


Twilight of the pollsters

A social theory of mass opinion in late modernity



Marius S. J. Ostrowski

All Souls College

Hilary Term 2017

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in Politics at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. I declare and confirm that the following submission is my own work except where otherwise indicated, that it has not previously been submitted for assessment, either at Oxford or at any other institution, and that all sources have been cited appropriately.

Word count: 105,687 words

Abstract

Twilight of the pollsters: A social theory of mass opinion in late modernity

Marius S. J. Ostrowski, All Souls College, Hilary Term 2017

DPhil in Politics

This thesis examines how the occupations people hold, and the social classes in which they are situated, affect the way in which they form and express opinions. At a theoretical level, it unites the ‘deep-structure’ macroanalysis of social theory with the individualised microanalysis of how subjects form and express opinions in opinion research, reviving an approach that has not been pursued since early-20th-century social research. At a practical level, it responds to several recent and prominent failures of prediction by the opinion polling industry, and asks whether a broader understanding of ‘mass opinion’ can help avert such failures in future. The thesis argues that opinions are subjects’ judgments about their social conditions, based on mental pictures they have of these conditions that combine the values and attitudes they hold with the information they have about their environment. Subjects form opinions based on these pictures via three ‘means of thinking’—personality-traits, emotions, and reason—and express them using two kinds of ‘means of articulation’—bodily organs and media. The thesis shows how the variety of occupations subjects hold, and the extremity of class differentials between them, introduce substantial plurality into their values and attitudes, the way they acquire information, how they think, and how they articulate themselves. In particular, it highlights the considerable asymmetries between higher- and lower-class subjects regarding: which parts of their social conditions they are experts about, and how far they are influenced by others; whether they think about their conditions more emotionally or with reasoning; and how great a range and quality of opportunities they have to articulate their views. The thesis closes by suggesting that these findings offer opinion researchers and social theorists clear directions for measuring ‘mass opinion’ in new ways, and potentially emancipating the voices of subjects whose opinions are suppressed in late-modern society.

For my parents,
to whom I owe everything.

Wer bin ich — und wenn ja, wie viele?

Who am I — and if so, how many?

——Richard David Precht

πολλὰ οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ, ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα.

Multa novit vulpes, verum echinus unum magnum.

A fox knows many things, but a hedgehog one big thing.

——Erasmus, after Archilochus

We are all experts in our own experiences.

——modern proverb

Ne supra crepidam sutor iudicaret.

A shoemaker should not judge beyond the shoe.

——Pliny

Are you thinking what we're thinking?

——UK Conservative party election slogan, 2005

CLAUDIUS: He hath not fail'd to pester us with message.

——William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, I.2

“I don't think—”

“Then you shouldn't talk,” said the Hatter.

——Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*

Contents

Preface	page 7
Introduction: Twilight of the Pollsters	16
§1. <i>The fractured field of opinion research</i>	19
§2. <i>Renewing social analysis of mass opinion</i>	24
§3. <i>Occupation, class, and mass opinion</i>	28
§4. <i>Overview of this enquiry</i>	34
I. Outline of a social theory	37
§1. <i>Defining 'the social': material and relational conditions</i>	38
§2. <i>Social agency and the domains of social activity</i>	41
§3. <i>Occupations and classes</i>	52
§4. <i>From agency to identity: habitus and socialisation</i>	58
§5. <i>Mass opinion: ideation, communication, and discourse</i>	65
§6. <i>Conclusion</i>	75
II. The nature and basis of opinion	76
§1. <i>Judgment and its objects</i>	77
§2. <i>The means of thinking: personality-traits, emotions, and reason</i>	89
§3. <i>The means of articulation: bodily organs and media</i>	109
§4. <i>Conclusion</i>	126
III. Experts in our own experience: pluralism in predispositions and information	128
§1. <i>The social constitution of predispositions</i>	129
§2. <i>The social sources of information</i>	146
§3. <i>The main influences on judgment in late modernity</i>	161
§4. <i>Conclusion</i>	187
IV. Are you thinking how we're thinking?: pluralism in opinion-formation	189
§1. <i>Occupation, class, and the means of thinking</i>	190
§2. <i>Personality-traits: progressive reasoners and reactionary emoters</i>	200
§3. <i>Emotions: positive reproducers and negative rethinkers</i>	214
§4. <i>Reason: rational purists and reasonable approximators</i>	229

§5. <i>Conclusion</i>	236
V. They have not fail'd to pester us with message: pluralism in opinion-expression	238
§1. <i>Occupation, class, and the means of articulation</i>	239
§2. <i>Bodily organs: sophisticate poseurs and common obsequy</i>	249
§3. <i>Media: omnivolent magnates and sporadic gadflies</i>	259
§4. <i>Conclusion</i>	273
Conclusion: Beyond the <i>Pollsterdämmerung</i>	275
§1. <i>'Between foxes and hedgehogs': the social nature and basis of opinion</i>	276
§2. <i>Occupation, class, and mass opinion: a review</i>	279
§3. <i>Measuring and emancipating mass opinion</i>	282
Bibliography	293

Preface

Und doch sehr oft, wenn wir uns von dem Beabsichtigten für ewig getrennt sehen, haben wir schon auf unserm Wege irgend ein anderes Wünschenswerthe gefunden.

And yet very often, when we find ourselves forever separated from what we had intended, we have already found something else desirable along the way.

—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, ‘Maxim 68’¹

It would be an understatement to say that this thesis has ended up in a very different place to where it started. When I first applied to the DPhil, the UK had just gone through one of the most turbulent summers in its recent history. On 4 August 2011, a 29-year-old mixed-race Londoner, Mark Duggan, was shot and killed by police officers from the Specialist Firearms Command (CO19) of the Metropolitan Police as part of an investigation into gun crime within the black community. Police mishandling of the aftermath of Duggan’s death led to a peaceful protest outside Tottenham police station escalating into a violent pitched battle between members of the local community and riot police. This, in turn, exploded into several nights of rioting and looting across London, with ‘copycat violence’ flaring up in other towns and cities throughout England, ultimately causing five deaths, 202 police and civilian injuries, and more than £200m of damage. As the country entered a state of flux for nearly a week, public discourse in its many forms erupted into rancorous debate about the personal, social, and political reasons for this pervasive breakdown of order. Whether through opinion pieces in the press, interviews and discussion programmes on radio and television, posts and comments on blogs and social media, or in their responses to surveys and opinion polls, vast swathes of the population from all walks of life seized the opportunity to document their reactions to the events of those few days. Across all of them, mass opinion covered various combinations of possible factors that caused the riots, ranging from consumerism, youth culture, endemic criminality, and family breakdown to police racism, poor education, lack of opportunities, and a society-wide values crisis. For each one, mass opinion rapidly

¹ Goethe 1833, vol.49.

crystallised into an almost stereotypical division between ‘right-wing’ and ‘left-wing’ views—a fault-line that persisted to a greater or lesser extent across all of the ways in which it was expressed.

It was out of my attempts to make sense of this problem that my DPhil project gradually took shape. As those closest to me would doubtless attest, I have never tired of recounting the story of when, and how, I first came to choose my doctoral topic: drinking with an old undergraduate friend in the Marquis of Granby after a somewhat nondescript day in the office interning at a thinktank. The Marquis—typically packed with researchers, civil servants, journalists, and other politics junkies jostling for space and spilling out onto the street—was unusually deserted for a balmy summer’s evening. It was the third day of the riots, and across the city many companies had sent their employees home absurdly early in order to avoid any accidental run-ins with marauding rioters. The Westminster bubble was apparently no exception. As my friend and I sat nursing our drinks and quietly discussing the recent events, alone except for a somewhat antsy-looking bartender, it struck us quite how deeply unnecessary and ironic the panic in London’s political workforce was. Unnecessary because the whole London political quarter sits in the more-or-less literal shadow of the Palace of Westminster and New Scotland Yard power nexus. It would be difficult to think of a place less at risk from the violence of the precariat in the whole of London, possibly excluding the soulless wasteland of Canary Wharf. (Needless to say, this triumphant logic was a little lost on worried friends and family, who were aghast that we had not joined the bourgeois exodus earlier in the day.) And it was ironic since it meant that even the people tasked with operating and influencing the bureaucratic machinery of government had briskly abandoned their faith in the state’s ability to ‘do its job’ in the most basic conceivable way.

But there was a deeper, and far more serious, aspect to this outbreak of mass panic among the residents and workers of London and elsewhere in the UK. In effect, over the course of the first few days of rioting, popular confidence, or trust, in the government’s authority was drastically eroded. In the absence of a meaningful state response, members of a variety of faith, ethnic, and other communities—the Sikh community in Southall, the Turkish and Kurdish communities in Dalston, Hackney, and Haringey, the Bengali community in Whitechapel, and the fans of Millwall and Charlton football clubs in Eltham—organised patrols and protective cordons to prevent rioters looting and destroying property in their localities. Likewise, social network users across London organised clean-up squads, colloquially termed ‘Riot Wombles’, in Ealing, Clapham, and elsewhere on Twitter via the hashtags #riotcleanup and #riotwombles, and on Facebook via a series of ‘groups’ and ‘events’. These and other movements were merrily endorsed and strategically co-opted by a variety of political figures—often in a warped

attempt to buttress the incumbent Coalition government's flagging (and now defunct) 'Big Society' agenda for greater voluntarism in public policy. But the problem remained that once the immediate societal rupture of the riots was resolved, the authority of state apparatuses would need to be re-established. (As mass rioting turned into mass looting it became fairly evident that the UK was not in the throes of any form of revolutionary conjuncture, nor were there many demands in evidence for a serious reconfiguration of the UK's political institutions.) At the same time, there would have to be some tangible change in the terms on which such a re-establishment of authority would need to take place. Neither the UK government, nor British society as a whole, could afford to simply pretend that the riots had not happened, or that they were a mere aberration that should not prevent the continuation of 'business as usual'. Yet, as my friend and I observed, the transparent schism within the UK population's views about what had caused the rupture—and hence what any 'new settlement' for governmental authority would need to address directly—made finding a common basis for these terms of re-establishment all the more challenging, and for the same reason all the more urgent.

This DPhil thus began life as a project to see what public policy (in the UK and possibly further afield) could learn from the events of the UK's very own recent 'state of exception'—and mass opinion about them—in order for effective governmental authority to be re-established in a 'post-riots' society. Needless to say, it did not settle there for long. After about two years of research, which also saw some of the most profound personal and professional changes in my life so far—including my first positions as a graduate tutor and policy researcher, as well as my unexpected promotion from my old home in Magdalen to the mystical halls of All Souls—it became clear that a full structural analysis of the sort I had hoped to deliver was well beyond the maximum possible scope of my DPhil research. Specifically, it had become apparent that both the events of the riots themselves, and the understanding of mass opinion I was using to evaluate discourse about them, were vastly more complex than I had anticipated. In order to do them full justice, I found that I would have to address them within the parameters of separate projects. I was consequently faced with the choice of which 'half' of my initial enquiry to pursue for my DPhil submission. As entertaining as it surely would have been to spend another year or two doing close textual analysis of the avalanches of apoplexy in the tabloid coverage of the riots and their aftermath, I eventually decided on the more novel and abstract option of exploring the concept of 'mass opinion' instead. I still harbour hopes of using my two years of work on the riots in a future project, once this DPhil is complete. (After all, I would hate to think that I spent a summer reading the *Daily Mail* for nothing.)

Of course, in reality, the fundamental motivation of this enquiry is not so far removed from the core assumption of my original project. I still cleave to the view—endorsed by many social and political theorists throughout history, not least David Hume and Walter Lippmann—that the legitimacy and success of political authority depends strongly on how political institutions respond to, and incorporate, the substantive views of the populations they seek to govern. The difference between this enquiry and my initial project on the riots lies in the fact that, rather than analysing a particular parochial instance of societal crisis to illuminate what the substantive content of mass opinion is in a given polity (the UK), I have chosen instead to focus on the diversity of the forms that mass opinion in general takes in late modernity to illuminate what it is (what social object or behaviour) that political institutions are supposed to be responding to, and incorporating. Insofar as there is an identifiable crisis to which I can pin this project, it takes the form not of a societal rupture, but of a stark, and highly visible, failure of research methodology. The failure in question is the major disaster that the opinion polling industry collectively experienced at the 2015 UK general election, where the statistical dead heat between the Conservative and Labour parties in the final polls before the day of the election completely failed to materialise, with the results instead showing a huge victory for the Conservatives by well over 6%. This watershed moment—which I fancifully called a *‘Pollsterdämmerung’* in an online article for the *New Statesman*—was the first of its kind since the well-known débâcle in 1992, and prompted extensive methodological soul-searching within the industry, and even a full investigation and report by the British Polling Council.² The fruits of this introspection have been rather less than impressive, and singularly failed to prevent a second (albeit less well publicised) failure of prediction for the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the EU. Rather than a breakdown in social order, then, it is this apparent impasse in the validity of opinion research towards which this enquiry is now oriented. In other words, my project has become more general, abstract, and interpretative, and less contingent, concrete, and prescriptive, since I began it in autumn 2012. It has been a highly enjoyable and informative change in tack, but one that has come at the cost of a year’s delay to my original completion schedule. I leave it to the reader to decide whether my shift away from the riots as an anchor for my research was ultimately ‘worth it’.

Over the last four or so years of doctoral research, as well as the five years of university education before that, I have accumulated more professional and personal debts of gratitude than I can ever hope to repay. As any of my students will testify—and as I argue in this enquiry—I view social thought as a

² Ostrowski 2015.

fundamentally collaborative and intersubjective enterprise. A truly exhaustive list of acknowledgments would thus take up as much space as the rest of this thesis, if not more, and even then I could not hope to express the full extent of my thankfulness to everybody on it. So I shall have to restrict myself to saying only a few words of deep appreciation here. First, to my academic colleagues and mentors. My highest personal and intellectual debt is to my supervisor Michael Freeden, whose incomparable kindness, patience, and generosity has helped me through even the most difficult moments of my project's evolution over the last four years. I do not think it would have been possible for me to pursue this DPhil in the way that I have done with anyone else at Oxford, and I will be forever grateful to him for showing me that 'another political theory is possible'—both in our discipline as a whole, and at our institution in particular. Many warm thanks also go to my academic advisor Cécile Fabre, whose keen-eyed criticism has helped me prune some of the more outlandish turns of phrase in my verbal arboretum (verboretum?), and uncover some of the more glaring faux-pas resulting from my methodological commitments. I am also extremely grateful to Simon Caney and Jeremy Waldron for their support in the early years of my DPhil project, and to my Confirmation of Status examiners, Michael Biggs and Daniel Butt, for helping me clarify the scope of my project.

I have been extremely fortunate to study with, and now work alongside, the outstandingly brilliant and engaging faculty members at the Department of Politics and International Relations since I started as a graduate student at Oxford in 2010, and I am especially grateful to Teresa Bejan, Gideon Elford, Liz Frazer, Lois McNay, Karma Nabulsi, Mark Philp, Marc Stears, and Stuart White for their help and advice at different stages in the last seven years. My undergraduate years were easily one of the most precious and wonderful times of my life so far, and I would like to express my profound gratitude to my former philosophy, politics, and economics tutors—and not so long afterwards colleagues—at Magdalen College for helping me embark on the first steps of my academic career, in particular Jenny Castle, Lizzie Fricker, Jane Gingrich, Tom Norman, Ralph Walker, and Stewart Wood. I must thank my former colleagues at Christ Church, David Hine, Eddie Keene, and Sophie Smith for making me feel so welcome during my year there as a stipendiary lecturer, and also to my former students across the university for making our political theory and history of political thought tutorials so very enjoyable and rewarding. Thanks also to my friends and colleagues past and present among the Fellowship of All Souls for putting up with my increasingly gloomy comments on opinion polls and the increasingly dodecaphonic strains of my piano-playing, especially Annalise Acorn, Mark Armstrong, Arthur Asseraf, Katherine Backler, Tessa Baker, Margaret Bent, Suzanne Bobzien, Francis Brown, Clare Bucknell,

Vincent Crawford, Hasan Dindjer, Arthur Downing, Wolfgang Ernst, Paul Fendley, Patrick Finglass, David Gellner, Birke Häcker, Claire Hall, Max Harris, Celia Heyes, Peregrine Horden, Jonathan Katz, Colin Kidd, Jeremy Lever, Dmitri Levitin, Tess Little, Ian Loader, Jack Lynch, Noel Malcolm, George Molyneaux, Catherine Morgan, Alex Mullen, Philipp Nothhaft, Kevin O'Rourke, Erik Panzer, Jørgen Rennemo, Catriona Seth, Claudio Sopranzetti, Péter-Dániel Szántó, Keith Thomas, Guenter Treitel, John Vickers, William Waldegrave, Christopher Wickham, Andrew Wilson, Peter Wilson, George Woudhuysen, and Andrew Wynn Owen. Beyond Oxford, I must express my deep appreciation to my colleagues and students at the New College of the Humanities for making me a part of such an exciting and vibrant project in the last two years, above all Olly Ayers, Callum Barrell, Matthew Batstone, Diana Bozhilova, Naomi Goulder, Anthony Grayling, Lars Kjaer, Marianna Koli, Suzannah Lipscomb, David Mitchell, Edmund Neill, David Rampton, Jaya Savige, and Christoph Schuringa. And finally, I am profoundly grateful to the community of historians and historians of political thought in Cambridge and London (and further afield), who have allowed me to discover a vast new avenue of enquiry for my future research, including Adrian Blau, Richard Bourke, Hannah Dawson, George Giannakopoulos, Signy Gutnick Allen, John-Erik Hansson, Shiru Lim, Julia Nicholls, Estelle Paranque, Miri Rubin, Lorenzo Sabbadini, Quentin Skinner, Gareth Stedman Jones, Georgios Varouxakis, and Sarah Wilford.

Next, I thank my wonderful friends for their love and comradeship over the last several years, as well as for their herculean efforts—well above and beyond the call of duty—to keep up with the chameleonic character of my research. My oldest friend, Dhaneesha Senaratne—master of the pithy postcard and NHS quality controller extraordinaire—has been my steadfast companion since our first days together at school, and I am inestimably a better person for having had him in my life all these years (especially now he has seen the light and defected to us from the Other Place). Since the start of our three years at Magdalen, I have rarely been so happy as when I am reunited with the exquisitely nerdy Ian Jordan to indulge in some platinum-grade political speculation. He has been the liberal fulcrum around which my politics have pivoted, and I still hold out hope that we will eventually get round to launching the Jordan-Ostrowski Institute of Enlightenment (JOIE) that we have been planning all this time. The erstwhile Epicurean Hugh Wilkinson has also been a stalwart friend since we were undergraduates, and I will always prize his warmth, his *bon-vivant* good humour, and on occasion even his legalistic refusal to indulge my more postmodern flights of fancy. My graduate *compañero* Puneet Dhaliwal—the Django to my Schultz, the ‘Indian Jesus’ to my ‘Spandau Ballet’, the ‘chic Sikh’ to my ‘suave Slav’—has been my political soulmate ever since he banged a copy of Kropotkin

on the table at the start of our MPhil. We have pulled each other up by the bootstraps more times than either of us cares to remember, and I am inordinately pleased that we have made it over the finishing line together. If I am ever asked what I remember about writing my DPhil, I will answer that my overwhelming abiding memory is of sitting in Caffè Nero in the Broad Street Blackwell's with the incredible Anik Laferrière, getting no work done whatsoever but having an absolute ball all the same. I could not wish for a more sympathetic ear and a truer soul—or indeed a better selfie accomplice—and I cannot wait for us to have adjacent offices when we make it big so that we can procrastinate majestically some more. Little did I know, when I met the lovely Ruth Spencer Jolly right at the start of my DPhil, that she would become one of my closest friends, and an irreplaceable companion for wandering and pondering the innermost truths of the world. Her wisdom, verve, and thoughtful charm have enriched my last few years immeasurably, and I know I would be a poorer person without her. My delightful confidante Lizzie Moore has always been a bastion of kindness and immense cheer—and an inexhaustible source of new ideas and adventures, from the ill-fated attempt to turn me into a half-competent knitter to our treks around the Cornish countryside at New Year's. It has been a true pleasure to spend the last few years in the company of my compatriot Bruno Leipold—whether roaring on *die Mannschaft* with him over a good lager, or debating the finer points of historical materialism over an even better ale. And finally, the brilliant and multi-talented Joanne Paul has been a wonderful counsellor through even the most uncertain periods over the last few years. I have been privileged to learn from her example in every way, and I will be forever grateful to her for the boundless care and affection she has brought into my life.

There are so many more to mention, and I am forever touched and grateful for everything they have taught me. My time at Magdalen has left me with a panoply of outstanding undergraduate and graduate friends from across the university, whose company I always cherished and have always looked back on with great fondness, including Claire Ahlquist, Philip Ahlquist, Ben Barnett, Emily Baxter, Shay Bishnoi, Tanya Blomfield, Izzy Boggild-Jones, Chiara Catterwell, Imogen Clark, Peter Clark, Hannah Davison, Biljana Đorđević, Seb Grey, Eleanor Jaquet, Michael Jones, Francesca Kaminski-Jones, Marta Kijowska, Karina Lickorish Quinn, Laurence Mills, Kate Mitchell, Alison Norman, Tarryn Peinke, Mae Penner, Kači Peringer, Jeremias Prassl, Cameron Quinn, Millie Ross, Rosie Scott, Will Sheldon, Matthew Shribman, and Thomas Twitchett. I owe my social consciousness—and myriad conversations that have clarified the evolution of my thinking—to many friends and allies in the fight for progress, among others Ilya Afanasyev, Thomas Ashby, Udit Bhatia, Hedda Bjørge Sørenshaugen,

Chris Brooke, Sarah Bufkin, Natalie Callan, JanaLee Cherneski, Simukai Chigudu, Jordan Laris Cohen, Mathias De Alencastro, Daniel Drucker, Maísa Edwards, Richard Elliott, Christopher Green, Danielle Greenspan, David Hall, Max Hayward, Dan Iley-Williamson, Zoë Jordan, Jutta Kawalerowicz, Johannes Kneiss, Ashok Kumar, Carolyn Laferrière, David Leon, Christopher Lewis, Giulia Macgarr, Sabrina Martin, Robin McGhee, Fabian Neuner, Martin O'Neill, Krishna Omkar, Quentin Patrick, Imogen Peck, Adam Ramsay, Rahul Rao, Clifford Robinson, Enzo Rossi, Sanya Samtani, Betty Schulz, Caitlyn Schwartz, Matt Sleat, Tamara Spitzer-Hobeika, Kiran Stallone, Sam Sussman, Claire Vergerio, and Henny Ziai. I have been very lucky to have been quasi-adopted by the student community at Keble College as a 'home away from home', and to form a number of firm friendship groups as a result. The current and former members of Keble choir and the college's wider chapel community have won a very special place in my heart, especially Gargie Ahmed, Emma Archbold, Andrew Brocklehurst, Kylie Crabbe, Amy Creese, James Cross, Simon Cuff, Ellen Doster, Robert Goode, Maya Graffy, Mary Marshall, Luke Martin, Katie Millard, Joe Morris, Rory Moules, Hannah Myers, Beth Potter, Ell Potter, Hannah Schofield, Matthew Schrecker, Matthew Segarty, Duncan Sim, Jenn Strawbridge, Bryony Thomas, and Jess Webster. I will always treasure the kind welcome shown to me by present and past associates of the Keble MCR and SCR, including Alexander Aston, Eleanor Ceindeg Jaskowska, Dan Claff, Roosmarijn de Geus, Lynn Edwards, Sam Kiss, Jonathan Phillips, Andrew Whatcott, Glen Wright Colopy, and Tim Zakian. Likewise, my friends formerly of Bartlemas Road have offered me a warm hearth, open hearts, and hearty feasting on so many occasions in the last four years: Aaron Dale (and Rapha), Djurre de Waard, Lauge Rasmussen, and Zoë Wallace. And finally, a slightly whimsical but utterly heartfelt vote of thanks must go to the textile artists at Hawes & Curtis and Joe Brown's, who have kept me well-supplied with outrageous shirts over the last few years, as well as to lionheartx10, Alex the Rambler, WarriorofSparta, HeirotCarthage, Jackie Fish, Pixelated Apollo, and the rest of the Total War online gaming community for keeping me endlessly entertained with their YouTube let's-play campaign videos.

Finally, I must pay tribute to my family—present and departed—for their unwavering support in every year of my life so far. In particular, I give my heartfelt thanks to Alexander, Astrid, Sibylle, Rita, and Günther, as well as the wider Hermann and Ostrowski clans both near and far, for their generous hospitality, their *Gemütlichkeit*, and for keeping alive my links to my various *Heimatländer*. The memory of my grandparents—who fought hard to make a better world for themselves and their loved ones under the horrors of successive totalitarianisms—abides with me always, and I hope one day, in my own small

way, to follow their example. Lastly, and most importantly, my parents, Doris and Markus, have given me their devoted attention and patient encouragement at every step of the way down the lifepath I have chosen—from the first tentative notes on the piano, to the many late nights of feverishly crafting imaginary worlds for creative writing homework, and now finally to my periodic excitable rants about the failings of modern capitalism. My successes are theirs as well as mine, and it is to them that I dedicate this thesis.

A brief comment to close: My shift in research focus has led to a somewhat drastic increase in the density and intricacy of my prose style. I cannot claim ever to have written in a simplistic way—and I make no apologies for treating readers as intelligent adults capable of entertaining complex thought and expression—but I do recognise that a certain native Teutonic idiom may occasionally obscure the clarity of my writing. For this, I ask a certain measure of indulgence. I have had more than my fair share of insults directed at my writing style in the past, with pieces of my research described variously as “turgid”, “wearing”, “distant”, “donnish”, and (my personal favourite) “rebarbative”. I am not really in the mood for any more. In my experience, the academic fetish for clarity of expression is all too often a cipher for economy of thought, and the drive for parsimony symptomatic of a refusal to consider nuance and ambiguity of meaning. Social life is complex, and social theorising should have the latitude to embrace this complexity both in its content and its delivery. So to those who look askance at my diction below, I say only this:

*O voi ch'avete li 'ntelletti sani,
mirate la dottrina che s'asconde
sotto 'l velame de li versi strani.*

(“O all of you whose intellects are sound,
look now and see the meaning that is hidden
beneath the veil that covers my strange verses.”)³

M.S.J.O.

Oxford

April 2017

³ Dante 2003, Canto IX.61-3.

Introduction: Twilight of the Pollsters

IAN HISLOP: There's no point in listening to anybody, I've decided this after reading newsprint for the last two years. Everyone was wrong about absolutely everything. ... Nearly all political punditry, nearly all political analysis turned out to be completely wrong. So that means you just don't have to read this stuff, you just guess! Everything they said would happen, didn't happen. Everybody said Trump couldn't possibly win, at every point, and it was all rubbish. No one knew anything!

MAUREEN LIPMAN: Is that one good thing, that perhaps there'll be no more polls, because they're always wrong?

CHARLIE BROOKER: What will they do instead of polls? They could just cut to a jazz band for five minutes...

IAN HISLOP: I think we should do entrails!

—*Have I Got News For You*, 11 November 2016⁴

MIKA BRZEZINSKI: Who are you consulting with consistently, so that you're ready on day one?

DONALD J. TRUMP: I'm speaking with myself, number one, because I have a very good brain and I've said a lot of things. ... I know what I'm doing and I listen to a lot of people, I talk to a lot of people and at the appropriate time I'll tell you who the people are. But my primary consultant is myself and I have a good instinct for this stuff.

—'Morning Joe', *MSNBC*, 16 March 2016⁵

"I think the people in this country have had enough of experts from organisations with acronyms saying that they know what is best and getting it consistently wrong."⁶ With these words, spoken during a *Sky News* interview on 3 June 2016, Michael Gove, then-Secretary of State for Justice and Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, calmly staked out the dividing lines for the upcoming referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union. Not, allegedly, left versus right, London versus the regions,

⁴ Brooker 2016.

⁵ Trump 2016.

⁶ Gove 2016.

rich versus poor, or young versus old—but expertise versus ‘common sense’. The monstrous irony that this casual indictment of the unanimous professional view of government, healthcare, academic, military, business, and labour sectors and associations came from a senior Conservative cabinet member was not lost on Gove’s interviewer, Faisal Islam. “Why should the public trust you over them?” Gove’s response simply sharpened the divide further. “I’m not asking the public to trust me, I’m asking the public to trust themselves. One of the striking things about this debate is that those who are arguing that we should remain have a vested financial interest in the operation of the European Union.” Not just experts versus the laity, then, but elites versus the people. “A faith in the British people to make the right decision.” Islam’s incredulity was palpable. “A blind faith! You’re treating the public as fools!” Gove’s retort was uncompromisingly populist. “You’re on the side of the elites, I’m on the side of the people.”

Barely three weeks later, the UK voted 51.9% to 48.1% to leave the EU.⁷ This victory for ‘Leave’, won by the tightest of margins on a turnout of just over 72%, ignited debate in all corners of society about what the result of the referendum—only the third such nationwide expression of popular sovereignty in the UK’s history—actually meant for the country’s future. Even the notionally obvious meaning of the referendum, a narrow endorsement of ‘Brexit’, was called into doubt, with the narrowness of the result prompting shocked ‘Remainers’ (“the 48%”) to question how such a small majority could claim to speak for the whole UK, much to the defiant fury of the ‘Leavers’.⁸ This disunity in the popular mind was exacerbated by the stark regional divides across the UK, as Scotland, London, and Northern Ireland clearly voted ‘Remain’, but Wales and the rest of England tipped the balance towards ‘Leave’. A stream of public figures queried whether the vote was even binding, or merely advisory for parliamentary legislators who—as the people’s elected representatives, acting on their behalf in the ‘national interest’—could appropriately refuse to pass the legislation needed to formalise the outcome. Questions over the decisiveness of the vote only increased with the emergence of a sizeable number of ‘Bregretters’—‘Leavers’ who claimed to have changed their mind as the initial adverse effects of ‘Brexit’ became clear, or not to have ‘really meant it’, or to have misunderstood what their vote would entail, or who felt that they had been systematically misled by the leaders of the ‘Leave’ campaign, several of whom beat a hasty and undignified retreat from public life within the first fortnight after the referendum.⁹ Ultimately, the prolonged period of discord and uncertainty culminated in the relatively new Prime Minister Theresa

⁷ Electoral Commission 2016.

⁸ Vulliamy 2016.

⁹ Dearden 2016.

May calling a snap election for 8 June 2017, which *de facto* became something of a single-issue campaign, with various parties coalescing around support for ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Brexit variants, as well as a few that defended ‘continuity Remain’.¹⁰ For a procedure intended to establish conclusively the public’s view on EU membership, the referendum seemingly created far more uncertainty than it helped to dispel.

The referendum result was profoundly earth-shattering, not least because it went against the ‘run of play’ in the opinion polls leading up to the vote. Although the economic and political fallout from the vote—including a sterling crash on the currency markets, and leadership changes and challenges in several political parties—rather drowned this out, 23 June 2016 was a minor disaster for the opinion polling industry, which on the eve of the referendum had confidently predicted a ‘Remain’ victory by a margin of between 3 and 10%.¹¹ This failure came hot on the heels of the ‘*Pollsterdämmerung*’ (‘twilight of the pollsters’) of 7 May 2015, where the final polls before the UK general election declared a statistical tie between the Conservative and Labour parties, and predicted a hung parliament favouring a left-wing ‘rainbow coalition’, while the actual vote produced a Conservative lead of 6.3%, and a Conservative government with a working majority of 16.¹² In fact, 2015 and 2016 were something of a *biennium horribile* for the opinion polling industry the world over. In the Israeli and Danish general elections, the opinion polls up to the eve of voting also noticeably underestimated the performance of right-wing parties (Likud and the *Dansk Folkeparti*) relative to the actual results, and spectacularly failed to predict the overall outcomes.¹³ Then, in the U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump won a shock Electoral College victory over Hillary Clinton in spite of the latter’s 2.1% lead in the nationwide popular vote, in contrast to the consistent lead of up to 7% (and commanding overall victory) Clinton had been predicted to achieve in opinion polls and poll aggregators for several months before the vote.¹⁴ Despite several high-profile attempts to discover and remedy the inadequacies and inaccuracies in polling methodology that led to these repeated mistakes, the polling industry’s credibility has been comprehensively undermined. Moreover, the hegemonic status of opinion polls themselves, as purportedly the best (or the only valid) mechanism to ‘take the temperature’ of the public’s prevailing mood in the interstices between elections and referendums, has been profoundly called into question.

¹⁰ *BBC News* 2017.

¹¹ Cooper 2016; Ipsos MORI 2016.

¹² *BBC News* 2015; Ostrowski 2015.

¹³ Central Election Committee of the 20th Knesset 2015; Danmarks Statistik 2015.

¹⁴ Federal Election Commission 2017; NBC News 2016.

§1. *The fractured field of opinion research*

The effect of these (and other) moments of shock and uncertainty has been to throw into sharp relief several latent but unresolved questions about the concept and status of ‘mass opinion’ as a social phenomenon. Mass opinion—i.e., judgments formed and expressed by members of the masses of people living in society—has, of course, existed in various forms throughout the course of human history. But it is in the transition to late modernity that mass opinion has gained a position of truly central societal importance. With surging population growth, intensifying information and communication networks, and the steady proliferation of political accountability and participation (e.g., elections, referendums) and global economic expansion (e.g., trade, stock and commodity markets), a significant and ever-increasing number of the areas of social life have become subject to mass insight and (to a lesser extent) influence. This, in turn, has brought about far-reaching social transformations—especially, but not exclusively, in the democratic polities and capitalist economies of the global North. Laws, policies, and institutions, as well as the figures in charge of them, strive and compete for broad popular support as a major criterion to measure their value and legitimacy. Similarly, the actions of state and other large organisations are frequently cast in terms of achieving some ‘common good’, defined as furthering the collated interests of at least a majority of the wider population. As a result, mass opinion has come under ever more careful scrutiny, with the emergence of a vast array of sophisticated methods of observation, including opinion polls, as well as attitudes surveys, gauges of consumer and investor sentiment, &c. At the same time, a growing number of mechanisms have developed whose sole purpose is to understand and shape mass opinion—to sway the hearts and minds of the people—on an ever-larger scale, through public information, propaganda, advertising, nudging, and other forms of social messaging.¹⁵

The questions about mass opinion that have been brought to the fore by these recent events concern its definition—i.e., ‘what it is’—and its social function—i.e., ‘what to do with it’. The continued inadequacy of current ways of measuring mass opinion, and the enduring tension between plebiscitary and representative modes of democratic authorisation, have created something of a vacancy for new responses to these questions. From the standpoint of socially-engaged academic research, there is thus a clear and urgent theoretical imperative to better understand the concept of mass opinion, and offer such a new response. Yet historically, the importance of mass opinion in social practice has only been

¹⁵ Bernays 2005; Bernays 2011; Thaler and Sunstein 2008.

captured from time to time by trends in social research. In fact, it would be fair to say that the concept is currently passing through a period of relative obscurity in academic research that sits radically at odds with its new prominence in ‘the real world’. As Michael Freeden observes, there is a reductive anti-vernacular tendency in contemporary social research, which “overemphasise[s] the gap between amateur and professional [...] thinking, while focusing on the latter”.¹⁶ This tendency treats mass opinion as (at best) a blank, incidental backdrop to ‘real’ or ‘actually important’ thought and communication—a passive audience, not a dialogical participant, to be informed or steered, perhaps, but never listened to, on account of its sheer marginalisation from ‘what matters’ (to use Derek Parfit’s hubristic phrase).¹⁷ Where it does consider mass opinion, social research generally only takes into account the fact of its existence, and maybe the superficial manifestations of its content, but rarely the processes of its formation and expression, and almost never any sense of its valuable contribution to social discourse.

This situation is not helped by the fact that the field of opinion research is characterised by an uncommonly divergent set of traditions. Even before the first ‘waves’ of democratisation in the modern era, and the entrenchment of ever-wider mass participation in political institutions, ‘what people think’ has featured consistently among the concerns of social enquiry.¹⁸ But different forms of social research—from moral philosophy to critical theory to political science—have historically engaged with the concept in vastly different ways. These divergent trajectories have left their mark on the ways in which these traditions treat mass opinion currently. Within political philosophy, mass opinion has been subsumed into post-Enlightenment treatments of the public sphere, which in turn have become dominated by the liberal discourse of public reason.¹⁹ Among critical theorists, mass opinion (if it appears at all) receives only cursory analysis as a contingent, manipulated product of underlying social forces, and is given fairly short shrift.²⁰ In political science, the two main opinion research journals, *Public Opinion Quarterly* and the *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, have abandoned the febrile methodological enquiries that filled the pages of their early volumes, and retreated to neurotic introspection about their reasons for existing, or increasingly derivative applications of existing methods to the social phenomena *du jour*.²¹

¹⁶ Freeden 2013, p.32.

¹⁷ Bernays 2005, pp.37–41; Parfit 2011.

¹⁸ Eisenstein 1979; Glynn *et al.* 2016, pp.26–40; Habermas 1989a; Herbst 1993, p.52; Lewis 2001, pp.21–4; Peters 1995.

¹⁹ Gaus 1996, 2011; Larmore 2002; Lister 2013; Quong 2013; Rawls 2001.

²⁰ Adorno and Horkheimer 1979; Adorno *et al.* 1950; Asher 1998; Benjamin 1985; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1992, 1996; Foucault 1977a; Habermas 1989a; Siune and Kline 1975.

²¹ Davison and Bredemeier 1957; Druckman, Mathiwetz, and Silverstein 2011; Singer and Schuman 1987.

When surveying the field of opinion research, then, it becomes easy to dismiss it as a fragmented wreck of patchwork incongruity. While, ordinarily, pluralism is an indicator of disciplinary health, the divergence regarding mass opinion has started to damage the field's overall integrity. It becomes difficult for authors to have meaningful conversations about mass opinion if their research interests, orientations, and even terminology share almost no common ground—e.g., the anti-absolutist optimism of Jeremy Bentham versus the blithe elitism of Edward Bernays or the wary circumspection of Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann.²² It thus comes as no surprise that, in the majority of cases, they do not try to do so. It is not so much that these traditions are all talking past each other within the same 'field' as that they are having mutually unintelligible and mistrustful conversations within entirely different (and barely adjacent) ones. Of course, this situation is no more than a particularly strong example of the pernicious trend towards an academic 'division of labour'. As with Adam Smith's pin manufacturers, the appropriation of this economic practice was meant to increase academic professionalism, productivity, and insight.²³ In reality, however, whatever its successes on this front, it has proved predominantly a recipe for siloisation, wasteful reduplication, and interdepartmental warfare. Instead of making better pins, researchers have ended up dancing on their heads. In their quest to act as what Stuart White calls 'democratic underlabourers'—although in some cases their democratic credentials are seriously in doubt—they have largely lost sight of the need for interdisciplinary collaboration, syncretism, and exchange.²⁴ In short, they all under-labour, but nobody oversees.

There is no good reason for this to be the case, within opinion research or any other field. Or rather, for this *still* to be the case: within opinion research, at least, some attempts have been made to 'reach across the aisle' between disciplines, even if only to recognise the sheer extent of methodological divergence now characterising the field. The political philosopher James Fishkin, in *The Voice of the People* and *When the People Speak*, catalogues the disparities that exist in contemporary polities between formal mechanisms of popular empowerment and opportunities for popular discussion. He focuses especially on the limitations of opinion polls in enabling people to formulate "informed judgments" about social issues, and proposes a National Issues Convention and model of "deliberative polling" that seeks to remedy this deficit.²⁵ Vincent Price, a communications theorist, acknowledges in his slim-line

²² Bernays 2005, 2011; Cutler 1999; Noelle-Neumann 1974, 1984.

²³ Smith 1999a, pp.109-16.

²⁴ White 2003, p.29.

²⁵ Fishkin 1995; Fishkin 2009.

volume *Public Opinion* the sheer variety of approaches to opinion research, and characterisations of its object, currently ‘in play’. Price offers an overview of the problems and ambiguities that these approaches have historically had to confront, as well as the solutions they have attempted—including the extent of popular competence, rival conceptions of mass opinion’s ‘authorship’, and debates over how it should be measured.²⁶ Finally, Slavko Splichal, another communications theorist, traces a painstaking path through the methodological history of opinion research in his magisterial tome *Public Opinion: Developments and Controversies in the Twentieth Century*, uncovering several neglected traditions in the process. He analyses the often fraught relationship between mass opinion and democracy, covering theories of the social will, participation, and surveillance, and highlights the crucial role of opinion polls and the mass media in creating and institutionalising popular views.²⁷

Each of these attempts, in its own way, makes a case for the divergences within opinion research to be reconciled. However, their contributions to such a reconciliation either tend to end there, or (where present) are surprisingly limited in scope and insight. Fishkin limits his substantive recommendations to the vague panacea of introducing a stronger conception of the public sphere to the polling process, defined in exclusively discursive—and extremely liberal—terms as a site of democratic deliberation.²⁸ He also sidesteps the question of how people acquire the views they exchange in these deliberations, and fails to engage with the methodological challenges posed to polling as a way to understand and measure mass opinion. Price, meanwhile, seeks to bring *clôture* to the methodological plurality he has described with the somewhat jarring (and unsupported) exhortation to find which of the many approaches and characterisations is closest to the ‘right’ one—in his view, some variant of opinion polling.²⁹ In doing so, he merely exacerbates the mutual mistrust and hostility between different opinion research traditions, and further prolongs the wait for their meaningful reconciliation. And Splichal fails to leverage his wealth of historical research into a clear programme, with his account petering out into somewhat tame proposals for media “democratisation and regulation”.³⁰ He misses the opportunity to acknowledge that mass opinion is a complex phenomenon, retaining vestiges of all the functions that historical research methods have sought to attribute to it, and does not really consider any alternatives to polling that may be better placed to capture these complexities. In short, while all three authors clearly illustrate the need

²⁶ Price 1992.

²⁷ Splichal 1999.

²⁸ Fishkin 1995, pp.161–81; Fishkin 2009, pp.25–32, 82–97.

²⁹ Price 1992, pp.90–1.

³⁰ Splichal 1999, pp.293–312.

to resolve the divergences between traditions, their attempts at laying the theoretical groundwork for doing so are ultimately unconvincing.

At the same time, even these attempts have been largely drowned out by the ‘major players’ in opinion research. These have predominantly remained inward-facing, operating within familiar paradigms of ‘their’ forms of social thought—with the overwhelming majority of researchers working in the political- and social-scientific tradition. To name only a few: for political philosophy, Nancy Fraser lies at the forefront of moves to develop a deliberative, collective understanding of mass opinion rooted in positive and critical appraisals of the bourgeois public sphere, most recently in *Transnationalising the Public Sphere*.³¹ For critical theory, Pierre Bourdieu articulates perhaps the most extreme dismissal of the idea that mass opinion is fully described by the content of opinion polls in his essay ‘Public Opinion Does Not Exist’, instead advocating greater consideration of the unquestioned and ‘uncontroversial’ *doxas* that shape people’s thought.³² And for political science, John Zaller has developed a highly psychologised account of opinion-formation in *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*.³³ None of them (nor their interlocutors) makes a serious or sustained attempt to engage across disciplinary boundaries, let alone move towards reconciling their methodological disagreements in any way.

The attempts undertaken hitherto to reconcile different opinion research traditions have been so unpersuasive because they have gone about doing so in rather the wrong way. The approach of authors like Fishkin, Price, and Splichal can be described as ‘derivative’ or ‘superficial’ (*oberflächlich*), as they collate what the available literature has to say about mass opinion, distil the results into presentable form, and wait for novel conclusions to emerge from them, mostly without considering the often contradictory deeper methodological origins and foundations of the different approaches they are trying to combine. This seems an unlikely prospect, since the different traditions have grown so far apart that non-trivial conclusions that apply to all of them are hard to find. Simply taking a survey of the literature is not, as such, conducive to analysing mass opinion in a clear and comprehensive way. Indeed, these authors’ approaches have been noticeably limited, concentrating on only one or two traditions at the expense of all the others, in the hope of finding conclusions with at least some substantive depth and partial validity. All three acquiesce to the continued hegemony of opinion polling, either *tout court* (Price), or fused with concerns about public discussion (Fishkin) or the media (Splichal). But other traditions contribute

³¹ Fraser *et al.* 2014.

³² Bourdieu 1977, pp.168-9; Bourdieu 1979, pp.124-30.

³³ Zaller 1992.

valuable insights of their own that can help researchers better understand mass opinion, and a full resolution to the fragmentation of opinion research must integrate them all to the greatest possible extent. What is needed is a syncretic theoretical approach, an overarching analytic framework that synthesises (and bridges the gaps between) different approaches to opinion research into an overarching social ‘picture’ of mass opinion. None of the attempts so far can support such a systematic, ‘joined-up’ account, which means the field of opinion research is still left waiting for its next agronomic revolution.

§2. *Renewing social analysis of mass opinion*

This is where the project presented here comes in. It takes up the challenge to find a joined-up account of how to understand *the structure and creation of mass opinion* that takes seriously, and engages with, insights from across the disciplines that have addressed the concept, and which can be applied to the questions about mass opinion raised by recent events. But, crucially, it inverts the way that this has been attempted so far. The approach that this project pursues is more ‘thoroughgoing’ (*gründlich*) or ‘from-the-ground-up’ (*von Grund auf*) (hence ‘inversion’), in that it identifies the level of analysis at which a systematic account of mass opinion is supposed to operate, formulates a robust general analytic framework for this level, and applies this specifically to opinion research (and its many traditions). Of course, this project does not reject or minimise the contributions of moral philosophy, critical theory, and political science to opinion research. Quite the opposite: it aims to realise the explanatory potential of these contributions more effectively than has been achieved hitherto by situating them in a rigorous and broad-based theoretical framework. Rather than trying to derive its method cumulatively by grafting parts of existing research traditions onto each other, this project adopts an *a priori* methodological vantage-point from which to ‘zoom in on’ the concept of mass opinion, and incorporates as far as possible the insights of existing perspectives where they become relevant. This, then, is the project’s preliminary challenge: *mass opinion is a complex phenomenon, and it must be theorised using an analytical framework capable of engaging fully with all opinion research traditions.*

The framework this project takes as the best way of attaining such a vantage-point is that of *social theory*. Social theory is a branch of social research that formulates comprehensive views of human societies by identifying the inner logics that characterise them and shape human social behaviour.³⁴ Its

³⁴ Giddens 1987, pp.vii-viii; Giddens 2014, pp.xvi-xx; Thompson 1995, pp.3-4; Unger 2004, pp.3-4, 8-9, 15.

main advantage is that, once formulated, these societal models can be used to explicate a vast range of social phenomena, not just in atomised ‘closed-system’ isolation, but by situating each phenomenon in relation to the others in its context. In contrast to social science and moral philosophy, social theory is more interpretative and historical than positivist or prescriptive.³⁵ It is not interested in statistical estimations based on observations of empirical data, as these only capture surface-level manifestations of societies and behaviour, nor in normative recommendations for their own sake, especially if these perpetuate or inadequately modify societies and behaviour because they fail to grasp or affect their deeper causes and origins. At the same time, unlike critical theory, ‘traditional’ social theory is interested in the construction, not deconstruction, of conceptual categories and frameworks.³⁶ It is not satisfied with merely problematising existing understandings and the practices that depend on them, but rather aims to deliver revised understandings that can inform remedial practices and identify ameliorative solutions.

It should be noted, by way of an ancillary complaint, that ‘social theory’ *qua* ‘theorising about society’ using comprehensive explanatory concepts and frameworks has lately fallen into neglect, and even disrepute. The institutional split, mutual miscomprehension, and even hostility, between ‘scientific’ and ‘philosophical’ branches of social thought has all but deafened social theorists on either ‘side’ to the other’s analytical tools and insights. Moreover, the crippling vogue of aggressive deconstructionism has forsaken any hints of structural rigidity and universal laws in social explication in favour of unpredictable postmodern agency, almost killing off attempts to offer large-scale, holistic, and *longue-durée* accounts of social phenomena, and reducing theorists to ‘tinkering at the edges’ in the semi-privatised peripheries of their respective disciplines. Nonetheless, there are some, including Anthony Giddens and Roberto Mangabeira Unger, who have tried to resurrect and rejuvenate social theory as an analytic approach, and to relegitimise comprehensive, society-level thinking as the best way to understand phenomena with complex, society-wide effects.³⁷

But it is not the stated aim of this project to address the ‘decline of social theory’ directly, nor to defend the need to rediscover it as a form of theorising. Rather, its argument is twofold: (1) mass opinion is exactly the kind of phenomenon with complex societal origins and implications that social theory ought to study; and, relatedly, (2) social theory is the best approach to use to provide a comprehensive

³⁵ This combines a distinction made by Freeden with the terminology of the dividing lines in early sociological theory. See Freeden 2012; Freeden 2013, pp.20, 51-7; Simmel 1977; Weber 1978, pp.4-23.

³⁶ The ‘traditional-critical’ divide in social theory is a convenient shorthand derived from Max Horkheimer’s original distinction. See Geuss 1981; Horkheimer 1972.

³⁷ See, for instance, Giddens 1987; Unger 2004.

account of mass opinion. This project's challenge can thus be refined into a core claim: *mass opinion is a social phenomenon, and it can be best theorised using the analytical framework of social theory*. In this respect, this project addresses an internal lacuna within opinion research itself, namely that a social theory of mass opinion has not been attempted for some time. It is remarkable, but nonetheless true, that the last point at which serious and innovative consideration was given to mass opinion as a social phenomenon with a complex inner logic was in the highly fertile engagements among (and between) German and American theorists in the early 20th century—such as Ferdinand Tönnies in *Critique of Public Opinion*, Walter Lippmann in *Public Opinion* and *The Phantom Public*, and John Dewey in *The Public and its Problems*.³⁸ With the possible exception of Herbert Blumer's brief article 'Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling', the passing comments in Herbert Marcuse's notorious essay 'Repressive Tolerance', or Jürgen Habermas's account in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, there has been a near-total dearth of novel social theorising about mass opinion since the late 1920s.³⁹

The effects of this lacuna have taken the form of two concrete trends: opinion research has (both consciously and via disciplinary inertia) gradually distanced itself from social theory; and social theory, insofar as it is 'done', has become increasingly dismissive of, and uninterested in, mass opinion. For the first trend, vast forward leaps in statistical and social-scientific methods and technology have encouraged academic understandings of mass opinion to become oriented strongly towards "the distribution of beliefs, their aggregation, and variation", measured through attitudes surveys and opinion polls, turning 'opinion research' disproportionately into the study of polling techniques and results.⁴⁰ Undoubtedly, this has been driven by the increased prominence of the opinion polling industry—which can be traced with rare specificity to George Gallup's very public victory over *Literary Digest* magazine in predicting the outcome of the 1936 U.S. presidential election—and, in turn, explains the continued synonymy between 'mass opinion' and 'polling' in popular usage. With the second trend, the normative shadow over mass opinion in social theorising is a legacy of the so-called 'Almond-Lippmann consensus'. This 'consensus' represented a methodological congruence between the 'theoretical' and 'scientific' branches of the discipline that agreed on three things: (1) mass opinion is volatile and irrational, shifting erratically in response to the most recent social developments; (2) mass opinion is incoherent, lacking an organised and consistent structure to the extent that many individual views are best described as 'nonattitudes';

³⁸ Dewey 2012; Hardt and Splichal 2000; Lippmann 1993; Lippmann 2010.

³⁹ Blumer 1948, pp.542-9; Habermas 1989a; Marcuse 1969; Splichal 2001b, pp.44-8.

⁴⁰ Freedman 2003, p.39.

and (3) mass opinion is devoid of interest, susceptible to manipulation and irrelevant to policy-making processes, ignored by political leaders because most people can neither “understand nor influence the very events upon which their lives and happiness are known to depend”.⁴¹ While the methodological influence of the consensus itself has waned since the 1960s, its normative effect has proved considerably more durable: social theory as a whole has yet to catch up with the more favourable view of mass opinion in contemporary social (especially political and economic) practice. Each of these trends has their own particular pernicious effects on the conception of mass opinion in the field of ‘opinion research’, and it is above all these effects that this project sets out to redress.

All in all, then, this thesis not only addresses an extremely (albeit unjustifiably) neglected topic, but takes a fairly novel approach to doing so. But it does so in the firm belief, to paraphrase John Thompson, that “[s]ocial theory has as much to offer [opinion] research as it has to gain from it”.⁴² Also, like Thompson, the analysis below aims to maintain a degree of judicious pluralism with respect to the intellectual sources and traditions that inform its argument. The existing modes of social theory and opinion research are deficient and problematic in different ways at different points, which means that offering a *new* social theory of mass opinion can benefit from adding the insights of a diverse set of pre-existing schools of thought. Here, these include—but are by no means limited to—the frameworks of ‘traditional’ and critical social and sociological theory, ideology theory and ideology critique, media theory and mediology, political and social psychology, and neuroscience. What unites them, or at least the parts that are relevant to this analysis, is a shared interest in how opinions emerge in society. Or, more specifically, they share—despite their diverse areas of enquiry—a common orientation towards the central question that concerns opinion research: *what determines whether, and how, people have opinions about something (as opposed to having others, or not having them at all)?* As an interpretative intervention in the field of opinion research, this analysis takes this question as the core impetus for, and framework of, its enquiry. But as an application of social theory, it also turns its focus away from merely studying superficial “results” (and their correlations), or “concrete and observable forms of human conduct”, and towards examining the underlying social processes that bring them about.⁴³ In other words, while ‘having opinions’ may well be a ‘surface-level’ phenomenon, this analysis takes ‘determination’ to refer to “deep-structure” logics of social explication of the kind endorsed by Giddens, Unger, and others in their vein.

⁴¹ Almond 1968; Converse 1964; Lippmann 1955.

⁴² Thompson 1995, p.7.

⁴³ Freedman 2003, p.39; Splichal 1999, p.262.

§3. *Occupation, class, and mass opinion*

But these research questions are extremely broad, and the limited scope of this enquiry requires them to be given a narrower focus. To provide this focus, the enquiry turns again to the debates that followed the result of the UK's EU membership referendum. Central to these debates was the question of whether, as Gove insinuated, the referendum was less a judgment on Europe than a mutiny by the British people against their own establishment. Some endorsed this interpretation, either in gloating tones—"an uprising ... against those who rule"—or with a sense of harried disquiet—"a working-class revolt".⁴⁴ Certainly, measured by social grade classifications, which categorise voters into both occupational groups and classes, there was some correlation between voters' socioeconomic situation and how they voted: 57% of the higher "AB" social groups (managerial, administrative, and professional occupations) voted for 'Remain', while 64% of the "C2DE" lower groups (skilled and unskilled manual and causal occupations) favoured 'Leave'.⁴⁵ Others, however, pointed out that the leaders of the 'Leave' campaign—such as Gove himself, as well as Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson—were themselves members of a "neoliberal elite" and "establishment" that had "revelled in the destruction of the working-class communities and cultures" they now claimed to stand for. Far from representing a "victory against the elite", they argued, 'Brexit' and its effects would simply empower the elite to enact policies that would "hurt the working class far more" than the EU ever could.⁴⁶ In other words, rather than the visions of society presented by the 'Remain' and 'Leave' campaigns representing a 'class divide' between 'elites' and 'the people', as Gove claimed, the referendum's true classist aspect lay in the competition among elites to 'inform' and 'guide'—or, pejoratively, 'manipulate' and 'distort'—mass opinion, which cross-cut UK society far more subtly than the voting tendencies for social grade classifications suggest.

This thesis takes its cue from the occupational and classist divides supposedly revealed in this particular 'moment' of mass opinion-expression, and extrapolates from them a useful general angle onto the social analysis of mass opinion. The deep structures on which it focuses—and which it argues play a significant role in explicating whether, and how, people have opinions—are those associated with *social occupations* and *social classes*. In other words, in choosing a specific social-theoretical approach with which to theorise mass opinion, this enquiry aligns itself with traditions in social thought which argue that the

⁴⁴ Harris 2016; O'Neill 2016.

⁴⁵ Ashcroft 2016.

⁴⁶ Crunden 2016; Mason 2016.

occupations people hold and class positions they occupy substantially determine social phenomena *in general*, and applies this to the specific consideration of whether people have opinions, and what opinions they have. Given the particular kind of social analysis this account formulates, then, the opinion research question can be rephrased to accommodate this precise steer: *what is the effect of social occupation and class on whether, and how, people have opinions about something (as opposed to having others, or not having them at all)?*

Of course, on a basic level, the suggestion that someone's social class translates into the opinions they have is fairly intuitive. Moreover, the idea that class divisions manifest themselves as differences within mass opinion has long been seriously entertained by social theorists and scientists alike—even if, following Arthur Kornhauser, there is rather less agreement on what these differences actually are.⁴⁷ There are clear, and often entirely logical, correlations between an individual's social class and the substantive views they hold on issues such as taxation and redistribution, civil liberties, identity politics, nationalism versus globalism, &c.⁴⁸ Insofar as this account engages in orthodox class analysis, there may therefore be justifiable questions raised about where its innovative aspects lie. At the same time, occupation and class are far from the only categories of social identity and 'groupness' that might reasonably be expected to have an effect on the opinions that people have. Human beings are also differentiated by other aspects of their existence that gain contingent social significance, like biological characteristics (age, health, bodily ability, skin pigmentation, reproductive organs, &c*), geography (localities, regions, nations, continents), or time-periods (generations, civilisations, eras, 'stages').⁴⁹ This raises further questions as to why a social analysis should focus on class over these other categories. In fact, academic interest in class analysis of mass opinion has varied significantly over time, as traced by Leslie McCall and Jeff Manza—and it has especially declined since the appearance (and wide acceptance) of Ronald Inglehart's thesis regarding the ascendancy of post-materialism and non-class social cleavages.⁵⁰

The analysis below addresses these questions implicitly throughout, but a brief explicit response can be provided here. Simply put, this enquiry is not interested in adding to existing analyses of the

⁴⁷ Kornhauser 1950. See also Goldberg 2011; McCall and Manza 2011; Negt and Kluge 1998; Wilson 1955.

⁴⁸ Bourdieu 2010; Goldthorpe 2002; Kellner 2014; McCall 2013; Sijuwade 2007.

⁴⁹ This list—especially for contingently significant biological characteristics—is not meant to be exclusive or exhaustive. Like every text, this analysis is a product of its time, and one way to address as-yet-unthinkable absences from this list for the benefit of future readers is by adding an asterisk to the '&c' after the currently-popular model 'LGBT*' or 'LGBTQIA*'.

⁵⁰ Inglehart 1977; McCall and Manza 2011.

superficial correlations between individuals' social occupation and class and the specific substantive opinions they hold. Rather, it focuses on deeper connections between social occupation and class and how, and why, individuals *come to* hold the opinions they do. Opinion research hitherto has for too long skirted the issue of analysing the mechanisms by which social occupation and class affect the processes by which opinion is formed and expressed. In response, then, to the more precisely-formulated opinion research question above, this account argues that social occupation and class affect subjects' opinions by determining: (1) the values and attitudes that orient their opinions, and the information they acquire and to which their opinions respond, which together create the basic pictures subjects have of the world around them; (2) the way subjects use their personality, emotion, and reason to form these pictures into more complex opinions; and (3) the way subjects use their own bodies and physical media to express the opinions they have formed. Since subjects amass a range of multiple occupational positions and class situations (simultaneously or over the course of their lives), they have to reconcile several competing versions of this determination every time they form and express an opinion. This places them on a spectrum '*between foxes and hedgehogs*', to paraphrase and analogise a distinction popularised by Isaiah Berlin. Subjects' experience of the world through the occupations and class situations they hold is not so diverse (*quasi foxes*) that they can draw straightforwardly on "unrelated and even contradictory [...] centrifugal" outlooks, "moving on many levels"—i.e., a "scattered or diffused" syncretic or synoptic range of values, attitudes, information, and means to form and express their opinions. But on the other hand, their experience is not so dominated by one occupational and classist experience (*quasi hedgehogs*) that they only rely consistently on "a single central vision, one system, less or more coherent or articulate"—i.e., "a single, universal, organising" set of values, attitudes, information, and means to form and express their opinions.⁵¹ This means that mass opinion is characterised by significant *pluralism* at every stage of its creation—its orientation, objects, formation, and expression—as a direct result of subjects' diverse occupations and class situations in late modernity.

Implicitly, this response contains an affirmative assumption: social occupation and class *do* determine whether, and how, people have opinions, and what kinds of opinions they have. But it does not stop there. Rather, it aims to go beyond both the basic intuition about a class-opinion link, and the *status quo* of social research. It does so by reorienting the way occupation and class is theorised for social theory *tout court*, and leveraging this into a more detailed specification of how they affect mass opinion.

⁵¹ Berlin 2014, p.2.

First, it broadens theoretical understandings of social differentiation and stratification beyond their characterisation in narrowly economic terms. In social settings, human beings are differentiated by, and stratified according to, asymmetries of power, which are created by unequal distribution of material resources, and imbalanced arrangements of relational linkages to others. This account does not, however, define the classes these create exclusively in terms of income and wealth distributions (the ‘neo-Weberian’ approach) and labour exploitation (the ‘neo-Marxist’ approach), but follows Bourdieu and others in giving the concept of class a broader social rooting.⁵² Second, it steers social theory away from broad views of class and towards more granular consideration of occupations as the primary categories of social analysis. In doing so, it adopts what David Grusky calls a ‘neo-Durkheimian’ approach, disaggregating “big classes” into their constituent institutionalised groupings of “technically similar” jobs, or other roles, which share “general functions and principal duties and tasks”.⁵³ Third, it explores how occupation and class intersect with the processes by which people *form* and *express* opinions, rather than just the correlations between class and the opinions people *have*, taken simply as outcomes. It achieves this through a fusion of basically structuralist insights on socialisation, and the creation of subjecthood, with psychological and communications-theoretical analyses of how opinions are formed and expressed.

Regarding the other social categories, it cannot be stressed enough that the occupational and classist focus of this analysis should not be read in any way as a ‘slight’ to, or cavalier dismissal of, urgent concerns of age, ability, race, gender, sexual orientation, &c*, in society. It is, of course, undeniable that these categories have a major role to play in determining what opinions people have, and almost certainly also on how they form and express them. Indeed, various traditions within opinion research have focused extensively on the impact of non-class social markers within their ‘parts’ of mass opinion—perhaps most prominently Fraser’s criticism of Habermasian public sphere theory for brushing over the existence of female ‘counterpublics’, and the regular enquiries by Darren Davis, Brian Silver, and others into the effects of racial differentials on the interactions of survey questioners and respondents.⁵⁴ In the same vein, a *full* social theory of mass opinion would also take these effects into account, along with the intersections of these effects with those of the occupational and class structures analysed here. In this

⁵² Bourdieu 2010; Breen 2005; Wright 2005a.

⁵³ Grusky 2005, pp.66-7; Hauser and Warren 1997, p.80; International Labor Office 1990, p.5.

⁵⁴ Anderson, Silver, and Abramson 1988; Burns and Kinder 2012; Cotter, Cohen, and Coulter 1982; Davis 1997; Davis and Silver 2003; Finkel, Guterbock, and Borg 1991; Fraser 1992; Hatchett and Schuman 1975; Junn, Mendelberg, and Czaja 2012; Liu and Wang 2015.

light, it is worth making absolutely clear that the focus on occupation and class in this enquiry should on no account be taken as a suggestion either that non-class categories of social differentiation can be simply *reduced* to occupational and class divisions, or that they should be theorised in *identity* terms in a way that is wholly independent of class analysis, to borrow a distinction made by Floya Anthias.⁵⁵ It is merely that the drive for explanatory completeness is regrettably (but unavoidably) made subservient to a necessary economy of ambition within the bounds of this specific project. But while this occupational and classist analysis of mass opinion may not be the ‘full story’, it is, at least, a start. It is also, moreover, a highly profitable place to start, as it gives this project an opportune attachment to the present social conjuncture, as well as contemporary trends in social theorising. The last decade has seen the ‘return of class’ in social thought—in forms ranging from the economist Guy Standing’s work on the emerging ‘precariat’, to political commentator Owen Jones’ discussion of the stereotyping of the British working class as ‘chavs’, as well as the well-publicised *Great British Class Survey* conducted by sociologist Mike Savage and his collaborators.⁵⁶ Consequently, while this project remains open to exploring the intersectional aspects of the social basis of mass opinion in future, for now it is the occupational and class aspects of mass opinion that are given analytic ‘primacy’.

A final note on terminology, namely: why use ‘mass opinion’ to describe this project’s *analysandum*? There is certainly no shortage of alternative terms. Philosophers of various stripes—most prominently post-Kantians such as G.W.F. Hegel and Martin Heidegger, and Marxists such as Antonio Gramsci—occasionally speak about ‘*common sense*’, in contrast to ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, ‘authenticity’, &c.⁵⁷ Others, often following the lead of the utilitarians, focus on the idea of ‘*collective interest*’.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, writers sensitive to the concept’s political possibilities, especially in the context of rapid demographic growth and densification, use the label ‘*popular sentiment*’—whence the soubriquet ‘Mr. Popular Sentiment’, with which Anthony Trollope satirised the social problem novelist Charles Dickens.⁵⁹ More recently, social scientists with the same political sensitivity—including James Stimson, Michael MacKuen, Robert Erikson, and Robert Shapiro—have articulated their analyses in terms of the ‘*national mood*’, sharpening the concept’s implicit connection to the policy measures taken by the governments of

⁵⁵ Anthias 2005.

⁵⁶ Savage *et al.* 2015.

⁵⁷ Gramsci 2005, pp.323–33, 419–25; Hegel 1991, §§315–18; Heidegger 1962, pp.187, 334, 339–40, 343, 363.

⁵⁸ Mill 2004, pp.285, 288.

⁵⁹ Trollope 1989.

modern nation-states.⁶⁰ Historically, of course, there were hopes that it would be possible to give this phenomenon meaningful legislative force within political institutions, which led early theorists of popular sovereignty—including Charles de Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, following Denis Diderot and Baruch Spinoza—to frame it as a societal ‘*general will*’, a concept whose echoes were still felt in the later plebiscitary theories of James Bryce and Carl Schmitt.⁶¹ And finally, perhaps most urgently, what about ‘*public opinion*’? Several of the authors already mentioned—Price, Splichal, Bourdieu, Tönnies, Lippmann, Blumer—and many others besides them frame their discussions of ‘opinion’ through the lens of ‘publicness’ rather than ‘massness’, and it would be unconscionably cavalier to pretend that this decision is simply a matter of aesthetics or semantics, and nothing more.

