The Fourth Republic and the Practicing of Democracy in Brazil, 1930-1968

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Dedication

I want to dedicate this thesis above all to my beautiful and intelligent wife, Andriele Silva Madison, for the undeserved and unwavering support, patience, and unconditional love she has given me from my first day of college to the conclusion of my doctorate. I also want to dedicate it to my son Taylor Brewster Madison who has endured a father short on time and attention for the entirety of his life and offered me nothing but love, as well as to his sibling expected in May 2023. I want to thank my parents Janet Hembrough and Larry Brewster Madison for everything they gave me as wonderful parents and for supporting me to pursue my dreams in life. Lastly, I want to thank my siblings Shellie Peterson, Jeffrey Madison, Christopher Madison, Timothy Madison, Adam Madison, and Carrie Dages, as well as their spouses and my sister-in-law Alana Silva for their love and support throughout my life.

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Abstract

This thesis offers a study of the Fourth Republic (1945-64), its origins, the nature and functioning of its democratic institutions, and its demise during the Cold War within the wider context of the history of democracy in Brazil. It shows that the Fourth Republic was built upon historical legacies and a compromise of competing conceptualizations of democracy as forwarded by leading contemporary political actors. The latter are central to the developments analyzed here, as the thesis examines the extent to which the manifested beliefs and behaviors of leading political actors shaped, enhanced and undermined the process of democratization during the existence of this regime. While firmly grounded in the history discipline, it dialogues with key works from the social sciences, particularly in the identification of conceptual tools to guide the enquiry. Furthermore, the thesis places the Brazilian case in the global context, in an effort to expand the historical study of democracy into the neglected post-war period. This thesis is organized into three parts and six chronological chapters, preceded by an introduction. Part I traces the origins of the Fourth Republic starting with the 1930 Revolution until 1945. Part II looks at the creation and functioning of the Fourth Republic itself up until 1961. Finally, Part III examines the demise of the regime and the consolidation of the military dictatorship that was complete by 1968. I close the thesis with some concluding reflections.

Long Abstract

This thesis offers a study of the Fourth Republic (1945-64), its origins, the nature and functioning of its democratic institutions, and its demise during the Cold War within the wider context of the history of democracy in Brazil. It shows that the Fourth Republic was built upon historical legacies and a compromise of competing conceptualizations of democracy as forwarded by leading contemporary political actors. The latter are central to the developments analyzed here, as the thesis examines the extent to which the manifested beliefs and behaviors of leading political actors shaped, enhanced and undermined the process of democratization during the existence of this regime. While firmly grounded in the history discipline, it dialogues with key works from the social sciences, particularly in the identification of conceptual tools to guide the enquiry. Furthermore, the thesis places the Brazilian case in the global context, in an effort to expand the historical study of democracy into the neglected post-war period. My research is based on a broad array of primary sources together with a thorough examination of the relevant secondary literature – in spite of the constraints imposed by the pandemic, which unfortunately prevented me from visiting Brazil, I had access to a significant amount of valuable digital archives and documentation that underpin its findings.

This thesis is organized into three parts and six chronological chapters, preceded by an introduction. Part I traces the origins of the Fourth Republic starting with the 1930 Revolution until 1945. Part II looks at the creation and functioning of the Fourth Republic itself up until 1961. Finally, Part III examines the demise of the regime and the consolidation of the military dictatorship that was complete by 1968. I close the thesis with some concluding reflections.

The introduction first provides a brief historical background to highlight some of the key features of Brazilian political culture that might have impinged on the story of democratization

after 1930. This is followed by a critical account of the historiography on the subject of the thesis, and a discussion of the approach I take in the study of democratization. Finally, I include a note on sources and an outline of the contents of the thesis.

Chapter I reviews the so-called Revolution of 1930 and the aftermath through 1937. It begins by detailing the causes of that revolution which brough about the end of Brazil's First Republic (1889-1930), including the 1930 presidential election. The chapter shows that, under the Provisional Government led by Getúlio Vargas, a competition of reform projects ensued. While liberal democracy advocates, allied with the displaced elite, argued for the legitimization of traditional liberal and representative institutions, groups inspired by fascism, communism, and corporatism advocated for doing away with such institutions. These latter groups forwarded competing plans that were predicated upon the centralization of power to enable the state to reconstruct society on more equitable terms. The clash of ideals pitted one definition of democracy as a set of means and institutions versus another as a set of outcomes, with both sides frequently employing the language of democracy in their appeals. Vargas pushed his own project for a centralized corporatist state with fascist influences as the head of the Provisional Government. Following an armed revolt in 1932 and a new constitution in 1934, the competing factions lost out as Vargas and his allies in the military launched a successful auto-coup in 1937, installing a corporatist dictatorship called the Estado Novo.

Chapter II examines the functioning and overthrow of the Estado Novo dictatorship (1937-1945) as well as its paradoxical legacy for future democratization. It also focuses on the way Brazil's participation in World War II affected its move back towards representative democracy. Secure in power with the military's backing, Vargas abolished the legislature and suspended elections. He then doubled down on his effort to construct a nationalist corporatist

state. This chapter shows that Vargas attempted to displace the traditional elite and replace institutions of representative democracy with a state apparatus built on the government controlled system of unions and professional associations that provided social benefits and granted influence over government decision making. To justify his position, Vargas coopted the idea of democracy as a set outcomes and regime supporters touted the merits of "authoritarian democracy." While ultimately unsuccessful at instituting a society-wide corporatist structure, Estado Novo reforms had unintended consequences for future democratization. The weakening of regional elites, nationalization of politics, expansion of education, and construction of a Brazilian national identity all changed the conditions in which subsequent democratization would take place. Estado Novo policies also ensured that development and social welfare would be central political concerns moving forward. Evidence provided here details how even old school liberals began to advocate ideas of "social democracy," as conceptualizations of democracy itself shifted. The Second World War emboldened advocates of a return to representative democracy, especially after Brazil entered the conflict on the side of the Allies. Closer association with United States brought increased political preferences for democracy, including among the officer corps. Eventually in 1945, military leadership, including former Vargas allies Generals Pedro Góes Monteiro and Eurico Dutra, deposed Vargas as the military began to assume an informal and self- given role of guarantor of democracy.

Chapter III covers the first elections after the collapse of the dictatorship in 1945 and the drafting of a new constitution in 1946. While some literature depicts the reconstitutionalization process as a contest between true democrats and those seeking to limit democratization, this chapter argues that the 1945 election and the drafting of a new constitution, similar to regime changes around the world, were actually competitions between varying conceptualizations of

democracy, including liberal democracy, social democracy, and popular democracy. Social democracy was advocated most visibly by the Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party/PSD) and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party/PTB), parties that had been constructed by the dictatorial government in preparation for a return to democracy. Meanwhile, the (National Democratic Union/UDN) united those in favor of liberal democracy while the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party) advocated for a popular democracy. This chapter argues that the 1946 Constitution was a compromise charter aimed at balancing these competing definitions of democracy. This process of regime change included several democratic advances and milestones, including broad public participation via manifestations and the media.

Chapter IV covers the presidencies of Dutra and Vargas as well as the tumultuous interim period until the inauguration of Juscelino Kubitschek in 1956. This chapter looks at how crises came about and how the regime weathered them without collapsing as happened in several other regimes of the time. During the presidency of Dutra, the Partido Comunista was illegalized, dramatically reshaping the political landscape, as the government attempted to cement its control over labor. Also during the Fourth Republic's first presidential administration, the issues of satisfying the demands of development and controlling inflation arose which would be central to every subsequent presidential term. Amidst division within the officer corps over the political role of the armed forces, many civilian actors on the right, led by the journalist politician Carlos Lacerda, made frequent appeals to the military to bar Vargas from returning which they refused to do. However, Vargas found governing in a democratic regime difficult and his opponents feared he might again try to impose an authoritarian solution, perhaps even a so called "unionist republic" in the style of Argentine president Juan Perón. In 1954, as Vargas was beset by scandal

and crisis, the bulk of the officer corps united behind the idea that the president should resign, he chose to take his own life instead. Lacerda and his co-conspirators tried to violently overturn the results of the 1955 election, and the army under Minster of War Henrique Lott prevented them from doing so, and the military's role as a guarantor of the regime solidified.

Chapter V covers the period of 1956-1961 which I contend was the pinnacle of democratic successes in the Fourth Republic. During the Kubitschek administration (1956-1960) the varying political actors began to accept the rules of the game and the president oversaw a process of depolarization. Kubitschek's time in office also saw unprecedented advances in economic development as part of his growth policies that included the construction of a new national capital in Brasília. Over this period, political parties began a process of realignment as they became more ideological, more representative, and responded to the intense social changes happening in the country. Inter-party fronts emerged around ideological positions. This period also saw the mass mobilization of the peasantry that was largely disenfranchised by a literacy requirement on voting and poor rural education. This mobilization pitted the Catholic Church against the Partido Comunista in countryside organization and saw the peasant class advocate for reforms, some of which came to fruition. In 1960, the UDN, the mainstay of the opposition, finally won its first presidential election with their populist candidate Jânio Quadros. Just eight months later, Quadros resigned in a doomed bid for greater power and military leadership attempted to veto the ascension of his vice president, João Goulart. However, the attempt by the heads of the branches of armed forces to interrupt the constitutional order was strongly opposed by a broad coalition of popular and political resistance that spanned the entire political spectrum with the exception of the far-right under Lacerda. The opposition successfully prevented the

military from imposing its will and lawmakers agreed to a compromise which saw Goulart assume the presidency at the head of a hastily created parliamentary regime.

Chapter VI covers the period from 1961 to 1968 and examines the demise of the Fourth Republic and the consolidation of the military dictatorship. This chapter points to polarization resulting from policy radicalism on the part of the far-left and refusal to accept Goulart on the far-right as the main cause of democratic breakdown. Radicalism thrived in the political environment that followed the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and the abrupt resignation of President Quadros in 1961. Leonel Brizola, brother-in-law to the President Goulart, was the most significant far-left leader and had organized the 1961 popular campaign to ensure the inauguration of Goulart. Brizola and his fellow far-left leaders misinterpreted this event as a broad popular endorsement of their political agenda. In this politically tense environment, Goulart attempted to lead the country amid a series of economic crises resulting from a decline in growth and skyrocketing inflation. He also attempted to implement an agenda of broadly popular legislative changes known as the basic reforms. However, an overconfident far-left eschewed any form of compromise and when reform efforts stalled, they became increasingly threatening towards the regime. These actions substantiated the fears of many on the right who dreaded a repeat of the Cuban Revolution and also began to doubt the feasibility of continuing a democratic system. When in 1964 Brizola and Goulart denounced the Constitution and attempted to circumvent Congress, it provoked outrage and spurred on support for the deposing of Goulart, which the far-right had been advocating for some time. A group of conspiring army officers led by General Humberto Castelo Branco removed the president and unilaterally instituted their own “revolutionary” regime. Over the course of the next four years an internal ideological struggle

played out within the military and what was supposed to be a temporary intervention evolved into the first long-term military dictatorship in Brazilian history.

The conclusion highlights the main findings of the thesis and provides some reflections on its wider significance and implications for both the history of democracy in Brazil and the history and study of democracy elsewhere.

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List of Abbreviations

CPDOC: Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (Contemporary Brazilian History Research and Documentation Center)

FGV: Fundação de Getúlio Vargas (Getúlio Vargas Foundation)

A.A.N.C.: Anais da Assembléia Nacional Constituinte (Annals of the National Constituent Assembly)

IBGE: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics)

Introduction

Reflecting upon the exploits and demise of varying 20th century presidents that preceded him, which included coups, resignations, and a suicide, Brazil's 34th president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso remarked, "Failure alone does not drive men to such extremes. It could only be the special kind of failure that results when tantalizing potential falls tragically short of expectations. That is the kind of failure that Brazil has always specialized in."[1] When Brazil's Fourth Republic (1946-1964) gave way to a military dictatorship it became a paragon of this "special kind of failure" that left a "tantalizing potential" for democratic stabilization unfulfilled.

The genesis of the Fourth Republic can be traced back to the overthrow of the First Republic in the Revolution of 1930 that saw the emergence of the dominant political figure of the age, Getúlio Vargas. A brief period of interim government and the short lived constitutional regime of the Second Republic (1934-1937) followed. Then Vargas consolidated power as the head of a new corporatist dictatorship called the Estado Novo (1937-1945). After Brazil joined the Second World War on the side of the Allies, growing dissatisfaction with the dictatorship led the military to oust Vargas in 1945 and usher in the Fourth Republic. This new constitutional regime brought about the country's first sustained period of competitive elections at the national level. The 1950s saw the return of Vargas via the ballot box and unprecedented economic growth and development, especially during the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1960). Following a series of political and economic crises in the early 1960s, the military deposed President João Goulart in 1964, and had institutionalized a brutal military dictatorship by 1968.

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[1] Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Brian Winter, *The Accidental President of Brazil: A Memoir* (New York; London, 2007), 4.

This brought to an end what the American historian of Brazil, Skidmore referred to as "an experiment in democracy."[2] This thesis offers a study of the Fourth Republic, its origins, the nature and functioning of its democratic institutions, and its demise during the Cold War within the wider context of the history of democracy in Brazil.

Research on democracy by historians has hitherto been relatively light with social scientists dominating the field.[3] There are, however, some significant exceptions, many of which are recent.[4] Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, democracy and liberalism had been in global decline. With the end of the Second World War and the collapse of European empires, a series of democratic regimes emerged across the globe in what political scientists commonly denote as the "second wave" of democracy.[5] At the height of this "second wave" in 1955, Gallie famously argued that democracy was an "essentially contested concept" with groups competing to advance

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[2] Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy* (Oxford, 2007) Originally published in 1967.

[3] John Dunn, ed., *Democracy: The Unfinished Journey, 508 BC to AD 1993* (Oxford, 1992); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago, 1992); Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, 1993); David Stasavage, *The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today* (Princeton, 2020); John Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy*, Reprint edition (London, 2010); Steven Muhlberger and Phil Paine, 'Democracy's Place in World History', *Journal of World History* 4, no. 1 (1993): 23–45; John Markoff, 'Where and When Was Democracy Invented?', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41, no. 4 (1999): 660–90; Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000* (Cambridge, 2004); Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge, 2000).

[4] Martin Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age* (Princeton, 2020); Joanna Innes and Mark Philp, eds., *Re-Imagining Democracy in the Mediterranean, 1780-1860* (Oxford, 2018); Paul Cartledge, *Democracy: A Life* (Oxford, 2016); Joanna Innes and Mark Philp, eds., *Re-Imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions: America, France, Britain, Ireland 1750-1850* (Oxford, 2013); R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800: The Challenge*, vol. 1 (Princeton, 1959).

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, 1993).

their definition as the most authentic version of democracy.[6] The study of the Brazilian Fourth Republic, allows for the observation of this democratic competition set within the unique circumstances of Brazil and Latin America.

How do we approach the history of "democratization," an "open-ended process" as defined by Laurence Whitehead, and how do we account for the emergence, progress, reversal, and ultimately the demise of democracy during the Fourth Republic?[7] The latter is the primary research question driving this analysis. This historical investigation operates on the assumption that political actors and actions are main drivers of democratization and account for its advances and reversals. Socioeconomic structures, culture, political institutions, and the international environment are seen as shaping the conditions in which political actors operate but these actors retain agency, and it is their beliefs and behaviors that may be determinative of outcomes. Through words and actions, what beliefs about democracy did the relevant actors display during the period? What were their competing policy agendas and how were they pursued? How did the international environment affect Brazilian political actors? These and other related questions receive special attention throughout the thesis.

In the rest of this introduction, I first offer a brief historical background to highlight some of the key features of Brazilian political culture that might have impinged on the story of democratization after 1930. This is followed by a critical account of the historiography on the subject of the thesis, and a discussion of the approach I take in the study of democratization.

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[6] W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56 (1955): 167–98.

[7] Laurence Whitehead, *Democratization: Theory and Experience* (Oxford, 2003), https://doi.org/10.1093/0199253285.001.0001.

Finally, I include a note on sources and a summary of the various chapters that structure the thesis.

Historical Background

Following independence in 1822, Brazil's government took the form of an empire with the former heir to the Portuguese throne ruling as Emperor Dom Pedro I.[8] The Empire of Brazil was an essentially liberal construct and a constitutional monarchy that included broad powers for the emperor.[9] While Brazil's first constitution enshrined traditional liberal rights for individuals, it also included the continuation of a hereditary aristocracy complete with lands and titles, the institutionalization of Catholicism as the state religion, lifetime terms for senators, and the moderating power. The moderating power, inspired by the philosophy of Frenchman Benjamin Constant, allowed the emperor to dissolve parliament, call for elections, and select the winners of senatorial elections from a list of the most voted candidates. The emperor also directly selected the provincial executives called presidents, which served as administrative sub-orders of the imperial government.

The Brazilian empire was characterized above all by the dominant presence of slavery, an institution that permeated most if not all aspects of social and economic life in the country. Slavery often clashed with liberal principles, as it did in the United States. The ubiquitous and economically crucial role of slavery meant that while politicians often openly condemned slavery

[8] For an authoritative source on the empire see Emilia Viotti da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories*, 2 edition (Chapel Hill, 2000).

[9] Jeffrey D. Needell, 'Capítulo 9: Variaciones para un tema: las vicisitudes del liberalismo durante la monarquía brasileña', in *Liberalismo Y Poder Latinoamerica En El Siglo Xix*, ed. Ivan; Jaksic and Eduardo Posada-Carbó (Santiago, 2012).

as a "necessary evil," they did little to eliminate it during the empire's early days. Under pressure from the British government, Brazil finally enforced a ban on the slave trade in 1850. With the abolition of slavery in the United States and elsewhere during the mid-nineteenth century, Brazil increasingly assumed a pariah status on the international stage. Furthermore, the economic importance of slavery declined with the advent of more modern agricultural practices. These factors led Brazil to enact a gradual emancipation law in 1871. Also in the 1870s, Brazil saw widespread civil society development in its urban centers in the form abolition societies. These societies, while originally regional, grew into national organizations. The abolition movement saw early attempts by poor Brazilians to access the court system via freedom suits conducted by slaves themselves. Castilho argued that these developments made the abolition movement a key part of the "history of Brazilian democracy" and the development of citizenship. Finally, in 1888 the imperial government abolished slavery outright. [10]

As in the United States, the institution of slavery co-existed with a relatively wide franchise, though unlike the United States there were no voting restrictions based on race. Instead, the empire employed a two round voting system with voting in the first round open to all men over the age of 25 regardless of race or literacy with an annual income greater than 100 thousand *réis*, a rather "inclusive" income barrier which Carvalho argued enfranchised all but the most destitute.[11] Elections were indirect and voters selected electors for the second round of

[10] Celso Thomas Castilho, *Slave Emancipation and Transformations in Brazilian Political Citizenship* (Pittsburgh, 2016); Jeffrey Needell, *The Sacred Cause: The Abolitionist Movement, Afro-Brazilian Mobilization, and Imperial Politics in Rio de Janeiro* (Stanford, 2020); Robert J. Cottrol, *Long, Lingering Shadow: Slavery, Race, and Law in the American Hemisphere* (Athens, 2013); Barbara Weinstein, 'Slavery, Citizenship, and National Identity in Brazil and the U.S. South', in *Nationalism in the New World*, ed. Don H. Doyle and Marco Antonio Pamplona (Athens, 2006); Emilia Viotti da Costa, '1870 - 1889', in *Brazil: Empire and Republic, 1822-1930* (Cambridge; New York, 1989), 161–217.

[11] José Murilo de Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil: O longo caminho,* 24th ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 2001), 30.

voting. In the case of senatorial elections, the constitution empowered the emperor to select the winner from the three most voted candidates. In practice, voting during the empire tended to be tainted by violence and bribery as a combination of deference, vote buying, and violence often restricted electoral competitiveness. However, these practices, which were also common where democracy developed elsewhere, in Spanish America, Europe and the United States, varied by location and over time.[12] By 1873 approximately 11% of the Brazilian population voted, around that same time 18% of the total population voted in the United States, 9% in Portugal, 7% in England, and 2% in Italy.[13]

Towards the end of the imperial period, in 1881, Brazil overhauled its voting system. Some politicians chafed at the endemic nature of corruption and fraud, while others worried about the increasing participation of black Brazilians resulting from gradual emancipation and that might follow the absolute abolishment of slavery. The reform instituted a single round direct election but crucially it created a literacy restriction for voting. Such restrictions were in keeping with liberal ideas and trends about voting qualifications and particularly targeted the growing population of freed slaves and their descendants.[14] The racial component of this exclusion, as

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[12] Costa, *The Brazilian Empire*; Costa, '1870 - 1889'; Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil*; Richard Graham, *Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil*, New Ed edition (Stanford, 1994); For a comparative perspective on electoral practices see Eduardo Posada-Carbó, 'Electoral Juggling: A Comparative History of the Corruption of Suffrage in Latin America, 1830–1930', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32, no. 3 (October 2000): 611–44.

[13] Jairo Nicolau, 'A Participação Eleitoral: Evidências Sobre o Caso Brasileiro', *Universidade de Coimbra*, 2004, 2; Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil*, 31.

[14] Nicolau, 'A Participação Eleitoral: Evidências Sobre o Caso Brasileiro'; Castilho, *Slave Emancipation and Transformations in Brazilian Political Citizenship*; Alan Kahan, *Liberalism in Nineteenth Century Europe: The Political Culture of Limited Suffrage* (Basingstoke; Hampshire, 2003); David A. Bateman, *Disenfranchising Democracy: Constructing the Electorate in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France* (Cambridge, 2018).

will be seen, lingered for generations. Brazil remained predominantly rural, and a legacy of Portuguese colonialism had been to handicap public education.[15] As a result, under the new system the electorate shrunk to less than 1% of the population by 1886.[16]

In 1889, the year after abolition, the Empire of Brazil was overthrown, largely without violence, when republican conspirators convinced General Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca to depose Emperor Dom Pedro II and parliament. Inspired by the ideology of positivism as expounded by the French philosopher Auguste Comte, republicanism had found adherents across Brazil since the founding of the Partido Republicano (Republican Party) in the capital of Rio de Janeiro in 1870.[17] Positivism's appeal was not limited to Brazil; many Latin American nations felt the call of positivism, most notoriously Mexico's Porfirian government. This philosophy was a form of liberalism that reduced history, politics, and science to evolutionary stages of progress. Comte advocated a dictatorial republic led by a scientific technocracy as the ultimate form of government. Comte also saw the liberty of individuals as incompatible with equality since individuals by nature possessed different mental and moral capacities.[18] This version of meritocracy appealed to many within Brazil's European style hierarchical society, this included

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[15] Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, 'The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World', *The Journal of Economic History* 65, no. 4 (December 2005): 891–921, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050705000343.

[16] Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil*, 39; Nicolau, 'A Participação Eleitoral: Evidências Sobre o Caso Brasileiro'.

[17] Auguste Comte, *A General View of Positivism*, trans. J. H. Bridges (Cambridge, 2009), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511692888.

[18] A common tension between liberals and democrats. See Norberto Bobbio, *Liberalism and Democracy* (London, 2005).

many members of the Brazilian military.[19] Comte's famous quotation, "Love, then, is our principle; Order our basis; and Progress our end," gave Brazil its national slogan of "Order and Progress."[20]

Following the emperor's removal, the republicans produced a new constitution in 1891 ushering in the First Republic. The new regime instituted several democratizing changes. The moderating power and titles of nobility were abolished and equality before the law proclaimed. The practice of senators and other officials serving for life was discontinued. Provincial presidents, now state presidents, were no longer selected by the central government but by the direct vote of their constituents. The state became secular, and freedom of religion guaranteed. In the area of voting rights, the income requirement was abolished but the exclusion of illiterates as well as preexisting restrictions against clergymen, enlisted soldiers, and women all remained intact.[21] The latter in spite of a growing women's rights and suffrage movement.[22]

Another crucial change was federalization. The impetus for regime change had come from a new more modern coffee growing and exporting elite that could be found primarily in regions of São Paulo and Minas Gerais that had long since economically displaced their counterparts in the sugar growing Northeast. Yet the centralized political system of the empire

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[19] Margaret Bakos, 'Augusto Comte e o positivismo no Brasil', *Estudios Historicos* 3, no. 7 (October 2011): 1–6.

[20] Comte, *A General View of Positivism*, 340.

[21] Boris Fausto, 'Society and Politics', in *Brazil: Empire and Republic, 1822-1930*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge, 1989), 257–309.

[22] June Edith Hahner, *A mulher brasileira e suas lutas sociais e políticas, 1850-1937* (São Paulo, 1981); June Hahner, *Emancipating the Female Sex: The Struggle for Women's Rights in Brazil, 1850-1940* (Durham, 1990).

had been designed to benefit this old elite and thereby become outdated. Therefore, structural changes as part of the First Republic saw states gain enormous autonomy with federalization emphasized in virtually all areas of governance. In practice, decentralization saw the powerful states of Minas Gerais, São Paulo, and to a lesser extent Rio Grande do Sul take control over the federal government and the selection of presidential candidates. In exchange for support of a federal policy dedicated to the needs of coffee exportation, the other states were given near total control within their borders. Resembling a confederation, the autonomy of state governments extended to the ability to take out foreign loans, create interstate tariffs, and even define their own immigration policy.[23] Economic development was also extremely uneven, as Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo developed industrial centers and saw significant advances the rest of the country lagged behind, especially the states of the Northeast.[24] Even the Brazilian military was lessened by decentralization. States began to rely heavily on their own militias and militarized police forces, whose combined ranks soon outnumbered the national Army.[25] Local politics dominated within states as well. Each state had its own autonomous Partido Republicano organization which served as the main means of political organization. The party chapters were supported by predominantly rural political bosses known as *coronéis* (colonels). This title was in reference to their often symbolic rank in the National Guard that no longer performed military functions and was meant to designate them as the local powerbroker. The local nature of this

[23] Histories of this period often conduct their analysis at the state level given the difficulty of identifying a single national narrative. See for example Joseph L. Love, *Rio Grande Do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882-1930* (Stanford, 1971); John D. Wirth, *Minas Gerais in the Brazilian Federation, 1889-1937* (Stanford, 1977); James Woodard, *A Place in Politics: São Paulo, Brazil, from Seigneurial Republicanism to Regionalist Revolt* (Durham, 2009).

[24] Fausto, 'Society and Politics'.

[25] Joel Wolfe, 'Change with Continuity: Brazil from 1930 to 1945', in *The Great Depression in Latin America*, ed. Paulo Drinot and Alan Knight (Durham, 2014), 81–101.

phenomenon again makes it difficult to produce a single definition. Sometimes party leaders sat atop the hierarchy. In other cases, the party was merely a tool of the most powerful *coronéis*. Still, *coronelismo* defined the First Republic and is best understood as a system whereby local political bosses delivered the votes of those under their influence for the designated candidate in exchange for broad patronage powers.[26] *Coronéis* often controlled the selection of local officials in their area and the application of the law itself. "For our friends, everything; for our enemies, the law" ran a popular Brazilian saying associated with *coronelismo*.[27] Their control over local services meant that their fieldhands and tenants often depended upon them for access to public goods and basic necessities. These rural bosses used a combination of violence, intimidation, patronage, and vote buying to ensure they could deliver the votes that afforded them their position. As Republican control solidified the practice of outright falsifying results became more common and on occasion Congress simply selected the winner it wished to certify.[28]

Participation did steadily increase after the advent of the republic reaching a high of 6% in the 1930 presidential election.[29] Contestation did exist, and opposition parties did win elections, but mostly within urban areas and unique circumstances like in the state of São Paulo

[26] For more on this phenomenon see Victor Nunes Leal, *Coronelismo: The Municipality and Representative Government in Brazil*, trans. June Henfrey, Cambridge Latin American Studies (Cambridge, 1977); James P. Woodard, 'Coronelismo in Theory and Practice: Evidence, Analysis, and Argument from São Paulo', *Luso-Brazilian Review* 42, no. 1 (1 June 2005): 99–117, https://doi.org/10.1353/lbr.2005.0037; Fausto, 'Society and Politics'.

[27] Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil*, 57.

[28] Jaqueline Zulini and Paolo Ricci, 'The Use of Electoral Manipulation by Political Parties in Oligarchic Regimes: The Case of Brazil (1900-1930)', SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, 29 August 2014); Paolo Ricci and Jaqueline Zulini, '"Beheading", Rule Manipulation and Fraud: The Approval of Election Results in Brazil, 1894–1930', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 44, no. 3 (August 2012): 495–521, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X12000764.

[29] Joseph L. Love, 'Political Participation in Brazil, 1881-1969', *Luso-Brazilian Review* 7, no. 2 (1970): 9.

where both a rural and urban middle class could be found.[30] Furthermore, as will be detailed in Chapter I, press outlets critical of the First Republic regime operated openly, and in the early twentieth century a nascent labor movement, driven by anarchism, syndicalism, and later communism, also left its mark. Ricci and Zulini argued for a "high level of political competition" during the "pre-democratic" period of the First Republic, but this competition was not for voters but instead for control over the means to "influence electoral results" at the registration, voting, and counting stages. "In a political system characterized by clientelistic voter-politician relations and lack of citizenship rights, the maintenance of political stability required the control over the electoral process, . . . but several parties were persistently competing for such a control."[31] Still government candidates prevailed the vast majority of the time, including every presidential contest.

As this brief summary shows, the democratization that followed 1930 and ultimately led to the Fourth Republic in 1946 had deep historical roots – Brazilians had long been "experimenting" with institutions of democracy. Traditions of liberalism, freedom of the press, elections, civil society organization, and popular participation all existed and influenced the beliefs and behaviors of political actors in the post-war period. In fact, many of those responsible for crafting the institutions of the Fourth Republic did so with an eye towards achieving the ideals of these previous regimes and or correcting for their faults.

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[30] Woodard, *A Place in Politics*; Mauricio A. Font, *Coffee, Contention, and Change: In the Making of Modern Brazil*, First edition. edition (Cambridge, 1990).

[31] Zulini and Ricci, 'The Use of Electoral Manipulation'; Ricci and Zulini, '"Beheading", Rule Manipulation and Fraud'.

Historiography

Many political histories have been written on the post-war regime, of particular value is the collection of essays edited by Ferreira and Delgado which deals directly with democracy.[32] Brazil's major parties and civil society organizations over this period have also been the subject of various significant books and articles.[33] Several biographies exist on the main political figures of the age as well.[34] However, as noted by several scholars, the bulk of traditional literature on

[32] Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, eds., *O Brasil Republicano: O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003); See also Leslie Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic, 1945–1964', in *Brazil since 1930*, ed. Leslie Bethell, vol. 9, The Cambridge History of Latin America (Cambridge, 2008), 87–164; Leslie Bethell, 'Brazil', in *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948*, ed. Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (Cambridge, 1992), 33–65; Edgard Carone, *A República Liberal: Instituições e Classes Sociais (1945-1964)*, vol. I (São Paulo, 1985); Edgard Carone, *A República Liberal: Evolução Política (1945-1964)*, vol. II (São Paulo, 1985).

[33] For example: Lucia Hippólito, *De raposas e reformistas: o PSD e a experiência democrática brasileira (1945-64)* (Rio de Janeiro, 1985); Ângela Maria de Castro Gomes and Maria Celina Soares D'Araújo, *Getulismo e Trabalhismo: Tensões e Dimensões Do Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro, 1987); Maria Celina Soares D'Araújo, *Sindicatos, carisma & poder: o PTB de 1945-65* (Rio de Janeiro, 1996); Ângela de Castro Gomes, 'Trabalhismo e Democracia: O PTB Sem Vargas', *Luso-Brazilian Review* 31, no. 2 (1994): 115–36; Maria Victória de Mesquita Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo: ambigüidades do liberalismo brasileiro, 1945-1965* (Rio de Janeiro, 1981); Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, *Estado e partidos políticos no Brasil (1930 a 1964)* (São Paulo, 1976); Brodwyn Fischer, 'The Red Menace Reconsidered: A Forgotten History of Communist Mobilization in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas, 1945-1964', *Hispanic American Historical Review* 94, no. 1 (1 February 2014): 1–33, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-2390595; Anita Leocádia Prestes, *Luiz Carlos Prestes e a Aliança Nacional Libertadora: Os caminhos da luta antifascista no Brasil (1934/35)*, 2nd ed. (Petrópolis, 1998); Stanley E. Hilton, 'Ação Integralista Brasileira: Fascism in Brazil, 1932-1938', *Luso-Brazilian Review* 9, no. 2 (1972): 3–29; Guilherme Leite Ribeiro, 'Frente Parlamentar Nacionalista: Trajetória e Ação Política (1956-1964)' (PhD Thesis, Rio de Janeiro, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2021); Thiago Nogueira de Souza, 'Ação democrática parlamentar: anticomunismo, democracia e radicalização política no Congresso Nacional' (Master's Thesis, Universidade Federal do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2015).

[34] For example: Maria Celina Soares D'Araújo, *O segundo governo Vargas 1951-1954: democracia, partidos e crise política*, 2. ed, Série Fundamentos 90 (São Paulo, 1992); Robert M. Levine, *Father of the Poor?: Vargas and His Era* (Cambridge; New York, 2008); John W. F. Dulles, *Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography* (Austin, 1967); John W. F. Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader: Volume I: The Years 1914-1960* (Austin, 2010); John W. F. Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader: Volume II: The Years 1960-1977* (Austin, 2010); José Viriato de Castro, *Espada x vassoura: marechal Lott* (São Paulo, 1959); Robert J. Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil* (Athens, 1991); Clovis Brigagão and Trajano Ribeiro, *Brizola* (São Paulo, 2015); Ricardo Arnt, *Jânio Quadros: o prometeu de Vila Maria*, Avenida paulista (Rio de Janeiro, 2004); Daniel Aarão Reis, *Luís Carlos*

the Fourth Republic is dedicated to explaining why the regime collapsed in 1964, democracy is treated as weak or superficial and its collapse is given as inevitable.[35] For example, Silva and Silva noted, "In general, analyzes of the first Brazilian democratic period, inaugurated with the 1945 election, are more concerned with offering explanations for its subsequent collapse."[36] Ferreira similarly found, "As we know that the democratic regime was extinguished with the civil-military coup of 1964, it is common to evaluate the liberal-democratic experience inaugurated in 1946 by its end," and further stated that such perspectives approach the 1964 coup as "unavoidable."[37]

In particular, the Fourth Republic has become heavily associated with populism or "populist democracy" understood negatively and in opposition to representative democracy.[38]

Prestes: Um Revolucionário entre Dois Mundos (São Paulo, 2014); Luiz Werneck Vianna, *Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil*, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 1978); Ricardo Maranhão, *Sindicatos e democratização: Brasil, 1945-1950* (São Paulo, 1979); Maurina Holanda Cavalcante, 'Disputa de poder: Ligas camponesas x Igreja Católica' (Simpósio Nacional de História XXV, 2009), 14; André Lopes Ferreira, 'Reforma Agrária e Revolução: Cuba e as Ligas Camponesas do Brasil nos Anos 60', *Revista Brasileira do Caribe* 10, no. 19 (2009): 163–89; João Pedro Stedile, *Questão agrária no Brasil: História e natureza das Ligas Camponesas, 1954-1964*, vol. 4 (São Paulo, 2006); Antônio Torres Montenegro, 'As Ligas Camponesas Às Vésperas do Golpe de 1964', *Projeto História : Revista do Programa de Estudos Pós-Graduados de História* 29, no. 02 (2004), https://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/revph/article/view/9974; Jorge Ferreira, *João Goulart: Uma Biografia*, 5th ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 2011).

[35] For others identifying this trend in the historiography see Thiago Silva and Estevão Silva, 'Eleições no Brasil antes da democracia: o Código Eleitoral de 1932 e os pleitos de 1933 e 1934', *Revista de Sociologia e Política* 23, no. 56 (December 2015): 75, https://doi.org/10.1590/1678-987315235604; Jorge Ferreira, 'Crises da República: 1954, 1955 e 1961', in *O Brasil Republicano: O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 417–18; Jorge Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart e o golpe civil-militar de 1964', in *O Brasil Republicano: O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 447; Argelina Maria Cheibub Figueiredo, *Democracia ou reformas?: alternativas democráticas à crise política, 1961-1964* (Rio de Janeiro, 1993), 24; Angela Gomes and Jorge Ferreira, 'Brasil, 1945-1964: uma democracia representativa em consolidação', *Locus - Revista de História* 24, no. 2 (4 February 2019): 273, https://doi.org/10.34019/2594-8296.2018.v24.20880.

[36] Silva and Silva, 'Eleições no Brasil antes da democracia', 75.

[37] Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 417–18.

[38] The mid-twentieth century is often seen as the age of 'classical populism' not only in Brazil but all of Latin America and even the world. See Michael L. Conniff, *Populism in Latin America*, 2nd ed.

Historical narratives consistently differentiate Brazil's Fourth Republic from the country's other regimes by referring to it as the "Populist Republic." "Despite the divergences regarding its content and its conceptualization," reads D'Araújo's succinct summary, "populism is accepted by most historians and political scientists as the main aspect of Brazilian politics in the post-1945 period. There is also a consensual idea that this period repeats, in a way, some previous political patterns, particularly those in force in the 1930s, especially the anti-party ideology and the authoritarian variant."[39] The study of populism in Brazil has a long historiography that stretches back to the 1950s as academics attempted to understand the new political styles that emerged as part of the urbanization process.[40] Works focusing on populism as an explanation for the "inadequacies" of the Fourth Republic started to emerge in the 1970s.[41]

The traditional populist narrative holds that the Fourth Republic political system was defined by charismatic leaders manipulating otherwise directionless urban masses that lacked a coherent class consciousness. According to the advocates of this position, populism "fostered political inclusion (though not empowerment)" of the emerging urban masses while still allowing politicians to satisfy the demands of the other social classes because they could control and direct

(Tuscaloosa, 2012); Margaret Canovan, *Populism* (London, 1981); Ghița Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics* (New York, 1969).

[39] D'Araújo, *O segundo governo Vargas,* 25.

[40] Gomes points to the essays produced in the academic journal Cadernos do Nosso Tempo starting in 1953. Ângela de Castro Gomes, 'O populismo e as ciências sociais no Brasil: notas sobre a trajetória de um conceito', *Tempo* 1, no. 2 (1996): 3; See also Aziz Simão, 'O voto operário em São Paulo', *Anais,* 1955.

[41] The most imporant early work in this direction is Octavio Ianni, *O colapso do populismo no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1971); For comprehensive historiographies of the term populism in Brazil see Jorge Ferreira, 'O Nome e a Coisa: O Populismo na Política Brasileira', in *O Populismo e Sua História: Debate e Crítica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 59–124; Gomes, 'O populismo e as ciências sociais no Brasil: notas sobre a trajetória de um conceito'.

the demands of the working class.[42] The subsequent development of class consciousness and independence among the working class in the 1960s is cast as destabilizing the populist system leading to a fragmented party system, polarization, and "policy immobilism."[43] With the loss of state control over the working class imminent, the 1964 military coup is depicted as the stabilizing reaction of the conservative upper segments of society.[44]

Similarly, authors such as Conniff, Fortes, Wallerstein, and Wolfe conceive of populism as a political strategy employed by certain politicians to garner broad support, especially among the urban working class.[45] A significant body of research has argued that political institutions, especially parties, were too weak and lacking in ideological orientation to allow for effective governance or mobilize support.[46] Populism is often depicted as emerging to fill this gap. Again,

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[42] Leslie Bethell, 'Populism in Brazil', in *Brazil: Essays on History and Politics* (London, 2018), 176.

[43] Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton, 1991), 507.

[44] For examples of this argument see Ianni, *O colapso do populismo no Brasil*; Francisco Weffort, *O Populismo na Politica Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro, 1986); Bethell, 'Populism in Brazil'; Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*.

[45] Michael L. Conniff, 'Brazil's Populist Republic and Beyond', in *Populism in Latin America*, 2nd ed. (Tuscaloosa, 2012), 48–70; Alexandre Fortes, 'World War II and Brazilian Workers: Populism at the Intersections between National and Global Histories', *International Review of Social History* 62, no. S25 (December 2017): 165–90, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859017000608; Michael Wallerstein, 'The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil: Its Economic Determinants', *Latin American Research Review* 15, no. 3 (1980): 3–40; Joel Wolfe, 'Populism and Developmentalism', in *A Companion to Latin American History* (Malden, 2010), 347–64, https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444391633.ch20; Kurt Weyland, 'Populism as a Political Strategy: An Approach's Enduring - and Increasing - Advantages', *Political Studies* 69, no. 2 (1 May 2021): 185–89, https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211002669; For populism as a political style see Alan Knight, 'Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America, Especially Mexico', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 30, no. 2 (1998): 223–48.

[46] Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil*; Philippe C Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford, 1971); Youssef Cohen, 'Democracy from Above: The Political Origins of Military Dictatorship in Brazil', *World Politics* 40, no. 1 (1987): 30–54, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010193; Mona M. Lyne, 'Parties as Programmatic Agents: A Test of Institutional Theory in Brazil', *Party Politics* 11, no. 2 (1 March 2005): 193–216, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068805049776; Bolívar Lamounier and Rachel Meneguello, *Partidos políticos e consolidação democrática: o caso brasileiro* (São Paulo, 1986);

the failure of democracy is seen as the result of the varying economic and political crises of the early 1960s which exceeded the capabilities of populist politics and exposed the flaws in the political system.

Other perspectives, not always mutually exclusive, exist as to the cause of the supposed weakness and demise of the Fourth Republic's flawed or populist democracy. Certain scholars, often denominating the Fourth Republic as the "Liberal Republic," contend that post-war democratization was successfully contained and mitigated by conservative forces and failure of the regime resulted when these same conservative forces sought to stymie renewed attempts at real democratization.[47] Meanwhile, arguments from Furtado, O'Donnell, Ianni, as well as Cardoso and Faletto give special importance to Brazil's particular stage of economic development.[48] They contended that as the country engaged in import substitution

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Scott Mainwaring, 'Chapter 11: Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy', in *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (Stanford, 1995), 354–98; Scott Mainwaring, 'Brazilian Party Underdevelopment in Comparative Perspective', *Political Science Quarterly* 107, no. 4 (1992): 677–707, https://doi.org/10.2307/2152290.

[47] Carone, *A república liberal*, 1985; Vianna, *Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil*; Anita Leocádia Prestes, 'Os Comunistas e a Constituinte de 1946', *Estudos Ibero-Americanos* 32, no. 2 (19 December 2006): 171–86, https://doi.org/10.15448/1980-864X.2006.2.1362; Sérgio Soares Braga, 'A Constituinte de 1946 e a Nova Ordem Econômica e Social do Pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial', *Revista de Sociologia e Política* 6, no. 7 (1996): 18; Caio Navarro de Toledo, *1964: visões críticas do golpe : democracia e reformas no populismo*, Visões críticas do golpe (Campinas, 1997); Caio Navarro de Toledo, '1964: o golpe contra as reformas e a democracia', *Revista Brasileira de História* 24 (2004): 13–28, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-01882004000100002; Mario Victor, *Cinco Anos Que Abalaram o Brasil: De Jânio Quadros Ao Maréchal Castelo Branco* (Rio de Janeiro, 1965); Moniz Bandeira, *O Governo João Goulart: as lutas sociais no Brasil, 1961-1964*, 4th ed., Coleção Retratos do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1978); Leslie Bethell, 'The Long Road to Democracy in Brazil', in *Brazil: Essays on History and Politics* (London, 2018), 147–74; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic'.

[48] Celso Furtado, *Analise Do Modelo Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro, 1972); Guillermo A O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley, 1973); Ianni, *O colapso do populismo no Brasil*; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 'Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications', in *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven, 1973), 142–76; Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto,

industrialization or developmentalism, populism provided the requisite political base by mobilizing the urban masses in favor of that particular economic strategy. Contrary to modernization theory, these authors contend that advancing to the next stage of economic development was not compatible with the populist system, as it required action contrary to the interests of the urban masses, bringing about the 1964 coup and the advent of an authoritarian government sufficiently walled off from popular influence as to make the necessary economic changes.

Skidmore's, *Politics in Brazil, 1930 - 1964: An Experiment in Democracy,* published in 1967, is the only book length analysis in English by a historian to focus specifically on democracy in Brazil over this period and is therefore deserving of special attention.[49] An excellently researched piece with a witnesses' perspective, this thesis particularly engages with his book which has also informed some of the general historical context of my analysis. According to Skidmore, his text too was born of an "attempt to investigate the causes of the fall of former President João Goulart" and offered three levels of analysis, political, social, and economic that reflect many of the perspectives discussed above.[50] On the political level, Skidmore identified the need to examine the behavior of political actors that produced deadlock by 1964. However, he insisted that these behaviors and the resulting deadlock could be traced back to a "social" cause that was "the deeper institutional crisis resulting from the failure to create political institutions and processes that could channel and direct the rapid social and

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Dependencia Y Desarrollo En América Latina: Ensayo de Interpretación Sociológica (Berkeley, 1979); Also see the essay collection, Celso Furtado, *Brasil: tempos modernos* (Rio de Janeiro, 1977).

[49] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964.*

[50] Ibid., xxxi–xxxii.

economic changes which have transformed Brazil since 1930." "Underlying all political events, especially since the early 1950's," he added as an "economic" explanation, "has been the need to make painful choices in economic policy. By 1964, the basic question was how to resume rapid economic growth and how to direct the benefits of such growth to a constantly larger share of the Brazilian population," Skidmore insisted that the failure of politicians to answer this basic economic question was evident by 1962.[51] In reality, this argument is ultimately political, as political actors are portrayed as creating inadequate institutions, failed economic policy, and behaving intransigently as a result.

In his critique of the Fourth Republic's democracy and its institutions, Skidmore singled out two weaknesses in particular: parties and the balance of power. On parties, Skidmore stated that "Brazilian society had become divided into more self-conscious sectors with conflicting interests. Yet these interests were very imperfectly represented in the new party system," which remained excessively "clientelistic."[52] He also asserted that flaws in the institutional setup produced separate electorates for the executive and legislative branches that prevented the government from functioning appropriately: "Thus, the Brazilian constitutional structure, like other federal systems combining a popularly elected President with a legislature that weighted heavily regional representation, exhibited an inability to respond quickly to the need for rapid economic and social change."[53] Finally, Skidmore contended that the political and economic crises resulting from political actions proved fatal to the regime: "In short, the lines of political authority were not sufficient to sustain the tasks of political leadership demanded by the crisis of

[51] Ibid., xxxi–xxxiii.

[52] Ibid., 185.

[53] Ibid., 186.

the early 1960's."[54] In a later text, Skidmore further insisted that "historical perspective" allowed him to see that the Fourth Republic had been a mere "interlude" to authoritarian regimes and insisted its failure was caused by "polarization" and "economic crisis." He concluded that "Both Right and Left were increasingly aware that the economic challenge was too great for any government that could have been elected in the deeply divided political atmosphere of early 1964."[55]

This thesis is more closely aligned with a smaller and more recent body of literature, with its origins in the 1970s and 80s, which analyzes the Fourth Republic as a legitimate democratic experiment that was neither doomed to fail nor undermined by populism.[56] In 2019, Gomes and Ferreira produced an article which brought together much of the work in this direction.[57] Speaking of the post-war regime they stated, "we want to emphasize that the period we are looking at requires, from the start, the confrontation of a first and great "mistaken thesis", which is evident in its own designation/interpretation of "populist republic"."[58] The authors viewed critically "traditional theses that, particularly with the concept of populism, disqualify the political history of the period."[59] Ferreira lamented that "The political history of the country is reduced, in this way, to a fairly simplistic dichotomy: on one side, a smart, super-conscious

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[54] Ibid., 319.

[55] Thomas E. Skidmore, 'Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil 1937-71', in *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven, 1973), 3–46.

[56] Gomes text is often highlighted as an early attempt to go beyond the 'populist' narrative. Angela Maria de Castro Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo* (São Paulo; Rio de Janeiro, 1988).

[57] Gomes and Ferreira, 'Brasil, 1945-1964'.

[58] Ibid., 254.

[59] Ibid., 251.

leader, capable of manipulating and deceiving; on the other, a mass without awareness of their interests, deceived by easy speeches without content."[60] Ultimately Gomes and Ferreira held that the Fourth Republic was a unique regime in Brazilian history whose democracy was deserving of greater scrutiny: "if the post-45 party system and electoral practices maintain links with the political dynamics of the Estado Novo and the First Republic, they also demarcate very important, but little noted, transformations in the political history of Brazil." "Despite its ambiguities," they concluded "it can be said that, in this period, Brazil was building an experiment of representative democracy."[61]

The literature on populism has suffered critique for its assumption of a dominant and manipulative role for populist leaders simply because the urban working class of the period failed to behave the way class-based models suggest they should have.[62] Valenzuela encountered a similar problem in the historiography when studying twentieth century Chile, "The notion that peasant voter choices were the product of trickery or coercion stems from the unstated assumption that their natural inclination would be to vote for the left, i.e., following their supposed class interest."[63] Several works, including those from Gomes and Fischer, have demonstrated that the working class, its organizations, and its leaders were intentional and

[60] Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 416.

[61] Gomes and Ferreira, 'Brasil, 1945-1964', 254.

[62] Gomes, 'O populismo e as ciências sociais no Brasil: notas sobre a trajetória de um conceito'; Ferreira, 'O Nome e a Coisa'.

[63] J Samuel Valenzuela, 'Class Relations and Democratization: A Reassessment of Barrington Moore's Model', *Kellogg Institute Working Papers*, no. 265 (March 1999).

informed participants in the politics of the period, not merely victims of deception.[64] Similarly, Ferreira and Delgado's volume seeks to explore the depth of this "democratic experiment" by "privileging social actors" and their struggles while viewing populism with skepticism.[65] Even some recent works that do focus on populism have agreed that manipulation and domination, especially as argued by Weffort, are insufficient to explain the functioning of populism and the behavior of the working class.[66]

There is also a considerable body of work contesting the arguments of insufficiency on the part of the party system and the supposed non-ideological environment. Soares' work contends that Brazil saw increasingly ideological parties and greater popular participation until the 1964 military coup.[67] Soares justified his approach, "We do not apply here very demanding intellectual criteria to define party action as ideological. High levels of demand, characteristic of the idealization of many intellectuals, collide with the reality of parties and, if applied, would lead to the conclusion that there are not and never have been ideological parties inside or outside Brazil."[68] In turn, Souza's quantitative study found Fourth Republic parties to be more sensitive to social change than traditional narratives suggested. She also contested the argument of Skidmore and others that insisted that the executive and legislative branch were separated along

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[64] Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*; Brodwyn M. Fischer, *A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro* (Stanford, 2008).

[65] Ferreira and Delgado, *O Brasil Republicano*, 9,11.

[66] Joel Wolfe, 'The Faustian Bargain Not Made: Getúlio Vargas and Brazil's Industrial Workers, 1930-1945', *Luso-Brazilian Review* 31, no. 2 (1994): 77–95; Wolfe, 'Populism and Developmentalism'; Wolfe, 'Change with Continuity'; Fortes, 'World War II and Brazilian Workers'.

[67] Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, *A democracia interrompida*, 1st ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 2001); Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, *Sociedade e Política No Brasil* (São Paulo, 1973).

[68] Soares, *A democracia interrompida*, 70.

socioeconomic lines by using electoral data to show that presidents still relied heavily on rural voters through the 1960 election.[69] Lavareda's study, utilizing opinion polling between 1960-64, demonstrated a high degree of partisan identification on the part of Brazilian society.[70] Modeling the behavior of presidents forming cabinets, Vasselai found that leaders behaved essentially the same in the Fourth Republic as they do in Brazil's current regime. In both cases, presidents operated under the assumption of party and ideological cohesion when selecting cabinet members that would facilitate a base of support in Congress.[71] In addition, Nicolau's work dramatically improved our understanding of electoral returns in this period.[72] Previous research struggled to deal with electoral data because official statistics report the votes received by electoral coalitions as if they were a separate party unto themselves. Nicolau's valuable contribution has disaggregated coalition votes providing accurate electoral data for each individual party for the first time. He found that this data did not support traditional hypotheses about party weakness or fragmentation. His data undermines arguments about a weakening of the electoral support for conservative parties that is said to have provoked a reactionary coup.

A review of the historiography therefore shows that until recently the dominant tendency among scholars had been to judge the Fourth Republic in teleological ways – that is, for various reasons (economic, political, cultural) it was an experiment bound to fail. However, newer

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[69] Souza, *Estado e partidos políticos no Brasil (1930 a 1964)*.

[70] José Antônio Lavareda, *A democracia nas urnas: o processo partidário eleitoral brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro, 1991).

[71] Fabricio Vasselai, 'Nomeações ministeriais e importância partidária na democracia de 1946-64: análises comparativas em relação à democracia atual', *Perspectivas: Revista de Ciências Sociais* 35 (2009): 173–210.

[72] Jairo Nicolau, 'Partidos na República de 1946: velhas teses, novos dados', *Dados* 47 (2004): 85–129, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0011-52582004000100003.

literature has provided fresh information and perspectives that suggest the need to revisit and reevaluate Brazil's post-war democracy. Unlike Skidmore and much of the traditional literature, this thesis does not seek merely to understand the causes of the 1964 coup, but to gain a better understanding of the history of democracy in Brazil during the whole period and understand this regime within the context of the global history of democracy and the wave of democratization that swept the globe following the Second World War.

Analyzing Democracy and Democratization

This thesis adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the study of democracy and democratization in Brazil, where a historically grounded examination is guided by social science concepts that allow me to identify the aspects of democratization the thesis will be focusing upon. This approach is particularly relevant for historians, such as I, attempting to study a topic whose very meaning is, as discussed, a matter of debate.[73] Here democracy is identified as a political regime where powerholders are selected via institutions of popular "participation and contestation" as forwarded by Dahl in his classic book on polyarchy.[74] These components exist in degrees. Participation refers to the extent to which the public is involved in selecting its leaders. Contestation refers to the ability of the opposition to challenge and eventually win power through peaceful means. In any democracy, neither participation nor contestation will be present in pure, full form, but instead will be found in varying degrees as defined by the regime itself. But where one or both are effectively absent, so too is democracy.

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[73] John Markoff, 'A Moving Target: Democracy', *European Journal of Sociology* 52, no. 2 (2011): 239–76.

[74] Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, 1971).

The perspective employed here is what some have termed "elitist democracy." This approach does not mean the exclusion of popular will or the disregarding of social and economic circumstances under which democracy develops. But it accepts the premise that elites - politicians, civil society leaders, business leaders, military officers, etc. exercise significant agency and their individual decisions, to an important extent, drive the political process. Classic scholars of democracy have been identified with this view. Schumpeter, for example, defined democracy as an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote;" Sartori defined it as a "system where the majority designates and supports the minority that governs."[75]

More recently, scholars have distinguished democracy from democratization – a distinction that has been helpful in articulating the historical approach offered in this thesis. Democratization can be understood not only as the process by which regimes transition from authoritarian to democratic but also as the sustaining and strengthening of that regime. As Whitehead notes, "Democratization is best understood as a complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended process. It consists of progress towards a more rule-based, more consensual and more participatory type of politics."[76] He also deftly explains that "The typical unfolding of a democratization process also involves many false starts, misjudgments, detours, and unintended consequences."[77] Similarly, Capoccia and Ziblatt argued that "Democratization is not only the

[75] Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London, 1994), 269; Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit, 1962), 117.

[76] Whitehead, *Democratization: Theory and Experience*, 27.

[77] Ibid., 28.

passing of singular momentous thresholds of democratic transition as the "transitions" literature sometimes presumes but instead is itself a long-term process that can usefully be thought of as a chain of big and small events, not always moving unidirectionally toward full democracy."[78]

In their study of twentieth century Latin America, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán articulated a theory that is particularly relevant to the approach adopted here, as they privilege political actors and their normative beliefs and behaviors in explaining regime change: "Political actors should be at the center of theories of regime survival and change. Political actors, not structures or cultures, determine outcomes, even though structures and cultures affect the formation and preferences of actors."[79] The authors identify as the most relevant political actors, "presidents and organizations such as parties, unions, business associations, the military, and organized movements."[80] Their theory is supported by several interconnected hypotheses that they summarize as follows: first "that policy radicalism is damaging to the prospects of competitive regimes. Conversely, policy moderation facilitates the survival of competitive regimes." Second, "actors' normative support for authoritarian regimes or leaders hinders democratization and stabilizes nondemocratic regimes," and third "a normative commitment to democracy increases the durability of competitive regimes." Finally, "a regional environment of

[78] Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, 'The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond', *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 8–9 (1 August 2010): 941, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010370431.

[79] Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal S. Pérez Liñan, *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall*, Democracies & Dictatorships in Latin America (Cambridge, 2013), 5.

[80] Ibid.

many democracies enhances the survival rate of competitive regimes and increases the transition rate from dictatorship to competitive regimes."[81]

Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán provide several key insights for pursuing this approach.[82] They offer a succinct argument that challenges modernization theory and detail its inadequacy, especially as it pertains to Latin America.[83] Furthermore, they show that many Latin American regimes are proof that "With a normative democratic commitment on the part of powerful political players and a favorable international environment, democracy can survive in the face of daunting challenges: poverty, significant ethnic cleavages, deep social inequalities, high inflation, and low growth."[84] They similarly caution against macro-analyses, especially those rooted in class, by providing evidence for their assertion that "Actors' normative attitudes about political regimes or their policy moderation/radicalism cannot be reduced to their structural position in society."[85] Finally, they identify two crucial behaviors that signal a normative commitment to democracy that are relevant to this thesis. The first is if actors "accept policy sacrifices to preserve democracy," meaning they are willing to accept setbacks to their legislative

[81] Ibid., 61.

[82] Further support for focusing on political actors and their normative democratic beliefs can be found in Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, 125–27; and Alfred C. Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, 2015), 133.

[83] Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, 'Level of Development and Democracy: Latin American Exceptionalism, 1945-1996', *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 9 (1 November 2003): 1031–67, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414003257068.

[84] Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan, *Democracies and Dictatorships*, 5.

[85] Ibid., 18.

agenda without attacking the system; and the second is "When candidates acknowledge their defeat in an election (rather than questioning its results)."[86]

While these tools from political science serve to focus my attention, I have also taken into account the various ways political actors themselves spoke about democracy. According to Valenzuela, the identification of democratization in history should be made on the basis of its recognition by contemporaries.[87] Indeed, recent histories of democracy have taken an explicit conceptual approach, which underlines the importance of understanding the trajectory of the word "democracy" among contemporaries.[88] This thesis does not offer a conceptual history of Brazilian democracy, but acknowledges that any history of democracy necessitates an examination of how democracy was discussed by the political actors involved. The approach of this thesis seeks to provide a more nuanced study of the Fourth Republic focused on political actors and institutions. The result, it is hoped, is a history of democracy in Brazil that places contemporaries and their democratic or non-democratic values at the heart of the narrative about the creation, operation, and demise of the post-war regime, avoiding teleological perspectives.

Note on Sources

In addition to a wealth of secondary sources, this thesis is supported by a wide range of primary documentation. Though hindered by the realities of the pandemic that forced the cancellation of the archival trips I had planned, I have been fortunate that the digitization of

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[86] Ibid., 6, 15.

[87] Valenzuela, 'Class Relations and Democratization: A Reassessment of Barrington Moore's Model'.

[88] Innes and Philp, *Re-Imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions*; Innes and Philp, *Re-Imagining Democracy in the Mediterranean, 1780-1860*; Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, eds., *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, Studia Fennica. Historica (Helsinki, 2010).

archives is quite advanced in Brazil and that I have relatives in the country willing to consult archives on my behalf. The archive of greatest value has been the Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC) hosted at the Fundação de Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, which holds nearly two million items and is the premier archive for twentieth century Brazilian history. CPDOC provided me with access to the personal documents of most of the political leaders of the time in addition to a wealth of party documentation, telegrams, letters, and campaign propaganda. I consulted the Partido Democrático collection at the Arquivo Público do Estado de São Paulo and the Biblioteca da Presidência da República which is the official government archive containing documents on all Brazilian presidents. I used official channels to access all referenced legislation and some primary sources were drawn from the state archives of São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. For electoral data, I rely on official statistics and the work of Nicolau, discussed in the historiography section above, which provided my thesis with more precise electoral results than most other assessments of the democracy of this period.[89] For my evaluation of the drafting of the 1946 Constitution, I reviewed the debates contained within the 26 volumes of the Anais da Assembléia Nacional Constituinte that are available via the collections of the Câmara dos Deputados. I also relied on a report by Braga from this same collection which recorded the biography and actions of every member at the constitutional convention.[90] Newspapers are used as a source of political speeches, coverage of campaigns and politics, as well as platforms for contemporary political debates. Most of these have been accessed via the Fundação Biblioteca Nacional but I have also

[89] Nicolau, 'Partidos na República de 1946'.

[90] Sérgio Soares Braga, 'Quem Foi Quem na Assembléia Constituinte de 1946: Um Perfil Socioeconômico e Regional da Constituinte de 1946' (Brasília, 1998).

extensively consulted the archive of the São Paulo liberal newspaper *Estadão* which was a near constant critic of governments and a notorious watchdog of electoral practices. Besides the wealth of secondary sources it provided, the Bodleian Libraries collection also allowed me to access primary sources like the diaries of President Getúlio Vargas, the autobiographies of prominent figures, and several other texts authored by contemporaries including multiple primary document collections edited by journalist Hélio Silva.[91] When no alternative existed, I relied upon excerpts of primary sources within secondary sources. In a final note on sources, all translations in this thesis when not specified otherwise, are the work of the author.

Thesis Outline

This thesis is organized into three parts and six chronological chapters, preceded by an introduction. Part I traces the origins of the Fourth Republic starting with the 1930 Revolution until 1945. Part II looks at the creation and functioning of the Fourth Republic itself. Finally, Part III examines the demise of the regime and institutionalization of the military dictatorship.

Chapter I reviews the Revolution of 1930 and the aftermath through 1937 to understand the origins of the wave of democratization that would lead to the Fourth Republic. It begins by detailing the causes of the Revolution of 1930 that brought about the end of Brazil's First Republic (1889-1930), including the 1930 presidential election. The chapter next reviews the relevant reforms and polices of Getúlio Vargas' provisional government and the debates about

[91] Getúlio Vargas, *Diário (1930 - 1936)*, vol. 1 (São Paulo; Rio de Janeiro, 1995); Getúlio Vargas, *Diário (1937 - 1942)*, vol. 2 (São Paulo; Rio de Janeiro, 1995); Juscelino Kubitschek, *A marcha do amanhecer* (São Paulo, 1962); Juscelino Kubitschek, *Por Que Construi Brasilia* (Rio de Janeiro, 1975); Hélio Silva, *1932: A Guerra Paulista* (Rio de Janeiro, 1967); Hélio Silva, *1937: todos os golpes se parecem* (Rio de Janeiro, 1970); Hélio Silva and Maria Cecília Ribas Carneiro, eds., *1964, golpe ou contragolpe?* (Rio de Janeiro, 1975); Virgilio Alvim de Mello Franco, *A campanha da U.D.N. (1944-1945)* (Rio de Janeiro, 1946).

democracy that waged within the country until the 1937 auto-coup by Vargas and his allies in the military that installed a corporatist dictatorship called the Estado Novo.

Chapter II evaluates the functioning and overthrow of the Estado Novo dictatorship (1937-1945) as well as its legacy for future democratization. Assessed here are the policies of the dictatorship in the areas of authoritarianism, nationalism, and corporatism. Additionally, it examines the process of democratization that brought about the Fourth Republic and the effect of World War II and Brazil's participation in that conflict on that process. The chapter also reviews the changing role of the military in political life.

Chapter III focuses on the drafting of the 1946 Constitution and the first elections following the end of the Estado Novo dictatorship. The chapter looks at how the constitutional convention came to be, the external politics influencing it, and the debates most relevant to democracy, namely those on elections, civil rights, and the social responsibilities of government. Also detailed is the advent of three main parties of the Fourth Republic, the Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party), the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party), and the União Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Union).

Chapter IV analyzes the way in which the new republic dealt with challenges to stability and avoided the democratic backsliding that happened elsewhere in the world. Among those challenges were polarization caused by the return of Vargas to power via the ballot box, inflation, Vargas' suicide, and an attempted coup. The chapter pays special attention to the military intervention led by Minster of War Henrique Lott that enforced the constitutional order and ensured the inauguration of the winning candidates in the 1955 election, President Juscelino Kubitschek and Vice President João Goulart.

Chapter V covers the period of 1956-1961, comprising the administrations of Kubitschek and Jânio Quadros, which I contend was the pinnacle of democratic success in the Fourth Republic. The chapter explores how depolarization came about, Brazil's successes on the front of economic development, changes to political organization, rural mobilization, and the public movements and political actions that overruled an attempted military veto that would have interrupted the constitutional order.

In the final chapter the thesis looks at the political polarization that led to the 1964 coup and the military's decision to intervene. Lastly, the chapter details the change in direction by the military government from short term intervention to long term dictatorship as it rolled back many democratic institutions and established a repressive authoritarian government over the period between 1961 and 1968.

The conclusion highlights the main findings of the thesis and provides some reflections on its wider significance and implications for both the history of democracy in Brazil and the history and study of democracy elsewhere.

Part I: Origins of the Fourth Republic

Chapter I Democratization or Dictatorship? 1930-37

The origins of the Fourth Republic lie in the 1930 Revolution and the 15-year government of Getúlio Vargas that followed and so our investigation begins here. After a period of democratization, accompanied in some cases by the expansion of the suffrage in varying countries, democracy and liberalism declined in the wake of World War I, as the result of the global assault on these values that accompanied the rise of fascism and the Great Depression.[92] As democratic regimes increasingly gave way to authoritarian ones after 1930 it seemed that liberal democracy might be reduced to a historical phenomenon.[93] Liberalism in Brazil had become increasingly associated with fraudulent electoral practices.[94] Over the 1920s, cracks appeared in the First Republic (1889-1930), as the dominant Partido Republicano (Republican Party) with its autonomous state chapters struggled to maintain its hold on politics but collapse did not appear imminent. Nevertheless, the Revolution of 1930 brought the entire system crashing down and opened the door to a brief period of democratization until the 1937 coup ushered in a dictatorship under Getúlio Vargas.

According to Collier and Collier, following the 1930 Revolution, Vargas and his allies, who "believed that the liberal state could not function in modern industrial society," attempted to impose a centralized "authoritarian" and "corporatist" solution. Vargas' opposition forced concessions and secured a brief period of constitutional government after 1934, but via skillful political manipulation Vargas won military support for a long-term authoritarian solution which

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[92] Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy*, 455–581.

[93] By one estimate only 13 democracies remained by 1940, see Max Roser and Bastian Herre, 'Democracy', *Our World in Data*, accessed 20 April 2022, https://ourworldindata.org/democracy.

[94] Robert Bellarmine Chisholm, 'Tropical Leviathan: The State in Brazilian Political Thought from Independence to the Estado Novo' (PhD Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2002), 145–86.

he imposed in 1937.[95] Skidmore reached a similar conclusion, "If politics had come alive with such vigor in 1934, how was a coup possible just three years later? The answer lies in the great skill with which Vargas manipulated one extreme against the other, producing in the minds of the military and the middle class profound pessimism about the viability of open politics. In Brazil, as in the entire Western political world, liberalism was steadily losing ground."[96] These analyses speak to the need to bring together international conditions, political agendas, and democratic behaviors of actors in a single narrative surrounding the 1930 Revolution and the subsequent attempt at democracy.

Several questions guide this chapter. What were the causes of the 1930 Revolution and what were its consequences for democratization? How was Vargas successful in establishing a dictatorship in 1937? How did the global rise of totalitarianism effect political events and actors in Brazil? How did reform agendas focusing on centralization and corporatism come about and what strategies were employed to pursue and oppose them? Finally, what were the expressed beliefs and attitudes displayed by the relevant political actors identified in this chapter towards democracy, contestation, and participation? This chapter begins by examining the 1930 Revolution, then it evaluates the attempt at democratization and reconstitutionalization that followed, and finally it assesses the breakdown of the regime and the auto-coup by Vargas in 1937.

[95] Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, 173–86.

[96] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 21–22.

