Experiences of Exile in Early Modern Europe: The Palatine Family and the Thirty Years' War, 1632-48

Thomas Pert

Lincoln College

University of Oxford

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Abstract: 'Experiences of Exile in Early Modern Europe: The Palatine Family and the Thirty Years' War, 1632-1648'

This thesis examines the experience of exiled royal and noble dynasties in the early modern period through a study of the electoral Palatine family during the mid-seventeenth century. My research primarily assesses how political exiles formulated and pursued strategies for their restoration during the tumultuous period of the Thirty Years' War and British Civil Wars, a time when the structure of European politics was shifting towards clearly defined sovereign states and dispossessed regimes faced the very real threat of permanent exclusion from their lands and titles. The thesis utilises a wide spectrum of archival materials, ranging from financial records, printed manifestos and pamphlets, and vast quantities of diplomatic and personal correspondence, to consider not only the resources available to the Palatine exiles, but also the ways in which they were employed in attempts to further their cause. Accordingly, the thesis will assess the extent to which exiled regimes had autonomy over the actions they pursued, or whether they were simply pawns in the machinations of more powerful nations.

The Palatine branch of the Wittelsbach family is an ideal case study, allowing the thesis to address broader issues of early modern statehood as central themes, such as notions of sovereignty and legitimacy. As an hereditary dynasty within the Holy Roman Empire, the Palatine family not only faced the struggle to reclaim lost lands and title common to every exiled power, but any restoration depended on the approval of the Emperor. The thesis examines the way in which exiled rulers attempted to obtain recognition of the legitimacy of their cause and their claims to sovereignty through writings and display. In doing so, this work will contribute to the debate regarding the importance of ceremony in the high

politics of early modern Europe by building on the work of Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger on the ceremonial display of the Holy Roman Empire.

This work addresses the factors which could prevent another power recognising an exiled ruler's claims to specific titles and territories, assessing whether legitimacy was very much in the eye of the beholder in early modern Europe. Another key theme of the thesis is the issue of 'dynasticism'. In particular, the work will assess the strength of dynastic connections between various ruling dynasties versus individual political circumstances and objectives, and determine how valuable and reliable such ties, such as the close familial bond between the Palatine family and the Stuart court, were for exiled royal and noble families. By demonstrating the considerable importance placed on familial connections by early modern exiles and their contemporaries, and how such concerns influenced the decision-making of powerful states, this thesis will show that dispossessed rulers and regimes remained an important fixture on the political stage. Although the Palatine family were deprived of their hereditary lands and titles at the start of the Thirty Years' War, the 'Palatine Question' remained one of the most divisive and important issues of the conflict, as well as in the Westphalian peace negotiations.

The timeframe covered by the thesis is often overlooked in the scholarship of the Palatine family in exile, which tends to span the period from the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 to the death of Frederick V, Elector Palatine, in 1632. The thesis covers the often-ignored period between Frederick's death and the eventual restoration of the Palatine family under the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This timeframe deserves greater scholarly attention as it witnessed independent Palatine military operations, the intervention of Frederick's children on both sides of the English Civil War, and the family's considerable

diplomatic endeavours throughout the 1630s and 1640s, including their involvement in the peace negotiations at Westphalia. By examining the family's strategies to obtain military, financial, and diplomatic support for their restitution in this period, the thesis will make a valuable contribution to the study of the Palatine family as an exiled regime, whilst also filling the historiographical gap between 1632 and 1648.

The first half of the thesis is thematic, addressing the wider topics of the various forms of capital available to exiled houses and their abilities to formulate independent policies. In doing so, the research will tie into the literature on other exiled dynasties of the early modern period, such as the work of Geoffrey Smith and Edward Corp on the Stuart exiles of the mid- and late-seventeenth century, and draw conclusions about the relative importance of military, financial, and dynastic 'capital' for exiled regimes. The first chapter will examine the broad policy objectives of the Palatine family between 1632 and 1648, as well as assessing any terms and offers which they refused during their exile, and the difficulties faced by exiles attempting to obtain recognition of their sovereignty and the legitimacy of their claims to specific lands and titles. This chapter also identifies the key figures who dominated and directed the Palatine family's policy in this period. As Elizabeth of Bohemia played an instrumental role in directing Palatine policy in the 1630s, the thesis will also contribute to the growing scholarship on exiled women and their ability to exercise political influence and engage in diplomacy in early modern Europe, such as Tryntje Helfferich's recent biography of Amalia Elisabeth of Hessen-Kassel and Toby Osborne's work on Marie de Medici. The second chapter examines the resources and forms of 'capital' available to the Palatine family, and exiled dynasties in general, broadly categorised as military, financial, and dynastic capital. The chapter discusses the extent to which the Palatines had access to each form of capital and the relative significance of each

in assisting exiled regimes to recover their lost lands and titles. In particular, this chapter addresses the question of dynasticism by assessing the strength of familial connections between different royal houses and ruling dynasties in comparison to individual political considerations.

The second part of the thesis will adopt a chronological approach in its examination of the strategies pursued by the Palatine family between 1632 and 1648. The shift from a thematic to chronological approach will better convey the changing circumstances facing the Palatine family during the 1630s and 1640s, in the light of the political and military developments in the Thirty Years' War and the outbreak of the English Civil War. The third chapter assesses the strategies pursued by the Palatine family between 1632 and 1642, and is divided into three chronological sections which reflect the changing military and political situation facing the Palatine exiles during this period and how they amended their strategies accordingly. This chapter will also examine the extent to which the Palatines were able to exercise autonomy in the military and political strategies they pursued in the latter half of their exile. In particular, this section will consider how the Palatine family attempted to capitalise on their dynastic connections and promote their claims to electoral status in the face of issues of diplomatic recognition for exiled regimes, financial privation, the military and political burdens and necessities of war, as well as the rigid hierarchy and traditions of the Holy Roman Empire. This will also allow an assessment of the extent to which the Palatine family were the authors of their own continued misfortune between 1632-48 or whether they were victims of constantly worsening circumstances.

The fourth chapter will examine the involvement of the Palatine family in the British Civil Wars between 1642 and 1649. As Frederick's heir, Charles Louis, spent much of the 1630s and 1640s in England, and his younger brothers Rupert and Maurice served as generals in the royalist army during the English Civil War, this section will also complement the work of Ian Roy and Steve Murdoch by helping to place the British conflicts in the wider context of Europe during the Thirty Years' War. This will also allow the thesis to engage with the topic of English foreign policy during the late-1630s and early-1640s. This chapter will consider the question of why Charles Louis arrived in England in June 1644 and sided with parliament, placing his actions in a broader geo-political context. In doing so, this chapter will challenge the prevailing scholarly assertion that the young prince's allegiance was dictated by a pre-existing political and religious affinity with parliament. The chapter will also address Charles Louis's actions in England during and after the first Civil War, demonstrating that he was primarily occupied with obtaining military and diplomatic support for the Palatine cause on the continent. This chapter will also provide an insight into the extent of interest in – and support for – the Palatine cause in England in the Civil War period, providing a useful study of how support for an exiled regime from even their most loyal supporters could dwindle over time.

The fifth chapter addresses the Palatines' participation in the Westphalian peace negotiations between 1645-48, a topic which has been greatly overlooked in studies of both the Palatine family and the Peace of Westphalia. The chapter highlights the difficulties faced by the Palatine exiles in obtaining recognition at the peace congress and the ways in which they attempted to gain influence and support for their cause at the negotiations. The final section will examine the final peace terms, the Palatine family's reaction to the discussions and articles which facilitated their partial restoration, and

provide a long-overdue reassessment of the traditional view of the Peace of Westphalia as a failure for the Palatine dynasty. The final chapter of the thesis examines the post-restoration Palatinate. The vast majority of literature on exiled dynasties views an eventual restitution as a victory and tends not to address the difficulties faced by restored rulers. This chapter will consider the state of the Palatinate after the Thirty Years' War and demonstrate how many of the issues supposedly resolved by the Peace of Westphalia continued into the 1650s. In addition, the chapter will address how these unresolved issues and the legacy of the Thirty Years' War influenced Charles Louis's policies as a newly-restored elector, and their impact upon the Palatine family as a whole.

The sixth chapter will also comment upon the role-reversal of the Palatine and Stuart families, as the latter were forced into exile from Britain whilst their Palatine cousins recovered lands and titles on the continent. Accordingly, the chapter will examine the extent to which Charles Louis was willing and able to support his newly-exiled relatives, providing another insight into the thesis's key theme of dynasticism. This section leads into the overall conclusion of the thesis, which draws together the main themes of the work to assess whether the eventual restoration of the Palatine family can be viewed as a 'victory', and the extent to which their experiences were reflective of those of other exiled dynasties and rulers during the seventeenth century.

Abstract: 'Experiences of Exile in Early Modern Europe: The Palatine Family and the Thirty Years' War, 1632-1648'

This thesis examines the experience of exiled royal and noble dynasties during the early modern period through a study of the electoral Palatine family during the mid-seventeenth century. By utilising a wide range of archival materials, including financial records, printed manifestos, and considerable quantities of diplomatic and personal correspondence, the work will examine the resources available to the Palatine exiles, as well as the ways in which they were employed in attempts to recover the lands and titles lost by elector Frederick V in the opening years of the Thirty Years' War. In particular, the emphasis placed on conspicuous display and diplomatic recognition by contemporaries allows the work to comment on the important interplay of the ceremonial and the political in seventeenth-century Europe. The thesis not only contributes to the growing scholarship on exiled peoples in the early modern era, but also the Thirty Years' War in general, as it covers the years between 1632 and 1648, a period which is greatly understudied in examinations of both the Palatine family and the European conflict.

By studying the experiences of exiled elites in early modern Europe, this work will also reveal the interplay of dynastic and political considerations in the high politics of the period. By assessing the belief of both exiled regimes and their extended family in the obligations produced by familial ties, and the subsequent impact this had on the policy-making of powerful European states, the thesis will demonstrate that dispossessed rulers and houses were not automatically rendered politically insignificant after losing their lands and titles. Although the Palatine family were driven into exile at the start of the Thirty

Years' War, the 'Palatine Question' remained one of the most divisive and important issues of the conflict, as well as in the Westphalian peace negotiations.

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A Note on Form

The anglicised forms of the names of the immediate electoral Palatine family members are used throughout this thesis, and other individuals are identified in the text using the names and titles by which they are best known in the English-language scholarship. Otherwise, this thesis uses the original German- or Dutch-language spelling for individuals' names. Place names are also given in the form most commonly used in English-language writing.

A Note on Currencies

This thesis makes reference to and uses the following units of currency: Dutch Guilder (florin), the English pound sterling, the French Livre Tournois (franc), and German Gulden (florin), and the imperial Reichstaler.[1]

The rates of exchange of the Guilder, Gulden and Reichstaler to the English Pound remained largely constant, throughout the period 1632-48. Accordingly, the thesis uses the following exchange rates:

Currency	Equivalent
Pound Sterling	11 Dutch Guilder
	4.44 Reichstaler
	6.66 German Gulden

[1] All information for values and exchange rates is taken from J.J. McCusker, *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775* (London, 1978), pp.44, 52-3, 63, 69-70, 88-9.

Dutch Guilder	0.09 Pound Sterling
	0.4 Reichstaler
	0.6 German Gulden
German Gulden	0.15 Pound Sterling
	1.67 Dutch Guilder
	0.67 Reichstaler
Reichstaler	0.225 Pound Sterling
	2.5 Dutch Guilder
	1.5 German Gulden

In contrast, the value of the French coinage weakened against the Pound as the conflict progressed. The thesis therefore uses the following exchange rates:

1 Pound Sterling	10 Livre Tournois (1624-31)
	11 Livre Tournois (1632-36)
	13 Livre Tournois (1637-46)

List of Abbreviations

Add MS	British Library, London: Additional Manuscripts.
Akkerman	N. Akkerman (ed.), *The correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia* (3 vols., Oxford, 2011-Present).
APW	*Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, gen. ed. K. Repgen (48 volumes in 3 series, Münster, 1961-Present).
BL	British Library, London.
Bod.	Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Bromley	G. Bromley (ed.), *A collection of original royal letters* (London, 1787).
CJ	*Journal of the House of Commons.*
Clm	Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich: Collectio Camerariana, 10381.
CSPD	*Calendar of States Papers, Domestic Series.*
CSPV	*Calendar of State Papers, Venice.*
EHR	*English Historical Review.*
Golden Bull	J. Nutt (ed.), *The golden bull; being the great charter of the Empire. Or, the liberties and immunities granted to the Empire, and all the members of it, by the Emperor Charles IV. in the year 1356.* (London, 1705).
Green	M.A.E. Green, *Elizabeth, Electress Palatine and Queen of Bohemia*, ed. S.C. Lomas (London, 1909).
Hartlib	Sheffield University Library, Sheffield: Special Collections: Hartlib Papers [MS 61].

Hauck	K. Hauck, *Karl Ludwig, Kurfürst von der Pfalz (1617-1680)* (Leipzig, 1903).
Häusser	L. Häusser, *Geschichte der Rheinischen Pfalz nach ihrem politischen, kirchlichen und literarischen Verhältnissen* (2 vols., Heidelberg, 1856).
HJ	*Historical Journal.*
IHR	*International History Review.*
IPM	Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriense (Peace of Münster).
IPO	Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugense (Peace of Osnabrück).
Knowler	W. Knowler (ed.), *The Earl of Strafforde's letters and dispatches* (2 vols., London, 1739).
LJ	*Journal of the House of Lords.*
Loomie	A.J. Loomie (ed.), *Ceremonies of Charles I: The Note Books of John Finet Master of Ceremonies, 1628-1641* (New York, 1987).
Manifest	Charles Louis, Elector Palatine, *The manifest of the most illustrious, and soveraigne prince, Charles Lodowick, Count Palatine of the Rhine, Prince Electour of the sacred Empire: Duke of Bavaria &c…*(London, 1637). [Unpaginated].
Messinger	S. Messinger, *Die Übertragung der pfälzischen Kurwürde auf das Herzogtum Bayern: Rechtliche, zeremonielle und politische Probleme* (Berlin, 2015).
Mout	N. Mout, 'Der Winterkönig im Exil: Friedrich V. von der Pfalz und die niederländischen Generalstaaten 1621-1632', *ZHF*, 15/3 (1988), 257-72.

'Notebook'	Theobald Maurice, 'Notebook', Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Geheimes Hausarchiv, Munich, MS Korrespondenzakten 1022 1/2, 1638.
Oman	C. Oman, *Elizabeth of Bohemia* (London, 1938).
P&P	*Past & Present*.
Palæstine	J.J. von Rusdorf, *The evaporation of the apple of Palæstine: that is, The sifting of the answeres and rescripts, lately given, in the cause of the restitution of the Palatinate…*(London, 1637) [Unpaginated] [ESTC: S102687].
Parker	G. Parker (ed.), *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1987).
Protestation	Charles Louis, Elector Palatine, *A protestation of the most high and mighty Prince Charles Lodowicke, Count Palatine of the Rhine, archidapifer, and prince elector of the sacred empire, Duke of Bavaria*, &c…(London, 1637) [ESTC: S4582].
Pursell	B. Pursell, *The Winter King: Frederick V of the Palatinate and the Coming of the Thirty Years' War* (Aldershot, 2003).
Schaab	M. Schaab, *Geschichte der Kurpfalz* (2 vols., Stuttgart, 1988-92).
Sourcebook	P.H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook* (Basingstoke, 2010).
SP 16	The National Archives, Kew: State Papers Domestic: Charles I.
SP 80	The National Archives, Kew: State Papers Foreign: Holy Roman Empire.
SP 81	The National Archives, Kew: State Papers Foreign: German States.
SP 84	The National Archives, Kew: State Papers Foreign: Holland.

Steiner	J. Steiner, *Die pfälzische Kurwürde während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges (1618-1648)* (Speyer, 1985).
Thomas	A.L. Thomas, *A House Divided: Wittelsbach Confessional Court Cultures in the Holy Roman Empire, c.1550-1650* (Leiden, 2010)
Thurloe	T. Birch (ed.), *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe* (7 vols., London, 1742).
TNA	The National Archives, Kew.
Tragedy	P.H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: A New History of the Thirty Years War* (London, 2009).
TS 23/1	The National Archives, Kew: Treasury Solicitor: Miscellanea: Copies of Royal Letters, 1636 to 1666.
Warburton	E.G. Warburton (ed.), *Memoirs of prince Rupert and the Cavaliers including their private correspondence* (3 vols., London, 1849).
Wendland	A. Wendland (ed.), *Briefe der Elisabeth Stuart, Königin von Böhmen, an ihren Sohn, den Kurfürsten Carl Ludwig von der Pfalz: 1650-1662* (Tübingen, 1902).
ZGO	*Zeitschrift der Geschichte des Oberrheins.*
ZHF	*Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung.*

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Introduction

In April 1621, Elector Frederick V of the Palatinate, together with his wife, Princess Elizabeth of England and Scotland, and a train of approximately 2,000 servants and followers, arrived in The Hague at the invitation of the Prince of Orange. They established a court-in-exile which would act as a base of operations for the dispossessed 'Palatine family' for almost three decades. The couple had fled Frederick's recently-acquired kingdom of Bohemia after his defeat by a combined Imperial-Bavarian army at the Battle of White Mountain the previous November, ending a reign of scarcely one year and earning the elector the mocking sobriquet of the 'Winter King'. Frederick's ancestral lands in Germany had also been invaded by Bavarian, Imperial, and Spanish forces, and he had been placed under the Imperial Ban and formally declared an outlaw by Emperor Ferdinand II in January 1621 for accepting the Bohemian throne in 1619, to which Ferdinand himself had been elected in 1617. Frederick's central role in the opening years of the Thirty Years' War led many contemporaries to blame him for the development of a relatively-localised rebellion into a Europe-wide war, which would ultimately last three decades and be the most destructive conflict in the history of the continent.

The capture of Heidelberg, the capital city of the electorate, in late-1622 heralded the ultimate fall of the Palatinate, and Ferdinand formally bestowed Frederick's electoral title and the vast majority of his territories upon Duke Maximilian of Bavaria in February 1623, with the remaining lands being distributed amongst the Emperor's supporters. The Palatine family were thus relegated from the highest ranks of the Imperial aristocracy to the status of penniless outlaws, dependent on the support of their extended family and well-wishers. The fate of the Palatine electoral title and lands, commonly referred to as the 'Palatine Question' or *Pfalzfrage*, would prove to be one of the most divisive issues of the

entire Thirty Years' War. This thesis will examine the much-overlooked period of the Palatine family's exile between Frederick's death in November 1632, and the partial restoration of his son, Charles Louis, under the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

The study of exiled ruling dynasties and elites in early modern Europe is hardly an original field of historical research, as evidenced by the wealth of scholarship on the plight of the Stuarts during the 1650s and after 1688.[1] The Palatine family has also received considerable scholarly attention through biographies of central figures.[2] However, previous scholars have neglected the period between Frederick's death and the Peace of Westphalia, which was one of remarkable activity for the Palatine exiles. It witnessed the only independent military venture mounted by the family after 1622, as well as a wide range of strategies to secure valuable diplomatic and financial support for Charles Louis's restoration. However, as an analysis of the experiences of the ruling house of the Electorate of the Palatinate between 1632 and 1648, this thesis is not simply filling a gap within the broad scholarship of one of the many ruling dynasties or elite figures who were forced from their ancestral lands and deprived of prestigious titles in the seventeenth century. It also provides a valuable insight into a number of topics relating to the subject of exile as well as notions of sovereignty in early modern Europe which have rarely been studied in the context of exiled rulers.

Themes

[1] In addition to other items cited in this introduction see G. Smith, *Cavaliers in Exile, 1640-1660* (Basingstoke, 2003); A. Keay, ''The Shadow of a King?': Aspects of the Exile of King Charles II', in P. Mansel and T. Riotte (eds.), *Monarchy and Exile: The Politics of Legitimacy from Marie de Médicis to Wilhelm II* (Basingstoke, 2011), pp.105-19; M.F. Williams, *The King's Irishmen: the Irish in the exiled court of Charles II, 1649-1660* (Woodbridge, 2014); P.K. Monod, *Jacobitism and the English People 1688-1788* (Cambridge, 1989).

[2] Examples include Pursell; Hauck; Oman; Green; V. Sellin, *Kurfürst Karl Ludwig von der Pfalz: Versuch eines historischen Urteils* (Mannheim, 1980) and P. Morrah, *Prince Rupert of the Rhine* (London, 1976).

This thesis primarily assesses how political exiles formulated and pursued strategies for their restoration during the period of the Thirty Years' War and British Civil Wars, a time when the structure of European politics was shifting towards clearly defined sovereign states and dispossessed regimes faced the threat of permanent exclusion from their lands and titles. The Palatine family are an ideal subject for such an assessment. A disputed royal status and familial connections to several European courts meant that their exile bore several similar characteristics to the experiences of regal exiles such as the Stuarts and Marie de Médici, especially in terms of the potential political and material support they could obtain from their royal kin and by virtue of their sovereign title. However, as the electoral title and lands had been bestowed on the Palatine family by an imperial decree in the fourteenth century, their authority was subordinate to that of the imperial crown and dependent on the approval of the Emperor. As a result, the difficulties faced by Charles Louis also make a useful comparison with those of the large number of fellow semi-sovereign rulers within the empire who were also forced into exile during the Thirty Years' War, such as the Landgraves of Hessen-Kassel, the Dukes of Mecklenburg, the dukes of Württemberg, and the Duke of Lorraine.

In addition to examining the exact nature of the situation of exiled regimes within the far-reaching diplomatic and familial networks of European elites, this thesis will also address the position and role played by other marginalised groups within dispossessed ruling dynasties. As Elizabeth played a dominant role in Palatine policy-making after 1632, an examination of women as leading figures in exiled houses will contribute to the broader scholarship on female agency in the early modern period. The seventeenth century is often viewed as a disappointing decrescendo for female political authority following the unprecedented number of women ruling in their own right the previous century. However,

a comparison of Elizabeth with her contemporary exiled 'widow regent' Amalie Elisabeth of Hessen-Kassel, as well as many other 'queen regents' of the period, will demonstrate that women were not denied political influence during the seventeenth century.

By being both 'sovereign' and 'subject', the experiences of the Palatine family allow a broader assessment of the experiences of exile in early modern Europe. In particular, this thesis shall examine the resources available to dispossessed regimes and individuals, and determine the extent to which exiled elites had autonomy over devising the strategies they pursued or whether they were simply powerless pawns in the machinations of more powerful states. Through a comparison of the Palatine family with other contemporary exiles, this study will assess which forms of capital were regarded as most useful for dispossessed elites and which strategies were regarded as the most effective for a dynasty seeking restoration. In addition, by studying the exiled Palatines' policy objectives and their willingness or refusal to compromise when presented with potential forms of restitution, the thesis will also examine the impact of less tangible considerations, such as prestige and public image, for dispossessed elites who were offered some manner of restoration to their lost lands and titles.

The example of the exiled Palatine family is also an ideal conduit into the broader topic of dynasticism in early modern Europe. As Charles Louis was related through blood and marriage to many royal, princely, and noble houses both within and outside the Holy Roman Empire, the Palatine family was arguably one of the most well-connected dynasties in Europe. This thesis will examine the strength of such familial connections and their role in allowing the Palatines to obtain financial, military, and diplomatic support for their restitution. An assessment of the usefulness of dynastic connections for a ruling family at

the nadir of their fortunes can provide a valuable insight into the limitations of such bonds on the geopolitical stage, as well as the pressure felt by contemporaries to assist their beleaguered kin in spite of their own political preferences and considerations. Conversely, the thesis will also examine the negative impact of dynasticism for exiled elites by considering the conflict within the wider Wittelsbach family between the electoral Palatine and Bavarian branches, as well as the line of Pfalz-Neuburg, for the lands and titles confiscated from Frederick in the early-1620s. Additionally, this thesis will assess the extent to which Charles Louis observed the implied obligations of familial loyalty accompanying ties of kinship in his own actions towards the Stuarts during the Civil War period and the Interregnum. By combining the topic of dynasticism with a study of dispossessed ruling houses and individuals, this thesis seeks to make a significant contribution to the growing scholarly understanding of exile in early modern Europe.

The existing literature on royal and noble exile in early modern Europe has been dominated by works on the Stuarts after 1688 by a large number of scholars including Edward Corp, Edward Gregg and Eveline Cruickshanks, who examined multiple aspects of the Jacobite cause and the experiences of the exiled Stuart courts in France and Italy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[3] However, as the work on exile in this period has drawn even greater scholarly attention in the last twenty years, there has emerged an increased understanding of the complexities and subtleties of the topic. Whilst the Stuarts remain the most famous and well-represented exiles in the scholarship on

[3] E.T. Corp (ed.), *The Stuart court in Rome: The Legacy of Exile* (Aldershot, 2003) and also his *A Court in Exile: the Stuarts in France, 1689-1718* (Cambridge, 2004) and *The Jacobites at Urbino: An Exiled Court in Transition* (Basingstoke, 2009); E. Gregg, 'The financial vicissitudes of James III in Rome', in E.T. Corp (ed.), *The Stuart Court in Rome*, and 'Monarchs Without a Crown', in R. Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and H.M. Scott (eds.) *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton* (Cambridge, 1997); E. Cruickshanks and E.T. Corp (eds.), *The Stuart court in exile and the Jacobites* (London, 1995); E. Cruickshanks and J. Black (eds.), *The Jacobite challenge* (Edinburgh, 1988).

dispossessed regimes in the early modern period, historians no longer simply focus on the experiences of ejected royal houses.[4] There has also been far greater interest in the writings of the 'vanquished', with the literary output of exiled individuals, especially women, being a particularly fertile ground for scholarly output to counter the histories written from a victor's perspective.[5]

The wealth of scholarship on English religious diaspora and French noble exiles in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has highlighted the several different types of exile ranging from internal banishment, expulsion abroad, voluntary withdrawal, and forced displacement, and how it could affect all strata of the social ladder.[6] As a study of exiles in the Thirty Years' War, however, this thesis predominantly focuses on rulers who were forced from their territories following military invasions by a rival power. More recent works have also explicitly highlighted the political significance of dispossessed rulers and elites within the wider political history of the period, such as Daniel Szechi's work on the Jacobites and their influence on French foreign policy in the early-eighteenth century.[7]

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[4] K. Gibbons, *English Catholic exiles in late sixteenth-century Paris* (Woodbridge, 2011); G.H. Janssen, *The Dutch Revolt and Catholic exile in Reformation Europe* (Cambridge, 2016); T.G. Fehler, G.G. Kroeker, C.H. Parker and J. Ray (eds.), *Religious Diaspora in Early Modern Europe: Strategies of Exile* (London, 2014); J. Spohnholz and G.K. Waite (eds.), *Exile and Religious Identity, 1500-1800* (London, 2014); A. Schunka, 'No Return? Temporary Exile and Permanent Immigration among Confessional Migrants in the Early Modern Era' and U. Niggemann, 'Inventing Immigrant Traditions in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Germany: The Huguenots in Context' both in J. Coy, J. Poley and A. Schunka (eds.), *Migrations in the German Lands, 1500-2000* (New York, 2016).

[5] See H. Chalmers, *Royalist Women Writers 1650-1689* (Oxford, 2004); P. Major (ed.), *Literatures of Exile in the English Revolution and its Aftermath 1640-1690* (Farnham, 2010) and his *Writings of exile in the English Revolution and Restoration* (Farnham, 2013); H.J. Helmers, *The Royalist Republic: Literature, Politics, and Religion in the Anglo-Dutch Public Sphere, 1639-1660* (Cambridge, 2015); S.J. Lee, *The discourse of exile in early modern English literature* (New York, 2018).

[6] C. D'Addario, *Exile and Journey in Seventeenth Century Literature* (London, 2007); K. Gibbons, 'No Home in Exile? Elizabethan Catholics in Paris' and M. Netzloff 'Catholic Exiles and the English State After the Gunpowder Plot' both in *Reformation*, 15/1 (2010); J. Swann, *Exile, Imprisonment, or Death: The Politics of Disgrace in Bourbon France, 1610-1789* (Oxford, 2017); J. Dewald, *Status, Power, and Identity in Early Modern France: The Rohan Family, 1550-1715* (University Park, PA., 2015); T. Osborne, "Chimeres, monopoles and stratagems': French Exiles in the Spanish Netherlands during the Thirty Years' War', *The Seventeenth Century,* 15 (2000) and his 'A Queen Mother in Exile: Marie de Médicis in the Spanish Netherlands and England, 1631-41', in Mansel and Riotte, *Monarchy and Exile*.

[7] D. Szechi, *The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788* (Manchester, 1994) and *Britain's lost revolution?: Jacobite Scotland and French grand strategy, 1701-8* (Manchester, 2015).

After all, an exile could also be an alternative ruler and so could become a focal point for political opposition, or an icon for a particular religious or ideological cause. Likewise, dynastic connections could provide exiles with potential sources of military, financial, and diplomatic support for their restitution, and familial ties to other royal and noble houses could also make dispossessed dynasties attractive marital or political allies for other powers. Accordingly, the study of exiles can provide a useful insight into the dynastic practices and patterns of early modern Europe.

The interplay of familial issues and matters of state in the early modern period has received considerable scholarly attention, ranging from Paula Sutter Fichtner's examinations of the limitations of dynasticism for the sixteenth-century Habsburgs, to explorations of the effectiveness of marriage as a political tool.[8] Whilst scholars agree that familial obligations often fell by the wayside when rulers were confronted with political realities, contemporary belief in the strength of kinship bonds through blood or marriage should not be underestimated. The importance of dynastic connections as a source of support was especially acute for exiled elites who often lacked sufficient independent military and financial to pursue their restoration. For example, Toby Osborne's article on Marie de Médici's exile in the Spanish Netherlands and England has shown how she expected financial support from her sons-in-law, Philip IV and Charles I.[9] Similarly, the

[8] P. Sutter Fichtner, *Ferdinand I of Austria: The Politics of Dynasticism in the Age of the Reformation* (New York, 1982), pp.259-61 and her articles 'Dynasticism and Its Limitations: The Habsburgs and Hungary, 1542', *East European Quarterly,* 4/4 (1971) and 'Dynastic Marriage in Sixteenth-Century Habsburg Diplomacy and Statecraft: An Interdisciplinary Approach', *American Historical Review,* 81 (1976); J.S. Morrill, 'Dynasties, Realms, Peoples and State Formation, 1500-1720', in R. von Friedeburg and J.S. Morrill (eds.), *Monarchy Transformed: Princes and their Elites in Early Modern Western Europe* (Cambridge, 2017); K.J. MacHardy, 'Cultural Capital, Family Strategies and Noble Identity in Early Modern Habsburg Austria, 1579-1620', *P&P,* 163 (1999); B.Y. Casalilla, 'Aristocratic Women across Borders, Cultural Transfers and Something More. Why Should We Care?', in J.L. Palos and M.S. Sánchez (eds.), *Early Modern Dynastic Marriages and Cultural Transfer* (Farnham, 2016), p.239; G. Delille, 'Kinship, Marriage, and Politics', in D.W. Sabean, S. Teuscher, and J. Mathieu (eds.), *Kinship in Europe: Approaches to Long Term Development (1300-1900)* (New York and Oxford, 2007).
[9] Osborne, 'Marie'.

significance of the creation of a distinct 'dynastic identity', which could be promoted by a ruler to assert their sovereignty and to inspire loyalty from their subjects, was particularly important to exiled regimes who often turned to ostentatious display and ceremony in their attempts to persuade potential supporters of the legitimacy of their claims.[10]

The thesis also addresses the political role of women in early modern Europe through an examination of Elizabeth of Bohemia's role in the exiled Palatine government. In doing so, it will correct the tendency to underestimate the extent to which women wielded political influence in the seventeenth century. The sixteenth century has been heralded by scholars as a watershed period in female political power, with numerous biographies of Mary I and Elizabeth I of England, and Mary Queen of Scots, as well as broad studies of female rule between 1500 and 1600 which ironically play on John Knox's 1558 criticism of the 'Monstrous Regiment of Women'.[11] In contrast, the existing literature tends to regard the subsequent hundred years as witnessing a 'poor showing' by the 'power-women' of the period.[12] Sharon Jansen claims that women disappeared from the political stage during the seventeenth century, citing the 1654 abdication of Christina of Sweden in favour of her cousin, the future Karl X Gustav, and lamenting the fact that Elizabeth I selected a male successor.[13] It is certainly true that fewer women sat on the thrones of Europe in the seventeenth century than in the previous hundred years. However, this did not mean that they had no political influence.

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[10] L. Geevers, 'The Nassau Orphans: The Disputed Legacy of William of Orange and the Construction of the Prince of Orange (1584-1675)', in L. Geevers and M. Marini (eds.), *Dynastic identity in early modern Europe: rulers, aristocrats and the formation of identities* (Farnham, 2015); P. Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* (London, 1992); Keay, 'Shadow'; E.T. Corp, 'The Extended Exile of James III' in Mansel and Riotte, *Monarchy and Exile*.

[11] See B. Millan, *Monstrous Regiment: Women Rulers in Men's Worlds* (Windsor, 1982); S.L. Jansen, *The Monstrous Regiment of Women: Female Rulers in Early Modern Europe* (Basingstoke, 2002); H. Stone, *That Monstrous Regiment: The Birth of Women's Political Emancipation* (Cirencester, 2015).

[12] Millan, *Monstrous Regiment*, p.197.

[13] S.L. Jansen, *Debating Women, Politics, and Power in Early Modern Europe* (Basingstoke, 2008), pp.9, 170.

Whereas the sixteenth century was the time of queens regnant, the seventeenth century was the era of queen regents. Although many of these women had not been educated in matters of state, and their performances as stateswomen have been debated by biographers, they undeniably held real political power.[14] This thesis intends to demonstrate that women in seventeenth-century Europe were politically influential without being rulers in their own right and that they could even do so whilst in exile. An examination of the political role of Elizabeth of Bohemia will therefore complement Tryntje Helfferich's biography of Amalie Elisabeth of Hessen-Kassel, a contemporary of Elizabeth who acted as de facto head of the dispossessed Hessian government following the death of her husband in 1637.[15] It should be noted, however, that whilst much of the existing scholarship on the Elizabeth greatly oversimplifies her political role, erroneously asserting that she was regent for Charles Louis, the fact that she held significant sway over Palatine policy demonstrates that women could exercise political influence without holding formal offices such as regent.[16]

The existing scholarship on the Palatine family in the Thirty Years' War, and the early modern period as a whole, has been dominated by works on Elizabeth and Prince Rupert. Whereas Charles Louis was the subject of only two biographies published since

[14] P. Sonnino, *Mazarin's Quest: The Congress of Westphalia and the Coming of the Fronde* (Cambridge, MA., 2008), pp.31-5; R. Kleinman, *Anne of Austria: Queen of France* (Columbus, OH., 1985), ch. 11; G. Treasure, *Mazarin: The Crisis of Absolutism in France* (London, 1995), ch. 8; L. Granlund, 'Queen Hedwig Eleonora of Sweden: dowager, builder, and collector', in C. Campbell Orr (ed.), *Queenship in Europe 1660-1815: The Role of the Consort* (Cambridge, 2004); E. Goodman, 'Conspicuous in Her Absence: Mariana of Austria, Juan José of Austria, and the Representation of Her Power', in T. Earenfight (ed.), *Queenship and Political Power in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (London and New York, 2005), p.163.
[15] T. Helfferich, *The iron princess: Amalia Elisabeth and the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge, MA., 2013).
[16] J. Ross, *The Winter Queen: The Story of Elizabeth Stuart* (New York, 1979), p.108; K.L. Nelson, 'Negotiating Exile: Henrietta Maria, Elizabeth of Bohemia, and the Court of Charles I', in C. Levin, J. Eldridge Carney and D. Barrett-Graves (eds.), *"High and Mighty Queens" of Early Modern England: Realities and Representations* (Basingstoke, 2003).

1903, his younger brother was studied in three biographies in 1976 alone.[17] Elizabeth has similarly been the focus of numerous biographical studies, with Carola Oman's *Elizabeth of Bohemia* and Sophia Lomas's revised edition of M.A.E. Green's *Elizabeth, Electress Palatine and Queen of Bohemia* remaining the most influential works on the Winter Queen.[18] It should be noted, however, that a number of studies of Elizabeth are overly romanticised, greatly oversimplifying her political position, and attempting to draw fatuous connections with her grandmother, Mary Queen of Scots, as well as providing somewhat tenuous evidence that she sought to emulate her namesake, Elizabeth I.[19] Nevertheless, a number of works centred on Elizabeth and her offspring have placed the Palatine family within important wider historiographical debates. For example, studies of the Palatine daughters have contributed to discussions on the role of noble women in the scientific, philosophical, and artistic communities of early modern Europe.[20] Examinations of the rhetoric and imagery employed at the wedding of Frederick and Elizabeth in February 1613, and the works it inspired, have also provided a valuable insight into the Church of England's connections with European Protestantism and its role within the polarised religious situation in Europe prior to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War.[21]

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[17] Hauck; Sellin, *Karl Ludwig*; Morrah, *Rupert*; M. Ashley, *Rupert of the Rhine* (London, 1976); G.M. Thomson, *Warrior Prince: Prince Rupert of the Rhine* (London, 1976). See also Warburton; E. Scott, *Rupert, Prince Palatine* (New York, 1899); C. Spencer, *Prince Rupert: The Last Cavalier* (London, 2007) and Frank Kitson's two volumes *Prince Rupert: Portrait of a Soldier* (London, 1994) and *Prince Rupert: Admiral and General-at-Sea* (London, 1998).

[18] Oman; Green. See also R.K. Marshall, *The Winter Queen: Elizabeth of Bohemia* (Edinburgh, 1998); J. Gorst-Williams, *Elizabeth, The Winter Queen* (London, 1977); Ross, *Winter Queen*.

[19] M. Hay, *The Winter Queen: Being the Unhappy History of Elizabeth Stuart, Electress Palatine, Queen of Bohemia* (London, 1910); J. Saxton, *The Winter Queen* (London, 1977); N. Goldstone, *Daughters of the Winter Queen: Four Remarkable Sisters, the Crown of Bohemia, and the Enduring Legacy of Mary, Queen of Scots* (New York, 2018), pp.431-2; G. Ziegler, 'A Second Phoenix: The Rebirth of Elizabeth I as Elizabeth Stuart', in E.H. Hageman and K. Conway (eds.), *Resurrecting Elizabeth I in Seventeenth-Century England* (Madison, NJ, 2007); N. Akkerman, 'Semper Eadem: Elizabeth Stuart and the Legacy of Queen Elizabeth I' in S. Smart and M.R. Wade (eds.), *The Palatine Wedding of 1613: Protestant Alliance and Court Festival* (Wiesbaden, 2013).

[20] C. Pal, *Republic of Women: Rethinking the Republic of Letters in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, 2012), especially pp.37-49; B.H. Zedler, 'The Three Princesses', *Hypatia*, 4/1: The History of Women in Philosophy (1989); N. Mackenzie, 'Jane Barker, Louise Hollandine of the Palatinate and 'Solomons Wise Daughter', *Review of English Studies*, New Series, 58/233 (2007).

[21] J. Miller, 'The Henrician legend revived: the Palatine couple and its public image in early Stuart England', *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire,* 11/3 (2004); K. Curran, 'James I and fictional

Studies of certain aspects of the Palatine family's experiences between 1618 and 1648 have also contributed to the study of exile during the early modern period. In particular, the investigations by Marika Keblusek, Nadine Akkerman, and others of the use of ceremonies and display at the exiled Palatine court have highlighted the central role of image and presentation in the attempts by dispossessed regimes to mobilise support for their cause.[22] Likewise, Andrew Thomas's study of the feud between the Bavarian and Palatine branches of the Wittelsbach dynasty, and Volker Press's article on the Palatines' cousins in the Pfalz-Neuburg line of the family, demonstrate how dynastic concerns could fuel competition within ruling families and deny exiled groups the support of some of their closest relatives.[23] After all, intra-familial strife was common in numerous imperial princely dynasties and often placed political issues before familial and religious solidarity. The competition between the electoral 'Ernestine' and ducal 'Albertine' lines of the House of Wettin saw these two Lutheran branches on opposite sides in the Schmalkaldic War of 1546-7.[24] Similarly, an inheritance dispute, sharpened by confessional issues, caused the Lutheran Landgraves of Hessen-Darmstadt to side with the emperor against their Calvinist cousins, the Landgraves of Hessen-Kassel during the Thirty Years' War.[25]

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authority at the Palatine wedding celebrations', *Renaissance Studies*, 20/1 (2006); A. Milton, 'The Church of England and the Palatinate, 1566-1642', in P. Ha and P. Collinson (eds.), *The Reception of Continental Reformation in Britain* (Oxford, 2010).

[22] M. Keblusek, 'The Bohemian Court at The Hague', in M. Keblusek and J. Zijlmans (eds.), *Princely Display: The Court of Frederk Hendrik of Orange and Amalia von Solms* (The Hague, 1997) and 'Entertainment in Exile: Theatrical Performances at the Courts of Margaret Cavendish, Mary Stuart and Elizabeth of Bohemia', in P. Davidson and J. Belper (eds.), *The Triumphs of the Defeated: Early Modern Festivals and Messages of Legitimacy* (Wiesbaden, 2007); N. Akkerman, *Courtly Rituals in The Hague: Elizabeth Stuart & Amalia von Solms* (The Hague, 2014). See also A. Hughes and J. Saunders, 'The Hague Courts of Elizabeth of Bohemia and Mary Stuart: Theatrical and Ceremonial Cultures', *Early Modern Literary Studies*, Special Issue, 15 (2007).

[23] Thomas; V. Press, 'Fürstentum und Fürstenhaus: Die dritte wittelsbachische Kraft', in K. Ackermann and G. Girisch (eds.), *Gustl Lang: Leben für die Heimat* (Weiden, 1989). See also his article 'Bayerns wittelsbachische Gegenspieler – Die Heidelberger Kurfürsten 1505-1685', in H. Glaser (ed.), *Um Glauben und Reich. Kurfürst Maximilian I. Beiträge zur Bayerischen Geschichte und Kunst, 1537-1657* (Munich, 1980), especially pp.24-35.

[24] J. Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire* (2 vols., Oxford, 2012), I, 318.

[25] *Tragedy*, p.205.

In light of the significant scholarly interest in the Palatine family during the Thirty Years' War and the insight that studies of their exile can provide for numerous broader topics, it is therefore surprising that there has been no detailed study of their actions during the latter half of the conflict. The near-absence of scholarship on the Palatine family's actions from the mid-1630s is representative of a lack of attention paid to the second half of the Thirty Years' War in general, with examinations of the years 1618 to 1635, as well as works on the Peace of Westphalia itself, dominating studies of the conflict.[26]

Even literature which specifically focuses on the Palatinate and its ruling dynasty during the period of the Thirty Years' War overwhelmingly tend to limit their chronological scope to the death of Frederick V in November 1632. This is no doubt due to the central role played by Frederick in the opening stages of the conflict, as well as the Palatinate's traditional position as the foremost Calvinist power within the empire and the founding member of the Protestant Union in 1608.[27] For example, the work of Elmar Weiss and Magnus Rüde on the relationship between the Electorate of the Palatinate and the Kingdom of England, and the financial support provided by James VI & I and Charles I to the Palatine exiles, both use this end point, even though English support for the Palatines can hardly be said to have died with Frederick.[28] Nicolette Mout's study of the Palatine court-in-exile at The Hague, and Friedrich Schubert's examination of the exiled government of the Palatinate similarly use the demise of the Winter King as their endpoint.[29]

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[26] Parker.
[27] Pursell; V. Press, *Calvinismus und Territorialstaat: Regierung und Zentralbehörden der Kurpfalz 1559-1619* (Stuttgart, 1970); C.P. Clasen, *The Palatinate in European History: 1559-1660* (Oxford, 1963), pp.1-25; Miller, 'Henrician legend'.
[28] E. Weiss, *Die Unterstützung Friedrichs V. von der Pfalz durch Jakob I. und Karl I. von England im Dreißigjährigen Krieg (1618-1632)* (Stuttgart, 1966); M. Rüde, *England und Kurpfalz im werdenden Mächteeuropa (1608-1632): Konfession – Dynastie – kulturelle Ausdrucksformen* (Stuttgart, 2007).
[29] Mout; F.H. Schubert, 'Die pfälzische Exilregierung im dreißigjährigen Krieg. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des politischen Protestantismus', *ZGO,* 102 (1954).

In addition, broad histories of the Palatinate, as well as studies of the *Pfalzfrage* during the Thirty Years' War as a whole, in both the German and English scholarship hardly examine the actions of the Palatine family between Frederick's death and the Westphalian peace negotiations in the mid-1640s.[30] For example, in Ludwig Häusser's comprehensive history of the Lower Palatinate, the fortunes of the Palatine family between 1632 and 1648 are afforded less than a third of the coverage of Frederick's actions between November 1620 and his death twelve years later.[31] Jürgen Steiner's *Der pfälzische Kurwürde während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges (1618-1648)* devotes only four pages to Charles Louis's military and diplomatic ventures after 1635, and Meinrad Schaab's seventeen-page chapter on the Thirty Years' War in his history of the Palatinate spends barely three pages addressing the activities of the Palatine exiles between 1633 and 1648.[32]

The lack of scholarly attention to the Palatine cause after 1632 is remarkable. Although the Palatine family were no longer the central figures in the conflict themselves, their cause was still a crucial issue. As the 'Palatine Question' has been described by numerous scholars as the dominant issue of the war, this suggests that the issue of Frederick's former lands and titles was not one which lessened in importance after his death.[33] However, as the Palatine exiles were rarely able actively to drive events on the continent, and they also failed to facilitate direct British intervention in the conflict, this

[30] See Clasen, *Palatinate*; S. Groenveld, 'Könige ohne Staat: Friedrich V. und Elizabeth als Exilierte in Den Haag 1621-1632-1661' in P. Wolf et al. (eds.), *Der Winterkönig, Friedrich von der Pfalz: Bayern und Europa im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart, 2003); Messinger.
[31] Häusser, II, 333-519, 519-80.
[32] Steiner, pp.126-30; Schaab, II, 118, 122-3.
[33] D. Croxton, *Westphalia: The Last Christian Peace* (Basingstoke, 2013), p.269; F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, 2nd edn (Münster, 1965), p.27.

means that their actions post-1632 are often paid scant attention in studies of the Thirty Years' War.

In spite of the wealth of contemporary evidence to the contrary, the existing literature on the fortunes and actions of the Palatine family between 1632 and 1648 tends to relegate them to the capacity of passive observers. For example, when detailing the supposed solution to the *Pfalzfrage* at the Westphalian peace negotiations, Steiner largely ignores the actions of the Palatine family and their representatives themselves during the talks, promulgating the theory that they were little more than flotsam buffeted by the waves of individual interests and ambitions of more powerful European states. However, this historiographical trend is especially pronounced in English scholarship on the personal rule of Charles I and the period of the Civil War. Although the Palatine family were disproportionately dependent on the support from Charles I's kingdom, these texts often overlook their abilities as independent actors and omit their interactions with other states.[34]

Charles Louis in particular has been portrayed by Veronica Wedgwood and Caroline Hibbard as little more than a 'chancer' and a hanger-on at the Stuart court.[35] Indeed, the existing scholarship tends to view the prince's actions during this period through an Anglo-centric prism in isolation from developments on the continent and ignoring the interplay between events on both sides of the English Channel. As a result, Charles Louis generally appears in the existing literature as a peripheral figure and a focal point of opposition to Charles I.[36] However, this thesis will demonstrate that whilst the

[34] K. Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven and London, 1992); R. Cust, *Charles I: A Political Life* (Harlow, 2005).
[35] C. Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1983); C.V. Wedgwood, 'The Elector Palatine and the Civil War', *History Today*, 4 (1954), 3-10 and her *The Trial of Charles I* (London, 1964).
[36] C. Russell, *The Fall of British Monarchies, 1637-1642* (Oxford, 1991); J. Adamson, *The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I* (London, 2007).

actions pursued by the Palatine family could not have proceeded without British backing, the strategies were actually devised by the exiles themselves. Accordingly, this work seeks to examine the experiences of Charles Louis and his family after 1632 in a wider geographical context and place the Palatine exiles back at the centre of their own narrative as semi-autonomous actors on the European political stage. In its transnational approach, the thesis will reassert the dynastic perspective which connected the ruling elites of different states, rather than adopt the anachronistic approach of 'national' histories in which dynastic ties and considerations are circumscribed by the geographical borders which limit the scope of such studies.

Sources

In shifting the emphasis back onto the Palatine family, this thesis utilises a considerable amount of epistolary evidence as well as other writings by Charles Louis, Elizabeth, and their representatives and advisers. The wealth of letters from the Palatine family provides a considerable insight into the experiences of an exiled dynasty in early modern Europe. In addition to complementing the vivid image painted by the memoirs of the youngest Palatine daughter, Sophia, of the difficulties facing dispossessed elites in terms of their basic subsistence, the correspondence of the Palatine exiles and their agents contain valuable information regarding the strategies they were pursuing.[37] In particular, as the Palatine family were dependent on the military, financial, and diplomatic support of other powers, they often wrote to potential allies to request such assistance and to persuade them of the merits of their intended strategies. The discussion of the various offers of restitution made to the Palatine family in the latter half of the Thirty Years' War can also

[37] H. Forester (ed.), *Memoirs of Sophia, Electress of Hanover* (London, 1888).

highlight which bargaining positions were deemed acceptable by exiles in the early modern period and the reasons behind the Palatines' refusal of multiple propositions.

Selections of correspondence of the Palatine family have appeared in numerous published volumes, such as Karl Hauck's edited selection of letters of the children of Frederick and Elizabeth, and George Bromley's *Collection of original royal letters*, which includes numerous communications from the Winter Queen, Charles Louis, and Rupert. Elizabeth's correspondence has received the greatest scholarly attention, with the most comprehensive collection being Nadine Akkerman's invaluable editions of the Winter Queen's letters.[38] However, the majority of epistolary sources used in this thesis are unpublished manuscripts held in a variety of British, German, and Dutch archives.[39] These materials can help to place the Palatine family in a broader geopolitical context as these individuals were often on the 'front line' in negotiations with other powers, and allow us to build a more reliable picture of the effectiveness of their attempts to obtain support for their restitution. One especially invaluable source has been the notebook of Elizabeth's secretary, Theobald Maurice. Dating from around the time of Charles Louis's military campaign in Germany in 1638, this document meticulously lists the financial reserves of the Palatine family and the donations from foreign backers. Such evidence allows a reliable assessment of the exiles' fiscal situation. In addition, as the notebook also records the size and cost of units being raised, it provides an invaluable insight into the piecemeal

[38] Akkerman; Bromley; K. Hauck (ed.), *Die Briefe der Kinder des Winterkönigs* (Heidelberg, 1908). See also Wendland; M. Baker (ed.), *The letters of Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia* (London, 1953) and M. Lemberg, *Eine Königin ohne Reich: Das Leben der Winterkönigin Elisabeth Stuart und ihre Briefe nach Hessen* (Marburg, 1996).

[39] SP 81, SP 16 and TS 23/1; Add MS 72434: Trumbull Papers CXCIII; Victoria and Albert Museum: National Art Library, London: Forster MS 39: Letters from Charles Louis to Elizabeth of Bohemia c.1636-58; Hartlib; Rousham Hall, Oxfordshire: Transcript Letters; Clm; Koninklijk Huisarchief, The Hague: A24: Papers of Hendrik Casimir I, Count of Nassau-Dietz (1612-1640).

fashion in which troops were raised by smaller powers during the Thirty Years' War, as well as the sums required to engage their services.[40]

As monetary concerns were essential for both the everyday subsistence and long-term strategies of dispossessed royal and noble families, this thesis also utilises numerous documents which give a valuable insight into the Palatine family's financial situation, albeit in disparate collections of state and estate papers. For example, an audit of Frederick's fiscal resources was conducted in January 1633 and an assessment of Elizabeth's debts was completed the following month and are contained in the State Papers Foreign: Holland and the German States collections respectively.[41] As much of the Palatine family's financial support came from Charles I's kingdom, the vast majority of documentation relating to the exiles' financial circumstances can be found in British libraries and archives. The Craven Estate Papers held at the Bodleian Library detail certain amounts given by William, Lord Craven, one of the most fervent champions of the Palatine family, and the notebooks of John Finet and the *Journal of the House of Commons* noted when a certain sum was awarded to the Palatine family by the king or parliament.[42] Exchequer records as well as various documents in several collections of state papers detail the total amounts paid over a certain time period, as well as the manner in which they were to be paid and who should receive them on Charles Louis's behalf.[43] It is also possible to identify exactly how much of the awarded amounts was received by the

[40] 'Notebook'.
[41] SP 84/146 ff.15-16: Account of moneys and cabinet of Frederick, Elector Palatine, 4/14 Jan. 1633; SP 81/40 ff.133-4: Queen of Bohemia's debts and arrears, 18 Feb. 1633.
[42] Bod.: Craven Estate Papers 80: Account book of Lewis Ziegler as Lord Craven's agent in Holland, 1649-53; Loomie, pp.219-20; *CJ*, III, 26, 77 and IV, 57-8, 61-3, 69, 275, 515-6.
[43] TNA: Auditors of the Imprest and Commissioners of Audit: Declared Accounts (in Rolls) [AO 1]: AO 1/5/5: Sir Abraham Williams. Money for the Queen of Bohemia, 29 Sept. 1633-29 Sept. 1638; TNA: Exchequer (Pipe Office: Declared Accounts) [E 351]: E 351/35: Agents Employed for special services: Sir A. Williams. Money for the Queen of Bohemia, 29 Sept 1633-29 Sept 1638; TNA: State Papers Domestic Supplementary [SP 46]: SP 46/108 f.19; SP 81/43 f.226: Confirmation of persons to receive money collected for the Palatinate, [Undated, 1636].

Palatine family through the meticulous accounts made by Charles Louis and his family's advisers of the arrears of their English pensions. Such records detail when a financial grant was awarded, how much had been received by a certain date, and the outstanding amounts.[44]

This thesis also draws heavily on the evidence of printed pamphlets and newsbooks. The Palatine family and their advisers produced numerous manifestos as public justifications of the legitimacy of Charles Louis's claims to the Palatinate and his father's electoral title, especially after the young prince attained his majority in late-1635. Johann Joachim von Rusdorf, one of the principal advisers to the exiled Palatines, penned *The evaporation of the apple of Palestine* and *Vindiciæ Causæ Palatinæ,* and has also been suggested as the author of the two manifestos issued in Charles Louis's name in London in 1637.[45] These documents clearly demonstrate the lines of constitutional and legal reasoning which underpinned Palatine arguments contesting the legality of the deprivation of Charles Louis's birthright. The use of pamphlets not directly authored or commissioned by the Palatine family can also provide a valuable insight into the extent of support for the Palatine family during the latter half of their exile, especially during the period of the English Civil War. It has been previously suggested that public interest in the Palatine cause waned after 1630 as Frederick's status as champion of European Protestantism was eclipsed by that of Gustavus Adolphus, and the complexities of the war on the continent in the 1640s made it difficult to follow the progress of the conflict.[46]

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[44] Bod.: MS Nalson 18 ff.456-7: The humble remonstrance of James Harrington, concerning the affaires of His High:s the Prince Elector Palatine, 17 Feb. 1645 and Craven Estate Papers 315: Abstract of Arrears due to Elizabeth of Bohemia drafted by Sir Abraham Williams, 6 June 1651.

[45] J.J. von Rusdorf, *Palæstine* and *Vindiciæ Causæ Palatinæ; Sive Assertio & Deductio Juris inviolabilis legitimæ Successionis, Serenissimi et celsissimi Principis, Caroli Ludovici, Comitis Palatini ad Rhenum, Sacri Romani Imperii Archidapiferi & Electoris, Ducis Bavariæ…*(Frankfurt, 1640); *Manifest*; *Protestation.*

[46] Miller, 'Henrician legend', p.330; J.E.E. Boys, *London's news press and the Thirty Years War* (Woodbridge, 2011), p.259.

Nevertheless, newspapers such as *The Moderate Intelligencer* in the mid-1640s suggest continued interest and pity for the Palatine exiles.[47] Conversely, the condemnation of Rupert's conduct during the war, as well as pornographic lampoons and criticisms of Charles Louis for taking parliamentarian finance whilst not actively assisting their cause, demonstrate the development of a far less sympathetic and deferential attitude to the Palatine family by the late-1640s than had been promoted previously.[48] This period also witnessed a number of publications reproducing letters from Charles Louis and Elizabeth to leading parliamentarian figures, as well as the prince's *Motives and Reasons* based on a statement he had sent to the House of Lords in order to justify his arrival in London and public adherence to parliament in 1644.[49] Although it is unclear whether Charles Louis and his advisers intended or anticipated that such items would be published, these pamphlets show the value of the opinions and actions of the Palatine family for parliament as propaganda during the Civil War, especially as princes Rupert and Maurice served with distinction in the Royalist army.

In order to place the experiences and strategies of the exiled Palatines in a broader context, this thesis also utilises a number of sources which provide the opinions of external observers who were not directly involved in the creation or implementation of their strategies. For example, the private correspondence of Sir William Boswell, the English resident ambassador in The Hague, to Viscount Scudamore provides valuable observations

[47] J. Dillingham (ed.), *The Moderate Intelligencer* (237 vols., London, 1645-9), LVI (26 Mar.-2 Apr. 1646), p.368, LVIII (9-16 Apr. 1646), p.392, LIX (16-22 Apr. 1646), p.398.
[48] H. Neville, *The Ladies Parliament* (London, 1647), [Unpaginated]; Anon, *Lex talionis. Or, a declamation against Mr Challener* (London, 1647), p.8.
[49] Henrietta Maria, Queen Consort of Charles I, *The Queens Majesties message and letter from the Hague…Also the declaration and petition of the Paltsgrave and the Queene his mother* (London, 1642); Anon, *Motives and reasons, concerning his Highnesse the Prince Elector Palatines coming into England. Presented to both the Honourable Houses of Parliament by His said Highnesse, on Satterday the 14. Of September. 1644. With two letters that were formerly sent from the Hagve* (London, 1644).

of a well-placed individual in close proximity to the Palatine court-in-exile.[50] There are also several printed volumes of primary source materials which this thesis uses for the same purpose. For example, the *Calendar of State Papers: Venice* span the entire period of the Palatine exile and the Venetian ambassadors in England, France, Holland, and Germany were ideally placed to report on the actions of Charles Louis and his representatives.[51] Similarly, the forty-eight published volumes of the *Acta Pacis Westphalicæ* contain numerous observations of the activities of the Palatine plenipotentiaries during the Westphalian peace talks.[52]

Structure

The thesis adopts both a thematic and a chronological approach in its examination of the Palatine family between 1632 and 1648. The first two chapters address the broader topics relating to experiences of exile in early modern Europe, such as examining the forms of capital available to dispossessed ruling dynasties and their abilities to formulate and pursue independent strategies in their attempts to recover lost lands and titles. An examination of the Palatine family's plight between 1632 and 1648 within the broad themes of exile is the best way to compare Charles Louis's experiences with those of other figures and regimes who were deprived of their ancestral lands and titles in the same period. Chapters one and two will provide a study of how exiled elites were forced to reconcile contemporary expectations of sovereignty, such as the role of women and the importance of regal display, with their strained circumstances and the implications this had for their respective causes. The first section will assess how the Palatine family attempted to use traditional 'sovereign' channels and methods to promote their claims to electoral

[50] TNA: Chancery: Duchess of Norfolk's Deeds [C115]: C115/109 nos.8730-8797c: Letters from Sir William Boswell in The Hague to Viscount Scudamore.
[51] *CSPV.*
[52] *APW.*

status in the face of issues of diplomatic recognition, financial privation, the military and political burdens and necessities of war, as well as the rigid hierarchy and traditions of the Holy Roman Empire. In spite of their dependence on the assistance of other states, it will be demonstrated that the Palatine exiles were the ultimate arbiters in devising and directing the strategies they pursued throughout the majority of the period covered by this thesis, albeit often in reaction to the events outside of their control as well as the open-handedness of their allies.

The first chapter will establish what constituted the ancestral lands and titles of the Electoral Palatinate prior to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War before examining the broad policy objectives of the Palatine exiles between 1632 and 1648. As they rejected numerous offers of restitution during the 1630s and early-1640s for reasons beyond financial concerns and the size of the offered territories, this chapter will also evaluate the less tangible considerations of perception and public image which could influence the actions of exiled rulers in early modern Europe. Chapter one also identifies the key figures who dominated and directed the Palatine family's policy in this period, assessing the roles played by Palatine advisers and the extended family. In doing so, the chapter also deals with the difficulties faced by exiles attempting to obtain recognition of their sovereignty and legitimacy to specific territories and titles, examining their position as a marginal group within the political and dynastic network of European rulers and monarchs. In particular, this chapter will examine the role played by Elizabeth of Bohemia. In addition to providing an assessment of her performance as a stateswoman during Charles Louis's minority, the chapter will address the extent to which Elizabeth and other widow-regents in the early modern period were able to exercise political influence and engage in diplomacy.

The second chapter examines the resources and the forms of 'capital' available to the Palatine family and exiled dynasties in general, broadly categorised as military, financial, and dynastic. It will discuss how far the Palatine exiles had access to each form of capital and the relative significance of each in assisting exiled regimes to recover their lost lands and titles. In particular, this chapter addresses the question of dynasticism by assessing the strength of familial connections between different royal houses and ruling dynasties in comparison to individual political considerations. In doing so, chapter two details the military, material, and financial support received by the Palatine family as a product of their kinship ties to the rulers of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Such a study allows a valuable examination of the impact of dynasticism on the experiences of exiled elites in early modern Europe, especially during such a tumultuous period as the Thirty Years' War. In addition, as the resources received from other states were dictated by the willingness and ability of the benefactors to provide such assistance, this chapter will demonstrate the necessity of adopting a transnational approach when examining exiled ruling dynasties. By comparing the resources of the Palatines with those of their dispossessed contemporaries, and the extent to which they facilitated their respective restorations, chapter two will also allow an assessment of how representative the experiences of the Palatine family were for exiled rulers in early modern Europe.

The remaining four chapters follow a chronological structure in detailing the activities of the Palatine exiles between Frederick's death and the Peace of Westphalia. Such an approach is necessary when studying the actions of an exiled dynasty who were forced to react to developments outside of their control. The activities of the Palatine family, and their fluctuations between willingness to compromise at the negotiating table

and pursuing military ventures to further their cause, exemplify the reactionary existence common to dispossessed regimes whose strategies were dictated by a constantly shifting political and martial situation. As a whole, this section seeks to explore the degree of autonomy exercised by exiled ruling houses in early modern Europe in devising and pursuing strategies for their restoration. As the existing scholarship tends to regard dispossessed elites as little more than rudderless observers riding the tides of military and political developments, it is important to examine the extent to which possession of the various forms of capital identified in the previous section could allow exiles to determine their own courses of action. In doing so, the thesis will provide an assessment of how much the Palatine family were the authors of their own continued misfortune between 1632-48 or were powerless victims of constantly worsening circumstances.

The third chapter examines the strategies pursued by the Palatine exiles to recover their lands between 1632 and 1643 and is divided into four distinct chronological sections which reflect the changing circumstances they faced and how they amended their actions in response. Such a study also provides a valuable insight into the experiences of exile for royal and noble dynasties during the early modern period as the chapter will demonstrate the extent to which the Palatine family were able to exercise autonomy in pursuit of their restitution during the latter half of their exile.

Chapter four will then further address the transnational nature of exile for early modern European elites by examining the involvement of the Palatine family during the British Civil Wars between 1642 and 1649. In particular, Charles Louis's adherence to Parliament against his uncle and brothers, as well as his actions during his time in London between 1644 and 1649, will be studied within the wider context of Europe during the

Thirty Years' War. It will be shown that the prince elector's allegiance and conduct was determined by the interplay of short-term developments in both the British and continental conflicts. Such a transnational approach to this topic is one of the truly original aspects of this thesis. This chapter will also provide a valuable insight into the experiences of long-term exile, by determining how the extent of support for the Palatine cause in England had changed by the mid- and late-1640s.

Chapter five examines the Palatine family's involvement in the Westphalian peace negotiations between 1645 and 1648. This chapter will highlight the difficulties faced by Charles Louis's representatives at the peace congress and assess the ways in which they attempted to gain support for their master's restitution. By providing an overview of the negotiations regarding the 'Palatine Question' and the bargaining positions of various powers, this chapter will demonstrate the problems faced by noble dynastic exiles in attempting to procure their restoration at general peace talks. The final section of the chapter provides an assessment of the peace terms, the Palatine family's reaction to the negotiations and articles which facilitated their partial restoration, and a reassessment of the traditional view of the Peace of Westphalia as a failure for the Palatine family.

The final chapter of the thesis addresses the legacy of the Thirty Years' War on the newly-restored electoral family and their recovered territories. As the vast majority of contemporary observers and secondary literature address an eventual restoration as a victory for exiled dynasties, it is important to address how the experiences of exile could be felt even after restitution had been obtained. Whilst the 'Palatine Question' is still regarded by the vast majority of scholars as having been solved with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, this chapter will demonstrate that several of the integral issues of the

Pfalzfrage persisted into the 1650s and beyond. The chapter will also comment upon the role-reversal of the Palatine and Stuart families, as the latter were forced into exile in the wake of the English Civil War whilst their cousins recovered lands and titles on the continent. An examination of the extent to which Charles Louis was willing and able to support his newly-exiled relatives seeks to provide another important insight into the importance of dynastic connections for dispossessed regimes in early modern Europe.

The thesis will then conclude with an assessment of the experiences of the Palatine family between 1632 and 1648 and how representative they were of other dispossessed regimes and families in early modern Europe. Although the professed electoral status of the Palatine exiles, as well as their dynastic connections and royal blood, made the family unique as the highest-ranking ruling dispossessed rulers of the Thirty Years' War, they faced the same considerations and difficulties both during their exile and in their restitution as other displaced regimes. Whilst it was possible for exiled rulers to act with differing degrees of autonomy in pursuing their restoration, especially to keep their cause politically relevant and maintain support, the thesis will conclude that an exiled ruler stood the best chance of restoration if their cause coincided with the objectives and policies of more powerful states. In doing so, it will be shown that the study of exiles is both a valuable field of scholarly interest in itself, and can add an alternative dimension to studies of the interaction of international politics and dynasticism in early modern Europe.

Chapter 1: Palatine Objectives and Policy Makers, c.1632-48

Upon Frederick's death in November 1632, it was deemed imperative that the interests of his heir, the fourteen-year-old Charles Louis, and his siblings were overseen by a 'Tutor or Administrator to prosecute their right & performe these things whereof children during their minority are uncapable'.[1] This position was assumed by the Winter King's younger brother, Ludwig Philipp, Count Palatine of Pfalz-Simmern-Kaiserslautern, in accordance with the directions of the Golden Bull. This decree, issued by Emperor Charles IV in 1356 enshrining the rights of the seven electors of Holy Roman Empire, declared that 'the elder [surviving] Brother of the deceas'd [elector] shall be Tutor and Protector of those under Age'.[2] Although the administrator was expected to direct Palatine policy until Charles Louis turned eighteen, Charles I regarded Ludwig Philipp as having insufficient power and ability for the role, and issued instructions stating that his nephew's affairs should instead be conducted 'by the assistance of such Directors, as wee, his mother, & the Prince of Orenge his uncle'.[3] The dependency of the Palatine family on the advice of external benefactors and supporters, together with the exodus of many of Frederick's erstwhile councillors and adherents, demonstrates the difficulties faced by dispossessed regimes in maintaining a functioning government and determining policy.

The first section of this chapter will examine the broad policy objectives pursued by the Palatine family between 1632 and 1648. By examining the private correspondence of Charles Louis, Elizabeth and their advisers, as well as pamphlets published to promote their cause, it is possible to discern a distinct policy by identifying their key aims, as well

[1] SP 81/39 f.375: Memorial of Sir Henry Vane on the Palatinate, Dec. 1632.
[2] Golden Bull, p.17.
[3] SP 81/39 ff.358-74 at f.360: Instructions to Sir Robert Anstruther (perfect copy), Dec. 1632.

as what they would not accept. This in turn allows an assessment of how far the Palatine family were willing to compromise, as well as the influence of less tangible factors, such as notions of honour and justice, on their aims. This section will determine why, in spite of their declining fortunes, the Palatine exiles repeatedly refused offers comprising some manner of restitution, including terms almost identical to those agreed under the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

Between 1632 and 1648, Charles Louis's affairs and interests were intermittently co-ordinated from a recently-restored yet short-lived regency government in Heidelberg and Frankenthal, the Palatine court-in-exile at The Hague, and the court of Charles I. Accordingly, the second section will identify the dominant figures in the formation of Palatine family's policy objectives and determine how far it is even possible to identify an independent Palatine policy. In doing so, a distinction will be made between individuals who actively influenced and devised the strategies pursued by the Palatine exiles, and those benefactors and donors to Charles Louis's cause, who would provide material support once a course of action had been decided. In addition, as Elizabeth of Bohemia has long been credited by scholars as the leading force of Palatine policymaking following her husband's death, it is important to assess the extent and nature of her involvement in the direction of her son's affairs. Such an examination will provide a valuable insight into how widow-regents were able to exercise political influence in early-modern Europe, in spite of the constraints imposed by their gender and contemporary expectations, options which were further restricted by the Palatines' exiled status.

The Palatine Electorate

It is important, however, to establish what constituted the Electorate of the Palatinate and specify the titles, rights, and dignities which had been confiscated from Frederick V following his proscription. The territorial entity which would later be recognised as the Electoral Palatinate came into existence following the Treaty of Pavia in 1329. This arrangement saw the Wittelsbach dynasty split into the Palatine and Bavarian branches, with the former receiving the traditional lands of the Counts Palatine of the Rhine, commonly referred to as the Lower Palatinate, as well as a collection of holdings in the Bavarian Nordgau.[4] This second, geographically separate territory, came to be known as the Upper Palatinate. As the Golden Bull decreed that the territories of an electorate were to be indivisible and inherited together with the electoral title through primogeniture, Elector Rupprecht I created a corpus of 'electoral lands' in 1368, based around seventeen castles and towns traditionally held by the Counts Palatine of the Rhine. In 1378, three further towns were added to this grouping, which was to be safeguarded from being sold, pawned, or granted as a dowry.[5] Although land purchases and military expansion saw the Palatine lands double in size over the fifteenth century, a disastrous defeat in the War of Landshut Succession of 1503-5, and the creation of a large number of secundogenitures, resulted in the electorate resembling 'a confused string of shapeless sausages' on the eve of the Thirty Years' War.[6]

[4] L. Holzfurtner, 'Die Oberpfalz und ihre Bedeutung für die Wittelsbacher', in A. Wieczorek, B. Schneidmüller, A. Schubert and S. Weinfurter (eds.), *Die Wittelsbacher am Rhein: Die Kurpfalz und Europa* (2 vols., Mannheim, 2013), I, 122-128.
[5] H.J. Cohn, *The Government of the Rhine Palatinate in the Fifteenth Century* (Oxford, 1965), p.21.
[6] Ibid., pp.43-74; Schaab, I, 145-69, 216-19; H.D. Heimann, 'Von Pavia nach Heidelberg. Die Hausordnungen der Wittelsbacher im 14. und frühen 15. Jahrhundert: Dynastieformierung in der Kontinuität des Gesamthauses' and R. Stauber, 'Der Landshuter Erbfolgekrieg – Selbstzerstörung des Hauses Wittelsbach?' both in A. Wieczorek, B. Schneidmüller, J. Peltzer and S. Weinfurter (eds.), *Die Wittelsbacher und die Kurpfalz im Mittelalter: Eine Erfolgsgeschichte?* (Regensburg, 2013); W. Tuckermann, *Das altpfälzische Oberrheingebiet von der Vergangenheit zur Gegenwart*, 2nd edn (Mannheim, 1953), p.44.


