The role of the United States in the European Union's decision-making on security policy: 2001-2005

Christopher R. Oates
Balliol College

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford

86,794 words

Trinity Term 2012

The role of the United States in the European Union's decision-making on security policy: 2001-2005

Christopher R. Oates, Balliol College
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations
Trinity 2012

Abstract

At the start of the 21st century, the European Union had entered the realm of security policy, gaining legal competence and building institutional structures. Yet it was not the only actor or institution in European security. Its constituent member states had independent security policies; most were part of the formal institution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and all existed within the informal institution of the transatlantic security community. The United States was the most powerful actor in the two latter institutions and had longstanding bilateral ties to EU member states. Given the overlapping institutional nature of this field and the United States' unique pertinence to European security, it seems possible that the US, although a non-member state, might have causal significance when the EU deliberates security policy. This thesis seeks to investigate this possibility and to identify what role the United States may play in the EU's decision-making process. It does so using a typology of roles – accommodator, entrepreneur, spoiler and veto player – created from examples in European and institutional literature and grounded in the history of European security since the end of the Cold War. The American role is explored with three case studies of EU security debates from 2001 to 2005: the discussion over EU security structure prompted by the April 29, 2003, Mini-Summit on European Security and Defense Policy; the political agreements surrounding the creation of the Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System; and the dispute over lifting the EU's arms embargo on the People's Republic of China. In each case study, the European Union is a significant force and its internal dynamics are difficult for the United States to penetrate. However, in each episode, the US is ultimately a causally significant player in the EU's decision-making process, most resembling, according to the typology, a veto player.

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without Professor Anne Deighton, who has been a wonderful supervisor during my Master's and Doctoral degrees at Oxford. Anne guided my initial vague ideas about relations between the United States and Europe towards a piece of research that could hold up to examination. I am indebted to her advice.

My degrees were financially supported by the Oxford University Press' Clarendon Fund and Balliol College's Dervorguilla Fund. Without their funds, my studies would not have been feasible.

A tremendous thanks goes to my classmates. From discussing research topics over Pizza Hut's lunch buffet to lending a mortarboard before an exam, they made the challenges of Oxford surmountable. Additionally, all of my friends at Holywell Manor, Walton Well, Wharf House and elsewhere deserve credit for this thesis. A project this lengthy and weighty needs to be leavened by the occasional game of football or episode of *Lewis*.

Finally, the most credit of all belongs to my family. They have always been willing to help, even when I needed a chapter full of IR terminology and jargon proof-read. It is because of them that this dissertation has been completed.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS v

ABBREVIATIONS viii

INTRODUCTION 1

CASE SELECTION 4

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 10

ARGUMENT 12

METHODOLOGY 15

CONTRIBUTION 17

THESIS OUTLINE 19

CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 20

THE US IN EUROPE 20

THE EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR 26

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN THE 2000S 37

LITERATURE ON THE US AND EU 41

CONCLUSION 45

CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 47

EU THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 48

INSTITUTIONALISM 55

METHODOLOGY 65

TYPOLOGY 72

CHAPTER 3: ESDP MINI-SUMMIT **78**

I: CRISIS 79

THE SUMMIT 79

DIPLOMACY AFTER THE MINI-SUMMIT 98

II: COMPROMISE 106

INITIAL APPROACH 106

BUILDING ACCORD 112

FINAL STAGES 121

III: CONCLUSIONS 130

CHAPTER 4: GALILEO SATELLITE SYSTEM **137**

I: FUNDING GALILEO 139

THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN SATELLITE SYSTEM 139

INITIAL MEMBER STATE POSITIONS 145

LOBBYING IN 2001 153

II: TRANSATLANTIC DISAGREEMENT 163

AMERICAN WORRIES 163

AMERICAN LOBBYING 170

TRANSATLANTIC SUSPICIONS 179

REACHING AGREEMENT 182

III: CONCLUSIONS 187

CHAPTER 5: ARMS EMBARGO **196**

I: GAINING CONSENSUS 197

THE ORIGINS OF THE EMBARGO 197

THE LEGALITIES OF THE EMBARGO 202

ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE 204

Initial Divisions 218

Emerging Discourses 222

II: External Involvement and Consensus Reached 227

Consensus Reached 233

British Motivations 235

Dutch and Nordic Motivations 238

III: Consensus Broken 242

IV: Conclusions 252

CONCLUSION 256

Typology 256

Chapter Overviews 259

Findings 262

Implications 264

Further Research 266

BIBLIOGRAPHY 270

Diplomatic Cables Released by WikiLeaks.org 270

Interviews 274

Newspaper Articles 275

Primary Documents 288

Secondary Works Consulted 295

APPENDIX A: WIKILEAKS CABLES 336

ABBREVIATIONS

ASL: Anti-Secession Law

AWACS: Airborne warning and control system

BAE: British defense company formed from the merger of British Aerospace and the Marconi Electonic Systems

C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CoC: Code of Conduct on Arms Exports

COREPER: Committee of Permanent Representatives

DCI: Defence Capabilities Initiative

DSACEUR: Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe

DoD: Department of Defense (US)

DG TREN: Directorate-General for Transport and Energy

EADS: European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company

EC: European Community

ECAP: European Capabilities Action Plan

ECJ: European Court of Justice

ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community

EGNOS: European Geostationary Navigation Overlay System

EDC: European Defense Community

EEC: European Economic Community

ELDO: European Launch Development Organization

EPC: European Political Cooperation

ESDP: European Security and Defense Policy

ESDI: European Security and Defense Identity

ESA: European Space Agency

ESS: European Security Strategy

EU: European Union

EUFOR: European Union Force (prefix to military operations)

EUMS: European Union Military Staff

Euratom: European Atomic Community

EUSD: European Union of Security and Defense

FYROM: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GAERC: General Affairs and External Relations Committee

GJU: Galileo Joint Undertaking

GNSS: Global navigation satellite system

GLONASS: Global Navigation Satellite System (Russia)

GPS: Global Positioning System

HoG: Heads of Government

IGEB: Interagency GPS Executive Board

HR: High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy

IGC: Inter-Governmental Conference

ISAF: International Security and Assistance Force, Afghanistan

ICCPR: International Convention on Civil and Political Rights

ITAR: International Traffic in Arms Regulations

Mercosur/Mercosul: "Southern Common Market," including Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay

MES: Market Economy Status

NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement, including the United States, Canada, and Mexico

NAVWAR: Navigation warfare

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NRF: NATO Response Force

NTA: New Transatlantic Agenda

OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom

OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PLA: People's Liberation Army

PSC: Political and Security Committee

PRC: People's Republic of China

PRS: Public Regulated Signal

QMV: Qualified Majority Voting

RAT: Rational Actor Theory

RMA: Revolution in Military Affairs

RRF: European Rapid Reaction Force

SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander - Europe

SEA: Single European Act

SEATO: Southeast Asian Treaty Organization

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers - Europe

TEU: Treaty on European Union

UK: United Kingdom

US/USA: United States of America

WEU: Western European Union

WTO: World Trade Organization

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 21st century, the European Union had entered the realm of power politics – of foreign and security policy that could transform the economic organization into an actor on the global political stage.[1] The EU had acquired a High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a military portfolio and a variety of projects to build capacity for expeditionary operations.[2] Academic debate shifted from whether the EU *could* be an international political actor to what type of actor it *would* be.[3] However, this debate must confront the fact that the EU, especially in the security realm, is not an autonomous, federated state. Its constituent member states have independent security policies; the majority of them belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); all are part of the transatlantic security community, which the European Security Strategy (ESS) terms "one of the core elements of the international system."[4] The EU has become a security institution, but one that exists alongside other, perhaps more powerful, formal and informal security institutions.

---

[1] The European Union was previously called the European Community/Communities (EC, 1967-1992), which emerged from the merger of the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957-1967), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom). For the sake of convenience, this thesis will refer to this political body and the major institutions associated with it as the EU, unless specifically discussing its iteration in an earlier time period.

[2] The post of High Representative was created in 1999; the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1998; and the Helsinki Headline Goal, signed in 1999, initiated a number of defense capabilities initiatives. These innovations are discussed in Chapter 1.

[3] For example, previously the EU had been considered only to have a *presence* in international politics, such as Allen, David and Smith, Michael (1990). "Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Arena," *Review of International Studies*. **16**(1). 19-37. Research began to appear like that of Börzel, Tanja A. and Risse, Thomas (2009). *Venus approaching Mars? The European Union as an Emerging Civilian World Power.* Freie Universität Berlin: Berlin, April 2009 and Manners, Ian (2002). "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(2). 235-258.

[4] Solana, Javier (2003). *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, presented at the European Council in Thessaloniki, June 20, 2003, pg. 9.

The overlapping institutional nature of the EU causes a significant analytical problem when one considers that the most important member of both NATO and the transatlantic security community – the United States – is not part of the EU.[5] It is therefore quite possible that, through institutional and bilateral connections, the US influences the EU's security policies.[6] During the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s, for example, cooperation on all political levels between the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Italy was so intense that the US was described as "an unofficial external member of the EU," determining EU responses before the other member states or EU institutions had a chance to add their voices to debates.[7] The EU, as a *sui generis* regional organization, an arena of intense integration, shared sovereignty, and internal institutional dynamics, has prompted a host of EU-specific theories, which have recently been used to examine issues of foreign and security policy within the EU.[8] However, those theories, designed to address the unique setting of shared sovereignty and institutional development of the European Union, are not

---

[5] US influence in European security is not just due to its inherent national capabilities. By the end of the Cold War 300,000 American troops were stationed in Europe. Even with the "peace dividend" drawdown in troops after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the US maintained 150,000 in the region. Kugler, Richard L. (1992). *The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era*. RAND: Santa Monica, CA, pg. 1.

[6] Hofmann describes how decisions in NATO can affect the policies of European Security and Defense Policy and vice versa in Hofmann, Stephanie C. (2009). "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP," *Perspectives on Politics*. **7**(1). March 2009. 45-52.

[7] Gegout, Catherine (2002). "The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US *Directoire* at the Heart of the European Union's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(2). 331-344, pg. 339.

[8] Some examples within one theoretical framework, Europeanization, include: Stavridis, Stelios, Coulombis, Theodore, Veremis, Thanos, and Waites, Neville, eds (1999). *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean Countries and Applicant Countries in the 1990s*. Macmillan: Basingstoke; Vaquer i Fanés, J. (2001). *Europeanization and Foreign Policy*. Observatorio de Politica Exterior Europea, Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus: Barcelona; White, Brian (2001). *Understanding European foreign policy*. London: Palgrave; Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, William E. (2003). *Foreign and Security Policy: On the cusp between Transformation and Accommodation*, in *Germany, Europe, and the Politics of Constraint*, Dyson and Goetz, Editors. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 325-345; Terzi, Özlem, (2005). "Europeanization of Foreign Policy and Candidate Countries: A Comparative Study of Greek and Turkish Cases," *Politique Européenne*. **3**(17). 113-136; Gross, Eva (2009). *The Europeanization of national foreign policy: continuity and change in European crisis management*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

equipped to address the role of the United States within the EU. They could include it as an unofficial member state (which might overestimate its influence) or as a generic external country (which might underestimate its influence). Neither solution is satisfying, especially given the potential importance of the US – a superpower and a closely connected state – to European security.

This thesis therefore asks: Is it possible to determine what role the United States plays in the process of European Union security policy? It seeks to understand the American role in shaping EU decision-making, finding whether it is causally significant in internal EU policy decision and, if so, how. To examine the full range of EU foreign and security policy is impossible in the confines of one thesis, so this question is addressed by examining three case studies from 2001-2005, one of the first time periods in which the EU had a significant presence in security policy.

I find that in each case study the ability of the United States to shape EU policy was in some ways limited. Internal EU dynamics and pressures account for the start of each of these disputes and for much of these cases the US found it difficult to enter the debate. By the end of these episodes, however, the US was able to ensure that the EU did not adopt a policy that crossed a "red line" of US national interest. These cases show that the US is in fact able to enter and causally impact internal EU debates when it deploys enough political capital to overcome intra-EU politics and, in so doing, the US plays the role of a veto player in EU security policy.

CASE SELECTION

Three cases have been chosen as examples of EU security policy in which the United States may have played a role. In each, major actors within the EU, including heads of government, officials in Brussels, and private sector representatives, debated a policy that would have considerable impact on the capabilities of the EU as a security actor or would be an expression of the EU's security capabilities.[9] In each, the US attempted to persuade the EU, or a subset of European actors, to change its policy preferences.

In the first case, the debate spawned by the so-called Mini-Summit on European Security and Defense Policy, the security structure of the EU was at stake. On April 29, 2003, the leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg met to propose a series of new arrangements for the EU. The most important and contentious of these were: a mutual defense clause in the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty; an independent planning cell for EU operations; and a security vanguard of member states, which was dubbed the European Union for Security and Defense. The United States and most other member states opposed these measures. In November 2003, Britain, France and Germany agreed on a compromise, creating: a "solidarity" clause in the Treaty; a planning cell within NATO and a civil/military cell at the EU Military Staff; and a plan for a less exclusionary Permanent Structured Cooperation body. Media reports stressed the need for American approval for passage and Prime Minister Blair communicated with President Bush in the days before the plan was adopted at the December 2003 Intergovernmental Conference.[10] This episode

---

[9] Throughout this dissertation, "Brussels" will be used as a metonym for the European Union level of government. It will not be used only when discussing a more specific part of the EU situated elsewhere, e.g. "Brussels" will not be used for the European Court of Justice (ECJ), located in Luxembourg.

[10] Sciolino, Elaine (2003). "The Great Divide: The U.S. and Europe Stretch to Close It", *New York Times*. December 8, 2003.

could have significantly shaped the ability of the EU to have an autonomous military capacity, which, according to the heads of government involved in the summit, is necessary for the EU "to fully play its role on the international scene."[11]

In the second case study, the creation of the Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System, the EU sought to gain an asset that could be used to support both civilian and military operations. The EU chose in 2001 to develop its own navigation satellite system, which would essentially duplicate the American Global Positioning System (GPS). Since GPS is a military asset, run by the Department of Defense and shared with allies, the United States opposed the Galileo project on the grounds that it was a waste of European military resources. The US only reluctantly acquiesced to Galileo's creation but objected to one of its frequencies, which overlapped a planned American military GPS frequency. This would prevent the US from jamming a Galileo-equipped enemy in wartime. Though the US faced opposition from the EU Transport Commissioner as well as many member states, an agreement between the US and the EU to move Galileo's frequency was reached in 2004. This would seem to be a least likely case for American causality. Galileo was led by the supranational Directorate-General for Transport and Energy and was, technically, a civilian project, which would minimize security linkages and pressures. The history of Galileo had seen American opposition at every stage of development and each time American opposition had been ignored. Yet we still find that the US was able to effectively veto a crucial aspect of Galileo.

The third episode is that of the EU's plan to end its arms embargo on China, established after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. This proposal was raised by France

---

[11] Office of the Presidency, French Republic (2003). *Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium on European defense*. Paris, April 30, 2003. Author's translation.

in mid-2003 and gained momentum throughout 2004. In the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Summit of December 2004, the EU vowed to lift the embargo within six months. The United States lobbied against lifting throughout 2004 and increased pressure in 2005. In March 2005, momentum faltered, and the EU let the deadline pass without action, much to the chagrin of China, which had been lobbying equally vigorously in favor of lifting. This is also a least likely case for American causality. An EU consensus existed to lift the embargo and the EU's reputation as a coherent actor was seen to be on the line. The unlikelihood for the US to successfully sway the debate was so great that Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson warned the Bush Administration over "pick[ing] a fight with Europe over this which it can't actually win."[12] By March 2005, the decision on the embargo was seen by many in Europe as settled. American pressure, in the eyes of Mandleson, had been attempted and failed.[13] But as I will argue, the US was still a veto player.

These cases are similar in that in each the EU was debating an issue in the realm of "high politics" and the EU would be the forum for the eventual policy decision.[14] The United States, rather than dealing with its European allies as it has done on countless

---

[12] Evans, Michael, Browne, Anthony, and Rozenberg, Gabriel (2005). "British arms firms will spurn China if embargo ends", *The Times*. London, February 22, 2005.

[13] There is a counter-argument that Galileo and the arms embargo are most likely cases of American involvement, since they deal with security issues – navigation warfare and Chinese military development – of high concern to the US government. I agree that such priorities make these cases most likely for American interest. However, the US pressured actors within the EU for a considerable amount of time and with a considerable amount of political capital to no avail. At the outset of each case one may predict that the US would be a significant actor. However, by the time that millions of euros had been spent on Galileo or consensus on the embargo had been publicly declared, the likelihood of American involvement had been greatly reduced.

[14] Although this term is ambiguous, given the implications of many "low political" issues to security affairs, the EU had explicit governance separation between security policy (Pillar 2) and economic matters (Pillar 1) and so the term seems useful for the EU. Barnett, Michael N. (1990). "High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967-1977," *World Politics*. **42**(4). July 1990. 529-562.

transatlantic issues, had to involve itself specifically in the EU. This is a crucial point for the contribution that this thesis wishes to make. A transatlantic issue will, by definition, involve the United States. The military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan were led by the United States. European efforts were channeled through *ad hoc* Western-dominated coalitions or through NATO.[15] There is little controversy in saying that the United States is an important actor in institutions it dominates. Solely European Union affairs – where the issue emerges from the European Union, is debated by actors within the European Union, and will be resolved within a body of the European Union – is where the American presence is underconceptualized.

In each of the case studies, the US opposed one of the major positions within the European Union. This could lead to selection bias. The United States does not always oppose the EU's security plans. In fact, it often supports them.[16] It is therefore possible that these cases may present an unrepresentative picture of US-EU relations. However, this thesis does not wish to examine the *intent* of the United States with regard to the EU, which may vary between administrations and cases. It wishes to examine what *role* the US plays within the EU. By examining cases in which there was dispute between the US and at least some parts of the EU, we can observe how the US tried to influence the EU, where it succeeded, and where it failed. We are examining American involvement, and, as Bennett

---

[15] Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan began with multilateral support and was later placed under the leadership of the NATO with most EU member states contributing. Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force were run under NATO auspices.

[16] For example, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Marc Grossman said at Senate hearings on March 9, 2000, "we want [the European Security and Defense Identity] to succeed. If we and our Allies and partners in Europe can get it right… ESDI will be good for the Alliance, good for US interests, and good for the US-European relationship." Moens, Alexander (2002). *Developing a NATO-EU Security Regime*, in *NATO for a new century: Atlanticism and European security*, Hodge, Editor. 2002, Praegen: London. 69-84, pg. 76.

and Elman argue, in order to understand a phenomenon, we need to have instances of it.[17] When the EU is on a path the US approves of, there is no need for the United States to involve itself. The lack of American involvement in those policies does not prove a generalizable trend. These cases were selected for their representativeness of American involvement and because they were drawn out disputes, which can provide the researcher with enough historical data to study the mechanisms of influence.[18] Also, since the second and third cases seem to be least likely cases, if we can prove that the US was a crucial factor here, then we can conclude that standard EU-oriented frameworks are incomplete and that the US's role is an important theoretical addition to those frameworks.[19]

The time period from which the case studies are drawn, 2001 to 2005, was chosen for three advantages it provides. First, this time period followed the reshaping of the EU and NATO in the late 1990s, in which the EU gained a significant foreign policy element and both institutions expanded (or prepared to expand) into Central and Eastern Europe.[20] One of the reasons why American involvement in the EU is unclear is that the EU is a "thick" enough institution to ensure that, in most issue areas, the political pressures influencing debates are contained within that organization. Therefore, it makes sense to study the EU only once it has acquired an institutional competence in security policy to make such "thickness" possible. By the beginning of this thesis's time period, the former customs union

---

[17] Bennett, Andrew and Elman, Colin (2006). "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Studies Methods," *Annual Review of Political Science*. **9**. 455-476, pg. 461.

[18] Representativeness is discussed in Gerring, John (2008). *Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, Editors. 2008, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 645-684, pg. 646.

[19] Gerring places least likely cases in the category of "crucial" case selection, best used for hypothesis confirming or disconfirming. Gerring (2008), *Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques*, pg. 647.

[20] NATO expanded to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999. The Vilnius Group of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was formed in May 2000 to lobby for membership. EU enlargement negotiations with applicant countries was initiated by the Luxembourg Council in December 1997.

had "all institutional arrangements required to carry out EU-led operations."[21] And in fact it would do just that, deploying its first four military missions in this period.[22] It was around the same time that academic literature began to analyze the europeanization of foreign and security policy in the EU, providing insight into the effect of the EU as a significant pressure on states largely sovereign in that area.[23]

Second, this period is useful because the United States was particularly interested in the actions of Europe during those years. Due to the post-Cold War adjustment of NATO, issues relating to the Balkans, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Atlantic alliance had become a major issue and a needed source of support for the US. If this thesis were to choose cases from a time of less American interest, such as after 2009, then an important variable in the theoretical framework may be missed because the US was then occupied elsewhere.[24] While the US may not take a position on every EU issue, or choose to spend political capital even when it does, we are interested in the role it plays within the EU when those conditions are met – as it often was during this period. Third, this time period sees continuity in heads of government in major states, which eliminates one potentially confounding variable.

This time period was marked by one of the biggest international crises to involve the European Union in its history. The Iraq War, which began on March 20, 2003, was preceded

---

[21] de Wijk, Rob (2004). "The Reform of ESDP and EU-NATO Cooperation," *The International Spectator*. **39**(1). 71-82, pg. 71.

[22] These were: Concordia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2003); Artemis (Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2003); Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2004); support for AMIS II (Darfur, 2005).

[23] One of the first uses of Europeanization in foreign policy research was Tonra, Ben (2000). *Denmark and Ireland*, in *The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States*, Manners and Whitman, Editors. 2000, Manchester University Press: Manchester. 224-242.

[24] European fears of American indifference during this time are found in articles like Klau, Thomas (2009). "China and America: Europe should fear G2 rather than G20", *Financial Times Deutschland*. Hamburg, March 13, 2009. There were reinforced when President Obama skipped the 2010 US-EU summit in Madrid, a move interpreted as a snub to Europe.

by months of acrimony and division globally and within Europe. The Union was divided between pro- and anti-American blocs, represented in the UN Security Council by Britain and France, respectively. However, this thesis is not about Iraq nor the divisions it engendered. Although it was certainly one of the most important foreign policy events of this era, it was not the only one. As I will discuss in Chapter 1, Iraq did not end, or even interrupt, the idea of the EU as a security actor, and some have argued that the crisis led to a strengthened EU.[25] Rather, work on ESDP went on as before and when Iraq does involve itself in the case studies, it is often that the US, stretched between two wars, had additional need of its allies or that the EU member states wished to repair relations among themselves. The case studies show the resilience of the Atlantic and European institutional frameworks, which increases the importance of this topic. If the US and EU continued debating security policy in a nearly identical manner both before and after a major crisis, then the role of the US is likely a structural aspect of the transatlantic community, rather than the reflection of a unique moment preceding the Iraq War.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The case studies in this thesis are examples of interstate politics but I believe that using a negotiation or bargaining framework, such as Putnam's two-level games model, would provide an incomplete analysis. These cases are not pure negotiation settings, such as a trade round or a missile treaty, with an externally generated time horizon, policy options, or

[25] Menon, Anand (2004). "From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq," *International Affairs*. **80**(4). July 2004. 631-648.

negotiating partners.[26] However, they ought not be viewed as simple power politics disputes. The United States is a far more powerful actor than each EU member state, but it is heavily constrained by its non-membership in the EU. In fact, the importance of the EU in these case studies – as the setting and object of policies in Chapter 3, a leading actor in Chapter 4, and as an incipient global power with its reputation at risk in Chapter 5 – is such that we would be incorrect to use a framework that ignores its strong pressures.

There is no single conceptual framework that suitably explains the case studies in their entirety. EU theories do not address the role of the United States and including the US might invalidate some of these theories' central mechanisms, such as the impact of Brussels institutions and joint membership in the European project. However, these theories do help explain many of the causally significant pressures on the EU member states. Institututionalism might be considered to avoid the problem of American non-membership in the EU. Institutionalism has been often used to explain the EU, with Pierson, for example, using historical institutionalism to explain the path dependent nature of the EU's integration process.[27] Its theoretical foundations have been used in Europeanization literature, which has been one of the most used and useful terms in European studies of the past fifteen years.[28] Integration literature is also based on the institutional effects of the EU, such as the spillover

---

[26] Putnam, Robert (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*. **42**(3). 427-460. Putnam's model was adapted for the EU in Larsén, Magdalena Frennhoff (2007). "Trade Negotiations between the EU and South Africa: A Three-Level Game," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **45**(4). October 2007. 857-881.

[27] Pierson, Paul (1996). "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis," *Comparative Political Studies*. **29**(2). 123-163.

[28] Sixty-six articles used Europeanization from 1999-2001 alone, before its application to foreign policy studies "took off." Featherstone, Kevin (2003). *Introduction: In the Name of 'Europe'*, in *The Politics of Europeanization*, Featherstone and Radaelli, Editors. 2003, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pg. 5; Wong, Reuben and Hill, Christopher (2011). *Introduction*, in *National and European Foregn Policies: Towards Europeanization*, Wong and Hill, Editors. 2011, Routledge: New York. 1-18. pg. 3; Radaelli, Claudio (2004). "Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?," *European Integration online Papers*. **8**(16). October 6, 2004 pg. 5.

across the competences of the institutional EU (neofunctionalism) or the EU as an institutional forum for member state negotiation (intergovermentalism).[29] Institutionalism can therefore take account of the dynamics of the EU, but could also look at the institutional dynamics of NATO and the transatlantic security community.[30]

However, institutionalism is designed to most often examine the importance or inner workings of an institution. European states are members of multiple, possibly conflicting institutions. Historical institutionalism, for example, might be able to explain why NATO or the EU developed in the way it did, but could not predict which institution would lay claim to greater loyalty from a state in a policy gray area. Therefore, while European and institutional literature will be used to provide conceptual tools to understand the decisions of states and to illuminate the structure of European security, this thesis does not use only one theory, but relies on a more general Rational Actor Theory framework to help explain the decision of actors. The utility of these frameworks will be elaborated in Chapter 2.

ARGUMENT

The first task in understanding the role of the US in the EU's security policy is to discover whether it has one at all. It may be that the US, while vocal about EU issues, does not have a causal significance. I term this role an *accommodator*. Though it may try to shape EU

---

[29] These schools of integration theory have their foundings in Haas, Ernst B., (1958). *The uniting of Europe: political, social, and economical forces, 1950-1957*. Library of world affairs no. 42. London: Stevens & Sons and Hoffmann, Stanley (1965). *The state of war: essays on the theory and practice of international politics*. New York: Praeger.

[30] Deutsch's definition of a security community followed much of the same pathways of construction as does an institution and this will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2. Deutsch, Karl W. (1957). *Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the light of historical experience*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

debates, it does not do so and can only accept the EU-driven outcome. If the US is a causally significant actor in EU debates, I postulate three other possible roles: *policy entrepreneur*, *spoiler*, and *veto player*.[31] An entrepreneur is a player who actively seeks to shape the course of events by promoting new ideas, structures, policies, etc. A spoiler actively seeks to undermine others' efforts but does not offer an alternative; it seeks to maintain the status quo by preventing change. A veto player is able to prevent change without making an active effort.

These types do not depend on the attitude of the US to the EU. The US has been called "schizophrenic" in its opinion of the European Union, sometimes supporting EU integration and policies, sometimes opposing them.[32] Numerous works have tried to discern the American attitude towards the EU or to predict the future of the US-EU relationship.[33] These efforts are certainly of great importance to understand the transatlantic relationship, but they rarely conceptualize the unique position of the US within EU decision-making structures. In order to achieve such conceptualization, we must understand the mechanisms of influence which the US uses to achieve its goals. Criteria are needed in order to understand what mechanisms found in the case studies would recommend a certain description. These criteria and their foundation in the literature are discussed in more depth in Chapter 2 but I present some of the most salient in the table below.

---

[31] For examples of these terms in use, see Haverland, Marcus (1999). *National adaptation to European integration: the importance of institutional veto points*. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute; Stürchler, Nikolas and Elsig, Manfred (2007). *Spoiling the Party? Multilateralism, Participation, and International Cooperation*, at *The New International Law*. Oslo: March 15-18, 2007; Horky, Ondrej (2010). *The Europeanisation of Development Policy*. German Development Institute: Bonn.

[32] Drozdiak, William (2000). "US tepid on European defense plan", *Washington Post*. Washington, DC, March 7, 2000.

[33] For example, Philippart, Éric and Winand, Pascaline (2001). *Ever closer partnership: policy-making in US-EU relations*. Brussels: Peter Lang; or Umbach, Frank (2003). *The Future of the ESDP*, at *New Europe, Old Europe and the New Transatlantic Agenda*. Warsaw: September 6, 2003, Centrum Stosunków Miedzynarodowych.

	Type of Player			
State Action	Accommodator	Entrepreneur	Spoiler	Veto Player
Interested in EU policy	X	X	X	X
Causally significant		X	X	X
Initiates policy		X		
Responds to EU policy	X		X	X
Able to prevent policy from being enacted			X	X
Able to advance own policies		X		
Post hoc constraint on EU choices				X

In the case studies, I will examine first whether the United States had a significant impact on an EU policy decision. If so, I ask by what mechanisms, and what role those mechanisms suggest for the United States. I find that the United States, though a superpower with close allies within the EU, does not have unconstrained ability to shape EU decisions. However, by the end of each of these case studies, when the EU position crossed what the US considers to be a "red line" on its national interests, the US is able to exert enough force to be a veto player. This happens in two of the three case studies. In the third, in which it agreed to the EU's eventual agreement, it was treated as a veto player by EU actors and its satisfaction with the result indicates it did not use a "veto" because to do so would be unnecessary to accomplish its aims.

METHODOLOGY

Three cases have been chosen as representative examples of the EU security policy in which the United States may have played a role. Because the United States may have an impact within EU debates, a large-*n* analysis would not be able to offer the kind of fine-grained historical research to prove American causality. Due to the possibility that the US responds on a case-by-case basis to European policy, multiple cases help to establish a pattern of behavior.

This thesis uses qualitative methods, especially historical process tracing, as it relies on understanding the causes of political change within the EU. To understand the causality of these case studies, we need detailed historical descriptions that provide sufficient evidence from which to draw conclusions. It is only from understanding why a decision was made – the motivations behind it, the mechanisms by which pressure was felt and policy ideas communicated – that we can understand whether the United States was involved. For example, the United States tried to intervene in the development of the ESS. A cable from the American embassy in Brussels to Washington wrote that "Now is the time to quietly engage our friends in the EU on our views of the ESS… The UK, Italy (which holds the EU Presidency), the Council Secretariat, Denmark, Spain and Poland are all good access points. All are sympathetic to U.S. views and are able to influence the debate, some considerably."[34] The American intent to be involved in the process was met warmly by the ESS's principal drafter, Robert Cooper, who welcomed American input "anytime,

---

[34] WL: *03BRUSSELS4143: First Steps toward an EU Use-of-Force Doctrine: Opportunities for the U.S.* Brussels Embassy, August 28, 2003. Diplomatic cables referenced in this thesis were released by WikiLeaks on August 30, 2011 and will be denoted by WL. These cables are labeled by the year of the release, the Embassy from which it was sent to Washington, the number of the cable from that embassy of that year, and a subject line. So the cable in this citation was the 4,143rd dispatch from the US Embassy in Brussels of 2003 and "First Steps…" was the title of the cable.

anywhere."[35] This cable shows that the United States attempted to shape one of the core documents of the EU. Without a detailed account of the process of its development, it would be impossible to state whether the US had causal significance.

This thesis draws upon secondary literature, interviews with academics and officials familiar with the events, and newspaper articles from the US, UK, France, Italy and Germany. It uses primary sources, including intergovernmental agreements, policy papers, and press conferences by leaders. Additionally, many American diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks in August 2011 relate to the case studies. The WikiLeaks release is, according to most, dangerous for international diplomacy, but as an academic, it would be pointless not to use information that is already in the public sphere.[36] These cables may present a partial view of events. WikiLeaks did not possess all American cables (those in Chapter 3, for example, come mainly from the US Embassy in Rome) and even so, they contain the story only as it was told to American officials.

This thesis uses Master's theses, especially to provide technical details on the GPS and Galileo navigation systems in Chapter 4. These types of works are rarely used in academic research as they have significant limitations both in the rigor to which they are subjected and presumed research and analytical skills of the writer. However, these theses are written by US military personnel, mid-level officers whose institutional connections allows them access to and understanding of the technical side of satellite systems. Their

---

[35] WL: *03BRUSSELS4143: First Steps toward an EU Use-of-Force Doctrine: Opportunities for the U.S.*, August 28, 2003.

[36] WikiLeaks cables were released unredacted because the password to the file was inadvertently published by a reporter from the Guardian. Subsequently, due to the legal difficulties of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange and financial institutions refusing to transfer money to WikiLeaks, the cables seem to have disappeared from their website. This poses an academic difficulty since these cables are not yet unclassified and should the websites on which they are hosted be shut down, other academics may not have the ability to consult them to review the conclusions of this work. Therefore, I have included screen captures of select cables used in this thesis as Appendix A. For more information, see Stöcker, Christian (2011). "A Dispatch Disaster in Six Acts", *Der Spiegel*. Hamburg, September 1, 2011.

professional competency allows me to consider their theses as akin to well-sourced journalistic accounts. They may not have the theoretical rigor of an article in an academic journal, but they are written by relative experts on the field who can translate the frequencies and modulation of these satellites into their political implications.

That being said, it is true that this thesis does not have the sourcing that is ideal for a definitive academic study. The subject of investigation – the influence of the United States on an institution to which it is not a party – can be elusive. Memos are not written detailing every reason, no matter how unpleasant, for an EU decision. If they were, they are unlikely to be published, since the case studies are recent and the topics sometimes concerning sensitive defense technologies. As with all studies of recent history, these findings are preliminary, subject to modification as more evidence comes to light in the years and decades to come. Steps have been taken to minimize the problems that the evidence might cause. When considering points of fact, non-academic and non-primary sources have been checked against other pieces of evidence. If only one source provides a fact, it is checked to determine if it contradicts other sources or explicitly acknowledged as only a possibility. Such compensations and procedures are necessary if we are to study a topic of recent history with academic rigor.

CONTRIBUTION

Hans Morganthau once wrote that the social sciences were vulnerable to drifting towards "the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely historical –

in short, the politically irrelevant."[37] But though this thesis will hopefully provide an addition to theoretical frameworks, I do not believe that Morganthau's argument applies here. The EU is one of the most important actors in the globe today. It is the largest single economy, has a population 60% larger than that of the United States, and yet its ultimate destination and teleology, especially in security policy, to a great extent unknown. The first case study sees Britain view the EU as a supplement to NATO, France push it towards an autonomous full-spectrum military force, and Germany try to constrain it to civil-military operations. These roles are mutually exclusive and it is unclear what direction the EU will eventually pursue.

No regional integration project has gone further than the EU and the theories that have grown up with the EU are crucial for political scientists to better grasp this institutional behemoth. If this thesis helps to identify a previously undertheorized variable in an important sector, it will provide a contribution to the literature. The importance of the United States – the world's only superpower, with a military budget larger than its competitors' combined, and a historic ally – to the European Union is clear; it is the cause for the expansive literature that will be discussed in the following chapter. To give greater understanding to the US-EU relationship, as well as the autonomy of the EU from the institutions with which it shares members, would be to help illuminate one of the most important political relationships of the post-Cold War era.

Second, this thesis adds to the historical record of the time period examined. To construct the narratives needed for analysis, this thesis has brought together information from secondary sources, newspaper articles in multiple languages, primary documents,

---

[37] Morganthau, Hans J. (1957). "Sources of Tension Between Western Europe and the United States," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, pg. 73.

interviews, and the recently released WikiLeaks cables. These cases have relevance beyond the role of the United States in EU foreign and security policy. They could be used to examine, for example, US-EU relations, the era of the Iraq War, and debates on structured cooperation (Chapter 3), EU space policy (Chapter 4), or relations with a rising China (Chapter 5).

THESIS OUTLINE

In Chapter 1, I provide the historical background of the case studies, including the institutional development of the 1990s that provided the EU a new trajectory for its global role. In Chapter 2, I present an overview of the conceptual frameworks and methodology to be used. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are the case studies, in which I present and dissect the historical record of these episodes and analyzing the American role in these EU issues. Finally, I present the thesis' conclusions and suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This thesis investigates the role of the United States in the decision-making process of European Union security policy. In this chapter, I provide the historical background necessary to contextualize the case studies, which exist within long-term trends of EU involvement in security policy and military technology and the reform of NATO in the post-Cold War era. This background also serves to validate a number of assumptions about the European security sphere embedded within this research agenda, namely: that the EU and US are intensely interconnected, such that the US could be a significant actor within the EU; that the EU is sufficiently capable and independent such that its internal decision-making might withstand American pressure; that the US has an interest in European affairs which would cause it to spend political capital to intervene in the EU; and that the roles of the US postulated in the introductory chapter are possible. This chapter, through a history of European security in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as an overview of the literature on the topic, will justify these foundations of the study and show that questions on the power within the system are still unresolved.

THE US IN EUROPE

During the Second World War, the Roosevelt Administration vowed not to repeat the mistakes of twenty years earlier, when the United States helped win a war in Europe and fell into a period of relative isolationism. Thus, when the war ended in 1945, the United States became an occupying power in Berlin, Germany, and Austria. It provided $13.3 billion in

material assistance to West European nations under the Marshall Plan and, as wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union disintegrated into Cold War, assisted the governments of Greece and Turkey against Communist influence under the Truman Doctrine.[1] The United States formalized its place in the European system with the Washington Treaty of 1949, which created NATO, and maintained a major military presence in Europe throughout the Cold War.[2] As the US involved itself in the security of Europe, it consistently supported the economic and political integration of Europe as another path to that end. Jean Monnet wrote that American insistence that West European nations cooperate was "the first time in history that a great power, instead of basing its policy on ruling by dividing, has consistently and resolutely backed the creation of a large Community uniting peoples previously apart."[3] Support continued throughout Democratic and Republican administrations, from President Harry S Truman to President George H. W. Bush.[4] Lundestad and others argue that this support was crucial to the integration of Europe.[5]

The Western alliance did of course experience internal conflicts during the Cold War. The United States threatened Britain's currency during the Suez Crisis; France wanted NATO to intervene in the Algerian War; and the United States could not get "a platoon of

---

[1] For background, see Lundestad, Geir (2003). *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: from "empire" by invitation to transatlantic drift*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1 and 2. See also Ikenberry, G. John, (2001). *After victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 6.

[2] Armin Rappaport called the treaty the "American Revolution of 1949" for its break from the United States' isolationist past. Cited in Kaplan, Lawrence S., (1999). *The long entanglement: NATO's first fifty years*. London: Praeger, pg. 1. US forces at the height of the Cold War in the late 1950s included eleven air wings, the Seventh Army, and the Sixth Fleet, as well as special forces and logistical support troops.

[3] Lundestad, Geir, (1998). *Empire by integration: the United States and European integration, 1945-1997*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pg. 3.

[4] For example, Kissenger said that "No element of American postwar policy has been more consistent than our support of European unity. We encouraged it at every turn." Lundestad (1998) *Empire by integration: the United States and European integration, 1945-1997*, pg. 8.

[5] See Lundestad (1998). *Empire by integration: the United States and European integration, 1945-1997*, pg. 126.

bagpipers" from the UK to Vietnam.[6] But though the US and Europe might clash on occasion, the threat of Soviet invasion ensured that, when matters became critical, the two sides indentified as one.[7] During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, President Kennedy worried about Soviet reprisals in Berlin and the message sent to Turkey if missiles were removed from there; meanwhile, he received full support from the often-alienating President de Gaulle.[8] The Cold War kept the Atlantic Community united in their primary foreign policy purpose and kept their attention focused on Europe.

When the Cold War ended, there was concern that without the Soviet menace, the US and Europe would drift apart. John Mearsheimer, for example, predicted that NATO would falter without a purpose or opponent.[9] In the 1990s, it became quickly apparent that Europe was no longer the main area for American activity and the US prepared to halve its military presence there.[10] American strategists looked elsewhere for the challenges of the new unipolar era, responding first to the Middle East as Iraq forcibly annexed Kuwait and then to the Horn of Africa as Somali instability triggered a humanitarian mission.

When Yugoslavia descended into civil war in the early 1990s, the United States sought to avoid involvement. The United Nations held the peacekeeping mandate and the

---

[6] Lundestad (2003). *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: from "empire" by invitation to transatlantic drift*, pp. 116, 142, 155.

[7] One of these crises, over the deployment of a neutron bomb, saw the West German government lobbying President Carter for additional weapons deployments to Europe to counteract Soviet armor. ----, (1978). "Carter Opposition to Neutron Bomb Reported Despite Plea from Germany", *Associated Press*. Washington, April 5, 1978.

[8] Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995). *Cooperation among democracies: the European influence on U.S. foreign policy*. Princeton studies in international history and politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pg 179.

[9] Mearsheimer, John, (1990). "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*. **15**(1). Summer 1990. 5-56.

[10] Kugler, Richard L. (1992). *The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era,* pg. 1.

US tried to pass on political leadership, saying it didn't have "a dog in that fight."[11] It was going to be "the hour of Europe," as Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos grandly proclaimed.[12] Instead, European unity failed, having been ruptured by Germany unexpectedly recognizing the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. This move was in "open disregard" for EC plans to negotiate with the two breakaway republics.[13] The United States, having earlier termed the Balkans the periphery of Europe (and therefore not connected to the larger issues of American support for Europe and NATO), accepted the importance of the conflict after the fall of Srebrenica and the ensuing massacre.[14] With NATO's Operation Deliberate Force and joint peace negotiations held at Dayton, Ohio, the US led efforts to end the fighting. Later, as the government of Slobodan Milosevic attacked Albanian nationalists in the province of Kosovo, the United Nations called on all parties to agree to a cease-fire. Again, negotiations failed and NATO launched Operation Allied Force, in which the United States provided the vast majority of effective firepower.[15]

The wars in the Balkans were the first conflict operations NATO had ever undertaken and they unveiled worrying points of conflict in the transatlantic alliance. The United States had not initially considered widespread chaos on the European continent part of its national interest or part of NATO's remit, as shaped by Article 5. When the US did

---

[11] UN Protection Force for Croatia created by UNSCR 743, February 21, 1992. Secretary of State James Baker, quoted in McAllister, J.F.O., *et al.* (1992). "Atrocity and Outrage," *Time Magazine*, August 17, 1992.

[12] Cited in Korski, Daniel (2007). *Balkan ghosts still haunt Europe*. European Council on Foreign Relations: London, November 20, 2007.

[13] Crawford, Beverly, (1996). "Explaining defection from international cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia," *World Politics*. **48**(4). July 1996. 482-521, pg. 482.

[14] Kagan, Robert (1995). "America, Bosnia, Europe: A Compelling Interest", *The Weekly Standard*. Washington, November 6, 1995.

[15] The US provided 66% of the aircraft and 90% of the mid-flight refueling, airlift, and electronic jamming capacity during Allied Force. Peters, John E. *et. al.*, (2001). *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation*. RAND Corp.

finally intervene, it found NATO to be an arena for friction. European members did not fully approve of American decision-making in the prosecution of NATO operations. The US was "unhappy and impatient" with constraints imposed by Europeans, who brought little to the military campaign but whose concern for "legal issues" prevented the war's effective prosecution.[16] In the post-Cold War era, the territorially based armies of Europe were ineffective for out-of-theatre operations. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that allowed the US to pursue high-tech, mobile, precision-guided operations had left Europe behind.[17] The US found interoperability with the technologically-inferior French army difficult in the Gulf War and cooperation with the more advanced British difficult in Bosnia and Kosovo.[18] Although NATO was used during the 1990s, significant elements of the Pentagon and the wider Washington establishment began to question the military utility of the alliance. An advancing global superpower and the diminishing importance of the European strategic theatre altered the basic assumptions of the Cold War – that the US had an interest in, and needed, Europe.

Alongside the possible drift of the US from Europe, there was a countervailing series of efforts from both sides of the Atlantic to update the alliance for the post-Cold War era. NATO Foreign Ministers began to study expansion into Central and Eastern Europe in

---

[16] Clark, Wesley (2001). *Waging Modern War*, Oxford: Public Affairs, pg. 421.

[17] The RMA is described in a 1995 US Army report as a military system "in which 'Information Age' technology would be combined with appropriate doctrine and training to allow a small but very advanced U.S. military to protect national interests with unprecedented efficiency." It requires high levels of research and development funding as well as shifting expenditures from personnel to good acquisitions, two areas in which European states trail the United States by some distance. Metz, Steven and Kievit, James, (1996). *Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy*. Army War College, June 27, 1995, pg. iii.

[18] Aldrich, Richard J., (2004). "Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation," *International Affairs*. **80**(4). 731-753, pg. 745.

December 1994.[19] The goal was to provide stability to the newly independent nations and a new purpose to NATO, transforming it from a purely defensive military alliance to a democratizing force in the former Warsaw Pact.[20] In 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were admitted to NATO, even though Hungary shared no borders with other NATO members. From a defensive standpoint, therefore, the admittance of Hungary made little sense. Its inclusion announced that NATO was an institution being re-designed to meet America's new needs of a stable Europe which could share global burdens.[21] The United States sought to strengthen the connection to Europe with a florescence of subsidiary institutional networks. With the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) agreement of 1995, members of NATO committed themselves "to the construction of a new European security architecture in which [NATO], the European Union, the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe have complementary and mutually reinforcing roles to play."[22] Under its aegis, institutions such as the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue, the Transatlantic Economic Council, and the Innovation Exchange were also created.[23]

The transatlantic partners additionally sought to address the European states' natural connections with each other within an Atlantic framework. At the January 1994 Brussels

---

[19] Rühle, Michael and Williams, Nicholas, (1995). "NATO Enlargement and the European Union," *The World Today*. **51**(5). May 1995. 84-88.

[20] Skalnes, Lars S. (1998). "From the outside in, from the inside out: NATO expansion and international relations theory," *Security Studies*. **7**(4). 44-87.

[21] Kydd, Andrew (2004). *Trust Building and Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement*, in *The rational design of international institutions*, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, Editors. 2004, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

[22] NATO (1995). "The New Transatlantic Agenda," Madrid, December 3, 1995; Croft, Stuart, (2000). "The EU, NATO and Europeanisation: The return of architechtural debate," *European Security*. **9**(3). 1-20, pg 5.

[23] Peterson, John and Steffenson, Rebecca (2009). "Transatlantic Institutions: Can Partnership be Engineered," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. **11**(1). 25-45, pg. 29.

Summit, NATO agreed to allow European states, as the WEU, to use NATO assets when NATO was not otherwise engaged.[24] At a 1996 ministerial meeting in Berlin, as the EU states were effecting institutional changes within their own organization in the run up to the Amsterdam Treaty, NATO further agreed to the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), a European pillar in NATO. This attempted to solve NATO's conundrum of a potentially bifurcated community: it allowed European countries to operate as a group, but that group was within the umbrella of NATO.

The 1990s told two different stories about the American presence in Europe. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War greatly reduced America's interest in the security of Europe against Soviet territorial aggression, since such security was achieved. The US and Europe seemed to be drifting apart due to their drastically different geopolitical positions. On the other hand, the US and Europe did not abandon their alliance but instead sought to maintain it. The US was still in Europe, but its ability to shape Europe's future may have been diminished by potential drift, as well as the remarkable rise of the EU.

THE EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR

The European Union was not originally designed for joint foreign policy and this field has been one of the last to be brought under the ambit of Brussels. The first European institutions were intended to facilitate the integration of West European economies. Politically, it was hoped that they would help prevent a reoccurrence of the bloodshed that had covered the continent twice in the 20th century; there was no plan for these institutions to be used for the foreign agendas of the member states. For the main foreign policy issue of

[24] Wörder, Manfred (1994). "Shaping the Alliance for the future," *NATO Review*.

the day – the Cold War – European states relied on NATO, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), the WEU, as well as the proposed, but never created, European Defense Community (EDC), showing an institutional division of labor in the early Cold War.[25] The other main foreign policy issue of this time – decolonization – was pursued by member states on their own, with occasional interest from the United Nations.[26] The only real connection between the European Economic Community and the colonies was French insistence that economic association be extended to its overseas possessions. Overall, in decolonization as with the Cold War, traditional foreign policy was excluded from the European Community framework.[27]

The European Community made an institutional foray into the field of foreign affairs in 1970. Prompted by a request from the Council, the Davignon Report suggested ways in which the six member states could better coordinate external policies.[28] One of these ways became European Political Cooperation (EPC), an informal consultation mechanism in the Council by which member states could discuss foreign policy developments so that they might find common positions. Their first substantive declaration came in 1973, when the EC

---

[25] The EDC provided for a joint military command between the countries as well as a common defense budget. A treaty was signed in 1952 but the plan was defeated in French Parliament in 1954. Presidency of the United States to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, (1952) *Translation of the Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community*. June 2, 1952, http://aei.pitt.edu/5201/01/001669_1.pdf, Accessed November 21, 2011.

[26] France saw decolonization struggles in Africa, Southeast Asia and Algeria. The UK in Malaysia, the Middle East and Africa. Belgium in the Congo. The Netherlands and Italy had lost their colonies before the treaties had gone into effect. Indonesia (Netherlands) won independence in 1949. Italy lost her colonies as part of the peace treaty ending WWII in 1947. In places like Somalia, Cameroon and Rwanda, colonizing powers operated under a United Nation Trust arrangement.

[27] Treaty of Rome, Article 238; Grilli, Enzo R., (1993). *The European Community and the developing countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pg 14.

[28] Davignon Report. *Bulletin of the European Communities*. November 1970, n° 11. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. http://www.ena.lu/davignon_report_luxembourg_27_october_1970-020002259.html. Accessed November 15, 2011.

broke with the US over the best path to peace after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.[29] European foreign policy cooperation was limited in the following years – at least compared to the actions of its constituent states. For example, there was no joint European response to the 1974 oil embargo; four member states conducted bilateral energy deals rather than support the Netherlands, which was being targeted by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Some of the EC's economic decisions did have political implications: the EC lifted sanctions on Greece after the military junta ceded to democratic rule; it granted Most Favored Nation trading status to the Soviet Union; it took a neutral stance on the Turkish invasion of Cyprus; and it was involved in the Helsinki Accords process.[30] However, the overall trend was of a European Community that was internally focused, except for its trade relations ("low politics") and one that did not have the capability to be a significant foreign policy actor.[31]

This situation changed – institutionally, at least – with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.[32] With this treaty, a European Union was created, based on a structure of three pillars. This structure was eliminated by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, but since it is the system used during the case studies, it is important to outline its functions. The European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which had been combined in the Merger Treaty of 1967, formed the

---

[29] Möckli, Daniel (2010). *The Middle East conflict, transatlantic ties and the Quartet*, in *European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Aymat, Editor. 2010, Chaillot Papers 124: Paris. 65-74, pg 66.

[30] van Ham, Peter (2009). *EU-OSCE relations: Partner or rivals in security*, in *The European Union and international organizations*, Jørgensen, Editor. 2009, Taylor and Francis: New York, pg. 134.

[31] Ginsberg, Roy H. (1989). *Foreign policy actions of the European Community: the politics of scale*. Adamantine studies in international relations & world security, no. 3. London: Adamantine Press, pg. 88.

[32] The Union was called on to "establish its identity on the international scene." TEU, Article 2.

first pillar of the Union, the European Communities.[33] This pillar was the most heavily supranational, with strong leadership from the European Commission in Brussels. European Political Cooperation became the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the second pillar. This was almost entirely intergovernmental and under the jurisdiction of the European Council. The third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters after 2003) was essentially intergovernmental.

The second pillar, CFSP, is often described as the EU's "foreign policy" in press and academic accounts.[34] However, the impact of the EU on the rest of the world comes through what Wong and many others term the external relations system of the EU.[35] This is a combination of the trade policies of the EU, CFSP, and the national foreign policies of the member states. On political and security issues, when Commission-based trade and development agencies are not involved, the EU's policy was dictated by an institutionally weak CFSP and often divergent national agendas.

This intergovernmentalism means that the organizational chart of the EU's external relations – the hierarchy of who does what and where power resides – was fuzzy. In each case study the power dynamics will be sketched as they relate to the specific issues at hand, but it is useful to outline the general structure.[36] Foreign and security policy was under the

---

[33] Euratom was established as an independent institution in the Treaty of Rome. In 1967, with the Merger Treaty having come into effect, it was brought under the governing institutions of the European Economic Communities, at which point those two, with the ECSC, became known as the European Communities or European Community.

[34] Smith, Karen E., (2003). *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. Malden, Mass, USA: Polity Press; Thomas, David C., (2009). "Explaining the negotiation of EU foreign policy: Normative institutionalism and alternative approaches," *International Politics*. **46**(4). 339-357; Roy, Ranjan (2005). "Diversity dooms new Europe: Rejection of constitution blow to EU foreign policy", *Times of India*. New Delhi, June 7, 2005.

[35] Wong, Reuben, (2008). "Towards a Common European Policy on China? Economic, Diplomatic and Human Rights Trends Since 1985," *Current Politics and Economics of Asia*. 17(1). 155-182, pg. 157.

[36] It is important to note that the United States is also not a unitary actor. The Presidency, State Department, Pentagon and Congress all have some level of autonomy from each other. However, in

jurisdiction of the European Council, comprised of the heads of state or government of the member states, chaired by the leader of the country holding the rotating Presidency of the EU and with the High Representative serving as the Council's Secretary-General.[37] Since national foreign policies are a significant part of the EU's external relations system, the most prominent foreign policy actors during this time were those countries which could assert leadership both within the Council as well as independently from Brussels. This group always included Britain, France and Germany and expanded to those countries with connections to specific issues, such as Spain, which hosted the EU Satellite Center, had with Galileo (Chapter 4), and, sometimes, those holding the rotating Presidency, as Italy did during the final negotiations on the security structure compromise (Chapter 3).[38] The Commission does have some influence in foreign policy; the External Relations Commissioner was, along with the High Representative, the voice for the EU abroad, though Commissioners for Trade, Enlargement, and Development and Humanitarian Aid complicated the system.[39] The Commission also had control of the purse strings. Since it oversaw the bulk of the EU's funds, the Commission was required for costly projects abroad and gained influence by that route.[40] Finally, the High Representative acted as a

---

these case studies, though much of the diplomacy was carried out by officials from State or Defense, action in the Executive Branch was largely unified and the Legislative Branch reinforced this message.

[37] The HR became the Secretary-General under the Amsterdam Treaty. This structure was changed by the Lisbon Treaty. There is now a non-national President of the Council serving for five-year terms and the External Relations Commissioner has been merged with the High Representative.

[38] It is not to say that the other countries have an easy time getting into such a leadership group. The Balkan "Quint" was a Quad until 1997, when Italy was admitted to it after years of trying.

[39] Deighton, Anne, (2000). "The Military Security Pool: Towards a New Security Regime for Europe?," *The International Spectator*. **35**(4). 41-54, pg. 44

[40] The use of the economically-oriented Community budget for external actions has not gone unnoticed in EU bureaucratic turf wars. Deputy Secretary-General of the Council Pierre de Boissieau remarked, "if you can explain to me how assistance to the provincial administration in Kosovo is necessary for the realization of the internal market, I wish you luck." Aggestam, Lisbeth, *et al.* (2008). *Institutional Competences in the EU External Action: Actors and Boundaries in CFSP and ESDP*. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies: Stockholm, May 2008, pg. 32.

coordinating figure and could take some initiatives using his own staff, such as the drafting of the ESS.

The external relations system of the EU therefore consisted of a variety of actors with varying degrees of influence in Brussels, with the knowledge that, regardless of the structures, a great deal of power lay in London, Paris and Berlin.[41] As the chart below displays, the power behind both national foreign policies and the CFSP (through the Council) remained with national governments, especially since security policy was largely removed from trade concerns.

Significant Actors in the EU's External Relations System

National foreign policies	Common Foreign and Security Policy	EU Trade Policies
Heads of Government of member states (biggest most important)	Heads of Government of member states (biggest most important, though constrained by need for consensus)	Commission
Member state Cabinets	High Representative for CFSP	EU Parliament
Member state Parliaments	Member State Foreign Ministers (meeting as the General Affairs and External Relations Council)	

[41] For example, the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany traveled to Tehran in October 2003 and discussed EU sanctions without Solana or a delegate from the Presidency Country of Italy. Hill, Christopher, (2006). "The Directoire and the Problem of a Coherent EU Foreign Policy," *CFSP Forum (FORNET)*. 4(6). November 2006. 1-4.

Countries Holding the Rotating Presidency during Time Period of the Thesis	
2001 (1st half)	Sweden
2001 (2nd half)	Belgium
2002 (1st half)	Spain
2002 (2nd half)	Denmark
2003 (1st half)	Greece
2003 (2nd half)	Italy
2004 (1st half)	Ireland
2004 (2nd half)	Netherlands
2005 (1st half)	Luxembourg

As the EU developed a foreign policy capacity, it inched towards the security sector.[42] The wars in the Balkans had demonstrated the weakness in European forces and the technological superiority of the American military. One attitude prominent in Britain was that NATO was threatening to crack not because America was drifting off on its own, but because European partners had become military dead weight.[43] This was a major impetus behind the Anglo-French bilateral summit at Saint-Malo in 1998, during which the United Kingdom and France consented to a European Union presence – the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) - in the security field. "For the UK, ESDP was an [Atlantic]

[42] The line between foreign and security policy is blurry, especially since the EU often includes both in labels, such as Common Foreign and Security Policy, or the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (created in the Lisbon Treaty). The thesis defines security policy as that which is necessary for the EU to be secure in an anarchic international system. It is therefore intimately connected with military matters and foreign affairs, though does not include the totality of the latter. For more, see Walt, Stephen M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies *International Studies Quarterly,* **35**(2). June 1991. 211-239, pg. 213.

[43] This is still a problem, as said by multiple speakers at Chatham House's European Defence and Security 2011 Conference, London, January 24-25, 2011.

Alliance project involving European instruments."[44] The UK believed that strengthening the European Union would serve the purposes of NATO. If European nations were prompted to upgrade their militaries, NATO would gain capabilities and a renewed relevance. France saw the deal in reversed terms. For France, ESDP was "a European project involving Alliance capabilities."[45] France saw ESDP as a step forward in building the EU, using the umbrella of NATO as temporary protection until the EU could stand on its own feet. Even in this agreement that was said to reconcile the two ends of European thought, there was still a teleological disconnect between the parties. However, their moment of unity had led to the European Union, not just the nations of Europe within NATO, being granted a security identity. It broke the "glass ceiling" preventing the EU from having a military identity and is considered the "birth-hour" of ESDP.[46]

Institutional developments quickly followed. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which entered into force in 1999, created the High Representative for the CFSP. This brought a coordinating figure and a Brussels presence to the intergovernmental Council.[47] At the June 1999 Cologne European Council Summit the WEU was folded into the EU, and with the 2001 Nice Treaty the EU acquired the Petersberg Tasks, a set of military priorities agreed by the members of the WEU in 1992, which including humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.[48] The Saint-Malo agreement and these institutional agreements were not definitive

---

[44] Howorth, Jolyon, (2004). "France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis," *Survival*. **45**(4). 173-192, pg. 174.

[45] Howorth (2004). "France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis," pg. 174.

[46] Deighton, Anne, (2002). "The European Security and Defence Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(4). 719-741; Reichard, Martin, (2006). *The EU-NATO relationship: a legal and political perspective*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pg. 58.

[47] Dijkstra, Hylke, (2008). "The Council Secretariat's Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **13**(2). 149-166, pg. 161.

[48] Petersberg Tasks incorporated as Article 17 of the Treaty of European Union (Nice Treaty revision of TEU).

plans in themselves, but they opened the political gates for a variety of innovations designed to accomplish the idea of creating an EU presence in the security field. Some of these have been: an EU Military Staff (EUMS) to assist the High Representative; a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to deploy quickly to crisis zones; and the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to bring European militaries up to American standards. None of these initiatives saw immediate success.[49] The EUMS became a source of dispute between the French and British, France wanting the EUMS to advance European autonomy and the British wishing to ensure that the EUMS did not duplicate NATO's facilities.[50] The RRF was delayed by Turkish opposition, as well as by American worries that it would duplicate NATO's proposed NATO Reaction Force (NRF). The EU responded by nominating a general from neutral Finland to be the EU's senior military advisor to show that the EU and the RRF would focus on "crisis management."[51] The DCI has been hindered by low defense spending in Europe and the technical difficulties of shifting bureaucracies to new ways of spending money. It would be wrong to suggest that the EU was a fully fledged security actor after Saint-Malo, but momentum, however halting, was in that direction.

American attitudes to European integration were, as the RRF showed, sometimes skeptical. After Saint-Malo, the Clinton administration argued that any EU decisions should not violate the "three Ds" – decoupling Europe from the US, discriminating against non-EU

---

[49] Whitman, Richard (2004). "NATO, the EU and ESDP: an emerging division of labour," *Contemporary Security Policy*. **25**(3). 430-451, pg. 441.

[50] Simón, Luis (2010). *Command and Control? Planning for EU military operations*. European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, pg. 19.

[51] Sullivan, Maj. Patrick T. (2002). *The European Security and Defense Identity Explained: Why the US Should Support It*, Master's Thesis: Air Command and Staff College Air University, April 1, 2002, pg. 37.

NATO members, and duplication of NATO assets.[52] However, the United States largely supported European security integration as a way to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance. At the 1999 NATO Washington Summit, the US agreed to what became known as "Berlin-Plus." This expanded the Berlin Agreement of 1996 to recognize the European Union as the representative of European NATO members. It "assured EU access to NATO operational planning capabilities that are able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations," presumed that NATO capabilities would be available for EU operations, identified a range of European command options, and adapted NATO's planning to account for forces deployed on EU missions.[53] In essence, Berlin Plus joined the security aspects of the European Union to NATO. The institutional EU would be able to use NATO assets in EU-missions and the Deputy Commander of NATO (DSACEUR), always a British or German officer, would be the operational commander of EU-led missions.

Berlin Plus took a three-year detour through one of the trickiest EU/NATO questions: Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Turkey was a member of NATO but not of the EU. Greece was a member of both, though that did not prevent major tensions with Turkey that had only been quelled by American pressure in the past.[54] Cyprus was divided between a Greek-speaking candidate for the EU and an unrecognized Turkish-speaking statelet. Turkey feared that the European Union might use common NATO assets against its interests in the Aegean or might cut it out of joint operations. It worked to block EU-NATO cooperation,

---

[52] Cornish, Paul and Edwards, Geoffery, (2001). "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture," *International Affairs*. **77**(3). 587-603, pg. 592.

[53] DeCamp, William Jr. (2005). *ESDP: NATO's Demise or Opportunities for NATO?*, Master's Thesis: U.S. Army War College, March 18, 2005, pg. 6.

[54] President Johnson in 1964 sent a letter to the Turkish Premier to avoid an invasion of Cyprus, an official intervention that kept the Mediterranean peace at the cost of alienating a crucial ally. Kalaitzaki, Theodora, "US Mediation in Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954," *Mediterranean Quarterly*. **16**(2). Spring 2005. 106-124, pg. 113.

playing on American suspicion of ESDP.[55] Turkey finally agreed to a deal in December 2001, but Greece immediately vetoed the agreement, claiming it gave too many concessions to Ankara.[56] Over the next year, the US and EU pressured both Greece and Turkey to find some sort of agreement. They finally found a face-saving loophole whereby Cyprus would not be covered by Berlin Plus since it was not part of NATO. On December 16, 2002, Berlin Plus was given the green light.[57] This deal was a major relief, as the importance of Berlin Plus should not be underestimated. De Wijk argued that with Berlin Plus, "all institutional arrangements required to carry out EU-led operations [were] in place."[58] The EU had a military commander to lead missions. It had access to the capabilities needed to plan and run these missions. There was a political consensus that the EU could run missions, a consensus that had been lacking in the Balkan conflicts. Moreover, this was an arrangement into which the United States had invested a great deal of effort, showing that it not only approved of EU action but actively supported the idea.

By the end of the 1990s, the European Union had begun to develop the capabilities to be a force in global politics. It had established legal grounds for such action in the Amsterdam Treaty and its member states had affixed themselves to a security identity for the EU at Saint-Malo and Cologne. There were a number of specific programs to advance EU capabilities and concepts like "double-hatting" Commission officials as Special Representatives answerable to the High Representative streamlined and centralized the

---

[55] Missiroli, Antonio, (2002). "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP," *Security Dialogue*. **33**(1). 9-26.

[56] Medcalf, Jennifer (2003). *Cooperation between the EU and NATO*, in *Unravelling the European Security and Defence Policy Conundrum*, Krause, Wenger, and Watanabe, Editors. 2003, Peter Land Publishing: Oxford, UK, pg. 109.

[57] Howorth, Jolyon, (2003). "ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock?," *Cooperation and Conflict*. **38**(3). 235-254, pg. 248.

[58] de Wijk, Rob, (2004). "The Reform of ESDP and EU-NATO Cooperation," pg. 71.

external relations system.[59] Structures for ESDP were created "from scratch" between 1999 and the Laeken Summit in December 2001. As with American involvement in Europe post-Cold War, there was strong disagreement about the direction the institution was progressing, between those who thought it of little significance and those who thought these could be the first steps towards the EU as a real force on the global stage.[60] Additionally, it was still unclear whether the organization, newly equipped with treaties and offices, would be an independent actor or merely a subset of the American-dominated transatlantic security community.

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN THE 2000S

The trends of the 1990s – of an Atlantic community possibly diverging, possibly staying together – were accelerated and made visible in the early 2000s, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On September 12, members of NATO for the first time ever invoked Article 5, which stated that an attack on one was an attack on all.[61] However, the United States eschewed NATO allies' offers of support.[62] Instead, likely influenced by the complications of using NATO in the Balkans, the United States attacked Afghanistan with a loose coalition that, while involving some NATO allies, was run through American

---

[59] Aggestam, *et al.* (2008) *Institutional Competences in the EU External Action: Actors and Boundaries in CFSP and ESDP*, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies: Stockholm, May 2008, pg. 51.

[60] See, for example, Whitman (2004). "NATO, the EU and ESDP: an emerging division of labour."; Wagner, Wolfgang (2005). *The democratic legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy*. European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, April 2005; Umbach (2003). *The Future of the ESDP*, at *New Europe, Old Europe and the New Transatlantic Agenda*.

[61] "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all," North Atlantic Treaty, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-4028FD4B-106F86BF/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. Accessed November 29, 2011.

[62] Deighton, Anne (2002). *911 and NATO, in Superterrorism: Policy responses,* Freedman, Editor, Oxford: Blackwell. 119-134.

command structures. This unilateralist sentiment was made explicit by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who set a policy that the "mission determines the coalition," thereby stripping European states of their ability to constrain the US via NATO, since the US would now only use NATO when convenient.[63]

The divide between the United States and Europe peaked the following year, as the Bush Administration pursued action against Iraq without regard to damage to the Atlantic alliance. George W. Bush demanded loyalty and support from America's allies, to be "with us or against us."[64] His administration's diplomacy was no less heavy-handed while seeiking Security Council resolutions against Saddam Hussein's regime. Rumsfeld spoke dismissively of France and Germany, allies for fifty years, as "old Europe."[65] The poisonous atmosphere permeated the EU. In France, President Jacques Chirac joined a growing uneasiness of the American *hyperpuissance* (hyperpower) of the post-Cold War era with opposition to a new war. In Germany, Chancellor Schröder had gained confidence from his country's actions in Kosovo and made opposition to a US-led invasion part of his domestic reelection platform.[66] Chirac and Schröder maneuvered against American action and Chirac vowed to veto any motion in the Security Council "no matter the circumstances."[67] Britain, Italy and Spain supported the United States and the rest of the EU member states were divided. Thirteen central and eastern European countries (eight of which would join the EU

---

[63] Rumsfeld, Donald, "Keeper of the Flame Award Dinner Remarks," at Center for Security Policy: November 6, 2001.

[64] -----, (2001), "'You are either with us or against us'", *CNN*. Washington, November 6, 2001.

[65] -----, (2003), "Outrage at 'old Europe' remarks", *BBC News*. London, January 23, 2003.

[66] Buras, Piotr and Longhurst, Kerry "The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the use of force," in *Old Europe, new Europe and the transatlantic security agenda*, Longhurst and Zaborowski, editors. 2005, Routledge: London. The election was held on September 22, 2002 and Schröder's coalition narrowly won, holding 306 seats out of the 603 in the Bundestad.

[67] Doyle, Leonard and Cornwell, Rupert "Chirac vows to veto war resolution", *The Independent*. London, March 11, 2003.

in 2004 and two in 2007) signed letters in support of the United States' position on Iraq.[68] At a press conference in February 2003, Chirac lashed out at them. He said that they were "not very well behaved" and "comported themselves with a certain thoughtlessness." He added during the crisis that "they missed a good chance to be quiet."[69] Prime Minister Blair, for his part, blamed Chirac's "unreasonable veto" for causing the war.[70]

The bitterness between the sides is hard to overestimate. There was concern that the very existence of the Atlantic alliance was in peril.[71] Robert Kagan, who coined the phrase of "Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus," said that the United States no longer needed Europe, given its extraordinary position of power, and that Europe had nothing to offer American, a point poorly received in Europe.[72] France and Germany lost some legitimacy within the EU from member states who bristled at their assumption of spokesmanship for the Union.[73] When considering the drift between the US and Europe after the Cold War - increasingly different geopolitical positions, inability to militarily cooperate, distrust of American superpower from France and distrust of European legalism from the United States – the war in Iraq seems the logical conclusion. The distance built up over the previous decade came out in the circumstances of an invasion of an independent state, and

---

[68] These states were heavily pressured by the United States, as exposed by Peel, Quentin (2003). "The Rift Turns Nasty," *Financial Times*, May 28, 2003.

[69] Conférence de presse de M. Jacques Chirac (17 février 2003)", Le Monde diplomatique. February 17, 2003. In French, the comments were: *ce n'est pas très bien élevé… ils se sont comportés avec une certaine légèreté… ils ont manqué une bonne occasion de se taire*. Chirac used "se taire" which is difficult to accurately translate. It is not as formal as "refrain from making a comment," but not as pejorative as "shut your mouth." It has a neutral tone. However, it is used colloquially to mean "shut up" and was translated as such, or as "to keep quiet" in English-language press. Levieux, Eleanor and Levieux, Michel (2003). "The World; No, Chirac Didn't Say 'Shut Up'", *New York Times*. New York, February 23, 2003.

[70] Wintour, Patrick and Henley, Jon (2003). "Don't blame us for conflict, protest French", *The Guardian*. London, March 20, 2003.

[71] For example, Lieven, Anatol (2002). "The end of the west?," *Prospect Magazine*, September 20, 2002.

[72] Kagan, Robert (2004). *Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order*. 1st Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books.

[73] Menon (2004). "From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq," pg. 647.

we see a US and Europe at odds.

However, even with this political and diplomatic crisis, the Atlantic alliance elsewhere enjoyed a period of some of its greatest cooperation. The United States and EU member states fought alongside each other in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.[74] NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003, its first ever out-of-theatre operation. The link between the US and Europe, although strained by the Balkans and imperiled by Iraq, was still present and useful to commanders in Afghanistan. Further, counter-terrorism cooperation was ever increasing and it was during the Iraq crisis that Berlin Plus was signed. At a time when the Atlantic alliance was supposedly falling apart, NATO agreed to let the EU use its assets for EU-only missions – and viewed this agreement as a triumph.

European institutional development also continued through this otherwise tumultuous time period. The EU was progressing internally, with the introduction of a common currency in January 2002 and expansion to ten new member states in May 2004, as well as externally, with additional foreign and security capacity in the Constitutional Treaty, signed June 2004.[75] The security sector continued its trajectory relatively unperturbed. Gnesotto said that "developments in ESDP in autumn 2001 continued along the traditional lines laid down the previous year, as if the attacks of 11 September had changed everything – except ESDP."[76] The EU also deployed its first four military missions in this period. The first of these, Operation Concordia, was launched less than two weeks after the start of the

---

[74] Gallis, Paul and Morelli, Vincent (2008). *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*. Congressional Research Service: Washington, DC, July 18, 2008, pg 1.

[75] The Commission believes expansion to be "unarguably… the Union's most successful foreign policy instrument." European Commission (2003). *Wider Europe - Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*. Commission, March 11, 2003, pg. 5.

[76] Gnesotto, Nicole (2002). *Preface*, in *From Nice to Laeken: European defence: core documents*, Rutten, Editor. 2002, Institute for Security Studies: Paris, pg. vii.

Iraq War, involved pro- and anti-war member states, and relied on Berlin Plus arrangements and NATO assets.[77]

This time period, of Iraq, Afghanistan, and institutional expansion, do not present any easy expectations for understanding the role of the US in EU decision-making. On the one hand, the EU was accelerating, the legacy of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Saint-Malo and Nice. One would not expect the US to play a major role in the EU, especially since it had tended to support EU developments, such as with Berlin Plus. On the other hand, the US had actively worked against any EU position on Iraq, it needed its allies' support in Afghanistan, and its efforts to preserve the Atlantic alliance showed its continued interest in Europe.

LITERATURE ON THE US AND EU

As can be expected with perhaps the world's most important political relationship, there is a wide body of literature on the United States and Europe. This body is far too diverse to be fully catalogued here but there are some features of the literature pertinent to the case studies in this thesis. First, many articles are constructed around crises within the alliance and on the demise of the Atlantic alliance. Second, when examining the United States and Europe, it is common to analyze the totality of the transatlantic relationship, from economic to political sectors, and often conclude that the relationship is too multifaceted to be given a definitive label. Since the case studies in this thesis are not based on a crisis in the alliance, but are episodes of discussion and debate between the major parties on EU issues, and since the case studies only address one feature of the relationship in one policy area, a brief overview

---

[77] International Security Information Service Europe (ISIS), (2003). "Operation Concordia and Berlin Plus: NATO and the EU take stock," *Nato Notes*. **5**(8). December 2003.

of this literature serves to explain the decision to use European and institutionalist theoretical frameworks to establish the thesis' typology in the next chapter.

Literature based on the demise of the Alliance, as might be expected, spikes whenever the two sides of the Atlantic come into conflict. The most recent cache of writings were prompted by the acrimonious disputes over the invasion of Iraq in 2003. These articles often extrapolate recent problems into long-term decline. One particularly egregious example is by Ronald Asmus, titled "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," published in Foreign Affairs only months after the fall of Baghdad. It begins by stating hyperbolically "One of the most striking consequences of the Bush administration's foreign policy tenure has been the collapse of the Atlantic alliance. Long considered America's most important alliance and a benchmark by which a president's foreign policy skill is measured, the U.S.-European relationship has been shaken to its foundations over a series of disputes that culminated in the U.S.-led war in Iraq."[78] The article proposes that disaster can be avoided only if the US and EU "forge a new grand strategy capable of meeting the great challenges of the era." This type of solution does not see the fate of the Alliance determined by geopolitical forces, but by the actions of leaders towards each other and towards the Alliance.

These more journalistic accounts are matched by academic analyses of the crises in Atlantic politics. They too tend to spike around crises, but given that the Atlantic alliance has seen frequent disputes ever since the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954, these works are well-gestated. They tend to view the most recent crisis neither as a calamity nor a setback from which a revival is necessary, but merely the most recent episode

---

[78] Asmus, Ronald D., (2003). "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*. **85**(2). September/October 2003. 20-31, pg. 20.

in broader trends of history. For example, Iraq was not a sudden crisis, but followed in the footsteps of differences in the Balkans in the 1990s.[79] The Balkans, in turn, were not terribly different from American frustration with European opposition to missiles deployment in the 1980s. Authors of such articles will often try to find causes of this decline from the golden age of Atlantic cooperation in the early Cold War to the vitriol in 2002 of the Bush and Chirac Administrations. Some look at the structural geopolitics of the world; the demise of the Soviet Union removed the threat holding the Alliance together and the peaceful consolidation of Europe removed much of the cause for American interest in the region.[80] Others focus on internal difference between the two regions, ranging from the specific cultural differences to the nature of societies and government.[81] These analyses can stretch from the crudest stereotyping to measured analysis of the role of internal politics in foreign affairs. Yet most tend to assume that the United States and Europe are fundamentally different and that, if unchecked, these differences will lead to a diminishing of the Alliance. These types of articles are countered by those predicting that the Alliance will make it though its current predicament as it has so many times before. Nonetheless, such arguments, for or against the future of the Alliance, operate in a similar theoretical framework. The Alliance is an institution and should its major members cease to act according to its rules and norms, it will cease to exist.

---

[79] Peterson, John, (2006). "Is the Wolf at the Door This Time: Transatlantic Relations after Iraq," *European Political Science*. **5**. 52-61, pg 56.

[80] Author's Interview with Jolyon Howorth, Yale University. January 21, 2009,

[81] Cox, Michael, (2006). "The Transatlantic Crisis: The Wolf is at the Door," *European Political Science*. **5**. 34-40. pg. 36. Michael Smith describes the US and Europe as fundamentally different in outlook. The US is a "warrior state" whereas the EU is a "trading state." Smith, Michael H. (2004). "Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the United States and World Order," *International Politics*. **41**. 95-117.

A second branch of the literature, that does not focus on crises, surveys the wider transatlantic relationship and its findings are often ones of ambivalence. Smith and Steffenson write of the USA as a "key partner…but also as a potential rival" to the European Union, producing what Smith terms "competitive cooperation."[82] This is an understandable focus, since the institution building of the 1990s encompassed all parts of international relations; the New Transatlantic Agenda involved business forums as well as NATO expansion. However, they often find that the transatlantic relationship follows different sectoral logics. While the political and security aspect of the EU and US can be characterized by crises and disputes, the economic and business sides tend to thrive unaffected by other aspects of the relationship. These findings qualify a view of the transatlantic alliance as an institution. Rather, the transatlantic relationship is a set of institutions, with the norms of the economic institution – free trade, resolution of disputes at the World Trade Organization – far more entrenched and less in dispute than the transatlantic political or security relationships.

Regardless of the sector, in comparison to articles about the latest crisis in the Atlantic alliance, these articles tend to emphasize the role of the EU more and to look at the US and EU on a bilateral basis. They accept that the US is intimately involved in the EU; Peterson and Steffenson refer to it as a "regulator" of European integration, its policy demands forcing the European nations to cooperate amongst themselves more than they otherwise could have achieved.[83] Smith and Steffenson go further, saying that "the intra-EU

---

[82] Smith, Michael and Steffenson, Rebecca (2011). *The EU and the United States*, in *International Relations and the European Union, Second Edition*, Hill and Smith, Editors. 2011, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 404-434; Smith, Michael H. (1998). "Competitive co-operation and EU-US relations: can the EU be a strategic partner for the US in the world political economy," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **5**(4). December 1998. 561-577.

[83] Peterson and Steffenson (2009). "Transatlantic Institutions: Can Partnership be Engineered," pg. 33.

system of international relations" permits the US to "enter into that system both as a contextual factor but also as, in some instances, a participant in the system itself."[84] Yet the specific type of participant in such a system is not defined, in part because the US varies between policy areas. In economic matters, the EU has considerable competence, ensuring that few outside influences permeate the EU system and placing the EU on equal footing with the US. In security, by contrast, the EU is less established and the part the US plays may be significant. However, Smith and Steffenson excepted, this literature, on the whole, is Brussels-centric and views the United States as an oppositional force to the EU, rather than part of a wider political system, a theoretical gap which this thesis seeks to address.[85]

CONCLUSION

This chapter sought to establish the historical background of the research agenda of this thesis. Contained within this agenda there are a number of assumptions which must be validated and which this chapter set out to do. First is that the US and EU are intensely interconnected, to the point that we may say the US may be a player in the EU system. This was certainly true during the Cold War and early European integration and, even after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has maintained a significant physical and institutional presence in Europe. Second, this thesis assumes that the EU is a capable and

---

[84] Smith and Steffenson (2011). *The EU and the United States*, pg. 410.

[85] On the focus of the institutional EU over its member states, see Maull, Hanns W., (2005). "Europe and the new balance of global order," *International Affairs*. **81**(4). 775-799, pg. 778; Leonard, Mark, (2005). *Why Europe will run the 21st century*. London: Fourth Estate; Manners, Ian, (2002). "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(2). 235-258; Börzel, Tanja A. and Risse, Thomas (2009). *Venus approaching Mars? The European Union as an Emerging Civilian World Power*. Freie Universität Berlin: Berlin, April 2009. On the opposition to the US, Howorth speaks of the necessity of the EU responding to the US, and speaks of US involvement as a dividing, external, pressure to be overcome. Howorth, Jolyon (2010). *The Political and Security Committee: a Case Study in 'Supranational Intergovernmentalism'*. SciencesPo | Centre d'études européens: Paris, March 2010.

increasingly autonomous actor that could resist American pressure, ensuring that this study is not simply an inevitable confirmation that the US is the most powerful actor in the Atlantic community. The expansion of the EU in terms of members, aspirations and capabilities indicates that this could be correct. Through the 1990s, Europe gained progressively more autonomy in security policy, from the 1994 Brussels Summit that allowed the WEU to use NATO assets, to the 1996 Berlin Agreement, and later to the 1999 Berlin Plus Agreement, ratified in 2002. These links to NATO structures developed alongside the creation of structures in Brussels for joint execution of security policy for the EU. The deployment of military operations under the EU flag demonstrate that the EU can pursue policies without the United States and possibly against the wishes of the United States. Third, the assumption that the US is interested in Europe can be seen through the efforts taken to update the Atlantic alliance after the Cold War.

In the following chapter, I argue that the two forces of European dynamics and Atlantic reform during this time prevents the use of a single theoretical framework to explain the decision-making process observable in the case studies and, therefore, understanding the role the United States plays within the EU.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this thesis, case studies serve to explore the role of the United States in EU security policy. Although theory helps to structure observations to provide a coherent picture of political events, there is no single theory that captures the entirety of the European security system.[1] The possible significance of the United States in the European Union means that theories focused on the internal dynamics of the EU have a major omitted variable. Yet institutionalist theories do not often address overlapping institutions, at least in cases of institutions as embedded and powerful as the EU or NATO.[2] Nonetheless, each of these bodies of literature shed light on some of the key dynamics at play in these case studies and should not be entirely discarded. The contributions of these literatures will be used to support a process-tracing- and Rational Actor Theory-based conceptual framework for unravelling the historical narratives of the case studies.