1930: Revolution and an Opening for Democratization

Scholars of twentieth century Brazil universally recognize the 1930 Revolution as dividing point in the country's history.[97] In an outstanding work on the conflict Fausto argued against the "dualist approach" which claimed that the 1930 Revolution was a conflict of the internal market or industrialists versus the external market or exporters.[98] He demonstrated that support for the uprising in São Paulo, the heartland of Brazilian industry, came from urban and agricultural middle classes in connection with a few members of the coffee exporting elite not industrialists.[99] Fausto further argued that the Revolution could not be connected to the specific interests of any single class or economic group. Baretta and Markoff likewise found that "The development of revolutionary events, in short, cannot be comprehended by placing at their center a specific class or group and its interests" and contended that the regime failed for lack of commitment to it not the emergence of a new group with conflicting interests.[100] Building on this

[97] For examples of the extensive work on the 1930 Revolution see Boris Fausto, *A revolução de 1930: historiografia e história*, 16th ed. (São Paulo, 1997); Silvio R. Duncan Baretta and John Markoff, 'The Limits of the Brazilian Revolution of 1930', *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 9, no. 3 (1986): 413–52; John D. Wirth, 'Tenentismo in the Brazilian Revolution of 1930', *Hispanic American Historical Review* 44, no. 2 (1 May 1964): 161–79, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-44.2.161; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*; Ann Quiggins Tiller, 'The Igniting Spark—Brazil, 1930', *Hispanic American Historical Review* 45, no. 3 (1 August 1965): 384–92, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-45.3.384; Hélio Silva, *1930: a revolução trída* (Rio de Janeiro, 1966); Lúcia Lippi Oliveira, 'Revolução de 1930: uma bibliografia comentada', *Revista Brasileira de Informação Bibliográfica em Ciências Sociais*, no. 4 (1978): 95–116.

[98] Fausto, *A revolução de 1930*.

[99] Studies of São Paulo have also found this to be the case, see Font, *Coffee, Contention, and Change*; Woodard, *A Place in Politics*; James P. Woodard, 'History, Sociology and the Political Conflicts of the 1920s in São Paulo, Brazil', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 37, no. 2 (May 2005): 333–49, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0500903X.

[100] Baretta and Markoff, 'The Limits of the Brazilian Revolution of 1930', 415.

scholarship, this section attempts to locate the origins of the 1930 Revolution before discussing how it played out and what allowed it to be successful.

Growing Discontent

The violent overthrow of the government in 1930 resulted partially from discontent with the regime that had been growing for some time. Since its beginning, the First Republic had been the subject of criticism by idealists who complained of the bastardization of republican ideals for the benefit of authoritarian rule. The most notorious of these critics was Rui Barbosa.[101] A framer of the 1891 Constitution, Barbosa like many of his contemporaries railed against the "oligarchies" by which he meant the state level alliances of *coronéis* and party machines (Thesis Introduction). Over a series of failed presidential campaigns, Barbosa argued for merit based staffing of the bureaucracy and reform of the voter enrollment that would take it out of the hands of municipal officials, reforms clearly targeting the heart of the *coronelismo* system. Barbosa's supporters hoped he would "democratize the republic" as his campaign proclaimed.[102] One notable supporter was the staunchly liberal journalist Júlio Mesquita who was both editor and owner of the newspaper *O Estado de S. Paulo*. In a 1924 editorial Mesquita declared, "*Estado* is a liberal newspaper, and the government has come to be an odious despotism."[103] Both Barbosa and Mesquita died in the 1920s and the idealistic Republicans from the regime's founding generation faded away. Their critiques of the system however, outlived them.

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[101] José Almino de Alencar, 'Rui Barbosa', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 7 April 2022, https://cpdoc.fgv.br/sites/default/files/verbetes/primeira-republica/BARBOSA,%20Rui.pdf.

[102] Taken from a speech at a rally in support of Barbosa. As quoted in Woodard, *A Place in Politics*, 103.

[103] As quoted in ibid., 62.

Carrying on their torch were multiple state based opposition parties that increasingly employed the language and ideology of liberal democracy following WWI. The two most consequential parties of this nature were the Partido Democrático (Democratic Party) in São Paulo and the Partido Libertador (Liberator Party) in Rio Grande do Sul. In 1926, several Paulistas,[104] led by a few prominent members of the state's coffee growing elite dissatisfied with the local Republican chapter, formed the Partido Democrático (Democratic Party).[105] Via its platform, the party declared its intentions, "To defend the liberal principles enshrined in the Constitution, making the government of the people by the people a reality and opposing any constitutional revision that implies restriction to individual guarantees and freedoms."[106] In 1928, the Partido Libertador was founded in Rio Grande do Sul as a successor organization to a previous opposition party. Similar to the Democrats, the Partido Libertador aimed to "Defend the democratic and liberal principles enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic, so that the government of the people by the people and for the people becomes a reality."[107] Like the idealistic republicans before them, these parties wanted to authenticate the Constitution via reform but not replace it. While frequently victims of voter fraud and the falsification of returns,

[104] Paulista is a demonym for the people of São Paulo.

[105] James P. Woodard, 'The Specter of Liberalism: Notes on the Democratic Party of São Paulo and the Historiography of Twentieth-Century Brazil', *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y El Caribe* 16, no. 2 (4 June 2005).

[106] 'Programma do Partido Democratico' (1926), BR_SP_APESP_IHGSP_PD_083_002_002, Arquivo Público do Estado de São Paulo.

[107] 'Programa e Lei Orgânica do Partido Libertador' (1945), Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, https://www.tse.jus.br/hotsites/registro_partidario/pl/manifesto_programa.htm. This document is dated 1945 when the party registered with the Electoral Justice System, but the quoted section remained from the original document in 1928.

these parties did manage to win a handful of federal offices in rare examples of opposition victories at the national level during the First Republic.[108]

Between 1917 and 1920 the country also witnessed a series of major labor strikes with the city of São Paulo being the epicenter. The growing labor movement was heavily influenced by anarchism, syndicalism, and to a lesser degree socialism that had come over with European immigrants. These strikes made the "social question" – what is the social responsibility of the government, especially with respect to its working class? – a permanent feature of the national political scene. Strikers called for workers' rights such as the right to organize, injury insurance, and retirement assistance while directly challenging the dominant social structure. Repression and deportation of leaders constituted the main government responses.[109]

The First Republic also generated dissatisfaction among junior officers in the military who chafed at the role of patronage in deciding promotions. Unlike the Partido Democrático and Partido Libertador, these officers frequently charged that liberalism was the problem as it was a system entirely foreign to Brazil and ill-suited to its social realities. The "oligarchies" or the dominant political machines were seen as resulting from this mismatch. Several of these officers admired and drew inspiration from the fascist and communist parties of Europe. They favored a strong militarist central government to usurp the power of the oligarchies and held a low opinion

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[108] Woodard, *A Place in Politics*; Font, *Coffee, Contention, and Change*; Love, *Rio Grande Do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882-1930*.

[109] Woodard, *A Place in Politics*, 79–85; Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*; John W. F. Dulles, *Anarchists and Communists in Brazil, 1900-1935* (Austin, 1974); Edilene Toledo and Luigi Biondi, 'Constructing Syndicalism And Anarchism Globally: The Transnational Making Of The Syndicalist Movement In São Paulo, Brazil, 1895–1935', in *Anarchism and Syndicalism in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, 1870-1940 : The Praxis of National Liberation, Internationalism, and Social Revolution*, ed. Steven Hirsch and Lucien Van Der Walt (Boston, 2010), 363–94.

of popular participation, preferring indirect elections. In 1922, 1924, and 1927, these officers led a series of uprisings, known as the Lieutenant Rebellions; these events captured national attention and many people sympathized with the rebels.[110]

One officer in particular achieved national fame: Captain Luís Carlos Prestes led his rebels, popularly known as the Prestes Column, across the Brazilian interior evading the Army until being forced into exile in Bolivia. Prestes soon found himself fraternizing with several Latin American communists before moving to the Soviet Union and becoming a full-fledged communist himself. He later returned to Brazil in 1935 as the head of the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party) and remained so throughout the period considered by this thesis.[111]

The Election of 1930

The challenge that proved fatal to the First Republic did not come primarily from its opposition however, instead it was a schism of Partido Republicano leadership in key states that opened the door to change. In a power sharing agreement, the Partido Republicano in Minas

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[110] Fausto, *A revolução de 1930*, 51–85; Woodard, *A Place in Politics*, 108–42; A great deal of scholarship on the revolts exists. For example: Maria Cecília Spina Forjaz, *Tenentismo e Aliança Liberal (1927-1930)*, vol. 2 (São Paulo, 1978); Hélio Silva, *1931: Os Tenentes No Poder* (Rio de Janeiro, 1966); Wirth, 'Tenentismo in the Brazilian Revolution of 1930'; Robert J. Alexander, 'Brazilian "Tenentismo"', *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 36, no. 2 (1956): 229–42, https://doi.org/10.2307/2508666; Robert J. Alexander, 'The Brazilian Tenentes after the Revolution of 1930', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 15, no. 2 (May 1973): 221–48, https://doi.org/10.2307/174698; Michael L. Conniff, 'The Tenentes in Power: A New Perspective on the Brazilian Revolution of 1930', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 10, no. 1 (May 1978): 61–82, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0001974X; Ernest A. Duff, 'Luís Carlos Prestes and the Revolution of 1924', *Luso-Brazilian Review* 4, no. 1 (1967): 3–16; Neill Macaulay, *The Prestes Column: Revolution in Brazil* (New York, 1974).

[111] Reis, *Luís Carlos Prestes*; Prestes, *Luiz Carlos Prestes e a Aliança Nacional Libertadora* This author is Luís Carlos' daughter. Macaulay, *The Prestes Column*; Duff, 'Luís Carlos Prestes and the Revolution of 1924'.

Gerais and São Paulo had exercised control over the selection of the official presidential candidate since the early days of the republic and the official candidate had always won and rarely faced even a minimal challenge (Thesis Introduction). This agreement came apart in 1928 when President Washington Luís selected a fellow São Paulo politician, Júlio Prestes, to be his successor effectively robbing their partisans in Minas Gerais of their opportunity to select the candidate. Paulista leadership felt their hand was strong enough to impose their will and Luís wanted a handpicked successor to continue certain policies.

Even if they wished to do so, Republicans in Minas Gerais could not successfully oppose a government backed candidate alone and so they reached out to the next most powerful state in the Partido Republicano apparatus that would be displaced by the Paulista power grab, Rio Grande do Sul. Republican leadership in Rio Grande do Sul was allowed to select the presidential candidate, while the Republicans in the less important state of Paraiba chose the vice presidential candidate, João Pessoa, Paraiba's state president. Rio Grande do Sul's party also nominated their state president, Getúlio Vargas. Republican leadership in Minas Gerais felt that Vargas would be little more than a figurehead for the coalition once elected.[112]

Seeking as broad a coalition as possible, the dissident Republicans appealed to the opposition parties of Brazil. Eventually most of the opposition parties in the country agreed to join the dissident Republicans in a coalition denominated as the Aliança Liberal (Liberal Alliance). Both the Partido Democrático and the Partido Libertador pledged their allegiance to the Aliança Liberal in exchange for a platform that included several of the reforms they

[112] Leslie Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil Under Vargas, 1930–1945', in *Brazil since 1930*, ed. Leslie Bethell, vol. 9, The Cambridge History of Latin America (Cambridge, 2008), 11–14; Fausto, 'Society and Politics', 301–4.

advocated as will be discussed below.[113] For many in the opposition it was jarring to be allied with the Republicans they had long denounced as "oligarchs." Both Partido Libertador and Partido Democrático leaderships believed that this presented an opportunity to leverage real change and introduce a greater degree of contestation. The head of the Partido Libertador, explained to his colleagues that the Aliança Liberal, while not ideal, was necessary. The Partido Libertador "does not vote for men but for ideas and principles," he declared and urged members of his party to vote with two goals in mind. First, to end the "humiliation of national sovereignty . . . of each president naming his successor with absolute contempt for the nation," and second to elect the candidate with the best principles.[114] Speaking before the São Paulo Chamber of Deputies, a deputy representing the Partido Democrático issued a similar message highlighting three main aims underlying the party's support of the Aliança Liberal: the reestablishment of the liberal principles in the 1889 Constitution, effective representation for minority parties, and the institution of the secret vote.[115]

The Aliança Liberal's presidential candidate, Vargas, was born to a prominent family in 1883 in Rio Grande do Sul and would go on to dominate the next two decades of Brazilian politics.[116] Like most elite families in the region, the Vargas family amassed its fortune through

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[113] Forjaz, *Tenentismo e Aliança Liberal (1927-1930)*; Alzira Alves de Abreu, 'Alianca Liberal', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 7 April 2022, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/alianca-liberal.

[114] 'A Candidatura Getulio Vargas Conquista Importantes Adhesões No Rio Grande Do Sul', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 7 August 1929, Acervo Estadão.

[115] 'Em S. Paulo: Camara Dos Deputados O Sr. Atonio Feliciano Explicou a Attitude Do Partido Democratico Deante Do Problema Da Sucessão Presidencial, Apoiando as Candidaturas Getulio Vargas - João Pessoa', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 11 September 1929, Acervo Estadão.

[116] For the biography of Vargas see Levine, *Father of the Poor?*; Richard Bourne, *Getulio Vargas of Brazil, 1883-1954 : Sphinx of the Pampas* (London, 1974); Dulles, *Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography*.

ranching. Vargas' father backed the Republicans, the winning side, in a violent civil conflict known as the Federalist Revolution (1893-1895) and, as a result, the family enjoyed powerful connections. Following a brief stint in the military, Vargas enrolled in law school. After graduating in 1907, he became the state Assistant Attorney General at just 24 years old, thanks to political favors called in by his father. In 1909, as a member of the Partido Republicano, he won an election to Rio Grande do Sul's Chamber of Deputies where he served until becoming a federal deputy for the state in 1924. When President Luís came into office in 1926, Vargas was the head of Rio Grande do Sul's congressional delegation and so Brazil's new president selected him as the Minister of Finance to secure his state's support for his economic agenda. After one year in the presidential cabinet, Vargas returned home to assume the Republican candidacy for state president and was duly elected. Vargas and Aliança Liberal leadership reached out to President Luís on many occasions to try and negotiate a settlement that would avoid a contested election. When the sides failed to agree, Vargas forged ahead with his candidacy.

The Aliança Liberal's platform was summarized in the popular slogan "Amnesty, Representation, and Justice."[117] Amnesty referred to reprieve for the rebellious junior officers that had become popular heroes and embodiments of resentment towards the system. By arguing their cause, the opposition hoped to coopt some of their popularity. Furthermore, the creation of a truly independent judiciary, a long standing request of the opposition parties, constituted the Aliança's claimed commitment to justice. On representation, the Aliança Liberal platform insisted that failure to achieve legitimate representation made the Brazilian electoral system one of the "most backward on the continent." Referencing established vote buying practices, the

[117] All of the following quotations from the Aliança Liberal platform are found in 'O Manifesto á Nação', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 21 September 1929, Acervo Estadão.

coalition complained, “In democracies, peace without agitation of ideas and without the full exercise of political rights is not peace, it’s stagnation.” To remedy this situation the coalition advocated automatic voter enrollment, the secret vote, and proportional representation; each reform carefully targeting facets of *coronelismo*. Appeals to democratization mostly utilized the language of liberalism and republicanism. “First of all, we want the Republic to reaffirm itself among us, as its apostles and founders imagined it” read the platform. Without making a specific promise, the platform also spoke favorably of enfranchising women as well, a known middle class aspiration. Uniting the opposition was the practice of the president selecting his own successor. An abuse of power which the coalition argued the government now wished to make an “implicit” prerogative of the president. Paraphrasing, the platform charged that President Luís had traded being head of state for being the head of his faction. In a largely novel strategy of appealing to urban workers, the platform forwarded social legislation including an 8-hour workday, minimum wage, women and children’s labor legislation, and vacation time which the coalition contrasted with the supposed indifference towards the issue of the current administration.[118]

Apart from electoral reform and the modest gesture towards social legislation, no radical differences in policy preferences existed between the government campaign and the Aliança Liberal. Notably absent from this electoral contest were references to the global economic crash concomitantly playing out. Brazil’s primary export, coffee, and thus its entire economy was damaged by the crash, but the country was more insulated from the effects of the downturn than others. The government and opposition positions essentially agreed on the need for stabilization

[118] Fausto, ‘Society and Politics’, 302–3.

measures and generous support for coffee as a response. Since to do otherwise would alienate coffee growers who held significant power in both the Partido Republicano and the Aliança Liberal.[119]

The Aliança Liberal conducted a national electoral campaign at a time when politics were usually regional. Vargas made visits across the country including enemy territory in the capital and São Paulo and was enthusiastically received wherever he went. Aliança Liberal surrogates also made the first use of radio for a presidential campaign.[120] Worried about matching their rivals, the Partido Republicano in São Paulo endeavored to increase turnout dramatically. This included extensive voter registration, including of those not legally eligible, and an intense print propaganda campaign. Their opponents in Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul responded in kind.[121]

In March 1930, nearly 2 million Brazilians or 5.7% of the population went to the polls in what constituted the highest turnout both in total votes and percentage of the population since the birth of the republic.[122] Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo each more than doubled their turnout from 1926 and accounted for more than half of the national total.[123] It should be remembered that fabrication of voting results was common, and the actual number of voters was probably lower than the official numbers suggest. According to the final official tally, Prestes

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[119] Baretta and Markoff, 'The Limits of the Brazilian Revolution of 1930'.

[120] Doris Fagundes Haussen, 'Radio and Populism in Brazil: The 1930s and 1940s', *Television & New Media* 6, no. 3 (1 August 2005): 251–61, https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476404273950.

[121] Woodard, *A Place in Politics*, 198–204; Fausto, 'Society and Politics', 301–4.

[122] Love, 'Political Participation in Brazil, 1881-1969'.

[123] For official election returns see 'Diário do Congresso Nacional' (Rio de Janeiro, 9 June 1926), Acervo da Câmara dos Deputados.

with 1,115,377 votes defeated Vargas with 782,236. A historic contest considering that presidential candidates frequently won with more than 90% of the vote. Ultimately, Vargas only prevailed in states where the Aliança liberal controlled the election machinery: Minas Gerais, Paraiba, and Rio Grande do Sul though he won these by comically large margins, just as Prestes did virtually everywhere else.

Reported alongside the results were accounts of widespread fraud. Members of the Aliança Liberal complained that their voters were being turned away at polls, denied ballots, or intimidated. One polling station, in violation of the law, even operated out of the police station. Still, the Aliança Liberal engaged in similar tactics in states where they controlled the election machinery. Drama continued to playout as committees attempted to count the votes. Several pages had been torn or altered in official result books submitted by delegations. In Minas Gerais, federal forces occupied the counting location.[124]

While historic, the result of the election was the anticipated one. Vargas resumed his work as state president and the Aliança Liberal vowed to continue to continue the struggle by way of their representatives elected to congress. They also promised to present their "abundant evidence" of fraud to the Congress so they could reveal what had been the "true pronouncement of the Brazilian people."[125] While the opposition clearly doubted the integrity of the result, they chose to pursue their agenda and register their objections within the system.

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[124] For these reports see the newspaper series from 1 March to 3 June 'A Successão Presidencial e a Renovação Do Congresso Nacional', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 1930, Acervo Estadão.

[125] 'Manifesto Da Alliança Liberal á Nação', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 22 April 1930, Acervo Estadão.

The Revolution of 1930

Events soon shifted the calculus. Even as the election results poured in, Vargas' running mate, Pessoa, had been struggling with violent civil unrest in his state by rebels fighting over local issues but that had connections to the federal government. Then on 26 July, an individual associated with the rebels assassinated Pessoa which incensed many members of the Aliança Liberal. A young Rio Grande do Sul politician and close ally of Vargas, Oswaldo Aranha, launched into a public tirade blaming the administration for codling the illegal and violent opposition in Paraiba just to settle a political score.[126] In Congress, the opposition presented stinging orations blaming President Luís and his government for the death of a heroic Brazilian.[127]

The election defeat itself had not proven sufficient to provoke an armed reaction because the Republican leadership in Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul was unwilling to endorse a violent reaction against their counterparts in São Paulo. However, Aranha and other young radicals in the Aliança Liberal had been pushing for armed resistance ever since that electoral defeat, as well as courting military support from the exiled junior officers.[128] Pessoa's assassination proved the necessary catalyst to secure the blessing for open conflict from the Republican leaders in the Aliança Liberal.[129] The rebellious officers were suspect of the Aliança

[126] 'O Presidente João Pessoa Foi Assassinado a Tiros, Em Recife', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 27 July 1930, sec. O Momento Politico, Acervo Estadão.

[127] 'A Repercussão Do Barbaro Assassino Do Presidente João Pessoa Em Todo o Paiz', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 29 July 1930, sec. O Momento Politico, Acervo Estadão.

[128] Jordan Young, 'Military Aspects of the 1930 Brazilian Revolution', *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 44, no. 2 (1964): 180–96, https://doi.org/10.2307/2511596.

[129] Tiller, 'The Igniting Spark—Brazil, 1930'.

Liberal that contained so many members of the political elite that they opposed; however, the sides reached a tentative agreement that saw many of these officers combine with state militias from Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul under the command of Vargas' friend and ally Colonel Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro.[130] Not all the rebel officers could be swayed. Luís Carlos Prestes, the most famous rebel and now an aspiring communist, declined Vargas' invitation to command the revolutionary forces and issued a statement declaring that only an "agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution" with the support of the masses would solve Brazil's problems and he advocated nationalization and land reform. Most of his rebellious colleagues rushed to distance themselves from Prestes' position.[131]

The rebellion finally broke out on 3 October 1930. In a speech to troops in his state, Vargas justified the uprising. The Aliança Liberal campaign had been synonymous with the will of the people, he claimed, and had been defeated by "electoral farce." This oppression had left "the representative regime struck dead, by the subversion of popular suffrage" to the benefit of the "oligarchies and political professionalism." The language employed still sought to rescue an ideal past as Vargas claimed his side fought "to re-acquire liberty, to restore the purity of the republican regime, to achieve national reconstruction." Vargas also pandered to the federal Army, calling them the "incorruptible guards of national dignity" forced to support a regime of morally corrupt political bossism.[132] Despite Vargas' claims of widespread support, popular

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[130] Young, 'Military Aspects of the 1930 Brazilian Revolution'.

[131] 'O Manifesto de Luiz Carlos Prestes', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 30 May 1930, Acervo Estadão; Reis, *Luís Carlos Prestes*.

[132] Getúlio Vargas, 'Rio Grande, de Pé, Pelo Brasil', in *A Nova Política Do Brasil*, vol. I (Rio de Janeiro, 1938), 55–63.

participation in the "revolution" was virtually nonexistent and the conflict remained confined to the political elite as well as the militia and military forces.[133]

Military command in Rio de Janeiro promised loyalty to President Luís but had grown weary over the last decade of having to ensure the stability of elected governments. The Army Chief of Staff and a group of senior officers decided on 24 October to depose President Luís instead. Publicly the military cited the need to avoid fratricidal civil war as their motivation; later the Army Chief of Staff privately added that, "No one wanted his son to put on a uniform and die fighting for a man frankly divorced from the common interest."[134] A military council assumed power and briefly considered retaining it. However, as Vargas and his forces approached Rio de Janeiro, it became obvious that only delivering power to him could avoid conflict. On 4 November, the military council declared Vargas the head of the Provisional Government.

The military's decision proved extremely consequential. Stepan described the Brazilian pattern of civil-military relations during the Fourth Republic as the "moderating pattern," in reference to the moderating power of the emperor (Thesis Introduction). The military's removal of Luís was the immediate precursor to that pattern. Already under the republic it was the military who assumed and was consciously given the power by civilian politicians to correct for abuses of power, especially on the part of the executive branch. Given the often outsized power wielded by presidents vis-à-vis the other branches, Stepan explains that "Many members of the polity have for these reasons felt little confidence in the efficacy of these institutions [Congress and the judiciary] to check executive activity. Informally or formally, pro-regime civilian groups

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[133] Fausto, *A revolução de 1930*; Baretta and Markoff, 'The Limits of the Brazilian Revolution of 1930'; Young, 'Military Aspects of the 1930 Brazilian Revolution'.

[134] As quoted in Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 6.

outside the government often tend to assign this task to the military."[135] To this end the First Republic's Constitution had mandated that the armed forces were "obliged to uphold constitutional institutions."[136] Stepan also stresses that the Constitution only required the military to be submissive to executive authority "within the limits of the law" essentially granting them constitutional authority to disobey a president they deemed to be operating outside those limits.[137] With the events of 1930, the military had shown that in the real world it was willing to move against the executive branch when they considered it to be "divorced from the common interest."[138]

It is important to reiterate that the First Republic fell at a time when liberalism and democracy were in retreat globally. With Europe as its epicenter, fascism and anti-liberalism were on the rise.[139] The economic crisis appeared to have laid bare the fallacies of prevailing ideologies and solutions demanded a dynamic government that need not concern itself with the endless debates of democracy and the limitations of liberalism. In Europe, the 1930s saw talk of purification and renovation turn into authoritarian regimes in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and of course the rise of Nazi Germany.[140] Meanwhile in Latin America coups and revolutions took place in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,

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[135] Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 74.

[136] 'Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1891' (1891) Art. 14.

[137] Ibid. Art. 14; Stepan, *The Military in Politics*.

[138] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 6.

[139] Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy*, 455–581.

[140] Philip Morgan, *Fascism in Europe, 1919-1945* (London, 2003); Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy*, 455–581.

Guatemala, and Peru between 1930 and 1932.[141] Even in the United States some commentators speculated on the possibility, though remote, that Franklin Roosevelt might emerge as the country's first ever dictator as democracy disappeared altogether.[142] Anti-liberal and anti-democratic sentiment influenced the 1930 rebels and as the remainder of the chapter demonstrates, continued to do so long after the conflict ended.

Contesting Democracy

With the First Republic swept away by the military the door was now open for fundamental political change, however, the revolutionaries first had to decide what shape the future should take. This section looks at the administration of the provisional government under Vargas and the actions of his opposition leading up to the drafting of the 1934 election. Examined here are the ideology and policy positions of the relevant political actors and then the advent of the 1932 Constitution.

Provisional Government and Ideological Clashes

As president of the Provisional Government, Vargas had virtually arbitrary power to conduct the transition. Yet in a state of uncertainty, he could only go as far as his support would allow. Making life difficult for Vargas was the fact that the revolutionary coalition was not

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[141] Fausto, *A revolução de 1930*, 101; Clarence H. Haring, 'Presidential Elections in South America', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1932, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-america/1932-01-01/presidential-elections-south-america; Some Latin American countries proved to be exceptions, most notably Colombia. See Eduardo Posada-Carbó, 'Las elecciones presidenciales de Colombia en 1930', *Revista de Estudios Sociales*, no. 07 (1 September 2000): 35–47.

[142] A. Lawrence Lowell, 'The Present Crisis in Democracy', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1934, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1934-01-01/present-crisis-democracy.

unified as to their vision of what should come next as will be seen.[143] For the interim president, military support was crucial to remain in power. To this end, Vargas shuffled the ranks, placing officers loyal to him in key posts and attempted to restore order and strength to the Army, severely weakened by the disorganization resulting from the 1930 Revolution. This reorganization also attended longstanding military angst and attempted to bring state militia forces under the control of the federal government. Vargas turned to his allies Góes Monteiro and Eurico Dutra who were both promoted to the rank of General. Several of the rebellious junior officers were also reintegrated into the military while those who opposed Vargas were expelled or passed over for promotion.[144] The rebellious junior officers that supported the 1930 Revolution constituted another important group of actors that filled key military and political posts in the Provisional Government.[145]

To advance their political vision, most of the rebel junior officers that had backed Vargas organized themselves into the Clube 3 de Outubro (October) in homage to the day the 1930 Revolution began. Club members or Octobrists dedicated themselves to the realization of what they recognized as the true aims of the revolution namely the "economic and social

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[143] This analysis is informed by similar exercises in Baretta and Markoff, 'The Limits of the Brazilian Revolution of 1930', 435–46; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 9–12; Dulce Pandolfi, 'Os anos 30: as incertezas do regime', *XXII Simpósio Nacional De História*, 2003.

[144] Shawn Smallman, *Fear and Memory in the Brazilian Army and Society, 1889-1954* (Chapel Hill, 2002), 40–61; Max Garrett Manwaring, 'The Military in Brazilian Politics' (PhD Dissertation, University of Illinois, 1968), 38–40; Frank D McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889-1937* (Stanford, 2004); Baretta and Markoff, 'The Limits of the Brazilian Revolution of 1930', 444; José Murilo Carvalho, 'Armed Forces and Politics in Brazil, 1930–45', *Hispanic American Historical Review* 62, no. 2 (1 May 1982): 207–10, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-62.2.193.

[145] Silva, *1931: Os Tenentes No Poder*; Silva and Silva, 'Eleições no Brasil antes da democracia'; Alexander, 'The Brazilian Tenentes after the Revolution of 1930'; Conniff, 'The Tenentes in Power'; Wirth, 'Tenentismo in the Brazilian Revolution of 1930'.

reconstruction" of Brazil.[146] The club characterized its ideology as "evolutionary and nationalist socialism" and its message showed influences of both fascism and communism.[147] They admitted, "We take advantage of the achievements of other peoples" while not "losing the notion of the Brazilian reality."[148] In a speech in 1932, General Góes Monteiro similarly encouraged the Octobrists to develop a "Brazilian fascism" or "nationalist fascism" suited to Brazil's unique social conditions.[149] The club differentiated itself from the supposed backward looking liberals by insisting Brazil should "not repeat the error of the idealists of 89" who produced a constitution unsuited to the "Brazilian reality."[150] The Octobrists perceived the country's problems as more social than political with society divided between the "productive and working classes" who gave to society and the "unproductive and parasitic classes" – the latter being large landholders and proprietors.[151] Curiously, they used the language of democracy to advance a corporatist vision: "We achieve democracy by giving the government over to those who work and produce," they declared, while advocating for a powerful corporatist and technocratic central government and elections utilizing a "secret vote" where voters would be allowed to cast a

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[146] 'Esboço do Programa Revolucionario do Clube 3 de Outubro', *Boletim do Clube 3 de Outubro*, May 1932, 1, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[147] 'Estatutos do Nucleo Central do Clube 3 de Outubro do Estado de São Paulo com séde em Santos e dos Nucleos Regionaes no mesmo Estado' (1934), 19, JT dpf 1931.12.12, CPDOC - Acervo Juarez Távora.

[148] 'Esboço do Programa Revolucionario', 1–2.

[149] As quoted in Fausto, *A revolução de 1930*, 111.

[150] 'Esboço do Programa Revolucionario', 1–2.

[151] Ibid., 2.

different number of votes depending upon the social value ascribed to their profession.[152] Several unions and civil society organizations undersigned the club's "Revolutionary Program."[153]

Advocates of liberal democracy could be found most visibly in the long standing opposition parties, the Partido Libertador and the Partido Democrático which had supported both the Aliança Liberal and the 1930 Revolution with the hope of securing democratizing reforms. These parties lacked any armed force under their control and had not made any significant contribution to the military success of the rebels.[154] As a result their voice in the Provisional Government was a small one. Contrary to the Octobrists, liberal democrats spoke of authenticating the vision of the First Republic not rejecting it. They sought, as Fausto stated, "to overcome the contradiction between liberal principles and political practice, aiming at the full realization of formal democracy through the secret ballot, the representation of minorities, the independence of the judiciary."[155]

Next there were the powerful Republican Party chapters from the previous regime. In support of the 1930 Revolution were the disaffected Republicans, primarily from Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul that had supplied important militia forces. Vargas himself was a Rio Grande do Sul Republican, though he would show little affinity with their positions moving forward. These Republicans did not see the First Republic as fundamentally flawed, instead they merely resented an abuse of power by President Luís and the São Paulo Republicans. They had

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[152] Ibid.

[153] 'Esboço do Programa Revolucionario'.

[154] Woodard, *A Place in Politics*, 189–212.

[155] Fausto, *A revolução de 1930*, 83.

always endorsed liberalism, at least on paper, and had even been willing to entertain some democratizing reforms in exchange for support, but they were not seeking significant upheaval of a system upon which they already sat atop. Finally, there were the Republicans of São Paulo. They openly considered their party and their state as the greatest example of true liberalism in the country and sometimes referred to "Paulista liberalism" to differentiate their supposedly superior ideological commitment.[156] They had been the direct victims of the 1930 Revolution, leaving them adamantly opposed to the new regime. These parties of the First Republic would often find themselves on the same side as the liberal democracy parties as both advocated for a return to a constitutional and republican order.

Vargas' Provisional Government pursued an agenda focused on the centralization of power and corporatism that closely, though not always perfectly, aligned with that of the Octobrists.[157] This government, like the Octobrists, also found inspiration in fascism. Generals Dutra and Góes Monteiro both openly admired the fascist states of Europe and held a negative view of liberal democracy.[158] In his 1934 text on military politics and the 1930 Revolution, General Góes Monteiro complained that Brazil was beset by "dissensions, misery, corruption and general indiscipline . . . whose source is liberal democracy."[159] Vargas himself saw sense in a

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[156] For example, see the debate recorded in 'Em S. Paulo: Camara Dos Deputados O Sr. Atonio Feliciano Explicou'; See also Woodard, *A Place in Politics*.

[157] Pandolfi, 'Os anos 30'.

[158] McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889-1937*; Frank D McCann, *Brazil and the United States during World War II and Its Aftermath: Negotiating Alliance and Balancing Giants* (Basingstoke; Hampshire, 2018); Stanley E. Hilton, *Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939: The Politics of Trade Rivalry* (Austin; London, 1975), 3–38; Baretta and Markoff, 'The Limits of the Brazilian Revolution of 1930', 442–46.

[159] As quoted in Sérgio Murillo Pinto, 'A doutrina Góis: síntese do pensamento militar no Estado Novo', in *Repensando o Estado Novo*, ed. Dulce Pandolfi (Rio de Janeiro, 1999), 297; For the original text see Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro, *A Revolução de 30 e a finalidade politica do exercito* (Rio de Janeiro, 1934).

transition away from liberalism. In a 1933 speech he argued that "classical models" of governance were too rigid for the complexities of contemporary social structures and decried "the decadence of individualist and liberal democracy" when faced with the current global crisis.[160] As governor of Rio Grande do Sul, he had also boasted that his government was inspired by the "corporatist right or class organization promoted by fascism, in the period of creative renovation that Italy is going through."[161] One of the most important thinkers of the administration, Francisco José de Oliveira Viana, frequently condemned the liberal institutions of the First Republic "as inappropriate for Brazil's conditions and deaf to Brazil's history."[162]

One of the first acts of the interim president was a new decree that fundamentally reorganized the state. It abolished state legislatures and replaced most state presidents with the newly created office of "interventor." Chosen by Vargas, usually from among the Octobrists, interventors in turn selected city mayors. This new position gave Vargas a powerful tool of patronage and allowed him to bypass the collapsing Partido Republicano structures within the states. Vargas' decree suspended Congress as well, personally assuming executive and legislative power at the national level and delegating it to the interventors at the state level.

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[160] Getúlio Vargas, 'A Paraíba Na Revolução e as Obras Contra as Sêcas', in *A Nova Política Do Brasil*, vol. II (Rio de Janeiro, 1938), 141–57.

[161] As quoted in Fausto, *A revolução de 1930*, 110.

[162] On Oliveira Viana see Chisholm, 'Tropical Leviathan', 147; For more on the fascist ideas in the Provisional Government see Jeffrey D. Needell, 'History, Race, and the State in the Thought of Oliveira Viana', *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 75, no. 1 (1995): 1–30, https://doi.org/10.2307/2516780; Robert Howes, 'Progressive Conservatism in Brazil: Oliveira Viana, Roberto Simonsen and the Social Legislation of the Vargas Regime, 1930-1945' (DPhil Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1976); Fábio Gentile, 'A apropriação do corporativismo fascista no "autoritarismo instrumental" de Oliveira Vianna', *Tempo* 25 (April 2019): 110–31, https://doi.org/10.1590/TEM-1980-542X2018v250106; Originally published in 1949, the best summary of Viana's political outlook can be found in Oliveira Viana, *Instituições políticas brasileiras* (Brasília, 1999).

These changes were meant to last only until a new constitutional assembly could be elected and the "general reorganization of the Republic" completed. The decree did not specify when reconstitutionalization would happen.[163] The new Vargas regime assumed responsibility for a much larger degree of internal policy with the creation of new federal ministries for health, education, labor, industry, commerce, and coffee. This centralization had the effect of concentrating authority and responsibility previously held by states and *coronéis* in the hands of the federal government.[164]

While weakening traditional powerbrokers, Vargas attempted to substitute the federal government in their place via corporatism.[165] The corporatist system implemented in Brazil via decree in 1931, was based on the Italian system under Benito Mussolini's fascist government that had been implemented in 1927. However, its architects took inspiration from many sources including the New Deal U.S.[166] Vargas and members of his administration, particularly Oliveira Viana, crafted a system that foresaw the organization of Brazilian society into Ministry of Labor approved and regulated labor unions, professional associations, and cultural associations which

[163] 'Decreto Nº 19.398' (1930), http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1930-1949/d19398.htm.

[164] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 33–41.

[165] On corporatism under the Provisional Government see John D. French, 'The Origin of Corporatist State Intervention in Brazilian Industrial Relations, 1930-1934: A Critique of the Literature', *Luso-Brazilian Review* 28, no. 2 (1991): 13–26; Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*; Angela Maria de Castro Gomes, 'Ideologia e trabalho no Estado Novo', in *Repensando o Estado Novo*, ed. Dulce Pandolfi (Rio de Janeiro, 1999), 53–72; Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*; Skidmore, 'Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil 1937-71'; Chisholm, 'Tropical Leviathan', 169–86.

[166] Needell, 'History, Race, and the State in the Thought of Oliveira Viana'; Melissa Teixeira, 'Making a Brazilian New Deal: Oliveira Vianna and the Transnational Sources of Brazil's Corporatist Experiment', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 50, no. 3 (August 2018): 613–41, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X17001602.

would serve as "consultative organs" of the state.[167] Only one entity would be allowed per economic activity per locality and organizations could not unite across sectors. Ministry of Labor approval was also necessary for internal leadership elections and the Ministry could intervene at any time to change leadership it felt had lost its way. Under this system, strikes were prohibited, and the adjudication of all labor disputes became the purview of a Labor Justice System, created in 1934. By serving as an impartial mediator and issuing binding resolutions, the Labor Justice System was meant to eliminate class friction by preventing employees and employers from entering into direct conflict. Crucial was a system of social security funds and institutions that began to be set up during the Provisional Government that provided pensions and other benefits depending on the industry. As noted by Skidmore, "most frequent was health care. Often included also were subsidized housing, subsidized food shops, job retraining, and recreational facilities."[168] Access to these were dependent upon membership in a government approved association that acted as a distribution center of social benefits much as *coronéis* did in the countryside.[169] Skidmore also contended that "These were the corporatist creations of a government that wished to preempt any form of voluntary organization that might arise and thereby constitute an independent political force."[170] To achieve this, the Provisional Government co-opted the labor organization structures of the country's existing unions that had been previously dominated by conflicting groups of anarchists and communists. Nevertheless,

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[167] 'Decreto Nº 19.770' (1931), http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/antigos/d19770.htm; See also Chisholm, 'Tropical Leviathan', 169–86.

[168] Skidmore, 'Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil 1937-71', 34.

[169] Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*, 271; Gomes, 'Ideologia e trabalho no Estado Novo', 66–71; Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, 169; Skidmore, 'Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil 1937-71', 42.

[170] Skidmore, 'Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil 1937-71', 32.

the government presented the system and social benefits as novel ideas and a gracious gift of Vargas to further emphasize dependency upon the central government, and upon Vargas himself. During the Provisional Government this corporatist system remained in its infancy and largely on paper, but it was key to Vargas' plans for the country.

It did not take long for Octobrist and advocates of a return to a constitutional order to clash. The parties of the Aliança Liberal and São Paulo Republicans were united in their desire to see the country adopt a constitution as soon as possible that would enable them to participate and contain unilateral social reforms by the executive. The Octobrists saw a constitutional government as a way for traditional powers to regain control and undermine the revolution.[171] One of the primary battlegrounds for this ideological contest was the state of São Paulo, the country's economic center and home to both the Partido Democrático and the São Paulo Republicans. Vargas named Octobrist officer João Alberto as the state's interventor – Alberto was not from São Paulo and Paulistas, known for their regional pride, found the selection of an outsider hard to accept while the Partido Democrático resented the fact that they had not been given the opportunity to govern despite their support for Vargas. The growing federal bureaucracy also robbed São Paulo of control over coffee policy. In 1931, Alberto accused the Partido Democrático of plotting against the Provisional Government, arrested some party leaders, and raided the party's newspaper.[172]

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[171] Pandolfi, 'Os anos 30'.

[172] James P. Woodard, '"All for São Paulo, All for Brazil": Vargas, the Paulistas, and the Historiography of Twentieth-Century Brazil', in *Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives*, ed. Jens R. Hentschke (New York, 2006), 83–107; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964,* 12–18; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil Under Vargas', 25–27.

In response, the Partido Democrático issued a public manifesto, in which it refused to cooperate any longer with Alberto and called on their members to resign from all public posts, which they did, in droves. The party insisted that the real aims of Alberto's government were "the perpetual hoarding of official positions, the propaganda of subversive ideas and permanent dictatorship, war against the Partido Democrático, and the death of civism." They contrasted this position with their own, namely the return to a constitutional order as quick as possible. "For the Partido Democrático this is a point of absolute intransigence," the manifesto read, "we would commit the most nefarious apostasy if we thought or acted in any other way." The manifesto argued that the way for the Revolution of 1930 had been paved by "democratic ideas" which demanded a new constitutional assembly.[173] The Clube 3 de Outubro scoffed at such prescriptions: "It is of little interest to us if the constitutionalization of the country happens today or tomorrow," read their program, "What concerns us is the economic and social reconstruction, within new molds, without the negativity of the bombastic formulas of an outdated democracy, for the illusion of the people and the benefit of half a dozen smart adventurers."[174]

By the beginning of 1932, the Partido Democrático's opinion of Vargas had reached a new nadir even after he agreed to replace Alberto as interventor. On 13 January, the Partido Democrático formally broke with the government and quickly reached an agreement with São Paulo Republicans to work together in a single Paulista opposition front. Telegrams and letters sent in celebration of the union emphasized the restoration of liberal and democratic ideals. Both parties had a substantial sense of self-importance when it came to their state and the idea that as

[173] 'O Manifesto Contra o João Alberto' (24 March 1931), BR_SP_APESP_IHGSP_PD_098_001_001, Arquivo Público do Estado de São Paulo.

[174] 'Esboço do Programa Revolucionario', 1–2.

São Paulo went so went Brazil was a powerful one in the new alliance.[175] Opposition was not contained to São Paulo. By February, politicians and publications in other states also began to be openly critical of the government and call for a constitutional assembly. "It is time to consider serious things. Among these, the most serious would be, undeniably, the drafting of the Constitution. Either that or no one can imagine the outcome of the revolutionary comedy," read an article from the Partido Libertador newspaper.[176] Meanwhile, in the nation's capital a new political club formed, demanding a return to the constitutional order. The Clube 24 de Fevereiro (February) named after the date on which Brazil's republican constitution had been issued in 1891, included government officials, newspaper proprietors, and even some of the rebel junior officers that dissented from the Octobrist camp.[177]

Given the political strength of the many liberal democratic parties and the economic importance of São Paulo, Vargas could not simply ignore this growing opposition. Under mounting pressure, Vargas and his cabinet worked feverishly to produce a new electoral code as a first step towards a new constitution.[178] Finally, on 24 February, Vargas published a new electoral code with several innovations. The new code delivered the long sought after secret vote, guaranteeing a private voting booth, prohibiting the presence of armed individuals including the

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[175] 'Collection of Telegrams in Support of the Frente Unica Paulista' (February 1932), BR_SP_APESP_IHGSP_PD_099_005_002, Arquivo Público do Estado de São Paulo.

[176] 'O Brasil só precisa de uma solução: o restabelecimento da ordem juridica Minas, S. Paulo e o Rio Grande do Sul reclamam a Constituinte', *Diario Nacional*, 5 February 1932, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[177] Vera Calicchio, 'Clube 24 de Fevereiro', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, 24, accessed 18 April 2020, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/clube-24-de-fevereiro.

[178] 'As Novidades Políticas De Hontem', *Correio Da Manhã*, 24 February 1932, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

police, and preventing the collection of ballots in order. Crucially, it also instituted a centrally administered Electoral Justice System within the judicial branch to monitor elections as well as decide cases of electoral impropriety, thereby assuming responsibilities that had formerly belonged to the states and municipalities. The code maintained the exclusion of illiterates from the vote as well as mendicants and enlisted military personnel.[179] While most Brazilians were still illiterate, a majority of white Brazilians over 15 had been literate as early as 1920, meaning this restriction now had even more pronounced racial repercussions.[180] Despite these concessions to the precepts of liberal democracy, as will be discussed below, Vargas mixed in corporatist innovations to strengthen his hand and satisfy his Octobrist supporters.

A significant reform made the 1932 Electoral Code a Brazilian historical landmark – the enfranchisement of women.[181] Brazil became just the fourth country in the Western Hemisphere to do so.[182] The origin of the women's suffrage demands in Brazil stretched back to women's rights movements in the nineteenth century but had struggled to gain traction under the First Republic regime that limited participation on all fronts. The movement also became quite elitist in nature since the ban on illiterates would mean that mostly middle and upper class women would gain the vote. This resulted in an even greater social cleavage among women than men

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[179] 'Decreto Nº 21.076' (1932), https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret/1930-1939/decreto-21076-24-fevereiro-1932-507583-publicacaooriginal-1-pe.html.

[180] UNESCO, *Progress of Literacy in Various Countries: A Preliminary Statistical Study of Available Census Data since 1900* (Paris, 1953), 40–45.

[181] On the women's suffrage movement see June Hahner, 'Feminism, Women's Rights, and the Suffrage Movement in Brazil', *Latin American Research Review; Austin, Tex.* 15, no. 1 (1 January 1980): 65–111; Hahner, *A mulher brasileira*; Hahner, *Emancipating the Female Sex*, 121–81; Teresa Cristina de Novaes Marques, *O Voto Feminino no Brasil* (Brasília, 2018); Jad Adams, *Women and the Vote: A World History* (Oxford, 2014), 309–33; Katherine M. Marino, *Feminism for the Americas: The Making of an International Human Rights Movement*, *Feminism for the Americas* (Chapel Hill, n.d.), accessed 5 November 2020.

[182] Canada, the United States of America, and Ecuador

since girls' education consistently lagged behind that of boys.[183] The movement benefitted from the leadership of the internationally renowned Bertha Lutz who had been inspired by women's suffrage movements she had seen firsthand in Europe.[184] Lutz was the president of the Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso Feminino (Brazilian Federation for Women's Progress) which she founded in 1922. The Brazilian women's suffrage movement made several connections with and received aid from international organizations, officially allying itself to the international suffrage movement at the Pan American Conference of Women in 1922. Lutz was elected Vice President of the Pan American Association that emerged from that conference. Throughout the 1920s, the cause of women's suffrage made legislative progress in Brazil, but it was extremely slow as it was not a legislative priority. Women in New Zealand, Europe, and the United States securing the vote allayed fears about the potential social upheaval while increasing the appeal of suffrage expansion among the many Brazilians that thought those countries were democracies worthy of emulation. The Aliança Liberal campaign vaguely endorsed the idea of enfranchising women as part of its attempt to attract voters and its constituent parties generally supported the move. However, movement leaders were the ones to finally make it a reality. When a draft of the electoral code did not meet with their satisfaction, Lutz and others met personally with Vargas and secured his promise of full female enfranchisement – on the same terms as men – which he subsequently enacted.[185] This was yet another democratic advance adopted by fiat from a powerful executive seeing to broaden his own base of support.

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[183] As of 1920, approximately 73% of females over 15 were illiterate compared with 57% of men. See UNESCO, *Progress of Literacy*.

[184] 'Berta Maria Júlia Lutz', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 8 April 2022, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/berta-maria-julia-lutz.

[185] Only men were obliged to vote and doing so remained voluntary for women.

Brazil's new electoral code prompted angry reactions from the Octobrists. On the very day the decree came into force, the Clube 24 de Fevereiro was forced to cancel a constitutionalist rally after authorities impressed upon club leadership that a planned Octobrist counter rally would almost certainly result in violence.[186] The next day, Octobrists in Rio de Janeiro ransacked the offices of a rival newspaper as Vargas' police chief turned a blind eye. The Clube 3 de Outubro then sent an official delegation to Vargas demanding that he formally repudiate the idea of a constitutional assembly.[187] Seeking to calm the waters, Vargas delivered a speech before the Clube 3 de Outubro on 4 March, warning them that he would not tolerate violence and that a transition to a constitutional regime was inevitable. However, he explained, this transition would be "oriented by the revolutionary government" and would not be "a return to the past." Vargas praised the Octobrists while echoing their criticism of the Aliança Liberal parties. "You are the vibrant civil and military youth that does not want the Revolution to sink into the quagmire of compromises, agreements, and accommodations between the false preachers of democracy and the reactionaries," Vargas stated, referring to the liberal democratic parties and the disaffected Republicans respectively. He also issued a call to action, "It falls to us to bring about the moral and material reconstruction of the country, realizing the sanitation of political customs and administrative reform, to achieve thereby the financial and economic restoration of the country."[188]

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[186] 'Não se realizará mais o comicio constitucionalista marcado para hoje', *Correio da Manhã*, 24 February 1932, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[187] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 14.

[188] Getúlio Vargas, 'A Volta Do País Ao Regime Constitucional', in *A Nova Política Do Brasil*, vol. II (Rio de Janeiro, 1938), 17–19.

In spite of their anger over a "premature" return to a constitutional order, the Octobrists did find some aspects of the new electoral code appealing. In yet another novel development, the code provided for class based representation, a key principle of the Clube 3 de Outubro's corporatist vision, alongside standard geography based representation. Eventually, the Octobrists came to celebrate and even claim credit for this innovation though it did not substitute geographic representation as they preferred. Barreto explained that appeasing the Octobrists was not the driving force behind the reform.[189] Instead, it was part of a larger corporatist strategy aimed at weakening the liberal democratic parties, while ensuring a supportive bloc of votes for the Provisional Government in the Constitutional Convention. Vargas had included this change over the objections of the more liberal members of his team. Ultimately, the government set aside 40 of the 254 seats at the convention for professional association representatives.[190]

Constitutionalist Revolution in São Paulo

While the liberal democratic parties celebrated the new electoral code, their estimation of Vargas improved little.[191] Still no election date had been set and the Paulista front continued to demand a local interventor. Following his appeasement of the Octobrists, Vargas was met with a series of resignations by liberal democrats within his administration. Led by former members of

[189] Alvaro Augusto de Borba Barreto, 'A representação das associações profissionais e os primeiros passos da Justiça Eleitoral (1932-1935)', *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política* 19 (April 2016): 221–52.

[190] Ibid.; French, 'The Origin of Corporatist State Intervention'; Vera Alves Cepêda, 'Contexto político e crítica à democracia liberal: a proposta de representação classista na Constituinte de 1934', *Perspectivas: Revista de Ciências Sociais* 35 (2009): 211–42.

[191] On the Constitutionalist Revolution see Silva, *1932: A Guerra Paulista*; Menotti Del Picchia, *A Revolução Paulista* (São Paulo, 1932); Aureliano Leite, 'Causas e objetivos da Revolução de 1932', *Revista de História* 25, no. 51 (29 September 1962): 139–46, https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2316-9141.rh.1962.121690; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 14–19.

his cabinet the major parties of Rio Grande do Sul, including the Partido Libertador, formed an opposition front in their state, which on 29 March 1932 formally broke with Vargas. Now the major parties in two of Brazil's three most powerful states opposed the central government, as did many Republicans in Minas Gerais. The same alliance that had sponsored Vargas' 1930 candidacy now opposed his government.

As the situation deteriorated, Vargas made further concessions in addition to the electoral code. On 7 March, he named Pedro de Toledo, a Paulista, as São Paulo's interventor. Toledo formed a state government with the Partido Democrático taking the lion's share of government posts as it finally secured the internal control it felt was its right as supporters of the revolution. Then on 15 March, Vargas set the date for the election of a constituent assembly for 3 May 1933. These concessions did not placate the Partido Democrático or many reconstitutionalization advocates as they expected a more immediate result than an election set a year away of which they could have no guarantee. On 23 May 1932, a major protest in favor of an immediate constitutional convention erupted in São Paulo. When the protesters descended on a popular center of Octobrist organization they were repulsed by an armed group of Provisional Government supporters. In the chaos, four pro-constitutionalization protesters were killed and instantly baptized as martyrs. At this point, a conspiracy between the united fronts in São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul to launch an armed uprising, gained significant support. General Góes Monteiro stepped in and attempted to broker peace between the two sides, but his efforts came to naught when Vargas proved unwilling to countenance any further Paulista demands.

On 4 July, the Partido Democrático held its party congress where Vargas was frequently criticized.[192] One speaker declared, "Mr. Getulio Vargas gave us the secret vote but denies us the organization of electoral tribunals; he gave us the secret vote, but he lives in conspiracy with the lieutenants and sergeants, without the courage to face national opinion and to run for office, in a free election, by way of the secret vote. Ultimately, the dictator granted us a right which we cannot exercise."[193] State leaders in São Paulo decided to launch the revolution believing that doing so would rally the support of other states, particularly Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais. Sympathizers in Rio Grande do Sul's united front felt confident they could sway their state's wavering interventor and secure control of the state militia for the rebellion and prominent Republicans in Minas Gerais courted support there. Vargas made his own preparations, changing his Minister of War to an Octobrist backed individual, securing their support and firming up the military behind him. The battle lines had been drawn and, on 9 July, forces in São Paulo rose up in what is known as the "Constitutionalist Revolution."

Enthusiasm for the constitutionalist cause ran high in São Paulo and engendered broad public support. The military and civilian leaders of the Constitutionalist Revolution issued a manifesto utilizing the language of democracy and justifying their "movement" and its sole goal "to reintegrate the country in the legal order" through immediate reconstitutionalization. They insisted the "dictatorship" was harming Brazilians, a people who "develop and prosper under the direction of constitutional representative democracy."[194] Vargas made his own case to the people

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[192] 'Transcrições do VIII Congresso do Partido Democrático de São Paulo' (4 July 1932), BR_SP_APESP_IHGSP_PD_105_003_008, Arquivo Público do Estado de São Paulo.

[193] Quote taken from a speech by Moacyr do Amaral Santos. See ibid.

[194] 'Constitutionalist Manifesto', in *A Revolução Paulista*, by Menotti Del Picchia (São Paulo, 1932), 44 As seen here, democracy was often accompanied by qualifiers like liberal or constitutional.

of Brazil in a public letter explaining that his government had been "surprised by the news of a seditious movement of a clearly reactionary character."[195] "As can be seen, all the measures dependent on the government, necessary and indispensable to the constitutionalization of the country, have been taken," he said, citing the new electoral code and election date. Defiantly he stated that he "would rather succumb fighting, in defense of the ideals of the revolution and as a simple soldier, than to submit and bow to threats or violence."[196] Critics of the Constitutionalist Revolution also frequently charged São Paulo with separatism and seeking the disintegration of Brazil, a charge which Constitutionalist leaders vehemently denied.

São Paulo's economic and industrial prowess made it a worthy opponent of the federal Army and it enjoyed some early successes. However, the interventor in Rio Grande do Sul opted for loyalty to Vargas, while attempts to rally military support in Minas Gerais failed. Alone and subject to aerial bombardment, São Paulo could not resist. Constitutionalist military leaders surrendered on 2 October, just 84 days after fighting began. No official causality record exists but estimates range from just over 1,000 to 10,000 with the Constitutionalists suffering the brunt.[197]

Victorious, the Provisional Government moved swiftly to exile or strip the political rights of key figures in the "insurrectional movement" carried out "under the false pretext of returning

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[195] Letter is reprinted in Silva, *1932: A Guerra Paulista*, 107–10.

[196] Ibid., 107–10.

[197] José Maria Mayrink, 'Revolução de 1932: derrota militar, vitória política', *Estadão*, 9 July 2016, https://sao-paulo.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,revolucao-de-1932-derrota-militar-vitoria-politica,10000061815.

to the constitutional regime."[198] Leaders of the revolt in Rio Grande do Sul insisted that the revolution was valid and the situation dire, "At this time, the civil spirit of the Nation faces two hypotheses: either the provisional holders of power . . . will allow an honest and free election, and in this case, Brazil's victory will undoubtedly emerge from the polls; or they will continue to exhaust themselves in the anarchizing policy of quibbles, the lack of frankness and the absence of constructive directions and in this conjuncture, no one will be able to predict the tragic days of tomorrow."[199] Before stepping down, São Paulo's revolutionary government told its supporters, "The page, now colored with your blood, will remain immortal in the eyes of the whole of Brazil as the most unmistakable demonstration of the sincere feelings with which you gave yourself to the cause of the rapid constitutionalization of the country."[200] While defeated militarily, the revolution had its desired effect. The threat of civil war made an extended period of Provisional Government untenable. Zulini and Ricci as well as Silva and Silva argued that, for Vargas, holding the elections now became a matter of survival and necessary for the legitimization of his government.[201] The President quickly announced his intention to hold the elections as previously scheduled.

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[198] 'Decreto Nº 22.194' (1932).

[199] Manifesto reprinted in Silva, *1932: A Guerra Paulista*, 322–36.

[200] Reprinted in Picchia, *A Revolução Paulista*, 231.

[201] Jaqueline Porto Zulini and Paolo Ricci, 'O Código Eleitoral De 1932 e as Eleições da Era Vargas: Um Passo na Direção da Democracia?', *Estudos Históricos* 33, no. 71 (December 2020): 600–623, https://doi.org/10.1590/s2178-14942020000300009; Silva and Silva, 'Eleições no Brasil antes da democracia'.

Reconstitutionalization of 1934

Under the new electoral code, the 1933 election would serve to elect 254 delegates for a constitutional convention, 214 geographically based, on a state by state basis, and then 40 class based delegates were elected to represent unions and professional associations. Over 800 candidates stood to fill the geographically based seats.[202] Attempts by the Provisional Government to form an official party of the 1930 Revolution failed and the government organized state parties instead, via its interventors. This strategy proved successful in the Northern and Northeastern regions of the country, but the Provisional Government struggled against the strong parties in the Center and South, especially São Paulo.

Practices in this election differed significantly from those of the First Republic and electoral competition was intense. Many contemporary observers "agreed that they were remarkably honest compared to pre-1930 elections"[203] and academic studies have since confirmed this opinion.[204] The system transitioned to proportional representation on a state basis and the secret vote was implemented via secure polling places with private booths. With the Electoral Justice System overseeing the vote, the practice of falsifying results virtually disappeared, as would be the case until 1964. Not all the ills were cured, however. *Coronéis* continued to benefit from the fact that rural states received representation based on their entire population not just those eligible to vote. This meant that the often small group of literate

[202] Sources for the 1933 election, including returns, except where otherwise specified are Zulini and Ricci, 'O Código Eleitoral De 1932'; Silva and Silva, 'Eleições no Brasil antes da democracia'; Ângela Maria de Castro Gomes, 'Assembléia Nacional Constituinte de 1934', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 1 May 2020, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/assembleia-nacional-constituinte-de-1934.

[203] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 19.

[204] Silva and Silva, 'Eleições no Brasil antes da democracia'; Zulini and Ricci, 'O Código Eleitoral De 1932'.

individuals in a rural area, susceptible to bribes and patronage from *coronéis*, voted for an outsized number of representatives. Even though registration was now technically automatic for many it remained an individual responsibility that required providing multiple documents and three photographs.[205] Zulini and Ricci have shown that political actors, in particular the Provisional Government and its interventors, developed "new forms of fraud" for this election.[206] While the vote was secret, people had to either prepare their own ballot or much more commonly collect one prepared by parties or newspapers. This allowed political bosses and employers to circumvent the secrecy of the election and furnish ballots for those under their auspices and then continue an old practice of plying them with food and drink until the time to vote came. Parties and politicians also produced ballots of varying color or size that allowed for easy recognition of the ballot a voter was carrying as they entered the private booth. State interventors also engaged in various suspect election administration practices that aimed to bias the election towards Provisional Government backed candidates.

Over a million people turned out to vote for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. While less than the 1930 presidential election, Zulini and Ricci demonstrated that new registration requirements, together with the shortened period for voter registration that was interrupted by the Constitutionalist Revolution meant that the number of registered voters in 1933 was approximately half of what it was in 1930. Therefore, the turnout rate of registered voters actually increased by 19% when compared with 1930.[207] There was also a noteworthy increase in public campaigning and enthusiasm for voting, especially among Brazilian women

[205] Photos were a new and onerous requirement, see Zulini and Ricci, 'O Código Eleitoral De 1932'.

[206] Ibid., 615.

[207] Ibid., 614.

casting their first votes.[208] However, registration among women progressed slowly and only 15% of eligible women voted in 1933.[209] Women also stood as candidates and one São Paulo woman, Carlota Pereira de Queirós, won a seat at the Constitutional Convention. Sixty-one of the 214 geographically based seats went to candidates who opposed the government, winning a majority in five of the state delegations, including São Paulo, demonstrating a significantly greater degree of contestation than had existed before 1930.

After the election of the geographical delegates, the professional association electors, selected by the leadership of their respective professional associations and unions, met in Rio de Janeiro to vote on delegates. Barreto explains that the Provisional Government prevented association electors from meeting previously so as to ensure that the election process would take place in the capital where the government could act as the "principal political articulator."[210] This provided further defense against would-be infiltrators into the official union system and the 40 delegates elected were largely sympathetic to the Provisional Government's positions.[211]

Brazil's reconstitutionalization took place in two stages: a draft produced by a commission and then revision at the convention.[212] In late 1932, a series of decrees by Vargas

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[208] 'Brazilian Election Was Colorful Affair: Candidates Set up "Offices" in Automobiles and Along the Streets', *The New York Times*, 28 May 1933, ProQuest Historical Newspapers; Mônica Karawejczyk, 'Urnas e Saias: Uma Mistura Possível. A Participação Feminina No Pleito Eleitoral de 1933, Na Ótica Do Jornal Correio Do Povo', *Topoi* 11, no. 21 (December 2010): 204–21, https://doi.org/10.1590/2237-101X011021011; Mônica Karawejczyk, 'A "Prenda" e o Voto: As Primeiras Participações Femininas Nas Eleições Do Rio Grande Do Sul (1933-1935)', *História: Debates e Tendências* 16, no. 2 (December 2016): 480–94.

[209] Bethell, 'The Long Road to Democracy in Brazil', 154.

[210] Barreto, 'A representação das associações profissionais', 241.

[211] Barreto, 'A representação das associações profissionais'.

[212] For sources on the 1934 Constitution and the convention see Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil Under Vargas', 31–32; Gomes, 'Assembléia Nacional Constituinte de 1934'; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964,*

established the commission to write the draft constitution. Vargas himself ensured that he had close allies at the table. The primary debate of the commission revolved around the degree of centralization with liberal leaders of strong states like São Paulo favoring a return to more federalization and Provisional Government supporters pushing for greater centralization. The commission eventually produced a compromise draft, but it also shifted the debate to the convention itself. On 15 November 1933, Vargas delivered a speech to open the convention where he insisted his government had been responsible for "the sanitation of the political customs against which the Nation rebelled" and told delegates that "in democratic regimes" the state rested upon "the legitimacy of popular representation."[213] While forgiving Vargas for succumbing to the inevitable, Octobrists continued to insist via a pamphlet produced in São Paulo that reconstitutionalization was nothing more than a "smoke screen" for the "triumph" of the "old machines or even new machines, built with old parts and by the same technique."[214]

Once convened the delegates formed into a loose pro-government majority and oppositional minority with the majority constituting roughly 76% of the seats.[215] The majority and opposition remained fluid throughout the convention, however, and shifted with the issues being debated. Opposition leadership came from São Paulo's delegation dominated by a

19–20; Fábio Lucas, *Conteúdo social nas constituições brasileiras* (Belo Horizonte, 1959), 65–71; 'Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1934' (1934).

[213] Getúlio Vargas, 'Mensagem Lida Perante a Assembléia Nacional Constituinte, No Ato de Sua Instalação, Em 15 de Novembro de 1933', in *A Nova Política Do Brasil*, vol. III (Rio de Janeiro, 1938), 15–158.

[214] 'Estatutos do Nucleo Central', 11.

[215] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil Under Vargas', 31.

coalition of Paulista parties. The opposition was weakened however, by the exile of many anti-Vargas politicians following the 1932 Revolution.

Reviewing and approving the actions of the Provisional Government was the first order of business. The majority secured for Vargas the approval of a decree issued the previous year that ensured that the convention would elect the first president as its final act leaving popular presidential elections until 1938. The Octobrists celebrated this victory that ensured that neither the *coronéis* nor any variation of the Partido Republicano could manipulate the electorate to regain control of the executive. Other significant measures also came about. Enshrined in the Constitution for the first time were social guarantees such as a minimum wage, holiday time, maternity compensation, an eight hour workday, and several others. Pro-government delegates secured the inclusion of the Labor Justice System and the continuation of electing representatives from professional associations. The Constitution canonized the 1932 Electoral Code conceding the vote to all Brazilians 18 and older except for enlisted military personnel, mendicants, and illiterates. Also included were the revamped independent judiciary and the successful Electoral Justice System that had allowed for cleaner elections. Constitutional protections for individuals and the press were reinstated.

Not all went as Vargas and his allies hoped. The convention voted to have itself become the legislative branch of government until the congressional elections that would take place in October of 1934, preventing Vargas from governing through decree in the interim. The powerful states were able to secure a greater degree of federalization than the Octobrists wished though well short of pre-1930 conditions. Crucially, Vargas' corporatist system was weakened by constitutional provisions allowing for labor autonomy and eliminating restrictions on the number of professional associations per locality. Ultimately, as Lucas argued, the Constitution of 1934

attempted to merge corporatism and social rights with "liberal-democratic" institutions.[216] Capelato detailed how many supporters of Vargas thought the two faces of the Constitution were irreconcilable.[217]

As the convention neared its end, the delegates prepared to elect the president. To secure broad support, Vargas issued decrees providing amnesty to the 1932 revolutionaries and ending press censorship. Vargas won the presidency easily with 175 votes and his next closest competitor received just 59 votes. The new Constitution came into effect in July 1934. Congressional elections under the Second Republic occurred in October of the same year; the overall number of voters in the congressional elections returned to 1930 levels even though voter registration continued to lag behind. In total, 48 parties secured seats in congress and only two states had all their delegates from the same party. *O Estado de S. Paulo* the self-described liberal publication that had spent decades decrying the corrupt electoral practices of the First Republic celebrated on its front page that the elections had taken place in "Perfect Order."[218]

Democracy: Means versus Ends

The finalization of the new Constitution did little to quiet political divisions or opinions about the unfitness of liberal and or democratic systems for the country. Under the new constitutional order, existing political forces clashed with new ones over the nature of

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[216] Lucas, *Conteúdo social nas constituições brasileiras*, 69.

[217] Maria Helena Capelato, 'The Estado Novo: Politics and Political Propaganda in Brazil, 1937–1945', *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History*, 22 January 2021, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.705.

[218] 'Em Todo o Estado as Eleições Decorreram em Perfeita Ordem, Assignalando-Se Desde Já Grande Maioria Para o P.C.', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 15 October 1934, Acervo Estadão.

democracy. Meanwhile, Vargas struggled to govern without arbitrary authority. In this final section we review the political events that led to the installation of the Estado Novo dictatorship and the public debates about democracy that preceded it.

New Political Divisions

With the 1932 Constitution in place, Brazilian politics saw the rise of two new national political forces. First, founded in 1932 was the Ação Integralista Brasileira (Brazilian Integralist Action), a fascist party. Then in 1935 a large coalition of left-wing parties formed, the Aliança Nacional Libertadora (National Liberation Alliance/ANL). At the center of the ANL was the Partido Comunista Brasileiro, though the party was much older having been founded in 1922. While most of Brazil's parties were regional, the Partido Comunista and Ação Integralista were national and quickly grew in strength. Despite their fundamental ideological differences, these two parties shared much in common with the Octobrists; as the Clube 3 de Outubro faded away after 1933, its members could be found in abundance on either side. Like the Octobrists, both these parties advanced single party authoritarian state solutions while utilizing the language of democracy.

The Ação Integralista was inspired by Italian fascism and was even the beneficiary of financing by the Mussolini regime. The Integralists adopted fascist salutes and paramilitary organizations of "green shirts" that paraded through city streets and brawled with communists in whenever possible.[219] Still Integralism had distinctly Brazilian elements. Party ideology partially emanated from the philosophies of its founder, Plínio Salgado, a writer from São Paulo, as well

[219] Hilton, 'Ação Integralista Brasileira'.

as from those of the early twentieth century Brazilian political thinker Alberto Torres.[220] Uniquely, Brazilian Integralism included alongside fascist doctrines an emphasis on Catholic Christianity and the societal role of families which Integralists labeled "the base of happiness on earth."[221] The Catholic Church had experienced a period of limited influence under the First Republic but since the 1920s had seen resurgence in its influence, especially among the urban middle class, in what Mainwaring defines as the "Neo-Christendom" phase. Church leadership in this phase emphasized values of hierarchy and anti-communism that shaped and paired well with the Integralist ideology and the Integralists received support from many Catholic leaders and civil society organizations.[222] Ação Integralista membership hailed mostly from the upper echelons of Brazilian society and anti-communist individuals of the middle class. Integralists harbored significant distrust for the masses that Salgado derided as a "stupid and unthinking monster."[223] Estimates by the U.S. embassy in 1937 stated that approximately 25% of army officers and nearly 50% of navy officers were members or sympathizers of the Ação Integralista. By the end of 1935, the Ação Integralista counted with around 200 thousand members.[224] The Integralists enjoyed some electoral success electing a federal deputy in 1934 and going on to

[220] Chisholm, 'Tropical Leviathan', 145–86.