By 1600, the Palatinate was the smallest of the four secular electorates in terms of geographical area, with the Lower- and Upper Palatinates having a combined area of approximately 11,000km^2. Whilst the Palatinates' 600,000 inhabitants greatly exceeded the population of the three ecclesiastical electorates of Mainz, Cologne and Trier, as well as that of Brandenburg, this number was scarcely half that of either Bohemia or Saxony.[7] One of only three Protestant electorates, the Palatinate had been regarded as a Calvinist state since the accession of Elector Friedrich III in 1559, apart from a reversion to Lutheranism under his successor between 1575-83, and the University of Heidelberg has been likened to 'a factory of Calvinist theologians for nearly half a century' by 1618.[8] However, on the eve of the Thirty Years' War there were still a number of towns in the Lower Palatinate, such as Oppenheim, in which Lutherans were the majority, and the Upper Palatinate was largely Lutheran.[9]

As with the other electors, the Elector Palatine was sovereign over his territories, as the Imperial lower courts did not operate within them, and his subjects could not appeal to Imperial appeal courts.[10] The Palatine electors also enjoyed an annual revenue in excess of 170,000 gulden, approximately 70% of which came from the larger, more populous, and fertile Lower Palatinate, described as 'the garden of Germany', as well as direct taxation worth over 113,200 gulden.[11] However, it should be noted that the electors also faced a chronic deficit, as outgoings exceeded 430,000 gulden.[12]

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[7] *Tragedy*, pp.17-18.
[8] Pursell, p.23.
[9] Ibid., p.24.
[10] J. Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire* (2 vols., Oxford, 2012), I, 23.
[11] M. Rüde, *England und Kurpfalz im werdenden Mächteeuropa (1608-1632): Konfession – Dynastie – kulturelle Ausdrucksformen* (Stuttgart, 2007), p.50; Pursell, p.23.
[12] Rüde, *England und Kurpfalz*, p.50.

Map 1. Electorates of the Holy Roman Empire, 1618.



In addition to the territories over which Charles Louis's ancestors had ruled, the Palatine exiles also sought to recover the prestigious electoral title which had been bestowed on their family three centuries earlier. The thirteenth century saw the number of voters in Imperial elections, held to elect either a new Emperor after the death of a predecessor, or to select a 'King of the Romans', the designated successor of an incumbent Emperor, limited to seven princes of the empire.[1] The Count Palatine of the Rhine, who was also Duke of Bavaria, was one of four secular noblemen and three ecclesiastical office holders who participated in these elections. Following the rupture within the Wittelsbach dynasty, the Treaty of Pavia, decreed that the vote was to alternate between the Palatine and Bavarian branches.[2]

However, less than thirty years later, the Golden Bull, the document which would be regarded as the unassailable constitution of the empire, not only elevated the seven voters to the status of 'Prince-Elector' or *Kurfürst*, but also decreed that the title could only be inherited through primogeniture.[3] Rupprecht, Count Palatine of the Rhine, along with the King of Bohemia, Duke of Saxony, and Margrave of Brandenburg, was elevated to electoral rank. In addition to these secular noblemen, the Archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier became the three ecclesiastical electors. Within the strictly defined hierarchy of the electors, the Elector Palatine was fifth in the order of precedence, behind the three Archbishop-Electors and the King of Bohemia. However, he would cast the fourth vote in Imperial elections, as the Archbishop of Mainz, as the highest-ranking elector, would cast the seventh and potentially decisive vote.[4] The settling of the electoral title on the Palatine

[1] Messinger, pp.28-9; Whaley, *Germany*, I, 26-7.
[2] Thomas, p.12.
[3] Golden Bull, p.17.
[4] Ibid., p.14.

branch in perpetuity resulted in an irreconcilable conflict with the dukes of Bavaria, who repeatedly sought to correct the perceived injustice of the Golden Bull and claim the electoral title.[5]

The privileges of individual electors were not limited to participation in Imperial elections. In addition to the right to mint coins and levy tariffs, each *Kurfürst* held an *Erzamt*, or 'Arch-Office', of the Imperial Household which were regarded as the most illustrious titles within the empire save that of Emperor.[6] These offices denoted the functions these individuals would perform at Imperial ceremonial events and were deemed highly prestigious, as the title-holders would be brought into close proximity with the Emperor whilst performing their duties.[7] For example, the Elector Palatine served as 'Arch-Steward', and would be responsible for presenting the Emperor with food at Imperial banquets. Although these ceremonial offices had traditionally rotated between the senior nobility of the empire, the Golden Bull confirmed the inseparability of the electoral titles with their corresponding *Erzamt*.[8] The constitutional significance of these roles is demonstrated by the fact that the electors would write their ceremonial position before their electoral title when signing their name, and displayed the insignia of their office on their coats of arms.[9]

Charles Louis's ancestors also possessed a number of important political and judicial powers. For example, the Elector Palatine would sit in judgement when an

[5] Thomas, p.27.
[6] Messinger, p.32.
[7] J. Duindam, 'The Habsburg Court in Vienna: Kaiserhof or Reichshof?', in R. Evans and P.H. Wilson (eds.), *The Holy Roman Empire, 1495-1806: A European Perspective* (Leiden, 2012), p.106; Hauck, p.104.
[8] A. Wolf, *Die Entstehung des Kurfürstenkollegs 1198-1298: Zur 700-jährigen Wiederkehr der ersten Vereinigung der Sieben Kurfürsten* (Idstein, 1998), p.14; Messinger, p.34; Golden Bull, pp.13-14.
[9] Messinger, p.35.

Emperor or his designated successor were called to account, a right which the Golden Bull claimed had been bestowed upon them by custom but had not been practised since the fourteenth century.[10] The Bull also decreed that the Elector Palatine was to serve as one of the two 'Imperial Vicars' together with the Elector of Saxony in the event of an interregnum if an Emperor died prior to the election of a King of the Romans.[11] In such circumstances, the Palatine elector was to exercise Imperial authority in Franconia, Swabia, the Rhine, and southern Germany, with the power to 'administer Justice to fill Church Benefices, to receive the Revenue of the Empire, to invest in Fiefs, and to receive Fealty and Homage for and in the Name of the Sacred Empire'.[12] This was an important function which offered the possibility of real political power, and Frederick V himself had been an Imperial Vicar in the interregnums following the deaths of Emperors Rudolf II and Matthias in 1612 and 1619 respectively.

Palatine Objectives

Recovery of Electoral Title

The recovery of the prestigious electoral title, together with its associated dignities and offices, was the key objective of Palatine policy between 1632 and 1648. One Palatine councillor claimed in a 1637 pamphlet that the issue of the electoral dignity was 'the chiefest, and greatest thing appertaining to this restitution', and the Venetian ambassador in London believed that the Palatine exiles valued the title and its associated privileges 'almost more than the Palatinate itself'.[13] Although Charles Louis was only restored to electoral rank by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, his family received a number of

[10] Schaab, I, 66; Golden Bull, p.15.
[11] P.H. Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire: A Thousand Years of Europe's History* (London, 2016), p.317; Messinger, p.33.
[12] Golden Bull, pp.14-15.
[13] *Palæstine*; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 105.

propositions purporting to offer the young prince the possibility of obtaining an electoral title, especially following his exclusion from the Peace of Prague in 1635. For example, Spanish officials suggested in summer 1635 that the Palatines could exercise the electoral vote of the now-hereditary Bohemian monarchy as a loan from Ferdinand II and his successors for as long as the Austrian Habsburgs held the Imperial throne.[14] Whilst such a proposition was denounced by Charles I as 'a chimerical Electoral dignity' and a demonstration that the Spaniards' 'only end is to feed us with fancies', offers of a shared electoral vote and a newly-created eighth title were also made as part of a general truce and treaty of restitution.[15]

As Charles Louis and advisers such as the noted English diplomat, Sir Thomas Roe, appear to have seriously considered these proposals, it is important to examine the merits of such suggestions and how they corresponded with the family's wider objectives. The fact that the Palatine family consistently refused both an alternating dignity and an eighth electoral title prior to mid-1647, only considering these options when faced with the prospect of permanent exclusion, demonstrates that they viewed obtaining anything other than their original electoral title as insufficient.

Such proposals would certainly have seen Charles Louis re-admitted to the Electoral College. However, the institution's rigid hierarchy of precedence, as well as the traditional dignities associated with their family's prestige and status, meant anything less than a full restitution to Frederick's ancestral titles, votes, and offices was seen as an insult. After all, the fact that the Winter King's third son, born in Prague one month after

[14] Bod.: MS Clarendon 7 f.49: Sir Arthur Hopton in Madrid to Sir Francis Windebank, 11 Aug. 1635; *Tragedy*, p.349.
[15] MS Clarendon 7 f.113v: Windebank to Hopton, 3 Sept. 1635.

Frederick's Bohemian coronation in 1619, was named after Rupprecht III, an Elector of the Palatinate who was elected King of Germany in 1400, was undoubtedly a demonstration of Imperial ambitions for the dynasty.[16] During the family's exile, it was predicted that any compromise which required the sharing or surrender of the fifth electoral title would lead to further erosions of their influence within the empire. A 1636 memorial on the Palatine cause claimed that 'by the diminution of [Charles Louis's] estate, and dignity, he shall consequently suffer the declination of his whole'.[17] Johann Joachim von Rusdorf, a senior Palatine counsellor in the 1630s, similarly claimed that, rather than accept an eighth electoral title, Charles Louis should rather 'renounce the whole Electorate, then consent [to] so dishonourable a change of precedency and order, into the lowest ranke'.[18]

The proposition that the ancestral Palatine electoral title should alternate between the Bavarian and Palatine branches of the Wittelsbach family was the option favoured by both Emperors Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III from the mid-1630s up to the Westphalian peace negotiations.[19] This proposal not only had the advantage that it would not require an overhaul of the terms of the Golden Bull, as only seven electoral votes would be exercised at any one time, but it also had a historical basis in the Treaty of Pavia.[20] However, Elizabeth claimed that the thought of an alternating electoral title made her feel physically ill and argued that the Protestant princes in the Empire would oppose such a scheme,

[16] *Tragedy*, pp.284-5; Oman, p.201; Pursell, p.102.
[17] SP 81/43 ff.189-91v at f.189v: Memorial on Palatine Restoration, July 1636.
[18] *Palæstine*.
[19] Messinger, pp.275-7; D. Albrecht, 'Bayern und die pfälzische Frage auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreß', in H. Durchhardt (ed.), *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte* (Munich, 1998), p.464. *Sourcebook*, p.286.
[20] Thomas, p.27; J. Peltzer, 'Der Pfalzgraf als Königswähler', in A. Wieczorek, B. Schneidmüller, A. Schubert and S. Weinfurter (eds.), *Die Wittelsbacher am Rhein: Die Kurpfalz und Europa* (2 vols., Mannheim, 2013), I, 82-91.

presumably due to the increased religious imbalance in the Electoral College.[21] An alternating vote shared with the Bavarians presented the possibility that Catholic electors could outnumber their reformed counterparts five to two in alternate Imperial elections. In such circumstances, the Lutheran Johann Georg of Saxony and Calvinist Georg Wilhelm of Brandenburg would be the only Protestant electors in the College.

Although an alternating electoral vote was never accepted, both Charles Louis and Roe appear to have been more amenable to the proposition as a means of avoiding the Palatine family's permanent exclusion from the empire.[22] It should be noted, however, that Roe did not advocate an unconditional acceptance of the offer, insisting that the terms of an alternating dignity must 'be so moderated for the present, and so well governed hereafter, that it may never returne to the House of Bavare'.[23] The ambassador argued that the Palatine family should 'have the first turne' exercising the electoral title and that Bavarian recipients should be limited to Duke Maximilian and his direct descendants.[24] Such demands were at odds with Ferdinand III's declaration that the title would only alternate between the Bavarian and Palatine Wittelsbach branches once the 'Wilhelmine Line', the descendants of Maximilian's father, Wilhelm V, became extinct in the male line.[25]

It is evident that the Palatines viewed the prospect of an alternating electoral title as a last resort, and sought to avoid accepting the proposition if there was any prospect of obtaining military assistance which would allow them to obtain a more favourable

[21] Akkerman, II, 973, 981, 1015.
[22] Ibid., 447, 995-6.
[23] Ibid., 1011.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Messinger, p.275.

arrangement. Roe asserted in November 1641 that 'if his Ma.ty and the Prince Elector doe not resolve to breake, and winne it by a war, we must consent to it'.[26] It is also significant that Charles Louis's attempts to persuade his mother of the merits of the 'alternative' ended after a committee of the Estates of Scotland proposed that 10,000 troops should be raised and transported to Germany for his use.[27]

Another potential solution to the 'Palatine Question' was the creation of an eighth electoral vote, which had been proposed as early as 1622 and throughout the 1630s and 1640s, as a means of both enabling a Palatine restoration as well as satisfying Maximilian's ambitions for an electoral title.[28] This proposition was widely regarded as the only way to establish a stable and long-lasting peace as both the Palatine and Bavarian families would have an electoral vote. Nevertheless, it was opposed by Ferdinand III, due to the inevitable need to amend the Golden Bull, as well as the potential future difficulties arising from an equal number of votes in an Imperial election, three of which would be held by members of the Wittelsbach dynasty.[29] However, the main difficulty with the creation of an eighth electoral title concerned the order of precedence within the Electoral College, as the holder of any newly-established electorate would be bottom of the hierarchy of electors. Maximilian insisted that the prospective eighth electorate be given to Charles Louis, and that Bavaria should retain the more prestigious fifth title and its associated offices, although such a suggestion was anathema to the Palatine family and

[26] Akkerman, II, 1011.
[27] Charles I, *Newes from Scotland. His Maiesties Manifest touching the Palatine Cause. And Act of Parliament concerning the same…*(London, 1641); C. Innes and T. Thomson (eds.), *The Acts of the Parliament of Scotland* (12 vols., Edinburgh, 1814-75), V, 650; SP 81/52 f.221: Declaration of Scot's parliament concerning Palatine, 12 Nov. 1641.
[28] Messinger, p.263.
[29] The three Wittelsbach electors would have been Charles Louis, Maximilian, and Ferdinand, Maximilian's younger brother, the incumbent Archbishop-Elector of Cologne. Ibid., p.267; D. Mußgnug, 'Die Achte Kurwürde', in B-R Kern, E. Wadle and K-P. Schroeder (eds.) *Humaniora: Medizin – Recht – Geschichte: Festschrift für Adolf Laufs zum 70. Geburtstag* (Berlin and Heidelberg, 2006), pp.225-6.

their supporters.[30] Rusdorf railed against the proposition in a 1637 treatise, and Charles Louis dismissed the notion of accepting an eighth electorate as a 'novelty' during the Westphalian negotiations a decade later.[31]

Territorial Restoration

The efforts of the Palatine family were also directed towards the full recovery of their hereditary lands in both the Upper- and Lower Palatinate. It should be noted that, although Elizabeth never relinquished the title of Queen of Bohemia, the Palatine family did not attempt to recover their briefly-held kingdom after Frederick's death in 1632. As early as 1627, the Winter King had authorised his emissaries at the abortive negotiations at Colmar to express his willingness to perform a 'renunciation to the Crowne of Bohemia and all dependances' in return for a full restoration to his hereditary lands and titles.[32] In addition, the widespread opposition to the prospect of a Palatine restitution in Bohemia led Gustavus Adolphus tacitly to abandon Frederick's later designs to reclaim the kingdom, and the Swedish king allegedly offered it to Wallenstein in 1631-32 to tempt him away from Imperial service.[33]

Although Michael Roberts claims that Oxenstierna pledged to restore the Palatine family to Bohemia after the deaths of both Gustavus Adolphus and Frederick, this is not supported by the articles agreed by the Swedish chancellor and Ludwig Philipp. In the treaty of restitution, the Swedes instead pledged to return the Upper and Lower Palatinates

[30] Mußgnug, 'Kurwürde', pp. 222-3; Albrecht, 'Frage', p.464.
[31] *Palæstine*; *LJ*, IX, 174.
[32] SP 81/34 f.215: Result of the Conference at Colmar, 8/18 July 1627.
[33] M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus: a history of Sweden, 1611-1632* (2 vols., London, 1953-58), II, 749-50, 753; A. Gaedeke, *Wallensteins Verhandlungen mit den Schweden und Sachsen 1631-1634* (Frankfurt am Main, 1885), p.42.

'in ye lawfull state they were before ye late troubles'.[34] Ludwig Philipp not only lacked the bargaining power to insist upon Swedish assistance to assist a Palatine restoration in Bohemia, but there is no evidence that Charles Louis or Elizabeth ever aimed to recover the kingdom. Aside from practical concerns, any semblance of dynastic claims of the Palatine family to the Bohemian throne had already been weakened prior to Frederick's death. Charles Louis's elder brother, Heinrich Friedrich, who had been acknowledged as his father's heir to the crown in 1620, drowned crossing the Haarlemmermeer lake in January 1629.[35] As Bohemia had become a hereditary possession of the Habsburg monarchy in 1627, denying the Bohemians the ability to elect their own kings, there was no hope that Charles Louis would be acknowledged as Frederick's heir to the crown after Heinrich Friedrich's death.[36]

In order to facilitate a full Palatine restitution, the Emperor would have been required to deprive Maximilian of Bavaria of the electoral title and lands which had been transferred to him in 1623. However, it was not in Ferdinand II's interests to do this. The terms of Maximilian's enfeoffment agreed in February 1628 stipulated that the transfer was made in lieu of repayment of Bavarian war expenses, which had reached the sum of 13 million florins by late 1627, and that the Emperor would be bound to compensate the duke if the lands were subsequently lost.[37] In addition, by the mid-1630s, Ferdinand's dependency on Bavarian military support meant that Maximilian's approval had become a prerequisite for peace, as shown by the series of concessions and the dynastic marriage with Ferdinand II's daughter, Maria Anna, which were granted to obtain Bavarian assent to

[34] M. Roberts, *From Oxenstierna to Charles XIII: Four Studies* (Cambridge, 1991), p.32; SP 81/40 ff.306-7: Anstruther's despatch, 27 Apr. 1633. This document contains a full copy of the 'Articles of restitution of ye Palatinat betwixt ye Chancellor & Administrator' dated 14 Apr. 1633.
[35] Pursell, p. 102; J.V. Polišenský, *The Thirty Years War*, tr. R. Evans (London, 1971), p.211.
[36] *Tragedy*, p.349.
[37] Ibid., p.422.

the Peace of Prague in 1635.[38] However, Elizabeth does not appear to have acknowledged the need to satisfy Bavarian demands in order to obtain a full Palatine territorial restoration. For example, when Roe suggested that a full restitution might be obtained upon financial compensation being paid to the Maximilian, Elizabeth was indignant, claiming that 'I see no reason that the Duke of Bavare shoulde demand any mony of us for keeping our country from us'.[39]

Whereas Elizabeth maintained her 'all or nothing' stance until the end of the conflict, both Charles Louis and Roe adopted a more pragmatic approach to the possibility of a partial restitution, especially with regards to the need to satisfy Bavaria. When it was proposed in autumn 1641 that the Palatines could receive the Lower Palatinate in exchange for repaying Bavarian war costs, marrying a Habsburg princess and sharing the electoral title with Maximilian, Charles Louis regarded it as 'the shortest way to obtaine Possession, which is said to be eleven points in the law'.[40] The elector also compared the resources available to both Wittelsbach branches. Whereas the Palatine family could only draw on hope and charity, 'Bavaria wanteth neither Men, mony, strong Townes…all seeke its friendship, all feare to offend it'.[41] It was even noted by Roe, widely regarded as a leading figure amongst the zealously Protestant supporters of the Palatine family, that 'it must be well considered, whither refusing that condition, we can probably get, or enforce a better'.[42] However, Charles Louis regarded such a compromise as a last resort and would reject such offers as soon as there was any prospect of military support with which to enforce more favourable terms.

[38] Ibid., p.567.
[39] Akkerman, II, 990.
[40] Ibid., 996.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid., 1009.

Perceived Rights vs Political Reality

It has been suggested that concerns of dignity blinded the Palatine family to the political realities of their situation, and their apparent refusal to compromise has been criticised as needlessly prolonging their exile, especially as they refused terms throughout the 1630s and early-1640s which were almost identical to those agreed at Westphalia in 1648.[43] However, it is insufficient to attribute the Palatine family's refusal of anything less than a full restitution to the lands and titles held by Frederick in 1618 simply to a prideful intransigence of baffling proportions. The imperial constitution left the powers of an emperor, including their ability to implement the Imperial Ban without the consent of the electors, largely undefined and vague, resulting in the emergence of two conflicting interpretations of the constitution emerging by the seventeenth century.[44] In contrast to the monarchical interpretation of imperial power, the Palatine family adhered to an aristocratic understanding of the constitution, which asserted that the emperor was merely first among equals, and framed their cause within this interpretation. Sweden would later promote the same reading of the imperial constitution as justification for their intervention in the war from 1630, which they claimed was to defend the rights of the German states from Habsburg oppression.[45] However, correspondence and pamphlet sources demonstrate that the Palatine family and their supporters were under a number of misapprehensions which, whilst having an apparently sound basis in Imperial law, ultimately proved inaccurate or irrelevant in the political and military situation of the 1630s and 1640s.

[43] C. Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1983), p.27.
[44] P.H. Wilson, 'The Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618-48', *EHR*, 123/502 (2008), p.580; Pursell, p.12.
[45] *Tragedy*, p.463; P. Piirimäe, 'Just War in Theory and Practice: The Legitimation of Swedish Intervention in the Thirty Years War', *HJ*, 43/3 (2002), p.505.

Central to the Palatine family's intransigence in the latter half of the Thirty Years' War was their unassailable conviction in both the justness of Charles Louis's claims to his father's lands, and a belief that the acceptance of anything less than a full restitution of Frederick's title and territories of 1618 would be an admission of wrongdoing.[46] Such concerns were far more acute for exiled rulers, who often had little else to their name than their name itself. A memorial of 1636 opposing a partial Palatine restoration stated that, 'no part of his Countrey can be worth ye great dysadvantages and inconveniences the Prince must undergoe for it'.[47] In addition, the acceptance of such an offer would have required the Palatine exiles to abandon the other anti-Habsburg powers of France, Sweden and the United Provinces, which would also render him 'subject to the displeasure of every petty Prince'.[48]

Many contemporaries initially believed that there would be no need for Charles Louis to request the revocation of the Imperial Ban as he had not been proscribed alongside his father and, as he was regarded as a minor until 1636, 'he cannot have erred or have merited punishment'.[49] Nevertheless, by the mid-1630s, the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, as well as supporters of the Palatine family, viewed Charles Louis's submission and the removal of the ban as a prerequisite to any form of restitution.[50] Although several influential Palatine advisers still regarded the ban against Frederick as unjustly implemented, they acknowledged the futility of arguing its illegality.[51] However, requesting the removal of the ban was unacceptable to Elizabeth, as it would be

[46] *Palæstine.*
[47] SP 81/43 f.190.
[48] Ibid.
[49] SP 81/39 ff.358-74; SP 81/41 ff.334-6: Notes on the Position of the Prince Palatine, [Undated] 1633; *CSPV: 1632-36,* 492.
[50] SP 80/9 f.97: John Taylor in Vienna to Secretary of State, 22 Feb./3 Mar. 1636 and ff.105-16v at 115v: Instructions for Arundel going to Ferdinand II as Ambassador Extraordinary and abstract, 1 Apr. 1636; *CSPV: 1632-36,* 492, 554.
[51] Akkerman, II, 427, 446.

tantamount to an admission that her husband had been justly proscribed by the Emperor, and Charles Louis argued that 'if I desire to have the ban taken from him, I declare it just, if it be just, my father is made guilty'.[52]

There was also a widespread belief that there could be no lasting peace in Europe without a Palatine restoration, as well as the Golden Bull's declaration that the lands of electors 'shall not be parted, divided, or dismembred, in any manner whatsoever, but that they remain for ever united and preserv'd entire'.[53] This view was shared by a large number of contemporaries, with the Elector of Saxony claiming that the transfer of Frederick's electorate to Bavaria would be a cause of perpetual war, and demonstrated by the fact that the Palatine family received numerous proposals offering some form of restoration.[54]

The Palatine Government-in-Exile in 1632

Regardless of whether Palatine policy during the first decade of the family's exile was dictated by Winter King himself, his remaining counsellors, or the English ambassadors and secretaries in his wife's service, it is important to examine why the Palatine family was confronted with a shortage of skilled advisers after Frederick's death in 1632.[55] The ability to maintain an effective functioning government-in-exile is one of the greatest challenges facing any dispossessed regime as it depends entirely on the continued presence and loyalty, as well as the political skill, of those who had either

[52] Ibid., 457, 421.
[53] SP 81/52 ff.260-1: Manifest of Prince Palatine for Roe, [Undated], 1641; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 101; Golden Bull, p.38; *Palæstine*; *Manifest.*
[54] T. Helfferich, *The Thirty Years War: a documentary history* (Indianapolis, 2009), p.65; *CSPV: 1632-36*. 95; SP 81/41 f.130: Instructions for Colonel George Douglas, June 1633.
[55] For a range of views on who determined Palatine policy between 1621-1632 see Pursell, pp.17-22; Mout, pp.257-72; F.H. Schubert, 'Die pfälzische Exilregierung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des politischen Protestantismus', *ZGO*, 102 (1954) and C.P. Clasen, *The Palatinate in European History: 1559-1660* (Oxford, 1963), p.26.

chosen, or been forced, to accompany them. Exile was a grim experience irrespective of status, with factors such as homesickness, grinding poverty, and fears for their families and estates, leading even erstwhile steadfast supporters either returning to their homeland or finding employment elsewhere.[56] Just as large numbers of royalists who could not cope with the rigours of exile flooded back to England during the Interregnum, many Palatine adherents abandoned their master.[57] Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Heidelberg had boasted the only German court which could rival that of the Emperor, and in 1613 one observer commented on the large size of Frederick's court, claiming that it 'is ever great; for it hath 1000 persons in ordinary'.[58] By comparison, the Brandenburg electoral court in Berlin numbered 500-800 during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[59] However, Marika Keblusek asserts that Frederick's court-in-exile consisted of approximately 200 people, following the desertion of many of the Winter King's former supporters and close councillors.[60] For example, Achaz von Dohna returned to his estates in East Prussia in 1624, and his brother Christoph, who was married to the Prince of Orange's sister-in-law, was appointed governor of the Principality of Orange by Frederik Hendrik in 1630.[61]

The common experiences of exile were compounded for the Palatine family by the implementation of the Imperial Ban against Frederick and three of his close confederates

[56] P. Mansel and T. Riotte (eds.), *Monarchy and Exile: The Politics of Legitimacy from Marie de Médicis to Wilhelm II* (Basingstoke, 2011), p.3; G. Smith, *The Cavaliers in Exile: 1640-1660* (2003), pp.91, 113.
[57] Smith, *Cavaliers*, p.108; Clasen, *Palatinate*, p.26.
[58] D. Mertens, 'Der Preis der Patronage. Humanismus und Höfe', in T. Maissen and G. Walther (eds.), *Funktionen des Humanismus: Studien zum Nutzen des Neuen in der humanischen Kultur* (Göttingen, 2006), pp. 125-6; Quotation in Green, p.83 n.2.
[59] M. Völkel, 'The Margravate of Brandenburg and the Kingdom of Prussia: The Hohenzollern Court 1535-1740', in J. Adamson (ed.), *The Princely Courts of Europe: Ritual, Politics and Culture Under the Ancien Régime 1500-1750* (London, 1999), p.214
[60] M. Keblusek, 'The Bohemian Court at The Hague', in M. Keblusek and J., Zijlmans (eds.), *Princely Display: The Court of Frederik Hendrik of Orange and Amalia von Solms* (The Hague, 1997), pp.49-50.
[61] V. Press, *Calvinismus und Territorialstaat: Regierung und Zentralbehörden der Kurpfalz 1559-1619* (Stuttgart, 1970), p.495; Clasen, *Palatinate*, pp.26-7.

in January 1621.[62] This device, under which the proscribed individual was declared an outlaw, with their rights and legal protection suspended, and deprived of the support of any dependents and subjects, succeeded in isolating the Winter King from many potential supporters as well as his own councillors.[63] Even Christian of Anhalt, the 'evil genius of Heidelberg policy', who pressured Frederick to defend Protestantism against the Habsburg antichrist by accepting the Bohemian crown, deserted the defeated Palatines in early 1621 after being placed under the Ban himself, before journeying to Vienna in 1624 to secure a pardon from the Emperor.[64]

Dispossessed regimes also faced the risk that their chances of restoration, and their significance within the European political scene, would be depleted as their exile continued. An apparently ever-decreasing importance on the international stage, together with the fact that pecuniary difficulties often forced exiled rulers to reduce the number of adherents, made serving at a court-in-exile a far less attractive prospect and led to a haemorrhaging of followers.[65] For example, Ludwig Camerarius, the aggressively militant Palatine councillor and propagandist, entered Swedish diplomatic service in 1626 as he believed he could better assist the 'causa communis' by working for Gustavus Adolphus than by remaining in Frederick's service.[66] Although Frederick and Elizabeth remained convinced of their former adviser's loyalty, and greatly approved his son's appointment as

[62] J.P. Abelin (ed.), *Theatrum Europæum* (21 vols., Frankfurt am Main, 1643-1738), I, 470-6; *Tragedy*, p.315.
[63] Wilson, *Empire*, p.614.
[64] Clasen, *Palatinate*, pp.21, 44; *Tragedy*, pp.284, 315; Pursell, p.131; Schubert, 'Exilregierung', pp.595-6.
[65] T. Osborne, 'A Queen Mother in Exile: Marie De Médicis in the Spanish Netherlands and England, 1631-41', in Mansel and Riotte, *Monarchy and Exile*, p.30; E. Gregg, 'Monarchs without a Crown', in R. Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and H.M. Scott (eds.), *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton* (Cambridge, 1997), p.388.
[66] Akkerman, I, 516; Clasen, *Palatinate*, p.29.

the Swedish ambassador to The Hague in 1629, Roe had to remind Elizabeth that Camerarius was now 'a minister of Suede, bound to their Interests, & not infallible'.[67]

In addition to these losses, the ranks of potential Palatine policymakers were further thinned by natural causes, with a number of experienced stalwarts of Frederick's councils in both the Palatinate and The Hague predeceasing their master. The Palatine Chancellor, Johann Christoph von der Grün, died a few days before the fall of Heidelberg in 1622, and Johann Albrecht von Solms-Braufels, Frederick's Grand Chamberlain who assumed a dominant role at the exiled court, followed him to the grave in 1623.[68] The spirited and talented Chief Justice, Andreas Pawell, who tirelessly promoted the Palatine cause in a number of European courts, died in 1630.[69] Finally, Volrad von Plessen, a member of the Palatine Privy Council since the accession of Frederick's father, and who acted as the leading councillor on foreign affairs, continued as an adviser to the exiled regime whilst serving as preceptor to Frederick's children in Leiden from 1623 until his death in September 1631.[70]

Guardian Uncles

It was widely believed upon Frederick's death that the two figures who would exert the greatest influence over Palatine affairs on behalf of the fourteen-year-old Charles Louis would be his two uncles: Ludwig Philipp, and Charles I. In addition to the expectations imposed by the terms of the Golden Bull, contemporaries speculated that Ludwig Philipp

[67] Akkerman, II, 126, 150, 613.
[68] S. Groenveld, 'Könige ohne Staat: Friedrich V und Elizabeth als Exilierte in Den Haag 1621-1632-1661', in P. Wolf et al. (eds.) *Der Winterkönig – Friedrich von der Pfalz: Bayern und Europa im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart, 2003), p.174.
[69] Schubert, 'Exilregierung', p.601; M. Lemberg, *Eine Königin ohne Reich: Das Leben der Winterkönigin Elisabeth Stuart und ihre Briefe nach Hessen* (Marburg, 1996), p.33.
[70] SP 84/112 f.131v: Sir Dudley Carleton at The Hague to George Calvert, 13 May 1623; Press, *Calvinismus,* p.487; Pursell, pp.131; Schubert, 'Exilregierung', pp.600-1.

would accept the administratorship to prevent the role devolving upon Charles Louis's next-closest adult male relative, Wolfgang Wilhelm, Count Palatine of Pfalz-Neuburg.[71] Wolfgang Wilhelm was not only a catholic convert and brother-in-law to Maximilian of Bavaria, but he had also attempted to press his own claim to the confiscated Palatine electorate in the 1620s, prompting Sir Henry Vane to fear that he 'will probably insinuate himselfe into the administrasion' as he 'wants not pretensions to the Electorship'.[72]

Wolfgang Wilhelm claimed that he was the rightful successor to the electoral lands and title after Frederick's proscription under the terms of the Golden Bull.[73] Although Pfalz-Neuburg was given Frederick's share in three districts in northern Bavaria in late 1622 to reconcile Wolfgang Wilhelm to his brother-in-law's elevation to electoral rank, the duke boycotted Maximilian's investiture ceremony and continued to press his own claims to the Palatinate.[74] It was reported from Vienna in 1638 that Wolfgang Wilhelm was not only seeking to ingratiate himself with the Emperor, but also that he hoped to marry the wife of Maximilian of Bavaria, who was reportedly in failing health, in order to further his designs on the electorate.[75] Frederick had acknowledged the threat posed by the close dynastic proximity of the Pfalz-Neuburg line following the birth of Heinrich Friedrich in January 1614. Upon the birth of his first son, the eighteen-year-old Frederick made his last will and testament to name his fellow Calvinist and former guardian, Johann II of Pfalz-Zweibrücken as Administrator of the Palatinate in the event of the elector's death.[76] Such a precaution was understandable, as Ludwig Philipp was only eleven-years-old in January

[71] See below Appendix I, p.309 for the family connection between the Electoral and Pfalz-Neuburg branches.
[72] SP 81/39 f.375; V. Press, 'Fürstentum und Fürstenhaus: Die dritte wittelsbachische Kraft', in K. Ackermann and G. Girisch (eds.), *Gustl Lang: Leben für die Heimat* (Weiden, 1989), p.263; Green, p.307.
[73] Thomas, p.307; Press, 'Fürstentum', p.263.
[74] *Tragedy*, pp.355-6; Parker, p.162.
[75] MS Clarendon 14 f.40: Taylor to Windebank, 14 Apr. 1638.
[76] Thomas, p.185; Press, *Calvinismus*, pp.507-8.

1614, and would not have been able to assume the administratorship until late-November 1620.

It was also expected that Charles I would make greater efforts for his sister and her children after Frederick's death, with one government administrator asserting that 'our King and State are obliged to do more for a nephew than a brother-in-law, and more likewise for a widow than for a wife'.[77] By comparing the influence of both Ludwig Philipp and Charles I on the formulation of Palatine policy, this section will examine whether it was possible for exiled dynasties to pursue their own independent policies, or whether they were forced simply to adopt strategies favoured by their allies and benefactors.

By late-December 1632, Ludwig Philipp had informed Elizabeth that he would undertake the guardianship of her son's dominions, and was styling himself as 'Tutor et Electoralis Palatinus Administrator' in his correspondence with Charles I.[78] Even John Durie, who had previously questioned Ludwig Philipp's willingness to act as administrator, described him in February 1633 as 'a zealous and godly young man, somewhat more resolute than his brother, the King of Bohemia'.[79] Ludwig Philipp has been greatly overlooked in literature on the Palatine exiles, being dismissed as an unwilling and ineffective administrator who lacked the political acumen of his contemporaries Oxenstierna and Richelieu.[80] Certainly, the administrator committed a number of diplomatic faux pas, such as angering the king of Denmark by neglecting to

[77] T. Birch and R. F. Williams (eds.), *The Court and Times of Charles the First* (2 vols., London, 1848), II, 206.
[78] *CSPV: 1632-1636*, 50; SP 81/39 f.329: Ludwig Philipp to Charles I, 28 Dec. 1632/8 Jan. 1633.
[79] SP 81/39 f.270: John Durie to Sir Thomas Roe, 2/12 Dec. 1632; SP 16/534 f.6v: Durie in Frankfurt to Roe, 4/14 Feb. 1633.
[80] Hauck, p.17; Oman, p.307; Lemberg, *Königin*, p.43.

send him a single letter during his first year as administrator, as well as addressing a letter to Henrietta Maria in a style in which 'greater Princes honour their inferior'.[81]

Nonetheless, between 1632 and 1635, Ludwig Philipp actively pursued recognition of his nephew's claim to the Palatine electoral lands and title, and his family's influence over their hereditary territories. In addition to producing a petition demanding the investiture of Charles Louis as elector, Ludwig Philipp sent Colonel Georg Johann Peblitz at the head of a team of representatives to the negotiations at Heilbronn, where they were recognised by the Swedes and the majority of German Protestant princes 'not only as ministers of the Princes of the Palatinate, but as those of an elector'.[82] The administrator also appears to have been the central Palatine figure during the negotiation of the articles of restitution with Oxenstierna in early-1633, which agreed that the Swedes would restore 'what they have or shall gayne' in the Upper and Lower Palatinates, with the exception of Mannheim, which would only be returned at the end of hostilities.[83]

It would, of course, be naïve to overlook the fact that Sir Robert Anstruther had been dispatched by Charles I to 'keepe the partie of the Princes united' and 'persuade them to intertain the restitution of our Nephew', and had intimated in private meetings to Oxenstierna that his master would be willing to provide considerable financial assistance to the Heilbronn League.[84] However, Anstruther himself asserted that the articles of restitution were negotiated entirely in Ludwig Philipp's name by his own ministers,

[81] Akkerman, II, 217, 336.
[82] SP 81/41 f.348: Petition for investiture of Charles Louis as Elector Palatine, [Undated] 1633**;** SP 81/40 ff.207, 226-7: Anstruther in Frankfurt to Lord Treasurer Portland, 20/30 Mar. 1633 and List of ambassadors at Heilbronn, Mar. 1633; Akkerman, II, 176; *CSPV: 1632-36,* 94.
[83] SP 81/40 ff.306-7.
[84] SP 81/39 ff.358-74 at f.358; S. Murdoch, 'Scottish Ambassadors and British Diplomacy 1618-1635', in S. Murdoch (ed.), *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648* (Leiden, 2001), p. 42.

demonstrating that, although the administrator was most likely dependent on English backing, he appears to have directed Palatine policy immediately following his brother's death.[85] In contrast with subsequent negotiations regarding the Palatine cause, Elizabeth's correspondence at this time makes no mention of sending her own emissaries to accompany Ludwig Philipp's representatives nor shows any knowledge of the terms of the restitution agreed with Oxenstierna. Indeed, it appears that she only received a copy of the articles of restitution when Secretary Coke wrote to her at Charles's behest the following month.[86]

In spite of his commitment to his nephew's cause, Ludwig Philipp was entirely dependent on the protection and financial support of stronger European powers in order to uphold Palatine authority in the restored areas of the Lower Palatinate, and his ability to pursue an independent policy was consequently considerably curtailed. Anstruther described the administrator as 'that good milde Prince…more zealous than potent, either in present meanes or Counsellors', and Rusdorf describing the regency government in Heidelberg as a flock without a pastor.[87] The loss of the recovered Palatine territories in mid-1635 ultimately forced Ludwig Philipp to relinquish his responsibilities as administrator of the Palatinate, and he appears to have spent the rest of the war attempting to recover control of his own duchy.[88]

Even before November 1632, it was widely anticipated that Charles I would play an important role in Palatine affairs in the event of Frederick's death, with Frederick

[85] SP 81/40 ff.295-8 at f.296: Anstruther in Frankfurt to Sir John Coke, 26 Apr. 1633 (Second Letter).
[86] Akkerman, II, 183-5.
[87] SP 81/40 f.178: Anstruther in Frankfurt to Coke, 11/21 Mar. 1633; Häusser, II, 526.
[88] SP 81/45 f.255: Ludwig Philipp in Sedan to Roe, 6/16 Nov. 1638; SP 81/52 ff.110, 196, 258: Ludwig Philipp to Roe, 13/23 Sept. 1641, 11/21 Oct. 1641 and 27 Dec. 1641/6 Jan. 1642.

repeatedly asking Charles to safeguard the interests of his wife and children in such an eventuality.[89] Unsurprisingly, the expectations of assistance from the Stuart court only increased after Frederick's demise. Elizabeth's sons sent a flurry of letters professing their loyalty to their royal uncle and claiming that they 'have neither friends, nor fortune, nor greather honour in this world, than to belong to your Royall blood', and the king appears to have confirmed such anticipation, assuring Charles Louis of 'my fatherlie care of you and your affaires'.[90] Even Ludwig Philipp reportedly stated that he only accepted the administratorship because of a confidence that he would receive prompt support from Charles I, and it should be noted that the administrator sent a representative to conduct discreet negotiations with the king shortly after assuming the role of tutor and guardian for Charles Louis.[91]

Although the king was the most significant diplomatic supporter and financial benefactor of the Palatine exiles throughout the 1630s, there is little evidence to suggest that Charles played an active role in devising the strategies pursued by Charles Louis in the second half of the decade. Charles provided the vital financial and martial supplies for his nephew's military enterprises in the later-1630s, but it is clear that he was not involved in planning the ventures. This is evident in the example of Charles Louis's purchase of the town of Meppen in March 1638, intended as a base from which to raise the first independent Palatine-led army since the fall of Heidelberg.[92] Elizabeth confided to Roe after the town was purchased that 'I was a little in paine not knowing how my Brother

[89] TNA State Papers Foreign: Treaties [SP 108]: SP 108 f.197: Deed of Frederick, Elector Palatine, entrusting the affairs of the Palatinate to Charles I of England, 29 Mar. 1630; SP 81/38 f.34: Frederick to Charles I, 16/26 Jan. 1632; Pursell, p. 270.
[90] SP 81/40 ff.76-7, 78-9: Rupert at The Hague to Charles I, 21 Jan. 1633 and Charles Louis to Charles I, 21 Jan. 1633; K. Hauck (ed.), *Die Briefe der Kinder des Winterkönigs* (Heidelberg, 1908), p.1: Charles Louis, Rupert, Maurice and Edward to Charles I, 12 Dec. 1632 and Charles I to Charles Louis, 26 Dec. 1632.
[91] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 90, 148; Loomie, pp.139-40.
[92] The business of Meppen will be covered in more detail in Chapter 3.

woulde like of my sons resolution', suggesting that the king had not been consulted in the planning of this action.[93] As Charles I does not appear to have had any significant role in the actual creation of Palatine policy, and Ludwig Philipp's leading role in his nephew's government evaporated after the re-invasion of the Lower Palatinate and Charles Louis's attainment of his majority in 1635, it is important to determine who actually devised and directed the exiles' strategies between 1632 and 1648.

Advisers and Adherents

The defections, desertions and deaths of Palatine advisers which occurred since the fall of Heidelberg in September 1622, meant that Charles Louis lacked the counsel of an influential statesman such as Grand Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna and Cardinal Mazarin, the leading advisers during the regencies of Christina of Sweden and Louis XIV respectively. The closest the Palatine family had to a chief adviser was Johann Joachim von Rusdorf, a 'man of great experience and loyalty', who authored a large number of political tracts promoting Charles Louis's cause and was regarded by a number of contemporaries as the young elector's 'chief counsellor & director' until his death in 1640.[94] Aged forty-three at the time of Frederick's death, Rusdorf was one of the rapidly promoted juniors who assumed a considerable amount of the burden of work during their master's exile and, although he had never been a member of Frederick's Privy Council, he had been a faithful servant of the Palatine government since May 1616.[95]

[93] SP 84/153 f.221: Ferencz at The Hague to Roe, 23 Feb./5 Mar. 1638; Akkerman, II, 670.
[94] SP 16/300 f.11: Durie at The Hague to Roe, 18/28 Oct. 1635; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 491-2, 545; F. Krüner, *Johann von Rusdorf. Kurpfälzischer Gesandter und Staatsmann während des dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Halle, 1876), pp.116-17. For examples of Rusdorf's political writings see: J.J. von Rusdorf, *Vindiciæ Causæ Palatinæ; Sive Assertio & Deductio Juris inviolabilis legitimæ Successionis, Serenissimi et celsissimi Principis, Caroli Ludovici, Comitis Palatini ad Rhenum, Sacri Romani Imperii Archidapiferi & Electoris, Ducis Bavariæ…*(Frankfurt, 1640) and *Palæstine*. He was also most likely the author of *Manifest* which is commonly attributed to Charles Louis.
[95] Schubert, 'Exilregierung', p.595.

Rusdorf has been viewed by a number of scholars as the Palatine family's most pragmatic adviser, and is credited with the shift from a maximalist agenda, such as Andreas Pawell's insistence on recovering Bohemia as well as the Palatinate, towards attempting to use British mediation to achieve more modest goals and compromise after 1626.[96] Although the young elector valued his adviser's insight into German affairs, to the point that he was willing to use them as the basis for diplomatic instructions, it is difficult to argue that Rusdorf had a continuously large role in determining Palatine policy. [97]

Whereas Christina effusively described Oxenstierna as 'a wise and prudent man' who knew the strengths and weaknesses of every European state and was 'immensely capable, and great-hearted', Rusdorf's employers did not provide such glowing praise.[98] Charles Louis confided to Roe that 'for secrets you may trust him no further than from hand to mouth' and that 'in holding correspondences with soe many, he can scarce keepe any thing secrett'.[99] Elizabeth's testimony was equally bleak. Although she asserted that 'I am confident he is not false', she supported her son's assessment that Rusdorf 'has too many correspondences', and that she would not have inflicted his presence on Roe at the Hamburg negotiations 'if we had any other that knoweth as well as he the state of Germany and customs'.[100] Rusdorf's considerable knowledge of German affairs led to his dispatch to important assemblies, such as Arundel's embassy to Vienna in 1636 and the conference at Hamburg in mid-1638.[101] However, his wisdom was most often employed in

[96] Ibid., p.591; Lemberg, *Königin*, p.33; Rüde, *England und Kurpfalz*, pp.226-43; Akkerman, II, 358 n.2.
[97] Akkerman, II, 421.
[98] Quoted in V. Buckley, *Christina: Queen of Sweden* (London, 2004), p.50.
[99] SP 81/44 ff.116v, 149v: Charles Louis in Rhenen to Roe, 9/19 June 1638 and Sir Richard Cave in Rhenen to Roe, 5 July 1638.
[100] Akkerman, II, 683.
[101] F.C. Springell, *Connoisseur & Diplomat: The Earl of Arundel's Embassy to Germany in 1636 as recounted in William Crowne's Diary, and the Earl's letters and other contemporary sources with a catalogue of the topographical drawings made on the journey by Wenceslaus Hollar* (London, 1963), p.13; E. Beller, 'The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg 1638-40', *EHR*, 41/161 (1926), p.66.

the implementation, and not the formation, of Palatine policy, with Roe likening him to 'a sharp knife, a good toole in hands that can guide it'.[102]

It is important to make the distinction between supporters and benefactors of Elizabeth and her children, and those individuals who actively helped to determine the course of Palatine policy in the years between 1632 and 1648. This is particularly significant when examining the role played by adherents of the Palatine family from the Winter Queen's homeland, such as Roe and William, Lord Craven. Craven had first encountered the Palatine family whilst serving in the Dutch and Swedish armies in the mid-1620s and became the 'constant follower' of Charles Louis's fortunes, as well as Elizabeth's most devoted admirer for over thirty years.[103] One of the nine wealthiest peers in England, Craven was undoubtedly the most generous private financial benefactor the Palatine exiles. Over the course of two decades he contributed large sums to Charles Louis's war chest, subsidised Elizabeth's court expenditure, and even paid significant amounts to redeem the jewels pawned by the family to fund their everyday subsistence.[104] Craven's generosity provoked derision from some of his contemporaries, perhaps envious of his considerable wealth. For example, although Craven's offer of £10,000 towards a potential Palatine naval campaign in 1637 was praised by the earl of Northumberland as highlighting the 'backwardness of everybody else' in supporting the scheme, Sir Ralph Verney claimed that 'by many he is condemned of prodigality, but by most of folly'.[105]

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[102] Akkerman, II, 687.
[103] Loomie, p.263; R. Haig, *Knight Errant: Lord Craven and the Court of the Winter Queen* (Croydon, 2015). Frederick commented on Craven's 'good affection' towards the family on multiple occasions. See Akkerman, I, 765 and II, 96.
[104] 'Notebook', 14; Bod.: Craven Estate Papers 80: Account book of Lewis Ziegler as Lord Craven's agent in Holland, 1649-53. For Lord Craven's wealth see M. Brod, 'The case of Lord Craven, 1650-60', in G. Southcombe and G. Tapsell (eds.), *Revolutionary England, c.1630-c.1660: Essays for Clive Holmes* (Abingdon, 2017).
[105] Akkerman, II, 568-9; Knowler, II, 49; J. Bruce (ed.), *Letters and Papers of the Verney Family down to the end of the year 1639* (London, 1853), p.190.

Craven personally raised over 3,000 men for Charles Louis's army in 1638 and pledged not only his money, but also his life, to the Palatine cause, performing acts of bravery and loyalty which went far beyond the call of duty.[106] Craven's near-obsessive devotion to Elizabeth caused rumours to circulate by the end of the eighteenth century that the perennial bachelor had secretly married the widowed Winter Queen, although few scholars take such speculations seriously.[107] However, there is little evidence to suggest that Craven played any notable role in the formation of Palatine policy. Rather, once a certain course of action was decided upon, the peer would back Elizabeth and her children to the hilt, placing his considerable resources, as well as his sword, at their disposal.

Sir Thomas Roe appears to have directly influenced Palatine policy more than perhaps any other adviser until his death in 1644. An experienced diplomat who would promote Palatine interests as Charles I's representative at a number of negotiations and conferences, Roe has been described as the leader of Elizabeth's adherents in her homeland and her most outspoken and devoted champion.[108] Certainly, Elizabeth was never as candid with any other correspondent as she was with her 'Honest fatt Thom', who declared that he had been devoted to her since her infancy, and is believed to have held an appointment at her childhood household at Combe Abbey.[109] Even though Roe had been excluded from inner court circles until late-1636, lamenting in April 1632 that 'I am now resolved to dock up, like Drakes ship, good for nothing but to be pointed at', Elizabeth and Charles Louis repeatedly requested, and apparently followed, Roe's advice, which the

[106] *Tragedy*, p.322.
[107] Green, pp.398-9; Haig, *Craven*, p.155; Oman, p.451.
[108] Beller, 'Hamburg', p.61; R.B. Mowat, 'The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to Vienna, 1641-2', *EHR*, 25/98 (1910); Hibbard, *Plot*, p.31; M. Strachan, *Sir Thomas Roe, 1581-1644: A Life* (Salisbury, 1989), pp.132-3.
[109] Akkerman, I, 374; Strachan, *Roe*, pp.6-7; Green, p.151; M.J. Brown, *Itinerant Ambassador: The Life of Sir Thomas Roe* (Lexington, KY, 1970), p.143.

young prince claimed to value 'to my good above any thing'.[110] For example, in addition to acting as the British representative at the negotiations in Hamburg, Elizabeth insisted that her own emissary to the conference, Rusdorf, was to defer to Roe, and requested that he examine Charles Louis's articles to the Swedes and 'mend or change as you think will be best'.[111]

Roe also drafted petitions for the Palatine cause and provided counsel on memorials which the Winter Queen and her son received and forwarded to their steadfast supporter.[112] The value of Roe's advice and diplomatic experience, compared to that of Charles Louis's other councillors, was perhaps best demonstrated by the young prince's request in summer 1643 for Roe to translate a memorial from French for him. The young elector claimed that 'I have none about me able to translate it into English, nor would it then be generally understood by those that councell me'.[113] However, as Roe himself noted, any final policy decision had to be made by Charles Louis, claiming that 'I am but the balance, he is the Spring that moves the wheeles'.[114] It is important, therefore, to examine whether the young prince was truly in control of political and military strategies pursued in his name, or if, as has been long-assumed by scholars, his mother continued to exercise substantial influence over Palatine diplomacy after Charles Louis attained his majority in December 1635.

Charles Louis

[110] Beller, 'Hamburg', p.61; SP 81/44 f.32: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 7 Mar. 1638; SP 81/45 f.121: Charles Louis in Osnabrück to Roe, 17/27 Sept. 1638; Akkerman, II, 932, 940.
[111] Akkerman, II, 721, 813, 819.
[112] SP 16/338 ff.70, 85: Charles Louis to Roe, 30 Dec. 1636 and Roe at Cranford to Charles Louis, 31 Dec. 1636; SP 80/10 ff.161-3v: Manifesto on the Palatinate drawn up by Roe, [Undated] 1641.
[113] SP 81/53 f.274: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 22 June/2 July 1643.
[114] Akkerman, II, 1009.

It is difficult to argue that Charles Louis played the leading role in directing Palatine policy for much of the period between 1632 and 1648. The disconnect between the regency government in the recently-restored Lower Palatinate and Elizabeth's court-in-exile at The Hague effectively precluded the young prince from taking any role in Palatine policy during his minority. Even though Charles Louis attained his majority in December 1635, it was not until 1643 that he could truly be described as the dominant figure in the formulation of his own diplomacy. For example, during his time at the Stuart Court between October 1635 and July 1637, Charles Louis appears to have acted primarily as a figurehead to inspire support from Elizabeth's homeland as he had little involvement in the negotiations regarding the Palatine cause. It was his councillors Rusdorf and Johann Konrad Blarer who remained in London and had frequent meetings with Laud and the secretaries of state whilst the young prince went hunting with the king, attended masques and courtly celebrations, and was feasted by prominent noblemen.[115]

It should be noted that Charles Louis appears to have taken a larger role in directing his own affairs from the later-1630s. He was the driving force behind the Palatine attempts to obtain an army, as well as the planning of military enterprises, in the later 1630s. However, Elizabeth continued to exert influence over Palatine policy into the early-1640s as the young prince repeatedly sought his mother's advice on diplomatic matters, perhaps out of an awareness of his own limited political experience. For example, the young elector wrote to his mother in 1636 that 'you can never doe me a greater favour then to tell me of my faults, for I know that I am young and more subject to faile than any bodye', and, when Rusdorf accompanied the earl of Arundel's embassy to Vienna, Charles

[115] *CSPV: 1632-36,* 491; Loomie, p.188; Knowler, I, 504; M. Butler, 'Entertaining the Palatine Prince: Plays on Foreign Affairs', *English Literary Renaissance,* 13/3 (1983).

Louis claimed to his mother that 'I would not give him any instructions afore I knew your advise'.[116] This does not appear to have been mere flattery as the young elector's requests for advice continued throughout the remainder of his family's exile, and Elizabeth still remained an important figure in the formulation of Palatine policy into the early-1640s.

It was not until after Charles Louis absconded from Charles I's camp on the eve of the English Civil War in summer 1642 and returned to The Hague, that Elizabeth jadedly surrendered her dominance over Palatine affairs as her son took an increasingly large role in determining his family's policy independent of the influence of his mother.[117] In November 1642, Elizabeth wrote to Roe that 'I cannot tell you what the Prince Elector will doe whither he will goe to the king or not', and claimed the following April that 'he is now of age to governe himselfe and choose better counsels than mine are and so I leave him to them, not meaning to medle with them'.[118] Certainly, Charles Louis's actions during the English Civil War, especially his overt declaration for Parliament in 1644, were his own policies, and the young elector co-ordinated the Palatine efforts at Westphalia from his lodgings in Whitehall.

Elizabeth of Bohemia

Elizabeth was the most consistent influence on the policies pursued by the Palatine family after 1632 and can rightfully be regarded as Charles Louis's most significant adviser for the majority of his exile, despite never being officially recognised as regent for her son. The Winter Queen's tireless activity for her family's cause has led a number of

[116] Akkerman, II, 382, 421.
[117] Ibid., 5; Oman, p.362.
[118] Akkerman, II, 1051; SP 81/53 f.228: Elizabeth at The Hague to Roe, 20/30 Apr. 1643.

scholars to describe her as a remarkably able stateswoman.[119] However, in order to determine the validity of such an assessment, it is important to examine exactly how Elizabeth was able to exercise political influence and assess the precise nature of her role between 1632 and 1643. The example of the Winter Queen can provide a valuable insight into how women assumed political roles within the strictly gendered society of early modern Europe, as well as why they chose to do so in a period of widespread conflict.[120]

It has been suggested that Elizabeth had experience of influencing Palatine affairs prior to her husband's death, with a number of scholars claiming that she determined Frederick's policy and that she emotionally blackmailed him to accepting the Bohemian crown due to a 'worldly vanity [which] made her oblivious to reason'.[121] However, such interpretations were the product of a number of 'memorable but fictitious quips', such as an apocryphal quotation attributed to Elizabeth that she 'would rather eat sauerkraut with a King than roast meat with an elector'.[122] In the sustained campaign of defamation against Frederick in political broadsheets of the early 1620s, which gleefully portrayed him as an incompetent villain, a self-pitying ingrate, a drunkard and even an ape, Elizabeth was also depicted as an ambitious temptress who led her husband astray.[123] In one 1621 broadsheet,

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[119] Akkerman, II, 14; J. Ross, *The Winter Queen: The Story of Elizabeth Stuart* (New York, 1979), p.108; K.L. Nelson, 'Negotiating Exile: Henrietta Maria, Elizabeth of Bohemia, and the Court of Charles I', in C. Levin, J. Eldridge Carney and D. Barrett-Graves (eds.), *"High and Mighty Queens" of Early Modern England: Realities and Representations* (Basingstoke, 2003).

[120] M.E. Wiesner, *Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1993), p.255; P. Richards, 'The Guise women: Politics, war and peace', in J. Munns and P. Richards (eds.), *Gender, power and privilege in early modern Europe* (Harlow, 2003), p.169.

[121] Quotation in Green, p.xvi also p.129; J.A. Nathan, *Soldiers, Statecraft, and History: Coercive Diplomacy and International Order* (Westport, CT, 2002), p.6; A. Schweickert, 'Die Religion, die Kur, die Kurpfalz: Notizien zur Ereignisgeschichte', in A. Schweickert (ed.), *Kurpfalz* (1997), p.38; M. Ritter, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation und des Dreissigjährigen Krieges (1555-1648)* (3 vols., Stuttgart, 1889), III, 49.

[122] Pursell, p.17; Green, pp. 129-30; F. Schiller, *The History of the Thirty Years War in Germany*, tr. W. Blaquiere (2 vols., Dublin, 1800), I, 78.

[123] R. Wolkan, *Deutsche Lieder auf den Winterkönig* (Prague, 1898); E.A. Beller, *Caricatures of the 'Winter King' of Bohemia* (Oxford, 1928); P. Voigt, 'Dosud Neznámá Verze Satiry na Útěk Fridricha Falckého', *Sbornik Národniho Muzea v Praze. Rada C: Literárni Historie*, 31, 3-4 (1986); J.R. Paas, *The German Political Broadsheet 1600-1700* (10 vols., Wiesbaden, 1985-2017), III, 313-17 and IV, 55.

titled ‘An intimate conversation between the Princess of Heidelberg and her close adviser Johann Claudius’, Elizabeth declares ‘I should be a queen’ before being chided that ‘It was enough to be an Electress’.[124] However, it should be mentioned that an equally large number of pamphlets, such as ‘The Palatine Pilgrim’ and ‘The Palatine’s Furlough’, depicted Elizabeth as a long-suffering wife caught between her foolish husband and a wrathful father.[125]

Although Elizabeth’s acute sense of rank is certainly evident from her correspondence, there is a consensus amongst scholars that there is no evidence to support the legend of Frederick as a cowed husband, with Brennan Pursell and Nadine Akkerman refuting any suggestion that she helped to initiate the ‘Bohemian adventure’.[126] However, it is unlikely that Elizabeth did not influence Frederick’s decision in some way. In a letter to the duke of Buckingham, in which she claimed her husband would not accept the Bohemian throne without hearing the advice of her father, Elizabeth betrays her inclination towards acceptance, and C.V. Wedgwood has observed that ‘it is difficult to believe that the Bohemian Crown was a subject altogether barred in the electoral bedchamber’.[127] Indeed, when Elizabeth sent letters to Ferdinand II and his heir at the time of the earl of Arundel’s embassy to Vienna in 1636, she also wrote to their spouses and specifically asked the Empress Consort to use her ‘benevolent intervention’ on her behalf, suggesting that she believed that royal wives could influence their husbands’ political manoeuvres.[128] Regardless of whether Elizabeth’s persuasion was a decisive factor behind Frederick’s acceptance of the Bohemian crown, it is highly unlikely that she exercised any meaningful

[124] ‘Vertrautes Gesprach von Prinzessin von Heidelberg mit ihrem gehaimen Rath Iohan Claudio’, in Paas, III, 317.
[125] Beller, *Caricatures*, pp.35-9.
[126] Pursell, pp.17-22; Akkerman, I, 24-5.
[127] Oman, p.171. See also *Tragedy*, p.284; C.V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years’ War* (London, 1938), p.97.
[128] Akkerman, II, 410, 412.

political influence or helped to dictate the direction of Palatine policy prior to her husband's death. Indeed, it was only in February 1633 that Elizabeth wrote to a beloved former lady-in-waiting that 'I think you would never have thought that I shoulde become a states woman'.[129]

The Winter Queen was one of a large number of women in early modern Europe who, due to 'the chances of birth, marriage and death' assumed real political power in their own right or as regents.[130] For example, Cardinal Mazarin's influence rested on his ability to secure the support of Anne of Austria during Louis XIV's minority, the Dowager Queen Hedwig Eleonora of Sweden had two votes on the regency councils of both Karl XI and Karl II, and Mariana of Austria exerted substantial influence at the Spanish court for over a decade as regent for Carlos II.[131] However, widows were by no means guaranteed political roles. Maria Eleonora, the widow of Gustavus Adolphus, enjoyed no influence in the regency of her daughter Christina, and Oxenstierna banished her to Gripsholm island in 1636. It should be noted that the paralyzing grief Maria Eleonora suffered following her husband's death together with possible mental instability, manifesting in attempts to exhume the late king's corpse, prompted the regency council to exclude her from any political power.[132]

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[129] Ibid., 170.
[130] L. Hopkins, *Women who Would be Kings: Female Rulers of the Sixteenth Century* (London and New York, 1991), p.8.
[131] P. Sonnino, *Mazarin's Quest: The Congress of Westphalia and the Coming of the Fronde* (Cambridge, MA, 2008), pp.31-5; R. Kleinman, *Anne of Austria: Queen of France* (Columbus, OH, 1985), ch. 11; G. Treasure, *Mazarin: The Crisis of Absolutism in France* (London, 1995), ch. 8; L. Granlund, 'Queen Hedwig Eleonora of Sweden: dowager, builder, and collector', in C. Campbell Orr (ed.), *Queenship in Europe 1660-1815: The Role of the Consort* (Cambridge, 2004); E. Goodman, 'Conspicuous in Her Absence: Mariana of Austria, Juan José of Austria, and the Representation of Her Power', in T. Earenfight (ed.), *Queenship and Political Power in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (London and New York, 2005), p.163.
[132] P.D. Lockhart, *Sweden in the Seventeenth Century* (Basingstoke, 2004), pp.56-8; *Tragedy*, p.512.

Whilst it is true that these women were only able to wield influence in statecraft because of their connections to male rulers, and that they were expected to relinquish it once their wards attained their majority, there are several examples of seventeenth-century queen regents who exercised political power even after their charges came of age. In Savoy alone, Christine Marie of France and Marie Jeanne Baptiste of Savoy-Nemours continued to wield authority after their sons reached the age to rule in their own right.[133] In addition, although Isabella Clara Eugenia of Spain lost her title as joint sovereign of the Spanish Netherlands following the death of her husband, Archduke Albert of Austria, in 1621, she accepted the governorship of the territory at the request of her nephew, Philip IV of Spain. Whilst undeniably a reduction in status, it is important to note that she enjoyed greater powers than any previous governor until her death in 1633.[134]

As a large number of women ultimately assumed regency powers on behalf of their underage offspring, it is surprising that the majority of widow-regents received no education to prepare them for such roles.[135] Whereas James VI and I's sons received instruction in disciplines intended to teach the 'craft' of monarchy, such as history, politics and Latin, Elizabeth's curriculum prepared her primarily for the roles of devoted daughter, sister and spouse and ornamental consort. The princess's studies emphasised music, vernacular languages, the art of letter-writing, and cultivating loyalty to her kin.[136] In addition to receiving no formal training in the arts of statecraft, Elizabeth declared her

[133] R. Oresko, 'Maria Giovanna Battista of Savoy-Nemours (1644-1724): Daughter, Consort, and Regent of Savoy', in Campbell Orr, *Queenship in Europe*, pp.26-8.
[134] M.S. Sánchez, 'Sword and Wimple: Isabel Clara Eugenia and Power', in A.J. Cruz and M. Suzuki (eds.), *The Rule of Women in Early Modern Europe* (Urbana, IL, 2009) and her *The Empress, the Queen, and the Nun: Women and Power at the Court of Philip III of Spain* (Baltimore, 1998), p.113.
[135] H. Wunder, *He is the Sun, She is the Moon: Women in Early Modern Germany*, tr. T. Dunlap (London, 1998), pp.154-5.
[136] A. Pollnitz, *Princely Education in Early Modern Britain* (Cambridge, 2015), pp.216-18 and her article 'Humanism and the Education of Henry, Prince of Wales', in T. Wilks (ed.) *Prince Henry Revived: Image and Exemplarity in Early Modern England* (Southampton, 2007), p.49.

hatred at the idea of becoming a stateswoman, describing it as 'that which I hoped never to be putt to'.[137] Considering her inexperience and disdain for direct political involvement, as well as the fact that her brother-in-law had already consented to act as Administrator during Charles Louis's minority, this invites the question of why the Winter Queen felt compelled personally to engage in diplomacy.[138]

One reason why royal and noble widows undertook dominant political roles was because they often felt it was the best way to protect the interests and rights of their children. It was for this reason that the recently widowed Anne of Austria dismissed the regency council named by Louis XIII, and assumed the central position in government on behalf of the four-year-old Louis XIV, albeit supported by the hardworking Cardinal Mazarin as head of the royal council.[139] The need for a widow to be the dominant figure in a regency government was especially acute for exiles. For example, as the restitution of the dispossessed house of Hessen-Kassel rested upon its possession of a force of 10,000 men, Amalia Elisabeth, the widow of Landgrave Wilhelm V, took personal involvement in directing the strategy of her late husband's army, to ensure that it would be employed in the interests of the eight-year-old Wilhelm VI.[140]

Elizabeth also appears to have adopted her political role in order to promote Charles Louis's claims to Frederick's lands and titles, proclaiming to Charles I that she would not return to her native country 'until my poor children can be re-established in the empire, or at least in a fair way of being so'. [141] Certainly, there was a concern that her

[137] Akkerman, II, 170.
[138] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 50; SP 81/40 f.28: Anstruther at The Hague to Secretary of State, 7/17 Jan. 1633.
[139] Kleinman, *Anne*, pp.144-57; Treasure, *Mazarin*, pp.58-61.
[140] T. Helfferich, *The iron princess: Amalia Elisabeth and the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge, MA. 2013), p.43.
[141] Akkerman, II, 151.

return to England would be interpreted by the German princes as an admission of the defeat of the Palatine cause as well as the wider 'Common Cause'.[142] It is perhaps for this reason that Wilhelm V urged her in January 1633 to 'return to the paths followed by the King your husband…to provide for the security of our religion, and the re-establishing of your dear children in their inheritance'.[143] In addition, the death and desertion of so many of Frederick's trusted advisers by late-1632 would only have compounded the sense of urgency for the Winter Queen personally to protect Charles Louis's interests. Roe viewed Elizabeth's primary role as to advance her son's claim and safeguard the dignity of Frederick's heir by refusing any dishonourable conditions 'and like an Eagle hyde the Prince under your wings'.[144]

Another possible reason why Elizabeth assumed a dominant role in Palatine policy-making was that she sought above all to comply with Frederick's dying wishes and was devoted to preserving his legacy. Elizabeth politely refused her brother's offer of sanctuary in England by claiming that 'I must prefer the welfare of my poor children to my own satisfaction. The last request that their father made me, before his departure, was to do all that I could for them'.[145] By citing the memory and wishes of their late husbands, widow regents could justify the pursuit of certain policies and downplay any visible effects of their own direct involvement in government by evoking typically female virtues such as matrimonial loyalty.[146] For example, Isabel Clara Eugenia claimed that her husband had asked her on his deathbed to remain as governor of the Spanish Netherlands because it was her duty to ensure that the provinces remained Catholic and loyal to Spain.[147] Similarly,

[142] SP 84/146 f.17: Lord Goring at The Hague to [Unspecified], 5/15 Jan. 1633; Oman, p.329.
[143] Akkerman, II, 156.
[144] Ibid., 489.
[145] Ibid., 156.
[146] Wunder, *Sun*, p.159.
[147] Sánchez, 'Sword', p.67.

Amalia Elisabeth repeatedly asserted throughout her thirteen-year regency that her rule was merely an extension of her husband's, and that all of her policies and actions were 'nothing more than either specifically following the orders of her husband, or at the very least more generally following his policies'. [148]

As regent widows were typically 'foreigners' in the lands they came to govern, their political influence as guardians was entirely dependent on their status as widows, which was itself promoted by a public image of chastity and loyalty to their deceased spouse.[149] For example, the political basis of the respective regency governments of Catherine and Marie de Medici was represented through motifs and artistic imagery displaying marital devotion as well as motherhood, and Amalia Elisabeth demonstrated subservience to her late husband by keeping at hand not only his letters, but also his preserved corpse![150] It is unsurprising, therefore, that a large number of early modern widows who used their position to enjoy new-found autonomy and independence, such as the infamous Caterina Sforza, also presented a public image of conforming with the contemporary expectation that widows should remain unmarried and mourn their husbands for the rest of their lives.[151] Indeed, Nadine Akkerman has even argued that the Winter Queen never remarried because she was loath to sacrifice her autonomy and because she 'refused to become dependent on a man once more'.[152] However, this claim implies that the thirty-six year old, impoverished and exiled widow of the most disgraced ruler in

[148] Helfferich, *Princess*, pp.43, 50.
[149] C. Fairchilds, *Women in Early Modern Europe 1500-1700* (Harlow, 2007), p.106.
[150] E. McCartney, 'A Widow's Tears, A Queen's Ambition: The Variable History of Marie de Medici's Bereavement', in A. Levy (ed.), *Widowhood and Visual Culture in Early Modern Europe* (Aldershot, 2003), p.101; S.L. Jansen, *The Monstrous Regiment of Women: Female Rulers in Early Modern Europe* (Basingstoke, 2002), p.212; Helfferich, *princess*, p.43.
[151] Fairchilds, *Women*, p.109; J. de Vries, 'Casting Her Widowhood: The Contemporary and Posthumous Portraits of Caterina Sforza', in Levy, *Widowhood*, pp.77-8.
[152] N. Akkerman, 'Semper Eadem: Elizabeth Stuart and the Legacy of Queen Elizabeth I', in S. Smart and M.R. Wade (eds.), *The Palatine Wedding of 1613: Protestant Alliance and Court Festival* (Wiesbaden, 2013), p.161.

Europe who, together with her nine living children, was sliding further down the line of succession for the English crown, was still regarded as a prize catch during her widowhood. There is no evidence that Elizabeth received any proposals of marriage after her husband's death, nor that there was any pressure or desire on her part to marry once more.

It is far more likely that Elizabeth's determination to learn and observe the customs governing electoral widows were out of devotion to the man she described as 'the best housband in the worlde', as well as an earnest desire 'so as to give no occasion for scandal' which could jeopardise both Frederick's reputation and Charles Louis's restitution.[153] In December 1632 Elizabeth professed that her efforts on her children's behalf were primarily driven by the fact that Frederick was their father, claiming that she '[loved] them better because they are his than because they are my own'.[154] Although such a statement, written so soon after her husband's death, could be seen as an exaggeration, it does complement the claims of her youngest daughter, that Elizabeth 'preferred the antics of her monkeys and lapdogs' to the company of her children.[155] Whilst biographers are divided about the extent of Elizabeth's maternal instincts, all agree that she was utterly devoted to Frederick, and it does not appear that her declarations that 'I shall never take anie more contentment in this worlde' and that '[I] shall ever greeve for him so long as I live' were made merely for effect.[156] The Winter Queen's grief was well documented by contemporaries who witnessed the effects of her bereavement. One of her secretaries claimed that Elizabeth 'hath passed through fire and water, sighs and tears', and the

[153] Akkerman, II, 151, 163; Lemberg, *Königin,* p.45.
[154] Akkerman, II, 151.
[155] H. Forester (ed.), *Memoirs of Sophia, Electress of Hanover* (London, 1888), p.8.
[156] Oman, pp.153, 327-30; Green, pp.95, 300-5; C. Spencer, *Prince Rupert: The Last Cavalier* (London, 2007), pp.20-6; Ross, *Winter Queen,* p.111; Akkerman, II, 163, 170.