---

[1] Stoker, Gerry (1995). *Introduction*, in *Theory and Method in Political Science*, Marsh and Stoker, Editors. 1995, Macmillan: Basingstoke, pp. 16-17.

[2] Research on overlapping institutions and states forum-shopping among them most often relates to economic and regulatory institutions. See Drezner, Daniel (2006). *The Viscosity of Global Governance: When is Forum-Shopping Expensive*, at *International Political Economy Society Annual Meeting*. Princeton University: November 17 & 18, 2006. The EU and NATO were examined in Hofmann (2009). "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP." Hofmann argued that the two institutions are interrelated and the politics of one shapes the politics of the other. This would further reduce the ability of most internally-oriented institutionalist theories to fully capture this area.

EU THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Though we investigate the American role in the EU, all of these case studies were ultimately determined by the EU and actors within it, meaning that analysis must primarily be grounded in an understanding of European dynamics. For that, theoretical frameworks designed to explain the European Union are useful, especially Europeanization, which focuses on politics within the EU after integration has occurred in a given field.

The development of European supranational governance was a novel political phenomenon when it emerged in the middle of the 20th century. Former enemies strove to avoid war by merging two of their crucial defense industries, coal and steel, and placing control of these commodities in the hands of a transnational body containing an executive council, a proto-Parliament, and a judiciary, mimicking state apparatus. The ECSC was joined by two other supranational institutions, the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community in 1957. As these new entities, and the political processes that emanated from them, did not fit into the realist, idealist, or Marxist worldviews that dominated international relations at the time, other theories emerged to explain the European institutions.[3] These focused on the construction of a European level of governance, disputing the logics and actors behind the emergence of the governance system centered in Brussels.[4] Ernst Haas developed neofunctionalism, which argues that European

---

[3] Interwar political thinking was described as a realist-idealist dichotomy in Carr, Edward Hallett (1946). *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations*. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan. Realism as defined by Morgenthau was ascendant at the time, especially in American political science. Morgenthau, Hans J. (1961). *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*. 3rd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

[4] For a summary of integration theories, see Rosamond, Ben (2000). *Theories of European Integration*. The European Union Series, ed. Nugent, Paterson, and Wright. New York: Palgrave; or Wiener, Antje and Diez, Thomas, (2009). *European integration theory*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

institutions grew incrementally through the decisions of self-interested actors.[5] The "spillover" effect, whereby European competence in one area, such as immigration control, leads to European competence in a related area, like border control, is a central driving mechanism of this theory. Stanley Hoffmann argued a contrary, intergovernmentalist theory. His framework emphasized state control over the integration process, and was expanded upon by Andrew Moravscik, who included the domestic origins of states' negotiating positions as a crucial, non-supranational aspect of integration.[6] In intergovernmentalism, while spillover may exist, it is a minor force compared to the interests of member states.

These theories focused on the integrative dynamics of the European project – how previously independent states chose to pool their sovereignty in progressively wider areas. As the EU developed, scholars also sought to understand the everyday governance aspects of the European Union. As Börzel put it, integration theory was ontological, asking what the EU was. Questions about its governance were, and demanded theories that were, "post-ontological."[7] One of these has been an idea of "multi-level games," expanding Putnam's two-level games theory to include EU levels that are at play in EU negotiations. Works in this field have used structures from a three-level system of domestic, EU, and international levels, to a five-level system of vertical and horizontal influence across borders within the EU.[8] Another is analyzing EU policy through the networks that create it, focusing on the

---

[5] Haas, Ernst B. (1958). *The uniting of Europe: political, social, and economical forces, 1950-1957*. Library of world affairs no. 42. London: Stevens and discussed in Rosamond (2000). *Theories of European Integration*, pg. 55.

[6] Hoffmann (1965). *The state of war: essays on the theory and practice of international politics*; Moravcsik, Andrew (1998). *The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht*. Cornell studies in political economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

[7] Börzel, Tanja A. (1999). "Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanisation in Germany and Spain," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **37**(4). 573-596, pg. 576.

[8] Rosamond (2000). *Theories of European Integration*, pg. 147; Larsén (2007). "Trade Negotiations between the EU and South Africa: A Three-Level Game."

epistemic communities that exist within the EU and shape leaders' decisions in national capitals and Brussels.[9] One of the largest bodies of literature to deal with post-ontological issues is Europeanization, which deserves special attention in the way that its emphasis on mechanisms with EU politics contribute to historical analysis of the case studies.

Europeanization, though the term has been used in a number of different ways, is broadly accepted to be about "the effect of the European Union on member states' polity, politics, and policy."[10] It examines how the EU, as well as the "distinctly political forces that consciously shaped the EU integration process and eventually define[d] the singularity of the EU as an economic and political union" shape the politics of member states.[11] This is especially useful in foreign policy, an area still largely controlled by the member states and in which analysis of the institutional EU may not be as fruitful as looking at how decision-making within states has been altered by the EU.

Europeanization literature tends to focus either on the direction of political influence in the EU or the mechanisms by which pressure is exerted. Europeanization originated as a "top-down" model; a decision is taken at the European Union level by EU actors and then impacts domestic policy in a member state.[12] This approach is seen in Bull and Baudner's

---

[9] For example, Howorth, Jolyon (2010). *The Political and Security Committee: a Case Study in 'Supranational Intergovernmentalism'*. SciencesPo | Centre d'études européens: Paris, March 2010 and Howorth, Jolyon (2005). "The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma: France, Britain, and the ESDP," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. **3**(1). 39-54.

[10] Haverland, Markus, (2005). "Does the EU cause domestic developments? The problem of case selection in Europeanization research," *European Integration online Papers*. **9**(2). January 14, 2005, pg 2. Discussion on the varied uses of Europeanization can be found in Olsen, Johan P. (2002). *The Many Faces of Europeanization*. Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo: Oslo, pp. 3-4 and Featherstone (2003). *Introduction: In the Name of 'Europe.'*

[11] Major (2005). "Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy - Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?," pg. 179.

[12] Radelli implies this model in one of the most cited definitions of Europeanization as "processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse,

analysis of Italian policy towards its underdeveloped *Mezzogiorno*.[13] Their article examines how the European Union's regional development framework evolved and how that Brussels-based evolution was reflected in the national Italian system. In this case, a member state adopted, or "downloaded," EU directives and policy. The literature expanded to include "bottom-up" Europeanization, in which a member state attempts to "upload" its own national preferences to Brussels. An example is Torreblanca's analysis of Spanish national foreign policy.[14] Because Spain, for commercial, cultural, and historic reasons, was the EU member with the greatest interest in Latin America, it was able to almost completely transfer its national agenda to the EU. Without any major competing voices in the Council or Commission, what Spain wished to accomplish in Latin America became what the EU wished to accomplish in Latin America. This is Europeanization, the authors of such articles argue, because Spain could not redirect its foreign policy through Brussels if it were not a member of the EU. A third direction is "cross-loading."[15] In this formulation, policies are transferred horizontally from one member state to another without becoming an EU directive. It is nonetheless Europeanization because such a transfer would not have occurred without the presence of the EU, which brings increased contact and more chances of learning better practices.

Another branch of Europeanization literature looks at the process of change in the EU in a more mechanistic framework: explaining the particular reasons that membership in

---

identities, political structures and public policies." Radaelli, Claudio (2000). "Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change," *European Integration online Papers*. **4**(8), pg. 5.

[13] Bull, Martin and Baudner, Joerg (2004). "Europeanization and Italian policy for the Mezzogiorno," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **11**(6). 1058-1076.

[14] Torreblanca (2001). *Ideas, preferences and institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy*.

[15] Dier, Alexandra (2010). *The Europeanisation of National Defence? Military Reform in Germany and Poland 1999-2009*, DPhil Thesis. University of Oxford, pg. 5.

the EU translates into domestic political adjustment. One of the first of these mechanisms was "goodness of fit," proposed by Caporaso, Cowles and Risse in 1998.[16] Under this description, Europeanization happened when there was a moderate level of misfit between European and national policies, i.e., when EU and domestic legislation were moderately divergent. If there were too much misfit, the national structures would resist change due to the high adjustment costs. If the national level were closely matched by the new EU policies, there would be no need to change.[17] Knill and Lehmkuhl have argued for disaggregating Europeanization into less quantifiable mechanisms: positive integration, negative integration, and framing.[18] Positive integration is clear directives mandated from the EU to the member states (e.g., to apply certain regulations). Negative integration tells the member states what *not to do* but leaves decisions for what *to do* to the States (e.g., break up a monopoly and somehow restructure the industry). Framing works by setting the terms of the debate within which member states act. When a country applies for admission to the EU, for example, not only must it comply with the *acquis communitaire*, a list of positive and negative integrative steps, but it adopts the common language of the EU. Leaders speak of democracy, transparency and capitalism and measure themselves by the metrics of Brussels. Studies that use Europeanization rarely discriminate between these perspectives.[19] In Bull

---

[16] Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse-Kappen (2001). *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change* cited in Torreblanca, (2001). *Ideas, preferences and institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy*.

[17] There has been discussion whether a bottom-up view could exist in this framework. Börzel attempted to predict state behavior using such a framework in Börzel, Tanja A. (2002). "Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(2). 193-214.

[18] Knill, Christoph and Lehmkuhl, Dirk (1999). "How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of Europeanization," *European Integration online Papers*. **3**(7). June 15, 1999.

[19] Such articles include Radaelli, Claudio, (1997). "How does Europeanization Produce Domestic Policy Change?: Corporate Tax Policy in Italy and the United Kingdom," *Comparative Political Studies*. **30**(5). October 1997. 553-575; Kallestrup, Morten, (2002). "Europeanisation as a Discourse: Domestic Policy Legitimisation through the Articulation of a 'Need for Adaptation'," [Competition Policy] *Public Policy and Administration*. **17**(2). Summer 2002. 110-124; Howell, Kerry E. (2002). *Europeanization or*

and Baudner's work on Italian regional policy, the EU acts both as a reference point and a source for downloaded policies.[20] In Wong and Hill's edited book on the Europeanization of national foreign policies, contributing authors were asked to look at top-down and bottom-up aspects of Europeanization with similar conceptual eclecticism.[21]

Theories designed to explain the development and governance of the European Union provide this thesis with a variety of tools to understand the dynamics within the EU. Because it is likely that the decision-makers in Britain, France, Germany and the other states which determine policies in the case studies are affected by intra-EU pressures, it is important to briefly sketch some of these conceptual tools. Neofunctionalism, for example, offers the spillover effect, whereby the presence of EU competence in one area creates pressure to expand EU competence into a related field. Europeanization highlights top-down pressure, bottom-up opportunistic action, as well as positive integration, negative integration, framing, and goodness of fit. Each of these brings our attention to a potential way that the EU shapes politics within the Union which in a purely state-based Rational Actor Theory may be missed. The EU is a *sui generis* political organization with "distinctly political forces" that requires additional theoretical understanding than a typical intergovernmental organization.[22]

However, this thesis does not rely solely on these theories. EU-specific theories, while useful, have distinct limitations. For this thesis, the main problem is omitted variable

---

European integration?: a study of UK financial services. Chelmsford: Earlybrave; Irondelle, Bastien (2001). *Europeanization without European Union? French Military Reforms 1991-1996*. at *ECSA Seventh Biennial International Conference*. Madison, Wisconsin: May 31-June 2, 2001; Bromley, Mark, (2007). "The Europeanisation of Arms Export Policy in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland," *European Security*. **16**(2). June 2007. 203-224.

[20] Bull and Baudner (2004). "Europeanization and Italian policy for the Mezzogiorno."

[21] Wong and Hill (2011). *Introduction*, pg. 1.

[22] Major (2005). "Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy - Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?," pg. 179.

bias. One example of this is Bratton's work on the role of the European Union on French military reform.[23] He argues that France moved towards a mobile expeditionary military because that is what will be needed out of a European Union defense force. The presence of the EU and the shadow of an integrated military propelled a policy change and so, in this case, Bratton concludes that Europeanization was present.[24] However, many other factors recommended this change. Military forces worldwide were (and still are) moving towards this force structure.[25] Without a conventional threat from the Soviet Union, France does not need a territorial conscript army. NATO has been pushing for its members to adopt such reforms and the United States has lobbied its allies to update their militaries.[26] States copy from each other outside of the European project.[27] Should a decision within the EU correlate with a pressure from the EU, is easy for an author to claim causality without mentioning external factors of possibly greater significance.

While this may be a manageable problem in certain policy areas, where EU involvement is extensive and competing influences minor, it is not in security policy. The

---

[23] Bratton, Patrick, (2002). "France and the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Contemporary Security Policy*. **23**(2). 87-112.

[24] Irondelle points out that this could in fact demonstrate the weakness of many Europeanization definitions, such as Radaelli's, which insist that Europeanization comes after integration. In this case, France may have acted because of the prospect of new EU institutions, possibly preparing to advocate for such. Whether this is Europeanization or a new look at the steps leading to integration is unclear. For this reason, Irondelle advocates viewing the relationship between integration and Europeanization as "dialectical" rather than sequential. Irondelle (2001). *Europeanization without European Union? French Military Reforms 1991-1996*, pg. 4.

[25] The United States was the first to adopt this structure and is being emulated by NATO allies and China. There are indications that Russia would reform if it had the money to do so. Kelly, Jason, (2006). "A Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs?," *Yale Journal of International Affairs*. **1**(2). Winter/Spring 2006. 58-71. Hashim, Ahmed S., (1998). "The Revolution in Military Affairs Outside the West," *Journal of International Affairs*. **51**(2). Spring 1998. 431-445.

[26] The American role in lobbying for reform has been so constant as to lead some French critics to paint it as another tool of American hegemony. Bratton (2002). "France and the Revolution in Military Affairs," pg. 88.

[27] See Lee, Chang Kil and Strang, David (2006). "The International Diffusion of Public Sector Downsizing: Network Emulation and Theory-Driven Learning," *International Organization*. **60**(4). Fall 2006. 884-909.

EU here exists as only one institution among others. One could explain the development of ESDP as the result of spillover from the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (neofunctionalism) or as the result of states' negotiations at Saint-Malo and Cologne (liberal intergovernmentalism), but those accounts, while not false, would be incomplete, since ESDP was partly a revised ESDI, agreed by and incorporated into NATO. Since these other security institutions are dominated by the United States, there is a significant variable omitted from many of these accounts which may be causally significant. Phillipart and Winand term the EU only "the third main element in the transatlantic institutional architecture, next to NATO and bilateral relationships," reducing the likelihood that the EU would be immune from significant competing influences.[28]

INSTITUTIONALISM

Institutionalist literature might seem to solve the omission of the United States. This literature has been used to study the EU as well as NATO and offers, like European integration theories, a number of useful conceptual tools. Historical institutionalism is one body of literature whose attention to the evolving nature of institutions and their shaping influence on the interests of states is of particular importance in this area of deeply embedded overlapping institutions. In this section, I will present an overview of these contributions, but ultimately conclude that an internal institutional mechanistic analysis of events is insufficient, given the existence of multiple and possibly competing institutions.

---

[28] Philippart, Éric and Winand, Pascaline (2001). *The Dynamics, Structures, Actors and Outcomes of US-EU Relations: An 'Inside-Out' Approach*, in *Ever closer partnership: policy-making in US-EU relations*, Philippart and Winand, Editors. 2001, Peter Lang: Oxford. 17-28, pg. 17.

However, this literature does help to create this thesis' typology of roles that the United States may play in the European Union.

Institutionalism arose from a desire to move beyond debates about the efficacy of institutions in international politics to a discussion about how they work.[29] The core assumption of the institutionalist approach is that "*institutions matter*" [emphasis in the original] and that institutions, defined as representing "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain states, and shape expectations," ought to be investigated to discover by what mechanisms, rules, roles, and other institutional aspects they shape international politics.[30] This field has generated a variety of approaches, roughly mirroring divisions in political science. The *Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions* divides the academic fields into: rational choice; historical; constructivist; network; and formal-legal/Marxist.[31] Jupille and Caporaso divide the frameworks according to whether institutions and preferences are endogenous or exogenous to the analysis.[32] Keohane distinguishes between views of institutions based on "substantive rationality" – a rationalist logic of consequences analysis – or "reflexive" decision-making – a constructivist logic of appropriateness.[33] While these are considerably

---

[29] For example, the shift from Mearsheimer, John, (1994). "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*. **19**(3). 5-49; and Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert O. (1985). "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics*. **38**(1). October 1985. 226-254; to Koremenos, Barbara*, et al.*, (2004). *The rational design of international institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[30] Bulmer, Simon (1998). "New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **5**(3). 365-386, pg. 368; Keohane, Robert (1989). 'Neoliberal institutionalism: a perspective on world politics', in Keohane (ed.), *International Institutions and State Power,* Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1–20, pg 3.

[31] Rhodes, R. A. W., Binder, Sarah A., and Rockman, Bert A. (2006). *The Oxford handbook of political institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[32] Jupille, Joseph and Caporaso, James A. (1999). "Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*. **2**. 429-444.

[33] Keohane, Robert (1988). "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly*. **32**(4). December 1988. 379-396.

diverging in their manners of analysis, these approaches are all based on the three significant "dimensions" of international institutions. They agree that institutions impact the actors involved in a decision, the environment in which a decision is made, and the payoff structure for a decision.[34]

All of these variants have been used to study European security and the institutions within it. Jupille and Caporaso write that

> "The literature on EU politics and policy making is increasingly turning away from specialized theories of integration or parochial applications of IR or comparative tools in favor of more generic (and broadly intelligible) forms of institutionalism. The best of the new EU literature transcends prevailing categories of institutional analysis and promises a fuller account of EU politics, one that considers both integration (system transformation) and politics within an existing institutional structure."[35]

Pierson has argued for institutional path dependency as one way to explain the development of the EU in a manner beyond the intergovernmentalist/neo-functionalist divide.[36] A major part of the Europeanization literature is based on the same foundations as institutionalism.[37] "Europeanization as institutionalism," according to Giuliani, sees parallels

---

[34] Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert O., (1985). "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics*. **38**(1). October 1985. 226-254.

[35] Jupille and Caporaso (1999). "Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics," pg. 440.

[36] Pierson (1996). "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis."

[37] Dier cites as examples of this type of institutionally-based Europeanization literature Goetz, Klaus H. and Hix, Simon, eds (2001). *Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems*. 2001, Frank Cass: London; Anderson, Jeffrey J., (2002). "Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic Polity, 1945-2000," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(5). 793-822 in Dier (2010). *The Europeanisation of National Defence? Military Reform in Germany and Poland 1999-2009*; Radaelli cites Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse-Kappen (2001). *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change*; Kurzer, Paulette (2001). *Markets and moral regulation: cultural change in the European Union*. Themes in European governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Olsen (2002). *The Many Faces of Europeanization*; Radaelli, Claudio (2003). *The Europeanization of Public Policy*, in *The*

between the workings of the EU and of generic international institutions.[38] He stresses three aspects that link the EU, theoretically, to institutionalism. First, the EU has specialized functions and is separated from its member states. Second, as time progresses and more decisions are made, the EU further entrenches itself, as in historical institutionalism.[39] Third, EU decisions cannot be predicted by examining the desires of one state, or even a group of states. The EU has an impact of its own on political games, effected actors, environment and payoff.

This literature can also be used for the transatlantic security community, which has properties similar to an institution. Karl Deutsch wrote in 1957 that the North Atlantic area had seen separate political entities integrate to the point that there is a "real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way."[40] The reasons for the emergence of the community are many and range from the neo-realist, such as the cost of fighting a nuclear-equipped superpower during the Cold War, to the sociological, based on the shared norms of the community.[41] Regardless of the reason for the absence of war among the states of Western Europe and North America, the fact is that these countries have not settled disputes amongst themselves with force since World War II, nor is it conceivable that they would do so in the future. Whatever the differences between France and Germany these days, disputes are settled in

---

Politics of Europeanization, Featherstone and Radaelli, Editors. 2003, Oxford University Press: Oxford in Radaelli (2004). "Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?," pg. 6.

[38] Giuliani, Marco, (2004). "Europeizzazione come istituzionalizzazione: questioni definitorie e di metodo," *Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche*. **1**. 141-161.

[39] Pierson, Paul (2004). *Politics in time: history, institutions, and social analysis*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

[40] Deutsch (1957). *Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the light of historical experience*.

[41] An overview of the origins of security communities can be found in Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael N. (1998). *Security communities in theoretical perspective*, in *Security communities*, Adler and Barnett, Editors. 1998, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. pp. 6-14.

conference rooms and courts, rather than on land or by sea. In the North Atlantic area, there are "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations," the definition of an international institution or regime, according to Krasner.[42] Ikenberry writes that this Western political order now has its foundation in the institutional arrangements and the cooperative and interdependent nature of its international politics.[43]

The informal institution of the security community encompasses the formal institution of NATO. It is one of the few military alliances in history to have lasted beyond the war for which it was built and evidence of the integration of the militaries of the two sides of the Atlantic. NATO has been analyzed with institutionalism frequently, especially on its persistence past the Cold War, an outcome unexpected by realists.[44] From the path dependent nature of NATO to the sunk costs associated with the alliance, the survival of the political entity and its use in the Balkans and Afghanistan has been examined with reference to internal institutional mechanisms, though with considerable conceptual eclecticism.[45]

There is therefore a strong precedent for using institutionalism to analyze the European Union, NATO, and the transatlantic security community, and the frameworks perhaps most useful for this thesis' issue area are the rational and historical versions of "new

---

[42] Krasner, Stephen D. (1983). *International regimes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pg 2. In the international context, regime and institution are often interchangeable. A regime may indicate a less formal structure of cooperation, but this is not always the case. Peters, B. Guy (2000). *Institutional theory in political science: the new institutionalism*. London: Continuum, pg 130.

[43] Ikenberry, G. John (2001). "American power and the empire of capitalist democracy," *Review of International Studies*. **27**. 191-212.

[44] See Mearsheimer, John (1990). "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*. **15**(1). Summer 1990. 5-56.

[45] Some of these include McCalla, Robert B. (1996). "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," *International Organization*. **50**(3). Summer 1996. 445-475; Wallander, Celeste A. (2000). "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization*. **54**(4). Autumn 2000. 705-735; Menon, Anand and Welsh, Jennifer (2011). "Understanding NATO's Sustainability: The Limits of Institutionalist Theory," *Global Governance*. **17**. 81-94.

institutionalism." This literature developed, in part, through March and Olsen's work in organization and decision theory, in which they argued that, rather than viewing institutions as an "arena for competition among rival interests," the polity of an institution is a separate entity endowing actors with institutional duties and roles.[46] New institutionalism focused on the polity, the structure of the political system and less formal ways in which the system shapes actors' decision-making. Within this literature, rational choice scholars exogenize state preferences, arguing that they are relatively fixed and that institutions function by imposing a cost-structure on their preferences. Historical institutionalism focuses on the evolving nature of an institution and the mechanisms by which the institution shapes states' preferences and changes over time.[47] Thelan and Steinmo argue that whether to include preference formation in a discussion of the impact of institutions is the defining difference between rational choice and historical institutionalism.[48] Bulmer agrees, calling rational choice institutionalism the "thin" end and historical institutionalism the "thick" end of institutionalism.[49]

In this thesis, because of the short time periods of the case studies, the difference between historical and rational choice is less likely to produce different explanations for state action. The United States' opinion on the EU possessing a competence in security policy, for example, may be shaped by the historical development of NATO and the EU. However, its immediate response to the Saint-Malo declaration was likely the result of

---

[46] March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. (1989). *Rediscovering institutions: the organizational basis of politics*. New York: Maxwell Macmillan cited in Bulmer (1998). "New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market," pg 375.

[47] Hall, Peter A. and Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996). "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies*. **44**. 936-957, pp. 938, 944.

[48] Thelen, Kathleen Ann and Steinmo, Sven (1992). *Historical Institutionalism in comparative politics*, in *Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*, Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, Editors. 1992, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 1-32, pg. 8.

[49] Bulmer (1998). "New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market," pg. 370.

rational-choice calculation. Its preferences may have evolved in the seven years since the crumbling of the Soviet Union, but could most likely be modeled as fixed in the few days during which the United States formulated its response.[50] These case studies take place in a constrained time period: Chapter 3 spans eight months; Chapter 4, three and a half years; Chapter 5, a year and a half. Whether that is enough time for an institution to have an evolving constitutive effect on state preferences is unclear. However, since the development of the transatlantic security community was a continuous and gradual process, as discussed in Chapter 1, it is likely that the broad preferences of the states involved were unchanged during the case studies, and that shifts – particularly volte-faces within a few days – were due to political maneuvering and new information. To use an example from Chapter 1, the Greek veto of the Berlin Plus agreement (which it previously supported) was not the result of a historically evolving view of its national preferences caused by its continuing membership of both the EU and NATO. Rather, it has long wished to compete against Turkey in the Aegean. It used its veto because of a rational analysis of the deal made to accommodate Turkey. Therefore, the divide between exogenous and endogenous preference-formation is of less importance and the two branches of "new institutionalism" can be collapsed into one in this thesis.[51]

Institutionalist theory, especially new institutionalism, provides useful mechanisms for understanding state behavior and a conceptual framework centered on dynamic institutions. This is especially applicable to the transatlantic community in which states have invested a great deal of effort into maintaining and expanding institutions since the end of

---

[50] Secretary of State Albright's article in the *Financial Times* was published on December 7, 1998, less than a week after the St-Malo Declaration. Albright, Madeleine (1998). "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future", *Financial Times*. December 7, 1998.

[51] This is analogous to modeling the earth as flat when measuring short distances. Though the earth is constantly curving, the impact of this fact on the analysis is negligible.

the Cold War. However, a focus entirely on institutions and their internal mechanisms may present an incomplete picture. While institutionalist literature may help understand why the EU developed in a certain way or NATO in another, this thesis investigates institutional overlap, when a state must balance potentially competing institututions or demands from an ally in one institution with demands from allies in another. Tracing the evolution and internal structures of institutions are useful, but may result in a situation of the US using issue linkage to the apples of NATO membership to compete with the oranges of EU dynamics. While institutional frameworks and theories developed for the European Union provide useful insights, it is necessary to take a broader, historical approach in order to establish causality in these case studies.

Before leaving the issue of conceptual frameworks, it is important to note that there are other bodies of literature which could be used to understand these cases, but which have not been chosen. The first alternative theoretical field includes theories of hegemony in the international system as well as the specific form of modern hegemony, Americanization. Literature on hegemony often traces its roots to the work of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian revolutionary and founder of the Italian Communist Party. His notebooks, compiled during his imprisonment, argue that the bourgeoisie attained cultural hegemony in capitalist states, which helped to maintain the legitimacy of the state through the acquiescence of other classes.[52] Giovanni Arrighi argues that such indirect control of political processes in the international or domestic setting is an "addendum" to coercive or voting power in a political system. Rather, hegemony aids control by a dominant group "by virtue of its capacity to

[52] For discussion on this issue, see Chapter 2 in Femia, Joseph V. (1987). Gramsci's political thought: hegemony, consciousness and the revolutionary process. Oxford : Clarendon Press.

place all the issues around which conflict rages on a 'universal' plane."[53] Robert Cox interprets hegemony as existing when "the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront."[54] In other words, hegemony in the international system exists when a state is able to ensure that norms and institutions consistent with its national interest are accepted by other states as universally beneficial. The hegemon likely has coercive power needed to establish these norms. The British navy in the 19th century provided practical support for its free trade principles. But coercive power often need not be demonstrated because competitors have "bought into" its way of thinking.[55]

It is certainly true that the United States is the leader if the Atlantic Alliance. It is also true that certain norms have become entrenched in all members of the alliance. Journalists and politicians frequently speak of "Western values." When the ex-Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe joined NATO, they had to demonstrate commitment to American-backed values of democracy, transparency, and non-corruption.[56] The United States, through its position of preeminence, could be said to be a hegemon within the Atlantic community and to use that position in a manner similar to the framing element of the *acquis communitaire* and Europeanization. The United States Americanizes its allies by insisting on the universal "rightness" of its favored norms; in this issue area that would include non-proliferation of weapons to China, military modernization, and preservation of NATO.

---

[53] Arrighi Giovanni (1994). *The long twentieth century: money, power, and the origins of our times*. London: Verso, pg 28.
[54] Cox, Robert (1987). *Production, power, and world order: social forces in the making of history*, New York: Columbia University Press, pg 164.
[55] Ibid, pg. 170.
[56] Gheciu, Alexandra (2005). "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe'," *International Organization*. **59**(4). Fall 2005. 973-1012.

While these are salient points when considering the Atlantic Alliance in general, I do not find that they offer much help in understanding these particular case studies. In each case, the United States was opposed to a proposal from Europe. In two of the cases, its opposition was almost overruled. In the third, it had to trust the good faith of the British government. Hegemony is rule by consensus, according to Cox, and these disputes arose precisely because there was no consensus. Hegemonic literature could explain why the US might likely succeed in reframing issues, but these cases seem to demand the more mechanistic and neutral approach of institutionalism.

Alliance theory could be a fruitful literature for this topic, since the thesis seeks to investigate the consequences of overlap between a political organization with a security element and a military alliance. However, alliance theory has focused on the creation of alliances: the why and how they are formed.[57] Snyder does discuss intra-alliance politics, comparing it to adversarial bargaining, with leverage belonging to the state most able to withstand the break-up of the alliance.[58] Snyder notes that the structure of an alliance "only constrains, it does not fully determine behavior." It puts partners "on either end of a very long leash."[59] Yet this is not particular to alliances. Institutions are almost all susceptible to the decision by sovereign states to withdraw and institutions operate as a constraining force on its members. Therefore, when discussing the internal politics of NATO, an alliance

---

[57] See the overview of alliance theory in Piccoli, Wolfango (1999). *Alliance Theory: The Case of Turkey and Israel*. Columbia International Affiars Online: New York, August 1999. As examples of the tendency to focus on alliance creation, see Morrow, James D. (1991). "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model," *American Journal of Political Science*. **35**(4). November 1991; Altfeld, Michael (1984). "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test," *The Western Political Quarterly*. **37**(4). 523-544.

[58] Snyder, Glenn H. (1990). "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs*. **44**(1). Spring/Summer 1990. 103-123, pg. 116. Also, see Snyder, Glenn H. (1997). *Alliance Politics*. New York: Cornell University Press.

[59] Snyder (1990), "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," pg. 121.

unique in that it does not exist to oppose any particular threat (as the Entente Cordiale was designed to oppose Germany or the Warsaw Pact to oppose the United States) and which has persisted past the war it was created for, alliance theory would use a similar conceptual view as institutionalism.

I therefore conclude that alternative theories do not offer a significant advantage over institutionalism and theories developed for the European Union. Hegemonic theory would point to the normative power of the United States, even though the EU disagreed with the American framing of the issues for much of the case studies. Alliance theory would resemble institutionalism, as well as potentially skewing our analysis towards NATO and away from the EU, where these issues resided. Nonetheless, neither institutionalism nor EU-specific theories will be of use if the case studies cannot be accurately deciphered. For that purpose, an appropriate methodology to analyze the cases is necessary.

METHODOLOGY

To understand the actions of decision-makers within the EU in the case studies, I will be using a qualitative methodology with a strong reliance on process-tracing. With this approach, a comprehensive narrative can be crafted, which is crucial to establish causality in a multivariate situation. From there it should be possible to establish the role of the United States. These case studies, requiring detailed knowledge, recommend qualitative research methods. This approach favors a causes-of-effects analysis, qualitative aspects of time, and a complex view of causality rather than the neo-Humean and experimental methods long

favored by much of the social sciences.[60] Qualitative methodologists tend towards a complex view of the social world, which makes even similar cases different and prevents the relatability among cases that large-*n* samples are based upon. Whereas quantitative research focuses on variables and mathematical models, qualitative research often draws on an analysis of the mechanisms within cases rather than the values of the independent and dependent variables. These mechanisms may vary in their output or be indicative of critical junctures or path dependency. Therefore, in qualitative research, an argument's strength is bolstered by deliberate case selection rather than the random selection necessary for statistical analysis. Each case should be able to contribute in some way to an understanding of the issue, whether it be a "most-likely" scenario in which we attempt to disprove a hypothesis which should apply here if nowhere else, or a "least-likely" scenario when we attempt to confirm a hypothesis which should not apply in this case.[61] Granted, deliberate selection can lead to bias. Since most cases are chosen because certain outcomes either happened or were close to happening, we may be violating King, Keohane and Verba's warning of selecting based on the dependent variable. However, as Bennett and Elman argue, within-case analysis is somewhat protected from such claims. It looks not just for the causal effect of an independent variable, but for the mechanisms by which it operates. By necessity, in order to understand those mechanisms, we need to have instances of that

---

[60] Mahoney, James and Terrie, P. Larkin (2008). *Comparative-historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, Editors. 2008, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 737-755, pg. 740. Quantitative methods were championed in King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., and Verba, Sidney (1994). *Designing social inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. They were critiqued for "assum[ing] that quantitative researchers have the best tools for making scientific inferences" by Mahoney, James and Goertz, Gary, (2006). "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research," *Political Analysis*. **14**. 227-249

[61] Gerring adds the following types of case studies: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, crucial, pathway, most-similar and most-different. Each attempts to use the context of the case study to acquire significant results, basing the strength of the argument on more than just what is found within the case study. Gerring (2008). *Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques*, pg. 646.

effect.[62] And with much of the argument occurring within a case study, the context of that case study is used mainly to give validity to the mechanisms being observed.

Brady and Collier offer a number of tools that aid a qualitative analysis. First is contextual knowledge, which allows the researcher to make claims about a topic. To study the development of the EU in security policy, for example, it is necessary to have an understanding about what that identity has been and what actions have previously occurred under its remit. In Chapter 1, I presented an overview of this topic. The second tool is Bayesian inference, which dictates that predictions about the probability of an outcome be made, but to have that probability constantly updated as new information is found. Bayesian logic allows for a more nuanced inference pattern, which is helpful in within-case analysis.

Another tool is counterfactuals. We wish to know the impact of the independent variable and therefore what would have happened in its absence. A counterfactual tries a straightforward approach to this, with the researcher posing a hypothetical situation and imagining how events would have unfolded. Obviously there are significant limitations to this. The counterfactual must be based on previously established theories at every step of the way.[63] It must occupy as small a space of time as possible with as few changes as possible.[64] It must be supported by strong arguments based in a contextual understanding. The counterfactual can be used in qualitative research, but because it is based on imagination rather than strict evidence, it is not often recommended as a significant stand-alone study. It

---

[62] Bennett and Elman (2006). "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Studies Methods," pg. 461.

[63] Haverland (2005). "Does the EU cause domestic developments? The problem of case selection in Europeanization research," p. 5; Levy, Jack (2008). *Counterfactuals and Case Studies*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, Editors. 2008, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 627-644, pg. 641.

[64] Weber, Max, Schils, Edward A. (translator), and Finch, Henry A. (translator) (1949). *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. New York: Free Press cited in Levy (2008). *Counterfactuals and Case Studies*, pg. 635.

is best when used as a part of the final tool for qualitative research – process-tracing, which has been described as a "core attribute" of qualitative analysis and will be the central methodological tool for this dissertation.[65]

Process-tracing follows the story of a particular episode and analyzes the flow of decisions – how they were made, why they were made, and how they influenced each other. It is similar to the way historians use narrative but is tailored to social science by its use in pursuit of a theory.[66] Its function is twofold. First, process-tracing identifies key moments in a case study. A single case is broken down into a continuous series of steps, each of which can be analyzed in greater depth.[67] Second, process-tracing encourages us to look within each step for causal mechanisms, which are often undertheorized or overlooked in more general studies.[68] Together, process-tracing looks for "a series of theoretically predicted intermediate steps" that provide a more nuanced version of events.[69]

Executing a successful process-tracing analysis depends on making strong arguments for the causal mechanisms within these steps. To do this, the tools of qualitative research described above are useful for one of the central tasks of process-tracing, which is to

---

[65] Mahoney and Terrie (2008). *Comparative-historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science*, pg. 740.

[66] Elman, Colin and Elman, Miriam Fendius (2001). *Introduction: Negotiating International History and Politics*, in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations*, Elman and Elman, Editors. 2001, The MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1-36, pg. 30. Lebow makes the point that "Historians study the past as a valuable exercise in its own right… Social scientists regard the past as data that might help them develop and test theories of human behavior." Lebow, Richard Ned (2001). *Social Scence and History: Ranchers versus Farmers?*, in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations*, Elman and Elman, Editors. 2001, The MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass. 111-136, pg. 111.

[67] Bennett and Elman (2006). "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Studies Methods," pg. 459 argue for a continuous explanation with as few breaks as possible.

[68] Bennett and George (2001). *Case Studies and Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci*.

[69] Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005). *It's the Process, Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics*. Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo: Oslo, October 2005, pg. 5.

confirm or deny alternate hypotheses. Since process-tracing involves a series of steps, and therefore a series of causal arguments, the validity of process-tracing depends on the strength of its constituent arguments, both the "affirmation of explanation, through evidence consistent with those explanations, and eliminative induction, or the use of evidence to cast doubt on alternative explanations that do not fit the evidence in a case."[70] Each of these causal arguments must be proven, but given the historical nature of these events and the inability to replay the situations, the researcher's hypothesis can be confirmed only if competing alternate hypotheses can be disproven. This requires a good faith search for competing evidence and competing theories. While one hopes to be presented with decisive evidence at all turns, it is highly unlikely. More likely, causal arguments must be constructed from what evidence there is married with existing, established theories. The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are described by Bennett and George, who write,

> Process tracing is not a panacea for theory testing or theory development: its requirements are often difficult to meet and it has inherent limitations. However, it has many advantages for theory development and theory testing, some of them unique. It can identify paths to an outcome, point out variables that were left out in the initial comparison of cases, check for spuriousness, and permit causal inference on the basis of a few cases or even a single case.[71]

Process-tracing must be based on a solid conceptual foundation. In this dissertation, that will be Rational Actor Theory, influenced by strategic-choice literature. Rational Actor Theory's incarnation in International Relations is perhaps best known from its description in

---

[70] Bennett, Andrew (2008). *Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, Editors. 2008, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 702-721, pp. 706-7.

[71] Bennett and George (2001). *Case Studies and Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci*, pg. 144.

Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision*, which tested it against two other paradigms.[72] In this model, Rational Actor Theory has government action as its unit of analysis. It examines a unified national actor responding to a strategic situation in a rational manner. We assume that the choice made was the "value-maximizing means for achieving the actor's objectives." To search for evidence, we perform "vicarious problem-solving."[73] We look for the goals of the actors, what options were available, what the payoff structure was among the actions, and predict the most beneficial option. If such a choice was not made, we look for evidence to explain why the payoff structure was perceived differently.

This model is "ubiquitous" in international relations.[74] Institutionalist theory, couched in terms of "shadow of the future" and "altering cost-benefit of cooperation," is based on states as rational actors.[75] Game theory models how two or more rational actors might interact. Historical accounts of international politics are often phrased with an assumption of Rational Actor Theory: "Germany mobilized to support its ally Austria-Hungary," "China refused to devalue its currency," "the United States supported sanctions against Iran." In each case, a unitary state is assumed to have made a rational choice in pursuit of its goals. Even the competing models in Allison's work, the Organizational Process model and the Governmental Politics model, are based on interest-seeking actors.[76]

---

[72] Description begins on page 24 of Allison, Graham T. and Zelikow, Philip, (1999). *Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman.

[73] Schelling, Thomas C., (1960). *The strategy of conflict*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press cited in Allison and Zelikow (1999). *Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis*, pg. 24.

[74] Ibid., pg. 34.

[75] Keohane, Robert O., (1984). *After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press cited in Allison and Zelikow (1999). *Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis*.

[76] A contrast, for example, would be prospect theory, which includes irrational decision-making based on reference points and notions of fairness. See Levy, Jack (1997). "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly*. **41**(1). March 1997. 87-112.

The importance of this work for this dissertation is to highlight the importance of crafting the situation in which it is assumed rational actors operate. In this vein, strategic-choice literature is useful. This approach "assumes actors are purposive, makes strategic interactions the unit of analysis, [and] provides a common framework for organizing interactions."[77] This sentence provides us with a way around some of the limitations of Allison's version of Rational Actor Theory. First, by making actors purposive, it maintains the essential function of Rational Actor Theory. If we assume that actors make their choices for a reason, we can find those reasons and follow the lines of costs, benefits and influence that led to the decision. In other words, we can find the causal mechanisms that process-tracing requires. Second, by making strategic interactions the unit of analysis, it allows us to break free of a strict level of analysis approach as Allison does, in which Rational Actor exists at the state level and Governmental Politics at the sub-state level. In strategic-choice approach, it is believed that strategic interactions at one level "aggregate into interactions at other levels in an orderly manner."[78]

This allows for a common framework for analysis. In case studies, we are looking at strategic interactions involving actors operating in an environment of costs, benefits, preferences and information. This can make explicit the foundations of the interaction and, like Rational Actor Theory, allow us to vicariously solve the problems the actor faced. Importantly for this dissertation, it allows the levels of analysis to be mixed. In the European Union, paths of influence may be multidirectional and the importance and place of actors may vary. By focusing on the interaction, rather than following an actor, we can craft the

---

[77] Lake, David A. and Powell, Robert (1999). *International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach*, in *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, Lake and Powell, Editors. 1999, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey. 3-38, pg. 6.

[78] Ibid., pg. 4.

narrative of the episode to more closely match how it happened. In the case studies, the United States government, member state Heads of Government, private defense firms, and mid-level officials representing the European Union all contend with each other. While these actors occupy vastly different places in the hierarchy of politics, they all mattered to the case study. By analyzing the interaction, actors are included as they need to be (and can be argued to have had an impact) and ignored when they are not.

The above methodology leads to a naturally inductive method of study. Rather than quantitative methods or game theory, in which a deductive approach leads to an "objective" result which any researcher could discover from running the numbers, this method requires faith in the researcher to accurately gauge the preferences of actors and how to weigh competing pressures. This could lead to a weaker argument. However, deductive reasoning is itself based upon an inductive foundation.[79] In game theory, determining which actors are involved, what sequence decisions are made, and what is the payoff structure requires the judgment of the researcher.[80] An inductive approach, since it depends on the reasoning of the researcher, prompts the explicit statement of assumptions and causal mechanisms, which, if there are mistakes, presents the field of possible errors to open analysis by others.

TYPOLOGY

Institutionalist and European integration theories argue that causality can be driven by institutional mechanisms. Neofunctionalism suggests that the spillover effect shapes state

---

[79] Bates, Robert H., *et al.*, (2000). "Review: The Analytical Narrative Project," *The American Political Science Review*. **94**(3). September 2000. 696-702, pg. 697

[80] In deductive reasoning, this is the difference between validity and soundness. While a game theory approach may be deductively valid – in that the structure as constructed would lead to a given outcome – it is not necessarily sound, which requires the premises of the argument to be true. Finding correct premises in social science requires inductive reasoning.

decision; historical institutionalism, that unintended consequences and the accumulation of precedent shift events away from the expected result. Yet these theories also argue that these institutional mechanisms, as part of the political structure, constrain or enable state capabilities to an extent that they assume roles within the institution separate from their abilities in the international environment.[81] The United States, for example, plays a very different role in the United Nations Security Council, where it holds a veto, than it does in the UN General Assembly, where it does not. This thesis seeks to identify the role of the United States within the European Union in security policy, an area where, because of formal institutional exclusion but, perhaps, informal inclusion, its role is ambiguous and underconceptualized.

I have drawn four broad types of actor: accommodator; entrepreneur, spoiler, and veto player. This typology is partly inspired by Krasner's writing on international economic regimes, in which the political realities of negotiations within and about institutions meant that states played different roles.[82] Some states were the "makers" of regimes; they had the political power to create policies that would be adopted by other states. Others were "breakers;" they opposed the new regimes and had the power to disrupt these policies, though they did not have the political power to set up new regimes. Others, often smaller states, were "takers" of regimes; they had neither the power to create nor disrupt and had to accept that other states dictated terms. This typology differs from other theories of cooperation in that it assumes that states are attempting to establish multilateral policies, which makes it useful for the transatlantic alliance, where states have constantly done so.

---

[81] Keohane, Robert (1989) 'Neoliberal institutionalism: a perspective on world politics', in Keohane (ed.), *International Institutions and State Power,* Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1–20, pg 3.
[82] Krasner, Stephen (1977). "US Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness," *International Organization*. **31**(4). Autumn 1977. 635-671.

The first role is that of accommodator, similar to Krasner's "taker." In this role, the United States accepts EU decisions and adjusts its own expectations to take into account these new developments. The United States may be involved in the EU debate but it is not a causal factor. This term has been used previously in European settings. Horky has used this term in Europeanization literature, arguing that the Czech Republic accommodated changing European standards for development policy.[83] For the United States, this would resemble how it acted after the Saint-Malo declaration when, although the Clinton Administration moved to ensure that NATO would not be divided, it did not outright oppose the declaration.

The second category, a policy entrepreneur, is based on Krasner's "makers." A policy entrepreneur actively seeks to change the status quo to a setting more aligned with its interests. This type of actor has parallels in other areas of institutionalism. Finnemore and Sikkink write about norm entrepreneurs.[84] Stürchler and Elsig discuss treaty sponsors.[85] Mattli and Woods analyze regulatory entrepreneurs.[86] Entrepreneurs "exercise political leadership… and mobilize their resources" to achieve their desired change.[87] In these cases, there must be at least one policy entrepreneur, since there are new policies being contested and new ideas broached. In many, there would be multiple entrepreneurs, each trying to achieve its own preferred policy at the expense of others. If the US entered a debate with a policy preference, its preferred solution was the end result and it could be argued that there

---

[83] Horky (2010). *The Europeanisation of Development Policy*.

[84] Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998). "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*. **52**(4). 887-918.

[85] Stürchler and Elsig (2007). *Spoiling the Party? Multilateralism, Participation, and International Cooperation*.

[86] Mattli, Walter and Woods, Ngaire (2009). *The politics of global regulation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[87] Stürchler and Elsig (2007). *Spoiling the Party? Multilateralism, Participation, and International Cooperation*, pg. 16.

was a causal connection, then the US would be an entrepreneur, and non-membership in the EU would prove to be less important than American predominance in parallel institutions.

The United States may be a spoiler in EU politics. This is similar to Krasner's "breakers." In this role, an actor not only is opposed to a policy, but actively seeks to undermine it.[88] Krasner writes that these types of states are not powerful enough to mold regimes in their own preferred image and therefore must try to throw the regime into chaos. That is perhaps overdetermining the capabilities of these states. Spoilers may simply prefer the status quo, in which case they could have any level of capabilities (though acting as a spoiler may correlate with a diminished level of capabilities). If the US is an unsuccessful entrepreneur but a successful spoiler, we might conclude that non-membership in the EU is a limiting factor in the US's place in Europe, but does not prohibit it from playing a causal role.

The final category, veto player, is not a separate role in Krasner's typology. It may or may not be involved in the crafting of policy, but its agreement is necessary for any change to occur. It need not expend any effort other than holding back its approval. Tsebelis has developed the concept of veto players in domestic settings.[89] He divides them into two categories: institutional veto players whose influence stems from its place in the existing structure, such as the US President's power to veto Congressional legislation derived from the Constitution; and partisan veto players whose power is generated from the political game, such as a Congressional majority of two-thirds, which could override any Presidential veto because of its voting power. Veto players can exist within the EU, given the institutional make-up of the Union, although the intergovernmental nature of foreign and

---

[88] Ibid., pg 17.

[89] Tsebelis, George (2002). *Veto players: how political institutions work*. New York: Princeton University Press.

security policy in these times means that official veto points are rare outside of the Council.[90] Yet vetoes do exist in European security. Turkey and Greece were institutional veto players in the Berlin Plus debate, because the institutional rules of NATO required unanimity, and Britain was for many years a partisan veto player in the discussion of a security identity for the EU, since its approval was seen as necessary for any kind of European force to be considered possible. For the US to be a veto player, because the transatlantic alliance is an informal institution, it would be a partisan veto player. Its ability to veto European policies would derive from its influence within the system and, most especially, from the influence that EU states wished to give it. Because the US does not have an official position within the EU nor a seat on the Council, its veto would have to be played informally.

In this chapter, I presented the conceptual framework for this thesis. European and institutionalist theories offer important insights for analyzing the European security sphere. Theories developed to explain the EU highlight the various ways in which the supranational institution shapes the actions of major decision-makers. These ways include: the spillover effect, positive integration, negative integration, framing, and the EU as a coordination point. Institutionalist theories, especially rationalist and historical new institutionalism, demonstrate the structural effect of institutions on actors within them. These conceptual tools will be useful in unpacking the case studies, but since each body of literature contains gaps in this issue area – EU theories missing the unique role of the US and institutionalist theories not addressing overlapping institutions – it would not be correct to use just one

[90] Haverland and others use the term veto points, which is perhaps more familiar. I use veto player to emphasize that the veto is wielded by an actor within a political game. Haverland (1999) *National adaptation to European integration: the importance of institutional veto points*.

theoretical framework in isolation. Rather, qualitative methodologies will be used to produce an analysis of the historical record that will suggest an institutional role for the US from the institutionalist- and European-derived typology.

CHAPTER 3

ESDP MINI-SUMMIT

On April 29, 2003, the leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg met in Brussels to discuss European defense. They proposed a variety of plans for improving ESDP, released a statement detailing policies, and held a press conference. What could have been an innocuous meeting – one of many in the evolution of the EU's defense identity – instead provoked a furious backlash. Newspaper reports portrayed it as a hostile provocation towards Atlanticist countries. "EU Plans draws rapid reaction" was the headline in the *Washington Times*; "France, Germany deepen UK rift" in *The Guardian*; and "Defence Plan could rival NATO" in the *Financial Times*.[1] The meeting was attacked viciously by American policymakers. The US Ambassador to NATO called the policies from the summit "one of the most serious dangers to the transatlantic relationship."[2] A State Department spokesman scathingly described it as a meeting of "chocolate makers" and as "four countries that got together and had a little bitty summit."[3] This summit became a major source of contention within the Atlantic alliance and the European Union until the issues it raised were resolved in December 2003.

This episode began mere weeks after the Atlantic security structure was supposedly settled through Berlin Plus, which had been agreed upon in December 2002 and ratified with

---

[1] Sands, David R. (2003). "EU Plan draws rapid reaction", *Washington Times*. April 30, 2003; Black, Ian (2003). "France, Germany depen UK rift", *The Guardian*. London, April 30, 2003; Dempsey, Judy (2003). "Defence Plan could rival NATO", *Financial Times*. London, April 29. 2003.

[2] Nicholas Burns quoted in Larrabee, F. Stephen, (2004). "ESDP and NATO: Assuring complementarity," *The International Spectator*. **39**(1). 51-70, pg. 52.

[3] Richard Bouchard quoted in Subierski, Phillippe (2003). "US slams "chocolate makers," as Belgium stands firm on EU military", *Agence France Presse*. September 2, 2003.

an exchange of letters between the High Representative of the EU and the Secretary-General of NATO in March 2003.[4] Throughout the debate following the summit, the United States was a constant presence and was constantly consulted, more so than many EU member states, in fact. In this chapter, I will present the narrative of this episode and strive to determine the reasons for states' decisions at each juncture. I will argue that, although the US agreed to the EU's position in the end, member state actions indicate that the US had the capabilities of a veto player and did not feel the need to exercise its "veto" because it was satisfied with the eventual settlement.

Timeline of Mini-Summit Episode

Dec 16, 2002	Berlin Plus ratified
Feb 5, 2003	Le Touquet Summit
Mar 20	Invasion of Iraq begins
Apr 29	ESDP Mini-Summit, Brussels
May 20	Gymnich Meeting, Brussels
Aug 29	Defense Experts Meeting, Rome
Sept 9	Second Mini-Summit (expected)
Sept 20	1st Berlin Accord
Oct 3	Virtual Task Force Proposed by Italy
Oct 15	North Atlantic Council meeting
Nov 27	2nd Berlin Accord
Nov 28-29	Foreign Ministers Meeting, Naples
Dec 1&2	Sec. Rumsfeld visit to NATO

I: CRISIS

THE SUMMIT

This meeting, termed variously the Chocolate Summit, the April 29 meeting, Gang of Four Summit, ESDP Mini-Summit, or Tervuren Summit, launched a diplomatic dispute that lasted for months and set the most powerful countries in the Atlantic alliance at odds with

[4] NATO (2003). *Berlin Plus Agreement*, http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm. Accessed November 30, 2011.

each other.[5] But before delving into the aftermath or analysis of this meeting, it is important to present what happened at the summit and the precise plans that emerged therefrom.

The offices of the leaders at the Mini-Summit – French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, and Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker – released a joint press statement that summarized the conclusions and ostensible causes of the event. It began with the rationale for increased European cooperation on defense: "With enlargement and the drafting of a constitutional treaty, the European Union of tomorrow will be stronger, but also more diverse. It is our common conviction that Europe must be able to express itself with one voice and to fully play its role on the international scene… the European Union must have at its disposal a credible policy of security and defense. Because diplomatic action is not credible – and therefore effective – unless it can equally rely on real civil and military capacities."[6]

The statement uses its second paragraph to invoke the common values between Europe and the US and the utility of the Atlantic alliance "which remains the foundation for the collective security of its members." The statement grounds itself in the Berlin and Washington NATO Summits and the NATO operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). It invokes the spirit of Saint-Malo, of the Cologne Summit, and of ESDP. After these preliminaries, the leaders declare that "the moment has come to build a

---

[5] There has never been a definitive name given for this summit. "Chocolate Summit" was used by Berlin's centrist *Der Tagesspiegel* in the immediate reporting of the event and is useful for being distinctive and memorable. However, it preserves the derogatory air with which it was intended. I will therefore use the more neutral term "ESDP Mini-Summit." -----, (2003). "European press review", *BBC News*. London, April 30, 2003.

[6] Office of the Presidency, French Republic (2003). "Joint Press Conference of M. Jacques Chirac, M. Guy Verhofstadt, M. Gerhard Schroeder, and M. Jean-Claude Juncker, on the issue of the meeting concerning European defense", Paris, April 30, 2003. Author's translation.

new stage in the construction of a Europe of Security and Defense." To do so, they propose a series of measures. First, they list a series of principles that they wish to be included in the Constitutional Treaty:

1. Advanced cooperation on defense goods.
2. A "general clause of solidarity and of a security community among all the Member States of the EU."
3. "The possibility for Member States who wish to take on additional obligations to form a framework of advanced cooperation."
4. A reformulation of the Petersburg Tasks.
5. Creation of a European agency on military goods development and acquisition.
6. Creation of a European military college.

The statement then expands on principle 3 by proposing a European Union of Security and Defense (EUSD). This would be an advanced version of ESDP and allow states to cooperate on industrial projects and undertake common exercises. Importantly, though, it would not be a part of the existing institutional framework of the European Union. Although it would be "open" to all member states, it would be separate from – or above and beyond – the EU.

The statement concludes with a list of initiatives that would improve European defense and the capabilities for European multilateral operations:

1. Creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force.
2. Creation of a European command for strategic airlift.
3. Creation of a European capacity for protecting civil populations from WMDs.
4. Creation of a European system for humanitarian aid.
5. Creation of a European training center.

6. "The strengthening of European capacity for operational planning and conducting operations. The Member States decided at the Cologne Summit in June 1999 to lead operational management using recourse to NATO means and capacity or in an autonomous manner. For those operations for which NATO capacities are not useful, a permanent arrangement between the EU and NATO has been put in place… Running EU operations without recourse to NATO capabilities… we think that it is necessary to better the operational planning and operational execution capabilities for the EU to avoid inefficient duplications among national capabilities. To this end, we propose to our partners the creation of a new joint planning and execution capacity for EU operations. It will be comprised of national personnel and able to establish liaison arrangements with their national counterparts. To assure a close rapport with NATO, they will be called to establish arrangements to liaise with SHAPE, with a view to supporting DSACEUR." This capacity ought to be in place by summer 2004 in Tervuren.
7. Creation of a deployable multi-national headquarters for operations.

The Mini-Summit concluded with a joint press conference on April 30. Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt opened by stating that this meeting was the realization of planning that began on July 18, 2002, when he formulated concrete propositions to restart European security and defense. He discussed these plans with President Chirac on September 10, 2002 and Chancellor Schröder on November 13, 2002. During his remarks, Chirac stated that the planning cell mentioned in point six of the initiatives was not meant to create a European SHAPE (NATO's headquarters in Brussels), but was "more simply searching to bring the national capabilities of the EU closer together and to limit ineffective national duplication." Schröder reiterated this point, saying that "within NATO, we do not

have too much America, but too little Europe."[7]

It is important to understand the totality of what was proposed from the Mini-Summit. The meeting was associated in the press most of all with the Planning Cell, to be based in Tervuren, and it was around the Planning Cell that much of the diplomacy of the summer and fall of 2003 publicly revolved. True, this cell was a significant part of the proposals. The Planning Cell (initiative 6) was five paragraphs long; the multi-national headquarters (initiative 7) had three paragraphs and all other initiatives were discussed in one paragraph each. However, the planning cell was only one initiative of seven, and the initiatives were only one section of three. The Mini-Summit was intended to be a major step forward in EU defense policy, consciously likening itself to the Berlin and Washington Summits, which granted European nations autonomous control of NATO assets, and Saint-Malo and Cologne, which gave the EU a defense identity. The aim of the Mini-Summit, as the statement and press conference illustrate, was threefold: incorporating defense and security into the European Union's Constitutional Treaty; to create the European Union for Defense and Security, a military eurozone; and a set of concrete plans to increase the EU's military capacity, one of which was the planning cell. Given this wide-ranging agenda, much of which built onto existing trends, it is curious that only one aspect of the summit received the lion's share of media attention and that the immediate reaction was as furious as it was.

In part, the reaction came because these conclusions were unexpected. Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, in a meeting with American officials a few days before the Mini-Summit, said that it was "highly unlikely that the summit communiqué would be

---

[7] Ibid.

anything more than proposals to enhance European military capabilities."[8] After the Mini-Summit, Italy was "as surprised as [the US Government]."[9] The fury was also triggered by the timing and the membership of the summit. April 29, 2003, fell during the transatlantic crisis over Iraq. The invasion of Iraq was launched a month earlier and the day after the Mini-Summit ended President Bush delivered his premature "Mission Accomplished" speech on the *U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln*. This was the culmination of months during which Iraq and the divisions it engendered were the leading international issue. In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to invade Iraq; in February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United Nations; and a few days later, France, Germany and Russia stated that they would not support an Anglo-American resolution at the Security Council. Coming during the most serious transatlantic dispute in a generation – and while Iraq was still considered a warzone – it seemed unlikely that the timing of the Mini-Summit was coincidental.[10] According to Stephen Blackwell, Head of the European Security Institute at the Royal United Services Institute, "The Blair government strongly suspected that the objective of the April meeting was a political poke at the US rather than a serious military initiative."[11]

The summit's members were known as the "ring-leaders of the EU's anti-war camp."[12] During the previous year, these four nations had opposed UK and US plans to use

---

[8] WL: *03ROME1776: ESDP Mini Summit - GoI views*. Rome Embassy, April 28, 2003.

[9] WL: *03ROME1834: ESDP Mini Summit - Frattini will come out swinging at Gymnich*. Rome Embassy, April 30, 2003.

[10] For an example of the atmosphere of the time, on the day of the Mini-Summit, the UN announced measures in response to chaos in Iraq. ----, (2003). "UNESCO to send experts to Iraq to compile data on looted antiquities", *UN News Centre*. New York, April 29, 2003.

[11] Blackwell, Stephen (2003). "Degrees of Separateness: The EU Military Planning Cell," *RUSI Newsbrief*. **23**(10). October 2003.

[12] Grant, Charles (2003). *Resolving the rows over ESDP*. Centre for European Reform: London, October 2003, pg. 2.

force against Iraq. In Germany, Schröder had used public opposition to the proposed war to bolster his party's chances in the tight federal elections held on September 22, 2002.[13] Chirac had led opposition within the Security Council. Belgium and Luxembourg officially condemned the Iraq War. More importantly to policymakers in London and Washington, this seemed to be an anti-NATO group. Earlier that year, having considered the possibility that Iraq would attack its northern neighbor during a war, NATO made moves to send defensive aid to Turkey before hostilities commenced. This would include AWACS surveillance planes, Patriot missile batteries and anti-chemical and anti-biological warfare teams. Germany, France and Belgium vetoed planning for these measures. Turkey responded by invoking Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stipulates that "parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened." The NATO Secretary-General described the dispute as "very serious" and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called it a "disgrace." Although aid was eventually sent, the message from these countries seemed to be that they valued opposition to the Iraq War over their obligations towards NATO allies.[14]

To American and British eyes, the message of the summit was contained not just in the list of principles, initiatives, and proposals, but in the document's signatories. In institutional design literature like that of Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, membership is considered one of the most important elements in the construction of an international institution.[15] The effective functioning of an institution is contingent upon the appropriate membership and the membership of an organization can determine the functioning of the

---

[13] Finn, Peter (2002). "U.S.-Style Campaign With Anti-U.S. Theme; German Gains by Opposing Iraq Attack", *Washington Post*, September 19, 2002.

[14] Gordon, Philip H. and Shapiro, Jeremy, (2004). *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis Over Iraq*. A Brooking Institution Book. New York: McGraw-Hill, pg. 137.

[15] Koremenos, *et. al.* (2004). *The rational design of international institutions*, pg. 23.

institution. For example, the League of Nations failed, in part, because one of the Great Powers, the United States, was not a member and therefore could not help enforce its decisions. NATO evolved into a framework for expeditionary operations because its current membership required that function. If the summit was designed with the same deliberate nature as institutions are theorized to have, then the membership is politically evocative, either because the membership implies what the EUSD would accomplish or because the Mini-Summit was a response to the needs of the attendants. Not only were the four members those which had loudly opposed the Iraq War, but all those countries which had supported the Iraq War were not included, even though some – Britain, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands – were the EU's biggest military powers and would be necessary for any of these proposals to succeed. In contrast, Belgium and Luxembourg had combined military expenditures less than that of Poland and only 10% of Britain's.[16] According to Stephen Blackwell, "Senior officials at the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence in London could barely conceal their amusement at the meager extent of the military capabilities that Belgium and Luxembourg could bring to the 'Tervuren Four.'"[17] The German national paper *Die Welt* was even more mocking. It claimed that "Belgium's power of deterrence lies mainly in the calorie content of its heavy chocolates"[18]

Assuming that the membership of this summit was a deliberate choice, there seems to have been three possible reasons for holding the Mini-Summit. First, it is possible that this was a serious Franco-German attempt to progress in the field of European defense and

---

[16] SIPRI Military Expenditures database (2011). http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2010.xls. Accessed November 21, 2011. In millions of 2009 US Dollars, military budgets were: Belgium, 5,417; Luxembourg, 279; Poland, 6,137; UK, 52,765.

[17] Cited in Payne, Kenneth (2003). *The European Security and Defence Policy and the future of NATO.* BBC News Analysis and Research: London, pg. 26.

[18] Quoted in Sands (2003). "EU Plan draws rapid reaction," April 30, 2003.

that Belgium and Luxembourg were more appropriate partners than Britain. This is unlikely. The logic behind the French position of Saint-Malo was that European defense benefits from the inclusion of Europe's largest military power. And it does not seem that the summit's position was to cast Britain out of Europe. In President Chirac's initial remarks at the summit's press conference, he twice mentioned Britain – referring to anti-terrorism engagements France undertook with Britain and Germany and to the Franco-British bilateral summit at Le Touquet.[19]

The Le Touquet meeting demonstrates the improbability that Britain would be excluded from a European defense summit. Less than three months prior, during the height of the acrimony over Iraq and one day before Colin Powell's speech to the UN, Blair and Chirac held a summit at the French resort town of Le Touquet, at which they promised increased cooperation on European Union security and defense. In a joint statement, the two leaders said that "France and the UK agree that developing the EU's ability to act in the face of new threats… means we must intensify efforts to improve military capabilities." Among the proposals they discussed were: to maintain a French or British aircraft carrier group at sea at all times; to pool military resources; an EU solidarity clause in the EU Constitution; an EU defense procurement agency; and a renewed commitment for an EU rapid reaction force.[20] All of these, bar the agreement on the aircraft carrier, were included in the Mini-Summit's conclusions.

---

[19] Office of the Presidency, French Republic (2003). "Joint Press Conference of M. Jacques Chirac, M. Guy Verhofstadt, M. Gerhard Schroeder, and M. Jean-Claude Juncker, on the issue of the meeting concerning European defense", April 30, 2003.

[20] -----, (2003). "UK and France boost defence ties", *BBC News*. London, February 5, 2003; Joint Statement in Missiroli, Antonio (2003). *From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defence core documents*. European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, December 2003, pg. 36.

If the Mini-Summit were to be a major breakthrough for military cooperation, then Britain ought to have been invited. From the Le Touquet summit, it seemed that the spirit of cooperation was present even during the Iraq Crisis. Therefore, I conclude that its exclusion was not a matter of practicality or of the purely military utility of this summit. The second option, which was the immediate reaction taken by many in London and Washington, was that the summit was a snub to Britain by countries still seething over the Iraq War. This is possible and indeed likely to have played some part. The breakdown in amity between the two sides over Iraq was extensive, as has been mentioned in Chapter 1. But it was not as absolute as news reports indicated. After the public debacle over providing defensive aid to Turkey, a compromise was brokered with the help of Germany. Patriot interceptor missile batteries were delivered to Turkey from Germany via the Netherlands and a deal was reached at NATO's Defense Planning Committee, where France did not have a seat. NATO would provide the defensive support that Turkey needed, but Germany would withdraw its own forces should Turkey enter the conflict offensively. Later, in May 2003, Germany allowed NATO to assume responsibility for logistical support to the Polish sector in Iraq. Although they took a loud and public anti-war stance, Germany's position was not to block NATO consensus where it otherwise existed over Iraq.[21] A similar tolerance could be seen in other issues stemming from the war in Iraq. On March 20, Schröder committed Germany to providing humanitarian, medical, and refugee support in that country.[22] Germany also supported UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which provided the foundation for the

---

[21] Overhaus, Marco (2005). "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," *SAIS Review*. **25**(2). Summer-Fall 2005. 27-41, pg. 30.

[22] Dettke, Dieter (2003). *The Future of Transatlantic Relations - A View from Germany*, at *Committtee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Europe, US House of Representatives*. Washington, DC: June 17, 2003.

UN's involvement in Iraqi reconstruction.[23] In Krasner's terminology, Germany was publicly a "breaker" of the American unilateralist regime, but was privately a "taker."[24] This shows some of the difficulties of analyzing overlapping institutions. To the casual observer of 2003, Germany was firmly Europeanist, allied with France against the American-led invasion of Iraq and leading the integrationist camp in Constitutional Treaty negotiations. Yet this "pro-EU" behavior did not prevent it from simultaneously supporting NATO and that organization's integrity. These actions also provide an example for how the United States might act in the case studies; although the rhetoric is that of a "breaker," actions and causal significance may be quite different.

Schröder "always felt uncomfortable about excluding the UK" from the Mini-Summit.[25] This sentiment was aired in Turin's *La Stampa* on April 15, 2003, the first public mention of what would become the Mini-Summit. The key paragraph about the political array before the summit is:

> The French and Belgians would like to approve the creation of a headquarters at the summit of April 29, accelerating the time to lobby Member States that have not yet decided whether to join. The Germans are against it because a separate location from NATO will be received as an act of rupture on the part of other States. For Berlin, above all it is unimaginable to have an initiative without London, not only for technological reasons, but because it would signify politically a definitive detatchment from the USA. According to sources, the Dutch, Greeks and Portuguese, who have already expressed their wish

---

[23] "Resolved that the United Nations should play a vital role in humanitarian relief, the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative governance." United States Senate (2003). S/RES/1483. May 22, 2003, pg. 1. http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1237558.html. Accessed November 27, 2011.

[24] Krasner (1977). "US Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness," pg. 636.

[25] Grant (2003). *Resolving the rows over ESDP,* pg. 3.

> to participate, have conditioned it on a cooperative agreement with Washington. A key point is the date: the French and the Belgians wish that the initiative be completely operational by May 1, 2004. Therefore it is before the entrance into the EU of the ten candidate countries, the greater part of which broke from Paris and Berlin on Iraq.[26]

This article paints a different picture from the Europe of American suspicions. Rather than being a product of the divide on Iraq, that divide, and German reticence to move against the US, almost prevented the Mini-Summit. But despite his misgivings, Schröder subscribed to almost everything proposed by Belgium and France. The second hypothesis – that the Mini-Summit was an anti-American protest – does not seem to stand up to evidence, even though bitter recriminations over Iraq likely colored the participants' attitudes. Rather, I conclude that the Mini-Summit was the result of a third causal factor, captured in the *La Stampa* article, which was the long-standing goals of France, and to a lesser extent Belgium, over the direction of the European Union's defense identity and was intended to create momentum for those goals before the junctures of the Constitutional Treaty and the expansion of the EU. The Mini-Summit's timing during the Iraq crisis was, although perhaps not coincidental, unlikely to have been the primary cause of the meeting.

At the press conference at the Mini-Summit, Verhofstadt said that he had conceived of the Mini-Summit's plans in the summer of 2002. They then went through a public gestation. France and Germany produced a joint paper that autumn calling for "more cooperation (to be decided by majority voting), the creation of multinational forces with 'integrated command capability,' harmonization of weapons planning and a European

---

[26] Carlo, Bastasin (2003). "Pro o contro gli Stati Uniti? Parigi e Berlino al bivio sulla Difesa commune europea eurocrisi (For or against the United States? Paris and Berlin at the crossroads on common European defense: Eurocrisis) ", *La Stampa*. Turin, April 15, 2004. Author's translation.

armaments agency" as well as a vague form of structured cooperation, called the European Defense Union.[27] France and Germany then released a joint declaration on January 22, 2003 commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty in which was written

> We are proposing the creation of a European Security and Defense Union which will give concrete shape and efficacy to its members' solidarity and common security and must also contribute to strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance. To signal our determination to pursue such a development of the European Security and Defense Policy, we shall embark on the requisite efforts to improve military capabilities and, by so doing, shall significantly step up our bilateral cooperation.[28]

In a parallel declaration by the Franco-German Defense and Security Council, the two nations called for a clause on solidarity in the Constitutional Treaty, greater flexibility within the EU "by adapting the enhanced cooperation mechanism to the ESDP, which would be open to the rest of the member States and even the Union as a whole," the strengthening of military capabilities and better coordination on military procurement.[29] The proposals tabled at the Mini-Summit were months in the making and many of them had previously been announced. And although the Planning Cell received the most attention, it seems that the main object of the "Tervuren Four" at this time was the European Union of Security and Defense, of which the Planning Cell was but one aspect.

---

[27] -----, (2003). "The old motor revs up again", *The Economist*. London, December 5, 2003; Salmon, Trevor (2005). "The European Security and Defence Policy: Built on Rocks or Sand?," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **10**. 359-379, pg. 368; Overhaus (2005). "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," pg. 32.

[28] Point 9, Joint Declaration for the Franco-German Summit – 40th anniversary of the Eysée Treaty, in Missiroli (2003). *From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defence core documents,* pg. 18.

[29] Section 2, Declaration by the Franco-German Defense and Security Council in Missiroli (2003). *From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defence core documents,* pg. 22.

It is necessary, therefore, to understand this new European Union, or as it was variously called, the hard core, pioneer group, vanguard, or core group of European defense. It would be based on the principle of enhanced cooperation. This concept, included in the Treaty of Amsterdam and amended in the Treaty of Nice, allows for a group of at least eight member states to cooperate on matters governed by EU treaties beyond what the EU as a whole is willing to do. In other words, it allows a subset of member states to take an EU competency and to integrate further within that subgroup.[30] The Treaty stipulates that enhanced cooperation can be undertaken only as a last resort, must be open to all member states, and all costs associated with enhanced cooperation must be borne by the subgroup.[31] The Treaty of Nice allowed for enhanced cooperation in Common Foreign and Security Policy, but each state retained a veto and these projects could not touch on military or security issues.[32]

The proposed EUSD aimed to end these restrictions and to form a security equivalent of the eurozone. This offered two advantages over ESDP. First, it would be easier to approve missions if neutral or opposing countries did not need to be consulted. This was a parallel of the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's argument against using NATO for the initial invasion of Afghanistan – that the mission ought to determine the coalition rather than the reverse. The EU's institutional structure added unneeded obstacles when countries with no real military power could veto operations. Perhaps of more importance at

---

[30] This mirrors the process of "differentiated integration," in which a sub-group integrates beyond what is possible in the EU, as with the Schengen travel area. However, this term does not seem to be applicable to EUSD. Differentiated integration is based on centripetal pressures that encourages non-members to join the group until it is included in the EU. The EUSD, as will be argued, may never have been designed to have such an expansionary effect. Kölliker, Alkuin (2006). *Flexibility and European unification: the logic of differentiated integration*. Governance in Europe. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.

[31] Treaty of Nice, Articles 43-45.

[32] Treaty of Nice, Articles 23 and 27A to 27E.

the Mini-Summit, it met France's goal of strengthening Europe while maintaining a leadership position.

One of the foundations of President Charles De Gaulle's European policy had been to use the European Community as a way to multiply the influence of France. The "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" was seen in Paris as a way for France to break away from the bipolar global system and thereby to assert itself.[33] But this required France to maintain leadership of the bloc. For De Gaulle, that meant a partnership with Germany and excluding Britain from the EEC.[34] The situation in Europe forty years later had some similarities and Chirac wanted to assert France's place in the world separate from the United States.[35] This was the cause of his frequent references to multipolarity during the Iraq Crisis. But France's influence was under threat not just from the United States but also from the balance of power within Europe. Not only had Germany unified, thus increasing its power in the EU, but expansion in May 2004 would bring into the Union ten new countries, seven of whom had strong Atlanticist tendencies and had sided with the United States over the Iraq War. Regarding ESDP there was "residual French resistance to integration structures that Paris is unable to control sufficiently" and a pan-EU security policy seemed likely to slip further away from French leadership after 2004.[36] The opening line of the Mini-Summit's conclusion was that the EU was soon to be "stronger, but more diverse." The diversity of the

---

[33] De Gaulle, speech in Strasbourg, Nov 23, 1959. For analysis, see Lüthy, Herbert, (1965). "De Gaulle: Pose and Policy," *Foreign Affairs*. **43**(4). July 1965. 561-573, pg. 568.

[34] Van Herpen, Marcel H. (2004). "Chirac's Gaullism - Why France has become the driving force behind the effort to build an autonomous European defence," *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*. **4**(1). 67-81, pg. 71.

[35] Hoffmann noted the similarity in the nationalist sentiments of Chirac and de Gaulle. Hoffmann, Stanley (2000). "Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy?," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **38**(2). 189-198.

[36] Umbach (2003). *The Future of the ESDP*, at *New Europe, Old Europe and the New Transatlantic Agenda*, pg. 4.

enlarged Union was perceived to be in contrast to its strength, a reasonable assumption from a French perspective, when considering that enlargement would lead to a pro-American majority, if states' position on the Iraq War can be used as a signifier for geopolitical outlook.

Position on Iraq War

Supported war	Opposed war	Neutral
Bulgaria (*joined EU in 2007)*	Austria	Ireland (though it allowed passage of US troops)
Czech Republic *(joined EU in 2004)*	Belgium	
Denmark	Cyprus *(joined EU in 2004)*	
Estonia *(joined EU in 2004)*	Finland	
Hungary *(joined EU in 2004)*	France	
Italy	Germany	
Latvia *(joined EU in 2004)*	Greece	
Lithuania *(joined EU in 2004)*	Luxembourg	
Netherlands	Malta *(joined EU in 2004)*	
Poland *(joined EU in 2004)*	Slovenia *(joined EU in 2004)*	
Portugal	Sweden	
Romania (*joined EU in 2007)*		
Slovakia *(joined EU in 2004)*		
Spain		
United Kingdom		
Total Population[37]: 290 million	Total Population: 189 million	Total Population: 4 million
Total Votes in the Council: 214	Total Votes in the Council: 124	Total Votes in the Council: 7

The EUSD would give France the chance to create a more streamlined and controllable European Union. Missions could be undertaken in the name of the EU, but without having to be bogged down by countervailing opinions or resorting to lowest common denominator missions. In this sense, the Mini-Summit was an excellent example of putative bottom-up Europeanization. Worried about the institutional alignment of a 25-member EU with a new Atlanticist infusion, France created a policy innovation in order to

[37] Population as of 2003. QMV votes as under Treaty of Nice.

achieve its primary domestic goal of sustaining a strong Europe with France at the helm. It was then hoped that the idea would disseminate across Europe – especially since the EUSD would be open to any who wished to join and would ostensibly be non-exclusive. The summit allowed France's preferred policy choice to have been publicly supported by two of the Big Three, and, presumably, to be presented as a *fait accompli* to the rest of the EU.

Why Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany would each back such a proposal was the result of different domestic logics. Belgium and Luxembourg have strong traditions of European integration, dating back to before the Treaty of Rome, and, given their small national capacity, consistently pushed technical advancements to the EU's capabilities. Belgium had elections on May 18 and it was speculated that the government wished to host a major meeting to increase its domestic standing.[38] Germany, on the other hand, was a committed NATO member, as it had shown in acquiescing to NATO planning for the Polish forces in Iraq, and was at this time trying to rebuild connections to Britain and the US after the Iraq Crisis, in part because Germany wanted greater NATO involvement in Afghanistan, where it co-lead ISAF.[39] However, the Franco-German axis was considered to be the core driver of EU integration, Germany had advocated for the "core Europe" concept previously, and France and Germany had in the previous months released a number of common positions in advance of the EU Constitutional Treaty discussions.[40]

It seems that Germany chose its alliance with France over concerns about weakening relations with Britain or the US, a trajectory possibly influenced by Schröder's electoral

---

[38] Dettke (2003). *The Future of Transatlantic Relations - A View from Germany*. Verhofstad's Open VLP party gained two seats (from 23 to 25) in the elections and formed a coalition with their Waloon sister party and the Flemish and Waloon Socialist Parties, each of whom also gained seats. This is comparable to the "wag the dog" use of foreign policy for domestic partisan gains. -----, (2004). "Cohen criticizes 'wag the dog' characterization", *CNN.com*. Washington, March 23, 2004.

[39] Umbach (2003). *The Future of the ESDP,* pg. 4.

[40] ------, (2003). "The old motor revs up again." December 5, 2003.

campaign. France's ability to sway Germany to its side could have been helped by Germany's tendency to emphasize the potential for the EU as an international actor – with a civil-military and peacekeeping veneer – over the strictly military NATO. For example, in 2005 when debating how to contribute airlift capacity to the African Union mission in Sudan, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands favored a NATO mission; France, Germany and Greece favored an EU mission.[41]

What place, then, did the Planning Cell have in this scheme? If the EUSD were to have any weight, and if it were to be a truly autonomous security community, it would have to have its own command and control capabilities. Although the Planning Cell would be a small unit, it would give the EU (or the EUSD) an autonomous planning capability and could be the foundation on which future growth would be built. This, of course, worried the United States, as it undermined the principle of Berlin Plus – that though the EU could operate separately from NATO, it would not be separated from the larger NATO umbrella. This fear was heightened by the solidarity clause; it suggested that the transatlantic security community might be fractured by an emerging EU-only security community.

The full evolution in the security structure of the EU, from the 1990s to the Mini-Summit, is presented below. As can be seen from these tables, the European Union gained capabilities in the shift from the Berlin Agreement to Berlin Plus. Under the plans from the Mini-Summit, the EU would gain a mutual defense agreement, but no additional areas of authority. Rather, the new EUSD would be able to run operations. Whether or not this would have increased the EU's security capabilities is a matter for debate. On the one hand, allowing the militarily capable states to run operations without the obstacle of gaining

---

[41] Varwick, Johannes and Koops, Joachim A. (2008). *The European Union and NATO: 'Shrewd interorganizationalism' in the making?*, in *The European Union and International Organisations*, Jørgensen, Editor. 2008, Routledge: London. 101-130, pg. 107.

consensus of all twenty-five member states (as of 2004) would increase the likelihood that a European group would undertake security missions. On the other hand, it would not be the EU running operations, but a subset of the EU.

It is interesting that in this evolution, the Berlin and Berlin Plus systems were established with the consent of the United States. The Mini-Summit, however, saw no US involvement and, as has been argued, was driven by factors within the EU. This suggests that the EU had developed to the point where its own institutional dynamics could shape the foundations of the European security system without the need for the United States to take part of the decision-making process, which would reduce the likelihood that the US could play a role other than accommodator.

System:	**Berlin Agreement**
Where system comes from:	1996 NATO ministerial meeting
States in favor:	NATO member states
Who runs operations?	• NATO • EU member states with NATO assets • WEU with NATO assets
How does the EU plan an operation?	It doesn't
Who has mutual defense agreements?	• NATO • WEU

System:	Berlin Plus
Where system comes from:	1999 Washington Summit and signed December 2002
States in favor:	NATO member states
Who runs operations?	• NATO • EU member states with NATO assets • EU with NATO assets
How does the EU plan an operation?	It uses NATO assets.
Who has mutual defense agreements?	• NATO • WEU

System:	European Union of Security and Defense
Where system comes from:	Mini-Summit, April 2003
States in favor:	France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg
Who runs operations?	• NATO • EU members states with NATO assets • EU with NATO assets • EUSD core group
How does the EU plan an operation?	It can use its own planning cell.
Who has mutual defense agreements?	• NATO • EU

DIPLOMACY AFTER THE MINI-SUMMIT

Almost immediately, the German position was shown to be less durable than what the Mini-Summit had implied. An article in the German news magazine *Focus* on May 5 revealed some of the divides within its political establishment. Schröder had wanted Blair to be present at the Summit "at all costs." His absence, as well as that of the leaders of the

Netherlands, Spain and Italy, was shown to be a snub by those countries to those at the Mini-Summit.[42] Schröder had been opposed on the Planning Cell by experts in the Defense Ministry. They "warned… that [the summit at] Brussels must not overstep a 'red line,' that is, no shifting of the basic lines of the common security policy in Europe – and no doubling of NATO and EU capabilities."[43] These warnings, reportedly made by the foreign and defense ministries in both Germany and France, were initially downplayed.[44] A German Cabinet Minister oddly stated that the summit and the EUSD "had a 'predominantly political impact to bring together France and Britain again' thus building a bridge to the United States."[45] Further, the government tried "to twist into shape" the Planning Cell from "obviously a parallel structure with NATO" to one that is no threat to the fundamentals of Berlin Plus. They argued that there would be only a "capability" to support DSACEUR in his capacity as commander of EU forces.[46] In Germany, dissension stemmed from fundamental disagreements on the future of European security. Although there has traditionally been support for European integration, there was respect for the "red line" of NATO supremacy and an aversion to crossing it.