[221] 'Ação Integralista Brasileira - A Doutrina e Os Fátos' (1932), JT dpf 1932.01.00/1, CPDOC - Acervo Juarez Távora.

[222] Scott Mainwaring, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985* (Stanford, 1986), 25–42; Carlos Vinícius Costa de Mendonça et al., 'Luz, Escuridão e Penumbra: O Governo Vargas e a Igreja Católica', *Dimensões* 26 (2011): 277–91.

[223] As quoted in Hilton, 'Ação Integralista Brasileira', 6.

[224] Ibid., 15.

elect 20 mayors and almost 3000 city councilmen.[225] The Vargas administration didn't endorse the party but encouraged its anti-communism.[226]

The Partido Comunista Brasileira, pursued the creation of a popular front after the Comintern endorsed this strategy in 1934. In 1935, the famous rebel officer Luís Carlos Prestes returned to Brazil secretly with several other prominent communists on Moscow's orders. He had been studying and working in the USSR since 1931, and the Soviet Union ensured that he was afforded a leadership opportunity within the Partido Comunista. Prestes proved key to the popular front strategy since his status as a Brazilian hero made him an attractive leader for the non-Communist parties of the ANL as well.[227] The ANL included many parties and organizations such as socialists, unionists, as well as progressive liberals and Catholics. Communist opinion was not always dominant within the coalition. In time, the Aliança Nacional further expanded their tent by becoming the standard-bearers of anti-fascism in Brazil. The coalition's social makeup while skewed towards the working class included individuals from all walks of life. ANL membership estimates in 1935 range from 70 thousand to 400 thousand.[228]

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[225] Ibid., 5.

[226] Hilton, 'Ação Integralista Brasileira'.

[227] Reis, *Luís Carlos Prestes*, 168–88; Prestes, *Luiz Carlos Prestes e a Aliança Nacional Libertadora*; McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889-1937*, 372–404.

[228] For estimates see Alzira Alves de Abreu, 'A Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL)', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 9 May 2020, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/alianca-nacional-libertadora-anl; For the Partido Comunista and the ANL see Prestes, *Luiz Carlos Prestes e a Aliança Nacional Libertadora*; John W. F. Dulles, *Brazilian Communism, 1935-1945: Repression during World Upheaval*, 1st ed. (Austin, 1983); Dulles, *Anarchists and Communists*; Dulce Chaves Pandolfi, 'A Aliança Nacional Libertadora e a Revolta Comunista de 1935', *Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social*, 2004, 8; Stanley E. Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917-1947* (Austin, 1991).

Again, debate over the real meaning and best form of democracy ensued. Both the Integralists and the Partido Comunista blamed "liberal democracy" and the traditional economic elite for Brazil's problems. The Ação Integralista argued "we have universal suffrage, democracy, generating the oligarchy and cementing the strength of the state governor."[229] The Partido Comunista complained of the power imbalance between landholders as well as wealthy business owners and their subordinates.[230] Each party envisioned a bright future with improved forms of democracy that concerned itself more with outcomes, especially social equity, than with institutions of contestation and participation. The Ação Integralista held that "Brazil wants to realize a DEMOCRACY OF PURPOSES not a 'democracy of means'," and that "INTEGRAL DEMOCRACY must definitively replace fictional democracy of a purely political nature."[231] Integralists proposed a single party corporatist state with voting restricted to citizens selecting class based representatives who would decide on all other matters.[232] The Partido Comunista, on the other hand, called for an uprising by an armed proletariat leading to a "democratic revolutionary dictatorship of worker and peasant councils."[233]

The ANL, however, was not subordinate to the Partido Comunista and did not share the Communist distaste for the constitutional regime. One non-Communist member of the coalition's leadership stated in an interview that the Aliança Nacional would continue its struggle "within the Constitution and the laws in force" and that the two main pillars of this struggle were

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[229] 'Ação Integralista Brasileira - A Doutrina e Os Fátos'.

[230] Prestes, *Luiz Carlos Prestes e a Aliança Nacional Libertadora*, 69.

[231] Capitalization comes from the source. 'Ação Integralista Brasileira - A Doutrina e Os Fátos'.

[232] Ibid.

[233] Prestes, *Luiz Carlos Prestes e a Aliança Nacional Libertadora*, 111–14.

"Courageous politics of economic nationalism [and the] sincere practice of democracy."[234] Both the Communists and the rest of the ANL did agree on an agenda of anti-imperialism, nationalization of key industries and public utilities, cancelation or suspension of foreign debt, and large scale land reform.[235]

Most of the electorate seemingly remained split among the many local and regional parties. This included a reorganization of the Partido Democrático which was renamed the Partido Constitucionalista de São Paulo (São Paulo Constitutionalist Party) and increased its membership drawing in defectors from the Partido Republicano. Organized around the governor of São Paulo, Armando de Sales Oliveira, a participant in the Constitutionalist Revolution, the new party maintained an uneasy alliance with the central government and insisted that the Revolution of 1930 had "departed from its inspiration."[236] In 1937, in preparation for the presidential elections scheduled for the following year, the Partido Constitucionalista joined with its allies, including the Republican chapters of Minas Gerais and several small opposition parties. into a national coalition called the União Democrática Brasileira (Brazilian Democratic Union/UDB) that took a liberal democracy position and opposed the Vargas administration.[237] As of the 1934 elections, the major parties of the UDB counted with over 800 thousand

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[234] As quoted in ibid., 108.

[235] 'Pela Libertação Nacional do Povo Brasileiro', in *Diário do Congresso Nacional* (Rio de Janeiro, 1935).

[236] For quote see 'Aos Paulistas', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 28 February 1934, Acervo Estadão; For party summary see Plínio de Abreu Ramos, 'Partido Constitucionalista de São Paulo', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 22 April 2020, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/partido-constitucionalista-de-sao-paulo.

[237] Plínio de Abreu Ramos, 'União Democrática Brasileira (UDB)', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 12 May 2020, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/uniao-democratica-brasileira-udb.

members, but this estimate precedes the rise of the Integralists and the Aliança Nacional making it difficult to determine how much support remained by 1937.[238] The other state level parties found themselves supporting the Vargas government to varying degrees.

Despite the successes of the new constitutional order in cleaning up elections and introducing a higher degree of competition, many of the political forces that emerged, influenced as they were by the ascendant ideologies of the 30s, were openly hostile to the regime. As many had predicted, it was proving difficult to reconcile corporatist and fascist ideas with a government constrained by liberal democratic institutions that limited executive power and allowed for broad competition.

Political Breakdown and Dictatorship

Brazil's new constitutional regime did not last long; assaults upon it by the Vargas government began in 1935. Unfortunately, for the ANL much of Congress saw the coalition as a mere front for the Communists whom they hated. In early April 1935, less than a month after the ANL's foundation, Congress passed the National Security Law, which defined "crimes against the political and social order." The ANL knew that the law was crafted to allow for their exclusion and members often referred to it as the "monster law."[239] It empowered the executive branch to suppress individuals or organizations that sought "to change, by violent means, the Constitution of the Republic." It also highlighted as punishable offences, the inciting of hate

[238] For estimate see 'O eleitorado brasileiro', *Jornal do Brasil*, 17 July 1937, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[239] 'Pela Libertação Nacional'.

"between social classes" and the encouragement of disobedience within the ranks of the military.[240]

On 5 July 1935, the ANL supporters crammed into the coalition's headquarters in Rio de Janeiro after a planned rally was cancelled by the mayor. Prestes delivered a fiery speech calling for the end of the "hated" Vargas government.[241] "The situation is one of war, and everyone must keep their post. . . The idea of an assault matures in the mind of the great masses. . . All power to the ANL!"[242] Such a provocative speech to a raucous crowd that included many members of the military sent shockwaves. Vargas responded a week later, wielding his new powers under the National Security Law. The police raided ANL headquarters, and the organization was soon closed and many of its leaders arrested. While some protests occurred, calls for a nationwide strike went unheeded. Some ANL leaders tried to distance themselves from the Partido Comunista hoping to spare their coalition. The ANL's president told a newspaper "Communism of the Third International is against our Constitution. True communism can only assume government by a coup of force. . . We are not communists. And the communists do not approve of anything that we are doing. They only approve of that which they determine. And whoever does not obey, they expel."[243] His plea was to no avail.

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[240] 'Lei Nº 38' (1935).

[241] 'A passagem da data Cinco de Julho', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 6 July 1935, Acervo Estadão; Pandolfi, 'A Aliança Nacional Libertadora e a Revolta Comunista de 1935'.

[242] As quoted in Prestes, *Luiz Carlos Prestes e a Aliança Nacional Libertadora*, 121.

[243] As quoted in ibid., 121–22.

Operating on Comintern orientation, the Partido Comunista now began preparations for armed revolution.[244] Since 1929, the party had been courting members of the military, mostly enlisted personnel, and leadership believed action by their allies in the Army would provoke a nationwide-armed uprising of the proletariat. Unbeknownst to Partido Comunista leadership, the military liaison of the Comintern was actually a British intelligence agent who passed on the inner workings of the plot. In November 1935, rebel units seized control of three military bases and the government responded quickly, crushing the small uprisings before the end of the month. Intense repression followed as police chased down suspected Communists, liberally applying brutal tactics like torture. Prestes and the other Communist leaders were eventually imprisoned, and Vargas saw to it that Prestes wife, a German-Jewish woman, was deported to Nazi Germany where she died in a concentration camp. Meanwhile, the Communists appeared to have overestimated their popularity and no proletariat agitation had accompanied the revolts. The Vargas government enthusiastically seized upon the revolt by producing propaganda and falsified reports designed to exaggerate the scale of the uprising and create imminent fear of another one. Vargas pushed for and secured a state of siege declaration from Congress that was renewed every 90 days for the next two years. Collier and Collier noted that Vargas used this "threat" to recoup some of the power he had lost as a part of reconstitutionalization and suppress not only the Partido Comunista but many other elements of his opposition, subjecting them to imprisonment and exile.[245]

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[244] On the 1935 revolt see ibid., 129–40; Dulles, *Brazilian Communism, 1935-1945*, chap. Preface; McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889-1937*, 375–88; Pandolfi, 'A Aliança Nacional Libertadora e a Revolta Comunista de 1935'; Reis, *Luís Carlos Prestes*, 168–88; Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917-1947*, 53–93.

[245] Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, 174.

The Integralists believed they would be the beneficiaries of the Communists' downfall and vied for Vargas' favor. However, many in congress and the military disliked the Integralists as much as they did the Communists. The National Security Law had banned private militias, a serious blow to the green shirts. Several congresspeople in November 1935 submitted a motion calling for the government to use the law against the Integralists in the same way it had with the Aliança Nacional.[246] Some state governments also began to repress the Integralists.[247] Vargas began to align himself more with the party after 1935 and floated the idea of joining together to back a single candidate for president. Several government loyalists scoffed at the idea and successfully scuttled the alliance with the fascists. Instead, the Integralists nominated their party head, Salgado, for president.

For Vargas to remain in power, he had to find a solution before the 1938 election. By 1937, José Américo de Almeida, a cabinet minister, had emerged as the government candidate for president. While administration officials and pro-Vargas governors backed Almeida, Vargas caused confusion by not personally endorsing him. Almeida campaigned by attempting to build upon the social legislative advances of the Provisional Government and directed his appeals to the working class.

The aforementioned UDB nominated São Paulo Governor and Partido Constitucionalista head Armando de Sales Oliveira for president while declaring its goal to be "Instituting the government of the people by the people, exercised through the vote, which is to say under a system of public freedoms, with all subordinated, from the depositaries of power to the most

[246] 'Requerimento N. 127 - 1935', in *Diário Do Poder Legislativo - Estados Unidos Do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1935).

[247] Hilton, 'Ação Integralista Brasileira'.

humble citizens, to the sovereignty of the law - the democratic regime" on the "basis of universal suffrage, the secret vote, electoral justice, and the proportional system."[248] Campaigning on a message of continuing the regime created by the 1934 Constitution, the UDB consistently opposed renewing the state of siege and pleaded with Brazilians not to be tempted by authoritarian solutions. Party leaders conceded "Democratic institutions, established with the Republic of 1889, have been poorly implemented in Brazil,"[249] but cautioned, "We do not need to appeal to dictatorship, nor even to make a profound change in the constitutional text. The reform of bad habits, which diverted normal life from democracy, is enough. Honest obedience to the principles of the regime, subordinating everyone to the collective interest is enough."[250] They warned against ideological appeals, "where the well-being of the people is promised and treated with naive simplicity,"[251] and assured the Brazilian people that "Anything useful to the country that may exist in extremist programs, on the right, as on the left, is perfectly achievable in the democratic regime."[252] The UDB platform emphasized federalism, protection of social rights, and criticized the concept of unions being used as "instruments of partisan politics."[253] Still the party rarely announced concrete policy proposals, focusing instead on advocating for the current regime. In July 1937, presidential candidate Sales Oliveira declared to an overflowing

[248] 'O Sr. Octavio Mangabeira Fala Sobre os Principios da U.D.B.', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 17 July 1937, Acervo Estadão.

[249] Ibid.

[250] 'O Sr. Armando Salles Falou Hontem ao Eleitorado Nacional Representado no Maior Comicio Já Realisado no Brasil', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 17 July 1937, Acervo Estadão.

[251] Ibid.

[252] 'O Sr. Octavio Mangabeira Fala Sobre os Principios da U.D.B.'

[253] 'O Sr. Armando Salles Falou Hontem'.

rally of more than 50 thousand people in Rio de Janeiro "To destroy democracy is to destroy Brazil."[254]

As the election neared, Vargas plotted to remain in power while his team drafted a dictatorial constitution and rumors swirled. Supporting Vargas and encouraging his line of thinking were Generals Góes Monteiro and Dutra. Military leadership had long had its own vision for the modernization of Brazil that consisted of a strong central government that could protect national resources, physically unite the country through improved infrastructure, and make Brazil self-sufficient in the production of military necessities while modernizing the military itself. The officer corps largely disliked the idea of a military dictatorship and were willing to support extending Vargas' stay in power as long as he incorporated their vision into his.[255] Congress reacted to the worrying circumstances and in the summer of 1937 and finally refused to renew the state of siege.[256] As a scare tactic, the Vargas administration began releasing over 300 prisoners it had taken under the authority of the state of siege, filling society with supposed left wing extremists that were mostly "pick pockets and street toughs."[257] The government returned to clandestine negotiations with the Integralists promising them important positions after the coup in exchange for their support. In September, the military together with

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[254] Ibid.

[255] Frank D. McCann, 'The Military and the Dictatorship: Getúlio, Góes, and Dutra', in *Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives*, ed. Jens R. Hentschke (New York, 2006), 109–41; Carvalho, 'Armed Forces and Politics in Brazil, 1930–45', 199–201; Carvalho, 'Armed Forces and Politics in Brazil, 1930–45'; Wolfe, 'Change with Continuity', 89–90; Stanley E. Hilton, 'The Armed Forces and Industrialists in Modern Brazil: The Drive for Military Autonomy (1889-1954)', *Hispanic American Historical Review* 62, no. 4 (1 November 1982): 629–73, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-62.4.629.

[256] For general sources on the 1937 coup see Silva, *1937*; McCann, 'The Military and the Dictatorship'; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 21–33; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil Under Vargas', 43–54.

[257] McCann, 'The Military and the Dictatorship', 111.

the Integralists fabricated a communist plot. An Integralist officer "discovered" the so-called "Cohen Plan" detailing a communist scheme based on strikes, assassinations, and armed popular uprisings to overthrow the government and turned it over to Góes Monteiro and Dutra who presented it to the president and called on Congress to restore Vargas' emergency powers.[258] With this new threat exposed, the Congress felt compelled to renew the state of siege, which it did in October over the objections of the delegations from São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. Vargas suspended constitutional rights and reinstituted press censorship. He also shuffled military assignments to strengthen his hand in disloyal states. The president undermined the official candidacy of Almeida by publicly labelling him a communist and insisted that UDB would return Brazil to the days of the First Republic.[259] In September, Vargas told military leadership that it was time to move "against the situation that was developing, by staging a revolution from the top down, that is, unleashed by the government itself."[260] Dutra, now Minister of War, agreed. He told a Ministry meeting that the armed forces were the "sole element capable of saving Brazil from the catastrophe ready to erupt."[261]

The UDB's Sales Oliveira in a last ditch effort to save the Brazilian democratic order sent a letter, on 8 November, to the heads of the branches of the armed forces pleading with them to save the Constitution. He decried all who declared the "ruin of Brazilian democracy on the eve of the day when it was going to offer unquestionable proof of its vitality." To those who claimed an end to the regime would bring better times he responded, "My party and I believe in the

[258] McCann, 'The Military and the Dictatorship'.

[259] Woodard, '"All for São Paulo, All for Brazil"'.

[260] As quoted in McCann, 'The Military and the Dictatorship', 122.

[261] As quoted in ibid., 123.

people, we think that it is up to them to say the decisive word and that this word will be of fidelity to the institutions." He also claimed that the conspirators had offered him control of São Paulo if he would end his presidential campaign and that he refused, "In my hands the glorious flame of Christian Brazil, democratic Brazil, free Brazil, will not go out." Lastly, he ended his appeal to the honor of the Brazilian military establishment saying that nation stood in suspense "awaiting the gesture that kills or the word that saves."[262] São Paulo's parliamentary delegation read out his letter to Congress the following day.

Sales Oliveira's plea frightened the plotters who felt it might cause dissension in the military and popular opposition "in the streets."[263] On 10 November, five days earlier than planned, the military surrounded and closed Congress turning away elected officials as they attempted to reconvene. Opposition leaders were placed under arrest. Vargas decreed a new constitution that gave himself dictatorial control over a corporatist state. Minister Dutra issued a public statement in support of the new constitution calling it a response to "the lacunas and defects in the statute of 1934."[264] Again the military had intervened, this time to put an end to the disorder providing an opportunity to the "adversaries of democratic rule."[265]

Conclusion

Reviewing the political upheaval that followed the 1930 Revolution, this chapter holds that it was a significant period in the history of democracy in Brazil and constitutes much more

[262] Document found in Silva, *1937*, 583–89.

[263] For the response from Vargas' inner circle see McCann, 'The Military and the Dictatorship', 129–30.

[264] As quoted in ibid., 131.

[265] Dutra in the same speech as the previous quote, as quoted in ibid., 131.

than a failed democratic experiment. While the advances of democratization seemed ephemeral, many proved enduring. Institutional changes like an independent judiciary, the extension of suffrage to women, and the Electoral Justice System would all return with the rise of the Fourth Republic. The increasingly national nature of politics would also endure and develop further. Several of the founders of the post-war regime looked to the 1934 Constitution for inspiration.

This chapter has uniquely detailed the intense debates surrounding the meaning of democracy during this period. As the varying sides forwarded their positions democracy was given multiple qualifiers; notions of liberalism, Integralism, constitutionalism, republicanism, representation, revolution, and even dictatorship were all attached to democracy by varying actors to indicate a specific nature of democracy they felt Brazil should or should not pursue. While the concept of a "democracy of purposes" or democracy as a set of outcomes not institutions, that the coming dictatorship would coopt, had proven destructive to the representative democracy regime of the 1934 Constitution, such an idea would, over time, contribute to new beliefs that democracy should encompass institutions *and* outcomes. The rise of authoritarianism was also hardly unique to Brazil as fascism and illiberalism spread across the globe.

Another development that would have significant consequences for democracy was the changing political role of the military. In the next decades, Brazilian civilian political actors frequently made appeals to the military to check or remove an executive they felt was operating outside the law or endangering constitutional institutions. Just as Sales Oliveira had done prior to the 1937 coup. As Stepan explains, "Whereas military intervention has traditionally been seen as representing the decomposition of the political system, in terms of the moderator model it may be seen as the normal method of composition in political life." The military had now acquired

the status of institutional saviors: “What before have been viewed as rapid, secret, or unilateral coups d’état by the military against civilian governments are now seen as slowly evolved, open, and dual responses of civilian and military elites to particular political crises, in which both civilians and the military look to the military for the resolution of the crisis.”[266]

While Brazil found itself under the yoke of authoritarianism after 1937, democratic advances and political changes that could not be easily undone had come to pass. The status quo of the First Republic had been irrevocably broken and the brief experiment with a competitive democratic system would not be easily forgotten.

[266] Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 64; See also Carvalho, ‘Armed Forces and Politics in Brazil, 1930–45’.

Chapter II Dictatorship and a War for Democracy, 1937-45

The overthrow of Getúlio Vargas and the collapse of the Estado Novo dictatorship – otherwise known as the Third Republic – in 1945 is what gave rise to the Fourth Republic. This dictatorship shaped the cultural, social, and political environment in which the post-war regime was formed. The Estado Novo has been heavily studied by many disciplines. A 1997 academic conference produced a volume edited by Pandolfi that brought together leading Brazilian experts to opine on every facet of this historically important regime, of which this chapter takes advantage.[267] Much of the literature on the Estado Novo dwells on the social change, particularly in the area of labor organization, that the Vargas government wrought.[268] While certainly important, Wolfe has argued that these aspects can be overemphasized with Vargas being remembered more for what he tried and failed to accomplish than for what he actually did. To this end, there are several other valuable works that shift their focus to the economic and cultural legacies of the Estado Novo.[269] This chapter builds on this broad body of scholarship to delineate more clearly the legacy of the regime for democratization after 1945.

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[267] Dulce Pandolfi, ed., *Repensando o Estado Novo* (Rio de Janeiro, 1999).

[268] Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*; Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*; Adalberto Cardoso, 'Estado Novo e Corporativismo', *Locus: Revista de História* 13, no. 2 (November 2007); French, 'The Origin of Corporatist State Intervention'; Marco Aurélio Vannucchi, 'The Strong Moment of Corporatism: Estado Novo and Liberal Professions', *Tempo* 25, no. 1 (April 2019): 198–218, https://doi.org/10.1590/tem-1980-542x2018v250111; Cássio A. A. Albernaz, 'The Technical Councils of the Brazilian Government Structure: Corporatism, Authoritarianism and Modernization (1934–1945)', *Portuguese Studies* 32, no. 2 (2016): 244–61; Gentile, 'A apropriação do corporativismo fascista no "autoritarismo instrumental" de Oliveira Vianna'; Vianna, *Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil*; Clifford Andrew Welch, 'Vargas and the Reorganization of Rural Life in Brazil (1930-1945)', *Revista Brasileira de História* 36, no. 71 (April 2016): 81–105, https://doi.org/10.1590/1806-93472016v36n71_004.

[269] Wolfe, 'Change with Continuity'; Wolfe, 'Populism and Developmentalism'; Daryle Williams, *Culture Wars in Brazil: The First Vargas Regime, 1930–1945* (Durham, 2001); Jens R. Hentschke, *Reconstructing the Brazilian Nation: Public Schooling in the Vargas Era* (Baden, 2007).

This chapter asks, how was a return to representative democracy possible in 1945 after being abandoned in 1937? What was the effect of the Second World War and Brazil's participation in that conflict on the course of political events? What were the relevant legacies of the Estado Novo that might have impinged on future democratization processes in Brazil? To answer these questions the chapter is divided into two sections. Reviewed first are the policies advanced by the Estado Novo and their ideological foundations, focusing on three aspects of this regime, "authoritarian democracy," nationalism, and corporatism. Second, the chapter analyzes how Brazil's participation in World War II initiated a push towards redemocratization that ended the Estado Novo regime.

Building the Estado Novo

The Estado Novo was a dictatorship that made frequent use of the language of democracy. The regime had not swept away the politics of the early 1930s, instead the anti-liberal ideas of that period now fueled the new government's rhetoric. This section looks at the ideological pillars of the Estado Novo and the policies they inspired.

Authoritarian Democracy

As previously shown, the 1920s and 30s had seen the rise of anti-liberalism across the globe, within Brazil this led to arguments that liberal democracy had been unfit for the country's "social reality" where local economic elite were politically dominant, and that real democracy required the elimination of the country's arcane social structures and a fairer redistribution of socioeconomic benefits or what came to be called "social justice." Originating largely in the military and among a small group of intellectuals, after 1930 these ideas were found in abundance among the Clube 3 de Outubro (October 3rd Club), the fascist Ação Integralista

Brasileira (Brazilian Integralist Action), and the Provisional Government.[270] The parties and politicians in favor of liberal democracy had been increasingly marginalized by the above forces in a global context of liberal democratic decline. With the success of the auto-coup installing the Estado Novo they were excluded altogether.

Estado Novo officials and their defenders continued to advance the view of democracy as a set of outcomes, such as social welfare and reduced inequality, not a set of institutions. On the evening of 10 November, the day of the auto-coup Vargas addressed the nation via radio. "The constitutional organization of 1934, cast in the classic molds of liberalism and the representative system," he stated, "was destined for a reality that had ceased to exist." "Party democracy" Vargas added "threatens the unity of the country and endangers the existence of the Nation," while he insisted that the parties themselves "expressed nothing ideologically, remaining in the shadow of personal ambitions or localist predominance."[271] Vargas's argument was reiterative of the need for a regime to match the Brazilian reality: "When the means of government no longer correspond to the conditions of existence of a people, there is no other solution but to change them." The president asserted that the new constitution restored to the nation its "authority and freedom of action" but "maintained the democratic form." Crucially for Vargas, the new constitution bypassed the ineffective legislature that thwarted the necessary "radical reforms" of education, defense, and the economy, and it also abolished the corrupt process of "presidential

[270] Chisholm, 'Tropical Leviathan'; Ronald H. Chilcote, *Intellectuals and the Search for National Identity in Twentieth-Century Brazil* (Cambridge, 2014); Evaldo Vieira, *Autoritarismo e corporativismo no Brasil*, 3ª edição (São Paulo, 2010); Howes, 'Progressive Conservatism in Brazil'; Needell, 'History, Race, and the State in the Thought of Oliveira Viana'.

[271] Speech reproduced in Getúlio Vargas, 'Proclamação ao Povo Brasileiro', in *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V (Rio de Janeiro, 1938), 19–36.

succession, transformed into a derisory competition of groups, forced to operate by bribery and demagogic promises."[272]

One notable regime apologist was Azevedo Amaral, a medical doctor who spent most of his life as a political thinker and journalist.[273] His 1938 book, *O Estado Autoritário e a Realidade Nacional* (The Authoritarian State and the National Reality) is one of the most notorious examples of an ideological defense of the Estado Novo. Azevedo celebrated the new national charter decreed by Vargas in November 1937 as the "First Brazilian Constitution" and praised the regime as an "authoritarian democracy." Amaral agreed with Vargas that Congress had become an "obstacle" to "urgent reforms." He contended that the new government would be able to advance the social and economic reforms necessary for democratic outcomes, such as a "balanced economic system" and the elimination of class conflict, because it had freed itself from certain "perversions" of democracy, namely, "direct election, the indispensable and indiscriminate temporariness of mandates, restrictions of the executive authority, the fiction of the division of powers."[274]

The 1937 Constitution designed by members of Vargas' administration and decreed by him in November of that year, was based on similar documents from Italy, Poland, and Portugal.[275] The constitution declared an indefinite national state of siege and gave Vargas the

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[272] Ibid.

[273] Lúcia Lippi Oliveira, 'Autoridade e Política: O pensamento de Azevedo Amaral', in *Estado Novo: ideologia e poder* (Rio de Janeiro, 1982), 48–70; Angela de Castro Gomes, 'Azevedo Amaral e o Século do Corporativismo, de Michael Manoilesco, no Brasil de Vargas', *Sociologia & Antropologia* 2 (December 2012): 185–209, https://doi.org/10.1590/2238-38752012v249.

[274] Azevedo Amaral, *O Estado Autoritário e a Realidade Nacional* (Rio de Janeiro, 1938), 72, 74, 97, 115.

[275] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil Under Vargas', 54.

power to rule through decree until the election of a new legislature could be arranged; no such elections would ever be held under the Estado Novo. The only fixed election provided for in the constitution was a plebiscite to approve the constitution but that too failed to materialize. State legislatures were dissolved, and power devolved to interventors selected at Vargas' pleasure as had been the case during the Provisional Government. Only the right to property remained enshrined while most other traditional liberal rights were significantly curtailed. The right to self-expression and the freedom of the press now fell within hard limits of state censorship.[276]

The Estado Novo created a supportive apparatus of authoritarian institutions. The Department of Press and Propaganda was created in 1939 to handle the many forms of state censorship and propagate messages of nationalism and developmentalism. This department based its approach on that of Nazi Germany and "was aimed at producing images, symbols, myths, and utopias, in other words, constructing a social imagination capable of giving political support to the leader and controlling the public through mechanisms capable of provoking passions."[277] Much of this propaganda centered on depicting Vargas as the "father of the poor" a benevolent leader gifting social legislation and considerations to an otherwise helpless working class.[278] Journalistic outlets required department authorization to operate and over the course of the regime, 420 newspapers and 346 magazines failed to gain government assent. For example, the liberal newspaper *O Estado de S. Paulo* saw its ownership harassed, arrested, and exiled, leading to the seizure of the paper by the propaganda department in 1940. For the rest of the Estado Novo, the newspaper operated as a public entity. Approved outlets were required to print

[276] 'Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1937' (1937).

[277] Capelato, 'The Estado Novo: Politics and Political Propaganda'.

[278] Ibid.

material created by the department and provide favorable coverage to government policies and leaders. Censorship went far beyond news media and included radio shows, plays, movies, books, and even music lyrics.[279]

Propaganda took varying forms. A government run monthly periodical *O Brasil de hoje, de ontem e de amanhã* began in 1940. For specialist consumption the government produced a journal, *Cultura Política,* that first appeared in 1941, wherein academics studied and declared the merits of the new regime. The department also produced propaganda and educational films, but its core functions concerned the radio. Radio had become widespread by the 1930s and Vargas' government created a public radio company in 1936. The Estado Novo made constant use of the radio to not only broadcast propaganda but to forward its nationalist vision and emphasize Brazilian musicians. The department produced a daily radio show starting in 1938, *Hora do Brasil,* which broadcast news, speeches, national music, and lectures from government ministers.[280]

Policing was also crucial to the function of the Estado Novo. State level secret police forces known as the Department of Political and Social Order were significantly strengthened and worked in connection with intelligence services in Nazi Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States to maintain a web of intelligence and suppression of regime opponents. Vargas selected as the chief of police for the Federal District, Filinto Müller, a hardened admirer of fascism. The police operated in conjunction with the Propaganda Department to silence divisive voices and were particularly repressive of communists,

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[279] Ibid.

[280] Ibid.; Haussen, 'Radio and Populism in Brazil'; Fernando Limongeli Gurgueira, *Integração nacional pelas ondas: o rádio no Estado Novo* (São Paulo, 2009).

immigrants, and religious minorities, all of whom clashed with the sense of "Brazilianess" that the government wanted to portray. The National Security Tribunal, a special court created by Vargas in 1936 made up of military and civilian judges selected by the president also served to prosecute crimes deemed contrary to national security.[281]

Amaral explained the vital role of these authoritarian institutions in a "democratic" state: "The democratic state of the authoritarian type, which exists today in Brazil, has the duty to exercise vigilance over the expressions of thought. In the exercise of this function inherent to the main purposes of the state organization, the public power must adopt as a practical criterion the verification of the possibility or not of resulting dangers for the State and for society of the particular expression of thought in question," and added that freedom of expression should be reserved for opinions of a high degree of "intellectual elevation" and "cultural refinement."[282]

Nationalism

Nationalism was at the heart of the Estado Novo.[283] The regime defined itself through the creation of a new national identity and as a reaction against *Coronelismo* or what Vargas called "regional caudillismo," centralization and unity were key pillars of the regime's nationalism.[284]

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[281] Maria Luzia Tucci Carneiro, 'O Estado Novo, o Dops e a ideologia da segurança nacional', in *Repensando o Estado Novo*, ed. Dulce Pandolfi (Rio de Janeiro, 1999), 327–40; Elizabeth Cancelli, 'Ação e repressão policial num circuito integrado internacionalmente', in *Repensando o Estado Novo*, ed. Dulce Pandolfi (Rio de Janeiro, 1999), 309–26; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil Under Vargas', 54–70.

[282] Amaral, *O Estado Autoritário*, 155.

[283] Evelina Dagnino, 'State and Ideology: Nationalism in Brazil; 1930-1945' (PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 1985).

[284] Vargas, 'Proclamação ao Povo Brasileiro', 22.

Therefore, early manifestations of nationalism were acts of aggression against supposed sources of disunity, political parties and the states of the federation.

Just weeks into the new government, Vargas issued Decree-Law 37. The law, while confirming the extinction of the Electoral Justice System, dissolved all political parties and their associated clubs or organizations. The law cited the justification of "social peace" and declared parties to be agents of division.[285] Delivering a speech on the radio on New Year's Eve 1937, Vargas told listeners, "The State, according to the new order, is the Nation, and must, therefore, dispense with political intermediaries, in order to maintain contact with the people and consult their aspirations and needs."[286] Political parties and their leaders, including those that had supported Vargas, suffered repression. The fascist Ação Integralista had supported Vargas' auto-coup but now the president saw the Integralists as a threat given that they constituted an independent political force; the law proscribing parties did not spare them. Repression and censorship of the Ação Integralista increased, and on 11 May 1938, a desperate group of Integralists together with some sympathetic reactionaries and liberals launched a hasty putsch that the Army easily put down. Repressive measures included over 1,500 arrests, closing the party newspaper, and the eventual exile of their leader Plínio Salgado.[287] Armando de Sales Oliveira the head of the União Democrática Brasileira (Brazilian Democratic Union), whose plea to the military had precipitated the 1937 coup also found himself in exile together with several other liberal politicians. In Paris, they formed an exile community and tried to organize

[285] 'Decreto-Lei Nº 37' (1937).

[286] Getúlio Vargas, 'No limiar do ano de 1938', in *A Nova Política do Brasil*, vol. V (Rio de Janeiro, 1938), 123.

[287] Hilton, 'Ação Integralista Brasileira'; Frank D. McCann, 'Vargas and the Destruction of the Brazilian Integralista and Nazi Parties', *The Americas* 26, no. 1 (July 1969): 15–34, https://doi.org/10.2307/979963.

opposition of the Estado Novo back home. They also made appeals to President Franklin Roosevelt in the United States and to the Brazilian armed forces. Sales Oliveira sent a letter in early 1939 to General Pedro Góes Monteiro, condemning the "totalitarian" nature of the Estado Novo – in vain he repeated his plea for the military to act against Vargas.[288] The harshest repression was saved for the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party). The torture of prisoners and the constant police persecution of suspected communists continued well into the Estado Novo years. In 1940, party head Luís Carlos Prestes and several other Communist leaders received long prison sentences without a proper trial in connection with the murder of a young girl, whom the party had executed for cooperating with police.[289]

Perhaps the most notorious example of Estado Novo nationalism came on 27 November 1937, just weeks after the auto-coup. The 1937 Constitution declared that the national flag, anthem, and seal should be used throughout the country and outlawed any other flags or seals.[290] In a public ceremony honoring the Brazilian national flag, Vargas oversaw the burning of each state flag. Attempting to ensure the subordination of the states and to avoid the kind of resistance that had brought him to power in 1930 and challenged him in 1932, Vargas employed a strong network of interventors that included family members, political allies, and military officers. The flag burning ceremony marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the Estado Novo to ingrain in Brazilians a sense of shared national pride and culture that would supersede regional loyalties.

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[288] Armando de Salles Oliveira to Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro, 'Carta de Sales Oliveira a Góes Monteiro sobre o Estado Novo', 25 February 1939, GV c 1939.02.25/1, CPDOC - Acervo Getúlio Vargas.

[289] Dulles, *Brazilian Communism, 1935-1945,* 1–24.

[290] Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1937, Art. 2.

Another key component of Estado Novo nationalism was developmentalism. Vargas' government had a vision for modernizing, industrializing, and developing the country on distinctly Brazilian terms. In 1940, Vargas announced a new initiative called the "March to the West" which combined nationalist and developmentalist aims and saw the government sponsor expeditions, expand infrastructure, create new federal territories, and encourage colonization in an effort to incorporate Brazil's vast unsettled interior.[291] Previously, Brazil's enormous territorial expanse beyond the coast was sparsely populated and virtually unknown, except to the native populations that lived there. The propaganda department worked to create public support for the initiative and encourage colonization. In his 1937 New Year's Eve speech Vargas declared "The true sense of Brazilianess is the march to the West . . . And there we will have to get: — from the fertile and vast valleys, the product of varied and abundant cultures; from the bowels of the earth, the metal with which to forge the instruments of our defense and our industrial progress."[292] Vargas' point about defense and industrial progress reflected the continued influence of military leadership on the policy priorities of the Estado Novo. General Góes Monteiro and Minister of War Eurico Dutra conditioned their support for the new regime on the modernization of the military.[293] The military had fallen behind many of its neighbors and leadership was increasingly distrustful of their Argentine neighbors.[294] In speeches and interviews, Vargas frequently referenced the "unavoidable need" to develop a steel industry and

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[291] Lúcia Lippi Oliveira, 'A conquista do oeste', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 19 January 2021, https://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/JK/artigos/Brasilia/ConquistaOeste; Wolfe, 'Change with Continuity', 92.

[292] Vargas, 'No limiar do ano de 1938', 124.

[293] Hilton, 'The Armed Forces and Industrialists in Modern Brazil'.

[294] McCann, 'The Military and the Dictatorship'; McCann, *Brazil and the United States during World War II*; Smallman, *Fear and Memory in the Brazilian Army and Society, 1889-1954*, 62–84.

with it modernize the armed forces.[295] As demonstrated in the second section, these priorities only increased as WWII approached.

The push towards industrialization saw the government adopt protectionist policies for the benefit of private industrialists, in addition to creating public companies in key areas as part of a strategy economists tend to classify as import substitution industrialization. The government also declared a moratorium on foreign debt payments leading to defaults in 1938 and 1939. The push for industrialization had real results. Over 31% of the population was living in an urban area by 1940 as internal migration dramatically increased. The number of people working in agriculture or rural industries declined by more than a million people from 1935 to 1940, and industrial output doubled over the course of the 1930s. Still, regional inequity remained strong; approximately half of Brazil's urban working class could be found in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Industrialization and urbanization were also not the sole result of government policy but instead heavily influenced by structural economic change resulting from the Great Depression and WWII.[296]

The public education system also underwent a major overhaul as part of the nationalist agenda. The Ministry of Education and Health promoted a more uniform and national curriculum while emphasizing subjects the ministry felt developed 'Brazilianess' – civic education, history, geography, literature, and Portuguese. A heavy emphasis on patriotism and support for the

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[295] Vargas, 'Proclamação ao Povo Brasileiro', 28.

[296] *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil: Ano VI - 1941/1945* (Rio de Janeiro, 1946); Marcelo Paiva Abreu, 'The Brazilian Economy, 1930-1980', in *Brazil since 1930*, ed. Leslie Bethell, vol. 9, The Cambridge History of Latin America (Cambridge, 2008), 293–319; Dagnino, 'State and Ideology', 270–331; Alfredo Saad Filho, 'Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Development Policy in Brazil', *Development and Society* 39, no. 1 (June 2010): 1–28; Werner Baer, *The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development*, 7th ed. (Boulder, 2013), 27–48.

Vargas regime dramatically reshaped the curriculum and textbooks. The new system abandoned an unachieved First Republic ideal for universal education by largely leaving traditional education to private initiative and focusing public efforts on what the 1937 Constitution described as vocational education for the "least favored classes" that prepared them for the workforce.[297] A system of vocational schools, particularly in the area of industry were developed and mostly to the benefit of the state of São Paulo. This established a more paternalistic link between the government and working class families. It also allowed the government in consultation with industrialist class leadership to produce human capital for its planned economic development.[298] Under Vargas, access to education did expand: from 1932 to 1939 the number of primary students per thousand inhabitants increased from 54 to 80, and secondary education enrollment more than doubled from 1930 to 1940, though the latter continued to be mostly a luxury of the elite. This accelerated rate of growth resulted from both urbanization and government efforts. Progress, though, did not happen evenly. Illiteracy continued to fall reaching 56% of the population older than 15 by 1940; yet census data in the same year revealed that among black Brazilians 10 or older the illiteracy rate was a staggering 79%.[299]

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[297] Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1937 Art. 129.

[298] Célio da Cunha, *Educação e Autoritarismo No Estado Novo* (São Paulo, 1981); Carmen Nava, 'Lessons in Patriotism and Good Citizenship: National Identity and Nationalism in Public Schools during the Vargas Administration, 1937-1945', *Luso-Brazilian Review* 35, no. 1 (1998): 39–63; Paulo Ghiraldelli Jr., *História da educação brasileira* (São Paulo, 2006), 77–87; Paulo Rennes Marçal Ribeiro, 'História Da Educação Escolar No Brasil: Notas Para Uma Reflexão', *Paidéia (Ribeirão Preto)*, no. 4 (July 1993): 15–30, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-863X1993000100003; Robert J. Havighurst and João Roberto Moreira, *Society and Education in Brazil*, University of Pittsburgh Studies in Comparative Education (Pittsburgh, 1965); Raquel dos Santos Quadros, 'Ensino Primário, Expressão de Um Plano de Educação No Período de 1934 a 1945', *X Anped Sul*, October 2014, 1–19; Chilcote, *Intellectuals and the Search for National Identity*, 17–27; Barbara Weinstein, 'The Industrialists, the State, and the Issues of Worker Training and Social Services in Brazil, 1930-50', *Hispanic American Historical Review* 70, no. 3 (1 August 1990): 379–404, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-70.3.379.

[299] Quadros, 'Ensino Primário, Expressão de Um Plano de Educação No Período de 1934 a 1945'; Havighurst and Moreira, *Society and Education in Brazil*, 187; UNESCO, *Progress of Literacy*, 42.

Producing a national culture went well beyond basic public education. In addition to their already mentioned efforts, the Propaganda Department dedicated significant energies to the encouragement of Brazilian cinema, literature, and music. Patriotic displays were frequently arranged at civic and sporting events. Intellectuals united by the *Cultura Política* also debated their role in developing a national culture in furtherance of the Estado Novo vision.[300] The government endeavored to mobilize the country around a civic calendar of immense patriotic celebrations that centered on Labor Day, Independence Day, the anniversary of the 1930 Revolution, and Vargas' birthday. A series of museums were founded via government initiative, including national museums of art and history. Historical narratives which cast the Estado Novo as the culmination of Brazilian progress were abundant.[301]

Shifting cultural perceptions of race within Brazilian society also played a role in Estado Novo nationalism. One of the foundational texts of Brazilian sociology, *Casa-Grande e Senzala* (The Masters and the Slaves), by Gilberto Freyre was published in 1933. Significantly, Freyre hailed from the rural Northeastern state of Pernambuco where slavery had been strong and left a legacy of diversity and underdevelopment.[302] In this and other texts, Freyre contended that Brazilian history had been a long and obstacle laden road towards "ethnic" or "social democracy," by which he meant egalitarian social relations where racial barriers had been broken

[300] Mônica Pimenta Velloso, 'Cultura e Poder Político: Uma configuração do campo intelectual', in *Estado Novo: ideologia e poder* (Rio de Janeiro, 1982), 71–108.

[301] Williams, *Culture Wars in Brazil*; Dagnino, 'State and Ideology', 332–414; Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*, 235–37; Capelato, 'The Estado Novo: Politics and Political Propaganda'; Chilcote, *Intellectuals and the Search for National Identity*, 17–27; Lauro Cavalcanti, 'Modernistas, arquitetura e patrimônio', in *Repensando o Estado Novo*, ed. Dulce Pandolfi (Rio de Janeiro, 1999), 179–90.

[302] Gustavo Mesquita, *Gilberto Freyre e o Estado Novo: Região, Nação e Modernidade* (São Paulo, 2000); Peter Burke, 'Gilberto Freyre, Hybridity and Cultural Translation', *Portuguese Studies* 27, no. 1 (2011): 70–77, https://doi.org/10.5699/portstudies.27.1.0070.

down by the miscegenation that unintentionally resulted from the Portuguese approach to colonization and Brazil's plantation system.[303] This miscegenation had produced in Brazil a mixed race "hybrid society" not an uneasy coexistence of separate races such as could be found in the United States.[304] Freyre also contested the common conceptualization that non-whiteness destined a nation for a less civilized existence and instead maintained that miscegenation made Brazil the beneficiary of the best of all its contributing mother cultures.[305] Still Freyre was always clear to draw a line between this type of democracy and "political democracy" which he felt had been thrown into "crisis" by the Estado Novo that he described as "near-fascist" and a "dictatorship."[306] A critic of Vargas, Freyre suffered police harassment and periods of exile. While the regime did not endorse Freyre or his work it did seek to take advantage of the idea of Brazil as a "racial democracy" that quickly spread into the political and academic mainstream.[307] Through cultural events, monuments, and celebrations of the abolition of slavery, the Estado Novo regime promoted the idea of Brazil as a country aware and proud of its many mother

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[303] Gilberto Freyre, *Brazil - An Interpretation* (New York, 1945); Gilberto Freyre, *New World in the Tropics: The Culture of Modern Brazil*, 1st ed. (New York, 1959); Gilberto Freyre, *The Masters and the Slaves*, trans. Samuel Putnam (Berkeley, 1986).

[304] Freyre, *The Masters and the Slaves*.

[305] For the construction of racial barriers to 'civilized' status in international law see Julia Gaffield, 'The Racialization of International Law after the Haitian Revolution: The Holy See and National Sovereignty', *The American Historical Review* 125, no. 3 (1 June 2020): 841–68, https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/rhz1226.

[306] See Freyre, *The Masters and the Slaves*, including the Preface to the First-English Edition.

[307] Fortes, 'World War II and Brazilian Workers', 188; George Reid Andrews, 'Brazilian Racial Democracy, 1900-90: An American Counterpoint', *Journal of Contemporary History* 31, no. 3 (July 1996): 483–507; Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (Durham and London, 1993), 173–218; Christophe Brochier, 'Le Concept de Démocratie Raciale dans L'Histoire Intellectuelle Brésilienne', *Revue de Synthèse* 135, no. 1 (1 March 2014): 123–50, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11873-014-0246-y; Mesquita, *Gilberto Freyre e o Estado Novo*; Chilcote, *Intellectuals and the Search for National Identity*, 17–27; For academic works supporting racial democracy see Donald Pierson, *Negroes in Brazil: A Study of Race Contact at Bahia*, First (Chicago, 1942); Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen, the Negro in the Americas* (New York, 1946). It should be noted that while Freyre opposed Vargas, he was a supporter of the Salazar dictatorship in Portugal and later supported the Brazilian military dictatorship after 1964.

cultures but also as a society that did not define itself by racial identities foreign to the Brazilian experience.[308] Indirectly, the racial democracy concept endorsed miscegenation as a new form of whitening as opposed to replacement by immigrants that had been the preferred strategy of the First Republic. The Vargas government portrayed foreign immigration from most countries (Portugal being a notable exception) as a threat to national unity and unwanted competition for the Brazilian working class. New controls on immigration were introduced as were assimilation measures. Immigrant communities suffered government intervention in their newspapers, civil society organizations, and schools and eventually saw bans on the use of foreign languages in school or print. With Brazil's entrance into WWII on the side of the allies in 1943, the government became openly hostile to German, Italian, and Japanese immigrant communities common throughout the South.[309]

A few black Brazilian publications pushed back on the ideas of racial democracy as did the black sociologist Alberto Guerreiro Ramos with his work in the 1950s.[310] However, the idea gained widespread adoption at that time, even among many black Brazilians. Nevertheless, several scholars have since contested "racial democracy" and clearly demonstrated that black Brazilians by in large continued to be on the wrong side of the country's inequity as part of the legacy of slavery, being vastly overrepresented among those living in poverty and struggling

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[308] Olívia Maria Gomes da Cunha, 'Sua alma em sua palma: identificando a "raça" e inventando a nação', in *Repensando o Estado Novo*, ed. Dulce Pandolfi (Rio de Janeiro, 1999), 257–88.

[309] Gomes, 'Ideologia e trabalho no Estado Novo', 66–71; Giralda Seyferth, 'Os imigrantes e a campanha de nacionalização do Estado Novo', in *Repensando o Estado Novo*, ed. Dulce Pandolfi (Rio de Janeiro, 1999), 199–228; Fortes, 'World War II and Brazilian Workers'; McCann, 'Vargas and the Destruction of the Brazilian Integralista and Nazi Parties'.

[310] Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, *Introdução crítica à sociologia brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro, 1995); Andrews, 'Brazilian Racial Democracy, 1900-90: An American Counterpoint'; Chilcote, *Intellectuals and the Search for National Identity*, 27–39.

with illiteracy. Cultural discrimination against black Brazilians especially within high society remained commonplace.[311]

Catholicism also had a place in Estado Novo nationalism. The Estado Novo years saw the church return to a greater level of prominence and state cooperation than it had known since the empire. The Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro was a personal friend of Vargas and the church strongly approved of the anti-communist nature of his government. The church also used calls for nationalism to attack other denominations as divisive and foreign to Brazil. For nearly the entirety of the Estado Novo years, church leaders spoke favorably of the regime and avoided criticism of its authoritarian nature.[312]

Corporatism

Under the Estado Novo, the corporatist system that Vargas and a key member of his administration Francisco José de Oliveira Viana had been pushing since 1931 now came into full effect (Chapter I). French explains that the Estado Novo "created the structures to *enforce* measures already on the books."[313] As noted by Amaral, the ideologue of "authoritarian

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[311] Florestan Fernandes, *A integração do negro na sociedade de classes* (São Paulo, 1965); Emilia Viotti da Costa, 'Chapter 9 The Myth of Racial Democracy: A Legacy of the Empire', in *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories*, 2 edition (Chapel Hill, 2000), 234–46; Howard Winant, 'Rethinking Race in Brazil', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24, no. 1 (1992): 173–92; Marcos Chor Maio, 'O Projeto Unesco e a agenda das ciências sociais no Brasil dos anos 40 e 50', *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais* 14, no. 41 (October 1999): 141–58, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-69091999000300009; Andrews, 'Brazilian Racial Democracy, 1900-90: An American Counterpoint'.

[312] Riolando Azzi, 'A Igreja Católica no Brasil Durante o Estado Novo (1937-1945)', *Síntese: Revista de Filosofia* 7, no. 19 (2 January 1980): 49–71; Mainwaring, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985*, 25–42.

[313] French, 'The Origin of Corporatist State Intervention', 14, italics come from the source. Cardoso, 'Estado Novo e Corporativismo'; Vannucchi, 'The Strong Moment of Corporatism'.

democracy," the purpose of the corporatist system was to avoid the "conflict of independent forces" that emerged under "the economic organization peculiar to liberal democracy" and replace it with "a rational systematization looking to the collective good."[314] In other words, class friction, another source of disunity, was meant to be eliminated and replaced with an allegedly superior system of social relations that would also allow the government to benefit from the input of all classes.

Labor organization was at the heart of the Estado Novo corporatist system. As during the Provisional Government, the Estado Novo permitted only one union or professional association per economic activity per locality. As of 1942, the government reported a total of 1,090 official unions and professional associations, by 1945, one quarter of the 2 million strong urban labor force belonged to government recognized unions or associations.[315] The Labor Justice System which had technically been created but not enacted in 1934 (Chapter I), was now put into practice.[316] The 1937 Constitution outlawed strikes and lockouts on the grounds that they were "anti-social" behaviors and designated the court system as the only permissible arena for labor disputes.[317] The government also instituted a union tax, a mandatory tax on wages which created funds to be doled out to the government approved unions.[318] Gomes argued that this new relationship with labor was part of the government's push for "social justice" which it cast as an

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[314] Amaral, *O Estado Autoritário*, 149.

[315] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil Under Vargas', 64–65; *Ano VI - 1941/1945*, 379.

[316] Arion Sayão Romita, 'Justiça do Trabalho: produto do Estado Novo', in *Repensando o Estado Novo*, ed. Dulce Pandolfi (Rio de Janeiro, 1999), 95–112.

[317] Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1937, Art. 139.

[318] Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*, 271; Vannucchi, 'The Strong Moment of Corporatism'.

issue for "all classes" – hence employers and employees alike were encouraged to join corporatist organizations. She showed how the government championed the anti-capitalist ideal that work not wealth or ownership should determine the social value of an individual.[319] Still the architects of the corporatist system did not want to tear down the existing social order but maintain it by providing enough social benefits to incorporate the working class and prevent their development as an autonomous political force, something their employers often also appreciated.[320] To this end, the Estado Novo instituted several new pieces of social legislation including a minimum wage, child labor laws, 8-hour workday, and guaranteed vacation time. Until 1943, minimum wage increases occurred regularly. The government also expanded access to pensions, retirement accounts, and social benefits, via the official unions, providing further incentive to join. These social benefits and legislation were depicted as gift from the government, and from Vargas personally, to the working class whose loyalty to the system was expected in return.[321]

Corporatism's architects also envisioned a representative function. By organizing the entirety of society and allowing them to work in partnership with the government, advocates, like system architect Oliveira Viana, hoped that corporatist bodies might replace the legislative bodies of liberal democracy and allow for participation without contestation or "harmful"

[319] Gomes, 'Ideologia e trabalho no Estado Novo'; Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*.

[320] Howes, 'Progressive Conservatism in Brazil'; Skidmore, 'Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil 1937-71', 34.

[321] Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*; Gomes, 'Ideologia e trabalho no Estado Novo'; French, 'The Origin of Corporatist State Intervention'.

ideological competition.[322] The original 1931 decree which conceived corporatism held that corporatist entities should serve as "consultative organs" of the state.[323] Under the Estado Novo, this became a reality. However, the system did not operate on egalitarian terms and proprietor associations enjoyed much greater participation in policymaking than labor unions. In exchange for their acquiescence in the government's social legislation, proprietors were allowed to shape that legislation and participate in central economic planning.[324] This economic planning happened via a system of technical councils that were created in the areas of trade, finance, petroleum, energy, etc. Some of the technical councils had been created before the Estado Novo; however, with the closure of Congress their importance increased dramatically. The Vargas administration charged these councils with implementing the state-led industrialization that would free Brazil from its agro-exporting past. The councils were composed of representatives from the relevant sector's leadership organizations, government ministers, and technocrats, and they became the principal engine of economic policy development and central planning. Albernaz explains that these councils came to play the role of "political intermediaries" by using economic expertise to legitimize state intervention in the economy. Central economic planning evolved to an even greater degree during the war, when the government expanded its control to ensure efficient wartime production. For a few groups, like the coffee growers of São Paulo that

[322] Chisholm, 'Tropical Leviathan', 176; Gentile, 'A apropriação do corporativismo fascista no "autoritarismo instrumental" de Oliveira Vianna'; Vieira, *Autoritarismo e corporativismo*; Needell, 'History, Race, and the State in the Thought of Oliveira Viana'; Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo,* 280–81.

[323] Decreto Nº 19.770.

[324] Vannucchi, 'The Strong Moment of Corporatism'.

dominated the First Republic, this represented a significant demotion; for many, especially industrialists, it offered an unprecedented opportunity to influence policymaking.[325]

In May 1943, the vast body of corporatist and social legislation introduced by the Estado Novo was unified in the Consolidation of Labor Laws. Gomes argued that the government promoted this legislation, which constituted the "realization" of Vargas' social agenda, as a bible for the working class and symbol of all Vargas had done for them.[326] Still, it would be incorrect to assume that intention was equal to practice in the case of Estado Novo corporatism. First, the system remained confined to urban areas at a time when just under 70% of Brazilians still lived in rural areas.[327] Uptake in the urban areas was also far from universal. As stated at the beginning of this subsection, three quarters of the urban workforce still did not belong to an official union by the end of the Estado Novo in 1945. Wolfe has argued that the scope of corporatism was quite limited and correctly pointed out that the majority of workers preferred to join their own extralegal independent organizations or not organize at all. Communist activists opposed the official union system and encouraged workers not to join. Both Wolfe and Weinstein have demonstrated that the government remained far from omnipotent, even in its authoritarian form. In its interactions with the private sector, especially the industrialists of São Paulo, the government was very much the junior partner to powerful local actors.[328] In rural areas, most

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[325] Albernaz, 'The Technical Councils of the Brazilian Government Structure'; Cardoso, 'Estado Novo e Corporativismo'; Eli Diniz, 'Engenharia institucional e políticas públicas: dos conselhos técnicos às câmaras setoriais', in *Repensando o Estado Novo*, ed. Dulce Pandolfi (Rio de Janeiro, 1999), 21–38; Weinstein, 'The Industrialists, the State',.

[326] Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*, 274–75.

[327] According to the 1940 census, see IBGE.

[328] Wolfe, 'The Faustian Bargain Not Made'; Wolfe, 'Change with Continuity'; Weinstein, 'The Industrialists, the State',.

historians have maintained that corporatism was kept at bay as part of an alliance between Vargas and the landholders; a recent piece from Welch suggests that the relationship was more complex.[329] Landholders had little to gain from adopting corporatism and Vargas lacked the necessary incentives or leverage to force them. Their strength and wealth existed independently from Vargas' industrialization program and would in fact be hurt by his protectionism and they already had strong control over their workforce that relied on them for access to things like healthcare and services long before the Estado Novo (Thesis Introduction). However, Welch demonstrated that Vargas tried to subtly undercut the strength of landholders by including the rural workforce in the margins of corporatist and social reforms whenever possible. For their part, landholder organizations eschewed most social change arguing that the countryside had a "solidarity of economic interests" between boss and worker and that the only exploitation was that of the rural sector by industrialists.[330] Therefore, they held that the rural reality should not be made to conform to an urban standard. Several projects for rural labor organization were advanced but none ever put into practice.[331]

Though not always successful in its endeavors the Estado Novo dramatically reshaped Brazilian citizenship. Its policies centralized power and accelerated the development of a truly national identity while also redefining the social role for government. Its successor regime would have to contend with these legacies.

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[329] Welch, 'Vargas and the Reorganization of Rural Life in Brazil (1930-1945)'.

[330] As quoted in ibid.

[331] Ibid.

A War for Democracy and Democratization at Home

In this section I look at how the Estado Novo came to an end. This process is inseparable from Brazil's participation in World War II on the side of the Allies. Thus, here I trace how Brazil moved from neutrality to a pro-Ally position, its involvement in the conflict, and the resulting efforts of advocates for a return to representative democracy.[332] The section examines the extent to which the war caused important shifts in public and military opinion.

From Neutrality to Ally

Brazil joining the Allies was far from inevitable, particularly given the quasi-fascist nature of the Estado Novo. Following the 1937 coup, U.S. policymakers feared that Brazil had moved towards fascism. The month the coup took place, the North American publication *Newsweek* declared Brazil Latin America's "First Fascist State"[333] as Italy and Germany made public declarations welcoming Brazil to the fold.[334] Brazilian officials quickly assured a concerned U.S. Ambassador that the Integralists "had no part whatsoever in the present change"

[332] For more on the international contexts of democratization see Laurence Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (Oxford, 1996).

[333] As quoted in Hilton, 'Ação Integralista Brasileira', 27.

[334] 'Change in Brazil Is Hailed in Reich: Government Circles See New Experiment Opening Way for Anti-Red Combine, PRESS IN ATTACK ON U. S. "Lack of Cooperation" and Fear of Economic Loss Charged to Us by Newspapers, Rome Lauds Brazil', *The New York Times*, 12 November 1937, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

and that the coup would enable Vargas to "put the brakes" on the movement.[335] U.S. fears were quieted somewhat by the repression of the Integralists.

In the period before the war, Brazil's foreign relations focused largely on securing favorable trade deals and agreements to modernize its military and aid its industrialization program. This effort saw Vargas negotiating with both Nazi Germany and the United States in an attempt to leverage ever greater offers from the other. Both countries were eager to have Brazil as an ally in a potential future conflict. United States' neutrality legislation prevented the United States from doling out weapons or material and Brazil lacked the liquidity to purchase them from private U.S. manufacturers. In June 1935, Brazil agreed to an informal trade deal with Germany who was willing to trade manufactured goods and war material in exchange for Brazilian agricultural products in lieu of cash. A Brazilian purchase of German artillery in 1938 sent shockwaves through the United States, which reached out to Brazil about closer cooperation. In 1939, U.S. military leaders began meeting with Brazilian leadership about the possible construction and use of naval and air bases in Northeast Brazil, which would be key in any conflict in North Africa and Europe, in exchange for armament and war material. Still, U.S. promises remained largely empty.[336]

Then in September 1939, the war became a reality with the Nazi invasion of Poland.[337] For Brazilian military leadership, such a war had long seemed inevitable and now the Estado

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[335] 'Letter from the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery) to the Secretary of State', in *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The American Republics*, vol. V (Washington, D.C), accessed 22 January 2021, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1937v05/d333.

[336] Hilton, *Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939*; McCann, *Brazil and the United States during World War II*; Frank D McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945* (Princeton, 1974).

[337] Except where otherwise specified, sources on Brazil's participation in the war and its interactions with the United States are McCann, *Brazil and the United States during World War II*; McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance,*

Novo faced a daunting challenge. General Góes Monteiro and Minister Dutra favored the Axis and believed they would likely win. Meanwhile, Brazil's economic and regional ties meant it was far more intimately involved with the United States than with fascist Europe. Oswaldo Aranha, the Minister of Foreign Relations since 1938 strongly favored backing the United States. Vargas initially decided on a position of neutrality. However, military leadership continued to insist that the country relied too heavily on imports for war material and could become isolated.[338] As a result, the government now acted with increased urgency to achieve its priorities of securing weapons, war material, and modernizing the army.

U.S. strategists feared a Nazi invasion of Northeastern Brazil might expose the Western Hemisphere while their Brazilian counterparts worried about Argentine aggression on behalf of the Axis powers.[339] As U.S. overtures continued into 1940, Brazilian military leadership became convinced that cooperation with them was the most feasible option but remained insistent that the United States make good on its promises. Vargas also hoped Brazil could play a supportive role and avoid actually fighting in a war that felt unrelated to Brazil. The ideological ambiguity of Vargas and his generals concerned US diplomats and military leaders greatly. Calculations began to shift rapidly after the attack on Pearl Harbor drew the United States into the war. In coordination with the United States, Brazil increasingly adopted Pan-American positions and spoke in favor of hemispheric defense. However, Vargas and military brass remained committed

1937-1945; Stanley E. Hilton, 'Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington–Rio de Janeiro "Axis" during the World War II Era', *Hispanic American Historical Review* 59, no. 2 (1 May 1979): 201–31, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-59.2.201; Antônio Pedro Tota, *The Seduction of Brazil: The Americanization of Brazil during World War II*, trans. Lorena B. Ellis, 1st ed. (Austin, 2009).

[338] Vargas, *Diário (1937 - 1942)*, 2:250–52.

[339] Gary Frank, *Struggle for Hegemony in South America: Argentina, Brazil, and the United States during the Second World War* (New York, 2021), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429338786.

to neutrality, insisting that the United States provide war material before they changed their position. Tensions came to point in January of 1942 at the Third Meeting of Consultation of Latin American Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro. After Vargas made the decision to back the United States, Brazil played key role in rallying the nations of the hemisphere behind the idea of breaking off relations with the Axis, while Argentina lobbied for neutrality. Vargas faced staunch resistance from Dutra and Góes Monteiro who threatened resignation. They believed it folly to make such a definitive choice when the United States had done so little; U.S. military officers derided the generals as Axis sympathizers. Vargas believed his decision would lead to securing the promised support. The president navigated the tensions in his cabinet and managed to convince his generals to withdraw their resignations. On 28 January, Aranha told the conference that, in the spirit of Pan-Americanism, Brazil had that very day broken off all relations with the Axis powers. Taking sides in the war portended serious domestic political consequences. That this move would strengthen advocates of liberal democracy was instantly apparent to Vargas who lamented in his diary that, "A large part of those elements that applaud this attitude . . . are the opponents of the regime that I founded."[340]

Brazilian cooperation with the United States dramatically increased and the first major shipments of war material finally began to flow with a 200 million dollar lend-lease agreement in March. In May, the Brazil-United States Political-Military Agreement made the alliance official. More than 1000 Brazilian officers went on to train in the United States including young officers Humberto Castelo Branco and Henrique Lott, both would go on to be protagonists in the history of the Fourth Republic. Northeast Brazil became the center of the American logistical effort

[340] Vargas, *Diário (1937 - 1942)*, 2:457.

supplying North Africa and Europe. The total number of allied bases and ports in Brazil grew to 17 over the course of the war with the air base at Natal becoming the largest of its kind in the world. Ultimately, Brazil received 70% of all U.S. lend-lease material delivered to Latin America.

Brazil's decision to side with the allies did not go unnoticed by Nazi Germany and in February U-boats began to sink Brazilian shipping which threatened to cripple the country. In August 1942, a German submarine sunk a ship carrying Brazilian army troops and more than 100 perished. The event galvanized Army support for Brazil's entry into the war and an active role in that war. On 22 August, Brazil informed Germany and Italy that their attacks on Brazilian shipping had created a state of war between them. With the decision to go to war made, Vargas' government now flipped its earlier position and endeavored to make sure that Brazilian participation would be substantial and not a simple token action. Vargas hoped robust participation would help the country secure aid for development and give Brazil a leadership role in the post-war world.[341]

Building the Força Expedicionária Brasileira (Brazilian Expeditionary Force/FEB) proved extremely difficult due to a lack of training, supplies, and poor health on the part of the regular soldiers, many of whom hailed from underdeveloped rural areas. To make up for its lack of manpower and expertise, the Army drafted from its civilian population and many reserve officers working as civilians were called up. Following a short training period, the FEB deployed to Italy in July of 1944. The total number of Brazilian troops deployed at the front surpassed 25 thousand as the FEB integrated with U.S. forces advancing against Nazi defenses. After a series

[341] David R. Mares and Harold A. Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power: Brazil on the Long Road to Global Influence* (Washington, D.C., 2016), 23–54.

of early setbacks, Brazilian forces scored a tactical and symbolic victory in February 1945 by taking the Nazi fortified position at Monte Castello that had pinned down the Allied advance. The Brazilian Army enjoyed a few more successes including the capture of a large German-Italian force. Despite an American request that the FEB take part in the occupation of Europe, Brazil declined, and the focus shifted to bringing the troops home. More than 1,800 Brazilian soldiers and sailors lost their lives in the conflict.

U.S.-Brazil cooperation went far beyond the battlefield. Cultural exchange was not merely a byproduct but an express goal of the alliance. Created in 1940 the U.S. Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs promoted closer cultural and business links between the two countries that ranged from literature and radio programs to Disney cartoons produced specifically for a Brazilian audience. Walt Disney and Orson Welles even made personal trips to Brazil and the public was bombarded with messages about the cause of democracy and freedom. Tota described this effort as selling the ideology of "Americanism" built on the pillars of "democracy" and "progressivism" to Brazil.[342] The United States also aided Vargas' developmental vision, as he had hoped. Fulfilling conditions of the political-military agreement, the U.S. provided a 20 million dollar loan from the Export-Import Bank and technical assistance for the construction of a large steel mill at Volta Redonda in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Construction began in 1940 and Vargas created a new public enterprise in 1941 to develop a national steel industry. In 1942, the United Kingdom also settled some iron ore concessions that allowed for another new public company, Vale do Rio Doce. That same year, the United States sent a technical assistance mission to Brazil the conducted a systematic inventory of the

[342] Tota, *The Seduction* of Brazil, 7.

country's resources and economic situation in varying sectors and provided a road map towards industrialization. The report recommended continued American developmental aid and closer economic ties between the two countries as a mutually beneficial way forward.[343] Economic conditions improved as the government industrialization program progressed and the need for Brazilian exports in the Allied nations allowed Brazil to build a reserve of foreign exchange and renegotiate its debt. Per capita GDP grew steadily with high marks of 6% and 5% growth in 1943 and 1944 respectively. Still, the negative effects of the war left a mark with an average annual inflation rate of 17% from 1942 to 1945 (Annex III).

