

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses international state behaviour by countries that share a historic legacy, and examines the delicate relations between West Germany, Austria and Israel in the wake of the Second World War as a case study. In it I propose a model – ‘diplomacy of memory’ - for this currently untheorized form of diplomatic conduct in order to explain how countries use official memories of their past on the international stage. Linking the interdisciplinary concept of collective memory with International Relations, my study characterizes the practice of ‘diplomacy with memory’ as a distinct policy undertaking that shapes and broadcasts historical narratives internationally for strategic foreign policy objectives.

To empirically test the diplomacy of memory model, this thesis investigates the two cases of West German-Israeli and Austrian-Israeli relations in the aftermath of World War II. Within these selected pairs, four core bilateral debates are analysed: first, reparation payments to Israel in 1951/52; second, the trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1960/61; third, the Six-Day War in 1967 and fourth, the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis of 1973. While the first two cases explore how the memory of the Nazi past is leveraged as part of later diplomatic strategies, the latter two, which concern West Germany’s and Austria’s reaction to the Middle East conflict, reveal a more subtle connection between national memories and foreign policy choices around key international conflicts.

This study engages in historical inquiry, based on archival documents and other primary sources in all three countries, to demonstrate how a country’s collective memory is invented and deployed on the international stage. Combining the theoretical aim of specifying the link between national narratives and diplomacy with the qualitative analysis of two historic cases, this thesis rests at the intersection of International Relations and History.

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INTRODUCTORY & THEORETICAL CHAPTER

1. Setting the stage

15 May 1955, 12:00am: The Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Figl, together with his colleagues from the four Allied Powers, appears on the balcony of Vienna's Belvedere. Figl holds the Austrian State Treaty, which they have just signed, in his hands like a trophy. Smiling proudly, he presents his proof that "Austria is free" to the gathered crowds, who begin to cheer loudly. The rejoicing is trumped only by the simultaneous ringing of all church bells of the city of Vienna. A wave of enthusiasm electrifies the masses and the Allied ministers alike. The Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov cannot resist blowing kisses to the happy crowds. People start to waltz.¹

7 December 1970, 10:35am: On a grey December morning, the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt is on his way to sign the treaty of Warsaw with the People's Republic of Poland. Before the signing ceremony begins, he asks to lay a wreath at the monument dedicated to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, which took place during the Nazi era. At the memorial, Brandt suddenly and spontaneously sinks to his knees. With his head bowed low, he freezes in this position for half a minute. The group of officials and journalists who accompanied him stay in the background. Awe-struck, no one dares speak a word. Lost in the thought of millions of murdered people, Brandt stays kneeling in silence.²

These two completely unrelated official acts have in common only that they both took place on a post-World War II European diplomatic stage. Being performed by representatives of peoples who were "defeated" rather than "liberated" in 1945, they could not be more different. One depicts a group of happy men in front of cheering crowds looking forward to a promising future, while the other one shows a man alone, distanced from suspicious bystanders, looking back to a shameful past. One state representative embodies a picture of innocence and liberation from undeserved victimhood, whereas the other portrays himself and his country as a guilty, worried and remorseful perpetrator. As immediately becomes apparent from these contrasts, the ways states showcased their Nazi legacy to the international environment differed fundamentally. The two scenarios thus open an interesting question: how do states and their representatives choose to employ history on the

¹ Steininger 2005, 142-144.

ORF.at, „Als Figl Österreich freisprach“ by Lukas Zimmer, 14 May 2015. Online at: <http://orf.at/stories/2278432/2278433/>.

² Brandt 1976, 398-399.

diplomatic stage, and for what purposes? And, on a more general level, what “new” kind of international state behaviour does this represent?

For such an enquiry, we must theoretically clarify three essential elements: How do states act on the diplomatic stage in general, and does their behaviour differ when they possess a shared legacy in post-conflict contexts? How can such a legacy be defined, and how then does it translate into state behaviour on the international stage? And finally, why do states decide to use a specific version of their history as a “diplomatic tool” instead of resorting to more “traditional” diplomatic strategies?

The present study attempts to answer these questions based on two empirical cases: West German and Austrian diplomatic relations with Israel in the timeframe of the first four decades following the end of World War II. The reason for selecting these cases lies in their shared past. Following the defeat of Hitler’s Germany in 1945, both West Germany and Austria were linked to the newly proclaimed Jewish state via the horrific legacy of the Holocaust. Previously, both countries formed the imperial centre of the Third *Reich*; their populations served in the German *Wehrmacht* as well as in high-ranking positions of the Nazi regime. Thus, their post-war societies consisted of perpetrators, victims and many bystanders.³ However, despite having the same legacy, both countries projected very different images of their Nazi past to the international stage. A comparison between these

³ Hillberg (1993) originally made this claim for Germany, however, the historic numbers relative to country size also render it true for Austria. Around 700 000 Austrians were members of the NSDAP, 90 000 of them had already been illegal members of the party before 1938. Once the war began, more than one million Austrians served in the *Wehrmacht* (1 126 000 Austrians according to Jagschitz 2000, 80) and 60 000 Austrians belonged to the *Waffen SS*. As a result, around 250 000 Austrians died in combat or became prisoners of war (See: Rathkolb 2010, 249; Manoschek/Safrian 2000, 125 and Hanisch 1994, 380). At the same time, Austrians have also had leading positions in the Nazi extermination machinery, most prominently including Kaltenbrunner, Globocnik, Murer, Stangl, Brunner, Lerch and Burger. Not least, Adolf Hitler himself was also Austrian, born in the city of Braunau am Inn (Reiter 2001, 21-22 and Hilberg 1985).

two countries and their opposing official images therefore lends itself well to the endeavour of understanding how states use diverse interpretations of history for diplomatic purposes.

Combining the theoretical quest of specifying the nexus between historic legacies and diplomacy with the empirical analysis of two historic cases, this study lies at the intersection of International Relations and History. As such, it broadly employs historical inquiry into the selected examples for the purpose of positing a connection between a country's legacy, i.e. its collective memory, and its behavior on the international stage.

This thesis therefore comprises two elements: It first develops a theoretical model that describes diplomatic behavior with memory as a separate form of state behavior observable between countries that share a common past. In the second part of this study, the assumptions of the model are then tested on the concrete cases of West German-Israeli and Austrian-Israeli relations in the aftermath of World War II.

2. The theoretical approach of this study

In order to develop the theoretical approach of this study, it is first necessary to define the interdisciplinary concept of collective memory and place it within existing IR research. Second, I then address gaps in the scholarly literature by designing my own theoretical model, which establishes an empirically traceable connection between collective memory and diplomacy.

2.1. Collective memory within IR research

In order to study why and how states make diplomatic use of different interpretations of their past, it is first of all necessary to define the concept of a shared legacy in International

Relations. Generally speaking, a shared legacy refers to what a country officially “remembers” about its own past. A country’s legacy is therefore equal to its “memory”. Unlike individuals, states do not hold memories physiologically, but instead create memories as social constructions.⁴ The interdisciplinary term used for this socially created memory on the collective level is “collective memory”.⁵ Because of its social construction, collective memory refers to a widely shared knowledge from the past rather than knowledge about the past.⁶ Collective memory is therefore not concerned with the past itself but only with the past as it is remembered and interpreted.⁷ As such, collective memory is situated in the present and can be studied by identifying its permanently shifting social frames.⁸ These characteristics render collective memory of interest to political science, linking it to concepts such as identity, norms and culture.⁹ In fact, collective memory as a constitutive feature of collective identity allots memory a prominent place in several subfields of political science such as the study of nationalism, ethnic identity, the politics of recognition and education.¹⁰ In political science, an ever-growing body of scholarly work is interested in the nexus between collective memory and contemporary power struggles. At the core of this research agenda is the understanding that memory is politically contested. Collective memory is therefore regarded as state-produced memory over which different groups struggle for strategic, political gain. Through such a lens, collective memory is put at the service of

⁴ Assmann A. 2001, 34-45.

⁵ Collective memory is subject to a vast interdisciplinary literature spanning the fields of sociology, history, psychology and anthropology, as well as political science (Olick/Vinitzky-Seroussi/Levy (Eds.) 2011, 41-47).

⁶ Bell (Ed.) 2010, 2.

⁷ Assmann J. 2000, 277-279.

⁸ This notion goes back to French Sociologist Maurice Halbwachs and his landmark work “*Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*” (Halbwachs 1925), which after Halbwachs’ death was re-published under the title “*La mémoire collective*” (Halbwachs 1950).

⁹ The sociological framework that Halbwachs (1950) suggested to studying collective memory has ever since been adopted by the scholarship on collective memory within political science: Studying memory which is shaped as much in the present than in the past, and which is variable rather than constant, provided the core assumptions for any later study on the “politics of memory”. This understanding of collective memory thus also underlies the *diplomacy of memory* model developed here.

¹⁰ Müller (Ed.) 2002, 2.

See, for instance, Anderson’s (1983) most famous work on nations as “imagined communities”.

power, and researchers approach it via an “instrumentalist view”: their focus is what people *do* with memory, rather than more sociological questions of what memory itself is and does.¹¹

While certainly providing important insights into how collective memory affects the relationship of power within society, such a research focus, however, only takes domestic politics into account. Political science scholarship widely acknowledges that collective memory emerges within a given society as a result of a complex interplay of political interests. While previous research views these interests as reflecting national and international political goals, collective memory as a concept has not yet been consistently introduced into International Relations. Existing work rather reflects a collection of different research foci, concepts, empirical cases and approaches.¹² Diverse authors furthermore use collective memory to refer to a wide range of official commemorations and collective representations of the past, often using related terms like legacy, myth, tradition, narrative, in addition to viewing collective memory indirectly as features of shared identity, culture, ideology and emotion.¹³ Others have explored the important relationship between politics and trauma as a distinctive form of memory.¹⁴ In Alon Confino’s critical words, “of course, everything is a memory case, memory is everywhere”.¹⁵ However, the concrete integration of the concept into International Relations has so far been a rather elusive project, with the nexus between memory and politics remaining unclear in most empirical studies.¹⁶ Moreover, as Berger pointed out, IR research in general exhibits a tendency to wildly

¹¹ Olick/Vinitzky-Seroussi/Levy 2011, 249-251.

Landmark works on the politics of memory, include: Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983, Bodnar 1992 and Schudson 1993.

¹² See, for instance: Müller (Ed.) 2002, 28. Bell (Ed.) 2010, 1-3. Langenbacher and Shain (Eds.) 2010.

¹³ Olick 1999, 336.

¹⁴ Edkins 2003. Fierke 2010, 116-134.

¹⁵ Confino 1997, 1387.

¹⁶ Müller (Ed.) 2002, 2. Bell (Ed.) 2010, 29.

underestimate the extent to which memory actually influences policy-making processes in the first place.¹⁷

The small existing body of scholarly work within International Relations that is interested in the concept of collective memory (or, as it is more often called: historic legacies), can be distinguished into two main strains.

The first takes a normative approach towards collective memory and is concerned with ethical issues intrinsically linked to the study of memory. Scholars hereby concentrate on questions of justice, reconciliation, the obligation to take responsibility for past actions and the duty to remember the dead.¹⁸ Elazar Barkan's work, for instance, assesses international state behaviour such as restitution cases and official apologies against a moral yardstick, viewing their global increase as a sign of a newly emerging morality within the international community of states.¹⁹

The second body of scholarly work is aimed at explaining state behaviour with memory/past legacies by taking a more positivist approach. Here, scholars have mainly focussed on analysing foreign policy decisions. Thomas Berger and Peter Katzenstein, for instance, concentrate on the interpretative framework of actors and how cultural narratives shape their policies.²⁰ Yuen Foong Khong theorizes how historical analogies are employed in foreign policy decision-making,²¹ and Ernest May examines how history is used and misused in American foreign policy.²² Thomas Banchoff goes beyond the decision-making process and discusses broader foreign policy implications resulting from historical memory.²³ Even though these works offer useful ways for assessing collective memory's influence on foreign

¹⁷ Berger 1998.

¹⁸ See, for instance: Margalit 2002. Elster 2004. Olick 2003.

¹⁹ Barkan 2001.

²⁰ Berger 1998 and 2002. Katzenstein 1996.

²¹ Khong 1992.

²² May 1975.

²³ Banchoff 1996 and 1999.

policies, their research is limited to the state enacting that policy. The state that is the object of these policies, however, is not taken into account.

Only Yinan He and Jennifer Lind define the details of how a country's legacy might translate into bilateral relations more broadly. While He focuses on the effect of a so-called "memory gap" in the reconciliation process between two countries, Lind develops a theory of "apologetic remembrance" that posits a connection between memory and threat perception.²⁴ Because these works combine traditional IR concepts of security-based fear and mistrust with constructivist theories, it is worth considering whether their theories hold when applied to the cases of this study. Unlike He's and Lind's case studies on Japan's post-war relations with China and South Korea as well as Germany's relations with its neighbours, Poland and France, West Germany and Austria are neither powerful (in the post-war period) nor in direct geographical proximity to Israel. Consequently, independent of their respective interpretation of history, they do not appear threatening to Israel. It is this simple fact that renders Lind's and He's frameworks less applicable to the cases selected for this study. Moreover, both authors concentrate merely on the perceptions and responses of former victims to former perpetrator states. No IR study has examined how former perpetrator states themselves employ memory when confronting their former victims on the international stage.

In order to fill this apparent gap, I build a theoretical model that sketches the behaviour of former perpetrator states vis-à-vis a former victim. Combining the interdisciplinary concept of collective memory with IR theories, the model seeks to clarify the relationship between collective memory and the diplomatic behaviour of states. It addresses several key questions: what influence does collective memory have on foreign policy behaviour? How does this influence manifest itself? How can it be measured? For what purposes is the past constructed

²⁴ He 2009. Lind 2008.

and reconstructed on the international stage? Are international constructions of the past congruent with domestic ones, and how do they interact? Is the past indeed used for foreign policy purposes, or is it a rather marginal tool when more conventional tools are unavailable?

2.2. The *Diplomacy of Memory* model

In this section, I outline the theoretical contours of international state behaviour for countries that share a historic legacy. The model designed to describe this currently untheorized form of state behaviour is henceforth called the *diplomacy of memory* approach. Its framework explains how perpetrator countries act on the diplomatic stage with the collective memory of their often shameful past. In order to do so, I first specify the independent variable of the *diplomacy of memory* framework: what kind of collective memory is forged into a diplomatic tool? In a second step, I clarify what we want to explain with collective memory, i.e. a country's foreign policy behaviour which is henceforth termed "diplomacy *with* memory". Given its aim of examining foreign policy in general, the approach of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) hereby offers guidance on how to research this specific form of foreign policy behaviour.

Conceptualizing collective memory as a diplomatic tool

Landmark works in the politics of memory literature all agree that within any country, different memories of diverse groups not only coexist but also mutually interact and battle with one another at any given point in time.²⁵ For the sake of integrating such a complex and dynamic domestic mosaic of collective memories into the *diplomacy of memory* framework, we therefore must simplify a much richer reality into a workable definition. This requires

²⁵ See, for instance, Hobsbawm and Ranger's (1983) "The Invention of Tradition", Bodnar's (1992) "Remaking America" or Schudson's (1993) "Watergate in American memory".

researchers to first ask: which of the many prevailing domestic collective memories can be forged into a diplomatic tool ready to be employed on the international stage?

In general, the potential number of collective memories to explore within the *diplomacy of memory* framework is unlimited. Empirically, researchers can therefore investigate the influence of any group's memory on foreign policy behaviour. For instance, Aleida Assmann's cultural memory²⁶, John Bodnar's vernacular memory²⁷ and Michel Foucault's counter-memory²⁸ all harbour the potential to impact foreign policy. While theoretically important, these fine distinctions between forms of collective memory are however empirically quite elusive and as such almost impossible to measure accurately with social-scientific methods.

Thus, while acknowledging that many different collective memories co-exist and interact within the public sphere of any given society,²⁹ I confine my research focus to the largest social group and the memory it holds; namely, a country's public, i.e. the public memory which reflects the prevailing narrative of a given population. I further consider the official memory which is embodied in the national narrative of a state.³⁰ The former is approximated

²⁶ The term "cultural memory" goes back to Aby Warburg (1999) and culminated in the writings of Jan and Aleida Assmann (Assmann J. 2007; Assmann A. 1999 and 2011). It refers to collective memory of historic events which a collective has neither directly experienced nor is particularly knowledgeable about, however, that past nevertheless still keeps exerting an influence on their identity.

²⁷ Vernacular memory refers to ethnic, local or regional communities' recollections of the past, representing an array of specialized group interests (Bodnar 1992, 13-15).

²⁸ "Counter-memories", sometimes also referred to by Foucault as "popular memory", describe alternative forms of memories that resist or come between official, dominant versions of the past (Foucault 2011, 252-253).

²⁹ See, for instance: Confino 1997, 1399.

³⁰ My distinction between public and official memory is a trimmed version of Bodnar's (1992, 13-15) distinction between "official memory" and what he calls „vernacular memory": While the first originates in the concerns of authorities who advance their concerns by promoting an official version of the past by way of, for instance, state-sponsored commemorations of national events; the later refers to ethnic, local or regional communities' recollections of the past. Public memory then, according to Bodnar, emerges from the intersection of official and vernacular memory. As such, what I call official memory is the same as Bodnar's official memory, however, what I call public memory is only referring to the dominant main version of a certain public's memory, as such a merged and admittedly artificial as well as over-simplified version of Bodnar's different vernacular memories and their interaction with the official memory.

in this study via media outlets and the public discourse journalists both mirror, produce and reflect; the latter is assumed to be contained in official texts and speeches.

Public and official memory can be assumed to also exert the strongest influence of any form of collective memory on foreign policies. Foreign policy officials in this study are supposed to embody the national narrative of a country, or in other words, they can be described to be the makers and bearers of official memory on the international stage. In contrast, the population they represent abroad is the holder of what was defined above as public memory. How public and official memory interact with one another in the domestic sphere before the official memory is carried to the international stage is best described by the existing politics of memory literature. In the domestic sphere, the two collective memories can conflict, clash or change.³¹ Once sparked, this battle between them, however, plays out rather unevenly.³² The past is transmitted through lines of authority, and those in power will not only actively seek alignment between the two narratives, but will also have the necessary resources to promote their version of the past over others. In order to win the domestic fight over collective memory, governments thus enshrine a specific national version of history in national symbols, images, rituals and monuments. The practical domestic functions of such efforts have been widely noted by the politics of memory literature:³³ National narratives supply a nation with a common myth of origin which endows a collective with emotional and normative underpinning.³⁴ Once created and enshrined, a specific national version of history is then passed on to future generations uniting them behind a positive self-image

³¹ Michel Foucault famously coined the idea of competition between official and what he calls “counter-memories”, that is alternative forms of memories that resist or come between official, dominant versions of the past (Foucault 2011, 252-253). With their concept on the “invention of tradition”, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983) develop a similar thought on the tension between official and public memory.

³² Bodnar 1992, 17-20 and 245-247.

³³ Müller (Ed.) 2002, 2. Anderson 1983.

³⁴ Berger 2002, 80.

while ultimately fostering nothing less than domestic peace and stability. As such, national narratives provide the necessary link between “history (as a fact), and national ideology (as a myth)”³⁵ for the final purpose of creating a common national identity.³⁶ This identity in turn forms a country’s national interest which on the international stage becomes represented and defended by its foreign policy officials. It is by way of this link that a country’s national narrative transcends state boundaries and becomes the subject of international rather than mere domestic political struggles about memory.

For the purpose of building a strong theoretical framework on the influence of collective memory on foreign policy behaviour, this model thus suggests concentrating on the version of collective memory that is reflected in a country’s national narrative, which then is represented and carried by foreign policy officials into the international sphere. While their work takes place exclusively on the elite-level, and is mostly not geared towards the public, the official version of memory used by foreign policy-makers is communicated, co-produced and at times challenged by the press. Despite its focus on the official level, the *diplomacy of memory* model thus requires taking into account the prevailing public memory within the domestic society. Best reflected in the media, this public memory is assumed to facilitate or challenge the official diplomatic use of memory.

Foreign policy behaviour with memory

Having conceptualized collective memory as the national narrative that officials carry to the international stage, it must still be specified what the *diplomacy of memory* framework

³⁵ Markovits and Reich 1997, 12.

³⁶ Gillis 1994, 3-26.

actually wants to explain with this type of collective memory, i.e. a country's foreign policy behaviour on the international stage.

In defining diplomatic behaviour with memory as a specific foreign policy strategy, the FPA approach offers guidance on how to analyse foreign policy in general.³⁷ Spanning an empirical subject matter characterized by links to both the domestic and international domains of a state, researchers traditionally either focus on decision-making processes or the policy outcome itself when it comes to analysing foreign policies. While acknowledging that foreign policies certainly result from the complexities of human decisional behaviour, foreign policy behaviour with memory in this framework is rather viewed through the latter lenses, i.e. as the outcome or the end product of a decision defined in terms of its content rather than the choice of action in the pursuit of a goal. According to Cohen and Harris, the end product of a foreign policy decision in general is defined as:

a set of goals, directive or intentions, formulated by persons in official or authoritative positions, directed at some actor or condition in the environment beyond the sovereign national state, for the purpose of affecting the target in the manner desired by the policy-makers.³⁸

Based on this minimum consensus, Walter Carlsnaes understands the *explanandum* of FPA, i.e. foreign policy itself, as consisting of three general characteristics: It is a policy undertaking, it has a purposive nature, and it takes the crucial role of state boundaries into account.³⁹

In order to apply this approach to what I want to explain, i.e. foreign policy behaviour with memory, the same three questions have to be answered. First, what kind of policy undertaking is this? Second, what is its purpose? And thirdly, how does the concept travel

³⁷ See the study of Carlsnaes 2013, 298-325.

³⁸ Cohen/Harris 1975, quoted in: Carlsnaes 2013, 305.

³⁹ Carlsnaes 2013, 305.

across state boundaries? Addressing these questions allows us to define the details of a country's diplomatic behaviour with memory, and to distinguish it as a separate foreign policy approach. The terminology I use for this as of yet untheorized form of state behaviour is "diplomacy with memory".

a. Diplomacy with memory as a policy undertaking

The first step in understanding diplomacy with memory is to specify its characteristics as a specific form of state behaviour. For that purpose, I first explore how traditional diplomatic behaviour unfolds according to mainstream IR theories, in cases where countries do not share a past legacy. The theoretical predictions on these countries' behaviour then form the counterfactuals to our cases.⁴⁰

Mainstream IR theories first and foremost suggest that diplomatic behaviour of states is always aimed at advancing a nation's interests on the international stage.⁴¹ Within an anarchic international environment, these interests are usually defined in purely static, materialistic terms.⁴² Both realists and liberalists alike postulate that states act like firms and consumers who want to maximize their utility towards objectives like gains in power, security and material wealth. In such a microeconomic approach to behaviour, rationality therefore implies a process of weighing costs against benefits according to tangible materialistic aims.⁴³

⁴⁰ The construction of counterfactuals is basing itself on the broader theoretical quest within International Relations to extract universal models and clear causal connections from a complex reality. Aiming to radically simplify the extraordinary number of factors at play at any given point in time, social scientists mainly employ three overlapping strategies for the purpose of identifying causal patterns in state behaviour: rational action, materialism and functionalism (Quirk 2008, 521-523).

⁴¹ Nye 2009, 5. Morgenthau 1973.

⁴² Lord Palmerston famously asserted that countries have no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent interests (Riordan 2003, 31).

For a critique on materialism in both realist and liberal IR theories, see Hurd (2010, 298-316).

⁴³ These assumptions go back to the notion of a "*homo economicus*" that both Adam Smith in "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations" (1776) and Thomas Hobbes in "Leviathan" (1998, originally published in 1651) trace back to human nature. In such a view, human action is guided by self-interest only.

However, when countries are linked to one another by a common tragic history, their behaviour does not appear to conform to this traditional understanding of how states calculate and pursue their interests. Materialistic cost-benefit calculus of traditional IR theories alone thus cannot fully explain diplomatic behaviour with memory. While I argue that such countries still follow a material cost-benefit calculation, its material properties cannot be viewed in isolation, but gain a different meaning through the collective memory which surrounds them.⁴⁴ In other words, countries with a shared past are willing to incur costs when interacting with those also affected by that same past. It is exactly this willingness to accept costs that cannot be predicted with traditional mainstream IR models. The resulting distortions of the material cost-benefit calculus are thus at the core of what distinguishes diplomatic behaviour with memory from traditional forms of diplomacy, and also demonstrate its distinctiveness. The purpose of stressing collective memory's role in foreign policy behaviour is not to deny that interests shape foreign policy, but to take the historical constructions of these interests into account. National interests are therefore not viewed as static but are rather interdependent with memory: National interests emerge in the struggle over past, present and future.⁴⁵

Having established that a shared traumatic past and the interpretation thereof have an influence on diplomatic behaviour, we still have to explain in detail how we can identify

⁴⁴ This view builds on constructivist scholars' work which asserts that in a socially constructed world, the national interest is not a permanent given but rather a specific construct in a certain time and space context. While material interests matter, their meaning as well is dependent on the underlying social construction (Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999). The constructivist approach moreover postulates that it is ideas rather than material forces that shape a state's preferences (Katzenstein 1996; Berger 1998). As such, it also lends itself well to the *diplomacy of memory* model: The notion that "ideas matter" can be expanded to the assumption that "ideas about the past", i.e. history and the interpretation thereof, exert a crucial influence on determining the diplomatic behaviour of countries.

⁴⁵ Müller (Ed.) 2002, 28 & 30.

such a state behaviour on the international stage. To return to the words of Carlsnaes, what kind of policy undertaking does diplomacy with memory represent?

I borrow from Todd Hall's analytical concept of "emotional diplomacy" to define state behaviour with memory as an alternative form of diplomatic behaviour.⁴⁶ Hall understands the display of emotions on the international stage as a diplomatic team performance that constitutes an alternative to traditional statecraft described by Hans Morgenthau as "persuasion, compromise, and threat of force".⁴⁷ While not applying with the set of behaviours associated with state interaction according to mainstream IR literature, Hall's alternative state behaviour nevertheless qualifies as rational bilateral behaviour. As such, Hall views the international performance of emotions not as attributed to a specific affect or emotion, but as resulting from the rational logic of consequentialism and appropriateness.⁴⁸ Hall's emotional diplomacy concept is hence useful to this research in that it theorizes a diplomatic strategy which is alternative to traditional statecraft but nevertheless aims at achieving rational goals. While Hall focuses on emotional performances for international political ends, I am interested in "memorial performances" for these same ends. Hence, I contend that countries who share a common past do not make diplomacy with emotions, but rather with memory. They do so not by portraying a specific emotion on the international stage, but rather by projecting a specific historic image. In doing so, states are assumed to adhere to the logic of their nationally fabricated official narrative.

The proposed diplomacy with memory approach and Hall's concept of emotional diplomacy, however, do not stand in opposition to one another but are rather complementary. Certain national narratives may require the official, concerted performance of particular emotions to

⁴⁶ Hall 2015.

⁴⁷ See Hall 2015, 35.

⁴⁸ For the foundational work on these assumptions of social behaviour, see Max Weber 1968, 29-30.

appear sincere. In contrast, certain forms of emotions may only make sense given the existence of a particular collective memory.

Diplomatic behaviour with memory thus consists - just like Hall's emotional diplomacy approach - of a deliberate, coordinated and costly diplomatic team effort to project the national narrative, i.e. a country's official collective memory, onto the international stage. According to Hall, this diplomatic effort is similar to what rationalist IR researchers, most prominently Robert Jervis, termed "signalling". As such, Jervis's work on states' attempts to signal a malign or friendly image to the international stage also applies here. Much is at stake when it comes to signalling a specific historic image, because that image can affect how a state is viewed and treated by others.⁴⁹ The international portrayal of a specific historic image has the potential to influence how future state interaction unfolds. Countries are thus willing to make a costly investment into this signalling effort and as such endow the selected national narrative with the power to skew the traditional cost-benefit calculus of foreign policy decision-making. State behaviour is thus pushed into a direction which cannot be predicted using mainstream materialistic models.⁵⁰

b. Diplomacy with memory as an instrumental form of state behaviour

The above considerations on the nature of the diplomacy with memory as a separate policy undertaking already suggest that diplomatic behaviour with memory is regarded as an instrumental form of state behaviour. Building on the insights into strategic action that rationalist work offers, in addition to Hall's emotional diplomacy concept, diplomacy with memory is considered a strategy with which actors seek to achieve certain aims on the international stage.⁵¹ The coordinated and costly team effort to signal an official version of

⁴⁹ Jervis 1989.

⁵⁰ Hall 2015, 16-18.

⁵¹ Hall 2015, 18.

For rationalist assumptions on state behavior in more general, see, for instance: Snidal 2002, 74-75.

a country's past to its international environment is thus not driven by moral considerations or oriented towards the historic truth, but has rather retained foreign policy's purposive nature despite using the non-traditional tool of memory to achieve its strategic goals.

c. Diplomacy with memory as a two-level game between international official and domestic public memory

Having clarified the nature and purpose of the diplomacy with memory, I now specify how this concept travels across state boundaries. When countries signal a specific historic image to the international stage, the receiver of such a signal is always an external and international, rather than domestic, audience. However, while diplomatic behaviour with memory targets particular foreign states, the official use of memory nevertheless remains constrained by domestic contexts. This is how the diplomacy of memory model links back to “the domestic politics of memory”: officials using collective memory for international purposes are always facing the prevailing domestic public's memory as well as an international audience. As such, the *diplomacy of memory* model takes into account the insight of authors working on the domestic politics of memory, namely, that political actors' ability to reconstruct the past as they wish is limited by the crucial social fact that others are trying to do the same.⁵² These diverse constructions and reconstructions of the past then bear the potential to clash, not only domestically, but also between the domestic and the international sphere. The past becomes disputed terrain on both stages as well as between them.

In aiming to rewrite the past to legitimize the present domestically and internationally,⁵³ foreign policy-makers are thus assumed to deliberately co-opt official memory for strategic international purposes. Their success in creating a convincing national narrative requires the

⁵² Schudson 2011, 290.

⁵³ Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983.

acquiescence of others. For the domestic sphere only, Schudson has already identified these “others”: the structure of available pasts, the structure of individual choices and the conflicts about the past among a multitude of mutually aware individuals and groups.⁵⁴ The *diplomacy of memory* model now adds another layer to this: The interaction between the international and the domestic sphere, between the official memory that is used on the international stage and the public memory that prevails at home. In cases where these conflict, trade-offs between international and domestic goals will become necessary. Putnam’s model of foreign policy behaviour in general therefore also applies to diplomatic behaviour with memory: it is a two-level game.⁵⁵ Foreign policy with memory must consider international and domestic audiences simultaneously, as the memory that best achieves a strategic international aim may not always be in line with what is domestically desirable. Diplomatic behaviour with memory therefore at all times requires a delicate balancing act between domestic and international imperatives.

2.3. Limitations of the *Diplomacy of Memory* model

The *diplomacy of memory* model offers a concrete way to explain foreign policy behaviour with memory. The model first and foremost suggests that collective memory is indeed an effective tool in international power struggles as well as merely domestic ones. It also opens the possibility of explaining how collective memory is employed by political actors on the international stage. Uniquely, it offers a framework to incorporate the complex interactions that give rise to and alter public and official memories of countries over time, in addition to adding another layer of interlinkages between the official memory portrayed on the international stage and the prevailing domestic public narrative of a country. With an eye to

⁵⁴ Schudson 2011, 287.

⁵⁵ Putnam 1988, 460.

the field of International Relations more broadly, the *diplomacy of memory* model shows a fresh way to bring the identity of states back into IR research which exhibits a persistent preference for material explanations.⁵⁶ By embedding the concept of collective memory within IR approaches, the influence of ideational factors on shaping international affairs is laid open within the discipline.

On a subfield level, the multilevel design of the *diplomacy of memory* model enriches the existing politics of memory literature by widening its focus to the international realm, in addition to reversing the interaction between domestic public and international official memory. Rather than placing memory's origins in the domestic sphere, the model uniquely proposes to look first into the international realm and see how collective memory was forged initially for an international audience, and only in a second step had to be reconciled with a domestic memory landscape. The *diplomacy of memory* model therefore attributes an active role to countries when it comes to making foreign policy with memory rather than passively having their international behavior constrained by a historic legacy as existing IR work claims.⁵⁷

However, the *diplomacy of memory* model also inherits one of the major shortcomings of work on the politics of memory within the domestic sphere. It remains limited to an instrumentalist view on collective memory that focusses on how the past is made and remade in the present for present purposes. Similar research designs that anchor collective memory all too strongly in the present⁵⁸ have rightfully been criticised by sociologists like Barry Schwartz and historians like Alon Confino as being too narrow.⁵⁹ Rather than advancing our

⁵⁶ Müller (Ed.) 2002, 29.

⁵⁷ See, for instance: Berger 1998 and Katzenstein 1996.

⁵⁸ According to Schwartz, the politics of memory scholarship with its instrumentalist view on collective memory exhibits a rigid dichotomy between presentists and essentialists: Presentists focus on how the past is made and remade in the present and for present purposes. Essentialists, on the other hand, focus on how the past defines identities and constrains action in the present (Schwartz 2011, 242).

⁵⁹ See Schwartz (2011, 243-247), and Confino (1997, 1393-1395) for a general critique on the "politics of memory" literature.

understanding of collective memory and its sources and functions within specific cultural realms, the politics of memory literature, just like the *diplomacy of memory* model presented here, produces little understanding of collective memory as such. Instead it only offers an explanation on memory's causes and consequences. The framework developed in this thesis therefore fails to acknowledge that – as Schwartz puts it - “the same present can sustain different memories and different presents can sustain the same memory”.⁶⁰

This shortcoming is further exacerbated by the model's privileging of structural explanations. By arguing that the past is not only made and remade for present purposes but that these purposes are to be found in the international system, the role of agents is diminished. Emphasizing agents over structure would instead redirect attention to the dispositions and intentions of foreign policy actors and as such offer more insights into how individuals mattered for forging memory into a diplomatic tool and how that choice could have varied with a different leadership. A stronger focus on agents would thus bear the potential to better explain how the same present can give rise to diverse diplomatic approaches with memory, underlining - unlike the structural approach followed in this thesis - that the diplomacy of guilt or innocence are not inevitable.

However, a modified research focus on agents within the *diplomacy of memory* concept would also not solve the agency-structure problem inherent in explanations of social behaviour more general. Agents are influenced by structural factors which then shape their dispositional characteristics and as such also determine particular types of intentions. The resulting inability to analytically distinguish agency from structure within the *diplomacy of memory* model is furthermore exacerbated by the intangibility of collective memory itself. While this study shows how we can approximate what foreign policy actors believe, or in this case, remember, at least on the official collective level, and how such a narrative can be

⁶⁰ Schwartz 2011, 247.

turned into a diplomatic tool on the international stage, we can never fully separate memory from its specific, socially-constructed time and space context in both collectives and individuals⁶¹ and as such never solve the agency-structure problem when it comes to integrating the concept of collective memory into the field of International Relations. To put it simply and in more IR terms, agents – collective or individual – simply do not create memory (that is, remember) through contingent acts of freedom, but through social lenses.⁶²

3. Empirically testing the *Diplomacy of Memory* model

In order to empirically test the nexus between collective memory and foreign policy suggested by the *diplomacy of memory* model, this research employs historical inquiry. Unlike the work of historians, applying historical inquiry within the field of International Relations is not an end in itself, but rather serves as an essential basis for the advancement of theoretical goals.⁶³ In the case of this study, using the method of historical inquiry is designed to demonstrate the existence of diplomatic behaviour with memory in the selected examples. Empirically, such an endeavour consists of two essential elements. The first is to trace diplomatic behaviour with memory as a distinctive state behaviour based on the characteristics ascribed by the *diplomacy of memory* model. Diplomatic behaviour with memory, however, constitutes not only a specific and separate type of diplomatic behaviour, but it may also empirically manifest itself in different forms. These diverse forms are only limited by the wide range of possible historic images employable as diplomatic tools.

⁶¹ See for instance, Olick (1999, 338-343) and his analytical distinction between the individualistically based “collected memory” as opposed to the social phenomenon “collective memory” and their interrelations with one another.

⁶² See Carlsnaes’ critique on the agency-structure problem in FPA more general: Carlsnaes 1992, 245-270.

⁶³ Quirk 2008, 518-533.

Identifying diplomatic behaviour with memory therefore, secondly, also requires defining the different historic images that make up what should then become distinguished as diverse strains of diplomatic behaviour with memory.

3.1. Tracing state behaviour with memory

Regarding the task of tracing diplomatic behaviour with memory as a distinctive form of diplomatic behaviour, the following empirical steps must be undertaken.

First, an investigation of whether collective memory, i.e. a country's national narrative, compels states to a specific foreign policy behaviour. This requires analytical priority on the choices and actions of state actors who are responsible for deciding and enacting a country's foreign policy. However, who are these actors? On most general terms, the conduct of foreign policy involves officials based at home and abroad. While foreign policy decisions and the choice of diplomatic strategy are mainly the responsibility of statesmen, i.e. chancellors/presidents and their foreign ministers, the primary task of diplomats is the tactical implementation of that strategy. As agents of their states, diplomats thus subordinate their own personal interests and moral beliefs to the reasons of the state they represent abroad. Diplomats are nevertheless active participants in diplomatic strategy: They carry messages for statesmen and negotiate on their behalf with other governments. They advocate the interests of their countries abroad and they inform and counsel statesmen and foreign ministers in order to better understand and manipulate foreign governments and peoples.⁶⁴ In short, diplomats are "statecraft's visible eyes, hands and ears"⁶⁵ on the international stage. The observance of their behaviour, combined with foreign ministers' and statesmen's

⁶⁴ Berridge/Lloyd 2012, 97-98; Freeman 1997, 73, 97-99, 107, 138.

⁶⁵ Freeman 1997, 4.

decisions on diplomatic strategies, therefore lends itself well to researching a country's foreign policy approach.

Corresponding to this understanding of actors conducting foreign policy, the second step taken by this study focusses on the qualitative analysis of the diplomatic discourse these actors undertake on the international stage. This diplomatic discourse consists of bilateral negotiations and debates vis-à-vis a target state. As diplomatic discourse is by its very nature bilateral, i.e. taking place between two states, the responses and reactions of the targeted state also have to factor in the analysis. Relevant documents analysed in this study are foreign policy directives, decisions and correspondences, private and public rhetoric as well as symbolic and substantive gestures.

Thirdly, researching whether foreign policy actors indeed employ a specific national narrative as a strategy to pursue their aims vis-à-vis a target state requires detailed process tracing between memory-bound reasoning and a country's diplomatic behaviour. In order to claim that collective memory (as reflected in the national narrative) indeed compelled a country and its agents to act in a certain way, the memory-bound reasoning behind a particular course of foreign policy must be clearly exhibited in the actual discourse used and the tangible gestures made towards the target state.⁶⁶ The *diplomacy of memory* model offers the following test of valid causal inferences between national narrative and diplomatic behaviour. If the national narrative indeed has an influence on diplomatic behaviour, we must find empirical evidence for the existence of state behaviour with memory as a distinctive form of diplomatic behaviour. As outlined by the model, for countries who share a common past it is - in clear contrast to their counterfactual cases - "memory, rather than money"⁶⁷ that matters for the pursuit of interest vis-a-vis a target state: If a country is indeed

⁶⁶ See literature on qualitative analysis within social sciences, for instance: Beach/Pedersen 2012, Goertz/Mahoney 2012, Mahoney 2012, King/Keohane/Verba 1994. See also Hall's (2015, 35-37) empirical approach.

⁶⁷ Müller (Ed.) 2002, 2.

using collective memory as an alternative strategic diplomatic tool, it is therefore necessary to empirically show that a.) this country is willing to incur a significant cost for the purpose of signalling a specific historic image of itself in its diplomatic behaviour; and b.) that this signalling is designed to achieve a strategic rational aim on the broader international stage; and c.) this country faces constraints in these efforts from the prevailing domestic public's memory of its own past.

While these three points help us generally to observe a distinct form of diplomatic behaviour between states, tracing the costly diplomatic strategy of signalling a national memory onto the international stage is only possible with particular historic images. Specifying these images enables us to not only empirically distinguish diplomatic behaviour with memory as a “new” and specific form of diplomatic behaviour, but also to define its diverse strains.

3.2. Tracing separate strains of diplomatic behaviour with memory: The diplomacy of guilt and innocence

I return to the broader collective memory literature to determine which exact historic images countries employ for political gain in different contexts. Aleida Assmann suggests several historic images around which countries fabricate their collective memory.⁶⁸ Under the dictates of the 19th century nation-state, the traditional construction of national narratives mainly followed the notions of the victor and the defeated. Unsurprisingly, the heroic image of the victor significantly helped to strengthen a nation's positive self-image. While glorious victories certainly always occupied the most prominent place in national memory, defeats

⁶⁸ See Assmann A. 2016, 47-57.

also constituted central historical points of reference: Shared suffering – as Ernest Renan pointed out - often unites more than joy.⁶⁹

With two total wars in the first half of the 20th century, however, these two categories require amendment. Particularly during World War II, ever larger segments of the civilian population were involved in atrocities, rendering suffering no longer restricted to military action alone. In its aftermath, the traditional dichotomy between the memory of the victor and the defeated was expanded to include two new categories originally stemming from the field of criminology: perpetrators and victims. The crucial difference between the old pairing (victor versus defeated) and new (perpetrator versus victim) categories lies in the question of reciprocity: The emerging notion of victim hinged on its passivity and defencelessness, i.e. its innocent suffering in the midst of a radically asymmetrical violence, and as such is directly opposed to the active sacrifice and heroism of the defeated.⁷⁰ The emerging notion of perpetrator, on the other hand, implies an unrighteous aggressiveness towards a weak and defenceless other and as such hinges on its guilt. As a result, the outcome of the actions of the perpetrator, unlike the ones of the victor, do not amount to strength, glory, triumph and pride, but rather to guilt and shame. Coming to terms with the past in a post-World War II environment thus required very different national narrative constructions that aimed at deriving a common national identity from these two very “non-heroic” images of suffering and shame.

In the aftermath of World War II, national narrative constructions thus formed around the notions of perpetrators and victims. The essential distinction between these two categories hinges on the concept of guilt. Guilt, however, can be both a state of being and an emotion. Perpetrators can therefore be guilty of a misdeed without feeling guilty and vice-versa.

⁶⁹ Renan, quoted in: Assmann A. 2016, 47-48.

⁷⁰ See Assmann A. (2016, 54-56) for the notion of victim.

Similarly, victims can feel victimized without necessarily being victimized. The categories of perpetrator and victim in a post-World War II environment therefore came to constitute two perceived states of being, one of guilt and one of victimized innocence. Performing them for political purposes created two separate ways in which states could deal with their unsavoury pasts: Either they admitted guilt and so also moral responsibility for their past wrongdoings, therefore portraying themselves as “guilty perpetrators” to the outside world.⁷¹ Guilt hereby becomes interpreted as a debt that can be settled or “made good again” by the perpetrator.⁷² Or, states chose to not admit moral responsibility for their past wrongdoings and instead portray themselves as “innocent victims” by way of adopting the notions of passivity and defencelessness suffered by the actual victims of war. As will become apparent, moral responsibility is distinct from legal responsibility and can be admitted despite or without the latter.

Corresponding to the adopted images of guilt and innocence, we can infer two different courses of diplomatic action for countries: The morally responsible, guilty perpetrator will seek to ameliorate the harm and send verbal and substantive gestures of remorse, shame and apologies, whereas a credible portrayal of “innocence” will avoid exactly these signals.⁷³ As mentioned above, the emerging notion of victimhood in the aftermath of World War II rested on the victim’s utter passivity and the connotations of innocence and purity associated with this status. Viewed through this lens, the victim derives its moral authority from putting emphasis on its own suffering and gains a positive self-image only by means of recognition and compensation for it.⁷⁴ In a post-World War II environment, this notion of victimhood was however not only sought by the real victims of National Socialism, but it was also

⁷¹ Maier 1988.

⁷² Hockerts (2007, 323) describes how the German word for guilt “*Schuld*” is related to debt “*Schulden*”, and how the latter implies the idea of monetary settlement.

⁷³ For more on the diplomacy of guilt and guilt behaviour, see: Hall 2015, 117-121.

⁷⁴ Assmann A. 2016, 62.

deliberately adopted by individuals and countries as well as their elites who aimed to evade responsibility for the past. These countries then fabricated their innocence and victimization according to the logic of victimhood. Following this logic, they put full blame for the tragedies of the past on others while at the same time highlighting their own suffering.

Based on these definitions, this study aims empirically to trace states' official portrayal of "guilt" or "innocence" vis-à-vis an unsavoury past as well as the acting out of the related "perpetrator" or "victim" behaviour on the international stage. Derived from these very opposite images, what appear to be two separate strains of diplomatic behaviour with memory are just two different sides of the same coin. The "diplomacy of guilt" aims to signal the image of a guilty perpetrator to the outside world, whereas what can be described as the "diplomacy of innocence" aims to portray the image of an innocent victim. Both, however, are diplomacy with memory: costly investment made into the projection of their respective images of the past to the international stage.

3.3. Empirical shortcomings and challenges for the application of the *diplomacy of memory* model

While the *diplomacy of memory* model offers a concrete pathway to specify the nexus between memory and a certain foreign policy outcome, strong causal chains remain challenging to establish with an intangible concept like collective memory. Any research agenda dealing with this concept thus needs to be aware of several methodological difficulties posed by collective memory. Collective memory is both "a mirror and a lamp",⁷⁵ as Barry Schwartz puts it, and therefore forms a cultural (belief) system in addition to a mere

⁷⁵ The expression of "the mirror and the lamp" goes back to the American literary critic Meyer H. Abrams.

resource, as most political scientists claim.⁷⁶ The impact of memory on foreign policy can thus run through both of these channels, severely jeopardizing any fine distinction between dependent and independent variables within a research design. A specific narrative – be it one of guilt or of innocence - can hence be assumed to be anchored in actors’ mind-sets, or/and be used by actors for other purposes. While the basic tenant of such a perspective is clear in ontological terms. i.e. the world is socially constructed and in part from collective memory, epistemologically specifying how collective memory provides an inspiration to act poses three problems common to all ideational research agendas within social sciences.⁷⁷

First, memory, just like ideas more broadly, cannot be seen and is therefore hard to track down. Measuring the effect of official memory on a specific outcome thus requires its verbal expression, while also keeping the underlying assumption in mind that memory is omnipresent in the mind-sets of actors. Thus, memory exerts an influence on actors also when not uttered.⁷⁸ As a result, any measurement of collective memory’s impact on foreign policy is likely to be indirect and imprecise.

Secondly, even if a specific memory is expressed, clearly distinguishing whether actors believe in or just use an official national narrative is equally challenging. Are particular memories invoked by leaders the actual motivating factors? Or, are they merely empty rhetoric, serving as “window-dressing” for other interests?⁷⁹ Empirically speaking, it is impossible to measure the actual specific memory of an individual over time while at the same time separating it from its use.

⁷⁶ Schwartz 2011, 242.

⁷⁷ Since the 1990s, social sciences have seen a renewed scholarly focus on the role of ideas (rather than self-interest) and their effects on politics across several disciplines, most evidently within the paradigm of neoinstitutionalism (e.g. Schmidt 2010, Blyth 2002, Campbell 2004 and Hall 1989, Berman 1998), political sociology with its emphasis on the influence of culture in politics (Dobbin 2004), as well as within the IR constructivist school of thought (Wendt 1992, Katzenstein 1996, Berger 1998).

⁷⁸ Béland/Cox 2010, 13-14.

⁷⁹ Berger 2002, 81-82. Müller (Ed.) 2002, 28.

Thirdly, there is also the problem of specifying the conditions under which memory changes, and to account for that change retrospectively. Due to the elusive character of memory as an idea, in addition to its formation and variability in diverse contexts, what actors remember at a specific point in time and when memory changed is hard to reconstruct in any precise way later on.

When applying the *diplomacy of memory* concept to the empirical cases of this study, it is thus crucial to keep these methodological difficulties in mind throughout. Having based the model on the most expressed and enshrined form of a country's memory, i.e. its official national narrative, the approach presented here navigates around some of the apparent obstacles posed by collective memory's intangible nature. While a precise measurement of memory's impact on foreign policy behaviour nevertheless remains challenging, the *diplomacy of memory* model at least proposes one concrete way to show collective memory's influence on state behaviour within the field of International Relations.

4. The case study on West German-Israeli and Austrian-Israeli relations

In this section, I introduce the two concrete examples selected to test the *diplomacy of memory* model: West Germany and Austria's diplomatic relations with Israel in the aftermath of World War II. In what follows, I first give political-scientific reasons as to why these cases have been chosen and why they lend themselves well to empirically investigate the above outlined model. I next discuss existing work on these two diplomatic relationships and their limitations. I then lay out in more detail the primary sources utilized for my own analysis, and finally introduce the organization of the empirical chapters to follow.

4.1. Case Selection

This study draws on selected bilateral debates that took place in the aftermath of World War II between West Germany and Israel as well as between Austria and Israel. With the Holocaust as the tragic legacy that connects these countries to one another, these are admittedly extreme cases. However, within the field of political science, those cases in which the chosen theoretical considerations are the most likely to hold true are regarded as promising for the purpose of theory building.⁸⁰ Thus, if the theoretical framework of the *diplomacy of memory* holds true in extreme cases, its applicability can then also be tested against less or even least likely cases taken from post-conflict scenarios in other parts of the world.

In line with the theoretical framework of this thesis, West Germany and Austria are furthermore drawn up as quasi “natural counter cases” to one another. Both have the same Nazi history, but adopted directly opposed official narratives: West Germany portrayed itself as a guilty and remorseful perpetrator,⁸¹ and is as such assumed to have followed a diplomatic behaviour vis-à-vis Israel that resembled what was outlined above as the diplomacy of guilt. Austria, on the other hand, adopted a national narrative of victimhood,⁸² and is as such likely to have behaved according to the logic described by the diplomacy of innocence.

For the purpose of fully acknowledging that diplomacy with memory takes place in a bilateral context, we also have to take into account the reaction of the state on the receiving

⁸⁰ Eckstein 1975.

⁸¹ This assumption is built on the large existing body of interdisciplinary work on how Germany dealt with the memory of the Nazi past domestically, explaining how and why the West German narrative of “guilt”, or what Olick (2007) calls “the politics of regret” emerged within West German culture. First triggered by Karl Jaspers’ (1946) philosophical considerations on German guilt and responsibility in the immediate aftermath of World War II, scholars until this day, however, debate the notion of a ‘German collective guilt’. See, for instance: Adorno 2010. Diner 2000. Olick 2005 and 2017. Art 2006. Herf 1997. Maier 1988.

⁸² See the vast existing literature on Austria’s national victim narrative, for instance: Art 2006, Knight 2000a, Mitten 1992, Pelinka/Weinzierl 1987, Rathkolb 2002 and 2010, Uhl 1992 and 2001, Pick 2000.

end of these strategies.⁸³ In this case, the target state is Israel. The perception and reciprocal strategies of Israel regarding the West German and Austrian diplomatic behavior with memory will therefore also have to feature in our analysis: How were the Austrian and West German approaches with memory perceived, interpreted, understood and reacted to by Israeli officials and their public?

Moreover, both selected cases - West Germany and Austria - lend themselves well to the assessment of a state's foreign policy behaviour with memory, as they have consistently retained their national narratives during the selected timeframe of this study.⁸⁴ During the first four decades following the end of World War II, West Germany's official narrative was one of guilt, whereas Austria's was one of victimhood. This circumstance allows us to hold the independent variable of this study constant, while precisely determining a specific narrative's impact on foreign policy behaviour over time. It may seem counterintuitive not to have studied only one case for assessing that same impact. For instance, Austria could have been examined before and after the change in its victim narrative that occurred in the mid 1980s, and the alterations this caused in Austrian policies vis-à-vis Israel.⁸⁵ Such a single case scenario, however, would have severely distorted memory's impact on foreign policy by the simple fact of time passing. Naturally, the impact of memory on foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of World War II was different and greater than in the 1980s/90s. In

⁸³ Hall 2015, 36.

⁸⁴ It was only with the end of the Cold War that memories of World War II were finally "unfrozen" in European countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain (Müller (Ed.) 2002, 6). Four decades after World War II, the Nazi past was now confronted in a new and very different light: Generational change and the altered international context had triggered a paradigm shift in collective memory within the entire Western world. Rather than focussing on the own victimization and heroic resistance to the Nazis, by the 1990s European countries had all begun to rethink their own involvement in the Holocaust. It was as such that the Holocaust was moved from the margins into the centre of European collective memory. With the end of the East-West competition, the Holocaust was thus turned into Western civilization's ultimate "other" and "evil", serving from now on as both, a large looming warning sign of "Never again", as well as an entry ticket into the European community (Judt 1992, 85-99).

⁸⁵ Following the so-called Waldheim Affair of 1986, the Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky in 1991 revised Austria's victim narrative by admitting Austrian co-responsibility for the Nazi crimes (See Interview with Franz Vranitzky, 30 March 2017, Vienna. Interview with Eva Nowotny, 29 December 2016, Vienna. See also: Uhl 2016, 86-95 and Uhl 1992).

later decades, new generations came to power and these of course remembered the past very differently than their predecessors of the 1950/60s and 70s. Of course, not only does the nature of collective memory change over time, but also its expediency for politics. When trying to understand collective memory's impact on foreign policy behaviour, it is thus better to compare different diplomatic approaches with memory at the same points in time over a longer timeframe.

As such, this study comprises four bilateral debates rather than only one spread out over four post-war decades. In addition, two case countries with opposed national narratives are contrasted with one another at the same points in time, rather than analysing only one country over the course of many decades. The case scenario of this thesis is thus chosen to best account for memory's diverse and alternating influence on the foreign policy behaviour of states.

4.2. Existing work and its limitations

The necessary precondition for undertaking a detailed qualitative analysis within a small N-study of two cases is the availability of reliable secondary sources concerning West Germany's and Austria's foreign policy towards Israel.

In the case of West German-Israeli relations, a multitude of interdisciplinary work has emerged. Inge Deutschkron's comprehensive study, for instance, retraces in all detail the historic steps of the West German-Israeli relationship,⁸⁶ whereas Markus Weingardt extends the focus from Israel to the entirety of German Middle East policies.⁸⁷ Scholars have further pondered whether the West German-Israeli relationship is indeed "special",⁸⁸ or whether the

⁸⁶ Deutschkron 1983.

⁸⁷ Weingardt 2002.

⁸⁸ Feldman 1984.

West German approach to *Wiedergutmachung*⁸⁹ could become a model for other states facing shameful pasts.⁹⁰ While in the aftermath of World War II, of course, no one can explain nor understand diplomatic relations between West Germany and Israel without taking history and the related notion of German guilt into account, none of these studies specified and explained how collective memory mattered for the FRG's foreign policy behaviour. Only three IR works employing Germany as one of their cases present an empirically more comprehensible approach. Thomas Berger explains West German foreign policy behaviour by pointing to its "culture of antimilitarism" resulting from the post-war national psyche.⁹¹ Similarly, Thomas Banchoff lays open how "historical memory" played a role in articulating the FRG's foreign policy priorities.⁹² Todd Hall, on the other hand, describes what he as well calls West Germany's diplomacy of guilt towards Israel as a way of strategically acting out the emotion of guilt.⁹³ In their understanding of "culture", "historical memory" and "emotion", these works bring up related explanations to my own, however, none of them has yet viewed West Germany's diplomatic behaviour towards Israel as a distinct strategic foreign policy effort with its national narrative.

In comparison to the multitude of research on the West German-Israeli relationship, academics have only more recently begun to unearth less straightforward relations between Israel and those states which denied or evaded co-responsibility for the Holocaust. The most obvious examples are the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Austria.⁹⁴ As regards the bilateral relationship between Austria and Israel, Helga Embacher and Margit Reiter's comprehensive historical study covers the entirety of the diplomatic relationship since the

⁸⁹ The expression "*Wiedergutmachung*" is difficult to render into English. It generally means "to make good again" damages caused by the Nazi-persecution (Hockerts 2007, 323).

⁹⁰ Lavy 1996 and Wolffsohn 1993.

⁹¹ Berger 1998.

⁹² Banchoff 1996 and 1999.

⁹³ Hall 2015.

⁹⁴ Timm 1997. On the diverse national narratives of West and East Germany (separate from their Israel policies), see: Herf 1997.

proclamation of Israel in 1948.⁹⁵ Additional existing work focusses on specific aspects of Austrian-Israeli relations such as the beginning of the relationship,⁹⁶ the question of reparations,⁹⁷ or the issue of Jewish transit migration via Austria,⁹⁸ the relations of the political left with Israel,⁹⁹ or cultural and individual contacts between Austrians and Israelis.¹⁰⁰ A more rigorous placing of the Austro-Israeli relationship within political science and the field of international relations, however, has not yet taken place. While Austria and its national narrative of victimhood was widely described as a clear-cut case of national myth-making for domestic and international political gain, only Thomas Berger employed Austria as one of his cases to explore how legacies and their interpretations affect international politics beyond the domestic sphere. In doing so, Berger concluded that Austria's national interpretation of history was facilitated by the international environment as well as having had disruptive effects on it.¹⁰¹ However, how Austria deliberately employed its victim myth when it came to Israel in order to achieve "positive" gain on the international stage does not factor at all in Berger's analysis. The existing body of work on Austria within the political science literature has therefore not yet analysed Austria's

⁹⁵ Embacher and Reiter 1998.

⁹⁶ For literature on the early years, the 1950s, see: Zweig 2010. For the 1960s, see: Falch/Zimmermann (Eds.) 2005.

⁹⁷ For the question of reparations, see: Knight 2000b, Bailer-Galanda/Blimlinger (Eds.) 2005.

⁹⁸ The issue of emigration and transit of Soviet Jews via Austria was dominant in the late 1960s, early 1970s. Given that it culminated in a Palestinian terrorist attack on Jewish immigrants in Austria in 1973, the topic also became of interest to security studies as well as for the broader academic debate on transnational terrorism. See, for instance: Dahlke 2011, Riegler 2012, Rath 2012.

⁹⁹ For literature on the Austrian left's relationship with Israel, see: Reiter 2001. On the particular era of Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and his Middle East policy, see, for instance: Röhrlich 2009, Rathkolb 1997, Reiter 2010.

¹⁰⁰ Literature focussing on cultural relations looked at initiatives of specific civil society groups and organizations. See, for instance: Adunka/Hecht/Mayr 2007. For a wide-ranging literature on individual connections between Austrians and Israelis with a special focus on the life stories of those who fled or emigrated from Austria to Israel during and after World War II, see for instance: Adunka 2002, Albrich (Ed.) 1998b, Weinzierl/Kulka (Eds.) 1992. Related to the socio-cultural side of the bilateral relationship is also the broader issue of antisemitism in Austria (Bunzl/Marin 1983) that is felicitously described by Marin (2000) as an "Anti-Semitism without Anti-Semites".

¹⁰¹ Berger 2012, 83-122.

strategies with its national narrative with regards to its foreign policy behaviour towards Israel.

For the Israeli perspective on its bilateral relationship with West Germany and Austria, less comprehensive secondary work exists. While there are many books concerned with Israel's way of dealing with the Nazi past and its perpetrators as well as their historic responsibility in more general, these works only marginally include Israel's view on West Germany per se.¹⁰² Only Deutschkron gives a detailed account on how Israelis actually perceived and reacted to the establishment and conduct of bilateral relations with the FRG.¹⁰³ The Israeli perspective on Austria is even more neglected in existing scholarly work. A few partial accounts concerning the immediate post-war years exist,¹⁰⁴ and although it gives some room to the Israeli reaction, Embacher and Reiter's study on the Austro-Israeli relationship focusses in large part on Austria's policies towards Israel rather than vice-versa.¹⁰⁵

With these apparent information gaps looming large, the *diplomacy of memory* model can only be tested successfully on the chosen examples if one goes beyond the existing body of scholarly work and resorts to primary sources. Where historic work exists, data was gathered with very different research goals in mind and can therefore only supplement my own analysis of original documents. Even if sometimes neglected by IR scholars, historians do not simply compile historical data but apply underlying implicit assumptions which could jeopardize the testing of the *diplomacy of memory* model. Especially when dealing with a delicate issue like collective memory which is to be found in the mind-set and actions of concerned politicians, it is therefore of utmost importance to look at original material rather than inviting bias by utilizing only existing work.

¹⁰² See, for instance: Segev 1994, Yablonka 2004, Cesarani 2005.

¹⁰³ Deutschkron 1983.

¹⁰⁴ Albrich 1997 and 1998b. Hotam 2005. Zweig 2010.

¹⁰⁵ Embacher and Reiter 1998.

4.3. Primary sources and their advantages

In order to successfully carry out the theoretical and empirical quest of this study, existing historic work on the West German-Israeli and Austro-Israeli diplomatic relationships must be supplemented with primary sources. For this study, these consist of official archival documents as well as press analyses and interviews. Triangulating information between these three helps this thesis to avoid common pitfalls of IR scholarship too heavily reliant on historians' work for information.¹⁰⁶

Archival Documents

As regards the availability of primary sources in the West German case, original documents and official speeches were collected and published by journalist Rolf Vogel.¹⁰⁷ At the end of the 1980s, all documents on the "German-Israeli dialogue" appeared in several editions separated according to the fields of economy, culture and politics. Vogel's collection on politics consisting of three separate books published between 1987 and 1988 serves as the main primary source for the analysis of the West German-Israeli case in this thesis.¹⁰⁸

In the less researched Austrian-Israeli example, I have consulted official documents from the Austrian State Archives (*Österreichisches Staatsarchiv*) in Vienna. Herein, the Archive of the Republic (*Archiv der Republik*) contains bilateral documents collected by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv which are fully open to view for the selected timeframe of this study.¹⁰⁹ The reports sent from Austrian ambassadors in Tel Aviv to the Foreign Ministry in Vienna have also been collected and published by Rolf Steininger in 13 volumes.¹¹⁰ For later years,

¹⁰⁶ For a critique on IR research's reliance on historians' work for information, see: Quirk 2008, 520.

¹⁰⁷ Vogel 1967a and 1967b.

¹⁰⁸ Vogel 1987, 1988a and 1988b.

¹⁰⁹ Documents from the Austrian State Archives (Archive of the Republic/Ministry of Foreign Affairs), will be cited in the following form: ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA (before 1959). ÖStA/AdR, BMAA (since 1959).

¹¹⁰ Steininger 2004.

particularly the 1970s and 80s, I also use documents housed in the Bruno-Kreisky Archive in Vienna.

Furthermore, the analysis of the Israeli reaction to the West German and Austrian strategies with memory is mainly based on documents discovered in the State Archives in Vienna in which the embassy in Tel Aviv closely recorded responses of the Israeli political elite to Austrian and West German policies.

Newspaper Analysis

The above named primary and secondary sources together allow us to retrace West German and Austrian foreign policy strategies as well as the official reaction of the target state Israel. However, we have not only described the diplomacy with memory as a diplomatic team effort carried out by foreign policy elites, but also as a two-level game. Thus, the public and its memory have to feature in the analysis as well. Domestic public opinion, i.e. public memory, are approximated through the lenses of selected media and press reports. In order to define public attitudes at specific points in time, a content-analysis was carried out in main newspapers spanning the political spectrum from left to right.

For the West German case, the left-liberal, center-left *Die Zeit* as well as the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* are taken into account, in addition to the more conservative, centre-right *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt*.

For the purpose of examining prevailing Austrian public opinion, a content analysis was undertaken in two Austrian newspapers: The conservative newspaper *Die Presse* and the Social Democratic Party's newspaper *Arbeiter Zeitung*.