English ambassador in The Hague reported 'whether the queen will long be able to bear the grief thereof, they who are nearest about her do much doubt'.[157]

Elizabeth's approach to negotiations regarding Charles Louis's claims to Frederick's hereditary territories and titles certainly suggests that she was predominantly concerned with preserving her late husband's memory. In contrast to Amalia Elisabeth, who honoured her husband's wishes but would not hesitate to deviate from them if they were flawed or became counterproductive, Elizabeth pursued Frederick's policies, or what she believed to be his intent, almost to a fault.[158] For example, at negotiations regarding the Palatine issue held at Colmar in summer 1627, Frederick's emissaries were instructed to express his consent that Maximilian of Bavaria should bear the electoral title for his lifetime.[159] However, whether through an ignorance of her husband's earlier instructions or because of her own consciousness of rank, Elizabeth vehemently denied the suggestion that Frederick would have surrendered his hereditary title, even temporarily, claiming that 'I dare assure you upon my word that it is false, for the king woulde never agree to so unworthie a condition'.[160] The Winter Queen's insistence on a full restoration of her late husband's title and lands was the defining feature of her political outlook, even at the risk of jeopardising any hope of her eldest son's restitution.

A number of biographers have oversimplified the nature of Elizabeth's political role, claiming that she was the ultimate arbiter in Palatine affairs from 1632 and engaged

[157] SP 16/534 f.12: John Dinley at The Hague to Roe, 14/24 Feb. 1633; SP 84/145 f.155: William Boswell at The Hague to [Coke], 19/29 Nov. 1632; R. Griffin (ed.), *The private correspondence of Lady Jane Cornwallis, 1613-1644* (London, 1842), p.252.
[158] Helfferich, *princess*, p.51.
[159] SP 81/34 f.215v; Pursell, pp.258-9; Messinger, pp.88-9; A. Gotthard, *Konfession und Staatsräson: die Aussenpolitik Württembergs unter Herzog Johann Friedrich (1606-1628)* (Stuttgart, 1992), p.431.
[160] Akkerman, II, 457.

directly in diplomatic ventures. For example, it has been asserted that Elizabeth dispatched her own ambassadors to champion her children's interests at congresses, such as the assembly of Protestant princes at Heilbronn in April 1633.[161] However, Elizabeth never dispatched official envoys acting in her name to congresses or assemblies to champion her son's interests, with the Palatine cause being represented at the Heilbronn assembly by Ludwig Philipp's envoys, as well as Sir Robert Anstruther.[162] It should also be noted that Elizabeth only issued formal letters of credence to her envoys journeying to individuals who had either already afforded her the title of Queen of Bohemia, such as Oxenstierna, or whom she assumed would recognise her professed rank, such as the Elector of Brandenburg, who was married to Frederick's sister Elisabeth Charlotte.[163]

It would have been very difficult for Elizabeth to engage in formal negotiations as exiles' diplomatic efforts, especially the dispatch of ambassadors to negotiate with other European notables, depended on an individual's professed sovereign identity being recognised by other powers. For example, Philip IV's refusal to acknowledge Marie de Medici's royal status during her exile in the Spanish Netherlands greatly endangered her attempts at diplomacy as her agents were denied the legal rights of protection typically afforded to ambassadors and diplomatic couriers. This resulted in the interception and execution of two of Marie's couriers by the French in 1632.[164]

[161] Green, p.308; J. Gorst-Williams, *Elizabeth, The Winter Queen* (London, 1977), p.128; Loomie, Appendix 1.
[162] SP 81/39 ff. 358-74; SP 81/40 f.170: Anstruther in Frankfurt to Coke, 7/17 Mar. 1633; W. Watts, *The Swedish intelligencer. The third part…Unto which is added the fourth part* (London, 1633), p.212.
[163] Akkerman, II, 198, 219.
[164] Osborne, 'Marie', pp.21-2 and his "Chimeres, monopoles and stratagems': French Exiles in the Spanish Netherlands during the Thirty Years' War', *The Seventeenth Century*, 15 (2000), pp.157-8.

As she was not the official regent for Charles Louis, and her professed title of 'Queen of Bohemia' was greatly contested, any diplomatic effort conducted by Elizabeth would have been hindered by issues of recognition. Elizabeth fiercely guarded her disputed regal status and would turn on those whom did not afford her the title. For example, she refused to accept a letter from Marie de Medici which addressed Elizabeth as 'my Niece the Electress Palatine' rather than as Queen of Bohemia.[165] In addition, once it was discovered that Sir Henry Vane, whom Elizabeth described affectionately as 'our fatt boobie Ambassadour', had ordered that she was not to be titled Queen of Bohemia in a royal manifesto on the Palatine cause, she claimed that 'I know he loves not me nor the Prince Elector', and she celebrated his later dismissal from his position as Secretary of State.[166]

Elizabeth's claim to 'queenly' rank was entirely based upon Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian crown, an act of rebellion which provoked horror and indignation throughout Europe and was widely regarded as the cause of the war. Accordingly, very few European rulers, especially within the empire, would have been willing to acknowledge her as Queen of Bohemia. In addition, the Golden Bull made no provision for an elector's widow to act as regent. In contrast, Ludwig Philipp's assumption of the administratorship and Charles Louis's claim to the electorship were grounded in Imperial law, and the Emperor declared that the Imperial Ban against Frederick did not prejudice the rights of his brother and children, with the result that a number of Imperial Princes were willing to recognise their claims to these titles.[167]

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[165] Akkerman, II, 175-6.
[166] *LJ*, IV, 300-1. The manifesto merely refers to Elizabeth as 'deare sister'; Akkerman, II, 984, 998, 1020-1.
[167] *Sourcebook*, p.92; Akkerman, II, 176; SP 81/40 f.236: Anstruther in Heilbronn to Lord Treasurer Portland, 6/16 Apr. 1633; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 94.

Although considerations of recognition prevented Elizabeth from sending representatives to various negotiations as formal representatives in her own name, she was on occasion able to influence the selection of personnel favourable to the Palatine cause to attend such talks as assistants of the principal English ambassadors. For example, Rusdorf was seconded to English service in 1636, at Elizabeth's insistence, to join the earl of Arundel's embassy to the Emperor and he received instructions from the Winter Queen to insist that 'nothing should be proposed, said, offered or conceded, which would injure the honour, esteem or conscience of the Elector'.[168] Likewise, it is highly probable that Roe's employment as ambassador extraordinary to the conference at Hamburg in 1638 was due to Elizabeth's desire that he be appointed.[169]

As the above examples demonstrate, Elizabeth's ability to influence diplomatic negotiations was subject to more limitations than have previously been acknowledged. It is important, therefore, to examine exactly how Elizabeth was able to influence Palatine policy and her family's wider attempts at diplomacy, navigating the inherent difficulties facing figures whose titles were not recognised by all participants, as well as how she operated within the strict boundaries imposed upon women's political activity in early modern Europe.

Elizabeth's primary diplomatic tool was letter-writing, described as the key component of women's involvement in political culture in this period.[170] Through the employment of charm and epistolary arts, Elizabeth was able to capitalise on existing friendships and associations, as well as forming and fostering relationships with the 'new

[168] Springell, *Connoisseur*, pp. 13-14; Akkerman, II, 423 n.2.
[169] Beller, 'Hamburg', p.63.
[170] J. Daybell and S. Norrhem (eds.), *Gender and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe, 1400-1800* (London, 2016), p.4.

men' at the Stuart court, such as Archbishop Laud.[171] However, the Winter Queen's letter-writing campaign was not limited to potential supporters within her homeland, with all European powers friendly to the Palatine family and the Protestant cause being solicited.[172] In these letters, Elizabeth tirelessly attempted to obtain support for her family's restoration by playing to the gender norms which defined a woman's power and agency. In particular, she appealed to the sense of honour and chivalry of her correspondents, enticing them to assist a poor, 'wretched' widow and her children, whom she described as innocent 'orphans', who had been the victims of gross injustice.[173]

Elizabeth's position as mother of Frederick's heir enabled her to influence the policies pursued in her son's name during his minority, as well as for several years after he attained his majority, despite never having been officially recognised as his regent. The ability of regent-mothers to continue to exercise power informally when their sons came of age depended on their child's affection and willingness to listen to their counsel and advice, and this could sometimes result in a power struggle in which a son had to assert his authority against a mother resisting the inevitable loss of political power.[174] Whereas Marie de Medici lost much of her political influence once Louis XIII attained his majority, Charles Louis consistently sought Elizabeth's advice on policy matters even after reaching the age of eighteen.[175] This suggests that there was some degree of affection between the two and that the well-documented animosity between mother and son only developed after Charles Louis was restored.

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[171] C. Carlton, *Archbishop William Laud* (London, 1987), p.111; Akkerman, II, 327, 329.
[172] R.K. Marshall, *The Winter Queen: Elizabeth of Bohemia, 1596-1662* (Edinburgh, 1998), p.73; Oman, p.330.
[173] Akkerman, II, 151, 161, 162, 163, 546, 588.
[174] Fairchilds, *Women*, p.217; J. Bepler, 'Enduring Loss and Memorializing Women: The Cultural Role of Dynastic Widows in Early Modern Germany', in L. Tatlock (ed.), *Enduring Loss in Early Modern Germany: Cross Disciplinary Perspectives* (Leiden, 2010), pp.134-5.
[175] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 237; Akkerman, II, 606; TS 23/1/24: Elizabeth at The Hague to Charles Louis, 13/23 May 1647.

As matriarch of the Palatine exiles, Elizabeth also played a key role in the dynastic policies pursued on their behalf, a position which she guarded jealously, declaring that no-one was to arrange a marriage for her children without consulting her, and that in such an eventuality 'I would break the match, for none should marry my children without me'.[176] Certainly, Elizabeth issued a list of conditions for Charles I to consider during the doomed marriage negotiations between her eldest daughter and the king of Poland, and, when there was the prospect of a match between Rupert and a wealthy French heiress, Charles Louis wrote to his mother that 'the King seemeth to like of it, but he would have your advice & consent in it'.[177] Even after her eldest son came of age to govern himself as head of the Palatine family, Elizabeth clearly still exercised considerable influence in his matrimonial affairs. For example, when it was suggested that Charles Louis should marry Maria Leopoldine of Austria, the Winter Queen condemned the proposition, citing 'the evill that matching with Papists brings with it', and declaring that 'the Prince Elector hath a minde to it but I can never like it'.[178] It should be noted that Elizabeth did not always view the proposed marriages with the pragmatic approach required. For example, she asked Roe to persuade Charles not to pursue a match between Charles Louis and the Emperor's daughter in 1636. A number of sources, including a letter from Elizabeth herself, indicate that her opposition to the match was that the intended bride was 'oulde and unhandsome', and Arundel reportedly had to tell her that 'princes in marriages did rather respect States then persons; & that in this the Prince Elector married the Palatinate rather then the Emperors daughter'.[179]

[176] Akkerman, II, 339.
[177] SP 81/42 ff.322-3: Considerations presented by Queen of Bohemia on marriage offered by King of Poland to her daughter Elizabeth, [Undated, 1634]. Reproduced as SP 81/43 ff.120-1 [Undated 1635]; Akkerman, II, 521.
[178] Akkerman, II, 990.
[179] Ibid., 415; SP 80/9 f.126v: Arundel at The Hague to Secretary of State, 14 Apr. 1636.

Another way in which the Elizabeth sought to foster relationships with influential figures throughout Europe was through the judicious giving of presents which, as noted by James Daybell, could attain a political significance 'in much the same way as did love tokens in the economy of courtship'[180]. In the early years of their exile, Frederick and Elizabeth attempted to obtain support for their cause by distributing gifts ranging from greyhounds for Marie de Medici to a large number of portraits for English and Scottish supporters of the Palatine family including Roe and the Marquess of Hamilton.[181] Portraits were of particular significance as gifts as they were intended to personate the sitter and could be used to play on the recipient's compassion for the plight of the subject.[182] For example, a portrait of the seven eldest Palatine children was sent to Charles I together with a note describing the painting as one 'in which your Majesty will see your little servants and maidens whom you bring up'.[183] Such a gift was no doubt calculated to play on the king's well-known twin loves of art and family. It is likely that Elizabeth's progressively worsening financial difficulties, including the 11,000 gulden owed to her favoured portraitist, Gerrit von Honthorst, in 1654, prevented her from sending such elaborate presents after her husband's death.[184] Nevertheless, the Winter Queen still attempted to obtain support for her family's cause through gift-giving in the 1630s. For example, she sent Sir Simonds D'Ewes three royal letters, intended as valuable additions to the

[180] J. Daybell (ed.), *Women and Politics in Early Modern England, 1450-1700* (Aldershot, 2004), p.4.
[181] Akkerman, I, 529, 649, 323-4, 441, 570, 743 and II, 138
[182] F. Heal, *The Power of Gifts: Gift Exchange in Early Modern England* (Oxford, 2014), p.164.
[183] Quoted in Spencer, *Rupert*, p.24.
[184] MS Clarendon 80 f.374: List of the Common Creditors of the Queen of Bohemia, 20 May 1654. Honthorst had provided Elizabeth with a loan of 35,000 gulden in 1651. See W. J. Hoogsteder, 'Die Gemäldesammlung von Friedrich V. und Elizabeth im Könighaus in Rhenen/Niederlande', in Wolf et al., *Winterkönig*, p.196;

antiquary's autograph collection, and appears to have encouraged Charles Louis to attempt to procure 'good horses' from England to give to Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar.[185]

Although the rigidly gendered hierarchy within the Holy Roman Empire, as well as the contention surrounding her professed title, imposed limitations imposed on Elizabeth's political activities, the Winter Queen acted as a vital link between Ludwig Philipp's government in Heidelberg and the Stuart court. For example, Elizabeth acted as a conduit through which the administrator requested money from Charles I for the relief of exiled ministers of the Palatine church as well as to meet the financial obligations owed by the Palatine government to the Swedes.[186] Charles I also repeatedly sought his sister's advice in matters relating to the Palatine family. In December 1632, the king instructed both Arundel and Anstruther to consult with Elizabeth prior to their negotiations with the Prince of Orange, the States General, and various German princes.[187] Charles's request for his sister's advice does not appear to have merely been a display of courtesy to Elizabeth. Steve Murdoch has asserted that the king was ill-informed of the balance of power in Germany following the deaths of Gustavus Adolphus and Frederick, and Elizabeth also provided Anstruther with a memoir intended to assist his negotiations at the conference at Heilbronn in 1633.[188]

In order to evaluate Elizabeth as a stateswoman, it is important to take into account all of the constraints imposed on her by virtue of her gender as well as the inherent

[185] J. S. McGee, *An Industrious Mind: The Worlds of Sir Simonds D'Ewes* (Stanford, 2015), p.248; Akkerman, II, 673-4, 519.
[186] Akkerman, II, 317; SP 81/42 f.116: Ludwig Philipp in Heidelberg to Theobald Maurice, 28 May 1634.
[187] SP 81/39 ff.358-74 at f.358v; SP 84/145 at ff.198-9 at f.199: Instructions for the Earl of Arundel, 26 Dec. 1632.
[188] Murdoch, 'Ambassadors' p.41; SP 81/40 ff.155-8v: Memorial given to Anstruther by Queen of Bohemia, [Feb.] 1633.

difficulties facing exiles wishing to engage in diplomacy, particularly when financial difficulties and issues of recognition prevent them from doing so through traditional channels. Elizabeth worked tirelessly to create and exploit all possible channels of communication and kinship networks in her attempts to obtain material and political support for her family's cause. However, there was no correlation between activity and effectiveness and there was only so much that could be achieved by the correspondence networks which Elizabeth worked so assiduously to cultivate.

Not only did some influential figures in English politics, including Wentworth, seemingly snub her attempts at establishing a working relationship, there was also no guarantee that her correspondences would yield results.[189] Indeed, the Venetian ambassador in London noted in 1633 that 'the Princess Palatine is doing her utmost to induce the king and ministers of England to her so that she may not be abandoned, but everything moves slowly and nothing is done'.[190] The extreme difficulties faced by Elizabeth and her family's advisers in their attempts to secure assistance from the Palatines' allies was plainly demonstrated on a number of occasions. Her attempts to obtain the services of military units she financed in Hessen-Kassel in 1634 were ignored by Landgrave Wilhelm, and Secretary Coke condescendingly instructed Sir William Boswell to 'represent the vanitie' in her endeavour to raise an army for her son.[191] In addition, during the earl of Arundel's embassy to Vienna in 1636, the nobleman visited The Hague and claimed in one despatch that Elizabeth had read his instructions and had declared herself 'willing to applie her selfe wholy to his Ma.tis order & direction'.[192]

[189] Akkerman, II, 318.
[190] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 73.
[191] See Akkerman, II, 242-3, 263, 265; SP 84/148 f.10: Coke at Whitehall to Boswell, 7 Jan. 1634 [First Letter].
[192] SP 80/9 f.124: Arundel at The Hague to Secretary of State, 12 Apr. 1636.

However, Arundel's report contrasted sharply with that of Elizabeth, who despaired that 'I cannot tell what speech of mine coulde make my Lord Marshall think I was satisfied'.[193]

The experiences of the Palatine family during the 1630s and '40s certainly demonstrate that the king's exiled relatives received considerably more financial and material support when Charles Louis was present at the Stuart court. Whilst it is true that Elizabeth orchestrated her son's first sojourn to England in 1635, believing that his presence 'may move compassion, and enflame nature' to prompt the king and his ministers into taking action on his nephew's behalf, this action can hardly be viewed as demonstrating a great insight of statecraft.[194] Almost every contemporary political figure understood the importance of access to the king, with even Wentworth in Ireland fearing the possibility that, when it came to Charles I, out of sight meant out of mind.

Elizabeth's refusal to accept anything less than a full territorial restoration must also be taken into consideration when assessing her performance as a stateswoman. When one considers the minimal resources available to the Palatine family, such a demand borders on blind obstinacy. Unlike Amalia Elisabeth of Hessen-Kassel, Elizabeth did not possess, nor have the financial reserves to recruit, a sufficiently large army either to recover the Palatinate or to use as a bargaining chip to obtain favourable terms, neither was her or her son's professed titles officially recognised within the empire by law. The relatively generous terms offered to Charles Louis by the Habsburgs in the mid-1630s and early-1640s, which were not dissimilar to those agreed in the Peace of Westphalia, were also hardly draconian to the extent that the Palatine family had nothing to lose by refusing

[193] Akkerman, II, 457.
[194] Ibid., 355-57, 364.

them. The Winter Queen's insistence that 'I ever desired all or nothing' suggests that her obsession with her perceived authority and rights blinded her to the political realities of the period.[195] Such an interpretation helps to explain an otherwise baffling lapse in judgement in mid-1643 which almost cost her the Palatine family's last remaining significant source of finance, their parliamentary pensions.

Although Elizabeth was aware that parliamentarian troops were intercepting her correspondence from the start of the civil war, and Charles Louis had issued a pamphlet in his and his mother's name denouncing Rupert's conduct at the sack of Brentford in November 1642, the Winter Queen sent letters to Rupert in which she praised his efforts in the royalist cause.[196] These letters were intercepted by Fairfax's troops and subsequently read in the House of Commons and recorded in full in the Commons' Journal before being returned to Elizabeth, together with a note 'expressing therein the Resentment this House has of this Letter'.[197] Indeed, the future regicide Henry Marten cautioned parliament to be wary of the Winter Queen as she 'had so well expressed her desires to further & hasten our ruin'.[198]

Although she apologised profusely for her conduct, Elizabeth attempted to use her royal status to claim that her parliamentary pension should not be ended, as it had been granted 'by the Love of the King my Father, and King my Brother'.[199] However, the damage to parliament's view of Elizabeth had been done. Although the Commons granted the Winter Queen three thousand pounds out of the King's Revenue on 22 June 1643, it

[195] *CSPD: 1641-43*, 329.
[196] SP 81/53 f.196: Elizabeth at The Hague to Roe, 16/26 Mar. 1643. For Elizabeth's letter to Rupert see *CJ*, II, 988-90.
[197] *CJ*, II, 988-90.
[198] McGee, *Industrious*, p.423
[199] Quoted in *CJ*, III, 60-1.

was the first time that a subsidy to the Palatine family was dependent on a parliamentary vote rather than being immediately granted because of Elizabeth's relationship with the English crown.[200]

It is difficult to describe the diplomatic efforts of Elizabeth of Bohemia in terms of success or failure. Whilst it is true that the Palatine family were not restored through her endeavours and their fortunes continued to dwindle, this alone cannot be used as an accurate indicator of her skills of statecraft. The Palatine family were one of a number of exiled dynasties which were hostages of circumstance and hampered by a lack of resources. As a result, that the survival of the Palatine house during the years of Elizabeth's unofficial regency was a victory in itself as the alternative was destruction. In addition, the diplomatic channels in which she operated were far more restricted than has previously been acknowledged. In spite of these considerations, it is difficult to argue that Elizabeth was the great stateswoman some scholars have claimed. Elizabeth used considerable energy and inventiveness in ably pursuing potential sources of military, financial and political support for the Palatine cause within the limited options for diplomatic activity available to women in early modern Europe. However, her refusal to accept anything less than a full Palatine restoration, as well as her ignorance of the need to conceal her royalist sympathies during the civil war, demonstrate a misplaced faith in the unassailability of her status and royal blood, and a blindness to political realities, which threatened the permanent exclusion and destitution of the Palatine family.

Conclusion

[200] Ibid., 139-41. The vote was passed by a majority of only three votes.

An examination of Palatine policy objectives, and their willingness to compromise, has shown that an unassailable belief in the justness of their cause, the inviolability of the Golden Bull, and the illegality of the transfer of Frederick's lands and titles, blinded them to political reality. Although Charles Louis was evidently more amenable to accepting a partial restitution than his mother, such a compromise was only ever considered when there was a very real possibility of permanent exclusion from a general peace treaty. Indeed, the young prince only accepted the newly-created eighth electorate, together with a partial territorial restoration, when it became apparent from mid-1647 that no other power would support his family's demands for a full restoration.[201]

This chapter has also highlighted the difficulties facing dispossessed dynasties in maintaining an effective government over a prolonged period of exile, with factors such as financial constraints and a declining political significance leading to an exodus of supporters, making it unlikely that such regimes would be able to depend on a consistent coterie of counsellors. In such circumstances, it is unsurprising that 'widow-regent' figures such as Elizabeth of Bohemia and Amalia-Elisabeth of Hessen-Kassel undertook responsibility for their children's interests and played a large role in the formulation of strategies and policies intended to recover and safeguard the birthrights of their offspring. It is evident that the Winter Queen played a large role in Palatine policymaking for over a decade. However, the means by which she could engage in diplomacy were far more restricted than has previously been acknowledged, and her skills as a stateswoman have been somewhat exaggerated. Accordingly, this chapter has demonstrated the need for a

[201] J. Arndt, 'Die Ergebnisse der Friedensverhandlungen in Münster und Osnabrück für die rheinischen Territorien', in S. Ehrenpreis (ed.), *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg im Herzogtum Berg und in seinen Nachbarregionen* (Neustadt, 2002), p.315; G. Immler, *Kurfürst Maximilian I. von Bayern und der Westfälische Friedenskongreß. Die bayerische auswärtige Politik von 1644 bis zum Ulmer Waffenstillstand* (Münster, 1992), p.389.

more balanced interpretation of Elizabeth's actions and her political abilities. The Winter Queen was not the stubborn and prideful incompetent portrayed in contemporary and subsequent commentaries, but this did not mean that she possessed a Machiavellian talent for statecraft.

It was possible for an exiled regime to devise strategies for their restitution, but the sheer ambitious scale of the Palatine policy objectives was starkly contrasted by their lack of vital military and financial resources as well as inconsistent diplomatic support. As a result, Charles Louis's cause was heavily dependent on the generosity of their extended family and supporters even though such benefactors played little or no role in the formulation of the strategies they were financing. Accordingly, any study of experiences of exile in the early modern period must address the importance of the dynastic connections of dispossessed dynasties. The following chapter will therefore determine the relative importance of military, financial, and dynastic capital for exiled regimes in this period and examine the extent to which they were available to the Palatine exiles between 1632 and 1648.

Chapter 2: Cannon, Cash, and Kin: The resources of an exiled dynasty

In September 1641, Charles Louis lamented that resources of the Palatine family consisted 'only in hope, & in the Charity of others', a sentiment which corresponds with an observation made almost two decades earlier that Frederick V had neither the money to raise an army, nor to live in the manner expected of a prince.[1] These comments highlight the three forms of capital which could be employed by dispossessed dynasties in their attempts to recover lost lands and titles. The possession of military capital could allow exiles to retake territories by force and offered the possibility of extracting monetary and political concessions from allies and enemies alike. Financial capital was essential to the raising and maintenance of an army, as well as attracting support for the legitimacy of an exile's cause by funding the promotion of their professed rank in print and through ostentatious display. The final form of capital available to royal and noble exiles in early modern Europe was 'dynastic capital', allowing individuals and houses to obtain military and monetary assistance due to their rank and family connections.[2] This chapter will examine the relative importance of each form of capital for exiled houses and assess how the supply or lack thereof affected the ability of the Palatine family to pursue their restitution.

In the twenty-six years from the fall of Heidelberg until Charles Louis's partial restoration in 1648, the Palatine exiles possessed an independent army on only one occasion lasting scarcely six months, and the family possessed almost no independent sources of income. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the fortunes of the Palatine family

[1] Akkerman, II, 996; J. Koči (ed.), *Documenta Bohemica Bellum tricennale illustrantia* (7 vols., Prague, 1971-81), III, 117.
[2] P. Bourdieu, 'Ökonomisches Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital', in R. Kreckel (ed.) *Soziale Ungleichheiten* (Göttingen 1983), pp.183-98.

rested on their ability to exploit their enviable reserves of dynastic capital. Through Elizabeth, the Palatine family was not only linked to the Stuarts, but also her maternal uncle Christian IV of Denmark and her cousin Friedrich Ulrich, duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg and prince of Wolfenbüttel. Likewise, Frederick V's mother was a half-sister of the Dutch Stadtholders Maurits and Frederik Hendrik, and the Winter King himself was the brother-in-law of both the Elector of Brandenburg and Count Palatine of Pfalz-Zweibrücken. In addition, Frederick's paternal aunt was the first wife of Karl IX of Sweden, and his maternal cousin, Amalia Elisabeth, was the wife of Landgrave Wilhelm V of Hessen-Kassel.[3]

A number of scholars have questioned the effectiveness of dynastic capital in early modern Europe, claiming that legitimacy was less important than strategy, and that weak family ties between monarchs led rulers to provide only the minimum acceptable level of support to meet the perceived obligation to assist their exiled kin.[4] Charles I was reportedly reluctant to defray the expenses of his exiled mother-in-law, Marie de Medici, upon her arrival in England in 1638 and the Dutch apparently felt forced to pay the costs of the Palatine court-in-exile because of implications for the 'honour and reputation' of their country if they did not assist the Stadtholder's royal kin.[5] It should also be noted that the perceived unwillingness of early modern European elites to assist exiled family was often due to an inability to provide aid. By focusing almost exclusively on the material support provided by monarchs to their dispossessed relatives, previous scholars have overlooked aspects of dynastic capital which were of great significance for exiled houses. As this

[3] Parker, pp.53-4; Pursell, pp.25-7. See below Appendix II., pp.310-11.
[4] P. Mansel and T. Riotte (eds.), *Monarchy and Exile: The Politics of Legitimacy from Mari de Médicis to Wilhelm II* (Basingstoke, 2011), p.6; L.J. Reeve, *Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule* (Cambridge, 1989).
[5] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 264; T. Osborne, 'A Queen Mother in Exile: Marie De Médicis in the Spanish Netherlands and England, 1631-41', in Mansel and Riotte, *Monarchy and Exile*, pp.29-31; Mout, p.261.

chapter shall demonstrate, the benefits of dynastic capital for the Palatine family were not limited to military and monetary donations from their relatives. As Elizabeth and her nine surviving children were scions of the House of Stuart, Charles I's subjects viewed military service and financial generosity to the Palatine cause as a way of demonstrating their loyalty to their monarch.[6] The possession of a royal rank could also act as surety and allow exiles to obtain valuable credit at times of financial difficulty. The Palatines' membership of a sovereign dynasty also made a marriage into the family desirable for ambitious and wealthy nobles, as well as beleaguered monarchs seeking to take advantage of the exiles' wider dynastic connections for their own ends. Such matches offered the potential of securing vital military assistance and financial support for Charles Louis's cause. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Elizabeth never renounced her title of Queen of Bohemia and the Palatine family endeavoured to project a regal image and demonstrate their lineage in an attempt to persuade other rulers and elites to acknowledge the legitimacy of their claims to Frederick's lost lands and titles.

Military Capital

Although possession of an independent army offered the possibility of recovering lost territories by force, the armies of exiled regimes during the Thirty Years' War were rarely of sufficiently large to recover lost territories held by more powerful enemies, such as France and Bavaria. As a result, their small forces were often employed by, or affiliated to, greater powers. For example, Charles IV of Lorraine, and his 1,000-strong army, entered Imperial service following the French invasion of his duchy in 1633.[7] Even the Palatine army of 1638 at its largest size of 4,000 has been described as 'too many for a

[6] S. Murdoch, 'The House of Stuart and the Scottish Professional Soldier 1618-1640: A Conflict of Nationality and Identities', in B. Taithe and T. Thornton (eds.), *War: Identities in Conflict, 1300-2000* (Stroud, 1998).
[7] *Tragedy*, p.521.

raid; too few for a serious campaign'.[8] Nevertheless, the ownership of military force could enhance the prestige of exiled elites, and act as a valuable bargaining chip in alliance and peace negotiations, guaranteeing support for their cause and preventing their permanent exclusion from their lands and titles. During the Conference at Hamburg in 1638, Sir Thomas Roe claimed that 'as soone as the Prince Elector shalbe in the field in Germany with an army of his owne…he shalbe received as a Confoederate, and his Minister as a member of our treatye'.[9] Similarly, Charles Louis voiced his fears that France and Sweden would agree to a peace treaty at the Westphalian negotiations 'without much regard of those of their allies, that are not in arms with them'.[10] It should be noted, however, that the prestige which could be gained from the possession of military capital would be eradicated following a defeat. Indeed, the day after the news of the Palatine defeat at Vlotho on 17 October 1638 reached the delegates at Hamburg, the Swedish representative made 'extravagant, high and absurd' demands of England in exchange for assisting the Palatine cause.[11]

Prestige was one of the most important considerations for exiled dynasties seeking to take advantage of the military capital of friendly powers. As one of the main tasks of dispossessed elites was to project their noble or royal rank, it would have been anathema to take up a paid position in the army commanded by an individual of a lesser rank than the one they claimed. In the summer of 1629 Frederick served as a volunteer in the army of the Prince of Orange during the siege of Bois-de-luc.[12] Similarly, when the disgraced Huguenot commander Henri, duke of Rohan joined the army of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar

[8] B. Fergusson, *Rupert of the Rhine* (London, 1953), p.19.
[9] Akkerman, II, 689.
[10] Bromley, pp.131-2.
[11] SP 81/45 f.204v: Sir Thomas Roe in Hamburg to Sir John Coke, 16 Oct. 1638; E.A. Beller, 'The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg, 1638-40', *EHR*, 41/161 (1926), p.71.
[12] Green, pp.268-9.

in early 1638, he offered his services as an unpaid gentleman volunteer and adviser until suffering a mortal wound at the Battle of Rheinfelden on 28 February 1638.[13] As Rohan and Bernhard were of equal ducal rank, the former could not formally serve as an officer in the 'Bernhardines' without sacrificing status. Although Rohan confided to his wife that 'some may find it ridiculous that I serve in the ranks at my age', it is clear that he was not prepared to compromise his noble rank in favour of a military one.[14] As the maintenance of status was of paramount importance for dynastic exiles, it is unsurprising that Elizabeth rejected any suggestion that Charles Louis, as head of the Palatine family and claimant to his father's prestigious electoral title, should 'goe like a vollontier into an armie or be under anothers pay'.[15]

Exiles and Recruitment

The loss of control over their former subjects and an absence of an existing army prevented the Palatines from recruiting troops through conscription and the enlistment of prisoners of war, identified by Geoffrey Parker as two of the most common methods of raising forces in the early modern period.[16] In addition, volunteers would be more inclined to join a well-established army which offered the possibility of pecuniary gain, adventure, and following their conscience in a perceived crusade for their faith, rather than enter the service of a penniless exile with no force of their own. Indeed, many of the able-bodied men who arrived in The Hague with Frederick and Elizabeth were offered positions in the Prince of Orange's army.[17] Financial difficulties also prevented dispossessed rulers from

[13] J.A. Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior: The Life and Times of Henri de Rohan, 1579-1638* (The Hague, 1966), pp.208-11; *Tragedy*, p.503.
[14] Clarke, *Warrior*, p.212.
[15] Akkerman, II, 556.
[16] G. Parker, *The military revolution: military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge, 1988), p.48.
[17] R.K. Marshall, *The Winter Queen: Elizabeth of Bohemia, 1596-1662* (Edinburgh, 1998), p.69.

hiring professional units and engaging the services of military enterprisers. Although the depiction of mercenaries as unscrupulous profiteers has been redressed in more recent scholarship, exiled houses could not compete with major powers which could afford to pay greater sums for hired units, as well as offer the possibility of future wealth and titles to contractors.[18]

Apart from the levies of men and financial contributions ordered by the English crown for the 1625 and 1631 expeditions of Count Mansfeld and the Marquess of Hamilton, the Palatines' familial ties were central to their ability to inspire volunteers to take up arms in the interests of Elizabeth and her children. As well as religious conviction, defence of the honour of the House of Stuart was cited as a dominant motive for the 60,000 Scots who served against the Habsburgs between 1618 and 1648.[19] Such loyalty could often transcend religious divisions as Scottish Catholics such as Sir John Hepburn, Colonel Andrew Gray, and the Earl of Nithsdale levied troops for the defence of the daughter of their monarch, and Sir Henry Bruce, the Imperial governor of Mikulor, left the Emperor's service to raise a regiment for the Winter Queen's cause. [20] In addition, although exiled elites could not engage in conscription or impressment of prisoners-of-war, the Palatine family were able to exploit their familial connections to obtain troops for their cause who were raised through such methods. For example, the 12,000 troops levied in late-1624 for Mansfeld's expedition were largely dismissed as 'gaol birds' and criminal

[18] P.H. Wilson, 'The German 'Soldier Trade' of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Reappraisal', *IHR*, 18/4 (1996), pp. 757-92; D. Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012), ch. 3; J. Fynn-Paul, *War, entrepreneurs, and the state in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300-1800* (Leiden, 2014), p.68.
[19] S. Murdoch (ed.), *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War* (Leiden, 2001), pp.18-19 and W.S. Brockington, 'Robert Monro: Professional Soldier, Military Historian and Scotsman', in Murdoch, *Scotland*, pp.223-5; R. Monro, *Monro his expedition with the worthy Scots Regiment* (London, 1637), p.26; J. Grant, *Memoirs and Adventures of Sir John Hepburn* (Edinburgh, 1851), p.12; J.H. Burton, *The Scot Abroad* (Edinburgh, 1864), p.315; T. Fischer, *The Scots in Germany* (Edinburgh, 1902), pp.73-5.
[20] J.V. Polišenský, *Tragic Triangle: the Netherlands, Spain and Bohemia, 1617-1621* (Prague, 1991), p.181; Murdoch, 'Stuart', p.45.

courts occasionally sent condemned men to serve the Palatine cause by proxy in the armies of Denmark and Sweden.[21]

However, it should be noted that very few of the troops raised to support the interests of the Queen of Bohemia actually entered Palatine service. In the absence of a Palatine army, Scottish and English recruits either served in forces funded by the English crown or joined armies which claimed to support Elizabeth's cause, such as Denmark and Sweden.[22] As a result, the majority of troops enlisted for the Palatine cause following the fall of Heidelberg could often be prevented from working towards the recovery of the Palatinate due to the interests and concerns of their paymasters and commanders. For example, the restrictions placed on Mansfeld's expedition of 1625, especially James I's concern not to provoke the hostility of Spain, neutered the contingent's effectiveness as a force to recover the Palatinate.[23] It was not until 1638 that English and Scottish troops were able to serve in an army led by a member of the Palatine family, primarily committed to recovering Frederick's lands and avenging the family's treatment by Bavaria and the Habsburgs.

The considerable demand for troops during the Thirty Years' War further hindered the ability of exiled elites who possessed no military capital to raise an army. In 1618, there were only three standing armies in Western Europe and even these relied heavily on foreign professional soldiers recruited by the estimated 1,500 military enterprisers

[21] S.J. Stearns, 'Conscription and English Society in the 1620s', *Journal of British Studies*, 11/2 (1972), pp.2, 8; D. Cressy, *Charles I and the People of England* (Oxford, 2015), p.134; Parker, *innovation*, p.50; *CSPD: 1628-9,* 395, 568.
[22] Murdoch, 'Stuart', p.37; Brockington, 'Monro', pp.223-4; Monro, *expedition,* p.26.
[23] S. Adams, 'Spain or the Netherlands? The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy', in H. Tomlinson (ed.) *Before the English Civil War: Essays on Early Stuart Politics and Government* (Basingstoke, 1983), p.97; T. Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution: English politics and the coming of war, 1621-1624* (Cambridge, 1989), pp.314-15.

operating during the conflict, particularly as a way of replenishing an army's ranks.[24] Accordingly, almost every state relied heavily on hired units, leading to a race to procure the services of as much military capital as possible, thereby denying their use by enemy forces. However, the Palatine family often came into conflict with other powers in their attempts to raise an army. Gustavus Adolphus prevented Frederick from raising his own troops upon his return to Germany in early-1632, claiming that it would weaken the Swedish army, and Charles Louis's farcical endeavour to secure the services of the army of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimer, resulted in the young elector being arrested and spending 10 months in French custody.[25]

The Palatine family's attempts to hire troops also depended on the strategic interests of the provider. Although Charles Louis has been criticised for not acting decisively to secure control of the Hessian army following the death of the exiled Landgrave Wilhelm V in October 1637, with Sir Thomas Roe claiming that 'the prince ought to put that to hazard which wisdom cannot always warrant', it is unlikely that Amalie Elisabeth would have relinquished control of her late husband's forces.[26] As the widowed Landgravine sought above all to recover and protect her young son's inheritance, retaining control of her 10,000 troops was essential. Apart from allowing the extraction of contributions from occupied territories, the possession of a sizeable army allowed the Landgravine to obtain financial support and political concessions from both her French and Dutch allies, as well as the empire. Such concessions would have been put at risk by

[24] F. Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce: A Study in European Economic and Social History* (2 vols., Wiesbaden, 1964-5), I, 210; W.P. Guthrie, *Battles of the Thirty Years War: From White Mountain to Nordlingen, 1618-1635* (London, 2002), p.8; V.G. Kiernan, 'Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy', *P&P*, 11 (1957), p.77.
[25] Akkerman, II, 43. Charles Louis's attempt to recruit the Weimar army will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter.
[26] SP 16/372 f.10: Roe to Colonel Thomas Ferentz, 20 Nov. 1637; C. Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1983), pp.78-9.

the Palatine family's planned military initiatives against the Emperor and the duke of Bavaria. In particular, Amalie Elisabeth negotiated a truce with the Emperor in March 1638 in which she retained possession of her existing garrisons and was recognised as regent during her son's minority, and so would be reluctant to part with her valuable bargaining chip, particularly to someone she regarded as a 'penniless, landless, friendless outlaw'.[27]

The primary factor which determined the ability of a ruler to procure and maintain an independent military force was the possession of financial capital. A general increase in the size of armies and the practice of attritional warfare, as well as factors such as the costs of conducting sieges, constructing fortifications, and the payment of subsidies to allies and foreign entrepreneurs, led to a considerable increase in the cost of warfare in the seventeenth century and could potentially cause great financial difficulty.[28] Unpaid wages was the principal issue behind the forty-six mutinies experienced by the Spanish army of Flanders between 1572 and 1607 as well as the series of serious insurrections by parliamentarian armies in summer 1647.[29] Similarly, upon the death of the exiled Wilhelm V of Hessen-Kassel in 1637, Amalia Elisabeth was acutely aware that her late husband's army would mutiny if there was any suggestion that she was unable to pay the troops.[30]

[27] *Tragedy*, pp.593, 617; T. Helfferich, *The iron princess: Amalia Elisabeth and the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge, MA, 2013), p.43.
[28] D. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642* (Cambridge, 2001), p.228; G. Parker, 'The "Military Revolution," 1560-1660 – a Myth?', *Journal of Military History*, 48/2 (1976), pp.212-13.
[29] G. Parker, 'Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1572-1607', *P&P*, 58 (1973), pp.41-2; J.S. Morrill, 'Mutiny and Discontent in English Provincial Armies, 1645-1647', *P&P*, 56 (1972), pp.49-74; Army of England and Wales, *Divers papers from the army* (London, 1647), pp.4-5 and *The declaration of the armie under His Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax* (London, 1647), p.2; *CJ*, IV, 60.
[30] Helfferich, *princess*, p.6.

The difficulties encountered by states in raising the finances to fund military activities were far more acute for exiled dynasties. As no early modern European government was able to pay for a prolonged war out of current taxation, states typically funded their military activities in three ways: extraordinary levies, saving up in advance, or borrowing vast sums from bankers and merchants against anticipated revenue.[31] However, none of these were possible for dispossessed ruling houses. The loss of territories deprived exiled dynasties of taxable populations and many lacked the necessary collateral with which to obtain substantial loans. The following section will examine the fiscal resources possessed by the Palatine family, as well as potential sources of revenue, between 1632 and 1649, and provide an insight into how dispossessed dynasties in early modern Europe were able to fund their years in exile. In particular, the section will explore the extent to which the Palatines' monetary situation depended on their dynastic connections.

Financial Capital

It should be noted that the loss of lands and their revenues did not necessarily render dispossessed rulers dependent on the financial charity of their kin and allies, particularly if they were already in control of an armed force which they were able to retain after being exiled, as was the case with the Duke of Lorraine and the Landgraves of Hessen-Kassel. Possession of an independent army at a time of widespread continental warfare offered exiles the possibility of extracting monetary as well as diplomatic assistance for their cause as major powers wanted to engage their services. The States General voted the newly-exiled Frederick 150,000 Gulders in 1622 to fund his remaining

[31] Parker, 'Military Revolution', pp.210-11; J. Lindegren, 'The Swedish 'military state', 1560-1720', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 10/4 (1985), p.319; J.B. Collins, *The Fiscal Limits of Absolutism. Direct Taxation in Early Seventeenth-Century France*, (Berkeley, 1988), pp.51-3; Parrott, *Richelieu's* Army, pp.230-7; J.R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620* (London, 1985), pp.238-9; R. Cust, *The Forced Loan and English Politics, 1626-1628* (Oxford, 1987).

forces in the Palatinate, and later sought to engage the troops of the Hessian exiles to act as a buffer along the republic's eastern border.[32] In 1636 the Dutch secured an agreement from Emden and East Frisia to pay 12,000 talers per month to maintain a force of 2,500 Hessians.[33] The French also made overtures to Amalia Elisabeth to prevent another power from securing the Hessian armies. Under the Treaty of Dorsten in August 1639, France agreed to pay the exiled rulers of Hessen-Kassel 200,000 talers per year, continue the late Landgrave's annual pension of 14,400, and make a one-off payment of 150,000 on the condition that Amalia Elisabeth maintain her force of 7,000 foot and 3,000 cavalry for French service.[34]

Charles IV of Lorraine similarly retained control of his army after being driven into exile by French troops in summer 1634 and was able to build up a force numbering between 8,000 to 10,000 troops by 1652, and profit accordingly.[35] The duke was gifted lands within the empire by virtue of his service alongside Imperial forces and his troops were later contracted as Spanish auxiliaries with the result that Charles had amassed a private fortune of almost 7 million livres in plate, ready money, and bills of exchange by 1653.[36] The possession of military force also enabled exiled houses to extract 'contributions' from occupied territories, often under the threat of *Brandschatzung*.[37] For example, the duchy of East Frisia yielded a contribution of 15,000 talers per month for the Hessian army which occupied it between 1637 and 1650, although this sum was halved in

[32] Mout, p.263.
[33] *Tragedy*, p.592.
[34] J. Ulbert, 'Französische Subsidienzahlungen an Hessen-Kassel während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges', in K. Malettke (ed.), *Frankreich und Hessen-Kassel zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und des Westfälischen Friedens* (Marburg, 1999), pp.165-6.
[35] Redlich, *Enterpriser,* II, 7.
[36] Ibid., 5-7; *Tragedy*, p.571.
[37] F. Redlich, *De Praeda Militari: Looting and Booty 1500-1815* (Wiesbaden, 1956), pp.44-5 and his 'Contributions in the Thirty Years' War', *Economic History Review*, 12/2 (1959), pp.247-54; J.A. Lynn, 'How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions during the Grand Siècle', *Journal of Modern History*, 65/2 (1983), pp.288-92.

1643.[38] In contrast to the Duke of Lorraine and the Hessians, Frederick had lost his army following the occupation of the Palatinate. The considerable expense required to raise an army meant that an exiled regime could see its financial reserves wiped out if defeated. However, exiled dynasties often lacked the wealth to raise a force which would be sufficiently large so as to risk battle without having to be subsumed into the army of a stronger ally.

The Palatine Family, 1632-50

One of the most common experiences any dispossessed group or individual, regardless of rank, was grinding poverty. The Palatine family were no exception, with Frederick claiming in September 1622 that 'I would be very displeased to make my lodgings in the debtors' prison of The Hague', and an audit conducted after his death revealed the sheer extent of the family's financial difficulties after a decade of exile.[39] The family's precarious monetary situation had dire consequences for their prospects of recovering and retaining their lost lands and titles. The articles of restitution between Oxenstierna and Ludwig Philipp stipulated that the latter was to pay £15,000 to cover Gustavus Adolphus's war expenses and maintain a military presence in the Palatinate which would have cost an estimated £120,000 per year.[40] However, the regular annual income of the Palatine family during their exile was, at most, scarcely one-sixth of the sum required.

Although it was possible for exiled royal houses to receive financial assistance from their former realms, such as the large sums sent by Jacobites in England to the exiled

[38] Helfferich, *princess*, pp.85, 168.
[39] Akkerman, I, 400; SP 84/146 ff.15-16: Account of moneys and cabinet of Frederick, Elector Palatine, 4/14 Jan. 1633.
[40] Akkerman, II, 183-4; Green, p.309.

Stuart courts in France and Italy after 1689, the devastation of Frederick's ancestral lands made it almost impossible that the Palatine family would receive donations from their former subjects.[41] In addition, it would be impossible for the Palatine exiles to attempt to recover the debt of 3,100,850 gulden owed to them by the French Crown for the military and financial assistance provided to Henri of Navarre and the Huguenots during the French Wars of Religion.[42] Even before the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, the French had only acknowledged a debt of 557,440 francs, of which only 36,000 was repaid to the Palatine family between 1613 and 1633.[43] The dire finances of the regency government led Ludwig Philipp to ask Oxenstierna to allow the Palatinate to take possession of ecclesiastical lands around Worms and Speyer in January 1633.[44] In addition to increasing the newly-restored regime's income, this would have allowed them to avenge the attempts of the Archbishop-Elector of Trier to reclaim all secularized church lands in the Lower Palatinate in the early-1620s. The Administrator's request was ultimately unsuccessful, and it is therefore important to examine the sources of revenue for the Palatine exiles.

The sale of possessions was an important means of income for the Palatine family. Frederick sold the lordship of Lixheim to the Duke of Lorraine in 1624 for approximately 300,000 francs.[45] 114,000 of the proceeds were lent to Sir Sackville Crowe and Philip Calandrini in May 1626 to redeem jewels left in bond by the Duke of Buckingham, and this loan yielded Frederick 7,980 francs in simple interest annually.[46] However, the majority of the sale monies were deposited in the comptoir of Holland in January 1624,

[41] E. Gregg, 'The financial vicissitudes of James III in Rome', in E. Corp (ed.), *The Stuart Court in Rome: The Legacy of Exile* (Aldershot, 2003), p.67; P.K. Monod, *Jacobitism and the English People 1688-1788* (Cambridge, 1989), p.286; SP 81/39 f.148: Sir Henry Vane in Strasbourg to Coke, 11/21 Oct. 1632.
[42] Pursell, p.27; SP 84/146 ff.15-16.
[43] SP 84/146 ff.15-16.
[44] SP 81/40 ff.69-70: Instructions to Ludwig Philipp's ambassadors to Oxenstierna, 18/28 Jan. 1633; Parker, p.91.
[45] SP 84/146 ff.15-16; Green, p.306.
[46] 'Notebook', 4; Green, p.306; Akkerman, I, 829 n.5.

with additional payments from other sources being made at various points in the 1620s and 1630s, each of which accrued 6.25% of simple interest per year.[47] Whilst the capital sums remained tied up in these investments, the interest payments were used to build a summer residence at Rhenen, and his English pension was wholly employed to maintain his children's court at Leiden and 'in the entertainments of his gentlemen & other servants'.[48] Indeed, the Winter King had no ready money at the time of his death, and had been forced to sell plate worth 8,000 talers to defray the costs of his final journey to join Gustavus Adolphus in 1632.[49] Table 1 shows the sums which had accrued by time Charles Louis emptied the Palatine family's coffers to help fund his military venture in early-1638.

One humiliating consequence of the Palatines' strained finances was they were forced to pawn a considerable number of jewels and valuables to finance both military and diplomatic campaigns, as well as fund their everyday subsistence. Princess Sophia observed that 'we feasted more richly than Cleopatra, dining exclusively on diamonds and pearls', and Elizabeth was heartbroken at being forced to part with her wedding ring, as well as pieces of considerable sentimental value which belonged to her late brother Henry, prince of Wales, and Elizabeth I.[50] Such an attitude was not shared by her children and supporters, who regarded the value of their family's plate and valuables as a way to fund the purchase of military capital. Charles Louis did not hesitate to pawn the diamond garter bestowed on him following his investiture to the Order in 1633, and claimed in December 1637 that 'rather than be idle this next year I will pawn everything to my shirt'.[51] In addition, when the Palatine family sought to take command of the army of the late Bernard

[47] 'Notebook', 3, 15.
[48] Oman, p.293; SP 81/40 ff.133-4: Queen of Bohemia's debts and arrears, 18 Feb. 1633.
[49] SP 84/146 ff.15-16.
[50] Quotation in M. Kroll, *Sophie, Electress of Hanover: A Personal Portrait* (London, 1973), p.39; Wendland, pp.49, 97, 120; Oman, p.417.
[51] Akkerman, II, 1033; SP 16/374 f.155: Charles Louis to Roe, Dec. 1637.

of Saxe-Weimar, Roe urged Elizabeth that 'it is now the tyme to make use of all [Charles Louis's] Jewells' as 'they will sooner be recovered, then a Country'.[52]

Amount Deposited (francs)	Source	Date Deposited	Interest Accrued, 1632-38 (francs)	Total by May 1638 (francs)	Additional Notes
150,000	Sale of Lixheim	Jan. 1624	6,925f. 9s	6,925 9s	Frederick withdrew the capital sum of 150,000 francs when he left The Hague to rendezvous with Gustavus Adolphus in early-1632.
30,000	Payment from French Crown	Oct. 1624	12,031f. 5s.	42,031 5s	Part of the debt owed to the Palatine family.
20,000	Sale of Lixheim	Feb. 1625	8,281f. 5s.	28,281 5s	n/a
30,000	Sale of Lixheim	Aug. 1625	12,421	42,421 17s	n/a
21,000	Gift from Duchess of Richmond	Sept. 1630	8,531f. 5s.	29,531 5s.	Gift upon birth of Princess Charlotte of the Palatinate.
10,000	Accrued interest from deposited sums	Apr. 1634	2,500	12,500	n/a
148,135	Loan to Crowe and Calandrini plus interest	May 1636	18,276f. 12s.	166,411 12s	n/a
			Total	**328,102 13s**	

Table 1: Sums deposited by the Palatine family in the comptoirs of Holland and Utrecht.[53]

A lack of military capital and meagre independent financial resources meant that the Palatine family became one of a number of royal and noble exiles in seventeenth-century Europe who relied heavily on the fiscal support of their extended family. There was an implicit obligation for rulers to provide financial assistance for exiled relatives as well as other dispossessed elites as a means of recognising their professed royal or noble

[52] Akkerman, II, 834.
[53] 'Notebook', 3-26.

status. For example, Philip IV of Spain furnished his exiled mother-in-law, Marie de Medici, with an allowance of 8,000 ducats per month, as well as bestowing pensions on Gaston d'Orleans and Thomas of Carignano in recognition of their princely status.[54] Charles I similarly granted £2,000 to Marie and her retinue upon her arrival in England in October 1638 before providing an additional £100 per day to defray her expenses, although the king's concerns regarding this financial burden were reported by the Venetian ambassador.[55] Concerns of dynastic dignity also prompted monarchs to settle the debts of their exiled kin as much as familial charity. After the Palatine family's arrival in The Hague, James I's Lord Treasurer ordered £6,000 to be paid to Elizabeth 'that there may no debts lie upon her majesty to the dishonour of the King and discontent of herself', and Charles I settled the couple's debts of £3,000 in 1625 and over £12,000 three years later.[56] However, the large sums granted by Charles I to his sister and her children in the mid-1630s, as well as the generous annual pension of 600,000 livres awarded by Louis XIV to the Stuart exiles in Paris following the Glorious Revolution in 1688, cannot be dismissed as these kings nominally meeting an obligation to their dispossessed relatives.[57]

The primary source of revenue for the Palatine exiles were the allowances awarded by James I and Charles I. Elizabeth and Frederick were granted monthly pensions of £1,000 and £500 respectively, with the latter's allowance later being added to that of his widow, Charles Louis was awarded an annual pension of £2,000 from 1629 and Rupert

[54] Osborne, 'Marie', pp.24, 29-31.
[55] TNA: Signet Office and Home Office: Docquet Books and Letters Recommendatory [SO 3] SO 3/11 (Nov. 1634-Oct. 1638) and SO 3/12 (Nov. 1638-Dec.1644); *CSPV: 1636-39*, 264.
[56] TNA: State Papers Domestic: James I [SP 14]: SP 14/133 f.119: Lord Treasurer Middlesex to [Unknown], [25 Oct.] 1622; *CSPD 1625*-6, 537; E. Weiss, *Die Unterstützung Friedrichs V. von der Pfalz durch Jakob I. und Karl I. von England im Dreißigjährigen Krieg (1618-1632)* (Stuttgart, 1966), p.122; SP 16/123 f.5: Account of debts of the Household of the King and Queen of Bohemia, 22 Dec. 1628/1 Jan. 1629; SP 16/148 ff.156-8: Instructions from Charles I to Philip Burlamachi, [29 Aug.] 1629.
[57] Corp, *Court in Rome*, p.17; E. Gregg, 'Monarchs Without a Crown' in R. Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and H.M. Scott (eds.) *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton* (Cambridge, 1997), p.389.

and Elisabeth each received £300 per year.[58] In addition, the Palatines were supposed to receive £1,150 per year for the purchase of wood, charcoal, beer and liveries, and £500 upon the birth of each of Elizabeth's children.[59] The consistent expansion of the Palatine nursery also resulted in the procurement of much needed revenue through the shrewd choice of godparents which reflected the family's professed rank.[60] Louise Hollandine received a life pension from the States General and a present of 10,000 ducats from the Duke of Brunswick, Gustavus Adolphus presented Elizabeth and Prince Louis with jewels worth 25-30,000 florins, and Lord Craven paid Elizabeth's youngest son a pension of £200 per year and gifted plate worth £1,500 at the child's christening.[61] The Palatine exiles could also obtain financial capital by campaigning for a number of pensions and lucrative positions for their children upon the deaths of the previous recipients. Sir Francis Nethersole and Secretary Conway secured the transfer of the late duke of Holstein's pension to Charles Louis in 1624, and Elizabeth successfully championed her infant son, Louis, as a successor to the profitable ceremonial post of Colonel of the French Guards following the death of the duke of Richmond in February 1624.[62]

A number of scholars have asserted that the Palatine family's debts had reached such high levels by 1632 that they could never be paid off with the sums granted by the

[58] SP 81/27 f.261: Demand of monies for Queen of Bohemia, [Undated]; SP 81/35 f.149: Rupert at Leiden to Charles I, 15/25 Feb. 1629; Akkerman, I, 724; Green, pp.267-8, 307; Weiss, *Unterstützung*, p.122.
[59] SP 16/174 f.31: Account of moneys due to the Queen of Bohemia out of the Exchequer, 10 Oct. 1630.
[60] Ibid.; S. Groenveld, 'Könige ohne Staat: Friedrich V. und Elizabeth als Exilierte in Den Haag, 1621-1632-1661', in P. Wolf et al. (eds.), *Der Winterkönig, Friedrich von der Pfalz: Bayern und Europa im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart, 2003), p.182.
[61] A. von Rohr, 'Die Pfalz-Kinder: Timon, Le Diable, Willlull Ned, Signora Antica, Mademoiselle sans Façon und die Successio Britannica' in Wolf et al., *Bayern und Europa*, p.214; SP 84/106 f.108: States of Holland: grant of pension to Louise, daughter of Princess Palatine, 26 Apr./6 May 1622; Green, pp.198-9; SP 84/107 ff.17, 45v: Sir Dudley Carleton at The Hague to Sir Francis Nethersole, 10/20 June 1622 and Carleton to George Calvert, 18 June 1622; *CSPV, 1623-25*, 478.
[62] SP 14/170 f.3v: Nethersole to Secretary Conway, 15 July 1624; SP 84/121 f.225v: Carleton at The Hague to Conway, 25 Dec. 1624; Akkerman, I, 459-60; Green, pp.233-4.

Stuarts.[63] Certainly, Elizabeth complained in June 1631 that the pensions were 'scares sufficient for us'.[64] However, an audit of Elizabeth's finances in 1633 suggested that her debts of £15,000 would be fully settled if she received the arrears due to her out of the exchequer.[65] By 1630, the payment of Elizabeth's annual pension and the yearly sum of £1,150 were over two years in arrears, and she was owed the traditional payment of £500 following the births of her last three children.[66] Rupert's pension was also over four years overdue by early 1633 and Charles Louis's was £14,950 in arrears.[67] It is therefore likely that the Palatine family's annual income was far below Nadine Akkerman's estimate of £27,800.[68]

Although Charles was able to make the occasional payment to settle his relatives' debts, by 1629 he could not pay for the provision of his own household and was therefore unable to meet his obligations to the Palatine family, let alone make additional contributions to fund their military efforts.[69] In contrast to the financial crisis facing Charles in 1625, by 1636, the royal debt had been almost halved, albeit through very unpopular fiscal expedients, and the strengthened state of English finances led to an improvement in the Palatines' fiscal situation.[70] The exiles' pensions were not only increased, but also paid with greater consistency. In summer 1637, Charles raised the pensions of Charles Louis and Rupert to £12,000 and £2,400 respectively, and granted Maurice an annual allowance of £1,000 two years later.[71] The elector's financial statement

[63] Akkerman, II, 11; Mout, p.271; M. Keblusek, 'The Bohemian Court at The Hague', in M. Keblusek and J. Zijlmans (eds.), *Princely Display: The Court of Frederik Hendrik of Orange and Amalia van Solms* (The Hague, 1997), p.48.
[64] Akkerman, I, 838-9.
[65] SP 81/40 ff.133-4.
[66] SP 16/174 f.31.
[67] SP 81/40 ff.133-4.
[68] Akkerman, I, 509 n.2, 839 n.4.
[69] *CSPV, 1629-32*, 297; Weiss, *Unterstützung*, p. 122.
[70] F.C. Dietz, *English Public Finance 1558-1641*, 2nd edn (London, 1964), p.270; *CSPD: 1634-5*, 586.
[71] Loomie, pp.219-20; Akkerman, II, 765.

of 1645 demonstrates that his increased pension was paid in full until September 1640, and the meticulous records of Elizabeth's agent in London, Sir Abraham Williams, illustrate that he received £90,000 on his mistress's behalf between 1633 and 1639, and that the king also appeared to be able to honour the arrears owed to his sister.[72] It should also be noted that this period witnessed a vast increase in the sums contributed by Charles I to the Palatine family to fund their military activities.[73] The financial support provided by Charles in this period is an often overlooked indication of his support for the Palatine cause, and the sheer size of the sums and the increased consistency with which they were paid demonstrates that the king was not simply paying 'to get rid of his poor relations'.[74]

In addition to receiving financial gifts and pensions from relatives, the Palatine family stood to inherit money upon the deaths of family members. Upon the death of their maternal grandmother, Sophie of Mecklenburg-Güstrow, in October 1631, Charles I initially granted Elizabeth his share of the bequest, which was calculated at 432,584 Reichstalers, presumably as she had received nothing following their mother's death in March 1619.[75] However, Christian IV refused to issue this sum from his late mother's estate, seeking to claim 300,000 Reichstalers in lieu of the sums promised by the Stuart crown to support Danish military intervention in Germany under the Treaty of The Hague in 1625.[76] Charles would later ask his sister to surrender her claims to Sophie's legacy so that he could settle this debt to Christian in his efforts to persuade Denmark to renew the Stuart-Oldenburg alliance in 1638.[77] Despite agreeing to this request, Elizabeth suspected

[72] Bod.: MS Nalson 18 f.456: The humble remonstrance of James Harrington, concerning the affaires of His High:s the Prince Elector Palatine, 17 Feb. 1645; TNA: Exchequer (Pipe Office: Declared Accounts) [E 351]: E 351/35: Agents Employed for special services: Sir A. Williams. Money for the Queen of Bohemia, 29 Sept 1633-29 Sept 1638; SO 3/11.
[73] SO 3/11 and SO 3/12; Akkerman, II, 754; Hibbard, *Plot*, pp.132-3.
[74] C.V. Wedgwood, *The King's Peace: 1637-1641* (London, 1955), p.128; Hibbard, *Plot*, p.133.
[75] Akkerman, II, 63; Green, pp.316-7.
[76] Akkerman, II, 136.
[77] Ibid., 676; Beller, 'Hamburg', p.65.

that Charles asked her to do so because he realised that the inheritance was far more substantial than he initially believed.[78]

Frederick had also received an eighth share in the Dutch West India Company upon the death of Maurits, Prince of Orange in April 1625.[79] He therefore presumably profited from the legendary capture of a portion of a Spanish silver fleet by Pieter Heyn off the north coast of Cuba in September 1628. This master stroke produced an estimated booty of 11.5 million florins, 3.5 million of which were disbursed as dividends to shareholders of the WIC.[80] It should be noted that neither Elizabeth's correspondence nor Frederick's biographer make note of a windfall which should have brought the family just under £40,000. However, the fact that Roe and Rusdorf looked into the possibility of a Palatine-led expedition to the West Indies to establish a trading company in early-1629 suggests that this proposed project was inspired by the Dutch success.[81] Nevertheless, the share price of the Dutch West India Company plummeted by almost 70% between January 1629 and February 1633, with the result that the company was 18 million florins in debt by 1636, rendering any stake of the Palatine family in the WIC as worthless.[82]

The Palatine family also received financial support from a number of Englishmen by virtue of their familial ties to the king.[83] For example, Dudley Carleton loaned large

[78] Akkerman, II, 681.
[79] Mout, pp.266-7. Akkerman claims that Elizabeth was left the shares. However, this is unlikely as Frederick's mother was a half-sister of the late Statthalter and therefore had a closer familial connection. See Akkerman, I, 37.
[80] H. den Heijer, 'The Dutch West India Company, 1621-1791', in J. Postma and V. Enthoven (eds.), *Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585-1817* (Leiden, 2003), p.92.
[81] Akkerman, I, 732.
[82] J.I. Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740* (Oxford, 1989), pp.162-3 table 5.12; W. Klooster, *The Dutch Moment: War, Trade, and Settlement in the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World* (London, 2016), p.253; P. Emmer, *The Dutch in the Atlantic Economy, 1580-1880: Trade, Slavery and Emancipation* (Aldershot, 1998), pp.96-7.
[83] M.A. Breslow, *A Mirror of England: English Puritan Views of Foreign Nations, 1618-1640* (Cambridge, MA, 1970), p.43.

sums to Frederick and Elizabeth and acted as guarantor for a loan of an additional £1,000, and Archbishop George Abbot bequeathed her £100 in his will 'to make a pretty cup of gold, in token of my dutiful respect and service to her princely dignity'.[84] Foremost amongst the family's individual benefactors was William, Lord Craven, who contributed £5,000 towards Charles Louis's military venture in 1638.[85] However, it should also be noted that Craven's generosity and dedication to Elizabeth's family was an exceptional example, and a willingness to lend money to the Palatine exiles was often encouraged by the fact that a royal status could act as security against any loan or credit for goods. For example, Sir Francis Nethersole pawned the plate gifted to him by Louis XIII for £455 to pay 'the most troublesome of the Queen's creditors' on the understanding that he would be reimbursed accordingly, and a loan of £6,000 made by Lord Goring to Charles Louis was repaid with interest out of the exchequer in May 1638.[86] The Winter Queen's connections to the Stuart court also encouraged the English merchants at Delft to grant credit to the Palatine exiles in the 1620s, an arrangement which proved vital when the payment of Frederick and Elizabeth's pensions fell into arrears.[87]

As the Palatine family was almost entirely dependent on the pensions and allowances granted by James I and Charles I, and later continued by Parliament until the late 1640s, their fortunes were inextricably linked with the ability and willingness of their benefactors to pay the promised sums. The financial crisis facing Charles I in 1625, which forced the king to pawn the crown jewels, sell vast tracts of crown land, and suspend all

[84] SP 84/120 f.253: Carleton at The Hague to Philip Burlamachi, 22 Oct. 1624; SP 16/123 f.5; A. Onslow, *The Life of Dr George Abbot, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury* (Guildford, 1777), p.67.
[85] 'Notebook', 14.
[86] SP 16/123 f.5v; *CSPD: 1627-8*, 579; SO 3/11.
[87] Green, p.306.

royal household payments inevitably had dire consequences for his sister's revenue.[88] Similarly, the disruptions in Charles I's kingdoms from the late-1630s drained the recently-recovered royal finances and led to a dearth in monetary support from the Stuart court. Elizabeth's pension was not paid after April 1642 and Charles Louis's was almost £36,000 in arrears by October 1644.[89] Although Parliament granted additional financial support between 1643 and 1647, the sums awarded were rarely, if ever, paid either in full or on time.[90] Even prior to the cancellation of Elizabeth's pensions in May 1649, the Winter Queen petitioned the States General for a yearly allowance as the irregular payment of her English pensions had rendered her almost destitute and, following the execution of her brother, 'her hopes have vanished of receiving any assistance from that kingdom'.[91]

Dynastic Capital

The previous two sections have demonstrated that the Palatine family's ability to procure military and financial capital depended largely on their dynastic connections and that their fortunes were for the most part inextricably linked with those of their Stuart relatives. As the legitimacy of dispossessed houses' claims to titles and territories were boosted by their professed rank being acknowledged by other ruling elites, the Palatines' dynastic connections were potentially of considerable value. If a ruler or their representatives officially addressed an individual with a certain title or afforded them the associated level of dignity, it typically meant that their state officially recognised this person as the rightful holder of the title. Such acknowledgement added valuable credibility

[88] K. Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven and London, 1992), p.105; Dietz, *Finance*, pp.243-4; *Acts of the Privy Council of England: new series*, gen. ed. J.R. Dasent (46 vols., London, 1890-1964), XL, 441.
[89] Bod.: Craven Estate Papers 315: Abstract of Arrears due to Elizabeth of Bohemia drafted by Sir Abraham Williams, 6 June 1651; MS Nalson 18 f.456v.
[90] *CJ*, III, 26 and IV, 69; MS Nalson 18 f.456; Craven Estate Papers 315: Abstract of Arrears, 6 June 1651.
[91] *CSPV: 1647-52*, 88.

to an exile's cause as it not only legitimised their claims to certain lands and status, but it also acted as a public refutation of any other claimants, as reports of the reception and hospitality shown to exiled rulers was of considerable diplomatic interest. After the Governor General of the Spanish Netherlands, received the exiled Charles II in a manner befitting the latter's professed regal status in December 1656, one contemporary claimed that 'the cavaliers brag notably of his civilities to their Charles', with such swagger coming from the knowledge that the exile's royal reception would shortly be reported all across Europe.[92]

However, numerous examples of exiled rulers in seventeenth-century Europe demonstrate that the concept of what constituted 'sovereignty' in the early-modern period was very much in the eye of the beholder, as one power could adopt different stances towards it depending on their own interests. For example, Louis XIV made a very clear differentiation between the claims of James II, who he regarded as the de jure king of England and Scotland, and those of William III who ruled de facto in London. Although such a distinction meant that the French king felt able to fete James as the lawful king of England whilst also adhering to the Treaty of Ryswick of 1697, which obliged Louis to acknowledge William as king, such fine points of definition ultimately had little practical benefit for the exiled Stuarts if Louis also afforded royal status to the man who currently occupied James's throne.[93]

The willingness of a dispossessed ruler's potential allies and extended family to recognise their professed title ultimately depended on whether doing so would benefit their

[92] *Thurloe,* V, 250; A. Keay, ''The Shadow of a King?': Aspects of the Exile of King Charles II' in Mansel and Riotte, *Monarchy and Exile*, p.108
[93] E. Corp (ed.), *A Court in Exile: The Stuarts in France, 1689-1718* (Cambridge, 2004), pp.160-1.

own interests. For example, the Savoyard ambassador in London offered to acknowledge Charles Louis as Elector Palatine in 1635 on the condition that the young prince recognised duke Victor Amadeus's claim to royal status and the crown of Cyprus.[94] Even the reception and fêting of Frederick and Elizabeth as royal guests by their Dutch hosts, as well as their treatment of Charles Louis with the honour appropriate to the son of a king, was not driven by a selfless belief in the legitimacy of the Palatine family's claims to the Bohemian throne. A number of scholars have instead claimed that the presence of the 'royal' court-in-exile within the Dutch Republic increased the ceremonial prestige of the House of Orange on the international stage, which in turn benefitted the States General when engaging in diplomatic negotiations with European monarchies which typically mistrusted republics.[95]

Marriage

It has been asserted that the Palatine family's status as penniless albeit well-connected exiles precluded any hope of an advantageous marriage with a European noble or royal house.[96] After all, the marriage between Prince Edward and Anna de Gonzague, the daughter of the duke of Mantua and Montferrat, in Paris in May 1645, a union which scandalized contemporaries, was the only marriage to occur prior to the Palatine restoration. The couple were banished from France by the Queen Regent Anne of Austria, and Edward's conversion to Catholicism caused his mother to declare that she would rather be dead.[97] However, a number of matches were pursued by and, more importantly,

[94] Loomie, p.192; See also R. Oresko, 'The House of Savoy in search for a royal crown in the seventeenth century', in R. Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and H.M. Scott (eds.), *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in memory of Ragnhild Hatton* (Cambridge, 1997).
[95] Thomas, p.318; J.I. Israel, 'The United Provinces of the Netherlands. The Courts of the House of Orange c. 1580–1795', in J. Adamson (ed.), *The Princely Courts of Europe: Ritual, Politics and Culture under the Ancien Régime 1500-1750* (London, 1999), p.122; Keblusek, 'Bohemian Court', p.50.
[96] A. Plowden, *The Stuart Princesses* (Stroud, 1996), p.70; Oman, p.344.
[97] *CSPV: 1643-47*, 187; Bromley, p.128.

offered to the Palatine children throughout the duration of their exile by both their enemies and potential allies. Such proposals deserve scholarly attention since, as Clarissa Campbell Orr has argued, whom someone nearly married can be as valuable in determining a family's strategies as whom they finally did marry.[98] An examination of the marriage offers received by the Palatine exiles not only demonstrates the perceived value of dynastic capital by contemporaries, but the fact that a number of proposed matches offered some degree of restitution yet ultimately failed due to considerations of prestige and religion provides a valuable insight into the priorities of exiles in this period.

