was less of a one-way street than previously depicted.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 326 no 453.

<sup>105</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 7649 and *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 288.

<sup>106</sup> Berger *Innocent IV*, I, p. 618, no 4070, *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 326 no 453 and *Regesta Imperii*, V, 7893.

<sup>107</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 326 no 453, Berger, *Innocent IV*, I, p. 618, no 4070 and *Regesta Imperii*, V, 7893.

<sup>107</sup> Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 65 and Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, p. 69.

<sup>108</sup> See Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, pp. 35-110 and this thesis, 'Chapter 1: Problematizing the Crusade', pp. XX.

Innocent IV's actions might be interpreted as contradictory and a sign of indecision. They may reflect that he was torn between the objective of regaining the Holy Land and protecting the Church – and himself – through the crusade against the Staufer in Germany. Yet it can also be seen as a sign that Innocent IV tried to be as nuanced as possible, and, despite the limitations to communication, to use crusader recruitment as a precision tool of warfare.

Once Innocent IV determined to prioritise the crusade against the Staufer over the crusade to the Holy Land, recruitment in Germany seems to have picked up very fast. Legate Peter was active in Germany during the rest of November 1247, aided by Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, who asked the citizens and clergy of Cologne to take the cross in support of William of Holland.<sup>109</sup> He continued to preach the word of the cross in December 1247, when he also organised for others to preach the crusade, probably the Franciscans and Dominicans.<sup>110</sup> The siege of Kaiserswerth marked the start of a military campaign that was characterized by a continuous need for as many men-at-arms as possible.

### **The siege of Kaiserswerth palace, December 1247**

Only two months after his election, William of Holland's first military action was to lay siege to the imperial palace at Kaiserswerth from 13 December onwards.<sup>111</sup> The siege is mentioned only briefly in the chronicles, but more information can be reconstructed from William's charters.<sup>112</sup> William probably blocked access to the palace with his ships on the river Rhine; he was possibly supported by the citizens of Cologne and their ships. Meanwhile, the countryside surrounding the palace, including the city and the monastery, were occupied by William's

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<sup>109</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1551, no 10203-4/10206-8/7896.

<sup>110</sup> Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, pp. 69-70.

<sup>111</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 4917a-4932. See Binding, *Deutsche Königspfalzen*, p. 321 and Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 54.

<sup>112</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 4917a-4932. See Buhlmann 'Die Belagerung Kaiserswerths durch König Wilhelm von Holland', p. 8.

army. This cut off the palace from its surroundings and prevented it from restocking food supplies.

Kaiserswerth was significant because its geographical location along the Rhine and in between the county of Holland and the city of Cologne allowed William to pacify the lower Rhine area. William's land and property in Holland lay in the North-East, bordering the North Sea. If his fleet was going to sail up the Rhine to Germany regularly, it may have been important to have access to an imperial palace or avoid any potential threat.

There is evidence that this likely was a consideration for William, because he moved his personal residence from Haarlem to The Hague during the next year. The Hague lay at the Nieuwe Maas river, a tributary of the Rhine, from where William could sail up the Rhine directly to Cologne and beyond. Kaiserswerth was also significant because the complex with its associated properties and rights was the centre of administration (*procuratio*) of *Reichsgut* along the lower Rhine and a place where imperial toll was levied.<sup>113</sup>

Control over Kaiserswerth was divided between burgrave Gernand of Hagenau as the imperial administrator and a steward close to Archbishop Conrad of Cologne.<sup>114</sup> Both acted as respective proxies for the imperial and papal party. The Counts of Berg controlled a large area between the rivers Rhine, Ruhr, and Wupper, which bordered the lands of Archbishop Conrad of Cologne.<sup>115</sup> Moreover, Count Adolf IV of Berg was married to Margarete von Hochstaden, the sister of Archbishop Conrad of Cologne. His father, Count Heinrich IV of Berg, had aligned himself with Henry Raspe but died within a fortnight of Raspe's death on 25 February 1246.

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<sup>113</sup> S. Lorenz, 'Kaiserswerth im Mittelalter. Genese, Struktur und Organisation königlicher Herrschaft am Niederrhein', *Studia humaniora* 23 (Düsseldorf, 1993), pp. 17–48 and M. Buhlmann, 'Politische Gliederung des Duisburg-Düsseldorfer Raums im frühen und hohen Mittelalter', in Bürgerverein Huckingen e.V. (eds.), *Huckinger Heimatbuch III* (Duisburg, 2015), pp. 61–75.

<sup>114</sup> Buhlmann, 'Die Belagerung Kaiserswerths durch König Wilhelm von Holland', pp. 8-9.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 55/59.

Adolf IV seemed to be a likely candidate to take the cross against the Staufer, as he had already taken part in the crusade against the Stedinger in 1234.<sup>116</sup> In a letter dating from 20 July 1246, Archbishop Conrad promised assistance to the new Count Adolf IV, if his support for them caused war to be waged against him.<sup>117</sup> The Counts of Berg held all their castles, for instance Windeck, Bensberg, Burg, and Angermund, as fiefs from Archbishop Conrad of Cologne.<sup>118</sup> However, the charter would not have been necessary if Count Adolf IV had taken the cross as a crusader. The count seems to have joined Archbishop Conrad not on crusading terms but as a feudal subject protected by his liege-lord.

The division of rights between the Counts of Berg and the imperial burgraves was highly complex, but by December 1247, Kaiserswerth was under the control of the imperial administrator burgrave Gernand von Hagenau.<sup>119</sup> Thus, after a successful siege to Kaiserswerth, William of Holland could expel imperial power, replace it with a representative closely aligned to his party, and make the Counts of Berg his vassals, thereby integrating them into his network of relationships. This would allow William to advance his rule even before he achieved his coronation. Although William of Holland likely hoped to take the palace quickly, the siege of Kaiserswerth palace would stretch over the next twelve months before he concluded it successfully.

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<sup>116</sup> See J. Schmeyers, *Die Stedinger Bauernkriege. Wahre Begebenheiten und geschichtliche Betrachtungen. Zur Erinnerung an die Schlacht bei Altenesch am 27. Mai 1234* (Lemwerder, 2004), B. Gloger, *Kreuzzug gegen die Stedinger 1233/34* (Berlin, 1980), and R. Köhn, 'Die Verketzerung der Stedinger durch die Bremer Fastensynode', *Bremisches Jahrbuch* 57 (Bremen, 1979), pp. 15-85.

<sup>117</sup> *Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte des Niederrheins*, p. 158, no 303.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 158-9, no 312.

<sup>119</sup> Lorenz, 'Kaiserswerth im Mittelalter', pp. 75-87.

## 1248

### Wartburg castle and back at Kaiserswerth palace, January 1248

In January 1248, William of Holland took possession of Wartburg castle, which had been at the centre of Henry Raspe's power. By taking over the castle, William clearly positioned himself as his successor towards the nobles of Thuringia and Hessa. The castle was a useful resource to William for his military campaigns. It gave him a military base in close proximity to his next sieges and provided him with a welcome addition of income of goods and men in the form of the administrators of the castle.<sup>120</sup> On 26 January 1248, William was back at the camp outside Kaiserswerth palace.<sup>121</sup> Meanwhile, legate Peter Capocci recruited crusaders from December 1247 to January 1248, staying in Leuven, east of Brussels, from 19 December 1247 to January 1248.<sup>122</sup>

### The relationship between election and coronation

In the 1240s and 1250s, the relationship between election and coronation as well as their respective importance in the process were not fully defined.<sup>123</sup> During the crusade against the Staufer, the criteria that created legitimacy for a king were in flux and, within limits, negotiable.

In 1202, Pope Innocent III argued in his bull *Venerabilem* that he recognized Otto IV as rightful *Rex Romanorum* because he was crowned in the right place (Aachen) by the right person (the archbishop of Cologne).<sup>124</sup> This marked the coronation in Aachen, the traditional place where kings were crowned, as the decisive event. It also attributed a certain importance to the coronator, even though the archbishop of Cologne as the right coronator was a relatively

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<sup>120</sup> William of Holland is attested at Wartburg castle on 28 January 1248, 21 October 1248, between 5 and 20 November 1248, and on 10 December 1248.

<sup>121</sup> Binding, *Deutsche Königspfalzen*, p. 321.

<sup>122</sup> Legate Peter Capocci was in Leuven on 26 December 1247 and 18/21/23 January 1248, *Regesta Imperii*, V p. 1551-2, no 10203-4/10206-8.

<sup>123</sup> Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, p. 699/715.

<sup>124</sup> Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, p. 69 and *Regestum Innocenti III papae super negotio Romani imperii*, ed. F. Kempf (Rome, 1947), p. 35, no 14.

recent development in the late twelfth century. The prerogative to crown the king used to belong to the archbishop of Mainz.<sup>125</sup> By the later Middle Ages, the decisive event became the election of the king, while the coronation was reduced to having a chiefly symbolic function.<sup>126</sup>

One way to understand the importance the respective royal candidates ascribed to each step in the process of becoming king is to look at the titles the royal candidates used to refer to themselves in their charters' *intitulatio* and to see from which starting point they counted their years in office.<sup>127</sup> Conrad IV in his charters called himself 'elected king' (*in regem electus*), though by using his full title (*Romanorum in regem electus semper augustus*), he already hinted at his imperial pretensions.<sup>128</sup> Under the Staufer, *semper augustus* was used for the royal title too, whereas previously it had only been used for the imperial title.<sup>129</sup> Until Frederick II's death, the title also included *divi augusti imperatoris Friderici filius*, which is a reference to his position subjected to his father and was a consequence of the conflict between Frederick and Henry (VII).<sup>130</sup> Conrad IV never counted the years of his rule, though after the death of his father, some of his charters numbered his years as king from 1250 onwards.<sup>131</sup> This reflects Frederick II's genealogical approach, which emphasised the right of the father to raise his son as rightful heir of the Staufer dynasty.

Henry Raspe simply called himself *Romanorum rex* after his election.<sup>132</sup> This showed his intent, but also disconnected him from the more nuanced royal and imperial titles of the Staufer tradition. Few of Henry Raspe's extant charters include a date, and only one refers back to the date of his election.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, p. 55 FN 79.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 699. See M. Krammer, *Wahl und Einsetzung des Deutschen Königs im Verhältnis zueinander* (Weimar, 1905).

<sup>127</sup> *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 60, no 30.

<sup>128</sup> Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, pp. 705/713.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 713.

<sup>130</sup> *MGH Const.*, p. 442, no 330.

<sup>131</sup> *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 60, no 30, and Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, p. 705.

<sup>132</sup> *Regesten Kaiserreich Heinrich Raspe*, no 1-16 and Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, p. 706.

<sup>133</sup> *Regesten Kaiserreich Heinrich Raspe*, p. 7 no 3, p.17 no 13, p. 107 no 71. See H. Bresslau, *Handbuch der Urkundenlehre für Deutschland und Italien. Volume 2* (Leipzig, 1958–1960), p. 426, FN 3.

In contrast to his predecessor, William of Holland usually called himself ‘elected king’ (*in regem electus*).<sup>134</sup> His very first charter after his election used the full royal title *Romanorum rex semper augustus*, though, as it may have been written by a scribe in the service of the count of Gelders, who was unfamiliar with the conventions of the royal chancery.<sup>135</sup> Already during the siege of Aachen, some of William’s charters started to use the full royal title.<sup>136</sup> After the capitulation of the city and even before his coronation, his charters permanently used the full royal title.<sup>137</sup>

William of Holland usually counted the years of his reign from the day of his coronation onwards, which can be seen as further evidence that he tried to make his claim to legitimacy through his coronation incontestable.<sup>138</sup> There is some contested evidence that William of Holland may have issued a charter on the day after his marriage to Elisabeth of Brunswick that used the formulation “rengni [sic] nostri anno primo”, which may indicate that he counted the years from the time when he had control over larger areas of Germany, as the marriage gave him access to the North. However, the charter is a sixteenth century forgery, which may have been based on a contemporary charter from the thirteenth century, while the charters from the day before and the next day describe the date as the fourth year of William’s reign.<sup>139</sup>

The charters therefore showed no unified approach with regards to counting the years of their reign; each claimant accentuated the aspect that was applicable to them and emphasized their legitimacy. Nevertheless, William of Holland hoped that the coronation in Aachen would give him a crucial advantage over the uncrowned Conrad IV and greatly increase his political and social capital as king. The necessary steps included solemnly entering the city, the ritual

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<sup>134</sup> *Regesten Kaiserreich Heinrich Raspe*, no 1/4.

<sup>135</sup> Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, p. 713.

<sup>136</sup> *Regesten Kaiserreich Heinrich Raspe*, 38/41.

<sup>137</sup> *Regesten Kaiserreich Heinrich Raspe* no 45-7 and *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, pp. 267-8.

<sup>138</sup> Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, pp. 705/715.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 706.

of coronation in the chapel of Charlemagne, and the subsequent feast and acceptance of homage by his new vassals.<sup>140</sup>

### **William of Holland and recruitment for the siege of Aachen, February-March 1248**

For about two weeks in February 1248, William of Holland joined legate Peter Capocci and together they recruited crusaders to bolster William's army. The army had to be large enough that he could simultaneously continue the siege to Kaiserswerth and gain access to the city of Aachen.<sup>141</sup> They travelled together between Leuven, Utrecht, Cologne, and Strasbourg, an area geographically close to Aachen, but west of the river Maas. It is highly likely that they used William of Holland's fleet, as they mainly moved along the Rhine. Their choice of geographical area showed that the recruitment effort was tailored to William, as they were in an environment that was politically, linguistically, and culturally connected to the county of Holland. This was the first time a royal candidate directly took part in the itinerant recruitment of crusaders.

On the journey, legate Peter probably joined William in Leuven. Sometime in early February 1248, they departed the city together and travelled along the lower part of the Rhine to Utrecht.<sup>142</sup> On the way, legate Peter probably preached the cross wherever he could.<sup>143</sup> They were attested to recruit crusaders in Utrecht on 18 February 1248.<sup>144</sup> Legate Peter "encourage[ed] and persuad[ed] the men he met to take the Cross against the men of Aachen."<sup>145</sup> However, the situation was volatile, and after only one or two days "some minor dispute blew up between [the legate and William's] men and the citizens, and as a result of this

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid., pp. VII/XII-XIII.

<sup>141</sup> Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, p. 67.

<sup>142</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 292. The chronicle claims that William of Holland and legate Peter Capocci moved along the lower part of the Rhine to Utrecht in January 1248, but February 1248 is more likely.

<sup>143</sup> Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, p. 70.

<sup>144</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 924, no 4898a and p. 1552, no 10209.

<sup>145</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 292.

the people became more and more angry.”<sup>146</sup> William of Holland and legate Peter left “not without shame and anger”.<sup>147</sup> The tense mood can be interpreted as continued loyalty by the citizens of Utrecht to the Staufer, a lack of support for the new king, or an unwillingness to accept interference by a papal representative in Germany. Legate Peter accompanied William probably until the second half of February 1248, when they parted, while the legate continued to preach the cross.

Through his presence, William of Holland tied his kingship inseparably to the crusade when he accompanied the papal legate as he recruited crusaders. He could fashion himself as a capable leader, a strong king, and as a crusader. This was the peak of recruitment for the crusade against the Staufer in Germany. Furthermore, it added to the religious dimension of his kingship and distinguished William of Holland as a papal champion.

Further recruitment efforts were characterized by a combined approach of recruiting crusaders and raising an army by secular means. From 20 February 1248 to 25 March 1248, William tried to leverage his network of connections in the county of Holland and Zeeland and the surrounding areas to recruit men-at-arms who were not crusaders. As a lay monarch, he could recruit through political and familial connections, but he did not have the power to give out indulgences or distribute the sign of the cross. He was attested in Zierikzee from 20 February to 5 March, in Middelburg from 11 to 24 March, and in 's-Gravenzande on 25 March 1248.<sup>148</sup> Like his predecessor, he also used some of the papal money he received to put together an army. This is exemplified by a charter from March 1249, in which he confirmed the loyalty of the Count of Katzenelnbogen with 700 marks. 300 marks were to be paid by Pope Innocent IV, 400 marks by William of Holland. Innocent IV did not cover the entire sum, because he held back some money to spend more on the crusade to the Holy Land.<sup>149</sup> William of Holland

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid, p. 293.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

<sup>148</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 924, no 4899/4901/4903-4/4899 and p. 925, no 4906.

<sup>149</sup> Büttner, ‘Nervus rerum’, p. 491.

had to mortgage several places to raise the necessary sum.<sup>150</sup> To alleviate his cash-strapped situation, additional funds were collected on his behalf. In early 1248, the Dominican Gotfried, papal chaplain and penitentiary, collected a fifth from ecclesiastics in Poland.<sup>151</sup> Innocent IV also ordered the twentieth to be collected in the whole of Germany, tasking two Dominicans from Leuven and Antwerp who previously raised money for the crusade from ecclesiastics in the church province of Cologne.<sup>152</sup> On 26 March 1248, William was back in Germany, in Hagen, and by 20 April he rejoined the siege of Kaiserswerth palace.<sup>153</sup>

### **Crusader recruitment, February-June 1248**

Legate Peter Capocci made his way to Cologne without William of Holland in the second half of February 1248.<sup>154</sup> There he “enlisted the laity through the words of his preaching, but he forced the prelates and many of the clergy to take the Cross partly by exhortation and partly by threats, laying sentence of excommunication on those who were unwilling. However, the next day he relaxed this sentence at the request of the lord archbishop of Cologne, leaving this as a matter of individual conscience, apart from those who had obtained benefices through the grace of the lord pope, or were seeking one.”<sup>155</sup>

Legate Peter stayed in Cologne until early March 1248.<sup>156</sup> On 10 March 1248, he was in Konstanz and ordered the abbot of Heisterbach to protect the abbess and convent of Blankenberg by means of ecclesiastical censure.<sup>157</sup> From Cologne, legate Peter went up the Rhine towards Strasbourg, where “it is said that he was honourably received” on 31 March

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p. 482/491.

<sup>151</sup> Gottlob, *Päpstliche Kreuzzugs-Steuern*, p. 78.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>153</sup> William was also attested at Kaiserswerth palace on 20 March 1248, but Middelburg and Kaiserswerth are about 250 km apart, so it would have been challenging for him to be there, see *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 925, no 4908.

<sup>154</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 292 and *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 195, no 1383.

<sup>155</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 292

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1552, no 10210, and *Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte des Niederrheins*, no 167.

1248.<sup>158</sup> He ordered Ulrich, *custos* of the Franciscans in Konstanz, to preach and have preached the cross against Frederick II, Conrad IV, and their supporters.<sup>159</sup> This order specified the duration of the crusaders' service, which was now as short as four weeks. All those who sent someone to fight in their stead or paid a fee according to their wealth received the same privileges.<sup>160</sup>

On 8 April 1248, Pope Innocent IV, upon William of Holland's explicit request, gave legate Peter Capocci the power to convert crusader oaths from the Holy Land to the crusade against the Staufer in Germany.<sup>161</sup> Legate Peter Capocci probably stayed in Strasbourg for most of April 1248; he was still there by 23 April 1248.<sup>162</sup> On that day, he confirmed that he won over Duke Matthias II of Lorraine.<sup>163</sup> He was in Nancy, south of Aachen, on 28 April 1248 and back in Utrecht by 21 May 1248.<sup>164</sup> Matthew Paris called William of Holland's army 'the army raised by the legate', which shows the important role he played to recruit crusaders.<sup>165</sup>

Targeted preaching also attempted to minimise interference with recruitment for king Louis IX's crusade, which set sail across the sea in the second half of June 1248. On 22 June 1248, Innocent IV ordered the Dominican prior Hydus to stop crusaders from the province Teutonia who prepared to depart to the Holy Land.<sup>166</sup> Christoph Maier analysed crusader recruitment in Frisia from the perspective of Louis IX's crusade to the Holy Land, arguing that the time to prepare for Louis IX's general passage of 1248 probably was too short, so that many Frisian crusaders commuted their vows and served in the army that besieged Aachen.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 292, *Regesta Imperii*, V, 10211, *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, no 1383. See Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, p. 75.

<sup>159</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, no 10211. See Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, p. 67 and Köster *Kreuzablass*, pp. 46-7.

<sup>160</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, no 10211.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1322, no 7981 and p. 1552, no 10211a.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1552, no 10212-4. See Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, p. 74.

<sup>163</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1552, no 10212 and p. 1553, no 10213.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1552, no 10215 and no 10216.

<sup>165</sup> *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, pp. 270-2.

<sup>166</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 600, no 3967 and *Bullarium Ordinis FF. Praedicatorum*, p. 182, no 199.

<sup>167</sup> Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, pp. 67-8.

However, this perspective neglects the positive appeal William of Holland's crusade had for many Frisians through their geographical and linguistic connection with William. This comes in addition to the practical considerations; Aachen was located much closer than Egypt and their vow could be fulfilled in a period as short as four weeks.<sup>168</sup>

It is also likely that oath conversions such as by prior Hydus would have angered Louis IX, if he received reports that his crusade preparations were hampered once again. Instead, Innocent IV seemed to hope that crusaders from Frisia, Holland and Zeeland would make a brief detour to Aachen, and then join another general passage across the sea. A charter by Innocent IV ordered these crusaders to prepare for a passage in the "near future" and specified March 1249 (*quod in mense martii proximo futuro*).<sup>169</sup> This means that Innocent IV had reason to assume that by spring 1249, the siege of Aachen would be over.

Meanwhile, the archbishops spent most of the beginning of the year in their dioceses, looking after their own affairs and recruiting for William of Holland's army. On 24 March, Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz allied himself to bishop Engelbert of Osnabrück against anyone between the Rhine and Weser, which was likely directed against Conrad IV. On 29 March and 1 April 1248, Archbishop Siegfried was in Erfurt, where based on a papal mandate he announced a bundle of measures in his diocese "to fight the thieves, arsonists, and all other criminals," which also hints at a connection with the conflict. In the second half of February, Archbishop Conrad hosted legate Peter Cappocchi in Cologne, but was forced to step in when he forcibly tried to recruit his clergy. From 29 April to 1 May 1248, archbishop Arnold joined William at the siege of Kaiserswerth.<sup>170</sup>

In preparation for the siege of Aachen, for the first time the cross was preached against Conrad IV. The first charter that explicitly mentioned Conrad IV as a target of crusading dates

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<sup>168</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, no 10211. See Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, p. 67 and Köster *Kreuzablass*, pp. 46-7.

<sup>169</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 600, no 3967.

<sup>170</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 196, no 1388-90.

from 18 April 1248, two days after another failed attempt by Louis IX to reconcile pope and emperor, which led Innocent IV to renew Frederick II's excommunication.<sup>171</sup> On 5 May 1248, Innocent IV sent special orders to bishop Conrad of Freising, bishop Rüdiger of Passau, bishop Albert of Regensburg, elected bishop Hartmann of Augsburg, and the procurator of the church of Salzburg to preach the cross to bishops of southern German and Austrian dioceses.<sup>172</sup> The elected Archbishop Philip of Salzburg preached the cross against Frederick II and Conrad IV in his diocese of Salzburg.<sup>173</sup> On 27 May 1248, a Franciscan brother preached the cross against both at the abbey of St. Gall.<sup>174</sup> By this time, abbot Berthold, who had remained loyal to Conrad IV during the battle of Frankfurt in 1246, had moved his loyalty to the papal party.<sup>175</sup> Another charter explicitly directed against Conrad IV dated from September 1248, while the siege of Aachen was well under way.<sup>176</sup>

### **The siege of Aachen, April-October 1248**

William of Holland started to lay siege to Aachen seven months after his election. The siege started in William's absence in April 1248 and was led on his behalf by one of his military leaders before he arrived in person in early May 1248.<sup>177</sup> The army's main strategy was to try to encircle the city to cut off provisions and to starve the population into submission. However, there were insufficient men to encircle the entire city, so Aachen's north side remained accessible. William's army was unable to block all the gates through which the citizens could leave and relief forces could enter, though they made frequent attacks on the city. They besieged the city walls with projective engines, such as mangonels, petreries, and trebuchets

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<sup>171</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe und des Domkapitels von Salzburg 1247-1343*, p. 6, no 45. See Köster, *Kreuzablass*, pp. 44-45 and Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 25.