Democracy at Home

Brazil's involvement with the Allied cause was a watershed for democratization. Capelato and others have argued that, after 1942, from an "ideological point of view, there was evidence of a relaxation of authoritarianism."[344] Peixoto similarly found that after 1942 the impending transition "became a point of concern on the Estado Novo's agenda, as the idea of authoritarian democracy was becoming unsustainable."[345] As the war progressed and U.S. propaganda increasingly cast it as a struggle for democracy, domestic pro-democracy forces in Brazil were increasingly able to mobilize against the authoritarian regime. Major opposition to the Estado Novo began with student organizations. Formed in 1937, the National Students'

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[343] Morris Llewellyn Cooke, *Brazil on the March: A Study in International Cooperation; Reflections on the Report of the American Technical Mission to Brazil* (New York, London, 1944), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3142981.

[344] Capelato, 'The Estado Novo: Politics and Political Propaganda'; See also Ângela Maria de Castro Gomes, 'O Redescobrimento do Brasil', in *Estado Novo: ideologia e poder* (Rio de Janeiro, 1982), 109–50.

[345] Raphael Peixoto, 'Constituent Power and Constitutional Change in Brazil's Transition to Democracy (1945-1946)', in *Innovation and Transition in Law: Experiences and Theoretical Settings*, ed. Massimo Meccarelli, Cristiano Paixão, and Claudia Roesler (Madrid, 2020), 209.

Union brought together students from across the country and began organizing pro-Ally demonstrations in 1940.[346] Students at the São Paulo Law School distributed an anti-regime newspaper and organized protests even while suffering from police repression.[347] On 4 July 1942, the National Students' Union held an anti-fascist demonstration in Rio de Janeiro, which also called for Brazil to enter the war. Vargas' pro-fascism police chief Müller attempted to suppress the gathering but supporters in the government, including Aranha, prevented him from doing so. The schism caused by the incident resulted in Müller being removed from his post.[348] Opposition continued to build the following year. In January 1943, the Society of Friends of America formed around supporting the U.S. and Allied cause and also called for a return to democracy. The society was particularly troubling for the regime as many of its members came from within the government and the armed forces, including Foreign Minister Aranha who was elected to the vice presidency of the organization in 1944. The society also enjoyed broad support from the National Students' Union.[349]

In October, a group of mostly prominent ex-Republicans in Minas Gerais, including ex-President Artur Bernardes, released a manifesto condemning the Estado Novo dictatorship. The manifesto was the first major public statement to target the Vargas regime directly. Censorship

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[346] Luís Antônio Cunha, Marcelo Costa, and Aline Portilho, 'Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes (UNE)', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 7 December 2020, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/uniao-nacional-dos-estudantes-une.

[347] John W. F. Dulles, *The São Paulo Law School and the Anti-Vargas Resistance (1938-1945)* (Austin, 2014).

[348] 'Grande Manifestação Estudantil Contra o Regime Totalitario', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 5 July 1942, Acervo Estadão; 'Filinto Müller', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 7 December 2020, https://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/AEraVargas1/biografias/filinto_muller.

[349] 'Sociedade Amigos da América', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 11 December 2020, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/sociedade-amigos-da-america.

made official publication impossible; instead, the original 50 thousand copies were secretly printed and distributed by hand. The document directed itself to the people of Minas Gerais, and reflected a strong regional pride; still, the authors hoped that they would inspire similar "movements" in other states.[350] The manifesto authors claimed to be acting in the spirit of Brazilian independence, the founding of the republic, and the 1930 Revolution. Their appeal recalled the old decentralization debate, praising "political ideals that are realized by state autonomy and democracy," linking the concept of democracy to federalism. The manifesto attacked the ideological foundations and economic progress of the Estado Novo, dismissing corporatism as an element of fascism and stating that, "Prosperity in business, success in professional activities, wealth, comfort, the enjoyment of easy everyday tranquility, even if they existed, would not exhaust our aspirations, nor would they sum up our conception of human destiny." While they acknowledged that "Brazil is in a phase of material progress," they countered saying, "in other countries . . . identical results were achieved without sacrificing civil rights, which shows that authoritarian forms of government are not peculiar." The manifesto provides an important glimpse into the way many Brazilians perceived the war and its consequences: "If we fight against fascism, . . . so that freedom and democracy are restored to all peoples, we certainly do not ask too much by claiming for ourselves the rights and guarantees that characterize them." The manifesto acknowledged the flaws of the pre-1930 liberal regime and made it clear that the democracy of the future would have to be different from that of the past. "It is easy to infer that the democracy we advocate is not the same as that of the time of bourgeois liberalism," they affirmed, adding, "the time of passive liberalism is over." "We want something besides the fundamental franchises, the right to vote, habeas corpus," they stated,

[350] 'O Manifesto dos Mineiros', in *Liberdade, essêcia de Minas* (Minas Gerais, 2014), 99–110.

insisting upon constitutional guarantees of "economic security and well-being for all Brazilians, not only in the capitals, but throughout the national territory."[351] This last point is illustrative of significant change. Members of the old elite and their partisans in one of Brazil's most powerful states had turned their back on classical liberalism and acknowledged a need for socioeconomic considerations when building a future democracy.

The response to the manifesto also heralded the weakening of authoritarianism. Punishment of the signatories was notably light with a few losing their public posts and others suffering from business complications, but there were no arrests or exiles.[352] By 1943, Vargas realized that the Estado Novo would not survive the war and began to prepare accordingly. This became more inevitable as post-war agreements and the United Nations endorsed elected democratic governments as the preferred regime type. Vargas sought to make sure that the transition would happen on his terms. That year his Minister of Labor Alexandre Marcondes Filho enacted a plan to build a base of popular support for Vargas centered on the official unions that the Ministry of Labor had direct control over. The *Hora do Brasil* radio program now included weekly lectures from the minister for the benefit of Brazil's workers, where Marcondes Filho laid out the political ideology of *trabalhismo* or workerism and attempted to consolidate urban workers in a single political body. The ideological foundation of workerism consisted in portraying the state, as embodied by Vargas himself, as the principal agent for affecting a "social

[351] Ibid.

[352] 'Manifesto Dos Mineiros', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 10 December 2020, https://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/AEraVargas1/anos37-45/QuedaDeVargas/ManifestoDosMineiros.

democracy" with rights and incorporation for the working class as the regime increasingly distanced itself from the once prevalent idea of "authoritarian democracy."[353]

Vargas slowly but surely gave public assurances of a return to representative democracy. On 15 April 1944, the president delivered a speech to the Brazilian Press Association. The majority of the speech extolled the accomplishments of his government, especially a supposedly equitable economic development. In his final remarks, he turned to the future. Vargas acknowledged the consequences of the war for democracy globally, "Each people will be able to organize themselves according to their own will, expressed by means appropriate to their historical tradition and to the imperatives of their autonomous existence." He explained that winning the war was the top priority but expounded vaguely on what might come next: "When we again enjoy the unparalleled benefits of peace, we will complete the institutional bodies that are not yet functioning. The people, by the most ample and free means, will then be able, without fear of any kind to manifest themselves and choose their leaders and representatives, democratically, within the order and the law." [354]

A few months later, on 7 September as part of the Independence Day festivities, Vargas delivered another speech with further clear signs the regime was changing. He extolled the virtues of "the reforms of 1937, of a profound and sound democratic sense, which incorporated a large part of the active population, workers and producers of national wealth into political life,

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[353] Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*; Gomes, 'Ideologia e trabalho no Estado Novo'; Gomes and D'Araújo, *Getulismo e Trabalhismo*; Ângela Maria de Castro Gomes, 'A Construção do Homen Novo: O trabalhador brasileiro', in *Estado Novo: ideologia e poder* (Rio de Janeiro, 1982), 151–66; Gomes, 'O Redescobrimento do Brasil'.

[354] Getúlio Vargas, 'A orientação renovadora do Govêrno e da Imprensa', in *A Nova Política Do Brasil*, vol. X (Rio de Janeiro, 1947), 275–82.

putting the interests of the people and the security of the community at the forefront."[355] In this way, he shifted the narrative around the Estado Novo regime as a long term solution appropriate to the Brazilian reality and recast it as a transitionary regime whose purposes had always been enabling future democratization. Vargas promised that elections would take place in peacetime and would include "ample" participation at the ballot box. Expounding, he stated that the remaining obstacle to a government of the majority in Brazil was the country's immense geographical size and widely dispersed population. "It is necessary to adopt a method that effectively registers the will of all individuals who contribute with their productive work to the prosperity of the country."[356] This point clearly hinted at the necessity to incorporate the peasant class, a move Vargas probably felt would strengthen his own political fortunes, yet he made no mention of abolishing the literacy barrier to suffrage.

The authoritarian state soon began to fracture internally. In August 1944, the Federal District police moved against the Society of Friends of America. The day before its new governing body members, including Aranha, were to assume their posts; the police invaded the society's headquarters and shut it down. Outraged, Aranha resigned from the cabinet immediately: Vargas lost an important member of his inner circle that had supported him since 1929. In October after a visit to the Italian front, Dutra became convinced that the opinion within the officer corps had shifted decidedly towards favoring a return to democracy and he

[355] 'O Discurso do Presidente Vargas na Hora da Independencia', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 9 September 1944.

[356] Ibid.

encouraged Vargas to hold elections before the end of the war. Góes Monteiro separately reached the same conclusion.[357]

Democratization now accelerated dramatically as other political actors joined the fray. In January 1945, the First Brazilian Writers Congress met in São Paulo. The event was seen as an afront to the Estado Novo as intellectuals met together and issued statements of support for freedom of speech and elections based on a "direct, universal, and secret vote."[358] The following month, the Department of Press and Propaganda stopped censoring the news which allowed for the publication of a controversial interview in the Rio de Janeiro based paper, *Correio da Manhã*. The interviewer was a young journalist, Carlos Lacerda. A former Communist, Lacerda was now an increasingly popular journalist on his way to becoming one the most important right wing politicians in the country.[359] Lacerda interviewed José Américo de Almeida, the government candidate from the 1938 election that Vargas had deliberately undermined. Almeida, now serving as a judge, criticized the government and encouraged more Brazilians to speak out in favor of democracy. Controversially, he declared that three Brazilians should refrain from standing as candidates. The first two were himself and Sales de Oliveira as he felt that they would only serve to split the electorate in favor of democratization. Vargas, unsurprisingly, was the other. Ultimately, Almeida felt a Vargas candidacy would be too divisive and he had reservations about the process of "democratic restauration" if Brazil simply elected its dictator as

[357] Bethell, 'Brazil'.

[358] As quoted in Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 48–49; See also Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil Under Vargas', 70.

[359] Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader I*.

president.[360] In April, the regime released its political prisoners, including Prestes and the other Communist leaders, and granted amnesty to all exiles. Then in May, the Department of Press and Propaganda was officially closed.

Later that same month Vargas issued a constitutional amendment and new electoral laws setting elections for Congress and the Presidency for December that year, while state level elections would be conducted in May of the following year. In explaining the reasoning behind it, the text of the amendment cited "the serious world events of the present time and the participation that Brazil has been having in them," as well as the "manifest trends of Brazilian public opinion."[361] Significantly, a new requirement mandated that parties in federal elections have at least 10,000 signatures from supporters in five different states to encourage a national brand of politics and avoid a return to state parties organized by local oligarchies.

This new institutional framework led to the formation of a new party system, defined by relationships to the Estado Novo. A party uniting opposition to the dictatorial regime emerged followed by two parties that represented the distinct sectors of the coalition that had supported the dictatorship. Ideological strains were identifiable, but they were not the primary factor in party formation and party positions were ambiguous.[362]

In April of 1945, the opposition formed around the União Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Union/UDN) that began as a coalition of parties and organizations, most of them proponents of liberal democracy. The UDN also entered into an alliance with the Esquerda

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[360] Carlos Lacerda, 'A Situação: Declarações do sr. José Américo', *Correio da Manhã*, 22 February 1945, Biblioteca Digital da Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[361] 'Lei Constitucional Nº 9' (1945).

[362] Bethell, 'Brazil'.

Democrática (Democratic Left) an organization of socialist and left wing partisans that supported representative democracy and eschewed communism. In August, the UDN nominated Air Force Brigadier and former 1930 revolutionary Eduardo Gomes as their candidate for president. In response the regime organized its own parties. The first party to emerge from the dictatorship was the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party/PTB). Founded in May 1945, it was the result of the efforts of Minister Marcondes Filho and the workerism ideology. The party was imposed top down through the Ministry of Labor on the official unions that formed the base level of organization. The PTB did not forward a candidate for president in 1945 but it named Vargas as its president, and he actively encouraged Brazil's workers to join the PTB. The second party to come out of the Estado Novo was the Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party/PSD), also organized under Vargas' direction but in this case, it was done at the state level via his interventors. The result was a party that represented the Estado Novo's apparatus and aimed to continue its ideology and policies within a framework of elections and "social democracy." The party was not merely a front for Vargas, however, and was dominated by the rural landholders, urban businessmen, and bureaucrats that favored the status quo. Like the PTB, the PSD named Vargas as its party president, but nominated Dutra for president as he was already the official government candidate. His candidacy would appease the Army and ensure a high degree of continuity.

For its part, the Partido Comunista refused an invitation to join the UDN and remained independent. In 1943, the USSR had dissolved the Comintern, so the party now acted without foreign direction. During the war, the Communists struggled with internal strife and constant oppression. Once the Soviet Union joined the Allies, the party began to advocate in favor of the Allied cause. As the war drew to a close and repression lessened, the Communists became more

politically active. Some communist intellectuals participated in the writers' congress in 1945 that spoke out in favor of democracy. Prestes emerged from prison as a hero to many on the left and drew huge crowds of 50 to 100 thousand people at two major Communist rallies over the summer in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Bethell notes that Prestes' crowds dwarfed those attending events for the two presidential candidates. Meanwhile, Prestes rejected the idea of supporting either of the military candidates.[363] As repression lessened, Brazil saw its first major strikes of the Estado Novo era. In mid-1945, the cities of Belo Horizonte, Campinas, Juiz de Fora, Porto Alegre, Rio de Janeiro, Santos, and São Paulo all experienced strikes that railed against skyrocketing prices and low wages though they did not condemn the government. One week saw 150,000 workers engaged in approximately 400 strikes in São Paulo alone. Communists had not organized the strikes, but they hoped to capitalize on them, and mass organization began as the party tentatively regained its legal status. The party opened headquarters in every state and membership quickly swelled to 50 thousand. With the support of the Partido Comunista, around 300 sympathetic union leaders founded their own inter-union organization, the Worker Unification Movement which agitated for the right to strike and labor organization autonomy.[364]

Despite an announcement by Vargas in March that he would not run for reelection, events on the ground soon threw his status into question. As early as February, some union meetings and spontaneous worker political mobilization began calling for a Vargas candidacy. Others suggested that elections should be postponed, and a constituent assembly held first with

[363] Ibid.

[364] Dulles, *Brazilian Communism, 1935-1945*, 179–220; Bethell, 'Brazil'.

Vargas retaining power in the interim. Eventually a full-fledged working class political movement emerged whose participants bore the name of *Queremistas* from their slogan *Queremos Getúlio* (We Want Getúlio).[365] The movement credited Vargas for the country's economic development and expanding social legislation. The PTB and many of its members participated in and organized the *Queremista* movement as thousands of working class individuals joined the ranks. The PSD and UND as well as most major newspapers not under government control strongly opposed the *Queremista* movement as did the Catholic Church. Since 1943, the Vatican had openly denounced authoritarianism and while the church in Brazil did not come out against a Vargas candidacy, they made clear that they favored a return to democracy and holding elections as scheduled.[366] For lack of evidence, Vargas's role, if any, in the *Queremista* movement is unknown but he never expressly accepted the movement's support or endorsed it. He did; however, publicly forward the idea that a third civilian candidate should stand against the two military ones, likely hoping to be that candidate. In August, the *Queremista* movement picked up steam. It had already organized headquarters in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo while continuing to expand across the country. Over the course of the month,

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[365] Jefferson José Queler, 'Os Sentidos do Queremismo: Disputas Políticas em Torno do Conceito na Redemocratização de 1945', *História (São Paulo)* 35 (19 December 2016), https://doi.org/10.1590/1980-436920160000000104; Jorge Ferreira, 'A transição democrática de 1945 e o movimento queremista', in *O Brasil Republicano: O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 11–49; Cássio Alan Abreu Albernaz, 'Em busca de cidadania política: o queremismo no Rio Grande do Sul frente à reorganização política e partidária 1945' (Master's Thesis, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2006); Michelle Reis de Macedo, 'Trabalhadores e cidadania no Brasil: o movimento queremista e a democratização de 1945' (Master's Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2008); Pedro Henrique Costa Pessoa, 'Do Getulismo ao Queremismo: transição democrática na Paraíba (1942-1945)' (Master's Thesis, Universidade Federal de Campina Grande, 2021); Ibirapuan B. N. A. Puertas, 'Queremismo: um movimento político-popular e as suas conseqüências para a esquerda nacionalista brasileira', *Revista Eletrônica de Ciências Sociais*, no. 5 (2008), https://periodicos.ufjf.br/index.php/csonline/article/view/17087.

[366] 'A Igreja e o Estado Totalitário', *Correio Da Manhã*, 4 October 1945, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil Under Vargas', 81.

unprecedented popular demonstrations descended on large cities across the country. When a massive rally gathered outside the presidential residence on 30 August, he reiterated to the crowd that he would not stand in the election. All presidential candidates had to resign any public post by September 2nd to be eligible for the December election, so when Vargas did not resign it seemed he truly would not run.[367] Stunningly over the course of August and September, the Partido Comunista began to work cooperatively with the *Queremista* movement at Prestes direction and aid the man that had brutally oppressed it for the last decade. The Communists adopted this position, not out of support for Vargas, but because they argued that democratization through a constitutional convention would be superior and more open than one overseen by either one of the current candidates emanating from the anti-communist armed forces. They also recognized the popularity that Vargas enjoyed with the working class and hoped to coopt some of that support. Communist support incensed Vargas' opponents, who saw it as proof that Vargas would attempt to establish a popular dictatorship.[368]

At the end of September 1945, the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil delivered a speech to the Journalist Union that proved explosive. The ambassador had shown Vargas the speech the day prior and believed the president had given it his assent. In the speech, he stated that the United States strongly approved of the "promise of free elections in Brazil, set for a definite date, by a government whose word the United States always found inviolable."[369] He implied that the United States would find it "tragic" if the elections were postponed to accommodate a

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[367] Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*, 288–324; Bethell, 'Brazil'; Ferreira, 'A transição democrática de 1945'.

[368] Dulles, *Brazilian Communism, 1935-1945*, 179–220; Bethell, 'Brazil'.

[369] As quoted in Stanley E. Hilton, 'The Overthrow of Getúlio Vargas in 1945: Diplomatic Intervention, Defense of Democracy, or Political Retribution?', *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 67, no. 1 (1987): 25–26, https://doi.org/10.2307/2515201.

constitutional convention that could simply take place following the election.[370] The speech enraged the *Queremistas* and Communists who denounced U.S. intervention. Vargas too was extremely upset and felt personally betrayed by the ambassador. Meanwhile, the opposition celebrated what they touted as the "atomic bomb" of speeches.[371]

On 3 October 1945, the fifteenth anniversary of the 1930 Revolution, a rally in Rio de Janeiro of approximately 150 thousand people turned out in support of Vargas and delivered a formal request for a constitutional convention election in lieu of the presidential one. Vargas hailed the gathering as an embodiment of the will of the people and endorsed their request. "Undoubtedly, the election of a Constituent Assembly is a genuinely democratic process in perfect agreement with our traditions," Vargas stated and added that Brazilians could "count on" him to do everything in his power to affect the will of the people. Yet he firmly stated, "Before God . . . I reaffirm that I am not a candidate."[372] His opponents remained unconvinced and "Remember 1937" rang out as a popular opposition slogan. Many within the UDN called upon the military to depose Vargas and let the judiciary run the election before the president could subvert the democratization process. Vargas kept encouraging the workers to join the PTB and offered support for the idea of a constitutional convention as October wore on.[373]

Events playing out in neighboring Argentina further inflamed tensions. There the military had been dealing with their own politician courting the support of the urban masses or

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[370] Ibid.

[371] Ibid.

[372] 'A Situação Politica - Manifestação Popular ao Presidente Getulio Vargas', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 4 October 1945, Acervo Estadão.

[373] Bethell, 'Brazil'.

descamisados, Juan Domingo Perón. In October 1945, as the *Queremista* movement was reaching new heights of activity in Brazil, a military coup had seen Perón imprisoned but a massive wave of strikes and worker mobilization led by Perón's partner Eva Duarte had crippled the military government and forced Perón's liberation on the 17th of that month.[374] The event was heavily reported in Brazil and struck fear into the hearts of those that saw Perón and Vargas as kindred spirits. On 10 October Vargas issued a decree moving the state and municipal elections up to match the federal election and requiring all candidates to resign public positions 30 days in advance. This would mean that, when all the current office holders resigned to run for their positions, Vargas could hand pick replacements that would then oversee the election. The UDN denounced what it saw as an abuse of power and rumors swirled that the election would be postponed by a decree declaring a constitutional convention.

The final straw came in late October when Federal District police moved to block a *Queremista* rally. In response, Vargas attempted to name his own brother Benjamim Vargas as the new police chief. By the time of Vargas' controversial measure, Army leadership led by Vargas' former allies, Dutra and Góes Monteiro, had decided it was time for the president to go. They met regularly over the month of October to discuss the situation. Dutra told Vargas to withdraw his brother's name or be forcibly deposed but he refused. On 29 October, Góes Monteiro ordered out the local garrison to cut off the presidential palace. Another general and friend of the president delivered a message to a defiant Vargas informing him that he would

[374] Robert J. Alexander, *Juan Domingo Peron: A History* (New York, 2018).

resign. Eventually, Vargas became convinced by those around him of the futility of his situation and resigned.[375]

Góes Monteiro released a statement clarifying the transfer of power. He stated that he had acted in the "name of the armed classes" to "avoid greater unrest." The declaration specified that José Linhares, the President of the Supreme Court, would act as President of the Republic in the interim, fulfilling the long-standing UDN request that the judiciary oversee the election. Góes Monteiro enacted this transfer of power entirely on his own authority; there was no process for succession specified in the 1937 Constitution. In addition, the general announced, "The President will make a proclamation to the Brazilian people in accordance with his resignation and high patriotism so that public order does not suffer . . . and the prestige of Brazil remains unaltered."[376] Vargas' statement revealed a man who felt cheated but remained conscious of his political future. After declaring that he had only ever sought to do what was best for the country Vargas declared, "I abstain from analyzing the serious events that led me to resign from the Government in order to prevent the country from greater harm and irreparable damage. History and time will speak for me." Still, he specified that he did not harbor any ill will towards "the glorious armed forces of my country." Vargas indicated he would leave public life but ended his statement by declaring "The workers, the humble, whom I never failed with my affection and assistance, the people, in short, they will understand me. And all will do me justice."[377]

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[375] Bethell, 'Brazil'.

[376] 'Decisivos Acontecimentos Politicos Ocorridos Ontem na Capital da Republica', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 30 October 1945, Acervo Estadão.

[377] As quoted in Antônio Sérgio Ribeiro, '29 de outubro de 1945: o fim do Estado Novo', in *Notícias da Alesp*, 31 October 2005, https://www.al.sp.gov.br/noticia/?31/10/2005/29-de-outubro-de-1945--o-fim-do-estado-novo.

Conclusion

The attempt by the Estado Novo to substitute a democracy of outcomes in place of a democracy of means, failed. With the military defeat of fascism, many of the ideas of moving beyond representative democracy lost their weight. Brazilians themselves had fought and died on the battlefields of Italy. As a result of this and increasing interactions with the United States, whose propaganda focused on the war as one for democracy, both public and military opinion had shifted in favor of democratization. Increasingly advocates of representative democracy referenced the idea that Brazil was fighting a war in favor democracy and against authoritarianism. This shift in opinion was so great that the regime felt compelled to disassemble itself as it changed its own messaging from "authoritarian democracy" as a long term solution for the future to laying the groundwork for "social democracy." The intervention of the armed forces to depose Vargas, meant that the "moderating pattern" of the military checking the executive was intertwined with an increasingly prevalent view among the officer corps that saw the military not only as guarantors of the regime but also as guardians of the democracy they had won in the war.

Nevertheless, the Estado Novo did not simply disappear, instead it left an enduring legacy. Though local circumstances continued to carry significant weight, politics had become nationalized. Processes of industrialization and urbanization dramatically accelerated. An interventionist state with a responsibility for economic development became the expectation. The federal government now wielded a massive bureaucracy that was in the beginning stages of professionalization. Perhaps most importantly, while the idea of democratic outcomes as a substitute for democratic means had not lasted, the idea of socioeconomic considerations as central to democracy did persist. This shift, which happened simultaneously in postwar Western

Europe and the post New Deal U.S., was the basis of the conceptualizations of social democracy which would be prevalent in the Fourth Republic.[378] Even the old liberals of Minas Gerais had come to the recognition that purely political democracy was not what their compatriots wanted.

The experiences through which Brazil had passed since 1930 had dramatically altered the political and social environment and a truly distinct Brazil emerged in 1945. The short lived Second Republic (1934-1937) had provided a roadmap of institutions and procedures to secure genuinely competitive elections. Meanwhile, the Estado Novo or Third Republic had mobilized and incorporated the urban working class on an unprecedented scale. Complicating the political scene for future democratization were complex legacies of military intervention and authoritarianism. Carvalho described the latter by arguing that the rapid advancement of social rights under an authoritarian government led to an "excessive valorization of the Executive Branch" and a "popular impatience with the generally slower functioning of the democratic decision-making mechanism."[379] While Carvalho's analysis is of the general public, these trends are seen among the political elite as well. This all came against a backdrop of a global scene where the war had once again left the idea of democracy in ascendancy as fascism receded and European empires collapsed. However, just as in Brazil, defining democracy was an increasingly complicated matter.

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[378] Gomes, 'O Redescobrimento do Brasil'; Sheri Berman, *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 2006), 177–99.

[379] Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil*, 221–22.

Part II: Practicing Democracy During the Fourth Republic

Chapter III Defining Democracy and the Birth of the Fourth Republic, 1945-46

In the decade and a half following World War II, processes of democratization took place across the globe in what political scientists frequently refer to as the second wave of democracy.[380] In Europe, the war had toppled most of the continent's pre-war governments which now sought a way to build a democracy that would not devolve into authoritarianism as had happened with the rise of fascism.[381] Meanwhile, European empires began to collapse leading to a wave of independence movements. This gave rise to several post-colonial democracies, such as India in 1947, that often had new ideas about what a democracy should look like.[382] Across Latin America, "dictatorships fell, popular forces were mobilized, and elections with a relatively high level of participation were held."[383] Further democratization even took place within stable democracies like the United States where the service of black Americans in the war fueled the beginnings of the civil rights movement and the expansion of suffrage.[384] Reflecting on this period, Keane commented, "for the first time ever in human history democracy went on trial in all four corners of Planet Earth."[385]

In Brazil, Getúlio Vargas had served as dictator of the quasi-fascist Estado Novo for eight years before being deposed in 1945 by the same generals who backed his takeover in 1937. Even

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[380] Huntington, *The Third Wave*; See also Roser and Herre, 'Democracy'.

[381] Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*; Kurunmäki and Strang, *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*.

[382] Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy*, 585–647.

[383] Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, eds., *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948* (Cambridge, 1992), 2.

[384] Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States*, second edition (New York, 2009), 256–315.

[385] Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy*, 649.

before his removal, the country had begun making preparations for a transition to democracy and reconstitutionalization. While virtually all the sides agreed on the need to return to a regime of elections, opinion varied widely on all other aspects of democracy as it did in much of the world. Many analyses of Brazil's post-war transition portray a limited political democratization under a largely pragmatic and conservative political elite that united to mitigate significant change. Vianna characterized reconstitutionalization as a "liberal intra-oligarchic pact" which "eliminated the political presence of the emerging middle classes and the subaltern classes."[386] Bethell maintained that "Brazilian democratization was real but controlled and limited. This new regime was anti-popular and had been secured by allowing the government to retain control of labor and the military to retain significant power."[387] Collier and Collier described the reconstitutionalization process as the "reinstallation of the Vargas machine, this time in a democratic guise."[388] Several other narratives depict the transition and the Constitutional Convention itself as an alliance of reactionary forces against democratic progressives mostly found within the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party).[389] Skidmore dedicated only a single paragraph to the 1946 Constitution where he characterized the document

[386] Vianna, *Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil*, 270.

[387] Bethell, 'Brazil', 65.

[388] Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, 364.

[389] Prestes, 'Os Comunistas e a Constituinte de 1946'; Braga, 'A Constituinte de 1946 e a Nova Ordem'; José Antonio Segatto, 'PCB: a questão nacional e a democracia', in *O Brasil Republicano - O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 270–95.

saying, “As in 1934, elaborate guarantees were included to assure free elections and civil liberties. But there was no return to the decentralized system prevailing before 1930.”[390]

These perspectives don’t do justice to the complexity and legitimacy of the democratization process. As Gomes and Ferreira contended, “if the post-45 party system and electoral practices maintain links with the political dynamics of the Estado Novo and the First Republic, they also demarcate very important, but little noted, transformations in the political history of Brazil.”[391] By focusing on political actors, particularly parties, and their debates about democracy and its institutions, this chapter offers a nuanced perspective to the literature on the 1946 Constitution and the real changes that accompanied its creation. It reviews the democratization process by returning to the final months of the Vargas government and analyzing the preparations for the general election of 1945, before analyzing the election itself, the 1946 Constitutional Convention, and the constitution it produced. The transition to a democratic regime and the drafting of a constitution are important moments when political actors have significant autonomy to decide rules and not just act within or against them. Their expressed positions concerning democracy and its institutions therefore take on even greater importance.[392] How was the 1946 reconstitutionalization process conducted in Brazil? What were the dueling definitions of democracy advanced over this process? How did these debates

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[390] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 64.

[391] Gomes and Ferreira, ‘Brasil, 1945-1964’, 254.

[392] Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, *The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy* (1985), 19–32; Guillermo A O’Donnell and Philippe C Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, 1986).

play out and what were their conclusions with the context of drafting the constitution? These constitute the principal research questions of this chapter.

Setting the Stage – The 1945 Election

As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the political philosopher Gallie described democracy in 1955 as an "essentially contested concept" where varying groups claim to be the most authentic modern iteration of a historical ideal.[393] In 1951, seeking conceptual cohesion, UNESCO commissioned a report, *Democracy in a World of Tensions,* which brought together democracy experts from around the world but, as highlighted by Kurunmäki and Strang, the report actually reiterated the "impossibility of finding a common ground for understanding democracy."[394] The report, however, did stipulate "The ambiguity is old, but the Committee points out that the unanimity in favoring and professing democracy is new."[395] Varying groups and parties across the world advocated for popular democracy, social democracy, and liberal democracy among others with several sub-variations of each. One case where this can be clearly seen is Western Europe. Conway's recent work on this region presented the potential paths towards redemocratization as divided between indirect parliamentary democracy, as embodied by socialist and Christian democracy parties, versus popular democracy as advocated by communist parties. According to Conway, the indirect parliamentary model triumphed as Western European leaders feared the chaos of popular democracy that had led to the original rise of the far right and as communism became increasingly associated with totalitarianism. These

[393] Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts'.

[394] Kurunmäki and Strang, *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, 17.

[395] 'Democracy in a World of Tensions: A Symposium Prepared by UNESCO' (Paris, 1951), viii.

new indirect parliamentary democracies limited public participation in favor of pragmatic technocratic governance of the center-right and center-left.[396]

What paths existed in Brazil? Influence over the process of democratization was decided by the general election of 2 December 1945 for both president and Congress. The presidential election was the first popular election of a president since 1930. However, the congressional elections were of greater consequence. While voters selected candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate as had been the case before 1937, each deputy and senator would also serve as a delegate to the Constitutional Assembly that would oversee the country's reconstitutionalization.[397] Examined here are the ideological underpinnings of the varying parties that contested the election and their approach to democracy generally, followed by a more specific review of the 1945 campaign and election.

The Party System of the Fourth Republic and Democracy

The party system that defined the Fourth Republic had four main parties of national scale and a series of smaller ones that tended to have only regional adherence. In an attempt to encourage national parties, the government required 10,000 signatures in five different states for registration after 1945, but some of the regional parties still managed to satisfy this prerequisite. Two of the main parties were created by the Estado Novo apparatus in 1945 and employed the language of social democracy, the Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party/PSD) and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party/PTB). Though the regime tried to

[396] Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*.

[397] Peixoto, 'Constituent Power'.

create a single party, its rural and urban bases proved too hard to reconcile. Crucially though, the quasi-fascist regime of the Estado Novo had not been on the losing side of the war. Therefore, a modified version of the "authoritarian democracy"[398] it preached could still feasibly be advocated, and this is seen in many of the PSD and even some PTB positions. In fact, the Estado Novo parties originally argued that the 1937 Constitution could be modified and need not be replaced.[399] Liberal democracy, broadly defined, had in turn most of its supporters among the União Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Union/UDN), the first of the new parties to emerge, it united much of the Estado Novo's opposition. Finally, there was the Partido Comunista Brasileiro which had existed since 1922 but returned to legality with the end of the Estado Novo in 1945 and pushed for popular democracy.

The Partido Social Democrático was formed by the interventors, the state level executives of the Estado Novo. The party united Estado Novo bureaucrats with the members of the rural economic elite that had cooperated with the regime. Most senior members of the administration belonged to the PSD. Unlike the other major parties that had a national directorate, control of the PSD rested with a board composed of the presidents of state chapters with Vargas being named party president.[400] The PSD in many respects was a continuation of the "progressive conservativism" of the Estado Novo in that it was socially conservative but supportive of an interventionist state with a vision for modernization.[401] The PSD platform that accompanied its founding in 1945 portrayed the 1937 Constitution and the Estado Novo as

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[398] Amaral, *O Estado Autoritário*.

[399] Peixoto, 'Constituent Power', 209.

[400] Hippólito, *De raposas e reformistas*; Soares, *A democracia interrompida*, 195–208.

[401] Howes, 'Progressive Conservatism in Brazil'.

essential parts of the state building and democratization process. The party supported the continuation of corporatism, vocational education, and centralized economic planning. It also declared agriculture the "base of national labor" which entitled it to "Permanent assistance from the State." On an institutional level, the platform called for "Revision of the Constitution, embodying the principles of a democratic, social, and federative regime, founded on the representation of the people and the electoral truth," while endorsing the restauration of the secret vote, civil liberties, Congress, and the judiciary.[402]

The other party of the Estado Novo was the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB).[403] Since 1943, Vargas' Minister of Labor had been developing the ideology of "workerism" and building a party on top of the government system of official labor unions.[404] Vargas was named the party's honorary president, but several union leaders and Vargas allies directed the party. The PTB's 1945 platform, like that of the PSD, did not call for the replacement of the 1937 Constitution but for its "reexamination" and it included no mention of democracy by name. The party placed a strong emphasis on the social rights of workers, vowing to defend the social legislation of the Estado Novo. Strikingly, considering the corporatist origins of the party, the PTB platform included planks calling for "greater union autonomy" and the right of "peaceful strikes." Clearly separating the PTB from the PSD was the former's insistence on the "extinction

[402] 'Programa do Partido Social Democrático' (14 June 1945), Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, https://www.tse.jus.br/hotsites/registro_partidario/psd/identificacao.htm.

[403] D'Araújo, *Sindicatos, carisma & poder*; Gomes and D'Araújo, *Getulismo e Trabalhismo*; Soares, *A democracia interrompida*, 195–208.

[404] Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*, 288–324.

of the *latifundios*," the name given to Brazil's large rural estates that consisted of massive amounts of uncultivated farmland which the PTB platform promised to redistribute.[405]

The bulk of the opposition came together to form the UDN in April of 1945. While generally liberal, the party in its early days had a wide ideological diversity given its position as a broad tent for the opposition to the Estado Novo. UDN leadership largely came from politicians that had been part of liberal parties like the Partido Democrático (Democratic Party) and the União Democrática Brasileira (Brazilian Democratic Union), participants in the 1932 Constitutionalist Revolution, as well as from the ranks of the rural elite that had opposed the Estado Novo (Chapters I and II). Many of these politicians had been in exile for the last several years while others had broken with the Vargas government over its authoritarian nature.[406] Unlike the PSD and PTB, the UDN dedicated a significant part of its 1945 platform to discussing democracy itself, advocating for direct elections, the secret vote, and proportional representation. "The União Democrática Nacional advocates and supports a process of democratization in Brazil, with a constructive and social purpose, capable of promoting political and economic progress and the well-being of all Brazilians," read the platform's introduction. Not sharing the PSD and PTB's fondness for recent history, the UDN openly denounced the Estado Novo as a repressive dictatorship.[407]

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[405] 'Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro ao Povo e Especialmente aos Trabalhadores', *O Jornal*, 13 September 1945, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[406] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 52–59; Phyllis Jane Peterson, 'Brazilian Political Parties: Formation, Organization, and Leadership, 1945-1959' (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1962), 72–75.

[407] 'Programa da União Democrática Nacional' (August 1945), Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, https://www.tse.jus.br/hotsites/registro_partidario/udn/identificacao.htm.

As evidenced by the manifesto from old guard liberals in Minas Gerais during the Estado Novo (Chapter II), attitudes towards state intervention and social considerations among liberal politicians had evolved.[408] This shift is identifiable in the UDN platform as well, which affirmed the responsibility of the state in providing for the social needs of citizens and favored union autonomy and the right to strike. Still, the party favored market solutions, declaring that the best defense against poverty was employment. The UDN platform emphasized the need to reverse Estado Novo protectionist policies and incentivize foreign investment with only limited protections for local industry. The UDN insisted that the government's role was to serve as an example of the "rational mobilization" of resources as opposed to direct intervention. Like the PSD, the UDN saw agriculture as worthy of government aid and credit, but like the PTB it also supported the "progressive parceling of land" though it is not clear exactly what this meant.[409]

Lastly, the Partido Comunista still led by Luís Carlos Prestes remerged as an active political force but now pursued a less radical and more nationalist agenda. Like their counterparts in Europe, the Partido Comunista advocated for popular democracy and benefited from the goodwill generated by the central role of the Soviet Union in defeating the Nazis. However, fears and mistrust of communism on the part of the military, traditional politicians, and the upper and middle classes remained.[410] The 1945 Communist platform abandoned calls to armed revolution and claimed to offer a superior form of democracy: "The Communist Party of Brazil, a party of the working class, composed primarily of workers, struggles to achieve the

[408] A shift by right wing parties in the direction of social democracy was detectable in Western Europe too. See Berman, *The Primacy of Politics*, 177–99; Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*, 162–254.

[409] 'Programa da UDN'.

[410] Bethell, 'Brazil', 55–65; Segatto, 'PCB: a questão nacional e a democracia'.

complete economic, political, and social emancipation of Brazil; to obtain for the people the guarantees of the most ample and effective democracy." The Communists offered a "genuinely popular" government and promised to fight "for the validity of public liberties and the guarantees of citizens inherent in all authentically democratic regimes; it will fight for the victory and full development of democracy; it will fight for a democratic constitutional charter and for it to be rigorously respected and fulfilled, tenaciously opposing all attempts to crush or restrict the freedoms enshrined therein." The party maintained its traditional positions of opposing foreign capital and strongly endorsed broad land redistribution to the "peasant mass" at no cost while promising to dramatically improve the quality of life of the working class.[411]

While these four parties dominated the election and politics thereafter, there were a few relevant smaller parties. The most significant of these in 1945 was the Esquerda Democrática (Democratic Left) a small, but still national, socialist party that repudiated communism and endorsed representative democracy with a platform focused on the "gradual and progressive socialization of the means of production." In advance of the election, the UDN reached out to the Partido Comunista to form a broad opposition front, but Communist leadership declined. Instead, the UDN allied itself with the Esquerda Democrática. The socialist party justified its alliance with the liberal UDN as necessary to defeat the forces of "continuism" and the path to "the most sincere democratic restauration."[412] Also backing the UDN were a few of the regional parties registered in 1945. Some surviving members of the First Republic political elites in Minas Gerais

[411] 'Programa do Partido Comunista do Brasil' (3 September 1945), Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, https://www.tse.jus.br/hotsites/registro_partidario/pcb/identificacao.htm.

[412] 'Manifesto da Esquerda Democrática' (25 August 1945), Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, https://www.tse.jus.br/hotsites/registro_partidario/psb/identificacao.htm.

founded a new but small Partido Republicano (Republican Party) and strongly advocated federalism. The classically liberal Partido Libertador (Liberator Party) that had supported Vargas' 1930 campaign was also reborn (Chapter I). New to the scene, was the Partido Democrata Cristão (Christian Democratic Party) supporting a Catholic value led democratization as happened in Western Europe. However, church leadership never got behind it as they continued to enjoy strong ties with politicians of the administration now in the PSD. Of course, not all small parties backed the UDN. The exiled leader of the fascist Ação Integralista Brasileira (Brazilian Integralist Action), Plínio Salgado returned and founded the much less successful Partido de Representação Popular (Party of Popular Representation) and backed the PSD.[413]

The election, therefore, presented voters with distinct democratization projects for their consideration. Social democracy and continuation of the Estado Novo's policies could be found in either the PSD or PTB, but the latter offered a mildly more progressive set of policies. The UDN was based largely on the repudiation of the regime and offered a platform of liberal democracy with which Brazilians were already familiar but tempered by some new social considerations. Finally, the Partido Comunista represented a radical break with the past and a turn towards popular democracy and a complete remaking of the country's social structure.

[413] Carlos Eduardo Leal, 'Partido Republicano (PR)', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 25 February 2021, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/partido-republicano-pr; Carlos Eduardo Leal, 'Partido Libertador (1945-1965)', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 25 February 2021, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/partido-libertador-pl-1945-1965; Carlos Eduardo Leal, 'Partido de Representação Popular (PRP)', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 25 February 2021, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/partido-de-representacao-popular-prp; Marieta de Morais Ferreira and Dora Flaksman, 'Partido Democrata Cristão (1945)', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 25 February 2021, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/partido-democrata-cristao-1945; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 96.

The 1945 Election

The rules for the 1945 general election had been set by the Vargas government, which was of great benefit to the PSD as its leaders were the members of the administration tasked with the electoral rulemaking. The most important of these individuals was Minister of Justice Agamenon Magalhães who was the primary author of the electoral measures.[414] The main acts governing the election were a constitutional amendment in February and a decree-law in May 1945.[415] Illiterates and enlisted military personnel remained barred from the ballot box, however, obligatory voting now extended to all women engaged in a "lucrative profession."[416] The racial implications of the literacy ban continued to grow, however, as roughly three quarters of the adult black population in Brazil was still illiterate by 1940 while the national illiteracy rate had fallen to 56% (Annex II).[417] The Electoral Justice System was reinstated, and the multi-state party registration requirement introduced. Candidates were permitted to stand for election for multiple parties or for any federal office in the country without having to reside in the state. Ballots remained the responsibility of the voter which meant a return to parties and candidates printing and distributing ballots to their voters.

Some of the new rules concerning the distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies directly benefitted the PSD with its rural base. Each state would elect two senators, but the Chamber would be determined by population. Allocation of seats fell within hard limits whereby

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[414] 'Agamenon Magalhães', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 23 March 2021, https://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/AEraVargas1/biografias/agamenon_magalhaes.

[415] Lei Constitucional Nº 9; 'Decreto-Lei Nº 7.586' (1945).

[416] Decreto-Lei Nº 7.586, Art 4.

[417] UNESCO, *Progress of Literacy*, 42.

no state would have less than five or more than 35 representatives. Minas Gerais and São Paulo had their representation capped while Amazonas, Sergipe, and Mato Grosso benefitted from the minimum. The caps prevented the populous states from dominating the proceedings and continued to overweight voters in rural states (Chapter I) who elected an outsized number of delegates due to the fact that representation was based on population but illiteracy in the countryside remained high (Annex II). Furthermore, with the return to a system of proportional representation the number of seats won by each party was determined by an electoral quotient.[418] According to the new rules, seats left over after the application of the quotient would be wholly awarded to the party that got the plurality of votes in the state. This rule proved to have the greatest distortion on the number of seats won by the PSD as its strong rural presence across regions allowed it to win a plurality in 15 of the 21 states. The party therefore received the bloc of leftover seats regardless of how slim their plurality was.[419] The new legislation also mandated that certain categories of employers report their employees' registration information to allow for automatic bloc voter enrollment. This applied almost exclusively to urban and public companies, sources of support for the PTB and PSD. One result was that several urban illiterate employees were actually registered to vote. Approximately 23% of voters in 1945 were registered through this system.[420] While the Vargas administration set the rules, their enforcement was carried out by others. The UDN had long been adamant that the courts administer the election and General

[418] The total number of votos válidos, that is . . . votes for candidates plus votos brancos (blank ballots), but excluding votos nulos (spoiled ballots), was divided by the number of seats to be filled to provide an electoral quotient for each state. The total vote for all the candidates of each party was divided by the electoral quotient to give the number of seats won by each party. See Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 91.

[419] Nicolau, 'Partidos na República de 1946', 90–92.

[420] Souza, *Estado e partidos políticos no Brasil (1930 a 1964)*, 121.

Pedro de Góes Monteiro obliged naming Supreme Court President José Linhares as Vargas' successor. Now President Linhares suspended most of the country's interventors and mayors replacing them with local judges under strict instructions to oversee an unbiased election.[421]

While Vargas was still president, Minister of War Eurico Dutra emerged as the government backed candidate for president in March of 1945; the PSD formed in May and endorsed Dutra's candidacy. The PTB participated in the unsuccessful *Queremista* movement seeking to extend Vargas' stay in power (Chapter II); with Vargas removed, the party opted not to nominate its own candidate so as not to undermine Dutra to the benefit of the UDN but ran their own congressional candidates. The UDN and its allies backed another military candidate, Air Force Brigadier Eduardo Gomes. The Partido Comunista had also supported the *Queremista* movement and opposed the military candidates. To increase the general appeal of their candidate, the Communists nominated a little known Estado Novo bureaucrat, Iedo Fiúza, who himself was not a Communist but sympathized with their agenda. However, party organization was limited to industrial areas and Fiúza never emerged as a serious contender.[422]

The PSD campaigned on continuing the social aspects of the Estado Novo under a regime of elections. At his first campaign event in September 1945, Dutra praised the Estado Novo and the 1937 Constitution for saving the country from civil war and a "demagogic wave." He rejected claims from his opponents that the 1937 Constitution had been "totalitarian" and insisted it had been necessary for the defense of "Brazilian civilization itself." Yet, he promised that, as president, he would give wide berth to Congress to revise or replace it. He also vowed, if elected,

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[421] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 54.

[422] Ibid., 61–63.

to continue the fight for the "social transformations of our democracy." This fight, he claimed, gave the party both its purpose and name and would entail further social legislation, rural education, and expanding infrastructure.[423] In turn, the UDN and Gomes tried to rally the "truly liberal and democratic forces" of the country for a definitive break with past. The party referred to the outgoing government simply as "the dictatorship" insisting that the "restauration of the regime of liberty" – the regime of the 1934 Constitution – necessitated the defeat of the parties the dictatorship had spawned and most importantly Vargas himself while the latter still remained in power. Gomes made references to the war in Europe where Brazilians were "giving their lives to the cause of liberty" only to return home to a "regime identical to the one they helped to destroy on the battlefields." Gomes described his campaign as one for the "reconquest of our liberties."[424]

The two sides pursued distinct mobilization strategies. Both held public rallies in the major cities, and both made frequent use of radio to broadcast speeches and propaganda. However, the PSD also dedicated significant attention to rural areas with Dutra venturing into the interior far more than his competitors. In the rural areas the greatest party resources were dedicated not to rallies or propaganda but to the enrollment of friendly voters (even illiterate ones in many instances), distribution of ballots, the transportation of voters to the polling location, and the sequestration of voters away from competitors. The ability of parties to register on behalf of voters not only made the literacy barrier permeable but also saw other fraudulent

[423] 'Constituiu Memoravel Acontecimento o Comicio do Partido Social Democratico Realizado Ontem em Belo Horizonte', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 2 September 1945, Acervo Estadão.

[424] Positions and quotes can be found in Gomes' press statement on 16 April 1945. Reproduced in Mello Franco, *A campanha da U.D.N.*, 233–37.

practices like registering voters in multiple jurisdictions.[425] Limongi's review of the 1945 election shows that several rural states had more registered voters than there were eligible adults in the population.[426] Again, as in previous elections, these practices relied heavily on wealthy landholders or the candidates themselves persuading or intimidating those under their influence and directing efforts on the ground. However, it should be noted that the Electoral Justice System was again successful in preventing large scale fraud when it came to counting the vote.[427]

After Vargas's removal, the PSD agreed to an electoral alliance with the PTB whereby Dutra promised to support their social policy and nominate a member of the party for Minister of Labor.[428] As a result of this agreement, the PTB largely took control of the urban facets of Dutra's campaign. The official union system served as the main mechanism of mobilization distributing propaganda and driving turnout, many union leaders doubled as campaign organizers. The PTB conducted extensive street campaigns that included rallies, campaign paraphernalia, and the development and distribution of messages tailored to the working class, usually via the radio. To increase his appeal, Dutra also attempted to associate himself with the Brazilian war effort that he had overseen as Minister of War. As the soldiers returned home to parades and celebrations, he tried to make himself a visible figure at these events and share in the

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[425] Fernando Limongi, 'Fazendo Eleitores e Eleições: Mobilização Política e Democracia no Brasil Pós-Estado Novo', *Dados* 58, no. 2 (June 2015): 371–400, https://doi.org/10.1590/00115258201547; Peterson, 'Brazilian Political Parties', 65–68; Fernando Daniel Hidalgo, 'Renovating Democracy: The Political Consequences of Election Reforms in Post-War Brazil' (PhD Dissertation, UC Berkeley, 2012), 49.

[426] Limongi, 'Fazendo Eleitores e Eleições', 380.

[427] Hidalgo, 'Renovating Democracy', 48.

[428] Gomes and D'Araújo, *Getulismo e Trabalhismo*, 27–28; Ferreira, 'A transição democrática de 1945', 44.

glory of the triumphant soldiers.[429] In urban areas the three other major parties had to contend with the strong working class presence of the Partido Comunista. Communist mobilization focused largely on bottom-up semiautonomous grassroots organizations called "Popular Democratic Committees" that were usually established by workers themselves in their workplaces. The committees organized support around local issues of immediate relevance to their members in addition to turning out electoral support for the Partido Comunista.[430]

The UDN differentiated itself by being the only one of the four major parties to focus its messaging and mobilization on the middle class.[431] The party still relied on a significant level of rural backing where it pursued strategies similar to the PSD, but the urban middle classes were at the heart of its electoral strategy. The UDN and the Gomes campaign enjoyed broad support from civil society such as liberal professional organizations and bar associations. In March 1945, the Brazil Bar Association released an official statement condemning the 1937 Constitution and rejecting the authority of Vargas to hold elections.[432] In June, several association members released a manifesto endorsing Gomes as the "restorer of democracy."[433] Also supporting the party were virtually all the country's major newspapers and magazines not under government control. This included the national paper chain *Diários Associados* (Associated Dailies) as well

[429] Ferreira, 'A transição democrática de 1945'; Gomes and D'Araújo, *Getulismo e Trabalhismo*, 25–33.

[430] Antonio Luigi Negro and Fernando Teixeira da Silva, 'Trabalhadores, sindicatos e política (1945-1964)', in *O Brasil Republicano: O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 56–58; Fischer, 'The Red Menace Reconsidered', 13.

[431] Peterson, 'Brazilian Political Parties', 73; Soares, *A democracia interrompida,* 195–208.

[432] Reproduced in Mello Franco, *A campanha da U.D.N.*, 192–206.

[433] 'Apoio dos advogados a Eduardo Gomes', *Diario Carioca,* 28 June 1945, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

as the large papers *O Globo* (The Globe) and *Correio da Manhã* in the capital.[434] The result was a web of newspapers and magazines that pushed the UDN message and encouraged turnout while manufacturing a narrative that a victory by Gomes was "practically inevitable."[435] In March 1945, 121 journalists, including Carlos Lacerda (Chapter II), issued a manifesto condemning the Estado Novo as the "darkest" period in Brazilian history. They argued that censorship had cut off the "oxygen of democracy." Disparaging the regime, they charged that all the fundamental problems of 1937 remained – low industrialization, illiteracy, poor infrastructure, and a low standard of living for the working class – and that the insignificant amount of progress made did not justify the "terrible price" of losing civil liberties. They eagerly endorsed Gomes as the candidate of the "democratic opposition" and the person "to integrate Brazil in the community of free peoples."[436]

By late September, many within the PSD had serious doubts about the viability of Dutra's candidacy. Dutra did not seem to be capturing the imagination of the people and the PSD felt undercut by the *Queremista* movement.[437] Party leadership met and decided to switch candidates but hesitated to inform Dutra. Hearing of the idea, an enraged General Pedro Góes Monteiro, threatened to resign if it was discovered that then President Vargas was behind the suggestion. Eventually, a consensus emerged within the campaign that Dutra should not

[434] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 60.

[435] Ferreira, 'A transição democrática de 1945', 20.

[436] 'Os jornalistas ao povo brasileiro', *Correio da Manhã*, 10 March 1945, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[437] Ferreira, 'A transição democrática de 1945', 23–24.

withdraw his candidacy in fear that him doing so would play into Vargas' hands.[438] As the election neared, many organizers on the ground, especially within the PTB, became convinced that Vargas' endorsement was essential to securing working class support, and Dutra took offence at the lack of support from the deposed president. Those around Vargas impressed upon him the necessity of his endorsement to avoiding a UDN victory despite his distaste for Dutra who had helped force him from office. "The shipwreck will be total without your hand at the helm," one partisan told Vargas, continuing he warned that if Dutra lost "reactionaryism will complete its work."[439] Finally, on 28 November, less than a week before the election, Vargas issued a halfhearted endorsement ensuring his followers that Dutra's positions coincided with those of the PTB. He used the occasion to continue to paint himself as the victim of misinformation while declaring that if Dutra did not keep his promises, he himself would be "by the side of the people, against the President."[440]

Gomes campaign also ran into trouble. In a speech in November in Rio de Janeiro, Gomes had discounted Vargas' supporters, declaring that he did not need the votes of the dictator's unemployed or useless followers. Using an alternative Portuguese word, the opposition rephrased his declaration to state that he did not need the vote of "*marmiteiros*," a term referring to workers that packed their own lunch. PTB leadership crafted an extensive campaign on the back of the *marmiteiros* incident portraying Gomes as a reactionary and an elitist who looked

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[438] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 63; Mauro Malin, 'Eurico Gaspar Dutra', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 2 March 2021, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/dutra-eurico-gaspar.

[439] From a letter reproduced in Gomes and D'Araújo, *Getulismo e Trabalhismo*, 30.

[440] 'Encerramento da Campanha Politica do General Gaspar Dutra', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 28 November 1945, Acervo Estadão.

down on Brazil's workers, poor, women, and black population. Multiple studies contend that this negative campaign successfully depleted working class support for Gomes.[441]

The number of Brazilians that voted in December 1945, 6.1 million or 13% of the total population, was triple the previous presidential election in 1930 when Vargas had lost, as the result of population growth, increasing literacy, and the participation of women.[442] The vast majority of eligible voters enrolled, and turnout surpassed 81% of registered voters (Annex IV). The electorate remained concentrated in São Paulo (1.7 million), Minas Gerais (1.2 million), Rio de Janeiro/Federal District (1 million), and Rio Grande do Sul (900,000).

Dutra easily triumphed, receiving 55% of the vote. Gomes (35%) trailed in second and the Communist candidate Fíuza (10%) brought up the rear. Dutra secured a majority or plurality in most states and territories including a big victory in São Paulo. Still the election had been close in many places. For example, in the state of Sergipe with more than 76 thousand ballots cast Dutra prevailed by just 93 votes. Results from the Federal District – which encompassed only the city of Rio de Janeiro separate from the state of the same name – offer a perspective on just how competitive the election was in urban environments. Gomes carried the district with 38% of the vote, Dutra came in second with 34% while the Communist candidate Fíuza captured 27%. The PSD did not even carry either of the capital's senators with the UDN and Partido Comunista winning one each. The Communists competed well with the other major parties but

[441] Ferreira, 'A transição democrática de 1945', 41–44; Gomes and D'Araújo, *Getulismo e Trabalhismo*, 29.

[442] For election data see *Dados Estatísticos*, vol. 1 (Rio de Janeiro, 1950); *Ano VI - 1941/1945*.

only in industrialized cities.[443] The PSD, Dutra's party, also triumphed in the congressional elections (Annex IV). As seen in Table 1, the plurality rule concerning the distribution of seats dramatically benefitted the PSD which secured a majority in the lower chamber despites receiving just 42% of the popular vote in a proportional representation system. This translated into a slim majority in the Constitutional Convention where deputies and senators constituted one delegate each. Urban parties like the PTB and Partido Comunista suffered from the rural bias and received less seats than vote share in the Chamber. The PTB also struggled due to the fact that it had originally dedicated itself to the Queremista movement and only managed to organize congressional campaigns in 14 of 20 states.[444]

Table 1: Congressional Election of 1945

Party	Lower House		Senate	Constitutional Convention
	Popular Vote (%)	Seats (%)	Seats (%)	Total (%)
PSD	42%	53%	62%	54%
UDN/Esquerda Democrática	27%	29%	29%	27%
PTB	10%	8%	5%	7%
Partido Comunista	9%	5%	2%	5%
Partido Republicano	4%	3%	0%	2%
Partido Democrata Cristão	2%	1%	0%	>1%
Partido Libertador	1%	>1%	0%	>1%
Others	5%	>1%	2%	5%

Sources: 'Dados Estatísticos' (Brazil: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 1950), Jairo Nicolau, 'Partidos na República de 1946: velhas teses, novos dados', Dados 47 (2004): 85–129.

[443] John D. French, 'Industrial Workers and the Birth of the Populist Republic in Brazil, 1945-1946', *Latin American Perspectives* 16, no. 4 (1 October 1989): 9, https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X8901600402.

[444] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 89.

Results for two individual congressional candidates bear mentioning, Vargas and Prestes. Their popularity meant that local chapters put them up for varying offices across the country. As a result, Vargas and Prestes received more votes nationwide than all other candidates apart from the presidential contenders. Vargas received more than 1.1 million votes en route to winning senatorial elections in two states and winning deputy elections in six states and the Federal District. Despite winning on the PTB ticket in São Paulo, Vargas chose to serve as the senator from his home state where he had won as the PSD candidate. Prestes meanwhile garnered just over 220 thousand votes, winning Federal District races for senator and deputy, in addition to winning elections in five other states. Prestes chose to serve as a Federal District senator, becoming the Partido Comunista's lone representative in that body.[445]

The election results shocked and devastated UDN leadership who felt a Dutra presidency and a convention with a PSD majority would be a mere continuation of the Estado Novo. Writing soon after the election, the UDN secretary-general lamented that it was difficult to convince those around him that the election was not "the final victory of the dictatorship."[446] He blamed Vargas or "the dictator" for the course of events: "Only a blind person does not realize that that mediocre little bourgeois - today penetrated with poorly digested socialist ideas . . . conceived the audacious plan to profoundly and violently subvert our public life, to prevent the current government from strengthening its power, serving the constituted order."[447] Yet the UDN candidate, Gomes, struck a conciliatory tone in his concession message. He complained of biases in the election laws but promised not to make any legal challenges to his opponent's victory and

[445] Braga, 'Quem Foi Quem', 286–91, 554–57.

[446] Mello Franco, *A campanha da U.D.N.*, VII.

[447] Ibid., VIII.

congratulated Brazilians on defeating the "evil government" of the Estado Novo. "The conclusions of the election, despite the notorious vices of the law that disciplined it, are anointed with the privilege of embodying the will of the nation. If it has sovereignly expressed its preferences, there is only reason to rejoice in this fruitful experience of a people, who are resuming the practice of their civic rights. Knowing freedom, they will never resign themselves to the ignominy of slavery." Gomes felt that even in defeat he had fulfilled his role, "I was less a pretender to government than a defender of democratic legality."[448]

Exemplary of the armed forces' changing view of itself, Gomes credited the military specifically for democratization, "The restauration of the authority of the law, with the handing over of the federal executive to the head of the judiciary, would be enough to signal our victory in the field of ideas. In that enduring moment in history, the armed classes identified themselves with civil sentiment. There will be few words to celebrate the moral height, in which the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force have placed themselves. The country is indebted to them for the freedom it enjoys."[449]

While the government candidate won, the 1945 election was not the democratic setback denounced by UDN leadership; indeed, it constituted multiple democratic advances. Even Gomes provided an astute evaluation in his concession speech, "It is not important to investigate whether this freedom was well or poorly exercised. The life of a people is not measured by a particular momentary angle, but by the larger lines of its evolution; it is a problem that belongs to

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[448] 'Mensagem do brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes á Nação', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 19 December 1945, Acervo Estadão.

[449] Ibid.

time."[450] The degree of contestation, or the ability of the opposition to win, was far greater in this election then it ever had been. The UDN and the other opposition parties did in fact win a significant portion of seats in Congress and thereby the Constitutional Convention. Next, given the actions of Góes Monteiro following Vargas' removal – meeting with both candidates and allowing the judiciary to oversee the election – it seems highly likely that had Gomes triumphed he would have been allowed to assume the presidency. While complaints about political machines were common and valid,[451] large scale allegations of outright fraud were notably absent. As in 1934, the vote count enjoyed a great deal of integrity.[452] Lastly, UDN leadership accepted the results of the election and did not agitate for an extralegal solution.[453]

Reconstitutionalization of 1946

With the election settled, Dutra took office in January of 1946 and the focus turned to the drafting of a new constitution for which each party had different aspirations. The UDN wanted to "completely excise from the country's organism the cancer of the dictatorship," claimed Otávio Mangabeira the head of the party's delegation.[454] Meanwhile the PSD and PTB sought to secure the gains of the Estado Novo though they differed in their understandings of what those were. Lastly, the Partido Comunista felt that barring radical changes this new regime would prove another disappointment. This section looks at the Constitutional Convention of 1946 beginning

[450] Ibid.

[451] Mello Franco, *A campanha da U.D.N.*, IX.

[452] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 63–64.

[453] Christopher J. Anderson et al., *Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy* (Oxford, 2007).

[454] 'Um Discurso do sr. Otávio Mangabeira', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 29 January 1946, Acervo Estadão.

with a review of the composition and structure of the convention before analyzing the debates on topics where competing definitions of democracy among political actors were most relevant. Finally, the section reviews the public's role in reconstitutionalization and the democratic transition.

Composition and Structure of the Convention

Socially, the Constitutional Convention that began its work in February 1946 represented all classes though not equally.[455] Among the convention's 328 members, there were 98 business owners and landowners, 230 individuals from liberal or middle class professions, and 10 working class representatives. While small, the participation by working class individuals was significant in Brazil's customarily elite dominated politics. Two of these individuals represented the PTB while the remaining eight came from the Partido Comunista. The Communist delegation also boasted the convention's lone black representative, Claudino José da Silva (Partido Comunista/Rio de Janeiro), himself one of the working class representatives and a union activist.[456] In a regression from the 1933 convention, this body had no women. A new generation of leaders dominated with only a few drafters of the 1934 Constitution returning. The parties themselves reflected varying social coalitions. The two largest social categories for members of the PSD were bureaucrats (44) and landowners (36). The vast majority (62) of the UDN's 89 members came from middle class professions with the largest single category being lawyers (25); however, landholders were the second largest category here as well (22). In addition to the

[455] Braga, 'Quem Foi Quem', 66–82.

[456] Juliano Medeiros, 'Das Profundezas da História: um comunista negro na Assembleia Nacional Constituinte de 1946' (Master's Thesis, Universidade de Brasília, 2013).

two working class representatives, the PTB's largest social group was bureaucrats (8) with the party occupying 23 seats in total. The Partido Comunista had no proprietors nor bureaucrats and its 16-person delegation was divided evenly between working class and middle class professions.[457]

Unlike previous Brazilian constitutional conventions, the representatives did not receive a draft project from which to work, instead referring to the 1934 Constitution. The convention delegated the preparation of a first draft to the "Constitution Commission." The parties received proportional representation on this 37-person commission with Nereu Ramos (PSD/Santa Catarina) serving as president and Prado Kelly (UDN/Rio de Janeiro) as vice president. The PSD overall had 19 commission seats, the UDN nine, the PTB two, and the remaining parties including the Partido Comunista and the Esquerda Democrática each had one. The Constitution Commission was divided into 10 sub-commissions, each worked on a section of the constitution before presenting their drafts to the whole commission which then amended it further, producing a draft for the general body of the convention.[458]

Political Institutions of Fourth Republic Democracy

Reviewed first here are the debates surrounding suffrage and elections. The Electoral Justice System, female suffrage, proportional representation, mandatory voting, and the secret vote had all been innovations of the 1930 revolutionary regime. Now these issues had migrated

[457] Braga, 'Quem Foi Quem', 66–82.

[458] Braga, 'Quem Foi Quem'; Andrei Felipe Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos do direito de greve: Assembléia Constituinte de 1946 e paralisação do trabalho' (Master's Thesis, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2015).

into the mainstream and easily made their way into the Constitution. The 1934 corporatist innovation of class based representatives, however, was discontinued.

The Constitution established a five year presidential term (the next presidential election would be 1950) and created the office of the vice president that would be elected separate from the president. The term of the sitting Congress was also extended until 1950, afterwards deputies would serve for four years and senators for eight. The Constitution added a third senator for each state and provided for the direct election of governors. A cross-party coalition of most of the delegates from Minas Gerais and São Paulo together with the entirety of the Partido Comunista tried unsuccessfully to eliminate caps on representation in the lower house which were merely weakened with one deputy being awarded for every 150 thousand inhabitants up to 20 deputies at which point states received one deputy for every 250 thousand inhabitants.[459] The election for the new senators, deputies, and governors was set for January 1947, although their terms would be modified to maintain a unified timetable. The Constitution also featured a return to liberal civil rights, freedom of the press, and a recommitment to the ideal of free universal basic public education.

The extension of the vote to illiterates – as well as enlisted members of the armed forces – was a hotly contested political topic. The affirmative position was most vehemently argued by the Partido Comunista. Gregório Bezerra (Partido Comunista/Pernambuco) stated, "In our country, unfortunately, true democracy is not yet practiced, . . . Mr. President, on behalf of the Communist delegation and, I am sure, expressing the sentiment of 30 million compatriots, I have

[459] Souza, *Estado e partidos políticos no Brasil (1930 a 1964)*, 128–33.

come to plead for the inclusion of the right to vote for the illiterate."[460] On the other side, the PSD and UDN largely favored the maintenance of the restriction. However, individual delegates rebelled and the Partido Comunista, the PSD, the UDN, and the PTB, among others, all had members who proposed or supported amendments to expand the right to vote. The reformers lacked sufficient numbers to secure change, but it became clear that this would be an issue of contention moving forward.[461]

Another debate took place surrounding the nature of the regime to be created. Raul Pilla (Partido Libertador/Rio Grande do Sul) proposed a parliamentary regime that he felt would better restrict executive power. In just one example of the many shifting alliances between ideological opposites, the liberal reformer found some of his greatest support among the Partido Comunista. Prestes, the Communist head, argued for the parliamentary system as part of a larger Communist agenda favoring popular democracy institutions including an elected judiciary. The Communists hoped a parliamentary system would be unicameral and thereby dissolve the senate of which they disapproved because representation there was not based on population. Prestes also seconded Pilla's argument, insisting that the presidential system in Brazil had always been "dictatorial" and "tyrannical," urging the delegates not to repeat the mistakes of the past.[462] Some members of the other large parties also supported Pilla's proposal but not nearly enough.[463] The issue of limiting executive power, however, went beyond the debates over the parliamentary system. Besides the Partido Comunista, the UDN and its liberal allies also wished for greater

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[460] *Anais da Assembléia Nacional Constituinte*, vol. IX (Rio de Janeiro, 1946), 223.

[461] Braga, 'Quem Foi Quem'.

[462] *Anais da Assembléia Nacional Constituinte*, vol. XXII (Rio de Janeiro, 1946), 140–45.

[463] Braga, 'Quem Foi Quem'.

limits on executive power than had existed in the past. Considerable effort on the part of the Communists was spent attempting to place safeguards in the Constitution which would prevent a future government from suppressing their party as Vargas had done. Usually in conjunction with the UDN, the Communists advocated for constraints on the executive and in some cases, they succeeded, like limiting the powers and duration of the state of siege but more often they failed.[464]

The leadership of both the PSD and the UDN as well as most of the delegates were openly hostile to communism and delegates frequently attacked the party and ideology as anti-democratic, anti-Christian, and foreign.[465] In its final form, the Constitution contained a contested provision that in 1947 would be used to outlaw the Partido Comunista, "The organization, registration or operation of any Political Party or association, whose program or action is contrary to the democratic regime, based on the plurality of Parties and the guarantee of fundamental human rights, is prohibited."[466] When the Constitution Commission presented its draft for consideration by the convention at large, the Partido Comunista stood out as the only party to vote against it.[467]

Constraining the executive again played into the section on the armed forces via updated versions of the provisions in previous constitutions. Article 176 specified that the armed forces were under the authority of the president "within the limits of the law," and Article 177 stated

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[464] Ibid.; Marcus Wyler, 'The Development of the Brazilian Constitution (1891-1946)', *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law* 31, no. 3/4 (1949): 59.