The Palatine exiles almost exclusively pursued marriages which offered the possibility of obtaining financial, military and political capital for the family's cause.[99] As women from princely families in the early-modern period were typically regarded as more valuable 'assets' in marriage negotiations than their male siblings, Elizabeth kept her daughters as 'noted adornments' at her side at The Hague, in the hope that they would attract husbands with the financial and martial means to facilitate a palatine restitution.[100] For example, from late-1638 there was a plan to marry the eldest Palatine daughter to Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who commanded a 14,000-strong army, and Charles Louis encouraged a prospective marriage between Rupert and Marguerite de Rohan, as 'she is great both in meanes & birth'.[101] After Rupert resolutely rejected the match in mid-1643, the prospect of obtaining the Huguenot heiress's annual revenue of 40,000 crowns prompted the elector to propose his younger brothers Maurice and Edward as alternative bridegrooms for Marguerite, arguing that 'such a likely advantage to our familie is not to

[98] C. Campbell Orr (ed.), *Queenship in Europe 1660-1815: The Role of the Consort* (Cambridge, 2004), p.12.
[99] SP 81/38 f.245: Elizabeth at The Hague to Roe, 12/22 June 1632; *CSPV: 1636-39*, 147; Akkerman, II, 184-5; Oman, p.337; von Rohr, 'Pfalz-Kinder', p.213.
[100] Campbell Orr, *Queenship*, p.12; von Rohr, 'Pfalz-Kinder' pp.212-3.
[101] Akkerman, II, 750, 758, 521; Oman, pp.402-3; von Rohr, 'Pfalz Kinder', p.213; *Tragedy*, p.615.

be lost'.[102] In spite of this assertion, Charles Louis himself never expressed any inclination to wed Marguerite himself even when it became apparent that Rupert had no inclination to marry.[103] This was most likely because a French duchess was deemed of insufficient status for the professed ruler of the most senior electorate, who was also of the blood royal. In addition, Charles Louis may have believed that he would possibly be required to enter into a marriage contract as part of an agreement to secure his restitution.

The ambition of noble families to enhance their position, by combining economic wealth with prestigious symbolic capital which could be obtained by a socially advantageous match, led to heightened status consciousness amongst early-modern European elites, particularly following the formalisation of feudal hierarchy within the Holy Roman Empire.[104] A marriage into a royal dynasty, even one whose sovereignty was disputed, would still have appealed to ambitious noble families. For example, in 1719, James Stuart, the 'Old Pretender', married one of the wealthiest heiresses in Europe, Maria Klementyna Sobieska, whose dowry included 600,000 livres and an estate worth a further 800,000.[105] Although Maria was a granddaughter of King Jan III of Poland, and related through marriage to the Imperial, Portuguese, and Spanish crowns, her father had not been elected to succeed Jan, and Maria was therefore not of royal rank.[106] In addition, it appears that the wealthy Marguerite de Rohan and her family were actively pursuing a marriage with Rupert in summer 1643 in spite of the Palatines' lack of military and financial

[102] SP 81/53 ff.210-11: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 30 Mar./9 Apr. 1643; Warburton, I, 63-7.
[103] Green, p.378.
[104] P.H. Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire: A Thousand Years of Europe's History* (London, 2016), p.426; K.J. MacHardy, 'Cultural Capital, Family Strategies and Noble Identity in Early Modern Habsburg Austria, 1579-1620', *P&P*, 163 (1999), pp.47-8.
[105] E. Corp, *The Jacobites at Urbino: An Exiled Court in Transition* (Basingstoke, 2009), p.92.
[106] Ibid.

resources, as well as their exclusion from the general amnesty offered by the Peace of Prague.[107]

Another attraction for European elites to marry into the exiled Palatine family was their dynastic connections, particularly with the Stuart court, and the potential support this could bring for their own ambitions. When Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg reportedly sought to marry Princess Louise Hollandine in early 1642, Charles I offered to mediate on the young elector's behalf in his territorial disputes with Sweden, the States General and Prince of Orange.[108] Similarly, between 1631 and 1637, the Catholic King Władisław IV of Poland sought a marriage with Princess Elisabeth in the hope of obtaining English aid to recover the Swedish throne lost by his father in 1599.[109] However, the princess's refusal to convert 'for all the Kingdomes of the world' scuppered the marriage negotiations.[110] Although these prospective matches both collapsed, the fact that both Władisław and Friedrich Wilhelm later married brides whose families could assist their respective causes demonstrates the belief of contemporaries to be garnered from dynastic capital. The Polish king renewed his anti-Swedish alliance with the Habsburgs by marrying Ferdinand II's daughter, Cecilia Renata, in September 1637, and Friedrich Wilhelm married Louise Henriette of Orange in 1646, obtaining a large dowry and promises of Dutch military support for his Cleves estates and in his dynastic quarrels over Pomerania and Jülich-Berg.[111]

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[107] Warburton, I, 68; M. Strachan, *Sir Thomas Roe, 1581-1644: A Life* (Salisbury, 1989), p.272.
[108] Akkerman, II, 1021**;** von Rohr, 'Pfalz-Kinder', pp.213; SP 81/53 ff.16-18: Proposal for marriage between the Elector of Brandenburg and Princess Palatine Louise, 22 Jan. 1642.
[109] SP 81/42 ff.322-3: Considerations presented by Queen of Bohemia on marriage offered by King of Poland to her daughter Elizabeth, [Undated, 1634]; von Rohr, 'Pfalz Kinder', p.213; Oman, p.343.
[110] Akkerman, II, 484.
[111] *Tragedy*, p.577; D. McKay, *The Great Elector* (Harlow, 2001), p.36.

It should also be noted that Ferdinand II and his successor offered Charles Louis a number of Habsburg brides, including his daughter Cecilia Renata, and his nieces Princess Anna of Tuscany and Archduchess Maria Leopoldine of Austria, in marriage agreements which would offer a form of Palatine restoration.[112] The fact that each of these proposals was rejected by the Palatine family provides a valuable insight into concerns of exiles which prevented apparently advantageous matches. Following the confirmation of Bavarian possession of Frederick's electoral title and the entire Upper- and eastern Lower Palatinate in May 1635, the prospect of a full Palatine restoration was rendered impossible, especially as securing Bavarian approval became an important prerequisite for peace by the mid-1630s.[113] Any alternative proposed restoration would therefore clash with the professed legitimacy of the Palatines' claims to the sovereignty of the entire Palatinate, as Frederick claimed in 1623 that anything less than a full restitution would be 'une marque d'infamie à moi & ma posterité', a sentiment which his widow regularly repeated. [114] A match with the Habsburgs would also have necessitated the removal of the Imperial Ban declared against Frederick in January 1621, requiring Charles Louis implicitly to admit the illegality of his father's acceptance of the Bohemian throne.[115] Such terms, together with the religious implications of wedding into the Habsburg family, would also have had a detrimental impact on the Palatine family's image as martyrs for the Protestant Cause.[116]

Promoting Status and Pedigree

[112] *CSPV: 1636-39,* 139, 522; Akkerman, II, 995.
[113] *Tragedy*, pp.567-7.
[114] Pursell, p.215, n.95. For Elizabeth's rejection of a partial restitution see SP 16/490 f.162: Elizabeth at The Hague to Roe, 23 May/2 Jun. 1642; TS 23/1/24: Elizabeth at The Hague to Charles Louis, 13/23 May 1647; Akkerman, II, 417.
[115] Akkerman, II, 421, 457; Green, p.333.
[116] W. Watts, *The Swedish intelligencer. The third part…Unto which is added the fourth part* (London, 1633), pp.170-4; Cogswell, *Blessed Revolution*, p.94; J. Miller, 'The Henrician legend revived: the Palatine couple and its public image in early Stuart England', *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire,* 11/3 (2004), pp.319-28; Breslow, *Mirror*, pp.37-8.

The importance of image and rank was acknowledged by contemporaries, such as Cardinal Richelieu, who asserted that a prince 'can accomplish more with his name alone than a less well esteemed ruler can with great armies at his command'.[117] Central to the enhancement of noble or royal house's dignity was the construction and promotion of a 'dynastic identity' through the manipulation of a family's history to meet present requirements and demonstrate the legitimacy of their claims to specific lands and titles.[118] For example, Orangist writers distorted the family's history to portray them as a hereditary ruling house, and Maximilian of Bavaria sought to substantiate his bid for Frederick's electoral title by employing Jesuit antiquarians to rehabilitate his ancestor, the fourteenth-century Emperor Ludwig the Bavarian, and enhance the reputation of his dynasty.[119] However, as Tim Blanning noted, 'the greater the doubts about the legitimacy of a throne, the greater the need for display' and this maxim is particularly applicable to the Palatine exiles.[120] The family not only had to counter the widespread derision of Frederick, who had become one of the most ridiculed figures in early modern European print, but also to legitimise their claims to his hereditary territories and electoral title which were formally settled on Maximilian under the Peace of Prague.[121] Accordingly, the Palatine family attempted to maintain a lifestyle worthy of their professed rank and demonstrate the legitimacy of their claims to Frederick's title and territories through ostentatious display

[117] Armand Jean du Plessis, duc de Richelieu, *The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu,* ed. and tr. H. Bertram Hill (Madison, WI, 1961), p.119.
[118] H. Scott, "The Line of Descent of Nobles is from the Blood of Kings': Reflections on Dynastic Identity', in L. Geevers & M. Marini (eds.), *Dynastic Identity in Early Modern Europe: Rulers, Aristocrats and the Formation of Identities* (Farnham, 2015), p.236.
[119] L. Geevers, 'The Nassau Orphans: The Disputed Legacy of William of Orange and the Construction of the Prince of Orange (1584-1675), in Geevers and Marini, *Dynastic Identity*, pp.197-216; R. Babel, 'The Court of the Wittelsbachs c. 1500-1750', in Adamson, *Princely Courts*, p.192; A. Schmid, 'Geschichtsschreibung am Hofe Kurfürst Maximilian I von Bayern', in H. Glaser (ed.) *Um Glauben und Reich. Kurfürst Maximilian I. Beiträge zur Bayerischen Geschichte und Kunst, 1537-1657* (Munich, 1980), pp.330-40.
[120] T. Blanning, *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe 1660-1789* (Oxford, 2002), p.32.
[121] For examples of Frederick V as a subject of mockery see E.A. Beller, *Caricatures of the 'Winter King' of Bohemia* (Oxford, 1928), especially pp.30-47.

and conspicuous consumption, regardless of the financial implications and the hostility such extravagance would provoke from their Dutch hosts.

The most important task for exiled ruling houses was the establishment of a formal court. Apart from acting as a base to attract supporters, even the most threadbare court-in-exile functioned as a public declaration of a dispossessed ruler's professed status, as well as demonstrating a determination to have the legitimacy of their claims recognised by other European elites.[122] One necessary feature of an exiled court was the maintenance of a sizeable functioning household which, as well as administering the daily needs of the dispossessed nobles, could convey a degree of status in spite of, or to compensate for, their contested sovereignty. Estimates of the size of Marie de Medici's retinue upon her arrival in England in 1638 range from 160 to 600 and the total number of servants engaged by the Palatines in their courts at The Hague and Leiden exceeded the exiled households of both Charles II and James II which numbered between 50-80 and 190 respectively.[123]

The maintenance of a household also allowed the promotion of a regal image through the establishment of a strict internal hierarchy and the introduction of household ordinances and rules of etiquette. Louis XIV acknowledged that the purpose of such regulations were not merely ceremonial, asserting that his subjects 'usually judge by what they see from the outside, and most often it is by precedence and rank that they measure their respect and obedience'.[124] Although the orders issued to Elizabeth's servants in 1636

[122] G. Smith, *Cavaliers in Exile, 1640-1660* (Basingstoke, 2003), p.212; Gregg, 'Monarchs without a Crown', p.384; Mansel and Riotte, *Monarchy and Exile*, p.8; Keay, 'Shadow', p.106; D. Szechi, *Britain's lost revolution? Jacobite Scotland and French grand strategy, 1701-8* (Manchester, 2015), p.78
[123] Osborne, 'Marie', p.25; *CSPD: 1638-9*, 48; *CSPV: 1636-39*, 468; N. Akkerman, *Courtly Rituals in The Hague: Elizabeth Stuart & Amalia von Solms* (The Hague, 2014), p.48; Groenveld, 'Könige', p.174; Smith, *Cavaliers*, p.120; *Thurloe*, III, 561; Corp, *Court in Exile*, pp.105-6.
[124] Quotation from R. Mettam, *Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France* (Oxford, 1988), p.117.

also sought to help alleviate the Winter Queen's financial difficulties, by seeking to reduce excessive consumption of food and wine by her staff as well as improving domestic account-keeping, the regulations primarily aimed to protect the prestige of the Palatine household and support Elizabeth's claims to royal status.[125] For example, the ordinances restricting access to the Winter Queen's presence mirrored those implemented by Charles I at the Stuart court.[126] Such measures were primarily intended to set the central figure of the court apart, reflect their personal morality, and afford them the prestige worthy of their professed rank.[127]

The use of images and ostentatious display also enabled early modern dynasties to promote their claims to a status, titles and lands, as well as being a means of remaining visible on the political and social scene.[128] Since an exile's absence from the military landscape during the Thirty Years' War risked reducing the significance of their cause in diplomatic talks, dispossessed dynasties had to find other ways of drawing attention to, and maintain the significance of their claims and cause. For example, the Jacobite exiles in Rome had the best box at the Teatro Alberti, the finest theatre in the city, where they could be clearly seen by other members of the audience and ultimately became an attraction themselves.[129] It could be argued that, for an exiled regime, the only thing worse than being talked about, was not being talked about.

[125] Rousham Hall, Oxfordshire: Orders for the Government of Ye Queen of Bohemia's Family at The Hague, 25 Nov. 1636 [Transcript].
[126] Ibid.; *CSPV: 1625-26*, 21.
[127] J.H. Elliott, *Spain, Europe and the Wider World 1500-1800* (New Haven and London, 2009), p.260; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, pp.210-22.
[128] P. Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* (London, 1992); K. Sharpe, *Image Wars: Promoting Kings and Commonwealths in England 1603-1660* (New Haven and London, 2010); Elliott, *Spain*, p.269.
[129] J. Clark, 'The Stuart presence at the opera in Rome', in Corp, *Court in Rome*, p.91.

Just as the House of Orange's Huis ten Bosch palace was decorated with portraits of European nobility to demonstrate the genealogical basis for their aspirations to princely status, the Palatine court-in-exile was furnished to promote a regal façade.[130] Their residence in the Wassenaer palace at The Hague was decorated with gold plate, the arms of the kingdom of Bohemia, as well as other insignia of sovereign rank, such as the chairs of state sent over from the English royal wardrobe.[131] In addition, the walls of the palace were bedecked with a number of portraits of illustrious Palatine ancestors, as well as Elizabeth's royal parents and brother, as demonstrations of the family's status and to justify Charles Louis's claims to Frederick's lost titles and territories.[132] The importance of art as a means of promoting the Palatine family's claims is demonstrated by the fact that, following Frederick's death, Elizabeth commissioned a portrait of her late husband dressed in the crown and regalia of the Bohemian kingdom, the insignia of the Order of the Garter, and alongside the vestments of an Elector of the Holy Roman Empire. Such overt displays of rank contrast sharply with the absence of outward signs of royalty in Spanish royal portraits of the period, supporting the assertion that there was often an inverse correlation between the strength of a regime and the extravagance of a court's representational culture.[133] Although the images commissioned by Elizabeth could not be accurately described as propaganda, due to their limited audience, paintings could act as statements of intent to be viewed by foreign ambassadors and notables. For example, 'The Triumph of the Winter Queen: The Allegory of the Just', completed the year after the Peace of Prague

[130] O. Mörke, 'Sovereignty and Authority: The Role of the Court in the Netherlands in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century', in R.G. Asch and A.M. Birke (eds.), *Princes, Patronage and the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age* (Oxford, 1991), pp.468-9.
[131] SP 14/121 f.100: Inventory of goods delivered out of the wardrobe for the Queen of Bohemia, [May] 1621; Mout, p.261; Keblusek, 'Bohemian Court', p.54.
[132] Thomas, p.333; W.J. Hoogsteder, 'Die Gemäldesammlung von Friedrich V. und Elizabeth in Könighaus im Rhenen/Niederlande' in Wolf et. al, *Bayern und Europa*, pp.189-91.
[133] J. Adamson, 'The Making of the Ancien-Régime court 1500-1700' and G. Redworth and F. Checa, 'The Courts of the Spanish Habsburgs 1500-1700' in Adamson, *Princely Courts*, pp.38 and 59 respectively.

deprived Charles Louis of his birthright, has been interpreted as a demonstration of Elizabeth's determination to go to war to recover her son's rightful inheritance.[134]

The exiled Palatine court also hosted banquets and dances with a degree of luxuriousness previously unseen in The Hague, to commemorate and capitalise on occasions such as the marriages of Charles I in 1625 and Luise van Solms in 1638, as well as organising masques and ballets on the theme of 'The Journey to Heidelberg'.[135] However, rather than inspiring sympathy and support for the Palatine cause, the conspicuous consumption and royal pretensions of the exiles offended the sensibilities of a Dutch society, which frequently interpreted disasters ranging from fires to floods as divine punishment for an obsession with riches.[136] Elizabeth's court was attacked in the pulpit and in print for its ostentatious luxury, obsession with leisurely pursuits, and immodest dress, which had rendered the exiled court 'more cavalier than Calvinist'.[137] Although Elizabeth was able to ignore the attempts of Dutch ministers to persuade her not to attend ballets and masques, claiming in 1655 that 'we have gotten a new diversion of little plays after supper…I hope the godlie will preach against it also', she was unable to ignore the financial consequences of pursuing a royal lifestyle.[138]

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[134] Akkerman, *Courtly Rituals*, pp.87-8.
[135] SP 84/153 f.193: William Boswell at The Hague to Coke, 5 Feb. 1638; Akkerman, II, 387; Thomas, pp.318-22; M. Keblusek, 'Entertainment in Exile: Theatrical Performances at the Courts of Margaret Cavendish, Mary Stuart and Elizabeth of Bohemia', in P. Davidson and J. Belper (eds.) *The Triumphs of the Defeated: Early Modern Festivals and Messages of Legitimacy* (Wiesbaden, 2007), p.179 and her 'Bohemian Court', p.55; I. Groeneweg, 'Court and City: Dress in the Age of Frederik Hendrik and Amalia', in Keblusek and Zijlmans, *Princely Display*, p.201.
[136] S.Schama, *The Embarrassment of Riches: An interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (London, 1987); W. Aglionby, *The Present State of the United Provinces of the Low-Countries* (London, 1669), pp.290-1.
[137] SP 84/155 f.254: Samson Johnson to Laud, 25 Nov./5 Dec. 1639; Groenveld, 'Könige', p.180; Mout, pp.263-5; Thomas, pp.317-18; J. Israel, 'The United Provinces of the Netherlands. The Courts of the House of Orange c. 1580–1795', in Adamson, *Princely Courts*, p.125
[138] Oman, p.424; Green, p.355.

The costs required to promote a regal image often depleted the already strained finances of royal exiles and exhausted their ability to obtain credit, with Elizabeth's steward Sir Charles Cottrell despairing that her court was 'every day in danger to want a dinner the next, since there is nothing to be had longer then there is ready money'.[139] Having spent almost 21,000 francs on the building and maintenance of the residence at Rhenen between 1632 and 1638, the property fell into such disrepair by the mid-1650s that Elizabeth's niece, the Princess of Orange, told her that 'she had a minde to crie, to see the house so spoiled'.[140] By 1650 the Winter Queen's debts had ballooned to £50,000, and she had been forced to dispose of her beloved horses as she could no longer afford to indulge her passion for hunting, which she described as 'all the pleasure I have in this place', as well as greatly reduce the size of her household.[141] Elizabeth's domestic and stable servants were owed £650 in back pay by January 1628 and consistent delays and defaults in wage payments caused the Winter Queen's staff to accumulate their own debts of 40,000 guilders with the merchants of The Hague by May 1654.[142] As a result, a number of Palatine servants, including Elizabeth's secretary, John Dinley, were forced to petition the Rump Parliament and Protectorate regime to settle arrears of their pay, and the Winter Queen herself was forced to remain in The Hague as a debtor in her tarnished gilded cage.[143]

Conclusion

[139] Rousham Hall: Transcript Letters: Sir Charles Cottrell to [Princess Elisabeth?], [1654?].
[140] 'Notebook', 30-2; Wendland, pp. 29, 67; Oman, pp.417-8.
[141] Plowden, *Princesses,* p.86; Oman, p.377; Green, p.367; Akkerman, II, 744; Wendland, p. 9; TNA: Council of State: Books and Accounts: Abstracts of petitions and orders [SP 25/92] SP 25/92 f.109 (24 Jan. 1656); Groenveld, 'Könige', pp. 181-2; Bod.: MS Clarendon 80, f.347; Green, p.382.
[142] SP 16/123 f. 5; MS Clarendon 80, f.347.
[143] *CSPD: 1653-4,* 135, 321; Rousham Transcripts: Cottrell to Mr Frays (Secretary to Charles Louis), 2 Nov. 1654.

Although military capital was viewed by contemporaries as the most useful resource for an exiled dynasty during the Thirty Years' War, as it allowed the extraction of financial support and diplomatic concessions from other powers due to the fierce competition for military resources, possession of an army by no means guaranteed a restoration of lands or titles. With the exception of the Hessian army, no exiled military force was sufficiently large to recover their territories without the assistance of more powerful states. Whilst military and financial capital was undoubtedly of great value to dispossessed regimes, this chapter has demonstrated that, rather than possessing materiel, an exile's best hopes for restitution depended on whether their restoration would be compatible with the policies and objectives of other powers. After all, the costly display and conspicuous consumption of exiled courts was partly driven by a need to persuade other states to recognise, and therefore legitimise, their claims to professed titles and lands. The relationship between the Palatine cause and the interests of other anti-Habsburg states will be addressed in further detail in chapter 3.

Despite being excluded from their former lands and titles, exiled rulers and regimes were still constituent parts of the political and dynastic network connecting the courts of early modern Europe. As a result, the multiple facets of dynastic capital offered the greatest benefits for dispossessed rulers and proved crucial for the Palatine family in their attempts to sustain their cause. Charles Louis not only lacked the military and monetary resources possessed by the dispossessed Hessians and the Duke of Lorraine, but the international span of the Palatines' familial connections was far broader than those of other exiled rulers during the Thirty Years' War.

The Palatines exploited these valuable familial connections both directly, by obtaining financial, military and diplomatic assistance from their relatives, as well as indirectly. Elizabeth's status as a princess of the House of Stuart not only inspired loyalty from her brother's subjects, manifesting in military service and donations, but it also allowed the Palatine family and their cause to become a conduit through which other powers could receive assistance from England. The fact that a number of rulers contemplated marrying into the exiled Palatine family in the hopes of obtaining support from Charles I for their own ambitions, demonstrates the importance of the contemporary belief in the usefulness and strength of familial connections. However, the dynastic ties of the Palatine family to other princely families both within and outside of the empire were also significant, and would become increasingly important as Charles I's kingdoms descended into Civil War, demonstrating the value of exiled rulers as a subject within the broader sphere of dynasticism in early modern Europe.

Chapter 3: 'Best-laid Plans': The Palatine Family c.1632-1642

In November 1632, it was predicted that 'the personal emnitie wch did arise about the Kingdom of Bohemia is dead wth [him]', and that Charles Louis could call on the support of the other Protestant electors and their allies in restoring the young prince to his late father's lands and titles.[1] Scarcely seven months later, the English ambassador to Spain made the less optimistic assertion that the best hope for Charles Louis's restoration lay in 'a composition wherein everybody must be contented to forgo his interests to fit us, which is hard to believe'.[2] This chapter will examine the strategies devised and pursued by the Palatine family in the decade spanning the Winter King's demise and the outbreak of the First English Civil War, and how these schemes were also shaped by, and conflicted with, the policies of their allies and fellow anti-Habsburg powers. In doing so, this chapter will correct the assumption that exiled rulers and regimes were inherently politically impotent and irrelevant, demonstrating that dispossessed groups still had agency and were able to play a role, albeit a subordinate one.

Although the Palatine family were unable to shape events themselves, being in the doubly-disadvantaged position as semi-sovereign Imperial Princes and exiles, they remained an important factor. This period saw them engage in various military and diplomatic schemes to sustain some degree of agency and recover their status within the hierarchy of the Empire. Even when exiled regimes lacked the means and ability to function as independent actors on the political and military stage, the Palatine family were still constituent parts of the dynastic and political network connecting early modern

[1] SP 81/41 ff.334-6 at f.335v: Notes on the Position of the Prince Palatine, [Undated] 1633.
[2] Quoted in K. Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven and London, 1992), p.95.

European states. Accordingly, this chapter will also demonstrate that the study of exiles can also provide a valuable insight into the relative importance of dynastic loyalties and international politics in the early modern period.

In order to examine how the strategies of the Palatine family were devised in response to military and political developments in the British Isles as well as continental Europe, this chapter is divided into four chronological sections. The first section spans the seventeen months between the partial recovery of the Lower Palatinate in 1633 and the battle of Nördlingen in September 1634, a period in which Ludwig Philipp's regency government sought to consolidate the Palatine family's weak hold over their restored lands. The second section covers the year between late-1634 and late-1635, which saw the Palatine cause at its lowest point following Imperial and Bavarian military successes and the conclusion of the Peace of Prague in May 1635. The third part of the chapter examines the military and political activities of the Palatine family between 1636 and 1638, and how their strategies were shaped by the foreign policy preferences of Charles I. The final section will cover the period between the final defeat of Charles Louis's short-lived army in October 1638 and the outbreak of the First English Civil War in 1642, a period which demonstrates the dangers facing exiled regimes when their main financial and diplomatic supporters were unable to provide assistance. The broadly chronological structure of this chapter underscores the limited ability of exiled rulers to operate as independent actors, and how they struggled for recognition and agency to pursue their goals as events developed.

1633-35: Consolidation and Negotiation.

Almost immediately after Frederick's death, Ludwig Philipp and Charles I attempted to persuade the crowned heads and statesmen of Europe to recognise Charles Louis as the rightful heir to the Palatinate. Sir Robert Anstruther was dispatched to Germany in December 1632 with instructions to persuade the German princes 'to intertain the restitution of our Nephew the Prince Elector Palatine', and was issued with almost fifty letters from the king to various anti-Habsburg monarchs, statesmen, free cities, and military commanders.[3] Charles also inducted his nephew into the Order of the Garter in spring 1633.[4] In addition to promoting the legitimacy of Charles Louis's claims to sovereign status, by admitting him to a fraternity whose members included his father as well as Christian IV, Frederik Hendrik of Orange, and Gustavus Adolphus, the ceremony was also intended as a public display of Charles I's support for his nephew.[5] Indeed, the Venetian ambassador at The Hague reported afterwards that 'they now style that prince Elector, and he has also been declared such by England', and that it was rumoured 'that whoever invades the Palatinate will be considered as the enemy of England herself'.[6]

As Charles Louis would not attain his majority until he turned eighteen in December 1635, it was important for Ludwig Philipp to be acknowledged as Administrator of the Palatinate, as it would act as a precedent to encourage other rulers to recognise his authority in engaging in diplomacy on the elector's behalf. After the young prince's uncle received a letter from Louis XIII addressing him as 'Administrateur du Palatinat', it was hoped that it could be used to persuade the Elector of Saxony to publicly support Ludwig

[3] SP 81/39 ff.358-74: Instructions to Sir Robert Anstruther (perfect copy), Dec. 1632; SP 80/8 ff.261-2: List of commissions and letters delivered to Anstruther on going as Ambassador to Germany, 26 Dec. 1632.
[4] G.F. Beltz, *Memorials of the Order of the Garter from its foundation to the present time* (London, 1841), p.188.
[5] SP 81/41 ff.153-4: Sir William Boswell at Boxtel to Charles Louis, 25 July 1633; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 130.
[6] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 137.

Philipp's possession of the title.[7] It was believed that if other powers recognised Charles Louis as Elector of the Palatinate, it would bolster the legitimacy of his claims to sovereign status as the rightful heir to Frederick's lands and titles. However, the Palatine family did not have the independent means to pressure other powers to recognise Charles Louis as elector, demonstrating their lack of autonomy and dependency on powerful backers.

The Palatine Family, Sweden, and the Heilbronn League

By the summer of 1633, the Palatine family was in a very peculiar situation. Ludwig Philipp had signed the articles of restitution with Sweden in April and established a regency government in Heidelberg, whilst Charles Louis remained at his mother's court-in-exile at The Hague. In addition, whilst the administrator's authority over the restored areas of the Lower Palatinate technically made the Palatine family *de facto* rulers of these lands once again, the transfer of the electorate to Bavaria a decade earlier precluded many states and their representatives from formally acknowledging Charles Louis as *de jure* Elector Palatine. It should also be noted that Ludwig Philipp's hold on the defenceless Lower Palatinate relied on continued Swedish military superiority in Germany over their opponents, allies, and the non-committed alike. Indeed, the articles of restitution dictated that 'The Administrator bynds himself & his pupils to concurre in ye choyce of ye direction of ye warre made by ye Crowne of Swede' and that they were 'not to enterprise any thing apart'.[8]

Although the relationship between Sweden and the Palatinate was undoubtedly asymmetrical in 1633, it was also beneficial for the restored regency government. As the

[7] BL: Stowe MS 134 f.138v: Louis XIII to Ludwig Philipp, 14 Feb. 1633; SP 81/40 f.178v: Anstruther in Frankfurt to Sir John Coke, 11/21 Mar. 1633.
[8] SP 81/40 ff.306-7: Anstruther's despatch, 27 Apr. 1633. This document contains a full copy of the 'Articles of restitution of ye Palatinat betwixt ye Chancellor & Administrator' dated 14 Apr. 1633.

only electorate amongst the states within the Swedish-dominated Heilbronn League established in April 1633, the Palatinate was the sole Imperial Estate to have their own representative in the council of 12 appointed to discuss military affairs with Oxenstierna.[9] In addition, the public championing of a Palatine restoration was intended to prove the sincerity of Sweden's professed aim to protect 'German Liberties', the fig leaf which hid their territorial and political ambitions in the empire.

It should be noted that Sweden's dominance in Germany was crumbling in the wake of the battle of Lützen in November 1632. As early as February 1633, Oxenstierna had assumed that they would be abandoned by her German allies as soon as they were no longer reliant on their aid.[10] It was becoming increasingly difficult for Sweden to continue shouldering the majority of the financial burden of the anti-Habsburg war effort. The troops serving in Swedish forces had not been paid in full since 1631, and a mutiny on 30 April 1633 had forced Oxenstierna to transfer a number of conquered German lands to his (predominantly German) officers as hereditary possessions, further alienating Sweden's allies within the empire.[11] In addition, although Sweden oversaw the establishment of the Heilbronn League in order to help ease her financial burden, the contributions required from the League's other members were chronically in arrears.[12] Oxenstierna, just like Christian IV of Denmark and the late Gustavus Adolphus, viewed Charles Louis's cause primarily as a way to extract assistance from Charles I.[13]

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[9] See lists of representatives at Heilbronn: SP 81/40 ff.226-7 and SP 84/146 f.153 both dated March 1633. Also SP 81/40 f.174: Notes on Oxenstierna's proposal to Heilbronn assembly, 8/18 Mar. 1633.
[10] H. Langer, 'Der Heilbronner Bund (1633-35)', in V. Press and D. Stievermann (ed.), *Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung in der Frühen Neuzeit?* (Munich, 1995), p.113; M. Roberts, *From Oxenstierna to Charles XII: Four Studies* (Cambridge, 1991), p.25.
[11] *Tragedy*, pp.517-8.
[12] Roberts, *Oxenstierna*, p.10.
[13] *Tragedy*, p.479. For Gustavus Adolphus's demands see: M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus: A History of Sweden, 1611-1632* (2 vols., London, 1953-58), II, 609 and Pursell, p.271.

Whilst the articles of restitution made no mention of England, the financial demands for the return of the Palatinate suggests that Oxenstierna was banking on the fact that Charles I would have to help pay the stipulated sums. It would have been a display of utter naivety for the Chancellor to think that Ludwig Philipp alone would have been able to raise the £15,000 for the return of the Swedish-held areas, as well as a monthly Heilbronn League contribution of some £3,600, and the £11,300 per month which would be required to pay for the defence of the Lower Palatinate.[14] The administrator could never have raised such large amounts from the restored territories, which continued to incur 'the unbearable burdens of war'.[15] Although Charles provided the £15,000, he refused to commit to a formal alliance against the Emperor and was reluctant to help subsidise the Swedish war effort.[16] Accordingly, Ludwig Philipp owed approximately £9,000 in arrears of his monthly contributions by May 1634, and was forced, under severe exhortation from Oxenstierna, to beg Elizabeth to petition her brother for financial assistance.[17] As Charles Louis's claim to be the rightful Elector Palatine was of disputed legality, and Ludwig Philipp's control over his nephew's lands rested almost entirely on continued Swedish military power in Germany, the regency government sought to consolidate the Palatine family's hold over their recently-returned ancestral territories.

Although Charles Louis and Ludwig Philipp were publicly acknowledged as elector and administrator of the Palatinate respectively by Charles I and the Heilbronn League, a large number of fellow Protestants and anti-Habsburg powers refused to acknowledge Charles Louis's claim to his father's lands and titles.[18] Elizabeth's maternal

[14] Ibid.; SP 81/41 f.337: Charges which the Palatine House ought to bear in the present war, [1633].
[15] SP 81/42 f.116: Ludwig Philipp in Heidelberg to Theobald Maurice, 28 May 1634.
[16] SP 81/41 f.130: Instructions for Colonel George Douglas, June 1633.
[17] SP 81/42 f.116; Akkerman, II, 296.
[18] SP 81/40 ff.197, 220 & 207: Anstruther to Coke, 14/24 and 28 Mar. 1633 and to Lord Treasurer Portland, 20/30 Mar. 1633.

uncle, Christian IV of Denmark, who was also an Imperial Prince through his possession of the duchy of Holstein and Schleswig within the Lower Saxon Circle, was one such example. Christian had been the most powerful Scandinavian monarch, as well as one of the wealthiest European rulers, before his country's intervention in the Thirty Years' War in 1625.[19] However, the disastrous Danish military performance against the forces of the Catholic League and the empire signalled the start of the country's decline into a minor power. The lenient Treaty of Lübeck of 1629, which allowed Denmark to retain its pre-war status, together with a desire to prevent Swedish territorial expansion in the Baltic and limit their political influence in the Lower Saxon Circle, meant that Christian was reluctant to alienate the Palatines' opponents and loath to support their greatest champions operating in Germany.[20] Christian refused to recognise his great-nephew as Elector of the Palatinate in 1633, as 'the king said he had already written to the Duke of Bavaria with the title of Elector', although he indicated that 'after the duke's death he might do something'.[21]

The remaining Protestant electors refused both to join the Heilbronn League and acknowledge Charles Louis as the rightful Elector of the Palatinate. Johann Georg of Saxony's virulent anti-Calvinist views made it plain that the Palatine exiles could expect no assistance from Saxony, in spite of the hopes of the English representative at Heilbronn.[22] Although Georg Wilhelm of Brandenburg was married to Charles Louis's aunt and had boycotted the transfer of Frederick's possessions to Bavaria, he believed in January 1633 that a reconciliation with the Emperor was the only way to obtain peace and

[19] J. Hein, 'The "Danish War" and Denmark's Further Role in the Conflict', in K. Bussmann and H. Schilling (eds.), *1648: War and Peace in Europe* (3 vols., Münster, 1998), I, 103-5; P.D. Lockhart, 'Denmark and the Empire: A Reassessment of Danish Foreign Policy under King Christian IV', *Scandinavian Studies*, 64/3 (1992), p.413.
[20] Copy of the Peace in *Sourcebook*, pp.97-9.
[21] *CSPV: 1632-36,* 146.
[22] Hartlib: 42/13/3A-B: Sampson Johnson in Berlin to John Durie, 8/18 July 1633; SP 81/40 f.220v.

free his territories from foreign occupation.[23] Indeed, Brandenburg refused to join the Heilbronn League unless Sweden withdrew its forces from Pomerania, an issue which persisted until the partition of the state between the two under the Peace of Westphalia.[24]

Individual state interests also led to the French refusing to acknowledge Charles Louis as elector. Louis XIII recognised Ludwig Philipp's title of Administrator of the Palatinate in early-1633 and his ambassador at Heilbronn acknowledged the Palatine delegates as those of an administrator. However, the French refused to regard them as representatives of an elector as doing so would contravene the Treaty of Fontainebleau between France and Bavaria.[25] In this secret agreement of May 1631, intended to separate Bavaria from the Emperor's service, Louis was obliged to recognise Maximilian's possession of the electoral dignity, and 'to defend and protect it against all who express the wish or seek to deprive him of it'.[26] Contemporaries were clearly aware of the risks of entering into a league or alliance with less powerful and beleaguered states. Richelieu even proclaimed it a universal truth that 'when two powers are joined by a treaty, the greater courts the risk of being abandoned by the lesser', who would 'sometimes even put themselves above obligations to those they have committed to the cause'.[27] It is therefore important to examine the strategies by which the Palatine family and other exiled dynasties could attempt to win the support and recognition of other powers to legitimise their claims, and the extent to which these strategies depended on the support of other states.

[23] *Tragedy*, p.356; Parker, p.136.
[24] H. Langer, 'The Royal Swedish War in Germany', in Bussmann and Schilling, *War and Peace*, I, 194.
[25] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 94, 100.
[26] *Sourcebook*, p.142.
[27] Armand Jean du Plessis, duc de Richelieu, *The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu,* ed. and tr. H. Bertram Hill (Madison, WI, 1961), p.101.

The administrator sought to reassert the Palatine family as *de facto* rulers in the restored areas, confirming the rights of towns such as Weinheim and receiving homage in Charles Louis's stead.[28] However, it was of the greatest importance for the restored government in Heidelberg to raise an army for the defence of the newly-recovered lands, as one observer noted that 'if ever it falls again into the hands of the Spaniards or Imperialists it will be in vain to hope ever to have it again'.[29] Under the military agreement with Sweden, the Palatines were obliged to maintain a 300-strong garrison at Mannheim, 4000 foot and 500 cavalry for the defence of the Lower Palatinate, and a flying column consisting of a further 4,000 foot and 1,000 cavalry, requiring an estimated £120,000 per year.[30] However, as the articles of restitution limited the number of troops which the Palatine government could raise within their own lands, as did their lack of money and materiel, the levying of such a force would require considerable assistance from other states.[31] Throughout 1633 and 1634 Ludwig Philipp and Elizabeth attempted to procure the additional £10,000 promised by Charles I to aid the reinforcement of the Palatinate, as well as the two regiments of troops in Hessian service which Elizabeth had funded.[32]

Another central facet of Ludwig Philipp's strategy to re-establish the Palatine family's control in the Lower Palatinate was the proposed return of Charles Louis to Heidelberg.[33] Rusdorf reported in May 1634 that Oxenstierna was 'frequently aghast' that the young prince had not returned to his capital, arguing that 'a state which is troubled by war and needs to be restored and established afresh can never prosper nor be well

[28] Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe: 43 (Archiv Pfalz) Nr. 5447 and 5506.
[29] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 179.
[30] SP 81/41 f.337.
[31] SP 81/42 f.326: Business of Sir R. Honiwood for the Queen of Bohemia [Undated 1634].
[32] Ibid.; Akkerman, II, 242, 262, 296.
[33] SP 16/254 f.70: Sir Francis Nethersole to Charles I, 28 Dec. 1633; SP 81/42 f.118: Ludwig Philipp in Heidelberg to Charles I, 28 May/7 June 1634.

governed, if he who is the ruler remains absent'.[34] The importance of a ruler's presence in their territories as a means of inspiring support from the inhabitants, was especially acute for restored dynasties which had been absent for extended periods of time. As Charles Louis had not set foot in his hereditary lands for over a decade, it is unsurprising that Ludwig Philipp commanded his nephew to join him in Heidelberg in summer 1634 so that, as Charles Louis wrote to Charles I, 'I might not be a stranger on mine own Inheritance'.[35] As precocious office-holding was a regular feature in early-modern princely education, it was also deemed vital that the young elector should return to his capital before attaining his majority in order to learn the business of ruling without 'having to carry the burden of the dignity of the Electorship and full government on his shoulders'.[36]

Whilst Charles Louis was reportedly 'ready to leap on horseback whensoever his uncle shall command him', he was ultimately prevented from returning to his hereditary lands.[37] Georg Johann Peblitz and the king's representative, George Douglas, reported from Heidelberg in 1633 that the young elector should only return to his father's lands if accompanied by an army. This force, which they recommended number 6,000 foot and 1,000 horse, was not merely intended for the young prince's protection, but also because 'otherwise he would not be respected in Germany where armed force wins respect'.[38] Naturally, such an army could only be raised with Charles I's assistance, prompting

[34] Akkerman, II, 285-7.
[35] SP 81/42 f.154: Charles Louis at The Hague to Charles I, 12/22 Jul. 1634.
[36] Roberts, *Gustavus*, I, 51; A. Pollnitz, *Princely Education in Early Modern Britain* (Cambridge, 2015); Akkerman, II, 286.
[37] John Dinley to Sr Thomas Roe, 19/29 Oct. 1633 quoted in Hauck, p.299 n.2.
[38] SP 81/41 f.248: Dinley to Secretary Coke, 9 Oct. 1633; SP 16/248 f.84: Dinley at The Hague to Roe, 19/29 Oct. 1633; D. Horsbroch, 'Wish You Were Here? Scottish Reactions to 'Postcards' Home from the 'Germane Warres', in S. Murdoch (ed.), *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648* (Leiden, 2001), p.252; Green, p.321.

Elizabeth and her adherents from making several requests for men, munitions and money, demonstrating once more the severe dependence of the Palatine family on the king.[39]

1632-35: Charles I and the Palatinate.

Charles I appears to have been disinclined to provide his nephew with the materiel necessary for Charles Louis to re-enter and establish his authority in the Palatinate, leading contemporaries and subsequent scholars to accuse the king of having abandoned the Palatine cause in favour of a pro-Spanish neutrality after 1630.[40] Successive historians have suggested various reasons for the lack of direct English intervention in the continental war following Frederick V's death. Such theories range from the influence of pro-Spanish and Catholic ministers such as Weston and Windebank, financial concerns and the benefits to be garnered from trade and friendship with Spain, and a reluctance to summon parliament. It has also been suggested that the dynastic imperative for assisting the Palatine exiles had been reduced by the birth of each Stuart royal child.[41] Whereas Elizabeth and her offspring had been next in line to the English throne before 1630, the birth of Prince Charles in May 1630, followed by another son and a daughter, meant that the succession was secured by the end of 1633.

However, the fact that the staunchly Protestant and anti-Habsburg Secretary of State Sir John Coke, who is often identified as one of the Palatine family's most ardent supporters, vehemently opposed English military intervention in the early-1630s suggests that there were other reasons for the king's refusal. Coke deemed it offensive that anyone

[39] SP 81/41 ff.213-20: Instructions for Dinley, 4/14 Sept. 1633; SP 16/248 f.84; SP 16/254 f.70.
[40] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 231; Green, p.321; L.J. Reeve, *Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule* (Cambridge, 1989), p.181; C. Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (North Carolina, 1984), pp.27-8.
[41] R. Cust, *Charles I: A Political Life* (Harlow, 2005), p.125; M. Kishlansky, *Charles I: An Abbreviated Life* (London, 2014), pp.38-9; *Tragedy*, p.479.

would suggest 'the sending of a Prince of 16 years old into the Palatinate in theis intestine warres: without due consideration of the inconveniences wch would follow', and lambasted the suggestion 'that a yong Prince wth a little armie can now determin that cause for wch King James of Happie memorie and his m.te have striven so manie years'.[42]

In addition to considerations of Charles Louis's youth and military inexperience, and the implications for his honour if he had to subordinate himself to the commander of another larger army, the principal issue for Charles and Coke was the fact that, if the young prince appeared to have taken up arms against the Emperor, it could lead to the Imperial Ban being implemented against him.[43] It was predicted that such a development would make the young elector 'more hateful to the adverse partie: & more neglected by his own to whom hee wil be a burden when Hee can not bee a healp'.[44] Accordingly, Coke instructed William Boswell, the English Resident Ambassador to the Netherlands, to 'represent the vainitie of this projected journey' to Elizabeth, and 'perswade her to imploy in her affaires calme & reposed Spirits, not forward to rash attempts: specially in the warres, wher men can erre but once'.[45]

Coke also argued that 'if [Charles Louis] once appeare wth an armie in the field his fathers banne wil put him in wurse case then anie other', as the extension of the ban to Charles Louis would appear justly implemented and would hinder his claim to be the lawful and legitimate ruler of the Palatinate. In contrast, it would be considered a 'just cause of warre' if the Emperor refused to return Frederick's lands and titles in accordance with the practice of primogeniture enshrined in the Golden Bull, and the other protestant

[42] SP 84/148 ff.9v-10: Coke in Whitehall to Boswell, 7 Jan. 1634 [First Letter]; Hauck, pp.18-19.
[43] SP 81/41 f.130v.
[44] Akkerman, II, 303.
[45] SP 84/148 f.10.

electors would be more likely to assist the Palatine cause in support of electoral rights, rather than to demand the restoration of a proscribed outlaw.[46] Charles therefore pursued a policy in which he would provide some degree of support for his nephew without committing to a formal military accord with the Palatine family's allies in the Heilbronn League, which he feared would 'cutteth of al hopes of accommodation wth the Emperor'.[47] This policy was neatly summarised by Coke, who claimed that 'as we are friends to all sides and enemies to none, so we will not tie ourselves to any neutrality which may hinder us from treating with any party that shall offer best conditions'. [48]

It was deemed particularly advisable for the Palatine family to avoid provoking the hostility of the duke of Bavaria. As the deed of enfeoffment bestowing the Palatine electorate upon Maximilian in February 1623 proclaimed not to prejudice the rights of Frederick's children, it was believed that the Palatinate and associated electoral title could be returned to Charles Louis after the death of the childless duke.[49] In January 1635, the English ambassador in Madrid wrote to Secretary Windebank that 'you must take heed the Prince Palatine bee not unreconciled att the Duke of Bavarias death (whoe is a man not likely to live about a yeare or two)'.[50] However, all of the reports which circulated in England of the duke's imminent death or his actual demise at various times throughout the mid-1630s were greatly exaggerated.[51] Indeed, Maximilian lived until September 1651 and was one of only a few rulers in place at the start of the Thirty Years' War who survived to witness its end in 1648.

[46] SP 81/41 ff.334-6 at f.334v: Notes on the Position of the Prince Palatine, [Undated] 1633.
[47] Ibid., f.127v: Instructions for Douglas, June 1633.
[48] SP 84/149 f.234v: Coke to Boswell, [May 1635].
[49] *Sourcebook*, p.92; SP 81/41 f.334.
[50] Bod.: MS Clarendon 6 ff.195-8v: Sir Arthur Hopton to Sir Francis Windebank, 22 Jan. 1635.
[51] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 230, 550; MS Clarendon 14 f.40: John Taylor to Windebank, 14 Apr. 1638.

Whilst Charles I's preferred strategy offered the advantage of not provoking the Emperor to extend the Imperial Ban to Charles Louis, as well as avoiding the financial drain of a costly military intervention, such an approach displays a naivety about political realities on the continent bordering on wilful blindness. Contemporaries observed the unsuitability of demanding the young prince's investiture on legal grounds as, if the Palatine family sought the Emperor's friendship and appealed for Charles Louis's restoration, they would alienate their continental allies and be in direct breach of the Heilbronn agreement.[52] Charles's reluctance to enter into a formal alliance with any anti-Habsburg country or league, or to provide any significant military assistance to the Palatine family or their allies, was widely interpreted as the king having forsaken his familial obligations and his sister's cause. The French ambassador reportedly concluded in February 1634 that the Palatinate could not expect any meaningful aid from England, and several ambassadors of the Protestant states at the second congress of the Heilbronn League at Frankfurt 'openly suggested the abandonment of the Palatinate, now it is seen that England, which, has such strong ties of obligation, cares nothing about it'.[53] Indeed, one of Elizabeth's secretaries, Sir John Dinley, had reported that any form of assistance to be obtained from the Dutch States 'will be governed by the help he gets from [England]', and the Landgrave of Hessen-Kassel offered 'to pledge himself for the security of the Palatinate provided England will contribute to the increase of his army'.[54]

The king's apparent aversion to contributing any substantial amount of men or money to Charles Louis's cause inevitably alienated the Palatine family's most important continental ally: Sweden. This was most evident when Oxenstierna sent his son, Johan

[52] SP 16/258 f.107v: Nethersole to Charles I, 10 Jan. 1634; SP 81/41 ff.253-4: Note from Heidelberg about demanding investiture of Palatine, 15/25 Oct. 1633. For the Heilbronn Agreement see *Sourcebook*, p.179.
[53] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 191, 231
[54] Ibid., 232, 187.

Axelsson, to England in Spring 1634 to seek a formal guarantee of Charles I's support for the 'common cause' as well as a levy of approximately 10,000 men.[55] However, the young Oxentierna returned to the continent without even a diplomatic gift. Although the king had offered a farewell present of 2,000 ounces of gilt plate, John Finet reported that the young ambassador rejected the gift, as to accept it would be 'as he understood it, a testimony of both theyr satisfactions, which he for his part could not acknowledge to have had'.[56] Elizabeth later received a justification of her brother's response from the Committee of Ordnance, which claimed that Johan had demanded men and money 'without power to treat or so much as promise, anie reciprocal conditions, to reflect upon your Mty & yours'.[57]

Although Patrick Ruthven managed to levy over 1,600 Scots for the Swedes in early-1634, the denial of substantial military and monetary support from England further undermined Sweden's already shaky domination of the Heilbronn League.[58] The contributions from member states were chronically in arrears, and attempts to expand the membership amongst the Upper and Lower Saxon Circles were hindered by the refusal of Brandenburg and Saxony to join.[59] Sweden's demands for Pomerania alienated the former, whilst Johann Georg simultaneously sought a religiously acceptable peace with the Emperor and attempted to persuade his fellow Protestant states of the dangers of siding with foreign powers interfering in German affairs.[60] There was no love lost between the elector and the Swedish chancellor, with the latter dismissing Johann Georg as 'an

[55] Ibid., 207, 209.
[56] Loomie, pp.157-9.
[57] Akkerman, II, 304.
[58] A. Grosjean, *An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden 1569-1654* (Leiden, 2003), p.98.
[59] Roberts, *Oxenstierna*, p.10; Langer, 'Swedish', p.194.
[60] SP 81/42 ff.143-4: Elector of Saxony's proposal at Frankfurt, and reply, [June 1634]; SP 16/270 f.123v: Durie in Frankfurt to Roe, 28 June 1634; Parker, p.157.

insignificant tosspot', whilst the elector described Oxenstierna as 'ein Plackscheisser'.[61] Numerous representatives reported the numerous Saxon machinations, claiming that Johann Georg's deputies 'have disseminated various ill offices in order to stir up disputes between the Princes' and that 'his jealousies against the Swedes are like to spoile all'.[62] The refusal of the two remaining Protestant electors to join the Heilbronn League ultimately spelled the end of the union and was a prelude to the disastrous Swedish defeat at the battle of Nördlingen later in the year.

1634-35: From Nördlingen to the Peace of Prague

In the twelve months after the collapse of the Frankfurt Diet and the victory of the Habsburg and Bavarian forces at Nördlingen in early-September 1634, described by the commander of the vanquished Swedish troops as 'the great misfortune…so bad it could not be any worse', the Palatine family could do nothing but watch their fortunes evaporate.[63] In the following year, the restored areas of the Lower Palatinate were twice invaded by Bavarian and Habsburg forces, and the Palatine family were excluded from the general peace treaty signed at Prague in May 1635, with Frederick's lands and titles being formally bestowed on Maximilian of Bavaria and his family in perpetuity. This period clearly highlights the difficulties facing beleaguered and exiled regimes when their defence or restitution conflicted with the interests of more powerful states, even when they were purportedly on the same side.

[61] Roberts, *Oxenstierna*, p.26. Johann Georg's opinion of the Swedish Chancellor has been somewhat sanitised in its translation to 'pen-pusher' in R.G. Asch, *The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-1648* (Basingstoke, 1997), p.110.
[62] SP 16/269 f.1: Durie at Hamburg to Roe, 1 June 1634 and SP 16/273 f.153: Durie in Frankfurt to Roe, 24 Aug. 1634; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 245.
[63] Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar quoted in G. Rystad, *Kriegsnachrichten und Propaganda während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges: die Schlacht bei Nördlingen in den gleichzeitigen, gedruckten Kriegsberichten* (Lund, 1960), pp.180-1.

French 'Protection', 1634-35

The Swedish defeat at Nördlingen fractured any semblance of unity between the members of the Heilbronn League, allowing the Imperial and Bavarian armies to sweep eastwards into the Lower Palatinate. The city of Heidelberg surrendered on 19 November, although the castle garrison refused to submit to the invaders.[64] The collapse of Swedish dominance in southern and western Germany robbed the restored Palatine government of its most valuable continental supporter, forcing Ludwig Philipp to dispatch representatives to the French court and seek protection for his nephew's lands.[65] Although Charles I was apparently incensed by the administrator's decision, Elizabeth held her brother responsible, claiming that 'if the king my deare Brother woulde but have assisted us with meanes, we had not bene troubled with these French'.[66]

Although France took up the mantle dropped by Sweden in the wake of Nördlingen to become the dominant anti-Habsburg power in Germany, the assertion of R.M. Smuts that the close followers of the Palatine family were 'the natural allies of [Henrietta Maria's] party, in its campaign for a French alliance' would have appalled individuals such as Sir Thomas Roe and Elizabeth herself.[67] The Winter Queen despaired in early-1634 that seeking the protection of Louis XIII was 'as much against my hart, as any thing was'.[68] In addition to believing that seeking French protection would 'bee the seed of future quarrells' within the Empire, Roe similarly claimed to Elizabeth in February that 'there is not less danger for your Ma:tie from France, in their intentions to enlarge as far as the Rhyne, then from Spayne to swallow all'.[69] Roe even predicted in January 1634 that 'the

[64] *Tragedy*, pp.549-50.
[65] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 298, 302.
[66] Ibid., 196; Akkerman, II, 306-7, 317-18.
[67] R.M. Smuts, 'The Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria in the 1630s', *EHR*, 93/366 (1978), p.36.
[68] Akkerman, II, 254.
[69] Ibid., 269, 306-7. See also SP 81/41 f.336.

French King will attempt to enlarge himself upon the Rhine, at the expense of the Palatinate, and if he once get a hold there, he will never give it up'.[70]

Such concern was understandable. Between April 1632 and early-1634, France had extended her political influence and military presence beyond her eastern frontier through aggressive expansion into the duchy of Lorraine, as well as offering protection to rulers who feared the intentions of Spain and the advancing Swedes, such as the Archbishop-Elector of Trier and the duke of Württemberg.[71] Of particular concern for the Palatine exiles was the French demand for the fortress of Philippsburg on the southern bank of the Rhine within the Electorate of Trier and on the border of the Lower Palatinate.[72] Ludwig Philipp and Elizabeth both reportedly urged the Swedes to dismantle the fortress, with the latter declaring that she would rather it remain with the Imperialists than be given to the French.[73] Elizabeth later declared her belief that the 7,000-strong force under the duc de La Force, which was dispatched to assist the relief of Heidelberg Castle in December 1634, was primarily intended to ensure French domination of the city and fortress rather than letting it be recovered by Swedish troops.[74]

Elizabeth was not reassured by French professions that the occupation of the numerous towns and cities in the Lower Palatinate was solely to deny them to Imperial and Bavarian forces, and that they would return them to Ludwig Philipp as soon as the administrator or his young charge had the means to defend them unaided.[75] She declared

[70] Parliamentary Archives, London: Main Papers [HL/PO/JO/10]: HL/PO/JO/10/1/41: Roe to Laud, 30 Jan. 1634.
[71] D. Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642* (Cambridge, 2001), pp.104-6.
[72] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 186.
[73] Ibid., 180, 192; SP 84/147 f.34v: Boswell at The Hague to Coke, 1/11 July 1633.
[74] Akkerman, II, 311.
[75] 84/148 f.262v: Boswell at The Hague to Coke, 26 Nov/6 Dec 1634 [First Letter]; Akkerman, II, 317-18; Green, pp.318-19.

that ‘I feare the phisition as much as the disease…I cannot trust them, as long as they call not my brother in law Administratour nor my sonne Electour.’.[76] French ambassadors repeatedly avoided recognising Charles Louis as ‘elector’. At the Heilbronn negotiations, the Marquis de Feuquieres refused to acknowledge Ludwig Philipp’s deputies as representing the interests of an elector, and the French ambassador in England would only address the young prince as ‘highness’.[77] Indeed, Senneterre declared in November 1635 that ‘for *Altesse* we will make no difficulty to give as he is a prince born and of the blood, and for…*Electeur* we shall have no cause to mention it’.[78] It was even asserted in January 1635 by the Venetian ambassador in London that Feuquieres had demanded for Charles Louis’s claim to the Palatinate to be conceded to Louis XIII, exciting ‘a proportionate wrath in the Administrator’, although it should be noted that this claim was not repeated elsewhere.[79] It is important, therefore to examine the aims of French policy in this period and demonstrate how the Palatine cause and strategies could often prove incompatible with the wider ambitions of other continental powers, even when such states faced the same common enemy as the Palatine family.

The main objective of Cardinal Richelieu’s foreign policy was to create an ‘ordered peace’ in which a group of forces with France at its centre would act as a counterbalance to thwart what he believed was a key Spanish and Imperial ambition: the creation of a ‘Universal Monarchy’ under Habsburg rule.[80] The First Minister’s policy involved the assertive extension of French influence into key strategic locations on the ‘Spanish Road’,

[76] Akkerman, II, 311.
[77] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 94, 100.
[78] Senneterre quoted in Loomie, pp.188-9.
[79] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 316.
[80] K. Malettke, ‘France’s Imperial Policy during the Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of Westphalia’, in Bussmann and Schilling, *War and Peace*, I, 178-82; H. Weber, “Une Bonne Paix’ Richelieu’s Foreign Policy and the Peace of Christendom’, in J. Bergin and L. Brockliss (eds.), *Richelieu and his Age* (Oxford, 1992), p.48.

such as Lorraine, thereby disrupting communications and important military supply routes between Habsburg territories, as well as creating a buffer zone between France's eastern frontier and the empire.[81] The Palatinate was of considerable strategic and geographical interest to the French, lying on the 'Spanish Road' as well as on the route from Mainz to Metz, which would serve as an ideal invasion route between the Empire and France.[82]

The fact that the Most Christian King went to war with the Holy Roman Emperor has often been held up as a demonstration that the Thirty Years' War 'saw a substantial diminution in its religious character' from 1635.[83] Although France's declaration of war against the Habsburgs alongside the protestant Dutch and Swedes was certainly not driven by confessional concerns, this did not preclude matters of religion being considered when devising the means by which they would obtain their 'secular' aims. As noted by Peter Wilson, all belligerents included considerations of faith in the 'common good' they sought to defend, and it is understandable that, all other things being equal, the French would have preferred the Catholic Bavarians to wield the traditional Wittelsbach electoral vote, rather than the Calvinist Palatine family.[84]

After all, the Palatine electors had pursued an anti-Catholic foreign policy during the second half of the sixteenth-century, providing considerable military and financial assistance to the rebellious Huguenots.[85] Roe's mistrust of French involvement in

[81] G. Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659* (Cambridge, 1972), p.76; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, p.103.
[82] B. Volger, 'Le Rôle des électeurs palatins dans le guerres de religion en France (1559-1592)' *Cahiers d'histoire*, 10 (1965), p.52.
[83] R. Bireley, 'The Thirty Years' War as Germany's Religious War', in K. Repgen (ed.), *Krieg und Politik 1618-1648* (Munich, 1998), p.103; C. Zwierlein, 'The Thirty Years' War – A Religious War? Religion and Machiavellism at the Turning Point of 1635', in P. Schröder and O. Asbach (eds.), *The Ashgate research companion to the Thirty Years' War* (Farnham, 2014), p.240.
[84] P.H. Wilson, 'Dynasty, Constitution, and Confession: The Role of Religion in the Thirty Years War', *International History Review*, 30/3 (2008), p.512.
[85] C.P. Clasen, *The Palatinate in European History: 1559-1660* (Oxford, 1963), p.5

Germany in the mid-1630s was fuelled by a fear that they 'will remember in their Civill wars, what the house Palatine hath done for the Religion'.[86] Maximilian's possession of an electoral vote would also offer greater benefits to France in the long-term than would a Palatine restoration. Richelieu envisaged Bavaria as a counterbalance against the Habsburgs within the empire itself, and Bavarian elevation to electoral rank increased the ratio of Catholics to Protestants within the Electoral College and offered the possibility that a Catholic non-Habsburg could be elected Emperor.[87] France's pro-Bavarian stance was especially threatening as they replaced the pro-Palatine Sweden as the leading anti-Habsburg combatant until the late-1630s, detaching Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar from Swedish service for 1.6 million Reichstalers per year in exchange for maintaining an 18,000-strong army, and ignoring Charles Louis as a prospective ally.[88] The fact that the Palatine family could not depend on the assistance of one of the most significant anti-Habsburg powers in continental Europe demonstrates the precarious position facing dispossessed regimes in early modern Europe. It could not be taken for granted that the enemy of one's enemy was a friend, especially if an exile's territories were of strategic importance for more powerful states.

30 May 1635: The Peace of Prague

The vulnerability of the Palatine family to the interests of the major belligerents of the Thirty Years' War was further demonstrated by the Peace of Prague. This treaty between the Elector of Saxony and Ferdinand II sought to isolate Sweden from her German allies in order to unite all the Imperial Estates and drive apparently malicious foreign crowns from the empire. Oxenstierna claimed that 'the Emperor has gained more

[86] Akkerman, II, 306-7.
[87] Messinger, p.247; *Tragedy*, p.464.
[88] Langer, 'Swedish', p.195.

by the peace than by two Nördlingens'.[89] The Peace displayed a softening of the stringent religious stance of the Edict of Restitution, incorporating a vague definition of Protestantism so as not to exclude Calvinists such as Brandenburg, who readily accepted the articles.[90] Whilst scholars debate the extent of the religious nature of the Thirty Years' War, the Peace has been widely credited with bringing an end to the conflict's confessional character, as both remaining Protestant electors and the majority of Lutheran territories accepted the terms, and militant Catholics lost their influence on Imperial policy.[91]

Although the Peace ultimately failed to bring the war in Germany to an end, it did serve to clarify the hitherto purgatorial position of Charles Louis and his claim to Frederick's electorate at a time when the young prince was approaching his majority.[92] Article 57 excluded the Palatines from the general amnesty, and article 31 proclaimed that 'everything is to remain as arranged by His Imperial Majesty for His Electoral Highness of Bavaria and the Wilhelmine line regarding the said electoral title and lands'. This meant that the electorate would remain in possession of the male descendants of Maximilian's father, Duke Wilhelm V, in perpetuity.[93] The Peace justified the transfer as 'it is known throughout the world that the outlawed Palatine Elector Frederick is a chief cause and instigator of all the evil that occurred in His Imperial Majesty's hereditary kingdom of Bohemia and subsequently in the Roman Empire'.[94] One small concession to the outlawed Palatine family was that Elizabeth 'will be left her widow's pension, as far as she has properly liquidated these', and Frederick's children would receive 'a princely allowance

[89] Quoted in Roberts, *Oxenstierna*, p.47.
[90] *Tragedy*, pp.568-9.
[91] Ibid., p.566; R. Bireley, 'The Peace of Prague (1635) and the Counterreformation in Germany', *The Journal of Modern History*, 48/1 (1976), pp.58-60; Parker, pp.143-4.
[92] Steiner, pp.125-6.
[93] *Sourcebook*, pp.194-206.
[94] Ibid.

from Imperial grace rather than obligation, once they have humbly submitted themselves to His Imperial Majesty'.[95] Although it was inconceivable that the Palatines would ever agree to such terms, the Spanish ambassador in Vienna reportedly later remarked that they 'have had the full measure of Caesar's clemency in the articles of peace with Saxony, and they ought to be well content'.[96]

Bavarian Successes

The exclusion of the Palatine family from the Peace of Prague was swiftly followed by a wave of Imperial and Bavarian military successes against the French, which transformed the political exclusion enshrined in the treaty into territorial reality. In July 1635, Ludwig Philipp was forced to flee to Sedan, abandoning Frankenthal which would shortly be captured by Spanish forces, and Heidelberg castle finally surrendered to Bavarian troops, followed by Mannheim in September.[97] Maximilian wasted no time in consolidating his authority in the Lower Palatinate, as well as the re-Catholicisation of the Upper Palatinate. The Venetian ambassador at The Hague reported in February 1636 that he 'is trying to secure himself in the affections of his subjects in the Palatinate, and has had the oath of fealty administered at Heidelberg and in a great part of the country'.[98]

The prospects of a Palatine restoration were further reduced in July 1635 by the marriage of Maximilian, a sixty-three-year-old childless widower, to his twenty-seven-

[95] Ibid; Add MS 4299 f.154-5: Decree of Emperor Ferdinand II on behalf of children of Frederick V in Latin (1635); Akkerman, II, 338.
[96] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 502-3.
[97] SP 81/43 ff.47, 55: Ludwig Philipp to Charles I, 4/14 June and 22 June/2 July 1635; *Tragedy*, p.562; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 424.
[98] TNA: Chancery: Duchess of Norfolk's Deeds [C115]: C115/109 no.7: 8731: Boswell in The Hague to Viscount Scudamore, 4/14 Feb. 1636; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 514, 516; A. Schindling, 'Die reformierten Kurfürsten aus der Linie Pfalz-Simmern und das Heilige Römische Reich (1559 bis 1685)', in W. Kreutz, W. Kühlmann and H. Wiegand (eds.), *Die Wittelsbacher und die Kurpfalz in der Neuzeit: Zwischen Reformation und Revolution* (Regensburg, 2013), pp.40-1.

year-old niece, Maria Anna of Austria, the eldest surviving daughter of Ferdinand II. There would be almost no chance of the Palatine lands and title being returned to Charles Louis upon Maximilian's death if the latter's second marriage produced a son. It is understandable, therefore, that the English agent in Vienna reported with concern in December 1635 the rumour that 'the Duke of Bavaria since his marriage feeds on nothing but capons and chickens fed with the flesh of vipers', which not only had the reputed effect of extending life, but also 'much facilitat[ing] the delivery of Women with child'.[99] Once news of Maria Anna's first pregnancy reached the Stuart Court in May 1636, the Venetian ambassador reported that 'the king is annoyed at the news…which destroys all hopes of the Palatine recovering his possessions and the electoral dignity through the lack of an heir'.[100] The union ultimately produced two sons, Ferdinand Maria and Maximilian Philipp Hieronymus, born in October 1636 and September 1638, both of whom survived to adulthood.

1636-38: Years of Activity

By the end of 1635, the apparent collapse of Swedish power in the empire, the disintegration of the Heilbronn League, and the permanence of the transfer of the Palatine electoral lands and title to Bavaria, meant that the Palatine family was at its lowest ebb since being driven into exile almost fifteen years earlier. A document prepared in December 1635 on the issues facing their restoration proclaimed that 'the Emp.r hath neither will, nor reason, ever to restore ye Prince Palatine' as to do so would merely be to 'replant a roote, from whence originally both his feares, and danger did spring'.[101] However, whilst supporters of the Palatine family condemned the Peace of Prague as

[99] MS Clarendon 7 f. 268v: Taylor in Vienna to Windebank, 13 Dec. 1635; M. Charas, *New Experiments Upon Vipers* (London, 1670).
[100] Akkerman, II, 442; *CSPV 1632-36,* 566.
[101] SP 81/43 f.103: Problem of restoration of the Palatinate, Dec. 1635.

pernicious to all Christendom, they took consolation from the fact that the Emperor had revealed his true intentions, and that this would inspire support from Charles I as well as other powers excluded from Peace. Dinley claimed that observers were now able to 'see to the bottome' of Ferdinand's intentions, and Roe asserted that 'the more our friends are oppressed, the more likely to unite'.[102] In addition to writing to Wilhelm V of Hessen-Kassel, who had also been excluded from the Peace, Elizabeth sent letters and copies of the peace articles to Archbishop Laud and Secretary Coke.[103] Barely holding back from saying 'I told you so', the Winter Queen wrote that 'you will see, how little the Emperour from the beginning did regard or esteeme the peaceable ways of treating with him', and that 'I think it concernes the kings honour to be revenged of there falsehood and neglect towards him as much as it will be for our good'.[104]

In a series of letters to Coke and Windebank, as well as to the king, Ludwig Philipp desperately attempted to promote his nephew's beleaguered cause.[105] In addition to the developments of the preceding year, there were two further considerations which made English assistance of vital importance in late-1635. Firstly, Charles Louis would reach the age of majority upon his eighteenth birthday in December 1635, and would be expected thereafter to shoulder the burden of responsibility for his exiled house. The daunting situation facing the impoverished and politically inexperienced prince was noted by Dinley in July 1635, who claimed that 'at Christmas he wilbe at age, some what too soon for his land'.[106] The second potentially disastrous development was a rumoured upcoming

[102] SP 16/293 ff.58-9v: Dinley at The Hague to Roe, 4/14 July 1635; Akkerman, II, 336.
[103] Akkerman, II, 340-1, 343.
[104] Ibid., 340-1.
[105] SP 81/43 ff.39-48, 55v: Ludwig Philipp to Coke and Windebank, both 18/28 May and to Charles I, 4/14 June and 22 June/2 July 1635. See also SP 81/43 ff.59-60: Memorial of Ludwig Philipp for Charles I, 28 June/8 July 1635.
[106] SP 16/293 f.59v.

Imperial election. Ferdinand II's health was already failing in Spring 1635 and the Emperor was advised to call an election so that his son, Ferdinand, King of Hungary, could be voted as his successor and given the title of King of the Romans.[107] As one document on the Palatine cause noted, 'it is not convenient nor safe for the Emp.r, especially, to give back that voice in the Electorall Dyett…they hope to make the Empire hereditarye'.[108] The acknowledgement of such an election as legitimate would be an affirmation of Maximilian of Bavaria's possession of the traditional Palatine electoral title and vote.

Charles Louis arrived in England on 21 November 1635 with a train of 60-70 followers and with the declared purpose of 'remonstrat[ing] to his Majesty the justice of his cause, and take counsel what to do when his minority is expired'.[109] It was hoped that a personal visit from the young prince would be more successful in securing a substantial English commitment to assist the Palatine cause than previous written appeals. Such hopes appeared vindicated by the warm reception and hospitality shown to Charles Louis and to Rupert, who arrived in England in February 1636 at the king's insistence.[110] Roe deemed it 'a wise resolution' for Charles Louis to journey to England, believing that his presence 'may move compassion, and enflame nature; and perhaps confound the faces, and confuse the Counsells of any that may oppose him'.[111] The Venetian ambassador likewise expected that 'the king will not refuse to assume openly the protection of his nephew when he comes to ask it in person'.[112] The urgency of Charles Louis's departure from the continent is demonstrated by the fact that, wanting to avoid the risk of refusal, Elizabeth did not send prior warning of his arrival, and that the young prince apparently informed the king of his

[107] *Tragedy*, p.566; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 472.
[108] SP 81/43 f.103v.
[109] Loomie, p.188; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 483; *CSPD: 1635*, 436.
[110] Loomie, p.194; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 491.
[111] Akkerman, II, 364.
[112] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 468-9.

intention to travel and of the start of his journey simultaneously.[113] As the future of the Palatine cause was deemed to rest on support from England, it is important to assess the foreign policy of Charles I from the mid-1630s, a subject which baffled contemporaries and successive generations of historians due to his diplomatic overtures to almost every major European power on behalf of the Palatine cause.

The Venetian ambassador claimed in December 1636 that 'mutability and confusion reign in the foreign policy of the ministry here', S.R. Gardiner claimed over 250 years later that Charles I's diplomacy in the 1630s succeeded only 'to make the brain dizzy', and subsequent scholars have been no nearer to deciphering the king's true preferences from 1635.[114] Whilst the broad scholarly consensus is that the restoration of the Palatine family was the central aim of English foreign policy in the 1630s, historians are divided about how far Charles was willing to go to war for his exiled relatives.[115] It is certainly true that the king would always favour even the faintest possibility of a peaceful solution to the 'Palatine Question', and Charles's apparently hopeless and contradictory diplomacy was symptomatic of his willingness to side with any power who could offer a full Palatine restoration without necessitating a substantial and expensive military commitment. Although Kevin Sharpe argues that the Peace of Prague led to a sharp reorientation of English diplomacy towards France, the king in fact remained reluctant to abandon hopes of the Palatinate being restored through negotiation with the Habsburgs.[116]

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[113] Green, p.323; Akkerman, II, 358 n.1; *CSPV: 1632-36*, 468.
[114] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 108; S.R. Gardiner, *History of England from the Accession of James I. to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642* (10 vols., London, 1893-96), VII, 169, 391; Cust, *Political Life*, pp.128-30; *Tragedy*, p.594; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, p.515.
[115] For a range of opinions see I. Atherton, *Ambition and Failure in Stuart England: The Career of John, First Viscount Scudamore* (Manchester, 1999), pp.194-5; C. Carlton, *Charles I: The Personal Monarch*, 2nd edn (London, 1995), pp.169-75; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, pp. 535-6; Cust, *Political Life*, p. 130.
[116] Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, p.96.