The German position before and immediately after the Mini-Summit offers evidence of the American role in the debate. Though the US was not yet involved, member states anticipated their reaction, revealing the importance they attached to it. The divide in the German government stemmed from different predictions about the American reaction. Schröder, it seems, believed that the US would accommodate this latest regime, at it had

---

[42] -----, (2003). "Germany's efforts to heal rift with USA "half-hearted" - paper", *Focus*. Munich, May 5, 2003.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Grant (2003). *Resolving the rows over ESDP*, pg. 2.
[45] -----, (2003). "Germany's efforts to heal rift with USA "half-hearted" – paper." May 5, 2003.
[46] Ibid.

when the EU moved into new areas at Saint-Malo and Cologne. Although perhaps not in favor of EU initiatives, it would not oppose them. This belief was justified by the fact that much of what was proposed had previously been announced. Fischer and others in the German defense and foreign ministries opposed the Mini-Summit on the grounds that it crossed a "red line" for the US. This assumes that the US would have the power to either prevent this initiative or to inflict enough costs to make the Mini-Summit unfavorable to Germany, which suggests a role as a spoiler or a veto player. Their assumption that the US would be opposed to the plans of the Mini-Summit was correct. However, their assessment of the capacity of the US to influence the debate would not be validated until the final settlement, when it would be seen whether American demands were enough to derail the European process.

Britain and the United States immediately opposed the Mini-Summit's proposals. British officials were widely quoted as mocking the Mini-Summit and the Prime Minister went on record opposing it.[47] The US Secretary of State, in testimony to Congress, portrayed the Mini-Summit as creating "some sort of plan to develop some sort of headquarters" which distracted from the priority of "fleshing out of the structure and the forces that are already there."[48] Italy and other Atlanticist countries also opposed the Mini-Summit's proposals, and at the May 20 Gymnich (informal foreign ministers) meeting, they argued that these initiatives ought to be, at the very least, discussed at the level of the 25 Member and Accession States, and that the proposed European Security Strategy document should be drafted by High Representative Solana. This diverted the security momentum from the Gang

[47] Peacock, Mike (2003). "Blair slams EU defence plan, says glad to miss it", Reuters, April 30, 2003
[48] Sands (2003). "EU Plan draws rapid reaction," April 30, 2003.

of Four to the EU as a whole.[49]

However, there were reports that France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg were planning another meeting for September 9. To preempt this, Italy, holding the EU Presidency in the second half of 2003, called an informal meeting of defense experts for August 29 and asked member states for their views in advance of the meeting.[50] The British Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence produced a joint paper on July 30 which they circulated among the member states.[51] This represented the UK's official policy response to the Mini-Summit and their initial negotiating position leading into the meetings of the autumn and winter. It also articulates the points made by US officials at the time and can therefore be read as the unofficial position of the US in this dispute.

In the MoD/FCO "Food for Thought Paper," the authors began by reiterating the government's previous stance. They stated that "the key components of a successful ESDP are: a coherent CFSP; capabilities (military and civil) to conduct successful operations; the political will to use them; and effective processes for crisis management." This fitted with the existing trends of updating the Atlantic alliance to the post-Cold War era. The UK wished above all to focus on improving the capabilities of EU forces, which they termed of "fundamental importance," and offered a variety of options. The paper offered support for a solidarity clause in the Constitutional Treaty, "in response to the new challenges posed by terrorist attacks and by other disasters."[52] However, it concluded with support for "the

---

[49] WL: *03ROME2326: Opportunity for "upstream" coordination with EU on strategic concept*. Rome Embassy, May 27, 2003.

[50] WL: *03ROME3823: Italy supports US views on ESDP; EU Presidency will protect Berlin Plus on August 29*. Rome Embassy, August 22, 2003.

[51] Ministry of Defence/Foreign and Commonewalth Office, (2003). *ESDP 29 August Meeting: UK Food for Thought Paper*. London, July 30, 2003.

[52] Ibid.

agreement reflected in the Nice conclusions that NATO remains the basis of the collective defence of its members."[53]

It was on the issue of the institutional development proposed at the Mini-Summit that the Food for Thought paper was diametrically opposed to "core Europe." The section on institutions begins: "We regard the institutional arrangements agreed at Nice and the links to NATO agreed there and in Berlin Plus as the essential basis for ESDP. The test against which further institutional development must be judged is whether it would increase the EU's capacity for rapid and effective action, while maintaining the fundamentals of the agreed EU/NATO relationship." And although the paper does not explicitly rebuke structured cooperation and the Planning Cell for this reason, it does critique the need for innovation in those areas. It argues that in both cases, existing institutions are adequate. Regarding structured cooperation, the paper states that:

> In considering proposals for different forms of co-operation, it is worth recalling that, using the Nice arrangements, the Council has shown itself able to plan, agree, launch and conduct two military operations, one in particular at short notice. Not all member states were involved militarily, but all took part in the decision-making and it was open to all to offer contributions, based on their national and multi-national capabilities. These operations demonstrate the flexibility and potential of the Nice arrangements. The UK is therefore against proposals which would fundamentally alter the balance achieved at Nice, especially any which would imply competition, rather than complementarity, with NATO. We believe the range of options available (from constructive abstention through to providing forces on the ground, with many intermediate Stages: supporting but not participating; providing enablers; providing

[53] Ibid.

> headquarters staff officers) will mean the Nice arrangements can work effectively in an EU of 25.[54]

On the issue of the Planning Cell, the paper argues that:

> the operational experience of 2003 validates the agreed arrangements for planning operations. In Macedonia, where NATO experience and assets were needed, a Berlin Plus operation was right. In Bunia, a national HQ, backed up by national resources and expertise and reflecting the leading role of the nation concerned in the operation, was right. ESDP's key assets are: NATO's machinery, to which the EU has automatic access; national HQs, capable of multinationalisation; and the EUMS strategic capacity." Also, "given the cost and duplication involved in a permanent structure, the UK would not support a separate OHQ solely for autonomous EU operations.[55]

The British took a position of improving on the existing institutional framework rather than changing it. The methods of cooperation currently available within the EU, they argued, meant that structured cooperation was not necessary. And no separate Planning Cell was needed because the EU already had options for operational planning, as the EU missions in 2003 demonstrated. Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia used NATO assets and Operation Artemis saw the French national headquarters multinationalized into the EU's HQ. Additionally, the EU Military Staff had "strategic capacity" that it could lend to missions if necessary.

Building off this position, the UK paper offered an alternative to the Mini-Summit. As chair of the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) Project Group on headquarters,

---

[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.

the UK was working on ways to best expand national headquarters into EU headquarters when necessary.[56] The UK also proposed creating an EU Planning Cell, but as an element of the EU Military Staff, to be located at NATO headquarters in Belgium. The cell would provide a link between the EU and NATO and would support the headquarters for EU missions, whether they be located at NATO (as in Concordia) or national HQs (as in Artemis). It would "provide a cost-effective and inclusive way to link the EUMS with the expertise in-depth that only a working Headquarters can provide."

Going into the August 29 ESDP meeting, the UK had clearly issued a "challenge" to the French and German plans, as commentary in *Die Welt* classified it.[57] The Mini-Summit plan was based on a Franco-German motor of integration to be expanded to willing EU member states, as had happened for the euro, and an autonomous EU capacity for military action. The UK plan was based on the Nice/Berlin Plus framework of EU operations being discussed by the EU as a whole and executed by *ad hoc* coalitions using national or NATO resources for command and control.

Opposition to the Franco/German structure had been made evident during the June 2003 convention on the Draft Constitutional Treaty. Article III-213 of this version of the Treaty included the idea of a core Europe. It stated that member states "which fulfil higher military capability criteria and wish to enter into more binding commitments in this matter with a view to the most demanding tasks, hereby establish structured cooperation between themselves."[58] According to the second and third paragraphs in the article, when decisions needed to be made regarding structured cooperation, including entrance into it and matters

---

[56] ECAP was adopted at the 2001 Laeken European Council. It is a series of panels of military experts working in various subject areas to remedy European capabilities shortfalls.

[57] Ridderbusch, Katja (2003). "Blairopa", *Die Welt*. Berlin, August 26, 2003.

[58] Draft Constitutional Treaty Article III-213. July 18, 2003. http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf. Accessed December 1, 2011.

pertaining to it, only ministers representing states in structured cooperation could deliberate and vote. Structured cooperation had been included in the draft treaty, but it had been opposed bitterly by representatives from the UK, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Latvia.[59] The Food for Thought Paper indicated that the UK had not given up on fighting structured cooperation when the Draft Constitution was to be debated again in the fall and winter.

The British position was evidence of the institutional development of the 1990s. Although the debate was cast in the media as EU vs. NATO, the UK position embraced both organizations. The Food for Thought paper was not a repudiation of the EU as a security actor, but an affirmation of the EU's position under the Berlin Plus agreement. The UK supported the EU as a coordination point for non-NATO multilateral missions. The British security outlook, which had traditionally been seen as the defender of NATO within the EU, had already expanded and been Europeanized to include the existing version of ESDP. The UK here validates a historical institutionalist perspective of the EU. It had become embedded in the British security outlook to the point where the British government was defending the value of the EU from the French government intent on subverting it, as they saw it, with a vanguard. The debate was not about whether the EU would have a security identity, but rather what type of security structure it would have and what would be the most efficient use of EU resources, meaning that Saint-Malo and Cologne had reframed the terms and boundaries of the security debate.

---

[59] Howorth, Jolyon, (2004). "The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A Question of Flexibility," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **9**, pg. 5.

System:	Food for Thought Paper
Where system comes from:	UK Paper circulated August 2003
States in favor:	UK, USA. Sympathetic countries included Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Poland
Who runs operations?	• NATO • EU member states with NATO assets • EU with NATO assets
How does the EU plan an operation?	• NATO assets • Multinational headquarters • Virtual task force *(Italian proposal)*
Who has mutual defense agreements?	• NATO • WEU • EU has a solidarity clause

II: COMPROMISE

INITIAL APPROACH

The August 29 defense meeting in Rome was a turning point for this issue. Before this, France, Germany and Britain had staked out opposing and mutually contradictory positions. Afterwards, the Big Three worked towards a compromise that gained the approval of the European Council and the United States. According to Howorth, at this meeting "a number of misperceptions were dispelled" and "Blair, Chirac and Schröder set their 'sherpas' working on a trilateral compromise which was duly agreed at a summit in Berlin on September 20, 2003."[60] The three leaders there signed an agreement stating that: "We are together convinced that the European Union should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities. Our goal

[60] Howorth (2004). "The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A Question of Flexibility," pg. 7.

remains to achieve such a planning and implementation capacity either in consensus with the 25 (member states) but also in a circle of interested partners."[61] This statement indicates a possible move away from NATO and towards a possible vanguard group. However, the agreement was vague and did not ordain these choices nor favor a specific method toward this "joint capacity." The agreement's existence demonstrated that something had changed to bring the sides to the table but I disagree with Howorth that it was merely "misunderstandings" being dispelled.[62] This implies that positions had always been close and the parties needed only to realize it. Actually, the two sides shifted their positions during and after the August 29 defense meeting to make compromise possible.

The German Cabinet had been divided going into the Mini-Summit and was still divided afterwards. Towards the end of August, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and Defense Minister Peter Struck "had demanded the abandonment of the Tervuren plans."[63] Around this time, "highly placed German delegation members" at a foreign minister conference in Riva del Garda the week following the Rome meeting were openly wondering whether a separate headquarters would be at all useful, given how rarely the WEU had been employed.[64] The pressure on Germany had been increased by the UK Food for Thought paper, which was described in the *Guardian* on the morning of the Defense Ministers meeting as "deliberately intended to undercut the Franco-German-Belgian idea for an

---

[61] -----, (2003). "Insider notes from United Press International for September 22", *United Press International*. September 22, 2003.

[62] Howorth (2004). "The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A Question of Flexibility," pg. 7.

[63] BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (2003). "Pullout from Tervuren", *Der Spiegel*. Hamburg, October 6, 2003.

[64] Bulcke, Bernard (2003). "Louis Michel Deems EU Spport for Iraq Resolution Possible: Military Command Can Stay With United States", *De Standard*. Groot Bijgaarden, Belgium, September 8, 2003.

independent EU 'planning cell.'"[65] The UK expected to receive the backing of Italy, Spain, Ireland and most of the candidate countries.[66] Italy publicly stated its opposition to the Mini-Summit on September 20 and had privately been opposing it for months. Defense Minister Antonio Martino said that "We believe the EU should have an operational and planning mechanism. This does not necessarily mean giving birth to a new operational HQ which can be interpreted as an alternative to NATO or hostile to NATO."[67] In the face of opposition externally and internally, France and Germany played down what they had expected from the Mini-Summit. Diplomats from the "Tervuren Four" who spoke to the press lamented that the British had overreacted; "At first glance [the proposal from the summit] is little more than Berlin Plus" and "the British hopelessly overrate what will come from Tervuren."[68]

In public, no compromise was announced and, at the August 29 meeting, they stuck to their positions.[69] The Belgian Prime Minister insisted only a few days after the Rome Meeting that the Planning Cell would happen. "The European military command headquarters" was an "absolute necessity," he said. "The European Union must be up to planning and deploying such operations. Such an ability will be put in place next year at Tervuren. There cannot be the slightest doubt on this matter."[70] And though he described the

---

[65] Black, Ian (2003). "UK tries to head off plan for EU rival to Nato", *The Guardian*. London, August 29, 2003.

[66] -----, (2003), "Defence: EU military planning under discussion", *European Report*. Brussels, August 28, 2003.

[67] -----, (2003), "Defence: Italy against undermining NATO with EU headquarters", *European Report*. Brussels, September 20, 2003.

[68] Castle, Stephen (2003). "Britain aims to sideline Franco-German plan for separate EU military structure", *The Independent*. London, August 29, 2003.

[69] WL: *03ROME3976: Italy's EU Presidency - Italy satisfied with results of August 27 ESDP Meeting*. Rome Embassy, US Department of State, September 2, 2003.

[70] Subierski (2003). "US slams "chocolate makers," as Belgium stands firm on EU military", September 2, 2003.

UK plan of an EU cell in NATO as an "excellent proposal," he would not allow it to be an alternative to the Planning Cell at Tervuren. In response, a US State Department spokesman described the Mini-Summit as a meeting of "four countries that got together and had a little bitty summit" and reiterated the immediate opposition to the plan by the Secretary of State.[71] The NATO Secretary-General also weighed in during September to endorse the UK plan.[72] Meanwhile, Chirac and Schröder released a statement on September 18 which committed themselves to a defense union "so that the EU can emerge as a full and equal partner on the world stage."[73]

Howorth's analysis is that the Berlin Accord of September 20, which emerged from discussions begun at the August 29 Rome Meeting, "was a trade-off. In exchange for solid reassurances from Chirac and Schröder that structured cooperation would be neither exclusionary nor inimical to NATO, Blair dropped his opposition both to the proposal itself (in which, with misperceptions dispelled, he could actually detect great potential) and to the EU operational planning cell (which everybody knew was primarily symbolic)."[74] I disagree that it was quite so straightforward, not only because of the immense and fundamental disagreements caused by the Mini-Summit, but also because of the vagueness of the Berlin Accord and because future haggling over the details would be fierce. The September 20 agreement did not put an end to the issue and was not brokered simply because the two sides saw mutually advantageous territory.

---

[71] Ibid.

[72] Hill, Luke (2003). "Robertson blasts separate EU planning centre", *Jane's Defence Weekly*. September 10, 2003.

[73] -----, (2003). "Germany, France vow to press ahead with EU military", *Agence France Press*. September 18, 2003.

[74] Howorth (2004). "The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A Question of Flexibility," pg. 7.

Instead, it seems that all parties compromised because their first-choice scenarios were unlikely to occur and they were salvaging what they could. For France and Germany, the EUSD and a fully independent operational headquarters had elicited a furious backlash. The US was implacably against these plans and the UK's rival proposal seemed to have the support of NATO and the other large states in the EU. Should the UK succeed in placing the EU headquarters in NATO, Berlin Plus would be locked in further and the EU would continue to be a minor figure in the security sphere. Additionally, Germany had significant disagreement within its cabinet, which weakened its ability to withstand opposing pressure. For the UK, a separate EU defense body would do great harm to NATO and one that split up France and Britain would do great harm to ESDP. The logic of Saint-Malo and Le Touquet, according to Howorth, was of a strengthened Atlantic alliance through a strengthened European pillar. Although the British government stressed the primacy of NATO, they declared in a White Paper in September that "a flexible, inclusive approach and effective links to NATO are essential to the success of ESDP."[75] In other words, the British government would rather bend its original negotiating stance than to see ESDP deterred by dreams of French multipolarity. The Berlin Accord accepted the idea of a core group – "circle of interested partners" – and of some kind of independent planning capabilties. However, the details were left undetermined and the eventual agreement was still three months away from completion. At this stage, it was not clear which side's view of EU security structure would win out. De Wijk says that the Accord "did not lead to concrete

[75] UK Government White Paper on European Constitutional Treaty quoted in Payne (2003). *The European Security and Defence Policy and the future of NATO,* pg. 21.

results" and although the final agreement would be a compromise, it was still to be determined which underlying framework would be the basis for the policy.[76]

The Berlin Accord, while not definitive, demonstrated the growing strength of the EU in the security sphere. Although the two sides had fundamental disagreements, each, especially Blair and Schröder, considered it necessary to work through the issues rather than maintaining deadlock with rival policies, which might cripple the EU in the security sphere. The development of the EU throughout the late 1990s had expanded the preferences of national actors to include the proper functioning of the EU's security policy. Preferences had been shaped by the institution, which is an aspect of historical institutionalism. While in the few months captured in this case study preferences may be exogenous, it does demonstrate the strength of the institution in which the US is not included.

However, that the Berlin Accord was made by the Big Three, and only the Big Three, is evidence of the weakness of the Brussels-based EU in this area. It also perhaps opened the door to American influence. During the Balkan Wars, the Quint operated against the wishes of the Commission and, in the minds of many officials in Brussels, undermined the EU's legitimacy as a significant player.[77] Also, since issues were discussed with American involvement and only presented to the rest of the EU once consensus had been reached, the US acted as an unofficial member state. Should the security structure of the EU be determined informally in a kind of *directoire*, and should the US involve itself, another

---

[76] de Wijk (2004). "The Reform of ESDP and EU-NATO Cooperation," pg. 79.

[77] The word "Quint" was not allowed to be mentioned within the "walls of the Council of the European Union" and External Relations Commissioner Hans Van Den Broek termed it "harmful to the image of CFSP as a unitary policy." Gegout (2002). "The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US *Directoire* at the Heart of the European Union's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process," pp. 336 and 339.

Quint (or Quad, given Italy's exclusion from Berlin) might arise and the US, instead of being just a spoiler or veto player, could in fact be a policy entrepreneur.[78]

BUILDING ACCORD

The Berlin Accord of September 20 was leaked to *Der Spiegel* by a member of Schröder's staff, "infuriat[ing]" Blair's government.[79] The German government was said to be planning to present the accord as a "major concession" by the British. Blair's office had to immediately deny that there was any kind of retreat or that they had abandoned their previous "core policy of linkage to NATO."[80] The leak could have been designed to convince German audiences that the agreement was a foreign policy "win;" the German position was successful and the British had backed down. But the leak was also indicative that the Berlin Accord, though it began the path towards a settlement, did not in fact achieve it. The "joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO" could mean very different structures, not all of which would be a British concession. According to the British Food for Thought paper, a national headquarters could be augmented to sustain an EU operation when necessary. This would not clash with the principles of Berlin Plus. Under the Tervuren plan, though, the EU would be separated from NATO. How to reconcile these two, or whether they could be reconciled, was unclear.

Belgium and Italy both attempted to bridge the gap. Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt released a statement in the *Financial Times Deutschland* that the planning cell

---

[78] Hill, Christopher (2006). "The Directoire and the Problem of a Coherent EU Foreign Policy," *CFSP Forum (FORNET)*. 4(6). November 2006. 1-4.

[79] -----, (2003). "Insider notes from United Press International for September 22." September 22, 2003.

[80] -----, (2003). "Blair backed Franco-German plan for EU defence project: reports", *Agence France Presse*. September 22, 2003.

at Tervuren was not a necessity in the upcoming agreement, offering some flexibility on that issue.[81] Italy attempted to square the circle with a new idea. At a Defense Ministers meeting at Rome on October 3, the Italian Defense Minister Antonio Martino offered a "non-paper" calling for a virtual task force.[82] In this plan, a group of staff officers from a number of countries trained in operations planning would gather informally and, when an operation was being considered, would establish themselves at a national headquarters. That national HQ would serve as the EU operations center for the duration of that mission. At this meeting, the idea of an HQ at Tervuren was rejected by "several member countries."[83] Italian and Portuguese Defense Ministers were on record in saying that NATO must maintain preeminence and the German and Belgian ministers indicated their flexibility on how the operations center was to be structured.[84] The Franco-German plan of an independent HQ seemed to be losing ground to the position of the British, who greeted the Italian proposal as a "step in the right direction."[85] Italy also offered thoughts about the core group of defense, but these were received "more coolly" by British officials and did not seem to be the main thrust of the October 3 meeting.[86]

Alongside these maneuvers to find common ground, the US continued to oppose any kind of European separation from NATO. At an October 8 background briefing, a senior defense official and senior administration official (who was probably NATO Ambassador

---

[81] Bulcke, Bernard (2003). "Verhofstadt Removes Obstacle to EU Defense", *De Standard*. Groot Bijgaarden, Belgium, September 27, 2003.

[82] -----, (2003). "Italy offers compromise on EU military HQ", *Agence France Presse*. October 3, 2003.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Cole, Deborah (2003). "EU defense ministers aim to avert military HQ row at Rome meeting", *Agence France Presse*. October 3, 2003; Ames, Paul (2003). "EU seeks agreement on military headquarters", *Associated Press*. October 3, 2003.

[85] Castle, Stephen (2003). "Italy brokers deal to end EU defence rift", *The Independent*. London, October 3, 2003.

[86] Ibid.

Nicholas Burns) addressed the plans of the summit, saying that "we thought in March of this year, when we signed the Berlin Plus agreements, that we had it straight… But when the ink was barely dry, you had this summit on April 29 of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg and they said let's create an independent EU military headquarters, let's think about an Article 5-like clause for the EU constitution, let's think about our own SHAPE… That's a major challenge."[87] According to this briefing, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had ten bilateral meetings scheduled for the European tour he was on at the time, including sit-downs with defense ministers from the Czech Republic, Poland, the Netherlands, the UK, Norway, Germany and Turkey. He also raised the issue at an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers. US National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice called Blair's chief foreign policy aide Nigel Scheinwald to express the American position as well.[88]

Ambassador Burns was one of the most vocal and public advocates of the American position. At a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on October 15, he called a possible independent EU headquarters "one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship." He then called an extraordinary meeting of NATO Ambassadors the following week to discuss the issue.[89] NATO Supreme Allied Commander General James L. Jones also lent his voice. He said that "At a time when NATO is busy transforming itself to become more relevant for the 21st century, it would at the very least be a distraction and at the very most a diminution for parallel structures to exist."[90] NATO Secretary-General George Robertson, a

---

[87] The Senior Administration Official is called "Ambassador" by a member of the press and mentions that he sits at NATO everyday; -----, (2003). "Department of Defense background briefing (as released by the Pentagon)", *Federal News Service*. Washington, October 8, 2003.

[88] -----, (2003). "Britain firm against EU military HQ amid reported US dismay", *Agence France Presse*. October 16, 2003.

[89] Harding, Gareth (2003). "Analysis: U.S. stung by EU defence plan", *United Press International*. October 17, 2003.

[90] Ibid.

former British Cabinet member, attacked the Tervuren agenda, saying that Europe needed "more usable soldiers and fewer paper armies."[91] The US was concerned about "some EU member states' apparent willingness to modify Berlin-Plus so soon after it was agreed; the possibility that during the course of intra-EU horsetrading on the IGC, a country or set of countries could bend on security matters to get something else in return; and lack of clarity about the operational modalities of structured cooperation."[92] The United States opposed this endeavor, in part, because it might undermine the Atlantic alliance by subjecting it to the needs of the European Union. Although Berlin Plus was signed at NATO, four member states of the EU were able to reopen the issue a month after it was finalized, and the forum in which the matter would be solved was an EU Inter-Governmental Conference on an EU treaty. The final decision would be made in an EU setting and with EU logics, possibly isolated from American influence.

The Planning Cell, core group, and solidarity clause were raised at the October 16-17 European Council meeting. Discussions on the issue took place in the context of the development of the EU Constitutional Treaty. This treaty was considered the next step in the European integration project and, by being consciously equated to a Constitution rather than just another intergovernmental agreement, it was being billed as an important and symbolically significant step.

The idea for a Constitutional Treaty had emerged from a speech by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer on January 12, 1999. It gained momentum when he was echoed by

---

[91] Thurston, Michael (2003). "NATO chief swipes at "gang of four" over defence row", *Agence France Presse*. October 21, 2003.

[92] WL: *03ROME4841: Italy's EU Presidency: October 16-17 Council Readout; Way ahead on ESDP, IGC*. Rome Embassy, October 22, 2003.

leaders in France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands.[93] The annex of the Nice Treaty included a declaration for "a deeper and wider debate about the future of the European Union" and a decision at the December 2001 European Council at Laeken in Belgium called for a convention, chaired by former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, to prepare a draft for the next Intergovernmental Conference.[94] The Convention held twenty-six plenary sessions from February 28, 2002 to July 18, 2003.[95] Throughout the process, the Constitution held the press's attention across the EU, as nations analyzed the content and chances of the Treaty.[96] It was "the first self-conscious attempt to reflect on the nature of the public authority of the European Union."[97] The debate encompassed questions ranging from the nature of European history, such as whether Christianity should be mentioned in the text, to fundamental political divides, such as Europe as a political entity and the applicability of supranational or intergovernmental structures.[98] The Constitutional Treaty had been invested with great weight, expectation, and political significance.

---

[93] de Witte, Bruno (2001). "The Nice Declaration: Time for a Constitutional Treaty of the European Union," *The International Spectator*. **36**(1). January-March 2001. 21-30, pg. 25.

[94] Final Act, Treaty of Nice, Annex I.3. Laeken European Council, December 14-15, 2001, Presidency Conclusions Part I.3. Available from http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Prep.htm. Accessed December 1, 2011.

[95] The European Convention list of plenary sessions. http://european-convention.eu.int/sessplen_all.asp?lang=en. Accessed December 1, 2011.

[96] For example, -----, (2003). "EU constitution could cost the UK £2bn a year", *Scotsman on Sunday*. Edinburgh, June 22, 2003; Bouilhet, Alexandrine (2003). "Demain, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing va présenter le projet validé par la Convention; Premier test pour la Constitution (Tomorrow, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing will present the Draft approved by the Convention; First test for the Constitution)", *Le Figaro*. Paris, June 19, 2003.

[97] Röben, Volker, (2004). "Constitutionalism of the European Union after the Draft Constitutional Treaty: How Much Hierarchy," *Columbia Journal of European Law*. **10**(2). 339-378, pg. 342.

[98] Black, Ian (2005). "A journey without maps", *The Guardian*. London, May 26, 2005; Nicolaïdis, Kalypso, (2004). ""We, the Peoples of Europe..."" *Foreign Affairs*. **83**(6). November/December 2004. 97-110.

Although the Treaty was expected to be finalized by December, this deadline would be "a miracle," according to one source in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[99] Even Berlusconi, who chaired the meetings as the representative for the Italian Presidency, was skeptical it could be completed. This deadline, and the possibility of failure, gave the issue of the EU's security architecture a sense of urgency. There were strong internal EU pressures to find a suitable position within two months to create one less obstacle to the Treaty. At the October Council Meeting, "there was little movement on national positions and no formal agreements on key issues."[100] However, these positions give an indication on the state of play at the time.

Tervuren – as in a dedicated military command at that location – was dead, according to Italian sources, and had not been revived by either France or Germany. Yet there was a clear desire to have some kind of command facility. The Italians were studying their idea of a virtual task force. The UK idea of a planning cell at SHAPE was another alternative, but did not have the full support of Italy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs NATO Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi said "What we cannot accept is a prescription that mandates its establishment there."[101]

On structured cooperation, there was no definitive answer, but Italian officials stressed that the structured cooperation in the Draft Treaty was not France's idea of a European Union of Security and Defense. They believed that any agreement would be made at the level of the entire European Union, and might serve NATO's interests, by creating a body comprised entirely of NATO members, since it would be unlikely that neutral

---

[99] *03ROME4841: Italy's EU Presidency: October 16-17 Council Readout; Way ahead on ESDP, IGC*. Rome Embassy, October 22, 2003.
[100] WL: *03ROME4841: Italy's EU Presidency: October 16-17 Council Readout; Way ahead on ESDP, IGC*. Rome Embassy, October 22, 2003.
[101] Ibid.

countries like Ireland and Sweden would join.[102] In this sense, the core group would resemble the WEU, which had been merged with the EU in 1999 but which, during its independent existence, had never proved troublesome for NATO.[103] This possibility continued during the next stage of discussions on structured cooperation. In late October, one option was for structured cooperation be approved by the 25 Member and Accession Countries at the December Council Meeting, which would delegate to a core group of militarily capable member states the "authority to plan and carry out military operations."[104] These member states would be the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, with Poland and the Netherlands perhaps joining as well. Significantly, it seemed that this group would not only be in charge of the technical aspects of EU operations, but that they would be delegated the authority to choose operations. It was the first time American officials had heard about EU military operations being decided at any level other than the full 25 member states. This proposal was not yet solidified – it had not been decided whether this group would decide missions by consensus or Qualified Majority Voting – but it seemed like it was the product of a British, French and German decision.

At a meeting with the American Ambassador to Italy Mel Sembler, Italian Senate President Marcello Pera asked why Blair had changed his pledge "to stand firm against structured cooperation" and he emphasized that it would be difficult "for Italy to stand up and oppose any proposal that the UK had agreed with Germany and France," especially with the enormous pressure Italy, holding the Presidency, was facing to finalize the

---

[102] Ibid.

[103] The merging process lasted ten years, as offices were switched to the EU, or shut down, but major bodies had already been incorporated into the EU. The Treaty of Nice eliminated the mention of the WEU that was in the Treaty of Amsterdam; the Security Studies Institute and the Satellite Center were transferred to the EU on January 1, 2002.

[104] WL: *03ROME4907: Structured cooperation: New variations from Italy's EU Presidency*. Rome Embassy. October 28, 2003.

Constitutional Treaty by December.[105] Pera suggested that giving Spain and Poland a role in this select defense group may "get them to shift their hard stance on voting weights," the issue that would ultimately scupper the Treaty negotiations in December. Under the terms of the Nice Treaty, Spain and Poland were heavily overrepresented in the European Union. France, Germany and Italy wanted those countries' voting power to be reduced to a level commensurate with their population.[106] The US saw this as justifying their fears of European drift. The EU was considering breaking from Berlin Plus for reasons of internal EU time deadlines and horsetrading on a separate EU matter.

American concern was significant enough to merit a wide-spread lobbying campaign among EU states to "contain US jitters" after the first Berlin Accord.[107] British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that Britain would never support a separate EU operations body.[108] Blair said that "It must be absolutely clear that for NATO countries the basic territorial defense rests with NATO. Any structured cooperation, which we support in principle, has got to be agreed by all 25 of the countries."[109] The Belgian Foreign Minister claimed no interest in undermining NATO.[110] The Italian Foreign Minister related to the American Ambassador that discussion on structured cooperation "was a means to forming closer cooperation with NATO."[111] The German Defense Minister said that any EU planning

---

[105] Ibid.

[106] Spain had 46% of Germany's population, but 93% of its voting power and 66% of France's population but 93% of its voting power.

[107] Black, Ian and Wintour, Patrick (2003). "Straw sets limits to EU military plan", *The Guardian*. London, October 21, 2003.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Johnson, Ed (2003). "NATO must remain cornerstone of Britain's defense policy, Blair says", *Associated Press*. October 23, 2003.

[110] -----, (2003). "Belgian FM insists no plans to undermine NATO", *Agence France Presse*. October 26, 2003.

[111] WL: *03ROME5093: FM Frattini insists IGC security architectures are no threat to transatlantic*

cell should be attached to NATO – at least "for the time being" – and even French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie said that European defense was designed to "support NATO."[112]

In this stage of the dispute, the importance of the United States becomes more and more evident. It clearly attempted to shape the debate and persuade its closest allies within Europe, specifically Britain, Italy and Poland, to press its case within the Council. At the very least, this shows that it would not be a willing accommodator. More significantly, the actions of member states indicate that they naturally also believed the attitude of the US mattered. There would be no wide-spread lobbying campaign to assuage American "jitters" if those jitters were not seen as meaningful, giving credence to the concept of the US as a significant part of the European decision-making process. However, as we see the United States assume increasing visibility in this debate, we also see the institutional significance of the EU. The Constitutional Treaty is one of the most clear-cut cases of the EU having an effect on its member states. The Treaty was an EU project; the IGC provided a fast-approaching deadline; the conflation of the two issues meant that states were constrained on the security structure of the Atlantic because of their desire to proceed with European integration. These intra-EU dynamics and the importance acribed to them by member states were acting to exclude the US from these debates.

---

relations; predicts Constitution will be finished under Italian Presidency. Rome Embassy, November 12, 2003.

[112] Vinocur, John (2003). "German says EU planning unit should be attached to NATO; News Analysis", *International Herald Tribune*. October 27, 2003; -----, (2003). "France insists EU defence plans not against NATO", *Agence France Presse*. November 17, 2003.

FINAL STAGES

On November 28-29, 2003, the EU foreign ministers met in Naples to discuss, in part, the EU's security architecture. But the talks that really mattered had taken place in Berlin before the meeting, when officials from France, Britain and Germany met to "[define] the basis of a proposal," in the words of French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, to be presented to the rest of the EU.[113] Presentation did not happen at Naples because the proposal was leaked to *Le Monde* and British diplomats were "struggling to convince the different players in Washington that their accord with Paris and Berlin [did] not threaten Nato."[114]

European lobbying towards the United States was extensive. Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini invited Secretary Powell to a working lunch of EU Foreign Ministers on November 18.[115] It was also, perhaps surprisingly, effective. Blair spoke with President Bush over the phone about the discussions and "according to some diplomats, as a result of his communication with Mr. Blair, Mr. Bush persuaded Mr. Rumsfeld to say nothing hostile about the European defense plan at the NATO meetings, especially in public."[116] Whether or not there was a Presidential order, the hawkish Secretary Rusmfeld, who had coined the phrase "old Europe" and had become a favorite of soundbite-seeking journalists, was diplomatic at a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels on December 1 & 2. Rumsfeld said that he was "confident that things will sort through in a way that we have an

---

[113] Joshi, Jitendra (2003). "EU "big three" agree on military planning wing", *Agence France Presse*. November 28, 2003.

[114] Castle, Stephen (2003). "Straw is left red-faced after leak of deal over military headquarters for EU", *The Independent*. London, November 29, 2003.

[115] WL: *03ROME5665: Italy's EU Presidency has uneven success but delivers on U.S. security interests*. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2003.

[116] Sciolino (2003). "The Great Divide: The U.S. and Europe Stretch to Close It." December 8, 2003.

arrangement that is not duplicative or competitive with Nato."[117] When asked further about the issue, he avoided the bait, and said that the matter was "above [his] pay grade," which, coming from one of the most powerful Cabinet members, leaves few options other than Presidential involvement.[118] The President himself was also diplomatic, saying that he trusted Blair to be "true to his word" not to undermine NATO. The NATO Secretary-General added to this message, offering that "I can't imagine anything being agreed by Prime Minister Blair in London that would undermine the integrity, strength and preeminence of Nato as the security organization of first choice."[119]

This bout of transatlantic cordiality led up to the official release of the Anglo-Franco-German proposal. The document was drafted by high-level officials from Britain, Germany, France and Italy and released by the Italian Presidency as "European Defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning and operations."[120] The proposal followed the principles of the September Berlin Accord and most of the technical aspects of the November tripartite plan. In that plan, as published by *Le Monde*, Blair, Chirac and Schröder largely agreed on the three contentious aspects: the planning cell, structured cooperation, and the mutual defense clause. First, because the UK opposed the term "European headquarters," the proposal spoke of "capacity to plan and conduct operations."[121] The EU would have a permanent planning cell at SHAPE, to coordinate EU missions which use NATO resources

---

[117] Castle, Stephen (2003). "Rumsfeld sidesteps showdown with EU over defence plan", *The Independent*. London, December 2, 2003.

[118] Sciolino (2003). "The Great Divide: The U.S. and Europe Stretch to Close It." December 8, 2003.

[119] Ibid; Castle (2003). "Rumsfeld sidesteps showdown with EU over defence plan", December 2, 2003.

[120] Prime Minister Berlusconi's "senior diplomatic advisor" Giovanni Castellanata who was described as the equivalent of the American National Security Advisor, was involved in the meetings. WL: *03ROME5665: Italy's EU Presidency has uneven success but delivers on U.S. security interests*. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2003.

[121] Description of the November plan are from Zecchini, Laurent (2003). "Paris, Londres et Berlin sont parvenus à un compromis sur la défense européenne (Paris, London and Berlin have reached a compromise on European defense)", *Le Monde*. Paris, November 29, 2003.

under Berlin Plus. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) in Brussels would be enlarged and given an operational dimension. It would conduct "early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning" for the EU through the efforts of a newly created cell with a civil/military identity.[122] The EUMS would be able to plan EU missions that did not use NATO assets and civilian responses to crises. And while most operations would use either NATO or national headquarters, the new civil/military cell could be transformed into a temporary operations center if necesary.

The paper that was produced by this agreement dealt only with consultation between NATO and the EU – declaring NATO to be "the forum for discussion and the natural choice for an operation involving the European and American allies" – and the planning cell.[123] It did not address structured cooperation or the mutual defense clause, which would be determined by the text of the Constitutional Treaty. However, these issues had been also decided at the Second Berlin Summit, according to reports. On structured cooperation, the November plan created a pioneer group of countries, whose membership was to be decided by the full Council. On the mutual defense clause, the proposal accepted a statement in which member states would be called to help others that are subject to armed aggression, but explicitly stated that NATO "remained, for those States which are members of it, the foundation of their collective defense."

This November agreement was a prelude to the final agreement. This was settled at the December 12 and 13 European Council meeting, whose main task was to approve the EU Constitutional Treaty. Ultimately, the Treaty was delayed, torpedoed by unrelenting

---

[122] -----, (2003). *European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations. Joint Paper by France, Germany and the United Kingdom - Naples, 29 November 2003*, in *From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defence: core documents*, Missiroli, Editor. 2003, EU Institute for Security Studies: Paris. 283-284.

[123] Ibid.

positions on voting weights and the IGC was described by the Belgian Foreign Minister as "a failure, a resounding failure."[124] However, the issue of the security architecture of the EU was resolved.

On the issue of the planning cell, the Italian Presidency presented the tripartite paper verbatim to the Council, which approved it. On structured cooperation, the full Council would decide by qualified majority voting which member states could participate in the advanced group according to strict criteria on military capabilities. On mutual defense, the compromise agreement read:

> If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.[125]

This was weaker than the July version, which had mentioned "military" means that member states could use to aid each other. This version specifically underscored the importance of NATO and also gave the countries non-aligned with military alliances an opt-out ("shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain

---

[124] Cole, Deborah (2003). "EU leaders put brave face on constitution debacle", *Agence France Presse*. December 13, 2003.

[125] See Document CIG 60/03, ADD 1, PRESID 14, Brussels, 9 December 2003; http://ue.eu.int/igc/index.asp, Accessed June 4, 2011.

Member States"), a move necessary after neutral foreign ministers opposed the clause in October 2003.[126] The resulting structure is summarized below.

System:	**IGC settlement**
Where system comes from:	December 2003 European Council decisions based on Anglo-Franco-German meetings.
States in favor:	EU member states. USA did not oppose.
Who runs operations?	• NATO • EU member states with NATO assets • EU with NATO assets • Structured cooperation group.
How does the EU plan an operation?	• NATO assets • Multinational headquarters • Temporary civil/military planning cell at EUMS as a last resort
Who has mutual defense agreements?	• NATO • WEU • EU has a solidarity clause

Although the IGC meeting devolved into blame-shifting and spin, attributing the failure to sign the Draft Constitutional Treaty either to Berlusconi's opening jokes about Schröder's ex-wives, the Polish Prime Minister's refusal to reconsider voting weights, or the unyielding negotiating stance of Chirac, the issue of the security structure of the EU – seemingly solved by Berlin Plus and then thrown into confusion by the Mini-Summit – was settled. The US, Britain, France, Germany and the rest of the EU were satisfied with the conclusion and accepted it.[127]

---

[126] Caballero-Bourdot, Corine (2004). *The common security and defence policy in the draft EU Constitutional Treaty*. Secretariat-General of the Assembly of the Western European Union: Brussels; Salmon (2005) "The European Security and Defence Policy: Built on Rocks or Sand?," pg. 364.

[127] Black, Ian (2003). "Inside Europe", *The Guardian*. London, December 22, 2003.

This final compromise is interesting because it was not a trade-off, but a watering down of the Mini-Summit. Comparing the summaries of the proposals presented above, the Mini-Summit offered the following options for who runs EU operations: NATO; EU member states with NATO assets (as under the Berlin Agreement); EU with NATO assets (as under Berlin Plus); EUSD core group. Under the final agreement, the arrangement is: NATO; EU member states with NATO assets (as under the Berlin Agreement); EU with NATO assets (as under Berlin Plus); Structured cooperation group. The arrangements were the same except that the EUSD became the less exclusionary and, according to Blair, less advanced permanent structured cooperation group. A similar shift happened on the mutual defense agreement, which was downgraded to a solidarity clause, and the planning cell. Instead of a fully operational, autonomous planning cell, the EU was endowed with a civil/military planning cell, which could be an operations center if NATO and member states passed on a mission, and a cell at NATO, which linked the EU closer to the Atlantic alliance. The British did not upload the policy preferences of their Food for Thought paper, which did not have these innovations (although there was acceptance of some kind of a solidarity clause and an EU cell at SHAPE). Instead, the final agreement was a weakened version of the original French and German positions.

This final arrangement seems like poor negotiating from the British. The Mini-Summit's positions drew the opposition of most member states, including the holders of the Presidency in the latter half of 2003, as well as the United States. The German government was divided. Presumably, the British had much greater leverage in this situation, but they agreed to the outlines of the French and German position. One way to explain this seeming contradiction is that the British saw the final arrangement as containing nothing they had opposed, while cloaked in the language of the Mini-Summit. One British official remarked

that "the whole Ops Centre concept represents a great diplomatic triumph for the UK: we have very magnanimously given Paris an empty room."[128] Another line was that "planners will never do more than polish paper clips under Nato guard."[129] This operations center was not even a full military headquarters. By giving it a civil/military identity, Britain thought of "drowning the Union's strategic potential in civilian waters" as well as giving it a differentiated role from NATO and the member states. One of the key red lines for the US after Saint-Malo was that the EU not duplicate NATO. By pushing the EU towards a civilian and humanitarian role, the UK was now preventing this line from being crossed. On structured cooperation, the British prevented what they had truly feared: France and Germany forming a separate group that took resources from NATO and ESDP. By degrading the EUSD to structured cooperation of which the UK would be a part, little changed. The UK would still be in the core group, along with Italy and Spain, opposing the shift away from NATO. The permanent structured cooperation group would include the bulk of the EU's military resources. The Big Three plus Italy and Spain accounted for 76% of the EU's military spending in 2003; with Poland and the Netherlands, the group would total 83%.[130] The distinction between the permanent structured cooperation group and ESDP would be minimal. And on the mutual defense clause, they ensured that NATO's primacy was specifically mentioned.

France and Germany also saw the final deal as gaining the essence of their national demands. For Germany, the civil/military cell played into their vision of an EU that

---

[128] Simón (2010). *Command and Control? Planning for EU military operations,* pg. 22.

[129] Black (2003). "Inside Europe," December 22, 2003.

[130] The EU had total military spending of $286 billion, in 2009 dollars. The permanent structured cooperation group had spending of $218 and the expanded group spent $236 billion. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2011). *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*. Available from: http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2010.xls. Accessed October 21, 2011

emphasizes civilian power, which allows it to avoid domestic opposition to deploying the German armed forces overseas and the historical baggage of German military operations.[131] Germany also favored the compromise, not least because it had never entirely embraced the Tervuren plan. Although Schröder believed in the proposals of the April summit, his foreign minister, defense minister, and high-level officials in both departments opposed the plans. The German government therefore could view a compromise as a win – since it avoided domestic schism – that its partner France saw as a loss. And though the final plan was not the EUSD nor a separate, fully operational military headquarters, France received enough to declare victory. The UK thought it had given France an empty room, but it was a room nonetheless. One French official said that "the Civ/Mil cell was just a façade; the real thing was the Ops Centre, but we could not get a permanent structure due to lack of political support."[132] Still, it was a step forward on the road to a fully autonomous capability. Further, the UK had agreed to structured cooperation, a novel innovation away from Berlin Plus and ESDP, and agreed to an independent capability for the EU. If the neofunctionalist logic of Ernst Haas were correct, the spillover effect from civil/military to purely military operations might lead the EU to gaining the independent capabilities originally desired by the Mini-Summit. France hoped to use this as a foundation and to capitalize on the sentiment expressed by Ian Black of *The Guardian* after the December Council Meeting: "the bargaining never really stops."[133]

So far, this section has largely maintained a Rational Actor-based analytical approach, with Blair, Chirac and Schröder as the actors and their preferences outlined in

---

[131] They were in fact disappointed that France insisted on putting the Cell in EUMS and having a military officer in charge. Simón (2010). *Command and Control? Planning for EU military operations*, pg. 18.

[132] Ibid, pg. 22.

[133] Black (2003). "Inside Europe," December 22, 2003.

their competing proposals released in the Mini-Summit and Food for Thought paper. Strategic choice focuses more on the interaction, which in this case has one salient and interesting aspect: the membership and venue of the bargains. Although this was an EU arrangement, it was determined by the Big Three acting as a *directoire*. There are two ways to analyze this choice, either for the logic of appropriateness or the logic of consequences. A logic of appropriateness approach states that actors make decision in accordance with existing norms of behavior.[134] In this case, it could be that when a major issue involves the EU, Blair, Chirac and Schröder preferred to operate independently. There is precedent for such actions. During the Balkan Wars, the response was originally coordinated by the Quad (UK, France, Germany and the US) and after September 11, 2001, Blair invited Chirac and Schröder to a dinner to discuss the EU's plans.[135]

It was also clear that such an arrangement was effective, as the Italian Senate President admitted that it would be difficult for Italy to oppose any Anglo-German-French agreement.[136] With the deadline of the December 2003 ICG looming, each side was interested in speedy resolution to this issue. Further, each side needed resolution. Britain did not wish for France and Germany to split ESDP, while France and Germany could see that the proposal was not being accepted by the Atlanticist countries in the EU. It was better for Britain to tie France back to the full EU membership and better for France to ensure that some of the Mini-Summit was passed. Looking to national interests, a rationalist logic of consequences might also recommend an exclusive series of summits to resolve the issue.

---

[134] March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. (2004). *The logic of appropriateness*. Arena Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo: Oslo.

[135] Oliver, Tim and Allen, David (2006). *Foreign Policy*, in *The Europeanization of British Politics*, Bache and Jordan, Editors. 2006, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 187-200, pg. 194.

[136] WL: *03ROME4907: Structured cooperation: New variations from Italy's EU Presidency*. Rome Embassy, October 28, 2003.

Each nation can communicate their preferences with a minimum of competing demands. The role of the US in this informal and exclusive setting is uncertain and to discover it requires investigation of the actions and attitudes of its participants.

III: CONCLUSIONS

This episode began, ended, and was, throughout its duration, punctuated with intergovernmental meetings to which the United States was not a party. This suggests that EU dynamics would play a significant role in the causality of the narrative, and this is, to a great extent, true. The first and most prominent way in which the EU featured in this case is how each interested member state was trying to upload its own preference for the EU's security posture. France publicly claimed to want a militarily capable autonomous EU. Germany wanted a capable civil/military actor. Britain wanted an EU that could take on those missions in which NATO opted not to engage. At every point during the dispute, the goal was to have one's policies adopted by the EU; the planning cell compromise was decided by the European Council and structured cooperation and the solidarity clause would be part of the Constitutional Treaty, signed by the heads of government of all member states and even submitted to national parliaments or referenda.

Having the EU as the subject and forum of the debate reduced the ability of the US to enter the process. The US tried to compensate by shifting the forum to NATO. The US Ambassador to NATO and the NATO Secretary-General were two of the most vocal opponents of the Tervuren plan. Burns also called a meeting of NATO Ambassadors in October to discuss the plan. Constantly invoking NATO would change the themes of the discourse from a solely internal EU debate to a wider conversation about Europe within the

Atlantic alliance. In that debate, the United States, as superpower and ally, would have a major impact. Instead of just being about European capabilities, as Saint-Malo and Le Touquet had been, in which the United States had a minor, exhortatory role to play, it became a question of reneging on Berlin Plus, for which the US had been a signatory and leading negotiator. However, this was largely unsuccessful and the major decisions were made at the trilateral Berlin meetings and subsequently at the IGC in Rome, not at NATO.

The EU determined many of the time pressures of the episode. From the very beginning, the Mini-Summit was concerned with May 1, 2004, the day on which ten new member states were to enter the EU. There is a strong reason to believe that the coming accession drove French desire for the streamlined EUSD. It would offer a French-led European defense force safe from the incoming member states who looked to the United States for security. These states were less concerned about force projection and multipolarity than protection against the power plays of a Russia less than fifteen years removed from dominating their politics (as with Poland and Hungary) or directly governing them (as with the Baltic states).[137] The projected Atlanticist shift within the EU shaped the policies that France was advocating and affected the politics of France, since they began the debate so that there would be enough time to establish the EUSD and planning cell before May 1, 2004.

Time played a significant role in the final agreement in December 2003. US embassy cables from Rome repeatedly stress the enormous pressure Italy was under to finalize the Draft Constitutional Treaty at the December 12-13 Intergovernmental Conference. The Constitution was to be a major achievement for Europe; its failure to pass in December 2003 would be a tremendous disappointment for the EU and for the country holding the

[137] -----, (2003). "When east meets west", *The Economist*. London, November 20, 2003.

Presidency. Berlusconi wanted the prestige of having the second founding of Europe be a second Treaty of Rome. Neither Italy, nor any other member state, wished to further jeopardize the Constitutional Treaty. The treaty, leaders had to assume, would pass by the end of the year. Since structured cooperation was in the June 2003 draft, any failure to negotiate would leave that mechanism in the final version. That gave a real impetus for Britain to at least try to come to terms with France and Germany. Britain's preferred policy arrangement, as articulated by the Food for Thought paper, was the status quo. Yet it was not able to delay and obstruct the Franco-German plans, since there was a deadline, after which it would likely be in the Constitution, and Blair would have been faced with accepting an unacceptable policy or vetoing a Europe-wide treaty years in the making. The Constitution provided an effect similar to negative integration in a Europeanization framework. Though it did not prescribe a single policy for Britain, it did close off one likely policy pathway. As well as the potential issue linkages to other matters, such as voting rights for Spain and Poland, the Treaty showed that the EU had become the locus for action. Matters touching on the Atlantic alliance, though discussed at NATO, were determined at the IGC.

These points show the growth of the EU and its importance to the course of the episode, but neither the EU nor a European body determined the final agreement. Rather, Britain, France and Germany made agreements without consulting the other member states or the High Representative. It is telling that the foreign ministers congregating at Riva del Garda learned of the Second Berlin Accord through a leak to *Le Monde*. But although the issue was resolved outside of European structures, the discussions were situated in the context of the EU. For example, France's strategy was shaped by the solid opposition within the full EU, which limited its bargaining position and suggested that a compromise was

necessary. That a *directoire* was the venue for resolution does not mean that the *directoire* was untouched by the effect of the EU nor, possibly, the US.

The United States was never fully excluded from the debate, even without access to the crucial meetings. Blair called Bush repeatedly to assure him of the final agreement's compatibility with NATO. "Washington concerns" were often mentioned as a possible obstacle to any compromise. Frattini invited Powell to an EU foreign ministers meeting. The US took action to connect the Mini-Summit debate to the Atlantic security community. It "held the transfer of SFOR [Stabilization Force-Bosnia and Herzegovina] hostage due to Washington's concerns about the Tervuren proposal and the direction of ESDP."[138] The transfer of the operation from NATO to EU control had previously been agreed, but was delayed for a year by the US. Although this was not an explicit punishment for the Mini-Summit, it demonstrated American unwillingness to cede control to an autonomous EU and an insistence that EU missions be run under Berlin Plus.[139]

The United States entered into the politics of the debate by assembling a coalition against the Franco-German plans. The US Embassy in Rome, discussing the developing European Security Strategy, which had been given to Solana in part to cut off the Tervuren mood, recommended coordinating "key ideas with like-minded EU members (UK, Italy, Spain, etc)."[140] On this document, Italy and the UK lobbied Solana to ensure that NATO would be mentioned as the primary guarantor of transatlantic security.[141] The US could still

---

[138] DeCamp (2005). *ESDP: NATO's Demise or Opportunities for NATO?*, pg. 8

[139] The EU indicated willingness to take over the mission in December 2002 and the UK and France proposed it at Le Touquet, but NATO did not reach consensus on a concept for the EU mission until December 2003. Kim, Julie (2006). *Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping*. Congressional Research Service: Washington, DC, December 5, 2006, pg. 2.

[140] WL: *03ROME2326: Opportunity for "upstream" coordination with EU on strategic concept*. Rome Embassy, May 27, 2003.

[141] Ibid.

exploit the division within the EU over Iraq and use its friends as vehicles for their interests and to oppose the Franco-German initiative – even suggesting that a counter-conference of these countries be organized after the Mini-Summit.[142] By pulling the issue back to the level of all 25 member states, the US could employ the Atlanticist accession countries. And the good relations between the US and these countries meant that the US was even invited to contribute to their response at the August 29 meeting.[143]

In these ways, the United States tried to act as a spoiler. It actively attempted to prevent the Mini-Summit's proposals from being realized. Yet the players involved did not treat it as a spoiler. Towards the end of the episode and after the first Berlin Accord, European ministers and diplomats assured the United States that the agreement would not damage NATO. Blair consulted with Bush multiple times. These actions imply that American approval or acquiescence was considered necessary before the plans were agreed upon and that the US was a veto player. In the end no veto was used and the US accommodated EU plans. This could be indicative that the United States' veto potential was not as absolute as the media may have presented it.

The United States had their interests represented most visibly by the UK and the Italian Presidency, who, in the words of an American diplomat, "while likely to be less forceful than the UK, will not go wobbly."[144] However, this meant that the US was dependent on these countries. The United States could publicly speak against European initiatives and it could lobby within NATO, but ultimately the decision on ESDP would be

---

[142] WL: *03ROME1834: ESDP Mini Summit - Frattini will come out swinging at Gymnich*. Rome Embassy, April 30, 2003.

[143] WL: *03ROME3382: Italian EU Presidency on August 29 ESDP Meeting*. Rome Embassy, July 24, 2003.

[144] WL: *03ROME4841: Italy's EU Presidency: October 16-17 Council Readout; Way ahead on ESDP, IGC*. Rome Embassy, October 22, 2003.

made within the EU. Because the US was not a part of the EU, its influence could not, it seems, penetrate entirely to the realm of Council meetings and Treaty horsetrading. The US relied upon friends in the EU, especially the UK, to protect its interests. Should the UK choose not to do this, American influence was greatly diminished. Its "veto" would have to be played in a separate venue important to Britain, such as a vague but unwelcome warning of decreased amity in transatlantic relations. The United States has shown itself willing to oppose Britain, for example, over the International Criminal Court or during the Suez Crisis. But the Berlin Accords existed on the margins of accepted Anglo-American positions. Both countries had the same goal: developing EU capabilities within the Atlantic alliance. Their differences came when the UK decided at Berlin that a compromise with France and Germany was the best way to accomplish this, whereas Washington was initially skeptical. Yet even if Washington strongly disagreed with the British calculation, it had limited options. The US could have opposed the measure, lobbying against its strongest allies in the EU, burning bridges and giving credence to the suspicion that the US was opposed to all attempts at EU defense.[145] Or it could have accepted the measure, trusting that the UK would not completely abandon their overall goals. It is interesting that, though the US lobbied for its own position when the issue was still up for debate, when the final decision was being made, both President Bush and Secretary-General Robertson appealed to Blair's trustworthiness in signaling their acceptance for the plan.

But however constrained the US veto was, American officials believed themselves to have "won" this episode. A diplomatic cable from Rome after the IGC said that Italy "deliver[ed] on U.S. security interests," in "keeping the EU's defense and security policy in

---

[145] WL: *03ROME5093: FM Frattini insists IGC security architectures are no threat to transatlantic relations; predicts Constitution will be finished under Italian Presidency*. Rome Embassy, November 12, 2003.

accord with NATO and the Berlin-Plus agreement."[146] This does not seem like the attitude of an accommodator or an unsuccessful spoiler, who is forced to swallow unpalatable policies. Rather, it seems like a successful veto player whose implicit threats helped preserve the core of its aims. American veto power may not have been absolute – especially since it took months to bring the Mini-Summit's proposals in line with Berlin Plus – but the constant communication with the US, mention of "red lines," and implication of a constraint on EU decision-makers' choices, show that though it was not an official part of the deliberations, it certainly played a role. Given the many EU pressures leading to the Mini-Summit and driving the episode discussed at the start of this section, this role seems significant, since it was working against strong European and institutional logics.

[146] WL: *03ROME5665: Italy's EU Presidency has uneven success but delivers on U.S. security interests*. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2003.

CHAPTER 4

GALILEO SATELLITE SYSTEM

The second case study of this thesis revolves around the political agreements needed for the creation of the Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). This was intended to be the European equivalent of the American Global Positioning System, the first and, at the time of the episode and of the writing of this thesis, only functional worldwide satellite navigation system. To develop Galileo, the member states of the European Union and the European Space Agency authorized spending more than a billion euros in a series of decisions from 1999 to 2003. They also signed an agreement with the United States in 2004 to make Galileo and GPS complementary and to avoid conflict with the US.

Before beginning the narrative, it is necessary to explain why this case, about a technological endeavor that would be used in aviation, research, and consumer products belongs in a study of the foreign and security policy of the EU. First, while Galileo was an EU project, it was also the subject of numerous international negotiations. Besides the agreement with the United States, the EU sought investment from and cooperation with China, India, South Korea, Israel, Japan and others.[1] Galileo drove the EU to create a strategy on politically sensitive issues including technology transfer, which is the center of the third case study, the role of NATO, the focus of the first case study, and satellite-based military systems, which were crucial for Western military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

---

[1] ------, (2001). "EU, China agree to cooperate on Galileo satellite system", *Der Spiegel*. Hamburg, September 24, 2001; Asaba, Harumasa (2003). "U.S.-EU GPS rivalry puts Japan in difficult position", *The Daily Yomiuri*. Tokyo, November 21, 2003.

Second, Galileo is an example of one way in which the EU may become a global political force. Galileo, as a dual-use system, has both civilian and military capabilities. Though it originated with funding from the Transport Council, officials from across the EU admit that it could be used for military purposes.[2] This spillover process, from civilian to military functions via dual-use projects, can be seen in military engagement, which was first accepted for humanitarian operations under the Petersberg Tasks. Commercial policy has become part of the foreign policy of the EU, since the Commission has used its leverage in trade negotiations to press for domestic reforms in negotiating partners, blurring the lines between the economic and political.[3] Third, Galileo has been explicitly described as a military asset for Europe. A Commission information note in 2002 stated that "Galileo will underpin the common European defense policy."[4] Galileo would be a jointly controlled security asset, giving the EU latent capability to conduct operations, similar to how Berlin Plus and 2003 IGC arrangements in the previous chapter were not military operations in themselves, but necessary precursors to any future engagements.

Timeline of Galileo Episode

June 17, 1999	Transport Council approves Definition Phase (€40m)
Dec 21, 2000	Transport Council fails to approve Development Phase
Oct 2001	US-EU negotiations begin
Dec 1, 2001	Wolfowitz sends letters to Defense Ministers
Dec 6	Transport Council fails to approve Development Pahse
Mar 26, 2002	Transport Council approves Dev. Phase (€500m)
June 17	Cooperation with China announced
Nov 19, 2003	EU moves on M-code overlay
June 28, 2004	US-EU cooperation agreement signed

---

[2] WL: *02ROME715: GoI slowly shifting to military role for Galileo*. Rome Embassy, February 13, 2002.

[3] Meunier, Sophie and Nicolaïdis, Kalypso (1999). "Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **37**(3). September 1999. 477-501, pg. 478.

[4] Quoted in Booker, Christopher (2004). "Satellite Wars: How to lose old friends", *Sunday Telegraph*. London, September 26, 2004.

I: FUNDING GALILEO

THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN SATELLITE SYSTEM

Satellite systems began with GPS. Created by the US military in the 1970s to position intercontinental ballistic missiles, GPS was opened to civilian use in 1983 by President Reagan after Korean Air Lines Flight 007 strayed into Soviet airspace and was shot down.[5] GPS satellites were launched from 1989 and the full constellation of 24 satellites was completed in 1993. GPS's utility was proven in the Gulf War, when it helped the coalition perform its "left hook" maneuver through trackless desert and guided precision bombs to their targets. It then became an integral part of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that was propelling the US military's technological advantage in the post-Cold War era. Although the Soviet Union had their own system, GLONASS (GLObal NAvigation Satellite System), it fell into disrepair during the Russian economic crises of the 1990s. By 2001, only a quarter of the satellites were operational and it was not a viable system, leaving GPS the only functional GNSS. It was used by NATO militaries and an increasing number of civilian applications.

Notwithstanding satellite navigation's superpower heritage, the politics leading up to the full funding of Galileo was the result of dynamics within the EU, excluding the United States from the decision-making process. In May 1994, the European Commission released a report titled "Europe and the Global Information Society: A Report to the European Council," colloquially known as the Bangemann Report.[6] This report observed that satellites were the building blocks of the modern economy, necessary for both communication and

---

[5] -----, (1983). "U.S. will give world its new air navigation system", *Philadelphia Inquirer*. Philadelphia, September 18, 1983.

[6] Bangemann, Martin et. al., (1994) *Europe and the global information society: Recommendations of the high-level group on the information society to the Corfu European Council (Bangemann group)*.

transportation coordination. Later that year, the Council of Transport Ministers, at the European Civil Aviation Conference, directed relevant parties to formulate a plan to contribute to a satellite system. In January 1998, the Commission released the communication "Towards a Trans-European Positioning and Navigation Network: including a European Strategy for a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)." This called for European contribution to the next generation of satellite navigation, either as part of a global effort, with a select number of partners, or independently.[7]

In 1999, the Commission released another report, "Galileo: Involving Europe in a new Generation of Satellite Navigation Services."[8] This was the first report to recommend a European-run satellite system and to name the project "Galileo." In December 1999, the European Space Agency joined with the Commission and released funds for the Definition Phase of Galileo, the part of the development process at which fundamental questions of design and purpose were to be asked. In the €80 million study, the ESA and Commission investigated who would pay for Galileo, who would build it, what would be the optimal technical requirements for Galileo, and how it would fit into the existing landscape of satellite systems and regulations.[9] By this stage of the process, two definite conclusions had been drawn. First, satellite navigation was a crucial part of the modern world. In 1996, just a year after GPS had been declared fully operational, 100,000 receivers were produced each

---

[7] In 1998, the United States announced that it would begin work on the next generation of GPS, called GPS III, a numbering system derived from the waves of satellites, with Block-I being the initial experimental satellites and Block-II being the first operational generation. About ten to fifteen years were needed before it would be operational, giving the EU time to join during the development process. Gleason, Michael P (2009). *Galileo: Power, Pride, and Profit. The Relative Influence of Realist, Ideational, and Liberal Factors on the Galileo Satellite Program*, George Washington University, January 31, 2009, pg. 111.

[8] Gleason (2009). *Galileo: Power, Pride, and Profit,* pg. 155.

[9] Askenazi, Vidal (2000). "The Challenges Facing Galileo," *Space Policy*. **16**. 185-188, pg. 185.

month.[10] Second, Europe was determined to be a part of this critical technological and industrial sector. This period signaled Europe's interest in satellite navigation, though it did not prescribe the route into the field it would take.

Before relating the development of Galileo past the Definition Phase, at which point politics began, it is important to outline the basics of a global satellite navigation system. Many of the debates about Galileo revolved around the technical aspects of the systems and it is useful to have some knowledge of the science behind the debates to understand why certain positions were taken and others deemed unacceptable.

Global satellite navigation works on the basis of triangulation between a ground receiver – which could be anything from a mobile phone to the precision tail fins on a bomb – and satellites in the sky. A satellite broadcasts two streams of information: the time and its position. The receiver uses the delay between the satellite sending out the time and the receiver picking it up to calculate the receiver's distance from the satellite. If it can calculate its distance between 4 or more satellites of known positions, the receiver can calculate its location longitudinally, latitudinally, and vertically. The more satellites in the sky, the more errors are minimized.[11] This simple system contains both the strengths and weaknesses of satellite navigation. First, because a receiver is a passive recipient of data, GPS is a non-exclusive, non-exhaustive good. As long as someone is paying for the maintenance of the satellites and the ground stations that keep their time and positions accurate, anyone with a receiver can locate themselves for free. However, that means that it is nearly impossible to have a targeted denial of service. If one wishes to shut off GPS for a certain area, one must

---

[10] Gleason (2009). *Galileo: Power, Pride, and Profit,* pg. 107.

[11] Beidleman, Scott W., Major, United States Air Force (2004). *GPS versus Galileo: Balancing for Position in Space*, Master's Thesis: School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, June 2004, pg. 10.

either disable the satellites in its sky or to jam the frequency on which GPS broadcasts its signal.

To counteract this vulnerability, the US Department of Defense, which developed GPS, created two separate frequencies. The standard positioning system (SPS), available to civilians, broadcasts at 1575.42 MHz (classified as L1 in the internationally defined radio spectrum) while the precise position system (PPS) broadcasts at 1575.42 MHz and 1227.6 MHz (L2). Should a conflict emerge in which the US's enemies have acquired GPS receivers, the military can jam 1575.42 MHz while keeping 1227.6 MHz available for its own forces. Since the PPS required a frequently changing cryptographic key which only the military possessed, the US was confident that it could maintain use of GPS while denying service to its enemies.[12]

GPS contained severe limitations, especially from a civilian point of view. First, GPS operates with an extremely weak signal. A 100-watt jammer, small enough to be carried by an individual, could cover a 65-kilometer region.[13] A signal on the same frequency could also unintentionally overpower the GPS signal. Second, because GPS broadcasts on one signal, it is susceptible to fluctuations in the ionosphere which might delay the radio waves and give an inaccurate position. Third, GPS does not have integrity monitoring. If a satellite malfunctions, there will be a significant lag time between the error and the user knowing about it, which prevents it from being used as the sole source of navigation for critical applications.[14] Fourth, the United States deliberately degraded the civilian system so that its military would have an advantage over potential adversaries. When GPS was first

---

[12] Ibid., pg. 16

[13] Ibid., pg. 28.

[14] John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (2001). *Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System*. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation: August 29, 2001.

developed, the military had positions accurate to 10 meters, while for civilians the possible error was 100 meters.[15] To counteract these issues, a variety of augmentation systems were developed, including using ground reference stations and additional satellites over North America, Europe, and Japan. These systems managed to increase accuracy down to the meter, which led to the market for GPS-enabled devices to explode and for GPS to become ubiquitous by the end of the 1990s.

GPS also suffered from the practical limits of a single satellite constellation. Although there were enough satellites to cover most of the globe, orbits left the polar regions underserved, which adversely affected Scandanavian countries. It also meant that urban regions, with tall buildings that obstruct clear views to the sky, suffered from patchy coverage. Yet there was one aspect of a single system that was of even more importance to political leaders in Europe. Because GPS is controlled by the United States government, an essential utility was in the hands of another government. GPS was run by the United States Air Force and paid for by the Defense Budget, which had already prioritized military users at the expense of civilians. As business grew ever reliant on GPS, the potential damage to the European economy should GPS be interrupted was tremendous – estimates put the cost between €130 million and €500 million per day.[16]

An upgraded GPS would solve many of these issues, but an independent European system offered a number of additional benefits. It would help with a problem that European transport ministers were considering at the time – how to standardize Europe's various guidance systems within the internal market. It would also contribute to the European

---

[15] State Department (2002). *U.S. Global Positioning System and European Galileo System*. Washington, March 7, 2002.

[16] Giegerich, Bastian, (2007). "Navigating differences: transatlantic negotiations over Galileo," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. **20**(3). September 2007. 491-508, pg. 497.

aerospace industry. The economics of space programs require large coordination and, almost always, government support. Costs of a system are generally split between 80% in the construction of the satellites and support structure, and 20% in operating the system.[17] A private firm is unlikely to create a system of its own, since the costs are frontloaded and returns uncertain. In the absence of coordinated government funding, the European space industry had lagged significantly behind the United States. Before this case study began, the EU space industry had a share of €5.5 billion in the €70 billion global market. In comparison, the United States government space budget alone was €35 billion.[18] Should European governments pool their resources for a major space program, it would not only help the EU maintain their technological base, but grant it access to a growing market. The historical comparisons most often used in discussions of Galileo were the Airbus and Ariane rocket launcher programs. With these cooperative transnational enterprises, Europe had cut into American monopolies and won for themselves globally-competitive industries.[19]

Finally, there were political benefits to an independent system. GPS was an integral part of the American military's warfare methods and Galileo could offer a similar contribution to European militaries and to the emerging European Security and Defence Policy. It could give the EU an independent capability to conduct military operations. Galileo would be a European asset for the European Union. Relying on GPS for all types of satellite navigation meant that the European Union was dependent on the United States.

---

[17] Pappas, Zannism M., Major, United States Air Force (2002). *Effects of the Galileo Constellation on U.S. National Interests*, Master's Thesis: Air Force Institute of Technology, June 2002, pg. 31.

[18] Keohane, Daniel (2004). *Introduction*, in *Europe in Space*, Bildt, Editor. 2004, Center for European Reform: London. 1-6, pg. 2.

[19] Airbus was founded in 1970 and received more orders than Boeing in 1999. Muller, Pierre, (1990). "Airbus: Partners and Paradoxes," *The European Journal of International Affairs*. (8). Spring 1990. 25-45. Ariane was developed beginning in 1973 and received 50% of all commercial launch orders in 2008. ----, (2009). *Press Release - Arianespace will apply its Service & Solutions capabilities to meet market needs in 2009 and beyond*. Available from: http://www.arianespace.com/news-feature-story/2009/01-06-2009-year-in-review-press-conference.asp. Accessed May 20, 2011.

Galileo would restore sovereignty to Europe in this area as well as bringing prestige to the EU by being a player in the superpower-exclusive GNSS game.

INITIAL MEMBER STATE POSITIONS

Although there had been Commission reports on a satellite navigation system and interest in satellite-guided precision weaponry had risen after the demonstration of American weaponry in Kosovo, there does not seem to have been movement by member states on the issue.[20] The Transport Council released €40 million for the study of Galileo on June 17, 1999, but that did not reflect a commitment to build Galileo. A year later, on December 21, 2000, that same Council failed to agree to the next phases of Galileo, Validation and Development (often elided to the Development Phase), in which the member states of European Union were to commit nearly a billion euros to a European satellite system. These phases, and the enormous amounts of capital required to complete them, were the true test of commitment to the system.

The December 2000 Transport Council meeting showed a split on the issue of Galileo. Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands opposed releasing the funds while Belgium, Italy, Spain and the Commission strongly supported Galileo. France, chairing the Council, was understood to be one of the most enthusiastic backers. The positions of the other member states were not publicly known.[21] This split, interestingly, does not seem to follow any previously contentious EU dividing line such as the

---

[20] Taverna, Michael A. (1999). "Europe Launches Satnav Project", *Aviation Week and Space Technology*. Washington, July 5, 1999.

[21] -----, (2000). "EU Transportation Ministers Fail To Agree On Launching Galileo Program," *Satellite Today*, December 22, 2000.

Atlanticist/Europeanist dichotomy that was seen in the Mini-Summit case or North/South groupings that would be seen in many economic disputes.[22] Rather, it seemed that Galileo was the product of "a collection of policies of individual member states."[23] It is useful to briefly outline those policies, before embarking on an exploration of how they changed.

The UK and Germany were skeptical of Galileo's business model. The British and German Transport ministers had stated in November 2000 that Galileo ought to be privately funded so their governments were not liable for billions on a potentially loss-making enterprise.[24] The UK Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions had doubts on the scheduling and user-benefits of Galileo and the ability of the government to recoup its investments.[25] This position would be shared by ministers from the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Austria.[26] Of those in favor, Italy, Spain and France were notable for having some of the most advanced space industries in the EU. France had launched its first spy satellite, Helios, in 1995 and Belgium, Italy and Spain bought "shares" in Helios so that they could use it for their own national interests. Italy and Spain had started development on national satellites (Sicral and SpainSat, respectively) and Italy had led an initiative for advanced security and environmental mapping satellites, Cosmo-Skymed.[27] The Western European Union's Satellite Center, to be transferred to EU control in January 1, 2002, was

---

[22] See for example, -----, (2005). "EU and China reach textile deal", *BBC News*. September 5, 2005.

[23] WL: *02ROME715: GoI slowly shifting to military role for Galileo*. Rome Embassy, February 13, 2002.

[24] Transport Ministers of the UK and Germany (2000). *Joint Press Statement from the UK and German Transport Ministers*. Department of the Environment, November 3, 2000.

[25] -----, (1999). "U.K. sees schedule, funding issues in EC's Galileo bid," *Aviation Week's Aerospace Daily & Defense Report*, April 27, 1999.

[26] Brand, Constant (2001). "EU warns high-flying plans for satellite system could be jeopardized by funding delays", *Associated Press*. December 7, 2001.

[27] Taverna, Michael A. (2002). "French Brass Urge Milspace Teamwork," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, March 11, 2002.

based in Torrejón, Spain.[28] Since 1999, these countries, along with Germany, had been working on an agreement that would allow them to jointly develop satellites.[29] In sum, those countries in favor of Galileo at the first significant meeting of its history were those who had the longest history in space operations and who had the most to gain industrially by the EU dedicating money to a space project.

However, the issue was not simply one of fiscal hawks against pork-barrel politicians. The laundry list of benefits that Galileo would provide struck a chord in French policy circles. France was a major proponent of using Galileo for military purposes as part of "making Europe independent from the US and to support European military efforts."[30] They had been pushing for "a military interface" since 1999.[31] French military leaders were concerned that the US military had "manipulated" GPS signals to support its operations during the Kosovo campaign; they wanted to ensure that their national missile guidance systems and independent nuclear deterrent were free from any GPS reliance.[32] It is not to say that the French government saw Galileo only as a military asset; Chirac spoke of Galileo as an infrastructure project and a scientific project, mentioning it alongside schemes to improve European universities.[33] Rather, at the beginning of consideration of an independent European satellite system, France was one of the only countries emphasizing its strategic

---

[28] EU Satellite Center (2012). *History of the European Union Satellite Centre*. Accessed January 31, 2012; Available from: http://www.eusc.europa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=41&Itemid=61.

[29] Pasco, Xavier (2004). *Ready for take-off? European defence and space technology*, in *Europe in Space*, Bildt, Editor. 2004, Center for European Reform: London. 19-32, pg. 25.

[30] -----, (2001). "EU transport ministers to limit funding for Galileo satellite system", *AFX*. April 5, 2001.

[31] -----, (1999). "It is not all clear sailing," *Aviation Daily*, February 16, 1999.

[32] WL: *09BERLIN1324: OHB-System CEO Calls Galileo a Waste of German Tax Payer Money*. Berlin Embassy, October 22, 2009.

[33] McElderry, Kevin (2004). "EU's big three launch Berlin summit, defending tactics", *Agence France Presse*. February 18, 2004; Czuczka, Tony (2003). "German and French leaders hold talks on postwar Iraq at Berlin summit", *Associated Press*. September 18, 2003.

possibilities. These additional reasons to fund the program may explain their position as the member state most enthusiastic for Galileo.

The European Commission was also strongly in favor of Galileo. In the Mini-Summit and arms embargo disputes, the Commission largely stayed out of the way; the biggest involvement by the institutional EU was often Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP, providing a coordination point among member states. Here, though, Transport Commissioner and Vice-President of the Commission Loyola de Palacio was vocal in her opinion that the member states should fund Galileo. At almost every stage of the debate, de Palacio spoke publicly about the benefits of Galileo. In fact, the Commission had circulated a Communication to member states before the December 2000 Transport Council meeting urging them to fund the project.[34] It is unclear whether this was because the Directorate-General of Transport and Energy (DG TREN) was convinced by the merits of Galileo or if, since they had been backing the proposal before the costs and benefits were clear, they supported it because their department would be in charge of the EU's largest scientific project, as an Organizational Politics reading would suggest.[35] Regardless of the true reason or, more likely, the balance between the two reasons, it is important to note that DG TREN never wavered from its support of Galileo and constantly lobbied for its funding.

The year 2001 was to be a decisive one for Galileo, it was assumed. Member states were open to the idea of an independent satellite system, as shown by their support for the €40 million Definition Phase, but there was not a qualified majority in the Council for the Development Phase. The task of Galileo's supporters would be to reach that threshold quickly, before the window of opportunity closed. The pro-Galileo lobbying effort was led

---

[34] European Commission (2000). *Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on Galileo COM (2000) 750 Final*. November 22, 2000.
[35] Allison and Zelikow (1999). *Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis*, pg. 164.

by EU institutional actors. One example was the "Wise Men Group," chaired by Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt.[36] It released a report on Galileo in November 2000 that detailed all of the benefits listed in the previous section. It would be an economic boon to the EU, granting it access to an emerging market and helping shore up the EU's technology and space industries. It would be a political asset, keeping the EU economy from being dependent on an American-run system. It would be a potential tool for the European Security and Defense Policy. Note that, from the point of view of a political observer, there is something for everyone here. Galileo is presented almost as a panacea – it has benefits for those interested in the global standing of the EU, for Europe's economy, for the internal market, and for EU defense policy. Galileo would be an essential tool for Europe, no matter what conception one had of Europe or political agenda for the European Union. In case that was not enough, Bildt also argued that by developing the broader satellite sector, the EU could help environmental monitoring, fend off low-end manufacturing competition from China and India, and bring broadband internet access to rural areas.[37]

The Commission ordered a study on the economic benefits of Galileo from PricewaterhouseCooper, released on November 20, 2001. With this, the Commission thought that it had winning data to back up the arguments made in the Wise Man Group's report.[38] The study predicted that Galileo would lead to €17.8 billion of economic benefits

---

[36] Bildt, Carl, Peyrelevade, Jean, and Späth, Lothar (2000). *Towards a Space Agency for the European Union: Report for the Director-General of the European Space Agency*. Brussels, November 2000.

[37] Bildt, Carl and Dillon, Mike (2004). *Europe's Final Frontier*, in *Europe in Space*, Bildt, Editor. 2004, Center for European Reform: London. 7-18, pg. 15.

[38] PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001). *Inception Study to Support the Development of a Business Plan for the GALILEO Programme*. PricewaterhouseCoopers for Directorate-General Transport and Energy: Brussels, November 20, 2001.

for the EU.[39] With the expected price of constructing Galileo at €3.9 billion, the system would have a benefit:cost ratio of 4.6, meaning every euro spent on Galileo would produce 4.6 euros in benefits. This was a "strongly positive ratio," since most public sector transportation projects in the UK, in the example PricewaterhouseCoopers gave, are approved with ratios of 3.0.[40] However, to realize these benefits, EU governments would have to pay for Galileo. The study suggested that €1.25 billion would be spent on Development of the system, which could be paid by the ESA and the Commission and then €2.35 billion would be needed to deploy and operate the system. The Deployment phase would see a mix of private and public funds, since revenue returns would not be sufficient to make it worthwhile as a strictly private venture. However, the study argued, the project would start to make operating profits in 2011 and investment would see a 4.1% rate of return in the Deployment and Operations phases.

These lobbying efforts were designed to convince relevant actors to fund Galileo, and so, before turning to examine their effect over the course of 2001, it is important to outline who exactly would be deciding on Galileo and where these decisions would take place. Galileo was to be run jointly by the European Commission and the European Space Agency. The ESA was created in 1975 to compete with the American and Russian space systems. The original members of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK had been joined by Ireland, Norway, Austria, Finland, and Portugal. Canada was an associate member.[41] The relationship between the ESA and the EU was similar to that of the WEU to the EU. Although not

---

[39] This number estimated from €7.4 billion in cost savings to airline passengers, €5.4 billion in time savings for airline passengers, and €4.8 billion in marine navigation benefits. Ibid., pg. 8.

[40] Ibid., pg. 8.

[41] Since this case study, Greece, Luxembourg and the Czech Republic have joined the ESA.

formally linked at the time, both organizations began with a similar purpose of reaching economies of scale through cooperative projects and the overlap in membership meant that EU member states' projects on space were almost always coordinated through the ESA. The ESA had launch facilities in French Guiana, was a contributor to the International Space System, and its collaborative efforts in the 1970s and 1980s helped Europe gain a 50% share of the launcher market and 20-30% of the satellite market.[42] Similar to the WEU being folded into the EU, the ESA has effectively become the space wing of the EU. The EU Council and the ESA Council agreed on a joint European Strategy for Space in November 2000 and established a Commission-ESA task force to implement it.[43] The Wise Man Group report was directed to the ESA Director-General and recommended the "need for a process of institutional convergence that does not exclude bringing the present ESA within the treaty framework of the European Union."[44] These recommendations would be met. The EU and ESA signed a framework agreement to facilitate cooperation between the two bodies on April 29, 2004, and the Commission has since transferred large sums of money to the ESA for space research.[45] The ESA would decide on funding its half of Galileo separately with decisions being made by its Council, comprised of the Research Ministers of its members. There may be an organizational ethos that influenced these ministers, but it should be noted that those voting on ESA funds, except for the Norwegian and Swiss ministers, all sat in

---

[42] Bildt, Peyrelevade, and Späth (2000). *Towards a Space Agency for the European Union: Report for the Director-General of the European Space Agency*, pg. 4.