[465] Braga, 'Quem Foi Quem'.

[466] 'Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1946' (1946), Art. 141 § 13.

[467] Braga, 'Quem Foi Quem'; Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos', 123–24.

"the armed forces are intended to defend the Homeland and guarantee the constitutional powers, law and order."[468] Though as Stepan noted, it was not the military or politicians with a military background that insisted upon these constitutional provisions. Instead, it was civilian politicians, many of whom believed that only the armed forces could prevent authoritarian takeovers.[469] As one PTB delegate put it, "I am of the opinion that we ought to give to the military the moral force necessary so that they can react against orders which are contrary to the national interest."[470]

The Economic and Social Order of the 1946 Constitution

Reflecting the changing expectations of democracy among politicians and the public, it was the subsection labelled the "Economic and Social Order" that showcased the greatest difference of opinion concerning democracy.[471] The ensuing debates emerged from conflicting understandings of the lessons of the 1930s and the Second World War and centered on the relationship between economic and social policy with democracy. Gaps were exposed between electoral allies like the PSD and PTB as well as the UDN and Esquerda Democrática and within individual parties, especially the PTB.

[468] Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1946.

[469] Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 75–80.

[470] As quoted in ibid., 78.

[471] Braga, 'A Constituinte de 1946 e a Nova Ordem'.

Former Minister of Justice Magalhães (PSD/Pernambuco) now serving as a deputy and member of the Economic and Social Order subcommission led the writing of the original proposal for this crucial section. The first part of his draft read:

> *Art. I The economic order is based on the principles of social justice, reconciling the freedom of initiative with the human valorization of labor.*
>
> *Sole paragraph. All are guaranteed work that allows for a dignified existence.*[472]

This article drew opposition even from Magalhães' own party. Eduardo Duvivier (PSD/Rio de Janeiro) offered a counter project that declared "The economic order has as a base individual initiative and as a goal the valuing of the individual." He reasoned that, "What characterizes democracy is the individual, the individual vested with inalienable rights," and argued that in absence of an emphasis on the individual all that remained was "planning, state intervention, and the bondage of the individual to the State."[473] Magalhães answered his detractors arguing that liberalism had solved the problem of production but not of distribution. Critiquing capitalism for its decadence and internationalism he stated, "either the democracies change themselves, revising their concepts, trying to solve the most pressing economic problems, or they will fail."[474]

Once the proposal moved to the convention floor, several UDN representatives criticized it on the grounds that it inappropriately conflated the economic order with the social one.

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[472] As quoted in ibid., 13.

[473] Duvivier proposal and quotes can be found in ibid., 14.

[474] As quoted in ibid., 15.

Arguing the UDN position fell to the famous sociologist and originator of Brazil's conceptualization of racial democracy (Chapter II), Gilberto Freyre (UDN/Pernambuco). Thereby, Pernambuco, a northeastern state that had become a paragon of the inequity and underdevelopment in the less favored regions of the country, produced the two most important orators of the debate on the economic and social order – the other being Magalhães. Freyre presented another alternative proposal, "The economic order will reconcile the freedom of enterprise with the human condition of labor and the social protection of workers" that received support beyond his own party. Freyre lambasted Magalhães' usage of the terms "social justice" and "human valorization of labor" as being unscientific and lacking any real meaning. He affirmed that the base of an economic order had to be economic, or concerning the production and utilization of resources, not a social consideration. He insisted that his proposal constituted the true "democratic solution" by maintaining the integrity of the economic order but restraining it within social considerations it created a societal compromise.[475] Again, Magalhães rebutted, fending off attacks from other constituents as he spoke. He claimed that without social justice the "bourgeois order" would destroy itself in class conflict and referencing the lessons of the two world wars he proclaimed, "Social justice, today, is the ideal of all nations."[476] In a separate speech, he also warned of repeating the same mistakes of past governments in instituting a regime of "purely formal democracy" that failed to take social considerations into account.[477]

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[475] *Anais da Assembléia Nacional Constituinte*, vol. XXIII (Rio de Janeiro, 1946), 106–15.

[476] Ibid.

[477] Quoted in Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos', 116.

After the rancorous debate it initially seemed that Freyre's amendment had prevailed until a precise vote count revealed that it had been narrowly defeated.[478]

The next issue was the ability of the "Union" or federal government to intervene in private interests both to nationalize industry and effect land reform which several of the parties, especially the Partido Comunista, had identified as central to their understanding of democracy. The second and third articles of Magalhães' proposal read:

> *Art. 2. Intervention in the economic domain will be fixed by law, within any limits that the public interest advises, and the Union may monopolize a certain industry or economic activity, on the terms on which it is authorized by special law.*
>
> *Art. 3. The right to property and its use will be conditioned to social well-being, the property being distributed to the largest number and allowing equal opportunities to all.*[479]

Again, these issues exposed deep ideological divisions closely tied to varying definitions of democracy. The Partido Comunista strongly backed these articles while arguing they should go even further. Prestes forwarded amendments to facilitate widespread land reform and nationalize all banks and insurance companies.[480] The predominantly rural PSD did not support land reform but mostly favored government intervention in the name of industrialization. Delegates from

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[478] *A.A.N.C. XXIII*, XXIII:106–15.

[479] *Anais da Comissão da Constituição: Pareceres e Relatórios das Subcomissões* (Rio de Janeiro, 1948), 83.

[480] Braga, 'Quem Foi Quem', 286–91; Prestes, 'Os Comunistas e a Constituinte de 1946'.

both the UDN and the Partido Republicano denounced all government economic intervention at length. A PSD overture led to mitigating language being placed into the proposed text as seen below.[481]

Government control over labor was yet another battleground for democracy.[482] This debate came to a head over the limitations to be set on union organization and the permissibility of strikes. Magalhães' proposal enshrined the right to strike and declared unionization and professional association to be "free" though still regulated by law.[483] The UDN joined the Esquerda Democrática and the Partido Comunista in supporting an amendment to declare unionization free without any stipulation for government regulation. UDN leadership denounced restrictions on labor organization as "fascist."[484] The bulk of the PSD endorsed government control of labor, but the PTB was split by the issue leading to a larger fissure within the party between delegates aligned with the priorities of the corporatist system that had created the party and others aligned with the priorities of the workers that comprised it.[485] The rank and file of the PTB that supported Vargas largely viewed the Estado Novo and its corporatist structure as a point of departure and not the end goal – they had understood increasing union freedom and the tolerance of strikes and labor disputes at the end of the Estado Novo as progress not

[481] Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos', 114–23; Braga, 'A Constituinte de 1946 e a Nova Ordem'.

[482] Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos', 114–23; Vianna, *Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil*, 243–88.

[483] *Pareceres e Relatórios das Subcomissões*, 85–86.

[484] Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos', 117–18.

[485] French, 'Industrial Workers and the Birth of the Populist Republic', 19–20.

breakdowns.[486] PTB defenders of corporatism argued that free association would weaken the labor movement by turning it against itself.[487] Ultimately, the Constitution neither endorsed nor eliminated corporatism. The right to strike brought up similar divisions. Again, the UDN joined the Partido Comunista and Esquerda Democrática in advocating for an unrestricted right to strike. The PSD position was that strikes remained unnecessary and that all disputes should continue to be handled by the Labor Justice System. Again, the PTB internal schism manifested itself. Overcoming PSD objections, the right to strike was included in the Constitution.[488]

The relevant sections of the constitution discussed here, read in their final form:

> *Art 145 - The economic order should be organized according to the principles of social justice, reconciling the freedom of initiative with the valorization of human labor.*
>
> *Sole paragraph - Everyone is guaranteed work that allows for a dignified existence. Work is a social obligation.*
>
> *Art 146 - The Union may, by means of a special law, intervene in the economic domain and monopolize a certain industry or activity. The intervention will be based on the public interest and limited by the fundamental rights enshrined in this Constitution.*

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[486] Vianna, *Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil*, 243–88; French, 'Industrial Workers and the Birth of the Populist Republic', 17.

[487] Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos', 118.

[488] Ibid., 135–40.

> *Art 147 - The use of property will be conditioned to social well-being. The law may, in compliance with the provisions of art. 141, § 16, promote fair distribution of property, with equal opportunity for all.*
>
> *Art 158 - The right to strike is recognized, the exercise of which the law will regulate.*
>
> *Art 159 - Professional or trade union association is free, the form of its constitution, its legal representation in collective labor agreements, and the exercise of functions delegated by the Public Authority are regulated by law.*[489]

After the failed counter project of Freyre, Article 145 emerged largely as Magalhães intended apart from the correction of his awkward phraseology concerning "human valorization" and the addition of work as a "social obligation." Articles 146 and 147 received limitations, both now referred to the rights contained in the Constitution. The referenced Article 141 guaranteed the right to property and the convention consciously chose to condition only the *use* of property not the right.[490] The Constitution itself would serve as protection against the abuse of the government intervention it enabled, leaving the judiciary and standard legislation to sort out the grey areas. Crucially, as will be seen in the final chapter of this thesis, the right to personal property included a caveat that government expropriation must be accompanied by "fair compensation in cash."[491] Article 147 did protect the right to strike but the caveat allowing for regulation by law meant that the debate would continue. Lastly, Article 148 created an

[489] Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1946.

[490] Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos', 117.

[491] Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1946. Art. 141, § 16.

ambiguous groundwork for labor organization that would still be overseen by the government but potentially less strictly than before. Many scholars portray the corporatist system of the Estado Novo as essentially continued in the 1946 Constitution as an authoritarian holdover,[492] but as detailed here and observed by others the Constitution did not endorse corporatism and many of the provisions such as the legalization of strikes represent a significant weakening of that system.[493] Additionally, the combination of democracy and corporatist systems of labor went beyond Brazil and was quite common among the post-war regimes of Western Europe as a measure for increasing social stability.[494]

Convention Politics and the Role of the Public

To fully appreciate the democratic moment of 1946, it is important to also consider the larger public participation in the drafting of the Constitution. Public attention on the convention was extremely high and all the major newspapers and radio programs provided frequent updates and weighed in with their own opinions. Campanini's review of the convention found that delegates frequently referred to the coverage by the press and were highly aware of public opinion of the proceedings.[495] The celebrity senators, Vargas and Prestes, drew significant attention though the nature of their participation differed greatly. Vargas rarely spoke except to

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[492] Vianna, *Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil*, 243–88; Maranhão, *Sindicatos e democratização*; Francisco Weffort, 'Origens do Sindicalismo Populista no Brasil', *Estudos Cebrap* 4 (1973): 65–106; Bethell, 'Brazil', 60; Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, 364.

[493] Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos'; Wyler, 'The Development of the Brazilian Constitution (1891-1946)', 60; French, 'Industrial Workers and the Birth of the Populist Republic'; Cardoso, 'Estado Novo e Corporativismo', 110.

[494] Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*, 138–42.

[495] Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos', 123–30.

vote and defend himself from personal attacks. Nevertheless, his very presence was polarizing. The day he was sworn into his position, the UDN presented an extremely controversial yet successful motion which saw the convention officially praise the armed forces for deposing Vargas.[496] Prestes on the other hand was very active, spending most of his time defending himself or his party from near constant attacks and forwarding several amendments.[497]

Besides accompanying the proceedings, the public also directly participated. Many civil society organizations held forums to opine on the constitutional process. Both the Brazilian Bar Association and a rival organization of communist lawyers prepared their own parallel constitutional drafts which they submitted to the convention for consideration. In May, the II Brazilian Congress of Social Rights brought intellectuals and experts together in the capital. Vianna explained that this congress became a vehicle for Catholic social doctrine and promoted the idea that companies and organizations should serve social functions but should not be agents of the state. Corporatism was again denounced as a fascist institution.[498] Public participation also came by way of labor organizations. Unions organized strikes and demonstrations to advocate for the right to strike, union autonomy, a minimum wage, and further social rights. In March, with the convention underway, President Dutra, wielding the unilateral executive powers granted by the 1937 Constitution, issued a decree reinforcing the corporatist labor system and doubling down on the illegality of strikes, emphasizing the Labor Justice System as the only appropriate

[496] Braga, 'Quem Foi Quem', 554–57.

[497] Ibid., 286–91.

[498] Vianna, *Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil*, 255.

channel for labor disputes.[499] On the basis of this decree, Federal District police began wholesale repression of the strikes and protests.[500]

In May, as repression became intense with unions being forcibly closed and their leaders jailed, the fight began to spill into the convention. The Partido Comunista and the UDN firmly condemned the actions of the government. Antônio Correia (UDN/Piauí) told his colleagues "I want to denounce before the Constituent Assembly the anti-democratic attitudes of the Executive branch, especially of the Chief of Police and Minister of Labor, who are engaged in a campaign full of truculent acts, trying, perhaps, to hide the incapacity, if not the deliberate refusal of the government to face and seek to solve distressing problems that the whole country knows. Because, Mr. President, it will not be closing unions, it will not be preventing the free expression of thought in a public square that will end the bread line." Correia went on to accuse the executive of following Estado Novo patterns and attempting to "asphyxiate the nascent democracy in our country."[501] The administration justified its actions, insisting that the worker agitation was being stoked by the Communist led Worker Unification Movement (Chapter II), and doing the bidding of the Soviet Union in an effort to upset the work of democracy.[502]

Later that same month, the Partido Comunista organized a series of rallies in the country's urban centers to celebrate the anniversary of its official relegalization. In Rio de Janeiro, the police prohibited the Partido Comunista from holding its event in the city center, a

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[499] 'Decreto-Lei Nº 9.070' (1946).

[500] Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos', 112–14.

[501] *Anais da Assembléia Nacional Constituinte*, vol. X (Rio de Janeiro, 1946), 28–29.

[502] Campanini, 'Entre usos e abusos', 112–14; Vianna, *Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil*, 243–88.

proscription which the Communist protested and eventually ignored. When rally goers descended on the city the police reacted with extreme violence. The police, some armed with machine guns, opened fire into the crowd to disperse the gathering wounding and killing an unknown number of people. *O Estado de S. Paulo* denounced the attack as "Nazi savagery."[503]

The event instantly became the topic of intense contestation among the delegates, whose close examination further illustrates the centrality of democracy at the constitutional convention. The Partido Comunista officially lodged a complaint against the police accusing them of firing on unarmed innocents and "fascist provocations" sparking outrage. Incensed, one PSD representative shouted out "This is not Russia, it is Brazil!" As the debate chaotically proceeded the chamber president continuously pled for civility. Another Communist orator made an appeal to democratic sensibilities: "The Partido Comunista, in this very grave moment, calls on all democrats to unite in an iron block, so that, once again, democracy, which cost so much to those heroic soldiers of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, will not be crushed in our homeland."[504] While the Esquerda Democrática, PTB, and UDN all conceded that the Partido Comunista had acted irresponsibly they were united in their condemnation of the actions of the police and the federal government. Segadas Viana of the PTB called for both the political agitators and the public officials responsible to be brought to justice. He added, "it will not be the use of violence that will prevent the propaganda of good or bad doctrines, because spilled blood only serves to fertilize ideas and ideals." Mangabeira of the UDN cautioned the assembly to "remember 37" when the Estado Novo coup used the suppression of communism as a pretext for the elimination

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[503] Rafael Corrêa de Oliveira, 'Cenas de selvageria nazista na capital da Republica', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 24 May 1946, sec. O Momento Politico, Acervo Estadão.

[504] *A.A.N.C. X*, X:182–206.

of "all freedoms." He proceeded to chastise the Partido Comunista telling them to "remember 35" and their failed attempt to come to power through violence. Speaking of the Communists, the UDN leader insisted, "The democracy to which they aspire, is different from the democracy to which we aspire" before proclaiming "anti-communists always; reactionaries never" the UDN motto.[505] The PSD leader Ramos defended the government and cited the predominance of narratives favorable to the government in the Rio de Janeiro press as evidence that solely the Communists were at fault. He forwarded a motion for the convention to give "its support and applause" to the government for the measures taken "to guarantee public order." Mangabeira proposed an alternative motion, with Communist backing, which lamented the "deplorable events of yesterday" and pledged to support the government in maintaining order on the basis of "democratic principles." Mangabeira's motion failed with 119 votes in favor and 133 against, Ramos' motion in support of the government passed.[506]

Organized labor continued to make its presence felt. Unions and worker associations flooded the convention with letters and telegrams largely in support of union autonomy and the right to strike. From May to July, the employees of the foreign owned Light and Power Co., Brazil's largest public utility company, went on strike. A parliamentary group made up of Esquerda Democrática, Partido Comunista, PTB, and UDN representatives met regularly with the union and strike leaders to hear their concerns. These labor leaders also appealed for the legalization of strikes.

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[505] Ibid.

[506] Ibid.

In September as the Constitutional Convention neared its end, the Union Congress of Workers convened in Rio de Janeiro. By this time, the constitutional draft was public knowledge as were the "Economic and Social Order" debates. Organized by unions but officially sponsored by the Ministry of Labor, representatives from the PTB and Partido Comunista constituted the vast majority of delegates to the Union Congress. The ministry hoped to use this body as a manifestation of labor support for corporatist positions. However, the PTB schism resulted in a massive rebellion and the congress officially endorsed union autonomy and the right to strike. When it became apparent that they had lost control of the proceedings the ministry attempted to dissolve the congress, but it simply continued without government approval. Besides these official pronouncements, the congress also founded the Confederation of Brazilian Workers to continue their work. This notable increase in working class participation starting in 1945 led French to argue against "studies that emphasize the continuity of a paternalistic and authoritarian relationship between the government and workers" and instead maintain that "the events of 1945-1946 are best seen as a radical break with the past marked by the dramatic entry of the urban working class into Brazilian political life."[507]

Conclusion

The 1945 election and the 1946 Constitution are significant landmarks in the history of democracy in Brazil. The election presented voters with a choice between social democracy, liberal democracy, and popular democracy projects for the future of the country, greatly increasing the degree of popular participation in this regime change when compared with those

[507] French, 'Industrial Workers and the Birth of the Populist Republic', 5; See also Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, 373; Negro and Silva, 'Trabalhadores, sindicatos e política', 59–62.

of Brazil's past. National campaigns made their case, and the Electoral Justice System again oversaw a legitimate and competitive election where opposition candidates frequently won. The loser of the presidential election accepted defeat.

The Constitution was the result of a uniquely Brazilian reconciliation of competing understandings of democracy driven by varying ideological currents. This chapter has provided an unprecedented analysis of the 1946 Constitutional Convention within the context of the history of democracy that allows for an important new perspective on this event. As discussed in the chapter's introduction, many works tend to privilege "progressive" actors as the only ones genuinely committed to democratization with reactionary groups thwarting their attempts. This approach obscures the fact that Brazil, as elsewhere, was host to several groups committed to a return to democracy but with varying perspectives on what that should entail. Alliances within the convention were fluid and the "conservative" parties of the UDN and PSD did collaborate on many issues; however, they also found themselves on the same side as their Communist and socialist counterparts on several occasions too. A lack of success for "progressive" positions is explained by the relatively small number of representatives elected by the Partido Comunista and Esquerda Democrática. The 1946 Constitution is also notable for what is not in it. In several areas the constitution delegated responsibility to future legislatures where simple majorities could effect change. This is a triumph by the opposition that prevented the PSD majority from firmly ensconcing authoritarian holdovers in the Constitution. With the exception of the literacy restriction on suffrage, Brazil had undergone an inclusive and competitive reconstitutionalization process, which included the participation of every social class and an active civil society. The result was a novel regime: the Estado Novo would not be essentially continued nor was the 1934 Constitution entirely resurrected.

Chapter IV Staying the Course, 1946-1956

On the global stage, the post-war euphoria about the future of democracy slowly gave way to the Cold War. Conway explains how increasing oppression within the Soviet Union led to a widespread conclusion in the West that Soviet communism did not constitute a "rival democracy," but the "antithesis" to democratic governance.[508] Everywhere emerging democratic regimes were buffeted by the two sides, and many slipped into authoritarianism. In Brazil, from 1946 to 1956, a compounding series of political and economic crises repeatedly raised the specter of democratic collapse. Yet by the mid-1950s Brazil was one of just four surviving democracies in Latin America and democratization continued to progress.[509]

Literature on the first decade of the Fourth Republic tends to focus on a few key topics, including the illegalization of the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party) in 1947, Getúlio Vargas' return to the presidency and eventual suicide in 1954, military intervention, and the rise of populism. On this latter issue, Vargas and a handful of other politicians are often highlighted as paragons of Brazilian populism, whereby politicians made personal appeals to the increasingly electorally important urban working class, in a political environment where parties and ideologies mattered little and were too weak to enable effective governance. These issues are seen as indictments of democracy in the Fourth Republic as underdeveloped or excessively unstable.[510]

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[508] Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*, 158.

[509] Together with Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. See Bethell, 'The Long Road to Democracy in Brazil', 158.

[510] D'Araújo, *O segundo governo Vargas*; Conniff, 'Brazil's Populist Republic and Beyond'; Weffort, *O Populismo na Politica Brasileira*; Bethell, 'The Long Road to Democracy in Brazil'; Bethell, 'Populism

Analyzing the early interactions between political actors and the new democratic regime, this chapter addresses a few key questions. What was the role of varying actors in exacerbating and solving the political crises faced? How did political behavior reflect commitments to democracy and the 1946 Constitution? What was the role of populism in the practice of democratic politics? What was the relationship between the military and the new regime? Finally, what accounts for the continued survival of the Fourth Republic regime by 1956 when so many others in the region had failed? This chapter proceeds chronologically treating the presidencies of Eurico Dutra and Vargas before analyzing the transition between the latter and his elected successor in 1956.

President Dutra and the First Years of the Fourth Republic

Dutra entered office in 1946 in an ambiguous position. His opponents in the União Democrática Brasileira (National Democratic Union/UDN) labelled him the candidate of the dictatorship who would continue where Vargas left off. However, Dutra had been part of the military conspiracy that forced Vargas' resignation and the ex-president endorsed Dutra only as a matter of last resort (Chapter III). The new administration initially attempted to govern in cooperation with both the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party/PTB) and the UDN. Cooperation with the Dutra government became a dividing issue for the UDN, as some leaders felt it would lend legitimacy to a dictatorial government while others felt they could secure democratizing gains from within the administration.[511] The UDN general-secretary

in Brazil'; Leslie Bethell, 'The Failure of the Left in Brazil', in *Brazil: Essays on History and Politics* (London, 2018), 195–222; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 65–163.

[511] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 59.

opposed cooperation insisting that liberals participating in authoritarian governments had contributed greatly to the "discrediting of liberal democracy among us."[512] Ultimately a few UDN rebels accepted cabinet posts but the party opted for opposition. The PTB received the Ministry of Labor as per the agreement prior to the election (Chapter III), but it was an unreliable partner. Dutra, therefore, delegated the bulk of the administration posts to his party the Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party/PSD) and began his task as the regime's inaugural president. This section starts by reviewing the struggle between Dutra and the Partido Comunista for control over organized labor. Next it briefly examines key policies of the administration before analyzing the early populism of the Fourth Republic and the election of 1947. Lastly, the campaigns of Vargas and his competitors as well as the results of the 1950 election are analyzed.

Democracy and Anti-Communism

Since the 1946 Constitution did not regulate government control over labor as strictly as Dutra and much of the PSD wished (Chapter III), the new administration dedicated itself to maintaining that control. This strategy put the government in direct competition with the Partido Comunista and labor progressives who committed themselves to freeing the unions from its grasp. Through the Communist inter-union organization, known as the Worker Unification Movement, and other autonomous labor organizations, these forces began to successfully displace government backed union leadership. The president responded by illegalizing the independent labor organizations and created official ones to replace them.[513]

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[512] Mello Franco, *A campanha da U.D.N.,* XI.

[513] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 103; Negro and Silva, 'Trabalhadores, sindicatos e política', 59–62.

After the 1947 election, in which the Communists performed reasonably well, Dutra's allies submitted complaints to the Electoral Justice System concerning the anti-democratic and foreign character of the Partido Comunista which they accused of being a front for the Soviet Union. Dutra then pressured the Superior Electoral Court to rule against the Communists. On 7 May 1947, in a 3-2 split decision, the Partido Comunista was deemed illegal under the constitutional provision that prohibited parties "whose program or action is contrary to the democratic regime."[514] The majority opinion cited the anti-Christian nature of the party and its disrespect for individual and human rights guaranteed by the Constitution.[515] Over the next several months, the Ministry of Labor removed approximately 1,000 union officials from 170 unions for being Communists or sympathizers. In October, Congress voted to approve the dismissal of all bureaucrats and public employees suspected of membership in the Partido Comunista.[516] The final battle came in January 1948 when, after months of pressure from the Dutra administration, Congress voted to the remove all Partido Comunista elected officials from office. The Esquerda Democrática (Democratic Left) and the PTB refused to support the measure, and so the PSD turned to the UDN who faced a dilemma as it weighed its ideological distaste for the Partido Comunista against its liberal democratic commitment to open participation. Only approximately half of the UDN supported the effort, but this provided the necessary votes to pass the measure which Dutra promptly signed.[517] The Communist leader Luís

[514] Constituição da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1946, Art. 141 § 13.

[515] Resolução 1841 (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 7 May 1947).

[516] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 106–7; Segatto, 'PCB: a questão nacional e a democracia', 275; Negro and Silva, 'Trabalhadores, sindicatos e política', 62–64.

[517] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 106–7.

Carlos Prestes published a manifesto that month denouncing the government as a tool of "American imperialism" and declaring the vote the latest in a series of "coups against the democratic conquests of 1945."[518]

The proscription of the Partido Comunista of course constituted a significant rollback of the degree of participation that had characterized the transition to democracy. It was not however, unique; across the Western world, as the result of US pressure and Cold War realities, communist parties were marginalized or excluded altogether.[519] Within the US itself during the 1950s Senator Joseph McCarthy led a series of controversial investigations and hearings in an attempt to purge communism from government institutions.[520] Bethell insisted that with the illegalization of the Partido Comunista, "The Brazilian Left . . . was now effectively excluded from 'formal' democratic politics (and remained so for the next forty years)."[521] This is an over exaggeration. Aside from the fact that the Partido Comunista did not constitute the entirety of the Brazilian left, oppression of the Communists after 1947 was relatively light in comparison to the Estado Novo. Communist leaders like Prestes went into hiding but police repression only lasted until the end of Dutra's presidency. Many former Communists continued to participate in politics

[518] Luís Carlos Prestes, 'Como Enfrentar os Problemas da Revolução Agrária e Anti-Imperialista' (January 1948), Arquivo Marxista, https://www.marxists.org/portugues/prestes/ano/mes/enfrentar.htm.

[519] Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*, 91–93; Patrick Iber, *Neither Peace nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America* (Cambridge, 2015), 53–56; Segatto, 'PCB: a questão nacional e a democracia', 275; Bethell, 'Brazil', 62–63.

[520] Ted Morgan, *Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America* (New York, 2020).

[521] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 105–6.

under other party labels and Communist press outlets soon returned to functioning.[522] The Brazilian left was not excluded but dramatically reshaped. The PTB and the Esquerda Democrática stood to gain the most. The Esquerda Democrática now broke ties with the UDN and renamed itself the Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party). Similarly, many left wing groups and politicians also left the UDN for other party labels and the UDN consolidated as a more coherent conservative liberal democratic party.[523] The PTB benefitted the most from the Communist demise, but it was not a one way interaction. Starting in 1947, the party began a leftward turn, accepting some homeless Communists into its ranks, as the party schism (Chapter III) began to resolve in favor of Vargas loyalists in the *Queremismo* or pro-worker mobilization mold.[524] Following the lack of PTB support for the administration's move against the Partido Comunista, the government and PTB, which had never been an enthusiastic partner, parted ways. The same month as the removal of the communist officials, the government officially reached a power sharing agreement with the UDN and the small Partido Republicano (Republican Party), excluding the PTB altogether. The agreement greatly facilitated the ability of Dutra to govern for the final two years of his term.[525]

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[522] Peterson, 'Brazilian Political Parties', 106–7; Wyler, 'The Development of the Brazilian Constitution (1891-1946)', 58; Fischer, 'The Red Menace Reconsidered'; Gomes and Ferreira, 'Brasil, 1945-1964', 264.

[523] Peterson, 'Brazilian Political Parties', 73; Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 61–76; Soares, *A democracia interrompida*, 95–97.

[524] Gomes and D'Araújo, *Getulismo e Trabalhismo*, 34–40; D'Araújo, *Sindicatos, carisma & poder*, 36–41.

[525] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 69–76; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 107.

Key Policies of the Dutra Administration

Central to the political environment of the Fourth Republic was each administration's approach to development and or inflation, issues that proved to have enormous impact on regime stability. As explained by O'Donnell, growth via industrialization was an "import intensive process" that required governments to facilitate in some way the importation of capital goods in addition to investing in infrastructure to improve internal conditions. As industrialization deepened the need to import increased and created many inflationary pressures.[526]

Under Dutra, Brazil used its foreign exchange reserves built up over the war to allow for increased importation without inflation, but these reserves ran dry and, after 1947, an overvalued currency, exchange controls, and an import licensing system constituted the government response to keep demand and prices in check. The strategy had only mixed success. The government unintentionally sponsored industrialization by keeping the currency overvalued and disincentivizing exports. However, the lack of exports further strained Brazil's lack of foreign exchange and thus lessened its capacity to import. The Dutra government also created the Superintendency of Money and Credit which, linked to the Bank of Brazil, marked the beginning of government control over monetary policy.[527] Dutra's years as president (1946-1950) saw annual averages of nearly 5% real per capita GDP growth accompanied by 10% annual inflation (Annex III).

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[526] O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics,* 59–63.

[527] Paiva Abreu, 'The Brazilian Economy, 1930-1980', 319–37; Baer, *The Brazilian Economy,* 49–72.

The main economic policy obstacle of the Dutra administration was the inability to improve the country's underdeveloped infrastructure. This resulted from congressional opposition and, more importantly, the lack of expected aid from the United States. U.S. promises had led Brazilian policymakers to believe the country would benefit from a Marshall Plan style aid package after the war to fund industrialization.[528] However, under President Harry Truman the United States deprioritized Brazil until the Cold War began in earnest and Brazil regained a degree of strategic importance in the U.S. estimation. Cooperation returned, including more technical missions to advise on development. In 1947, Brazil hosted the negotiations that produced the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty, creating the base for hemispheric defense during the Cold War. That same year, Brazil not only suppressed the Partido Comunista but broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, both to the satisfaction of U.S. foreign policy.[529]

Towards the end of Dutra's administration, Brazil gained two more institutions of U.S. cooperation. First, in 1949, the two countries established the Higher War College which would allow for U.S. led training of Brazilian military officers and significantly influence military and civilian opinion moving forward.[530] Then in 1950 the Joint Brazil–United States Economic Development Commission came into being: a technical mission with the unique ability to submit

[528] Stanley E. Hilton, 'The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special Relationship', *The Journal of American History* 68, no. 3 (1981): 603–6, https://doi.org/10.2307/1901941.

[529] Paiva Abreu, 'The Brazilian Economy, 1930-1980', 319–37; McCann, *Brazil and the United States during World War II*, 249–57; Hilton, 'The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War'.

[530] Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 172–97.

projects it identified to the World Bank or the U.S. Export and Import Bank for loans and assistance. [531]

Brazilian Populism and the Elections of 1947 and 1950

The elections in January 1947 served to fill the new senate and deputy seats created by the 1946 Constitution (Chapter III) as well as some gubernatorial posts. The congressional returns followed a similar pattern as the previous election among the major parties. The PSD took a plurality of the open seats in both chambers with the UDN and PTB also making modest gains. The Partido Comunista, just months before it was outlawed, narrowly failed to add to their congressional totals though the party did enjoy success at the state and municipal levels.[532] The PSD won the greatest number of gubernatorial races (12), though some of these came via coalitions.[533] As in the past, Brazilian politics took on distinctly local flavors: though the national parties dominated, they represented different things from state to state.[534] As a result, the PSD, UDN, and PTB all won gubernatorial elections in coalition with each of the other two parties.

In São Paulo the major parties struggled to gain a foothold. Against this backdrop a form of politics was on display in the gubernatorial election that became synonymous with the Fourth Republic, populism.[535] Here populism is understood as a political style that is predicated upon

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[531] Paiva Abreu, 'The Brazilian Economy, 1930-1980', 326.

[532] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 105.

[533] *Dados Estatísticos v.1,* 1:61.

[534] Olavo Brasil de Lima Júnior, *Os partidos políticos brasileiros: a experiência federal e regional, 1945-1964* (Rio de Janeiro, 1983).

[535] For comprehensive historiographies of the term in the Brazilian context see Ferreira, 'O Nome e a Coisa'; Gomes, 'O populismo e as ciências sociais no Brasil: notas sobre a trajetória de um conceito'; Angela de Castro Gomes, 'Populism in Brazil, 1930–1964', *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin*

personalistic and clientelistic appeals by a political leader, usually to the urban working class, that are unmediated by an autonomous party or coherent ideology and usually rely upon an us versus them vocabulary.[536] The candidate in question was Ademar de Barros, a former interventor in São Paulo, who stood as the candidate and head of a party he founded in June 1946, the Partido Social Progressista (Progressive Social Party/PSP), which served merely as an extension of himself. Barros and the PSP projected a message that demonized the "elite" and promised better times for the common Brazilian. Though casting himself as an outsider, Barros was actually a member of São Paulo's coffee growing upper class. Skidmore described Barros' political style which was targeted toward the working class as a combination of charismatic campaigning, generous patronage, and extravagant public works including hospitals, schools, and highways. He made skillful use of radio, magazines, and newspapers to reach his audience. Barros even managed to turn his reputation for light corruption to his advantage and his supporters trumpeted the slogan, "He steals but he gets things done."[537] To further increase his working class appeal, Barros secured the endorsement of the Partido Comunista in exchange for the promise that he would prevent its suppression; he did not hold up his end of the bargain when the time came. Barros triumphed with 35% of the vote in a close multi-party race. He received more than half his votes from the city of São Paulo where Communist organization and support

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American History, 26 May 2021, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.947; See also Weffort, *O Populismo na Politica Brasileira*; Bethell, 'Populism in Brazil', 183; Wolfe, 'Populism and Developmentalism'; Conniff, *Populism in Latin America*; Ferreira, 'O Nome e a Coisa'.

[536] Scholarship on populism is extremely vast. The definition provided here is informed by Knight, 'Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America, Especially Mexico'; Ferreira, 'O Nome e a Coisa'; Ernesto Laclau, 'Populism: What's in a Name?', in *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* (2005), 32–49.

[537] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 68–69.

was strong.[538] Barros' rise and political style captured the attention of contemporaries.[539] That politics were redrawn by the inclusion of urban workers is not in question. However, this thesis contests the idea that this new style of politics somehow disqualified the democratic experiment or indicated a lack of ideological contests and effective parties.[540]

Appeals to the working class came to the national stage with Vargas' 1950 campaign for president. Vargas felt cheated by his removal from office and likely harbored desires to return to power as soon as he left. Following his deposition by the military, his very person had become central to debates on democracy. His opponents labelled him a dictator while his supporters saw him as a national savior. Elected as a senator for Rio Grande do Sul in 1945, he rarely participated in Congress and spent most of his time at his large ranch that became a place of pilgrimage for younger politicians. Vargas, technically serving as a PSD senator, emerged from his reclusion to campaign for the PTB in 1947 and became a leading critic of the Dutra administration.[541] His presidential aspirations started to take concrete shape in 1949. He had worked hard to organize and strengthen the PTB which had a strong base in his home state Rio Grande do Sul but could not carry him to the presidency alone. The divorce of the PTB and PSD

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[538] Ibid., 67–69; Conniff, *Populism in Latin America*, 52–58; John D. French, 'Workers and the Rise of Adhemarista Populism in São Paulo, Brazil 1945-47', *Hispanic American Historical Review* 68, no. 1 (1 February 1988): 1–43, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-68.1.1; Antônio Augusto da Costa Faria, 'Partido Social Progressista (PSP- 1946)', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 22 April 2021, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/partido-social-progressista-psp-1946; Guita Grin Debert, *Ideologia e populismo: Adhemar de Barros, Miguel Arraes, Carlos Lacerda, Leonel Brizola* (Rio de Janeiro, 2008).

[539] Lopes Rodrigues, *Adhemar de Barros perante a nação* (São Paulo, 1954).

[540] Some scholars even suggest that populism is indicative of the presence of democracy. See Margaret Canovan, 'Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy', *Political Studies* 47, no. 1 (1 March 1999): 2–16, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184.

[541] Dulles, *Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography*, 330–55.

combined with Vargas' opposition to President Dutra doomed a brief attempt to recreate the previously successful coalition of 1945. Vargas turned to São Paulo's new governor to broaden his support, striking a deal in March 1950 whereby Barros and his PSP agreed to back Vargas in exchange for Vargas supporting him as his successor in 1955.[542]

Vargas now had a viable political base, but another obstacle laid between him and a second presidential campaign. The military had removed Vargas from power because they considered him a threat to the reconstitutionalization process (Chapter II), and he needed to ensure they would not prevent his return. Increasingly, the political opinions of Army officers were formed within the Military Club. Older than the Republic itself, the club housed both active and retired Army officers and its internal politics came to be a central part of the national political scene.[543] In his characterization of the political currents within the officer corps after 1945, Carvalho identified three distinct groups. First, there were the "right-wing nationalists" – staunchly opposed to communism and social upheaval, they supported an interventionist state that would plan the economy for the good of the nation and of the military. President Dutra and retired General Pedro Góes Monteiro were the standard bearers of this group. Second, there were the "left-wing nationalists" who also advocated an interventionist state but a more redistributive one. Carvalho highlighted that this group lacked the ardent hatred of communism of their right wing counterparts. Third, the "right-wing cosmopolitan" group of officers, including the UDN 1945 presidential candidate Air Force Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, opposed both interventionism

[542] Gomes and D'Araújo, *Getulismo e Trabalhismo*, 34–40.

[543] Nelson Werneck Sodré, *História militar do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), 304–26.

and social revolution, especially communism.[544] Interactions with the U.S. military starting in World War II and accelerating with the Higher War College influenced the political leanings of this last group and was the source of much of their anticommunism.[545]

In 1949, Vargas and Governor Barros sent an emissary to the now Senator Góes Monteiro, a prominent figure in the Military Club, to feel out his position on Vargas running for president. Góes Monteiro's leadership of the 1945 coup had understandably created enmity between the two and Vargas tried desperately to repair the relationship. Vargas knew that Góes Monteiro's endorsement would signal to skeptics both within and without the military that he could be trusted with the levers of power without attempting an authoritarian takeover as he had in 1937 and had been accused of attempting in 1945 (Chapter II). Responding to the emissary, Góes Monteiro told Vargas that "within the Armed Forces no resentments or preconceived ideas against him persisted, nor would they oppose his inauguration in the event of his being elected, provided that he respected not only the Constitution, but also the military's inalienable rights."[546] What "inalienable rights" he meant isn't clear, though it is reasonable to believe that he meant their right to intervene in politics on behalf of the constitutional order. The two men eventually reconciled, but Góes Monteiro still insisted on remaining loyal to the PSD candidate.[547] In January 1950 as the official rollout of Vargas' candidacy neared, the position of the military became clearer. Dutra's Minister of War wrote to his regional commanders telling them, "the

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[544] José Murilo de Carvalho, 'Vargas e os militares', in *Repensando o Estado Novo*, ed. Dulce Pandolfi (Rio de Janeiro, 1999), 344; For a similar analysis see Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 121.

[545] Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 173–74.

[546] Lourival Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe* (Rio de Janeiro, 1955), 496.

[547] Ibid., 494–96.

Army does not veto anyone, does not support anyone" and declaring, "Any attempt to move away from the democratic practices reestablished on October 29 will have to start with my violent removal . . . for in no way will I permit the use of the Army as an instrument to compress the will of the people and I will not consent that through us the Constitution be disrespected." [548] Newspapers widely reported and celebrated his orders. In May, the Military Club leadership elections polarized the officer corps, but completely cleared the way for Vargas' nomination. The new club president, General Newton Estillac Leal, was a leader of the left-wing nationalist officers as identified by Carvalho and he had opposed the movement to depose Vargas in 1945.[549]

Finally, in June the PTB and PSP conventions nominated Vargas for president. For vice president, a separately elected post, the coalition nominated PSP Federal Deputy João Café Filho. Vargas' opponents struggled to find their presidential candidates The governing coalition of the PSD, UDN, and Partido Republicano sought a joint candidate, but couldn't agree on a nominee. The PSD and Dutra decided to double down on the party's strong base in Minas Gerais and nominated Cristiano Machado, a virtually unknown lawyer and federal deputy from that state.[550] The UDN meanwhile, renominated its candidate from the previous election, Brigadier

[548] As quoted in D'Araújo, *O segundo governo Vargas*, 59.

[549] Sodré, *História militar*, 304–26; João Roberto Martins Filho, 'Forças Armadas e política, 1945-1964', in *O Brasil Republicano: O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 121–25; Carvalho, 'Vargas e os militares', 344.

[550] Carone, *A república liberal*, 1985, II:33–42; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 73–80; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 108–12.

Gomes, as many idealists within party leadership believed the country had just needed time to appreciate the superiority of the party's positions and its candidate.[551]

The candidates followed dramatically different campaign styles. Machado limited his campaigning to Minas Gerais and other PSD strongholds never making a national effort.[552] The party touted its steady leadership of Brazil's reconstitutionalization and economic development.[553] As in 1945, Gomes campaigned in cities across the country and the UDN still enjoyed the backing of most major newspapers and radio stations, which resulted in a concerted campaign of electoral propaganda in favor of Gomes.[554] The UDN lambasted Vargas as an authoritarian who would subvert the democratic regime if given the chance, and continued to argue that voting institutions were biased towards the PSD and PTB.[555] Gomes told one rally that his sole goal was the "maintaining and safeguarding of democratic institutions."[556] Economically, the UDN continued to advance free-market policies in contrast with Vargas' plans for state led industrialization. The party also advocated austerity and deflationary policies.[557] One notable and radical UDN voice was the journalist, Carlos Lacerda.[558] Originally a Communist, he

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[551] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 78.

[552] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 79.

[553] 'O encerramento da Convenção Nacional do P.S.D', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 11 June 1950, Acervo Estadão.

[554] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 79.

[555] Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader I*, 115–18.

[556] 'O Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes Iniciou Ontem com Absoluto Exito sua Segunda Excursão Eleitoral ao Interior de S. Paulo', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 26 August 1950, Acervo Estadão.

[557] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 77–83.

[558] Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader I*.

had become disillusioned and turned decidedly anti-communist. He made a name for himself as a columnist and in 1949 started his own newspaper, the *Tribuna da Imprensa*. While a member of the UDN, Lacerda was a fiery critic of all sides and lectured on the need for a higher moral standard in politics. He had been beaten and intimidated on multiple occasions after harshly criticizing powerful figures. In June of 1950, he penned an article in his paper condemning Vargas for even running and declaring that if elected "we must turn to revolution to prevent him from governing."[559]

Vargas' campaign, as all campaigns, had both public and behind the scenes components. Capitalizing on the nepotism and loyalty towards him within the ranks of the PSD, Vargas gained the support of several PSD political bosses and nine gubernatorial candidates that betrayed Machado's candidacy. This included support from Rio de Janeiro where the PSD candidate was his son-in-law, Rio Grande do Sul where his cousin stood for the party, and the candidate in Minas Gerais, Juscelino Kubitschek. Vargas also shockingly endorsed João Cleofas for Governor in the state of Pernambuco despite the fact that he was the candidate of the UDN, the party whose uniting principal was opposition to Vargas. Cleofas in return broke with his party and backed Vargas who was determined to win at any cost and privately Vargas admitted that he had authorized his agents to seek out alliances "without examining ideology."[560] Still, he lacked the charismatic campaigning style of populists like Barros and his image and message in 1930 and 1943 had been cultivated by others. This time the task fell to his daughter, Alzira Vargas do Amaral Peixoto who was also the wife of the PSD candidate for governor in Rio de

[559] Ibid., 107–17.

[560] Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe*, 500–502.

Janeiro.[561] Alzira for all intents and purposes served as her father's campaign manager and helped him project an image as a Brazilian patriot enjoying retirement only to be reluctantly dragged back into the public square for the good of the people. She coordinated the varying local campaign teams, raised funds, wrote press releases, and organized a campaign itinerary that Skidmore described as a "model of effectiveness."[562] In each city, Vargas delivered a message tweaked to reflect local issues. To combat the lack of access to media outlets the campaign relied heavily on pamphlets and sound trucks in city streets, though radio also played an important role. Massive crowds attended Vargas' rallies and followed him through the streets.[563]

Vargas' 1950 campaign is often highlighted as a paragon of populism.[564] For example, Skidmore held: "At this stage of his career, Vargas typified in a preliminary manner a new populist style of politician."[565] Such arguments highlight the campaign's paternalistic messaging depicting Vargas as the "father of the poor" and striking a quasi-religious tone declaring his second coming while claiming that ideological or policy-based appeals were rare or absent altogether. It is true that the campaign endeavored to create a near savior like persona around Vargas. For instance, one campaign pamphlet read, "Princess Izabel Freed the Slaves in 1888. Getúlio Vargas will Free the Brazilian people in 1950."[566] However, since its beginnings the

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[561] For Alzira's contribution see Conniff, *Populism in Latin America*, 53–54.

[562] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 79.

[563] Ibid.; 'Exposição Virtual Campanha de 1950', CPDOC, 17 August 2018, https://expo-virtual-cpdoc.fgv.br/campanha-de-1950.

[564] Conniff, 'Brazil's Populist Republic and Beyond'; Weffort, *O Populismo na Politica Brasileira*, 53–54; D'Araújo, *O segundo governo Vargas*; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 67.

[565] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 67.

[566] 'Panfleto Princeza Izabel' (1950), GV ce 1950.08/09.00/53, CPDOC - Acervo Getúlio Vargas.

workerism ideology developed by the Estado Novo had intertwined Vargas' person with the very real social legislation the regime had passed that had seemingly been quite popular with segments of the working class as evidenced by the *Queremista* movement (Chapter II).[567] His campaign therefore is not best understood as merely populist. Vargas also talked about pursuing economic development in an equitable fashion with broad social legislation, a message that was larger than simple patronage.[568] Democracy also figured in Vargas' rhetoric. He credited his first government for the triumph of "socialist democracy" or "democracy of the workers" over "capitalist democracy"[569] and called his campaign one of "democratic renovation."[570] Vargas insinuated that those that deposed him in 1945 had not acted in defense of democracy as they claimed but on behalf of foreign interests and the agriculture-exporter economy.[571]

The upcoming election took place under a modified set of rules. Under pressure from the UDN, Congress passed an updated electoral code in 1950 which responded to some of the biases the party saw in the electoral rules. The legislation eliminated automatic enrollment of voters by their employers, prohibited candidates from standing for more than one office, and created a fairer distribution of seats not accounted for by the electoral quotient (Chapter III). Limongi

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[567] Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo*.

[568] Gomes and D'Araújo, *Getulismo e Trabalhismo*, 53–56.

[569] As quoted in Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 78.

[570] Getúlio Vargas, 'Discurso Pronunciado em Sergipe' (9 August 1950), GV CE 1950.08.09.00.21, CPDOC - Acervo Getúlio Vargas.

[571] Vianna, *Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil*, 251–52.

highlighted that the legislation, which still allowed for parties to register on behalf of voters, ensured that parties and not the state would remain the main engines of enrollment.[572]

Eight million Brazilians turned out on election day in 1950 as turnout among those old enough to vote modestly increased (Annex IV).[573] *O Estado de S. Paulo* declared it "The day of redemption" as the paper prematurely celebrated what it believed was Gomes' impending victory and an end to the Vargas era.[574] On the contrary, Vargas won a clear plurality (48.7%) prevailing in 17 of the country's 24 states and territories as well as the Federal District. Gomes (29.7%) was the runner up while Machado (21.5%) and the incumbent party came in a dismal third. The Partido Socialista had utterly failed to capture the support of the left in the absence of the Partido Comunista and its candidate received only 0.1% of the vote. Vargas ran well ahead of his running mate, defeating Gomes by 1.5 million votes, Café Filho, defeated his UDN challenger by a mere 176 thousand votes. Vargas victory clearly had a personal quality and such split ticketing also served as a clear indicator that elections were more than a simple competition between party machines devoid of persuasion.

The congressional election renewed the Chamber of Deputies and one third of the Brazilian Senate. The new electoral code, with its fairer distribution of seats, dramatically weakened the PSD that lost its majorities in both houses. The Chamber of Deputies was now much more evenly divided among the PSD (37% of seats), UDN (27%), and PTB (17%). The division in the senate was even more equitable among the three (Annex IV). Besides a

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[572] Limongi, 'Fazendo Eleitores e Eleições', 383–84; Hidalgo, 'Renovating Democracy', 40–77.

[573] Election statistics found in *Dados Estatísticos*, vol. 2 (Rio de Janeiro, 1952).

[574] 'O dia da redenção', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 3 October 1950, sec. Notas e Informações, Acervo Estadão.

weakening of the PSD, the results heralded dramatic improvement for the PTB which more than doubled its share of seats in the chamber in the wake of the illegalization of the Partido Comunista. Barros PSP gained national prominence winning 10% of the lower house and three senate seats. At the state level, the PSD remained numerically dominant in gubernatorial contests and the PSP again frustrated the major parties winning São Paulo's governorship.

If the UDN had been shocked in 1945, it now entered a state of utter disbelief. Not only had they lost another election but the former dictator they had fought so hard to remove had been returned to power. For UDN radicals this was the last straw.[575] Either due to Vargas' manipulation or unfair electoral rules, the "true" popular will was being stymied and the solution would have to be imposed from the top, likely by military intervention. One prominent UDN congressman publicly appealed to the military to prevent Vargas' ascension to power. His pleas were met by indifference or outright rebuke by military figures like General Estillac Leal and Góes Monteiro.[576] The UDN mainstream chose to pursue a legal recourse, petitioning the court that Vargas' victory should be voided because the presidential winner should have received an absolute majority (50% plus one) not a plurality. The 1946 Constitution was silent on the issue, whereas the 1891 Constitution had explicitly required an absolute majority. The 1950 electoral code stated, "In the election of President and Vice-President of the Republic . . . the majority principle will prevail."[577] *O Estado de S. Paulo* cautioned that if the court failed to annul Vargas' victory, "we democrats will have to bear, throughout the presidential term, a head of government who represents only the minority of the electorate and who is, in addition, the most dangerous

[575] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 83–87.

[576] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 102.

[577] 'Lei 1.164' (1950).

enemy that Brazilian democracy has ever faced."[578] The Superior Electoral Court ruled that only a plurality or simple majority was required and given that the vote count was not contested, there were no grounds for forcing the country into a new election.[579]

D'Araújo and Skidmore have argued that this election exposed the non-ideological nature of Brazil's parties and that Vargas' triumph further handicapped institutional development by emphasizing personalistic politics over ideological appeals.[580] Referring to the electoral alliances Vargas struck with governors including one from the UDN, Skidmore stated: "One could hardly have found greater proof of the non-doctrinal character of parties in the economically backward states!" However, I posit that this election is better understood as an early point for the post-war party system: parties were developing not devoid of ideology. As Ferreira noted, critics who contend that the Fourth Republic was not a "liberal-democratic experience" often fail to understand that democracy "is not born ready" and must be "conquered" and "amplified."[581] It is not surprising that Brazil's five year old party system still relied on traditions of patronage and clientelism hundreds of years old. But the parties and candidates, including Vargas, did present policy positions and ideological appeals. The context of supposed ideological weakness should also be remembered. Vargas' cross party alliances were mostly with the PSD, a party his government founded, with a sympathetic ideological strain.

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[578] 'O Debate Sobre a Maioria', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 9 November 1950, sec. Notas e Informações, Acervo Estadão.

[579] 'Tribunal Superior Eleitoral', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 19 January 1951, sec. O Momento Politico, Acervo Estadão.

[580] D'Araújo, *O segundo governo Vargas*, 80; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 78.

[581] Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 416.

On 31 January 1951, Dutra peacefully transferred power to President Vargas. This marked the first electoral transfer of power in Brazilian presidential history when the incoming president was not the government endorsed candidate. While the PTB may not have been an opposition party in the traditional sense, Vargas was certainly not Dutra's preferred successor. Nevertheless, neither the government nor the military attempted in any way to challenge the results or prevent Vargas from taking office. The objection by the opposition party had been considered by the appropriate authority and rejected. Brazil's new democratic regime passed its early tests.

The Return of Getúlio Vargas

In his inaugural address, Vargas credited his own 1945 electoral reforms for "the victory of the freedom, guarantee, and legitimacy of the popular vote" and he expressed his "entire confidence in the improvement of our political customs, in the progress and improvement of democratic practices, and in the increasingly numerous and substantial participation of the people in the problems and decisions of national life."[582] Privately, Vargas had confessed to Góes Monteiro prior to his election that "he would have difficulty in governing with a Congress along the lines of ours."[583] Governing within a democratic framework where he needed Congressional support did indeed prove frustrating to Vargas, as it had during the brief lifetime of the 1934 Constitution. The polarization that resulted from his return to the presidency was damaging to the new regime but not fatal. In fact, under Vargas the political system proved it

[582] Getúlio Vargas, 'Discurso de Posse de 1951' (27 January 1951), Biblioteca da Presidência da República, http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/getulio-vargas/discursos/discursos-de-posse/discurso-de-posse-1951/view.

[583] Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe*, 499.

could whether severe crisis with individual rights and freedoms intact. This section reviews some key policies and the economic development strategy of the Vargas government before analyzing the political crises that arose, including the president's suicide.

Vargas' Second Government

The new president lacked a loyal majority in Congress and attempted to build one through cabinet appointments.[584] Vargas entered an instantly polarized environment. His election disillusioned many in the UDN that lost faith in a system that had returned a former dictator to power, and they continued to claim that Vargas would attempt to displace the democratic regime at the earliest available opportunity.[585] Early in his administration, Vargas engaged in multiple futile efforts to win over the UDN, but the party remained in opposition. Vargas found support in the more natural ally of the PSD; though conservatives within the party disapproved of Vargas, the gap was far easier to bridge. The new governor of Rio de Janeiro and Vargas' son-in-law, Ernâni Peixoto, became president of the PSD in 1951, further facilitating an alliance. Yet at no point did PSD support become unconditional. All but a few of the original cabinet appointments went to the PSD, reflecting the party's outsized importance for passing legislation. For his own party, the PTB, he reserved only the crucially important Ministry of Labor. Vargas' ally, Barros, was allowed to select a few posts, including the head of the Bank of Brazil who determined credit policy – of paramount importance to the businesses and industrialists of São Paulo. For the crucial post of Minister of War, Vargas selected Military Club president and left-wing nationalist

[584] A common strategy under Brazilian presidentialism, see Vasselai, 'Nomeações ministeriais'.

[585] Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader I*, 115–18.

officer General Estillac Leal. This selection gave Vargas the best chance to avoid running afoul of the military.[586]

As discussed, central to the administration and stability of the Fourth Republic were the issues of economic development and inflation. Vargas' economic strategy is commonly referred to as "developmentalist nationalism."[587] Fonseca and Salomão have argued that developmentalist nationalism has often been inappropriately labelled as a "populist" economic strategy which they define as "generally associated with nationalism and distributive and fiscally irresponsible demagoguery."[588] Instead, they portray developmentalist nationalism as a long-term strategy built on central economic planning that attempts to steer development and industrialization down a path that is primarily beneficial to domestic businesses and workers. Developmentalist nationalism has its intellectual origins in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) which was created by the United Nations in 1948. Economists at the ECLA sought development strategies that could mirror the gains Latin American economies experienced during the Great Depression and to a lesser extent the world wars, when they were largely freed from competition with industries in developed countries. Many Brazilian economists engaged with the ECLA, especially Celso Furtado who joined the organization in 1949. Furtado and other ECLA economists insisted that inflation was an inevitable result of development and emphasized the need for the state to implement protectionist policies and to be involved "through targeted

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[586] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 112–13.

[587] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 88–89; Pedro Cezar Dutra Fonseca and Ivan Colangelo Salomão, 'O nacional-desenvolvimentismo em tempos de Getúlio Vargas (1951-1954)', in *O Brasil Republicano: O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003).

[588] Fonseca and Salomão, 'O nacional-desenvolvimentismo', 175–76.

investments in key sectors and through direct economic planning."[589] The United States opposed the strategies the ECLA endorsed as they threatened U.S. foreign investment. In 1952, U.S. diplomats moved to discontinue the ECLA but resistance in which the Vargas government played a central role, kept it open.[590]

The planning of the economy in the new administration was delegated to a new institution created by Vargas in 1951, the Economic Advisory. This new appendage of the executive branch brought together a small handful of developmentalist economists to formulate policy and advise executive action. Under Vargas, the advisory was principally concerned with energy production, which it identified as a bottleneck to further development and industrialization.[591] The creation of Petrobras was the crown jewel of Vargas' economic nationalism. In the late 1930s Brazil discovered oil and debates about how to take advantage had raged ever since. The nationalization of oil had swept Latin America in the 1930s, most visibly in Mexico in 1938, with the resource becoming an important source of energy and income for these developing states. In his first year, Vargas proposed the creation of Petrobras, a public-private company dedicated to oil extraction and refining. The PTB and much of the officer corps quickly endorsed the idea as crucial not only to development but national self-sufficiency and economic independence. A few defenders of liberal economics in the UDN and PSD opposed the

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[589] Joseph Vavrus, 'Institutions and the Evolution of Development Economic Thought in Brazil: 1950-1980', in *XXVII Annual ILASSA Student Conference* (Austin, 2007), 5–13; See also Wolfe, 'Populism and Developmentalism'; Fonseca and Salomão, 'O nacional-desenvolvimentismo'; Herminio Martins, 'Ideology and Development: "Developmental Nationalism" in Brazil', *The Sociological Review* 11, no. 1 (1 May 1963): 153–72, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1963.tb03090.x; Margarita Fajardo, *The World That Latin America Created: The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in the Development Era* (Cambridge, 2022).

[590] Fonseca and Salomão, 'O nacional-desenvolvimentismo', 187.

[591] Ibid., 183–88.

idea, but the proposal was very popular, and most politicians did not want to be associated with opposing it. The official UDN position supported the creation of Petrobras and a state monopoly on all oil extraction.[592] The Partido Comunista, still illegal though now free of police repression, denounced the project as too weak because it still allowed for private and foreign investment. Several unions and civil society organizations were at the center of a large public mobilization in favor of the proposal as well. However, Negro and Silva specified that this popular participation was not simply the result of populist or paternalistic direction, but that the working class retained its "political independence" throughout Vargas' time in office and mobilized in favor of their own "interests and expectations."[593] In October 1953, a bill authorizing the creation of Petrobras as a public-private enterprise and a state monopoly on oil extraction was signed into law. Vargas attempted to build on his success by creating a similar company for electricity production, but the political capital had then been spent and the project was held up by congressional opposition.[594]

While pushing growth, the Vargas administration also attempted to appease the president's working class base. Workers were acutely affected by inflation which had reached 12% in 1950 (Annex III). In 1951, the new president raised the minimum wage by more than 200%. The UDN was deeply opposed to the move, but the minimum wage was set via the Ministry of Labor and did not need congressional approval to be adjusted. Decreed on December

[592] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 200–203.

[593] Negro and Silva, 'Trabalhadores, sindicatos e política', 69–70.

[594] George Philip, *Oil and Politics in Latin America: Nationalist Movements and State Companies* (Cambridge, 1982), 227–42.

24, the measure was paternalistically billed as Vargas' Christmas present to workers.[595] The Ministry of Labor also loosened the ties of corporatism, reducing interventions into unions. Labor leadership diversified as a result; some communists even managed to secure union positions.[596] It was in this environment that the first major strikes since 1945 occurred. In early 1953 industrial centers across the country saw labor organizations react against skyrocketing inflation and demanded higher wages. The most notorious of these manifestations was a 27 day general strike in São Paulo that mobilized more than 300 thousand workers.[597] While the workers called on the government to act, many of them did not blame Vargas whom they saw as being restrained by reactionary forces.[598]

Efforts by Vargas' Ministry of Finance to control inflation ran into two central obstacles. First, the 1951 minimum wage hike created inflationary pressure. Second, the Bank of Brazil, an independent public-private institution whose head had been selected by Vargas' ally and São Paulo Governor Barros, pursued loose credit policies to satisfy the industrialists of São Paulo even as the Ministry of Finance tried to tighten the money supply. This meant that the Bank of Brazil consistently undermined government stabilization efforts.[599] Inflation continued to rise during the Vargas presidency and hit 25% in 1954 even as per capita GDP growth continued at an annual average of 3.2% from 1951 to 1954 (Annex III).

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[595] Paiva Abreu, 'The Brazilian Economy, 1930-1980', 333.

[596] Renato P. Colistete, 'Productivity, Wages, and Labor Politics in Brazil, 1945-1962', *The Journal of Economic History* 67, no. 1 (2007): 111–13.

[597] Negro and Silva, 'Trabalhadores, sindicatos e política', 66–69; Wolfe, 'Populism and Developmentalism', 355.

[598] Negro and Silva, 'Trabalhadores, sindicatos e política', 58.

[599] Paiva Abreu, 'The Brazilian Economy, 1930-1980', 328–33.

On the foreign policy front, Vargas had to deal with the Korean War that broke out just before he entered office. The United States hoped that Brazil would contribute troops and the issue divided military and political opinion. Vargas' Foreign Minister believed that the United States had failed to provide the developmental assistance it promised after World War II and insisted that Brazil enter no more conflicts until the United States made good on its commitments. Unsurprisingly, the Partido Comunista denounced the conflict as American imperialism. Tensions soared when a group of anonymous officers published a pro-neutrality article by way of the Military Club, criticizing the United States for starting the war. Many senior officers worried about the similarity between the Communist stance and that of these officers and felt their position resulted from the ideological orientation espoused by Minister Estillac Leal and the left-wing nationalists. The Minister of War attempted to distance himself from the officers behind the statement but opposed closer cooperation with the United States. In 1952, the Vargas government reached a new political-military accord whereby the United States would provide arms and training to the Brazilian military and Brazil would provide crucial raw materials for the U.S. war effort including uranium. Estillac Leal opposed the treaty and resigned as Minister of War once Congress approved it.[600]

The bulk of the officer corps within the Military Club now aligned against Estillac Leal and the left-wing nationalists. Building on this sentiment, a new faction formed within the club called the Democratic Crusade and it easily defeated Estillac Leal in the Military Club leadership elections of 1952, while proceeding to purge some of the left-wing nationalists from military ranks. Respect for the military hierarchy and the depoliticization of the Military Club were the

[600] McCann, *Brazil and the United States during World War II*, 257–60; Hilton, 'The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War', 606–13.

top priorities of the Democratic Crusade. Their 1951 platform stated, "The Democratic Crusade wants the Club to be reincorporated into the tradition of Brazilian life in the performance of its high functions and in the context of the Armed Forces, as it considers the use of its moral and material patrimony in other causes, a danger and a disloyalty to democratic institutions."[601] In his inauguration speech, the new club president further condemned what the Crusade saw as the Military Club's political activism under Estillac Leal and attributed it to a failure to properly understand democracy: "Nationalism and democracy, when misunderstood, make their most ardent supporters an easy instrument of dangerous doctrines and political exploitation."[602] The Crusade did not delineate what a correct understanding of democracy would be but insinuated that to protect democracy the military should remain "apolitical" and restrict itself to defending the country and the constitution.[603] This shift within the officer corps did not make the armed forces decidedly anti-Vargas, but the president had lost a crucial base of enthusiastic support.[604]

Political Crisis and Vargas' Suicide

By 1953, the country was plagued by political polarization and mounting inflation, the resulting opposition to the government and Vargas attempts to rectify the situation would lead directly to his suicide in 1954. The president encountered almost universal hostility from the

[601] 'Prepara-se o Clube Militar para as eleições do próximo ano', *Correio da Manhã*, 30 December 1951, 10, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[602] 'Posse da Nova Diretoria do Clube Militar', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 27 June 1952, 24, Acervo Estadão.

[603] 'Prepara-se o Clube Militar para as eleições do próximo ano', 6.

[604] Martins Filho, 'Forças Armadas e política', 121–25; Sodré, *História militar*, 304–26; Manwaring, 'The Military in Brazilian Politics', 47.

major news outlets which now included television.[605] Still, Lacerda and his *Tribuna da Imprensa* constituted the most ardent critics of the administration. Lacerda was constantly on the lookout for Vargas' move to implant dictatorship and made frequent appeals for an emergency military regime to purge Brazil of undemocratic elements – by which he meant most of the PSD and PTB, especially Vargas. To this end Lacerda conspired with junior military officers sympathetic to the UDN; however, they lacked the support of senior officers. In 1953, Lacerda also formed the Lantern Club, uniting several journalists and other radical UDN politicians, in opposition to Vargas. Lacerda and his paper had continuous debates with another Rio newspaper, *Última Hora*, which had been founded in 1951 by Samuel Wainer in concert with Vargas to create a news source friendly to the administration.[606]

To stabilize the situation, Vargas made a series of cabinet changes in 1953. This included removing the cabinet picks of his electoral ally Barros and the alliance with the PSP broke down. Vargas turned to his old lieutenant Oswaldo Aranha (Chapters I and II), whom he named as the new Minister of Finance, to solve the inflation problem. To avoid the Bank of Brazil undermining government policy, Aranha was allowed to name a new bank head with whom he worked to implement a tight credit policy and a major devaluation of the currency to near market levels, which had the effect of exacerbating inflation in the short run. Pursuing this stabilization strategy proved unpopular and provoked strikes and protests. Vargas attempted to shift blame by insisting that foreign powers were forcing his hand. He railed against foreign companies for

[605] Alessandra Aldé, 'TV Tupi', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 21 May 2022, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/tv-tupi.

[606] Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader I*, 135–73.

excessive profit remittances abroad and passed legislation in an effort to limit them, but to little effect.[607]

The most consequential cabinet appointment in 1953 came from Vargas' own party. To shore up working class support, Vargas named the new president of the PTB, João Goulart, as Minister of Labor. Goulart hailed from Vargas' hometown and had become his protégé. Coming up in the PTB, he had developed close ties with the labor unions.[608] Lacerda and the opposition saw him as the heir to Vargas and a Brazilian version of Argentina's Juan Perón.[609] The opposition increasingly accused both Goulart and Vargas of plotting to install a "unionist republic," by which they meant a Peronist state where the executive uses his control over corporatist labor unions to marshal the masses to intimidate and undermine the other branches of government and the military.[610] The newspaper *Correio da Manhã* announced Goulart's appointment with the headline "Preparing the Coup." Official unions organized a large strike in Rio de Janeiro in solidarity with Vargas' agenda to coincide with Goulart's ascension. The paper portrayed this as an attempt to intimidate democratic institutions, particularly Congress. Additionally, they reported on a rumored plan by Goulart's inner circle to unite the labor unions

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[607] Paiva Abreu, 'The Brazilian Economy, 1930-1980', 319–37.

[608] Bethell, 'Populism in Brazil', 186–87.

[609] For comparisons and connections between Vargas and Perón see Alejandro Groppo, *The Two Princes: Juan D. Perón and Getulio Vargas: A Comparative Study of Latin American Populism* (Villa María, 2010); Flavia Fiorucci, '¿Aliados o enemigos? Los intelectuales en los gobiernos de Vargas y Perón', *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 15, no. 2 (2004): 15–26; Paul H. Lewis, 'The Durability of Personalist Followings: The Vargas & Peronist Cases', *Polity* 5, no. 3 (March 1973): 401–14, https://doi.org/10.2307/3234057; Carvalho, 'Armed Forces and Politics in Brazil, 1930–45', 223; Haussen, 'Radio and Populism in Brazil'.