After receiving word from his envoy in Vienna that 'the Empr will free [Charles Louis] From the Bann' and 'put him into a good part of ye possession of his lands leaving a faire way open to his right and pretensions to ye Electorat', the king dispatched the earl of Arundel as ambassador extraordinary at the head of a lavish embassy to the Emperor in April 1636.[117] However, the Palatine family and their supporters claimed that 'there is no reason of State, why the Empr should restore the Prince entirely, neither in present, nor in future', and Elizabeth despaired that 'I thought the king had no cause to trie [the Emperor's] falsehood further'.[118] Although Charles never truly abandoned hopes of a peaceful restoration for his Palatine relatives, as demonstrated by Roe's dispatch to the Imperial diet at Regensburg in 1641, it was the failure of Arundel's embassy rather than the Peace of Prague that prompted change in Charles's policy, pushing it towards military action.

However, there appear to have been two constant factors which would have to be fulfilled if England were to enter the Thirty Years' War on Charles Louis's behalf. Firstly, the cost of military intervention would not require the king to summon parliament. Secondly, Charles would be supported by a continental ally, regardless of religion and considerations of England's 'traditional' foreign policy, who would be bound by any agreement to support a full Palatine restoration. If one accepts these two considerations as a fulcrum around which Charles I's foreign policy rotated, then Charles's apparently erratic vacillations between France and Spain becomes more understandable.

[117] SP 80/9 f.97: Taylor in Vienna to Secretary of State, 22 Feb./3 Mar. 1636; F.C. Springell, *Connoisseur & Diplomat: The Earl of Arundel's Embassy to Germany in 1636 as recounted in William Crowne's Diary, and the Earl's letters and other contemporary sources with a catalogue of the topographical drawings made on the journey by Wenceslaus Hollar* (London, 1963), p.16 n.34.
[118] SP 80/9 ff.101-2v: Considerations on hope given by Taylor on restoration of Palatinate, 20 Mar. 1636; Akkerman, II, 454.

These guiding principles, as well as their grounding in the experiences of the disastrous campaigns of the duke of Buckingham and the marquess of Hamilton in the 1620s and early-1630s, can be seen in the instructions issued to Joseph Avery prior to his dispatch to the Swedes at Lüneburg in January 1636. These instructions claimed that 'wee have learned to our cost, how inconvenient it is to make warre at such distance Specially without assurance of any firme party resolved to joine for our interests', and that supporting allies with a strong navy would be more beneficial than 'sending our men to fight with hunger and sicknesse and doe no other good.[119] Similarly, Charles's ambassador in Paris attempted to convince Louis XIII's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the French king 'seemed to bee more pressed & obligd for the restitution of the Prince Elector Palatine then his Ma.tie of Great Britaine' as 'reason of State being publick reason is to bee held more weighty then reason of Bloud'.[120] Charles himself outlined his position in a letter to Wentworth the following year, stating that the question 'is not, whether I should declare a War to the House of Austria or not, but whether I shall join with France and the rest of my Friends to demand of the House of Austria my Nephew's Restitution, and so hazard (upon Refusal) a Declaration of War?'[121]

1636-37: The Palatine Princes in England

As Charles I's criteria for entering war shaped his response to the Palatine policy, it is important to examine how the Palatine family responded and tailored their strategies accordingly. Following the failure of Arundel's embassy, Elizabeth wrote to the earl that 'you have lost no honour by it…you shall not come to a place where you shall be welcome then hither', and reportedly advised Charles Louis to 'use the Earl with all kind of

[119] SP 81/43 ff.130-2v at 132v: Instructions to Joseph Avery, Jan. 1636.
[120] TNA: State Papers Foreign: France [SP 78]: SP 78/99 f.208: Viscount Scudamore in Paris to Coke, 7 Dec. 1635 [First Letter].
[121] Knowler, II, 78.

affection and acknowledgement of his good service'.[122] The courting of leading political and noble figures within and without the Stuart court was a key strategy of the Palatine princes during their time in England in their attempts to obtain military, financial and political support for their restitution. Although Charles Louis had certainly been in contact with some influential figures in the years preceding his journey to England, his arrival in London marked the first occasion that he was able to personally ingratiate himself with many of the people who had regarded his parents as martyrs for the Protestant cause. Elizabeth was particularly concerned that her sons would alienate potential supporters by a lack of courtly skills due to their youth and inexperience. In a display of her own brand of maternal confidence, the Winter Queen wrote to Sir Henry Vane the elder that Charles Louis was 'a verie ill courtier', and that he and Rupert would likely commit many faux pas, but took solace in her belief that they would not be regarded as handsome by the ladies of the court, and so would not engage in amorous trysts.[123]

Upon Charles Louis's arrival, he was presented with an armorial of English peers which had been commissioned by Elizabeth in 1633. However, in a preamble to the work which was added shortly before its presentation, the Somerset Herald, John Philipot, claimed that he had received recent instructions 'to adjoine unto this worke, some explications of the distinction of our English Nobilitie, and the Titles their Children participate that your highness may be informed of the Rules used in this Kingdome'.[124] Such an *aide memoire* would have been undoubtedly useful, as the young prince's social calendar was almost immediately filled. In little over a month following Charles Louis's arrival, Strafford received reports that 'the City hath feasted him…The Inns of Court Men,

[122] Akkerman, II, 536, 565.
[123] Ibid., 356, 361, 387.
[124] John Rylands Library, Manchester: GB 0133 Eng MS5: Armorial of English Peers, 1635.

and most of the Lords about the Court, among others my Lord of Dorset, made him a light Supper', and that he 'is much at the King's Table', as well as dining with the Lord Chamberlain, Archbishop Laud, and Sir Thomas Roe.[125] Indeed, when Charles Louis fell ill with an apparent fever in January 1636, the Venetian ambassador attributed his condition to 'the excessive hospitality of the lords here, who want to entertain him with sumptuous banquets every day without regard to his health'.[126]

Although Charles Louis sought to ingratiate himself with influential figures at his uncle's court regardless of faction, he and Rupert were especially feted by advocates of a 'traditional' Protestant foreign policy, as well as pro-French members of Henrietta Maria's circle who sought a break from the Spanish friendship which had characterised English international relations since 1630.[127] For example, on 5 May 1636 the queen took Charles Louis to a performance of *Alphonsus, Emperor of Germany*, a 'specially revived Elizabethan tragedy', in which a Palatine Prince is depicted as a resolute supporter of heroic Englishmen against a murderous Spanish-born Emperor of Germany.[128] Charles Louis also received numerous gifts from such individuals, such as a number of roman coins from Sir Simonds D'Ewes, a sizeable quantity of plate from the earl of Dorset, and twelve horses from the earl of Bedford.[129] The earl of Essex was also observed as a close companion of the young prince during his time in England.[130] It has even been suggested that the Master of Arts received by the earl during a royal visit to Oxford in [August] 1636

[125] Knowler, I, 489, 504.
[126] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 505.
[127] Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, p.539; Hibbard, *Plot*, pp.30-3.
[128] M. Butler, 'Entertaining the Palatine Prince: Plays on Foreign Affairs 1635-1637', *English Literary Renaissance*, 13/3 (1983), pp.336-7.
[129] J.O. Halliwell (ed.), *The Autobiography and Correspondence of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, Bart., during the reigns of James I and Charles I* (2 vols., London, 1845), II, 139; Knowler, I, 504.
[130] Halliwell, *D'Ewes*, II, 139.

was due to Charles Louis's recommendation, although there is insufficient evidence to support this assertion.[131]

Another important strategy undertaken by the Palatine family during this period was the production of printed materials promoting their cause. Although a lot of scholarly attention has been devoted to depictions of Frederick and Elizabeth in pro-Palatine and pro-Protestant propaganda in the 1610s and 1620s, especially comparisons of the Winter Queen with her regal Tudor namesake, there is no conclusive proof that the Palatine family themselves commissioned such materials in the first half of the Thirty Years' War.[132] In contrast, there is ample evidence of their involvement in the production of propaganda during Charles Louis's time in England in the mid-1630s. In Spring 1636, following the announcement of an electoral congress to be held at Regensburg to consolidate the Peace of Prague and smooth the way for the election of the Emperor's son as King of the Romans, Charles Louis asked his mother to send copies of the 'chiefest acts which were in the King my fathers time'.[133] These documents, including Imperial decrees and proclamations by Frederick, were intended to provide substantiating legal evidence for the Palatine family's claims to the electorate, and the illegality of the proposed election, which would also be articulated in a letter from Charles Louis to the assembled representatives at Regensburg.[134] However, following the Imperial election in December 1636, Roe advised the young prince that 'there is nothing more necessarye in this Conjuncture then the

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[131] V.F. Snow, *Essex the Rebel: the Life of Robert Devereux, the Third Earl of Essex, 1591-1646* (Lincoln, NE, 1970), p.208.
[132] G. Ziegler, 'A Second Phoenix: The Rebirth of Elizabeth I in Elizabeth Stuart', in E.H. Hageman and K. Conway (eds.), *Resurrecting Elizabeth I in Seventeenth-Century England* (Madison, NJ, 2007); M.A. Breslow, *A Mirror of England: English Puritan Views of Foreign Nations, 1618-1640* (Cambridge, MA, 1970), pp.37-8; J. Miller, 'The Henrician legend revived: the Palatine couple and its public image in early Stuart England', *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire,* 11/3 (2004), p.329.
[133] *CSPV: 1632-36,* 545, 555; Akkerman, II, 450-1.
[134] M.C. Lundorp (ed.), *Der römischen kayserlichen Majestät und dess Heiligen römschen Reichs…acta publica, von anno 1608 (-1691) durch M.C. Londorpium colligirt* (18 vols. and index, Frankfurt am Main, 1688-1721), IV, 662-76. For Charles Louis's letter see pp. 640-2.

publishing yr Manifest', as to remain silent 'wilbee an implcitie, tacite, or involved desertion of yo.r right'.[135]

The results were the comprehensive *The manifest of the most illustrious, and soveraigne prince, Charles Lodowick, Count Palatine of the Rhine, Prince Electour of the sacred Empire*, supposedly penned by Rusdorf, as well as *A protestation of the most high and mighty Prince Charles Lodowicke*.[136] Although these texts were completed in January 1637, the death of Ferdinand II on 15 February led to the publication of the documents being delayed 'entirely for the sake of seeing what the course of future events will be'.[137] The potential significance of such texts is demonstrated by the fact that John Taylor in Vienna felt it necessary to publicly claim that 'it was made without the leave or approbation of His Ma:ty', an action for which the ambassador was sharply rebuked by Secretary Windebank.[138]

In addition to being published in London in English and German, the notebook of Elizabeth's secretary shows that the Palatine family paid over forty pounds to printers in Leiden and The Hague for hundreds of copies of both documents in Latin and German.[139] The manifesto, addressed to the Emperor, and 'to all Kings, Potentates, Electors, Princes, and Estates', was based heavily on the documents requested by Charles Louis in May 1636, and aimed to demonstrate the legitimacy of the young prince's claim to his father's titles and lands on the basis of primogeniture and the supposed illegality of the transfer of

[135] SP 16/338 f.85: Roe at Cranford to Charles Louis, 31 Dec. 1636.
[136] *Manifest; Protestation*; W.J.C.G. Casparson, *Nachrichten von der Person und dem Leben Johann Joachims von Rusdorf* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1762), p.140.
[137] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 167.
[138] MS Clarendon 14 f.22: Windebank to Taylor, 30 Mar. 1638.
[139] 'Notebook', 34-5; *CSPV: 1636-39*, 213.

the electorate.[140] Evoking the concept of justice in accordance with the Imperial constitution, the text argued that the Ban implemented against Frederick in 1621, and which provided the legal basis for the transfer of the electoral lands and title to Bavaria, was illegal as the Electoral College had not been consulted.[141] Indeed, the manifesto claimed that an elector could only ever be punished following 'a lawfull tryall before the Electorall Colledge and estates of the whole Empire' as an Emperor allegedly had no authority to do so since they did not hold lordship over an elector's lands. Such assertions neatly exemplify the aristocratic interpretation of the imperial constitution, which the Palatine family had promoted since the start of the seventeenth century. It should also be noted that the considerable contemporary interest in the contents and arguments of Charles Louis's manifesto demonstrates that 'German issues' were still important in the second half of the Thirty Years' War, contradicting Geoffrey Parker's assertion that statesmen had 'little or no concern' in such matters after 1635.[142]

The manifesto also presented the Palatine cause as a defence of electoral rights, asserting that a son could succeed a proscribed father as elector, as 'the Son succeedeth not in the Right of his Father, but of his owne; by reason of that first and Originall Contract made with his Ancestours' under the terms of the Golden Bull. Indeed, it was argued that the pattern of succession was 'so rooted in these Electorall Families…that it cannot be plucked up, nor alienated, nor forfeited, nor transferred by any resignation, or delinquencie; but onely by failing and extinction of blood'.[143] The *Protestation*, whilst being less reliant on the evidence of documentary sources, was more explicit in

[140] Steiner, pp.141-2.
[141] C. Kampmann, *Reichsrebellion und kaiserliche Acht: Politische Strafjustiz im Dreißigjährigen Krieg und das Verfahren gegen Wallenstein 1634. Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte* (Münster, 1992), pp.32-5.
[142] Parker, p.154.
[143] *Manifest*.

condemning the 'most dangerous dispositions, and conclusions of the peace at Prague…the hasty, precipitate and unlawfull election of a King of the Romans, and above all, against the violent, unjust and hainous usurpation, detention, and privation made and continued by the Duke of Bavaria.[144] It is therefore surprising that one contemporary reported the publication of the document and claimed that Charles Louis's case was 'so modestly set down, as, with more modesty, it could not have been expressed'.[145]

The most inflammatory document, however, was Rusdorf's *The evaporation of the apple of Palæstine*, published under an alias in March 1637.[146] In addition to the legal arguments of the manifest and the protestation, the pamphlet protested the treatment of Charles Louis by attempting to contrast his experience with the heirs of other individuals who had been placed under the Imperial Ban. The pamphlet also attacked any proposed partial restitution of the Palatine family as illegal as well as impractical, claiming that any partition of the electorate would contravene the Golden Bull and would leave Charles Louis's territories 'so small, and contemptible, that it will bee ignominious, and bring great prejudice upon the King and the Electour, to accept it'. Most controversial, however, was the preamble addressed to Charles Louis, which urged the young prince to return to Germany and take up arms, claiming that 'you shall have God, and the winds to second your Sailes with a prosperous gale. The pamphlet also argued that 'a small Army, guided with Councell and true valour, have many times subdued great forces', and that 'even small Creatures have procured danger and destruction to greatest beasts'.

1636-38: Military Strategies

[144] *Protestation*, pp.19-20.
[145] T. Birch and R.F. Williams (ed.), *The Court and times of Charles the first* (2 vols., London, 1848), II, 280.
[146] *Palæstine*.

Shortly before Charles Louis and Rupert returned to the continent in June 1637, Elizabeth wrote to Roe that 'there is nothing I so much desire as to see [Charles Louis] in action, but I know not how he shall best putt himself into it'.[147] Throughout the brothers' time in England, there were numerous proposals for Palatine military campaigns, although many were rejected by the Palatine family and their advisers as inappropriate or unsuitable. For example, there were several attempts by individuals such as the earls of Holland and Arundel to revive plans made in the mid-1620s to launch attacks on Spanish colonies and shipping. It was believed that such endeavours, which were seen as inexpensive yet profitable, would help to finance a land war in Germany whilst also avenging the recent Spanish attack against the Providence Island Company in 1635.[148] However, several contemporary observers were baffled by the logic behind such schemes.[149]

One particular strategy which earned Elizabeth's ire was the proposal for Rupert to lead an expedition to establish a colony on Madagascar, a scheme which the Winter Queen ridiculed as 'one of Don Quixots conquests', asking Roe to 'putt such windmills out of his head'.[150] It should be noted that even Roe, who was perennially interested in potentially profitable colonial endeavours, described the plan as 'absurd, impossible, & of no use, neyther to weaken the enemy, nor strengthen your cause' as the action 'will have little relation to Europe'.[151] Similarly, in late-1636, the king offered Charles Louis a monthly pension of £1,000 to join any continental army of his choice, a scheme which Archbishop

[147] Akkerman, II, 607.
[148] Reeve, *Road*, pp.230-1; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, p.7; K.R. Andrews, *Ships, Money & Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I* (Cambridge, 1991), pp.139-40; T. Cogswell, *The Blessed Revolution: English politics and the coming of war, 1621-1624* (Cambridge, 1989), pp.96-7; R. Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (London, 2003), pp.299-301.
[149] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 2.
[150] Akkerman, II, 583, 589.
[151] Ibid., 579-80; M. Strachan, *Sir Thomas Roe 1581-1644: A Life* (Salisbury, 1989), p.225.

Laud claimed 'will maintaine him like a Prince, & with care & providence maye increase, 'till some better waye be found'.[152] Elizabeth's reaction to this proposition demonstrates the difficult position facing exiled dynasties dependent on the assistance of other states. The Winter Queen lamented that the scheme would be dishonourable to Charles Louis, as to be seen as a volunteer in another state's army would be humiliating for a claimant to the most prestigious secular electoral title, and the king would also be exposed to criticism for reducing his nephew to such a station.[153] However, the alternative would be for the young prince to remain in England 'whilst all the worlde was in action in a manner for his sake', which would be 'so much to his dishonour that he were better be in his grave then doe it'.[154] This scheme was swiftly abandoned following a shift in Charles I's foreign policy in the opening months of 1637.

The humiliating failure of Arundel's embassy, as well as the election of Ferdinand II's son as King of the Romans, led to Charles I proposing 'the speedy execution of some enterprise at sea of which the Palatine should be the leader', whilst taking care 'not to enter at one stroke upon an open rupture without greater support'.[155] This project clearly reflects the aforementioned conditions upon which the king would be willing to re-enter the European war, and which were contained in the Franco-Stuart treaty approved by Charles in February 1637. In exchange for Louis XIII not agreeing to any peace with Spain, Bavaria, or the Emperor without inclusion of a full Palatine restoration, Charles agreed to allow France to levy 6,000 men from his kingdoms, furnish a fleet of thirty vessels to blockade the Flanders coast, and also provide Charles Louis with at least a dozen ships.[156]

[152] SP 16/334 f.84: Charles Louis at Newmarket to Roe, 24 Oct. 1636; Green, p.336; Akkerman, II, 539.
[153] Akkerman, II, 551-2, 558, 555.
[154] Ibid., 553.
[155] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 134; Cust, *Political Life*, p.129.
[156] Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, p.529; Atherton, *Scudamore*, pp.193-4.

In short, the king would only be committed to a limited naval war, using vessels funded by his extra-parliamentary Ship Money taxes, whilst the French would shoulder the financial cost of the levied troops.

Charles Louis was overjoyed at the prospect of being provided with a fleet, claiming that 'it seemeth to me as a dreame', and excitedly informing his mother that Lord Craven had pledged £10,000 to the scheme.[157] The fact that a list of fourteen ships to be employed in the young prince's service was drawn up in March 1637 suggests that the king certainly intended to provide his nephew with the vessels.[158] Ian Atherton has asserted that Charles's insistence that the fleet sailed under the Palatine flag would have enabled him to disown them if they became embroiled in a conflict with Spain.[159] However, the fact that Buckingham sailed under the Palatine banner during his abortive assault on Cadiz in an open declaration of war against Spain in 1625, suggests that it was highly unlikely that Charles truly believed that he could avoid all diplomatic repercussions from Philip IV simply by having English ships fly his nephew's flag.[160] Rather than wanting to avoid a break with Spain at any cost, it is more likely that Charles wished to wait until the conclusion of the Franco-Stuart treaty before openly declaring war.[161] Ultimately, however, the scheme fell apart in the summer of 1637 after Richelieu refused to ratify the treaty and there was also a suspicion that the French had interfered in the Scottish riots against the Laudian Prayer Book.[162] Although Charles allowed Charles Louis and Rupert to return to the continent in June 1637 in an attempt to persuade the Dutch

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[157] Akkerman, II, 568-9.
[158] *CSPD: 1636-7,* 479.
[159] I. Atherton, 'John, first Viscount Scudamore, 1601-71: A Career at Court and in the Country, 1602-43' (PhD. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1993), p.133
[160] Pursell, p.237; Kishlansky, *Abbreviated,* p.26.
[161] SP 16/362 ff.7-8v: Proposition and Reasons for ye Presence of ye Prince Elector Palatine at Hamburgh or Any other Place neare ye Sea, 19 June 1637; Green, p.336.
[162] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 219; B. Quintrell, 'Charles I and his navy in the 1630s', *The Seventeenth Century*, 3/2 (1988), p.173; Smuts, 'Puritan Followers', p.40; Hibbard, *Plot*, p.77; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, p.535.

States to join the proposed Franco-Stuart alliance, it is clear that the Palatine family had become disillusioned with their prospective naval venture.[163] Whilst both Elizabeth and Charles Louis were happy for the appointed vessels to be employed in their service, they believed that the young prince's presence in Germany, preferably at the head of an army, would be of far greater benefit to the Palatine cause.[164]

1638: Meppen and the Vlotho Campaign

The stagnation of the Franco-Stuart treaty negotiations undoubtedly spurred Charles Louis to seize the initiative and raise the first independent Palatine army in over fifteen years. One Palatine agent reportedly claimed that the talks 'are worth nothing and that the prince will end by finding himself without either territory or rank'.[165] Following the death of Ferdinand II in February 1637, his son had assumed the Imperial title, having previously been elected as King of the Romans on 22 December 1636. As the acknowledgement of a new Emperor would be to approve the legality of the election, and therefore recognise Maximilian of Bavaria as the legitimate holder of the traditional Palatine electoral title, it was vital that other powers did not address Ferdinand III as Emperor. Although the French and Dutch had promised not to do so in May 1637, there was no guarantee that this would continue indefinitely, especially if negotiations with England broke down.[166] Even Charles I could not be depended on to refuse Ferdinand the Imperial title, as Laud claimed that it would be counter-productive to do so in negotiations on his nephew's behalf if the vast majority of European rulers acknowledge him as Emperor.[167] It was, therefore, of great importance for Charles Louis to be seen to be

[163] Akkerman, II, 611.
[164] SP 81/44 ff.30v-1: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 5 Mar. 1638; *CSPV: 1636-39*, 227.
[165] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 260.
[166] Akkerman, II, 601.
[167] Ibid., 595.

actively promoting his cause, as 'if he doe nothing to seeke to keep his right in it, it may prejudice him'.[168]

Charles Louis's attempts to recruit an independent army initially faltered with the failure to secure the service of the Hessian troops following the death of Landgrave Wilhelm V in September 1637, however an apparently perfect opportunity presented itself in early-1638.[169] The widow of Dodo baron von Innhausen und Knyphausen, a Field Marshal in Swedish service, offered to sell Meppen, a town on the Münster-East Frisian frontier which had been seized from the bishop of Münster by the Swedes and gifted to Knyphausen.[170] Although Charles Louis acknowledged to Roe that the purchase of Meppen and the raising of an independent army was hazardous, he proclaimed that 'it must be ventured, rather than incurre the blame of faint of heart'.[171]

On paper, Meppen appeared to be the perfect base of operations for a Palatine army, and Charles Louis was strongly encouraged to purchase the town by his mother as well as the Prince of Orange.[172] Not only was it located on the borders of 'the Countryes of [Palatine] friends & confederats', but the town already housed a large supply of munitions as well as a garrison of 400 troops willing to join Charles Louis's service. Meppen seemed a wise investment in financial terms, as it was predicted that the town and its surrounding area would produce an annual revenue of 41,800 Imperial dollars, generating an instant profit against the 30,000 required to purchase the town plus the additional 8,000 for its

[168] Ibid., 582.
[169] Steiner, p.129.
[170] *Tragedy*, p.594.
[171] SP 81/44 f.31.
[172] SP 81/45 f.375: Representations to King Charles on behalf of the Palatinate, [1638]; *CSPD: 1637-8*, 47; Akkerman, II, 667.

ordinance and munitions.[173] In a document outlining the aforementioned benefits of purchasing Meppen, and proclaiming promises of support by the French, Dutch, Hessians, and British officers in the Swedish army, Charles Louis beseeched Charles I to assent to the scheme, as well as to provide 'Money, Men, Corne, Canon, Ammunition'.[174] The king provided a large amount of munitions, as well as £42,600, which would ultimately arrive in the Netherlands in mid-June 1638.[175] Although Charles declared his support for the scheme, it is evident that Charles Louis did not wait for his uncle's response before purchasing Meppen on 24 March.[176] Palatine officers took control of the town and garrison in early-April, and Charles Louis issued instructions for the raising of 2,000 horse and 4,000 foot.[177] However, it is unlikely that the levies reached the intended 6,000 total. Indeed, the notebook of Elizabeth's secretary recorded the incredibly piecemeal fashion in which units were raised, with the vast majority of contracts paying for the recruitment of single companies of foot and horse numbering 120 and 100 men respectively[178]

The presence of a Palatine army in Germany appeared to have the intended effect. Taylor reported from Vienna that 'all the German Princes have bene awakened thereby', and Roe claimed that the electors of Mainz and Cologne were sufficiently intimidated as to send Ferdinand III 'some Conditions in behalf of the house Palatine'.[179] In addition, at the beginning of May 1638, Anstruther excused himself acting Charles I's ambassador to the

[173] SP 81/44 f.12: The Situation & other commodities of the Towne & Territory of Meppen, [Jan. 1638]; 'Notebook', 47.
[174] SP 81/45 f.375.
[175] TNA: Signet Office and Home Office: Docquet Books and Letters Recommendatory [SO 3]: SO 3/11 (Nov. 1634-Oct. 1638).
[176] 'Notebook', 47. Elizabeth wrote to Roe on 12 April 1638 claiming that she had not received her brother's opinion of Charles Louis's proposed purchase of Meppen. See Akkerman, II, 670.
[177] C115/109 no.7: 8768: Boswell to Scudamore, 9/19 Apr. 1638; Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen. Fürstbistum Münster, Landesarchiv: Militaria 77: ff.2-3v: Instructions from Charles Louis to Hermann Taurinus and Hans Caspar Rischer, 19 Apr. 1638; 'Notebook', 48, 50.
[178] 'Notebook', 49-55.
[179] MS Clarendon 14 ff.69-69v: Taylor to Windebank, 12 May 1638; Akkerman, II, 674-5.

congress at Hamburg, and the role was immediately offered to Roe, who was not only the preferred choice of Charles Louis and Elizabeth, but had been 'selected for that post in universal opinion'.[180] The support of an ardent champion, who had been instructed to demand a Palatine restitution 'as they were before the year 1618', would have been an undoubted boon to complement Charles Louis's military activities in Germany.[181] However, barely a month after taking command of Meppen, Imperial forces recaptured the town, together with twenty pieces of ordinance and almost all of Charles Louis's military provisions.[182] The surrender of Meppen was so sudden that Elizabeth was convinced that it 'was done certainlie by treason'.[183]

The actions of the Palatine family following the capture of Meppen provide a valuable insight into the difficulties facing exiled regimes following military failures. Although Elizabeth and Boswell both reported that Charles Louis had not been overly discouraged by the loss, and that he was levying troops to replenish his force's depleted ranks, they could not have been ignorant of the potentially devastating impact of this setback for the Palatine cause.[184] The young prince confided that 'I feare the base losse of Meppen hath in somethings changed the scene'.[185] Roe in particular later asserted that the loss would make his negotiations at Hamburg far more difficult, as the Palatine family's value as a potential ally plummeted. Not only would the other states' representatives question whether the capture of Meppen was due to poor preparation or incompetence on Charles Louis's part, but as the Palatine family had lost their sole base of military

[180] Akkerman, II. 610-11; *CSPV 1636*-39, 410; S. Murdoch, 'Scottish Ambassadors and British Diplomacy 1618-1635', in Murdoch, *Scotland*, p.45; E.A. Beller, 'The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg, 1638-40', *EHR*, 41/161 (1926), p.63.
[181] SP 81/44 ff.64-71: Instructions for Sir Thomas Roe to Hamburg, 9 May 1638.
[182] O. Bezzel, *Geschichte des kurpfälzischen Heeres von seinem Anfängen bis zur Vereinigung von Kurpfalz und Kurbayern 1777* (2 vols., Munich, 1925-8), I, 86.
[183] Akkerman, II, 677.
[184] Ibid.; C115/109 no.7: 8773: Boswell to Scudamore, 21/31 May 1638.
[185] SP 81/44 f.116: Charles Louis in Rhenen to Roe, 9/19 June 1638.

operations, 'it will be demanded, upon what ground yr High:s then founded your future designes'.[186] Accordingly, it was deemed imperative for the young elector to pursue objectives which would make him a visible military presence and a viable ally for other anti-Habsburg powers represented at Hamburg.[187] Although Roe claimed that 'the deepe contrivings of plotts of warre are not to be expected from a Prince of twenty years', he advocated 'brave actions' which would bring glory to the Palatine family, such as the recovery of Meppen, but stipulated that Charles Louis needed to be seen as acting independently of any other power.[188]

However, such independent action would be incredibly difficult for the Palatine army, which dwindled to 1,700 by July 1638.[189] The panicked Imperial intelligence report of 12 June, which claimed that Charles Louis was recruiting 10,000 men, was premature.[190] Although many officers in the Hessian army had supposedly promised their service to Charles Louis in the event of Amalia Elisabeth signing a reportedly imminent truce with Ferdinand III, this ultimately did not occur.[191] In addition to recruiting units of troops discharged from nearby garrisons, such as 300 troops dismissed by the city of Cologne in late-Summer, the survival of Charles Louis's force was only due to the assistance of other states, as well as individual supporters of the Palatine family.[192] Indeed, it is estimated that only 900 of the approximately 4,000 troops under the elector's command in October 1638 had been in his army six months earlier.[193] For example, the

[186] SP 81/45 ff. 44-6: Roe at Wesel to Charles Louis, 24 Aug. 1638.
[187] Akkerman, II, 689; SP 81/44 f.249: Charles Louis to Roe, 23 July/2 Aug. 1638.
[188] Add MS 4168: 36 and 79: Roe to Charles Louis and Lt Gen. King, 8 June and 20 July 1638; SP 81/45 f.44; Akkerman, II, 691.
[189] *Tragedy*, p.595; Bezzel, *Heeres*, I, 87.
[190] J. Koči (ed.), *Documenta Bohemica Bellum tricennale illustrantia* (7 vols., Prague, 1971-81), VI, 245-7.
[191] Koninklijk Huisarchief, The Hague [KHA]: A24-43: Charles Louis.to Hendrik Casimir of Nassau-Dietz, 5/15 June 1638; SP 81/45 f.123: Charles Louis at Osnabrück to Roe, 17/27 Sept. 1638 [Postscript]; Akkerman, II, 705.
[192] *Tragedy*, p.595.
[193] Bezzel, *Heeres*, I, 87.

Dutch allowed the young elector to lodge his troops in their frontier towns and raise troops within their territories, and Charles Louis dispatched agents to levy troops in England, with the Venetian ambassador in London reporting that 600 men had been raised and transported in September 1638.[194] Lord Craven raised over a dozen companies of Englishmen, and James King, a Scottish officer in the Swedish army, joined Charles Louis's force with approximately 1,000 troops in early-September 1638.[195] Charles I also sent his nephew military supplies, including 10 cases of powder and 10 pieces of ordinance, each with 100 pieces of shot, all of which arrived at The Hague in mid-June 1638.[196] In addition to increasing Charles Louis's arsenal, Boswell claimed that this delivery 'seemeth also to have quickened and bettered the states intentions', as it was seen as an evident demonstration of Charles I's support for the Palatine cause, especially as it coincided with Roe's dispatch to the conference at Hamburg.[197]

As exiled regimes lacked traditional forms of income for ruling houses, the Palatine family encountered considerable financial difficulties in their attempts to replenish their depleted forces.[198] The loss of Meppen denied Charles Louis the anticipated income, and the reduced size of the Palatine army prevented them from extracting contributions from the area in which they were lodged, especially as these territories were now under the protection of the Dutch Republic.[199] When the elector proposed loaning his levied troops for Dutch service as a means of saving money, Roe rejected the idea as 'the worst of

[194] SP 81/44 f.249; C115/109 no.7: 8778: Boswell to Scudamore, 2/12 July 1638; KHA: A24-43: Charles Louis.to Hendrik Casimir of Nassau-Dietz,4 June 1638; *CSPV: 1636-39*, 457.
[195] SP 81/45 ff.66-7: Account of Prince Elector's march from Wesel, 30 Aug./9 Sept. 1638; *Tragedy*, p.595; S. Murdoch & A. Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648* (London, 2014), pp.89-90.
[196] SO 3/11; SP 81/45 f.82: Charles Louis to Sir Henry Vane, 3 Sept. 1638; *CSPV: 1636-39*, 422.
[197] C115/109 no.7: 8775: Boswell to Scudamore, 14 June 1638.
[198] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 461
[199] SP 81/44 f.249v.

Counsells' which would 'let yo.r reputation in those parts fall flatt'.[200] In order to preserve the independence of his army, the elector exploited all possible sources of revenue, drawing advances on his siblings' pensions and draining his family's savings. In May 1638, Charles Louis withdrew almost £26,000 from the comptoirs of Holland and Utrecht which, combined with almost seven years of interest payments on the deposited sums, produced a total of approximately £32,800.[201]

However, the Palatine family was heavily dependent on financial assistance from Charles I, with Charles Louis telling Coke that 'if such moneys faile as the King hath granted me (wch I doe not hope) then I shall confesse myself to be in an ill case'.[202] Even donations, such as the £5,000 given by Lord Craven in March 1638, and the £42,600 provided by Charles I, did not resolve the Palatine family's financial issues.[203] Charles Louis could not afford to engage anyone who volunteered to levy much-needed regiments of foot unless they were 'of good meanes & credit' as 'I have not meanes great enough to satisfie those that offer to levie them'.[204] In addition, a number of volunteers, who 'would be noe lesse than Collonels', retracted their offers of service as Charles Louis could not afford to satisfy their demands, particularly as a colonel typically earned 300 Reichstalers per month, almost four times the wage of their immediate subordinates.[205]

The first objective for the newly-replenished Palatine army was to obtain a new base of operations. Charles Louis had initially hoped to secure a base near the Rhine prior

[200] Add MS 4168: 64: Roe to Charles Louis, 3 July 1638.
[201] 'Notebook', 12-13, 26.
[202] SP 81/44 f.59: Charles Louis at The Hague to Coke, 6/16 May 1638.
[203] 'Notebook', 14.
[204] SP 81/44 f.250v.
[205] Ibid.; H. Salm, *Armeefinanzierung im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichkreis 1635-1650* (Münster, 1990), p.184.

to rendezvousing with King on 9 September 1638.[206] The necessity for Charles Louis's force to possess a fortified town was made more acute by a need for winter quarters without being dependent on the goodwill of other powers.[207] Indeed, the constant marches faced by the elector's force meant that Charles Louis had to leave many sick troops and two-thirds of his ordinance at Wesel under Dutch protection when he left to join King's force at Stadtlohn.[208] In addition to the practical benefits to be enjoyed from possessing a fortified base, the capture of such a locale would make Charles Louis an attractive ally for other powers. The initial target of the elector's force was Meppen, however the town was too heavily defended, and King instead persuaded Charles Louis to capture the Imperial stronghold of Lemgo, a base nearer to Swedish posts along the river Weser.[209]

Arriving in the vicinity of Lemgo at the beginning of October, the Palatine and Swedish troops prepared to besiege the town, living rapaciously off the nearby towns of Detmold, Horn, Blomberg, and Brake. The last of these settlements incurred approximately 12,000 Reichstalers of damage in two weeks.[210] However, the siege was broken off on 16 October due to the foul weather which weakened the entrenched troops and rendered the moat around the fortress unfordable, as well as the more pressing matter of an approaching 8,000-strong Imperial army under Field Marshal Melchior von Hatzfeldt.[211] The slow withdrawal of Charles Louis's army towards the Swedish stronghold at Minden, hindered by a cumbersome baggage train at the head of the

[206] Akkerman, II, 699.
[207] SP 81/45 ff.121-3.
[208] Ibid. f.66.
[209] Ibid. ff.121-3; C115/109 no.7: 8787: Boswell to Scudamore, 15/25 Oct. 1638; W.P. Guthrie, *The Later Thirty Years War: from the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of Westphalia* (London, 2003), pp.72-3; *Tragedy*, p.595.
[210] H. Peter, 'Der Kriegszug Karl Ludwigs und Rupprechts von der Pfalz in Niedersachsen vom Jahre 1638', *Ravensburger Blätter für Geschichte, Volks- und Heimatkunde*, 38 (1938), p.75.
[211] SP 81/45 f.193: M. Nichols at Minden to [Roe], 11/21 Oct. 1638; Guthrie, *Later*, p.73.

procession, together with the speed of Hatzfeldt's mobile column, meant that the Imperial army was able to overtake them and cut off their retreat.[212]

The Palatine military campaign came to an ignominious end on 17 October near Vlotho on the banks of the Weser. Although Charles Louis's secretary and Roe claimed that the Imperial army was four or six times larger than the combined strength of the Palatine and Swedish forces, more recent estimates judge their numbers to have been around 5,800 and 4,000 respectively.[213] After a two-hour battle, Charles Louis's army was thoroughly routed. Whereas Hatzfeldt's force reportedly suffered less than eighty casualties, approximately 1,200 of the elector's troops were captured together with the entire baggage train, including Charles Louis's private papers, and all of their cannon.[214] Amongst those taken prisoner were Rupert and Lord Craven, both of whom reportedly displayed remarkable courage, as was Ferencz and numerous other officers.[215] In contrast, Charles Louis was able to escape in his coach, but it sank whilst crossing the Weser, with the driver and horses drowning and the elector only surviving by reportedly clutching a willow branch and hauling himself ashore before making his way to Minden.[216]

1638-1642: Years of Disaster

The defeat at Vlotho marked the end of an independent Palatine cause and ushered in a period of humiliation and disaster, clearly demonstrating the dangers facing exiled regimes whose fate rested on the support of their extended family, as well as unscrupulous foreign backers. Such perils were evident from the immediate aftermath of the battle when

[212] SP 81/45 f.193; *Tragedy*, p.595.
[213] SP 81/45 f.193v; Akkerman, II, 720; Guthrie, *Later*, p.73.
[214] *Tragedy*, p.595; SP 81/45 f.193v.
[215] SP 81/45 f.200: Colonel Wolfe in Minden to [Unspecified], 13/23 Oct. 1638.
[216] *Tragedy*, p.595.

Charles Louis attempted to rebuild his shattered army. Whilst at Minden, the young elector sought to recruit a force of two thousand foot, including a levy of eight hundred men from Bremen, however over half of these troops deserted, with less than three hundred arriving at Minden.[217] In addition, those troops which did arrive were regarded by their Swedish hosts as little more than a burden 'sence they are not strong enough joinctly wth them to goe to the field & too many to be entertained out of those quarters', with the result that they were not permitted to lodge at Minden without also swearing allegiance to the Swedish crown.[218]

Although the annihilation of the Palatine army seemingly deprived Charles Louis of the small vestige of autonomy on the European political stage, the years between 1638 and 1642 saw the Palatine family engage in a number of strategies to obtain military capital as well as diplomatic support. The need for action in this period was made especially acute by the fact that many combatants were making the first tentative steps towards negotiating a general European peace, raising the risk of the Palatine family's permanent exclusion. However, having emptied the family coffers to finance his military venture, Charles Louis was even more dependent on willingness and ability of his extended family and allies to provide financial assistance and champion his restoration on the diplomatic stage. An examination of how the fortunes of the Palatine family were affected by political turmoil and the outbreak of hostilities within the Stuart kingdoms highlights the difficulties facing dispossessed regimes who were entirely reliant on the support of other powers, many of whom had interests which could contradict those of the Palatines.

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[217] SP 81/45 ff.202, 218: Charles Louis at Minden to Roe, 15/25 and 20/30 Oct. 1638; Anon,. *1. An abstract of some special forreigne occurrences, brought down to the weekly newes, of the 20 of December…*(London, 1638)
[218] SP 81/45 f.218.

Once it became apparent that Charles Louis's attempts to rebuild his army was futile, he immediately travelled to the conference at Hamburg 'to support the negotiations and encourage assistance by his presence, which the mere suggestions of his uncle have not yet succeeded in obtaining', arriving on 27 November 1638.[219] In particular, Charles Louis visited his great-uncle, Christian IV, at Glückstadt in an attempt to persuade the king to champion the Palatine cause at Hamburg. In addition to being treated with utmost hospitality by the king, Charles Louis was well-received by the dignitaries of the town, who presented him with a gift and afforded him 'all his rights, and titles in their grave oration'.[220] Charles Louis was similarly well-received by the counts of East Frisia and Oldenburg on his journey back to The Hague in early-1639, at the same time that the Venetian representatives were making assurances of the Doge's 'desire for the prosperity of all the Palatine House'.[221]

However, courtesy and vague assurances of support are of scant tangible value to an exiled regime facing permanent exclusion. Accordingly, the Palatine family continued to seek military capital to improve their own bargaining position at Hamburg and subsequent peace talks, as well as increase their value as an ally for other states. Ultimately, however, such attempts either proved abortive or were thwarted by the actions of more powerful states who had their own designs for the limited supply of available men and materiel. Even before the Palatine defeat at Vlotho, it was believed that Amalie Elisabeth of Hessen-Kassel would shortly sign a peace treaty with the Emperor and that Charles Louis would be able to assume command of the Hessian troops. Elizabeth even

[219] Beller, 'Hamburg', p. 72; *CSPV: 1636-39,* 484.
[220] Akkerman, II, 740, 746.
[221] SP 81/46 f.115: Charles Louis in Emden to Roe, 18/28 Feb. 1639; *CSPV: 1636-39,* 489.

stated in January 1639 that her brother had already given Charles Louis £15,000 to engage the services of the Hessian troops.[222] However, it should be noted that there is no evidence of such a sum being paid to Charles Louis in the records of the Signet Office, and a letter from the young prince in April 1639 suggests that nothing had been paid.[223] Ultimately, the Emperor refused to ratify the article of the Hessian peace treaty which would have granted Calvinists the same rights as Lutherans, and Amalie Elisabeth renewed her French alliance in March 1640.[224]

The Palatines also attempted to procure the army of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, a controversial military commander who had defected from Swedish service to the French in 1635, and whose army numbered 14,000 in April 1639.[225] However, in attempting to recruit Bernhard's army, Charles Louis risked provoking their French paymasters. From late-1638, the Palatine family attempted to employ their familial capital, as well as their professed status as one of the highest-ranking dynasties within the empire, to marry the eldest Palatine daughter, Elisabeth, to the ambitious general, who had already proposed marriage to the wealthy Margueritte de Rohan.[226] The fact that Bernhard was the third surviving brother of the incumbent duke of Saxe-Weimar suggests that the proposed marriage was intended as a pragmatic arrangement to obtain the service of a sizeable army rather than being driven by any dynastic considerations. As this scheme risked alienating France, Elizabeth deemed it imperative that it should be kept secret, as 'without dout the French king will seeke to hinder it not willing that Duke Bernard shoulde be English'.[227] In

[222] Akkerman, II, 754.
[223] SP 81/46 f.234: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 16/26 Apr. 1639.
[224] *Tragedy*, pp.619-21; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army,* p.298.
[225] *Tragedy*, p.615.
[226] Akkerman, II, 750, 758; Oman, pp.402-3; A. von Rohr, 'Die Pfalz-Kinder: Timon, Le Diable, Willful Ned, Signora Antica, Mademoiselle sans façon und die Sucessio britannica', in P. Wolf et al., (eds.), *Der Winterkönig – Friedrich von der Pfalz: Bayern und Europa im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart, 2003), p.213; *CSPV: 1636-9,* 428.
[227] Akkerman, II, 762.

spite of the Winter Queen's insistence on secrecy, the Venetian ambassador in England made numerous reports of the intended betrothal in early-1639.[228]

Although Bernhard's death in July 1639 put paid to the initial plan to obtain this army through marriage, Charles Louis still sought to assume command of the force. The young prince swiftly journeyed to England in late-July before returning to the continent two months later with remittances for £10,000 of the £36,000 promised by the king to help secure command of the 'Bernhardines'.[229] Charles Louis had hoped to depart from England unnoticed so as not to arouse the suspicions of the French, leaving for Dover with only Lord Craven and three or four other companions, 'without noise, or so much as a farewell taken of any but their majestyes'.[230] However, Charles Louis's attempts at inconspicuousness were doomed from the start in the most farcical fashion. Not only did the Venetian ambassador in England relate the route and purpose of the young prince's sudden departure, but he also reported that Charles Louis's vessel was afforded a full-gun salute by the Spanish, English, and Dutch fleets during his voyage to Calais.[231] Unsurprisingly, the French were well aware of the prince's movements as he attempted to travel through their country incognito on his journey to join the Bernhardines at Breisach.[232]

On 20 October 1639 the elector was arrested by agents of Cardinal Richelieu at Moulins and he was imprisoned in Bois de Vincennes until the following August. The French claimed that Charles Louis was detained because he was attempting to travel

[228] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 500, 534.
[229] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 580; Loomie, pp.261-3.
[230] Loomie, p.263.
[231] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 575, 584.
[232] Akkerman, II, 843.

through their country without a passport, but it was widely agreed that this was a 'vain pretext', and that they instead sought to strengthen their own possession of the army.[233] Although the directors and colonels of the Bernhardines had reaffirmed their loyalty to France in the treaty of Breisach on 9 October 1639, the matter of an oath of allegiance to Louis XIII remained unresolved and there was a concern that the troops of the new Armée d'Allemagne would desert their French masters en masse in favour of the Swedish army.[234] As the Palatines had pledged to use the Bernhardines 'in the service of the Crown of Sweden', it is unsurprising that Richelieu sought to prevent Charles Louis from jeopardising the uneasy working relationship between France and the Weimarian army.[235] Indeed, Roe informed Elizabeth in March 1640 that 'I well know the discontents of the Weymar armye, and I have had fayre ouvertures from them', but that 'I have no power, neyther is it seasonable in the condition wherein the Prince Elector now is, in the Lyons paw'.[236]

1638-42: Charles Louis and England

It was hoped that the Palatine defeat at Vlotho would prompt greater assistance from England. The Venetian ambassador to France noted that 'they regret the event here, but hope that it will serve as a spur to the King of Great Britain', and Elizabeth wrote to Charles I to request more troops 'which woulde extremelie incourage him & his frends', although she did confide to Roe that 'what will be done in it God knows'.[237] This period saw the young prince make two unexpected journeys to England in his attempts to procure financial and diplomatic assistance for his cause in response to short-term developments:

[233] Ibid., 857; SP 81/48 f.147: Roe in Hamburg to Secretary of State, 1 Nov. 1639; *CSPV: 1636-39*, 591.
[234] G. Symcox (ed.), *War, Diplomacy, and Imperialism, 1618-1763* (New York, 1974), pp.121-5; Parker, p.137; *Tragedy*, p.617; Parrott, *Richelieu's Army*, pp.294-5.
[235] Akkerman, II, 822.
[236] Ibid., 885.
[237] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 470; Akkerman, II, 721.

the death of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar in July 1639 and an upcoming Stuart-Orange marriage in 1641. Charles Louis also attempted to rekindle acquaintanceships which he had made during his earlier sojourn at the Stuart court. For example, he wrote to the earl of Huntly in April 1639 to remind him of the professions of friendship 'of which you have given me such assurance att my beeng in England', and in August 1641 he asked Roe to 'informe my Ld of Essex of my businesse, for you know how well he is inclined towards it'.[238] Ultimately, however, the increased political turmoil within Charles I's kingdoms, and the outbreak of hostilities, meant that the Palatine family could often do little more than watch as their most significant financial and political supporter descended into rebellion and civil war.

The fracturing of royal authority over Charles I's three kingdoms from 1638 prevented the king from exercising diplomatic influence with other European powers at a time when the combatants of the Thirty Years' War were making the first tentative steps towards a peace settlement. At the conference of anti-Habsburg powers at Hamburg, Charles Louis wrote to Laud that the only way to 'redresse my former disasters', was for his uncle to enter into a confederation with the other participating states.[239] However, the French and Swedish representatives both reported in late-1638 that the troubles in Scotland precluded effective assistance from England.[240] Christian IV also reportedly responded to Roe's assertions of English military action against the Emperor by scoffing that Charles needed to ensure he could control his subjects first.[241] Roe encountered similar difficulties as Charles I's official representative during his negotiations with the Emperor at

[238] West Sussex Record Office, Chichester: Goodwood/1427/11: Charles Louis to the Marquess of Huntly, 9 Apr. 1639; SP 16/483 f.26: Charles Louis in Whitehall to Roe, 6/16 Aug. 1641.
[239] SP 81/45 f.333: Charles Louis in Hamburg to Laud, 14/24 Dec. 1638.
[240] Ibid. ff.158-60, 204-6: Roe in Hamburg to Secretary of State, 28 Sept. and 16 Oct. 1638; Beller, 'Hamburg', p.72.
[241] Murdoch, 'Ambassadors', p.47.

Regensburg and Vienna in 1641 and 1642. Both Charles Louis and Elizabeth commiserated with their long-time supporter for the ultimate failure of his talks, with the latter praising Roe for doing 'that which none of your predecessours has done, which is to make them pull off there masque in shewing plainlie they will not restore my sonne though they confesse he is restorable'.[242]

The young prince and his mother clearly believed that Roe's diplomatic efforts were hamstrung by the turbulence plaguing Charles I's kingdoms, claiming that '[the king] cannot avenge himself by reason of his owne broiles', an opinion shared by numerous contemporaries.[243] Although Charles I issued a manifesto in July 1641 pledging 'all such Force and Power wherewith God hath enabled Us, both by Our own Arms and the Help and Assistance of all Our Allies and Friends' to facilitate a Palatine restoration, this was mocked as a 'weaponless threat' which 'will give little or no help to the Ambassador Roe in his negotiations'.[244] Similarly, Walter Leslie, a Scottish Imperial field marshal, informed Roe of a general opinion that 'Germany could hope and expect little from [Charles I] either in ayde his nephews or correspondence with his Friends' due to rumours 'that the Parliament had taken from the king both his royal power & his revenew'.[245]

The limitations of Charles I's diplomatic influence in the wake of the Bishops' Wars, and the subsequent impact it had on the fortunes of the Palatine family, was especially evident in the negotiations surrounding the marriage of Princess Mary to the future William II of Orange in May 1641. The king's determination to avenge his defeats,

[242] SP 16/490 f.145v: Charles Louis in York to Roe, 18 May 1642; Akkerman, II, 1044.
[243] SP 16/490 f.145v; Akkerman, II, 1028; R.B. Mowat, 'The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to Vienna, 1641-2', *EHR*, 25/98 (1910), p.275.
[244] *LJ*, IV, 300-1; *CSPV 1640-42*, 182.
[245] SP 81/51 ff.191-3v: Heads of the discourse of Count Lesly to Sir Thomas Roe, 19 July 1641.

his financial difficulties, and reluctance to become dependent on parliament, led to his submission to Dutch demands for his eldest daughter in a marriage agreement exclusive of a political alliance which could have provided vital support for a Palatine restoration.[246] The evident hostility of the Palatine family to the match was noted by contemporaries, and subsequent scholars have claimed that Charles Louis travelled to England in early-1641 to disrupt the match and claim the bride for himself in accordance with a supposed tacit agreement between Charles I and Elizabeth.[247] However, such assertions appear to have been based on a single report from the Venetian ambassador that Dutch envoys claimed that Charles Louis had 'lost the hope of having the princess for himself'.[248] Although the elector and his mother both criticised the 'great saussiness in [the House of Orange] to demand the breeding of soe great a kings daughter', these views were widely shared at the Stuart court, and so cannot be viewed as evidence that either Elizabeth or Charles Louis believed that the latter should have been Mary's bridegroom.[249]

Charles Louis viewed a marriage between the houses of Stuart and Orange as an opportunity for the king to enter into an alliance with a continental state which would assist a Palatine restoration. Although critical of the fact that his mother had not been informed of the marriage negotiations, when the young prince found out about the proposed match in late-1640, he wrote that 'I doe beseech [Roe] that nothing may be rashly concluded in this businesse, but that some advantage may be made of it in my

[246] P. Geyl, *Orange and Stuart 1641-71*, tr. A. Pomerans, (London, 1969), pp.7-8; S. Groenveld, 'The House of Orange and the House of Stuart, 1639-1650: A Revision', *HJ*, 34/4 (1991), pp.957-9; Cust, *Political Life*, p.271; Hibbard, *Plot*, p.177.
[247] *CSPV: 1640-42*, 147; Loomie, p.313; Oman, p.355; C.V. Wedgwood, *The King's Peace, 1637-1641* (London, 1955), pp.386, 397-8; J. Ross, *The Winter Queen: The Story of Elizabeth Stuart* (New York, 1979), p.121; Akkerman, II, 953 n.2; Strachan, *Roe*, p.255; Hibbard, *Plot*, p.176-7; Keblusek, 'The Bohemian Court at The Hague', in M. Keblusek and J. Zijlmans (eds.), *Princely Display: The Court of Frederik Hendrik of Orange and Amalia von Solms* (The Hague, 1997), p.56.
[248] *CSPV: 1640-42*, 135.
[249] SP 16/472 f.68: Charles Louis to Sir Richard Cave, 30 Nov./10 Dec. 1640; Akkerman, II, 943; Wedgwood, *Peace*, p.436.

Cause'.[250] In addition, Charles I himself declared in a speech to the House of Lords on 10 February 1641 that 'use may be had of this Friendship towards the Reestablishment of My Sister and Nephews'[251] Given Charles Louis's fear that 'if this occasion of the King and people's meeting be neglected…I am lost', it is unsurprising that he decided to journey to England in late-February 1641 to press his interests in person, presenting his uncle with a list of demands to be put to the Dutch negotiators for inclusion in the marriage treaty.[252] These obliged the Dutch to reject any peace treaty or alliance which did not incorporate a full Palatine restitution, as well as provide financial and military aid, including giving Charles Louis 'some Towne upon their frontier for a place of Armes' and allowing him to furnish troops without paying 'ye charges, toles, licenses, excises or other impositions of ye country'.[253]

The sheer audacity of these demands, together with Elizabeth's assertion that 'I cannot see what the king can gaine by precipitating this marriage', demonstrates that the Palatine family vastly overestimated the strength of Charles I's bargaining position.[254] The representatives of the States General and the Prince of Orange flatly refused to include Charles Louis's terms in the marriage treaty, instead pledging to send the propositions to their masters with the vague assurance that they would 'in reasonable & faisable things…always make appeare to have a singular affection to ye restablishment of his Electorall Highnes'.[255]

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[250] SP 16/472 f.68v.
[251] *LJ*, IV, 157; J. Adamson, *The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I* (London, 2007), p.189.
[252] SP 16/472 f.68v; SP 16/478 ff.37-8: Proposition of the Elector Palatine Charles Louis to the King, 7 Mar. 1641; BL: Stowe MS 133 ff 302-6 at f.304v: Articles presented to Charles I, on the affairs of the Palatinate, 1640.
[253] SP 16/478 ff.37-8.
[254] Akkerman, II, 943.
[255] Stowe MS 133 f.306.

The king's dependency on the potential benefits of a Stuart-Orange marriage alliance also meant that Charles was unable to safeguard the prestige and traditional precedence of his exiled relatives over the House of Orange at the risk of alienating the Dutch negotiators and his future son-in-law. Indeed, Charles ruled against his nephew in the latter's dispute with the twelve-year-old William of Orange over precedence, a decision which Elizabeth claimed would only succeed 'in making [the House of Orange] more proud and insolent to us'.[256] The visible eclipse of the Palatine family by the growing prestige of the House of Orange would have been all the more galling for the Winter Queen as Princess Amalia of Orange was the daughter of Frederick's late Grand Chamberlain, and had served as one of Elizabeth's ladies-in-waiting until her marriage to Prince Frederik Hendrik in 1625. It was only in early-1637 that the States General voted to change the mode of addressing Frederik Hendrik from 'excellency' to 'highness', and the Palatine family appear to have regarded the dynastic ambitions of the House of Orange as cynical social climbing, with Elizabeth claiming that Mary's Dutch bridegroom was 'too low for her'.[257]

The reversal in precedence between the Palatine and Orange houses at the 1641 royal marriage was in sharp contrast to the wedding of Amalia's sister in February 1638, at which Charles Louis and Elizabeth were afforded prominent positions appropriate to individuals of royal birth at the marriage ceremony, banquets, and tournaments.[258] Although Charles Louis's absence at his cousin's wedding ceremony on 2 May 1641 and his subsequent refusal to attend the young Prince of Orange was a matter of much

[256] Akkerman, II, 952, 964.
[257] J.I. Israel, 'The Courts of the House of Orange c.1580-1795', in J. Adamson (ed.), *The Princely Courts of Europe: Ritual, Politics and Culture Under the Ancien Régime 1500-1750* (London, 1999), p.128; Akkerman, II, 943: Elizabeth to Roe, 11 Dec. 1640.
[258] Israel, 'Orange', p.128; Keblusek, 'The Bohemian Court', pp.49-50, I. Groeneweg, 'Court and City: Dress in the Age of Frederik Hendrik and Amalia', in Keblusek and Zijlmans, *Princely Display*, p.201.

contemporary speculation, the elector's correspondence suggests that his conduct was primarily driven by concerns of prestige.[259] Charles Louis complained of 'how the little Prince of Orenge carrieth himself towards me', and resolved that he would not follow the king's suggestion to visit William and pay his respects without an express demand that he do so, as such a command would mean that 'to the eye of the World…I may have that excuse' for prejudicing his own honour.[260] It appears, however, that the elector submitted to his uncle's wishes, with Elizabeth lamenting that 'my sonne was bothe the sufferer and forced to give satisfaction too, which is verie hard, and it greeves me not a little'.[261] It would have been humiliating for a prince of the blood, whose father also held a royal title, to be publicly observed as having been reduced to a lower precedence than William, a scion of a non-royal dynasty who was also the offspring of one of his mother's former attendants. It would appear as yet another demonstration that the Palatine family's most significant ally had lost interest in defending their cause.

The disturbances within Charles I's kingdoms also drained the coffers of the Palatine family's most significant benefactor. Charles Louis was informed in May 1639 that 'there must noe mony be expected from England as long as the Scotland business last', and was understandably overjoyed at the news of the Pacification of Berwick which brought the First Bishops' War to an end in June 1639.[262] Indeed, Charles Louis claimed to Roe to be 'in so happy a conjuncture I cannot forbeare to aske your advice how to make the best use of the Scots accommodation'.[263] However, the peace would last little over a year until the outbreak of the Second Bishops' War in the summer of 1640. Roe's request

[259] Loomie, p.313; *CSPV: 1640-42*, 147.
[260] Akkerman, II, 952, 957-8.
[261] Ibid., 964.
[262] SP 81/47 f.32v: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 21/31 May 1639.
[263] Ibid. f.115: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 12 July 1639.

for £20,000 to distribute as judicious 'presents' to assist his negotiations at Regensburg and Vienna was met with rejection because of the turmoil in Britain, with Sir Henry Vane writing that 'his majestie conceives that a very great summe, & wth wch his affayres att present will hardly be able to dispence'.[264]

The king's expensive defeats in the Bishops' Wars, together with the financial obligations imposed by the Covenanters in the Treaty of Ripon of October 1640 had dire consequences for the Palatine family's finances.[265] Their annual allowance of £1,150 for liveries and beer was not paid after 1638, and whilst Charles Louis's yearly pension of £12,000 was paid in full until 29 September 1640, the payments 'began to bee obstructed in part, & soone often wholly', as a result of 'the distemper of these times'.[266] In addition, although Charles I provided his nephew with funds for his doomed attempt to secure the services of the Bernhardine army, the king initially refused to part with any money until Charles Louis actually took command of the force.[267] Even when Charles relented two months later and authorised payments to be made to Charles Louis, it is important to note that the funds were specifically noted as being advance payments of his nephew's pension, in contrast to the large sums given to the young prince the previous year to purchase Meppen.[268] It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Charles Louis lamented in June 1641 that money was 'a ware hard to come by in these times'.[269]

[264] SP 80/10 f.127: Sir Henry Vane in Edinburgh to Roe, 18 Oct. 1641; Mowat, 'Vienna', p.268.
[265] P. Donald, *An Uncounselled King: Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637-1641* (Cambridge, 1990), pp.268-9.
[266] Bod.: MS Nalson 18 f.456: The humble remonstrance of James Harrington, concerning the affaires of His High:s the Prince Elector Palatine, 17 Feb. 1645.
[267] SP 81/47 f.269v: Charles Louis in Bagshot to Roe, 30 Aug. 1639.
[268] SO 3/12 (Nov. 1638-Dec.1644); *CSPV: 1636-39,* 575.
[269] Akkerman, II, 971.

The increasing turmoil within Charles I's realms also prevented the Palatine family from procuring military capital not only from the king, but also a number of independent Scottish backers who had served the Protestant cause on the continent but were later drawn into the emerging hostilities. In summer 1638, James King sought to provide 2,000 foot and horse and Sir John Ruthven offered to levy 1,200 infantry, four troops of dragoons and four of cavalry to serve Charles Louis. However, both officers and their men were diverted to serve the king in the First Bishops' War, and Alexander Leslie returned to Scotland to command the Covenanter army.[270] The Venetian ambassador also claimed that 'the disturbances of Scotland' prevented Charles Louis from recruiting more than 600 men in the aftermath of the battle of Vlotho.[271]

In July 1641, nine months after the end of the Second Bishops' War, Charles I announced his intention to prepare a manifesto regarding the Palatine cause for the Reichstag at Regensburg. The Imperial Diet opened in September 1640 was the first in 27 years, and was summoned by Ferdinand III in an attempt to facilitate a general peace within the Empire, and unite the Imperial Estates behind the Emperor to defeat the French and Swedish allegedly bent on suppressing German liberty.[272] The Diet even attempted to provide for the Palatine family by offering an eighth electoral title.[273] In preparing his manifesto, the king proclaimed that 'I hope all the world shall see that there is a good understanding between me and my people', and that 'if I should do it without the advice of my Parliament, it would be of much less force'.[274] Charles Louis accordingly enthused that 'concerning my business…his Majesty will take his Parliament's advice along with his

[270] SP 81/44 f.196: Lt. Gen. King's answer to Sir R. Cave and Ambassadors answer, 8 July 1638; Akkerman, II, 693-5; Murdoch and Grosjean, *Generals*, p.89.
[271] *CSPV: 1636-39*, 457.
[272] *Tragedy*, p.625.
[273] Ibid.
[274] *CSPD: 1641-3*, 44-5.

own determination', and believed that it would 'stop the mouths of those that proclaimed and augmented the news of these kingdoms' troubles'.[275] The following month, Charles Louis accompanied his uncle to Edinburgh on the king's first visit to Scotland since 1633 and was well received by the Scottish parliament as well as army officers, such as Leslie, 'who are all willing to goe be imployed for us'.[276] Indeed, the Scottish parliament approved the king's manifesto regarding the Palatine cause on 28 August and on 12 November 1641, a committee of four members from each Estate proposed that 10,000 infantry troops should be raised '& transported to what rendezvous in Germany shalbe thought expedient for the Prince Elector in his Service'.[277]

Although the Venetian ambassador claimed that the Scots merely intended 'to make this paper strike fear, instead of taking the vigorous steps that are necessary', it appears the offer was genuine and was indicative of a high degree of support for the Palatine family.[278] Had the Scots simply been attempting to force the Emperor to negotiate, it is strange that they would only offer Charles Louis an army after the dissolution of the Reichstag at Regensburg in October 1641, at which Roe could have utilised such a bargaining tool. Indeed, it appears that events in Britain were overtaken by developments in Germany, as the Diet succeeded in reconciling the vast majority of Imperial Estates to the Emperor, with the exception of the Palatine family, Hessen-Kassel, and the Dukes of Brunswick.[279] Unlike the other two powers, the Palatines had no alliance with Sweden, and so their continued exclusion after rejecting the offer of an eighth electorate appeared

[275] Ibid., 101.
[276] Akkerman, II, 996-7, 999; Adamson, *Revolt*, pp.348-49.
[277] Charles I, *Newes from Scotland. His Maiesties Manifest touching the Palatine Cause. And Act of Parliament concerning the same…*(London, 1641); C. Innes and T. Thomson (eds.), *The Acts of the Parliament of Scotland* (12 vols., Edinburgh, 1814-75), V, 650; SP 81/52 f.221: Declaration of Scot's parliament concerning Palatine, 12 Nov. 1641.
[278] *CSPV: 1640-42*, 223.
[279] *Tragedy*, pp.625-6; Parker, p.167.

increasingly likely. Charles Louis was nevertheless buoyed by the Scots' offer, confiding to Roe that 'I think my affairs in a very fair way…and my interest in great safety' and he even announced that, unless he received satisfaction from the Emperor by April 1642, 'he will then proceed to Germany with a powerful army'.[280] Ultimately, however, the Irish Rebellion thwarted any hopes of Anglo-Scottish military assistance for the Palatine cause, as the 10,000 Scottish troops under Leslie's command were dispatched to Ulster to suppress the rebels in 1642.[281]

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the status of an exiled ruling dynasty in early modern Europe was far more complicated than has previously been acknowledged. In spite of losing their lands and titles in the early-1620s, the Palatine family remained constituent parts of the dynastic and political network of European elites. Whilst being no guarantee of monetary and diplomatic assistance, the Palatine family's dynastic ties made them by far the most well-connected exiles of the Thirty Years' War, and therefore of great interest to other powers, so long as there appeared a chance of British intervention in Europe on their behalf. Although the Palatine family were able to devise and engage in strategies in pursuance of their restitution between 1632 and 1642, the support or opposition of more powerful states strictly circumscribed their agency through the provision or denial of diplomatic support or military and financial capital.

Nevertheless, rather than simply declining in significance, the importance of an exile's cause oscillated depending how it related to the interests and circumstances of other

[280] SP 16/483 f.156: Charles Louis in Edinburgh to Roe, 22 Aug. 1641; *CSPV 1640-42*, 223.
[281] Murdoch and Grosjean, *Generals*, p.119. D. Scott, *Politics and war in the three Stuart kingdoms, 1637-49* (Basingstoke, 2004), p.33; M. Braddick, *God's Fury, England's Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars* (London, 2008), p.305.

states based on military and political developments. Whereas the Palatine cause was deemed of such relative unimportance in 1635 as to merit the family's exclusion from the Peace of Prague, the issue of Charles Louis's restitution would become one of the most significant issues at the Westphalian peace negotiations over a decade later. Although the Palatine army was far too small to recapture the Palatinate by itself, its presence was a reassertion of the Palatine cause and a demonstration, albeit short-lived, that Charles Louis would most likely need to be reconciled in the event of a general peace, as shown by the attempt to reconcile the Palatine family to the Emperor at Regensburg. Instead of interpreting the military and political strategies devised by the Palatine family between 1632 and 1642 in simple terms of success or failure to recover their lands and titles, it is more useful to examine their effectiveness in maintaining the Palatine cause as a relevant issue on the political stage.

Chapter 4: The Elector Palatine and the English Civil War, c.1642-49

On 29 August 1644, almost two years after his sudden departure from Charles I's camp, Charles Louis landed at Gravesend amidst considerable contemporary interest and suspicion.[1] Viscount Dunbar received a letter from his son in Rotterdam informing him that 'the Prince Elector is going from hence to London, I imagine for no good', and the Venetian ambassador in London claimed that Charles Louis was driven by 'an ambition more reprehensible than his father's…which renders him odious to the foreign princes and to Parliament'.[2] The most frequently-argued motivation for Charles Louis's journey to England and his declaration of support for parliament in 1644 is that the elector hoped that he would be offered the English throne in the event of Charles I's defeat and deposition.[3] However, such interpretations do not consider Charles Louis's position as head of an exiled ruling dynasty whose primary objective was the recovery of his father's lands and titles in Germany.[4]

An examination of the elector's motives and actions between 1642 and 1649 provides a valuable insight into the clash between dynastic considerations and political and financial concerns of rulers in early modern Europe. Such a conflict was especially acute for the Palatine exiles, as obligations of familial loyalty and the ability to acquire resources for their own subsistence and restitution appeared to require choosing between Charles I and his parliamentarian enemies. The first section of this chapter will examine Charles Louis's actions between 1642 and 1644, as well as his motivations for travelling to his uncle's war-torn kingdom and siding with parliament, placing the young prince's decision

[1] Edward Hyde wrote that 'The arrival of the Prince Elector at London was no less the discourse of all tongues than the death of Mr Pimm': W.D. Macray (ed.) *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England begun in the year 1641, by Edward, Earl of Clarendon* (6 vols., Oxford, 1888), III, 324.
[2] SP 84/158 f.26: John Constable in Rotterdam to Viscount Dunbar, 30 July 1644; *CSPV: 1643-47*, 138-9.
[3] Schaab, II, 122; E. Blesch, *Restitution der Pfalz und Beziehungen Karl Ludwigs zu England* (Heidelberg, 1891), pp.46-7; C.V. Wedgwood, *The Trial of Charles I* (London, 1967), pp.167-8.
[4] Hauck, p.73.

in a broader chronological and geographical context. In doing so, this section will counter the allegation that Charles Louis was driven by an ambition for the English crown, as well as the suggestion that he had either a long-standing affinity with the parliamentarian cause, or an enmity against the king, which made his eventual allegiance a foregone conclusion. Rather, it will be shown that the prince primarily sought financial, diplomatic and military assistance for the Palatine cause at a time of burgeoning peace negotiations in Europe which risked cementing the exclusion of the Palatine family, and that he sought to maintain a neutral stance between the king and Parliament for as long as possible. The second section will examine Charles Louis's actions in England between 1644 and his eventual departure to his recently-restored electorate in March 1649. By assessing the prince's activities and the attitude towards the Palatine cause in England in the mid- and late-1640s, this chapter will also provide a valuable insight into how support for an exiled regime and their perceived political significance could change over time.

The King, the Parliament, and the Elector

When viewed solely in the Anglo-centric context of the English Civil Wars, it is unsurprising that the arrival of the king's eldest nephew, as well as his professions of support for parliament, has been interpreted as proof of the elector's ambition for his uncle's crown.[5] Although there is no evidence to support such a claim, this is frequently argued as the only logical explanation, with Gardiner asserting that it 'renders explicable what otherwise is inexplicable'.[6] In addition, a number of historians evoke the example of William III of Orange, who was invited to England in 1688 to replace his uncle as king of England, and infer that Charles Louis harboured similar ambitions four decades earlier.[7]

[5] M. Strachan, *Sir Thomas Roe 1581-1644: A Life* (Salisbury, 1989), p.280; G.M. Thomson, *Warrior Prince: Prince Rupert of the Rhine* (London, 1976), pp.118-19.
[6] J. Willcock, *The Life of Sir Henry Vane the Younger: Statesman & Mystic (1613-1662)* (London, 1913), p.140**;** S.R. Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War* (4 vols., London, 1987 ed.), II, 28.
[7] Gardiner, *Civil War*, II, 27; C. Russell, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642* (Oxford, 1991), p.458; Thomson, *Warrior Prince*, pp.118-19.

