The Disjunction and Conjunction Theses

Journal article

This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my 'Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis'. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction Thesis and my case against the Conjunction Thesis. I shall show that his objections are unfounded and based on serious misunderstandings of my position, what the relevant debate is, and some fundamental notions of Truthmaker Theory. Jago argues that accepting the Disjunction Thesis and rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is hard to maintain. But I show that Jago has not shown that accepting the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is impossible or even hard to maintain. Jago believes that, to accept the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis, one needs to reject his axiom (T3), which says that all the truthmakers for (PandP) are truthmakers for (P). I argue that there are reasons to reject such a principle, and the version of it that says that what makes (PandP) true makes (P) true. © Rodriguez-Pereyra 2009.

Authors: Rodriguez-Pereyra, G

• Publication status: Published
• Journal: MIND
• Volume: 118
• Issue: 470
• Pages: 427-443
• Publication date: 2009-04-01
• DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzp064
• EISSN: 1460-2113
• ISSN: 0026-4423
• Language: English