[610] 'O P.T.B.: Viva a República Sindical', *Tribuna Da Imprensa*, 5 August 1953, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional; Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader I*, 135–73; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 114–15.

into a militant "popular force."[611] Goulart answered his detractors upon assuming the ministry. He committed to strengthening the official unions and, resorting to the language of democracy, he asserted, "but I must say that the wave of exploitation that my investiture has awakened in certain political circles does not frighten me . . . because my purposes, whether political or administrative, will never depart from the sacred principles of fidelity to the laws and to the democratic postulates that have always guided my public life."[612]

Vargas government subsequently suffered a series of blows. First, in 1953 President Dwight Eisenhower, who did not share his predecessor's views on foreign aid, assumed office. The new US administration ended the joint commission as well as significantly curtailing loans and aid.[613] This handicapped Aranha's tight credit efforts as now Brazil had to fund many of the projects that the commission had recommended on its own.[614] Furthermore, the government policy of maintaining an artificially high price for coffee backfired by provoking a U.S. boycott damaging foreign exchange income and import capacity. Communists and nationalists cited these events as proof of a developed nation trying to keep Brazil in subservience.[615] The next blow fell later in 1953, when the UDN succeeded in convincing congress to launch an investigation into the funding for Wainer's *Última Hora.* Though Wainer had paid it off, the

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[611] 'Preparando O Golpe', *Correio da Manhã,* 16 June 1953, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[612] 'Posse do Novo Ministro do Trabalho', *O Estado de S. Paulo,* 19 June 1953, Acervo Estadão.

[613] Bevan Sewell, 'Early Modernisation Theory? The Eisenhower Administration and the Foreign Policy of Development in Brazil', *The English Historical Review* CXXV, no. 517 (1 December 2010): 1464, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/ceq345; Warren Michael Weis, 'Roots of Estrangement: The United States and Brazil, 1950-1961' (PhD Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1987), 113–76; Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill, 2017).

[614] Hilton, 'The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War', 613–16.

[615] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964,* 117, 136.

committee focused on Vargas' involvement in securing a Bank of Brazil loan for a newspaper that now defended his government. Lacerda and most of the media flooded the country with stories and speculation of corruption on the back of the committee's work. Eventually the final report found that the administration had engaged in impropriety.[616] Then in February 1954 Vargas charged Goulart with making plans for another minimum wage hike to alleviate the suffering of workers caused by inflation. Despite economist recommendations for a 40% rise, Goulart favored doubling the minimum wage.[617] The opposition saw such a generous raise as evidence of an attempt to buy working class support for a unionist republic. *O Estado de S. Paulo* accused Vargas and Goulart of preparing a "social revolution" and declared Goulart the leader of "Brazilian Peronism."[618] Several employers unsuccessfully challenged the legality of the wage increase before the Supreme Court and insisted that it would lead to more price increases.[619]

Later that same month, a group of 81 junior officers issued a statement later known as the Colonels' Manifesto, addressed to military high command. The officers complained that bad pay, inflation, and low social status was hurting the "military class" and driving their counterparts into civilian jobs where they became politically active, tainting the military's apolitical reputation. If the proposed wage hike were enacted, they claimed, inflation would worsen and the minimum wage would nearly equal the salary of college graduates, subverting "professional

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[616] Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader I*, 135–40; Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 84–85.

[617] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 134.

[618] 'A "peronização" do País', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 16 February 1954, sec. Notas e Informações, Acervo Estadão.

[619] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 135.

values" and complicating the recruitment of officers. They warned that the demoralization of the military was opening space for the "infiltration of pernicious anti-democratic ideologies or the spirit of political partisanship."[620] Enraged that he had not been kept informed of the military's discontent, Vargas dismissed his Minister of War. Realizing that the situation required drastic measures he begrudgingly asked for Goulart's resignation as well. General Euclides Zenóbio da Costa a conservative anti-communist officer was placed in the Ministry of War to restore discipline.[621]

No sooner had this crisis hit then an even larger scandal captured the country's attention. Upset at having been released in the 1953 cabinet shuffle, Vargas former Minister of Foreign Affairs gave an interview in April 1954 in which he claimed that, as minister, he had come to the knowledge of secret negotiations between presidents Perón and Vargas with the Argentine president hoping to draw Brazil and Chile into an anti-U.S. alliance. The former minister's accusations came as reports circulated of a rumored speech by Perón to the Argentine military lamenting Vargas' failure to hold up his end of the pact.[622] Though Perón had favored an economic union between the three countries, Buenos Aires denied both the speech and the secret pact, as did Vargas.[623]

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[620] 'Manifesto dos Coronéis' (8 February 1954), Memorial da Democracia, http://memorialdademocracia.com.br/card/coroneis-batem-de-frente-com-getulio.

[621] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964,* 130–31.

[622] 'Depõe João Neves', *Diario da Noite,* 1 April 1954, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[623] Danilo José Dalio, 'The Vargas Administration and the Proposal of the ABC Pact: The Place of Peronist Argentina in Brazilian Foreign Policy', *Contexto Internacional* 38, no. 2 (August 2016): 731–52.

On 1 May, Vargas doubled down with his only stable base of support, the urban working class. His speech celebrating Labor Day was nationally broadcast via radio. Vargas defiantly announced that he would double the minimum wage and gave credit to the now former Minister Goulart, a "tireless friend and defender of the workers." He extolled the many efforts of his government on behalf of labor: "Workers of Brazil, as you see, everything that depends on the government's action, within the scope of its constitutional faculties, has been done so that there is no lack of support and assistance to the working masses." Vargas' speech crescendoed with his famous declaration "You constitute the majority. Today you are with the government. Tomorrow you will be the government."[624]

UDN hardliners were outraged. Vargas had now been caught conspiring with the originator of the unionist republic and was rallying the working class to create his own such regime. Many party members called for Vargas to resign or be impeached. Attacks directed against him now questioned if inflation and unrest resulted from Vargas' incompetence or ingenuity. Recalling 1937 and the imaginary communist plot that the government had used to justify the coup creating the Estado Novo, the *Correio da Manhã* posited, "If the country's economic and social structure collapses, shaken by disturbing agitations and demands, he will try to appear as its "savior" with a new regime."[625] Some in the UDN felt they had to act to cut off an impeding autocoup. Impeachment charges were drafted in June accusing Vargas of corruption, incompetence, an alliance with Peronism, and sympathy for communism.[626] If the

[624] Getúlio Vargas, 'Petrópolis, 1º de maio de 1954', in *Getúlio Vargas*, ed. Maria Celina Soares D' D'Araújo, Perfis Parlamentares 62 (Brasília, 2011), 757–63.

[625] 'Depois dêle, o dilúvio', *Correio da Manhã*, 4 May 1954, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[626] Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 380.

organizers sincerely believed they could remove Vargas from office, they badly miscalculated. The motion to even consider the charges failed by a vote of 35 to 136. Only a few members of the PSD supported the motion; most saw no reason to remove a government they participated in, especially since their plurality in Congress meant they could squash any legislation they disliked. Not wanting to sign on to a losing cause, most of the UDN simply abstained from the vote. The UDN minority leader in Congress argued that the measure had at least warned Vargas that "the paths of adventure and illegality are not unimpeded."[627] A PSD congressman that opposed the motion, alleged that the UDN accomplished its real clandestine goal which was to convince sympathetic military officers of the impossibility of a constitutional solution.[628]

In August, Vargas' position went from precarious to untenable. Though accounts differ, it seems that members of Vargas' inner-circle approached the longtime head of his personal security who had a deep sense of loyalty to the president and impressed upon him the need for Lacerda to be silenced. Almost certainly without Vargas' knowledge, the security chief arranged to have Lacerda, who was campaigning for Congress in the Federal District, assassinated. Just after midnight on 5 August, as Lacerda returned home, the assassin struck. In the ensuing gun fight, he shot and killed an Air Force officer who supported Lacerda and was serving as his bodyguard. The attacker only managed to wound Lacerda who survived. Vargas promised the Air Force that justice would be done, and an intensive manhunt ensued that tracked down the

[627] 'Interpretação do Lider da Minoria ao Resultado da Votação do "Impeachment"', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 17 June 1954, sec. O Momento Politico, Acervo Estadão.

[628] Impeachment vote and PSD reaction found in 'Diário do Congresso Nacional Ano IX - 98' (Rio de Janeiro, 17 June 1954).

culprit within days, who then quickly revealed his connections to the Presidential palace.[629] Once the involvement of his personal guard had been confirmed, UDN leadership demanded Vargas resign and pressured the military to remove him as protesters descended on the capital. Via his newspaper and impassioned radio broadcasts, Lacerda denounced the "regime of corruption and terror" that had tried to take his life. "Before God, I hold one man responsible for this crime," Lacerda declared, "He is the protector of thieves . . . Getúlio Vargas."[630]

Several people tried to impress upon the president that his resignation was the only constitutional solution left that could avert military intervention. Responding to a military envoy Vargas stated, "I was elected by the people, and I cannot leave here chased away by the Armed Forces. I do not resign, I will only leave dead, and my corpse will serve as a protest against this injustice."[631] Vargas still enjoyed the support of his Minister of War who did not want to see the Army wade into direct intervention, but Navy and Air Force leadership had abandoned him. On 23 August, Vice President Café Filho of the PSP convened the Senate to inform them that he had offered to resign with Vargas and allow Congress to choose interim replacements only for the president to reject him and cling to power. He then promised to head a government of national unity once Vargas had been forced out. Many in the governing majority accused the vice president of betraying Vargas for his own gain. Later in the day, 29 generals issued a joint demand for the president's resignation though many reluctantly signed on. Much of the military

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[629] Sérgio Lamarão, 'Atentado da Toneleros', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 19 May 2021, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/toneleros-atentado-da; Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 382.

[630] Carlos Lacerda, 'O sangue de um inocente', *Tribuna da Imprensa*, 5 August 1954, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[631] 'Especial Getúlio Vargas - Agosto de 1954: 50 anos de uma tragédia brasileira' (São Paulo, August 2004), https://www.al.sp.gov.brhttps://www.al.sp.gov.br/noticias/.

opposition came from within the ranks of the Democratic Crusade and some officers advocated an emergency military regime.[632] Just before midnight the Minister of War met informed Vargas that it had become impossible to resist the demands that he resign.[633]

Early the next morning, the president called his cabinet together to advise him. While awaiting their arrival, Vargas prepared what would be his suicide note. The meeting included the cabinet and other insiders like Goulart and Vargas' daughter Alzira. Opinions were divided and military advisors warned the president that he could only count on a fraction of the armed forces to support him. To avoid civil war, Vargas opted for what he felt would be a compromise solution. He would officially take a leave of absence and Café Filho would become the Acting President; he would not resign. When military leadership learned of Vargas' decision, confusion abounded, would Vargas expect to come back at some point? Reports reached Vargas that the military was not receptive to his solution and would remove him. Retiring to his room alone, just after 8:30 AM Vargas drew a pistol from his personal safe, aimed it at his heart, and pulled the trigger. He died soon after amid hysteria from his family. Despite attempts by some members of the military to suppress the suicide note, it was almost instantly disseminated nationwide via radio and print.[634]

Vargas insisted that he was the head of a victorious revolution which installed a "regime of social liberty" and that the forces "against the people" that sought the "plunder of Brazil" had conspired against him. Specifically, he blamed "international economic and financial groups"

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[632] Karla Guilherme Carloni, 'Marechal Henrique Teixeira Lott: A Opção das Esquerdas' (PhD Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2010), 102.

[633] 'Especial Getúlio Vargas'.

[634] Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 383–84.

and their internal reactionary allies for stifling his agenda in Congress and handicapping Brazilian economic development. Directing himself to the Brazilian people, Vargas stated:

> *I choose this way to be always with you . . . And to those who think they have defeated me; I answer with my victory. I was a slave to the people and today I free myself to eternal life. But these people to whom I was a slave will never again be anyone's slave. My sacrifice will be forever in your soul and my blood will be the price of your ransom . . . I gave you my life. Now I offer you my death. I fear nothing. Serenely, I take the first step on the path of eternity and leave life to enter history.*[635]

Vargas' final appeal to the people of Brazil would have a long lasting impact. Besides rallying his supporters in the aftermath of his death, the suicide note, as will be discussed in the following chapters, inspired the next generation of PTB leaders - as Ferreira has pointed out, the note became for the PTB, a "founding document of their political tradition."[636] Vargas' enemies, "international economic and financial groups" and the internal forces that aided them, would be deemed Brazil's enemies.

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[635] Getúlio Vargas, 'Carta Testamento' (23 August 1954), Câmara dos Deputados, https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/plenario/discursos/escrevendohistoria/getulio-vargas/carta-testamento-de-getulio-vargas.

[636] Jorge Ferreira, 'Brizola em Panfleto – as Idéias de Leonel Brizola nos Últimos Dias do Governo de João Goulart', *Projeto História* 36 (June 2008): 105; See also Thomas D. Rogers, '"I Choose This Means to Be With You Always": Getúlio Vargas's Carta Testamento', in *Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives*, ed. Jens R. Hentschke, Studies of the Americas (New York, 2006), 227–55.

Surviving the Interim Period

Vargas had been the dominant figure in politics for 24 years and suddenly he was gone. Throngs clamored to see the deceased president's body. Any chance of a military coup transferring power to UDN conspirators dissipated.[637] Without Vargas no coup could be justified, and many legalist officers who had been on the fence before, could now comfortably support the constitutional process of transferring power to the vice president. Furthermore, the righteous anger of mobs now burned for anyone deemed Vargas' enemy. Opposition newspapers found their offices and trucks assaulted or set ablaze and Lacerda went into hiding.[638] This final section analyzes the interim government and the elections of 1954 and 55 before focusing on the actions of the military in the lead up to the 1956 inauguration of President Kubitschek. This includes a discussion of the way democracy became central to the way officers within the armed forces defined their political role.

A New Government and the 1954 Election

Vice President Café Filho assumed the presidency and now had to make good on his earlier promise of a national unity government until the inauguration of the next president in January 1956. The new president made it clear from the outset that his government would not pursue an agenda of its own and instead focus on stabilizing the economic situation and upholding the constitutional order. A member of Barros' PSP, Café Filho had no direct link to any of the major parties and due to his supposed "betrayal" of Vargas, the PTB refused to

[637] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 87–92.

[638] Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 384–90.

participate in his government. Instead, the UDN and PSD divided up most of the appointments giving the interim administration a solid base in Congress. General Henrique Lott, who had a reputation as a professional soldier with an unwavering commitment to an apolitical stance for the military was named Minister of War.[639]

The 1954 congressional elections were set for just over a month away on 3 October. The UDN, fearing a backlash at the polls, insisted that the elections must be postponed due to the chaos caused by Vargas' suicide. Café Filho refused and the elections happened on schedule. UDN fears proved unfounded, as the composition of Congress remained largely unchanged (Annex IV). While Vargas' death had galvanized his supporters, it had done little to redraw political cleavages. Among the notable results were Lacerda's election to the Chamber of Deputies as a representative for the Federal District and Goulart's defeat in his senatorial race. Goulart's brother-in-law, his sister's husband, Leonel Brizola, was elected to the chamber for their home state of Rio Grande do Sul. Brizola, a fiery politician from an impoverished and working class background, had been a fierce Vargas loyalist and he and Goulart became the most consequential figures of the PTB moving forward.[640]

Once more, a local election in São Paulo portended serious national consequences. A heavyweight contest for governor pitted Barros against a new rival, Jânio Quadros. The prior year the PSD, PTB, and UDN all joined with the PSP to back a single candidate for the mayor of São Paulo, hoping to gain a major victory in the ever elusive realm of São Paulo politics. Instead, they merely received front row seats to witness the PSP being beaten at its own game. At just 36

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[639] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 143–44; Carloni, 'Marechal Henrique Teixeira Lott'; Castro, *Espada x vassoura*.

[640] Brigagão and Ribeiro, *Brizola*.

years old, Quadros won that election in a landslide. A member of the Partido Democrata Cristão (Christian Democratic Party), Quadros had taken a page out of Barros' book with flamboyantly performed public appearances before large rallies. Yet, Quadros didn't campaign on public works or patronage but decried the corruption of the political elite, including Barros, and preached moralization. He attained nationwide fame for carrying a broom on the campaign trail to symbolize the sweeping away of corruption. Unlike the broad popular appeals of Barros and Vargas, Quadros uniquely targeted the middle class with his messages. Now in the 1954 gubernatorial election, Quadros triumphed with 35% of the vote to Barros' 34%. A UDN-PSD candidate also captured 26%. Once in power, he worked to remove the PSD and PSP from the state's bureaucracy, seeing them as a source of corruption.[641]

Following the congressional election, Café Filho reiterated that the presidential elections in 1955 would take place on schedule. The interim government tried its hand at inflation and development. First, the Café Filho administration tightened the money supply and reduced available credit, but these efforts outraged industrialists and floundered. Next the government attempted to reduce the massive expenditures on excess coffee purchases, but this angered the politically powerful coffee exporters and also failed, high inflation persisted (Annex III). To fuel development, Café Filho signed a decree facilitating investment from foreign companies willing to import key capital goods. This policy would prove to have the greatest impact over the next

[641] Jorge Miguel Mayer and Libânia Xavier, 'Janio da Silva Quadros', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 31 May 2021, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/janio-da-silva-quadros; Arnt, *Jânio Quadros*, 77–122.

several years, but it was hotly denounced by economic nationalists who opposed greater foreign participation in Brazil's development.[642]

1955 Presidential Election

On the issue of succession, military leadership, including Minister of War Lott, encouraged the major parties to produce a single civilian national unity candidate.[643] Café Filho swore not to interfere in the election but declared solidarity with the armed forces' position, describing military command as those most responsible for "the order and tranquility of the country, as well as for the survival of democratic institutions."[644] The parties, however, chose to pursue their own candidates.

The PSD nomination was narrowly won by Governor Kubitschek of Minas Gerais in February 1955 over the objections of the conservative wing of the party. The alliance with the PTB was renewed and that party named Goulart as the vice presidential candidate, much to the dismay of the UDN who despised him as the heir to Vargas and Perón. Kubitschek campaigned on promises to speed up Brazilian development via his "Targets Program" that would serve as a road map for the entire economy. While focused on development, he frequently referenced his commitment to the constitutional order. Kubitschek's campaign included a few novelties: the

[642] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 143–63.

[643] Carone, *A república liberal*, 1985, II:93.

[644] João Café Filho, 'Discurso de Café Filho sobre a posição do governo face ao problema da sucessão presidencial' (27 January 1955), J. 1955.01.27, CPDOC - Acervo Café Filho.

first use of television, women's committees, and traveling to campaign events via airplane.[645] The Partido Comunista officially endorsed Kubitschek and Goulart. Prestes said that his party felt that Kubitschek and Goulart offered the best chance for the "broadest united front against the fascist military coup" that removed Vargas. Prestes further clarified "We trust in the forces of the people that are invincible and in the democratic and patriotic feelings of the soldiers, corporals, sergeants and officers of our armed forces. These must never be confused with the group of coup generals and servants of the American monopolies."[646] Communist support convinced many in the UDN of the communist leanings of their competitors. They insisted that an electoral alliance had been formed with the Communists that would give them power in a Kubitschek government. Kubitschek denied making any such bargain, though in reality he had provided assurances that he would cease most repressive measures affecting the Partido Comunista in exchange for their support.[647]

Previous elections had left UDN leadership with a pessimistic perspective on their electoral chances in 1955. At the party's nominating convention, one UDN founder declared, "We live in freedom and under a democratic regime. Freedom to corrupt and look upon the corrupt; freedom to defraud and reap the effects of fraud; freedom to steal public money and avoid punishment; freedom for everything except moralizing. It would be better to live clean in a

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[645] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 121–44; Edward Anthony Riedinger, 'The Making of the President, Brazil 1955: The Campaign of Juscelino Kubitschek.' (PhD Dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1978).

[646] 'Entrevista de Luiz Carlos Prestes', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 14 September 1955, Acervo Estadão.

[647] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 141–42.

prison than free in this rottenness . . . This is our freedom, and this is our democratic regime."[648] For Lacerda and UDN hardliners the election was a lost cause and they returned to conspiring and advocating for an emergency military regime.[649] In a February editorial, Lacerda insisted that the original purpose of the Brazilian Republic was to abolish aristocratic privilege, but the "Vargas Republic" had the opposite effect, developing a "degenerate aristocracy" of "money and kinship." He wrote, "Yes, we want the coup. Our coup . . . is the reform of Brazilian democracy." He reasoned that this was necessary because the country was trapped "by institutions that are, after all, only a caricature of Democracy." Lacerda rebuked military leadership for their inaction in the name of legalism: "The crisis of Brazilian Democracy can only be overcome by reforming the institutions that govern the country . . . even if they don't want to do it, the military will have to do it, because, before being political or apolitical, they are patriots."[650]

The interim government continually rebuffed the calls for a coup by Lacerda and UDN radicals. In a speech just a month before the election, President Café Filho lamented his administration's failure to control inflation but highlighted its successes on the front of democracy:

> *[W]e have the consolation of some results, among which the preservation of public order and constitutional normality should not be underestimated, by way*

[648] 'Vibrante demonstração de civismo a solenidade de encerramento da convenção nacional da UDN', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 2 August 1955, Acervo Estadão.

[649] Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader I*, 177–230.

[650] Carlos Lacerda, 'Crise e reforma da Democracia brasileira', *Tribuna da Imprensa*, 18 February 1955, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

> *of the exercise and enjoyment of freedoms in their fullness and respect and guarantee of democratic franchises. . . The government urges the electorate to gather at its rallies and march to the polls on 3 October, in the certainty that the verdict of this national judgement, in which the only judge will be the people, will be respected.*

Speaking against pessimism about democracy, he suggested that the country should be optimistic because Brazil's traditions of "democratic oversight" had developed to the point that "no regime lacking sufficient moral bases will find among us conditions for survival." He also praised the commitment of the armed forces to the legal order, "Upon the country's Armed Forces rest the destinies of Brazil, as an integrated, peaceful, and democratic nation."[651]

UDN mainstream leadership resigned itself to playing kingmaker searching for an external candidate to back. After a brief flirtation with a candidacy advanced by PSD conservatives upset by Kubitschek's nomination, the UDN instead endorsed the candidate of the Partido Democrata Cristão, General Juarez Távora, in June 1955. The general had served as commander of the Higher War College and been part of the military group that insisted on Vargas' resignation. Originally, he had refused to run, instead backing the idea of a unity candidate.[652]

Alongside the campaign, the UDN also sought and secured further reform of electoral institutions. The reform, passed by Congress in August 1955, introduced an official ballot

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[651] 'Enaltecida pelo chefe do governo a atuação das Forças Armadas em face da atual situação politica', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 6 September 1955, Acervo Estadão.

[652] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 92–96.

produced by the government and filled in by voters and it wiped the voter registration in advance of the 1958 congressional election. These measures were aimed at the rural political bosses of the PSD who enrolled blocks of voters and then delivered them to polling places ballot in hand. The number of spoiled ballots increased as many voters struggled to fill out the ballot themselves and the literacy barrier hardened. Voter registration under stricter rules dramatically reduced the size of the electorate in rural areas going into the 1958 election.[653] Kubitschek estimated that the official ballot cost him approximately one million votes, though he blamed it on the fact that the reform came so close to the election.[654] Still, the UDN push for reform had been frustrated in some respects. First, their effort to amend the constitution so that in the case no presidential candidate received a majority of the vote the election would be decided by the Chamber of Deputies, failed. Second, while the official ballot was adopted the PSD amended the measure to allow anyone, not just government officials, to distribute the ballot. This allowed political bosses to still hand out ballots though they could no longer fill it out or make it identifiable.[655]

Joining Kubitschek and Távora in the race were two more candidates. Barros ran at the head of his PSP, while victory seemed a long shot, his candidacy mattered because he was sure to draw a lot of votes from São Paulo which accounted for a large portion of the electorate. Plínio Salgado, the former fascist leader, also ran and though he had no chance at victory, his mere participation meant the vote would be split four ways.

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[653] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 92; Hidalgo, 'Renovating Democracy', 40–77; Jairo Nicolau, *Eleições no Brasil: do Império aos dias atuais*, Nova biblioteca de ciências sociais (Rio de Janeiro, RJ, 2012), 9.

[654] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 144.

[655] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 146–49.

In September, just weeks before the election, Lacerda produced a shocking revelation. On television, he read out a letter from an Argentine politician addressed to Goulart that detailed a pact whereby the Perón administration would provide weapons and backing for a revolution to impose a unionist republic.[656] Goulart and the PTB immediately demanded a military investigation into the authenticity of the letter and denied any such pact. Lacerda's scare tactic was undercut by the fact that the very same day he revealed the letter, Perón was forced into exile by a military coup. The ensuing investigation eventually proved that the letter was a forgery by an Argentine group seeking to profit off Goulart's opposition, but only after the election.[657]

On 3 October 1955, more than nine million votes were cast in the closest presidential election of the Fourth Republic.[658] Kubitschek triumphed with just 36% of the vote. Távora (30%) came in a close second, Barros (26%) took third and Salgado (8%) fourth. In the vice presidential contest with only three candidates – Salgado ran alone – Goulart won with 44% of the vote. Both he and the UDN candidate received more total votes than Kubitschek as Goulart surpassed his running mate by half a million votes. He had an imprecise claim to being the more popular name on the ticket. It also suggested that Távora might have triumphed in the absence of Salgado's candidacy.

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[656] 'Eis a Prova da Traição de Jango', *Tribuna da Imprensa*, 17 September 1955, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[657] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 150.

[658] Election data can be found in *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil: Ano XVII - 1956* (Rio de Janeiro, 1956), 469.

Enforcing the Transition

Kubitschek's small margin of victory and modest share of the vote resulted in a hotly contested result. Members of the UDN, that had been complaining of the injustice of their own inevitable defeat for some time now, made several efforts to overturn the election. Again, the party unsuccessfully petitioned the court to require an absolute majority for the winner. In Congress the UDN attempted to reject the election results on the grounds of the "fraudulent" practices of PSD political bosses. Távora released a statement complaining that the electoral system suffered from "grave deformations" intentionally created by the dictatorship in 1945 and that those in Congress who wanted to maintain "positions inherited from the dictatorship" had repeatedly frustrated attempts to reform the electoral system. He cited the failed attempt to adopt a majority criteria as well as the mitigating changes to the official ballot reform.[659] Others in the UDN suggested a constitutional amendment to implement a parliamentary system, significantly limiting Kubitschek's power in favor of the legislature where the UDN would have a much greater say; advocates clamed this would end the constant state of crisis that resulted from the current presidential system.[660] All these UDN efforts failed.

Lacerda and his coconspirators doubled their efforts towards a coup. Lacerda again complained of Brazil's "false democracy" pleading for a coup "to destroy the electoral oligarchies" and prevent a government of a "dictatorship of the minority."[661] As virtually all the

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[659] 'Impugnação dos resultados do pleito, viciados pela fraude, corrupção e outras irregularidades', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 6 November 1955, Acervo Estadão.

[660] 'Disposta a União Democratica Nacional a recorrer á Justiça contra a fraude nas ultimas eleições', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 28 October 1955, sec. Na Camara dos Deputados, Acervo Estadão.

[661] Carlos Lacerda, 'Entre Ademar e Kubitschek: a terceira solução', *Tribuna da Imprensa,* 5 October 1955, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

country's parties condemned the idea of a coup, the UDN remained silent. The party could not openly endorse a coup without a great deal of hypocrisy, but its leadership knew this was the only remaining path to power.[662] Much to their dismay, Minister Lott took a hard stance that the military would remain apolitical and enforce the result of the election. A faction within the officer corps formed around this position called the Constitutionalist Military Movement, their leaders included Vargas' former ministers of war, generals Zenóbio da Costa and Estillac Leal. Despite his affinity for their position, when Zenóbio da Costa spoke publicly in favor of the inauguration of the elected candidates, Lott reprimanded him for violating military political neutrality.[663]

On 1 November 1955, at a high profile military funeral, one of the coup conspirators, Colonel Jurandir Mamede, delivered a strong endorsement of military intervention. Eulogizing the departed, Mamede lauded the previous generation of military leadership for their willingness to enact an "extralegal" but "moral" solution to the crisis of 1954 while remaining apolitical. He insinuated that the regime would be a "democratic lie" if it allowed executive power to be won by a "victory of the minority." Mamede reminded his military audience that senior officers have "heavy responsibilities" in a country striving "for the realization of their democratic ideal" and concluded "vigilance by those leaders will often be essential to prevent bitter days for the people and avoid public disorder and national debacle."[664]

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[662] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 152–53.

[663] Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 396.

[664] 'A Oração do Coronel Bizarria Mamede', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 2 November 1955, Acervo Estadão.

The speech enraged Lott, but as Mamede was an officer of the Higher War College, only the president had the authority to punish him. The Minister of War insisted that Café Filho discipline Mamede, but the president hesitated, and the political drama drew intense media attention. Then suddenly on 3 November, Café Filho had a heart attack which left him hospitalized and incapable of performing his duties. With the vice presidency still vacant, Congress turned to the constitutionally mandated line of succession and transferred power to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Carlos Luz, who became acting president on 8 November. Luz was a PSD politician from Minas Gerais but a central figure in the conservative PSD group that had opposed President-Elect Kubitschek's candidacy. Minister Lott immediately requested Luz punish Mamede, but the acting president refused. Angered, Lott offered his resignation which Luz accepted.[665] Meanwhile, Lacerda and his colleagues appeared emboldened, and rumors swirled that they were in league with Luz. Preventing the inauguration of Kubitschek and Goulart, Lacerda claimed, was the goal of Luz's government. "These men cannot take office, must not take office, will not take office" he assured his readers.[666]

Acting President Luz prepared to publicly announce his new Minister of War with whom he was arranging for changes in command postings that appeared to facilitate a coup. Lott recalled his thoughts at that time in a magazine interview later that month: "The Army, the Navy and the Air Force would fall into the hands of commanders in favor of a coup against the institutions and, above them, an interim President of the Republic nursed the same intention of

[665] John W. F. Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises 1955-1964* (Austin, 1970), 33–36.

[666] Carlos Lacerda, 'Não Podem Tomar Posse', *Tribuna da Imprensa*, 9 November 1955, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

suspending democratic guarantees, denying the free pronouncement of the ballot box."[667] Taking advantage of his last moments as minster, Lott ordered out the Army units in Rio de Janeiro and occupied the capital in the early hours of 11 November. The Army hierarchy held but the Navy and the Air Force largely sided with Luz. Quickly however, these branches ran up against their ineffectuality in the face of the overwhelming strength of the Army. Acting President Luz, Lacerda, Colonel Mamede, and a group of cabinet ministers and UDN politicians escaped the city on board the Navy cruiser *Tamandaré*. Brigadier Gomes, now Air Force Minister, followed by air.[668]As the vessel steamed out of the harbor, Lott gave the stunning order for the city's costal batteries to open fire on the ship carrying the acting president and his allies. The bombardment rained down, but the cruiser completed her escape and set sail for São Paulo where the exiled government hoped to gather loyal forces for a civil war. Governor Quadros considered backing Luz but quickly realized that his own position was precarious. He refused to support the exiles as the Army units in the state made it clear they were not welcome. Dejected, the cruiser turned back towards the capital.

Back in Rio de Janeiro, Lott forced Congress into session and told congressional leaders that a new acting president needed to be named though he vowed that the military would not interfere in the selection process. He made public declarations citing Luz's refusal to punish Mamede as evidence of his lack of reverence for the constitutional order and assured Brazilians that both Congress and the Supreme Court approved of his actions.[669] Congress again turned to

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[667] 'Depoimento de Lott', *Manchete*, 19 November 1955, 7, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[668] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 36–46.

[669] 'Deposto o Presidente Interino pelo Gen. Lott - O Ex-Ministro dá Posse ao Sr. Nereu Ramos', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 12 November 1955, Acervo Estadão.

the constitutional line of succession and moved the presidency to the Vice President of the Senate. This post was filled by Dutra's former vice president Nereu Ramos, who became the third President of Brazil that month. The vote to install Ramos took place along party lines with the UDN in opposition as they now protested the interruption of the legal order by military intervention.[670] On 14 November, Luz returned to the capital and was allowed to take up his spot in Congress, in a defiant speech he condemned Lott's coup "against the constitutional order."[671] Lacerda received asylum in the Cuban embassy before heading to exile in Cuba itself.

Just as things seemed to stabilize, Café Filho recovered. On 21 November, he informed Congress that he intended to reassume the presidency immediately. Lott, still Minister of War, doubted Café Filho's intentions and wished to avoid another transfer of power. Wasting no time, Lott ordered out the Army who occupied the capital once again and placed Café Filho under house arrest. Compelling Congress into another emergency session the following day, Lott asked them to resolve the crisis. Congress voted to disqualify Café Filho, leaving Ramos as acting president for the remainder of the term.[672] Ramos' military ministers then requested that Congress authorize a 30 day state of siege which they did, renewing it until February 1956. However, the expanded executive authority was rarely used and only for "irregular press censorship."[673] In December, the Supreme Court, acting free of any direct military coercion, rejected a petition by Café Filho to reverse the Congressional vote disqualifying him. One

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[670] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 36–52.

[671] 'O sr. Carlos Luz apresenta sua renuncia à Camara', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 15 November 1955, Acervo Estadão.

[672] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 55–61.

[673] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 157.

Supreme Court minister argued in his decision that "Congress did nothing more than acknowledge the material impossibility of Mr. Café Filho reassuming the presidency in the face of tanks and bayonets of the Army. . . It is a situation of fact created and maintained by the force of arms, against which, obviously, any decision of the Supreme Court would be impractical."[674] The court essentially recognized the military as an institution that could legitimately check itself and the legislature.

Kubitschek had watched the events of the transition from his home state of Minas Gerais. There he had denounced the coup against him and used his influence with the state government to organize local police and Army units for a potential armed conflict to defend the Constitution. Otherwise, he felt it best to remain distant from the situation.[675] He assumed the presidency on schedule on 31 January 1956. In his investiture address, Kubitschek congratulated the country for resolving the crisis and said it provided evidence of Brazil's political maturity, "Included among the number of civilized countries, are only those in which the rules of the political game are inviolable, once accepted."[676]

Internal divisions within the military officer corps sharpened. Carvalho sees this change as a merging of the cosmopolitan and nationalist right-wings.[677] However, the new cleavage is better understood as being based on competing understandings of democracy and the role of the

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[674] As quoted in Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 60.

[675] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 155–59.

[676] Juscelino Kubitschek, 'Kubitschek no Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, ao receber o diploma de Presidente da República' (27 January 1956), Biblioteca da Presidência da República, http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/jk/discursos/1956/01.pdf/view.

[677] Carvalho, 'Vargas e os militares', 344.

military in it. The first group led by Lott favored a legalist position and playing the role of constitutional enforcer. Many officers that might be labelled "right-wing" remained a part of this first group.[678] The second smaller group, that was stronger within the Air Force and Navy, concurred with UDN radicals that current democratic institutions stood on a corrupt foundation and could not function properly until the institutional legacies of the Estado Novo had been erased.[679] Indeed, democracy became a hot topic in military circles. In the twilight of his life, former General Góes Monteiro sat with an interviewer dictating his memoirs when the news of Lott's intervention shocked them both. The interviewer who clearly revered his subject, admired what he saw as Lott following the old general's example by enacting a "democratic solution." By this he meant the transferring of power in crisis as opposed to assuming it, just as Góes Monteiro had transferred power after he deposed Vargas in 1945. He felt that a comparison against the other republics of South America, whom he described as mostly "subjected to military yokes," led to the conclusion that in Brazil "we possess, happily, an Army with a democratic spirit."[680] His comments reflected a widespread pride in Brazilian exceptionalism. Later in December of 1955, Lott defended what the media had taken to calling the "countercoup": "I am purely and simply a democrat . . . The best of dictatorships would always be worse than the worst of democratic governments . . . The Army, supported by part of the Navy and Air Force, sought to prevent Brazil from being led into a dictatorial regime."[681]

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[678] Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 399–403.

[679] Manwaring, 'The Military in Brazilian Politics', 54–55; Carloni, 'Marechal Henrique Teixeira Lott', 102–3.

[680] Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe*, 497.

[681] 'Sou pura e simplismente um democrata e a Democracia não será ferida', *Correio da Manhã*, 6 December 1955, 16.

Conclusion

Democratization in Latin America suffered a series of setbacks by the end of a decade that had opened with some promising prospects – democracy had run aground in many countries of the region such as Argentina and Venezuela and even Colombia which succumbed to military dictatorship in 1953 following decades of civilian rule. Yet, the Brazilian democratic regime survived and made progress in spite of intense political polarization, economic crises, and would be coups, as this chapter has shown. Free and fair elections happened on schedule, including during the chaos that followed Vargas' suicide, and the electorate expanded. Even under the state of siege, individual rights and democratic institutions remained largely intact with few exceptions.

Detrimental to the democratic regime was the development of the UDN radicals, led by Lacerda and others.[682] The acceptance of electoral results by political actors is, of course, a key behavior for demonstrating commitment to democratic regimes.[683] UDN radicals had proven increasingly unwilling to do so, with each electoral loss delegitimizing the system in their view. While they professed a commitment to democracy, they advocated for a regime where most members of the other two major parties would be barred from participating. Though their complaints about biases in electoral rules and practices had some validity, the UDN was able to secure meaningful changes to the governance of elections before both the 1950 and 1955 contests. Yet Lacerda and his adherents continued to display anti-democratic behavior and sought to undermine the constitutional order.

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[682] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 83–87.

[683] Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan, *Democracies and Dictatorships*, 15; Anderson et al., *Losers' Consent*.

The endurance of democracy in Brazil by 1956 was due in large part to the role of the Army in serving as the guarantor of the regime. Ferreira has highlighted that this conclusion is contradictory to much of the literature on this topic: "Rarely said is that, in November 1955, the Army itself, as an institution, guaranteed the continuity of the democratic process – something that directly contradicts the thesis that the military were mostly [in favor of a coup]."[684] Understanding the democratic debates that took place within the military is central for a better appreciation of the history of democracy in Brazil – a point highlighted by this chapter. In 1889 the military toppled the emperor, in 1930 they put an end to the First Republic, in 1937 they closed Congress and backed the Estado Novo, and in 1945 they deposed Vargas. Skidmore cited the events of the 1955 transition as evidence of the fragility of Brazilian democracy and the inability of institutions to peacefully transfer power.[685] However, given the pattern above the fact that those like Lacerda called for a coup when their party failed to win was not unique – in Brazil or elsewhere. What was distinctive was that Lott rebuffed the request. The events of November were exceptionally contentious only because of the commitment to the constitutional order on the part of military leadership. Lott himself had not favored Kubitschek's candidacy, he had joined General Távora in calling for a single unity candidate; nevertheless, he enforced the results of the election. While the tumultuous transition does signal a degree of precariousness, it must also be noted that it was a sign that democracy in Brazil was on firmer ground than it had ever been.

[684] Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 419.

[685] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 157.

Nevertheless, the legalist stance of Lott and the Army did have many inconsistencies that were problematic for democracy.[686] While demonstrating a novel commitment to the constitutional order and the democratic regime, the military enacted some arbitrary judgements about what was and was not consistent with the legal order. President Vargas had a constitutional right to his office and given the chance to impeach him, Congress declined. Military leadership pushed Vargas to resign because it was the last constitutional solution remaining, but the Constitution did not give the military the power to decide when resignation was necessary. Furthermore, while the evidence suggests that Vargas viewed congressional opposition to his agenda as unpatriotic or detrimental to "the people," he had taken no concrete action to subvert the institution. Many within the military were even willing to resort to extralegal means if required to force Vargas from power. In 1955, both Café Filho and Luz came to power through constitutional procedure, but Lott personally decided that barring them from office was essential to ensuring the succession of the legally elected candidates. The fact that Lacerda, Mamede, and others instantly appeared at Luz's side after Lott deposed him lends credibility to his opinion, but he still acted on a suspicion. Given their role as the monopolists of violence, the military was essentially acting as an enforcer of democracy, recognized by politicians and the Supreme Court but with little accountability.

[686] Skidmore also attempts to analyze the role of arbitrary military action in Brazilian democracy, see ibid., 156–58.

Chapter V Crescendo, 1956-1961

After surviving the instability of the mid-fifties, the Fourth Republic underwent a series of developments that can be considered significant democratizing milestones. First, the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek was a period of exceptional stability with the major political actors generally participating within the rules of the game. Second, over the 1950s and early 60s Brazil's political parties passed through a transformative period as they became more ideological and representative. Third, the rural working class, long excluded from formal politics, mobilized and organized. Fourth, in the 1960 election, the opposition party, the União Democrática Brasileira (National Democratic Union/UDN), won its first presidential election. Finally, in 1961 popular organization and pressure overrode an attempt at a military veto that would have disrupted the constitutional order.

Yet much of the literature fails to fully appreciate this democratization. The stability under Kubitschek is seen as an anomaly resulting from the president's personal skill and unique historical circumstances.[687] Political parties are depicted as outdated and breaking down while losing touch with the population.[688] For example, referring the late 1950s, Skidmore argued, "Brazilian society had become divided into more self-conscious sectors with conflicting interests. Yet these interests were very imperfectly represented in the new party system," and he

[687] Ibid., 163–87; Marcelo Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961): estabilidade política e desenvolvimento econômico', in *O Brasil Republicano: O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 228–69.

[688] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 185–86; Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado, 'Partidos políticos e frentes parlamentares: projetos, desafios e conflitos na democracia', in *O Brasil Republicano: O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 140–69; Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil*, 152; Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil*; Ronald M. Schneider, *The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a 'Modernizing' Authoritarian Regime, 1964-1970* (New York, 1971); Lyne, 'Parties as Programmatic Agents'.

repeatedly referenced the "gap between the rapidly changing society and the responsiveness of the political system."[689] Lyne concurred that over the course of the Fourth Republic "Brazilian parties failed to organize around alternative national legislative programs."[690] Rural mobilization is often reviewed within the context of serving as a pretext for a reactionary backlash that would lead to the 1964 coup.[691] Finally, the rise and fall of Jânio Quadros and the accompanying political chaos is highlighted as a the dying gasp of a "populist democracy" reaching its limits.[692]

To frame the democratic advances of the regime over this period, this chapter examines three topics. First the presidency of Kubitschek and the stability the regime enjoyed. Second, the changes to political organization, namely the transformations of the party system and the mass mobilization in the countryside. Finally, the chapter considers Quadros' path to the presidency, his brief stay in office, and the popular organization following his resignation that ensured the inauguration of his vice president, João Goulart, over the objection of military senior leadership.

Kubitschek's Presidency

Kubitschek's arrival in power had been overshadowed by attempted coups and a conflict that pit branches of the armed forces against each other and polarized politics, as shown in the previous chapter. Yet during his presidency most political actors accepted the rules of the game and all the parties enjoyed at least a working relationship with the executive branch. This

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[689] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 185–86.

[690] Lyne, 'Parties as Programmatic Agents', 205.

[691] Cliff Welch, 'Rivalry and Unification: Mobilising Rural Workers in São Paulo on the Eve of the Brazilian Golpe of 1964', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 27, no. 1 (February 1995): 161–87, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X00010208.

[692] Victor, *Cinco Anos Que Abalaram o Brasil: De Jânio Quadros Ao Maréchal Castelo Branco*.

allowed for greater cooperation and productivity among policymakers. The country made significant gains in the high priority areas of growth and development though the plague of inflation continued. At no point during his tenure did the regime face existential peril. This section first looks at the depolarization of politics under Kubitschek and his commitment to democracy and secondly at the wave of economic development that defined his tenure.

Depolarization

The idea of Kubitschek's time in office as one of stability and cooperation is well accepted. Skidmore identified Kubitschek as a "grand improviser" whose "basic strategy was to press for rapid industrialization, attempting to convince each power group that they had something to gain, or at least nothing to lose."[693] In his 1991 biography of Kubitschek, Alexander declared his administration "the most democratic regime that the country has ever had"[694] and insisted Kubitschek aimed to demonstrate that "democracy is not only abstractly the best system of government, but that it is also the best form of government to obtain all of the other goals which he had set before himself and the nation."[695]

Much of Kubitschek's genius laid in his ability to depolarize a political environment that was at its limits. Going beyond just placation, the new administration endeavored to be truly inclusive. Writing on democracy after he left the presidency Kubitschek detailed a philosophy that illuminates his approach as president:

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[693] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 167.

[694] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek* xii.

[695] Ibid., 397; On political stability see also Maria Vitória Benevides, *O governo Kubitschek: desenvolvimento econômico e estabilidade política, 1956-1961* (Rio de Janeiro, 1976).

> *Democracy becomes a fact in an authentic sense of free and dignified social life when every class, every group, every individual, loses fear of the state . . . A government that turns its back on the people, which seeks to intimidate individuals . . . choosing its own time to distribute benefits, may present itself as having all the external characteristics of a regular democracy . . . but it is, in essence, a totalitarian regime. A regime of this type, the Brazilian people no longer accept.*[696]

On the day of his inauguration, Kubitschek ended censorship of the press and asked Congress to cancel the state of siege imposed by the government, thereby depriving himself of the opportunity to govern with expanded executive powers.[697]

A top priority was quelling the unrest within the armed forces. Kubitschek retained General Henrique Lott, who had enabled his ascension to the presidency, as his Minister of War (Chapter IV). However, it was not the Army but the Navy and Air Force that had attempted to prevent his inauguration. Immediately after Kubitschek took office a small rebellion broke out within the Air Force as a few officers and indigenous civilian conspirators seized control of strategic points deep in the Brazilian interior. Government forces avoided a major confrontation by capturing their leader but not before several Air Force and Navy officers had been arrested for refusing to aid in putting down the revolt.[698] Kubitschek used the opportunity to have Congress pass legislation granting amnesty to anyone charged with insurrection related crimes since the

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[696] Kubitschek, *A marcha do amanhecer*, 223.

[697] Kubitschek, *Por Que Construi Brasilia*, 267; Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek', 243.

[698] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 63–100.

1955 election. To further smooth military angst, in December 1956 he arranged for the extremely expensive purchase and refit of a British aircraft carrier, to the delight of the Brazilian Navy. The president ensured that military requests for pay raises or equipment were given top priority.[699] While many Air Force and Navy officers continued to resent Kubitschek, they largely reconciled themselves with his presidency. Kubitschek recounted in an interview that, early in his presidency, some hoped they might be able to force him from power as they had done with Getúlio Vargas (Chapter IV), but that such hopes quickly dissipated upon the realization that "I was unwilling to kill myself."[700]

Outside the military, Kubitschek also pursued inclusivity. His cabinet was divided between his Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party/PSD) and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party/PTB) with the UDN in official opposition, but the government was friendly with all parties, with the exception of UDN radicals who continued to insist on the illegitimacy of Kubitschek's election (Chapter IV).[701] Kubitschek placated members of the rural elite by avoiding the extremely controversial issue of land reform – as a PSD politician might be expected to do – and maintaining the government's generous coffee purchase program even as it failed to rescue coffee prices. His ambitious industrialization program satisfied industrialists and development advocates. He avoided the rhetoric of remaking the country socially that had engendered so much consternation under Vargas. When it came to labor and students, Kubitschek relied on his vice president, João Goulart, whom those sectors deeply

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[699] Ibid.

[700] Carlos Castello Branco, 'JK Não Quer Ficar', *O Cruzeiro*, 2 April 1960, 91, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[701] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 127; Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek', 251.

respected to be the face of the administration. Government interference in the union system virtually ceased as corporatism continued to be undone. The Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party) and its press outlets were allowed to function openly and freely with the exception of running candidates on its own label, though they frequently contested elections via other parties. Consistent wage increases were doled out to the military and civil servants and wage settlements mediated under this administration tended to be generous. Finally, the president proved adept in the distribution of patronage, especially through the federal bureaucracy, to secure congressional majorities behind his proposals.[702]

Towards the end of his presidency, many of Kubitschek's supporters believed that the country and the Fourth Republic regime had benefitted from the respite provided by his leadership. They encouraged the president to push for a constitutional amendment to allow his own reelection to avoid subjecting the country to the administration of some less able politician. Kubitschek refused, "I repelled with vehemence the suggestion, since to accept it would be to give the lie to all of the work of democratic consolidation carried out by me with so many sacrifices."[703]

Two exceptions to Kubitschek's distaste for censorship and repression are often noted. In his first year in office, the president acted against the UDN firebrand and conspirator in the coup against him, Carlos Lacerda (Chapter IV). He closed Lacerda's Lantern Club by executive order on the grounds that the institution was plotting an illegal overthrow of the government. The administration seized an issue of Lacerda's newspaper and banned him from making radio and

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[702] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 306–43; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 163–87; Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek'.

[703] As quoted in Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 338.

television statements after he returned from self-imposed exile in October 1956. However, efforts by the administration's congressional allies to impeach Lacerda failed and many radio and TV stations simply ignored the ban on him. The courts also ruled that the gag on Lacerda could not be applied to his campaigning efforts ahead of the 1958 congressional election. Additionally, Kubitschek temporarily closed a labor union and a civil society organization that were under the direction of Communists in 1958.[704]

Development and Brasília

Depolarization was a consequence of Kubitschek's political style and commitment to democracy, but his agenda was driven by economic development. Like Vargas, Kubitschek's economic approach is often classified as developmentalist nationalism (Chapter IV). However, their strategies differed significantly. Kubitschek relied far more on economists and technocrats to develop his policies. These advisors again were heavily influenced by the work of the United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Celso Furtado the most prominent Brazilian economist working with the ECLA produced research that shaped the approach of the Kubitschek government and later in 1958 was named to a bureaucratic post by the president.[705] Also differentiating the new developmentalist strategy was the fact that it was far less protectionist and less concerned with redistribution.[706] The Kubitschek administration actually

[704] Ibid., 331–32; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 171–72; Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader I*, 264–65.

[705] Cristina Guido, 'Celso Monteiro Furtado', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 1 April 2022, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/celso-monteiro-furtado; Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek', 253.

[706] Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek', 259.

doubled down on the controversial policies of the preceding interim government that had facilitated foreign investment (Chapter IV). Development policy shifted to facilitating investment whether the source was foreign or domestic. The government also maintained loose credit policies and created "executive groups," bringing business leaders in the private sector together with those in charge of economic planning to ensure that government and private investment took place on the terms that those business leaders felt would be the most beneficial.[707]

Throughout his campaign and early presidency, Kubitschek and his technical advisors developed what they called the Targets Program, promising "fifty years of progress in five." This complex policy served as a road map for virtually the entire economy and set extremely ambitious output goals in areas identified as industrialization barriers like energy production, mining, and infrastructure construction. Building upon the Economic Advisory of the Vargas administration (Chapter IV), Kubitschek created the Council of National Development just days after he assumed office, further institutionalizing technocratic planning and oversight of the economy, now via the Targets Program.[708] Social scientists and academics played a key role in the government's development agenda. This mostly took place through the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies/ISEB). Founded in 1955 by the Ministry of Education, ISEB researched and advised the government on economic policy and attempted to develop a consistent developmentalist ideology. For most of Kubitschek's administration, ISEB academics supported his government and policies; but, from 1959 onward

[707] Ibid., 257–59; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 165–66.

[708] Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek', 254–57.

the organization was taken over by advocates of nationalism who saw "big business, international capital, and the latifundio" as the main obstacles to development and denounced Kubitschek for catering to them.[709]

The developmental agenda received a gargantuan symbol when the president decided to make good on an old constitutional provision. Starting with the first republican constitution in 1891, the government had reserved a plot of land deep in the Brazilian interior with the intention of relocating the country's capital.[710] Yet by 1956, relocation was still just a political pipe dream, and the land remained an undeveloped plain. Kubitschek first publicly promised a new capital in response to a question on the topic during his campaign and latched onto the idea as an emblem of his development policies. Not only would the country carve a futuristic city out of the Brazilian interior, but it would connect it to the rest of the country through massive infrastructure projects, especially a highway system. Kubitschek ambitiously promised to move the capital before the end of his term.[711] Despite UDN opposition that decried the new capital as a wasteful and fanciful endeavor, the president passed the necessary legislation in his first year and construction began. Construction provided major opportunities for patronage of which the government made generous use, labeled as corruption by the UDN. Congressional oversight, led by the UDN, found inflated contracts and a general lack of record keeping when it came to how

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[709] Chilcote, *Intellectuals and the Search for National Identity*, 37; See also Martins, 'Ideology and Development', 154–59.

[710] On Brasília see Ernesto Silva, *História de Brasília: Um sonho, uma esperança, uma realidade* (Distrito Federal, 1999); Adirson Vasconcelos, *A mudança da capital* (Brasília, 1978); Norma Evenson, *Two Brazilian Capitals: Architecture and Urbanism in Rio De Janeiro and Brasilia* (New Haven, 1973); James Holston, *The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia* (Chicago, 1989).

[711] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 213–35.

funds were spent. Stories and rumors of contractors making fortunes of corruption were common. Nevertheless, the building of Brasília remained very popular as did Kubitschek.[712]

Guided by the modernist vision of Brazilian architects Oscar Niemeyer and Lúcio Costa, Brasília became the center of not only economic development but also a cultural renaissance. The new capital was endued with the new Brazilian identity founded on ideas of racial democracy that had developed since 1930 (Chapter II). Pains were taken to construct a national capital that celebrated Brazil's native and African roots and that was distinct from the capitals of Europe and North America, though that did little to improve the treatment of the predominantly black labor force that was abandoned to shantytowns on the city's outskirts after the project. Cultural effects were reflected in music, literature, art, cinema, and politics. The government's cultural promotion also took advantage of the national pride that swept the country following Brazil's first World Cup championship in 1958.[713] Brasília even enjoyed a special relationship with democracy. Built under the new regime it stood as Brazil's democratic capital, no longer tainted by a history of monarchy and authoritarianism. In a practical sense, Kubitschek felt it was necessary for the stability of the democratic regime that the federal government be moved away from an industrialized city like Rio de Janeiro where the masses, by which he seems to have meant militant labor groups, could place undue pressure upon it.[714]

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[712] Ibid.; Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek', 238–40.

[713] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 254–78; Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek', 238–39.

[714] Kubitschek, *A marcha do amanhecer*, 65; Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 327–30; For more on Rio de Janeiro in this period see Fischer, *A Poverty of Rights*; Fischer, 'The Red Menace Reconsidered'; Evenson, *Two Brazilian Capitals*.

Judging the developmental policies of the Kubitschek administration by their stated goals shows them to be successes. Brazilian economic growth and industrialization skyrocketed. Per capita GDP growth averaged 5% per year from 1956 through 1960 (Annex III) and industrial output nearly doubled. Energy output and oil production dramatically increased. The country even exceeded the Targets Program's mark in the area of highway construction, building 17,000 kilometers worth. Brazil's growth was nearly three times greater than the rest of Latin America in the 1950s. A major self-sustaining auto industry was willed into existence as a result of the government's policies courting foreign investment. Most visibly, on 21 April 1960, Brazil relocated its capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília. All this within a single presidential term.[715]

However, like his predecessors, Kubitschek had to grapple with the plague of inflation as well. A flood of government spending and loose credit intensified Brazil's persistent inflation crisis. Annual inflation averaged 25% during the Kubitschek years (Annex III). The country relied heavily on foreign creditors to bankroll development initiatives, especially the United States and private banks in North America and Europe; as inflation worsened, creditors worried. After the president avoided serious losses in the 1958 congressional election (Annex IV), he decided the time was right to attempt his own stabilization program. A requested 300 million dollar loan from the United States and the general availability of international credit hinged on Brazil's ability to secure International Monetary Fund (IMF) approval for its financial strategy. The IMF favored austerity measures and economic shock treatments, but these strategies had not proven effective elsewhere and would cripple the administration's development strategy. Instead, the government unveiled a two-pronged gradual approach focused on curbing price increases and

[715] Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek', 254–57; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 164–66; Wolfe, 'Populism and Developmentalism', 356–58.

simultaneously slowly limiting the expansion of the money supply. The IMF declined to approve the measures until they saw the results.

Industrialists chafed at reductions in available credit while social unrest resulted from a corresponding reduction on import subsidies. Nationalist politicians criticized the government for giving in to foreign pressure. Stabilization proved quite unpopular, and it became apparent that the development agenda would have to relent in some way to allow for fiscal stability. In June 1959, President Kubitschek instructed his representatives to break off negotiations with the IMF and abandoned stabilization to the delight of nationalists and many on the far left. Brazil leaned into inflation for the sake of growth even as foreign investment dried up as a result of the developing economic crisis and the United States canceled the pending loan.[716]

Changes to Political Organization

Ongoing processes of social change begat significant transformations for the party system and political mobilization in the countryside. Urbanization was at the heart of this social change. By 1960 nearly 45% of the population lived in urban areas (Annex II). A review of Brazil's largest farms shows that while they increased the amount of land owned in the 50s, they employed only 1.8 million people in 1960, nearly a million less than 10 years prior.[717] Educational gains tracked closely with urbanization as the 1950s saw the largest increase in literacy for any single decade in the twentieth century and less than 40% of the adult population

[716] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 236–53; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 174–78; Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek', 261–63.

[717] C. Daniel Dillman, 'Land and Labor Patterns in Brazil During the 1960s', *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 35, no. 1 (1976): 49–70, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1976.tb01214.x.

in Brazil was illiterate by 1960 (Annex II).[718] The official ballot and cleaner enrollment process introduced in 1955 also had the effect of increasing the weight of the urban voter.[719] This section looks first at the transformations within the major parties that occurred concomitantly with these social changes. Reviewed secondly, is the mobilization of rural labor and political organizations. The latter process extended through 1963 but is examined in this chapter because its origins lie in the period covered here.

Party Transformations

After 1955, new factions developed within the PSD, UDN, and PTB. In the PSD, the Ala Moça (Youth Wing) united several of the younger members of the party in support of Kubitschek's candidacy in 1955 and an agenda of modernization. The Ala Moça was far more willing to entertain ideas about social reform than party conservatives allied to the agrarian base. With the new president's support, they secured key congressional positions and a strong hold over party affairs.[720] The UDN also developed a progressive wing known as the Bossa Nova faction, taking its name from the musical trend. This faction formed towards the end of the Kubitschek administration and united around a perceived need for the party to increase its popular appeal. UDN radicals like Lacerda denounced the Bossa Nova as quasi-communist and

[718] Moving to an urban area did not bring immediate access to all the benefits of citizenship and the urban poor often had limited access to social rights and public services while living in 'informal' settlements. See Fischer, *A Poverty of Rights*.

[719] Hidalgo, 'Renovating Democracy', 43.

[720] Hippólito, *De raposas e reformistas,* 210–56; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 127.

repudiated their ideas.[721] Within the PTB a strong left-wing nationalist faction developed under the leadership of Vice President Goulart's brother-in-law Leonel Brizola, with its foundations in the suicide note of Getúlio Vargas that had identified foreign capital and its internal allies as the greatest obstacle to equitable economic development and Brazilian independence (Chapter IV).[722] These left wing nationalists occupied some important political positions including the governorship of Rio Grande do Sul after Brizola's election victory in 1958, a powerful post. Brizola's most notorious act as governor was to nationalize the largely American owned electricity provider in his state, to the dismay of Kubitschek. PTB nationalists, despite the fact that their party supported the government, became increasingly critical of the Kubitschek administration, especially its willingness to allow foreign investors into the industrialization process. Kubitschek's stabilization program enraged them, and they accused him of playing into the hands of American imperialism. Brizola took to making impassioned weekly radio broadcasts lampooning the administration.[723]

As these transformations played out, the PTB shifted the political debate in 1958 by unveiling its agenda for "basic reforms." The term basic reforms had become vogue in the politics of the 1950s and referred to the idea that fundamental reforms to Brazilian political and social institutions were necessary to adapt the regime to the new social realities of the country.

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[721] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 147–282; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 127.

[722] Vargas, 'Carta Testamento'.

[723] César Daniel de Assis Rolim, 'Leonel Brizola e os setores subalternos das Forças Armadas Brasileiras: 1961-1964' (Master's Thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2009), 39–72; Kenny Braga et al., 'Leonel Brizola: perfil, discursos e depoimentos (1922-2004)' (Porto Alegre, 2014); Ferreira, 'Brizola em Panfleto'; Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 311–16; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 96; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 178–82.

The PTB advanced the debate by giving a concrete shape to these reforms. The proposals spanned the categories of administration, agriculture, banking, currency, education, elections, taxation, and urbanization. The extension of suffrage to illiterates as well as enlisted military personnel and land redistribution stood out.[724] Several parties and candidates in the coming years would embrace the basic reforms in one way or another.

As new factions now dominated the PSD and PTB and divided the UDN, a new ideological cleavage developed in Brazilian politics between nationalism and liberal conservativism. This cleavage found its greatest expression through broad fronts, first within Congress and then involving segments of civil society. The two most important fronts from a legislative perspective, were the Frente Parlamentar Nacionalista (Nationalist Parliamentary Front) on the left and the Ação Democrática Parlamentar (Parliamentary Democratic Action) on the right – also referred to as the Frente Nacionalista and Ação Democrática respectively hereafter. While the Frente Nacionalista supported some of the administration's initiatives, both of these fronts proved critical of Kubitschek and much of his agenda.

In 1956, the Frente Parlamentar Nacionalista formed uniting 56 federal deputies across eight parties in the first interparty bloc in Brazilian republican history. The PTB (41%), PSD (14%), UDN (14%), Partido Republican (11%), and Ademar de Barros' populist party the Partido Social Progressista (Progressive Social Party/PSP) (11%) were the main sources of adherents. Brizola was a prominent member and Ala Moça and Bossa Nova representatives figured heavily in the front. The bloc maintained connections with civil society, including labor

[724] Cássio Silva Moreira, 'O Projeto de Nação do Governo João Goulart: O Plano Trienal e as Reformas de Base (1961-1964)' (PhD Thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2011), 261; D'Araújo, *Sindicatos, carisma & poder*, 125–26.

unions, and a new publication, *O Semanário*, endorsed the front and began to function as its de facto official newspaper.[725]

The iteration of nationalism shared by the Frente Nacionalista centered on state led developmentalism free from U.S. coercion and social equality through redistribution. Land reform constituted the central piece of their plan for reducing inequality. Generally, this brand of nationalism did not embrace xenophobia or socialist aims of transferring control over the means of production. Once Kubitschek endeavored on his stabilization program, the Frente Nacionalista became critical of his administration. His actions ran contrary to their vision for independent development and confirmed their suspicions about foreign powers manipulating developing economies to do what was best for the countries at the top.[726] One nationalist PTB deputy, Sérgio Magalhães, published a book critiquing the policy agenda of the administration. He claimed that foreign involvement in the modernization process would make the country dependent on outsiders, especially the United States. He argued that this "aggravation of colonial dependence" would lead to "the instability of power – the instability of the representative regime, the degeneration of political parties, the deformation of class associations, etc."[727] According to this view, democracy depended on nationalism to be viable; the people could only control the government if the United States did not.

Prior to the 1958 election, the Partido Comunista threw its support behind the Frente Nacionalista and candidates who supported a nationalist agenda. Via an official declaration, the

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[725] Ribeiro, 'Frente Parlamentar Nacionalista'.

[726] Ibid.

[727] Sérgio Magalhães, *Problema do desenvolvimento econômico* (Rio de Janeiro, 1960), 33.

party adopted a new stated end goal of "Nationalist and Democratic Government." The party professed loyalty to the Constitution, dedicating itself to a gradual revolution within the system. A new common enemy was identified: "The defeat of the policy of American imperialism and its internal agents will pave the way for the solution of all the other problems of the national and democratic revolution in Brazil." The party invited everyone, including the bourgeoise and even major landholders who were not part of the imperialist system, to join the cause. The party celebrated what it saw as a long "process of democratization" extending back to 1930 with setbacks in 1937 with the Estado Novo, 1947 with the illegalization of the party, and 1954 with imperialist forces pushing Vargas out. "Nationalist and democratic forces," they claimed, had saved the regime at every point. They advocated an independent foreign policy, progressive economic development, land reform, extension of suffrage to illiterates, and relegalization of their party. Communist adherents were encouraged to vote for "nationalist and democratic" candidates that "exist in all the parties."[728]

On the right, a civil society organization, the Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática (Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action) was formed in 1959 as an anti-communism think tank and center of mobilization for conservative causes. In 1961, to counter the Frente Nacionalista, UDN politicians linked with the institute organized their own interparty front called the Ação Democrática Parlamentar that was made up of conservatives from the UDN (27%), PSD (41%), and PTB (11%) as well as several smaller parties. The Ação Democrática organized around a message of anticommunism and defense of the democratic regime. Parliamentarians from the Ação Democrática opposed the basic reforms though to varying degrees. The institution of the

[728] Comitê Central do Partido Comunista do Brasil, 'Declaração sôbre a Politica do Partido Comunista do Brasil', *Voz Operária*, 22 March 1958, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

same name produced and disseminated a free magazine on behalf of the congressional front and aided the campaigns of its members. It also sponsored radio programs promoting a "democratic ideology" opposed to communist infiltration.[729] By October 1961 the Ação Democrática had 155 members in Congress.[730]

Much of the literature on this period describes the party system as suffering a breakdown and failing to adjust to social change.[731] However, several critiques of this traditional position exist. Delgado argued that the party system was in a process of "transformation" not collapse and she stipulated that the parties remained "strong and very representative."[732] She depicted the fronts as emerging from this transformation to provide voters with a "clearer profile, demarcating [the parties'] identities and differences."[733] Souza highlighted that the exact result of this process cannot be known because the 1964 coup prevented it from reaching its conclusion.[734] Perhaps the fronts would have served as the basis for a new party system or merely as the mechanism by which politicians of a similar ideological profile migrated to one of the three parties. Given the importance of the party structures for turning out the vote, they could not be instantly abandoned

[729] Ivan Hasslocher, 'O IBAD e a Liberdade', *O Estado de S. Paulo,* 6 September 1963, Acervo Estadão.

[730] Souza, 'Ação democrática parlamentar'.

[731] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964,* 185–86; Delgado, 'Partidos políticos e frentes parlamentares'; Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil,* 152; Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil*; Schneider, *The Political System of Brazil*; Lyne, 'Parties as Programmatic Agents'.

[732] Delgado, 'Partidos políticos e frentes parlamentares', 165–66; See also Judson Marshall De Cew Jr., 'Political Experience and Electoral Behavior in Brazil: Rio Grande Do Sul, 1950-1974.' (PhD Dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1977), 85.

[733] Delgado, 'Partidos políticos e frentes parlamentares', 165–66.

[734] Souza, *Estado e partidos políticos no Brasil (1930 a 1964),* 140.

in favor of the fronts.[735] However, the fronts did provide immediate clarity for voters and ideological coherence for governance. Ribeiro's investigation of the Frente Nacionalista also found little support for the concept of "partisan fragility." His literature review found no evidence of a causal relationship between party fragmentation and the formation of interparty fronts. Instead, he concluded that the Frente Nacionalista "did not weaken the parties but reinforced them by allowing spaces for specific discussions that would not take place in these traditional groups."[736] Collier and Collier also found that the fronts were "ideologically more coherent."[737]

Nicolau's quantitative analysis of the electoral data found, "there is no evidence of growing party fragmentation. Therefore, no crisis of the party system can be attributed to a possible increase in party fragmentation, simply because it did not occur."[738] Utilizing his more accurate data, Nicolau successfully challenged a prevailing hypothesis in the literature that suggested that after 1955 the PSD and UDN entered in decline in favor of the PTB and small parties as voters lost faith in the major parties. Nicolau demonstrated that the PSD and UDN contraction was extremely small with UDN popularity actually increasing after 1958 (Annex IV).[739] The growth of the PTB, following Soares, is more correctly credited to the fact that expansion of the electorate largely through urbanization and literacy expansion benefitted the

[735] De Cew Jr., 'Political Experience and Electoral Behavior in Brazil', 85.

[736] Ribeiro, 'Frente Parlamentar Nacionalista', viii.

[737] Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena,* 510.

[738] Nicolau, 'Partidos na República de 1946', 97.

[739] Nicolau, 'Partidos na República de 1946'.

urban working class more than the social classes allied to the PSD and UDN.[740] Parties were not in a state of decay, nor had they ceased to communicate the preferences of the segments of society which they represented. They did not generate a crisis, nor reflect the signs of an ailing regime.

Rural Mobilization

During this period, mobilization reached the frontier of Brazilian political organization, the rural working class.[741] Starting in the Northeastern state of Pernambuco in 1955 and spreading to other rural states, a series of rural labor associations sprung up that gained the name, Peasant Leagues. These associations sought to provide medical assistance, legal resources, and other benefits to their members. In so doing, they challenged the landholders whose power flowed from their ability to bestow or withhold such benefits. They also enabled their members to legally challenge landholders for their rights. Politically, the leagues advocated for land reform and pressed for the expansion of social legislation to the countryside. The Peasant Leagues were not the first forms of rural organization, but they quickly became the largest and most effective. By 1962, the Peasant Leagues boasted a quarter of a million members. The leagues became associated with the leadership of Francisco Julião, a lawyer from a large

[740] Soares, *A democracia interrompida*, 65–84.