In the selected newspaper articles of both case countries, only two categories were investigated. First, are views expressed by journalists and readers in accordance with, or critical of the official national narrative/memory? Second, related to the first question: are

views expressed by journalists and readers sympathetic with, or critical of Israel? The prevailing public opinion on their own Nazi past and Israel is then - throughout all chapters - contrasted with the country's Israel policies and the views of the past expressed by officials. All the findings are furthermore compared with the broad existing secondary literature available on the ways both West Germans and Austrians dealt with their past in the post-war decades, in addition to consulting public opinion surveys where available.¹¹¹

In order to once again give credit to the fact that the diplomacy with memory takes place in a bilateral context, its success was defined as not only dependent on a domestic public audience, but also on the public reaction of the state targeted by this approach, i.e. Israel. I therefore also examined articles in Israeli newspapers on West Germany and Austria, again asking two questions. First, are views expressed by journalists and readers sympathetic or critical of West Germany/Austria? And again, where possible, a related question is considered: are the projected national historic images accepted or rejected by the Israeli public? The analysis of Israeli newspapers was mainly based on a sample of articles from the Israeli English-speaking newspaper *The Jerusalem Post* (centre-right) and the German-speaking *Israel Nachrichten*. I also used articles from *Haaretz* (nowadays left liberal, up until the 1970s more oriented towards the political right), *Yedioth Ahronoth* (the largest Israeli newspaper by sales and circulation with a centre-left political orientation) and *Maariv* (centre-right), as they were collected and translated into German by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv.

¹¹¹ For West German opinion surveys, see: Allensbach Institute (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach). Online at: <http://www.ifd-allensbach.de>.
For Austrian opinion surveys, see: Statistik Austria: https://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/index.html.

Interviews

In order to adequately reconstruct the mind-set and opinions of actors, it is furthermore best to let people speak for themselves. I therefore bolster the information gathered from original documents and secondary accounts by incorporating biographies and memoirs of key foreign policy actors such as Chancellors Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky. In the Austrian case, where less material is available, three semi-structured, one hour-long interviews¹¹² were conducted with the former Austrian Ambassador to Tel Aviv, Franz Josef Kuglitsch, as well as with the former Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky and his foreign policy advisor at the time, Eva Nowotny, who were both crucial in orchestrating the national reversal of Austria's victim narrative during the 1980s/90s.¹¹³

¹¹² For the conduct of semi-structured interviews within social sciences, see, for instance: Rathbun 2008, 686-700 and Leech 2002.

¹¹³ Interview with Franz Vranitzky, 30 March 2017, Vienna.

Interview with Eva Nowotny, 29 December 2016, Vienna.

Interview with Franz Josef Kuglitsch, 16 December 2016, Vienna.

4.4. Structure and organization of the empirical chapters

Testing the theoretical assumptions outlined by the *diplomacy of memory* model, the empirical analysis of this study spans the four main foreign policy debates which took place between West Germany, Austria and Israel in the course of the first four post-war decades: the bilateral discussions surrounding reparation payments to the State of Israel in 1952 (Chapter 1); the case of Adolf Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem in 1961 (Chapter 2); and the question of support for Israel or the Arab/Palestinian side when confronted with the Middle East conflict in the course of the Six-Day War of 1967 (Chapter 3); and in the course of the Yom Kippur War and the following oil crisis in its wake in 1973 (Chapter 4).

Organized as such, the selected topics can be differentiated in two pairs. The first pair are issues that are directly related to the Nazi past. One concerns a form of *Wiedergutmachung* for the Nazi crimes, and the other one, deals with the issue of bringing one of the biggest Nazi war criminals to justice. In contrast, the second pair of topics concern the stances of West Germany and Austria towards a matter completely unrelated to the Nazi past: the Middle East conflict. While it is likely that diplomacy with memory was at work in the first instances, it is important for the wider applicability of the *diplomacy of memory* model to go beyond the extreme case of National Socialism's concrete legacy and investigate whether portraying a specific national image vis-à-vis the Nazi past also exerts an influence on foreign policy behaviour when it comes to later conflicts.

EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS

CHAPTER 1: The case of reparations to the State of Israel in 1952

The focus of this chapter's empirical analysis is the first major bilateral debates between West Germany and Israel and between Austria and Israel regarding the issue of reparations paid to the Jewish state in 1952. While it is obvious that the legacy of the Holocaust gave rise to this bilateral discussion, this chapter, by way of applying the *diplomacy of memory* model, seeks to clarify and explain precisely how that legacy mattered in the early first contacts between West Germany/Austria and Israel. In order to prove that West Germany and Austria indeed forged diverse diplomatic approaches with their memory of the Nazi past, West German and Austrian decision-making regarding reparations must be shown to consist of a.), a costly diplomatic team effort to portray either guilt or innocence to the international stage. This effort must b.), follow a concrete strategic purpose. Furthermore, while using a specific official memory of the Nazi past for foreign policy gain, each country's foreign policy actors must c.), face trade-offs from the prevailing domestic public memory of that same Nazi past.

1. Setting the stage for diplomacy with memory: The beginning of bilateral contacts between West Germany, Austria and Israel

In order to ensure that Nazism as an organized political force would cease to exist after Hitler's defeat in 1945, Allied occupying powers pushed the "other Germany" and the "other

Austria” to take centre stage in the post-war years. These new states drew from the re-emergence of non- and anti-Nazi traditions of the pre-war period under the leadership of those who were politically prosecuted by the Nazi regime.¹¹⁴ When the State of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, Germany and Austria were still under joint Allied occupation and control, hence having no independent foreign policy. Nevertheless, both occupied countries understood early on that establishing diplomatic relations with the newly founded Jewish state would be of utmost symbolic rather than material importance to them.¹¹⁵ Their new image as successor states to the Third Reich would significantly depend on their relationship with Israel. As the American High Commissioner for Germany, John McCloy, expressed it in Heidelberg in 1949: “The way the Germans will behave towards the Jews will constitute the crucial test for German democracy.”¹¹⁶ Thus, the ultimate indicator of how the newly established German and also the Austrian state would evolve in the international community was how they would interact with the new Jewish state.

In their official intention to approach Israel, Austria and West Germany, however, started off from very diverse positions. The reasons for differentiating Austria from Germany in the eyes of Israeli officials were laid out by the Knesset as early as 1949. Debating its basic principles, Israel labelled the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that emerged out of the three Western occupation zones in 1949 as an “enemy state” and prohibited all contacts with the country and its citizens. Official Israel from then on always made a clear distinction between Germany and Austria, despite oppositional voices.¹¹⁷ It classified Austria somewhere between the enemy state Germany and the rest of the world

¹¹⁴ Herf 1997, 4-5.

¹¹⁵ Compared to the Arab world, Israel was both politically and economically of little importance to Germany and Austria.

¹¹⁶ John McCloy 1949, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 27. In German original: “*Die Art, wie die Deutschen sich den Juden gegenüber verhalten (...) als die Feuerprobe der deutschen Demokratie*”.

¹¹⁷ It can be assumed that the real extent of the Austrian participation in the Holocaust had not been fully known in 1950, neither amongst Israelis nor amongst Austrians, however, what must have been known at the time was that Austria did not only suffer but also benefitted from the Nazi regime (Steininger 2012, 63).

with which relations were labelled as “normal”. Yet, unlike other liberated countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, Austria was never regarded by Israel as a truly “liberated” country. This ambivalence gave rise to the persistent Israeli dilemma of conflicting moral and pragmatic interests when it came to Austria.¹¹⁸

For Austria, on the other hand, the Israeli distinction between Austria and Germany was of utmost symbolic importance to its own national image, which it began to promote in the immediate aftermath of World War II. A few days before the official end of the war, on 27 April 1945, the three founding parties of the Second Republic, the Social Democratic Party SPÖ (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*), the Christian Democratic Party ÖVP (*Österreichische Volkspartei*) and the Communist Party KPÖ (*Kommunistische Partei Österreichs*) declared Austria independent. In the declaration of independence, the *Anschluss* of Austria to the German Reich in 1938 was considered “null and void”¹¹⁹, while the Republic of Austria was re-established on the basis of the constitution of 1920.¹²⁰ With respect to the *Anschluss*, even then the preamble of the declaration portrayed Austria’s government as defenceless and the Austrian population as robbed of both power and will at the hands of the military aggressor Nazi Germany. In the wording of the independence declaration, Germany had dragged Austria into a war that no Austrian ever wanted.¹²¹ Austria’s emerging official narrative of the Nazi past therefore was based on the assumption

¹¹⁸ Hotam 2005, 154-155.

¹¹⁹ See Austrian Declaration of Independence, Art. II: “*Der im Jahre 1938 dem österreichischen Volke aufgezwungene Anschluss ist null und nichtig.*” In: *Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich*, 01.05.1945; online at: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1945_1_0/1945_1_0.pdf.

¹²⁰ See Austrian Declaration of Independence, Art. I: Art. I: “*Die demokratische Republik Österreich ist wiederhergestellt und im Geiste der Verfassung von 1920 einzurichten.*” In: *Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich*, 01.05.1945; online at: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1945_1_0/1945_1_0.pdf.

¹²¹ See Bischof 2004, 18-19 and Uhl 2001, 20-23, as well as the Austrian Declaration of Independence, Preamble: “*(...) angesichts der Tatsache, dass die nationalsozialistische Reichsregierung Adolf Hitlers kraft dieser völligen politischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Annexion des Landes das macht- und willenlos gemachte Volk Österreichs in einen sinn- und aussichtslosen Eroberungskrieg geführt hat, den kein Österreicher jemals gewollt hat, jemals voraussehen oder gutzuheißen instand gesetzt war, zur Bekriegung von Völkern, gegen die kein wahrer Österreicher jemals Gefühle der Feindschaft oder des Hasses gehegt hat (...)*”. In: *Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich*, 01.05.1945; online at: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1945_1_0/1945_1_0.pdf.

that Austria was a victim of the violent aggression of Nazi Germany.¹²² In this narrative, the country was occupied by foreign troops between 1938 and 1945 and so disappeared from the map during that entire time period. The logical implication was that Austria bore no responsibility for anything that happened in these seven years of occupation.¹²³ While such an official narrative resonated only with a small number of Austrians - former concentration camp inmates, resistance fighters and a few anti-Nazi elites who were part of the founding parties of the Second Republic - it quickly gained strong public support from wide segments of Austria's society.¹²⁴ By promoting unity and Austrian national self-identification as different from Germany, the national victim narrative bore the potential to absorb diverse social groups and their different war experiences, shifting the focus to the needs of the present and future.¹²⁵ Austria's post-war politicians soon realized the potential of the victim narrative for domestic peace and stability and actively worked to retain from the past only what served as a present source of national pride and patriotism. They managed to create a distinctive "Austrianess" built on historic events from the time before the *Anschluss*, or on Austria's role skilfully tweaked in opposition to (Nazi) Germany.¹²⁶

¹²² The roots of such a self-image go back even further than 1945, to the Moscow Declaration of 1943. In October 1943, the foreign ministers of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States met in order to discuss the allied war tactics towards the Nazi Regime. One item on the agenda was concerned with Austria. In their joint declaration, the Allied powers characterized Austria as the first free country that had fallen prey to Hitler's aggression and that consequentially had to be liberated from German rule. However, the declaration also included reference to a passage on Austrian co-responsibility for the war which was later dropped in the negotiations about the Austrian State Treaty in 1955.

See Austrian Declaration of Independence, Reference to the passage of co-responsibility stemming from the Moscow Declaration: „*Jedoch wird Österreich darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass es für die Beteiligung am Kriege auf Seiten Hitlerdeutschlands Verantwortung trägt, der es nicht entgehen kann, und dass bei der endgültigen Regelung unvermeidlich sein eigener Beitrag zu seiner Befreiung berücksichtigt werden wird.*“ In: Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich, 01.05.1945; online at: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1945_1_0/1945_1_0.pdf.

¹²³ Uhl 2011.

¹²⁴ Hanisch 1996, 33-50. Uhl 1992, 84.

¹²⁵ Pelinka 1996, 23-31. Wodak et al. 2009, 52-55.

¹²⁶ Pelinka 1990, 127-129.

However, while contributing to a stable and peaceful climate within the Second Republic, the country's grand delusion ("*Lebenslüge*"¹²⁷, as it became known) received serious questioning from the international community. Among the critical voices was first and foremost, Israel. As such, while Austrian post-war elites certainly had more urgent priorities at the time than the proclamation of the State of Israel in the Middle East, officials – unlike the Austrian public¹²⁸ – nevertheless showed an immediate interest in the newly proclaimed Jewish state from the very beginning. For instance, despite the negligible material worth of Austrian property in Palestine,¹²⁹ Austrian officials closely followed and actively tried to intervene in the Knesset debate of 26 July 1950 on the expropriation of German property in Palestine. During the debate, Austrian officials attempted behind the scenes to silence a call from Zerach Wahrhaftig, a member of the national-religious *Mizrachi* party, who requested the inclusion of Austrian property within this law by repeatedly pointing to Austria's involvement in the Nazi prosecutions and its voluntary rather than forced *Anschluss* in

¹²⁷ Botz 1996.

¹²⁸ The Austrian public showed no particular interest in the proclamation of Israel in 1948 as only a brief mentioning in the newspapers underlines. The disinterest of the Austrian public in matters important to Jewish history became also evident in the first bilateral act between Austria and Israel in which officials cooperated to transfer the remains of Theodor Herzl, the mentor and founder of the Jewish state from Vienna to Jerusalem. The accompanying ceremony in Vienna that took place in August 1949 was of insignificant scale and attended mainly by Jews. The matter was apparently of little importance, if not completely unknown to the general Austrian public (Embacher and Reiter 1998, 44-55).

¹²⁹ For the purpose of this argument, it is important to point out that the real value of Austrian property in Palestine had been estimated relatively low. It concerned mainly property held by the Church as well as by individual companies (Albrich 1997, 180). Moreover, only two known cases had been documented in the archives: a shipping company in Haifa, seized in 1939; and the valuables of one individual person that consisted of sporting guns and binoculars which had previously been auctioned off by the British.

Sources: Internal office note by Dr. Krahl addressed to the Department 5pol: "Austrian property in Palestine", Vienna, 10 September 1948. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Palästina 49, 116846_pol 1948.

1938.¹³⁰ In order to stop Wahrhaftig, both Knesset members¹³¹ and journalists¹³² with Austrian roots were approached with a request to neutralize the matter and once and for all establish a clear distinction between Germany and Austria. This first Austrian diplomatic effort vis-à-vis Israel was ultimately successful: the Israeli expropriation law in the end did not include Austrian property. Nevertheless, the debate had for the first time marked a red line for the Austrians; the mere naming of Austria at the same time as Germany was regarded as “defamatory” and “discomforting”.¹³³ In other words, Austrian officials had realized that Israel posed a major threat to but also an opportunity for its national image of victimhood vis-à-vis Nazi Germany. The Jewish state would henceforth be crucial to the realization of Austria’s aim to portray its innocence regarding the Nazi past to the international stage and Austria began to structure its national interest around this notion. The Austrian interest in

¹³⁰ See: Knesset protocols of the speeches of Sarach Wahrhaftig and Zwi Pinkas, 26 July 1950. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 49, Gz. 126 722_pol 1950.

Hartl reports to Foreign Minister Gruber on the “Law on expropriation of German property in Israel”, Tel Aviv, 19 August 1950. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 49, Gz. 126 722_pol 1950.

¹³¹ Knesset member David Zwi Pinkas, a former Austrian Jew from Burgenland who openly harboured sympathies for his old home country and who was from the same religious Zionist front as Wahrhaftig was approached by Karl Hartl. Consequentially, Pinkas – in response to Wahrhaftig - underlined the difference between German and Austrian guilt in front of the Knesset. By pledging to concentrate on “facts rather than emotions”, he accused Wahrhaftig of making himself judge over “good and evil”. In his defence of Austria, he further pointed to the collaboration of all European countries with the Nazis.

See: Hartl reports to Foreign Minister Gruber on the „Law on expropriation of German property in Israel“, Tel Aviv, 6 August 1950. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 49, Gz. 126 722_pol 1950.

Knesset protocols of the speeches of Sarach Wahrhaftig and Zwi Pinkas, 26 July 1950. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 49, Gz. 126 722_pol 1950.

¹³² As a consequence, Journalist Immanuel Unger, a former Viennese Jew, published a pro-Austrian article under the title “Reconciliation and Retaliation” (“*Versöhnung und Vergeltung*”) in the German-speaking newspaper *Yedioth Hayom*. The article reinforced the Austrian victim myth by pointing to Austria’s opposition towards the Nazis despite its small size and powerlessness. Unger further underlined his argument with Austria’s cultural mentality, the so-called “*Wiener Gemütlichkeit*” or Viennese charm that stands in stark contrast to German/Prussian militarism. Unger went as far as to excuse the eventual case of Austrian antisemitism: Dependent on the amount of wine consumed, the general Austrian was either “*antisemitic or anti-nazi or anti-socialist*”. The article concluded by welcoming official Israel’s decision to clearly differentiate between Germany and Austria.

See: *Yedioth Hayom*, “*Versöhnung und Vergeltung*”, by Imanuel Unger, 4 August 1950. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 6, Gz. 121475_pol 1950.

¹³³ See: Hartl reports to Foreign Minister Gruber on the “law on expropriation of German property in Israel”, Tel Aviv, 19 August 1950. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 49, Gz. 126 722_pol 1950.

Hartl reports to the Austrian Foreign Ministry on the “Israeli Press on Austria”, Tel Aviv, 26 August 1950. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 6, Gz. 121475_pol 1950.

Israel therefore stems from little material interest¹³⁴ but a high symbolic worth for its very own national image, a notion that the first Austrian representative in Tel Aviv later summed up in the rhetorical question: “who is interested in Israel anyway, unless it starts shouting that the Austrians were Nazis?”¹³⁵

In practice, the Israeli differentiation between Austria and Germany manifested itself on several levels. The import ban on German products did not touch Austrian produce, even though the initial Knesset vote on the matter was almost tied in the first round and could only be ratified in a second round of voting.¹³⁶ The ban of German items also did not end in the economic sphere; the use of the German language was forbidden in Israel, as were German cultural goods. Austrian films, magazines and books were again left untouched by this regulation.¹³⁷

On the political and diplomatic level, Israel treated the FRG as an anathema. Germans were denied entry visas to Israel and Israeli passports excluded travel to Germany. Israeli diplomats were further advised to find the earliest possible way out of conversation should a German diplomat approach them on social occasions. The office of the Jewish Agency in Munich which facilitated the emigration of displaced persons and Holocaust survivors was accredited with the occupying powers rather than with the German authorities, and while the office was retained after the formation of the FRG in 1949, Consul Eliahu Kurt Livneh was advised not to entertain any (open) contact with Germans.¹³⁸ Moreover, on the international stage, the Israeli government actively worked against the restoration of Germany into the

¹³⁴ In the late 1940s, beginning of 1950s, Israel was for Austria - in comparison to the Arab world - of little importance: both politically and economically. Austria's main material interests in Israel were mutually beneficial trade contacts, the remaining Austrian property in Israel and the legal protection of numerous Austrian Jews that had emigrated to Israel (Albrich 1997, 180 and Steininger 2012, 43).

¹³⁵ Hartl 1952, quoted in: Embacher and Reiter 1998, 44.

¹³⁶ Hotam 2005, 155.

¹³⁷ Embacher and Reiter 1998, 65.

¹³⁸ Segev 1995, 257-260.

community of states, for instance by opposing FRG membership in international organizations.¹³⁹ When German parliamentarians at the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Congress in Istanbul in 1950 met the Israeli delegation for the first time, the Israeli speaker and later president Ben Zvi protested the German presence and called it "an insult to every honest and decent human being".¹⁴⁰

While Israel treated Germany as a pariah state, bilateral contacts began with Austria. Austria, despite diplomatically finding itself in some sort of no-man's land when it came to its foreign policy, having not yet gained full sovereignty from the occupying powers, was nevertheless among the first countries to welcome the creation of the State of Israel.¹⁴¹ "I am pleased to inform Your Excellency that the Austrian government has de facto recognized the state of Israel. At this opportunity, I'd like to express the hope that diplomatic relations between our countries will soon become possible," wrote Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber to his Israeli counterpart Moshe Sharett on 11 April 1949.¹⁴² The timing of the Austrian recognition of Israel was not accidental and reflected the leverage that world opinion had on Austria's decision: Austria's de-facto recognition came shortly after the UN's move to grant membership to the Israeli state and of course after Soviet and American recognition had been given. As such, Austria felt inclined and to some extent even obliged to recognize Israel without seeking approval from the Allied Council first.¹⁴³

Israel, on the other hand, was not keen on Austria's recognition. A briefing note to Kurt Lewin, the unofficial Israeli immigration officer in Salzburg who, like his German

¹³⁹ Such as the WHO, UNESCO and the ILO (Hall 2015, 123).

¹⁴⁰ Ben Zvi 1950, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 19.

¹⁴¹ Zweig 2010, 51.

¹⁴² Telegram of the Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber to Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, 11 April 1949, quoted in: Steining 2012, 32. The German original: "*Ich freue mich, Eurer Exzellenz mitteilen zu können, dass die österreichische Bundesregierung den Staat Israel de facto anerkannt hat. Bei diesem Anlass möchte ich auch der Hoffnung Ausdruck geben, dass eine baldige Aufnahme der Beziehungen zwischen unseren Ländern möglich sein wird.*"

¹⁴³ Chancellor Figl, 15 March 1949, quoted in: Steining 2012, 31.

counterpart in Munich, was accredited with the occupational powers rather than with the Austrian authorities,¹⁴⁴ revealed Israel's reluctant attitude: "We are not eager for this recognition. (...) if you are being asked, answer diplomatically that the state of Israel welcomes recognition; but do not apply any pressure."¹⁴⁵ The Israeli credo instead was to retain a low profile and keep diplomatic relations to a minimum.¹⁴⁶ This obvious Israeli reluctance to establishing relations with Austria flies in the face of any realist cost-benefit calculus on Israel's side. Not only was the politically isolated and economically weak Israel eager for any diplomatic support it could get at the time, but, in addition, Austria also represented all of its main national interests: immigration, raw materials and non-alignment.¹⁴⁷ Economically, Austria with its low price level constituted an attractive market for Israel,¹⁴⁸ and the country's strategic location between what would soon emerge as the Eastern and Western bloc gave Austria a unique position as a transit country for Eastern European and Russian Jews.¹⁴⁹ These present Israeli interests conflicted with normative considerations about the past and gave rise to Israel's reluctant and ambivalent attitude towards Austria for the decades to come. While Austria had by now clearly realized that

¹⁴⁴ Kurt Lewin started his work in Salzburg (in the American occupation zone) as early as September 1948. Under the auspices of Lewin and with the support of US-Jewish organizations, the office in the *Getreidegasse* facilitated the emigration of 4700 displaced persons and survivors of concentration camps between August 1948 and January 1949 (Albrich 1998a, 114). Overall, between the end of the war and the closure of the office in 1950, an estimated number of 300 000 Jews from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe emigrated to Palestine/Israel passing through Austria (Albrich 1998a, 130). Internal Austrian and Israeli documents however reveal that keeping the matter "tacit", i.e. out of the eyes of their publics, as well as "unofficial", i.e. at a low level, was in the interest of both countries at the time (Hotam 2005, 146-150).

See also: Israeli Foreign Ministry Shertok to the Foreign Minister of Austria on Dr. Kurt Lewin, Hakyria, 29 June 1948. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Palästina 3, Gz. 110216_pol 48.

Internal document by the Austrian Foreign Ministry titled „Information on Dr. Kurt Lewin, Delegate of the State of Israel“, Vienna, 7 September 1948. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Palästina 3, 110216_pol 1948.

¹⁴⁵ Israeli Foreign Ministry to Kurt Lewin, 3 March 1949, quoted in: Hotam 2005, 150.

¹⁴⁶ See, for instance: Hotam 2005, 150 and an article in *Hakidmah*, titled "Austria 1951" by Moshe Meisels, 28 September 1951. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 6, Gz. 131737_pol 1951.

¹⁴⁷ Hotam 2005, 149. Zweig 2010, 51.

¹⁴⁸ As a consequence, as early as 1949, trade and economic agreements with Austria were discussed with the result that since the 1950s, Israel imported chemical fertilizer, prefabricated houses, wood, paper, machines and products made of iron and steel from Austria. Austria on the other hand became the fifth biggest importer of Israeli citrus fruits world-wide (Albrich 1997, 181 and Hotam 2005, 148).

¹⁴⁹ See for instance, Hotam 2005, 146.

good relations with Israel would serve to underline its victim status in front of the world and in the eyes of the Allied powers, Israel too had understood Austria's political calculus with the past. From the time of recognition onwards, the disputed legacy of Austria's past dictated a specific bilateral dynamic between the two countries: while Austria aimed for an upgrade of relations to a higher status for the purpose of conveying its "innocence" to the world, it was Israeli policy to keep the Austrians at a distance exactly for the purpose of not providing any grounds for Vienna to point to healthy diplomatic relations with the Jewish state as evidence of Austria's status as a victim of the Nazis.¹⁵⁰ History and its specific national interpretations hence became utilized on both sides to further their respective goals.

The first official exchange and choice of consuls between Austria and Israel in 1950 once more underlines the two countries' intentions to make diplomacy with their own memory of the past. Karl Hartl was selected as the first Austrian consul to Tel Aviv. Hartl was not picked by accident: after the *Anschluss* in 1938, Hartl, who was a socialist, had fled to France together with his Jewish wife. Following the outbreak of war, he fought in the French resistance and was captured by the SS in the battle for Southern France's liberation, but managed to flee just before his planned execution. In the aftermath of the war, he then served in the Austrian representative office in Paris from where he facilitated the repatriation of

¹⁵⁰ Zweig 2010, 51.

Generally speaking, states establish diplomatic relations with one another to manage official interaction between national governments. According to the international code of diplomatic conduct, the establishment of bilateral relations broadly reflects the degree of friendship between two countries. Exchanging ambassadors is the highest form of a bilateral relationship, while the exchange of consuls signifies a lower degree of ties. In fact, the latter often forms a preliminary step towards the establishment of "full" diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level. In order to upgrade the diplomatic relationship from "half" to "full", bilateral agreement has to be sought: Diplomacy is always governed by what is called "the rule of reciprocity". Such a rule suggests the exchange of officials of equal ranking. Similarly, the withdrawal of ambassadors or the threat thereof has become an internationally accepted, diplomatic practice that emphasizes sanctions against the other state. Having no diplomatic relations at all is of course the strongest sign of two countries' not recognizing one another's existence as sovereign, independent actors in international affairs and often is accompanied by mistrust and outright hatred between the countries in question. Diplomatic relations and their varying degree hence in and of themselves can become an instrument of statecraft that signals distance or friendship between countries (Freeman 1997, 93-95 and Sen 1988, 9-24 & 526-530).

Austrian war prisoners.¹⁵¹ An internal Foreign Ministry document described him as a “(...) glowing Austrian patriot of a specific Viennese coloring”.¹⁵² Hartl thus not only embodied Austria’s victim status but also the country’s resistance to Nazi Germany. By sending an opponent and victim of the Nazi regime to Israel, official Austria clearly sought to project the country’s recently fabricated national narrative to the outside world. Further evidence of this effort can be found in the Austrian Foreign Ministry’s additional advice to its personnel in Israel to emphasize the absence of antisemitism in Austria and to deliberately underline the similarity between the experiences of Austrian politicians and Jews who had suffered side-by-side in Nazi Germany’s concentration camps.¹⁵³

Hartl’s Israeli counterpart in Vienna was Arie Eshel. While Hartl somewhat embodied the Austrian victim narrative, the choice and mind-set of Eshel also reflected Israel’s ambivalent diplomatic strategy. Eshel was a German Jew who upon his arrival in Palestine lived in a kibbutz and was part of the *Hechalutz* pioneer movement.¹⁵⁴ Due to his origins, he was well acquainted with the German language and culture, thus a good fit for the post in Vienna. However, while Hartl was instructed by the Foreign Ministry to portray a philosemitic image of Austria, Eshel was advised by the Israeli Ministry not to be too friendly with the Austrian officials with whom he dealt.¹⁵⁵

A closer comparison between the mind-sets of the two early consuls is even more revealing of the two countries’ diverse official interpretations of the recent past. Hartl, just like most of Austria’s post-war socialist political elite, was a clear proponent of the Austrian victim narrative, standing ready to transfer his own individual victim status to the entire nation. In

¹⁵¹ Steininger 2012, 45-46.

¹⁵² Ambassador Bischoff 1946, quoted in: Steininger 2012, 46. The German original says: “Seine hervorstechendsten Eigenschaften sind (...) ein glühender österreichischer Patriotismus von spezifischer Wiener Färbung”.

¹⁵³ Embacher and Reiter 1998, 58.

¹⁵⁴ Embacher and Reiter 1998, 63.

¹⁵⁵ Zweig 2010, 51.

all of his many reports and letters – be they private or official – Consul Hartl never questioned Austria’s victim status, therefore showing little tolerance for Israel’s permanent insistence on Nazi issues.¹⁵⁶ Hartl’s “active adversary in Vienna” – as Hartl described Eshel¹⁵⁷ - on the other hand tirelessly criticised the emerging Austrian victim myth and attempted to keep the memory of the past alive. Eshel pointed again and again to the remaining and resurging antisemitism within Austrian society as well as to Austria’s role within the Nazi regime.¹⁵⁸ In a newspaper interview in 1951, Eshel described his “delicate” position in Austria, a country – as he underlined - that clearly had played its part in the extermination of the Jews. While always emphasising a differentiation between Austria and Germany, he nevertheless was of the opinion that the few individuals that had been in opposition to Nazism and who now formed the political Austrian elite could not free the entire Austrian population from its responsibility.¹⁵⁹ This of course was the exact opposite of the official Austrian strategy.

The formation of the Austro-Israeli relationship hence took place within a frame of conflicting national narratives about the Nazi past. Forged on the official level only, these narratives formed almost completely out of the sight of and independent from the public. In contrast to the official level, the public in the immediate post-war years had not yet

¹⁵⁶ Steininger 2012, 70.

See Hartl’s reports:

Hartl reports to the Austrian Foreign Ministry on the “Israeli Press on Austria”, Tel Aviv, 26 August 1950. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 6, Gz. 121475_pol 1950.

Hartl reports to Foreign Minister Gruber on the “Law on expropriation of German property in Israel”, Tel Aviv, 19 August 1950. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 49, Gz. 126 722_pol 1950.

Hartl to the Austrian Foreign Ministry: “The Israeli Press on Austria”, Tel Aviv, (undated) 1951. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 6, Gz. 131737_pol 1951.

Hartl reports to the Austrian Foreign Ministry on “The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel”, Tel Aviv, 26 May 1952. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 146 350_pol 1952.

¹⁵⁷ Hartl 1954, quoted in: Embacher and Reiter 1998, 63.

¹⁵⁸ Embacher and Reiter 1998, 63.

¹⁵⁹ Consul Eshel quoted in an article in *Hakidmah*, titled “Austria 1951” by Moshe Meisels, 28 September 1951. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 6, Gz. 131737_pol 1951.

developed a clear collective memory of the Nazi past. In West Germany, Austria and Israel, public memory was buried under an urge to forget by looking to the present and future.¹⁶⁰ While the Israeli public's silence stemmed from the traumatic experience of the Holocaust, the West German and Austrian public's silence can best be explained as being the result of a predominant "clean sweep" or "zero hour" ("*Stunde Null*") mentality, aimed at a fresh start into a new future unburdened by the past. This oppressive past was not the Holocaust, but instead the Austrian public's own suffering as a result of war; the struggle of daily survival and the expulsion from the East, as well as Soviet repression. As such, in Austria to an even stronger extent than in West Germany, any feelings of guilt that people may have harboured were overshadowed by the overwhelming feeling of victimization resulting from the hardships undergone in and after the war.¹⁶¹ Former enemies and present occupiers were blamed for this suffering, in addition to a handful of ruthless Nazi criminals (in the West German case) and Nazi Germany itself (in the Austrian case).¹⁶² Looking back on post-war public memory later on, German philosopher Herman Lübbe argued in 1983 that the public's "partial silence" or what Theodor Adorno called an "atmosphere of cold and empty forgetting"¹⁶³ had been a social, psychological and political necessity for the transformation of the German population into the citizenry of the Federal Republic.¹⁶⁴ The same could be said about the formation of the Austrian population into the citizenry of the Second Republic. Whatever the ultimate domestic purpose of the public's memory was, officially and internationally the picture looked very different for both West Germany and Austria. While

¹⁶⁰ For more on Israel's public silence about the Holocaust in the direct aftermath of World War II, see: Zerubavel 1995, 1-15.

¹⁶¹ Herf 1997, 6 & 276. Berger 2012, 87.

For a more nuanced approach on German public memory in the aftermath of World War II, see: Olick 2005 and Longerich 2006. On a comparison between the Holocaust reception in Austria and Germany, see: Thünemann 2005.

¹⁶² For Austria's public memory, see: Hanisch 1994, 405 & 420 and Knight 2000a, 7.

¹⁶³ Markovits and Reich 1997, 36.

¹⁶⁴ Herf 1997, 6.

the domestic public attempted to forget the past for the sake of the present and future, officials began to deliberately shape national memory for the purpose of present and future political gain. The diplomatic efforts between Austria and Israel described above were one way in which this endeavour entered the international arena. Whereas pragmatic interests conflicted with moral considerations on the Israeli side when it came to establishing bilateral relations with Austria, Austrian interests in Israel were derived almost exclusively from the symbolic value that Israel held over Austria's emerging national victim image. Consequently, Austria could fully concentrate its efforts on forging its memory into a diplomatic tool that would from then on not only distort the cost-benefit calculus in the country's conduct with Israel, but would also determine the outcome of bilateral negotiations in the years to come. Israel, on the other hand, clearly used diplomatic relations with Austria and its "non-relationship" with West Germany as an instrument of statecraft to signal distance and mistrust. At the same time, Israel's dire economic conditions and political needs began to loom ever larger next to the normative considerations stemming from the past. It was in this context that the issue of reparations came onto the negotiating table.

2. Forging the diplomacy of guilt: The question of reparations between West Germany and Israel

On 15 September 1949, Konrad Adenauer became the first freely elected Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. The legacy of the past and how to deal with it were crucially interwoven in these first free elections. While Kurt Schumacher, Adenauer's opponent from the Social Democratic Party (SPD), stood for the option of democratization with a clear commitment to memory and justice, Adenauer himself promoted a democratic model at the

price of a weakened memory and justice delayed. The ultimate electoral victory of Adenauer's conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU) not least reflected the then widespread German public's attitude of reticence about the past. Democracy and the transformation of the post-war German population into a German citizenry should come at the price of (temporary) public forgetting.¹⁶⁵ Adenauer - like no one else – stood for this pathway towards democratisation and Westernization, while the emerging fault-lines of the Cold War facilitated his plan.¹⁶⁶ By way of his personality, Adenauer, or “*der Alte*” (“the old one”) as he was nicknamed, served as a somewhat father-like figure who would protect and integrate all Germans, even those with compromised pasts. As a consequence, Adenauer who himself was a fierce opponent of the Hitler regime not least due to his strong Catholic convictions, inaugurated a first West German parliament which included 53 elected parliamentarians who were former members of the NSDAP.¹⁶⁷ West Germany's classic era of silence and democratization through integration had begun – a trend that was only reversed in the 1960s.¹⁶⁸

It was nevertheless Adenauer who became crucial in reaching out to Israel and the Jews.¹⁶⁹ In doing so, Adenauer clearly understood the importance of reconciliation with Israel as a political necessity of rehabilitating Germany in the world. It was in this way that the memory of the Holocaust resurfaced on the official level and was placed in the service of power.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵ Herf 1997, 6-11. Bark and Gress 1993, 250-257.

For more on the formative phase of the Federal Republic, see: Haftendorn 2006, 14-17.

¹⁶⁶ The Cold War rapidly shifted the Western Allied powers' focus from denazification to anticommunism at the expense of the memory of the Nazi past. The newly emerging fault-lines made solidarities aroused by the war obsolete and even dangerous. Thus, Churchill's “unnatural alliance” between the West and the Soviet Union that had brought about Nazism's defeat already seized to exist by 1949 (Herf 1997, 8).

¹⁶⁷ 1/8 of all members of the first West German Parliament were former NSDAP members; 3 of them had even been members of the SS and one was a member of the SA (Deutschkron 1983, 28).

¹⁶⁸ Herf 1997, 266-267.

¹⁶⁹ Vogel 1967a, 17 and Deutschkron 1983, 12.

¹⁷⁰ Herf 1997, 7.

As early as his first interview on 11 November 1949, Adenauer declared his stance regarding the Jewish question. In expressing not only his personal opinion but also the attitude of the Federal Republic, this interview signified a radical break with the previous years of official German silence.¹⁷¹

In so far as it is possible in the aftermath of the annihilation of millions of people beyond retrieval, the German people are willing to *make good* the injustice committed against the Jews in the German name by a criminal regime. We consider such a restitution (*Wiedergutmachung*) as our duty. The Federal Government is committed to initiate appropriate action.¹⁷²

In its desire to atone for the past, West Germany indeed soon reached out to Israel. With a first concrete offer of 10 Million DM, West German officials tested the ground on whether Israel would consider entering into direct negotiations with the FRG. This step was novel and significant for two reasons. First, it recognized Israel as the representative of Jewish claims. Second, it extended the possibility of an extensive material transfer. Previous forms of compensation for Nazi victims had been directed only at individuals.¹⁷³ The FRG thus signalled that it was willing to freely accept legal and moral responsibility for Nazi crimes, and without using a loophole of international law that did not require reparations between countries that had not existed at the time the crimes were committed.

In Israel, this German signal was initially met with significant opposition. On the one hand, the Israeli government was in desperate need for financial support. The newly founded Jewish state was not only regionally isolated and surrounded by hostile neighbours, but it

¹⁷¹ Deutschkron 1983, 12.

¹⁷² Interview with Adenauer on 11 November 1949 by Karl Marx, Editor of *Allgemeine Wochenzeitung der Juden in Deutschland*, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 18. The German original:

“Das deutsche Volk ist gewillt, das Unrecht, das in seinem Namen durch ein verbrecherisches Regime an den Juden verübt wurde, soweit wiedergutzumachen, wie dies nur möglich ist, nachdem Millionen Menschen unwiederbringlich vernichtet sind. Diese Wiedergutmachung betrachten wir als unsere Pflicht. Die Bundesregierung ist entschlossen, die entsprechenden Maßnahmen zu treffen.”

¹⁷³ Hall 2015, 124 -125.

also lacked both industrial means of production as well as foreign currency. In addition, its sparse resources were strained by an ever-increasing number of Jewish immigrants and an ongoing conflict with the Arabs.¹⁷⁴ On the other hand, there was an extremely strong moral opposition to any kind of direct interaction with the FRG, particularly when this would come at the price of increasing the FRG's legitimacy. In navigating the dilemma between material and moral considerations, Israel appealed to the occupational powers for reparation requests instead of talking to the FRG directly.¹⁷⁵ However, while being sympathetic to the idea of reparations, the Allied powers did not know how they could legally force the FRG to pay reparations to the State of Israel, as it had not existed during the war. Hence, Israel could no longer ignore the FRG and was forced to enter into direct talks with the West Germans.¹⁷⁶

The first meeting between Adenauer and the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Finance, David Horowitz, as well as the Israeli Ambassador to France, Maurice Fischer, took place in Paris in full secrecy on 19 April 1951. The aim was to test the ground for future negotiations between the two countries.¹⁷⁷ Horowitz immediately began to outline the Israeli position. Even though it was utterly impossible to atone for such a horrific past, any kind of financial negotiation could only begin once an official and public declaration of guilt had been made by the FRG. Such a statement had to acknowledge both responsibility for and condemnation of the Nazi crimes. "It will happen", answered Adenauer promptly, adding that his country sincerely wished to support Israel.¹⁷⁸

On 27 September 1951 Adenauer followed up on his promise and gave a speech in front of the German *Bundestag*: "The Government of the Federal Republic and with it the majority

¹⁷⁴ Deutschkron 1983, 29 and Hall 2015, 125.

¹⁷⁵ See: Legation of Israel 1951 "The Israel claim for reparations from Germany. Identical note to the occupying powers."

¹⁷⁶ Vogel 1967a, 29 and Deutschkron 1983, 21.

¹⁷⁷ Deutschkron 1983, 29-30.

¹⁷⁸ Segev 1995, 271.

of the German people are aware of the overwhelming suffering that the time of National Socialism has inflicted upon the Jews in Germany and the occupied countries.”¹⁷⁹ While underlining that a major part of the German population did not personally participate in the crimes against the Jews, Adenauer nevertheless continued to emphasize that unspeakable atrocities were committed in the name of the German people and that this alone obliged them to provide moral and material compensation.¹⁸⁰ Despite Adenauer’s hint at the FRG’s material limits regarding the amount of reparations, stemming from its own financial burden of having to integrate refugees and war victims, Adenauer nevertheless showed his full willingness to enter into negotiations with Israel in order to – as he put it – “facilitate the cleansing of the soul from indefinite suffering”.¹⁸¹ The speech concluded by pointing out that the FRG was “deeply committed to the idea that the spirit of true humanity should again become alive and fertile. The Federal Government further viewed serving this spirit with all its strength as the foremost duty of the German people.”¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Adenauer’s speech before the German Bundestag, 27 September 1951, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 36.

The German original: “Die Bundesregierung und mit ihr die große Mehrheit des deutschen Volkes sind sich des unermesslichen Leidens bewusst, das in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus über die Juden in Deutschland und in den besetzten Gebieten gebracht wurde.”

¹⁸⁰ Adenauer’s speech before the German Bundestag, 27 September 1951, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 36.

In German: “(...) Das deutsche Volk hat in seiner überwiegenden Mehrheit die an den Juden begangenen Verbrechen verabscheut und hat sich nicht an ihnen beteiligt. (...) Im Namen des deutschen Volkes sind aber unsagbare Verbrechen begangen worden, die zur moralischen und materiellen Wiedergutmachung verpflichten, sowohl hinsichtlich der individuellen Schäden, die Juden erlitten haben, als auch des jüdischen Eigentums, für das heute individuell Berechtigte nicht mehr vorhanden sind.”

¹⁸¹ Adenauer’s speech before the German Bundestag, 27 September 1951, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 36.

In German: “Hinsichtlich des Umfangs der Wiedergutmachung – in Anbetracht der ungeheuren Zerstörung jüdischer Werte durch den Nationalsozialismus ein sehr bedeutsames Problem – müssen die Grenzen berücksichtigt werden, die der deutschen Leistungsfähigkeit durch die bittere Notwendigkeit der Versorgung der zahllosen Kriegsoffer und der Fürsorge für die Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene gezogen sind. Die Bundesregierung ist bereit, gemeinsam mit Vertretern des Judentums und des Staates Israel, der so viele heimatlose jüdische Flüchtlinge aufgenommen hat, eine Lösung des materiellen Wiedergutmachungsproblems herbeizuführen, um damit den Weg zur seelischen Bereinigung unendlichen Leidens zu erleichtern.”

¹⁸² Adenauer’s speech before the German Bundestag, 27 September 1951, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 36.

In German: “Sie ist tief davon durchdrungen, dass der Geist wahrer Menschlichkeit wieder lebendig und fruchtbar werden muss. Diesem Geist mit aller Kraft zu dienen, betrachtet die Bundesregierung als die vornehmste Pflicht des deutschen Volkes.”

With this speech, Adenauer had thus officially committed the FRG to enter into discussions with Jewish representatives and the Israeli state. His speech further contained all the elements of West Germany's emerging "diplomacy of guilt" towards Israel:¹⁸³ the acknowledgment of the wrongdoings in the German name, the expression of guilt and shame¹⁸⁴ and the will for *Wiedergutmachung* based on the voluntary admittance of moral (and legal) responsibility. A credible, morally responsible, guilty perpetrator would thenceforth and correspondingly to these convictions seek to ameliorate the harm and send verbal and substantive gestures of remorse just as Adenauer had now promised to Israel. Yet in this remarkable early acceptance of the burdens of the Nazi crimes, Adenauer had to resort to troubling circumlocutions in order to make his views acceptable to the broader German public. He almost always used the passive voice when referring to the suffering of the Jewish people so not to identify the perpetrators and he further openly exculpated the majority of Germans from the Nazi crimes. Adenauer clearly knew that the public's narrative of the past was very different to his official version of guilt. His speech, however, not only revealed that the FRG deliberately chose to convey an officially constructed image of a guilty and morally responsible perpetrator to the international stage, but that this specific image also served the FRG's strategic aims by fostering its reintegration into the Western world community. Hence, with Adenauer's speech in front of the German *Bundestag* in September 1951, the diplomacy of guilt was born as the FRG's official diplomatic strategy. The entire

¹⁸³ See Todd Hall's (2015, 117-139) analysis of the same example of West German reparation payments to Israel. Hall understands West Germany's diplomacy of guilt towards Israel in a similar way, however, he puts emphasis on the strategic acting out of the emotion of guilt rather than of the international portrayal of an official historic image/narrative.

¹⁸⁴ The notion that the Germans should feel collective shame (*Kollektivscham*) rather than collective guilt (*Kollektivschuld*) goes back to President Theodor Heuss: „Das Wort *Kollektivschuld* ist eine simple Vereinfachung, ist eine Umdrehung, nämlich der Art, wie die Nazis es gewohnt waren, die Juden anzusehen: dass die Tatsache, Jude zu sein, bereits das Schuldphänomen in sich eingeschlossen habe. Aber etwas wie eine *Kollektivscham* ist aus dieser Zeit gewachsen und geblieben. Das Schlimmste, was Hitler uns angetan hat (...), ist doch dies gewesen, dass er uns in die Scham gezwungen hat, mit ihm und seinen Gesellen gemeinsam den Namen Deutsche zu tragen.“ (Heuss 1949, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 23).

Bundestag showed its support for Adenauer's statement by standing for a minute's silence.¹⁸⁵

While Adenauer's speech formed the first expressive gesture of West Germany's diplomacy of guilt, it is worth pointing out that its wording was not Adenauer's work alone. Moreover, the draft of the speech was circulated countless times back and forth between Bonn, Jerusalem and the World Jewish Congress until a satisfactory formulation had been reached for all sides. The declaration was not only important for Adenauer to gain domestic support for his diplomatic approach of signalling guilt, but also for the Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, who faced fierce opposition from his own public.¹⁸⁶ The issue of *shilumin*¹⁸⁷, or "blood money" as critics would refer to it, in fact had triggered the first major domestic crisis in Israel. Ben Gurion thus needed Adenauer's statement to find broader support for direct negotiations with the Germans. While both statesmen struggled with their domestic publics, Adenauer personally found himself in a more favourable position than Ben Gurion. For Adenauer, the practising catholic who was not a Nazi, conscience and moral values were completely aligned with the interests of his country, while Ben Gurion was torn between his own moral conscience and the political interests of Israel.¹⁸⁸ In the end, and with the facilitation of Adenauer's expressive gesture, the Israeli government came to the conclusion that it had no choice but to accept German payment. In a heated Knesset debate in January 1952, Ben Gurion managed to convince his opponents with the plea: "Let not the murderers of our nation also be its heirs."¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ Hall 2015, 128.

¹⁸⁶ Deutschkron 1983, 42-44.

¹⁸⁷ *Shilumin* is the Israeli term for reparations from Germany. The word was invented by Moshe Sharett who derived it from Jewish legal tradition. *Shilumin* moreover comes from the root "*leshalem*" which simply means "to pay" whereas the usual Hebrew word for reparations would be *pitsuim* (compensation) which implies a clearance of guilt that settles previous wrongs (Segev 1995, 264-265).

¹⁸⁸ Segev 1995, 272-273 and 276-277.

¹⁸⁹ Ben Gurion 1952, quoted in: Segev 1995, 289.

2.1. The Luxembourg Agreement

Adenauer's symbolic gesture of admitting moral responsibility paved the way for substantive action.¹⁹⁰ On 6 December 1951, the West German Chancellor and the Chairman of the Jewish Claims Conference, Nahum Goldman, met in London. Against Goldman's fears, "arguing over pennies" was certainly not Adenauer's intention and he agreed on the spot to accept Goldman's suggestion of 1.5 billion USD as a basis for negotiations.¹⁹¹ "I can hear the wing beat of history" revealed a personally invested Adenauer to Goldman.¹⁹² The West German Chancellor clearly regarded these negotiations as taking place outside of the realm of standard transactions and that it was memory, not money that mattered most. As a consequence, he had to make his decision over the heads of not just many opposing voices from the public but also from those within his own party who applied material cost-benefit calculations to the issue. One of them was Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer. Schäffer repeatedly pointed to the financial burden that reparations implied for West Germany. In a letter to him, Adenauer once more clarified his standpoint: "I'd like to express the wish that negotiations will be conducted putting aside concerns that in any other case would apply, and instead will be orientated towards the moral and political weight that these unique obligations carry for us."¹⁹³ As such, Adenauer openly asked his officials to suspend traditional cost-benefit calculations in these bilateral negotiations for the sake of achieving a different rational aim. He further obliged his officials to deliberately make a costly investment into portraying a certain official attitude about the past onto the diplomatic stage.

¹⁹⁰ For a detailed account on the way to Luxembourg, see: Weingardt (2002, 76-93).

See Hall (2015, 134-139) for a similar interpretation of the Luxembourg Agreement as being a substantive gesture of the diplomacy of guilt.

¹⁹¹ Bark and Gress 1993, 312-313.

¹⁹² Adenauer 1951, quoted in: Segev 1995, 276. In German: "*Ich höre den Flügelschlag der Geschichte*".

¹⁹³ Letter from Adenauer to Fritz Schäffer, Bonn, 29 February 1952, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 41. The German original: "*Ich gebe dem Wunsche Ausdruck, dass die Verhandlungen unter weitgehender Hintanstellung aller Bedenken, die in einem anderen Falle sehr verständlich wären, in einem Geiste vorbereitet und durchgeführt werden, der dem moralischen und politischen Gewicht und der Einmaligkeit unserer Verpflichtungen entspricht*".

For that purpose, Adenauer chose Franz Böhm as his chief negotiator, who he noted in his memoirs as a man who held similar views to him regarding these questions.¹⁹⁴ Böhm, a *Bundestag* member of the CDU, indeed was one of those few individuals who held *Wiedergutmachung* in high regard and understood better than most West Germans that the FRG had a huge legacy of historical debt.¹⁹⁵ “Any person who was appalled by the cruelties and abominations of the Hitler period when they were perpetrated, who empathized with the victims and helped when he was able, is passionately committed to *Wiedergutmachung*”, as Böhm recalled his stance in 1954. Mobilizing the concept of *Wiedergutmachung* as an appeal to conscience, he added with an eye to its many opponents:

But those who identified with Hitler back then, who considered everyone the Gestapo arrested to be an enemy, a criminal or someone socially undesirable, or who, if confronted with the sight of all the cruelty and brutality, consoled himself with the old saw: ‘you can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs’ – that person will view *Wiedergutmachung* today basically as some kind of nuisance.¹⁹⁶

The negotiations with Israel began on 21 March 1952 in Wassenaar, The Netherlands, in full secrecy.¹⁹⁷ However, soon into the negotiations, opposition to Adenauer’s diplomacy of guilt was sparked once again amongst those who remained devoted to the traditional considerations of a cost-benefit calculus, and the prospect of the London Debt conference began to delay agreement in Wassenaar. The FRG’s official proclamation that it was the sole legal successor of Nazi Germany, performed not least also for the purpose of bolstering the FRG’s position vis-à-vis the GDR, entailed nothing less than accepting all financial burdens amassed by the Nazi state. The Head of the FRG’s London delegation Hermann Josef Abs

¹⁹⁴ Deutschkron 1983, 48.

¹⁹⁵ Hockerts 2007, 324.

¹⁹⁶ Böhm 1954, quoted in: Hockerts 2007, 324.

¹⁹⁷ Segev 1995, 304.

thus opposed making any financial commitments to the Israelis until the FRG had reached agreement over its other debt payments. Abs hence clearly viewed the reparation issue through the lens of a material cost-benefit calculus; he couldn't attempt to convince creditors to absolve FRG financial liabilities when at the same time West Germany promised Israel to spend more. Abs received support from Finance Minister Schäffer, who viewed the possibility of taking on another burden as "impossible" without inviting economic collapse, seriously doubting the FRG's ability to pay. Schäffer further insisted that reparations directed towards individuals were sufficient and that the FRG was under no legal obligation to pay additional amounts to the Israeli state. However, what Abs and Schäffer overlooked was that Israeli claims were not to be compared to other German commercial debts. Böhm, in contrast, stood by Adenauer's logic and ever more fiercely prioritized reaching an agreement before any economic concerns. Protesting the threat of a breakdown of negotiations with Israel, Böhm publicly resigned his post.¹⁹⁸ As a result, Adenauer feared a "foreign policy catastrophe of the first order" should his own cabinet turn against reparations. He, however, also understood that moral considerations would not be enough to convince his opponents. Adenauer hence began to once more stress the importance of reparations for West Germany's national interest. No agreement on reparations would severely impair West German efforts to receive foreign credits, thus "reconciliation with the Jews forms an indispensable moral, political and economic requirement for the Federal Republic".¹⁹⁹ In Adenauer's view, reparations were part of the price for West German entry into the Western alliance.²⁰⁰ It was in this context of conflicting German attitudes on what should guide diplomatic behaviour that Adenauer made the choice to pay that price and make a costly gesture that would rescue his diplomatic approach of projecting guilt to Israel and

¹⁹⁸ Weingardt 2002, 82-88. Herf 1997, 284.

¹⁹⁹ Adenauer 1952, quoted in: Herf 1997, 286.

²⁰⁰ Weingardt 2002, 88-89.

the world. He asked Böhm to withdraw his resignation and to make an immediate offer of 3 million DM to Goldman as a basis for continuing negotiations. This amount should furthermore be paid as a series of yearly transfers primarily in the form of goods.²⁰¹ In saving his diplomacy of guilt, Adenauer thus countered the traditional view by refiguring the material cost-benefit calculus: the FRG's image in the world and the paramount significance this matter had for its relations with Western countries, especially the US, must outweigh all financial concerns. The diplomacy of guilt had won.

The final text of the treaty was again circled back and forth between Jerusalem and Bonn. A compromise was sought between the condemnatory language that the Israeli side desired and what Adenauer thought his public was able to digest: "I am ready to hear that," he replied to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett's draft speech, "but Germany is not".²⁰² The FRG's official diplomacy of guilt was clearly directed at an international rather than a domestic audience. Thus, the treaty text reflected a trade-off in its final version: "Unspeakable criminal acts were perpetrated against the Jewish people during the National Socialist regime of terror" and "the Federal Government of Germany made known their determination, within the limits of their capacity, to make good the material damage caused by these acts".²⁰³ That Adenauer's diplomacy of guilt was first and foremost aimed at an external audience rather than the domestic public became more obvious when he justified his decision before the German *Bundestag*:

²⁰¹ Hall 2015, 131-132.

²⁰² Adenauer 1952, quoted in: Segev 1995, 315. In German: "*Ich bin bereit, das zu hören aber Deutschland ist es nicht*".

²⁰³ See: Abkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Staate Israel, Luxembourg, 10 September 1952, printed in: Vogel 1967a, 62.

The German original text says: "*In Erwägung, dass während der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltherrschaft unsagbare Verbrechen gegen das jüdische Volk verübt worden sind, und dass die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in ihrer Erklärung vor dem Bundestag vom 27. September 1951 ihren Willen bekundet hat, in den Grenzen, in den Grenzen der deutschen Leistungsfähigkeit die materiellen Schadensfolgen dieser Taten wiedergutzumachen (...).*"

Clearly, not all Germans were Nazis (...). Nevertheless, this act of compensation (*Wiedergutmachung*) by the German people is necessary, because it was through the misuse of the German name that these crimes were committed. (...) As far as it is at all possible that something in our power can be done to overcome what happened, (...) the German people has the serious and sacred duty to help, even when those of who do not personally feel guilty are called upon to sacrifice, maybe sacrifice greatly.²⁰⁴

Adenauer was careful throughout his speeches and actions not to admit moral responsibility and collective guilt on behalf of the German people out of concerns for a possible domestic backlash. This strategy confirms that the FRG's diplomacy of guilt was based on a fabricated official narrative about the Nazi past. The West German Chancellor was well aware that his official narrative was neither congruent with the prevailing public narrative of the time, nor did any sort of society based on feeling the emotion of guilt exist among his population. As the theories on collective memory more broadly suggest, it was rather the case that different versions of collective memory began to co-exist under the umbrella of the public's silence regarding the Nazi past, and these significantly constrained the instrumental use of one specific historic narrative for political purposes – at least in the domestic sphere.

Unlike in the official international realm, the admission of guilt and moral responsibility was certainly not part of emerging public narratives within the FRG. By the beginning of the 1950s, West German public memories did not include the Jewish Holocaust but rather began to form around the heroic image of the fallen soldier and the suffering induced by Allied bombings and the expulsion of 13 million Germans from the East as well as large looming repressions in the Soviet Zone, i.e. its victimization.²⁰⁵ As a result of such a mind-set, the

²⁰⁴ Adenauer before the German *Bundestag* on 4 March 1953, quoted in: Hall 2015, 133.

²⁰⁵ Herf 1997, 276.

West German public was largely opposed to reparations: an opinion poll in September 1952 revealed that 44% considered them “superfluous”, 24% as “too high”, and 21% were undecided while only 11% of the population supported an agreement with the Israelis.²⁰⁶ With only slim public support, Adenauer was forced – just like his Israeli counterpart Ben Gurion - to draw on opposition parties’ help in order to achieve ratification of the agreement. His continuing cautious justifications suggest that he was conscious of the fact that with this agreement he was speaking to two very different “memory audiences” in the domestic and in the international realm.

While the FRG’s domestic public remained either critically silent or outright opposed, at least with respect to the policy’s main target, the international audience, Adenauer’s strategy even in the first hours after the signing ceremony in Luxembourg on 10 September 1952 began to bear its fruits; it was no coincidence that the newly founded European Coal and Steel Community met for the first time on that same day. Adenauer clearly did not want to enter the European Community without proof of West Germany’s desire for reconciliation with the Jewish people.²⁰⁷ Adenauer’s diplomatic strategy with memory had thus yielded its first immediate and concrete success on the international stage.

To conclude with Adenauer’s own words, which sum up his and the official FRG’s intentions very well:

As I sat across from Minster Sharett in Luxembourg, I was deeply moved, but also happy that I at least could do something to offset the harm. Naturally, it was clear to me that this agreement only signified a symbol of reconciliation (*Wiedergutmachung*), that it only represented an attempt to rehabilitate Germany on this issue.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ Fink 2006, 277.

²⁰⁷ Vogel 1967a, 61.

²⁰⁸ Adenauer 1967, quoted in: Hall 2015, 133.

Despite reflecting the pursuit of strategic, rational interests on both sides, i.e. the FRG seeking political rehabilitation into the world community and Israel seeking economic recovery, the Luxembourg agreement cannot be explained with traditional notions of statecraft. The FRG under the leadership of Adenauer instead conducted a specific strain of diplomacy with memory in which the FRG deliberately acknowledged moral and legal responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi past by projecting an image onto the diplomatic stage that adhered to Adenauer's officially constructed historic narrative. As a consequence, and as Hall had described it, a significant diplomatic team effort consisting of costly expressive and substantive gestures was applied for the sole purpose of portraying Germany as a guilty and remorseful perpetrator. This behaviour superseded all other traditional cost-benefit concerns and pushed the decision-making process towards a swift agreement with the Israelis.²⁰⁹ At stake was nothing less than all of the FRG's material concerns, which ranged from the financial burden of the FRG to the imminent threat of a break of economic and political relations with the Arab countries.²¹⁰ However, the Wassenaar negotiations and the final Luxembourg agreement took place outside the realm of such standard considerations. Instead, the FRG of its own free will, and for the rational purpose of achieving the country's rehabilitation into the world community, took on a significant material cost (3.45 billion DM worth of goods and services)²¹¹ in what Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett rightly called "a unique step in the history of international relations".²¹²

²⁰⁹ See Hall's (2015, 134-139) explanation of the Luxembourg Agreement as "diplomacy of guilt".

²¹⁰ Deutschkron 1983, 64. See also: Weingardt 2002, 97-103.

²¹¹ From 1953 to 1965, the FRG delivered ships, machine tools, trains, cars, medical equipment, telephone technology and other crucial goods that supported the construction of infrastructure making West German deliveries amount to 15 percent of annual Israeli imports. In addition, restitution payments to individual survivors amounted to 40.4 billion DM by 1971, 77 billion DM by 1986 and 96 billion DM by 1995, making up a total of 124 billion DM (See Herf 1997, 288 - based on German reports).

²¹² *Die Presse*, „Sharett: ‚Einzigartig in der Geschichte‘. Der israelische Außenminister zum Abkommen mit Bonn“, 12 September 1952.

3. Forging the diplomacy of innocence: The question of reparations between Austria and Israel

While informal contacts between West Germany and Israel had only begun with reparations, Austria and Israel had already established “half” diplomatic relations with one another by the beginning of the 1950s. Keeping these bilateral relations on a lower level, i.e. exchanging consuls rather than ambassadors, reflected Israel’s deliberate strategy to satisfy the country’s ever more critical public which, unlike Israeli officials, was not ready to differentiate between Austria and Germany when it came to the Nazi past. Official Austria, on the other hand, had always pushed for an upgrade in bilateral relations precisely to dispel Israeli criticism and doubts of its victim status. The start of direct talks between West Germans and Israelis, however, now had begun to alter the international context and so also Israeli calculations when it came to Austria:

I have become convinced that we have to make a decision between the following two possibilities: either we continue with the current contacts. i.e. a bit of recognition, a bit of anger, and then we exploit our special position in order to – as we did with Germany – claim reparation payments etc. from Austria. Or, we stop carrying on with this strategy because we have already missed the right point in time, and we promote a full normalization of the relationship in our own interest.²¹³

As Israeli Consul Eshel’s advice above suggests, official Israeli strategy towards Austria in 1951 still manoeuvred somewhere between practical interests and moral considerations. While standing ready to sacrifice moral considerations for the sake of ever more pressing

²¹³ Letter from Consul Eshel to Gershon Avner, Director of the West European Department in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 1951. Quoted in: Hotam 2005, 160.

national interests, officials increasingly grew divided between two newly emerging practical alternatives: either pressing reparations on a “guilty” Austria, or using an only “half guilty” Austria as a measure of its desired and, because of the critical Israeli public, required distance from Germany. With regards to the latter strategy, the “small devil” Austria for Israeli officials served as a welcome public test case to eventually establish relations also with the “big evil” West Germany should political interests require them to do so.²¹⁴ It was in this ambivalent context that the economically weak Israel started to negotiate a credit agreement with Austria. As a result of these bilateral deliberations, in 1952 Austria granted Israel a commercial loan of 100 000 Million Austrian Schillings^{215, 216}

3.1. The credit agreement

For Israel, a credit agreement with Austria signified a modest loan to finance purchases of pre-fabricated housing manufactured in Austria. These houses in turn were used to absorb new immigrants to Israel in a time when the country was in dire economic circumstances.²¹⁷ However, what motivated Austria to grant such a loan despite its own financial difficulties? Austria’s economy at the time was still fully dependent on the Marshall Plan, but, as internal Israeli sources reveal, Austria nevertheless enthusiastically embraced the project. When the Director of the Austrian National Bank expressed concern that Israel would not be able to repay, he was instructed to authorize the loan or resign.²¹⁸ That an economically weak

²¹⁴ Albrich 1997, 183. Embacher and Reiter 1998, 63-64. Zweig 2010, 55.

Hartl to Foreign Minister Gruber on “Israel – the establishment of diplomatic relations”, Tel Aviv, 2 January 1952. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 146 350_pol 1952.

²¹⁵ 100 000 Million Austrian Schillings were about 2,5 Million USD in 1952. Taking the retail price index (that changed around 641,8% between May 1952 and December 2016) into account, this sum is equivalent to the nowadays sum of 53,9 Million Euro (December 2016) (Statistik Austria, Indexrechner, online at: <http://www.statistik.at/Indexrechner/>).

²¹⁶ See: Hartl reports to Foreign Minister Gruber on “The establishment of diplomatic relations”, Tel Aviv, 3 November 1951. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 146 350_pol 1951.

²¹⁷ Zweig 2010, 54.

²¹⁸ Letter from Eshel to Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 December 1951, quoted in: Zweig 2010, 54. See also: *Hakidmah*, titled “Austria 1951” by Moshe Meisels, 28 September 1951. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 6, Gz. 131737_pol 1951.

Austria was willing to make such a costly investment into helping a distant, small country of little material and strategic importance to it constitutes a surprising puzzle at first sight. However, a closer look at the bilateral debate about the wording of the agreement reveals that this credit was “no business as usual” for both countries.