It has even been claimed that parliament's shocked reaction to Charles Louis's arrival suggested that there had been a scheme to replace Charles I with the elector, which the latter's appearance in England threatened to expose.[8] Although the House of Lords ordered the preparation of 'handsomely and completely furnished' apartments for the elector at Whitehall, as well as the defrayment of his expenses for fourteen days, both houses appeared intent on limiting his stay in England to two weeks.[9] This caveat was ultimately removed when a joint committee of Lords and Commons issued a formal welcome to Charles Louis on 31 August, but the 'strange welcome' was recorded by Thomas Juxon, and the parliamentarian news press declared that the elector had not been invited by parliament, and that 'his stay is like to be little'. [10]

However, rather than being a convoluted scheme to divert suspicion from a planned overthrow of Charles I, it is far more likely that parliament's reaction to the elector's arrival arose from an earnest wish to allay any suspicions that they had invited a potential pretender to London. For example, less than a fortnight before the elector landed at Gravesend, the Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered the parliamentarian representative at The Hague 'not to give any encouragement to the Prince Elector for his coming over to England'.[11] This is further supported by the correspondence of Sir Cheney Culpepper with Samuel Hartlib, who held a semi-official diplomatic appointment in London from Charles Louis during the early years of the Civil War.[12] In early January 1644, Culpepper argued

[8] L. Mulligan, 'Peace Negotiations, Politics and the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 1644-1646', *HJ*, 12/1 (1969), pp.8-9; Willcock, *Vane*, p.143; V.A. Rowe, *Sir Henry Vane the Younger: A Study in Political and Administrative History* (London, 1970), pp.54-9.
[9] *LJ*, VI, 693-5; *CJ*, III, 614.
[10] *LJ*, VI, 695; K. Lindley and D. Scott (eds.), *The Journal of Thomas Juxon, 1644-1647* (Cambridge, 1999), p.57; R. Collings (ed.) *The kingdomes weekly intelligencer* (332 vols., London, 1643-9), LXX (27 Aug.-3 Sept. 1644), p.561.
[11] *CSPD: 1644*, 433.
[12] C. Webster (ed.), *Samuel Hartlib and the Advancement of Learning* (Cambridge, 1970), p.32 n.

that the elector's presence in England may 'rayse a kinde of juste jealousy in [King Charles]' as 'whatsoever the [true] intentions of [Queen of Bohemia], [Parliament] & [Prince Elector] be, the thinge will seeme [otherwy's] to [King Charles].[13]

As the eldest living son of the king's only surviving sibling, Charles Louis was the logical replacement if Charles I was deposed and his children disinherited. However, there is no evidence that he sought his uncle's throne or even contemplated the possibility that Charles would be deposed. The elector had already witnessed a reconciliation between the king and his subjects following the end of the Second Bishops' War in 1640, and his correspondence in late 1648 shows that he did not believe that the army 'will use any violence against [the king], or stand upon all those things they now propose for the change of the Governement'.[14]

Nevertheless, the king was certainly aware of the credible threat his nephew could potentially pose as a focal point for any opposition had the young prince been willing to do so.[15] After all, Frederick V and Elizabeth had inherited the hopes of 'political puritans' after the death of Henry, Prince of Wales in November 1612, and the Palatine family subsequently became icons for opponents of Charles I.[16] Mere days after Charles prorogued parliament in June 1628, the diarist John Rous recorded 'a secret whispering of looking towards the Lady Elizabeth', and that 'our king's proceedings have caused men's

[13] Hartlib: 13/28A-29B: Sir Cheney Culpepper to Samuel Hartlib, 9 Jan. 1644. The words in brackets were deciphered by Hartlib in his annotations.
[14] Victoria and Albert Museum: National Art Library, London [V&A]: Forster MS 39 f.55: Charles Louis at Somerset House to Elizabeth, 8 Dec. 1648; TS 23/1/30: Charles Louis to Elizabeth, 20 Oct. 1648.
[15] R. Cust, *Charles I: A Political Life* (Harlow, 2005), p.270; Russell, *Fall*, p.209.
[16] M.A. Breslow, *A Mirror of England: English Puritan Views of Foreign Nations, 1618-1640* (Cambridge, MA, 1970), pp.37-8; J. Miller, 'The Henrician legend revived: the Palatine couple and its public image in early Stuart England', *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire,* 11/3 (2004), p.310; D. Cressy, *Dangerous Talk: Scandalous, Seditious, and Treasonable Speech in Pre-Modern England* (Oxford, 2010), pp.163-5.

minds to be incensed, to rove and project'.[17] Such imaginings only increased over the 1630s and '40s, with the anonymously penned *Tom Tell Troath* of 1630 claiming that 'in your Majesties owne Tavernes for one healthe that's begun to your selfe ther are ten drunke to the Princes your forayn Children'.[18] The 1642 reply to this pamphlet similarly warned the king of the danger of support for the Palatine family, claiming that 'I seeke not to prejudicate the Innocent, but to advise your Majestie to use all due circumspection, and be well armed against all treacherous plots and projects'.[19] The Venetian ambassador in London even reported in late-August 1641 that, during violent protests in the Commons against Charles's proposed trip to Edinburgh, some members suggested giving the crown to either the Prince of Wales or Charles Louis.[20] Indeed, it is most likely that Charles requested that his nephew accompany him during the attempted arrest of the Five Members on 4 January 1642 in order to implicate a potential leading pretender to the throne.[21]

It is unsurprising, therefore, that the king wrote to Charles Louis in September 1644 that 'your coming, at this tyme, into this kingdom is, in all respects, much more strange to mee', and demanded to know 'upon what invitation you ar come, then, the desire of your coming'.[22] However, it appears that previous scholars have exaggerated the extent of the king's suspicions regarding Charles Louis's actions, as well as the impact of the elector's presence in England on the royalist high command. Several biographers of Prince Rupert claim that his elder brother's arrival in England caused the king to delay appointing Rupert as commander-in-chief of the royalist forces until November 1644,

[17] J. Rous, *Diary of John Rous, Incumbent of Santon Downham, Suffolk, from 1625 to 1642,* ed. M.A.E. Green (London, 1856), p.19.
[18] Anon, *Tom Tell Troath or A free discourse touching the manners of the tyme* ([Amsterdam], 1630), p.3.
[19] George Calvert, Baron Baltimore, *The answer to Tom-Tell-Troth the practise of princes and the lamentations of the kirke: Written by the Lord Baltimore, late Secretary of State* (London, 1642), p.4.
[20] *CSPV: 1640-42,* 200.
[21] J. Adamson, *The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I* (London, 2007), pp.496, 499.
[22] K. Hauck (ed.), *Die Briefe der Kinder des Winterkönigs* (Heidelberg, 1908), p.27.

when it became clear that parliament were not going to offer Charles Louis the crown.[23] However, two weeks before the elector even landed at Gravesend, Lord Digby had confided to Rupert that he would take over command from the aging and ailing earl of Brentford 'as soon as [the king] shall find means to satisfy the old general, that it may be no disgrace to him'.[24] It was not until Brentford was wounded in the Second Battle of Newbury on 27 October 1644 that the Lord General was honourably retired and replaced by Rupert.[25]

The prince's biographers have similarly argued that Charles Louis's presence in England contributed to Rupert's dismissal following the surrender of Bristol in September 1645, especially as the latter had already advised the king to make peace and, less than a month later, the elector was granted a considerable annual pension from parliament.[26] Although Digby's secretary asserted that 'the House of Palatine do think themselves assured of the Crown', and the Venetian ambassador claimed that Charles 'consequently conceived the greatest distrust of his nephews' and was planning to arrest both Rupert and Maurice, such speculation is unsubstantiated. Not only was Maurice never named as a participant in any of the rumoured plots against his uncle, but Charles also wrote to him on 20 September 1645 to inform him that 'I know you to be so free from [Rupert's] present misfortune, that it noways staggers [me] in that good opinion I have ever had of you.[27]

[23] F. Kitson, *Prince Rupert: Portrait of a Soldier* (London, 1994), p.212; R. Rebitsch, *Rupert von der Pfalz (1619-1682): Ein deutscher Fürstensohn im Dienst der Stuarts* (Innsbruck, 2005), p.38; Thomson, *Warrior Prince*, p.120.
[24] Warburton, III, 11-13
[25] R. Hutton, 'The Structure of the Royalist Party, 1642-1646', *HJ*, 24/3 (1981), p.563.
[26] C.V. Wedgwood, *The King's War, 1641-1647* (London, 1958), pp.486-90; C. Carlton, *Charles I: The Personal Monarch*, 2nd edn (London, 1995), p.289; Thomson, *Warrior Prince*, pp.137-8; A. Hopper, *Turncoats and Renegadoes: Changing Sides during the English Civil Wars* (Oxford, 2012), p.137.
[27] Warburton, III, 189.

Rather than harbouring long-lasting suspicions that Charles Louis sought his crown, it is more likely that the king realised that his nephew's actions were driven by pecuniary difficulties. Clarendon asserts that, once the king's initial wariness of his nephew's motivations had passed, he took little notice of him, except 'sometimes to express that he was sorry on his nephew's behalf that he thought fit to declare such a compliance' with parliament.[28] As Clarendon was a vocal critic of Charles Louis's conduct towards the Stuart exiles in the 1650s, it is unlikely that he would downplay any criticism or suspicion the king had for his nephew when writing his *History of the Rebellion.* Charles's understanding, though not approval, of his nephew's motives can also be seen in a letter from Charles Louis to Elizabeth dated 12 November 1647, in which the elector recounted accusations made by his uncle in a recent exchange at Hampton Court. Although a number of scholars have used the king's suggestion that Charles Louis wanted 'to have only one chickin more in my dish' as proof of Charles's suspicions that his nephew harboured ambitions for the English throne, this quotation is often taken out of context.[29]

Instead of accusing his nephew of coveting his crown, the letter demonstrates that Charles actually condemned Charles Louis for siding with parliament simply to relieve his immediate financial needs and to promote his own cause. The prince claimed that the king declared that he should have 'lived upon bread & water, then have complied wth the Parlt Wch he said I did to have only one chickin more in my dish'.[30] The king even appeared offended that his nephew's loyalty had been sold for such a seemingly low price as his basic subsistence, stating 'that he would have thought It a design more worthy his Nevou,

[28] Macray, *Clarendon*, III, 325.
[29] V&A: Forster 39 f.49v: Charles Louis to Elizabeth, 12 Nov. 1647; C.V. Wedgwood, 'The Elector Palatine and the Civil War', *History Today*, 4 (1954), p.10; R.G. Asch, 'Charles Lewis [Karl Ludwig]', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (3 Jan 2008), https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:4563/10.1093/ref:odnb/65815 (21 May 2019).
[30] V&A: Forster 39 f.49v: Charles Louis to Elizabeth, 12 Nov. 1647.

if I had gonne about to have taken his Crowne from his Head'.[31] However, as Karl Hauck noted in his 1903 biography of Charles Louis, it was not possible for impoverished exiled rulers to be so naïvely principled, and it was easy for individuals who did not share in their relative poverty to condemn them for not adhering to contemporary mores regarding dynastic loyalty.[32]

Whilst more recent scholars concede that it is more likely that Charles Louis's actions during the Civil War were motivated by the financial plight and political circumstances facing the Palatine court-in-exile, they continue to assert that he viewed parliament as his true allies and had a long-standing relationship with leading figures dating back to the 1630s.[33] This interpretation was undoubtedly influenced by the *Motives and reasons, concerning his Highnesse the Prince Elector Palatines coming into England,* presented by Charles Louis to the House of Lords on 14 September 1644, and published the following month.[34] In this document, the elector professed his support of parliament and the Covenanters, and sought to portray a long-standing affinity between the elector and the parliamentarian cause. However, such claims are unsurprising when one considers that the young prince's cause and basic subsistence depended on parliament's willingness to provide vital financial support.

It should also be noted that the most significant champions of the Palatine cause in the decade prior to the outbreak of the Civil War were hardly concentrated in the

[31] Ibid.
[32] Hauck, p.73.
[33] C. Spencer, *Prince Rupert: The Last Cavalier* (London, 2007), p.110; Asch, 'Charles Lewis [Karl Ludwig]'.
[34] Parliamentary Archives, London: Records of the House of Commons Library, Manuscript Collection [HC/LB/1]: HC/LB/1/17/c: Message from the Elector Palatine to both Houses of Parliament, 14 Sept. 1644; *LJ*, VI, 705-6; Anon, *Motives and reasons, concerning his Highnesse the Prince Elector Palatines coming into England. Presented to both the Honourable Houses of Parliament by His said Highnesse, on Satterday the 14. Of September. 1644. With two letters that were formerly sent from the Hagve* (London, 1644).

parliamentarian camp after 1642. Indeed, none of the notable English and Scottish noblemen who fought alongside Charles Louis at Vlotho in October 1638 took up arms for parliament. James King and the earl of Northampton both fought for the king, and Lord Craven held royalist sympathies despite taking no direct part in the Civil War. In addition, whilst Charles Louis claimed in his *Motives* that his allegiance to parliament was also due to a shared 'love and zeale to the Reformed Religion', he did not express such sentiments during the parliamentary debates on the Root and Branch Bill to abolish episcopacy in June 1641.[35] In a letter to Elizabeth, Charles Louis simply regarded the discussions as a waste of time which detracted from the Palatine cause, claiming that it 'will bring some troubles, and, by consequence, will keep back my business'.[36] Such remarks hardly tally with his later public professions of religious kinship with parliament, especially his assertion that the turmoil in England and the Empire were caused by 'the same Popish Principles, hammered upon the same Jesuiticall Anville'.[37] It should also be noted that the *Motives* marks the first time that a tract produced by Charles Louis or his advisers explicitly evoked the Protestant cause, with even the most provocative of Rusdorf's texts published in London in the late-1630s making no mention of it.

Although it could be suggested that the Palatine family's earlier publications had removed any overtly Protestant bellicosity to conform to the Crown's increased influence over newsprint from the mid-1630s, the fact that Georg Weckherlin, one of the most ardent supporters of Charles Louis's cause, was the king's licenser of foreign news makes this unlikely. Weckherlin repeatedly flouted the official policy of avoiding inflaming public support for Protestant militarism by licensing *The Swedish Intelligencer* between 1632-33,

[35] *Motives*, p.3.
[36] Bromley, p.119.
[37] *Motives*, pp.2-3.

as well as the sensationalist *Lamentations of Germany* by Philip Vincent in 1638, which contained lurid woodcuts of Catholic atrocities.[38] It is likely, therefore, that the inclusion of overt anti-Catholic declarations in the *Motives*, was primarily an attempt by Charles Louis to play to the Presbyterian and Calvinist gallery.

The young prince's support for the execution of Strafford in May 1641, and his claim that Charles 'hath shewed himself a good Master & a good Christian & att last a good King' by signing the death warrant, also need to be viewed in a broader context.[39] As Charles Louis believed that he could obtain greater levels of support if the king and his subjects were reconciled, it was understandable that he desired the removal of a figure who was not only a source of conflict between Charles I and parliament, but had also been a vocal opponent to English military intervention in Europe. As this section has demonstrated that Charles Louis neither had designs on his uncle's crown, nor a long-standing allegiance to parliament, it is important to examine the elector's actions prior to his arrival in England in 1644, in order to determine why he eventually travelled to his uncle's kingdom and declared for his enemies.

Charles Louis and the English Civil War, 1642-44

The impact of the Bishops' Wars on the fortunes of the Palatine family in the late-1630s demonstrated the problems facing exiled rulers who relied on the ability of their allies and extended family to provide material and diplomatic assistance. However, the divisions caused by the commencement of the English Civil War in 1642 complicated an

[38] A.B. Thompson, 'Licensing the Press: The Career of G.R. Weckherlin during the Personal Rule of Charles I', *HJ*, 41/3 (1998) pp.675-7; B. Ravelhofer, 'Censorship and Poetry at the Court of Charles I: The Case of Georg Rodolf Weckherlin', *English Literary Renaissance*, 43/2 (2013), pp.280-87.
[39] Akkerman, II, 957.

already troubling situation facing the Palatine family on the eve of hostilities. Charles Louis was not only dependent on the diplomatic support provided by his royal uncle, but also the revenues controlled by the king's enemies in parliament, many of whom had been ardent supporters of Frederick V and the Palatine cause in the 1620s and had feted the young prince during his multiple visits to England since the mid-1630s. Accordingly, Charles Louis initially attempted to maintain a neutral position between 1642 and 1643, in the hopes of a reconciliation between king and parliament. It was not until early-1644 that the circumstances facing the Palatine family, as well as military and political developments on both sides of the English Channel, persuaded the young prince to openly declare his support for parliament. This section therefore adopts a transnational approach to the examination of Charles Louis's actions during the first two years of the Civil War.

It is important to address why the young prince deemed it necessary to abscond from the royalist camp and return to the continent in July 1642 in the first place. Only a few months earlier, Charles Louis had declared his resolve 'to follow the King my Uncle, until I be reconciled & restored in Germanie…or that I be put into some Action of honour that way, or that he chase me from him'.[40] Charles Louis's correspondence demonstrates that he left England without the king's permission and that the latter was 'very much displeased with me for undertaking it'.[41] Whilst the elector undoubtedly wished to extricate himself from a situation in which he would be seen as adhering to one side in the unfolding civil war, the existing scholarship has overlooked important developments on the continent which played a role in prompting Charles Louis's departure in July 1642.

[40] Ibid., 1036-7.
[41] Hauck, *Briefe*, p.23.

Although the young prince's post-factum claim to Charles I that he had business at The Hague requiring his urgent return could be viewed with scepticism, it should be noted that Ferdinand III had recently ratified the agreed peace preliminaries with France and Sweden regarding the form of what would become the Westphalian peace negotiations.[42] Indeed, John Durie claimed in a letter to Samuel Hartlib dated 10 July 1642 that 'I know that great Preparatives are made for a Party for [Charles Louis] in Germany which in due time will shew it selfe' so long as the prince 'be not wanting to his owne Cause, & were nearer at hand to negotiate in it for himself'.[43] It is significant that Charles Louis returned to the continent very shortly after Durie beseeched Hartlib that 'my only desire is that for the good of that House [Palatine] & of the Protestant Cause in Germany yow would use your best industry to move [Charles Louis] to transport himself hither'.[44] As Durie also claimed that it was of utmost importance for Charles Louis to obtain sufficient finance to recruit troops and appear a valuable negotiating partner, it is unsurprising that the young prince wished to prevent alienating the greatest provider of his revenue: parliament.[45]

Whereas Rupert arrived in England in summer 1642 with 46 guns from the Prince of Orange as well as 'a galliot with a provision of muskets, powder, and arms', his older brother immediately sought to correct the impression that he returned to the continent in order to secure arms for the royalist cause. In a letter presented to the House of Lords on 27 September 1642, which was reproduced in print the following month, Charles Louis emphasised that 'neither since his going into Holland has there beene an occasion of sending over any ammunition, or other provision for warre, to be imployed against the

[42] Ibid.; *Tragedy*, p.632.
[43] Hartlib: 6/4/143A: [John Durie?] at The Hague to [Samuel Hartlib?], 10 July 1642.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.

Parliament'.[46] The elector's attempts to maintain an image of neutrality was evidently successful. On 19 September the Lords recommended that financial payments to Charles Louis continue as he 'hath shewed his Respect to the Parliament, in going away, and not be employed against it'.[47] Likewise, parliament's representative at The Hague, Walter Strickland, reported in spring 1643 that the elector 'is as right as you can wish him, is sensible of his owne good and that of both Kingdoms'.[48]

However, maintaining an aloof neutrality would hardly mitigate the unsavoury contemporary opinion of Rupert as a product of the devastation which encapsulated the continental war in the popular English imagination, seemingly proved by his role in the sack of Brentford in November 1642.[49] As early as September 1642, Sir Thomas Roe warned Charles Louis of the damage Rupert's actions, such as the use of *Brandschatzung* at Leicester, were having on English sympathies for the Palatine family, claiming that 'nothing is so cried out against as his actions which doth reflect upon your family and cause'.[50] Even supporters of the Palatine family such as Sir Simonds D'Ewes lamented that Rupert's actions only served to 'ruin himself and to make his mother and family odious to this kingdom'.[51]

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[46] Anon, *A declaration of the Prince Paltsgrave, to the high court of Parliament, concerning the cause of his departure out of England in these times of distractions, and the manner of his carriage and behaviour during the time of his continuance with His Majesty in the north* (London, 1642), p.4.
[47] *LJ*, V, 363.
[48] Bod: MS Tanner 62 f.78v: Walter Strickland at The Hague to Lord Grey, 15/25 Apr. 1643.
[49] T.B., *Marleborowes Miseries, Or, England turned Ireland*, by the Lord Digby and Daniel Oneale (London, 1643); I. Roy, 'England Turned Germany? The Aftermath of the Civil War in Its European Context', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 28 (1978), p.128; M. Braddick, *God's Fury, England's Fire: A New History of the English Civil War* (London, 2008), pp.248, 253; Gardiner, *Civil War*, I, 57; B. Donagan, 'Codes and Conduct in the English Civil War', *P&P*, 118/1 (1988), pp.68-70, 79**;** J. Norton, *The miseries of war. By a Lover of truth and peace: And by him dedicated to all that are such* ([London], 1643), p.10; Sir Benjamin Rudyerd, *Sir Benjamin Rudyerd his speech in the High Court of Parliament the 17. Of February, for a speedy treaty of peace with His Majestie* (London, 1643), p.4.
[50] BL: Harleian MS 1901 f.48: Sir Thomas Roe to Charles Louis, 20 Sept. 1642; Donagan, 'Codes', p.74.
[51] W.H. Coates, V.F. Snow and A.S. Young (eds.), *The Private Journals of the Long Parliament* (3 vols., New Haven and London, 1982-92), III, 342.

Charles Louis clearly felt that it was necessary to distance himself and his mother from the actions of his younger brothers in order to safeguard the payment of his family's pension, declaring in a proclamation to Parliament dated 5 October 1642 that Rupert's actions 'grieves us at out very Soules for his unhumane cruelties we heare he commits'.[52] The elector also despaired to Roe that 'it is impossible for the Queen my mother, or myself, to bridle my brother's youth and fieriness at so great a distance' and that 'it were a great indiscretion in any to expect it, and an injustice to blame us a things beyond our help'.[53] The significance of this declaration as propaganda for parliament's cause is evidenced by the fact that it was reproduced in two newsbooks in October and quoted verbatim in a pamphlet in February 1643, which incorrectly stated that Elizabeth had summoned Rupert to The Hague 'whereby shee might impart her mind unto him'.[54] However, Charles Louis's condemnation of Rupert in September and October 1642 should not be interpreted as a declaration of allegiance to parliament. Not only did the king denounce Rupert's conduct at Leicester, but the elector continued to make sycophantic appeals to the king to protest his loyalty and obedience.[55]

This is most evident between September 1642 and January 1643 when Charles Louis offered to mediate with Christian IV of Denmark on behalf of the English royalist cause, whilst simultaneously attempting to persuade parliament of his neutrality. Henrietta Maria reported that the elector offered to travel to the Danish court on his uncle's behalf but on the condition that the king 'enter into no accommodation during his stay in

[52] Henrietta Maria, Queen Consort of Charles I, *The Queens Majesties message and letter from the Hague…Also the declaration and petition of the Paltsgrave and the Queene his mother* (London, 1642); pp.7-8.
[53] SP 16/492 f.85: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 6 Oct. 1642.
[54] Ibid.; Anon, *Declaration*; Anon, *The best newes that ever was printed* (London, 1643), p.3.
[55] Roy, 'England Turned Germany?', p.128. For Charles Louis's attempts to persuade Charles I and his followers of his loyalty see: Hauck, *Briefe*, pp. 23-4, 26-7; SP 81/53 f.190v: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 9/19 Mar. 1643.

Denmark, without warning him of it; and in fact, also into no treaty without comprising him'.[56] More revealing, however, was Charles Louis's insistence that the scheme be kept secret 'for fear of the Parliament'.[57] The elector certainly downplayed his willingness to assist his uncle when challenged by the parliament's representatives, claiming to Walter Strickland in late 1642 that 'he was earnestly pressed to put himself into the Queen's affairs'.[58] Although Charles Louis's actions during the first year of the civil war demonstrate that he initially sought to maintain good relations with both the king and parliament until the war ended, by early 1644 the elector was making more overt declarations of his 'good affections' towards the English parliament and their cause.[59] Accordingly, it is important to examine developments in both the continental and British wars, as well as the elector's personal fortunes, between 1643 and 1644 which would have encouraged Charles Louis to make public protestations of fidelity to the parliamentarian cause.

One reason why the elector felt emboldened to openly declare his allegiance to parliament was that the European situation had changed dramatically by late-1643, with the result that he was more reliant on English diplomatic support, which his royal uncle was increasingly unable to provide. Although the king did not rule out the possibility of sending an ambassador to the Westphalian peace negotiations, the demands of the ongoing civil war inevitably occupied his attention and emptied his coffers. In May 1643, Charles informed Roe that, whilst he agreed 'that it will be expedient for some Minister of Ours to

[56] M.A.E. Green (ed.), *Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria, including her Private Correspondence with Charles I. Collected from the Public Archives and Private Libraries of France and England* (London, 1857), pp. 104-5.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Quoted in Mulligan, 'Peace', p.8 n 37.
[59] MS Tanner 62 f.559: Charles Louis at The Hague to Lord Grey of Warke, 12/22 Feb. 1644; *CJ*, III, 415; *LJ*, VI, 437 and the Venetian ambassador in England wrote in March that Charles Louis had written letters to the parliament 'which are not only submissive but prejudicial to his uncle': *CSPV: 1643-47*, 79.

assist & be present' at the peace talks, 'the disruption of Our owne Dominions are grown to such a height as take up our whole time & require even a greater proporcion of supply then is in Our command to employ in the same'.[60] It appears that Charles Louis was either not informed of his uncle's response or was overly optimistic that the civil war would shortly come to an end before the Westphalian peace talks commenced in earnest.

In autumn-1643 the young elector claimed that 'as for the kings sending an Ambassador, his Ma.ty will have time enough to consider of, since the French are so slow in their journey towards the meeting'.[61] However, scarcely a month later, Charles Louis acknowledged despairingly that he was 'likely only to enjoy faire words' from his uncle's kingdom, and that he would have to rely on the support of Denmark, France, and Sweden.[62] However, developments in the continental war destroyed the prospect of these nations presenting a united front on behalf of the Palatine cause by the end of 1643. On 24 November the French suffered a devastating defeat against the Bavarians at the battle of Tuttlingen and, two days later, the Swedish Riksdag authorized war with Denmark.[63] Accordingly, the prospects for Charles Louis's restitution without English intervention appeared bleak. In a subsequent letter to Roe, the Elector lamented that 'I cannot be confident of any frend' and that the French defeat was 'an unexpected & unfortunate blow for my businesse'[64]

The increased pressure on Palatine finances also helps to explain why Charles Louis abandoned the delicate balancing act he had pursued since 1642. In a letter to Pym

[60] SP 81/53 f.240: Charles I at Oxford to Roe, 1 May 1643.
[61] Ibid. f.334: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 21 Sept./1 Oct. 1643.
[62] Ibid. f.352: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 26 Oct./5 Nov. 1643.
[63] *Tragedy*, pp.643-5, 686-7; Parker, p.175.
[64] SP 81/53 f.368: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 27 Nov./7 Dec. 1643.

in June 1643, the prince evoked the cause of European Protestantism in a request for finance, asking for 'a share, soe farre as may contribute to the resettlement of the Protestant Cause & my just interests, which depend of it'.[65]Although parliament had granted financial assistance to Charles Louis between 1643 and 1644, including a one-off payment of £3,000 in March 1643 and the regular income of the profits of the Alnage and the Farthing Office awarded to the elector in May 1643, much of this revenue was never received.[66] In February 1645, James Harrington presented a remonstrance to the Commons, which meticulously demonstrated that Charles Louis had received only £5,050 out of the profits of the Alnage and Farthing Office between April 1643 and August 1644, just over twelve percent of the total profits of the period.[67] Charles Louis's financial difficulties were further exacerbated by the need to fund an independent Palatine embassy to the Westphalian congress.[68] As parliament controlled most of the sources of public revenue by 1644, closer adherence to his uncle's enemies was the most financially prudent course of action.

However, the most significant development which prompted Charles Louis to abandon the 'balancing act', which he had maintained since his return to the continent in summer 1642, was the military intervention of the Covenanters on the parliamentarian side from January 1644. The flurry of letters from Charles Louis following the arrival of the Covenanter army in England demonstrates that the elector sought to capitalise on the union between parliament and their Scottish allies in order to obtain the military assistance that had been pledged by the Scottish parliament in 1641 once the king and parliament were

[65] Bod. MS Clarendon 22 f.63: Charles Louis at The Hague to Pym, 1/11 June 1643.
[66] *CJ*, III, 26, 77.
[67] Bod.: Nalson MS 18 ff.456-457: The humble remonstrance of James Harrington, concerning the affaires of His High:s the Prince Elector Palatine, 17 Feb. 1645.
[68] Ibid.; Hartlib: 20/4/17A: Charles Louis to the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 17 Feb. 1645; *CJ*, IV, 58.

reconciled. Such an expectation was understandable as a number of the leading Covenanters in 1644 had either served the Protestant cause in Europe or campaigned for the restitution of the Palatine family. For example, John Campbell, earl of Loudon and Lord Chancellor of Scotland, had been prominent in the discussions of the Scottish parliament relating to the Palatine cause and had issued a number of pamphlets in 1641 championing Charles Louis's restitution. Alexander Leslie, the commander of the 22,000-strong Covenanter army, had also repeatedly attempted to procure troops and military bases for the Palatine cause.[69] Certainly, the elector believed that 'the Estates of Scotland will, according to my request upon this occasion, and their former promise, willingly ioyne with the Parliament of England' to champion the Palatine cause.[70]

In addition to taking the Covenant in Spring 1644, Charles Louis appealed to the Committee of Estates in Edinburgh to 'recommend his public and domestic subsistence to the Parliament of England', and asked whether the English parliament and the Covenanters 'wilbe pleased to consider my publick Interests…as they have formerly declared in my behalf'.[71] Both the Scots and their English counterparts thanked the elector for his affections to their cause, and suggested that the military assistance promised in 1641 would be made available for the Palatine cause once the king and parliament were reconciled.[72] The main text of Charles Louis's *Motives* similarly depicted a Palatine

[69] John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, *The Lord Lowden his learned and wise speech in the Upper House of Parliament in Parliament in Scotland, September 9 1641,* (London, 1641); and his *A second speech made by the Lord Lowden, in the Parliament of Scotland the 24 of Septemb. 1641. Being in Answer to some Objections made against the honourable Designe of the Palatinate* (London, 1641); J.R. Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy 1641-1647: The Palatine, The Dutch Republic and Sweden', in S. Murdoch (ed.), *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648* (Leiden, 2001), pp.84-5; S. Murdoch and A. Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648* (London, 2014), p.123.
[70] MS Tanner 62 f.559.
[71] H.W. Meikle (ed.), *Correspondence of the Scots commissioners in London, 1644-1646* (Edinburgh, 1917), p.9; MS Tanner 62 f.559.
[72] Meikle, *Correspondence*, p.9 n 4; *LJ*, VI, 503.

restitution as completely dependent on the cessation of hostilities in England.[73] Although financial difficulties and the intervention of the Covenanters undoubtedly prompted Charles Louis's more overt adherence to parliament, these factors do not explain why he travelled to England in late-August 1644.[74] In order to determine the motives behind the elector's actions, two factors need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, why Charles Louis deemed it necessary to be present in his uncle's kingdom in the middle of the civil war and, secondly, why he decided to make the journey in summer 1644 rather than at any time before.

It should be noted that Charles Louis's experiences in the 1630s and early 1640s suggested that he could obtain greater levels of material and diplomatic support from the English king and parliament if he appealed for assistance in person, an expectation which was shared by a large number of the elector's contemporaries.[75] This supports Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger's assertions of the continued importance of 'presence' in early modern political culture as a means of publicly reinforcing bonds of personal closeness and kinship between state actors.[76] For example, in late 1643, when it became apparent that the Palatine family could not expect any substantial diplomatic assistance from England at the Westphalian congress, Charles Louis despaired that 'my absence hath blotted out their performance as well in my publicke affaires'[77] Such a view was further corroborated in February 1644 after the elector's letter to William Lenthall, in which he described the 'so great a tye' between his family and the Commons, and requested that parliament provide

[73] *Motives*, p.3.
[74] Ibid., p.4.
[75] *CSPV: 1632-36*, 468-9.
[76] B. Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor's Old Clothes: constitutional history and the symbolic language of the Holy Roman Empire*, tr. T. Dunlap (New York, 2015), pp.8, 46-7.
[77] SP 81/53 f.352.

the £3,000 awarded in March 1643, apparently produced no additional financial relief.[78] Under such circumstances, it was understandable for Charles Louis to desire reconciliation between his uncle and Parliament, an equilibrium which his experiences of the early 1640s suggested would be most likely to produce support for the Palatine cause, and that the elector would want to travel to England to promote his family's interests when peace appeared imminent.

There had been contact between both sides since February 1644 regarding the possibility of peace negotiations and in May 1644, the parliamentarian secretary for foreign affairs, Georg Weckherlin, wrote to the young elector in May 1644 to inform him that 'when a peace shall be brought to perfection your Highness will have your share in reaping the desired fruits thereof'.[79] Such a sentiment echoed that contained in the letter Charles Louis received from parliament the previous month, which claimed that 'their sincere Intentions are the same towards yourself as formerly', and that he could expect military assistance following a reconciliation between the king and his enemies.[80] Although Weckherlin's letter has been interpreted as hinting at a scheme to depose Charles I and install Charles Louis on the English throne, it is far more likely that he was reassuring the elector that the Palatine family's interests would be included in any peace negotiations between the king and parliament.[81]

This is supported by the fact that the Palatine cause was consistently represented in parliamentarian peace propositions between 1642-4. During the Oxford Negotiations in

[78] *Motives and reasons…*, pp.7-6 (irregular pagination); Nalson MS 18 ff. 456-7; *CJ*, III, 411.
[79] Braddick, *Fury*, p.347. Quotation from Mulligan, 'Peace', p.9 n.38.
[80] *LJ*, VI, 503.
[81] Mulligan, 'Peace' pp.8-9; C. Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1983), p.31; Thompson, 'Press', p.676.

winter 1642-3, the terms presented to Charles demanded that the king enter into a strict alliance with the European protestant princes. It was hoped that such an action would have the effect that his subjects 'will be much encouraged, in a Parliamentary Way, for Your Aid and Assistance, in restoring your Royal Sister and the Prince Elector to those Dignities and Dominions which belong unto them'.[82] As the Palatine Cause was promoted by parliamentarian negotiators at Oxford, and the elector had long felt that he would receive greater assistance from his uncle and parliament if he represented his interests to them in person, this invites the question of why Charles Louis did not travel to England prior to August 1644. Certainly, during the Oxford Negotiations, the popular press reported that the elector and his mother would shortly arrive in England and Roe attempted to persuade Elizabeth to travel to England as a mediator, claiming that 'some great lords' desired her presence and that there would be public joy if she came 'crowned and crowning with the olive branch'.[83] It is highly likely, therefore, that the most significant short-term development which influenced Charles Louis's decision to journey to England in summer 1644 was the victory of the combined Scottish and Parliamentarian force at Marston Moor on 2 July.

Although military historians of the Civil War declare unanimously that the royalist defeat marked the beginning of the end for the king's cause in northern England but was not decisive in terms of the overall war, this omniscient view of the conflict was not possessed by contemporaries who heard reports of the annihilation of 3,000 royalist

[82] *LJ*, V, 582.
[83] T.C., *Another famous victories obtained by his Excellencie the Earle of Essex. Against the Kings army, neer Reading, Oxford, Marlow and Healy…Also, His Majesties proceedings at Oxford, and the great preparations that are made there to entertain the Queen of Bohemia* ([London], 1642) [Unpaginated]; Strachan, *Roe*, p.269.

troops.[84] Certainly, accounts of the battle and the number of killed and captured royalist soldiers were published in the popular press and it was also suggested in a number of pamphlets that the king would now be forced to make peace.[85] It was reported in *The kingdome's weekly intelligencer,* that 'this unparalleled victory…(in all humane probability) will in consequence be a meanes, in short time to settle Peace and Truth in this land', and an account of the battle was included as an appendix in a pamphlet entreating the king to make peace with parliament.[86]

The timing of Charles Louis's journey also suggests that he anticipated that the king would soon make peace with parliament. News of Marston Moor had clearly reached the continent by early-August as the imperial field marshal Rudolf von Colloredo provided a summary of the battle, in which he blamed Rupert for the royalist defeat, in a letter to Wenzel Eusebius von Lobkowitz dated 6 August 1644.[87] As the elector's intention to depart for England was first reported in a letter dated 30 July 1644, it is likely that he had received an account of Marston Moor shortly beforehand and was emboldened by the decimation of the royalist forces and of the ignominious self-imposed exile of their commander, the earl of Newcastle.[88] The importance of the outcome of Marston Moor has

[84] M. Wanklyn and F. Jones, *A Military History of the English Civil War, 1642-1646: Strategy and Tactics* (Harlow, 2005), p.188; P. Young and R. Holmes, *The English Civil War: A Military History of the Three Civil Wars, 1642-1651* (London, 1974), p.202; J. Kenyon, *The Civil Wars of England* (London, 1988), p.109; P. Gaunt, *The English Civil War: A Military History* (London, 2014), pp.191-3.
[85] Anon, *A True relation of the late fight between the Parliament forces and Prince Rvbert, within four miles of Yorke* (London, 1644); W. Stewart, *A full relation of the late victory obtained (through Gods providence) by the forces under the command of General Lesley, the Lord Fairfax, and the Earl of Manchester* (London, 1644); L. Watson, *A more exact relation of the late battell neer York; fought by the English and Scotch forces, against Prince Rupert and the Marquess of Newcastle* (London, 1644); W.H., *A relation of the good successe of the Parliaments forces under the command of Generall Lesly, the Earl of Manchester, and the Lord Fairfax, against the forces commanded by Prince Rupert and the Earl of Newcastle on Hesham-Moore, on Thursday July 2. 1644* ([Cambridge], 1644).
[86] *The kingdomes weekly intelligencer,* LXII (2-9 July 1644), p.498; Anon, *A petition to the Kings Majesty. Also a glorious victory, certified in a briefe relation of the total routing of Prince Rupert. And the taking of all his ordnance, armes and ammunition, bagge and baggage* (London, 1644), pp.5-6.
[87] Rebitsch, *Fürstensohn,* p.37.
[88] SP 84/158 f.26; Young and Holmes, *Wars,* p.202.

been entirely overlooked in studies of the elector and his actions during the Civil War. Although parliament were robbed of an outright victory in the latter months of 1644 as a result of Essex's poor military judgement in his campaign in the south-west, as well as the earl of Manchester's reluctance to pursue a complete victory, the elector had already arrived in England by the time Essex's infantry surrendered on 2 September 1644. It is therefore likely that the outcome of Marston Moor informed Charles Louis's decision to travel to England so that he could ensure that the Palatine cause was represented in the anticipated peace negotiations. This was certainly suggested in the elector's *Motives,* which expressed a hope that 'God be pleased to send, first unto these Kingdomes, and afterwards, by their meanes, to himself and His Subject; full to deliverance, establishment, and Peace'.[89]

The Elector Palatine in England, 1644-49

As Charles Louis's *Motives* proclaimed the elector's commitment to the parliament's cause, it was understandable that rumours spread claiming that 'he will take up arms for the Parliament and doe anything they will have him doe'.[90] However, the existing scholarship argues that the young elector was little more than a wastrel who was 'content to put his convenience before his dignity' and live in decadent comfort in unoccupied royal palaces in the company of artists at the expense of Parliament until the Peace of Westphalia enabled him to return to his hereditary lands.[91] After all, Charles Louis fathered an illegitimate son during his time in England, and took an interest in

[89] *Motives*, p.4.
[90] Ibid., p.3; Quotation from Brilliana Harley to Colonel Harley, 8 Sept. 1644 in HMC, *Fourteenth Report, Appendix, Part II: The Manuscripts of His Grace The Duke of Portland, Volume III* (London, 1894), p.127.
[91] Wedgwood, *King's War*, p.589 and *Trial*, pp.167-8; Strachan, *Roe*, p.280; M. Hay, *The Winter Queen: Being the unhappy history of Elizabeth Stuart Electress Palatine Queen of Bohemia,* (London, 1910), p.408; J. Gorst-Williams, *Elizabeth, The Winter Queen* (London, 1976), p.165.

patronising scientific works and the publication of philosophical and political treatises.[92] However, far from remaining idle, the elector played a central role in co-ordinating the Palatine effort at the Westphalian congress, and was the parliament's primary source of information regarding the negotiations.[93]

It should be noted that Charles Louis actually intended to leave England in the months immediately following his arrival, once it became clear that the royalist defeat at Marston Moor would not bring the king to the negotiating table. The elector wished to travel to the assembly of Imperial Estates, which had been convened at Frankfurt in January 1643 to discuss the issues to be debated in the upcoming Westphalian peace negotiations. However, he was advised that, until France confirmed its intentions regarding the Palatinate, 'I feare this notion of yr journey would bee unseasonable'.[94] In the meantime, Charles Louis endeavoured to obtain a visible demonstration of English support for his cause in order to improve his bargaining position. This is evident from the *Motives*, in which the elector claimed he asked for such assistance 'as his Cold Friends may be heated thereby into more affection, and his Enemies cooled of their violence'.[95] However, the ongoing civil war meant that there was very little prospect of considerable military or diplomatic endeavours from Charles I's kingdoms to complement the Palatine efforts at Westphalia.

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[92] Wedgwood, *King's War*, pp.589-90. For works patronised by Charles Louis see: J. Wilkins, *Mathematicall magick, or, The vvonders that may be performed by mechanicall geometry in two books, concerning mechanicall povvers, motions, being one of the most easie, pleasant, usefull (and yet most neglected) part of mathematicks, not before treated of in this language* (London, 1648); Bod.: Rawlinson Letters 84c fol.214: Gerardus Johannes Vossius in Amsterdam to Charles Louis in London, 3 Jan. 1645.
[93] *LJ*, VIII, 15 and IX, 174-5. See: *The kingdomes weekly intelligencer*, CCII (23-30 Mar. 1647), p.474.
[94] Add MS 72434 f.11: Extract of several letters from Paris of the 7 October/27 September and 13/3 October 1644 to Charles Louis.
[95] *Motives*, p.4.

It was not until early-1646, after the surrender of the last royalist field army, that it was suggested to send an army to assist the Palatine cause in Germany. The *Moderate Intelligencer* proposed sending 10,000 Scots and 'as many English, which may be spared' in early-April 1646, and Thomas Juxon reported the following February that Alexander Leslie had offered 8,000 Scottish troops for Charles Louis's service.[96] The elector himself refrained from raising his family's cause with parliament until March 1647, as he 'had too certain Knowledge that the Distractions of this Kingdom, and of the Kingdom of Scotland, have for some Years been such as have wholly disabled them to undertake and do any Thing' in the interests of the Palatine family. However, as Charles Louis faced the real threat of exclusion from the European peace negotiations, he dispatched a number of papers to the House of Lords on 25 March which detailed developments in the Westphalian peace negotiations which were, according to the elector, 'infinitely to the Prejudice of the Protestants'.[97]

In addition, a number of foreign ambassadors claimed in spring 1647 that Charles Louis was in negotiations with Cromwell and other senior officers to transport veterans of the New Model Army to the battle fields of Germany.[98]Although the elector's business was not discussed in the English parliament until 4 May, the delay can be attributed to the heightened tensions between parliament and the army in March and April 1647 rather than because, in the words of the Venetian ambassador, 'Parliament was not disposed to satisfy him'.[99] However, the disputes between the army and parliament in summer 1647, and the eventual outbreak of the Second Civil War in early-1648, precluded any significant British

[96] J. Dillingham (ed.), *The Moderate Intelligencer* (237 vols., London, 1645-9), LVI (26 Mar. – 2 Apr. 1646), p.367; Lindley and Scott, *Juxon*, p.148.
[97] *LJ*, IX, 174-5.
[98] Gardiner, *Civil War*, III, pp.222-3.
[99] Ibid., 115; R. Ashton, *Counter-Revolution: The Second Civil War and its Origins, 1646-8* (London, 1994), p.170; *CSPV: 1647-52*, 311.

military assistance for the Palatine cause at a time when it could have made a decisive impact on the Westphalian peace negotiations.

This is not to say that Charles Louis was unable to procure any military capital during his tenure in England. In late-1647, the elector petitioned parliament to provide troops to serve under his brother, Philip.[100] The youngest Palatine prince had recently entered Venetian service after killing the Marquis d'Espinay, a rakish admirer of the Winter Queen and her daughters, and fleeing The Hague in June 1646.[101] By seeking military employment, Philip was embarking on a typical career for younger sons of noble families, and service against the Ottomans in defence of Christianity was seen as especially honourable. However, it should be noted that Charles Louis wished that 'either my brother Rupert or Maurice would undertake the Venetian employment' as Philip was 'very young to undertake such a task'.[102] By the end of the following year, almost one thousand men were transported to Corfu to serve under Philip.[103] However, parliament's generosity in this instance was undoubtedly self-serving, as it provided a convenient means of disposing of royalist prisoners. Four days after the battle of St Fagans on 8 May 1648, parliament declared that one third of the 3,000 captives taken in the battle would be removed to Italy and placed under the command of the elector's brother.[104]

Charles Louis was more successful in obtaining financial assistance. It should be noted that the elector waited almost six months before dispatching the MP James

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[100] *CSPV: 1647-52*, 43; *The Moderate Intelligencer,* CLXII (20-27 Apr 1648), p.1292; *LJ*, X, 220-1, 180.
[101] A. von Rohr, 'Die Pfalz-Kinder: Timon, Le Diable, Willful Ned, Signora Antica, Mademoiselle sans façon und die Sucessio britannica', in P. Wolf et al., (eds.), *Der Winterkönig – Friedrich von der Pfalz: Bayern und Europa im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart, 2003), p.212; Oman, p.365.
[102] Bromley, pp.136-7.
[103] *CSPV: 1647-52*, 43; *The Moderate Intelligencer,* CLXII (20-27 Apr. 1648), p.1292; *LJ*, X, 180, 220-1, 253
[104] *The Moderate Intelligencer*, CLXVI (18-25 May 1648), p.1349; *LJ*, X, 253; *CJ, V,* 564; *CSPV: 1647-52,* 78

Harrington to the House of Commons on 21 February 1645 to present a remonstrance, demonstrating that the funds granted by parliament between 29 September 1640 and 29 September 1644 were £35,800 in arrears.[105] This action, together with the declaration that the elector would be required to finance a delegation to represent his interests at the Westphalian peace congress, resulted in parliament awarding Charles Louis a grant of £1,000 four days later.[106] In September 1645, at a time when Sir Robert Honywood was despairing that 'we have not been able to procure a penny for that Queen [of Bohemia]', it was reported that Parliament was to grant Charles Louis an allowance of £8,000 per annum.[107] The provision of this pension, £2,000 of which was to be levied on the king's revenue and the remainder raised from sequestered estates of 'notorious delinquents', drew contemporary comment, with Honywood declaring that 'some have been at gaze to see his Highness's success'.[108] In 1646, Charles Louis's secretary informed the Palatine representative at Osnabrück that his master's continued residence in London was an attempt to ensure the payment of these generous sums.[109] The elector repeated this sentiment in a letter to his mother in April 1648, claiming that 'neither doe I know att this time where I should be better, for I would rather be beholding to those that have never disobliged me…for my maintenance, then to France, or any others that have wronged me'.[110]

The elector's pension may have been in arrears of £6,500 by March 1649 but this means that, after almost three and a half years, he had received over £21,000 from

[105] *CJ*, III, 614; *LJ*, VI, 693; MS Nalson 18 f. 457.
[106] MS Nalson 18 ff. 456-7; *CJ*, IV, 58, 61-2.
[107] SP 16/510 f.185: Sir Robert Honywood at Charing Cross to Sir Henry Vane the Elder, 9 Sept. 1645; C.H. Firth and R.S. Rait (eds.), *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-60* (3 vols., London, 1911), I, 784-6.
[108] Firth and Rait, *Acts*, I, 784-5.
[109] Clm: no.117: Johan Jacob Frays in London to Camerarius, Apr. 1646.
[110] V&A: Forster 39 ff.51v-52: Charles Louis to Elizabeth, 7 Apr. 1648.

Parliament.[111] Nevertheless, the irregular payment of his pension, as well as the expenses incurred from funding the Palatine delegations to Münster and Osnabrück, meant that Charles Louis still encountered considerable financial difficulties.[112] In October 1648, the elector informed his mother that he could not afford to pay the wages owed to one Palatine servant as 'if I should once open that gappe, I should want for my owne dayly subsistence, as well as for those that serve me'.[113]

Charles Louis was only able to obtain assistance for the Palatine family when parliament was in a position to oblige him and the elector's attempts to secure money for his family on the continent were tempered by a concern not to alienate the parliament and make them unwilling to provide for his cause. Certainly, the elector's correspondence suggests that, both before and after Elizabeth's parliamentary pension was reintroduced in 1646, his petitions to parliament to secure financial assistance for his mother were rarely successful and, on one occasion, 'hath caused me the hatred of those persons who were touched by it'.[114] Having to act with caution within the constraints of what parliament was able and willing to provide helps to explain why the elector earned a reputation of doing nothing during his time in England between 1644 and 1649.

Once it became apparent to the elector that he had misjudged the timing of his arrival in England, he could do little else except manage his affairs as best he could until a reconciliation between the king and parliament offered the possibility of a concerted English diplomatic or military effort in Europe. As such an endeavour had been one of the

[111] *CJ*, VI, 154-5.
[112] MS Tanner 58 fols. 554, 755: Charles Louis at Richmond to William Lenthall, 21 Oct. 1647 and 14 Mar. 1648.
[113] TS 23/1/30: Charles Louis to Elizabeth, 20 Oct. 1648.
[114] *CJ*, IV, 519; *LJ*, VIII, 280. Bromley, pp. 129-31. See also TS 23/1/30: Charles Louis to Elizabeth, 20 Oct. 1648.

parliamentarian demands in the peace negotiations at Oxford and Uxbridge, it is most likely that Charles Louis's request to visit the king at Caversham in early-July 1647 was motivated by a desire to secure his uncle's support for a similar scheme in any peace agreement with parliament.[115] It should also be noted that the elector attended Charles at Hampton Court on 7 September 1647, the same day that the king received a revised version of the Newcastle Propositions.[116] Ultimately, however, the eventual Palatine restoration facilitated by the Peace of Westphalia owed nothing to Charles Louis's efforts in England between 1644 and 1649.

England and the Palatine Cause, 1642-48

Whereas the Palatine exiles had been a *cause celebre* during the 1620s, the lack of military and diplomatic support from the English parliament, which had vocally called for intervention in Germany, made it appear as though they had little interest in obliging Charles Louis's appeals by the mid-1640s. Such an apparent change in attitude towards the Palatine family suggests that interest and support for their cause dwindled as their exile persisted, supporting Toby Osborne's assertion that the political capital of a dispossessed regime or ruler inevitably declined over time.[117] However, this section will demonstrate that, whilst the actions of the three eldest Palatine brothers during the civil war did sour the attitudes of some Englishmen towards their family, the issue of the Palatinate was still regarded by many on the parliamentarian side as an important aspect of the European Protestant cause.

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[115] *LJ*, IX, 312.
[116] T. Herbert, *Memoirs of the last two years of the reign of king Charles I*, 3rd edn (London, 1815), pp.42-3; *CJ*, V, 232; Anon, *A declaration of the engagements, remonstrances, representations, proposals, desires and resolutions from His Excellency Sir Tho: Fairfax, and the generall councel of the Army* (London, 1647), p.146.
[117] T. Osborne, 'A Queen Mother in Exile: Marie de Médicis in the Spanish Netherlands and England, 1631-41', in P. Mansel and T. Riotte (eds.), *Monarchy and Exile: The Politics of Legitimacy from Marie de Médicis to Wilhelm II* (Basingstoke, 2011), p.30.

As senior officers in the king's forces, Rupert and Maurice were severely castigated in the parliamentarian press. Although Jayne Boys makes the remarkable claim that depictions of Rupert in popular print during the civil war made an almost tongue-in-cheek reference to his actions in the context of the plight of the Palatine family, such an interpretation ignores the wealth of material devoted to Rupert's black reputation.[118] There were certainly sarcastic observations that 'Prince Rupert is grown so famous for pillaging of Waggons: he is like to be called into Germany to be a Generall', and that his supposed thefts of plate and jewels was 'a strange way to Recrute the Palatinate'.[119] However, the vast majority of portrayals of Rupert in parliamentarian pamphlets promoted his reputation as 'Prince Robber', particularly following the sack of Birmingham in April 1643 and the massacre at Bolton the following May.[120]

The two royalist Palatine princes were depicted as deserving merciless retribution for betraying their family's cause, their Calvinist faith, and the parliamentarians who had championed a Palatine restitution since the 1620s. In particular, Rupert was accused of being an 'ungratefull Viper', having 'stung to death those that formerly preserv'd thy life', and that he deserved 'to have his flesh torne off his backe with hot Pincers as they do in

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[118] J.E.E. Boys, *London News Press and the Thirty Years War* (Woodbridge, 2011), p.259; M. Stoyle, *The Black Legend of Prince Rupert's Dog: Witchcraft and Propaganda during the English Civil War* (Exeter, 2011).

[119] H. Blunden (ed.), *Speciall passages and certain information from severall places* (44 vols., London, 1642-3), XXXV (4-11 Apr. 1643), p.288; Anon, *An answer to Mercurius Aulicus: or, His communicated intelligence from the court to the rest of the Kingdome: faithfully trased through, to undisceive those who love the truth. The forty ninth weeke, ending December. 9.* (London, 1643), p.4.

[120] Braddick, *Fury*, pp.266, 397; R. Andrewes, *A perfect declaration of the barbarous and cruell practises committed by Prince Robert, the Cavailliers, and others in His Majesties army, from the time of the Kings going from his Parliament until this present day* (London, 1642); *Mercurius Cambro-Britannus* (9 vols., London, 1643-4), V (20-27 Nov. 1643), p.2; Anon, *An exact relation of the bloody and barbarous massacre at Bolton in the moors in Lancashire, May 28. By Prince Rupert* (London, 1644); Anon, *Englands wolfe with eagles clawes or the cruell impieties of bloud-thirsty royalists, and blasphemous anti-parliamentarians, under the command of the imhumane Prince Rupert, Digby, and the rest* (London, 1646).

France, to the greatest Traitors'.[121] The anonymous author of *An answer to Prince Ruperts declaration* also suggested that Rupert's conduct in the civil war destroyed any sympathy for the Palatine family. In particular, the writer claimed that 'the people's goodness alone made them give to the Queen of Bohemia so many great and free contributions…and now you have not only taken away their wills but their means of ever doing the like'.[122]

It should be noted that the elector was also lampooned in a number of bawdy satires, from both parliamentarian and royalist writers, as a hypocrite who was content to live off the revenues of sequestered estates and parliamentary finance without assisting their cause.[123] However, the most blatant demonstration of declining sympathy for the Palatine family amongst the English populace occurred in early 1646, when one Isaac Tully presented the Sheriffs of London with a writ to arrest Charles Louis for debt. Not only did this incident prompt the Commons to summon Tully as a delinquent, but it was also deemed necessary to nominate a committee to examine the whole business and compose an ordinance 'to prevent any Proceedings against the Person of the Prince Elector'.[124] Although the generosity of Englishmen to the Palatine cause during the supposed 'halcyon days' of the 1630s prompted Sir Francis Windebank's observation that 'there is blood enough in the King's subjects, if the right vein be opened', by 1646 the population had been drained by four years of fiscal-, as well as physical, blood-letting by both sides.[125] It is unsurprising, therefore, that Charles Louis alienated some Englishmen,

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[121] Anon, *A nest of perfidious vipers: or, The second part of the Parliaments kalender of black saints* (London, 1644), p.5; *The kingdomes weekly intelligencer*, LXVIII (14-20 Aug. 1644), p.549.
[122] Anon, *An answer to Prince Ruperts declaration* (London, 1643), p.2.
[123] H. Neville, *The Ladies Parliament* (London, 1647), [Unpaginated]; Anon, *Lex talionis. Or, A declamation against Mr Challener* (London, 1647), p.8.
[124] *CJ*, IV, 500, 588, 592-3.
[125] *CSPD: 1633-4*, 90; M. Braddick, *The Nerves of State: Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558-1714* (Manchester, 1996), pp.95-101, 115; D. Pennington, 'The War and the People' and R. Hutton, 'The Royalist War Effort', in J.S. Morrill (ed.), *Reactions to the English Civil War, 1642-1649* (London, 1982), at pp.127-8 and p.59 respectively.

who had not already lost sympathy for the Palatines due to the conduct and reputation of Rupert and Maurice, as a result of his being an expensive, and apparently unproductive, guest of parliament.

Despite assertions made in popular print, it is clear that not all members of the Palatine Family were tarnished by the allegiance and actions of Rupert and Maurice. This was evident from the debates in the Commons on 17 August 1644, when the question of whether Charles Louis's restoration should be extended to his two younger brothers was first raised.[126] The peace propositions presented to the king at Uxbridge in December 1644, included demands for royal assent to assisting in Charles Louis's restitution, 'provided that this extend not to Prince Rupert, or Prince Maurice, who have been the Instruments of so much Bloodshed and Mischiefs'.[127] It is also important to note that the Directory of Worship, introduced in January 1645 to replace the Book of Common Prayer, called for prayers 'for the comforting of the afflicted Queen of Bohemia, sister to our Soveraign, and for the restitution and establishment of the illustrious Prince Charles, Elector Palatine of the Rhene, to all his Dominions and Dignities'.[128] Such an inclusion was an explicit demonstration of parliament's support for the Palatine cause. Indeed, the litany of the 1633 Book of Common Prayer had been far less explicit, asking only to bless and preserve Elizabeth and her issue, and all mention of the Palatine family had been removed when the 1642 edition was published.[129]

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[126] *CJ*, III, 596, 639.
[127] *CJ*, IV, 360.
[128] Westminster Assembly, *A directory for the publique worship of God, throughout the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland together with an ordinance of Parliament for the taking away of the Book of common-prayer* (London, 1645), p.22. See also C.B. van Dixhoorn, B. Chad, D.F. Wright, M.A.Garcia, J.A. Halcomb and I. Jones (eds.), *The minutes and papers of the Westminster Assembly, 1643-1652* (5 vols., Oxford, 2012), V, 93.
[129] Church of England, *The booke of common prayer* (London, 1633) [Unpaginated] and *The book of common prayer and administration of the sacraments* (London, 1642) [Unpaginated].

The treatment of Charles Louis during his stay in England also shows that parliament still regarded him highly as a prominent Protestant prince. For example, the elector was allowed to attend the gallery at Saint Martin's Church in Westminster, typically reserved for MPs, and granted permission to sit at the Westminster Assembly of Divines, with a number of contemporary accounts stating that he was often present during discussions.[130] One member of the assembly, Dr Cornelius Burges, described Charles Louis as 'a high borne prince soe well deserving of all the Christian world'.[131] Parliament also fiercely countered any attempts to besmirch the young prince's honour. After a sexually scandalous tract featuring Charles Louis was produced in late-1644, a committee of Lords and MPs was assembled in his lodgings 'for the Examination of a Scandal and Wrong, of a high Nature, put upon his Highness the Prince Elector Palatine, with other Persons of Honour'.[132] When it was finally decided in April 1645 that the author, John Griffith, should be brought to trial 'for scandalising the Prince Elector, and the Lady Herbert', Sir Simonds D'Ewes launched a passionate defence of Charles Louis's character to the Commons.[133] However, the most significant demonstration of parliament's continued esteem for the elector and the Palatine cause is the large pension he received in October 1645. Despite being a non-combatant, who had not suffered in the course of the civil war, Charles Louis was awarded an annual pension of £8,000, only £2,000 less than that awarded to the earl of Essex, the commander-in-chief of the parliamentarian forces who 'hath been plundered, robbed, and spoiled, of his Goods and Estates amounting to a great Value'.[134] It should also be noted that parliament made great efforts to pay the arrears

[130] *CJ*, III, 675, 686; Lindley and Scott, *Juxon*, p.62; J.R. Pitman (ed.), *The whole works of the Rev. John Lightfoot, D.D.: Master of Catharine Hall, Cambridge* (13 vols., London, 1822-1825), XIII, pp.323-5.
[131] van Dixhoorn et al., *Westminster Assembly*, III, 429.
[132] *LJ*, VII, 81.
[133] *CJ*, IV, 101; J. McGee, *An Industrious Mind: The Worlds of Sir Simonds D'Ewes* (Stanford, 2015), p.490; BL: Harleian MS 166, fo. 198v: Defence of Elector Palatine, 5 Apr. 1645.
[134] *LJ*, VI, 64.

of Charles Louis's pension upon his departure to the continent, and it appears that the £6,500 deficit was paid off by March 1650.[135]

Conclusion

When Charles Louis returned to the continent in March 1649, it appeared that his time in England had been fruitless except to earn him a reputation as a selfish intruder into the affairs of his uncle's kingdom, an impression shared by numerous contemporaries and promoted in subsequent scholarly works. However, this chapter has demonstrated that the elector's actions between 1642 and 1649 were driven primarily by short term developments in both the British and continental wars, as well as the emerging peace talks at Westphalia which presented the very real possibility of the permanent exclusion of the Palatine family from the empire. The reactive nature of Palatine policy reflected the precarious situation and limited agency of exiled regimes. The apparent familial disloyalty displayed by Charles Louis in his adherence to parliament also highlights the conflict between dynastic obligations and private political interests which often complicated the foreign policies of ruling dynasties in early modern Europe. Just as the works of Peter Edwards and Mark Stoyle have sought to place the conflict within a wider geographical context through works on the European arms trade and foreign soldiers in the English Civil War, a study of the Elector Palatine's motivations during these years further demonstrates that this contained war should not be viewed in isolation.[136]

Just as previous chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that the *Pfalzfrage* remained an important and contentious issue throughout the Thirty Years' War, an

[135] *CJ*, VI, 154-5, 312, 374.
[136] P. Edwards, *Dealing in death: the arms trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638-52* (Stroud, 2000); M. Stoyle, *Soldiers and strangers: an ethnic history of the English Civil War* (London, 2005).

examination of the reception of the Palatine cause in England during the civil war period similarly shows that the issue of Charles Louis's restitution had not become a political insignificance by the 1640s. The reverence shown to the elector as a Protestant prince, the repeated championing of a Palatine restoration in peace proposals, as well as the generous financial assistance bestowed by parliament, demonstrate that the issue of the Palatinate was still regarded as being of great importance in Britain, as well as amongst the negotiating parties at Westphalia.

Chapter 5: The Palatinate and the Westphalian Peace Negotiations

In a 1645 lampoon of the Westphalian peace negotiations, in which the assembled plenipotentiaries are depicted dancing for better bargaining positions, the Palatine cause is represented by the tomb of the late Frederick V, which can be glimpsed behind partially-drawn drapes in a dark corner.[1] This visual characterisation neatly encapsulates how the Palatine cause has appeared in accounts of the peace congress. Most scholars argue that, whilst the fate of the Palatine lands, titles and offices was the most divisive issue debated at Münster and Osnabrück, the 'Palatine question' became merely a bargaining chip in the intrigues of more powerful states.[2] Such an interpretation is unsurprising. The *Pfalzfrage* was only admitted for debate at the general peace talks at the insistence of states such as Sweden and France, and was an area of contention not only between opposing belligerents, but also between purported allies, many of whom had their individual preferences for the fate of the Palatinate. In addition, Charles Louis continued to reside in London instead of returning to promote his cause at the peace talks, and there were no representatives for the Palatine family amongst the signatories of the Peace of Osnabrück which confirmed their partial restoration.[3] As a result, the involvement of the Palatine exiles in the Westphalian peace negotiations has been largely ignored by historians of the Thirty Years' War.

However, the suggestion that the Palatine family stood idly by whilst greater powers dictated their future is not supported by contemporary sources. Through the use of

[1] 'Groß Europisch Kriegs-Balet' in J.R. Paas, *The German Political Broadsheet 1600-1700*, (14 vols., Wiesbaden, 1985-2017), VII, p.307.
[2] Steiner, p.179; D. Albrecht, 'Bayern und die pfälzische Frage auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreß', in H. Durchhardt (ed.), *Der Westfälische Friede. Diplomatie – politische Zäsur – kulturelles Umfeld – Rezeptionsgeschichte* (Munich, 1998), p.463; P.H. Wilson, 'Dynasty, Constitution, and Confession: The Role of Religion in the Thirty Years War', *IHR*, 30/3 (2008), p.509.
[3] K. Repgen, 'Die Hauptprobleme der Westfälischen Friedensverhandlungen von 1648 und ihre Lösungen' in *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgechichte*, 62 (1999), p.420; D. Croxton, *Peacemaking in Early Modern Europe: Cardinal Mazarin and the Congress of Westphalia, 1643-1648* (London, 1999), pp.51-2.

previously overlooked correspondence of the Palatines and their representatives at Münster and Osnabrück, this chapter will examine their participation at the peace negotiations between 1645 and the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia in October 1648. The first section will address the Palatine involvement at the congress, examining their actions in the months preceding the conference, their contribution to the process of negotiations, as well as the difficulties they faced in championing their cause. The second part will assess the peace articles which facilitated the Palatine family's restoration after almost three decades of exile, as well as determining their reaction to these terms. Finally, it will be demonstrated that the Palatine biographers' interpretation of the Peace of Westphalia as a defeat requires reassessment. Whilst the family's experience of the Thirty Years' War was unquestionably catastrophic, with the titles, dignities, and much of the land confiscated in the early 1620s being permanently lost, the partial restitution received by Charles Louis in 1648 should be regarded as a victory in itself.

The Palatine Family at Westphalia: Objectives and Strategies

Unsurprisingly, the efforts of the Palatine family at Westphalia were directed towards obtaining the full recovery of Frederick's lands and titles.[4] Throughout the congress, Charles Louis and his representatives asserted that a full Palatine restoration was essential to ensure a peaceful balance between Catholics and Protestants within the Electoral College, and the young prince expressed hostility at any suggestion of a compromise with Bavaria.[5] However, the prospect that Charles Louis would receive all of his late father's territories, titles and offices was out of the question. Not only was the emperor adamant that any resolution to the *Pfalzfrage* should not entail a full restoration,

[4] Hauck, p.80.
[5] SP 81/53 f.267: Charles Louis at The Hague to Charles I, 15/25 June 1643; Clm: nos. 4, 117: Philipp Streuff von Lauenstein at Münster to Joachim Camerarius , 3/13 June 1645 and Johan Jacob Frays in London to Camerarius, [?] Apr. 1646.

but the Palatine family lacked the resources which would have enabled them to press for such terms.[6] The young elector lacked an armed force which could improve his negotiating position through victory on the battlefield, and any attempt to draw such a force away from their current employer risked alienating a potential ally. For example, when it was suggested that Charles Louis try to secure the command of the Weimarian army in France, he feared that he would lose French support at Westphalia if he attempted to do so.[7] The Palatine family also lacked the financial means with which even politically weak states, such as Portugal, attempted to influence the diplomacy of other powers.[8]

It is likely, therefore, that Charles Louis believed that if the *Pfalzfrage* was admitted for discussion at a general peace congress, his family's allies from within and outside of the empire could exercise diplomatic pressure on other participants to improve the chances of a recovery of his father's lands and titles in their entirety.[9] The Palatine family's reliance on the diplomatic support of other states at Westphalia was demonstrated by their attempts to canvas support from other European powers and their delegates, especially before Ferdinand III allowed the Imperial Estates to participate in the congress in 1645. For example, the Venetian ambassador to Münster reported in November 1643 that 'two letters have come from Holland, one from the Princess Palatine and the other from the Prince, her son, both recommending his interests at the congress'.[10]

[6] Ferdinand III's secret instructions to Count Trauttmannsdorff, 16 Oct. 1645 in *Sourcebook*, p.286.
[7] SP 81/54 ff.9-10: Charles Louis at The Hague to Sir Thomas Roe, 7/17 Mar. 1644.
[8] D. Croxton, *Westphalia: The Last Christian Peace* (New York, 2013), p.169; P. Cardim, '"Portuguese Rebels" at Münster. The Diplomatic Self-Fashioning in mid-17th Century European Politics', in Durchhardt, *Der Westfälische Friede*, pp.303, 311.
[9] SP 81/53 ff.210, 234, 253, 282, 334: Charles Louis to Roe, 30 Mar./9 Apr., 27 Apr./7 May, 25 May/4 June, 6/16 July, 21 Sept./1 Oct. 1643.
[10] *CSPV: 1643-47*, 43.

Charles Louis sought to exploit his family's dynastic connections to secure additional support, asking Charles I to press for a full Palatine restitution at Westphalia by sending 'substantiall letters…to France, Denmarke, Sweden, and ye rest of the Princes and States of eyther Party, that send to ye said Treatye; and to their [ambassadors] imployed therein'.[11] In addition to petitioning other states for their support at the negotiations, the Palatines also attempted to curry favour with individual negotiators whom they believed would be able to advance their cause. In summer 1644, Charles Louis asked a contact in the House of Commons to procure a pass so that one of the French plenipotentiaries, Abel Servien, could transport 'halfe a dozen English horses' to the continent. The young elector claimed that he was 'very desirous to gratfie [Servien] herein, considering the particular respects, he hath shewed to me, and my Family…and the eminent Imployment he now hath, wherein he promised me all assistance for my interests'.[12]

English diplomatic and financial help had always been key to any potential Palatine restitution. Indeed, Sir Thomas Roe drew up a document of three propositions for the recovery of the Palatinate in May 1642, each of which required considerable English diplomatic intervention and financial assistance, and it initially appeared that the king would provide such aid during the Westphalian negotiations.[13] Charles expressed a willingness to provide the sizeable monetary sums required to pay off Maximilian of Bavaria and secure the Upper Palatinate for his nephew, and requested that Roe should produce letters to the other participants of the congress which would 'be most for the

[11] SP 81/53 f.267.
[12] Bod.: MS Nalson 23 f.199: Charles Louis to James Harrington, 23 June/3 July 1644.
[13] SP 16/490 f.156: Three separate propositions [designed by Sir Thos. Roe] for restitution of the Palatinate, 20 May 1642; SP 81/53 f.282: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 6/16 July 1643.

advancement of the Pr: Electors Cause'.[14] The absence of England from the negotiating table was therefore a particular blow to Palatine hopes.

Although the Palatine family were heavily dependent on the influence of more powerful states, this did not mean that they left their cause solely in the hands of other powers. In April 1644, Charles Louis received a letter from a French plenipotentiary which insisted that he send representatives to the congress cities, claiming that 'you shall hereafter enjoy such fortunes, as you shall make yourselves, communicating your counsels with us in this Senate of the Christian world'.[15] In addition, an imperial envoy reported the presence of one of Charles Louis's secretaries in Münster in July 1644, almost six months before Ferdinand III permitted the diet of the Imperial Estates to relocate from Frankfurt to Westphalia as observers in January 1645, and almost a year before the Palatine delegations were dispatched to Münster and Osnabrück.[16]

Once the emperor allowed the estates to attend the general peace discussions, there was the issue of how the three colleges of the imperial diet would be divided between Münster, where the Spanish-Dutch talks and negotiations between France and the empire were taking place, and Osnabrück, the venue of the talks with Sweden. The three colleges of the Imperial Diet were ultimately divided into five. The electoral *Kurfürstenrat* met as a group in Münster, and the colleges of the Imperial Princes and that of the Imperial Cities, the *Fürstenrat* and *Städtkollegium* respectively, were each divided between Münster and

[14] SP 81/53 ff.216, 300: Charles I at Oxford to Roe, 7 Apr. 1643 and Sir Edward Nicholas to Roe, 31 July 1643.
[15] Add MS 4155: Thurloe Papers vol. I, 206: Comte d'Avaux to Charles Louis, 6 Apr. 1644.
[16] *APW III C 2,1: Diarium Volmar, 1. Teil: 1643*-1647, 165.

Osnabrück along broadly confessional lines. However, although this was mitigated by the fact that major powers, including the electors, sent envoys to both venues.[17]

This was the approach taken by the Palatine exiles, with Charles Louis dispatching a delegating team to each of the congress cities in early-May 1645. The ailing Philipp Streuff von Lauenstein, who had played a key role in concluding the Treaty of Paris between the Heilbronn League, Sweden and France in November 1634, was dispatched to Münster. To press his interests at Osnabrück, Charles Louis sent Dr Jonas Meisterlin, a servant of his uncle Ludwig Philipp who had represented the Palatine cause at the diet of Regensburg in the early-1640s, and was a replacement for the recently-deceased Dr Konrad Spina, who Charles Louis had originally intended to send to Westphalia.[18] The Palatines also dispatched Joachim Camerarius to Osnabrück. The son of Frederick V's former adviser, Camerarius had been in Swedish service since 1631 and was one of Queen Christina's royal councillors from 1637.[19] It was undoubtedly hoped that the employment of an individual with such strong connections to both the Palatinate and Sweden would bolster Swedish support for Charles Louis's cause at the peace talks.