[741] Secondary sources for this subsection except where otherwise specified are Carolina Ramos, 'A construção do sindicalismo rural brasileiro', *Anais do VI Simpósio Nacional Estado e Poder: Cultura*, 2010; Antônio Torres Montenegro, 'Ligas Camponesas e sindicatos rurais em tempo de revolução', in *O Brasil Republicano: O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 296–335; Montenegro, 's Ligas Camponesas Às Vésperas do Golpe'; Vianna, *Liberalismo e sindicato no Brasil*; Vanilda Paiva, ed., *Igreja e Questão Agrária* (São Paulo, 1985); Ruy Alckmin Rocha Filho, 'O parto dos caminhos: Formação dos Sindicatos Rurais no Rio Grande do Norte (1960 - 1964)' (Master's Thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, 2005); Welch, 'Rivalry and Unification'; Robert E. Price, 'Rural Unionization in Brazil', *Land Tenure Center Research Papers*, August 1964.

landholding family. While studying at university, Julião had gain a predilection for Marxist ideas and as a lawyer he dedicated himself to representing peasants. In 1947, he joined the Partido Socialista Brasileiro; in 1948 he began representing rural associations; and by 1955 he was the nationally recognizable leader of the Peasant Leagues. In 1962, the state of Pernambuco elected Julião as federal deputy.[742] Rural mobilization placed enormous pressure on the government and in 1963 the Rural Worker Statute – the politics of which will be discussed in Chapter VI – was passed. This statute extended all the social legislation applied to urban workers since 1943 to rural workers, including the ability to form government recognized labor organizations.

The Leagues did not act alone in the countryside. Starting after World War II but beginning in earnest in the 50s, the Catholic Church, led by progressive priests, had sought to improve the plight of the rural poor. This took the form of organizations, under the umbrella of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops, dedicated to providing education and healthcare. The Partido Comunista also took advantage of the growing revolutionary sentiment in the rural areas and in 1954 expanded its organization into the countryside. The party produced the newspaper *Terra Livre* to spread its message and communicate with its adherents. *Terra Livre* was designed to be read out loud for its heavily illiterate target audience. Communists and the Leagues often worked together in their advocacy for rural rights

Once the Rural Worker Statute allowed for unionization, a tense competition set off between the Partido Comunista and Catholic leaders to shape rural labor organization. Communists saw rural mobilization as a potential new base of support for revolution while the Catholic Church saw an imperative need to rescue rural workers from the corrupting influence of

[742] Claudio Aguiar, *Francisco Julião: Uma biografia* (Rio de Janeiro, 2014); Pablo Porfirio, *Francisco Juliao: Em Luta com seu Mito, Golpe de Estado, Exilio e Redemocratizacao do Brasil* (Jundiaí, 2016).

communism.[743] Catholic education programs aimed to "educate workers for democracy, moving them away from communist ideas" and spread literacy while helping workers become aware of their rights.[744] Education played a fundamental role in Catholic unionization as well. Unionization courses provided by the church focused on the topics of political economy, labor and social legislation, constitutional rights, and criticisms of Marxism. The church encouraged workers to fight for agricultural reform without "destroying the Christian social order."[745] The Partido Comunista, in turn, made frequent use of *Terra Livre* to discredit Catholic backed unions as inauthentic representatives of rural workers while holding up revolutionary Cuba as an example of a truly democratic country.[746]

The mobilization of rural workers alarmed landholders and rural proprietors who since the Estado Novo had used their influence in government to prevent the expansion of social legislation into the countryside (Chapter II). Via proprietor associations, the rural elite attempted to control and mitigate the mobilization of their workforce. *Revista Gleba*, the official media outlet of the national confederation of proprietor associations, insisted that rural workers lacked the education and culture necessary for urban style unionization. Rural proprietors asserted that rural unions should be controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture instead of the Ministry of Labor and that these unions should focus on the provision of services like education and healthcare not labor disputes. When these efforts failed the rural elite turned to backing a moderate mobilization

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[743] Mainwaring, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985*, 54–59.

[744] Ramos, 'A construção do sindicalismo rural brasileiro'.

[745] Church pamphlet quoted in ibid.

[746] For example, see 'Terra e Liberdade para os Lavradores de Cuba', *Terra Livre*, January 1960, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

as embodied by the Catholic movements while denouncing the Communists and the Peasant Leagues. *Revista Gleba* extolled the virtues of unions that valued "social peace" and insisted that unionization should not disrupt the "constructive dependency" that existed between employers and employees in the countryside that struggled together against common enemies of climate and markets.[747] Nevertheless, expansion of the vote to illiterates and land reform remained popular causes among the rural working class that did not share a positive view of "constructive dependency" and instead sought to liberate themselves from such dependence upon proprietors. Rural workers in both Catholic and Communist led unions continued to agitate for their rights.

After 1962, rural unions largely displaced the Peasant Leagues as the primary units of rural mobilization.[748] Unionization advanced rapidly and by 1963 nearly 800 rural unions had been organized with 270 of those already having received official recognition from the government and the rest awaiting certification. The recognized unions already represented approximately half a million rural workers, far outpacing the Leagues.[749]

In the more inclusive and competitive political environment under Kubitschek, large scale political mobilization reached the countryside. This mobilization secured real change, like the Rural Worker Statute, and created significant political pressure around issues of import to the peasant class, especially land reform and the extension of suffrage to illiterates. These rural

[747] As quoted in Ramos, 'A construção do sindicalismo rural brasileiro'.

[748] Anthony Pereira, 'O Declínio das Ligas Camponesas e a Ascensão dos Sindicatos: As Organizações de Trabalhadores Rurais em Pernambuco na Segunda República, 1955-1963', *CLIO: Revista de Pesquisa Histórica* 26, no. 2 (2008).

[749] Bethell, 'The Failure of the Left in Brazil', 207.

issues remained at the heart of Brazilian politics after 1960 and were the subject of much of the polarization that occurred in 1963 and 1964 as will be discussed in the following chapter.

The Election of 1960

With Kubitschek refusing to amend the constitution to allow for his own reelection, a transfer of power in 1961 became inevitable. The 1960 election served as further evidence of the democratic advances the country was making and Kubitschek's commitment to an inclusive and competitive regime. Dominating discussions of the coming presidential election was the new face of Brazilian politics. Buoyed by magazine, television, and radio coverage, Quadros, the Governor of São Paulo, had become an unrivaled national political celebrity while still just in his early 40s.[750] Long before the campaigns began, many political actors believed that he would win the presidency regardless of what parties did or did not endorse him. Quadros, who had originally achieved local elected office thanks to the expulsion of Partido Comunista office holders, had been affiliated with multiple parties over his short career but never with any of the major ones. He derided the political elite and wealthy Brazilians as generally morally corrupt while denouncing Vargas' legacy.[751] Yet, the face of anti-Vargas politics found himself in a peculiar post in 1958. As his term as governor drew to a close, Quadros needed a position where he could prepare for the presidential contest. The São Paulo constitution barred him from running for any office within the state, so he accepted an invitation from the state level PTB organization in the state of Paraná to run for federal deputy. Paraná PTB leadership hoped to

[750] Lavareda, *A democracia nas urnas*, 126–27.

[751] Jefferson José Queler, 'O governo Jânio Quadros: entre a política e o personalismo', in *O Brasil Republicano: O Tempo da Experiencia Democratica*, ed. Jorge Ferreira and Lucília de Almeida Neves Delgado, 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 2003), 425–46.

profit from his celebrity and many within the traditional party of Vargas had come to admire Quadros as a leader for social change even as he denounced their party as corrupt. The arrangement paid off and Quadros won more votes than any other candidate in a state which he had never visited prior to his nomination.[752]

Several events in the latter half of 1959 shaped the 1960 election. "Preoccupied with the future of the country," Kubitschek felt it would be best if the next president came out of the UDN, allowing the opposition to secure power "democratically," and hopefully dampening the support for coups that had been growing in its ranks.[753] Some scholars have also suggested that Kubitschek calculated that his reelection in 1965, when he would next be constitutionally eligible, would be best served if the president dealing with the looming financial crisis was from the opposition.[754] Whatever the motivation, Kubitschek began negotiations with UDN leadership to select a UDN candidate who would be endorsed by the PSD and PTB, so long as that candidate was not Quadros or Lacerda. With the endorsement of the three major parties and the support of their turnout machines, a candidate might be able to best Quadros.

Consensus formed around the name of UDN president and moderate politician Juracy Magalhães. However, word of the negotiations leaked to Lacerda, still the most consequential leader of the radical wing of the UDN, who abhorred the idea of accommodating Kubitschek in any way. He immediately flew to São Paulo where he unilaterally offered the UDN endorsement to Quadros should he run. Though not acting in any official capacity, Lacerda had ensured that

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[752] Alessandro Batistella, 'A participação e a influência de Jânio Quadros na política paranaense (1958-1961)', *Antíteses* 11, no. 22 (2018): 661–86.

[753] Kubitschek, *Por Que Construi Brasilia*, 268.

[754] Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 340; Cedro, 'O governo Juscelino Kubitschek', 265.

any attempt to nominate someone besides Quadros would split the UDN.[755] Lacerda and a group of UDN leaders had been leaning towards Quadros for some time. Though they found him off putting and erratic, he was the most popular politician in Brazil outside of the Estado Novo parties and the prohibitive favorite to win the election. It seemed too good of an opportunity to pass up and they were desperate to avoid losing another presidential contest. Despite continued resistance of UDN moderates, Quadros received the UDN nomination in November of 1959 as well as the nomination of several small parties.[756]

As the result of its nationalist turn the PTB and Kubitschek had grown further apart. The president particularly disliked Brizola. Besides his familial relationship with the vice president, Brizola had also secured the loyalty of the Commander of Brazil's Third Army that was stationed in Rio Grande do Sul, where Brizola was governor. In late 1959, the Kubitschek administration became aware of a rumored plot whereby Brizola would use his organized labor connections to foment unrest and social upheaval. Once the chaos reached a fevered pitch, the Third Army would step in and impose a unity candidate for president aligned with organized labor, likely Goulart or Brizola. Using militant labor to undermine democratic institutions was the exact kind of Peronist tactic which Vice President Goulart's enemies had always dreaded. Now Kubitschek feared Brizola might be the one to carry it out. When the administration leaked their suspicions to the public it caused an uproar. Goulart promised the president he had no

[755] Kubitschek, *Por Que Construi Brasilia*, 268–69.

[756] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 107–11.

knowledge of such a plan and publicly denounced any plot that would disrupt Brazil's democratic institutions.[757]

Finally, in December 1959 a small group of Air Force officers again attempted a revolt as they had after Kubitschek's inauguration. This time the plotters even prepared declarations for an emergency military government that would proscribe certain Estado Novo institutions and politicians of the Vargas tradition. The officers made their plans known to opposition legislators they believed would be supportive, including Lacerda. This time, however, Lacerda reported their plans to the government who quickly ended the revolt before it began. The UDN blamed Kubitschek for creating conditions of desperation but denounced the plot. Ultimately, Lacerda and the UDN believed they could finally win a presidential election and feared that a foolhardy coup attempt might give the government cause to cancel the elections or provoke a counter coup from Brizola and the portion of the Army loyal to him. For the time being, the UDN appetite for a military solution, even that of Lacerda, had dried up. These were arguably positive developments for Brazilian democratization.[758]

With Kubitschek's attempt to unite behind the UDN ruined, the PSD searched for its own presidential candidate for 1960. The Ala Moça successfully pushed for Minister of War Lott, who had become enamored with his own reputation as the savior of Brazilian democracy and allowed his name to be put forward. Kubitschek thought Lott an uninspiring choice and offered only lukewarm support. The PSD then sought to renew its alliance with the PTB. Though Lott's actions in 1955 had made him a hero with the Brazilian left, many within the PTB had mixed

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[757] Kubitschek, *Por Que Construi Brasilia*, 272–74.

[758] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 91–100.

feelings about his candidacy. Party leadership wanted to nominate Goulart, but they knew his candidacy would be extremely controversial and might provoke a hostile reaction from elements in the military. The party contented itself with maintaining the Estado Novo alliance and nominated Lott with Goulart again standing for vice president. While the PSD had hoped to avoid Goulart on the ticket again, alternatives were scarce. The Partido Comunista also backed Lott though the candidate remained staunchly anti-communist.[759] Lott summarized his campaign into four points, democracy, education, development, and nationalism. Like his Ala Moça supporters, he embraced a moderate form of nationalism, which he defined as a "political orientation, through which the Nation, knowing the problems of its organization, is willing to face them and prepares itself to solve them."[760] Nationalism to Lott meant Brazil solving its own problems without external tutelage. While Lott did not expressly endorse the basic reforms agenda, his campaign's democracy plank included a promise to support the extension of suffrage to illiterates. Yet Lott proved a poor campaigner, he lacked charisma and relied on his accolades to endear him to voters.[761]

Some members of the PTB disapproved of the nationalist turn the party was making and of Goulart and Brizola's leadership. Such was the case of Federal Deputy Fernando Ferrari; seeking to create a more bottom-up party for labor, he and other PTB defectors founded the Movimento Trabalhista Renovador (Renewal Labor Movement) in 1960. Instead of forwarding

[759] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 131–32.

[760] 'Lott define os principios de sua filosofia politica', *O Estado de S. Paulo,* 2 September 1960, Acervo Estadão.

[761] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964,* 189–90.

their own candidate for president the movement nominated Ferrari for Vice President and encouraged their members to vote for Quadros as president.[762]

If any successful candidate for the presidency of the Fourth Republic can be properly categorized as populist, it is Quadros. Far more charismatic than any of his predecessors he expertly developed an unmediated connection with his supporters. The son of a doctor turned politician, Quadros came from a middle class background but his family had suffered from debt and poverty at times, and the governor could claim a more direct connection to the common Brazilian than most politicians of his time.[763] Parties had little control over him, and he railed against them as tools of the elite and promised his supporters that he was beholden to none of them, not event those that backed him. Future president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso who interacted with Quadros throughout his life, painted a dark picture. He described Quadros as an unpredictable drunk with an immoral and violent relationship with women who masqueraded as a moralizer. Cardoso declared him, perhaps the most "eccentric, mercurial, or tragic figure" in Brazilian history.[764] Yet Quadros proved extremely popular despite or because of his oddities and failings.[765]

Quadros remained well aware at all times that UDN needed him far more than he needed them. In the face of party demands on his future government and insistence on a UDN vice

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[762] Maura Bombardelli, 'A trajetória de Fernando Ferrari no PTB: da formação do partido ao "trabalhismo renovador" (1945-1960)' (Master's Thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2016).

[763] Cardoso and Winter, *The Accidental President of Brazil*, 57.

[764] Ibid., 57.

[765] Arnt, *Jânio Quadros,* 123–62; Queler, 'O governo Jânio Quadros: entre a política e o personalismo', 425–31.

presidential candidate, Quadros dramatically resigned the UDN nomination on two separate occasions. The party managed to coax Quadros back each time and got him to accept the UDN's Milton Campos as his running mate. The theatrics and wild oscillations of the candidate he brought to the party infuriated Lacerda. Privately he threatened to destroy Quadros' candidacy describing him as a "clown," "charlatan," and "imposter," wondering aloud, "If he starts this way, imagine how he will finish."[766] Yet Quadros' popularity seemed to know no bounds. Besides the traditional sources of UDN support like the urban middle class, he had endorsements from Julião and the Peasant Leagues and Ferrari's PTB defectors. Soon electoral "committees" organized by PTB rebels emerged that encouraged PTB voters to split their ticket and vote for Goulart as vice president and Quadros as president instead of Lott. Since neither man much cared for their running mate, they did nothing to distance themselves from these campaigns. With Goulart, Ferrari, and Campos, there were now three candidates officially or unofficially running as Quadros' vice president.[767]

Quadros repeated his promises from past elections to reduce the bureaucracy and fight corruption, but he now included an endorsement of the basic reforms, particularly the extension of social legislation into the countryside, and an independent foreign policy. He promised to maintain economic development but did not endorse the leading role the government had played under Kubitschek. Instead, he insisted that development could be maintained, and inflation controlled simultaneously. To the joy of liberal economics advocates in the UDN, Quadros endorsed a balanced budget and the need for increased foreign investment.[768] Quadros spoke

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[766] As quoted in Arnt, *Jânio Quadros*, 127.

[767] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 132.

[768] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 191.

frequently of democracy which for him meant overcoming the "confabulations" of the political elite that muted the "will of the majority." Instead, he claimed, "I prefer the streets and public squares, in the legitimate exercise of the democratic regime, where everyone is equal in the search for the common ideal of progress and culture."[769] Before and after the election, Quadros clung to this idea of democracy as something made manifest in the public expressions of the people and not in the parties or Congress.

After 15 years of opposition, the UDN finally won a presidential election.[770] In October 1960, nearly 12 million Brazilians voted and Quadros (48%) easily triumphed over Lott (33%) as well as Barros who again stood as the PSP candidate (19%). This time the UDN had no qualms with the winning candidate receiving slightly less than an absolute majority. The *Estado de S. Paulo* celebrated the "victory of democracy" over the "remains of Getulismo" and nationalism.[771] The vice presidential contest was reversed. Goulart (42%), narrowly defeated the UDN's Campos (39%) to win reelection. For the first time the vice presidential candidate on the ticket of the presidential winner had lost, another clear demonstration of the superiority of Quadros in his alliance with the UDN.

Despite the polarized and violent backdrop against which he assumed the presidency, the Kubitschek years had proved to be the best the Fourth Republic had enjoyed. Deliberate efforts to depolarize and build consensus had led most of the political and military elite to accept the

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[769] 'Janio Quadros Lê na Cidade de Recife Sua Plataforma de Governo', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 20 September 1960, 52, Acervo Estadão.

[770] For official election results see *Anuário Estatístico Do Brasil: Ano XXII - 1961* (Rio de Janeiro, 1961).

[771] 'A derrota do nacionalismo', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 6 October 1960, sec. Notas e Informações, Acervo Estadão.

administration even if they did not support it. This contributed to a dramatically improved working environment and allowed for major pieces of legislation and reform to be implemented, principally in the areas of economic development. Politicians and their parties had shown themselves to be sensitive to the social changes around and increasingly coalesced around identifiable ideological positions. Simultaneously, the mobilization in the countryside was expanding participation at the margins and changing political debates. Kubitschek's closing act was to oversee another competitive presidential election and peacefully transfer power to the opposition party, notwithstanding his personal distaste for his successor.

The Brief Presidency of Jânio Quadros and the Overriding of a Military Veto

By virtue of his position as the candidate of the opposition, Quadro's election stood out as a significant accomplishment for the developing democracy of the Fourth Republic. His resignation eight months into his presidency threw the country into its greatest political crisis yet and pitted military senior leadership against popular opinion. The result was mass mobilization and a defiant legislative branch that refused to acquiesce to a military veto.

Quadros' Presidency

Quadros proved as unpredictable as president as he had as a candidate.[772] In addition to his infamous alcoholism, the president proved easily distracted and seemed to switch priorities

[772] For the Quadros presidency see Arnt, *Jânio Quadros*, 123–62; Queler, 'O governo Jânio Quadros: entre a política e o personalismo'; Felipe Pereira Loureiro, 'Varrendo a democracia: considerações sobre as relações políticas entre Jânio Quadros e o Congresso Nacional', *Revista Brasileira de História* 29 (June 2009): 187–208, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-01882009000100008; Victor, *Cinco Anos Que Abalaram o Brasil: De Jânio Quadros Ao Maréchal Castelo Branco*, 31–319; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 187–205.

and strategies on a whim. Assuming office in January of 1961, Quadros prepared his cabinet giving the lion share of posts to the UDN which would now exercise significant control over the bureaucracy for the first time. Quadros retained the Minister of War that had replaced Lott when he left to contest the presidency, the conservative General Odílio Denys.[773]

Inflation and the financial crisis awaited Kubitschek's successor. Consensus among economists was that government expenditure was the cause of the inflation. Kubitschek had never been willing to reign in his development spending for the sake of controlling inflation. Quadros immediately set about making painful decisions apparently assured of his popularity. He simplified the exchange rate which dramatically devalued the Brazilian currency. Next, he slashed import subsidies on wheat and oil which sent food and transportation prices skyrocketing to market level. He also prepared budget cuts. The IMF rejoiced and finally gave its approval to a Brazilian stabilization effort. More importantly, in January 1961 as Quadros took the reins, John F. Kennedy was also sworn in as President of the United States. The Kennedy administration was far more willing to engage with Latin America as part of its Cold War strategy to abate the spread of Communism known as the Alliance for Progress. This new U.S. administration eagerly supported Quadros, happy to have a willing partner, especially one willing to repay Brazil's debts, at the head of its most important ally in South America. By June, the Quadros administration had secured a two billion dollar financing package that included new foreign loans as well as the consolidation and reorganization of Brazil's existing foreign debt on more favorable repayment terms. However, the overwhelming negative public reaction to the effects of fiscal stabilization, manifested via widespread protests, quickly shook Quadros'

[773] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964,* 193–94.

resolve. The president suddenly shifted directions and began resurrecting the central planning apparatus of the Kubitschek administration that he had originally discarded. Credit restrictions began to loosen by August and foreign creditors again grew concerned.

Financial stability was the problem Quadros had to contend with, corruption and administration reform were the ones he wanted to address. The Brazilian bureaucracy was bloated, more positions meant more patronage for presidents and officials to dole out. Civil positions were made valuable by their protected status which made them difficult to dismiss. Kubitschek and Vargas had also taken to creating new departments and organizations to bypass inefficient ones. The result was a confusing web of excess and redundancy. Quadros issued a flurry of executive orders in his attempt to clean up government, but incoherence abounded. Some executive orders restructured the bureaucracy but randomly the president would get distracted by moralistic side projects that have since become legendary. These included bans on bikinis, miniskirts, and certain Carnaval celebrations. The executive branch also began to oversee a string of corruption investigations as it maligned the Kubitschek administration. Most of these investigations targeted opposition politicians, mainly from the PSD and PTB, including Vice President Goulart. The PSD and PTB responded by accusing the president with playing political games and using their combined majority in Congress conducted oversight reviews of the anti-corruption investigations to undermine them.[774]

Significantly impacting the presidency of Quadros and 1960s Latin American politics in general was the Cuban Revolution in 1959. As Weyland has recently shown, the success of Fidel Castro and his revolutionaries had profound implications across Latin America, giving both the

[774] Ibid., 193–200; Arnt, *Jânio Quadros*, 123–62.

far right and far left an inflated sense that the events of Cuba might be replicated elsewhere. This had the effect of creating pressure to polarize as concessions and compromise came to be viewed as a slippery slope to imperialist domination or socialist revolution.[775] It also had the effect of focusing U.S. attention on the region as the Kennedy administration insisted all of Latin America ostracize the island nation.[776] Within Brazil, the Partido Comunista and rural leaders had taken particular note of the events in Cuba. Julião, the leader of the Peasant Leagues, carried out a series of visits to Cuba where he secured support and financing from the Cuban government. The Communist chief, Luís Carlos Prestes, even accompanied Julião on one of his visits to Cuba in 1963 where both men met with Castro and other Cuban leaders. The Castro government went as far as providing military training and weapons to a small group of rural leaders who hoped to transplant guerrilla tactics to Brazil for their own revolution. Such designs never achieved much, but they were enough to vilify Julião and much of the Brazilian left in the eyes of the U.S. government and its Central Intelligence Agency.[777]

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[775] Kurt Weyland, *Revolution and Reaction: The Diffusion of Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Cambridge, 2019), 75–110; See also O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, 69; Nancy Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton, 2003), 70–71; Marcelo D'Alencourt Nogueira, 'As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola no governo Jango (1961-1964)' (Master's Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2006), 68.

[776] Michael Dunne, 'Kennedy's Alliance for Progress: Countering Revolution in Latin America. Part I: From the White House to the Charter of Punta Del Este', *International Affairs* 89, no. 6 (1 November 2013): 1389–1409, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12080; Michael Dunne, 'Kennedy's Alliance for Progress: Countering Revolution in Latin America Part II: The Historiographical Record', *International Affairs* 92, no. 2 (1 March 2016): 435–52, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12558.

[777] Ferreira, 'Reforma Agrária e Revolução: Cuba e as Ligas Camponesas do Brasil nos Anos 60'; Montenegro, 's Ligas Camponesas Às Vésperas do Golpe'; Montenegro, 'Ligas Camponesas e sindicatos rurais'.

Against this backdrop, Quadros fulfilled a campaign promise by pursuing an independent foreign policy which was not well received by the Kennedy administration. During the campaign, he made a trip to revolutionary Cuba and as president he promised to defend "with intransigence the sovereignty of Cuba," in open defiance of U.S. policy toward the island.[778] Unlike his fiscal policy, the new president's foreign policy seemed designed to spurn the United States as much as reasonably possible. Skidmore suggested that Quadros was inspired by countries like Egypt that he felt had successfully played the superpowers against each other to their own benefit.[779] Quadros insisted that more financing was needed from the U.S. and Western Europe: "The Western world must show and prove that it is not only Communist planning that promotes the prosperity of national economies. Democratic planning must also do so."[780] Just three months into the Quadros administration, the United States failed in its attempt to topple Castro with the botched Bay of Pigs invasion. The Kennedy administration doubled down on its insistence that its allies in the region isolate Cuba diplomatically and economically; Quadros refused and instead reopened diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union, closed since 1947, while pursuing a trade agreement with the communist bloc. The administration also signaled its intention to vote in favor of seating Communist China at the United Nations. In August, the president made the unexpected decision to award the National Order of the Southern Cross, an honor for foreigners who provided a service to the Brazilian nation, to the revolutionary leader Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who was then serving as the Cuban economy minister. The award

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[778] Jânio Quadros, 'Brazil's New Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, October 1961, Foreign Affairs Archive, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/1961-10-01/brazils-new-foreign-policy.

[779] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 199.

[780] Quadros, 'Brazil's New Foreign Policy'.

confused many and enraged pro-U.S. politicians within the UDN.[781] Meanwhile nationalists and the PTB celebrated the award and Quadros' foreign policy that defied American imperialism. For advocates of a nationalist economic strategy, an independent foreign policy was a prerequisite for a country that wished to pursue an economic strategy free from external control.[782] It was a rare area of agreement between Quadros and the left.

Quadros resigns

President Quadros had proven unpredictable and impossible to control. He had grown ever more distant and uncooperative with the UDN and clashed frequently with the opposition. Loureiro has shown that, from the beginning, Quadros worked to delegitimize Congress in the public's eyes and accused it of being an undemocratic institution too distant from the people. In his first radio broadcast as president, Quadros had called for more "organs of democratic mechanics . . . closer to the masses," though it was unclear what he meant.[783] Similarly, Quadros told those around him that Brazil needed a constitutional amendment to prevent Congress from obstructing the president's agenda though again he provided no details as to what that would mean. Opposition leaders charged the president with usurping the powers of the legislative branch and preparing a dictatorship. Quadros grew increasingly confrontational as he found himself with an ambitious reform agenda, including plans for agrarian reform, and no allies in Congress to aid him.[784]

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[781] Queler, 'O governo Jânio Quadros: entre a política e o personalismo', 435–36; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 200–202; Arnt, *Jânio Quadros*, 123–62.

[782] Martins, 'Ideology and Development', 161–62.

[783] As quoted in Loureiro, 'Varrendo a democracia', 190.

[784] Loureiro, 'Varrendo a democracia'.

Lacerda, Quadros' original UDN backer, had seen enough and took it upon himself to bring the president down. In August of 1961, while serving as the governor of the newly created state of Guanabara, Lacerda launched a series of public attacks on television and the radio against the president. Commanding huge audiences, he warned the Brazilian people that Quadros' was plotting a coup to install a dictatorship, a charge the administration denied. Behind the scenes Quadros had in fact been attempting to convince military leadership that greater powers that would allow him to bypass the legislature would be necessary to avoid a socialist revolution. However, his pleas had largely been ignored. Once he broke with the president, Lacerda too approached the military ministers in the government to propose his own coup and an emergency regime under the control of the armed forces; he was also rejected.[785]

Then on 25 August, nearly seven months into his presidency, Quadros shocked the nation by resigning. He blamed reactionaries for frustrating his agenda and told those around him, "With this Congress I cannot govern."[786] The consensus among historians is that Quadros, inspired by the example of French President Charles de Gaulle, hoped to force Congress or the military to grant him broad emergency powers. Quadros seems to have believed that his popularity combined with the military's disdain for Goulart would make it impossible for his resignation to be accepted. It should be noted that Goulart's presence in the vice presidency at this point was made possible by the institutional design which allowed for the separate election of the vice president and immediate reelection to that post. Quadros had even dispatched Goulart

[785] Queler, 'O governo Jânio Quadros: entre a política e o personalismo', 440–42; Arnt, *Jânio Quadros,* 123–62.

[786] As quoted in Victor, *Cinco Anos Que Abalaram o Brasil: De Jânio Quadros Ao Maréchal Castelo Branco*, 309.

to Communist China to highlight the radical threat his vice president supposedly posed. It turned out to be one of the most consequential political miscalculations by a president in Brazilian history. Congress quickly voted to accept his resignation, and the military did nothing to prevent them from doing so. Quadros' confidence quickly soured into disbelief as the relatively small popular manifestations on his behalf failed to intimidate Congress and return him to power. Quadros behavior reflected an assumption that the Brazilian population preferred his leadership to the continued existence of democratic institutions, a bold and ultimately erroneous assumption for a man who won slightly less than 50% of the total vote. Finally, by sending Goulart out of the country he actually lessened the threat he posed since he was not immediately available to assume the presidency, political actors could formulate alternative solutions.[787]

Democracy and Military Vetoes

With Goulart out of the country, Congress voted to install the President of the Chamber of Deputies Ranieri Mazzilli (PSD) as the acting president in accordance with the constitutional line of succession. As Quadros hoped, many military leaders rejected the idea of Goulart as president. The three military ministers in the cabinet led by General Denys communicated to Goulart that he should not return to Brazil under any circumstance and that if he did, he would be immediately placed under arrest. The military ministers stated that Goulart was not "worthy" of respect for the constitutional order because of his fraternization with communists.[788] The PTB furiously demanded that Goulart be allowed to assume the presidency, insisting that anything

[787] Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil*, 135; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 200–205; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 135–36; Queler, 'O governo Jânio Quadros: entre a política e o personalismo', 442; Arnt, *Jânio Quadros*, 163–210.

[788] As quoted in João Marcelo Pereira dos Santos, 'Os herdeiros de Sisifo: a ação coletiva dos trabalhadores porto-alegrenses nos anos de 1958 a 1963' (Master's Thesis, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2002), 177.

else would constitute a coup. Within Congress, led by the PTB, PSD, and the Frente Nacionalista, a majority supported the idea of Goulart's ascension. Lott came out of retirement to insist that the military should not oppose Goulart as he was the constitutionally mandated president, even vowing that he would lead troops if necessary to defend the regime. Denys would not stand for such a threat and instantly arrested and imprisoned Lott. Soon suspected nationalist officers across the armed forces found themselves under arrest.[789]

The military ministers demanded that Congress vote to bar Goulart from office but in a significant show of independence, they refused. Even several conservative politicians in the Ação Democrática resisted the idea of the military dictating congressional action and only the most radical right-wing politicians, Lacerda included, supported the position of the military ministers.[790] In response, the three military ministers issued a public statement attacking Congress' position. While accusing Goulart of communist leanings, their comments suggest a greater fear of Brazilian Peronism or a unionist republic of which Goulart had been frequently accused. "Mr. João Goulart clearly demonstrated his ideological tendencies, encouraging and even promoting successive and frequent agitations in union circles, with evidently political objectives and even to the detriment of the real interests of our working classes." Adamantly they declared that a Goulart presidency would mean the ruin of "democratic institutions and with

[789] Jorge Ferreira, 'A Legalidade Traída: os Dias Sombrios de Agosto e Setembro de 1961', *Tempo* 2, no. 3 (1997): 149–82; Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 404–19.

[790] Ferreira, 'A Legalidade Traída'; Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 404–19.

them justice, freedom, social peace, all the highest standards of our Christian culture" unless Congress vetoed his return.[791]

As political and military leadership settled into an uneasy stalemate, the debate spilled out into the public arena. In Rio Grande do Sul, Goulart's brother-in-law Governor Brizola, in conjunction with organized labor and communist activists prepared a popular campaign in favor of Goulart's return. Brizola had originally reached out to offer safe harbor and aid to Quadros against what he was sure was a coup. Those around Quadros had to convince Brizola that the president had in fact resigned of his own volition. At this point the governor and civil society leaders organized a series of Democratic Resistance Committees to mobilize supporters especially those within the organized labor structure by holding rallies and distributing materials. The committees, who claimed to stand for the "defense of legality" and of the "Constitution of the Republic" received tens of thousands of volunteers and support from many press outlets in the state.[792] Besides political organization these committees also began to prepare "worker battalions" by arming unions and other civil society members as Brizola became convinced that civil war would be Goulart's only path to the presidency.[793]

Brizola then nationalized his fight. His government assumed control of the local radio station and through connections with more than 100 stations across the country formed the

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[791] Odylio Denys, Sylvio Heck, and Gabriel Grum Moss, 'Manifesto dos Ministros Militares Contra a Posse de João Goulart na Presidência da República Quando da Renúncia de Jânio Quadros' (30 August 1961), Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, https://gedm.ifcs.ufrj.br/upload/documentos/4.pdf.

[792] 'Dezenas de Milhares de Pôrto-Alegrenses no 1o. Comité de Resistência Democrática', *Diário de Notícias*, 30 August 1961, 9, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[793] Santos, 'Os herdeiros de Sisifo', 169–85; Ferreira, 'A Legalidade Traída'; Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 404–19.

Cadeia da Legalidade (Legality Network). The network, the Partido Comunista's national structure, and the official labor unions served as the base for what came to be called the Legality Campaign in favor of Goulart's inauguration. Still, support for the constitutionally mandated succession went well beyond the Brazilian left and direct supporters of Goulart incorporating politicians, news outlets, and civil society organizations of the right, including the Brazilian Bar Association and the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops, in a broad coalition.[794] As Ferreira explained, "In political parties, unions and churches, among students, intellectuals and associations of liberal professionals and capitalists, in factions of the Armed Forces and in the press, among several other social groups and political institutions, there were those who refused any solution to the crisis other than that of legality and democracy."[795] Protests and strikes filled the streets of the country's cities. The traditionally conservative newspaper *Correio da Manhã* declared the actions of the military ministers to be a "coup abolishing the republican regime in Brazil" and insisted that the ministers alone would bear "the responsibility for everything that happens to Brazil" from that point forward.[796] Never had military intervention faced popular backlash on this scale.[797] Minister Denys ordered out the Third Army under the command of recently installed General José Lopes to launch an assault on Brizola's gubernatorial palace and suppress his activities. Brizola's worker battalions and police forces numbering less than 15 thousand now prepared to fend off an assault from a professional well-armed and armored force

[794] Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 448.

[795] Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 415.

[796] 'Ditadura', *Correio da Manhã*, 31 August 1961, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[797] Ferreira, 'A Legalidade Traída'; Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 404–19; Santos, 'Os herdeiros de Sisifo', 169–85.

of more than 40 thousand. By 28 August, the Army had reached its destination. At Lopes' suggestion he and Brizola had a face to face meeting even as Brizola prepared to fight to the bitter end. To the governor's surprise a conflicted Lopes admitted that he agreed with the legalist position and he and his generals had decided to defend the Constitution. Lopes decision to side with Brizola was met with widespread popular acclaim. Denys attempted in vain to relieve Lopes of his command. He then ordered a bombing run on Brizola's position but the sergeants in charge of maintaining the fighter jets sabotaged them. With Lopes' defection, the combined legalist forces in favor of Goulart's ascension now controlled the three states south of São Paulo and outnumbered the First Army, the country's largest combat force. The Brazilian military now found itself hopelessly divided; no military solution would rectify the division except civil war in the greatest sense of the term.[798]

With the South under legalist control, Goulart was able to return from exile into his home state of Rio Grande do Sul where his brother-in-law and a massive demonstration eagerly awaited him. Brizola encouraged Goulart to rally his supporters and military allies and cut a path to Brasília where he could forcibly take the presidency. To the governor's dismay, Goulart lacked his ardor or any desire for civil war. Withdrawing from the public eye, he quietly awaited the result of the political negotiations underway in Brasília.

Under pressure from the mounting public discontent and the looming threat of full scale civil war, Brazil's politicians searched for a compromise. They seemed to have found it in parliamentarism, an institution with some roots in nineteenth-century Brazil. During the drafting of the 1946 Constitution, Raul Pilla from the small Partido Libertador had unsuccessfully

[798] Ferreira, 'A Legalidade Traída'; Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 404–19; Santos, 'Os herdeiros de Sisifo', 169–85.

advocated for a return to a parliamentary regime. Defeated on that occasion, Brazil's political elite now came back to Pilla hoping he might save them. The UDN had previously advocated a switch to the parliamentary system after Kubitschek's victory. Now the PSD agreed that this would be the best compromise. If Pilla's constitutional amendment creating a parliamentary system was passed, conservative politicians and more importantly the military ministers agreed to allow Goulart to govern. Under the proposed system the bulk of executive and agenda driving authority would be shifted to the prime minister and his council of ministers. Nominated by the president these officials would have to be approved by Congress at large. However, only a few congresspeople saw a parliamentary system as a long term solution to Brazil's woes. Goulart's opponents mostly viewed it as an opportunity to neuter him until an election could produce a safer more legitimate president. As a result, the amendment stipulated that the parliamentary system would last until April 1965 at which point a plebiscite would allow voters to choose the governing system moving forward. Believing that Brazilians would choose a presidential system, Goulart's opponents hoped he would be confined to a small lame duck period until the 1965 election winner was inaugurated in January of 1966.

The PTB refused to support the agreement but on 2 September both houses of the Brazilian Congress overwhelmingly approved Constitutional Amendment #4 formally adopting a temporary parliamentary system. Over Brizola's adamant objections, Goulart accepted the compromise and flew to Brasília. President Goulart reassured Brazilians "I remain, as in all my public life, entirely devoted to democratic principles."[799] Two weeks after Quadros' resignation

[799] As quoted in Santos, 'Os herdeiros de Sisifo', 183.

on 7 September 1961, Brazilian Independence Day, Goulart was officially inaugurated as president in accordance with the 1946 Constitution.[800]

Conclusion

Reviewing the "crises" the Fourth Republic suffered between 1954 and 1961, Ferreira found that, in spite of evidence that the "institutions of liberal democracy functioned" over this period with increasing participation by "political and social groups interested in preserving democratic rules," there remains among many scholars "some difficulty in admitting" that the Fourth Republic constituted "an experience of representative democracy."[801] He further highlighted that analyses that frame these events, particularly those of 1961, as precursors to the 1964 coup, apply an inappropriate teleological lens.[802]

At the time Goulart assumed the presidency in 1961, the democratic experiment of the Fourth Republic was neither hollow nor collapsing. Kubitschek had overseen a process of depolarization and by passing major legislation while executing his development agenda, he had demonstrated the viability of the regime. The political parties were responding to the societal change around them and continued to interpret and communicate popular preference. In fact, the capacity to govern and ideological clarity were increasing as the fronts formed by the parties presented consistent policy positions. Rural organizations of the left and right were pressuring the government and opening the door for the inclusion of the long excluded rural working class.

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[800] Ferreira, 'A Legalidade Traída'; Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 404–19; Santos, 'Os herdeiros de Sisifo', 169–85.

[801] Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 415–17.

[802] Ibid., 418.

Furthermore, the events of August and September 1961 laid bare just how isolated far right politicians and military officers were in their desire to overturn the regime. Significantly, popular will had mitigated an attempt at military intervention to the benefit of the constitutional order. The democratic experiment seemed therefore sufficiently strong and had several considerable achievements to its name.

Part III: The End of the Fourth Republic

Chapter VI Polarization and Demise

Just three years after what can be described as the "democratic crescendo" of 1961, a military coup deposed the legal president and instituted a military regime that evolved into a 21 year long brutal dictatorship. Reflecting positively on the events that secured the constitutionally mandated ascension of João Goulart (Chapter V), the Brazilian historian Ferreira stated that it was curious "how, in such a short period, Brazilian society, combative and jealous of democratic legality in 1961, accepted the authoritarian solution in 1964, as if no other alternative besides it existed."[803] He further concluded, "The great question to be resolved is why, at the end of March and beginning of April 1964, the same civil and military coup groups, until then a minority, managed to win over important social sectors and the whole of the Armed Forces, putting an end to the democratic regime and instituting dictatorship in Brazil."[804] Reviewing Goulart's presidency, the 1964 military coup, and the path to dictatorship that followed, this chapter seeks to answer Ferreira's "great question."

As stated in the introduction to this thesis, the majority of the scholarship on the Fourth Republic concerns itself with the collapse of the regime and the 1964 coup; the most common explanations will be briefly reviewed here. One traditional argument lays the blame for the coup solely at the feet of far-right reactionaries both military and civilian in connection with U.S. actors. According to these arguments the social reform portended by the Goulart administration frightened these sectors.[805] However, as discussed in the previous chapter these forces had

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[803] Ibid., 415.

[804] Ibid., 419.

[805] Bethell, 'The Long Road to Democracy in Brazil'; Bethell, 'The Failure of the Left in Brazil'; Toledo, '1964'; Victor, *Cinco Anos Que Abalaram o Brasil: De Jânio Quadros Ao Maréchal Castelo Branco*; Bandeira, *O Governo João Goulart*; Edmar Morel, *O golpe começou em Washington* (São Paulo, 2014).

already been adamantly opposed to Goulart in 1961 and their attempt at a coup failed miserably. Simply put, far-right actors that opposed the constitutional regime could not bring about its demise on their own and required a much larger base of support.[806]

Economic arguments insist that the economic crisis, namely skyrocketing inflation, and the need to institute unpopular economic changes to stabilize the situation and advance development led to authoritarian government. According to these works, the military lost faith in the government's ability to solve the country's economic problems without caving to popular pressure and instituted an authoritarian government to oversee a technocrat led development without interference from the masses.[807] As argued by Figueiredo in her review of many of these same arguments, "these analyzes assume a perfect coincidence between structural requirements and individual or group actions, without specifying the mechanism through which the 'need' is realized in the action."[808] Additionally, the economic shifts identified by Cardoso and O'Donnell do not neatly correlate with the coup.[809] Furthermore, as observed by scholars who analyzed the

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[806] On the importance of popular support for the success of the coup see Ferreira, 'Crises da República', 419; Ferreira, 'A Legalidade Traída'; Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 82–122, 188–212; Cohen, 'Democracy from Above', 44.

[807] Furtado, *Analise Do Modelo Brasileiro*; O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*; Ianni, *O colapso do populismo no Brasil*; Cardoso, 'Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications'; Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependencia Y Desarrollo En América Latina: Ensayo de Interpretación Sociológica*; Also see the essay collection, Furtado, *Brasil*.

[808] Figueiredo, *Democracia ou reformas?*, 23–24.

[809] Cohen, 'Democracy from Above', 30–35; Wallerstein, 'The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil'; Albert O. Hirschman, 'The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for Its Economic Determinants', in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, ed. David Collier (Princeton, 1979), 61–98; Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven, 1973); José Serra, 'Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection between Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes', in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, ed. David Collier (Princeton, 1979), 99–164, https://www.academia.edu/24571743/The_New_Authoritarianism_in_Latin_America; Figueiredo, *Democracia ou reformas?*, 23–24.

many depositions and interviews with officers that participated in the coup, the military actors rarely cited economic conditions as a motivating factor. When they did speak to inflation, it was usually indirectly and in reference to a general feeling that the administration had lost control of the country.[810] Cohen concluded "the military probably would not have intervened if it had been merely a matter of stabilizing the economy."[811] Reviewing the same evidence Ferreira stated, "there was not a project in favor of something, but against it. The immediate issue was to depose Goulart and then carry out a political "cleansing". Only further on, with difficult understandings between factions of the Armed Forces, would an "ideology" emerge out of the military regime."[812] Comparatively, Cohen highlighted that similar shifts in economic strategy to more traditional strategies happened in the early 1960s within democratic systems in Colombia and Chile.[813]

Finally, several scholars blame failures on an underdeveloped or collapsing political system. Parties are often blamed for being disconnected from the population and not allowing for effective governance.[814] For many authors who see populism as the sustaining political force of the regime, the system collapsed as the working class developed a class consciousness and could

[810] Cohen, 'Democracy from Above', 37; Soares, *A democracia interrompida*, 307, 368; Maria Celina Soares D'Araújo, Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, and Celso Castro, *Visões do golpe: a memória militar sobre 1964*, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 1994).

[811] Cohen, 'Democracy from Above', 37.

[812] Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 509.

[813] Cohen, 'Democracy from Above', 37.

[814] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 319; Carvalho, *Cidadania no Brasil*, 152; Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil*; Lyne, 'Parties as Programmatic Agents'; Lamounier and Meneguello, *Partidos políticos e consolidação democrática: o caso brasileiro*; Mainwaring, 'Chapter 11'.

no longer be easily manipulated from above.[815] But as this thesis has shown, there were important signs of democratic development by 1961.

Building on a relatively small but significant body of literature, this chapter identifies political polarization as the catalyst that elevated the economic and political crises to the level of existential regime threat.[816] Identifying polarization as the primary cause of the coup, however, requires one to answer the next logical question, what was the cause of the polarization? This is, of course, a complex and hotly debated topic among political scientists.[817] The authors cited here in relation to the Brazilian case offer varying political, social, and economic explanations for polarization. In keeping with this thesis' agency based view of democratization, this chapter concurs with Bermeo's argument that the blame for polarization and the resulting democratic breakdown "lay overwhelmingly with political elites" be they politicians, civil society leaders, military officers, etc.[818] Bermeo's comparative study of several cases across the globe of democratic breakdown resulting from polarization, including Brazil in 1964, showed that polarization tends to mostly happen among elites, even as much of the population does not

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[815] Weffort, *O Populismo na Politica Brasileira*; Bethell, 'Populism in Brazil'; Bethell, 'The Failure of the Left in Brazil'; Bethell, 'The Long Road to Democracy in Brazil'; Ianni, *O colapso do populismo no Brasil*.

[816] Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*; Cohen, 'Democracy from Above'; Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*; Jorge Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto: a frente de mobilização popular', *Revista Brasileira de História* 24 (2004): 181–212, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-01882004000100008; Figueiredo, *Democracia ou reformas?*; Hidalgo, 'Renovating Democracy'; Stepan, *The Military in Politics*; Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, *Sessenta e quatro, anatomia da crise* (São Paulo, 1986); Jorge Luiz Ferreira and Angela Maria de Castro Gomes, *1964: o golpe que derrubou um presidente, pôs fim ao regime democrático e instituiu a ditadura no Brasil*, 1a ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 2014).

[817] Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty, 'Causes and Consequences of Polarization', in *Negotiating Agreement in Politics*, ed. Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin (Washington, D.C., 2013), 19–53; Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan, *Democracies and Dictatorships*, 38–39; Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Colchester, 2005), 116–92.

[818] Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*, 221.

gravitate towards extreme ideological positions. Polarization does not remain contained only to elites, but it is driven by them. Though it often spreads into other sectors of society, its epicenter is the political elite.

The Parliamentary Regime and the Basic Reforms

At his inauguration, Goulart expounded on the duty before him, "Our great task is to not disillusion the people, and for this we must promote, by all means at our disposal, the solution of their problems, with the same dedication and the same enthusiasm with which they knew to defend law, order, and democracy." He thanked all those who "fought valiantly for the preservation of the democratic order," among whom he highlighted congressional leadership, the Catholic Church, students, the "forces of production," and finally the segments of the armed forces that "remained faithful to the spirit of democracy."[819] Finally in power, 13 days after Jânio Quadros resigned, Goulart assumed the presidency with an ambitious reform agenda and nearly an entire presidential term remaining to carry it out. This section looks at Goulart's presidency, in particular his successes and failures in the area of reform and the consequences for the democratic regime.

Goulart's Reform Agenda and the Campaign against the Parliamentary Regime

Governing within the confines of the new parliamentary system (Chapter V), Goulart nominated his ministers. Tancredo Neves of the Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party/PSD), became Brazil's first prime minister since the fall of the empire. Neves' moderate

[819] João Goulart, 'Perante o Congresso Nacional, ao assumir a Presidência da República' (7 September 1961), Biblioteca da Presidência da República, http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/joao-goulart/discursos/1961/01.pdf/view.

positions made him acceptable to portions of all three of the major parties and the new cabinet had members of all of them, including the União Democrática Brasileira (National Democratic Union/UDN) which officially opposed the administration.

Goulart and his party, the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party/PTB), pursued a goal of holding the plebiscite to end the parliamentary system much sooner than the April 1965 date provided for in the amendment. This was not a particularly daunting task as it quickly became apparent that the parliamentary regime instituted by the military's unpopular interference, was itself widely disliked by politicians and the general public. One poll suggested that 72% of the population opposed the parliamentary system.[820] As the 1962 election approached, politicians from all sides, including the far-right's Carlos Lacerda, appealed to voters by denouncing the parliamentary regime. Goulart's brother-in-law and political ally, Leonel Brizola, dedicated his talents for mobilization to organizing support for an early plebiscite. While Goulart attempted to regain the full powers of the presidency, he also had to decide what he would do about the unpopular stabilization program he inherited from Quadros. Seeing no way out, and eager to prove he was not the radical his enemies claimed, he pressed forward with the measures including the painful cut to wheat and oil subsidies.[821]

In April 1962, Goulart travelled to the United States where he further endeavored to prove his democratic and fiscally responsible nature. Goulart, likely realizing the United States would be far less patient with him than his predecessor, condemned Castro's Cuba and communism but refused to break off relations. In a speech before a joint session of the U.S.

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[820] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 141.

[821] Ferreira and Gomes, *1964*, 103–26; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 140–41.

Congress, Goulart praised the Kennedy administration for the Alliance for Progress and the willingness of U.S. institutions to finance Brazilian development as a manifestation of the aid many in Brazil had felt they were due since WWII.[822] Speaking on democracy he stated, "I wish to reaffirm my country's identification with the democratic principles that unite the peoples of the West," before expressing his belief that the good example of the "democratic world" could convince the "socialist world" that "representative democracy is the most perfect of the forms of government and the most compatible with the protection of man and the maintenance of his freedom."[823] Brazil's new president had thus declared his solidarity with democracy as understood in the West. Goulart's tour gave the Kennedy administration hope that their fears about the left wing politician might be unfounded. The U.S. government approved a 131 million dollar aid package. In return, Goulart indicated he would be accommodating of foreign owned utility companies and foreign investment.[824]

At home, Goulart began to advocate for the basic reforms advanced by his party (Chapter V), especially land reform and the elimination of the literacy restriction on suffrage. Lacking the

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[822] On Goulart and the Alliance for Progress see W. Michael Weis, 'The Twilight of Pan-Americanism: The Alliance for Progress, Neo-Colonialism, and Non-Alignment in Brazil, 1961–1964', *The International History Review* 23, no. 2 (1 June 2001): 322–44, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2001.9640933; John DeWitt, 'The Alliance for Progress: Economic Warfare in Brazil (1962-1964)', *Journal of Third World Studies* 26, no. 1 (2009): 57–76; Felipe Pereira Loureiro, 'The Alliance for Progress and President João Goulart's Three-Year Plan: The Deterioration of U.S.-Brazilian Relations in Cold War Brazil (1962)', *Cold War History* 17, no. 1 (2 January 2017): 61–79, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2016.1254620; Andrew J. Kirkendall, 'Kennedy Men and the Fate of the Alliance for Progress in LBJ Era Brazil and Chile', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 18, no. 4 (13 December 2007): 745–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592290701807218.

[823] João Goulart, 'Ao ser recebido pelo Congresso dos Estados Unidos da América' (4 April 1962), Biblioteca da Presidência da República, http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/joao-goulart/discursos/1962/12.pdf/view.

[824] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 216–17.

agenda setting power of the executive, he took his case to the people. On Labor Day, Goulart gave a speech to a group of workers associating his reform agenda with the legacy of Vargas. "Workers! No one will snatch the flag which Getúlio Vargas delivered us from our hands." Detailing his basic reforms agenda, he gave the greatest importance to land redistribution. "We must meet the legitimate aspirations of the rural population, helping them to free themselves from the conditions of extreme poverty in which they live, and giving them the opportunity to share in the benefits of industrial civilization." Goulart pressed for a return to the presidential regime and explained that the stakes were too high to fill the unoffensive role his opponents had carved out for him. "If I thought in terms of personal convenience, there would be nothing more comfortable for me than adopting a position as an arbiter of political situations. The interests of Brazil are at stake, however, and it would not be permissible for me to omit myself in the performance of my duties." He also made sure that his audience understood that the basic reforms were on the ballot in the upcoming congressional election. "It is up to the Nation to listen to its candidates, verify what they think about the regime and the social order, and choose the men most representative of their hopes and aspirations. In this choice, workers — always at the vanguard of the just demands of the nation — must play a preponderant role, since on them, on their unity, on their struggle and on their vote, the tendencies of the future National Congress may depend."[825] Goulart was counting on his supporters to give him the presidential power and congressional base needed to pursue his reform agenda.

[825] João Goulart, 'Nas comemorações do Dia do Trabalho' (1 May 1962), Biblioteca da Presidência da República, https://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/joao-goulart/discursos/1962/18.pdf/view.

The 1962 Election and the Plebiscite

Preparations for the 1962 congressional election and the fight for an earlier plebiscite progressed concomitantly. In June 1962, Prime Minister Neves resigned to run for another office. To replace him, Goulart nominated the Minister of Foreign Relations Francisco San Tiago Dantas a PTB politician. San Tiago Dantas was quickly emerging as the most prominent leader of the center-left which had begun to call itself the "positive left," to distance itself from Brizola and the far-left that they referred to as the "negative left." Despite San Tiago Dantas' moderate politics, his commitment to an independent foreign policy made him an unpalatable choice for the conservative parliamentarians of the Ação Democrática (Democratic Action) front, who successfully scuttled his nomination. After a brief failed attempt with a second politician, Congress finally approved the third nominee Francisco de Paula Brochado da Rocha in early July, another PSD politician who openly opposed the parliamentary system and in August the new prime minister introduced legislation to move the plebiscite to December of 1962.[826]

The potential for violence also influenced the political scene. In late 1962, Brizola made a somewhat subtle threat when he told a workers' conference that Brazil had only avoided civil war during the succession crisis "because I didn't want it." He argued that Congress had implemented a "parliamentary dictatorship" and was "playing with fire" that might lead to "unforeseeable consequences."[827] His comments provoked outrage from the opposition. The danger of civil war then became frighteningly real when on 12 September the new commander of the Third Army, Jaír Dantas Ribeiro, informed the government that he could not guarantee

[826] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 141–42.

[827] 'Brizola ameaça o Congresso', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 18 August 1962, Acervo Estadão.

control over the actions of his subordinates if Congress voted to reject the early plebiscite. The Ministry of War rebuked Ribeiro for threatening them and leaking the information to the public. A breakdown of discipline due to political division constituted the Brazilian Army's worst nightmare and since the Third Army had stood with Brizola it had become more and more a reality. Now mostly composed of staunchly legalist officers promoted by Goulart, military senior leadership endorsed an early plebiscite to maintain unity. In July 1962, a general strike by industrial workers, in response to the unpopular stabilization measures and the rising cost of food, threatened to paralyze the country.[828] Goulart called the labor leaders to the capital and convinced them to end the walk out. The president again insisted he needed full powers to keep social peace and his opponents again accused him of using organized labor to cause trouble only he could solve. Over the objections of a small intransigent minority, Congress voted on 14 September to advance the plebiscite to 6 January 1963.[829]

In the 1962 congressional election, both the UDN and the PTB saw increases in their share of the vote, mostly at the expense of the PSD that reached a new low point.[830] For the first time, the PTB narrowly surpassed the UDN in both the share of votes and the number of seats in the chamber to become the second largest party. The PTB now had more senators than the UDN as well. Goulart's reform agenda was proving popular and paying dividends for his party. The

[828] Felipe Pereira Loureiro, 'Strikes in Brazil during the Government of João Goulart (1961–1964)', *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 41, no. 1 (2 January 2016): 76–94, https://doi.org/10.1080/08263663.2015.1126105.

[829] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 220–23.

[830] Official election results are recorded in *Anuário Estatístico Do Brasil: Ano XXIV - 1963* (Rio de Janeiro, 1963), 425–28.

PSD remained the largest party with 30% of the lower chamber vote but this was its smallest share yet (Annex IV). The UDN even bested the PSD in number of gubernatorial contests won.

The 1962 election saw the forerunner of polarization as some on the right, with support from the United States, mobilized against Goulart's reform agenda but not yet against the regime itself. A new right wing civil society organization was formed that same year by a group of Brazilian businesspeople, mostly in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, called the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (Institute of Research and Social Studies) which worked to produce anti-communist and anti-Goulart academic work as well as materials for public consumption. This institute together with Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática (Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action) (Chapter V) prepared electoral propaganda and more importantly provided campaign financing to opposition candidates in 1962. In addition to the funds from donors, the campaign chest also received illegal clandestine payments from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). While the Kennedy administration had originally accepted Goulart lukewarmly, for reasons discussed below, the administration had gradually soured on him and sought to weaken his government.[831]

There was also some polarization around the person of Brizola who the Brazilian historian D'Araújo described as "one of the main actors in the process of political radicalization that the country experienced on the eve of the 1964 coup."[832] Campaigning strongly in favor of the basic reforms in their most extreme form, he won election as a federal deputy for the state of Guanabara with 270 thousand votes, the most ever for a deputy. However, his chosen successor

[831] Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 456–57; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 151–52.

[832] D'Araújo, *Sindicatos, carisma & poder*, 9.

for Governor of Rio Grande do Sul lost to a coalition that included the PSD and UDN, calling itself the Aliança Democrática e Popular (Democratic and Popular Alliance), that campaigned against Brizola's radical record and "demagoguery."[833]

Besides the trend towards polarization, the congressional elections of the late 50s and early 60s are often cited as evidence, by those who argue that the Fourth Republic system collapsed in on itself for two reasons. First, parties increasingly won congressional victories in coalition which is seen as indicative of the lack ideological rigidity.[834] Second, an increasing percentage of blank or spoiled votes is interpreted as a manifestation of dissatisfaction with an unrepresentative system.[835] Recent research and updated data allow for an alternative understanding of these phenomena. Nicolau's updated data shows that only small fluctuations occurred in the percentage of the vote received by the major parties in these final elections.[836] Parties may have won more in coalition, but they still appealed to roughly the same portion of the population. On the second criticism, looking at elections for the Chamber of Deputies, the percentage of blank or spoiled votes did increase from 3% in 1945 to 19% in 1962.[837] It is possible that some dissatisfaction with the party system is reflected here. However, the electorate grew quickly with several first-time voters due to population growth, literacy expansion, and immigration. The official ballot (Chapter IV) also made it harder for many voters who now had to read their ballot and fill it in themselves. As Souza's assessment indicated, it is impossible to

[833] Santos, 'Os herdeiros de Sisifo', 191–207.

[834] Lyne, 'Parties as Programmatic Agents'; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 229.

[835] Bethell, 'The Long Road to Democracy in Brazil', 167–69.

[836] Nicolau, 'Partidos na República de 1946'.

[837] Souza, *Estado e partidos políticos no Brasil (1930 a 1964)*, 164.

know to what degree each of these factors is responsible for the increase in blank or spoiled ballots.[838] Lavareda's data from opinion polls in 1964 also shows that party identification remained high with 64% of respondents saying they identified with a specific party. A comparative exercise demonstrated that Brazil had a similar or greater degree of partisan identification in the 1960s than Ireland, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, or West Germany did by the 1970s.[839]

Months after the 1962 congressional election, Brazilians voted again, now in the plebiscite on the parliamentary system. Over 12 million people turned out and delivered a clear result with 83% of valid votes in favor of ending the parliamentary system. The system reverted to presidentialism at the end of January 1963. The parliamentary solution had backfired for Goulart's opponents. Not only had it been discarded after barely a year, but it also now afforded Goulart a greater claim to a mandate than he would have otherwise had. Almost 10 million Brazilians had voted for presidentialism knowing that he would be the president.[840]

With Goulart wielding the full powers of the presidency and the success of the PTB in the 1962 elections, the political system would now be forced to grapple with the basic reforms agenda. However, the PTB did not have nearly enough strength to force through legislation on its own and compromise would still be necessary. It was in this environment that, as a consequence of political actions, polarization reached levels that threatened the regime itself.

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[838] Ibid., 166.

[839] Lavareda, *A democracia nas urnas*, 135–41.

[840] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 143–44.

Polarization Undermines the Regime

Over the course of 1963 and 1964, policy radicalism and polarization came from forces on the right and left. This polarization soon spread from politicians into other sectors including the military and the general public. This section seeks to understand the evolution of polarization over this period and details how efforts to contain it failed.

Increasing Mobilization of the Left and Right

For the year of 1963 Brazilians would have a reformist president and a Congress where conservative strength had reached an unprecedented low. In 1962 and 1963, the administration passed the Rural Worker Statute (Chapter V), education reform, a law restricting profit remittances by foreign companies, raised taxes, and created a public private national electric company. The frequent critique of contemporaries like Brizola and many academics that reform was too difficult within the Fourth Republic system don't stand up to the many accomplishments of the Goulart administration.[841] Still, the opposition, centered around the conservative Ação Democrática, remained strong. Some UDN politicians, while amenable to reform, opposed anything Goulart did just for the sake of spurning their political rival. For most of his presidency Goulart followed a path of moderation attempting to appeal to the moderate segments of his opposition.[842]

Goulart's pursuit of moderation was severely complicated by Brizola, who consistently made his brother-in-law's life harder as the principal leader of the PTB's far-left and a driver of

[841] Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, 507; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 233.

[842] Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart'.

radicalization. The far-left in Congress strongly supported the basic reforms in their most ample form and opposed the president's agenda as too modest. Believing the basic reforms to be overwhelmingly popular, they vehemently denounced "conciliation" or compromise with conservatives and advocated the use of executive power to overrule Congress if the institution proved uncooperative. Far-left members secured several PTB leadership positions including Brizola who was named the party leader in Congress. Brizola and the far-left relied heavily on alliances with civil society. Their main ally was the Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (General Workers' Command/CGT). Founded in 1962, the CGT was a labor organization that united union leadership across sectors. Under the existing labor legislation inter-sector cooperation was illegal, but Goulart did not attempt to suppress the CGT and the slow death of government control over labor continued. Members of the PTB and the Partido Comunista (Communist Party) dominated leadership and the CGT brought more than 70% of Brazil's official unions under its umbrella as well as some extralegal labor organizations. The CGT expertly used strikes to forward its political agenda which sometimes meant supporting Goulart and other times meant trying to push him further left. From 1961 through 1963, Brazil saw 435 strikes compared with just 177 in the three years prior to that.[843] Besides the CGT, radical Catholic groups also supported the far-left and its reform goals. Inspired by Pope John XXIII's encyclicals the *Mater et Magistra* (May 1961) and *Pacem in Terris* (April 1963), certain Catholic youth and student groups like the Juventude Universitária Católica (Catholic University Youth) and the Ação

[843] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 148; Nogueira, 'As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola'; Loureiro, 'Strikes in Brazil'.

Popular (Popular Action) participated both in protests and rural mobilization in favor of the basic reforms. On the secular side, the National Students' Union engaged in similar activities.[844]

To unify the parliamentary and civil society groups in favor of fundamental reform by any means necessary, Brizola founded the Frente de Mobilização Popular (Popular Mobilization Front). Representatives from the PTB, CGT, the Frente Nacionalista, and other groups comprised the central structure of Brizola's new organization which defined itself as a "parliament of the lefts."[845] Some of the key anti-democratic behaviors identified by Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan for explaining democratic breakdown became evident: while the far-right had long refused to accept election results, under the leadership of Brizola and other politicians and civil society chiefs, the far-left now increasingly demonized institutions and compromise when they impeded the advancement of their agenda.[846] "Conciliation" soon became a most vile epithet that far-left politicians frequently used to lambast politicians of the center-left willing to compromise with conservatives.[847]

On the right to counter the left wing mobilization, Admiral Sílvio Heck founded the Frente Patriótica Civil-Militar (Civil-Military Patriotic Front) in 1963 to coordinate opposition to Goulart and Brizola. The front organized around the "Establishment of a truly democratic, honest and new type of government, based on the foundation of the people organized with the Armed

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[844] Mainwaring, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985*, 60–75; Bethell, 'The Failure of the Left in Brazil', 208.

[845] As quoted in Braga et al., 'Leonel Brizola', 77; See also Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto'; Rolim, 'Leonel Brizola e os setores subalternos das Forças Armadas'; Nogueira, 'As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola'.

[846] Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan, *Democracies and Dictatorships*, 15.

[847] Ferreira, 'Brizola em Panfleto', 111; Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto'.

Forces." Though it was not clear what new type of government the front had in mind, it declared the country's main problems to be the need for agrarian reform, inflation control, and regional inequity.[848] The front declared war on "extremism as much from the right as from the left."[849]

While the right and left increasingly mobilized against each other, reviewing their positions it becomes apparent that there was an emerging consensus about the main problems Brazil faced, an archaic agrarian system, destabilizing inflation, and extremely high levels of inequality – particularly between regions. As 1963 began, the chance for reform and progress was real given the widespread agreement as to the task at hand. Ergo polarization did not come over disagreement about the problems faced but resulted from radical policy solutions proposed by the parties and the way they were pursued.

The Three Year Plan: Reform and Stabilization versus Polarization

Goulart attempted to balance the popular basic reforms against unpopular stabilization measures by selling them to the public as part of a single program unveiled at the end of 1962 called the Three Year Plan. Just prior to the return to presidentialism, Goulart appointed United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America veteran Celso Furtado to the newly created position of Minister of Planning and selected the head of the "positive left" or center-left San Tiago Dantas as the new Minister of Finance.[850] Both were heavily involved with the Three Year Plan which constituted yet another attempt to control inflation without sacrificing growth.

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[848] 'Frente Patriótica Lança Seu Programa', *Correio da Manhã*, 19 December 1963, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[849] 'Organiza-se uma Frente Civil-Militar', *Correio da Manhã*, 16 July 1963, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[850] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 220–23.

Inflation in 1962 had reached a painful 52% (Annex III) and Furtado, like most contemporary economists, identified the deficit as the main cause of inflation. By raising taxes and cutting subsidies, the plan hoped to reduce the deficit without reducing public investment spending. A restructuring of debt and an aggressive exportation strategy would ensure that the country's ability to import remained intact. The government secured congressional support and passed a bill raising taxes primarily on wealthier Brazilians. Subsidies were cut and the currency devalued to near the market rate. Again, the slashing of subsidies caused inflation to skyrocket in the short run.[851]

San Tiago Dantas went to the United States in March and insisted Brazil would stay the course of the Three Year Plan and asked for a new aid package and debt renegotiation. The Kennedy administration provided only conditional commitments and frustrated San Tiago Dantas, who insisted that Brazil needed the aid upfront to enable it to endure the pains of stabilization. San Tiago Dantas and the administration, despite their continued commitment to an independent foreign policy, were ridiculed by Brizola and his far-left front as sellouts to imperialism for working with the U.S.[852]

On the home front, San Tiago Dantas had to deal with a wage increase for civil servants and the military to compensate for inflation. These wages were not determined solely by the executive branch like the minimum wage and instead had to be approved by Congress. American and International Monetary Fund (IMF) representatives had impressed upon the minister the need for this raise not to surpass 40%. Those representing the civil servants rejected this figure as

[851] Moreira, 'O Projeto De Nação Do Governo João Goulart'; Ferreira and Gomes, *1964*, 143–60.

[852] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 234–44.

far too low, and the military again complained of the disappearing gap between the salary of officers and the working class. The Military Club even went as far as issuing an ultimatum to Congress. With the sway these groups held over politicians and Goulart's absolute need to appease the military, a pay raise of 70% was passed in July with the enthusiastic support of Brizola who again opposed any moderation.[853]

Over their combined presidencies, Quadros and Goulart held on to significant stabilization measures longer than any other Fourth Republic government and neither introduced substantial new spending. Even as the deficit began to slowly contract, the pain was being felt by average Brazilians, who suffered from skyrocketing prices for food and transportation caused by the elimination of subsidies. Subsequently demands arose for ever higher wages to compensate, but every step in this direction only fed back into the problem. Strikes grew more frequent with one strike in São Paulo in October of 1963 uniting more than 700 thousand workers.[854] San Tiago Dantas made several television and radio appeals for Brazilians to hold on. Straining under the pains of stabilization, especially credit tightening, in mid-1963 the economy entered its first recession since 1942. In 1963, per capita GDP contracted by 2.3% (Annex III). Important scholarship has shown that the recession and the corresponding drop in government revenue were crucial to fueling the hyperinflation that came and that much of the decline in growth had political not economic causes as the turmoil of Quadros' resignation and the misperception of Goulart as a radical soured the investment environment.[855] The United States also refused to

[853] Ibid.

[854] Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 483; Loureiro, 'Strikes in Brazil'.