At the beginning of the year 1952, the Director of the West European Department in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Gershon Avner, brought up the idea of a specific statement of friendship that should go beyond the usual wordings included in preambles of bilateral agreements. Israel’s representative in Vienna, Arie Eshel, quickly re-modified Avner’s proposal: Israel would accept a credit from Austria only paired with a friendship declaration.²¹⁹ What exactly such a friendship declaration meant soon became clear: the Israeli Foreign Ministry requested that the Federal Republic of Austria should openly state that it regarded itself as the successor state to the former democratic Austria and that it had nothing to do with Hitler’s Germany and the Austrian Nazis. Austria should furthermore strictly condemn the atrocities that had been committed by National Socialists against the Austrian Jews. Israel hence aimed for a symbolic gesture similar to Adenauer’s statement before the German *Bundestag*, which would allow Israeli officials to justify taking Austrian money in front of a critical Israeli public. As in the case of West Germany, the Israeli hope was that such a statement would open a path domestically to deepen contacts with Austria.²²⁰ What Israeli officials however did not take into account was that Austrian thinking in this matter followed the logic of its emerging diplomacy of innocence. Although such a statement meant a pure condemnation of the past without necessarily admitting moral responsibility,

²¹⁹ Hartl to Foreign Minister Gruber on “Israel – The establishment of diplomatic relations”, Tel Aviv, 2 January 1952. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 146 350_pol 1952.

Hartl’s letter to Foreign Minister Gruber, Tel Aviv, 2 February 1952. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 146 350_pol 1952.

²²⁰ Hartl reports to the Austrian Foreign Ministry on “The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel”, Tel Aviv, 26 May 1952. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 146 350_pol 1952.

See also: Embacher and Reiter 1998, 66. Zweig 2010, 54-55.

Austria refused. Any open declaration that took the past into account would run counter to Austria's diplomatic approach with memory and therefore bore the potential of putting the entire endeavour at risk. Officials immediately sensed the threat and began a significant diplomatic team effort to stop Israel's request. The Austrian Consul-General to Tel Aviv, Karl Hartl, was the first to interpret the Israeli move as an attempt to present Austria with "the bill of the Nazi past through the backdoor of the credit agreement".²²¹ Behind the scenes, Hartl therefore began to threaten the termination of the agreement to Israeli officials and portrayed Austria as uninterested in credit agreement and an upgrade of diplomatic relations should Israel continue to insist on Austria's involvement in the Nazi regime.²²²

In an attempt to appease the Austrians, Israeli officials began to justify their interest in the friendship declaration as a mere preparatory tool to silence domestic public criticism. This Israeli stance, however, was dismissed by Austrian officials as mere deception. The Israeli public must surely have more important worries at the moment than the bilateral relationship with Austria, wrote an angry Hartl to Vienna. Hartl further inferred on the part of the Israelis a deliberate attempt to issue a "temporal punishment in expiation of the past (*zeitliche Sühnestrafe*)" on Austria by withholding a "normalization" of bilateral relations.²²³ In order to avert what was perceived as an Israeli attack on Austria's historic image, the Austrian Foreign Ministry in its response from Vienna began to paint the credit agreement as a generous gift on the Austrian part and showed no understanding of what was portrayed as a completely misplaced Israeli request: "The Republic of Austria, which had itself been violently occupied by Nazi Germany, has nothing to do with these things and therefore

²²¹ Hartl reports to the Austrian Foreign Ministry on "The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel", Tel Aviv, 26 May 1952. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 146 350_pol 1952.

²²² Private follow-up letter from Hartl to Ambassador Clemens Wildner, Tel Aviv, 26 May 1952. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 146 350_pol 1952.

²²³ Private follow-up letter from Hartl to Ambassador Clemens Wildner, Tel Aviv, 26 May 1952. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 146 350_pol 1952.

Austria sees no reason to specifically state that in a friendship declaration.”²²⁴ In line with its national narrative, the Ministry went on to bind Hartl to a neutral formulation of the treaty text that focussed on the present and future rather than on the past:

The Republic of Austria and Israel, aiming at strengthening the existing bond of peace between them via contracts that foster the amicable exchange between their territories reflecting the intellectual, cultural, economic and business aims of their peoples, have decided to²²⁵

This Austrian insistence on a successful completion of the credit agreement despite the dispute with the Israelis reveals the broader aim of the Austrian strategy. Rather than merely reaching agreement on a simple credit, its national narrative of victimhood was at stake. As such, for Austria the economic losses from the credit agreement were offset by the gains in credibility when it came to signalling its historic image of innocence to the international stage. It was thus the national narrative that shifted the credit agreement outside the realm of standard transactions for Austria: a successful agreement would deepen bilateral relations with Israel while at the same time avoiding reparation payments. Both served to signal Austria’s distinctiveness from West Germany at a time when reparations but no diplomatic relations were agreed between Israel and the FRG.

In the end, Austria indeed asked for nothing less in return for the 100 Million Schilling credit than an official Israeli renunciation from any future reparation requests. What Consul-General Hartl later referred to as “the word that should cost us 100 Million Schillings”²²⁶ was finally voiced in 1952 by Israel’s Foreign Minister Sharett: “Israel will not demand

²²⁴ Response from the Austrian Foreign Ministry to Hartl, Vienna, 17 June 1952. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 146 350_pol 1952.

²²⁵ Response from the Austrian Foreign Ministry to Hartl, Vienna, 17 June 1952. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 146 350_pol 1952.

²²⁶ Karl Hartl’s letter to Adolf Schärf, Tel Aviv, 7 December 1953. Original letter reprinted in: Steininger 2012, 84.

reparations from Austria. (...) Israel accepts the supposition that Germany is responsible for acts committed against Austrian Jews since they took place only after the *Anschluss*.”²²⁷ That Sharett made this statement in Paris en-route to a signing ceremony for the reparations agreement with West Germany was no coincidence and made once more clear that Israel had accepted that the Austrian and German cases were different.²²⁸ In the diplomatic backchannels, almost completely outside the eye of the public, the Austrian diplomacy of innocence had yielded its first major international success.

4. Conclusions: A new form of diplomatic behaviour

This chapter shows that the beginning of diplomatic contacts between West Germany, Austria and Israel in the late 1940s and early 1950s cannot be explained by mainstream IR approaches. Both Austria and West Germany moreover followed a specific strain of what the *diplomacy of memory* model suggested on diplomatic behaviour in the face of a shameful legacy. The case of the West German approach towards reparations for Israel reflected all major elements of what referring to Todd Hall was theoretically outlined as the diplomacy of guilt: West Germany under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer made a concerted diplomatic team effort to portray the FRG as a guilty perpetrator based on an official admission of moral responsibility for the Nazi crimes. Such a move included not just verbal acknowledgment of the wrongdoings in the German name as well as an expression of guilt

²²⁷ Sharett 1952, quoted in: Steininger 2012, 62.

²²⁸ Historians up until this day debate and try to understand Sharett’s decisiveness on the issue of reparations from Austria. The main explanation points to the legal status of Austria as a liberated country which would have rendered reparation claims almost impossible to achieve under International Law. While that situation absolved Austria as a state from legal liability vis-a-vis reparation requests from Israel, Austria still had to directly deal with the claims of Jewish organizations regarding the (individual) restitution of heirless property (Zweig 2010, 56).

and shame, but also the will to ameliorate the harm with substantive action and significant costs.²²⁹ While facing rejection nationally, on the international stage this self-portrayal made strategic sense: West Germany hoped for nothing less than its reintegration into the world community of states. In fact, the Federal Republic's entire post-war identity was inextricably linked to that goal; multilateralism within the Western alliance (*Westbindung*) began to form the core of the Federal Republic's *raison d'état*.²³⁰ Reaching out to Israel, and thereby also satisfying its Allied supporters, first and foremost the US, was an integral part of that strategy.

Looking ahead from 1952 onwards, the West German move was rather successful. On 5 May 1955, the Bonn-Paris conventions (*Pariser Verträge*) came into force. The ratification of the conventions put an end to the Allied occupation of West Germany endowing the Federal Republic with full sovereignty. West Germany's right to self-determination was closely tied to the FRG's integration into Western international organizations. With the Bonn-Paris agreement, West Germany joined the NATO as well as the Western European Union (WEU).²³¹ In 1957, West Germany was even among the six founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC).²³²

Austria on the other hand followed the opposite path when it came to its diplomatic behaviour with memory and pursued what I theoretically outlined as the diplomacy of innocence. While West Germany's approach to gain absolution from the past was to immerse itself politically, culturally and economically into the West, Austria's absolution came from its active distancing from Germany. Any association with *Anschluss* was buried and the new Republic of Austria aimed at nothing less than final independence from the occupation.

²²⁹ See Hall (2015, 134-139) and his accounts on how the FRG diplomatically acted out the emotion of guilt.

²³⁰ Bark and Gress 1993, 257. Markovits/Reich 1997, 106. Banchoff 1999, 23-59.

²³¹ Weingardt 2002, 106.

²³² For more on West Germany's basic decisions on European policy and *Westbindung*, see: Haftendorn 2006, 49-53.

Austria's post-war identity was thus developed in opposition to Germany and anchored around a very different *raison d'état*: neutrality²³³ instead of *Westbindung* should become an integral part of a deliberately created, distinctive "Austrianess".²³⁴

As such, it was rational for Austria to follow the logic of the diplomacy of innocence vis-à-vis Israel: By portraying the country as an innocent victim to the outside world, it denied moral responsibility and put full blame for Nazi crimes on Germany alone. Its strategy furthermore included a denial of complicity in the ideas and beliefs of National Socialism by underlining Austria's role in the resistance to the Nazis. The delegation of a resistance fighter as the first consul to Israel was only one essential part of this official effort. Instead of highlighting or even referring to the past, Austria's emphasis was always put on a pretence of normality by permanently pushing for an upgrade in the relationship with Israel. As such, Austria aimed at nothing less than a clear distinction from West Germany in front of the eyes of the world. What could provide better proof of that than a deepened diplomatic relationship with Israel without any further Israeli reparation requests?

This strategy – like in the case of West Germany – also aimed at a rational goal on the broader international stage: the swift independence of Austria as well as the departure of the occupying powers without having to fulfil the large looming reparation demands from the victims of the Third *Reich*. Countries with potential demands to be avoided were not only Israel but also the Soviet Union, which still occupied the East of Austria including Vienna. Unsettled Soviet claims on "German property" in Austria thus loomed large. However, the increasing East-West confrontation came to Austria's assistance, as the emerging competition with the Soviet Union made the Western occupying powers willing to turn a blind eye to Vienna's strategy with memory on the international stage.²³⁵ It was in this

²³³ Austria never joined the NATO and based its security not on the Western Alliance but rather on the country's "smallness" and its belonging to nothing (Markovits/Reich 1997, 106).

²³⁴ Hanisch 1994, 398 and Markovits/Reich 1997, 106.

²³⁵ Knight 2000b, 18.

context that Austria's Foreign Ministry took the rational choice of making a costly investment into portraying the country as an innocent victim to the outside world by issuing a commercial loan to Israel in 1952. While this step took place mainly outside the eye of the Austrian public, it faced - unlike in the West German case - no constraints at home, as the prevailing public narrative during the early 1950s was one of victimhood vis-à-vis the Nazi past. The public's collective memory of Austrians' role during World War II was thus completely congruent with the country's official diplomacy of innocence vis-à-vis Israel. While both West Germany and Austria derived their interest in Israel first and foremost from the symbolic value of the past rather than from present material concerns, Israel was torn between present needs and moral considerations derived from the Holocaust. In this ambivalent position, Israel after 1952 continued to use diplomatic conduct with both countries as a measure of distance, albeit to different degrees. Even though the negotiations around and acceptance of reparations from West Germany marked the first tentative contacts between West Germans and Israelis, official diplomatic relations were withheld completely by Israel, at least for the time being. In contrast, with regards to Austria, Israel deliberately linked an upgrade of diplomatic relations to an agreement on the open issue of heirless property. While Israel itself had forgone reparation requests from Austria, it nevertheless pushed Austria into settling the bill of the past with Jewish Organizations directly.²³⁶ Consequently, negotiations between Austria and the Jewish Claims Committee continued

Interview with the Austrian Ambassador to Tel Aviv, Franz-Josef Kuglitsch, 16 December 2016.

²³⁶ Zweig 2010, 58-59.

For evidence, see, for instance, a letter from Avner to Eshel, 26 June 1952, quoted in: Zweig 2010, 53: „With the exception of Germany, there is no country that has sinned against the Jewish people as Austria has. They cannot be compared to the Poles or any other peoples occupied by the Nazis. The Austrians were willing collaborators and antisemites, and the Austrian government has avoided with one excuse or another any attempt to repair the distortion, for example in the field of [restituting] heirless property (...). We intend to make the establishment of full diplomatic relations conditional on a desirable and just solution to the problem of heirless property.”

for two full years, once more revealing Austria's insistence on its victim narrative and sparking frequent crisis and deadlock.²³⁷

Ultimately, it was the US rather than Israeli diplomatic pressure that forced an agreement. The issue of Austrian settlement of heirless property was linked to the final signature of the Austrian State Treaty. When the State Treaty was signed by the Soviets, US Secretary of State Dulles made clear to the Austrians that the US would not ratify it until the negotiations with the Jewish Claims Committee had been completed. With independence in sight, the Austrian diplomatic strategy of projecting innocence seemed to have reached the ultimate goal of its purpose, allowing Austria to slightly modify its stance.²³⁸ Within 6 weeks, the negotiations were concluded and a payment of 22 million USD to former Austrian citizens living abroad was issued.²³⁹ While this sum only represented approximately 30% of what the Jewish Organizations had originally asked for, it nevertheless freed the way for Austria's independence and for Israel to establish full diplomatic relations with Austria.²⁴⁰ In the end, the Austrian State Treaty was ratified only 9 days after the conclusion of formal negotiations between Austria and the Jewish Claims Committee on 18 July 1955.²⁴¹ At the very last minute, Austrian politicians, including first and foremost Foreign Minister Leopold Figl who deployed his own past as a former concentration camp prisoner, even managed to convince

²³⁷ See archival documents from the Austrian State Archives under the title "Israel", years 1953, 1954 and 1955. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 1953, 1954, 1955.

²³⁸ The restitution of Jewish property is not conflicting with Austria's official victim narrative as individual restitutions unlike reparations do not imply liability for the state. As such, this restitution effort could even be read as proof of the promoted identification between the two "victims", Austria and its former Jewish citizens (Knight 2000b, 14).

²³⁹ This sum was to be paid over the next 10 years. The settlement also included the tracing of heirless property, improvements to existing indemnification legislation, and a one-time ex gratia payment to inmates of concentration camps (Zweig 2010, 58).

²⁴⁰ In the end, full diplomatic relations between West Germany and Israel were only established in 1965, while the Austro-Israeli bilateral relationship was upgraded from "consular" to "delegation" in 1956 and finally to the full "ambassadorial" level in 1959.

See website of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, chronology of important events in the Austrian-Israeli relationship. Online at: <http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/embassy/tel-aviv/bilateral-relations.html>.

See also website of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, bilateral relations, an overview. Online at: <http://embassies.gov.il/vienna/Relations/Pages/Bilaterale%20Beziehungen.aspx>.

²⁴¹ Zweig 2010, 58-59.

the Allied powers to delete the Moscow Declaration's passage on Austrian co-responsibility for the war from the final version of the treaty.²⁴² The path towards a neutral, prosperous and most important, "spotless" welfare state located between the newly emerging fault lines of East and West was now open for Austria. With the help of its diplomatic strategy of innocence, official Austria had thus by 1955 smoothed the way to independence.

²⁴² Bischof 1993, 345-366 and Rathkolb 2005, 168.

CHAPTER 2: The case of Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem in 1961

Almost ten years after bilateral negotiations over reparations for the State of Israel took place, the Nazi past returned to challenge West Germany and Austria in yet another form on the international stage. In May 1960, Israel had captured Adolf Eichmann, one of the highest-ranking Nazi war criminals, and intended to put him on trial in Jerusalem. It is the aim of this chapter to examine the West German and Austrian reaction to this trial. What diplomatic strategies with memory did West Germany and Austria adopt in the face of a public trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem? Did their respective national narratives of guilt and innocence still influence their official responses here, in the later context of the 1960s?

As has been shown in chapter one, in the course of reparation negotiations both countries followed a specific strain of diplomacy with memory. Adhering to the logic of its officially constructed narrative, West Germany decided to implement a foreign policy strategy that projected guilt towards the international stage, whereas Austria aimed to achieve its goals by portraying itself as an innocent victim. In retrospect, both strategies towards Israel were fairly successful: one year prior to Adolf Eichmann's capture in May 1960, Austria and Israel had established full diplomatic relations. Despite their rapprochement in the wake of the Luxembourg agreement, West Germany and Israel, however, had not yet formalized their diplomatic relationship. Informal exchanges between the two countries were nevertheless at their height, and by the beginning of the 1960s, West German reparations alone already amounted to more than 15 percent of annual Israeli imports.²⁴³ Furthermore, at a personal meeting between David Ben Gurion and Konrad Adenauer in New York in March 1960, the two heads of state not only reaffirmed West German economic aid for Israel, but also discussed the issue of military support. Adenauer hereby had always pushed for more than

²⁴³ Herf 1997, 288.

mere material exchanges and relentlessly underlined that full diplomatic relations must soon ensue from West Germany's reparation efforts.²⁴⁴ Unlike in the Austrian case where Austria's unwillingness to pay adequate compensation for Jewish victims of National Socialism delayed a normalization of the bilateral relationship until 1959, the deepening of West German–Israeli relations now began to follow a rather different logic, as at the time of Eichmann's trial the East-West conflict was at its peak. In August 1961, the Wall was built between East and West Berlin, and West Germany's foreign policy was ever more dictated by the so-called *Hallstein* Doctrine which prescribed that no diplomatic relations would be established with any country which recognized the GDR.²⁴⁵ In the context of the Middle East, from 1955 onwards, Bonn was well aware that any push for diplomatic relations with Israel would immediately be countered by Arab attempts to initiate relations with East Germany. In the time between the Eichmann trial and the year when full diplomatic relations finally began in 1965, the international rather than the two national environments therefore induced reservation and even deadlock into the establishment of bilateral relations between West Germany and Israel.²⁴⁶

Despite the different stages reached by West Germany and Austria with regards to their bilateral relationship with Israel, both countries by the time of the 1960s were nevertheless able to reap the first benefits from their diplomatic approaches with memory. While West

²⁴⁴ Vogel 1967a, 129 & 133–136.

²⁴⁵ Named after State Secretary Walter Hallstein, the Hallstein Doctrine was key to the foreign policy of the FRG between 1955 and 1970. Following from the claimed exclusive mandate to represent the whole of Germany (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*), its main aim was to isolate the GDR diplomatically. As such, the West German government regarded it as “an unfriendly act” if countries recognized the GDR or maintained diplomatic relations with it, viewing such an act as contributing to the division of Germany. In May 1956, a secret meeting between German ambassadors and Walter Hallstein in Istanbul rendered the doctrine official political strategy with regards to the Middle East. In the meeting, German policies towards Israel were discussed. While the FRG since Luxembourg had always pushed for the establishment of diplomatic relations, officials now opposed such a move on the grounds of fearing an imminent retaliation from the Arab countries coming in the form of recognition of the GDR. The Hallstein Doctrine thus hampered the reconciliation process with Israel that had started with the reparation agreement, or in other words, it had deadlocked West German foreign policies in the Middle East (Weingardt 2002, 107-108).

²⁴⁶ Große 1995, 167-169. Vogel 1967a, 130.

Germany's integration into the Western community solidified and its image in Israel and the world recovered not least thanks to its commitment to reparations, Austria with the help of its innocent victim narrative had managed to proclaim independence from Allied occupation in 1955, putting aside reparation requests from both Israel and the Soviet Union. It was in this context that the case of Eichmann began to constitute a renewed challenge for both states. By bringing the extent of the Nazi crimes to full light, the trial posed a threat to the recovering image of Germans in the world, and the apparent close links between Eichmann and Austria stood out in stark contrast to Austria's passive victimhood: Eichmann grew up in Linz and his entire family still lived there. Furthermore, he committed many of his crimes on Austrian soil, and the majority of his collaborators, the so-called "*Eichmänner*"²⁴⁷, were Austrian citizens.²⁴⁸ The Eichmann trial had therefore virtually overnight brought the Holocaust and West Germany's as well as Austria's role therein back on the radar of Israel and the world.

How did West German and Austrian officials as well as their publics react to the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem? By way of applying the *diplomacy of memory* model, this chapter seeks to clarify the influence of the previously adopted West German narrative of guilt and the Austrian narrative of innocence on official diplomatic strategies vis-à-vis an Israeli state that was in the process of indicting an infamous Nazi war criminal. For this purpose, this chapter first analyses the public/media reaction to the trial and contrasts it to the official responses of both countries. The key question is: was guilt and innocence also during Eichmann's trial performed for international purposes in a costly, diplomatic team effort that faced trade-offs between official international and domestic public memory?

²⁴⁷ The designation "*Eichmänner*" or "*Eichmann-Männer*" goes back to Raul Hilberg 1982.

²⁴⁸ Oppenheimer (Ed.) 1961.

1. The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem

On 23 May 1960, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion announced that Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann had been captured in Argentina and would soon stand trial in Israel:

During the Second World War this man Eichmann was the person directly responsible for the execution of Hitler's orders for the 'final solution' (...). Hundreds of thousands of the survivors are living in our midst, and hundreds of people in Israel and abroad would not rest since the end of the war until they had found the man who had been in charge of this appalling campaign of extermination. They regarded it as their mission in life to bring the man responsible for this crime, without precedent in history, to stand trial before the Jewish people. Such a trial can take place only in Israel.²⁴⁹

After his seizure by Israeli agents near Buenos Aires on 11 May 1960, Eichmann was smuggled to Israel. Almost a year later, on 11 April 1961, his trial began in Jerusalem. The case was sensational in many regards: Eichmann faced 15 charges, including crimes against humanity, crimes against the Jewish people, and war crimes. At the core of these were his activities since 1939 as Head of Department IV D4 of the Gestapo which was responsible for Jewish Affairs. In this position, his main responsibility was to organize the deportation and transport of Jews from all over Europe into holding stations or ghettos, and then to the concentration camps. The "efficiency and success" of the department under Eichmann's leadership became known as the "Viennese Model" and served as an example for similar organizations across the entire German Reich.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ Ben Gurion in a letter to Argentinian President Arturo Frondizi, 3 June 1960, quoted in: Lord Russell 2002, xxviii.

²⁵⁰ Safrian 1993, 9-10. Overy 2002, ix-xii. Lord Russell 2002, xiii-xiv & 308.

When Eichmann was captured, however, his name was barely known to the broader public.²⁵¹ Adolf Eichmann, born in Solingen in the Rhineland in 1906, was brought up in the Austrian city of Linz, where he was an ordinary and not very successful lower middle class man of the 1920s.²⁵² His career only transformed once he rose through the ranks of the Nazi Party, thus representing the quintessential “mastermind behind the scenes” (“*Schreibtischtäter*”).²⁵³ Throughout the trial, Eichmann was portrayed as both a monster and mass-murderer as well as a colourless bureaucrat who just carried out orders.²⁵⁴ That he should have refused such orders, however, never crossed his mind: “I wish to emphasise once more, my guilt lies in my obedience, my respect for discipline, my military obligations in time of war, my allegiance to the colours and to the service”.²⁵⁵ Even though historians up until this day debate whether Eichmann’s self-depiction as a mere instrument of the Nazi system is indeed accurate,²⁵⁶ Hannah Arendt’s famous interpretation of Eichmann as the ordinary and dutiful “subordinate” significantly shaped the description of Eichmann’s persona.²⁵⁷ The Eichmann case appeared to show that unspeakable crimes were not only unleashed by a fanatic Nazi ideology, but also enabled by the incapacity of individual followers to think independently for themselves within such a totalitarian system. This was especially the case given claims that Eichmann was not blinded by ideology. He, like so many Nazi officials, must have engaged in a profound moral displacement, leading him to carry out Hitler’s *Endlösung* out of a sense of duty and loyalty which overrode simple humanity.²⁵⁸ It is this phenomenon that Arendt famously called “the banality of evil”,

²⁵¹ Deutschkron 1983, 119.

²⁵² Cesarani (2004, 18-19).

²⁵³ Overy 2002, xii.

²⁵⁴ Safrian 1993, 14.

²⁵⁵ Eichmann addressing the court in 1961, quoted in: Lord Russell 2002, 303.

²⁵⁶ Cesarani (2004, 11-17) later claimed that it was a sheer myth that Eichmann only followed orders.

²⁵⁷ Arendt 2006.

²⁵⁸ Lord Russell 2002, xvii.

“before which the word itself cannot speak anymore and all thinking fails”.²⁵⁹ Hence, if we were to believe Eichmann’s words in court and Arendt’s interpretation of it, Eichmann “transported” 6 Million Jews to their death not because he was “evil”, but because he was told to do so: “the trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that they were neither perverted nor sadistic; that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal”.²⁶⁰

It was the apparent tragedy of the persona of Eichmann, who thought that obedience to an order exonerated him from responsibility for the murder of 6 million Jews, which stirred up public emotions during the trial. “There is a need to draw a line between the leaders responsible and the people like me forced to serve as mere instruments in the hands of the leaders,” stated Eichmann in his final pardon plea to Israel’s President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi. And further: “I was not a responsible leader, and as such do not feel myself guilty.”²⁶¹

The judges as well as President Ben-Zvi disagreed that Eichmann’s claim of simply following orders alleviated him from responsibility. They found Eichmann guilty on all counts and sentenced him to death on 15 December 1961. On 31 May 1962, Adolf Eichmann was hanged near Tel Aviv.

²⁵⁹ Arendt 1986, 300.

Translation by the author from the German original: “(...) *“Banalität des Bösen”, vor der das Wort versagt und an der das Denken scheitert.*”

²⁶⁰ Arendt 1986, 326.

Translation by the author from the German original: *“Das beunruhigende an der Person Eichmanns war doch gerade, daß er war wie viele und daß diese vielen weder pervers noch sadistisch, sondern schrecklich und erschreckend normal waren und sind.”*

²⁶¹ *The New York Times*, “Pardon Plea by Adolf Eichmann, Nazi War Criminal, is made public”, by Isabel Kershner, 27 January 2016.

2. Public and media reaction to the trial

The prominence of the Eichmann trial not only stemmed from Eichmann's case and profile, but also from the unprecedented international media attention that the trial received. The trial of Adolf Eichmann was the first trial to be televised in history.²⁶² It was extensively covered by journalists from all over the world, 400 of whom gathered in the court room in Jerusalem, with more than 700 attending the opening. Major newspapers sent star reporters, such as Hannah Arendt, Elie Wiesel, former Chief US Prosecutor at Nuremberg Telford Taylor, Hugh Trevor-Roper and Lord Russell of Liverpool to report on their behalf from Jerusalem.²⁶³ In the course of Eichmann's trial and the extensive media reception it sparked, the real extent of the Jewish tragedy was for the first time since World War II brought directly to a wider audience. It was therefore only in the wake of the Eichmann trial that the world finally began to openly discuss what later became known as the Holocaust.²⁶⁴

“Putting Eichmann on trial before a Jewish court in Israel will compensate for the inhuman and chaotic emptiness that has marked Jewish existence from the day the Jews went into Exile until now”, wrote Israeli poet and journalist Natan Alterman.²⁶⁵ For Israel, the trial indeed served, as Hannah Yablonka put it, as the catharsis for its attempts to emerge from the shadows of the past and create a sense of nationhood based on strength and pride rather than on victimhood.²⁶⁶ In stark contrast to these new developments, in Israel's first years of national consolidation, the tragedies of the past were met with silence. The sheer enormity

²⁶² There was no television service in Israel at the time of the Eichmann trial, however, TV had already been introduced to West Germany and Austria. The trial in Jerusalem was nevertheless carried live via closed circuit television to a large nearby auditorium. This video material was then made available to any interested broadcasting service in order to be aired around the world, among them were the Austrian and the West German TV (Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002, 42).

²⁶³ Cesarani 2004, 325.

²⁶⁴ On the media coverage of the Eichmann trial in Israel, West Germany and Austria, see, for instance: Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002. Garscha 2005.

²⁶⁵ Natan Alterman, quoted in: Segev 1994, 327.

²⁶⁶ Yablonka 2004.

of the recent trauma inhibited survivors from speaking out about what they had witnessed. Moreover, the Jewish state aimed to forge its national narrative around the “new Israeli pioneer” whose image was created in opposition to the weak and defenceless Holocaust victim.²⁶⁷ As a result and with the lone exceptions of the reparation debate and the Kastner trial²⁶⁸, public awareness of the Holocaust was very low throughout the 1950s, and mourning remained confined to the private sphere. Stereotypes of Jews furthermore dominated the image of the Holocaust victim, stigmatising survivors with a “shameful secret”. On the one hand, there was the Jewish collaborator (*Judenrat*), on the other hand, the rebellious partisan hero, and in the middle, were the masses that were led “like sheep to slaughter”.²⁶⁹ The victims’ inability to explain the unfathomable had thus led younger Israelis seriously to question their parents’ generation’s integrity.

It was exactly this painful silence which was finally broken by the Eichmann trial.²⁷⁰ For Israel, the public trial in Jerusalem thus marked the most important media event in Israeli history prior to the Six-Day War.²⁷¹ Already at the onset of the trial, *Ha’aretz* openly asked “(...) whether the young generation, being strong, tanned and willing to fight could be able to understand their pale, submissive fathers? Could they understand this compliant, obedient generation (...)”²⁷² As such, by the beginning of the trial, Israeli journalists had clearly grasped that this occasion formed the first major opportunity to bring young people closer to the Holocaust and explain to them what exactly had happened. Israeli news reporting

²⁶⁷ Zerubavel 1995, 1-15.

²⁶⁸ Rudolf Kastner, a Hungarian lawyer and journalist, was accused and found guilty of collaborating with the Nazis. His trial took place in the District Court of Jerusalem in 1954 (Löb 2008).

²⁶⁹ Goldberg 2012, 49-52.

²⁷⁰ The notion of collective silence prevailing in the beginning years of the State of Israel was recently subject to revision by scholars such as Anita Shapira (1998), Dalia Ofer (et al, 2012) and Hannah Yablonka (2012, 185-207). Taking a more differentiated view on survivors showed that the Eichmann trial did not cause a transformation from collective silence to speaking up about the Holocaust overnight. It rather altered attitudes towards survivors and brought the Jewish persecution to the foreground of historical awareness (Cesarani (Ed.) 2005, 2).

²⁷¹ Shapira 2005, 20.

²⁷² *Ha’aretz*, 4 April 1961, quoted in: Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002, 32.

therefore followed a political intention, aiming first and foremost to elucidate the overall experience of the Holocaust. For that purpose, articles were not limited to the trial only, but included the examination of many non-judicial aspects, such as the phenomenon of antisemitism and lessons drawn from the past.²⁷³ This journalistic effort had long-lasting consequences for the integration of the Holocaust into the Israeli identity: when witnesses and victims were given a name and a voice to testify, a more open attitude towards survivors who were not heroes but who had merely survived developed among the Israeli public.²⁷⁴ A comprehensive study of Israeli newspapers comprising all political orientations revealed that not only Eichmann but the Holocaust itself was on trial.²⁷⁵ “Tense Anticipation for the Opening of the Holocaust Trial” was the title of *Yedioth Ahronoth* on 10 April 1961, for instance.²⁷⁶ The trial was further meant to mete out historical justice: “It is not only justice bestowed upon one man but justice for the history of an entire people”, wrote *Ha’aretz* a day later.²⁷⁷ Coupled with a clear statement that the Jewish people had survived and a reminder that only the State of Israel could ensure the security of Jews, it was this new notion of the Holocaust that was integrated into Israeli identity from then on.²⁷⁸

Emphasizing the importance of the trial as a means of raising awareness of the Holocaust, Israel’s press covered Eichmann’s case in unprecedented detail. Apart from Israel, the greatest amount of attention given to the Eichmann trial came from West Germany; more West German reporters were sent to Jerusalem than from any other country. Just like Israeli newspapers, West German journalists wrote in detail about every single one of the 114 court sessions, not hiding any of the facts. Furthermore, West German media surveys showed that

²⁷³ Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002, 138-139.

²⁷⁴ Young 1993, 213.

²⁷⁵ See: Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002. Israeli newspapers analysed in this study: *Hatzofeh*, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *Ha’aretz*, *Davar*, *Herut*.

²⁷⁶ *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 10 April 1961. Quoted in: Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002, 32.

²⁷⁷ *Ha’aretz*, 11 April 1961. Quoted in: Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002, 32.

²⁷⁸ Segev 1994, 326-327.

the Eichmann trial reached a wider audience than any previous media event in the FRG: about half of the West German population read all or at least one-third of the 114 newspaper reports on the trial's sessions. Moreover, the trial was aired in West German TV under the title "*Eine Epoche vor Gericht*" ("An era under trial") at prime time immediately following the evening news at 20:00.²⁷⁹

With regards to the prevailing public narrative of the Nazi past, the Eichmann trial reached West German society in a time when its collective memory was still dominated by what was later called a "*Stunde Null* mentality". In a widespread attempt to suppress the past, Nazis were viewed as demonic intruders rather than being true Germans. As a consequence, West Germans disinherited the Nazi past and wished to start afresh from the zero hour into a new future with a clean conscience. In light of this "clean start mentality", the West German attitude towards Nazi trials also altered throughout the 1950s. While the Nuremberg Trials right after the end of World War II were widely perceived as "enlightening", public opinion on war crimes trials changed significantly thereafter. Instead of exercising justice, the trials were regarded as unfair and merely serving the political goals of the occupying powers. The widespread public attitude prevailing in the 1950s furthermore insisted on the notion that the time has come to finally terminate all war crimes trials. It was in this context of a continuing public preference for collective silence that the Eichmann trial took place.²⁸⁰

The extensive press coverage of German media must therefore retrospectively be viewed as having been far ahead of its time, as during the trial in Jerusalem, West German journalists clearly worked against the tendency to sweep the Nazi past under the carpet. However, the broader West German public itself was not yet ready to cope with the full significance of the trial. As such, the Eichmann trial brought the Nazi past back to public awareness, yet, the

²⁷⁹ For the reaction of the West German public and press to the Eichmann trial, see, for instance: Deutschkron 1983, 130-134.

²⁸⁰ Weingardt, quoting Schwartz 1983, called the 1950s a decade in which the West German public was "oddly silent" ("*merkwürdig still*") about the past (Weingardt 2002, 137).

subject was still treated with caution. The main message conveyed in West German media was that today's Germany was different from the Germany of the past, and neither Eichmann nor Hitler should be viewed in any way synonymous with all Germans. For fear of arousing resentment from the general population, any indication of a collective feeling of guilt was absent from West German reports.²⁸¹

In their comparison between Israel and West Germany's media reaction to the trial, Cohen et al confirmed this notion:²⁸² While both countries' newspapers published extensively on the trial, irrespectively of their political orientation, West German reporting was strongly orientated towards the defendants, whereas Israeli news naturally focussed more on the victims. In West German news, the defendants were certainly not exonerated, but their personality and actions were described in detail that in the Israeli press was dedicated to the atrocities of the Holocaust. In fact, the word "Holocaust" itself did not appear in West German newspapers until the end of the 1960s. Unlike in the Israeli press, social phenomena related to Eichmann's case, such as antisemitism and its contemporary presence, as well as lessons drawn from the past, were hardly explored in West Germany. In Israel, a clear link between the Holocaust and the present was made while West German journalists stuck to the narrative that remained dominant since the creation of the Federal Republic in 1949: The democratic reconstruction of the German society required a break with the past. As such, West German news reporting, while confronting the past through its extensive coverage of the trial, also warded off the past in a persistent attempt to disassociate West Germans from the offenders.²⁸³

²⁸¹ Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002, 23-28 & 140-145.

²⁸² The analysis by Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002 included four West German daily newspapers: *Die Welt*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, and 5 Israeli newspapers: *Hatzofeh*, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, *Ha'aretz*, *Davar*, *Herut*.

²⁸³ Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002, 141-148.

The Austrian press and TV also covered the trial extensively. In Austria's print media, articles on Eichmann frequently featured on page one, and all major Austrian newspapers, just like their West German counterparts, dispatched their own correspondents to Jerusalem. For Austria's public, the trial of Adolf Eichmann came in a time when the belief in the national victim narrative was at its height. By the end of the 1950s, democracy and the integration of all Austrians into the Second Republic had come at the clear expense of justice: the issue of Austria's own denazification was believed to be off the table since the Austrian Parliament had granted amnesty to 12 000 former Nazis in 1954 in an attempt to "heal the wounds of the German occupation".²⁸⁴ Furthermore, Austria's innocent victim status was internationally re-enforced in the granting of full independence from the Allied occupation in 1955. By the time Eichmann's trial began in Jerusalem, the country was thus set upon its distinctively neutral and Austrian (i.e. non-German) path into a prosperous and spotless future. The reporting about the Eichmann trial therefore took place when the Austrian public was convinced that National Socialism was a foreign, German phenomenon that had inflicted great harm on Austrians themselves. This officially backed narrative had so far hindered Austria's public from both confronting the Nazi past as well as informing themselves about that same past.

As such, it was only during the Eichmann trial that Austrian newspapers, for the first time, published long reports on the dramatic happenings under the Nazi regime, describing the mass murder of Jews in all its horrendous detail.²⁸⁵ Articles printed accounts on gas chambers as well as on mass shootings and burials, the portrayal of which as "new" and "sensational" suggested that they were up until this point mostly unknown to readers.²⁸⁶ The

²⁸⁴ Zweig 2010, 52.

²⁸⁵ Based on findings of a content analysis of articles related to the Eichmann trial in *Die Presse*, Austria's biggest conservative newspaper that is closest to the Christian Democratic Party ÖVP and in *Arbeiter Zeitung*, the newspaper of the Social Democratic party SPÖ. Timeframe of analysis: May 1960 to June 1962.

For secondary literature on the Austrian public reaction to the Eichmann trial, see: Garscha 2005, 187-188.

²⁸⁶ See, for instance:

crimes were further called “without precedent in human history”²⁸⁷ and “the most atrocious in world history”²⁸⁸. A comparison with earlier descriptions reveals the novelty of these accounts in Austria. Previously, the Holocaust was rather vaguely described as “perishing in concentration camps” (“*Umkommen im KZ*”)²⁸⁹ or – as the *Österreich Lexikon* suggested – as “a drop in the Jewish part of the population”.²⁹⁰

Eichmann himself was now referred to as “the biggest Nazi criminal of all times”²⁹¹, or as the “manager of mass murder”²⁹². In trying to make sense of his personality, *Arbeiter Zeitung* even went as far as to analyse his facial expressions with the help of a drawing (See figure 1: “Drawing of Eichmann’s face”). Readers were encouraged to cover one part of the



drawing with their palm, exposing Eichmann’s face either as the bureaucrat or the devil.²⁹³

Most importantly, the titles given to Eichmann by Austrian journalists directly referenced Jews as the primary victims. Eichmann was called “the liquidator and murderer of Jews”²⁹⁴ or “the *Endlöser* of the Jewish Question”²⁹⁵, as well as “Hitler’s assistant in the Final Solution”²⁹⁶. Thus, in the course of the Eichmann trial and the great

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Die Juden wurden zu Tausenden hingeschlachtet. Erschütternde Augenzeugenberichte im Eichmann-Prozess“, 3 May 1961.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Kommen die Nazi-Zeugen nach Israel?“, 29 April 1961.

Die Presse am Sonntag, “Extrareportage: Der Fall Adolf Eichmann“, by Louis Barcata, 9 April 1961.

Die Presse, “Lebend verbrannt oder lebend begraben. Eichmann-Prozess enthüllt Greuel der SS.“ 3 May 1961. See also: Garscha 2005, 187-188.

²⁸⁷ *Die Presse am Sonntag*, “Extrareportage: Der Fall Adolf Eichmann“, by Louis Barcata, 9 April 1961.

²⁸⁸ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Eichmann und wir“, by David Astor, 11 April 1961.

²⁸⁹ Garscha 2005, 187.

²⁹⁰ Bamberger, R./Maier-Bruck, F. (Eds.) (1966). *Österreich Lexikon*, Band 1, A-K, Entry on “Jews” (“*Juden*”).

²⁹¹ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Hitlers Judenreferent Eichmann in Israel verhaftet“, 24 May 1960.

²⁹² *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Eichmann: Manager des Massenmordes“, 25 May 1960.

²⁹³ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Eichmann: Bürokrat oder Beelzebub?“, by Emery Kelen, 30 April 1961.

²⁹⁴ *Die Presse*, „Adolf Eichmanns Familie verschwunden. Der Judenliquidator lebte seit 1950 in Buenos Aires“, 5 June 1960. *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Judenmörder Eichmann im Gefängnis in Israel“, 25 May 1960.

²⁹⁵ *Die Presse*, “Jerusalem vor dem Beginn des Eichmann-Prozesses“ Gedämpfte Leidenschaften in Israel um das Verfahren gegen den Endlöser der Judenfrage“, by Louis Barcata, 11 April 1961.

²⁹⁶ *Die Presse*, “Duell zwischen Eichmanns Verteidiger und Ankläger: Monsterprozess in Jerusalem gegen Erfüllungsgehilfen von Hitlers ‚Endlösung der Judenfrage‘ eröffnet,“ 12 April 1961.

media attention it received, Jewish victims of the Holocaust emerged for the first time as witnesses, lending a voice and face to what was previously an anonymous number of the dead.

Hence, the Eichmann trial posed the first major opportunity for the Austrian and West German public to confront the Nazi past and grasp the real extent of the Jewish tragedy. Numerous readers' comments and letters to the editor in both countries provide evidence that their publics indeed engaged in a first open debate about that unsavoury part of their history.²⁹⁷ In fact, the revelations of the trial left no one untouched, triggering a mix of shock and shame, in addition to a wave of sympathy with the Jewish victims:

I have to say the following out loud, I cannot restrain myself anymore! I have to finally state what I felt and still feel when I am reading your news about the Eichmann trial. Shame, shame, shame, nothing less than wild, desperate shame! Shame, that I am German and that I was forced to wear this uniform.²⁹⁸

While such a direct and open expression of shame was more common in West German newspapers, Austrian writers voiced outrage but not shame over the crimes of Eichmann and declared their solidarity with Israel and its accusation: "The Jewish people are entitled to atonement for what constituted perhaps the most atrocious prosecution in history."²⁹⁹ A feeling of collective guilt, however, was not mentioned in either country. Nonetheless,

²⁹⁷ Garscha 2005, 186-195.

²⁹⁸ A former *Oberfeldwebel* of the German *Luftwaffe* in *Die Welt*, 17 May 1961, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 132.

Translated by the author from the German original: "*Ich muss Ihnen das mal sagen, ich kann nicht anders! Ich muss das mal aussprechen, was ich empfunden habe und empfinde, wenn ich Ihre Nachrichten über den Eichmann-Prozess lese. Scham, Scham, Scham, weiter nichts als wilde hoffnungslose Scham! Scham, dass ich ein Deutscher bin und einmal gezwungen war, diese Uniform zu tragen.*"

²⁹⁹ *Die Presse*, "Briefe an die Presse: Moral und Gesetz im Fall Eichmann", by Dr. Josef Zitta, 16 April 1961. Translated by the author from the German original: "*Das jüdische Volk hat Anspruch auf Sühne der wohl grauenhaftesten Verfolgung der bisherigen Geschichte!*".

newspapers in Austria for the first time began to tentatively touch on the issue of potential Austrian involvement in the Nazi crimes. In the course of the trial, ever more names of Austrian war criminals came up in the press, and their cases, just as Eichmann's, also received great attention.³⁰⁰ In addition, specific mention was made of crimes that had happened in what used to be called the *Ostmark*.³⁰¹ The conservative newspaper *Die Presse* even reported on how SS officers forced Jews to clean the sidewalks of Vienna after the *Anschluss*.³⁰² Austrian news reporting therefore neither hid nor whitewashed the details of Nazi crimes committed on Austrian soil. However, a clear reference to German occupation was always included. None of the articles examined admitted or even pondered Austrian co-responsibility for these crimes, except for one comment published in the left-wing *Arbeiter Zeitung*:

No, there is no doubt about whether Eichmann's trial is our business. We ourselves are being summoned as witnesses and as co-defendants. And not only those who lived through 1943 and who remained silent out of a thousand different reasons, but also those who were born afterwards and who – because they did not receive an appropriate education in schools – have not become any smarter than their parents.³⁰³

³⁰⁰ Amongst them, first and foremost, the case of Hermann Höfle who was even called “the small Eichmann”. See, for instance:

Die Presse, “Der “Kleine Eichmann” kommt vor Gericht. Hermann Höfle erwartet in Salzburg der Prozess“, 15 November 1961.

For other reports on Nazi war criminals in Austria, see, for instance:

Die Presse, “Höttl, heutiger Schuldirektor in Bad Aussee, sagt gegen Eichmann aus“, 27 April 1961.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Trotz drohender Niederlage erst recht Judenmord. Ein SS-Kollege: Eichmann trägt die volle Verantwortung.“ The subtitle within this article concerned the case of Wilhelm Höttl: „Ein SS-Major jetzt Schuldirektor in Österreich“, 27 April 1961.

³⁰¹ *Die Presse*, “Eichmann und wir“, by Otto Schulmeister, 14 April 1961.

³⁰² *Die Presse*, “Eichmann schlug Himmler die ‚Endlösung‘ vor. Österreicher belasten Angeklagten schwer“, 27 April 1961.

³⁰³ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Das Kalte Herz“, by O.F., 18 April 1961. Translated by the author from the German original:

“Nein, es ist gar keine Frage, ob uns der Eichmann-Prozess etwas angeht. Wir sind selbst vorgeladen, als Zeugen und Mitangeklagte. Und nicht nur die, die 1943 erlebt und aus hunderterlei guten Gründen geschwiegen haben, sondern auch die, die später geboren wurden und – weil man sie in den Schulen nicht entsprechend belehrt hat – nicht klüger geworden sind als ihre Eltern.“

Such an open statement, however, formed the exception rather than the rule in Austrian print media. In comparison, the conservative newspaper *Die Presse* opposed public silence about the past, with no hint to Austrian involvement on the side of the perpetrators but instead including Austria on the side of the victims.³⁰⁴

While the trial and its outcome were widely greeted by most West German and Austrian readers as well-deserved, a self-critical public debate about their role in the Nazi apparatus did not take place.³⁰⁵ Especially the idea of collective guilt, be it for all Germans or, as one commentator specifically mentioned, for Austrians, remained highly controversial. Some insisted that only those who individually committed crimes should be punished,³⁰⁶ while other readers at least mentioned that the Nazis were elected and that “also many Austrians enthusiastically followed National Socialism and the *Führer*”.³⁰⁷ A West German survey furthermore revealed that 88% indeed did not feel guilty with regards to the extermination of the Jews. 50% furthermore stated that their interest in the Eichmann trial stemmed from a “general interest” rather than from the fact that these crimes had been committed by Germans. Eichmann, for a majority of West Germans, was solely “Eichmann” and in no way typical for them.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁴ *Die Presse*, “Eichmann und wir“, by Otto Schulmeister, 14 April 1961.

³⁰⁵ See, for instance:

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Eichmann gehenkt – Bonn: Gerecht“, and the reader’s comment “Endlösung“, 2 June 1962. *Die Presse*, „Adolf Eichmann starb am Galgen. Die Leiche verbrannt, die Asche in alle Winde gestreut“, and reader’s comment on “Eichmann ist tot. Eine Schuld der Menschheitsgeschichte wurde getilgt“, 2 June 1962. Only one reader’s comment published in the conservative newspaper “*Die Presse*” openly criticised the Eichmann trial by calling it a “deliberate defamation campaign against Germans” who have suffered to a much greater extent than the Jews. The comment, however, also immediately attracted opposition and resentment by other readers.

See: *Die Presse*, “Briefe an die Presse: Greuelpropaganda?“, by Marg. Hornung, 19 April, 1961.

Die Presse, “Briefe an die Presse: Greuelpropaganda um Fall Eichmann?“, by Gabriel Havas, 21 April 1961.

³⁰⁶ *Die Presse*, “Briefe an die Presse: Generalisieren unstatthaft“, by Erich Steiner, 16 April 1961.

³⁰⁷ *Die Presse*, “Briefe an die Presse: Der Unterschied“, by Dr. Friedrich Reitlinger, 26 April 1961.

³⁰⁸ Deutschkron 1983, 133.

While the public in both West Germany and Austria remained largely uncritical of itself, dissenting voices from public intellectuals became louder in the wake of the trial. The most prominent example is the short one-man play called “*Der Herr Karl*” (“Mister Karl”) by Austrian cabaret artists Helmut Qualtinger and Carl Merz. Aired on Austria’s public television channel ORF in November 1961, the play provoked a scandal overnight. Karl, the Viennese “everyman”, represented the prototypical opportunist and a petit-bourgeois collaborator who manoeuvred his way through different regimes and times without conscience and political convictions, solely seeking his own benefit.³⁰⁹ Was he a typical Austrian? The strong public reaction to the story of Karl showed that Karl was transformed into a mirror of the Austrian population’s soul, unmasking a whole mentality: “One wanted to mock a specific type of person, and a whole nation shouted: Au!”³¹⁰, noted theatre critic Hans Weigel. The widespread public outrage about the play not only revealed that a large part of the Austrian population identified with Karl’s character, but also confirmed the population’s strong support for the national victim narrative. One of the comments to “Mister Karl” made it particularly clear that offense was not only taken at Qualtinger’s questioning of their victim status, but also at the perceived disturbance of the “idyllic normality” provided by the official silence: “As soon as grass finally grows over the story, along comes a camel and eats it off again.”³¹¹

³⁰⁹ Austrian Broadcasting Cooperation ORF: “*Der Herr Karl*”, by Qualtinger/Merz/Neuberg. 15 November 1961. Online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5KUV7Vz9r_Q.

³¹⁰ Weigel 1961, quoted in: *Die Zeit*, “Kabarettist Helmut Qualtinger: Vom Herrn Karl...Vor 50 Jahren empörte Helmut Qualtinger mit dem Monolog eines Opportunisten die Nation”, by Georg Biron, No. 46, 10 November 2011.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Man hatte einem bestimmten Typus auf die Zehen steigen wollen und eine ganze Nation schrie: Au!*”.

³¹¹ *Die Zeit*, “Kabarettist Helmut Qualtinger: Vom Herrn Karl...Vor 50 Jahren empörte Helmut Qualtinger mit dem Monolog eines Opportunisten die Nation”, by Georg Biron, No. 46, 10 November 2011.

The direct quote from the manager of Austrian Airlines in 1961 was translated by the author from the German original: “*Kaum ist Gras über die Geschichte gewachsen, kommt so ein Kamel und frisst es wieder ab.*”

Despite the extensive media reports and public discussion of the Nazi crimes, “an irritation, but no earthquake”³¹² was triggered by the Eichmann trial, neither among the West German nor the Austrian public.³¹³ Garscha found reasons for this in the geographic distance that separated the trial in Jerusalem from the people in Austria and West Germany.³¹⁴ In the end, it was not the Eichmann trial but the Auschwitz trials that effectively formed West Germany’s perception of its own Nazi past. Time also might have played a role in limiting the trial’s impact on the Austrian and West German publics, as only 15 years after the end of World War II, society was not yet ready to deal with happenings that it had recently successfully suppressed.³¹⁵

Nevertheless, in the course of the Eichmann trial, the Israeli, West German and the Austrian publics were for the first time confronted with the details of the Holocaust. While facts were not whitewashed in West Germany or Austria, a self-critical reflection on collective guilt and responsibility did not take place. In Austrian news reporting, the dominant narrative of Austria as the first victim of Nazi Germany prevailed and guided commentators. National Socialism and its crimes sparked outrage and sympathy with the victims, but remained perceived as a solely “foreign”, i.e. “German” phenomenon. Additionally, Austria’s public, just like West Germany’s, mostly denied prior knowledge of what was revealed in the course of the Eichmann trial. While shock, sympathy and shame characterized the West German reaction in both readers’ comments and editorials, responsibility for these crimes was also in the West German case diverted from the German collective to Eichmann himself.³¹⁶ The

³¹² Garscha 2005, 186.

³¹³ Deutschkron 1983, 133-134.

³¹⁴ The notion that distance mattered for the public perception of the Holocaust was also confirmed by the findings of Cohen et al: Their comparative study on the Israeli and West German media reaction to the Nuremberg, Eichmann, Auschwitz and Demjankuk trials revealed that Israelis payed more attention to the two trials conducted in Israel (Eichmann and Demjankuk), whereas the Nuremberg and Auschwitz trials had more meaning for the West German examination of their past (Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002, 138-140).

³¹⁵ Garscha 2005, 196.

³¹⁶ Deutschkron 1983, 131-134.

publics of both countries were therefore struggling with the notion of collective guilt, and while critical voices became louder amongst them, the majority successfully managed to divert the blame to either Nazi Germany or Nazi criminals alone. It was in the context of this broad but conflicted public debate that the Austrian and West German governments reacted to the trial in Jerusalem.

3. Official responses to the Eichmann trial

For Israel, the Eichmann trial formed a welcome patriotic experience that came just at the right time when there was a great need to fuse Israeli identity. By the end of the 1950s, gaps had appeared between different generations and between Zionist Israelis and Diaspora Jews, as well as between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews in Israel itself. In 1959, violent riots had torn the later apart in Haifa's neighbourhood Wadi Salib, further adding to the already large looming economic divide between the relatively prosperous Ashkenazi and the disadvantaged Sephardic Jews.³¹⁷ Not least due to these domestic tensions, a public trial of a Nazi war criminal of Eichmann's calibre posed a major opportunity for official Israel to unite Israelis behind the collective memory of the Holocaust while at the same time sending a reminder to Jews still living in the Diaspora that only the State of Israel could ensure their security.³¹⁸ In letters and interviews, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion often emphasized that not the man Adolf Eichmann himself, but rather the historic importance of his trial was of interest to him:

³¹⁷ Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002, 33.

³¹⁸ Goldberg 2012, 49-52.

It is not the punishment that is the main thing here but the fact that the trial is taking place, and is taking place in Jerusalem. (...) Not only Eichmann and his deeds but the entire Holocaust would come before the court.³¹⁹

As such, Ben Gurion followed two main official goals with Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem. First and foremost, to remind the countries of the world that the Holocaust obliged them to support the only Jewish state. And second, to impress the lesson of the Holocaust on the people of Israel, especially on the younger generation.³²⁰

With an eye to Israeli policies regarding West Germany in particular, the trial posed another welcome opportunity for Ben Gurion's government. In light of the widespread public opposition to the acceptance of reparations from West Germany, and Ben Gurion's imminent intention to conclude an arms deal with the West Germans, a public trial of a Nazi war criminal in Jerusalem would underline that the Ben Gurion government was not wholly indifferent to the memory of the Holocaust. At the same time, Ben Gurion wanted to avoid endangering Israel's rapprochement towards the FRG. He, from the very beginning of the trial onwards, thus always aimed to protect West Germany's image. For instance, in response to Attorney General Gideon Hausner's draft of his proposed opening speech of the trial, Ben Gurion only suggested corrections that tried to diminish the guilt of the German people: Instead of referencing "the crimes of 'the Germans'", say "Nazi Germany" and emphasize the guilt of Hitler, wrote Ben Gurion in reply to Hausner's draft.³²¹

Like Ben Gurion, the West German political elite was well aware that the Eichmann trial posed an imminent danger to the fragile trust that had been established with Israel since the Luxembourg agreement in 1952. The trial was dreaded by West German politicians, as it risked potentially harming not only West Germany's name within Israel but also its

³¹⁹ Ben Gurion, quoted in: Segev 1994, 327.

³²⁰ Segev 1994, 327.

³²¹ Segev 1994, 346-347.

recovering international image in the eyes of the entire world. In their official reaction to the trial, West German politicians in numerous and extensive speeches and interviews, appearing in radio, TV and newspapers, thus always highlighted West Germany's democratic attitude, while at the same time drawing a clear line between Eichmann and the ordinary German citizen. Yet, all public statements in one way or the other signalled German readiness to confront and seriously work through the past.³²²

While Eichmann stood before trial in Jerusalem, the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer took up his role as the "*Pater Patriae*"³²³ and prepared the German population for revelations which bore the potential of conflicting them:

It is without doubt that the Eichmann trial will again stir up the entire abominations of Hitler's regime and it is only human, if we as impartial and well-meaning people, when we hear and read about all of that, will be appalled by these atrocities. And it is also likely, that these feelings influence our judgment of Germany as a whole.³²⁴

Just as in the case of reparations, Adenauer - throughout the Eichmann trial - remained careful not to extend collective guilt to the entire population. As the West German media reaction to the trial had already demonstrated, the collective memory of the public was not

³²² President Heinrich Lübke held a speech in Hamburg, 13 April 1961; Former President Theodor Heuss spoke at "*Westphälische Rundschau*", Dortmund, 9 April 1961 about the Eichmann trial, and Federal Chancellor Adenauer spoke about the trial in the German Television on 10 April 1961. Amongst others, Willy Brandt, then Mayor of Berlin, gave a speech in the radio RIAS, 16 April 1961, and Eugen Gerstenmaier, President of the German Bundestag, appeared in a TV interview aired by the American Broadcasting Company. For the purpose of underlining West German interest and cooperation in bringing Nazi war criminals to justice, a "White Book" was even prepared containing details of previous prosecutions in the Federal Republic. See, for instance: Lamm 1961. Vogel 1967a, 145-148. Große 1995, 146.

³²³ Deutschkron 1983, 125.

³²⁴ Adenauer at a press conference in the *Bundeshaus*, 10 March 1961, quoted in: Große 1995, 139-140. Translated by the author from the German original: "*Es ist ganz zweifellos, dass der Eichmann-Prozess die ganzen Abscheulichkeiten des Hitlerregimes wieder aufwühlen wird, und es ist sehr menschlich, wenn unbefangenen Menschen, auch wohlwollende Menschen, wenn sie das nun alles hören und lesen, vor diesen Greuel zurückschrecken, und es ist auch möglich, dass etwas davon dann auch auf das Urteil über Deutschland abfärbt.*"

yet ready for critical self-examination and included attempts of victimhood and forgetting, just as in the Austrian case. Even so, Adenauer's signals to an external international audience were once again fully in line with his previously established diplomacy of guilt. The night before the trial began in Jerusalem, he appeared on German television:

We wish for the trial to bring the full truth to light and do justice. After Germany's capitulation, everyone who started rebuilding was filled with shame and worry. We were filled with shame because now, for the first time, we realized the horrifying abyss of National Socialism. We were filled with worry because we asked how it could ever become possible to eradicate this poison from the soul and life of wider circles of the German people.³²⁵

By way of publicly offering German support in bringing about justice, while at the same time underlining German shame and worry regarding the Nazi past, Adenauer followed the logic of atonement of the morally responsible perpetrator. He further underlined the steps that West Germany had taken in seeking to ameliorate the harm by pointing to the reparation agreement and highlighting his excellent personal relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion. While not missing the opportunity to show West German gratitude for Israeli acceptance of this gesture, Adenauer nevertheless added the hope that West Germany's generosity and good-will would now be reciprocated.³²⁶ The West German Chancellor openly feared that his strategic goal of recovering West Germany's image in the world was once again under jeopardy. As a result, he relentlessly underlined the difference between the new and the old Germany, the *Rechtsstaat* and the Third Reich, the Germans and the

³²⁵ Adenauer 1961, quoted in: Lamm 1961, III. Translated by the author from the German original: "Wir wünschen, dass in diesem Prozess die volle Wahrheit ans Licht kommt und dass Gerechtigkeit geübt wird. Nach dem Zusammenbruch Deutschlands waren alle, die an die Arbeit gingen, Deutschland wiederaufzubauen, erfüllt von Scham und Sorge. Wir waren erfüllt von Scham, weil nunmehr zum ersten Male uns, dem deutschen Volk, der furchtbare Abgrund des Nationalsozialismus zum Bewusstsein kam. Wir waren erfüllt von Sorge, weil wir uns fragten, wie es möglich sein werde, dieses Gift aus dem seelischen Empfinden, aus dem seelischen Leben weiter Kreise des deutschen Volkes wieder zu entfernen."

³²⁶ Adenauer 1961, quoted in Deutschkron 1983, 125.

Nazis.³²⁷ In his efforts, Adenauer even went as far as to urge journalists and Israelis not to blame all Germans for the crimes of the Nazis: “I’d like to ask you – (...) You know many Germans, you know what we think; you know what we have done. Please support us so that no harm arises for all Germans.”³²⁸ Adenauer clearly hoped that the Hitler regime was on trial and not the Germans of today:

Of course the Eichmann trial worries me, but not only the trial as such. Eichmann will get what he deserves. I have complete faith in the Israeli administration of justice. But I am concerned about the effect of what will be said on the way we Germans are judged generally.³²⁹

By publicly emphasising his confidence in Israel’s legal system and German support in bringing about justice, while at the same time underlining Germany’s shame and sorrow regarding the Nazi past in addition to its efforts towards *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (“coming to terms with the past”) and *Wiedergutmachung* (“making good again”), Adenauer was still fully in line with West Germany’s apologetic diplomacy of guilt vis-à-vis Israel. The potential harm that the Eichmann trial could exert on West Germany’s recovering international image hereby became the main target of official West German efforts. Even a decade after the Luxembourg agreement, Adenauer was thus committed to continuing his diplomacy of guilt for the strategic purpose of recovering, and by now also protecting, West Germany’s reputation in the world.

³²⁷ Adenauer 1961, quoted in: Lamm 1961, III.

³²⁸ Adenauer at a press conference, 10 March 1961, quoted in: Große 1995, 140.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Ich möchte Sie bitten – (...) Sie kennen viele Deutsche, Sie wissen was wir denken; Sie wissen, was wir getan haben, wenn Sie uns auch dabei helfen würden, dass kein Schaden für alle Deutschen entsteht.*”

³²⁹ Adenauer at a press conference, 10 March 1961, quoted in: Lavy 1996, 87.

The original German quote can be found in: Deutschkron 1983, 123. “*Der Eichmann-Prozess macht mir Sorgen. Nicht der Prozess als solcher...ich habe zu der Rechtspflege in Israel volles Vertrauen. Aber...wegen der Rückwirkungen...auf das Urteil über uns Deutsche überhaupt.*”

These manifold West German official activities in the wake of the Eichmann trial stood out in stark contrast to Austria's official silence. While Austrian media covered the case of Eichmann extensively, the country's political elite mostly refrained from commenting publicly on the trial. Only Justice Minister Christian Broda issued a short and rather vague statement in the realm of a routine press conference that gained little media attention:

The trial against Eichmann became the historic reckoning with National Socialism as a system. It - at the same time - serves as a warning to all of us: let's not tolerate the creation of legends around the Third Reich!³³⁰

No other official public comment had been made throughout the entire course of the Eichmann trial, other than one: The Interior Ministry supplied a brief statement that Eichmann was a German, not an Austrian citizen, an issue considered in detail below.³³¹

Can this official Austrian silence indeed be traced back to a mere neglect and lack of interest on part of the Austrian officials, or was it rather a deliberate strategy to keep the case of Eichmann and Austria's involvement in the Nazi regime as much out of the public's eye as possible? Internal documents from the Austrian Interior Ministry, the Upper Austrian Police Authority,³³² as well as archival material from the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy in Tel Aviv reveal that Austrian officials behind the scenes not only paid close attention to Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem, but they also pushed to influence the trial's impact on Austria,

³³⁰ Broda 1961, quoted in: Garscha 2005, 195.

Translated by the author from the German original: „*Der Prozess gegen Eichmann ist zur geschichtlichen Abrechnung mit dem Nationalsozialismus als System geworden. Er ist gleichzeitig eine Mahnung an uns alle: Dulden wir keine Legendenbildung um das Dritte Reich!*“

³³¹ Garscha 2005, 195-196.

An article in the Austrian newspaper *Die Presse* also noticed the official silence, openly raising the question of why the case of Eichmann seemed to constitute a taboo in Austria.

See: *Die Presse*, "Eichmann und wir", by Otto Schulmeister, 14 April 1961.