The Palatine Family at Westphalia: Obstacles and Difficulties

Bavaria

The greatest obstacle facing the Palatine cause during the Westphalian negotiations was the influence of Bavaria, whose satisfaction was important to a number of powers at the peace congress. In addition to Bavaria's position as a significant military ally of the emperor, the Treaty of Munich of 1619 had obliged the Austrian Habsburgs to refund

[17] Croxton, *Westphalia*, pp.202-3; *Tragedy*, p.674.
[18] SP 16/497 f.3: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 2/12 Jan. 1643; SP 81/52 f.110: Ludwig Philipp in Meisenheim to Roe, 13/23 Sept. 1641; *CSPV: 1640-42*, 138.
[19] Akkerman, II, 635.

Maximilian's military costs 'with their property and lands'.[20] Accordingly, the emperor's own territory of Upper Austria, which had been transferred to Bavaria by Ferdinand II in February 1621, together with any captured enemy territory, were to be held in pawn until their expenses were settled. Although Ferdinand III attempted to put together a consortium to raise the 13 million florins owed by the mid-1640s, such a sum was insurmountable.[21] On the other hand, permanently granting Maximilian and his descendants the Palatine electoral title and associated territories offered the emperor a convenient means of settling the debt without having to surrender his own family's lands.[22] However, some anti-Habsburg powers, such as France, also had a vested interest in Bavarian satisfaction. The need of several opposing parties at Westphalia to satisfy Maximilian only strengthened the Bavarian bargaining position and further entrenched their intransigence. For example, in early-1647, Maximilian's representatives rejected all attempts by Sweden to reduce their master's demands for the entire Upper Palatinate, claiming that they would not give up a single village in the territory.[23]

Although Bavarian possession of the traditional Palatine electoral dignity and lands had been confirmed by the Peace of Prague of May 1635, the prospect of a general peace treaty placed the issue in flux once again. Accordingly, Maximilian initially strove to prevent the *Pfalzfrage* from being admitted for discussion at the general peace negotiations at Westphalia, hoping instead that the issue would be resolved at the imperial deputation at Frankfurt.[24] In September 1643 the Venetian ambassador in Frankfurt reported the great

[20] *Sourcebook*, pp.57-8. See especially articles III and V.
[21] Albrecht, 'Bayern', pp.464-5.
[22] F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden,* 2nd edn (Münster, 1965), p.27; K. Repgen, 'Die Westfälischen Friedensverhandlungen. Überblick und Haputprobleme', in K. Bussmann and H. Schilling (eds.), *1648: War and Peace in Europe* (3 vols., Münster, 1998), I, p.362.
[23] *APW III C 3.2: Diarium Wartenberg, 2. Teil: 1647-1648,* 807; Clm: no.245: Camerarius in Osnabrück to Streuff von Lauenstein, 11/21 Feb. 1647.
[24] SP 81/53 ff.355-6: Memorial of Charles Louis for Roe, 2/12 Nov. 1643; Hauck, p.80.

influence of Bavaria on the gathered Imperial Estates, and that Maximilian 'refuses absolutely to allow that the Palatinate shall be discussed in the general congress at Münster…Bavaria wishes that affair to be dealt with separately'.[25] As the ambassador observed, Bavaria hoped to have the issue resolved in an Imperial Diet, where they would hold considerable sway, rather than at a general peace congress in which the Palatine cause would likely be supported by states such as Denmark, Sweden, and even France.[26]

Recognition

Although the emperor finally agreed to allow the Imperial Estates actively to participate in the Westphalian negotiations on 29 August 1645, there was no guarantee that the Palatine representatives would be accepted as legitimate delegates by the other negotiating powers, including their apparent supporters. The diary of François Ogier, the chaplain to the Comte d'Avaux, recorded that the French delegation encountered Charles Louis's representative on the road to Münster in May 1645, but did not provide any form of reception 'as his master was not in possession of the Electorate'.[27] Any refutation of Charles Louis's professed title by his fellow electors could hamstring his delegates' diplomatic efforts, as they would not have been able openly to negotiate with representatives of the Imperial Princes and Imperial Cities due to the rigid order of precedence of the three constituent colleges of an Imperial Diet.[28] Such concerns were acknowledged by the Palatine delegates. Streuff von Lauenstein wrote to Camerarius in June 1645 that, so long as the representative from Brandenburg recognised Charles Louis as an elector, Camerarius would be able to claim the title of 'excellency' which was to be

[25] *CSPV: 1643-47*, 20.
[26] Ibid.
[27] F. Ogier, *Journal du Congrès de Munster, publ. par A. Boppe* (Paris, 1893), p.121.
[28] Hauck, p.78; Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.150.

given to the primary representatives of the electors at the negotiations.[29] Charles Louis was ultimately acknowledged as 'elector' for the duration of the negotiations, albeit on the understanding that the title would have no legal basis if no agreement was reached at Westphalia.[30]

Uncertain Allies

In spite of the lack of an English delegation, the states represented at the peace talks included numerous anti-Habsburgs, co-religionists, and even Charles Louis's extended family. In September 1643, William Curtius claimed to the Venetian ambassador to Münster that 'the interests of the Palatine are supported by the general body of the Electors and Princes, and are only contested by the duke of Bavaria'.[31] A similar report was made two years later by Walter Strickland, the parliamentarian representative at The Hague, who claimed that 'I hear from good Hands, that not only France and Sweden, but most of the Princes of Germany, declare themselves favourable for the Interests of the Elector's Family'.[32] However, the reports received in London of the extent of support for Charles Louis's cause at Westphalia, let alone a full Palatine restoration, were extraordinarily optimistic as almost every participant had a vested interest in the solution of the *Pfalzfrage*.[33]

Both Streuff von Lauenstein and Camerarius were aware of a need to proceed with caution to prevent alienating any potential allies.[34] Charles Louis could not even be certain

[29] Clm: no.2: Streuff von Lauenstein at Münster to Camerarius, 2 June 1645; *Tragedy*, p.672; Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.150.
[30] Schaab, II, 123.
[31] *CSPV: 1643-47*, 20.
[32] Quoted in *LJ*, VIII, 15.
[33] Repgen, 'Friedensverhandlungen', p.362.
[34] Clm: nos.4, 241: Streuff von Lauenstein at Münster to Camerarius, 3/13 June 1645 and Camerarius in Osnabrück to Streuff von Lauenstein, 1/11 Mar. 1647.

of the support of his fellow Protestant electors at the negotiations. Although Brandenburg would become the most significant proponent of the Palatine cause amongst the Imperial Estates, Johann Georg of Saxony emphatically supported the proposal for Bavaria to retain the Upper Palatinate in lieu of the vast sums owed by the emperor.[35] Such an arrangement would help to legitimate Saxon possession of Lusatia, which had similarly been ceded to Johann Georg by Ferdinand II as security against the 3.93 million florins of military expenses incurred by Saxony whilst assisting the emperor during the Bohemian revolt.[36]

The conflicting interests of apparently pro-Palatine states jeopardised the prospects for Charles Louis's restoration at the negotiations. This was particularly evident following the outbreak of the 'Torstensson War' between Sweden and Denmark in late-1643. In addition to being an early proponent of the peace conference, Denmark had also been one of the most vocal supporters for the inclusion of the Palatine cause in any negotiations for a general treaty.[37] As Christian IV had volunteered his services as a mediator, Charles Louis was confident of Danish support at the upcoming peace talks, claiming that 'Denmarcke…stands firme to have my Cause handled there, & is not likely to vary'.[38] It should be noted, however, that Christian's key objective had always been for *dominium maris baltici*, and the king's gradual rapprochement with Vienna from the early-1630s, as well as his offers to act as mediator in the peace congress, was primarily driven by an ambition to clip Sweden's wings.[39] Christian hoped that a successful peace leading to a united empire would prevent Sweden making territorial gains on the Baltic which would

[35] For the importance of Brandenburg as a champion of the Palatine cause at Westphalia see Clm: nos.4, 96: Streuff von Lauenstein in Münster to Camerarius, 3/13 June 1645 and 5/15 Mar. 1647.
[36] Albrecht, 'Bayern', p.467; Parker, p.142; *Tragedy*, p.356; F. Müller, *Kursachsen und der Böhmische Aufstand 1618-1622* (Münster, 1997), pp.435-45, 460-1.
[37] SP 16/497 f.3; SP 81/53 f.368: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 27 Nov./7 Dec. 1643; Croxton, *Westphalia*, pp.53-4
[38] SP 81/53 f.334: Charles Louis at The Hague to Roe, 21 Sept./1 Oct. 1643.
[39] M. Bregnsbo, 'Denmark and the Westphalian Peace', in Durchhardt, *Der Westfälische Friede*, pp.361-4.

enable them to encircle Denmark.[40] However, Sweden's pre-emptive military strike not only prevented Christian from acting as mediator at Westphalia, but also prompted him to recall almost all his representatives from the peace talks, robbing the Palatine delegation of a potentially valuable ally in the negotiations.[41] Indeed, an imperial envoy in Münster recorded in his diary in June 1644 that Franz Gernand, a secretary employed by the Palatine family, had petitioned the sole remaining Danish representative whether Christian would send another delegation to Westphalia.[42]

The independent, and sometimes conflicting, territorial and political interests of the other anti-Habsburg powers was another difficulty facing Charles Louis's representatives at the peace talks, as even the most apparently stalwart supporters of the Palatine cause would not sacrifice their own aims on behalf of an exiled dynasty with very little to offer in return. Certainly, the Swedish and French insistence that all of the Imperial Estates participate in the Westphalian peace talks was primarily driven by a desire to weaken the emperor's position at the congress, and their championing of 'German liberty' was a negotiating ploy to further their own interests.[43] The imperial envoys in Osnabrück wrote to Ferdinand III in April 1646 that the satisfaction of French and Swedish demands for Alsace and Pomerania could be useful in separating these states from the Palatine cause.[44] Charles Louis also certainly feared that 'the crowns of France and Sweden will make their peace (if they intend any) without much regard to those of their allies, that are not in arms with them', and Streuff von Lauenstein claimed in early-1647 that the possibility of these

[40] Ibid., pp.361-2; Croxton, *Westphalia*, pp.53-4.
[41] Croxton, *Westphalia*, pp.89-98.
[42] *APW III C 2,1*, 165.
[43] *Tragedy*, p.705; Parker, p.180.
[44] *APW II A 4: Die kaiserlichen Korrespondenzen, Band 4: 1636*, 64.

powers abandoning the Palatine cause had been an ever-present concern during the negotiations.[45]

The Palatine delegates also had to contend with the fact that the two most significant opponents of the Habsburgs had differing aims for the fate of the traditional Palatine lands and titles. Indeed, the *Pfalzfrage*, has been described as 'the chief area of dispute between Sweden and France' at Westphalia.[46] Swedish diplomats initially championed a full Palatine restitution, with their official instructions in October 1641 citing the necessity of equal numbers of Catholics and Protestants within the Electoral College, as well as the long-standing friendship and ties between the Palatine family and the Swedish crown.[47] In contrast, the French supported Bavarian acquisition of the traditional Palatine electorate and the Upper Palatinate, as they had since the initial transfer over two decades previously, in their attempt to win Maximilian over to an anti-Habsburg or neutral stance.[48] However, it should be noted that the French delegates were instructed to support Bavarian claims in an adroit manner, so that they would not be seen as having directly assisted Maximilian.[49]

Finance

Another issue which hampered the Palatine family's diplomatic abilities at Münster and Osnabrück was their perennial lack of money. Although the cost of the very modest Palatine delegation to the Westphalian negotiations, estimated by Franz Bosbach to be

[45] Bromley, pp.131-2; Clm: no.95. Streuff von Lauenstein in Münster to Camerarius, 5/15 Mar. 1647.
[46] Croxton, *Peacemaking*, p.51; S. Lundkvist, 'Der schwedischen Kriegs- und Friedensziele 1632-1648', *Schriften des Historischen Kollegs: Herausgegeben von der Stiftung Historisches Kolleg Kolloquien,* 8 (1988), p.239.
[47] *APW: Serie I: Instruktion: Band 1: Frankreich, Schweden, Kaiser*, 294.
[48] Albrecht, 'Bayern', p.465.
[49] *APW I 1*, 109-10

14,168 talers, exceeded that spent by the majority of Imperial Cities and Princes, it was far below the amount spent by the rest of the electors, with the exception of Trier. For example, Mainz and Brandenburg incurred expenses of over 111,000 and 134,000 talers respectively, and Bavaria spent nearly five times as much as their Palatine cousins.[50] It should be noted that Bosbach overestimated the amount spent on Palatine representation at Westphalia, as the figure was based on the average cost of a princely deputation and he approximated that the Palatine delegations lasted forty-four months.[51] However, contemporary sources demonstrate that Streuff von Lauenstein and Camerarius did not arrive in Münster and Osnabrück until late-May 1645.[52] Even if Charles Louis's representatives had remained continuously in the congress cities until the signing of the final peace in October 1648, the delegations would only have lasted forty months. It is likely, therefore, that the amount spent on Palatine representation was even less than the small amount which has been previously assumed.

As early as November 1643, Charles Louis despaired that he would not be able to afford to send deputies to the peace negotiations.[53] In February 1645, the MP James Harrington presented a remonstrance to the House of Commons on Charles Louis's behalf, asking for financial assistance 'in aspect of His necessarie negotiations abroad, especially at the general Treatie at Munster & Osnabrugg whereunto his High:s is invited to send Ministers by the Crownes of France & Sweden'.[54] Although this request garnered a grant of one thousand pounds, the elector could not afford to pay his representatives a sufficient

[50] F. Bosbach, *Die Kosten des Westfälischen Friedenskongresses: Eine strukturgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (Münster, 1984), pp.227-8.
[51] Ibid., pp.227, 230.
[52] Clm: nos.2, 160: Streuff von Lauenstein at Münster to Camerarius, 2 June 1645 and Camerarius in Osnabrück to Streuff von Lauenstein, 8 June 1645; Ogier, *Journal*, p.121; *APW III C 2,1*, 351.
[53] SP 81/53 f.355v.
[54] MS Nalson 18 f.457: The humble remonstrance of James Harrington, concerning the affaires of His High:s the Prince Elector Palatine, 17 Feb. 1645. *CJ*, IV, 58.

salary to meet the extortionate costs of accommodation and victuals in Münster and Osnabrück, increasing the ambassadors' personal debts.[55] Whereas Charles Louis was only able to pay his delegates 100 talers per month, this was considerably less than the amount received by envoys of the other electors.[56] Indeed, the twenty-eight strong Bavarian delegation spent more per person on their monthly consumption of beer and wine than the Palatine representatives received in wages.[57] Camerarius in particular complained about the limited provision for his subsistence at Osnabrück, and requested that Charles Louis bestow a number of fiefs in the Lower Palatinate upon his family in the event of a Palatine restoration in return for his diplomatic efforts.[58]

The limited financial circumstances of the Palatine family had an impact on their diplomatic efforts as it precluded their ability to engage in expensive ceremonial display. Such spectacle, involving the size and pomp of a delegate's entourage, was the only means of demonstrating a ruler's rank within the hierarchy of princes assembled at Westphalia. Even the decoration of an ambassador's lodgings, where the negotiations were almost exclusively conducted, would reflect the majesty and authority of his master.[59] Although it is unclear how many followers accompanied the Palatine delegates, the issue of expenditure makes it unlikely that they could afford any sizable retinue of servants. In contrast, even the relatively modest retinue of the Bavarian delegation included three personal attendants, three footmen, and six kitchen staff.[60] Whilst it was reported that

[55] Parliamentary Archives, London: Records of the House of Lords: Journal Office, Main Papers [HL/PO/JO/10]: HL/PO/JO/10/1/181: Draft order for the Commissioners of Excise to reimburse themselves £1,000 advanced for the Elector Palatine, 25 Feb. 1645. Reproduced in *CJ*, IV, 61; Hauck, pp.77-8.
[56] Hauck, p.77; Bosbach, *Kosten*, pp.50-1.
[57] Bosbach, *Kosten*, p.142.
[58] Clm: nos.119, 120, 116: Frays in London to Camerarius, 22 Aug. and 14 Nov. 1645, and Apr. 1647.
[59] N.F. May, 'Staged sovereignty or aristocratic values? Diplomatic ceremonial at the Westphalian peace negotiations (1643-1648)', in T.A. Sowerby and J. Hennings (eds.), *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c.1410-1800* (London, 2017), pp.81-2; Croxton, *Westphalia*, pp.136-7.
[60] Bosbach, *Kosten*, p.23.

Streuff von Lauenstein's train to Münster 'did not appear unpleasant for an envoy of a dispossessed elector', it should be noted that not only was the apparent luxury of the Palatine delegate's transportation necessary to alleviate the pain caused by his gout whilst travelling, but he was required to foot the bill himself.[61]

Another clear display of rank was the staging of elaborate entries by delegations as they arrived at their respective congress cities. Such festivities were the privilege of ambassadors of rulers with royal status, as well as those representing the electors, and were intended to awe the local populace and persuade fellow delegates of their master's power and status.[62] Streuff von Lauenstein claimed that all of Westphalia was delighted by the magnificence of the entry of the duke of Longueville in Münster on 30 June 1645.[63] The duke's arrival was heralded by a vast procession including luxuriously ornamented coaches, horses, and mules bedecked in sumptuous silken blankets in the colours of the Bourbon dynasty, and rows of cavalrymen covered in gold and silver decoration.[64] Although a number of delegates waived their right to hold a ceremonial entry to avoid competing with the ostentatious display of their adversaries, such an event could have helped Charles Louis's ambassadors to justify their master's claim to electoral status in the eyes of their peers. However, as the Palatines could scarcely afford to pay for their own subsistence, they would not possess the vast sums required to hold such festivities, and so their arrival at the congress cities was inconspicuous.[65]

[61] Ogier, *Journal*, p.121; Hauck, p.77.
[62] A. Stiglic, 'Hierarchy of Ceremony and Status on the European Diplomatic Stage: The Diplomats' Solemn Entries into the Conference City of Münster', in Bussmann and Schilling (eds.), *War and Peace*, I, p. 391.
[63] Clm: no.8: Streuff von Lauenstein in Münster to Camerarius, 20/30 June 1645.
[64] Stiglic, 'Ceremony', p.394; Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.145.
[65] *APW II B2: Die französischen Korrespondenzen, Band 2: 1645*, 337 n.

Financial concerns also forced Charles Louis to remain in England rather than pressing his case at Münster and Osnabrück. Both Streuff von Lauenstein and Camerarius suggested that their master's presence would have helped to promote the Palatine cause and, once a solution had been found to the 'Palatine Question' in spring 1647, the latter complained that Charles Louis's attendance would have remedied a great deal of inconvenience.[66] However, the prince's secretary, Johann Jacob Frays, reported from London that the primary reason for the elector's continued residence at Whitehall was to ensure the payment of his parliamentary pension, claiming that there would be considerable difficulty in obtaining the funds if he was not present in London.[67] Certainly, Charles Louis would not have wanted to jeopardise the regular payment of his annual pension of eight-thousand pounds which had been awarded by parliament in September 1645, especially when one considers the irregular remittance of his earlier annuities after his return to The Hague at the outbreak of the civil war in 1642. Nevertheless, Charles Louis was aware of how his absence would be perceived, as he appears to have commissioned a medal portrait in 1645, with the reverse displaying a crowned Palatine lion together with an inscription proclaiming that being stationary was not a surrender, as shown in fig.1.

[66] Clm: nos.94, 117, 243: Streuff von Lauenstein in Münster to Camerarius, 2/12 Mar. 1647, Frays in London to Camerarius, Apr. 1646, and Camerarius in Osnabrück to [Streuff von Lauenstein], 15/25 Mar. 1647.
[67] Ibid., no.117.




Fig.1. Print of Medal Portrait of Charles Louis, Elector Palatine.[68]

The Palatine Delegation at the Westphalian Congress

Although Charles Louis remained in England until after the Peace of Westphalia was concluded, he appears to have been very much the director of the Palatine delegations at Münster and Osnabrück. The correspondence of the elector's secretary, as well as his representatives, demonstrate that Charles Louis received regular updates from Westphalia and that any official documents, such as petitions and memorials, required his approval.[69] The young elector also sent letters to various European heads of state in support of his cause, and took an active involvement in the discussion of the proposed peace terms.[70] However, Charles Louis's presence across the English Channel also exacerbated the communication issues which affected almost every delegation at the congress.[71] The dates

[68] Print of Medal Portrait of Charles Louis, Elector Palatine. British Museum, London. https://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details/collection_image_gallery.aspx?assetId=1142276001&objectId=3351850&partId=1 (21 June 2019). The listing for this item describes it as from an unknown publication, however it is almost certainly from E. Ashmole, *The institution, laws & ceremonies of the most noble Order of the Garter* (London, 1672), p.227.
[69] Ibid., nos.122, 245: Frays in London to Camerarius, 11/21 July [1645] and Camerarius to Streuff von Lauenstein, 11/21 Feb. 1647.
[70] Charles Louis to Imperial Estates, 15 Aug. 1645 in J.G. von Meiern (ed.), *Acta pacis Westphalicæ publica, oder Westphälische Friedens-Handlungen und Geschichte, verfasset und beschreiben von J.G. von Meiern* (6 vols., Hannover, 1734-36), I, 569-70; Clm: nos.119, 115: Frays to Camerarius, 22 Aug. 1645 and 30 Apr. 1647; Bod.: C 2.6 Art. Seld [Unfoliated]: Summary of considerations on proposed solution to the Palatine cause, [1648].
[71] Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.160.

of Camerarius's letters from Osnabrück and the replies from Charles Louis's secretary in London show that it could take between two weeks and a month for responses to be written, with the result that it could be almost six weeks before Palatine delegates received instructions on any issues.[72]

The actions of the Palatine ambassadors in Westphalia, and the extent of Charles Louis's influence in their conduct, have been largely overlooked in the scholarship on the peace talks. It has been repeatedly claimed that the Palatine representatives were paid no attention by the other delegates, with Anuschka Tischer and Derek Croxton even claiming that the death of Streuff von Lauenstein in April 1647 was disregarded by nearly the entire congress.[73] However, contemporary evidence demonstrates that this was not the case.[74] The other participants at the congress were hardly unaware of the presence of Charles Louis's representatives. For example, the imperial delegates reported Streuff von Lauenstein's imminent arrival in Münster in May 1645.[75] In addition, the Bishop of Osnabrück, who was also the representative of the Elector of Cologne, and the representative for Brunswick-Lüneburg, both remarked upon how the Palatine delegates were prevented from presenting their case to the imperial colleges in October 1645.[76] Such evidence demonstrates that the Palatine delegates were deliberately obstructed, rather than simply being ignored. Nevertheless, contemporary evidence shows that Charles Louis's representatives were busily engaged in diplomatic wranglings at the congress cities, and it

[72] Clm: nos.120, 122: Frays to Camerarius, 14 Nov. and 11/21 July 1645. These letters were responses to dispatches dated 22 Oct./2 Nov. and 16/26 June 1645.
[73] Steiner, p.178; Hauck, p.78; D. Croxton and A. Tischer, *The Peace of Westphalia: A Historical Dictionary* (Westport, CT, 2002), p.55.
[74] Clm: no.107: 'Elegia in obitum P. Streuff'; *APW II C 3: Die schwedischen Korrespondenzen, Band 3: 1646-1647,* 361.
[75] *APW II A 2: Die kaiserlichen Korrespondenzen, Band 2: 1644-1645,* 303.
[76] *APW III C 3,1: Diarium Wartenberg, 1. Teil: 1644-1646,* 306; *APW III A 3,1: Die Beratungen des Fürstenrates in Osnabrück,* 1. Teil: 1645, 369.

is therefore important to identify their personal involvement in the negotiations, as well as their influence in the diplomacy of other powers at the congress.

Although the Palatine envoys were unable to announce their arrival in the congress cities with a ceremonious entries, they made their presence known by visiting other delegates to present their credentials, as well as making public declarations of their master's cause.[77] As the Imperial Ban against the Frederick V excluded his son's envoys from participating in the official debates of the imperial colleges at Westphalia, the vast majority of Palatine diplomacy had to be conducted in private meetings with the delegates of other powers. Camerarius, Meisterlin, and Streuff von Lauenstein all had numerous meetings with French and Swedish plenipotentiaries to discuss the Palatine cause.[78] Charles Louis's ambassadors also involved themselves with the issue of the religious peace, with the duke of Longueville identifying the Palatine representatives as members of a Calvinist clique together with those of Brandenburg and Hessen-Kassel.[79] In early-1646, Camerarius and Meisterlin hosted a secret meeting in their quarters with envoys of these states, as well as fellow Calvinists representing Pomerania, Anhalt, the city of Bremen, and the counts of the Wetterau. It was decided at this meeting that a deputation should be sent to petition the Swedes to demand the inclusion of Calvinism in any religious peace.[80] It is also important to note that Charles Louis's representatives were not simply tolerated or humoured by the other delegations. Sweden, in particular, made great efforts to keep the Palatine ambassadors updated on developments regarding their master's restoration. Charles Louis received letters from Queen Christina promising the utmost assistance at the

[77] *APW III C 4: Diarium Lamberg: 1645-1649,* 113; *APW II A 5: Die kaiserlichen Korrespondenzen, Band 5: 1646-1647,* 362.
[78] For examples see: Clm: no.117: Frays in London to Camerarius, Apr. 1646; *APW II C 3,* 287; *APW II A 4,* 17; *APW II C 2: Die schwedischen Korrespondenzen, Band 1: 1645-1646,* 20.
[79] *APW II B 5.1,* 392.
[80] *APW III A 3,2: Die Beratungen des Fürstenrates in Osnabrück, 2. Teil: 1645,* 573-7.

Westphalian congress, and Swedish proposals on the *Pfalzfrage* were frequently discussed with the Palatine envoys.[81]

Debates on Palatine Restoration: March-August 1647

Although the Peace of Westphalia was not concluded until the Treaty of Osnabrück was signed on 24 October 1648, a workable solution to the *Pfalzfrage* had actually more or less been found as early as March 1647.[82] The discussions regarding the Palatine Question in the Spring and Summer of 1647 provide a good example of how the continuance of military activities alongside the negotiations conducted at Münster and Osnabrück could have an immediate and profound impact on the diplomatic manoeuvres at the peace congress. Although the Palatine family were not ignored by the other representatives during these crucial months, they and their supporters were unable to withstand the overwhelming force of martial and political circumstances, which led to a lasting agreement between several powers on the fate of the Palatinate being reached in August 1647.

As a full restitution of the Palatine family's hereditary lands, titles, and offices was out of the question in spite of Swedish support for the same, and almost every negotiating power at Westphalia recognised the necessity of restoring Charles Louis in some manner, this left only two possible solutions to the question of the Palatine electoral title. The first was that the Bavarian and Palatine Wittelsbachs could share the traditional fifth dignity, with the exercise of the electoral vote in imperial elections alternating between the two branches. This proposition was supported by pro-Palatine powers when it became apparent

[81] HL/PO/JO/10/1/203: Queen Christina of Sweden to Charles Louis, 8 Apr. 1646 [Translation]; Clm: nos.121, 241, 245: Frays to Camerarius, 4/14 July 1645, Camerarius to Streuff von Lauenstein, 1/11 Mar. and 11/21 Feb. 1647; Hauck, p.80.
[82] Steiner, p.185.

that a full restoration of Frederick V's lands and titles was unobtainable, as it would still allow Charles Louis and his descendants to exercise his family's traditional prestigious electoral title.[83] The suggestion of an alternating dignity was also favoured by the emperor, who instructed his chief plenipotentiary, Count Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff, in October 1645 that the issue of the Palatine electoral dignity 'must be settled on the basis of the alternation…this point must not be relinquished'.[84] However, the short-lived alternation of the Wittelsbach electoral vote in the fourteenth century persuaded a number of powers, especially Bavaria, that such a project would not produce a lasting solution to the 'Palatine Question'.[85]

The other solution was the creation of an eighth electoral title. This proposal had been suggested as early as 1623 by England during the 'Spanish Match' negotiations.[86] In early 1624 Maximilian recommended that Ferdinand II raise Frederick to an eighth electoral position, and the Bavarians continued to argue along these lines until the Palatine family's exclusion from the general amnesty of the Peace of Prague appeared to render moot any suggestion of their restoration.[87] However, once it became apparent that the *Pfalzfrage* would be discussed at Westphalia, Maximilian was adamant that Charles Louis would have to be satisfied with a new electorate, informing Trauttmansdorff that an alternating title was out of the question and that he would not surrender the fifth electoral dignity transferred to his family two decades earlier.[88] The French similarly argued for the

[83] Hauck, p.82.
[84] *Sourcebook*, p.286.
[85] Albrecht, 'Bayern', pp.461-2.
[86] Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.270; Messinger, p.263.
[87] D. Mußgnug, "Die Achte Kurwürde", in B-R Kern, E. Wadle and K-P. Schroeder (eds.), *Humaniora: Medizin – Recht – Geschichte: Festschrift für Adolf Laufs zum 70. Geburtstag* (2006), pp.222-3; Messinger, p.264.
[88] Albrecht, 'Bayern', p.464; G. Immler, *Kurfürst Maximilian I. von Bayern und der Westfälische Friedenskongreß. Die bayerische auswärtige Politik von 1644 bis zum Ulmer Waffenstillstand* (Münster, 1992), p.169.

creation of an eighth electorate for the Palatine family, most likely viewing an increase in the number of electors as a useful way of loosening the Habsburg hold on the imperial throne. However, the suggestion was vehemently opposed by several Imperial Estates, as well as Ferdinand III, who reportedly claimed that the required alteration to the imperial constitution was comparable to granting religious freedom to the Turks, and would only consider the proposal as a last resort.[89] Ultimately, Ferdinand and the Imperial Estates would be forced to decide whether the foundation of a lasting solution to the 'Palatine Question' would be worth a seismic alteration of the imperial constitution.

By the start of 1647, the negotiations surrounding the Palatinate had reached something of a deadlock in spite of the fact that most of the negotiating powers were nearing a consensus. Trauttmansdorff had conceded in May 1646 that an eighth electorate could be created for the Palatine family.[90] Such a solution was promoted by the French, who insisted on an eighth title and almost the entire Lower Palatinate for Charles Louis, supported Bavaria's refusal to give up any territory in the Upper Palatinate.[91] Whilst the Swedes had slightly reduced their demands regarding the *Pfalzfrage* by the start of 1647, their negotiating position was still at odds with those of the other parties. Indeed, the Imperial-Swedish agreement on Swedish satisfaction in February 1647 made no mention of the Palatinate as their positions on this issue were still so far apart.[92] Although Johan Oxenstierna accepted the notion of the creation of an eighth electorate for Bavaria in July 1646, Sweden still favoured the option of an alternating title and pressed for the return of almost all the Palatine lands to Charles Louis, claiming that the County of Cham alone

[89] Schaab, II, 122; Hauck, p.81; *Sourcebook*, p.286.
[90] Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.271.
[91] Clm: no. 241, 245: Camerarius to Streuff von Lauenstein, 1/11 Mar. and 11/21 Feb. 1647.
[92] Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.271.

should be sufficient to satisfy Bavarian territorial ambitions.[93] The Prince-Bishop of Osnabrück recorded that the Swedes were still making such a demand in February 1647, with the additional caveat that the alternation of the title should end upon Maximilian's death and thereafter be settled permanently on the Palatine family.[94]

The conclusion of the *Pfalzfrage* in the summer of 1647 was undoubtedly hastened by the Truce of Ulm on 14 March. Following a wave of Swedish successes against the Austrian Habsburgs which culminated in the systematic plundering of the Rhineland and Bavaria in the winter of 1646-47, Maximilian realised that the emperor could no longer offer the protection he needed to defend his hard-won territories and to preserve his young sons' inheritance. Accordingly, the electors of Bavaria and Cologne, together with several of their allies, signed a ceasefire with the representatives of France, Sweden, and their German confederates at Ulm, with Mainz following suit two months later.[95] Many contemporaries recorded the stunned Imperial reaction to the news that their valuable military ally had pledged to lay down their arms.[96] It is unsurprising, therefore, that the emperor, who had previously avoided addressing the 'Palatine Question' at Westphalia in an attempt to retain a hold over Bavaria, rapidly gave way to Maximilian's demands on the issue.[97]

On 16 March, the Imperial propositions for the resolution of the *Pfalzfrage* were submitted for consideration to the imperial colleges.[98] The majority of these terms,

[93] Ibid.
[94] *APW III C 3.2*, 743-4.
[95] *Tragedy*, p.715; Parker, pp.184-5. For a copy of the truce see *Sourcebook*, pp.301-2.
[96] Clm: no.243: Camerarius in Osnabrück to [Streuff von Lauenstein], 15/25 Mar. 1647; K. Lindley and D. Scott (eds.), *The Journal of Thomas Juxon, 1644-1647* (London, 1999), p.153.
[97] Messinger, p.276; *Tragedy*, p.726.
[98] Meiern, *APWP*, IV, 383-5; *APW III C 4*, 175.

professed to be the most conducive means of bringing peace to the empire, would eventually be enshrined in the final Peace of Westphalia. Maximilian was to retain the former Palatine electoral title and the Upper Palatinate, and, if Charles Louis submitted himself to the emperor, he would receive a newly-created eighth electoral title as well as the Lower Palatinate, albeit under a number of conditions. The religious situation in the territory was to remain unchanged and Charles Louis was also to recognise the privileges of the Imperial Knights, those nobles whose direct overlord was the emperor himself, in Franconia, Swabia and on the Rhine. Finally, the restored Lower Palatinate would not incorporate the Bergstraße, which would remain with the Electorate of Mainz. This lucrative trade route, described by James VI & I as 'the prime flower of our son-in-law's revenue', had been mortgaged to the Palatinate by the Archbishop-Elector of Mainz in 1463, but had been occupied by Spanish troops following the invasion of the Palatinate in 1620, with the valuable revenues being granted to Mainz by the emperor shortly afterwards.[99]

The members of the colleges representing the electors, Imperial Princes, and Imperial Cities, almost unanimously approved the proposed terms. As far as most of the electors were concerned, Bavarian possession of the fifth electoral dignity had been confirmed at the congress of Mühlhausen in 1627 and further enshrined in the Peace of Prague.[100] Brandenburg and the Prince-Archbishopric of Salzburg, were the only estates which raised objections to the proposed diminution of the Palatine family's lands and titles in March and April 1647.[101] On 18 March, Brandenburg was the sole member of the

[99] Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, *State Papers Collected by Edward, Earl of Clarendon* (3 vols., Oxford, 1767), I, 13: James VI & I to Earl of Bristol, 13 Nov. 1623; *Tragedy*, p.356.
[100] *APW III A 1,1: Die Beratungen der kurfürstlichen Kurie, 1. Teil: 1645-1647*, 729, 739.
[101] Clm: no.96: Streuff von Lauenstein to Camerarius, 5/15 Mar. 1647; Dickmann, *Frieden*, pp.399-400; Albrecht, 'Bayern', p.467.

Electoral College to favour an alternating electorate between the Bavarian and Palatine Wittelsbachs, as this solution would allow the latter to retain the more prestigious fifth electoral dignity, and would require a less significant amendment to the Golden Bull.[102] However, the other electoral representatives countered that a previous attempt at an alternating electoral vote between the two Wittelsbach branches had been unsuccessful and so was unlikely to produce a lasting peace. Accordingly, they were willing to consent to an alteration of the Golden Bull and the hallowed number of seven electors for the good of the empire.[103]

In addition, during the sessions of the *Fürstenrat* in Osnabrück, the representative of Pfalz-Neuburg had attempted to persuade the envoys of their fellow Imperial Princes of their claims to the Palatine lands and title, having previously attempted to obtain financial compensation from Bavaria in exchange for renouncing their claim to the Upper Palatinate.[104] Although the duke of Pfalz-Neuburg was concerned that the renunciation of Charles Louis and his brothers of their rights to the Upper Palatinate and the traditional Palatine electoral title would affect his own claims, the final Peace of Westphalia ultimately protected the inheritance rights of the Pfalz-Neuburg line in accordance with agreements confirmed by former emperors.[105]

The opinions of the Princes and the Imperial Cities represented at Osnabrück were reported to the Electoral College at Münster on 1 April, and a formal report on the

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[102] *APW III A 1,1*, 744-5.
[103] Ibid., 730, 734-6; Messinger, pp.269, 276-7.
[104] *APW: Serie III Abt A: Protokolle: Band 3: Die Beratungen des Fürstenrates in Osnabrück. 4. 1646-1647*, 120-4; Clm: no.241: Camerarius to Streuff von Lauenstein, 1/11 Mar. 1647.
[105] *APW II A 5*, 624; Clm: no.115: Frays to Camerarius, 30 Apr. 1647; IPO Article IV § 10/IPM Article 18 in *Sourcebook*, p.306. For the order of inheritance for the Palatine electorate as of 1 January 1649 see Meiern, *APWP*, VI, 790-91. The house of Pfalz-Neuburg stood to inherit the electorate following the extinction of the electoral line and that of Ludwig Philipp in the male line.

resolutions of the Imperial Estates on the Palatine cause was issued six days later.[106] In addition to accepting all of the imperial propositions, the Catholic estates gathered in Münster had demanded that all of the Catholic institutions established in the Lower Palatinate by occupying powers were to remain.[107] However, a number of states also sought to gain at the expense of a restored Palatinate. For example, the Archbishop-Elector of Trier sought to obtain the revenues of the abbey of Limburg as well as a number of villages which he claimed came under his jurisdiction as bishop of Speyer, and Mainz likewise coveted several abbeys and monasteries in the Lower Palatinate in addition to the Bergstraße.[108]

Although Charles Louis's supporters at Westphalia attempted to negotiate a more favourable arrangement, there was ultimately very little they could obtain in the face of opposition from France, Bavaria and both Catholic and Protestant electors, princes, and free cities of the empire. Brandenburg issued a protestation dated 9 April 1647, they asserted that the 1623 transfer of Frederick's lands and titles to Bavaria was only for the duke's lifetime, and that the entire Palatinate should be returned to Charles Louis whilst Maximilian's heirs should be content with the new eighth electoral title.[109] However, such demands were almost immediately dismissed by the other negotiating parties, and Brandenburg would not allow the peace negotiations to collapse because of the Palatine issue, especially as they had already concluded a territorial settlement in February 1647 which increased the total size of the Brandenburg electorate by over a third.[110]

[106] *APW III A 1,1,* 763; Meiern, *APWP,* IV, 395-9.
[107] *APW III A 1,1,* 754-63.
[108] Meiern, IV, 395-9.
[109] Ibid., 399-403.
[110] Hauck, p.81; *Tragedy*, p.717; P. Baumgart, 'Kurbrandenburgs Kongreßdiplomatie und ihre Ergebnise', in Durchhardt, *Der Westfälische Friede,* pp.479-83.

Sweden similarly attempted to improve the terms of any Palatine restoration. Camerarius reported in late March that the Swedes would only concede for Charles Louis to share an alternating electoral vote with Bavaria, and French ministers claimed to Johan Oxenstierna that they would support a full territorial Palatine restitution if Maximilian received Upper Austria from the emperor instead.[111] It is evident that Charles Louis's representatives were being consulted throughout this period. In March 1647, Oxenstierna reportedly attempted to persuade the Palatines to compromise by accepting the transfer of the Upper Palatinate.[112] In addition, Frays discussed the merits of the suggested alternating electoral title in a letter to Camerarius the following month, suggesting that it would be a good solution, especially if Mainz also renounced their pretensions to the Bergstraße.[113]

Ultimately, the Swedes amended their bargaining position in early April, with Queen Christina writing to the commander-in-chief of the Swedish army that her representatives would no longer press for a return of the traditional electoral dignity and their lands as much as previously.[114] Certainly, the Prince-Bishop of Osnabrück, Franz Wilhelm, Count von Wartenberg, recorded in his diary on 3 April 1647 that Oxenstierna had promised to accept Bavaria's wishes after Maximilian rejected the Swedish offer of an alternating dignity and half of the Upper Palatinate.[115] Longueville also claimed in a letter of 8 April that the Swedes had relaxed their stance on the Palatine affair.[116] However, just because the Swedes had expressed a willingness to reduce their demands on behalf of the Palatinate, this did not mean that they immediately withdrew their support for a more

[111] Clm: no.243: Camerarius in Osnabrück to [Streuff von Lauenstein], 15/25 Mar. 1647; Hauck, p.82; *APW II B 5,2: Die franösischen Korrespondenzen, Band 5, 2. Teil: 1647,* 917.
[112] *APW III C 3.2,* 784.
[113] Clm: no.115: Frays to Camerarius, 30 Apr. 1647.
[114] *APW II C 3,* 364.
[115] *APW III C 3.2,* 807.
[116] *APW II B 5,2,* 1002.

substantial restoration for Charles Louis. Indeed, Dieter Albrecht's claim that the Swedes did not deviate from the proposition of an eighth electorate for Charles Louis from April 1647 is not supported by contemporary evidence.[117] For example, Wartenberg recorded in his diary in May 1647 that Sweden was clashing with Bavaria by still insisting upon an alternating electoral title, as well as demanding that Bavarian exercise of this right be limited to Maximilian and his direct descendants instead of the broader Wilhelmine line.[118]

A number of scholars have used Sweden's eventual acceptance of an eighth electorate to question their commitment to Charles Louis, with some claiming that they were merely championing the cause for the sake of appearance until they achieved all of their own territorial and financial objectives.[119] Jürgen Steiner even argued that the Swedes had embraced the proposal of an eighth electorate for the Palatines as early as August 1646.[120] However, such a view overlooks the fact that Swedish territorial gains in Pomerania had already been secured in February 1647, and that other issues of interest to the Swedes, such as the financial settlement and the payment of their army, would not be addressed until the matters of the empire had been resolved. In addition, had the Swedes been willing simply to abandon the Palatine cause in order sooner to debate their remaining private interests, it is unlikely that they would have continued pressing for a more substantial Palatine restitution in opposition to proposals which had the support of the majority of other delegations. Indeed, in a letter of 8 April 1647 from Johan Oxenstierna and Johan Adler Salvius to Queen Christina, the ambassadors described a visit

[117] Albrecht, 'Bayern', pp.467-8.
[118] *APW III C 3,2*, 851, 864.
[119] Croxton, *Peacemaking*, pp.51-2; Steiner, p.185; Immler, *Maximilian*, p.300.
[120] Steiner, p.185.

from a deputation of evangelical princes who asked them to acquiesce to the imperial propositions and French-backed Bavarian demands.[121]

It was not until the summer of 1647 that the French and Swedes reached a consensus regarding the fate of the Palatinate, especially regarding the religious situation in the restored territories. The French propositions drawn up at the end of July 1647 suggested that Bavaria would receive the traditional electoral title, the Upper Palatinate, and the County of Cham in exchange for the renunciation of the 13 million talers owed by the emperor. Charles Louis, on the other hand, would receive the long-threatened eighth electoral dignity. However, with the exception of the Bergstraße, all secular and ecclesiastical possessions in the Lower Palatinate would be returned to the Palatine family, albeit on the condition that the archbishop of Trier could appeal to recover certain church lands.[122] Bavaria had already agreed to disband the Catholic institutions and communities which had emerged in the Lower Palatinate from the early-1620s.[123] These terms were largely approved by the Swedes, who made minor changes in their counter-proposal in early-August, with the only alteration being to ensure the freedom of worship for Lutherans in accordance with the *Normaljahr* of 1624.[124] On 19 August, the French delegation at Münster reported that a consensus had been reached with Sweden, and that envoys had been dispatched to the Bavarians with an annotated version of the Swedish terms.[125]

[121] *APW II C 3,* 370.
[122] Meiern, *APWP,* IV, 409-11.
[123] Steiner, p.186.
[124] Meiern, *APWP,* IV, 412-14; Albrecht, 'Bayern', p.467.
[125] *APW II B 6: Die französischen Korrespondenzen, Band 6: 1647,* 310; Meiern, *APWP,* IV, 415-17.

Ultimately, the uneasy Truce of Ulm did not survive, as the Bavarians re-entered the war on the side of the emperor after signing the Passau Recess on 7 September 1647. However, the duration of the truce had witnessed almost all the major negotiating powers agreeing a solution to the *Pfalzfrage*. Charles Louis was to be restored to the Lower Palatinate, and would receive an eighth electoral title. In addition, in return for renewed military assistance from the autumn of 1647, the emperor promised Maximilian that Bavarian retention of the more prestigious fifth electoral dignity, as well as the Upper Palatinate, would be amongst the imperial conditions for peace.[126] The needs of war, and a keen desire within the empire for peace, had won out against the urge to protect the hallowed ordinances of the Golden Bull, and after almost twenty-five years the 'Palatine Question' had finally been solved.

The Palatine Reaction

The Palatine family's reaction to the negotiations conducted in the spring and summer of 1647, as well as the terms of their restitution, was predictably hostile. Sweden's eventual declaration in favour of a partial restoration was regarded as a betrayal, with Elizabeth claiming that 'I finde that they follow the fashion now in the worlde to be no longer treue then is for there owne ends'. Their about-face extinguished the faint glimmer of hope that Charles Louis could be restored to his hereditary lands and titles in their entirety.[127] The proposed eighth electoral title was condemned as a 'novelty' and the territorial transfers were equally galling.[128] Charles Louis's secretary lamented the loss of the Upper Palatinate to Bavaria without any equivalent recompense, claiming that the

[126] Steiner, p.187; *Tragedy*, p.726.
[127] TS 23/1/24: Elizabeth at The Hague to Charles Louis, 13/23 May 1647; Steiner, p.191.
[128] Clm: no.97: Streuff von Lauenstein to Camerarius, 12/22 Mar. 1647; 'Papers from the Prince Elector, concerning the Protestant Cause', 26 Mar. 1647 reproduced in *LJ*, IX, 174-5.

remaining territory would be too meagre for the dignity of an elector.[129] Elizabeth also refused to offer any advice to her son regarding the peace terms, writing that 'I ame verie unwilling to have anie hand in councelling for the diminishing of [the electorate]'.[130] It was even feared that the elector's younger brothers would refuse to renounce their claims to lands in the Upper Palatinate, a prerequisite for Charles Louis's restoration to the Lower Palatinate and his readmission to the rank of elector.[131]

Following the report of the Imperial Estates regarding the proposed solution to the 'Palatine Question', one of Charles Louis's representatives presented the assembled delegates with a protestation challenging the legality of the suggested terms.[132] This document repeated many of the same arguments which had been used by the Palatine family since Frederick V's death fifteen years earlier. It claimed that the issue of the Palatinate had changed since the Winter King's demise, and the Golden Bull guaranteed Charles Louis's right to inherit all of Frederick's former lands and titles through primogeniture, rendering the transfer of any traditional Palatine-held offices part of the electorate to Bavaria as unconstitutional. The creation of an eighth electorate for Charles Louis also was condemned as troublesome. Not only would it contravene the Bull's decree limiting the number of electors to seven and present the possibility of a tie in future imperial elections, but Bavaria's possession of the traditional Palatine electoral vote meant that the Protestant electors would be outnumbered 5-3 by their Catholic counterparts in the Electoral College.[133] However, these arguments were no more effective in 1647 than they had been at any time since 1632.

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[129] Clm: no.115: Frays to Camerarius, 30 Apr. 1647.
[130] TS 23/1/24: Elizabeth in The Hague to Charles Louis, 13/23 May 1647.
[131] C 2.6 Art. Seld [Unfoliated]: Transcript of letter from Osnabrück to Charles Louis, Aug. 1648.
[132] Steiner, pp.184-5.
[133] Meiern, *APWP*, IV, 405-7.

As the imperial propositions favouring Bavarian possession of the traditional Palatine electoral title and the Upper Palatinate had already met with widespread approval in spring 1647, the Palatine family had to explore alternative diplomatic channels to solicit support for their cause. The elector wrote to the Protestant Swiss cantons to beg them to pressure France not to support Maximilian's demands, and the Venetian ambassador claimed in late-April 1647, that 'the Palatine is very active in London over his personal interests'.[134] Charles Louis had forwarded the proposed peace terms to the House of Lords in late March, asking them for their advice regarding 'this pretended Amnestia' which he claimed was 'infinitely to the Prejudice of the Protestants'.[135] Dispatches from the French and Florentine ambassadors also claimed that Charles Louis requested military assistance from Parliament in April, and had several meetings with Cromwell, to try to procure an army to transport to Germany.[136] Charles Louis evidently hoped that he would not be forced to choose between a dishonourable, partial restitution, or a principled, permanent exclusion. Indeed, he appeared to welcome rumours of a breach between the negotiating parties in May 1647, claiming that 'I am likely by it to escape the beeng putt to a difficult exigence either on accepting their offers & renouncing my right to the rest, or by refusing this to get nothing at all for my share'.[137] By the end of August 1647, however, the Palatines appear to have abandoned their efforts to influence any solution to the *Pfalzfrage* as Charles Louis recalled his ambassadors from the negotiations, leaving only a secretary in Osnabrück.[138] As the Palatine family had stubbornly refused similar offers on a number

[134] Clm: no.115: Frays to Camerarius, 30 Apr. 1647; *CSPV: 1643-47,* 311.
[135] *LJ*, IX, 105. See also 174. These peace proposals were not discussed by the House of Lords until 4 May 1647.
[136] S.R. Gardiner, *History of the Great Civil War* (4 vols., 1987 ed.), III, 222-3 n.
[137] TS/23/1/26: Charles Louis at Whitehall to Elizabeth, 28 May 1647.
[138] Steiner, p.186; Hauck, pp.86-7.

of occasions in the preceding two decades, it is important to address why they accepted the final terms offered at Westphalia in 1648.

The most likely reason why Charles Louis withdrew his envoys from the Westphalian negotiations in late summer 1647 was that he had exhausted all possible avenues to find diplomatic support for his cause, and that he knew his demands for a full restoration were futile without the support of more powerful states.[139] By the time that the final peace treaty was signed in October 1648, the elector declared that his friends 'are few and timorous'.[140] In contrast to the situation facing the Palatine family following their exclusion from the Peace of Prague in 1635, there were no major European powers to whom Charles Louis could turn in 1647 to champion his demand for a full restoration. The elector's representative in Münster wrote in March that, as the French had only ever spoken of restitution in terms of the Lower Palatinate and an eighth electorate, it was pointless to expect more from them, and Sweden finally acquiesced to the planned partial restoration by the summer.[141]

In addition, Denmark's disastrous defeat in the 'Torstensson War' between 1643-5, and the humiliating peace of Brømsebro 'effectively demolished Denmark's already tottering reputation as a great power'.[142] Whilst the Dutch were reportedly inclined to assist Charles Louis, they would only do so if Charles I and the English parliament were willing to give him the men and materiel to make him 'considerable'.[143] However, the

[139] Messinger, p.141; J. Arndt, 'Die Ergebnisse der Friedensverhandlungen in Münster und Osnabrück für die rhenischen Territorien', in S. Ehrenpreis (ed.), *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg im Herzogtum Berg und seinen Nachbarregionen* (Neustadt, 2002), p.315.
[140] C2.6 Art. Seld: Summary of letter to Palatine representative at Osnabrück, 27 Oct. 1648.
[141] Clm: no.96: Streuff von Lauenstein to Camerarius, 5/15 Mar. 1647.
[142] P.D. Lockhart, 'Denmark and the Empire: A Reassessment of Danish Foreign Policy under King Christian IV', *Scandinavian Studies*, 64/3 (1992), p.415; Bregnsbo, 'Denmark', pp.364-5.
[143] Hauck, p.309 n.3.

aftermath of the First English Civil War meant that such aid was not forthcoming from the Winter Queen's homeland. Camerarius despaired in February 1647 that England cared little for the Palatines and that they would repent missing the opportunity to intervene in the negotiations regarding their restitution.[144] Charles Louis's objections to the proposed peace terms also found little support within the empire. It has even been suggested that the agreement of the vast majority of Imperial Estates to these terms was a key factor in persuading Sweden to drop their demand for a full Palatine restoration.[145]

In addition to an absence of support both within and outside the empire, Charles Louis was also acutely aware of his family's impotence against the threat posed by more powerful states if he should reject the proposed solution to the *Pfalzfrage*. In October 1648, the elector justified his agreement to the peace terms by claiming that 'my enemyes were known to be both cunning and powerfull', and that it was wiser to prevent 'temps miseriam', than attempt anything 'post factum'.[146] However, it was not only enemies of the Palatine family who presented a danger, as the elector informed his mother in May 1647 that 'if the war continue in Germanie, it is certaine, (& soe professed by the French Ministers themselves) that France will restore nothing of what for the present they do possesse, either of their friends or Ennimies'.[147] Charles Louis repeatedly remarked on the importance of military power in dictating the terms of the final peace articles, claiming that the conduct of the negotiations showed that 'strength will still prevaile, be it right or wrong', and that, accordingly, 'there was very little consideration had of justice and aequity'.[148]

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[144] Clm: no.245: Camerarius to Streuff von Lauenstein, 11/21 Feb. 1647.
[145] Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.271; Hauck, p.82.
[146] C2.6 Art. Seld: Summary of letter to Palatine representative at Osnabrück, 27 Oct. 1648.
[147] TS 23/1/26: Charles Louis in Whitehall to Elizabeth, 28 May 1647.
[148] C2.6 Art. Seld: Summary of letter to Palatine representative at Osnabrück, 27 Oct. 1648.; TS 23/1/32: Charles Louis at Somerset House to Elizabeth, 28 Dec. 1648.

It should be noted that as the offered terms transferred the electoral dignity and Upper Palatinate to Maximilian, his children, and all the Wilhelmine line, 'whilst there shall be any Male Children in being', there was a possibility that the title and territory could eventually revert back to the Palatine Wittelsbachs. Indeed, Charles Louis's secretary wrote to Camerarius that 'the door to the said dignity is left open in case no more heirs male of the Wilhelmine line are born. This is a consideration which should not be neglected and I implore you to ask for it'.[149] It is not impossible, therefore, that this faint possibility somewhat sweetened the bitter pill which the Palatines were forced to swallow at the Westphalian negotiations. Apart from the septuagenarian Maximilian and his two young sons, the only other offshoot of the Wilhelmine line in 1647 was through his younger brother, Albrecht of Bayern-Lauchtenberg, who had already been predeceased by two of his four sons.[150] Although Steiner dismissed the prospect of an eventual recovery of the transferred lands and offices as no more than wishful thinking, one should not forget the unpredictability of the lottery of births, marriages and deaths which dictated the practice of inheritance.[151] After all, the Pfalz-Simmern line of the Palatine branch, which had ruled as electors since 1559 became extinct in the male line with the death of Charles Louis's heir in 1685, and a cadet branch of the Palatine Wittelsbachs did eventually inherit the Bavarian electorate in 1777.[152]

There was also most likely an element of face-saving in Charles Louis's acceptance of the final peace articles. It was deemed more honourable for the young elector to be seen to accept the offered terms under a pretext of *amore pacis*, rather than continue soliciting

[149] Clm: no.115: Frays to Camerarius, 30 Apr. 1647.
[150] See Appendix III.
[151] Steiner, p.190.
[152] See Appendix I.

for an alternative peace arrangement which was unlikely to be obtained.[153] Certainly, Charles Louis received a letter from the assembled electors, princes, and states at Münster in November 1648 asking him to accept the peace terms.[154] The French plenipotentiary, Servien, also wrote to the young prince to persuade him to accept the agreed articles, claiming that doing so would demonstrate Charles Louis's love of peace and his willingness to make a personal sacrifice for the general good of the Empire.[155] Such an action would supposedly afford Charles Louis the moral high-ground, enabling him to claim that his ambitions were for a good, Christian peace rather than earthly possessions and titles. Of course, this distortion of the facts would require all observers to overlook the circumstances facing the Palatine family, and disregard the metaphorical loaded gun held to Charles Louis's head by more powerful states. Nevertheless, when the young prince declared his acceptance of the peace in December 1648, he claimed that he did so in the name of peace.[156]

The final terms of the Peace of Westphalia accepted by Charles Louis in late 1648 effectively mirrored those agreed the previous year. Maximilian of Bavaria and his male successors were to receive the Upper Palatinate and the County of Cham, as well as the traditional fifth electoral dignity, in exchange for relinquishing any claim to either the thirteen million talers in military expenses owed by the emperor or the Habsburg territory of Upper Austria, which had been pledged as collateral for the debt.[157] The peace treaties also stipulated that the Palatines were not to be excluded from the general amnesty, and

[153] C2.6 Art. Seld: Summary of letter from [Unknown] at Münster to Charles Louis, 7/17 Oct. 1648; Hauck, p.86.
[154] HL/PO/JO/10/1/277: Ambassadors and Councillors of the Electors, Princes, and States of the Holy Roman Empire at Münster to Charles Louis, 8 Nov. 1648.
[155] C2.6 Art. Seld [Unfoliated]: Abel Servien at Münster to Charles Louis, 27 Nov. 1648.
[156] Meiern, *APWP*, VI, 787.
[157] IPO Article IV § 3-4/IPM Articles 11-12 in *Sourcebook*, p.306.

that Charles Louis was to be restored to the Lower Palatinate and provided with a newly-created eighth electoral title, which was to be lowest in the order of precedence in the Electoral College.[158] In addition, in the event of the Bavarian Wittelsbach branch becoming extinct in the male line, the Palatine family would recover the fifth electoral title, together with the Upper Palatinate, and the eighth dignity would be abolished.[159] However, it should be noted that the peace terms did not resolve a number of disputes relating to the offices and dignities which had previously been held by Charles Louis's ancestors.[160]

The territorial settlement of the Peace was also not limited to the separation of the Lower and Upper Palatinate between the Palatine and Bavarian branches of the Wittelsbach dynasty, described as 'simply the geographical expression of a house divided'.[161] Although the political and religious situation of the Lower Palatinate was to be reset as the status quo of 1618 before Frederick V accepted the Bohemian crown, instead of the *Normaljahr* date of 1 January 1624 which was applied to the rest of the empire, there were a number of additional terms which further reduced Charles Louis's lands.[162] In addition to Mainz reclaiming the Bergstraße, a number of loyal Imperial and Bavarian supporters were permitted to retain the fiefs in the Lower Palatinate which they had received from the emperor and Maximilian during the conflict, albeit on the condition that they accepted the Palatine electors as overlords.[163] The Peace also confirmed the restoration of three cadet branches of the Palatine Wittelsbachs, the houses of Pfalz-Veldenz, Pfalz-Zweibrücken, and that of Charles Louis's uncle and former administrator,

[158] IPO Article IV § 3,5-6 & 13/IPM Articles 11, 13-14 & 21 in *Sourcebook*, p.306.
[159] IPO Article IV § 9/IPM Article 17 in *Sourcebook*, p.306.
[160] See below pp.264-71.
[161] Thomas, p.21; IPO Article IV § 14/IPM Article 22 in *Sourcebook*, p.306.
[162] IPO Article IV § 6/IPM Article 14 in *Sourcebook*, p.306; Parker, p.182.
[163] IPO Article IV § 7 & 18/IPM Article 15 & 26 in *Sourcebook*, p.306.

Ludwig Philipp of Pfalz-Simmern-Kaiserslautern.[164] Indeed, a number of the abbeys claimed by the electors of Trier and Mainz, such as Hornbach and Sponheim, were successfully proved to be the rightful possessions of these cadet branches of the Palatine family in April 1647, and were ultimately restored to Pfalz-Zweibrücken and Pfalz-Simmern-Kaiserslautern rather than the electoral branch under the final Peace of Westphalia.[165]

The Palatine Family and the Peace of Westphalia: A Re-assessment

Several biographers of the Winter Queen have been highly critical of the settlement reached at Westphalia, claiming that the peace terms were 'at best…a compromise and at worst a defeat'.[166] However, such an interpretation has its basis in the fact that her son's acceptance of the articles was a betrayal of the increasingly deluded 'all or nothing' stance espoused by Elizabeth, who had no involvement in the Palatine efforts at Münster and Osnabrück. This view also greatly overestimates both the strength of their bargaining position and the extent of other powers' support for the Palatine cause. In contrast, her son's representatives at the congress cities acknowledged the very real possibility of the exclusion of the Palatine family from the final peace treaty. In early-1647, Camerarius relayed reports that the Palatines would receive no form of restitution whatsoever, and Streuff von Lauenstein described the rumoured abandonment of Charles Louis's cause by France and Sweden as a threat which had been present throughout the negotiations.[167] Many states may have sympathised with the plight of the Palatine family and believed that they deserved some form of restitution, but they would not allow the stubbornness of a

[164] IPO Article IV § 20-22/IPM Article 28 in *Sourcebook*, p.306
[165] Meiern, *APWP*, IV, 408-9; IPO Article IV § 20-22/IPM Article 28 in *Sourcebook*, p.306. See Appendix IV Map 2 below p.314.
[166] J. Gorst-Williams, *Elizabeth, The Winter Queen* (London, 1976), p.167; Oman, pp.371-2.
[167] Clm: nos.246, 95. Camerarius in Osnabrück to Streuff von Lauenstein, 22 Feb./4 Mar. 1647 and Streuff von Lauenstein in Münster to Camerarius, 5/15 Mar. 1647.

weak exiled dynasty to jeopardise the prospect of peace, nor risk the hard-won gains they obtained through years of arduous negotiation.

It is easy to see why the terms of the Peace of Westphalia could be regarded as a humiliating failure. By accepting the final treaty, the Palatine family effectively surrendered their more senior secular electoral title, as well as the entire Upper Palatinate, to Bavaria. However, the suggestion that the Palatines were 'losers' rather than 'gainers' of the Peace overlooks the circumstances they faced when the negotiations commenced. Charles Louis possessed nothing at the start of the congress and there was no guarantee that his situation would improve when the peace talks were concluded. The Peace of Prague had formally excluded the Palatine family and settled their hereditary lands and titles on Bavaria, and the elector did not possess any military capital or sufficient financial resources to recover them. The outbreak of civil war in 1642 also meant that England did not send representatives to Westphalia, depriving Charles Louis of the diplomatic assistance of perhaps the only European power for whom a Palatine restoration was a goal in itself, rather than merely a 'political football' or a means to an end.

The fate of the Palatine family at Westphalia therefore highlights the difficulties facing transnational dynasties in the early modern period, as their fortunes were inextricably bound to political developments and the fortunes of their allies in both Germany and the British Isles. Such a situation was further complicated by the involvement of a large number of states in the affairs of the Palatinate, none of whom were willing to jeopardise either their own interests or the prospect of peace for the Palatine family. As a self-contained event, the Peace of Westphalia should not be regarded as a defeat for the Palatines, but a modest recoup by Charles Louis of the enormous losses

incurred by his father's ill-advised gamble almost three decades earlier. It was the family's experiences of the Thirty Years' War, rather than the treaty that brought it to an end, which had been a dismal failure for the Palatine family.

Chapter 6: Happily Ever After? The Palatine Family and the Legacy of the Thirty Years' War c.1648-60

On 18 April 1649, Charles Louis and his retinue landed at Rotterdam, and embarked on the long-awaited journey to his ancestral lands. En route, the newly-restored Elector Palatine was joined by his younger brother, Philipp, he got engaged to the sister of Landgrave Wilhelm VI of Hessen-Kassel, and attended the magnificent 'Peace and Joy' feast for the military commanders and negotiators at the congress at Nuremberg on 25 September.[1] It was not until 5 October that the brothers finally set foot in the Palatinate. The inhabitants of Mosbach greeted the princes with festivities and a celebratory service of thanksgiving, with a number of schoolchildren delivering a welcome address to their long-exiled ruler which reportedly moved the gathered crowds to tears.[2] On 7 October the princes made their entry into Heidelberg, the battle-scarred capital city which Charles Louis had been forced to flee in his infancy in the opening stages of the Thirty Years' War, and which Philipp had never seen, having been born at their parents' court-in-exile at The Hague in September 1627. After almost three decades of exile, the electoral Palatine family had finally been restored.

However, this chapter will demonstrate that the trials of the Palatine family did not end with the Peace of Westphalia in October 1648. The first section will demonstrate that, whilst the signing of the general peace treaty supposedly guaranteed Charles Louis's restoration and the creation of an eighth electoral title for the Palatine family, it took almost a year for these terms to be implemented. There were also a number of issues

[1] Hauck, p. 90; H. Langer, *The Thirty Years' War*, tr. C.S.V. Salt (Poole, 1980), p.261
[2] Schaab, II, 125; Häusser, II, 583.

relating to the *Pfalzfrage* which had been left unresolved by the Peace, and would not be settled until the mid-1650s if at all. The chapter will then address the challenges faced by Charles Louis upon his return to the Lower Palatinate, and his attempts to rebuild this devastated and depopulated territory. The final section will examine Charles Louis's familial concerns by firstly determining how his conflicts with various family members over lands and money arose from a wide gulf between the expectations of his mother and siblings, and the realities facing Charles Louis as ruler of a much-reduced Palatinate. It will then be shown his dynastic policy was shaped by the political situation in the wake of the Thirty Years' War. In addition, as 1649 also witnessed the start of the Stuart dynasty's eleven-year exile, this chapter will examine the assistance provided by the restored Palatines to their newly-dispossessed relatives. An assessment of this reversal of fortune, and Charles Louis's ability and willingness to assist his penniless and landless cousin, will provide yet another valuable insight into the importance of dynastic connections for exiled ruling houses in early-modern Europe.

1648-58: Implementing the Peace of Westphalia

On the evening of 24 October 1648, the pealing of church bells and a three-volley salute from the seventy guns on the walls of Osnabrück celebrated the signature of the second of the two treaties which comprised the Peace of Westphalia, an event which is credited with bringing the Thirty Years' War to an end.[3] However, many inhabitants of the empire would have noticed little change, as approximately 180,000 troops remained on imperial soil and it is interesting to note that many Imperial Estates and cities only celebrated the end of the war once the peace was confirmed almost two years later and the

[3] F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden,* 2nd edn (Münster, 1965), p.493.

occupying armies had been withdrawn.[4] For example, there were almost as many celebrations taking place in the empire in 1650 as in the previous two years combined.[5] The delayed festivities reflected the uncertainty that the Peace of Westphalia would be any more successful at establishing a lasting peace in the empire than those of the Peace of Prague thirteen years earlier.

The difficulties in executing the terms of the Peace of Westphalia were particularly acute for the Palatine family, whose lands remained largely in the hands of Bavarian troops as well as the Spanish garrison in the city of Frankenthal. It was one thing for the treaty to decree Charles Louis's restoration to the Lower Palatinate, and for the emperor to provide assurances for the restitution of Protestant lands in February 1649, however the implementation of these terms was an entirely different matter.[6] Although the restored Elector Palatine had hoped in mid-1649 that the emperor would arrange an immediate Bavarian withdrawal from the Palatinate and persuade the Spanish to return Frankenthal within three months, it would be almost three years until Charles Louis received all of the territories pledged in the Peace of Westphalia.[7]

The pressing matters of troop payment and withdrawal, and the restoration of Protestant property, led to the Swedish generalissimo, Karl Gustav of Pfalz-Zweibrücken-Kleeburg, calling for a new conference at Nuremberg, resulting in a special Execution Congress being held in the city between April 1649 and July 1650 to implement the Peace

[4] Langer, *War*, p.261; D. Croxton, *Westphalia: The Last Christian Peace* (Basingstoke, 2013), p.321; A. Oschmann, *Der Nürnberger Exekutionstag 1649-1650: Das Ende des Dreißgjährigen Krieges in Deutschland* (Münster, 1991).
[5] C. Gantet, 'Peace Celebrations Commemorating the Peace of Westphalia in Southern German Cities and the Recollection of the Thirty Years' War (1648-1871)', in K. Bussmann and H. Schilling, *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, 3 vols. (Münster, 1998), I, 649.
[6] Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.321.
[7] Bromley, pp.148-50.

of Westphalia.[8] Most representatives still in Westphalia moved to Nuremberg to participate in the *Exekutionstag*. Derek Croxton claims that the Palatine restitution was 'the most important case in dispute during the summer of 1649', and Charles Louis travelled to Nuremberg in September 1649 in order to participate in the debates.[9] The elector was able to enjoy active support from Karl Gustav at Nuremburg in his capacity as the Swedish plenipotentiary. This distant cousin of Charles Louis, who had been promoted to commander of the Swedish forces in Germany in June 1647 and would succeed Queen Christina as monarch in 1654, strove to ensure that the matter of Palatine restitution was settled as soon as possible.[10] However, it was not until Charles Louis ratified the 1648 peace treaty in September 1649, and renounced his dynasty's claims to the Upper Palatinate for as long as the Wilhelmine Line of the Bavarian Wittelsbachs continued in the male line, that the emperor officially restored him to the entirety of the Lower Palatinate, with the exception of Frankenthal.[11] As the gains afforded to Maximilian by the Peace had now been ratified, the Bavarian forces withdrew from the Lower Palatinate, handing over the city and castle of Heidelberg to Hessian troops, with the last soldiers leaving the territory two days before Charles Louis made his solemn entry into the capital on 7 October 1649.[12]

The issue of Frankenthal was more difficult to resolve due to the ongoing Franco-Spanish War, which would continue until 1659. The French garrison at Philippsburg on the southern border of the Lower Palatinate, and the Spanish military possession of the

[8] Oschmann, *Exekutionstag*, p.12.
[9] Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.323; Hauck, p.91.
[10] J.G. von Meiern, *Acta Pacis Executionis Publica, oder Nürnbergische Friedens-Executions-Handlungen und Geschichte, in denen enthalten, wie die Vollziehung des Westphälischen Friedens geschehen ist,* (2 vols., Hannover, 1736-7), I, 98; Croxton, *Westphalia*, pp.323-4; Hauck, pp.90-1; Oschmann, *Exekutionstag*, pp.269-70.
[11] Meiern, *APEP*, I, 271-2, 276 (mislabelled as p.476).
[12] Schaab, II, 125; Steiner, p.193.

fortress of Frankenthal in the middle of the territory, posed the risk that the devastated lands recovered by Charles Louis would become a military thoroughfare once again. Ferdinand III attempted to persuade Spain to evacuate Frankenthal, as it presented the risk of creating a common cause between France and the Palatinate, however he had no special leverage over Philip IV, whom he had abandoned to fight the French alone.[13] Although there had been a rumour at Münster in July 1649 that Spain and the Palatines would negotiate a separate agreement regarding Frankenthal, it was not until June 1650, shortly before the end of the *Exekutionstag*, that some semblance of an agreement was reached between the diet's participants regarding the town.[14] Until the Spanish garrison was withdrawn, Charles Louis was to hold the Imperial City of Heilbronn in pledge and receive 8,000 talers per month, collected from the Swabian and Frankish Imperial Circles, to maintain a garrison there. The Elector Palatine was also to receive an additional 3,000 talers per month from the Imperial Paymaster as compensation for the loss of revenues from Frankenthal. As indemnity against any future harassment and encroachment by Spanish troops, Charles Louis was also exempted from paying contributions for the maintenance of the imperial army so long as the foreign garrison remained at Frankenthal, and the emperor would compensate any damages by levying taxes on the Lower Saxon Circle. In addition, the estates of the Upper Rhenish Circle were to assist in providing financial support for the Spanish garrison in order to protect the villages in the vicinity of Frankenthal from rapacious raiding, although this was later replaced by a general imperial tax.[15]

[13] Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.325.
[14] *CSPV 1647-52*, 110.
[15] Meiern, *APEP*, II, 313-14; Oschmann, *Exekutionstag*, pp.405-6; V. Sellin, *Die Finanzpolitik Karl Ludwigs von der Pfalz. Staatswirtschaft im Wiederaufbau nach dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Stuttgart, 1978), p.60.