[855] Wallerstein, 'The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil', 27; Cohen, 'Democracy from Above', 35–37.

extend aid or renegotiate debt and successfully pressured the IMF to cut Brazil off from further loans in an effort to undermine the Goulart administration.[856]

Polarization was perhaps most visible in the debates on agrarian reform. In March 1963, the government submitted a modest land reform bill to Congress. Responding to the concerns of rural proprietors, the Ação Democrática resisted the bill and decried it as an attack on private property. Still, the leadership of all three major parties supported or were at least amenable to the idea of land reform and had their own ideas about how to go about it. An opinion poll from the following year showed that 72% of Brazilians felt that agrarian reform was necessary, though inflation was seen as a more urgent issue.[857] While Goulart had moderated the scope of land redistribution, his plan called for landholders to be compensated in government bonds while the Constitution mandated cash compensation for appropriations (Chapter III), which the government simply could not afford given the inflation crisis. To this end, the administration proposed a constitutional amendment to allow for compensation with bonds; however, amending the Constitution meant that Goulart needed the backing of 2/3rds of both chambers. Brizola led popular mobilization in favor of the amendment, and repeatedly called for Congress to be closed and the Constitution amended via executive authority if legislators would not cooperate. Seeking to break through the polarization, the PSD, led by former president and now Senator Juscelino Kubitschek, offered a compromise. They would support the amendment to allow for compensation via government bond as long as appropriation was restricted to unused land on extremely large rural estates. Goulart considered the compromise until Brizola and the far-left

[856] Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 469; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 322–30.

[857] Lavareda, *A democracia nas urnas*, 157–61.

legislators vehemently denounced it as conciliation, demanding that the PSD not be accommodated in any way or else they would withdraw their support. This move of policy radicalism undermined the compromise and left no path forward for the amendment which failed by a wide margin.[858]

After the reform failed, Brizola raised the stakes by threatening his colleagues in a speech in Congress, "Your Excellencies, will allow the reform even if you do not want to do it. Your Excellencies will be responsible for what happens outside, even against your will. The reform will come out even if it is by force."[859] Nogueira detailed how Brizola's repeated calls for Congress to be closed and reform enacted unilaterally had the effect of uniting much of the PSD and UDN in obstinate opposition to Goulart's entire agenda and even moderate reform.[860] At the same time, several military officers publicly criticized Brizola's increasingly frequent appeals through television, radio, and rallies to noncommissioned officers and enlisted men. They accused Brizola of stoking a revolution and undermining the chain of command.[861]

As political conditions deteriorated, the viability of the Three Year Plan disappeared. In June, both San Tiago Dantas and Furtado were removed from their posts. With agrarian reform blocked in Congress and stabilization efforts collapsing, the government was paralyzed; an

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[858] Nogueira, 'As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola', 27–37; Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 350; Souza, 'Ação democrática parlamentar'; Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 470–73; Ferreira and Gomes, *1964*, 161–76.

[859] 'Ataques de Brizola causam violento tumulto na Câmara', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 9 May 1963, Acervo Estadão.

[860] Nogueira, 'As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola', 37.

[861] 'Contra a subversão', *Correio da Manhã*, 9 May 1963, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional; Rolim, 'Leonel Brizola e os setores subalternos das Forças Armadas'.

occurrence that frequently besets presidential systems when the executive and legislative branches are at odds.[862] As polarization worsened, both the right and left grew increasingly unwilling to countenance any effort to work with the other side. Goulart continued to preach the necessity of the basic reforms but lacked any plan for breaking the legislative stalemate.

Polarization Spreads

In September 1963, political conditions worsened. On the 12th of that month, a revolt of sergeants and enlisted men, mostly from the Air Force and Navy, successfully locked down Brasília for most of the day until loyal units responded and ended the revolt largely without violence. The day before the Supreme Court had ruled that as they could not vote, sergeants were also ineligible to hold office, the ruling had the effect of removing several recently elected sergeants from office. As the news of the event rippled through Brazil, the CGT organized a series of strikes in solidarity with the imprisoned rebellious soldiers. Again, military leadership felt its worst fears had been realized. The overriding concern was that soldiers and sailors might trade loyalty to superior officers for loyalty to heroes and organizations of their social class. This included fraternization with the CGT and other elements of the radical left including Brizola, or even worse in the eyes of military leadership, Communists.[863] Many in the military wanted to see the rebels firmly punished and suffered disappointment when Goulart opted for leniency though not amnesty.[864]

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[862] Juan J. Linz, 'The Perils of Presidentialism', *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 1 (1990): 51–69.

[863] Rolim, 'Leonel Brizola e os setores subalternos das Forças Armadas'.

[864] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 230–33.

Adding to the tension was Governor Lacerda who had emerged as the prohibitive favorite for the UDN nomination in 1965 and staked his profile on opposition to the government and its reform agenda. Everywhere, he saw ties to Communism and plots to form a dictatorship. In September he reached out via the American press in hopes of convincing the United States that it should topple Goulart. Lacerda described the president as "a communist version of a South American-style totalitarian" and referred to the administration saying, "I don't think this thing will go to the end of the year," before suggesting that the United States intervene or pressure Brazil until Goulart was removed from office.[865]

The military ministers in the administration advised the president to request a state of siege, which he did just days after Lacerda's interview. His advisers worried that the revolt and the interview were symptomatic of a dangerous degree of instability against which the government needed to protect itself. The congressional reaction was overwhelmingly negative. The UDN believed that this was Goulart's coup being put into motion while the PTB and Partido Comunista feared it was the military manipulating the president to crack down on the left. Virtually no one thought the situation would be improved by granting emergency powers to the executive.[866] On 7 October, President Goulart had to awkwardly withdraw his request.[867]

A group of officers, many trained at the United States influenced Higher War College and informed by the increasingly prominent French doctrine concerning counterinsurgency, now

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[865] Julian Hartt, 'Brazil Governor Sees Goulart Fall, Urges U.S to Withhold Aid Funds. Brazilian Sees Goulart Ouster', *Los Angeles Times*, 29 September 1963.

[866] 'Forte resisténcia ao sítio no PSD; Amaral Peixoto também seria contra', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 5 October 1963, Acervo Estadão.

[867] Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 473–79; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 153–54.

prepared a defensive military coup as a last resort.[868] The group included many legalist officers such as their leader, General Castelo Branco. The other primary conspirator was the more conservative General Artur da Costa e Silva. This group agreed that the military would only be justified in deposing Goulart if he proactively threatened the regime. They had the loyalty of the small Fourth Army and the conditional support of the Second Army under General Amauri Kruel. However, Kruel was a close friend to Goulart and only wanted to act in the direst of circumstances. The more powerful First and Third armies remained beyond their reach, under the command of Goulart loyalists.[869]

The response of the United States to the growing polarization in Brazil was to support Goulart's political and military opponents and further emphasize the dangers of communist infiltration.[870] The CIA and the U.S. Embassy maintained close contacts with the Castelo Branco

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[868] For the Higher War College see Frederick M. Nunn, 'Military Professionalism and Professional Militarism in Brazil, 1870–1970: Historical Perspectives and Political Implications', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 4, no. 1 (May 1972): 49–53, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0000167X; Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 172–87; For French influence see Weyland, *Revolution and Reaction: The Diffusion of Authoritarianism in Latin America*, 134.

[869] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 308–9; Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 188–212.

[870] There is a large body of literature concerning the role of the U.S. in the 1964 coup that is too vast to be analyzed critically here. See Anthony W. Pereira, 'The US Role in the 1964 Coup in Brazil: A Reassessment', *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 37, no. 1 (1 January 2018): 5–17, https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12518; Morel, *O golpe começou em Washington*; Weis, 'The Twilight of Pan-Americanism'; Toledo, '1964'; Phyllis R. Parker, *Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964* (Austin, 2011); Matias Spektor, 'The United States and the 1964 Brazilian Military Coup', *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History*, 26 April 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.551; Peter Kornbluh and James G. Hershberg, 'Brazil Marks 50th Anniversary of Military Coup', *The National Security Archive* (blog), 2 April 2014, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/; Peter Kornbluh, 'Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup: Declassified Documents Shed Light on U.S. Role', *The National Security Archive* (blog), 31 March 2004, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm; Loureiro, 'The Alliance for Progress and President João Goulart's Three-Year Plan'; Jonathan C. Brown, *Cuba's Revolutionary World* (Cambridge, 2017), chap. 10; LADB Staff, 'Releases Shows US Encouragement of 1964 Brazil Coup' (Albuquerque, 2004), https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/13247.

group that it identified as the only plot with enough strength and legitimacy to depose the government if needed. Since 1962, the Kennedy administration had begun to consider the possibility that Goulart might need to be removed, due to the fact that the Brazilian president continued to defy U.S. policy towards Cuba and, in the United States' view, did too little to distance himself from his radical brother-in-law and communism in general.[871] President Kennedy and the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon both agreed that Goulart was "giving the damn country away" to the "Communists" either "willingly or unwillingly," but Ambassador Gordon cautioned that any attempt to back a coup must account for the fact that "The military's not united."[872] Following a visit to Brazil in December of 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy informed his brother that Goulart would likely ally himself with the Soviet Union and China and make Brazil a dangerous threat to U.S. interests. Much of the anxiety on the part of U.S. policymakers was caused by a poor understanding of the Brazilian political environment which frequently led them to confuse left wing nationalism with communism.[873] The United States increased CIA activity and worked to strengthen the political opposition through the aforementioned campaign donations, financial pressure, and Alliance for

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[871] Brown, *Cuba's Revolutionary World*, chap. 10; James G. Hershberg, 'The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1)', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 6, no. 2 (1 April 2004): 3–20, https://doi.org/10.1162/152039704773254740; James G. Hershberg, 'Soviet-Brazilian Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 22, no. 1 (1 February 2020): 175–209, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00930.

[872] Timothy Naftali, ed., 'Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin', in *The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises*, vol. 1 (New York; London, 2001), 18–22.

[873] Gerald K. Haines, *The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945-1954*, America in the Modern World (Wilmington, Del, 1989), 25–38.

Progress aid channeled to states with anti-Goulart governors.[874] After the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963, the administration of Lyndon Johnson continued to monitor the situation in Brazil and inherited a very negative view of Goulart.

Through 1963 and early 1964 the economic crisis steadily worsened, exacerbating the crisis, and opening the door to greater polarization. The government issued a series of price and rent controls, simplified exchange rates, allowed the return of some subsidization for wheat and oil, and tried to clamp down on foreign profit remittances, all to little avail. In 1962, inflation surpassed the unprecedented 50% mark and reached 92% by 1964 (Annex III).

Matters went from bad to worse for Goulart when Brizola and the Frente de Mobilização Popular officially broke with the administration in October. The front announced its "total independence from the President of the Republic's policy of conciliation." They demanded land reform, the extension of the vote to illiterates and enlisted men, the release of the sergeants imprisoned after the September revolt, a freeze on foreign remittance of profits, and an immediate suspension of payments on foreign debt. The Frente de Mobilização Popular condemned "the Executive's vacillation regarding the adoption of popular policies, the inactivity of the Legislative, and the partiality of the Judiciary."[875]

Meanwhile, Brizola continued to take his case for reform to the public. Starting in 1963, he delivered near daily lectures condemning conciliation and right-wing coup plots via the Mayrink Veiga radio network and in 1964, he also began to distribute his own weekly newspaper

[874] The exact role of the CIA in the lead up to 1964 remains unknown, the author submitted a request for the relevant documentation, but was rejected.

[875] 'Manifesto Popular na Câmara Federal', *Correio da Manhã*, 15 October 1963, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional; See also Nogueira, 'As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola'; Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto'.

O Panfleto. Brizola became associated with the famous slogan of reform "by law or by force."[876] Via his radio broadcasts, Brizola organized "Groups of Eleven" across the country, based on the number of players on a football squad. According to one estimate, approximately 70 thousand individuals belonged to the one of the Groups of Eleven.[877] Both scholars and contemporaries differ on classifying these groups either as local political organizations or an attempt to prepare cells for guerilla or revolutionary combat as had happened in Cuba. Not to be outdone, Lacerda and the opposition created their own radio network in October 1963, the Rede da Democracia (Democracy Network), from which they countered Brizola and opposed the Goulart government.[878]

Concerned with the growing polarization, San Tiago Dantas created yet another front, this time uniting civil society and parliamentarians of the center-left. The Frente Progressista de Apoio às Reformas de Base (Progressive Front to Support Basic Reforms) had the stated purpose of "ensuring parliamentary and popular support" for the basic reforms "to be processed in the country, peacefully, through the expansion and consolidation of the democratic process, and without breaking the continuity of the constitutional system." "The Front limits itself to emphasizing the aspirations for which it was possible to obtain a broad base of support . . . reducing internal tensions and creating conditions for the continuation of the work of renovating government by democratic methods," read the Frente Progressista's platform. The front

[876] Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto', 185.

[877] Ibid., 200.

[878] Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto'; Ferreira, 'Brizola em Panfleto'; Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 477–78; Rolim, 'Leonel Brizola e os setores subalternos das Forças Armadas'; Braga et al., 'Leonel Brizola'; Nogueira, 'As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola'; Eduardo Gomes Silva, 'A Rede da Democracia e o Golpe de 1964' (Master's Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2008).

encouraged compromise and acknowledged the need to stabilize the fiscal situation simultaneously.[879] By early 1964, the Frente Progressista and its agenda had the endorsement and adherence of President Goulart who still hoped to pass the basic reforms during his presidency. The Frente Progressista invited the politicians and organizations of Brizola's Frente de Mobilização Popular to join them in an attempt to contain the growing polarization and unite the entirety of the left behind an achievable reform agenda. Brizola and other far-left leadership rejected the overture and blasted the new center-left front as the latest manifestation of "conciliation." Their resistance robbed the new front of the support it needed to succeed in Congress.[880]

Time and time again, efforts at moderation and compromise failed due to obstinance and radicalism at the extremes. With each successive failure the two sides withdrew further from each other, and the polarization spread into other sectors of society. Reform had become nearly impossible, not solely because of partisan politics or the nature of the Brazilian presidential system but also largely as a result of polarizing choices by political actors.

Demise of the Fourth Republic

As polarization increased, it not only paralyzed government but led to the breakdown of the democratic constitutional regime itself. This section analyzes the events that led to the 1964 coup and the military's decision to intervene. Reviewed next is the coup itself and the narrow margins of its success. Lastly, we consider the actions of the new military government with the

[879] 'Goulart Lançou Frente de Apoio às Reformas de Base', *Correio da Manhã*, 6 February 1964, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional; Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto', 200–201.

[880] Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto', 200–201; Ferreira and Gomes, *1964*, 229–42.

goal of understanding how the military's goals changed from short term intervention to long term dictatorship and the methods used to reverse democratization developments in Brazil.

Goulart Radicalizes

With the center-left effort dead in the water and the economic crisis spiraling out of control, Goulart remained committed to the basic reforms but was once again left without a path forward. U.S. Ambassador Gordon cited sources close to the administration who told him that the Brazilian president felt he had three options: abandon the reforms and finish his term fulfilling purely ceremonial functions; resign; or force reform from the top down as Brizola and the Frente de Mobilização Popular had long advocated.[881] Goulart opted for the latter and embraced Brizola and his movement. The results were catastrophic. Goulart, a man famous for being weak willed, turned into a firebrand. With the support of the president, Brizola too became bolder than ever. The president's far-left allies presented him with a strategy based on massive rallies and executive actions: Goulart would embark on a tour of the country and, in front of huge crowds delivered by the Frente de Mobilização Popular, he would simply enact the basic reforms through executive action, challenging the other branches of government to stop him and incur the wrath of the people.[882] On 13 March, the first rally was held in Rio de Janeiro. Nationally televised, the crowd grew to more than 150 thousand people as the government bussed supporters in from other cities. Many of the onlookers carried banners and signs, some waved red flags or called for the legalization of the Partido Comunista. Speaking first, Brizola insisted

[881] Paulo Sotero, 'Lincoln Gordon e o Papel Dos EUA No Golpe de 64', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 6 May 2001, 107, Acervo Estadão.

[882] Nogueira, 'As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola'; Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto'; Ferreira, 'Brizola em Panfleto'.

that the people had had enough of Congress which no longer identified "with the aspirations of our people." He called for a new constitutional convention based on a "popular congress" made up of "workers, peasants, nationalist sergeants and officers, authentic public men, and from which the old traditional foxes are eliminated." Similar to Lacerda's appeals over the years for politicians of the Vargas tradition to be barred from participation, Brizola now prescribed the same for traditionalist forces. In his conclusion, he warned the "reactionary minorities" that, "Our path is peaceful, but we will know how to respond to violence with violence." [883]

A reportedly nervous Goulart then signed two executive actions before delivering his speech to close the rally. The first executive order nationalized all private oil refineries into the hands of Petrobras. The second order unilaterally expropriated all unused land on properties larger than 12,000 acres which sat within six miles of a federal highway, railroad, dam, or irrigation project. It was unclear how the government intended to compensate those whose land would be expropriated or if it would do so at all.[884] In his speech, Goulart described the current impasse in Brazil as a conflict between types of democracy. On the one hand there was the democracy advanced by the reactionaries that declared the rally that day a threat to the democratic regime, "Damned be Democracy if it has to be defended by such democrats." He then added, "The Democracy they wish to foist on us is anti-people, anti-union, anti-reform Democracy, that is, the one that best suits the interests of the groups they serve or represent. The Democracy they want is the Democracy of intolerance and hatred. The Democracy they want is the Democracy to liquidate Petrobras; it is the Democracy of private national and international

[883] As quoted in Ferreira, 'Brizola em Panfleto', 116–18.

[884] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 155–56.

monopolies, it is the Democracy that fights against popular governments, and that led Getúlio Vargas to the supreme sacrifice." Sounding like Quadros, who had declared his preference for the "streets and public squares, in the legitimate exercise democratic regime,"[885] President Goulart told the crowd, "Democracy is precisely this: the people free to express themselves, including in public squares, without the slightest danger to the security of institutions. of the Democracy is what my government has been trying to accomplish, as it is its duty not only to interpret popular aspirations, but also to achieve them through the paths of understanding and social peace." The president agreed with his brother-in-law that the problem rested in institutions which prevented reform, "This Constitution is antiquated, because it legalizes an outdated, unjust and inhumane socio-economic structure; the people want to expand democracy and to put an end to the privileges of a minority; they want land ownership accessible to all; they want everyone to be allowed to participate in political life through the vote, being able to vote and be voted for." Goulart announced that he would continue reform via executive order, a constitutionally dubious path, and demanded that Congress extend the vote to illiterates and enlisted military personnel.[886]

The following day in his annual address to Congress, the president pushed lawmakers to fundamentally reform the country's outdated institutions. He insisted on plebiscites for the basic reforms and suggested that legislative power should be delegated to the president. He also called for constitutional amendments that would allow for reelection of the president and allow relatives of the president to run to succeed them, measures that seemed tailored to benefit both

[885] 'Janio Quadros Lê na Cidade de Recife'.

[886] 'Jango: A Hora é das Reformas', *Correio da Manhã*, 14 March 1964, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

himself and Brizola.[887] A March editorial in Brizola's newspaper further supported creating a new constitution, "Our commitment is to true democracy, which is the people's regime. A constitution may or may not be popular, and if not, it will necessarily cease to be democratic."[888] Brizola's message reflected an affinity for a type of popular democracy which he clearly felt was not compatible with the existing regime.

As discussed in Chapter V, the Cuban Revolution had the effect of instilling in far-left and far-right actors across Latin America a distorted perception of the replicability of social revolution in their country.[889] Several academics have noted that far-left leaders, especially Brizola, misinterpreted the popularity of their 1961 movement in favor of Goulart's inauguration for widespread support for their reform agenda.[890] While defense of the constitution had been overwhelmingly popular, the far-left abandoned this position and instead became openly hostile to the constitutional regime. Some political scientists such as Figueiredo have argued that "leftist and pro-reform groups pursued these reforms even at the cost of democracy. To obtain reforms,

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[887] João Goulart, 'Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional 1964' (14 March 1964), Biblioteca da Presidência da República, http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/publicacoes-oficiais/mensagem-ao-congresso-nacional/mensagem-ao-congresso-nacional-joao-goulart-1964/view; See also Ferreira, 'Brizola em Panfleto', 119.

[888] As quoted in Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto', 206.

[889] Weyland, *Revolution and Reaction: The Diffusion of Authoritarianism in Latin America*, 75–110; O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, 69; Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*, 70–71; Nogueira, 'As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola', 68.

[890] Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto', 207; Ferreira, 'Brizola em Panfleto', 114; Ferreira, 'A Legalidade Traída', 5; Nogueira, 'As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola', 63–64; Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 91; Figueiredo, *Democracia ou reformas?*, 201–2; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 223–29; Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*, 96.

they proposed and were willing to support undemocratic solutions. They accepted the democratic game only as long as it was compatible with radical reform."[891]

There is a good deal of evidence that the far-left claims to overwhelming popular support for their agenda was mistaken. As Bermeo argued, while much of the political elite polarized to extremes, the bulk of the population remained much closer to the center. She highlighted that Brazilians enjoyed a high degree of consensus in favor the Fourth Republic regime as evidenced by the campaign for legality in 1961 and the opposition to the imposed parliamentary system.[892] There is no evidence of a significant shift of popular opinion against the regime between 1961 and 1964. In fact, Lavareda's work with opinion polling that had become far more common by 1964 is particularly revelatory of the moderate nature of public opinion, though it should be noted that these polls conducted across major cities reflect a mostly urban opinion. One 1963 survey asked Brazilians which ideological line the country should follow, left, right, or center. Only 19% said left with 23% answering right and a large plurality of 45% responding center. Another indicator of the population's political leanings came from a 1964 poll on preferences for the 1965 presidential election. Kubitschek (37%) a centrist candidate led with Lacerda (25%) a far-right candidate in second. Reflecting popular opinion of the far-left one 1964 survey asked respondents if they were favorable or opposed to the relegalization of the Partido Comunista, an overwhelming 76% responded in the negative.[893]

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[891] Figueiredo, *Democracia ou reformas?*, 202.

[892] Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*, 88–89.

[893] Lavareda, *A democracia nas urnas*, 121–62.

The 13 March rally provoked a series of conflicting responses. Lacerda accused the president of stoking "Revolutionary war" and called for his removal, via violence if necessary.[894] Partido Comunista leader Luís Carlos Prestes declared his support and that of his party for the president, and celebrated the success of the rally in which the Communists had played a significant role.[895] Many military officers expressed dismay that Army units had been used as security for the rally and might be seen as supporting the president's positions. In late March, a large group of retired generals issued a manifesto claiming that Goulart was now acting "outside the law" and therefore the military was no longer constitutionally obliged to obey him.[896] Much of the country's press that had been favorable to Goulart for most of his presidency now turned on him.[897] The newspaper *Correio da Manhã,* that had often given Goulart lukewarm support, declared on 14 March that while it supported the basic reforms, it condemned the president's rally as "a veiled threat towards existing institutions" and "psychological warfare" against Congress.[898] The opposition press hardened their criticism: the newspaper *O Estado de S. Paulo* cited the rally as evidence that the country was being run by a "pre-totalitarian regime" and claimed the president was "inciting the masses" against the branches of government.[899] Still

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[894] As quoted in Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader II*, 201.

[895] As quoted in Jorge Ferreira, 'O Partido Comunista Brasileiro e o governo João Goulart', *Revista Brasileira de História* 33 (December 2013): 129–32, https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-01882013000200007.

[896] 'Generais: Goulart é Transgressor da Lei', *Diário de Notícias*, 22 March 1964, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[897] Ferreira and Gomes, *1964*, 246–48; Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 458–59.

[898] 'O Último Comício', *Correio da Manhã*, 14 March 1964, 6, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[899] 'Notas e Informações', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 14 March 1964, 3, Acervo Estadão.

some publications remained loyal like *Ultima Hora* which ran the celebratory headline: "The People with [Goulart] Begin the Reform!"[900]

Goulart's radical turn led to a corresponding backlash among segments of the public as polarization spread ever further. On 19 March, the Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade (March of the Family with God for Liberty) took over the streets of São Paulo, turning out between 300 to 500 thousand people. A Catholic middle class women's organization, the Campanha da Mulher pela Democracia (Women's Campaign for Democracy) was the primary organizer with the support of some politicians and church leaders. Protesters chanted anti-Brizola and anti-Goulart slogans while singing the national anthem and Ave Maria. A manifesto distributed to marchers denounced Goulart's rally and the evils of communism and asserted "the Fatherland is in extreme danger, through the fault of men of immeasurable ambition, without piety and without scruples." The group also declared its faith in the armed forces and held mass for the "salvation of democracy."[901] Given the success of the march, the organizers began preparations for several more in the month of April to counteract the planned rallies of the president. The goal seemed to be to deprive Goulart of the ability to refer to a single cohesive "people" as supportive of his methods.[902]

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[900] 'O Povo com Jango Começa a Reforma', *Ultima Hora*, 14 March 1964, 1, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[901] 'Auro na Marcha Pediu Fé nas Fôrças Armadas', *Correio da Manhã*, 20 March 1964, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[902] Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 492–93.

The 1964 Coup

For many military conspirators, the time had come. Goulart and Brizola, they claimed, had declared their hostility to the constitutional regime and their willingness to act violently. The increasingly apparent shift in public opinion was also important as the 1961 coup had failed for lack of popular support.[903] Via the civil society organizations of the right, the military conspirators organized support from politicians and civilian sources that went well beyond Lacerda and his UDN radicals. Tension mounted within the group as legalist officers remained hesitant about acting against the sitting president while others wanted to act before Goulart or Brizola could pre-empt them through some action of their own. There remained a good deal of mystery about who would be on what side should a coup attempt be launched and if the rebellion would have the numbers to succeed.[904] Meanwhile, Ambassador Gordon and the U.S. encouraged a coup but told the Brazilian conspirators not to count on being "rescued" by the United States.[905] The unofficial head of the conspiracy, General Castelo Branco, issued an internal memo in response to the president's rally that soon spread through military circles. He stated that the country faced "two threats," the proposed constitutional convention and the "widespread agitation by the illegal power of the CGT." The general explained that "The coveted constituent assembly is a revolutionary objective via the violence of closing the current Congress and the institution of a dictatorship." He stipulated, "Insurrection is a legitimate resource of a

[903] Stepan demonstrated the importance of public opinion for both the 1964 coup and military coups in general. See Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 82–122, 188–212; See also Ferreira and Gomes, *1964*, 254–57.

[904] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 303–9.

[905] As quoted in ibid., 324.

people . . . are the Brazilian people asking for a military or civil dictatorship and constituent assembly? Not yet, it would seem." He asked his subordinates to "Be ready to defend legality" and condemned the attempts by either side to claim the military's support, "The Armed Forces cannot betray Brazil. Defending the privileges of rich classes is on the same anti-democratic line as serving fascist or unionist-communist dictatorships."[906]

The following week, a group of sailors from the communist influenced Association of Sailors and Marines protested the living conditions for Navy enlisted personnel. These protests included a broadcast from the pro-Brizola Mayrink Veiga radio network. Upset by the display, the Navy Minister signaled a willingness to discuss the sailor's concerns but ordered a 10 day imprisonment of the leaders of the association. On 25 March, the sailors gathered in the headquarters of the Guanabara Metalworker's Union with the support and attendance of the CGT and Brizola and some local Groups of Eleven. The sailors condemned the response of the Navy Minister and demanded amnesty, refusing to turn over the sentenced sailors among them. Association leaders also spoke out in favor of the basic reforms.[907] Brizola gave speeches championing the sailors. After two days of negotiations that cost the Navy Minister his position, the mutinous sailors agreed to allow themselves to be arrested in exchange for amnesty soon afterwards.[908] Skidmore and Ferreira both identified the sailor's revolt as the final straw for

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[906] Humberto Castelo Branco, 'Circular reservada do Chefe de Estado-Maior do Exército' (20 March 1964), A Defesa Nacional, http://ebrevistas.eb.mil.br/index.php/ADN/article/view/5937.

[907] One association leader was José Anselmo dos Santos who was later revealed to be a member of Navy intelligence and a CIA plant. It is unknown if he was acting on CIA instructions during this episode, but he was not the instigator. See Sabrina Guerghe, 'Jose Anselmo dos Santos', in *CPDOC Enciclopédia*, accessed 1 December 2021, http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/jose-anselmo-dos-santos.

[908] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 278–89; Rolim, 'Leonel Brizola e os setores subalternos das Forças Armadas', 190–239.

military leadership that had been terrified to the core by the breakdown of hierarchy and the protection of the mutineers from punishment. All this had happened with support from the CGT and Brizola, inside a union building.[909] The military feared it was losing its monopoly on violence, upon which rested the ability to intervene, to the clutches of organized labor and populist politicians that might soon command the loyalty of the lower ranks.[910]

Within the Castelo Branco group of military conspirators, the plans for a coup slowly advanced and a tentative date of 4 April was set. Still Castelo Branco remained convinced the plot would fail without the adhesion of Goulart's friend General Kruel who commanded the Second Army in São Paulo. Plotters planned on a fight with the powerful First Army in Rio de Janeiro and the Third Army in the South. While Kruel's support was vital, he remained adamant that Goulart had not yet crossed the line of acting against the regime itself. Other officers opposed to the administration felt that the next election was close enough to wait. The coup was a poorly kept secret and several groups on the left now publicly condemned the plans for 4 April. A few even called for violence to be met with violence.[911]

Attention turned to a planned speech from Goulart to be delivered to an association of military police sergeants on 30 March at the Automobile Club in Rio de Janeiro. Moderates around the president urged him to skip the event but Goulart saw it as an opportunity to push back on the officers of the armed forces that he felt had lost touch with their subordinates. The

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[909] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 297; Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 495.

[910] Rolim, 'Leonel Brizola e os setores subalternos das Forças Armadas'.

[911] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 267–90; Soares, *A democracia interrompida*, 371.

president's military advisors ensured him he had the support of the bulk of the armed forces.[912] Goulart's speech was relayed via national television and radio. The president told the receptive sergeants that the current crisis was the fault of a "privileged minority" that loved the past and feared "the bright future that will open up to democracy through the integration of millions of our countrymen in the economic, social and political life of the Nation, liberating them from penury and ignorance." Goulart excoriated his opponents; of his military critics he stated: "In the 1961 crisis, the same Pharisees who today display a false zeal for the Constitution, wanted to tear it up and bury it under the cold tomb of fascist dictatorship." In describing his civilian opposition, he said, "the politicians who have most preached hatred in this country reach out to the most corrupt politicians in Brazilian history and together have the cynicism to speak on behalf of the Catholic feelings of the people." He labelled those leading his opponents the "eternal enemies of democracy." The president insisted that the constitution must be amenable to the "institutions of the future" and insisted that basic reforms could not be delayed as they constituted "legitimate and felt demands of the Brazilian people and are indispensable to the development of our country." Finally, the president informed those in the military worried about the hierarchy that true discipline is "based on mutual respect between commanders and the commanded."[913]

The next day Brazilian media was virtually united in condemnation of Goulart.[914] While the president's opponents called for his removal and resignation, a chorus of centrist politicians

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[912] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 290–91.

[913] 'Goluart pede aos sargentos que respeitem a hierarquia', *Jornal do Brasil*, 31 March 1964, Fundação Biblioteca Nacional.

[914] Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 497; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 159.

pled for moderation and respect for the military's hierarchy. This group was headlined by Kubitschek whom the PSD had hurriedly nominated just two weeks earlier in an attempt to ensure Brazilians and the military of a calmer future. Besides issuing a public manifesto, Kubitschek met with Goulart personally to urge him to reverse course and heed military concerns as to "avoid consequences which might be irreparably damaging to the tranquility of his government, and disastrous to the democratic regime, which it was the duty of all to preserve."[915] Goulart refused to disavow his positions or apologize to military leadership.[916]

Events had already been set in motion. Enraged by the president's speech, General Olímpio Mourão Filho, famous in military circles for his unpredictable behavior, unilaterally mobilized his troops and in the early morning of 31 March and set off from Minas Gerais to launch an assault on the First Army in Rio de Janeiro, where Goulart still remained following his speech. Meanwhile, Mourão's soldiers rounded up labor leaders and controlled communications between Rio de Janeiro and Brasília. A bewildered Castelo Branco was shocked to learn of Mourão's actions. Besides the fact that no concrete plan yet existed, the other conspirators were only learning of Mourão's actions as he was taking them and could hardly assist him. Most importantly, General Kruel and the Second Army had still not agreed to join the plot. If Kruel remained loyal and the First Army mobilized, Mourão's force would easily be crushed. Mourão was aware of and unconcerned by the odds. Before setting off he invited his subordinate officers

[915] As quoted in Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 356.

[916] Ibid., 356–57.

"to die" with him.[917] He personally phoned a completely unaware Kruel to tell him that he would soon assault the First Army.[918]

Castelo Branco frantically tried to seize control of the situation by taking over a leaderless Ministry of War that by this point was in complete disarray. He quickly dispatched another general and his force to join Mourão and normalize his behavior. Minister of War General Ribeiro attempted to command the government response from his hospital bed where he was suffering from cancer. He ordered out portions of the First Army to put down Mourão's force. Kruel realized that his decision could be delayed no longer. He made repeated phone calls to his friend the president and told him that he must publicly and unequivocally renounce the Communists, the CGT, and the far-left politicians around him to save his presidency. Goulart told Kruel that was impossible; Kruel answered the president: "From this moment on, we are separated." He then prepared to join the coup but could only convince the officers under him to cooperate by assuring them that the movement was not against the president himself but the Communists that had misled him. The Second Army now set out to join Mourão's assault on the First Army. Several governors, including those of Minas Gerais and São Paulo also publicly endorsed the uprising as did Governor Carlos Lacerda in Guanabara.[919]

With events quickly developing, U.S. President Johnson was adamant that Brazil not be allowed to slip into the Soviet orbit and told his advisors, "we just can't take this one." He then authorized Operation Brother Sam which saw the United States direct a supply laden carrier

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[917] As quoted in Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 315.

[918] Ibid., 303–60.

[919] Ibid.

group towards Brazil. Once there the fleet would supply the rebels designated as the "democratic forces."[920] If fighting proved fierce then the carrier would be well positioned to launch air support and potentially even clear the way for a landing of American troops. Johnson charged both his CIA Director and Secretary of Defense with the issue. As it turned out, U.S. assistance proved unnecessary for the rebel forces, but it did help convince Goulart of the futility of resistance.[921] In his analysis of the coup, Soares argued, "Personally, I have no doubt that Goulart would fall with or without American support."[922]

While the top commanders of the First Army remained loyal to the president, the officers in the field proved less so. As government regiments made contact with their opponents, a series of negotiations began. Officers commanding loyal forces were soon persuaded by rebel arguments that to defend Goulart would make them indirectly into soldiers of communism. The First Army fragmented as the president's defenses melted away. On 1 April, Goulart decided to fly to Brasília while he was still free to do so. His hospitalized War Minister, now suffering from hemorrhages, resigned. Goulart soon learned that the loyal remnants of the First Army had lost control of the situation in Rio de Janeiro. The Third Army around his native Rio Grande do Sul stood with the government but was dealing with rebellious units and could hardly face the rest of the Brazilian military on its own. Meanwhile, rebel troops were advancing on the capital and the Presidential Guard was in retreat. Goulart told those around him that he had no desire to subject the country to civil war and once he learned of the coming U.S. aid, he was sure any fight would

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[920] *President Lyndon B. Johnson Discussing the Impending Coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball*, MP3 (Washington, D.C, 1964), National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm.

[921] Pereira, 'The US Role in the 1964 Coup in Brazil'.

[922] Soares, *A democracia interrompida*, 350.

be a losing one. That night he flew to Rio Grande do Sul, there he found Brizola tirelessly denouncing the coup via radio broadcasts. Brizola, encouraged his brother-in-law to stand and fight, but Goulart went into hiding at his ranch. With an asylum agreement reached, on 4 April the final president of the Fourth Republic went into exile in Uruguay. Angered by Goulart's decision, Brizola stayed behind to organize resistance but was also forced to flee the country just weeks later.

At midnight on 2 April, a divided Congress was forced into session. Goulart supporters bitterly complained as the presidency was declared vacant and chamber president Mazzilli was returned to acting president status. The United States instantly recognized the new administration. The military formed a body called the Supreme Revolutionary Command with General Costa e Silva at its head; the command informed the acting president that they would handle executive decision making for the foreseeable future. Across the country, labor leaders and pro-Goulart politicians were arrested, followed soon by anyone the military thought might be problematic. Droves of exiles fled the country. The CGT and several Goulart allies called for national strikes and popular resistance but, with a few small exceptions, none materialized.[923]

Weffort pointed to this lack of popular backlash as evidence of populism's hold on people and the inability of the masses to mobilize in the absence of a leader directing them.[924] This thesis suggests an alternative explanation. Like Quadros before them, Goulart and Brizola seemed convinced that the popularity of their reform agenda meant that the population preferred the enactment of those reforms even over the continued existence of the constitutional

[923] Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 303–60; Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 159–64; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 229–302.

[924] Weffort, *O Populismo na Politica Brasileira*, pt. I.

democratic regime.[925] In reality, the radicalization of 1963 and 1964 shrunk the base of support enjoyed by Goulart.[926] While a large majority had supported Goulart's ascension to the presidency and rejected a parliamentary regime, events, such as the popular Catholic mobilizations, suggest that many had been turned off by the president's tactics and a perceived association with communists. The basic reforms were popular, however, that did not mean that a majority of the population endorsed Brizola's contention that legislative opposition to reform delegitimized constitutional institutions. Next, confusion and fear abounded in the wake of the coup. Standing up to a military takeover (especially one arresting subversives in mass) is a dangerous action and it's not surprising that some might have chosen not to do it. Lastly, the military had intervened before and after a brief period the situation had always seemed to work itself out and normality returned, as in 1955. Brazilians in favor of the Fourth Republic regime had no reason to suspect this time would be profoundly different.[927]

Scholarly analyses of the statements and records of the military figures that led the coup show three overriding motivations.[928] First, a fear that the constitutional regime was threatened by a communist or unionist republic takeover executed by Goulart and Brizola. Second, that military hierarchy had been dangerously destabilized and that officers might soon lose control of the lower ranks. Third, many in the military felt that the political chaos was proof that politicians

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[925] Figueiredo, *Democracia ou reformas?*

[926] Nogueira, 'As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola', 61–68; Gomes and Ferreira, 'Brasil, 1945-1964', 260.

[927] Similar arguments found in Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*, 94.

[928] D'Araújo, Soares, and Castro, *Visões do golpe*; Soares, *A democracia interrompida*, 331–72; Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 303–60; Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*, 97; Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 134–212.

in general lacked the ability to govern the country. Some of these concerns were unfounded – the Partido Comunista was in no position to take over the country and neither Goulart nor Brizola were communists.[929] These concerns also reflected anxieties older than the Fourth Republic itself about Vargas and later Goulart as stewards of "Brazilian Peronism." Other apprehensions however were legitimate. The far-left which the president now supported had launched open attacks on Congress and the Constitution. Furthermore, Brizola had actively courted relationships with the lower ranks and advanced the idea of a left wing coup.[930]

The Military Reverses Democratization

Even after their successful coup, the military's two camps continued divided. Many former legalists like Castelo Branco had been persuaded by their peers that a brief military government was indeed necessary to overcome certain institutional bottlenecks and enact difficult reforms that would make the country "ready for democracy" at which point civilians could regain control. On the other hand, the anti-Vargas officers, who now counted many younger officers among their ranks, had originally believed that a certain strain of politician was corrupting democracy but had now moved closer to the belief that democracy, at least in Brazil, produced morally bankrupt and incompetent politicians. After all, Quadros had been no better in their view than Kubitschek or Goulart. For this group, usually denominated as hardliners, the military government needed to be a long experiment that encompassed the process of

[929] Soares, *A democracia interrompida*, 371.

[930] Rolim, 'Leonel Brizola e os setores subalternos das Forças Armadas'; Ferreira, 'O governo Goulart', 490–91; Ferreira, 'A estratégia do confronto'.

development. At some far off point the military could return a morally upright and developed country to a thankful population.[931]

What both factions of the military could agree upon was that some degree of repression and reform by force, as their foe Brizola was fond of saying, was necessary. The military encountered an obstacle to governance almost instantly. With the elected president and vice president out of office, the constitution required Congress to select an interim president within 30 days. The newly formed military body, the Supreme Revolutionary Command, wanted Congress to officially remove Goulart from office and pass a sweeping emergency powers bill that would allow the new executive to conduct the necessary political purges. Congress, continuing its defiance of military directives, refused to do either. The UDN which saw itself as the unofficial party of the military government, presented a compromise bill that would grant a more limited version of emergency powers.[932] The Supreme Revolutionary Command soon made it apparent that the country's politicians had badly misinterpreted their relationship with the new government. On 9 April 1964, citing the authority it gave itself, the command issued Institutional Act #1.[933] This act did everything the military had requested Congress do. The executive was temporarily empowered to suspend for 10 years the political rights of any individual in addition to immediately removing them from any elected office they should hold. Similarly, job protection for civil service employees was suspended for 6 months, a power Quadros certainly

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[931] Maud Chirio, 'Mobilisations et révoltes d'officiers sous la dictature brésilienne' (PhD Thesis, Paris, Universidade Paris, 2009); Maud Chirio, *Politics in Uniform: Military Officers and Dictatorship in Brazil, 1960-80* (Pittsburgh, 2018); Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985* (Oxford, 1990), 3–17; Skidmore, 'Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil 1937-71', 16–17; Dulles, *Unrest in Brazil*, 350–60; Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 213–66.

[932] Benevides, *A UDN e o udenismo*, 125–46.

[933] 'Ato Institucional Nº 1' (1964).

would have coveted. The president could now submit constitutional amendments to Congress who had 30 days to approve them, and approval required only a majority instead of the previous requirement for 2/3rds that had so frustrated Goulart. Spending bills would now be submitted by the president to Congress who could approve or reject them but never alter them. The president could now also simply declare a state of siege.[934]

With this action, just eight days after the coup, the military demolished any remnant of the rule of law in Brazil. From this point forward, whenever the military conflicted with other institutions it would simply circumvent them with an institutional act. The rules of the game became meaningless as they could be arbitrarily changed at the whim of the armed forces. After purging many leftist politicians, the military presented General Castelo Branco for election as the new president and Congress complied on 11 April.[935] President Castelo Branco and the legalist officers still believed this could be a short intervention and he was elected only to serve out the rest of what had originally been Quadro's presidential term. The 1965 elections remained on the calendar. The new president promised the country he would "reinvigorate democracy."[936] A concerned Senator Kubitschek directed himself to the new president. He told Castelo Branco that while he believed that he was truly a democrat he worried about many of the officers around him who had plans for a long-term intervention. The new president assured Kubitschek that he would

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[934] Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil*, 18–45; Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*, 303–22.

[935] Bethell, 'Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic', 164.

[936] Humberto Castelo Branco, 'Pelo Rádio e através da TV, saudando o povo brasileiro após ter sido eleito Presidente da República pelo Congresso Nacional' (11 April 1964), Biblioteca da Presidência da República, http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/castello-branco/discursos/1964-1/01.pdf/view.

hold the legalist line and told him "I will not be at the service of anyone in the government, except to obey the law."[937]

The Castelo Branco government now went about "fixing" the country so democracy could resume in 1966. The first step was to "drain the communist" influence from the political system.[938] Hardliners presented the president with a list of 5,000 individuals to be purged. Castelo Branco and the legalists bristled at such a broad approach. Ultimately, the administration stripped 441 individuals of their political rights, including six governors and 55 leftist members of Congress. An additional 10,000 government and military officials lost their jobs. Goulart and Quadros were unsurprising victims of the purge, but debate surrounded the proscription of Kubitschek. Castelo Branco was reluctant to include a moderate politician and favorite for the 1965 elections but acquiesced under pressure.[939] A defiant Kubitschek delivered a fiery speech on his last day in the senate: "They are not hurting me personally, but rather all of those who believe they have the right to choose, who want to choose those who are to preside over their destinies," he declared and warned the new government, "I know that in this Brazilian land, tyrannies do not last."[940]

That the Castelo Branco administration was, at least originally, genuinely committed to a short term intervention is evidence by its actions designed to correct for the deficiencies it believed to be the cause of the regime's troubles. The presidential term was shortened to four

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[937] As quoted in Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 360.

[938] Ato Institucional Nº 1.

[939] Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil*, 18–45.

[940] As quoted in Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 365–66.

years and general elections of president, deputies, and senators were set to occur simultaneously. An absolute majority was required to be elected president and failing this, the most voted candidate could be approved by Congress. If Congress declined to do so, a second round election of the top two candidates would be held. The rural bias in the distribution of seats was diminished. In November 1964, the military government even passed a land reform law. However, it contained so many caveats and protections for landholders that it resulted in very little real change. A central bank was created to make fighting inflation easier. All these reforms reflected a sincere belief by those in power that their tenure would be short.[941]

Eventually, the Castelo Branco government reached the conclusion that economic and political stabilization would be painful and take time to manifest itself. This being the case the administration feared a democratically elected government would abandon the measures prematurely. In July 1964, a constitutional amendment extended Castelo Branco's term for an additional year and postponed the presidential election to 1966.[942] Lacerda, the longtime advocate of an emergency military regime, firmly opposed the amendment and became openly hostile to the government once it passed. Writing to the UDN leaders that aided Castelo Branco in extending his term, Lacerda declared, "I say *adeus* to the owners of my party and wish them a happy grave . . . I will take whatever path I can to preserve the people's trust in someone, in some fidelity, in some commitment, and the hope still for a democratic solution . . . The most serious thing is that you are also liquidating what existed of democracy in Brazil." He assured leadership that they were deceiving themselves, "once voted an extension, there will be no election either in

[941] 'Emenda Constitucional Nº 9' (1964); 'Emenda Constitucional Nº 17' (1965); Dillman, 'Land and Labor Patterns in Brazil During the 1960s'.

[942] Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil*, 18–45.

1966 or anytime soon."[943] True to Lacerda's prediction, Brazilians would not vote for their president again until 1989. Facing increasing censorship, Lacerda now dedicated himself to opposition to the military regime. In 1966, he was one of three founders of the Frente Ampla (Ample Front) to unite Brazilians in opposition to the dictatorship. The other two founders joining Lacerda in his latest crusade were none other than former presidents Kubitschek and Goulart, both living in exile. The two men Lacerda once vowed to never let take office became his allies in a doomed quest to resurrect Fourth Republic democracy. Predictably the front was outlawed and Lacerda found himself imprisoned and stripped of his political rights. The three men continued their work until they all died separately between 1976-1977 in rather mysterious circumstances.[944] This fact has since led many to speculate that they were victims of the infamous Operation Condor whereby the United States sponsored the efforts of South American dictatorships to murder their political opponents.[945]

In 1965, the military government endeavored to display its new and improved "democracy" by way of the gubernatorial elections in 11 states. The election was preceded by a new ineligibility law which disqualified another wave of politicians deemed unfit. Even under these conditions, several government backed UDN candidates in key states lost in a clear expression of voter dissatisfaction with a regime they could not directly change. Enraged and threatening a coup against Castelo Branco himself, the hardliners secured further concessions. Following the election, the government decreed Institutional Act #2. All Brazil's political parties

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[943] Carlos Lacerda, 'Carta de Carlos Lacerda para Bilac Pinto', in *Minhas cartas e as dos outros* (Brasília; Belo Horizonte, 2005).

[944] Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader II*; Alexander, *Juscelino Kubitschek*, 376–77.

[945] For more on the operation, see Francesca Lessa, *The Condor Trials: Transnational Repression and Human Rights in South America* (New Haven, 2022).

and organizations were declared extinct, and the executive also received a new set of purge powers. The regime now imposed a two party system with its supporters organized under the umbrella of the Aliança Renovadora Nacional (National Renewal Alliance) and the few remaining opposition politicians who still enjoyed political rights placed under the party label Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement). Institutional Act #2 also expanded the Supreme Court to 16 ministers as the court had been obstructing some government actions and freeing political prisoners and the military needed to bring that institution under control. Crucially, the selection of presidents would now be via indirect election by way of an electoral college system within Congress which the government party now tightly controlled.[946] This declaration officially erased the earlier changes that had been implemented with a short stay in power in mind and prepared the way for a long-term dictatorship. Crucially, the act came in response to an election that hardline officers had interpreted as proof of the inadequacy of democracy and the inability of the population to make the right choice.[947]

The idea that democracy itself was the problem had won out and through deliberate acts the dictatorial regime had dismantled many of Brazil's democratic institutions. In 1966, the military designated General Costa e Silva as Castelo Branco's successor and he was confirmed by an electoral college vote that opposition delegates refused to dignify with their presence. In 1967, the implicit became explicit when the military decreed a new constitution to sustain the dictatorship. The 1946 Constitution, the last vestige of Brazil's post war regime was swept away. Institutions like the National Congress and state governments survived and were evidence that

[946] 'Ato Institucional Nº 2' (1965).

[947] Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil*; Chirio, *Politics in Uniform*.

the military felt it necessary to at least maintain the illusion of democracy, but these institutions were stripped of any real authority and left at the mercy of an executive with arbitrary power. On 5 December 1968, the dictatorship unveiled the infamous Institutional Act #5. Habeas corpus and individual constitutional rights were suspended. The executive was given the permanent ability to remove any lawmaker and intervene in any level of government at its pleasure.[948] The act's effect was to usher in a reign of terror based on gruesome torture, exile, and state sponsored murder. Brazil's post-war democratization had been largely undone.[949]

Conclusion

The military coup of 1964 and the resulting military dictatorship were made possible by the radicalization and degradation of the political environment by political actors on the far-right and far-left. Referring to the two sides of Brazilian political spectrum in 1964, Figueiredo noted that, "Both groups subscribed to the notion of democratic government only insofar as it suited their convenience."[950] In his study of the origins of the Brazilian military dictatorship, Cohen noted that "it is the way in which the political leadership and the political system convert the grievances and demands of the lower classes that determines whether an autocratic regime will emerge or not. If the political leadership had transformed the demands of the Brazilian lower classes in a more moderate way, the military might never have intervened."[951] Viewing the events through this lens, it allows one to see that while economic and political crisis opened a

[948] 'Ato Institucional Nº 5' (1968).

[949] Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil*; Chirio, *Politics in Uniform*.

[950] Figueiredo, *Democracia ou reformas?*, 202.

[951] Cohen, 'Democracy from Above', 42.

door to polarization, it is ultimately elites that chose to react to crisis in polarizing or radical ways.[952] Stepan argued a similar point stating, "Although great loads existed on the political system by early 1964, what made the crisis a total one in which the constitutional, democratic framework of government was called into question was the widespread belief and argumentation by politicians on the left and the right that the system was unworkable."[953] The political choice to respond to crisis with polarization has been shown to be detrimental to democratic regimes.[954] However, in the text that provided the theoretical framework for this thesis, Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan presented an important caveat that polarization is not always destructive to democratic regimes. "What explains why polarization contributes to breakdown in some cases but is unproblematic in others? The key issue is radicalism, that is, the intransigence and the urgency of actors with policy preferences toward the left or right of the spectrum. Radical actors are not willing to defer their quest to achieve policy objectives into the distant future . . . Willingness to achieve objectives over the long term can compensate for polarization, because actors may favor a pronounced shift away from the status quo and yet accept playing by the rules of the competitive regime."[955] Therefore it is not just ideological distance but the urgency with which actors pursue their goals that matters.

In Brazil, as the two sides grew further apart and the immediacy of their demands increased, polarization spread and deepened. The definition of democracy itself was a subject of

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[952] Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*, 232.

[953] Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, 147.

[954] Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*; Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan, *Democracies and Dictatorships*.

[955] Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan, *Democracies and Dictatorships*, 38–39.

polarization, while Brizola and others on the far left insisted that putting democracy into action consisted of implementing what they believed to be overwhelmingly popular reforms by any means possible, their opponents, many with a significant degree of hypocrisy given their earlier refusals to accept electoral results or the constitutional line of succession, held that democracy was best served by fealty to constitutional institutions. Once again, as had been the case during the Second Republic, the language of democracy was used by the left and right to advance anti-democratic positions. Political actors at the center were unable to stabilize the political environment despite the fact that the bulk of public opinion was towards the center. As evidenced by the many early successful reforms under Goulart, it was polarization and not systemic failings that paralyzed government.

While weaknesses in the political system and those inherit in presidentialism were contributing factors, it was polarization that exacerbated these to the point of imperiling the existence of the regime. Comparatively, Barber and McCarty's analysis of polarization in the twenty-first century United States found that polarization has the effect of weakening Congress "relative to the other branches of government" as both the executive and the judiciary expand into the legislative arena abandoned by a dysfunctional legislative branch. "Presidents facing strong partisan and ideological opposition from Congress are more likely to take unilateral action rather than pursue their goals through legislation."[956] Similarly, in his critique of presidentialism, Linz held: "no democratic principle exists to resolve disputes between the executive and the legislature about which of the two actually represents the will of the people."[957] These arguments

[956] Barber and McCarty, 'Causes and Consequences of Polarization', 44.

[957] Linz, 'The Perils of Presidentialism', 63.

are clearly reflected in the Brazilian case with Goulart's radicalization. With the legitimacy and democratic credentials of the government and politicians themselves degraded by polarization the door was opened to military intervention with a degree of popular support. Once the constitutional order had been violated the damage was too great to be repaired, and those in favor of sustained dictatorship prevailed. From the final generation of Fourth Republic politicians to military leadership, this iteration of democracy, like so many others, came to an end as the result of actions by those charged with caring for it.

Conclusion

In 1915, the editor of the *Estado de S. Paulo* newspaper Júlio de Mesquita wrote, "The Destiny of Peoples who want to live free is that of Sisyphus: to raise and reraise the falling stone, until it rests upon the top of the mountain. One shouldn't lament the sweat that one spills on this labor."[958] The Fourth Republic (1946 – 1964) constitutes a crucial but underappreciated raising of that stone in the labor of Brazilian democratization. Accordingly, this thesis has offered a history of democracy in Brazil, focused on the Fourth Republic, but tracing its roots back to its wider past. It shows that the Fourth Republic was built upon historical legacies and a compromise of competing conceptualizations of democracy as forwarded by leading contemporary political actors. The latter are central to the developments analyzed here, as the thesis examines the extent to which the manifested beliefs and behaviors of political actors shaped, enhanced, and undermined the process of democratization during the existence of this regime. My research is based on a broad array of primary sources together with a thorough examination of the relevant secondary literature – in spite of the constraints imposed by the pandemic, which unfortunately prevented me from visiting Brazil, I had access to a significant amount of valuable digital archives and documentation that underpin its findings. In the rest of this conclusion, I first highlight the main developments that marked the history of Brazilian democratization during the Fourth Republic, and then move on to briefly discuss the wider significance of the thesis, and its contribution to the field.

For a start, democracy in Brazil did not originate in the Fourth Republic. As shown in the introduction of the thesis, important democratizing developments took place as early as the

[958] Júlio de Mesquita, 'Notas e Informações', *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 16 December 1915, Acervo Estadão.

nineteenth-century through the first decades of the twentieth century, though these are still to be fully studied by modern historians. There were serious setbacks in the 1930s, particularly during the Estado Novo (1937-45), but such setbacks ought to be understood in the wider context of democratic decline elsewhere in the world – nevertheless, even during these years, there were some developments relevant to the story of democracy, examined in chapters I and II of this thesis. During the Fourth Republic, however, Brazil went through multiple experiences that can be seen as significant milestones in its history of democratization. That is certainly the case, if viewed from the perspective of electoral procedures. Brazil held every election on the constitutionally mandated schedule from 1946 until the 1965 presidential election was postponed by the military government. Opposition parties won at all levels and executive power was transferred peacefully by presidents to rival successors. In fact, no president of the Fourth Republic was succeeded by the candidate he endorsed and candidates for the PSD, PTB, and UDN all reached the presidency. The electoral justice system oversaw elections generally accepted as honest and opposition parties contested rules, not vote tallies. Opposition parties also secured successful reforms to the rules of the game on multiple occasions, including a fairer distribution of congressional seats and a switch to an official ballot. No election winner was barred from assuming office, though President João Goulart (1964) and the Partido Comunista (1947) were stripped of their legal mandates. Violent attempts to interrupt the constitutional order were successfully overcome until 1964. The electorate steadily expanded as the result of growth, urbanization, and increasing literacy. Suffrage was restored to women who voted in a presidential election for the first time in 1945. Acknowledgement of these advancements does not minimize the fact that illiterates remained legally barred from voting, significantly limiting

participation, especially among black Brazilians. But a complete picture of the way democracy was practiced over this period requires us to have a better appreciation of such developments.

Democratic progress existed outside the area of elections as well. Until Goulart's deposal in 1964, individual rights remained largely respected, even during crises and states of siege. Congress successfully rejected calls for emergency powers from the executive and together with the general public overruled a military veto. On multiple occasions, such as the refusal to completely support the Kubitschek administration's gag order on Carlos Lacerda or acquiesce to the military government's wishes after 1964, the judicial branch too ruled in defiance of the wishes of the executive. Significant popular reforms like the expansion of social legislation to the countryside, a progressive tax increase, national companies in the areas of petroleum and energy, and education reform were all successfully passed via Congress. The party system itself became more ideologically coherent and representative, including the organization of ideological fronts, as time went on. Civil society and labor organization steadily increased. Labor organization also trended towards greater degrees of independence as each successive president loosened the central government's control over the labor apparatus. Political mobilization expanded into rural areas even when the vote did not. Newspapers, magazines, radio, and television all helped to create a national political culture, increasing popular involvement.

It should be stressed that all these developments, studied in detail in this thesis, took place at first during a brief period of revival of democracy in the region after the Second World War, but the Brazilian experience with democratization extended through the 1950s, at a time when democracy was floundering elsewhere in Latin America. Against this background, the events leading to the 1964 military coup need to be reassessed. Traditionally, the literature has argued that the regime's collapse was the inevitable result of economic development or of the

very democratic and institutional deficits of its political system or just another casualty of the Cold War, particularly after the fears in the hemisphere provoked by Cuban revolution. This thesis does not discount the significance of any of these factors, which undoubtedly contributed to the crises. However, it provides evidence that it was ultimately polarization resulting from the choices of political actors that exacerbated those crises to the point of proving fatal to the regime. The decision to launch the 1964 coup and its success came down to a few individual decisions. While the military dictatorship began as a limited intervention, extremists opposed to democratic governance soon won out and oversaw the reversal of many aspects of Brazil's first experiment of sustained representative democracy. It was a major setback, but it is important to keep it in perspective. Indeed, the democratizing legacy of the Fourth Republic, while beyond the scope of this thesis, needs to be taken into account. As noted by Rollie E. Poppino, at the time of the coup "the military commanders acted with remarkable self-denial . . . retaining the forms and much of the spirit of representative government and vowing to return the nation to civilian rule when overdue institutional change had been effected."[959] This did not take place overnight. But again, as pointed out by Scott Mainwaring, "compared to the military dictatorships in the Southern Cone, military rule in Brazil had a distinct feature that parties, elections and Congress usually functioned, albeit under sever constraints at times . . . parties, elections, and Congress ultimately proved to have highly consequential implications for military rule and for gradual and protracted transition to democracy."[960] Furthermore, several politicians of this period, Leonel Brizola and

[959] Rollie E. Poppino, 'Brazil since 1954', in *A History of Modern Brazil, 1889-1964*, by José Maria Bello (Stanford, 1966), 353–54.

[960] Mainwaring, 'Chapter 11', 363–64.

Jânio Quadros among them, also reemerged with the return of democracy. Brazil's current regime, therefore, is definitively linked with the Fourth Republic.

Revising the History of Democracy in Brazil

In examining the Fourth Republic, this thesis aims to offer a novel contribution to the history of democracy in Brazil. While firmly grounded in the history discipline, it dialogues with key works from the social sciences, particularly in the identification of conceptual tools to guide the enquiry. Of course, this is not the first study of democracy in Brazil during the period covered here – among the many studies on the topic, the seminal book by Skidmore stands out.[961] Skidmore has inspired this thesis and I engage with his work throughout. I also engage with other historians and social scientists of Brazil, while trying to bridge the existing literatures on Brazil in both English and Portuguese. In some of the most notable studies of the history of democracy in Brazil, including Skidmore, democracy is often treated much like a switch, turned on in 1934, off in 1937, and on again in 1946 before being switched off more definitively in 1964 by the military coup. Without endorsing a teleological view, this thesis attempts to identify some lines of 'democratic' continuities in those successive movements of advances and retreats.

This thesis also offers an examination of the topic that is more sensitive than the traditional texts to the democratic language used by contemporaries. For example, I made use of valuable resources like the Minas Gerais Manifesto and the debates of the 1946 Constitutional Convention to introduce nuance into this story. The manifesto issued by many old school liberals in Minas Gerais clearly demonstrated changing perceptions of democracy that reflected a move

[961] Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964*.

towards a more inclusive social democracy, even among the right (Chapter II). The examination of democracy at the 1946 Constitutional Convention conducted here – itself a novel exercise as far as I know – revealed that contemporaries very consciously debated the meaning of democracy when designing the Fourth Republic's institutions and that these debates were driven by the ideological positions and different lessons learned among the varying sides since 1937, the setback of 1937 therefore, paradoxically left some democratic legacies (Chapter III). The importance of contemporary debates is also on display in the analysis of the Fourth Republic's demise. Polarization not only manifested in policy solutions, but also in the expressed understandings of democracy. Brizola based his opposition to the constitutional order on the idea that Constitution had ceased to be democratic while supporters of the coup and civil society on the right declared themselves to be defenders of democracy against President João Goulart, Brizola, and their alleged communism (Chapter VI). These and other debates illustrate the fundamental point that in historicizing democracy the historian is inevitably driven to study the various and even opposing ways the contending parties and political actors defined democracy.[962]

One particular group of contemporaries whose opinions about democracy have been significantly understudied is military officers. This thesis suggests the need to better integrate the opinions and the practices of the military more fully into the democratic story. The involvement of the military in the functioning of democracy is certainly problematic, and any intervention tends to be perceived as detrimental to the essence of the democratic system. However, problematic though it may have been, in the case of the Fourth Republic the military was heavily

[962] As Conway noted in the European case: 'The early years of the Cold War took the form of a rhetorical war over the ownership of the concept of democracy.' Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age*, 54.

involved in how the democratic system operated. As stressed in this thesis, changes in opinion among the officer corps led the military to depose Getúlio Vargas in 1945 and make way for the Fourth Republic (Chapter II). Suspicions among the armed forces of Vargas motivations and abilities as a president in a democratic system played a key role in creating the political crisis that led to his suicide in 1945. In 1955, the staunch legalist position of Henrique Lott led him to mobilize the Army in defense of electoral results (Chapter IV). The opinion of several key military leaders about the appropriate functioning of the democratic system and the threat posed by Goulart was central to their decision to intervene. Finally, debates about democracy and its viability within the officer corps were decisive in putting Brazil on the path towards a long-term military dictatorship (Chapter VI).

In summation, this thesis tries to move away from traditional perceptions of the Fourth Republic as an abortive flirtation with democracy. Rather, it looks at the Fourth Republic as a serious democratic experiment where actors from all sides and the public more broadly engaged significantly with the language and practices of democracy. Presented here is a robust body of evidence that each of the four major parties employed the language of democracy frequently as they forwarded their own unique democratic projects via party platforms and campaigns. Newspapers and civil society organizations like the Campanha da Mulher pela Democracia (Women's Campaign for Democracy) also made their own claims about democracy. This does not mean that the language of democracy was not also employed to advocate for anti-democratic measures, evidence of that has also been presented here. This includes the seemingly contradictory appeals of Goulart and Brizola to democracy while advocating the concentration of power in the hands of the executive and coup support from the right wing civil society organization Ação Democrática (Democratic Action). However, what becomes apparent from the

overall analysis of this thesis is that there was a broad commitment to and engagement with democracy across the political spectrum during the Fourth Republic.

Expanding the History of Democracy

While the main focus of this thesis is Brazil, some of its findings have wider implications for the history and study of democracy in general. As discussed in the previous section, this thesis has highlighted the value of analyzing contemporary understandings of democracy when investigating what Markoff denotes as the "moving target" of democracy.[963] Furthermore, building on the perspective of scholars such as Capoccia and Ziblatt, who argued for a conceptualization of democratization "as a chain of big and small events, not always moving unidirectionally toward full democracy," the evidence complied here has demonstrated that democratization happens unevenly and develops in different areas, different times, and in different directions.[964] Crucial milestones like the extension of suffrage to women and the secret vote came via fiat from an authoritarian politician in Vargas who was attempting to maintain himself in power (Chapter I). The inclusion of the working class and the advancement of many social rights came about under Vargas' dictatorial regime, the Estado Novo (Chapter II). These democratizing advances, which developed alongside democratic reversals, were then inherited by the post-war democratic regime. The short lived Second Republic and the advent of the Estado

[963] Markoff, 'A Moving Target'; See also Laurence Whitehead, 'The Vexed Issue of the Meaning of "Democracy"', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 2, no. 2 (1 June 1997): 121–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569319708420754.

[964] Capoccia and Ziblatt, 'The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies', 941.

Novo dictatorship also further the point of Whitehead that democratization is subject to "false starts" and "detours."[965]

Furthermore, I have attempted to place the Brazilian experience within the global democratic scene. The democratization detailed here took place against the backdrop of the rise and fall of fascism and a renewed optimism about democracy in the wake of World War II that ran up against the global political tension of the Cold War. In this way, this thesis adds an important study to the history of democracy, particularly during a period that became known as "the Second Wave of Democratization" among social scientists, that is all the more important given the relative lack of analysis by historians concerning democracy in the post-war period.[966] Understanding the global context in which national democratic experiments take place is crucial to a solid analysis and further elucidates the ways in which democracy operates as global phenomenon that is continuously transmuted on top of local conditions. While expanding the history of democracy into a period where historical studies are lacking, my work has benefited from an important interdisciplinary perspective while still utilizing the historical method. Future historical studies of democracy would benefit from incorporating the many lessons and tools provided by the social sciences on this topic.

In his memoirs, Fernando Henrique Cardoso registered the words of a billboard in Brasilia on 15 January 1985, when it was announced that the Electoral College had elected Tancredo Neves as the next president of Brazil, bringing an end to the military regime: "Good

[965] Whitehead, *Democratization: Theory and Experience*, 28.

[966] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 18.

morning democracy."[967] But the dawn of democracy in Brazil had long, important antecedents. The analysis and narrative presented here challenge the idea that democracy is relatively new to Brazil. It becomes apparent that the history of democracy, particularly in the post-war period, merits greater attention from historians. As the Brazilian historian Delgado stated, when reflecting upon the demise of the Fourth Republic, "And so ended a stage in Brazilian political life, identified by many as the best test of democracy ever experienced in Brazil. Between 1945 and 1964, political and electoral democracy was not tested in Brazil. It was practiced."[968]

[967] Cardoso and Winter, *The Accidental President of Brazil*, 153–54.

[968] Delgado, 'Partidos políticos e frentes parlamentares', 166.

Annexes

Annex I – Total Population of Brazil

Year	Population
1920	30,635,605
1940	41,236,315
1950	51,944,397
1960	70,992,343
1970	94,508,583

Annex I Source: IBGE

Annex II – Literacy and Urbanization



Annex II Source: IBGE. 'Mapa do Analfabetismo no Brasil'.

Annex III – GDP Growth and Inflation

Per capita GDP Growth (%)

1930	-3.33
1931	-4.52
1932	2.97
1933	7.48
1934	7.73
1935	1.57
1936	10.48
1937	3.02
1938	2.84
1939	0.79
1940	-2.73
1941	2.96
1942	-4.62
1943	6.24
1944	5.23
1945	0.82
1946	8.91
1947	-0.16
1948	6.87
1949	4.84
1950	3.89
1951	1.98
1952	4.27

1953	1.70
1954	4.68
1955	5.62
1956	-0.12
1957	4.53
1958	7.53
1959	6.57
1960	6.19
1961	5.42
1962	3.50
1963	-2.30
1964	0.44
1965	-0.50
1966	3.71
1967	1.31
1968	6.79

Annual Inflation Variation (%)	
1930	-12.3
1931	-10.9
1932	1.6

1933	-2.0
1934	6.3
1935	4.8
1936	1.6
1937	9.4
1938	3.2
1939	2.0
1940	6.7
1941	10.2
1942	16.2
1943	16.6
1944	20.6
1945	14.9
1946	14.6
1947	9.0
1948	5.9
1949	8.1
1950	12.4
1951	12.3
1952	12.7
1953	20.6
1954	25.8
1955	12.2

1956	24.5
1957	7.0
1958	24.4
1959	39.4
1960	30.5
1961	47.8
1962	51.6
1963	79.9
1964	92.1
1965	34.3
1966	39.1
1967	25.0
1968	25.4



Annex III Source: IBGE, Munhoz, ‘Inflação Brasileira’

Annex IV – Electoral Statistics







Annex IV Source: 'Dados Estatísticos' vol. 1-7. Nicolau, ‘Partidos na República de 1946’.

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