<sup>172</sup> *Annales ecclesiastici*, p. 7. See Köster, *Kreuzablass*, pp. 43-4.

<sup>173</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe und des Domkapitels von Salzburg 1247-1343*, p. 6, no 45.

<sup>174</sup> Christian Kuchimaister, *Niwe Casus Monasterii sancti Galli*, pp. 44-5/373.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>176</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV, II*, p.10, no 4166 and Köster, *Kreuzablass*, p. 45.

<sup>177</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, no 4917a-4932.

(‘Bliden’), which they erected on all sides of the city and used to hurl stones against the city walls, though they also used archers. Although trebuchet attacks took place during day and at night-time, their attack was insufficient as long as the city could not be blockaded, hence in the earliest phase of the siege in April neither side was able to force a decision.<sup>178</sup>

The *Royal Chronicle of Cologne* offers a snapshot of events from 29 April 1248.<sup>179</sup> William of Holland was not in the camp at Aachen, because he was attested at the siege of Kaiserswerth on that day.<sup>180</sup> At sunset, some in William’s army stormed one of the city gates of Aachen, though the citizens, both knights and commoners, were able to parry the attack by charging out of the gate in defence. Some of William’s soldiers during combat suddenly fell into waterfilled cellars belonging to demolished houses outside the city wall. This prompted the entire rest of William’s army to flee while the men of Aachen retreated back into the city under the cover of darkness. Among the dead was a nobleman from Perwez and sixteen knights and retainers, whose bodies were later recovered from the cellars. The death toll among the citizens was unknown, but one of the brothers of a certain Gimnich was mortally wounded.<sup>181</sup>

William of Holland arrived in the camp at Aachen on 4 or 5 May 1248.<sup>182</sup> He was joined by the Archbishops Conrad of Cologne, Siegfried of Mainz, and German ecclesiastics and nobles, such as the bishops of Metz and Strasbourg, the abbot of St Gall, Duke Henry of Brabant, and Berchtold of Falkenstein.<sup>183</sup> While it is likely that Archbishop Arnold of Trier was also present, there is no evidence for this.<sup>184</sup>

The response to recruitment for the siege was strong.<sup>185</sup> William’s army consisted of crusaders from all over Germany. Others came from the county of Holland, especially

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<sup>178</sup> *Chronicle of Menko*, p. 541, *Excerpta ex Chronica Thomae Wikes*, p. 450, and *Matthew Paris’ Chronica Maiora*, p. 17.

<sup>179</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, pp. 292-3.

<sup>180</sup> *Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte des Niederrheins*, p. 171, no 328 and pp. 171-2, no 329.

<sup>181</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, pp. 292-3.

<sup>182</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V no 4917. See Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci*, p. 74.

<sup>183</sup> *Regesta Imperii* V, p. 824.

<sup>184</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, no 4921 and *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, pp. 292-3.

<sup>185</sup> See Köster, *Kreuzablass*, p. 49.

Friesland, as well also Brabant, Flanders, Picardy, the dioceses of Metz and Strasbourg, as well as Gotland, Denmark, Hungary, and Russia.<sup>186</sup> Legate Peter Capocci presented himself together with the elected bishop of Liège on 15 June 1248.<sup>187</sup> Over the next three months, he occasionally acted as a witness to William of Holland's charters, suggesting that the legate dipped in and out of the siege to recruit crusaders, even making a last-minute dash to Liège on 27 October 1248.<sup>188</sup>

The same was true for Archbishops Siegfried of Mainz and Conrad of Cologne. Archbishop Siegfried also concentrated on the recruitment of crusaders. He preached the cross in Würzburg on 23 August 1248, where he signed several people with the sign of the cross. In contrast, Archbishop Conrad of Cologne spent most of his time from May to August 1248 in the city of Cologne. He mainly seems to have left the military conquest of Aachen to William, while he fulfilled his duties as archbishop of Cologne. Only towards the end of the siege did the archbishop join William in Aachen more often.

At some point during the siege, engineers who were part of William's army built a dam or rampart through which the water from a river flowing next to the city was redirected to flood a part of Aachen.<sup>189</sup> The waterfilled cellars in which some fell on 29 April 1248 may indicate that the attackers began to redirect the river even before William of Holland's arrival. The aim was to cut off the city from its surroundings by partially flooding it with water. The redirected water created a pool in front of William of Holland's army.<sup>190</sup> The *Royal Chronicle of Cologne* makes explicit that the rampart was built by specialist engineers who were not signed with the

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<sup>186</sup> Matthew Paris' *Chronica Maiora*, pp. 25/27/270-2/634, *Gesta Abbatum Horti Sanctae Mariae*, p. 602, and *Chronique à Baudouin d'Avesnes*, ed. J-B-M-C. Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Istorie et croniques de Flandres, d'après les textes de divers manuscrits* (Brussels, 1879-1880), p. 171.

<sup>187</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1553, no 10217a and no 4921. See Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 55.

<sup>188</sup> Legate Peter Capocci was in Aachen on 9 July 1248, 4 August 1248, 28 September 1248, 7 October 1248, and 18 October 1248, *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1553, no 10220-3.

<sup>189</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 293.

<sup>190</sup> Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich II*, pp. 494-5. See Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, pp. 55-6.

cross, but legate Peter Capocci (mistaken in the chronicle for the Italian legate Octavian) granted an indulgence to these workers.<sup>191</sup> They were assisted by the crusaders from Brabant, Flanders, and Picardy.<sup>192</sup> Frisian expertise in water engineering and amphibious warfare seems to have played a considerable role in William's conquest of Aachen.

One of the main factors that turned William of Holland's siege of Aachen into a success was the continuous reinforcement of his army by newly arriving crusaders.<sup>193</sup> In addition to ongoing efforts by legate Peter and the archbishops, the Dominicans and Franciscans displayed a strong presence and daily preached the cross against the Staufer.<sup>194</sup> They received special preaching mandates specifically for Aachen.<sup>195</sup> Most of these special mandates focused on recruitment in the great west-German centres along the Rhine and in Flanders, where the position and rule of the royal candidate not yet completely accepted but where pro-Staufer resistance to a change in power was easiest to break.<sup>196</sup>

The Franciscan brother Wilbrand was especially successful in Frisia. He was allowed to give out indulgences to everyone who listened to his sermons. This vastly increased his audience, which translated into higher numbers taking the cross against the Staufer.<sup>197</sup> However, some people in Frisia also resisted Wilbrand's preaching. This delayed the arrival of some Frisians at Aachen, but the late reinforcement may have benefited the siege. In autumn, encouraged by Franciscan preaching, a high number of crusaders arrived from the Rhineland, the Moselle, Holland, and most numerous of all from Frisia.<sup>198</sup> Among those who went to Aachen were also crusaders whose vows to go to the Holy Land were commuted.<sup>199</sup> The army

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<sup>191</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 292-3.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>193</sup> Freed, *Friars and German Society*, p. 153 and Doublier, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, p. 130, fn 186.

<sup>194</sup> *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, pp. 270-2.

<sup>195</sup> Doublier, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, pp. 129-30.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, FN 186.

<sup>197</sup> *Chronicle of Menko*, p. 540. See Köster, *Kreuzablass*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>198</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 293.

<sup>199</sup> *Excerpta ex Chronica Thomae Wikes*, p. 450.

encircled the city on the north-side, which hitherto had been free. The longer the siege lasted, the larger William's army became.<sup>200</sup>

During the siege of Aachen, Conrad IV tried to relieve the city in October 1248, though he only arrived just before the end of the siege.<sup>201</sup> He was unable to approach the city earlier because he was still fighting certain nobles in the duchy of Swabia, having just returned from Italy.<sup>202</sup> Before Conrad IV reached Aachen, he was attacked by Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz between Swabia and Bavaria.<sup>203</sup> Archbishop Siegfried's presence in Swabia is the only evidence that he may have been involved in the rebellion by the Swabian nobles against Conrad IV. They clashed in Nördlingen, south of Würzburg, but Conrad IV drove Archbishop Siegfried west as far as Bruchsal, enlisting the help of the citizens of Worms, Speyer, and Oppenheim.

The citizens of Speyer were in conflict with William of Holland's chancellor Henry of Leiningen, whom Innocent IV wanted to see provided with the bishopric of Speyer, which once more exemplified how various local interests intersected in the military campaign. When Conrad IV reached Aachen, he was accompanied by an army that comprised, among others, of abbot Conrad of Reichenau, the Counts of Kyburg, Frohburg, Sigmaringen, and Gröningen, as well as mercenaries sent by Frederick II.<sup>204</sup> Their relief attempt was unsuccessful, though no information survives on the exact circumstances.

After six months, the situation of the city was dire and its inhabitants hungry, devastated, and impoverished.<sup>205</sup> The pressure on the citizens of Aachen became sufficiently strong that they surrendered at the end of October 1248.<sup>206</sup> Their surrender was mediated by Archbishop

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<sup>200</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, pp. 55-6.

<sup>201</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 824, no 4521a, *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, p. 884, and *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, pp. 270-2.

<sup>202</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 823.

<sup>203</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 300, no 637, *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 824, *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, p. 884, and *Annales Wormatienses*, p. 454.

<sup>204</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 824.

<sup>205</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, pp. 55-6.

<sup>206</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 201, no 1427.

Conrad of Cologne, in whose diocese Aachen was located, on 18 October 1248.<sup>207</sup> On 1 November 1248, All Saints Day, William of Holland was crowned in the chapel of Charlemagne by Archbishop Conrad of Cologne.<sup>208</sup> Archbishop Siegfried probably was able to reach Aachen in time and to attend the coronation, just like papal legate Peter. During the ritual, William was enthroned, anointed, crowned with the *regalia*, handed the insignia, and he said prayers and made an oath.<sup>209</sup>

### **William of Holland between Aachen and Kaiserswerth, April-December 1248**

The siege of Kaiserswerth palace had continued throughout the year 1248.<sup>210</sup> William of Holland laid siege to Kaiserswerth and Aachen in parallel, from April to October 1248, moving back and forth between the two locations.<sup>211</sup> Next to Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, many of the most powerful nobles of the local area were attested at the siege, such as Count Adolf of Berg, his brother Duke Walram of Limburg, the Counts Dietrich IV of Cleves, Otto of Gelders, William of Jülich, and Adolf of the Mark with two of his sons, and certain Dutch *ministeriales*.<sup>212</sup>

By late April or early May 1248, the palace was cut off and there was no military support from its surrounding area.<sup>213</sup> William was able to take the surrounding imperial farms and manors, which he gave out as fiefs to Count Adolf IV of Berg.<sup>214</sup> William also conquered the city of Duisburg, with which he enfeoffed Count Adolf's brother Duke Walram V of

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<sup>207</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, pp. 55-6.

<sup>208</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 10, no number, between no 32 and 33. See Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, pp. 57-63.

<sup>209</sup> Johannis de Beka projects fourteenth century expectations and requirements for the coronation ritual onto the thirteenth century, see *Excerpta ex Chronica Johannis de Beka*. pp. 434-6.

<sup>210</sup> Binding, *Deutsche Königspfalzen*, p. 321.

<sup>211</sup> He was attested in the camp at Kaiserswerth on 20 April, 23 April, 25 April, 29 April, 1 May, 21 October, every day 5-22 November, 5 December, 10-20 December, 23 December, 26 December, and 30 December 1248. In the camp at Aachen, he was attested on 5-7 May, 10 June, 18 August, 3 September, 17 September, 18 October, 19 October, 30 October, and 31 October.

<sup>212</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, no 4915. See Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 55 and Buhlmann, 'Die Belagerung Kaiserswerths durch König Wilhelm von Holland', p. 13.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>214</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 196, no 1388.

Limburg.<sup>215</sup> Only nine days after his coronation, William re-joined the siege of Kaiserswerth on 10 November 1248. The news of the surrender of Aachen seemed to have influenced the morale at the imperial palace. It held out for another month when it had to surrender because of hunger and starvation of the population.<sup>216</sup>

William successfully concluded the siege and took control of Kaiserswerth between 11 and 14 December 1248.<sup>217</sup> Burgrave Gernand the younger gave up the castle and put it under the protection of the archbishop of Cologne.<sup>218</sup> One of his sons, Friedrich of Hagenau, became William's vassal ("fidelius [sic] noster").<sup>219</sup> The conquered palace served its military purpose. William of Holland continued to hold Kaiserswerth and did not hand it out as a fief, probably to continue the lucrative income from its tolls.<sup>220</sup>

Although Kaiserswerth was nominally under his control, he was not able to make full use of it. The bundle of rights associated with the palace, which had been mostly been in the hands of the Staufer, splintered under William of Holland. He had to give out many of the rights over jurisdiction and income to burgrave Gernand the younger of Hagenau. William of Holland confirmed Gernand the younger as burgrave for life and conferred the surplus of the income from the toll to him. At times he borrowed money from the burgrave. Yet he retained some right over the toll, namely the right to free certain people or institutions from it. He did this mainly for religious houses such as the monasteries Heisterbach, Himmerod, and (Alten) Kamp, as well as for the Teutonic Order. This weakened his power, while strengthening that of the local princes who controlled territory along the lower Rhine, among them Archbishop Conrad of Cologne.<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> See Lorenz, 'Kaiserswerth im Mittelalter', pp. 70-2.

<sup>217</sup> Buhlmann, 'Die Belagerung Kaiserswerths durch König Wilhelm von Holland', pp. 9/22.

<sup>218</sup> Binding, *Deutsche Königspfalzen*, p. 321.

<sup>219</sup> Lorenz, 'Kaiserswerth im Mittelalter', pp. 72-3.

<sup>220</sup> Buhlmann, 'Die Belagerung Kaiserswerths durch König Wilhelm von Holland', p. 15.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., pp. 19-20.

## **Archbishops Arnold of Trier and Conrad of Cologne at Thuranth castle, September-November 1248**

By September 1248, Archbishop Arnold of Trier was back at the siege of Thuranth castle.<sup>222</sup> Between September and October 1248, he was intermittently joined by Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, who went back and forth between the sieges of Aachen and Thuranth.<sup>223</sup> Upon Archbishop Conrad's arrival, some of Zorno's supporters were persuaded to reconcile with Archbishop Arnold of Trier, while others abandoned him.<sup>224</sup> The approach to the siege was the same as at Aachen; the archbishops' men blocked access to the castle, placed trebuchets on the opposite mountain (since known as 'Bleidenberg'), and the occupants eventually started to run out of victuals.<sup>225</sup>

Archbishop Conrad's military support contributed to a swift conclusion of the siege. With his help, Archbishop Arnold achieved in two months what before he had failed to accomplish in two years.<sup>226</sup> On 17 November 1248, the two archbishops signed a contract of atonement with Duke Otto of Bavaria, in which the duke relinquished the castle and thenceforth they shared custody over Thuranth.<sup>227</sup> To implement their shared custody, they erected a wall that split the castle into two parts with separate towers, entries and keeps, as well as their respective burgraves. With castle Thuranth, Duke Otto of Bavaria lost his last base along the river Mosel.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe zu Trier*, pp. 45-6.

<sup>223</sup> Archbishop Conrad was at Thuranth castle from 5 to 16 September 1248, in Aachen from 16 to 23 September 1248, and briefly back in Cologne on 24 September 1248. From 25 September until the end of the month he was back at Thuranth castle, and from 3 to 18 October back in Aachen. After another brief visit to Cologne on 23 October 1248, he was part of the end of the siege of Aachen and negotiated the surrenders of the citizens.

<sup>224</sup> Zenz, *Die Taten der Trierer*, p. 63.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid. and Ulrich, 'Beobachtungen Moselburgen', p. 158.

<sup>226</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 200, no 1416.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., pp. 200-1, no 1421.

<sup>228</sup> See W. Dotzauer, 'Die Pfalzgrafen am Rhein', in F.-J. Heyen (ed.), *Zwischen Rhein und Mosel. Der Kreis Sankt Goar* (1966), pp. 59-76.

### Collecting money, October 1248-January 1249

The siege of Aachen and William of Holland's relationships with his new vassals came with great expenditure, but Innocent IV was unable to provide him with additional funds. Instead, for the first time Innocent allowed funds to be collected in Germany through the traditional crusader channels, such as church taxes and vow redemptions. Initially, only the redemptions of oaths given to go on crusade against Frederick the Staufer could be collected on the behalf of William of Holland.<sup>229</sup> In a secret letter Innocent IV gave the order also to provide William of Holland with money collected from redemptions of vows to go on crusade to the Holy Land, thereby paralleling some of the incidences when he secretly gave priority to crusader recruitment for Louis IX.<sup>230</sup>

In October 1248, Innocent IV ordered two Dominicans to collect the twentieth in Germany. He also instructed his legate Jacob of Liège (later Urban IV) in Poland to collect money that was intended to be used against Frederick II. Legate Jacob of Liège held a provincial council in Breslau and induced the local bishops to pay a fifth for three years.<sup>231</sup> Innocent IV first only tried to tax the richest ecclesiastics with benefices in Italy, who could spare the money most easily, but as a last resort proceeded to raise the levy for twentieth.<sup>232</sup> On 9 December 1248, Innocent IV gave the order also to collect the fifth in Germany. On 2 January 1249, he expanded this mandate, now also ordering suitable friars to be appointed to collect the profit from redemptions of crusader vows.<sup>233</sup> It is impossible, though, to calculate the total earnings the papal party made from taxing ecclesiastics, churches, monasteries, as well as lay subjects.<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> Büttner, 'Nervus rerum', p. 474.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

<sup>231</sup> Gottlob, *Päpstliche Kreuzzugs-Steuern*, pp. 77-8.

<sup>232</sup> See W. Küster, *Beiträge zur Finanzgeschichte des deutschen Reiches nach dem Interregnum. Teillieferung 1: Das Reichsgut in den Jahren 1273-1313 nebst einer Ausgabe und Kritik des Nürnberger Salbüchleins* (Leipzig, 1883).

<sup>233</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV, II*, p. 29, no 4269.

<sup>234</sup> Gottlob, *Päpstliche Kreuzzugs-Steuern*, p. 80.

Innocent IV's orders were addressed to legate Siegfried of Mainz and Henry of Leiningen. Henry of Leiningen was William of Holland's chancellor and, controversially, elected bishop of Speyer.<sup>235</sup> He was the first person outside of the inner circle of the three Rhenish archbishops who was trusted with a task that carried such great responsibility, though in his office of chancellor he was particularly well-qualified. William of Holland spent Christmas at Kaiserswerth palace with Archbishop Conrad of Cologne. He was now crowned in Aachen, controlled Wartburg castle, Kaiserswerth palace, and together the archbishops of Trier and Cologne held Thurant castle. Therefore, the year 1248 ended as a success for William of Holland.

However, for Innocent IV, the timing of when he allowed William of Holland's kingship to be funded by money collected through the traditional crusader channels showed that this was a more delicate moment for the project of changing power in Germany than might first appear. When William of Holland moved his focus from taking all the necessary steps to become king to implementing his rule, it became more difficult for Innocent IV to justify the use of the machinery of crusading to support him against critics. On the one hand, William's legitimacy as king was bolstered by his coronation. On the other hand, when William of Holland started to implement his rule, the immediate importance of the military campaign, which was the most visible part of the crusade, decreased in favour of political actions such as granting fiefs to new vassals. When he began to enact his new power, his actions appeared even more political than when he laid siege to Aachen. This further removed the experience on the ground in Germany from Innocent IV's initial justification why a crusade against the Staufer was necessary.

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<sup>235</sup> Henry of Leiningen was elected bishop of Speyer on 27 October 1245, but never confirmed or consecrated. He could not assert himself as bishop of Speyer and in 1247, he even had to flee the diocese. See Berger, *Innocent IV, I*, p. 398, no 2672.

## 1249

### Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz as papal legate, late 1248/early 1249-March 1249

Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz followed Peter Capocci as the new apostolic legate. There is no evidence as to whether he assumed the office directly after legate Peter Capocci's departure in November 1248 or later.<sup>236</sup> One day after William of Holland's coronation, legate Peter Capocci gifted the mountain on which he had resided (*mons cardinalis*) to the dean and chapter of Aachen and left Germany soon afterwards.<sup>237</sup> As his most pressing task in Germany was now achieved, Innocent IV considered Peter Capocci's expertise urgently required in Italy, where he made him an apostolic legate again.<sup>238</sup> Archbishop Siegfried was the first German ecclesiastic to hold the office during the crusade against the Staufer; he held the position of legate before in July 1243.<sup>239</sup> On 25 February 1249, Innocent IV wrote to the archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors, and all other prelates as well as to the whole clergy of Germany to obey Archbishop Siegfried in his new office as legate. He also repeated his previous prohibition of free elections of bishops in all German dioceses in February 1249.<sup>240</sup>

Peter Capocci was an Italian outsider, whom Innocent IV sent to Germany to fulfil specific tasks but who was not part of the network of German princes. When the pope made Archbishop Siegfried his apostolic legate, he trusted that their goals were sufficiently aligned that his new 'domestic' legate would not prioritize his own interests in a way that would hinder a change in power in Germany. Nevertheless, Innocent IV seems to have been concerned that he would not be able to control Archbishop Siegfried's actions as easily as those of the previous

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<sup>236</sup> See *Annales Erphordiensis*, p. 36 and *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 302, no 655.

<sup>237</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1553, no 10223a/10225. Initially named *mons latronum*, then renamed *mons cardinalis* because Peter Capocci resided there; today the mountain is called Salvatorsberg.

<sup>238</sup> Legate Peter Capocci was in Lyon by 18 December 1248, see Berger, *Innocent IV*, 4395, *Regesta Imperii*, V, 8068 and *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 502, no 25.

<sup>239</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 274, no 449.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 303-4, no 667-8.

legates who had been reliable agents of his will. This translated into Innocent IV's closer personal involvement in Germany.

### **Direct involvement by Pope Innocent IV, late 1248-May 1249**

In 1249, Innocent IV involved himself more intimately with imperial politics in Germany to supervise the change in power under a domestic legate. Innocent IV knew that William of Holland's coronation was not yet the final step in this process; now they entered the crucial phase of consolidating his rule as king. For this, William of Holland had to create many bonds of vassalage and alliances, all of which still were of a highly reciprocal nature because of his weak power base.

Pope Innocent IV began to apply some of the administrative instruments with which he was familiar to imperial politics. One example is marriage dispensations, which lay in the competence of the pope because of their spiritual consequences, but did not unduly burden the papal treasury.<sup>241</sup> Between late April and the middle of May 1249, Innocent IV granted three marriage dispensations to nobles whose alliances were strategically relevant.<sup>242</sup> On 22 April 1249, he granted to the knight Bastiano de Viseto to remain married to his wife, despite being related to her to an uncanonically close degree. On 11 May 1249, Innocent IV ordered Archbishop Conrad to grant a marriage dispensation to the daughter of the Count of Hoya and Count Henry of Aldenburg on the northern Coast of Germany bordering Frisia.<sup>243</sup> On 15 May 1249, he ordered Archbishop Conrad to grant a similar dispensation to Count Ulrich II of Münzenberg, a noble from the Wetterau who became chamberlain to William of Holland.<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> See K. Witthinrich, *Si negotio ecclesiae videtur expedire: die Päpste des Mittelalters zwischen Eherecht und Heiratspolitik: eine typologische Untersuchung* (Husum, 2011), pp. 254-68.

<sup>242</sup> For marriage dispensations, see Berger, *Innocent IV, II*, no 1996/2927 and *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 204, no 271 and p. 210, no 280.

<sup>243</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV, II*, p. 74, no 4501 and *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 530, no 716.

<sup>244</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV, II*, p. 76, no 4511-2, and p. 77, no 4513.