The French complained that these terms violated the Westphalian peace by pledging financial support for their Spanish enemies, and sought support from the Upper Rhenish estates, including Charles Louis's uncle Ludwig Philipp, and threatened that the French garrison at Philippsburg would be forced to support itself by scouring the surrounding area.[16] However, the outbreak of the Fronde in 1648 reduced France's ability to influence the negotiations, and, in spite of the German estates' refusal to continue fulfilling the financial obligations of the agreement in October 1650, no other alternative was immediately forthcoming. Indeed, Charles Louis speculated in May 1651 that, 'as long as Philipsburg is in the French hands, or the war continue between that Crown and Spain, they will not quit Franckendal'.[17] It was not until Spring 1652 that an agreement was eventually reached which resulted in the Spanish withdrawal.[18] In exchange for 500,000 talers, as well as Besançon, the sole remaining Imperial Free City in Franche-Comté, Philip IV agreed to evacuate Frankenthal. The Spanish garrison withdrew from the town on 2 May 1652, completing the territorial restitution promised to Charles Louis by the Peace of Westphalia over three-and-a-half years earlier.[19]

Whereas Charles Louis was able to recover the Lower Palatinate, there were a number of disputes relating to the offices and dignities previously held by his ancestors which were not addressed in the peace treaty and remained unresolved. For example, the final Peace made no mention of any arch-office to accompany the eighth electoral title created for Charles Louis. As the honour of the electors was bound to these prestigious positions, Charles Louis stubbornly continued to claim the traditional Palatine arch-office of Arch-Steward, *Archidapifer,* ignoring the fact that this title was inextricably bound to

[16] Meiern, *APEP*, II, 789-91; Oschmann, *Exekutionstag*, pp.448-9.
[17] Bromley, p.156.
[18] Wendland, pp.22-3.
[19] Croxton, *Westphalia*, p.326.

the fifth vote in the Electoral College and had therefore been transferred to Bavaria. In May 1649, Charles Louis informed his mother that his initial ratifications of the final peace treaty had not been accepted at Münster 'because my title of Archidapifer was in the frontispiece of them'.[20]

The newly-restored elector initially refused to surrender his pretensions to the title until a new arch-office had been created for him and his descendants, however it was not until August 1652, shortly before the Electoral Diet at Prague, that the emperor granted Charles Louis the title of Arch-Treasurer, *Architesaurarius*.[21] Charles Louis was also granted the heraldic symbol of the Aachen imperial crown, which he was to carry in his hands, rather than on a velvet cushion, at the coronation of Ferdinand IV as King of the Romans in June 1653.[22] The significance of the arch-office and related insignia can be seen in how the elector had himself depicted in broadsheets and portraits. For example, fig.2, produced in 1654, shows Charles Louis in his electoral regalia holding the imperial crown. Charles Louis's behaviour supports Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger's assertions regarding the continued importance of the ceremonial alongside politics. After all, the privileged position of the electors partly derived from their arch-offices and the performance of symbolic services, and, as Stollberg-Rilinger states, 'an honor…that was not visible would invariably disappear sooner or later'.[23]

[20] Bromley, p.146.
[21] Meiern, *APEP*, I, 273; Oschmann, *Exekutionstag*, pp.153, 274; Hauck, pp.103-4; B. Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor's Old Clothes: constitutional history and the symbolic language of the Holy Roman Empire,* tr. T. Dunlap (New York, 2015), p.155.
[22] Stollberg-Rilinger, *Clothes*, p.156.
[23] Ibid.



Fig.2. Print of Charles Louis (Regensburg, 1654).[24]

The contrast of Charles Louis's new title and his dire financial situation was a source of mirth for one French ambassador, who joked that the Elector Palatine was a treasurer without treasure.[25] In this new role, Charles Louis was given the task of distributing coins to the cheering crowds at imperial ceremonial events, however it should be noted that this role was less prestigious than that of Arch-Steward, as he would have no

[24] Print of Charles Louis, Elector Palatine, Regensburg, 1654, British Museum, London https://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=3351763&partId=1&people=43903&peoA=43903-1-6&page=1 (20 May 2019).
[25] Schaab, II, 126.

contact with the emperor himself whilst undertaking his new duties.[26] The elector faced further embarrassment after falling from his horse on the first occasion that he performed this role at the coronation of Ferdinand IV in June 1653, sustaining an injury to his arm which plagued him for several months afterwards.[27]

The Peace of Westphalia also did not specify whether the Palatine or Bavarian branch of the Wittelsbach dynasty would act as administrator of the empire, in the capacity of Imperial Vicar, if an emperor died without an appointed successor having been elected King of the Romans. This role had been bestowed on the electors of the Palatinate by the Golden Bull, but the Peace did not confirm whether the office was linked to the title 'Elector of the Palatinate' or to the fifth electoral dignity, which was now in the possession of Bavaria. Unsurprisingly, both Wittelsbach branches purported to be the rightful *Reichsvikar* when Emperor Ferdinand III died in 1658, having been predeceased by his elected heir four years earlier.[28] One heated dispute on the matter in mid-1658 descended into insults and objects being hurled, with the Bavarian ambassador Dr Öxel calling Charles Louis 'the Son of a rebell', to which the elector responded by calling the envoy a 'pedant' and throwing an inkhorn at his face.[29] However, Charles Louis also hit the representative of the Elector of Trier, and reportedly sent him a considerable amount of wine by way of apology.[30] Elizabeth commended her son's response to the Bavarian insult as 'verie just', and Charles Louis claimed that 'my only fault was, that in my anger, I missed my aime and did not hit him right as he deserved, and that I did not imbroader his

[26] J. Duindam, 'The Habsburg Court in Vienna: Kaiserhof or Reichshof?', in R. Evans & P. Wilson (eds.), *The Holy roman Empire, 1495-1806: A European Perspective* (Leiden, 2012), p.106; Hauck, p.104; Stollberg-Rilinger, *Clothes*, pp.130-1.
[27] J.C. Lünig (ed.), *Theatrum Ceremoniale Historico-Politicum, Oder Historisch- und Politischer Sachau-Platz Aller Ceremonien* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1719-20), I, 1157; Wendland, pp.28-30.
[28] Hartlib: 39/3/7A: Henry Oldenburg at Geneva to Samuel Hartlib, 21 May 1658; Schaab, II, 131; *CSPV: 1657-59*, 104.
[29] Hartlib: 39/3/11A: Oldenburg at Frankfurt to Hartlib, 5/15 June 1658.
[30] Schaab, II, 131.

nose as well with Inke as I did his band and Coat'.[31] Although the Elector of Saxony recognised Ferdinand Maria of Bavaria as his fellow *Reichsvikar* prior to the election of Leopold I in July 1658, no solution was found until the Palatine and Bavarian electors agreed to act as joint vicars in 1724. However, the issue ultimately became moot when elector Karl Theodor of the Palatinate inherited the Electorate of Bavaria in 1777.[32]

The Palatinate and the Legacy of the Thirty Years' War

In addition to these political issues, Charles Louis was forced to confront the consequences of three decades of devastation in his lands. Even the traditional seat of the palatine electors, Heidelberg Castle, had been so severely damaged over the course of the Thirty Years' War that Charles Louis had to rent a residence called the Commissariat House until repairs had been completed.[33] The central role of the Palatinate in the opening stages of the Thirty Years' War and its geographic situation as a gateway for France into the empire led to the territory becoming a thoroughfare for almost all of the major participants over almost three decades. By October 1632, the Lower Palatinate had already become 'so ruined, that it [was] almost a desert', and this devastation only became more severe after the French entry into the war in 1635, with the result that Charles Louis was writing to the emperor in 1653 that many villages in his recovered territories still lay entirely wasted.[34] It should be noted, however, that there were only a few cases of a settlements undergoing total destruction, with Mannheim being the only city in the Lower Palatinate which had been reduced to rubble during the conflict. In most instances, areas

[31] Wendland, pp. 90, 94.
[32] Schaab, II, 131.
[33] H. Forester (ed.), *Memoirs of Sophia, Electress of Hanover* (London, 1888), p.37.
[34] SP 81/39 f.148: Sir Henry Vane in Strasbourg to Sir John Coke, 11/21 Oct. 1632; A. Schindling, 'Die reformierten Kurfürsten aus der Linie Pfalz-Simmern und das Heilige Römische Reich (1559 bis 1685)', in W. Kreutz, W. Kühlmann and H. Wiegand (eds.), *Die Wittelsbacher und die Kurpfalz in der Neuzeit: Zwischen Reformation und Revolution* (Regensburg, 2013), pp.40-1; Sellin, *Finanzpolitik*, p.98.

had simply been abandoned. For example, almost half of the villages and hamlets in the district of Kaiserslautern were entirely devoid of inhabitants by 1648.[35]

Although the earlier assertions of a 90-98% loss in population over the course of the war were exceedingly pessimistic, it is clear that the Lower Palatinate was one of the worst-affected areas.[36] A number of scholars have noted the difficulties in determining an average demographic estimate of the impact of the Thirty Years War on the empire, due to the vast variation in experiences between different areas, as well as the use of the anachronistic criteria of the 1871 and 1914 borders of the German Reich.[37] More recent scholarly consensus reduces the total estimated population decline to somewhere between 15-30% between 1618 and 1648.[38] However, even the most conservative estimates suggest that the population of the Palatinate fell by 60%, with other studies claiming a demographic decline of up to 80%.[39]

As with attempts to determine a broad average of population decrease for the empire as a whole, there was considerable variation between areas within the Lower Palatinate. For example, the towns of Bretten and Hedelsheim lost an estimated 50% and 68% respectively, whereas the areas around Heidelberg and Mosbach each experienced a population decline of approximately 80%.[40] The city of Kaiserslautern was an extreme

[35] Schaab, II, 121.
[36] Oman, pp.371-2; C.V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1938), p.512; Häusser, II, 583; J. Theibault, 'The Demography of the Thirty Years War Re-visited: Günther Franz and his Critics', *German History*, 15/1 (1997), p.2.
[37] J. Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire* (2 vols., Oxford, 2012), I, 633; *Tragedy*, pp.786-8; Parker, p.211.
[38] Parker, p.215; *Tragedy*, p.787.
[39] G. Franz, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg und das deutsche Volk: Untersuchungen zur Bevölkerungs- und Agrargeschichte*, 4th edn (Stuttgart, 1979), p.59; Schaab, II, 121; K. Kollnig, *Wandlungen im Bevölkerungsbild der pfälzischen Oberrheinebene* (Heidelberg, 1952), p.14; Schindling, 'Kurfürsten', pp.40-1.
[40] Sellin, *Finanzpolitik*, p.99; Schaab, II, 121.

example, experiencing a loss of 94% of its inhabitants by the end of 1635.[41] Although earlier scholars have attributed this decrease to the storming of the city by imperial troops in July 1635, describing it as a bloodbath, it is unlikely that 3,000 of the 3,200 pre-war population met their end at the besiegers' swords.[42] Indeed, the violence of invading armies often played only a small role in the population decrease of affected areas. Even in the sack of Magdeburg in May 1631, which saw 80% of the population perish and became a benchmark for brutality, relatively few of the 20,000 inhabitants and defenders killed in the storming of the city died by the sword. Rather, the majority died in the conflagration, which had almost certainly been started accidentally, or had suffocated whilst hiding in their cellars.[43] It was primarily the financial ruin, famine and disease which accompanied plundering invading armies, rather than military violence, which contributed to high rates of mortality and migration to less devastated areas. For example, a member of the earl of Arundel's embassy to the emperor in 1636 recorded that, at Bacharach, 'poor people are found dead with grass in their mouths', and Sir Thomas Roe wrote in June 1638 of desperate Palatine inhabitants pulling down their houses to sell the timber in order to buy bread.[44]

The destruction and demographic devastation suffered by the Palatinate also presented Charles Louis with a disastrous financial situation. Between 1618 and 1648, the value of taxable assets in the Lower Palatinate plummeted from 18.8 million to 3.8 million gulden, and the annual revenue crashed by almost 83%.[45] In addition, although Charles

[41] Schaab, II, 121.
[42] Häusser, II, 537.
[43] *Tragedy*, pp.767-70.
[44] F.C. Springell, *Connoisseur & Diplomat: The Earl of Arundel's Embassy to Germany in 1636 as recounted in William Crowne's Diary, and the Earl's letters and other contemporary sources with a catalogue of the topographical drawings made on the journey by Wenceslaus Hollar* (London, 1963), p.58; SP 81/44 f.159v: Sir Thomas Roe in Hamburg to Coke, 29 June 1638.
[45] *Tragedy*, p.803.

Louis was to receive the 3,000 talers per month in compensation for the Spanish occupation of Frankenthal and 8,000 to maintain the garrison at Heilbronn, these payments were frequently delayed, placing an even greater pressure on his finances. In a letter of September 1650, the elector despaired that, if the Elector of Mainz also defaulted on the payment of 100,000 gulden for Charles Louis's surrender of the Bergstraße, 'I am banquerout, both with your Majesty, the merchants at Franckfort, and my own servants'.[46] Charles Louis had already petitioned the Imperial Estates in December 1648 to request a reduction in the quota to be provided by his newly-reduced electorate for the satisfaction of the Swedish army, claiming that the loss of the Upper Palatinate and the Bergstraße would scarcely provide sufficient revenue to maintain his electoral rank.[47] Indeed, the debts of the Palatinate were so catastrophic that the emperor granted a moratorium for ten years in May 1653, as well as an exceptional 50% reduction in interest payments for a further decade.[48]

Such fiscal concessions, together with the instructions of Charles Louis's decree in December 1654 regulating the debts incurred before and during the war, helped to ease the financial pressure faced by the elector, as did the occasional windfall in the form of generous subsidies.[49] For example, the French paid Charles Louis 285,000 gulden in a deluded attempt by Mazarin to sway the electors to vote for Louis XIV in the 1658 imperial election.[50] However, much of these payments, together with portions of the compensation for Frankenthal and almost half of state revenues, were invested in the

[46] Bromley, pp.152-4; Sellin, *Finanzpolitik*, p.60; Schaab, II, 135.
[47] J.G. von Meiern, *Acta pacis Westphalicæ publica, oder Westphälische Friedens-Handlungen und Geschichte, verfasset und beschrieben von J.G. von Meiern* (6 vols., Hannover, 1734-6), VI, 789-90.
[48] C. Hattenhauer (ed.), *Schuldenregulierung nach dem Westfälischen Frieden* (Frankfurt am Main, 1998), pp.161-2; *Tragedy*, p.804.
[49] Hattenhauer, *Schuldenregulierung*, pp.163-5.
[50] C.J. Ekberg, 'Abel Servien, Cardinal Mazarin, and the Formulation of French Foreign Policy, 1653-1659', *IHR*, 3/3 (1981), p.326.

rebuilding of the Lower Palatinate.[51] Charles Louis proclaimed to his mother in 1661 that 'I assure your Majesty I lay up no money at interests out of the revenue of the Palatinate, but have spent a great deal of what I got by other means, for the bettering of it'.[52] Certainly, the elector's court expenditure was managed with extreme parsimony and vigilance. For example, excessive servants were dismissed, and the elector's kitchen expenses and the sums employed on stocking his cellars were 62.7% and 35.8% of the amounts spent during his son's reign.[53] In addition, the elector stripped his parents' residence at Rhenen of hangings and furniture to replace those destroyed or stolen from Heidelberg Castle instead of purchasing new items.[54] Charles Louis even attempted to sell the hunting lodge at Rhenen to raise additional revenue, however he was ultimately unable to find a buyer.[55] Although contemporary observers praised Charles Louis's frugal revenue management, after almost twenty-five years of careful fiscal management, the value of taxable assets in the Lower Palatinate had increased to barely a quarter of the pre-war levels.[56]

Family relationships

The physical and economic rebuilding of the Lower Palatinate, especially the religious toleration which facilitated the mass migration essential for the repopulation of his devastated lands and saw the re-establishment of Jewish communities for the first time since 1390, earned Charles Louis the admiration of contemporaries and subsequent scholars.[57] An agent of John Thurloe claimed that the elector '[governed] his states,

[51] Sellin, *Finanzpolitik*, p.60; Schaab, II, 135.
[52] Bromley, pp.234-5.
[53] Sellin, *Finanzpolitik*, pp.87, 41.
[54] Wendland, p.62.
[55] Ibid., p.150.
[56] Thurloe, VI, 99; Sellin, *Finanzpolitik*, p.77.
[57] J.H. Clapham, 'Charles Louis, Elector Palatine, 1617-1680: An Early Experiment in Liberalism', *Economica*, 7/28 (1940), pp.391-2; Hauck, pp.184-85; Schaab, II, 134.

revenues, and court, judiciously, frugally, splendidly', and even Veronica Wedgwood, perhaps the most vociferous critic of Charles Louis in the existing scholarship, acknowledged that he 'truly earned the title of the "Good Elector"'.[58] However, it has been argued by several biographers of Elizabeth of Bohemia that the Palatine restitution 'accentuated Charles Louis's churlishness', and that he was the only child of the Winter Queen 'to be totally selfish, totally ruled by self-interest, and, in the end, totally indifferent to her'.[59] Such an assessment is scarcely surprising, as many of these scholarly works draw heavily on the numerous and voluminous complaints Elizabeth wrote to, and about, her son, claiming that 'I shall have neither meat, nor bread, nor candles…I believe he means to starve me out of this place', and 'I cannot live upon the aire'.[60]

Certainly, the restoration of the Palatine family appeared to have little impact on the fortunes of the Winter Queen. Elizabeth's debts continued to balloon, reaching 644,212 Dutch guilders excluding interest in May 1654, with the result that her creditors blocked any attempt to leave The Hague.[61] In spite of the sale of much of her remaining plate and pawning her most precious jewellery, the Winter Queen's court was plunged into such financial straits that she could scarcely afford to have her linen cleaned, and would on occasion be forced to go without turf for cooking and domestic heating, candles, bread, and drink.[62] The summer residence at Rhenen also fell into such disrepair that it was deemed uninhabitable, and her servants were 'almost starved for lacked board wages' and

[58] Thurloe, VI, 99; C.V. Wedgwood, 'The Elector Palatine and the Civil War', *History Today*, 4 (1954), p.10.
[59] J. Gorst-Williams, *Elizabeth The Winter Queen* (London, 1977), p.178; R.K. Marshall, *The Winter Queen: The Life of Elizabeth of Bohemia, 1596-1662* (Edinburgh, 1998), p.101; J. Saxton, *The Winter Queen* (London, 1977), p.190.
[60] Wendland, pp.8-9; Green, p.379.
[61] Bod.: MS Clarendon 80 f.374: List of the Common Creditors of the Queen of Bohemia, 20 May 1654; S. Groenveld, 'Könige ohne Staat: Friedrich V. und Elizabeth als Exilierte in Den Haag, 1621-1632-1661', in P. Wolf et al. (eds.), *Der Winterkönig, Friedrich von der Pfalz: Bayern und Europa im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart, 2003), pp.181-2; Wendland, pp.31, 43.
[62] For examples see Wendland, pp.24, 49, 56-7, 97.

threatened with arrest for their own debts.[63] Elizabeth held Charles Louis responsible for her financial situation, claiming that the pension from her son, which fluctuated between 500 and 2,000 talers per month, was insufficient, and that his enemies would rejoice in her poverty and that 'the shame uill be yours'.[64] In addition, she accused him of withholding funds from her, and later blamed him for not settling her debts in The Hague or redeeming her jewels.[65]

During the 1650s, Elizabeth was heavily dependent upon the financial support of Lord Craven, who provided 16,000 livres to subsidise her court between October 1650 and March 1651 alone and over 30,000 livres to redeem jewels pawned by Charles Louis and Elizabeth, until his estates were sequestered by the Commonwealth in October 1652.[66] After being deprived of this valuable source of finance, the Winter Queen relied on the charity of the States General, who provided her with 1,000 guilders per month for her subsistence, having previously given Elizabeth a one-off payment of £6,000 as a demonstration of sympathy following the execution of Charles I.[67] It was not until after the restoration of Charles II that Elizabeth received sufficient financial assistance to allow her to depart from The Hague. As a princess of the blood, the Winter Queen received a payment of £10,000, as well as an annual pension of £12,000.[68] Although Elizabeth informed her son in mid-1660 that the new king 'has undertaken it himself that the parlement shall pay my debts', her Dutch creditors were still petitioning the English

[63] Wendland, pp.29, 80; Thurloe, I, 673.
[64] Rousham Hall, Oxfordshire: Transcript Letters: Johan Jacob Frays to Sir Charles Cottrell, 15/25 Oct. 1654 (postscript); Wendland, pp.35, 106.
[65] Wendland, p.191.
[66] Bod.: Craven Estate Papers 80: Account book of Lewis Ziegler as Lord Craven's agent in Holland, 1649-53; M. Brod, 'The Uses of Intelligence: The case of Lord Craven, 1650-60', in G. Southcombe and G. Tapsell (eds.) *Revolutionary England, c.1630-c.1660: Essays for Clive Holmes* (Abingdon, 2017), p.112.
[67] Wendland, p.57; Thurloe, I, 122; *CSPV: 1647-52*, 88.
[68] CJ, VIII, 170, 234; Craven Estate Papers 315: Letters Patent, Grant of £1,000 a month to the Queen of Bohemia, Oct. 1661; Green, p.408.

government for outstanding sums as late as April 1667, over five years after her death.[69] The protracted disputes with the elector led Elizabeth to retire to her homeland, rather than returning to the Palatinate, demonstrating how the experience and legacy of exile could tear ruling dynasties apart. Indeed, relations with her son had deteriorated to the extent that, whereas Elizabeth had previously professed that Charles Louis was her favourite child, even 'when he was but a second sonne', her will bestowed everything of value elsewhere.[70]

The relatively small sums Charles Louis gave his mother, his rejection of any liability for her debts, and his attempts to claim ownership of all of his late father's property, going as far as trying to prevent the transport of Elizabeth's goods to England when she journeyed to England in 1661, have been interpreted as spiteful by several of her biographers.[71] However, such works tend to overlook the extent of the ruinous fiscal situation inherited by Charles Louis after the Thirty Years' War. For example, when Elizabeth scolded her son for apparently ignoring her frequent requests for corn and wine from the Palatinate, and her assertions that he would incur little costs by paying for their transport in kind, Charles Louis retorted that 'they think corn and wine groweth here with no more cost and hazard than mushrooms'.[72] In his exasperation, the elector declared that if Elizabeth knew anyone who could produce wine and corn in such high quantities that he could afford to give them away and not be worse off, 'I wish they may come up and rent all my revenue in that kind; and I am content to receive one third less in money of what it is worth in the best years'.[73]

[69] Wendland, pp.143-44, 148; MS Clarendon 85 f.444: Instructions to ambassadors at Breda, [Apr.] 1667.
[70] Akkerman, II, 458; Green, pp.409-10; Oman, p.441.
[71] Bromley, pp.236-37; Wendland, p.204.
[72] Bromley, pp.233-5.
[73] Ibid. as well as p.231.

When one looks beyond the evocative language of Elizabeth's correspondence, it appears as though she was ignorant of the extent of the devastation left by three decades of conflict and the dire financial situation facing the newly-restored elector in his attempts to rebuild and consolidate his lands. Charles Louis chided his mother in February 1651 that if he provided her with more money than he could spare, he risked becoming vulnerable 'against any that uill put mee out of the fruition of what I haue so dearely acquired'.[74] In January 1661, the elector responded to his mother's suggestion that he had not provided her with enough financial assistance since his restitution by declaring that he hoped she would 'examine what my expences and receipts were' over the previous twelve years.[75] It is also important to note that the monthly pension of 2,000 talers provided by Charles Louis , which Elizabeth deemed insufficient, was eight times larger than the yearly financial provisions he initially made for his brothers Rupert and Edward combined.

Although it is easy to sympathise with Elizabeth's plight, it should be noted that some of her demands were simply impossible to meet. For example, she demanded the 3,000 talers per month which was intended as compensation for the Spanish occupation of Frankenthal, as it was one of her dower towns, and asserted that Charles Louis should be content with the 8,000 talers provided for the maintenance of the Palatine garrison at Heilbronn. Confusingly, she claimed that 'I thought I eased much your other reveneues by asking it'.[76] Charles Louis responded that 'little or nothing will remaine for a surplus' after paying the costs of maintaining the Heilbronn garrison 'in the condition it ought to bee in for Men, Ordonnance, Armes, ammunition, Victuals and fortification'.[77] In addition, when

[74] Wendland, p.14.
[75] Bromley, pp.234-5.
[76] Wendland, pp.2-4.
[77] Ibid., p.6.

it appeared that Elizabeth would be forced to leave the Netherlands for the Palatinate following the peace between the States General and the Protectorate regime in early-1654, the Winter Queen expected to take up residence in one of her dower towns, writing to Charles Louis that 'I hope you uill now think also of building Frankendale'.[78] In the meantime, however, she made particular requests for a suite of rooms at Heidelberg Castle, asking her son to 'let me have those, that have the most chambers upon one floore.[79]

Even Elizabeth's major-domo, Sir Charles Cottrell, believed that Elizabeth's insistence on the rebuilding of the near-ruined Frankenthal was fanciful. Although he suggested that Charles Louis could mollify his mother by appearing willing to prepare an appropriate residence for her in the town, Cottrell stated that 'I have no desire she should be anywhere but at Heydellberg, & I shall ever be of the same mind because I believe shee can be nowhere so well'.[80] However, the elector clearly believed that his mother would have to adjust her expectations if she returned to the depopulated and financially and physically ruined Palatinate. Writing to Cottrell, Charles Louis claimed that 'I must needs be in feare that neither here no[r] att Frankendal, the Q[ueen] will be well satisfied wth hir Lodgings', blaming the 'want of good Masters, workmen & materials, wch for money are not to be had, especially good fine glass & dry boards, because they are everywhere soe scant'.[81] Nevertheless, Elizabeth berated her son in early 1661 for 'never [making] the least shew of preparing Frankendale for me'.[82] She claimed that her son was obliged to build her a residence in the town, disregarding his protests that the devastation of the area necessitated the building of a new property, 'which to do on a sudden, or in a few years,

[78] Rousham Hall: Transcript Letters: Cottrell to Charles Louis, 26 Jan. 1654; Wendland, p.36.
[79] Wendland, p.36.
[80] Rousham Hall: Transcript Letters: Cottrell to Charles Louis, [Undated].
[81] Ibid: Charles Louis to Cottrell, 18/28 Feb 1654.
[82] Wendland, p.191.

my purse was never yet in a condition for it'.[83] Charles Louis made a similar case to Lord Chancellor Clarendon, claiming that, without a resumption of the pensions awarded by James I and Charles I, he 'could find no feasible meanes towards the satisfying of her Mtys great pretensions', especially as all he had previously offered 'was esteemed little, or nothing satisfactory'.[84]

The financial and territorial difficulties faced by Charles Louis upon his return to the Lower Palatinate were also the source of disagreements with his brothers and sisters. It is certainly true that Protestant princes tended to support partition more ardently than their Catholic counterparts as their faith prescribed fairness to all male offspring, who could no longer be provided for with careers in the church.[85] Even electoral dynasties, such as Brandenburg and the Palatines, circumvented the practice of primogeniture enjoined in the Golden Bull by creating secundogenitures for younger sons out of territories which had been acquired after the Bull's introduction in 1356, whilst the electoral title and core lands were passed to the eldest son.[86] However, several scholars have asserted that the economic and political consequences of the Thirty Years' War persuaded 'even the most stubborn defenders of partible inheritance' that the practice threatened dynastic survival, with many princes subsequently adopting the custom of primogeniture.[87] Nevertheless, there was still an expectation that Charles Louis would provide financial support for his sisters and partition areas from his much-reduced and devastated electorate for his younger brothers.

[83] Ibid., p.194; Bromley, pp.236-7.
[84] MS Clarendon 75 f.161: A Memoriall for the Ld High Chancel. Of England, 7 Sept. 1661.
[85] P. Sutter Fichtner, *Protestantism and Primogeniture in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1989); R. Bonney, *The European Dynastic States 1494-1660* (Oxford, 1991), pp.527-8; Whaley, *Germany*, I, 486-7.
[86] Whaley, *Germany*, I, 487.
[87] Sutter Fichtner, *Primogeniture*, p.72; F.L. Carsten, *Princes and Parliaments in Germany From the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1959), p.436.

The obligation for Charles Louis to provide for his siblings, in spite of the ruined and depopulated state of his reduced electorate, was recognised in the Treaty of Osnabrück. The emperor was obliged to pay 400,000 talers over a period of four years to allow Charles Louis to fulfil his obligations to his brothers, and each of the elector's four sisters were to receive 10,000 if they married.[88] As neither Elisabeth nor Louise Hollandine married, with both choosing a religious life in the early-1660s and ultimately becoming the Abbesses of Herford and Maubuisson respectively, the emperor was not obliged to subsidise their maintenance.[89] In contrast, it was decided at the Prague Recess in 1652 that Charles Louis would be assigned the shares of two of his recently-deceased siblings.[90] The youngest Palatine brother, Philipp, had died fighting Spanish troops in the battle of Rethel in December 1650 whilst serving as a colonel in the duke of Lorraine's army, and Henriette Marie succumbed to a fever in September 1651 shortly after her marriage to a brother of the Prince of Transylvania. The elector was likewise allowed to claim the portion intended for Maurice after the latter, acting as Rupert's vice-admiral in the exiled Charles II's navy, was lost at sea near the Virgin Islands in September 1652.[91] However, whilst Charles Louis received the 10,000 talers which the emperor was obliged to provide upon Henriette Marie's marriage, it appears that he obtained less than 77,000 of the 200,000 talers initially owed to the elector's deceased brothers by the time of his own death in 1680.[92]

[88] IPO Article IV § 12, 15/IPM Articles 20, 23 in Wilson, *Sourcebook*, p.306.
[89] A. von Rohr, 'Die Pfalz-Kinder: Timon, Le Diable, Willlull Ned, Signora Antica, Mademoiselle sans Façon und die Successio Britannica', in Wolf et al (eds.), *Der Winterkönig, Friedrich von der Pfalz: Bayern und Europa im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart, 2003), pp.213-14.
[90] Sellin, *Finanzpolitik*, p.60.
[91] von Rohr, 'Kinder', pp.211-15.; Wendland, pp.37-8, 42, 43; Thurloe, II, 386, 427.
[92] Sellin, *Finanzpolitik*, p.60.

Although the sums prescribed by the Peace of Westphalia were intended to alleviate the pressures facing the elector, both Rupert and Edward expected that Charles Louis would provide them with secundogenitures partitioned from the reduced electorate. In the preamble to an agreement signed by Charles Louis and Edward in May 1653, the elector claimed that the loss of the Upper Palatinate and the lucrative Bergstraße, as well as the ruined state of the Palatinate, meant that 'we have trouble to maintain ourselves and our people according to our condition'. In exchange for a guarantee never to contest the terms of this accord, Edward was to be granted property in either of the villages of Eußerthal or Schönau, as well as the annual sum of 2,000 gulden for six years, increasing to three thousand thereafter.[93] The following year, Charles Louis agreed to provide Rupert with 2,500 gulden per year, with this amount to be raised to 4,000 after five years.[94]

This financial arrangement was more generous than that agreed with Edward. However, as the second son, Rupert was expected to receive a greater portion than his younger brother and, unlike Edward, he did not have a wealthy wife. Indeed, Edward's wife, Anna was the main provider for the couple, as it was the sale of her personal goods which allowed the couple to purchase a house in Asniéres as well as the estate of Le Raincy which had a combined value of at least 650,000 livres tournais.[95] The issue of a territorial appanage for Rupert, however, would not be resolved for almost two decades, with the hostility between the brothers coming to a head in late-1656. After being denied entry into Heidelberg castle on the instructions of Charles Louis, who forbade admittance to anyone whilst he was not in residence, Rupert swore a solemn oath that he would never

[93] BL: Egerton MS 2542 ff.102-3v: Agreement between Charles Louis, Elector Palatine, with his brother Edward concerning appanage, 1653.
[94] Wendland, p.45; Hauck, p.253.
[95] R. Pillorget, 'Die Kinder Friedrichs V. v. d. Pfalz in Frankreich: Philipp, Eduard und Luise-Hollandine, Äbtissin von Maubuisson', *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte,* 44 (1981), pp.260-61

again set foot in his ancestral lands.[96] Some scholars, such as Karl Hauck, claim that the younger brother was at fault for demanding what Charles Louis could not possibly provide, whilst numerous biographers of Rupert criticise the elector for mistreating his brother and not granting the territorial holdings that he desperately needed in order to secure an advantageous marriage.[97]

This fraternal conflict clearly demonstrates the clash between the traditional expectations of younger scions of ruling dynasties and the realities facing German princes in the wake of the Thirty Years' War. There were some territories demanded by Rupert, such as the district of Kaiserslautern, which could not be granted as the Westphalian peace had confirmed them as the formal property of other branches of the Palatine family.[98] Others, which had been offered by Charles Louis, were rejected by his younger brother as unsuitable. For example, Laubach was dismissed as 'a damnably watery place; no man can live there in good health', and Umstadt was in a perpetual boundary dispute between the Palatinate and Hessen-Darmstadt.[99] Whilst these offers have been seen by some scholars as deliberately provocative, Charles Louis does appear to have been willing to provide for his brother in spite of his reluctance to further fragment the electorate. For example, he proposed granting Rupert 'the totalle part I have in the Ampt Weyden', but with the proviso that the sovereignty of the area would remain with the elector.[100]

[96] *CSPV: 1655-56*, 289; Thurloe, V, 541; P. Morrah, *Prince Rupert of the Rhine* (London, 1976), p.296.
[97] See Hauck, p.256; F. Kitson, *Prince Rupert: Admiral and General-at-Sea* (London, 1998), p.122; Morrah, *Rupert*, pp.293-94; von Rohr, 'Kinder', p.211.
[98] Warburton, III, 466-7; von Rohr, 'Kinder', p.211.
[99] K. Hauck (ed.), *Die Briefe der Kinder des Winterkönigs* (Heidelberg, 1908); Morrah, *Rupert*, p.295.
[100] Kitson, *Admiral*, p.122; Wendland, pp.151-3.

The conflict between Charles Louis and Rupert was not resolved until the brothers signed an agreement, with Charles II as guarantor, in September 1670.[101] As well as confirming the 1654 arrangement, Rupert was to receive the Rhenen hunting lodge, 4,000 additional gulden per year, and an additional 2,000 in grain and wine in exchange for renouncing his claim to the jewels, plate, furniture and ready money bequeathed by their mother.[102] In addition, Charles Louis would be liable for the remaining 45,000 owed by the emperor under the terms of the Peace of Westphalia unless Rupert received the outstanding sum within seven years.[103] However, Rupert would never return to the Palatinate, even when the electoral Palatine branch faced extinction in the male line and the prospect of the electorate passing to the Catholic Pfalz-Neuburg branch. When it became apparent that the marriage of Charles Louis's sole male child would not produce any offspring to secure a future succession, the elector beseeched Rupert to return to his ancestral lands, marry, and father legitimate male offspring. Rupert simply replied that his brother had 'caused me to take a solemn oath to God that I will never more set foot in the Palatinate' and 'my sworn, if regrettable, oath I will keep'.[104]

The disputes over the lands extended beyond the main electoral line, as several cadet branches of the Palatine family also sought to recover their territories which had been lost and devastated during the Thirty Years' War. In April 1647, a representative of duke Friedrich of Pfalz-Zweibrücken at the Westphalian negotiations contested that the monastery of Hornbach and the abbey at Sponheim belonged to the houses of Pfalz-Zweibrücken and Pfalz-Simmern-Kaiserslautern respectively, and so should not be

[101] Craven Estate Papers 315: Agreement between Charles Lewis Elec. Pal. and his Bro. Prince Rupert touching Pr Rupert's Apponage, 22 Sept. 1670; *CSPD: 1670 With Addenda 1660-70,* 419.
[102] Hauck, p.259; Green, p.410; Oman, p.441.
[103] Hauck, p.259.
[104] Quoted in E. Scott, *Rupert, Prince Palatine* (New York, 1899), p.290.

incorporated in Charles Louis's restoration to the Lower Palatinate.[105] Accordingly, the Peace decreed that Friedrich recovered his rights to Hornbach, as well as rights to the Rhine tolls at Vilzbach, and both the houses of Pfalz-Simmern-Kaiserslautern and Pfalz-Veldenz were to recover the lands they held before the war.[106] Nevertheless, in the early-1650s Charles Louis entered into a protracted dispute with his uncle, Ludwig Philipp, and sought to claim the counties of Sponheim and Lautern for himself.[107] The elector's suit was supported by Elizabeth, who wrote the county of Simmern alone had always been the traditional secundogeniture for the younger brother of an Elector Palatine, and that 'I wish you had all, that has bene given from your house by your ancestours'.[108] In particular, the Winter Queen encouraged Charles Louis to challenge his uncle's claims to Sponheim, even though many of the key cities and towns within the county had been bequeathed to Ludwig Philipp by his father in 1610 as part of his secundogeniture.[109]

The dispute was finally resolved at the Reichstag held at Regensburg in late-1653.[110] Charles Louis was granted immediate control over one-fifth of the county of Sponheim and two-thirds of the district of Stromberg, as well as a number of church lands in the district of Lautern. It was also agreed that control of Kaiserslautern was to be returned to the electoral branch upon Ludwig Philipp's death, and the remainder of Lautern, with the exception of Ottenberg, would likewise be absorbed into the electorate after the deaths of both Ludwig Philipp and his wife, as would ultimately happen following Maria Eleanora's death in February 1675.[111] Finally, the county of Simmern, as

[105] Meiern, *APWP*, IV, 408-9.
[106] *Sourcebook*, p.307.
[107] Schaab, II, 126.
[108] Wendland, pp.22-3.
[109] Ibid.; Häusser, II, 247.
[110] Wendland, p.31.
[111] See Appendix IV Map 3, below p.315.

well as the smaller districts of Wolfstein and Rockenhausen, were to remain with Ludwig Philipp's descendants.[112] The elector appears to have been somewhat dismissive of the arrangement, claiming that 'if I had been sure of a quick dispatch in law, I should not have quitted my right at so small a rate', but the outstanding territories would ultimately revert to Charles Louis after his uncle's only surviving son, Ludwig Heinrich, died without issue in 1674.[113]

Dynastic Policy

As a newly-restored ruler, it was imperative for Charles Louis officially to re-establish traditional alliances and forge new friendships within the network of European princes. Traditionally, the most effective means of doing this was through the practice of dynastic marriage, as this would not only demonstrate recognition of Charles Louis's recently-acquired official electoral status, but also offered the potential of increasing Palatine influence in other European courts, acquiring more territory, and providing military support. However, the implied ties of obligation created through dynastic marriages was almost entirely subjective, as they depended entirely on the willingness and ability of individual rulers to respect them. In addition, such ties could be severely weakened, or entirely dissolved, with the deaths of certain figures. Accordingly, the execution of Charles I and the exile of the Stuarts, as well as the death of Christian IV of Denmark in February 1648, risked robbing the restored Palatine family of the future assistance of two kingdoms which had been some of their greatest supporters in the recent conflict.

[112] Schaab, II, 126; Bromley, pp.159-60.
[113] Bromley, pp.159-60.

An examination of the dynastic policies pursued by the Palatine family after 1648 provides a valuable insight into the importance of familial connections for early-modern ruling dynasties, especially those that were weak and vulnerable like the Palatinate. In addition, as confessional concerns continued to dictate marriage practices in the wake of the recent conflict, this section will examine the extent to which Charles Louis's willingness to act with pragmatism in matters of religion and domestic policy also influenced his dynastic ambitions and the pool of potential matches for the Palatine family.

In February 1650, Charles Louis married Charlotte of Hessen-Kassel in an elaborate ceremony at Kassel. The elector was enamoured with his tall, beautiful bride, and the union initially appeared to be a great success. Charles Louis's sister, Sophia recorded that 'at that time one would have said that their love was likely to be of lifelong duration', as evidenced by the public kissing and 'continual embracing' of the pair.[114] In addition, in just over three years of marriage, Charlotte had given birth three times, with two of the children, Karl and Elizabeth Charlotte, surviving to adulthood. However, the initial prescience of the medals struck in anticipation of the wedding, depicting Cupid proclaiming 'I have succeeded', soon proved premature as the union descended into farce.[115] The marital strife, which Sophia speculated was caused by Charles Louis's jealousy and Charlotte's foul temper, led to a scandalous separation in 1657.[116] In a public declaration, the elector proclaimed his intent to exercise his prerogative as ultimate arbiter in religious and secular matters within his territory to dissolve his marriage to a

[114] Forester, *Memoirs*, p.39.
[115] Gold medal of Charles Louis and Charlotte of Hessen-Kassel, 1649, British Museum, London https://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=952406&partId=1&people=43903&peoA=43903-1-6&page=1 (20 June 2019).
[116] Forester, *Memoirs*, pp.39-40; L. Fehrle-Burger, *Königlische Frauenschicksale zwischen England und Kurpfalz* (Mannheim, 1965), pp.135-46.

'disobedient, obstinate, distressing and unruly' wife, and live in an honest and Christian manner with one of his wife's ladies-in-waiting, Luise von Degenfeld.[117]

In January 1658 the elector contracted a morganatic, and arguably bigamous, marriage with Luise, which Charles Louis likened to that of John of Gaunt and Katherine Swynford.[118] The elector's new bride was given the title of *Raugrafin,* and produced thirteen children before her death in March 1677. Charlotte, however, never acknowledged her marriage to Charles Louis as legally terminated, and even continued residing at Heidelberg. This arrangement earned the condemnation of the elector's mother. Indeed, Elizabeth deemed it 'against Gods law and mans law', and claimed that 'your open keeping that wench doth you no smale dishonour to all persons of all conditions', and even Sophia recorded that she was unwilling to visit Charles Louis's new bride, 'that the world might suppose me to approve my brother's divorce'.[119]

The elector's ill-fated decision to marry Charlotte, a woman ten years younger than himself, in spite of his future mother-in-law's warnings about her daughter's foul temper, has led to suggestions that Charles Louis got engaged in a moment of madness after being captivated by Charlotte's 'beautiful sparkling eyes, full pouting lips, and very fine teeth'.[120] One recent biographer of the Palatine daughters describes her as a 'seventeenth-century equivalent of a trophy wife', a suggestion supported by Sophia's portrayal of her as obsessed with clothes and incredibly vain, claiming that her sister-in-law's sole thought at the imperial diet at Regensburg was 'how best to display her beauty before this great

[117] W.L. Holland (ed.), *Schreiben des Kurfürsten Karl Ludwig von der Pfalz und der Seinen* (Tübingen, 1884), pp.15-16.
[118] Ibid., p.107; Wendland, p.157.
[119] Wendland, p.92, 154-5; Forester, *Memoirs*, p.95.
[120] Fehrle-Burger, *Frauenschicksale*, p.135; Hauck, p.90. Description of Charlotte from Forester, *Memoirs*, p.36.

assembly'.[121] However, such an interpretation overlooks the sound dynastic and political reasons which made Charlotte a suitable bride. In addition to the wedding further strengthening the relationships between the leading Calvinist imperial states, following the union of Charles Louis's first cousin, Hedwig Sophia of Brandenburg, to Wilhelm VI of Hessen-Kassel in 1649, Charlotte was also arguably the most eligible Calvinist match at the time of their marriage. Indeed, both sisters of the Elector of Brandenburg were already married, as was Charlotte's elder sister, and it is unlikely that Charles Louis would have considered a match with the princely house of Orange, as this would have meant marrying a daughter of his mother's former lady-in-waiting, Amalia van Solms. The union with Charlotte also proved financially beneficial for Charles Louis as, in addition to her dowry, the bride brought 16,000 talers as *Paraphernalgeld*.[122]

Charles Louis's priorities for dynastic marriages can be clearly seen in the negotiations surrounding the marriage of his sister, Henriette Marie, to Sigismund Rákóczi, the younger brother of Prince Georg II of Transylvania, in June 1651. This match, which had been orchestrated by the bride's sister Elisabeth and their paternal aunt Elisabeth Charlotte, the dowager electress consort of Brandenburg, did not meet with Charles Louis's approval.[123] Although Elisabeth attempted to persuade her brother of the prospective groom's financial and Calvinist credentials, describing him as 'the richest and most desirable match that could be found amongst the Protestants', factors which won the support of the Winter Queen, Charles Louis was concerned that Henriette Marie would be marrying beneath her rank.[124] Indeed, the elector felt it necessary to write to Ferdinand III

[121] N. Goldstone, *Daughters of the Winter Queen: Four Remarkable Sisters, the Crown of Bohemia, and the Enduring Legacy of Mary, Queen of Scots* (New York, 2018), p.265; Forester, *Memoirs*, pp.37-8, 49.
[122] Sellin, *Finanzpolitik*, p.54.
[123] von Rohr, 'Kinder', p.214; Hauck, p.266; Bromley, pp.152-4.
[124] Oman, pp.385-6.

to confirm whether Sigismund's princely title was recognised by the empire before he ultimately consented to the union.[125] Tragically, the marriage lasted only a few months before Henriette Marie died of a fever in September 1651, followed by her widowed husband the following February.

Considerations of status also played a key role in the betrothal of Charles Louis's son, Karl, to Princess Wilhelmine Ernestine of Denmark in 1671. Although Karl had no inclination towards the marriage, his father welcomed the prospect of marrying his son into a royal dynasty, as well as the dowry of 100,000 talers provided by the bride's brother Christian V.[126] Likewise, the union of Elizabeth Charlotte to Philippe I, Duke of Orléans, in 1671 was driven by Charles Louis's desire for a royal dynastic match with a powerful potential military ally who would otherwise pose a threat to the Palatinate's western frontiers.[127] It is ironic, therefore, that the devastating French invasion of the Palatinate in 1688 was conducted on the pretext that Louis XIV was championing his sister-in-law's claim to the duchy of Simmern following the death of her childless brother and the transfer of the electorate to the Pfalz-Neuburg line in 1685.[128] In addition, the longstanding debts owed to the Palatine electors by the French crown were also to be settled through the non-payment of a dowry, relieving the financial pressure on Charles Louis, as well as freeing him from the near-impossible task of recovering the French debts.[129]

Although some writers view the conversion of Charles Louis's daughter as further evidence that the elector's Calvinist faith was less significant than it had been for his

[125] Bromley, pp.152-4.
[126] Hauck, p.282; K. Kollnig, *Die Kurfürsten von der Pfalz* (Heidelberg, 1993), p.74; Schaab, II, 143.
[127] Schaab, II, 140.
[128] Ibid., 149-53; D. Onnekink, 'The Last War of Religion? The Dutch and the Nine Years War', in D. Onnekink (ed.), *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648-1713* (Farnham, 2009), p.69.
[129] Sellin, *Finanzpolitik*, pp.62-3.

father, it should be noted that Charles Louis did not sacrifice his daughter's beliefs on the altar of state interests. Indeed, the elector decreed that 'Liselotte' should only undertake instruction in Catholic doctrine at her own free will, and his correspondence shows his grief at her conversion.[130] Although Frederick would never have countenanced a Catholic match for any of his children, nor would any of his predecessors have approved of the extent of the religious toleration granted to the inhabitants of his ancestral lands, this does not mean that the Calvinist faith was not important to Charles Louis. Unlike his father, however, Charles Louis's strategies and actions during his exile and thirty-year reign were not dictated by his private religious observance. It should also be noted that, although the Peace of Westphalia extended religious toleration to include Calvinism, the faith had lost all of the political momentum it had possessed during Frederick's reign and reflected a general Protestant decline post-Westphalia. In the period between 1648 and 1769, 31 German princes converted to Catholicism, and the balance in the Electoral College was overwhelmingly in the Catholics' favour by 1700, with only the electors of Brandenburg and Hanover facing seven Catholic electors.[131] The ranks of the four Catholic electorates before 1648 were bolstered by the elevation of Maximilian of Bavaria to electoral rank, the Pfalz-Neuburg inheritance of the Palatinate, and the conversion of Augustus II of Saxony in 1697.

The Palatine and Stuart Dynasties in the 1650s

The 1650s witnessed a dramatic reversal in the fortunes of both the Palatine family and their Stuart relatives, as Charles Louis was restored to Heidelberg just as his cousins were forced into exile. As the elector's experiences in the 1630s and '40s, and his dynastic

[130] Schaab, II, 140; Hauck, *Briefe*, pp.225-6.
[131] *Tragedy*, pp.767-8; A.C. Thompson, 'After Westphalia: Remodelling a Religious Foreign Policy', in Onnekink, *War and Religion*, p.64.

policy following the Palatine family's restoration, demonstrate the elector's belief in the potential value of familial connections for dispossessed rulers, it is important to examine the support he provided for his Stuart relatives. In particular, whether he and his contemporaries felt that he was obliged to assist the dispossessed Charles II, either due to the strength of the familial ties between the two dynasties or to repay their cousins for the assistance provided by the Stuarts during their own exile. An examination of Charles Louis's treatment of his exiled Stuart relatives in the 1650s, as well as the contemporary reaction to his actions provides a valuable insight into the usefulness of dynastic connections between early-modern dynasties, as well as the expected obligations that were implied by such ties.

The exiled Charles II certainly hoped to receive assistance from his Palatine relatives, shown by the fact that Maurice and Edward were the first and third individuals to be invested as Knights of the Garter following his accession in 1649, Charles Louis and Rupert having been inducted into the order by Charles I.[132] In addition, Charles II also made a clumsy attempt to court Charles Louis's youngest sister, Sophia, in 1649 in a supposed attempt to induce the prospective bride to secure finance from her family friend, Lord Craven, for the exiled king. Although Elizabeth was in favour of the match, Sophia was offended by this scheming, as well as Charles's attempt to compliment her by claiming that she was more attractive than 'Mrs Barlow', the name used by his mistress Lucy Walter at The Hague.[133]

[132] J.N., *A perfect catalogue of all the knights of the most noble Order of the Garter: from the first institution of it until this present April, Auno 1661* (London, 1661), p.31.
[133] Oman, pp.403-4; Forester, *Memoirs*, pp.22-5; J.N. Duggan, *Sophia of Hanover: From Winter Princess to Heiress of Great Britain, 1630-1714* (London, 2010), pp.41-2.

There was also a belief amongst royalist circles that Charles Louis was obliged to assist his exiled Stuart relatives because of his close family relationship to Charles II, as well as to repay the assistance given to the elector's family by the British crown over the previous thirty years. Clarendon described Charles Louis as 'so nearly allied to the Crown, and so much obliged by it', and Elizabeth later argued that the elector owed the Stuarts 'a thankfulness and respect' for the efforts of her father and brother on behalf of the Palatine cause.[134] By not providing the assistance expected of a close and indebted relative, Charles Louis's conduct was regarded as doubly despicable. Apparently demonstrating the same disloyalty as he had shown by his allegiance to parliament in the Civil War, the newly-restored elector appeared to be not only ignoring his obligation to his cousins, but also displaying immense ingratitude for the efforts of James I and Charles I for the Palatine cause over the past three decades.

Certainly, when compared to the rest of his family, Charles Louis's actions smack of ingratitude and familial disloyalty. Although Elizabeth's biographers often conveniently ignore her acquiescence of her eldest son's adherence to parliament during the civil war, and her willingness to accept their money, she became vociferously opposed to the regime which had executed her brother.[135] The Winter Queen likened Cromwell to the beast in the Book of Revelation and refusing to acknowledge the existence of the Commonwealth.[136] One letter of intelligence to London in June 1654 compared The Hague to a 'nest of malignant vypers', and claimed that Elizabeth's court, together with that of Princess Mary, 'nourishes those creatures'.[137] However, Lisa Jardine goes too far in claiming that

[134] W.D. Macray (ed.), *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England Begun in the year 1641, by Edward, Earl of Clarendon* (6 vols., Oxford, 1888), V, 361; Wendland, p.163.
[135] Gorst-Williams, *Elizabeth*, p.158; J. Ross, *The Winter Queen: The Story of Elizabeth Stuart* (New York, 1979), p.128; Oman, p.361. For a more accurate depiction see Akkerman, II, 13.
[136] Oman, p.373.
[137] Thurloe, II, 344.

Elizabeth refused money from the parliament, as she did attempt to procure the reinstatement of her pension after it was discontinued by the new regime in May 1649.[138] Nevertheless, Elizabeth never recognised the legitimacy of the Commonwealth, even though such an action could have helped to procure the resumption of her £10,000 annual pension or the payment of the arrears of numerous other annuities awarded by Charles I and the parliament from the late 1630s, totalling 100,969*l.* 3*s* 4*d*.[139] Indeed, she openly criticised the States General for acknowledging Cromwell as Lord Protector, and intimated that any member of her household holding intercourse with parliamentarian representatives at The Hague would be thrown down the stairs and forcibly removed.[140] Elizabeth even wrote to Charles Louis that she hoped he would command his agents in The Hague not to visit ambassadors St John and Strickland, claiming that 'if you doe it, you will doe yourself much wrong'.[141] Whilst she could not provide financial support to her nephew, Elizabeth was present at the negotiations between Charles and the Scots Presbyterian royalists at Breda, and sought to utilise her broad diplomatic and familial connections on the continent to circulate information and correspondence on her nephew's behalf.[142]

The younger Palatine brothers also found employment in their cousin's service. Rupert and Maurice both served in the Royalist navy, with the former also acting as Charles II's Master of Horse between 1653-5. The close relationship between Charles and

[138] L. Jardine, *Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland's Glory* (London, 2008), p.88; Thurloe, I, 184, 189-90; idem, III, 526; *CJ*, VI, 205.
[139] Craven Estate Papers 315: Abstract of Arrears due to Elizabeth of Bohemia drafted by Sir Abraham Williams at Westminster, 6 June 1651.
[140] Wendland, p.36; Oman, p.373.
[141] Wendland, p.15.
[142] A. Hughes and J. Sanders, 'Gender, Exile and The Hague Courts of Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia and Mary, Princess of Orange in the 1650s', in P. Mansel and T. Riotte (eds.), *Monarchy and Exile: The Politics of Legitimacy from Marie de Médicis to Wilhelm II* (Basingstoke, 2011), p.53 and their article 'The Hague Courts of Elizabeth of Bohemia and Mary Stuart: Theatrical and Ceremonial Cultures', *Early Modern Literary Studies*, Special Issue 15 (2007), p.16; *CJ*, VI, 545-46.

Rupert was also evidenced by an invitation to England following the Stuart restoration.[143] Rupert settled in London at the start of 1662, where he was appointed to the Privy Council before being made Lord High Admiral in 1673, a post he held until his death in November 1682.[144] Even Edward created a minor diplomatic incident in March 1651 by confronting the parliamentarian representatives in The Hague, and '[telling] them they were Rogues…grinding his teeth at them, and calling them Dogs'.[145] Although the English ambassadors complained to the States General of the 'high dishonour and abuse', and Edward was made to apologise, albeit half-heartedly, Elizabeth confided her pleasure to Charles II by writing that her son had done no more than call the parliamentarian delegates 'by their true names'.[146] In contrast, Charles Louis could be seen as having abandoned his relatives to their plight and acting with pettiness in personal interactions with the exiled Stuarts. Of all the electors, the Palatinate provided the smallest amount of financial aid to the exiled Charles II as part of the pension awarded by the emperor at the Diet of Regensburg in 1653.[147] In addition, the elector did not write to Henrietta Maria after Charles I's execution, he did not invite Charles II to be godfather of his son, Karl, and he apparently deliberately snubbed his cousins in public.[148]

It is important to note, however, that the secondary literature which criticises Charles Louis's conduct towards his Stuart relatives in the 1650s is largely based on the memoirs and correspondence of leading royalist figures who would be understandably critical of an apparent unwillingness of the elector to assist his dispossessed cousins. The Anglo-centric scholarship also tends to overlook the depleted state of the Palatinate, and

[143] Wendland, pp.147-8.
[144] M. Ashley, *Rupert of the Rhine* (London, 1976), p.157; Kitson, *Admiral*, p.138.
[145] *Mercurius politicus* (514 vols., London, 1650-60), XLIV (3-10 Apr. 1651), p.713.
[146] Thurloe, I, 179; Oman, p.364; Elizabeth to Charles II, 29 Mar/8 Apr 1651 in Green, p.431.
[147] SP 81/54 f.106: Contributions of the Circles of Germany, 9/19 Jan. 1655.
[148] Bromley, pp.150-1, 155; Macray, *Clarendon*, V, 361.

how that reduced the elector's ability to support the royalist cause in the 1650s. Accordingly, it has been suggested that Charles Louis was a 'sordid hypocrite' who 'had his revenge on the children of Charles I for the way their father had slighted him'.[149] For example, Charles Louis has been accused of refusing to offer protection to his young cousin, Henry, duke of Gloucester, when Parliament wished to release him to the elector's care.[150] On 11 September 1650, the parliament at Westminster issued an order instructing that Henry was to receive an annual pension and be sent to Heidelberg, and Elizabeth begged her son 'to accept him upon anie conditions…for Gods sake make no scruple in receaving him so he be out those divells hands'.[151] It should be noted that Elizabeth clarified in a subsequent letter that her passionate entreaties were 'in case the parliament shoulde desire you to take him', rather than because an offer had actually been made, and that Charles Louis should not actively petition parliament for custody of Henry, claiming that 'if you shoulde seak to have him, I know woulde make them jealous of some plot'.[152] Indeed, it appears that the new regime changed their minds, rather than Charles Louis refusing to assist his young cousin. On 18 October 1650, the Council of State decreed that 'considering the change of affairs in Scotland, it is now their opinion that Scotland is the most fit place for [Henry]' rather than Heidelberg.[153] The following month, the Council ordered that the duke was to be confined to Carisbrooke Castle 'in regard of the insurrections already begun', and he would ultimately remain on the Isle of Wight until he was permitted to depart to reunite with his siblings on the continent in February 1653.[154]

[149] Warburton, III, 428; Wedgwood, 'Elector', p.10.
[150] Wedgwood, 'Elector', p.10.
[151] *CJ*, VI, 466; Wendland, p.10.
[152] Wendland, p.11.
[153] *CSPD: 1650*, 392
[154] Ibid., 449; *CSPD: 1652-3*, 162.

The relations between Charles Louis and his exiled relatives appear to have been initially amicable, with Charles II congratulating his cousin upon his marriage, and the elector professing his devotion to the king's service.[155] Prior to the diet at Regensburg in 1653, even Henrietta Maria thanked Charles Louis for all the assistance he was to provide her son, and the king wrote to the elector that 'I am very glad, to heare that you have so much power with the emperor, being most confident that you will imploy it for my benefit'.[156] At the diet, Charles Louis allowed the Stuart representative at Regensburg to use his coaches, an overt display of support for his exiled cousin, and in 1654 it was rumoured that the king would relocate to the Palatinate after being compelled to leave France.[157] It appears, however, that relations between the elector and his royal cousin had deteriorated by the end of 1655. Clarendon claimed that it was the Elector of Mainz who had obtained the pledge of a subsidy for Charles II from the Imperial Estates at the diet of Regensburg, rather than Charles Louis, who was one of the many German princes who did not contribute.[158] It was also alleged that, when the exiled king was at Cologne, 'the Elector of Heydlebergh, so nearly allied to the Crown, and so much obliged by it, did not think fit to take any notice of the King's being so near him, or to send a messenger to salute him'.[159] Conversely, Charles II rebuffed his cousin's repeated invitations 'both by letters and a person of honour' to come to Heidelberg, and even deliberately avoided Charles Louis when he travelled to Frankfurt personally to invite them to his capital.[160]

It is likely that one key factor which led to the deterioration of relations between Charles Louis and Charles II was the fact that the Palatine elector provided far less

[155] Hauck, *Briefe*, pp.41, 67; MS Clarendon 43 f.307: Charles Louis to Charles II, 2/12 Sept 1652.
[156] Hauck, *Briefe*, pp.74-5: Henrietta Maria and Charles II to Charles Louis, 24 and 25 Dec 1652.
[157] *CSPV: 1653-54*, 24, 232.
[158] Macray, *Clarendon*, V, 350.
[159] Ibid., 361.
[160] Thurloe, IV, 88; Wendland, p.66.

financial support to the exiled Stuarts than his fellow electors, despite having the nearest familial obligation. A note of the contributions received from the Electoral Rhenish Circle in January 1655 reveals that the Palatinate provided half the amounts granted by both the electors of Mainz and Cologne.[161] Although Elizabeth claimed that 'I ame not so unreasonable to think that you have the same revenues out of the lower Palatinat as the king had', and Clarendon conceded that 'all the German princes were at that time very poor', both evidently expected Charles Louis to provide a greater level of financial and material support than was forthcoming.[162] This suggests that they were either ignorant of the extent of Charles Louis's financial difficulties and the extent of the devastation in his recovered lands, or felt that it should make no difference.

For example, in July 1653, Charles Louis was criticised for denying his cousin the one hundred tuns of Rhenish wine per year which had supposedly been an ancient right of the kings of Scotland, instead granting 'a civil concession of the duties on so much as a Prince might consume in his own home'.[163] Hyde claimed that the elector insisted instead that 'a civility must not grow into a right' and that only twelve tuns per year were to be provided for the king's use.[164] In addition, Elizabeth chided her son in June 1660 for his 'unkindness' towards the recently-restored Charles II during his exile, claiming that 'I ame sure he had a full purpose to visit you at Heidelberg, but you made so manie scruples to no purpose about it as he heasilie saw you had no minde to see him there'.[165] These 'scruples' were presumably requests to limit the size of his retinue, in order to relieve the pressure on Charles Louis's tightly-controlled household expenditure. However, as the size of a court-

[161] SP 81/54 f.106.
[162] Wendland, pp.8-9; Macray, *Clarendon*, V, 350.
[163] MS Clarendon 46 f.86: Edward Hyde to [Belins/Beling], 25 July 1653.
[164] Ibid., f.87v: Hyde to Middleton, 25 July 1653.
[165] Wendland, p.147.

in-exile helped to legitimise a dispossessed ruler's royal and noble pretensions, such limitations would be deemed unacceptable by the exiled Stuarts and their supporters, even if Charles Louis could not afford to maintain a second court at Heidelberg.

Although Charles Louis certainly sent envoys to England during the interregnum to appeal for the reinstatement of the annual pension awarded to him by parliament in 1645, an action which earned him widespread and lasting condemnation from his mother and royalist exiles, it is important to note that he only did so in the late-1650s.[166] Whilst this action could be regarded as a selfish exhibition of familial disloyalty, especially when compared to the actions of his mother and siblings, Charles Louis was burdened with responsibilities to his newly recovered lands and people and his actions should be regarded as driven by financial necessity. Given the slow recovery of the Palatine economy, with the value of taxable assets in the Lower Palatinate only increasing by approximately £7,000 per year between 1659 and 1673, the resumption of an annual pension of £8,000 would be a valuable lifeline.[167]

However, despite 'fair words' to the Palatine envoy, and promises that Charles Louis's pension would be debated in parliament, the matter was never raised in the House of Commons.[168] It should also be noted that Charles Louis was not the only cousin of Charles II to make favourable overtures to the Lord Protector in the interests of statecraft, as Louis XIV signed the Treaty of Paris with the Protectorate regime in March 1657. Nevertheless, Elizabeth damned her son's actions, proclaiming 'lett that action of yours dye in affliction for there is no excuse for it', and that 'there is great difference betwixt

[166] MS Clarendon, 53 f.144v: 'Jo. Jennings' to Hyde, 1 Jan. 1657; Wendland, p.163; *CSPV: 1657-59*, 99, 102.
[167] Sellin, *Finanzpolitik*, p.77.
[168] *CSPV: 1657-59*, 122.

your kindred and the frensh kings, my Brother was not his oune Uncle, who was murthered by Cromwell'.[169] Such condemnation demonstrates not only the contemporary belief in the perceived strength of dynastic connections, but also how the implied financial and diplomatic obligations of such familial ties, as well as financial expectations, could prove incompatible with the realities of early modern Europe.

Conclusion

Whilst the Peace of Westphalia did not bring about a European peace in 1648, it is still widely claimed that the treaty resolved the *Pfalzfrage*. However, this chapter has demonstrated that the difficulties faced by the Palatine family continued after the Peace and the return of Charles Louis to the Lower Palatinate, contradicting the contemporary interpretation of restoration as simply the ultimate victory for exiled regimes and marking the end of their trials. An examination of the impact of the severe economic, physical, and demographic devastation of the restored Palatinate, together with the resulting familial tensions within its ruling dynasty demonstrate the difficulties facing restored rulers in the wake of the Thirty Years' War. In addition, the continued disputes with Bavaria in the 1650s also demonstrate the significance attached to the ceremonial roles alongside political offices, especially for electors, in the attempts to re-establish some degree of status quo ante bellum in the empire after 1648.

The criticism received by Charles Louis for failing to provide substantial financial and diplomatic assistance to his exiled Stuart relatives, as well as his mother and siblings, in spite of his strained circumstances and the devastation of his restored territories demonstrates the strong contemporary belief in the obligations arising from dynastic

[169] Wendland, p.168.

connections. Although familial concerns often took a back seat in the statecraft of early modern regimes when honouring such commitments ran counter to other policy objectives, this did not negate dynastic considerations as integral components of the geopolitical landscape of early modern Europe.

Conclusion: Experiences of Exile in Early Modern Europe

In his 1903 biography of Charles Louis, Karl Hauck claimed that the brief flourishing of the reduced Palatinate under the restored elector was not the dawn heralding a bright new day, but rather the last flash of sunlight before the darkness of night which fell with the extinction of Charles Louis's house in the male line in 1685 and a French invasion three years later .[1] Although most of the difficulties encountered by the Palatinate after 1648 were specific to its individual circumstances, Charles Louis faced many of the same issues as a large number of other restored rulers and regimes in early modern Europe. The restitution of an exiled dynasty or individual was undoubtedly a victory in itself, as the alternative would be exclusion and oblivion. However, whilst a restoration was often regarded as an attempt to turn back the clock to some form of status quo ante bellum, this was rarely the outcome. Just as the political position of the Palatine family within the Empire was somewhat lessened as a result of being downgraded within the Electoral College, as well as their considerable financial difficulties, the authority of Charles II after 1660 was less than that of his father, and the restoration did not banish the issues facing earlier Stuart monarchs.[2] Similar to the partition of the Palatine electorate under the Peace of Westphalia, the duchy of Lorraine lost much of its territorial integrity with the Treaty of Vincennes in February 1661. Although this agreement facilitated the restoration of Duke Charles IV of Lorraine, he was obliged to surrender a number of villages to allow the creation of a 'French Corridor', which would allow their troops to pass into Germany unhindered.[3]

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[1] Hauck, p.88.
[2] R. Hutton, *Restoration: A Political and Religious History of England and Wales, 1658-1667* (Oxford, 1985), pp.181-2; T. Harris, *Restoration: Charles II and His Kingdoms, 1660-1685* (London, 2005), pp.60-7; G. Tapsell, *The Personal Rule of Charles II, 1681-85* (Woodbridge, 2007), pp.20-1.
[3] P. McKlusky, *Absolute monarchy on the frontiers: Louis XIV's military occupation of Lorraine and Savoy* (Manchester, 2013), p.18.

Despite the numerous forms of exile practised in early modern Europe, ranging from external and internal banishment, and expulsion either by another state or a ruler's own subjects, it is possible to see general trends in the experience of exile in the period. The unique position of the Palatine family during the Thirty Years' War as both dispossessed royalty, as well as proscribed members of the Imperial nobility, also makes them a useful counterpoint against which to compare the circumstances of 'regal' exiles, such as the Jacobites and Marie de Medici, as well as Imperial Princes like the landgraves of Hessen-Kassel. As with the vast majority of exiles in early modern Europe, the Palatine family between 1632 and 1648 were in the seemingly hopeless position of lacking the resources deemed necessary to recover the Palatinate, especially substantial military and financial capital. The contradiction between a dispossessed regime's ambitions and their assets made it inevitable that an exile's reach would exceed their grasp.

As this thesis has demonstrated, exiled elites rarely possessed sufficient recourses to be able to recover their lost lands and titles independently. In most cases, the only ways in which dispossessed regimes and rulers were able to act with agency was through promoting their legitimacy and publicising their pedigree, keeping their cause alive whilst simultaneously attempting to attract support on the European diplomatic stage. In such circumstances, the significance of dynastic capital was especially acute. For exiled regimes without independent military or financial resources, the exploitation of ancestry and familial connections offered the possibility of obtaining much-needed support. The importance of such ties and status can also be seen in the unique financial concessions granted to Charles Louis in the 1650s, but which were not afforded to other restored Imperial Princes whose territories had been left devastated by the Thirty Years' War, such

as the dukes of Mecklenburg and Württemberg. Although Eberhard III of Württemberg's lands had incurred an estimated 58.7 million florins in damages and military exactions during the second half of the conflict, he did not enjoy the exemption from financial payments which was granted to Charles Louis in 1653.[4] In addition to considerations of the condition of his reduced electorate, this unique arrangement was undoubtedly influenced by his pedigree and need to maintain the image expected of an electoral dynasty. This example is a further demonstration of the benefits to be gleaned from the Palatine family's position as both 'royal', through Elizabeth's Stuart heritage, as well as the 'quasi-royal', due to the pre-eminent position of electoral dynasties above the other Imperial Princes.

By highlighting the importance of display and image as complementary to real political power in early modern Europe, this thesis has also shown that the spending of the Palatine family during their exile should not be attributed to sheer profligacy. In an age of sumptuary laws, conspicuous consumption was a useful means, albeit a financially crippling one, by which dispossessed rulers could attempt to assert their professed rank and obtain recognition from other powers. The importance of recognition for exiled regimes is also demonstrated by the strategies employed by the Palatine family to obtain support for their restitution. In addition to engaging in 'presence culture', through Charles Louis's visits to the Stuart court and attending the negotiations at Hamburg to promote his cause, the Palatine exiles exploited printed media. By publishing manifestos and pamphlets in numerous languages, as well as tailoring the content of such documents to appeal to different groups, shows that the Palatine family were attempting to appeal to the broadest possible audience to attract support for their restoration.

[4] *Tragedy*, p.784.


The importance for exiles of being acknowledged as the rightful holder of certain lands and titles is demonstrative of a central finding of this thesis: the deciding factor in a dispossessed regime's eventual restoration was whether it coincided with the interests of more powerful states. Just as French interests kept Charles IV of Lorraine out of his duchy for over twenty-five years, their desire to weaken the Habsburg hold on the imperial throne led them to favour Bavarian possession of Frederick's electoral lands and titles over the claims of Charles Louis. Conversely, had a Palatine restoration not been deemed vital to any lasting peace by almost every negotiating power at Westphalia, it is almost impossible to believe that Charles Louis would have recovered even the reduced territory and lesser title he ultimately received in 1648.

In addition to adopting a nuanced approach in studying the diplomatic significance of exiled rulers and dynasties in early modern Europe, this thesis has also highlighted the need for a more balanced assessment of the political role of royal women in the seventeenth century. The sheer number of widow-regents, who wielded real political power in the period, contradicts the prevailing assertion that women were prevented from exercising influence after 1600. However, the example of Elizabeth of Bohemia demonstrates that the avenues through which aspiring stateswomen were able to operate politically could be severely circumscribed by the difficulties facing exiled regimes, such as issues of diplomatic recognition. Such constraints, together with an examination of her activities for the Palatine cause, have prevented a far more complex appraisal of the Winter Queen's performance as a stateswoman than has been promoted by her previous biographers.

The study of dispossessed regimes can provide an invaluable insight into the interplay of dynasticism and diplomacy in the period. Although it has been claimed that dynastic connections through marriage were not the effective and binding diplomatic tools as had previously been assumed, one should not ignore the importance placed on familial connections by contemporaries as a source of support from both the beleaguered as well as their potential providers. The Palatine family not only sought to capitalise on their relationship with the Stuart monarchy to obtain support directly, but other powers made offers of marriage and assistance to the Palatines in attempts to extract diplomatic and material support from Charles I. As even exiled dynasties and their familial connections featured prominently in the making of the foreign policies of great powers, greater scholarly attention needs to be paid to not only the political significance of dispossessed regimes, but also the interplay of dynasticism and interests of state, in the high politics of early modern Europe.

Accordingly, this thesis has demonstrated that exiled rulers were not automatically rendered politically insignificant after losing their lands and titles. In addition to providing a focal point for any opposition to a new ruling regime, such as the Jacobites after 1688, an exiled ruler or house was still a constituent part of the network combining political and dynastic concerns which connected almost every court in early modern Europe. The actions of exiled elites therefore need to be examined through a transnational lens. Although the Palatine family were undoubtedly used by powerful backers for their own ends, they also possessed some degree of political agency. Charles Louis may have had a weak hand to play in negotiations, but his familial ties and ancestry meant that he was still an actor, albeit a lesser one, with a role to play on the diplomatic stage.


Appendix I: The Palatine Wittelsbachs



Key	
	Elector of the Palatinate


Appendix II: The Palatine Family in 1632.

1. Palatine Family connections within the Holy Roman Empire.




Appendix II: The Palatine Family in 1632.


1. Palatine Family connections outside of Holy Roman Empire.




Appendix III: The Bavarian 'Wilhelmine Line' in 1648.




Appendix IV: Maps of the territories of the Palatine family.



1. Territories of Frederick V of the Palatinate as King of Bohemia, 1619/20



2. The Lower Palatinate after the Peace of Westphalia, 1648



3. The Lower Palatinate, 1655.

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MS Clarendon 46

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MS Clarendon 80

MS Clarendon 85

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