[43] -----, (2012). *About ESA*. Accessed February 3, 2012; Available from: http://www.esa.int/esaMI/About_ESA/SEMDIUEVL2F_0.html.

[44] Bildt, Peyrelevade, and Späth (2000). *Towards a Space Agency for the European Union: Report for the Director-General of the European Space Agency*, pg 7.

[45] European Council (2003). *Framework Agreement between the European Community and the European Space Agency*. November 25, 2003, L 261 (August 6, 2004) Vol. 47. 64-68. One example is €104 million in 2011 for Earth observation satellites. de Selding, Peter B. (2011). "European Commission Doles out Down Payment for Initial GMES Launchers," *Space News*, June 10, 2011.

Cabinet with their colleagues that would decide on the other half of the funding at the EU Transport Council.

Although the Commission would oversee Galileo with the ESA, they did not have the authority to fund the project. That decision would come from the Transport Council, comprised of the Transportation Ministers from EU member states. It was these ministers who would cast the deciding votes, but it is unclear how much agency each minister had. Galileo was discussed in Cabinet meetings in the UK, Germany, and Italy, at the very least, and was discussed at the Head of Government level at European Councils. Decisions on Galileo should be seen as national choices, albeit with Transport Ministers enjoying a position of influence they would not otherwise enjoy in foreign policy debates.

Qualified Majority Voting Weights

10:	Britain, France, Germany, Italy
8:	Spain
5:	Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal
4:	Austria, Sweden
3:	Finland, Denmark, Ireland
2:	Luxembourg

Decisions on Galileo would be made by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV).[46] Under this system, 62 votes out of the 87 allocated among the member states were needed to pass an act of the Council.[47] The December 2000 Transport Council meeting saw 33 votes strongly in favor of Galileo (Belgium, France, Italy, Spain), 25 noted as being against Galileo (UK, Germany, the Netherlands) and 11 more votes (Austria, Denmark, Sweden) controlled by countries who would oppose Galileo in the next year. Assuming that all other member states whose preferences were not known (Luxembourg, Finland, Ireland,

[46] According to Spanish Transport Minister and confirmed by other ministers. -----, (2002). "Spain's Alvarez Cascos says Galileo project needs no unanimity", *AFX European Focus*. January 21, 2002.

[47] Article 148 of the EC treaty, as amended by Article 8 of the Accession Treaty of Austria, Finland and Sweden.

Portugal, and Greece, totalling 18 votes) would side with the Commission, Galileo's supporters needed to find 12 more votes in order to make the system a reality.

LOBBYING IN 2001

The year began with some slightly positive news for Galileo's supporters. The ESA released €53 million in January to begin preliminary work on the Development Phase, though it would not decide on the bulk of its share, €450 million, until November. In April, the Transport Council released €100 million, though it too delayed releasing the majority of funds. Its December meeting would determine whether the EU would provide the final €450 million needed to develop Galileo. As an industry source put it, the light was "pale green" for the project.[48] Though the Transport Council was interested in Galileo, it had a number of questions it wanted answered before the full funds were released, including:

- Galileo's political control and legal context for this control
- Galileo's objectives and mission requirements
- Interoperability with GPS and GLONASS
- Long term commitment from the private sector
- System security
- Integration with the previously built European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), which augmented GPS signal for Europe
- Involvement by non-EU actors[49]

---

[48] -----, (2001). "Galileo wins 'pale green light'," *Global Positioning & Navigation News*, April 18, 2001.
[49] Gleason (2009). *Galileo: Power, Pride and Profit*, pg. 205

These were broad questions, asking about the fundamental rationale and operation of the system, indicating that member states were hesitant, even after releasing €100 million. As the Commission sought to answer these questions, work on the foundations of Galileo continued as they had for the past few years. After the decision in 1999 to begin the Definition Phase of Galileo, the ESA and France filed for Galileo frequency allocations to be determined at the 2000 World Radio Conference. The November 9, 2000, Wise Men report advocated a proactive European space policy and the November 16, 2000, *European Strategy for Space*, led to the creation of an Commission-ESA task force on space. These moves created legal space for Galileo, by ensuring that internationally-accepted frequencies were available, and political space, by building the credibility of the Commission in space politics. As the first question from the Transport Council indicated, member states wished to be assured that whoever was controlling Galileo understood its political implications. The head of strategy and planning at Alcatel Space, a French company predicted to be one of the major participants in Galileo, said that the system was "the first big program for Europe under the [Commission] and nobody understands exactly how to run it."[50]

Uncertainty also stemmed from American actions that had undermined Galileo's rationale. Galileo had been advertised as a partial solution to the problems of GPS, with deliberately degraded accuracy for civilian users and a lack of integrity monitoring being two of the most common complaints. However, in May 2000, President Clinton eliminated the degrading of the system, immediately increasing GPS's accuracy tenfold.[51] This was planned to happen in 2006, but it seems that possible competition from Galileo had

---

[50] -----, (2001). "Galileo wins 'pale green light'," April 18, 2001.

[51] Constantine, Roftiel, Lt. Col., United States Air Force (2007). *GPS & Galileo. Friendly Foes?*, Master's Thesis: Air Force Fellows Air University, April 2007, pg. 9. According to a State Department memo from March 7, 2002, this improved the accuracy from 100 meters to 10-20 meters. With augmentation systems, millimeter level accuracy is possible.

prompted the US government to speed up its schedule. The US also announced that the next stage of GPS, which would include integrity monitoring, would be operational sooner than planned, thereby shrinking the window during which Galileo would have a technical advantage over GPS and, presumably, during which it could charge for service. It is difficult to imagine that airlines and ship owners, faced with two similar navigation services, would not choose the free one and so, for Galileo to establish itself, it needed considerable time as the most accurate GNSS available.

Yet these moves did not deter the lead agencies involved in Galileo. The ESA began design work in January 2001 and the Commission released a more detailed Definition Document on February 13, 2001. On March 15, 2001, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Commission and a variety of companies in the space industry, committing €200 million in private money for the Development Phase. In May, the French government released a report arguing that Galileo offered capabilities for ESDP. In June, the Commission presented a plan for the Galileo Joint Undertaking (GJU), the management body for Galileo, which would bring together representatives of the ESA, Commission, and the private sector. In November, the ESA released the entirety of their €547 million share of the Development Phase, contingent on the Transport Council agreeing to release their funds.[52] In the ESA decision thirteen Research Ministers approved the funds, with the British and Danish ministers opposed.

If all member states that voted for Galileo at the ESA did the same at the crucial December Transport Council meeting, the funds would pass, with a possible cushion of 12 votes more than needed. The United Kingdom seemed to be set to vote against Galileo.

---

[52] Gleason (2009). *Galileo: Power, Pride and Profit*, pg. 210

Though its Secretary of State for Trade and Industry supported the project, the Treasury and Transport Ministry were opposed. In fact, the Transport Minister, John Spellar, was said to be "more Treasury than the Treasury."[53] Yet this did not look to be enough to stop Galileo. Given the votes of the Research Ministers, full EU funding for the Development Stage was ready to pass at the Transport Council. The "most likely outcome," according to industry observers, was that Galileo would progress with Britain playing a marginal role.[54] Workshare would be determined from ESA funding distributions, meaning that Germany would take the lead role with 25% of funding and the reciprocal jobs, with Italy providing and gaining 22% and France, 17%.

Yet this scenario was not to be. The ministers of Germany, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden and Britain (36 votes, 11 more than needed for a blocking minority) opposed releasing the combined €1 billion in funds.[55] This opposition was prompted by the Finance Ministers from these countries, who all called for "detailed consideration" before they would approve releasing money for the project.[56] This decision was strongly opposed by France and Italy, for whom the chance to launch a major strategic asset for the EU outweighed the need for a cost analysis.[57]

The reaction to this "non-decision" was harsh.[58] Transport Commissioner de Palacio said that "If there is no decision by the end of the year, the project is finished."[59]

---

[53] Harrison, Michael (2001). "Cabinet divided on Galileo satellite project", *The Independent*. London, December 3, 2001.

[54] Harrison, Michael (2001). "Britain told to invest in pounds 2bn Galileo satellite project or lose contracts", *The Independent*. London, November 22, 2001.

[55] Brand (2001). "EU warns high-flying plans for satellite system could be jeopardized by funding delays", December 7, 2001.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Gleason (2009). *Galileo: Power, Pride and Profit*, pg. 212.

[58] Pasco, Xavier (2003). *Galileo: A Cornerstone of the European Space Effort.* Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique: Paris, July 21, 2003, pg. 3.

Commission President Romano Prodi stated in a major speech on December 11 before the European Council in Laeken, Belgium, that it "beggars belief that you have the research ministers all enthusiastically agreeing to it and then the other subsequent councils blocking it."[60] Over the following months, as Galileo hung precipitously in the balance and grew ever closer to missing the window of opportunity for technical superiority over GPS, the Commission and other interested parties pressed hard to gain acceptance for Galileo.

The official line was stated by spokesman Gilles Gantelet in the aftermath of the December Transport Council, that "As far as the Commission is concerned, it is strategically, politically important. It is vital for Europeans, it should be developed."[61] This was followed by other lobbying efforts. On the same day as the Transport Council's non-decision, the Commission released a communication *Towards a European Space Policy*, ratified by the European Council on December 10.[62] On December 13, the aerospace and space industry lobbying groups released a joint press statement in which they argued that delay caused real problems for European industry.[63] The European Parliament sent a letter to the Council urging them to press their Transport Ministers for quick approval. Finally, the European Council approved a statement on December 15 which pressed the Transport Council to decide on the matter by March 2002.

---

[59] Brand (2001). "EU warns high-flying plans for satellite system could be jeopardized by funding delays", December 7, 2001.

[60] -----, (2001). "Prodi demands action not words", *BBC News*. London, December 12, 2001

[61] Brand (2001). "EU warns high-flying plans for satellite system could be jeopardized by funding delays", December 7, 2001.

[62] European Commission and European Space Agency Joint Task Force Report (2001). *Towards a European Space Policy COM(2001) 718 Final*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

[63] AECMA (European Association of Aerospace Manufacturers) and Eurospace Joint Press Release, "Galileo: The Urgent Need for a Positive Decision," Brussels: December 2001. http://www.aecma.org/Press/pr0111.htm.

Momentum seemed to be moving in favor of Galileo again – but one could have said that to be true since the idea of a GNSS was first floated in the 1990s. Those who were in favor of Galileo were public in their support, while skeptical governments were quieter. The Directorate-General for Transportation and Energy released a position paper in December that stated that without Galileo, Europe would lose its autonomy in defense within 30 years.[64] Galileo was presented by the Commisssion as addressing security concerns, economic concerns, technological concerns, as well as being a significant step in the European project. The cost would be €3 billion euros, the same as 150 kilometers of semi-urban roadways.[65] It was, according to its backers, an obvious investment.

Galileo became even more likely in February 2002, when German officials expressed favorable interest in the project. They met with Spanish counterparts to discuss Galileo, and seemed to have been won over.[66] At the end of February, the German Cabinet clarified questions on the financing of the project and approved releasing funds for the Development Phase.[67] This drastically shifted the voting dynamics. Galileo's proponents were only 1 vote away from full funding. This was likely to come from Denmark, which in February "softened" its opposition to the Development Phase.[68]

The British government still opposed Galileo. One official said, "We don't want this thing spiraling out of control," implying doubt that the project would come in at the expected

---

[64] Directorate-General Transport and Energy (2001). *Galileo: An Imperative for Europe*. Brussels, December 31, 2001.

[65] Directorate-General Transport and Energy (2002). *Galileo Information Note: The European project on radio navigation by satellite*. European Commission: Brussels, March 26, 2002, pg 1.

[66] -----, (2002). "Military Pushes for Galileo," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, February 18, 2002.

[67] -----, (2002). "German cabinet agrees financing of Galileo satellite project", *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. February 27, 2002.

[68] Castle, Stephen (2002). "Galileo satellite project goes into orbit; Blair changes tune, supporting a pounds 2bn European space system opposed by US military", *The Independent*. London, March 10, 2002.

budget or that the private sector would make the expected contribution.[69] However, with the German and Danish shifts, British opposition would be unable to stop the full funding from being released. Therefore, Prime Minister Blair sought to exchange his support for Galileo for concessions on other issues from its most enthusiastic proponents, specifically French support on the liberalization of energy markets. As a British official said, "When you have opposed something and it becomes inevitable, it is always better to come on side and try to win concessions rather than being the Last of the Mohicans."[70]

At the March 15-16 European Council in Barcelona, the trade-off was made. The Heads of Government unanimously approved full funding for Galileo, and called on their Transport Ministers to ratify the decision at their upcoming meeting. With the political approval in place, the ministers did so on March 26, 2002. The EU was now committed, by more than half a billion euros (with another half-billion coming from the ESA budget), to developing an independent navigation satellite system. Member state opposition had been overcome and Transport Commissioner de Palacio declared that "Europe has demonstrated its readiness to establish its credentials as a player on the international stage."[71]

At this stage, Galileo was determined by intra-EU dynamics and although the US was frequently mentioned in relation to its control of GPS, it had no causal significance in the debate. More than an arena for national interests, the EU played a significant role in creating Galileo. Interestingly, there was no inherent need to involve the EU in satellite developments. Member states already had an intergovernmental organization with a history

---

[69] -----, (2002). "Military Pushes for Galileo," February 18, 2002.

[70] Castle (2002). "Galileo satellite project goes into orbit; Blair changes tune, supporting a pounds 2bn European space system opposed by US military", March 10, 2002.

[71] -----, (2002). "Transport Council: Ministers give go-ahead for Galileo satellite navigation project," *European Report*, March 27, 2002.

of transnational industrial projects – the European Space Agency – and a history of cooperating bi- and multilaterally on satellites.

Galileo was often compared to the Ariane rocket launcher program, with which the European states entered an American- and Russian-dominated industry. To compete in this market, Britain, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands created the European Launch Development Organization (ELDO) in the 1962.[72] After the unsuccessful Europa launcher was abandoned, the ELDO was merged with the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) to create the European Space Agency in 1975. The ESA assumed the task of building a marketable launcher and succeeded with Ariane, first launched in 1979. Other comparisons were Airbus, formed from merging national aeronautical corporations in 1970, and the Helios, Cosmo-Skymed, and SAR-Lupe satellite systems, which were constructed nationally or multilaterally.[73] The success of these programs asks the question: why wasn't Galileo placed under the umbrella of the ESA rather than the EU?

The role of the ESA in Galileo, being responsible for about half the funding and sharing development and control of the satellites, demonstrates the usefulness of the institution. The technical knowledge and credibility of the ESA in the field of satellites ensured its "stickiness" and that it became part of the Galileo project. There was no need for the EU to be involved as well. With nearly identical membership, it should not have mattered to member states what organization controlled Galileo. Yet there was never any debate that the EU, and the Directorate-General of Transportation and Energy specifically,

---

[72] Long, Tony (2011). "This Day in Tech: June 14, 1962: Western Europe Officially Joins the Space Race," *Wired*, June 14, 2011.

[73] SAR-Lupe is a German spy satellite. On July 30, 2002, France and Germany signed the Schwerin Agreement to exchange programming rights between SAR-Lupe and Helios. Technological and Aerospace Committee of the WEU (2008). *Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS): European space cooperation for security and defence*. Western European Union: Brussels, December 3, 2008.

would be in charge of the program. This likely occurred for three reasons: by the Commission leading the process, by framing Galileo as an asset for the internal market, and for political considerations.

The concept of Galileo emerged from three Commission reports in the 1990s which played a tremendous role in building support for a European GNSS. The debate soon became whether or not member states should approve *either* a satellite system under the auspices of the Commission *or* no satellite system at all. The question of a satellite system not run by the EU was never asked. This increases that chances that the EU would be involved in a satellite system, in a similar way to how the sequencing of ordered voter preferences can change the results of an election.[74] If member states of the EU and ESA had varying preferences on who should run the system, the Commission's lead on the project effectively cut out the option of a Galileo built by the ESA only, with technical arguments against Commission leadership minimized by including the ESA. Also, given that no member state had a national space body advocating for a GNSS, and given the inertia and reticence of many member states towards Galileo, it is unlikely that the idea of a GNSS would have emerged without strong EU lobbying, thereby further guiding member state choices towards funding an EU-based satellite system.

Second, the Commission secured a position in Galileo by presenting it as an infrastructure project, in line with existing competences of the EU. Rather than being simply a security project, as were the initial justification for GPS and GLONASS, it was presented as a boon to European technological firms, crucial to the economic position of the EU in the information age, and as a way to harmonize maritime, land, and air navigation, thereby

---

[74] The issue is discussed in Bartholdi, J. III, Tovey, C. A., and Trick, M. A. (1989). "Voting Schemes for which It Can Be Difficult to Tell Who Won the Election," *Social Choice and Welfare*. **6**. 157-165.

strengthening the internal market. GNSS has a wide variety of uses, and could be put into a number of different bureaucratic domains. But by emphasizing the civilian aspects, it removed one obstacle to EU control and presented it as following in the footsteps of previous EU actions, from the ERASMUS educational network to highway construction.[75]

Third, the EU was selected as the administrative home for Galileo for reasons of EU political development. Renato Libassi, special advisor to the Italian Minister for Transportation and point man in the Italian government for Galileo, said that "Europeans were pursuing Galileo primarily for political rather than economic reasons… [T]o Galileo's EU supporters an independent European GNSS was a goal in and of itself."[76] Galileo would be a statement of European prestige, of being a global actor on the political stage. For those supporters, Galileo was not just an industrial project that would reap technological or monetary rewards, but was more aptly equated to the euro or ESDP – a project that would provide the EU with additional weight both within Europe and internationally. French statements had indicated that the traditional supporters of European political autonomy saw Galileo in this light. Chirac had lobbied for Galileo by saying that Europe risked "vassal status" to the United States, "first scientific and technical and then industrial and economic" if the satellite system were not funded.[77] Although he spoke only of economic subordination, the language was political in tone and was interpreted by others as such. Further, economic

---

[75] Galileo's cost was presented in comparison to infrastructure costs in Directorate-General Energy and Transport (2002). *Galileo Information Note: The European project on radio navigation by satellite*. March 26, 2002, pg 1.

[76] WL: *02ROME1848: Italian response to Galileo demarche*. Rome Embassy, April 12, 2002.

[77] -----, (2002). "Galileo Feuding Involves Financial, Political and Foreign Relations Issues," *Satellite News*, January 21, 2002.

rationales were always mentioned alongside political and strategic reasons in pro-Galileo reports.[78]

The rationales of individual member states will be discussed in Part III. Their actions during funding disputes and negotiations with the United States after March 2002 provides key evidence for the reasons behind their policy decisions. But it is already clear that the institutional EU had considerable importance in the development of Galileo, which may minimize the ability of the US to intervene in what would become, in American eyes, a vital issue for the Atlantic alliance.

II: TRANSATLANTIC DISAGREEMENT

American Worries

By March 2002, the EU member states had committed to significant investment in Galileo as an independent satellite system controlled by the European Union. To those in favor of the project, Galileo was a tremendous benefit in a variety of areas. To the United States, Galileo was a threat. Galileo thus became a major transatlantic dispute, only resolved when an agreement was signed in June 2004.

The United States had never been in favor of a European satellite system. To Washington, Galileo was a waste of time and resources – a European vanity project. Since GPS and Galileo can be military assets, Europe was spending billions of euros on "a military service that was already provided by the US, funds that could be better spent addressing

[78] E.g., Bildt, Carl*, et al.* (2004). *Europe in space.* Centre for European Reform: London, October 2004; and Directorate-General Energy and Transport (2002). *Galileo Information Note: The European project on radio navigation by satellite*, March 26, 2002.

more pressing shortfalls in European military capabilities."[79] Just months after the Commission released "Towards a Trans-European Positioning and Navigation Network: including a European Strategy for a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)," NATO entered the conflicts in Kosovo. The subsequent military operations highlighted the superiority of the United States to its allies' militaries. The US flew the majority of all sorties and its technology, which included precision-guided munitions and navigational positioning, was so far advanced that interoperability with other NATO members was difficult. There was clearly a need for European military reform and the United States was at the forefront of urging Europe to embrace the Revolution in Military Affairs and to bring their militaries into the modern era. Any conference or paper on European defense, even today, recite the same damning statistics: the EU spends far less than the US on military research and development; even with similar personnel levels, the EU can only deploy a fifth as many troops as the US, and those are scattered across national commands.[80] Although the EU and US have similarly sized economies, the redundancies and fractured acquisitions structure in Europe means that the EU states cannot project nearly as much power as the US.

Why, then, asked American policymakers, would the EU embark on Galileo? Why ignore the pressing problems that were straining the transatlantic alliance, causing NATO to be seen as an obstacle to avoid – as the US did in the war in Afghanistan by using a coalition of the willing – in order to create a redundant satellite system? For Washington, "Considering that GPS has become a global public good, an international utility paid for by

---

[79] J.A. Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, quoted in Constantine (2007). *GPS & Galileo. Friendly Foes?*, pg. 43.

[80] The US spent $40 billion on R&D in 2001. France, Germany and the UK combined for $7 billion. Keohane, Daniel, (2003). "The European defence plans: Filling the transatlantic gaps," *The International Spectator*. **38**(3). 61-77, pg. 66. European deployment figures from Biscop, Sven *Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future of ESDP*. Royal Institute for International Relations: Brussels, pg. 3.

the United States and free for use by anyone, and that most of Western Europe has been a staunch American ally since WWII, Europe's pursuit of Galileo GNNS approache[d] heresy."[81] The United States initially sought cooperation with the European Union, arguing for a system based on the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS) and EU use of GPS, creating a complementary subsystem rather than a separate constellation.[82] Under this plan, the EU would launch satellites that would remain in the European sky to provide additional points of reference for European users. This plan would cement GPS as the global satellite system while providing additional services to Europeans without the cost of Galileo. This was the option chosen by Japan, which built its Quasi-Zenith Satellite System of three satellites (compared to Galileo's expected total of 24-30) to augment GPS coverage for Japan.[83]

The initial American reaction was to dismiss the possibility of a European space system. The United States had frequently seen communications from the Commission proposing major initiatives devolve into unmet promises and empty rhetoric. However, the US did take some action to preempt a rival system. In response to European claims that GPS was unreliable because it would prioritize its military funders and clients, President Clinton issued a directive in 1996 ordering GPS to be managed both by the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation in an Interagency GPS Executive Board (IGEB) in order to give equal weight to the concerns of civilian users.[84] Operations were still run by the

---

[81] Beidleman (2004). *GPS versus Galileo*, pg. 1.

[82] Braibanti, Ralph, Kim, Jason Y., and Wells, Damon (2002). *GPS-Galileo Negotiations: Commercial Issues at Stake*, at *Briefing to ISAC-1*. April 25, 2002, slide 2.

[83] This system was announced in a joint statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Obuchi in 1998. Lewis, James Andrew (2004). *Galileo and GPS: From Competition to Cooperation*. Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington, DC, June 2004, pg. 8.

[84] Clinton, William Jefferson (1996). *Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-6*. White House, March 28, 1996.

Air Force, but, given that they had the funding and thirty years of experience, that was perceived (in the US government) only as a matter of expedience.[85] The US also announced that it would cease degrading the civilian signal by 2006, in an "effort to make GPS more responsive to civil and commercial users worldwide."[86] It ended degradation in 2000, undermining Galileo's technological rationale during its Definition Phase. The US also accelerated GPS modernization by about eight years, cutting significantly into the time during which another system would have a performance advantage over the current generation of GPS.

As Galileo's Definition Phase ended and lobbying for development began, the United States launched more targeted attacks on Galileo. These fell under the categories of Galileo's effect on American business and Galileo's effect on the American military. The first issue was that of the business of GNSS. One of the reasons for creating Galileo was to cash in on the satellite navigation market. GPS was run by the American government and so most of the economic benefits went to American firms. However, because GPS was free, there was little incentive for companies to pay for Galileo. There would certainly be benefits for the European companies building the satellites or the navigation devices, but how that money would find its way back to the European Union's budget or the companies who invested in the program was unclear. The United States treated GPS as a global public good, one that was worth billions of taxpayers' dollars for its benefits not only for American firms and citizens, but for anyone in the world who wishes to use it.[87] The GPS data streams were

---

[85] Lewis (2004). *Galileo and GPS*, pg. 2.

[86] Clinton, William Jefferson (2000). *Statement by the President Regarding the United States' Decision to Stop Degrading Global Positioning System Accuracy*, The White House, May 1, 2000.

[87] Title 10 of U.S. Public Law, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 136, Section 2281 states that "It is in the national interest of the United States for the United States to support continuation of the multiple-use

publicly available so anyone in the world could develop their own GPS equipment.[88] One possible way for the EU to recoup expenses of the duplicate service would be to mandate the use of Galileo in European territory. This would require American airlines, for example, to pay for Galileo on routes to Europe even though GPS would still be available. Or the companies that invested in Galileo could turn a profit by being the only ones with access to the information needed to produce Galileo receivers. This would shut American firms out of the Galileo business and, if the industry came to be dominated by joint Galileo/GPS receivers, would shut American firms out of the satellite navigation business altogether. This would not be a welcome development for the country whose investment created the market for satellite navigation and it viewed such moves as severe obstacles to trade.[89]

These business concerns went along with a major national security concern, which was the most important aspect of Galileo for the US. In order to understand it, it is necessary to place the issue in the context of US policy towards space. GPS was at the heart of American military policy. In the Gulf War, eight percent of bombs were precision guided, in Kosovo, thirty percent, and in Afghanistan, sixty percent.[90] The use of GPS spread throughout the armed forces, becoming the fundamental asset that allowed the US military to outmaneuver the enemy. Instead of carpet-bombing an area in order to ensure a target is destroyed, only one bomb was necessary. Instead of a large invasion force needed to secure

---

character of the Global Positioning System." Pappas (2002). *Effects of the Galileo Constellation on U.S. National Interests*, pg. 34.

[88] Beidleman (2004). *GPS versus Galileo*, pg 2.

[89] Braibanti, Kim, and Wells (2002). *GPS-Galileo Negotiations: Commercial Issues at Stake*, at *Briefing to ISAC-1*.

[90] Precision guided includes GPS-guided and other systems. However, non-GPS use has decreased because they often require direct line of sight and are not useful in bad weather. Bowie, Christopher J., Haffa, Robert P. Jr., and Mullins, Robert E. (2003). *Future War: What Trends in America's Post-Cold War Military Conflicts Tell Us About Early 21st Century Warfare* Northrup Grumman Corporation Analysis Center: Washington, January 2003, pg. 46.

an area, a mobile force coordinated though GPS, aerial surveillance, and integrated intelligence and combat computer networks was able to achieve the same result. This is often confused with the doctrine of the "light footprint" that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld embraced when he took office in 2001, but it is instead the basis for it – the technological foundation upon which such a doctrine could be built.[91] While the Iraq War, which happened during the middle of this episode, damaged the credibility of the light footprint doctrine, it only accelerated the dependence of the US armed forces on GPS.

American dependence on GPS was highlighted by the report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (the "Space Commission"), which was assigned to the task of its name in the Congressional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. Satellites permit "U.S. leaders to manage even distant crises with fewer forces because those forces can respond quickly and operate effectively over longer ranges. Because of space capabilities, the U.S. is better able to sustain and extend deterrence to its allies and friends in our highly complex international environment."[92] However, by shaping forces around these capabilities, the US created a major vulnerability. The Commission found that the US is "an attractive candidate for a 'Space Pearl Harbor.'"[93] Protecting this new center of gravity is therefore of the utmost concern to the American government and military.

The Commission also argued that "The United States will require the means to negate satellite threats."[94] This led to a strategy of navigation warfare, or NAVWAR. Under

---

[91] Rumsfeld, Donald, (2002). "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs*. **81**(3). May/June 2002. 20-32.

[92] Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (2001). *Report of the Space Commission*. Department of Defense: Washington, January 11, 2001, pg. 13.

[93] Space Commission (2001). pg. 22.

[94] Ibid., pg. 29.

this doctrine, the US military wishes to ensure access to GPS for itself and allied forces, to deny use of GPS (or other advanced space-based navigation system) to adversaries, and to ensure access to GPS for all those outside of the theatre of operations. Just as the success of invasions across the English Channel in World War II were determined through control of the air, modern war would depend on space and navigation superiority.[95]

In October 2001, the working group on Galileo announced that the frequencies it would use included 1176.45 MHz, 1207.14 MHz, 1278.75 MHz, and 1575.42 MHz. This last frequency, the L1 band, was also used by GPS and was the destination for the next-generation GPS's military code (M-code).[96] Additionally, Galileo's Public Regulated Service (PRS) – its own protected service to be used by European governments – would operate on the same modulation scheme as the M-code.[97] In other words, Galileo and GPS would overlay their frequencies. Any attempt to jam Galileo would jam GPS as well. This had the potential of crippling the American doctrine of NAVWAR. In a crisis, if the United States were to face an adversary equipped with Galileo positioning receivers; it would not be able to knock out enemy navigation services without blinding its own troops. Either the US would lose a significant military asset or it would need to secure consensus on changing Galileo's encryption code – thereby rendering the enemy's devices unusable – from all members of the EU and ESA. Neither choice was acceptable to American policymakers. Additionally, there was the possibility that the GPS signal would be degraded and overpowered by the Galileo signal, as might happen when listening to a radio station when a more powerful station is on a nearby frequency. A former Commissioner stated that US

---

[95] More on navigation warfare can be found at http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/nssrm/initiatives/navwar.htm or http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/nav-overview.htm.

[96] M-code would be the updated version of PPS. Beidleman (2004). *GPS versus Galileo,* pg. 16.

[97] Beidleman (2004). *GPS versus Galileo,* pg. 53.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, while he often "went through the motions" stating the American position on various issues of transatlantic contention, came alive when discussing satellites and was very concerned about the protection of GPS.[98] This concern was held not just by the Secretary, but by members of Congress, State Department officials, and the American military establishment.[99]

AMERICAN LOBBYING

The United States had been talking with the EU since a separate GNSS had been proposed, pushing for Galileo as a subsystem to GPS. As the Definition Phase ended and Galileo became a credible possibility, the talks shifted towards ensuring that Galileo could be built without adversely affecting US interests. The American team was led by Ralph Braibanti, Director of the State Department's Office of Space and Advanced Technology, and dealt with representatives from the European Commission. One of the first meetings took place in October 2001; the main topics of discussion were the M-code and commercial regulation of GNSS devices.[100] On neither of these issues did the US receive answers it considered satisfactory. On the M-code the EU refused to budge from the frequencies it had been allocated at the 2000 World Radiocommunications Conference. The US therefore continued and expanded its campaign to persuade the EU to change its positions.

---

[98] Author's Interview with Former Commissioner. May 17, 2011 in Oxford, UK.

[99] For example, in an article written in *Roll Call*, Rep. Dave Weldon (R-Fla) of the Science Committee linked "American space power and control" to worldwide promotion of democracy and trade. Weldon, Dave (2003). "The Future of Air Power; Space Is Greatest Strategic Venue", *Roll Call*. Washington, June 2, 2003.

[100] Lee, Jennifer 8 (2001). "Technology; Europe plans a constellation of satellites", *New York Times*. New York, November 26, 2001.

The US had secured agreement at NATO that GPS was a vital military asset and should not be overlaid by another signal.[101] On December 1, 2001, Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz sent a letter to the defense ministries of all EU member states to emphasize this point. In it, he said that "I am writing to convey my concerns about security ramifications for future NATO operations if the European Union proceeds with Galileo satellite navigation services" and that "I believe it is in the interest of NATO to preclude future Galileo signal development in spectrum to be used by the GPS M-code."[102] Wolfowitz asked defense ministers to convey their concerns to their transport counterparts before the December 7, 2001, Transport Council meeting at which funding for Galileo development was delayed. The Department of Defense sent another letter on March 6, 2002 and the State Department followed suit on March 7, 2002. The State communiqué was particularly blunt. It warned that "At this point in the dialogue, it remains unclear whether or not a solid basis for cooperation exists" and argued that it would be "unacceptable" for Galileo to be overlaid onto GPS frequency.[103] The State Department sent a demarche to Italy in April 2002 – and presumably similar ones to other member states as well, although the source does not mention it – in order to assemble "a representative panel of the diverse GOI [Government of Italy] stakeholders in Galileo" for a video conference with US negotiators.[104] American insistence managed to put the issue before a NATO *ad hoc* working group on command, control and communications, which reported on the "GPS-Galileo interrelationship" in

---

[101] Lindström, Gustav and Gasparini, Giovanni (2003). *The Galileo satellite system and its security implications*. The European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, April 2003, pg. 22.

[102] -----, (2001). "US warns EU ministers on Galileo's possible military conflicts", *Agence France Presse*. December 18, 2001.

[103] State Department (2002). *U.S. Global Positioning System and European Galileo System*. Washington, March 7, 2002.

[104] WL: *02ROME1848: Italian response to Galileo demarche*. Rome Embassy, April 12, 2002.

August 2002 and American embassies delivered letters to Transportation Ministers in December 2002.[105]

In these communications, the United States repeatedly "stressed the importance" of the issues and tried to elevate the priority given by the EU to the concerns prompted by Galileo, especially on the M-code.[106] Robert G. Bell, NATO assistant secretary-general for defense support increased the rhetoric at a conference in June 2002. He stated that "The stakes are huge here – and I am not talking about dollars or euros. I am talking about our nations' security and the well-being of the men and women in uniform we send in harm's way."[107] M-code was a zero-sum issue, since the US said both satellite systems could not operate on the same spectrum.

Galileo's backers within the European Union recognized the pressure the US was exerting. De Palacio mentioned that American opposition had increased since September 11, heightened by the concern that terrorists could use Galileo to conduct attacks. Nonetheless, they resisted the lobbying and strongly disagreed with American arguments. The clearest example of these rebuttals came from DG TREN, which released an aggressive information note on the same day that the Transport Council released its funds, March 26, 2002. The note contained a section on "Unfounded American Arguments." Below is the entirety of that section, which is worth quoting in full to convey both the content and undiplomatic tone:

> The United States, which preaches the gospel of free competition, is doing its utmost to avoid competition since it may lose its dominant

---

[105] WL: *02ROME4292: GPS/Galileo consultations in Italy*. Rome Embassy, September 4, 2002; *02ROME6059: Italian Transport Minister discusses Galileo with de Palacio*. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2002.

[106] WL: *02ROME6059: Italian Transport Minister discusses Galileo with de Palacio*. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2002.

[107] Bell, Robert G., (2002). *NATO Discusses GPS and Galileo Security Issues*. in *European Satellites for Security Conference*. Brussels.

position.

In a nutshell:

- The United States emphasises that the GPS is free of charge while Galileo's services will be against payment. This argument does not hold water: as with the GPS, Galileo will be free of charge for basic applications; the applications for which a charge will be made will be those which require a very high quality of service which the GPS cannot provide.

  This argument is reminiscent of the early 1960s when the United States offered to launch European satellites free of charge. If it had accepted this "generous" offer, Europe would not have won over half the world satellite launching market with Ariane.

- The United States is showing surprising concern by "warning" their European friends that, in its view, Galileo is not economic. The credibility of such a message from a threatened competitor is obviously dubious. It simply shows to what extent the United States is afraid that a rival system will be successful.
- Frequencies have been earmarked by the International Telecommunications Union for all radio navigation systems. The United States is disputing the right of Europeans to use some of them which might, according to the United States, interfere with the GPS signal. The Europeans are aware of the need to avoid any risk of disturbing that system, and have come up with solutions which give every possible guarantee in this connection.

  The United States claims the right to jam Galileo's PRS (Public Regulated Service) signal since it believes that it could be hijacked for hostile purposes. The purpose of this signal is to ensure continuity of service for governmental applications.

  However, two years of research on this problem have resulted in technical solutions that have already been proposed to the Americans. The Europeans are quite open to joint consideration by

equal partners of any problem of concern to them.

More generally, the Europeans do not intend in their turn to adopt a protectionist and monopolistic approach. They do not deny the value of the GPS, even though Galileo is superior; they recognise that an even greater level of security will be obtained as a result of the joint use of the two systems; they are designing their system in such a way as to ensure that the same receiver can be used by a dual user; and they are willing to co-operate actively in all areas with the United States, as well as with Russia or China."[108]

The most striking aspect of this note is its tone. Rarely do official communiqués use sarcastic quotation marks, as this did twice, or speak so dismissively of an ally's motivations and concerns. This note seems more suited for a partisan Washington think tank than the often anodyne press releases of the Commission. The note was part of a trend of European intemperance about American pressure. The Commission described Wolfowitz's letter as "unjustified" and "in danger of muddying the waters" before the Transport Council meeting.[109] The Commission spokesman said that "We must however beware of using the security argument to delay the Council decision on starting the Galileo program, as the Americans are currently avoiding continued discussions until they can see more clearly whether the Galileo program is going to go ahead or not."[110] This statement seems to imply that American security concerns are a ploy to kill Galileo and that this maneuver is proven by their reluctance to discuss Galileo in depth before knowing whether it will be funded. The Commission rebutted American statements that the US saw "no compelling need" for

---

[108] Directorate-General Transport and Energy (2002). *Galileo Information Note: The European project on radio navigation by satellite,* March 26, 2002, pg 7

[109] -----, (2002). "Galileo Camp Accuses U.S. Of Trying to Safeguard GPS Global Monopoly", *Aviation Week's ATC Market Report*. January 24, 2002.

[110] Ibid.

Galileo in a world of free GPS use by saying that "On the compelling need, that is a matter for Europe, obviously not the United States."[111]

The tone of the note is partially explained by its content. First, Galileo is portrayed as an economic and technological project and GPS is viewed as the same. The American position is classified first and foremost as a way to protect a monopoly on a lucrative market. Lockheed Martin and Boeing are the prime contractors for the space and ground control segments of GPS and of 46 manufacturers of GPS receivers at the time, only six worked outside the US.[112] GPS is compared to previous American monopolies on airplane manufacturing and satellite launchers – both areas in which Europe eventually equaled the American market share. American concerns of Galileo are seen as coming from a "threatened competitor." Second, American concerns about the security impact of Galileo are dismissed as being illegitimate. Radio frequencies are not allocated to specific projects or countries, but to areas of application. The International Telecommunication Union earmarked certain frequencies for satellite navigation and the United States had no exclusive claims on those frequencies. American worries about PRS being used by hostile forces are implied to be impossible, since service is restricted to government applications. There is acknowledgement that something unfortunate might happen, but concerns are baseless because European scientists are said to be working on sufficient solutions. The Commission saw the United States as claiming exclusive control to an area into which Europeans are entitled to enter and threatening a technology that would endow the European project with

---

[111] -----, (2002). "EU Commission dismisses US opposition to Europe's Galileo rival to GPS", *Agence France Presse*. March 8, 2002.

[112] Pappas (2002). *Effects of the Galileo Constellation on U.S. National Interests*, pg. 33.

the capabilities of a global actor. Further, the US did not seem to be dealing fairly with the EU, but was "negotiating by ultimatum."[113]

For the United States, this response was frustrating. They recognized that the commercial argument for Galileo had merit, but considered the "unexpected risk to a key U.S. military resource" to have altered the terms of the debate.[114] They believed that such a risk was not taken seriously in the EU.[115] This negative perception of Galileo was increased when the EU took advantage of investment from the country most likely to gain attention in Washington – China.

Part of the EU's strategy to minimize the costs of Galileo and to ensure its worldwide adoption was to join into investment partnerships with foreign nations. One of the first and largest of these agreements was with the People's Republic of China. In September 2001, the EU and China agreed at a summit to cooperate on Galileo.[116] On June 17, 2002, de Palacio met with Minister of Science and Technology Xu Guanhua to announce the creation of a Sino-European "center for cooperation on satellite radionavigation."[117] This would be set in China and house teams of European and Chinese researchers working on Galileo. The Chinese Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji, said that his country was interested in being fully involved in Galileo, "financially, technically and politically."[118] The European Commission stated that "Considering both the state of progress of potential cooperation with

---

[113] WL: *02ROME6059: Italian Transport Minister discusses Galileo with de Palacio*. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2002.

[114] -----, (2001). "EU, China agree to cooperate on Galileo satellite system", BBC Monitoring Europe, originally in Der Speigel (Hamburg). London, September 25, 2001.

[115] Lewis (2004). *Galileo and GPS*, pg. 1

[116] -----, (2001). "EU, China agree to cooperate on Galileo satellite system", September 24, 2001

[117] European Commission (2002). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: State of progress of the Galileo programme.* Brussels, September 24, 2002, pg. 14.

[118] Ibid, pg. 14.

China, the importance of the stakes of collaboration with this country in terms of markets, policies on standardisation and frequencies, and the political objectives of both parties in terms of sovereignty, technology transfer, etc., the Commission will shortly present a proposal for a directive on specific negotiations with China."[119]

The promise was fulfilled the following year when on September 18, 2003, the EU signed the Sino-European Galileo Plan Technology Cooperation Agreement.[120] This unwieldily titled document included a Chinese contribution of €200 million to Galileo in exchange for a 20% share of the project. This would include €70 million in space technologies and €130 million in ground technologies and applications.[121] According to Casirini, "Never before have the European Union and China embarked on a cooperation project of the same magnitude as Galileo. This project goes well beyond industrial or standardization issues. It entails a strong strategic component which will have far reaching consequences on future Sino-European political relations."[122]

The United States strongly objected to this collaboration, in part, due to the nature of the space industry. Space technology is tremendously dependent on research and development. As mentioned above, about 80% of a satellite system's costs occur before the system is operational. Therefore, space technology relies on exports to spread the fixed initial costs among as many buyers as possible. Yet space is, like weaponry, a national security issue. The United States has a military advantage in the space sector and wishes to maintain it. It has therefore considered space exports to be a matter of weapons proliferation

---

[119] Ibid, pg. 14.

[120] Johnson-Freese, Joan and Erickson, Andrew S., (2006). "The emerging China-EU space partnership: A geotechnological balancer," *Space Policy*. **22**. 12-22, pg. 18.

[121] Pollpeter, Kevin (2008). *Building for the Future: China's Progress in Space Technology During the Tenth 5-Year Plan and the U.S. Response*. Strategic Studies Institute: Carlise, PA, March 2008, pg. 14.

[122] Casarini, Nicola (2006). *The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership*. European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, October 2006, pg. 26.

and tried to prevent the spread of American technology to hostile or rival hands. For example, it was found in 1999 that technology had been illegally transferred to China which helped improve their ICBMs. After Congressional hearings, control of export licenses of communications satellites were transferred from the seemingly lax Commerce Department to the more politically astute State Department.[123]

Efforts to prevent the spread of technology comprise the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which extrajudicially controls the export of goods on the United States Munitions List. This highly restricts the export of American technology and have allowed "ITAR-free" companies to gain market share by billing themselves as unbound by American restrictions.[124] Galileo, and the involvement of China, therefore posed a dilemma for American export procedures, mirroring the dilemma with the arms embargo in the following chapter. If the United States continued to cooperate with NATO allies, its technology in satellite navigation might find its way into Galileo, and from there to China. The PRC is highly interested in using technology transfer to advance its scientific sector, and there is no doubt that one of the main reasons it invested in Galileo was to improve its own satellite system and capabilities in satellite warfare. Renato Libassi understood that "extensive" Chinese involvement would heighten American concerns over non-NATO control of Galileo.[125] This recognition, along with French desire to make Galileo ITAR-free, contributed to the American view that Galileo was more than a commercial venture but had

---

[123] Crook, Jason A., (2009). "National Insecurity: ITAR and the Technological Impairment of U.S. National Space Policy," *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*. (74). 505-526.

[124] Bini, Antonella, (2007). "Export control of space items: Preserving Europe's advantage," *Space Policy*. **23**. 70-72.

[125] WL: *02ROME4292: GPS/Galileo consultations in Italy*. Rome Embassy, September 4, 2002.

political, and possibly anti-American overtones.[126]

TRANSATLANTIC SUSPICIONS

In 2003, as the EU split over Iraq and the ESDP Mini-Summit caused tensions within NATO, Galileo remained an uncertainty. The United States was still implacably opposed to any overlay of Galileo's signal with the M-code and they insisted that no technical solution was possible.[127] The President mentioned the issue at the US-EU summit on June 25, 2003 and American officials provided a classified briefing in Brussels in the summer of 2003.[128] Delegations traveled back and forth between the US and EU and ambassadors met with relevant officials, but no progress was made.

American officials suspected that the EU was not being honest about its intent for Galileo. The Rome Embassy believed that the overlay was done for political reasons, since most industry and satellite experts they met were willing to seek resolution to the issue, while politicians "declined to commit openly to seeking a resolution of the issue, ostensibly to maintain EU unity."[129] They also worried that Commission negotiators were "positioning themselves to argue to the EU member states that they had made a good faith effort to reach a compromise, but the U.S. would not meet them halfway, so Galileo must move ahead

---

[126] WL: *09BERLIN1324: OHB-System CEO Calls Galileo a Waste of German Tax Payer Money*. Berlin Embassy, October 22, 2009.

[127] WL: *02ROME6059: Italian Transport Minister discusses Galileo with de Palacio*. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2002 and reiterated in WL: *03ROME3567: Galileo: Ambassador Aragona advocates additional technical talks to resolve M-Code overlay issue*. Rome Embassy, August 6, 2003.

[128] WL: *03ROME3567: Galileo: Ambassador Aragona advocates additional technical talks to resolve M-Code overlay issue*. Rome Embassy, August 6, 2003; *03ROME4495: Italian views on Galileo's next steps*. Rome Embassy, September 30, 2003.

[129] WL: *02ROME4292: GPS/Galileo consultations in Italy*. Rome Embassy, September 4, 2002.

without an agreement to cooperate with the U.S."[130]Although Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political Director Gianfranco Aragona discounted this possibility, it was remarked that in a meeting with embassy officials he "stuck to the script of the [Commission] briefing book" and seemed disingenuous.

It was suspected that the M-code overlay was in fact a designed feature of Galileo. France was thought to be pressing to keep it because it could sell precision guided weapons that could not be jammed by the US, giving their products a commercial edge.[131] Pentagon officials even suspected that the EU gave China "secret assurance that they would never shut down the system, giving [China] a massive boost if it were ever to attack Taiwan."[132] While these views may not have been widely held (or correct), they reflect the lack of trust the American military establishment had for the Commission negotiators.

The US tried to influence the negotiations by switching to a NATO forum. GPS was used by all NATO militaries and, although the alliance did not take a position on Galileo, concern about the overlay had "increased considerably" after Development Phase funds were released.[133] The US tried to make the negotiations NATO-EU rather than US-EU, but the Commission refused to do so. "It's not in the NATO mandate," said DG TREN spokesmen Gilles Gantelet. He then further dismissed NATO's worries on overlay, saying that "We should speak about realities, not fantasies."[134] The EU refused to accept the American terms of the debate. Transport ministers of the member states lacked the

---

[130] WL: *03ROME3567: Galileo: Ambassador Aragona advocates additional technical talks to resolve M-Code overlay issue*. Rome Embassy, August 6, 2003.

[131] Ibid.

[132] Heath, Allistar and Boles, Tracy (2004). "Pentagon would attach EU satellites in wartime", *Sunday Business*. London, October 24, 2004.

[133] Mahony, Honor (2002). "NATO: EU satellite project will endanger allied forces", *EUObserver.com*. Brussels, June 21, 2002.

[134] -----, (2002). "EU aims to talk 'soon' to US over Galileo navigation system security", *AFX European Focus*. June 21, 2002.

competence to deal with military issues and instead insisted that the EU's position was merely due to the need for the commercial viability of Galileo.[135]

Meanwhile, Galileo saw internal threats to its viability. Germany and Italy were vying for leadership on the project. Although Galileo headquarters was presumed to be destined for Italy, Germany was "aggressively seeking" it for their own in August 2002.[136] The two countries both overbid in order to be the leading contributor to the project, and thereby to have the greatest workshare. The ESA was pledged 33% more money than needed for its share of the project, which delayed work until funding matched the budget.[137] While this may seem like a petty dispute after the major decision about Development Funding had been approved, it was greatly threatening to Galileo. Germany and Italy were at an impasse for months, leading Prodi to warn that their rivalry might terminate Galileo and "damage our credibility."[138] A December 2002 agreement fell through when a Frenchman was selected to take over the ESA from an Italian, who, it was understood, would lobby his government to allow Germany to take leadership on the program. A possible agreement in April 2003 was scuttled by Spain and Belgium, who wanted more of the investments, and the workshare arrangements were only settled in May 2003, having cost Galileo a year and reducing the amount of time it would have an advantage over GPS.

---

[135] WL: *02ROME6059: Italian Transport Minister discusses Galileo with de Palacio*. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2002; *03ROME3567: Galileo: Ambassador Aragona advocates additional technical talks to resolve M-Code overlay issue*. Rome Embassy, August 6, 2003.

[136] WL: *02ROME4292: GPS/Galileo consultations in Italy*. Rome Embassy, September 4, 2002.

[137] -----, (2002). "ESA's Failure To Approve Funding Threatens To Derail Galileo," *Aviation Week's ATC Market Report*, June 27, 2002.

[138] -----, (2003). "Italy offers compromise on EU military HQ." October 3, 2003.

REACHING AGREEMENT

American lobbying efforts throughout 2002 and early 2003 did not make an immediate impact on the Commission negotiators and the US played no causal role in the EU's decisions. It had accommodated on the creation of Galileo and was only objecting to three areas: market access, Chinese technology transfer, and M-code. Its efforts in that time did, however, lay the groundwork for the eventual agreement. The US had not succeeded in transforming the negotiation into a NATO-EU matter, but they had created concern among NATO members that Galileo would harm the alliance's capabilities. British and Dutch demands that Galileo be used only for civilian purposes in 2002 was attributed to American pressure at NATO.[139] Every other NATO state, except France, had made statements noting the importance of GPS to their military systems and to the interoperability of the alliance.[140] The US also targeted individual member states. In Italy, the US had won an ally in the Prime Minister's security advisor and in Minister of Defense Antonio Martino, who thought Galileo to be "a huge waste of money."[141] Martino spoke in Cabinet meetings in favor of the American position, but claimed to be seen as too close to the US to be effective. He recommended that the US embassy speak to Gianni Letta, Berlusconi's closest advisor, who related that the Prime Minister had been briefed regularly on the issue.[142] However, the US was told that Italy "had industrial interests" to defend in the US-EU negotiations and suspected that they were deferring to Brussels and Paris to ensure that their workshare was

---

[139] -----, (2002). "EU SUMMIT: Leaders approve 3.4bln eur Galileo satellite navigation system", *AFX European Focus*. March 16, 2002.

[140] Gleason (2009). *Galileo: Power, Profit or Pride*, pg. 239; *02ROME4292: GPS/Galileo consultations in Italy*. Rome Embassy, September 4, 2002.

[141] WL: *03ROME3567: Galileo: Ambassador Aragona advocates additional technical talks to resolve M-Code overlay issue*. Rome Embassy, August 6, 2003; WL: *03ROME4746: Galileo/M-Code: Increased high-level Italian attention -- but no answers*. Rome Embassy, October 17, 2003.

[142] WL: *03ROME4746: Galileo/M-Code: Increased high-level Italian attention -- but no answers*. Rome Embassy, October 17, 2003.

protected.[143] The United States attempted to break through this evasion by raising the political stakes. They warned that "the culminating act of Italy's EU Presidency could be a major transatlantic train wreck" if overlay was not solved.[144] This came at the same time as the Presidency was threatened by the impasse on the Constitution and the ESDP Mini-Summit's ramifications discussed in the previous chapter.

Although there were some indications that an agreement could be reached, nothing happened until late 2003. In April of that year, anonymous sources in the EU said that the Commission might be willing to move PRS "slightly," but only if an overall solution was reached.[145] A government official said that "We now accept that, yes, the U.S. will be able to jam our signal without jamming the GPS signal. We no longer are adopting the view that it is strategically important to have mutually assured jamming capabilities. But let's be clear: Our agreement on this is subject to a global political agreement with the U.S. on how Galileo and GPS will cooperate."[146] However, this initial opening did not lead to an agreement. Chief US negotiator Ralph Braibanti said in May 2003 that "We have talked ourselves to death on both sides, hoping the issue would work itself out."[147]

The impasse endured, in part, because the US was not willing to compromise on the M-code. In March 2003, Julie Karner of the State Department gave a presentation in which she reiterated the same points the US had been making for years, saying that the "Most

---

[143] WL: *03ROME3567: Galileo: Ambassador Aragona advocates additional technical talks to resolve M-Code overlay issue*. Rome Embassy, August 6, 2003.

[144] WL: *03ROME4495: Italian views on Galileo's next steps*. Rome Embassy, September 30, 2003.

[145] Gleason (2009). *Galileo: Power, Pride, and Profit*, pg. 240.

[146] de Selding, Peter B. (2003). "Europe Takes Steps To Prevent Galileo From Interfering with GPS Military Code," *Space News*. April 15, 2003.

[147] Gleason (2009). *Galileo: Power, Pride, and Profit*, pg. 241.

serious issue is M-code overlay."[148] The US had provided a classified briefing at NATO to EU member states telling them what the Commission's position meant for the allied military structure. According to Karner, "All NATO nations agree: No matter how secure, no matter how well the service is encrypted, no matter how rigorous equipment access is controlled, Risk of compromise cannot be ruled out."[149] At discussions in Washington in the spring and summer of 2003 and in London in September, the US refused to compromise on M-code and linked the dispute to wider issues, stating that the transatlantic relationship was "at risk" because of Galileo.[150]

At the Hague on November 19, 2003, the EU proposed a new signal structure for Galileo to avoid overlay, moving its position outside the M-code spectrum.[151] This was the key in breaking the impasse. By December, an informal agreement had been reached. While it needed to be finalized, and issues relating to market access and Chinese involvement were not resolved, settling the issue of the M-code changed the tone of all press statements. From non-negotiable impasses, "satellite navigation now clearly appear[ed] to be an area that [was] going to clearly add to the strength of the transatlantic partnership," according to Braibanti.[152]

This agreement was reached because the EU "blinked first" in the standoff.[153] According to an official from EADS Astrium UK, one of Galileo's primary contractors, "In

---

[148] Karner, Julie (2003). *The Global Positioning System: International Cooperation*. March 2003 accessible at, http://navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/cgsicMeetings/41//6%20Karner%20Intl.ppt.

[149] Ibid., slide 20.

[150] Ibid., slide 23.

[151] -----, (2004). "U.S., Europe work toward mutual cooperation on global positioning, Galileo satellite system", *States News Service*. Washington, January 8, 2004.

[152] Thurston, Michael (2004). "EU, US trumpet 'win-win' accord in satellites row", *Agence France Presse*. February 26, 2004.

[153] -----, (2004). "Galileo fudged," *New Scientist*, July 3, 2004.

the end, Europe moved… It wasn't the absolute optimum solution that Europe wanted, but it was close enough."[154] In the final agreement United States got Galileo to move off of the M-code frequency and secure market protection for GPS in Europe. The US pressed the EU to ensure that China was excluded from any political control of Galileo, to the point that by 2006, China pulled out of the system and began work on its own GNSS. In exchange, the US offered to move the next generation GPS civilian signal to Galileo's open signal – making Galileo the world standard – as well as offering technological support from the Pentagon.[155] The United States preserved the navigation warfare capabilities of NATO and Europe was in the global navigation satellite business. In the following months, technical details were finalized, and on June 28, 2004 at a US-EU summit in Ireland, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Commission Vice-President Loyola de Palacio and Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen signed the "Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications."[156]

In understanding this rapid capitulation, it is necessary to recall the state of Galileo and what kind of leverage each side was able to bring to the negotiating table. The Commission, and DG TREN specifically, led negotiations for the EU. This insulated them somewhat from direct American pressure, since DG TREN had no NATO connection and fended off attempts to bring the issue to NATO. The Commission also had the legal right to the frequencies. However, the Commission did not have the same political standing as the member states' heads of government. After the failure of the December 2001 Transport Council meeting, DG TREN was reduced to lobbying member states to approve

---

[154] Ibid. and Gleason (2009). *Galileo: Power, Profit, or Pride*, pg. 242.

[155] Taverna, Michael A., Barrie, Douglas, and Wall, Robert (2004). "Europe, US Resolve Galileo Dispute", *Aviation Week and Space Technology*. March 7, 2004.

[156] Available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7384/7384.pdf Accessed February 17, 2012.

Development Phase funding, and the money was passed only when the German and Danish Cabinets backed the plan and the European Council gave unanimous consent in March 2002. The Commission also suffered from a decreasing window for Galileo. According to PricewatershouseCoopers, Galileo required as much time as possible to gain market share before GPS was modernized to the same level of accuracy and integrity. It was expected that Galileo would be operational in 2008 and the new GPS "1 or 2 years thereafter."[157] The EU would also lose the frequencies they were allotted if they did not launch a satellite by 2006.[158] With the funding disputes between Germany, Italy, Spain and Belgium, the program had lost valuable time.

The United States was able to take advantage of these weaknesses in the Commission's position. It could lobby member states and cause enough worry to delay the process. It could offer incentives, as it did with the offer of Pentagon support, to make this project more viable. And the United States had one more card they could play. If M-code overlay was not resolved, and if the United States were to be in a situation where Galileo threatened the safety of its soldiers, the US was willing to shoot down Galileo. At a conference entitled "Future of Transatlantic Military Space Relations" at the UK's Royal United Services Institute in October 2004, Pentagon officials admitted this. According to a senior European delegate, "The Americans were very calm. They made it clear that they would attempt what they called reversible action, but, if necessary, they would use irreversible action."[159] This was confirmed by a doctrine document from August 2, 2004, in which Under-Secretary of the Air Force discusses what might the military be forced to do if

---

[157] PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001). *Inception Study to Support the Development of a Business Plan for the GALILEO Programme*, pg. 4.

[158] Kelly, Emma (2002). "Decision Day", *Flight International*. March 5, 2002.

[159] -----, (2004). "Pentagon would attack EU satellites in wartime", *Sunday Business*. London, October 24, 2004.

enemies use Galileo against the US.[160] There is no indication that this possibility was discussed in the negotiations leading up to the agreement. However, it is the logical outcome of the repeated American statements that M-code overlay was unacceptable to the US and that no compromise was possible.

Therefore, it seems that the final agreement on Galileo was the product of American pressure applied on a faltering Commission position, indicating that the US was, in the end, a causal player in the decision-making process. With their business model becoming untenable through delays (and in fact, Galileo would have to be bailed out through unspent Common Agricultural Policy funds in 2007) and member states possibly regaining interest in micromanaging the project, Brussels' "optimal solution" became unrealistic and settling the matter held more benefits than a protracted standoff.

III: CONCLUSIONS

Though the Commission played a pivotal role in lobbying for Galileo, it was the member states which the authority to fund Galileo. Their decisions demonstrate the strength of intra-EU dynamics in this case study, which nearly blocked the United States from involvement in this episode.

France is frequently cited as the state most supportive of Galileo. This was for reasons of military growth, industrial reasons, and EU prestige and capabilities. France had been one of the European leaders in the 1980s for developing autonomous satellite telecommunications and imaging capabilities, with the Syracuse and Helios

[160] Ibid.

constellations.[161] However, French space funding had been cut by half in the latter years of the 1990s as money was diverted to other aspects of military modernization.[162] Therefore, pushing for Galileo would commit additional national resources to military satellite technology, as well as leveraging the budgets of other member states to reach an economy of scale that would allow for a global system. The choice to make a military procurement project multilateral when faced with national budget constraints is not unique to Galileo nor to France. It follows the path trod by the Eurofighter Typhoon (UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain) and the Joint Strike Fighter (USA, UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Turkey, Australia, Norway and Denmark), and would be followed by Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy's agreement to maintain a joint aircraft carrier group.[163]

For France, the EU could also be a platform for its national military interests. The CEO of OHB-System, Germany's leading satellite manufacturer and expected builder of half of Galileo's satellites, described the system as "a stupid idea that primarily serves French interests." He also described it as "a waste of EU tax payers' money championed by French interests."[164] France wanted Galileo so that its missile guidance systems would not be reliant on GPS, to preserve national political autonomy from the US, and wanted to make it ITAR-free, to protect sales to third-parties from American restrictions. Galileo was an instrument for French national interests and the French national military establishment and the drive to build Galileo regardless of assured private sector involvement (which was

---

[161] The first Syracuse (Système de Radiocommunication utilisant un Satellite) was launched in 1984 and serves both France Telecom and the French navy. Gregory, Shaun (1990). "French nuclear command and control," *Defense Analysis*. **6**(1). 49-68, pg. 55.

[162] Taverna (2002). "French Brass Urge Milspace Teamwork," March 11, 2002.

[163] Hartley, Keith (2008). "Collaboration and European Defence Industrial Policy," *Defence and Peace Economics*. **19**(4). 303-315; -----, (2010). "Cameron and Sarkozy hail UK-France defence treaties", *BBC News*. London, November 2, 2010.

[164] WL: *09BERLIN1324: OHB-System CEO Calls Galileo a Waste of German Tax Payer Money*. Berlin Embassy, October 22, 2009.

uncertain at the December 2000 and December 2001 Transport Councils) reflects the primacy of these national interests.

It is not to say that European interests did not also impact the French position. Chirac spoke of Galileo as protection for Europe's future as an autonomous political entity, arguing that with Galileo, "We would not have to accept Europe's subjugation in space matters."[165] Galileo would be useful for French national interests as well as supporting France's interest in a strong and autonomous EU in both commercial and security fields. However, for it to pass in the Council, France would need the support of other member states.

Germany and Italy were swayed more by commercial and industrial reasons than political drives. This is shown in their willingness to risk Galileo's fate in their funding disputes of late 2002 and early 2003. Each desired that the greatest share of Galileo's funds benefit their own national aerospace sectors and, in so doing, delayed Galileo's development and reduced its window of opportunity to consolidate market share over the upgraded GPS. It appears that their compromise was not due to political affiliation to the project, but to ensure that the project, and its benefits to this industrial sector, did not completely disappear. In Italy's initial support for Galileo, industrial concerns seemed to have been a driving force, since it and Spain were France's greatest allies. Germany was more concerned with costs in 2000 and 2001 than political advantages and for that reason delayed funding the project. When it switched opinion on the Development Phase, it aggressively pursued the greatest returns, again delaying the project. This indicates that the switch was due to seeing Galileo, rather than a burden for their budget, as an opportunity for their aerospace sector. Spain seemed to use a similar calculus, as it stood to benefit from its advanced aerospace sector

---

[165] -----, (2002). "EU SUMMIT: Leaders approve 3.4bln eur Galileo satellite navigation system", March 16, 2002.

and the location of the EU's satellite center in Torrejón.

However, though national concerns may have driven support for Galileo, the process of negotiations was shaped by membership in the EU. Italy, although sympathetic to American concerns – the Minster of Defense fully supported the US and the Transportation Minister brought up overlay to de Palacio after a Transport Council meeting – refused to negotiate separately with the US. Libassi stated that Italy "did not want to weaken the European Commission by pursuing a separate Galileo dialogue with the United States and that Italy intends to give its 'full, loyal support to the [Commission]' in this matter."[166] The CEO of Alenia Spazio, whom the US Embassy believed to be one of the two most important figures in Italy for Galileo, said that policy was dictated by a combination of the ESA, the Commission, and French officials. Libassi was nominally Italy's leader on Galileo policy, but he in fact only coordinated among agencies to support the policies coming from Brussels.[167] This was not due to an Italian disinterest in the project, given its early support and funding brinksmanship, but rather a decision that their industrial interests were best served by allowing the Commission to pursue joint negotiations.[168] This is best explained in a Europeanization framework. Italy saw the EU as a coordination point and accepted its authority on a security-related matter even though the United States strongly pressured it to break ranks. Germany and Spain similarly saw gains to be made by funneling funds through the Commission and accepting DG TREN leadership on a project of national importance. They altered their national response to the US to maintain EU unity and the specifics of the project they were to fund would be determined by the Commission. The result was to treat

---

[166] WL: *02ROME4292: GPS/Galileo consultations in Italy*. Rome Embassy, September 4, 2002.

[167] WL: *03ROME4766: Galileo discussion with Alenia's Virgilio*. Rome Embassy, October 2, 2003.

[168] WL: *03ROME3567: Galileo: Ambassador Aragona advocates additional technical talks to resolve M-Code overlay issue*. Rome Embassy, August 6, 2003.

an issue of foreign and security policy as a Commission-driven trade negotiation.

The United Kingdom is a much simpler and clearer picture of the EU altering member state preferences. Initially the UK was opposed to Galileo. It had no compelling need for the system, since it used American satellites and its own constellation.[169] It was concerned with Galileo's implications for NATO and opposed using Galileo for military purposes.[170] It also believed that costs would outweigh the benefits. There was no reason for the UK to support Galileo except for the fact that, with Germany and Denmark announcing their support, they knew that it would happen. Not wishing to be marginalized, Blair traded support for Galileo for energy market liberalization at the European Council in Barcelona. The European Union, and its rules on Qualified Majority Voting, forced a volte-face in British policy and the political trade-offs made possible by the internal market suggested Blair's course of action. In the British case, the EU had complete causality and the United States was completely out of the decision-making process.

The UK, France, Germany and Spain show the importance of the institutional dynamics of the EU. Brussels acted as a coordination point for Italy, Spain and Germany when competing for industrial contracts and the voting rules of the Transport Council served as positive integrative force for Britain. Interestingly, this was not a debate between member states. In the previous chapter, member states generally acted in a unitary fashion; one can say that France and Belgium supported Tervuren while Britain and Italy did not. On Galileo, however, the alliances were cross-national coalitions of supporters and detractors. In late 2001, when Development Funds were being decided, research ministers were mostly in

---

[169] Taverna (2002). "French Brass Urge Milspace Teamwork," March 11, 2002.

[170] -----, (2001). "Netherlands urges non-military use of EU's Galileo satellite system", *AFX*. April 5, 2001; -----, (2002). "Galileo Feuding Involves Financial, Political and Foreign Relations Issues," January 21, 2002.

favor of Galileo (with only Britain and Denmark voting against it), while transport ministers were more hesitant (those two countries being joined by the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria and Germany), who were supported by their cost-conscious finance ministers. Defense ministers, meanwhile, were interested in Galileo and its possibility for new weapons systems, but were wary of strongly supporting it for fear of being asked to pay for the project.[171] Later, when the US asked for Galileo's frequencies to be moved, Defense Ministers acknowledged the importance of GPS for NATO, while transport ministers claimed that the issue, though an aspect of the system they controlled, was outside of their competence.[172] Such transnational bureaucratic alliances exist in other institutional frameworks, in which functional linkages may trump national boundaries.[173] Here that institutional framework was the EU, which shaped the environment for the actors and provided the negotiators in dealings with the United States.

The lead role of the EU and Galileo's location in a supranational part of the institution makes this a least likely case for American involvement and, initially, American involvement was prevented. The US wanted Europe to forget about an independent GNSS and to spend money on upgrading other aspects of their military. This did not happen. The US then wished for Europe to build a supplementary sub-system to GPS, which again the EU did not do. Until 2001, the United States, though attempting to enter the debate, was unable to do so. The first success that the United States had was in contributing to the decision to ensure that Galileo was a civilian project, even though it had dual-use capabilities. France was "the major proponent of military use for Galileo as part of making

---

[171] Taverna (1999). "Europe Launches Satnav Project", July 5, 1999.

[172] WL: *02ROME6059: Italian Transport Minister discusses Galileo with de Palacio*. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2002.

[173] For example, Neustadt described the intertwined political establishments of Britain and the US in Neustadt, Richard E. (1970). *Alliance politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Europe independent from the U.S. and to support European military efforts" and a military view of Galileo was supported at times by Commission President Prodi.[174] The Netherlands, supported by Britain and Denmark, strongly opposed dual-use for Galileo. It is possible that it is a coincidence that this Europeanist move was blocked by some of the most Atlanticist countries, but seems unlikely.

This was a minor American victory (and indication that it could be a spoiler), but American pressure, in the form of Wolfowitz's letter in December 2001 and subsequent letters in the spring of 2002 could not prevent Development Funds from being released and, given the sunk costs of over a billion euros, later prevent Galileo from being developed. The US accommodated the creation of Galileo and concentrated on three specific questions raised by the system: ensuring market access for American firms and non-discrimination to GPS; preventing excessive Chinese involvement; and preventing M-code overlay. On all three areas the US was successful, even though these deals led to costs for the EU. Business non-discrimination removed a possible source of revenue for Galileo. Strict political controls on Galileo led China to leave Galileo and develop their own satellite constellation in 2006, losing future investment for the EU.[175] And M-code overlay meant that Galileo shifted their signal to a less technically optimal spectrum.

In these areas, the US seems to have acted as a spoiler or veto player, in that they preserved what was, by that point, the status quo. The US went to great lengths to communicate their opinions and in terms of the lobbying campaign they exerted. They also

---

[174] -----, (2001). "Netherlands urges non-military use of EU's Galileo satellite system", April 5, 2001.

[175] This rupture did not occur at the same time as the June 2004 agreement but was the result of lobbying pressure applied during the 2001-2004 period. In December 2003, for example, an official at Galileo Industries, the primary construction company formed by a joint venture of major European aerospace firms, saw Chinese involvement as a risk to relations with the US and warned that "We cannot break our good relations with the United States." WL: *03ROME5491: Galileo comments at Rome Conference on space and security policy*. Rome Embassy, December 5, 2003.

took active steps by offering compensatory measures to the EU in technical assistance and coordinating the next generation of GPS with Galileo. This would imply a spoiler. However, as Pentagon officials stated in October 2004, the US was willing to take "irreversible action" against Galileo if need be.[176] This could be considered a veto point. American insistence on the integrity of its NAVWAR capabilities and willingness to defend them offered the US control on the debate at that hypothetical extremity. That such an action would come to pass is highly unlikely but it fit with American absolutism on the issue. This attitude and the unrelenting messaging conveying presented a blocking opposition and seem to have convinced the EU to "blink first."[177]

The Galileo satellite system by the end of 2004 could be seen as metaphor for the political pressures that went into creating it. Largely, it was a European system, the product of Commission enterprise and the support, active or reluctant, of its member states. Yet it had been shaped in some areas, such as its frequency decisions and business model, by American demands and in accordance with an agreement with the United States. In this case the United States, overall, acted as a veto player, but only willing or able to deploy a "veto" on issues of core national interests. Though it opposed Galileo from its initial conception, trying to cast it as a misallocation of military assets, it was unable to overcome the strong national concerns of France, Italy, Germany and Spain or the internal voting system of the EU. For more than two years it was also unable to break into the EU negotiating process. Member states like Italy deferred to Brussels and the civilian DG TREN negotiators dismissed the US's security concerns. It was only on a few "red line" issues, most notably M-code overlay, where the US was able to enter the EU decision-making process. Yet even

---

[176] -----, (2004). "Pentagon would attack EU satellites in wartime", October 24, 2004.

[177] -----, (2004). "Galileo fudged," July 3, 2004

with EU negotiators stymieing their tactics and a billion euros invested, the US was able to shape a rival satellite system.

CHAPTER 5

ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA

The final case study of this thesis is the dispute surrounding the European Union's arms embargo on the People's Republic of China. This case study is a least-likely case of American involvement. Though the US lobbied heavily against the EU lifting the embargo, consensus was reached in December 2004. Traditional American access points, such as the Atlanticist countries, were set on lifting the embargo and the official announcement was less than a month away when a disastrous EU delegation trip to Washington alerted EU governments to the severity of American opposition. European consensus then quickly crumbled, to the embarrassment of the EU and the dismay of China, who had been lobbying vigorously in favor of lifting.

Timeline of Embargo Episode

June 27, 1989	Embargo enacted
June 30, 2003	French Def. Min. supports lifting embargo
Dec 1	Chancellor Schröder supports lifting embargo
Jan 26, 2004	GAERC votes 14-1 not to lift embargo
Apr 2	Divided PSC has "heated" discussion on embargo
Oct 7	US passes HConRes 512, calling on EU not to lift
Nov 22	GAERC approves lifting embargo
Dec 17	Council approves lifting within six months
Mar 14, 2005	China passes Anti-Secession Law
Mar 21	Giannella-led delegation to Washington
April 15	GAERC further than ever to lifting

This case shows an EU resilient to American pressure for over a year, with intra-EU dynamics and the institutional reputation of the EU taking precedence over US concerns. Actors within the EU, including the Trade

Commissioner and the UK's Director General for Political Affairs in the Foreign Office, assumed that the US had no choice but to accommodate the inevitable EU decision to lift the embargo.[1] Nonetheless, the episode ended with member states seeking Washington's approval before taking action, a clear indicator of a veto player in the EU's security policy.

I: GAINING CONSENSUS

THE ORIGINS OF THE EMBARGO

In the spring and summer of 1989, as the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe was crumbling, pro-democracy demonstrations spread across China. After the death of reformer Hu Yaobeng, who had been forced out of office as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by hardliners two years earlier, students and activists gathered to pay tribute to him in major cities. In Beijing, over a hundred thousand congregated in the city's central plaza, Tiananmen Square. The protesters remained for weeks demanding media liberalization, democratic reform, and market expansion. The central government opted to forcibly suppress this burgeoning uprising and, during the night of June 3, 1989, and into the morning of June 4, armored personnel carriers and troops of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) stormed the square, killing hundreds of unarmed civilians.[2] Nationwide arrests of those in government and society suspected of collaboration with the protesters soon followed.

---

[1] WL: *04BRUSSELS3333: EU/China arms embargo: readout of UK PolDir Sawers meeting with Japanese DFM Tanaka*. Brussels Embassy, August 5, 2004.

[2] No exact death toll has ever been produced. The Chinese government states that 200 civilians and "several dozen" soldiers died. Amnesty International claims close to 1,000 civilians were killed. -----, (1990). "How Many Really Died?," *Time Magazine*, June 4, 1990.

The bloodshed and death were broadcast on television to a worldwide audience and countries swiftly condemned what became known as the Tiananmen Square massacres. Japan froze negotiations on a $6 billion loan package.[3] Australia placed an arms embargo against China.[4] The United States Congress and President George H.W. Bush cut off high level ambassadorial visits as well as instituting an arms embargo, which was incorporated into law, effective from June 5, 1989.[5] West Germany, Italy and Belgium suspended all grants, loans and aid to China. The Netherlands cancelled a state visit by Queen Beatrix. The United Kingdom and Switzerland imposed arms embargoes.[6] On June 6, the twelve member states of the then European Community issued a joint statement condemning the massacre.[7] They released a follow-up declaration at the European Council summit in Madrid on June 26-27, 1989. In the second statement, the Council condemned the "brutal repression taking place in China" and called on China to "respect human rights and to take into account the hopes for freedom and democracy deeply felt by the population." The Council enacted six measures, a collection of its member states' existing sanctions:

1. raising the issue of human rights in China in the appropriate international fora: asking for the admittance of independent observers to attend the

---

[3] Foot, Rosemary, (2000). *Rights beyond borders: the global community and the struggle over human rights in China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pg. 117

[4] Archick, Kristen; Grimmett, Richard; and Kan, Shirley (2005). "European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service. May 27, 2005, pg. 20.

[5] Public Law 101-246. The text of the law is clear: "Notice is hereby given that all licenses and approvals to export defense articles and defense services from the United States to the People's Republic of China pursuant to section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act are suspended effective immediately… This suspension includes manufacturing license and technical assistance agreements." State Department (1989). "Notice of Arms Embargo," in The Federal Register, Vol. 54, Issue 108, pg. 24539.

[6] Talmadge, Eric (1989). "Governments prepare to evacuate citizens; protests continue", *Associated Press*. June 6, 1989.

[7] The members of the EC at the time of the declarations were: Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.

trials and to visit the prisons,

2. interruption by the member states of the [European] Community of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in arms with China.
3. suspension of bilateral Ministerial and High Level contacts,
4. postponement by the community and its member states of new cooperation projects.
5. reduction of programmes of cultural, scientific and technical cooperation to only those activities that might maintain a meaning in the present circumstances,
6. prolongation by the member states of visas to Chinese students who wish it.[8]

These sanctions isolated China politically to a greater extent than at any time since the Cultural Revolution. The global condemnation had a material effect, costing China as much as $11 billion in aid over four years.[9] But the sanctions were not permanent nor all-encompassing. The ban on high-level contacts never applied to the United Kingdom or Portugal, who were negotiating, respectively, the returns of Hong Kong and Macao to China.[10] France and Italy offered new loans in February 1990 and Germany followed in April.[11] Gradually, the EC sanctions fell away and little more than a year after the declaration, on October 22, 1990, the Council agreed to ease restrictions on high-level contacts for all member states and to resume cooperation projects. This return to normality had been accelerated by outside events. China used its vote on the UN Security Council authorizing the Gulf War as leverage with Western countries.[12] Communist-controlled

---

[8] European Council (1989). "Declaration on China," Madrid: June 26-27, 1989.

[9] Foot (2000). *Rights beyond borders: the global community and the struggle over human rights in China*, pg 117.

[10] Hong Kong reverted to China in 1997 and Macao in 1999.

[11] Foot (2000.) *Rights beyond borders: the global community and the struggle over human rights in China*, pg. 129.

[12] UNSC Resolution 678 authorizing the war passed on November 29, 1990 with China abstaining from voting in favor or from vetoing the resolution.

governments had fallen peacefully across central and eastern Europe, Germany had reunified, and the era of June 4th seemed long past. Other sanctioning nations followed similar paths. Japan quickly resumed economic links to counter the beginning of its decade-long recession. Australia lifted its arms embargo in 1992. The United States resumed high-level contacts in July 1990.

In both Europe and America, the arms embargo endured. But while in the US the embargo was legally defined, in Europe its details were never confirmed. Member states tried and failed to create an EC-wide list of products banned from trade. They could only agree to a mutual understanding not to sell lethal weapons to China.[13] All additional definitions were left to the discretion of member states. The European Council created a working group on conventional arms exports to coordinate national exports but their measures applied only to purely military items (often covered under the "lethal" provision of the embargo agreement) and to embargoes levied in the future.[14]

National definitions differed greatly, usually tending towards laxer restrictions among arms exporting countries. In the United Kingdom, the government precluded from sale "lethal weapons…, specifically designed components of [lethal weapons], military aircraft and helicopters, vessals of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms; any equipment which is likely to be used for internal repression."[15] This, and other policies similar to it, created the space for member states to keep a nearly constant trade in military goods with China.

---

[13] Shafer, James *et. al.*, (1998). "China: Military Imports from the United States and the European Union since the 1989 Embargoes," U.S. General Accounting Office / National Security and International Affairs Division, June 1998.

[14] Kreutz, Joakim (2005). *Hard Measures by a Soft Power?: Sanctions policy of the European Union 1981-2004*. Bonn International Center for Conversion: paper 45, pg. 10.

[15] SIPRI. (2004). *UK interpretation of arms embargo against China*. Available at http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/euchiuk.html. Accessed May 18, 2008.

In 1996, the French government tried to sell the obsolete aircraft carrier *Clemenceau* to China. The French Foreign Ministry considered the embargo outdated and tried to find loopholes, such as classifying the sale as a gift or by allowing China to purchase only the non-lethal electronic systems in the carrier.[16] The deal never materialized but it demonstrated a disregard for the spirit of the embargo which was arguably present in other states. The United Kingdom sold Searchwater maritime radar in 1996. Italy sold air combat radar in 2002. France built a utility helicopter by license with a Chinese defense firm in 2001. All of these products fit the requirements of "non-lethal," but were clearly of use to the Chinese military, which has its greatest needs for import in what it cannot produce itself – the high-tech field of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).[17] Additionally, the utility chopper was quickly modified into an attack variant and all were reverse engineered, i.e. taken apart to discover how they were made, boosting the Chinese military's overall technological prowess. European states sold €210 million worth of military goods to China in 2002 and €416 million in 2003. Whether the arms embargo was effective was debatable. Clearly, products of military value were being sold to China. However, China was the world's largest military importer ($2.3 billion from Russia alone in 2004) and the political considerations of the embargo, perhaps, kept member states from allowing much larger sales.[18]

---

[16] Sakhuja, Vijay (2000). "Dragon's Dragonfly: The Chinese Aircraft Carrier," *Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses*. **24**(7). October 2000.

[17] A complete list of exports can be found in a report to the United States Congress on the issue. Archick (2005). "European Union's Arms Embargo," pg. 37.

[18] Imports from Russia consisted of 5% of China's declared military budget. Kohlmeier, Gabrielle, "EU Eyes Lifting China Arms Embargo," *Arms Control Today* **34**(7), September 2004; Archick (2005). "European Union's Arms Embargo," pg. 14.

THE LEGALITIES OF THE EMBARGO

The declaration that created the embargo was enacted under the auspices of European Political Cooperation. As codified in Title III of the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, effectively a separate "treaty" contained with the SEA, EPC encouraged the member states to consult each other on foreign policy matters of general interest, and to keep the Commission and European Parliament informed of negotiations.[19] But besides mandating quarterly meetings of heads of government and Foreign Ministers, there was no legal obligation for member states to discuss matters at the European level, nor to implement what was agreed there. All matters under EPC were intergovernmental in nature and subject to national decisions.

Embargoes, because they are connected with trade, are mentioned in the earlier treaties of the economically-focused EC. Article 301 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome states that economic relations with a non-member state can be interrupted by a common decision of the European Community. However, Article 57 specifically says that arms embargos are the responsibility of member states. The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in 1992 at Maastricht, makes Council Resolutions and Declarations more binding, but leaves to member states the ability to impose or revoke an arms embargo unilaterally. Maastricht also introduced the instrument of a Common Resolution, which gave some legal weight to foreign policy decisions. In the years since Maastricht, all previous EPC sanctions regimes were reintroduced as Common Resolutions –except for the arms embargo on China. It is the only sanction policy of the EU not to be made into a Common Resolution, indicating that

[19] SEA Article 30.3.b, Article 30.4.

throughout the 1990s it was seen as unique and a "highly sensitive case."[20] It remains founded on the 1989 Joint Declaration of the European Council, which, as an EPC initiative, is not legally binding.[21] Should any member state wish to revoke the arms embargo unilaterally, it can. Should any state wish to keep the embargo in name, but to ignore its provisions, it can. Power to determine the course of the embargo rests solely with the European Council. The European Commission might comment on the policy, but has no jurisdiction. Neither does the European Parliament nor European Court of Justice. The supranational bodies and legal system of the EU are marginalized on this policy. The only power the embargo possesses is what the heads of government of the member states collectively decide it has. There is nothing except their own opinions that prevent them from revoking it.