Put simply, this choice of language comes about as a result of this project’s methodological commitments. Because it is making an intervention that is, first and foremost, targeted at the contemporary status of opinion research, this project deliberately ‘buys into’ many of the methodological-individualist assumptions that currently characterise this field of study, which stem from the contingent hegemony within it of social-scientific methods of enquiry. In other words, it accepts the social-scientific view that ‘opinion’ on its own is *prima facie* an individualistic concept, and that processes of opinion-formation and expression fundamentally take place at an individual level. As Splichal has pointed out, this is a view that sets up an internal tension, or even “contradiction”, when individualist ‘opinion’ is paired with “contrasting” collectivist or universalist modifiers such as ‘public’, ‘popular’, ‘national’, ‘general’, &c.⁶² Instead of attempting the significant task of reconciling this contradiction, the analysis sidesteps the problem by using a modifier—‘mass’—that is compatible with both individualist and collectivist readings, and which, thanks to Zaller, already has precedent within opinion research.⁶³ Following Thompson, the term ‘mass’ “conjures up the image of a vast [group] comprising many thousands, even millions of individuals”—but individuals who are “passive” and “undifferentiated” members of ‘mass culture’ and ‘mass society’.⁶⁴ There is no reason, as such, to portray the authorship of ‘mass opinion’ either in “narrowly quantitative terms”, or as the product of a “bland and homogeneous” collective agent—or mass opinion itself as necessarily either a statistical aggregate or a “corporate social

⁶⁰ Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson 1999; Stimson 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995.

⁶¹ Bryce 1995; Israel 2000, p.274; Montesquieu 1989, XI; Riley 1978; Schmitt 1985.

⁶² Splichal 2001b, p.26.

⁶³ Zaller 1992, p.265.

⁶⁴ Thompson 1995, p.24; Schulz 2001, p.340.

entity”.⁶⁵ Rather, the term ‘mass’ should be taken to mean that the ‘opinion’ it describes is, in principle, created by a plurality of authors—a “multitude”, to borrow Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s term—who belong in some way to the population of a given society.⁶⁶

Of course, this is not to say that this contradiction is unimportant, or that the alternatives to ‘mass opinion’ are straightforwardly synonymous and interchangeable. Rather, it reflects a recognition that choosing one of the other terms as an *analysandum* would import a vastly more complex set of embedded assumptions and additional concerns, which would risk distracting from this project’s main aim of making a clear and rigorous contribution to opinion research *simpliciter*. ‘Mass opinion’ is thus, in some respects, a placeholder term that allows this project’s insights about individual opinions to be quickly and easily aggregated and scaled up to the societal level of analysis. So, all in all, it is more for reasons of parsimony than profound conviction that ‘mass opinion’ becomes the object of enquiry for this analysis. After all, in much sociological analysis—and, almost by definition, in all communitarian or left-political theory—individualism is typically treated as something of a methodological limitation, and this analysis is certainly not unsympathetic to its many potential problematisations.

§4. *Overview of this enquiry*

With this, it is now possible to give a brief overview of the structure of this analysis. The first two chapters detail this enquiry’s methodological approach and the object towards which it is oriented.

I. Outline of a social theory:

The thesis starts with a ‘methodology section’, which elaborates the chosen approach to analysing mass opinion. It defines ‘the social’, or the field of enquiry of social theory, as the material and relational conditions (MRCs) of human subjects, and the implications these have for the workings of power. It refines this account by considering the way human agency interacts with ‘the social’, and formulates a model of how this agency is functionally divided into different activities (and domains), and occupations arranged into class stratifications, as well as how subjects are socialised into the functional ‘roles’ created by these divisions. Finally, it offers a pair of starting hypotheses for how the concept of ‘opinion’ could fit into this model, which it breaks down into interrelated activities of ‘ideation’ (the creation of ideas, based on the action of ‘thinking’) and ‘communication’ (the transmission of information, based on ‘articulation’).

⁶⁵ Splichal 2001b, p.25.

⁶⁶ Hardt and Negri 2005.

II. The nature and basis of opinion:

The analysis turns to examine the concept of ‘opinion’ on its own, along with the ways in which subjects in general form and express it. It begins by characterising ‘opinion’ as a form of discourse concerned with epistemological or evaluative judgment, which has as its object the mental ‘pictures’ that subjects have to represent their social environment. These mental pictures contain ‘verdicts’ about ‘the social’, and are created by the ‘marriage’ of subjects’ predispositions (values and attitudes) to information they acquire directly or indirectly from their environment. Subjects form opinions by transforming these ‘verdicts’ using a combination of three physiological and psychic elements, which together comprise their ‘means of thinking’: personality-traits, emotions, and reason. Subsequently, and separately, subjects express these opinions by converting their content into messages using a variety of physiological elements or resources in their environment, which fall into either of two categories of ‘means of articulation’: bodily organs and media.

The remaining three chapters consider how the processes of opinion-formation and opinion-expression outlined in chapter II are influenced by the structure of ‘the social’ in late modernity presented in chapter I. These influences are illustrated by a series of ‘case study’ vignettes interspersed periodically throughout the analysis, although readers may pass over these as non-essential parts of the argument.

III. Experts in our own experience: pluralism in predispositions and information:

This chapter examines how ‘the social’ affects the predispositions and information which subjects use to create the mental pictures of their environments. It suggests that subjects’ involvement in different social activities, and their occupational positions and class situations that frame this involvement, leads to them being endowed with particular norms and dispositions, and specific judgmental predispositions derived from them, which are defined and disseminated by a type of institutions called ‘discursive apparatuses’. Next, it argues that subjects’ occupational specialisation gives them a part of ‘the social’ about which they acquire information directly, and hence about which their opinions exhibit ‘expertise’ and discursive ‘originality’—but at the expense of relying on indirect information about the rest of ‘the social’, making their opinions about it ‘lay’ and discursively ‘dependent’ on a network of other subjects. Lastly, it looks at the several categories of individual subjects and groups that are especially influential in transmitting predispositions and information to other subjects in society: elites, peer-groups, the intelligentsia, ‘heroic individuals’, and a few others. It suggests that the pluralism in the predispositions and information that underpin mass opinion in late modernity is best characterised as *multipolarity*.

IV. Are you thinking how we’re thinking?: pluralism in opinion-formation:

Next, the analysis turns to explore how ‘the social’ determines which means of thinking subjects have access to when they form opinions based on the mental pictures of their environments. The chapter starts by arguing that, while personality-traits, emotions, and reason all play some part in every subject’s opinion-formation processes, the degree and nature of subjects’ use of them varies significantly depending on which social activities they are involved in, and what occupations and class situations they hold. It then examines these differences for each means of thinking in turn. For personality, it

finds that, in general, subjects in higher versus lower social classes exhibit traits that *a priori* incline them more towards reasoned versus emotional thinking respectively, and towards ‘mixed’ versus ‘conservative’ readings of their mental pictures. With emotions, it argues that subjects in higher classes are generally more positive and comfortable in their established assessments of ‘the social’, while those in lower classes are more negative and prone to revising their views, at least in contingent circumstances. And with reason, the analysis suggests that higher-class subjects are more likely to think rationally (i.e., reasoning subjectively) in a way that relies on a full and diverse range of information, while lower-class subjects generally think more reasonably (i.e., reasoning intersubjectively) and restrict themselves to only a few ‘stand-out’ types of information. It thus describes the pluralism in the processes by which mass opinion is formed in late modernity in terms of *multiformity*.

V. They have not fail’d to pester us with message: pluralism in opinion-expression:

In the final chapter, the analysis examines how ‘the social’ affects which means of articulation subjects have access to when they express the opinions they have formed. As with the means of thinking, the chapter begins by outlining how, while bodily organs and media are all broadly available for every subject’s opinion-expression processes, the degree and nature of their use of them also depends extensively on the activities they are involved in, and the occupations and class situations they hold. Again, it assesses these differences for each means of articulation in turn. For bodily organs, it observes that subjects in higher classes tend to dominate those in lower classes for all forms of expression, but above all in the quality and quantity of verbal communication. And for media, it finds that higher-class subjects are similarly dominant, especially for printing, broadcast, and certain *sui generis* types of media, while lower-class subjects are slightly more able to ‘hold their own’ with (among others) written, electronic, and digital communication. The chapter closes by characterising the pluralism in the processes by which mass opinion is expressed in late modernity as *multimodality*.

Finally, the analysis concludes with some observations for how the social model of mass opinion developed in this enquiry could be applied.

Conclusion: Beyond the *Pollsterdämmerung*

The analysis recapitulates the insights of this enquiry and considers how they can be used to improve the ways in which the concept of ‘mass opinion’ is theorised and treated in practice. It suggests that the various pluralisms this model has identified in mass opinion—its multipolarity, multiformity, and multimodality, which together give it an overarching *multivocality*—indicate promising trajectories for new forms of measurement to be integrated into opinion research. Moreover, it also finds in them possible opportunities for mass opinion to be emancipated by alleviating the occupational and classist asymmetries that still obtain within it in late modernity.

I. Outline of a social theory

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity.

——Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels⁶⁷

Marx (and many others) was right in assuming that occupational position would be a major determinant of political orientation and class organisation in industrial society. ... The changes in the class and political relations of developed societies may be analysed within the framework of an apolitical Marxism; that is, the assumption that the level of technology will determine their forms.

——Seymour Martin Lipset⁶⁸

The first step towards providing a new social understanding of mass opinion that unifies the disparate strands of opinion research is to formulate an account of ‘the social’, and define a framework with which to analyse social phenomena. This enquiry has distanced itself from the uncritical methodological ‘superficiality’ of other opinion research traditions, which means that outlining a ‘thoroughgoing’ approach to analysing mass opinion entails furnishing the concept with a new theoretical basis from within the wider domain of social research. Since social theory sets out to provide an analytic framework that can explicate far more than just the concept of mass opinion, this involves starting at a general, fundamental level of analysis, and gradually adding layers of complexity and refinement in order to ‘home in on’ the phenomenon of mass opinion. What follows here is thus intended as a *prolegomenon*, or a ‘methodology section’, for the remainder of this enquiry. To avoid any risk of unclarity later in the enquiry, this chapter lays out its social-theoretical framework in a way that is deliberately painstaking, and aims to situate and explain comprehensively and accurately the concepts

⁶⁷ Marx and Engels 1975, p.31.

⁶⁸ Lipset 1981, p.22.

and terminology used in this analysis. It begins with an account of the conditions of subjects' social existence, which comprise the resources by which subjects are surrounded and the linkages in which they are imbricated, and the effects these have on subjects' power (§1). This account is refined by identifying systematic differences in the way that subjects interact with these conditions. These appear, firstly, as a division of 'the social' into several distinct activities, grouped into domains (§2), within which subjects are constituted by processes of socialisation (§3), and, secondly, as a division of these activities into sets of tasks associated with specific occupations, grouped into classes (§4). Each activity and occupation is associated with a particular form of power, based on specific distributions and arrangements of resources and linkages, and with a *habitus* that shapes how subjects act. Finally, the account turns to analyse the concept of mass opinion, and defines it as the outcome of two interlinked activities, ideation and communication, that together form the domain of discourse (§5).

§1. *Defining 'the social': material and relational conditions*

Every social theory needs a clear and parsimonious account of its field of enquiry. This analysis is no exception: if it is to provide a truly 'thoroughgoing' and 'from-the-ground-up' examination of mass opinion as a social phenomenon, it needs to revisit the most fundamental starting premises of social research. This may entail a little sacrifice of nuance and completeness, but should nonetheless offer a 'guiding principle' (*Leitfaden*) or 'conceptual notion' (*Auffassung*)—in Karl Marx's sense—for conducting this analysis.⁶⁹ For present purposes, 'the social' is understood as referring to the *material and relational conditions of human subjects*. Human beings are surrounded by *materials*: physical, earthly substances that constitute the world, matter that is concretely present, including other humans, but specifically resources that can be used as tools, equipment, materiel, or in any other way as means. As Hannah Arendt observes, "human life [...] is always rooted in a world of men and [...] things which it never leaves or altogether transcends".⁷⁰ Subjects' *material conditions* (MCs) describe the topography of their surroundings—i.e., how materials are distributed. At the same time, human beings are imbricated in *relations*: links that connect them, forms of comparison and involvement based on the existence of mutual contact, from contrast and opposition to correspondence and association. This is perhaps most

⁶⁹ Marx 1987, pp.262-4.

⁷⁰ Arendt 1958, p.22.

succinctly captured by Dewey: humans are “born organic beings associated with others”.⁷¹ Subjects’ *relational conditions* (RCs) designate the contours of their imbrications—i.e., how relations are arranged. Together, as a basic preliminary definition, these material and relational conditions (MRCs) constitute ‘the social’ as the *distribution of resources around human subjects*, together with the *arrangement of linkages between them*. This distribution, and this arrangement, are what subjects are confronted with when they are ‘thrown’ (*geworfen*), or ‘particularised’ (*besondert*), into their place in the world—in Heidegger’s and Hegel’s terminology respectively—based on the physical and temporal conjuncture into which they are born.⁷²

On its own, however, this definition creates insufficient difference between ‘the social’ and what might be called ‘the natural’. As defined so far, MRCs would equally be candidates for natural- or physical-scientific as well as social analysis—MCs as objects of analysis for (e.g.) geology or mechanics, and RCs as concerns of (e.g.) ecology or population biology. This is unsurprising: materials and relations are complex phenomena, so it would be unusual (to say the least) to claim that social analysis has hegemonic or exclusive insight into either of them. Which form of analysis is chosen depends on what it is about MRCs that is to be analysed. Social theory is oriented towards human subjects, so its main perspective onto MRCs aims to identify their relevance *for* human subjects. This is the force of calling MRCs ‘conditions’, rather than ‘phenomena’ or ‘features’: they are conditions *of* human subjects in the sense of being conditions *for* them, i.e., conditions *of concern to* subjects, or conditions *as far as they are concerned*. Subjects interact, or engage, with ‘the social’ fundamentally by *being affected by* MRCs—a passive, or reactive, form of interaction that is ineluctable, and hence ‘of concern’, because of what Heidegger calls the “obstinacy” of the materials and relations in subjects’ context. What social theory explores is the points at which (and the ways in which) materials and relations become not just ‘present-at-hand’ (*vorhanden*), casually or ‘observationally’ present for human subjects, but ‘ready-to-hand’ (*zuhanden*), integrally or ‘involvedly’ present in a way that immediately affects them.⁷³

The specific nature of this concern, which makes MRCs conditions *for* human subjects, and in which social theory is primarily interested, is that MRCs underpin, and determine the workings of power, and that social attributions of power emanate from the distribution of resources and arrangement of linkages among human subjects. Power is a diffuse concept that has been addressed in various (often

⁷¹ Dewey 2012, p.125.

⁷² Hegel 1991, §§6, 182-7; Heidegger 1962, pp.174, 435.

⁷³ Heidegger 1962, pp.104, 137.

mutually unintelligible) ways across different social research traditions. Yet at their core, they can be reduced to two parallel, complementary interpretations of the concept as (1) an absolute *capacity*, often given the shorthand ‘power-to’, and as (2) comparative *status*, framed as ‘power-over’ or ‘power-with’.⁷⁴ These map closely onto the framework of MRCs. Power-as-capacity depends on whether, and how, human subjects ‘have’ the materials that surround them. Materials that are distributed proximally to, rather than distantly from, subjects permit power to concentrate around them as discrete entities within ‘the social’. This includes their own bodies, which surround subjects in the sense that they ‘inhabit’ them, insofar as these can act as resources, or in any other way as means. *Control over, disposal of, and access to* materials allows subjects to accrue power-as-capacity by giving them a definite foundation from which, or vehicles through which, to wield or exercise it.⁷⁵ (The ‘control’ aspect introduces a sense of materials ‘belonging to’ subjects, so it makes sense to shift from talking about distributions of materials *around* subjects to distributions of capacities *among* them.) Meanwhile, power-as-status depends on whether, and how, human subjects are arranged towards one another by the relations in which they are imbricated. Relations that are arranged strongly in favour of subjects permit power to concentrate around them at their locations within ‘the social’ conceived in Michel Foucault’s sense as a “network”.⁷⁶ This includes every form of contact with other subjects resulting from their subjective location, insofar as these can be characterised as linkages, or in any other way as connections. The existence of (*de*)*privilege*, (*dis*)*advantage*, or (*im*)*balance* within relations allows subjects to accrue power-as-status by giving them a comparative framework within which, and conduits through which, to wield or exercise it.

The relationship between MRCs and power is not definitional or equivalential—rather, they are fluidly intertwined in a reciprocal formula of support and concretisation. MRCs ‘support’ power in the sense that subjects’ distribution of resources and arrangement of linkages translate into, or ‘give’ them, particular capacities and status(es). Conversely, power is ‘concretised’ through MRCs in the sense that subjects’ capacities and status(es) manifest as, or are ‘stored’ in, particular distributions of resources and arrangements of linkages. Neither translation nor manifestation are necessarily fixed or consistent, and the precise relationship between MRCs and power can vary significantly according to subjects’ precise physical and temporal contexts. For now, however, the main implication is that the definition of ‘the

⁷⁴ Arendt 1958, pp.199–207; Barry 1991; Foucault 1980; Lukes 2004; Miliband 2009; Morriss 2012; Poulantzas 2014; Weber 1946, p.78; Weber 1978, pp.926–7.

⁷⁵ Thompson 1995, p.13.

⁷⁶ Foucault 1977a, p.88; Foucault 1980, pp.71, 119, 122, 138, 142, 186, 207.

social' can be slightly expanded: material and relational conditions (MRCs), through their effect on power, constitute 'the social' as the *distribution of resources and capacities among human subjects*, together with the *arrangement of linkages and statuses between them*.

§2. *Social agency and the domains of social activity*

So far, so materialist. Social phenomena exist in a specific physical and temporal context shaped by the material and relational conditions (MRCs), and the distribution or arrangement of power, into which subjects are 'thrown'. This, of course, includes 'mass opinion', and much of the analysis below is concerned with elucidating how mass opinion responds to, and becomes part of, subjects' social context. But this description of 'the social' leaves social theory's field of enquiry as-yet slightly underdetermined. Since social theory seeks to study human subjects in their totality, what is missing is the dynamic aspect of subjects' interaction with 'the social'—i.e., interaction understood as *action*. To capture this, and go beyond what is otherwise a fairly static account, the meaning of the term 'conditions' must be refined further. 'The social' as described above is pregnant with possibility: possible uses of materials and directions of relations, and possible wieldings or exercises of power. The realisation of this possibility requires a 'spark' that is not present in 'the social' conceived only as material and relational conditions, but must be 'injected' into it. This 'activation' of 'the social' requires *human agency*—in particular, agency that is *purposive*, in the sense that it serves a *function* (or *functions*), and is thus 'designed' to achieve some outcome, if not strictly always 'purposeful', in the sense that subjects may not always 'intend' the outcomes they achieve. In general terms, the purpose, and functions, towards which agency is oriented is straightforward: 'dealing with' MRCs, and their effects on power, as they present themselves to subjects in their physical and temporal contexts. As Dewey and Max Weber (among others) observe, it is purposive human agency and action that definitively take MRCs out of the realm of natural and physical science and into the ambit of social research.⁷⁷

The vital role of human agency as the additional dimension that completes what social theory explores is precisely what Marx notes in his *Theses on Feuerbach*, in a passage that Bourdieu highlights in the epigraph to his *Outline of a Theory of Practice*:

⁷⁷ Dewey 2012, pp.46-8; Splichal 2001a, p.12; Thompson 1995, p.12; Weber 1978, pp.4-23.

The chief defect of all previous materialism [...] is that things [*Gegenstand*], reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the *object*, or of *contemplation*, but not as *human sensuous activity*, *practice*, not subjectively.⁷⁸

Through the addition of agency, subjects convert ‘the social’ from a backdrop that frames their existence into a sphere of *activity*, and material resources and relational linkages from ‘conditions’ in the sense of causal determinants to ‘conditions’ as contingent parameters. (This is not to suggest that social action is always successful: subjects may well try and fail to achieve any outcomes whatsoever, intended or otherwise. Rather, the emphasis here is on the qualitative shift that takes place when subjects ‘act’ within their physical and temporal context.) It is the contrast between two senses in which MRCs are conditions *for* subjects that Heidegger has in mind when he identifies a semantic distinction between two connotations of the German word *Umwelt*: one as ‘environment’, and another as “in-order-to-world”, i.e., the world where human purposes are realised.⁷⁹ Arendt, meanwhile, unifies this distinction by observing that the MRCs that act as subjects’ environment in their physical and temporal contexts are often “man-made” or “fabricated” rather than strictly natural:

Things and men form the environment for each of man’s activities ... yet this environment, the world into which we are born, would not exist without the human activity which produced it. ... No human life, not even the life of the hermit in nature’s wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or indirectly testifies to the presence of other human beings.⁸⁰

That is to say: the precise nature of (some) subjects’ interaction with their environment is often the result of (other) subjects’ having exercised their purposive agency on it.

Echoing Bourdieu, then, this social theory “insists” that its field of enquiry is at least partly “*constructed*, and ... that the principle of this construction is practical activity oriented towards practical functions”.⁸¹ But purposive activity is not just an abstract phenomenon, and human agency is not an abstract attribute. Rather, both depend closely and essentially on the specific conditions of subjects’ ‘thrownness’ (*Geworfenheit*) into the world. The social distribution of resources and capacities, and the arrangement of linkages and statuses is not just what subjects’ agency, and purposive activity, is oriented towards, but also precisely what ‘makes it possible’ for subjects—i.e., what ‘facilitates’, or ‘empowers’ them—to ‘take action’. Subjects’ environment, in other words, determines not just what they ‘act on’,

⁷⁸ Marx 1975b, p.6. Original emphasis.

⁷⁹ Heidegger 1962, p.93.

⁸⁰ Arendt 1958, p.22.

⁸¹ Bourdieu 1977, p.96. Original emphasis.

but also how they do so. While all subjects have a basic level of agency merely as living beings, the nature and degree of their control over, disposal of, and access to materials, and (de)privilege, (dis)advantage, or (im)balance within relations—and the way these translate into capacities and status(es)—determines how ‘large-scale’, ‘significant’, or ‘far-reaching’ the activity towards which they direct their agency can be. Again, as with the relationship between MRCs and power, the conversion of agency into action is not constant, but can vary according to subjects’ precise physical and temporal contexts. The main insight here, however, is that subjects’ MRCs not only provide a ‘framework’ for their agency, and the ‘starting-points’ of their subjective purposive activity, but also determine the form(s) in which, and instruments with which, this activity can take place.

Even more than MRCs, however, subjects’ agency depends on their *physical embodiment*. The human body is a unique material, since unlike tools, equipment, materiel, or other physical matter, it is not just a resource for subjects to use. It also possesses inherent biological, physiological, and psychological faculties that *enable* human agency, and which are exercised whenever subjects ‘act’. This is true of activity *simpliciter* within ‘the natural’, as well as activity that gains a ‘social’ character by being oriented towards the distribution of resources and capacities, and the arrangement of linkages and statuses. For them to be ‘able’ to ‘act’ *at all*, then, subjects need at least minimal control over, disposal of, and access to the material(s) comprising their bodies. They must ‘have’ (or ‘inhabit’) their bodies in such a way that they can use them as a basis for their agency—i.e., that their agency *is put in a position of being able to* interact with (other) materials and relations. Insofar as human subjects can use their body in this way, they accrue (at least a modicum of) power, simply by physically existing as a discrete entity located within ‘the social’, to which resources can be distributed, which can be arranged into linkages, and around which power can concentrate. Subjects need this ‘agency power’ as both ‘*capacity for agency*’ and ‘*status as agent*’ in order to convert their purposes into *outcomes*—i.e., in order for their activity to have even a minimal ‘impact’ on their environment. Overall, this means that the ‘activation’ of ‘the social’ represents (at least to a small degree) the ‘empowerment’ of human subjects.

With the addition of agency, subjects’ scope for interacting with ‘the social’ is greatly expanded. Beyond the basic level of passive, or reactive, interaction with MRCs through being ineluctably affected by them, subjects’ agency and purposive activity allow them to interact with MRCs in an active, or proactive, sense of *affecting* them by ‘acting on’ them. That is to say: subjects do not just (passively) have materials, and are not just (passively) arranged into relations, but can also (actively) use materials and relations to affect materials and relations in turn—i.e., to “intervene in the course of events and to affect

... [their] sets of circumstances”, in Thompson’s words.⁸² Unlike interaction-as-being-affected, which becomes of concern to subjects through the sheer ‘obstinacy’ of materials and relations, interaction-as-affecting is associated with a more *reflexive* form of concern—i.e., concern that is self-aware and autonomous, in the way that Bourdieu, Giddens, or Robert Merton use the term.⁸³ Subjects become ‘concerned with’ their active interaction with ‘the social’ because, and exactly insofar as, their agency and activity are oriented towards dealing with the MRCs in their environment (or ‘in-order-to-world’). Of course, these two forms of interaction can coexist. Subjects are passively affected by (some) MRCs, and actively affect (the same, or other) MRCs, depending on the precise nature of their ‘thrownness’ into their particular physical and temporal contexts. Nevertheless, *being-affected* and *affecting* represent two qualitatively different forms of interaction with ‘the social’, whose significance is explored more later.⁸⁴

Of course, the possibilities offered by ‘the social’, the purposes for which subjects act, and the ways they deal with MRCs and their effects on power, are evidently not monolithic. Instead of a singular form of social activity, as argued by Talcott Parsons and especially Niklas Luhmann, subjects engage in a vast range of “differentiated” *activities* towards the MRCs in which they find themselves.⁸⁵ In the first instance, this means that human social action exhibits a functional *division of purposive agency*. (Such a division, of course, is not a unique phenomenon of late modernity, but has certainly become more evident and exacerbated in the post-Enlightenment period.) Activities—i.e., the parts of this division—can be categorised into *domains* according to the specific approach they take to dealing with MRCs and power. (On occasion, several activities can be grouped into one domain, which unites several categories in the social division of purposive agency if their approaches to dealing with ‘the social’ are very similar, or strongly interlinked.) Some of these categories and domains are, by now, entirely familiar, not least from the work of Giddens and Thompson, as well as Ernest Gellner and Michael Mann.⁸⁶ Perhaps the best-known, and the most analytically sophisticated to date, is Marx’s identification of ‘the economic’ as the domain of *production*, which can be expanded, following Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say and John Stuart Mill, to include the activities of *consumption* and *exchange*, or *distribution*, as well.⁸⁷ Here, ‘the economic’ represents the primary level of the division of purposive agency—into domains—while production,

⁸² Thompson 1995, p.12-13.

⁸³ Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994; Bourdieu 1992; Merton 1957.

⁸⁴ See p.144ff.

⁸⁵ Luhmann 2012; Luhmann, Holmes, and Larmore 1982; Parsons 1967.

⁸⁶ Gellner 1988; Giddens 1985; Mann 1986; Thompson 1995, p.13-18.

⁸⁷ Marx 1996; Marx and Engels 1975; Mill 1994; Say 1971; Smith 1999a, 1999b.

consumption, and exchange are the three parts of the secondary level of this division—the disaggregated activities that together comprise domains. In a similar vein, Weber has been read by Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills as seeking to extrapolate the Marxian logic to ‘the political’ as the domain of *administration*, or *coordination* in Thompson’s terms, and of *coercion*, or *repression* in Louis Althusser’s conception.⁸⁸ Again, ‘the political’ is the primary level, and administration and coercion the secondary level, of the division of purposive agency.

There are surely other domains and activities, though as yet many of them have not been theorised as thoroughly as ‘the economic’ and ‘the political’. Perhaps the next most prominent in social-theoretic analysis after ‘the economic’ and ‘the political’ is the domain that comprises the two activities of *ideation* and *communication*, or the formulation of ideas through thought, and their expression in various guises as information. There are a number of rival candidates for what this domain should be called: Althusser favours ‘the ideological’, Habermas ‘the cultural’, and Thompson ‘the symbolic’, while Bourdieu oscillates between the latter two.⁸⁹ This account uses ‘the discursive’, or the domain of *discourse(s)*, following in the footsteps of Foucault, as well as discourse analysts (critical or otherwise) such as Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, and Ruth Wodak.⁹⁰ Unusually for social theory, this enquiry treats the activities of ideation and communication—or thought and expression—not only as analytically separate forms of social action, but also as carrying equal ‘weight’ in the constitution of the ‘discursive’ domain. For comparison, Habermas clearly subordinates reasoned thinking to communicative action, whereas theorists of discourse like Foucault (and to a lesser extent Bourdieu) focus on the ideational content and how it is realised in all forms of social existence and agency, without separating out communication as a distinct activity, and hence focus of research.⁹¹ Rather, this account resembles more that of Althusser, who delineates a split between ‘cultural’ and ‘communications’ institutions within ‘ideology’ broadly construed, or that of Thompson, who brackets both “information” and “communication” under ‘symbolic activity’, but acknowledges the clear independence of media institutions.⁹² It is this domain—‘the discursive’—that is of particular and direct interest to the analysis of mass opinion, so it is discussed in greater detail below.

⁸⁸ Gerth and Mills 1946, pp.46-7; Althusser 2014, pp.39-43, 125-9, 239-45.

⁸⁹ Althusser 2014, pp.94-139, 171-208; Bourdieu 1977, pp.97, 109, 119-20; Habermas 1988, pp.2-17; Thompson 1995, p.17.

⁹⁰ Fairclough 1995, 2001; Foucault 1980; van Dijk 1998; Wodak and Meyer 2001.

⁹¹ Bourdieu 1977, 2010; Foucault 1977b, 1980, 2008; Habermas 1989b.

⁹² Althusser 2014, p.243; Thompson 1995, pp.17-18.

A few other domains can be tentatively enumerated, as follows: First, ‘the religious’ as the domain of *devotion* as an activity, concerned with salvation and spirituality, and comprising all faiths, denominations, and sects.⁹³ Second, ‘the educational’ as the domain of *instruction* and *study*, associated with the psychological, physical, and social formation, schooling, qualification, training, and guidance of subjects. Third, ‘the curative’ as the domain of *nurture*, or *care-giving*, often defined with respect to medicine and social care, and parenting and the raising of children, but also more broadly to do with supporting the well-being of other family members, friends, and wider social contacts.⁹⁴ Fourth, ‘the juridical’ as the domain of *regulation*, the stipulation of laws, rules, and procedures to govern subjects’ interactions, often via permissions and restrictions, or rights and obligations.⁹⁵ There are arguably two further domains, which are less developed as parts of ‘the social’ than the others, partly because with them, the differentiation between ‘the social’ and ‘the natural’ begins to break down. They are: ‘the ludic’ as the domain of *recreation*, or partaking in leisure and other discretionary pastime activities for the sake of enjoyment, amusement, satisfaction, or pleasure; and ‘the architectural’ as the domain of *construction*, the planning, design, and building of frameworks, infrastructure, and other structures.⁹⁶ In principle, even more domains could be defined, as Jan Künzler, Walter Reese-Schäfer, and more recently Steffen Roth and Anton Schütz have all variously tried to do—though some of those listed here are already fairly speculative, as they often elide with other, more conclusively established domains.⁹⁷ This enquiry errs on the side of conservatism, and focuses primarily on the economic, political, discursive, religious, educational, curative, and juridical domains.

It is not always straightforward, and in fact often difficult, to delineate which activities belong in which domains. The reason for this only becomes clearer with a *longue-durée* historical view, of the sort attempted by Robert Brenner, Ellen Meiksins Wood, and others in the ‘political Marxist’ tendency.⁹⁸ Activities shift constantly between domains, as with more or less familiar processes of ‘politicisation’,

⁹³ This list is largely derived from a synthesis, and extension, of two related institutional divisions: (1) Althusser’s division of the ‘ideological’ level of the social superstructure into, among others, “religious”, “educational/scholastic”, “family”, “legal”, &c; (2) Thompson’s division of the types of symbolic, or cultural, social activity into “religious”, “educational”, &c. Althusser 2014, p.243; Thompson 1995, p.17.

⁹⁴ Aderhold 2004; Alstott 2004; Baecker 1994; Cudd 2006; Fuchs 2000; Maaß 2009; Nussbaum 2000; Okin 1989; Reichel 2012; Tronto 1993; Tyrell 1979; Williams 2000.

⁹⁵ Hart 2012, pp.13-17; Luhmann 2004; Raz 2009, pp.163-79, 246-9, 316-7; Reese-Schäfer 1999; Schoeneborn 2011.

⁹⁶ Bette 1999; Huizinga 1955, pp.1-27, and *passim*; Schulze 2005; Stichweh 2005; Tully 2008, pp.39-70.

⁹⁷ Künzler 1989; Reese-Schäfer 1999; Roth and Schütz 2015, p.24.

⁹⁸ See, for instance, Brenner 2009; Meiksins Wood 2002; Teschke 2003.

‘economisation’, or ‘juridification’.⁹⁹ There is insufficient space here to explore how such shifts take place, but the analysis below should be read in a way that remains sensitive to the fact that they do so. Yet despite such shifts, what does not change is the essential nature of domains insofar as they continue to exist. At heart, the existence of a social division of purposive agency reflects the fact that there are many different purposes for which subjects can deal with MRCs, and a range of outcomes they can aim to achieve, which will require them to act on, and affect, MRCs in various distinct ways. While at the granular level, many of these purposes are contingent constructs responding to subjects’ physical and temporal contexts, in broad terms social purposes arise from certain common, if not strictly ‘universal’ or ‘inherent’, *needs* (however defined) that subjects have in ‘the social’, or even ‘the natural’. Of course, there is a danger that giving needs-based justifications for social phenomena turns social analysis into an *apologia* for functionalism. This model of social theory is relaxed about such Spencerian or Parsonian echoes, and generally endorses the idea that social needs have at least partial explanatory validity. However, it stops short of identifying any specific needs as having transcendent importance for subjects. Rather, the claim here is only that there are needs that subjects experience in the face of the MRCs into which they are ‘thrown’, and as a consequence of their ‘thrownness’, but that the precise nature of these needs, and their translation into subjective purposes, varies according to subjects’ specific physical and temporal contexts.

None of these domains or activities completely or even predominantly—*contra* Marx on ‘the economic’—determines ‘the social’, and none—*contra* Foucault on ‘the political’—takes obvious priority for analysing MRCs and their effects on power.¹⁰⁰ Instead, each one offers a unique angle onto human social activity, and the insights of each can be harnessed to sharpen the lens of social theory. This point bears reinforcing. It is not ‘the social’ itself that is divided along activity-lines, although some materials and relations can conceivably ‘belong’ more to one activity than others. Certain objects—including buildings, supplies, and technological implements—can be put to a variety of uses, from providing goods and services to managing people, looking after them, training them, and enabling them to contact one another. Similarly, the same group of people may relate to one another in different ways on different occasions—as work colleagues, friends, fellow voters, consumers, parents, and so on. Rather, it is subjects’ agency, and the way they act on ‘the social’, that is differentiated, which leaves open the

⁹⁹ Alexander 1985; Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996; Blumler and Kavanagh 1999; Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 2010; Chomsky 1997, 1999; Habermas 1989b; Lash 2007; Pfeil 2011; Smart 2003; Urry 2010; Wallerstein 2004.

¹⁰⁰ Foucault 1977a; Marx and Engels 1975.

possibility that the same parts of ‘the social’ may simultaneously be ‘of concern’ for different domains and activities. For instance, an everyday action such as buying an item in a shop can be interpreted simultaneously as having not only economic (exchanging money for a commodity and consuming it) but also political (buying domestic produce), discursive (buying Fairtrade or organic as an ethical statement), curative (buying healthy or as a present for someone else), religious (buying *halal* or *kosher*), and juridical (buying rather than stealing) inflections.

Of course, domains and activities are complementary and interconnected in a complex variety of ways: they often have structured points of overlap, and more informal areas of mutual influence. One particularly common such overlap happens whenever one activity takes place, as it were, ‘secondarily’, either within the context of, or with respect (or regard) to, other ‘primary’ social activities—i.e., where subjects’ orientation when engaging in this activity is not generic, but specifically focuses/depends on the approaches of other activities to dealing with MRCs and power. For example, many activities have skills qualification programmes, from apprenticeships to ‘shadowing’ to training courses and workshops, as well as codes of conduct, from contractual obligations to bye-laws to traditions, which provide instruction and regulation respectively for the activities to which they are ‘attached’. In societal contexts with high levels of functional differentiation, the distinctions between instances of an activity ‘dedicated to’ other activities in this way may become sufficiently acute and clearly-defined that it becomes possible to characterise them as identifiably separate ‘*sub-types*’ of this activity, operating, as it were, in separate ‘*silos*’ (to borrow a term from management theory).¹⁰¹ In such cases, each sub-type is a unique ‘hybrid’ fusion of its ‘parent’ activity-type with the activity in the context of which it takes place. The ‘order’ of this type of overlap between activities is significant, as an example from the intersection of politics and economics illustrates. Comparing ‘production with respect to administration’ with ‘administration with respect to production’, the former evokes the securitarian ‘military-industrial complex’, while the latter concerns the analytically distinct field of ‘business management’.¹⁰²

Despite these overlaps, domains and activities do not blur into each other, but are analytically distinct (and must be kept distinct). The ‘flow’ between them is dialectical, rather than monological, and

¹⁰¹ Ensor 1988.

¹⁰² Althusser makes a similar point when—despite trying to separate the economic from the political domain—he concedes that the former has “agents of internal repression ... not policemen or soldiers, but agents of the productive process themselves (factory directors and all those under their orders, from supervisory personnel down to foremen, as well as most ‘engineers’ and upper-level technicians)” that perform the “functions of surveillance-control-repression in the process of production”. See Althusser 2014, pp.201-2.

multidirectional, rather than unidirectional, which allows for a more complex assessment of society than one premised on the priority of any one domain/activity on which all others depend. To put this in Althusserian terms: rather than domains and activities forming an “edifice”, with the “infrastructure” of an “economic base” supporting two superstructural “floors” (the “political-legal” and “ideological” levels), they should be conceived as lying alongside one another, and all potentially intersecting in practice.¹⁰³ To continue the imagery, in this account’s “topographical representation” of society, Althusser’s edifice is turned on its side. At most, domains and activities maintain connections of various kinds to each other at their peripheries, or ‘liminal zones’ of overlap with each other’s approaches to dealing with (some of) the same parts of ‘the social’. In this sense, state fiscal and monetary policy can be seen as an instance of marginal political intervention in ‘the economic’, academic detention and suspension procedures as juridical intervention in ‘the educational’, and almsgiving (like *tzedakah*, *zakat*, or *dāna*) as religious intervention in ‘the curative’ and ‘the economic’ domains. Depending on how extensively functional differentiation has taken place in a given physical and temporal context—and specifically how far it has affected the points of overlap between activities—each activity may have its own ‘mini-superstructure’, comprising those sub-types of other activities that take place with respect to it.

Recognising this also implies a further refinement to the way social analysis is conducted. If subjects exercise their purposive agency within a framework of multiple domains and activities, MRCs and power must be analysed on a domain-by-domain and activity-by-activity basis. This is largely intuitive, since it has long been customary to differentiate between (e.g.) ‘economic’, ‘political’, ‘discursive’, ‘religious’, ‘educational’, ‘curative’, or ‘juridical’ types of materials, relations, power, and behaviour, both conceptually and by the social contexts in which they are used.¹⁰⁴ Yet this analytic fragmentation of ‘the social’ does not challenge its underlying framework as constituted by MRCs and their effects on power. Instead, each domain and its constitutive activities replicate the material-relational divide in their own way and on their own terms. The way this takes place can be modelled on the Marxian analysis of production.¹⁰⁵

In general, the activities into which purposive agency is divided contain (material) *means* and *relations* of that activity. The means of an activity are those resources (as part of ‘overall’ MCs) and capacities that lend themselves to this specific activity, including tools, equipment, buildings,

¹⁰³ Althusser 2014, pp.53-5.

¹⁰⁴ Thompson 1995, pp.13-18.

¹⁰⁵ For this analysis, see Marx 1976, 1987, 1996, chs.1, 7, 14; Marx and Engels 1975, §§1, 3.

technologies, &c. Likewise, the “social and technical” relations of an activity are those linkages (as part of ‘overall’ RCs) and statuses associated specifically with it, including possession and control relations, collective associations, social structures, &c. Obviously, subjects do not engage their whole agency in an activity, but contribute only a particular part of it, which can be called a *purposive ‘input’*—and which depends on an equivalent ‘sub-division’ of their ‘agency power’, residing in their embodiment and deriving from their biological, physiological, and psychological faculties. *Contra* Marx, this input cannot simply be characterised in all cases as ‘labour’, but must be differentiated according to the unique approach of each activity to purposive social action—e.g., speculatively, ‘organisation’ and ‘violence’ for the administrative and coercive activities in the political domain, ‘worship’ in the religious domain, ‘teaching’ and ‘learning’ for educational instruction and study, or ‘rulemaking’ for the juridical domain.¹⁰⁶ This purposive input is one of the *factors* of this activity, alongside the means, which can be split into two separate factors, the *means* (or *instruments*) of this purposive input, and the *objects* (or *subjects*) of this input. When engaging in an activity, subjects exercise their purposive input, using the means of this input on the object of this input, to create the *output* of this activity, which refers to the social effect that subjects’ purposive action has on the materials and relations in their environment. Again, unlike in Marxian theory, the social outputs of different activities are not always ‘commodities’, but are far more varied and intangible—e.g., political ‘order’ and ‘conflict’, religious ‘confession’ or ‘revelation’, curative ‘welfare’, educational ‘skill’ or ‘intelligence’ and ‘qualification’, or juridical ‘rule’ or ‘law’.¹⁰⁷

From these ingredients, a model of the overall internal structure of social activities can be constructed. The purposive input to an activity and the means of this input together constitute the *forces* of that activity.¹⁰⁸ The combination of the forces and relations of an activity constitutes the *mode* of that activity, which defines the form of cooperation by which it takes place in a certain physical and temporal context (see fig.1). Further, the means of an activity and the embodied basis of subjects’ purposive input constitute the *material conditions* of this activity, due to the unique double-function of bodies as both preconditions and means for subjects to act. Combined with the relations of this activity, they can be called the *material and relational conditions* (MRCs) of this activity. For each activity, the prevailing mode

¹⁰⁶ Althusser 2014, p.136; Marx 1996, ch.6.

¹⁰⁷ Here, the enquiry draws on, for example, Arendt 1970; Dworkin 1986; Hafen 1998; Hart 2012; Raz 1979; Shapiro and Hardin 1993; Tillich 1976; Weber 1978; Winch and Gingell 2008; Witvliet 2013.

¹⁰⁸ This is a slight simplification. In some accounts, Marx includes only labour and the means/instruments of labour in the forces of production. In others, he also includes subjects/objects of labour (i.e., all the means of production). The first approach is taken here.

of cooperation determines the *status quo* of its MRCs—i.e., the level of development of the forces of that activity, and the composition of its relations. It also determines what form power takes within that activity—i.e., which precise capacities and status(es) the MRCs of that activity in this *status quo* support and concretise, and which accrue to subjects engaged in the activity. This, then, is the way that different physical and temporal contexts settle the otherwise variable relationship between MRCs and power—mediated through the mode of the activities to which the MRCs ‘belong’.




Fig.1: The structure of social activities

Though the origin of this model is avowedly Marxian, the point here is not to offer a renewed defence of Marxian economic theory. That would be to re-tread an extremely well-worn and overcrowded path.¹⁰⁹ Rather, it pursues the novel and considerably more radical idea that the Marxian framework for analysing production in terms of means, relations, forces, and modes can, *mutatis mutandis*, be extended to model other activities as well. In other words, alongside the familiar economic modes—e.g., mercantilism, *laissez-faire* capitalism, monopoly capitalism, state socialism, &c—it is also possible to analyse political, juridical, religious, &c modes of cooperation in the same way as well. This makes it possible to take the Marxian form of ‘deep-logic’ or ‘deep-structure’ social theory, as Unger calls it, as a foundation for social analysis, and revise and re-accommodate it into a new form.¹¹⁰ Where domains and activities overlap, their modes of cooperation may influence one another reciprocally, and

¹⁰⁹ There is a vast range of defences of Marxian political economy to choose from, but for a good selection, see Althusser *et al.* 2016; Cohen 1978; Harvey 2014.

¹¹⁰ Unger 2004, pp.87-96, and *passim*.

even begin to converge. This can be seen, for example, in the transfer of the ‘provider-customer’ relationship from economics (specifically, consumption) to areas in the political (the outsourcing of public policy delivery), curative (commercialisation of healthcare provision), and educational domains (privatisation in higher education), among others.¹¹¹ This trend is perhaps most clearly the case with the instances where an activity takes place with respect to other activities. If these are differentiated enough to constitute separate sub-types of activity, the form of social cooperation by which each of them takes place becomes characterised by a unique ‘*sub-mode*’ of that activity, which ‘synthesises’ the prevailing mode of cooperation for its ‘parent’ activity-type with that of the activity towards which it is oriented. For example, the debates around ‘worker self-management’ in cooperative business models centre on attempts to counter the ‘oligarchic’ tendencies of boards of directors by introducing into the organisation of firms and other productive enterprises the same democratised mode of cooperation that shifted sovereignty from dynastic feudal attachments to territorialised populations in the political domain.¹¹²

§3. *Occupations and classes*

To summarise the argument so far: human social agency in any given physical or temporal context can be differentiated into domains and activities. This means that a social analysis of ‘mass opinion’ must take into consideration the full extent of this differentiation, and examine the effects that different activities and domains have on how the subjects engaged in them form and express opinions. But this analysis remains as-yet underspecified, as while the subjects engaged in a social activity contribute their agency to it ‘on aggregate’ in the form of purposive inputs—i.e., labour, organisation, worship, teaching, rulemaking, &c—individual subjects’ social behaviour is mutually differentiated far more, and far more subtly, than just by a broad-brush division of agency into domains and activities. Subjects do not simply engage in social activities in a broad or diffuse way, but do so within the specific parameters of particular social *occupations*. In the classic Weberian or Durkheimian formulation, an ‘occupation’ (*Beruf*) is a “mode of specialisation, specification, and combination of the functions of an individual”, which groups together “technically similar” jobs that share routinely-performed “general functions and principal duties and tasks”.¹¹³ Within activities, purposive inputs are disaggregated and split up between subjects, with

¹¹¹ Barzelay 2001; Dunleavy *et al.* 2006; Hood and Jackson 1991; Kaboolian 1998.

¹¹² Ellerman 1990, pp.44-9, 56; Schweickart 2002, pp.47-9.

¹¹³ Durkheim 2014; International Labor Office 1990, p.5; Weber 1978, p.140.

each of them assigned a set of specific task(s) or function(s) to perform within the overall activity. In addition to the division of purposive agency into (1) domains and (2) activities, therefore, this analysis needs to recognise a tertiary level of complexity, namely the *division of purposive inputs* into (3) tasks.

Occupations define and give each subject a specific social situation of their own, based on the tasks they are individually given to perform. The ‘mode of specialisation, specification, and combination of functions’ that determines subjects’ tasks and occupations, and hence their social situations, is determined partly by the overarching activity’s sheer nature and existence (a more ‘permanent’ factor), but also partly by its prevailing mode of cooperation between subjects (a more ‘variable’ factor). This enquiry takes a broad view of how ‘occupations’ as sets of tasks and functions are to be defined. *Contra* Weber, they do not necessarily have to “constitute[] for [subjects] the basis of a continuous opportunity for income or earnings”, since—even under the high tendencies towards economisation under late capitalism—not all human social agency is automatically commodified as wage-labour.¹¹⁴ Rather, they are ‘occupations’ in the sense of ‘preoccupation’ (*Beschäftigung*), or ‘something a subject spends their time doing’. Thus, ‘factory worker’, ‘shopper’, ‘civil servant’, ‘voter’, ‘tutor’, ‘pupil’, ‘nurse’, ‘parent’, ‘barrister’, and ‘juror’ are all examples of (fairly common) social occupations, even while only some of them constitute forms of formalised contractual ‘employment’, at least at the time of writing. Occupations give subjects the first basis for a social dimension to their identity, beyond contingently important biological characteristics such as age, health, bodily ability, skin pigmentation, reproductive organs, &c*. They link subjects equivalentially with others in the same occupational position simply on the basis that they perform the same functions. In short, they give subjects a *peer-group*, specific to a given activity in a given domain. Subjects share a certain likeness, or affinity, with the others in their peer-group, because they interact with the same very specific part of their overall MRCs.

Subjects’ occupations also ground their place in social *hierarchies*, specifically *class stratifications*. Subjects that occupy a common position in the division of purposive agency and inputs wield a measure of common power, which accrues similarly to individual subjects as group members and to the group as a collective “bloc”.¹¹⁵ Within each activity, the prevailing mode of cooperation determines not just the *status quo* of its MRCs, but also the *level* and *nature* of their differential distribution and arrangement among subjects, according to the requirements of their respective allocated occupations. Subjects’

¹¹⁴ Abeysekera 2008; Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft 2014; Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 2010; Putterman 2007; Rosewarne 2010; Smart 2003; Weber 1978, p.140.

¹¹⁵ Poulantzas 1978, pp.144-64; Poulantzas 2014, pp.146-53.

occupational power-as-capacity and power-as-status depend on their ‘share of’ or ‘part in’ the MRCs for the relevant ‘overarching’ social activity—i.e., their control over, disposal of, and access to its materials, and their (de)privilege, (dis)advantage, or (im)balance within its relations—specifically in virtue of the tasks they perform within it. When, under a given mode of cooperation, materials within a given activity are distributed unequally to, and relations are arranged asymmetrically between, consistently identifiable aggregate groups of occupations, power accrues differently to them, and that activity becomes stratified into classes, with its internal plurality of occupations transformed into a hierarchy. On the material side, in a ‘neo-Weberian’ sense, the aggregated group into which an individual subject’s occupation falls then determines their “probability of (1) procuring goods, (2) gaining a position in life, and (3) finding inner satisfactions, a probability which derives from [their] relative control over goods and skills”.¹¹⁶ On the relational side, in a ‘neo-Marxist’ sense, it determines whether subjects are in a position of ‘dominance’ and ‘authority’, or ‘subordination’ and ‘subjection’—i.e., whether they are beneficiaries or victims of oppression and exploitation.¹¹⁷ With class defined in terms of both “gradations” and “relations”, to use Erik Olin Wright’s terms, subjects’ class power thus depends on not only the quantity of resources they have, but also the kind of linkages into which they are arranged.¹¹⁸ In other words, each activity’s mode of cooperation determines not only what form power takes in it as a whole, but also for each occupation and class within it, and hence for each subject within these occupations and classes—i.e., which capacities and status(es) accrues to individual subjects through their membership of defined occupational groups and classes.

This rendering of class is somewhat different to its contemporary social-scientific usage as an abstract label for subjects’ ‘socioeconomic’ attributes (wealth and income, education level, &c).¹¹⁹ For a start, it covers a wider array of the material components of class, and incorporates relational aspects that an atomised analysis of individual attributes can barely capture. It is also far more flexible, and can be used to theorise *any* social activity. The depiction of subjects’ interaction with their MRCs in a given activity in terms of a *division of purposive inputs, occupations, classes, and class power*, need not—*pace* Marx and Weber—be restricted narrowly to productive economic activity.¹²⁰ The existence of ‘strata’ and

¹¹⁶ Breen 2005, pp.32-6; Weber 1978, p.302.

¹¹⁷ Engels 1976a, pp.99-102; Engels 1976b, pp.341-3; Marx 1976, pp.211-2; Marx and Engels 1976, pp.482-96; Wright 2005a, pp.23-7.

¹¹⁸ Wright 2015, p.viii. Original emphasis.

¹¹⁹ Breen 2005, pp.36-43; Goldthorpe 1980; Goldthorpe and Hope 1974.

¹²⁰ Weber 1978, pp.926-38.

oppression between them is commonplace throughout ‘the social’, and by no means limited to economic activity. As Terry Eagleton, Ernesto Laclau, and Nicos Poulantzas variously imply, it is arbitrarily reductive to treat ‘the economic’ as the only domain that can be theorised in class-like terms to generate valuable social insights.¹²¹ On the same basis, feminist theorists such as Alexandra Kollontai and Shulamith Firestone have begun to develop analyses of ‘the curative’ domain premised on the concept of ‘sexual classes’, while since Gaetano Mosca it has been *de rigueur* to analyse the activities of government using the terminology of ‘political class’.¹²² This is where the social-theoretic model adopted by this enquiry parts company most significantly with the methodology of opinion research hitherto. Occupational and class analyses of mass opinion have typically been content to adopt uncritically and work with narrow ‘statistical’ social-scientific understandings of both occupation and class, which focus on a more limited set of material components, ignore relational aspects, and are heavily ‘economised’.¹²³ It is thus a logical extension of rejecting the ‘methodological superficiality’ of existing opinion research traditions to try to resolve this narrowness (at least partly) by offering an alternative occupational and classist theorisation of ‘the social’, in order to ‘rebuild’ opinion analysis on a new theoretical foundation.

There are two brief observations to be made here. First, since subjects interact with ‘the social’ in multiple ways, they engage in more than one social activity, and hold multiple simultaneous locations within their societies’ divisions of purposive agency. In other words, each subject has their own personal constellation of occupations and class-memberships from across the full set of domains of activity. Their social action cannot be understood through just one of these occupations (or classes)—e.g., ‘bourgeois’ and ‘proletarians’ in Marxian theory, ‘consumers’ and ‘taxpayers’ in neoliberal political economy, ‘citizens’ in republican political philosophy, or ‘voters’ in behaviourist political science—and social theories that are unduly selective in the types of human action they analyse are likely to offer insights that are skewed and analytically impoverished. More generally, in complex societies, there are many social situations that incorporate, or cut across, several activities, such that what appears superficially as one social function for subjects in fact comprises multiple analytically discrete occupational positions (and hence potentially class situations). For example, while being a member of a family is mainly a curative occupation, it also has clear educational aspects due to the importance of early-years pedagogy as part of ‘child-rearing’, as

¹²¹ Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner 1994, pp.155-7; Barrett 2014, pp.241-2; Eagleton 2007, pp.150-4, 211-5; Freedman 2003, p.105; Poulantzas 1978, pp.14-24; Therborn 1980, p.7.

¹²² Firestone 1970; Kollontai 1980; Mosca 1939; Weber 1978.

¹²³ McCall and Manza 2011.

well as some lower-level economic, political, and juridical aspects through the occupations and tasks of ‘breadwinners’, ‘doing chores’, ‘authority figures’, ‘house rules’, &c. In addition, it is strictly more accurate to say that subjects belong to *at least* one class per activity (and domain), according to their location within its social division of purposive inputs. Subjects may hold multiple occupations, or be assigned multiple tasks in a given activity, which may cause them to ‘bridge’ classes, or oscillate between them. This makes possible, for instance, the countervailing tendencies of *proletarianisation* and *embourgeoisement* (or *deproletarianisation*) in late-modern developments within employment relations—including ‘freelancing’ or ‘contracting’, ‘self-employment’, and ‘self-incorporation’.¹²⁴ All in all, occupational pluralisation is a normal and empirically increasingly frequent social eventuality in late modernity, which often places subjects in what Wright terms “contradictory class situations”.¹²⁵ This may well apply more to some subjects than others, but for the purposes of this enquiry, it is important to acknowledge that the potential for such multiplicity accrues to all subjects in a society.

Second, it is important to maintain an analytic distinction between classes in different activities, as they are associated with discrete approaches to dealing with MRCs and operate in mutually independent ways. It is not guaranteed that a subject’s occupational position and class situation in one activity necessarily translates into a similar occupational position or class situation in any other activities—especially not, *contra* Althusser and other Marxians, that economic class hierarchies automatically fully determine social stratifications in all other domains and activities.¹²⁶ To paraphrase Elliot Weininger, subjects’ social class situation *en gros* is a highly complex aggregation that depends not just on the “volume” of subjects’ distribution and arrangement of MRCs and class power, but also its “composition” across each of the activities in which they are engaged.¹²⁷ Savage and his collaborators have tried to provide precisely such an ‘overall’ picture of class, and in doing so have begun the move towards expanding the concept of class beyond purely economic considerations.¹²⁸ But their analysis is somewhat incomplete, as it only looks at small number of non-economic factors, consolidated into very broad-brush “cultural” and “social” categories. Instead, this model suggests that subjects’ ‘overall’ distribution and arrangement of MRCs and power, as well as the precise bases for this distribution and arrangement, can be disaggregated to a far more granular level along activity and occupational lines. So,

¹²⁴ Abrams and Rose 1960; Brass 1990; Thompson 1963; Weber Cannon 1980.

¹²⁵ Wright 1985, pp.42-57.

¹²⁶ Althusser 2014, pp.271-2.

¹²⁷ Weininger 2005, pp.88-9.

¹²⁸ Savage *et al.* 2015, pp.4, 49-53, and *passim*.

while Savage *et al.* are right that ‘overall’ social class emerges from stratifications in different aspects of ‘the social’, a full approach to characterising this differentiation needs to look at the divisions of purposive agency and inputs to capture the full range of parallel class stratifications that exist in multiple social activities—economic, political, religious, educational, curative, juridical, &c.

Yet although stratifications are analytically independent, there is evidence that a degree of what Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit call “*clustering*” does tend to occur in practice for both MRCs and power.¹²⁹ Savage *et al.* themselves have identified clear cases of clustering at the extremes of high or low distribution of materials, and favourable or unfavourable arrangement of relations.¹³⁰ Subjects whose occupations give them maximal class power—i.e., the most extensive distribution of materials, and the most favourable arrangement within relations—belong to highest class for each activity, vernacularly termed the ‘*elite*’ or ‘*establishment*’.¹³¹ These typically include subjects in senior positions, such as business executives, financiers, ‘high net worth’ consumers, heads of state and government, ministers, top-tier bureaucrats, high court judges, or consultant physicians. By extension, those with minimal class power—i.e., the least extensive distribution of materials, and the least favourable arrangement within relations—constitute their activity’s lowest class. Examples of these would be subjects in junior positions, such as ‘underemployed’ workers and others threatened by “precarity”, voters, activists, resident aliens, refugees, prisoners, or young family members. Between these extremes, Savage *et al.* find several parallel ‘middle classes’ comprising occupations with different constellations of MRC-distributions and arrangements across different social activities, which jostle for their relative place in the ‘overall’ social hierarchy. It is conceivable that applying the greater disaggregation that this model of social theory envisages may discover an even more complex situation. But for now, it is especially the extremes of highest- and lowest-class occupations in which this enquiry is interested, and on which it predominantly focuses. Of course, this is not to suggest that subjects in the jostling ‘middle-class’ occupations can, or should, be neglected. Rather, for the sake of analytic parsimony, this enquiry adopts a general working assumption that the social situations of ‘middle-class’ subjects (and their correlative effects) fall on some midpoint along a spectrum that lies between the highest- and lowest-class extremes.

¹²⁹ Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, pp.119–28.

¹³⁰ Savage *et al.* 2015, pp.168–81.

¹³¹ Jones 2015; Lewis 2001.

§4. *From agency to identity: habitus and socialisation*

Overall, then, in addition to the division of ‘the social’ into various domains and activities, it can be disaggregated further into a series of intersecting occupational and class structures across these activities (and their sub-types). The social theorisation of ‘mass opinion’ must therefore take this disaggregation into account as well, and explore the effects of different occupations and classes on how subjects within them form and express their opinions. Before applying the social-theoretical outline developed here to ‘mass opinion’, however, it is worth examining the effects these multiple layers of functional differentiation of social agency have on individual subjects themselves. The way subjects exercise their agency is not just a matter of their superficial interaction with their environment, but is constitutive of their personal social *identity*, which they share with the other subjects in their activities, and their occupational (and class) peer-group(s). The conversion of subjects’ occupational position and class situation into their identity takes place via a mixture of contingent accident and social design. In part, it is a product of subjects’ ‘thrownness’ into their particular physical and temporal context: different natural and social situations engender different needs, which require different activities to be performed and occupations created to meet them. Within any social activity, subjects’ physical and temporal context, and the prevailing mode of cooperation, determine subjects’ environment and the parameters within which they contribute their purposive inputs. That is to say: the conditions of subjects’ ‘thrownness’, combined with the *status quo* of the MRCs of a particular activity, frame the way subjects act when they engage in that activity, including the means with which and objects on which they do so. As Bourdieu argues, for every “particular type of environment” or subjective “conditions of existence”, this determination, or framework, takes the form of a “system” of “durable, transposable dispositions” and “cognitive and motivating ... structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes”.¹³² Bourdieu follows Norbert Elias and Marcel Mauss in referring to this collection of *practices, systems, structures, principles* (or *norms*), and *dispositions* as a *habitus*, which is shared by all subjects who engage in the activity to which these practices, systems, &c, belong.¹³³ Briefly put, the purpose of *habitus* is to steer, and supplement, subjects’ ‘natural’ agency with respect to the parts of ‘the social’ on which they act. It develops their ‘inherent’ embodied ‘agency power’ as a ‘force’ of the

¹³² Bourdieu 1990, pp.52-3.

¹³³ Elias 2000; Mauss 1934.

activities in which they engage, and channels it towards the relevant purposive inputs, according to subjects' particular occupational position(s), in order to make subjects 'better at' the tasks they are required to perform.

Every social activity has its own discrete *habitus*, delimited by the division of purposive agency, which is complex when established but variable, developing as physical and temporal contexts and modes of activity change. That is to say: the practices, structures, norms, &c, that govern political activity, for example, are *prima facie* appreciably different to those that govern economic, religious, educational activity, and so on. Similarly, the division of purposive inputs within activities correlatively subdivides their 'overall' *habitus* into a series of separate *habitus* that pertain to each occupational group and class within them. Thus, for instance, different educational occupations—e.g., primary school teachers, university professors, private tutors, sports instructors, &c, as well as the different correlative types of 'learners'—are similarly shaped by different 'subsets' of the 'overall' educational practices, systems, structures, norms, and dispositions. For each context and each mode of cooperation, these activity, occupational, and class *habitus* define subjects' "*interests ... and with them the objective functions and subjective motivations of their practices*", which they automatically share with all the other subjects in their activities, and in their occupational (and class) peer-group(s).¹³⁴ Thus, subjects' physical and temporal context, and the prevailing modes of cooperation, establish not only a singular, homogeneous *habitus* for each activity in which they are engaged, but also—following Bourdieu and *contra* Althusser—an additional *habitus* that is entirely specific to the occupational (and classist) tasks and functions they perform.¹³⁵ Usually, each *habitus* is so unique that it recognisably belongs to a particular activity within a particular context and under a particular prevailing mode, and distinctively characterises the way 'its' activity takes place in the given contexts and under the prevailing modes of cooperation.

Of course, since domains and activities dialectically and multidirectionally influence each other, the *habitus* for different activities, occupations, and classes may 'cross-fertilise', and aspects of their practices, norms, dispositions, &c may transfer between them, and become shared, across contexts and over time. This can be seen in cases as varied as the existence of 'internal politics' within company offices or higher education departments, the pervasive attempt to inject competitive 'entrepreneurialism' into occupations as different as academic research or military procurement, or the 'aspirational' adoption by subjects in the economic 'working class' of middle and upper-class social outlooks and forms of

¹³⁴ Bourdieu 1977, p.76.

¹³⁵ Althusser 2014, pp.83-9, 174-7, 218-31; Bourdieu 1977, pp.80-6; Pêcheux 1994, p.142.

behaviour. Thus, with sufficient functional differentiation, each sub-type of an activity, and the occupations (and classes) within it, may develop its own independent *habitus*, correlative to its distinctive sub-mode of cooperation, which ‘fuses’ the prevailing practices, systems, structures, norms and dispositions of its ‘parent’ activity-type (and occupations) with those of the activity towards which it is oriented. For instance, the exact *habitus* of commercial law differs from that of criminal, health, or constitutional law, on the grounds that the generic juridical practices, norms, &c, by which these occupations are all shaped have to be ‘squared’ with the different activities in which they specialise—respectively, (aspects of) exchange, coercion, caregiving, and administration. In short, *habitus* allows subjects’ exercises of purposive agency to gain the specificity that *makes* them contributions of purposive inputs and performances of specific tasks rather than more generic exercises of social agency. This, then, is the way that different physical and temporal contexts determine how subjects’ agency is converted into social action—in the form of practices, modulated through systems and shaped by structures, and guided by norms and dispositions belonging to the *habitus* of particular social activities, occupations, and classes.

But the conversion of *habitus* as frameworks for social action into bases for subjects’ social identity does not happen automatically simply once *habitus* are established. Rather, it is the result of the specific vital process of *socialisation*, by which subjects are ‘prepared’ to engage in the various (sub-)types of social activity within the frameworks imposed on them by activity, occupational, and class *habitus*. Socialisation makes individual human beings agents, and in doing so, constitutes them *as* social subjects *by virtue of* their occupational positions and class situations, and the activity (sub-)types in which they hold these. As argued earlier, subjects’ agency, and hence their interaction with MRCs via their engagement in differentiated social activities, depends on their physical embodiment—i.e., the mere fact of their physical and temporal presence in the (natural as well as social) world. This pre-exists ‘the social’, in that all humans, as living, embodied beings, have (at least in some basically similar form) some of the same underlying ‘natural’ biological, and to a lesser extent physiological and psychological faculties that allow them to exercise their agency—a view defended by theorists with a clear ‘realist’ streak, such as John Dunn.¹³⁶ But the ‘mere fact’ of subjects’ ‘natural’ embodiment radically underdetermines the sheer variety of ways in which human beings as ‘*subjects*’ can exercise their agency within ‘the social’. The additional determination that ‘refines’ and ‘completes’ the ‘*subjectivity*’ of each subject is precisely what the *habitus* of each activity (or sub-type), occupation, and class provides. Rather than just ‘human beings’, or even

¹³⁶ Dunn 2000, p.31, 43-4, 168, 243, 361.

‘agents’, *habitus* categorises subjects into differentiated (albeit fairly broad) ‘identities’ to match the differentiation of social action introduced by the division of purposive agency—i.e., as ‘economic subjects’, ‘political subjects’, ‘religious subjects’, &c, and more specifically as ‘producers’, ‘consumers’, ‘administrators’, ‘instructors’, ‘caregivers’, &c. Physical embodiment thus acts as a “*kernel*”, to use Slavoj Žižek’s term, or a “subtle corpse, relatively independent of time and space”, to leverage his spin on F.W.J. Schelling, that gives the *habitus* for any activity something to work on—i.e., something capable of being “symbolised, constituted, structured”, and onto which layers of contingent complexity can be “grafted”.¹³⁷ How ‘deep’ these layers ‘go’—i.e., how much of subjects’ social activity is attributable to their ‘natural’ characteristics, and how much to socialisation—is a matter of ongoing controversy, not least in the debate between Noam Chomsky and Foucault over whether ‘human nature’ has “fundamental elements” or is mainly an “effect of power”.¹³⁸ What is clear, however, is that these layers of socialisation turn human beings into *the kind of agents who* engage in specific (sub-)types of social activity. Socialisation, or ‘*subjectivisation*’, gives human beings a social ‘*role*’ based on the exercise of their social agency via the contribution of a specific purposive input, as determined by the practices, systems, structures, norms, and dispositions of their relevant *habitus*. Fundamentally, it is possible for any subject to play any social role, and it is this ‘possibility’ that socialisation brings about.