³³² Eichmann and his family were residents of Linz, the capital of the region of Upper Austria, therefore the Upper Austrian Police Authority was in charge of his case.

Israel and the world. In the focus of this diplomatic team effort was first and foremost the unresolved question of Eichmann's citizenship.

3.1. The debate around Eichmann's citizenship

In an immediate response to Eichmann's capture, Austria's *Arbeiter Zeitung* stated on page one: "He is from Linz". The article further included details about Eichmann's childhood in Austria, in addition to naming his relatives who were still living in the region of Upper Austria.³³³ While the mentioning of Eichmann's Austrian roots remained rather brief and factual in Austrian news reporting, Austrian officials behind the scenes began to take immediate action. Within a month of Eichmann's capture in Argentina, clear evidence was circulated to the inquiring court in Frankfurt am Main that Adolf Eichmann, despite having spent most of his life in Linz, never possessed Austrian citizenship.³³⁴ This led to the statement issued by the Interior Ministry mentioned above.³³⁵

While this position formed the undisputed official Austrian stance, the memories of Upper Austrian policeman Leo Maier, involved in Eichmann's manhunt since the late 1940s, revealed policy-makers' deliberate efforts to turn Eichmann from an Austrian into a German citizen.³³⁶ In the wake of Eichmann's capture, Maier was called into the Interior Ministry in Vienna where Interior Minister Josef Afritsch assigned him the following task:

³³³ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "Hitlers Judenreferent Eichmann in Israel verhaftet", 24 May 1960.

³³⁴ Internal document between the Austrian Foreign and Interior Ministry on the „Question of Eichmann's citizenship“, Vienna, 13 June 1960. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 22568_2/60.

³³⁵ *Die Presse*, „Eichmann und wir“, by Otto Schulmeister, 14 April 1961.

³³⁶ *Salzkammergut/Bad Ischler Stadt Zeitung*, „Ein „heimlicher Besuch“ in der Alpenfestung - und seine Folgen“, by Leo Frank, 14 March 1991.

Leo Frank was the pseudonym under which Leo Meier, a policeman in Linz, published his detective stories. See online: Katalog der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: <https://portal.dnb.de/opac.htm?method=simpleSearch&cqlMode=true&reset=true&referrerPosition=0&referrerResultId=%22108736326%22%26any&query=idn%3D108736326>.

I need a report from you that states that Eichmann was a German citizen. Because if he is tried as an Austrian, we will pay crazy amounts of reparations. At such a trial, many victim organizations will bring in their claims, do you get it?³³⁷

Maier understood and immediately started searching for relevant documentation in Eichmann's home town Linz. However, despite his efforts, he simply could not find any evidence that Eichmann was not Austrian. Even though Eichmann was born in Solingen in the Rhineland in 1906, he had been brought up and was a resident of the Austrian city of Linz. According to the citizenship law of 1918, permanent residence within Austria sufficed to receive Austrian citizenship. All discovered documents therefore rather clearly revealed Eichmann as an Austrian, not a German citizen.³³⁸ It was in this context that Leo Maier came up with an idea: Austrian law also prescribed that any Austrian who had joined a foreign military organization loses his/her citizenship. Given that Eichmann joined the "Austrian Legion" in Bavaria in 1933, Maier suggested they should apply this law to Eichmann's case and thus retroactively withdraw his citizenship. The Interior Minister responded with praise: "Very well done! My colleagues, the Ministers are very relieved."³³⁹ The Republic of Austria further expressed its gratitude to Maier with a monetary reward and his subsequent delegation to Jerusalem as one of Austria's two official observers to the trial.³⁴⁰

The personal accounts of Leo Maier point to the importance that a "convenient" construction of the past had for Austria's political establishment, especially with an eye to the high costs

³³⁷ Leo Frank 1991, quoted in: Safrian 1993, 320.

Translation by the author from the original in Austrian dialect: *"Ich brauch' von Ihnen einen Bericht, dass der Eichmann deutscher Staatsbürger ist. Weil wenn der als Österreicher verurteilt wird, dann zahlen wir uns mit den Wiedergutmachungen teppert (KB: Austrian dialect for the German word „blöd“). Bei dem Prozess hängen sich eine Menge Opferverbände mit Forderungen an, verstehn S'?"*

³³⁸ *Die Presse*, „Wie Eichmann vom Österreicher zum Deutschen wurde“, by Siobhán Geets, 26 November 2011.

³³⁹ Leo Frank 1991, quoted in: Safrian 1993, 320.

Translation by the author from the original in Austrian dialect: *"Des habens sehr guat gmacht. Meine Ministerkollegen san sehr erleichtert."*

³⁴⁰ Safrian 1993, 320.

Die Presse, "Wie Eichmann vom Österreicher zum Deutschen wurde“, by Siobhán Geets, 26 November 2011.

of potential demands for reparations that would very likely be triggered by the trial. The same went for efforts of Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky. On 4 April 1961, Kreisky asked his General Secretary Martin Fuchs to create a “working group of Austrian patriots (*“Arbeitsgruppe von Österreichischen Patrioten”*)”. Fuchs’ notes reveal the purpose of that group: “In the light of the Eichmann trial, the Germans want to shift a big part of their blame onto us”, wrote Fuchs in his diary.³⁴¹ The working group was thus formed to collect relevant material in order to defend Austria from what was perceived as an imminent political conflict with West Germany.

Further anticipating increased international media and political attention on the matter of Eichmann’s citizenship once the trial in Jerusalem would begin, the Interior Ministry meticulously prepared its position, as follows.

The investigations by the Austrian authorities have found no indication that Eichmann ever held Austrian citizenship. His father had applied for Austrian citizenship in 1928, and held double citizenship thereafter. At that time, Adolf Eichmann was already over 18 years old and was as such not affected by his father’s decision. Eichmann himself never applied for Austrian citizenship and emigrated to Germany (as a German citizen) in 1933.³⁴²

Following this official statement, Austrian diplomatic representatives world-wide were advised to reject eventual press and other comments in “(...) the appropriate form (...)”. An additional advice was also included: “(...) refrain from engaging in any polemics and do not

³⁴¹ Diary entry of Martin Fuchs, 4 April 1961, quoted in: Röhrlich 2009, 174.

³⁴² The official statement was reprinted in a letter of the Austrian Foreign Ministry informing all Austrian representative offices on „The question of citizenship of SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann”, (Highly Confidential!), Vienna, 6 April 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israeli 49, Gz. 17410_61.

create the outward impression that your statements are aimed against the Federal Republic of Germany.”³⁴³

While this initial discussion about Eichmann’s citizenship started internally between different Austrian and German authorities, it did not end there. Given the doubts about Eichmann’s citizenship, the regional court of Köln, shortly before the trial started, rejected the claim of Dr. Robert Servatius, Eichmann’s attorney, that the Federal Republic of Germany should be held responsible for the costs of the trial. In contrast to the inference angrily made by Austrian officials from West Germany’s opposition to bearing the costs of the trial, the Federal Republic’s response can neither be explained by a simple cost-benefit calculus on part of West Germany, nor by an attempt to palm off costs and blame for Eichmann onto Austria.³⁴⁴ The ongoing high West German expenditures in reparations for Israel in fact suggest that political and not material calculus defined West Germany’s attitude regarding the defence of Eichmann.³⁴⁵ Rather than fearing the trial’s material costs, West Germany worried much more about eventual negative consequences on its image from legally defending Eichmann. When Adenauer stated in the NBC programme “*Meet the Press*” that “Eichmann is not a German citizen, and we have no obligations to fulfil towards

³⁴³ The Austrian Foreign Ministry informing all Austrian representative offices on “The question of citizenship of SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann”, (Highly Confidential!), Vienna, 6 April 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israeli 49, Gz. 17410_61.

The German original letter says: “*Sie werden eingeladen, allfälligen Pressemeldungen oder sonstigen Äusserungen, dass Eichmann österreichischer Staatsbürger wäre bzw. dass seine Staatsbürgerschaft nicht geklärt und er möglicherweise österreichischer Staatsbürger sein könnte, in geeignet erscheinender Weise unter Hinweis auf die eindeutige Feststellung des Bundesministeriums für Inneres entgegenzutreten. Hierbei wäre jedoch unbedingt zu vermeiden, sich in eine Polemik einzulassen oder den Anschein zu erwecken, dass sich Ihre Feststellungen gegen die BRD richten.*”

³⁴⁴ Austrian Ambassador to Germany, Schöner, to the Foreign Minister on: „Eichmann, Austrian?“, Bonn, 5 April 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 49, Gz. 17410_61.

Süddeutsche Zeitung, “Problems of Eichmann’s defense. Lawyer Servatius sues the Federal Republic in order to clarify who will bear the costs for his legal assistance”, by Albert Wucher, No. 80, 4 April 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A_61.

³⁴⁵ Große 1995, 171 – 174.

him”,³⁴⁶ he referred to the controversy about any legal obligations that West Germany might have towards Eichmann as a German citizen, rather than attempting to turn Eichmann into an Austrian. According to the law, West Germany indeed could have put in a request for extradition of Eichmann and offered him legal protection, just as Eichmann’s lawyer Servatius had demanded. West Germany, however, instead decided not to act at all. Keeping Eichmann’s citizenship unresolved was simply the most convenient way for West Germany to bypass any obligations to grant Eichmann legal protection. The reasoning behind West Germany’s inaction therefore did not lie in a material cost calculation nor in its intent to blame responsibility for Eichmann on Austria, but once again stemmed from its fear of harming its slowly recovering international reputation. Bargaining with Israel over the extradition of a mass murderer would certainly not serve West Germany’s interest in that regard.³⁴⁷

Within Austria, on the other hand, the urgent attention that the question of Eichmann’s citizenship received underlined the threat that the case of Eichmann posed to Austrian interests. In order to mitigate the danger, officials throughout the trial put a combined diplomatic team effort under way which aimed at nothing less than portraying the country’s innocence vis-à-vis the Nazi past to the international stage.³⁴⁸ By way of pointing to slim and, as has been shown above, retroactively constructed evidence that was almost more luck than historic fact, official Austria indeed managed last-minute to avoid raising international doubt about its victim myth: once the trial started, Austrian and Israeli news reporting undoubtedly assumed that Eichmann was German.³⁴⁹ While Israelis had always shown a

³⁴⁶ Adenauer in the NBC programme “Meet the press”, 16 April 1961, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 124. Translated by the author from the German original: “*Eichmann ist kein deutscher Staatsbürger, und wir haben keine Verpflichtungen ihm gegenüber.*”

³⁴⁷ Deutschkron 1983, 123-125. Weingardt 2002, 134-135.

³⁴⁸ Luegmayer to Foreign Ministry on „The question of citizenship of the former SS-Obersturmbannführers Adolf Eichmann. Tel Aviv, 11 April 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 49, Gz. 17410_61.

³⁴⁹ Regarding Austrian media reports, see:

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Servatius: Eichmann ist kein Österreicher“, 15 April 1961.

limited interest in the question of Eichmann's citizenship, Austrian officials throughout the trial remained vigilant towards what was perceived as persistent West German provocations. West German observers, for instance, detected and mocked Eichmann's obvious Austrian accent,³⁵⁰ a notion that the Austrian observers - of course - strongly disagreed with: "We were certainly not going to take that (...)", remembered the Austrian representative to the trial in a later interview.³⁵¹ With their defensive stance against West Germany, Austrian officials were fully in line with the rationale of their country's previously adopted diplomacy of innocence. According to the logic of denying moral responsibility for the past, any successful portrayal of Austria's innocence necessarily had to include putting full blame for National Socialism, the war and the extermination of the Jews on Germany alone. As media reports had already revealed, this diplomatic strategy received almost undisputed domestic support in the early 1960s: The out-group or "the other" for the Austrian identity at the time was "the Germans" and not "the Jews", and National Socialism was widely perceived as an external, German matter only. The Austrian government was nevertheless clearly aware of the constructed nature of the country's innocent victim status. On advice of the Foreign Ministry, official efforts were deliberately confined to behind the scenes, and loud rejections

Die Presse, „Eichmanns Verteidiger im Angriff. Bonn soll zum Schutz des Angeklagten angerufen werden“, 15 April 1961.

Regarding Israeli media, see:

Davar, "Eichmann was not an Austrian citizen", 10 April 1961, (translated from Hebrew by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv). ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A_61.

Haboker, "Eichmann was never an Austrian citizen", 10 April 1961, (translated from Hebrew by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv). ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A_61.

Al Hamishmar, "The Austrian observers search for material", 10 April 1961, (translated from Hebrew by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv). ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A_61.

³⁵⁰ Austrian observer to the Eichmann trial, Wiesinger, to Interior Minister, Jerusalem, 15 May 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 49, 17410_61.

³⁵¹ Wiesinger Interview 2002, quoted in: Garscha 2005, 217 – 218.

Translated by the author from the German original: "Wir wollten das nicht auf uns sitzen lassen (...)".

and direct accusations of Germany were to be avoided against the fear of triggering a potential international backlash on Austria's narrative.³⁵²

While the official Austrian reaction to the question of Eichmann's citizenship was in line with Austria's diplomacy of innocence vis-à-vis Israel and the world, the West German response too reflected its diplomacy of guilt. As such, German efforts were once again not driven by a material cost-benefit calculation, but rather focussed on limiting the potential danger the trial posed to the country's recovering international reputation. In contrast to Austria's initial concerns, West German opposition to solving Eichmann's citizenship was thus motivated by a desire to deny legal defence to a mass murderer for fear of negative consequences to its image. The FRG therefore also in 1961 clearly pursued its strategic goal of deepening West Germany's integration within the international community. Hence, it can be concluded that both West Germany and Austria during Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem still considered their diplomatic strategies according to the rationale of their nationally fabricated narrative, for the purpose of realizing their respective international goals.

3.2. The delegation of official observers to the trial in Jerusalem

The West German delegation to the trial

Several countries and international organizations sent official observers to the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem.³⁵³ Among them, the West German delegation was one of the largest, consisting of ten people and including functionaries and staff from the Foreign Ministry and the Federal Press Office.³⁵⁴ These West German representatives were carefully selected: Gerhard von Preuschen, the head of the delegation, was a lawyer from Wiesbaden who had

³⁵² The Austrian Foreign Ministry informing all Austrian representative offices on "The question of citizenship of SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann", (Highly Confidential!), Vienna, 6 April 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israeli 49, Gz. 17410_61.

³⁵³ Cohen/Zemach-Marom/Wilke/Schenk 2002, 15.

³⁵⁴ Große 1995, 162.

participated in the plot against Hitler on 20 July 1944. As such, he was an “unproblematic” candidate with regards to his personal biography. Being neither a politician nor a diplomat, the choice of von Preuschen helped the FRG to avoid the outward impression of a German “watchman” over the trial. His task was in fact much more than one of a mere observer; since no bilateral relations existed between Israel and West Germany at the time, Von Preuschen represented the first official delegate of the German government to Israel.³⁵⁵ The presence of the West German delegation in Jerusalem therefore signified nothing less than the first direct encounter between Israelis and Germans since World War II. That this would constitute a difficult endeavour was clear from the beginning, although – as German journalist Albert Wucher from *Süddeutsche Zeitung* recalled - no one could beforehand imagine how hard it really was for both sides. Questions that Israelis asked West Germans over and over again included:

Isn't Eichmann representing the typical German? Don't all Germans show traits of Eichmann within their personalities? (...) Is it all just slumbering within you, now that you are well off? Is it at all possible for a nation that had committed such a sin on humanity to regain its innocence and moral integrity simply by way of changing the constitution (...)?³⁵⁶

While there were - of course - no answers, Israelis and West Germans at least for the first time were able to confront these questions together. As such, the trial constituted on the one hand and in Von Preuschen's words, “a cut in the abscess” (“*Schnitt in eine Eiterbeule*“), but on the other hand “another step in the healing process between the two countries”.³⁵⁷ In

³⁵⁵ Deutschkron 1983, 126.

³⁵⁶ Wucher 1961, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 131. Translated by the author from the German original: “*War nicht in Eichmann typisch Deutsches, haben nicht alle Deutschen etwas von Eichmann in sich? (...) Schlummert es nur, weil es ihnen gutgeht? Kann eine Nation, die sich derart an der Humanität versündigt hat, ihre Unschuld, ihre moralische Integrität im Handumdrehen wiedergewinnen dadurch, dass sie ihre Verfassung ändert (...)?*”

³⁵⁷ Wiesinger to Luegmayer on „The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem“, Jerusalem, 12 of July, 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 20765_2A/62.

fact, the main strategic purpose behind the German delegation to the trial was to ensure a continuation of the rapprochement with Israel that had started with the Luxembourg Agreement in 1952. The way to achieve that goal went through offering West German support and cooperation in the prosecution of war criminals. With regards to the case of Eichmann in particular, West Germany's strategy therefore delicately manoeuvred somewhere between supporting Israel in bringing Eichmann and his collaborators to justice, while at the same time aiming to limit potential damage to the entire German name. As the high amount of 426.756,11 DM allocated to the German delegation underlined, West Germany spared no expense for this important endeavour.³⁵⁸

However, while the FRG remained fully committed to Israel, the emerging international context of the Cold War rendered Von Preuschen's mission to Jerusalem – as he himself claimed - ever more delicate.³⁵⁹ On the one hand, he was supposed to promote friendship and understanding between West Germans and Israelis, while on the other he should not promise too much regarding eventual diplomatic relations because of Arab attempts to establish contacts with the GDR.³⁶⁰ Furthermore, while Eichmann's trial in and of itself posed enough of a challenge to West Germany's image, the FRG faced additional targeted accusations from the communist bloc. Representatives and journalists from communist countries repeatedly attacked the FRG and Adenauer's government by asserting an unbroken continuity between the Federal Republic and the Nazi regime. The main target of the Eastern bloc's campaign was Hans Glöbke, currently Director of the Federal Chancellery of West Germany and former chief legal advisor in Eichmann's department.³⁶¹ The case of Glöbke and the manifold accusations from the East German delegation hence formed an additional

³⁵⁸ Große 1995, 164-165.

³⁵⁹ Von Preuschen 1967, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 126.

³⁶⁰ Große 1995, 167-169.

³⁶¹ Braunbuch 1965. Kriegs- und Naziverbrecher in der Bundesrepublik: Staat, Wirtschaft, Armee, Verwaltung, Justiz, Wissenschaft. Staatsverlag der DDR.

and persistent challenge and “embarrassment“ for the government in Bonn and its apparent deficits when it came to dealing with the past.³⁶² In the end, with the support of Israel’s political elite, Glöbke was not invited to stand witness before the court in Jerusalem, and a major ideological clash between East and West was avoided at the very last minute.³⁶³

The Austrian delegation to the trial

The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem not only touched on vital West German but also on Austrian interests: Eichmann had committed his crimes predominantly on the territory of what is today’s Republic of Austria. Thirteen of his 25 closest collaborators were Austrians and some of them still lived in Austria. The name of Austria and Austrians would therefore almost certainly come up during the trial requiring prompt executive and judicial action on parts of the Austrian authorities. As such, “(...) only an objective and frequent reporting will allow Austrian authorities to safeguard Austrian interests during the trial”, concluded the Director of the Upper Austrian Police Department, Kohler, in his letter to the Interior Ministry.³⁶⁴ The Ministry indeed soon took up the matter: “(...) there is no doubt that happenings in Austria and the behaviour of persons who are connected to Adolf Eichmann will become a topic of conversation.”³⁶⁵ In addition to Austria’s direct links with Eichmann and his collaborators,³⁶⁶ the Austrian Jew and famous “Nazi hunter” Simon Wiesenthal, then President of the Austrian Jewish Community, did not only crucially contribute to

³⁶² Wiesinger to Interior Minister Afritsch, Jerusalem, 15 May 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 49, 17410_61.

³⁶³ Weingardt 2002, 134.

³⁶⁴ Police Department of Upper Austria, Director Dr. Kohler, on “Eichmann Adolf, former SS-Oberstrumbannführer; Participation of Austrian observers at the upcoming trial in Israel”. Linz, 2 June 1960. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 49, 17410_61.

³⁶⁵ Ministry of Interior, State Police Department, Information. Vienna, 24 January 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 49, 17410_61.

The German original says: *“Schon allein auf Grund der Tatsache, daß Adolf Eichmann lange Jahre hindurch in Linz gelebt hat (...), muss angenommen werden, daß im Verlauf des Prozesses, (...) viele Vorgänge in Österreich, die mit Adolf Eichmann im Zusammenhang stehen, erörtert werden.”*

³⁶⁶ Former SS officer Franz Novak has only recently been captured by the Austrian authorities.

Eichmann's capture, but had already arrived in Israel to help prepare Eichmann's lawsuit. For Austrian officials, it therefore became increasingly clear: Eichmann was also Austria's business and as such they prepared to dispatch a delegation to Jerusalem, "(...) in order to, on the one hand show Austria's interest in the trial, and on the other hand, give the Austrian authorities the opportunity to react and take immediate action whenever Austrian interests are at stake." Such an effort, would underline "the Austrian government's willingness to contribute to finding the truth according to its possibilities before the world's public".³⁶⁷

The High Commissioner of the Upper Austrian Police in Linz, Josef Wiesinger, was selected as Austria's official observer to the trial. His expertise in the subject matter of war criminals as well as his command of the English language were stated as the official motivations behind this choice.³⁶⁸ However, in a later interview, Wiesinger himself told a different story. Rather than being an expert in the prosecution of war criminals, he was a former colleague and friend of Rupertsberger, the Interior Ministry official who was in charge of this matter.³⁶⁹ Wiesinger, in any case, was to be accompanied by another colleague from the Upper Austrian police department, the policemen Leo Meier who had already been involved in the manhunt for Eichmann in previous years and who shortly before had skilfully turned Eichmann into a German citizen. Sending two police officers to the trial underlined Austria's intent: the main aim of the delegation was to enable cooperation between the Israeli and Austrian executive branch in order to bring Eichmann and his collaborators to justice. The mission of the two policemen was not merely technical, but also had – as documents from

³⁶⁷ Ministry of Interior, State Police Department, Information. Vienna, 24 January 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 49, 17410_61.

Translated by the author from the German original: "(...) *um einerseits das österreichische Interesse an dem Prozess selbst zu bekunden und andererseits den österreichischen Behörden selbst die Möglichkeit zu bieten, auf im Prozess auftauchende, die österreichischen Interessen berührende Vorgänge, sofort reagieren und die notwendigen Maßnahmen treffen zu können. Hierdurch würde die Bereitschaft der österreichischen Regierung, zur Findung der Wahrheit nach Möglichkeit beizutragen, vor der Weltöffentlichkeit dokumentiert.*"

³⁶⁸ Ministry of Interior, State Police Department, Information. Vienna, 24 January 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 49, 17410_61.

³⁶⁹ Wiesinger Interview 2002, quoted in: Garscha 2005, 214.

the Ministry of Interior revealed - a clear political angle attached: to defend Austria's image of an innocent victim in front of Israel and the world.³⁷⁰

In the wake of the Eichmann trial, the challenge to Austria's victim narrative stemmed not only from the case of Eichmann and his testimony, but also from ever more frequent Israeli attacks on the Austrian justice system. Israel's criticism mainly focussed on the observation of Austrian courts which had issued numerous acquittals to war criminals over the past years. Fuelled by investigations into lay judges' questionable biographical pasts, in addition to a persisting antisemitic sentiment among the Austrian public, Israel suspected that Austrian lay judges were complying with the ideas of National Socialism rather than convicting them.³⁷¹ Formulated along these lines, Israel's critique therefore not only targeted Austria's executive and judicial branches, but also openly questioned the prevailing image of Austria as an innocent victim of Nazi Germany.

Rescuing that very image thus became the main political target of the Austrian observers during the trial. Immediately upon their arrival to Israel, the Embassy in Tel Aviv called a press conference. Before a crowd of suspicious Israeli journalists, official Austria desired to restate its interest in the imminent Eichmann trial while unambiguously offering Austria's cooperation in the prosecution of Eichmann's collaborators.³⁷² And indeed, the Austrian strategy to promote its image in front of the Israeli public yielded immediate success: the day after the press conference, Israeli newspapers reported extensively on the Austrian observers and their mission during the trial.³⁷³ Some newspapers highlighted Austria's

³⁷⁰ See the above quoted documents from the Ministry of Interior, in addition to the Interior Ministry's documents from 1961/62, quoted in: Garscha 2005, 205-206.

³⁷¹ Wiesinger informs the Police Department of Upper Austria on the Eichmann trial: "Report on the 2nd part of the trial, December 1961", Linz, 9 January 1962. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A/61.

³⁷² Luegmayer to Foreign Ministry on „Press conference introducing the Austrian observers to the Eichmann trial", Tel Aviv, 19 April 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 49, 17410_61.
Wiesinger Interview 2002, quoted in: Garscha 2005, 215.

³⁷³ *Al Hamishmar*, „The Austrian observers search for material", 10 April 1961, (translated from Hebrew by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv). ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A/61.

previous efforts in Eichmann's manhunt,³⁷⁴ and others even went as far as to confirm Wiesinger's "unproblematic" past. An article in *Maariv* claimed that the Austrian observer – during the war – had no idea of the existence of Mauthausen.³⁷⁵ In contrast, there was scant mention of the Austrian delegation to Jerusalem in Austrian newspapers themselves. The *Arbeiter Zeitung* merely published the names of the observers and described their mission as one of cooperation with the Israeli authorities in order to bring further Nazi criminals to trial.³⁷⁶

Despite this initial success, "the bias of the press and the reserve of Israeli public authorities"³⁷⁷ persisted throughout the entire course of the trial. It was this Israeli mistrust that – apart from the technicalities of the subject matter – dominated Wiesinger's frequent reports from Jerusalem to the Interior Ministry in Vienna. What was perceived as a deliberate and unjustified Israeli defamation campaign against Austria's justice system was countered in an official team effort of observers and embassy personnel. However, neither press conferences nor oral corrections of journalistic articles nor official statements had the desired effect. The Israeli public remained suspicious of Austria. Limited success with regards to presenting Austria in a more favourable light to the Israelis stemmed from the numerous informal meetings between the officials, as well as the coincidental reopening of the cases of Franz Murer and Alfred Slawik in Vienna, in addition to the conviction of Dr. Egon Schönpflug through an Austrian jury court in Wels. In the midst of all this Israeli criticism,

³⁷⁴ *Haaretz*, „Austria searches for Nazi criminals“, 10 April 1961, (translated from Hebrew by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv). ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A/61.

Davar, „Eichmann was not an Austrian citizen“, 10 April 1961, (translated from Hebrew by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv). ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A/61.

Davar, „Preparations for the Eichmann trial“, 6 April 1961, (translated from Hebrew by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv). ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A/61.

³⁷⁵ *Maariv*, „The Germans say: We knew nothing“, 10 April 1961, (translated from Hebrew by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv). ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A/61.

³⁷⁶ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, „Im Zeichen des Eichmann-Prozesses“, by Israel J.E. Palmon, 11 April 1961.

³⁷⁷ Wiesinger to Luegmayer on "The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem", Jerusalem, 12 July 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 20765_2A/62.

these three cases – as Wiesinger underlined to the Ministry in Vienna - served as much needed proof that Austria was willing to prosecute war criminals and that Austrian jury courts not only issued acquittals.³⁷⁸

In the end, the Austrian observer concluded that Israel's press remained "full of hidden accusations" ("*voll versteckter Vorwürfe*")³⁷⁹ and that tireless efforts were ultimately to no avail: Israeli behaviour remained perceived as both intentionally defamatory as well as outright absurd. The Israeli public, according to Wiesinger, had established a "strange interconnectedness" ("*eine eigenartige Verquickung*") between Austria's unwillingness to pay reparations and its prosecution of war criminals, deriving motivation for both from sympathies for the Nazis and persisting antisemitic tendencies within the Austrian population (...).³⁸⁰ Wiesinger's irritation about this finding testifies once more of how much the Austrian and Israeli narrative about Austria's past deviated from one another's. The victim narrative that Wiesinger clearly represented as well as his own position within the national security forces apparently did not allow him to see Austria's approach towards the Nazi past in any critical way and instead he turned to Israel and the country's own problems for a more plausible explanation: Israel's fear of Jewish return migration to European countries must have induced Israeli authorities deliberately to exaggerate antisemitic incidents in Europe, and therefore also in Austria.³⁸¹ In a later interview, Wiesinger recalled the mind-set of the time among both Austrians and Israelis which had hindered them from mutually understanding their respective positions: While a climate of heightened fear persisted among Israelis, especially with an eye to the doubtful security of Jews in Austria,

³⁷⁸ Wiesinger to Luegmayer on "The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem", Jerusalem, 12 July 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 20765_2A/62.

³⁷⁹ Wiesinger informs the Police Department of Upper Austria on the Eichmann trial: "Report on the 2nd part of the trial, December 1961", Linz, 9 January 1962. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A/61.

³⁸⁰ Wiesinger to Luegmayer on "The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem", Jerusalem, 12 July 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 20765_2A/62.

³⁸¹ Wiesinger informs the Police Department of Upper Austria on the Eichmann trial: "Report on the 2nd part of the trial, December 1961", Linz, 9 January 1962. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A/61.

official Austria was of the opinion that National Socialism was a foreign German phenomenon only. As such, antisemitism was considered to be non-existent in Austria and the Republic lauded itself for having successfully closed all legal proceedings against Nazi war criminals by 1955 (thirty Nazi criminals had been executed in Austria by that year): “The widespread attitude was that we have done enough and that we cannot continue like this forever.”³⁸²

Despite the evident controversy between Austrian observers and the Israeli public, the Austrian observers’ mission was nevertheless internally referred to as a political success: “Via skilled awareness training, the Austrian observers could convince the representatives of the world press, who were not parsimonious with critique, of Austria’s interest in the matter of open cases of war criminals.”³⁸³ The re-occurring attempts by ministers to justify the deployment of Austrian observers in front of the Austrian Parliament, however, reveal that there must have been significant internal opposition to sending two officials to Jerusalem, probably due to financial considerations. Such reasoning once again shows the low significance that the prosecution of Nazi criminals had in Austria at the time.³⁸⁴ Concerns about Austria’s image to the outside world, however, ultimately outweighed the cost considerations, at least on the highest ministerial level: “(...) it would be ill-received by Israel if an Austrian representative was missing at the proclamation of the sentence.”³⁸⁵

³⁸² Wiesinger Interview 2002, quoted in: Garscha 2005, 218.

Translated by the author from the German original: “Die weit verbreitete Einstellung war, man habe genug gemacht und man könne das nicht ewig fortsetzen.”

³⁸³ Interior Minister Afritsch and Justice Minister Broda on 27 November 1961, quoted in: Garscha 2005, 205. Translated by the author from the German original:

“Die österreichischen Vertreter konnten durch geschickte Aufklärungsarbeit die mit Kritiken nicht spendenden Vertreter der Weltpresse von dem Interesse Österreichs an dem Problem der Lösung noch unerledigter Kriegsverbrecherfälle überzeugen.”

³⁸⁴ Garscha 2005, 205-206.

³⁸⁵ Ministry of Interior 1961, quoted in: Garscha 2005, 206.

Translated by the author from the German original: “Abgesehen davon würde es wahrscheinlich in Israel sehr übel aufgenommen werden, wenn ein österreichischer Vertreter bei der Urteilsverkündung fehlen würde.”

4. Conclusions: The success of diplomatic strategies with memory

The Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961 not only formed the first test case of West Germany's and Austria's diplomatic approaches with memory, but also challenged the international goals both countries aimed to reach with their respective strategies since 1952. In the West German case, nothing less than its slowly recovering reputation was at stake, and, in the Austrian case, its recently achieved "spotless" image that came with independence was put in jeopardy. The official West German and Austrian responses to the Eichmann trial, however, revealed that both countries – just like during the bilateral debate about reparations - still followed their selected diplomatic approaches with memory when confronted with the Nazi past on the international stage. This was obvious not only in the manifold public declarations made by West German politicians at the beginning of the trial, but also in the official silence on part of their Austrian counterparts. Furthermore, the frenetic behind the scenes efforts of Austrian policy-makers, which aimed at turning Eichmann into a German citizen while at the same time tried to defend the country against West German and Israeli criticism, fully reflected the logic of Austria's diplomacy of innocence. In clear contrast to Austria's deliberate attempt to keep a low public profile during the trial, the West German delegation, on the other hand, was - as the Austrian observers put it in their reports³⁸⁶ – omnipresent in Jerusalem. Moreover, the West German delegation consisted of a variety of political, legal and press representatives, in addition to being equipped not only with a large financial budget but also with a broad political mission. Unlike the diplomacy of

³⁸⁶ Wiesinger informs the Police Department of Upper Austria on the Eichmann trial: "Report on the 2nd part of the trial, December 1961", Linz, 9 January 1962. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 25641_2A/61.

innocence, the diplomacy of guilt was not aimed at evading responsibility, but rather at facing it.

When judged by their relations with Israel, both strategies were ultimately successful. While the West German mission to the trial resembled a tightrope walk between the requirements of a “special treatment” of Israel stemming from the FRG’s Nazi legacy and the challenges arising from the East-West conflict, West Germany’s sincere efforts in confronting the past and collaborating with the Israelis in bringing Eichmann and other war criminals to justice in the end paid off: Despite the threat posed, the trial in Jerusalem came to constitute the first direct encounter not only between Israeli and West German officials, but also between their publics. As such, the Eichmann trial formed yet another milestone in paving the way to future bilateral relations between Israel and West Germany. Only the Eastern bloc had actively worked against this West German endeavour. Israel, on the other hand, showed itself to be cooperative with the FRG’s interests in the way in which Attorney General Hausner pursued the accusation. He first and foremost aimed at strengthening a sense of community amongst the Jews while bringing the immense suffering of the Jewish people to the world’s attention. To do so, it was important to condemn the actions of Nazi Germany, but Hausner was always careful not to discredit the entire German population.³⁸⁷ As was mentioned earlier, Ben Gurion himself had a hand in this strategy, staying true to his pragmatic attitude towards the FRG which he had pursued firmly since the Luxembourg agreement. In his statements made throughout the trial, Ben Gurion openly avoided blaming all Germans. At the end of the first part of the trial, he even revealed to a German journalist from *Deutsche Zeitung*: “My views on today’s Germany have not changed. Nazi Germany does not exist anymore.”³⁸⁸ Ben Gurion, after all, had to make sure that the new beginning in West

³⁸⁷ Wiesinger to Luegmayer on “The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem”, Jerusalem, 12 July 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 20765_2A/62.

³⁸⁸ Ben Gurion answers questions of journalist Vogel (*Deutsche Zeitung*), 17 August 1961, quoted and translated into German in: Große 1995, 142.

German-Israeli relations which he himself had helped to create would not be spoiled: “On the Israeli side, there is readiness for close and normal relations and full cooperation,” he emphasized in August 1961.³⁸⁹ It was not least this commitment to West Germany on the highest levels of the Israeli government that crucially contributed to the ultimate success of Adenauer’s strategy of keeping the German name untarnished in the wake of the trial in Jerusalem.³⁹⁰ Moreover, the West German reputation even withstood the watchful eye of the - compared to Israel’s political establishment - traditionally more critical Israeli press: The overall Israeli impression was that West Germans were following the trial with sympathy for Israel, awareness of their guilt, and a desire for absolution. As such, the Eichmann trial can be said to have moderated rather than exacerbated anti-German sentiment among Israel’s public:³⁹¹ Thanks to Israelis’ readiness to distinguish between the FRG and the time of Eichmann, the trial did not damage the West German reputation, noted the Federal Government’s Press and Information Office as early as April 1961. Instead, the Eichmann trial provided an opportunity to face history together which liberated the contacts between both peoples from “the burden of the unsaid”.³⁹²

Despite this broad success of West Germany’s strategy, the trial nevertheless stirred up a new, though rather marginal, wave of anti-German feelings among some parts of the Israeli population, best reflected in Herut’s call to discontinue all cultural and educational relations with West Germany. While the Knesset clearly rejected the party’s request in January 1962, Abba Eban, then Minister of Education and Culture, agreed to at least render personal travel to West Germany subject to government permission: “For memories that were abstract suddenly became vivid and concrete, particularly among the young who had not experienced

³⁸⁹ Ben Gurion 1961, quoted in: Lavy 1996, 88, as well as in: Weingardt 2002, 136.

³⁹⁰ Next to David Ben Gurion, also Nahum Goldmann and Shimon Peres publicly underlined their positive attitude towards the FRG (Weingardt 2002, 135).

³⁹¹ Segev 1994, 366.

³⁹² Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, April 1961, quoted in: Weingardt 2002, 137.

the Holocaust.”³⁹³ The subsequent curtailing of private contacts between Israelis and West Germans caused permanent offense for the Federal Republic until the measure finally ceased with the onset of the Six-Day War in 1967. West German-Israeli economic and political relations, however, remained entirely unaffected by the Eichmann trial.³⁹⁴

In contrast to the West German case, the Israeli reaction to Austria was less favourable in the light of the Eichmann trial. While the question of Eichmann’s citizenship did not receive much attention within Israel, a surge in Israeli press articles which connected Austria with neo-Nazi activities and a persisting antisemitism was noted by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv. *Al Hamishmar*, for instance, wrote that German philosemitic attitudes prevailing after the war, had never reached Austria: “The Austrians often hide behind an icy silence whenever the topic of the murder of the Jewish people comes up and they have no words of regrets in these regards.” Not even the case of Eichmann, added the newspaper bitterly, had any impact on the Austrians.³⁹⁵

Comparing the Austrian with the West German strategy towards the Eichmann trial, the broad political mission of the large West German delegation stood in clear contrast to the small Austrian delegation which followed a technical rather than openly political aim. By sending two policemen to Jerusalem, Austria merely offered its collaboration with the Israeli executive to obtain evidence against Eichmann’s collaborators. On this very technical level only, the Austrian mission was indeed rather successful: valuable hints could be secured for Austrian courts and as a consequence, Franz Murer, Wilhelm Höttl and “the small Eichmann” Hermann Höfle were put on trial in Austria.³⁹⁶ The look at the Austrian Interior

³⁹³ Eban 1962, quoted in: Lavy 1996, 89.

³⁹⁴ Lavy 1996, 87-89.

³⁹⁵ *Al Hamishmar*, quoted and translated in: Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv to the Foreign Ministry on “The attitude of the Israeli press regarding Austria in the 2nd part of 1960”. Tel Aviv, 16 January 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 6, Gz. 16534_61.

³⁹⁶ See for instance: Interior Minister Afritsch and Justice Minister Broda on 27 November 1961, quoted in: Garscha 2005, 205.

Ministry's motivation to delegate observers to the trial, however, also revealed a hidden political agenda. Rather than fostering a sheer technical cooperation between executives, the political strategy was aimed at internationally defending Austria's image of an innocent victim of Nazi Germany. Whereas the threat of Eichmann's citizenship had already been averted successfully at the very beginning, during the trial Austria's innocence was once again called into question by what was perceived as a deliberate Israeli defamation campaign against Austria's judiciary. As such, rather than leading to a revision of the Austrian approach in prosecuting war criminals, Israeli critique only triggered irritation and defensiveness among Austrian officials. Viewed through the lens of Austria's victim narrative, the Austrian observer even interpreted the final plea of Attorney General Gideon Hausner as one last attempt to discredit Austria. While Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were named as countries which had successfully prosecuted and executed war criminals, Austria remained unmentioned. Hauser's cautiousness with West Germany in that same plea only exacerbated Austrian irritation: "While Austria is criticized as unwilling to pay reparations and to bring war criminals to trial, Germany is perceived in a much better light", reported a puzzled Wiesinger back to Vienna.³⁹⁷ The notion that Germany's "diplomacy of guilt" was easing relations with the Israelis, while Austria's converse "diplomacy of innocence" was troubling the Austro-Israeli relationship, was understood by the Austrian Ambassador to Tel Aviv, Ernst Luegmayer:

Attempts to declare Germans alone guilty or Austrians as not responsible, can (...) only be unsuccessful and even provoke the opposite reaction as it is pointed out that the Federal Republic of

Wiesinger reports in a letter to an employee of the Interior Ministry on "the trial of Adolf Eichmann", Jerusalem, 11 December 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 20765_2A/62.

Wiesinger to Interior Minister Afritsch, Jerusalem, 15 May 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 49, 17410_61.

³⁹⁷ Wiesinger to Luegmayer on "The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem", Jerusalem, 12 July 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Gz. 20765_2A/62.

Germany at least acknowledges its guilt and honestly aims at achieving reparations, while Austria tries to duck out with all kinds of flimsy pretences.³⁹⁸

The receiving ministries of Luegmayer's words did not react to the Ambassador's assessment. This wilful negligence on the ministerial level provides further evidence that Austria's diplomacy of innocence vis-à-vis Israel was indeed a politically calculated strategy constructed on the highest levels of the political elites. While high ranking politicians deliberately fabricated, employed and safeguarded the national victim narrative, lower ranking officials as well as the public by the beginning of the 1960s exhibited a strong and undisputed belief in that same narrative. The Austrian observer's expressed irritation vis-à-vis Israeli critique in addition to Austrian press reporting confirmed how strongly ingrained the victim myth was in the mind-set of a majority of Austrians during that time. As such, Austria's official diplomacy of innocence, as much as it was constructed, still derived its legitimacy from both its resonance with the domestic public as well as its ultimate international success. In the end, in Israel, Austria was only marginally associated with Eichmann and the bilateral relations between the two countries – despite the eventual and persisting disturbance by Israeli public critique regarding Austria's attitude on the prosecution of war criminals³⁹⁹ – continued as usual.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁸ Luegmayer to Foreign Minister Kreisky on "The improvement of the Austro-Israeli relationship", Tel Aviv, 19 April 1961. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 23413_61.

³⁹⁹ See, for instance:

Bauer to Tončić-Sorinj on "Israel and the Austrian attitude to the Middle East conflict", Tel Aviv, 27 July 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 24244_67.

Internal information on the bilateral relationship between Austria and Israel, Vienna, 16 October 1972. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 151676_72.

⁴⁰⁰ For the same assessment of the overall impact of the Eichmann trial on the Austrian-Israeli relations, see: Albrich 1997, 187; Embacher and Reiter 1998, 83; Steininger 2012, 112.

CHAPTER 3: The West German and Austrian responses to the Six-Day War in 1967

While the bilateral debates analysed in the first two chapters – reparations and the Eichmann trial - were directly linked to the Nazi past, it will be the aim of Chapters 3 and 4 to examine whether national narratives also determined policy choices in seemingly unrelated matters, such as the selected countries' stances towards the Middle East conflict. Did the previously employed national narrative of guilt, in the West German case, and innocence, in the Austrian case, influence their foreign policy towards the evolving conflict in the Middle East?

Via a comprehensive qualitative analysis of newspaper articles as well as diplomatic and foreign policy documents shortly before, during and after the Six-Day War, this chapter illustrates how both West Germany's and Austria's support for Israel in 1967 can be interpreted as an extension of their traditional diplomatic approaches of projecting and confirming their very own version of the Nazi past to Israel and the world. In order to make this claim, I first analyse the West German and Austrian public reaction to the Six-Day War. The prevailing public opinion of Israel in 1967 is approximated through press articles and public action taken. I analyse these texts using two simple categories: are the views expressed by journalists and readers, and the public actions taken, sympathetic with or critical of Israel? While the main focus of this study is on official, diplomatic strategies, the broader public's opinion is important in so far as it might have either constrained foreign policy-makers, or in that officials might have sought to steer larger public sentiments for their diplomatic aims.

In a second step, this chapter examines the official West German and Austrian reaction to the Six-Day War. As in previous chapters, researching whether or not a country's national

narrative exerts an influence on its foreign policy behaviour requires qualitative analysis of diplomatic negotiations and documents, private and public rhetoric, as well as taking symbolic and substantive gestures into account. Showing that it was indeed the national narrative that determined behaviour requires constructing counterfactuals: if the West German and Austrian narratives also had an impact on foreign policies in 1967, diplomatic behaviour must deviate from the path mainstream approaches would suggest. As such, the countries in question must accept a significant cost that does not adhere to a rational cost-benefit calculus but rather to the logic of their previously adopted diplomatic approaches with memory. This chapter thus attempts to answer the question of whether projecting guilt or innocence to Israel still formed a West German and Austrian diplomatic team effort at the end of the 1960s and regarding a matter that was seemingly unrelated to the Nazi past: the Middle East conflict.

1. The Six-Day War of 1967

Tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbours had existed since the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948; however, animosity escalated once again in the spring of 1967. In mid-May, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser expelled UN troops stationed on Sinai and Gaza and closed the Straits of Tiran for Israeli ships. On May 30, Egypt and Jordan formed a defence alliance, which was joined by Iraq on June 4. The rhetoric of Arab leaders intensified and became ever more aggressive, ultimately culminating in extermination threats against Israel. The intention to “throw all Jews into the sea”, expressed first by PLO leader Ahmed Shukeiry, became the general tenor of Arab leaders and their publics, triggering a widespread existential *angst* among Israelis that rose to outright fears of an imminent and

renewed Holocaust. The Israeli Defence Forces reacted with a general mobilization, and all sides now prepared for war. While the UN called for a de-escalation in the Middle East, the two superpowers took sides. The US supported Israel; the Soviet Union sided with Egypt. The Arab-Israeli conflict threatened to turn into yet another proxy war between East and West.

On 5 June 1967, Israel decided to strike pre-emptively to counter an ever-closing Arab encirclement. The Israeli air force caught the Egyptian air force by surprise, destroying it within hours while it was still on the ground. In the following days, the Israeli army conquered Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and highly symbolic East Jerusalem from Jordan, as well as the Golan Heights from Syria. On June 10, a victorious Israel declared a ceasefire, which was signed on 11 June 1967.⁴⁰¹

Even though the war in 1967 lasted only six days and in the end did not trigger superpower involvement, international attention to the events in the Middle East was huge. At no other time in history did the world show as much interest in a comparably brief, regional conflict.⁴⁰² While Western governments tried to retain a neutral stance, at least on the official level, the majority of the European publics euphorically and overwhelmingly sided with Israel.⁴⁰³ The strong pro-Israeli sentiment prevailing throughout the entire Western world was closely linked to the ongoing Cold War, as the West aligned itself with Israel, whereas the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc supported the Arabs against what was considered an “Israeli imperialist aggression”.⁴⁰⁴ However, I argue that the legacy of World War II, as well as these ideological dispositions, contributed to evoking sympathy for Israel among European countries. To prove this claim, I will take a closer look at the specific public

⁴⁰¹ Oren 2002.

⁴⁰² Embacher and Reiter 1998, 123-124.

⁴⁰³ Laqueur 1969, 207.

⁴⁰⁴ Austrian Embassy in Warsaw reports to the Foreign Ministry on “Israel is stigmatized as the aggressor; Polish government declaration,” Warsaw, 9 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 13825_67.

reaction of West Germans and Austrians to the Six-Day War, and ask: did the Nazi past still exert its influence on their positions regarding the Middle East conflict in 1967?

2. Public reaction to the Six-Day War

2.1. West German and Austrian news reporting

In the course of the Six-Day War, West Germany's public fully aligned itself with the endangered Jewish state. "Never in post-war history had Germans decided to side with the Jews as spontaneously and as intuitively as they did in 1967", wrote the German-Israeli journalist Inge Deutschkron.⁴⁰⁵ Public opinion polls showed that 55% of all West Germans openly admitted to being pro-Israel, while only 6% stated to support the Arab side.⁴⁰⁶

Notwithstanding the geographic distance, West Germans treated the Six-Day War as if it was "theirs": They showed widespread outrage about what was perceived as an "Arab aggression" and sympathy for the suffering "Jewish victims".⁴⁰⁷ The tenor of all West German newspapers fully embraced the Israeli narrative: an iron ring had formed around Israel, which now threatened its existence and could not be tolerated by the world. Journalists frequently resorted to historical analogies to underline the gravity of the situation: Israel in 1967 was compared with "Munich" in 1938, hinting to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's failed appeasement strategy towards Hitler.⁴⁰⁸ Invoking the Nazi past in the public discourse of 1967 furthermore served as an urgent call for action within the FRG:

⁴⁰⁵ Deutschkron 1983, 337.

Translated by the author from the German original: "*Nie zuvor in der Nachkriegsgeschichte hatten sich Deutsche so impulsiv und so spontan auf die Seite der Juden gestellt.*"

⁴⁰⁶ Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1965-67, quoted in: Deutschkron 183, 338.

⁴⁰⁷ Deutschkron 1983, 337-338.

⁴⁰⁸ Ben-Natan 1967, Interview with Rolf Vogel, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 338.

The Jews have suffered enormous injustice at our – German – hands, therefore we have the obligation to help them in the moment of their existential fight. Neither in order to undo the past, nor in order to make the Jews forget, but in order to be there for them when the Jewish state is facing its test – because we all need to contribute to a better future.⁴⁰⁹

West German newspapers did not shy away from requesting West German partiality for Israel specifically due to the country's special responsibility for the Jewish state stemming from the Nazi past. As such, supporting Israel was viewed as a moral obligation and anyone who harboured pro-Arab sentiments immediately came under suspicion of exhibiting Nazi leanings.⁴¹⁰

Triggered by historic guilt and shame,⁴¹¹ the younger generation especially was not afraid to be openly philosemitic for the first time in German history.⁴¹² Such a pro-Israeli public sentiment of course fitted well into West Germany's official diplomacy of guilt and its approach of *Wiedergutmachung* vis-à-vis Israel. However, Austria's opinion polls of 1967 reveal a similar pro-Israeli stance: 54% of Austrians wished for Israel's victory while only 11% wanted the Arabs to win.⁴¹³ If it was indeed historic guilt that sparked West Germany's pro-Israeli attitude, what then motivated Austria's sympathy for Israel in the course of the Six-Day War?

⁴⁰⁹ *Die Presse*, "Dayan wird mit Rommel verglichen. Welle der Sympathie für Israel auch in der Bundesrepublik", by Klaus Emmerich, 13 June 1967.

Translated by the author from the German original: "Den Juden ist von uns, den Deutschen, so viel Unrecht geschehen, dass wir im Augenblick ihres Existenzkampfes um Staat und Volk helfen müssen. Nicht um es ungeschehen zu machen, nicht um die Juden vergessen zu lassen, sondern um dabei zu sein, wenn sich der jüdische Staat zu bewähren hat, damit wir alle für eine bessere Zukunft sorgen."

⁴¹⁰ Austrian Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Minister Tončić-Sorinj on "The German attitude in the Middle East conflict", Bonn, 6 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 13825_67.

⁴¹¹ *Der Spiegel*, 12.6.1967, quoted in: Embacher and Reiter 1998, 142.

Ben-Natan 1967, Interview with Rolf Vogel, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 339.

⁴¹² Austrian Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Minister Tončić-Sorinj on "The German attitude in the Middle East conflict", Bonn, 6 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 13825_67.

Die Presse, "Dayan wird mit Rommel verglichen. Welle der Sympathie für Israel auch in der Bundesrepublik", by Klaus Emmerich, 13 June 1967.

⁴¹³ Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft, quoted in: Reiter 2001, 110.

An analysis of Austrian newspapers⁴¹⁴ indicates that reporting on the war was extensive and throughout exhibited a clear pro-Israeli tenor, just like in the West German press. Irrespective of their political orientation, Austrian newspapers predominantly narrated the Six-Day War as a story of the small encircled David forced to defend himself from an aggressive and overpowering Goliath. In many often very emotional articles, Israel was portrayed as a peace-loving, righteous and successful country whose existence was now endangered by the war-mongering, ideologically-blinded and backward Arab states wishing for nothing less than Israel's total destruction.⁴¹⁵ Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's actions were furthermore described as a "useless show of force" ("*sinnlose Kraftmachererei*") in an attempt to instigate the "Arabs' psychosis of a Holy war"⁴¹⁶ with "bloodthirsty announcements" ("*blutrünstigen Ankündigungen*")⁴¹⁷ that led to a "lethal stranglehold" ("*tödliche Umklammerung*")⁴¹⁸ for Israel. Hereby, Nasser – in both West

⁴¹⁴ In the timeframe between 1 and 15 June 1967, the analysis of articles related to the Six-Day War in the social democratic *Arbeiter Zeitung* showed a very strong partiality for Israel: There was no single article or comment that was critical of Israel or sympathetic with the Arabs and their cause. Compared to the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, the conservative newspaper *Die Presse* was more neutral in its reporting about the Six-Day War, giving a little more room to Arab perspectives, however, also *Die Presse* retained a clear pro-Israeli attitude throughout all of its articles and comments.

⁴¹⁵ See, for instance:

Arbeiter Zeitung, "Israels Kriegsziel heisst Friede", by AZ-Sonderberichterstatter Hacker, 9 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, Cartoon: "David und Goliath", 7 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, "Tragödie im Nahen Osten", by Friedrich Scheu, 6 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, "Folgt auf Nasser wieder nur ein Nasser? Möglicherweise wäre der Nachfolger noch extremer – Wenig Chancen für eine Demokratie in Ägypten", by Otto Fielhauer, 11 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, "Die Stunde der Großen", by Franz Kreuzer, 7 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, Einschub: Brennglas: "Die Brüder", by Otto Fielhauser, 1 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, "Kein Jubel über Nasser-Sturz", by AZ-Sonderberichterstatter Hacker, 11 June 1967.

Die Presse, "Die Brandstiftung", by Otto Schulmeister, 6 June 1967.

Die Presse, "Aufmarsch zum nächsten Akt", by Ludwig Marton, 13 June 1967.

Die Presse, "Kopf aus dem Sand", by Thomas Chorherr, 9 June 1967.

Die Presse, "'Zweites Jalta' in Nahost? Keine Rolle für Paris im Vermittlerspiel der Großmächte", by Hermann Bohle, 12 June 1967.

⁴¹⁶ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "Die Stunde der Großen", by Franz Kreuzer, 7 June 1967.


Die Presse, "Die Brandstiftung", by Otto Schulmeister, 6 June 1967.

⁴¹⁷ *Die Presse*, "Aufmarsch zum nächsten Akt", by Ludwig Marton, 13 June 1967.

⁴¹⁸ *Die Presse*, "Moskaus Rechnung", by Johannes Eidlitz, 8 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, "Die Stunde der Großen", by Franz Kreuzer, 7 June 1967.

German and Austrian newspapers – was frequently compared to Hitler.⁴¹⁹ The cartoon (See figure 2: “Cartoon of Nasser with Hitler moustache”) pictured below and published in Austria’s *Arbeiter Zeitung*, for instance, portrayed Nasser’s face on his coffin with an added Hitler moustache.⁴²⁰



The image of an Hitler-like, aggressive and irrational Nasser stood out in clear contrast to the portrayal of Israeli leaders: Levi Eshkol was called a “man of compromise” (*“Mann der Verständigung”*),

emphasizing his rationale and his orientation towards peace and accommodation, whereas Moshe Dayan’s bravery and war victories were highlighted by regularly using his nickname “the lion of the Sinai” (*“Der Löwe von Sinai”*).⁴²¹ Somewhat bizarrely, in both West German and Austrian newspapers “the lion of the Sinai” was compared to the Nazi’s “desert fox”, Erwin Rommel, whose image survived as the “embodiment of the fair general”.⁴²² Among both publics, military ideals were apparently still strongly admired also in the 1960s.⁴²³

Once the tide of war had turned in favour of Israel, Austrian and West German newspapers cheered with the Israelis.⁴²⁴ In Austria, euphoria for the military success of the “small and

⁴¹⁹ While Nasser was the main target of Hitler comparisons, other Arab leaders were also mentioned. Jordan’s King Hussein, for instance, in the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, was compared to the Kings of Bulgaria and Romania who served as Hitler’s vassals during World War II.

See, for instance:

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Der Weg zum Frieden”, by Friedrich Scheu, 9 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Folgt auf Nasser wieder nur ein Nasser? Möglicherweise wäre der Nachfolger noch extremer – Wenig Chancen für eine Demokratie in Ägypten”, by Otto Fielhauer, 11 June 1967.

⁴²⁰ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Cartoon, 11 June 1967.

⁴²¹ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Eshkol und Dayan: Israel mobilisiert alle Talente”, 2 June 1967.

⁴²² *Die Presse*, “Dayan wird mit Rommel verglichen. Welle der Sympathie für Israel auch in der Bundesrepublik”, by Klaus Emmerich, 13 June 1967.

⁴²³ Embacher and Reiter 1998, 143-144.

⁴²⁴ See, for instance:

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Israel stößt zum Suezkanal vor und erobert Jerusalem Altstadt”, 7 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Nassers Flugzeuge vom Himmel gefegt”, 7 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, Vormarsch der israelischen Armee an allen Fronten”, 7 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Israel ist seines Sieges gewiß. Das ganze Land jubelt über die militärischen Erfolge der ersten Kriegstage”, by AZ correspondent Schrage Beschalom, 7 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Vier Luftwaffen in 60 Stunden zerstört”, by AZ correspondent Walter Hacker, 7 June 1967.

encircled” Israel led journalists to even draw parallels to the country’s own geographic position surrounded by the Iron Curtain.⁴²⁵ The case of Israel apparently embodied tiny and neutral Austria’s worst fears: in the event of aggression, small countries remained dependent solely on their own capabilities without hope for superpower protection.⁴²⁶ Crucially, comparisons between Israel and Austria stemmed not only from their similar sizes and geographic locations, but also from historic analogies between Nasser’s “stranglehold” of Israel and Austria’s situation in 1938:

Austria itself knows what happens when a small state is being attacked and when democratic powers simply ignore such a situation. In 1938, the democratic world’s public was of the opinion that Hitler’s aggression against Austria was none of their business and so the world intervened only too late.⁴²⁷

The victim myth clearly formed the essential basis for these parallels.

Furthermore, and mirroring the West German case, Austrian solidarity with Israel was in large part motivated by sympathies with the suffering of Jewish people during World War II.⁴²⁸

Our feelings for Israel are being nurtured by the fact that many former Viennese and other Austrians are among the peoples who live in Israel today (...). Many of these elderly men and women have

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Israels historischer Tag. Nach 1897 Jahren ganz Jerusalem wieder jüdisch“, by AZ correspondent Schrage Beschalom, 9 June 1967.

⁴²⁵ *Die Presse*, “Kopf aus dem Sand“, by Thomas Chorherr, 9 June 1967.

Die Presse, “Die Brandstiftung“, by Otto Schulmeister, 6 June 1967.

⁴²⁶ *Die Presse*, “Der Blitzkrieg ist wiedergekehrt. Israels Sieg beruhte auf der Überlegenheit der operativen und taktischen Führung – Lehren aus dem Nahostfeldzug“, by August Ségur-Cabanac, 13 June 1967.

⁴²⁷ Bruno Pittermann, the President of the Socialist International and Chairman of the MPs, quoted in: *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “AUA-Maschine nach Tel Aviv kehrte um“, 7 June 1967.

Translated by the author from the German original: “Österreich hat es selbst erlebt, (...) was geschieht, wenn ein Kleinstaat angegriffen wird und wenn die demokratischen Mächte meinen, man könne darüber hinwegsehen. Auch 1938 meinte die demokratische Weltöffentlichkeit, der Angriff Hitlers auf Österreich ginge sie nichts an, und erst sehr spät griff sie ein. Möge es diesmal gelingen, den Frieden in jenem Teil der Welt rasch wiederherzustellen und den Völkern den Frieden zu sichern (...).“

⁴²⁸ See, for instance:

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Israels Kriegsziel heißt Friede“, by AZ-Sonderberichterstatte Hacker, 9 June 1967.

suffered such hardship in their lives and it is saddening to think that now they face the horrors of war in a country which gave them hope for refuge and peace.⁴²⁹

The blame for this Jewish suffering was, however, always put on Nazi Germany and West Germany alone. “Austria’s former aggressor” Germany was thus also in 1967 still viewed as the “enemy”, or the Austrian “other”. The FRG was even mocked by Austrian journalists for its “belated” philosemitism: “Are hidden abysses of the German soul suddenly coming to the forefront? The entire people (...) seek to protect the Jews (...)” While Nasser certainly killed fewer Jews than Hitler, continued the article, “(...) he apparently killed enough so that certain Germans can finally free themselves from their guilt and throw stones from the glasshouse in which they sit into the Middle East.”⁴³⁰ This open and cynic Austrian attack was countered in an immediate letter to the editor by two German citizens: “Don’t you also have people in your country who have actively participated in the massacres that happened in concentration camps? To only point fingers at Germany is outrageous.”⁴³¹

The firm belief in Austria’s victim status, however, withstood German critique and remained intact also in the light of the Six-Day War: A clear link between the Nazi past and support for Israel was only apparent in the case of West Germany, but not in the case of Austria. Moreover, West German solidarity with Israel was regarded by Austrians as a natural and

⁴²⁹ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Tragödie im Nahen Osten”, by Friedrich Scheu, 6 June 1967.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Unsere Gefühle für Israel werden auch durch die Tatsache genährt, dass viele ehemalige Wiener und andere Österreicher unter den Menschen sind, die heute in Israel leben und die, die israelischen Staatsbürgerschaft besitzen. Viele dieser älteren Männer und Frauen haben in ihrem Leben so viel Schweres mitmachen müssen, dass es einem das Herz bedrückt, zu denken, dass sie jetzt in dem Land wo sie Zuflucht und Frieden zu finden hofften, noch einmal den Schrecken des Krieges ausgesetzt sind.*”

⁴³⁰ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Brennglas: Gasmasken für Israel”, by Otto Fielhauser, 3 June 1967.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Aber genug, um gewisse Deutsche endlich schuldbefreit aufatmen und die Steine aus ihrem Glashaus in den Nahen Osten werfen zu lassen.*”

⁴³¹ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Die Redaktion korrespondiert: ‚Der Balken im Auge‘”, by D.B. and W.St. from Freising, Germany, 15 June 1967.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Gibt es bei Ihnen nicht Leute, die bei den angeführten Massakern in den KZs als aktive Helfer mitgewirkt haben? Jetzt den Schwarzen Peter nur in deutsche Schuhe zu schieben, ist wohl fehl am Platz (...)*”.

adequate way of redeeming collective guilt.⁴³² That the same could apply also for Austria, however, crossed no journalist's mind. If there was any underlying feeling of "suppressed guilt" that motivated Austrians' pro-Israeli stance, it was certainly not expressed, but rather happened subconsciously as Embacher and Reiter suggest.⁴³³ In the course of the Six-Day War, Austria's potential guilt was, unlike West Germany, nowhere openly admitted in its public discourse. Thus, while West German and Austrian newspapers give very similar accounts of the Six-Day War in addition to coming to the same conclusion, i.e. support for Israel, they both started from different places: one sympathized *with* a victim, and the other one sympathized *as* a victim.

Overall, the newspaper analysis of this chapter also indicates that West German and Austrian pro-Israeli attitudes reflected a peculiar mix of present and past stereotypes about Jews and Arabs. As such, the prevailing positive image of Israel in the end did not lead to a fundamental change in West German and Austrian attitudes towards Jews in more general. In fact, both clichés about Jews and Israelis existed almost in parallel to one another: Israelis were viewed by West Germans and Austrians as somewhat "exceptional", "non-Jewish" Jews. In what Bernd Marin called a form of "new antisemitism", traditional antisemitic stereotypes about the "Jews" were now attributed to the Arabs, degrading Arabs to the scapegoats,⁴³⁴ while characteristics regarded as similar to "Germans" became appreciated in the Israelis.⁴³⁵ A joke circulating in Israel at the time hints at exactly this paradox:

⁴³² See, for instance:

Austrian Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Minister Tončić-Sorinj on "The German attitude in the Middle East conflict", Bonn, 6 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 13825_67.

Die Presse, "Dayan wird mit Rommel verglichen. Welle der Sympathie für Israel auch in der Bundesrepublik", by Klaus Emmerich, 13 June 1967.

⁴³³ Embacher and Reiter 1998, 142.

⁴³⁴ Bernd Marin (1983, 186) found that people who hold slight antisemitic attitudes as opposed to strong ones usually tend to harbour stereotypical and negative perceptions of Arabs.

⁴³⁵ Marin 1983, 184–185.

During the Six-Day War, an Austrian Minister pinned flags down on the map, however all of a sudden, he stopped. Why?

- Because he only learned today that the Israelis are Jews.⁴³⁶

Antisemitism hence survived and intermingled with the public's Israel euphoria of 1967 in both West Germany and Austria.