Arms sales are similar to the embargo – the privilege of member states, with the only real constraint the opinions of others. Article 57 of the Treaty of Rome, which was renumbered Article 223 in the Treaty of Maastricht and 296 in the consolidated Nice Treaty, states that "(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes."[22] In simpler language, arms are exempt from the common market. If a state invokes Article 296 on a certain product, it does not need to

---

[20] Sandschneider, Eberhard (2006). "Is China's military modernization a concern for the EU?" in *Facing China's Rise*, Zaborowski, editor. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.

[21] Kreutz, Joakim (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the Clash between Value and Rationale in the European Security Strategy," *Perspectives: The Central European Review of International Affairs*. **22**. September 2004, pg. 46.

[22] Official Journal C 325, 24/12/2002 P. 0148 – 0149.

follow Commission procedures. The Commission has begun to claw back the abuse of this practice. It recently ruled that Spain could not exempt defense goods from Value Added Tax, and that internal goods transfers ought to be made in accordance with EU regulations.[23] Yet on the issue of arms exports to third countries, such as China, Article 296 leaves ultimate authority – when binding Council Resolutions are not in place – to the member states. Given the reliance of European arms makers on foreign markets, arms sales could easily be argued to be "necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security" as they are crucial for European states to maintain domestic arms industries.

ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE

On June 30, 2003, the French Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie, on a visit to Beijing, said that her government was "working hard" to remove the EU arms embargo on China.[24] Her comments went largely unnoticed. Since the failure to sell the *Clemenceau*, the embargo had been a dormant issue in Europe. Moreover, the ability to lift the embargo did not lie with the Defense Ministry and it was assumed that the remarks were mere rhetoric, part of the ongoing diplomatic push for better Sino-French relations. In addition to cooperation on Galileo, the "Year of China" would start in France in October 2003 and be followed by a "Year of France" in China in October 2004. But other actors had been discussing the embargo as well. China had lobbied the EU and member states for removal of the embargo

---

[23] Bratanova, Elena (2004). *Legal Limits of National Defense Privilege in the European Union: Overview of the recent European Court of Justice judgement on Art. 296 European Community Treaty and the new role of the Commission in armaments: A step towards a single market in armaments?* Bonn International Center for Conversion: Bonn.

[24] -----, (2003). "French defense minister says country working to lift EU arms embargo on China", *Associated Press Worldstream*. June 30, 2003.

since 1997 and it increased pressure in 2003.[25] In an October 2003 meeting of the Foreign Affairs committee of the Swedish Parliament, Foreign Minister Laila Freiwalds revealed that China had been "very assertive" towards the EU during recent trade and tourism negotiations. Chinese officials stressed that removing the embargo would have an important symbolic effect towards building goodwill in Sino-European relations.[26] They noted that the only other states subject to EU arms embargoes were Burma, Zimbabwe, and the Sudan, not the kind of company for the EU's third largest trade partner.[27] China made a formal request to have the arms embargo eliminated in a strategy paper on the European Union released October 13, 2003. The final line of the paper states: "The EU should lift its ban on arms sales to China at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defense industry and technologies."[28] The Chinese delegation brought up the issue once more at the 6th China-EU summit in Beijing on October 30, 2003, but nothing was decided or noted in the conclusions of that meeting.[29]

European defense firms advocated lifting the arms ban. Phillipe Camus, CEO of the Franco-German-Spanish European Aeronautic and Space Defense Company (EADS), said on November 19, 2003, that the embargo was "obsolete" and "out-of-date."[30] This was the same month that EADS bought a large share of a Chinese aerospace company at its initial

---

[25] Kreutz (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the Clash between Value and Rationale in the European Security Strategy," pg. 48.

[26] Ibid. pg. 49.

[27] China would become the second largest trade partner in 2004. -----, (2004). "China now second trade parner of EU25." Eurostat Press Release: December 7, 2004.

[28] Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003). *EU Policy Paper*, October 13, 2003. Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/ceupp/t27708.htm.

[29] -----, (2003) *Sixth China-EU Summit: Joint Press Statement*. 13424/03 (Presse 298) October 30, 2003.

[30] -----, (2003). "Roundup: Europe's companies urge removal of ban on high-tech exports to China", *Xinhua General News Service*. November 26, 2003.

public offering.[31] Other firms echoed EADS, especially those involved in the Galileo project. In September 2003, China announced that it would invest €230 million, a fifth of the total project's estimated cost, and the EU revised its scientific security regulations to allow scientists from China's military-run space program to collaborate.[32] To these companies, the embargo was simply an obstacle to accessing the burgeoning Chinese market. In addition to annual economic growth rates around 10%, China's publicly acknowledged military spending had grown by 17% in 2002, and most intelligence agencies suspected the true number was even higher.[33] Moreover, China at this time was the "one bright spot amid the gloom pervading the world airline industry" following the 2001 recession and drop in air travel after the September 11th attacks.[34] Access to the Chinese market was crucial for these companies and their military and civilian product lines. SNECMA, a French Galileo contributor, made motors for military and commercial aircraft and EADS owned 80% of Airbus, the European airplane conglomerate. To get into this market, it was thought that EU action was needed. In the words of an EADS spokesman, "The logic is economic, but the signatures are political."[35]

Chinese and French industrial lobbying were not the precipitating events of the dispute, though. In the same newspaper article that announced Camus' opposition to the embargo, the EU Ambassador to China stated that the EU had no plans to lift the embargo

---

[31] Tkacik, John, (2004). "Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China." Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C.: Backgrounder #1739. March 18, 2004.

[32] North, Richard, (2004). "Galileo: The Military and Political Dimensions." Bruges Group: Paper No. 47. January 17, 2004. China was the first non-European country to be involved in the project. European Commission (2006). "China Strategy Paper 2007-2013."

[33] GlobalSecurity.org (2009). "China's Defense Budget." Accessed February 23, 2009, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm.

[34] -----, (2004). "Airbus aims high in China market", *People's Daily*. Beijing, January 20, 2004.

[35] -----, (2003). "Roundup," *Xinhua*, November 26, 2003.

soon and that it was a matter "strongly linked to human rights and public opinion."[36] It was not until German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, while visiting China with forty-two German business executives on December 1, 2003, announced his wish to overturn the embargo that the wheels of controversy were set in motion. With the support of France (through Alliot-Marie, assumed to be speaking for President Chirac) and Germany (through Chancellor Schröder), the proposal gained attention.

Understanding the rationale for France and Germany to support lifting the embargo helps the analysis of the American role, as it can indicate the likelihood that France and Germany could be easily swayed by American influence. There do not seem to be major external stimuli that could have triggered these new positions, such as a major change in the human rights of China or a sudden shift in the East Asian balance of power. The issue seems to have come out of the blue, which points to internal factors dominating French and German thinking. For France, which began this debate, I find three possible domestic reasons to start this dispute: an attempt to increase arms sales to China; to mitigate economic pressures; and to respond to American power.

The first and simplest reason that France might want to lift the arms embargo is so that it could sell more arms to China. Since the time of President Charles de Gaulle, France had prided itself on an autonomous foreign policy. This rested on a self-sufficient military, lest American leverage over France's materials of self-defense prevent their free hand.[37] However, the economics of modern weapons systems require large purchases to recoup the high fixed costs of research and development. France by itself could not afford to maintain a

---

[36] Ibid.

[37] Young, Marcus, Maj. US. Army (2006). "France, de Gaulle and NATO: The Paradox of French Security Policy," Air Command and Staff College. Master's Thesis: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, pg. 10.

military-industrial complex large enough for this. They needed to export products to other countries if they were to stay competitive with firms reliant on the far bigger American market.[38] Human rights and other normative concerns were rarely a limiting factor for these exports. France exported $25 billion worth of weaponry to Iraq between the 1970s and the Gulf War.[39] In the 1980s it sold radar, helicopters and ship-to-air missiles to China and, when that market closed after the embargo, it sold frigates and fighters to Taiwan.[40] Protecting these exports became an important foreign policy goal. French involvement in development of a European Fighter Aircraft ended in part because the new consortium would cut into the French share of the foreign market.[41]

China was a growing arms market that France had tried to enter with the *Clemenceau* sale in 1996 and French business leaders now were pushing to eliminate all obstacles to sales. However, France continually vowed that no new sales would happen. This could have been simply to quiet American opposition; a number of State Department officials did not trust French restraint.[42] But if the French were willing to adopt discourse against arms sales,

---

[38] In 1970, for example, the US military budget was 16 times that of France's. Data from U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/GDPC1.txt). U.S. Office of Management and Budget, (2004). "Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005," pages 45-52; NationMaster.com (source: World Development Indicators database), "GDP (1970) by country," Accessed March 8, 2009 at http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp-economy-gdp&date=1970.

[39] Laurenson, John, (2003). "France's economic ties to Iraq", *BBC News*. February 13, 2003. One major impetus for tighter national arms control in the 1990s was the experience of coalition troops facing British, French and German equipment during the Gulf War. Davis, Ian, (2002). *The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pg. 51.

[40] France sold six Lafayette FL3000 frigates and sixty Mirage 2000-5 fighters between 1991 and 1992. Johnson, Harold J., (1998). *GAO on US and Euro Military Exports to China*. U.S. Government Accounting Office, June 16, 1998, pg. 4; Cabestan, Jean-Pierre, (2001). "France's Taiwan Policy: A Case of Shopkeeper Diplomacy," at *The Role of France and Germany in Sino-Europe Relations*. Hong Kong Baptist University: June 22-23, 2001.

[41] Moravcsik, Andrew (1993). "Armaments among Allies: European Weapons Collaboration, 1975-1985," in *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, editors, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993, pg. 139.

[42] Author's interview with Charles Emmerson, Chatham House, February 2009.

it suggests that arms exports were not the primary motivation for trying to lift the EU arms embargo.

The second factor lies in the broader economic climate at the time. The French economy had felt the effects of the early 2000s recession. Real GDP growth in 2002 was only 1%, down from 3.9% in 2000 and below the EU average of 1.2%.[43] Its main trade partner, Germany, was faring even worse, at 0% growth in 2002, dropping to -0.2% in 2003. China's rise over the previous twenty years made it a large economic force, but this was not always to the immediate good of its partners. France, like most Western countries, saw its trade deficit with China increase precipitously – from €2.7 billion in 1999 to €4.9 billion in 2003.[44] The Euro continued to rise against both the dollar and Chinese renminbi, which was pegged to the dollar, hurting the competitiveness of French exports in two of the world's largest markets.[45] With a struggling economy, a sagging Eurozone, and an increasing deficit with China, the solution was obvious: sell more, particularly to China. But with the rising euro, this could not necessarily be left to the flow of the markets.

Political initiative has a strong history in Sino-French trade, traditionally dominated by singular *grands contrats*.[46] Most of France's sales to China were big purchases, billion-euro packages of aircraft and trains, which required high-level government approval from the CCP.[47] A diplomatic push from France could very likely accomplish more sales to

---

[43] Data from Eurostat.

[44] The deficit stood at almost two-thirds of the trading volume. In 2005, the EU exported €52 billion to China and imported €158 billion. European Commission (2006). "EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsbilities." October 24, 2006.

[45] From a year and a half before the embargo dispute to reaching consensus in December 2004 the euro rose by 44%. Source: Yahoo Finance.

[46] Wong, Reuben (2006). *The Europeanization of French foreign policy: France and the EU in East Asia*. French politics, society, and culture series. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. 67.

[47] Barysch, Katinka, (2005). *Embracing the Dragon: The EU's partnership with China*. London: Center for European Reform, pg 20.

China. It must be said that some do not believe China truly adjusts its business to suit political relationships. External Relations Commissioner and former Governor-General of Hong Kong Christopher Patten thinks this to be the product of Western gullibility, led on by the mirage of a billion new consumers.[48] He has written: "We cannot blame the Chinese for [suggesting political connections]. If we regularly behave like suckers, why shouldn't they treat us like suckers?"[49] However, there is evidence to support the view that the PRC uses its market as a diplomatic weapon. First, there are statements by Beijing officials, such as Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, who implied in November 2005 that trade would increase as the political relationship increased.[50] Second, there is history of such action. In 1990, the US Congress was debating renewal of Most-Favored Nation trade status for China. The House of Representatives was against renewal, partly due to the continued fallout from Tiananmen Square. China decided that it needed to act to prevent this diplomatic and material loss. The central government released 211 prisoners arrested during the post-Tiananmen crackdown and also bought $4 billion in Boeing Aircraft and large supplies of wheat.[51] Given that French exports to China are of the kind requiring political approval and that China has used its purchases for political goals, a diplomatic offensive was a logical solution to France's economic needs. A strategic choice reading of the situation also confirms the likelihood that France would use such a strategy. If, as seems likely, China blurred the lines between economics and politics, with trade deals being determined by political leadership, then the arena in which France negotiated would be a heavily politicized one. Political issues would

---

[48] Mirsky, Jonathan, (1999). "An eldorado of two billion armpits," *New Statesman*, January 22, 1999.

[49] Patten, Christopher, (2006). *Cousins and Strangers: America, Britain and Europe in a New Century*. New York: Times Books, pg. 263.

[50] -----, (2005). "China urges EU to 'trash' arms embargo," Agence France Presse, November 4, 2005.

[51] Foot (2000). *Rights beyond borders: the global community and the struggle over human rights in China*, pg. 126.

be able to be drawn in, if only because of the political nature of the actors involved. Additionally, in a study of EU-China relations, France under Chirac has been classified as a protectionist country which tried to compensate for its adversarial approach to imports from China by acquiescing to Chinese political demands.[52]

French political goals also favored increased goodwill with China at this time. Chirac had spoken openly of the need for multipolarity, to balance the American superpower. This followed the French habit of using the EU as "a force multiplier of French influence, both in Europe and beyond."[53] It is possible that Chirac wished to use relations with China to this end. By increasing French and EU ties to China, he furthered the EU's presence as a global actor and demonstrated that the EU could work globally without the United States. This echoes French policy in East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, which used "*grand geste*, symbols and 'special relationships'" as a way to send messages about US-French ties.[54]

These were compelling reasons for a political gesture towards China, but neither economics nor geopolitics specifically required the arms embargo as the chosen method. To understand why the relatively obscure EU arms embargo emerged as the center of the dispute, I turn to Putnam's two-level game model. The PRC, leading up to its October 2003 White Paper on the EU, indicated that it desired better relations with European states. France, in turn, wished for better relations with China. These goals, and the cooperation between the two countries that they required, constitute the essence of an international negotiation and can therefore be modeled as such.

---

[52] Fox, John and Godement, François (2009). *A Power Audit of EU-China Relations*. European Council on Foreign Relations: London, pg 4.

[53] Dale, Reginald (2003). "European Union, Properly Constructed," *Policy Review*. Issue 122. December 2003 & January 2004, accessed at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3446306.html.

[54] Wong (2006). *The Europeanization of French foreign policy: France and the EU in East Asia*, pg 25.

In the policy paper, the PRC had a number of specific requests for the EU and its member states. These requests were China's "win-set," i.e. measures important enough so that China could divert trade to France and still have success on the deal at the domestic level. These requests included: a strict observance of the One China policy and an avoidance of military product sales to Taiwan; not to meet with the Dalai Lama; to address human rights in China with a continuance of the EU-China dialogue instead of confrontation at international organizations; to "grant China a full market economy status at an early date, reduce and abolish anti-dumping and other discriminatory policies and practices against China… and compensate the Chinese side for its economic and trade losses which may arise due to the EU enlargement;" and that "The EU should lift its ban on arms sales to China at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defence industry and technologies."[55]

France's win-set was more limited. The first three choices – no support of Taiwan no meeting with the Dalai Lama, and no confrontation over human rights – were issues of restraint. Chirac needed a grand gesture to achieve his goals quickly and so these options were not feasible.[56] The fourth suggested avenue to goodwill was that the EU grant Market Economy Status (MES) to the PRC. This determines whether a country can, without violating World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, impose penalties on imports that it believes have benefited from unfair trade practices, such as state intervention or excessive subsidies. Many of China's cheap exports to Europe have been the target of such penalties

[55] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003). "EU Policy Paper."

[56] He nonetheless tried these ways. At the January 2004 meeting Chirac committed not to sell arms to Taiwan. Wong (2006). *The Europeanization of French foreign policy: France and the EU in East Asia*, pg 33.

and China wanted MES to protect itself from such action.[57] This is an economic issue and so falls under the First Pillar of the European Union. The European Commission would take a major role in an MES decision, diminishing the credibility of any gesture by Chirac. Further, European, and especially French, public opinion was strongly against granting MES to China.[58] This was not in Chirac's win-set as he approached China.

Lifting the arms embargo was therefore the only option that Chirac could use to generate goodwill with China. There was a domestic constituency in favor of it (defense firms), a history of selling arms, and France had no strategic interests in the region that would have blocked the deal. Unlike MES, this was a European Council decision. Chirac had much more control over the process, both within the EU and in France where it did not need to be ratified by the legislature. As the French and Chinese win-sets had only lifting the embargo else in common, Putnam's framework suggests that this would be the result of the negotiation, as it was.[59]

---

[57] China agreed to non-MES for 15 years on its accession to the WTO in 2001, but had since gained MES from New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Green, Stephen (2004). *China's quest for market economy status.* Association for Asian Research: October 6, 2004.

[58] In 2005, the EU fought a "textile war" against China, during which 75 million garments languished in European ports while a deal was brokered. An old tariff had expired, leading to a surge in Chinese imports to Europe, which triggered the imposition of a quota system from the EU. France, along with Italy, Spain and Portugal, was strongly in favor of the quotas and other measures to keep out cheap Chinese textiles. -----, (2005). "EU and China reach textile deal", September 5, 2005.

[59] Unilateral lifting of the embargo was not an option. China specifically asked that the EU as a whole lift the embargo.

Policy:	In China's win-set?	In France's win-set?
No relations with Taiwan	**Yes**	No
No relations with the Dalai Lama	**Yes**	No
No confrontation on human rights	**Yes**	No
Market economy states	**Yes**	No
Lifting arms embargo by only France	No	No
Lifting arms embargo by EU	**Yes**	**Yes**

One potential problem with this analysis is, as ever, whether we are reading into history what we expect to see. However, there is strong evidence to suggest that this type of quid pro quo negotiation is not just supported by the theories of institutional cooperation, but by the facts of the EU-China relationship. There is a sense that in dealing with China, the EU is a "*demandeur*," always seeking things from China without being able to give anything in return.[60] This is due to the skewed nature of the trading relationship between the two powers. While the EU maintains a largely free market open to Chinese imports, China has a variety of hurdles to European business in the PRC, as well as a variety of problems unique to European strengths, such as copyright fraud and intellectual property theft. Even symbolic gestures like the arms embargo are useful in giving China something in order to get significant concessions in return. There is no reason to believe this would not be true in this situation.

[60] Author's interview with Antonio Missiroli, Bureau of European Policy Advisors, European Commission, February 17, 2011.

Chancellor Schröder faced a similar economic situation to President Chirac. Germany, too, needed an economic boost; it had dropped into negative growth during 2003 as unemployment reached 5-year highs (10%) and kept rising.[61] The Chinese market was crucial for German growth, dependent on exports of heavy machinery and infrastructure products, just what China needs as it builds railroads, subways and airports to connect its vast country together.[62] Schröder had made China one of his top foreign destinations and had been termed one of China's "most persistent suitors."[63] It was a profitable relationship between the EU, led by its largest economy, and China. The PRC needed trade in general and the EU specifically to expand the number of potential trading partners and to increase China's bargaining power in contract negotiations.[64]

But Sino-European trade is not what mattered most to Schröder – he wanted to increase Sino-German trade. France had initiated the debate by showing in June 2003 its willingness to lift the embargo. Germany's choices were now constrained. It could not allow France to develop better relations with China and win big contracts for French firms. Germany and France export the same kinds of products to China; contracts diverted to French companies may come at the expense of German firms. Trains are but one example of

---

[61] -----, (2003). "German unemployment hits new high", *CNN*. Berlin, February 5, 2003. Unemployment would rise until 2007. IndexMundi, "German Unemployment Rate." Accessed March 5, 2009 at http://www.indexmundi.com/germany/unemployment_rate.html.

[62] Niblett, Robin (2004). "The United States, the European Union, and Lifting the Arms Embargo on China," *CSIS Euro-Focus*. **10**(3). September 30, 2004, pg 4.

[63] -----, (2004). "Schröder's Sixth Visit to China. Expanding Bilateral trade to 100 billion dollars", *The Atlantic Times*, December 2004.

[64] After abandoning communist tenets, the CCP's legitimacy has relied on the promise of continually rising quality of life. 8% annual growth is the unofficial minimum needed to provide jobs for the millions of Chinese who enter the work force every year and avoid social unrest. (Macartney, Jane, (2009). "China sets 8% target for economic growth", *The Times*. London, March 5, 2009.) One of the reasons China wished to eliminate the arms embargo is to introduce more potential sellers. As of 2003 it bought almost exclusively from Russia, which allowed Russia to set monopolistic price levels. Even if the EU sold no arms to China, the possibility of doing so would cause Russia to lower their prices. Department of Defense (2005). "Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005," pg. 25.

the high stakes involved. China expected to build 20,000 kilometers of railroads in the coming decades, according to the French trade minister in 2004. As the project was divided, jobs to French firms were jobs from German firms.

If the economic relationship between France and Germany towards China was intense and, at times, zero-sum, and if China manipulated its large purchases to countries that supported its positions, as was the prevailing thought among Europeans, then the competition between France and Germany can be modeled by the matrix below. Whenever France and Germany take identical positions (roughly classified as "pro-China" or "anti-China"), the PRC cannot discriminate between the two and trade occurs on a non-political basis. When the two states take opposite positions, China directs trade towards the state favoring China. France moved first in the game, taking a pro-China stance, leaving Germany with only "Trade same" or "More trade to France" as outcomes. The game now resembles a game of Chicken in which one player has disabled the steering wheel.[65] Germany's best choice was a pro-China position – in this case lifting the embargo – to maintain the trade dynamics between France and Germany.

Model of the effects of trade positions towards China		**Germany**	
		Pro-China	***Anti-China***
France	***Pro-China***	Trade same	More trade to France Less trade to Germany
	Anti-China	More trade to Germany Less trade to France	Trade same

[65] Kahn, Herman (1968). *On escalation: metaphors and scenarios*. Baltimore: Penguin, pg 11.

There are costs to taking a pro-China position, such as seeming weak on human rights, but these concerns were marginalized in two ways. First, the initial discourse surrounding the proposal downplayed the importance of the current state of human rights in China. Schröder portrayed the embargo as a response to 1989 levels of human rights abuses in the PRC, which had since improved. Second, China's special status of a human rights abuser with a rapidly growing economy, led to a division of labor between the member states and the EU.[66] The institutions in Brussels handled China as a developing state and the unpleasant aspects such as human rights, good governance, and the rule of law.[67] The member states focused on trade deals for their respective countries and, occasionally, military cooperation. France and Britain had held joint military exercises with China during the embargo controversy and hosted the Chinese navy at European ports.[68] The embargo, even though it was never under the authority of the European Commission, was handled by the External Relations Commissioner until the beginning of the dispute. For Schröder to focus on trade with China and ignore human rights was not an abrogation of Germany's support of human rights, but was a reflection of the policy portfolio of a national leader in the EU.

The embargo dispute arose through the pursuit of national commercial interests in France and Germany, with political ambitions possibly playing a part for Chirac. Possible costs, in terms of concessions on the European human rights agenda, were minimized

---

[66] This division had been created by Germany, which began pursuing aggressively pro-China policies decoupled from political values in 1993. Stumbaum, May-Britt (2007). "Engaging China - Uniting Europe? EU Foreign Policy towards China," in *European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road towards Convergence*, Casarini and Musu, editors. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pg. 74.

[67] European Commission (2006). "China Strategy Paper 2007-2013," pg. 20.

[68] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005). "China's Military Diplomacy in 2004," from http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zgjj/ssysz/FR/t244850.htm.

through entrusting that portfolio to the EU level. This would indicate difficulty for the United States to break into the debate. If the issue is connected to national leaders gaining trade deals for stagnant economies, it is unlikely for them to easily abandon the idea of lifting the embargo, especially since it was one of the only ways Chirac could make a gesture of goodwill to China without incurring overwhelming domestic costs. This indicates that if France and Germany were successful in selling this policy to the rest of the member states, then the US would most likely be an accommodator in this case.

INITIAL DIVISIONS

The issue was placed on the agenda of the December 12, 2003, European Council summit when Chirac requested a discussion of the policy. The leaders agreed to delegate the matter to their foreign ministers, who meet as the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). They were tasked "to re-examine the question of the embargo on the sale of arms to China" and did so at their meeting on January 26, 2004.[69] French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin pressed for a swift vote on the proposal to remove the embargo, acting on the wishes of Chirac and Schröder, who tried to "railroad" the proposal through the Council of Ministers.[70] According to a diplomat quoted by Reuters "Nobody backed it. Most countries said it posed problems for them."[71] A vote to immediately rescind the embargo failed 14-1.[72] However, they agreed to consider the issue again in April, and delegated the discussion to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), made up of political

---

[69] European Council (2003). "Presidency Conclusions," December 12, 2003. Point 72.

[70] Patten (2006). *Cousins and Strangers: America, Britain and Europe in a New Century*, pg. 261.

[71] -----, (2004). "France and China cozy up", *DW-World*. January 27, 2004.

[72] Tkacik (2004). "Washington Must Head Off."

directors in national foreign ministries, and to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). However, there were some results from the January GAERC meeting; it was reported that foreign ministers were open to the proposal, if not ready to act immediately.[73]

By earning a place on the European agenda, the embargo drew the attention and opinions of a number of EU actors. On December 18, 2003, the European Parliament voted 373 to 32 with 29 abstentions that China's human rights record and relations with Taiwan were enough reason for the embargo to remain.[74] The European Commission at first appeared divided. Commission President Romano Prodi seemed to support lifting the embargo whereas the spokesperson for the External Relations Commissioner stated that China needed more "concrete steps" on human rights before it could be removed, though this was changed to a more amenable position after the January 2004 Council of Ministers meeting.[75] However, Parliament and the Commission had no authority over the decision.

Domestic interest groups and national parliaments also contributed to the debate, asking leaders to explain their positions. The German Bundestag questioned Joshcka Fischer, Foreign Minister and leader of the Green Party, about the issue in December 2003. He responded that if the embargo were to be debated in the EU, human rights and China's readiness for a "peaceful settlement of the quarrel with Taiwan" would have to be improved. This was a much more complex position than Schröder had expressed in Beijing, when he called the embargo an irrelevant policy tool and, if anything, a poor reflection on China's

---

[73] Wielaard, Robert (2004). "EU may lift ban on arms sales to China", *Associated Press*. January 26, 2004.

[74] -----, (2003). "EU Parliament resists end to arms embargo against China", *AFX News*. December 19, 2003.

[75] -----, (2003). "European Parliament opposes lifting arms embargo against China", *Agence France Press*. December 20, 2003.

evolution since 1989.[76] Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen played to two different audiences. While on a trip to Beijing, he said that Denmark "does not wish to oppose lifting the arms embargo."[77] Upon his return, he explained to an angry parliament that he would only agree to lift the embargo if China made substantial progress in human rights. The parliament's foreign affairs committee agreed to an eventual repeal with this qualifying condition. The Danish position was not to remove the embargo actively, but not to oppose rescinding it. In December 2003, Dutch Prime Minister Jan Balkenende expressed a view similar to his Danish counterpart. When asked by domestic groups why he would agree to this proposal, given his concerns for human rights and Taiwan, he was honest: "If we were the only country to refuse lifting this embargo, it would not be good for economic relations with China."[78] Even though the decision of the European Council, the collection of the heads of state or government of EU member states, could be stopped by a single country's veto, the Dutch acknowledged that such a strategy would not be in that country's interest.

The initial responses from most countries were similar to the Dutch, Danish and Fischer's attitudes. They were in favor of "reevaluation" of the issue, but would not take any action in the near future and talked about it only in the context of conditions they would like to see met and caveats that would have to be discussed.[79] Some were even more evasive.

---

[76] -----, (2003). "German minister links lifting of China arms embargo to human rights", *ddp News Agency*. Berlin, December 10, 2003.

[77] -----, (2004). "Danish PM's remarks on arms embargo against China causes furore", *Agence France Press*. February 27, 2004.

[78] Bork, Ellen (2004). "Keep a Common Front on Arms Sales to China", *Financial Times*. May 21, 2004.

[79] WL: *04ROME647: EU-China arms embargo - Italians proceed cautiously*. Rome Embassy, February 20, 2004.

The Italian government merely said that it was "highly sensitive since serious problems regarding respect for human rights persist in China" and would not state a definite opinion.[80]

The only country that was fully committed to lifting the embargo, without dissenting views within cabinet, was France. It had pushed hard for removal at the January 2004 Council of Ministers meeting, allegedly because Chinese President Hu Jintao was visiting France at that time, a trip described as a "love fest."[81] The Eiffel Tower was lit red for the Chinese New Year, Hu was given the honor of addressing the French National Assembly though half the delegates boycotted, and Chirac proudly announced that France would work to lift the "outdated" embargo.

Nonetheless, no quick action was taken. The March 2004 European Council summit did not discuss the embargo. It was occupied by preparation for the accession of ten new EU members in May 2004 and with the stalled talks on the EU Constitutional Treaty. At the April 2004 GAERC meeting, the embargo was discussed over a working lunch but ministers were "of the opinion that the issue required further discussion" and again delegated to the PSC and COREPER.[82] Talk of the embargo continued into the spring of 2004. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Europe in May and expressed confidence that the EU would lift the embargo, regardless of human rights: "I think that we shouldn't create links between lifting the embargo… with other problems." Nonetheless, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt remarked at the same press conference that China would have to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) before the embargo was lifted.

---

[80] -----, (2003). "EU/China: MEPs Reject French Pleas over Arms Ban", *European Report*. December 20, 2003.

[81] -----, (2004). "France and China cozy up", January 27, 2004.

[82] GAERC (2008). "The EU's relations with China." Accessed August 13, 2008 at http://ec.europa.eu.eu/external_relations/china/gac.html.

Wen assured the press that China was "intensifying its preparations" to ratify the document that it had signed in 1998. At the June 17-18, 2004, European Council summit, as at their March meeting, the subject of the embargo was not initially on the agenda. During the meeting, Chirac raised the topic, but there was only a brief discussion and it was again delegated for future examination.[83]

EMERGING DISCOURSES

The first phase of the embargo dispute, from its initiation in 2003 until the postponements into the summer of 2004, demonstrated the themes that would be repeated throughout the following year. There were three general questions that were never fully resolved. First, whether the embargo was a symbolic measure about overall relations or was concerned with military sales. Second, whether the embargo designed to reflect on the human rights abuses at Tiananmen Square specifically or be used as leverage to encourage human rights improvements in general. Third, whether the military and political situation in the Taiwan Straits would be affected by the decision to lift.

The first question, on the nature of the embargo, began with the dispute. In the statement that began the episode in June 2003, French defense minister Alliot-Marie said that, until the embargo was lifted, France and China would continue to cooperate on non-combat aircraft. This implied that, once the ban was lifted, cooperation on combat aircraft could begin. The embargo was an obstacle to military ventures and its removal would allow more weapons sales and joint development.

---

[83] European Council (2004). "Presidency Conclusions," June 17–18, 2004. Document No. 10679/04. Point 77.

Schröder never mentioned military sales when discussing the embargo, instead focusing on its role as an obstacle to better diplomatic relations. On the December 2003 trip during which he announced his opposition to the embargo, he stressed his support of the One China policy – drawing parallels to China's support of German reunification – and indicated a willingness to approve the sale of an entire nuclear reprocessing plant that had been built near Frankfurt in the early 1990s but never put into operation. The sale fizzled out of anti-nuclear sentiment and fears of proliferation, but the message of the summit was clear: Germany considered China an equal partner.

The second debate centered on the purpose of the embargo, whether it had been designed as a response to the circumstances after Tiananmen or could be used to address all human rights in China. On this, Chirac and Schröder were united. Both argued that it was a sanction for a very specific purpose at a very specific time. All other parts of the 1989 Madrid Declaration had been overturned once China climbed back to its pre-Tiananmen levels of human rights and the embargo was an anachronism.

In the initial responses to the proposal to lift the embargo, it became clear that many actors viewed the embargo as a way to protest civil rights abrogations in general. In its December 2003 resolution, the European Parliament said that the situation of human rights in China "remains unsatisfactory."[84] Verhofstadt asked that China ratify the ICCPR before the embargo be removed and Rasmussen's mandate was to approve removal only if China matched European movement with human rights improvements. Fischer stated that the EU

[84] -----, (2003). "European Parliament opposes lifting arms embargo against China", December 20, 2003.

should not give China anything unless they receive something in return.[85] These actors treated the embargo as a foreign policy instrument to achieve their goals vis-à-vis China.

The third theme was whether or not lifting the embargo would affect the tense situation in the Taiwan Straits, simmering since the Chinese Civil War. The PRC asserts sovereignty over Taiwan and neither side recognizes the other's legitimacy. The United States, European Union member states and most other nations in the world play a balancing act. They have a "One China" policy in which both the PRC and Taiwan are of the same country and will be eventually reunified, but all stress that reunification must not come about by force.[86] Though there have been moments of crisis across the straits, no military action has occurred.[87] However, it is not clear what the PRC would do if they had the capabilities to force Taiwan to unify. The Chinese military has grown considerably in the past 20 years and how much longer the United States' Congressionally-mandated security guarantee to Taiwan can deter Chinese action is unclear.[88] Many EU actors, when speaking of Taiwan, worried that lifting the embargo could threaten regional stability. This position assumes that lifting the embargo would result in a technology transfer, a suspicion reinforced by the French rhetoric about military cooperation.

To compensate for that possibility or perhaps to assuage American concerns that EU weapons might be used against an American-protected Taiwan, discussion about the embargo began to involve talk of the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports (CoC). Fischer,

---

[85] Author's interview with Joschka Fischer, former German Foreign Minister, February 25, 2009.

[86] The US position was formalized in the Shanghai Communiqué of February 27, 1972. For PRC position, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America (1993). *White Paper - The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue*. Washington, DC, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/White%20Papers/t36705.htm. Accessed February 21, 2011.

[87] The most recent Taiwan Straits Crisis lasted from July 1995 to March 1996 and involved PRC missile tests and a US carrier group passing through the straits in a show of force.

[88] The guarantee is contained in the Taiwan Relations Act Section 2(b), Public Law 96-8. January 1, 1979.

for example, stated that he supported a review of the embargo policy if it were combined with an update of the CoC. If the EU Code were strengthened, the argument implied, the symbolically disheartening embargo could be dropped without resulting in an increase in arms sales. At least, that was the hope – that a technical solution could gloss over potentially serious political disagreements. This does not indicate a particular role that the United State might play in the debate, but it implies that American concerns might prove troublesome and, possibly, causally significant.

But, as with the embargo, no one quite knew what the CoC did either. The member states had hastily adopted the CoC in 1998. The United Kingdom had suffered a scandal over arms exports and was under pressure domestically for tighter restriction, but it wished to avoid getting undercut by other states.[89] It wanted to create a joint Franco-British draft and then circulate it to the other states for adoption. The French opposed the CoC and threatened to scuttle the entire proposal. They weakened it as much as possible, eventually turning it into a legally non-binding Council Declaration, the same policy instrument as for the embargo.[90]

The CoC works through public transparency and peer pressure among member states. When considering approving an arms license, member states are supposed to consult a database the CoC established to see if another member state had approved a similar license and if so, the two should discuss the transaction. This would allow states to check that others were following similar lines of approval and rejection. The Code provides some criteria to consider arms sales. But no EU-wide list for prohibited weapons exists and the legal impact

---

[89] Abrams, Fran (2000). "Action on arms exports 'is too little and too late'", *The Independent*. London, December 7, 2000.

[90] Davis (2002). *The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports*, pg. 101. The Code of Conduct was made into a Common Position, which gave it more weight, but only in 2008. Author's interview with Neil Campbell, International Crisis Group, December 10, 2008.

of the code is debatable.[91] "Talk to ten different EU-law experts and you get ten different opinions about whether the code can be made binding… And not one of them says unequivocally: Yes," according to one observer.[92] On the one hand, the CoC has been incorporated into or cited in legally or politically binding documents. On the other, states had been "very creative" at circumventing its provisions, not breaking the letter of the Code "but certainly the spirit of the agreement."[93]

The embargo dispute had become a technical muddle. The purpose of the embargo, the result of lifting it, and the efficacy of plans to minimize adverse consequences were contested. As the dispute continued, it would turn into a fight based almost purely on national interpretation and political power. And after the initial few months of the episode, it was clear that these competing interpretations left the EU divided.

In a "heated 90-minute exchange on April 2" in the PSC, national positions were laid out and related to the American embassy in Brussels.[94] According to British and Hungarian contacts, France had staked out a position of "zero flexibility" in favor of lifting the embargo and against linking it to human rights improvements or improving the Code of Conduct. The Danish led the opposition, insisting that removing the embargo could only be considered if linked to "specific Chinese steps on human rights" and a review of the CoC. Other member states were in between. Germany was said to have moved closer to Denmark and were "the largest EU member state with serious reservations about lifting the embargo."

---

[91] European Council (2006). "User's Guide to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports." Document No. 16440/06. December 18, 2006. Point 1.4.10.

[92] Kogan, Eugene (2005). *The European Union Defence Industry and the Appeal of the Chinese Market.* Berlin: Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, pg. 9.

[93] Bauer, Sibylle (2004). "The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports - much accomplished, much to be done." Stockholm: SIPRI, April 27, 2004, pg. 7.

[94] WL: *04BRUSSELS1510: China arms embargo: April 2 PSC debate and next steps for U.S.* Brussels Embassy, April 7, 2004

The UK was said to be close to the French end. Greece was the closest member state to the French position. The Czech Republic supported some of France's position, swayed by Prague's desire to sell radar equipment to China. The Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Italy, and Belgium called for further study. The Commission took no position. Ireland wanted to avoid the issue for the duration of its Presidency.

At this stage it would have been difficult to predict which way the embargo dispute would end. The EU had two of the most important heads of state (Chirac and Schröder) publicly in favor of lifting, leaders of smaller nations against lifting without conditionality, and national representatives taking more nuanced positions in the PSC. Whichever way the debate went, though, it was an internal EU issue. It had been debated at various fora in Brussels, with a variety of national and supranational actors involved, and would be determined by GAERC and eventually the European Council. It was highly unlikely that this issue could be shifted to a transatlantic arena, as was attempted with the ESDP Mini-Summit debate. This constrained, though did not eliminate, American attempts at swaying member states.

II: EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT AND CONSENSUS REACHED

Because of the geopolitical implications of China's rise, the United States, with bases and alliances across East Asia, watches the Chinese military closely. Congress mandates that the Department of Defense issue an annual report on the Chinese military. These reports catalogue the PRC's aggressive efforts to modernize their military, through increased spending, imports, and espionage. Past reports have termed Chinese targeting of influential figures in the scientific and business communities the top threat to sensitive US

technology.[95] The United States also acts to stall China's military rise, including intervening in foreign business transactions. In 2000, Israel sold $200 million worth of the EL/M-2075 Phalcon Airborne Early Warning and Control radar system systems to China. The United States strongly protested and pressured Israel to cancel the sale. Israel did, and had to compensate China approximately $150 million for breach of contract.[96] The amount of power the United States exerted over Israel, to force it not just to forgo a lucrative trade deal, but to actually lose money must have been considerable and indicates a willingness to expend considerable political capital to prevent Chinese acquisition of high technology.[97]

Just days after Alliot-Marie's comments in June 2003, a neoconservative think tank in Washington released a livid memo arguing against the proposal, disparaging the French as being "adept at playing global power games without necessarily possessing global power."[98] Government officials also responded to the push for the embargo. In February 2004, embassies delivered points to member states about American concerns.[99] At a March 15 meeting in Brussels with the American Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) to the EU and foreign policy and Asia officials from the US, Netherlands, Ireland, and the Council Policy

---

[95] Department of Defense (2008). "Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008," pg. 6.

[96] Adelman, Jonathan (2002). "The Phalcon Sale to China: The Lessons for Israel." Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: March 1, 2002.

[97] It is true that the US has leverage over Israel. In 2000, the year of Phalcon, the United States gave $4 billion in aid to Israel, $3 billion of which was in the form of military grants to a country whose total defense expenditures were $15 billion. However, one salient feature of American politics is Israel's privileged position in Washington which strongly suggests that pressure on Israel is a difficult tactic to employ. Sharp, Jeremy (2008). "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel." Congressional Research Service, January 2, 2008. Mearsheimer and Walt (2008). *The Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy*, New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux.

[98] Tkacik, John J. (2003). "Responding to a Paris–Beijing Arms Axis." Washington: Heritage Foundation, July 3, 2003.

[99] WL: *04ROME647: EU-China arms embargo - Italians proceed cautiously*. Rome Embassy, February 20, 2004.

Unit, the embargo was described as "the issue all had been waiting for" and a potential "major falling out."[100]

At the end of March 2004, the US increased the pressure, sending demarches perceived to have a threatening tone to EU member states and to Brussels. On April 2, the PSC entered their meeting room to find copies of US demarches "sitting on their otherwise empty desks. The demarche was received badly because it gave the impression that 'big brother was watching,' and because it appeared timed as a heavyhanded and hubristic attempt to influence the PSC."[101] The Greek representative objected to the American cable being distributed by the Council Secretariat under a Council cover and with a Council identifying number and "insisted that it be stricken from EU record."[102] The meeting then opened with the Irish ambassador waving a front page *Financial Times* article about the embargo from that day and "implor[ed] his colleagues to protect the confidentiality of internal EU deliberations."[103] This statement was relayed by contacts from the UK and Hungary to the US embassy.

In late June, the US sent another round of demarches to member states and the US DCM in Brussels provided Robert Cooper, policy advisor to Solana, a detailed briefing to help the EU prepare for their summit with China in December.[104] On July 22, the PSC held an informal meeting to receive an American intelligence briefing on China's military

---

[100] WL: *04BRUSSELS1081: US-EU COASI consultations part 1: East Asia*. Brussels Embassy, March 15, 2004

[101] WL: *04BRUSSELS1510: China arms embargo: April 2 PSC debate and next steps for U.S.* Brussels Embassy, April 7, 2004

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid.

[104] WL: *04ROME2489: Italy - EU arms embargo on China*. Rome Embassy, June 25, 2004; WL: *04MADRID2416: Spanish response: maintinaing the EU arms embargo on China*. Madrid Embassy, June 25, 2004.

modernization and during the summer bills were drafted in Congress that would sanction entities which sold arms to China.[105]

These bills were introduced in the autumn. On October 7, the House of Representatives passed House Concurrent Resolution 512.[106] It called for President Bush to seek a commitment from EU leaders not to lift the embargo and requested that the annual DoD report to Congress on Chinese military power include an "analysis of the effect on United States interests in the Asia-Pacific region if the European Union lifts its embargo" and "a review of the steps taken by the United States to address such action by the European Union." The resolution clearly delineated the US's rationale for opposing the proposal. First, human rights abuses were ongoing in China; some of those who had been arrested during the Tiananmen protests were still in jail. Second, lifting the embargo "will result in the increased procurement of arms by the People's Republic of China" and because of the shared defense technology between the US and Europe, "lifting the embargo will render it impossible to guarantee that the military technology that the United States shares with Europe will not be passed on to the People's Republic of China." Third, the Taiwan Strait was a flashpoint at which the balance of power continued to shift towards the PRC and at which the United States might be drawn into a conflict.[107] The United States shared the same concerns as the European Parliament, Denmark and Belgium over human rights and Taiwan, but it added the prospect of decreased transatlantic security cooperation if the embargo were lifted. If the United States could not trust its military technology with its European allies,

---

[105] WL: *04BRUSSELS3210: EU/China arms embargo: briefing the PSC on China's military modernization*. Brussels Embassy, July 28, 2004; WL: *04BRUSSELS3059: US-EU political directors look at upcomig issues for Dutch Presidency*. Brussels Embassy, July 19, 2004.

[106] Concurrent Resolutions are not legally binding, but express the sense of the body that passes them.

[107] House of Representatives of the United States Congress (2004). *H.Con.Res 512, "Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the European Union's plans to lift the embargo on arms sales to the People's Republic of China,"* October 7, 2004.

then it might not share its technology with Europe. This would hurt the interoperability of NATO forces as well as the technological capabilities of European militaries, since they rely on the far larger US research and development spending for the latest weaponry.

To emphasize the House resolution, the United States tried to make its message as clear as possible. While discussing the embargo at a conference on the Taiwan Straits in Paris on November 23, 2004, a US representative reminded the Europeans of American commitment to preventing arms sales to China. "Remember Phalcon," he said.[108]

China, too, expressed its opinions forcefully. Chirac visited Beijing on a five-day state trip in early October 2004. The French President did not address human rights, and his silence on the issue was marked as a sign of "allegiance" to the Chinese leaders.[109] He instead criticized the United States' attempt to create a "generalized underculture" of English around the world and described the embargo as "a measure motivated purely and simply by hostility towards China."[110] He returned from the trip with $4 billion worth of industrial orders. Airbus sold $2.2 billion worth of aircraft and Alstom came away with $1.7 billion in train contracts. The amount of the deals, and the manner in which France had won them, caught the attention of other European officials. "There is no denying that France is pushing to establish itself in China with an intensity we haven't seen before," one German official said. "In light of how aggressive the French are pursuing their interests in Asia, the German approach is also becoming more direct."[111] It seemed to observers that France was

---

[108] Author's interview with Charles Emmerson, International Crisis Group, February 20, 2009.

[109] Bennhold, Katrin (2004). "Chirac nets over $4 billion in orders: France-China deals awaken Europeans", *International Herald Tribune*. Paris, October 12, 2004.

[110] He was lambasted in France for both his avoidance of human rights and critiques of the "Anglo-Saxons." Bremmer, Charles and August, Oliver (2004). "French scorn Chirac's outburst against US", *The Times*. London, October 11, 2004.

[111] Bennhold (2004). "Chirac nets over $4 billion in orders: France-China deals awaken Europeans." October 12, 2004.

being rewarded by China for its support in lifting the arms embargo.

But China was not willing to use only the carrot and abandon the stick. While the transport deals were large, they did not represent a huge success for Chirac. The contracts for twenty of the twenty-six Airbus planes had been previously announced and none were the super-jumbo A380, the new plane that was Airbus' "bet-the-house wager" on the future of the airline industry. If China had purchased a considerable number of A380s, it would have been a vote of confidence in Airbus's business model and helped it assert dominance over Boeing worldwide for the next generation.[112] According to reports, holding off on the purchases reflected China's disappointment at the continued existence of the embargo. In return for helping Airbus, "China wanted something in return," according to Lu Xiaosong of China Aviation Supplies Import and Export Group, a government corporation.[113] "It's understandable," he said. "Politics and economics can never be separated." The main contenders for the Airbus planes, Air China and China Eastern Airlines, were both owned by the government and required high-level approval for major purchases such as the $1.4 billion for the five A380s Chirac wanted to sell. China had shown that it was willing to play hardball to get the embargo lifted.

---

[112] To briefly put that decision in context, Boeing and Airbus shared different visions of air travel. Boeing believes that travel will be point-to-point; a passenger traveling from Boston to Vienna will take a direct flight. Such travel will involve mid-sized planes serving mid-sized destinations, for which Boeing designed its 300-passenger 787. Airbus forecasts a hub-and-spoke model. Passengers from medium cities would take small planes to "hub" airports, where they would collect for the main leg of their journey to other hub airports, and then transfer to another small plane for their final leg. This hypothetical passenger might travel from Boston to New York to Frankfurt to Vienna. This model allows for and requires large aircraft for the hub-to-hub legs, for which Airbus created the 850-passenger A380. Given the costs of airplane design, neither of these companies could easily produce a competitor to the other. They must rely on countries adopting their vision of travel and developing their infrastructure accordingly. In this, air travel resembles a coordination problem with whoever achieves initial dominance poised for much greater gains. David, Paul A. (1985). "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," *The American Economic Review*. **75**(2). May 1985. 332-337; Babej, Marc E. and Pollak, Tim (2006). "Boeing versus Airbus", *Forbes*. New York, May 24, 2006.

[113] Hutzler, Charles and Michaels, Daniel (2004). "Politics delays Airbus order", *The Wall Street Journal*. New York, December 3, 2004.

CONSENSUS REACHED

The Dutch Presidency of the second half of 2004 had predicted that the embargo would be one of the most difficult issues they would face.[114] While they did not wish to push the Franco-German proposal, they made clear that they would not stand in the way if the remaining member states supported rescinding the embargo. At their October 2004 meeting, GAERC "took stock of the state of discussions on the embargo and on the sale of arms to China and questions relating to the application of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports" but made no decision.[115] At their November 22nd meeting, however, the foreign ministers discussed the issue and "confirmed… that the EU was ready to give a positive signal to China."[116] They couched this with precautions about human rights and the CoC, but it seemed that the Council of Ministers, to whom the European Council had delegated the issue, approved of lifting the embargo and was sending it back to the heads of government, to be decided upon at their December 2004 summit.

The Presidency Conclusions of the December 16 & 17, 2004, European Council meeting "reaffirmed the political will to continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo." This could have been rhetoric hiding postponement, especially as it was coupled with caveats about Chinese ratification regarding the ICCPR and improvement of the CoC, but the following line – "[The European Council] invited the next Presidency to finalize the well-advanced work in order to allow for a decision" – indicated that real change had

---

[114] Kohlmeier, Gabrielle (2004). "EU Eyes Lifting China Arms Embargo," *Arms Control Today*. **34**(7). September 2004.

[115] General Affairs & External Relations Committee (2008) *The EU's relations with China*. http://ec.europa.eu.eu/external_relations/china/gac.html Accessed August 13, 2008.

[116] Ibid.

happened.[117] By asking the following Presidency to "finalize" the issue, the European Council was reporting that they were close to action and would move on the embargo within six months. This was confirmed in unofficial reports; a French Foreign Ministry spokesman later said that an "understanding" had arisen that the removal would happen during the Luxembourg Presidency in the first half of 2005.[118]

Since European Council decisions must be unanimous, lifting the embargo required the support of every member state. By the April 2 PSC meeting, the member states were reported to be divided by a pro-lift camp led by France, consisting only of France, an anti-lift camp led by Denmark that insisted on strict conditionality, and most member states falling in between. Over the course of the summer of 2004, US embassy officials learned that Spain, Italy, and Finland were in favor of lifting the embargo, but none wanted to lead on the issue.[119] Luxembourg said it would favor lifting if the US threatened Congressional retaliation against Europe, stating that it would act for European autonomy if the issues became linked. Poland and Lithuania were described as "feeling stuck," wishing to support the United States but not wanting to disrupt a foreign policy issue that predated their recent entry into the EU.[120] In the autumn of 2004, as unnamed member states were looking to announce lifting the embargo at the December EU-China summit, the EU seems to be divided into the following groups on the embargo.

---

[117] European Council (2004). "Presidency Conclusions," December 16-17, 2004, Point 57.

[118] Dempsey, Judy, (2005). "EU feels the heat on China embargo", *International Herald Tribune*. Paris, March 23, 2005.

[119] WL: *04MADRID2416: Spanish response: maintaining the EU arms embargo on China*. Madrid Embassy, June 25, 2004; WL: *04ROME3927: EU GAERC - Italy confirms ministers will endorse decision to lift Libya arms embargo; will discuss US concerns over China arms embargo*. Rome Embassy, October 8, 2004; WL: *04HELSINKI1288: China arms embargo: Presidential Chief of Staff agrees that call to Halonen would be well received*. Helsinki Embassy, October 1, 2004.

[120] WL: *04BRUSSELS4376: EU/China arms: DAS Suchan visit launches public debate*. Brussels Embassy, October 13, 2004.

Positions by autumn 2004

In favor of immediate lifting	Somewhat in favor of lifting	Neutral or ambivalent	Somewhat opposed to lifting	Opposed to lifting unless strict linkages met
France	Greece	UK (*publicly*)	Germany (*in the April PSC*)	Denmark
Germany (*Schröder*)	UK (*in the April PSC*)	Ireland	Sweden	Netherlands
	Czech Republic	Italy		
	Spain	Belgium		
	Finland	Luxembourg		
		Poland		
		Lithuania		
		Commission		

Since the ambivalent countries might be expected to go with the prevailing sense of the Council, how the EU went from this divide to unanimity is the story of how Britain – expected by others to oppose the embargo – and the Netherlands and Nordic countries – vocal in their opposition – agreed to remove the embargo without any concessions from China.

BRITISH MOTIVATIONS

The British could have supported lifting the embargo because they were "true believers" in the merits of the arguments in favor of lifting the embargo. China had progressed significantly since Tiananmen and the embargo was from a different era. But this seems unlikely. The debate and merits of the proposal were muddled and Britain had not raised the issue of the embargo in years. Even as they supported removal in December 2004 the British delegation expressed that they did not wish to remove the embargo during their Presidency. Britain could also have wished to build their economic relationship with China, the same

factor that drove France and Germany to initiate the affair. This also seems unlikely. France and Germany were driven by dire economic situations at home and heavy political involvement in their trade relations. Neither factor applied to Britain. The UK's annual GDP growth was 2.8% in 2003, compared to 1.1% for France and -0.2% for Germany.[121] Britain's trade with China centered on joint ventures and Foreign Direct Investment; there were relatively few exports and those were not government-sanctioned purchases of jumbo jets.[122] Britain's position is strengthened by its connections to Hong Kong, the most economically open city in China, due to the PRC's "One Country, Two Systems" policy.[123] Britain invested more in Hong Kong alone than Germany invested in all parts of China and, unlike France, Britain rarely advocates protectionist measures against China.[124]

There did not seem to be inherent reasons for Britain to want lift the embargo, but there were reasons for them to oppose it. They, as with all states, had domestic interest groups against lifting the embargo, for reasons of human rights and the situation in Tibet.[125] Without the probability of economic compensation from China, their cost-benefit calculations are against lifting the proposal. Many observers, some as high-placed as German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, believed this to be so. Fischer was surprised when Prime Minister Tony Blair did not veto the motion in the December 2003 summit, and

---

[121] Eurostat.

[122] Barysch (2005). *Embracing the Dragon: The EU's Partnership with China*, pg 18.

[123] Devised by Deng Xiaoping in 1984 to ease tensions over accession of Hong Kong and Macao to the PRC and formalized in Hong Kong Basic Law Chapter 1, Article 5: "The socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years."

[124] FDI is difficult to accurately assess. The UK had 2.8% of all FDI in China in 2000, compared to 2.56% for Germany and 2.09% for France. This may in fact be much higher, since 9.4% of all FDI is reported as coming from the Virgin Islands, likely shell companies from the US, UK, or continental Europe. Taube, Markus (2002). "Economic Relations between the PRC and the States of Europe," *The China Quarterly* **169**, April 2002, pg. 100.

[125] These groups wrote a joint open letter to member states. World Uyghur Congress, et. al. (2004). *Open Letter to EU against Lifting Arms Embargo on China*. December 9, 2004.

more surprised when he agreed to support the proposal in December 2004.[126] Since their position seems to have been based on more than the specifics of the embargo, it is helpful to take a broader look at Britain's position at this time.

In 2003, Britain was trying to repair relations with France and Germany in the aftermath of the Iraq War, while the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and Afghanistan required additional troops. Within the EU, the debate over the Constitutional Treaty had used up considerable political capital defending their "red line" issues against integrationist countries like France and Germany, which did not want to diminish the text to suit British demands.[127] This divide was a "critical backdrop" to the embargo debate.[128]

With the UK having exerted itself on other issues, Chirac and Schröder felt they had got "Tony Blair over a barrel" on the arms embargo.[129] While there may not have been any direct trade on these issues, it does seem that British passivity on the embargo in December 2003, which came as a surprise to Fischer, was designed to generate goodwill with France and Germany. The UK was described as "satisfied to hide behind the EU flag," supporting lifting the embargo, though they did not want to be publicly seen as a leader of the pro-lift camp.[130] The UK showed the importance of intra-EU dynamics in this episode. It had no pressing national interests in the arms embargo and allowed others to determine the policy, even though the United States was strongly against it.

---

[126] Author's interview with Joschka Fischer, February 25, 2009.

[127] Grice, Andrew and Castle, Stephen (2003). "PM draws his lines in the sand before debate starts on EU draft treaty", *The Independent*. London, June 20, 2003.

[128] Author's interview with Andrew Small, German Marshall Fund, November 27, 2008.

[129] Author's interview with Jolyon Howorth, January 21, 2009.

[130] WL: *05BRUSSELS1231: Is the EU retreating on the China arms embargo?* Brussels Embassy, March 24, 2005.

DUTCH AND NORDIC MOTIVATIONS

The Netherlands and the Nordic countries of Denmark, Sweden and Finland were the states which were most vocal about their reluctance to remove the arms embargo on China. All these states had a strong human rights tradition and there were large domestic pressures against agreeing to the Franco-German proposal. The Dutch and Swedish parliaments urged their prime ministers to use their veto. In Denmark, the parliament had voted to give the Prime Minister authority to vote to remove the embargo only if China made significant human rights progress. When the Danish prime minister supported lifting the embargo in December 2004, China had made no such progress and there were no major improvements expected within the six-month timeframe.[131] Given the strong domestic pressure against removing the embargo, the initial cost-benefit calculus for these leaders are in favor of keeping the embargo. As with Britain, there must have been something that swayed their votes.

It is unlikely that these countries were moved by the wish for internal EU goodwill, as Britain likely was. Although the Netherlands and Denmark had supported the Iraq War, they did not send large military contributions, nor had they been at the center of the vitriolic debate, minimizing a breakdown in relations.[132] Sweden and Finland had opposed the Iraq War. Nor did they take a leading Euroskeptic position during the EU Constitutional Debate Treaty as the UK did.

It is also unlikely that these states accepted the proposal simply because it was proposed by two of the biggest states in the EU. After September 11, Blair, Chirac and

---

[131] Barysch (2005). *Embracing the Dragon: The EU's Partnership with China,* pg. 15.

[132] The Netherlands sent no troops. Denmark sent one submarine and one warship. -----, (2004). "Denmark reveals Iraq arms secrets", *BBC News*. London, April 19, 2004.

Schröder held a separate meeting before the European Council summit on October 20, 2001, attempting to agree first on a position that satisfied the "Big Three" of France, Germany and Britain and then pressure the rest of the EU to agree with them. They planned to repeat the exercise on November 4, but the prime ministers of Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium (which held the Presidency), and High Representative Javier Solana, "forced their way, almost literally, to the table."[133] For four of the richer states to be resigned to their fate on a European Council matter that requires unanimity, when only two member states were actively in favor, seems unlikely. The concept of a *directoire* of the leading member states, in which these countries may acquiesce to policy demands of others, does not seem applicable here. Britain was not actively working with France and Germany and this issue would not suit such a system. When the Foreign Ministers of the Big Three, with Javier Solana, negotiated with Iran in 2003, they dealt with an issue of international sensitivity and complexity that made it difficult to involve the entire EU.[134]

If these countries were not swayed by the merits of the debate, nor by internal EU lobbying, it is most likely that the side payments that changed the cost-benefit for these states came from China. The evidence lies in statements of those leaders themselves. Dutch PM Balkenende said that opposing China "would not be good for economic relations."[135] The CCP, he believed, would retaliate against Dutch business for their Prime Minister's opposition to removing the embargo, just as they intimated rewards would come for French and German support. China had taken such measures before. In 1997, the United States

---

[133] Hill, Christopher (2004). "Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **42**(1), February 2004, pg. 147.

[134] These negotiations lasted years, involving a contact group of the UN, China, Russia and the United States, who, while being perhaps the most interested party, did not have diplomatic relations with Iran. Calabresi, Massimo (2008). "U.S. and Iran: A One-Sided Negotiation," *Time*, July 21, 2008.

[135] Bork (2004). "Keep a Common Front on Arms Sales to China," May 21, 2004.

persuaded Denmark to propose a resolution criticizing Chinese human rights practices at the annual UN Commission on Human Rights meeting in Geneva. Similar resolutions had been presented every year with the support of almost all Western states. China always lobbied against the measure, but to no effect before 1997. That year, France, Germany, Spain and Italy announced they would vote against the resolution, a shift prompted by a package of trade deals, including a sale of 30 Airbus planes.[136] Denmark and the Netherlands vowed to present the resolution notwithstanding the division among the EU nations. China responded with fury, threatening that the motion would "become a rock that would smash the Danish government's head."[137] The resolution was proposed and China retaliated against Denmark, even though the majority of the EU and the US had voted for the measure. It was estimated that Denmark lost between $50 and $235 million in trade with China in the following years.[138]

China suggested that the embargo might follow a similar path. They worked hard on the Netherlands and Nordic countries after Chirac's state visit in October 2004.[139] A Swedish security expert told a reporter in March 2005 that Chinese officials had "warned Swedish and Finnish companies over possible negative repercussions if their governments continued to support the embargo."[140] Those companies almost certainly include Ericsson and Nokia, vital to their home countries' economies and keen to expand in China, already

---

[136] Foot (2000). *Rights beyond borders: the global community and the struggle over human rights in China*, pg. 193. This group was derisively called "The Airbus Group." Wong, Reuben (2006). *The Europeanization of French foreign policy: France and the EU in East Asia*, pg. 95.

[137] Mufson, Stephen (1997). "China cautions U.S., Denmark against human rights criticism", *Washington Post*. April 11, 1997.

[138] Jakobson, Linda (1997). *Taiwan's Unresolved Status: Visions for the Future and Implications for EU Foreign Policy*. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, pg. 61.

[139] Barysch (2005). *Embracing the Dragon: The EU's Partnership with China*, pg. 15

[140] Dempsey, Judy (2005). "EU feels the heat on China embargo", *International Herald Tribune*. Paris, March 23, 2005.

the world's largest mobile phone market.[141]

It is important that these countries were all relatively small, meaning that the cost of interrupting trade might be acceptable to China. In 1997, this was apparently true. Punishing Denmark for raising the question of human rights was worth the $50-$235 million in trade that China interrupted for the political message it sent. There is a limit to such action. Eventually, the costs of such punitive measures outweigh the benefits accrued from the political action. For example, to punish France for President Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2008, the PRC pulled out of the China-Europe summit, a symbolic gesture since preparatory meetings did not indicate any important deals being made there.[142] China did not cancel any contracts. Possibly from the experience of Denmark in 1997, the Dutch, Danish and Swedish leaders determined that their economic relations with China were small enough to allow retaliation if they were the only states to oppose the embargo and lifting was due to happen within six months.

The experience of these countries show that, although this issue would be decided by consensus, in which every state had a veto, in practice their vetoes were constrained. To have used a veto would have set them against some of the most powerful states within the EU as well as, which this analysis argues to be of causal importance, the pressure of an external actor. China's role shows that it is possible for a non-EU member state to influence this debate, which opens the door to possible American influence, but it also shows that the US, if it wishes to prevent lifting the embargo, will have to overcome EU consensus as well as lobbying from China.

---

[141] In 2004, Nokia accounted for 3.5% of Finnish GDP, 25% of their exports and, in 2002, 40% of the Helsinki stock market. Maney, Kevin (2004). "Unlike some celebrity marriages, Nokia-Finland union won't end soon," *USA Today*, June 30, 3004.

[142] Authour's interview with Andrew Small, German Marshall Fund, November 27, 2008.

III: CONSENSUS BROKEN

The embargo quickly rose to the top of the official agenda on both sides of the Atlantic in 2005. On February 1, the House of Representatives passed H.Res 57, "Urging the European Union to maintain its arms embargo on the People's Republic of China," similar in scope and rationale to H.Con.Res 512 of three months earlier. On February 17, the companion bill, S.Res. 59 was passed in the Senate. President Bush traveled to Brussels on February 22 to speak at a NATO summit. Before the visit, Congress held hearings on the embargo; the American sentiment on the EU's plans was summed up by one speaker: "It is a breathtakingly myopic and stupid policy."[143] During the trip President Bush and members of his cabinet and staff pressed the Europeans not to take any action.

Meanwhile, the United States targeted groups they believed could influence the EU's decision-making. The US continued to dispatch teams of military experts to EU capitals to educate government officials about the dangers and implications new technologies would have on China's military modernization.[144] They tried to create a Pacific coalition by asking Japan and Australia to lobby the Europeans against lifting the ban. Japan happily complied but the Australian government was divided and did nothing.[145] The US lobbied parties, committees and national governments in the EU. "We were told there could be consequences if the EU lifted the embargo," said the foreign affairs spokesman for the Free

---

[143] Dr. John Hulsman, Fellow at the Heritage Foundation (2005). House Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats, "An Overview on Transatlantic Relations prior to President Bush's visit to Europe." U.S. House of Representatives, February 16, 2005.

[144] Gompert, David, *et al.* (2003). *China on the Move: A Franco-American Analysis of Emerging Chinese Strategic Policies and Their Consequences for Transatlantic Relations*. Paris: RAND Corporation, pg. 47.

[145] Australia was thanked by China for its passivity. Menotti, Roberto (2007). *The European Union and China: A Rude Awakening.* Lowy Institute for International Policy: Sydney, April 2007, pg. 9.

Democrats, a German opposition party.[146]

European defense firms were ripe targets. The resolutions passed by the House and Senate mention the difficulty lifting the embargo would place on transatlantic military cooperation. Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee Sen. Richard Lugar stated in February that he was "troubled" with the issue and that "The technology the US shares with European allies could be in jeopardy."[147] The House of Representatives debated a bill mandating that every European firm which sold arms to China face increased examination of their activities and allowing the President to deny those firms access to American technology.[148]

European companies took notice of these threats and soon enough their calculations changed. The firms had a very simple agenda of profit-maximization. Many pushed to lift the embargo because they wished to access the growing Chinese market. Now they had a dilemma. If they sold to China, they might be shut out of the American defense market, the largest in the world, and American military technology, the most advanced in the world.[149] The threats compelled these firms to decide between the USA and the PRC. All chose the US.

BAE Systems announced that it would not sell arms to China even if the EU lifted the embargo. It had 27,000 jobs in the US and £3.8 billion in annual sales to the Pentagon. One official put it directly: "We can't do America and China, and we want to preserve our business relationship with the US; we're not going to spoil that for the sake of winning new

---

[146] Dempsey (2005). "EU feels the heat on China embargo", March 23, 2005.

[147] Evans, Michael; Browne, Anthony; and Rozenberg, Gabriel, (2005). "British arms firms will spurn China if embargo ends", *The Times*. London, February 22, 2005.

[148] H.R. 3100 of the 109th Congress. The bill failed its initial vote on July 15, 2005.

[149] The US defense budget in Fiscal Year 2006 (Oct 05-Sept 06) was $419 billion, over 10 times more than China's.

business with China." Brinley Salzmann, exports director for the British Defence Manufacturers Association said "We have nothing to gain by lifting the embargo."[150] Even the company that helped start the controversy, EADS, announced that they would not sell arms to China no matter what the politicians decided. The Chinese market is attractive, "But we're very aware of our interests," the CEO stated, "US threats to cease all transfers and exports of technology to Europe clearly demonstrate that we have to take the US into account on anything that concerns China and Taiwan. We are vulnerable and dependent."[151]

American pressure was effective on these companies because they rely on foreign markets, of which the United States is by far the largest. BAE does 75% of its business outside of the UK. Thales of France has a similar percentage of sales from outside its borders and Saab of Sweden receives half of its income from foreign deals. Eurocopter, the subsidiary of EADS that developed the utility helicopter with China, exports two-thirds of its output.[152]

Chinese action also entered the debate in early 2005. On March 14, the Tenth National People's Congress passed the "Anti-Secession Law" (ASL) directed at the Taiwan situation. The first seven articles in the law are standard reiteration of accepted principles. The PRC government ascribes to the One China Principle, believes that reunification is the "sacred duty of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included," wishes that Taiwan will rejoin the mainland peacefully, and points out some areas for cross-Strait negotiations. Article 8 caused a bit of a stir. It reads: "In the event that 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's

---

[150] Evans, Browne, and Rozenberg (2005). "British arms firms will spurn China if embargo ends", February 22, 2005.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Kogan (2005). *The European Union Defence Industry and the Appeal of the Chinese Market*, pg. 28.

secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity."[153]

This article declares that China would go to war if Taiwan attempted to secede. It was met with condemnation from many parts of the world. The EU Presidency issued a declaration asking "all parties to avoid any unilateral action which might rekindle tensions," and reiterated its commitment to the One China policy and its opposition to any use of force on the subject.[154] Officials in the United States, Australia and Japan all stressed that they wished to see the issue resolved peacefully.

On the issue of the embargo, the ASL created "a difficult political environment," according to British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. But the ASL did nothing new. It formalized China's commitment to use force against a Taiwanese independence movement, but no observer, having heard China's rhetoric about reunification and having seen the Straits crises of the 1990s, would have thought otherwise. American Presidents have routinely criticized Taiwanese politicians who pushed for too much distance from Beijing.[155] Chinese government officials, while hoping for a peaceful resolution to the scenario, never ruled out the military option. The ASL only reminded people that the Taiwan Straits are still a flashpoint in geopolitics. It is relevant because it was mentioned in many reports as a possible reason for the embargo's failure, but there was never a causal link presented, and in

---

[153] Tenth National People's Congress (PRC), Third Session (2005). "Anti-Secession Law," March 14, 2005.

[154] Asselbom, Jean, on behalf of the Presedency of the European Union (2005). "EU Presidency declaration on the anti-secession law' by China," March 14, 2005.

[155] Ross, Robert (2006). "Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement," *Foreign Affairs* **85**(2), March/April 2006, pg. 144.

any case, it did not immediately alter the EU's plan. There was still a drive to lift the embargo after the ASL was passed.

France was particularly adamant about lifting the embargo, but did so with decidedly mixed results. President Chirac gave an interview on March 20, 2005 on a trip to Japan in which he stressed that "Lifting the embargo does not mean selling arms. The Europeans have no intention of engaging in a policy of exporting weapons to China, who isn't asking for this."[156] That statement was undercut by comments made by Michèle Alliot-Marie on a trip to China a month earlier. Observers of EU politics have expressed in interviews that the defense minister was "in over her head" during this issue and that this blunder proved it. For, at a time when the US was pressing its concerns over arms sales to China and EU leaders were talking about the Code of Conduct and the toolbox, which had been created as an addition to the CoC, Alliot-Marie said "The lifting of the embargo could be a better protection for us than maintaining it."[157] She continued: "China is rapidly developing its industry, and today our experts say that in five years China could make exactly the same arms that we have today, and they will do it if they cannot import. So maybe if we can sell them the arms, they will not make them. And in five years' time they will not have the technology to make them." In meetings with American officials, Alliot-Marie's diplomatic advisor argued that her comments were taken out of context, but the public, and more widely-known, sentiment was that of a rationalization of an uncomfortable fact – that France

---

[156] -----, (2005). "Interview given by Jacques Chirac", *Asahi Shimbun*. Tokyo, March 21, 2005.

[157] The toolbox would require states to exchange information on arms sales to post-embargo states approved or denied (the Code only requires notification of denial) and, to establish a baseline, disseminate all licenses granted in the past five years or denied in the past three years. However, it too, would not be binding. Archick (2005). "European Union's Arms Embargo," pg. 25.

was going to sell arms to China.[158] These comments contributed to the general distrust of French motives by American officials.[159]

Given the misperceptions between the two sides of the Atlantic, the EU sent Annalisa Giannella, a special envoy of High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana, to brief Congress on the embargo and smooth over the transatlantic tensions. She traveled to Washington in mid March and was "pummeled" by Congress, specifically by senior members like Sen. Ted Stevens of Alaska, chair of the Commerce Committee, and Sen. John McCain of Arizona. Giannella's failure to convince any member of Congress, and the fierce opposition of the Senate, traditionally more even-tempered than the House, were "alarm bells" to Brussels.[160] The EU's will to act soon faltered.

Before American pressure moved defense firms, before the ASL, before Giannella's trip, the EU had been certain that the embargo would be lifted. EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson had stated in the press: "I think the [Bush] Administration would be wrong to pick a fight with Europe over this which it can't actually win."[161] But this confidence would be misplaced as the European Union started to step back from action in late March 2005. A week after Giannella's trip, an official speaking to the New York *Times* said that "You won't see a backing away from the commitment. But there's no consensus to act right

---

[158] This image was later strengthened when it was learned in April 2005 that Dassault Aviation had been preparing sales of its latest fighters to China, possibly 210 Mirages for €12 billion, in anticipation of the embargo's lifting. -----, (2005). "Taiwan mulls new jet fighters on reports Dassault may sell aircraft to China", *AFX*. April 12, 2005; Shambaugh, David (2007). "China-Europe Relations Get Complicated." Washington: Brookings Institute, May 2007; WL: *05PARIS1084: EU China arms embargo: Expanding on French Defense Minister's Financial Times Comments*. Paris Embassy, February 18, 2005.

[159] Author's interview with Charles Emmerson, Chatham House, February 2009.

[160] Weisman, Steven (2005). "Europeans said to keep embargo on arms to China", *New York Times*, March 22, 2005.

[161] Evans, Browne, and Rozenberg (2005). "British arms firms will spurn China if embargo ends", February 22, 2005.

now."[162] In other words, the EU would do something, but not within the predicted six-month window.

Still, Chirac wanted the embargo lifted and Schröder asserted that no matter how the Bundestag might vote on the matter, ultimate authority on the issue lay with him and the Federal Government. Yet the two leaders seemed to be increasingly out of step with the rest of the EU. Giannella was spinning a new story on the issue. "Nobody has said we are going to lift our embargo for free," she asserted in the *International Herald Tribune* on April 15.[163] Joschka Fischer said on April 6 that his Green Party wanted to reach a consensus to lift the embargo, but for that to happen it would be "necessary for China to move" on human rights and the Taiwan Straits.[164] One official stated outright: "The ball is in China's court."[165] Suddenly, instead of talking of an outdated policy that the EU would lift by June 2005 with no consequences for China's military, the embargo was an instrument for leverage that would have been lifted but for China's uncooperative nature. Only in April 2005 were these conditions being seriously attached to the debate.

Though officials tried to spin the decision as a minor, temporary delay it was clear that in March 2005 the EU's consensus, built over the course of a year, had fallen apart. Journalists pointed to two possible decisive factors. The first was the passage of the Anti-Secession Law on March 14, and the second was Giannella's visit to Congress a week later. The ASL meant that the EU had a more difficult environment with which to work, and Giannella's trip signaled to the EU the level of American concern on the issue.

---

[162] Weisman (2005). "Europeans said to keep embargo on arms to China", March 22, 2005.

[163] Bernstein, Richard (2005). "Backpedaling on the arms ban", *International Herald Tribune*. Paris, April 15, 2005.

[164] Mukhopadhyay, Alok Rashmi (2005). "EU Arms Embargo on China: The German Debate." Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses: New Delhi, May 2, 2005.

[165] Buckley, Chris (2005). "EU offers China hope on embargo", *International Herald-Tribune*. Paris, May 12, 2005.

In interviews, though, the ASL was dismissed as a reason for dropping the embargo. It was a "gift," that allowed certain member states, especially Britain, to announce a newfound opposition without losing face or seeming indecisive.[166] This argument leaked only slightly into the press coverage. A *Financial Times* article from March 23, after the consensus started to seriously crumble, remarked in its second-to-last sentence that "French officials believe the UK has used the controversy over China's anti-secession law as a "pretext" for meeting the US's demands."[167] The same *Financial Times* article demonstrates the changing path away from consensus: "Washington has consistently lobbied against ending the embargo, which the EU had planned to do during the first six months of the year, and several European countries, led by Britain, would like a delay."[168]

This rapid move from consensus, when no internal political shifts had occurred, makes intra-EU dynamics an unlikely culprit. Rather, it seems that Giannella's trip was the cause at least of a halt in momentum, after which it was never regained. Before the trip, officials in Madrid had remarked that Giannella's trip was not predicted to change minds in the US, but they hoped that it would help them understand the toolbox and see the EU's point of view.[169] Afterwards, these officials were "not eager to see the EU embargo lifted" and had only agreed to do so to support France, Germany and the UK.[170] After the trip, "EU members [were] now convinced that any decision to lift the embargo should come after a strategic dialogue with the [United States Government] on regional stability in the Pacific

---

[166] Interview with Andrew Small, German Marshall Fund, November 27, 2008.

[167] Dombey, Daniel; Adams, Christopher; and Benoit, Bertrand (2005). "Solana to mediate in China arms ban dispute", *Financial Times*. London, March 23, 2005

[168] Ibid.

[169] WL: *05MADRID1000: Spain's views in advance of March 16 Foreign Affairs meeting*. Madrid Embassy, March 15, 2005.

[170] WL: *05MADRID1140: Spanish views on EU delegation's meetings on China arms embargo*. Madrid Embassy, March 23, 2005.

and a framework for pre-consultations on arms exports to China."[171]

Though Chirac and Schröder were still in favor of lifting the embargo even after Giannella's trip, their position was increasingly isolated.[172] US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick threatened trade reprisals and a "new transatlantic crisis," which *Le Figaro* cited as eliminating the support of defense industry firms and the UK.[173] All major European editorial boards were against lifting and Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times*, one of the most internationalist writers in the American media, wrote a harsh column before Giannella's visit titled "Arms sales begin at home."[174] He argued that the EU states could sell arms to whomsoever they liked, so long as they first built up their own militaries. His most cutting line summed up the American view of Europe as an irrelevant actor that shirked responsibility while criticizing the United States: "If Europe wants to go pacifist, that's fine. But there is nothing worse than a pacifist that sells arms -- especially in a way that increases the burden on its U.S. ally and protector." The arms embargo threatened to open up the issues that had driven the US to ignore its allies in 2001 and 2002 and the questions building since the end of the Cold War.[175] The American reaction turned the embargo dispute into a "loyalty test" over the direction of the Atlantic alliance.[176]

Suddenly, governments were "holding their cards to their chests" trying to avoid being seen as a problem by the US, China, or their own parliaments.[177] The Dutch wanted to

---

[171] Ibid.

[172] WL: *05BRUSSELS1231: Is the EU retreating on the China arms embargo?* Brussels Embassy, March 24, 2005

[173] WL: *05PARIS2287: Media reaction report - China arms embargo - Deputy Secretary Zoellick to Brussels Iraq - election of President*. Paris Embassy, April 6, 2005

[174] Friedman, Thomas (2005). "Arms sales begin at home", *New York Times*, March 6, 2005.

[175] Joffe, Josef (2002). "Of Hubs, Spoke and Public Goods," *The National Interest*. Fall 2002.

[176] Barysch (2005). *Embracing the Dragon: The EU's partnership with China*, pg. 65

[177] WL: *05BRUSSELS1231: Is the EU retreating on the China arms embargo?* Brussels Embassy, March 24, 2005

avoid lifting the embargo so as not to "jeopardiz[e]" their referendum on the Constitutional Treaty that May. Luxembourg did not want lifting to occur "on its watch" in the first half of 2005.[178] The proposal to lift the embargo suffered another blow at the April 15 GAERC meeting. The issue was postponed: "Discussions on this topic will continue both within the EU and with our partners" and it was reported that lifting the embargo was less likely than at any point since the debate began.[179]

A month later, prospects for removing the embargo suffered again. On May 22, Schröder's Social Democratic Party lost a regional election in Germany's most populous state, North Rhine-Westphalia, which gave the opposition a majority in the federal upper house. This led to a vote of no-confidence not long thereafter and a call for early elections. A spokesman for the opposition Christian Democratic Party announced in June that his party would not move to lift the embargo without American approval. The elections resulted in a Grand Coalition, but with a Christian Democratic Chancellor, Angela Merkel.[180] On May 29, the French voted "*non*" on a referendum for the Constitutional Treaty. This threw the European project into a crisis, took time away from the embargo, and threatened to turn Chirac into a lame duck, as the vote was seen as popular reaction against domestic policies.[181]

The proposal was never rejected outright. The official stance of the Council of

---

[178] Ibid; WL: *05MADRID1140: Spanish views on EU delegation's meetings on China arms embargo*. Madrid Embassy, March 23, 2005.

[179] General Affairs & External Relations Committee (2005). "The Ministers for Foreign Affairs held a strategic discussion on relations with China," at the Informal Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (Gymnich), April 15, 2005; WL: *05BRUSSELS1542: Gymnich takes no decision on China arms, confirms views on Mid-East and frozen conflicts*. Brussels Embassy, April 19, 2005.

[180] Dombey, Daniel (2005). "EU drive to lift China arms ban falls apart", *Financial Times*. London, June 14, 2005.

[181] Randall, Colin (2005). "Chirac fights to save his authority and his dream," *The Telegraph*, London, June 1, 2005.

Ministers remains a "willingness to carry forward work towards lifting the arms embargo on the basis of the European Council conclusions of December 2004."[182] But the United Kingdom had stated in 2004 that they did not want the embargo removed while they held the Presidency, meaning that the second half of 2005 would see no action. Even with Chinese pressure, the issue remained dormant and was truly out of consideration when Chirac and Schröder lost elections in 2005 and their successors announced an aversion to discussing lifting the embargo.[183]

IV: CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this episode, the United States wanted to prevent the embargo from being lifted. By February 2004, US embassies were delivering statements to member state governments to advocate their position. Throughout 2004 the US lobbied the EU, even going so far as to pass resolutions in Congress about the embargo. However, the US was unable to achieve their goals, even with the EU initially divided and some member states with strong domestic opposition to lifting. The EU reached a consensus for lifting the embargo and the delay in the official announcement of its lifting was caused only by some minor technical work on the CoC.[184]

EU actors acted somewhat imperiously to American opposition. The UK Foreign Office's Director General of Political Affairs, in a meeting with the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister, said that "US claims are exaggerated" and that "even the US understands

---

[182] GAERC (2008). "The EU's relations with China."
[183] -----, (2007). "Japan's Abe wants arms embargo kept on China," *The European Weekly's New Europe*.
[184] WL: *05PARIS364: EU-China arms embargo: latest French thinking*. Paris Embassy, January 20, 2005.

it can't change things."[185] The Director of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Office of EU Foreign Policy and Common Security described the embargo as "ridiculous" and added that the situation in the Taiwan Straights "only heats up when the Taiwanese heat it up," dismissing American concerns about possible PRC aggression.[186] Even though Japan also lobbied against lifting the embargo, the US and its opposition was shut out of the process. It was expected to act as an accommodator, quite different than expectations during the ESDP Mini-Summit, when the US was constantly consulted by EU leaders.