Similarly, the definition and establishment of subdivided occupational and class *habitus* further refines subjects’ differentiated social identities along the lines of the division of purposive inputs. In addition to their identities as ‘producers’, ‘administrators’, ‘caregivers’, &c, at the level of the division of purposive agency, these subdivided *habitus* give subjects more detailed subjectivities within each activity (and its sub-types). Of course, these change—i.e., are created or replaced—with changes in modes (and sub-modes) of cooperation. Thus, for instance, in the economic domain, the shift in modes of production (since early modernity) from manorialism to mercantilism, agrarian capitalism, industrial capitalism, and finally finance capitalism created a range of more or less historically durable occupations and classes: landed gentry and tenant-farmers versus overseers versus serfs and peasants; craftsman and artisans versus apprentices; business owners and executives versus foremen and managers versus factory and office workers; and entrepreneurs and financiers versus shareholders and investors versus

¹³⁷ Žižek 1994, pp.20-1.

¹³⁸ See Elders 2011.

speculators.¹³⁹ In other words, while the layers of socialisation provided by *habitus* at the level of activities and their sub-types start to determine how subjects exercise their agency in ‘the social’, it is the further layers added by occupational and class *habitus* that continue the process, and aim to make them the kind of agents who hold a particular occupation, and are assigned specific set(s) of tasks to perform. Occupational and class subjectivisation thus adds granular precision to the social role subjects play under the division of purposive agency by narrowing it down to the way they perform tasks under the division of purposive inputs, determined by the relevant occupational and class practices, systems, structures, norms, and dispositions.

Of course, socialisation is not a generic or monolithic event, but can be disaggregated into several specific constituent and mutually supporting processes. These processes correspond to particular socialising ‘effects’ of the different sub-types of activity ‘dedicated to’ the ‘primary’ activities for which subjects are meant to be constituted. Socialisation is not the only, or even necessarily the main, function of these sub-types of activity. It is only when they are specifically oriented towards, or ‘concerned with’, the subjects who are engaged in the activity they are ‘dedicated to’, and not just the activity in general, that their function becomes one of socialising these subjects by affecting or ‘acting on’ them in different ways as, in effect, part of the MRCs of the activity as a whole. (Recall that human beings are not just agents, but material parts of the environment for themselves and other subjects.) For any given activity, the sub-types of (other) activities ‘dedicated to’ it each affect subjects in their own familiar way, as decided by the social division of purposive agency. Among the most significant are the functions of curative and educational activity. As Bourdieu observes, subjects are partly “conditioned” or “inculcated” into, and ‘grown’ or ‘raised for’, the occupations they later hold fairly early in life by subjects with their own activities and occupations—either intergenerationally by parents and other family members, or by contemporaries in their friendship groups.¹⁴⁰ Similarly, Göran Therborn argues that every activity and occupation must ensure that subjects are ‘qualified for’ and ‘trained towards’ effective performance of the tasks it requires to operate successfully—which is the aim of academic and apprenticeship institutions, as well as more informal course of learning and skills enhancement.¹⁴¹ Other activities help support the core socialising effects of ‘raising’ and ‘qualification’. Foucault and Therborn note the effect of the

¹³⁹ See, for example, Acemoğlu and Robinson 2008; Bloch 2014; Boldizzoni and Hudson 2015; Hansen 2001; Kellenbenz 1976; Pirenne 2006; Rostow 1960; Vaggi and Groenewegen 2003.

¹⁴⁰ Arnett 1995; Bourdieu 1977, pp.87-9; Maccoby and Martin 1983.

¹⁴¹ Therborn 1980, pp.17, 25, 53.

“sanctions” and “rewards” provided by juridical activity on ‘disciplining’ subjects into conforming to their *habitus*—generally through legal frameworks or codes of conduct, but *in extremis* also through incarceration and other forms of punishment via the penal system.¹⁴² Socialisation also has a political manifestation, as observed by Durkheim and historical sociologists such as Dietrich Rueschemeyer *et al.*, through the creation of bureaucracies and professional associations to oversee conduct and demarcate occupational and class group boundaries—e.g., trade unions, ‘admin staff’, hospital or school governance structures, &c.¹⁴³ Likewise, socialisation is given an economic aspect by the widespread connection of occupations to sources of income at different levels (from highly lucrative to unpaid) in a way that enables or inhibits subjects’ ability to secure their livelihood through conformity to or deviation from their *habitus*—e.g., via promotion opportunities, performance bonuses, or conversely fines, ‘getting fired’, &c.¹⁴⁴ In other words, the disaggregation of socialisation is a direct result of functional differentiation and the division of purposive agency. Each of its constituent processes has its own separate part to play in endowing subjects with the ‘full’ *habitus*—i.e., the ‘whole’ set(s) of practices, systems, structures, norms, and dispositions—that guide their social action.

Crucially, there is a distinction between what the definition of *habitus* and socialisation aim to achieve and how far they actually succeed in doing so. While their aim is to specify how subjects ‘act’ differently for each social activity (and its sub-types) and each occupation—i.e., how they contribute particular purposive inputs, and use different means—they cannot guarantee that subjects will always conform fully, or even approximately, to this specification. This is because the constitution of social subjects—the ‘grafting’ of layers of socialisation onto subjects’ natural ‘kernels’—does not happen instantaneously, but slowly and incrementally, often overcoming limitations imposed either by ‘natural’ aspects of subjects’ ‘kernels’, or by previous iterations of socialisation, and which thus takes up a significant portion of their lifespans. Therefore, the *habitus* for activities, occupations, and classes ‘determine’ subjects’ identities only to the extent of stipulating them as ‘*ideal-types*’ (in the Weberian sense), rather than immediately and universally valid characterisations of any and all subjects engaged in these activities, holding these occupations, and performing the relevant tasks.¹⁴⁵ Here, socialisation relies heavily on (quasi-)religious activity to provide ritualised reifications and ‘sacralisations’ of these ‘ideal-

¹⁴² Carmi 1983; Foucault 1977a; Poole and Regoli 1981; Therborn 1980, pp.34, 116.

¹⁴³ Durkheim 2014; Grusky 2005, p.56, 62, 69; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992.

¹⁴⁴ Breen 2005, pp.32-3, 35, 38; Denhart and Jeffress 1971.

¹⁴⁵ Parsons 1967, pp.601-9; Weber 1978, pp.20-1.

types’—e.g., the ‘cult of genius’ in the Romantic period, the Stakhanovite movement of idealised labour productivity in the early USSR, or even the routine formulation of ‘mission statements’ and setting checklists of targets. It is entirely consistent with the existence of ideal-types that subjects fail to ‘live up’ to them in any given moment—as long as they are firmly established as the ‘criteria’ against which subjects’ social actions are ‘measured’. The social roles subjects acquire through the differentiation of social action are hence as much expectations about how subjects exercise their purposive agency as ‘aspirations’, or ‘asymptotes’, towards which subjects’ ongoing processes and trajectories of socialisation are turned—though these are typically refined into narrower and more ‘manageable’ everyday ‘goals’ by which to ‘assess’ subjects’ social actions. Moreover, thanks to the steady development of the mode (and sub-modes) of each activity (and its sub-types), and correlative changes in the *habitus* they support, these ‘aspirations’ are not fixed but changeable—‘moving targets’ that recede tantalisingly whenever subjects approach them. Socialisation is thus an ever-ongoing process that never clearly reaches ‘completion’, whose requirements subjects can never fully meet, but to which subjects are always ‘*subjected*’, and by which they are constantly ‘*subjectified*’.¹⁴⁶

This completes the model of social theory on which the remainder of this enquiry relies. In summary: in the sense espoused here, formulating a ‘social theory’ of a phenomenon consists in analysing the ways it intersects with subjects’ material and relational conditions, as these support and concretise the workings of power, and as their distribution and arrangement is differentiated according to the division of subjects’ purposive agency into activities and occupational tasks. Before moving on, there is one final observation to make about this model of social theory. It treats ‘the social’ as roughly equivalent to ‘the world’, comprising MRCs that take on a social character because they, and their effects on power, are of concern to human subjects. This equivalence gives ‘the social’ a certain unity, which only becomes differentiated with the emergence of a division of purposive agency. This enquiry takes this division of purposive agency to be the primary social differentiation, albeit one that intersects with other forms of differentiation. A population of subjects can clearly be differentiated into groups whose sources of identity and solidarity do not depend on their social agency, but more basic aspects of their embodiment, and physical and temporal context, including: biological characteristics (age, physical and mental health, psychological ‘make-up’, bodily ability, skin pigmentation, reproductive organs, &c*), geography (spaces, localities, regions, nations, continents), time-periods (generations, civilisations, eras, ‘stages’),

¹⁴⁶ Althusser 2014, pp.187-201, 261-6.

&c. These introduce ‘*borders*’ that cross-cut the differentiation of MRCs by activities and occupations, creating alternative (biological, geographical, temporal) “cleavages”, to use Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s term, whose significance may rival and even eclipse that of the division of purposive agency.¹⁴⁷ The result—to follow the logic of Josef Stalin’s account of ‘nations’ as societies characterised by “a common language”, “a common territory”, “an internal economic bond ... [and] division of labour”, and “a common psychological make-up”—is that there may be multiple divisions of purposive agency/inputs within ‘the social’ overall.¹⁴⁸ These borders are clearly important—albeit in all cases fluid to a significant degree—and a full conception of social theory would explore the intersections between occupations and classes, and these rival sources of identity and solidarity. It is thus only for the sake of parsimony that this account prioritises the social differentiations brought about by the divisions of human purposive agency, and endorses an analytic ‘*primacy of occupation*’ that echoes the orthodox Marxian commitment to the ‘*primacy of class*’.¹⁴⁹

§5. *Mass opinion: ideation, communication, and discourse*

The model of social theory outlined above can now be applied to the specific phenomenon of concern in this enquiry: mass opinion. This next step can be phrased in the form of two hypotheses. First, as follows:

H₁: Mass opinion is not just an object but also an action.

The suggestion is that treating mass opinion as a mere datum or artefact misses much of what makes it a worthwhile focus of analysis. Instead, this approach posits that there is a dynamic action of ‘opining’ or ‘opination’ that creates the static object(s) known as ‘opinion(s)’, and that this action is what social analysis should explore. In part, this is a way to introduce the (inter)temporal considerations considered earlier to the specific analysis of mass opinion. From this angle, ‘opinion’ connotes an end-point that has been achieved, settled, or completed. But also, more pragmatically, this step aims to join up the disparate interpretations of ‘opinion’ across the various opinion research literatures, which often veer disjointedly between static and dynamic readings. In other words, this enquiry seeks to incorporate these literatures into a single metric of analysis that can capture as comprehensive a range as possible of the

¹⁴⁷ Lipset and Rokkan 1967.

¹⁴⁸ Stalin 1953, ch.1.

¹⁴⁹ For more discussion of this, see Wright 1996.

ways in which ‘mass opinion’ is described, and offer a more sophisticated account of how it comes into existence.

The second hypothesis follows closely on from the first, focusing on the vital ingredient of purposive human agency that turns the processes of ‘opination’ into activities, and hence opens up the possibility of applying the earlier social-theoretical analysis to determine how these activities ‘work’. It takes the form:

H₂: As an action, opinion comprises ideation and communication.

The proposition here is that the concept of mass opinion requires internal differentiation, and is situated at the intersection of the linked pair of discursive activities: *ideation* and *communication*. ‘Opinion’ as a phenomenon and ‘opination’ as an action contain a crucial ambiguity of meaning, as they refer to both opinion-as-it-is-*formed* and opinion-as-it-is-*expressed*—a contrast originally drawn by Tönnies, and echoed in much of the subsequent opinion research literature.¹⁵⁰ This contrast is central to the way this enquiry models mass opinion, and will be explored more throughout the analysis below. But for now, its force is that ‘mass opinion’ is not a phenomenon that can be confined exclusively to the area of formulated thought, or of expressed information *tout court*. Rather, it ‘bridges’ both ideation and communication, which is to say that it is a particular category of discourse, and creates a particular category of information. Part of the task of this enquiry is thus to establish what kind of discourse mass opinion is, and what kind of information it creates.

Each of the activities in this division can now be explicated more precisely. First, *ideation*. Despite its slightly unusual signifier, this is one of the most common activities in which subjects engage: the “creation of new ideas”, or “mental images of things not present to the senses”.¹⁵¹ The link to formation comes about because ideas are literally brought into existence through this activity, which is *internalised* because it takes place (first and foremost) within a subject’s set of mental faculties, working in the currency of intangible concepts, and at the level of ‘imagination’. The internal structure of ideation—following Gramsci’s analysis of ‘philosophy’, broadly construed, as well as Althusser’s theorisation of thought as a material practice, in contrast to Marxian accounts of “abstractly mental labour”—can be modelled as outlined above.¹⁵² Subjects’ purposive input into ideation is *thinking*, which describes the faculties that enable interpretation and understanding, including sensation, perception, and ‘processing’,

¹⁵⁰ Hardt and Splichal 2000, pp.117-9; Price 1992; Zaller 1992.

¹⁵¹ See ‘ideation, n.’, in *Oxford English Dictionary* 2016.

¹⁵² Althusser 2014, pp.184-7, 258-61; Gramsci 2005, pp.323-77; Marx 1975a, p.333.

which underpin subjects' 'thinking power' *qua* 'capacity for thinking' and 'status as thinker'. The means of ideation are thus the means and objects of thinking—respectively, the psychological and physical tools, mechanisms, and 'ways of thinking' that subjects use to 'ideate', and the stimuli and sense-data their thinking 'works with'. In other words, the means of ideation are the resources and capacities that lend themselves to specifically 'ideative' activity, and its particular *habitus*. Thinking (power) plus the means of thinking make the forces of ideation; and both together with the objects of thinking comprise the factors of ideation. The relations of ideation are the sum total of 'social and technical' relations that subjects must enter into in order to ideate—above all the *division of thinking* that constitutes subjects as different types of 'ideators' performing specific and different occupational thinking-tasks, e.g., casual pondering, positive and critical theorising, apologism, or dogmatic exposition. These are thus the RCs-of-ideation: the linkages and statuses associated with 'ideative' activity and *habitus*. Means of ideation and the embodied basis of thinking power make the MCs-of-ideation, which combine with the relations of ideation to make the MRCs-of-ideation, while for every physical and temporal context, the level of development of the forces and relations of ideation is consolidated into the mode of ideation (see fig.2). The distribution and arrangement of the MRCs of ideation under its prevailing mode underpins the internal constellations of ideative power, which in turn determine the existence of classist stratifications among subjects engaged in ideation. Finally, the output of this domain is *content*: ideation converts subject-matter into psychological *substance*, taking the form of definite *ideas*.




Fig.2: The structure of ideation

In light of this, one aim of this project is to characterise how—i.e., about which objects and with what means—subjects think when they form opinions. This depends on subjects’ physical and temporal contexts, as well as the prevailing modes of ideation and ideative *habitus*, both in general and subdivided along occupational and class lines under the prevailing division of thinking. This enquiry does not have space for a full historical-sociological overview of how ideative modes and *habitus* have differed and developed between societies and over time, but it remains sensitive to the insight that there are (and have been) many ways for subjects to form (mass) opinion. Ideation, and hence opinion-formation, is in a constant state of plurality and change, responding to incremental as well as seismic shifts in the forces and relations of ideation throughout the ‘history of philosophy’. For instance, at least within the European metropole, the Classical period saw the proliferation of critical debate ‘for its own sake’, the institutionalisation of conceptual enquiry, the rise of normative and narrative theories, and the codification of formal logic. This was accompanied by the emergence of the first ‘philosophers’, such as academicians and *scholarchs* and their ‘followers’ and ‘pupils’, advancing the scope and complexity of the worldviews of various ‘schools of thought’. Medieval elaborations on causality and ontology, alongside attempts to reconcile faith and reason, marked a shift away from the importance of oracles, shamans, or prophets with access to ideas ‘revealed’ through spiritual or divine forces, and their various acolytes, disciples, and diviners, towards the interpretative and reflective roles of priests and monks. Meanwhile, the early-modern turn towards natural observation and human concerns fostered the growth of secular scholarship by ‘academics’ and ‘students’ at schools and universities. Likewise, the replacement of dogmatism by esotericism and scepticism, and the rise of new approaches like empiricism, rationalism, and experimentalism, along with later challengers like historicism, organicism, and dialectics, saw the appearance of ‘science’ as distinct from ‘philosophy’, and the expansion of a *Bildungsbürgertum* (‘cultured bourgeoisie’), comprising ‘literati’ and specialist practitioners of various kinds. This has culminated in the modern emergence (and endurance) of a methodological divide between traditions that take either the grand complexity of subjective existence, practical action, and authentic experience, or small-scale problem-solving through linguistic-logical analysis, positivist reasoning, and quantitative-statistical measurement, as favoured ways of thinking.¹⁵³ Each of these developments in consecutive modes of ideation—which can be summarised broadly as ‘Academic’, ‘scholastic’, and ‘scientistic-critical’—has left

¹⁵³ For collected overviews of developments in ‘the history of philosophy’, see, for example, Baldwin 2012; Beaney 2015; Clarke and Wilson 2011; Forster and Gjesdal 2015; Harris 2017; Humphreys 2016; Marenbon 2015; Schmitt and Skinner 1990; Thompson 2017; Wainwright 2007; Wood and Hahn 2012.

some form of legacy to ideation as it takes place in late modernity, under the contemporary division of thinking, whether in the professional environment of ‘research institutions’, or in the ‘everyday’ thinking of subjects who do not hold formal ideative occupations.

Now, *communication*. This is a more familiar term, but an equally common activity: the “transmission or exchange of [...] ideas, by means of [various] media”.¹⁵⁴ The link to expression is that ideas are put into a transferable form, which is *externalised* because it separates them from subjects’ mental faculties, operating in terms of physical phenomena, and at the level of ‘realisation’. The internal structure of communication—following theorisations of ‘the media’ by Bernays, Tönnies, and Marshall McLuhan, but also aligned with accounts of ‘communicative action’, such as that of Habermas—can be modelled in the habitual way.¹⁵⁵ Subjects’ purposive input into communication is *articulation*, which refers to the various faculties that enable utterances and signals, including using motor functions to create sound and movement, which underpin subjects’ ‘articulation power’ *qua* ‘capacity for articulation’ and ‘status as articulator’. The means of communication are thus the means and objects of articulation—respectively, the biological and other physical mediums, mechanisms, and ‘ways of expression’ that subjects use to communicate, and the substance their articulation ‘works with’. As above, the means of communication are the resources and capacities that lend themselves to specifically ‘communicative’ activity, and its attendant *habitus*. Articulation (power) plus the means of articulation make the forces of communication; and both together with the objects of articulation comprise the factors of articulation. The relations of communication are the sum total of ‘social and technical’ relations that subjects must enter into in order to communicate—above all the *division of articulation* that constitutes subjects as different forms of ‘communicators’ with specific and different occupational articulation-tasks, e.g., public speaking, personal correspondence, literary writing, making art, or current affairs broadcasting. These are the RCs-of-communication: the linkages and statuses associated with ‘communicative’ activity and *habitus*. Means of communication and the embodied basis of articulation power make the MCs-of-communication, which combine with the relations of communication to make the MRCs-of-communication, while for every physical and temporal context, the level of development of the forces and relations of communication is consolidated into the mode of communication (see fig.3). The distribution and arrangement of the MRCs of communication under its prevailing mode underpins the

¹⁵⁴ See ‘communication, *n.*’, in *Oxford English Dictionary* 2016. The *OED* stipulates these media as “speech, writing, mechanical or electronic”, though this comes across as needlessly specific.

¹⁵⁵ Bernays 2005, 2011; Hardt and Splichal 2000, pp.137–59, 195, 204–5; McLuhan 2001; Habermas 1986, 1989b.

internal constellations of communicative power, which in turn determine the existence of classist stratifications among subjects engaged in communication. Lastly, the output of this domain is *message*: communication conveys ideas in a concrete *form*, namely packaging them as *information*.




Fig.3: The structure of communication

Another aim of this project, then, is to characterise how—i.e., which objects and with what means—subjects articulate when they express opinions. As with ideation, this depends on their physical and temporal contexts, and the prevailing modes of communication and communicative *habitus*, both in general and for different occupations and classes under the prevailing division of articulation. Again, instead of a full overview of societal and intertemporal differences and developments in communicative modes and *habitus*, this enquiry merely stresses that there are (and have been) many ways for subjects to express (mass) opinion. Communication and opinion-expression responds to shifts in the forces and relations of communication throughout the ‘history of the media’. Since the Palaeolithic origins of symbolism, including petroglyphs, pictograms, ideograms, and later logographic and alphabetic writing, subjects have acted as ‘artists’ of various kinds, including painters, sculptors, and above all writers. The ongoing evolution of spoken language was refined by Classical developments of oratory, recitation, and dialogical debate, and the appearance of *rhetors*, rhapsodists and other poets, playwrights, actors, and other forms of authorship and ‘spokespersonship’. Meanwhile, the expansion of record-keeping, the display and oral proclamation of bulletins (initially for political and economic purposes), and later the circulation of written news sheets prompted a need for scribes or scriveners, chroniclers, and early forms of ‘newsreaders’, criers, and heralds. The medieval and early-modern rise of vernacular languages and

dialects to rival courtly and religious *linguae francae*, coupled with steady increases in popular literacy, led to vast growth and popularisation of the various forms of literature, as well as the gradual expansion of letter-writing. One crucial development was the invention and commercialisation of printing, and the rise of ‘publishing’. The proliferation of print formats cultivated new categories of authorship, from essayists and pamphleteers to diarists and novelists, and allowed the compilation of encyclopaedias, dictionaries, and other durable repositories of mass information. Above all, it permitted the birth of journalism in the form of chronicles and gazettes, or regularised periodicals, newspapers, and magazines—curated by editors, columnists, and other contributors—and conversely the rise of advertising, licensing, and censorship. Subsequent innovations have mostly served to expand the technological possibilities of existing forms of communication, and create updated variants of the occupations associated with them. This includes: the entry of mechanical, electronic, and digital technologies, such as telegraphy, telephony, computing, and artificial satellites; the emergence of sound and image recording, and radio and television broadcasting; and the rise of the internet, and virtual and online communication.¹⁵⁶ Again, each development in modes of communication—‘visual-oral’, ‘literary’, ‘mechanical-electric’, and ‘digital’—has left its mark on the way communication takes place in late modernity, under the contemporary division of articulation, whether in the professional environment of ‘the media’, or in the ‘vernacular’ articulation of subjects without formal communicative occupations.

As a result, mass opinion is ‘spread across’ two social activities—ideation and communication—which are analytically distinct, and which have mutually independent MRCs, modes, and *habitus*. But in late modernity, the activities of ideation and communication that constitute mass opinion take place in a context of high functional differentiation, with a complex division of purposive agency and inputs into several well-established activities and myriad different occupations. In fact, since the 17th and 18th centuries, it has become increasingly common for discourse to move away from generalism, and show more sensitivity to the differentiation, mutual exclusivity, and complexity of social functions. Gone, in other words, is the breezy interdisciplinary facility of the medieval and Renaissance periods, exemplified by physicist-geographer-linguist Al-Bīrūnī, scientist-theologian-jurist Averroës, composer-historian-philosopher St. Hildegard of Bingen, artist-engineer-botanist-historian Leonardo da Vinci, or poet-philosopher Tullia D’Aragona. Where ‘polymathy’ has persisted—e.g., with poet-philosopher-scientist

¹⁵⁶ For collected overviews of developments in ‘the history of the media’, see, for example, Bailey 2008; Blanchard 1998; Briggs and Burke 2010; Chapman 2005; Curran and Gurevitch 2005; Folkerts and Teeter 2001; Fourie 2007; Kenski and Jamieson 2017; Kolker 2008; Kovarik 2011; Lorimer and Scannell 1994.

Margaret Cavendish, poet-philosopher-statesman Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, or scientist-composer Alexander Borodin—this has often taken the form of ‘hobbies’ or ‘dilettantism’, and true discursive generalism has drastically declined.¹⁵⁷ In late modernity, the way subjects think and articulate is strongly tied to the activities they engage in, and the occupations they hold (and class situations they occupy) within them. This means that it is not just the activities of ideation and communication *simpliciter*, and their respective modes and *habitus*, that this enquiry must consider, but the separate ‘*siloised*’ sub-types, sub-modes, and correlative *habitus* of ideation and communication that have become ‘dedicated to’ each social activity, as well as their internal occupational and classist divisions. These are often fairly protean, informal creations. Subjects in particular occupations within a given activity may ‘happen to’ engage in ‘everyday’ thinking or ‘vernacular’ articulation in the context of ‘what they are doing’ to their MRCs—e.g., activists formulating campaign strategies, judges offering opinions on the merits of legal cases, pupils talking about their homework, &c. Conversely, subjects in specifically ideative or communicative occupations may ‘happen to’ orient themselves towards the MRCs of particular social activities—e.g., philosophers and scientists weighing in on public policy, or newspaper columnists or other media commentators addressing topical social issues.

However, in some cases, functional differentiation and the emergence of sub-types of ideation and communication have also given rise to a range of specialised discursive occupations and subjectivities. These systematically ‘hybridise’ the occupational and class *habitus* within ideation and communication ‘in general’ with either the ‘overall’ *habitus* of, or subdivided occupational and class *habitus* within, the social activities with regard to which ideation and communication takes place. The subjects in these occupations comprise what is typically described as the ‘*intelligentsia*’, both for society in general and for ‘their’ social activities in particular.¹⁵⁸ For instance, on the ideative ‘side’, academic ‘theorists’ and researchers ‘fuse’ the *habitus* of ‘philosophers’ and ‘scientists’ with those of occupations in their ‘fields of enquiry’—e.g., business owners, workers, or consumers in ‘economic theory’, rulers, advisers, and citizens in ‘political theory’, judges and jurors in ‘legal theory’, &c. Similarly, on the communicative ‘side’, subjects engaged in ‘publicity’ or ‘messaging’ combine the *habitus* of ‘advertisers’ with those of their designated activity—e.g., priests and other clergy for ‘preachers’ and ‘pastors’, doctors

¹⁵⁷ Abbott 1988, 2001; Kelly 2009; Mahon and Cantlon 2011; Oleson and Voss 1979; Povinelli and Preuss 1995; Stebbins 2015.

¹⁵⁸ Bourdieu 1977, pp.1, 19, 24, 96-7, 116-7; Ehrenreich 1989; Mannheim 2014, pp.91-170; Weber 1978, pp.462, 500-18, 567-8; Williams 2014.

and other medical staff for ‘public health officers’, traders and salespeople for ‘PR specialists’ and ‘marketers’, or ministers, civil servants, election candidates, and activists for ‘propagandists’ and ‘communications directors’. By comparison, at a general level, the various categories of media ‘correspondents’, ‘commentators’, and ‘reporters’ hybridise the *habitus* of journalists with the activity-*habitus* of their specialism, if not strictly those of occupations and classes within them—e.g., administration and coercion for ‘parliamentary’ or ‘war’ correspondents, production for ‘business’ or ‘financial’ correspondents, instruction and study for ‘education’ correspondents, &c. It is this diversification that has ultimately given rise to the prodigious but narrowly-focused discursive activity of late-modern ‘greats’, from cosmologist Carl Sagan or talk-show host Oprah Winfrey to political activist bell hooks or music theorist (and composer) Karlheinz Stockhausen.¹⁵⁹ In fact, *in extremis*, functional differentiation and specialisation within ideation and communication has become so pronounced that the subjects who hold these ‘hybrid’ discursive subjectivities may no longer even hold any additional occupations in the activities with regard to which they are discoursing—even if, historically, they originally did so. Thus, for instance, economists, marketers, or business reporters need not necessarily themselves also be business owners and traders, nor political scientists, spin doctors, or parliamentary correspondents themselves also politicians or civil servants, for their discursive *habitus* to be ‘inflected’ by the *habitus* of the activity ‘in’ which they have their (general, occupational, or class) specialism.

With this in mind, it is now possible to draw together the methodological strands outlined in this chapter into a refined statement of the purpose of this analysis. Late-modern society is characterised by an intense level of functional differentiation in the way subjects interact with their environment. The aim of this project is to explore how the existence of this functional differentiation shapes the processes of ideation and communication that ‘go into’ creating ‘mass opinion’ in late modernity. How does the fact that subjects are socialised into particular sub-types of ideation and communication that are specific to certain social activities, and to occupations (and classes) within them, affect how they form and express opinions? And what does this mean for ‘mass opinion’, which comprises the opinions formed and expressed by a plurality, or ‘multitude’, of subjects who have been socialised to think and articulate in these highly specific ways? The remainder of this enquiry should be seen as an attempt to address these questions, and to construct an analytical framework for their continued exploration.

¹⁵⁹ hooks 1987; Sagan 1983; Stockhausen 1989; Winfrey 2014.

Two closing observations can be made here. First, it is worth addressing a lurking methodological question left over from this model's origins in Marxian thought. The social theory outlined here has been careful to avoid surreptitiously incorporating any assumptions of inevitability about the form, or development, of 'the social'. Yet several of the authors and traditions on which it relies do exactly this. Notably, orthodox Marxian analysis—either in its historical-materialist or dialectical-materialist form—presumes an inexorable progressive trajectory of development in social forces, as well as positive, ameliorative adjustments to social relations, resulting from (r)evolution that originates in the economic domain. It is not clear that either must necessarily be the case, in the economic domain or elsewhere in 'the social'. Of course, it is possible to talk in Marxian terms of 'stages of development' for activities and 'the social' *en gros* in a diagnostic sense—i.e., identifying past periods and genealogical 'milestones'—without needing to slot these into an inevitable pattern, progression, or trajectory. In other words, this model of social theory seeks to preserve the interpretative value of Marxian analysis without imposing the further assumption that such interpretation can be leveraged to predict how the future will (or should) look.

The second observation concerns vernacularity. In most cases, analyses of ideation and communication have historically only examined (and usually still prioritise) the discourses of "exceptional individuals".¹⁶⁰ Even those that conscientiously seek to take account of mass society and "group, collective, and cultural tendencies" are still predominantly oriented towards the thinking and articulation of a tiny minority of subjects, typically ones with prestigious name-recognition, a long tradition of affiliated scholarship, or links to privileged social strata—and to that extent *unrepresentative* of the wider social conditions of their time(s). Given that the focus of this project is *mass* opinion, such elitist tendencies are rejected utterly. Instead, this enquiry is explicitly committed to analysing 'the vernacular' in mass opinion—what Freeden calls "normal, or typical" (as opposed to "superior") discourse, even in its "qualitatively impoverished variants".¹⁶¹ In short, the discourse of subjects in lower class situations can, and should, be subjected to the same genres and standards of analysis as that of higher-class subjects. The only differences between them hinge on the maintenance of qualitative boundaries between the discourses of different classes in order to recognise the disparities in their respective social power. This analysis inclines to the view that such boundaries can, and should, be

¹⁶⁰ Freeden 2013, p.38.

¹⁶¹ Freeden applies this sentiment originally to *political* thinking, but it easily and obviously applies to *social* thinking as well.

weakened or dissolved entirely. But for now, this project is content to pursue its interpretative task of illustrating the structure of mass opinion, and let others draw prescriptive conclusions.

§6. *Conclusion*

This chapter has offered an overview and explication of the analytic lens through which this enquiry examines mass opinion. It characterises ‘the social’ in terms of subjects’ material and relational conditions (MRCs)—i.e., material resources that they have control over, disposal of, or access to, and relational linkages that are (de)privileged, (dis)advantageous, or (im)balanced for/toward them—and the power that accrues to them, given their location in a particular physical and temporal context. It describes how subjects interact with these MRCs, and argues that their active interaction with them exhibits a division of purposive agency that segments ‘the social’ into analytically distinct domains and activities. Each of these activities is internally structured into means and relations, and is governed by a mode of cooperation. Subjects’ action in these activities takes place through a series of unique purposive inputs, and is framed by practices, systems, structures, norms, and dispositions that collectively constitute a *habitus*. Activities also exhibit further differentiation through the division of their purposive inputs into sets of specific tasks and functions, each of which is performed by a particular social occupation with its own distinctive *habitus*. By holding such occupations, subjects have a certain distribution of materials and are arranged into certain relations, which gives them a commensurate measure of power in each of their activities. If these distributions and arrangements differ radically across occupations, subjects become stratified into classes. Finally, the analysis then began to apply this model of social theory to the phenomenon of mass opinion, framing it as a combination of two activities—ideation (how opinion is formed) and communication (how it is expressed)—and hence a particular category of social discourse. The enquiry now continues by examining how these processes of opinion-formation and opinion-expression take place.

II. The nature and basis of opinion

Where do correct ideas come from? Do they drop from the skies? No. Are they innate in the mind? No. They come from social practice, and from it alone. ... It is man's social being that determines his thinking.

—Mao Tse-tung¹⁶²

'Tell me one last thing,' said Harry. 'Is this real? Or has this been happening inside my head?'

Dumbledore beamed at him, and his voice sounded loud and strong in Harry's ears even though the bright mist was descending again, obscuring his figure.

'Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?'

—*Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows*¹⁶³

The previous chapter outlined the general social-theoretic framework on which this enquiry rests. The next step is to give an overview of the specific object it analyses: the (static) concept of 'opinion', and the (dynamic) processes by which subjects form and express it. This is more challenging than one might expect from vernacular readings of 'opinion', which tend to coalesce around the meaning "what or how one thinks about something".¹⁶⁴ Across disciplines and research traditions, a surprising range of mutually inconsistent interpretations compete for primacy, and—*pace* Philip Converse—even the establishment of an opinion polling industry over the last century has not "homogenised the definition and stabilised it for the foreseeable future" beyond the limited ambit of polling research.¹⁶⁵ Yet it is also a necessary step, since 'opinion' must first be clearly defined before the additional complexities of social analysis can be introduced. For now, this overview will be highly individualised and subject-focused, on the basis that, as Floyd Allport suggests, opinion-formation and opinion-expression is fundamentally a

¹⁶² Mao 2007, p.167.

¹⁶³ Rowling 2007, p.579.

¹⁶⁴ Taken, by way of example, from the *OED* definition. See 'opinion, *n.*', in *Oxford English Dictionary* 2016.

¹⁶⁵ Converse 1987, p.S13; Glynn and McLeod 1984, p.43; Splichal 1999, p.4.

matter of the “behaviour of human individuals”.¹⁶⁶ The layers of social analysis will be added in later chapters. This chapter starts by defining ‘opinion’ as a specific category of discourse concerned with epistemological or evaluative judgment, based on information and predispositions (§1). It then outlines the means subjects use to form their opinions—personality, emotion, and reason—and the effects each has on their content (§2). Finally, the account examines the means subjects use to express their opinions—bodily organs and media—and how these affect the form they take as messages (§3).

§1. *Judgment and its objects*

In chapter I, this analysis argued that ‘opinion’ is a particular kind of information, created through social activities of ideation and communication, which together constitute the domain of discourse.¹⁶⁷ Before examining separately the ideative and communicative aspects of ‘opinion’, it is important to clarify what kind of discourse and information ‘opinion’ refers to. Within discourse generally construed, subjects engage in different types of ideative and communicative activity. There are many kinds of statement, or ‘enouncement’, other than ‘opinion’ that subjects can form and express, distinguished from one another by the particular intention of their processes of ideation and communication.¹⁶⁸ These range from the simple to the complex—such as everyday phatic expressions or extensive conversations—and the general to the specific—e.g., storytelling, questions, commands, or greetings. ‘Opinion’, meanwhile, refers specifically to those forms of discourse that express “judgment which is formed and entertained”, per Dewey’s phrase, and ‘opining’ or ‘opination’ (both unhelpfully rare terms) to activities of formation, entertainment, and expression.¹⁶⁹ Thus, when subjects ‘opine’, their ideation and communication are intended towards ‘judging’, and create information that specifically conveys ‘judgment’. But ‘judgment’ has two parallel meanings, each with a long historical tradition.¹⁷⁰ The first is *epistemological*, and relates to *cognition*: drawing on the Platonic division between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*, or the Humean distinction between ‘relations of ideas’ and ‘matters of fact’, judgment refers to claims of conviction, as opposed to objective knowledge and established truth.¹⁷¹ The second meaning is *evaluative*, and relates to *estimation*:

¹⁶⁶ F. Allport 1937, p.13.

¹⁶⁷ See ch.I §4.

¹⁶⁸ Foucault 2008, pp.29-43.

¹⁶⁹ Dewey 2012, p.137.

¹⁷⁰ Habermas 1989, pp.89-90; Price 1992, p.6.

¹⁷¹ Price 1992, p.6; Splichal 2001, p.6.

here, judgment signifies “reputation, esteem, and [...] general regard” in its Machiavellian or Lockean sense as a gauge of status according to some prescriptive standard.¹⁷² In other words, there are two kinds of ‘judgment’ which ‘opinion’ as a kind of discourse can ‘perform’. Both imply some form of subjective position or stance in the absence of absolute certainty, which Immanuel Kant describes as ‘holding-for-true’ (*Fürwahrhalten*).¹⁷³

The source of the ‘judgmental’ orientation of subjects’ opinions lies in their discursive *habitus*, in particular their ideative norms and dispositions. In general, as for other activities, these guide how subjects engage in all kinds of ideation. When subjects are specifically forming opinions, however, the norms and dispositions that guide their ideation are those that carry an explicit ‘judgmental’ focus.¹⁷⁴ Ideative norms, or the “principles which generate and organise practices” in subjects’ ideative *habitus*, take judgmental form as *values*—longer-term foundational interpretive or prescriptive beliefs, which act as “explicit standards for judging” and “general plans for guiding personal action”.¹⁷⁵ There is a large variety of these to be found in different sub-types of social discourse: ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’, ‘just/unjust’, ‘strong/weak’, ‘legitimate/illegitimate’, ‘holy/unholy’, ‘cheap/expensive’, ‘healthy/noxious’, &c. Similarly, subjects’ “durable, transposable” ideative dispositions take judgmental form as *attitudes*—“organisation[s] of several beliefs” that “imply general likes and dislikes”, which engender “immediate, intuitive ... [and] enduring orientation[s] to respond to something favourably or unfavourably” at a deep psychological level.¹⁷⁶ These have also proliferated across sub-types of discourse: ‘piety’ versus ‘profanity’, ‘competitiveness/cooperativity’, ‘carefulness/carelessness’, ‘tolerance/bigotry’, ‘politeness/rudeness’, ‘kindness/cruelty’, &c. Together, values and attitudes—collectively termed *predispositions* or *schemata*—are “part of the raw materials, or building blocks” that subjects develop into opinions through “thought-out choice[s]” based on “argumentation”.¹⁷⁷ This means that opinions are never ‘aimless’, but are given clear judgmental impetus and inclination by the cognitive and estimative predispositions embedded in subjects’ discursive *habitus*.

With the proliferation of opinion research traditions, some inconsistency and interchangeability has emerged regarding whether it is subjects’ ‘raw’ predispositions or their ‘thought-out’ opinions that

¹⁷² Machiavelli 1970, III.34; Noelle-Neumann 1979; Noelle-Neumann 1984; Ozouf 1988, pp.S1-S2; Price 1992, p.6.

¹⁷³ Kant 1952, p.241.

¹⁷⁴ Price 1992, p.3.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p.55.

¹⁷⁶ Price 1992, pp.46-7, 49, 55; Wiebe 1953, p.333.

¹⁷⁷ Berelson and Steiner 1964, p.557; Childs 1965, p.13; Doob 1948, p.35; McGuire 1969; Price 1992, pp.46, 52.

should be given primary analytic consideration.¹⁷⁸ While predispositions are crucial to understanding where subjects' 'deeper' judgmental orientation comes from, they rarely become explicit except through their conversion into opinions. Conversely, while opinions are often more "situational and superficial", they are usually also (for this reason) directly observable and measurable, unlike predispositions.¹⁷⁹ This tension has been compounded by an unhelpful tendency in the polling industry to blur the distinction between 'opinion' and 'attitude', as part of a gradual shift—initiated by Louis Leon Thurstone—towards testing for ever more foundational manifestations of judgment.¹⁸⁰ For instance, many statistical surveys conducted by qualitative and quantitative social research institutes and polling organisations have simply rebranded 'mass opinion' as 'social attitudes', with scant regard for the conceptual discrepancies between these terms—e.g., the British Social Attitudes Survey, conducted by the National Centre for Social Research.¹⁸¹ As a result, the objects of enquiry hitherto analysed under the rubric of 'opinion' occupy a broad stretch of conceptual ground, from rudimentary Kantian readings of 'mindsets' to the more elaborate 'conceptions' or 'determinations' advanced by Tönnies.¹⁸²

There are advantages to be gained from embracing such methodological diversity in opinion research. Above all, it shows Bourdieu's criticism that opinion research focuses only on judgments that take the form of "different and equally legitimate answers ... given to an explicit question" in the context of "the confrontation of competing discourses" to be somewhat misplaced.¹⁸³ Certainly, the polling industry does not put enough effort into interrogating judgments on which there is societal "*majority* ... consensus", or even "*unanimity*"—which is what Bourdieu calls "*doxa*", as distinct from "*opinion* as liberal ideology understands it".¹⁸⁴ But this is more a criticism of polling as a way of conducting opinion research than an indictment of opinion research *tout court*. If anything, capturing the attitudes that underlie subjects' opinions is merely one of several ways, alongside Bourdieu's favoured strategy of "critique", of trying to identify *δόξα* in all its guises, or "bring[ing] the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation". Opinions are no less opinions—i.e., cognitive or estimative judgments—just because they rest on predispositions that are widely "taken for granted" or "beyond question", and it is well within

¹⁷⁸ Price 1992, pp.46, 49.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., pp.46, 52.

¹⁸⁰ Price 1992, p.49; Splichal 1999, pp.29-30; Thurstone 1928.

¹⁸¹ For the most recent edition, see Curtice, Phillips, and Clery 2016.

¹⁸² Kant 1952, p.241; Splichal 1999, pp.64, 108-9.

¹⁸³ Bourdieu 1977, pp.167-8.

¹⁸⁴ Bourdieu 1977, pp.167-8; Zaller 1992, p.3. Original emphasis.

the remit of opinion research to bring into consideration “the sum total of the theses tacitly posited on the hither side of all inquiry”.¹⁸⁵ For the purposes of this enquiry, it is worth acknowledging that all stages of opinion-formation and opinion-expression merit careful consideration—from the values and attitudes that orient judgment to the communicative activity that conveys it.

While predispositions give opinions their orientation, these also need objects to be oriented towards. They are “by definition” *transitive* concepts, Price argues, in that their ‘judgment’ “must be *about* something”.¹⁸⁶ Opinions as such can be about anything, however worldly or imaginary, concrete or abstract, complex or mundane, as long as it stimulates cognition or estimation. But within the parameters of this enquiry, ‘opinions’ in a *social* sense address subjects’ material and relational conditions (MRCs)—the distribution of resources and capacities, and the arrangement of linkages and statuses. This, of course, includes not only MRCs in ‘the present’—i.e., contemporary to subjects’ having opinions about them—but also romantic or critical views of ‘the past’, or historical MRCs, as well as utopian or dystopian fantasies about ‘the future’, or MRCs yet-to-come. Since subjects are ‘thrown’ into a specific physical and temporal context, they interact with some aspects of the ‘overall’ MRCs more than others. While, therefore, all MRCs are (at least potential) objects for their opinions, these mainly address MRCs that are ‘of concern’ in subjects’ particular social situations—i.e., the distribution of the resources, tools, equipment, materiel, and other subjects with which they are surrounded, and the arrangement of the links, involvements, contacts, and associations in which they are imbricated. Specifically, they address the MRCs with which subjects interact—either by being passively affected by MRCs due to their ‘obstinacy’ in subjects’ contexts, or by actively affecting them as subjects are oriented towards dealing with them through purposive action.¹⁸⁷ Further, the exact environment with which subjects are presented, and which they need to deal with, is not, at least foundationally, a matter of their choice. Since they are ‘thrown’ into their place within ‘the social’, their experience from earliest consciousness onwards consists in “encountering” and “discovering ... entities ready-to-hand”, which always-already ‘demand’ (at least potentially) to be interacted with—or, in the case of ‘opinion’, to be ‘judged’.¹⁸⁸ It is thus more accurate to say that subjects form and express opinions about MRCs *because*, or *insofar as*,

¹⁸⁵ Bourdieu 1977, pp.166-70.

¹⁸⁶ Price 1992, p.60. Emphasis added.

¹⁸⁷ See ch.I §§1, 2.

¹⁸⁸ Heidegger 1962, pp.100, 174, 435.

they interact with them, which is the force of Noelle-Neumann's comment that 'opinion' "*arises from an interaction of individuals with their social environments*".¹⁸⁹

The condition for subjects' interaction with MRCs is their physical embodiment, as argued in chapter I, and this also provides the condition for them to form and express opinions about them.¹⁹⁰ Specifically, subjects 'judge' MRCs because, or insofar as, their (passive or active) interaction with them leads them to *experience* concrete *stimuli* that prompt cognition and estimation. They do so when their bodies 'come up against' their MRCs in a way that provides tangible 'evidence' of their presence—i.e., when resources, other subjects, links, contacts, &c, contingently 'connect with' subjects or enter into their proximity. Through their embodiment, subjects occupy a space within 'the social' that (however small) is entirely exclusive to them. Following Arendt:

[T]hough the common world is the common meeting ground of all, those who are present have different locations in it, and the location of one can no more coincide with the location of another than the location of two objects.¹⁹¹

Subjects' experience of their MRCs is thus specific to them—i.e., unique to them, and specified by the context of their 'thrownness'. This specificity is what makes subjects' opinions about MRCs *subjective*. Their position among the objects towards which their opinions are oriented is contextually bound and situated, which means that their interaction with their social environment 'prompts' opinions that are 'relevant' to the MRCs in their context. In reality, this is simply the basic premise of materialism: "[i]t is not men's consciousness that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness".¹⁹² Subjects' 'being' (their interaction with MRCs) is primary, and conditions their discourse (including their opinions about MRCs) by providing its 'concern' and its 'parameters'.¹⁹³

Moreover, because subjects are embodied, their 'vantage-points' onto their contexts themselves originate and emerge from within these same contexts, and are inextricably tied to them. Subjects' physical and temporal 'thrownness' not only specifies the social environment that subjects experience, but also constricts the scope of their *attention* to, or *awareness* of, this experience—what Zaller calls subjects' "reception and comprehension of communication from the [social] environment"—by

¹⁸⁹ Noelle-Neumann 1974, p.43; Splichal 1999, p.201. Emphasis added.

¹⁹⁰ See ch.I §2.

¹⁹¹ Arendt 1958, p.57.

¹⁹² Marx 1987, p.263.

¹⁹³ See ch.I §1, 2.

imposing on them a *perceptual horizon*.¹⁹⁴ Fundamentally, this horizon is a result of the physical and temporal limits of subjects' bodily perceptual faculties—their senses of sight, hearing, touch, &c—transposed into the context of their embodiment. Subjects are not automatically attentive to, or aware of, all the (potential) stimuli they experience through their interaction with their environment. In order to experience MRCs as stimuli—i.e., in order to 'recognise' them as (potential) objects of opinion—subjects need to '*register*' them within their horizons. It is not enough for resources, other subjects, links, contacts, &c, simply to 'appear' in subjects' close proximity: subjects need to see, hear, feel, &c, the stimuli these 'effect' *and* (more or less consciously) 'realise' they have done so. The outer bound of subjects' horizon is the limit of their environment: the sum total of MRCs with which they (passively or actively) interact. But at any given moment, the stimuli that subjects register in their perceptual horizons are restricted to the MRCs with which they are interacting—i.e., which are 'of concern' *in that moment* through their 'obstinacy', or the orientation of subjects' activity. As Heidegger suggests, subjects' awareness is "proximally and for the most part" (*zunächst und zumeist*) determined by "that which [they] encounter[] in the environment and that with which [they are] circumspectively concerned".¹⁹⁵ This makes subjects' opinions about MRCs not just subjective but also *perspectival*, as both their position among their objects of opinion and their orientation towards them are contextually bound and situated, and cannot attain a transcendent "cosmic perspective", in Margaret Canovan's words.¹⁹⁶ Subjects' interaction with their environment thus not only 'prompts' but also 'frames' their opinions to be 'relevant' to the MRCs in their context.

But subjects also form and express opinions about MRCs outside their physical and temporal contexts—i.e., which concern other subjects elsewhere, or themselves and others in the past or future—and which they thus interact with (at most) indirectly, or not at all. Since these MRCs lie beyond their perceptual horizons, subjects do not experience and register stimuli immediately from them, but rely instead on mediating exogenous '*cues*', or "pellets" as McLuhan calls them, that appear within their horizons, which distil the complexity of these 'alien' MRCs into representative '*proxies*', or what John

¹⁹⁴ Gadamer 2013, pp.313-7; Johnson 2004, pp.1-24; Raftopoulos 2007, pp.5-8; Volkmer 2014, p.181; Wright and Ward 2008; Zaller 1992, p.21. Zaller uses "political environment", but (as with other instances) there is no reason not to expand this to 'the social' as a whole.

¹⁹⁵ Heidegger 1962, p.439.

¹⁹⁶ Arendt 1958, p.xv.

Durham Peters calls “condensational symbols”.¹⁹⁷ Of course, MRCs cannot generate such cues of their own accord: social facts “do not speak for themselves”, as Dewey, Freeden, and Žižek variously put it.¹⁹⁸ Instead, these cues are transmitted into subjects’ perceptual horizons by the discursive activity of other subjects who are ‘closer’ to the MRCs in question—i.e., who directly interact with these MRCs due to the physical and temporal context into which they are ‘thrown’. In other words, cues are not just exogenous but *xenogenous* in origin: they come not just from elsewhere in ‘the social’ but specifically from *other subjects*. As a result, for subjects to form and express opinions about MRCs beyond their perceptual horizons, they are relying on there to be other subjects who experience and register these MRCs within their own environments and perceptual horizons, and who can ‘make them speak’, or ‘vocalise’ them, for the original subjects. Zaller summarises this succinctly:

Of any [public] event [that has wide effects] we see at best only a phase and an aspect. ...

Inevitably our opinions cover a bigger space, a longer reach of time, a greater number of things, than we can directly observe. They have, therefore to be pieced together out of what others have reported and what we can imagine.¹⁹⁹

At the point where cues ‘reach’ subjects, the MRCs they represent have been ‘filtered through’ the discursive activity of one or more other subjects. This lends an irreducible *intersubjective* aspect to the way subjects experience ‘the social’ beyond their own sensory perception, as when they register cues as stimuli they necessarily incorporate other subjects’ perspectives into their own. Few subjects are directly ‘plugged into’ more than a handful of other subjects’ perspectives, which means that, for more distant parts of ‘the social’, subjects may be several degrees of separation away from those within whose perceptual horizon(s) the MRCs in question lie, within an overarching *network* of similar relationships of vocalisation. The further beyond subjects’ perceptual horizon(s) MRCs lie, the more other subjects any information about these MRCs is likely to have been ‘filtered through’ before it reaches them. Every extra subject adds further layers of discourse, making the information that is eventually ‘delivered’ to its final recipients increasingly intersubjective.²⁰⁰ If these cues are the result of other subjects’ formation and expression of opinions, they reach subjects ‘complete with’ clear (albeit often complex) pre-existing cognitive or estimative judgments—i.e., the cues are *valenced* to give the MRCs they represent an

¹⁹⁷ Belknap and Campbell, 1951; Campbell *et al.* 1960; Converse 1964; Fishkin 1995, p.84; Fishkin 2009, p.7; Key 1967; McLuhan 2001, p.247; Mueller 1973; Price 1989; Peters 2001, p.86; Sassi 2001, p.104; Zaller 1992, pp.45, 47.

¹⁹⁸ Dewey 2012, p.41; Freeden 2003, p.8; Žižek 1994, pp.7, 10-11.

¹⁹⁹ Zaller 1992, p.6.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p.45.

‘intrinsic’ cognitive or estimative attractiveness or aversiveness, which subjects can either affirm/confirm or dismiss/reject.²⁰¹ The reliance on a network of other subjects to vocalise the MRCs beyond their perceptual horizons is one of the most fundamental and universally durable relations of ideation and communication for all social subjects.

This intersubjectivity makes subjects’ views of ‘the social’ more complex, but is essential for them to be complete. Since at least Lippmann and (in a rare moment of agreement) Dewey, opinion research has rejected as a *prima facie* “illusion” and “unattainable ideal” the possibility that subjects can achieve social ‘*omnicompetence*’.²⁰² Omnicompetence describes a situation where individual subjects have a full grasp of all their possible objects of opinion—i.e., all the MRCs comprising ‘the social’, not just those they interact with in their social environments. It assumes that subjects can ‘break out’ of their environments, and ‘expand’ their perceptual horizons to attain a ‘complete’—if not strictly ‘cosmic’—synoptic and experiential view of ‘the social’ in its full complexity.²⁰³ Yet such transcendence is literally impossible for subjects to achieve, as their physical and temporal embodiment leaves them irretrievably rooted in the context into which they have been ‘thrown’, however hard they may try to ‘uproot’ themselves from it. While they may have some scope to increase their attentiveness and awareness in order to ‘register’ more of their environment within their perceptual horizon, as Dewey implies, this is a much more limited aspiration than omnicompetence.²⁰⁴ Subjects’ reliance on cues from others about the parts of ‘the social’ outside their subjective context—i.e., recognising and accepting that their perception has a horizon—is not a sign of their “self-incurred minority”, as Kant claims, or a lack of “courage to make use of [their] *own* understanding”.²⁰⁵ Rather, subjects acknowledge that pure autarkic reliance on their subjective perspective is too crude to overcome the limits of their ‘thrownness’, as they may ‘miss something’ without support or corroboration from others. In fact, this corroborative aspect of intersubjectivity is the essential point of communication, and it is exactly in this sense that, as McLuhan puts it, communicative activity functions as an extension of the human nervous system.²⁰⁶ Together with the stimuli that subjects experience directly, cues create a (reductive) ‘map’ of the *totality* of MRCs with

²⁰¹ Belknap and Campbell 1951; McGuire 1969, p.198; Price 1989; Taylor and Fiske 1978; Zaller 1992, pp.35, 45.

²⁰² Splichal 1999, pp.145, 154, 157; Splichal 2001a, p.11.

²⁰³ Dewey 2012, p.127; Hobhouse 1994, p.35; Lippmann 1993, p.10.

²⁰⁴ Dewey 2012, pp.46, 125.

²⁰⁵ Kant 1996, p.17.

²⁰⁶ McLuhan 2001, p.3.

which that subject interacts.²⁰⁷ This is precisely what Arendt has in mind when she observes that “appearance—something that is seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves—constitutes reality”.²⁰⁸ Of course, the impossibility of omnicompetence dictates that this totality in its wholeness is unfathomable or, in Žižek’s words, “sublime” for any single subject.²⁰⁹ Rather, when subjects form and express opinions about ‘the social’, their grasp is at best partial: they have the *competence* (but not omnicompetence) to ‘judge’ the MRCs they interact with, but (without cues from other subjects) little more than *ignorance* about the rest of ‘the social’.

The stimuli subjects register from their own and others’ MRCs, either directly or via representational cues, are thus the objects of opinion, which opinions are oriented towards by predispositions. Stimuli provide subjects with *information* about ‘the social’, and it is this information that acts as the ‘target’ (however specific or diffuse) for their judgment. Zaller tries to capture this by describing each instance of ‘judgment’ as a “*marriage of information and predisposition*”.²¹⁰ *Prima facie*, it is more accurate to see it as an *application* (usually unconscious) of predispositions *to* information: subjects’ social interactions give them specific experiences on which they exercise their (pre-existing) general attitudinal and valuative impetus and inclination. However, subjects do not apply their predispositions directly to each individual ‘piece’ of information from every stimulus they experience and register. Before it becomes ‘raw material’ for cognition or estimation, subjects integrate the information they acquire into what Lippmann terms their “*pseudo-environment*”, which is their (more or less) coherent derivative ‘interpretation’ or ‘representation’ of ‘the social’ within and beyond their physical and temporal context.²¹¹ This interpretation is “a hybrid compounded of ‘human nature’ and ‘conditions’”—i.e., jointly determined by subjects’ sensory perception and their subjective perspective within the specific physical and temporal context in which they are embodied.²¹² When subjects form and express opinions, therefore, they do so at a certain remove from the ‘bare’ MRCs that their opinions are ostensibly ‘about’, as they ‘judge’ them only in mediated form.²¹³ As Lippmann puts it, subjects “act[] upon their environment, moved by stimuli from their pseudo-environment”, which means that different subjects

²⁰⁷ McLuhan 2001, p.247.

²⁰⁸ Arendt 1958, p.50.

²⁰⁹ Žižek 1994, p.221.

²¹⁰ Zaller 1992, pp.51. Emphasis added.

²¹¹ Lippmann 2010, pp.13-14, 18-19. Emphasis added.

²¹² Lippmann 2010, p.18.

²¹³ Price 1992, p.17.

“live [...] in different worlds”—or “[m]ore accurately, they live in the same world, but they think and feel in different ones”.²¹⁴ It is this ‘wider’ pseudo-environment to which subjects apply their predispositions, converting the information they acquire about the MRCs in ‘the social’ into what Lippmann and Friedrich Engels describe as “pictures inside their heads” (*Gedanken-Abbilder*).²¹⁵

These “*mental pictures*”—to adopt the shorter phrasing used by William James, John Tyndall, and Wilhelm Wundt—take the form of basic ‘verdicts’ (*Urteile*) of either cognitive affirmation-versus-denial, or estimative praise-versus-censure, of the relevant parts of ‘the social’.²¹⁶ Crucially, these ‘verdicts’ do not sit in a one-to-one relationship with their objects. In fact, subjects may form at least one if not more substantively different, parallel, or conflicting pictures of the same object, as a result of either (1) competing sets of predispositions, due to rival discursive *habitus*, or (2) dissimilar or even contradictory pieces of subjective and intersubjective information about MRCs.²¹⁷ But in all cases, as ‘verdicts’, pictures exhibit what Robert Lane and David Sears refer to as a “pro-con” quality, or a ‘for-against’ *direction*.²¹⁸ Of course, this ‘pro-con’ aspect cannot just be modelled as an absolute ‘yes/no’ dichotomy—in fact, it has been clear since the early days of opinion research that simple binaries are practically “worthless for any understanding of human attitudes”.²¹⁹ Binaries sacrifice cognitive and estimative nuance, forcing subjects to choose between only two unambiguous ‘positions’—or three if they allow for a “middle resting place” of abstention, ambivalence, or neutrality—in a way that may be entirely unsuited to the content of their judgments.²²⁰ Instead, for ‘verdicts’ that are ‘for-against’ (i.e., ‘A’ or ‘¬A’), a better way of capturing the nuance of subjects’ mental pictures is by framing ‘judgment’ as a spectrum, or at least a scale comprising several gradations, to represent subjects’ reluctance to fully endorsing the ‘pro’ or ‘con’ positions.²²¹ These can stem from contradictory, inconclusive, or complex predispositions—i.e., ‘nuanced’ versus ‘simplified’ epistemological beliefs, or ‘moderate’ versus ‘extreme’ evaluative beliefs—which subjects apply to the information they receive about their MRCs, and which make their mental pictures ‘overcomplicated’, ‘underdetermined’, ‘unclear’, or otherwise more ‘balanced’ and circumscribed. However, not all judgments have a direction that takes a simple ‘for-against’ form. Subjects’ ‘verdicts’

²¹⁴ Lippmann 2010, p.16.

²¹⁵ Engels 1987, ch.1; Lippmann 2010, pp.21-2; Splichal 1999, pp.153-4.

²¹⁶ Bennett and Hacker 2003; Brant 2013, p.227; Kant 1952, p.241. Emphasis added.

²¹⁷ Tesser 1978, pp.297-8, 307; Zaller 1992, pp.37-8.

²¹⁸ Lane and Sears 1964, p.6; Lang and Lang 1983, p.23; Price 1992, p.79; Splichal 1999, p.266.

²¹⁹ Abrams and Rose 1960, p.7; Albig 1939, p.157.

²²⁰ Green 2011, p.45; Hodder-Williams 1970, p.64; Neumann and Noelle-Neumann 1962.

²²¹ Hodder-Williams 1970, pp.23, 28.

about their MRCs may be substantive competitors but not logical opposites (i.e., ‘A’ vs ‘B’ vs ‘C’, &c), so representing their exact positions requires greater complexity than even a ‘pro-con’ spectrum can provide. This usually occurs when there are multiple ‘answers’ to epistemological or evaluative ‘questions’, or several concrete ‘possibilities’ or ‘interpretations’ for ‘what is the case’—e.g., ‘Which of the following is most affected by a weaker pound sterling? The UK’s trade balance, growth rate, net capital flows, interest rates, inflation, or unemployment?’—and ‘how things are/should be’—e.g., ‘Which of these options is better for the UK? EEA membership, EU Customs Union membership, a bespoke bilateral trade agreement, or defaulting to WTO rules?’—in situations of ‘multiple-choice’ judgment.

Moreover, subjects’ mental pictures can be assessed not only by the direction of their judgments, but also qualified in several ways via “several related but conceptually distinct dimensions”.²²² One of the most important alternative measures is the *intensity* of ‘judgment’, which covers how strongly or passionately subjects ‘hold’ their mental pictures—e.g., vehement commitment to the veracity of anthropogenic climate change, or lukewarm endorsement of a presidential candidate.²²³ Similarly, the *degree* of ‘judgment’ refers to the extent (or absence) of caveats or reservations with which subjects ‘favour’ their pictures—e.g., provisional acceptance of the constitutional correctness of the *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* U.S. Supreme Court ruling, or an unconditional condemnation of ‘alt-right’ ideology—*certainty*, how sure subjects are of their pictures’ validity—e.g., confidence in the negative economic prospects of the UK outside the EU, or hesitant support for the death penalty—and *firmness*, how liable subjects are to change their pictures—e.g., malleable belief in the existence of a divine Demiurge responsible for Creation, or unwavering support for women’s reproductive rights.²²⁴ At a more self-reflective level, there are two further modifiers, *salience*, how central and accessible a psychological place subjects allocate to their pictures—e.g., the peripheral need to accept the insights of string theory, or the crucial place of a belief in the immorality of inequality—and *importance*, how “critical” or ‘concerning’ subjects see the objects underlying their pictures to be—e.g., the crucial significance of belief in heliocentric astronomy, or the marginal import of the lexical ordering of John Rawls’s principles of justice.²²⁵ Like direction, all of these dimensions are better modelled as spectrums or scales than binaries. Moreover, they are often strongly correlated with one another, especially salience and importance: as

²²² Price 1992, p.65.

²²³ Converse and Presser 1986; Riesman and Glazer 1948; Schuman and Presser 1981.

²²⁴ Childs 1965, pp.14–24; Splichal 1999, p.266.

²²⁵ Hodder-William 1970, p.64; Krosnick 1988, 1990; Price 1992, p.65; Splichal 1999, p.213.

Price puts it, “the more time spent considering something, the more important it may seem”, while “things deemed important may occupy a large share of one’s attention”.²²⁶ The existence of such correlations makes it essential for opinion research to keep these dimensions analytically distinct.

The ‘verdicts’ contained in subjects’ mental pictures are the most rudimentary form in which information can be ‘married’ to predispositions. They embed basic cognitive and estimative attitudinal-valuative inclinations in subjects’ perception of ‘the social’, giving their whole pseudo-environments a certain *a priori* valence. The (largely unconscious) creation of mental pictures is the most basic way that subjects can exercise what Rawls and Alain Badiou call their “*capacity* for judgment” or “*faculty* of judgment”.²²⁷ They are thus also the simplest ‘situational’ manifestations of judgment itself, and hence the ‘ultimate’ foundations of opinion that the polling industry and opinion research more broadly have tried to uncover. In fact, much social-scientific opinion research takes the extremely minimalist view that the creation of pictures fully describes the amount and type of mental activity that subjects engage in when they form opinions, and that subjects move from (unconsciously) applying predispositions to information straight onto opinion-expression.²²⁸ Lippmann even goes so far as to say that “[t]he pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationships, *are* their [mass] opinions”.²²⁹ But this reductionist approach simply ignores the fact that opinions can be far more complex than just basic attitudinal-valuative inclinations towards objects—i.e., to use terminology from earlier, ‘thought-out’ as well as ‘raw’. The mental pictures that subjects have of ‘the social’ do not directly and inevitably determine the opinions subjects ‘form and entertain’ about it, since they do not remove the need, or possibility, for subjects to process these pictures—i.e., to *think* about them—and ‘arrive at’ more complex cognitive and estimative assessments. Consequently, the content (and quality) of opinions depends on the level and sort of sophisticated *elaboration* that subjects add to the judgments contained in the pictures through which they represent ‘the social’ to themselves, from their subjective perspective, in their ‘thrown’ position. It is to this elaboration that the analysis now turns.

²²⁶ Price 1992, p.65.

²²⁷ Badiou 2005, p.13; Rawls 2001, p.29. Emphasis added.

²²⁸ For tendencies towards this approach see, variously, Bartels 1988; Bishop *et al.* 1984; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Kinder and Sanders 1990; Popkin 1991; Schuman and Presser 1981; Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988; Wilson and Hodges 1991; Zaller 1992, pp.34-9.

²²⁹ Lippmann 2010, p.21. Emphasis added.