2.2. Public action during the Six-Day War: West Germans and Austrians support Israel

As well as unusually high journalistic interest in the Six-Day War in both West Germany and Austria, there was also a high level of public attention to the Middle East conflict. People listened "live" to the latest developments of the war, receiving "*Kol Israel – The voice of Israel*", "*Here Radio Cairo*" and "*Radio Damascus*" directly into their living rooms.⁴³⁷ "From the bakery to the hairdresser's salon, everyone followed the news (...)", remembered Traudl Brandstaller in *Die Furche*.⁴³⁸ A similar account of Austria's society in 1967 was given in *Die Presse*:

The ostrich tears its head out of the sand and looks around surprised. The Austrian does the same: He was woken up by the sound of thunder coming from afar, disturbed in his sweet dreams and chased from the resting pillow of neutrality, because what happens in Israel touches him (...). He suddenly understood that his home is the world (...) and that the Middle East is at his very own doorstep.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁶ Yitzhak Patish, Israeli Ambassador in Vienna, quoted in: Embacher and Reiter 1998, 141.

Translated by the author from the German original: "*Während des Sechstagekriegs steckte ein österreichischer Minister Fähnchen auf der Landkarte auf, doch plötzlich hört er damit auf. Warum? – Er hat heute erfahren, dass die Israelis Juden sind*". Yitzhak Patish, Israeli Ambassador in Vienna, quoted in: Embacher and Reiter 1998, 141.

⁴³⁷ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "Werbung für Radiowellen – Hören Sie direkt vom Kriegsschauplatz", 7 June 1967.

⁴³⁸ Traudl Brandstaller 1967, quoted in Embacher und Reiter: 124.

⁴³⁹ *Die Presse*, "Kopf aus dem Sand", by Thomas Chorherr, 9 June 1967.

Journalist Inge Deutschkron reported about an equally emotional public reaction among West Germans: Support came from everyone across the entire social spectrum: doctors, students, workers, priests, industrialists and artists:⁴⁴⁰ “Be it the student from West-Berlin, the postman from Munich or the steel worker from Stuttgart”, the major part of the German population enthusiastically supported the Israelis.⁴⁴¹

The unusually high public interest and corresponding emotional partiality for Israel furthermore led to multiple public actions in both West Germany and Austria. Numerous pro-Israeli protests took place in the largest cities, mainly organized by student and youth organizations, parties, trade unions or church groups.⁴⁴² “We stand with Israel – Our hearts are flames of solidarity” (“*Wir stehen zu Israel – Unsere Herzen sind Flammen der Solidarität*”), or, “Berliners, help Israel!” (“*Berliner, helft Israel!*”) could be read on signs



held up at various student demonstrations in West Berlin.⁴⁴³ “Israel’s death is the death of the free world” (“*Israels Tod ist der Tod der freien Welt*”) was written on signs in Munich (See figure 3: “Pro-Israel protests in Munich, Summer

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Vogel Strauß zieht den Kopf aus dem Sand und blickt erstaunt um sich. Desgleichen tut der Österreicher, vom fernen Donnergrollen geweckt, aufgefahren aus dem Ruhekissen der Neutralität nun aus süßen Träumen, weil ihm das, was sich in Israel abspielt, fast so unter die Haut geht, wie einst das, was der ungarische Nachbar erlitt. Schlagartig ist ihm bewusst geworden, dass er in der Welt zu Hause ist, (...), der Nahe Osten liegt vor der eigenen Haustür.*”

⁴⁴⁰ Deutschkron 1983, 337.

⁴⁴¹ *Die Presse*, “Dayan wird mit Rommel verglichen. Welle der Sympathie für Israel auch in der Bundesrepublik”, by Klaus Emmerich, 13 June 1967.

⁴⁴² For Germany, see: Deutschkron 337-339. Vogel 1967a, 312.

For Austrian see, for instance:

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Protestkundgebung der SP-Jugend”, 3 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Der Geist Israels – in Österreich. Machtvolle Solidaritätskundgebung”, 9 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Wien: Begeisterungsturm für Israel”, 8 June 1967

⁴⁴³ Vogel 1967a, 330.

1967”).⁴⁴⁴ In Düsseldorf, demonstrators comprising trade unionists and church organizations called for “peace and the rescue of Israel” (“*Wiederherstellung des Friedens und die Rettung der Existenz Israels*”).⁴⁴⁵ In Vienna, a massive demonstration of solidarity with Israel was organized by Youth organizations linked to the Social Democratic Party.⁴⁴⁶ Speakers came from the highest levels of government and included Bruno Pittermann, the President of the Socialist International, Bruno Kreisky, the Head of the Social Democratic Party in Austria and Vienna’s Major Bruno Marek. All speeches were directed against Arab aggression and called for solidarity with and support for Israel.⁴⁴⁷ Smaller demonstrations also took place in front of the Israeli, Arab, Soviet, US and British embassies, while at the same time nearly all Arab embassies received frequent bomb threats.⁴⁴⁸ At the Saudi embassy in Vienna, unknown delinquents even managed to remove the Saudi coat of arms and replaced it with the Star of David.⁴⁴⁹ Furthermore, Arab students studying in Austria received a warning telegram from their representative body, the Austrian *Hochschülerschaft* (ÖH): “All those who preach an exaggerated nationalism and call for the destruction of peoples have lost the sympathy of the Austrian students.”⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁴ Photograph: Vogel 1967a, 321. Demonstration in Munich for the right of existence for the Israeli people, Summer 1967.

⁴⁴⁵ Vogel 1967a, 314.

⁴⁴⁶ The event took place on June 7 in the *Kongresshaus Margaretengürtel*, and it included *Sozialistische Jugend*, *Verband Sozialistischer Studenten* and the socialist fraction of the *Gewerkschaftsjugend*.

⁴⁴⁷ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Der Geist Israels – in Österreich. Machtvolle Solidaritätskundgebung”, 9 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Protestkundgebung der SP-Jugend”, 3 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Wien: Begeisterungssturm für Israel”, 8 June 1967.

⁴⁴⁸ Peterlunger to Sektion III on “The crisis in the Middle East, Protests in front of Embassy buildings”, Vienna, 7 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 13825_67.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “AUA-Maschine nach Tel Aviv kehrte um”, 7 June 1967.

⁴⁴⁹ *Die Presse*, “Welle der Sympathie für Israel”, 7 June 1967.

⁴⁵⁰ *Die Presse*, “Welle der Sympathie für Israel”, 7 June 1967.

The President of Vienna's Israelite Community, Ernst Feldberg, founded a "Solidarity Committee for Israel" ("*Solidaritätskomitee für Israel*"). Interestingly, with his call for action, he addressed not only Viennese Jews, but all Austrians in their entirety, i.e. "anyone of good will, Christians, democrats, all progressive elements of society, former



concentration camp inmates, resistance fighters, all humans who feel solidarity with Israel and its people" at this darkest hour (See figure 4: "Call for Solidarity with Israel").⁴⁵¹ While victims of the Nazi regime were named explicitly in Austria, a similar initiative in the FRG addressed everyone irrespective of their biographic background: "We call upon you to help, in order to re-establish peace in the Middle East and save Israel from destruction", read the West German statement issued by

Adolf Arndt, a member of the German *Bundestag*.⁴⁵² Supported by the German-Israeli Society, and published in all major newspapers as well as on the walls of West German cities and villages, the German statement - in further contrast to the Austrian note - unambiguously invoked public solidarity on the grounds of a moral responsibility stemming from the past:

We cannot remain silent when the Israeli people face annihilation. The State of Israel is the last home of many who originated in our country and who managed to escape the genocide organized by Germans against the European Jews.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵¹ See image: "Jüdische Männer und Frauen! Solidaritätskundgebung für Israel", printed in: *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 7 June 1967.

⁴⁵² Arndt 1967, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 329. Translated by the author from the German original: "Wir rufen: Helft mit, den Frieden in Nahost wiederzugewinnen und Israel vor dem Untergang zu bewahren."

⁴⁵³ Arndt 1967, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 329. Translated by the author from the German original: "Wir können nicht schweigen, wenn das israelische Volk mit Völkermord bedroht wird. Der Staat Israel ist die letzte Heimat vieler Menschen, die aus unserem Lande stamen und dem von Deutschen ins Werk gesetzten Völkermord an den europäischen Juden entronnen sind."

Another public call in Koblenz that was signed by multiple leading personalities equally referenced German responsibility vis-à-vis the Jewish state: “There can be no neutrality when faced with injustice. It is our moral duty to take sides. Declarations of sympathy are not enough.”⁴⁵⁴ Similarly, in Munich, major Hans-Jochen Vogel formed a committee supported by multiple public figures. Also in Munich’s call, it became once again clear that West Germans interpreted the Six-Day War as an opportunity to show “that Germans never wanted people to be mistreated, disregarded and then nearly annihilated without having done anything wrong”.⁴⁵⁵

Words were soon followed by concrete public action in both West Germany and Austria. The *Samariterbund* and the *Red Cross*, for instance, established a blood donation service named “blood for Israel” (*Blut für Israel*). *Caritas* called for contributions and student and youth organizations established humanitarian drives.⁴⁵⁶ Even in the first days of war, the Israeli embassy in Bonn received 600 telephone calls as well as numerous letters inquiring how to best help Israel. Furthermore, 1600 West Germans asked to join the Israeli army⁴⁵⁷ and about 3500 people volunteered their workforce.⁴⁵⁸ The West German help was again clearly and openly motivated by guilt: to name just one individual instance, a former SS

⁴⁵⁴ Vogel 1967a, 333-334.

Translated by the author from the German original: “Gegenüber dem Unrecht gibt es keine Neutralität. Es ist unsere moralische Pflicht, Stellung zu beziehen. Sympathieerklärungen allein genügen nicht!”

⁴⁵⁵ Vogel 1967a, 334-335.

Translated by the author from the German original: “Beweist, dass es niemals unsere Billigung fand, als dieses Volk schuldlos misshandelt, verachtet und dann zum großen Teil vernichtet wurde.”

⁴⁵⁶ See, for instance:

Arbeiter Zeitung, “AUA-Maschine nach Tel Aviv kehrte um”, 7 June 1967.

Die Presse, “Polizei stopt (sic!) arabische ‘Invasion’”, 9 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “SP-Spendenaktion für Israel. Beschluss des Parteivorstandes”, 9 June 1967.

⁴⁵⁷ All inquiries to join the Israeli army were however rejected on the grounds that Israel does not allow foreigners in its Defence Forces (Deutschkron 1983, 338).

⁴⁵⁸ Deutschkron 1983, 338-339.

officer called the Israeli embassy in Bonn to issue his donation of 1500 DM with the accompanying message that not all former SS officers were criminals.⁴⁵⁹

While Austrians' motivation for supporting Israel was less obviously connected to their personal role in the Nazi regime, Austrian efforts were just as strenuous; the Israeli embassy in Vienna reported an enormous increase in donated blood, money and volunteers.⁴⁶⁰ Most notably, the Vienna Philharmonic donated a considerable sum of money to Israel via the International Red Cross,⁴⁶¹ and the President of the Socialist International, Bruno Pittermann handed a cheque in the amount of 1 Million Schillings to Michael Simon, Israel's Ambassador to Vienna. This large sum of money had been collected within only a few days.⁴⁶² Furthermore, through Vienna airport, young people from Austria, but also from other Western European countries, as well as from the US, Canada and Latin America were flown to Israel. Among them were doctors, engineers and technicians. They all stood ready to replace *kibbutzim* who had been mobilised for military service.⁴⁶³ Throughout the war, this quasi "airlift" between Vienna and Tel Aviv remained active in both directions:⁴⁶⁴ Austrian Airlines delivered around 500 kilograms of medicine to Israel⁴⁶⁵ and *Gewerkschaftsbund* and *Ärztelkammer Österreich* called a humanitarian action into being which brought Israeli children to Vienna ("*Kinder aus Israel nach Wien*"). The *Gewerkschaftsbund* also hosted 100 children in its Youth Recreation Centres,⁴⁶⁶ and the

⁴⁵⁹ *Die Presse*, "Dayan wird mit Rommel verglichen. Welle der Sympathie für Israel auch in der Bundesrepublik", by Klaus Emmerich, 13 June 1967.

⁴⁶⁰ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "Israel-Botschaft: Viele Blutspender", by Reinhold Perner, 6 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, "AUA-Maschine nach Tel Aviv kehrte um", 7 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, "Gegen Mitarbeit österreichischer Techniker in Heluan machtlos – Keine Panikkäufe", by Paul Fritz, 8 June 1967.

⁴⁶¹ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, „Panikkäufe: Die Vorarlberger wurden aus Schweizer Geschäften gewiesen“, 10 June 1967.

⁴⁶² Embacher und Reiter 1998, 126.

⁴⁶³ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "Israel ist seines Sieges gewiß. Das ganze Land jubelt über die militärischen Erfolge der ersten Kriegstage", by S. Benschalom, 7 June 1967.

⁴⁶⁴ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "Luftbrücke Wien - Tel Aviv intakt", by Manfred Scheuch, 8 June 1967.

⁴⁶⁵ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "Panikkäufe: Die Vorarlberger wurden aus Schweizer Geschäften gewiesen", 10 June 1967.

⁴⁶⁶ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "ÖGB lädt Kinder aus Israel ein", 3 June 1967.

director of a notable Austrian health resort in Bad Gastein requested and obtained ministerial permission to heal three wounded Israeli and – pointing to Austria’s principle of neutrality – also three wounded Arab soldiers in his institution.⁴⁶⁷ Similarly, in Bonn, a private doctor donated an entire operating room while an organization of private children’s homes offered 15 spaces for Israelis as well as for pregnant Israeli women.⁴⁶⁸ Hamburg’s doctors alone donated medicine in the worth of 35 000 DM.⁴⁶⁹

On the cultural level, a committee of artists was founded under the slogan “Viennese artists for Israel” (“*Wiener Künstler für Israel*”). The committee included 71 famous Austrian artists who joined forces and launched a sales exhibition in the Viennese *Künstlerhaus*. The profit from selling the paintings was donated fully to Israel, and the group received international support from actors such as Elizabeth Taylor and Barbara Streisand.⁴⁷⁰ As in Austria, in West Germany people attempted ever more original ways of generating as much support for Israel as possible. Prominent artists organized the midnight show “Shalom” and donated its profit of 34 000 DM to the Israeli Red Cross.⁴⁷¹ The taxi drivers of West Berlin sent their entire day’s pay to Israel, and the city of Frankfurt organized an auction of paintings by Oskar Kokoschka. In Berlin’s *Gedächtniskirche*, Catholics, Protestants and Jews came together to pray for Israel’s victory.⁴⁷² It was in this context of overwhelming public support for Israel that official West Germany and Austria had to react to the Six-Day War.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Gegen Mitarbeit österreichischer Techniker in Heluan machtlos – Keine Panikkäufe”, by Paul Fritz, 8 June 1967.

⁴⁶⁷ Schenkenfelder to Nationalrat Ernst Leimböck, Bad Gastein, 26 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 25633_67.

⁴⁶⁸ Vogel 1967a, 331.

⁴⁶⁹ Vogel 1967a, 333.

⁴⁷⁰ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Gegen Mitarbeit österreichischer Techniker in Heluan machtlos – Keine Panikkäufe”, by Paul Fritz, 8 June 1967.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Panikkäufe: Die Vorarlberger wurden aus Schweizer Geschäften gewiesen”, 10 June 1967. *Die Presse*, “Hochschülerschaft warnt Araber”, 10/11 June 1967.

⁴⁷¹ Vogel 1967a, 333.

⁴⁷² Deutschkron 1983, 338-339.

3. The official West German response to the Six-Day War

3.1. Context of West German-Israeli relations in the 1960s: No more special relationship?

The official West German reaction to the Six-Day War took place in the wider context of West German belief that its special responsibility towards Israel had finally been successfully fulfilled. Only two years previously, West Germany and Israel had established full diplomatic relations. Prior to the exchange of ambassadors in 1965, contacts between West Germany and Israel went through two different phases. As alluded to in previous chapters, during the first phase, West Germany, under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, pursued diplomatic relations to foster the FRG's reintegration into the Western community, even though Israel, and especially the Israeli public, shied away. "The wound remains deep, even if on the outside it looks as if it has healed", wrote *Haaretz* in an editorial opposing diplomatic relations with Germany.⁴⁷³ In the second phase, Israel, especially under the leadership of Ben Gurion, pursued diplomatic relations with West Germany for economic reasons, as it had once again become the most important power on the European continent. However, this time, the FRG was reluctant. Since the late 1950s, West Germany had regained sufficient international recognition and as such began to orient itself more and more towards Arab countries. Moreover, the major task of West German diplomats at the time was to isolate East Germany and prevent other countries from recognizing its independence (Hallstein Doctrine). Coupled with the recently revealed presence of German rocket scientists in Egypt and the debate about stature-barred prosecution of Nazi war criminals,

⁴⁷³ *Haaretz*, quoted in: Segev 1994, 377.

this West German hesitation steered up Israeli mistrust and dealt a harsh blow to Ben-Gurion's pro-German policies among a critical Israeli public.⁴⁷⁴

It was in this ambivalent context that the decision to finally establish full diplomatic relations happened rather hastily. In the wake of leaking reports on secret arms deals between the FRG and Israel in February 1965, West Germany officially announced its halt on delivering military equipment to Israel and offered financial support instead. Egypt's President Nasser nevertheless decided to retaliate and invited - as the first non-communist country to do so - the leader of the GDR, Walter Ulbricht, to Cairo. West Germany's tit for tat move was to offer diplomatic relations to Israel.⁴⁷⁵

In an immediate Knesset vote, the Israelis seized the moment: 66 members voted in favour of establishing relations, 29 opposed and the rest abstained or were absent. In comparison, the Knesset vote on the reparation agreement 15 years earlier exhibited 61 votes in favour and 50 votes against. Israeli opposition to the Federal Republic now clearly lacked its previous fervour.⁴⁷⁶ In the altered context of the 1960s, not the past, but the present threat and blackmail originating from Israel's neighbours had decided the Israeli "dilemma between emotion and reason"⁴⁷⁷, as Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had put it, in favour of West Germany.⁴⁷⁸

In hindsight, Israeli opponents' fears around establishing diplomatic relations with the FRG, did not come true. Full and "normal" diplomatic relations between the two countries did not

⁴⁷⁴ Segev 1994, 372-377.

For more on the West German-Israeli debate about the presence of German rocket scientists in Egypt, as well as on the discussions around the stature-barred prosecution of Nazi war criminals within the FRG, see: Weingardt 2002, 138-147.

⁴⁷⁵ Weingardt 2002, 150-154. Fink 2006, 279.

As a response to the FRG's establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, ten Arab governments (among them Egypt) withdrew their ambassadors from Bonn, but no Arab state recognized the GDR (Fink 2006, 279).

⁴⁷⁶ Segev 1994, 379.

⁴⁷⁷ Eshkol 1965 before the Israeli Knesset, quoted in: Weingardt 2002, 157.

⁴⁷⁸ Prime Minister Eshkol did not share his predecessor Ben Gurion's warmth towards the FRG, and as such was, just like his Foreign Minister Abba Eban, prepared to risk Germany's interests (Fink 2006, 280).

eradicate the memory of the past; in fact, quite the opposite. At the smallest trigger, the past came back to exert its influence on political and public bilateral discussions between West Germany and Israel.

The biography of the first German Ambassador to Tel Aviv only formed the first of such incidents. While Israel would have liked the first German ambassador to be a man who would in person symbolize Germany's repentance for the Nazi crimes, West Germany decided to send Rolf Friedemann Pauls, a professional diplomat who had lost his right arm in the Second World War where he served as a *Wehrmacht* officer.⁴⁷⁹ The number-two in his embassy was viewed even more critical by the Israeli public: Alexander Török used to be a member of the Arrow Cross, the Hungarian Nazi party. Little surprisingly, upon their arrival in Jerusalem to present Pauls' credentials, violent demonstrations broke out. "Gloom shall not prevail, and even the darkest of nights yields to the dawn," announced Israeli President Zalman Shazar at the heavily protected ceremony.⁴⁸⁰ Ambassador Pauls replied in a short speech:

The new Germany is looking back upon the atrocious crimes of the National Socialist regime with sadness and disgust. Since then, many people of good-will on both sides worked patiently in order to pave the way towards a new beginning in the relations between both peoples. We are hopeful, that the exchange of ambassadors will contribute to successfully follow that pathway.⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁹ While Rolf was a *Wehrmacht* officer, he, on the other hand, never joined the NSDAP. Furthermore, he even belonged to wider circles of resistance fighters involved in the 20 July plot against Hitler (Weingardt 2002, 158).

⁴⁸⁰ Shazar 1965, quoted in: Segev 1994, 380.

⁴⁸¹ Pauls 1965, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 314.

The German original says: "*Das neue Deutschland sieht auf die grauenvollen Verbrechen des nationalsozialistischen Regimes mit Trauer und Abscheu zurück. Seitdem haben viele Menschen guten Willens auf beiden Seiten geduldig daran gearbeitet, den Weg zu diesem neuen Anfang der Beziehungen der beiden Völker zu bereiten. Wir hoffen, dass der Austausch von Botschaftern dazu beitragen wird, auf diesem Wege erfolgreich weiterzugehen.*"

At the ceremony, the German anthem was played by Israel's police band, although the verse "*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*" was left out.⁴⁸²

On the part of the FRG, the choice of Pauls and Török was always justified by reference to their professional qualities and skills. The fierce West German resistance to Israeli criticism in that regard also suggests that the FRG wanted to demonstrate once more that relations had indeed "normalized". As such, there was no further need for West Germans to present themselves as repentant perpetrators who must take every Israeli sensitivity into account. Almost demonstratively, the FRG's Foreign Office therefore ignored Israeli wishes.⁴⁸³

Despite the initial trouble, Ambassador Pauls' great deal of goodwill, wisdom and tact helped him to quickly and successfully enter Israeli society. The West German embassy in Tel Aviv handed out generous support for cultural and scientific institutions, and made a significant investment into improving the FRG's image in Israel. Hebrew translations of selected German literature were funded and Israeli high school students and journalists were taken to visit West Germany, in addition to payment for Israeli TV correspondents to be stationed in West Berlin. Acknowledging that "we stand here between the past and the future"⁴⁸⁴, Israel's Minister of Education Abba Eban presented a new set of guidelines on the previously forbidden cultural relations with Germany: Israelis were now allowed to study in Germany but would not receive scholarships for this purpose. German students and professionals would be allowed to visit Israel, however, Israeli performers who wished to appear in Germany would have to ask permission on an individual basis.⁴⁸⁵ From West Germany, Rolfs' counterpart in Bonn, Ambassador Asher Ben-Natan,⁴⁸⁶ actively supported

⁴⁸² Segev 1994, 380.

⁴⁸³ Weingardt 2002, 158-159.

⁴⁸⁴ Eban 1965, quoted in Segev 1994, 383.

⁴⁸⁵ Segev 1994, 382-383.

⁴⁸⁶ The first Israeli Ambassador to Bonn, Asher Ben-Natan was born in Vienna. He fled Austria after the *Anschluss* and reached Palestine in 1938. After the war, he returned to Vienna in order to collect material on Nazi crimes and criminals (the only existing photograph of Adolf Eichmann was secured by Ben-Natan), in addition to helping Jewish survivors with the emigration to Israel. Since 1956, Ben-Natan worked for the

efforts to build closer ties between the two countries, albeit with the constant hint that relations would never be fully normalized. Notwithstanding, Bonn became more and more determined that it was high time to finally move away from its special relationship with Israel: West German officials interpreted full diplomatic relations first and foremost as a clear sign that the responsibility towards the past had been fulfilled.⁴⁸⁷ “Germany is once again occupying a respected place within the community of states. There is no more permission needed for that,” stated Pauls in Tel Aviv as early as in 1966.⁴⁸⁸ In other words, Pauls had begun to once and for all “redirect the focus of political dialogue between Bonn and Jerusalem from the past to the present and future”.⁴⁸⁹

By the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967, official West Germany, now ruled by a grand coalition led by the Christian Democrat Kurt Georg Kiesinger as Chancellor and the Social Democrat Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister, hence believed that it had successfully atoned for its past. With regards to Israel, relations had finally been normalized and the wider strategic aim of re-integration into the Western World community was viewed as fulfilled. The stronger participation of the SPD in a Left-Center government furthermore stood for an increasingly self-assured, less penitent FRG that would now begin to look eastwards.⁴⁹⁰ In 1967, there was thus no obvious need for a West German diplomacy of guilt vis-vis Israel. However, did the past and the official narrative of guilt indeed cease to exert its influence on West Germany’s diplomatic behaviour, or was it rather still used as a diplomatic tool despite having no strategic purpose?

Israeli Defence Ministry. Posted to Paris, he was responsible for arms purchases of the IDF. In this position, he had already reached out to Bonn before becoming its Ambassador in 1965 (Deutschkron 1983, 321–322).

⁴⁸⁷ Fink 2006, 280. Deutschkron 1983, 340.

⁴⁸⁸ Pauls 1966, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 336.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Deutschland nimmt wieder einen geachteten Platz in der Völkerfamilie ein. Es bedarf dazu keiner Genehmigung mehr.*”

⁴⁸⁹ Wolffsohn 1993, 28.

⁴⁹⁰ Fink 2006, 281-282.

3.2. “No neutrality of the heart!”

From the very beginning of the Six-Day War, official West Germany always emphasized its adherence to the principle of strict neutrality and non-interference when it came to international matters. However, a closer look at West German politicians’ statements regarding the Six-Day War also reveals a move away from this formal, official stance. As soon as they became aware of Nasser’s closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships, the Federal Government did not hesitate to condemn the United Arab Republic. In the eyes of the Western world, Nasser’s step constituted a breach of the principle of freedom of navigation. However, the Federal Republic’s position was not solely motivated by International Law, but also by its own experience: “We Germans understand what free access means”, added the speaker of the West German government, hinting at the FRG’s lengthy fight for free access to West Berlin.⁴⁹¹ Further official statements underline that it was not only the Cold War context but also West Germany’s special responsibility for the Jews which determined the FRG’s rapprochement to the Israeli side. Appearing on German TV on June 5, Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, when emphasizing that the Federal Republic would not take sides in the unfolding Middle East conflict, added – certainly also with an eye to the FRG’s overwhelmingly pro-Israeli public - that such a neutrality would not necessarily imply a neutrality of the heart.⁴⁹² Two days later, Brandt elaborated on his alleged “impossibility of a neutrality of the German heart” before the German *Bundestag*:

(...) I am very much inclined, (...) to once more emphasise as my own personal conviction, with which I however do not stand alone, that our non-interference and therefore our neutrality in an

⁴⁹¹ Deutschkron 1983, 337.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Wir Deutsche wissen, was freier Zugang heißt.*”

⁴⁹² Brandt 1967, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 339.

See also: Wolffsohn 1988, 37.

international legal sense of the word does neither mean a moral indifference, nor an inertia of the heart.⁴⁹³

Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) fully approved of Brandt's notion of the impossibility of a neutrality of the heart: "(...) The Federal Government neither wants nor can it hinder German citizens to assist in all humanitarian ways possible (...)." ⁴⁹⁴ The Chairman of the CDU/CSU, Rainer Barzel could not agree more,⁴⁹⁵ as did his coalition colleague, the Chairman of the SPD, Helmut Schmidt. For Social Democrats, as Schmidt re-emphasized Brandt's position, non-interference could never imply moral and political indifference regarding the outcome of this conflict:

We are deeply saddened by the outbreak of this war (...). As much as we value our traditional friendship with the Arab people, we must speak up against the intention of their leaders to destroy Israel. (...) we cannot help but to perceive the threat to this state's existence and the cynical menace publicly stated to annihilate these people with deeply felt involvement. (...) We would like to show our solidarity with the Israeli people (...).⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁹³ Brandt 1967, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 320.

Translated by the author from the German original: "(...) *mir liegt sehr daran, (...) noch einmal unterstreichen zu dürfen – als meine persönliche Überzeugung, mit der ich aber nicht allein stehe –, dass unserer Nichteinmischung und damit Neutralität im völkerrechtlichen Sinne des Wortes keine moralische Indifferenz und keine Trägheit des Herzens bedeuten kann.*"

⁴⁹⁴ Kurt Georg Kiesinger 1967, quoted in: Vogel 1977, 23.

Translation by the author from the German original: "(...) *sie bedauert es aus tiefsten Herzen, daß es zum Ausbruch des Krieges im Nahen Osten gekommen ist. (...) Die Bundesregierung kann und will aber deutsche Bürger nicht daran hindern, humanitäre Aufgaben in jedem Raum und auch in den Kampfgebieten zu erfüllen.*"

⁴⁹⁵ Barzel 1967, quoted in Vogel 1967a, 319. Translated by the author from Barzel's German speech: "*Ich meine, die deutsche öffentliche Meinung ist hier klar. Sie hat sich der Gleichgültigkeit der Herzen versagt.*"

⁴⁹⁶ Schmidt 1967, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 316.

In German original: "*Wir sind tief bestürzt über den Ausbruch dieses Krieges (...). Sosehr uns an der traditionellen Freundschaft unseres Volkes mit den arabischen Völkern liegt, müssen wir uns gegen deren Absicht ihrer Führer verwahren, Israel zu vernichten. (...) wir können die Bedrohung der Existenz dieses Staates und die öffentlich und zynisch ausgesprochene Androhung der Vernichtung eines Volkes nicht ohne tiefe innere Beteiligung vernehmen. (...) Wir möchten unsere Verbundenheit mit diesem Volk der Israelis bekunden (...).*"

Official Israel quickly noticed the apparent West German partiality for Israel. The Israeli Ambassador to Bonn, Ben-Natan, who had closely followed the *Bundestag* debate, expressed his satisfaction. With a hint to the obvious verbal circumlocutions employed across party lines for the purpose of at least sounding somewhat neutral on a formal level, he commented: “They had to suppress their own thoughts”, but their stance was clear: West German officials were overwhelmingly on the side of Israel.⁴⁹⁷ Only the opposition party FDP showed restraint and warned against leaving the principle of strict neutrality, especially with an eye to the FRG’s business interests in the Arab world.⁴⁹⁸

Once weakened in word, the principle of neutrality and non-interference in international matters was also weakened in deeds. For instance, fearing an imminent Egyptian use of poisonous gas against them, Israelis shortly before the outbreak of war had asked the Federal Republic for a delivery of 20 000 gas masks. Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt immediately approved. However, when the issue was handed over to the Defence Ministry responsible for the matter, Defence Minister Gerhard Schröder refused, as the delivery of war material to a war zone formed a clear breach of the principle of neutrality and bore the risk of drawing the Federal Republic into the Middle East conflict. Schröder, however, was the only minister of this opinion, and as such, in a special session of the cabinet, it was quickly decided to hand the matter over to Interior Minister Paul Lücke instead. Sidestepping Defence Minister Schröder’s opposition, gas masks now became deliberately depicted as falling under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry and its task of “protecting civilians”. In order to ensure a quick delivery to Israel, West German politicians

⁴⁹⁷ Ben-Natan 1967, Interview with Rolf Vogel, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 340.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Sie mussten ihre eignen Gedankengänge verdrängen (...)*.”

⁴⁹⁸ See the speech of Freiherr von Kühlmann-Stumm, Chairman of the Free Democrats (*Freie Demokraten*), quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 318.

thus skilfully portrayed the endeavour as a strictly humanitarian measure. As such, with a delay of one week, West Germany successfully delivered gas masks to Israel.⁴⁹⁹

That the FRG's partiality for Israel stemmed from its "guilt" vis-à-vis the Jewish state became once more obvious in the West German condemnation of the East German reaction to the Six-Day War. The GDR, in accordance with Soviet support for the Arab side but in even more virulent rhetoric, called Israel "the aggressor" and had brought a defamation campaign against the FRG on its way. In speeches, press articles and pamphlets, Jews were portrayed as the victims of "German imperialists", while the Western world's sympathies for Israel were called a camouflage for the purpose of hiding imperialistic power interests.⁵⁰⁰ In accordance with broader communist propaganda, the GDR's reporting on the Six-Day War furthermore underlined that the US, Britain and the FRG were responsible for the war, and Israel's victory was only rendered possible by extensive weapon deliveries from the West. Despite their clear propagandistic aim, the East German speculations about West German military support for Israel nevertheless provided an ongoing international embarrassment for the FRG's "neutral" image. As such, the FRG's observer to the UN, Ambassador Baron Sigismund von Braun relentlessly emphasized West Germany's strong interest in preserving world peace while at the same time expressing West German regret that the GDR exploited the tragedy of the Middle East for its own propaganda.⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹⁹ Deutschkron 1983, 338.

Weingardt 2002, 190.

Arbeiter Zeitung, "Bonn liefert Israel Gasmasken. 20 000 Stück – aus humanitären Gründen – vorher Konflikt in der Regierung", 1 June 1967.

⁵⁰⁰ Erklärung jüdischer Bürger der DDR, printed in: *Neues Deutschland*, 23 June 1967. Quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 321-322.

In order to support the "anti-imperialistic fight of the Arab peoples", the Red Cross of the GDR donated medicine to the "victims of Israeli aggression" and East German hospitals and sanatoriums offered spaces for Arab soldiers and civilians (Vogel 1967a, 322).

⁵⁰¹ Letter from the FRG's Observer to the UN, Ambassador Baron Sigismund von Braun, to the President of the UN General Assembly, 29 June 1967, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 323-324.

Leaving aside ideological differences dictated by the Cold War, West German politicians always showed a clear outrage about the GDR's behaviour towards Israel on the basis that East Germans exhibited no understanding for the special responsibility that all Germans held regarding the Jews: "(...) we are ashamed by the fact that official speeches and words of those in charge of the other part of Germany contain nothing - and absolutely nothing - of the special responsibility that we Germans hold vis-à-vis these people."⁵⁰² Chancellor Kiesinger struck a similar tone to Helmut Schmidt and condemned East German behaviour with clear reference to German history: "Given the recent past of our people, it is truly tragic that those in power in the other part of Germany aim to fuel the conflict by acting in a completely irresponsible manner."⁵⁰³ As such, both official statements before the German *Bundestag* and the West German reaction to the GDR's response to the Six-Day War exhibited clearly how the past as well as - as some authors infer - the East-West conflict⁵⁰⁴ or the "dictates of the day"⁵⁰⁵ led to the West German impossibility of a neutrality of the heart.

Taken altogether, these motivations fuelled the FRG's decision to weaken its neutrality even more in the eye of the aggravating conflict in the Middle East. In addition to gas masks, trucks – again defined not necessarily as "war material" - left from West Germany for Israel,

⁵⁰² Schmidt 1967, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 316.

Translated by the author from the German original: "(...) *dass wir beschämt sind von der Tatsache, dass die offiziellen Reden und Äußerungen der Verantwortlichen im anderen Teil Deutschlands von der besonderen Verpflichtung, die wir Deutschen diesem Volk gegenüber haben, nichts, aber auch gar nichts spüren lassen.*"

⁵⁰³ Kiesinger 1967, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 316.

Translated by the author from the German original: "*Auf dem Hintergrund der jüngsten Geschichte unseres Volkes ist es wahrhaft tragisch, dass die Machthaber im anderen Teil Deutschlands durch ein in jeder Weise unverantwortliches Verhalten den Konflikt zu schüren versuchen.*"

⁵⁰⁴ Fink (2006, 281-285) interprets the Six-Day War as a major turning point in West German-Israeli relations: The grand coalition of SPD and CDU stood for a less penitent West Germany and with the bilateral relationship fully normalized in 1965, automatic support for Israel was now no longer a given. Despite Brandt's expressed moral obligation towards Israel, the West German reaction to the Six-Day War was therefore defined mainly by the gradually weakening Cold War consensus and Bonn's opening to the East rather than by the FRG's moral responsibility stemming from the Nazi past.

⁵⁰⁵ Wolffsohn (1993, 29) interpreted West Germany's reaction to the Six-Day War as pursuing the dictates of the day (*Tagespolitik*) while only pretending to be attending to the requirements of history (*Geschichtspolitik*).

and the Israeli airline *El Al* received “tacit permission” from West German authorities to fly “any kind of freight” to Israel via their territory.⁵⁰⁶ A blind eye was also turned towards American weapon deliveries to Israel via the FRG.⁵⁰⁷ As such, while it would have been the more rational choice to stay committed to its non-interference in international matters, official West Germany – due to its special obligation towards Israel and its overwhelmingly pro-Israeli public – walked a fine and risky line between support for Israel and its principle of neutrality in international conflicts.

The overwhelming West German support didn’t go unnoticed among Israelis. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, for instance, thanked the German people for their solidarity, proclaiming in an interview in *Die Welt*: “The relations between the Federal Republic and Israel have never been better.”⁵⁰⁸ Israeli Ambassador Ben-Natan expressed himself similarly:

In times of need, it becomes clear who your friends are. This must lead to reactions. For years, contacts between Germans and Israelis have developed into a positive direction. There is no question that the sympathy and help of the German people for Israel will further these developments (...).⁵⁰⁹

With an eye to the past, Ben-Natan added: “It will help many people here and over there to overcome it.”⁵¹⁰ And indeed, in the FRG, the Israeli gratitude for West German support was

⁵⁰⁶ Deutschkron 1983, 339.

⁵⁰⁷ Weingardt 1997, 66.

⁵⁰⁸ Eshkol 1967, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 340.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik und Israel waren noch nie so gut.*”

⁵⁰⁹ Ben-Natan 1967, Interview with Rolf Vogel, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 339.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*In Zeiten, wo man Sympathie und Hilfe braucht, kann man deutlich erkennen, wie sich jemand verhält, wo man Freunde hat. Das muss zu einer Reaktion führen. Seit Jahren hat eine positive Entwicklung zwischen Deutschland und Israel begonnen. Es ist keine Frage, dass die Sympathiekundgebungen und die Hilfe, die aus dem deutschen Volk für Israel aufgebracht werden, diese Entwicklung weiterführen werden (...).*”

⁵¹⁰ Ben-Natan 1967, Interview with Rolf Vogel, quoted in: Vogel 1967a, 339.

not only received by a majority with satisfaction, but it was also interpreted as yet another sign that relations with Israel were finally “normal”, and as such would from now on be oriented toward the present rather than the past.⁵¹¹

Summing up the West German reaction to the Six-Day War, whenever confronted with bilateral issues with a direct connection to the Nazi past, be it the issue of reparations, or be it the Eichmann trial, West Germany had deliberately opted for officially projecting guilt and portraying itself as an apologetic and repentant perpetrator towards Israel. This diplomatic behaviour ultimately gave rise to its “special relationship” with Israel. As a consequence, support for Israel became firmly anchored in West Germany’s *raison d’état*. However, in 1967, West Germany was confronted with the question of siding with Israel in a contemporary conflict that had nothing to do with the Nazi past. As such, another one of the FRG’s founding principles began to conflict with the former: the principle of political neutrality and non-interference when it came to international matters. In reacting to the unfolding events of the Six-Day War, the coalition of CDU and SPD thus had to compromise between its “special relationship with Israel”, an overwhelmingly pro-Israeli attitude and its position within the East-West conflict, as well as between its principle of non-interference and its interests in the Arab world. As has been shown, in the end, it was again memory that triumphed against most of the FRG’s traditional interests and as such, also in 1967, pushed West German behaviour towards the decision that “a neutrality of the German heart” was impossible during the Six-Day War.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Sie wird vielen Menschen hüben und drüben helfen, über manches hinwegzukommen.*”

⁵¹¹ Deutschkron 1983, 340.

4. The official Austrian response to the Six-Day War

4.1. “Friend, foe or just lukewarm?”

With the air in the Middle East beset with tension, the Israeli Foreign Office began to garner support for its cause through diplomatic backchannels. As such, at the end of May 1967, an Israeli diplomat began to informally inquire about Austria’s view of the current situation in the region. In the course of the conversation, however, it soon became clear that the enquiring partner pushed for something more concrete. While Israel had noted the widespread pro-Israeli stance of the Austrian population with satisfaction, official Austria’s silence in the face of the emerging Middle Eastern crisis was deemed unacceptable. Israel, as he emphasized, did not wish for partisanship, but it at least expected a common international affirmation of legal principles, especially when it came to the right of navigation.⁵¹² Israel’s diplomat clearly aimed at garnering international condemnation of Egyptian president Nasser’s recent move to close the Straits of Tiran for Israeli ships. However, while West Germany had already openly condemned Nasser’s step, Austria remained silent. The informal exchange between the Austrian and Israeli diplomats thus ended with a direct, personal hint from the Israeli side: “In times of crisis, one can view the attitude of states under magnifying glasses. It becomes evident who is a friend and who a foe and who belongs to those who are just lukewarm.”⁵¹³ The Austrian reply deliberately ignored the hint and merely emphasized the official line of the Austrian government which strictly adhered to the principle of neutrality. The Austrian official present at the

⁵¹² Bauer to Foreign Minister Tončić-Sorinj on “The Austrian attitude regarding the crisis in the Middle East under Israeli magnifying glasses”, Tel Aviv, 31 May 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 13825_67.

⁵¹³ Bauer to Foreign Minister Tončić-Sorinj on “The Austrian attitude regarding the crisis in the Middle East under Israeli magnifying glasses”, Tel Aviv, 31 May 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 13825_67.

Translated by the author from the German original: *“In Krisenzeiten werde die Haltung von Staaten wie unter einem Vergrößerungsglas erkennbar. Es werde ersichtlich, wer zu den Freunden, zu den Feinden und zu den Lauen zu zählen sei.”*

conversation, Friedrich Bauer, however, understood the Israeli message: Austria, under Israel's "magnifying glasses", belonged to those who were just "lukewarm". Angered and offended by this Israeli assertion, Bauer in his letter to the Foreign Ministry concluded that Israel's demands were unjustified: Austria had no obligation to act and side with Israel whatsoever.⁵¹⁴

With the outbreak of actual war on 5 June 1967, the official Austrian position vis-à-vis Israel changed only slightly. On that same day, Prime Minister of Israel, Levi Eshkol, sent a personal letter to the Federal Chancellor of Austria, Josef Klaus, in order to once again garner international support for his country:

Dear Mr. Federal Chancellor,

After weeks in which our peril has grown day by day, we are now engaged in repelling the wicked aggression which Nasser has been organising against us (...). (...) The extraordinary catalogue of aggression must be abhorred and condemned by world opinion in all peace-loving countries, including your own. So far nothing effective has been done by the United Nations or its members and not enough said against a ruthless attempt to destroy the State of Israel which embodies the memories, sacrifices and hopes of an ancient people whose recent torment is without parallel in history. (...) This morning we have been attacked. I add that we claim nothing except peaceful life in our territory and the exercise of our legitimate maritime rights. I most earnestly hope that you will now come out clearly and firmly against the aggression that has been perpetrated against us and do your utmost to prevent outside forces from exploiting and enlarging the tension.

Believe me, Mr. Federal Chancellor,

Very truly yours.

Levi Eshkol.⁵¹⁵

⁵¹⁴ Bauer to Foreign Minister Tončić-Sorinj on "The Austrian attitude regarding the crisis in the Middle East under Israeli magnifying glasses", Tel Aviv, 31 May 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 13825_67.

⁵¹⁵ Levi Eshkol to Josef Klaus, Jerusalem, 5 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 13825_67.

On the following day, the Austrian Foreign Minister Lujo Tončić-Sorinj addressed the Council of Ministers in Vienna. Soon thereafter, the Government issued an official statement: “The attitude of the Republic of Austria to the current Middle East conflict is defined by the duties that Austria derives from its perpetual neutrality and its membership in the United Nations.”⁵¹⁶ Defence Minister Georg Prader further emphasised that Austria would not tolerate any violation of its neutrality. Entries into Austria’s airspace like those that had happened in the case of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 were strictly forbidden.⁵¹⁷ Unlike the FRG, Austria would therefore not allow US use of its airspace for the purpose of weapon deliveries. Thus, while Foreign Minister Willy Brandt in the FRG openly admitted that “the legal principle of neutrality and non-interference does certainly not mean a moral indifference of the heart,”⁵¹⁸ his Austrian counterpart, Foreign Minister Tončić-Sorinj always underlined the country’s strict neutrality.⁵¹⁹ Only Federal Chancellor Josef Klaus - in a radio interview – aimed at an explanation of the ever more apparent contrast between his government’s attitude and the widespread Austrian public support for Israel: “Austria has to appreciate its neutrality whereas its citizens have no such obligation.”⁵²⁰ His party colleague and the Chairman of the ÖVP’s Parliamentary Club, Hermann Withalm, however, made the government’s line clear: the ÖVP would not take sides, neither with Israel, nor

⁵¹⁶ Tončić-Sorinj to the Council of Ministers on the “Middle East conflict; Austrian statement”, Vienna, 6 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 13825_67.

An additional appeal was released to all Middle Eastern states: “The Austrian government calls upon the states of the Middle East who are involved in war since Monday to recognize the dreadful responsibility they took on with respect to world peace. Austria expects that the life and property of the Austrian citizens who live in the area is being protected. Moreover, Austria appeals to the warring states to spare the Holy Sites of Christianity in their combat operations.” See: Appeal of the Federal Government, Vienna, 6 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 13825_67.

⁵¹⁷ *Die Presse*, “Österreich erwartet Taten: Bundesregierung appelliert an die Kriegsführenden in Nahost”, 7 June 1967.

⁵¹⁸ Brandt, quoted in: Weingardt 1997, 66.

Shortened, translation by the author from the original German quote: “*Nichteinmischung und damit Neutralität im völkerrechtlichen Sinne des Wortes kann keine moralische Indifferenz und keine Trägheit des Herzens bedeuten.*”

⁵¹⁹ *Die Presse*, “Österreich strikt neutral”, 8 June 1967.

⁵²⁰ Klaus 1967, quoted in: Embacher and Reiter 1998, 127.

with the Arab countries.⁵²¹ Hence, Austria's ruling party ÖVP concluded that Austria was to remain strictly neutral in the Middle East conflict.

While the ruling Christian Democratic Party ÖVP cautiously hid behind Austria's neutrality, the opposing Social Democratic Party SPÖ loudly supported Israel:

We, Austrian Socialists, are fully on the side of Israel and the Israeli people. We wish for these people, who have suffered so much, that they will overcome also this challenge, that they will repel the Arab aggressors, and that they will soon regain the opportunity to build up their country in peace and prosperity. This notion is in no way contravening with the strict neutrality of the country. Austria is obliged to be militarily neutral, not only in the conflict between East and West, but also in the current war in the Middle East. The obligation of neutrality, however, does not apply to the feelings of the Austrian population. And it is the hope that also Austria will do anything possible in order to offer support and aid to alleviate the suffering caused by this war.⁵²²

The SPÖ and its numerous sub-organizations were at the forefront of garnering support of the Austrian people for the Israeli cause.⁵²³ In the SPÖ's parliamentary club, Bruno Pittermann, the President of the Socialist International and Chairman of the MPs, declared: "Today, dictatorship and reactionary nationalism is threatening democratic Israel. Under such circumstances, there is no doubt who the aggressor is. Therefore, the behaviour of

⁵²¹ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "AUA-Maschine nach Tel Aviv kehrte um", 7 June 1967.

⁵²² *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "Tragödie im Nahen Osten", by Friedrich Scheu, 6 June 1967.

The German original: "*Wir österreichischen Sozialisten stehen mit unserer ganzen Sympathie auf Seiten Israels und des israelischen Volkes. Wir wünschen diesem Volk, das so viele Leiden durchgemacht hat, dass es auch diese Fährlichkeiten überwindet, dass es die Angriffe der Araber zurückschlägt, und bald wieder die Möglichkeit erhält, zum friedlichen Aufbau des Landes zurückzukehren. Dieses Bekenntnis steht in keinen Widerspruch zur strengen Neutralität des Landes. Österreich hat natürlich nicht nur in den Konflikten zwischen Ost und West, sondern auch in einem Krieg wie dem jetzigen im Nahen Osten seine militärische Neutralität genau zu wahren. Für die Gefühle der Bewohner Österreichs gilt aber diese Neutralitätsverpflichtung nicht. Und Österreich wird auch hoffentlich alles, was möglich ist, tun, um durch tatkräftige Hilfe das Leid zu lindern, dass dieser Krieg mit sich bringt.*"

⁵²³ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "Der Geist Israels – in Österreich. Machtvolle Solidaritätskundgebung", 9 June 1967.

Western democracies makes one very worried.”⁵²⁴ Pittermann went on to underline his argument by comparing Israel in 1967 with Austria in 1938: Austria in 1938 was left alone by the superpowers, hence falling prey to Hitler’s aggression: “May we succeed this time to restore peace (...) for all peoples.”⁵²⁵ Vienna’s Social Democratic Major Bruno Marek also called for partiality for Israel: “In thought and spirit, we are on the side of Israel and we aim to offer all available support.”⁵²⁶ In his very passionate speech, Marek further condemned all those who stayed silent in the face of injustice, warning of the long-standing hatred against Jews and also drawing parallels to the Hitler regime.⁵²⁷ Hence, by comparing Austria in 1938 and Israel in 1967, the Social Democratic opposition party in the wake of the Six-Day War strongly invoked Austria’s national victim narrative for the purpose of garnering support for Israel and underlining urgency of action. Reference to Austria’s national narrative hereby served to forge solidarity between Jews and Austrians, both victims of an overpowering, external aggressor.

Six days later, the war ended with a dramatic victory for Israel. Shortly thereafter, on 14 June, Federal Chancellor Klaus replied to Levi Eshkol: “I highly appreciate and see it as proof for our friendly relationship that you have found the time to personally explain to me the viewpoint of your country during these critical days.”⁵²⁸ While further emphasizing that

⁵²⁴ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “AUA-Maschine nach Tel Aviv kehrte um“, 7 June 1967.

In German original: “Gegen das demokratische Israel stehen heute Diktatur und reaktionärer Nationalismus. Unter diesen Umständen kann es nicht zweifelhaft sein, wer der Angreifer ist. Deshalb erfüllt uns das Verhalten der westlichen Demokratien mit besonderer Sorge.“

⁵²⁵ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “AUA-Maschine nach Tel Aviv kehrte um“, 7 June 1967.

In German original: “Möge es diesmal gelingen, den Frieden in jenem Teil der Welt rasch wiederherzustellen und den Völkern den Frieden zu sichern.“

⁵²⁶ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Der Geist Israels – in Österreich“, 9 June 1967.

⁵²⁷ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Der Geist Israels – in Österreich“, 9 June 1967.

⁵²⁸ Josef Klaus, Federal Chancellor of Austria replies to Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel, Vienna, 14 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 13825_67.

In German original: “Ich weiss es als einen Beweis der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen, die zwischen unseren beiden Ländern bestehen, ganz besonders zu schätzen, dass Sie in diesen kritischen Tagen die Zeit gefunden haben, mir persönlich den Standpunkt Ihres Landes darzulegen.“

any Austrian action in international matters was determined by the principle of strict neutrality and the duties that arose from its membership in the UN, Klaus nevertheless added:

I may express the hope that now that the guns have fallen silent, a just solution will be found which takes into account the vital interests of your country and will enable and permanently secure the peaceful restoration efforts of the Israeli people – an endeavour that the Austrian people have followed with active sympathy over all these years. In so far as our limited capabilities allow, Austria will wherever it can, especially within the framework of the UN, promote such a durable peace settlement.⁵²⁹

This private letter exchange between the Austrian and Israeli heads of state testifies of Chancellor Klaus' sympathies for Israel. It also reveals Austria's continuing wish for Israel's friendship. Previously, this wish was always deliberately hidden in official responses to Israel. Austrian politicians rather portrayed friendly relations with Israel as a matter of course and, if anything, as the result of Israeli needs rather than Austrian attempts. As previous chapters have already shown, in official reasoning, Austrian-Israeli relations, unlike the West German-Israeli relationship, were not burdened by the past, and as such, Austria never had to earn Israel's friendship. Therefore, although previous Austrian chancellors had strictly regarded Austria as "the first victim of the Nazi regime" and as such purposefully overlooked the past as a potential obstacle in the way of bilateral relations with Israel, current Chancellor Klaus apparently had not forgotten this past in showing his gratitude for Israel's willingness for friendship with Austria. A look into Klaus' biography reveals an interesting

⁵²⁹ Josef Klaus, Federal Chancellor of Austria replies to Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel, Vienna, 14 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 13825_67.

In German original: *"Ich darf der Hoffnung Ausdruck geben, dass nunmehr, da die Waffen schweigen, eine gerechte und den Lebensinteressen Ihres Landes Rechnung tragende Lösung gefunden werden kann, die es ermöglicht, dass die friedliche Aufbauarbeit des israelischen Volkes, welche das österreichische Volk in all diesen Jahren mit reger Anteilnahme verfolgt hat, dauerhaft gesichert wird. Soweit es unsere begrenzten Möglichkeiten zulassen, wird Österreich überall dort, wo es dazu berufen ist, also insbesondere im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen, für das Zustandekommen einer solchen dauerhaften Friedensregelung eintreten."*

and possible explanation: Klaus was the first and only Austrian chancellor of the Second Republic who served in the German *Wehrmacht*.⁵³⁰ His predecessors Leopold Figl⁵³¹ and Alfons Gorbach⁵³² were imprisoned in concentration camps, Julius Raab⁵³³ was never jailed but he was always regarded as “politically unreliable” by the Nazi Regime and as such had to remain more or less concealed within Austria between 1938 and 1945. Furthermore, Klaus’ successor, Bruno Kreisky, was a Jew who spent the entire period of Nazi rule in exile in Sweden. Thus, Klaus was the only chancellor who was not a personal victim of the Nazi regime and, interestingly, it was under his government that Austria became friendliest with Israel.

Despite these private statements, in official public declarations the Austrian government did not go beyond its principle of neutrality. Hence, while the Austrian public and press clearly sided with the Israelis during the Six-Day War, official Austria remained impartial, neutral and again mainly silent. This Austrian attitude did not go unnoticed within Israel. At the opening of an Israeli Information Center in Vienna, Israel’s ambassador to Austria, Michael Simon, thanked Austria’s public for its overwhelming support but also added that Israel still waited for an official Austrian statement in support of Israel. The Austrian Foreign Ministry immediately dismissed Simon’s words for breaking diplomatic etiquette. After all, an ambassador had no right to make public demands from governments. While West Germans received Israeli gratitude for their support during the Six-Day War with pleasure and as proof that the past was now indeed overcome, Simon’s show of Israeli gratitude for the Austrian public’s support gave Austrian officials ever more reason to be angry with him: Simon’s actions were regarded as a way of leveraging the Austrian public sentiment to put further

⁵³⁰ Rathkolb 2005, 183.

⁵³¹ Leopold Figl (ÖVP) was Chancellor of Austria between 1945 and 1953 (Rathkolb 2005, 164-168).

⁵³² Alfons Gorbach (ÖVP) was Chancellor of Austria between 1961 and 1964 (Rathkolb 2005, 180-182).

⁵³³ Julius Raab (ÖVP) was Chancellor of Austria between 1953 and 1961 (Rathkolb 2005, 169-180).

pressure on the Austrian government.⁵³⁴ The outrage over Simon's comments points to a certain level of discomfort prevailing among Austrian elites vis-à-vis their public's Israel euphoria. In the wake of a loud, emotional and partial domestic debate, Austrian foreign policy-makers began to face ever more constraints from both the dominant domestic but also international public opinion. As such, official Austria came under the pressure of openly declaring where it stood with regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

4.2. The Austrian vote at the UN – a belated restitution effort?

Where states stand vis-à-vis international conflicts is usually best conveyed in their voting behaviour at the United Nations. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which from the end of the Six-Day War onwards formed the essential reference point for the Arab-Israeli peace process, was adopted unanimously on 22 November 1967.⁵³⁵ A closer look at the draft text of the resolution however revealed that it was the product of “many minds and many pens”.⁵³⁶ In fact, a variety of member states had submitted their proposals to the General Assembly, and among them the non-aligned and Latin American countries were particularly proactive.⁵³⁷ In an attempt to find a solution to the conflict, most UN member states viewed a withdrawal of Israeli forces as the indispensable requirement for peace. However, there was disagreement about the notion of linking withdrawal of Israeli forces to other measures. The Soviet Union and a group of non-aligned states (what became called the Soviet and Indian-Yugoslavian resolution) tried to obtain approval of a one-sided condemnatory approach that solely aimed at an Israeli troop withdrawal to the borderlines

⁵³⁴ Internal document of the Austrian Foreign Ministry on “The Israeli ambassador criticises the attitude of the Federal government”, Vienna, 4 July 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 18298_67.

⁵³⁵ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1993, vii and 1.

⁵³⁶ Turner 1993, 21.

⁵³⁷ The key elements of debate were a withdrawal of forces, the termination of belligerency, the freedom of transit through international waterways, a possible solution to the refugee problem, a peaceful settlement and the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General to help enforce the agreement (Turner 1993, 21).

of before the war. Simultaneously, a group of Latin American states submitted a draft resolution which linked withdrawal to other issues, such as ending the state of belligerency. This text was overwhelmingly supported by Western countries and was regarded as being in the interest of Israel by its critics. In the end, both drafts failed, and it was ultimately a British draft by Lord Caradon that carried the day for formulating Resolution 242.⁵³⁸

Notwithstanding the actual outcome, Austria as a UN member state deliberated and voted on the different draft texts that were circulated within the UN General Assembly. Interestingly, official Austrian reasoning about these texts and the consequential casting of its vote clearly exhibited Austria's rapprochement to the Israeli side. In fact, the decision to actually vote for the Latin American resolution, and therefore in favour of Israel, was taken on the highest levels of government, involving both Federal Chancellor Klaus as well as Foreign Minister Tončić-Sorinj. While Austrian officials throughout the entire debate fiercely defended their decision with reference to the country's neutral and pro-peace attitude rather than its pro-Israeli stance, it was without doubt well known to all at the time that this vote would send a clear signal of Austria's support for Israel to the entire international community.⁵³⁹ Why did Austria decide to vote in favour of Israel rather than abstaining from its vote? In any rational cost-benefit calculation, abstention would have been the most beneficial choice for a neutral country. Nevertheless, Austria decided to take sides and as a consequence invited threats and heavy criticism from Arab, Eastern-bloc as well as non-aligned countries.

As early as mid-June 1967, for instance, the General Secretary of the Syrian Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Khandji, had already warned the Austrian ambassador per telephone that the upcoming vote constituted a "question over life and death" for Arab countries. As

⁵³⁸ Turner 1993, 21-28.

⁵³⁹ Bauer to Tončić-Sorinj on "Israel and the Austrian attitude to the Middle East conflict", Tel Aviv, 27 July 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 24244_67.

such, they would re-evaluate their economic, diplomatic and cultural relations with all states based on the choices they would make in this crucial vote at the UN.⁵⁴⁰ By pointing to Austria's specific position as a "neutral and friendly hinge between East and West", Arab countries placed full responsibility for its decision on Austria alone. Facing no American pressure, Austria's choice would in their eyes more than that of other Western European countries reflect nothing else but its very own opinion.⁵⁴¹ In order to invoke Austrian sympathies, Jordanian officials even went as far as to point to Austria's victim status, although following a reverse logic: Austria itself had suffered for many years from the consequences of aggression, therefore it would better understand the Arab cause.⁵⁴² Interestingly, now that another country clearly invoked Austria's victim myth, Austria remained silent. This was, of course, because Austria in the course of the Six-Day War had decided to apply its "solidarity between two victims" logic to Israel rather than to the Arab side. Thus, in justifying its support for Israel vis-à-vis the Arab world, Austria instead decided to point to its own "exposed geographic position" as a small country at the fault-lines of the Cold War, and not to its status as a victim of Nazi Germany's aggression.⁵⁴³ In clear contrast, the Austrian reaction to Eastern and non-aligned criticism of its pro-Israeli vote at the UN explicitly mentioned the latter whereas now the former was deliberately left out:

⁵⁴⁰ Austrian Ambassador in Beirut, Breycha-Vauthier to the Foreign Ministry on "The attitude of Austria in the upcoming UN debate on the Middle East conflict; declaration of the Syrian Foreign Minister to the Austrian government", Beirut, 16 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 24244_67.

⁵⁴¹ Depeche from the Austrian Embassy in Cairo to the Foreign Ministry in Vienna, Cairo, 22 July 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 13825_67.

Austrian Ambassador in Beirut, Breycha-Vauthier to the Foreign Minister on "Syria and the Austrian vote at the UN", Beirut, 14 July 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 24244_67.

⁵⁴² Breycha-Vauthier to Foreign Minister on "A visit to King Faisal", Beirut, 29 June 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 13825_67.

⁵⁴³ Federal Government document on "Austria's vote in the Special Session of the General Assembly regarding the Middle East conflict", Vienna, July 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 24244_67.

(...) Hundreds of thousands of former Austrian citizens live in Israel, who have - without their own fault and without the fault of the Austrian government - first suffered grave injustice, and then had to leave their country in order to find a new home (...). We think that we can count on the Soviet Union's understanding that out of these reasons a different casting of vote would have been unthinkable for Austria.⁵⁴⁴

Interestingly, the pre-prepared text for Moscow - unlike the one for Belgrade - contained an additional sentence that was crossed out by hand in the draft and disappeared in the final version of the document: "Austria has the moral responsibility (*“die moralische Verantwortung”*) to support its former citizens in preserving their livelihood in their new homeland."⁵⁴⁵ The delicate circumlocutions when using reference to the Nazi past testify of the deliberate, strategic team effort to project and protect Austria's victim narrative to the outside world. This effort can therefore be said to have in 1967 still formed the core of the Austrian Foreign Ministry's strategy with memory. In portraying itself as a victim of the Nazis to the international stage, Austria attempted to invoke a shared solidarity with other Nazi victims, be it Israel, or be it, in this particular case, the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. The strict denial of responsibility comprised in its national victim myth, however, required censorship when it came to invoking historic bonds between Israelis and Austrians: Austria's choice to support Israel reflected a sense of solidarity between two victims and should in no

⁵⁴⁴ Austrian Foreign Ministry, "Official language rules for Moscow, Belgrade and New York", Vienna, July 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 24244_67.

In German original: *“Wollen sie ferner in privaten Gesprächen, vor allem mit ihrem Gewährsmann, durchblicken lassen, dass ein weiteres Element, das für die österreichische Haltung mitbestimmend war, darin liegt, dass in Israel hunderttausende ehemaliger österreichischer Staatsbürger leben, die ohne ihr Verschulden und ohne Verschulden der österreichischen Bundesregierung zunächst schwerstes Unrecht erleiden und dann ihr Land verlassen mussten, um in Israel eine neue Heimstätte zu finden. Wir glauben auf das sowjetische Verständnis rechnen zu dürfen, dass schon aus diesem Grunde eine andere österreichische Stimmabgabe nicht möglich erschien.”*

⁵⁴⁵ Austrian Foreign Ministry, "Official language rules for Moscow, Belgrade and New York", Vienna, July 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 24244_67.

The German (crossed-out) original: *“Österreich hat für diese seine ehemaligen Bürger nach wie vor die moralische Verpflichtung, ihnen die Lebensmöglichkeit in ihrer neuen Heimat erhalten zu helfen.”*

way be mistaken for a moral obligation on the Austrian part. Only when framed as such would Austria openly admit to supporting Israeli interests. How firmly anchored the victim narrative was in the mind-sets of both, officials and their public by the end of the 1960s, is revealed in the fact that self-censorship had to be performed on the document when circulating it between different levels of the Foreign Ministry. The threat emanating from phrasing Austria's support for Israel as a "moral responsibility" was only detected and corrected on the highest levels. Domestically, it was therefore clearly out of question that Austria's support for Israel could be motivated by anything else than the "logical" solidarity sparked between the two innocent and powerless victims Austria and Israel. However, the country's foreign policy elite had realized that it was likely that the outside world would not view Austria's support through the lens of its "victim narrative" and could therefore potentially mistake Austrian solidarity with Israel for a moral obligation on part of the Austrians vis-à-vis the Jewish state. It was this threat that officials now actively worked against on the international stage.