Ultimately, though, the opposition of the United States was the decisive factor in breaking the consensus of the EU. There had been times when the EU took note of the US before Giannella's trip. An April 2004 cable from the US embassy in Brussels read "We have heard that [the PSC] are also looking at the US electoral calendar and quietly wondering whether it would be worth holding off their decision until November or December in the hopes of sneaking it past the US radar. They have not and will not discuss such issues openly, even amongst each other in the PSC, but our UK contact confirms that quiet conversations and suggestive comments are going on in the wings"[187] Throughout 2004, the EU took meetings with American officials and received classified intelligence briefings. However, this attention did not translate into political movement until March 2005, when Annalisa Giannella's high-profile trip to Congress sparked realization of the depths of American opposition.

At this point, the EU found itself stuck. Some officials believed that "backing down

---

[185] WL: *04BRUSSELS3333: EU/China arms embargo: readout of UK PolDir Sawers meeting with Japanese DFM Tanaka*. Brussels Embassy, August 5, 2004.

[186] WL: *04MADRID2416: Spanish response: maintaining the EU arms embargo on China*. Madrid Embassy, June 25, 2004.

[187] WL: *04BRUSSELS1510: China arms embargo: April 2 PSC debate and next steps for U.S.* Brussels Embassy, April 7, 2004.

risks Chinese diplomatic and perhaps commercial consequences, and also see it as a blow to the EU's credibility as a global player capable of making autonomous decisions on important international issues"[188] Having come so close to lifting the embargo, the EU faced a real cost if it were to abandon its promised policy. However, it was only when it was so close that the EU apparently realized the cost to lifting. That the EU backed down at this point is an indication that US opposition acted as a veto on the policy, preventing the embargo from being lifted even after the intent to lift had become connected to EU prestige. Once the EU realized that American opposition was not a *pro forma* position, but would trigger their "veto," in the form of defense industrial sanctions and damaged relations, member states began backpedalling.

EU statements and actions also show the US to be a veto player. Solana was supposed to travel to Washington in April 2005 to "come to terms with Americans," who "had [the EU] over a barrel on this."[189] Member states were convinced that any decision on the embargo would have to wait for a strategic dialogue on East Asian security with the United States.[190] Italy wanted an "informal closed consultative group" of the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the US to discuss China, harking back to the Quint of the Balkan Wars, when the US was an "unofficial member state."[191] The EU chose the path of a strategic dialogue with Japan and the US and wrote a secret guideline paper that reflected a chastened Brussels. It said that "The US's security commitments to Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan and the associated presence of US forces in the region give the US a

---

[188] WL: *05BRUSSELS1231: Is the EU retreating on the China arms embargo?* Brussels Embassy, March 24, 2005.

[189] Ibid.

[190] WL: *05MADRID1140: Spanish views on EU delegation's meetings on China arms embargo*. Madrid Embassy, March 23, 2005.

[191] WL: *05ROME1005: Italy-China: Fini-Li meeting doomed after EU statement*. Rome Embassy, March 23, 2005.

distinct perspective on the region's security challenges. It is important that the EU is sensitive to this."[192]

An independent report to the Commission on transatlantic relations wrote that the "issue thus illustrates clearly that failing to engage with the US before EU positions are finalised is a recipe for trouble."[193] Not only was the US a veto player, but it was suggested that this veto could only be avoided if it was brought into the decision-making process. This statement shows that the United States has a role in the European Union and that, in the opinion of this report, the lesson of the arms embargo is that it should have even more. This is strong evidence that the EU as a security actor is highly constrained by its position within the transatlantic security community and that the US has an important causal role in EU security policy.

---

[192] European Council (2005). "Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia," Document No. 16468/07, Adopted late 2005, made public December 14, 2007. Point 8.

[193] Peterson, John, et. al. (2005). *Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and United States*. European Commission DG External Relations Unit 1C, pg 15.

CONCLUSION

This thesis investigated one of the unique aspects of the European Union. Though it has acquired a competence in and institutional support for security policy, it exists alongside the formal security institution of NATO and within the formal and informal system of the transatlantic security community. The United States, the most powerful actor in NATO and the transatlantic community, is not a member of the EU. This thesis has explored the extent to which the EU's security policy may have been shaped by this closely linked non-member state. I sought to explore the position of the United States in the EU through three case studies from 2001 to 2005. The case studies were of sufficient duration that I could track the formulation of states' and institutions' positions, the pressures they applied on each other, and, sometimes, the changes in their positions. The evidence generated by these historical analyses served to locate the US in a typology of possible roles.

In this conclusion, I will reiterate this typology, summarize the findings of each chapter, present my conclusions, discuss the wider implications of this thesis, and suggest avenues of further research.

TYPOLOGY

In the Introduction and Chapter 2, I presented the types of roles that the US might play within the EU. One of the core assumptions of institutionalist literature is that institutions have a shaping effect on politics within them, one aspect of which is prescribing and

providing roles for members.[1] The mechanisms, organizational structure, membership, and other features of the institution create opportunities and constraints. For example, Britain, Germany and France have been able to operate on occasion as a *directoire* in EU foreign policy because of the institutional structure of the EU in that area.[2] Brussels has limited competence and intergovernmental policy with 25 member states can be unwieldy, allowing leading states to set the agenda. In other areas, where QMV within the Council and leadership from the Commission and Parliament curtail the influence of these states, a *directoire* is not possible and therefore it is not possible to be a member of a *directoire*.

The role that the United States plays in international relations, where institutional constraints are minimal, and the role it plays in NATO, where its monopoly of the position of SACEUR evinces its institutionalized leadership, is likely to be different than the role it plays in the EU. The US has no voting rights in the EU and is excluded from nearly every meeting. Yet it has historic links to the EU, a position of prominence in other institutions concerning European security, and the EU Security Strategy specifically mentions the importance of the transatlantic alliance.[3] The institutional structure of the EU – closed to the US but engaging with it – opens the possibility for a variety of roles for the US. In order to make falsifiable claims about the American presence in the EU, I condensed what we may consider a spectrum of involvement into four observable roles of accommodator, entrepreneur, spoiler and veto player.

---

[1] Bulmer (1998). "New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market," pg. 368.
[2] Hill (2006). "The Directoire and the Problem of a Coherent EU Foreign Policy."
[3] Solana (2003). *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, pg. 1.

These roles were partly inspired by Stephen Krasner's typology of "makers," "breakers," and "takers" in international economic regimes.[4] In his article, the capabilities of states to shape an institution determined which role it played in reform efforts: leading, undermining, or accepting. The United States might act similarly with the EU. It could lead reform efforts, using its material capabilities and connections to member states to push policies it desired. It could spoil the agenda of EU members using those same connections. Or it could accommodate EU policies, its position outside of the EU preventing it from shaping European debates. I added the role of veto player to this typology.[5] A veto is common in many institutions, often the product of its structure, and provides the actor wielding it with unique capabilities. For example, Germany may be one of the Big Three in the EU with Britain and France, but the latter two countries play a far more important role when an issue is deliberated at the UN Security Council, where they are permanent members with vetoes.

In Chapter 1, I argued that each role had been played in EU foreign and security policy at various moments since the end of the Cold War. The US was an accommodator after Saint-Malo, an entrepreneur with the Defense Capabilities Initiative, and a spoiler during the run-up to the Iraq War. An external veto in EU security policy was played by Turkey in negotiations over Berlin Plus and the development of EU capabilities were impeded by politics within NATO. In each of those cases, the role played was relatively

---

[4] Krasner (1977). "US Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness."

[5] A veto player is defined by Tsebelis as individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo. Tsebelis (2002). *Veto players: how political institutions work*, pg. 36.

clear and would not be confused for another, indicating that this typology possessed the rigor needed for analysis of new and relatively unexamined case studies.[6]

CHAPTER OVERVIEWS

In Chapter 1, I surveyed Euro-American security relations since the end of the Cold War to provide the necessary historical background to the case studies. This history also served to validate the assumptions of this thesis' research agenda, that the US might be a quasi-member of the EU and that the EU is sufficiently autonomous that it might be able to resist the influence of even a superpower and ally. The 1990s saw two broad trends in the Atlantic alliance. The first was divergence associated with the United States turning its attention away from Europe, no longer threatened by the Soviet Union, and the EU seeking to grow into a global political actor and overcome its "capabilities-expectations gap."[7] The second was of the United States and European states attempting to preserve and revitalize the alliance through agreements like Berlin Plus and the New Transatlantic Agenda. These contradictory trends were seen in the wars of the early 21st century, as vitriolic division over Iraq emerged between states who were fighting alongside each other in Afghanistan. This chapter also looked at the current literature on US-EU relations, arguing that it had not fully examined the role of the US within the EU, instead tending to look at the two polities as separate, often opposing, actors.

---

[6] For an overview of the proper use of typologies in social science, see Collier, David, LaPorte, Jody, and Seawright, Jason (2012). "Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor," *Political Research Quarterly*. **65**(1). 217-232.

[7] Hill, Christopher (1993). "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **31**(3). 305-328.

Chapter 2 examined the theoretical foundations of the issue area. It argued that neither European integration nor institutionalist theories fully capture the topic. Theories developed for the study of the European Unionneglect the potential impact of the United States. Their understandable focus on intra-EU mechanisms leaves analyses vulnerable to omitted variable bias when extra-EU factors are causally significant. Institutionalist theories, however, rarely address instances of overlapping institutional membership, especially when the institutions in question are as embedded in the political systems of their members as the EU and NATO are. Nonetheless, both bodies of literature offer useful analytical tools necessary for understanding the history of the case studies. Historical institutionalism, for example, highlights how institutional membership constrains state choices while the Europeanization literature demonstrates the ways in which the EU provides opportunities for states to advance their national interests at the level of the EU as well as how Brussels institutions shape the policies, politics and polities of the member states. This chapter also presented the methodology and typology to be used in the case studies.

Chapter 3, the first case study, examined the dispute emerging from the April 29, 2003, "Mini-Summit" on European Security and Defense Policy. The United States opposed the Franco-German-Belgian-Luxembourgish proposals for a planning cell at Tervuren, a European Security and Defense Union, and a mutual defense clause in the EU Constitutional Treaty. At the two Berlin summits later in the year, each of these policies were watered down, to a civil-military cell in the EUMS and a planning cell at NATO, to permanent structured cooperation, and to a solidarity clause referencing the primacy of NATO. The United States, having been extensively consulted by member states, seemed to be satisfied

that these changes maintained US security interests.[8] This case showed the United States as a veto player, as the evidence failed to confirm other roles and provided strong indications for the US having capabilities that might be considered a "veto" on EU action. An accommodator is unable to change policy it disagrees with and, since the US did not disagree with the final settlement, this case cannot show the US as an accommodator. The US could not be considered an entrepreneur, since the policy it had advocated, Berlin Plus, was nearly overturned. Nor could it be considered a spoiler since, though it lobbied member states about the issue, the crucial lobbying campaign occurred within the EU and the crucial decisions were made at the Berlin summits without American input. That the Second Berlin Accord had to be delayed in its announcement until the US was placated demonstrates that the decision-making excluded American officials, but could have been overridden by US opposition. This case thus corresponds with the definition of a veto player, an actor whose approval is necessary for the passage of a policy. Fischer, before the Mini-Summit occurred, spoke of "red lines" of the transatlantic community, implicit admission that the policy needed to stay within Washington's limits.[9] Therefore, though the United States did not deploy a "veto" against the EU compromise position, the evidence suggests that it possessed one.

In Chapter 4, the development of the Galileo satellite system, the United States was a veto player on certain aspects of the program. On the issue of the M-code overlay, the United States repeatedly stressed that it would not accommodate the EU's position. Its attempts to suggest alternate schemes for European participation in satellite navigation were ignored and its continual position of responding to EU initiatives prevent it from being

---

[8] WL: *03ROME5665: Italy's EU Presidency has uneven success but delivers on U.S. security interests*. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2003.

[9] ----- (2003), "Germany's efforts to heal rift with USA "half-hearted" – paper." May 5, 2003.

considered an entrepreneur. In this case it tried to be a spoiler, taking an active role in negotiations to persuade DG TREN to alter Galileo's frequencies and with member states to encourage them to pressure the Commission. However, this is not the best description of its role. The US was rebuffed on nearly every step of Galileo's development, from its inception to its cooperation agreements with China. On the M-code, however, the US refused to budge and its repeated warnings that it would not alter its stance eventually persuaded the Commission to "blink first."[10] This appears to be a veto point.

In the case of the arms embargo on China, Chapter 5, the US is perhaps most clearly a veto player. The US was expected to be an accommodator by European actors, but never wavered from its lobbying campaign to prevent the embargo from being lifted, even after consensus in the Council had been reached. However, this spoiler campaign was not the factor that prevented the embargo from being lifted. Giannella's trip to Washington in March 2005, which made the EU aware of the severity of American opposition and the retaliatory measures they were willing to take, almost immediately stopped the policy, as might be seen when a veto is used. Later EU discourse included seeking to "come to terms" with the US and engaging with the US before finalizing an EU position, which imply that American approval is necessary for a successful policy.[11]

FINDINGS

The case studies of this thesis find that the United States is best described as a veto player within the decision-making of the European Union's security policy. This was an

---

[10] -----, (2004), "Galileo fudged," July 3, 2004.

[11] WL: *05BRUSSELS1231: Is the EU retreating on the China arms embargo?* Brussels Embassy, March 24, 2005; Peterson et. al. (2005). *Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and United States*.

unexpected result given the history of the 1990s and the demands of the 2000s. American involvement in European affairs in the reforms of NATO and the Balkan campaigns might suggest an active role as entrepreneur or spoiler; the desire of the Bush Administration to repair relations with its allies as Afghanistan required additional troops after 2003 might have led it to accommodate the EU. Yet these cases also demonstrate that the United States is not an institutionally-defined, automatic veto point. When the President of the United States, for example, wishes to veto a Congressional bill, he must only sign a piece of paper; his veto is a feature of the system. In these cases, the American "veto" is a partisan veto, in Tsebelis' terminology, derived from its influence in the political games of the Atlantic area.[12] Yet since the US is not a member of the EU, this power must be properly signaled and mediated through its "friends" and "access points" in the EU.[13] This constrains the US' ability to deploy its veto. In the embargo case, though the US was attempting to use its veto, the EU did not recognize this. The EU assumed that, though the US opposed lifting the embargo, it did not oppose it enough to resort to its "veto." There is, apparently, a cost to using a veto, which in this case was issue linkage to transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. The US, we can deduce, will not assume this cost for every disagreement. Galileo was an example of this point. Though the US disagreed with the need for a second Western GNSS, it did not try to veto the system, even if it tried to spoil the EU's plans, by speeding up GPS modernization and eliminating civilian degrading. The issue of the M-code, however, was important enough for this severe form of pressure to be applied.

The Mini-Summit episode demonstrates that American power is further constrained by the need to have its positions executed in the EU by others. President Bush, in agreeing to

---

[12] Tsebelis (2002). *Veto players: how political institutions work*.

[13] WL: *03BRUSSELS4143: First Steps toward and EU Use-of-Force Doctrine: Opportunities for the U.S.* Brussels Embassy, August 28, 2003.

the final settlement, cited Prime Minister Blair's constant support to NATO. Blair's trustworthiness as an ally soothed American worries, but it also gave him room to maneuver. The United States depended on Britain to prevent the more worrisome EUSD from entering into the Constitutional Treaty. With only a blunt instrument of a costly veto, the United States relied on British (and Italian) judgement on the details of the case.

These cases show the US to be a causal, and crucial, part of the decision-making process of the European Union's security policy. It acts as a veto player, though this "veto" will only be triggered when the EU threatens what the US to be a core national interest and strays outside of the "red lines" of the transatlantic bargain negotiated in the 1990s, that the EU's growth would not threaten the basic unity of the Atlantic Alliance. The veto will not be used for every transatlantic disagreement and is less likely to be used when an issue operates in an area of uncertainty, since the US will not be able to control the details of every European policy. Though the EU has become a security actor, and though much of the action of the case studies occur as the result of internal EU dynamics, it exists soundly within the transatlantic security community and with NATO permeating its debates. An analysis of the EU's security policy without a consideration of the United States omits a significant variable.

IMPLICATIONS

This thesis has significance for wider debates about the EU and the Euro-Atlantic area beyond the specific role of the United States in EU security policy. I will now briefly touch on two of these.

Chapter 1 discussed debates in the literature on whether Europe and the US would inexorably drift apart, implying a "tectonic" shift in geopolitics.[14] In the time period of the case studies, there was discussion about an emerging global multipolarity and scholars pondered a future in which the EU may be a separate and equal pole.[15] While predictions about the international structure are beyond this thesis, the case studies do show the continuity and embeddedness of the United States in European security more than ten years after the end of the Cold War. Although the US need not have been involved in these cases as they were issues of the European Union, rather than the Atlantic alliance, its presence was causally significant and it was invited to comment by Europeans. In Chapter 5, the Irish Presidency took pains to include American viewpoints in EU meetings and the PSC held a special session to receive an American intelligence briefing. This embeddedness comes from a variety of factors, such as the value member states place on NATO's continued usefulness, but one factor that has often been overlooked is the interconnected nature of the Atlantic defense industry. The Revolution in Military Affairs has made modern war highly dependent on expensive technology. For European states to possess the latest equipment necessary for their advanced militaries, they need access either to research and development funds or to markets for their own defense corporations to reach the needed economies of scale. Ideally, they will have both. The United States spends more on new technology than any other military and has the world's largest military budget. It has both bought from its allies and sold to them. In Chapters 4 and 5, the US defense industry was an important piece of leverage on the EU. As the industry is built on multi-year projects, billion-dollar contracts and elaborate regulatory systems to protect against proliferation, it is a durable connection

---

[14] Author's Interview with Jolyon Howorth. January 21, 2009

[15] For example, see Shambaugh, David (2005). "The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China's Rise," *The Washington Quarterly*. **28**(3). Summer 2005. 7-25.

between the two sides of the Atlantic, unlikely to be fully severed even in severe political crises.

Second, this thesis reiterates the extent to which security policy is in the hands of the big states in the EU. The agreements on the security structure for the entire EU in Chapter 3 were determined by France, Germany and Britain in a trilateral summit. Although France was the only state voting for lifting the embargo at the first GAERC to discuss the issue, its hardline lobbying helped to win consensus within a year. Smaller states, especially after American opposition was known, saw themselves caught between France and the US, and unwilling to make a move that would alienate either. With fewer decision-makers in security than economic policy, this allows the United States to assume a position of prominence, consulted by smaller member states on what the bigger ones are doing.[16] The intergovernmental and unequal nature of security policy indicates that, though the EU has developed greatly since the end of the Cold War, it is far from being a closed system.

FURTHER RESEARCH

European security exists in a gap between two literatures. EU-specific frameworks and institutionalist literature have both been used to study aspects of this issue area – EU theories for the EU, and institutionalist theories for both the EU and NATO. EU literature rarely addresses extra-European variables in analysis of the EU policy process, a flaw acknowledged by Wong and Hill in their recent work on the Europeanization of foreign

[16] In Chapter 3, even Italy asked the US for information on what the Big Three were doing. WL: *03ROME4907: Structured cooperation: New variations from Italy's EU Presidency*. Rome Embassy, October 28, 2003.

policy.[17] Institutionalist literature examines the internal dynamics that shape state decisions and there has been little theoretical work on overlapping and competing institutions as the EU and NATO are. Unlike the subjects of most of the work on forum-shopping between institutions, which deals with weakly institutionalized bodies regulating "low political" issues, NATO and the EU are strongly embedded in the polities of their members, have lengthy histories that allow for internal dynamics and path dependency, and are considered vital for the national interests of their members. In European Union security policy, we have an issue area in which these institutions simultaneously do and do not matter. The EU contains policy networks so dense and a political ideal so powerful that for much of these cases it was able to rebuff the world's only superpower. Yet the transatlantic nature of European security allowed a non-member state to wield an effective veto over EU policy.

This gap could be investigated further. This thesis was deliberately constructed with a narrow research agenda. In an issue area of innumerable variables, vague declarations, unfilled agreements, and changing international environments, it was necessary to eliminate, as much as possible, confounding variables from the data. Detailed cases were required to allow for policy shifts which could reveal the effects of political pressure. These two concerns led to the selection of three case studies from a five-year period. This thesis is only able to argue that the US is a veto player *in these cases*. While I would argue that it is highly likely that the US is a veto player in general since it is a role dependent on the structure of the political system, the limited duration and breadth of these cases do not allow me to say so conclusively. One avenue of future research would therefore be to use this typology in other cases and in other areas of foreign and security policy.

---

[17] "Isolating the effects of Europeanization from other possible causes of change" is one of four limitations of the framework. Wong and Hill (2011). *Introduction*, pg. 11.

However, this thesis also illustrates the difficulty which this area presents to a researcher. In order to make the theoretical claims of the type of role the United States played in these cases, it was necessary to establish historical narrative and plausible accounts of causality. This task is hindered by limited evidence. The cases are recent enough that archives are not yet open, yet far back enough that the institutional memory of the agencies involved is fading. Issues of military technology, which is the basis for many current security decisions, come with walls of proprietary information and classified documents. For these reasons, it was serendipitous that WikiLeaks released its cache of American diplomatic cables during the writing of this thesis to supplement the journalistic, primary, secondary, and interview sources. These cables present a side of meetings that rarely make it into newspapers, as well as the evolving suspicions and agendas of various actors. Although they have their own drawbacks, namely, a bias towards the American perspective and uneven coverage of events, they are incredibly valuable historical tools and should be used more in academia.

It may be that these cases are specific to a point in time, ten years after the end of the Cold War, with the EU growing, NATO lingering, and the Bush Administration's expansive foreign policy placing the US and Europe publicly at odds. In the coming decades, the US may recede into a more cautious power or fulfill its "pivot" towards Asia and increasingly ignore Europe.[18] The EU may itself diminish, the effects of the 2008 financial crash and eurozone crisis stopping the momentum that fostered Berlin Plus, the Lisbon Treaty, and EU military operations. However, if these scenarios are avoided, and if current structural trends

[18] Green, Michael (2012). "Is the US "pivot" to the Pacific genuine?," *The World Today*. **68**(1). February & March 2012.

continue, the 21st century is likely to see the rise of China, India, Brazil and medium-size powers emerging to geopolitical positions alongside the EU, Japan, and the United States. The EU could be a crucial part of this multipolarity, but there would be a question whether it would be a truly independent pole or part of the Atlantic community. As the only one of these poles that is not a sovereign state but a developing institution, its internal decision-making and intra-EU balance of power could be determine its ability to be an autonomous security actor. To understand the position of the European Union in the world, therefore, it will be necessary to understand the position of the United States in the European Union.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

DIPLOMATIC CABLES PUBLISHED BY WIKILEAKS.ORG

02ROME1848: Italian response to Galileo demarche. Rome Embassy, April 12, 2002.

02ROME3036: Tour d'horizon with ASI President Vetrella. Rome Embassy, June 20, 2002.

02ROME4292: GPS/Galileo consultations in Italy. Rome Embassy, September 4, 2002.

02ROME6059: Italian Transport Minister discusses Galileo with de Palacio. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2002.

02ROME715: GoI slowly shifting to military role for Galileo. Rome Embassy, February 13, 2002.

03BRUSSELS1081: US-EU COASI consultations part 1: East Asia. Brussels Embassy, March 15, 2004.

03BRUSSELS4143: First Steps toward and EU Use-of-Force Doctrine: Opportunities for the U.S. Brussels Embassy, August 28, 2003.

03ROME1776: ESDP Mini Summit - GoI views. Rome Embassy, April 28, 2003.

03ROME1834: ESDP Mini Summit - Frattini will come out swinging at Gymnich. Rome Embassy, April 30, 2003.

03ROME2326: Opportunity for "upstream" coordination with EU on strategic concept. Rome Embassy, May 27, 2003.

03ROME3382: Italian EU Presidency on August 29 ESDP Meeting. Rome Embassy, July 24, 2003.

03ROME3567: Galileo: Ambassador Aragona advocates additional technical talks to resolve M-Code overlay issue. Rome Embassy, August 6, 2003.

03ROME3823: Italy supports US views on ESDP; EU Presidency will protect Berlin Plus on August 29. Rome Embassy, August 22, 2003.

03ROME3976: Italy's EU Presidency - Italy satisfied with results of August 27 ESDP Meeting. Rome Embassy, September 2, 2003.

03ROME4022: Frattini-Straw meeting readout. Rome Embassy, September 4, 2003.

03ROME4133: Italy's EU Presidency: A slow start on an ambitious agenda. Rome Embassy, September 10, 2003.

03ROME4495: Italian views on Galileo's next steps. Rome Embassy, September 30, 2003.

03ROME4746: Galileo/M-Code: Increased high-level Italian attention -- but no answers. Rome Embassy, October 17, 2003.

03ROME4766: Galileo discussion with Alenia's Virgilio. Rome Embassy, October 2, 2003.

03ROME4841: Italy's EU Presidency: October 16-17 Council Readout; Way ahead on ESDP, IGC. Rome Embassy, October 22, 2003.

03ROME4907: Structured cooperation: New variations from Italy's EU Presidency. Rome Embassy, October 28, 2003.

03ROME5093: FM Frattini insists IGC security architectures are no threat to transatlantic relations; predicts Constitution will be finished under Italian Presidency. Rome Embassy, November 12, 2003.

03ROME5179: Italian EU Presidency - Response to demarche for November 17-18 EU FM meeting. Rome Embassy, November 14, 2003.

03ROME5491: Galileo comments at Rome Conference on space and security policy. Rome Embassy, December 5, 2003.

03ROME5665: Italy's EU Presidency has uneven success but delivers on U.S. security interests. Rome Embassy, December 19, 2003.

04BRUSSELS1510: China arms embargo: April 2 PSC debate and next steps for U.S. Brussels Embassy, April 7, 2004.

04BRUSSELS1577: EU Code of Conduct on arms exports: qustions and answers. Brussels Embassy, April 14, 2004.

04BRUSSELS2211: Brussels view of Ireland's EU presidency: a home-stretch report. Brussels Embassy, May 25, 2004.

04BRUSSELS3059: US-EU political directors look at upcoming issues for Dutch Presidency. Brussels Embassy, July 19, 2004.

04BRUSSELS3159: EU/China: readout of June 30 human rights seminar on ICCPR. Brussels Embassy, July 26, 2004.

04BRUSSELS3210: EU/China arms embargo: briefing the PSC on China's military modernization. Brussels Embassy, July 28, 2004.

04BRUSSELS3310: Human Rights Watch on EU/China arms embargo. Brussels Embassy, August 4, 2004.

04BRUSSELS3333: EU/China arms embargo: readout of UK PolDir Sawers meeting with Japanese DFM Tanaka. Brussels Embassy, August 5, 2004.

04BRUSSELS4376: EU/China arms: DAS Suchan visit launches public debate. Brussels Embassy, October 13, 2004.

04BRUSSELS4474: EU/China arms: slowing the rush to the summit. Brussels Embassy, October 18, 2004.

04BRUSSELS4944: Commission and Council responses on Nov. 22 GAERC demarche. Brussels Embassy, November 19, 2004.

04HELSINKI1288: China arms embargo: Presidential Chief of Staff agrees that call to Halonen would be well received. Helsinki Embassy, October 1, 2004.

04MADRID2416: Spanish response: maintinaing the EU arms embargo on China. Madrid Embassy, June 25, 2004.

04MADRID3839: Spain favors Code of Conduct with the lifting of the Chinese arms embargo. Madrid Embassy, October 4, 2004.

04MADRID3951: Pre-GAERC demarche, Spain's views on Iraq, China, Lubya, Sudan and

North Cyprus. Madrid Embassy, October 8, 2004.

04MADRID4488: Spain: latest on EU arms embargo on China. Madrid Embassy, November 24, 2004.

04ROME1342: EU arms embargo on China: Italy wearing poker face. Rome Embassy, April 5, 2004.

04ROME1590: EU arms embargo on China: more Italian views. Rome Embassy, April 23, 2004.

04ROME1871: Italy wants to see GPS-Galileo signed at U.S.-EU Summit. Rome Embassy, May 13, 2004.

04ROME2442: The Deputy Secretary's Meeting with EU Hi-Rep Solana. Rome Embassy, June 7, 2004.

04ROME2489: Italy - EU arms embargo on China. Rome Embassy, June 25, 2004.

04ROME3927: EU GAERC - Italy confirms ministers will endorse decision to lift Libya arms embargo; will discuss US concerns over China arms embargo. Rome Embassy, October 8, 2004.

04ROME3958: Approach to Italian government on China arms embargo: daylight between MFA and Prime Ministry positions. Rome Embassy, October 13, 2004.

04ROME4444: Italian views on November 22 GAERC. Rome Embassy, November 19, 2004.

04ROME4646: EU/China arms embargo: MFA provides details on Fini/Ciampi's Beijing remarks. Rome Embassy, December 6, 2004.

04ROME647: EU-China arms embargo - Italians proceed cautiously. Rome Embassy, February 20, 2004.

05BRUSSELS1231: Is the EU retreating on the China arms embargo? Brussels Embassy, March 24, 2005.

05BRUSSELS1542: Gymnich takes no decision on China arms, confirms views on Mid-East and frozen conflicts. Brussels Embassy, April 19, 2005.

05BRUSSELS2252: Preview of June 13 EU Foreign Ministers' meeting. Brussels Embassy, June 10, 2005.

05BRUSSELS25: EU/arms exports/China: 2003 report shows license issuances. Brussels Embassy, January 4, 2005.

05BRUSSELS283: EU/China arms: text of draft EU "toolbox" for post-embargo countries. Brussels Embassy, January 21, 2005.

05MADRID1000: Spain's views in advance of March 16 Foreign Affairs meeting. Madrid Embassy, March 15, 2005.

05MADRID1140: Spanish views on EU delegation's meetings on China arms embargo. Madrid Embassy, March 23, 2005.

05PARIS1084: EU China arms embargo: Expanding on French Defense Minister's Financial Times Comments. Paris Embassy, February 18, 2005.

05PARIS1542: France: EU China arms embargo, Code of Conduct and the toolbox. Paris

Embassy, March 9, 2005.

05PARIS1580: French position on the joint EU-China statement on nonproliferation: a behind-the-scenes look. Paris Embassy, March 10, 2005.

05PARIS1588: Japanese Embassy on Chirac visit to Japan, EU arms embargo, and ITAR. Paris Embassy, March 10, 2005.

05PARIS1698: China arms embargo: French positions unchanged. Paris Embassy, March 14, 2005.

05PARIS2287: Media reaction report - China arms embargo - Deputy Secretary Zoellick to Brussels Iraq - election of President. Paris Embassy, April 6, 2005.

05PARIS2316: Media reaction report - China arms embargo Paris - Thursday, April 7, 2005. Paris Embassy, April 7, 2005.

05PARIS3491: French on May 23-24 GAERC. Paris Embassy, May 20, 2005.

05PARIS364: EU-China arms embargo: latest French thinking. Paris Embassy, January 20, 2005.

05PARIS630: EU China arms embargo: French tell Japanese EU ready to lift in March. Paris Embassy, February 1, 2005.

05ROME1005: Italy-China: Fini-Li meeting doomed after EU statement. Rome Embassy, March 23, 2005.

05ROME1734: Italian views on May 23 GAERC agenda. Rome Embassy, May 19, 2005.

05ROME905: Italy will make no commitments to Chinese FM Li on arms embargo. Rome Embassy, March 17, 2005.

09BERLIN1324: OHB-System CEO Calls Galileo a Waste of German Tax Payer Money. Berlin Embassy, October 22, 2009.

INTERVIEWS

Austin, Greg. Vice President, East-West Institute. March 23, 2009.

Campbell, Neil. Senior Advocacy Manager, International Crisis Group. December 10, 2008.

Deletroz, Alain. Vice President, International Crisis Group, December 3, 2008.

Emmerson, Charles. Chatham House, February 2009.

Fischer, Joschka, Former Foreign Minister of Germany, February 25, 2009.

Former Commissioner. May 17, 2011.

Howorth, Jolyon. Yale University, January 21, 2009.

Missiroli, Antonio. Bureau of European Policy Advisors, European Commission, February 17, 2011.

Rogers, James. Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, March 11, 2009.

Small, Andrew. German Marshall Fund, November 27, 2008.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

-----, (1978). "Carter Opposition to Neutron Bomb Reported Despite Plea from Germany", *Associated Press*. Washington, April 5, 1978.

-----, (1983). "U.S. will give world its new air navigation system", *Philadelphia Inquirer*. Philadelphia, September 18, 1983.

-----, (1990). "How Many Really Died?," *Time Magazine*, June 4, 1990.

-----, (1997). "UK wins G-7 support over Hong Kong", *Reuters*. June 22, 1997.

-----, (1999). "It is not all clear sailing," *Aviation Daily*, February 16, 1999.

-----, (1999). "U.K. sees schedule, funding issues in EC's Galileo bid," *Aviation Week's Aerospace Daily & Defense Report*, April 27, 1999.

-----, (2000). "EU opens new office to develop satellite system", *Associated Press*. May 5, 2000.

-----, (2000). "EU seeks go-ahead for Galileo satellite system's next phase on Dec 20", *AFX*. November 22, 2000.

-----, (2000). "EU Transportation Ministers Fail To Agree On Launching Galileo Program," *Satellite Today*, December 22, 2000.

-----, (2000). "EU's de Palacio urges world regulators to back Galileo satellite system", *AFX*. May 16, 2000.

-----, (2001). "'You are either with us or against us'", *CNN*. Washington, November 6, 2001.

-----, (2001). "EU transport ministers to limit funding for Galileo satellite system", *AFX*. April 5, 2001.

-----, (2001). "EU, China agree to cooperate on Galileo satellite system", *BBC Monitoring Europe, originally in Der Speigel (Hamburg)*. London, September 25, 2001.

-----, (2001). "Galileo wins 'pale green light'," *Global Positioning & Navigation News*, April 18, 2001.

-----, (2001). "Netherlands urges non-military use of EU's Galileo satellite system", *AFX*. April 5, 2001.

-----, (2001). "Prodi demands action not words", *BBC News*. London, December 12, 2001.

-----, (2001). "US warns EU ministers on Galileo's possible military conflicts", *Agence France Presse*. December 18, 2001.

-----, (2002). "ESA's Failure To Approve Funding Threatens To Derail Galileo," *Aviation Week's ATC Market Report*, June 27, 2002.

-----, (2002). "EU aims to talk 'soon' to US over Galileo navigation system security", *AFX European Focus*. June 21, 2002.

-----, (2002). "EU Commission dismisses US opposition to Europe's Galileo rival to GPS", *Agence France Presse*. March 8, 2002.

-----, (2002). "EU SUMMIT: Leaders approve 3.4bln eur Galileo satellite navigation system", *AFX European Focus*. March 16, 2002.

-----, (2002). "Galileo Camp Accuses U.S. Of Trying to Safeguard GPS Global Monopoly", *Aviation Week's ATC Market Report*. January 24, 2002.

-----, (2002). "Galileo Feuding Involves Financial, Political and Foreign Relations Issues," *Satellite News*, January 21, 2002.

-----, (2002). "German cabinet agres financing of Galileo satellite project", *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. February 27, 2002.

-----, (2002). "German-Italian row could scupper Galileo satellite project: Prodi", *Agence France Presse*. October 3, 2002.

-----, (2002). "Military Pushes for Galileo," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, February 18, 2002.

-----, (2002). "Spain's Alvarez Cascos says Galileo project needs no unanimity", *AFX European Focus*. January 21, 2002.

-----, (2002). "Transport Council: Ministers give go-ahead for Galileo satellite navigation project," *European Report*, March 27, 2002.

-----, (2002). "US steps up offensive against European rival to GPS", *Agence France Presse*. Washington, March 7, 2002.

-----, (2003). "Belgian FM insists no plans to undermine NATO", *Agence France Presse*. October 26, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Blair backed Franco-German plan for EU defence project: reports", *Agence France Presse*. September 22, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Britain firm against EU military HQ amid reported US dismay", *Agence France Presse*. October 16, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Bush reaffirms warning against undermining NATO", *Agence France Presse*. December 4, 2003.

-----, (2003). "China urges EU to lift arms embargo", *Agence France Presse*. December 18, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Conférence de presse de M. Jacques Chirac (17 février 2003)", *Le Monde diplomatique*. February 17, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Defence: EU military planning under discussion", *European Report*. Brussels, August 28, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Defence: Italy against undermining NATO with EU headquarters", *European Report*. Brussels, September 20, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Department of Defense background briefing (as released by the Pentagon)", *Federal News Service*. Washington, October 8, 2003.

-----, (2003). "EU calls for new look at China arms embargo", *Agence France Presse*. December 12, 2003.

-----, (2003). "EU constitution could cost the UK £2bn a year", *Scotsman on Sunday*. Edinburgh, June 22, 2003.

-----, (2003). "EU leaders fail to adopt Constitution", *China Daily*. December 15, 2003.

-----, (2003). "EU military headquarters reportedly not to be established in Tervuren", *Der Spiegel*. Hamburg, October 6, 2003.

-----, (2003). "EU military planning cell greeted in silence by Pentagon", *Agence France Presse*. December 13, 2003.

-----, (2003). "EU Parliament resists end to arms embargo against China", *AFX News*. December 19, 2003.

-----, (2003). "EU's Lamy Signals Review of Embargo on Arms to China", *Wall Street Journal*. New York City, December 3, 2003.

-----, (2003). "EU/China: MEPs Reject French Pleas over Arms Ban", *European Report*. December 20, 2003.

-----, (2003). "European Companies Want Chinese Technology Trade Ban Lifted", *GSN-Global Security Newswire*. December 2, 2003.

-----, (2003). "European Parliament opposes lifting arms embargo against China", *Agence France Press*. December 20, 2003.

-----, (2003). "European press review", *BBC News*. London, April 30, 2003.

-----, (2003). "European Union: Summit Talks on Constitution Collapse", *Facts on File World News Digest*. December 18, 2003.

-----, (2003). "France insists EU defence plans not against NATO", *Agence France Presse*. November 17, 2003.

-----, (2003). "French defense minister says country working to lift EU arms embargo on China", *Associated Press Worldstream*. June 30, 2003.

-----, (2003). "German minister links lifting of China arms embargo to human rights", *ddp News Agency*. Berlin, December 10, 2003.

-----, (2003). "German unemployment hits new high", *CNN*. Berlin, February 5, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Germany, France vow to press ahead with EU military", *Agence France Press*. September 18, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Germany's efforts to heal rift with USA "half-hearted" - paper", *Focus*. Munich, May 5, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Insider notes from United Press International for September 22", *United Press International*. September 22, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Italy in bid to break EU deadlock", *CNN.com*. December 13, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Italy offers compromise on EU military HQ", *Agence France Presse*. October 3, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Outrage at 'old Europe' remarks", *BBC News*. London, January 23, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Roundup: Europe's companies urge removal of ban on high-tech exports to China", *Xinhua General News Service*. November 26, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Schroeder confirms pushing for lifting of EU arms embargo against China", *AFX News*. London, December 2, 2003.

-----, (2003). "Solana says entire EU must decide on lifting of arms embargo against China", *Bild am Sonntag*. Hamburg, December 7, 2003.

-----, (2003). "The old motor revs up again", *The Economist*. London, December 5, 2003.

-----, (2003). "UK and France boost defence ties", *BBC News*. London, February 5, 2003.

-----, (2003). "UNESCO to send experts to Iraq to compile data on looted antiquities", *UN News Centre*. New York, April 29, 2003.

-----, (2003). "When east meets west", *The Economist*. London, November 20, 2003.

-----, (2004). "Airbus aims high in China market", *People's Daily*. Beijing, January 20, 2004.

-----, (2004). "Bold military plans on table as EU's 'big three' hold summit", *Agence France Presse*. February 16, 2004.

-----, (2004). "Cohen criticizes 'wag the dog' characterization", *CNN.com*. Washington, March 23, 2004.

-----, (2004). "Danish PM's remarks on arms embargo against China causes furore", *Agence France Press*. February 27, 2004.

-----, (2004). "Denmark reveals Iraq arms secrets", *BBC News*. London, April 19, 2004.

-----, (2004). "EU Considers end to ban on arms sales to Beijing", *AP-Associated Press*. January 25, 2004.

-----, (2004). "EU, Israel to sign pact on Galileo", *Total Telecom*. July 13. 2004.

-----, (2004). "EU, US end Galileo satellite navigation dispute", *DMEurope*. June 28, 2004.

-----, (2004). "France and China cozy up", *DW-World*. January 27, 2004.

-----, (2004). "Galileo fudged," *New Scientist*, June 3, 2004.

-----, (2004). "No "exact date" for lifting arms embargo on China: Solana", *Xinhua News Agency*. Beijing, February 12, 2004.

-----, (2004). "Pentagon would attack EU satellites in wartime", *Sunday Business*. London, October 24, 2004.

-----, (2004). "Schröder's Sixth Visit to China. Expanding Bilateral trade to 100 billion dollars", *The Atlantic Times*. Germany, December 2004.

-----, (2004). "U.S. offers EU deal on Galileo satellite system", *Total Telecom*. January 9, 2004.

-----, (2004). "U.S., Europe work toward mutual cooperation on global positioning, Galileo satellite system", *States News Service*. Washington, January 8, 2004.

-----, (2005). "China urges EU to 'trash' arms embargo", *Agence France Presse*. November 4, 2005.

-----, (2005). "China: Agreement for Promotion of Galileo Satellite System", *ANSA English Media Service*. March 10, 2005.

-----, (2005). "Chirac Defies Bush on China arms", *BBC News*. February 22, 2005.

-----, (2005). "EADS won't sell arms to China, even if EU lifts embargo", *AFX*. April 12, 2005.

-----, (2005). "EU and China reach textile deal", *BBC News*. September 5, 2005.

-----, (2005). "EU official calls China embargo "unfair"", *China Daily*. Beijing, March 24, 2005.

-----, (2005). "France pushes to lift China arms ban", *China Daily*. Beijing, February 16, 2005.

-----, (2005). "Galileo operator to be selected this month", *Satellite News*. February 7, 2005.

-----, (2005). "Interview given by Jacques Chirac", *Asahi Shimbun*. Tokyo, March 21, 2005.

-----, (2005). "Taiwan mulls new jet fighters on reports Dassault may sell aircraft to China", *AFX*. April 12, 2005.

-----, (2006). "High-speed Beijing-Shanghai railway to start in 2010", *Forbes*. April 3, 2006.

-----, (2007). "EU agrees to disagree," *New Europe*, November 17, 2007.

-----, (2007). "Japan's Abe wants arms embargo kept on China," *The European Weekly's New Europe*.

-----, (2007). "Six world powers to discuss Iran in Paris Saturday", *Reuters*. November 28, 2007.

-----, (2010). "Obstacles to Lifting Europe's Arms Embargo Against China", *Stratfor*. Austin, Texas, December 30, 2010.

Abrams, Fran (2000). "Action on arms exports 'is too little and too late'", *The Independent*. London, December 7, 2000.

Albright, Madeleine (1998). "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future", *Financial Times*. December 7, 1998.

Albright, Madeleine (1998). Interview on "The Today Show," NBC. February 19, 1998.

Ames, Paul (2003). "EU seeks agreement on military headquarters", *Associated Press*. October 3, 2003.

Ames, Paul (2003). "EU seeks to resolve dispute over defense plans", *Associated Press Worldstream*. December 4, 2003.

Asaba, Harumasa (2003). "U.S.-EU GPS rivalry puts Japan in difficult position", *The Daily Yomiuri*. Tokyo, November 21, 2003.

Babej, Marc E. and Pollak, Tim (2006). "Boeing versus Airbus", *Forbes*. New York, May 24, 2006.

Barber, Tony (2009). "China sees EU as mere pawn in global game", *Financial Times*. London, April 23, 2009.

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (2003). "Pullout from Tervuren", *Der Spiegel*. Hamburg, October 6, 2003.

Beatty, Andrew (2004). "China and EU will have world's biggest trade relationship, predicts Prodi", *EUObserver*. May 6, 2004.

Bennett, Rosemary (2003). "Blair sabotages French plan for EU army", *The Times*. London, August 25, 2003.

Bennhold, Katrin (2004). "Chirac nets over $4 billion in orders: France-China deals awaken

Europeans", *International Herald Tribune*. Paris, October 12, 2004.

Berkofsky, Axel (2004). "EU unlikely to life China arms embargo soon", *Asia Times*. April 30, 2004.

Bernstein, Richard (2005). "Backpedaling on the arms ban", *International Herald Tribune*. Paris, April 15, 2005.

Binnendijk, Hans (2005). "A trans-Atlantic storm over arms for China; Bush in Brussels", *International Herald Tribune*. Paris, February 9, 2005.

Black, Ian (2003). "France, Germany deppend UK rift", *The Guardian*. London, April 30, 2003.

Black, Ian (2003). "Inside Europe", *The Guardian*. London, December 22, 2003.

Black, Ian (2003). "Powell calls on Nato to send troops to Iraq: Secretary of state says alliance is united on need to play bigger role", *The Guardian*. London, December 5, 2003.

Black, Ian (2003). "Rumsfeld tries to cool row over EU military plan: US defence secretary and allies play down talk of transatlantic rift over defence initiative", *The Guardian*. London, December 2, 2003.

Black, Ian (2003). "UK tries to head off plan for EU rival to Nato", *The Guardian*. London, August 29, 2003.

Black, Ian (2004). "Analysis: Union's struggle to strut its stuff on world stage", *The Guardian*. London, April 28, 2004.

Black, Ian (2004). "Human rights record costs China EU deal", *The Guardian*. April 30, 2004.

Black, Ian (2005). "A journey without maps", *The Guardian*. London, May 26, 2005.

Black, Ian and White, Michael (2003). "Blair accepts European defence deal", *The Guardian*. London, November 29, 2003.

Black, Ian and White, Michael (2003). "Washington accepts EU's independent military plan", *The Guardian*. London, December 12, 2003.

Black, Ian and Wintour, Patrick (2003). "Straw sets limits to EU military plan", *The Guardian*. London, October 21, 2003.

Blank, Stephen (2004). "China-Taiwan arms race quickens", *Asia Times*. February 24, 2004.

Booker, Christopher (2004). "Satellite Wars: How to lose old friends", *Sunday Telegraph*. London, September 26, 2004.

Bork, Ellen (2004). "Keep a Common Front on Arms Sales to China", *Financial Times*. May 21, 2004.

Boucher, Richard (2001). "State Department Regular Briefing", *Federal News Service*. Washington, December 18, 2001.

Bouilhet, Alexandrine (2003). "Demain, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing va présenter le projet validé par la Convention; Premier test pour la Constitution (Tomorrow, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing will present the Draft approved by the Convention; First test for the Constitution)", *Le Figaro*. Paris, June 19, 2003.

Brand, Constant (2001). "EU warns high-flying plans for satellite system could be jeopardized by funding delays", *Associated Press*. December 7, 2001.

Brand, Constant (2001). "Leaders promise Europe-wide air traffice space; delay satellite project with BC-EU summit", *Associated Press*. March 24, 2001.

Brand, Constant (2003). "U.K., France, Germany OK EU defence deal", *Associated Press Online*. November 28, 2003.

Bremmer, Charles and August, Oliver (2004). "French scorn Chirac's outburst against US", *The Times*. London, October 11, 2004.

Browne, Anthony (2003). "EU defence review heals rift with US", *The Times*. London, December 12, 2003.

Browne, Anthony and Evans, Michael (2003). "Rumsfeld attacks EU defence plans as threat to Nato", *The Times*. London, December 1, 2003.

Bruneau, Leon (2003). "EU, confident of winning over US, announces military planning wing", *Agence France Presse*. December 12, 2003.

Buckley, Chris (2005). "EU offers China hope on embargo", *International Herald-Tribune*. Paris, May 12, 2005.

Bulcke, Bernard (2003). "Louis Michel Deems EU Support for Iraq Resolution Possible: Military Command Can Stay With United States", *De Standard*. Groot Bijgaarden, Belgium, September 8, 2003.

Bulcke, Bernard (2003). "Verhofstadt Removes Obstacle to EU Defense", *De Standard*. Groot Bijgaarden, Belgium, September 27, 2003.

Bush, George W. (2002). "Speech at the United Nations General Assembly", September 12, 2002.

Calabresi, Massimo (2008). "U.S. and Iran: A One-Sided Negotiation," *Time*, July 21, 2008.

Carlo, Bastasin (2003). "Pro o contro gli Stati Uniti? Parigi e Berlino al bivio sulla Difesa commune europea eurocrisi (For or against the United States? Paris and Berlin at the crossroads on common European defense: Eurocrisis) ", *La Stampa*. Turin, April 15, 2004.

Caron, Ryan (2006). "Letter: Galileo and Compass," *The Space Review*, August 7, 2006.

Castle, Stephen (2002). "Galileo satellite project goes into orbit; Blair changes tune, supporting a pounds 2bn European space system opposed by US military", *The Independent*. London, March 10, 2002.

Castle, Stephen (2003). "Blair heals rift by agreeing to EU defence missions", *The Independent*. London, September 23, 2003.

Castle, Stephen (2003). "Britain aims to sideline Franco-German plan for separate EU military structure", *The Independent*. London, August 29, 2003.

Castle, Stephen (2003). "Britain caught between NATO and EU as Rumsfeld flies in", *Independent on Sunday*. London, November 30, 2003.

Castle, Stephen (2003). "European summit: At long last, a deal is struck on the EU defence force", *The Independent*. London, December 12, 2003.

Castle, Stephen (2003). "Germany retreats on EU strategic defence plans", *The Independent*. London, November 14, 2003.

Castle, Stephen (2003). "Italy brokers deal to end EU defence rift", *The Independent*. London, October 3, 2003.

Castle, Stephen (2003). "NATO calms US fears of European defence HQ", *The Independent*. London, October 21, 2003.

Castle, Stephen (2003). "Rumsfeld sidesteps showdown with EU over defence plan", *The Independent*. London, December 2, 2003.

Castle, Stephen (2003). "Straw is left red-faced after leak of deal over military headquarters for EU", *The Independent*. London, November 29, 2003.

Chalmers, John and Ladki, Nadim (2003). "European Countries Block NATO Over Iraq; U.S. Fumes", *Reuters*. February 7, 2003.

Cliff, Roger and Medeiros, Evan S. (2004). "Europe's Embargo: Keep the ban on arms for China", *International Herald Tribune*. Paris, March 23, 2004.

Cole, Deborah (2003). "EU defense ministers aim to avert military HQ row at Rome meeting", *Agence France Presse*. October 3, 2003.

Cole, Deborah (2003). "EU leaders put brave face on constitution debacle", *Agence France Presse*. December 13, 2003.

Cooper, Robert (2002). "The new liberal imperialism", *The Observer*. London, April 7, 2002.

Czuczka, Tony (2003). "German and French leaders hold talks on postwar Iraq at Berlin summit", *Associated Press*. September 18, 2003.

de Selding, Peter B. (2003). "Getting Galileo Right", *Space News*. Reston, VA, December 23, 2003.

de Selding, Peter B. (2003). "One More Time: ESA Tries to Put Galileo On Track", *Space News*. Reston, VA, January 14, 2003.

de Selding, Peter B. (2004). "Europe Concedes to U.S. On One GPS, Galileo Roadblock", *Space News*. Reston, VA, January 6, 2004.

de Selding, Peter B. (2007). "Galileo Funding Solution Remains Elusive", *Space News*. Reston, VA, September 17, 2007.

de Selding, Peter B. (2009). "China's Satnav Progress Stokes Concerns About Galileo Overlap", *Space News*. Springfield, VA, January 12, 2009.

de Selding, Peter B. (2011). "European Commission Doles out Down Payment for Initial GMES Launchers," *Space News*, June 10, 2011.

Dempsey, Judy (2003). "Defence Plan could rival NATO", *Financial Times*. London, April 29. 2003.

Dempsey, Judy (2005). "EU feels the heat on China embargo", *International Herald Tribune*. Paris, March 23, 2005.

Dempsey, Judy (2005). "EU stance on China arms stirs 3 nations", *International Herald Tribune*. Paris, March 4, 2005.

Dinerman, Taylor (2006). "China and Galileo, continued," *The Space Review*, August 21, 2006.

Dinerman, Taylor (2006). "Galileo gets a Chinese overlay," *The Space Review*, July 31, 2006.

Dinerman, Taylor (2009). "Galileo and the Chinese: one thing after another," *The Space Review*, February 9, 2009.

Dombey, Daniel (2005). "EU drive to lift China arms ban falls apart", *Financial Times*. London, June 14, 2005.

Dombey, Daniel, Adams, Christopher, and Benoit, Bertrand (2005). "Solana to mediate in China arms ban dispute", *Financial Times*. London, March 23, 2005.

Doyle, Leonard and Cornwell, Rupert (2003). "Chirac vows to veto war resolution", *The Independent*. London, March 11, 2003.

Drozdiak, William (2000). "US tepid on European defense plan", *Washington Post*. Washington, DC, March 7, 2000.

Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose (2003). "Powell goes on attack over EU defence The US secretary of state says Washington wants military planning to stay inside Nato", *The Daily Telegraph*. London, December 5, 2003.

Evans, Michael, Browne, Anthony, and Rozenberg, Gabriel (2005). "British arms firms will spurn China if embargo ends", *The Times*. London, February 22, 2005.

Finn, Peter (2002). "U.S.-Style Campaign With Anti-U.S. Theme; German Gains by Opposing Iraq Attack", *Washington Post*. Washington, D.C., September 19, 2002.

Frankland, Mark (1995). "Humbled Europe Learns Its Lowly Place in the World", *The Observer*. London, July 23, 1995.

Freeman, Simon (2006). "Iran referred to atomic watchdog in path to sanctions", *The Times (UK)*. London, January 31, 2006.

Friedman, Thomas (2005). "Arms sales begin at home", *New York Times*. New York, March 6, 2005.

Fuller, Thomas (2003). "EU leaders agree on defense policy; Planning unit is separate from NATO; deal on voting system seems unlikely", *The International Herald Tribune*. December 13, 2003.

Geitner, Paul (2003). "Talks deadlock over EU's constitution", *Associated Press*. December 12, 2003.

Goldsmith, Jack and Posner, Eric (2008). "Does Europe believe in international law?" *Wall Street Journal*. New York, November 25, 2008.

Grice, Andrew and Castle, Stephen (2003). "PM draws his lines in the sand before debate starts on EU draft treaty", *The Independent*. London, June 20, 2003.

Harding, Gareth (2003). "Analysis: U.S. stung by EU defence plan", *United Press International*. October 17, 2003.

Harmsen, Peter (2003). "China calls for end to European arms embargo, full market status", *Agence France Press*. October 13, 2003.

Harrison, Michael (2001). "Britain told to invest in pounds 2bn Galileo satellite project or lose contracts", *The Independent*. London, November 22, 2001.

Harrison, Michael (2001). "Cabinet divided on Galileo satellite project", *The Independent*. London, December 3, 2001.

Heath, Allistar and Boles, Tracy (2004). "Pentagon would attach EU satellites in wartime", *Sunday Business*. London, October 24, 2004.

Heath, Allister (2005). "Europe must reform or die, the CIA warns", *The Business*. London, January 16, 2005.

Henley, Jon (2003). "Chirac basks in warm glow of adulation", *Guardian*. London, March 12, 2003.

Hill, Luke (2003). "Robertson blasts separate EU planning centre", *Jane's Defence Weekly*. September 10, 2003.

Hutzler, Charles and Michaels, Daniel (2004). "Politics delays Airbus order", *The Wall Street Journal*. New York, December 3, 2004.

Ingham, Richard (2003). "Europe gives organisational launch to Galileo satellite system", *Agence France Presse*. June 16, 2003.

Johnson, Ed (2003). "NATO must remain cornerston of Britain's defense policy, Blair says", *Associated Press*. October 23, 2003.

Johnson, Ed (2004). "NATO secretary-general says alliance's priority is Afghanistan", *Associated Press Worldstream*. Februrary 12, 2004.

Joshi, Jitendra (2003). "EU "big three" agree on military planning wing", *Agence France Presse*. November 28, 2003.

Joshi, Jitendra (2005). "Chinese premier confident of end to EU arms ban", *Agence France Presse*. Paris, May 5, 2004.

Kagan, Robert (1995). "America, Bosnia, Europe: A Compelling Interest", *The Weekly Standard*. Washington, November 6, 1995.

Kaplan, Robert (2005). "How We Would Fight China," *The Atlantic*, June 2005.

Kelly, Emma (2002). "Decision Day", *Flight International*. March 5, 2002.

Klau, Thomas (2009). "China and America: Europe should fear G2 rather than G20", *Financial Times Deutschland*. Hamburg, March 13, 2009.

Lanfranco, Ed (2003). "Trade tops Schroeder trip to China", *United Press International*. December 3, 2003.

Laurenson, John (2003). "France's economic ties to Iraq", *BBC News*. February 13, 2003.

Lee, Jennifer 8 (2001). "Technology; Europe plans a constellation of satellites", *New York Times*. New York, Novermber 26, 2001.

Levieux, Eleanor and Levieux, Michel (2003). "The World; No, Chirac Didn't Say "Shut Up"", *New York Times*. New York, February 23, 2003.

Lieven, Anatol (2002). "The end of the west?," *Prospect Magazine*, September 20, 2002.

Long, Tony (2011). "This Day in Tech: June 14, 1962: Western Europe Officially Joins the

Space Race," *Wired*, June 14, 2011.

Macartney, Jane (2009). "China sets 8% target for economic growth", *The Times*. London, March 5, 2009.

MacIntyre, Donald (2003). "At last, Mr Blair has done a deal to gladden the hearts of pro-Europeans; Donald Rumsfeld's diplomatic behaviour should not obscure", *The Independent*. London, December 2, 2003.

Mahony, Honor (2002). "NATO: EU satellite project will endanger allied forces", *EUObserver.com*. Brussels, June 21, 2002.

Maney, Kevin (2004). "Unlike some celebrity marriages, Nokia-Finland union won't end soon", *USA Today*. June 30, 3004.

McAllister, J.F.O*., et al.* (1992). "Atrocity and Outrage," *Time Magazine*, August 17, 1992.

McElderry, Kevin (2004). "EU's big three launch Berlin summit, defending tactics", *Agence France Presse*. February 18, 2004.

McLean, Renwick (2005). "Hu presses Spain on EU arms embargo", *The International Herald Tribune*. Paris, November 14, 2005.

Meade, Geoff (2003). "Hoon bids to ease U.S. fears over euro defence", *Press Association*. December 1, 2003.

Mirsky, Jonathan (1999). "An eldorado of two billion armpits," *New Statesman*, January 22, 1999.

Mosquera, Mary (2004). "Transportation to lead civilian GPS management", *Government Computer News*. Washington, December 17, 2004.

Mufson, Stephen (1997). "China cautions U.S., Denmark against human rights criticism", *Washington Post*. Washington, April 11, 1997.

Office of the Presidency, French Republic (2003). "Joint Press Conference of M. Jacques Chirac, M. Guy Verhofstadt, M. Gerhard Schroeder, and M. Jean-Claude Juncker, on the issue of the meeting concerning European defense", Paris, April 30, 2003.

Pan, Phillip (2004). "US pressing EU to uphold arms embargo against China", *The Washington Post*. Washington, D.C., January 31, 2004.

Peel, Quentin (2003). "The Rift Turns Nasty: The Plot That Split Old and New Europe", *Financial Times*. May 28, 2003.

Rachman, Gideon (2008). "Irrelevance, Europe's logical choice", *Financial TImes*. London, May 19, 2008.

Randall, Colin (2005). "Chirac fights to save his authority and his dream", *Telegraph*. London, June 1, 2005.

Reis, Reinholf and Rahir, Patrick (2004). "Paris, Berlin and London seek to be driving force behind enlarged EU", *Agence France Presse*. January 22, 2004.

Ridderbusch, Katja (2003). "Blairopa", *Die Welt*. Berlin, August 26, 2003.

Romic, Sanja (2004). "EUROPE: Despite U.S. grumbling, EU sets up its own defense panel", *Inter Press Service*. January 7, 2004.

Roy, Ranjan (2005). "Diversity dooms new Europe: Rejection of consitution blow to EU

foreign policy", *Times of India*. New Delhi, June 7, 2005.

Sands, David R. (2003). "EU Plan draws rapid reaction", *Washington Times*. Washington, April 30, 2003.

Sciolino, Elaine (2003). "The Great Divide: The U.S. and Europe Stretch to Close It", *The New York Times*. New York, December 8, 2003.

Siuberski, Philippe (2003). "US slams "chocolate makers", as Belgium stands firm on EU military", *Agence France Presse*. September 2, 2003.

Stöcker, Christian (2011). "A Dispatch Disaster in Six Acts", *Der Spiegel*. Hamburg, September 1, 2011.

Subierski, Phillippe (2003). "US slams "chocolate makers," as Belgium stands firm on EU military", *Agence France Presse*. September 2, 2003.

Summers, Deborah (2003). "Majority voting is block to EU pact; Blair admits that deal on constitution is still out of reach", *The Herald*. Glasgow, December 13, 2003.

Talmadge, Eric (1989). "Governments prepare to evacuate citizens; protests continue", *Associated Press*. June 6, 1989.

Taverna, Michael A. (1999). "Europe Launches Satnav Project", *Aviation Week and Space Technology*. Washington, July 5, 1999.

Taverna, Michael A. (2002). "French Brass Urge Milspace Teamwork," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, March 11, 2002.

Taverna, Michael A. (2003). "Planning Ahead", *Aviation Week & Space Technology*. Washington, December 8, 2003.

Taverna, Michael A., Barrie, Douglas, and Wall, Robert (2004). "Europe, US Resolve Galileo Dispute", *Aviation Week and Space Technology*. March 7, 2004.

Thurston, Michael (2003). "NATO chief swipes at "gang of four" over defence row", *Agence France Presse*. October 21, 2003.

Thurston, Michael (2004). "EU, US trumpet 'win-win' accord in satellites row", *Agence France Presse*. February 26, 2004.

Vinocur, John (2003). "German says EU planning unit should be attached to NATO; News Analysis", *International Herald Tribune*. October 27, 2003.

Walker, Martin (2003). "Blair eases U.S. defense fears", *United Press International*. December 12, 2003.

Washington, George, *Farewell Address*. 1796, The Avalon Project at the Lillian Goldman Yale Law Library: New Haven, Connecticut.

Wastell, David (2003). "Straw fuels fear of rift between EU and US Washington increasingly concerned that 'EU army' will undermine Nato", *Sunday Telegraph*. London, November 30, 2003.

Watson, Graham (2004). "Ethics over commerce: EU must keep its ban on arms sales to China", *International Herald Tribune*. Paris, August 4, 2004.

Weisman, Steven (2005). "Europeans said to keep embargo on arms to China", *New York Times*. New York, March 22, 2005.

Weldon, Dave (2003). "The Future of Air Power; Space Is Greatest Strategic Venue", *Roll Call*. Washington, June 2, 2003.

Wernicke, Christian (2003). "Blair's Breach of Taboo: For the First Time British Prime Minister Supports Plans for Independent European Defense Policy", *Suddeutsche Zeitung*. Munich, September 22, 2003.

Whitney, Craig R. (1991). "WAR IN THE GULF: EUROPE; Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans' Fragile Unity", *New York Times*. New York, January 25, 1991.

Wielaard, Robert (2004). "EU may lift ban on arms sales to China", *Associated Press*. January 26, 2004.

Wintour, Patrick and Henley, Jon (2003). "Don't blame us for conflict, protest French", *The Guardian*. London, March 20, 2003.

Zecchini, Laurent (2003). "Paris, Londres et Berlin sont parvenus à un compromis sur la défense européenne (Paris, London and Berlin have reached a compromise on European defense)", *Le Monde*. Paris, November 29, 2003.

Zecchini, Laurent (2003). "Two Visions of Europe and its Defense", *Le Monde*. Paris, October 7, 2003.

PRIMARY DOCUMENTS

------- (2003) *Sixth China-EU Summit: Joint Press Statement*. 13424/03 (Presse 298) October 30, 2003.

------- (2003). *European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations.* Adopted December 12, 2003. http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/misc/78414.pdf. [Accessed September 20, 2011].

------- (2003). *Joint Paper by France, Germany and the United Kingdom - Naples, 29 November 2003*, in *From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defence: core documents*, Missiroli, Editor. 2003, EU Institute for Security Studies: Paris. p. 283-284.

------- (2004). *China now second trade parner of EU25.* Eurostat 146/2004: December 7, 2004.

------- (2005). *Germany's external relations with China.* Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report: July 2005.

------- (2005). *Lifting EU Arms Embargo on China: AIA Opinion Piece.* Aerospace Industries Association: Arlington, VA, May 2005.

------- (2009). *E3+3 Statement on Iran's nuclear programme.* S214/09 New York, September 23, 2009.

------- (2012), *About ESA*. [cited February 3, 2012]; Available from: http://www.esa.int/esaMI/About_ESA/SEMDIUEVL2F_0.html.

-----, (1984) *Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong*. December 19, 1984, http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm [Accessed March 10, 2009].

AECMA and Eurospace Joint Press Release (2001). *Galileo: The Urgent Need for a Positive Decision.* Brussels, December 13, 2001.

Asselbom, Jean, (2005) *EU Presidency declaration on the "anti-secession law" by China.* Presidency of the European Union, March 14, 2005. http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_4470_en.htm [Accessed March 10, 2009].

Auswärtiges Amt, (2002) *Tasks of German Foreign Policy in East Asia at the beginning of the 21st century*. Federal Foreign Office, May 2002.

Bangemann, Martin et. al., (1994), *Europe and the global information society: Recommendations of the high-level group on the information society to the Corfu European Council (Bangemann group)*. European Council, June 24-25, 1994.

Bell, Robert G. (2002). *NATO Discusses GPS and Galileo Security Issues*. in *European Satellites for Security Conference*. June 19, 2002. Brussels.

Blair, Tony and Chirac, Jacques (1998). *Franco-British summit Joint declaration on European defense*. December 4, 1998. Saint-Malo, France. http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2002/02/joint-declaration-on-eu-new01795 [Accessed September 15, 2011].

Braibanti, Ralph, Kim, Jason Y., and Wells, Damon (2002). *GPS-Galileo Negotiations:*

Commercial Issues at Stake, at *Briefing to ISAC-1*. April 25, 2002.

Caballero-Bourdot, Corine (2004). *The common security and defence policy in the draft EU Constitutional Treaty.* Secretariat-General of the Assembly of the Western European Union: Brussels, http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/presse/articles/2004/BourdotEFn1ConstengFIN.pdf?PHPSESSID=f3137d60 [Accessed November 15, 2011].

Clinton, William Jefferson, (1996), *Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-6*. The White House, March 28, 1996.

Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (2001). *Report of the Space Commission.* Department of Defense: Washington, January 11, 2001.

Department of Commerce (2009) *Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal*. Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/GDPC1.txt, [March 8, 2009].

Department of Defense (2005) *Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005*. Washington.

Directorate General Energy and Transport (2002). *Galileo Information Note: The European project on radio navigation by satellite.* European Commission: Brussels, March 26, 2002.

Directorate General for Transport and Energy (2001). *Galileo: An Imperative for Europe.* Brussels, December 31, 2001.

EU Satellite Center (2012). *History of the European Union Satellite Centre*. [Accessed January 31, 2012]; Available from: http://www.eusc.europa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=41&Itemid=61.

European Commission (1994) *Towards a New Asian Strategy*. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asem/asem_process/com94.htm. [Accessed December 29, 2011].

European Commission (1995) *A Long Term Policy for China Europe Relations*. COM(1995) 279, Brussels.

European Commission (2000) *Commission Communication to the European Parliametn and the Council on Galileo*. November 22, 2000.

European Commission (2000) *Implementation of the Communication "Building a Comrehensive Partnership with China"*. COM(2000) 552 final, Brussels, September 8, 2000.

European Commission (2000) *Perspectives & Priorities for the ASEM Process into the New Decade*. COM 2000 (241), Brussels, April 18, 2000.

European Commission (2001) *EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more Effective EU Policy*. COM(2001) 265 final Brussels, May 15, 2001.

European Commission (2002) *For the European Union: Peace, Freedom, Solidarity*. November 12, 2002.

European Commission (2002) *Fourth Asia Europe Meeting Summit in Copenhagen, September 22-24, 2002 (ASEM 4): Unity and Strength in Diversity*. SEC(2002) 874.

European Commission (2002) *GALILEO: YES, at last!* IP/02/478, March 26, 2002, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/478, [Accessed March 12, 2011].

European Commission (2002). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: State of progress of the Galileo programme.* COM(2002) 518 final, Brussels, September 24, 2002.

European Commission (2003) *A Maturing Partnership: Shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations*. Commission, Policy Paper (2003) 533. Brussels. September 10, 2003.

European Commission (2003) *EU commitment to promoting Human Rights and Democracy*. Memo 03/254. Brussels, December 10, 2003.

European Commission (2003) *Wider Europe - Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*. COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, March 11, 2003.

European Commission (2006) *China Strategy Paper 2007-2013*. Brussels.

European Commission (2006) *Competition and Partnership*. COM(2006) 632 final. Brussels, October 24, 2006.

European Commission (2006) *EU – China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities*. COM(2006) 631 final Brussels, October 24, 2006.

European Commission (2007) *Regional Programming for Asia Strategy Document 2007-2013*. Brussels, May 31, 2007.

European Convention (2003) *Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*. Brussels June 13 and July 10, 2003, http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf [Accessed November 15, 2011].

European Council (1989). *Declaration on China.* European Council: Brussels, June 26-27, 1989.

European Council (1989). *Statement Concerning China. Conclusions of the European Council, 89/180*. Brussels.

European Council (2003) *Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy 155579/03*.

European Council (2003). *Framework Agreement between the European Community and the European Space Agency*. Agency, November 25, 2003.

European Council (2003). *Presidency Conclusions*. in European Council Summit, Brussels, December 12, 2003.

European Council (2004) *2559th Council Meeting 5519/04, Brussels 26/1*. January 26, 2004.

European Council (2004) *Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), 10198/04*.

European Council (2004) *Draft Conclusions, European Council Summit, Brussels 10615/04,* June 17-18, 2004.

European Council (2004) *Presidency Conclusions,* 10679/04 Brussels June 17-18, 2004.

European Council (2004) *Presidency Conclusions*. Brussels, December 16/17, 2004.

European Council (2005) *Presidency Conclusions*, 7619/1/05 Rev 1 Concl 1 European Council Brussels March 22 and 23, 2005.

European Council (2007). *Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia*. 16468/07 Adopted late 2005, made public December 14, 2007.

European Council (2009) *Factsheet on the EU and China*. www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/FACTSHEET_ON_THE_EU_AND_CHINA.pdf [Accessed March 15, 2009].

European Council Secretariat (2006) *User's Guide to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 16440/06*. PESC 1244 COARM 73, December 18, 2006.

European Court of Auditors (2009). *The Management of the Galileo Programme's Development and Validation Phase.* Special Report No 7: Brussels.

European Parliament Committee on International Trade (2005) *Report on Prospects of Trade Relations between the EU and China*. 2005/2015(INI) September 5, 2005.

European Parliament Committee on International Trade (2009) *Report on Trade and Economic Relations with China* (2008/2171(INI)). January 27, 2009.

European Union and the People's Republic of China (2003). *Cooperation agreement on a civil global navigation satellite system (GNSS) - Galileo - between the European Community and its Member States and the People's Republic of China.* http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-documents/treaty-command-papers-ems/explanatory-memoranda/explanatory-memoranda-2007a/china-gnss. [Accessed December 29, 2011].

Eurostat (2009). *EU-27 Trade Since 1995 by CN8*. [Accessed April 4, 2009].

Foreign Affairs Minister of Finland, (2006) *General Affairs and External Relations - 2771st Council Meeting.* 16291/06 (Presse 353). December 11-12, 2006.

General Affairs & External Relations Committee (2008) *The EU's relations with China*. http://ec.europa.eu.eu/external_relations/china/gac.html [Accessed August 13, 2008].

General Affairs & External Relations Committee (2008) *The EU's relations with Taiwan*. http://ex.europa.eu/external_relations/taiwan/intro/index.html [Accessed August 13, 2008].

Gill, Bates (2005) *Lifting of the EU Arms Embargo on China*. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, March 16, 2005, Washington.

GlobalSecurity.org (2009). *China's Defense Budget*. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm [cited February 23, 2009].

González Márquez, Felipe et. al. (2010). *Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities: Report to the European Council by the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030*.

Grimmett, Richard and Papademetriou, Theresa, (2005) *European Union's Arms Control Regime and Arms Exports to China: Background and Legal Analysis*. Congressional Research Service, March 1, 2005.

House of Commons for the United Kingdom (2004), *House of Commons Hansard Written Answers*. December 20, 2004, London.

House of Commons of the United Kingdom (2005), *House of Commons Hansard Debates*. January 25, 2005, London.

House of Representatives of the United States Congress (2004) *H. Con. Res. 512, Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the European Union's plans to lift the embargo on arms sales to the People's Republic of China.* 108th Congress, 2nd Session, October 7, 2004.

House of Representatives of the United States Congress (2005) *H.Res. 57, Urging the European Union to maintain its arms embargo on the People's Republic of China*. 109th Congress, 1st Session, February 1, 2005.

House Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats, (2005) *An Overview on Transatlantic Relations prior to President Bush's visit to Europe*. February 16, 2005, Washington.

IndexMundi (2009). *German Unemployment Rate*. http://www.indexmundi.com/germany/unemployment_rate.html. [Accessed March 5, 2009].

Japanese Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (2006) *Energy in Japan Factsheet*, www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/energy-in-japan/energy2006Epdf/p2122_energy2006E-9.pdf [Accessed February 15, 2009].

John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (2001). *Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System.* Office of the Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation: August 29, 2001.

Johnson, Harold J., (1998) *GAO on US and Euro Military Exports to China*. Government Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, June 16, 1998.

Karner, Julie (2003). *The Global Positioning System: International Cooperation*, March 2003, http://navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/cgsicMeetings/41//6%20Karner%20Intl.ppt, [Accessed March 20, 2011].

Ministry of Defence/Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2003). *ESDP 29 August Meeting: UK Food for Thought Paper.* London, July 30, 2003. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmfaff/1233/3102804.htm. [Accessed August 20, 2011].

NationMaster.com (source: World Development Indicators database) (2009). *GDP (1970) by country.* http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp-economy-gdp&date=1970 [Accessed March 15, 2009].

NATO (1999). *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*. Washington, D.C.: April 23-24, 1999.

NATO (1995). "The New Transatlantic Agenda," Madrid, December 3, 1995.

Office of Management and Budget, (2004) *Historical Tables, Budget of the United States*

Government, Fiscal Year 2005. 45-52.

Office of the Press Secretary, White House, (2004) *Fact Sheet: U.S.-EU Summit: Agreement on GPS-Galileo Cooperation*. June 26, 2004.

People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003). *China's EU Policy Paper*. October 13, 2003, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/ceupp/t27708.htm, [Accessed March 15, 2009].

People's Republic of China's Embassy in the United States of America (1993). *White Paper - The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.* Washington, DC, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/White%20Papers/t36705.htm [Accessed February 21, 2011].

People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005). *China's Military Diplomacy in 2004*. Published by Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa, http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zgjj/ssysz/FR/t244850.htm [Accessed March 15, 2009].

Presidency of the United States to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, (1952) *Translation of the Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community*. June 2, 1952, http://aei.pitt.edu/5201/01/001669_1.pdf, [Accessed November 21, 2011].

President of Finland (2006) *Chairman's Statement of the Sixth Asia-Europe Meeting.* Helsinki, September 10-11, 2006.

President of the United States (2002). *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. September 2002.

PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001). *Inception Styudy to Support the Development of a Business Plan for the GALILEO Programme.* PricewaterhouseCoopers for Directorate-General Transport and Energy: Belgium, November 20, 2001.

Rueda, Raül Romeva, (2004) *Report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report according to Operative Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (2004/2103(INI))*. A6-0022/2004. European Parliament, October 19, 2004.

Rumsfeld, Donald (2001). *"Keeper of the Flame" Award Dinner Remarks*, at Center for Security Policy: November 6, 2001.

Rumsfeld, Donald (2001). *Press Conference.* Department of Defense: Washington, October 18, 2001.

Rumsfeld, Donald (2002). "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs*. **81**(3). May/June 2002, p. 20-32.

Schumann, Robert (1950). *Declaration of May 9, 1950.* http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm [Accessed May 15, 2011].

Shafer, James*, et al.*, (1998) *China: Military Imports from the United States and the European Union since the 1989 Embargoes*, GAO/NSIAD-98-176, United States General Accounting Office / National Security and International Affairs Division, June 1998.

Sharp, Jeremy, (1998) *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel*. Congressional Research Service, January 2, 2008.

Solana, Javier (2003). *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, at

European Council. Thessaloniki: June 20, 2003.

State Department (1989) *Notice of Arms Embargo*. State, Federal Register **54**:108 p. 24539, June 7, 1989.

State Department (2002). *U.S. Global Positioning System and European Galileo System.* Washington, March 7, 2002.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2004) *UK interpretation of arms embargo against China*. [Accessed May 18, 2008]; Available from: http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/euchiuk.html.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *International Arms Embargoes*. http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/embargoes.html. [Accessed March 15, 2011].

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*. http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2010.xls [Accessed October 21, 2011].

Tenth National People's Congress, Third Session, (2005) *Anti-Secession Law*, March 14, 2005.

Transport Ministers of the UK and Germany (2000). *Joint Press Statement from the UK and German Transport Ministers*. Department of the Environment, November 3, 2000.

United States and the European Community, (2004) *Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Application*. June 28, 2004.

United States Government (1993) *International Traffic in Arms Regulations*, in *22 CFR 126.1*., Federal Register, July 22, 1993: United States of America.

United States Senate (2005) *S. Res. 59 Urging the European Union to maintain its arms export embargo on the People's Republic of China*. 109th Congress, 1st Session, February 17, 2005.

SECONDARY WORKS CONSULTED

-----, (2009). *Implications of European Defense Acquisition Reform.* Center for Strategic & International Studies: Washington, DC, October 19, 2009.

-----, (2010). *Europe's Ambitions as a Global Security Provider - Priorities for CSDP Conference*. October 14-15, 2010. Brussels: Egmont Institute.

Achen, Christopher H. and Snidal, Duncan (1989). "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," *World Politics*. **41**. 144-169.

Adcock, Robert and Collier, David (2001). "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research," *The American Political Science Review*. **95**(3). September 2001. 529-546.

Adelman, Jonathan (2002). *The Phalcon Sale to China: The Lessons for Israel.* Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: March 1, 2002.

Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael N. (1998). *Security communities in theoretical perspective*, in *Security communities*, Adler and Barnett, Editors. 1998, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Aggestam, Lisbeth (2008). "Introduction: ethical power Europe?," *International Affairs*. **84**(1). 1-11.

Aggestam, Lisbeth*, et al.* (2008). *Institutional Competences in the EU External Action: Actors and Boundaries in CFSP and ESDP.* Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies: Stockholm, May 2008.

Aktipis, Michael and Oliver, Tim (2011). *Europeanization and British Foreign Policy*, in *National and European foreign policies: towards Europeanization*, Wong and Hill, Editors. 2011, Routledge: New York. 72-92.

Aldrich, Richard J. (2004). "Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation," *International Affairs*. **80**(4). 731-753.

Alecu de Flers, Nicole and Müller, Patrick (2011). "Dimensions and Mechanisms of the Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues," *Journal of European Integration*. May 3, 2011.

Allen, David and Smith, Michael (1990). "Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Arena," *Review of International Studies*. **16**(1). 19-37.

Allin, Dana H. (2004). "The Atlantic crisis of confidence," *International Affairs*. **80**(4). July 2004. 649-663.

Allison, Graham T. and Zelikow, Philip (1999). *Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman.

Altfeld, Michael (1984). "The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test," *The Western Political Quarterly*. **37**(4). 523-544.

Amnesty International (2004). *Undermining Global Security: The European Union's Arms Exports.*

Andersen, Mikael Skou and Liefferink, Duncan (1997). *European environmental policy: the*

pioneers. Issues in environmental politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Andersen, Mikael Skou and Liefferink, Duncan (1997). *Introduction: The Impact of the Pioneers on EU Environmental Policy*, in *European Environmental Policy: The Pioneers*, Andersen and Liefferink, Editors. 1997, Manchester University Press: Manchester.

Anderson, Jeffrey J. (2002). "Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic Polity, 1945-2000," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(5). 793-822.

Anderson, Stephanie (2008). *Crafting EU Security Policy: In Pursuit of a European Identity*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Anderson, Stephanie and Seitz, Thomas R. (2006). "European Security and Defense Policy Demystified: Nation-Building and Identity in the European Union," *Armed Forces & Society*. **33**(1). October 2006. 24-42.

Andreatta, Filippo (2005). *Theory and the European Union's International Relations*, in *International Relations and the European Union*, Hill and Smith, Editors. 2005, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 18-38.

Archick, Kristen and Gallis, Paul (2005). *NATO and the European Union.* Congressional Research Service: Washington, May 12, 2005.

Archick, Kristen, Grimmett, Richard, and Kan, Shirley, (2005). *European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy*. Congressional Research Service, May 27, 2005

Archick, Kristin (2005). *The European Union in 2005 and Beyond.* Congressional Research Service: Washington, July 11, 2005.

Arrighi, Giovanni (1994). *The long twentieth century: money, power, and the origins of our times*. London: Verso.

Askenazi, Vidal (2000). "The Challenges Facing Galileo," *Space Policy*. **16**. 185-188.

Asmus, Ronald D. (1992). *Germany after the Gulf War.* RAND: Santa Monica, CA.

Asmus, Ronald D. (2003). "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*. **85**(2). September/October 2003. 20-31.

Austin, Greg (2005). *The 1989 China Arms Ban: Putting Europe's Position to Congress.* The Foreign Policy Centre: Washington.

Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert O. (1985). "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics*. **38**(1). October 1985. 226-254.

Bache, Ian (2003). *Europeanisation: A Governance Approach*, at *EUSA 8th International Biennial Conference*. Nashville: March 27-29, 2003.

Bache, Ian and Jordan, Andrew (2006). *The Europeanization of British politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Badie, Bertrand (2009). "The European challenge to Bismarkian diplomacy," *International Politics*. **46**(5). 517-526.

Bailes, Alyson J. K. (2008). "The EU and a 'better world': what role for the European Security and Defence Policy," *International Affairs*. **84**(1). 115-130.

Baker, Philip (2002). "Human Rights, Europe, and the People's Republic of China," *The China Quarterly*. 169. 45-63.

Barkin, Samuel (2008). *'Qualitative' Methods?*, in *Qualitative methods in international relations: a pluralist guide*, Klotz and Prakash, Editors. 2008, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 211-220.

Barnett, Michael N. (1990). "High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967-1977," *World Politics*. **42**(4). July 1990. 529-562.

Barysch, Katinka (2005). *Embracing the Dragon: The EU's partnership with China.* Center for European Reform: London.

Bates, Robert H.*, et al.* (2000). "Review: The Analytical Narrative Project," *The American Political Science Review*. **94**(3). September 2000. 696-702.

Bauer, Sibylle (2004). *The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports - much accomplished, much to be done.* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Stockholm, April 27, 2004.

Becher, Klaus (2004). "Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe's Role in the World After the 2003 European Security Strategy," *European Security*. **13**(4). 345-359.

Bechtel, Michael M. and Schneider, Gerald (2010). "Eliciting Substance from "Hot Air": Financial Market Responses to EU Summit Decisions on European Defense," *International Organization*. **64**. Spring 2010. 199-223.

Beidleman, Scott W., Major, United States Air Force (2004). *GPS versus Galileo: Balancing for Position in Space*, Master's Thesis: School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, June 2004.

Bennett, Andrew (2008). *Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, Editors. 2008, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 702-721.

Bennett, Andrew and Elman, Colin (2006). "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Studies Methods," *Annual Review of Political Science*. **9**. 455-476.

Bennett, Andrew and George, Alexander L. (2001). *Case Studies and Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci*, in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations*, Elman and Elman, Editors. 2001, The MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass. 137-167.

Benz, Arthur (2004). "Path-Dependent Institutions and Strategic Veto Players: National Parliaments in the European Union," *West European Politics*. **27**(5). 875-900.

Bergsten, C. Fred (1999). "America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?," *Foreign Affairs*. **78**(2). March/April 1999. 20-34.

Berkofsky, Axel (2006). *The EU-China strategic partnership: rhetoric vs reality*, in *Facing China's rise: Guidelines for an EU strategy*, Zaborowski, Editor. 2006, EU Institute for Security Studies: Party.

Berkofsky, Axel (2007). "Europe Gets Tough on China," *Far Eastern Economic Review*. February 2007.

Bersick, Sebastian (2006). "Strategic considerations in the US-China and the role of European soft power," *Asia-Europe Journal*. **4**(2). June 2006

Bildt, Carl (2003). *We have crossed the Rubicon - but where are we headed next?*, at London: November 17, 2003, Center for European Reform/Svenska Institutet för Europapolitiska Studier.

Bildt, Carl and Dillon, Mike (2004). *Europe's Final Frontier*, in *Europe in Space*, Bildt, Editor. 2004, Center for European Reform: London. 7-18.

Bildt, Carl*, et al.* (2004). *Europe in space.* Centre for European Reform: London, October 2004.

Bildt, Carl, Peyrelevade, Jean, and Späth, Lothar (2000). *Towards a Space Agency for the European Union: Report for the Director-General of the European Space Agency*. Brussels, November 2000.

Bini, Antonella (2007). "Export control of space items: Preserving Europe's advantage," *Space Policy*. **23**. 70-72.

Biscop, Sven (2004). "Able and Willing? Assessing the EU's Capacity for Military Action," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **9**. 509-527.

Biscop, Sven (2006). *The Ambiguous Ambition: The Development of the EU Security Architecture*, at *The EC/EU: A World Security Actor? An Assessment after 50 Years of the External Actions of the EC/EU*. Paris: September 15, 2006, EU Institute for Security Studies.

Biscop, Sven (2008). *Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future of ESDP*. Royal Institute for International Relations: Brussels.

Biscop, Sven, Howorth, Jolyon, and Giegerich, Bastian (2009). *Europe: A Time for Strategy*. Royal Institute for International Relations: Brussels.

Bitzenger, Richard (2004). "A Prisoner's Dilemma: The EU's China Arms Embargo," *China Brief*. **4**(13).

Blackwell, Stephen (2003). "Degrees of Separateness: The EU Military Planning Cell," *RUSI Newsbrief*. **23**(10). October 2003.

Blair, Tony (2010). *A Journey: My Political Life*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Boese, Wade (2003). "Israeli Arms Exports to China of Growing Concern to U.S.," *Arms Control Today*. March 2003.

Boese, Wade (2005). "EU Retains China Arms Embargo," *Arms Control Today*. **35**(1).

Bono, Giovanni (2002). *European Security and Defence Policy: theoretical approaches, the Nice Summit and hot issues.* ESDP Democracy Project: February 2002.

Bonvicini, Gianni (2008). *EU's Projection of Security. Peace Missions as a Tool either for Fusion or Fragmentation.* Istituto Affari Internazionali: Rome, July 2008.

Borchard, Edwin M. (1933). "The Arms Embargo and Neutrality," *The American Journal of International Law*. **27**(2). April 1933. 293-298.

Börzel, Tanja A. (1999). "Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanisation in Germany and Spain," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **37**(4).

573-596.

Börzel, Tanja A. (2002). "Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(2). 193-214.

Börzel, Tanja A. (2004). *How the European Union interacts with its member states*, in *The member states of the European Union*, Bulmer and Lequesne, Editors. 2004, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Börzel, Tanja A. (2005). "Mind the gap! European integration between level and scop," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **23**(2). April 2005. 217-236.

Börzel, Tanja A. and Risse, Thomas (2003). *Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe*, in *The Politics of Europeanization*, Featherstone and Radaelli, Editors. 2003: Oxford University Press.

Börzel, Tanja A. and Risse, Thomas (2009). *Venus approaching Mars? The European Union as an Emerging Civilian World Power.* Freie Universität Berlin: Berlin, April 2009.

Bosold, David and Opperman, Kai (2006). *Governments as gatekeepers: Mediating Domestic and International Discourses in Two-Level Games*, at *4th CEEISA Convention*. Tartu, Estonia: June 25-27, 2006.

Bosse, Giselle (2007). "Values in the EU's Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or Reflection of a Coherent Policy?," *European Political Economy Review*. **7**. 38-62.

Bossuyt, Fabienne (2007). *An economic giant, political dwarf and military worm? Introducing the concept of 'transnational power over' in studies of (the EU's) power in IR*, at *4th European Consortium for Political Research General Conference*. Pisa, Italy: September 6-8, 2007.

Bowie, Christopher J., Haffa, Robert P. Jr., and Mullins, Robert E. (2003). *Future War: What Trends in America's Post-Cold War Military Conflicts Tell Us About Early 21st Century Warfare* Northrup Grumman Corporation Analysis Center: Washington, January 2003.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Brady, Henry E., and Collier, David (2008). *The Oxford handbook of political methodology*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Brady, Henry E. (2003). *Models of causal inference: going beyond the Neyman-Rubin-Holland theory*, at *Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association*. Chicago.

Brady, Henry E. (2008). *Causation and Explanation in Social Science*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, Editors. 2008, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 217-270.

Brady, Henry E. and Collier, David (2004). *Rethinking social inquiry: diverse tools, shared standards*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

Bratanova, Elena (2004). *Legal Limits of National Defense Priviledge in the European Union: Overview of the recent European Court of Justice judgement on Art. 296 European Community Treaty and the new role of the Commission in armaments: A step towards a single market in armaments?* Bonn International Center for Conversion: Bonn.

Bratton, Patrick (2002). "France and the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Contemporary Security Policy*. **23**(2). 87-112.

Bretherton, Charlotte and Vogler, John (2006). *The European Union as a global actor*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

Brimmer, Esther (2007). *Seeing blue: American visions of the European Union.* European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, September 2007.

Bromley, Mark (2007). "The Europeanisation of Arms Export Policy in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland," *European Security*. **16**(2). June 2007. 203-224.

Bromley, Mark (2008). *The Impact on Domestic Policy of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports: The Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Spain.* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Stockholm, May 2008.

Brookes, Peter (2005). *The Lifting of the EU Arms Embargo on China: An American Perspective.* January 31, 2005.

Brunschvig, David, Garwin, Richard L., and Marwell, Jeremy C. (2003). "Space Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*. July/August 2003.

Bull, Martin and Baudner, Joerg (2004). "Europeanization and Italian policy for the Mezzogiorno," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **11**(6). 1058-1076.

Buller, Jim and Gamble, Andrew (2002). "Conceptualising Europeanisation," *Public Policy and Administration*. **17**(2). Summer 2002. 4-24.

Bulmer, Simon (1998). "New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **5**(3). 365-386.

Bulmer, Simon (2007). *Theorizing Europeanization*, in *Europeanization: new research agendas*, Graziano and Vink, Editors. 2007, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 46-58.

Bulmer, Simon (2009). "Politics in Time meets the politics of time: historical institutionalism and the EU timescape," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **16**(2). March 2009. 307-324.

Bulmer, Simon and Lequesne, Christian (2005). *The member states of the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bulmer, Simon and Padgett, Stephen (2004). "Policy Transfer in the European Union: An Institutionalist Perspective," *British Journal of Political Science*. **35**. 103-126.

Buras, Piotr and Longhurst, Kerry (2005). *The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the use of force*, in *Old Europe, new Europe and the transatlantic security agenda*, Longhurst and Zaborowski, Editors. 2005, Routledge: London.

Burckhardt, Christian W. (2004). *Why is there a public debate about the idea of a 'Civilian Power Europe'?* European Institute, London School of Economics: London, October 2004.

Buzan, Barry and Foot, Rosemary, eds (2004). *Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in memory of Gerald Segal*. The New International Relations Series. 2004, Routledge: New York.

Cabestan, Jean-Pierre (2001). *France's Taiwan Policy: A Case of Shopkeeper Diplomacy*, at *The Role of France and Germany in Sino-Europe Relations*. Hong Kong Baptist University: June 22-23, 2001.

Cabestan, Jean-Pierre (2005). *A European Role in Cross-Strait Relations?*, at *5th Europe-*

Northeast Asia Forum: The Taiwan Strait and Northeast Asia Security. Berlin: December 15-17, 2005.

Carlson, Allen (2002). *Protecting Sovereignty, Accepting Intervention: The Dilemma of Chinese Foreign Relations in the 1990s.* National Committee on United States-China Relations: New York, September 2002.

Carr, Edward Hallett (1946). *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations*. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.

Casarini, Nicola (2006). *The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership.* European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, October 2006.

Casarini, Nicola (2007). "The International Politics of the Chinese Arms Embargo," *The International Spectator*. **42**(3). September 2007.

Casarini, Nicola and Musu, Costanza, eds (2007). *European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road Towards Convergence*. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. 2007, Palgrave Macmillan: New York.

Casey, Terence (2006). "Of Power and Plenty? Europe, Soft Power, and 'Genteel Stagnation'," *Comparative European Politics*. **1**.

Chan, Steve (2004). "Can't get no satisfaction? The recognition of revisionist states," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*. **4**. 2007-2238.

Charillon, Frédéric and Wong, Reuben (2011). *France: Europeanization by default?*, in *National and European foreign policies: towards Europeanization*, Wong and Hill, Editors. 2011, Routledge: New York. 19-34.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001). *The Europeanization of Citizenship?*, in *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change*, Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse-Kappen, Editors. 2001, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y.; London. 180-197.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005). *It's the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics.* Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo: Oslo, October 2005.

Chilcoat, Richard, *et. al.,* (2006). *Future of Transatlantic Security Relations Colloquium Report*. 2006. Bush Presidential Conference Center, College Station, Texas: Strategic Studies Institute.

Ching, Frank (2004). "Changing dynamics in EU-China Arms Relations," *China Brief*. (5).

Christensen, Thomas J. (1999). "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security*. **23**(4). Spring 1999. 49-80.

Christensen, Thomas J. and Snyder, Jack (1990). "Chain gangs and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity," *International Organization*. **44**(2). 137-168.

Clark, Wesley K. (2001). *Waging modern war: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the future of combat*. Oxford: Public Affairs Ltd.

Coed, David (2007). "Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **14**(3). 333-345.

Coker, Christopher (2003). "Empires in Conflict," *Whitehall Papers*. **58**.

Cole, Alistair and Drake, Helen (2000). "The Europeanization of the French polity: continuity, change and adaptation," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **7**(1). 26-43.

Collier, David, LaPorte, Jody, and Seawright, Jason (2012). "Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor," *Political Research Quarterly*. **65**(1). 217-232.

Collinson, Sarah (1999). "'Issue-systems,' 'multi-level games' and the analysis of the EU's external commercial and associated policies: a research agenda," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **6**(2). June 1999. 206-224.

Comino, Anna (2007). "A Dragon in Cheap Clothing: What Lessons can be Learned from the EU-China Textile Dispute," *European Law Journal*. **13**(6). November 2007. 818-838.

Constantine, Roftiel, Lt. Col., United States Air Force (2007). *GPS & Galileo. Friendly Foes?*, Master's Thesis: Air Force Fellows Air University, April 2007.

Cooley, Alexander and Spruyt, Hendrik (2009). *Contracting states: sovereign transfers in international relations*. Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Cooper, Richard N. (1972). "Trade Policy is Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*. (9). Winter 1972-1973. 18-36.

Cornish, Paul and Edwards, Geoffery (2001). "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture," *International Affairs*. **77**(3). 587-603.

Cornish, Paul and Edwards, Geoffrey (2005). "The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report," *International Affairs*. **81**(4). 801-820.

Cowles, Maria Green and Smith, Michael *Risks, Reform, Resistance, and Revival*, in *The State of the European Union: Risks, Reform, Resistance, and Revival*, Cowles and Smith, Editors, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Cowles, Maria Green and Smith, Michael, eds *The State of the European Union: Risks, Reform, Resistance, and Revival*. Vol. 5, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Cowles, Maria Green, Caporaso, James A., and Risse-Kappen, Thomas (2001). *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change*. Cornell studies in political economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Cox, Michael (2006). "The Transatlantic Crisis: The Wolf is at the Door," *European Political Science*. **5**. 34-40.

Cox, Robert (1987). *Production, power, and world order: social forces in the making of history*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Crawford, Beverly (1996). "Explaining defection from international cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia," *World Politics*. **48**(4). July 1996. 482-521.

Croft, Stuart (2000). "The EU, NATO and Europeanisation: The return of architechtural debate," *European Security*. **9**(3). 1-20.

Crook, Jason A. (2009). "National Insecurity: ITAR and the Technological Impairment of U.S. National Space Policy," *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*. (74). 505-526.

Crooks, Heather, Capt., United States Air Force (2009). *Transatlantic Relations: The Role of Nationalism in Multinational Space Cooperation*, Location: Naval Postgraduate School,

June 2009.

Crowe, Brian (2003). "A common European foreign policy after Iraq," *International Affairs*. **79**(3). 533-546.

Crum, Ben (2006). "Parliamentarization of the CFSP through informal institution-making? The fifth European Parliament and the EU high representative," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **13**(3). 383-401.

Daehnhardt, Patricia (2011). *Germany in the European Union*, in *National and European foreign policies: towards Europeanization*, Wong and Hill, Editors. 2011, Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York. 35-56.

Dahl, Erik J. (2002). "Network centric warfare and the death of operational art," *Defence Studies*. **2**(1). 1-24.

Dale, Reginald (2003/2004). "European Union, Properly Constructed," *Policy Review*. (122). December 2003 & January 2004.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja (2004). *Homeland security. American and European responses to September 11th*, in *The Politics of European Security*, Pilegaard, Editor. 2004, Danish Institute for International Studies.

Dallek, Robert (1995). *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 1932-1945*. New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dannreuther, Roland (2004). *European Union foreign and security policy: towards a neighbourhood strategy*. London: Routledge.

David, Paul A. (1985). "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," *The American Economic Review*. **75**(2). May 1985. 332-337.

Davis, Ian (2002). *The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

de Melo Palma, Hugo (2009). *European by Force and by Will: Portugal and the European Security and Defence Policy.* College of Europe: Bruges.

de Wijk, Rob (2003). "European Military Reform for a Global Partnership," *The Washington Quarterly*. **27**(1). Winter 2003-04. 197-210.

de Wijk, Rob (2004). "The Reform of ESDP and EU-NATO Cooperation," *The International Spectator*. **39**(1). 71-82.

de Witte, Bruno (2001). "The Nice Declaration: Time for a Constitutional Treaty of the European Union," *The International Spectator*. **36**(1). January-March 2001. 21-30.

DeCamp, William Jr. (2005). *ESDP: NATO's Demise or Opportunities for NATO?*, Master's Thesis: U.S. Army War College, March 18, 2005.

Deighton, Anne (2000). "The Military Security Pool: Towards a New Security Regime for Europe?," *The International Spectator*. **35**(4). 41-54.

Deighton, Anne (2002). "The European Security and Defence Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(4). 719-741.

Deighton, Anne (2002). *911 and NATO, in Superterrorism: Policy responses,* Freedman, Editor, Oxford: Blackwell. 119-134.

Deighton, Anne and Bossuat, Gérard (2007). *The EC/EU: a world security actor?* Paris: Soleb.

della Cananea, Giacinto (2000). *Italy*, in *The national co-ordination of EU policy: the domestic level*, Kassim, Peters, and Wright, Editors. 2000, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 99-113.

della Sala, Vincent (2010). "Political Myth, Mythology and the European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **48**(1). 1-19.

Deltac Limited. and Saferworld (1995). *Proliferation and export controls : an analysis of sensitive technologies and countries of concern*. Chertsey.

Dettke, Dieter (2003). *The Future of Transatlantic Relations - A View from Germany*, at *Committtee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Europe, US House of Representatives*. Washington, DC: June 17, 2003.

Deutsch, Karl W. (1957). *Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the light of historical experience*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Dier, Alexandra (2010). *The Europeanisation of National Defence? Military Reform in Germany and Poland 1999-2009*, DPhil Thesis: University of Oxford.

Diez, Thomas (2005). "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*. **33**(3). 613-636.

Dijkstra, Hylke (2008). "The Council Secretariat's Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **13**(2). 149-166.

Dinan, Desmond (2004). *Europe recast: a history of European Union*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Divis, Dee Ann (2002). "Military role for Galileo emerges," *GPS World*. **13**(5). May 2002. 10.

Dolman, Everett C. (2002). *Astropolitik: classical geopolitics in the space age*. London: Frank Cass.

Dolowitz, David and Marsh, David (1996). "Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer Literature," *Political Studies*. **44**. 343-357.

Dolven, Ben (2004). "Making the Whole World Listen," *Far Eastern Economic Review*. February 26, 2004. 26-29.

Drezner, Daniel (2006). *The Viscosity of Global Governance: When is Forum-Shopping Expensive*, at *International Political Economy Society Annual Meeting*. Princeton University: November 17 & 18, 2006.

Duchêne, François (1972). *Europe's Role in World Peace*, in *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, Mayne, Editor. 1972, Fontana: London.

Duchêne, François (1973). *The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence*, in *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community*, Kohnstamm and Hage, Editors. 1973, Macmillan: London. 1-21.

Duffield, John S. (1994). "NATO's Functions after the Cold War," *Political Science*

Quarterly. **109**(5). Winter 1994-1995. 763-787.

Dumbrell, John (1996). "The Johnson Administration and the British Labour Government: Vietnam, the Pound and East of Suez," *Journal of American Studies*. **30**(2). 211-231.

Dunne, Tim (2004). ""When the shooting starts": Atlanticism in British security strategy," *International Affairs*. **80**(5). October 2004. 893-909.

Economides, Spyros (2005). "The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy," *West European Politics*. **28**(2). 471-491.

Economy, Elizabeth and Oksenberg, Michel (1999). *China joins the world: progress and prospects*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.

Economy, Elizabeth and Segal, Adam (2009). "The G-2 Mirage: Why the United States and China are not ready to upgrade ties," *Foreign Affairs*. **88**(3). May/June 2009. 14-23.

Edmonds, Richard L. (2002). *China and Europe since 1978: a European perspective*. China quarterly special issues, no. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Edwards, Geoffery (2006). "Is There a Security Culture in the Enlarged European Union," *The International Spectator*. **41**(3). 7-23.

Elman, Colin and Elman, Miriam Fendius (2001). *Bridges and boundaries : historians, political scientists, and the study of international relations*. Belfast Center for Science and International Affairs studies in international security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Elman, Colin and Elman, Miriam Fendius (2001). *Introduction: Negotiating International History and Politics*, in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations*, Elman and Elman, Editors. 2001, The MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass. 1-36.

Engelbrekt, Kjell and Hallenberg, Jan (2008). *The European Union and strategy: an emerging actor*. Contemporary security studies. London: Routledge.

Evangelista, Matthew (1989). "Issue-Area and Foreign Policy Revisited," *International Organization*. **43**(1). Winter 1989. 147-171.

Evans, Peter B., Jacobson, Harold Karan, and Putnam, Robert D. (1993). *Double-edged diplomacy: international bargaining and domestic politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Everts, Steven (2004). "The ultimate test case: can Europe and America forge a joint strategy for the wider Middle East?," *International Affairs*. **80**(4). July 2004. 665-686.

Exadaktylos, Theofanis and Radaelli, Claudio (2009). "Research Desing in European Studies: The Case of Europeanization," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **47**(3). 507-530.

Featherstone, Kevin (2003). *Introduction: In the Name of 'Europe'*, in *The Politics of Europeanization*, Featherstone and Radaelli, Editors. 2003, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Featherstone, Kevin and Radaelli, Claudio, eds (2003). *The Politics of Europeanization*. 2003, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Femia, Joseph V. (1987). Gramsci's political thought: hegemony, consciousness and the revolutionary process. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ferraro, Stacy N. (2007). "The European Defence Agency: Facilitating Defense Reform or Forming Fortress Europe?," *Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems*. **16**. Winter 2007. 549-620.

Ferrero-Waldner, Benita (2005). *The EU, China and the Quest for a Multilateral World*, at *Conference to Mark the 30th anniversary of EU-China relations*. Brussels: July 4, 2005, Institut Français de Relations Internationales - China Institute of International Studies.

Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998). "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*. **52**(4). 887-918.

Fischer, A., Nicolet, S., and Sciarini, P. (2002). "Europeanisation of a Non-EU Country: The Case of Swiss Immigration Policy," *West European Politics*. **25**(4). 143-170.

Flockhart, Trine (2010). "Europeanization or EU-ization," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **48**(4). 787-810.

Flournoy, Michèle A. and Smith, Julianne (2005). *European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilites.* Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington, DC.

Foot, Rosemary (2000). *Rights beyond borders: the global community and the struggle over human rights in China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foot, Rosemary (2001). "Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State," *The China Journal*. **45**. January 2001. 1-19.

Foucault, Martial (2008). *Does the European defence burden-sharing matter?*, in *Conflict Management, Peace Economics, and Development*, Chatterji and Fontanel, Editors. 2008, Emerald: London.

Fox, John and Godement, François (2009). *A Power Audit of EU-China Relations.* European Council on Foreign Relations: London.

Friedberg, Aaron L. (1989). "The Strategic Implications of Relative Economic Decline," *Political Science Quarterly*. **104**(3). Autumn 1989. 401-431.

Friedberg, Aaron L. (1992). "Why Didn't the United States become a Garrison State," *International Security*. **16**(4). Spring 1992. 109-142.

Frieden, Jeffry A. (1999). *Actors and Preferences in International Relations*, in *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, Lake and Powell, Editors. 1999, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey. 39-76.

Fruchart, Damien*, et al.* (2007). *United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour.* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Stockholm.

Gallis, Paul and Morelli, Vincent (2008). *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlanitc Alliance.* Congressional Research Service: Washington, DC, July 18, 2008.

Garver, John (1993). *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Gegout, Catherine (2002). "The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US *Directoire* at the Heart of the European Union's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(2). 331-344.

Géré, François (2008). *Why three straight lines rarely form a triangle: US, EU and Chinese strategies in the twenty-first century*, in *The European Union and strategy: an emerging actor*, Engelbrekt and Hallenberg, Editors. 2008, Routledge: London.

Gerring, John (2008). *Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, Editors. 2008, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 645-684.

Gheciu, Alexandra (2005). "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe'," *International Organization*. **59**(4). Fall 2005. 973-1012.

Giamouridis, Anastasios (2007). "'Only through Enlargement': The New European Myth?," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **12**. 183-292.

Giegerich, Bastian (2006). "Book Review: Foreign Policy Analysis: Brian C Rathburn, *Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans*," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*. **35**. 231-233.

Giegerich, Bastian (2007). "Navigating differences: transatlantic negotiations over Galileo," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. **20**(3). September 2007. 491-508.

Giegerich, Bastian and Wallace, William (2004). "Not Such a Soft Power: the External Deployment of European Forces," *Survival*. **46**(2). Summer 2004. 163-182.

Ginsberg, Roy H (2001). *EU-US Relations after Amsterdam: 'Finishing Europe'*, Philippart and Winand, Editors. 2001. 351-363.

Ginsberg, Roy H. (1989). *Foreign policy actions of the European Community: the politics of scale*. Adamantine studies in international relations & world security, no. 3. London: Lynne Rienner.

Ginsberg, Roy H. (1999). "Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **37**(3). September 1999. 429-454.

Ginsberg, Roy H. (2001). *The European Union in international politics: baptism by fire*. New international relations of Europe. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Giuliani, Marco (2004). "Europeizzazione come istituzionalizzazione: questioni definitorie e di metodo (Europeanization as institutionalism: questions of definitions and method)," *Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche*. **1**. 141-161.

Gleason, Michael P (2009). *Galileo: Power, Pride, and Profit. The Relative Influence of Realist, Ideational, and Liberal Factors on the Galileo Satellite Program*, PhD dissertation: George Washington University, January 31, 2009.

Gnesotto, Nicole (2002). *Preface*, in *From Nice to Laeken: European defence: core documents*, Rutten, Editor. 2002, Institute for Security Studies: Paris.

Goetz, Klaus H. (2006). *Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization.* Institut für Höhere Studien: Vienna, April 2006.

Goetz, Klaus H. and Hix, Simon, eds (2001). *Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems*. Frank Cass: London.

Gompert, David*, et al.* (2003). *China on the Move: A Franco-American Analysis of Emerging Chinese Strategic Policies and Their Consequences for Transatlantic*

Relations. Paris: RAND Corporation.

Gordon, Philip H. (1997). "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy," *International Security*. **22**(3). Winter 1997-1998. 74-100.

Gordon, Philip H. (2001). "NATO after 11 September," *Survival*. **43**(4). 89-106.

Gordon, Philip H. and Shapiro, Jeremy (2004). *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis Over Iraq*. A Brooking Institution Book. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Gowan, Richard and Brantner, Franziska (2008). *A Global Force for Human Rights? An Audit of European Power at the UN.* European Council on Foreign Relations: London, September 2008.

Grande, Edgar (1996). "The state and interest groups in a framework of multi-level decision-making: The case of the European Union," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **3**(3). 318-338.

Grant, Charles (2003). *Resolving the rows over ESDP.* Centre for European Reform: London, October 2003.

Graziano, Paolo and Vink, Maarten Peter (2007). *Europeanization: new research agendas*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Green, Michael (2012). "Is the US "pivot" to the Pacific genuine?," *The World Today*. **68**(1). February & March 2012,

Green, Stephen (2004). *China's quest for market economy status.* Association for Asian Research: October 6, 2004.

Gregory, Shaun (1990). "French nuclear command and control," *Defense Analysis*. **6**(1). 49-68.

Gries, Peter Hays and Rosen, Stanley (2004). *State and society in 21st-century China: crisis, contention, and legitimation*. Asia's transformations. New York: Routledge.

Grilli, Enzo R. (1993). *The European Community and the developing countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gross, Eva (2007). "Germany and European Security and Defence Cooperation: The Europeanization of National Crisis Management Policies," *Security Dialogue*. **38**(4). December 2007. 501-520.

Gross, Eva (2009). *The Europeanization of national foreign policy: continuity and change in European crisis management*. Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gualini, Enrico (2004). *Multi-level governance and institutional change: the Europeanization of regional policy in Italy*. Urban and regional planning and development. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Gupta, Sonika (2004). "China, EU and the Arms Embargo.," *Observer Research Foundation Brief*. (1).

Haas, Ernst B. (1958). *The uniting of Europe: political, social, and economical forces, 1950-1957*. Library of world affairs; no. 42. London: Stevens.

Haas, Ernst B. (1980). "Why Collaborate?: Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics*. **32**(3). April, 1980. 357-405.

Haggard, Stephan and Simmons, Beth A. (1987). "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization*. **41**(3). Summer 1987. 491-517.

Haine, Jean-Yves (2003). *From Laeken to Copenhagen: European defence core documents.* European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, February 2003.

Haine, Jean-Yves (2004). *The Union Inaugural Address*, in *The Politics of European Security*, Pilegaard, Editor. 2004, Danish Institute for International Studies.

Haine, Jean-Yves (2005). "Back to transatlantic pragmatism," *The International Spectator*. **40**(2). 41-52.

Hall, Peter A. and Taylor, Rosemary C. R. (1996). "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies*. **44**. 936-957.

Hamilton, Daniel (2004). *American perspectives on the European Security and Defence Policy*, in *The Politics of European Security*, Pilegaard, Editor. 2004, Danish Institute for International Studies.

Harmsen, R. and Wilson, T. (2000). *Introduction: Approaches to Europeanization*, in *Europeanization: Institutions, Identities and Citizenship*, Harmsen and Wilson, Editors. 2000, Rodopoi: Amsterdam.

Hartley, Keith (2008). "Collaboration and European Defence Industrial Policy," *Defence and Peace Economics*. **19**(4). 303-315.

Hartley, Keith and Sandler, Todd (1999). "NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future," *Journal of Peace Research*. **36**(6). November 1999. 665-680.

Hashim, Ahmed S. (1998). "The Revolution in Military Affairs Outside the West," *Journal of International Affairs*. **51**(2). Spring 1998. 431-445.

Haverland, Marcus (1999). *National adaptation to European integration: the importance of institutional veto points*. San Domenico: European University Institute.

Haverland, Markus (2005). "Does the EU cause domestic developments? The problem of case selection in Europeanization research," *European Integration online Papers*. **9**(2). January 14, 2005

Hay, Colin and Rosamond, Ben (2002). "Globalisation, European integration and the discursive construction of economic imperatives," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **9**(2). 147-167.

Hazelzet, Hadewych (2001). *Carrots or Sticks? EU and US Reactions to Human Rights Violations (1989-2000)*, PhD Thesis: European University Institute,

Heisbourg, François (2001). *Managing a rising China: European Options.* Paris, October 22, 2001.

Heisbourg, François (2004). "The French-German Duo and the Search for a New European Security Model," *The International Spectator*. **3**. 61-72.

Hellmann, Gunther*, et al.* (2005). "De-Europeanization by Default? Germany's EU Policy in Defense and Asylum," *Foreign Policy Analysis*. **1**(1). 143-164.

Hendrickson, Ryan C., Strand, Jonathan R., and Raney, Kyle L. (2007). "*Operation Artemis* and Javier Solana: EU prospects for a stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy," *Canadian Military Journal*. Spring 2007. 35-42.

Heuninckx, Baudouin (2008). "Towards a Coherent European Defence Procurment Regime? European Defence Agency and European Commission Initiatives," *Public Procurement Law Review*. **17**(1). 1-20.

Hill, Christopher (1993). "The Capabilities-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **31**(3). September 1993. 305-328.

Hill, Christopher (1997). *Closing the Capability-Expectations Gap?*, at *Fifth Biennial International Conference of the European Community Studies Association of the United States*. Seattle: May 29-June 1, 1997.

Hill, Christopher (2001). "The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **6**. 315-333.

Hill, Christopher (2002). "CFSP: Conventions, Constitutions and Consequentiality," *The International Spectator*. **4**. 75-89.

Hill, Christopher (2003). *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Hill, Christopher (2004). "Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **42**(1). 143-163.

Hill, Christopher (2006). "The Directoire and the Problem of a Coherent EU Foreign Policy," *CFSP Forum (FORNET)*. **4**(6). November 2006. 1-4.

Hill, Christopher and Smith, Michael, eds (2005). *International Relations and the European Union*. The New European Union Series. 2005, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Hill, Christopher and Wallace, William (1996). *Introduction: Actors and Actions*, in *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, Hill, Editor. 1996, Routledge: New York. 1-18.

Hill, Christopher and Wong, Reuben (2011). *Many actors, one path? The meaning of Europeanization in the context of foreign policy*, in *National and European foreign policies: towards Europeanization*, Wong and Hill, Editors. 2011, Routledge: New York. 210-232.

Hix, Simon (1994). "The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics," *West European Politics*. **17**(1). January 1994. 1-30.

Hodge, Carl Cavanagh (2002). *NATO for a new century: Atlanticism and European security*. London: Praeger.

Hodge, Carl Cavanagh (2005). *Atlanticism for a new century: the rise, triumph, and decline of NATO*. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson/Prentice Hall.

Hoerber, Thomas (2009). "ESA + EU: Ideology or pragmatic task sharing," *Space Policy*. **25**. 206-209.

Hoffmann, Stanley (1965). *The state of war: essays on the theory and practice of international politics*. New York: Praeger.

Hoffmann, Stanley (2000). "Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy?," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **38**(2). 189-198.

Hoffmann, Stanley (2003). "US-European relations: past and future," *International Affairs*. **79**(5). 1029-1036.

Hoffmann, Stanley (2005). "Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century," *Foreign Affairs*. **84**(3). May/June 2005.

Hofmann, Stephanie C. (2009). "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP," *Perspectives on Politics*. **7**(1). March 2009. 45-52.

Holland, Paul W. (1986). "Statistics and Causal Inference," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. **81**(396). December 1986. 945-960.

Horky, Ondrej (2010). *The Europeanisation of Development Policy.* German Development Institute: Bonn.

Howell, Kerry E. (2002). *Europeanization or European integration?: a study of UK financial services*. Chelmsford: Earlybrave.

Howorth, Jolyon (2003). "ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock?," *Cooperation and Conflict*. **38**(3). 235-254.

Howorth, Jolyon (2003). *Saint-Malo plus five: An interim assessment of ESDP.* Groupement d'études et de recherches Notre Europe: Paris, Novermber 2003.

Howorth, Jolyon (2004). "France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis," *Survival*. **45**(4). 173-192.

Howorth, Jolyon (2004). "The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A Question of Flexibility," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **9**.

Howorth, Jolyon (2005). "The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma: France, Britain, and the ESDP," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. **3**(1). 39-54.

Howorth, Jolyon (2010). *The Political and Security Committee: a Case Study in 'Supranational Intergovernmentalism'.* SciencesPo | Centre d'études européens: Paris, March 2010.

Howorth, Joylon (2000). *European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge?* Chaillot Paper 43. Paris: Institute for Security Studies-Western European Union.

Hulsmna, John C. (2003). *Laying Down Clear Markers: Protecting American Interests from a Confusing European Constitution.* The Heritage Foundation: Washington, DC, December 12, 2003.

Hurrell, Andrew and Menon, Anand (1996). "Politics like any other? Comparative politics, international relations and the study of the EU," *West European Politics*. **19**(2). April 1996. 386-402.

Hyde-Price, Adrian (2006). "'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **13**(2). March 2006. 217-234.

Hyde-Price, Adrian (2008). *A neurotic 'centaur': The limitations of the EU as a strategic actor*, in *The European Union and strategy: an emerging actor*, Engelbrekt and Hallenberg, Editors. 2008, Routledge: New York.

Ikenberry, G. John (1998). "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," *International Security*. **23**(3). Winter 1998-1999. 43-78.

Ikenberry, G. John (2001). "American power and the empire of capitalist democracy,"

Review of International Studies. **27**. 191-212.

Ikenberry, G. John (2001). *After victory: institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

International Security Information Service Europe (ISIS) (2003). "Operation Concordia and Berlin Plus: NATO and the EU take stock," *Nato Notes*. **5**(8). December 2003.

Irondelle, Bastien (2001). *Europeanization without European Union? French Military Reforms 1991-1996*, at *ECSA Seventh Biennial International Conference*. Madison, Wisconsin: May 31-June 2, 2001.

Issler, Jean-Luc*, et al.* (2003). "Galileo Frequency & Signal Design," *GPS World*. **14**(6). June 2003. 30-37.

Jacquot, Sophie and Woll, Cornelia (2003). "Usage of European Integration - Europeanisation from a Sociological Perspective," *European Integration online Papers*. **7**(12). December 30, 2003.

Jakobson, Linda (2004). *Taiwan's Unresolved Status: Visions for the Future and Implications for EU Foreign Policy.* The Finnish Institute of International Affairs: Helsinki.

James, Harold (2006). *The Roman predicament: how the rules of international order create the politics of empire*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Joffe, Josef (2002). "Of Hubs, Spoke and Public Goods," *The National Interest*. Fall 2002.

Johnson-Freese, Joan (2006). "A New US-Sino Space Relationship: Moving Toward Cooperation," *Astropolitics*. **4**(2). 131-158.

Johnson-Freese, Joan and Erickson, Andrew S. (2006). "The emerging China-EU space partnership: A geotechnological balancer," *Space Policy*. **22**. 12-22.

Jonas, Manfred (1969). *Isolationism in America, 1935-1941*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Jones, Seth G. (2007). *The rise of European security cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jupille, Joseph and Caporaso, James A. (1998). *States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics*, in *The European Union in the world community*, Rhodes, Editor. 1998, Lynne Rienner Publishers: London.

Jupille, Joseph and Caporaso, James A. (1999). "Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*. **2**. 429-444.

Kagan, Robert (2004). *Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order*. 1st Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books.

Kagan, Robert (2008). "The End of the End of History," *The New Republic*. April 23, 2008.

Kahn, Herman (1968). *On escalation: metaphors and scenarios*. Baltimore: Penguin.

Kalaitzaki, Theodora "US Mediation in Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954," *Mediterranean Quarterly*. **16**(2). Spring 2005. 106-124.

Kalbermatter, André (1999). *Sanctions Practice of the EC.* Wenger, Vieli & Belser Law

Firm: Zurich.

Kallestrup, Morten (2002). "Europeanisation as a Discourse: Domestic Policy Legitimisation through the Articulation of a 'Need for Adaptation'," *Public Policy and Administration*. **17**(2). Summer 2002. 110-124.

Kan, Shirley, (2001) *China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy*. Congressional Research Service, September 5, 2001.

Kan, Shirley, (2008) *Taiwan: Major Arms Sales since 1990*. Congressional Research Service, January 8, 2008.

Kan, Shirley, (2011) *China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy*. Congressional Research Service, January 24, 2011.

Kane, Thomas and Dai, Xiudian (2009). *New Players, New Rules? Sino-European Space Cooperation as a Case Study in Chinese Foreign Policy*, at *Inside/Outside: 60 Years of Chinese Politics*. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology: August 20-21, 2009.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. (1999). *The long entanglement: NATO's first fifty years*. London: Praeger.

Kassim, Hussein, Peters, B. Guy, and Wright, Vincent (2000). *The national co-ordination of EU policy: the domestic level*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keane, Rory (2005). "ESDP from Cologne to Sarajevo: Critiques and Constellations of Post-Nationalism," *Global Security*. **19**(1). January 2005.

Keane, Rory (2005). "European security and defence policy: from Cologne to Sarajevo," *Global Society*. **19**(1). 89-103.

Kelly, Jason (2006). "A Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs?," *Yale Journal of International Affairs*. **1**(2). Winter/Spring 2006. 58-71.

Keohane, Daniel (2003). "The European defence plans: Filling the transatlantic gaps," *The International Spectator*. **38**(3). 61-77.

Keohane, Daniel (2004). *ESDP and Military Reforms*, in *The Politics of European Security*, Pilegaard, Editor. 2004, Danish Institute for International Studies.

Keohane, Daniel (2004). *Introduction*, in *Europe in Space*, Bildt, Editor. 2004, Center for European Reform: London. 1-6.

Keohane, Daniel*, et al.* (2008). *Towards a European Defence Market.* European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris.

Keohane, Robert (1988). "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly*. **32**(4). December 1988. 379-396.

Keohane, Robert (1989). *Neoliberal institutionalism: a perspective on world politics*, in *International Institutions and State Power*, Keohane, Editor. 1989, Westview Press: Boulder, CO. 1-20.

Keohane, Robert (2002). "Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(4). 743-765.

Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After hegemony cooperation and discord in the world political*

economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Khoo, Nicholas and Smith, Michael L. (2002). "The future of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific: a Concert of Asia or a clear pecking order?," *Australian Journal of International Affiars*. **56**(1). 65-81.

Kim, Julie (2006). *Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping.* Congressional Research Service: Washington, DC, December 5, 2006.

King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., and Verba, Sidney (1994). *Designing social inquiry scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

King, Toby (1999). "Human Rights in European Foreign Policy: Success of Failure for Post-modern Diplomacy," *European Journal of International Law*. (2). 313-337.

Kirchner, Emil J. (2005). "Security threats and institutional response. The European context.," *Asia-Europe Journal*. **3**. 179-197.

Kissenger, Henry A. and Summers, Lawrence H. (2004). *Renewing the Atlantic Partnership.* Council on Foreign Relations: New York City.

Klotz, Audie and Prakash, Deepa (2008). *Qualitative methods in international relations: a pluralist guide*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Knill, Christoph and Lehmkuhl, Dirk (1999). "How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of Europeanization," *European Integration online Papers*. **3**(7). June 15, 1999.

Knill, Christoph and Lehmkuhl, Dirk (2002). "The national impact of European Union regulatory policy: Three Europeanization mechanisms," *European Journal of Political Research*. **41**. 255-280.

Knowles, Vanda and Thomson-Pottebohm, Silke (2004). "The UK, Germany and ESDP: developments at the convention and the IGC," *German Politics*. **13**(4). 581-604.

Knutsen, Bjørn Olav (2008). *The EU and the challenges of Civil-Military Coordination at the strategic level.* Norwegian Defence Research Establishment: September 25, 2008.

Kogan, Eugene (2005). *The European Union Defence Industry and the Appeal of the Chinese Market.* Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie: Vienna.

Kohler-Koch, Beate and Eising, Rainer (1999). *The transformation of governance in the European Union*. Routledge/ECPR studies in European political science. London: Routledge.

Kohlmeier, Gabrielle (2004). "EU Eyes Lifting China Arms Embargo," *Arms Control Today*. **34**(7). September 2004.

Kölliker, Alkuin (2006). *Flexibility and European unification: the logic of differentiated integration*. Governance in Europe. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

Koremenos, Barbara, Lipson, Charles, and Snidal, Duncan (2004). *The rational design of international institutions*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Korski, Daniel (2007). *Balkan ghosts still haunt Europe.* European Council on Foreign Relations: London, November 20, 2007.

Krasner, Stephen (1977). "US Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness," *International Organization*. **31**(4). Autumn

1977. 635-671.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1983). *International regimes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kreutz, Joakim (2004). "Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the Clash between Value and Rationale in the European Security Strategy," *Perspectives: The Central European Review of International Affairs*. **22**. September 2004. 43-58.

Kreutz, Joakim (2005). *Hard Measures by a Soft Power?: Sanctions policy of the European Union 1981-2004.* Bonn International Center for Conversion, paper 45.

Kugler, Richard L. (1992). *The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era.* RAND: Santa Monica, CA.

Kydd, Andrew (2004). *Trust Building and Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement*, in *The rational design of international institutions*, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, Editors. 2004, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.

Ladrech, Robert (1994). "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **32**(1). 69-88.

Lake, David A. and Powell, Robert (1999). *International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach*, in *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, Lake and Powell, Editors. 1999, Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J. 3-38.

Lake, David A. and Powell, Robert (1999). *Strategic choice and international relations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Lampton, David M. (2001). *The making of Chinese foreign and security policy in the era of reform, 1978-2000*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

Larrabee, F. Stephen (2004). "ESDP and NATO: Assuring complementarity," *The International Spectator*. **39**(1). 51-70.

Larsén, Magdalena Frennhoff (2007). "Trade Negotiations between the EU and South Africa: A Three-Level Game," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **45**(4). October 2007. 857-881.

Larsen, Paul B. (2001). "Issues relating to civilian and military dual uses of GNSS," *Space Policy*. **17**(2). May 2001. 11-119.

Layne, Christopher (1998). "Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century," *World Policy Journal*. **15**(2). 8-28.

Lebow, Richard Ned (2001). *Social Scence and History: Ranchers versus Farmers?*, in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations*, Elman and Elman, Editors. 2001, The MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts. 111-136.

Lecours, André (2005). *New institutionalism : theory and analysis*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Lee, Chang Kil and Strang, David (2006). "The International Diffusion of Public Sector Downsizing: Network Emulation and Theory-Driven Learning," *International Organization*. **60**(4). Fall 2006. 883-909.

Lembke, Johan (2001). *The Politics of Galileo.* European Union Center, Center for West European Studies, University of Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh, PA, April 2001.

Lembke, Johan (2002). "EU Critical Infrastructure and Security Policy: Capabilities, Strategies and Vulnerabilities," *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*. **11**(2). 99-129.

Leonard, Mark (2005). "Europe's Transformative Power," *Center for European Reform Bulletin*. (40). February/March 2005.

Leonard, Mark (2005). *Why Europe will run the 21st century*. London: Fourth Estate.

Levy, Jack (1994). "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," *International Organization*. **48**(2). March 1994. 279-312.

Levy, Jack (1997). "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly*. **41**(1). March 1997. 87-112.

Levy, Jack (2008). *Counterfactuals and Case Studies*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, Editors. 2008, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 627-644.

Lewis, James Andrew (2004). *Galileo and GPS: From Competition to Cooperation.* Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington, DC, June 2004.

Liefferink, Duncan and Andersen, Mikael Skou (1998). "Strategies of the 'green' member states in EU environmental policy-making," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **5**(2). June 1998. 254-270.

Lijphart, Arend (1971). "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review*. **65**(3). September 1971. 682-693.

Lindley-French, Julian (2002). "In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing," *International Affairs*. **78**(4). October 2002. 789-811.

Lindstrom, G. and Schmitt, B. (2004). *One year on: lessons from Iraq.* Institute for Security Studies: Paris.

Lindström, Gustav (2004). "The Moment of Truth for Galileo," *Security Dialogue*. **35**(1). 117-119.

Lindström, Gustav (2005). *EU-US burdensharing: who does what?* European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, September 2005.

Lindström, Gustav and Gasparini, Giovanni (2003). *The Galileo satellite system and its security implications.* The European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, April 2003.

Lipson, Michael (1999). "The Reincarnation of CoCom," *The Nonproliferation Review*. **6**(2). Winter 1999. 33-51.

Liska, George (1962). *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press.

Longhurst, Kerry Anne and Zaborowski, Marcin (2005). *Old Europe, new Europe and the transatlantic security agenda*. London: Routledge.

Lundestad, Geir (1998). *Empire by integration: the United States and European integration, 1945-1997*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lundestad, Geir (2003). *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: from "empire"*

by invitation to transatlantic drift. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Luo, Yan (2007). "Engaging the Private Sector: EU-China Trade Disputes Under the Shadow of WTO Law?," *European Law Journal*. **13**(6). November 2007. 800-817.

Lüthy, Herbert (1965). "De Gaulle: Pose and Policy," *Foreign Affairs*. **43**(4). July 1965. 561-573.

MacFarlane, S. Neil (2004). *The Caucasus and Central Asia*, in *European Union foreign and security policy : towards a neighbourhood strategy*, Dannreuther, Editor. 2004, Routledge: London.

Maguire, Joseph, Poulton, Emma, and Possamai, Catherine (1999). "The War of the Words? Identity Politics in Anglo-German Press Coverage of EURO 96," *European Journal of Commmunication*. **14**(1). 61-89.

Mahoney, James and Goertz, Gary (2006). "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research," *Political Analysis*. **14**. 227-249.

Mahoney, James and Terrie, P. Larkin (2008). *Comparative-historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, Editors. 2008, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 737-755.

Major, Claudia (2005). "Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy - Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?," *Politics*. **25**(3). 175-190.

Makienko, Konstantin (2003). *Les ventes d'armes de la Russie à la Chine. Aspects stratégiques et économiques.* CAIRN. Paris.

Manners, Ian (2002). "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(2). 235-258.

Manners, Ian (2010). "Global Europa: Mythology of the European Union in World Politics," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **48**(1). 65-85.

Manners, Ian and Whitman, Richard (2003). "The 'difference engine': constructing and representing the international identity of the European Union," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **10**(3). June 2003. 380-404.

March, James G and Olsen, Johan P. (2004). *The logic of appropriateness.* Arena Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo: Oslo.

March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. (1989). *Rediscovering institutions: the organizational basis of politics*. New York.

March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. (1996). "Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*. **9**(3). 247-264.

Marks, Gary and Steenbergen, Marco R, eds (2004). *European Integration and Political Conflict*. 2004, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Markusen, Ann (1999). "The Rise of World Weapons," *Foreign Policy*. Spring 1999. 40-51.

Marsh, Christopher and Dreyer, June Teufel (2003). *U.S.-China relations in the twenty-first century: policies, prospects and possibilities*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.

Martin, Lisa L. (1992). "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falklands Islands Conflict," *International Security*. **16**(4). Spring, 1992. 143-178.

Martin, Lisa L. (1993). "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions," *World Politics*. **45**(3). April, 1993. 406-432.

Mathiopoulos, Margarita and Gyarmati, István (1999). "Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense," *The Washington Quarterly*. **22**(4). 65-76.

Mattli, Walter (1999). *The logic of regional integration: Europe and beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mattli, Walter (2000). "Sovereignty Bargains in Regional Integration," *International Studies review*. **2**(2). Summer 2000. 149-180.

Mattli, Walter and Slaughter, Anne-Marie (1998). "Revisiting the European Court of Justice," *International Organization*. **52**(1). Winter 1998. 177-209.

Mattli, Walter and Woods, Ngaire (2009). *The politics of global regulation*. Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Mattox, Gale A. (2008). *The ambivalent power: The United States and European security and defense policy*, in *The European Union and strategy : an emerging actor*, Engelbrekt and Hallenberg, Editors. 2008, Routledge: London.

Maull, Hanns W. (2000). "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," *Survival*. **42**(2). Summer 2000. 56-80.

Maull, Hanns W. (2005). "Europe and the new balance of global order," *International Affairs*. **81**(4). 775-799.

Mayall, James (2005). *The Shadow of Empire: The EU and the Former Colonial World*, in *International Relations and the European Union*, Hill and Smith, Editors. 2005, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 292-316.

Mayer, Frederick W. (1992). "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments," *International Organization*. **46**(4). 793-818.

McCalla, Robert B. (1996). "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," *International Organization*. **50**(3). Summer 1996. 445-475.

McGuire, Steven and Smith, Michael (2008). *The European Union and the United States: competition and convergence in the global arena*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mead, Lawrence M. (2010). "Scholasticism in Political Science," *Perspectives on Politics*. **8**(2). 453-464.

Mearsheimer, John (1990). "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*. **15**(1). Summer 1990. 5-56.

Mearsheimer, John (1994). "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*. **19**(3). 5-49.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). *The tragedy of Great Power politics*. New York: Norton.

Mearsheimer, John J. and Walt, Stephen M. (2007). *The Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy*. 1st ed. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux.

Medcalf, Jennifer (2003). *Cooperation between the EU and NATO*, in *Unravelling the European Security and Defence Policy Conundrum*, Krause, Wenger, and Watanabe, Editors. 2003, Peter Land Publishing: Oxford, UK.

Meier, Oliver (2005). "Between Noble Goals and Sobering Reality: An Interview with EU Nonproliferation Chief Annalisa Giannella," *Arms Control Today*. **35**. September 2005.

Men, Jing (2008). *EU-China Relations: from Engagement to Marriage?* College of Europe: Bruges, Belgium.

Menon, Anand (2004). "From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq," *International Affairs*. **80**(4). July 2004. 631-648.

Menon, Anand (2009). "Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten," *International Affairs*. **85**(2). 227-246.

Menon, Anand and Welsh, Jennifer (2011). "Understanding NATO's Sustainability: The Limits of Institutionalist Theory," *Global Governance*. **17**. 81-94.

Menotti, Roberto (2007). "Italy's Growing Burden of Choice in Security Policy," *The International Spectator*. **42**(3). 431-444.

Menotti, Roberto (2007). *The European Union and China: A Rude Awakening.* Lowy Institute for International Policy: Sydney, April 2007.

Mérand, Frédéric (2010). "Pierre Bordieu and the Birth of European Defense," *Security Studies*. **19**(2). 342-374.

Merlingen, Michael (2007). "Everything is Dangerous: A Critique of 'Normative Power Europe'," *Security Dialogue*. **38**(4). 435-453.

Messerby-Whiting, Graham (2004). *Intelligence cooperation in the European Union*, in *The Politics of European Security*, Pilegaard, Editor. 2004, Danish Institute for International Studies.

Metz, Steven and Kievit, James, *Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy*. Army, June 27, 1995.

Meunier, Sophie and Nicolaïdis, Kalypso (1999). "Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **37**(3). September 1999. 477-501.

Meunier, Sophie and Nicolaïdis, Kalypso (2006). "The European Union as a conflicted trade power," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **13**(6). September 2006. 906-925.

Meyer, Steven E. (2003). "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," *Parameters*. **33**(4). Winter 2003-04. 83-97.

Milner, Helen (1992). "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," *World Politics*. **44**(3). April 1992. 466-496.

Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, William E. (2003). *Foreign and Security Policy: On the cusp between Transformation and Accommodation*, in *Germany, Europe, and the Politics of Constraint*, Dyson and Goetz, Editors. 2003, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 325-345.

Miskimmon, Alister J. (2001). *Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and the Transatlantic Relationship*, in *New Europe, new Germany, old foreign policy?: German foreign policy since unification*, Webber, Editor. 2001, Frank

Cass: Ilford, Essex. 83-106.

Missiroli, Antonio (2001). "European Security Policy: The Challenge of Coherence," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **6**(2). 177-196.

Missiroli, Antonio (2002). "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP," *Security Dialogue*. **33**(1). 9-26.

Missiroli, Antonio (2003). *From Copenhagen to Brussels: European defence core documents.* European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, December 2003.

Missiroli, Antonio (2008). *Revisiting the European Security Strategy - beyond 2008.* European Policy Centre: April 2008.

Mitchell, A. Wess (2008). "Perhapsburg," *The American Interest*. **4**(2). November/December 2008. 25-34.

Möckli, Daniel (2010). *The Middle East conflict, transatlantic ties and the Quartet*, in *European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Aymat, Editor. 2010, Chaillot Papers 124: Paris. 65-74.

Moens, Alexander (2002). *Developing a NATO-EU Security Regime*, in *NATO for a new century: Atlanticism and European security*, Hodge, Editor. 2002, Praegen: London. 69-84.

Möller, Kay (2002). "Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and the European Union," *The China Quarterly*.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1993). "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **31**(4). December 1993. 473-524.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1993). *Armaments among Allies: European Weapons Collaboration, 1975-1985*, in *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Editors. 1993, University of California Press: Berkeley, CA.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization*. **51**(4). Winter 1997. 513-553.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1998). *The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht*. Cornell studies in political economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Moravcsik, Andrew (2001). "Despotism in Brussels? Misreading the European Union," *Foreign Affairs*. **80**(3). May/June 2001. 114-122.

Morganthau, Hans J. (1957). "Sources of Tension Between Western Europe and the United States," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 22-28.

Morganthau, Hans J. (1966). *The Purpose of Political Science*, in *A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objectives, and Methods*, Charlesworth, Editor. 1966, American Academy of Political and Social Science: Philadelphia.

Morgenthau, Hans J. (1961). *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*. 3rd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Morrow, James D. (1991). "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability

Aggregation Model," *American Journal of Political Science*. **35**(4). November 1991. 904-933.

Morrow, James D. (1999). *The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics*, in *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, Lake and Powell, Editors. 1999, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey. 77-114.

Mowthorpe, Matthew and Kane, Thomas (2004). *Geopolitical Developments and the Future of the Space Sector.* Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Paris, May 7, 2004.

Mukhopadhyay, Alok Rashmi (2005). *EU Arms Embargo on China: The German Debate.* Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses: New Delhi, May 2, 2005.

Muller, Pierre (1990). "Airbus: Partners and Paradoxes," *The European Journal of International Affairs*. (8). Spring 1990. 25-45.

Nardon, Laurence (2009). *Galileo and the Issue of Public Funding*, in *Yearbook on Space Policy 2007-2008*, Schrogl, Mathieu, and Peter, Editors. 2009, Springer: New York.

Neustadt, Richard E. (1970). *Alliance politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Niblett, Robin (2004). "The United States, the European Union, and Lifting the Arms Embargo on China," *CSIS Euro-Focus*. **10**(3). September 30, 2004

Niblett, Robin (2007). "Choosing between America and Europe: a new context for British foreign policy," *International Affairs*. **83**(4). 627-641.

Nicolaïdis, Kalypso (2004). ""We, the Peoples of Europe..."" *Foreign Affairs*. **83**(6). November/December 2004. 97-110.

Nicolaïdis, Kalypso and Howse, Robert (2002). "'This is my EUtopia...': Narrative as Power," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **40**(4). 767-792.

Norheim-Martinsen, Per M. (2009). *Matching ambition with institutional innovation: The EU's Comprehensive Approach and Civil-Military Organisation.* Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI): Kjeller, Norway, July 3, 2009.

North, Richard (2004). *Galileo: The Military and Political Dimensions.* Bruges Group.

Nugent, Neill (2003). *The Government and Politics of the European Union*. 5th ed. The European Union Series, ed. Nugent, Paterson, and Wright. New York: Hargrave Macmillan.

Nye, Joseph S. (1990). "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*. (80). Autumn 1990. 153-171.

O'Neill, Jim (2001). *Building Better Global Economic BRICs.* Goldman Sachs: November 30, 2001.

O'Prey, Kevin P. and Brookings Institution. (1995). *The arms export challenge: cooperative approaches to export management and defense conversion*. Brookings occasional papers. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution.

Ojanen, Hanna (2002). *Theories at a loss? EU-NATO fusion and the 'low-politicisation' of security and defence in European integration.* Finnish Institute for International Affairs: Helsinki.

Ojansen, Hanna (2003). "ESDP in Practice: 'Effective Multilateralism' in the making?," *CFSP Forum (FORNET)*. **1**(2). September 2003. 1-3.

Oliver, Tim and Allen, David (2006). *Foreign Policy*, in *The Europeanization of British Politics*, Bache and Jordan, Editors. 2006, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 187-200.

Olsen, Johan P. (2002). *The Many Faces of Europeanization.* Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo: Oslo.

Olson, Mancur and Zeckhauser, Richard (1966). *An Economic Theory of Alliances.* The Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, Calif, October 1966.

Oneal, John R. (1990). "The theory of collective action and burden sharing in NATO," *International Organization*. **44**(3). Summer 1990. 379-402.

Orbie, Jan (2006). "Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debate," *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*. **41**(1). 123-128.

Orbie, Jan (2008). *Europe's global role: external policies of the European Union*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

Osica, Olaf (2004). "Poland: A New European Atlanticist at a Crossroads?," *European Security*. **13**(4). 301-322.

Overhaus, Marco (2005). "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," *SAIS Review*. **25**(2). Summer-Fall 2005. 27-41.

Papadopoulos, Yannis (2008). "Europeanisation? Two logics of change of policy-making processes in Switzerland," *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*. **10**(3). 255-278.

Pape, Robert A. (2005). "Soft Balancing against the United States," *International Security*. **30**(1). Summer 2005. 7-45.

Pappas, Zannism M., Major, United States Air Force (2002). *Effects of the Galileo Constellation on U.S. National Interests*, Master's Thesis: Air Force Institute of Technology, June 2002.

Pasco, Xavier (2003). *Galileo: A Cornerstone of the European Space Effort.* Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique: Paris, July 21, 2003.

Pasco, Xavier (2004). *Ready for take-off? European defence and space technology*, in *Europe in Space*, Bildt, Editor. 2004, Center for European Reform: London. 19-32.

Patten, Christopher (2006). *Cousins and Strangers: America, Britain and Europe in a New Century*. New York: Times Books.

Patten, Christopher (2007). *Peace-making in the Middle East and the Role of Europe*, ELIAMEP Annual Lecture. Athens: September 20, 2007.

Patterson, Lee Ann (1997). "Agricultural policy reform in the European Community: a three-level game analysis," *International Organization*. **51**(1). January 1997. 135-165.

Payne, Kenneth (2003). *The European Security and Defence Policy and the future of NATO.* BBC News Analysis and Research: London.

Peeters, Walter (2002). "Effects of commercialisation in the European space sector," *Space*

Policy. **18**. 199-204.

Peters, B. Guy (2000). *Institutional theory in political science: the new institutionalism*. London: Continuum.

Peters, B. Guy and Pierre, Jon (2007). *Institutionalism*. London: SAGE.

Peters, John E. and al., et. (2001). *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation.* RAND Corp.

Peterson, John (2004). "America as a European power: the end of empire by integration?," *International Affairs*. **80**(4). July 2004. 613-629.

Peterson, John (2004). "Europe, America, Iraq: Worst Ever, Ever Worsening?," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **42**(Annual Review). 9-26.

Peterson, John (2006). "Is the Wolf at the Door This Time: Transatlantic Relations after Iraq," *European Political Science*. **5**. 52-61.

Peterson, John and Steffenson, Rebecca (2009). "Transatlantic Institutions: Can Partnership be Engineered," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. **11**(1). 25-45.

Peterson, John, et. al. (2005). *Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and United States.* European Commission, DG External Relations, Unit 1C.

Philippart, Éric and Winand, Pascaline (2001). *Ever closer partnership: policy-making in US-EU relations*. Brussels: Peter Lang.

Philippart, Éric and Winand, Pascaline (2001). *The Dynamics, Structures, Actors and Outcomes of US-EU Relations: An 'Inside-Out' Approach*, in *Ever closer partnership: policy-making in US-EU relations*, Philippart and Winand, Editors. 2001, Peter Lang: Brussels. 17-28.

Piccoli, Wolfango (1999). *Alliance Theory: The Case of Turkey and Israel.* Columbia International Affiars Online: New York, August 1999.

Pierson, Paul (1996). "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis," *Comparative Political Studies*. **29**(2). 123-163.

Pierson, Paul (2004). *Politics in time: history, institutions, and social analysis*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Pilegaard, Jess (2004). *The European Security and Defence Policy and the Development of a Security Strategy for Europe*, in *The Politics of European Security*, Pilegaard, Editor. 2004, Danish Institute for International Studies.

Pilegaard, Jess and Rasmussen, Niels Aadal (2006). "Global Power Europe? EU25 between Internationalism and Parochialism," *Studia Diplomatica*. **59**(1). 119-128.

Pilegaard, Jess, ed. (2004). *The Politics of European Security*. 2004, Danish Institute for International Studies.

Pollack, Mark A. (2001). "International Relations Theory and European Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **39**(2). 221-244.

Pollack, Mark A. and Shaffer, Gregory C. (2006). "Transatlantic Economy Relations: Continuity amid Discord," *European Political Science*. **5**. 62-68.

Pollpeter, Kevin (2008). *Building for the Future: China's Progress in Space Technology During the Tenth 5-Year Plan and the U.S. Response.* Strategic Studies Institute: Carlise, PA, March 2008.

Pomper, Miles A. (2005). "U.S., Israel Reach China Arms Deal," *Arms Control Today*. September 2005

Portela, Clara (2007). "The EU's "Sanctions Paradox"," *SWP Comments*. **18**. October 2007

Portela, Clara and Kreutz, Joakim (2004). "New EU Principles on the use of sanctions: from symbolism to effectiveness?," *European Security Revew*. (23). 12-13.

Posen, Barry (2004). "The European Security Strategy: Practical Implications," *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*. **1**. 33-38.

Posen, Barry, R. (2004). "ESDP and the Structure of World Power," *The International Spectator*. **39**(1). 5-17.

Posen, Barry, R. (2006). "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?," *Security Studies*. **15**(2). 149-186.

Princen, Sebastiaan (2007). "Agenda-setting in the European Union: a theoretical exploration and agenda for research," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **14**(1). 21-38.

Przeworski, Adam and Teune, Henry (1970). *The logic of comparative social inquiry*. New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Putnam, Robert (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*. **42**(3). 427-460.

Quille, Gerrard*, et al.* (2006). *Developing EU Civil Military Co-ordination: The Role of the new Civilian Military Cell.* Centro Militare di Studi Strategici ISIS Europe: Brussels.

Radaelli, Claudio (1997). "How does Europeanization Produce Domestic Policy Change?: Corporate Tax Policy in Italy and the United Kingdom," *Comparative Political Studies*. **30**(5). October 1997. 553-575.

Radaelli, Claudio (2000). "Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change," *European Integration online Papers*. **4**(8).

Radaelli, Claudio (2003). *The Europeanization of Public Policy*, in *The Politics of Europeanization*, Featherstone and Radaelli, Editors. 2003, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Radaelli, Claudio (2004). "Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?," *European Integration online Papers*. **8**(16). October 6, 2004.

Rehn, Olli (2008). *Europe's smart power in its region and the world*, speech at European Studies Center, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford: May 1, 2008.

Reichard, Martin (2006). *The EU-NATO relationship : a legal and political perspective*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Rhodes, Carolyn (1998). *The European Union in the world community*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Rhodes, R. A. W., Binder, Sarah A., and Rockman, Bert A. (2006). *The Oxford handbook of political institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rice, Condoleeza (2000). "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*. January/February 2000.

Richardson, J. J. (2006). *European Union: power and policy-making*. 3rd ed. Routledge research in European public policy. Abingdon: Routledge.

Richardson, Louise (1992). "Avoiding and incurring losses: decision-making in the Suez Crisis," *International Journal*. **47**. 370-401.

Ricks, Thomas E. (2007). *Fiasco: the American military adventure in Iraq*. London: Penguin.

Rieker, Pernille (2005). *From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security Towards the Europeanisation of French Foreign and Security Policy.* Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Rifkin, Jeremy (2004). *The European dream: how Europe's vision of the future is quietly eclipsing the American dream*. Cambridge: Polity.

Rip, Michael and Hasnik, James (2003). "An Evaluation of the Military Benefits of the Galileo System," *GPS World*. April 1, 2003.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995). *Bringing transnational relations back in: non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions*. Cambridge studies in international relations ; 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995). *Cooperation among democracies: the European influence on U.S. foreign policy*. Princeton studies in international history and politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Risse, Thomas (2005). "Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **12**(2). 291-309.

Röben, Volker (2004). "Constitutionalism of the European Union after the Draft Constitutional Treaty: How Much Hierarchy," *Columbia Journal of European Law*. **10**(2). 339-378.

Rogowski, Roger (1999). *Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice*, in *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, Lake and Powell, Editors. 1999, Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. 115-136.

Rosamond, Ben (2000). *Theories of European Integration*. The European Union Series, ed. Nugent, Paterson, and Wright. New York: Hargrave.

Ross, Robert (2006). "Taiwan's Fading Indepdency Movement," *Foreign Affairs*. **85**(2). March/April 2006. 141-148.

Roy, Denny (1998). *China's Foreign Relations*. London: MacMillan Press.

Rühle, Michael and Williams, Nicholas (1995). "NATO Enlargement and the European Union," *The World Today*. **51**(5). May 1995. 84-88.

Russett, Bruce M. (1970). *What price vigilance? : The burdens of national defense*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rutten, Maartje, ed. (2001). *From St-Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents*. Chaillot Paper 47. 2001, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union: Paris.

Rynning, Sten (2003). "Why Not NATO? Military Planning in the European Union," *Journal of Stategic Studies*. **26**(1). 53-72.

Saalman, Lora and Yuan, Jing-dong (2004). *The European Union and the Arms Ban on China.* Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Sakhuja, Vijay (2000). "Dragon's Dragonfly: The Chinese Aircraft Carrier," *Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses*. **24**(7). October 2000.

Salmon, Trevor (2005). "The European Security and Defence Policy: Built on Rocks or Sand?," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **10**. 359-379.

Sandler, Todd and Murdoch, James C. (2000). "On Sharing NATO Defence Burdens in the 1990s and Beyond," *Fiscal Studies*. **21**(3). 297-327.

Sandschneider, Eberhard (2002). "China's Diplomatic Relations with the States of Europe," *The China Quarterly*. **169**. March 2002. 33-44.

Sandschneider, Eberhard (2006). *Is China's military modernization a concern for the EU*, in *Facing China's rise: Guidelines for an EU strategy*, Zaborowski, Editor. 2006, EU Institute for Security Studies: Paris.

Sanford, Jim and Holland, Simon (2008). *US-EU Regulatory Cooperation*, at *WTO TBT Committee Workshop on Good Regulatory Practices*. March 18-19, 2008.

Sautenet, Antoine (2007). "The Current Status and Prospects of the 'Strategic Partnership' between the EU and China: Towards the Conclusion of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement," *European Law Journal*. **13**(6). November 2007. 699-731.

Scharpf, Fritz W. (1997). *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*: Westview.

Scharpf, Fritz Wilhelm (1999). *Governing in Europe: effective and democratic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scheipers, Sibylle and Sicurelli, Daniela (2007). "Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia?," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **45**(2). 435-457.

Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). *The strategy of conflict*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Schimmelfennig, Frank and Rittberger, Berthold (2006). *Theories of European Integration*, in *European Union: power and policy-making*, Richardson, Editor. 2006, Routledge: Abingdon.

Schmidt, John R. (2007). "Last Alliance Standing? NATO after 9/11," *The Washington Quarterly*. **30**(1). 93-106.

Schmidt, Peter (2005). "Bowling by the Same Rules? EU-United Nations Relations and the Transatlantic Partnership," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. **3**(1). Spring 2005. 123-138.

Schmidt, Vivian and Radaelli, Claudio (2004). "Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues," *West European Politics*. **27**(2). March 2004. 183-210.

Security and Defence Agenda (Year). *EU-US defence cooperation*. 2008: Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels and Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington DC.

Seibert, Bjoern H. (2007). *African Adventure?: Assessing the European Union's Military Intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic.* MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass.

Selden, Zachary (2010). "Power is Always in Fashion: State-Centric Realism and the European Security and Defence Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **48**(2). 397-416.

Shambaugh, David (2004). "China and Europe: The Emerging Axis," *Current History*. September 2004.

Shambaugh, David (2005). "The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China's Rise," *The Washington Quarterly*. **28**(3). Summer 2005. 7-25.

Shambaugh, David (2005). *Don't lift the arms embargo on China.* Brookings Institute: February 23, 2005.

Shambaugh, David (2005). *Lifting the EU Arms Embargo on China: An American Perspective*, at *China's Rise: Diverging U.S-EU Approaches and Perceptions*. Berlin: April 28-29, 2005.

Shambaugh, David (2007). *China-Europe Relations Get Complicated.* Brookings Institute: May 2007.

Shambaugh, David, Sandschneider, Eberhard, and Hong, Zhou, eds (2008). *The China-Europe relationship: Perceptions, policies and prospects*. 2008, Routledge: New York.

Shapiro, Jeremy and Witney, Nick (2009). *Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations.* European Council on Foreign Relations: London, November 2009.

Shue, Vivienne (2004). *Legitimacy crisis in China?*, in *State and society in 21st-century China: crisis, contention, and legitimation*, Gries and Rosen, Editors. 2004, Routledge: New York.

Simmons, Beth A., Dobbin, Frank, and Garrett, Geoffrey (2008). *The global diffusion of markets and democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Simón, Luis (2010). *Command and Control? Planning for EU military operations.* European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris.

Sireci, Jonathan and Coletta, Damon (2009). "Enduring without an Enemy: NATO's Realist Foundation," *Perspectives. Review of International Affairs.* (1). 57-87.

Sjöstedt, Gunnar (1977). *The external role of the European Community*. Westmead: Saxon House.

Skalnes, Lars S. (1998). "From the outside in, from the inside out: NATO expansion and international relations theory," *Security Studies*. **7**(4). 44-87.

Smith, Hazel, (2002). *European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and What it Does*. London: Pluto.

Smith, Karen E. (2000). "The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?," *The International Spectator*. **35**(2). April-June 2000. 11-28.

Smith, Karen E. (2003). "The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in Intenational Relations," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*. **9**(2). 103-113.

Smith, Karen E. (2003). *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. Malden, Mass: Polity Press.

Smith, Karen E. (2005). "Beyond the civilian power debate," *Politique Européenne*. **1**(17). 63-82.

Smith, Karen E. (2009). "The Justice and Home Affairs Policy Universe: Some Directions for Further Research," *Journal of European Integration*. **31**(1). 1-7.

Smith, Michael E. (2000). "Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy co-operation," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **7**(4). October 2000. 613-631.

Smith, Michael E. (2004). "Toward a theory of EU foreign policy-making: multi-level governance, domestic politics, and national adaptation to Europe's common foreign and security policy," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **11**(4). 740-758.

Smith, Michael H. (1998). "Competitive co-operation and EU-US relations: can the EU be a strategic parter for the US in the world political economy," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **5**(4). December 1998. 561-577.

Smith, Michael H. (2001). "The European Union's commercial policy: between coherence and fragmentation," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **8**(5). 787-802.

Smith, Michael H. (2003). "The framing of European foreign and security policy: towards a post-modern framework," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **10**(4). August 2003. 556-575.

Smith, Michael H. (2004). "Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the United States and World Order," *International Politics*. **41**. 95-117.

Smith, Michael H. (2005). "Taming the Elephant? The European Union and the management of American power," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*. **6**(1). 129-154.

Smith, Michael H. (2006). "Comment: Crossroads or cul-de-sac? Reassessing European foreign policy," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **13**(2). 322-327.

Smith, Michael H. (2006). "European Foreign Policy in Crisis? EU responses to the George W. Bush administration," *European Political Science*. **5**. 41-51.

Smith, Michael H. (2007). "The European Union and International Order: European and Global Dimensions," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **12**. 437-456.

Smith, Michael H. (2009). "Between 'soft power' and a hard place: European Union Foreign and Security Policy between the Islamic world and the United States," *International Politics*. **46**(5). September 2009. 596-615.

Smith, Michael H. and Steffenson, Rebecca (2011). *The EU and the United States*, in *International Relations and the European Union, Second Edition*, Hill and Smith, Editors. 2011, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 404-434.

Smith, Michael H. and Vichitsorasatra, Natee (2010). "The European Union's Asia strategies: Problems of foreign policy and international relations," *International Politics*. **47**(3/4). 338-354.

Smith, Michael H. and Woolcock, Stephen (1994). "Learning to Cooperate: The Clinton Administration and the European Union," *International Affairs*. **70**(3). July 1994. 459-476.

Smith, Michael H. and Xie, Huaixian (2009). *The European Union, China and the United States: "Complex Interdependence" and "Bi-Multilateralism" in Commercial Relations*, at *50th International Studies Association Annual Convention*. New York: February 2009.

Snyder, Glenn H. (1984). "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*. **36**(4).

Snyder, Glenn H. (1990). "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs*. **44**(1). Spring/Summer 1990. 103-123.

Snyder, Glenn H. (1991). "Alliances, balance, and stability," *International Organization*. **45**(1). 121-142.

Solana, Javier (2003). "The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Reinvention or Reform," *Progressive Governance*. July 10, 2003.

Stavridis, Stelios (2001). ""Militarising" the EU: The Concept of civilian power Europe revisited," *The International Spectator*. **36**(4). 43-50.

Stedman, Stephen John (1997). "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security*. **22**(2). Autumn 1997. 5-53.

Steinmo, Sven, Thelen, Kathleen Ann, and Longstreth, Frank (1992). *Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stetter, Stephan (2004). "Cross-pillar politis: functional unity and institutional fragmentation of EU foreign policies," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **11**(4). 720-739.

Stevenson, Jonathn (2003). "How Europe and America Defend Themselves," *Foreign Affairs*. **82**(2). March/April 2003. 75-90.

Stoker, Gerry (1995). *Introduction*, in *Theory and Method in Political Science*, Marsh and Stoker, Editors. 1995, Macmillan: Basingstoke.

Stone Sweet, Alec and Sandholtz, Wayne (1997). "European integration and supranational governance," *Journal of European Public Policy*. **4**(3). September 1997. 297-317.

Studwell, Joe (2002). *The China Dream: The Quest for the Last Great Untapped Market on Earth*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.

Stumbaum, May-Britt (2007). "Opportunities and Limits of EU-China Security Cooperation," *The International Spectator*. **42**(3). September 2007. 351-370.

Stumbaum, May-Britt (2007). *Engaging China - Uniting Europe? EU Foreign Policy towards China*, in *European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road towards Convergence*, Casarini and Musu, Editors. 2007, Palgrave Macmillan: New York.

Stumbaum, May-Britt (2009). *Risky business? The EU, China and dual-use technology.* European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris.

Stürchler, Nikolas and Elsig, Manfred (2007). *Spoiling the Party? Multilateralism, Participation, and International Cooperation*, at *The New International Law*. Oslo: March 15-18, 2007.

Sullivan, Lt. Col. Shannon (2002). "Globalized Security: An Allied Industrial Base for the 21st Century," *Acquisition Review Quarterly*. Spring 2002.

Sullivan, Maj. Patrick T. (2002). *The European Security and Defense Identity Explained: Why the US Should Support It*, Master's Thesis: Air Command and Staff College Air University, April 1, 2002.

Sutter, Robert (2004). "Asia in the Balance: America and China's Peaceful Rise," *Current History*. September 2004.

Suzuki, Shogo (2009). "Chinese Soft Power, Insecurity Studies, Myopia and Fantasy," *Third World Quarterly*. **30**(4). 779-793.

Swaine, Michael D. and Johnston, Alastair Iain (1999). *China and Arms Control Institutions*, in *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects*, Economy and Oksenberg, Editors. 1999, Council on Foreign Relations Press: New York. 90-135.

Taneja, Pradeep (2010). "China-Europe relations: The limits of strategic partnership," *International Politics*. **47**(3/4). 371-387.

Tang, Shao Cheng (2003). "EU's Taiwan Policy in the light of its China policy," *Asia-Europe Journal*. **1**. 511-525.

Taube, Markus (2002). "Economic Relations between the PRC and the States of Europe," *The China Quarterly*. **169**. April 2002. 78-107.

Taylor, Trevor (1994). "West European Security and Defence Cooperation: Maastricht and Beyond," *International Affairs*. **70**(1). January, 1994. 1-16.

Technological and Aerospace Committee of the WEU (2008). *Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS): European space cooperation for security and defence.* Western European Union: Brussels, December 3, 2008.

Terzi, Ö. (2005). "Europeanization of Foreign Policy and Candidate Countries: A Comparative Study of Greek and Turkish Cases," *Politique Européenne*. **3**(17). 113-136.

Thelen, Kathleen Ann and Steinmo, Sven (1992). *Historical Institutionalism in comparative politics*, in *Structuring politics : historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*, Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, Editors. 1992, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 1-32.

Thomas, David C. (2009). "Explaining the negotiation of EU foreign policy: Normative institutionalism and alternative approaches," *International Politics*. **46**(4). 339-357.

Tiersky, Ronal (1997). "French Military Reform and NATO Restructuring," *Joint Forces Quarterly Forum*. Spring 1997. 95-102.

Tkacik, John J. (2003). *Responding to a Paris–Beijing Arms Axis.* Heritage Foundation: July 3, 2003.

Tkacik, John J. (2004). *Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China.* Heritage Foundation. March 18, 2004.

Toje, Asle (2008). *The EU, NATO and European Defence - A slow train coming.* European Union Institute for Strategic Studies: Paris.

Tomes, Robert R. (2006). *U.S. defense strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: military innovation and the new American way of war, 1973- 2003*. New York: Routledge.

Tömmel, Ingeborg and Verdun, Amy (2008). *Innovative governance in the European Union*

: the politics of multilevel policymaking. London: Lynne Rienner.

Tonra, Ben (2000). *Denmark and Ireland*, in *The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States*, Manners and Whitman, Editors. 2000, Manchester University Press: Manchester. 224-242.

Tonra, Ben (2003). "Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **41**(4). 731-756.

Torreblanca, José I. (2001). *Ideas, preferences and institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy.* Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo: Oslo.

Tremonti, Giulio (2005). *Rischi fatali: L'Europa vecchia, la Cina, il mercatismo suicida: Come reagire (Fatal risks: Old Europe, China, suicidal mercantilism: How to react)*: Mondadori.

Tsebelis, George (2002). *Veto players: how political institutions work*. Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press.

Tsebelis, George (2005). *The European Convention and the Rome and Brussels IGCs: a veto players analysis.* Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones: Madrid, June 2005.

Tsuruoka, Michito (2006). *How External Perspectives of the European Union Are Shaped: Endogenous and Exogenous Sources*, at *20th World Congress of the International Polical Science Association*. Fukuoka, Japan: July 9-13, 2006.

Umbach, Frank (2003). *The Future of the ESDP*, at *New Europe, Old Europe and the New Transatlantic Agenda*. Warsaw: September 6, 2003, Centrum Stosunków Miedzynarodowych.

Umbach, Frank (2004). *Will the EU Arms Embargo towards PR China be Lifted? Perspectives and Implications.* Institute for National Policy Research, Taiwan Perspective e-Paper 29.

Valasek, Tomas (2004). *Galileo's 'strategic' role*, in *Europe in Space*, Bildt, Editor. 2004, Center for European Reform: London. 33-43.

Valasek, Tomas (2007). *The roadmap to better EU-NATO relations.* Centre for European Reform: London, December 2007.

Van Der Jagt, Culver (2002). *Galileo: The Declaration of European Independence*, PhD dissertation, American Graduate School of International Relations and Diplomacy.

van der Putten, Frans Paul (2007). "The EU Arms Embargo, Taiwan, and Security Independence between China, Europe and the United States," *The Indian Journal of Asian Affairs*. (Special Edition: China and the World). July 2007.

van der Putten, Frans Paul (2009). *The EU Arms Embargo against China: Should Europe play a role in East Asian security?* Hong Kong Shue Yan University/Pace University, NYC.