Furthermore, Innocent IV focused on winning over high calibre nobles through diplomacy. The most important example was Margrave Hermann VI of Baden, who was also the duke of Austria.<sup>245</sup> As duke of Austria, Margrave Hermann was one of William of Holland's most important potential allies; as the new king, William of Holland was supposed to enfeoff Margrave Herman with the duchy of Austria.<sup>246</sup> However, the succession was controversial, because the duchy fell to Margrave Hermann VI through the female line of inheritance via his wife Gertrud of Babenberg. Gertrud was the niece of the late Duke Frederick of Austria, but as a woman she needed permission to inherit the duchy. Innocent IV allowed Gertrud of Babenberg to inherit through the female line of succession, if her husband Hermann VI of Baden followed up on his promise and took the cross against the Staufer. The pope confirmed to the margrave his wife's right to bestow the duchy of Austria to him on 14 September 1248.<sup>247</sup> William of Holland could agree to the female line of succession based on a privilege (*privilegium minor*) by the Holy Roman Emperors granted to the dukes of Austria in 1156.<sup>248</sup> This was a significant concession, which showed how much William depended on the support of crucial allies. It is also noteworthy that Margrave Herman VI of Baden asked for the duchy of Austria to be confirmed to him by the pope, not by William of Holland nor the deposed Emperor Frederick II.

By 31 January 1249, Innocent IV sent a letter to William of Holland, in which he advised him to confirm the female succession to Duke Hermann in terms that the new king would find difficult to refuse.<sup>249</sup> Innocent IV very rarely sent direct letters to William of Holland, but the message fell into a period when the pope was integrally involved in such

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<sup>245</sup> See Maier, *Preaching the Crusade*, p. 73.

<sup>246</sup> By this time, the Count of Baden was Rudolf I of Baden, but until 1247, Rudolf I shared the title with his brother Hermann VI. Hermann VI left the full title to his brother when he married Gertrud of Babenberg and became duke of Austria, but the charter still referred to Hermann VI as the count of Baden.

<sup>247</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1328, no 8036, *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, p. 690 and *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 464.

<sup>248</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1333, no 8087.

<sup>249</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, II, p. 41, no 4328.

negotiations.<sup>250</sup> This marked a significant shift of power from the aspiring Holy Roman Emperor to the pope; it is unlikely that the monarch would have accepted such interfering advice regarding a matter with temporal and spiritual implications in a key territory in the Holy Roman Empire at a time when royal power was intact. Margrave Hermann VI was an extraordinarily important ally, yet the episode also highlighted how intricately the decision to become a crusader against the Staufer in Germany was entangled with dynastic and imperial politics. Whether or not Hermann VI of Baden personally became a crusader and fought in William of Holland's military campaign was a secondary aspect of this diplomatic alliance; the duke's political influence weighed much heavier. The recognition of his royal power William of Holland received when he gave the duchy of Austria as a fief out of his hands to Count Hermann was much more important at this point than the military fighting power the new duke could provide.

### **Crusader recruitment by the mendicant orders, January-March 1249**

The previous legates had been in charge of recruitment, and their departure from Germany left a vacuum that Innocent IV filled personally when he took the general organisation of crusader recruitment directly into his own hands. To do this, he made unprecedented use of the Franciscan and Dominican orders and for the first time directly contacted their ministers with regards to the crusade against the Staufer. From the beginning of the year and over the next months of 1249, recruitment for the crusade against the Staufer relied *en bloc* on the mendicant friars as the principal force of preaching.<sup>251</sup>

On 2 January 1249, Innocent IV issued a mandate that ordered those who preached the cross to grant an indulgence of forty days to the audience of crusader sermons and a plenary

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<sup>250</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 530, no 716 and Berger, *Innocent IV, part II*, p. 74, no 4501.

<sup>251</sup> Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, pp. 162-3 and Doublier, *Abläss, Papsttum und Bettelorden*, pp. 125-6.

indulgence to everyone who was signed with the cross.<sup>252</sup> It was addressed to Franciscans of the province of Alamania, to the custodes of the Franciscans of Cologne, Utrecht, Liège, and Brabant, as well as to the priors of the convents of the Dominicans in Cologne, Utrecht, Liège, and Antwerp.<sup>253</sup> On 14 May 1249, this was expanded to all Franciscans throughout the kingdom of Germany (*per regnum Alemannie*).<sup>254</sup> Together, a total of between 64 and 99 Franciscan and 42 or 43 Dominican custodies were involved.<sup>255</sup>

The discrepancy is caused by the uncertain foundation dates of houses. Between 1246 and 1251, the existence of 64 Franciscan houses can be confirmed (another 35 Franciscan houses maybe existed), while 42 Dominican houses can definitely be confirmed (one additional foundation is possible).<sup>256</sup>

Forty days of indulgence could be granted to audience members for listening to a sermon.<sup>257</sup> In addition, Innocent IV ordered the cross to be preached in German borderlands that had a connection to William of Holland, such as Antwerp, Brabant, and the Benedictine abbey of Egmond in the north of Holland. It was part of the archdiocese of Trier and held long-standing ties with the counts of Holland. He ordered the bishop of Kurland to recruit crusaders, probably through vow commutation. Finally, mirroring his tailored approach to diplomacy, Innocent IV for the first time also specifically targeted Duke Otto of Bavaria, against whom he ordered the cross to be preached by bishop Albert of Regensburg in his diocese on 6 February 1249.<sup>258</sup>

Despite Innocent IV's orders to the mendicant orders from January to March 1249, it is unlikely that as many crusaders assumed the cross as during the peak of recruitment for the

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<sup>252</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 448, no 630, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 12151 and Berger, *Innocent IV*, 02, pp. 28-9, no 4265.

<sup>253</sup> Köster, *Kreuzablass*, p. 52 and Freed, *Friars and German Society*, pp. 152-3.

<sup>254</sup> See *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 13360.

<sup>255</sup> See this thesis, *Maps*, '1246-51: Dominican & Franciscan Convents', pp. 298-306.

<sup>256</sup> Based on Freed, *Friars and German Society*, Appendix I.

<sup>257</sup> See Köster, *Kreuzablass*, p. 52.

<sup>258</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, II, p. 42, no 4333.

siege of Aachen.<sup>259</sup> There was also a growing threat to the safety of the mendicant friars, especially in southern Germany.<sup>260</sup> Numerous attacks took place on mendicant preachers by Stauffer supporters; several friars were harassed or even killed while promoting the papal cause and recruiting crusaders.<sup>261</sup> This is exemplified in a chronicle entry by Richard of San Germano:<sup>262</sup>

From that time, moreover, the friars were greatly troubled by Frederick, who had been legally deposed by the Council of Lyon, and were with great confusion expelled from their convents in many provinces, and many were imprisoned, some were even killed, because, obedient to the command of their church, they as pious sons manfully stood by their mother. No other religious order did more than the Friars minor.

Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Conrad IV and his supporters had the power or administrative capacity in Germany to build a comparatively all-encompassing apparatus of torture and persecution like that of his father Frederick II in Italy, who, according to Matthew Paris, ordered the death of Franciscans friars if they as much as listened to confessions of crusaders in the papal army.<sup>263</sup>

### **The siege of Boppard and Ingelheim palace, February-March 1249**

In 1249, William of Holland's focus shifted back to bringing more of Germany under his rule, which he did by conquering more palaces in the area along the Rhine, but also by diversifying his targets to include more strategically important cities. Having previously gathered his forces

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<sup>259</sup> Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 72. Maier erroneously placed William of Holland's coronation in 1249, instead of on 1 November 1248.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 72-3.

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>262</sup> *Ryccardi de Sancto Germano notarii chronica*, pp. 353/380.

<sup>263</sup> *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, p. 66, *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, p. 710. See Loud, 'The Case of the Missing Martyrs', pp. 144-7.

in Mainz, William laid siege to Boppard from 6 February 1249 onwards.<sup>264</sup> Boppard was a royal palace with a city that supplied provisions to the king and levied imperial tolls.<sup>265</sup> It may also have been part of William's general plan to control the area, as it lay along the Rhine and may have posed a danger to William's fleet.

This was going to be the first of a total of four sieges over the next two and a half years until he was able to control the city by 1251. This shows the extraordinary importance Boppard had as a fiscal centre and part of the *Reichsgut*. It was the seat of administration where income in its various forms was collected from a dense cluster of surrounding manors.<sup>266</sup> The extensive lands and goods came with rights and prerogatives that were almost completely owned by the Stauffer.<sup>267</sup>

The first siege ended after a brief period, when the citizens of Boppard negotiated a peace treaty with William of Holland.<sup>268</sup> Immediately after his first attack on Boppard, William laid siege to Ingelheim palace from 19 February until the end of March 1249.<sup>269</sup> The palace was located very close to Mainz, which made it easier to attack, and advantageous for William of Holland to possess a palace so close to one of his closest supporters.<sup>270</sup> However, during the siege, Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz fell gravely ill. He died in Bingen on 9 March 1249.<sup>271</sup>

William of Holland remained at Ingelheim palace until he was able to take it, after a forty-day long siege, on 28 March 1249, but he had to interrupt his siege of Boppard, which he

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<sup>264</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, 4963a, *Gesta Arnoldi*, p. 411 and *Annales Sancti Pantaleonis Coloniensis*, p. 491.

<sup>265</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 66 and Schulrat Klein, *Geschichte von Boppard* (Boppard, 1909), p. 32.

<sup>266</sup> F-J. Heyen, *Reichsgut im Rheinland. Die Geschichte des königlichen Fiskus Boppard* (Bonn, 1956), pp. 24-6.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 40-3.

<sup>268</sup> *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 386, *Annales Sancti Pantaleonis Coloniensis*, p. 491, *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 12, no 52-3 and 4963a.

<sup>269</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 296.

<sup>270</sup> See P. Classen, 'Die Geschichte der Pfalz Ingelheim bis zur Verpfändung an Kurpfalz 1375', in J. Autenrieth (ed.), *Ingelheim am Rhein* (Stuttgart, 1964), pp. 87-146, H. Schmitz, *Pfalz und Fiskus Ingelheim* (Marburg, 1971), and *idem*, 'Die Pfalz Ingelheim', in W. Schlesinger (ed.), *Mittelrheinische Beiträge zur Pfalzenforschung* (Mainz, 1964), pp. 154-75.

<sup>271</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 303, no 666 and p. 304, no 673, *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 387 and *Acta Imperii Selecta*, p. 298, no 356

resumed in autumn 1249.<sup>272</sup> Afterwards, he picked up Archbishop Conrad in Neuss, north of Cologne, and together they travelled to Mainz to arrange for the election of a new archbishop of Mainz on 29 June 1249.<sup>273</sup>

Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz's life was so closely intertwined with the crusade against the Staufer and the change of power in Germany that it was reflected in his tombstone effigy in the cathedral of Mainz constructed after his death.<sup>274</sup> The tomb plate depicts Archbishop Siegfried in his episcopal robes with staff and mitre, flanked by Henry Raspe and William of Holland, while putting crowns on their heads. He is the large central figure, while the royal candidates flank his sides as smaller figures. The effigy symbolizes that the royal candidates became kings by Archbishop Siegfried's grace. The depiction is symbolic rather than realistic, because by the thirteenth century, kings were crowned by the archbishops of Cologne, not by the archbishops of Mainz anymore.<sup>275</sup>

This may have been the cause of potential rivalry between the archbishops of Mainz as the former, and the archbishops of Cologne as the current coronators. The effigy challenged Archbishop Conrad of Cologne's dominant position in the papal party, which was reflected in the choice of William of Holland as a royal candidate, who like Archbishop Conrad came from the region of the lower Rhine. Archbishop Siegfried paved the way for William of Holland as royal candidate when he agreed to the peace with Duke Henry of Brabant, as Innocent IV acknowledged in his letter from 17 November 1247.<sup>276</sup> The effigy therefore can be read as a claim that Archbishop Siegfried was the true kingmaker.

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<sup>272</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 12, no number, between 58 and 59.

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 824, no 4522a.

<sup>274</sup> See this thesis, *Image, Tombstone Effigy of Archbishop Siegfried III of Mainz (1195-1249)*, p. 257.

<sup>275</sup> Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, p. 55, FN 79.

<sup>276</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV, I*, p. 618, no 4072.

### **Archbishop Conrad of Cologne as papal legate, March-April 1249**

After the death of Archbishop Siegfried, the clergy of Mainz initially wished for Archbishop Conrad to assume the office of the archbishop of Mainz in addition to the position he already held as archbishop of Cologne.<sup>277</sup> However, Innocent IV preferred not to pool as much power in the hands of a single archbishop; instead, he made Conrad the new apostolic legate in Germany.<sup>278</sup> Archbishop Conrad was interested in the offer, but he was aware that such an unprecedented accumulation of power would have made him one of the most powerful ecclesiastics in Christian Europe. The *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum* presented the office as a consolation prize, as Innocent IV denied Archbishop Conrad the most significant expansion of power for which he would ever have a chance.<sup>279</sup> However, as the relationship between the Archbishops Christian and Conrad soured over the next years, this does not seem reliable. It is quite likely that Innocent IV made Archbishop Conrad his legate before he ordered the chapter of Mainz to choose a new archbishop among the suitable candidates in its chapter on 4 May 1249.<sup>280</sup> On 18 March 1249, Archbishop Arnold was attested in Koblenz, about 150km from Neuss, where William of Holland met Archbishop Conrad. By 27 April 1249, Archbishop Arnold of Trier was also in Mainz, so it is possible that he was also involved in the election.<sup>281</sup>

The circumstances forced Innocent's IV hand to make Archbishop Conrad his new legate, but he could be even less sure that their plans were fully aligned than with Archbishop Siegfried. Archbishop Conrad had shown himself to be independent and domineering in the past, and between June 1249 and April 1250 he issued at least 36 charters in which he confirmed decisions or ordered actions in his capacity as papal legate.<sup>282</sup> He also delegated the

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<sup>277</sup> *Regesta Imperii V*, p. 824, no 4522a.

<sup>278</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, pp. 521-2, no 704.

<sup>279</sup> *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, p. 270.

<sup>280</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV, II*, p. 70, no 4481a.

<sup>281</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe zu Trier*, p. 46.

<sup>282</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe von Köln im Mittelalter*, pp. 208-18, no 1488-1578.

office for Austria to Konrad of Steinach, provost of St Wido, so there was an immediate danger that he could use his new legatine powers to increase to further his own political expansion in a way that interfered with Innocent IV's plans for changing power in Germany.<sup>283</sup>

In a move to curb his influence, Innocent IV initially did not give Archbishop Conrad the full mandate of legate, but restricted his office in scope and geographical range.<sup>284</sup> This also took into consideration some of the defensive manoeuvres Archbishop Conrad's appointment caused inside the papal party, as Archbishop Arnold of Trier procured for Archbishop Conrad's legation to be revoked for the archdiocese of Trier, because it detracted from its privileges.<sup>285</sup> Archbishop Arnold was determined to defend his political territory against Archbishop Conrad's legatine powers. Nevertheless, Archbishop Conrad became a full legate between March and April 1249.<sup>286</sup> His power in Germany was now unmatched, and he was the most senior member among the papal party.

As soon as Innocent IV made Archbishop Conrad his legate, he tried to make use of him in the same way as of his previous legates. He sent him orders that paralleled the ones he sent to legate Peter Capocci, for example to provide important allies with bishoprics or to forbid chapters from providing vacant churches with pastors without apostolic licence.<sup>287</sup> Archbishop Conrad seems to have fulfilled Innocent IV's orders and worked with the pope to greatly diminish the free election of ecclesiastics in Germany. However, he also focused intensely on expanding his power base and regulating the temporal affairs of the archdiocese of Cologne.<sup>288</sup>

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<sup>283</sup> *Annales Spirenses*, p. 84. See Köster, *Kreuzablass*, p. 52.

<sup>284</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV, II*, p. 75, no 4507 and *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 205, no 1459-60 and p. 207, no 1478.

<sup>285</sup> Zenz, *Die Taten der Trierer*, p. 64-5 and *Gesta Arnoldi*, p. 410.

<sup>286</sup> See for the date, J. Ficker, 'Erörterungen zur Reichsgeschichte des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts von Julius Ficker. Die Ernennung Erzbischof Konrads von Köln zum päpstlichen Legaten 1249', in H. Böhlau et al (eds.), *Mitteilungen des Institutes für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 04* (Innsbruck, 1883), pp. 379-80.

<sup>287</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 205, no 1461-2 and *Ep Saec XIII*, pp. 509-10, no 686 and p. 511, no 688.

<sup>288</sup> See E. Wisplinghof, 'Konrad von Hochstaden, Erzbischof von Köln (1205-1261)', in E. Strutz and F.-J. Heyen (eds), *Rheinische Lebensbilder II* (20 vols, Düsseldorf, 1966), pp. 7-24.

As in every conflict between a Holy Roman Emperor and a pope, the archbishops of Cologne could make use of them to further their own political independence.<sup>289</sup>

The fullness of Archbishop Conrad's spiritual and temporal power threatened to outshine the kingship of William of Holland. It also threw into sharp relief that his loyalty to the new king was not absolute. By April 1249, the archbishop considered seriously the possibility that William of Holland would voluntarily abdicate, or that Frederick II would be reinstated if William died prematurely.<sup>290</sup> In a charter from 18 April 1249, in which he made a contract with burgrave Gernand of Kaiserswerth, Archbishop Conrad expressed his understanding of his role, as he ascribed to himself a special duty to maintain order in the Holy Roman Empire that went beyond that of other German princes.<sup>291</sup> Further evidence is a charter by Duke Walram of Limburg from 19 April 1249, in which he swore that going beyond his duty as a vassal, he would militarily support Archbishop Conrad against anyone who was in conflict with him, without making any mention of King William.

Odilo Engels contended that Archbishop Conrad intended to make the see of Cologne the true seat of royal power in the Holy Roman Empire, and Hugo Stehkämper argued that in the thirteenth century, the archbishops of Cologne primarily saw themselves as prince regents and not as spiritual shepherds, like their twelfth century predecessors did.<sup>292</sup> While one could go as far as to argue that the language Archbishop Conrad used in his charters already sounded more like that of a king than that typically used by an archbishop or a representative of papal will, by 1249 there seems to have been no indication of open discord between Archbishop Conrad and William of Holland.<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>289</sup> Stehkämper, *Reichsbischof und Territorialfürst*, pp. 148-9.

<sup>290</sup> Cardauns, *Konrad von Hochstaden*, pp. 32-3.

<sup>291</sup> Stehkämper, *Reichsbischof und Territorialfürst*, p. 127.

<sup>292</sup> See O. Engels, 'Die Stauferzeit', in F. Petri and G. Droege (eds.), *Rheinische Geschichte I/3* (Düsseldorf, 1983), p. 263.

<sup>293</sup> Cardauns, *Konrad von Hochstaden*, pp. 32-3.

### **Christian of Bolanden as archbishop of Mainz, May-August 1249**

Christian of Bolanden (1197-1253) became the new archbishop of Mainz.<sup>294</sup> At the same time as Innocent IV gave the office of legate to Archbishop Conrad, he also tried to make William of Holland's chancellor Henry of Leiningen the new archbishop of Mainz.<sup>295</sup> The cathedral chapter of Mainz was split on the election of the new archbishop, but the canons enforced their choice of Christian of Bolanden against Pope Innocent IV's preference. This was also to mark the independence of their choice, as on 12 February 1249, Innocent IV ordered his legate Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz to arrange that no dome chapter in the area of his legation could freely elect their new bishop without papal approval.<sup>296</sup> The mandate repeated the prohibition from 9 September 1246, implemented by Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz. In his answer to the chapter of Mainz, Innocent IV did not mention the prohibition.<sup>297</sup> Still, he made the chapter's decision dependent on the consent by the bishop of Strasbourg, thereby nevertheless constraining their freedom of election.

Archbishop Christian of Mainz seems to have taken up office in May 1249, even before he was elected archbishop of Mainz on 29 June 1249 and consecrated by Archbishop Conrad in July or August 1249. Archbishop Conrad spent much of May and June 1249 in Mainz; he was only briefly attested in Cologne on 13 June 1249. Archbishop Christian received his *regalia* from William of Holland and was consecrated by Archbishop Conrad. During this period of struggle, time was lost for crusader recruitment and by the time everyone settled into their new roles, almost half of the year had passed. The archbishop of Mainz now went from

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<sup>294</sup> See H. Schrohe, *Mainz in seinen Beziehungen zu den deutschen Königen und den Erzbischöfen der Stadt bis zum Untergang der Stadtfreiheit (1462)* (Mainz, 1915).

<sup>295</sup> Gatz, *Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches*, p. 745.

<sup>296</sup> See K. Ganzer, *Papsttum und Bistumsbesetzungen in der Zeit von Gregor IX. bis Bonifaz VIII. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der päpstlichen Reservationen* (Tübingen, 1968), and P. Aldinger, *Die Neubesetzung der deutschen Bistümer unter Innozenz IV. (1243–54)* (Leipzig, 1900).

<sup>297</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 48, no 4359, *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 360, no 55 and *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, p. 664.

the most senior to the newest member in the group, which greatly tilted the power dynamics within the group in favour of the older members.

Although Archbishop Christian still had to establish his place in the papal party, he soon became a problem the crusade against the Staufer and the project of changing power in Germany as a whole. In late August 1249, only a month after his election, the most junior among the archbishops tried to unilaterally negotiate a peace agreement with Conrad IV and the Staufer party. The *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, written by Archbishop Christian himself, reported that in July 1249, Archbishop Christian “made negotiations with the enemies” (*negocio fuerant inimici*).<sup>298</sup> It may have been possible that he saw an opening for peace in a period when William had run out of crusaders and funds.

This is the only direct evidence for peace negotiations between the Archbishop Christian and Conrad IV or his supporters, though there is circumstantial evidence for a further meeting in late August 1249 in a location in the surroundings of Worms. Worms, where Conrad IV was on 17 August, and Eberbach, where Archbishop Christian was on 20 August, are only about 80km by road from each other, which makes it possible that representatives of both sides could meet.<sup>299</sup>

In Worms, Conrad IV aimed to resolve a conflict between two of the strongest camps among his supporters, Ludwig, son of Duke Otto of Bavaria, and the citizens of Worms.<sup>300</sup> Such a conflict could have seriously threatened the coherence of his party. Conrad IV was accompanied by a large number of nobles, such as Duke Otto of Bavaria, Counts Friedrich and Emich of Leiningen, Lord Eberhard of Eberstein and his son the Count of Sayn, Lord Otto of Eberstein, Count Henry II of Zweibrücken, Raugrave Heinrich, Count Johann of Spannheim

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<sup>298</sup> *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, p. 270.

<sup>299</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, pp. 824-5, no 4524. Archbishop Christian was attested twice in the diocese of Mainz on unspecified dates in August 1249. He was in Scharfenstein on 5 August 1249 and in Eberbach on 20 August 1249. Conrad IV was in the area around the Rhine, south of Mainz, between 16 and 31 August 1249. He was in Worms on 17 August 1249, and in Halle and Nuremberg sometime during the same month.

<sup>300</sup> See H. Schwarzmeier, *Worms. Bis zur Einführung der Reformation 1556* (Sigmaringen, 1986).

and his brothers, Lord Philip of Hohenfels, and Lord Wirich of Daun. If all of these nobles were present during a meeting with Conrad IV or by representatives of both sides, this increased the solemnity of the event. It indicates that Archbishop Christian was sincere in his efforts, though the outcome of the negotiations was not successful.

If Archbishop Christian carried out these negotiations in secret, the magnitude of such a meeting with leaders of the enemy party and some of his most important supporters would also have increased the sense of betrayal felt by William of Holland as well as Archbishops Conrad and Arnold once they found out about the meeting. It is highly likely that when they gained knowledge of Archbishop Christian's negotiations, they perceived his actions as treasonous. This would have put a significant strain on the relationship between Archbishop Christian and the rest of the papal party in Germany early on in his tenure.

In contrast, the clergy of Mainz was delighted by the news of the negotiations with Conrad IV ("congratulantur ei") and put their hopes in Archbishop Christian as a peace-maker.<sup>301</sup> Although the citizens and clergy of Mainz suffered greatly from the conflict, their hope is remarkable, as William of Holland and the Archbishops Conrad and Arnold had no intention of making peace with Conrad IV.<sup>302</sup> It is possible to infer that despite their actions, the papal party in Germany still felt pressure to at least pretend that they considered a peaceful solution to the conflict.

### **Crusader recruitment, May 1249**

As soon as Archbishop Conrad became papal legate in May 1249 there seems to have been a sharp decline in crusader recruitment that lasted for his whole legateship.<sup>303</sup> This seems to have accelerated a previous, more gentle decline in recruitment in the wake of the conquest of

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<sup>301</sup> *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, p. 270.