That Austria's support for Israel was deliberately portrayed as resulting from its "innocence", rather than in the West German case from a notion of "guilt", furthermore became clear in the Austrian disappointment about the Israeli response to its vote. In an angry letter, the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv complained to the Foreign Minister in Vienna that the Israelis viewed "Austria's vote as a matter of course and an act of moral compensation".⁵⁴⁶ Neither the Director of the Western European Department nor the Israeli diplomat in charge of Austria, nor the Austrian Israelis living in the country had shown any sign of gratitude, noted the Embassy bitterly. This Israeli reaction was - of course - the opposite of what the diplomacy of innocence was aiming for. Gratitude was expected in the

⁵⁴⁶ Bauer to Tončić-Sorinj on "Israel and the Austrian attitude to the Middle East conflict", Tel Aviv, 27 July 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 24244_67.

first place because Austria had no moral obligation to the Israelis whatsoever. To the Austrian official's expressed disappointment, only one Israeli journalist received the message and had thanked the country for doing more for Israel than its neutrality would have predicted.⁵⁴⁷

While Israeli gratitude was insufficiently expressed towards Austria, at least Israel's previous direct and indirect critique of official Austrian silence had stopped in the wake of the General Assembly vote. Inner-Israeli circles furthermore revealed that the Austrian vote came rather unexpectedly for Israel: Israeli officials at the time believed that Austria would abstain from its vote by pointing to its neutrality.⁵⁴⁸ And indeed, any rational, realist theory would have predicted that same outcome for Austria's decision: abstention. However, Austria apparently did not regard Israel as any other country and therefore not only material cost-benefit calculations influenced officials' decision, but also something more intangible: the legacy that linked these two small distant countries and their publics to one another. Even if it came in the somewhat odd form of "solidarity between two victims", the spontaneous outpour of sympathy visible among both, the Austrian public and its officials, showed that the past had not ceased to exert its influence by the end of 1967. It is only when taking this broader public context and the delicate, official tightrope walks in diplomatic backchannels into account that we can explain how traditional cost-benefit calculations were suspended on the Austrian side and the country voted for Israel – against all odds.

⁵⁴⁷ Bauer to Tončić-Sorinj on "Israel and the Austrian attitude to the Middle East conflict", Tel Aviv, 27 July 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 24244_67.

⁵⁴⁸ Bauer to Tončić-Sorinj on "Israel and the Austrian attitude to the Middle East conflict", Tel Aviv, 27 July 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 24244_67.

5. Conclusions: Diplomatic strategies with memory become habit

Over the past two decades in which the relations between West Germany, Austria and Israel developed, diplomatic approaches vis-à-vis Israel were carefully forged around the prevailing interpretation of the Nazi legacy that linked these countries to one another. Respectively, West Germany followed a diplomatic approach of projecting guilt, whereas Austria followed a diplomatic approach of projecting innocence. Over time, both images were deliberately defended against contestation from bilateral issues that were directly related to the Nazi past: first, the issue of reparations, and second, the case of Adolf Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem. In the wake of the Six-Day War in 1967, however, the diplomatic approaches of projecting innocence or guilt were applied in the realm of a very different scenario: a modern-day conflict in the Middle East that sparked a strong pro-Israeli sentiment among both publics, and an indirect alignment of the superpowers with the warring parties. The US and with it the Western world sided with Israel whereas the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc supported the Arab countries. While such a scenario at a first glance might appear less threatening to the two countries' respective narratives, in the course of the Six-Day War, it became obvious that this event was just as dangerous to the international credibility of their historic images than the previous ones were. West German and Austrian officials therefore carefully manoeuvred their way from a neutral attitude to a subtle pro-Israeli stance, paying close attention to the global, regional and domestic environments.

While analogies between the Nazi past and the current Middle East conflict were manifold in West German and Austrian newspapers, only West Germans openly linked their partiality for Israel to their special responsibility towards the Jews. In Austria, the Nazi past was always invoked in accordance with its national victim myth. Solidarity with Israel was thus

forged by pointing to the “quasi natural bond” between the two “innocent victims”, Austria and the Jews. Both West German and Austrian newspapers therefore gave similar accounts of the Six-Day War, but they started out from very different places: The West German public apparently felt guilty and as such, sympathised with the Israeli victims, whereas the Austrian public remembered its own victimization and as such empathized as a fellow victim.

On the official level, the outbreak of the Six-Day War hence created very diverse and delicate scenarios for both West Germany and Austria and their respective diplomatic strategies towards Israel: While their publics were overwhelmingly supportive of Israel and the Western bloc aligned itself with the Israelis, the West German and Austrian governments had to adhere to the legal principles of non-interference and neutrality. In the Federal Republic of Germany, however, the past soon induced the coalition of CDU and SPD to compromise its founding principle of non-interference in international matters. Hereby, the country’s previous admission of moral and legal responsibility for the Jewish state convincingly explained West Germany’s “impossibility of a neutrality of the heart” and conveniently justified the FRG’s policies before an international audience. In Austria, on the other hand, the ruling Christian Democratic government managed to insist on a strict neutral stance, despite the public’s and the Social Democratic opposition party’s loud partiality for Israel. Unlike the Federal Republic, Austria’s national narrative of victimhood did not necessarily “force” official Austria in the direction of weakening its neutrality.

While the FRG’s partiality for Israel was in line with its official narrative of itself as a repentant and guilty perpetrator, the Austrian heart, however, was also not neutral. Austria’s public and media, as well as a majority of its politicians exhibited a clear pro-Israeli stance which ultimately culminated in Austria’s voting behaviour at the UN. However, in contrast to the Federal Republic, an open statement of solidarity with Israel stemming from a certain obligation for the Jews had to be avoided at all costs. After all, Austria, since the end of

World War II, had managed to portray itself successfully to Israel and the world as an innocent victim rather than a guilty perpetrator. For exactly that purpose, a renewed team effort was made in diplomatic backchannels to justify Austria's support for Israel, while at the same time raising no questions about its own moral or legal responsibility towards the Jewish state. Austria's pro-Israeli stance had to strictly be portrayed as a mere act of goodwill, rather than an obligation. The fine line that officials walked in explaining their sympathies for Israel with the past while simultaneously keeping up their "historic lie" about that same past becomes once more obvious in the words of Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus who explained in a *Maariv* interview what to Israelis must have looked as a peculiar paradox:

Austria has, as a small and neutral state, an uttermost interest in sustaining the right of existence of all people and states. The terrifying threats that the Arab states vocalized against Israel prior to the Six-Day War have sparked spontaneous sympathies for Israel among Austrians. It cannot be overlooked that many former Austrian citizens live in Israel, and Austria has always maintained close relationships with them. One should also not forget the immense suffering that was inflicted upon the Austrian Jews in the recent past.⁵⁴⁹

Even though Austrian support for Israel came in the odd way of emphasizing solidarity between "two victims", the Israelis – despite their surprise and initial reluctance to give too much credit to Austria's sudden "philosemitism" – in the end received the message: Austria was now on the side of Israel. The past therefore also in 1967 still exerted enough power over Austria's behaviour vis-à-vis Israel so to suspend traditional cost-benefit calculations on the part of the Austrians when it came to the Middle East conflict. If Austria had behaved according to realists' assumptions, it would have certainly abstained from its vote in the

⁵⁴⁹ *Maariv*, "The Austrian Federal Chancellor in an interview with the *Maariv*-correspondent; 'Peace in the Middle East is impossible without direct negotiations'", 12 September 1967. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, 31880_67.

General Assembly. This would have been in the interest of its relations with Arabs, its position as a neutral country between the two blocs and its “non-special relationship” with Israel. However, and also to Israel’s surprise, Austria did not abstain, and instead resorted to complicated circumlocutions in order to justify its pro-Israeli stance without raising doubt about its victimhood vis-à-vis the Nazi past. The historic legacy thus once again shaped action in a way that cost-benefit calculations would not have predicted, determining how actors act and react to one another and ultimately generating the interactive dynamic that rendered the Austro-Israeli relationship so unique.

The same is true for the West German-Israeli relationship: Here the West German official interpretation of their past, i.e. their prevailing national narrative of guilt, still exerted its influence on the FRG’s attitude on the Middle East conflict. While mainstream theories would have predicted West Germany’s strict adherence to the legal principle of non-interference in international matters as the rational choice in any traditional cost-benefit calculation, West Germany nevertheless took the risk of weakening these legal principles in addition to disturbing its close-knit economic ties with the Arab world by openly admitting a West German impossibility of a neutrality of the heart. As speeches and statements of West German officials clearly revealed, this impossibility mainly stemmed from West Germany’s special responsibility towards the Jews. In contrast to what Israeli critics of West Germany had feared, and also unlike what many West Germans might have hoped for, the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1965 had not erased the influence of the past on West German behaviour, but quite the opposite. The past was – as this chapter had revealed – alive in the minds and strategic tool boxes of politicians on all sides. It was ultimately “memory, rather than money” that determined the reactions of both West Germany and Austria towards the Middle East conflict.

Altogether, these findings not only explain the specific historic cases of the West German-Israeli and Austrian-Israeli relations in the wake of the Six-Day War, but they also point to a surprising theoretical puzzle regarding the use of memory as a diplomatic tool. While previous chapters have shown how the respective national narrative was strategically employed by both countries to achieve broader rational aims on the international stage - independence in the Austrian case and reintegration into the Western community in the West German case - these initial strategic aims had already been fulfilled by 1967: Austria had gained its full independence in 1955 and West Germany, by the mid 1960s, had widely recovered its reputation and place in the Western world. Despite the loss of their rational strategic aims, both countries nevertheless still pursued their diplomatic approaches with their respective memory vis-à-vis Israel. By 1967, the diplomacy of guilt and innocence can therefore be regarded as having become “habit” or “sticky”, and as such led both Austria and West Germany to reactions to the Middle East conflict that according to mainstream IR theory could have neither been predicted, nor – having lost their wider strategic aim - would they still qualify as rational.⁵⁵⁰ The diplomacy of guilt did not allow for West Germany’s neutrality despite it being in the best rational interest of the country which had already recuperated its image in the Western world. Similarly, the diplomacy of innocence did not allow for an open Austrian partiality for Israel despite the overwhelming pro-Israeli sentiment and obvious Western alignment with Israel. Furthermore, it ultimately also forced Austrian officials to resort to troubling circumlocutions in order to achieve both a pro-Israeli vote at the UN and an intact image of victimhood vis-à-vis the Nazi past, irrespective of the fact that Austria had fully reached its strategic goal with independence more than a decade ago. The prevailing national narrative in both cases thus continued to enable and/or constrain foreign policy behaviour way beyond the initially set goals that in the beginning had justified

⁵⁵⁰ For more on the concept and logic of “habit” in IR Theory, see: Hopf 2010, 539-561.

their diplomatic approaches with memory as yet another form of rational state behaviour on the international stage. Hence, once memory was employed as a diplomatic tool, it kept distorting the rational cost-benefit calculus of these countries, despite having long lost its rational basis in an altered context. Over time, shameful legacies therefore can be said to not only crucially influence state behaviour when strategic gain is pursued, but also continue to shape diplomatic action beyond its purpose. Furthermore, a particular state behaviour with memory does not only become “habitual” with regards to topics directly related to the past, but also determines foreign policy in future conflicts.

CHAPTER 4: The West German and Austrian responses to the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis of 1973

This chapter once more tests the influence of national narratives on foreign policy positions vis-à-vis the Middle East conflict. While the previous chapter showed how the West German and Austrian narratives of guilt and innocence formed support for Israel during the Six-Day War of 1967, this chapter now aims to explain the inverse scenario: West Germany's and Austria's increasing shift towards the Arab/Palestinian side in the wake of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the international oil crisis it triggered.

In order to establish that the national narrative of guilt - in the West German case - and of innocence - in the Austrian case – determined foreign policy choices also in the 1970s, this chapter first explores the altered economic and political incentive structures stemming from the Yom Kippur War and the oil crisis of 1973. Within these structures, I derive concrete predictions for state behavior within the materialistic lenses of mainstream IR approaches. These counterfactual scenarios are then contrasted with the actual official responses by West German and Austrian politicians to the oil crisis. Proving that not only material cost-benefit calculus but also the prevailing national narrative of the Nazi past informed the reasoning behind these responses requires qualitative analysis of official documents and debates as well as private and public rhetoric employed in the selected case countries. If the West German and Austrian narratives indeed still assert an impact on official stances towards the Middle East conflict, concerned politicians' policy choices must clearly deviate from the materialistic cost-benefit calculus that mainstream approaches would suggest. Instead, official reasoning must be shown to reflect the logic of previously adopted diplomatic approaches with memory.

This chapter therefore aims to prove that the internationally promoted national self-images of guilt and innocence not only informed support for Israel during the 1960s, but also determined the degree of shifting support towards the Palestinian cause in the 1970s. Combining the previous chapter's empirical findings of the West German and Austrian responses to the Six-Day War with those to the Yom Kippur War promises to test the suggested causal link between the national collective memory of the Nazi past and a country's position vis-à-vis the modern-day Middle East conflict.

1. A changed Middle East: From the Six-Day War to the Yom Kippur War and the oil crisis

1967 was a milestone in Middle Eastern history. The war that took only six days would have lasting consequences for the entire region: the area under Israeli control tripled and 300 000 Palestinians were displaced.⁵⁵¹ As a result of Israel's sweeping victory, Israel's internal morale and external reputation increased. Its previous image as a weak, defenceless victim dissolved into a new role of a victorious, self-confident, striving, but also occupying power in the Middle East. The humiliating Arab defeat on the other hand forced the Arab world into a lengthy and difficult process of soul-searching, which ultimately led to the downfall of Pan-Arabism as the driving ideology of the region, and the rise of Political Islam in its place.⁵⁵² The changed realities after 1967, however, provided fertile ground for an increased mobilization of both Islam and Judaism. With East Jerusalem and the West Bank, territory was all of a sudden in the hands of the Israeli state that had uttermost importance and sanctity

⁵⁵¹ Reiter 2001, 109.

⁵⁵² Ajami 1978, 357.

for religious Jews. The new overlap between Israel and biblical Holy Land led to the emergence of religion as an ever more virulent force within Israel's society and the country's political landscape. It ultimately also gave rise to the settler movement which from then on would significantly hinder future "land for peace" negotiations.⁵⁵³

As well as the introduction of religion into the Middle Eastern conflict, the emergence of a new player also altered perceptions on both sides. This new actor was the Palestinians' representative organization, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), led from 1969 by Yassir Arafat. With the help of the PLO's international (diplomatic and guerrilla) activities, the fate of Palestinian refugees for the first time came to the attention of the world. While Palestinians in 1967 were - by most states - not viewed as wholly distinct from Arabs/Jordanians, after 1967 the Middle East conflict slowly but surely transformed from an Arab-Israeli to a Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Despite this transformation, the open wounds of 1967 triggered one more war between Israel and its combined Arab neighbours in 1973. On October 6, marking both Yom Kippur and Ramadan, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. Their main goal was to reconquer what was lost in 1967 and thus restore Arab reputation. Initial military successes on the Arab sides were, however, soon reversed by the Israelis and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) began to once again advance far into Syrian and Egyptian territory. While the timing of the attack on the holiest day of the Jewish Calendar certainly came as a shock to Israel, in the end it led to yet another military victory. On the psychological level, however, the Yom Kippur War came to constitute a grave defeat for the Israelis: Israel, after 1973, understood that it was vulnerable and that military force alone would never provide it with the desired peace with its neighbours. When the war ended on 25 October, the territorial gains of 1967 thus became perceived in a different light: Rather

⁵⁵³ See, for instance: Gorenberg 2006 and Feige 2009.

than representing a mere blessing, they were from now onwards also understood as a serious liability.

For the Arab side, on the other hand, the Yom Kippur War came to signify the reverse of the Israeli perspective: The war stood for both a psychological victory and a military failure which throughout the Arab world, and especially in Egypt, was however perceived and presented as a victory. By way of force, Egypt under the leadership of Sadat had managed to stir diplomatic talks with Israel and begin the land for peace negotiations which would culminate in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in 1979. The successful exchange of “land for peace” between Israel and Egypt, however, also marked the last nail on Pan-Arabism’s coffin: With Egypt, the Palestinian struggle for nationhood lost its most powerful supporter, and in all Arab countries national interests now began to take clear precedence over combined efforts to liberate Palestine. It was in this altered context that the PLO under Arafat emerged as an independent and ever more powerful political force.⁵⁵⁴

On a global level, one of the most immediate consequences of the Yom Kippur War was a world-wide oil crisis. When the tide of war had once again turned in favour of Israel, Arab countries began to discover oil as a powerful weapon. On 17 October 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) used their leverage over the world price-setting mechanism for oil and reduced the supply rate by 5%. Simultaneously, they also imposed an embargo on several “Israel friendly” countries in order to push them towards a more pro-Arab position.⁵⁵⁵ By November, the supply rate of oil was once more reduced, this time by 25%. As an immediate consequence, the price of oil quadrupled in 1974, triggering an

⁵⁵⁴ Siniver 2013, 3-8.

Rabinovich 2005.

⁵⁵⁵ On top of the Arab boycott list landed the United States, Canada, Japan, South Africa, the United Kingdom as well as the Netherlands. The Netherlands was the only European country that allowed its airfields to be used for the American airlift during the war (Siniver 2013, 4).

outright panic among European states, as their economic reconstruction after World War II was to a large extent based on a steady supply of Middle Eastern oil at constant prices. The oil shock of 1973 now threatened to put an end to the decade-long economic growth and for the first time revealed the dangerous dependence of European prosperity on Middle Eastern resources. For European countries, it became increasingly clear that support for Israel would land them immediately on the Arab boycott list. As such, the embargo created a major rift within NATO and within the EC, with some countries seeking to disassociate themselves from Israel and US foreign policy in the Middle East for the sole purpose of avoiding becoming a target of the boycott.⁵⁵⁶

Considered from the perspective of a strategic cost-benefit calculus only, the altered economic and political incentive context in the wake of the Yom Kippur War therefore suggests a shift in support from Israel towards the Arab/Palestinian side as the rational next step for European countries. However, could countries linked to Israel via the tragic past of the Holocaust also only consider self-interested, material concerns when it came to embracing the Arab world? Or did their very own interpretation of the Nazi legacy still influence their foreign policy behaviour also during the 1970s? With the help of the cases of West Germany and Austria, this chapter aims to demonstrate the impact that the Nazi past had on their shift of support from Israel to the Palestinian cause following the Yom Kippur War and the global oil crisis of 1973.

⁵⁵⁶ Siniver 2013, 3-4.
Weingardt 2002, 228-230.
Petritsch 2010, 225-226.

2. The West German response to the oil crisis

2.1. Context of the West German-Israeli relationship in the early 1970s

While the West German-Israeli relationship peaked following the solidarity forged during the Six-Day War, relations between West Germany and the Arab world plummeted. Despite repeated attempts to signal neutrality, West Germany in the eyes of the Arabs now qualified as a clear friend and supporter of Israel. As a result, by the end of the 1960s, the FRG had lost all of its political ties with Arab countries, culminating not only in a rupture of diplomatic relations but also Iraq's recognition of the GDR as the first non-communist country to do so in May 1969. Sudan, Syria, South Yemen and Egypt soon followed in Iraq's footsteps, thus rendering the Hallstein doctrine's politics of non-recognition a complete failure in the Arab world.⁵⁵⁷

In the Federal Republic itself, the end of the 1960s marked a surge of the political left which peaked in the student revolts of 1968. This "new left", with its traditional solidarity concerning the weak and oppressed, began to discover the 250 to 300 000 Palestinians (according to UN estimations) that became refugees as a result of the Six-Day War. Paralleling the armed struggle against US imperialism ala Che Guevara or Mao Tse Tung, the PLO sparked affinities with the emerging new left of the student movement. The resulting rise of critics of Israel who previously were confined to the right wing of the political spectrum left Israel both confused and alarmed.⁵⁵⁸ The West German shift towards the Left was also reflected in the elections of 1969. For the first time since the proclamation of the *Bundesrepublik*, the conservative CDU/CSU was forced into opposition, and in its place stepped the German Social Democratic Party SPD under the leadership of Willy

⁵⁵⁷ Weingardt 2002, 191-192 & 200.

⁵⁵⁸ Jaeger 1994, 31. Weingardt 2002, 194. Wolffsohn/Brechenmacher 2005, 121.

Brandt. Brandt did not choose the CDU/CSU as a coalition partner but the liberal Free Democratic Party FDP.⁵⁵⁹

The year 1969 also marked a change in government in Israel. While the Labour Party remained strongest, the premiership passed from Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, who had died earlier in the year, on to Golda Meir. By the beginning of the 1970s, both countries' left-wing parties - the Israeli Labour Party and the SPD, as well as their leaders Meir and Brandt - had knitted close ties with one another on the international level, and the Socialist International provided an indispensable forum for their interaction.⁵⁶⁰ Despite their shared socialist outlooks, it was however rather uncertain as to what stance Brandt would take vis-à-vis Israel. While previous conservative chancellors Adenauer and Erhard stood for reconciliation and West Germany's special responsibility towards the Jewish state, the social democratic obligation towards that responsibility was less straight forward. A large number of SPD representatives, just like Willy Brandt himself, had been in resistance to or refugees from the Hitler regime, leading Israel to fear that this government would less strongly identify with the image of a guilty perpetrator that former conservative governments had created.⁵⁶¹ In addition, Israel was specifically suspicious of Brandt's new Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. He, together with his party FDP, had already exhibited a stronger interest in the Arab world than partiality for Israel.⁵⁶² Adding to Israel's insecurity, Brandt's first government declaration on 28 October 1969 did not contain – unlike all previous

⁵⁵⁹ Bark/Gress 1993, 151-152.

⁵⁶⁰ The Socialist International is an international political organisation composed of socialist, social democratic and labour parties throughout the world. It was founded by Karl Marx in London in 1864. Its purpose is to strengthen relations between affiliated parties and organisations and to co-ordinate their political attitudes by consent (Source: Socialist International document: "The Socialist International: Background information to the forthcoming Socialist International Bureau meeting in Oslo, June 12-13, 1980", Kreisky Archiv, VII. 4, Nahost, Box 17).

⁵⁶¹ Wolffsohn/Brechenmacher 2005, 117.

⁵⁶² See previous chapter on the West German debate regarding support for Israel in the wake of the Six-Day War. Weingardt 2002, 198.

government declarations by West German Chancellors - a clear hint to Israel and the Jewish people. Instead Brandt merely mentioned that the FRG desired friendly relations with all states in the Middle East.⁵⁶³

Brandt's chancellorship would indeed bring a major change in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic. His first aim was to foster a rapprochement with the Eastern bloc and as such he also put an end to the Hallstein doctrine in the FRG's foreign policy approach. A major milestone of Brandt's new *Ostpolitik* was the signing of the "Basic Treaty" (*Deutsch-Deutschen Grundlagenvertrag* 1972) with the GDR in which both of them recognized one another as sovereign states. As such, West Germany in 1972 gave up its claim to be the sole representative of the German people and opened the way towards diplomatic and economic relations with communist countries.⁵⁶⁴ It was in this new context that West Germany's foreign policy options widened also with regards to the Middle East. With the threat of Arab recognition of the GDR rendered irrelevant, avenues opened towards the Soviet-supported Arab countries. Simultaneously, Arabs also began to exhibit a renewed interest in West Germany for the purpose of weakening their dependence on the Eastern bloc, especially on the Soviet Union which was to a large part blamed for the 1967 defeat.⁵⁶⁵ It was not least due to these circumstances that Israel was from the beginning suspicious of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶³ Deutschkron 1983, 346.

⁵⁶⁴ It is worth noting that Brandt's *Ostpolitik* signified no break with the West but quite the opposite. *Ostpolitik* constituted a further step towards West Germany's integration into the Western community. Already US President Kennedy had aimed at a reduction of tensions in the East-West conflict, so did his successor Johnson. In the early 1970s, US President Nixon together with his Foreign Minister Kissinger further pressed for a policy of détente. As such, Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was fully in line with US foreign policies. What was new about Brandt's approach was that unlike previous governments who simply adapted to US policies, the FRG now deliberately took on a role of providing initiative in East-West relations in addition to defining specific West German goals. In 1971, Brandt received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts (Bark/Gress 1993, 160 & 164. Weingardt 2002, 199).

⁵⁶⁵ Weingardt 2002, 200-201

⁵⁶⁶ Wolffsohn/Brechenmacher 2005, 165-166.

2.2. “A more balanced Middle Eastern approach”

Once the oil crisis hit, the initial West German economic interest in the Arab World and its plan of rapprochement towards Arab countries was turned into an economic necessity of the first order. OPEC’s oil embargo triggered an outright panic within the FRG. With 75% of its oil imports coming from the Arab world, the country’s economy was almost fully dependent on Middle Eastern resources. Even though oil imports were immediately reduced by 6% in the wake of the oil crisis, the FRG still spent 17 billion DM more on them in 1974. In order to alleviate the damage caused by the oil embargo, the government introduced country-wide oil saving measures such as car-free Sundays and speed limits on motorways as well as for Lufthansa planes. Yet, the economic impact of the oil crisis hit West Germany hard: economic development slowed, and unemployment and inflation rates rose significantly. While unemployment was limited to 300 000 in 1969, it doubled to 600 000 in 1974, and surged to 1.1 million people in 1975.⁵⁶⁷ West Germany thus painfully realized that the oil-producing Arab countries held the key to its prosperity.

As a consequence, the Federal Republic’s oil minister instantly began to promote a more pro-Arab stance as being in the urgent interest of the country. However, at least initially, the government of the Federal Republic refused to follow the oil minister’s advice and instead insisted on its politics of impartiality regarding the Middle East conflict. In the wake of official West German reluctance to give in to their pressure, Arab warnings and threats became ever more virulent: “As much as we have fired in the war, you shall now freeze“, declared Libyan Ambassador to Bonn, Jahal Mohamed Daghely.⁵⁶⁸ Furthermore, once Israel-friendly Holland with Europe’s most important oil port in Rotterdam was cut off from

⁵⁶⁷ Baring 1982, 689.

Baring/Schöllgen 2002, 152-154.

⁵⁶⁸ Libyan Ambassador to Bonn, Jahal Mohamed Daghely, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 379.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*So viel, wie wir im Nahost-Krieg verfeuert haben, sollt ihr jetzt frieren.*”

OPEC's oil supply, Libya's Head of State Muammar al-Ghaddafi began to target the FRG, stipulating that in order to escape the oil boycott, West Germany must cease any economic support for Israel.⁵⁶⁹ Chancellor Willy Brandt nevertheless still showed his reluctance to give in to these Arab threats: "One cannot buy friends by applying pressure, not even when using oil as a bargaining chip."⁵⁷⁰ His warnings to Arab states, however, were to no avail. The Arab world aimed at nothing less but to force an end to Western support for Israel. Official West Germany was thus left in a situation of predicament: as economic pressures on the German economy increased, political and diplomatic obligations stemming from Germany's past still bound West Germany to Israel. As such, the Federal Republic carefully began to manoeuvre its way towards supporting some Arab claims while at the same time not fully abandoning its special responsibility vis-a-vis Israel. The solution to the dilemma was a more balanced approach in the Federal Republic's Middle East policies, based on both the improvement of relations with the Arab countries as well as an attempt to normalize relations with Israel.⁵⁷¹ This was pursued via two distinctive avenues. The first aimed directly at West Germany's special responsibility vis-a-vis Israel. The second was targeted at the facilitation of a common European policy stance within the EC.

Regarding the first avenue, the politics with the past, West Germany was well aware that its diplomacy of guilt vis-à-vis Israel and the special relationship that stemmed from it was the biggest obstacle towards realizing West German interests in the Arab world. The FRG further knew that its support for Israel made it highly likely for West Germany to soon land on top of the Arab boycott list for oil deliveries. As such, now that the country's heavy reliance on oil forced West Germany in the direction of the Arab world and its new *Ostpolitik*

⁵⁶⁹ Deutschkron 1983, 379.

⁵⁷⁰ Willy Brandt at the SPD *Bundestagsfraktion*, 6 December 1973. Quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 379. Translated by the author from the German original: "Mit Druck kann man sich keine Freunde kaufen, nicht einmal mit dem Druckmittel Öl"

⁵⁷¹ Jaeger 1994, 34.

had cleared the way towards these countries, some West German politicians attempted to push back against the specific character of the FRG's relationship with Israel. Foreign Minister Scheel led the way. With an eye to the Arab world, he repeatedly emphasised that relations with Israel have normalised and as such any special responsibility stemming from the past had by now been fulfilled:

Our relations with Israel are the same as with all other countries. Normalization implies that previous agreements forged for the purpose of settling the past have now been replaced by a very normal cooperation. There is nothing special about it.⁵⁷²

Upon protest from his Israeli counterpart Abba Eban, Scheel when visiting Israel in June 1971, was forced to backtrack on his position, albeit only slightly: He admitted a “special responsibility for Israel (*“besondere Verantwortung für Israel”*)”, but no special relations.⁵⁷³

While Scheel clearly tried to reach out to the Arab world by way of rolling the past back behind the needs of the present, Chancellor Brandt, however, followed a different approach with the memory of the past. During his visit to Israel in June 1973,⁵⁷⁴ he assured his counterpart Golda Meir: “German-Israeli relations have to be viewed against the gloomy backdrop of the National Socialist reign of terror. This is what we imply when we state that our normal relations have a special character.”⁵⁷⁵ Brandt's formulation of “normal relations

⁵⁷² Walter Scheel, in an interview on 18 December 1968. Quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 347.

Translated by the author from the German original: *“Unser Verhältnis zu Israel ist wie mit anderen Ländern. Die Normalisierung besteht darin, dass wir die früheren vertraglichen Abmachungen als Bereinigung bestimmter Tatbestände der Vergangenheit abgelöst durch eine ganz normale Zusammenarbeit. Es gibt nichts Besonderes daran.”*

⁵⁷³ Deutschkron 1983, 384.

⁵⁷⁴ Willy Brandt was the first German Chancellor to visit Israel.

⁵⁷⁵ Brandt 1973, quoted in: Weingardt 2002, 223.

Translated by the author from the German original: *“Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen müssen vor dem düsteren Hintergrund der nationalsozialistischen Schreckensherrschaft gesehen werden. Dies meinen wir, wenn wir sagen, unsere normalen Beziehungen haben den Charakter der Besonderheit.”*

with a special character” was just like his 1967 stance on “the impossibility of the neutrality of the heart” in line with the diplomacy of guilt that his predecessors had constructed and as such satisfied the Israelis. However, Brandt’s move from special relations to “relations with a special character” nevertheless implied – if only slightly – a reduction of the particularity of the relationship.⁵⁷⁶ Via acknowledging both the needs of the past and the present, Brandt therefore managed tactfully to manoeuvre the Federal Republic’s way through the Middle East: His notion of “normal relations with a special character” were meant to satisfy the Israeli side without putting off the Arabs.⁵⁷⁷

That this approach was ultimately successful was also owed to Brandt’s own biography and integrity as a person. While Brandt’s balanced Middle East approach certainly signified a slight move away from West Germany’s diplomacy of guilt vis-à-vis Israel in terms of substantive gestures, Brandt at the same time also managed to send symbolic gestures which filled West Germany’s diplomacy of guilt with renewed emotionality and credibility. Only a few years earlier, during a visit to Warsaw on 7 December 1970, Brandt had sent an unforgettable picture of the FRG as a repentant perpetrator around the world. At the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial, he spontaneously sank to his knees and stayed in this position for several minutes (See figure 5: “Brandt kneeling in Warsaw”). “Oppressed by the memories of Germany’s recent history, I simply did what people do when words fail them,” he



commented in his memoirs.⁵⁷⁸

Officially, Brandt declared: „In the name of our people, I wanted to ask your pardon for a million-fold crime committed in the abused German

⁵⁷⁶ Jaeger 1994, 51.

⁵⁷⁷ Weingardt 1997, 83.

⁵⁷⁸ Brandt 1976, 399.

name.”⁵⁷⁹ That it was specifically Brandt, himself a resistor of the Third Reich, who was willing to acknowledge guilt on behalf of his people gave this gesture its particular weight.⁵⁸⁰ Brandt’s genuflection touched and impressed Israel. Reactions within the FRG, however, were rather mixed. According to a survey by *Der Spiegel*, out of 500 West Germans asked, 48% thought Brandt’s gesture was exaggerated, while 41% regarded it as “appropriate”, and 11% had no opinion at all.⁵⁸¹ The reserved domestic reaction to Brandt’s emotional gesture once more underlines how much the diplomacy of guilt was confined to the official performance of guilt and its underlying official narrative, rather than being based on the prevailing public narrative and opinion about the past. Furthermore, acting out guilt on the diplomatic stage was – as Brandt’s genuflection had clearly revealed - directed first and foremost at an external and not at a domestic audience. On the international stage only, and especially in the eyes of the Israelis, Brandt’s gesture was a success. His open acknowledgment of collective guilt and shame cemented his moral authority to shift the focus on present needs without denying the past during the oil crisis. In the course of the 1970s, through a combination of expressive gestures and his new *Ostpolitik*, Brandt thus managed to bring about a delicate shift towards the Arab countries while at the same time not fully abandoning the Israelis.⁵⁸²

West German attempts at a more balanced Middle Eastern approach were further aided on the multilateral level. West Germany’s membership in the European Community (EC) played a crucial role in altering the focus of the FRG’s foreign policies towards the Middle

⁵⁷⁹ Brandt 1970, Interview in *Der Spiegel*, 51/1970, 14.12.1970. Quoted in: Wolffsohn/Brechenmacher 2005, 7-8.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Ich habe im Namen unseres Volkes Abbitte leisten wollen für ein millionenfaches Verbrechen, das im mißbrauchten deutschen Namen verübt wurde.*”

⁵⁸⁰ Baring/Schöllgen 2002, 130.

⁵⁸¹ Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, on request of: *Der Spiegel*, 51/1970, 14.12.1970. Quoted in: Wolffsohn/Brechenmacher 2005, 8.

⁵⁸² Weingardt 2002, 239.

East. Since the foundation of the Federal Republic, a major component of its foreign policy strategy had been *Westbindung*, with not only its Israel policies but also its EC membership being at the heart of such efforts.⁵⁸³ West Germany thus always showed a high interest in bringing about a closer political rather than solely economic integration of the EC. In 1970, the establishment of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) was a crucial stepping stone into that direction. With the EPC, the six EC member states for the first time attempted to overcome their strict focus on sovereignty in foreign policy matters and created an informal consultation process for the purpose of tackling selected foreign policy issues together. In their attempt to speak with one voice, they decided to form a common stance regarding the Middle East conflict even at the first meeting in Munich in 1970. While the region was certainly of utmost importance to European interests and security, consensus on how to best pursue these interests was rendered difficult by the multiple links that connected diverse EC countries with the Middle East. While Britain and France were former colonial powers in addition to holding specific international weight as permanent members of the UN Security Council, West Germany had established a special relationship with Israel because of its Nazi past.⁵⁸⁴

In the course of finding consensus, France's position under the leadership of French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann soon became dominant. Via skilful tactics, Schumann managed to turn France's own pro-Arab stance⁵⁸⁵ into the EC's voice, against the clear pro-Israeli tendencies of West Germany, Holland and Denmark. In May 1971, the six EC foreign ministers thus signed an unofficial working paper which – to West Germany's embarrassment - was leaked to the public. The EC document confirmed UN resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. However, it was based on the French version of the contested

⁵⁸³ Banchoff 1996, 39-48.

⁵⁸⁴ Weingardt 2002, 204.

⁵⁸⁵ France already followed a pro-Arab stance since 1967. Its main aim was to realize France's own interests in the Middle East and weaken US influence in the region (Deutschkron 1983, 371).

resolution which demanded that Israel withdraw from *all* territory conquered in the Six-Day War. Becoming overnight the EC's quasi-official standpoint, the desired French position also ever more pronouncedly promoted refugees' right to return. Little surprisingly, this triggered both US critique and Israel's anger: France's anti-American and anti-Israeli hand was simply too obvious throughout the entire document.⁵⁸⁶

As a consequence, Israel now more than ever became fiercely opposed to any European interference in the Middle East conflict: Abba Eban immediately warned his German colleague Walter Scheel that "the working paper gives the impression as if our friends in Europe would like to anticipate our bargaining position."⁵⁸⁷ Israel, however, expected to bargain the terms of peace without European interference, especially without intervention of its "German friends". Scheel's first visit to Israel in July 1971 thus took place under the shadow of the working paper and forced him to manoeuvre his way through what constituted an embarrassing situation for the Federal Republic. Upon frequent Israeli requests, in the end, Scheel admitted that the FRG did not support the French position, and as such would never request Israel's retreat from *all* occupied territory. Israeli pressure had forced Scheel to correct the West German stance expressed in the working paper, leaving Eban content,⁵⁸⁸ but triggering confusion at home, both in the *Bundesrepublik* as well as within the EC. Upon questioning from CDU member of parliament Kurt Birrenbach, Scheel in the *Bundestag* resorted to the odd excuse of being unable to answer because he didn't have the paper in front of him.⁵⁸⁹ The government's spokesperson Conrad Ahlers came to Scheel's rescue: "It cannot be called 'distancing'." The Federal Republic had always considered only the English version of the text requesting a "withdrawal from territories": "How these new borders will

⁵⁸⁶ Weingardt 2002, 205-206.

⁵⁸⁷ Deutschkron 1983, 374.

⁵⁸⁸ Abba Eban, according to FAZ, 12.7.1971, called Scheel's visit "a perfect visit" (Quoted in: Jaeger 1994, 39).

⁵⁸⁹ Deutschkron 1983, 375.

then actually look is up to the affected parties (...).”⁵⁹⁰ Despite doubts raised by the EC working paper, Israel’s right of existence within secure borders thus remained at the heart of West German Middle Eastern policies, and still constituted the first priority for Bonn.⁵⁹¹ Paris, unsurprisingly, was angered and deemed the FRG “unreliable”: Scheel was accused of having given in to Israeli pressure while sacrificing a common European stance.⁵⁹² Despite the difficulties of consensus and persisting American and Israeli critique, the EC nevertheless continued its efforts to develop a common position on the Middle East conflict. Once the oil crisis hit, these EC attempts gained ever more urgency. In its wake, French President Georges Pompidou initiated a first joint statement on the Middle East which was issued on 9 November 1973. In it, the now nine EC member countries laid out their principles for a Middle Eastern peace agreement. Going far beyond UN resolution 242, which only spoke of the necessity of finding a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, the EC countries urged Israel “to end the territorial occupation which it maintained since the conflict of 1967”, and openly mentioned the importance of acknowledging “the legitimate rights of the Palestinians” for any “just and lasting peace account”.⁵⁹³ It was obvious to everyone, with this statement, the EC had once and for all turned pro-Arab.

Among the signatories was naturally German Foreign Minister Scheel. Upon returning from Brussels, he had to defend the resolution against wide-spread domestic and international criticism. A major part of the West German press and public regarded it as solely in the interest of Arabs, thus calling West Germany’s neutrality into question. The resolution

⁵⁹⁰ Ahlers 1971, quoted in: Jaeger 1994, 39.

Translated by the author from the German original: *“Distanzierung kann man es nicht nennen. (...) Wie diese neuen Grenzen dann tatsächlich aussehen werden, das ist Sache der unmittelbar Beteiligten, derjenigen, die einmal ein Abkommen oder einen Friedensvertrag zu schließen haben.”*

⁵⁹¹ Jaeger 1994, 40.

⁵⁹² Deutschkron 1983, 375.

⁵⁹³ Joint Statement by the Governments of the EEC, 6 November 1973, online at: http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/joint_statement_by_the_governments_of_the_eec_6_november_1973-en-a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e.html.

furthermore reflected the EC's and the Federal Republic's surrender to what was widely perceived as unjustified Arab threats as well as French attempts for supremacy in Europe. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, for instance, called the document "a sign of partisanship for the Arabs" ("*eine Parteinahme für die Araber*"), the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* spoke of "an invitation to Arabs to exert more pressure" ("*eine Einladung an die Araber zu weiteren Pressionen*") and added: "In Brussels, oil counts most" ("*In Brüssel zählt das Erdöl mehr*").⁵⁹⁴ Also in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, the German public had remained firmly on the side of Israel, although without the element of spontaneously expressed solidarity in 1967.⁵⁹⁵ According to an Allensbach poll, a month after the war, 57% of West Germans stated that the government should continue its support for Israel despite the oil crisis. Only 16% desired the FRG to give in to Arab requests.⁵⁹⁶

Also in the *Bundestag*, social democrats and the opposing CDU both protested against the anti-Israel tendencies of the document. The CDU's Karl Carstens called the EC's decision "not satisfying", as it not only lacked objectivity, but also disregarded Israeli interests.⁵⁹⁷ Similar voices came from within the SPD, where Deputy SPD Chairman Heinz Kühn emphasized: "Arab oil policies towards Europe constitute a terror in the face of which we will not capitulate. Arabs are not winning friends here and will soon realize where such policies lead to."⁵⁹⁸ Brandt attempted to mediate and emphasized that "our engagement served both the well-understood interests of the Arabs and Israel".⁵⁹⁹ In reaction to

⁵⁹⁴ Deutschkron 1983, 381.

⁵⁹⁵ Allensbach Institute's survey of October 1973 found that 57% of West Germans were on the side of the Israelis and only 8% held a pro-Arab attitude regarding the Yom Kippur War (Weingardt 1997, 86-87).

⁵⁹⁶ Weingardt 1997, 86-87.

⁵⁹⁷ Deutschkron 1983, 381.

⁵⁹⁸ Kühn 1973, quoted in: Jaeger 1994, 57.

Translated by the author from the German original: "*Die arabische Ölpolitik gegenüber Europa ist ein Terror, vor dem wir nicht kapitulieren werden. Die Araber werden dadurch keine Freunde gewinnen und merken, wohin diese Politik führt.*"

⁵⁹⁹ Brandt 1973, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 383.

In German original: "*Unser Engagement zum Frieden dient genauso den recht verstandenen Interessen der arabischen Völker, wie es Israel dient.*"

widespread protest, the government's spokesperson furthermore underlined before an outraged West German press that the EC declaration reflected neither "a short-sighted reaction to the oil boycott", nor partiality regarding the Middle East conflict. Instead, the FRG's position was inspired by finding consensus and a unified EC voice with regards to international conflicts, of which the Middle East only formed one first step.⁶⁰⁰

Israel – unsurprisingly –reacted bitterly to these new developments within Europe: Golda Meir called the document "the harshest condemnation of the Israeli position in the Middle East conflict that has ever been issued by a Western organization".⁶⁰¹ Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban further warned that the EC document was not concerned with peace in the Middle East but rather with a steady oil supply for Europe.⁶⁰² According to Eban, the much celebrated unity of Europeans had merely been forced from the outside, and Bonn had once more given in to French pressure at the expense of Israel.⁶⁰³ Israel's Ambassador to the FRG, Eliashiv Ben Horin, became ever more literal: "Israel's security cannot be placed on the same level as the availability of central heating."⁶⁰⁴ A worried Meir also showed herself personally disappointed with Brandt and repeatedly urged him to hinder an ever more pro-Arab stance within the EC. Israel clearly expected West Germany to use its influence on other European countries. Furthermore, Meir also expected Brandt to use his power as Chancellor over his very own Foreign Minister. By way of reassuring Meir and the Israelis that West Germany had not lost its understanding for Israel, Brandt once again tried to mediate: "(...) We are witnesses of a conflict that continues to constitute the biggest threat

⁶⁰⁰ Deutschkron 1983, 382.

⁶⁰¹ Meir, 7 November 1973, *Jerusalem Post*. Quoted in: Jaeger 1994, 55.

⁶⁰² Deutschkron 1983, 382.

⁶⁰³ Jaeger 1994, 56.

⁶⁰⁴ Ben Horin, quoted in: Abediseid 1975, 386.

The German original: "Die Sicherheit Israels kann nichts mit dem Funktionieren von Zentralheizungen zu tun haben."

to world peace. However, there shall be no doubt: We are involved witnesses,”⁶⁰⁵ stated Brandt before the *Bundestag* while presenting his thoughts on the oil crisis. As such, he continued, the FRG had the responsibility to participate in the attempts to bring a just peace to the Middle East “with the passion and commitment of an affected party”:⁶⁰⁶ “Our participation does not reflect – as has often been misunderstood - a neutrality in awareness and conscience, but the opposite: it is the expression of an engagement.”⁶⁰⁷ West Germany’s new positioning in the Middle East conflict was thus skilfully presented by Brandt as still reflecting the FRG’s special responsibility vis-à-vis Israel. While in 1967, West German partiality for Israel was justified by the “impossibility of a neutrality of the heart”, in 1973 that same “impossibility” now motivated the FRG’s proactive participation in finding a solution to the Middle East conflict:

I have often emphasised, and I’d like to confirm it once again. For us, there can be no neutrality of heart and conscience. If we acted neutral in that sense, we would have no interest in participating in the attempt to find a just and lasting peace for the suffering Middle East. We understand our duties differently!⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁵ Brandt 1973, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 383.

Translated and shortened by the author from the German original: *„Ich möchte zunächst sagen, wenn wir Zeugen sind des Konfliktes, der weiterhin die ernsteste Gefahr für den Weltfrieden bleibt, dann soll doch niemand daran zweifeln dürfen, dass es sich nicht um irgendwelche Art von Zeugen, sondern um beteiligte Zeugen handelt.“*

⁶⁰⁶ Brandt 1973, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 383.

Translated and shortened by the author from the German original: *„Ich möchte feststellen dürfen, dass wir an den Bemühungen um einen dauerhaften und gerechten Frieden in jener Region, einen Frieden, der die Existenz und die sicheren Grenzen jedes Staates der Nahostregion garantieren soll, mit der Leidenschaft von Betroffenen mitwirken.“*

⁶⁰⁷ Brandt 1973, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 383.

Translated by the author from the German original: *„Es handelt sich hier nicht, wie oft missverstanden wurde um Neutralität von Bewusstsein und Gewissen, sondern im Gegenteil um den Ausdruck eines Engagements.“*

⁶⁰⁸ Brandt 1973, quoted in: Deutschkron 1983, 383.

Translated by the author from the German original: *„Ich habe oft betont – und mir liegt daran, es hier zu bestätigen -, dass es für uns keine Neutralität des Herzens und des Gewissen gibt und geben kann. Wären wir in diesem Sinne neutral, dann hätten wir geringen Anlass, die Forderung nach einem gerechten und dauerhaften Frieden in jener gequälten Nahostregion zu der unseren zu machen. Wir begreifen unsere Pflichten anders.“*

Under the umbrella of the EC, official West Germany thus manoeuvred its way through a predicament: Despite pressures on the West German economy, the political and diplomatic obligations that stemmed from Germany's past bound it on the one hand to Israel, and on the other hand – via the Franco-German friendship treaty of 1963 - also to neighbouring France. In addition, circumstances rendered West Germany's security strongly dependent on the US, while the FRG at the same time favoured a unified foreign policy voice of the EC. However, that unified voice under the leadership of France now clearly took the direction of a pro-Arab/pro-Palestinian stance and as a consequence qualified as both anti-Israeli and anti-American.⁶⁰⁹

In attempting to balance these diverging interests and players, West Germany towards the end of the oil crisis sacrificed its independent Middle East policy for the sake of speaking with a unified European voice. From now on, finding a common European position always dominated West German efforts regarding the Middle East conflict. This stance not only fostered an ever-closer integration among EC countries, but certainly also aided the FRG's interests in the Arab world: „Under the protective umbrella of a common European policy, the Federal Government took up its position of ‘critical solidarity’ with Israel”, concluded Weingardt.⁶¹⁰ The EC certainly provided a welcome avenue for West Germany to approach the Arab states while at the same time bypassing their very own special responsibility towards the Jews. Yet, West Germany always remained Israel's strongest supporter within the EC.⁶¹¹ Unofficial rumour around the joint EC statement had it that the FRG had hindered an even stronger pro-Arab stance among EC member states. Furthermore, Brandt himself

⁶⁰⁹ Deutschkron 1983, 380-382.

⁶¹⁰ Weingardt 2002, 238.

In German original: *„Im Schutze einer gemeinsamen europäischen Politik nahm die Bundesregierung eine Position der ‚kritischen Solidarität‘ ein.“*

⁶¹¹ Weingardt 2002, 238.

never made a secret of his unhappiness with the EC's formulations. West Germany's membership in the EC and the threat of oil, however, had compromised his position.⁶¹²

The Arab countries were in general pleased with the developments in Europe. On 18 March 1974, the oil embargo was lifted. In the end, West Germany in subscribing to the EC's November Declaration was classified by the Arab League as a "friendly country" and could as such fully escape the embargo.⁶¹³

3. The Austrian response to the oil crisis

3.1. Context of the Austrian-Israeli relationship in the early 1970s

At the beginning of the 1970s, the Austrian-Israeli relationship flourished. Previous Israeli criticism of Austrian acquittals of Nazi war criminals had seemingly dissolved in the wake of Austria's diplomatic support during the Six-Day War: "The Israelis have not forgotten the Austrian voting behaviour in June/July 1967 (...). Up until this day, we can feel that the Austrian vote had significantly improved the Austrian-Israeli relations and the image of Austria in Israel (...)"⁶¹⁴, noted Austria's Ambassador to Tel Aviv, Arthur Agstner in 1972. His opinion was matched in the Yearbook of the Israeli Government 1969/70: "It can pleurably be said that the Austrian Government is keenly and sympathetically aware of the principal aims of Israel policy. Relations are excellent (...)." ⁶¹⁵

⁶¹² See: Deutschkron 1983, 373.

⁶¹³ Abediseid 1975, 391. Weingardt 2002, 232-233.

⁶¹⁴ Agstner to Foreign Ministry: "Beziehungen Österreich-Israel; Rückblick und Ausblick", Tel Aviv, 31 August 1972. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 162498/6_72.

Translated by the author from the German original: "*Unvergessen ist auf israelischer Seite das österreichische Stimmverhalten im Juni/Juli 1967 (...). Man kann auch heute noch sagen, dass diese Stimmabgabe für die österreichisch-israelischen Beziehungen und das Österreichbild in Israel einen Auftrieb bildete (...).*"

⁶¹⁵ Agstner to Foreign Ministry: "Jahrbuch der israelischen Regierung 1969/70; Beurteilung der Beziehungen zu Österreich und anderen europäischen Staaten", Tel Aviv, 26 May 1970. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 86741/6_70.

On the national level, the year 1970 marked a political watershed in Austria. On 1 March 1970, the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) won a landslide victory and Bruno Kreisky was sworn in as chancellor. Not only was it the first time in post-war history that the SPÖ had won a plurality of seats in parliament therefore allowing it to govern without its usual coalition partner, the conservative Christian Democratic Party (ÖVP), but it was also the first time in history that a German-speaking country was to be governed by a Jew.⁶¹⁶ Thus, at the beginning of the 1970s, Israel and Austria were both being ruled by socialists of Jewish origin: in Israel, the Labor Party under the leadership of Golda Meir was in power; in Austria, the Social Democratic Party formed a minority coalition under Bruno Kreisky. Moreover, by the time Kreisky became Chancellor of Austria in 1970, the two heads of state were already familiar with one another. Both had met several times at the UN in their previous capacity as foreign ministers, and both were active participants in the Socialist International.⁶¹⁷ Meir – as the Austrian ambassador noted with satisfaction in 1970 – harbored a special appreciation of Kreisky.⁶¹⁸

In addition to the close personal links between the two heads of state, Austria had also become of strategic importance to Israel as a major transit hub for Eastern Jewish emigrants. Since 1965, Austria, the neutral country between East and West with its proximity to the Iron Curtain, served as an important stop for Eastern European and Soviet Jews on their way to Israel. As a result of Israel's break with the Soviet Union following the Six-Day War, emigration through Austria surged. In order to facilitate immigration, the Jewish Agency set up special transit camps, one of the most important of which was situated in Schönau castle


⁶¹⁶ Secher 1994, 10.

⁶¹⁷ Meir 1975, 349.

⁶¹⁸ Agstner to Foreign Ministry: "Jahrbuch der israelischen Regierung 1969/70; Beurteilung der Beziehungen zu Österreich und anderen europäischen Staaten", Tel Aviv, 26 May 1970. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 86741/6_70.

near Vienna. Until 1973, 164.638 Jewish immigrants from the communist bloc⁶¹⁹ passed through Austria, 70.000 of which were channelled through the Schönau camp.⁶²⁰

However, at the same time as the Jewish migration via Austria peaked, Palestinian/Arab terror directed against Israel and its Western supporters had also already reached Europe and Austria's border: On 5 September 1972, the Palestinian terrorist group "Black September" attacked the Israeli Olympic team at Munich's summer Olympics, killing all hostages in a failed rescue attempt.⁶²¹ While the shock of the attack in Munich still loomed large, anonymous messages warning of an imminent attack began to threaten the Austrian



government (See figure 6: "Anonymous message warning of imminent Palestinian terror").⁶²² Their target was the Jewish transit camp at Schönau.

And indeed, on 28 September 1973, the day of the Jewish New Year, Austria, for the first but not the last time,⁶²³ became the stage for Middle

Eastern terrorism. Two Palestinian terrorists entered a train at the Lower Austrian town of Marchegg, taking three Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union as well as an Austrian border guard as hostages. In broken English, the terrorists declared that their attack was directed against the Jewish immigration to Israel. The two terrorists managed to escape with

⁶¹⁹ 72.078 of these came from the Soviet Union, and the rest from Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia (Riegler 2011, 114).

⁶²⁰ Riegler 2011, 114.

⁶²¹ Deutschkron 1983, 356-358.

⁶²² Ambassador Backes to Foreign Ministry: "Anonyme Warnung vor palästinensischen Terroraktionen in Österreich", Beirut, 8 February 1973. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2/7, Gz. 30378/6_73.

⁶²³ Arab/Palestinian terror groups were also behind the 1975 OPEC hostage crisis. In 1981, the Al-Assifa group under Abu Nidal's leadership murdered the President of the Austrian-Israeli Society Heinz Nittel in Vienna and a few months later attacked Vienna's synagogue "Stadttempel". In 1985, that same group launched an attack on the El-Al Terminal at Vienna Schwechat Airport. Measured in terms of both, intensity and number of victims, Middle Eastern terrorism thus took on the most virulent form of all terrorist activities launched in the Second Republic of Austria (Riegler 2011, 32-33).

the hostages to Vienna Schwechat Airport where they requested the closure of the transit camp Schönau and free passage to the Middle East. Chancellor Kreisky – in close consultation with the Egyptian, Libyan, Lebanese and Iraqi ambassadors as well as psychological counsellors – began to negotiate with the terrorists. After 13 hours of long and bitter bargaining, Kreisky agreed to the terrorists' requests and closed Schönau in order to save the hostages' lives.⁶²⁴

Even though the Austrian hostage drama ended bloodlessly – unlike the one in Munich a year before – Kreisky's decision triggered a storm of international critique. Surrender to terrorists, rather than the closure of Schönau, was the core of these criticisms.⁶²⁵ According to Israel, Austria had created a dangerous precedent that would only unleash new terror attacks. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was shocked:

To our astonishment and horror, the Austrian cabinet, led by Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, gave in at once, to the tune of loud rejoicing both from the gunmen ... and from the entire Arab press, which could hardly contain its glee at what it called "the successful commando blow to the movement of Russian Jews emigrating to Israel."⁶²⁶

With the aim of convincing Kreisky to immediately reverse his decision, Golda Meir – on her way back from a meeting in Strasbourg – stopped in Vienna. The meeting in Kreisky's office, however, soon escalated in a verbal exchange between the two heads of states that

⁶²⁴ For more on the terrorist attack, see: Riegler 2011, 119. Röhrlich 2009, 303. Petritsch 2010, 216.

⁶²⁵ US President Richard Nixon for instance stated at a press conference on 3 October 1973: "(...) Austria is in the eye of a hurricane (...). (...) we simply cannot have governments, small or large, give in to international blackmail by terrorist groups." (Nixon 1973, quoted in: Riegler 2011, 177).

For more on the international critique triggered in the wake of Kreisky's Schönau decision, see: Riegler 2011, 175. Röhrlich 2009, 304.

⁶²⁶ Meir 1975, 349.

triggered an outright bilateral crisis.⁶²⁷ Against all expectations, and despite their mutually shared Socialist and Jewish backgrounds, Meir and Kreisky were unable to find common ground, either politically or personally. Meir's attempts to invoke a quasi-Jewish solidarity between herself, Israel, and Kreisky was entirely unsuccessful: "I am Chancellor of Austria, not of the Jewish state, and I therefore conduct politics for Austria. You cannot expect that I do something that is good for the interests of Israel and bad for the interests of Austria."⁶²⁸ In his role as Austrian Chancellor, Kreisky thus decidedly rejected Meir's Zionist assertion expecting unconditional help from Diaspora Jews while ignoring their sense of loyalty to their home country. It is exactly this notion of Israel's centrality to Jewish identity that often ideologically divides Zionist and Diaspora Jews.⁶²⁹ In Meir and Kreisky's case, this ideological gap was looming too large to be bridged: After concluding that they belonged to "two different worlds"⁶³⁰, Meir stormed out of Kreisky's office and left Austria angry. Upon arrival at Ben-Gurion Airport, Meir announced in front of a group of journalists: "I think the best way of summing up the nature of my meeting with Chancellor Kreisky is to say this: he didn't even offer me a glass of water."⁶³¹ This was of course only a way of saying that she could not convince Kreisky to reverse his decision.⁶³² For the time being, Israel seemed to have only one enemy: the traitor Bruno Kreisky.⁶³³

Meanwhile, in Austria, Israeli and international criticism was perceived as an unjustified attack on the country, as well as an interference with Austria's sovereignty. It thus fostered

⁶²⁷ For more on the meeting between Meir and Kreisky in Vienna, see: Thalberg 1984, 419. Kreisky and Berg 2000, 473. British journalist David Yallop interview with Bruno Kreisky. Quoted in Riegler 2011, 180. Avner 2010, 222-223.

⁶²⁸ Kreisky 1973 to *Jedioth Acharonoth* journalist Jeshajahu Ben Porath, quoted in: Petritsch 2010, 221. Translated by the author from the German original: „*Ich bin Bundeskanzler nicht des Judenstaates, sondern Österreichs, und ich führe eine Politik, die eine österreichische Politik ist. Sie können von mir nicht erwarten, dass ich irgend etwas mache, das gut ist für die Interessen Israels, aber schlecht für die Interessen Österreichs.*“

⁶²⁹ Safran 2012, 6&25. Dror 2012, 88. Smith 1995, 17.

⁶³⁰ Avner 2010, 223.

⁶³¹ Avner 2010, 224.

⁶³² Kreisky and Berg 2000, 472. Riegler 2011, 182–3. Petritsch 2010, 219.

⁶³³ On detailed accounts of the Israeli critique, see, for instance: Thalberg 1984, 419. Riegler 2011, 176. Embacher and Reiter 1998, 170.

strong patriotic feelings of “we, the Austrians” against “the rest of the world”.⁶³⁴ Uniting the political spectrum, the Austrian public came to the defence of their chancellor. While the left was mainly proud of Kreisky’s humanitarian decision to save the hostages’ lives and at the same time glad that his Jewish roots gave him the power to stand up to the Israelis’ harsh anti-terror approaches,⁶³⁵ right-wing Austrians began to regard Kreisky as their saviour from what was perceived as a “Jewish burden”.⁶³⁶ That it would be exactly a Jewish chancellor who ended the pro-Israeli policies of previous governments furthermore particularly impressed the “Mr. Karls” among Austria’s population,⁶³⁷ leading to wide-spread avowals of sympathy for Kreisky:⁶³⁸ “Now Kreisky has proven himself to be an Austrian rather than a Jew.”⁶³⁹

In standing up to Israel’s demands in the course of the Schönau crisis, Kreisky promoted an Austrian patriotism that was fully complicit with the national victim narrative. Austria, after all, had no obligations to Israel whatsoever. Kreisky’s Jewishness gave the narrative even more credibility, as he quintessentially embodied the Austrian national victimhood in his personal biography. In rejecting all Israeli doubts, criticism and accusations of Austria in the course of the Schönau debate, Kreisky further not only enhanced the victim narrative’s

⁶³⁴ Reiter 2001, 257.

⁶³⁵ See, for instance: *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Der Kommentar”, by Günter Traxler, 2 October 1973.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Es ging um Menschen”, by Manfred Scheuch, 30 September 1973.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Meinungen der AZ Leser”: „Neonazi Kreisky“, by Rolf Wimmer, 6 October 1973.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Interessen Österreichs verteidigt“, 6 October 1973.

⁶³⁶ See, for instance:

Volksstimme, “Alte Schuld“, by Hans Wolker, quoted in: *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Spaltung durch Österreichs Presse“, 2 October 1973.

Volksstimme, 2 October 1973, quoted in: Niederleitner 2001, 138.

⁶³⁷ *Der Spiegel*, “Herr, öffne das Herz Österreichs“, 8 October 1973.

⁶³⁸ While antisemitic attitudes certainly came to the forefront in the course of the Schönau crisis, it is fair to say that it was first and foremost the humanitarian argument that provided Kreisky’s decision to close Schönau with the broad public support it received from within Austria. In fact, the analysis of 2000 “Thank you” letters addressed to Kreisky revealed that 90% of the writers were indeed grateful to Kreisky for saving the lives of the hostages, while only 10% indicated that their gratitude stemmed from what they perceived as a liberation from the “Jewish burden” (See collected letters in: Kreisky Archiv, IV. 8, Schönau, Box 25. For secondary sources, see: Embacher and Reiter 1998, 166. Röhrlich 2009, 306).

⁶³⁹ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 October 1973. Quoted in: Niederleitner 2001, 199.

In German original: “Jetzt hat Kreisky bewiesen, dass er ein Österreicher und kein Jude ist.“

domestic legitimacy, but also its international credibility: Austria's Jewish chancellor became a strong international signal that Austria was indeed innocent.⁶⁴⁰

Only a week after the Schönau hostage crisis, on 6 October 1973, the Yom Kippur War broke out, bringing the brief but bitter Austro-Israeli debate to an abrupt end. The camp in Schönau was closed on 12 December 1973, but Austria - as Kreisky had promised - continued the Jewish transit via Austrian territory without interruption. Instead of the Jewish Agency's camp at Schönau castle, the Austrian Red Cross set up a camp in Wöllersdorf. In 1974 alone, 20.000 Jewish migrants passed through Austria – a fact that was appreciated by Israel only retrospectively.⁶⁴¹

Kreisky's Schönau decision nevertheless once and for all revealed that he – against the expectations of Israelis and many Austrians – would stand up against Israeli criticism and Jewish demands. In doing so, he showed himself fully aligned with Austria's victim myth. Kreisky thus not only acted in accordance with Austria's diplomacy of innocence vis-à-vis Israel, but he also went on to correct the pro-Israeli course of the previous government. His personal biography provided him with the specific credibility to rebuff all accusations of antisemitism when doing so. Unlike other Austrian heads of state, Kreisky could therefore openly stand up against Israel and turn Austria's attention more and more to the Arab world.

3.2. Shifting from a pro-Israeli to a Pro-Palestinian stance

Bruno Kreisky's unprecedented interest and engagement in the Middle East can only be understood in the context of the international environment of the 1970s. Unlike previous conservative governments, Kreisky interpreted Austria's neutrality in a proactive rather than

⁶⁴⁰ When Kreisky was elected into power, *The New York Times*, for instance, hailed Austria's vote as a sign that antisemitism had ceased to be a decisive factor in Austrian politics (Secher 1994, 18).

⁶⁴¹ Riegler 2011, 177-178.

a passive way (“*aktive Neutralitätspolitik*”). Irrespective of Austria’s size, in Kreisky’s view the country’s security between the two blocs was best guaranteed by acting preventively to mitigate global conflicts. In the context of the Cold War, this meant to proactively contribute to a détente between the two superpowers. Forming one of the major trouble spots of the time, the Arab-Israeli conflict bore the potential of inviting superpower engagement in Europe’s neighbourhood and as such constituted a major target for Kreisky to test his new foreign policy approach.⁶⁴² That it was specifically Kreisky who overcame the traditional eurocentrism and one-sided transatlantic focus of previous Austrian governments can mainly be explained by Kreisky’s social democratic engagement in the Socialist International.⁶⁴³ It was this international forum that gave Kreisky the opportunity to be involved with world affairs beyond his role as Austrian chancellor, and turned him into one of the leading Socialist figures of the time.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the Socialist International was closely associated with and supportive of Israel.⁶⁴⁴ In fact, the Jewish state with its kibbutz movement and strong Labour Parties⁶⁴⁵ was regarded as an important promoter of international Socialism in the Middle East and beyond.⁶⁴⁶ However, as Kreisky noted in his memoirs, as well as ideological affinities creating close links between Israel and European social democrats, the past also played a role: “European democracies somehow felt responsible for the terrible faith of European Jews. They all had the feeling that they were guilty in not having hindered Hitler. This caused a certain obligation of conscience when it came to Israel.”⁶⁴⁷

⁶⁴² Riegler 2011, 55&71.