Van Evera, Stephen (1997). *Guide to methods for students of political science*. Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press.

van Ham, Peter (2004). *Shaping Europe by the Sword?* Clingendael Institute: The Hague.

van Ham, Peter (2009). *EU-OSCE relations: Partner or rivals in security*, in *The European*

Union and international organizations, Jørgensen, Editor. 2009, Taylor and Francis: New York.

Van Herpen, Marcel H. (2004). "Chirac's Gaullism - Why France has become the driving force behind the effort to build an autonomous European defence," *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*. **4**(1). 67-81.

Vaquer i Fanés, J. (2001). *Europeanization and Foreign Policy.* Observatorio de Politica Exterior Europea, Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus: Barcelona.

Varwick, Johannes and Koops, Joachim A. (2008). *The European Union and NATO: 'Shrewd interorganizationalism' in the making?*, in *The European Union and International Organisations*, Jørgensen, Editor. 2008, Routledge: London. 101-130.

Vennesson, Pascal (2007). "Lifting the EU Arms Embargo on China: Symbols and Strategy," *EurAmerica*. **37**.

Vennesson, Pascal (2007). *Europe's Grand Strategy: The Search for a Postmodern Realism*, in *European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road towards Convergence*, Casarini and Musu, Editors. 2007, Palgrave Macmillan: New York.

Vennesson, Pascal (2010). "Competing Visions for the European Union Grand Strategy," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **15**. 57-75.

Vielhaber, Jost and Sattler, Daniel (2002). "Why Europe Wants Galileo," *Internationale Politik*. **3**(4). Winter 2002. 35-38.

von der Dunk, Frans G. (2009). "A European "Equivalent" to United States Export Controls: European law on the Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space Technologies," *Astropolitics*. **7**(2). May 2009. 101-134.

Wacker, Gudrun (2005). *Lifting the EU Arms Embargo on China: US and EU Positions*, at *China's Rise: Diverging U.S-EU Approaches and Perceptions*. Berlin: April 28-29, 2005.

Wagner, Wolfgang (2005). *The democratic legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy.* European Union Institute for Security Studies: Paris, April 2005.

Wagnsson, Charlotte (2008). *The EU as a global strategic actor, re-actor or passive pole*, in *The European Union and strategy: an emerging actor*, Engelbrekt and Hallenberg, Editors. 2008, Routledge: New York.

Wallace, William (2001). "Europe, the Necessary Partner," *Foreign Affairs*. **80**(3). May/June 2001. 16-34.

Wallace, William (2003). "A Security Strategy for the EU?," *CFSP Forum (FORNET)*. **1**(2). September 2003. 3-4.

Wallace, William (2007). *'European' Foreign Policy: A Realistic Aspiration, or an Unattainable Goal*, in *European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road towards Convergence*, Casarini and Musu, Editors. 2007, Palgrave Macmillan: New York.

Wallander, Celeste A. (2000). "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization*. **54**(4). Autumn 2000. 705-735.

Walt, Stephen M. (1985). "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,"

International Security. **9**(4). Spring 1985. 3-43.

Walt, Stephen M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies *International Studies Quarterly,* **35**(2). June 1991. 211-239.

Waltz, Kenneth Neal (1979). *Theory of international politics*. New York; London: McGraw-Hill.

Wang, Sheng-Chih (2008). *Europe Opens Its Eyes: The Settlement of Transatlantic Dispute over Satellite Navigation Capability*, at *European Consortium for Political Research, Standing Group on the European Union, Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics*. University of Latvia, Riga: September 25-27, 2008.

Wang, Sheng-Chih (2009). "The Making of New 'Space': Cases of Transatlantic Astropolitics," *Geopolitics*. **14**(3). 433-461.

Wang, Sheng-Chih (2010). *Surviving the Crises: The Changing Patterns of Space Cooperation among the United States, Russia, Europe and China*, at *ECPR SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR*. Stockholm: September 9-11, 2010.

Webb, David *On the Definition of a Space Weapon (When is a Space Weapon Not a Space Weapon).* The Praxis Centre, Leeds Metropolitan University: Leeds, UK.

Webber, Douglas (2001). *New Europe, new Germany, old foreign policy?: German foreign policy since unification*. Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass.

Weber, Max, Schils, Edward A. (translator), and Finch, Henry A. (translator) (1949). *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. New York: Free Press.

Weitsman, Patricia A. (1997). "Intimate enemies: The politics of peacetime alliances," *Security Studies*. **7**(1). 156-193.

Wendt, Alexander (2004). *Driving with the rearview mirror: On the rational science of institutional design*, in *The rational design of international institutions*, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, Editors. 2004, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 259-290.

White, Brian (2001). *Understanding European foreign policy*. London: Palgrave.

Whiting, Stephen N. (2003). "Space and Diplomacy: A New Tool for Leverage," *Astropolitics*. **1**(1). 54-77.

Whitman, Richard (2004). "NATO, the EU and ESDP: an emerging division of labour," *Contemporary Security Policy*. **25**(3). 430-451.

Whitman, Richard and Juncos, Ana (2009). "The Lisbon Treaty and the Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: Reforms, Implementation and the Consequences of (non-)Ratification," *European Foreign Affairs Review*. **14**. 25-46.

Wiener, Antje and Diez, Thomas (2009). *European integration theory*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Winn, Neil (2003). "CFSP, ESDP, and the Future of European Security: Whither NATO?," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*. **9**(2). 149-160.

Winn, Neil and Harris, Erika (2003). "Conclusion: The story of a death foretold," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*. **4**(1). 167-170.

Wong, Reuben (2005). *The Europeanization of Foreign Policy*, in *International Relations*

and the European Union, Hill and Smith, Editors. 2005, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 134-153.

Wong, Reuben (2006). *Forging Common EU Policies on China*, in *The EC/EU: a World Security Actor?*, Deighton and Boussuat, Editors. 2006, Soleb: Paris.

Wong, Reuben (2008). "Towards a Common European Policy on China? Economic, Diplomatic and Human Rights Trends Since 1985," *Current Politics and Economics of Asia*. **17**(1). 155-182.

Wong, Reuben and Hill, Christopher (2011). *Introduction*, in *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization*, Wong and Hill, Editors. 2011, Routledge: New York. 1-18.

Wong, Reuben Yik-Pern (2006). *The Europeanization of French foreign policy: France and the EU in East Asia*. French politics, society, and culture series. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wong, Reuben Yik-Pern and Hill, Christopher (2011). *National and European foreign policies: towards Europeanization*. New York: Routledge.

Wörder, Manfred (1994). "Shaping the Alliance for the future," *NATO Review*.

World Uyghur Congress, et. al. (2004). *Open Letter to EU against Lifting Arms Embargo on China.* December 9, 2004.

Xiang, Lanxin (2004). "China's Eurasian Experiment," *Survival*. **46**(2). Summer 2004. 109-122.

Yahuda, Michael (2004). *Europe and America in Asia: Different Beds, Same Dreams.* The Sigur Center, George Washington University: Washington.

Yost, David (2002). "Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe," *International Affairs*. **78**(2). April 2002. 277-300.

Young, Marcus, Maj. US. Army (2006). *France, de Gaulle and NATO: The Paradox of French Security Policy*, Master's Thesis, Air Command and Staff College: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Youngs, Richard (2004). "Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. **42**(2). 415-435.

Zaborowski, Marcin (2006). *Facing China's rise: Guidelines for an EU strategy.* EU Institute for Security Studies: Paris.

Zaborowski, Marcin (2006). *The EU as a global power.* EU Institute for Security Studies and European Centre Natolin: Warsaw, May 19, 2006.

Zaborowski, Marcin (2006). *US-China relations: runing on two tracks*, in *Facing China's rise: Guidelines for an EU strategy*, Zaborowski, Editor. 2006, Institute for Strategic Studies: Paris.

Zaborowski, Marcin (Paris France) (2006). *Friends again?: EU-US relations after the crisis*. Transatlantic book. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Zheng, Bijan (2005). "China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status," *Foreign Affairs*. September/October 2005.

Zilmer-Johns, Lisbet (2004). *The Convention, the IGC and the Great Powers: the ESDP and New Security Threats*, in *The Politics of European Security*, Pilegaard, Editor. 2004, Danish Institute for International Studies.

Zilmer-Johns, Lisbet and Pilegaard, Jess (2004). *Towards a Common European Security and Defense Policy?*, in *The Politics of European Security*, Pilegaard, Editor. 2004, Danish Institute for International Studies.

APPENDIX A

The American diplomatic cables used in this thesis were released unredacted by WikiLeaks.org in August 2011 and the US government quickly mobilized against the website. As of June 2012, the cables are hosted at http://www.cablegatesearch.net after WikiLeaks became unable to afford the server space. It is unknown how long these cables will stay on that site or if there are academic projects to archive the material. Though it is impractical to reprint all documents used in this thesis (which total more than 500 pages), I have included the six most cited cables in case this cache of documents become inaccessible in the future.



WikiLeaks
Currently released so far...
251287 / 251,287

Articles

Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
Global
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand

Browse latest releases

2011/08

Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 78 79 85 86
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I
J K L M N O P Q
R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H
I J K L M N O P
Q R S T U V W X
Y Z

Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
SECRET
SECRET//NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR

Viewing cable 03ROME4841, ITALY'S EU PRESIDENCY: OCTOBER 16-17 COUNCIL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
03ROME4841	2003-10-22 15:33	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Rome

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004841

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR IT NATO EUN
SUBJECT: ITALY'S EU PRESIDENCY: OCTOBER 16-17 COUNCIL READOUT; WAY AHEAD ON ESDP, IGC

Classified By: A/DCM TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D)

¶1. (C) Summary. The Italian EU Presidency is, in general, pleased with the results of the October 16-17 European Council Meeting and with progress thus far on the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). Italy remains confident that any new EU agreements on European security architecture will not jeopardize the transatlantic alliance. Italian officials were sanguine that eventual structured cooperation on defense would be compatible with NATO; Italy will insist that its operational parameters be agreed "at 25". They reassured us that the idea for an autonomous EU planning cell at Tervuren is dead. While FM Frattini is optimistic that a political agreement to close the IGC will be ready by December, PM Berlusconi is less sure the Italian Presidency will complete the process, and one key player at the MFA would consider closure by December "a miracle." End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) On October 21 Embassy officers fanned out to pulse officials at the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's office on the October 16-17 European Council meeting and the EU's evolving defense and security architecture. A/DCM Tom Countryman and Polmiloff consulted Deputy Diplomatic Advisor to PM Berlusconi Gianpaolo Scarante and Assistant Diplomatic Advisor Francesco Talo. Poloff met with the MFA's EU European Correspondent and ESDP coordinator Sandro De Bernadin as well as Giuseppe Buccino-Grimaldi from the MFA's office of EU Institutional Affairs. Two polmil officers engaged the MFA's NATO Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi.

EU DEFENSE IDENTITY WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH NATO

¶3. (C) A/DCM Countryman began the discussion with the PM's diplomatic advisors by underscoring that the USG is well aware of Italy's efforts to defend the principle that the EU's defense identity must be fully compatible with NATO. Nevertheless, he said, there is concern about how the EU may operationalize it. A/DCM explained that concern about the EU's approach is driven by several factors, including some EU member states' apparent willingness to modify Berlin-Plus so soon after it was agreed; the possibility that during the course of intra-EU horsetrading on the IGC, a country or set of countries could bend on security matters to get something else in return; and lack of clarity about the operational modalities of structured cooperation.

¶4. (C) Scarante said he was aware of the USG's general concern, but was puzzled by the timing of the Embassy's interest in consultations. He did not think that the dynamic on security cooperation within the EU was one that should particularly trouble us. Scarante claimed there is an understanding within the EU that steps to build an EU defense identity must be compatible with NATO. Berlusconi, he pointed out, made a strong public statement to this effect at

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Community resources

Follow us on Twitter
Check our Reddit
Twitter this
Digg this page
Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

the conclusion of the October 16-17 EU Council meeting. Italy's position is that whatever the EU does on defense and security matters must add value to the Alliance.

¶5. (C) De Bernadin thought that "reproducing" language already agreed to in WEU documents could serve to defuse any conflict with NATO article 5 commitments. He explained that details on defense arrangements and structured cooperation criteria would be spelled out in a protocol or annex to the main document (as noted in Article III-213 of the current draft treaty), which the Presidency would also write. De Bernadin hoped to have a draft text of the protocol ready to share with EU FMs at the November 17 GAERC.

¶6. (C) Brauzzi acknowledged that if the French idea for a European Security and Defense Union had found its way into the Convention's constitutional draft, Italy would have been concerned -- even frightened. That eventuality could have led toward the development of a multipolar world. Now, we are on much firmer ground, he affirmed, adding that the elements are in place to move forward with an EU-NATO relationship grounded in cooperation. He rebuffed any suggestion that the EU had not been fully transparent with NATO in its pursuit of a more robust ESDP.

EU FM NAPLES "CONCLAVE"

¶7. (C) De Bernadin told poloff that for all the cacophony in the press over the Council's discussion on European Security, there was little movement on national positions and no formal agreements on key issues such as structured cooperation and the form that a European planning operation might assume. What was achieved was an airing of national positions, setting the stage for progress at the November 17-18 GAERC, followed by a special meeting of heads of state proposed for November 24 (location tbd), and at a November 27-28 FM "conclave" in Naples.

STRUCTURED COOPERATION - BUT AGREED AT 25

¶8. (C) De Bernadin underlined the Presidency's view that any structured cooperation must be "inclusive and transparent" with membership criteria and operational parameters "established and agreed to at 25". Above all, for the Presidency, the relationship with NATO is "essential" insisted De Bernadin. He underlined that Article 40-2 of the current draft treaty states that EU common security "...shall respect the obligations of certain member states, which see their common defense realized in NATO, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework."

¶9. (C) Brauzzi, from his NATO perspective, also argued energetically--and defensively--that Article 40 of the EU's draft constitution guarantees defense of NATO's interests; Brauzzi did not expect the core principles contained therein to be altered in the final document. Scarante added that structured cooperation presupposes EU and NATO compatibility; nothing the EU is currently considering cuts against the interests of NATO, he asserted.

STRUCTURED COOPERATION A PLUS FOR THE ALLIANCE

¶10. (C) Talo and Brauzzi both argued that the creation of a core group in the EU willing to take on more military responsibility will be to NATO's advantage, not least because it will in all probability be composed exclusively of Alliance members (Brauzzi could not imagine Ireland or Sweden joining, for example). Italy, Talo reasoned, would have even more influence in such a group than in a future EU of 25 members. The added pressure of EU military spending targets and capabilities criteria, Brauzzi believed, would result in a synergistic effect and contribute to transatlantic security.

TERVUREN (STILL) DEAD

¶11. (C) Talo confirmed that EU leaders meeting in Brussels touched only lightly on the issue of where to house/how to structure an eventual EU planning cell. He said emphatically that Tervuren is dead. While other ideas are being studied, including the Italian proposal to set up a virtual planning cell (which Talo indicated was a Defense Ministry initiative), the issue is not ripe for a full Council-level discussion. Asked to explain Berlusconi's October 17 public comment that the EU would need a "dedicated command", Talo said the PM meant that to manage an autonomous operation the EU would require some sort of planning cell. He clarified that Berlusconi was not calling for a fixed and permanent cell, but one that could conceivably even be created on an ad hoc basis.

¶12. (C) Brauzzi, pressed on why Italy hasn't been more forthcoming in support of the UK proposal to set up an EU planning cell at SHAPE, said that Italy has nothing against such a notion. "What we cannot accept," he said, "is a prescription that mandates its establishment there." Berlin-Plus doesn't dictate where a cell should be located, he noted. SHAPE is an option, as is the idea to create a

virtual planning cell. Regardless of the modalities for establishing a planning capacity, Brauzzi argued, planners seconded to any EU cell will remain national resources and available to NATO. He viewed the development of an autonomous EU planning capability as adding flexibility to the system of transatlantic security and fully in keeping with the interests of the Alliance.

---------- -
TREATY OF ROME WON'T BE ANOTHER TREATY OF NICE
---------- -

¶13. (C) Buccino-Grimaldi said that the overall IGC discussions on the Council margins were positive. He said that FM Frattini is very optimistic that the IGC will finish during the Italian Presidency. PM Berlusconi is also hopeful, but "more prudent" than Frattini. Grimaldi, who's office is responsible for drafting treaty elements dealing with reforming the EU's institutions, told poloff that it would be "a miracle" if there is a document ready for the final Council meeting of the Italian Presidency on December ¶12. He said that the Presidency would only prepare the overall package for heads of state to sign after the late November FM's conclave, based on their input and ongoing discussions. "Italy will not make the same mistake France did with the Nice Treaty." The package, if presented, will be "complete, tight" and not contain every amendment and revision desired by member states, which according to Grimaldi was the case with Nice. Italy has red lines in this regard, one of which is to change the voting structure enshrined in Nice so that a small minority of the 25 cannot block decisions.

¶14. (C) Grimaldi said that his cynicism over completing the treaty by December is based on the number and weight of negotiations pending. He predicted that decision areas subject to qualified majority voting (QMV) will remain more or less unchanged, but only after much debate. Two areas he sees as critical to completing the treaty on time are agreement on numbers of commissioners and the role of and control over the proposed EU foreign minister position. Compromise will not be easy on either.

¶15. (C) Comment: Our Italian colleagues did their level best to reassure us that modalities for implementing ESDP will be compatible with NATO. Berlusconi's strong pronouncements--and the unity of top government officials--have reinforced this fundamental principle and suggest that Italy, while likely to be less forceful than the UK, will not go wobbly. We were struck by the apparent calm of our interlocutors, who evidently believe that an eventual EU Constitution will prevent some member states from straying from their Atlanticist brethren in pursuit of a more robust EU defense identity. We respect their view, but with the operational details of ESDP still in flux, we will continue to press them to ensure that it complements NATO. End Comment.
SEMBLER

NNNN
2003ROME04841 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL



WikiLeaks
Currently released so far...
251287 / 251,287

Articles

Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
Global
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand

Browse latest releases

2011/08

Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 78 79 85 86
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I
J K L M N O P Q
R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H
I J K L M N O P
Q R S T U V W X
Y Z

Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
SECRET
SECRET//NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR

Viewing cable 03ROME5665, ITALY'S EU PRESIDENCY HAS UNEVEN SUCCESS BUT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
03ROME5665	2003-12-19 16:26	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN	Embassy Rome

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 005665

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR EUR/WE, EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2013
TAGS: PREL IT EUN
SUBJECT: ITALY'S EU PRESIDENCY HAS UNEVEN SUCCESS BUT
DELIVERS ON U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS

REF: A. ROME 4133
¶B. ROME 4564
¶C. BRUSSELS 4892
¶D. ROME 3237
¶E. ROME 5150
¶F. BRUSSELS 5622

Classified By: DCM EMIL SKODON FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Against the backdrop of EU members' continuing divisions over Iraq, Italy's EU Presidency managed to further U.S. interests in fighting terrorism and in keeping the EU's defense and security policy in accord with NATO and the Berlin-Plus agreement - in line with Italy's Presidency goal of strengthening transatlantic ties. Italy also succeeded in meeting other key EU Presidency goals of enlarging the EU and improving border control. It was less effective, however, in resolving U.S.-EU differences on economic and trade issues, notably regarding genetically modified organisms. In addition, the Italian EU Presidency's economic growth initiative to increase investment, transportation, and telecommunications did not fulfill its lofty ambitions, particularly on infrastructure projects, but resulted in the Council's endorsement of public/private investments to improve competitiveness and reduce unemployment.

¶2. (C) Italy's failure to bring about approval of the EU draft Constitution is likely to be its EU Presidency legacy. Much of the European press and a number of EU parliamentarians have blamed Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi for not being able to mediate member states' implacable differences on voting rights. Berlusconi decided it was better to end the InterGovernmental Conference (IGC) rather than preside over a weekend of futile haggling. He deserves some credit for meeting with EU government leaders to attempt to forge consensus and for proposing last-minute compromises, but ultimately could not overcome Spain and Poland's determination to hold on to the voting advantages they fought for at the Nice Treaty, and France's refusal to compromise on the Convention's QMV formula. END SUMMARY.

Two Presidencies

¶3. (C) Berlusconi's senior diplomatic advisor (NSA equivalent), Giovanni Castellaneta, told DCM that Italy's tenure should be viewed from two perspectives - the normal residency responsibilities and the IGC. He emphasized that the Prime Minister was pleased with the overall Presidency results and the concluding documents approved in Brussels. Italy was particularly proud of the statement on Transatlantic relations authored by Italy and approved by the

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Community resources

Follow us on Twitter
Check our Reddit
Twitter this
Digg this page
Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

final Council. He was pleased with the public statement of gratitude by A/S Jones. Italy will continue to push for stronger US-EU ties during upcoming Presidencies, he promised.

¶4. (C) Both Castellaneta and MFA office director for EU Institutional Affairs Giuseppe Buccino-Grimaldi laid the blame for the IGC's failure to agree on a draft in two corners. Most important was the Spanish/Polish unwillingness to bend on Nice voting arrangements. The other was France's reluctance to compromise in good faith on the QMV formula laid out in the original Convention draft. All other issues had been agreed to or would have been adopted with some modification, emphasized Buccino. The big question now is whether the areas already agreed will be frozen while QMV negotiations continue. DCM put this question to a number of EU member COMs and DCMs at President Ciampi's holiday reception for the Diplomatic Corps on December 19, and received the full range of answers -- yes, no, and maybe. Ireland will have its hands full managing this process while at the same time presiding over an EU preoccupied with formal enlargement in May, elections in Spain and Poland and for the European Parliament. For all these reasons, Buccino opined that the treaty would not be ready for another attempt at consensus until the Dutch Presidency in the second half of ¶2004.

ESDP in Accord with Berlin-Plus

¶5. (C) Italy's failure to unite EU members in resolving voting rights differences has also put on the shelf for now its provisions for structured cooperation, a single foreign minister, and a watered-down mutual defense clause that may have satisfied neutral EU states but appeared to no longer obligate all members to come to one another's defense. The EU defense planning capabilities decided on prior to the Summit, however, are intact. The proposal -- welcomed by NATO SYG Robertson and in accordance with the Berlin-Plus agreement reinforcing NATO/EU cooperation -- creates an independent EU military planning cell that will link EU military officers in national military headquarters to coordinate operations in which NATO does not participate. According to this plan, a NATO liaison officer will sit at the EU military office, and the EU will have a staff at SHAPE. Castellaneta -- who was involved in drafting this proposal with his British, French, and German colleagues -- was particularly pleased that it set out a clear hierarchy of preferences for EU planning: NATO as the "natural choice," then Berlin-plus, then an EU national headquarters lead, and only when none of these apply a recourse to an EUMS-led approach. European defense policy also evolved during the Italian EU Presidency to enhance capabilities for gendarmerie and humanitarian forces deployment before or after military conflict and a European Defense Agency that will coordinate research, development, and arms purchases.

¶6. (C) The European Council's final declaration under the Italian EU Presidency states that the EU is committed to multilateralism and "a strong UN," and it begins and ends with statements that the transatlantic relationship is "irreplaceable and essential." In order to underscore the importance of these ties, Foreign Minister Franco Frattini invited Secretary Powell to the EU foreign ministers' Nov. 18 working lunch in Brussels, an initiative that fostered goodwill; the final Summit declaration refers to the "positive results" of that meeting.

Fighting Terrorism and WMD

¶7. (C) Frattini played a key role in persuading the EU to declare Hamas a terrorist organization and freeze its assets; EU consensus on blocking assets for charities that support Hamas and suspected terrorists in Italy and abroad remains a problem, however, but Castellaneta insisted that Italy would continue to push the issue within the EU. MFA POLDIR Aragona has told DCM the same, but cautioned that it will be difficult to get some other EU members to move more quickly. Italy led the EU in adopting a position on strengthening international treaties against weapons of mass destruction (including the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, IAEA rules, the treaty banning nuclear tests and experiments, conventions

on biological and chemical weapons, and the Hague code of conduct against proliferation of ballistic missiles). The EU also passed a measure requiring all future EU treaties to include a clause against WMD proliferation.

Boosting Enlargement: Italy's Investment in the Future

¶8. (C) Italy made considerable progress in achieving one of its key presidency goals of advancing the EU candidacies of Turkey, Balkan countries, and former Soviet states -- an accomplishment that promises to promote stability in fragile democracies. At the Dec. 12 Council, Italy succeeded in pushing for early accession -- January 1, 2007 -- of Bulgaria and Romania. It greatly encouraged Turkey's path to reform, stressing the importance of using Ankara's influence to facilitate a Cyprus settlement. Castellaneta pointed to the encouraging gains made by the anti-Denktash Parliamentarians in the elections, and promised to work closely with his Irish counterpart to keep the pressure on all sides to continue reform.

Iraq

¶9. (C) Italy demonstrated leadership as President by pledging 200 million Euro for Iraq reconstruction at the Madrid conference, the second largest amount by an EU member state. Italian efforts to get the EU to show stronger political support for coalition efforts in Iraq were generally

unsuccessful; even the final European Council declaration was only a minor improvement over previous lowest-common-denominator language.

EU Outreach

¶10. (C) Italy did not meet all of its ambitious MEPP goals but held several conferences to further the peace process, including the AHLC Palestinian donors conference, where Rome pledged 77 million euro, and a Euromed Partnership Conference that facilitated meetings among Arab and Israeli foreign ministers. In its EU Presidency declarations and during meetings with Israeli leaders in November, Italy took a balanced approach of moderate support for Israel (including new bilateral agreements on technical cooperation) while condemning Israel's security wall incursion into Palestinian territory; it worked to further Palestinian development while pressing Palestinian leaders to crack down on terrorism. Italy reaffirmed that the roadmap is still the only viable peace plan on the table.

¶11. (SBU) Italy was successful in turning the EU's attention back towards the Balkans in the wake of the war in Iraq. The Presidency successfully used the EU's Balkan Stabilization and Association process to push continued reform throughout the region, especially in Albania and Croatia. Under Italy's watch, the EU police follow-on to NATO in Macedonia continued to provide a stable security environment around Tetovo and other areas of ethnic tension, and has been praised by some EU member states as the first Berlin-plus operation and as proof that the EU can deploy into (somewhat) hostile areas. Italy was also instrumental in clarifying the transition phase of an EU Berlin-plus SFOR follow-on, which will occur only in close consultation with NATO (and the US) and would continue to include a small NATO contingent even after the EU is fully deployed.

¶12. (C) The EU-Russia Summit in November resulted in a number of cooperation agreements, but Berlusconi sent the wrong message to Moscow when he defended President Vladimir Putin on the issues of Russia's human rights record in Chechnya and its arrest of energy czar Khodorkhovsky -- remarks that prompted a rare censure from the European Parliament. Frattini later led the EU in joining Secretary Powell to warn Russia about adhering to its promises to withdraw troops from Georgia and Moldova and respect human rights.

¶13. (C) During Italy's Presidency, the EU urged Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment activities and agree to the IAEA Additional Protocols on Safeguards. The EU also has denounced torture and human rights violations in Iran but

agreed to continue dialogue with Tehran. Castellaneta said that the EU debate on how to deal with Iran will continue, and emphasized Italy's view that the International Community (IC), while continuing to be tough with Iran, should also keep open communications lines. Iran has received a warning from the IC on its nuclear program and will therefore be more cautious in the future, he averred. Under the right conditions, Iran could be used as a tool to promote regional stability. Luigi Maccotta, head of the MFA's Iran and Iraq office, told Poloff that, in terms of Iran policy, the EU Presidency had been a disappointment. The EU, he explained, prefers to pursue a policy of engagement with Tehran, favoring carrots over sticks. The IAEA Board of Governors criticism in November of Iran's nuclear policies, followed shortly by a UN resolution condemning Iranian human rights policies, both fall in the latter category. (Comment. Tehran postponed FM Frattini,s trip to Iran earlier this month, immediately following Italian support for the UN resolution, in order to express its pique at the Italians. Maccotta said the trip has not been rescheduled but will be, since dialogue is paramount to the Italians. End comment). Maccotta added, however, that these events did lay down markers so that Iran knows exactly where it stands with the EU, which could alleviate any ambiguities in future dialogue.

¶14. (SBU) Near the end of the EU Presidency, a high-level Italian diplomat led an EU delegation to both Pyongyang and South Korea to express EU concerns about North Korea's nuclear program and to push for six-party nuclear talks.

¶15. (C) Bilateral and EU meetings with Ukraine President Leonid Kuchma were important in keeping Ukraine within the EU sphere on the heels of Kiev's increasing economic alliances with Russia. MFA Counselor for NIS Affairs told poloffs that Berlusconi recommended to Kuchma that Ukraine could bolster its EU aspirations by increasing its efforts to help broker a solution to the Moldova/Transnistrian conflict.

Breakthroughs on Justice and Home Affairs

¶16. (C) Concerns about combating a dramatic rise in illegal immigration from North Africa over the last decade moved Italy to push European border security to the top of the JHA agenda, paving the way for the establishment an EU Border Management Agency and enhancing the EU's capacity to combat illegal immigration across maritime borders. On the law enforcement front, there was moderate progress in beefing up Europol while a new Framework Decision established an EU-wide basis for the definition of criminal acts and penalties in the field of drug trafficking. In addition, the Presidency was able to secure JHA Council political support for the EC to finalize its proposal on biometrics in visas and residency permits -- a decision endorsed by leaders at the EU summit.

Trade and Economic Issues

¶17. (C) The Italian EU Presidency had some economic successes but none helpful to US policy. Italy abstained on the EU vote to lift a ban on genetically modified corn, reflecting a major rift among the GOI ministries on the issue. Italy also lent little weight to resolve the impasse with the EU on the proposed Galileo satellite system signals that interfere with U.S. military navigational warfare capability and instead has preferred to leave the issue with European Commission experts. Similarly, with the Passenger Name Recognition issue, Italy overcame the objections of its national data privacy authority on the transfer of passenger data to the U.S., then left negotiations at the EU level to the Commission.

¶18. (SBU) The Italian Presidency made progress in the financial arena: achieving consensus on a European takeover code -- capping the end of 15 years of infighting; making progress on the Investment Services and Transparency Directives; and advancing agreement on the Financial Services Action Plan, which is designed to create a single harmonized EU securities market. Italy, in response to U.S. approaches, included language in the preamble to the Takeover Directive to ensure that U.S. firms will not be disadvantaged by the Directive. On the down side, under Italy's EU watch Italian

Finance Minister Tremonti led the European Council in supporting the suspension of the Stability Pact in order to accommodate French and German deficits, leading to still resounding recriminations from smaller countries alleging double standards and hypocrisy (but not "unilateralism").

¶19. (SBU) Italy claimed success in realizing one of its key goals, a European economic growth initiative that continues the Lisbon agenda of increasing economic competitiveness. At the final Summit, the European Council endorsed Italy's plan to invest in infrastructure, research, and education using public (national governments and the European Investment Bank) and private sector funds.

The Berlusconi Factor

¶20. (C) Berlusconi's leadership of the EU Presidency was marred by controversy from his suspended bribery trial, his verbal gaffes offending other EU leaders, coalition tensions, and his government's declining popularity ratings. Berlusconi and EU Commission President Romano Prodi indulged in spats motivated in part by their domestic political rivalry: Berlusconi scheduled Prodi as the last speaker at the IGC opening in October; Prodi, poll respondents' most popular choice to lead the Left in the next Italian national elections, published a manifesto for the European left widely viewed as a challenge to Berlusconi's center-right government. During the Presidency, Berlusconi's government faced several challenges, including internal squabbling over legislation and from widespread but largely ineffective

transportation strikes and demonstrations against proposed pension reform legislation.

¶21. (C) Berlusconi -- a leader for whom personal relationships are paramount -- became one of the few EU Presidents to be censured by the European Parliament after he spoke out in defense of Russian President Putin's human rights record in Chechnya and the arrest of Yukos chairman Khodorkhovsky. While there's no love lost between Berlusconi and the Brussels bureaucracy, Berlusconi has been, on the other hand, an ardent friend of Washington and -- in spite of Italian public disapproval of the Iraq war and the loss of 19 Italians to a terrorist attack in Iraq -- an eloquent defender of U.S. efforts to fight terrorism.

Comment

¶22. (C) Italy's slow start lowered expectations for a successful conclusion to its EU Presidency. Despite the IGC collapse over QMV, Italy nevertheless ironed out with other EU transatlanticists a European security policy in accord with NATO and led the EU to contribute to the fight against terrorism. For these reasons, we give the Italian EU Presidency a "B" grade reflecting its uneven success overall but its support for U.S. foreign policy interests. The transatlantic successes of this EU Presidency set the stage for continued EU-US cooperation in future Presidencies.
SEMBLER

NNNN
2003ROME05665 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL



WikiLeaks

Currently released so far...
251287 / 251,287

Articles

Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
Global
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand

Browse latest releases

2011/08

Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 78 79 85 86
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I
J K L M N O P Q
R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H
I J K L M N O P
Q R S T U V W X
Y Z

Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
SECRET
SECRET//NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR

Viewing cable 02ROME4292, GPS/GALILEO CONSULTATIONS IN ITALY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
02ROME4292	2002-09-04 13:46	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Rome

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 004292

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR OES/SAT/JULIE KARNER
NATO PASS SES-4 FOR MELVIN FLACK
USDOC PASS OFFICE OF SPACE COMMERCIALIZATION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2007
TAGS: TSPA TSPL ECON TSPL ECON TSPL ECON IT ITTSPA ITTSPA
SUBJECT: GPS/GALILEO CONSULTATIONS IN ITALY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ROME 04292 01 OF 03 041407Z

CLASSIFIED BY: ACTING ECONOMIC MINISTER COUNSELOR DAVID MULENEX FOR REA
SONS 1.5 (B,D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: DURING 23-24 JULY CONSULTATIONS IN ROME, ITALIAN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED A DIVERSE SET OF NUANCED RESPONSES TO US CONCERNS OVER THE POSSIBLE OVERLAY OF THE GPS M-CODE BY GALILEO PRS. WHILE ITALIAN TECHNICAL EXPERTS WORKING ON GALILEO EXPRESSED SOME SYMPATHY TO US CONCERNS AND A WILLINGNESS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE, THOSE OFFICIALS DEALING WITH GOI GALILEO POLICY RESPONDED IN A MORE AMBIGUOUS MANNER. BUT EVEN THEY ACKNOWLEDGED USG CONCERNS, EVEN IF THEY WERE NONCOMMITTAL ON A WAY FORWARD TO FINDING A SOLUTION. ALTHOUGH THE USG GPS DELEGATION MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF A VARIETY OF GOI AGENCIES, THE ITALIANS HAD CLEARLY COORDINATED THEIR POSITION AS A RESULT OF HAVING BEEN BRIEFED IN DETAIL ABOUT A DRAFT REPORT ON GPS-GALILEO INTERRELATIONSHIP PRODUCED BY AN AD HOC WORKING GROUP OF THE NATO C3 BOARD. ON THE WHOLE, THE ITALIANS SEEM COMMITTED TO GPS-GALILEO INTEROPERABILITY, BUT IT IS UNCLEAR HOW THIS WILLINGNESS WILL TRANSLATE INTO ITALIAN ASSISTANCE IN ACHIEVING A FAVORABLE RESOLUTION OF THE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE. END SUMMARY.

¶3. (SBU) OES/SAT JULIE KARNER AND USNATO DIRECTOR OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS DIVISION MELVIN FLACK, ACCOMPANIED BY ESTOFF LORENZO MARTINI, MET WITH OFFICIALS OF THE ITALIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA), THE ITALIAN MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION (MOT) AND THE ITALIAN SPACE AGENCY (ASI). IN ALL THREE MEETINGS, THE US DELEGATION MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE USG IS NOT OPPOSED TO EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE GALILEO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ROME 04292 01 OF 03 041407Z
GLOBAL NAVIGATIONAL SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS) IN PRINCIPLE BUT WISHES TO ASSURE THAT GPS AND GALILEO ARE FULLY INTEROPERABLE SO THAT GNSS CIVILIAN CONSUMERS OBTAIN THE BEST POSSIBLE SERVICE AT THE LOWEST PRICE. YET, THE USG CAN NOT ACCEPT THE OVERLAY OF A PORTION OF THE U.S. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) MILITARY SIGNAL (M-CODE) BY THE PROPOSED GALILEO PUBLICLY REGULATED SIGNAL (PRS) BECAUSE OF THE RISKS TO U.S. AND NATO MILITARY CAPABILITIES. THE DELEGATION STRESSED THAT WHILE THE USG WAS EAGER TO COLLABORATE WITH THE EUROPEANS ON GALILEO INTEROPERABILITY, THE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE WOULD BE AN OBSTACLE TO FUTURE USG COOPERATION IF IT REMAINS UNRESOLVED. MR. FLACK ANALYZED THE POTENTIAL DETRIMENTAL IMPACT TO NATO WAR-FIGHTING CAPABILITIES AND THE RISKS TO NATO TROOPS AS A RESULT OF AN M-CODE OVERLAY. IN PARTICULAR, MR. FLACK EXPLAINED THE POTENTIAL HARM TO NATO OBJECTIVES AND PERSONNEL IF AN ADVERSARY OBTAINED THE CAPACITY TO USE GALILEO SIGNALS FOR ITS OWN WAR-FIGHTING CAPABILITIES. CONCERNS OVER THE ROBUSTNESS OF ENCRYPTION TO BE USED BY PRS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A WIDE DISSEMINATION OF ACCESS TO PRS

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Community resources

Follow us on Twitter
Check our Reddit
Twitter this
Digg this page
Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

AMONG NON-GOVERNMENTAL USERS REPRESENT AN INHERENT RISK OF THE PROLIFERATION OF GNSS CAPABILITY TO POSSIBLE NATO ADVERSARIES. BY OVERLAYING THE M-CODE, NATO FORCES WOULD DEGRADE THEIR ABILITY TO USE GNSS SIGNALS WHILE TRYING TO DENY PRS TO AN ADVERSARY IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS. THE ALTERNATIVE, CHANGING THE PRS ENCRYPTION KEYS TO DENY ACCESS TO THE ADVERSARY, WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON NATO'S ABILITY TO OBTAIN A RAPID CONSENSUS FOR COOPERATION AMONG ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AND THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY (ESA), SOME OF WHOM ARE NOT NATO MEMBERS. IN ADDITION, MS. KARNER EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMITMENT TO INTEROPERABILITY, NOTING AN APPARENT EUROPEAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 ROME 04292 01 OF 03 041407Z
PREFERENCE TO PURSUING INDEPENDENCE RATHER THAN INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE AREAS OF TIMING, GEODESY AND SIGNAL STRUCTURE.

¶4. (SBU) AT THE MFA, THE DELEGATION MET WITH COUNSELOR ENRICO GUICCIARDI, HEAD OF SPACE COOPERATION AFFAIRS OF THE MFA'S DIRECTORATE OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION. GUICCIARDI ACKNOWLEDGED THE USG'S CONCERNS BUT DID NOT ADDRESS THEM IN DETAIL, SHIELDING HIMSELF BEHIND HIS LACK OF TECHNICAL EXPERTISE. HE BELIEVED THAT USG CONCERNS WERE SOMEWHAT PREMATURE SINCE GALILEO WAS AT SUCH AN EARLY STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. HE PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW OF THE JOINT UNDERTAKING BETWEEN ESA AND THE EU TO MANAGE THE PROGRAM. THE UNDERLYING THESIS OF HIS PRESENTATION WAS THAT THE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE COULD BE ADDRESSED COMPREHENSIVELY ONCE THE EUROPEANS HAD WORKED OUT ALL THE WRINKLES IN THE OPERATION OF THE JOINT UNDERTAKING. WITHOUT PROVIDING A COMMITMENT, GUICCIARDI SEEMED AMENABLE TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE BUT ADMITTED THAT HE WAS NOT THE KEY GOI DECISION-MAKER ON GALILEO.

¶5. (C) ON 24 JULY, THE DELEGATION MET WITH COUNSELOR RENATO LIBASSI, A SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GOI'S INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5851

PAGE 01 ROME 04292 02 OF 03 041408Z
ACTION OES-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AMAD-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	CTME-00	INL-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	PERC-00	SRPP-00
	EB-00	EUR-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FAAE-00	VC-00	FRB-00
	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	L-00	VCE-00	NASA-01
	AC-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PM-00	ACE-00
	SP-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	EPAE-00	PMB-00	DRL-02	G-00	SAS-00	/011W

----------E24E86 041412Z /38

R 041346Z SEP 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5691
USDOC WASHDC
USMISSION USNATO
INFO EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMCONSUL MILAN
AMCONSUL NAPLES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ROME 004292

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR OES/SAT/JULIE KARNER
NATO PASS SES-4 FOR MELVIN FLACK
USDOC PASS OFFICE OF SPACE COMMERCIALIZATION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2007
TAGS: TSPA TSPL ECON TSPL ECON TSPL ECON IT ITTSPA ITTSPA
SUBJECT: GPS/GALILEO CONSULTATIONS IN ITALY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ROME 04292 02 OF 03 041408Z

GALILEO. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE US DELEGATION'S CONCERNS, LIBASSI DID NOT DIRECTLY ADDRESS THEIR MERITS. INSTEAD, HE PROVIDED A NUANCED RESPONSE THAT REITERATED AN ITALIAN COMMITMENT TO AN OPEN US-EUROPEAN DIALOGUE WITH THE GOAL OF

ACHIEVING GPS-GALILEO INTERDEPENDENCE WHILE MAINTAINING EU SOLIDARITY. LIBASSI STRESSED THAT ITALY DID NOT WANT TO WEAKEN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC) BY PURSUING A SEPARATE GALILEO DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THAT ITALY INTENDS TO GIVE ITS "FULL, LOYAL SUPPORT TO THE EC" IN THIS MATTER. WHILE HE LEFT THE DOOR OPEN TO A NATO-EU DIALOGUE ON THE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE, HE INDICATED THAT THE US-EU NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PRIMACY OVER ANY NATO-EU DISCUSSION. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT DISPUTE THE MERITS OF THE CONCERNS OF THE US OR OTHER NATO MEMBERS ON M-CODE OVERLAY, HE EXPRESSED A CONCERN ABOUT THE USE OF SECURITY ISSUES AS A COVER FOR COMMERCIAL OR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. SPECIFICALLY, LIBASSI DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE OVERLAY ISSUE USED BY UNNAMED EU MEMBER STATES TO USE THEIR DUAL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AS A MEANS TO REOPEN AGREEMENTS THAT HAD BEEN CONCLUDED WITHIN THE EU TRANSPORT COUNCIL IN ORDER TO RENEGOTIATE BETTER TERMS. (EMBASSY COMMENT: HE MAY HAVE BEEN REFERRING TO THE COMPETITION FROM GERMANY TO BE THE SITE OF THE FUTURE ADMINISTRATIVE SEAT OF GALILEO. ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS WERE LATECOMERS IN JOINING GALILEO, THEY ARE AGGRESSIVELY SEEKING TO HAVE THE GALILEO HEADQUARTERS BASED IN GERMANY ACCORDING TO A AUGUST 21 CONVERSATION BETWEEN ESTOFF AND THE GERMAN EMBASSY COUNSELOR FOR SCIENCE AFFAIRS JEN-PETER VOSS (PROTECT). GUICCIARDI MENTIONED ITALIAN-GERMAN FRICTION OVER THIS ISSUE BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. END COMMENT) HE CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS A "STRONG POLITICAL WILL" WITHIN THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ROME 04292 02 OF 03 041408Z
EU TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE UNITED STATES OVER GALILEO AND IMPLIED THAT FULL US ENGAGEMENT IN GPS-GALILEO INTEROPERABILITY "MIGHT AFFECT DESIGN." HE NOTED THAT THE EUROPEANS WILL LOOK VERY CAREFULLY AT THE ISSUES OF ACCESS CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF PRS ENCRYPTION. ALTHOUGH HE CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE SEEN A COPY OF THE NATO C3 BOARD'S WORKING GROUP'S DRAFT REPORTON GPS-GALILEO INTERRELATIONSHIP, HE ADMITTED TOHAVING BEEN BRIEFED ON ITS CONTENTS.

¶6. (C) LIBASSI MADE AN OFFHAND COMMENT REGARDING THE ROLE OF CHINA, WHICH ALLOWED THE US DELEGATION THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK FOR CLARIFICATION ON THE NATURE OF CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN GALILEO THROUGH A PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENT WITH ESA. LIBASSI RESPONDED THAT THE ROLE OF ESA'S NON-EU COLLABORATORS SUCH AS CHINA COULD PLAY IN GALILEO HAD NOT BEEN DECIDED. HE SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND THAT EXTENSIVE CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN GALILEO WOULD HEIGHTEN US CONCERNS OVER THE POTENTIAL OF NON-NATO COUNTRIES TO HAVE A DE FACTO VETO POWER OVER NATO DECISION-MAKING IN A CRISIS THROUGH PRS OVERLAY OF THE M-CODE. IN ADDITION, HE MADE AN OBLIQUE COMMENT REGARDING "NATO BECOMING AN ASSISTANCE GROUP" OVER TIME. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT HE MEANT BY THIS STATEMENT, AND THE US DELEGATION DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESS HIM FOR CLARIFICATION. (EMBASSY COMMENT: WE VIEW THIS STATEMENT TO REFLECT LIBASSI'S PERSONAL OPINION ONLY. HE DOES NOT HAVE ANY COMPETENCY IN NATO AFFAIRS, SINCE HE DOES NOT HAVE ANY DIRECT ROLE IN ITALIAN NATO POLICYMAKING, NOR DOES HE SEEM TO HAVE ANY EXPERTISE IN THIS AREA. END COMMENT.)

¶7. (C) AT ASI, THE DELEGATION MET WITH THE DIRECTOR OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 ROME 04292 02 OF 03 041408Z
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, ROMEO PERNICE, AND THE TWO CHIEF ASI REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ESA AND EU TECHNICAL WORKING GROUPS ON GALILEO, DR. FRANCO MARCONICCHIO AND DR. FRANCO MARUCCI. MARCONICCHIO AND MARUCCI ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GALILEO. THIS DISCUSSION WAS MUCH MORE OPEN AND DIRECT WITH REGARD TO THE ITALIAN RESPONSE. THE ASI REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE WHOLE, EXPRESSED A SINCERE DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES ON GPS-GALILEO INTEROPERABILITY. MARCONICCHIO, IN PARTICULAR, ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE US-EUROPEAN TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE NON-PRS GALILEO SERVICES AND SEPARATE THEM FROM THE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE. WHILE THE USG PLANS TO GO FORWARD WITH GPS-GALILEO TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS, THE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE, IF IT REMAINS UNRESOLVED, WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME AN IMPEDIMENT TO FUTURE USG COOPERATION WITH GALILEO. FROM ASI'S PERSPECTIVE, ON THE WHOLE, US-EUROPEAN TECHNICAL COOPERATION ON GPS-GALILEO ARE PROCEEDING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. ASI IS COMMITTED TO COMPLETE INTEROPERABILITY WITH GPS AS BEING A FUNDAMENTAL GOAL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GALILEO. THE ASI TEAM NOTED THAT A PRELIMINARY SYSTEM DESIGN REVIEW FOR GALILEO WAS COMPLETED

THE WEEK OF 14-20 JULY 2002 BUT THE EXACT CAPABILITIES OF PRS HAD NOT YET BEEN DECIDED. WHATEVER THEIR PERSONNEL PERCEPTIONS OF THE MERITS OF THE U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ5852

PAGE 01 ROME 04292 03 OF 03 041408Z
ACTION OES-01

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AGRE-00	AID-00	AMAD-00	CEA-01	CIAE-00
	CTME-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	PERC-00	SRPP-00	EB-00
	EUR-00	EXIM-01	E-00	FAAE-00	VC-00	FRB-00	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	ITC-01	L-00	VCE-00	NASA-01	AC-01
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	OPIC-01	PM-00	ACE-00	SP-00
	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	PMB-00	DRL-02	G-00	SAS-00	/011W		

----------E24E8A 041412Z /38

R 041346Z SEP 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5692
USDOC WASHDC
USMISSION USNATO
INFO EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL FLORENCE
AMCONSUL MILAN
AMCONSUL NAPLES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ROME 004292

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR OES/SAT/JULIE KARNER
NATO PASS SES-4 FOR MELVIN FLACK
USDOC PASS OFFICE OF SPACE COMMERCIALIZATION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2007
TAGS: TSPA TSPL ECON TSPL ECON TSPL ECON IT ITTSPA ITTSPA
SUBJECT: GPS/GALILEO CONSULTATIONS IN ITALY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ROME 04292 03 OF 03 041408Z

RISKS OF THE M-CODE OVERLAY (MARUCCI SEEMED TO BE PARTICULARLY SKEPTICAL), THEY ALL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES VIEWS THIS ISSUE. THE ASI TEAM ALSO ADMITTED TO HAVING BEEN BRIEFED ON THE CONTENTS OF THE NATO C3 REPORT BEFORE THEIR MEETING WITH THE US DELEGATION.

¶8. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT: THE ITALIANS WERE FAIRLY UNANIMOUS IN THEIR DESIRE TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF REACHING A COMPREHENSIVE LEVEL OF INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN GPS-GALILEO. THE GOI DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE A DEEPLY VESTED INTEREST IN PRS OVERLAYING THE GPS M-CODE ISSUE BUT DECLINED TO COMMIT OPENLY TO SEEKING A RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE, OSTENSIBLY TO MAINTAIN EU UNITY. THE ASI TECHNICAL EXPERTS SEEMED TO BE THE MOST WILLING TO SEEK A RESOLUTION, WHICH SUGGESTS THAT THE DECISION TO OVERLAY THE M-CODE IS BEING DRIVEN BY POLITICAL RATHER THAN TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS, AT LEAST IN ITALY. UNFORTUNATELY, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE DELEGATION TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ITALIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, WHICH MIGHT HAVE A MORE VESTED INTEREST IN THE SANCTITY OF THE M-CODE. END COMMENT.

¶9. (SBU) OES/SAT JULIE KARNER CLEARED ON THIS MESSAGE. USNATO DIRECTOR OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS DIVISION MELVIN FLACK WAS UNABLE TO COORDINATE ON THIS CABLE PRIOR TO ITS TRANSMISSION.
SKODON

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ROME 04292 03 OF 03 041408Z

CONFIDENTIAL

>
2002ROME04292 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL



WikiLeaks
Currently released so far...
251287 / 251,287

Articles

Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
Global
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand

Browse latest releases

2011/08

Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 78 79 85 86
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I
J K L M N O P Q
R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H
I J K L M N O P
Q R S T U V W X
Y Z

Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
SECRET
SECRET//NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR

Viewing cable 03ROME3567, GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
03ROME3567	2003-08-06 15:23	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Rome

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003567

SIPDIS

STATE FOR OES/SAT (BRAIBANTI, KARNER)
DEFENSE FOR OASD/NII (STENBIT MANNO WORMSER SWIDER CHESKY)
DEFENSE ALSO FOR OSD/P (TOWNSEND, NOVAK)
JOINT STAFF FOR J5/J6

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013
T...

SUBJECT: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL TALKS TO RESOLVE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE

REF: USNATO 00777

Classified By: A/ECMIN David W. Mulenex; reasons 1.5 B and D.

¶1. (C) Summary: Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco Aragona informed a U.S. delegation on July 16 that he still believes technical solutions exist to the U.S.-EU dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal overlay of the M-code. Aragona recognized US security concerns regarding the overlay, but repeatedly insisted the EU must safeguard the "Integrity and operability" of Galileo. The U.S. delegation insisted that an overlay would harm U.S. and NATO NAVWAR capabilities and put lives at risk in the event of warfare. Aragona did not completely reject the delegation's point that a political solution was necessary to avoid this outcome but made it clear he does not believe the dispute is ripe for high level political intervention. Aragona did agree that the delegation's suggestion to merge unclassified technical talks and plenary negotiations was a good idea and promised to convey the idea to the Commission. Aragona stated firmly that NATO would not be an acceptable venue for classified discussions. He suggested they could take place at the US Mission to NATO, but insisted that he participants must be limited to the U.S. and the EC. See Embassy comment para 16. End Summary.

¶2. (U) On July 16 a U.S. delegation met with Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco Aragona to discuss the US-EC dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal overlay of the GPS M-code. The U.S. delegation was led by Ralph Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced Technology, State Department Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Technical Affairs and included Mel Flack, Director, Communications Electronic Division, US Mission to NATO; Richard McKinney, Deputy Director Space Acquisition, US Air Force; Todd Wilson, EST Officer, US Mission to the EU; Marja Verloop EUR/ERA; and representatives from the political and science sections of Embassy Rome. Those joining Aragona included Giovanni Brauzzi, Director, Office of NATO Affairs, MFA; Sandro Bernardin, European Correspondent, MFA; Mario Caporale, Navigation Office, Italian Space Agency; and Umberto Cantielli, Chief, Navigation Identification Office, Defense General Staff, Ministry of Defense.

U.S. Delegation Insists Political Solution is needed

¶3. (C) Braibanti told Aragona that the U.S. believes it is important to hold informal consultations with key EU member States to advance U.S.-EC differences over Galileo towards a decision. He recalled that the President raised M-Code

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Community resources

Follow us on Twitter
Check our Reddit
Twitter this
Digg this page
Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

overlay at the last U.S.- EU Summit. In reviewing the USG position on Galileo, Braibanti explained that the U.S. accepts the EU satellite system as a reality, but the security implications of having the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) overlay the GPS M-Code are unacceptable to both the U.S. and NATO. so far, the U.S. has fought a defensive battle with the European Commission (EC). Braibanti allowed that some progress has been made in convincing European officials that direct overlay of M-Code by the PRS is a bad idea. However, consideration being given by the EC to use BOC 2.2 for Open Service (OS) also involves a partial overlay of M-Code, and damages navigational warfare capabilities. The U.S. will be unable to accept this outcome.

¶4. (C) Braibanti assured Aragona that the USG is committed to finding a solution, but cautioned that without some flexibility and compromise from the EC, progress will be difficult. The U.S. has proposed several technical options for Galileo PRS and OS that our experts believe meet all stated technical and performance requirements for Galileo services. Braibanti underscored that, given the EC's timetable for making design decisions on Galileo, member states may find that the Commission has locked in technical solutions that threaten U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct navigational warfare. To avoid this eventuality, which could put allied lives at risk, member states need to give clear political guidance now to the EC that the Galileo signal structure cannot undermine NAVWAR operations.

But Aragona Puts Faith in Further Technical Talks

¶5. (C) Aragona, signaling his reluctance to take on U.S. concerns vis-a-vis Italy's EU partners, underscored that Galileo negotiations had been entrusted to the EC. He assured the U.S. team that Italy recognized the security issues at stake. "Given our NATO membership it would be crazy for us not to be sensitive to U.S. arguments," Aragona declared. These concerns are shared by the EC, he claimed, but any solution must also safeguard the "integrity and operability of Galileo for it to be a commercially viable and reliable system (Note: Aragona came back repeatedly throughout the course of the consultations to this theme. End Note).

¶6. (C) Aragona pressed claims by EC experts that technical negotiations could lead to a solution to both protect the integrity and operability of Galileo and address US security concerns. Referencing the U.S.-EU Summit, Aragona asserted that, as an "agreement" had been reached to proceed with technical talks, the pace of negotiations to try to reach a "technical solution" to the overlay conundrum should be intensified. Italy and the EC are ready to take into account U.S. and NATO security concerns and believe that technical solutions, which protect them, are available.

¶7. (C) Aragona wanted to know when the U.S. would be ready to discuss the most recent EC proposals, which he understood included a certain "inventiveness" and were "not so stuck in the prejudices of the past." The EC was ready to sit and discuss a mutually agreeable technical solution. As for political input, Aragona said once more that the Commission is well aware that U.S. security concerns must be addressed while taking into account the "integrity" of the Galileo system.

¶8. (C) Braibanti countered that, with regard to EC technical proposals, he was aware of only two to which a formal reply had not been given: using filtering to mitigate the navigation warfare problems posed by overlaying BOC 2.2, and having the U.S. change the frequency for its military GPS signals. In the spirit of cooperation, the U.S. had not rejected these ideas out of hand, but instead asked its technical experts to analyze them carefully. Now that he had seen the results of this analysis, Braibanti could say with some certainty that it is highly unlikely that either of these options will work. Summing up this portion of the discussion, Braibanti framed the state of play for Aragona: We may well reach a situation in September where we will have analyzed the EC's proposals and decided they can not provide a solution which protects U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct NAVWAR. Our concern is that if EC technical experts continue to operate within their current frame of reference, we will arrive at a technical impasse. To avoid this impasse, the EC team needs clear political direction from

member States that they should focus on options that do not negatively impact NAVWAR. (Note: on the margins of the meeting, Braibanti told Aragona that the USG worries the EC negotiators may be positioning themselves to argue to the EU member states that they had made a good faith effort to reach a compromise, but the U.S. would not meet them halfway, so Galileo must move ahead without an agreement to cooperate with the U.S. Aragona discounted this possibility, suggesting that the EC recognizes the need for Galileo-GPS interoperability. (End Note)

NATO a Non-Starter for Classified Talks

¶9. (C) Aragona said the U.S. and EU face a practical problem over where to hold classified discussions and that this problem should be easily resolvable. Italy expects the U.S. to provide a formal answer to the letter EC negotiator Heinz Hillbrecht sent to Braibanti on July 2 (reftel). Aragona maintained that the EC wants further discussions in a classified setting, but that setting can not be NATO. He underscored this point in uncharacteristically blunt language. Aragona said holding the talks at the US Mission to NATO was perfectly acceptable as long as they were U.S.-EC rather than NATO-EC discussions. The issue under discussion is between the U.S. and the EC, Aragona argued, and, moreover, there are several non-EU members of NATO. Braibanti took Aragona's points and assured him that the USG was considering the issue of additional classified discussions, including the modalities for such meetings.

Some Agreement on Procedure, but....

¶10. (C) Braibanti, moving the discussion to how and when to hold the next plenary negotiating session, said the U.S. will work with the Commission on dates for a September meeting to review technical and trade issues He suggested folding the technical discussions into the plenary negotiating session. This could help to ensure transparency and avoid misunderstanding among the political negotiators about the available technical options. Aragona acknowledged that Braibanti's idea had merit and committed to "see what could be done" to make a political recommendation to the EC to proceed along these lines.

Still Talking Past Each Other on substance

¶11. (C) The U.S. delegation raised concerns that France might be driving the EC toward a decision counter to the interests of other EU member states, the U.S. and NATO. Mel Flack said it was difficult not to arrive at the conclusion that France was interested in an M-Code overlay so it could guarantee reliability for precision guided weaponry it might seek to sell to third countries.

¶12. (C) "I have objected to Europeans who say that U.S. actions demonstrate an intent to undermine Galileo," Aragona told the delegation. "Likewise," he said, "I do not believe that there is any maliciousness on the part of a particular country or the EC." Above all, he maintained, Galileo is a commercial undertaking; the system's signal structure was selected according to well established criteria based on the belief that it provided the most robust, reliable service. "I accept your arguments about the need to jam adversaries in a NAVWAR context," he said, but the U.S. "needs to keep in mind that Galileo service must be sold. The problem of selective jamming is not just political; commercial aspects are also involved." When Aragona stated it would not be acceptable to expect the EU to settle for alternate, less robust, signals, Braibanti countered it would be unacceptable for the U.S. and its allies to risk the lives of soldiers in order to allow the EU to have more robust signals for Galileo.

¶13. (C) Aragona acknowledged the point in passing, but moved quickly to close and summarize the conversation. He suggested the next step would be to find a suitable venue to hold classified discussions. He claimed there is flexibility and that the EU is aware of the need for a solution amenable to both sides. Braibanti emphasized that after the September discussions the USG would like to hold another set of bilateral consultations with Italy. Aragona was noncommittal, offering to share thoughts after the September plenary session and then decide on a way forward. In terms of U.S.-Italian engagement, he said he hoped that discussions

would not lead to the "extreme" situation in which the U.S. and EU would be negotiating on exclusively U.S. terms, by which he meant asking the EU to accept moving PRS to another frequency band and to only then negotiate a solution. He noted in closing that Italy had its own technological and industrial interests to defend.

Better Signals, Less Political Clout from Other GOI Ministries

¶14. (C) Braibanti, Flack and EST Couns met with Vice Minister for Research Guido Possa on July 15. Possa is responsible for the Italian Space Agency and through it for Italian participation in ESA. After a brief explanation of the overlay problem and its implications for NAVWAR, Possa immediately understood that a political, and not a technical approach was needed to resolve outstanding problems. Possa suggested that the U.S. should work closely with the Germans, and in Italy with Minister of Defense Martino, whose commitment to NATO and to close cooperation with the U.S. were well known. On the margins of a July 28 representational event, ESTCOUNS and A/POLMINCOUNS raised briefly the overlay problem with MINDEF Martino. Martino said that, from his point of view, Galileo was unnecessary and a huge waste of money -- one GPS system was enough. He was unaware that the USG now supported Galileo in principle. Martino was sensitive to our arguments on the security implications of the overlay, but observed that he was perceived within the GOI as too pro-American to be of much assistance. He suggested that the Embassy's best bet for moving the GOI closer to the USG position would be to approach U/S to the PM Gianni Letta, who, we note, is PM Berlusconi's closest political advisor.

¶15. (C) ESTCOUNS, ECONCOUNS, AND USEU ECONCOUNS met July 18 with Ministry of Transport Diplomatic Advisor Maraini to discuss the Aragona meetings and to seek the perspective of the Ministry on the decisions to be taken concerning Galileo at the December Transport Council. Maraini told us that he believed that Galileo was now principally a political problem, and a problem beyond the competency of the Transport Ministry and Transport Council. In a candid appraisal of Hillbrecht-whom Maraini admitted he did not know well--the Diplomatic Advisor said that the decision to be taken was beyond the competency of Hillbrecht's technical committee. Maraini understood and agreed with our assessment that very little time and scope remained for technical solutions, and that an impasse requiring a major political decision by the EU was likely. Maraini is worried about the outcome. He undertook to prepare a note for Minister Lunardi to be sent to the Prive Minister before the PM's departure for Crawford.

¶16. (C) Embassy Comment: The U.S. delegation made the trip to Rome to follow up on indications from Aragona, made during his recent trip to Washington, that he may have been willing to carry some water for us with the EC and member states. We were left with the impression that Italy's PolDir had instead decided to keep his EU hat firmly in place and stick to the script of the EC briefing book on Galileo. Despite understanding within the functional ministries of the GOI, peeling Aragona, the MFA, and Italy away from the EC position will be difficult, judging from Aragona's assessment that "technical solutions" still offer a way forward. He threw us a quarter of a bone by offering to help give political top cover to the expert level technical discussions. However, Aragona's implicit insistence that Galileo's commercial viability may depend on at least a partial M-Code overlay to "guarantee" service is troubling for its resemblance to French arguments.

¶17. (U) This message has been cleared by OES/SAT Braibanti.
Sembler



WikiLeaks
Currently released so far...
251287 / 251,287

Articles

Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
Global
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand

Browse latest releases

2011/08

Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 78 79 85 86
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I
J K L M N O P Q
R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H
I J K L M N O P
Q R S T U V W X
Y Z

Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
SECRET
SECRET//NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR

Viewing cable 04BRUSSELS1510, CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: APRIL 2 PSC DEBATE AND NEXT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
04BRUSSELS1510	2004-04-07 12:11	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET//NOFORN	Embassy Brussels

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001510

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014
TAGS: PARM PHUM PREL PINR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: APRIL 2 PSC DEBATE AND NEXT
STEPS FOR U.S.

REF: A. USEU TODAY 04/06/04
¶B. BRUSSELS 1464
¶C. STATE 68263
¶D. PRAGUE 390

Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY

¶1. (S/NF) The EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) discussed the EU arms embargo on China during a heated 90 minute exchange on April 2. PSC Ambassadors generally agreed that the issue -- of whether, when and how to lift the embargo -- should be sent back down to working groups for further study before being presented to political groups for a decision. France objected, however, and succeeded in getting agreement to discuss the issue at the April 26 FMs meeting (GAERC) -- but failed in its campaign to secure an early decision. The debate will likely continue well into the Dutch EU Presidency. This cable draws on a detailed readout and a sensitive internal report provided to Poloff by UK and Hungarian contacts (please protect accordingly), as well as background provided in recent days by other interlocutors. It also offers a strategy for continuing US engagement.

PSC Reacts Badly to Latest US Demarche

¶2. (S/NF) PSC Ambassadors reportedly arrived at the April 2 meeting to find copies of ref C demarche sitting on their otherwise empty desks. The demarche was received badly because it gave the impression that "big brother was watching," and because it appeared timed as a heavyhanded and hubristic attempt to influence the PSC, according to our UK contact. Some reps, led by Greek Ambassador Paraskevoupoulos, objected to the Council Secretariat's distribution of the demarche under Council Secretariat cover and with a Secretariat identifying number. He argued that the document had no business being circulated by the Secretariat, and insisted that it be stricken from EU

SIPDIS
records. Ambassadors also reacted against what they perceived as the threatening tone of our demarche.

¶3. (S/NF) The Financial Times' front page article on April 2 about the US demarche campaign also enflamed the Ambassadors because it appeared directly aimed at Friday's PSC discussion. Irish Ambassador Kelleher reportedly opened the meeting by waving the article in the air and imploring his colleagues to protect the confidentiality of internal EU deliberations. Poloff pointed out that the timing of the

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Community resources

Follow us on Twitter
Check our Reddit
Twitter this
Digg this page
Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

latest US demarche was a coincidence, as we were previously unaware that the PSC was scheduled to discuss the issue on that day. (COMMENT: Our demarche was received badly not so much because of its substance, but because of the way it was presented. Our UK contact faulted the Irish and the Council Secretariat for the way the demarche was handled in the PSC,

SIPDIS
and also the awkward timing that made it seem, along with the FT article, tailor-made to influence the April 2 discussion. END COMMENT).

National Positions: France versus Denmark

¶4. (S/NF) According to our UK contact, France staked out a "zero flexibility" position on lifting the embargo, and is opposed to any talk of applying conditionality (i.e. by insisting on further human rights progress by China and/or strengthening the Code of Conduct prior to lifting the embargo). The Danes are reportedly still leading the opposition, and have circulated to EU partners a list of ten human rights conditions that they believe China should meet before the embargo is lifted (we have not yet obtained a copy of this list). Other EU Member States are lining up somewhere in between, although "all agree in principle" that the embargo should be lifted if certain conditions are met. The debate from now on will focus on defining conditions and timing.

¶5. (S/NF) Following is a summary of national interventions made at the April 2 PSC:

-- France: The embargo is anachronistic and must go; willing to discuss timing but not conditionality because China would not accept human rights conditionality; likewise would be contradictory to enhance the Code of Conduct specifically for China while also lifting the embargo; opposed also to making Code of Conduct legally binding; wants issue to remain political; opposed to sending it down to working groups.

-- Denmark: Any decision to lift the embargo must be linked to specific Chinese steps on human rights; EU also needs to review Code of Conduct to ensure that lifting the embargo does not result in increased arms sales to China.

-- Germany: EU must consider regional impact of lifting the embargo; now is not a good time to lift embargo (COMMENT: The Germans appear to have moved closer to the Danes in recent weeks, and are now the largest EU member state with serious reservations about lifting the embargo. One report of the discussion suggests that "the tough German position, coupled with the strength of US views, might be tempering French enthusiasm." END COMMENT).

-- UK: Should be further study by working groups to identify implications for human rights and regional stability, and to examine options for strengthening Code of Conduct (COMMENT: Our Hungarian contact reports that the UK is fundamentally closer to the French end of the spectrum than the Danish. The UK, like France, does not favor making the Code of Conduct legally binding. END COMMENT).

-- Greece: Should explore gestures China could make on human rights without explicitly linking them to lifting the embargo; should not link regional stability to lifting embargo; "provocatively" proposed that the Code of Conduct be made legally binding. (COMMENT: Our contacts report that the Greek position on lifting the embargo is closer to France than any other Member State. END COMMENT).

-- Ireland: Supports sending the issue back to working groups (in part to keep the EU from making any decision during its Presidency).

-- Netherlands: Central consideration should be possible release of political prisoners from the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown.

-- Czech Republic: Supports French position that issue should remain political; silent on other points (COMMENT: Our UK contact said that the Czech position is generally understood to be informed by that country's interest in selling radar

equipment to China, as described ref D. END COMMENT).

-- Sweden: Working groups should further study issues of human rights, regional stability, and enhancing the Code of Conduct.

-- Austria: Should explore gestures on human rights that China could make but avoid linkage to lifting the embargo; should conduct a general (i.e. non China-specific) review of Code of Conduct.

-- Italy: Intervened with same points as Austria.

-- Belgium: More discussion needed of implications, including on human rights, of any decision to lift embargo.

-- Commission: Took no position on lifting embargo but said EU should remain focused on human rights.

Other member states did not intervene in the PSC discussion.

Timeline: Back to the Working Groups?

¶6. (S/NF) The PSC will meet again on this issue on April 7, when it is expected to approve an "issues paper" which will then be sent through COREPER to FMs for discussion at the April 26 GAERC. According to our UK and Hungarian contacts, the paper is intended as a tour d'horizon for the GAERC discussion. It will not contain recommendations, and FMs are not expected to take a decision. Instead, they will likely send the paper back down to the PSC for re-examination. Most PSC Ambassadors, having satisfied the French desire for a ministerial discussion in April, will then press France to accept the majority preference for sending the issue back to the working groups. The working groups would need two to three months, minimum, to complete their assessments and submit their papers to the PSC (EU working groups are comprised of capital-based experts who rarely meet more than once per month). The relevant working groups are COHUM (human rights), COASI (Asia Directors), and COARM (conventional arms exports).

¶7. (S/NF) What all this means is that the debate will likely continue well into the Dutch Presidency. Already, Member States are beginning to look toward the December EU-China Summit as a possible timeframe for any decision to lift the embargo. We have heard they are also looking at the US electoral calendar and quietly wondering whether it would be worth holding off their decision until November or December in the hopes of sneaking it past the US radar. They have not and will not discuss such issues openly, even amongst each other in the PSC, but our UK contact confirms that quiet conversations and suggestive comments are going on in the wings.

Next Steps for the US

¶8. (S/NF) Our efforts have managed to slow down the momentum in favor of removing the arms embargo, but have not killed this idea outright. In addition to the ongoing diplomatic dialogue on this issue, we recommend the following steps to help us keep the pressure on European governments:

-- We should coordinate closely with Japan, and perhaps also the ROK. According to numerous EU interlocutors, the Japanese have become increasingly active on this issue, but their efforts appear so far uncoordinated with our own. While this may have served our interests in the sense that it gave the Europeans the impression that Japan's concerns were genuine and not dictated by Washington, it is now time to begin coordinating our efforts, so that Europeans recognize that other key players in the region share our regional stability concerns.

-- We should engage the European Parliament, and particularly members of its Human Rights Committee. The EP is already on record opposing an end to the embargo. By calling attention to EU deliberations and ongoing Chinese human rights abuses, the EP could increase the political heat on member state governments against any decision to lift the embargo.

-- We should consider increasing our public statements and press briefings for European audiences, on the assumption that more scrutiny by European publics would help our views on this issue, especially as regards human rights.

-- We should increase our engagement with institutional and member state representatives to the COHUM, COASI and COARM working groups. In this way we could ensure that our views on human rights, regional stability and the Code of Conduct are fully understood by those experts who will be supplying recommendations to the political groups for discussion.

-- Additionally, as suggested ref B, we recommend the USG begin considering options for how the EU might strengthen controls on arms exports to China in a post-embargo scenario. The worst case for us would be for the EU to lift its embargo without having in place some sort of new mechanism for controlling the transfer of arms and sensitive technologies to China.

Schnabel



WikiLeaks
Currently released so far...
251287 / 251,287

Articles

Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
Global
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand

Browse latest releases

2011/08

Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 78 79 85 86
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I
J K L M N O P Q
R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H
I J K L M N O P
Q R S T U V W X
Y Z

Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
SECRET
SECRET//NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR

Viewing cable 05BRUSSELS1231, IS THE EU RETREATING ON THE CHINA ARMS EMBARGO?

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
05BRUSSELS1231	2005-03-24 11:27	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Brussels

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001231

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR, EAP/CM, PM, T, S/P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC CH TW EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: IS THE EU RETREATING ON THE CHINA ARMS EMBARGO?

REF: A. USEU TODAY 3/23/05
¶B. USEU TODAY 3/22/05
¶C. USEU TODAY 3/21/05
¶D. USEU TODAY 3/18/05
¶E. LUXEMBOURG 253
¶F. STATE 49288
¶G. EMBASSY LONDON DAILY REPORT 3/23/05
¶H. RECINOS E-MAIL 3/23/05
¶I. DEAN E-MAIL 3/23/05
¶J. ROSENBERRY E-MAIL 3/22/05

Classified By: USEU Charge Michael McKinley for reasons 1.5 b/d

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU drive to lift its arms embargo on China appears to be faltering as a result of the March 14 passage of the anti-secession law, increased U.S. pressure, and China's unwillingness to deliver concessions on human rights. Our EU contacts generally confirm press reports that EU governments might be persuaded by these factors -- plus increasing opposition from domestic constituencies -- to postpone their decision beyond the current June deadline. The EU is particularly keen on finding some accommodation with the U.S. before moving forward, and High Rep. Solana plans to travel to Washington in April with a "mandate" to "come to terms with the Americans." While these are positive signs in the wake of the anti-secession law and suggest the EU is finally beginning to understand the depth of our concerns, it is far too early to declare victory. The EU machinery is still geared up for a June lift; reversing that momentum will not be easy. More important, Presidents Chirac and Schroeder appear as committed as ever to lifting, and Solana, whose opinion is especially valued by smaller Member States, continues to argue that the time has come for lifting the embargo. The UK, meanwhile, is sending ambiguous signals and appears satisfied to hide behind the EU flag. END SUMMARY.

New Reasons for Hope ...

¶2. (C) Stories in major U.S. and European news outlets this week report that the EU's determination to lift its arms embargo on China is wavering in the face of increased U.S. pressure. China's adoption of an "anti-secession" law designed to intimidate Taiwan is cited as another key reason for the EU retreat. Our contacts in Brussels largely confirm these reports and acknowledge that a number of EU governments are having second thoughts about whether or when to lift the embargo. The Irish PSC Ambassador told us March 19 that some delegations have begun to think twice about lifting the arms embargo by the end of the Luxembourg EU Presidency in June (ref. C). Council Deputy DG Peter Feith told a HIRC Staffdel March 22 that he thought the decision "might well" be delayed (ref. A). According to a Council policy advisor working on the embargo, the whole issue is "in flux" and EU governments are "holding their cards close to their chests" for fear of

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Community resources

Follow us on Twitter
Check our Reddit
Twitter this
Digg this page
Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

being seen as the problem by China, the U.S., or their own parliaments (ref. B). The bottom line, according to the advisor, is that the EU will find it difficult to proceed without: 1) some accommodation with the U.S., 2) assurances that they can weather the likely reactions of their publics and parliaments, and 3) clear concessions from China on human rights. Until then, "you have us over a barrel," the advisor said.

¶3. (C) The EU has consistently argued that the U.S. simply did not understand either their intent with lifting the embargo or the effectiveness of the regime they intended to adopt in its place (the strengthened Code of Conduct on arms exports and the "Toolbox" of additional controls). However, after Annalisa Giannella's widely-publicized visit to Washington this month (ref. F), the EU has begun to realize that our opposition cannot be explained away with vague assurances about intent or yet more technical briefings about the Code and Toolbox. Recent remarks by President Bush and Secretary Rice, plus tough warnings from senior Congressional

SIPDIS
leaders, have driven home the message that there will be a serious price to pay for transatlantic relations and defense trade if the EU proceeds with lifting the embargo. For the first time, EU governments appear to be as concerned about the U.S. reaction to a decision to lift the embargo as they are of the Chinese reaction if they do not.

¶4. (C) There are also signs that increased public and parliamentary opposition is having an impact on the calculations of EU Member States. The European Parliament has passed two near-unanimous resolutions since November demanding that the EU not lift the embargo, and leading MEPs from the far left to the far right are increasingly trying to raise public awareness. By our count, all major European editorial boards (including international papers like the Financial Times, Wall Street Journal Europe, International Herald Tribune, and Economist) have come out in opposition to the EU move, and several European think tanks have taken up the issue and given it greater prominence in public debate (the next seminar in Brussels will be on April 6 at the Transatlantic Institute). Prominent NGOs, led by Amnesty International, have held press conferences and organized public commentary, including by prominent Chinese dissidents, and we have even seen press coverage of student protests against lifting the embargo.

¶5. (C) Public efforts such as these appear to have altered the political atmosphere surrounding the embargo and have left some European governments nervous about domestic fallout if they are seen to be overly supportive of lifting the embargo. A British contact told us that the Dutch seem to want to avoid a decision on the embargo at least for the next few months in order not to jeopardize their national referendum on the EU Constitution, scheduled for June.

¶6. (C) Nor has China helped the EU lift the embargo. While China has always insisted there should be no linkage between human rights and the decision to lift the embargo, EU leaders have made it very clear that they expected at least token progress on human rights before they could justify taking a decision. The EU even spelled it out for Beijing by suggesting that ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), release of Tiananmen prisoners, or reform of the Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) system would help facilitate an EU decision.

¶7. (C) So far, China has done virtually nothing to give the EU the fig leaf it needs. Instead, China irritated the EU by passing the anti-secession law and then sending FM Li to Europe to demand quicker progress on lifting the embargo. The anti-secession law, in particular, has given some Europeans pause, leading them to realize that US concerns about regional stability have greater validity than they previously thought. As a result, according to WMD Rep. Giannella's Deputy, the Europeans now need even more progress on human rights from China in order to counter the perception that they are giving Beijing an undeserved reward. According to the Council advisor, High Rep. Solana pressed this point in his March 17 meeting with FM Li, saying that progress on just one of the three human rights issues highlighted by the EU (ICCPR, Tiananmen prisoners, RTL) would no longer be enough; China now needed to make progress on all three (ref.

D).

... But not out of the Woods Yet

¶8. (C) The December European Council declaration that the EU was working toward lifting the arms embargo by the end of the Luxembourg EU Presidency in June remains the only current, "official" EU position. While the declaration was drafted vaguely enough to allow some wiggle room (EU leaders "invited the next Presidency to finalize the well-advanced work in order to allow for a decision"), the EU has seen it as a deadline and the Chinese as a promise. Some EU officials believe backing down risks Chinese diplomatic and perhaps commercial consequences, and also see it as a blow to the EU's credibility as a global player capable of making autonomous decisions on important international issues. President Chirac, Chancellor Schroeder, and High Rep. Solana all remarked to the press March 23 (on the margins of a European Council meeting) that the EU should maintain its political will to lift the embargo as soon as possible. We should expect intense lobbying from these and other European leaders, and from the Chinese, over the coming weeks.

¶9. (C) Nor are we comfortable with where the UK is on lifting the arms embargo. While some press reports are characterizing the UK as unlikey to support a lift during its EU presidency in the second half of the year (we have heard reports that the local UK PSC ambassador has made similar statements), we see other indications that give us pause. The UK is sending ambiguous signals that suggest a preference for hiding behind the EU flag. Asked on March 22 about the UK's position on lifting the embargo, PM Blair's Official Spokesman responded that it was an EU-led issue and the UK wanted EU consensus. However, he added that the UK still believed that a strengthened Code of Conduct could meet U.S. concerns (ref. G). While FM Straw acknowledged to the press March 20 that the anti-secession law had created a "difficult political environment" around the embargo, Deputy PM John Prescott then told the press March 23 that he thought "the good sense in Europe will be that they will come to some agreement on this matter and lift the embargo." Comments such as these indicate that we should not count on the UK to help us with this issue, even if it lands in their Presidency. (We defer to Embassy London for a more authoritative assessment.)

¶10. (C) Moreover, the EU's bureaucratic machinery has been gearing up for a spring lift. Work on the Code of Conduct and Toolbox has been all but completed by national experts in the COARM group. These measures could be adopted as soon as the Luxembourg Presidency decides to put them on the agenda of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The calendar also offers plenty of opportunities for France, Germany and others to push for continued progress. There will be four more meetings of EU Foreign Ministers before the end of June, including an informal "Gymnich" gathering on April 15 (the GAERCs will be April 25, May 23 and June 13). Heads of Government will meet June 16-17, and will almost certainly discuss China regardless of their expectations at that point on the embargo. The EU will also have a troika ministerial with China on May 8 to celebrate 30 years of official relations. At any of these meetings the dynamic could turn very quickly and a June decision could again look imminent. Our first test will be on April 5 when the PSC convenes to discuss the arms embargo and to examine options for further engagement with the U.S.

Next Steps with the U.S.

¶11. (C) High Rep. Solana plans to visit the Washington in April to follow-up on the Giannella visit. According to Council Deputy DG Feith, Solana will be traveling with a &mandate" from Member States to "come to terms with the Americans" (ref. A). There is a desire within the EU, Feith added, to reach agreement with the U.S. on weapons and technology that should not be transferred to China. According to the Council advisor, the EU still hopes to overcome at least our biggest concerns through some combination of strategic talks on China and consultations about weapons and technology. They recognize that we will

not support lifting the embargo no matter what they do, but they hope to at least reduce the risk of serious damage to transatlantic relations and defense trade. "You've got us over a barrel on this, and we can't really move forward until we see what happens with the strategic dialogue and weapons consultations," he said.

Comment

¶12. (C) The technical discussions on April 5 will be important, but far more critical will be the Solana visit later in the month. In our view, Solana is part of the problem. He jumped on board the pro-lift train early, and his views have been important in influencing smaller member states. He does not take our regional stability concerns seriously, nor give prominence to China's persisting human rights problems. He was quoted yesterday saying it was "unfair to maintain sanctions on China so many years after the reason" it was imposed. We should use Solana's visit to "re-educate" him on our concerns, challenge him on many of his assumptions, and then to discuss in detail the nature of a strategic dialogue that will allow us to look at China in the broader regional and global perspective. If we can lock the EU into a process, Mission believes they will be more likely to delay any final decisions that run counter to our interests. We can then use the time gained to keep ratcheting up the pressure, especially by exploiting the gap that currently exists between European leaders and their publics on this issue.

McKinley
.