§2. *The means of thinking: personality-traits, emotions, and reason*

The additional sophistication that transforms subjects' cognitive and estimative judgments from mental pictures into 'fully-fledged' opinions is provided by a range of attributes, or instruments, that subjects use to process these pictures, and through them the subjective and intersubjective information available to them. These were referred to in chapter I as the means of thinking—"the psychological and physical tools, mechanisms, and 'ways of thinking' that subjects use to 'ideate'"—which subjects 'use on' their objects of thinking—the "stimuli and sense-data" from which they create pictures representing MRCs—to create ideas, or in the case of 'opinions', subjective epistemological and evaluative judgments.²³⁰ The means of thinking can now be enumerated more precisely as falling into three categories: *personality-traits*, *emotions*, and *reason*. Each of these elements has its own unique function in converting the 'flow' of predispositions and information acquired about MRCs into different types of judgment, and this section explores how (and to what extent) these functions have been theorised within opinion research. It is worth highlighting a small caveat here which will take on greater importance later on in this enquiry. Strictly speaking, subjects do not have to use all of these means to form every opinion: rather, they are 'options' at their disposal, in their control, or accessible to them for doing so. But importantly, they are options that *all* subjects have, at least to some degree. This is because, to a greater or lesser extent, the means of thinking are all partly to be found at the most personal and basic level of subjects' embodiment—specifically, within physiological and psychological aspects of their pre-social 'kernel'—which means that the extent to which they use them is only partly determined by processes of socialisation.²³¹ Of course, this is not to say that the formation of opinions can, or should, be completely reduced to *purely* subjects' psychological aspects.²³² Rather, the point is that psychological analysis clearly has its place in ensuring that opinion research has the most up-to-date understanding of how opinions are formed, and hence that it can act as a reliable starting-point for this social model of mass opinion.

First, subjects' *personality*. As Joseph Schumpeter argues, one of the most significant insights of the rise of individual and social psychology in the latter half of the 19th century was the steady abandonment of "the idea of the human personality [as] a homogeneous unit".²³³ In place of the crude

²³⁰ See pp.62-3.

²³¹ See pp.56-7.

²³² Splichal 2001b, p.35.

²³³ Schumpeter 1962, p.256.

psychic ontologies on which much Enlightenment thought rests, psychologists have developed a more rigorous model of personality as a “multifaceted and enduring psychological structure” that is “relatively stable over time”, to use Jeffery Mondak and Matthew Hibbing’s description. This structure exercises “one of the longest of long-term influences” on subjects’ thinking and behaviour, including partly framing, at least in “broad, general” terms, the predispositions by which subjects are oriented *ex ante* towards their MRCs.²³⁴ Personalities vary from subject to subject, which explains why, in the presence of “similar life circumstances” and identical “key features of the environment”—i.e., *ceteris paribus*—different subjects nonetheless acquire different information from the stimuli in their environment, approach it with different predispositions, and form different opinions about it. There are a number of different ways of theorising personality, typically divided into personality-*type* analyses, which group subjects into distinct qualitative categories based on their personality ‘profile’, and personality-*trait* theories, which break down these categories and profiles into quantifiable patterns or tendencies. Type theories take various approaches, ranging from modern rediscoveries of the Hippocratic, Galenic, or Avicennist ‘temperaments’ and ‘humours’, Meyer Friedman and Ray Rosenman’s ‘Type A and Type B’ classification, and Oscar Ichazo and Claudio Naranjo’s semi-mystical ‘enneagram’ model, to typologies influenced by Jungian psychoanalysis, including the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and David Keirsey’s Temperament Sorter.²³⁵ Many of these have been severely criticised for their lack of scientific rigour, leaving trait theories by far the dominant way of understanding personality.²³⁶

In particular, five *trait-dimensions*, the so-called ‘Big Five’, derived from the work of Hans Eysenck and Lewis Goldberg, have been found to capture much of the breadth that personalities exhibit.²³⁷ Each dimension works as a spectrum, with a series of subordinated traits at its ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ ends: *openness to experience*, also called *intellect* or *culture*; *conscientiousness*, or *dependability*; *extraversion*, or *surgency*; *agreeableness*, or *pleasantness*; and *neuroticism*, or *emotional stability* (see fig.4).²³⁸

²³⁴ Mondak and Hibbing 2012, pp.217-9, 221, 224.

²³⁵ M. Friedman 1996; Friedman and Rosenman 1959; Hippocrates 1983; Jung 1971; Kagan 1998; Keirsey and Bates 1984; Lindberg 2007; Lutz 2002, p.60; Myers 1995; Riso and Hudson 2000.

²³⁶ Lilienfeld, Lynn, and Lohr 2014; Long 1992.

²³⁷ Ellis *et al.* 2009; Goldberg 1993; Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003, p.506; Mondak and Hibbing 2012, p.220.

²³⁸ Conley 1985; Costa and McCrae 1985; Costa and McCrae 1988; Heidegger 1962, pp.216-7; McCrae and Costa 1987, pp.81-90.

Personality trait	High-end traits	Low-end traits
Openness to experience	Creativity, “curiosity” (<i>Neugier</i>), imagination, independence, inventiveness, intellectual unpredictability, lack of focus, preference for novelty/unusualness/variety, self-actualisation.	Caution, consistency, data-drivenness, dogmatism, perseverance, pragmatism, being closed-minded, imperceptive, shallow.
Conscientiousness	Achievement-orientation, efficiency, organisation, planning, reliability, self-discipline, being dutiful, obsessive, stubborn, thorough.	Flexibility, negligence, spontaneity, unreliability, being careless, easy-going, sloppy.
Extraversion	Activity, engagement, high energy, positive affect, sociability, being assertive, attention-seeking, domineering, outgoing, talkative.	Passivity, reserve, self-absorption, silence, being aloof, reflective, solitary.
Agreeableness	Compassion, cooperativity, naïveté, trust, warmth, being friendly, helpful, kind, submissive, well-tempered.	Analytical detachment, antagonism, hostility, suspicion, being argumentative, challenging, competitive, deceitful, selfish.
Neuroticism	Dynamism, excitability, impulsivity, instability, sensitivity, temperamentality, being highly reactive, moody, nervous.	Confidence, impulse control, lack of concern, security, being calm, emotionless, uninspiring.

Fig.4: The ‘Big Five’ personality trait-dimensions

Each subject ‘sits’ at a certain ‘point’ on these spectrums, and the combination of these ‘points’ constitutes their overall personality-profile. The stronger a given trait—i.e., the more a subject sits at one end of a dimension—the likelier they are to exhibit that series of subordinated traits. Of course, subjects may have ‘no strong preference’ on any or all of these dimensions, in which case their personalities are seen as adaptable, moderated, reasonable, but occasionally also unprincipled, inscrutable, or calculated. There is still disagreement over how complete a picture of personality this ‘Five-Factor’ or ‘OCEAN’ model gives, or whether it needs additional factors, such as *humility* (as in Michael Ashton and Kibeom Lee’s HEXACO model), *excellence*, or *decency*.²³⁹ But the ‘Big Five’ dimensions have proven a rich and reliable source of insight so far, so this enquiry will use them as well.²⁴⁰

²³⁹ Ashton *et al.* 2004; Boyle 2008; Briggs 1989; John 1989; Livneh and Livneh 1989; Santrock 2005, pp.366-99; Waller and Ben-Porath 1987.

²⁴⁰ Cattell 1946; Fiske 1949; Tupes and Christal 1961.

While the link between personality-traits and subjects' concrete opinions has yet to be fully established, personality evidently affects the content of values and attitudes *qua* discursive norms and dispositions.²⁴¹ Of the five trait-dimensions, openness to experience and conscientiousness have the most significant effect, with the former associated with strong aversion to values of traditionalism, judgmentalism, universalism, and security, and the latter associated with strong embrace of them.²⁴² In social-scientific opinion research, this has been taken as an indication of a correlation between openness and *progressivism*, often (misleadingly) termed “liberalism”—defined (very loosely) as an “interest in new solutions to existing [...] problems and the willingness to embrace societal change”—and between conscientiousness and *reactionarism*, or “conservatism”—that is, “cautious[ness] in policy making and reluctan[ce] to alter the *status quo*”, alongside “valu[ing] personal responsibility”.²⁴³ The effects for other dimensions are weaker but still discernible. In particular, Bryce Dietrich has found “more modest” but still significant correlations between agreeableness and progressivism, and neuroticism and reactionary views respectively.²⁴⁴ This is borne out to a large extent by the commitments of different social ideologies. Progressive ideologies often favour “unusualness”, “independence”, “creativity”, or “self-actualisation”, alongside “kindness”, “helpfulness”, or “cooperativity”—e.g., variously, in the embrace of ‘eccentricity’ and aversion to ‘mediocrity’ by liberals like John Stuart Mill or Alexis de Tocqueville, the importance of ‘compassion’ to social solidarity emphasised by Martha Nussbaum, the endorsement of spontaneous voluntary decision-making by autonomist Marxists like John Holloway or Antonio Negri, the rooting of emancipation in mutual charity with liberation theologians like Gustavo Gutiérrez, or the ‘catallactic’ view of market activity as driven by diverse and disparate individual goals by Austrian school economists such as Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek.²⁴⁵ Conversely, reactionary ideologies lay weight on “self-discipline”, “organisation”, “dutifulness”, and “achievement-orientation”, as well as “dynamism”, “excitability”, and “moodiness”—e.g., with the submission to political and religious hierarchies endorsed by theocrats such as Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald, the romantic sentimental attachment to tradition defended by conservatives like Roger Scruton or Christian socialists such as John Ruskin, the

²⁴¹ Price 1992, p.55.

²⁴² Caprara, Vecchione, and Schwartz 2009; Carney *et al.* 2008; Gerber *et al.* 2010; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak and Hibbing 2012, p.226; Riemann *et al.* 1993.

²⁴³ Mondak and Hibbing 2012, p.226.

²⁴⁴ Dietrich *et al.* 2012.

²⁴⁵ Gutiérrez 1973; Hayek 2012; Holloway 2002; Lotringer and Marazzi 2008; Mill 1989; Mises 2007; Nussbaum 1996; Tocqueville 2003.

‘militia’ tendencies and state-sanctioned terror of fascist and conservative movements like the Spanish *falange*, German *Stahlhelm*, or the Hungarian *Magyar Gárda*, the spectrum of nationalisms ranging from benign patriotism to chauvinist demonisation of ‘others’, and the cults of obedient loyalty to personalist state leadership cultivated under left- and right-wing totalitarianism.²⁴⁶

However, personality-traits do not just affect the substantive judgments that subjects form about ‘the social’, but enter in earlier to have an impact on how they acquire and process information about it as well. First, different combinations of traits shape subjects’ perceptual horizons by giving them different levels of attentiveness and awareness. Here, (high) openness has the strongest impact, as subjects who are curious, imaginative, and prefer novelty are more likely to receive and accept stimuli and cues from their environment than those who are cautious, imperceptive, and closed-minded.²⁴⁷ ‘Open’ subjects—e.g., those who are ‘in touch with’ and ‘attuned to’ the world around them—consciously ‘try to’ see, hear, feel, &c, their MRCs, precisely in order to ‘extract’ and ‘absorb’ information from them. There is a similar role for (high) extraversion, since, according to Zaller, “the greater a person’s level of cognitive engagement with an issue, the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend—in a word, to receive—[social] messages concerning that issue”.²⁴⁸ Subjects who are active, engaged, and sociable—e.g., those in influential or leadership positions, and those with wide-ranging social contacts—are likely to put themselves in situations, or act in ways, that enable them to ‘encounter’ their MRCs more ‘frequently’, and more ‘deeply’, than those who are passive, reserved, or solitary. Further, different combinations of traits affect how closely subjects conform to their *a priori* predispositions when forming opinions—i.e., whether they think in accordance with the norms and dispositions of their discursive *habitus*. Here, (low) openness and (high) conscientiousness have the main impact, as subjects who are consistent, dogmatic, thorough, and dutiful are more inclined to view and evaluate the social information they receive strictly through the lens of their pre-existing attitudes and values, as well as “tend[ing] to resist [stimuli and cues] that are inconsistent with their [social] predispositions”.²⁴⁹ Subjects with this tendency are typically seen as (excessively) ‘proper’ or ‘pernickety’, either as ‘sticklers for the rules’, ‘stuck-in-the-muds’, or ‘swivel-eyed true believers’ inflexibly committed to some *idée fixe*. Lastly, different traits also make subjects more or less inclined to make use of the other means of thinking available to them to

²⁴⁶ De Bonald 2014; de Maistre 1975; Gardner 1974; Özkırmılı 2017; Ruskin 1997; Sartori 2005; Scruton 2014; Žižek 2011.

²⁴⁷ Mondak and Hibbing 2012, p.225.

²⁴⁸ Zaller 1992, p.42.

²⁴⁹ Mondak and Hibbing 2012, p.225; Zaller 1992, p.44.

form their opinions. For instance, high extraversion and high neuroticism—i.e., positive affect, sensitivity, moodiness, or emotional instability—steer subjects towards greater reliance on emotional means of thinking.²⁵⁰ This is stereotypically associated with subjects who have an ‘artistic’ or ‘dramatic’ temperament, display religious fervour, or have a predilection for lurid sensationalism in literary or media consumption tastes. In a similar way, high openness, high conscientiousness, moderate extraversion, moderate agreeableness, and low neuroticism—i.e., imagination and thoroughness, some reflectivity and analytical detachment, and impulse control—push subjects towards a more extensive use of reason in forming their opinions.²⁵¹ This often characterises subjects tasked with ‘working out’ complex social problems, such as those engaged in theoretical and practical analysis, financial calculations, finding medical or legal solutions, or formulating governmental or business strategy. In other words, there is always a degree of reciprocity and co-determination between the three constituent elements of subjects’ means of thinking. The analytical separation in this analysis is not intended to imply that they are independent of each other in their practical operations.

While personality represents an underlying structure that shapes subjects’ acquisition of information and longer-term patterns in its conversion into opinions, the two other elements have a more contingent effect on these processes. Subjects experience *emotions* towards their MRCs in the form of “gut reactions”—what Jonathan Haidt calls unconscious “flash[es] of intuition”—to particular stimuli in their social environment as and when they interact with them.²⁵² Physiologically, emotions ‘pick up’ where sensory perception ‘leaves off’: as information is acquired, based on either subjective perception or intersubjective cues, it provokes a “complex set of interrelated reactions [...] that can include electrochemical processes in the brain, changes in autonomic and motor systems (e.g., breathing, heart rate, muscle tension), facial expressions, behavioural impulses, and conscious feelings”. What subjects ‘detect’ are the affective states these processes create—“liking and disliking, pain and pleasure, moods, and emotions”—which they integrate into their mental pictures of the MRCs in question.²⁵³ These states become “equiprimordial”, in Heidegger’s phrase, to the way MRCs are perceived: forming opinions

²⁵⁰ Buckingham, Charles, and Beh 2001; Larsen and Ketelaar 1989; Rafienia *et al.* 2008; Riggio and Riggio 2002; Schneider 2004; Tuuva *et al.* 1997.

²⁵¹ Blau, Fuller, and Vaccaro 2006; Freeman, Evans, and Lister 2012; Furnham, Crump, and Swami 2009; Pacini and Epstein 1999; Samar, Walton, and McDermut 2013.

²⁵² Berinsky 2012, p.11; Haidt 2007, p.999.

²⁵³ Brader 2012, p.194.

about them becomes a matter of processing information that always-already embeds some affective reaction, which subjects can perhaps counter, or change, but never wholly transcend.²⁵⁴

There are many available classifications of emotions, but there is broad agreement that in their basic form, emotions fall into a small number of categories of varying sizes. These were originally defined by Paul Ekman, and later grouped into opposed (broad) ‘positive-negative’ pairs and expanded by Robert Plutchik: *anger* and *fear*, *happiness* and *sadness*, *trust* and *disgust*, and *anticipation* and *surprise* (see fig.5).²⁵⁵

‘Positive’ emotion	Associated range	‘Negative’ emotion	Associated range
Anger	Aggravation, annoyance, bitterness, dislike, envy, exasperation, ferocity, frustration, fury, grumpiness, hatred, hostility, jealousy, outrage, rage, resentment, scorn, spite, torment, vengefulness, wrath.	Fear	Alarm, anxiety, apprehension, distress, dread, fright, horror, hysteria, mortification, nervousness, panic, shock, suspense, terror, unease, worry.
Happiness	Amusement, bliss, cheerfulness, contentment, delight, ecstasy, elation, enjoyment, enthrallment, enthusiasm, exhilaration, gladness, glee, hope, joy, jubilation, pleasure, pride, relief, satisfaction, serenity, zeal.	Sadness	Agony, anguish, dejection, depression, despair, disappointment, dismay, embarrassment, gloom, glumness, grief, guilt, humiliation, hurt, loneliness, melancholy, misery, neglect, pensiveness, pity, regret, rejection, shame, sorrow, suffering, sympathy, woe.
Trust	Acceptance, admiration.	Disgust	Boredom, loathing, revulsion.
Anticipation	Interest, vigilance.	Surprise	Amazement, astonishment, distraction.

Fig. 5: Basic emotional categories

At any given moment, each subject may feel any number of these basic emotions, and the resulting combination—however brief or durable it might be—constitutes their emotional ‘state’. Plutchik and others, such as Jessica Hagy, have suggested that, when these basic categories are combined, they give

²⁵⁴ Heidegger 1962, pp.175–6.

²⁵⁵ Ekman 1992; Parrott 2001; Plutchik 2001; Shaver *et al.* 1987.

rise to more complex emotions, typically the result of dyadic pairings, such as: *optimism* (anticipation plus happiness), opposed to *disapproval* (surprise plus sadness); *love* (happiness plus trust) versus *remorse* (sadness plus disgust); *submission* (trust plus fear) versus *contempt* (disgust plus anger); and *awe* (fear plus surprise) versus *aggressiveness* (anger plus anticipation).²⁵⁶ However, there is much less agreement within individual and social psychology on how emotions ought to be combined, and how to define the complex ‘states’ that emerge from these combinations, so this analysis will restrict itself to using only the basic categories.

Within opinion research, the enduring hegemony of analyses that prioritise “cognitive” thought processes—i.e., conscious reasoning—means that approaches focused on affect, as championed by Joseph LeDoux and Robert Zajonc, are still in their infancy.²⁵⁷ However, the effects of some of the basic emotional categories on information-processing and opinion-formation, as well as the substantive content of subjects’ judgments, have begun to be identified.²⁵⁸ *Fear* and especially *anxiety*, which respond to threats and (potential) danger in the social environment, encourage attentiveness and compromise, causing subjects to “pay greater attention to what is happening [...], seek out more information, reconsider their options in light of available information, avoid risky courses of action, and prefer public policies focused on prevention and protection”. This applies equally to financial investors staring intently at their boards during stock market crashes, students ‘cramming’ before examinations, or viewers ‘glued to’ TV coverage of natural disasters or other momentous events. *Anger*, prompted by (un)fair or (un)intentional frustration of goals, has the reverse effect, making subjects “stick with their convictions, eschew compromise, spend less time thinking things through, embrace risks more readily, and prefer aggressive and punitive public policies”. This can be seen in the resurgence of British nationalism and Empire nostalgia associated with Eurosceptic hostility to the supposed ‘overreach’ of EU institutions, or the aggressive entrenchment around ‘muscular liberalism’ in response to popular outrage against terror attacks by religious extremists.²⁵⁹ *Enthusiasm*, a specific form of *happiness* arising from good conditions and success, bolsters subjects’ confidence but “reinforce[s] the automatic tendency [...] to spend little time reflecting on their opinions and to stick more closely to their [social] habits and loyalties”. There

²⁵⁶ Hagy 2012; Plutchik 2001.

²⁵⁷ Brader 2012, p.194; LeDoux 1999; Zajonc 1980.

²⁵⁸ Abelson *et al.* 1982; Brader 2006; Brader 2012, pp.200-5, 211-2; Conover and Feldman 1986; Kinder 1994; Isbell and Ottati 2002; Marcus, MacKuen, and Neuman 2011; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Marcus *et al.* 2005; Rahn 2000; Rahn, Kroeger, and Kite 1996; Small and Lerner 2008; Way and Masters 1996.

²⁵⁹ Freedman 2017.

are aspects of this to be detected, for example, in the rapid transformation of liberal-capitalist euphoria over ‘winning’ the Cold War into an un-self-critical and complacent ‘end of history narrative’, as well as recurring jingoistic attempts to play up the ‘fun’ aspects of warfare, from the ‘pals battalions’ of WW1 to Daesh’s high-octane recruitment videos.²⁶⁰ *Sadness* is largely similar to fear, causing subjects to “expend more effort on thinking through decisions ... [making them] more likely to pay attention to the details of a situation and, as a result, take account of those situational details”. This can cover everything from bereaved friends and relatives ‘dwelling on’ the life of a loved one to the declaration of a period of ‘national mourning’ after the death of a prominent figure or the occurrence of some mass tragedy. Meanwhile, *pride* and *shame*, as specific forms of *happiness* and *sadness* respectively, are ‘social’ emotions that arise when subjects are judged to “exemplify” or “fall[] short of ... the standards and values expected by their community or group”, and make them “adopt or apply” these values “more faithfully”. These are often associated with rituals of reward or humiliation, such as school prizegiving days, political ‘show trials’ and publicised criminal trials, and sporting or military medal ceremonies. Finally, *disgust* resembles anger in that it inclines subjects to “purify [their] environment”, provoking in them “harsher moral judgments and moral conservatism”. This is often leveraged in the context of societal scandals, whether in the form of corporate fraud, governmental corruption, or ‘taboo’ sexual behaviours.

In general, the link between emotions and opinions is fairly straightforward: positive emotions tend to foster positive opinions, and negative emotions foster negative opinions. Enthusiasm and pride straightforwardly reinforce the ‘pro’ ‘verdicts’ contained in subjects’ mental pictures, with fear, shame, and disgust doing the same for ‘con’ ‘verdicts’, while anger and sadness respectively foster positive and negative reactions to MRCs in a more nuanced, indirect way. But, as with personality-traits, emotions also affect how subjects acquire and process information about ‘the social’, again specifically their attentiveness to, and awareness of, environmental stimuli and cues, and their conformity to their discursive predispositions. Broadly, positive emotions encourage subjects to fall back on their memories of past judgments rather than considering new social information, and to conform weakly to their *a priori* predispositions. As a result, subjects become less likely to receive and accept, and more likely to resist, environmental stimuli and cues—especially if these clash with their predispositions—and “retrieve ... from memory ... related considerations” that they have “recently used, seen, heard, or indirectly referenced, ... [and] called to mind or thought about” to form new opinions.²⁶¹ This is what is often

²⁶⁰ Fukuyama 2012.

²⁶¹ Zaller 1992, p.48.

referred to as the ‘blindness’ or ‘shortsightedness’ of anger, enthusiasm, or pride, in the sense that these emotions lead subjects to ‘shut out’ all but the most dramatic happenings around them. Meanwhile, negative emotions make subjects more attentive to new information, as well as driving them to ‘revisit’, and *in extremis* revise, their predispositions.²⁶² These correlatively increase subjects’ likelihood of receiving and accepting stimuli and cues, and open up their thinking to including “long unused” or “forgotten ... consideration[s]” regardless of whether these have been “recently activated”.²⁶³ Emotions like fear, sadness, shame, and disgust all have a strong ‘shock value’, in the sense that they ‘jolt’ subjects into abruptly ‘breaking out of’ their ideative inertia, or their path dependency on ‘inherited’ attitudes, values, and information. Both inflate the effect of “affect-congruent” predispositions—i.e., attitudes and values that are close in their positivity or negativity to the emotions subjects feel—in forming opinions about a given social stimulus, although it is debatable whether positive or negative emotions have the more clearly discernible impact.²⁶⁴ This is what leads to compound associations between predispositions and emotions, such as ‘righteous anger’, the disgust cultivated towards medically unhealthy behaviour, the fusion of ‘guilt’ and ‘illegality’ in the concept of ‘penitentiary’ imprisonment, or the historical treatment of ‘hysteria’ and ‘melancholy’ as noxious medical conditions.²⁶⁵ Moreover, different emotions incline subjects to use reasoning as a further means of thinking to form their opinions in different ways. Positive emotions tend to foster “heuristic processing”, encouraging subjects to apply familiar, even ‘garbled’ or ‘corner-cutting’ reasoning, while negative emotions encourage “systematic processing”—i.e., conformity to the demands of formal logic or rationality—and make subjects ‘refresh’ their grasp of the practices of thinking demanded by their prevailing ideative *habitus*.²⁶⁶ Ultimately, this comes down to the relative ‘urgency’ that different emotions lead subjects to attribute to their MRCs, since if their view of ‘the social’ is more positive than negative, subjects feel they can ‘afford to’ redirect their limited energies at least partly away from ideation and towards other social activities. Of course, as Carroll Izard argues, it is rare for subjects to experience any of these emotions in their “pure” form. Rather, subjects tend to feel a complex cocktail of emotions towards any given stimulus or cue, which makes their opinions about it proportionately more nuanced.²⁶⁷

²⁶² Schwarz and Clore 1983.

²⁶³ Zaller 1992, p.48.

²⁶⁴ Brader 2012, pp.197, 205. Kühne *et al.* 2011.

²⁶⁵ Aquinas 2014, II-II, Q.158, a.1, *sed contra*; Blazer 2005; Gilman *et al.* 1993; Jackson 1986; Veith 1965; Whitby 1845, p.212.

²⁶⁶ Schwarz and Clore 1983.

²⁶⁷ Izard 1972.

Lastly, subjects use *reason*, or *reasoning*, to process their mental pictures of their environment. Opinions are ‘reasoned’ if subjects consciously apply their ‘thoughtful’ and ‘intellectual’ cognitive and neural processes to ‘reflect on’ and ‘make sense of’ their MRCs. The redefinition of ‘opinion’ as (at least partly) a “matter of reason”—i.e., formed through a certain measure of “cool deliberation” as well as “affective impulse” and “intense feeling”—is a particular legacy of Enlightenment thought.²⁶⁸ At heart, reason “essentially involves the acquisition of an accurate, fine-grained mental picture of the [...] world”, as Tom Hoffman puts it, involving additional mental processing to that provided by personality and emotions.²⁶⁹ While, *contra* Tönnies, it is not only reason that distinguishes ‘opinion’ from its underlying beliefs (whether attitudes or values)—since it is partly also a “matter of heart”—subjects use reason to give their opinions the character of ‘thought-out’ choices or decisions.²⁷⁰ Unlike with emotions, subjects ‘detect’ both the process and the outcome of reasoning, which means that cognitive states are not integrated as firmly as affective states into subjects’ mental pictures of ‘the social’. Thus, they do not become ‘equiprimordial’ to the way MRCs are perceived, in that information does not as such always-already embed a ‘reasoned’ reaction in the same way. They do, however, become ‘primordial’ in that, as Milton Lodge argues, subjects accumulate conclusions from past reasoning as new information into their pictures.²⁷¹ In short, the psychic route from information to opinion via reason is more complex (because more conscious) and less consistent than via emotions, which makes its precise effects on opinion-formation harder to predict.

There are several types of processing that belong to the overall category of reason. One of the most prominent is *rationality*, which, as Jesús Mosterín observes, is often wrongly seen as the only type of reasoning.²⁷² Subjects use ‘rational’ thinking to streamline and systematise (‘rationalise’) their information acquisition and processing, in order to refine the efficiency and effectiveness of their opinion-formation.²⁷³ At its most basic, this is simply the application of Karl Popper’s ‘principle of rationality’—i.e., the assumption that subjects try to achieve their purposive ends—to the activity of ideation.²⁷⁴ But, following the classic Weberian distinction, this general principle disguises two ways in

²⁶⁸ Price 1992, pp.16, 48; Speier 1950; Splichal 1999, pp.108-9.

²⁶⁹ Hoffman 2001, p.129. Hoffman’s original phrase is “*political world*”.

²⁷⁰ Bem 1970; Price 1992, pp.46, 48, 52; Splichal 1999, pp.108-9.

²⁷¹ Hoffman 2001, p.135; Lodge 1995; Lodge and Stroh 1993; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; Lodge and Steenbergen 1995.

²⁷² Mosterín 2008.

²⁷³ Hauser 2001, p.177; Hoffman 2001, p.131; Popkin 1991, pp.9-17.

²⁷⁴ Popper 1994, ch.8.

which rationality refines how subjects think. First, *instrumental* rationality (*Zweckrationalität*) refines the relationship between ends and means. Subjects show “informed awareness of the nature of the ends [they] are proposing to achieve”—i.e., the outcomes into which they want to convert their purposes, here, forming opinions from the ‘marriage of information and predisposition’—and “select those means which, on the best available evidence, are the most effective way of realising those ends”, i.e., relevant cognitive and neural processes.²⁷⁵ They choose and deploy ‘thinking aids’, often particular rules and styles of consistent stepwise reasoning, which can sometimes be materialised in the form of ‘handbooks’ or ‘guidelines’—containing, for instance, logical rules, mathematical and scientific formulae, or conceptual and interpretative models—and apply tried-and-tested reasoning tools and strategies designed to create opinions. Second, *value*-rationality (*Wertrationalität*) refines the relationship between ends and starting commitments. For the same end—the ‘marriage of information and predisposition’ to form opinions—subjects select the commitments, i.e., relevant attitudes and values, which are most important, or desirable, to incorporate into their opinions. They then pursue ‘lines of argument’ that ‘flow from’ their predispositions—i.e., rules and styles of reasoning that ‘match’ or ‘expand on’ their orientations towards ‘the social’, such as utility calculus for ‘usefulness’, maximisation for ‘profitability’ or ‘efficiency’, &c—to ‘rationalise’ their mental pictures, imparting cogency and sophistication to their ‘worldviews’.²⁷⁶

When ‘thinking rationally’, subjects combine these two (often divergent) aspects to raise the qualitative calibre of their opinions. In general, as Hoffman argues, this consists of finding “better inputs into decision-making processes”, such as becoming more circumspect to acquire “more diverse experience[s] and better quality information”, and hence better grasp the “complexity and nuance” of their environment.²⁷⁷ Subjects increase their opportunities to see, hear, feel, &c, environmental stimuli from multiple situations in their given physical and temporal context, and become more selective in the sources from which they acquire intersubjective cues. Moreover, subjects who think rationally pay closer attention to the logical structure of their reasoning processes, and attempt to “render accurate judgments” that avoid fallacious or specious argument, and which are consistent by the standards of deductive, inductive, or abductive inference. They seek to ‘iron out’ cognitive and estimative dissonances within and between their mental pictures of ‘the social’, and ‘join up’ steps of reasoning into an unbroken and

²⁷⁵ Sibley 1953.

²⁷⁶ Dewey 2012, p.50.

²⁷⁷ Parkinson 2012, p.28; Hoffman 2001, pp.129, 131.

internally correct sequence.²⁷⁸ Even with these stipulations, ‘what counts as’ rational thinking can vary between subjects and situations. One use of rational thinking implies that subjects pay special attention to the opportunities they have to broaden their perceptual horizon, or to supplement it with cues from their social environments—which is, of course, influenced by subjects’ levels of openness to experience and conscientiousness. This is the rationality of the scientist, and the academic or policy researcher, who tries rigorously to accumulate as large a body of ‘evidence’ and corroborative ‘references’ as possible in order to make their reasoning ‘complete’. But rationality might alternatively imply something more akin to Anthony Downs’ concept of “rational ignorance”, whereby subjects systematise their reasoning by making it more parsimonious, and reducing potentially complicating inputs by refraining from acquiring new experiences or information—which, again, depends on their openness and conscientiousness.²⁷⁹ This is the rationality of the overwhelmed shopper or the busy voter, who tries to ‘cut out’ extraneous detail in the information they take into account, and ‘boil down’ the basis and stages of their consideration to its most parsimonious minimum. Precisely which approach is ‘rational’ in any situation depends on subjects’ context: the nature of the predispositions, and the quantity and quality of the information, which they combine to form opinions, and the processes by which they do so. This does not, of course, mean that ‘rationality’ is entirely subjectively-determined. Rather, following W.M. Sibley, opinions cannot be considered rational or irrational without “assum[ing] knowledge of the agent’s controlling dispositions or purposes”—i.e., respectively, their underlying attitudes and values, such as ‘right/wrong’, ‘strong/weak’, ‘legitimate/illegitimate’, ‘cheap/expensive’, &c, and the formation of opinions—as well as the information with which (and processes by which) these are ‘married’.²⁸⁰ This insight is not typically acknowledged sufficiently in liberal treatments of mass opinion, as well as within many social-scientific approaches in opinion research, both of which generally assume an impoverished, fixed understanding of rationality as either information-maximisation or (as a second-best) ignorance.²⁸¹ It is crucial that a more pluralistic understanding of rationality be incorporated into opinion research, in order to give a more accurate representation of the diversity of ways in which mass opinion can be ‘rational’, let alone more broadly ‘reasoned’ or ‘thought’.

²⁷⁸ Cooper 2007; Egan, Santos, and Bloom 2007; Festinger 1957; Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999; Metin and Metin Camgöz 2011; Tavis and Aronson 2007.

²⁷⁹ Downs 1997, pp.244-6, 266-71; Nyborg 2011.

²⁸⁰ Sibley 1953, p.556.

²⁸¹ Fishkin 1995, pp.21-5, 41-5; Gaus 1998; Gutmann and Thompson 2004, pp.50, 66, 73; Neblo 2015, pp.37, 92-4, 102-16; Rosenberg 2014, p.99; Steiner 2012, pp.57-87.

But the refinements in opinion-formation which rationality provides do not automatically take the extreme form of optimisation. Although rationality certainly “prefers the greater value to the lesser”—i.e., it veers towards thinking that is more rather than less efficient and effective—it does not strictly seek to “maximise value”, and ‘full’ rationality exists more as an aspiration rather than an imperative for subjects.²⁸² Even scientists and researchers are not expected to accumulate *every single* piece of evidence or reference that might be relevant to their focus, and it is the *relative* ‘completeness’ of their reasoning that gives their thinking ‘fuller’ rationality. There are also several examples of uses of reason where the requirements of pure subjective rationality are relaxed. One such is Herbert Simon’s concept of “bounded rationality”, which arises as a result of (exogenous) constraints on subjects’ thinking processes.²⁸³ These include above all informational limitations—hence Samuel Popkin’s alternative term “low-information rationality”—but also subjectively insuperable challenges such as the scale or tractability of the issues about which subjects form opinions, or restrictions on the time and mental resources subjects can devote to doing so.²⁸⁴ In each case, subjects may need to form opinions in light of ‘known and unknown unknowns’ (following Donald Rumsfeld) about the object in question, or have to confront objects whose complexity is beyond the limits of their comprehension—e.g., complex financial modelling, the nature of divinity, the consequences of conflict in the South China Sea—or be forced to come to ‘snap judgments’ within an extremely short timescale, yet still aim to think ‘rationally’ within these constraints. In response to such constraints, subjects take reasoning shortcuts that ‘rationalise’ their thinking without ‘optimising’ it, whether by getting tolerably close to optimisation, as with Huw Dixon’s model of “epsilon-optimisation”, or by reaching a predefined ‘acceptability threshold’, as with Simon’s own concept of “satisficing”.²⁸⁵ They may try to incorporate a certain minimum proportion of the information available to them, or allow for a certain maximum number of omissions, and make their reasoning ‘logical enough’ or ‘broadly consistent’, by either a subjective or socially-derived standard of tolerance.

Another example of reasoning without pure subjective rationality is *reasonableness* (or *reasonability*), which represents the complexification and social expansion of rationality’s individualistic aspects. Reasonable thinking expands subjects’ circumspection from their own commitments, means,

²⁸² Sibley 1953, p.558.

²⁸³ Gigerenzer and Selten 2002; Simon 1957.

²⁸⁴ Popkin 1991.

²⁸⁵ Brown 2004; Dixon 1992; Manktelow 2000, p.221; Simon 1947, 1955, 1956.

and ends, to those of other subjects, which they consider from a perspective tending towards that of a “disinterested, impartial spectator”. Beyond “correctly calculating future consequences”, as with pure subjective rationality, reasonable subjects think *transperspectively*, and can “justify [their opinion] in terms of some principle capable of being appealed to by all parties concerned, some principle from which from which [others] can reason in common”.²⁸⁶ Subjects thus reason with reference to mental pictures insofar as they share them with other subjects—i.e., to the extent that they rest on commonly available information and are oriented by mutually agreed-upon predispositions—and using only those ‘thinking aids’, tools, and strategies to which all the subjects concerned have easy recourse. This gives the concept its connotations of fairness or “equity”, proportionality, prudence, and moderation, as opposed to the excess, extravagance, or hostility associated with ‘unreasonable’ opinions. Again, as with rationality, reasonable thinking is context-contingent, and must be judged with reference to the specific values and attitudes—e.g., ‘right/wrong’, ‘just/unjust’, ‘holy/unholy’, ‘healthy/noxious’, ‘efficient/inefficient’, &c—shared by the group towards whom subjects are being ‘reasonable’, as well as the information about MRCs with which they are ‘married’ to form subjects’ opinion. However, while both bounded rationality and reasonableness have been accepted as categories of thinking within economic and philosophical analysis respectively, they have yet to be integrated into opinion research—again, a serious neglect of the sheer plurality of reasoning by which mass opinion can be formed.²⁸⁷

Beyond rationality, there are a number of more ‘basic’ uses of reason on which subjects rely to form opinions, which are bracketed under the category of *heuristics*.²⁸⁸ These are relatively simple ‘rules of thumb’—rather than the logically rigorous reasoning required by rationality—that offer subjects mental ‘shortcuts’ to fall back on when they experience what John Sweller terms high “cognitive load”, or, again, are working from limited information.²⁸⁹ Heuristic thinking works on the basis of “attribute substitution”: subjects deal with a complex ‘target’ problem by answering a simpler and more easily calculated ‘heuristic’ problem, often one that focuses only on some partial aspects of a more complex totality.²⁹⁰ They may turn to comparative analogies, memories of prior experiences, or others’ behaviour for ideative ‘guidance’, or ‘pick out’ certain features of their mental pictures—their clarity or obscurity,

²⁸⁶ Sibley 1953, p.557.

²⁸⁷ Gigerenzer and Selten 2002; Habermas 1995, pp.126-9; Kahneman 2003; Rawls 1996, pp.49, 54-7, 217, 224-5, 387; Rubinstein 1997; Tisdell 1996.

²⁸⁸ Simon 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1974.

²⁸⁹ Sweller 1988.

²⁹⁰ Kahneman and Frederick 2002.

familiarity or novelty, simplicity or complexity, &c—as particularly important to include in their thinking about them. This places fewer demands on subjects’ psychic resources, and offers a “fast and frugal” way to form tolerably accurate opinions without full information—i.e., making their judgments more ‘reflective’ without pushing for full optimisation.²⁹¹ As Gerd Gigerenzer observes, this can make opinion-formation based on heuristics more efficient and effective than thinking that insists on ‘full’ rationality—albeit at the potential cost of introducing what social science derogatorily calls ‘cognitive biases’ into subjects’ judgments.²⁹² However, the opinions formed using heuristics are ‘biased’ only in that they are a ‘skewed’ version of what they ‘would be’ if they were formed rationally—generally by inflating or downplaying the importance of certain kinds of information and predispositions relative to the putative ‘impartiality’ of ‘full’ rationality—and there is no reason why they should be a less legitimate way of doing so. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky originally identified three heuristics that are of particular importance in subjects’ thinking: the *availability*, or *simulation* heuristic; the *representativeness*, or (closely related) *similarity* heuristic; and *anchoring and adjustment* heuristic.²⁹³ Subsequently, a vast range of others have been identified, some of which derive from Kahneman and Tversky’s original three, and some of which incorporate parallel and prior work by Robert Axelrod, James Frazer, Michael Lynn, Muzafer Sherif, and Itamar Simonson, among others.²⁹⁴ Each of these has specific effects on how subjects interact with objects in their environment in general, and in particular how subjects process their predispositions, information, and the resultant mental pictures into complex opinions (see fig.6).

Heuristics	Effects on opinion-formation
Availability/ simulation	Subjects use how vividly information comes to mind—i.e., how easily they can form mental pictures of it—as an estimate for its correctness, likelihood, or frequency of incidence.
Representativeness/ similarity	Subjects rate information—and hence mental pictures—according to its similarity to posited or memorised prototypes, seeking out favourable pictures and avoiding unfavourable ones.

²⁹¹ Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group 1999.

²⁹² Gigerenzer 1996.

²⁹³ Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Sutherland 2013, pp.16-17; Tversky and Kahneman 1973; Zaller 1992, p.48.

²⁹⁴ Ariely and Carmon 2003; Axelrod 2006; Baron 2008, p.235; DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal 2006; Frazer 2009; Hertwig *et al.* 2008; Higgins and King 1981; Gilovich, Tversky, and Vallone 1985; Koehler and Harvey 2004, p.99; Kruger *et al.* 2004; Kunda 1999, pp.68-70; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips 1982; Lynn 1989; Lynn 1992; Miller and Sanjurjo 2015; Miron-Shatz 2009; Monin 2003; Pachur, Hertwig, and Rieskamp 2013; Plous 1993, pp.109-20; Rand and Nowak 2013; Read and Loewenstein 1995; Rozin and Nemeroff 2007; Sherif 1935; Simonson 1990; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Wyer and Srull 1989; Zukier 1982.

Anchoring and adjustment	Subjects use a pre-defined value—and hence mental picture—as a ‘starting point’, and selectively choose information to shift (‘upwards’ or ‘downwards’) to reach a plausible opinion.
Contagion	Subjects avoid (or seek out) information—and hence mental pictures—about anything seen as ‘contaminated’ by prior contact with objects or subjects valorised as bad (or good).
Diversification	Subjects forming several opinions simultaneously introduce more variety into their judgments than when they form them sequentially.
Effort	Subjects estimate the significance of a mental picture according to the perceived time and effort that went into creating it—e.g., by acquiring information—with more seen as ‘better’.
Equity	Subjects treat all available information—and hence mental pictures—about a given part of ‘the social’ equally, and distribute resources equally among them when thinking about them.
Familiarity	Subjects steer towards old, or already-known predispositions and information—and hence mental pictures—in preference to novel ones.
Fluency	Subjects determine the significance of judgments by the speed, ease, skilfulness, elegance, or smoothness with which they can be mentally processed into opinions.
‘Hot hand’ fallacy	Subjects see (their own or others’) judgments about random events as evidence of an increased chance of similar judgments for later versions of the same events.
‘Peak-end’	Subjects process their mental pictures based on their most intense aspect(s) (<i>memory bias</i>) and their final aspect(s) (<i>recency bias</i>), rather than the total sum or average of all their aspects.
Scarcity	Subjects estimate the significance of information—and hence mental pictures—by how hard (or easy) it is to acquire (or lose), with perceived abundance indicating lower quality.
Social proof/social-circle	Subjects adopt the thinking of others, in a descending order of proximity to themselves, to determine and reflect ‘correct’ opinions for ambiguous social situations, on the assumption that they have a better notion of ‘how to judge’ the parts of ‘the social’ in question.
Tit-for-tat	Subjects reciprocate, or mirror, others’ previous judgments, especially in choices between agreement (‘cooperation’) and disagreement (‘defection’).

Fig.6: Heuristics

This tabulated list is not complete, not least because in the ongoing process of individual and social psychological research new potential heuristics are constantly being hypothesised and discovered. But the point is, rather, that even the importance of this series of heuristics to subjects’ thinking—which has been extensively accepted by, for instance, decision theorists such as Maurice Allais and Daniel Ellsberg,

prospect theory, or behavioural economic analysis—has been all but ignored by the dominant currents in opinion research.²⁹⁵ These still wrongly and unjustifiably see heuristic reasoning as ‘flawed’ or ‘lower-quality’—a symptom of their preference for rational reasoning—which leads them to adopt unrealistic and impoverished understandings of how subjects can (and do) turn their mental pictures into more complex judgments.²⁹⁶

Between them, these three means of thinking cross-cut the parallel cognitive and estimative meanings of ‘opinion’ as ‘holding-for-true’.²⁹⁷ Yet while they clearly coexist in subjects’ minds, there is serious theoretical dispute over their relative importance and normative position in opinion-formation. For some theorists, reason (especially in its rational form) is simply a superior means of thinking to ‘raw’ emotions or ‘basic’ personality—and contributes to a ‘better’ mode of ideation ‘across the board’.²⁹⁸ However, in the context of ‘opinion’ specifically, it is by no means obvious that narrow reason must have automatic priority over the other two means. Indeed, defenders of the “primacy of affect” go so far as to argue that, at least as far as emotions are concerned, the direction of this priority is the other way around.²⁹⁹ The reality almost certainly lies between these two extremes, and the relationship between reason and emotions especially is far more reciprocal than their separate analytical treatment might imply. The role of reason is usually supportive, helping subjects convert simple views into more complex arguments—while, in turn, as observed by Antonio Damasio, emotions provide reason with its frame of reference, making them “indispensable” for reasoned thinking.³⁰⁰ L.T. Hobhouse expresses the link between “rational determination by clear-sighted purpose” and “the rule of impulse” as, in effect, one of guidance:

The passions of men must be aroused if the frost of custom is to be broken or the chains of authority burst; but passion of itself is blind and its world is chaotic. ... When it comes to be a question of any far-reaching change, [men] must not merely conceive their own immediate end with clearness. They must convert others, they must communicate sympathy and win over the unconvinced. ... They are, in fact, driven on by the

²⁹⁵ Allais 1953; Ellsberg 1961; Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2002; Kahneman 2003; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Shah and Oppenheimer 2008.

²⁹⁶ Hardman 2009; Plous 1993; Pohl 2004; Sutherland 2013.

²⁹⁷ Price 1992, p.8.

²⁹⁸ Dryzek 2010, pp.45-6; Fishkin 1995, pp.86, 148-9, 171, 175; Fishkin 2009, pp.2, 98, 119-28.

²⁹⁹ Lodge and Taber 2005.

³⁰⁰ Damasio 2000, pp.xiv, 160, 250; Goleman 1996, pp.28, 53.

requirements of their position to the elaboration of ideas, and in the end to some sort of social philosophy.³⁰¹

Subjects invest different levels of effort in information processing, depending on the context—from “systematic” and “careful” reflection, “taking the time and effort to sift through the available information and weigh arguments for or against each option”, to “peripheral” and “heuristic” thinking, “mak[ing] a quick judgment based on simple cues and decision rules”.³⁰² The application of reason is thus a (relatively) conscious choice, and far from a *sine qua non* of cognition or estimation.

Opinion research in particular must decisively abandon the view that reasoned thinking leads to cognitive or estimative judgments that are inherently ‘better’ than those from personality-influenced or emotional insights. Indeed, the question of ‘goodness’ should be removed entirely from comparisons of different types of information processing and opinion-formation. It is a peculiar norm of the Enlightenment mode of ideation—and a fallacy prominently and anachronistically entertained both by political philosophers, such as Rawls, and political scientists, such as Price—that rationality *alone* is “thoughtful” and “intelligent”, and should thus be valorised as *the* way for subjects to orient themselves in their environment.³⁰³ A full account of ‘opinion’ must accept that subjects’ processes of information acquisition and thinking are clearly “mixtures of rationality and irrationality”, as Lane and Sears put it.³⁰⁴ Further, as Brader argues with particular reference to emotions, the ‘irrationality’ of any of these modes is no reason to disqualify them from contributing to opinion-formation—they “are neither good nor bad in themselves, but simply useful” for human thinking.³⁰⁵ Hobhouse is particularly emphatic in endorsing the usefulness of emotional thinking:

[T]he philosophies that have driving force behind them are those which arise [...] out of the practical demands of human feeling. The philosophies that remain ineffectual and academic are those that are formed by abstract reflection without relation to the thirsty souls of human kind.³⁰⁶

In other words, in any well-rounded model of opinion, “[e]motion and logic” cannot be conceived as mutually conflictual, or on opposite sides of a ‘forced choice’, but rather “must be combined [...] in some

³⁰¹ Hobhouse 1994, pp.24, 161.

³⁰² Brader 2012, p.203.

³⁰³ Blumer 1946, p.192; Mouffe 1999, p.756; Mouffe 2009, pp.87, 89, 95-7; Price 1992, p.27; Rawls 2001, p.141.

³⁰⁴ Lane and Sears 1964, p.72.

³⁰⁵ Brader 2012, p.212.

³⁰⁶ Hobhouse 1994, p.24.

kind of balance”.³⁰⁷ *Contra* Rawls, judgment does not only have to take place under “conditions ... favourable to the exercise of our powers of reason” for it to be “considered” and “sound”.³⁰⁸

Together, personality-traits, emotions, and reason combine in different ways to add complexity to subjects’ psychic responses to the MRCs they experience. Subjects’ cognitive and estimative judgments can be more or less reasoned, emotional, or personality-driven, without having any *prima facie* effect on their quality or significance. All three forms of thinking count as subjects “us[ing] intelligence in pursuing” their purpose of converting their mental pictures with attitudinal-valuative ‘leanings’ into “conscious decision[s] to support or oppose”.³⁰⁹ However, it is worth noting that subjects use them above all when they form *new* opinions, especially opinions about what Bernays, Lippmann, and Tönnies call “news” or “events”—i.e., opinions based on new mental pictures, relying on information about physical or intertemporal changes in MRCs.³¹⁰ The more ‘familiar’ objects of opinion are for a given subject—i.e., the more often they have experienced and registered stimuli (directly or indirectly) from the relevant MRCs—the more likely they are already to have several relevant opinions “stored away” in their longer-term memory, often condensed into their mental pictures of those MRCs.³¹¹ In these cases, subjects are unlikely to use all available means of thinking to (re)process these mental pictures, which means they do not ‘waste time’ elaborating on the cognitive or estimative orientation their values and attitudes give them. Rather, they “retrieve” the outcome of their prior opinion-formation and “auto-process” their informational cues into opinions based on the pre-existing values and attitudes, bypassing much of the process of thinking, and forming opinions “off the top of [their] head”.³¹² Conversely, to the extent that their MRCs are new and unfamiliar, subjects may use new information, and fresh thinking based on it, to (at least partly) “update” the pictures they store in their memory for future use, as suggested by proponents of the ‘on-line processing’ model of opinion-formation.³¹³ However, as Zaller observes, it is “wildly unrealistic to expect citizens to use each piece of incoming information to update all of the ‘attitudes’ to which it might be relevant”.³¹⁴ Rather, such changes to

³⁰⁷ Lane and Sears 1964, p.74.

³⁰⁸ Rawls 2001, p.29.

³⁰⁹ Sibley 1953, p.560; Zaller 1992, p.3.

³¹⁰ Bernays 2011, pp.170-1; Hardt and Splichal 2000, p.184; Lippmann 2010, pp.39-42; Splichal 2001a, p.16; Suhonen 2001, pp.313-7.

³¹¹ Federico 2012, pp.80, 91;

³¹² Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988; Wyer and Srull 1989, p.81; Zaller 1992, pp.38, 48.

³¹³ Hastie and Park 1986; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989.

³¹⁴ Zaller 1992, p.50.

subject's pictures are incremental, and depend on multiple, iterative experiences of the new MRCs and information, processed using the means of thinking outlined above.

To return to an earlier point, then, the means outlined in this section describe the full range of 'options' subjects have control over, disposal of, or access to, when they form opinions. Bearing in mind the possibility for subjects to have multiple mental pictures for any given part of their MRCs, as well as the multiple alternative combinations of means of thinking they can use to formulate complex judgments, there is a possibility for subjects to form *at least one if not more* substantively different, parallel, or conflicting opinions of the same object. The different opinions subjects have about any given aspect of 'the social' may be more or less mutually integrated or isolated, either organised into "opinion-clusters", or "groups of related opinions", or perhaps "simply ... scattered about".³¹⁵ In either case, these opinions can exhibit varying degrees of breadth—i.e., they fit within wider or narrower general tendencies—as well as of consistency—i.e., levels of mutual consonance or dissonance between the contents of individual judgments.³¹⁶ In general, subjects' opinions are arranged more systematically than just a random collection of cognitions and estimations—i.e., they 'hang together' in collocations of some description. But they are usually less systematised, and more *ad hoc* and contingent, than concrete, durable, or complex forms of ideation referred to as 'ideologies' or 'philosophies'.³¹⁷ Opinion research has barely started to recognise the need to find analytical tools that can capture both the full range of ways in which complex opinions are formed, and accurately situate subjects' different individual opinions relative to the others they hold about the same part of 'the social'.

§3. *The means of articulation: bodily organs and media*

So far, this analysis has treated only those aspects of 'opinion' that fall under the activity of ideation: the use of means of thinking to add complex elaboration to the basic 'verdicts' on MRCs contained within the mental pictures subjects form of 'the social' within and beyond their subjective environments. The output of this activity is the content of 'opinion', or the concrete ideas—concepts, axioms, propositions, arguments, or other 'thoughts'—that give opinions their substance. Occasionally, 'opinion' is used to refer only to this ideative content—recall, for instance, Dewey's account of 'opinion'

³¹⁵ Lane and Sears 1964, p.11; Price 1992, pp.64-5.

³¹⁶ Lane and Sears 1964, p.12.

³¹⁷ Freedman 2003, p.32; Gramsci 2005, pp.323-6.

as “judgment which is formed and entertained”.³¹⁸ On this usage, opinion is *defined as* opinion by its substance—the epistemological or evaluative judgment it contains—which suggests that opinion research only needs to consider its objects (MRCs, &c) and the means of thinking (personality-traits, emotions, and reason). But this view is too narrow. It neglects situations in which ‘opinion’ clearly refers to more than just ‘silent’ processes of opinion-formation, but (additionally or separately) to communicative processes of opinion-*expression*. The existence of an analytic distinction—even “contradiction”, for Tönnies—between two activities that both ‘belong’ to ‘opinion’ is recognised in vernacular usage as well as academic opinion research.³¹⁹ Vernacularly, ‘opinion’ and ‘judgment’ are often described in expressive terms, as being ‘given’ or ‘written’, and ‘cast’ or ‘passed’ respectively. This is particularly strong in the case of legal and medical verdicts and opinions, but applies equally to other types of opinion-formation throughout ‘the social’. At the same time, opinion researchers acknowledge that the cognitive or estimative formulation of judgment is a separate consideration to whether, and how, judgment is projected into subjects’ environments. This acknowledgment underlies the whole subfield of polling methodology analysis within opinion research, which seeks to establish whether, and how, factors such as question framing, interviewer and respondent demographics, and survey media (e.g., write-in, telephone, online) change the opinion-statements subjects make. But opinions are not *self-expressing* once they are formed: instead, it is incumbent on subjects to invest extra purposive agency in order to *express them*. This has even prompted some researchers, such as William Albig and Tom Harrisson—perhaps due to the growing influence of the polling industry—to insist that ‘opinion’ is incomplete *without* an expressive element, and that the designation ‘opinion’ should be reserved exclusively for *observable* “statement[s] of support or opposition”.³²⁰ While this analysis does not go as far, it accepts that ‘opinion’ only partly operates within subjects’ mental faculties, and only partly remains framed in imaginary terms. Opinions can also acquire an independent existence beyond subjects’ mental processes by being realised in physical form—but for them to appear in ‘the social’ at all, they must be made capable of physical transmission.

Of course, the link from opinion-formation to opinion-expression is far from automatic or inevitable. As Richard Hodder-Williams notes, “it is surely the case that men hold opinions in the

³¹⁸ Dewey 2012, p.137.

³¹⁹ Hardt and Splichal 2000, pp.133–4, 166; Splichal 1999, p.190.

³²⁰ Albig 1939, p.1; Harrisson 1940; Price 1992, pp.46, 59.

common sense of the word without actually expressing them”.³²¹ This means that, rather than simply presuming a like-for-like equivalence between formed opinions and the form they take when they are expressed, this model of opinion needs an account of how the former are ‘turned’, or ‘translated’, into the latter. The onus for this lies with subjects themselves—i.e., subjects face an active choice of whether, and how, to give their cognitive or estimative judgments an expressive form. Zaller argues that, when faced with the opportunity, or need, to express opinions about their MRCs, subjects “sample” the relevant psychic responses—i.e., they make a “non-random but stochastic” selection from among the set of opinions or opinion-clusters they have previously formulated about that part of ‘the social’—and “average across” these responses to derive the specific substantive opinion they express.³²² Subjects’ expressed opinions thus depend on the precise constellation of their formed opinions that they have ‘sampled’ and ‘averaged across’. For instance, in the case of straightforward ‘pro-con’ binary judgments, “the probability that a person will support or oppose a given policy depends on the mix of positive and negative considerations available in the person’s mind at the moment of answering a question about it”.³²³ This is the case with many opinion polls and surveys, especially those fielded ahead of plebiscites and other referenda, or two-way run-offs for presidential candidates and parliamentary parties. Thus, for example, a British voter’s decision whether to choose ‘Remain’ or ‘Leave’ in the EU referendum will have been influenced by their (positive or negative) appraisal of any number of partly related issues, including: the proper locus of sovereignty (Brussels versus London versus more local), immigration (EU and non-EU), trade strategy (free versus protectionist), and the government’s record (Westminster in general, and David Cameron’s Conservative administration in particular). Likewise, a French voter’s decision between two of François Fillon, Marine Le Pen, Emmanuel Macron, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the second round of the 2017 *présidentielle* required them to ‘fit’ their ‘true’ ideological position into the binary framework imposed by the results of the first round, which includes considerations such as: the acceptability of candidates’ views on different policy areas (e.g., welfare, education, healthcare, the EU, immigration), their absolute and relative positions (Gaullist conservative, far-right nationalist, Third Way social-democratic, and left-wing populist respectively, and ‘comparative’ left and right), and the expected behaviour of other voters. With judgments that fall into more subtly gradated ‘pro-con’ spectrums, or even more pluralistic choices, the set of considerations subjects have to ‘sample’ and

³²¹ Hodder-Williams 1970, p.5.

³²² Zaller 1992, p.38.

³²³ Ibid., p.51.

‘average across’ becomes larger and more complex, but the process fundamentally remains the same. Thus, while the first round of the *présidentielle* is usually presented as an opportunity for voters to cast ballots for their ‘true’ ideological preferences, the reductive effect of party structures and their awareness of the last opinion polls before the vote still force them to choose ‘strategically’ based on comparisons of the candidates’ platforms and manifestos with their own policy views. Crucially, *which* considerations subjects sample—including whether they “canvass their minds for all considerations relevant to the given issue”, or only use “whatever considerations are accessible ‘at the top of the head’”—and which they thus ‘average across’ to determine the opinion they express, remains entirely their subjective choice.³²⁴ This implies that, *contra* James Lemert, it is not necessarily possible to infer the form that opinions will take (how subjects will express themselves) merely from their content (the fact that subjects have formed certain judgments).³²⁵ Nor, *contra* Noelle-Neumann, is it possible to “reverse[] the direction of this presumption”, and ‘reverse-engineer’ the full content of subjects’ opinions (what precise judgments they have formed) merely from observing the forms they take (how subjects choose to express themselves).³²⁶ As Splichal rightly argues, “both assumptions are reductionist; neither variable can be used as the predictor of the other one”.³²⁷ This is as much as to say that opinion-formation and opinion-expression are separate activities, and must be analysed discretely.

Moreover, the distinction between opinion-formation and opinion-expression is not just a question of theoretical rigour, but also has significant practical implications. All too often, opinion research elides, or omits, not just the thoughtful nuances that differentiate complex opinions from their underlying mental pictures, but also the mental processes which subjects perform to choose which of the complex opinions they ‘hold’ to ‘give’ into their environments. Opinion polls and surveys do not normally have scope for respondents to ‘show their working’ for how they ‘arrived at’ the opinion they state, nor to offer more than one opinion in their ‘statement’ if they are ‘torn’ between several conflicting ‘thoughts’. Whenever this happens, much of the richness and diversity the concept of ‘opinion’ contains becomes lost. These elisions and omissions lead to opinion research failing to capture the distinctions between, for instance, mainly emotional or reasoned opinions based on the same mental pictures, or the subtle variations in substantive outcomes when the same cognitive or estimative ‘verdicts’ are “wobbled through

³²⁴ Ibid., p.48.

³²⁵ Lemert 1981, p.30.

³²⁶ Noelle-Neumann 1991, pp.282-3.

³²⁷ Splichal 1999, p.193.

the prism of personality” and its different trait-dimensions, to borrow a phrase from Martin Amis.³²⁸ For instance, opinion research currently cannot tell the difference between a subject who gives their intention to vote for Donald Trump because of their fear of ‘radical Islamic terrorism’, one who does so out of anger at losing their job under previous administrations’ trade policies, one who does so because they are a proud white nationalist, one who does so because they heuristically vote ‘straight-ticket’ for Republican candidates in every election, or one who does so based on a rational calculation that his election will accelerate the collapse of capitalism in the U.S.A.³²⁹

The major cost to this is that opinion research often fails to recognise (formed and expressed) opinions *as opinions* at all if they fail to map conveniently onto the kinds of narrow binaries—‘pro-con’, ‘for-against’, ‘yes/no’—that characterise the ‘verdicts’ in subjects’ mental pictures in their most basic form. First, the tendency to blur ‘opinions’ into ‘attitudes’ has meant that opinion research may fail to consider adequately the ‘elaboration’ aspect of opinion-formation, leading it to dismiss judgments that are simply too complex to condense into a more basic ‘mental picture’ form.³³⁰ For instance, while the ‘degree’ of a subject’s judgment of, e.g., the Royal Family, the works of Eduard Bernstein, or the relative merits of Portsmouth F.C., &c, in their mental picture of them may be constrained by their having some reservations about their judgment, it is only through the addition of personality-driven, emotional, and reasoned thinking that they can ‘work through’ these reservations, and convert them from amorphous doubts into concrete objections. Second, another significant cause of apparent ‘nonopinions’ is precisely the fact that subjects’ opinion-formation and opinion-expression do not always ‘match up’—that is to say, that subjects cannot always find a suitable way to communicate their ideative judgments.³³¹ They may, for example, lack the vocabulary to express adequately the sheer disgust they reserve for the Liberal Democrats’ u-turn on university tuition fees, or be constrained by the famous 140-character limit on Twitter from detailing the full reasoning that brought them to their broadly favourable reception of an article on stem cell research. In both cases, as Splichal observes, within the especially restrictive scope of opinion polls and surveys, subjects may express any qualifications of their opinions through “answers such as ‘I don’t know’, ‘I’m not aware’, or ‘I cannot answer’”, or, frequently, by choosing ‘at random’ between the positions they are offered, because they lack the ability to represent the complexity added

³²⁸ Coren 2003.

³²⁹ Fishwick 2016; Friedersdorf 2015; Lee *et al.* 2016.

³³⁰ Dewey 2012, p.50.

³³¹ Fishkin 1995, p.83; Hodder-Williams 1970, p.23.

by their thinking processes.³³² The conventional response within opinion research to such situations has been, following Converse, to argue that subjects “simply do not have meaningful beliefs”, or are “missing” ‘actual’ judgments, and to discard the expressions they make as “nonattitudes” or “nonopinions”.³³³ However, this analysis takes the view, shared by Splichal, that it is theoretically ungrounded and unsatisfying to infer from either ‘don’t knows’ or random answers that subjects necessarily have *no* opinions about the MRCs in question. Rather, it suggests that the existence of so-called ‘nonattitudes’ and ‘nonopinions’ is a symptom of the failure within opinion research to provide adequate and sufficient opportunities for subjects to convert their formed opinions into opinion-expressions, and to formulate the tools and criteria needed to measure them properly. In other words, then, this enquiry holds that the analysis of ‘opinion’ is only partially complete without a detailed conceptualisation of the great plurality of ways in which the opinions subjects form can become ‘materialised’.

The material existence of opinions outside, and independent of, the mental processes of the subjects who formulated them—i.e., the creation of a concrete ‘place’ for them within ‘the social’—is the result of a range of mechanisms, or tools, that subjects use to convert the ‘intangible’ substance of cognition and estimation into a ‘tangible’ form. In chapter I, these were described as the means of articulation—“the biological and other physical mediums, mechanisms, and ‘ways of expression’ that subjects use to communicate”—which subjects ‘use on’ their objects of articulation—in general, the outputs of ideation, and here specifically, the opinions subjects have formed using their personality-traits, emotions, and reason—to transmit their ideas, or in the case of ‘opinions’, subjective epistemological and evaluative judgments.³³⁴ The means of articulation fall into two categories: *bodily organs* and *media*. Again, as with the means of thinking, each of these elements has a unique function in transforming subjects’ judgments about MRCs into different types of message, and this section examines how (and to what extent) these functions have been captured within opinion research. A similar caveat must be raised here as well, perhaps even more urgently given the great and growing diversity of means of articulation. Subjects do not have to use all of these means to express every opinion: instead, they are ‘options’ at their disposal, in their control, or accessible to them for doing so. Again, they are also options that all subjects have to some degree. Many means of articulation are partly connected to subjects at the

³³² Splichal 1999, p.258.

³³³ Converse 1964.

³³⁴ See pp.65-6.

personal and basic level of their embodiment—specifically, to physiological aspects of their pre-social ‘kernel’—so that, again, the extent to which they use them is only partly a result of socialisation.³³⁵ However, at the same time, and unlike with the means of thinking, the shift from opinion-formation to opinion-expression also introduces mechanisms and tools that are wholly external to subjects’ embodiments, and are the result of developments in other social activities, especially innovations in commodity-production. This means that different strands of communications analysis—ranging from linguistics and semiotics to media and telecommunication studies—are all vital to ensuring that opinion research has an up-to-date understanding of how opinions are expressed, and hence offer necessary starting-points for this model of mass opinion.

First, subjects’ *bodily organs*. This category includes any elements in the human physiology that can be used to convey symbolic meaning and transmit information, with especial focus on the organs subjects have that are specifically designed to deliver signals into subjects’ environment, and make their presence ‘detectable’ within it. Of these, the voice is the most significant, followed by the face and eyes, alongside specific combinations with the rest of the body, in producing a range of expressive behaviours that can be grouped into several sub-categories.³³⁶ The main focus within communication studies is often given to *vocal* and, more broadly, *sonic* means of articulation, which includes speech and language, song, and other sounds or verbalisations subjects make with their bodies.³³⁷ The other organic means of articulation are often categorised in aggregate as ‘nonverbal communication’, an area of research first introduced by Charles Darwin and then pioneered by Ray Birdwhistell and Adam Kendon, although the label disguises the sheer variety of different actions that fall within this bracket.³³⁸ *Postural* and *gestural* means of articulation cover the ways in which subjects use their posture, body position, distance, and other cases of body language, as well as gestures, physical contact, and other kinds of movement, to express themselves.³³⁹ Meanwhile, *ocular*, *visual*, and *facial* means of articulation refer to the expressive possibilities of eye contact and movement, gaze, facial expressions, countenance, mien, or other aspects of subjects’ visages.³⁴⁰ The combination and juxtaposition of these means gives a very large number of

³³⁵ See pp.56-7.

³³⁶ Cozolino 2006, p.447, and *passim*; Ginsberg 1989, pp.278-9; Schmidtchen 1959; Splichal 1999, p.251; Splichal 2001b, p.37.

³³⁷ Argyle *et al.* 1970; Ottenheimer 2007.

³³⁸ Birdwhistell 1952; Darwin 2009; Kendon 2004.