<sup>302</sup> *Cronica S. Petri Erfordensis moderna*, pp. 242-3.

<sup>303</sup> For recruitment after Aachen, see Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 73.

Aachen. On 14 May 1249, Innocent IV especially ordered the Franciscans to preach the cross against Frederick II and Conrad IV fervently throughout Germany, and even threatened them with excommunication if they did not carry out his orders.<sup>304</sup>

On the same day, Innocent IV ordered William of Eika, Dominican friar and William of Holland's chaplain, personally to collect, organise the collection, and store for future use money from the redemptions of crusader vows throughout Germany and to collect money from the redemption of crusader vows to go to the Holy Land.<sup>305</sup> With chancellor Henry of Leiningen and chaplain William of Eika, two of William of Holland's closest servants and advisors were involved in crusader recruitment.<sup>306</sup> Despite the brisk tone of these letters, the Franciscans reduced their recruitment efforts in Germany in May 1249 because they were in greater danger than before.<sup>307</sup> Innocent IV did not issue any more blanket orders to the Franciscans or Dominicans to preach the word of the cross for almost two years.

Several factors may have coincided to cause the drastic decline in recruitment. One explanation for this was that the successful conclusion of the siege of Aachen and William of Holland's coronation in Charlemagne's chapel may have created an impression that the main goal of the crusade was achieved, which lessened its glamour and appeal. In reality though, implementing William of Holland's rule in a sustainable manner turned out to be a much more formidable challenge than to achieve his coronation. This created a problem for William, who still relied on men-at-arms in his army to implement his rule.

Another explanation was that the change in recruitment pattern occurred roughly at the same time when Archbishop Conrad began his legateship in March or April 1249 and that he did not prioritize the organisation of recruitment. After the departure of legate Peter Capocci,

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<sup>304</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 76, no 4509 and *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 532, no 720.

<sup>305</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV, II*, p. 75, no 4508 and p. 76, no 4510.

<sup>306</sup> See P. Diriken, *Religieus erfgoed in Haspengouw* (Kortesseem, 2013).

<sup>307</sup> See Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 73.

Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz had not been in charge of crusader recruitment; Innocent IV put the organisation directly into the hands of the mendicant orders.

However, as the situation in Germany became increasingly more dangerous for Franciscan and Dominican friars alike, Archbishop Conrad chose to focus his energy as legate on other areas of his office than this challenge. There is no evidence that by the time Archbishop Conrad of Cologne became legate, he was still personally involved personally in the preaching of the cross or any other aspect of crusader recruitment. He increasingly appointed mendicant friars to preach the cross against the Staufer, especially Franciscans. Outsourcing recruitment to the mendicant orders freed Archbishop Conrad's hands to focus on increasing his political power, but William of Holland struggled to assemble an army large enough for his military pursuits.

A further explanation may again have been connected to Louis IX's general passage. The French king's fleet departed after a two-week delay from Cyprus to Egypt on 19 May 1249.<sup>308</sup> As Innocent IV had already given precedent to William of Holland's campaign over recruitment for Louis IX in October and November 1247, he may have wanted to curb recruitment in Germany for a last-minute boost of the crusader army crossing the sea. As the urgent need caused by the siege of Aachen was over, Innocent IV may have wanted to preempt criticism of his crusading policy by supporting Louis IX as he was about to depart.

A final reason for the decline in crusader recruitment may have been a temporary shift in focus from Conrad IV as the main target of crusading to his half-brother Enzo, another of Frederick II's sons. Enzo, who was Frederick II's favourite, was captured at the Battle of Fossalta in northern Italy on 26 May 1249. Only two weeks later, on 10 June 1249, Innocent IV ordered the crusade against Frederick II to be preached on Sardinia, where Enzo was

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<sup>308</sup> Stürmer, *Friedrich II*, p. 577-8/585-6.

king.<sup>309</sup> This was the only evidence for crusade preaching in Sardinia and there seems to have an intention to humiliate the Staufer. When all of these factors together led to a reduction in crusader recruits, this influenced William of Holland's military campaign over the next one and a half years.

### **William of Holland's military campaigns, July-November 1249**

Although William of Holland never reached the city of Frankfurt, the *Royal Chronicle of Cologne* made it explicit that it would have been his intended next military target.<sup>310</sup> The city was located in the Rhine area that William tried to control in 1249, but it was not situated directly along the Rhine where he normally moved. It was also still loyal to the Staufer, who owned parts of the *Reichsgut* that William of Holland desired to bring under his authority.<sup>311</sup> Control over Frankfurt would therefore have been a further step in expanding his territory, including the city's associations with royal power and peace.<sup>312</sup>

Archbishop Conrad, now as legate, joined William of Holland with an army for his summer campaign destined for Frankfurt in July 1249. There is no information on Archbishop Arnold of Trier for May to July 1249; though it is possible that was also present. William of Holland was in Mainz between 4 and 11 July 1249, presumably to add Archbishop Christian's forces to his army.<sup>313</sup>

However, Archbishop Christian resisted the participation in warfare; during the time William of Holland stayed with him he may have realised that he was running low on men and money. In his *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, Archbishop Christian indicated that he was

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<sup>309</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, p. 127, no 4741.

<sup>310</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 297.

<sup>311</sup> Heyen, *Reichsgut im Rheinland*, pp. 40-1.

<sup>312</sup> Schmieder, 'in terra que dicitur Frankeserde', p. 20.

<sup>313</sup> Kruisheer, *De oorkonden en de kanselarij van de graven van Holland tot 1299*, p. 283, no 235, *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 388 and Gruner, *Opuscula* 2, p. 122-4; *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 13, no 66 and no 67.

“summoned unwillingly” on William’s military campaigns, which “incited the hate of the king.”<sup>314</sup> Instead, between the middle of July and August 1249, Archbishop Christian probably met with Conrad IV in the area around Worms for their secret peace negotiations. The reference to the destruction William of Holland’s campaign wrought may have been intended to cover up his treason and might explain why he chose to include his poor relationship with King William when narrating his own deeds.<sup>315</sup>

In lieu of crusaders and Archbishop Christian’s forces, the bishops of Liège and Utrecht brought with them an additional retinue that allowed William to increase the size of his army.<sup>316</sup> A great number of temporal nobles located in the Rhine area also joined them, almost all of whom appeared in William of Holland’s vicinity for the first time.<sup>317</sup> While this indicated that William stepped out of the exclusive company of the nobility of the lower Rhine and tried to rally support along its middle part in order to branch out further, it also showed though how far William still was from being recognized throughout the German kingdom.<sup>318</sup>

The destruction of the village Sachsenhausen between 10 and 15 July 1249 was collateral damage on William’s route to Frankfurt.<sup>319</sup> Sachsenhausen was situated in the riverbend at the Main opposite Frankfurt. The village allowed access to the bridge at Frankfurt, hence it was a strategically important point of access. Sachsenhausen had been partially fortified, but William’s crossbowmen kept up a heavy fire so that the defenders of the village had to flee. The defenders garrisoned the castle established on the bridge and took refuge in Frankfurt. William set fire to Sachsenhausen, thereby probably destroying it completely. On his way, William of Holland ravaged the crops and lands of his opponents.<sup>320</sup>

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<sup>314</sup> *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, p. 270.

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>316</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 77.

<sup>317</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V 4982-3 and *Annales Sancti Pantaleonis Coloniensis*, p. 492.

<sup>318</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 69.

<sup>319</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 4984.

<sup>320</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 297.

However, outside Frankfurt, William suddenly abandoned the attack on the city. According to the *Royal Chronicle of Cologne*, William of Holland estimated that he could not take Frankfurt and would “profit little by proceeding further at this time”, so he disbanded his army.<sup>321</sup> Some of the nobles of the lower Rhine area who were briefly attested in the proximity of William of Holland may have switched their loyalty back to the Staufer, based on a comparison with list of witnesses in a charter signed by Conrad IV and his Duke Otto of Bavaria.<sup>322</sup> It is possible that their service came with certain restrictions and that they wanted to return to their lands and property because it was uncommon for them to go on campaign so far away from their lands and property.<sup>323</sup>

On 16 July 1249, William of Holland was back in Mainz.<sup>324</sup> It is possible that this further setback strengthened Archbishop Christian’s conviction that this presented an opportunity for peace negotiations in August 1249.<sup>325</sup> Meanwhile, Archbishop Conrad of Cologne besieged and destroyed a fortress called Ringsheim on his return journey on 13 August 1249.<sup>326</sup>

Over the next weeks, William stayed within the territory of Archbishops Christian of Mainz and Arnold of Trier for a prolonged period of time.<sup>327</sup> William of Holland was only in the area of Archbishop Christian for a brief time in late July or early August 1249, though it is unclear whether at this point he was already aware of his negotiations with Conrad IV. In September 1249, Archbishop Arnold of Trier hosted William of Holland and his men for eight weeks at the castles Ehrenbrechtstein and Montabaur, located along the Rhine and near

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<sup>321</sup> Ibid.

<sup>322</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 66.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>324</sup> *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 388 and *Regesta Imperii, V*, pp. 13-4, no 68.

<sup>325</sup> *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, p. 270.

<sup>326</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 210, no 1502.

<sup>327</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 297. See Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, pp. 66/77.

Koblenz, and in his borderlands.<sup>328</sup> Archbishop Arnold entertained him and a retinue of supporters at his own expense. More men-at-arms were “arriving daily”, which indicates that William of Holland was determined to continue his military campaigns.<sup>329</sup> It seems though that William used his time to gather another army. Although William of Holland was often militarily active during the summer months, there is no more evidence for further military activity until the beginning of October 1249.

By 1 October 1249, the citizens and knights of Boppard had not fulfilled the terms of the peace treaty they negotiated with William of Holland when he was forced to interrupt his siege because of Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz’ death six months prior. William gathered his forces and with the assistance of the Archbishops Arnold, Conrad, and Christian, as well as the bishop-elect of Liège, he moved towards the city for another attack.<sup>330</sup> This was the first time Archbishop Christian joined William of Holland on his military campaign, though the archbishops’ presence still points to a low number of crusader recruits in William of Holland’s army.

The imperial supporter Philip of Hohenfels arrived on the same day with a strong force.<sup>331</sup> This forced William of Holland and his army to retreat and they were only able to destroy a castle opposite the city.<sup>332</sup> William was therefore still unable to bring Boppard back under his control. Philip of Hohenfels was appointed protector of Boppard by Conrad IV and had been present when Archbishop Christian of Mainz tried to negotiate the peace treaty less than two months earlier.<sup>333</sup> Yet it seems that Archbishop Christian put his full effort into the

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<sup>328</sup> *Gesta Arnoldi*, p. 411 and Zenz, *Die Taten der Trierer*, p. 65. See M. Wild, *Schloss Montabaur, Einblicke in die historische und kunsthistorische Entwicklung eines bedeutenden Baudenkmal* (Montabaur, 1995) and D. Kerber, *Herrschaftsmittelpunkte im Erzstift Trier. Hof und Residenz im späten Mittelalter* (Sigmaringen, 1995).

<sup>329</sup> *Gesta Arnoldi*, p. 411.

<sup>330</sup> *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 298.

<sup>331</sup> *Ibid.*, By 2 October 1249, William of Holland was in Koblenz, *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 14, no 70, *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 388, and *Acta Imperii Inedita*, p. 431, no 527.

<sup>332</sup> *Annales Moguntinenses*, p. 250. See Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 78.

<sup>333</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 66/69/77-78.

siege, as he was the one who destroyed the castle, maybe to showcase his loyalty.<sup>334</sup> After Boppard, Archbishop Christian did not provide any military support to William of Holland until June 1250.

In October 1249, William abruptly stopped his military campaign and returned to the County of Holland and Zeeland to free his brother Flores, who had been taken captive by Countess Margaret of Flanders in the context of the War of the Flemish Succession.<sup>335</sup> Margaret, countess and ruler of Flanders (1244-78), was engaged in a long dispute, mainly about the possession of Zeeland, with the Counts of Holland and the Avesnes family, relatives of her first husband. The conflict between Margaret's heirs regarding the counties of Flanders and Hainault would tie William of Holland's energies frequently to these regions over the next years, though it remained unsolved until the 1250s.<sup>336</sup>

By 11 October 1249, William was in Den Haag and he spent November and December 1249 in the county of Holland.<sup>337</sup> During his prolonged periods of absence, William disbanded his army because he was not able to pay for it.<sup>338</sup> News also spread that Conrad IV was leading attacks to defeat enemies in the duchy of Swabia.<sup>339</sup> Innocent IV tried to support William of Holland with regard to his need for additional funds. On 6 December 1249, he ordered the Dominicans and Franciscans to ensure that the faithful paid the ecclesiastical tithe.<sup>340</sup>

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<sup>334</sup> *Annales Wormatienses*, pp. 139-40 and *Annales Moguntinenses*, p. 250.

<sup>335</sup> Hoffmann, *Konrad IV*, p. 175.

<sup>336</sup> Graaf, *Oorlog om Holland 1000-1375*, pp. 160-74 and D. Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (London/New York, 1992), pp. 156-81.

<sup>337</sup> Kruisheer, *De oorkonden en de kanselarij van de graven van Holland tot 1299*, p. 283, no 236, *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, p. 298 and *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, p. 270.

<sup>338</sup> *Annales Stadenses*, p. 372.

<sup>339</sup> Hoffmann, *Konrad IV*, p. 175.

<sup>340</sup> *Bullarium Ordinis FF. Praedicatorum*, p. 185, no 208.

## 1250

### **Legate Peter of Albano and the end of Archbishop Conrad of Cologne's legateship, January-May 1250**

Peter of Albano replaced Archbishop Conrad as legate around April 1250, most likely because Innocent IV was worried that Conrad used his power as legate too much to further his interest as an imperial prince. During William of Holland's absence in the county of Holland, Archbishop Conrad acted as William of Holland's representative and administered some of his royal duties. This concentrated power even more strongly in Archbishop Conrad's hands and intensified some of Innocent IV's worries that he first and foremost acted as a German prince regent.

William of Holland's absence allowed Archbishop Conrad to act more independently as legate to use the office to pursue his own interests. His actions as legate and the continuous warfare aggrieved some of his episcopal colleagues.<sup>341</sup> In April 1250, a messenger (*nuntius*) in the service of Archbishop Conrad of Cologne complained about abuse by other bishops, who called Archbishop Conrad a 'man of blood'.<sup>342</sup> Though the main reason for this was his conduct as legate, it is also possible that Innocent IV was displeased with how Archbishop Conrad handled the succession of Bishop Rüdiger of Passau.<sup>343</sup>

To counteract this, Innocent IV sent Peter of Albano, archbishop of Rouen (unknown-1253), as legate to Germany.<sup>344</sup> He belonged to the group of cardinals whom Innocent IV raised to their status in 1244, and who had been among the prelates whose capture at sea by Frederick's II forces caused a scandal in 1241.<sup>345</sup> When Peter of Albano joined Archbishop

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<sup>341</sup> See Köster, *Kreuzablass*, p. 54.

<sup>342</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 219, no 1579.

<sup>343</sup> Cardauns, *Konrad von Hochstaden*, p. 32, especially FN 2.

<sup>344</sup> Also known as Petrus de Collemedio, see Eubel, *Hierarchica Catholica*, p. 7, *Histoire des archevêques de Rouen*, ed. F. Pommeraye (Rouen, 1667), pp. 461-8, and V. Tabbagh, *Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae 2. Diocèse de Rouen: Répertoire prosopographique des évêques, dignitaires et chanoines des diocèses de France de 1200 à 1500* (Turnhout, 1998), p. 447.

<sup>345</sup> Eubel, *Hierarchica Catholica*, p. 7.

Conrad as legate in Germany in January or February 1250, his initial official primary task was to remove Bishop Rüdiger from the see of Passau.<sup>346</sup>

Bishop Rüdiger of Passau had already been deposed in 1248, probably by Albert of Beham.<sup>347</sup> Another candidate was elected in the person of Duke Conrad II of Silesia, but the papal curia did not confirm him, maybe because the election of a duke as bishop was unusual. Innocent IV repeated Bishop Rüdiger's excommunication in 1249 and demanded that he abdicated. When Bishop Rüdiger did not follow Innocent's IV orders and Archbishop Conrad of Cologne failed to remove him, the pope sent his legate Peter of Albano to implement the deposition in person. On 17 February 1250, legate Peter repeated Bishop Rüdiger's excommunication and deposition.<sup>348</sup> Pope Innocent IV confirmed his legate's actions on 11 March 1250, and Bishop Rüdiger was expelled from the diocese of Passau.<sup>349</sup> If it was part of his duties, legate Peter of Albano was probably equally unable to focus on recruiting crusaders or preaching the word of the cross because the situation along the Rhine was too dangerous during summer 1250.

Archbishop Conrad of Cologne was legate until the end of April 1250.<sup>350</sup> The handover of Conrad's legatine duties to Peter of Albano may have happened around the time of the council of Liège, which took place with a slight delay on 3 May 1250.<sup>351</sup> Another of Peter of Albano's official duties was to organize the council. Innocent IV informed Archbishop Conrad that he sent Peter of Albano as a legate to Germany to hold the council of Liège some time before the initial date set on 24 April 1250.<sup>352</sup> It is plausible to assume that when Innocent IV ordered Peter of Albano to organize the council, he also prepared him to take over from

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<sup>346</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1555, no 10233d.

<sup>347</sup> *Aventinische Exzerpte des Albert von Beham*, p. 53.

<sup>348</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1555, no 10234.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid*, no 10234/10237/4996a.

<sup>350</sup> The last two charters in which he names himself papal legate date from 28 April 1250, *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 218, no 1577-8.

<sup>351</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 220, no 1588, *Regesta Imperii*, V, no 4996a/8209-10, and *Regesten Kaiserreich Willhelm*, p. 939, no 4996b.

<sup>352</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 220, no 1588 and *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1555, no 10233d.

Archbishop Conrad as apostolic legate. William of Holland, Archbishop Conrad, and Archbishop Christian of Mainz were all attested at the council.<sup>353</sup> Likewise present were Duke Henry of Lothringia and Archbishop William of Besancon.<sup>354</sup> In his role as archbishop of Rouen, legate Peter consecrated the altar in the cathedral of Liège, for which he gave out indulgences.<sup>355</sup>

At the council a conflict between Archbishop Conrad and the brother of the Count of Jülich was resolved, when William of Jülich became Archbishop Conrad's vassal.<sup>356</sup> In their function as counts of Hochstaden, Archbishop Conrad and his brother Friedrich, provost of Xanten, gifted the county of Hochstaden to the church of Cologne to increase its assets.<sup>357</sup> Yet the change in ownership seems to have led to financial losses for Walram, brother of the Count of Jülich. This caused the conflict with Walram, brother of Count William of Jülich and his wife Mechthildis, relative of Archbishop Conrad.<sup>358</sup> Even though they eventually resolved the conflict, Walram nevertheless took the business to Pope Innocent IV.<sup>359</sup> The prelates, chapter, and whole clergy of Cologne requested Pope Innocent IV not to heed Walram of Jülich's accusations and informed him when they resolved the conflict.<sup>360</sup>

It is possible that this conflict further strengthened Innocent's IV resolve to take the office of legate out of Archbishop Conrad's hands. Later correspondence suggests that Innocent IV found a way to convince Archbishop Conrad to give up the office of apostolic legate without an insult to his dignity or lasting conflict, and he was back in Cologne by 29 May 1250.<sup>361</sup> Due

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<sup>353</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 1555, no 10233d and *Regesten Kaiserreich Wilhelm*, p. 939, no 4996b.

<sup>354</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 1555, no 10233d.

<sup>355</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 220, no 1588.

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.*, no 1604.

<sup>357</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 203-4, no 1446 and p. 220, no 1591, *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 939, no 4996/4998, p. 1711, no 11594a. See Hintze, *Das Königtum Willhelms von Holland*, pp. 34-6 and Cardauns, *Konrad von Hochstaden*, p. 64.

<sup>358</sup> See E. Wisplinghoff, 'Vom Mittelalter bis zum Ende des Jülich-Klevischen Erbstreits (ca. 700-1614)', in H. Weidenhaupt (ed), *Düsseldorf. Geschichte von den Ursprüngen bis ins 20. Jh. 1. Von der ersten Besiedlung zur frühneuzeitlichen Stadt (bis 1614)* (Düsseldorf, 1988), pp. 161-445.

<sup>359</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 223, no 1616.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 203-4, no 1446.

<sup>361</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 224, no 1622 and *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 52, no 65.

to William's absence and the prohibitive situation that Franciscan and Dominican friars encountered when preaching the cross, there were no further papal mandates for crusader recruitment in 1250.

### **William of Holland's military campaigns, June-October 1250**

In 1250, William of Holland's position in Germany shifted from offensive to defensive, probably in direct reaction to his eight to nine-month long absence during which his military campaign was suspended. He was only present and militarily active in Germany from June to October 1250, as he spent the rest of the year in the areas close to Flanders. When William of Holland began his summer campaign in June 1250, he still confined his military activity to the Rhine area.

From 20 June to 21 July 1250, he again unsuccessfully laid siege to Boppard.<sup>362</sup> Archbishop Arnold already joined him in Boppard on 10 July 1250 to compensate with his retinue for a persistent lack of troops.<sup>363</sup> During the entire summer campaign of 1250, William of Holland relied heavily on the retinues of the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier. Although the siege lasted at least a month, William failed to take Boppard for the third time.<sup>364</sup> Sieges almost never led up to the conquest of a city like Boppard because as more cities and towns were able to afford to surround themselves with walls, their ability to defend themselves outgrew the offensive capabilities available to attackers.<sup>365</sup>

From a technological point of view, siege technology such as catapults, belfries, battering rams, and various techniques of mining were insufficient to overcome thickly

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<sup>362</sup> *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, pp. 390-1, *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 16, no 89- 9, and *MGH Const* 2, p. 358.

<sup>363</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe zu Trier*, p. 46.

<sup>364</sup> *Ibid.*, *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 825 and *Annales Wormatienses*, p. 187.

<sup>365</sup> Toch, *Medieval German City under Siege*, p. 35/45 and A. Haverkamp, 'Die 'frühbürgerliche' Welt im hohen und späten Mittelalter', *Historische Zeitschrift* 221 (1975), pp. 572-602.

constructed city walls, manned by their inhabitants.<sup>366</sup> Only towns whose merchants and artisans experienced considerable economic growth had the means to invest in city walls or acquire other military defence technology and fighting forces.<sup>367</sup> Boppard exemplified that the more relevant a city and town were for William of Holland's rule, the harder they were to conquer for, while Sabine Happe's study on Speyer, Worms, and Koblenz corroborates this in more detail for the cities along the middle Rhine.<sup>368</sup>

The most important military development in July and August 1250 was that William of Holland stood directly opposed to Conrad IV's army for the first time, though both avoided direct confrontation. In late June, Conrad IV held his camp at nearby Oppenheim, a free imperial city loyal to the Staufer that contained a castle and levied toll.<sup>369</sup> By 1 July 1250, Conrad IV was closing in; he moved his camp to Dienheim, located just two kilometres south of Oppenheim.<sup>370</sup> When he approached, both armies opposed each other. Boppard was on the brink of being captured, but Conrad IV was able to liberate the city fairly soon by bringing in more troops.<sup>371</sup> For the first time William was in a defensive situation, and eventually withdrew.<sup>372</sup>

As a consequence, William of Holland tried to achieve a more modest goal. On 21 July 1250, he moved his army from Boppard to Oppenheim, set up camp there, and started to attack the villages belonging to Boppard's defender Philip of Hohenfels. Instead of taking Boppard by directly defeating Philip of Hohenfels, William tried to punish him by destroying his vulnerable villages. Perhaps he hoped that this would lure Philip of Hohenfels away from Boppard and eventually leave the city open to attack. Archbishop Arnold was attested at

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<sup>366</sup> Toch, *Medieval German City under Siege*, p. 35.

<sup>367</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>368</sup> S. Happe, *Stadtwerdung am Mittelrhein. Die Führungsgruppen von Speyer, Worms und Koblenz bis zum Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne, 2002).

<sup>369</sup> *Annales Wormatienses*, p. 142.

<sup>370</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>371</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 825.

<sup>372</sup> *Ibid.* and *Annales Wormsatienses*, p. 187.

Ehrenbrechtstein castle on the same day.<sup>373</sup> Four days later, on the feast of St James the Apostle on 25 July 1250, William with his troops entered the village of Bechtoldsheim, which was located about a two-hour long march south-west of Oppenheim.<sup>374</sup> He established his camp there and burned down all the villages belonging to Philip of Hohenfels in the next days. He extracted protection money from the villages and spared those that paid.<sup>375</sup> Among the villages in the surrounding area from which he extorted large sums were Osthofen and Westhofen.<sup>376</sup>

At Bechtoldhsheim, Archbishops Conrad of Cologne and Christian of Mainz joined William's campaign.<sup>377</sup> William of Holland had likely called them as reinforcement in the face of the acute threat by Conrad IV. William's army was now being reinforced by many Rhenish nobles, including Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, Archbishop Christian of Mainz, Archbishop Arnold of Trier, Bishop Henry of Speyer, Bishop Eberhard of Worms, the Waldgraf and his son, the Count of Nassau, the Count of Weilnau, the Count of Katzenelnbogen, Conrad the Raugraf, Lord Ulrich of Münzenberg, Count Werner of Bolanden and his son, Lord Wirich of Daun, and many others.<sup>378</sup> Without their military support, William of Holland may not have dared to move further into territory controlled by Conrad IV, because he could have cut him off easily.<sup>379</sup> Crucially, it showed that William of Holland was unable to directly raise a sufficient number of men. It is unclear whether this was because he had run out of money or whether the preaching of the cross was less successful. The strength of this army was dependent on the men brought by the nobles from the lower Rhine.<sup>380</sup>

On 29 July 1250, the Saturday after the feast of St James the Apostle, William and his army established camp at 'the location of certain crosses' (possibly a cemetery) between Mainz

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<sup>373</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe zu Trier*, p. 46, no number.

<sup>374</sup> *Annales Wormatienses*, pp. 140-1. Bechtoldsheim is located 20 kilometers northwest of Worms.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.* Westhofen is located on the Rhine river 90 kilometers northwest of Worms.

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid.* and *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 311, no 31.

<sup>378</sup> *Annales Wormatienses*, p. 141.

<sup>379</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 85.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.

and Oppenheim.<sup>381</sup> At this point, William had to suspend his campaign. Archbishop Conrad only stayed for four days before he returned to Cologne.<sup>382</sup> It is possible that the nobles of the lower Rhine, among them Archbishop Conrad, urged William to restrict the length of his military campaign, because they could not be away from their cities on a campaign along the upper parts of the Rhine for longer than one or two weeks.<sup>383</sup> Alternatively, he may have run out of money to finance his troops. He was forced to dissolve his army and turn around and retreat back down the Rhine between 29 July to 3 August 1250. William and Archbishop Christian retreated to Mainz on 3 August 1250, while it is likely that Archbishop Arnold returned to Trier.

It is noticeable that both William of Holland and Conrad IV did not risk open battle. The campaign in July and August 1250 was to remain the closest to a direct confrontation between William of Holland and Conrad IV when the outcome of the conflict was still open. Kempf argued that William of Holland offered battle to Conrad IV at ‘the location of the crosses,’ but that Conrad IV feared the direct confrontation.<sup>384</sup> He bases this on one sentence in the *Annales Wormatienses*: “Adhuc autem permansit dominus Conradus rex apud Oppenheim.”<sup>385</sup> Although the pointed way in which the chronicle emphasises that Conrad IV stayed at Oppenheim while William of Holland burned the villages may allow for speculation whether the author felt some annoyance at Conrad IV’s inaction, the evidence is too flimsy to interpret this as a direct offer of battle. This will become clear in William of Holland’s further military actions during the year.

Conrad IV showed unprecedented military activity in August 1250. He headed towards Mainz and established his camp nearby at Dahlheim monastery to threaten William and

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<sup>381</sup> *Annales Wormatienses*, p. 141.

<sup>382</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>383</sup> See Cardauns, *Konrad von Hochstaden*, p. 33.

<sup>384</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, pp. 85-6. Against Schirmacher’s erroneous assumption that they crossed the Rhine, see *Regesta Imperii*, V, 5020a.

<sup>385</sup> *Annales Wormatienses*, p. 142.

Archbishop Christian. His camp was so close that it was “almost a suburb of the city.”<sup>386</sup> While William remained inside the city walls without an army, Conrad burned all of the villages belonging to the citizens of Mainz and Archbishop Christian, except for those that paid a heavy money fine.<sup>387</sup> Nevertheless, Conrad must have realized that at the moment he lacked the resources to conquer Mainz, and he asked the citizens of Worms for military aid. After five days outside Mainz, Conrad IV marched his army toward Olm to destroy it in the meantime.<sup>388</sup>

The citizens of Worms sent Conrad IV half of the military forces of their city by Sunday 12 August 1250. According to the *Annales Wormatienses*, they joined Conrad IV at Olm with “2000 armed men and one hundred crossbowmen,” though as always the numbers are likely to be exaggerated.<sup>389</sup> It is noticeable though that he did not lay siege to Mainz.<sup>390</sup> It does not seem that Archbishop Christian was holed up in Mainz the entire time either, because on 18 August 1250 he was attested in Bingen.<sup>391</sup>

Even with the men of Worms, Conrad IV’s force still seemed not large enough to directly attack Mainz. It is possible that Conrad IV requested help from other cities as well. While he was waiting for reinforcements to arrive, he could punish his enemies by ravaging their lands. This would also help him to sustain his army. Conrad IV only had enough force to take revenge on his enemies by ravaging their lands. In August 1250, Conrad IV and the citizens of Worms destroyed the villages of Dalheim, Flonheim, Mauchenheim, Heppenheim, and Deidesheim.<sup>392</sup> In September, he was opposed by the bishops of the region until they agreed on a truce.<sup>393</sup>

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<sup>386</sup> Ibid., p. 141.

<sup>387</sup> Olm is located approximately 30 kilometers north-northwest of Worms.

<sup>388</sup> *Annales Wormatienses*, p. 141.

<sup>389</sup> Ibid.

<sup>390</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 826, no 4528c-i and *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, pp. 891-2. It is the month for which most of Conrad IV’s charters survive, which allowed the reconstruction of a detailed itinerary.

<sup>391</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 311, no 34.

<sup>392</sup> *Annales Wormatienses*, p. 141. Mauchenheim is located approximately 20 kilometers west of Worms.

<sup>393</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 4528k/4528u/4528l and Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 87.

William of Holland assembled another army in the area around Mainz in September 1250. On 2 October 1250, he laid siege to Gelnhausen palace, but he was unsuccessful.<sup>394</sup> The palace was located near the intersection of the imperial roads *Via Regia* and *Via Imperii* and lay along several other major trade routes. The Kintzig valley narrows where Gelnhausen is, so controlling the stronghold meant controlling access to the valley.

In William's choice of targets, its strategic purpose was important, but it also represented his political power. After failing to take Gelnhausen palace, William led his army down the Rhine and departed for Flanders for the rest of the year.<sup>395</sup> Archbishop Conrad remained in Cologne and in its surrounding area, Archbishop Christian of Mainz spent Christmas in Erfurt, and no information is extant on Archbishop Arnold's actions or locations for the rest of 1250.<sup>396</sup>

In 1250, William of Holland's advance halted, he failed to enlarge his territory, and was still largely constrained to the Rhine area. This can be explained by his relatively brief presence in Germany and his continuous absorption by warfare in Flanders. Conrad IV also only gained little strategic advantage from his campaigns in August and September 1250. Even now, he was unable to even attempt an attack on Mainz, where William of Holland sought shelter; it was clear that neither he nor William of Holland had the necessary military or political capacity to break their stalemate.<sup>397</sup> Archbishop Conrad was praised by Innocent IV in a letter from February 1251 for his 'tireless support of the business of the empire', which probably referred to the substantial military support the archbishop provided to William during the military campaign of summer 1250.<sup>398</sup>

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<sup>394</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 5023 and *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 14169.

<sup>395</sup> *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 391 and *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 16, no 94.

<sup>396</sup> *Annales Erfordiensis fratrum praedicatorum*, p. 107.

<sup>397</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 88.

<sup>398</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 224, no 1622.

### **Peter of Albano as papal legate and crusader recruitment, June-December 1250**

The loss of momentum in establishing William of Holland's kingship expressed itself in the lack of a clearly defined task for legate Peter of Albano, who pursued assorted activities to replace bishops, win allies, and recruit crusaders in 1250. Between May and June 1250, legate Peter of Albano was in Utrecht with William of Holland and Archbishop Conrad for the resignation of Bishop Goswin of Utrecht.<sup>399</sup> He was locally elected to be bishop of Utrecht in 1249, but Innocent IV appointed Henry I van Vianden instead, so Goswin withdrew from the post in 1250. They were attested in Utrecht on 1 June 1250, but Archbishop Christian did not accompany them and was back in Mainz on 17 May 1250.<sup>400</sup>

In addition to the bishopric of Utrecht, legate Peter of Albano also enlisted crusaders by diplomatic negotiation.<sup>401</sup> One of the most high-profile nobles to switch his support to the papal party thanks to a diplomatic mission was Duke Henry of Lothringia.<sup>402</sup> According to Matthew Paris, the mendicant friars supported the legate actively in diplomatic negotiations, which may have added to why the situation in Germany became so dangerous for them.<sup>403</sup>

It is likely that Conrad IV's attack on William of Holland in July and August 1250 went in tandem with increased hostility by Staufer supporters towards mendicant friars who tried to recruit crusaders. Legate Peter of Albano's activity to recruit crusader was confined to the West of Germany because of the increased fighting between William of Holland and Conrad IV during the summer. It would have made sense for Archbishop Christian to try to assist legate Peter in his recruitment efforts in the same way his predecessor had done, but there is no evidence for this. His failure to do so may have further enraged William of Holland.

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<sup>399</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1555, no 10235a.

<sup>400</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 311, no 31.

<sup>401</sup> Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 65/73.

<sup>402</sup> See W. Mohr, *Geschichte des Herzogtums Lothringen. Vol II. Niederlothringen bis zu seinem Aufgehen im Herzogtum Brabant (11.-13. Jahrhundert)* (Saarbrücken, 1976), and idem, *Geschichte des Herzogtums Lothringen. Vol III. Das Herzogtum der Mosellaner (11.-14. Jahrhundert)* (Lorraine, 1979).

<sup>403</sup> Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, p. 65.

Travelling westwards on a circular route in the county of Hainaut, Peter of Albano was in Liège from 13 to 16 June and in Bergen in Germany from 16 to 18 August 1250.<sup>404</sup> From 28 August to 6 September 1250, he was in Valenciennes and from 15 October to 10 November 1250, he was back in Liège.<sup>405</sup> On 13 November, he was in Floreffe, and from 20 to 27 November 1250 in Mons.<sup>406</sup> Afterwards, Peter of Albano only remained an apostolic legate in Germany until 10 December 1250 or 28 January 1251.<sup>407</sup>

Although there were no further papal mandates to the Dominicans and Franciscans for crusader recruitment, there is evidence that itinerant preaching by mendicant friars continued on a reduced scale during the year 1250. On 27 November 1250, Innocent IV ordered William of Eika to preach the cross against Conrad IV.<sup>408</sup> By December 1250, a certain Franciscan friar called Berthold had acquired fame and gathered large audiences for his preaching in the city of Regensburg.<sup>409</sup> Brother Berthold, whose family belonged to the urban patriciate of Regensburg, was one of the most notable German preachers of his time. Some further individual friars who were appointed to recruit crusaders and seek political allies can be identified by name: the Dominican William Maaseik, the Dominican Henry of Montfort, and the Franciscan John of Diest.<sup>410</sup>

Frederick II's sudden and unexpected death in Fiorentino castle near Lucera on 13 December 1250 dramatically changed the political situation in the Holy Roman Empire. Now William of Holland had to fight Frederick II's last will, in which he designated Conrad IV as future Holy Roman Emperor and King of Sicily.<sup>411</sup> Even in the face of death, Frederick II still refused to abandon his goal of connecting the Holy Roman Empire and the kingdom of Sicily

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<sup>404</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1555, no 10236-8 and p. 1556, no 10246-8.

<sup>405</sup> Valenciennes: *Ibid.*, p. 1555, no 10241-4 and p. 1556, no 10245. Liège: *Ibid.*, p. 1555, no 10239-40 and p. 1556, no 10249/10249a.

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1555, no 10242-4 and p. 1556, no 10245-8/10248a/10249/10249a.

<sup>407</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1556, no 10251.

<sup>408</sup> *Bullarium Ordinis FF. Praedicatorum*, p. 188, no 213.

<sup>409</sup> Freed, *Friars and German Society*, pp. 14/34/236.

<sup>410</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, 5036. See Maier, *Preaching the Crusade*, p. 73.

<sup>411</sup> *MGH Const 2*, no 345, p. 453

and treated the empire like a personal inheritance that he could bequeath to his heirs in the Staufer family.<sup>412</sup>

### **Criticism from France, 1250-1**

Much of the crusade against the Staufer coincided with the preparation and conduction of Louis IX's crusade to the Latin East, which made Innocent IV vulnerable to accusations that he prioritized the crusade against the Staufer over a successful crusade in the Latin East out of self-interest.<sup>413</sup> Matthew Paris reported that "the French" blamed Innocent IV for the failure of Louis' expedition.<sup>414</sup>

In summer 1250, Charles of Anjou and Alphonse of Poitiers arrived back from the crusade in the Latin East and brought news of their brother Robert Artois' death on 2 February 1250 and Louis IX's defeat and capture at the Battle Al Mansurah on 6 April 1250.<sup>415</sup> They pleaded with Innocent IV to make peace with Frederick II, so that they could come to the aid of their brother Louis IX.<sup>416</sup> From their perspective, this made the pope's refusal to make peace with Frederick II before the general passage look stubborn or even reckless.

Innocent IV's concern about such criticism can be seen in an order from 29 November 1250, in which he ordered the prior of the Dominicans and the Franciscan minister of the province Germania to commute the vows of Frisian and Norwegian crusaders who had taken the cross against the Staufer to the crusade to the Holy Land for the next general passage. For once, he reversed his policy of giving priority to recruitment for the crusade against the Staufer, because he wished to please Louis IX's mother Blanche of Castille ("ad beneplacitum").<sup>417</sup>

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<sup>412</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 111/114.

<sup>413</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, p. 83.

<sup>414</sup> Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading*, pp. 180-1.

<sup>415</sup> Stürner, *Friedrich II*, pp. 585-6.

<sup>416</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, pp. 82-3.

<sup>417</sup> *Bullarium Ordinis FF. Praedicatorum*, p. 188, no 215.

However, Innocent IV's small gesture was not enough for Queen Blanche to compensate for his refusal to make peace with the Staufer. He continued a conflict that absorbed copious amounts of resources, even though Frederick II was already dead, and her son Louis IX was in a desperate situation across the sea. By 1251, Queen Blanche was sufficiently infuriated with Innocent IV that she issued an edict that "the lands of any royal liegemen who took the cross against Conrad IV should be confiscated: 'Let those who fight for the pope be fed by the pope's officials, and let them go, never to return.'"<sup>418</sup> Many French barons whose lands lay on the borders between France and the Holy Roman Empire followed her order.

Norman Housley, considering this evidence for the anger of the French court, doubted its significance, because much of it was derived from Matthew Paris, "whose work was notoriously unreliable and who was bitterly prejudiced against the papacy."<sup>419</sup> Yet the resentment and fear of Louis' IX relatives for their family members was likely accurate, regardless of the fact that it was Matthew Paris who recorded it. More importantly, if one looks beyond Matthew Paris, the picture that emerges is one of more widespread discontent than he alleged.

## 1251

### **The Aftermath of Frederick II's death, January-March 1251**

After Frederick II's sudden death, Pope Innocent IV's situation improved because Staufer power crumbled irrevocably in Germany. Frederick II remained the pillar of Staufer power throughout the crusade, while Conrad IV had been unable to establish himself. William of Holland spent January and February 1251 in Middelburg in Zeeland and probably heard about

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<sup>418</sup> *Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora*, pp. 174-5/260-1.

<sup>419</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, p. 82.

Frederick II's death in late February or early March. The imperial party tried to repress the news, but it was inevitable that the truth could not be kept secret for long. Frederick's death did not end the war between the papacy and imperial party, but caused a shift in the direction of the papal attack towards the Staufer heirs.

On 21 February 1251, Innocent IV once more intervened on William of Holland's behalf by sending letters to certain German princes, in which he urged them to swear allegiance to William, as he would soon receive the imperial crown.<sup>420</sup> Innocent asserted that William would not be opposed by Conrad IV, because he had no right to the empire, as he could not be designated by his father's last will but only by election by the princes. Innocent IV sent these letters to Duke Otto of Bavaria, the Margraves of Brandenburg, the Margraves of Meissen, the Duke of Brunswick, the Duchess of Brunswick, the Duchess of Bavaria, and the Duke of Saxony.<sup>421</sup> It is noteworthy that he also addressed these letters to two women; maybe they could help to restore the peace, a role traditionally associated with women.

Furthermore, Innocent IV sent letters in which he demanded obedience to William of Holland to Staufer loyalists, including Philip of Hohenfels, and several cities.<sup>422</sup> Papal prestige was at stake; if Frederick's deposition was valid, his sons could not inherit any of his realms. Innocent IV expected William of Holland soon to be able to dominate the German military and political situation and was still determined, maybe more than ever, to make William the next Holy Roman Emperor.

Conrad IV continued to see himself under siege by the papacy, as Innocent IV was too deeply committed to the policy of annihilating Staufer power.<sup>423</sup> In February 1251, Innocent IV authorized all papal letters directed against Frederick to be used against Conrad IV and a

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<sup>420</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 14204-13.

<sup>421</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>422</sup> *Ibid.*, 14210-1/14213/14224.

<sup>423</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, no 3024.

crusade only against Conrad IV to be preached throughout Germany.<sup>424</sup> As early as 1247, Innocent IV had promised the Lombards that neither Frederick II nor any of his sons would ever be allowed to rule as king or emperor.<sup>425</sup>

Innocent IV worried that William of Holland's efforts would wane and the support by the archbishops diminish after Frederick II's death. Hence also in February 1251, Innocent IV sent a letter to Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, in which he encouraged him to continue to pursue vigorously the business of the Church.<sup>426</sup> As Archbishop Conrad put so much energy into the struggle during the previous year, now he should not cease his efforts, as Frederick's death made it easier for them to succeed. On 7 February 1251, Innocent IV ordered Archbishop Conrad and all his suffragan bishops to put under ecclesiastical ban anyone who wanted to subordinate the Kingdom of Sicily after Frederick's death, which was directed against Conrad IV and his supporters.<sup>427</sup> The pope hoped that as William of Holland wore down Conrad IV's power, the German princes would inevitably support him as the new king. To organise the practicalities of their next steps, Innocent IV sent for William to come to Lyon in April 1251.<sup>428</sup>

### **Archdeacon Jacob of Liège as papal legate in Germany, February 1251**

To reinvigorate his plans for Germany, for the first time Innocent IV divided legatine tasks in Germany between several legates and one envoy. They helped to keep up momentum and the tasks they fulfilled responded to the various needs of the papal party in a new situation. Most importantly, the papal representatives were given powers to absolve the excommunicated and to begin a new era of reconciliation. Instead of a blanket approach, their tasks were more specialized and targeted, which would increase their effectiveness to reach their respective

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<sup>424</sup> Strayer, *Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century*, pp. 258-9.

<sup>425</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, no 3024.

<sup>426</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 224, no 1622.

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*, no 1621.

<sup>428</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 14247/14280, *Annales Spirenses*, p. 156, and *Gesta Treverorum*, p. 412.

goals. The tasks of a legate could fluently transition between crusader recruitment and winning over allies for William of Holland, which highlights again that the two objectives were interwoven and could not be artificially separated. Nonetheless, when compared with the opportunity Frederick II's death presented, the number of people tasked with changing power in Germany as well as crusader recruitment remained relatively low in 1251.

Archdeacon Jacob of Liège (1200-64), the future Pope Urban IV, was the legate who interacted most with the papal party in Germany. He replaced Peter of Albano as legate in early 1251.<sup>429</sup> His main tasks were to recruit crusaders, raise funds, convince reluctant princes to recognize William of Holland as king, and to organize spiritual punishments of repentant nobles, so that they could render penitence in preparation for their return into the grace of the Church. He started to receive orders as apostolic legate to recruit crusaders in lower Germany in February 1251.<sup>430</sup> Previously, Jacob had been tasked with recruitment for the Northern Crusades in Prussia, but for this he did not hold the office of papal legate.<sup>431</sup>

On 5 February 1251, Innocent IV ordered him to task Archbishop Conrad with raising 1000 marks from the clergy of the city and diocese of Cologne, which he was to deposit in a safe place and await further instructions.<sup>432</sup> On 18 February 1251, Innocent IV ordered him to visit the dukes, margraves, and counts of Germany to convince them to pay homage to King William of Holland.<sup>433</sup> On the same day, Innocent IV confirmed Archdeacon Jacob as apostolic legate towards the bishops and prelates of Germany and ordered them to provide him and his entourage with all the goods they needed.<sup>434</sup> He was to travel and work with Theoderich, master of the Teutonic Order of Prussia, who spoke German and would act as a translator.

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<sup>429</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 1554, no 10233b.

<sup>430</sup> *Ibid.* and Abulafia, *Frederick II*, pp. 413-5.

<sup>431</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, pp. 1553-4.

<sup>432</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 224, no 1620.

<sup>433</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, p. 1354, no 8325 and *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 53.

<sup>434</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, p. 1354, no 8326.

On 20 February 1251, Innocent IV ordered legate Jacob to start or organise to be started the legal prosecution of cities that refuse to return to the fold of the Church, while those cities or nobles who submitted themselves to the Church were to be absolved.<sup>435</sup> He still encountered some heavy opposition though; some time during his travels in Germany, probably in the archdiocese of Trier, legate Jacob was robbed and imprisoned by the knight Hermann of Willemsdorf and his sons, as well as a certain Everhard of Bicken.<sup>436</sup>

### **Papal penitentiary Henry as papal envoy, February 1251**

Innocent IV sent the papal penitentiary and Dominican brother Henry to upper Germany in February and March 1251. As an envoy, he did not have the mandate of an apostolic legate, but as papal penitentiary, he could absolve persons from sin in cases that were sufficiently serious that the absolution was usually reserved for the pope.<sup>437</sup> In the wake of Frederick II's death, the papal party expected many who had been loyal to the Staufer to return to the Church by becoming loyal to William of Holland. Conrad IV was so weak that he was unlikely to be a feasible political alternative for many of his allies, even if their sympathies had not changed.

At the same time, the wish to be absolved from sin acted as an incentive for many to return to the Church. Penitentiary Henry had special powers to absolve those from sin who wished to repent. He was also tasked to actively win over allies for William of Holland, so it was a push and pull movement at the same time. This shows that at the moment, there was not just need for blanket crusader recruitment, but for a targeted winning over of those who were formerly lost to the papal side.

On 13 February 1251, Innocent IV sent his papal penitentiary Henry to Duke Otto of Bavaria.<sup>438</sup> It is noteworthy that this happened upon Duke Otto's own request out of concern

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<sup>435</sup> Ibid. and *Ep Saec XIII*, no 62.

<sup>436</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, pp. 1462-3, no 9459.

<sup>437</sup> Ibid., no 8313-4/8321/8333/8370.

<sup>438</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1353, no 8314, *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 47, and Berger, *Innocent IV*, II, p. 231.

for his political position and salvation; now that Frederick II was dead, Duke Otto renewed and intensified his attempts to negotiate a peace agreement with Pope Innocent IV. The pope also tried to enlist other members of the Wittelsbach family. On the same day, he also commanded Ludwig, son of Duke Otto of Bavaria, to follow the advice of his penitentiary and sent a charter to Agnes, wife of Duke Otto of Bavaria, to encourage her husband to return to the Church.<sup>439</sup> In the light of Conrad IV's weak position, this was now a move towards a resolution of the conflict.

By 19 February 1251, Innocent IV confirmed that penitentiary Henry had been in discussion with Duke Otto of Bavaria, but the negotiations were stalling.<sup>440</sup> Innocent IV once again admonished Duke Otto to switch sides to the Church and to support William of Holland. This offered an elegant way out for Duke Otto, as Innocent IV made it look as if Duke Otto was forced to remain loyal to the Stauffer out of fear of their imperial power, as opposed to any conscious decision. However, sometime after 21 April 1251, papal penitentiary Henry received an order by legate Hugo of St Sabina to admonish Duke Otto of Bavaria and to warn him not to attack the Church at Freising.<sup>441</sup> Duke Otto and his family continued to be allied to Conrad IV and remained the main representatives of the imperial party over the next years.

On the same day when Innocent IV confirmed that penitentiary Henry had been in discussion with Duke Otto of Bavaria, the pope also sent charters to the dukes of Saxony<sup>442</sup> and Brunswick,<sup>443</sup> as well as the margraves of Brandenburg<sup>444</sup> and Meissen,<sup>445</sup> inviting them to repent. He sent a charter to all German cities,<sup>446</sup> but specifically addressed the city of Worms

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<sup>439</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, p. 1353, no 8313 and p. 1355, no 8334, and Berger, *Innocent IV, II*, p. 231, *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 46.

<sup>440</sup> *Geschiedenis van Graaf Willem van Holland, Roomsche Koning*, p. 84.

<sup>441</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1556, no 8314, 8333, 8370 and 10252.

<sup>442</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1355, no 8331.

<sup>443</sup> *Ibid.*, no 8335.

<sup>444</sup> *Ibid.*, no 8336.

<sup>445</sup> *Ibid.*, no 8332.

<sup>446</sup> *Ibid.*, no 8338.

because of their close connection and strong loyalty to Conrad IV.<sup>447</sup> Negotiations with the citizens of Konstanz must have already progressed, as their charter included tangible plans to absolve them if they want to return to the Church.<sup>448</sup> On 20 February 1251, Innocent IV ordered his penitentiary Henry, in an order paralleling that to legate Jacob, to start personally as well as arrange for the legal prosecution of cities that refused to return to the fold of the Church, while cities and nobles who submitted themselves to the Church were to be absolved.<sup>449</sup>

### **Pope Innocent IV and the Swabian nobles, March 1251**

On 31 March 1251, Innocent IV sent a highly significant charter to the Swabian nobles, in which he notified them that he had asked King William of Holland to travel to Swabia to come to their aid against Conrad IV. This was prompted by a visit from Count Ulrich of Württemberg and Berthold of Blankenstein to Lyon sometime before 20 March 1251.<sup>450</sup> The goal of the visit was to convince Innocent IV to put pressure on William of Holland and the princes of the lower Rhine to invade the duchy of Swabia. This showed that the Swabian nobles did not take Conrad IV's complete defeat for granted, despite Frederick's recent death and Conrad's deposition as duke of Swabia by William of Holland five years earlier. The nobles were sufficiently worried about the prospect of Conrad IV making peace with the Church and remaining duke of Swabia that they sent representatives to visit Innocent IV in person.

Acting as their ambassador, Count Ulrich of Württemberg outlined to Innocent IV the support the Swabian nobles had given to him. In return, Innocent IV praised the Swabian nobles for their loyalty to the Church. Until a legate arrived, whom he specifically sent for this purpose, his papal penitentiary Henry would help the Swabian nobles and King William of

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<sup>447</sup> Ibid., no 8337.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid., no 8339.

<sup>449</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 1354, no 8326, *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 62, and *Geschiedenis van Graaf Willem van Holland, Roomsche Koning*, p. 99.

<sup>450</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 1358, no 8370, *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 80, *Geschiedenis van Graaf Willem van Holland, Roomsche Koning*, p. 105, *Württembergisches Urkundenbuch*, pp. 258-60.

Holland in preparation for the military campaign by preaching the cross against Conrad IV in Swabia. Innocent IV reassured the Swabian nobles that the ‘viper-like’ Staufer dynasty would never again rule over the duchy of Swabia or the Holy Roman Empire. Finally, he reminded them to remain steadfast in the face of adversity.<sup>451</sup> Just before William of Holland’s visit to Lyon, the Swabian ambassadors also convinced the pope to give them a security that even if the Church made peace with Conrad IV, he could not remain duke of Swabia.<sup>452</sup>

### **Discussing Germany’s future, March-April 1251**

William of Holland was cutting a corner as Pope Innocent IV’s champion. Instead of being willing to defeat the Staufer completely, he tried to find a more convenient solution by negotiating with Conrad IV. By 17 March 1251, William was in Trier to pick up Archbishop Arnold.<sup>453</sup> Together with William’s chancellor they made their way to Lyon. Meanwhile, Archbishops Conrad and Christian spent time in their respective dioceses.<sup>454</sup> Their absence from such an important journey might be interpreted as a sign of tension or estrangement, as will be seen in the case of Archbishop Christian.

From 27 to 31 March 1251, just before his visit to Pope Innocent IV, William of Holland met with Conrad IV at Oppenheim.<sup>455</sup> They initially clashed in a military encounter, where William, together with Archbishop Arnold of Trier and his retinue of sixty riders, defeated Conrad IV.<sup>456</sup> However, the only evidence for this encounter comes from a chronicle designed to accentuate the archbishop’s deeds in the context of the history of Trier.<sup>457</sup> An older version of the *Gesta Treverorum* without this insertion does not mention the clash nor Archbishop

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<sup>451</sup> Ibid.

<sup>452</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, p. 265, no 14258. See Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 118.

<sup>453</sup> *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe zu Trier*, p. 46.

<sup>454</sup> See J. Ficker, ‘Erörterung zur Reichsgeschichte des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts’, *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 111* (Vienna, 2003), pp. 350-2.

<sup>455</sup> *Gesta Arnoldi*, p. 41 and *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 13, no 67 and p. 829, no 4540-1.

<sup>456</sup> Zenz, *Die Taten der Trierer*, p. 65 and *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 17, no 100.

<sup>457</sup> *Gesta Arnoldi*, p. 41

Arnold's role in it.<sup>458</sup> It is unclear why their meeting was accompanied by fighting if both sides wished to negotiate.

It seems likely that in their discussions, they came to an agreement that William of Holland would be *Rex Romanorum* in Germany, and maybe the future Holy Roman Emperor. Conrad IV would become King of Sicily. Only the rule over the Northern Italian city states remained undistributed, which could further expand their independence.

The timing suggests that William of Holland wanted to have an agreement with Conrad IV before negotiating with Innocent IV about his next steps in Lyon in April 1251.<sup>459</sup> He was likely aware that the unresolved War of the Flemish Succession would absorb his attention and energy over the next years.<sup>460</sup> Conrad IV would depart Germany in October 1251.

William of Holland and Archbishop Arnold of Trier, together with chaplain Henry of Leiningen, elected bishop of Speyer, visited Pope Innocent IV in Lyon from 16 to 30 April 1251.<sup>461</sup> Though there is no evidence what they discussed, it seems inevitable that they addressed plans for William of Holland to become the next Holy Roman Emperor.<sup>462</sup> Innocent IV confirmed William as king on Maundy Thursday 13 April 1251 in the presence of several bishops. This was in addition to his previous confirmation in writing through the papal legate.<sup>463</sup> When Innocent IV preached to the people on a field, William held his stirrup, a ritual symbolizing his service to the pope.<sup>464</sup> Thus, Innocent III's decretal *Venerabilem* was fulfilled.

However, it was decided to delay William of Holland's journey to Italy. His current military and political position in Germany was not strong enough, nor was his rule sustainably implemented, to be crowned emperor by Innocent IV in Italy. William was still paid little

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<sup>458</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 13, no 67.

<sup>459</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 14247/14280 and *Gesta Treverorum*, p. 412.

<sup>460</sup> Graaf, *Oorlog om Holland 1000-1375*, pp. 160-74 and Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, pp. 156-81.

<sup>461</sup> *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 392, *Acta Imperii Inedita*, pp. 433-4, no 532, and *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 17, no number between 100 and 101.

<sup>462</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 14204-13.

<sup>463</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 114.

<sup>464</sup> *Gesta Treverorum*, p. 412 and Nicolaus de Curbio, *Vita Innocenti IV papae*, ed. A. Molinier, *Les Sources de l'histoire de France - Des origines aux guerres d'Italie (1494)*. III. Les Capetiens, 1180-1328 (Paris 1903), cap 30.

attention by the majority of princes and cities in Germany, and without their support he could not afford to depart for Italy. This base was so fragile that these considerations outweighed the glory of being crowned emperor, which may have compelled more princes to recognize William in Germany.<sup>465</sup> It is unlikely that their decision was informed by any knowledge of Innocent IV of William of Holland's agreement with his rival.

With regards to Conrad IV, they planned for William of Holland to invade the duchy of Swabia. Innocent IV was influenced by the visit of Counts Ulrich of Württemberg and Berthold of Blankenstein. They represented the interest of the Swabian nobles who rebelled against Conrad IV, and who wanted the pope to put pressure on William of Holland and the archbishops to invade the duchy of Swabia.<sup>466</sup> It seems improbable that Innocent IV would have been willing to recognize Conrad IV as King of Sicily, even under the condition of his complete obedience and subjugation. Therefore, he urged William of Holland to completely defeat Conrad IV in Germany.<sup>467</sup> If this was the case, Archbishop Arnold must have kept any information on the meeting with Conrad IV from Innocent IV, even though he was especially honoured by the pope at Lyon, when he received the kiss of peace and acted as translator for Innocent IV's sermon to William of Holland and their German companions.<sup>468</sup>

During the previous year, William of Holland had begun to rely heavily on archiepiscopal retinues; hence in preparation for the invasion of Swabia, the archbishops must lend William their full military support.<sup>469</sup> They probably agreed to seek the removal of Archbishop Christian of Mainz in Lyon, on account of his hesitancy to support William

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<sup>465</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 116.

<sup>466</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 12265/14248a/14283. See Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 118/121.

<sup>467</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 14265.

<sup>468</sup> Zenz, *Die Taten der Trierer*, pp. 65-6.

<sup>469</sup> See F. Jürgensmeier, 'Pro und Contra: Die Stellung der Erzbischöfe (1160-1249) im Reichsgeschehen', in F. Jürgensmeier (ed), *Handbuch der Mainzer Kirchengeschichte Band. 1. Christliche Antike und Mittelalter* (2 vols, Würzburg, 2000), pp. 106-9 and P-J Heinig, 'Die Mainzer Kirche am Ende des Hochmittelalters (1249-1305)', in F. Jürgensmeier (ed), *Handbuch der Mainzer Kirchengeschichte 1* (2 vols, Würzburg, 2000), pp. 347-51.

militarily. Pope Innocent IV therefore dispatched his legate cardinal Hugo of St Sabina to Mainz to convince Archbishop Christian to resign.<sup>470</sup>

### **Absolution from sin by legate Hugo of St Sabina, May-July 1251**

William of Holland and his delegation returned to Germany in May 1251. Pope Innocent IV accompanied them for parts of the way up to Lombardy.<sup>471</sup> Eventually, he would travel back to Italy, which he now considered safe enough for his return, even though Conrad IV was still present in Germany.

Legate Hugo of St Sabina's (1200-63) was part of the delegation. His main mission was to help William of Holland to win the support of the German princes, which was the most important strategic goal to be achieved at this point.<sup>472</sup> He was a noted biblical commentator from Burgundy and among the most learned Dominican friars.<sup>473</sup> A year after Innocent IV made him cardinal, he played an important part at the Council of Lyon in 1245. There is a pattern of Innocent IV preferring to send as legates against the Stauffer to Germany cardinals whom he himself created, as they were men whose loyalty he could rely on and whom he trusted.<sup>474</sup>

The choice of Hugo of St Sabina is a further illustration of Innocent's IV preference for men who were of outstanding learning and who were intimately familiar with the legalities of the conflict with the Stauffer. Legate Hugo was a specialist on the nature of the human soul in union with the body and wrote the treatise *De Anima* on the subject in Paris in the 1230s.<sup>475</sup> This showed that Innocent IV anticipated his task to be nuanced judgements of how supporters

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<sup>470</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 313, no 52.

<sup>471</sup> Zenz, *Die Taten der Trierer*, p. 66 and Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, pp. 115-6.

<sup>472</sup> *Annales Spirenses*, pp. 84/156, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, and Nicolaus de Curbio, *Vita Innocenta IV papae*, cap. 30.

<sup>473</sup> M. Bieniak, *The soul-body problem at Paris ca 1200-1250: Hugh of St-Cher and his contemporaries* (Leuven, 2010), p. 9.

<sup>474</sup> See Nicolaus de Curbio, *Vita Innocenta IV papae*, cap. 15.

<sup>475</sup> Bieniak, *Soul-Body Problem*, pp. 24-7.

of the Staufer had committed sin and loaded guilt upon their soul. In order to welcome them back into the Church, legate Hugo had to make use of his expertise to judge each individual case.

Legate Hugo tended to spend most of his time in big cities connected to his papal allies, such as Strasbourg, Mainz, and Cologne, but he travelled less frequently than some of his predecessors. Legate Hugo spent June 1251 with his Dominican brothers in Strasbourg in Alsace, where he met with a messenger of Bishop Berthold of Basel (or possibly even the bishop himself), discussing military ventures against Conrad IV.<sup>476</sup> Bishop Berthold's career was representative of many bishops who profited from the conflict. He held the military command over Basel as the city's *defensor* and administered its worldly business as papal *capitaneus*.<sup>477</sup> He had only been in place for two years, replacing a more Staufer-friendly bishop.<sup>478</sup> He conquered Rheinfelden with all farms and manors from Conrad IV and used the conflict to expand his lands.

Legate Hugo spent most of July 1251 in Mainz to depose Christian as archbishop of Mainz.<sup>479</sup> This was interrupted by a brief visit in Ingelheim<sup>480</sup> and some time in Bingen and Koblenz<sup>481</sup> It seems though that his mission did not bear fruit as quickly as the papal party hoped, as the German cities that paid no attention to William of Holland before also were not swayed by the apostolic legate. Even after Frederick's death, some still hoped that Staufer rule would eventually prevail.

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<sup>476</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1557, no 10256.

<sup>477</sup> B. W. Häuptli, 'Berthold II von Pfirt', *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon* 30 (2009), col 113-5.

<sup>478</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1556, no 10253 and p. 1557, no 10254.

<sup>479</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1557, no 10257-60/10262-3 and *Annales Erphordienses*, p. 38, and *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, p. 248.

<sup>480</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1557, no 10261.

<sup>481</sup> *Ibid.*, no 10264-8.

### **Recruitment efforts by William of Holland and papal penitentiary Henry, May-July 1251**

While the visit to Lyon had taken place swiftly, the execution of the military campaign to Swabia proved to be surprisingly sluggish. Maybe William of Holland was not in a great hurry anymore, because he came to an agreement with Conrad IV. Another reason may have been that he still lacked troops to put his plans for Swabia into action. He went to Strasbourg to collect troops. In Salins in Burgundy, he won over Count John of Chalons, who swore an oath of obedience and aid against Conrad IV and received 10,000 marks in return.<sup>482</sup>

It is likely that William again tried to collect troops in Cologne in June. It may have become more difficult to recruit crusaders after the death of Frederick II. One of the main draws for the campaign was lost, even though Innocent IV had renewed orders to preach the cross on 5 February 1251.<sup>483</sup>

William visited numerous locations belonging to the archbishops of Strasbourg, Trier, Cologne, and Mainz. He visited Bishop Henry in Strasbourg in May and June,<sup>484</sup> Archbishop Conrad in Cologne in June,<sup>485</sup> and the newly elected Archbishop Gerhard in Mainz, Bingen, and Ehrenbrechtstein castle in June and July 1251.<sup>486</sup> It is noticeable how often William specifically visited castles and palaces, such as Ehrenbrechtstein (24 June), Ingelheim (11 July), Blitzenhausen (21 August and 21 September), Boppard (27 August), Erbenheim (6 November), and Scharfenstein (15 November). In addition to winning the loyalty of the administrators, this may be evidence that he was there to organize troops.

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<sup>482</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, 5037-8. See Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, pp. 118-9.

<sup>483</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 14170/14176/14177.

<sup>484</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, pp. 17-8, no 103 and *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 392 and p. 398, no 3.

<sup>485</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, *Nachträge und Ergänzungen*, p. 1, no 724.

<sup>486</sup> *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 392, *Urkundenbuch der Stadt und Landschaft Zürich*, no 818, *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 18, no 106, *Acta Imperii Inedita*, p. 434, no 533, Kruisheer, *De oorkonden en de kanselarij van de graven van Holland tot 1299*, p. 288, no 268, *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 392-3, and *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 18, no 105/107.

After his mission regarding Duke Otto of Bavaria, papal penitentiary Henry also recruited crusaders for the military campaign into Swabia. For this campaign, William of Holland needed crusaders. Papal penitentiary Henry probably preached the cross in Swabia against Conrad IV between April and August 1251.<sup>487</sup> Maybe his recruitment efforts continued until October 1251, but William of Holland assembled the army by August 1251. Those who took the cross against Conrad IV on this occasion truly could fight a crusade in front of their own door; they did not even have to leave the duchy of Swabia for it.

### **Archbishop Gerhard of Mainz, June-August 1251**

In July 1251, William of Holland replaced Archbishop Christian of Mainz with a more bellicose candidate to ensure greater military and political support from his successor.<sup>488</sup> Having received assurances of compensation, Christian relinquished his office as archbishop in July 1251.<sup>489</sup> In his chronicle, he alleged that his downfall also owed much to the machinations of his successor Gerhard I of Dhaun, though it is possible that he wanted to gloss over the fact that he fell out of favour with his king and former allies.<sup>490</sup> He joined the Order of Saint John and moved to Paris, where he died.<sup>491</sup>

His successor Gerhard of Dhaun was very young, probably still adolescent, but as a cousin of William of Holland's chancellor Henry of Leiningen he had close ties to the papal party. This highlighted the degree to which free choices by the dome chapter were curtailed. By now, even the choice of an archbishop was heavily influenced by papal control.<sup>492</sup> Gerhard of Dhaun took up office in July, and, upon the initiative of papal legate Hugo, was confirmed

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<sup>487</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 1358, no 8370.

<sup>488</sup> Christian's last charter dated from 2 June 1251, *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 313, no 52.

<sup>489</sup> *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, p. 270, *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 313, no 52, and *Cronica S. Petri Erfordensis moderna*, pp. 244/270.

<sup>490</sup> *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, pp. 270-1.

<sup>491</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 313, no 52.

<sup>492</sup> *Christiani Chronicon Moguntinum*, pp. 270-1.

by the cathedral chapter as archbishop of Mainz in August 1251.<sup>493</sup> In his choice, legate Hugo was supported by Hostiensis, also known as Archbishop Henry of Embrun. In his chronicle, former Archbishop Christian of Mainz accused Hostiensis of being open to bribery and secretly accepting 200 marks from Gerhard of Dhaun, though the veracity of this accusation cannot be established.<sup>494</sup>

The young archbishop was eager to fulfil William of Holland's military expectations and from 1 to 14 August 1251, he already lay in the field near Kriegsheim along the river Pfrim to attack Conrad IV.<sup>495</sup> On 14 August 1251, the archbishop's men destroyed the village of Pfeddersheim near Worms.<sup>496</sup> This happened before Archbishop Gerhard was consecrated by Hostiensis and invested as archbishop of Mainz, which only took place in Brunswick on 24 March 1252.<sup>497</sup>

### **William of Holland's military campaigns, August-October 1251**

The change in power in Germany progressed inexorably between August and October 1251, against the background of Conrad IV preparing to depart Germany. William of Holland assembled an army, took Boppard, and invaded the duchy of Swabia. In August 1251, William of Holland and legate Hugo moved between Ringsheim, Mainz, and Blitzenhausen, most likely to raise an army.<sup>498</sup>

They probably raised William's army through a mixture of granting indulgences and temporal rewards. The presence of legate Hugo of St Sabina may indicate that recruits took the cross and received indulgences, but the presence of William of Holland suggests that he tried

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<sup>493</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 314, no 1 and 2.

<sup>494</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>495</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 315, no 2.

<sup>496</sup> *Annales Wormatienses*, p. 143.

<sup>497</sup> Gatz, *Die Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches*, p. 402.

<sup>498</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1557, nos 10269/10270/10270a and *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 315, nos 3-4. There is no information on Archbishop Gerhard's location or actions from September to October 1251. If he continued to fulfil William's expectations, Archbishop Gerhard was with him in the Wetterau.

to commend himself as king. The evidence does not allow for an analysis of whether they offered recruits more temporal incentives than before or whether William mainly wanted to win over allies; it was likely a mixture of the two. This was only the second time William of Holland personally participated in recruitment, after the preparation for the siege of Aachen in February 1248. It is an indication that he once again intended to create a close bond between recruits and his kingship – to motivate men-at-arms to fight for him and not just against the Stauffer.

On 21 August 1251, William of Holland again laid siege to Boppard, accompanied by legate Hugo of St Sabina, though information for Archbishops Conrad, Arnold, and Gerhard is missing.<sup>499</sup> The siege only lasted about a week and was over by 27 August 1251.<sup>500</sup> Such a short duration after three unsuccessful attempts implied that the city surrendered after Frederick II's death. They probably did so with Conrad IV's assent, as it is possible that at Oppenheim they discussed the future of allies like Boppard.<sup>501</sup>

The attack must be seen in the light of preparation for the invasion of the duchy of Swabia, and William of Holland would not have taken a detour to Boppard without the expectation of a quick surrender. In September 1251, William of Holland was in Blitzenhausen castle, which belonged to Count Ulrich of Württemberg and was situated between Boppard and Bingen.<sup>502</sup> He had already used it as a base to lay siege to Boppard. William of Holland together with Count Ulrich of Württemberg and other Swabian nobles attacked Conrad's IV stronghold Friedberg and took the Wetterau in October 1251.<sup>503</sup> This was a direct consequence of Conrad IV's agreed departure in October 1251.

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<sup>499</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 18, no 108, *Acta Imperii Inedita*, ed. Eduard Winkelmann (Innsbruck, 1880), pp. 434-6, no 534 and *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 393.

<sup>500</sup> *Studien zum Urkundenwesen Wilhelms von Holland*, p. 393 and *Regesta Imperii, V*, p. 18, no 109.

<sup>501</sup> Zenz, *Die Taten der Trierer*, p. 65.

<sup>502</sup> *Regesta Imperii, V, Nachträge und Ergänzungen*, p. 103, no 725.

<sup>503</sup> *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 315, no 3-4.

By successfully invading the duchy of Swabia, William of Holland finally pierced the heart of Staufer power in Germany in October 1251. He was in Scharfenstein castle in November and spent Christmas 1251 in Cologne.<sup>504</sup> There he prepared for his wedding to Elisabeth of Brunswick next month. In January 1252, William of Holland married Elisabeth, daughter of the duke of Brunswick.<sup>505</sup> She brought her father's lands, as well as his political connections and military power into the marriage. One of the most effective tools William had at his disposal was an advantageous marriage. Through this alliance, he could significantly enlarge his *Hausgut* and broaden the reach of his rule into the north-east of Germany.<sup>506</sup> Like many other decisions intended to determine Germany's future, William discussed his choice of bride with Innocent IV in Lyon in April 1251.<sup>507</sup>

Legate Hugo spent at least some days each month in Cologne between September 1251 and January 1252.<sup>508</sup> He granted many indulgences, while the archbishops looked after the affairs of their respective dioceses over the last months of 1251.<sup>509</sup> Legate Hugo mediated a peace between Archbishop Conrad and Count Willhelm of Jülich in Neuss on 9 September 1251.<sup>510</sup> He was in Aachen on 13 October 1251 and in Liège on 1 November.<sup>511</sup>

In his role as *Rex Romanorum*, William of Holland eventually deposed Conrad IV as duke of Swabia in 1252. In a letter to Innocent IV from 1252, to which only the reply has survived, William of Holland informed the pope that on a court day in Frankfurt, he deposed Conrad IV as duke of Swabia just like his predecessor Henry Raspe did.<sup>512</sup> He deposed Conrad

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<sup>504</sup> See *Regesta Imperii*, V 4563c-4569b and *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 14199-200.

<sup>505</sup> *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, 14199-200.

<sup>506</sup> See Schlunk, *Königsmacht und Krongut*, 'Grafik 50' on p. 193 and 'Grafik 60' on p. 206.

<sup>507</sup> Kempf, *Geschichte des Deutschen Reiches während des grossen Interregnums*, p. 117.

<sup>508</sup> He was in Cologne on 6/16-8/25-6 September 1251, on 3-5 October 1251, on 10/27 November 1251, on 6/9/14/20 December 1251, and on 5 January 1252, see *Regesta Imperii*, pp. 1557-8, nos 10271-4, 10275-80, 10283-9.

<sup>509</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 227, no 1645 and p. 228, nos 1650/1652, *Die Regesten der Erzbischöfe zu Trier*, p. 47, and *Regesten zur Geschichte der Mainzer Erzbischöfe*, p. 315, no 5.

<sup>510</sup> *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1558, no 10271a.

<sup>511</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1558, nos 10281-2.

<sup>512</sup> See this thesis, 'Chapter 2: Henry Raspe's Crusade, 1246-7,' pp. 123-5.

IV and relieved him of all his property in Germany because he persecuted the Church and was not invested as duke of Swabia by him or his predecessor Henry Raspe.<sup>513</sup> Innocent IV replied to William of Holland that he allowed and confirmed the deposition of Conrad IV as duke of Swabia on 8 February 1253.<sup>514</sup>

It is noteworthy that even after his father's deposition, Conrad IV never distanced himself from Frederick II as a source of legitimacy. From early 1251 onwards, when Conrad IV left Germany, he did not use the title *heres regni Ierusalem* anymore, but expressed his claims through the title *Ierusalem et Sicilie rex*.<sup>515</sup> As Frederick II's heir, he saw himself as the legitimate king of the Kingdoms of Sicily and Jerusalem. Nevertheless, he kept his title as 'king elect' (*in Romanorum regem electus*) until his death in 1254.<sup>516</sup>

After Conrad IV's departure, there was a sharp decrease in William's military campaigns in Germany. This may seem surprising, because Conrad IV's absence could have opened an opportunity for William of Holland to actively develop his rule. One of the reasons for this was that William more urgently focused on the War of the Flemish Succession. Another reason may have been that after William came to an agreement with Conrad IV, there was less pressure to expand his rule through a military campaign. Despite having launched his kingship as a crusader, William had other priorities than the defence of the liberty of the Church.<sup>517</sup>

The last evidence of the cross being preached against Conrad IV in Germany dates from May 1253, while the last charter by legate Hugo of St Sabina in Germany is from 5 October 1253.<sup>518</sup> Duke Otto of Bavaria, who was the last German prince to represent Conrad IV's claim to power in Germany, died on 29 November 1253. Even after Conrad IV's death on 21 May 1254, William's kingship was not marked by the same level of military activity as the period

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<sup>513</sup> *Ep Saec XIII*, p. 155 and *Regesta imperii*, V, p. 1377-8, no 8569/5105a.

<sup>514</sup> Berger, *Innocent IV*, III, p. 171, no 6303 and *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1377-8, no 8569.

<sup>515</sup> Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone*, p. 713.

<sup>516</sup> For Frederick II's will, see *MGH Const* 2, p. 453, no 345.

<sup>517</sup> Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, pp. 156–81.

<sup>518</sup> By 29 November 1253, Innocent IV referred to him as 'tunc legatus', *Regesta Imperii*, V, p. 1566, no 10439a.

between May 1246 and October 1251.<sup>519</sup> However, the relationship between William of Holland and Archbishop Conrad of Cologne deteriorated between 1251 and 1253, mainly over claims to lands along the Rhine.<sup>520</sup> Between autumn 1254 and 1255, William of Holland successfully averted an attempt by Archbishop Conrad to depose and replace him as king.<sup>521</sup>

### **Appraisal of William of Holland's crusade**

To understand William of Holland's kingship, it is critical to understand how the military campaign interacted with the supply of troops, whether it was through crusader recruitment or secular levies. It is also central to appreciate the changing dynamics of William's relationship with the archbishops and papal legates.

William of Holland had the advantage of being able to look back at Henry Raspe's tactics before he decided on his own strategy to changing power in Germany. In contrast to his predecessor, he focused on constructing his own kingship as King of the Romans that would overpower the military and political power of the Staufer. William's strategy to become King of the Romans was two-pronged.

The first prong was to conquer royal palaces as a base of his own kingship to crowd out Staufer power. Palaces such as Nijmegen, Kaiserswerth, Ingelheim, and Boppard, had several uses; they emulated traditional Staufer rule, but also provided his military campaign with much needed additional resources in men, money, and victuals. William of Holland only received

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<sup>519</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, pp. 142-52. See B. Laying, 'Niederrhein und Reich in der Königspolitik Konrads von Hochstaden bis 1256', *Vestische Zeitschrift* 73/75 (1971/73), pp. 183-248 and P. Scheffer-Boichorst, 'Über den Plan einer Thronumwälzung in den Jahren 1254 und 1255', *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtswissenschaft* 6 (Vienna, 1885), pp. 558-82.

<sup>520</sup> J. Burckhard, *Conrad von Hochstaden, Erzbischof von Köln] und Gründer des Köllner Doms (1238-1261)* (Bonn, 1843), pp. 95-7.

<sup>521</sup> *Regesten Erzbischöfe Köln*, p. 3, no 1858. See H. Finger, 'Der Wandel in den Beziehungen des Papsttums zu den Kölner Erzbischöfen im 13. Jahrhundert', in S. Weinfurter (ed), *Päpstliche Herrschaft im Mittelalter* (Ostfildern, 2012), pp. 361-82, P. Scheffer-Boichorst, 'Über den Plan einer Thronumwälzung in den Jahren 1254 und 1255', *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 6 (Vienna, 1885), pp. 558-82, and Hintze, *Das Königtum Willhelms von Holland*, pp. 142-52.

papal money after his election because the papal treasury was impoverished, and he faced outstanding debt to the counts of Swabia from his predecessor.

The second prong was to gain legitimacy by achieving his coronation in Aachen to compensate for the shortcomings in his election as King of the Romans. Like his predecessor, William of Holland was missing in his election some of the most important temporal princes who would become permanent members of the body of prince electors. Even though he followed the steps of becoming king quite closely, William's election and coronation did not yet fully conform to the ideal that developed over the next decades and centuries.

For his military campaigns, William of Holland had to gather sufficient troops. Under legate Peter Capocci there was a shift away from blanket preaching of the cross to more targeted recruitment, for example of important nobles whose retinues could supply William of Holland's army. William's fledgling kingship also provided a new focus point to crusaders who had already taken the cross against the Staufer under William's predecessor. Pope Innocent IV changed his crusading policy to support William of Holland; from October to November 1247 onwards, he gave priority to recruitment for the crusade against the Staufer over the crusade to the Holy Land.

The preaching of the cross against the Staufer reached its peak in preparation for the siege of Aachen, which lasted from April to October 1248. Crusader recruitment in Frisia could draw on the political and cultural affinity between William of Holland and the Frisians. This affinity played an especially large role during the two weeks in February 1248, when William of Holland accompanied legate Peter Capocci in the lower-German speaking region between Utrecht and Leuven. Thereby, he specifically tied the crusaders to his person as king. He incentivised crusaders to take the cross in a way that went beyond agreement with the papal narrative of why a change of power in Germany was necessary. Crusaders did not just take the cross against Frederick II and Conrad IV anymore, they took it for William of Holland.

Although many of the men-at-arms in his army were crusaders, William of Holland also tried to raise troops by secular means. In March 1248, he tried to boost his forces through a combined approach of recruiting crusaders and leveraging his local network in the county of Holland and Zeeland. This further exemplified how motives to support William of Holland blended into each other. There was a spiritual rationale to take up the cross and to follow the example of Jesus Christ, though even these men received rewards in the form of plenary indulgences and legal protections. There were also outright secular motivations for men to take up arms, when a royal candidate with ties to their local area activated longstanding loyalties and bonds of vassalage.

The legal relationship between the election and coronation was unclear, so William was determined to create a new reality on the ground. After the costly military campaign that led to his coronation, William of Holland required even more money to implement his rule. Pope Innocent IV still was unable to pump additional funds into the crusade against the Staufer. Instead, in October 1248, he allowed William of Holland to collect money from redemptions of vows to go to the Holy Land, which was sufficiently controversial that it had to be done secretly.

William of Holland was in the process of implementing his kingship, when the papal party was rocked by changes in personnel. Legate Peter Capocci's departure from Germany began a new phase in the crusade, in which the legateship for the crusade passed from an Italian outsider into the hands of an insider from Germany. The German members of the papal party, even though they supported the papal cause, had much freedom to pursue their own personal interests. As a result, previously looming problems intensified.

During Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz's legateship, Innocent IV delegated crusader recruitment to the mendicant orders. However, Archbishop Siegfried passed away in March 1249. His successor Archbishop Christian of Mainz held secret peace negotiations with the

Staufer party. Archbishop Christian's conduct during the crusade seems to have been insufficiently bellicose, despite his military support for William of Holland. Within two years, he was replaced as archbishop of Mainz by Gerhard of Eppstein.

Under Archbishop Conrad of Cologne's legateship, crusader recruitment by the mendicant orders plummeted. He did not put as much energy into recruitment as the two previous legates, but he amassed enough power as legate that he threatened to overshadow William of Holland's kingship. Pope Innocent IV began to involve himself personally in imperial politics, for example by granting marriage dispensations, and eventually replaced Archbishop Conrad of Cologne with Peter of Albano to curb his power as papal legate. Thus, he retained some control over how the change of power was conducted in Germany.

In October 1249, William of Holland abruptly stopped his military campaign and returned to the county of Holland and Zeeland. Over the next eight to nine months, the conflict with Countess Margaret of Flanders occupied William of Holland more than the crusade against the Staufer. Between October 1249 to June 1250, William of Holland was absent from the Rhine-Main area and traditional places of Staufer rule to concentrate on the War of the Flemish Succession. His military campaigns and the political project of his kingship were largely suspended in his absence.

During his military campaign from June to October 1250, he increasingly relied on the private retinues of the archbishops, as well as troops from certain bishops and Rhenish nobles. Although William of Holland may have successfully expanded his ties with nobles of the lower Rhine, the constraints of their service may have forced him to give up his planned attack on Frankfurt in July 1249. It is likely that he would not have encountered the same problem if he had enough crusaders at his disposal.

William of Holland's position in Germany shifted from offensive to defensive in 1250. For the first time, he was directly confronted by Conrad IV, who felt that he had accumulated

the military strength to put meaningful pressure on William of Holland. Conrad IV's forces were insufficient to decisively change the military and political power balance though. Despite William of Holland's weakness, the year ended in a stalemate.

All political and military developments were overshadowed by the death of Frederick II on 13 December 1250. His death was a turning point; it destroyed the pillar of Staufer power and provided the biggest chance yet for the crusade to succeed. The enormity of the change showed that Frederick II had failed to build up Conrad IV as a viable successor during his lifetime. Thus, Innocent IV assumed that in the foreseeable future many supporters of the Staufer would like to make peace with the Church and be released from excommunication or further spiritual censure.

During William of Holland's visit in Lyon, the papal party decided to stabilize the situation in Germany first. They delayed William's journey to Italy to become the next Holy Roman Emperor. Unbeknownst to Pope Innocent IV though, William had struck a deal with Conrad IV in which they distributed political power. He sacrificed his role as defender of the liberty of the Church in favour of a smaller, more achievable settlement. When Conrad IV departed for Italy in October 1251, much of the left-over resistance in Germany collapsed. Finally, William of Holland was able to conquer the duchy of Swabia, and he reiterated Conrad IV's deposition as duke of Swabia in the following year.

Overall, William of Holland regularly suffered from a dearth of troops, hence he was forced to adjust his tactics in accordance with their availability. Without widespread preaching of the cross and the large-scale distribution of indulgences, William's military campaigns could not have commenced. However, in the face of several adverse factors, he could not rely on crusader recruitment alone. To compensate for low numbers, William activated his own networks in the county of Holland, used the retinues of the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier, and depended on men brought by Rhenish nobles.

## **Conclusion**

The crusade against the Staufer applied crusading ideas and rhetoric to the protracted conflict between emperors and popes. By the 1240s, crusading ideology had been transferred from Muslim enemies in Outremer and applied to political conflicts within Christendom for several decades. However, in the case of the crusade against the Staufer, Pope Innocent IV's endeavour to use the institution of crusading to add legitimacy to the change of power in Germany failed to take hold as a cohesive and convincing narrative, based on the evidence from chronicles and annals. Nevertheless, deep-rooted or common acceptance of the papal narrative that the military and political campaigns by the royal candidates constituted a crusade with an important spiritual dimension was not necessary for the short-term success of political change in Germany. It was enough for the papal story to fulfil its function for crusader recruitment for its destabilizing effect to perforate imperial power in Germany.

The chapter 'Problematizing the Crusade against the Staufer' showed that the military campaigns were not reported widely in chronicles and annals by using the terms and concepts typical of crusading. Almost all German chronicles related the military campaign as an exclusively secular enterprise, even if chronicle writers were ecclesiastics who were likely to embrace the pope's point of view. This implies that many contemporaries perceived the conflict mainly in secular and political terms. Neither was the papal justification for Frederick II's deposition universally accepted in Germany.

However, the question of how much politics was in the religion and how much religion in the politics cannot be solved on the language level of the sources alone. Instead, the crusade against the Staufer in Germany was defined by how it unfolded in practice. The respective chapters on the crusade against the Staufer under Henry Raspe and William of Holland showed in detail how the application of crusading ideology to a conflict against a Christian political enemy could manifest in practice. Henry Raspe tackled the challenge head-on; he confronted

Conrad IV in battle and invaded the duchies of Bavaria and Swabia. William of Holland's struggle revolved around conquering royal palaces, thereby securing patronage and loyalty in Germany, while only being able to exert limited military force. Their different paths to the throne show that the crusade against the Staufer can only be understood properly in its German context.

The thesis demonstrates that there was a push and pull relationship between the military campaign and crusader recruitment. A closer look at the events that defined the royal candidates' military campaigns shows that they both heavily relied on the crusader recruits gathered by preaching the word of the cross, to such an extent that without the specific appeal of a crusade, Henry Raspe and William of Holland would not have been able to raise sufficiently large armies for their military campaigns. The indulgences and remissions of sins received by those signed with the cross functioned as a currency to pay for military service.

The crusading apparatus made the campaigns possible on a practical level, by activating traditional routes of disseminating the word of the cross and raising money. It strengthened or replaced pre-existing ties of vassalage and obligations of loyalty, which otherwise would have determined a royal candidate's access to an army. Although numbers cannot be pinpointed, it is highly likely that crusaders constituted a majority of the soldiers in both armies. Without framing the conflict as a crusade, Henry Raspe's and William of Holland's attempts to become the new king would have collapsed immediately, or not even been able to take off the ground.

Furthermore, the thesis highlights that there was not only a push and pull relationship between the military campaign and crusader recruitment, but also between military and political events during the crusade. This was particularly critical for Henry Raspe's victory at the battle of Frankfurt, which enabled him to depose Conrad IV as duke of Swabia, and for William of Holland's successful siege of Aachen, which enabled his coronation. The military successes of the royal candidates showed that a change of power was possible in Germany.

Innocent IV called for the crusade to enact this change, but the endeavour became more legitimate and credible in the wake of the military campaign's success. In the end, this meant that crusader recruitment directly impacted on the success of the political goal of replacing Conrad IV with a new King of the Romans.

On the one hand, the conflict with the Staufer in Germany included many of the characteristics of a crusade: it was called for by the pope, the word of the cross was preached, crusaders assumed the sign of the cross and were rewarded with remission of their sins through plenary indulgences. Innocent IV's order to preach a crusade gave the military campaign a spiritual dimension that it would not otherwise have had. The crusade, like Frederick II's excommunication and deposition, marked the Staufer as a public enemies of the Church, as opposed to framing the conflict as a secular war over political interests. Declaring a crusade allowed the pope to channel the prestige of his office and weight of his judgement against the Staufer. It highlighted Pope Innocent IV's attempt to frame the conflict as a holy war.

On the other hand, the conflict encompassed many features that made it indistinguishable from political and military campaigns led by any previous royal candidate. Henry Raspe and William of Holland spent much of their time with the same tasks as those who had aspired to take over the German throne by purely secular measures. Henry Raspe fought a battle to gain access to Frankfurt and deposed Conrad IV as Duke of Swabia in a legal proceeding. William of Holland besieged Aachen to be crowned there and conquered royal palaces to widen his power base. Both royal candidates, led by the archbishops, attempted to gather support from electors. They laboured to secure patronage, make alliances, and gain new vassals by granting land, money, and privileges as rewards. The way they put their respective claims to the throne into practice was entirely distinct from any notion of holy war.

It is useful to distinguish between the 'front end' and the 'back end' of the crusade. The 'back end' refers to how the crusade was conceptualized in theory by popes, canonists, and

other ecclesiastical thinkers. Their vision was shaped by the concerns that motivated Innocent IV during the conflict, such as how he understood his office or how he thought about the conflict between *imperium* and *sacerdotium*. The ‘front end’ refers to how the crusade was experienced and perceived in Germany. The reports in the chronicles and annals reflect the impact the royal candidates’ immediate concerns centring around the practicalities of becoming king had on some German princes and urban elites. The distinction explains the separation that is visible in the sources; papal documents and canonist texts were often concerned with the ‘back end’ of the conflict, whereas German sources were concerned with the ‘front end’.

The difference between how the pope envisioned the crusade and how it was perceived means that our understanding of what defines a crusade must move away from elevating the papal point of view to the exclusion of all others. If historians select sources produced directly by the papal chancery and by giving them priority over non-papal sources originating in Germany and abroad, their analyses tend to give more weight to the papal point of view than might strictly be due for an interested party, which the papacy is on this occasion. One of the most striking features of the crusade against the Staufer is that the papacy is an involved party that considers the papal state directly threatened by its opponent. This should be taken into consideration when papal sources for this crusade are compared to papal sources for other crusades with regards to papal self-perception and reasoning as expressed in the sources.

The secular language in the chronicles and annals suggests that the ‘front end’ of the crusade was being experienced as so political that it outweighed the back end of Innocent IV’s ideological line of argument. This highlights the deep void between the mindset at the papal curia and the reality of war as it was perceived among many contemporaries in Germany. For the institution of crusading, the implication of this difference was that the papal framework of legitimisation found its limit with the crusade against the Staufer in Germany in the middle of the thirteenth century.

The thesis further argues, based on the results from the chapters on Henry Raspe and William of Holland, that acceptance of the papal narrative that the change of power in Germany was part of a holy war was not, in fact, necessary for the military campaign to be successful in the short-term. Even though the chronicles and annals may not reflect a widespread perception of the royal candidates' military campaigns as crusades, the appeal of the institution of crusading was enough to recruit, at least initially, enough crusaders to commence the fight against the Staufer.

In the period between Henry Raspe's election and William of Holland's coronation, crusader recruitment alone could likely sustain the military campaigns. During this time, despite constraints, the preaching of the cross produced sufficiently large numbers of crusaders to sustain the royal candidates' respective armies. Nevertheless, after William of Holland's coronation at Aachen, numbers seem to have dwindled and the supply of crusaders seems to have become more unreliable. Hence, it is likely that the archbishops began to supplement William of Holland's force with their private retinues to carry out the military campaign that they envisioned. As it turned out, it was enough to initiate the destabilization of Staufer rule in Germany for a provisional success of the crusade until Frederick II's death, which led to Conrad IV's departure from Germany. However, it was not enough for William of Holland to build his own kingship in the long-term.

The institution of crusading, in addition to its practical benefits, enhanced the legitimacy of the kingship of the royal candidates. The main components of their legitimacy were that they were endorsed by the pope and that their status as valuable members of the Christian community was intact. Unlike Frederick II, they were not excommunicated and deposed, and they did not have a history of having persecuted members of the Church. There were no doubts about the orthodoxy of their faith. Ideally, they could even fashion themselves as especially pious champions of the Church – holy warriors supported by God.

The indirect effects of the legitimacy the institution of crusading gave to the royal candidates' respective kingships are more difficult to quantify than its practical benefits. Most likely, it sowed doubts among those inclined to support the Staufer and delayed political action against the royal candidates just long enough for them to achieve certain levels of provisional success. It may have accelerated the political progress the papal party made, while stopping the Staufer party from effectively organising itself.

The thesis opens several avenues of questioning for future research. One of the most promising topics of enquiry is the impact the crusade had on the German princes, both temporal and ecclesiastical, as individuals and nodes in a network of power. The effect of the crusade resembled that of a civil war, in which neither side could win without political allies. One of most important effects of the crusade was the pressure the royal candidates' military and political successes put on the German princes. Germany was different from other kingdoms because its king was elected, and the role of the princes was key to the political nature of the crusade against the Staufer. Thus, the German princes held an especially important role with how the crusade unfolded in practice.

The crusade attempted to replace a king who was elected by the German princes. It sought to win favour with the same princes to support the change in power in Germany. Certain German princes, like the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz, became central to the conduct of the crusade, although it is worth remembering that they took independent military action before they aligned their goals with those of Pope Innocent IV. In turn, the archbishops won over Henry Raspe and William of Holland as royal candidates, who became the cornerstones of papal strategy in Germany.

The German princes' concerns were often of a different nature to those in the writings of ecclesiastics, on which crusader historians often focus. The attitudes of the German princes towards the crusade were unlikely to be reflected in the type of sources Elizabeth Siberry and

Palmer Throop examined in their studies of criticism of the crusades. Sometimes they could be found in administrative charters and letters, such as in the case of the letters of Duke Otto of Bavaria to Albert of Behaim. Instead of searching for explicit criticism that argued that the ideal of crusading was tainted, which was more likely to come from canonists and ecclesiastical thinkers, to further an understanding of the crusade against the Staufer, the focus should be shifted onto the actions of the German princes and their responses to the royal candidates.

The rival and competing interests of allies were of great importance to the crusade, because the conflict increased the pressure on individuals as well as groups to pick a side. This holds true both the narrow circle of prince electors and the wider circle of high nobility. The numerous, frequently shifting alliances between the higher and lower nobility, *ministeriales*, military orders, as well as cities, abbeys, and cathedral chapters had important ramifications for the royal candidates' kingships, both during and after the crusade. They had to recognize that the desire for peace between emperor and pope which had marked the actions of the German princes in the early 1240s was in vain. When the military campaign of the crusade began in 1246, all were forced to position themselves more clearly in the conflict between the papal and imperial party.

Furthermore, the crusade could be juxtaposed with a systematic study of Conrad IV's military campaign. Conrad IV's lack of men and funds denied him military victory, and he was unable to prevent his rivals' advance in Germany. Their opposition towards each other could be contextualized in the network of sympathetic and hostile factions in Germany. Finally, no systematic study of German episcopal allegiances during the struggle between the Staufer and the papacy has been undertaken so far.<sup>1051</sup> Early on in the conflict, the Staufer lost the support of a majority of the German bishops, which made it easier for Henry Raspe and William of

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<sup>1051</sup> Like Norbert Kamp did for Italy and Sicily: see idem, *Kirche und Monarchie im Staufischen Königreich Sizilien* (4 vols, Munich 1973-1982).

Holland to establish themselves as royal candidates. Both the Staufer and the papal party were interested in bringing the bishops into their camp and filling vacant sees with sympathetic candidates. Any of the approaches described above, the German princes' reaction to the royal candidates, setting up alliances, and setting the crusade in relation to Conrad IV's campaign, would allow for further study within the framework the thesis laid out.

The thesis stipulated that this crusade was a bit more political than others. A closer analysis of the crusade showed that the crusade against Staufer in Germany was a holy war in which its spiritual dimension moved into the background. Although the success of the military campaigns was only made possible through the religious nature of the rewards crusaders received, and, to a lesser degree, through the legitimacy the institution of crusading lent to recruitment for the royal candidates, the military campaigns were shaped by a goal that was political in nature: the steps to become the new King of the Romans and the requirements to put his rule into practice. The scales between religion and politics tipped in favour of political considerations so often that the crusade against the Staufer became distinct from other crusades in Europe. Thus, the crusade that emerged from the pages of the chronicles and annals at points more resembled secular military campaigns of previous royal candidates than it did previous crusades.

This thesis mostly set aside 'public opinion,' because it is fraught with difficulty to infer the internal thoughts and attitudes of wider social groups from chronicles and annals.<sup>1052</sup> What can be said, though, is that the representation of war in the chronicles and annals mostly neglects the spiritual elements of the crusade. Theologians and canonists may have approached the subject from a legalist perspective that differed from those of other ecclesiastics. Ecclesiastics, in turn, were different from lay people. It is impossible to say whether lay people

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<sup>1052</sup> See this thesis, chapter 'Historiography, Sources, and Method', p. 34.

of political influence, such as high and low nobility, *ministeriales*, and city councils, were well versed in canon law and whether a legal mindset was important to them in how they formed their opinions.

Some final thoughts on ‘public opinion’ arise from such deliberations. At first glance, it may appear a forgone conclusion that everyone who became a crusader must have agreed with Innocent IV’s argument that this was a holy war in defence of the faith, and that Frederick II was deposed on the grounds of heresy and other crimes that justified the crusade. It might be assumed that any person taking the cross against the Staufer, demonstrably through that action, accepted the papal narrative. The evidence of crusaders who participated in the crusade against the Staufer and the language of crusading present in some chronicles and annals suggests that many people concurred with the papal narrative. This would be especially true for those who participated in the crusade in some way, or those who were active in the vicinity of the archbishops. After all, enough people took the cross against the Staufer that Henry Raspe and William of Holland each had a sufficiently large army to carry out their military campaigns.

However, the silence in the sources on crusader language point to a more ambivalent situation than might be expected. If the writing in the chronicles did not reflect universal acceptance of the papal narrative, this raises the question whether some level of scepticism of the papal narrative even may have been present in the way some crusaders saw the crusade. It is possible that not every crusader fully subscribed to Innocent IV’s version of the story. They may have agreed with him that the conflict held an important spiritual dimension, but it remains open to question whether they agreed on the details; for example, that Innocent IV deposed Frederick II because he was a heretic. It is likely that crusaders who fought against the Staufer subscribed to the idea that the military campaign was a crusade, because it was called for by the pope, whose prerogative it was, and they were granted remission of their sins, but some of

them may have been critical in their assessment of the events leading up to the proclamation of the crusade.

Motivation is nuanced, and quotidian factors may have played an important role in addition to spiritual motives. The advantages of service comparatively close to home, while still granted legal protection by the Church, may have been an important incentive in crusaders' decision to assume the sign of the cross. The Frisians may have responded particularly enthusiastically to recruitment because of their cultural affinity with William of Holland, though cultural affinity and subscription to the papal narrative were not mutually exclusive. The negotiations surrounding how many days of indulgences were granted to crusaders may also be a sign how rewards interacted with convictions. This even raises the possibility that a silent majority in Germany may not have thought about Henry Raspe and William of Holland's campaigns in crusading terms.

If it is possible that certain people, non-crusaders and crusaders alike, did not fully agree with the papal narrative, this leads back to the question why there was so little evidence of outrage over the supposed abuse of the crusader ideal. Norman Housley and Elizabeth Siberry replied to this question that many contemporaries may not have perceived the crusade as an aberration from the ideal of crusading.<sup>1053</sup> Their argument still stands. The apparent contradiction may be entirely modern. The assumption that complete agreement with all aspects of how Innocent IV's deposed Frederick II and how he justified the crusade against the Staufer were a prerequisite for becoming a crusader against them was not necessarily correct. If a recruit accepted that it was the pope's prerogative to proclaim a crusade, the line of argument that led up to this point decreased in importance once it was proclaimed – if crusaders were even familiar with and interested in the details of how the conflict between Frederick II and the popes escalated in the first place.

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<sup>1053</sup> See this thesis, chapter 'Problematizing the Crusade against the Staufer', pp. 40-1/74-8.

The crusade against the Staufer was the thirteenth century incarnation of the long conflict between *imperium* and *sacerdotium*. It reflected many of the concerns and approaches of the time, such as heresy and the increased importance of legal thought and procedure at the papal curia. Perhaps Frederick II was a victim of the legalistic theological *mentalité* of the thirteenth century. Maybe he should have foreseen the futility of his endeavour to reconcile himself with the papacy, but popes had not deposed an emperor since Henry IV. They had shied away from the devastating effects of civil war that dominated the eleventh century; factions supporting a king or anti-king, who in turn might raise anti-popes. The papacy's use of crusades against enemies of the Church and its increasingly deep penetration into national politics were both symptoms of contemporary papal interpretations of their duties as leaders of Christendom. Maybe Frederick II was merely a victim of an unfavourable cycle in the *longue durée* of the relationship between emperors and popes. Confronted with some of the most hierocratic exponents of the papacy and the adverse political circumstances of his birth and youth, any ruler may have found it impossible to succeed.

## Appendix

### 1.) Key events in Chronicles and Annals

Name	Election Henry Raspe in 1246	Election William of Holland in 1247	Coronation William of Holland in 1248	Language of Crusading
Annales Argentinenses	X	X	X	
Annales Colmarienses	X	X		
Annales de Burton				
Annales Erfordiensis fratrum praedicatorum/ Chronicon Erphordiense	X	X	X	X
Annales Floreffenses		X (called him 'elected' in context of siege of Aachen in 1248)	(mentioned siege and capture of Aachen in 1248)	
Annales of Hermann of Niederaltaich	X	X		
Annales Maurimonasterienses				
Annales Moguntinenses	X	X		
Annals Parmenses Maiores	X	X		
Annales Placentini Gibellini	X			
Annales Spirenses		(referred to William of Holland as king, but did not mention election)		
Annales Stadenses	X	X	X (wrong year)	X
Annales Wormatienses		X		
Bartholomei Scribae Annales	X	X		
Bavarian continuation of Sächsische Weltchronik	X	X		
Christiani Chronicon Moguntium	X	X		
Chronica anonyma Ordinis Fratrum Minorum provinciae Saxoniae				
Chronica Praesulum Spirensium				
Chronici Saxonici continuatio Erfordensis	X	X (wrong year)		

Chronicle of Thomas Wykes	X	X	X	X
Chronicon Wormatiense		X		
Continuatio Sancrucensis II				
Cronica fratris Salimbene ordinis Minorum	X	X		
Cronica Minor Minoritae Erfurt	X	X		
Cronica Presulum et Archiepiscoporum Coloniensis ecclesie		X		
Cronica S Petri Erfordensis Moderna	X (wrong year)	X (wrong year)	(reported the victory over Aachen, but not coronation)	
Gesta Treverorum/ Gesta Arnoldi	X	X	(reported siege of Aachen, but not coronation)	X
Hugo de Rutlingen	X	X		
Iohannes de Beka	X	X	X	
Iohannes Victoriensis	X	X	(reported siege of Aachen, but not coronation)	
Levoldi a Northof Catalogus Archiepiscoporum Coloniensium	X	X	X* (referred to consecration instead of coronation)	
Martin Poloni	X	X		
Matthew Paris' Chronica Maiora	X	X	X	X
Melis Stoke	X	X	X	
Notae Historicae Argentinenses	X			X
Royal Chronicle of Cologne	X	X	X	X
Thomae Tusci Gesta imperatorum et pontificum				

The chronicles and annals included in this list that did not feature the election of Henry Raspe, the election and coronation of William of Holland, or the language of crusading contained other relevant information on the conflict.

## 2.) Timeline Letters and Propaganda 1239-1250

### 1239

- 10 March 1239: Frederick II: Letter to the cardinals to prevent his excommunication
- 20 March 1239: Pope Gregory IX: Letter of Excommunication
- 7 April 1239: Frederick II: Letter regarding his excommunication to the Council of Cardinals
- 7 April 1239: Pope Gregory IX: Encyclical that reiterates reasons for excommunication
- 20 April 1239: Frederick II: Encyclical regarding his excommunication to several European princes
- 21 May 1239: Gregory IX: Ex maria
- Soon after 21 May 1239: Frederick II: Reply to Ex maria
- Soon after 21 May 1239: Second version of Frederick's reply to Ex maria (Graefe suspects the longer version to be a "Stilübung"; the second might have been sent out to the cardinals)
- October 1239: Frederick II: Letter to King Henry III of England
- 29 October 1239: Frederick II: Letter to the English barons

### 1240

- Summer 1240: Encyclical by Frederick against Gregory IX and the Lombards
- June 1240: Frederick II: Letter to Conrad IV
- Summer 1240: Ecclesiastical author close to the imperial court: polemical, anti-papal pamphlet
- 9 August 1240: Gregory IX: Invitation to ecclesiastical and secular princes to General Council in Rome on 31 March 1241
- Shortly after 9 August 1240: Frederick II: Letter of protest of the General Council to bishop of Ostia
- Shortly after 9 August 1240: Frederick II: Letter in protest of the General Council to King Henry III of England
- Shortly after 9 August 1240: Frederick II: Letter in protest of the General Council to King Louis IX of France
- Shortly after 9 August 1240: Frederick II: Letters in protest of the General Council to German princes
- Shortly after 9 August 1240: Frederick II: Pamphlet ordering his subjects to prevent participants of the Council from travelling to Rome
- Shortly before autumn 1240: Frederick II: Encyclical to King Henry III of England to not let English prelates leave the country
- Autumn 1240: Frederick II: Encyclical to those who are loyal to him
- 15 October 1240: Gregory IX: Invitation to ecclesiastical and secular princes to General Council in Rome on 31 March 1241
- After 6 December 1240 or early 1241: Ecclesiastical author: Pamphlet from French cleric who warns about the dangers of travelling by ship to the council

### 1241

- 27 February 1241: Frederick II: letter to the Dominican chapter in Paris
- 18 May 1241: Frederick II: letter to King Henry III of England, reporting the "happy news" of the sea battle on 3 May 1241 in which he took as prisoners prelates on their way to the council
- 22 August 1241: Death Gregory IX

### **1241-1243**

- Sede vacante
- Frederick II: Reprimanding letter to cardinals to hasten the election of a new pope
- After July 1242 or June 1243: Roman cleric: Pamphlet against cardinals
- 25 June 1243: Election of Innocent IV

### **1244**

- 10 March 1244: Continuation of Peace negotiations in Acquapendente (central Italy)
- 12 March: Frederick II: Full power to Pietro della Vigna and Thaddeus of Suessa to negotiate and make peace between the pope and Emperor
- 28 March 1244: Frederick II: Full power to Pietro Della Vigna and Thaddeus de Suessa to finish negotiations and make peace with Innocent IV according to points described
- 28 March 1244: Frederick II: Full power to Raymond of Toulouse, Pietro della Vigna, and Thaddeus of Suessa to swear an oath of peace between the pope and emperor
- 31 March 1244: Frederick II: Full power to make the oath to Pietro and Thaddeus
- 31 March 1244: Frederick II: Letter to Conrad IV that negotiations 10-31 March 1244 finished and that they swore his subjugation under the rule of the church
- 31 March 1244: Oath of peace sworn and directly broken again by warfare
- 5 April 1244: Frederick II: Renewed negotiations on how to implement peace

### **1245**

- April 1245: Innocent IV: Pamphlet *Apsidis Ova* to caution Gertrude, potential wife of Frederick II, not to marry him. This pamphlet was also sent to Lyon and was used as guideline to lead the discussion at the general council
- 30 April 1245: Innocent IV: Pamphlet
- Between May and June 1245: Cardinal Rainer of Viterbo: Letter addressed to the members of the council, especially Emperor Balduin of Constantinople and Patriarch Nikolaus of Constantinople
- 25 June 1245: Innocent IV: Pamphlet
- Just before 28 June 1245: Innocent IV: *Afusa est mater*, third pamphlet against Frederick II
- Just before 28 June 1245: Innocent IV: *Juxta vaticanum*, list of Frederick II's crimes
- Just before 28 June 1245: Innocent IV: Additional list of Frederick II's crimes at beginning of Council of Lyon
- 17 July 1245: Innocent IV: Letter of Deposition, *Ad Apostolicae Dignitatis Apicem*
- 31 July 1245: Frederick II: Manifesto against his deposition to King Henry III of England
- Late July or early August 1245: Frederick II: Manifesto against his deposition to King Louis IX of France
- 5 August 1245: Frederick II: Manifesto against his deposition to King Wenceslaus of Bohemia
- Later in 1245: Frederick II: Manifesto against his deposition to the people of France

### **1246**

- February 1246: Frederick II: *Illos felices*, encyclical suggesting Church reform with milder political programme than in 1239
- Spring 1246: Innocent IV: Reply to Frederick II's *Etsi causae nostrae*
- May 1246: Frederick II: Encyclical warning "princes of Europe" that if Pope Innocent IV deposed him, he might do the same to them
- Between May and June 1246: Innocent IV: Manifesto
- December 1246: Frederick II: Letter to King Louis IX of France against his deposition concerning French anti-clerical baron league

- December 1246: Innocent IV: Letter to King Louis IX of France defending Frederick II's deposition with regards to implications for French anti-clerical baron league

**1247**

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**1248**

- May 1248: Frederick II: Letter stating that he stops his attempts to make peace and will only accept peace if offered

**1249**

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**1250**

- Statutes of French anti-clerical league are strongly influenced by Frederick II's manifesto *Illos felice*

- May 1250: Frederick II: Last encyclical

### 3.) Henry Raspe's military campaigns in Germany, 1246-7

<b>Military activity by Henry Raspe in Germany 1246-7</b>	
22 May 1246	Election at Veitshöchheim
5 August 1246	Battle outside city of Frankfurt
December 1246	Siege of city of Nuremberg (duchy of Bavaria)
January 1247	Campaign in duchy of Swabia
January 1247	Campaign in duchy of Bavaria
Late January 1247	Siege of city of Ulm (duchy of Swabia)
16 February 1247	Death on Wartburg castle

#### 4.) William of Holland's military campaigns in Germany, 1247-51

<b>Military activity by William of Holland in Germany 1247-51</b>	
3 October 1247	Election at Worringen
December 1247 - January 1248	Kaiserswerth palace
April - December 1248	Kaiserswerth palace
April - October 1248	Aachen city
February 1249	Boppard palace and city
February - March 1249	Ingelheim palace
July 1249	Sachsenhausen village, en route to Frankfurt
October 1249	Boppard palace and city
June - July 1250	Boppard palace and city
July 1250	Oppenheim, Bechtoldsheim Osthofen and Westhofen villages
August 1250	Mainz city (refuge)
October 1250	Gelnhausen palace
March 1251	Oppenheim
August 1251	Boppard palace and city
October 1251	Wetterau (duchy of Swabia)
October - November 1251	Departure of Conrad IV from Germany

Note: The chart lists William of Holland's military actions; he was not always present for their whole duration.

## 5.) The military activities by the archbishop of Cologne, 1246-51

<b>Military activity by Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, 1246-51</b>	
20 July 1246	Alliance with his brother-in-law Adolf, son of duke of Limburg, against Conrad IV
5 August 1246	Battle of Frankfurt
3 October 1247	After William of Holland's election, promises to assist him with men and resources in a treaty
March 1248	Archbishop Conrad allies himself with Bishop Engelbert of Osnabrück against anyone between Rhine and Weser
September - October 1248	Thurant castle
April - October 1248	Siege of Aachen
19 April 1249	Alliance with Duke Walram of Limburg, against everyone (incl William of Holland)
July 1249	Sachsenhausen village, en route to Frankfurt
13 August 1249	Ringsheim fortress
October 1249	Boppard palace and city
July 1250	Oppenheim, Bechtoldsheim Osthofen and Westhofen villages
October 1251	Probably Wetterau (duchy of Swabia)

## 6.) The military activities by the archbishops of Mainz, 1246-51

<b>Military activity by Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz, 1246-9</b>	
5 August 1246	Battle of Frankfurt
February - September 1247	Archbishop Siegfried 's men clashed with those of Duke Otto of Bavaria at Wallhausen (duchy of Bavaria)
3 October 1247	After William of Holland's election, promises to assist him with men and resources in a treaty
December 1247 - January 1248 / April - December 1248	Perhaps Kaiserswerth palace ?
1 April 1248	Bundle of measures from incorporated papal mandate to fight thieves, arsonists, and other criminals in archdiocese of Mainz; perhaps connected to crusade ?
April - October 1248	Siege of Aachen
October 1248	Nördlingen
February - March 1249	Ingelheim palace
<b>Military activity by Archbishop Christian of Mainz, 1249-51</b>	
October 1249	Boppard palace and city
July 1250	Oppenheim, Bechtoldsheim Osthofen and Westhofen villages
August 1250	Mainz city (refuge)
March 1251	Perhaps Oppenheim ?
<b>Military activity by Archbishop Gerhard of Mainz, 1251</b>	
1-14 August 1251	Kriegsheim village
14 August 1251	Archbishop Gerhard's men destroy Pfeddersheim village
October 1251	Probably Wetterau (duchy of Swabia)

## 7.) The military activities by the archbishop of Trier, 1246-51

<b>Military activity by Archbishop Arnold of Trier 1246-51</b>	
5 August 1246	Probably Battle of Frankfurt
September 1246	Thurant castle
13 April 1247	Thurant castle
3 October 1247	After William of Holland's election, promises to assist him with men and resources in a treaty
May 1248	Kaiserswerth palace
September - November 1248	Thurant castle
April - October 1248	Siege of Aachen
July 1249	Sachsenhausen village, en route to Frankfurt
September 1249	Hosts William of Holland at Ehrenbrechtstein and Mantobur castle to assemble army
October 1249	Boppard palace and city
July 1250	Oppenheim, Bechtoldsheim Osthofen and Westhofen villages
March 1251	Oppenheim
October 1251	Probably Wetterau (duchy of Swabia)

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### **Unpublished Thesis**

Hardy, D., *Associative political culture in the Holy Roman Empire: the Upper Rhine, c.1350-1500* (Unpublished DPhil Oxford, 2015).

## Image

### Tombstone Effigy of Archbishop Siegfried of Mainz (1195-1249)



(Source: <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5d/Siegfried3.jpg> Last accessed on 25 October 2020).

## Maps

### 1246 – 16 February 1247: Locations Henry Raspe & Conrad IV



#### Henry Raspe (blue):

Forchheim  
Frankfurt  
Kolitzheim  
Mainz

Nuremberg  
Schmalkalden  
Ulm  
Veitshöchheim

Wartburg Castle  
Würzburg  
Zeilitzheim  
Bavaria

#### Conrad IV (red):

Aachen  
Augsburg  
Breisach  
Esslingen  
Forchheim  
Frankfurt  
Frohburg

Gmund am Tegernsee  
Halle (Saale)  
Neresheim Monastery  
Nuremberg  
Rotenburg an der Fulda  
Schaffhausen  
Speyer

Trifels Castle  
Ulm  
Outside Ulm  
Alsace  
Bavaria  
Swabia

## 16 February – 31 December 1247: Locations William of Holland & Conrad IV




### **William of Holland (black):**

Andernach  
Cologne  
Düsseldorf-Kaiserswerth  
Neuss  
Bavaria

### **Conrad IV (red):**

Esslingen  
Neresheim Monastery  
Swabia  
Parma

**1248: Locations William of Holland & Conrad IV**



**William of Holland (black):**

Aachen  
 Outside Aachen  
 Bruges  
 Cologne  
 Düsseldorf-Kaiserswerth  
 Duvenee

Haarlem  
 Herzogenrath  
 Ingelheim am Rhein  
 Leuven  
 Middelburg  
 Nijmegen

Rijnsburg  
 The Hague  
 Utrecht  
 Wartburg Castle  
 Zierikzee

**Conrad IV (red):**

Aachen  
 Augsburg  
 Nördlingen  
 Parma

**1249: Locations William of Holland & Conrad IV**



**William of Holland (black):**

Andernach	Ingelheim am Rhein	Salzgitter-Ringelheim
Boppard	Koblenz	's-Gravenzande
Cologne	Mainz	The Hague
Düsseldorf-Kaiserswerth	Nassau	Trechttingshausen
Eberbach	Neuss	Utrecht
Frankfurt	Sachsenhausen	Wenden

**Conrad IV (red):**

Hagenau  
 Halle (Saale)  
 Neresheim Monastery  
 Nuremberg  
 Near Worms

## 1250: Locations William of Holland & Conrad IV



### William of Holland (black):

Aachen  
 Antwerp  
 Bechtolsheim  
 Bertoldsheim  
 Outside Boppard  
 Brussels  
 Diest

Diest  
 Dordrecht  
 Gelnhausen  
 Koblenz  
 Kreuzkapelle  
 Leuven  
 Liège

Mainz  
 Middelburg  
 Mons  
 The Hague  
 Utrecht  
 Zierikzee

### Conrad IV (red):

(Alteberstein)  
 Augsburg  
 Around Boppard  
 Dienheim  
 Dahlheim  
 Dalheim Monastery  
 Deidesheim

Ebersteinburg  
 Elsach  
 Flonheim  
 Heiligenkreuz  
 Heppenheim  
 Mainz  
 Mauchenheim

Nördlingen  
 (Nieder-)Olm  
 Oppenheim  
 Regensburg  
 St Emmeram's Monastery

## 1251: Locations William of Holland & Conrad IV



### William of Holland (black):

Antwerp  
 Argentine  
 Arnhem  
 Between Lyon and  
 Salins-les-Bains  
 Bingen  
 Boppard  
 Outside Boppard  
 Cologne

Ehrenbreitstein  
 Friedberg  
 Ingelheim am Rhein  
 Lorraine  
 Lyon  
 Mainz  
 Middelburg  
 Neuss  
 Oppenheim

Pleizenhausen  
 Salins-les-Bains  
 Strasbourg  
 Trier  
 Utrecht  
 Wetteraukreis  
 Wiesbaden  
 Worms  
 Outside Worms (Neuer)


**Conrad IV (red):**

Aachen  
Augsburg  
Cham  
Cremona  
Goito  
Hagenau  
Halle (Saale)  
Kriegsheim  
Lachen

Lignano  
Lonigo  
Munich  
Nuremberg  
Oppenheim  
Near Oppenheim  
Piran  
Pola  
Pordenone

Porto  
Regensburg  
Rotenburg an der Fulda  
Speyer  
Split  
Verona  
Vicenza  
Outside Weissenburg  
Worms

## 1246-51: Locations Dominican & Franciscan Convents



### Dominican Convents (red):

Antwerp	Friesach	Neuruppin
Augsburg	Gdańsk	Ptuj
Basel	Halberstadt	Regensburg
Bolesławiec	Hamburg	Riga
Bremen	Hildesheim	Soest
Cammin	Koblenz	Stralsund
Chełmno	Konstanz	Strasbourg
Cologne	Krems an der Donau	Trier
Eisenach	Leeuwarden	Utrecht
Elblag	Leipzig	Vienna
Erfurt	Leuven	Worms
Frankfurt	Lübeck	Wrocław
Freiberg	Magdeburg	Würzburg
Freiburg im Breisgau	Minden	Zürich

**Franciscan Convents (blue):**

Aachen	Graz	Oberwesel
Altenburg	Greifswald	Oschatz
Andernach	Halberstadt	Paderborn
Arnstadt	Halle (Saale)	Parchim
Augsburg	Hamburg	Regensburg
Basel	Hildesheim	Riga
Bautzen	Hofgeismar	Rostock
Berlin	Kiel	Schwäbisch Hall
Bolzano	Koblenz	Schwerin
Bremen	Konstanz	Speyer
Brixen	Ljubljana	Stade
Brunswick	Lübeck	Strasbourg
Brussels	Lüneburg	Świdnica
Cologne	Magdeburg	Szczecin
Diest	Mainz	Torgau
Dordrecht	Marburg	Torun
Eisenach	Maribor	Trier
Erfurt	Mechelen	Ulm
Freiberg	Middelburg	Utrecht
Freiburg im Breisgau	Mühlhausen	Wolfsberg
Fritzlar	Neuss	Worms
Fulda	Nordhausen	Wrocław
Gelnhausen	Nördlingen	Würzburg
Goslar	Nuremberg	Zürich

All maps are based on charters and chronicles discussed in the chapter ‘Historiography, Sources, and Method.’