⁶⁴³ Gehler 2005, 1003.

⁶⁴⁴ Socialist International document: “The Socialist International: Background information to the forthcoming Socialist International Bureau meeting in Oslo, June 12-13, 1980”, Kreisky Archiv, VII. 4, Nahost, Box 17.

⁶⁴⁵ The Labour Zionist movement consisted of several parties, which unified only in 1969/70.

⁶⁴⁶ Röhrlich 2009, 315.

⁶⁴⁷ Rathkolb 2007, 435.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Die europäischen Demokratien haben sich irgendwie verantwortlich gefühlt für das furchtbare Schicksal der europäischen Juden, denn sie alle hatten das Gefühl,*

While the Socialist International's contacts with Israel were manifold, the organization barely had any links with Arab states. It was only with the onset of the Yom Kippur War and the first oil crisis in autumn of 1973 that this situation changed significantly. Kreisky hereby played a vanguard role in the Socialist International's attempt to reach out to the Arab world. This embrace of the Arab world in the wake of the oil crisis was also completely in line with Kreisky's socialist beliefs. As he noted in his memoirs, the first oil crisis formed the textbook example for Marxist thinking, as political attitudes within Europe only changed once profound changes to the economic environment were under way. It was as such only logical that, under the threat of the oil weapon, European countries moved their support away from Israel and to the Arab/Palestinian cause.⁶⁴⁸

With this new incentive structure in place, the first meeting of the Socialist International following the Yom Kippur War in November marked a historic watershed. Western European social democratic parties had begun to turn their attention to the Arab world, leaving Israel in a forever altered international environment. Little surprisingly, Golda Meir, who was present at the meeting, showed herself fully disappointed into her fellow comrades: "Arabs are using oil as a political weapon," and "we are paying the price to keep Europe, the USA and Japan supplied with oil (...)," stated the Israeli Prime Minister in London: "The legitimate rights of the Palestinians which the nine EC countries call upon imply the destruction of Israel – I hope that they do not know what they are talking about."⁶⁴⁹ Western Europeans, however, by now disagreed with Meir, first and foremost Austria's Chancellor Bruno Kreisky: "I do not think that when we are talking with the Palestinians, Israel will be

sie wären schuld, Hitler nicht verhindert zu haben. Dieser Umstand hat diese Gewissensverpflichtung gegenüber Israel begründet."

⁶⁴⁸ Rathkolb 2007, 441.

⁶⁴⁹ Golda Meir at the Socialist International meeting in London, 11 November 1973, quoted in: Thalberg 1984, 303.

lost.⁶⁵⁰ Clearly more cautious than Kreisky, also Willy Brandt began to voice his opinion: Western Europe had always supported Israel; however, the Palestinian problem has to be solved too. He added: „Our hearts are not neutral. But an opportunity for peace is now arising that we – and also the Israeli Labour Party - have to take up (...).”⁶⁵¹

Actions soon followed words. In order to investigate possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Socialist International decided to dispatch three fact-finding missions to the Middle East, which took place in 1974, 1975 and 1976. Bruno Kreisky became the head of these missions and in this capacity personally and frequently travelled to the region in order to explore Arab readiness for peace.⁶⁵² In his final report submitted in 1977, Kreisky concluded that the Arab states were willing to recognize Israel’s right to exist within the 1967 borders, and the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza formed the ultimate solution to the conflict: “The Palestinian question is the linchpin of the Middle East conflict. Without the Palestinians, there will be no peace in the region”, wrote Kreisky in the report.⁶⁵³ With such a conclusion, Kreisky was far ahead of his time: At the beginning of the 1970s, Palestinians were not yet regarded as a separate people but rather as Arabs or Jordanians by a majority of Israelis. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir insisted – like many others of her generation – that “there is no such thing as a Palestinian,”⁶⁵⁴ and the Israeli government frequently spoke of “terrorists” with later Prime

⁶⁵⁰ Kreisky at the Socialist International meeting in London, 11 November 1973, quoted in: Thalberg 1984, 303.

The German original: *“Ich glaube nicht, dass, wenn man mit den Palästinensern redet, Israel verloren ist.”*

⁶⁵¹ Willy Brandt at the Socialist International meeting in London, 11 November 1973, quoted in: Thalberg 1984, 303.

Translated by the author from the German original: *“Wir kennen keine Neutralität der Herzen. Aber es gibt jetzt eine Friedenschance, die man ergreifen muss – auch die Israeli Labour Party (...).”*

⁶⁵² See: Bruno Kreisky, Final Report of the Socialist International Fact-Finding Mission to the Middle East, London 1977. Kreisky Archiv, VII. 4, Nahost, Box 17.

Secondary Sources: Petritsch 2010, 231. Röhrlich 2009, 317.

⁶⁵³ Bruno Kreisky, Final Report of the Socialist International Fact-Finding Mission to the Middle East, London 1977. Kreisky Archiv, VII. 4, Nahost, Box 17.

⁶⁵⁴ Claybourne 2003, 54.

Ministers Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir at the end of the 1970s, beginning of the 1980s still referring to the PLO as a “murder organization”.⁶⁵⁵ It was in this international environment that Bruno Kreisky insisted on the recognition of Palestinians as people and, as a consequence, also on their right to national self-determination: “It is my personal conviction that a just solution looks like this: There will be a free, democratic Israeli state and a free Palestinian state, while both states are going to gradually approach one another,”⁶⁵⁶ emphasized Kreisky in his memoirs.

In the end, Kreisky’s frequent missions to the Middle East not only formed his vanguard views on the Arab-Israeli conflict and his consequential tireless effort for Palestinian rights and statehood, but also helped both the Socialist International and Austria to build stronger and lasting political and economic ties with Arab countries: “I have created a vivid connection which especially in the economic area has proven to be excellent. (...) Today, Austrians over there are regarded as friends.”⁶⁵⁷ In accordance with his socialist beliefs, Kreisky had thus immediately understood the importance of the economic interdependence between Arab oil states and Western industrial societies. If Arab oil formed the material basis for Europe’s economic growth, a parallel political rapprochement between the two regions had to happen. Besides these rational, material considerations, Kreisky nevertheless always mentioned his very own normative mind-set as a motivation for his increasing support of the Palestinian cause. Grounding his norms in a socialist belief system with its

⁶⁵⁵ See, for instance: Thalberg 1984, 313. Deutschkron 1983, 412.

Primary sources: *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Kreisky zu Israel-Protest: Gespräch diente dem Frieden“, 10 July 1979. Austrian Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Minister: “Beziehungen BRD-Israel; offizieller Besuch des israelischen Außenministers Yitzhak Schamir in Bonn am 17. und 18. November 1980“, Bonn, 25 November 1980. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.18.11/1-II4a_80.

⁶⁵⁶ Rathkolb 2007, 454.

In German original: “*Mir persönlich scheint eine Lösung am gerechtesten, die etwa so aussieht: Dass es einen freien demokratischen israelischen Staat und einen freien palästinensischen Staat gibt, wobei sich beide Staaten in einem gewissen Prozess aneinander annähern.*“

⁶⁵⁷ Rathkolb 2007, 442-443.

In German original: “*Ich habe also eine lebendige Verbindung geschaffen, die sich besonders in wirtschaftlichen Dingen als hervorragend erweist. (...) Heute gelten die Österreicher dort als Freunde.*“

inherit ethical commitment to the oppressed, he also derived his sympathy with the Palestinians from his personal biography:

I myself have been a political refugee, a, if you want, displaced person, and I therefore have a special sensitivity for the problem of displacement, regardless of whether the displaced are coming from Europe or from anywhere else in the world. That is the reason why I have always and already from early on voiced my sympathy for the displaced Palestinians.⁶⁵⁸

While adding this normative/ethical explanation stemming from his personal victimhood to explaining his sympathies with other victims, Kreisky, however, was careful to distance himself from yet another victim group that could arguably even more obviously invoke his support, i.e. those who were persecuted on the basis of their race:

I myself never understood my emigration as a consequence of my Jewish roots. I would have been persecuted anyway as I had been already persecuted for political reasons in previous years. Therefore, I am lacking the experiences of Jews persecuted based on their race.⁶⁵⁹

Kreisky's tireless effort for the Palestinian cause hence not only stemmed from a rational-material cost-benefit calculus regarding oil and world peace, but was motivated also by his own personal experience as a refugee in Swedish exile. That Kreisky between 1938 and 1945 indeed never considered himself a Jewish refugee, but rather a political refugee who was

⁶⁵⁸ Rathkolb 2007, 436-437.

In German original: *"Ich selber war ein politischer Flüchtling, ein, wenn man so will, Vertriebener, und ich habe ein spezielles Sensorium für das Problem der Vertriebenen, ob es sich nun um Vertriebene aus Europa handelt oder Vertriebene irgendwo in der Welt. Das ist der Grund dafür, dass ich schon sehr früh meine Sympathie für die vertriebenen Palästinenser zum Ausdruck gebracht habe."*

⁶⁵⁹ Rathkolb 2007, 437.

In German original: *"Ich selbst habe meine Emigration nie als Folge meiner jüdischen Herkunft verstanden, ich wäre so oder so verfolgt worden, wie ich ja auch schon vier Jahre zuvor aus politischen Gründen verfolgt worden bin. Mir fehlen also viele Erlebnis-inhalte, die den rassistisch verfolgten Juden eigen sind."*

prevented temporarily from pursuing his political mission due to his “Jewish origins”,⁶⁶⁰ can only be explained in the specifically Austrian historic context from which his attitude emerged. After the Austro-Fascist seizure of power in 1934, socialists formed bonds with national socialists against their common enemy, the Christian conservative authoritarian government under Engelbert Dollfuss and later Kurt Schuschnigg. For the young socialist Kreisky, the main enemy was thus Austro-Fascism and not National Socialism, and as such, his hatred for Dollfuss was greater than his fear of Hitler. It happened under these circumstances that Kreisky considered himself as only a political rather than a racial refugee during his wartime exile, and his Austrian patriotism remained untouched despite the *Anschluss* of 1938.⁶⁶¹ Needless to say, such a portrayal also fitted well into the logic of Austria’s post-war victim narrative. With the help of his biography and a deliberate emphasis on his persecution for political rather than racial reasons, Kreisky thus invoked the “solidarity between two victims” logic that was inherit in Austria’s narrative, however, this time with respect to a different victim group: The Palestinians rather than the Israelis.

3.3. Arafat in Vienna

Kreisky’s frequent visits to the Middle East not only strengthened his support for the Palestinian cause, but also provided him with the opportunity to develop personal friendships with Arab leaders like Anwar Sadat and Yasser Arafat.⁶⁶² While Arafat, unlike Sadat, had left no significant first impression on Kreisky during their meeting in Cairo in March 1974,⁶⁶³ the two later approached one another both politically and personally in a frequent

⁶⁶⁰ Röhrlich 2009, 363.

⁶⁶¹ See Secher 1994, 11-14.

For more on Kreisky’s Swedish exile during World War II, see: Rathkolb 2007, 83, 141, 201, 216 & 334. Petritsch 2010, 43&83. Röhrlich 2009, 363-367.

⁶⁶² The close personal ties between Kreisky and Arab leaders also led to a continuation of meetings in Austria: In February 1975, for instance, Kreisky hosted Sadat and US President Ford in Salzburg, in 1978, Sadat, Peres and Brandt convened in Austria (Röhrlich 2009, 321).

⁶⁶³ Petritsch 2010, 229. Thalberg 1984, 305.

exchange of letters between 1978 and 1990.⁶⁶⁴ In these letters, Kreisky and Arafat aimed to approximate their political positions in the jointly stated hope of “contributing to a just peace in the Middle East”.⁶⁶⁵ Throughout, Kreisky always made a deliberate effort to render Arafat’s political agenda more moderate and pragmatic: “You have, first of all, told the world what you refuse, but I feel that the time has come to tell the world what you constructively propose.”⁶⁶⁶ Throughout his time as chancellor, Kreisky always remained convinced that the fight against Palestinian terror could only be won via an objective and factual discussion with the Palestinian leader.⁶⁶⁷ In this spirit, Kreisky suggested a personal meeting with Arafat in Vienna in the summer of 1979.⁶⁶⁸ It was the first time ever that a Western head of state would receive the Chairman of the PLO in a Western European country. Immediately grasping the importance of such an opportunity for the diplomatic success of the PLO, Arafat accepted:

Dear Chancellor Kreisky:

Thank you very much for the invitation to visit you in Vienna (...).

(...) I was deeply moved by the invitation and the accompanying message of goodwill which was an eloquent testimony to the deep bonds of friendship which bind us together. Your great wisdom, deep sense of justice and immense reserve of moral courage, have endeared you not only to me, but also to the Palestinian people and won you their love and admiration.⁶⁶⁹

The Vienna meeting took place between 6 and 8 July 1979. Kreisky – who out of security concerns had kept the meeting secret beforehand - served as the official host and initiator.

⁶⁶⁴ Find the collected letters between Kreisky and Arafat in: Kreisky Archiv, IX. 3, Prominenten-Korrespondenz, Box 2.

⁶⁶⁵ Kreisky to Arafat, Vienna, 20 June 1979. Kreisky Archiv, IX. 3, Prominenten-Korrespondenz, Box 2.

⁶⁶⁶ Kreisky to Arafat, Vienna, 4 May 1979. Kreisky Archiv, IX. 3, Prominenten-Korrespondenz, Box 2.

⁶⁶⁷ Petritsch 2010, 229.

⁶⁶⁸ Arafat to Kreisky, Beirut, 19 May 1979. Kreisky Archiv, IX. 3, Prominenten-Korrespondenz, Box 2.

⁶⁶⁹ Arafat to Kreisky, Beirut, 10 June 1979. Kreisky Archiv, IX. 3, Prominenten-Korrespondenz, Box 2.

The invitation was however sent in his position as the Vice President of the Socialist International and the Chairman of its member party SPÖ rather than in his official role as Austrian Chancellor. The Socialist International's proactive engagement to foster peace and end oppression world-wide thus provided the official motivation for the meeting. In such a view, the outreach to the stateless Palestinians was only the logical next step.⁶⁷⁰

For the purpose of obtaining “an exhaustive review of the situation”⁶⁷¹ in the Middle East, Kreisky and Arafat discussed matters for more than 13 hours. The Chairman of the Socialist International and former Chancellor of West Germany as well as a close friend of Kreisky's, Willy Brandt, joined them for parts of the meeting, and an estimated 5 hours of the Vienna discussions were held with Brandt.⁶⁷² While Brandt deliberately kept himself in the background, the Vienna talks nevertheless ended with a joint public press conference. Brandt, Kreisky and Arafat announced that they had reached agreement that the Palestinian problem formed the core of the Middle East conflict and that without its solution no fair and satisfying settlement could be reached for the region. While Kreisky went on to acknowledge Yassir Arafat as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians and the sole leader of the PLO, Brandt, with an eye to Israel, was clearly more cautious in his statements. In anticipation of Israeli criticism, he rather added that no one had the right to question his own or Kreisky's loyalty with their Israeli friends just because of their meeting with Arafat.⁶⁷³

Arafat, on the other hand, openly showed his gratitude to Kreisky and Brandt. He called them two “important statesmen”, who he admired – as he underlined - not only due to their

⁶⁷⁰ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Brandt-Kreisky nach den Gesprächen mit Arafat: ,Die Vernichtung Israels ist nicht das Ziel der PLO“, 9 July 1979.

Socialist International document: “The Socialist International: Background information to the forthcoming Socialist International Bureau meeting in Oslo, June 12-13, 1980“, Kreisky Archiv, VII. 4, Nahost, Box 17.

⁶⁷¹ Kreisky to Arafat, Vienna, 20 June 1979. Kreisky Archiv, IX. 3, Prominenten-Korrespondenz, Box 2.

⁶⁷² Kreisky to Arafat, Vienna, 20 June 1979. Kreisky Archiv, IX. 3, Prominenten-Korrespondenz, Box 2. Röhrlich 2009, 328.

⁶⁷³ Pressecommuniqué, Vienna, 8 July 1979. Kreisky Archiv, IX. 3, Prominenten-Korrespondenz, Box 2.

Arbeiter Zeitung, “Brandt-Kreisky nach den Gesprächen mit Arafat: ,Die Vernichtung Israels ist nicht das Ziel der PLO“, 9 July 1979.

constructive role in today's world politics, but also because of their long-standing reputation as independent and democratic fighters who chose exile and imprisonment instead of surrendering to the Nazi regime.⁶⁷⁴ Interestingly, Kreisky, but not Brandt – the two first met during their exile in Scandinavia – responded by invoking his personal past as an “Austrian refugee” in Sweden:

Anyone who has ever been in a situation like I have been, in a foreign country together with ten thousand of Austrians, speaking for a country which did not exist anymore on the map, but its people existed, such a refugee as I have been once will always have a special understanding for similar causes. And I also feel responsible myself for my own past, and as such I am doing more than the usual with regards to this question.⁶⁷⁵

Hence, Kreisky invoked the “solidarity between two victims” during the press conference with Arafat and Brandt that was inherent in the logic of Austria's national narrative in order to justify his own and Austria's support for the Palestinian cause. Kreisky was again careful to identify the sources of his victim status as distinctively “Austrian” stemming from his political and patriotic views rather than from his Jewishness.

⁶⁷⁴ Brandt and Kreisky met during their time in exile in Sweden. Both political refugees, they developed a close, life-long personal friendship and held similar political views: “Both of us were political refugees, and both of us later became Chancellors of defeated countries” (In German: “*Beide waren wir durch die politischen Umstände vertrieben, und beide wurden wir später zu den höchsten Ämtern berufen, zu Kanzlern besiegter Länder.*”), wrote Kreisky in his memoirs (Rathkolb 2007, 334).

⁶⁷⁵ Kreisky at the press conference in Vienna, 12 July 1979, quoted in: Riegler 2011, 59.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Wer einmal so wie ich im Ausland war zusammen mit Zehntausenden Österreichern und für ein Land gesprochen hat, das es aber nicht mehr auf der Landkarte gegeben hat, dessen Menschen aber existiert haben, ein solcher Flüchtling wie ich es einmal war, der hat ein besonderes Verständnis für Bewegungen ähnlicher Art. Und ich fühle mich auch meiner eigenen Vergangenheit verantwortlich, und das ist mit ein Grund, warum ich in dieser Frage vielleicht ein bisschen mehr tue als üblich.*”

While the Arab world and the Palestinians celebrated the Vienna meeting as a “new victory of the PLO in Western Europe”⁶⁷⁶ and “a landmark in their struggle for the redemption of their lost national rights”,⁶⁷⁷ Israel was gripped by panic at the mere sight of Brandt, Kreisky and Arafat in Vienna, not to speak of the symbolic gestures that accompanied the meeting, amongst them first and foremost the infamous hug between Kreisky and Arafat at Vienna’s airport.⁶⁷⁸



(See figure 7: “Kreisky and Arafat hug at Vienna airport”). In the Knesset, Prime Minister Menachem Begin called Arafat “the boss of murderers” and

Kreisky a “Jewish traitor”.⁶⁷⁹ Opposition party leader Shimon Peres also voiced his outrage, however, in a less harsh but still very serious tone:

In our judgement Arafat did not change, but his position was improved when two very important leaders of our age like Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky are receiving Arafat in open – Arafat who is still in charge of the terror, Arafat who still claims the destruction of Israel.⁶⁸⁰

As a consequence, the Knesset – in the presence of Israel’s President Yitzhak Navon – issued a sharp condemnation of the Vienna meeting with a majority of 82 votes in favour of the resolution, and only 5 dissenting voices. It was officially declared that the stated goal of the PLO which was called a “gang of murderers” was the destruction of the State of Israel. As a consequence, the Knesset sharply condemned the invitation and official reception of the

⁶⁷⁶ Ghadafi, quoted in: Austrian Ambassador Franz Parak to Foreign Ministry: “ARAFAT Gespräche in Wien; Syrische Haltung und Erklärungen von Oberst Ghadafi in Damaskus“, Damascus, 13 July 1979. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.57/12-II.4a_79.

⁶⁷⁷ Arafat to Kreisky, Beirut, 25 July 1979. Kreisky Archiv, IX. 3, Prominenten-Korrespondenz, Box 2.

⁶⁷⁸ *Jerusalem Post*, “Talking to Assassins”, by Meir Merhav, 20 July 1979. ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.57/27-II.4a_79.

⁶⁷⁹ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Kreisky zu Israel-Protest: Gespräch diente dem Frieden“, 10 July 1979.

⁶⁸⁰ Shimon Peres at the Socialist International’s Party Leaders Conference in Sweden, 20-21 July 1979. Quoted in: Röhrlich 2009, 328.

“chief of the organization of murderers” by the Austrian Chancellor.⁶⁸¹ The Israeli Ambassador to Austria, Jacob Doron, was called back to Jerusalem for consultations, and the Israeli Foreign Ministry sent a verbal note of similar content to the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv: Israel without doubt regarded the meeting as a “provocative act that – with ostentation - was directed against the state of Israel and the Jewish people“.⁶⁸² In addition, demonstrations were reported in front of the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv and its exterior walls were besmeared with the letters PLO.⁶⁸³

The Austrian Embassy as well as Foreign Ministry in Vienna, however, immediately and decisively rejected Israeli protests.⁶⁸⁴ Arafat had been invited to Austria on behalf of the Socialist International, not on behalf of the Republic of Austria. The Federal Chancellery added that in any case, Israel had no right to dictate who meets whom in Vienna. Official Austria further showed itself confident that Israel would not wish a worsening of diplomatic relations with Austria, reminding Israel of the many benefits that it received from the bilateral relationship. The question about why Arafat had been received in the Office of the Federal Chancellor was further played down as an irrelevant “icing on the cake” by “fusspots” (*“I-Tüpfel-Reiterrei”*).⁶⁸⁵ Kreisky’s personal response to what in Austrian newspapers was reported as Begin’s outrages (*“Ausfälle”*) was a lapidary “that doesn’t bother me” (*“Das stört mich nicht”*).⁶⁸⁶ He furthermore insisted that the talks only served peace efforts in the Middle East and that such peace can only be obtained via direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Remaining committed to his own impression

⁶⁸¹ *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Kreisky zu Israel-Protest: Gespräch diente dem Frieden“, 10 July 1979.

⁶⁸² *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Israel verurteilt Arafat-Treffen“, 9 July 1979.

In German original: “(...) *demonstrative Akt gegen den Staat Israel und das jüdische Volk.*”

⁶⁸³ Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv, Peter Wilfling to Foreign Ministry: “Besuch ARAFATs in Wien; israel. Reaktionen,“ Tel Aviv, 17 July 1979. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.57/13-II.4a_79.

⁶⁸⁴ Untitled and undated, internal Foreign Ministry document on the Israeli protests, Vienna. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.57/13-II.4a_79.

⁶⁸⁵ *Die Presse*, “Arafats Wien-Besuch barg Sprengstoff. Geheime Zusagen des PLO-Chefs?“, 10 July 1979.

⁶⁸⁶ *Die Presse*, “Kreisky zu Begins Ausfällen: “Das stört mich nicht!“, 11 July 1979.

of Arafat and the PLO, he urged the Israelis to acknowledge the realities, and recommended his comrade Peres to better inform himself about Arafat's real positions.⁶⁸⁷

While official Israel was united in condemning the Vienna meeting,⁶⁸⁸ the reactions from the Israeli public were even harsher:

We cannot think of anything more abhorrent than to see the assimilated Jew Kreisky and the former Chancellor of Germany receiving with all honours the leader of terrorist gangs which aim at the liquidation of Israel. This disgust-provoking image will go down in world history as a disgrace.⁶⁸⁹

The Israeli public was simply furious. But, rather than criticising Austrian policies, Israel's anger focussed – just like in the case of Schönau - first and foremost on the persona of Kreisky. An “Open Letter to Bruno Kreisky” published in *Israel Nachrichten*, for instance, mocked Kreisky's “naive belief” in Palestinian/Arab readiness for peace and requested his solidarity with the Jews.⁶⁹⁰ Once the Israeli public had, however, clearly realized that all attempts to invoke a Jewish bond between themselves, Israel and Kreisky failed, Kreisky was diagnosed with a specific form of Jewish antisemitism and self-hatred that was commonly used for Jewish critics of Israel.⁶⁹¹ Israeli writer Ephraim Kishon, for instance, asked in his *Jerusalem Post* opinion piece titled “How odd of God”, whether a Jew can be

⁶⁸⁷ *Die Presse*, “Kreisky zu Begins Ausfällen: “Das stört mich nicht!”, 11 July 1979.

Die Presse, “Kreisky und Brandt würdigen PLO. Arafat für Europa “salonfähig”?, 9 July 1979.

Kronen Zeitung, “Begin: „Kreisky sprach mit Chef einer nazistischen Mörderbande””, 10 July 1979.

⁶⁸⁸ Only former President of the Jewish World Congress, Nahum Goldman, in an interview with Israeli radio called the Kreisky-Arafat meeting as a step forward (Source: *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Kreisky zu Israel-Protest: Gespräch diente dem Frieden”, 10 July 1979).



⁶⁸⁹ *Hazofeh*, 9 July 1979, quoted in: Jaeger 1994, 93.

In German: “Es lässt sich wohl kaum ein abscheulicherer Anblick denken, als den assimilierten Juden Kreisky und den ehemaligen Kanzler von Deutschland den Anführer der Terrorbanden, die sich die Liquidierung Israels zum Ziel gesetzt haben, mit allen Ehren empfangen zu sehen. Dieses ekelregende Bild wird als Schandbild in die Chronik der Weltgeschichte eingehen.”

⁶⁹⁰ *Israel Nachrichten*, “Offener Brief an Bruno Kreisky”, by Alice Schwarz, 20 July 1979. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.57/27-II.4a_79.

⁶⁹¹ See, for instance: *Israel Nachrichten*, “Der jüdische Hahnenkampf”, by Ephraim Kishon, 5 December 1975. Quoted in: Röhrlich 2009, 313.

antisemitic? “With a bit of good will he can,” answered Kishon his own question with reference to Kreisky, and added: “There’s no more poisonous brew than oil mixed with antisemitism.”⁶⁹² Cartoons published across several Israeli newspapers depicted Kreisky in a similar way: Kreisky, the traitor and hater of his own Jewish roots (See figure 8: “Cartoon of Kreisky, *Haaretz*”)⁶⁹³ suffered from an outright “Jewish self-hatred” (See figure 9: “Cartoon of Kreisky looking into a mirror”)⁶⁹⁴, in addition to becoming portrayed as the antisemite who was even compared to Hitler (See figure 10: “Cartoon: Bruno Kreisky in a relaxed moment”)⁶⁹⁵.



In an interview with *Yedioth*

Ahronoth, Kreisky attempted to calm the waters: “Arafat is different than in your imaginations: He is not the fanatic with a knife between his teeth.”⁶⁹⁶ Retaliating upon Israeli attacks directed at his person and his Jewish roots, he countered: “It is alarming that people in Israel who are not happy with my actions fall back into the style of the old Nazis.”⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹² *Jerusalem Post*, “How odd of God”, by Ephraim Kishon, 20 July 1979. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.57/27-II.4a_79.

⁶⁹³ *Haaretz*, Cartoon, 5 September 1978. Kreisky Archiv, VII. 1, Israel, Box 3.

⁶⁹⁴ *Maariv*, Cartoon by Zeev, 17 May 1985. Kreisky Archiv, VII. 1, Israel, Box 4.

⁶⁹⁵ *Jerusalem Post*, Cartoon Dry Bones: “Bruno Kreisky in a relaxed moment”, 4 September 1978. Kreisky Archiv, VII. 1, Israel, Box 3.

⁶⁹⁶ *Yedioth Ahronoth*, “Österreichs BK Bruno Kreisky in einem Interview für Yedioth Ahronoth: ‚Von der jetzigen Regierung in Israel erwarte ich nur Katastrophen‘“, by Edwin Eitan, 20 July 1979. Translated by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv, 23 July 1979. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.57/27-II.4a_79.

In German original: “Arafat ist ganz anders, als die Vorstellungen von einem Fanatiker mit dem Messer zwischen den Zähnen (...).“

⁶⁹⁷ *Yedioth Ahronoth*, “Österreichs BK Bruno Kreisky in einem Interview für Yedioth Ahronoth: ‚Von der jetzigen Regierung in Israel erwarte ich nur Katastrophen‘“, by Edwin Eitan, 20 July 1979. Translated by the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv, 23 July 1979. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.57/27-II.4a_79.

In German original: “Es beunruhigt mich, dass Leute an der Regierung in Israel, die mit meinen Aktionen nicht zufrieden sind, in den Stil der alten Nazi fallen.“

After the meeting in Vienna, the bilateral relationship between Austria and Israel was clearly more strained.⁶⁹⁸ The renewed controversy triggered between Austria and Israel in the wake of the meeting demonstrated that not only pragmatic political reasons but the specific interpretation of Austria's Nazi past determined Kreisky's actions, giving him the motivation and credibility to direct talks with Arafat, and ultimately also allowing him to again counter and reject Israel's criticism. In clear contrast, Willy Brandt - despite being the President of the Socialist International - throughout the meeting with Arafat remained discretely in the background. He was present only for part of the event and his statements regarding the Palestinian cause always showed caution and restraint compared to Kreisky's, in addition to including frequent assurances of loyalty and friendship with Israel.⁶⁹⁹ Brandt thus never went as far in his criticism of Israel as Kreisky did. While Brandt and with him the German Social Democrats supported Kreisky and the SPÖ in their Middle East policies, they happily left the leadership role in this matter to the Austrians. This policy choice can only be explained by taking Germany's Nazi past into account. The SPD and Brandt felt morally obligated to such a restrained attitude because of the West German acknowledgment of its responsibility for the Holocaust.⁷⁰⁰ While West Germany's special responsibility vis-à-vis Israel had clear practical implications for its Middle East policies, Austria because of its national victim narrative faced no such obligations or restraints and could therefore fully embrace the Palestinian cause.

⁶⁹⁸ Internal Foreign Ministry document: "Israel Information' anlässlich der Überreichung des Beglaubigungsschreibens durch neuen israelischen Botschafter", Vienna, 12 September 1979. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.02.01/II.4a_79.

⁶⁹⁹ See also: Deutschkron 1983, 408-409.

⁷⁰⁰ Röhrlich 2009, 322-323.

3.4. Austrian recognition of the PLO

The next logical step of Austria's pro-Palestinian policies was the official recognition of the PLO. With this move, Austria in 1980 was again first among Western European countries. Despite its diplomatic turn in 1974, the PLO was at the time still regarded by the US and Israel as a terrorist organization.⁷⁰¹ Its first tentative diplomatic breakthrough had, however, already happened at the UN: On 14 October 1974, the UN General Assembly recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Following Arafat's "gun and olive branch" speech at the General Assembly on 13 November 1974, the PLO was granted non-state observer status at all General Assembly sessions. A year later, on November 1975, the UN passed United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 in which by a vote of 72 to 35 with 32 abstentions, Zionism was determined as a form of racism. The resolution mainly passed with the support of the Soviet bloc, Soviet-aligned developing countries combined with the votes of Arab and Islamic countries. Austria and West Germany both voted against the resolution. There was clearly a line that neither West Germany nor Austria would cross.⁷⁰²

While this resolution remained contested among Western countries, the process of political reassessment of the PLO within the international community nevertheless continued: In the same year, the UN granted observer status to the PLO, with offices opening in New York, Geneva and since 1977 also in Vienna.⁷⁰³ When PLO representative Ghazi Hussain arrived in Vienna on 9 February 1977, he was accredited with the Vienna-based UNIDO only, not

⁷⁰¹ Israel and the US considered the PLO a terrorist organization until the Madrid Conference in 1991.

⁷⁰² For the Austrian reaction, see: Foreign Ministry Document by Dr. Schramek: "Israel in den VN; Information für den Herrn Bundesminister", Vienna, 9 December 1975. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.01/27-II.5_75.

For the West German reaction, see: Jaeger 1994, 71. Deutschkron 1983, 398-399.

⁷⁰³ Bundeskanzleramt: "PLO; Parlamentarische Anfrage an Herrn Bundeskanzler", Vienna, 31 March 1978. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.18/5-II.4a_78.

with the Austrian government.⁷⁰⁴ This would change with Austria's official recognition of the PLO in 1980. On 29 October 1979, Kreisky declared, at the 34th session of the UN General Assembly, that Austria viewed the PLO as the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people. The Austrian government will hence "fully acknowledge this fact and will also stress its convictions with other countries".⁷⁰⁵

These "other countries" were however not pleased with Austria. Despite Europe's previous and frequent statements about Palestinian rights, countries like Britain, France and West Germany now strictly rejected Austria's move. While some of them had already allowed PLO offices to open in their capitals, none quite yet wanted to grant political recognition to the PLO. That last step was rather held back as a diplomatic strategy to exert pressure on the PLO. In fact, the Western consensus was to link the PLO's diplomatic recognition to concrete concessions such as renouncing its armed struggle and accepting Israel's right of existence. Austria, without waiting for Palestinian commitments, had now simply anticipated this Palestinian position. Thus, not only Israel,⁷⁰⁶ but also the US and other Western embassies sought immediate clarification from Kreisky.⁷⁰⁷ Furthermore, Brussels during the entire debate remained strikingly silent while even the traditionally pro-Arab France under the leadership of Giscard d'Estaing showed itself committed to the standpoint that a recognition of the PLO can only happen in the wake of Palestinian concessions. Arafat

⁷⁰⁴ Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten/Tschofen: "Österreich und die PLO, Information", Vienna, 18 March 1980. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.19/44-II.4_80.

⁷⁰⁵ Kreisky 1979, quoted in: Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten/Tschofen: "Österreich und die PLO, Information", Vienna, 18 March 1980. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.19/44-II.4_80. In German original: "(...) dieser Tatsache in Zukunft voll Rechnung tragen und wird diese Auffassung anderen Staaten gegenüber mit aller Eindringlichkeit vertreten."

⁷⁰⁶ See, for instance: *Arbeiter Zeitung*, "PLO-Anerkennung: Angriffe aus Israel – Auch Peres protestiert", 15-16 March 1980.

Arbeiter Zeitung, "Anerkennung durch Wien erregt internationales Aufsehen. PLO: Genugtuung im Westjordanland", 15-16 March 1980.

⁷⁰⁷ *Herald Examiner*, "Israelis protest Austrian PLO move", 19 March 1980. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.19/88-II.4_80.

Los Angeles Times, "Austria grants recognition to PLO diplomat", 14 March 1980. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.19/88-II.4_80.

– in the eyes of the EC countries - seemed neither ready, nor politically able to actually make such concessions yet. What might also have played a role in France's and the EC's general reluctance to recognize the PLO at this point was the European intention to avoid any disturbance of the ongoing negotiations at Camp David towards an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.⁷⁰⁸ Of course, especially West Germany showed itself strictly opposed to the Austrian step: "Our policies have not changed: Our position is dependent on the PLO's stance on Israel's right to exist in secure and recognized borders."⁷⁰⁹ On the question of why out of all European democracies exactly Austria would take such a pioneering stance on the Palestinian issue, Kreisky answered: "(...) many of us know exactly how much we would have saved ourselves, maybe even a ten-year long occupation after liberation in 1945, if we had had such a representation of our national interests after 1938."⁷¹⁰ With this response, Kreisky was squarely in line with Austria's diplomacy of innocence. In comparing Austria in 1938 to the situation of the Palestinians today, he once more convincingly invoked the logic of promoting solidarity between the two victims, Austrians and the Palestinians, on the international stage for the purpose of justifying his move in front of the eyes of the Western community. For West Germany, this logic of course did not apply and the country under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher remained

⁷⁰⁸ Austrian Embassy in Brussels to Foreign Ministry: "Nahostproblem; vor einer westlichen Initiative", Brussels, 19 April 1980. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.19/80-II.49_80.

Austrian Embassy in Oslo to Foreign Ministry: "Ernennung eines offiziellen Vertreters der PLO bei der österreichischen Bundesregierung; Kommentar in der norwegischen Presse", Oslo, 25 March 1980. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.19/61-II.4a_80.

⁷⁰⁹ Genscher 1980, quoted in: Austrian Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Minister: "Beziehungen BRD-Israel; offizieller Besuch des israelischen Außenministers Yitzhak Schamir in Bonn am 17. und 18. November 1980", Bonn, 25 November 1980. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.18.11/1-II.4a_80.

In German: "Unsere Politik hat sich nicht geändert. Unserer Haltung bestimmt sich weiterhin danach, welche Positionen die PLO ihrerseits zur Frage des Rechtes Israels einnimmt, in anerkannten und sicheren Grenzen zu leben."

⁷¹⁰ Kreisky 1979, quoted in: Riegler 2011, 75.

In German original: "(...) dass viele von uns sehr genau wissen, wie viel wir uns erspart hätten – vielleicht sogar eine zehnjährige Besatzung nach der Befreiung im Jahre 1945, wenn es eine solche Vertretung unserer nationalen Interessen nach 1938 gegeben hätte."

committed not to acknowledge the PLO before the Palestinians themselves had clearly recognized Israel's right to exist.⁷¹¹

In the end, it was not only among Israelis and the wider Western community that Kreisky's Middle East policies triggered criticism, but also within Austria. While the conservative opposition party ÖVP accused Kreisky of sympathies for terrorists jeopardizing both Austrian security and neutrality,⁷¹² the right wing FPÖ constantly reminded the Chancellor that he'd better care more about his own country than Palestine.⁷¹³ Unlike the FRG where the opposition party CDU repeatedly warned the ruling social democrats of their responsibilities vis-a-vis Israel stemming from the Nazi past,⁷¹⁴ no such open hint of historically-conditioned responsibilities towards Israel were mentioned in Austria by politicians nor journalists. Only the West German conservative newspaper *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* at one point attempted to remind Austria of its past: "Austria, the country from where Hitler and Eichmann came, is after the two Germanys the last country to position itself against Israel."⁷¹⁵ Austria, however, never adhered to such a logic, and under Kreisky ever more fiercely rejected it: "Any kind of kin liability (*"Sippenhaftung"*) is inhuman, unjustified, yes even ridiculous, and in the end just falls back on those who promote it," stated Kreisky in an interview. While, for Kreisky, "kin liability" for Austria was always out

⁷¹¹ Schmidt 1979, quoted in: Riegler 2011, 81.

Genscher 1980, quoted in: Austrian Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Minister: "Beziehungen BRD-Israel; offizieller Besuch des israelischen Außenministers Yitzhak Schamir in Bonn am 17. und 18. November 1980", Bonn, 25 November 1980. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.18.11/1-II.4a_80.

⁷¹² ÖVP's foreign policy spokesman Ludwig Steiner, quoted in: *Die Presse*, "Arafats Wien-Besuch barg Sprengstoff. Geheime Zusagen des PLO-Chefs?", 10 July 1979.

Die Presse, "Arafats Wien-Besuch barg Sprengstoff. Geheime Zusagen des PLO-Chefs?", 10 July 1979.

Die Presse, "Kreisky und Brandt würdigen PLO. Arafat für Europa ‚salonfähig‘?", 9 July 1979.

Kronen Zeitung, "ÖVP-Kritik an Kreiskys Treffen mit PLO-Arafat", 11 July 1979.

⁷¹³ *Kronen Zeitung*, "Staberl: ‚Kreisky gewann einen Eindruck‘", 11 July 1979.

⁷¹⁴ CDU Pressedienst, 27 July 1979, quoted in: *Deutschkron* 1983, 409.

⁷¹⁵ *Die Presse*, "Pressestimmen: *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*", 10 July 1979.

In German original: "Österreich, das Land, aus dem Hitler und Eichmann kamen, ist nach den beiden Deutschlands der letzte Staat, der sich gegen Israel stellen kann."

of question, he further also mocked West Germany's special responsibility vis-a-vis Israel as a "stupid policy" which would lead "nowhere".⁷¹⁶

Domestically, Kreisky's Middle East policies in the end also led "nowhere", and even contributed to his political demise. When Arab-sponsored Palestinian terror had once again reached Austria in 1981, the already slim domestic support for Kreisky's pro-Palestinian policies plummeted. On 29 August 1981, a terror attack on the Viennese synagogue "*Stadttempel*" orchestrated by the so-called Abu Nidal Group left two people dead and 22 injured. Coupled with the group's recent murder of the President of the Austrian-Israeli Friendship League, Heinz Nittel, outside of his home in Vienna on 1 May 1981,⁷¹⁷ the synagogue attack spread shock and outrage among Austrians.⁷¹⁸ Abu Nidal's state sponsored terrorism,⁷¹⁹ unlike its predecessor Al Saika,⁷²⁰ was explicitly directed against the PLO which was regarded as too moderate and compromising with Israel and the West. Unlike previous terrorist attacks committed by Al Saika's Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution, Abu Nidal's attacks were hence directly aimed at Austria's foreign policy towards the Middle East.⁷²¹ Kreisky's calculus to keep the terror away from Austria by "befriending" Arafat and other Middle Eastern rulers hadn't worked. Arafat had not been able to control the splinter groups within the PLO.⁷²² Palestinian terror itself thus completely undermined domestic support for Kreisky's Middle East policies among Austria's population. Compared to the Schönau hostage crisis, Kreisky's pro-Palestinian policies never sparked the same defensive

⁷¹⁶ *Kronen Zeitung*, "Sonderinterview mit dem Bundeskanzler: ,Manche Israelis reihen Kreisky gleich hinter Hitler"", 23 September 1979.

In German original: "*Jede Sippenhaftung ist unmenschlich, unbegründet, ja lächerlich und fällt zuletzt auf den zurück, der sie betreibt.*"

⁷¹⁷ The murder of Heinz Nittel constituted the first political assassination of the Second Republic.

⁷¹⁸ Riegler 2011, 232-235 & 242-249.

⁷¹⁹ Abu Nidal's sponsors were Iraq, Syria and Libya (Riegler 2011, 230).

⁷²⁰ The Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution who committed the terror attack on Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union in 1973 were an off-spring of the pro-Syrian Palestinian movement Al-Saika (See Schönau incident in 1973 above).

⁷²¹ Riegler 2011, 230.

⁷²² Petritsch 2010, 229.

Die Presse, "Die Schüsse von Wien", by Thomas Chorherr, 31 August 1981.

stance (and also antisemitic tones) among Austria's public. In the end, Kreisky – thanks to his reputation and charisma – managed to avoid “political suicide”. However, in the election in 1983, the SPÖ lost its absolute majority. When Kreisky stepped down as Chancellor of Austria, his successor Fred Sinowatz did not continue Kreisky's Middle East policies. After Kreisky, and especially with the ÖVP's increased electoral gains, Austria's foreign policy was fully re-oriented towards Europe.⁷²³

4. Conclusions: Diplomatic strategies with memory determine positions vis-a-vis future conflicts

It was the aim of this chapter to show that a shift from a pro-Israeli attitude in 1967 towards a pro-Arab stance in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 was dependent on the official national narrative that the case countries West Germany and Austria held about their own Nazi past. While in West Germany, the self-portrayal of a guilty perpetrator continued under Chancellor Willy Brandt, his famous *Kniefall* at the Warsaw Ghetto becoming one of its most significant international signals, in Austria, the national victim narrative received encouragement from a somewhat unusual supporter. With Chancellor Bruno Kreisky coming to office in 1970, it was the first time in history that a German-speaking country was governed by a Jew. However, in the course of bilateral debate about Jewish transit, it soon became clear that Kreisky showed himself not only fully complicit with Austria's victim narrative, but with the help of his specific biographic background would also significantly consolidate Austria's innocent victim image on the international stage.

⁷²³ Riegler 2011, 454.

Once the oil crisis had hit European countries hard in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, any realist cost-benefit calculation predicting the foreign policy behaviour of states would suggest that countries were now induced to adopt a pro-Arab position. Such a policy shift was also in the best strategic interest of the Federal Republic of Germany, which since 1967 had lost all ties with the Arab world. However, its special responsibility stemming from the Nazi past vis-à-vis the Jewish state did not allow for such a policy shift. Instead, the Federal Republic was torn between conflicting pragmatic and moral interests, present needs and past obligations as well as diverse bilateral and multilateral links to France, the US, Israel and the EC. In the end, West German Middle East policies, unlike the predictions of mainstream IR theories, aimed at a more balanced approach towards the warring parties rather than becoming fully supportive of the Arab side. For that purpose, the Federal Republic's foreign policy behaviour carefully manoeuvred its way towards Arab interests without fully abandoning its diplomacy of guilt vis-à-vis Israel. While some, among them first and foremost Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, openly attempted to get rid of obstacles stemming from the past by way of normalizing the relationship with Israel, others, and most prominently Willy Brandt, understood West Germany's special responsibility vis-à-vis Israel as not up for negotiation, even in the light of economic crisis. However, by emphasizing "normal relations with a special character" instead of "special relations", Brandt while satisfying the Israeli side also brought about a slight reduction in the particularity of the relationship. His move almost went unnoticed in Israel but opened the way towards a balanced Middle Eastern approach for the Federal Republic. His famous declaration of the "impossibility of a neutrality of the German heart" during the Six-Day War in 1967 was now extended to justify West Germany's contribution to finding a solution to the Middle Eastern conflict. In the context of a multilateral compromise required among EC member states, such a solution, however, in 1973/74, began to ever more resemble the

Arab rather than the Israeli position. The economic pressures of the oil crisis in addition to the political requirements of a united European foreign policy voice had thus led to a delicate change of West German policies towards Israel. This shift can best be described as a “critical solidarity”⁷²⁴ with Israel, which even though to a weakened extent, still stemmed from its diplomacy of guilt vis-à-vis Israel.

While West Germany was hesitant and cautious in reaching out to the Arab world, Austria under the leadership of Kreisky fully turned its support away from Israel towards the Arab countries. This Austrian policy shift certainly reflected a rational-material cost-benefit calculus that was ever more exacerbated by the consequences of the oil crisis. However, official Austria also always deliberately underlined its moral-ethical motivation for its increased support of the Palestinian cause. With the help of Kreisky’s biography and a deliberate emphasis on his persecution for political rather than racial reasons, official Austria now began to invoke the “solidarity between two victims” logic inherent in Austria’s national narrative, however, this time targeting the Palestinians rather than the Israelis. By transferring Kreisky’s personal “victim status” as an Austrian, hence a “stateless and resisting” refugee in exile after 1938 on the entire country, Austrians and Palestinians were linked to one another by the specifically created historic bond of solidarity among victims. In the wake of the Yom Kippur War, the previously created solidarity between the two victims, Austria and Israel, had thus become obsolete, and Austria’s support shifted to a new victim group: The Palestinians.

Framed as such, Austria’s policy shift from the Israeli to the Palestinian position not only fitted well into Austria’s deliberate diplomatic approach of projecting “innocence” to the international stage, but its prevailing national narrative – as the comparison with West Germany once more underlined - also allowed for such a radical shift to happen in the first

⁷²⁴ Weingardt 2002, 238.

place. While existing scholarship mainly pointed to Kreisky's Jewish roots as giving him the credibility and right to internationally promote a Palestinian state,⁷²⁵ I argued that it was first and foremost Austria's prevailing victim narrative and Kreisky's own interpretation of his personal biography therein that ultimately allowed him to turn Austria away from a pro-Israeli to a pro-Arab/Palestinian stance: While the SPD and Brandt felt morally obligated to adopt a cautious attitude when shifting their support to the Arab/Palestinian side because of West Germany's special responsibility towards the Jewish state, the SPÖ and Kreisky faced no such obligation due to their strong belief in the national victim myth. Thus, when West Germany's acceptance of responsibility for the past had clear practical implications for its Israel policies also in the 1970s, Austria could wholeheartedly support the Palestinian cause. Israel's reaction to West Germany's balanced Middle East approach was in the end fiercer than its response to Austria's turn from a pro-Israeli to an outright pro-Palestinian stance. Israel apparently openly expected loyalty stemming from the past only from West Germany: "Especially Germans should refrain from giving advice (...). Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Volga is soaked in Jewish blood", expressed Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1979, and added: "Buying Arab oil with Jewish blood is absolutely disgusting."⁷²⁶ In case these pro-Arab policies would lead to practical results, Brandt should further "already prepare himself to kneel again in front of the Jewish victims in Israel".⁷²⁷ As had already become obvious in previous chapters, official Israel had to a certain extent accepted Austria's victim narrative, limiting itself to criticism of what was ultimately perceived as a provocation by Kreisky, while requesting responsibility for the past from West Germany alone.

⁷²⁵ Röhrlich 2009, 301.

⁷²⁶ Begin 1979, quoted in: *Der Spiegel*, No. 43/1979. In: *Deutschkron* 1983, 408.

⁷²⁷ Begin 1979, *Berliner Rundschau*, 19 July 1979, quoted in: Jaeger 1994, 93.

Both bilateral relationships were nevertheless strained throughout the 1970s,⁷²⁸ especially since support for the Palestinian cause did not end with the oil crisis. In the course of the 1970s, Austria under the leadership of Kreisky went on to internationally promote Palestinian statehood. In 1979, Kreisky was the first Western head of state to receive Arafat in Vienna. In comparison, Arafat was only invited to Bonn 14 years later, in 1993.⁷²⁹ An equally large time lag can be found in yet another example: Austria was not only the first Western country to officially receive Arafat, it was also the first Western European country to diplomatically recognize the PLO in 1980. In clear contrast, the Federal Republic would only recognise the PLO 16 years later, in 1996.⁷³⁰ Also in the course of the 1970s, it was therefore the Nazi past and the respective national interpretation thereof that determined foreign policy choices for both West Germany and Austria when it came to the conflict in the Middle East.

⁷²⁸ See: Internal Foreign Ministry document: "Israel Information' anlässlich der Überreichung des Beglaubigungsschreibens durch neuen israelischen Botschafter", Vienna, 12 September 1979. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.02.01/II.4a_79.

Austrian Embassy in Bonn (Geschäftsträger Türk) to Foreign Minister: "Zur Haltung der BRD im Nahostkonflikt und zum Stand der deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen; Besuch von Außenminister Dayan in Bonn, 9. Bis 11. September 1979", Bonn, 18 September 1979. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2, Gz. 88.19.50/159-II4a_79.

⁷²⁹ Arafat visited the office of the Federal Chancellor in Bonn on 7 December 1993 (Jaeger 1994, 220-221).

⁷³⁰ Riegler 2011, 81.

CONCLUSION

People are always shouting they want to create a better future. It's not true. The future is an apathetic void of no interest to anyone. The past is full of life, eager to irritate us, provoke and insult us, tempt us to destroy or repaint it. The only reason people want to be masters of the future is to change the past. They are fighting for access to the laboratories where photographs are retouched and biographies and histories rewritten.⁷³¹

This thesis is dedicated to the fight “for access to the laboratories where histories are rewritten”. These laboratories are not only to be found within the borders of a country, but also on the international stage where the past is just as “eager to irritate, provoke and insult” states to a point where they invest into a strategic official effort to “destroy or repaint it”. The result of this effort is best reflected in a country’s collective memory, i.e. its official national interpretation of a tragic and shameful legacy. In the aftermath of World War II, the ways states aimed to destroy or repaint their Nazi past broadly followed the two categories of perpetrators and victims with related notions of “guilt” and “innocence”. The portrayal of a country as a “guilty perpetrator” or “innocent victim” to the outside world thus did not necessarily reflect the historic truth. Rather, countries produced repainted versions of the past according to what was politically most convenient at the time. While existing research on the “politics of memory” has focussed predominantly on the domestic political fight for access to the laboratories where histories are rewritten, this study concentrated on how states employ their officially repainted interpretations of the past to win that fight within the realm of International Relations.

⁷³¹ Milan Kundera (1982), Part I: Lost Letters.

In order to clarify the interaction between an officially constructed national narrative of a country and its foreign policy behaviour, I have suggested that in cases where two countries are linked to one another by a shared legacy we can observe an alternative form of international state behaviour which is best described by the *diplomacy of memory* model. Diplomatic state behaviour with memory was theoretically distinguished into three core elements:

It is a.), a separate policy undertaking that consists of a deliberate, coordinated and costly diplomatic team effort directed at portraying a country's official narrative to the international stage. It is b.), an instrumental form of state behaviour, i.e. its purpose is to reach rational, strategic goals on the international stage. And c.), it is a two-level game between international official and domestic public memory.

To empirically test this model, I looked for evidence in the diplomatic behaviour of West Germany and Austria towards Israel in the aftermath of World War II. These pairs of countries are linked to one another via the tragic legacy of the Holocaust. However, while West Germany and Austria inherited the same shameful past, both countries nevertheless adopted two very different national interpretations thereof. The official West German narrative presented the FRG as a repentant and remorseful perpetrator, whereas the Austrian narrative portrayed the country as an innocent victim vis-à-vis the Nazi regime. Consequently, with respect to Israel, West Germany officially followed what I called the *diplomacy of guilt*, while Austria opted for the opposite strain in its diplomatic approach with memory: the *diplomacy of innocence*. Both cases therefore lent themselves well to the question of how memory in its diverse interpretations impacts the foreign policy behaviour of perpetrator countries in a post-war environment.

Within these two selected pairs of countries and their diplomatic relationships, I have further focussed on four core bilateral debates that took place in the first four decades following World War II. Two of these were directly related to the Nazi past: the question of reparation payments to the state of Israel in 1951/52 and the responses to the trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1960/61. The other two concerned West Germany's and Austria's reaction to the Middle East conflict, focussing first on the Six-Day War in 1967 and second, on the Yom Kippur War of 1973 with its connected oil crisis as well as the emerging "Palestinian issue". While the first two cases aimed to show how memory is leveraged for diplomatic strategy, the latter two debates tested a somewhat less intuitive connection between the national narrative and a country's foreign policy behaviour, shedding light on whether a country's official interpretation of its own past also influences its foreign policy in matters unrelated to that same past, such as its attitude to a modern-day conflict.

1. Results from testing the *Diplomacy of Memory* model: Summary of empirical findings

In order to prove that memory can indeed be qualified as an alternative diplomatic tool on the international stage, the empirical findings of the four case chapters must confirm all three core elements that describe diplomatic behaviour with memory as a separate but rational form of state behaviour in post-conflict environments.

a. Summary of findings on the diplomacy with memory as a policy undertaking

In cases where countries are linked to one another via a tragic legacy, perpetrator states were expected to undertake a deliberate, coordinated and costly diplomatic team effort to project the official collective memory, i.e. the country's nationally fabricated narrative about its own past, onto the international stage. The four selected bilateral debates of this study all provided clear evidence on how West Germany and Austria employed their official interpretations of the Nazi past when it came to their conduct with Israel.

In the course of the bilateral debate about reparations to the State of Israel in 1951/52 it became obvious for the first time which specific historic image the two countries would from now onwards signal internationally. While West Germany developed an official narrative of guilt that formed the basis for its diplomacy of guilt vis-à-vis Israel, Austria developed a national narrative of victimhood, and thus, when it came to Israel, behaved according to what I outlined as the diplomacy of innocence. During the first tentative meetings between Israeli and West German officials in Paris, London and Wassenaar, West Germany under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer thus made a coordinated diplomatic team effort to admit moral and legal responsibility for the Nazi past and consequently portray itself as a guilty and repentant perpetrator to Israel and the outside world. Austria, on the other hand, deliberately tried to keep a low profile when it came to the question of reparations while its diplomats behind the scenes relentlessly worked to portray the country as a first victim of Nazi Germany. In both countries, these diplomatic efforts comprised verbal expressions of guilt and shame as well as denial thereof. They also led to substantive action, culminating in the Luxembourg Agreement of 1952 between West Germany and Israel as well as into the credit agreement between Austria and Israel in that same year. For Austria, support for Israel in the form of a commercial loan signalled normality in the relationship between the two

countries as well as an orientation to the future and as such underlined Austria's innocence vis-à-vis the Nazi past. Reparations, on the other hand, reflected the special character of the contacts between West Germany and Israel stemming from the past and as such internationally emphasized West Germany's guilt vis-à-vis the Nazi regime.

Almost ten years later, West Germany and Austria once again were internationally confronted with the Nazi past. This time, the catalyst was not compensation payments, but the arrest and trial of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann. When his trial began in Jerusalem in 1961, both West Germany and Austria reacted to it by continuing their previously adopted diplomatic approaches with memory. West Germany, still under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, exhibited yet another coordinated and costly diplomatic team effort to signal an image of the FRG as a morally responsible perpetrator to the international stage which offered its full support to bring Eichmann to justice in Israel. Correspondingly, at considerable cost, West Germany dispatched a large delegation of observers to Jerusalem with an ambitious political mission to establish the first post-war direct contacts with the Israelis. In contrast, Austria, when confronted with the Eichmann trial as well as with Eichmann's close biographical links to Linz, began to fiercely project its innocent victim status. While a deliberate official silence was aimed at signalling to the outside world that Eichmann was none of Austria's business, behind the scenes officials made a coordinated team effort to turn Eichmann from an Austrian into a German citizen. In further contrast to the West German delegation, the Austrian delegation to the trial was rather small and technical. Two policemen did what was necessary in order to signal an adequate degree of Austrian interest, but not Austria's involvement and culpability.

While these two cases both demonstrate how West Germany and Austria adopted and consequently performed "guilt" and "innocence" in a deliberate, coordinated and costly

diplomatic team effort when confronted with Israel and their own past on the international stage, the subsequent cases of the West German and Austrian reaction to the Middle East conflict in the 1960s and 1970s reveal that the two countries also portrayed, performed and leveraged their own history when it came to international matters unrelated to the Nazi past. In the wake of the Six-Day War in 1967, for instance, both West Germany and Austria were careful to justify their emerging pro-Israeli attitude as in line with their previously adopted diplomatic approaches of guilt and innocence. As such, only West Germans openly took sides with Israel by linking their partiality for Israel to their special responsibility towards the Jews. In Austria, on the other hand, partiality for Israel was expressed less openly and - once it nevertheless became apparent - was justified by pointing to the quasi natural bond between the two “innocent victims”: Austria in 1938 and Israel in 1967. Not only in their explanations for their pro-Israeli attitude did West Germany and Austria resort to their own official narrative about the past, but the shameful legacy – among other factors – also gave rise to both countries’ pro-Israeli stance in the first place. According to mainstream theories on how rational foreign policy behaviour unfolds when based on a mere material cost-benefit calculus, both countries would have been predicted to refrain from any partiality in the Middle East conflict. However, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the coalition of CDU and SPD soon compromised its founding principle of non-interference in international matters by openly admitting a West German “impossibility of a neutrality of the heart” that clearly stemmed from the Nazi legacy. In Austria, on the other hand, the ruling Christian Democratic Government initially managed to insist on a strict neutral stance, although it soon became evident that the Austrian heart was also not neutral. Austrian diplomats thus faced the task of portraying Austria’s support for Israel at the UN as a mere act of good-will to leave no doubt that Austria, unlike West Germany, was not guilty and therefore in no way obliged to side with Israel.

Following Israel's victory of 1967, the realities in the Middle East changed significantly. The image of Israel as a weak and defenceless victim dissolved while Arab losses and humiliation triggered a desire for revenge and restoration that culminated in yet another war in 1973. In the course of that same war, Arab countries began to leverage oil for the purpose of forcing the West to shift its support from the Israeli to the Arab/Palestinian cause. With these clear material incentive structures in place, mainstream IR theories would now without doubt suggest that European countries would soon side with the Arabs/Palestinians. However, in the Federal Republic, the special responsibility stemming from the Nazi past vis-à-vis the Jewish state immediately hindered such a move, and the country instead carefully manoeuvred its way towards a more balanced Middle Eastern approach. While West Germany was hesitant and cautious in reaching out to the Arab world despite the large looming economic incentives, Austria in the wake of the oil crisis could fully embrace the Palestinian cause. Thanks to its innocent victim image and the renewed international credibility its narrative had received from Austria's Jewish Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, the country, unlike West Germany, faced no constraints from the Nazi legacy and as such was in no way obligated to support Israel against its own interests. Once the new economic incentive structures were in place, the previously created solidarity between the two victims, Austria and Israel, was simply turned on its head and from now onwards directed towards a new victim group: the Palestinians, rather than the Israelis.

Altogether these examples show that the past was clearly alive in the minds and strategic tool boxes of politicians even thirty years after the end of World War II, and "international performances of memory" still adhered to the logic of a country's nationally fabricated narrative. Just as the interdisciplinary literature on the domestic politics of memory had suggested, it was thus "memory, rather than history" that mattered for political gain also on

the international stage. Moreover, as the *diplomacy of memory* model put forward in its critique of mainstream IR assumptions, it was indeed “memory, rather than money” that determined West German and Austrian foreign policy strategies vis-à-vis Israel in all four post-war decades.

b. Summary of findings on the diplomacy with memory as an instrumental form of state behaviour

The coordinated and costly team effort to project an official version of a country’s past to the international stage was further described as a rationally motivated, strategic effort. As such, diplomacy with memory was disassociated from normative or moral considerations derived from notions of guilt and innocence. Guilt, as the West German-Israeli example showed, was not introduced into diplomatic behaviour because of some sort of collective feeling of guilt and an eventual moral necessity for remorse associated with it. Neither testifies the diplomacy of innocence, as the case of Austria and Israel revealed, of a lack of guilt feeling or the moral wrong of denying responsibility for past actions. Both approaches from the beginning onwards rather formed diverse pathways towards a concrete, rational aim on the international stage. Diplomatic behaviour with memory was therefore described as yet another instrumental form of state behaviour. Evidence for this assertion was found especially in the early years when the diplomacy of innocence and guilt were forged.

By agreeing to high reparation payments to the State of Israel in 1952, West Germany aimed for its reintegration into the western world’s community of states. In fact, the Federal Republic’s entire post-war identity was inextricably linked to that strategic goal. Multilateralism within the Western alliance formed the core of the Federal Republic’s *raison d’état*. On the other hand, Austria’s refusal to pay reparations to Israel throughout the 1950s

was also aimed at a rational goal on the broader international stage: A swift independence of the country as well as the departure of the occupying powers without having to fulfil large looming reparation demands from the victims of the Third *Reich*. For that purpose, Austria's entire post-war identity was developed in opposition to Germany and anchored around neutrality instead of *Westbindung* in order to showcase the country's distinctive "Austrianess". Thus, normal, commercial and political relations with the new Jewish state in a time when no bilateral contacts other than reparations (equalling guilt payments) existed between West Germany and Israel were of utmost strategic importance for Austria, as they contributed to amounting international proof of Austria's past and present distance to Germany.

A decade later, the Eichmann trial hit when the initial strategic goals of the West German diplomacy of guilt and the Austrian diplomacy of innocence had already been partially reached: West Germany's image was recovering and its *Westbindung* advancing, and Austria had signed its State Treaty in 1955. However, the domestic and international publicity around Eichmann's case immediately jeopardized both countries' newfound normalities. For the strategic purpose of not interrupting its reputational recovery, the FRG thus launched yet another diplomatic team effort to portray itself as a guilty and remorseful perpetrator to the outside world. Austria, on the other hand, took urgent action behind the scenes to protect the foundational myth of its only recently proclaimed Republic, which stood out in stark contrast to Eichmann's statements. In the course of the trial, Austrian efforts with its own narrative were thus mainly motivated by the broader aim of rescuing the country's name from being tarnished, in addition to once again avoid reparation requests. Also in the 1960s, both West Germany and Austria therefore still diplomatically acted out memory for the strategic goal of limiting the negative impact of Eichmann's trial on their own international reputation.

While the two cases on reparations and Eichmann revealed how West Germany and Austria carefully forged their diverse national narratives into strategic diplomatic tools in order to achieve rational goals on the international stage, the two case studies on the Middle East conflict showed that – once adopted – the diplomacy of guilt and innocence guided foreign policy behaviour way beyond these initially stated foreign policy aims. The diplomacy of guilt, without doubt, made strategic sense for the FRG in 1952 and also in 1961, but not after 1967. By the end of the 1960s, the goal of West German integration can be viewed as fulfilled: with NATO membership since 1955, European Economic Community founding membership since 1957 and the proclamation of the European Community in 1967, West Germany's initial motivation for its diplomacy of guilt vis-à-vis Israel had dissolved.

The same is true in the Austrian case. The diplomacy of innocence certainly made strategic sense for Austria in 1952 when the country's victim status formed a stepping stone towards its desired independence from the occupation, in addition to freeing it from the threat of large looming Jewish and Soviet reparation requests. However, once the Austrian Republic was proclaimed in 1955 and especially since the biggest international challenge to its victim status was averted in the course of Eichmann's trial, the initial rational motivation for Austria's diplomacy of innocence was clearly gone.

The empirical analysis of chapters three and four nevertheless revealed that both countries continued to pursue diplomatic approaches of innocence and guilt in their reactions to the Six-Day War of 1967 as well as in their stances towards the Palestinian/Arab cause during the 1970s. Each country's foreign policy behaviour of projecting guilt or innocence therefore stayed the same despite the fact that it no longer had a strategic goal. Cost-benefit calculations were still distorted for the sake of a specific memory, however, this time without serving any broader rational purpose on the international stage.

These findings point to a surprising theoretical puzzle as regards the use of memory as a diplomatic tool. Once established and with time passing, the diplomacy of guilt and innocence apparently became habitual, or path-dependent, as institutionalist scholars would suggest.⁷³² A country that adopted a specific strain of diplomacy with memory therefore sustained certain patterns of behaviour for decades to come, even if the initial instrumental motivation for its policies had already dissolved.

In other words, a country that once employed its own image of a guilty perpetrator or an innocent victim for foreign policy gain kept yielding biased perceptions and attitudes from that identity and as a logical consequence also constrained its future behaviour towards the targeted state. As such, in 1967 the diplomacy of guilt did not allow for West Germany's neutrality despite it being in the best rational interest of the country in a situation where its reputation among the Western world community was already fully recovered. Similarly, the diplomacy of innocence didn't allow an open Austrian partiality for Israel despite overwhelming pro-Israeli sentiment among the Austrian public and the wider Western world, forcing Austrian officials to resort to troubling circumlocutions in order to being able to vote for Israel at the UN while at the same time also keeping an intact image of victimhood vis-à-vis the Nazi past. All of these efforts, however, in 1967, were made without any concrete strategic purpose in mind. The same is true for the two countries' later reaction to the oil crisis and the Palestinian issue in the course of the 1970s. Instrumental rationality thus falls short in explaining these sustained patterns of the diplomacy of innocence and guilt over time.

Existing IR theories on the operation of the logic of habit might offer a more convincing, alternative explanation for these cases: Once state behaviour becomes habit-driven, the core

⁷³² See, for instance: Keohane 1989, Ikenberry 1998, Pierson 2000, Walt 1997.

underlying IR assumption of rationality is eliminated. Habit by its very nature is unreflective, therefore indifferent to a conscious process of weighing costs and benefits.⁷³³ Phrased in IR terminology, habit operates in “(...) a zone of no rationality, no agency, and no uncertainty”.⁷³⁴ This seems to have been the case for the West German and Austrian reaction to the Middle East conflict since 1967 and their continued acting out of guilt and innocence on an international stage. Although no further rewards for such behaviour were available, once the logic of habit kicked in, the diplomacies of innocence and guilt were sustained against all odds.

The inertia and stickiness that habit induces into state behaviour is similarly explained by institutionalists with the process of institutionalization.⁷³⁵ States hereby are regarded as both self-interested/rational but also rule-following social agents. The broad definition of institutions as formal and informal rules, agreements, procedures, routines, norms and conventions further also fits our definition of diplomatic behaviour with memory.⁷³⁶ Defined as an institution, a certain diplomatic behaviour not only regularizes state actions but also becomes ingrained in a state’s identity over time. The diplomacy of innocence and guilt therefore provide normative and cognitive maps for interpretation and actions.⁷³⁷ By way of this characteristic, institutionalization thus gives rise to path dependence, locking states on a particular track of (diplomatic) action. Over time, as Pierson put it, path dependence means nothing less than – just as our cases have shown - “(...) preceding steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction”.⁷³⁸ In the place of the dissolving initial rationale over time rises the emerging rationale of increasing returns. This logic

⁷³³ Hopf 2010, 539-561.

⁷³⁴ Hopf 2010, 549.

⁷³⁵ The so-called “new institutionalism” consists of three different analytical approaches: Historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. They all share the large role they attribute to institutions in the determination of social and political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996).

⁷³⁶ Keohane 1989, 163.

⁷³⁷ Ikenberry 1998, 52.

⁷³⁸ Pierson 2000, 252.

forecasts that the probability of further movement along the same path increases with each step down that path simply because the costs of exit rise with time passing. Thus, signalling a constant image of guilt or innocence yields relative benefits compared to other possible options once that pathway has been chosen. As the West German and Austrian cases have clearly demonstrated, these relative benefits then increase over time and with higher levels of institutionalization in a self-reinforcing, positive feedback process.⁷³⁹

When linking these new findings not only to IR theory, but also to the interdisciplinary literature on the politics of memory, yet another interesting insight into the use of memory as a diplomatic tool becomes apparent: The sociological critique of existing political-scientific scholarship's strong reliance on the indeed rather limiting dichotomy of either a presentist or an essentialist view when it comes to the political use of memory cannot be extended to the *diplomacy of memory* model as it was presented here. While the findings of the first two chapters best explained diplomatic behaviour with memory through the lenses of a presentist position, i.e. how the past is made and remade in the present and for present international purposes, the later findings of the last two chapters, on the other hand, necessitated a shift to a more essentialist view: The past now was found to define identities and to constrain action in the present. Thus, once memory is successfully employed on the international stage, it transforms from a simple resource to a complex "cultural system" paying justice to the underlying societal functions of collective memory as being both, "a mirror and a lamp".⁷⁴⁰

⁷³⁹ Pierson 2000, 252.

See also: Walt (1997, 166) who argues that alliances survive even after their original rationale has evaporated because high levels of institutionalization may create capabilities that are worth keeping.

⁷⁴⁰ See Schwartz's (2011, 242-247) critique of the politics of memory literature. The expression of memory being "a mirror and a lamp" that Schwartz uses, goes back to the American literary critic Meyer H. Abrams.

c. Summary of findings on diplomacy with memory as a two-level game between international official and domestic public memory

While the first two elements of the *diplomacy of memory* model described diplomatic behaviour with memory as a coordinated and costly official team effort to achieve strategic aims on the international stage, the diplomatic use of memory was also described as a two-level game.⁷⁴¹ In such a game, the specific official collective memory that is convenient to use with regards to reaching an international aim may not always be in line with what is also domestically desirable. While an international audience was assumed to be the main target of diplomatic approaches with memory, the prevailing domestic public's narrative may exert an enabling or constraining effect on the entire endeavour. All analysed empirical examples confirmed this assumption: The forging and diplomatic use of memory for international purposes in both, the West German and in the Austrian case, faced opportunities as well as constraints from the simultaneously prevailing domestic public narrative about the past.

The conflicting relationship between public and official narrative and the resulting limits posed for the instrumental use of a specific memory on the international stage became most obvious in the West German case. In the wake of bilateral discussions about reparation payments to Israel, the diplomacy of guilt was crafted almost exclusively for an international audience. In stark contrast to Adenauer's officially fabricated narrative of the FRG as a guilty and repentant perpetrator, the West German public memory at the beginning of the 1950s desired a "clean break" from the Nazi past rather than the admission of moral responsibility. In order to gain domestic support for his foreign policy decision to pay reparations to Israel without provoking popular backlash, Adenauer thus had to resort to careful circumlocutions that admitted collective guilt only on behalf of the state, but not on behalf of all Germans.

⁷⁴¹ Putnam 1988, 460.

Different versions of collective memory co-existed and as a result also constrained one another not only in the West German case, but also in Austria. Austria's official victim narrative, while initially crafted by a selected number of post-war politicians for an international audience, soon began to resonate with most segments of the Austrian population. Unlike the political elites, only a minority of Austrians had resisted the Nazi regime, yet most Austrians felt in one way or the other victimized by World War II. It was in this context that what started out as the Foreign Ministry's instrument to achieve Austria's independence on the international stage soon merged into the patriotic, public narrative of an entire population.⁷⁴² By the beginning of the 1950s, the diplomacy of innocence, unlike West Germany's diplomacy of guilt, thus enjoyed full domestic support within Austria.

When the Eichmann trial was transmitted via TV into the living rooms of West Germans and Austrians in 1961, silence and forgetting about the Nazi past still dominated their collective memory. As such, in the FRG, Adenauer once more had to carefully prepare his population for disclosures that contained the potential of contradicting them. In its official narrative projected to the international stage, West Germany always portrayed itself as repentant and guilty, whereas in its public narrative directed at a domestic audience, it was only Eichmann who ought to be repentant. In Austria, on the other hand, overlap between the public and official narrative of innocence was further consolidated in the course of Eichmann's trial: Eichmann's crimes were perceived as a solely "foreign", i.e. German phenomenon. In accordance with a public uncritical of itself, Austrian officials underlined

⁷⁴² All Austrian officials interviewed by the author confirmed that the victim myth was first and foremost an invention of the Austrian Foreign Ministry in the beginning years of the Second Republic, and initially served the purpose of achieving strategic international goals such as Austria's independence.

See: Interview with Franz Vranitzky, 30 March 2017, Vienna.

Interview with Eva Nowotny, 29 December 2016, Vienna.

Interview with Franz Josef Kuglitsch, 16 December 2016, Vienna.

To further confirm this assertion, see also: Hanisch 1994, 421 and Uhl 2007, 239.

this notion by signalling that the trial was none of Austria's business while, out of the public's eye, Eichmann's Austrian roots were denied and finally also deleted.

International and domestic public and official narratives also interacted in the latter case studies about the Middle East conflict. In the wake of the Six-Day War in 1967, a strong pro-Israeli sentiment was sparked among both countries' populations. As a consequence, West German and Austrian foreign policy actors carefully manoeuvred their way from a neutral attitude to a subtle pro-Israeli stance, paying close attention to the global, regional and domestic environments. In the West German case, the public's overwhelming euphoria for Israel was now for the first time fully in line with the officially pursued diplomacy of guilt vis-à-vis Israel. In Austria, on the other hand, the overwhelming pro-Israeli public sentiment now for the first time conflicted with the official portrayal of the country as innocent to the international stage. While domestically there was no doubt that public partiality for Israel stemmed from the solidarity between the two victims, Austria in 1938 and Israel in 1967, internationally, Austria's support for Israel had to be carefully justified and explained by diplomats as a mere act of goodwill rather than stemming from any obligation on the Austrian part vis-à-vis the Jews.

Brandt's famous genuflection at the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial in 1970 again demonstrates how strongly diplomatic approaches with memory are directed first and foremost at an international audience, thus bearing the potential to severely conflict with the public's image of itself in the domestic sphere. While having been most positively perceived by Israel and the wider world, the majority of the West German population felt that Brandt's gesture was "exaggerated" at a time when the West German public had already started to feel absolved from its past. While guilt stemming from the Nazi past had overwhelmingly motivated public support for Israel in 1967, in the altered context of yet another Arab-Israeli war on Yom

Kippur of 1973, West German partiality for Israel was to a much lesser extent derived from any such obligation. Moreover, Israel's new position of power since 1967, combined with a domestic strengthening of the "new left" in the FRG, had triggered a turn of public attention away from the Jewish-German past towards the present situation of the Palestinians. As such, by the beginnings of the 1970s, the West German population exhibited a peculiar mix of attitudes that was to become also reflected in the official line of their government. While officials tried their best to still align the FRG's new balanced Middle East approach with its traditional diplomacy of guilt, it nevertheless became obvious that the country and its people, officially as well as publicly, by the end of the 1970s regarded themselves as much less guilty. Public and official memory had thus once again interacted with one another in the domestic and international sphere, taking a toll on the diplomacy of guilt vis-à-vis Israel, though yet not completely eradicating it on the global stage.

While Brandt's gesture of guilt raised eyebrows among West Germany's public, the Austrian public by the beginning of the 1970s still strongly believed in the country's victim narrative. This became most evident when Bruno Kreisky's reaction to the Palestinian terror attack in Schönau in 1973 provided the Chancellor with an unheard-of wave of domestic sympathy and widespread support: Both officials and their public once again agreed that Austria had no responsibility for Israel stemming from the past and as such should and could stand up against Israeli demands. A Jewish Chancellor confirming this Austrian view gave the national myth renewed domestic legitimacy and international credibility throughout the 1970s, thus also enhancing Austria's diplomacy of innocence vis-à-vis the Jewish state on the international stage. Its pro-Israeli policies of 1967 were now reformed into a pro-Arab stance that was in full accordance with the implication that Austria had no obligation whatsoever to support Israel.

Altogether, these examples underline that foreign policy indeed does not take place merely in foreign ministries but rather it is constrained and enabled by domestic contexts. Memory used as a diplomatic tool is no exception. Whenever the official memory employed was aligned with the public's memory, diplomacy with memory was carried out openly and more smoothly. Where the two collective memories were in conflict with one another, officials had to resort to explanations, often even to troubling circumlocutions for the mere purpose of rendering a specific diplomatic approach with memory acceptable to their populations. However, while the effort with memory on the international stage was certainly enabled and constrained by domestic contexts, it nevertheless remained first and foremost targeted at particular foreign states and the wider international community. Serving a broader international goal, diplomats and foreign ministers thus enforced their approaches with memory also when facing opposition from their domestic publics. Often this happened by way of a delicate (verbal) balancing act between domestic and foreign imperatives. As such, in the ideal case scenario, the two memories were fully aligned with one another. Yet, in case of non-alignment, the diplomacy with memory – with the necessary verbal justifications, official adjustments or deliberate silences – also remained in place. Thus, while rightly described as a two-level game, diplomatic behaviour with memory on the international stage nevertheless remains oriented first towards the external imperatives and a country's strategic goals on the international stage, and only secondary towards its domestic public.

2. Future research on the *Diplomacy of Memory* model

While the three core elements of diplomatic behaviour with memory withstood the empirical testing of this study, applying the *diplomacy of memory* model to more diverse cases would promise to further strengthen the model's theoretical predictions and generalisability. Future research agendas are therefore advised to analyse a longer time-frame in their empirical study of diplomatic behaviour with memory, in addition to applying the model to more cases from different (cultural) regions. Furthermore, a stronger focus on agents rather than on structure within the *diplomacy of memory* model would also bear the potential to provide additional insights into how diplomatic behaviour with memory unfolds in specific contexts. While it has to be left to future research to apply and further develop the *diplomacy of memory* model, the following three mini-studies shall at least hint at the direction in which such altered research foci promise to lead in terms of new empirical and theoretical findings.

2.1. A stronger focus on agency over structure

By arguing that an international goal determined diplomatic behaviour with memory, the *diplomacy of memory* model presented here has throughout privileged structure over agents. The cases studied in this thesis, however, revealed that individuals crucially mattered for the choice of a country's diplomacy with memory. While this study mainly focussed on the concerted team effort of foreign policy actors with an official narrative, future research should instead give priority to the individual influence of key politicians and their decision-making processes when it comes to the effort of portraying memory on the international stage.

Emphasising agents over structure would redirect attention to the intention and aims of foreign policy action (intentional explanation) as well as on why policy-makers were

disposed to choose one foreign policy course over the other (dispositional explanation), and as such would give more insight into why “the same present can sustain different memories and different presents can sustain the same memory”.⁷⁴³ Particularly, a stronger emphasis on actors’ biographies and memoirs would allow for a better judgement in this matter. While more in-depth biographical analysis of key persons discussed in the empirical chapters of this study would certainly be necessary to make firm claims, there was evidence throughout that individuals with their underlying belief system and values had a crucial influence on choosing and successfully implementing a selected strain of the diplomacy with memory.

For instance, how specific individuals mattered for the credible portrayal of German guilt on the international stage became especially obvious in the Chancellors Adenauer and Brandt. Adenauer who himself was a fierce opponent of the Hitler regime not least due to his strong Catholic convictions also showed a strong commitment to recognize responsibility for the crimes of Germans. In doing so, he most likely went further with reparation payments than any other German leader would have. Historians later explained his determination in part by way of his personal biography. On the way to Luxembourg, as his memoirs revealed, he remembered the day in 1933 when the Nazis had dismissed him from his post as mayor of Cologne. At a time when he was most destitute, only two people came to his help, and both were Jews.⁷⁴⁴ Viewed through these lenses, Adenauer’s admission of guilt on behalf of Germany for him therefore signified also a way of repaying a personal debt of honour. A historian judges Adenauer’s disposition in a similar way:

⁷⁴³ Schwartz 2011, 247.

⁷⁴⁴ Gress and Bark 1993, 314.

In the depths of the great man's heart, on a level deeper than all his foxy tricks and Odysseus-like notions for the political struggle of the day, there was, very surprisingly, an almost childlike simplicity and grace – grace in the original sense of *gratia* – meaning mercy, thankfulness, and dignity.⁷⁴⁵

Equally, Willy Brandt, also a personal victim of the Nazis, sent the most symbolic and lasting gesture of West Germany's guilt to the international stage when he knelt in front of the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial in 1970, "oppressed by the memories of Germany's recent history"⁷⁴⁶ and "apologizing for the crimes that were committed in the German name".⁷⁴⁷ Just like Adenauer, Brandt, who had personally resisted the Nazi regime, decided to restyle himself into a repentant perpetrator on behalf of his people. A journalist witnessing the scene in Warsaw commented on exactly that link between Brandt's personal biographic background and the weight it carried for the successful portrayal of guilt to the international stage: "Then he knelt, he who has no need to, on behalf of all who ought to kneel but don't – because they dare not, or cannot, or cannot venture so to do."⁷⁴⁸

That the biography of people matters also became obvious in the Austrian example: Interestingly, however, personal victimization of Austria's post-war politicians, unlike the case of West Germany, led to the very opposite approach. For instance, Chancellor Leopold Figl, who was crucial in negotiating Austria's independence in 1955, deployed his personal past as a former concentration camp prisoner to extend his very own victim status to the entire Austrian nation.

The same is true for Bruno Kreisky. Despite being of Jewish origins, he nevertheless always recounted his exile in Sweden after Austria's *Anschluss* as stemming from political, i.e. from

⁷⁴⁵ Gillessen, quoted in: Gress and Bark 1993, 314.

⁷⁴⁶ Brandt 1976, 399.

⁷⁴⁷ Brandt 1970, Interview in *Der Spiegel*, 51/1970, 14.12.1970. Quoted in: Wolffsohn/Brechenmacher 2005, 7-8.

⁷⁴⁸ Brandt 1976, 399.

his Socialist beliefs rather than from racial reasons. Emphasizing his typical “Austrianess” as opposed to his Jewish roots, he thus fully aligned his own biography with Austria’s national narrative of a “nation in resistance” victimized by an external aggressor:

The peoples of Central Europe have been the raw material of history, pushed hither and thither according to the whims of superior powers. An Austrian born at the turn of the century grew up in the Danubian monarchy, came of age in the First Republic and saw it sucked into the Third Reich in time to participate in its decline and fall. The Second Republic rose from the ashes (...).⁷⁴⁹

Fitting his own story perfectly into his country’s constructed version of history, Kreisky, the Jew but Austrian patriot, a victim of the Nazis but resistance fighter in exile, not only became the ultimate incarnation of Austria’s victim myth but also endowed it with renewed credibility and legitimacy throughout the 1970s. Further comparing Kreisky’s recalling of his own past with that of Brandt (the two actually became life-long friends during their shared exile in Scandinavia) clearly evidences also on an individual level what the findings of this study had already attested to on the collective level: the same past can even in the “same present” lead to very different individual interpretations thereof. A more agency-focussed approach within the *diplomacy of memory* model would thus bear the potential to better explain how exactly this “same present” of post-war West Germany and Austria gave rise to and was able to sustain these very different individual and collective memories.

That the formation of memory is an interactive dynamic process within a specific socially constructed time and space becomes also clear when one compares the personal biography of the selected leaders with their officially represented memory. One could have intuitively inferred, for instance, that someone who was personally either a victim or a perpetrator

⁷⁴⁹ Kreisky 1959, 281.

would gravitate towards a specific strain of diplomatic behaviour with memory. While needing further in-depth study to fully confirm this notion, the cases analysed all revealed no specific link between a personal experience/memory and the official representation of a certain memory. As the above-named cases of Adenauer, Brandt, Figl and Kreisky showed, specific interpretations of both personal and collective memory rather emerged in different contexts and were re-interpreted in light of these. Some believed the prevailing official narrative more than others by way of having a matching biographic background, i.e. by having overlaps between their own narrative and the national one. This however mattered little for the actual use and effectiveness of the narrative, as those who didn't have the same amount of overlap simply re-interpreted their own role in the past to bring it in line with the current national interpretation, and as such stylized themselves into the incorporation of a collective narrative that was at complete odds with their biography.

Despite the apparent lack of coherence between personal biography and political enactment of the past in individual actors, one trend deserving future attention was revealed within the Austrian-Israeli case study. When looking at the biographic backgrounds of Austrian officials, those most complicit with the national narrative of victimhood were those personally victimized by the Nazi regime rather than those who were followers, bystanders or even perpetrators. As a consequence, foreign policy-makers who were personal victims were overall less supportive of Israeli demands than those post-war officials who had a more compromised past vis-à-vis the time of National Socialism.

This finding became evident on the level of ambassadors, and on the highest levels of government: Josef Klaus was the first and only Austrian Chancellor who was personally not a victim of the Third Reich, but rather served in the German *Wehrmacht*, and he became friendliest with Israel while putting least emphasis on Austria's national victim narrative. In

contrast, his predecessor Leopold Figl, a former KZ inmate, and his successor Bruno Kreisky, a Jew who spent the years of the Nazi rule in exile, deliberately created, fuelled, leveraged and incorporated “Austria’s life lie” at the expense of Israel.

When looking at the background of the Austrian ambassadors posted to Israel since the beginning of the diplomatic relationship, a similar link between personal biography and victim narrative becomes obvious. Ambassador Ernst Luegmayer in 1961 was the first Austrian Ambassador to Tel Aviv to express doubt on the viability and credibility of Austria’s victim narrative. Compared to his two predecessors, Karl Hartl and Kurt Enderl, Luegmayer was also the first Austrian representative in Israel who was not an opponent and victim of the Nazi regime but had instead served in the *Wehrmacht*. Thus, Austrian officials who were personal victims of the Nazis, i.e. former concentration camp inmates, displaced persons and resistance fighters, like Chancellors Figl and Kreisky as well as Ambassador Hartl, seem to show a stronger and undisputed belief in the national narrative.

While this link between personal victimization and the strength of the belief in the victim narrative has already been pointed out by scholars looking only at the domestic Austrian context,⁷⁵⁰ it would require more in-depth research in other bilateral cases of the diplomacy of innocence to confirm causality between personal victimhood of foreign policy actors and their re-enactment of the diplomacy of innocence on the international stage.

Future research taking a stronger focus on agency rather than structure thus promises to provide new, interesting insights in the interactions between personal biography and the official use of memory for political gain on the international stage. A fine distinction between agency and structure when it comes to collective memory will however always remain

⁷⁵⁰ See, for instance, Diner (2007, 13) who claims that Austrian politicians of the post-war era were to a major part either incarcerated in concentration camps or political émigrés during the Nazi period and as such communicated their personal narratives as Nazi victims to ensemble the Austrian nation.

challenging. Apparently, Marx and Engels's aphorism also applies here: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."⁷⁵¹

Compared to the structural approach taken in this thesis, a redirected focus within the *diplomacy of memory* model nevertheless bears greater potential to counter the widespread sociological criticism on the limits of an all too instrumentalist and presentist view on memory within the field of political science.⁷⁵² As the examples of Adenauer, Brandt, Figl and Kreisky show, as well as the diverse biographic experiences of the Austrian politicians above, the same present can indeed, as Schwartz argued, sustain different memories and different presents can sustain the same memory. In contrast, this study's stronger focus on structure failed to recognize this complex role of collective memory in human experience and as such did not offer a convincing explanation as to why, for instance, in two Western democratic countries (West Germany and Austria) such different memories emerged, or why on the other hand, in the very different "presents" of the GDR and Austria, a similar narrative was sustained.

While more in-depth research into all of these cases certainly bears the potential of further illuminating how intentional and dispositional motivations interact with one another via biographic backgrounds in agents for the purpose of explaining foreign policy behaviour, such an agency focussed approach would also resonate with a more sophisticated analytical perspective within FPA. In accordance with Carlsnaes' tripartite approach, the dynamic *diplomacy of memory* model is able to take structural, dispositional and intentional

⁷⁵¹ Marx and Engels 2001, 7.

⁷⁵² Schwartz 2011, 243-247.

dimensions and their mutual interactions into account when it comes to its analysis of foreign policy behaviour. Other works employing FPA have often approached state-level factors as mere static attributes that constrain foreign policy action.⁷⁵³ Collective memory, however, can never form a simple ‘constraint’ in a static model on how domestic factors limit the options available to foreign policy-makers. Instead, collective memory as it is understood here, i.e. as socially created, interpreted and re-interpreted in the present for current and future purposes, constitutes a ‘constraint’ that is in constant and fluid interaction with the socio-political environment and its actors. A stronger agency focussed approach within the *diplomacy of memory* model would thus clearer distinguish this model from more limited research designs employing FPA. It would lay open the complex underlying interactions between agency and structure and refute criticism of what at a first instance might sound like the simple option of using memory as a mere tool for foreign policy gain. Instead, it would highlight that the *diplomacy of memory* model offers a dynamic, diachronic analysis that views foreign policy behaviour as the empirical end result of a series of complex, reciprocal agent-structure interactions best reflected in the concept of collective memory itself.

2.2. A longer timeframe of the analysis

While a stronger emphasis within the *diplomacy of memory* model on agency rather than structure promises to offer new insights on how individuals and their diverse interpretations of the past matter for diplomatic behaviour with memory on the international stage, covering a longer timeframe when applying this concept to empirical cases would accentuate the model’s dynamism in accounting for change. In fact, with more post-war decades included,

⁷⁵³ On general works of FPA, see: Breuning 2007, 12-13. Carlsnaes/Guzzini 2011. On their critique, see: Carlsnaes 1992, 260-268.

the *diplomacy of memory* model would allow researchers to better analyse the altering interplay of structural and agential international and domestic factors.

For instance, if I had gone beyond the selected timeframe of this study for both of my cases, I would have found that a substantial paradigm shift in memory happened soon thereafter in the entire memory landscape of Europe: Triggered by the (nearing) end of the Cold War, in combination with generational change, a new post-ideological, post-national European context gave rise to a so-called memory boom that shifted the Holocaust from the margins of memory into its global centre. Once the communist East had disappeared as the “evil other” threatening the West, Auschwitz emerged from the shadows of history into the “radical other” of Western civilization.⁷⁵⁴ It was in this context that the Holocaust became of universal relevance beyond those who had perpetrated or suffered it, and the time of myth-making, silence and forgetting was over once and for all. Auschwitz became a warning sign of “Never again!” for future generations, and this acknowledgement by states signified – as Judt put it - their entry ticket into Europe.⁷⁵⁵ From now onwards, the duty of remembrance would form the moral imperative of the new generation, rendering the traditional narratives of heroic resistance or victimhood superfluous. Their patriotic and nationally motivated messages were no longer at the forefront of public attention, replaced by the moving stories of those who had survived. As such, while in post-war myths the focus was on the occupied and “raped” nations, the attention now shifted from countries to their societies that had both suffered but also enabled National Socialism. As a result, all Western European societies in perpetrator, victim and bystander countries finally discovered the actual victim groups of the Holocaust, but also their very own involvement in the Nazi regime.⁷⁵⁶

⁷⁵⁴ The notion of the Holocaust signifying a break with civilization (“*Zivilisationsbruch*”) goes back to: Diner (Ed.) 1988.

⁷⁵⁵ Judt 2005, quoted in: Uhl 2016, 90.

⁷⁵⁶ Diner 2007, 12-20. Uhl 2016, 85-95. Judt 1992, 83-118. Huyssen 2003, 11- 24.

What Judt called “the revenge of history”,⁷⁵⁷ however, took on diverse forms in different national contexts. In the two cases of this study, West Germany and Austria, two separate pathways were followed: In both countries, chancellors for the first time took office who belonged to the second generation and have as such not been actively involved in the happenings of the Third Reich: In West Germany, Helmut Kohl (CDU), born in 1930, became Chancellor in 1982 (until 1998), in Austria, Franz Vranitzky (SPÖ), born in 1937, ruled Austria between 1986 and 1997. Their “late birth” naturally shaped their relationship to the Nazi legacy in different ways than those of their predecessors, but also took on diverse forms in the light of the two separate memory landscapes of their countries. While Helmut Kohl used “the mercy of a late birth” (“*die Gnade der späten Geburt*”)⁷⁵⁸ as a way of getting past West Germany’s special responsibility stemming from “old particularities” in the hope of finally leading the FRG into a pronounced “new normality”,⁷⁵⁹ Vranitzky, on the other hand, reversed the Austrian victim narrative which no longer reflected the moral and political requirements of his time. These narratives, in both West Germany and Austria, centred around the urge to remember rather than the need to forget, thus opening new ways for politicians to acknowledge and deal with the now ever more “present pasts”.⁷⁶⁰ The “new normality” would thus be - unlike what Kohl had aimed for - not free of the past but rather full of it. In the West German context, the sensitivity that Kohl lacked regarding this issue was compensated for once Richard von Weizsäcker became president. On the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, on 8 May 1985, von Weizsäcker delivered a historic speech that fully satisfied the newly emerging public need to remember in the spirit of “Never again”:

⁷⁵⁷ Judt 1992, 97.

⁷⁵⁸ Kohl on the ARD’s programme “Bonner Perspektiven”, 28 August 1983, quoted in: Weingardt 2002, 306.

⁷⁵⁹ Weingardt 2002, 312.

⁷⁶⁰ The term “present pasts” goes back to Huyssen 2003.

We can learn from our own past what humans are capable of. We therefore ought not think that we are now different and better people. There exists no ultimate endpoint for moral perfection – for no one and no country! We have grown as humans; we remain endangered as humans. But we have the power to overcome these hazards every day anew.⁷⁶¹

After Adenauer and Brandt, with von Weizsäcker, the FRG's enactment of its special responsibility stemming from the Nazi legacy had a new face, and the past was once again back on the official agenda of West Germany.⁷⁶² However, von Weizsäcker's speech not only signalled a continuation of the special relationship between West Germany, Israel and the Jews, but - enabled by the changing collective memory of West Germany's second generation public - also meant a full alignment between the official (international) and public (domestic) image of Germany as a guilty perpetrator: For the first time, it was possible for a West German politician to declare the 8th of May as a day of liberation rather than as a day of defeat within an exclusively domestic context.⁷⁶³ As such, what before was stated officially and mainly with an eye to an international audience, could now openly also be said to a domestic one: "The 8th of May was a day of liberation. It liberated all of us from the inhuman system of National Socialist tyranny. (...) Let's today - as much as we can - look truth into the eye."⁷⁶⁴

⁷⁶¹ Von Weizsäcker's speech before the German *Bundestag*, 8 May 1985. Online at: [Tagesschau.de: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/rede-vonweizsaecker-wortlaut-101.html](https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/rede-vonweizsaecker-wortlaut-101.html).

Translated by the author from the German original: "Wir lernen aus unserer eigenen Geschichte, wozu der Mensch fähig ist. Deshalb dürfen wir uns nicht einbilden, wir seien nun als Menschen anders und besser geworden. Es gibt keine endgültig errungene moralische Vollkommenheit - für niemanden und kein Land! Wir haben als Menschen gelernt, wir bleiben als Menschen gefährdet. Aber wir haben die Kraft, Gefährdungen immer von neuem zu überwinden."

⁷⁶² Weingardt 2002, 313.

⁷⁶³ Uhl 2016, 91.

⁷⁶⁴ Von Weizsäcker's speech before the German *Bundestag*, 8 May 1985. Online at: [Tagesschau.de: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/rede-vonweizsaecker-wortlaut-101.html](https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/rede-vonweizsaecker-wortlaut-101.html).

In German original: "Der 8. Mai war ein Tag der Befreiung. Er hat uns alle befreit von dem menschenverachtenden System der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltherrschaft. (...) Schauen wir am heutigen 8. Mai, so gut wir es können, der Wahrheit ins Auge."

Domestically, the effort of “looking truth into the eye” triggered the so-called *Historikerstreit* in 1986, an open argument among academic historians and public intellectuals about the relative status of the Holocaust in the context of other contemporary crimes. The debate was ultimately decided only by interference on the highest level of the government with both Chancellor Kohl and President von Weizsäcker officially recognizing the unique characteristics of the Holocaust and their incomparability.⁷⁶⁵ With this judgement, the official German attitude was fully aligned with the memory demands of the time: Auschwitz came to signify a unique break with civilization and the ultimate evil of the Western world. Any comparison with the Holocaust was thus rejected as an impermissible belittlement of the Nazi crimes.⁷⁶⁶ This new official rhetoric, coupled with the declaration of the 8th of May as a day of liberation rather than a day of grief, signified a radical break with the domestic political practices of memory in the post-war decades. Before then, guilt and remorse had been exclusively signalled to an international audience while the domestic public had to be kept cautiously at peace by emphasizing German suffering above all other. While, in West Germany, the paradigm shift in memory led to a closer approximation between the official narrative of guilt and the broader public’s memory, and therefore also to a continuation of the diplomacy of guilt vis-à-vis Israel after re-unification, in the Austrian case the national victim narrative changed completely in the course of the 1980s/90s. In 1986, almost at the same time of the *Historikerstreit*, the so-called Waldheim debate was triggered in Austria: When running for presidency, former UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim was asked about his wartime role as a *Wehrmacht* soldier and declared that he had done nothing but his duty. Representing a typical Austrian follower biography, the Waldheim case made clear that the experience of the broad Austrian public was different to

⁷⁶⁵ Weingardt 2002, 317.

⁷⁶⁶ Maier 1988.

that of a victim of the Nazi regime. The obvious irreconcilability between being victimized and “faithfully performing one’s duty” laid the fabricated nature of the national narrative open and thus also led to its final de-legitimization. Unlike other countries like France or Italy, in Austria it was therefore not the unravelling of historic facts that dissolved the victim narrative, but rather the individual case of Kurt Waldheim.⁷⁶⁷

With the victim myth finally dissolved, official Austria henceforth faced the task of creating a new national narrative that would serve its integrative function within both, an altered domestic memory landscape and a changed outside world. It was Chancellor Franz Vranitzky who took up the lead in this matter and made a historic step in 1991 by admitting Austrian co-responsibility for World War II:

There exists a co-responsibility for the suffering that, even if not Austria as a state, its citizens have caused other peoples. We’d like to acknowledge all our past actions of all segments of our population, the good ones and the bad ones; as we claim the good ones in our benefit, we also have to apologize for the evil ones - to the survivors and the descendants of the dead.⁷⁶⁸

Soon thereafter, Chancellor Vranitzky indeed went on to apologize to the victims: During his official visit to Israel in 1993, he asked for forgiveness in the name of the Austrian Republic,⁷⁶⁹ facilitating, as he recalled in an interview with the author, “a long overdue normalization in the relations between Austria and Israel: It was not only the end of the upkeep of a life lie but it also set the impulse for *Wiedergutmachung* (...).” Remembering

⁷⁶⁷ Uhl 1992, 86-87 and Uhl 2007, 239. Beker 2010, 102-108.

⁷⁶⁸ See Vranitzky’s speech before the Austrian Parliament, 8 July 1991, in: Nationalrat, XXIV.GP, Stenographisches Protokoll, 40. Sitzung, p. 91. Online at the website of the Austrian Parliament: http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00040/SEITE_0091.html.

Translated by the author from the German original: “*Es gibt eine Mitverantwortung für das Leid, das zwar nicht Österreich als Staat, wohl aber Bürger dieses Landes über andere Menschen und Völker gebracht haben. Wir bekennen uns zu allen Taten unserer Geschichte und zu den Taten aller Teile unseres Volkes, zu den guten wie zu den bösen; und so wie wir die guten für uns in Anspruch nehmen, haben wir uns für die bösen zu entschuldigen - bei den Überlebenden und bei den Nachkommen der Toten.*”

⁷⁶⁹ See Vranitzky’s speech in Jerusalem, printed in *Der Standard*, 11 June 1993.

the warm welcome he had received in Israel, Vranitzky added: “This was a really beautiful breakthrough to a normal reality (...).”⁷⁷⁰

The years 1993/94 thus came to signify a turning point in Austrian-Israeli relations, which once more confirms the main assumption of this study. When the nationally fabricated narrative is altered, also the diplomatic approach with memory changes on the international stage. While within Austria a newly formed official historic commission began to unearth facts about the *Anschluss* and the role of Austrians in the Nazi Regime, to the outside world and especially to Israel, Austria now began to present itself in a very different light. In stark contrast to its previous diplomacy of innocence, Austrian diplomatic behaviour from now onwards rather resembled the West German approach of projecting guilt. With the establishment of the National Fund of the Republic of Austria for Victims of National Socialism in 1995, Austria belatedly began significant restitution efforts.⁷⁷¹ Substantive gestures were furthermore accompanied by frequent verbal and symbolic acknowledgments

⁷⁷⁰ Franz Vranitzky, Interview with the author, Vienna, 30 March 2017.

Shortened and translated by the author from Vranitzky's words in the original German interview transcript: “(...) *das war ja nicht nur das Ende der Aufrechterhaltung einer Lebenslüge, sondern es war auch der Anstoß (...) für Wiedergutmachung. (...) Und vor allem, dann auch nach mir, die Normalisierung des Verhältnisses der Republik Österreich zum Staat Israel. Auch das wollte ich nicht weiter anstehen lassen, dass mehr oder weniger auf hoher Regierungsebene oder diplomatischer Ebene keine geordneten Beziehungen da waren. Ich bin dann auch 1993 hingereist, wunderbar und wunderschön aufgenommen worden. Eigentlich ein wirklicher und schöner Durchbruch zu einer normalen Realität (...).*“

⁷⁷¹ The National Fund of the Republic of Austria for Victims of National Socialism was established in 1995 (Federal Law Gazette no. 432/1995), culminating in the signing of the so-called Washington Agreement in 2001 by representatives of Austria, the USA and victim's organizations. The belated reparation payments under the umbrella of these agreements took the form of a symbolic sum of 5087,10 Euros to each survivor who has been an Austrian citizen on 13 March 1938 or permanent resident up until then, or child of such. Reparations further included restitution for losses of assets and property suffered as a result of National Socialist prosecution (*Entschädigungsfondsgesetz* or General Settlement Fund Law, Federal Law Gazette I 12/2001). In addition, social welfare benefits for Austrian Jewish survivors including pensions, nursing care (*Pflegegeld*) and victim relief (*Opferfürsorge*) have been issued. These long overdue reparation payments to victims have been supported by several other laws that followed a similar aim, most prominent amongst them the art restitution law (*Kunstrückgabegesetz*, Federal Law Gazette 181/1998) of 1998.

Sources:

See website of the historic commission of the Austrian Republic at: <http://www.historikerkommission.gv.at/>.

See website of the Claims Conference for more information on the Austrian National Fund, online at: <http://www.claimscon.org/about/history/closed-programs/austrian-national-fund/>.

See homepage of the National Fund of the Republic of Austria for Victims of National Socialism, online at: <http://www.en.nationalfonds.org/index-2.html>.

See also: Karner/Iber (Eds.) 2015 and Uhl 2007, 243-245.

of guilt and remorse. To name but one instance, Thomas Klestil, the President who succeeded Kurt Waldheim, bowed his head during an official visit to Israel in 1994 “with deep respect and profound emotion” on behalf of the Republic of Austria in front of the victims, acknowledging that “no word of apology can ever expunge the agony of the Holocaust”.⁷⁷² Official Austria’s international performance of memory was indeed altered significantly throughout the 1990s. Just as in post-war years, however, also now international gain was to be expected from making diplomacy with memory: As Judt had suggested, in a changed post-Cold War environment, a country’s positioning vis-à-vis the Holocaust formed its entry ticket into Europe. And indeed, it did so for Austria; with the country joining the EU in 1995, Austria’s new diplomacy of guilt can thus be said to have yielded its first immediate international success.

Applying the *diplomacy of memory* model to a selected case over an extended timeframe that ideally also includes a shift in the national narrative from innocence to guilt (Austrian case) or only new forms of one strain of the diplomacy with memory (West German case) thus would offer additional evidence on how international performances of memory change when the nationally fabricated narrative is altered with time. Furthermore, as became evident in this mini study, a longer timeframe of the analysis would also take into account nuances between different approaches of the diplomacy of guilt and innocence respectively, as well as their accompanying notions of guilt/remorse and victimhood when altered in differing contexts. Tracing the influence of national and international structural and agential forces over a longer period of time further promises to lead to a clearer analytical distinction

⁷⁷² See speech of President Thomas Klestil before the Knesset, 15 November 1994, quoted in: Beker 2010, 108.

between them as well as a better understanding of their mutual causal conditioning of one another over time. As such, future research that integrates narrative change from innocence to guilt or vice-versa into the *diplomacy of memory* model can prove the model's dynamism and its potential to account for change, only hinted at by the cases presented here.

2.3. Application to other empirical cases

For the purpose of building a theory that contributes to the understanding of foreign policy behaviour in other post-conflict situations, it is important to move beyond what is unique in the historic examples of this study and instead extract generalizable elements that allow the *diplomacy of memory* model to travel to other bilateral scenarios.

First of all, we established that the *diplomacy of memory* concept can only be applied wherever there exists a legacy between two countries that is valued as significant, i.e. traumatic and shameful, and that as a consequence renders the bilateral relationship between these two different to other bilateral relations of states who do not share such a historic connection.

Concrete cases that fit this assumption would be, for instance, the bilateral relations between Japan and China, as well as Japan and South Korea, all connected by the tragic legacy that resulted from Japanese expansionism during the 1930s/40s and the accompanying military incursions of the Japanese Empire into Chinese and Korean territory. Furthermore, the bilateral relations between Japan and the US could also be examined with the traumatic legacies of Pearl Harbour and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki connecting this pair of countries. Or, we may take the example of two less distant and less powerful nations, Vietnam and Cambodia, with their long history of border disputes and outright

wars.⁷⁷³ In Europe, the bilateral relationships between Germany and France as well as between Germany and Poland could also serve as further testing ground for the *diplomacy of memory* model with both sets of countries connected via the traumatic legacy of Nazi occupation. Another example of a shameful Fascist legacy stemming from the time of World War II would be Italy and its diplomatic relations with its post-war allies. In the Balkans, the relationship between Serbia and the rest of the former Yugoslavian states, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo could also be analysed at the backdrop of the Yugoslav Wars fought in the 1990s and their accompanying horrific legacy of ethnic cleansing. Other examples from Europe, for instance, include British-Irish relations vis-à-vis the conflict in Northern Ireland and the Bloody Sunday massacre of 1972 as the shameful legacy in question. Or, from the European periphery, Armenian-Turkish relations against the backdrop of the more distant but all the more atrocious legacy of the Ottoman government's systematic extermination of Armenians in 1915.⁷⁷⁴

Only having a tragic legacy that connects two countries is however not sufficient for case selection. In order to show that memory indeed constitutes an alternative diplomatic tool for these countries, research must trace if and how foreign policy decision-makers interpret a country's legacy for the purpose of leveraging it for strategic gain on the international stage. The selected examples suggest that most perpetrator countries likely followed what I outlined as the diplomacy of innocence, with some showing a mixture between the diplomacy of innocence and guilt, especially when considering a longer timeframe. The diplomacy of guilt example of West German-Israeli relations, on the other hand, was rarely employed and, if at all, then only to a much lesser extent.

⁷⁷³ See, for instance: Westad/Quinn-Judge 2006.

⁷⁷⁴ The timespan of the Armenian genocide just as using the word "genocide" itself is contested and varies from source to source, but the happenings are generally associated with 1915, the year when most of the atrocities took place. See, for instance: Lewy 2005, 245-257.

For instance, compared to Germany, Japan in the aftermath of World War II has been described by Ian Buruma as resembling a “petulant child, stamping its foot, shouting that it had done nothing wrong, because everybody did it”.⁷⁷⁵ In further contrast to Germany’s behaviour towards Israel but also towards France and Poland, Japanese apologies to China and South Korea, even though including elements of the diplomacy of guilt,⁷⁷⁶ have been perceived as “too little, too late”.⁷⁷⁷ Moreover, the countless times when Japan attempted to fend off its past by outright denying it in its political actions or whitewashing it in its textbooks rather attest to the pursuit of the diplomacy of innocence than the diplomacy of guilt vis-à-vis its Asian neighbours.⁷⁷⁸ Besides Japan, another example that could be employed to exhibit how the diplomacy of innocence and guilt gave way to one another over a longer timeframe would be Italy. Italy’s national myth of pure victimization and resistance was crucially questioned in a post-Cold War European context, suggesting that attention should be directed at how this change in the Italian national narrative also altered its diplomatic conduct vis-à-vis its European neighbours.⁷⁷⁹ The example of Britain, on the other hand, exhibits a mixture of first, innocence, and then, guilt towards Ireland regarding the Northern Irish conflict.⁷⁸⁰ In contrast, Vietnam⁷⁸¹, Serbia⁷⁸² and Turkey⁷⁸³ seem to have at most times projected “innocence” towards their target countries vis-à-vis their shameful past in question. In the cases of Serbia and Turkey, this effort was mainly undertaken by

⁷⁷⁵ Buruma 1995, 294.

⁷⁷⁶ As suggested by Todd Hall 2015, 176-185.

⁷⁷⁷ Lind 2008, 2.

⁷⁷⁸ For the politics of war commemoration in East Asia, see, for instance: Saito 2017.

For a more detailed account on Sino-Japanese relations and their reconciliation process, see: He 2009.

On Japanese-South Korean relations, see: Lind 2008.

⁷⁷⁹ For Italy’s national narrative on its fascist legacy and its alterations over time, see, for instance: Thomassen/Forlenza 2013, 137-154.

⁷⁸⁰ For Britain’s role in the conflict in Northern Ireland and its steps towards reconciliation, see, for instance: Dixon 2001.

⁷⁸¹ On Cambodian-Vietnamese Relations, see, for instance: Pouvatchy 1986, 440-451.

⁷⁸² On Serbia’s way of dealing with the past, see: Gordy 2013.

⁷⁸³ On Turkey and the Armenian genocide as well as its effect on the future of Turkish-Armenian relations, see, for instance: Lewy 2005 and Marchand/Perrier/Blythe 2015. Neyzi/Kharatyan-Araqelyan 2010.

way of outright denying the status of genocide to the atrocities committed while at the same time deliberately relativizing them by pointing to the own suffering.⁷⁸⁴

With regards to the directly opposed approach of presenting one's country as a remorseful perpetrator rather than an innocent victim, West German-French and German-Polish relations would deserve further research attention as possible cases of how the diplomacy of guilt worked out in the diverse contexts of two Western European neighbours and between a Western and Eastern European country.⁷⁸⁵ While Franco-German and German-Polish relations were restored with much less contrition than in the German–Israeli case, the basic acknowledgment of past violence on behalf of West Germany nevertheless appears to have been the most important step in that direction.⁷⁸⁶ Both bilateral relationships have furthermore been described as nothing short of a “miracle”,⁷⁸⁷ which already hints at the immense, combined reconciliation efforts at the backdrop of the large looming atrocious legacy of war and occupation. To take up the most recent issue stemming from the past in Polish-German relations, even Germany's refutation of admittedly belated Polish reparation requests in 2017 speaks to this study's assumption: if the international incentive context is altered, so is the motivation for the diplomacy of guilt.⁷⁸⁸

Explanations as to why diplomatic behaviour with memory might vary between diverse case countries at different times may not only be found in structural conditions but also in the identity of states themselves. How the past and associated displays of guilt and contrition

⁷⁸⁴ Naimark 2016, 122-123.

⁷⁸⁵ On Germany's relations with Poland and France and their reconciliation processes, see, for instance: Feldman 2012.

On the Franco-German reconciliation, see also: Lind 2008. On Franco-German relations more general, see: Germond/Türk (Eds.) 2008 and Cole 2001.

For an analysis of the West German-Polish reconciliation process, see He 2009 and Wiatr 2014.

⁷⁸⁶ Lind (2008, 181) and Feldman (2012, 258-259) both come to that same judgement.

⁷⁸⁷ For an estimation of the Franco-German relationship as a miracle, see Lappenküper 2008, 160-161. Wiatr (2014, 7) characterized the Polish-German relationship in the aftermath of World War II as a miracle.

⁷⁸⁸ See: *Der Spiegel (online)*, “Gutachten bestätigt polnische Forderung nach Reparationen von Deutschland“, 11 September 2017. Online at: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/polen-gutachten-bestaetigt-forderung-nach-reparationen-von-deutschland-a-1167107.html>.

are handled by countries is determined by cultural dispositions which differ significantly among states and regions. While the case countries selected for this study, West Germany and Austria, belong to the same cultural sphere, the cases of this mini-study belong to very different cultural realms. These, according to Friedrichs' intercultural theory of international relations, can broadly be distinguished into honor, face and dignity cultures.⁷⁸⁹ While not set in stone, each of these cultural predispositions is assumed to lead to different understandings and behavior vis-a-vis other countries also when it comes to the diplomacy with memory. As such, due to their specific cultural lenses, states ascribing to, for instance, a dignity culture, i.e. the United States and Western Europe, absorb the judgment of others in different ways than states belonging to face cultures, i.e. Asian countries, would do. This is because dignity cultures understand self-worth as intrinsic to the subject and thus inalienable, while face cultures see it as determined by the reference group, thus extrinsic and alienable.⁷⁹⁰ Taking these cultural differences into account therefore offers an alternative explanation as to why, for instance, Japan's post-war behaviour differed fundamentally from Germany's. Given Japan's predisposition as a face culture, a self-portrayal as a guilty perpetrator ala West Germany would have signified a severe loss of face under the (perceived) controlling, external gaze of others. In cultures where your face denotes your place, such a loss of face would be devastating. Loosing face by admitting guilt was thus an unlikely step to take for Japan. Dignity cultures, on the other hand, allow for the reintegration of victims of past humiliations as well as of perpetrators due to their cultural disposition for everybody's intrinsic and inalienable dignity. As such, for West Germany, the option of reoccupying a dignified space by admitting guilt and moral responsibility existed. Cultural dispositions

⁷⁸⁹ Friedrichs 2016, 68-71.

⁷⁹⁰ On the specific cultural dispositions and international behavior of face and dignity cultures, see: Friedrichs 2016, 77-80.

therefore offer another explanation as to why state behaviour with memory might differ significantly across countries and regions.

Even though diplomacy with memory can take on different forms and nuances across diverse cultures, to prove that countries indeed use their legacy as a foreign policy tool researchers must further investigate states' willingness to make a costly investment in the effort of credibly signalling a specific historic image of guilt or innocence to the target state as well as to the outside world.

In the Japanese case, for instance, that would mean showing that its decade-long practices of official development assistance for China were actually motivated by a sense of responsibility for Japanese war crimes during World War II.⁷⁹¹ Or in reverse, one would need to prove that Japanese Prime Ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine to remember Japanese war dead including war criminals, was indeed a sign of projecting innocence, i.e. Japanese victimhood, towards China and the international community, and for what strategic purpose.⁷⁹²

While looking for evidence where memory received the power to skew the traditional cost-benefit calculus in the above-named cases, only one of them stands out as exceptional and is as such likely to not be applicable to the *diplomacy of memory* model: US-Japan relations. Neither the US nor Japan have apologized for the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki or for Pearl Harbour respectively.⁷⁹³ Far from showing any signs of contrition, the atrocious legacy of the American bombings seemed simply not to have mattered to US conduct with Japan at all. The two countries immediately restored peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with one another in the direct aftermath of World War II.⁷⁹⁴ A possible explanation

⁷⁹¹ Hall 2015, 178.

⁷⁹² Ma 2013, 102-142.

⁷⁹³ Lind 2008, 181.

⁷⁹⁴ See, for instance: Vogel 2002.

might lie in the US' nature of being the sole superpower among the named examples. Do superpowers not conduct diplomacy with memory even if there exists – as the case of the atomic bombs exemplifies - a most tragic and shameful legacy? Future research would be needed to confirm this assertion; however, one possible explanation could stem from the very nature of memory as a diplomatic tool. For small and medium-sized countries, the effort to portray a certain historic image to the international stage is costly, nevertheless, still a “cheap but meaningful signal”⁷⁹⁵ when compared to other diplomatic tools that countries can resort to. Superpowers, by way of their privileged position within the international system, apparently do not face the need to invest in the effort of projecting a specific historic image because they can also employ other, costlier tools. Neither do superpowers face the need to reap benefits from such a signal being “meaningful” for they already hold a desirable place among the international community of states. In short, superpowers lack the strategic aim that motivates other countries to act out memory internationally. As such superpowers, as the US example with the outstandingly tragic legacy of the atomic bombs hints at, neither have to portray themselves as “innocent” or “guilty” vis-à-vis their own past onto the international stage, but instead conduct no diplomacy with memory at all.

When looking for further case studies upon which to test the *diplomacy of memory* model, it is therefore not enough to select countries which are linked via a shameful legacy of crimes perpetrated upon another country. These countries further, as the example of the US underlines, not only have to have inflicted harm in the past on another state, but they also must have something to gain from making diplomacy with that legacy on the international stage, be it by way of admitting guilt or by way of projecting innocence. This latter condition does not seem to be in place when it comes to powerful countries. Therefore, the set of countries connected to one another by a shameful legacy have to somehow be equals in terms

⁷⁹⁵ Hall 2015, 189.

of power relations within the current international system due to the simple fact that only smaller or middle powers - depending on the specific context that they find themselves in - can potentially gain from projecting either innocence or guilt to the international stage, and as such are also likely to actually use memory as a diplomatic tool. Researchers must therefore not only look for a tragic legacy and how it is perceived by foreign policy makers through specific cultural lenses, but also trace its strategic purpose on the international stage in a changing international context.

Deserving more future research attention in other cases is also the third and last element of the *diplomacy of memory* model that described diplomatic behaviour with memory as being a two-level game: When applying memory as a foreign policy tool, foreign policy actors are forced to strike a delicate balancing act in order to satisfy international imperatives and domestic constituencies simultaneously. As was obvious in the cases studied in this thesis, this balancing act seems to be an easier endeavour with the diplomacy of innocence, whereas the diplomacy of guilt, while internationally received most positively, is more likely to face domestic backlash from patriotic, conservative and revisionist forces within a country. Lind's findings in her study of official apologies as well point to this notion, so does a quick look at the domestic opposition to actual and even only potential attempts in the direction of contrition in the examples cited here: For instance, take Tony Blair's apology to the people of Ireland for the 1972 Bloody Sunday massacre. Many British and Northern Irish unionists immediately denounced his gesture by dismissing both British culpability and criticising Irish victim mentality.⁷⁹⁶ In Italy, the attempts to confront past collaboration triggered yet again "a war, now fought by every segment of public opinion" that also included violent

⁷⁹⁶ See Lind (2008, 181-185) on contrition triggering backlash in more general, and on the British-Irish case (2008, 184).

public disputes during the 1990s.⁷⁹⁷ Another example is provided by Turkey, where the prominent journalist Hrant Dink was gunned down by a Turkish nationalist for advocating Turkish recognition of the Armenian genocide.⁷⁹⁸ Countless examples where contrition was met with protest can also be found in Japan. To name only two instances, when Japanese Diet member Kato Koichi criticised Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, his home was burned down by rightists. Or, on a larger national scale, the apologetic statements by Prime Ministers Hosokawa and Murayama in the 1990s for what was called an "aggressive war" prompted fierce opposition within Japanese society and high-level officials to decry these attempts as "unpatriotic distortions of Japanese history".⁷⁹⁹ Applying the *diplomacy of memory* model to more and different cases would therefore not only give further insight into when and for what purpose countries chose to portray what memory to the international stage, but also why some portrayals face more domestic resistance than others in specific contexts over time.

As the diversity of these examples in terms of legacy in question (its scale, its distance in time, its perception), the current identity of the perpetrator country (its size, power and culture) as well as the relations between two case countries to one another (their geographic proximity and balance of power as well as their belonging to the same or diverse cultural realms) already suggest, diplomatic behaviour with memory is likely to vary across regions dependent upon a specific and complex interplay of domestic and international agents and structures. Despite contextual nuances, researchers - when selecting further cases for testing the *diplomacy of memory* model - nevertheless should pay attention to all three core elements

⁷⁹⁷ Thomassen/Forlenza 2013, 147.

⁷⁹⁸ Lind 2008, 185.

⁷⁹⁹ Ma 2013, 115-116.
Lind 2008, 181 & 185.

that qualify “memory” as a separate diplomatic tool and a new form of rational state behaviour. There has to exist a relevant (often shameful) legacy between the selected countries. The perpetrator country must furthermore perceive the costly signalling effort of its national interpretation of that legacy as a way to strategically gain on the international stage. In doing so, its foreign policy makers however face both constraints and opportunities from their own domestic public. If future research finds clear evidence of this kind of state behaviour also in other regions and post-conflict contexts, then the toolkit of diplomatic strategies within International Relations indeed needs to be amended by collective memory.

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- ÖStA/AdR, BKA/AA (before 1959).
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Bruno Kreisky Archive, Vienna

3. Interviews

Interview with Franz Vranitzky, Austrian Chancellor 1986-1997.

The one-hour long interview took place in the Bruno Kreisky Forum, Ambrustergasse 15, 1190 Vienna, on 30 March 2017.

Interview with Eva Nowotny, Foreign Policy Advisor to Chancellor Vranitzky and later Ambassador to the US.

The one-hour long interview took place at her home in Vienna, on 29 December 2016.

Interview with Franz-Josef Kuglitsch, Austrian Ambassador to Tel Aviv 2012-2015.

The one-hour long interview took place at the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, Minoritenplatz 8, 1010 Vienna, on 16 December 2016.

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7. List of figures

Figure 1: “Drawing of Eichmann’s face”

Source: *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Eichmann: Bürokrat oder Beelzebub?“, by Emery Kelen, 30 April 1961.

Figure 2: “Cartoon of Nasser with Hitler moustache”

Source: *Arbeiter Zeitung*, Cartoon, 11 June 1967.

Figure 3: “Pro-Israel protests in Munich, Summer 1967”

Source: Photograph taken by and published in: Vogel 1967a, 321.

Figure 4: “Call for Solidarity with Israel”

Source: *Arbeiter Zeitung*, “Jüdische Männer und Frauen! Solidaritätskundgebung für Israel“, 7 June 1967.

Figure 5: “Brandt kneeling in Warsaw”

Source: https://www.planet-wissen.de/geschichte/persoenlichkeiten/willy_brandt/pwiederkniefallvonwarschau102.html
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Figure 6: “Anonymous message warning of imminent Palestinian terror”

Source: Ambassador Backes to Foreign Ministry: “Anonyme Warnung vor palästinensischen Terroraktionen in Österreich”, Beirut, 8 February 1973. ÖStA/AdR, BMAA, Israel 2/7, Gz. 30378/6_73.

Figure 7: “Kreisky and Arafat hug at Vienna airport”

Source:
https://www.frontpagemag.com/sites/default/files/uploads/2014/07/kreiskyarafat_PLO.jpg
(Viewed: 19 February 2018).

Figure 8: “Cartoon of Kreisky, *Haaretz*”

Source: *Haaretz*, Cartoon, 5 September 1978. Kreisky Archiv, VII. 1, Israel, Box 3.

Figure 9: “Cartoon of Kreisky looking into a mirror”

Source: *Maariv*, Cartoon by Zeev, 17 May 1985. Kreisky Archiv, VII. 1, Israel, Box 4.

Figure 10: “Cartoon: Bruno Kreisky in a relaxed moment”

Source: *Jerusalem Post*, Cartoon Dry Bones: “Bruno Kreisky in a relaxed moment”, 4 September 1978. Kreisky Archiv, VII. 1, Israel, Box 3.

Questions for semi-structured interviews (in German)

1. Der Österreichische Opfermythos als das dominante, nationale Geschichtsnarrativ zwischen 1945 und 1993:

- Wurde der nationale Opfermythos von den Nachkriegspolitikern bewusst implementiert (top-down)?
- Und für welche politischen Zwecke (innen- und/oder außenpolitische Motive)?
- Wie verankert war das Opfernarrativ in der Österreichischen Bevölkerung?

2. Die Österreichisch-Israelischen Beziehungen zwischen 1945 und 1993: die sog. „Diplomatie der Unschuld“ ein strategisch, bewusst kalkuliertes, diplomatisches Instrument der Österreicher gegenüber Israel, um nationale Interessen durchzusetzen?

- Stellte der Staat Israel eine Gefahr für den Österreichischen Opfermythos dar?
- War die österreichische Diplomatie gegenüber Israel ein strategisch-geplanter, gemeinsamer diplomatischer Versuch, Österreich als erstes Opfer des Nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands darzustellen?
- Und welches Publikum wurde von den Diplomaten bei ihrem Versuch den Opfermythos nach außen zu projizieren angesprochen: die österreichische Regierung und Bevölkerung oder ausländische Regierungen und die internationale Gemeinschaft?

3. Die Österreichisch-Israelischen Beziehungen zwischen 1945 und 1993: Die „Diplomatie der Unschuld“ als eine in den Köpfen der Akteure fest verankerte Idee?

- War das Opfernarrativ nicht nur Strategie, sondern vielmehr in der Weltanschauung der Diplomaten und relevanten Politiker (Außenminister/Bundeskanzler) so stark verankert, dass keine andere Politik gegenüber Israel denkbar war?
- Hat hierbei die persönliche Biographie von Politikern/Diplomaten eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt?
- Ist es richtig anzunehmen, dass jene, die persönlich Opfer des Nationalsozialistischen Regimes waren, ihren Opferstatus quasi auf das gesamte Land Österreich übertragen haben, während Politiker, die in der Wehrmacht dienten, eher dazu neigten, das nationale Opfernarrativ zu hinterfragen?

Additional Interview Questions for Chancellor Vranitzky and Ambassador Nowotny only:

4. Die SPÖ und Israel:

- Warum vollzog sich innerhalb der SPÖ ein Stimmungswandel von Pro-Israel in 1967 zu Anti-Israel (Pro-Palästinenser) in den 1970er Jahren?
- Waren beide Haltungen Resultat der nationalen Opferthese? Das heißt: Berufung auf die Loyalität und Identifikation mit den jeweils anderen „unschuldigen“ Opfern - eine quasi „Solidarität zwischen Opfern“?

5. Das Ende des Opfermythos

Die Waldheim-Affäre deutet darauf hin, dass das Opfernarrativ innerhalb der Bevölkerung wenig verankert war. Die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung hat sich mit Waldheims Satz „*Ich habe nur meine Pflicht getan*“ mehr identifiziert als mit dem Opferstatus der Nachkriegspolitiker. Die „künstliche“ Konstruktion des Opfermythos wurde somit ein für alle Mal offengelegt: Menschen können eben nicht Opfer sein und gleichzeitig aber auch ihre Pflicht tun. Der Opfermythos hatte daher nach fast 4 Jahrzehnten sein einendes Potential für alle Österreicher verloren.

In diesem Kontext haben Sie als erster Bundeskanzler offiziell die Opferthese relativiert und die **Mitschuld Österreichs anerkannt** (1991 vor dem Nationalrat – 1993 in Israel).

- Wie kam es zu dieser Entscheidung?
(War das österreichische oder das internationale Umfeld ausschlaggebend? Hatte Israel einen entscheidenden Einfluss?)
- Welchem politischen Zweck diente diese Entscheidung?
- Wie groß war der Widerstand gegen diese Initiative und von welchen Gruppen ging der meiste Widerstand aus?
- Wie wurde Ihre Entscheidung in Israel und der Welt aufgenommen?
(Reaktionen aus Deutschland?)
- Wurden die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu Israel dadurch entscheidend verändert/verbessert?
- Wurden die Österreichischen diplomatischen Strategien gegenüber Israel bewusst an das neue Geschichtsverständnis angepasst und verändert?
- Kann man sagen, dass seit 1993 Österreich eine West-Deutschland ähnliche „Diplomatie der Schuld“ gegenüber Israel verfolgt und die österreichisch-israelischen Beziehungen seit 1993 den gleichen besonderen Charakter haben wie die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen?