³³⁹ Kirch 1979; Krauss, Chen, and Chawla 2000; Navarro 2008.

³⁴⁰ Ekman 2003.

ways in which subjects can use their own bodies to ‘be expressive’ (in general)—ways that may be more or less voluntary or deliberate on subjects’ part. In late modernity, as it has been throughout history, the way subjects use each of these bodily elements is governed by (natural or synthetic) systems of rules, or *codes*, derived from the changing norms (and, more widely, the *habitus*) of successive prevailing modes of communication.³⁴¹ Perhaps most prominently, these include the changing standards of social etiquette around ‘polite’ uses of oral, vocal, facial, or gestural forms of organic communication—e.g., encouraging subjects to clap, cheer, laugh, smile, or enjoining them not to sing, hum, whistle, drum their fingers, tap their feet, or use taboo vocabulary.³⁴² These codes are highly specific to the characteristics of each means of articulation used, and in each case frame—i.e., restrict or enhance—how, and to what extent, these means can convert the abstract substance of subjects’ ideas into the concrete form of information.

Some of these organic elements have become particularly associated with opinion-expression, though their exact meaning is often left to be determined by various social contexts. In each case, bodily organs have specific ways of expressing both the underlying ‘pro-con’ direction, intensity, degree, certainty, salience, and importance of subjects’ judgments, and the additional complexity imparted to them in their conversion into ‘fully-fledged’ opinions via personality-traits, emotions, and reason, which depend to a great extent on the intrinsic possibilities and limitations of each means (see fig.7).³⁴³

Organic means	Some examples for opinion-expression
Vocal and sonic	Various forms of stress or accent (loudness, vowel length, heightened articulation, pitch changes, timbre differences) used for emphasis or prominence and changing meaning—e.g., high signifying anger, fear, or enthusiasm; low signifying sadness. Various forms of intonation (mostly pitch variation) to indicate ‘pro-con’ ‘verdicts’ and emotions—e.g. high-to-low pitch signifying enthusiasm; low signifying anger or disgust; high signifying fear. Rhythm (isochrony, repetition, cadence, pausing) used for emphasis or prominence—e.g., shorter duration signifying disgust; longer duration signifying sadness, fear.

³⁴¹ For more on the distinction between codes, mediums (or channels), and messages, see Debray 1996, p.71; Eco 1986.

³⁴² Elias 2000; Martin 1979; Vanderbilt 1957.

³⁴³ Bachorowski 1999; Celce-Murcia, Brinton, and Goodwin 1996; Coulson 2004; Cruttenden 1997; Crystal 1969; Dael, Mortillaro, and Scherer 2012; Duclos *et al.* 1989; Hirst and Di Cristo 1998; Izard 1977; Jack, Garrod, and Schyns 2014; James 1932; Ladd 2009; Laver 1994; Naumann *et al.* 2009; Oosterwijk *et al.* 2009; Park 2014; Parrott 2001; Pittam and Scherer 1993; Rossberg-Gempton and Poole 1993; Sauter *et al.* 2010; Trager 1961.

	Variations in language tone (diction, syntax, imagery, details, figurative language) used to convey emotions. Tempo (articulation rate variation) to indicate emotions—e.g., faster signifying enthusiasm, fear, or anger. Particular (often respiratory) paralinguistic noises to indicate ‘pro-con’ ‘verdicts’—e.g., gasps, yawns, moans, sighs, hissing, cheering, throat-clearing, whistling.
Postural and gestural	Emblematic gestures to indicate ‘pro-con’ ‘verdicts’—e.g., nodding or shaking one’s head; raising or waving one’s hands and arms signifying enthusiasm; crossing or stretching out one’s arms to signify anger, fear, or disgust; clenching fists signifying anger; approaching or recoiling from objects or other subjects signifying enthusiasm or disgust; various classic ‘thinking’ actions to indicate more complex reasoning (stroking face with hand). Subjectively ‘natural’ poses as strong indicators of personality-traits, and contingent postures associated with different emotions—e.g., open postures (straight or raised head, spread feet and hands) associated with pride and other positive (‘pro’) emotions; closed postures (bowed head, crossed arms and legs, clasped hands, cowering) reflecting sadness, fear, shame, and other negative (‘con’) emotions.
Ocular, visual, and facial	Use of eyes to indicate ‘pro-con’ ‘verdicts’ and specific emotions—e.g., glancing, gazing, or staring to indicate attention, desire, and positive (‘pro’) appraisal; averting or rolling eyes to indicate negative (‘con’) appraisal; closed, downturned, or widened eyes signifying fear; glaring eyes for anger; ‘glittery’ eyes for enthusiasm; teary or downturned eyes for sadness and shame; aversion of eyes for disgust. Facial movements to convey ‘pro-con’ ‘verdicts’ and specific kinds of thinking—e.g., smiling or frowning to indicate positive or negative appraisal; raised eyebrows to show fear; furrowed eyebrows and snarling lips for anger; wrinkled nose for disgust; various classic ‘thinking’ facial expressions to indicate more complex reasoning (furrowed brow, squinting eyes, pursed lips).

Fig. 7: Bodily organs

This list is far from complete, and there is a vast literature in vocalics, kinesics, proxemics, haptics, oculusics, and other fields associated with defining precisely how different bodies can be used to express the underlying ‘verdicts’ and thinking processes of opinion-formation.³⁴⁴ With organic means of articulation, the dimensions of judgment and the complexity of opinion are all generally interpreted

³⁴⁴ Birdwhistell 1975; de Meijer 1989; Furnham 1999; Mehrabian 1981; Montepare *et al.* 1999; Moore 2010; Wallbott 1998.

through the speed, angle, pitch, volume, vigour, or extremity (in any other sense) of subjects' behaviour, with the exact meaning of each one contextually determined. But by relying on the specific capacities of subjects' embodiment to express all of these dimensions and this complexity—i.e., a swift or reticent response, shouting or whispering, forceful or muted motions, &c—the finer differences between them risk being 'lost in translation'. Opinion research has not devoted nearly enough attention to the full range of ways in which subjects can articulate judgments through their bodily behaviour, and has generally restricted itself narrowly to analysing vocal means—specifically, spoken language—often within only very specific contexts—e.g., live-response surveys, public oratory and rhetoric, interviews, &c.³⁴⁵ Although some recent research has begun to widen this analysis to focus especially on ocular and facial expression of opinion, the field as a whole has largely failed to leverage the disparate analyses of various branches of communication studies and integrate them into a pluralistic understanding of how subjects use their bodies to express opinions.³⁴⁶

Second, *media*. This category covers the resources in subjects' environments that can be acted on, or used, to create physical representations, replications, or 'stores' of what opinions are 'trying to say'. These resources range from the most rudimentary, generic materials, appropriated *ad hoc* and arranged so as to take on symbolic meaning and transmit information, to intricate fabrications (technology, machinery, &c) specifically designed to do so. In this range are found all the devices familiarly classed as 'media', also arranged into several sub-categories.³⁴⁷ In their most basic form, media include various forms of *imagery* and *symbolism*, such as pictures, photographs, and other visual depictions, as well as alphabetic and numerical systems and their statistical derivatives.³⁴⁸ Throughout history, these have been accompanied by media oriented towards *writing* and (later) *printing*, which includes the press, and more broadly publishing and advertising.³⁴⁹ A much more recent addition has been the sub-category of *telecommunications* and *broadcasting* media, represented by the telephone and its historical equivalents (e.g., the telegram), television, radio, and other broadcast media, as well as sound, film, and other audiovisual recordings.³⁵⁰ More recent still has been the emergence of *electronic* and *digital* means of

³⁴⁵ Dael, Mortillaro, and Scherer 2012.

³⁴⁶ Vrij *et al.* 2015.

³⁴⁷ McLuhan 2001, pp.v-vi, and *passim*.

³⁴⁸ Daniels and Bright 1996; Ifrah 1999; Lenman 2005; Levinson 1997; Logan 2004; Powell 2009; Schmandt-Besserat 1996; Sontag 1977; Wells 2004.

³⁴⁹ Chandler 1995; McLuhan 2001, pp.88-96, 170-94, 220-35; Powell 2009; Robinson 2003; Rogers 2005.

³⁵⁰ Carey 1989; Goggin 2011; Haykin 2001; McLuhan 2001, pp.267-80, 289-36; Meyrowitz 1995; Stallings 2004; Thompson 1995; Wells 1996; Wheen 2011.

articulation, especially the online resources associated with social networks, forums, blogs (and microblogs), apps, and other virtual and computing media platforms.³⁵¹ Lastly, there are also a series of *sui generis* means of articulation, whose function as ‘mediums’ is not their primary, or most obvious purpose: infrastructure and modes of transport, clothing, housing and other buildings, mediums of exchange and stores of value, feedback and accountability mechanisms in social institutions, and even weaponry.³⁵² The various ways in which subjects can use these to ‘be expressive’ is even greater than for their organic elements—not least because, unlike subjects’ bodies, the materials used as mediums are not tied to the various constants of human physiology, and hence the scope for (and impact of) technological innovation is far greater. Given that subjects act consciously on the means in the environment, it is likely that these ways of expression are, in general, much more voluntary or deliberate than their organic equivalents. Like bodily organs, the way subjects use each of these mediums is determined by (mostly synthetic) codes, which are also not fixed, but depend even more closely on the changing norms (and *habitus*) of successive modes of communication. While they also have some etiquette-type content, for media these codes generally take the form of ‘styles’ associated with different content formats—e.g., writing systems and scripts, ways of rendering art materials, musical notation, digital and analog audio and video coding formats, printed and electronic document formats, statistical models, graphic organiser styles, chemical formulae, time standards, mapping/geographic information schemes, &c. Similarly, these codes are specific to the characteristics of each medium, and frame how they convert subjects’ abstract ideas into concrete information.

Again, some mediums recur more frequently in opinion-expression than others, and in general their exact meaning is customised more precisely than that of bodily organs to the social contexts in which they are used. Like bodily organs, however, different media have specific ways of expressing opinions’ underlying ‘pro-con’ direction, intensity, degree, certainty, salience, and importance, as well as their personality-driven, emotional, or reasoned complexity, which again depend on their intrinsic possibilities and limitations (see fig.8).

³⁵¹ Boyd and Ellison 2007; Herbert 2000; Kawamoto 2003; Pavlik and MacIntosh 2015; Scott 2005; Shirky 2008; Wheen 2011; Wright and Hinson 2008.

³⁵² Cumming 2004; Davies 1996; Jevons 1875; Jones 1976; Laver 1979; McLuhan 2001, pp.129-69, 195-203, 236-45, 369-77; Menger 1892; Polhemus and Procter 1978; Sassen 1992; Weatherford 1997; Wright 1983; Yammiyavar, Clemmensen, and Kumar 2008.

Media	Some examples for opinion-expression
Imagery and symbolism	Artwork indicating varying complexities of judgment—e.g., colours; paintings, pictures, and sketches; cartoons; photographs; animations; statues. Visual models to ‘illustrate’ opinions—e.g., graphs and charts; diagrams and tables; technical illustrations. Symbols with specifically attributed meanings—e.g., alphabetic and numerical systems; scientific symbols (astronomical, chemical, electronic, engineering, ecological, medical); maps and cartography; ideograms and emblems (brand logos); consumer symbols (currency signs, food safety, dietary law, recycling, barcodes and QR codes, certification marks, copyrights and trademarks); ticks and crosses (voting, product ratings); religious symbols (iconography).
Writing and printing	‘Informal’ ways of expressing either ‘pro-con’ ‘verdicts’ or more complex opinions—e.g., signatures; marginalia; graffiti; calligraphy; labels; worksheets; memos; ‘write-in’ survey responses and opinion polls; notes; cards; letters; diary entries; essays and précis summaries. Forms of publication that express complex opinions—e.g., newspaper and magazine leaders, opinion-pieces, and ‘op-eds’; academic journal and press articles; pamphlets; theoretical and ‘trade’ books; press releases; feedback forms; reports; manifestos and campaign literature; petitions; textbooks; course guides and readers.
Telecommunications and broadcasting	Audiovisual recordings and broadcasting of opinions expressed via other means—e.g., speeches and lectures, classes, seminars, dramatic and musical performances (instruments, CDs, DVDs). Unique ways of using telecommunications and broadcasting to express complex opinions—e.g., landline and mobile telephony (conversations, opinion polls); telefax; radio stations and television channels (news programmes, shows, commercial advertising, jingles); film and cinema; text messaging.
Electronic and digital	Digitisations of opinions expressed via other means—e.g., digital image files; ‘emoji’; ‘memes’; photo and video sharing services (Instagram, Snapchat, Vine); podcasting; videotelephony (FaceTime, Google Hangouts, Skype). Unique electronic and digital ways of expressing either ‘pro-con’ ‘verdicts’ or more complex opinions—e.g., email; instant messaging (Yammer, Slack, WhatsApp); websites (news websites, opinion polls); search engines; forums and wikis (Wikipedia); blogs (Blogger, Medium, Technorati, Wordpress); microblogs (Tumblr, Twitter, Weibo); ‘apps’; social media posts, likes, ‘reactions’, ‘favouritings’, and comments (Facebook, Google+, LinkedIn, Pinterest).
<i>Sui generis</i>	Various ways of expressing either ‘pro-con’ ‘verdicts’ or more complex opinions—e.g, food and drink (ethical consumption, environmentalism, dietary laws, healthiness); clothes (dress

	codes, uniforms, casual/home wear); buildings and infrastructure (planning, investment, construction, moving in or out, using means of transport); money (purchasing choices, investment); immigration and emigration; weaponry (aggression, capital and corporal punishment).
--	--

Fig.8: Media

With physical mediums, the sheer range of options for communication available allows for a more differentiated and nuanced representation of the dimensions of judgment and the complexity of opinion, even as mediums operate on the same principles of extremity and contextualisation of meaning. The capacities of these media are far more plastic than those of subjects' physiologies, and can be refined specifically to better articulate these dimensions and this complexity—including choice of language, aesthetics and other aspects of appearance, timing, and the repetition of messages. Opinion research in late modernity has also neglected to account for the full variety of ways in which subjects can use media to articulate judgments, and restricted itself to analysing predominantly written, telecommunications, and some *sui generis* means (or those aspects of other means modelled on them), again often only in specific contexts—e.g., online or telephone polls and surveys, online or print media articles, referendums and elections, &c. Despite the existence of marginal trends towards examining above all the innovations afforded by electronic and digital media, here again opinion research has mostly failed to integrate the analyses of different branches of cultural and media studies, and discourse and content analysis, into a syncretic understanding of how subjects use material resources to express opinions.³⁵³

It is clear that the sheer pluralism of the means of articulation—bodily organs and media—creates a vast number of ways in which opinions can be expressed in late modernity. What unites the means in each category, and what differentiates the two categories from one another, is the differing extent to which they are connected to subjects' personal embodiment, or the external MRCs of their social situations. The unifying characteristic of bodily organs is their (extensive) *subjectivity*: they are contained within the same pre-social physiology as the means of thinking, at least in their most basic forms. Meanwhile, what unites media, and what separates them from organs *and* the means of thinking, is their (necessary) *intersubjectivity*: they are all external materials 'activated' by subjects in their interactions with

³⁵³ For overviews of these research fields see, for example, Berelson 1952; During 2007; Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler 1992; Krippendorff and Bock 2008; Miller 2006; Roberts 1997; Wimmer and Dominick 2005.

their social environments. In social terms, this typically manifests as subjects having ‘full possession’ over their organic means of articulation—connected to an economic or juridical understanding of ‘full self-ownership’—but less than ‘full possession’ over media.³⁵⁴ However, this differentiation between organs and media also has a distinct effect on *how widely* opinions can be communicated—i.e., on the size of the *audience* that receives them. Organic communication is generally limited to subjects’ fairly immediate vicinity, because it is contingent on their embodied existence and social situation, which limits the potential ‘reach’ of the messages they are trying to project. This imposes on subjects a personal *articulatory horizon* within their social environment, which restricts the audience for their opinion-expression by organic means to only those others situated ‘within range’ of their physical embodiment—i.e., ‘within view’ of their faces and bodies, ‘within earshot’ of their voices, &c.³⁵⁵ By contrast, the main advantage of media communication is that it is *not* limited to subjects’ personal articulatory horizons, because it is *not* contingent on their embodied existence and situation, which means that the ‘reach’ of their messages can be (indeed, is usually designed to be) spatially and intertemporally unlimited, as Thompson notes.³⁵⁶ Media extend the ‘range’ of subjects’ opinions by vastly expanding, or often simply transcending, their articulatory horizons, allowing them to communicate with a greater number of other subjects—e.g., ‘over the phone’, ‘over the radio’, ‘through the television’, ‘on social media’, &c.³⁵⁷

The substantial variation between the ways in which different means of articulation can be used to express judgment also serves as a reminder that, while the ideative aspect of ‘opinion’ (formation) may take ‘precedence’—in that it is a prerequisite for opinions to exist at all—it is the communicative aspect (expression) that ultimately determines how they appear in ‘the social’. This is the thrust of McLuhan’s observation that “the medium is the message”—namely, that the particular means by which information is communicated embeds itself in the message that this means transmits, *in addition to* and *distinct from* its substantive content.³⁵⁸ In other words, it is not just that the form that opinions take when they are expressed depends on the means used, but that the activity of opinion-expression itself is always one of finding a *compromise* between substance, or content, and form, or message. Rather than letting the

³⁵⁴ Dan-Cohen 2002, pp.199-245, 264-302.

³⁵⁵ Strictly speaking, a subject’s *articulatory* horizon is not necessarily the same as their *perceptual* horizon, as their sensory organs are separate from their organs of expression, but it can be assumed that there is a fair amount of overlap between them in practice.

³⁵⁶ Thompson 1995, pp.81-7.

³⁵⁷ McLuhan 2001, p.278.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.7.

content of opinions “blind[] us to the character of the medium”, in McLuhan’s terms, it is important to pay careful attention to the possibilities and processes for how cognitive or estimative judgments can be transmitted by any given means of articulation.³⁵⁹ In turn, this means that opinion research must become more sensitive to problems of symbolic transposition. It cannot simply assume that, since opinions are defined by their substance, they remain constant and identical regardless of the form they take. Nor can it treat the connection between opinion-formation and opinion-expression as merely incidental, attributing no theoretical or practical significance to possible differences in how opinions can be ‘materialised’.

The fundamental concern for all variants of opinion-expression is how accurately and successfully a message can ‘render’ content, and hence how closely subjects’ concrete opinion-statements match their substantive ideas. The quality of articulation processes—i.e., how well opinion-expression ‘captures’ or ‘preserves’ formed opinions—can be impaired in several ways. Opinion-expression can *distort* or *deform* the ‘contours’ of formed opinion, leading to aberrations in, and either over- or underplaying of, the various dimensions of subjects’ judgment.³⁶⁰ For instance, a one-off opinion poll that offers subjects binary ‘pro-con’ options for their views on a small number of political issues—e.g., immigration, welfare, and healthcare—may exaggerate how important these issues actually are versus others that shape their political ‘worldviews’, how intense the views are that subjects hold, and how firmly they are committed to them. Opinions are also susceptible to *leakage* and *crosstalk* at the point of articulation—the ‘spillover’ of their content, carried as a message by a given means of articulation, into that of another message carried by a closely related means—as well as, conversely, *noise* and other *interference*—effectively the reverse, namely the ‘spillover’ of content from other messages into the one under consideration.³⁶¹ While this is mainly a problem for recording and broadcast media, a similar effect can happen if subjects ‘change tack’ several times in quick succession when verbalising or writing down their arguments, to the point where the separate ‘points’ that comprise their opinions become ‘blurred together’ or ‘confused’. Content formats may require *simplification* and *compression* of opinions, leading to ‘unnecessary’—i.e., ‘redundant’, ‘peripheral’, or ‘supplementary’—parts of their ‘overall’ substance being omitted from the information produced.³⁶² This is the logic of crude discursive instruments such as (especially tabloid)

³⁵⁹ Ibid., p.9.

³⁶⁰ Eargle 2005; Huber 2005; Newell 2007.

³⁶¹ Barthes 1985; Cowell 2004; Kosko 2006; Ott 1976; Russolo 2004; Schwartz 2011.

³⁶² Salomon 2008; Wade 1994.

newspaper headlines—e.g., ‘Gotcha’, ‘The Truth’, or ‘It’s Paddy Pantsdown’—as well as campaign slogans—e.g., ‘*Tiocfaidh ár lá!*’, ‘Drill, baby, drill’, or ‘*No Pasaran!*’—and protest placards—e.g., ‘We are the 99%’, ‘Power to the People’, or ‘*Wir sind das Volk*’. Opinions may also be expressed at varying levels of *definition* or *resolution*—from ‘low’ to ‘high’, or what McLuhan terms ‘cool’ to ‘hot’—that affect their ‘clarity’, or the ease or effort with which ‘missing details’ of its content can be inferred or ‘filled in’.³⁶³ Here, the contrast is between opinions that can be adequately ‘stated’ using only one or a few means of articulation—e.g., nodding, saying ‘Yes!’, ticking a box, or ‘liking’ a social media post—and those that rely on a complex combination of means to communicate their full ‘meaning’—e.g., reading out a passage of writing in a sceptical tone while rolling one’s eyes to denote irony or sarcasm. Depending on the possibilities and limitations of different means of articulation in overcoming these concerns, they will lend themselves more or less well to faithful, or ‘high-fidelity’, ‘materialisation’ of the substance of subjects’ opinions.³⁶⁴ Even under best conditions, then, the ‘purity’ of subjects’ thinking processes may be partly ‘warped’ as they are translated from one stage of discourse (ideation) to another (communication), creating an *articulatory deficit* between subjects’ opinions as substantive ideas and their opinions as informative statements—i.e., a distinction between ‘what subjects mean’ and how they ‘put it’. This effect may even be exaggerated in cases where information is deliberately *encrypted* or *scrambled* at the point of expression, in order to ‘protect’ the content of subjects’ opinions from any subjects who do not have the ‘key’ required to access it.³⁶⁵ In all cases, this is not just significant for *encoding* itself, and for the intrinsic quality of the information produced, but also for the information’s ultimate purpose of being perceived and understood—i.e., it has direct implications for how the information is to be *decoded* by other subjects.³⁶⁶ The more separate and dissimilar formats for information are from subjects’ psychic processes, the bigger the impact of ‘translation’, and hence the more effort will be required to ‘retranslate’ information back into its underlying ideas.

Together, or separately, then, bodily organs and media ‘materialise’ the substance of subjects’ opinions in various concrete forms. Subjects’ cognitive and estimative judgments can be more or less organic or mediated, without having any *prima facie* effect on their quality or significance. Both forms of articulation—or, rather, all its many variants across the two categories—count as subjects ‘realising’

³⁶³ McLuhan 2001, pp.24–35.

³⁶⁴ Hartley 1958, p.200; Read 1952; Read and Welch 1976.

³⁶⁵ Fouché Gaines 1939; Lee and Kim 2013; Piper and Murphy 2002; Paar and Pelzl 2011.

³⁶⁶ Campbell 2003; Decherney and Sender 2017; Hall 1980; Pullman and Gu 2017; Schröder 2000.

their personality-driven, emotional, or reasoned “conscious decision[s] to support or oppose”.³⁶⁷ Again, as with the means of thinking, the means of articulation outlined in this section describe the full—and evidently considerable—range of ‘options’ subjects have control over, disposal of, or access to, when they express opinions. Moreover, just as the possibility of having multiple mental pictures for any given set of MRCs, coupled with the multiplicity of means of thinking, means that subjects are able to form several different opinions about the same object, the vastly greater ‘choice’ of means of articulation adds a further layer of pluralism, enabling subjects to express *at least one if not more* parallel or conflicting opinions for any or all of the opinions they have formed as well. For example, a subject with conflicted views on whether the UK ought to ‘Remain’ within or ‘Leave’ the EU had the opportunity to do (or not do) any of the following as a way of expressing their ‘position’: donating to, and canvassing for, the ‘Stronger In’ and ‘Vote Leave’ groups; sharing articles in support of either view on social media; ringing their relatives to discuss the case for continued EU membership; flying an EU or UK flag from their window; or attending speeches by leading campaigners on either side. However, under current understandings of opinion measurement, only their decision to tick the box marked ‘Remain’ or ‘Leave’ on the actual referendum ballot paper will have ‘counted’ as their ‘definitive’ opinion.

These expressed opinions may also be more or less mutually integrated or isolated, and exhibit greater or lesser breadth and consistency—albeit not through the ‘clustering’ or ‘scattering’ of ideas, or their ‘width/narrowness’ and ‘consonance/dissonance’, but rather through the ‘harmonious’ or ‘jarring’ juxtaposition of subjects’ various expressive behaviours. These manifest as cases of everyday low-level ‘hypocrisy’, or ‘performative contradiction’ (*performativer Widerspruch*), that are entirely typical of the vast majority of subjects—e.g., a committed environmentalist who adheres to a strict vegan diet but owns a petrol-fuelled car, or a thoroughgoing socialist who attends anti-government protests but enjoys wearing expensive clothes.³⁶⁸ Overall, the choice of means of articulation adds extra layers of significance and ‘colour’ to the ‘materialisation’ of subjects’ opinions—and it is too arbitrary to impose any kind of hierarchy of importance that stipulates that any of these choices is necessarily more or less ‘legitimate’ than others. In reality, this means that the ‘sum total’ of any individual subject’s judgmental discourse about any given set of MRCs will ‘deliver’ a vast array of different bits of information, embedding a wide range of separate ideas. These may be partly mutually corroborative or contradictory, depending on the processes of thinking and articulation by which each individual bit of information was created, but they

³⁶⁷ Zaller 1992, p.3.

³⁶⁸ Habermas 1990.

must all be taken into account. In other words, it is not plausible for opinion research just to look at subjects' opinion poll responses and voting habits, and hope to infer from this narrow 'dataset' the full complexity of 'mass opinion' about 'the social'. Instead, it has to come to terms with the full range of ways in which opinions can be expressed, develop the analytical criteria and assessment tools to capture this range, and accurately compare subjects' different individual opinions relative to the others they 'give' about the same part of 'the social'.

§4. *Conclusion*

The fundamental insight of this analysis is that opinion-formation and opinion-expression, which varies to a great degree between subjects, relies on ideative and communicative tools that they all (broadly) share. It may be helpful to illustrate the full trajectory of these processes in the form of a diagram, summarised as follows (see fig.9): Subjects form and express opinions based on their mental pictures of the social world around them, which contain 'verdicts' that result from the 'marriage' of their discursive predispositions—i.e., cognitive and estimative attitudes and values—and information—derived either from stimuli within subjects' perceptual horizons, or from cues received from beyond these horizons. Next, subjects process these pictures into more complex opinions using various combinations of three means of thinking—personality-traits, emotions, and reason. Finally, subjects use means of articulation that fall into either of two categories—bodily organs and media—to transmit their opinions as information, either limited in its 'reach' to their articulatory horizons, or able to transcend them. The full set of opinion-formation and opinion-expression processes can be built up to varying degrees of complexity, depending on the balance of physiological and psychological capacities, as well as material resources, that subjects choose to use to respond discursively to their experiences of 'the social'. However, the analysis thus far has depicted these processes of opinion-formation and opinion-expression in a somewhat atomistic way. It treats subjects as 'closed systems', ascribing to them strong control of their physiological and psychic capacities, and their social resources, and viewing them as discrete loci of cognition and estimation whose judgments about 'the social' are fundamentally original. Yet it is not clear that this holds in practice for any of the stages in the trajectory of opinion-formation and opinion-expression outlined in this chapter. It is to this consideration that the analysis now turns.




Fig. 9: The structure of opinion

III. Experts in our own experience: pluralism in predispositions and information

EMILY: Really Charles, people will think...

CHARLES: ...what I tell them to think.

—*Citizen Kane*³⁶⁹

MALCOLM TUCKER: I've got an expert who will deny that. ... My expert would totally oppose that.

HUGH ABBOT: Who is your expert?

MALCOLM TUCKER: I've no idea, but I can get one by this afternoon. You see, the thing is, you've spoken to the wrong expert. You've got to ask the right expert. And you've got to know what an expert's going to advise you before he advises you. ... So what I'm going to do is, I'm going to get you another expert.

—*The Thick of It*³⁷⁰

The previous chapter presented an account of 'opinion' as a 'marriage of information and predisposition', which takes place through a twofold process of formation (using means of thinking) and expression (using means of articulation). At this point, the enquiry can start to explore in detail how subjects' social conditions shape the nature and basis of their opinions—i.e., to apply the social-theoretic framework developed in chapter I to the account of information and predispositions, opinion-formation, and opinion-expression outlined in chapter II. The overall aim is to cash out this enquiry's overarching claim that subjects' social activities, occupational positions, and class situations extensively determine the opinions that they form and express. Subjects' interaction with their material and relational conditions (MRCs) leaves traces on their activities of ideation and communication that are far more subtle than merely provoking stimuli or providing media of expression (which are 'obvious' aspects of

³⁶⁹ Welles 1941.

³⁷⁰ Ianucci 2007.

their environments). Rather, these MRCs themselves ‘bootstrap’ these activities, in that occupational (and classist) distributions of resources and capacities among subjects, and arrangements of linkages and statuses between them, directly affect *how* (and *whether*) subjects form and express opinions. The objective in the rest of this enquiry is thus to trace the precise impact of ‘the social’—i.e., MRCs, their effects on power, and the contingently differentiated ways in which subjects act purposively to deal with them—on subjects’ biological, psychological, and physiological processes of thinking and articulation. The aim is to provide a more nuanced understanding of the concept of ‘opinion’ than the near-total individualism of its treatment in contemporary opinion research—which Splichal acknowledges as a legacy of positivist social science—and outline an account that is more strongly oriented towards the core characteristics of ‘the social’.³⁷¹

In this chapter, the enquiry examines how the processes by which subjects acquire the predispositions and information which they combine into the mental pictures, on the basis of which they form and express opinions, is determined by the activities in which they are engaged, the occupations they hold, and the class situations they occupy. The chapter starts by examining how subjects’ values and attitudes are affected by the activities they engage in, and the occupations (and classes) they occupy (§1). Next, it turns to look at how subjects’ location in the social division of agency and inputs impacts on the way in which they acquire information directly or indirectly about ‘the social’ (§2). Finally, the chapter details the particular categories of individuals and groups who play a significant part in shaping both predispositions and information in late modernity, and hence disproportionately influence the ‘verdicts’ subjects have about ‘the social’ in their most basic form (§3). Overall, it argues that the predispositions and information on which contemporary mass opinion is based are characterised by a large and growing degree of pluralism, which it refers to as the *multipolarity* of the concept in late modernity.

§1. *The social constitution of predispositions*

First, the social determinants of the predispositions that orient subjects’ opinions. Here, the enquiry takes the basic observation that, while all subjects use some judgmental values and attitudes when they form and express opinions, different subjects approach the information they acquire about

³⁷¹ Splichal 2001b, pp.26-7.

‘the social’ with very different values and attitudes. The ‘pro-con’, ‘for-against’, or ‘yes/no binary ‘verdicts’ that subjects form and express about ‘the social’ can embed any number and combination of competing pairs, the definition of which can vary radically between subjects: ‘good/evil’, ‘right/wrong’, ‘desirable/undesirable’, ‘just/unjust’, ‘legitimate/illegitimate’, &c. The task here is to explore what effect ‘the social’ itself has on determining why this is the case, and identify some broad trends within these intersubjective differences. The premises of this exploration are fairly straightforward. In chapter I, this analysis argued that subjects are partly ‘thrown’ and partly gradually socialised into *habitus* that guide their social action, and constitute them as social subjects who hold specific occupations within certain social activities (and their sub-types).³⁷² In particular, it noted the emergence of distinct occupations and *habitus* in the activities of ideation and communication (together comprising the domain of discourse). Further, it also suggested that social action in late modernity is characterised by such a high degree of functional differentiation that the ‘available’ ideative and communicative *habitus* have greatly proliferated, both through the emergence of multiple sub-types of ideation and communication ‘dedicated to’ different social activities, and the creation of both informal and systematic ‘hybrid’ discursive subjectivities from the subdivision of ideation, communication, and the activities they address into occupations and classes. Meanwhile, chapter II provided a general account of the ‘place’ of predispositions in subjects’ opinion-formation and opinion-expression, locating them in subjects’ discursive *habitus*, specifically their ideative norms and dispositions.³⁷³ It argued that these predispositions give the mental pictures that all subjects have of ‘the social’ a universal judgmental quality, in the form of basic cognitive and estimative ‘verdicts’ about their environments. The aim in this section is thus to try and reconcile the differentiation identified in chapter I with the universality of the account outlined in chapter II.

To outline how subjects acquire the norms and dispositions for their social activities, occupational positions, and class situations, recall that the general process of socialisation by which subjects are endowed with their *habitus* can be disaggregated into its constituent aspects, associated with different activities: the ‘raising’ function of curative activity, the ‘qualifying’ function of education, &c.³⁷⁴ Here, in the first instance, the analysis focuses specifically on the processes by which activity, occupational, and class *habitus*—especially norms and dispositions—are *defined* and *disseminated*, which is a socialising

³⁷² See pp.54-61.

³⁷³ See pp.73-84.

³⁷⁴ Bourdieu 1977, pp.87-9; Therborn 1980, pp.17, 25, 53.

function that belongs mainly to sub-types of ideation and communication. Briefly put, discursive socialisation gives *habitus* its substantive ‘content’ and converts it into various forms of ‘message’—e.g., ‘instructions’, ‘orders’, ‘guidelines’, ‘directions’, ‘explanations’, or ‘explications’, &c, that are ‘delivered’ by verbal, written, broadcast, or other means—thereby ‘informing’ subjects of the practices, systems, structures, norms, and dispositions that frame their social action.³⁷⁵ This aspect of the ‘constitution of subjects’ can be described using the Althusserian idea of ‘*interpellation*’, and the Heideggerian concept of ‘*calling*’. Partly building on Lacanian psychoanalysis, Althusser argues that one of the primary functions of discourse is to “hail[] or interpellate[] concrete individuals as concrete subjects”.³⁷⁶ By this, he means that, in a context of the social division of purposive agency and purposive inputs, discourse “acts’ ... in such a way as to ‘recruit’ subjects among individuals (it recruits them all) or ‘transform’ individuals into subjects (it transforms them all)” in order for them to ‘take on’ the occupational ‘roles’ that have been created through the emergence of functional differentiation in the way subjects deal with their MRCs.³⁷⁷ Specifically, ideation defines (formulates) and communication disseminates (transmits) the practices, systems, structures, norms, and dispositions that constitute a subject’s *habitus*, given their particular personal combination of occupational positions (and class situations) within specific social activities. The aim is for subjects to internalise their *habitus* to the extent that it becomes their (socialised) “conscience”. Heidegger, echoing Kant, argues that subjects experience conscience as a “call [*Ruf*]” that “has the character of an *appeal* to [subjects] by calling [them] to [their] ownmost potentiality-for-Being-[themselves]”—here (from a social perspective), their ‘best possible’ fulfilment of the occupational ‘roles’ to which they are assigned. Conscience operates by “*summoning* [subjects] to [their] ownmost Being-guilty”, which occurs (again, from a social perspective) if they fail to abide by the *habitus* for the social activities in which they are engaged.³⁷⁸ The inculcation of such ‘guilt’ is how socialisation attempts to ensure that subjects will conform as closely as possible to the ‘ideal-types’ of their occupational identities. There is a close, and far from accidental, similarity between this ‘call’ (*Ruf*), which subjects ‘hear’ when

³⁷⁵ Adorno and Horkheimer 1979; Curran 1977; Gauntlett 2002; Hurrelman 2009; McQuail 2010, pp.307-36, 419-50, 477-536; Rancière 1992.

³⁷⁶ The Althusserian tradition talks about interpellation as being a function specifically of ideology. However, since both ideation and communication can be defined very broadly—not just as “exhibit[ing] a recurring pattern” and being “held by significant groups”—this analysis addresses interpellation in terms of the broader category into which ideology can be subsumed: discourse. Althusser 2014, pp.189-97, 261-70; Freeden 2003, p.32.

³⁷⁷ Althusser 2014, p.190.

³⁷⁸ Heidegger exclusively addresses the internalised aspects of ‘conscience’, without considering its social origins. Heidegger 1962, pp.314-5; Kant 1996, p.18. Original emphasis.

they are interpellated, and the concept of ‘vocation’ (*Berufung*). The point of interpellation is to turn subjects’ ‘occupation’ (*Beruf*) into their ‘calling’, or a ‘role’ to which they feel that they are ‘called’—i.e., not just a set of tasks into which they are ‘thrown’ or ‘grown’, or for which they are ‘qualified’, but a ‘purpose in life’ to which they experience a subjective *inclination*, and towards which they are therefore oriented.

Under the strong functional differentiation that characterises late modernity, the ‘siloes’ sub-types of ideation and communication for a given activity—especially their interpellating functions—become *institutionalised* via ideative and communicative (together, discursive) *apparatuses*, in the Althusserian sense of the term.³⁷⁹ Apparatuses ‘enforce’ the ‘dedication’ of these sub-types of discourse to each ‘primary’ activity by ‘attaching’ them to it on a more (1) *exclusive*, (2) *quasi-permanent*, and (3) *systematic* basis. Exclusivity comes about when, and insofar as, sub-types of ideation and communication that take place uniquely within the context of, or with respect to, specific activities become so extremely siloesed that they start to lose contact with one another. If this happens, each sub-type takes on a ‘life of its own’, and follows an independent trajectory of operation over and above developments in ideation, communication, and their ‘primary’ activities taken separately. Thus, for instance, the institutions and processes by which subjects are interpellated (and more broadly, socialised) as investment bankers, barristers, primary school teachers, or civil servants in late-modern society—e.g., training workshops, schools and colleges, staff meetings, mentoring schemes—have next to nothing in common with one another.³⁸⁰ Quasi-permanence arises when, and insofar as, sub-types of ideation and communication become part of their ‘primary’ activities’ own MRCs and modes of cooperation. If so, interpellation is integrated as a contingent, ‘fabricated’ parameter for subjects’ action in the environment imposed on them by their engagement in certain activities and performance of their designated occupational tasks. In late modernity, processes of interpellation (and socialisation) often take place ‘on the job’ or ‘in-house’, and are carried out by subjects who are directly ‘attached’ to the places where subjects perform their occupational tasks—e.g., the roles of strategists, consultants, and ‘chief economists’ in companies, governmental ‘special advisors’, legal counsels, policy researchers, &c.³⁸¹ Finally, systematisation occurs

³⁷⁹ Althusser 2014, pp.74–93, 103–47, 198–206, 218–31, and *passim*; Eagleton 1994; Pêcheux 1994; Therborn 1980, pp.84–9; Therborn 1994.

³⁸⁰ Jee, Schafheutle, and Noyce 2016; Mangset, Maxwell, and van Zanten 2017; Martinez 2016; Mazerolle, Bowman, and Dodge 2014; Tabvuma *et al.* 2015; Yanson and Johnson 2016.

³⁸¹ Gill 2015; Hugon, Kumar, and Lin 2016; Kaufman, Allan, and Ibrahim 2013; Newman *et al.* 2011; Schaffer and Stearn 2015; Yong and Hazell 2016.

when each sub-type of ideation and communication takes place not *ad hoc* but within a “system of defined institutions, organisations, and the corresponding practices” such that it is “structured in a particular way into a system of linkages and interdependence”, to combine Althusser’s and Therborn’s definitions.³⁸² Specifically, it takes place in institutions that form part of subjects’ MRCs not only in the ‘parent’ activity it originally ‘comes from’—i.e., ideation or communication—but also in the activities towards which it is oriented, and to which its apparatuses are attached. That is to say, the structures of ideation and communication also become consolidated as part of subjects’ *habitus* for the activities they ‘discourse’ about—e.g., through the creation of company compliance departments, research and data analysis ‘units’ with a permanent staff, hospitals, thinktanks, universities, ‘secondment’ of consultants, &c.³⁸³

Thus, apparatuses institutionalise the overlap between sub-types of ideation and communication, and the activities they are oriented towards, by partly internalising the former within the latter. Each activity has its own set of discursive apparatuses, which means that subjects engaged in them are interpellated for it in a unique way, independently of their interpellation for other activities. Like Therborn, this analysis also parts company with Althusser’s “rather sterile and even actively confusing” attempt to bracket all the discursive apparatuses that exist in a given society under the label of ‘*state apparatuses*’, and their operations under the auspices of governmental activity.³⁸⁴ Strictly speaking, *any* activity sub-type that takes place within the context of, or with respect to, another ‘primary’ activity can become institutionalised through apparatuses in this way, without necessarily having a connection to state structures or ‘the political’ as a domain. Each activity’s ‘mini-superstructure’ thus takes the form of multiple parallel apparatuses that institutionalise the different sub-types of activities ‘dedicated to’ it, above all their socialising functions—e.g., curative apparatuses such as ‘in-house’ sports teams, weekly ‘drinks’, charities and food banks, or ‘in-work’ benefits systems, educational apparatuses like mentorship schemes, skills workshops, training drills, or research seminars, and juridical apparatuses such as military provosts, university proctors, canon law, or the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, &c.³⁸⁵ Generally, all of these apparatuses support and assist each other in achieving the various disaggregated aspects of the overall process of socialisation—although there may occasionally be cases where their attempts to endow (incentivise, discipline, define, disseminate, inculcate, &c) subjects with particular

³⁸² Althusser 2014, p.77; Therborn 1980, p.86.

³⁸³ Embi and Tsevat 2012; Katwala 2009; Lapsley, Miller, and Pollock 2013; Struyk 2002.

³⁸⁴ Therborn 1980, p.85.

³⁸⁵ For a more orthodox rendering of this position, see Althusser 2014, pp.140-1, and *passim*.

activity- or occupation-specific *habitus* become mutually contradictory or misaligned. For instance, school pupils may be intensely ‘sanctioned’ by ‘strict’ teachers for failing to work hard (their juridical apparatus), but at the same time be indulged by ‘laid-back’ parents who insist that ‘there’s more to life than school’ (their curative apparatus). Or there may be stringent laws against drug possession, jaywalking, or domestic violence in a given jurisdiction (the juridical apparatus), to which the police are prepared simply to turn a blind eye (the political apparatus). Overall, however, apparatuses ‘streamline’ socialisation—and discursive apparatuses ‘streamline’ interpellation—so that subjects’ engagement in activities and performance of tasks becomes homogenised along occupational and class lines.³⁸⁶ Depending on which activities they engage in, and which occupations they hold, subjects are socialised into very different *habitus* to guide their social action, which in the case of interpellation means that they have defined for and disseminated to them very different and mutually unrelated sets of norms and dispositions.

It is worth pausing here to outline more precisely how interpellation works—i.e., how discursive apparatuses define and disseminate the norms and dispositions by which subjects abide. As a first step, ideative apparatuses—e.g., research ‘clusters’ and institutes, economist divisions, theological seminaries, medical laboratories, law schools, policy ‘units’, &c—formulate and refine particular fragmentary ideas with substantive normative or dispositive ‘content’. These include the important underlying principles and overarching themes for each of the given activities, and in the case of opinion-formation and expression itself refer to valuative or attitudinal orientations. These ideas are not necessarily arranged into complex conceptual ‘maps’ or ‘patterns’—as compared with the elaboration that Freeden associates with fully-developed ideologies—but are directive, ‘intention-forming’, and ‘action-guiding’ even so.³⁸⁷ Next, communicative apparatuses—e.g., publicity and messaging institutions, marketing and advertising departments, religious proselytic groups, public health bodies, statutory codification and publication media, government propaganda and information services, &c—convert these ideas into the ‘messages’ by which subjects are ‘called’ to their identities. Since the ideas themselves are generally fragmentary, the messages based on them are also rarely comprehensive, and sometimes not even explicit. Rather, they take the form of ‘*micro-indications*’, ‘bitesize’ cues containing normative and dispositive signals about

³⁸⁶ Allen and Meyer 1990; Ashforth and Saks 1996; Bauer and Erdogan 2011; Bauer *et al.* 2007; Jones 1986; Klein, Fan, and Preacher 2006; Klein and Weaver 2000; Menguc, Han, and Auh 2007; Ostroff and Kozlowski 1993; van Maanen and Schein 1979.

³⁸⁷ Freeden 2008, pp.47-95.

how subjects ‘should’ act, implied through specific applications, illustrative ‘case-studies’, or examples meant for emulation—e.g., ‘fables’, ‘parables’, legal precedents, medical case notes, graphs, memos, lists of ‘dos and don’ts’, ‘worked examples’, iconic imagery, &c.³⁸⁸ Together, these fragments and micro-indications conceptually create and delimit subjects’ social identities based on their activities and tasks. Specifically, they constitute what Therborn calls the “existential”, “historical”, “inclusive”, and “positional” aspects of subjects’ identities—i.e., respectively, their identities as “sexed individual[s] at [...] particular point[s] of [their] life cycle[s] related to other sexed individuals of different generations at a certain point of their life cycle”, as “person[s] who exist[] only in certain human societies at a particular point in human history”, as “member[s] of a meaningful world”, and as “having a particular place in the world in relation to other members of it”.³⁸⁹

Part of the reason for this disjointed process of definition and dissemination of norms and dispositions is the sheer complexity of the *habitus* required to constitute human agents as the kind of subjects who can perform the tasks required of them in their occupational position. In most cases, it would totally overwhelm, or to use Alvin Toffler’s term, “overload”, subjects if this information were transmitted to them all in one go.³⁹⁰ Instead, processes of subjectivisation in general and interpellation in particular are gradual and incremental, taking up a significant portion of subjects’ lives, and taking place ‘alongside’ subjects’ activity-specific and occupational exercises of social agency. Since subjectivity cannot be miraculously bestowed, but must be built up patiently over time, it is the function of interpellation, and of discursive apparatuses, to provide subjects with a steady ‘stream’ of micro-indications, which ‘accumulate’, or ‘stack up’, to give subjects their activity-specific, occupational, and class identity. These micro-indications need to be constantly repeated, since much of their content is ‘wasted’ in the sense of not being fully absorbed by subjects in any one instance of dissemination, and because activities must limit the scope for interpellated subjects to ‘creatively interpret’ their norms and dispositions. So, for example, graphs and iconic imagery need to be used again and again (e.g., the ‘hockey stick’ climate change graph, chemical hazard symbols), fables and parables need to be retold (e.g., in religious sermons), lists and memos reissued and ‘put up’ in several places, legal precedents compiled and accumulated, medical trials repeated, and so on.³⁹¹ This also implies that each individual

³⁸⁸ Dunne 2012; Ginns *et al.* 2016; Hanauer and Waksman 2000; Liu 2015; Pachman, Sweller, and Kalyuga 2014.

³⁸⁹ Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner 1994; Therborn 1980, pp.22–5.

³⁹⁰ Bargh and Thein 1985; Edmunds and Morris 2000; Gross 1964; Jones, Ravid, and Rafaeli 2004; Toffler 1970.

³⁹¹ Edworthy *et al.* 2015; Mitchell 2014; Temperley and Gildea 2015; Unkelbach, Fiedler, and Freytag 2007.

micro-indication needs to ‘deliver’ to subjects a carefully-honed ‘right’ amount of normative and dispositive information, in an attempt to avoid the dangers of incurring either a ‘*surplus of meaning*’ in Paul Ricoeur’s sense, as well as its opposite, a ‘*deficit of meaning*’—i.e., making instructions, orders, guidelines, and explanations, &c, ‘simple’, ‘straightforward’, and ‘clear’, but also ‘comprehensive’ and ‘complete’.³⁹² However, these sorts of attempts are almost always limited in their effectiveness and prone to fail, since discursive apparatuses cannot control completely for how subjects ‘receive’ such micro-indications—through misapprehension, confused understanding, under- or overinterpretation, or in any other way ‘missing the point’.³⁹³ Ultimately, interpellation cannot ensure that subjects ever fully meet the requirements of their activity-level, occupational, and classist ideal-types. Subjects can only be ‘told’ and periodically ‘reminded’ what their relevant behaviour ought (or is expected) to be. This is why subjects are to some extent always kept ‘within’, or ‘subjected to’, the discursive and other apparatuses for their activities—as opposed to merely constituted in a ‘one-off’ way—since this allows their socialisation for their social roles to continue (and be maintained) without interruption as far as possible.

Alongside the functions of the other socialising apparatuses in endowing subjects with their relevant *habitus*, then, discursive apparatuses aim to interpellate subjects with the norms and dispositions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ‘conduct’ for their activity in general, and their occupation (and class) in particular. In other words, as well as the other hallmarks of ‘professionalisation’—e.g., demonstrating the skills required to perform their tasks, attaining acceptable and relevant qualifications, being members of professional associations, abiding by ‘codes of conduct’, &c—subjects engaged in different activities and occupations are demarcated from one another, as well as from ‘outsiders’ or ‘amateurs’, by the ‘way they behave’, specifically, how they are oriented when they deal with ‘the social’ in the particular way associated with a given activity and occupation.³⁹⁴ With the high degree of functional differentiation in late modernity, different social activities under their prevailing modes of cooperation have developed distinct and distinctive portfolios of norms and dispositions with which subjects engaged in them are interpellated. For instance, economic activity is strongly guided by (often maximising and minimising) emphases on revenue versus cost, profit versus loss, growth versus decline, usage versus waste, &c, usually

³⁹² LeDoux 2017; Ricoeur 1976.

³⁹³ Bazzanella and Damiano 1999; Collini 1992; Dascal 1999; Weigand 1999.

³⁹⁴ Abbott 1988; Collins 1979; Darity 2008; Derber, Schwartz and Magrass 1990; Jacobs and Bosanac 2006; Kenschaft 2008; Macdonald 1995; Meehl 1997; Vollmer and Mills 1966.

with the aim of increasing production, exchange, and consumption as far as possible.³⁹⁵ Political activity, meanwhile, is often characterised by a focus on success versus failure, order versus chaos, probity versus corruption, publicity versus privacy, &c, generally concerned with the ‘reach’ of administration and coercion.³⁹⁶ Curative activity prioritises concepts such as prophylaxis versus indulgence, healing versus injury, palliation versus aggravation, help versus hindrance, support versus neglect, &c, with the aim of bettering nurture, or care-giving.³⁹⁷ Religious activity across various faiths has adopted principles like spirituality versus secularity, occultation versus divulgence, exaltation versus debasement, forgiveness versus blame, &c, geared towards more extensive devotion.³⁹⁸ Juridical activity focuses on behaviour versus misbehaviour, stipulation versus implication, compliance versus refusal, ratification versus veto, endorsement versus censure, &c, which are designed to achieve more effective regulation.³⁹⁹ Lastly, educational activity relies on concepts such as accomplishment versus ineptitude, endurance versus lethargy, understanding versus speculation, practice versus improvisation, consistency versus variation, &c, to facilitate more thoroughgoing instruction and study.⁴⁰⁰ Of course, there is clear occupational and classist variation between subjects within each activity in how far their social behaviour is ‘motivated’ or ‘generated’—to use Bourdieu’s terms—by every one of these norms and dispositions.⁴⁰¹ But to some extent they are shared by all the subjects engaged in each activity, as part of the unique social identity they ‘gain’ *by being* engaged in it. In Therborn’s terms, the *habitus* subjects acquire as “practitioners of particular occupations” are predominantly “positional-historical”, in that they try to relate subjects to others around them in ‘the social’ at a given physical and temporal conjuncture.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁵ For various overviews of the norms and dispositions of production, exchange, and consumption, see, for instance, Brenkert and Beauchamp 2012; DeMartino and McCloskey 2016; Kincaid and Ross 2009; Rugman and Brewer 2009; Weingast and Wittman 2006.

³⁹⁶ On norms and dispositions of administration and coercion, see variously Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier 2008; Dryzek, Honig, and Phillips 2008; Estlund 2017; Goodin 2011; Levi-Faur 2014; Moran, Rein, and Goodin 2006; Rhodes, Binder, and Rockman 2006.

³⁹⁷ On norms and dispositions of caregiving, see variously Francis 2017; Leach 2012; Sadler, van Staden, and Fulford 2015.

³⁹⁸ On norms and dispositions of devotion, see variously Clarke 2009; Flint and Rea 2009; Juergensmeyer 2011; Meilaender and Werpehowski 2007; Stausberg and Engler 2016; Wainwright 2007.

³⁹⁹ On norms and dispositions of regulation, see variously Coleman, Shapiro, and Himma 2002; Deigh and Dolinko 2011; Orford and Hoffmann 2016; Reimann and Zimmermann 2008; Rosenfeld and Sajó 2012; Shelton 2015; Whittington, Kelemen, and Caldeira 2008.

⁴⁰⁰ On norms and dispositions of instruction and study, see variously Cowen, Kazamias, and Unterhalter 2009; Hayden, Levy, and Thompson 2015; Siegel 2009; Tight 2009.

⁴⁰¹ Bourdieu 1990, pp.52-3.

⁴⁰² Therborn 1980, p.25.

The same distinctiveness is found within late-modern norms and dispositions of ideation and communication, especially the values and attitudes that constitute discourse in the specifically judgmental form of opinion. Given that judgment-claims can be divided into cognitive and estimative categories, the assessment criteria they ‘apply’ to ‘the social’ are either epistemological or evaluative—i.e., the values and attitudes from which subjects create their opinions in their most basic form are derived from either some theory of truth and validity, or some account of morality and ethics. Very briefly, on the epistemological side, subjects’ values and attitudes derive from several possible criteria for truth: appeals to *authority* for a known source; the *coherence* of integrated arrangements of information; *consensus* with the values and attitudes of other subjects; *consistency* (via non-contradiction or relation) between values and attitudes; *correspondence* between information and its referents; *instinct* and *intuition* assumed from an unexamined source; *revelation* by a supernatural source; *tradition* or *custom* by ‘handing on’ values and attitudes over time; and so on.⁴⁰³ On the evaluative side, meanwhile, subjects’ values and attitudes stem from intrinsic or instrumental criteria of evaluation: *consequentialist* assessments of good outcomes; *deontological* views of inherent goodness; *hedonist* or *utilitarian* analyses in terms of pleasure, happiness, welfare, and lack of pain; *virtue* and *role ethics* assessments of subjects’ character, individually or within a community; and so on.⁴⁰⁴ Of course, it is extremely rare for subjects outside academic research to have a detailed command of which epistemological and evaluative criteria they favour—an indication especially of classist divisions between ‘specialist’ and ‘vernacular’ ideation in late modernity.⁴⁰⁵ But, either alone or in combination, these criteria underpin all of the judgmental orientations subjects can ‘give’ their mental pictures of ‘the social’, and hence their opinions about them. Again, in Therborn’s terms, subjects’ discursive *habitus* are mostly “inclusive-existential”, as they attempt to ‘make meaningful’ subjects’ membership of ‘the natural’ (and, as a narrower subset of it, ‘the social’), given their own physical conditions.⁴⁰⁶

For subjects engaged in different activities, or with different occupations (and class situations), their predispositions emerge via a contingent combination of the judgmental parts of their discursive norms and dispositions with those of the activities with regard to which they are forming and expressing

⁴⁰³ On epistemology, see variously BonJour 2002; Bovens and Hartmann 2003; Dancy 1991; Greco and Sosa 1999; Hendricks 2006; Morton 2002; Popper 1972.

⁴⁰⁴ On evaluation and ethics, see variously Becker and Becker 2002; Conner 1981; Copp 2007; Crisp 2015; Hirose and Olson 2015; LaFollette 2003, 2014; Rea-Dickins and Germaine 1992.

⁴⁰⁵ Hirschhorn 2006; Meehl 1997; Rowe and Brass 2008; Tange 2016.

⁴⁰⁶ Therborn 1980, pp.23–4.

opinions—or, in Therborn’s terms, a reconciliation of subjects’ ‘inclusive-existential’ and ‘positional-historical’ *habitus*. In late modernity, as in any other temporal context, it is the norms and dispositions under prevailing modes of ideation, communication, &c, that are combined in this way. However, the way this takes place differs slightly between (1) the specialised discursive subjectivities created by the emergence of sub-types of ideation and communication, and (2) subjects who ‘informally’ form and express opinions in the context of their activities, occupations, and class situations. First, the values and attitudes of specialised discursive subjectivities—e.g., different types of academics, researchers, publicity agents, journalists, and others in the ‘intelligentsia’—systematically hybridise ‘general’ values and attitudes with the occupational and classist norms and dispositions of the activities with which they concern themselves. In turn, these hybrid values and attitudes become an integral aspect of their discursive identity. Here, the ‘order’ of hybridisation matters, i.e., that it is sub-types of ideation and communication with respect to (other) social activities for which subjects are interpellated, not the other way around. Specifically, this means that it is the *habitus*—i.e., especially the norms and dispositions—of ‘primary’ activities that are “determinant” (in Althusser’s sense) in their hybridisation with ideative and communicative *habitus*—i.e., especially ‘general’ values and attitudes.⁴⁰⁷ Interpellation thus has a ‘direction’, not from the ‘general’ to the ‘specific’ (i.e., here, from discursive activity to its sub-types), but rather from the ‘primary’ to the ‘secondary’ (i.e., in this case, from the activities subjects are engaged in to the sub-types of discourse ‘dedicated to’ these activities).

The upshot of this is that subjects in different activities, occupations, and classes judge ‘the social’ in different ways. As a result, the plurality of values and attitudes identified in chapter II can be separated into the different hybridisations of ‘general’ values and attitudes and occupational and classist norms that created them. For instance, values like ‘efficient/inefficient’ and ‘cheap/expensive’ (e.g., applied to goods and services, investments, production processes, &c) stem from a consensus or correspondence view of economic concerns about usage/waste and revenue/cost, coupled with a consequentialist evaluation of its effects on profit/loss, itself often treated as a deontological good *qua* ‘profitability/unprofitability’.⁴⁰⁸ Similarly, values such as ‘healthy/noxious’ (e.g., for food and drink, exercise, causes of illness, &c) come from correspondence, consensus, or traditional views and deontological evaluations of healing/injury,

⁴⁰⁷ Althusser 2014, pp.238, 253.

⁴⁰⁸ See, for instance, Becker 1978; Brenkert and Beauchamp 2012; Kincaid and Ross 2009; Marshall 2010; Samuelson and Nordhaus 2009; Weingast and Wittman 2006.

combined with consequentialist evaluations of the medical emphasis on prophylaxis/indulgence.⁴⁰⁹ ‘Holy/unholy’ (e.g., referring to sacred objects, figures, places, rituals, &c) is a partly revelatory view and partly deontological or virtue-based evaluation of religious concerns about spirituality/secularity and exaltation/debasement.⁴¹⁰ Values such as ‘strong/weak’, ‘legal/illegal’, ‘legitimate/illegitimate’, and ‘just/unjust’ (e.g., describing strategies, policies, loci of authority, wars, &c) are partly correspondence, consensus, consistency, intuitive, or traditional views, and partly deontological evaluations, of political concerns about success/failure and order/chaos, or juridical concepts of behaviour/misbehaviour or compliance/refusal.⁴¹¹ Meanwhile, attitudes of ‘kindness/cruelty’ and ‘tolerance/bigotry’ (e.g., about the mutual relationships and behaviour of family members, friends, or members of different ethnocultural groups) represent either deontological, virtue-based, or utilitarian evaluations of curative emphases on help/hindrance and support/neglect, as well as religious principles of forgiveness/blame.⁴¹² And, as a final example, ‘diligence/laxity’ (e.g., applied to completing set work, examination revision, &c) is linked to both coherence views and deontological evaluations of educational concerns for endurance/lethargy and consistency/variation.⁴¹³ All of these highly specific values and attitudes interplay and overlap to shape the ‘verdicts’ contained in subjects’ mental pictures. The processes of systematic hybridisation that create these specialised discursive subjectivities are same ones that institutionalise the ‘dedicated’ sub-types of ideation and communication via discursive apparatuses. For instance, the rise of ‘economic theory’ as an autonomous sub-type of ideation—due in part to Alfred Marshall—was swiftly followed by the emergence of ‘economist’ as a discrete occupation, as well as the establishment of university economics departments, government economics offices and services, and economics divisions within private-sector banking and finance, commerce, accountancy, or marketing corporations.⁴¹⁴ As a result, the hybrid values and attitudes taken from the *habitus* of ‘general’ discourse and (other) social activities can become ideal-types for how *any* subjects are meant to form and express opinions with respect to the

⁴⁰⁹ See variously Baecker 1994; Fuchs 2000; Leach 2012; Maaß 2009; Nussbaum 2000; Sadler, van Staden, and Fulford 2015; Tronto 1993; Tyrell 1979.

⁴¹⁰ See, for instance, Flint and Rea 2009; Meilaender and Werpehowski 2007; Roth and Schütz 2015; Wainwright 2007.

⁴¹¹ See variously Dryzek, Honig, and Phillips 2008; Goodin 2011; Hart 2012; Levi-Faur 2014; Luhmann 2004; Moran, Rein, and Goodin 2006; Raz 2009; Reese-Schäfer 1999.

⁴¹² See variously Alstott 2004; Cudd 2006; Flint and Rea 2009; Francis 2017; Juergensmeyer 2011; Meilaender and Werpehowski 2007; Okin 1989; Reichel 2012; Stausberg and Engler 2016; Tyrell 1979.

⁴¹³ See, for instance, Cowen, Kazamias, and Unterhalter 2009; Siegel 2009.

⁴¹⁴ Marshall 2010.

relevant activities in late modernity—although, in reality, no subjects will (or are expected to) conform to these ideal-types more than those with specialised discursive roles.

Second, with subjects who combine ideation and communication more ‘informally’ with their (other) social activities, the hybridisation of values and attitudes—like the wider ‘synthesis’ between their discursive activities and any other activities with respect to which they might be ‘discoursing’—is (to a large extent) ‘up to’ subjects themselves. Rather than constituting a necessary integral aspect of their social identity—which, moreover, they share with a specific group of similar subjects, e.g., theologians, jurists, medical researchers, PR specialists, communications directors, business reporters, or war correspondents—their hybrid predispositions are more subjective and *ad hoc*. In effect, they are more of a ‘spillover effect’ of being endowed with norms and dispositions for their ‘primary’ activity, and (especially *qua* values and attitudes) for discourse taken separately. That is to say, subjects are trained, qualified, employed, organised, interpellated, &c, as teachers, nurses, soldiers, factory workers, &c, and they are exposed (at least to some level, even if only implicitly) to relatively up-to-date epistemological and evaluative methods as part of their early-years development and schooling—which means they possess the ‘building blocks’ from which to create ‘their own’ hybridisation of their occupational norms and dispositions with their ‘general’ discursive values and attitudes.⁴¹⁵ As a result, subjects who form and express ‘everyday’ or ‘vernacular’ opinions with respect to their activities, occupations, and class situations are not expected to conform perfectly to any one ideal-type. However, in practice, their predispositions are often derived from, or bear at least a strong underlying similarity to, the ‘systematic’ ideal-types provided by specialised discursive subjectivities, albeit with significantly greater latitude for deviation, inconsistency, or other kinds of lower-calibre conformity. Thus, for example, both doctors and patients form and express opinions oriented by predispositions of ‘healthy/noxious’, even if they do not define them as precisely, and in the same way, as medical researchers. At the same time, the ‘streamlining’ effect of discursive (and other socialising) apparatuses sets limits to this latitude, and leads to at least some degree of homogenisation of predispositions across subjects within the same activities, and to a slightly greater extent those within the same occupational groups and classes. Thus, seminaries, law schools, policy ‘units’, marketing departments, propagandists, health correspondents, &c, will still try to ‘spread’, or ‘popularise’, conceptions of, e.g., ‘holy/unholy’, ‘legitimate/illegitimate’, ‘cheap/expensive’,

⁴¹⁵ Bester 2007; Fischer 1980; Harris 1995; Kelly 1999; Maccoby and Martin 1983; Nurco 1999; Plomin and Daniels 1987; Whitbeck 1999.

‘just/unjust’, ‘healthy/noxious’, &c, even if only the subjects active within each of these apparatuses use these predispositions ‘fully’ or ‘properly’ to orient their opinions.⁴¹⁶

Of course, most subjects engage in several social activities and hold multiple occupations, if not always simultaneously, then at least over the course of their lives. For instance, in late modernity, it is reasonable to expect that most subjects will variously be children, parents, pupils, consumers, workers, citizens, voters, as well as possibly teachers, employers, jurors, religious adherents, organisers, &c, *at some point*. This means that they are subjected to a multiplicity of “interlapping” or “interlaced” mini-superstructures of socialising apparatuses across each of their activities, to borrow a description from Bernays and Dewey.⁴¹⁷ In particular, they are discursively interpellated from multiple angles, and ‘called’ to different purposes within and orientations toward ‘the social’, as part of their constitution as subjects with several different identities—e.g., participating in late-capitalist production, *Rechtsstaat* regulation, parliamentary-democratic administration, evangelical-Christian devotion, conjugal-familial caregiving, &c. This multiplicity adds more aspects to their social ‘role’ when they form and express opinions by vastly expanding and diversifying the set of norms and dispositions that guide how subjects engage in social activities and perform occupational tasks. In turn, whether because subjects hold specialised discursive occupations, or because they discourse more informally about their activities, this multiplicity expands and diversifies the cognitive and estimative impetuses and inclinations which subjects apply to the social information they acquire to form their mental pictures of ‘the social’. In other words, an inevitable effect of the functional differentiation of society is that subjects are endowed with multiple parallel predispositions, or judgmental orientations, towards ‘the social’.⁴¹⁸ They may be simultaneously predisposed towards the MRCs they encounter as (any or all of) a child, parent, pupil, consumer, worker, citizen, voter, or any other occupation from the various activities in which they are engaged—with all the complexities this adds to their mental pictures of ‘the social’. There is no necessary reason why these multiple aspects of their general social and specifically discursive subjectivities should ever be consonant, rather than contradictory. This means that subjects are interpellated by the discursive apparatuses associated with different activities in several ways that ‘set them up’ to form and express opinions very differently about (even the same set of) MRCs. It also means that subjects always retain to some extent

⁴¹⁶ Bauer and Erdogan 2011; Jee, Schafheutle, and Noyce 2016; Jones 1986; Kelly 1999; Martinez 2016.

⁴¹⁷ Bernays 2005, p.44; Bernays 2011, pp.147, 152; Dewey 2012, pp.77–8.

⁴¹⁸ Therborn 1980, p.78.

a degree of ‘choice’ over which *habitus* and the predispositions derived from it to abide by when they form and express opinions, i.e., which of their socialised judgmental orientations to ‘go with’.

Overall, then, the social constitution of predispositions manifests as a particular kind of plurality, both within subjects individually and hence in mass opinion on aggregate. For subjects, the attitudes and values that orient their opinions are not simply a cross-section of all those present within their society, but rather a more restricted, personal ‘set’ determined by the activities they are engaged in, and the occupations (and class situations) they hold within them. With mass opinion as a whole, the processes of society-wide cognition and estimation are suffused with attitudes and values from across the full spectrum of social activities—e.g., ‘legal/illegal’ from ‘the juridical’, ‘noxious/healthy’ from ‘the curative’, ‘profitable/unprofitable’ from ‘the economic’, ‘legitimate/illegitimate’ from ‘the political’, ‘holy/unholy’ from ‘the religious’, &c—which means that any understanding of how ‘the mass’ judges any given object must be rounded out to incorporate a far wider spectrum of ‘verdicts’ than simply ‘pro-con’ or ‘for-against’. This implies that if opinion research is going to continue testing for subjects’ generic attitudes without concrete points of reference for them to ‘attach to’, in order to identify ‘majority consensual’ or ‘unanimous’ *δόξα*, then it must become more sensitive to the effects of functional differentiation on greatly expanding the full set of attitudes and values that comprise this *δόξα*. Above all, it must decisively reject the misguided efforts of some, such as Rawls, to imbue “basic man”—and, by aggregation, ‘the mass’—with a single complex pre-packaged “moral psychology” as unjustified attempts to ‘naturalise’ and universalise the contingent “cultural inscription of values” with which subjects are interpellated.⁴¹⁹

Of course, opinion research must also seek to understand better that there is always scope for the social constitution of predispositions to the problematised and resisted in late modernity. The analysis so far has assumed that subjects involved with any given activity *acquiesce* to the nature and existence of the socialising (including discursive) apparatuses ‘attached’ to it, and the processes of interpellation they carry out. Recall that, through their physical embodiment, all subjects have a ‘kernel’ that acts as the target of different activities’ *habitus*, which to some extent pre-exists ‘the social’ and processes of socialisation (including interpellation).⁴²⁰ Further, recall that these socialising processes are never quite successful or complete, but rather ongoing moments of subjection and subjectification, whose effects on

⁴¹⁹ McLaren 2002, p.83; Rawls 2001, pp.116-7, 195-8.

⁴²⁰ See pp.56-7.

Case study 1: 'Brits 45 mins from doom'?

The reception of the 2003 Iraq War in public discourse, and in particular its lead-up and aftermath, was characterised by a particularly visible series of conflicting epistemological and evaluative orientations. IR and military theorists argued over whether the Coalition forces' swift victory (e.g., 'Mission Accomplished') but subsequent failure to 'win the peace' (e.g., Iraq's inability to form a government in 2010, the rise of Daesh in 2013) were a sign of the U.S.A.'s strength or weakness in projecting global geopolitical influence. President George W. Bush declared the war a central part of the War on Terror, which he had described as a 'crusade' against Islamic jihadism—thereby elevating suppressed echoes of medieval wars of religion—and was in turn decried as fostering a new strain of bigotry and cultural imperialism in U.S. liberal democracy. Critics of U.S. militarism highlighted the vast cost of the war, framing it as an unnecessary and expensive exercise, and a painfully inefficient allocation of state expenditure given the existing pressures on health or welfare spending. Meanwhile, arms manufacturers and oil companies (e.g., Lockheed Martin, Boeing, BAE Systems, General Dynamics, BP, Shell, CNPC, Halliburton) saw in it the creation of profitable opportunities for market expansion via large-scale contracts for natural resource exploitation and government military procurement. And, perhaps most prominently of all, debates raged—and still continually flare up to this day—in domestic parliaments and international bodies over the legality of the war, and the justice of instigating a 'preemptive strike' based on at best tenuous evidence of a concrete threat (i.e., the non-existence of caches of long-range Weapons of Mass Destruction).

subjects and their social actions are “normalising” but not “totalising” in Foucauldian terms.⁴²¹ Together, these leave subjects some scope for ‘unguided’ agency, whereby they can (at least potentially) act *outside* the tasks they are expected to perform, and *counter to* the *habitus* they are expected to abide by. It is in this sense, therefore, that, as Foucault and Bourdieu suggest, the human body—and its biological, physiological, and psychological faculties—can act as a “site of resistance” within any social activity.⁴²² As a result, the proper and successful functioning of apparatuses and interpellation relies to some extent on subjects’ (tacit or explicit) *cooperation*.

But this cannot necessarily be taken for granted. Lapses in subjects’ acquiescence to their occupational and classist norms and dispositions, and the hybridised predispositions they help create, can be fairly banal in origin. For instance, subjects may be irremediably ‘bad at’ their social occupations, and hence at discoursing about them, perhaps by making incompetent or insufficiently skilful use of their bodies and their activity’s means. But they are especially brought out by instances where subjects’ *habitus* are not designed (except by induction) to ‘cope with’ novelty, or abnormal deviation, within the parts of ‘the social’ with which they interact. If their subjective experience diverges sufficiently from the way they are socially ‘called’ to judge it, subjects are suddenly ‘abandoned’—that is, left beyond the reach

⁴²¹ Finch *et al.* 2013; Foucault 1977a, 1998; May and Finch 2009.

⁴²² Hoy 2002; McLaren 2002, pp.83–6.

of interpellation—both for ‘dealing with’ the MRCs in question, and for discoursing about them. This *anomie* creates the possibility for contradictions to emerge between (1) the existence and nature at any given point of the MRCs with which subjects interact, (2) the way they are expected to actively engage with them according to their occupational and classist *habitus*, and (3) the way they are expected to form and express opinions about them according to their specific hybridised predispositions.

When they emerge, such contradictions reveal themselves through what Žižek calls “spectral apparitions” from beyond the limits of discursive interpellation.⁴²³ While the initial experience of these contradictions is often accompanied by a vague sense of unease or dread of the sort alluded to by Heidegger and Søren Kierkegaard, the nonconformity they engender among subjects to norms and dispositions, and ‘general’ and hybridised values and attitudes when they form and express opinions, is often raised to the level of reified norms of resistance.⁴²⁴ On the epistemological, or cognitive side, discursive resistance often take the form of a revision or explicit rejection of a prevalent ‘method’, although not always as systematically expressed as in Paul Feyerabend’s account of ‘epistemological anarchism’.⁴²⁵ This tendency has been especially prominent in the popular anti-scientism of certain pockets of late-modern society, which opposes the scientific or scholarly consensus on everything from anthropogenic climate change, the risks of vaccine use, abortion, crime and incarceration, or the teaching of creationism versus evolution in school curriculums—the dangers of which have been amply elaborated by Bruno Latour.⁴²⁶ On the evaluative, or estimative side, resistance usually aims to undermine or oppose some form of hegemonic ‘morality’, though again, this does not always take as rigorous or comprehensive a form as the ideology critique of the Frankfurt School or the postmodern deconstructionist tendency initiated by Jacques Derrida.⁴²⁷ This can be seen in countless appropriations and counter-appropriations of valorised terms—e.g., ‘queer’, ‘dyke’, ‘Yankee’, ‘redneck’, ‘tree hugger’, ‘fat’, ‘free speech’, ‘safe space’, ‘social justice warriors’, ‘cuck’, &c, by progressive and reactionary forms of identity politics—which has led Habermas, among others, to criticise deconstructionists as aiders and abettors of the most divisive and discriminatory tendencies in late modernity.⁴²⁸

⁴²³ Žižek 1994, p.21.

⁴²⁴ Heidegger 1962, pp.227, 234; Kierkegaard 2015.

⁴²⁵ Feyerabend 2010.

⁴²⁶ Holton 1993; Latour 2004; Levins 1996; Segerstrale 2000; Vining 1999.

⁴²⁷ Critchley 2014; Culler 1982; Derrida 1978; Geuss 1981; Horkheimer 1972; Marcuse 1972; Rorty 1995.

⁴²⁸ Croom 2011; Fraser 1985; Godrej 2003; Habermas 1981, 2014; Landry 2000, p.26.

§2. *The social sources of information*

Next, the social determination of the information towards which subjects' opinions are oriented. The approach here is analogous to the one for predispositions in the previous section. It starts with another basic observation, namely that all subjects acquire information about 'the social' by experiencing stimuli from it, but that different subjects acquire this information via different combinations of direct interaction and representational cues: scientific research, accidental observation, talking to their friends, 'reading the papers', 'watching TV', 'going online', &c. This section examines what effect 'the social' has on determining why this is the case, again combining premises taken from the analysis in previous chapters. In chapter I, subjects were characterised as 'surrounded by' and 'embedded in' particular MRCs—i.e., as having particular materials distributed to them and as arranged within particular relations—because they hold specific occupations in certain activities.⁴²⁹ That is to say, each subject has control over, disposal of, and access to particular (material) means, and a particular (de)privileged, (dis)advantaged, or (im)balanced location within relations, thanks to the activities they engage in and the tasks they perform. Meanwhile, chapter II gave a general account of the sources of information about which subjects form and express opinions in their experience of a combination of stimuli.⁴³⁰ These stimuli have two types: either subjects register within their perceptual horizon the MRCs they interact with within their environment, or they rely on representational cues from a network of other subjects about the MRCs beyond their horizon. In the former case, subjects are 'competent' to form and express opinions about their MRCs, while in the latter case, their opinions about MRCs are 'ignorant'. Again, the aim here is to try to reconcile the differentiation from chapter I with the universality from chapter II.

The main effect of the social division of purposive agency and inputs is to add a significant degree of occupational variation to which MRCs subjects interact with, and hence which they register within their perceptual horizon. Occupational specialisation refines and modifies the discursive competence that subjects have when judging these MRCs into the special category of *expertise*.⁴³¹ This happens in two connected ways. First, holding an occupation alters and restricts the nature of subjects' interaction

⁴²⁹ See pp.34-53.

⁴³⁰ See pp.73-84.

⁴³¹ On expertise, see variously Chi, Glaser, and Rees 1982; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2005; Ericsson *et al.* 2006; Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Romer 1993; Ericsson, Prietula, and Cokely 2007; Gobet 2015; Goldman 1999; Hofer and Pintrich 1997; Mieg 2001; Shanteau *et al.* 2002; Sjöberg 2001; Tynjala 1999.

with their environment. Subjects are not just ‘thrown’ into—or embodied within—any random physical and temporal context, and they do not (passively or actively) interact with MRCs, and experience stimuli from them, in an *ad hoc* or casual way. By being socialised for particular occupational positions and class situations, subjects are ‘steered’ towards affecting ‘the social’ in specific systematic ways by the practices in their *habitus*. In addition, the modes of cooperation for the activities in which they hold occupations decide which material resources they have control over, disposal of, or access to, and what (de)privileged, (dis)advantaged, or (im)balanced relational linkages they are arranged into. For example, a craftsman, soldier, and teacher use very different means in their day-to-day lives—e.g., machinery, graph paper, paints, maps, assault rifle, aerial drone, textbooks, whiteboard, coloured pen—and are put in different relations to others—e.g., employment or apprenticeship, chains of command and obedience, pastoral support, &c. Together, these effects restrict how much of ‘the social’ falls into subjects’ environment by determining specific contexts in which subjects are predominantly situated, and where they spend much of their time. In other words, subjects’ occupation and class ‘shrink down’ the specific set of proximate MRCs with which they are presented, and with which they interact, either by their ‘obstinacy’ in subjects’ environments, or because subjects deal with them through purposive action. The disproportionate proximity of these MRCs to subjects compared with the rest of ‘the social’—the frequency, consistency, and intensity of their interaction with them, and their integral social role in being the ones to do so—gives them greater experience of the stimuli these MRCs offer to prompt subjects’ cognition and estimation. It is this that makes subjects ‘experts in their own experience’, to follow the modern proverb, and not merely ‘competent’: subjects are systematic and regular ‘participants’ in their social conditions, and consequently accumulate a ‘wealth of experience’ through their extensive exposure to their particular part of ‘the social’.⁴³² The implication of this is that expertise—*contra* many ‘Brexiters’ and Trump supporters, as well as much of the academic literature—is not necessarily at all an ‘elite’ phenomenon.⁴³³ Every subject can be an expert in, or about, *some* part of ‘the social’, depending on the activities they engage in, and the occupations they hold within them.

Second, having specific occupational tasks to perform reshapes and focuses the outline of subjects’ perceptual horizon. Again, subjects are not universally attentive to, and aware of, all the MRCs they interact with, nor do they simply register an arbitrary cross-section of them as experiential stimuli. Rather, the occupations they hold give their activity a specific orientation, which means that their

⁴³² Wright 2016.

⁴³³ Ackerman 2014; Crane 2012; Ericsson 2014.

attention and awareness is ‘turned’ towards the (narrow) subset of MRCs that are distributed to them and into which they are arranged, and with which they interact. To use the same examples, a craftsman, soldier, and teacher only ‘care about’ MRCs insofar as they ‘belong’ to those they need to ‘take into account’ in their carefully circumscribed tasks—e.g., hand-producing an artisanal commodity in a workshop, incapacitating enemy hostiles to achieve a tactical objective, or helping pupils understand a new mathematical concept—which usually leads to them ‘ignoring’, ‘blanking out’, or ‘overlooking’ MRCs that do not fall into these categories.⁴³⁴ This restricts how much of their environment subjects can register within their perceptual horizon by determining which parts of it are particularly ‘of concern’ to subjects, and hence which they predominantly ‘concentrate on’. In other words, subjects’ occupation and class ‘shrink down’ the extent of their social environments that are strictly ‘relevant’ to their activities and tasks, and hence onto which they need to ‘target’ their finite perceptual faculties, again either due to the ‘obstinacy’ of the MRCs involved, or the remit of subjects’ purposive action. The disproportionate coverage subjects acquire of these MRCs compared with any other part of ‘the social’—the closeness, extent, and sensitivity of their attention to and awareness of them, as well as their necessary social role in doing so—gives them a better perspective from which to register them as stimuli for cognition and estimation.⁴³⁵ In this way, subjects accrue expert “familiarity”, to use Schumpeter’s term, instead of merely competent ‘acquaintance’: subjects are systematic and regular ‘observers’ of their social conditions, which gives them a ‘practiced eye’ or ‘seasoned view’ due to their sustained focus on their part of ‘the social’.⁴³⁶

Together, these two effects introduce a qualitative division into the remit of subjects’ competence to ‘judge’ MRCs. Insofar as subjects interact with a particular set of MRCs (even extensively) merely to the extent of being passively *affected* by them, their competence to form and express opinions about them remains basic and partial. Only where subjects interact with MRCs by actively and directly *affecting* them—i.e., by dealing purposively with them thanks to their occupational position and class situation within given activities in certain physical and temporal contexts—do they develop the higher and fuller competence to form and express opinions about them, which Lippmann calls “an insider’s knowledge”.⁴³⁷ It is only the latter, higher form of competence, tied to direct action, that falls into the category of

⁴³⁴ Burton 2006; Grabner and Speckbacher 2016; Hayden 2017; Lacewing 2015.

⁴³⁵ Ericsson 2014; Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Romer 1993; Gobet 2015; Shanteau *et al.* 2002.

⁴³⁶ Schumpeter 1962, pp.258-9.

⁴³⁷ Lippmann 1993, p.54.

‘expertise’. This distinction between competence and expertise is what Schumpeter has in mind when he argues that a subject has a “full sense of [...] reality” only of

the things that directly concern himself ... or any [...] social group[s] of which he is an active member ... the things under his personal observation, [and] the things ... which he can directly influence or manage and for which he develops the kind of responsibility that is induced by a direct relation to the favourable or unfavourable effects of a course of action.⁴³⁸

In other words, subjects form and express expert opinions about MRCs only if these MRCs ‘belong to’ one of the activities in which they hold an occupation—i.e., if their ‘judging’ of these MRCs takes place ‘secondarily’ within the context of, or with respect to, their engagement in some ‘primary’ activities. The overarching logic of this is that where subjects act directly on the aspects of ‘the social’ that form the most fundamental stimuli for (their) perception, their conversion of these stimuli into ‘pseudo-environments’ is the most immediate it could ever be.

Crucially, all subjects not only *can*, but actually *do* have *some* foundational level of expertise to form and express opinions about *some* part(s) of ‘the social’, simply by virtue of holding one or more occupations in society at large. All of them are in some sense, and to some degree, ‘experts in their own experience’—an experience determined by their specific engagements in functionally-differentiated late-modern society. Walter Benjamin puts it as follows:

As an expert, which for good or ill [they] must inevitably become in a highly specialised labour process (be it merely an expert in some minor matter), [the subject] gains access to authorship. ... [P]utting one’s job into words is part of the skill required to perform it.⁴³⁹

Since the modes of cooperation for different social activities determine the internal distribution and arrangement of MRCs among the subjects engaged in them, they determine how many of the MRCs in ‘the social’ enter subjects’ environments, as well as how many of these they can bring within their perceptual horizons. In cases where subjects do not actively interact with a given set of MRCs, their opinions about them become characterised by ‘*laity*’ or (archaically) ‘*layship*’.⁴⁴⁰ This is a more expansive category than mere ignorance—to which only subjects who lack *any* competence to judge the given MRCs are relegated—since it also includes subjects who have a degree of non-expert competence,

⁴³⁸ Schumpeter 1962, pp.258-9.

⁴³⁹ Benjamin 2008, p.23. Where Benjamin refers to the “labour process”, of course, purposive inputs for other activities can be substituted as well.

⁴⁴⁰ See ‘layman, *n*.1’, and ‘laity, *n*.’ in *Oxford English Dictionary* 2016.

perhaps by having ‘come across’ this particular set of MRCs ‘in passing’, as it were, or by being intermittent ‘witnesses’ to the relevant part(s) of their social conditions. This is the case of the ‘competent’ or (sometimes) ‘informed layperson’—e.g., subjects who ‘follow politics’ or ‘keep up with scientific developments’, but are not themselves professional politicians or scientists.⁴⁴¹ Inevitably, each subject must strike a personal balance between having the expertise to form and express opinions about some part(s) of ‘the social’, and correlatively being a layperson, or even entirely ignorant, about the rest—and hence reliant on exogenous cues for information about it. The mere fact that subjects have certain occupations within some social activities itself precludes (to a large extent) them having a remotely comparable level of engagement in many other activities: their heightened proximity to, and coverage of, certain MRCs comes ineluctably at the expense of greater distance from, and desensitisation to—for Marx, alienation from—other aspects of ‘the social’.⁴⁴² This can be seen as a paradoxical effect of specialisation. On the one hand, it increases subjects’ competence vis-à-vis certain parts of certain activities, shrinking subjects’ environments, and adapting their perceptual horizons, to the set of MRCs relevant to their occupational position. However, on the other hand, it decreases their competence everywhere else, increasing the set of MRCs that lie beyond subjects’ environments, and also increasing the set of MRCs that may be present in subjects’ environment, but to which subjects’ perception becomes less ‘receptive’ such that they do not register them within their perceptual horizon.

Subjects’ degree of specialisation ‘in’ a particular set of MRCs, and hence their level of unique and exclusive expertise in forming and expressing opinions about them, depends on how far the activity in which they hold the relevant occupation is internally functionally differentiated under its prevailing mode of cooperation.⁴⁴³ The level of functional differentiation affects the range of MRCs distributed among, and arranged between, subjects engaged in each activity—with higher differentiation generally leading to subjects having a smaller share of materials, and being located in a more complex framework of relations, and lower differentiation having the opposite effect. This varies significantly between activities (and domains), each of which can be differentiated into varying numbers of separate constitutive classes, occupations, and jobs. For instance, the activities of production, administration, medical caregiving, instruction, and regulation are very highly differentiated, through the existence of

⁴⁴¹ Battersby 2014; Coyle, Ishizawar, and Seesel 2012; Levin 1976; Office of the Federal Register 2009, §3.159.

⁴⁴² Barrera 2014; Houthakker 1956; Marx 1975a; Parker, Wall, and Cordery 2001; Rummel *et al.* 2005; Wadeson 2013.

⁴⁴³ For the cognitive effects of functional specialisation, see Barrett, Cosmides, and Tooby 2010; Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Levinson 2006; Mahon and Cantlon 2011; Povinelli and Preuss 1995; Tooby, Cosmides, and Price 2006.

multiple economic sectors and industries (e.g., primary, secondary, tertiary, &c, or agriculture, manufacturing, construction, services, &c), specialist areas of medicine (e.g., anaesthetics, general surgery, internal medicine, neurology, paediatrics, psychiatry, radiology, &c), teaching ‘subjects’ (e.g., early modern history, Finnish literature, microeconomics, organic chemistry, social anthropology, &c), and specialist areas of law (e.g., commercial, criminal, employment, family, intellectual property, patent, tort, &c), as well as detailed jobs within each one.⁴⁴⁴ By contrast, coercion, familial caregiving, and devotion are noticeably less differentiated—e.g., police versus branches of the military, and their internal ‘ranks’, *ad hoc* roles within nuclear and extended family units, different faiths and their internal hierarchies, depending on whether they are ‘sacerdotalist’, &c—while consumption is barely specialised at all, as most subjects need to consume some goods and services from all sectors of the economy.⁴⁴⁵ The more internally differentiated an activity, the more specific and restricted the set of MRCs to which subjects engaged in this activity have occupational proximity, and of which they have coverage, and hence about which they can form and express expert opinions. By extension, and correlatively, the greater is the set of MRCs from which subjects have occupationally-determined distance, to which they are desensitised, and hence about which their opinions exhibit at best lay competence if not outright ignorance. In other words, the breadth or narrowness of the expertise that subjects (and their opinions) can achieve within any given social activity is a direct result of the division of purposive inputs and class stratifications that obtains within it under its prevailing mode of cooperation, and in particular their subjective position within them.

The distinction between expertise and laity, and competence and ignorance more generally, is elevated under prevailing post-Enlightenment modes of ideation and communication into a normative distinction between *discursive originality* and *discursive dependence*.⁴⁴⁶ First, subjects who have the occupational expertise or at least (to a lesser degree) the experiential competence to form and express opinions about some part of ‘the social’ are usually granted a significant degree of discursive ‘priority’, ‘primacy’, or even ‘sovereignty’, over ‘their’ part of the relevant social activity compared to other subjects who lack this expertise or competence, based on their rootedness within, and intense interaction with, its MRCs. This can be seen in the widespread tendency of subject ‘from all walks of life’ to ‘turn to’

⁴⁴⁴ Abbott 2001; Clark 1940; Cotterrell 2006; Fisher 1939; Luhmann 2004; Oleson and Voss 1979; Podgórecki 1974; Smith 1979; Weisz 2003.

⁴⁴⁵ Hoerder and Neunsinger 2015; James and Szeman 2010; Kahana, Biegel, and Wykle 1994; Stearns 2006.

⁴⁴⁶ *Harvard Law Review* 2002; Hudson 1973; Mackworth 1965; Mayseless, Eran, and Shamay-Tsoory 2015; McFarland 1985; McGinnis 2009.

scientists on questions involving the structure of the natural world, government ministers on questions of policy, or clergy on questions of faith, or in the typical practice in, e.g., anthropological or sociological research of relying on interviews and other ethnographic methods in order to accurately capture the ‘lived experience’ of the subjects they are studying. This norm of discursive originality rests on the assumption that the more frequently and intensely subjects interact with their MRCs, and the closer and more sensitively they are attentive to and aware of them, the more (probabilistically) likely it is that they will exhibit epistemic *insight* in their opinions about them. Subjects are insightful insofar as they form and express opinions that are (held to be) new or novel, imaginative and inventive, credible, clear, honest rather than deceptive, unique, containing valid discoveries and realisations, or in any other way ‘right’.⁴⁴⁷ Second, by contrast, subjects with at most the lay competence to form and express opinions about the same part of ‘the social’, and especially those who are entirely ignorant about it, are often ‘deemphasised’, ‘marginalised’, and even ‘subordinated’ within discourse about the relevant social activity. This is manifested through the negative social cachet of ‘un-self-awareness’ attached to subjects who express opinions that are ‘clueless’ or ‘naïve’ about the aspects of ‘the social’ in question—ranging from ‘put-downs’ of ‘dumb’ comments by friends to the derisive loathing of ‘Twitter eggs’ or ‘comment sections’ underneath online articles—generally framed as an inability on their part to acknowledge the limits of their understanding. Since ignorance is a direct corollary of the rejection of omnicompetence, the norm of discursive dependence is primarily normativised in a negative way as an absence of discursive originality. On this basis, it assumes that where subjects interact only rarely or weakly with their MRCs, and are only distantly or clumsily attentive to and aware of them, their opinions about them are (again, probabilistically) likely to be epistemically *banal*. This banality manifests itself through subjects forming and expressing opinions that are (considered) tired or old, dull and boring, dubious or incredible, vague, ‘bullshit’, dishonest, ineffectual, commonplace, containing derivative or even trite observations, or held to have ‘failed’ in any other way.⁴⁴⁸ It is this distinction between insight and banality that Jonathan Portes alluded to when (in debate with Gove) he described the role of experts as that of identifying things that are “true but not obvious”, and acting as “intellectual garbage disposal” for spurious judgment-claims.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁷ Dacey 1999; Davidson and Sternberg 1984; Kaufman and Beghetto 2009; Kim 2005; Klein and Jarosz 2011; Kounios and Beeman 2009; Kozbelt, Beghetto, and Runco 2010; Metcalfe and Wiebe 1987; Niu and Sternberg 2006; Runco and Albert 2010; Sternberg and Davidson 1996; Sternberg and O’Hara 1999; Weisberg 1993.

⁴⁴⁸ Austin 1979; Cohen 2002; Cook and Lewandowsky 2012; Eubanks and Schaeffer 2008; Frankfurt 1986; Friggeri *et al.* 2014; Pennycook *et al.* 2015; Sagan 1996.

⁴⁴⁹ Portes 2017.

The norms of discursive originality and dependence are *prima facie* intended to provide a criterion to discriminate between opinions—and hence informational cues for other subjects—on the basis of their quality. They are designed to differentiate between subjects who ‘know what they are doing’ and hence ‘what they are talking about’ with respect to a given set of MRCs, and subjects who do not.⁴⁵⁰ Yet while experts’ greater experience of MRCs, and their privileged perspective onto them, is a social fact, the assumption that this automatically makes their opinions about them ‘perfectly right/correct’ or ‘unambiguously true’ is only a contingent discursive norm. Specifically, they cannot quite claim that their discursive priority gives their opinions any *objective* validity. They are still ‘only human’, that is, irrevocably embodied and with vantage-points on ‘the social’ that are inextricably contextually bound—even if their embodiment is within a narrower and more ‘manageable’ context and their vantage-point is more focused and refined. Their experience and perspective, while professional, is still *subjective*—and their ‘original’ opinions are entirely capable of being mistaken, flawed, or simply dishonest—which means that there is always some room for them to be challenged by subjects in a position of lesser expertise or greater laity/ignorance. It is into this technical niche, for instance, that Trump has driven the blunt wedge of absolute rejectionism, as with his refusal to listen to intelligence briefings on the basis that the CIA and other bodies wrongly identified the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, or his dismissal of all unfavourable opinion polls on the basis that few pollsters predicted his election victory.⁴⁵¹ In other words, experts’ discursive ‘sovereignty’ may well be ‘primary’ but it is never quite ‘exclusive’. What the prevailing scientific-critical mode of ideation does, in combination with hierarchical tendencies in successive modes of communication (i.e., visual-oral, literary, mechanical-electric, digital), is contingently ‘smooth over’ these caveats about expert discursive originality, and by extension lay discursive dependence, and turn a probabilistic likelihood into a presumed certainty. Together, they contingently give the ‘first go’ at discursive originality to experts, and turn the probabilistic likelihood of their greater insight into the comparative pre-eminence of their ‘correctness’ vis-à-vis other subjects. Occupational specialisation is seen as lending subjects the greatest credibility available for any given context in ‘the social’, because (in that context) it is the ‘best that can be done’, and certainly better than casual experience—i.e., parents and children ‘know best’ about their respective aspects of familial life, ministers and civil servants ‘know best’ about the executive ‘machinery

⁴⁵⁰ Price 1992, pp.50-2; Thurstone 1928; Wiebe 1953.

⁴⁵¹ Miller and Entous 2016; Revesz 2017.

of government’, &c.⁴⁵² Nevertheless, the presumed universality of experts’ discursive originality—purely because they are experts—is, and remains, a contingent normative approximation.

But the particular force of discursive *dependence* is also that, to a large extent, lay and ignorant subjects (are expected to) ‘take on’, or ‘follow’, the opinions formed and expressed by discursively original subjects. This elevates the reliance on exogenous cues, which all subjects have to accept in order to alleviate their partial ignorance about ‘the social’, and complete their views of it, into a norm of what Bourdieu calls ‘*delegation*’, whereby subjects ‘withdraw’ their agency from forming and expressing opinions about parts of ‘the social’ in which they are not experts, and ‘outsource’ their cognitive and estimative judgments “by proxy” to other subjects.⁴⁵³ Subjects who are discursively dependent on others *are expected to recognise* the insightfulness of these subjects—i.e., accept that these subjects’ opinions reflect valid discoveries about ‘the social’—and, by extension, their own banality—i.e., acknowledge that their own opinions about that part of ‘the social’ are ineluctably derivative. Discursive dependence is thus a relationship of *trust* in the accuracy of the information passed as cues from discursively original subjects to their lay and ignorant ‘dependents’. Subjects, in general, (have to) trust fiscal and monetary policymakers to make the right ‘judgment-calls’ on the economy, trust judges to pass the right ‘verdicts’ in court cases, and trust students to make the right ‘choices’ when working out their most effective learning methods. Conversely, it is precisely the alleged ‘sacrifice’ or ‘gambling away’ of this trust through prominent incidents of expert mistakes—e.g., the failure of most orthodox economists to predict the 2007-8 subprime mortgage and ensuing financial crisis—that Gove was seeking cynically to exploit with his wholesale rejection of prognoses for the UK economy after Brexit in his *Sky News* interview.⁴⁵⁴

Moreover, the norm of discursive dependence also refines the network on whom subjects rely for cues about ‘the social’. Rather than (at least potentially) including *any* other subjects, it narrows down the sources for cues to only those subjects who experience and register the relevant MRCs within their environments and perceptual horizons because of their occupational position(s) and class situation(s). Thus, for instance, subjects mainly (or exclusively) tend to ‘turn to’ subjects involved in administration—e.g., parliamentarians, ministers, civil servants, public officials, thinktank researchers, political scientists, policy-specific correspondents, &c—for ‘political information’, or cues about the MRCs-of-administration, and to subjects involved in devotion—e.g., priests, monks and nuns, pastoral assistants,

⁴⁵² Alessandri 2011; Bluff and Holloway 1994; Breheny 1998; Lewis *et al.* 2012; Mallett *et al.* 2011.

⁴⁵³ Bourdieu 2010, pp.423-6.

⁴⁵⁴ Allen and Inman 2017; Schrager 2016; Wren-Lewis 2016.

theologians, preachers, &c—for ‘religious information’, or cues about the MRCs-of-devotion. The prevailing (sub-)modes of ideation and communication exaggerate, and intensify, subjects’ discursive dependence on one another by (1) strengthening their exclusive expertise and discursive originality regarding all the MRCs within their perceptual horizons; and (2) correlatively weakening it for any MRCs that lie beyond them. In other words, the general informational networks in which subjects are situated are transformed into specific normativised *networks of discursive dependence*.⁴⁵⁵ For any given set of MRCs, the subjects who have occupational (and classist) expertise in forming and expressing opinions about them are located at the ‘centre’, or ‘hub’, of this network. Meanwhile, all other subjects with lesser expertise—i.e., the laity—are located further ‘down’ the individual ‘spokes’, ‘chains’, or ‘capillaries’ of the network, with their ‘distance’ from the ‘centre’ increasing in direct proportion as their competence in judging these particular MRCs decreases. Thus, for political and religious information, for example, while the subjects involved in each activity—i.e., parliamentarians, thinktank researchers, priests, theologians, &c—are at the ‘centre’ of networks of political-discursive and religious-discursive dependence, the ‘spokes’ of each network are populated by competent lay subjects who only interact passively with political and religious MRCs, but whose discursive interests are nonetheless highly politicised or religified—i.e., subject who are ‘really into politics’ or ‘have strong faith’—while at the ‘ends’ of each ‘spoke’ sit the subjects who are entirely ignorant of either activity—e.g., subjects who are politically ‘apathetic’, ‘irreligious’, or quite simply unaware. The exact structure of this network varies between different parts of ‘the social’, as different MRCs are ‘captured by’ the expertise of different (combinations of) occupations. In broad terms, however, the effect of the norms of discursive originality and dependence is that insofar as subjects are specialist experts in a given part of ‘the social’, they form and express opinions about it based on information that is primarily subjective, making them predominantly opinion-*makers* about it (for themselves and for others). The more they are laypersons, the more intersubjective their information, and the more they are opinion-*takers*.

The normative transformation of informational networks into networks of discursive dependence also refines how subjects receive cues about the MRCs beyond their perceptual horizons. At every moment, subjects have at their disposal vast quantities of information, both from the sense-data they receive from their environment, but also (especially) from the vocalisations of many sources beyond their

⁴⁵⁵ On social network analysis and its application to information flows, see variously Anger and Kittl 2011; Baber *et al.* 2013; Fu 2016; Grandjean 2016; Kadushin 2012; Kiesling 2016; Otte and Rousseau 2002; Pinheiro 2011; Riquelme and González-Cantergiani 2016; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Wellman and Berkowitz 1988; Worrell, Wasko, and Johnston 2013.

perceptual horizons—quantities which technological development of the forces of communication is constantly increasing.⁴⁵⁶ For any parts of ‘the social’ that lie beyond their immediate experience, subjects’ location in general informational networks provides them with a unique and personal instantiation of what Heidegger calls “the ‘they’” (*das ‘Man’*): a subjective ‘backdrop’ of other subjects whose “idle talk” (*Gerede*) strongly and importantly modulates their perception of the relevant MRCs.⁴⁵⁷ In this context, subjection to very specific networks of discursive dependence for a given set of MRCs helps subjects ‘decide’ to which cues—i.e., which subjects’ vocalisations within this ‘idle talk’—to pay special attention, or of which to be particularly aware, and which subjects within ‘the they’ to ‘count as’ discursively original about them. Thus, subjects accept cues about, for instance, their own medical condition, the state of the economy, or the history of their country insofar as they have originally ‘come from’ the relevant medical, economic, or historical experts, even if only indirectly by having been ‘filtered down’ the ‘spokes’ of the relevant network—and are (at least in principle) reticent and sceptical of cues that cannot demonstrate the same ‘quality’ in their provenance.⁴⁵⁸

However, while the norms of discursive originality and dependence determine who subjects consciously ‘turn to’ for cues to incorporate into their ‘pseudo-environment’, subjects often need help differentiating ‘insightful’ (and thus desirable) cues from their network of discursive dependence from among other ‘banal’ (and less desirable) cues from their general information network. This manifests in different forms, ranging from the basic mistakes and ‘illiteracy’ that ‘ordinary’ subjects may show (often accidentally) in their ‘everyday’ conversations about economics, science, the law, &c, to the systematic ‘disinformation’ spread by purveyors of disreputable or ‘fake news’, e.g., Breitbart News, InfoWars, Gateway Pundit, LifeZette, The Canary, &c.⁴⁵⁹ Subjects receive a relentless barrage of stimuli from others’ vocalisations of MRCs beyond their perceptual horizons, which (to extend the metaphor) can become an overwhelming ‘cacophony’. They are simply not psychologically equipped to deal with the sheer volume of ‘overinformation’ they receive in its entirety—rather, they can do so only up to a certain limit before reaching the ‘capacity’ of their attentiveness and awareness.⁴⁶⁰ This means that the vocalisations that subjects ‘ought’ to be receiving through their networks of discursive dependence risk

⁴⁵⁶ McLuhan 2001, pp.3-6, 38-40, 45-52, 55-6, 63, 74.

⁴⁵⁷ Heidegger 1962, p.213. “A subject” replaces Heidegger’s original “*Dasein*” as (for these purposes) broadly interchangeable.

⁴⁵⁸ Anger and Kittl 2011; Fu 2016; Grandjean 2016; Hudson 1973; McFarland 1985; Otte and Rousseau 2002; Pinheiro 2011; Riquelme and González-Cantergiani 2016.

⁴⁵⁹ Taylor 2016.

⁴⁶⁰ Eagleton 1994, p.220.

being ‘shut out’ or misrecognised, depriving subjects’ ‘pseudo-environments’ of their (normatively) optimal level of sophistication and intersubjective corroboration. Discursively dependent subjects thus require their discursively original sources to express themselves in such a way that the ‘right’ information *does* ‘get through’—i.e., to identify and use techniques to make their cues stand out within subjects’ perceptual horizons in a way that their senses will pick up, and help subjects decode these cues *as* proxies for specific MRCs. Or, to put it differently, subjects need to find a way of arranging themselves within informational networks in such a way that there is maximum, or at least significantly increased, intersection between the articulatory horizons of discursively original subjects and the perceptual horizons of their discursive dependents to ensure a ‘smooth’ delivery of ‘high-quality’ cues from one to the other.

The best way to do this, as Bernays puts it, is for discursively original subjects to “high-spot” the information in their opinions—i.e., to make its content and form unique, unusual, or disproportionately appealing compared to the rival stimuli that compete simultaneously for dependent subjects’ focus.⁴⁶¹ ‘High-spotting’ takes several forms. Information can be dramatised, personalised, exaggerated, and narrativised in a way that triggers subjects’ means of thinking (their personality, emotions, or reason). While this may allow for complex evidenced argument that allows subjects to ‘show their working’, it often requires subjects to ‘pare down’ or omit some nuances of the discursive processes that created the information in question in order to ‘fit’ it into easily communicable signals.⁴⁶² At a basic level, this tendency can be seen in the attempts by rival political parties to impose block-colour ‘narratives’ on the social conjunctures in which they are competing for office, and to leverage ‘iconic’ stories filled with named individuals in order to appeal to voters. *In extremis*, however, this can also feed into the relatively novel tendency towards rival sources using hyperbolic “clickbait” information-claims as they compete to “out-high-spot” each other via sheer exaggeration—e.g., sensational headlines such as “23 Books You Need To Read Before You Get Married” and “These last moments of the Standing Rock protest will break your heart”, or, in a different register, George Osborne’s prediction for ‘Stronger In’ that Brexit would cost households £4300 per year versus the infamous ‘Vote Leave’ bus-borne ‘£350m a week for the NHS’ pledge during the EU referendum campaign.⁴⁶³

⁴⁶¹ Bernays 2005, p.38.

⁴⁶² McLuhan 2001, p.348.

⁴⁶³ Foglia 2017; Lagorio-Chafkin 2014; Pous 2017; Riley-Smith 2016; Thompson 2013; Viner 2016.

Informational cues can also be repeated, playing on subjects' memory of the stimuli they have been exposed to over time to register gradually in their perceptual horizon.⁴⁶⁴ The aim of this is to render the cues from networks of discursive dependence more 'familiar' to subjects—pandering especially to several forms of heuristic reasoning—and hence more 'trusted' by them, than those from their general informational networks. These cues usually take the form of 'soundbites', 'slogans', or 'mantras' that are expressly designed for their mnemonic value—e.g., 'Take Back Control', 'I'm With Her', 'Make America Great Again', 'Brexit Means Brexit'. Alternatively, cues can be presented in specific combinations or 'batches', relying on subjects' aptitude for pattern-recognition to 'draw' their perceptual focus.⁴⁶⁵ In particular, they can be supplemented with 'labels' or 'metadata' that indicate that it is specifically from discursively original subjects (and not from 'just anyone') that the information comes, or encrypted and 'scrambled' in such a way that only the 'targeted' discursively dependent subjects have the ability to 'translate' the cues in order to extract their informational content.⁴⁶⁶ Usually these take the form of contextualising authorial information (in Twitter 'bios', article bylines, television 'lower thirds', book blurbs, &c) to indicate the occupational (and hence class and activity) provenance of the cue—e.g., 'Sam Bowman, Executive Director of the @ASI, neoliberal, Irish', 'Carolyn Johnson is a reporter covering the business of health. She previously wrote about science at the Boston Globe', &c.⁴⁶⁷ In all cases, however, cues must 'spell out' their core meaning unambiguously: as 'representative summaries' of MRCs, they are supposed to be "easily marketable" to discursively dependent subjects, to borrow a term from Freeden.⁴⁶⁸ They must therefore be 'high-spotted' in a way that both stands out to subjects by appealing to their activity-specific and occupational roles, *habitus*, and behaviours, and connotes the activity to which the MRCs in question belong. The aim is to trigger dependent subjects' recognition of, and 'delegative' acquiescence to, other subjects' discursive originality when they try to form and express opinions about the MRCs under consideration, and prompt them to 'register' predominantly (or even only) *their* cues within their perceptual horizons.

Overall, the social sources of information are also characterised by a degree of plurality for individual subjects and thus mass opinion as a whole. Subjects all receive some information directly from

⁴⁶⁴ Hardt and Splichal 2000, p.146; Gramsci 2005, pp.194-5, 339-41; McLuhan 2001, p.340; Schumpeter 1962, p.257.

⁴⁶⁵ Bernays 2005, p.73; McLuhan 2001, p.247; Price 1992, p.54; Splichal 1999, p.155. On pattern-recognition see, for instance, Margolis 1987.

⁴⁶⁶ Fouché Gaines 1939; Lee and Kim 2013; Piper and Murphy 2002; Paar and Pelzl 2011.

⁴⁶⁷ Bowman 2016; Johnson 2017.

⁴⁶⁸ Freeden 2003, p.7.

‘the social’, namely within the environments and perceptual horizons associated with their occupational positions and class situations, but mostly rely for cues on a variety of activity-specific networks of discursive dependence. Within mass opinion, information originates from the aggregation of the different narrow expertises of a vast array of individual subjects, and circulates intersubjectively through networks whose number has been multiplied by functional differentiation in society. McLuhan characterises subjects in this situation of plurality as conforming to a model of “man the [...] information-gatherer”—seeing “electronic man” as a kind of “nomad”, ‘hunting’ and ‘grazing’ on the informational cues with which their ‘habitat’ provides them.⁴⁶⁹ In this light, opinion research must take far more serious note of the ways in which subjects’ occupational expertise and laity—and the attached norms of originality and dependence—partly align with, and partly cross-cut, subjects’ basic perspectival competence and ignorance when evaluating their opinions. The implicit universalistic treatment of all subjects, regardless of occupation or class, in the polling industry especially leads to a confusion of *authenticity* with competence, and a failure to *qualify* subjects’ opinions based on how ‘expert’ (and how ‘original’) they are when making them.⁴⁷⁰ Subjects can always be ‘better’- or ‘worse’-informed, more or less discursively original or dependent, and more or less opinion-makers or opinion-takers, without this making them any more or less authentic—i.e., more or less subjective ‘authors’—when they form and express opinions.

However, as for predispositions, opinion research must also analyse far more thoroughly the various ways in which the social provision of information is problematised and resisted in late modernity. These stem ultimately from the simultaneous *ubiquity* and *narrowness* of social subjects’ expertise—i.e., the fact that every subject who has an occupation has *some* context of direct experience and area of familiarity, but that these are radically restricted by the complex functional differentiation of society. The first of these, ubiquity, has led to an emergent *mistrust* of the subjects who sit at the ‘centres’, or ‘hubs’ of networks of discursive dependence—and to this dependence itself being seen not as a simple correlative of the norm of discursive originality in a context of inevitable reliance on intersubjective informational networks, but as a source of social *disadvantage*. Resistance thus takes the form of a radical subjectivism, whereby (usually lower-class) subjects deliberately reject the informational cues from their networks of discursive dependence in favour of falling back on purely their own perspectives, or in other

⁴⁶⁹ McLuhan 2001, p.309.

⁴⁷⁰ On authenticity, see variously Fishkin 1995, p.76; Golomb 1995; Heppner *et al.* 2008; Kernis and Goldman 2006; Lakey *et al.* 2008; Phillips 1997; Taylor 1992; Trilling 1974; Wood *et al.* 2008.

Case study 2: Pluto, *déclassé*?

The astronomical debate over Pluto's status as a planet in the Solar System is a classic case of an issue with significant social implications whose resolution subjects have been largely content to delegate to a technical dispute between academic experts. Pluto gained strong cultural recognition after its discovery by Clyde Tombaugh in 1930 (with several predisccovery observations by the Yerkes and Lowell Observatories between 1909 and 1915). Its discovery made media headlines throughout the world, prompted a high-profile naming competition (won by then-11-year-old Venetia Burney), inspired Walt Disney to create Mickey Mouse's eponymous canine companion, and led Glenn Seaborg to name the newly-created element 94 plutonium. However, from 1992 onwards, an increasing number of other celestial bodies were found orbiting the Sun in the same area as Pluto, forming a population of objects called the Kuiper belt, and in 2005, a new trans-Neptunian object was discovered, Eris, that was considerably more massive than Pluto. This sparked growing controversy within and beyond the astronomical community over the definition of 'planet' status, with some museums and planetariums opting to omit Pluto from their models of the Solar System, while press coverage preferred to frame Eris as a 'tenth planet' alongside Pluto. In August 2006, the International Astronomical Union convened in Prague to settle the definition, and decided to reclassify both Pluto and Eris as 'dwarf planets' because neither had 'cleared the neighbourhood' around its orbit. In general, the reclassification was widely accepted, with encyclopedias and educational books and toys quickly amended to reflect the decision. However, some loci of resistance remained, as several U.S. state governments passed more-or-less facetious resolutions to reject or criticise the IAU's decision, the American Dialect Society recognised the word 'plutoed' as a synonym for demotion or devaluation, several commemorative songs were released, such as Aesop Rock's 'Bring Back Pluto' or Robbie Fulks' 'Pluto', and a sentimental page appeared on Facebook called 'When I Was Your Age, Pluto Was A Planet'. Though the IAU did not bow to public pressure to restore Pluto's status, it acknowledged the planet's cultural popularity by announcing in 2008 that all trans-Neptunian dwarf planets would in future be referred to as 'plutoids' in the former planet's honour.

words, having confidence only in 'what they find out for themselves'—*in extremis* an illusory inference of equivalent, or even superior, discursive originality observed variously by Bertrand Russell, Charles Bukowski, and Darwin, and theorised more recently as the 'Dunning-Kruger effect'.⁴⁷¹ This form of resistance can be seen in the periodically-recurring bayardist 'know-nothing' tendencies that scourge democratic political systems, as with Trump cavalierly dismissing Clinton's 30 years as a Washington 'insider' as "bad experience" during the election campaign, or in the casual use of "alternative facts" (i.e., inaccuracies or outright lies) by Trump's press team since his inauguration.⁴⁷²

At the same time, in combination with the second aspect, narrowness, it has encouraged subjects to claim for themselves an expertise, and a discursive originality, that far exceeds the remit of their

⁴⁷¹ Ames and Kammrath 2004; Dunning *et al.* 2003; Ehrlinger and Dunning 2003; Ehrlinger *et al.* 2008; Kruger and Dunning 1999.

⁴⁷² Buncombe 2017; Cowen 2017.

occupational specialisation, and thus loses contact with their actual material and relational environment. Resistance with such ‘*ultracrepidarian*’ tendencies makes the flawed inference that the partial, skewed perspective that subjects have thanks to their place in the social division of purposive agency and inputs can, to all intents and purposes, transcend the specific conditions of their embodiment, and hence be transferred, or universalised, to cover a wider part of ‘the social’. This peculiar form of discursive arrogance is particularly in evidence in the regular crude (and deliberately asymmetric) political appeals to ‘hardworking families’ or ‘taxpayers’ as in some way sources of privileged social insight. While there are obviously good grounds to critique, or contest, the norms of discursive originality that obtain in late modernity, ‘ultracrepidarian’ resistance of this sort goes too far, and entirely denies the necessary basis of expertise in occupational specialisation. Together, these forms of resistance appeal to the superficial comfort and security of ‘familiar knowledge’, using norms that reify the nobility and honesty of ‘blissful ignorance’ and ‘folk wisdom’—all of which serve to brush over the importance of each subject’s instantiation of ‘the they’ to completing their understanding of ‘the social’. In direct opposition to the norms of originality, which rest on a particular interpretation of the significance of competence and expertise, these resistances manifest as what Isaac Asimov calls a “cult of ignorance”—not, of course, a historically unprecedented phenomenon, but one with unusually pervasive ramifications in late modernity.⁴⁷³ In so doing, they create a rivalrous distinction between ‘mass opinion’ in the pluralistic and deeply complex sense in which this enquiry is theorising it and a highly populist conception of ‘common sense’ that prefers to homogenise and simplify the aggregative pictures it creates of ‘the social’ in subjects’ minds. The dangers of such resistance become all too obvious when its supporters attempt to leverage their rejection of current discursive norms into ‘positive’ counter-projects of their own—as with the misguided attempt by Beppe Grillo to counteract ‘fake news’ in Italian politics by having news articles judged by a randomly chosen popular jury, a feature recently copied by the *Washington Post* with a “fact checker user poll” underneath each of their articles.⁴⁷⁴

§3. *The main influences on judgment in late modernity*

To summarise the argument in this chapter so far, the functional differentiation of agency into activities and occupations restricts and refines how, and from where, subjects acquire the predispositions

⁴⁷³ Asimov 1980.

⁴⁷⁴ Taylor 2017.

and information they combine into their mental pictures of ‘the social’. Subjects are interpellated by discursive apparatuses, which define and disseminate to them the predispositions associated with forming and expressing opinions about each of the social activities in which they are engaged. They receive information about ‘the social’ either because they directly affect MRCs through their occupational engagements—in which case, their opinions exhibit expertise, elevated into the normative attribute of original insight—or indirectly via informational cues from other subjects who do so—where their opinions are characterised by (more or less competent) laity, reliant on normativised networks of discursive dependence.

It remains to ask whether the social sources of predispositions and information can be identified more precisely—i.e., whether there are specific types of subjects (and groups) who operate or steer discursive apparatuses, and hence define and disseminate norms and dispositions (including values and attitudes) to subjects, and who dominate or stand disproportionately at the ‘centre’ of networks of discursive dependence, and hence ‘originate’ the information on which subjects depend. The political-scientific tradition within opinion research has tended to assume that most subjects (especially those ‘lay’ subjects who form and express ‘vernacular’ opinions) do not know who they are interpellated by, and on whom they discursively depend. As Zaller puts it:

To an extent that few like but none can avoid, citizens in large societies are dependent on unseen and usually unknown others for most of their information about the larger world in which they live.⁴⁷⁵

In other words, the subjects ‘in charge’ of the discursive apparatuses for each activity are assumed to be anonymous and homogeneously nondescript, while those who are discursively original about a given part of ‘the social’ remain undifferentiated from the wider Heideggerian ‘they’ of subjects’ general information networks. But this is not quite accurate. At the very least, it is possible to narrow down the ‘cast list’ of subjects in each case, based on the differentiation of social action into activities (and domains), and occupations (and classes). The subjects who act as social sources of predispositions and information may not necessarily be *personally* known to other subjects, but they are not the shadowy figures that Zaller suggests. To a considerable extent, they are entirely visible and well-known—i.e., if they are hiding, they are ‘hiding in plain view’.

⁴⁷⁵ Zaller 1992, p.6.

For a start, throughout history but especially in late modernity, the subjects who define and disseminate predispositions and those who provide information are often very similar, if not outright one and the same. The functional specialisation that has accompanied the development of the modes of ideation and communication has led to the emergence of certain occupations whose specific (and even exclusive) task is not only to spread predispositions, but also to ‘gather up’ the ‘representative proxies’ that different subjects with occupational expertise (and, under the relevant modes of ideation and communication, discursive originality) create about the MRCs they interact with, and ‘pass them on’ *en masse* and on a large scale to other subjects. The most obvious cases of such occupations are, of course, journalists and media institutions more generally, but an equivalent role also accrues to, among others, academic researchers (above all those with a ‘generalist’ focus on macrosocial phenomena), publishers (especially of dictionaries, encyclopedias, textbooks, &c), publicity agents (e.g., spokespeople, preachers, lecturers, &c), and others in the intelligentsia.⁴⁷⁶ This way of ‘streamlining’ the societal circulation of discourse, and the presence of occupations ‘responsible for’ it, is not strictly a necessary part of any society. Rather, it is a contingent phenomenon of specific physical and temporal contexts, especially late modernity, which makes it all the more important to maintain an analytic separation between discursive apparatuses and networks of discursive dependence. For instance, the early days of written and print journalism from the 15th to the early 18th centuries saw a relatively clear-cut distinction maintained between publications with the ‘ideological’ function of defining and disseminating predispositions—e.g., pamphlets, periodicals, early magazines—and those with a purely ‘factual’ remit of providing information—e.g., ‘relations’, gazettes, bulletins, newsletters—and it was only during the Enlightenment that the two began to be frequently combined into single ‘newspaper’ publications.⁴⁷⁷ However, one major effect of this pervasive integration of apparatuses and networks—or elision between them—is that often predispositions and information are packaged into the same individual cues, or ‘pellets’, that subjects who operate discursive apparatuses and dominate discursive networks transmit into others’ perceptual horizons. Even though they are distinct categories of discourse, micro-indications with specific information about how subjects ‘should’ act (here, ‘judge’)—i.e., discourse with a specific socialising function—are integrated with the ‘proxies’ that represent a particular set of MRCs—i.e., discourse in a more generic ‘informative’ sense. Social phenomena are very often presented alongside a

⁴⁷⁶ See pp.61-9. Bernays 2011, pp.94, 124; Bourdieu 1977, pp.96-7, 116-7; Ehrenreich 1989; Mannheim 2014, pp.91-170; Weber 1978, pp.500-18.

⁴⁷⁷ Bailey 2008; Briggs and Burke 2010; Chapman 2005; Curran and Gurevitch 2005; Kovarik 2011; Thompson 1995.

framing that either explicitly states or strongly implies the orientation with which subjects should ‘approach’ them—e.g., presentation of topics (inequality, liberty, democracy, authority) as well as their interpretation as ‘problems’ or ‘goods’ in social research and education, or the collocation and interspersal of ‘news stories’ with ‘opinion/comment pieces’ in print, broadcast, or online journalism.⁴⁷⁸ It is then ‘up to’ the interpellated and dependent subjects (often as a result of previous iterations of socialisation) to ‘pick apart’ the different components of these cues from one another.

Another point to note here is that, while the sources of predispositions and information are all in practice individual subjects, it is not always possible to attribute responsibility to them at a personal level. There is a spectrum of possibility for locating the ‘starting-point’ for any given cue—whether fragmentary micro-indication or representative proxy—ranging from concrete and identifiable to diffuse and vague. *In extremis*, this spectrum stretches from singular individuals to whom the creation of predispositions and discursive originality accrues exclusively, all the way up to entire (occupational or classist) subsets of the total set of subjects, to whom this creation and originality accrues evenly and collectively, simply because it does not clearly ‘belong’ to any one of them more than any other. The former, paraphrasing Gramsci, can be called ‘*influential personalities*’, while the latter, following the conventions of the political-scientific tradition, are ‘*reference-groups*’.⁴⁷⁹ There are some obvious examples of individuals and groups who can be identified as ‘prime movers’ in ‘directing’ and ‘operating’ both interpellation and networks of discursive dependence—e.g., the role of ‘trendsetters’ such as the ‘early adopters’ of new technologies, and ‘arbiters of fashion’ in the vein of dandies like Beau Brummell, or of state propaganda institutions (such as the *Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda* in Nazi Germany, the *Отдел пропаганды и агитации* in the USSR, or the Committee on Public Information in the USA).⁴⁸⁰ But in most instances, their roles are not as obvious, and their personal responsibility can, on the surface, only be hinted and guessed at—e.g., the ‘shadowy’ shaping of media discourse by certain media proprietors (Rupert Murdoch, the Barclay brothers, Evgeny Lebedev, Lord Rothermere), or the subtle homogenising effect of ‘peer pressure’ in friendship groups.⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁸ Brooks 2004; Cullen 2014; Gutsche 2015; Lewis 2001; Muhlmann and Birrell 2008; Poe 2011.

⁴⁷⁹ Bernays 2005, pp.73–6; Fishkin 2009, pp.3, 6; Gramsci 2005, p.194; Heidegger 1962, pp.213, 435; Lane and Sears 1964, pp.34, 40–1, 70; Splichal 1999, pp.202–3, 208–9; Zaller 1992, p.41.

⁴⁸⁰ Bernays 2005, 2011; Rogers 1962; Žižek 2011.

⁴⁸¹ Bursztyn and Jensen 2015; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2010; Day 2015; Heimer 2016; McKnight and Hobbs 2011; Wolff 2010.

In the case of influential personalities, their definition and dissemination of predispositions, and provision of information, takes the form of ‘*opinion-leadership*’.⁴⁸² This reflects the fact that other subjects rely on them to ‘start’ networks of discursive dependence for ‘their’ part of ‘the social’, and ‘follow’ their cues about it when they do so. This covers the role of government spokespeople, ‘prophets’, media commentators, senior judges, &c, but, as Foucault suggests, it is especially true in academia, where there is a tendency to lionise the role of individual ‘great’ thinkers in ‘founding’ discourses—as with Alfred North Whitehead’s eminently tiresome (and historically ignorant) description of “the European philosophical tradition” as “a series of footnotes to Plato”.⁴⁸³ By contrast, with reference-groups the same processes constitute what Noelle-Neumann calls an ‘*opinion-climate*’.⁴⁸⁴ This represents two related situations: (1) receiving cues that exhibit a prevalent ‘pattern’ across many subjects involved in them implies that these subjects share ‘prevailing conditions’, and hence a ‘prevailing experience’ (of MRCs) that explains the ‘prevailing opinions’ among them; (2) subjects see themselves as ‘surrounded’ by sources of predispositions and information because the intersubjective cues they receive come ‘from multiple sides’. This happens whenever subjects ‘respond to’ their ‘office environment’, adopt the ‘herd mentality’ of a political protest, adapt to ‘family expectations’, &c—or, as Bernays and Bourdieu variously note, when they ‘look up to’, and take their cues from, the ‘social circles’ in which they aspire to ‘move’.⁴⁸⁵ Of course, all of these concepts—and especially the specific location of subjects on the spectrum from influential personalities to reference-groups—are constructs of the prevailing modes of ideation and communication, as well as their sub-modes for different ‘primary’ activities. Crucially, they are not fixed or absolute, but vary fluidly between different physical and temporal conjunctures.

Armed with these observations, the individuals and groups who are overwhelmingly responsible for transmitting micro-indications and proxies to other subjects can be identified in greater detail. Again, Zaller offers a tentative characterisation of the subjects in question, albeit focused exclusively on political activity:

The ‘others’ on whom we depend, directly or indirectly, for information about the world are, for the most part, persons who devote themselves full time to some aspect of politics

⁴⁸² Belknap and Campbell 1951-2; Bernays 2011, p.88; Gramsci 2005, pp.194-5; Hanson 1993, p.285; Hoffman 2001, pp.127, 137; Kant 1996, p.21; Mueller 1973; Popkin 1991; Price 1989; Splichal 1999, p.30; Zaller 1992, pp.45-6.

⁴⁸³ Foucault 1977b; Whitehead 2010, II.1.1.

⁴⁸⁴ F. Allport 1937, p.18; Noelle-Neumann 1984, pp.28, 124, 169; Noelle-Neumann 1991, p.269; Price 1992, p.67; Splichal 1999, p.178.

⁴⁸⁵ Bernays 2005, pp.38, 54, 73-6; Bernays 2011, pp.124, 130-3, 161-2; Bourdieu 2010, pp.5-8, 73-80, 262, 280-93.

or public affairs—which is to say, political elites. These elites include politicians, higher-level government officials, journalists, some activists, and many kinds of experts and policy specialists.⁴⁸⁶

While this is a useful starting-point, Zaller is wrong to group all of these occupations together into the ‘elite’ class categorisation. It is a particular pathology of political science, and its heavily institutional understanding of power, to divide the ‘mass’ into elites and non-elites—a class division that is simultaneously too universalistic and too simple. It ignores the far more subtle gradations and social hierarchies uncovered by the more structuralist analysis of class this enquiry endorses, which strongly problematises its reduction into merely a binary distinction.⁴⁸⁷ Moreover, Zaller’s characterisation wrongly implies that ‘devoting oneself full time’ to some part of ‘the social’—i.e., meeting the prerequisites for expertise—necessarily bestows ‘eliteness’ on subjects, in the sense of maximal class power underpinned by having the greatest distribution of materials, and the best arrangement within relations in the relevant activity. As seen earlier, this is not the case. Expertise accrues to subjects because they specialise in *some* (any) occupation within a social activity, and not because of their class situation within it—i.e., because they ‘have’ materials and are arranged into relations in an activity *at all*, not only if their particular ‘share’ of its MRCs happens to favour them over others. By brushing over this distinction, and ignoring the classist differences between subjects who act as the sources of predispositions and information, the political-scientific tradition panders unwittingly to populist rhetoric around an aloof yet pervasive social ‘establishment’—as with Gove’s deliberate elision of ‘elites’ and ‘experts’.⁴⁸⁸

Nevertheless, with the exception of his slightly one-dimensional exaggeration of eliteness, Zaller’s list shows a way to add some differentiation to the ‘they’ from whom subjects receive predispositional and informational cues. These are not just an average blur of generic ‘noise’, but can be disaggregated into cues transmitted by multiple sources, discretely categorised according to the various roles that subjects can play. Of course, this is not only true of political activity, but of all parts of ‘the social’: again, it is only a poorly-considered conceit of political science that ‘the political’ fully circumscribes the remit of what ‘mass opinion’ is concerned with.⁴⁸⁹ In broad terms, these categories are the same across all

⁴⁸⁶ Zaller 1992, p.6. Again, Zaller focuses on political activity, but this can be extended to ‘the social’ as a whole.

⁴⁸⁷ See pp.48–53. Fishkin 2009, p.6.

⁴⁸⁸ Canovan 1981; Jones 2015; McGuigan 1992; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015; Serazio 2016.

⁴⁸⁹ Dewey 2012, pp.60–78, 132–44; Zaller 1992, pp.6–16.

activities, although their internal composition may be somewhat more variable, comprising: (1) members of activity *elites*; (2) co-members of occupational *peer-groups*; (3) subjects in each activity's branch of the *intelligentsia*, divided into *academics* and *journalists*; and (4) a selection of '*heroic*' *individuals* with disproportionate discursive influence for their social position, and *other* occupations with secondary or implicit discursive functions. Together, as individuals and as groups, subjects in these categories take priority in providing subjects not only with representative proxies for the MRCs beyond their perceptual horizons, but also fragmentary micro-indications that shape the way they form and express opinions about them.

It is important to examine each 'member' of this 'cast list' in turn. In each case, there are two kinds of explanation for each one's role as a source of predispositions and information: (1) a structural logic, based on the contingent attributes of different social activities; and (2) a normative justification for their discursive priority, especially their endowment with discursive originality, which takes the form of specific norms or ideologies. These ideologies each, in their own often very different ways, attempt to establish relationships of not just *trust* but also discursive *deference* between the categories of subject with discursive priority, and all the other subjects who are discursively dependent on them, in order to *ensure* the smooth functioning of networks of discursive dependence and the apparatuses of discursive interpellation.

First, *elites*. Discourse with respect to a given 'host' activity is closely determined by that activity's internal structure—specifically, the nature and degree of its internal hierarchical class stratifications. One of the effects of the material and relational differentials which class stratifications (instituted by different modes of cooperation) introduce between subjects (as individuals and as groups) is that subjects in different occupations and classes within a given activity interact with its MRCs on vastly different '*scales*'. As argued in chapter I, subjects whose occupation places them into a higher class have more materials, and are arranged more favourably compared to other subjects by their relations, than subjects whose occupation places them in a lower class.⁴⁹⁰ This means that they interact with more MRCs within that activity as part of their subjective embodiment within a given context, and they use more of them, giving their agency within that activity greater 'effect'—i.e., they not only have more power within that social activity, but are also more '*important*' to its nature (and existence). Elites are simply those individuals or occupational/class groups that enjoy this the 'most', and who have the greatest 'impact' on

⁴⁹⁰ See pp.48-53.

‘their’ activities—e.g., political leaders and government ministers, military chiefs of staff, senior civil servants, judges in supreme courts or highest courts of appeal, headteachers and senior professors, school governors and university chancellors, company chief executives and directors, senior doctors and health administrators, family patriarchs and matriarchs, or ecclesiastical primates and other religious authorities.⁴⁹¹

This ‘scale’, greater ‘effect’, and greater ‘importance’ give elites a fairly universal role as sources of predispositions and information across the various social activities. Subjects in elite occupations act as what Bernays calls “invisible government[s]” for ‘their’ activities.⁴⁹² Their actions (individually and as a social group) not only have a major ‘impact’ on their activity, but also ‘steer’ how it takes place overall by framing, or restricting, how subjects in subordinate occupations can exercise their agency within it. For instance, civilian political leaders determine public policies, military leaders give strategic and tactical orders, judges issue rulings, and heads of families set instructions, which are implemented or followed by subjects in lower tiers of the respective hierarchies. This includes one of the most significant elite tasks, namely dispensing occupations among, or determining them for, all the subjects engaged in these activities, under the prevailing modes of cooperation—e.g., hiring workers, assigning tasks, determining organisational divisions, specifying remuneration, &c—as well as making certain forms of behaviour acceptable for them. Thus, elites determine which occupational ‘roles’ subjects need to be ‘prepared for’—i.e., the ideal-type of each social subjectivity into which they must be constituted. Elites control, or ‘own’, the ‘mini-superstructure’ of socialising apparatuses attached to ‘their’ activities, including the discursive apparatuses that carry out interpellation—and, while they may not ‘operate’ these apparatuses directly, they decide to which other occupational groups the task of running them should be delegated. This can be seen in the division between media owners and newspaper editors-in-chief or television and radio executives, the growth of public relations and marketing departments (and even dedicated firms) separate to companies’ executive boards, or in the recent emergence of the ‘spokesperson’ or ‘surrogate’ as stand-ins for political leaders and government ministers, as observed by Jeffrey Green.⁴⁹³ Elites are therefore predominantly responsible for ‘devising’ the occupational and classist norms and dispositions they ‘need’ subjects to conform to under the modes of cooperation under which they themselves hold

⁴⁹¹ Althusser 2014, pp.194-9, 266-70; Bernays 2005, pp.147-8; Bernays 2011, pp.88, 94, 124, 130-3, 161-2; Federico 2012, pp.88-9, 91-3; Fishkin 1995, pp.75-6; Hardt and Splichal 2000, p.168; Mills 2000, pp.94-297; Zaller 1992, pp.6-22.

⁴⁹² Bernays 2005, p.38.

⁴⁹³ Green 2011, pp.194-8; Ifill 2012; Kelly 2016; Weinberger, Spotts, and Markos 2010.

elite class situations, which means they indirectly shape the predispositions that are created when these norms and dispositions are hybridised with ‘general’ values and attitudes. At the same time, by virtue of their larger scale of engagement within an activity, elites have more expansive perspectives than subordinate subjects with lesser scales of action. Their comparatively high control of materials, and privileged location within relations—e.g., by owning factories and buildings as assets, holding capital for investment, determining teaching syllabi, being at the ‘top’ of a ‘chain of command’, &c—places a significant proportion of the MRCs of their activity in proximity to them, allowing elites to experience directly a greater range of stimuli in their environments than subordinate subjects. Moreover, the orientation of their occupations ‘turns’ their attention and awareness towards the considerable proportion of their activity’s MRCs that are distributed to them, and into which they are arranged—e.g., by adopting a ‘big-picture’ perspective, ‘taking charge’, needing to ‘stay on top of the workings of companies and departments, &c—which also inclines them to register a larger range of stimuli within their perceptual horizons. Together, this gives subjects in elite occupations extensive coverage of the full set of MRCs in their activity, where the specific nature of their expertise is one of *comprehensive* familiarity with the activity in question. As such, elites’ class situation makes them vital *universalistic* contributors to the informational networks for ‘their’ activity, on which (other, especially subordinate) subjects rely for cues about the MRCs beyond their (narrower) perceptual horizons.⁴⁹⁴

In late modernity, elites’ discursive priority is justified by converting their higher ‘importance’ for their activities—including their control of discursive apparatuses and their comprehensive coverage of the MRCs in their activities—into a set of normative claims about their exceptional social position. These claims play a crucial role in consolidating elites’ significant discursive roles by establishing hierarchies of epistemic superiority between subjects that replicate the classist stratifications within the activities themselves. They are *exclusive*, in that they address elites’ unique social situation—i.e., their disproportionate distribution of materials, and their disproportionate advantage in relations—which comes at the expense of (many) other subjects. These claims are also *inclusive*, in that they constitute subjects in elite occupations into singular, powerful classes, rather than merely a random assortment of powerful subjects or occupational groups.⁴⁹⁵ The prevailing modes of ideation and communication

⁴⁹⁴ Gardner *et al.* 2011; Goodall, Kahn, and Oswald 2011; Hackman and Walton 1986; Luthans and Avolio 2003; McGrath 1962; Mills 2000, pp.94–241; Peterson *et al.* 2012; Peus *et al.* 2012; Vroom and Jago 1988; Vroom and Yetton 1973; Walumbwa *et al.* 2008; Yukl 2010.

⁴⁹⁵ Hardt and Splichal 2000, p.168.

elevate both this exclusive and this inclusive aspect to the level of ‘goods’, or ‘virtues’, giving the former the guise of ‘*success*’, and fostering the latter by casting members of elite occupational groups as objects of mutual appreciation within the elite, and objects of envy and, above all, *aspiration* outside it—which together manifest as what is termed ‘*achievement ideology*’.⁴⁹⁶ This is associated in late modernity with shibboleths such as ‘meritocracy’, ‘desert’, ‘equality of opportunity’, or ‘social mobility’, and manifests through, for instance, openings for promotion, increasingly generous remuneration levels, the awarding of honorific titles and prestigious sinecures—e.g., peerages, national civic awards, board memberships, &c—or easier opportunities for media exposure.⁴⁹⁷ Ostensibly, it is elites’ ‘achievement’ (rather than their higher class power) that gives them discursive originality regarding ‘their’ MRCs, as it shows that they are not just ‘important to’ the social activity they dominate, due to the scale of their interaction with its MRCs, but also ‘good at’ acting within it—an almost Engelsian phase transition from quantity to quality.⁴⁹⁸ Hence, it is ‘achievement’ that is used to explain why businessmen and ministers, rather than workers or low-ranking civil servants, are assumed to have priority in opinion-making, even where subjects in ‘lower-class’ occupations interact with the same MRCs, often in greater proximity.⁴⁹⁹

Second, *peer-groups*. The discursive role of peer-groups is another effect of the material and relational differentials between subjects imposed by their stratification into classes under different modes of cooperation. Subjects in the same class, and especially those in the same occupation, within a given activity interact with its MRCs in extremely similar ways—specifically, with a very similar degree of ‘*immediacy*’. They have similar distributions of materials, and are arranged similarly into relations, compared with subjects in other classes—and in the case of subjects in the same occupational groups, they have (broadly) *the same* materials and locations in relations. As briefly noted in chapter I, this gives them an likeness, or affinity to one another, as they interact with, and use, very similar MRCs as part of their subjective embodiment—i.e., they have similar power within their social activity, and are of equivalent (if not strictly equal) ‘importance’ to its nature and existence.⁵⁰⁰ Examples of peer-groups include: family members (especially those in the same ‘generation’), work colleagues (especially those on the same ‘team’), fellow citizens or nationals (especially those in the same locality), other students and

⁴⁹⁶ Carter 2008; Ford 1992; MacLeod 2004; Prisock 2015.

⁴⁹⁷ Arrow, Bowles, and Durlauf 1999; Kagan 2012; Lampert 2012; Lipset and Bendix 1991; Matthys 2012; Miller 1976; Olsaretti 2003; Young 1958.

⁴⁹⁸ Engels 1987.

⁴⁹⁹ Bernays 2011, p.161; Fiedler 1967.

⁵⁰⁰ See pp.48-53.

pupils (especially those in the same ‘class’ or ‘set’), or fellow members of a religious community (especially those in the same congregation).⁵⁰¹

This similarity and equivalence of the ‘immediacy’ and ‘importance’ of their social action give peer-groups a likewise fairly universal role as sources of predispositions and information across different activities. Subjects in peer-groups act as ‘guarantors’ for how social activities take place at a granular level—i.e., they ‘guarantee’ that other members of their groups exercise their social agency in the same way as they themselves do. Price suggests that peer-groups offer subjects “social support” for, and a way to avoid “opposition” to, the tasks they perform as part of the relevant social occupations (and classes) within a given activity.⁵⁰² Co-workers, friends, classmates, neighbours, &c, act as the ‘frontline’, or ‘first point of contact’, for providing help, advice, and guidance to subjects whenever they experience difficulty or uncertainty in fulfilling their occupational roles—i.e., they reaffirm the occupational *habitus* by which subjects are expected to abide.⁵⁰³ Peer-groups reinforce the occupational and classist ‘roles’ which subjects are expected to ‘fulfil’—i.e., they are the most proximate, everyday mechanisms that perform the ever-ongoing process of ‘refreshing’ the ideal-types of the social subjectivities into which they have been constituted.⁵⁰⁴ As Lane and Sears (among others) note, they are instrumental to subjects’ ability to “achieve a life perspective”, in that they provide *both* the “life space” *and* the “picture of reality” their members need to ‘function properly’ in the activities to which they belong—and, in return, subjects abide by their prevailing occupational and classist norms and dispositions.⁵⁰⁵ This is especially the case at the points when subjects ‘join’ a peer-group for the first time—e.g., enrolling at an educational institution, starting work for a company, converting to a religion, even being born—as they are usually provided with an initial period of particularly intensive ‘orientation’—e.g., university ‘freshers’ week’, ‘introductory training’, ‘learning the ropes’ in a new office, &c.⁵⁰⁶ In this way, peer-groups ensure that subjects hybridise their ‘general’ values and attitudes with these group-specific norms and dispositions to create the predispositions with which subjects orient their opinions. Moreover, through the similar nature of their engagement within their activities, subjects in any given occupational or classist peer-group share

⁵⁰¹ Dyson, Robertson, and Wong 2015; Henderson, Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau 1976; Mills 2000, pp.30-46, 298-324; Robertson and Symons 1996; Sampson 1991; Stewart 1991; Tait 2017.

⁵⁰² Price 1992, pp.58, 67.

⁵⁰³ Charoensukmongkol, Moqbel, and Gutierrez-Wirsching 2016; Eby and Allen 2012; Gountas, Gountas, and Mavondo 2014; Guchait, Paşamehmetoğlu, and Dawson 2014; Tafvelin, Hyvönen, and Westerberg 2014.

⁵⁰⁴ See pp.54-61.

⁵⁰⁵ Hitti and Killen 2015; Lane and Sears 1964, pp.40-1; Stewart 1991.

⁵⁰⁶ Jee, Schafheutle, and Noyce 2016; Martinez 2016; Tabvuma *et al.* 2015; Yanson and Johnson 2016.

(largely) identical perspectives onto ‘the social’. By having the same (kinds of) materials and the same (kind of) location within relations—e.g., being in the same place, having the same job description and title, ‘working for’ the same superiors, &c—peer-groups enjoy the proximity of the same (narrow) set of MRCs in their activity, and the subjects within them experience the same environmental stimuli. Likewise, since subjects in the same peer-groups have the same occupations (and, albeit to a lesser extent, because they are in the same class situations), they are attentive to, and aware of, the same MRCs—e.g., they purchase the same goods and services, use the same study materials, attend the same meetings, &c—and hence register the same stimuli in their perceptual horizons. This means that subjects in similar occupational positions and class situations ‘replicate’, and to large (and even disproportionate) degree ‘reinforce’, one another’s coverage of their particular subset of their activity’s MRCs, and the nature of peer-group expertise is that subjects’ familiarity with this activity is (broadly) *comparable* to, or on a par with, that of others in the group. Peer-groups thus contribute to informational networks for ‘their’ activity by providing intersubjective cues that *corroborate* subjects’ direct experience of stimuli within their perceptual horizons.⁵⁰⁷

In late modernity, peer-groups’ discursive priority is justified by converting their similar ‘importance’ for their activities—including their socialising effects and their replication of subjects’ perspectives—into normative claims about their comparable social position. These claims set out peer-groups’ significant discursive roles by creating bonds of epistemic equivalence between subjects that mirror the occupational and classist differentiations within activities. The claims are predominantly *inclusive*, in that they group subjects on the basis of broadly similar control of materials, mutually balanced relations, and hence comparable accrual of power within the given activity. They are also slightly *exclusive*, in that they establish divisions between subjects according to the nature of the tasks they perform, and whether they are ‘effective’ at doing so. The prevailing modes of ideation and communication elevate both of these aspects to the level of ‘goods’, or ‘virtues’, framing the inclusive aspect in terms of occupational ‘*solidarity*’, and the exclusive one in terms of differential *function*—which combine into an expression of ‘*conformity ideology*’.⁵⁰⁸ This is linked in late modernity to concepts such as ‘*esprit de corps*’, ‘teamwork’, ‘organicism/community’, or ‘collective responsibility’, and is materialised

⁵⁰⁷ Breen 2005, pp.32–6; Campion, Medsker, and Higgs 1993; International Labor Office 1990, p.5; Marx 1976, pp.211–2; Marx and Engels 1976, pp.482–96; Miller *et al.* 1980; Morse and Weiss 1955; Orr 1996; Weber 1978, pp.140, 302; Wright 2005a, pp.23–7; Wright 2015, p.viii.

⁵⁰⁸ Ankerl 1980; Bayertz 1999; Berg and Bass 1961; Cohen and Lee 1975; Dezalay and Sugaman 1995; Dubin 1958; Durkheim 2014; Romme 2016; Rudoff 1991; van Gyes, de Witte, and Pasture 2001; White 1961; Wood 2004.

through, for example, ‘team-building’ exercises, deliberately similar remuneration levels, performance awards—e.g., school prizes, ‘employee of the month’, ‘Hero of Socialist Labour’, military unit citations, &c—as well as ‘hazing’ or ‘mobbing’.⁵⁰⁹ Superficially, it is this ‘conformity’ (rather than their broadly equal class power) that gives peer-groups discursive originality regarding ‘their’ part of an activity’s MRCs, because it shows that they are ‘well versed’ in the way subjects in their occupations and class situations must act to help their fellow group-members perform their tasks. Hence, it is ‘conformity’ that makes subjects attuned and responsive to the opinion-making of their occupational ‘colleagues’—not, *pace* Bernays and Lippmann, any inherent gregarious drives on their part, appeals to which Dewey rightly dismisses as a “lazy fallacy”.⁵¹⁰

Third, the two categories of *intelligentsia* in civil society. In contrast to social elites and occupational or classist peer-groups, the discursive role of academics and journalists as the primary representatives of a society’s specialised discursive subjectivities in late modernity is a result of differentials in the MRCs of ideation and communication introduced by their contingently prevailing modes of cooperation. Through their specialisation, the engagement of these subjects in their sub-types of ideation and communication becomes systematised and professionalised, and affords them greater access to discursive materials as well as more privileged locations within discursive relations. In turn, this places them at the ‘cutting edge’ of the development of forces of ideation and communication, especially as these pertain variably to the specific sub-types of ideation and communication that take place with respect to different activities—e.g., new theoretical models, new experimental evidence, the latest publications, innovative applications of media technologies, &c.⁵¹¹ Together, these enable subjects within academia and journalism to interact *discursively* with the MRCs in their physical and temporal context to a higher degree of ‘intensity’ than subjects who only discourse about them in a more *ad hoc* or ‘informal’ way. To a significant extent, these classist stratifications within ideation and communication are imported into their various sub-types when they take place with respect to other activities. Moreover, these stratifications may align strongly with the internal stratifications of their ‘host’ activities. Subjects in the intelligentsia often (but by no means always) enjoy a disproportionately close link to subjects in

⁵⁰⁹ Aronson and Mills 1959; Festinger 1961; Gilbert 2000; Hollmann 2002; Nuwer 2004; Page and Donelan 2003; Sadler 2007; Salas *et al.* 2008; Spencer 1841.

⁵¹⁰ Bernays 2005, p.73; Bernays 2011, pp.120-1, 161; Dewey 2012, p.45; Lippmann 1993, p.113.

⁵¹¹ Bailey 2008; Baldwin 2012; Briggs and Burke 2010; Chapman 2005; Clarke and Wilson 2011; Forster and Gjesdal 2015; Harris 2017; Humphreys 2016; Kovarik 2011; Lorimer and Scannell 1994; Lyytinen *et al.* 2007; Marenbon 2015; Rowe and Brass 2008; Schmitt and Skinner 1990; Wood and Hahn 2012.

elite occupations—indeed, there is also often extensive osmosis of personnel between the two categories—which may translate into them acquiring a degree of occupational and class power within the ‘host’ activity in their own right as well. This can be seen in the case of university academics and journalists being hired as policy researchers, ‘special advisors’, speechwriters, strategists, or ‘spin doctors’ by politicians, thinktanks, and parties—e.g., Maurice Glasman, Paul Mason, Seumas Milne, Marc Stears, or Stewart Wood for the UK Labour party at various times—and often ‘going into politics’ themselves—e.g., Ed Balls, Yvette Cooper, David Miliband, or Ed Miliband, again for Labour. This, ultimately, is why Zaller is able to quietly blur together the shared higher-class situation of “journalists” and “policy specialists” with that of “politicians” and “higher-level government officials” when outlining the categories of subjects with discursive priority in the political domain.⁵¹² In late modernity, the most influential subjects in the intelligentsia are those associated with political and economic activity—i.e., economists, political philosophers and scientists, or business, finance, war, parliamentary, foreign affairs editors, reporters, and correspondents, &c—but also to a lesser degree those for curative, religious, and juridical activity—i.e., medical researchers, science and health reporters, jurists, or theologians.⁵¹³

This systematisation and ‘intensity’ of their discursive engagement give the intelligentsia a fairly universal role as sources of predispositions and information in different social activities—albeit more limited and asymmetric for journalists than for academics. By virtue of their specialisation, subjects in specialised discursive occupations are (at least partly) incorporated into, and become ‘agents’ of, discursive apparatuses. Recall that the processes of systematic hybridisation that create their specialised discursive subjectivities are the same ones that institutionalise ‘dedicated’ sub-types of ideation and communication via apparatuses—university departments, government offices, company divisions, &c.⁵¹⁴ Thus, it is often (present and former) academics and journalists to whom elites delegate the task of running discursive apparatuses, which means that not only do these subjects systematically hybridise ‘general’ values and attitudes with occupational and classist norms and dispositions *for their own discursive purposes*, but they also ‘pass on’ the hybrid values and attitudes to other subjects engaged in the relevant activities (and hold relevant occupations), and to subjects who discourse with respect to them. This is ultimately why the *ad hoc* hybrid predispositions of, for example, workers, students, patients, blackletter

⁵¹² Zaller 1992, p.6.

⁵¹³ Alexander 1985; Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996; Blumler and Kavanagh 1999; Bourdieu 1988; Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 2010; Chomsky 1997, 1999; Habermas 1989b; Krishnan 2009; Lash 2007; Lea and Street 2006; Pfeil 2011; Smart 2003; Urry 2010; Wallerstein 2004.

⁵¹⁴ See pp.130-9.

lawyers, religious adherents, &c, are so similar in practice to the more systematic hybridisations of the researchers and publicity agents ‘attached to’ their respective activities. Of course, for specialised discursive subjectivities, interpellation is somewhat reflexive, or recursive, in that—not unlike peer-groups—the intelligentsia constantly ‘reminds themselves’ of the occupational and classist norms and disposition, and the ‘general’ and hybridised values and attitudes by which they ‘call’ (themselves and) other subjects to abide. As a result, academics and journalists create self-reifying ideal-types modelled on themselves of how to discourse with respect to relevant activities, and use them to set the discursive *habitus* for non-specialised discoursing subjects—although, ultimately, no other subjects will conform to these ideal-types as precisely as these specialised discursive subjectivities themselves. Further, through their comparatively more intense discursive engagement with their activities, subjects in the intelligentsia develop more refined perspectives than subjects with more *ad hoc* engagement. On the one hand, their discursive specialisation means that the context in which their engagement takes place is radically shrunk and reshaped to the eventual point where their environment deliberately only includes, and is ‘defined’ according to, the proximate MRCs to whose stimuli they are professionally ‘expected’ to respond—e.g., disciplinary divisions within academia (arts, humanities, natural sciences, &c), or special foci for journalists (business, home affairs, foreign affairs, sport, war, &c).⁵¹⁵ On the other hand, the nature of their specialisation allows them to ‘sustain’ more evenly their attention towards, and awareness of, the MRCs towards which their occupations’ orientation has ‘turned’ them, which allows them to register more, and more detailed, stimuli from ‘their’ set of MRCs (however narrow or broad) within their perceptual horizons—e.g., dedicate more time to researching or investigating an aspect of ‘the social’, focus on it ‘in depth’, accumulate information materials and interview other subjects associated with it, &c. Together, these give subjects in the intelligentsia a ‘sharper’ kind of the specific, narrow coverage that any subject can gain of their part of ‘the social’, which gives academics and journalists expertise characterised by *thorough* familiarity with ‘their’ activity. This allows them to contribute to informational networks for this activity by adding *precision* to the socially available set of cues about ‘their’ set of MRCs, complementing the comprehensiveness of elites and the corroboration of peer-groups.

The intelligentsia’s discursive priority is justified in late modernity by converting their professional discursive ‘intensity’—including their vital role in discursive apparatuses and the precision of their perspectives—into normative claims about the social basis of their discourse. These claims bear a certain

⁵¹⁵ Chubin 1976; Frodeman, Klein, and Mitcham 2010; Jacobs and Frickel 2009; Krishnan 2009; Lea and Street 2010.

resemblance to those surrounding social elites, in that they establish the intelligentsia's significant discursive role by creating parallel hierarchies of epistemic superiority between subjects. They are exclusive in a similar way, in that they address the intelligentsia's preeminent social situation—their disproportionate distribution of *discursive* materials, and their disproportionate advantage in *discursive* relations—versus (again, many) other subjects. And they are inclusive in a similar way as well, since they constitute subjects in discrete occupations and (often) classes into an 'intelligentsia', rather than just a collection of discursive specialists. The prevailing modes of ideation and communication elevate both aspects to the level of 'goods', or 'virtues', casting the exclusive aspect in terms of differential '*intelligence*' or '*sophistication*', and the inclusive aspect by cultivating a shared and mutually validating identitarian sense of '*intellectualism*'—which together take the form of a conjoined pair, '*wisdom* (in the broad sense of *φρόνησις*) *ideology*' and a specific form of '*skill* (in the sense of *τέχνη*) *ideology*'.⁵¹⁶ These are associated in late modernity with phenomena such as 'nerd' and 'geek' culture, the focus on 'genius' and 'talent', 'highbrow' culture, and 'the chattering classes', and are materialised through the heavy reification of 'debate' and 'conversation' (usually led by, and modelled on, the intelligentsia), cultural snobbery (especially regarding music or literary tastes), the awarding of academic titles—e.g., learned society fellowships, memberships of academies, honorary doctorates, &c—and, again, increased opportunities for media exposure.⁵¹⁷ Notionally, it is their 'wisdom' (rather than their higher discursive class power) that gives subjects in the intelligentsia discursive originality regarding 'their' MRCs, as it implies that they are not merely the beneficiaries of socially structured discursive privilege, but that they have also become independently 'good at' discoursing about 'their' activities by internalising ideative and communicative skills to achieve 'enlightened' insight—specifically, making the 'jump' from *δόξα* to *ἐπιστήμη*. It is thus 'wisdom' and 'skill' that are used to explain the priority of, e.g., philosophers, scientists, or other higher education researchers, as well as editors, broadcasters, and columnists, in opinion-making, even for MRCs with which other subjects who are not discursive specialists routinely interact within the activity, often in comparable if not greater physical proximity.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁶ Annas 1999; Cooper 2012; Lecklider 2013; Roochnik 1996; Smith 1998.

⁵¹⁷ Brown *et al.* 2014; Esperdy 2015; Gladwell 2008; Hayes 2000; Hoevel 2010; Kendall 1999; Madigan 2013; Murray 1989; Nugent 2008; Rouvillois 2008; Weisberg 1999.

⁵¹⁸ See pp. 73–4. Dacey 1999; Davidson and Sternberg 1984; Kant 1996; Kim 2005; Kozbelt, Beghetto, and Runco 2010; Niu and Sternberg 2006; Price 1992, p.6; Runco and Albert 2010; Splichal 2001, p.6; Sternberg and Davidson 1996; Sternberg and O'Hara 1999.

Fourth, lastly, *heroic individuals* and *other* occupations. Unlike elites, peer-groups, or the intelligentsia, the discursive role of subjects who are ‘heroic’, or who hold occupations that have implicit discursive aspects, does not necessarily derive from—indeed, may be radically misaligned with—their occupational position or class situation within the activity with respect to which they are discoursing, or within the sub-types of ideation and communication ‘dedicated to’ it. ‘Heroic individuals’ are subjects who strive for achievement and excellence in their part of ‘the social’, either in a strong-willed “agonal” way that is ‘superhuman’ (*übermenschlich*) or ‘above and beyond the call of duty’, as glorified by Friedrich Nietzsche or Ralph Waldo Emerson, or by being ‘representatively average’ in their performance of their occupational tasks, as in the sense of ‘ordinariness’ celebrated by late-modern political rhetoric.⁵¹⁹ Thus, they can come in the form of ‘celebrities’ of various kinds—e.g., ‘star’ business people (Warren Buffett, Bill Gates, George Soros, Mark Zuckerberg), ‘colourful’ politicians (Rob Ford, Pim Fortuyn, “Amma” Jayalalithaa Jayaram), prophets, comedians, ‘TV’ judges or doctors, or ‘supernanny’ parenting advisors—or, conversely, in the fetishisation of ‘normality’ and ‘the people’ in contexts as diverse as the eliciting of ‘vox pop’ views by print and broadcast media, the periodic return of ‘normcore’ tastes in music and fashion, or the deification of ‘reality TV’ contestants (Big Brother, the X Factor, Britain’s Got Talent), which all subtly underpinned Gove’s populist diatribe.⁵²⁰ Their disproportional discursive influence, and their unusually high access to discursive materials and privileged location within discursive relations, goes explicitly ‘against the grain’ of prevailing classist stratifications— as a result of either individual ‘effort’ or social ‘endowment’. With other occupations, meanwhile, this influence and more favourable distribution and arrangement of discursive MRCs comes *ex officio*, as an indirect effect of the discursive ‘implications’ of the sub-types of whichever activity they are involved in, usually connected to a socialising role. There are many examples of occupations in non-discursive apparatuses whose tasks have an implicit discursive function—e.g., parents, teachers, propagandists, advertisers, or legal and religious authorities. In both cases, subjects’ discursive interaction with their MRCs is ‘*extraordinary*’, or ‘*heightened*’, either because they have achieved a scale or immediacy of occupational interaction with them that is unusual for someone in their occupational position or class situation, or because their discourse about them has an intensity that would normally be reserved for subjects in specialised discursive occupations. In late modernity, heroic individuals are generally to be found in political,

⁵¹⁹ Emerson 2010; Nietzsche 2008; Thiele 1990.

⁵²⁰ Allison 2010; Brooks 2014; Carlyle 1841; Cochrane 2014; Cooper-Chen 2005; Holmes and Jermyn 2004; Hook 1943; Murray and Ouellette 2004; Nussbaum 2017; Price 2014; Tschorn 2014.

economic, and religious activity, and less so in the juridical, educational, or curative domains, while examples of *ex officio* interpellation by other occupations can be identified across all parts of ‘the social’.⁵²¹

The ‘extraordinariness’ of their discursive engagement gives subjects in both of these categories a fairly ubiquitous role as sources of predispositions and information in the various social activities. By acquiring greater access to discursive materials and a more advantageous location within discursive relations, heroic individuals of both kinds become ‘tastemakers’ within ‘their’ parts of ‘the social’, and are thus integrated as ‘agents’ into discursive apparatuses alongside more traditional members of the intelligentsia. Rather than the systematic combinations of ‘general’ values and attitudes with occupational and classist norms defined and disseminated by specialised discursive occupations, with heroic individuals the hybridisations they ‘pass on’, and which become disproportionately influential, are much more personal (and often *ad hoc*), speaking expressly to the specific (narrow or broad) conditions of their subjective social experiences, rather than for entire classes or activities. For both ‘superhuman’ and ‘average’ heroic individuals, then, this means that their narrow (at best occupational) predispositions—e.g., as an artist, business leader, soldier, chef—are elevated and extended to apply to considerations in the rest of ‘the social’—as with Stephen Hawking and Meryl Streep both decrying the reactionary political tendencies unleashed by Trump’s election.⁵²² For the subjects in other occupations, their agency in discursive apparatuses emerges from the fact that, in reality, different socialising apparatuses are not as discrete as they appear when they are portrayed analytically. Many subjects, institutions, and processes associated with other socialising activities embed ideative and communicative aspects into their activities as well, which often allows them to act as supporting occupations for the primary interpellating functions of specialised discursive occupations. For instance, parents do not just ‘raise’ their children, but also ‘tell them what to do’, school and university staff do not just research, teach, or administer, they also ‘lecture’ or ‘present’ and ‘distribute’ information, and trade unions do not just organise, they also ‘campaign’, ‘protest’, and ‘argue for’ their views. At the same time, the role of all of these subjects in informational networks follows a similar logic to that of elites, peer-groups, and (especially) the intelligentsia. Heroic individuals have perspectives that are more refined (and occasionally also more expansive) than those of other subjects in their occupational and classist peer-

⁵²¹ Althusser 2014, pp.74-81, 103-39, 142-7, 218-31, 242-6; Blashfield 1981; Calder 1977; Campbell 1949; Mills 2000, pp.71-93; Therborm 1980, pp.84-92.

⁵²² Grazian 2010; Hellmueller and Aeschbacher 2010; Hill, Weibull, and Nilsson 2007; Murray and Ouellette 2004; Riley 2010.

groups, but which nonetheless at least superficially resemble them thanks to their shared embodiment, because they broadly experience stimuli from, and are attentive to, and aware of, the same proximate set of MRCs in ‘their’ activities—goods and services, study materials, office space, employment relations, meeting schedules, &c.⁵²³ Meanwhile, subjects in other socialising occupations also acquire more refined perspectives onto ‘their’ subset of the MRCs in any given activity, as the nature of their *non-discursive* specialisation demands that they ‘sustain’ other sub-types of activity ‘dedicated to’ the ‘host’ activity in question. This inevitably reshapes their environment, and intensifies their attention and awareness to its stimuli, along similar lines to subjects in specialised discursive occupations—i.e., disciplinary divisions, special foci, research and investigation opportunities, &c.⁵²⁴ In all cases, although this means that the nature of the expertise of subjects in these categories is also characterised by thorough and comparable (as well as possibly comprehensive) familiarity with ‘their’ activities, it is more an unusual, diluted, or incidental imitation of the heightened experience, attentiveness, and awareness of subjects who are ‘fully’ in the intelligentsia—and of the precision and corroborative force (and possibly universality) with which they imbue their informational cues.

In late modernity, the discursive priority of heroic individuals and subjects in other socialising occupations is justified by reflecting their discursive ‘extraordinariness’—i.e., their special placement within discursive apparatuses and the moderate corroborative precision of their perspectives—into another set of normative claims about the social basis of their discourse. Again, like those for social elites and the intelligentsia, these claims establish more hierarchies of epistemic superiority between subjects—this time, also (partly) within notionally homogeneous peer-groups. Their exclusivity is hence also similar, as they address the raised social situation of subjects in these categories—their disproportionate distribution of, and arrangement within, discursive MRCs—versus other subjects. Their inclusivity is, again, also similar, as they constitute these subjects into discrete sociological categories, if not necessarily fully delineated occupations and classes. The prevailing modes of ideation and communication elevate these aspects to the level of ‘goods’, or ‘virtues’, framing the exclusive aspect for heroic individuals in terms of either ‘*atypicality*’ or ‘*stereotypicality*’ (for the different kinds of ‘heroism’), and the inclusive aspect in terms of ‘*fame*’, either through ‘*exceptionality*’ or ‘*relatability*’—together bracketed under either

⁵²³ Grindstaff 2011; Murray and Ouellette 2004; Onion 2014; Papacharissi and Mendelson 2007; Rose and Wood 2005; Zimmer 2010.

⁵²⁴ Abbott 1988, 2001; Chubin 1976; Frodeman, Klein, and Mitcham 2010; Jacobs and Frickel 2009; Krishnan 2009; Lea and Street 2010; Oleson and Voss 1979.

'celebrity ideology' or 'everyman ideology'.⁵²⁵ In late modernity, these have become associated with concepts such as 'famous for being famous' versus '15 minutes of fame', 'the glitterati', 'fascination/recognition', or 'all-star/prodigy', and are manifested in, for example, individual product endorsements for marketing campaigns, widespread imitation of fashions and styles of speaking, following health advice, as well as ritualised media exposure for 'select' individuals and groups—e.g., 'gossip columns' focusing on 'celebutantes' such as Paris Hilton or Kim Kardashian, or conversely tabloid adulation of the dutifully militaristic townsfolk of Wootton Bassett.⁵²⁶ Meanwhile, subjects in the other socialising occupations mirror the 'virtues' of the intelligentsia, with exclusivity cast as 'intelligence' and 'sophistication', inclusivity as 'intellectualism', and the overarching ideology again being that of 'wisdom' and 'skill'. Like 'wisdom', it is *prima facie* this 'celebrity' or 'everyman' status (rather than their higher discursive class power) that gives heroic individuals discursive originality regarding 'their' MRCs, by downplaying their socially granted discursive privilege in favour of implying that they are 'good at' or 'well versed in' both performing their occupational tasks and discoursing about 'their' activities in general. Thus, it is 'celebrity', 'everyman' status, and (again) 'wisdom' and 'skill' that are used to explain the priority of, e.g., 'the rich and famous', 'socialites', 'self-made' millionnaires, or 'voters on the street', and also (more generally) subjects in educational and religious occupations, in opinion-making, often alongside or even ahead of the other subjects in the elites, peer-groups, &c, from which they have been 'selected'.⁵²⁷

By virtue of having certain occupations, subjects are interpellated by, and discursively dependent on, specific combinations of these categories of other subjects whenever they form and express opinions about a given part of 'the social'. The general norm of experts' discursive originality is refined to include an additional *order* of discursive priority that reflects the contingent norms of deference to, and trust in, subjects in these particular categories with respect to each activity. The precise balance of this 'cast list' varies between subjects, depending on whether they are engaged in the activity in question, or whether they only hold occupations in other activities, and thus approach this first activity from a perspective of (at best competent) laity. If they are engaged in it, subjects disproportionately receive predispositions and information from their activity elite(s) *and*, first and foremost, their peer-group. Thus, a worker in

⁵²⁵ Crompton 2007; Hilton and von Hippel 1996; Lawrence 2009; McGarty, Yzerbyt, and Spears 2002; Mill 1989; Onion 2014; Schickel 1985; Zimmer 2010.

⁵²⁶ Argetsinger 2009; Birchall 2006; Feeley and Frost 2014; Freedon 2013, pp.170, 197-9; Gabler 2001; Guinn and Perry 2005; Hoffman and Tan 2013, 2015; Langer 1998; Levy 2008; Riley 2010.

⁵²⁷ Beckers and Harder 2016; Beckers, Walgrave, and van den Bulck 2016; Biressi and Nunn 2013; Bosch 2014; Dobbins and Pettman 2006; Elkins 2016; *New York Times* 1984; Sherwin 2011; Sykes 2015.

‘middle management’ is mainly influenced on business topics by their immediate co-workers and their company boss, a low-ranking civil servant on policy matters by their ‘team’ members, ministers, and ‘permanent secretaries’, and a pupil on curriculum issues by their classmates and teachers. If they are not, the influence of activity-specific peers is largely removed, and that of elites reduced to the same level as that of the activity-related intelligentsia or subjects from other categories in the ‘cast list’. A subject who does not have any chronic healthcare needs is thus influenced on medical matters by their GPs or health-related ‘news stories’, but not usually by specialist medical staff, while one who ‘steers clear’ of politics is influenced on public policy issues by senior politicians or ‘current affairs’ discussions ‘in the news’, but not typically by civil servants, parliamentary researchers, or activists.⁵²⁸ If the creation of predispositions and discursive originality are evenly diffused among the subjects in these categories, the categories *as a whole* become subjects’ main reference-groups and predominantly set their opinion-climate regarding the relevant activity—e.g., ‘the people in the office said...’, ‘I saw it on the TV’, ‘I read it in the paper’, ‘I was chatting with some friends and...’, &c. And insofar as they clearly accrue to individual subjects within these categories, these become subjects’ main influential personalities, and predominantly provide them with opinion-leadership regarding this activity—e.g., party leaders, newspaper columnists, famous scientists and academics, TV ‘personalities’, ‘their friend who is a doctor/lawyer/teacher’, &c.⁵²⁹

Uncovering the disproportionate role of elites, peer-groups, academics and journalists, heroic individuals, and other occupations refines how the internal ‘shape’ of discursive apparatuses and the networks of discursive dependence constructed around subjects should be understood in late modernity. In broad terms, these apparatuses and networks are the same for each activity, but their precise arrangement depends on the internal structure of that activity—the number of occupations and classes it contains under its prevailing mode of cooperation, and the distribution and arrangement of MRCs (and hence power) between them. With activities that are highly specialised and differentiated, such as production, administration, or medical caregiving, apparatuses and networks are much more complex, which means that while ‘responsibility’ for discursive influence may, in reality, accrue to smaller groups and specific individuals, the precise nature of this influence may become less definable and obscured. By contrast, with less specialised and differentiated activities, like familial caregiving, devotion, or consumption, the opposite is the case: discursive influence is more diffused, but its effect on subjects is

⁵²⁸ Bernays 2005, pp.73-6; Lane and Sears 1964, pp.34, 40-1, 70; Splichal 1999, pp.202-3, 208-9; Zaller 1992, pp.6-22, 41.

⁵²⁹ F. Allport 1937, p.18; Bernays 2011, p.88; Gramsci 2005, pp.194-5; Hanson 1993, p.285; Noelle-Neumann 1984, pp.28, 124, 169; Noelle-Neumann 1991, p.269; Splichal 1999, p.30; Zaller 1992, pp.45-6, 178.

far more obvious and direct.⁵³⁰ In all cases, however, apparatuses and networks are vast, and their effects on subjects' opinions are quite formidable. They 'amplify' and 'enforce' the discursive priority of elites, peer-groups, academics and journalists, heroic individuals, &c (individually and as groups), as either influential personalities or reference-groups, which consigns other subjects who are interpellated by them, or discursively dependent on them, to 'following their lead', or 'acclimatising to their climate', in forming and expressing their opinions (or, indeed, in choosing *not* to do so). This gives the subjects tasked with operating discursive apparatuses and dominating networks of discursive dependence immense power in the creation of 'mass opinion' at an aggregate social level.

However, even though subjects receive both the predispositions and the information that underpin their opinions almost entirely from this comparatively small set of subjects, they still retain a degree of 'choice' regarding which of them to 'listen to' at any given moment. Firstly, as argued earlier, subjects are likely to hold several occupations, at least over the course of their lives, even if they do not perform all of their occupational tasks simultaneously.⁵³¹ From the analysis in this chapter, it can thus be inferred that subjects will, over the course of their lives, form and express opinions within various climates of opinion, as well as 'steered' by several sources of opinion-leadership—in both cases often mutually contradictory—almost 'wherever they turn', i.e., whichever MRCs they form and express opinions about.⁵³² In other words, each subject is 'subjected' to their own personal constellation of discursive apparatuses (providing various predispositions), and has constructed around them a unique and highly complex network of discursive dependence (providing a range of information), both of which they always 'carry with them'—and between which they must 'adjudicate'—whenever they enter an 'opinion situation'. This becomes especially clear when aspects of 'the social' 'cut across' the analytic divides between activities and domains—e.g., with questions over raising public spending to pay for the construction of new schools, or over the rights of devoutly religious doctors to refuse to perform late-term abortions, &c.⁵³³ In these cases, subjects' opinions will be oriented and informed simultaneously (even if not strictly equally) by their multiple overlapping identities—e.g., respectively, as a taxpayer, voter, parent, and local resident, or as a religious adherent, patient, voter, friend, political activist, &c.

⁵³⁰ Abbott 1988; Cotterrell 2006; Fisher 1939; Hoerder and Neunsinger 2015; James and Szeman 2010; Oleson and Voss 1979; Stearns 2006; Weisz 2003.

⁵³¹ See pp.48-53. Therborn 1980, p.78.

⁵³² Bernays 2005, p.44; Bernays 2011, pp.147, 152; Dewey 2012, pp.77-8.

⁵³³ Nejaime and Siegel 2015; Pope 2010; Sibietta 2015; Stein 2011.

Secondly, the categories of discursively prior subjects—elites, peer-groups, academics, journalists, heroic individuals, &c—are far from monolithic constructions.⁵³⁴ Any number of discrete individuals and groups (and social institutions) can constitute these categories for any given activity—and in late modernity, they usually comprise several reference-groups and influential personalities, who transmit different and often conflicting predispositional and informational cues to other subjects. The extent of fragmentation or homology within each of these categories depends typically on the degree of pluralism that obtains within a given society, which is at least superficially related to the size and diversity of its ‘civil society’ and ‘state’ aspects (both independently and relative to one another). This situation can take the form of ‘hearing conflicting reports’ about the military situation in a warzone, different evaluations of public expenditure decisions by government, business and labour organisations, and charities, conflicting product information from rival companies’ PR departments, contradictory evidence for policy proposals from rival parties, disagreement among members of the same families and friendship groups, or ‘second opinions’ from different medical specialists.⁵³⁵ *In extremis*, this can lead to the contemporary problems of ‘parallel realities’ attached to the proliferation of cable news outlets, whereby rival media organisations—e.g., MSNBC, CBS, CNN, Fox News—deliver ‘representative proxies’ of MRCs that are so different as to be mutually incompatible, so that ‘viewers’ who are asymmetrically discursively dependent on one outlet over the others no longer agree with one another on basic ‘facts’ about ‘the social’.⁵³⁶ Of course, the appearance of diversity can be deceptive, since many newspapers and magazines, television channels, film studios, and other outlets are owned and operated by a few media conglomerates—e.g., in the USA (and UK), Comcast owning NBC, MSNBC, CNBC, Telemundo, USA Network, and Universal Pictures; Walt Disney owning ABC, ESPN, the History Channel, Marvel Entertainment, and Pixar; News Corp owning Fox News, the National Geographic, the *New York Post*, the *Times* and *Sunday Times*, the *Sun*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and Twentieth Century Fox; Time Warner owning CNN, HBO, HTV, Warner Brothers, DC Comics, and *People*, *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune* magazines; Viacom owning MTV, VH1, Nickelodeon, Comedy Central, Spike TV, and Paramount Pictures; or CBS owning Simon & Schuster, Pocket Books, Scribner, and the Free Press publishing houses.⁵³⁷ In some cases, this concentration is disguised by the superficial appearance of substantive

⁵³⁴ Splichal 1999, p.120.

⁵³⁵ Appleyard 2013; Dillner 2017.

⁵³⁶ Bartlett 2000; Blake 2017; Ciciora, Farmer, and Large 2004; Graham 2017; Himberg 2014; Street 2011;

⁵³⁷ For a detailed overview, see Sanders 2016, pp.438–44.

diversity—as with American News LLC owning several “hyperpartisan” websites notionally from opposite ends of the political spectrum, such as the centre-left *Liberal Society* and *Democratic Review*, centre-right *American News* and *Conservative 101*, and “religious clickbait” site *God Today*.⁵³⁸ But, *prima facie*, the point remains that subjects can choose between the multiple cues they receive from their various sources, including those from any other subjects, although under the deference and trust norms of the contingently prevailing modes (and sub-modes) of ideation and communication they are steered predominantly towards choosing among cues from sources with ‘established’ discursive priority.

As a result, the plurality in predispositions and information identified earlier can be modified and more precisely defined, at least for the specific societal conditions of late modernity. For both individual subjects and ‘the mass’ overall, both parts of the ‘marriage’ that constitutes opinions in their most rudimentary form are created and ‘steered’ disproportionately—but, of course, never quite exclusively—by the ‘cast list’ comprising elites, peer-groups, academics, journalists, heroic individuals, and others. While this might *prima facie* seem to reduce the plurality identified earlier, there is still scope for extensive mutual divergence between (and within) the discursive behaviour of subjects and groups within each of these categories. This is as-yet undertheorised in opinion research, which typically focuses only on a generic, non-disaggregated understanding of ‘elites’—as seen with Zaller above—and a fairly macroscopic understanding of ‘opinion climates’—as with Noelle-Neumann. Instead, this enquiry suggests that opinion research needs to recognise the disproportionate but shifting influence of specific occupational groups in late modernity. When opinion research measures ‘a’ subject’s opinion, it is really also measuring the opinions of anyone who has influenced either the predispositions or information on which that subject’s opinion is based—and it is the intricacies of this set of social relationships to which opinion research needs to become more sensitive.

One caveat should be noted here: this cast list of which categories of subjects disproportionately determine predispositions and information may, in any given physical and (especially) temporal context, not fully align with—indeed, may strongly crosscut—the ‘actual’ competence-ignorance and expertise-lait divisions in society, as determined by functional differentiation. Part of the purpose of formulating norms for discourse under given modes (and sub-modes) of ideation and communication is to simplify and systematise the complex, shifting relationships of discursive interpellation and dependence in a highly differentiated society. This creates space for tensions and contradictions to emerge between, on

⁵³⁸ Silverman 2017.

Case study 3: Better Together?

The major influential sources of predispositions and information, as well as the possibilities for fragmentation within them, were illustrated particularly visibly during campaigning ahead of the Scottish independence referendum in 2014. Perhaps inevitably, although subjects in the civil service or the armed forces were obliged to maintain their scrupulous neutrality, all major political parties (and in particular their leaderships) took a position on either side of the debate, with the SNP and Green parties supporting independence (under the aegis of the cross-party 'Yes Scotland' campaign), and Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, and UKIP opposing it (with most backing the 'Better Together' campaign). At the same time, although most businesses stayed officially neutral, some (e.g., BP, BAE Systems) formally endorsed a 'No' vote, while trade unions were more evenly split (e.g., with the Scottish branches of the RMT, CWU, and Prison Officers Association supporting independence, while ASLEF, the national committee of the CWU, and Community opposed it). Many subjects in the intelligentsia adopted positions either via formal organisations (e.g., Academics for Yes, Academics Together) or their individual platforms, including philosophers (e.g., Noam Chomsky for independence, A.C. Grayling against), historians (e.g., Tariq Ali for, Niall Ferguson against), filmmakers (e.g., Ken Loach for, Terry Jones against), writers (e.g., Liz Lochhead for, J.K. Rowling against), newspaper columnists (e.g., George Monbiot for, Peter Osborne against), and radio/television broadcasters (e.g., Lesley Riddoch for, David Attenborough against). Similarly, both campaigns relied on prominent individuals from many 'walks of life' endorsing either position in their personal or social capacities, including comedians (e.g., Frankie Boyle for, Jo Brand against), sportspeople (e.g., Andy Murray for, Alex Ferguson against), and musicians (e.g., Billy Bragg for, Vera Lynn against), as well as individual business leaders (e.g., Jim McColl for, Alan Sugar against) or politicians (e.g., Artur Mas for, Hillary Clinton against). Finally, the campaign also gave rise to the highly-publicised phenomenon of acrimonious splits over independence emerging between family members, friends, work colleagues, or activists, which in several cases outlasted the referendum campaign itself (e.g., the lasting disjunct between Scottish and UK Labour parties).

the one hand, which sources subjects are 'expected' to receive their cues from (as stipulated by norms of discourse), and on the other hand, which sources they 'ought' to receive their cues from (based on the composition of society). Similarly, the structural grounds and normative justifications for discursive priority often clash with one another, and compete for primacy. All these categories of subjects are direct *rivals* in the dissemination of predispositional and informational cues to (other) subjects, and the contradictions between them serve to create a degree of *counterpoint* between each of their claims to discursive priority, and pose a critical *challenge* to the predispositional and informational content of their cues. On the back of these contradictions are built many of the social conflicts for discursive priority between social elites and subordinated occupational groups—e.g., the 2015–16 UK junior doctors' strike and dispute between the British Medical Association and the Conservative government, as a case of two sides claiming to 'know best' about healthcare policy.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁹ BBC News 2016b.

As a result of this, the latent tendencies to problematise and resist the social sources of predispositions and information combine into a form of late-modern discursive resistance that is heavily predicated on an active rejection of the discursive priority of some (but not all) ‘members’ of the ‘cast list’ outlined above. Predominantly, this takes the form of *anti-elitism* against the discursive priority of subjects in dominant social classes, especially ones that are ‘obvious’ or ‘visible’ like political rulers, and *anti-intellectualism* against the priority of the intelligentsia and their supporting subjects in other socialising occupations.⁵⁴⁰ This can be seen in the abruptly falling trust in governmental, business, and media elites, in the ‘discursive Farageism’ of the perennial accusations at, for example, academics for “not having a real job”, or the ‘discursive Trumpism’ of complaints about the media being “biased”, “very dishonest”, or (most toxic of all) “the lying press” (*Lügenpresse*).⁵⁴¹ In their place, this resistance lionises (incomplete) subjective perspectives and their associated discursive *habitus*, justified *prima facie* in terms of a reversion to “instinct”—a tendency regrettably abetted by the increasingly toxic and un-self-critical “intuitionism” of several dominant strands of academic social thought.⁵⁴² In reality, however, this resistance is not a ‘rejection’ of the external sources of predispositions and information, but rather an attempt to ‘break out’ of the ongoing cycle of interpellation and discursive dependence to which subjects are subjected. This means that subjects do not invent new predispositions or find new information to underpin their opinions—i.e., start ‘fresh’, or ‘with a clean slate’—but are merely stuck with their past predispositions (including increasingly reactionary values and attitudes) and rely on their memory of prior information (which becomes increasingly ‘hazy’ and out-of-date). Subjects’ attempt to resist interpellation and discursive dependence comes at a cost—specifically, of detachment from social reality, with the result that subjects end up living, thinking, and articulating, in different social realities.⁵⁴³ If they try to avoid this but still reject the priority of elites and the intelligentsia, they become disproportionately discursively dependent on ever more inward-looking peer-groups—as with the ‘echo chamber’ phenomenon in contemporary social media—or on progressively more arbitrarily-chosen heroic individuals—as with any caesarist strand of populist demagoguery.⁵⁴⁴

Of course, this is not by any stretch a uniquely late-modern phenomenon, although its particular form in late modernity is strongly influenced by recent developments in the modes of cooperation for

⁵⁴⁰ Blewett 2016; Claussen 2004; Hofstadter 1963; Spode 2016; Wright 2016.

⁵⁴¹ Grierson 2017; Jacobs 2017; Lyons 2016; Noack 2016.

⁵⁴² Rawls 1971, pp.30-40.

⁵⁴³ Bump 2016.

⁵⁴⁴ Baehr and Richter 2004; Jamieson and Cappella 2008; O'Donnell 1992; Williams 2011; Yavetz 1971.

various other activities bleeding across into ideation and communication. This is especially true of changes in the mode of administration, where the shift from absolutism to democratic constitutionalism, along with the rise of popular sovereignty, has brought about a political context characterised by (more) equalised participation, universalised enfranchisement, and regular elections.⁵⁴⁵ This broadly anti-hierarchical development has come into conflict with enduring stratifications in the discursive domain, which restrict access to, and favourable location within, the MRCs of ideation and communication—and hence discursive power—to a much smaller part of any given societal population than that empowered in late-modern politics.⁵⁴⁶ And this contradiction has only been exacerbated by the societal ‘spillover effects’ of developments in other domains—e.g., low-level *embourgeoisement* at the same time as increasing concentrations of capital in higher productive classes, the spread of commercialisation and the logic of ‘consumer choice’ logic into non-economic domains, and the universalisation and expansion of rights (including free speech and expression) within and beyond the juridical domain.⁵⁴⁷ In light of this, what is often forgotten, and what opinion research must pay greater attention to, is that to really challenge the current ideologies that sustain the discursive priority of elites—and to an extent also that of occupational peer-groups, academics, journalists, heroic individuals, and others—for a given activity, it is not enough merely to reject, or try to subvert, its associated discursive apparatuses. Rather, lasting discursive change requires ‘deeper’ social action to change the MRCs and modes of cooperation for the social activities with respect to which subjects form and express opinions.

§4. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the functional differentiation of social agency leads to the emergence of a large degree of pluralism in the predispositions and information that underpin opinion-formation and opinion-expression, both for individual subjects and for ‘mass opinion’ as a whole. The particular type of pluralism in question here can be characterised as *multipolarity*. Analogous to the way this concept is used in international relations theory, the sense of plurality it refers to is that, even in its most classist forms, mass opinion contains many ‘poles’ or centres of power—here ideative and communicative

⁵⁴⁵ Coppedge 2012; Whitehead 2002.

⁵⁴⁶ Bourdieu 1988; Ellcessor 2016; Gutsche 2015; Lester 2010; Lyytinen *et al.* 2007; Potter and Baum 2013; Rowe and Brass 2008; Tange 2016; Whitworth and Friedman 2009.

⁵⁴⁷ Abeysekera 2008; Barendt 2007; Bergvall-Kärebörn and Howcroft 2014; Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 2010; Paul and Miller 2004; Piketty 2014; Putterman 2007; Rosewarne 2010; Smart 2003; Weber Cannon 1980.

(discursive) power rather than military (political) or industrial (economic) power *per se*.⁵⁴⁸ The chapter started by outlining how subjects receive the norms and dispositions that guide their social behaviour as part of their wider socialisation, and identified the definition and dissemination of these norms and dispositions as being carried out by specific discursive apparatuses via processes of interpellation. Subjects' values and attitudes (i.e., predispositions), as specific judgmental categories of discursive norms and dispositions, are determined by—and vary according to—the activities (occupational positions, class situations) in the context of which they are forming and expressing opinions. Next, the chapter looked at how subjects receive information about MRCs within, and beyond, their experience, which feeds into the mental pictures that act as the objects of their opinions, and argued that all subjects have a degree of expertise in judging MRCs associated with the occupations in which they specialise, but a correlative degree of laity for all other MRCs. At least in late modernity, these characteristics are elevated into a normative distinction between discursive originality and dependence that reinforces subjects' mutual reliance for representational cues about more distant areas of 'the social', and embeds them in specific networks based on the occupations they hold. Finally, the chapter identified the influential personalities and reference-groups by whom subjects are primarily interpellated, and on whom they mainly depend for information, as falling into the following categories: social elites, occupational (and class) peer-groups, academics and journalists (the civil society intelligentsia), 'heroic individuals', and some others. In late modernity, each of these is associated with an ideology of deference and trust that cements their dominant role in shaping subjects' opinions. Opinion research must bear in mind all the effects of multipolarity and social stratification when analysing the many ways in which mass opinion is oriented and informed. Next, this enquiry continues by exploring the existence of similar pluralistic effects of functional differentiation on the processes of opinion-formation.

⁵⁴⁸ Ikenberry 1999; Jervis 2009; Mansfield 1993; Waltz 1964, 1993, 2000.

IV. Are you thinking how we're thinking?: pluralism in opinion-formation

The personality is strangely composite: it contains Stone Age elements and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of a human race united the world over.

—Antonio Gramsci⁵⁴⁹

NEWT GINGRICH: The current view is that liberals have a whole set of statistics which theoretically may be right, but it's not where human beings are. People are frightened.

ALISYN CAMEROTA: But what you're saying is – but hold on, Mr Speaker, because you're saying liberals use these numbers, they use this sort of magic math. This is the FBI statistics. They're not a liberal organisation, they're a crime-fighting organisation.

NEWT GINGRICH: No, but what I said is equally true. People feel more threatened.

ALISYN CAMEROTA: Feel it, yes, they feel it, but the facts don't support it!

NEWT GINGRICH: Fine, as a political candidate, I'll go with how people feel, and I'll let you go with the theoreticians.

—'New Day', *CNN*, 22 July 2016⁵⁵⁰

The previous chapter outlined how subjects' social activities, occupational positions, and class situations affect how they acquire the predispositions and information with which they create their mental pictures of 'the social'. Their predispositions are defined and disseminated by discursive apparatuses, while information circulates throughout society by means of normativised networks of discursive dependence, which are both specific to the various social activities, and are disproportionately operated (apparatuses) and dominated (networks) in late modernity by particular categories of subjects and groups. This chapter continues with the next stage of the analysis, namely the impact of subjects' social conditions on the way they form opinions about 'the social'. Specifically, it examines how far

⁵⁴⁹ Gramsci 2005, p.324.

⁵⁵⁰ Gingrich 2016.

subjects' control over, disposal of, and access to, the means of thinking they use to form opinions—i.e., the material basis of their ideative power—varies according to the activities in which they are engaged, the occupations they hold, and the class situations they occupy. The chapter starts by considering to what extent means of thinking are 'permanent' features of opinion-formation for all subjects, and how far they are contingent on occupational divisions and classist stratifications within the prevailing mode of ideation in late modernity, as well as the prevailing sub-modes of ideation associated with different activities—i.e., whether they are universally or differentially used by subjects in different parts of 'the social' (§1). It then examines, in turn, the differences that the division of 'the social' into activities and occupations (and classes) introduces into the ways in which subjects use each means of thinking to form their opinions: personality-traits (§2), emotions (§3), and reasoning (§4). Finally, it suggests that the processes of ideation by which contemporary mass opinion is formed are characterised by a historically consistent degree of pluralism, which it terms the *multiformity* of the concept in late modernity.

§1. *Occupation, class, and the means of thinking*

This part of the analysis begins with the basic observation that, even though all subjects use some personality-traits, emotions, and reason to process their mental pictures of 'the social', different subjects combine these means to form their opinions in very different ways. The substantive opinions that subjects 'hold' about 'the social' can be derived via any number or variety of competing psychological elements, the emphasis on which can shift radically between them: different subjects can form opinions 'conscientiously', 'agreeably', 'neurotically', &c, 'emotionally' ('angrily', 'fearfully', 'sadly', &c) or 'via reason' ('rationally', 'reasonably', 'heuristically'), as well as any combination of these. The aim here is to establish what effect 'the social' itself has on determining why this is the case, and point out some wider trends within these intersubjective differences. As in the previous chapter, it is worth revisiting the premises of this part of the analysis. In chapter I, this enquiry argued that, for every activity, the distribution of materials (especially means) among, and arrangement of relations between, the subjects engaged in it is determined by that activity's prevailing mode of cooperation. In the case of opinion-formation, this distribution and arrangement is governed by the prevailing mode of ideation. However, with the high degree of functional differentiation in late modernity, and the emergence of sub-types of ideation 'dedicated to' different social activities, determining the distribution/arrangement of the MRCs of ideation with respect to each activity has become the preserve of the various hybridised sub-modes of

ideation. These have created a range of ideative occupations that are specialised ‘in’ particular parts of ‘the social’—academic ‘theorists’ and researchers, and other members of the predominantly ideative ‘branch’ of the discursive ‘intelligentsia’ for any activity—as well as more informal ways of ‘thinking about’ them.⁵⁵¹ Meanwhile, in chapter II, the enquiry identified the general effects that the different means of thinking have on opinion-formation, arguing that subjects combine personality-driven, emotional, and reasoned thinking in mutually supportive or contradictory ways to add complex sophistication to the judgments embedded in their mental pictures of their environments.⁵⁵² The purpose of this chapter is thus to continue with the task of reconciling the classist asymmetries in evidence in late modernity theorised in chapter I with the universality of the model of opinion-formation outlined in chapter II.

First, it is worth considering how much scope there is for differentiation in how subjects use each of their means of thinking—i.e., in general, how ‘permanent’ or ‘variable’ their control over, disposal of, or access to personality-traits, emotions, and reason is. Of course, all three are usually considered to be at least partly ‘permanent’ faculties of human psychology and physiology, as in general they are clearly something that all subjects have, and that is ‘naturally’, or ‘inherently’, connected to their sheer existence as living, embodied beings. Hence, to some extent, personality-traits, emotions, and reason all belong to subjects’ ‘kernel’ of pre-socialised humanity. However, it is still an open question to what extent subjects’ specific personality-profiles, emotional states, or approaches to reasoning are ‘permanent’ or ‘contingent’ features of their subjectivities—i.e., whether the precise combination of ‘points’ where each subject ‘sits’ on the trait-spectrums, the ‘balance’ of emotions they feel, and how they use their reason are also immutable and fundamental characteristics, or instead variable consequences of socialisation processes. The consensus in individual and social psychology lies more towards seeing them as partly ‘contingent’ features—with approximately half the intersubjective variation in subjects’ uses of personality, emotions, and reasoning explained by genetic inheritance, and the remainder by subjects’ social experiences, mostly durable from socialisation during early childhood except for (on occasion) sudden significant shifts due to major life crises in adulthood.⁵⁵³ For personality-traits, there has been wide agreement since the earliest studies of trait theory that, to use Gordon Allport’s terms, some aspects of personality are “central” (found to some degree in every subject), while others are “secondary” (only

⁵⁵¹ See pp.62-5.

⁵⁵² See pp.85-105.

⁵⁵³ Bouchard and McGue 2003; Specht, Egloff, and Schmukle 2011; Thorpe and Schmuller 1958.

manifest in some circumstances), and that it is the personality-traits that are “common” (recognised within a given discourse) and “cardinal” (intrinsically attributable to specific subjects) that predominantly influence agents’ social actions ‘*at the margin*’.⁵⁵⁴ For instance, a subject may be ‘defined by’, or ‘known for’, being unusually conscientious or agreeable (cardinal traits), while also being moderately open, extraverted, and neurotic (central traits), specifically to the same degree as other subjects in their social situations (common traits)—e.g., their work colleagues, friendship groups, coursemates, or fellow activists—but occasionally become uncharacteristically ‘closed’ or ‘introverted’ in certain contexts (secondary traits)—e.g., job interviews, family occasions, examinations, or public debates.

Such a distinction is seen even more clearly with emotions and reason, since while personality-traits are stable structures exercising long-term influence on subjects’ thinking, affective states and applications of reasoning are (respectively) more circumstantial and less immediate—even consciously chosen—ways for subjects to process their mental pictures of ‘the social’ as and when they experience stimuli within it.⁵⁵⁵ Certain contexts—i.e., specific aspects of ‘the social’, such as economic inequality, a piece of music, the outbreak of war, natural resource depletion, or someone’s death—may prompt subjects to feel temporary ‘periods’, or even just momentary ‘flashes’, of fear, anger, enthusiasm, sadness, pride, shame, or disgust, and which contexts elicit which emotions can vary drastically between subjects—e.g., a diplomat, a bereaved relative, an environmental campaigner, a composition teacher, or an industry executive. Likewise, subjects differ (and can often choose to differ) to a large extent in how thoroughly and ‘effortfully’ they ‘reason through’ their judgments—e.g., how carefully or selectively they acquire information, how many ‘shortcuts’ they take when processing their mental pictures, &c—and how far to take others’ thinking into account when they do so—e.g., how far they adhere to ‘shared’ senses of ‘good/evil’, ‘right/wrong’, &c.⁵⁵⁶ As a result, while the fundamental components of their personalities and the capacity for emotional and reasoned thinking may be more or less universal across all subjects, there is considerable scope for ‘the social’—and for socialisation processes—to ‘bring out’ different specific traits, emotions, and types of reasoning under some conditions more than others. With personality-traits and emotions, socialisation is arguably less a question of determining *whether* subjects have control over, disposal of, or access to them, but rather *how* they do so—i.e., how they use traits and

⁵⁵⁴ G. Allport 1937; McAdams 2001.

⁵⁵⁵ Brader 2012, p.194; Mondak and Hibbing 2012, p.219.

⁵⁵⁶ Barrett, Tugade, and Engle 2004; Evans 1984, 2003; Kahneman 2011; Lizardo *et al.* 2016; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000; Osman 2004; Reisberg 2013; Sloman 1996; Smith and DeCoster 2000.

emotions they have ‘naturally’, or ‘inherently’—whereas with reason, it is a case of determining *both* whether and how they have access, control, or disposal—i.e., what means they have, and how they (choose to) use them.

This means that the contingently prevailing modes (and activity-specific sub-modes) of ideation have significant leeway to affect (e.g., steer, exacerbate, or reinforce) how subjects use particular personality-traits, emotions, and forms of reasoning to form opinions about different parts of ‘the social’. So far, opinion research has traditionally only examined the extent to which subjects’ opinions, as part of their broader ideological worldviews, can be predicted by features of their psychology, especially their personality-traits but to some degree also their emotions and uses of reason.⁵⁵⁷ Instead, this enquiry argues that this focus is too superficial, and that opinion research must also examine how far subjects’ opinions and the specific combination of means of thinking they use to form them—i.e., any or all of several different personality-traits, emotions, and forms of reasoning—can be predicted through a ‘deep-structure’ analysis of the mode of ideation by which their thinking is governed, and other aspects of their ideative *habitus*.⁵⁵⁸ Since at least the Stoics, successive ideative modes (and sub-modes) and *habitus* have varied drastically in the relative weight they have placed on personality, emotion, and reason in general, and specific traits, emotions, and forms of reasoning in particular. Instead of a complete overview of the thinking ‘preferences’ of each mode, it is possible to illustrate some general tendencies in how different means of thinking have historically been mobilised and essentialised.

The norms around the various means of thinking have often focused on various interpretations of the need for subjects to be intellectually emancipated from the strictures of foregoing modes of ideation, especially where these required subjects to defend ‘received’ dogmas via exegesis of renowned *auctores* and accepted methods and ideas. In the case of personality, the historical development of these norms (at least within Europe) is characterised by two major tendencies, separated by a significant shift, or break. First, the transition from medieval scholasticism via early-Renaissance humanism to late-Renaissance and early-Enlightenment rationalism and scientific experimentalism was associated with a reification of inquisitiveness, thoroughness, reserved reflection, analytical detachment, and impulse control.⁵⁵⁹ By contrast, the Counter-Enlightenment reactions of *Sturm und Drang* and Romanticism,

⁵⁵⁷ Caprara, Vecchione, and Schwartz 2009; Carney *et al.* 2008; Mondak and Hibbing 2012; Verhulst, Eaves, and Hatemi 2012. See also ch.II §2.

⁵⁵⁸ For more on the direction of causality between subjects’ psychology and ‘the social’, see, for instance, Murray, Rushton, and Paunonen 1990.

⁵⁵⁹ Clarke and Wilson 2011; Harris 2017; Marenbon 2015; Schmitt and Skinner 1990.

&c, can be read in part as an attempt to reverse many of these norms, and instead embrace compassion, spontaneity, high energy, moodiness, and sensitivity.⁵⁶⁰ Meanwhile, accounts of the role of emotions have moved from Aristotelian (and later medieval) views of passion as a vital component of virtue, via humanist treatments of emotions as key to understanding the complex versatility of human nature, as well as the reification of intense emotionality in the Counter-Enlightenment, to their psychiatrisation since the late 19th century as both evolutionary and adaptive, and hence integral to all planning and decision-making.⁵⁶¹ In parallel, the focus on reason has undergone a shift from Classical debates about its role in deriving cosmic conclusions from *ἀρχαί* ('first principles'), through medieval views of reason as 'natural', objectively fixed and discoverable, its individuation and epistemologisation in the Enlightenment as a subjective faculty for forming concepts and formalising procedures, and the incorporation of mathematical logic under analytic philosophy, to reach its apotheosis in positivist theories of science.⁵⁶² The norms and practices around the use of each means of thinking have developed in a continuous and often dialectical series of moves and counter-moves—and while each of them has had its vigorous defenders and critics, attempts to compatibilise the three have persisted throughout the 'history of philosophy'. In late modernity, with the fragmentation of ideative hegemony, and the existence of several competing modes—scientism, positivism, pragmatism, critical theory, existentialism, postmodernism, &c—it becomes harder to 'pin down' a single, conclusively favoured norm of personality, emotion, or reason within 'contemporary' ideation.⁵⁶³ But it should be clear that such norms nonetheless exist with at least some degree of definition for each of them.

In general, for each mode of ideation, socialising apparatuses—and especially apparatuses of discursive interpellation—endow subjects with these norms regarding their use of personality, emotion, and reason as part of their wider ideative *habitus*. Just as the values and attitudes they define and disseminate give subjects' opinions their judgmental orientations, these ideative norms represent the contingent ideal-types of 'how to think' using personality-traits, emotions, and forms of reasoning under the prevailing mode of ideation (as this has developed over time). That is to say, for every physical and temporal conjuncture, they stipulate the 'average' societal archetype for *how* 'openly', 'conscientiously', 'angrily', 'fearfully', 'rationally', 'reasonably', &c, subjects should be thinking when they form opinions.

⁵⁶⁰ Forster and Gjesdal 2015; Wood and Hahn 2012.

⁵⁶¹ Baldwin 2012; Clarke and Wilson 2011; Forster and Gjesdal 2015; Schmitt and Skinner 1990; Wood and Hahn 2012.

⁵⁶² Beaney 2015; Harris 2017; Humphreys 2016; Marenbon 2015.

⁵⁶³ See, for instance, Livingston 2014; Rorty 1979; Thompson 2017; Williamson 2008.

However, although these norms are *prima facie* intended to apply to some degree to all social subjects engaged in ideation at any given conjuncture, the specific ideal-types to which they are expected to conform become ‘disaggregated’ along the lines of the divisions of thinking instituted by each mode of ideation. Recall that, for each social activity, the division of purposive inputs subdivides its ‘overall’ *habitus* under a prevailing mode of cooperation into separate *habitus* for each occupation/class within them.⁵⁶⁴ This means that the norms around the use of means of thinking by which subjects are expected to abide when they form opinions will vary—often significantly—depending on the precise ideative occupation they hold within the division of thinking, and consequently ‘their’ distribution and arrangement of the MRCs of ideation. The precise ‘content’ of each subject’s norms (and hence the kind, or level, of their access, &c, to their personality-traits, emotions, and reason) will depend on the type of (vernacular or specialised) ‘ideating’ they are doing when they form opinions—i.e., casual pondering, positive and critical theorising, apologism, or dogmatic exposition, &c.⁵⁶⁵ Moreover, in late modernity, the prevailing mode of ideation is markedly classist, which manifests as systematic (and sometimes radical) inequalities in the MRCs of ideation, and hence the ideative power, of subjects in different ideative occupations—including specifically differential control over, disposal of, and access to the means of thinking. As suggested in chapter III, the ideative occupations in the intelligentsia—i.e., academics and other researchers—enjoy the most favourable distribution and arrangement of MRCs, and hence constitute an ideative elite in any society, and can therefore use means of thinking far *better* and far *more* than subjects in lower-class or ‘informal’ ideative occupations. Subjects in the intelligentsia are thus expected to exhibit personality-traits, feel emotions, and use forms of reasoning in a way that enhance, rather than inhibit, the complexity and sophistication of their thinking processes—associated with elements and extensions of ‘wisdom ideology’, such as ‘thoughtfulness’, ‘detachment’, ‘creativity’, ‘rigour’, ‘intelligence’, &c—possibly even to the detriment of subjects outside the ideative elite.⁵⁶⁶ This is especially obvious when ‘thinking aids’ and reasoning tools and strategies are materialised (embedded, realised) in, or rely on, external resources—i.e., books (especially dictionaries and thesauri), formulas, statistical models, symbols, and other representations of reified abstract concepts, such as numbers and letters. Academics and researchers have far greater and more immediate control over, disposal of, and

⁵⁶⁴ See pp.55-6.

⁵⁶⁵ See pp.62-5.

⁵⁶⁶ See p.172. On rigour, see Brentano 1995; Crippen *et al.* 2005; Davies and Dodd 2002; Dilthey 1991; Morse 2004; Poincaré 1982; Twardowski 1999; Zelik, Patterson, and Woods 2010.

access to these resources than other ‘ideators’—because they have often developed and discovered them themselves—and hence a firmer and ‘wiser’ grasp of the ways of thinking they ‘embed’, or ‘realise’.⁵⁶⁷ As a result, subjects in the intelligentsia are endowed with a ‘fuller’ ideal-type of ‘how to think’, while those in other ideative occupations receive ideal-types that are to some extent ‘derivative’ or ‘impoverished’, reflecting their comparatively reduced use of the means of thinking.

But the way in which subjects form opinions is not merely differentiated according to divisions within ideation alone. The overarching norms and practices for using personality-traits, emotions, and reason, and the prevailing classist divisions within ideation, are ‘cross-cut’ by the social division of purposive agency into activities (and domains) and occupations (and classes) in late modernity. This takes place in two ways. First, recall that ideative *habitus* and occupational/class divisions become more granular with the emergence of separate sub-types of ideation ‘dedicated to’ different social activities. Since the sub-modes of ideation governing these sub-types hybridise the prevailing mode of ideation with the modes of cooperation for the activities with respect to which subjects are forming opinions, these ‘primary’ activities are “determinant” in modifying the general ideative norms of how, and whether, subjects use the various means of thinking to do so. For different sub-types of ideation associated with specific activities, it is possible to identify certain personality-profiles, emotional tendencies, and ways of reasoning that are reified and universalised across *all* subjects engaged in these activities under their contingent sub-modes of ideation. For example, the emergence of social contract ideology as the contingent response of Enlightenment rationalism and methodological individualism to the rise of political rights, constitutionalism, and popular sovereignty and participation rewards a very specific ‘balance’ of personality-traits such as agreeableness, extraversion, and neuroticism, along with an unusual prominence for fear and certain forms of sadness, and ‘fuller’ forms of rational reasoning.⁵⁶⁸ By contrast, the aestheticisation and emotionalisation of politics under various socialisms and fascisms—e.g., the ‘socialist realist’ tendency in Soviet art and literature, the heavy influence of futurism on early fascism, and the accommodation of neo-Nazism to various counter-cultural movements, such as ‘skinheads’, ‘bikers’, and now ‘hipsters’—steers subjects towards a different ‘balance’ of especially openness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism, adds anger, pride, and disgust to fear in subjects’ emotional

⁵⁶⁷ Csíkszentmihályi 1999; Grudin 2004; Hirschhorn 2006; Lyytinen *et al.* 2007; Rowe and Brass 2008; Tange 2016; Whitworth and Friedman 2009.

⁵⁶⁸ Grotius 2005, Prol. §§6-8, 10, 12, 16, I.1, II.20; Haakonssen 2004; Hochstrasser 2000; Hobbes 1996, XI.4-5, XIII.5-9; Pufendorf 2005, II.1-3, III.4, VII.1-2, VIII.4; Rousseau 1984.

portfolio, and occasionally downplays ‘full’ rationality in favour of more heuristic reasoning.⁵⁶⁹ At the same time, each sub-type of ideation replicates, or incorporates, general classist differentiations in subjects’ use of each of the means of thinking, also modified to a greater or lesser extent by the mode of cooperation of its ‘primary’ activity. These manifest as differences in control over, disposal of, and access to the means of thinking between the specialised discursive occupations for each social activity and those subjects who only ‘informally’ form opinions in the context of their occupational position and class situation within this activity. Thus, despite the significant differences between the activities to which ‘their’ activities are ‘dedicated’, there are very similar divisions between, for instance, professional economists and ‘ordinary’ workers or business owners, political theorists and civil servants or citizens, theologians and priests or worshippers, and jurisprudents and ‘blackletter’ lawyers or jurors, in the ‘way they think’ when they form opinions about various parts of ‘the social’.

Second, the norms of personality, emotion, and reason, and the classist divisions of ideation, are further ‘cross-cut’ by the divisions of purposive inputs within the social activities about which subjects form opinions. That is to say, it is not only *ideative* class divisions that can lead to subjects having differential control over, disposal of, and access to the means of thinking when forming opinions about a given ‘primary’ activity. Rather, different sub-modes of ideation—and the way subjects form opinions under them—may also reflect the occupational plurality and (where present) class stratifications that obtain in the activities to which they are ‘dedicated’. Subjects in different social occupations within the same activity may well think very differently, even though they are all in the same ideative class within ‘its’ sub-type of ideation—specifically, not in that activity’s intelligentsia. For instance, the origins of utility-maximising economic ideology lie in a predominant concern with firms and (belatedly) consumers, rather than with workers—an observation that lies at the core of the Marxian critique of classical economics.⁵⁷⁰ This may simply be because an activity’s mode of cooperation makes different requirements of subjects engaged in it, whereby the socialisation processes that ‘prepare’ subjects for performing different occupational tasks also quasi-incidentally lead them to favour certain personality-traits, emotions, and forms of reasoning when they think about ‘the social’. For instance, for more-or-less skilled workers and pupils or students, late-modern modes of production and instruction both favour high levels of conscientiousness as a motivator for good ‘work performance’ and scholastic achievement

⁵⁶⁹ Antliff 2007; Benjamin 2008; Gentile 2003; Hewitt 1993; James 1973; MacDougald 2016; Nelson and Grossberg 1988; Payne 2005; Penny 2017; Sinyavsky 1982; Sternhell 1998; Sternhell, Sznajder, and Ashéri 1994.

⁵⁷⁰ Pilling 1980.

respectively, while modes of regulation—especially since the ‘reintegrative’ turn under the ‘positive criminology’ and penology advocated by John Braithwaite, Martha Nussbaum, and Natti Ronel—treat shame in criminal offenders as a useful tool to achieve their social restoration and reinclusion.⁵⁷¹ However, this reflection often comes about because subjects can leverage their location within the MRCs of one activity into an (at least) equivalent location in those of another—especially if they ‘start from’ a favourable, or privileged, distribution and arrangement of MRCs in any given activity. Where such *fungibility* of MRCs (and, implicitly, power) between activities exists, subjects in elite and other higher-class occupations within the ‘primary’ activities can acquire greater access to the means of thinking needed to form opinions about it—albeit perhaps not to quite the level of the intelligentsia as the highest ideative class. As Savage *et al.* observe, following Bourdieu, in late modernity there is significant fungibility between, for instance, subjects’ wealth and income, education level, and social status, which in turn affects the comparative privilege of their access to means of thinking at a given physical and temporal conjuncture.⁵⁷²

Further, since subjects in certain occupations—above all the members of the ‘castlist’ of influential personalities and groups—direct and determine processes and apparatuses of socialisation within their social activities, they can, in effect, award themselves more privileged ideative positions—i.e., capture the ‘best’ use of personality-traits, emotions, and reason under the given sub-modes of ideation. Since they define and disseminate ideal-types for all the subjectivities in the sub-type of ideation ‘associated with’ that activity, elites, peer-groups, the intelligentsia, heroic individuals, and the other occupations can all help to perpetuate and enforce classist divisions within it—by reducing lower-class subjects’ control over, disposal of, and access to certain personality-profiles, emotional tendencies, and ways of reasoning, and inflating that of higher-class subjects correlatively. Elites and intelligentsia, often aided by other occupations, such as teachers at different levels of education (primary, secondary, higher), act as exclusionary ‘gatekeepers’ that restrict exposure to certain ‘ways of thinking’—e.g., logical inference, syntactic and grammatical rules, or the scientific method—to only the narrow tranche of the population intended to replace them later in life.⁵⁷³ At the same time, peer-groups exert homogenising pressure on

⁵⁷¹ Bakker, Demerouti, and Ten Brummelhuis 2012; Braithwaite 1989; Brown *et al.* 2011; Byrne *et al.* 2005; Chen, Casper, and Cortina 2001; Ellershaw *et al.* 2016; Kmicinska *et al.* 2016; Nussbaum 2015; Ronel and Segev 2015.

⁵⁷² Bourdieu 1977, pp.40-9, 54-67, 70, 89, 171-87; Bourdieu 2010, pp.5-9, 14-20, 56-8, 67-80, 98-9, 110-19, 131, 176, 225, 258-61, 283-5, 376-7, 407-12, 536-7; Gellner 1988; Mann 1986; Savage *et al.* 2015, pp.57-184; Thompson 1995, pp.12-18; Weininger 2005, pp.86-90.

⁵⁷³ Csíkszentmihályi 1999; Grudin 2004; Lyytinen *et al.* 2007; Whitworth and Friedman 2009.

Case study 4: Too big to fail?

The 2007–08 financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession are a classic instance of an issue about which subjects in different classes (in this case, mostly economic classes) thought about in very different and mutually all-but-inaccessible terms. Economic forecasters and both micro- and macroeconomic theorists broadly failed to predict either the slowing of the U.S. market, or the wholesale financial collapse that resulted from the bursting of the housing bubble—in part because the consensus (still) is that financial crises are fundamentally ‘random’ and unpredictable—which subsequently placed them in a prolonged awkward period of alternately defending the integrity of their economic models, or frantically scrabbling to revise them ‘on the hoof’. Some heterodox economists, however, especially from the Austrian or Marxian schools, saw credit-fuelled market bubbles and periodic crises (e.g., the Roaring Twenties, 1970 Poseidon Bubble, 1997 Asian financial crisis, 2000 dotcom bubble crash) as either the predictable result of artificially lax monetary supply, or an inevitable feature of capital accumulation and market creation, so were sympathetic but ultimately far more sanguine. Meanwhile, investors, shareholders, and executives in financial institutions or companies with high corporate debt faced the urgent need to safeguard their wealth portfolios—manifested through their desperate cries for bank bailouts—but also saw opportunities for ‘firesale’ asset acquisitions (e.g., merging with or acquiring cheap staff, buildings, or shares from bankrupt companies like AIG, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, or Northern Rock) and future business growth. Government fiscal and monetary policymakers were also caught almost entirely unawares (e.g., Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s now-infamous hubristic ‘abolished boom and bust’ speech), and their anxiety to fix the immediate problem of stabilising and restoring confidence to financial markets, in order to prevent financial contagion from bringing about the wholesale collapse of the global banking system, often drowned out considerations for ‘planning ahead’ regarding how best to mitigate or avert future crises (e.g., the ‘quick fixes’ of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, and 2011 Basel III accord). Bank customers, especially small and medium enterprise owners and mortgage-holders (‘subprime’ or otherwise), were unsurprisingly worried at the potential loss of their accumulated savings and pension ‘pots’, or their sudden inability to borrow investment capital, and demanded government intervention to guarantee their wealth and ‘get banks lending’ again. Finally, voters and taxpayers were widely ‘spooked’ by the sovereign debt crisis that followed on from the financial crisis (often due to the vast cost of the bank bailouts), but even more frustrated and infuriated at the often brutal tax rises and ‘swingeing’ government spending cuts carried out under the rubric of ‘austerity’ programmes, which translated into a vast upward transfer of wealth from poorer taxpayers to financial institutions, and which in many cases were still being pursued well into the subsequent business cycle.

subjects ‘not to think too much’ or ‘not to get ideas above their station’, and heroic individuals either ‘elevate’ exceptional thinking styles ‘beyond the reach’ of ‘ordinary’ subjects, or popularise them with the aim that other subjects echo, or imitate them—e.g., the aloof, wilfully dry or obscurantist argumentation of David Estlund or Emmanuel Levinas, compared with the accessible logic of Neil deGrasse Tyson or J.K. Rowling.⁵⁷⁴ As a result, the occupational and classist divisions in the use of means of thinking within

⁵⁷⁴ Clayton 2015; Graff 2000; Oppenheimer 2006; Pinker 2014.

each sub-type of ideation to some extent ‘tracks’, or ‘aligns with’, occupational and classist divisions within both ideation in general and the activity about which subjects are forming opinions.

Together, this implies that the functional differentiation of society, which results in the hybridisation of ideation with the activities with regard to which it takes place, adds significant variety to the way subjects form opinions about ‘the social’. The ways subjects use personality, emotion, and reason to convert their mental pictures of their environments into complex opinions about them are not universal, but extensively shaped by the activities, occupations, and class situations into which they are socialised—which sometimes even ‘trump’ the differentiations introduced by the prevailing mode of ideation itself. Ultimately, the longer and more closely subjects are engaged in a given activity, and hold a given occupation (or occupy a given class situation) within it, the more they ‘take on’ the *habitus* of its associated sub-mode of ideation—i.e., the more they tend towards the ideal-typical way in which each activity ‘expects’ subjects to use their means of thinking when forming opinions about it. The enquiry now turns to look more precisely at how functional differentiation affects the way subjects in different social roles form opinions in late modernity, and illustrate how different personality-traits, emotions, and forms of reasoning are mobilised and essentialised by different sub-modes of ideation. In each case, as suggested in chapter I, this enquiry focuses on the mobilisation and essentialisation of tendencies for subjects in the occupations at the higher- and lower-class extremes of their respective activities, and continues with the assumption that the tendencies for subjects in ‘middle-class’ occupations will lie between those extremes.

§2. *Personality traits: progressive reasoners and reactionary emoters*

Earlier, this enquiry observed that subjects exhibit five personality-traits, each of which has a long-lasting, underlying effect on how subjects convert their mental pictures of ‘the social’ into complex opinions: *openness to experience*, *conscientiousness*, *extraversion*, *agreeableness*, and *neuroticism*.⁵⁷⁵ The exact constellation of traits that subjects exhibit variously influence the ‘progressive’ or ‘reactionary’ content of their opinions, and inclines them towards more or less extensive reliance on emotions or reason when forming them. It is worth looking at each of these personality trait-dimensions in turn, examining how they are used, or cultivated, differently (1) in different social activities, and (2) by different occupations

⁵⁷⁵ See pp.85-90.

(and classes) within them. The aim is to establish whether subjects' use of—i.e., control over, disposal of, and access to—certain traits is typically more associated with some activities and occupations (and classes) than others. Insofar as this is the case, it allows opinion research to trace more accurately the social origins of the opinions subjects 'entertain' about different parts of 'the social', and in particular explicate why these opinions may be radical 'outliers' or moderated and 'normal', as well as more or less dependent on emotions or reasoning, compared with those of other subjects in a given population.

First, *openness to experience*. In general, most activities tend to have a favourable view of openness, as they all generally rely on subjects being aware of, and responsive to, the cues from their respective 'cast list' of influential subjects as well as the information they gain directly through their occupational specialism.⁵⁷⁶ However, it is a more prominent feature of some activities' sub-modes of ideation than others, and in several cases is clearly mitigated by exactly opposite tendencies. For instance, successful educational performance (i.e., effective study and instruction), identifying new political problems around which to mobilise, and for which to negotiate and enforce complex policy solutions, finding new and better ways to deliver economic growth, exercising 'consumer choice' to 'upgrade' possessions and replace perishable goods to ensure an ever-increasing standard of living, or interpreting and applying case and statutory law, all need subjects to be curious, creative, imaginative, comfortable with novelty and variety, and intellectually independent, as they are continually confronted with a broad range of new problems and information.⁵⁷⁷ At the same time, the more repetitive aspects of instruction and study (e.g., rote-learning, iterative exercises, and marking), the more mundane aspects of administration and coercion (e.g., working out policy consensus, implementing decisions, or coordinating mobilisation strategies), subjects' need to manage risk and pursue complex production tasks and investment decisions, or what James Hedegard calls the "stress [...] placed on unfolding the existing structure of the law rather than on criticising that structure and examining alternative structures", countervailingly reward caution, consistency, focus, data-drivenness, perseverance, pragmatism, and even dogmatism, as well as keeping the less disciplined and more 'opportunistic' aspects of social thinking in check.⁵⁷⁸ But in some activities, openness is a much lower priority. In both medical and more informal family and friendship aspects of

⁵⁷⁶ Federico 2012, p.91; Zaller 1992, p.19.

⁵⁷⁷ Aghion and Howitt 1992; Barrick and Mount 1991, p.19; Bell *et al.* 2012; Caprara *et al.* 2011; Galor 2005; Gerber *et al.* 2011a; Hedegard 1979; Helpman 2004; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; Meadows *et al.* 1972; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Philp 2007; Piketty 2014; Poropat 2009; Raworth 2017; Russo and Amnå 2015; Shanahan *et al.* 2014; Solow 1956; Swan 1956; Tett, Jackson, and Rothstein 1991.

⁵⁷⁸ Hedegard 1979; Lenin 1974; Zaleskiewicz, Perugini, and De Raad 2001.

curative activity, it is important for subjects to show dedication, either through rigorous application of medical knowledge or loyalty (e.g., in cases of child-rearing, looking after someone with a chronic illness, or just preserving a long-term friendship), while religious activity—especially fundamentalist tendencies, rather than what Gordon Allport calls “mature” religiosity, which sees faith as a complex “open-ended search”, or “quest”, filled with doubt and change, to use Daniel Batson’s term—is often concerned with literalism, purism, restorationism, and rejection of diversity over and above specific substantive articles of faith.⁵⁷⁹ Both of these lend themselves strongly and fairly uniformly to caution, consistency, closed-mindedness, and perseverance, as well as a mix of data-drivenness and dogmatism.

Within activities, openness is generally associated with occupations that provide subjects with greater opportunities for self-direction and (where they are remunerated) higher income—i.e., higher-class occupations.⁵⁸⁰ Often, this is an indirect effect of the association between openness and good job performance—especially for occupations with a high interpersonal component, compared with more ‘isolated’ skilled and semi-skilled occupations—and high training proficiency, measured via performance ratings, work samples, and time taken to complete tasks, both of which are prerequisites for occupational promotion.⁵⁸¹ This is most pronounced in the “cognitive complexity” associated with leading or managing large and complex political (state and non-state) organisations (especially their bureaucratic and enforcement operations), the high tolerance for ‘entrepreneurship’, ‘innovativeness’, and risk-loving embrace of unpredictability in business owners, investors, or traders, the privileged latitude and exclusive prerogative to interpret divine ordinances and canonical texts of religious leaders and thaumaturges in faiths (religions, denominations, sects) practising ‘clericalism’ or ‘sacerdotalism’—i.e., with segregated orders of priesthood, or practices such as formalised creeds or closed communion, rather than ‘universal priesthood’—and the “original thinking”, broad-minded “intellectual curiosity” and interests, and self-improving discovery of meaning and applications for skills expected of teachers and students in ‘higher education’.⁵⁸² This contrast with the obeisance and capacity to narrowly follow instructions, commands, and orders expected of low-grade administrative officials, rank-and-file armed personnel, and even often ‘political subjects’—apart from rising aspirations for greater policy interest and engagement since the advent of parliamentarism and mass enfranchisement—the performance of routine productive tasks by

⁵⁷⁹ Allport 1950; Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993; Bernat 2012; Grøthe, Biong, and Grov 2015; Saroglou 2002.

⁵⁸⁰ Shanahan *et al.* 2014.

⁵⁸¹ Hurtz and Donovan 2000.

⁵⁸² Busato *et al.* 1998; Clark and Guest 1995; Costin and Grush 1973; Hermann 1976; Komaraju and Karau 2005; Rauch and Frese 2007; Rushton, Morgan, and Richard 2007; Sears, Kennedy, and Kaye 1997; Witty 1947.

lower-class working occupations—albeit more in agriculture or manufacturing rather than service or ‘creative’ industries—the passivity and dutifulness emphasised among ‘lay’ subjects in congregations, who largely follow the priests’ lead, and the large degree of “patience” and “endurance” demanded of teachers and pupils in early-years, school, or ‘special needs’ education, which still predominantly relies on regimented rote-learning for standardised uniform examinations.⁵⁸³ However, some activities slightly cross-cut this general tendency. Juridical activity reveals an occupational divide in openness between ‘black letter’ lawyers and lay occupations (e.g., jurors), who are predominantly concerned with finding the best way to interpret and apply technical legal rules—and rely on traits like consistency, perseverance, even dogmatism—and scholars of jurisprudence (especially those working in ‘critical legal studies’), who often hold out for abstract, conceptual thought and intellectual independence.⁵⁸⁴ Meanwhile, the divide in openness for curative activity is not one of different tendencies, but rather of different intensities of the same contradictory pulls towards dedication versus attentiveness—i.e., ‘closed’ versus ‘open’ traits—with professional medical and care staff generally needing patience, stamina, and focus to deal with challenging healthcare situations, and awareness of the wide range of potential problems they could face (including rare, undiagnosed, or undiscovered diseases) more intensely and persistently than the periodic pressures faced by subjects in family and friendship groups.⁵⁸⁵

Second, *conscientiousness*. The treatment of conscientiousness is remarkably homogeneous across social domains, in that (with only rare exceptions) they all unanimously favour traits at the higher end of the spectrum, as this increases subjects’ likelihood of conforming to the predispositions from their occupational or activity-specific ideative *habitus*, and more likely to accept cues from their ‘established’ discursive authorities. For instance, the economic drive for ‘growth’ through targets for productivity, profit, and turnover in a context of increasingly complex global enterprises and markets, and the rise of financialisation, the expansion of complex bureaucratic and military structures that rely on administrative officials and coercive personnel to be ‘competent’ and *au fait* with the ‘good practice’ instrumental to attaining a good political reputation and ‘glory’ (*dignitas*), religious emphases on diligence, temperance, and compliance, occasionally to a fanatical extent, juridical expectations of rigid, ‘sticklerish’ adherence

⁵⁸³ Belussi 2000; Galloway 2013; Gartman 1998; Hooghe and Oser 2015; Meng 2016; Mihailidis and Thevenin 2013; Murray, Rushton, and Paunonen 1990; Rushton, Murray, and Paunonen 1983; Rustin 1989; Sherman and Blackburn 1975; Suspitsyna 2012; Tauss 2012; Tomasco 1980; Witty 1947; Zaff *et al.* 2010.

⁵⁸⁴ On critical legal studies, see Brown and Halley 2002; Kelman 1987; Kennedy 2004; Unger 1983.

⁵⁸⁵ Bushardt 2016; Doherty and Nugent 2011; Klee and Renner 2013; McKee 1998; Oscoz-Iruozqui and Ortuño 2016.

to the precedents of case law or the guidance of legal norms when establishing the details of legal problems, “extrapolating both causes and consequences”, and coming to clear and decisive verdicts about them (e.g., sentencing, legal judgments), educational hopes that students and teachers ‘see through to the end’ their academic learning programmes, and ‘deliver’ effective instruction, or curative expectations that medical staff follow strict treatment (e.g., surgical) procedures, and that family members and friends try to meet the needs of their dependents, and avoid abandonment, inconstancy, neglect, or treachery, all reward subjects being achievement-oriented, careful, dutiful, reliable, responsible, self-disciplined, and thorough, perhaps even to the point of being stubborn and obsessive.⁵⁸⁶ There are some activities that occasionally permit some greater variation on the spectrum of conscientiousness, such as faiths whose doctrines tolerate, or even encourage, relaxations of conscientiousness, ranging from the casualisation of religious rituals to the embrace of charismatic worship (e.g., Pentecostalist movements within modern Christianity), or the partial leeway for learners to confront new challenges and information positively and fruitfully—but they generally only do this to a limited degree, in order to prevent subjects from sliding into more socially ‘damaging’ traits like carelessness and negligence.⁵⁸⁷

For differences within activities, there is a strong general association between conscientiousness and occupational success—measured in terms of job performance, proficiency and productivity, salary or wages, length of tenure, promotion opportunities, occupational prestige, or high net worth in later life—as well as self-direction across all occupations, regardless of activity or class.⁵⁸⁸ As Murray Barrick and Michael Mount put it, “individuals who exhibit traits associated with a strong sense of purpose, obligation, and persistence generally perform better than those who do not”, simply because “it is difficult to conceive of a job in which the traits associated with the conscientiousness dimension would not contribute to job success”.⁵⁸⁹ This implies that all subjects require a degree of conscientiousness in order to acquire familiarity with, or any form of specialist interaction with, the MRCs of a given social domain. This is true, for example, of all producing subjects (from ‘entrepreneurs’ down to casualised

⁵⁸⁶ Aghion and Howitt 1992; Bell *et al.* 2012; Doherty and Nugent 2011; Galor 2005; Hedegard 1979; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; Miller 1967; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Philp 2007; Raworth 2017; Shanahan *et al.* 2014; Solow 1956; Swan 1956.

⁵⁸⁷ Emmons and Paloutzian 2003; Saroglou 2002.

⁵⁸⁸ Borghans *et al.* 2008; Borghans, ter Weel, and Weinberg 2008; Duckworth and Weir 2012; Jencks 1979; Judge *et al.* 1999; McAbee and Oswald 2013; Ng *et al.* 2005; Poropat 2009; Shanahan *et al.* 2014.

⁵⁸⁹ Barrick and Mount 1991, pp.8, 21–2; Digman and Takemoto-Chock 1981; Hurtz and Donovan 2000; Tett, Jackson, and Rothstein 1991.

labourers) who are expected to show (and be seen to exert) a “need for achievement”, “generalised self-efficacy”, and demonstrable high effort in their work to secure remuneration, ‘competent’ subjects in administrative and coercive mobilisation or operations positions, engaged ‘political subjects’ registering and turning out to vote in ‘important’ campaigns, adherents of all faiths (from ‘equilibrated’ institutional religions to ‘assertive’ or ‘withdrawalist’ sects), juridical subjects from professional jurists to lay jurors, teachers who are expected to have “unusual proficiency in teaching a particular subject”, be “ambitious” and “willing to assume responsibility”, and practice “fairness and impartiality”, as well as learners and researchers who have to be “hard-working”, “responsible”, and geared towards their “individual success”, to limit study avoidance and acquire the skills to pass assessment examinations.⁵⁹⁰ Insofar as there are generalisable classist distinctions between different occupations, there is evidence that subjects in higher-class social occupations may show much more variable conscientiousness (achievement-orientation and obsessiveness) in their behaviour and thinking, either higher through a sense of narcissistic entitlement to their ‘elite’ position, or lower because they have ‘earned’ a measure of flexibility and indulgence as a ‘reward’ for notional past achievement.⁵⁹¹ This is the case, for instance, with the almost relaxed ‘low-intensity, high-stakes’ activity of business-owners, executives, or company management, or the strenuous efforts by professional politicians and activists in ‘front-line’ leadership and strategy coordination activity (e.g., electoral competition, military campaigning) to seem ‘personable’ rather than bookish, boring, and off-putting, versus the extreme dutifulness and self-discipline expected of senior clergy in older and more complex hierarchical institutionalised religions, or the high energy, stamina, and exactitude demanded of medical and care staff, parents, and senior relatives with the time- and effort-intensive responsibility of ‘treating’, ‘looking after’, or even ‘curing’ their dependents (patients, children, or younger relatives).⁵⁹²

Third, *extraversion*. Social domains are somewhat divided in their treatment of extraversion, based on the extent to which their characteristic activities are heavily centred on interpersonal interaction or allow space for more isolated and autonomous functioning. Some are straightforwardly favourable. For

⁵⁹⁰ Berliner 1976; Busato *et al.* 1998; Clark and Guest 1995; Cooper, Golden, and Socha 2013; Costa and da Silva 2015; Costin and Grush 1973; Dodge 1943; Gerber *et al.* 2011a; Komaraju and Karau 2005; Mondak *et al.* 2010; Murray, Rushton, and Paunonen 1990; Rauch and Frese 2007; Rushton, Morgan, and Richard 2007; Sears, Kennedy, and Kaye 1997; Tomasco 1980; Witty 1947.

⁵⁹¹ Piff 2013.

⁵⁹² De Landsheer, De Vries, and Vertessen 2008; Devlin 1987; Doherty and Nugent 2011; Grøthe, Biong, and Grov 2015; Immelman 1998; Seifert 2012.

instance, medical and familial caregivers face a consistent, often wide-ranging and intense high level of exposure to—and expectations to ‘take charge of’ and ‘look after’—other subjects and their surroundings, while pedagogues and research coordinators are often meant to ‘take charge’ of classes, seminar groups, research teams, laboratories, &c, both of which requires subjects to be assertive, energetic, outgoing, sociable, and prepared to engage with their environments.⁵⁹³ Other activities, meanwhile, are far more ambivalent in their treatment of extraversion. On the more favourable side lie economic ‘dealmaking’, ‘bargaining’, and negotiation, which fixate on the market performance of goods and services, beating out competitors, and ensuring effective use of resources, the dependence of political interest and efficacious coordination on courage, charisma, and heroism, the expectation that “dominant”, “expressive”, and “socially outgoing” juridical subjects engage in stylised, and often highly public, confrontations (e.g., presentation of arguments, cross-examination, &c) with the intention of winning outright or extracting concessions from other parties, or the strong religious valorisation of ‘communal spirit’ and—in extreme cases of theocratic or theonomic groups, such as Christian ‘dominionism’ or Wahhabist-Salafist Islam—of aggressive, universalistic-monopolistic doctrinal confrontation of competitors.⁵⁹⁴ This contrasts, for example, with the ‘lost-in-the-crowd’ anonymity and isolation imposed on subjects by the legacy of Fordist conditions of production for, and undifferentiated ‘personal-gratification’ consumption within, a mass market, the frequent ‘turns’ in politics towards hostility, tribalism, and partisanship, which reward subjects’ vanity, self-servingness, arrogance, and hubris, the vast array of ‘private’ and autarkic juridical tasks (e.g., case preparation, client consultation, or other ‘office work’) which cultivate subjects’ “more introspective” side, and the frequent religious emphasis on the need for inner contemplation, all of which favour ‘introverted’ traits such as reflectiveness, reserve, silence, solitariness, and even passivity.⁵⁹⁵

Within activities, all occupations need subjects to show extraversion to some extent, to ensure that they engage sufficiently with their environment to perform their tasks—hence the correlation between extraversion and subjects’ preparedness to participate in the behaviour expected of them.⁵⁹⁶ By the same token, extraversion allows subjects to be integrated into discursive apparatuses, enter into relations of discursive dependence, and be interpellated as discursive subjects. There is also a fairly strong association between extraversion and occupational success—specifically, job performance, proficiency, and

⁵⁹³ Poropat 2009; Shanahan *et al.* 2014.

⁵⁹⁴ Bell *et al.* 2012; Cooper, Golden, and Socha 2013; Emmons and Paloutzian 2003; Etheredge 1978; Johnstone 1983; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Philp 2007; Saroglou 2002.

⁵⁹⁵ Belussi 2000; Gartman 1998; Hedegard 1979; MacDonald 2000; Pace 1964; Rustin 1989; Stern 1970; Tauss 2012.

⁵⁹⁶ Mondak and Hibbing 2012, p.225.

salary/wages—as well as self-direction, especially in occupations with a high interpersonal component.⁵⁹⁷ This applies, for example, to teachers, who are expected to be “high in leadership ability”, have a “sense of humour” or somewhat “dramatic” presentation, show “interest in [their] pupils’ problems”, make copious “use of recognition and praise”, and feel “at ease in social contacts”, and students, who need to be “genuinely responsive in human relationships” to facilitate good active learning, develop their “sense of ‘belonging’ to a group”, and prevent their “withdrawal”, religious occupations (e.g., parochial vicars, pastors, and curates) that require high participation intensity, interpersonal engagement, and leadership, the “assertive”, “dominant”, “expressive”, and “sociable” behaviour expected of barristers and advocates (perhaps more so than solicitors or notaries, in the jurisdictions where this distinction is observed) in legal confrontations, cemented by their early years of training and practice, and economic occupations that require extensive interpersonal interaction (e.g., sales or managerial from foremen up to executives, &c).⁵⁹⁸ Of course, there are some exceptions to this general tendency, such as individual or team researchers, who must balance their “dominant” or “aggressive” competition against one another with the isolation often associated with carrying out research, or religious occupations that practice coenobitic or anchoretic religious ‘withdrawalism’—associated above all with monastic asceticism, hermitry, and mendicancy, e.g., Hindu *sādhus*, Christian orders of friars, or Zen Buddhist *zazen*.⁵⁹⁹ Regarding classist distinctions between occupations, there is a fairly consistent positive correlation across activities between behaviour and thinking that is highly extraverted, and leadership, which is reinforced to the extent that extraversion (like conscientiousness) gives ‘elite’ subjects a sense of entitlement to their social position.⁶⁰⁰ Thus, for example, more extraversion is expected of professional medical and care staff (e.g., ‘front-line’ positions such as doctors, nurses, or care workers), parents, and the ‘dominant’ members of friendship groups, who exert decisive control over, and ‘take the lead’ for, their patients, children, and ‘subordinate’ friends, political leaders who aspire to electoral success, effective coordination, or opportunities for promotion, or the “proactive personality” associated with occupations with greater economic capital (e.g., business owners, investors, financial speculators, &c) under discourses of ‘entrepreneurialism’.⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁷ Hurtz and Donovan 2000; Judge *et al.* 1999; Shanahan *et al.* 2014.

⁵⁹⁸ Barrick and Mount 1991, p.20; Burris 1976; Costin and Grush 1973; Dodge 1943; Hedegard 1979, p.864; Rushton, Murray, and Paunonen 1983; Tett, Jackson, and Rothstein 1991; Tomasco 1980; Witty 1947.

⁵⁹⁹ Busato *et al.* 1998; Hedegard 1979, p.864; Komaraju and Karau 2005; McGinn 2006; Melia 2002; Rushton, Murray, and Paunonen 1983.

⁶⁰⁰ Cottam *et al.* 2010, p.20; Norr and Crittenden 1975; Piff 2013.

⁶⁰¹ Dietrich *et al.* 2012; Immelman 1998; Lilienfeld *et al.* 2012; Rauch and Frese 2007.

By contrast, far more ‘introverted’ behaviour and thinking is anticipated under norms of ‘self-interest’ and a lack of mobilisation opportunities among lower-class occupations in both semi-skilled production (e.g., farmers, secretaries, assemblers, accountants) and consumption, and while extraversion is positively correlated with political participation, voting turnout, and activist mobilisation (especially in highly conflictual contexts), the expansion of mass democracy has reduced ‘political subjects’ to what Jeffrey Edward Green (following Schmitt) calls ‘ocular’, privatistic, disengaged spectators, relegated to at best marginally more reflective passivity.⁶⁰²

Fourth, *agreeableness*. There is significant division between the importance activities attribute to agreeableness as an aspect of behaviour and thinking. Some are straightforwardly favourable, almost by definition, as agreeableness is vital to achieving social cooperation between subjects by encouraging them to abide by the prevailing ‘culture’ (i.e., *habitus*) of their activities, as well as to perform at least adequately in ‘teamwork’ with other subjects—although they all tolerate a low level of argumentativity, selfishness, and suspicion, a small degree of which is usually seen as ‘healthy’ for social relationships. For instance, subjects need extensive goodwill and an engaging demeanour to be ‘good’ medical staff, family members, or friends, coupled at least to some extent with an altruistic willingness to prioritise other subjects over themselves, as well as to achieve educational success (e.g., higher grades, positive classroom behaviour, or motivation), while there is a close proximity between faith and hopeful or providential trust in the ineffability or mysticist atopy of awesome divinity (e.g., the identity of God in Abrahamic religions, or the primordial essence of the Tao) and the authority of canonical texts, and a strong communitarian aspect in religious welfare programmes (e.g., anti-poverty attempts by Catholic ‘liberation theology’).⁶⁰³ Meanwhile, other social activities take a far more mixed, or even disapproving view of agreeableness. Political efficacy requires subjects to show honour and ‘integrity’, and avoid envy, avarice, venality, sleaze, treachery, “political delinquency”, or faithlessness, but also relies on the decisive use of force (from imposing *clôture* in plenary debates to invoking coercive police and other security measures), while the conflicting views of privatisation and marketisation in production and exchange in different schools of economic theory (‘orthodox’ classical or Keynesian, ‘heterodox’ mutualist, Marxian, or anarchist, &c) and their associated economic structures (e.g., guilds, trade unions, friendly societies, welfare states) take

⁶⁰² Barrick and Mount 1991, p.19; Gerber *et al.* 2011b; Green 2011; Weinschenk and Panagopoulos 2014.

⁶⁰³ Arthur 1986; Batifoulouier and Da Silva 2014; Bennett-Hunter 2015; Blum 2012; Emmons and Paloutzian 2003; Gutiérrez 1973; Heckman and Kautz 2012; Herring and Foster 2012; Jones 2002; Poropat 2009; Saroglou 2002; Shanahan *et al.* 2014.

different views of competitive and self-interested *homo economicus* subjecthood, and juridical public confrontation steers subjects towards argumentative, even hostile competition, rather than “altruistic” helpfulness or kindness, while case preparation demands “logical analysis” that takes detachment over compassion as a measure of true ‘objectivity’.⁶⁰⁴

For differences within activities, as with extraversion, all occupations need subjects to demonstrate at least a basic level of agreeableness simply so that they can perform their social functions adequately. Again, as with extraversion, there is a fairly strong association between agreeableness and occupational success—in particular job performance and salary/wages—and self-direction, most notably for occupations with a high interpersonal component.⁶⁰⁵ But overall, it appears that, while “being courteous, trusting, straight forward, and soft-hearted” has *some* positive association with occupational success, its impact is not nearly as significant as “being talkative, active, and assertive”—i.e., agreeableness is less urgent a *desideratum* for social occupations than extraversion.⁶⁰⁶ This implies that agreeableness is a more variable trait across social occupations than a hard classist structure can necessarily capture. For instance, teachers are expected to have high “understanding” and “nurturance”, possess a “pleasing manner”, and show “mutual respect” towards their students, along with “consideration” for their needs, learners are incentivised towards obedient ‘good behaviour’—though in both cases this is progressively deemphasised at higher levels of education in favour of more *laissez-faire* or critical approaches—but researchers, even if their work is team-based rather than autarkic, are allowed to be fairly “independent”, “non-meek”, and “non-supportive”, while political leaders need to strike the ‘slippery’ balance between at least moderate ‘hunger for power’ and generating political appeal and support (and electoral success) by showing their ‘human touch’, and keeping their more “quarrelsome” sides in check, and ‘political subjects’ are torn in a qualitatively different way between ‘argumentative’ citizenship, activism, and mobilisation, and ‘pliant’ support for parliamentary representatives and state bureaucracies (e.g., via ‘mere’ voting registration or weak partisanship).⁶⁰⁷ By contrast, clericalist/sacerdotalist faiths expect much greater agreeableness from ‘followers’ than ‘religious leaders’, often justified through the ‘infallibility’ of senior figures and canonical

⁶⁰⁴ Bell *et al.* 2012; Cooper, Golden, and Socha 2013; Dequech 2007; Etheredge 1978; Hedegard 1979, p.863; Jo, Chester, and D’Ippoliti 2018; Lawson 2006; Lee 2009; Miller 1967; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Pareto 1971; Persky 1995; Philp 2007; Russo and Amnå 2015; Sen 1977.

⁶⁰⁵ Hurtz and Donovan 2000; Shanahan *et al.* 2014.

⁶⁰⁶ Barrick and Mount 1991, p.21; Tett, Jackson, and Rothstein 1991.

⁶⁰⁷ Busato *et al.* 1998; Cooper, Golden, and Socha 2013; Costa and da Silva 2015; Gerber *et al.* 2011a; Hermann 1976; Immelman 1998; Rushton, Morgan, and Richard 2007; Rushton, Murray, and Paunonen 1983; Sherman and Blackburn 1975; Tomasco 1980; Weinschenk and Panagopoulos 2014; Witty 1947.

works (e.g., imams in Shi'a Islam, the Rebbe in Chabad Hassidic Judaism, the Pope in Catholicism, Biblicism in Evangelical Protestantism), lawyers (especially barristers and advocates) rely on competitive argument to defend and win cases, while jurors need to 'work together' as a group to deliver their verdict in response to professional pleading in legal trials, and business owners and investors typically compete to 'win' in market transactions by maximising profit, turnover, market share, &c (except in contexts of strategic coordination and cartel behaviour), whereas 'sales', 'customer service', and 'human relations' occupations are required to be friendly, helpful, and warm (or at least feign these fairly well), while all classes of consumers (especially 'big spenders') can be thoroughly 'disagreeable' under the rubric of 'the customer is always right'.⁶⁰⁸

Fifth, *neuroticism*. As with conscientiousness, activities are strongly united in their treatment of neuroticism—except that on this occasion their consensus is strongly negative, favouring traits at the lower end of the spectrum. Several domains value emotional stability for the confidence, calmness, and sense of security it gives subjects' behaviour and thinking, which helps all subjects perform their social functions effectively. For example, education relies on subjects concentrating, avoiding distractions, and developing a certain 'objective' distance from the material they are studying, juridical confrontations and preparation need subjects to be 'on top of' their arguments and evidence, which requires high confidence as well as slightly 'impersonal' consideration of case 'facts' divorced from their human significance, while medical, familial, and 'friendly' caregivers are expected to provide poles of stability and responsibility for their 'wards', often compensating for the latter's lack of inhibitions (due to age, temporary incapacity, or medical impairment), without becoming 'over-attached' or 'over-involved', and political efficacy typically needs subjects to show a high level of 'composure' (calm, control) and retain 'a sense of proportion'—except where administration and coercion relies on the decisive use of force.⁶⁰⁹ Some activities even go so far as to see subjects as 'afflicted' by particular kinds of neuroses, and offer specific 'remedies' for how subjects should counteract these in their behaviour and thinking. For instance, many faiths suggest that secular 'irreligion' causes subjects to experience paralysing doubt and uncertainty, and offer religiosity as a respite, with subjects encouraged to 'find rest' and achieve 'inner peace' through spiritual detachment from their worldly troubles, while subjects from all areas of production, exchange, and consumption are

⁶⁰⁸ Bowles and Gintis 2013; Cross and Livingstone 1997, p.831; Gastil *et al.* 2008; Gintis 2005.

⁶⁰⁹ Bell *et al.* 2012; Etheredge 1978; Hedegard 1979; Klee and Renner 2013; McKee 1998; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Pace 1964; Philp 2007; Shanahan *et al.* 2014; Stern 1970.

prone to a degree of ‘herd’ behaviour, so that economic *habitus* are fixated on providing predictability, reassurance, and confidence to markets and investors—especially as a priority response to moments of economic crisis and uncertainty.⁶¹⁰

Within activities, as with several of the other personality-traits, all occupations need subjects to have a fairly low level of neuroticism for them to perform their social functions. As Barrick and Mount put it, “those individuals who are highly neurotic are unable to function effectively on their own and, as a result, are not likely to be in the labour force”—or, to remove the bias towards ‘labour’ and monetary reward, they are not likely to hold a social occupation (for any meaningful length of time, if at all).⁶¹¹ Low neuroticism is thus unsurprisingly a “consistent personality correlate” of occupational success—especially job performance, proficiency and productivity, and salary/wages—as well as self-direction across all occupations and classes, above all whether these have a high component of interpersonal interaction.⁶¹² Hence, teachers are required to be “less subject to fears and worries” but still “sensitive to the opinions of others”, and to “free themselves from [...] persistent infantile reactions and emotional compulsions”, while learners and researchers are expected to develop ‘stability’ to avoid “discouragement” and ‘steel themselves’ for examinations and other skill tests, and subjects in ‘sales’, ‘customer service’, or ‘managerial’ occupations are expected to show a high degree of “stress tolerance” across class divides.⁶¹³ While this is by far the main occupational significance of neuroticism—namely, that subjects cannot have an occupation if they are “critically unstable”—there are some slight classist distinctions identifiable too. In general, lower-class subjects (especially children) “more commonly exhibit neurotic personality traits”, and there are several domains that tolerate or actively cultivate low-level neuroticism in ‘mass’ occupations.⁶¹⁴ This can be seen in the division between often more confident and dispassionate senior lawyers (e.g., judges) and the susceptibility of their juniors (e.g., legal clerks) to “feelings of anxiety and internal conflict” due to their fast-paced and stressful work environments, the tolerance for ‘neuroses’ in patients and children more than their (often professionally ‘distant’) caregivers, mitigated by the hope for medium- to long-term ‘recovery’, and the ‘emotional stability’ and moderation expected of political

⁶¹⁰ Emmons and Paloutzian 2003; Ferri and Morone 2014; Mihut, Trenca, and Pece 2015; Rook 2006; Saroglou 2002; Wilczek 2016; Wray, Bishop, and Marinazzo 2016.

⁶¹¹ Barrick and Mount 1991, p.20.

⁶¹² Borghans *et al.* 2008; Hurtz and Donovan 2000; Mueller and Plug 2006; Poropat 2009; Roberts, Caspi, and Moffitt 2003; Shanahan *et al.* 2014.

⁶¹³ Busato *et al.* 1998; Rauch and Frese 2007; Rushton, Murray, and Paunonen 1983; Sherman and Blackburn 1975.

⁶¹⁴ Sewell 1961.

leaders—especially for ‘self-reflective’ emotions like guilt (*Schuld*) and remorse—except in cases where invoking them can strategically ‘humanise’ them in electoral contexts, versus the higher emotionality needed to motivate partisanship and galvanise mobilisation (e.g., election turnout, joining protests, &c) in ‘political subjects’.⁶¹⁵ The only exception to this classist arrangement is that certain highly-specialised occupations may encourage slight ‘neurotic’ tendencies regardless of their class position, purely on the basis that “individuals who are worrying, nervous, emotional, and high-strung are better performers in these jobs”.⁶¹⁶ For instance, low-level neuroticism is tolerated in learners and researchers, partly to avoid ‘unhealthy’ behaviour and thinking that “hid[es] all feeling”, but mostly because moderate “anxiety about failure” can foster their drive for achievement, consumers are encouraged to sustain an artificially high responsiveness to price signalling, cultivated through targeted advertising and the discourse of ‘impulse purchasing’, while several faiths positively valorise neuroticism in the guise of zealotry (e.g., ‘firebrand’ polemicism, conversionism, or glossolalia in evangelical and charismatic Christianity).⁶¹⁷

Overall, there is a fair degree of variety in the personality-traits that subjects engaged in different social activities, holding different occupations, and occupying different class situations can ‘bring to’ their processes of opinion-formation. All subjects tend to exhibit *openness* and *conscientiousness* in their thinking to at least some degree, while their use of *extraversion* and *agreeableness* is far more divergent, and *neuroticism* is highly disfavoured in all activities. Meanwhile, openness and extraversion are typically associated more with higher-class occupations, but conscientiousness and agreeableness are much more universal (albeit slightly relaxed for higher-class subjects), and neuroticism is at best tolerated to a limited degree in lower-class subjects. Given the effects that these traits have on opinion-formation, as outlined in chapter II, opinion research should expect this diversity in social subjects’ use of different personality-traits to manifest as clear occupational (and classist) differences in how subjects form opinions. Overall, these include *underlying* tendencies (i.e., longer-term ‘baseline’ patterns) for higher-class subjects to be: (1) more receptive to new information (and to changing their mental pictures of their environments); (2) slightly more inclined to use reason; and (3) balanced between ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ readings of their mental pictures, with some (e.g., higher religious or medical classes) more reactionary than

⁶¹⁵ Brandstätter and Opp 2014; Cooper, Golden, and Socha 2013; Dietrich *et al.* 2012, p.205; Gerber *et al.* 2011b; Hedegard 1979; Hermann 1976; Philp 2007.

⁶¹⁶ Barrick and Mount 1991, p.20; Tett, Jackson, and Rothstein 1991.

⁶¹⁷ Bell and Lattin 2000; Costin and Grush 1973; Courty and Pagliero 2010; Dodge 1943; Inzlicht *et al.* 2009; Komarraju and Karau 2005; Krishnamurthi, Mazumdar, and Raj 1992; McGregor *et al.* 2008; Miller 1994; Putler 1992; Witty 1947.

Case study 5: *Pax Britannica*?

The effects of personality-traits on how subjects in different classes think can be detected with a considerable measure of clarity in the classist variation that characterises popular views on the British Empire, especially in the Anglosphere. Social and above all scholarly elites are invited to explore a wide range of detailed analyses of the UK's imperial history and legacy, often taken from in-depth professional research (e.g., on the link between colonialism and the capitalist need for readily exploitable natural resources, different visions of Empire under rival party ideologies, or the administrative structures of the British Raj). Meanwhile, 'ordinary' voters, consumers, media audiences, or school pupils typically gain their awareness of the British Empire mostly through proxy concepts such as the Commonwealth Games, the peculiar geographical distribution of cricket or rugby, the global status of the English language, or oblique references in historical television dramas (e.g., *Roots*, *The Crown*) and as part of the 'Tudors and Nazis' fixation of school history syllabi. Elites are also slightly more inclined to lace their opinions with complex reasoned considerations (e.g., on the neo-colonial echoes of foreign aid conditionality, or inconsistencies in the treatment of 'white settler' versus non-white colonies), whereas lower-class views of the Empire are often extensively coloured by 'broad-brush' sentimental attachments to associated concepts (e.g., the Royal Family, the 'Union Jack', anti-British uprisings, or pre-colonial indigenous traditions). Elites also have the luxury of formulating much bolder or more iconoclastic views about imperialism in both directions, whether as an unambiguous 'force for good' that secured global peace and led to a valuable 'exchange of cultures' between Europe and the rest of the world of which the UK should be rightly proud and from which it should seek future inspiration (e.g., John Seeley, Thomas Babington Macaulay, Herbert L. Osgood, Niall Ferguson, Michael Gove), or as an unforgivably brutal 'crime against humanity' that must be atoned for through large-scale financial reparations and the decolonisation of UK institutions (e.g., J.A. Hobson, Joseph Schumpeter, Norman Angell, Richard Gott, Shashi Tharoor). By contrast, lower-class subjects tend to cluster demurely around the median prevailing perception of the Empire as a 'net positive' and glorious but ultimately closed chapter of the UK's history, marred by 'a few' indisputably problematic episodes (e.g., the 1845-52 Irish Potato Famine, the 1919 Amritsar Massacre, the 1947 Partition of India). However, irrespective of class, only very rarely does the British Empire elicit in subjects the same level of neurotic self-doubt as does Germany's relationship towards the Nazi Holocaust, post-Soviet views of the 1932-33 Ukrainian *Holodomor*, or even the U.S.A.'s views on the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

others (e.g., higher educational or political classes). This can be seen in the detailed attentiveness of senior business executives to the release of the latest economic data, the higher expectations for cogent argument in professors and senior researchers, or the relative tolerance for ideological 'purity' and 'radicalism' in party elites and activists. At the same time, subjects in lower-class occupations may be fundamentally: (1) more likely to conform to pre-existing predispositions; (2) slightly more inclined to use emotions to form opinions; and (3) more pervasively 'reactionary' in their readings of mental pictures. This covers, among other things, the reticence of church laity in accepting new doctrinal developments (e.g., on female clergy or same-sex marriage), the tendency of children to recourse to appeals to emotion, or the *status quo* 'centrism' of national electorates. In light of these extreme classist tendencies in the use

of personality-traits, social subjects can, in general, be said to lie on a spectrum between ‘progressive reasoners’ at the higher-class end, and ‘reactionary emoters’ at the lower-class end.

§3. *Emotions: positive reproducers and negative rethinkers*

Now, to turn to emotions. As argued previously, there are five emotions that have a consistent and significant, albeit more contingent, effect on how subjects form opinions about ‘the social’: *fear/anxiety*, *anger*, *enthusiasm* and *pride*, *sadness* and *shame*, and *disgust*.⁶¹⁸ The combination of emotions that subjects feel steers their opinions towards ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ appraisals of specific aspects of ‘the social’, encourages them either to ‘stick with’ or revisit the information and predispositions they have about them, and inclines them towards reliance on either more heuristic or more rational reasoning when forming their opinions. Again, this analysis takes each of the emotions identified earlier, and examines them in turn, starting with emotions arranged loosely into the pairs suggested by Plutchik. If the use of certain emotions can be found to be more associated with some activities, occupations, and classes than others, opinion research will be better able to explicate the social basis for subjects holding more favourable or disfavoured opinions about different parts of ‘the social’, and for either reproducing entrenched mental pictures and processing ‘shortcuts’ or engaging in careful rethinking, relative to other subjects in their population.

First, *fear* and *anxiety*. In general, all social activities tend to encourage their subjects to exhibit a low-to-moderate level of both fear—short-lived, present-focused, and geared towards escaping specific threats—and anxiety—long-acting, future-focused, and cautious of diffuse threats (rather than coping with them constructively).⁶¹⁹ Fear ensures that subjects avoid excessively risky or unusual behaviour and thinking that jeopardises their activity’s *habitus*. It reminds subjects of their “reduced personal control” over social phenomena, some of which “cannot be prevented”, for which “blame is not easy to assign”, and with which they “cannot as easily cope” unaided.⁶²⁰ Anxiety, meanwhile, “triggers an increase in attention to incoming information”—i.e., subjects’ immediate MRCs and the cues they receive from others—and prompts them to question and downplay their previous dispositions and attitudes.⁶²¹ It does

⁶¹⁸ See pp.90–4.

⁶¹⁹ Sylvers, Lilienfeld, and Laprairie 2011.

⁶²⁰ Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards 1993; Lerner and Keltner 2001.

⁶²¹ Brader 2011; Groenendyk 2011.

not change their “processing effort” or their recall of information, but raises their “cognitive vigilance”, making them reprioritise their activity to “learn more about anxiety-inducing phenomena”.⁶²² Thus, fear and anxiety can be assuaged or harnessed to make economic and political subjects risk-averse (or, indeed, risk-loving) towards the uncertainty of imminent systemic change, failure (crisis, collapse), “unfamiliar threats”, and “hidden dangers” (e.g., violent, lethal, or otherwise coercive, such as war or terrorism), or inculcate in religious subjects either “ominous” awe, *tremendum*, such as superstitions about supernatural evil (demons, ghosts, &c), fear of judgment (by other religious adherents), or terror about death and the afterlife (i.e., divine eschatology), or “enchanted concern”, *fascinans*, in the form of veneration towards totemic objects (e.g., concepts of divinity), focused on avoiding meaninglessness.⁶²³ There is a generally positive relationship between the level of fear and anxiety, and the achievement of changes in subjects’ behaviour and thinking. In particular, low-level fear and anxiety (e.g., worry and apprehension) are used to warn subjects away from certain ‘objectionable’ types of behaviour, and encourage them to conform to ‘approved’ forms appropriate to their social tasks—the so-called Yerkes-Dodson law—e.g., fear of medical pain or injury, familial rejection, or legal punishment, making subjects become ‘healthier’, ‘more polite’, or act ‘lawfully’.⁶²⁴ Overall, moderate risk-aversion maintains subjects’ acquiescence to prevailing modes of cooperation and prevents them from becoming overconfident or complacent—but, at the same time, a certain level of risk-taking is vital to ensuring continuous and incremental innovation, so practices such as contracts and intertemporal commitments are used to allow subjects to be at least moderately risk-loving in certain contexts.⁶²⁵ This is especially because excessive alarmism or catastrophisation can frighten subjects into ‘desperate’ apathy, abstention, or withdrawal.⁶²⁶ Thus, for example, in educational contexts, fear and anxiety are restricted to low-level anticipation and stress (about failure or punishment), as *in extremis* they simply engender laziness and procrastination, making subjects excessively timorous, with a skewed estimation of threats, while in political activity, fear and anxiety are subjected to a careful trade-off, as subjects’ “immediate and reflexive increase in surveillance” of their environment, and greater and more open-minded thinking and deliberation, comes at the cost of the “adverse consequence of

⁶²² Brader 2006; Civettini and Redlawsk 2009; Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2009.

⁶²³ Conover and Feldman 1986; Corrigan 2014; Davis 1992; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Huddy *et al.* 2005; Jong and Halberstadt 2016; LeDoux 1996; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004; Loewenstein 2000; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000, pp.93-4; Nguyen and Noussair 2014; Otto 2014; Shklar 1989; Valentino *et al.* 2011; Weber 2012; Wodak 2015.

⁶²⁴ Weinstein 1993.

⁶²⁵ Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Bandelj 2009.

⁶²⁶ Keller 1999; Schwarz, Servay, and Kumpf 1999; Sternthal and Craig 1974; Teigen 1994; Weber 2012.

demobilisation” and the “defensive adaptation” of intolerance if their environment is not “safe, familiar, and normatively compliant”.⁶²⁷ To militate against this, fear and anxiety are often paired with positive resolutions to foster subjects’ coping skills—either via new guidance from discursive apparatuses, or the formulation of self-conscious responsible choices in the sense advocated by Kierkegaard—which is why many faiths encourage subjects to practice religiosity as a way to overcome their religious doubts and strengthen their credence in orthodoxy.⁶²⁸

For differences within activities, all occupations need subjects to have at least a basic level of fear and anxiety so that they pursue behaviour and thinking that is generally consonant with their social functions, and does not disrupt the prevailing mode of cooperation. However, given that the main effect of these two emotions is to encourage subjects to be attentive and alert to informational signals, including cues from discursive apparatuses, fearful and anxious thinking is often cultivated disproportionately in subjects who hold lower-class, subordinated occupations, with those in higher-class occupations given greater latitude to be ‘fearless’ or ‘carefree’.⁶²⁹ For example, economic *habitus* are designed to assuage excessive fear and anxiety in business owners, investors, financial speculators, high-end consumers, &c, to maintain ‘healthy’ levels of risk-taking investments and purchases, and ensure market confidence rather than turmoil, educational *habitus* try to downplay fear and anxiety (e.g., glossophobia) to give teachers the confidence they need to be effective and successful, curative *habitus* aim to avert caregivers’ experiential fear (alarm and horror), so they can take a ‘dispassionate’ approach to problem-solving and healing injuries, clericalist/sacerdotalist faiths often exempt senior religious leaders and thaumaturges from both temporal and spiritual judgment and give them a ‘revealed insight’ into their faith’s doctrines (e.g., via infallibility, inerrancy, divine forgiveness/mercy), and some juridical modes place higher-class occupations beyond the reach of legality or constitutionality—e.g., Schmittian theories of sovereignty as the ‘exceptional’ ability to transcend the ‘rule of law’—which effectively removes their fear of sanction.⁶³⁰ By contrast, for example, lower-class workers and consumers are encouraged (often by ‘fear, uncertainty, and doubt’ marketing) to sustain a range of fears and anxieties, especially towards death (poverty, &c), failure (e.g., lack of proficiency or advancement), and negative evaluation or peer rejection, to motivate

⁶²⁷ Eysenck 2000; MacKuen *et al.* 2010; Marcus, Wood, and Theiss-Morse 1998; Robarchek 1979; Weber 2012.

⁶²⁸ Duriez and Hutsebaut 2001; Fry 2003; Galek *et al.* 2007; Kahoe and Dunn 1976; Kierkegaard 2015; Tillich 2014, p.76; Wink 2006.

⁶²⁹ Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007.

⁶³⁰ Agamben 2005; Beidel and Turner 1988; Ferrero 2011; Liebert and Morris 1967; Powell 2013; Schmitt 2014; Schwartzberg 2007; Teigen 1994.

harder work, greater spending, or “far-sighted behaviours such as saving for retirement”, educational *habitus* cultivate moderate “test anxiety” (i.e., fear of negative evaluation) in learners and researchers to motivate them to perform well in their assignments and assessments, medical and familial caregivers need to instil moderate (anticipatory) apprehension but not outright terror of pain and injury in their ‘wards’, faith ‘adherents’ carry the disproportionate share of religious fears and anxieties (e.g., superstitions, veneration), and political activity (especially under more ‘authoritarian’ modes) ‘plays up’ anticipatory terror towards threats and experiential horror of past events in lower-class administrative and coercive occupations and ‘political subjects’, to disincentivise all but the most “sporadic” and “cheap” forms of political participation, and “depress” complex coordination and mobilisation, which “require sustained effort over an extended timeframe”—albeit, in all cases, not to the extent of fomenting subjects’ ‘choice anxiety’ or social withdrawal.⁶³¹

Second, *anger*. Social activities take very different approaches to the treatment of anger in subjects’ behaviour and thinking. At a basic level, all activities have some limited tolerance for subjects exhibiting anger, albeit often more in a prophylactic way to avoid the personal and social harmfulness of excessive anger suppression.⁶³² Anger reinforces subjects’ existing norms and dispositions—harnessed especially in religious contexts, where revealing (rather than denying or suppressing) anger to deities and sacralised objects is seen as allowing subjects to reaffirm their commitment to prevailing doctrine—and strengthens the impact of their activity-specific discursive values and attitudes on their thinking.⁶³³ It makes subjects “close themselves off to new and counterattitudinal information”, and “leads to information-processing strategies qualitatively similar to positive affect”—i.e., it offers subjects ‘positive resolutions’ to guide their thinking.⁶³⁴ For example, anger motivates economic subjects to compete in order to convert past failures into future successes, while in political activity it is consistently correlated with “more costly” forms of participation, such as activism and mobilisation, “energis[ing] voters” to turn out in elections, and (paradoxically) provoking more “discussion” but making subjects more closed-minded by increasing

⁶³¹ Beidel and Turner 1988; Groenendyk 2011; Jaquith 2006; Jung, Park, and Rie 2015; Liebert and Morris 1967; Loewenstein 2000; Pfaffenberger 2000; Solomon, Zaichkowsky, and Polegato 2013; Teigen 1994; Weber 2012.

⁶³² Kemp and Strongman 1995.

⁶³³ Allison 2003; Nouwen 1978.

⁶³⁴ Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer 1994; Groenendyk 2011; E. Harmon-Jones *et al.* 2004.

their “aversion” to “familiar threats”, often other subjects who are seen as somehow “blameworthy”.⁶³⁵ Activities differ, however, in the extent to which they attempt to strategically manage subjects’ anger—i.e., steering them towards “settled and deliberate” bitterness and annoyance—or allow scope for it to be more spontaneous and uncontrolled—i.e., “hasty and sudden” exasperation or fury.⁶³⁶ In the reverse of the situation for fear and anxiety, high levels of anger may lead to subjects engaging in excessively risky or destructive behaviour that jeopardises the activity itself. Anger’s association with “more optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices” means that, for instance, political and economic *habitus* need to assuage or harness it in different contexts, encouraging subjects to be either risk-averse or risk-loving, while in legal, medical, or familial contexts its use is generally limited to moderate passive or ‘settled and deliberate’ anger (e.g., resentment or annoyance), which make subjects professionally ‘dispassionate’ and motivate their determination to redress grievances and promote justice.⁶³⁷ Above all, this is because anger increases subjects’ tendency to make (often speculative) “causal attributions”, especially in allocating blame for the sources of their anger, which may lead to them engaging in passive or aggressive behaviour that endangers activities’ internal cohesion.⁶³⁸ Ultimately, it is an open question whether or not regular ‘catharsis’ of aggressive anger is socially helpful, which means that—more than with other emotions—social activities under almost any mode of cooperation must exercise extreme caution in determining how far they entertain, or encourage, subjects’ anger.⁶³⁹ For instance, economic subjects who are angry at their ‘counterparties’ often “act contrary to their [...] interests” and demonstrate “inconsistencies in concern for the future over time and across activities”, anger in learners inhibits the acceptance of new information, and angry political subjects experience a “heightened perception of personal control” that “facilitate[s] behavioural approach over withdrawal” in the form of “confront[ing] an adversary”, which explains why anger is a “primary driver of intolerance” (e.g., xenophobia, racism, cultural chauvinism, or even decreased welfarism), while religious activity strongly condemns anger, except in its ‘righteous’ form triggered by social injustice—e.g., the treatment of ‘wrath’ as a Christian ‘deadly sin’, or of *vyāpāda* (‘ill-

⁶³⁵ Bandelj 2009; Groenendyk 2011; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Lebel and Ronel 2009; MacKuen *et al.* 2010; Valentino *et al.* 2011; Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2009; Weber 2012.

⁶³⁶ Hughes 2013.

⁶³⁷ Aristotle 2014; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Huddy *et al.* 2005; Kemp and Strongman 1995; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004; Seneca 1995.

⁶³⁸ Small, Lerner, and Fischhoff 2006.

⁶³⁹ Geen, Stonner, and Shope 1975; Murray and Feshbach 1978.

will’) as one of the Buddhist *pañca nivāraