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The grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism

Abstract:

The supervenience argument against non-reductive moral realism threatens to rule out the existence of irreducibly normative properties by establishing that for every normative property there is a corresponding non-normative property that is necessarily co-extensive with it. This paper first considers but rejects the suggestion that one can address the supervenience argument by insisting that normative properties only supervene with normative but not metaphysical necessity. It then establishes...

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Publication status:
In press
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Host title:
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Publication date:
2016-10-01
Acceptance date:
2016-10-02
Pubs id:
pubs:655581
UUID:
uuid:8fca61ec-4387-4d2e-ace1-fcad3fd2f781
Local pid:
pubs:655581
Source identifiers:
655581
Deposit date:
2016-10-28

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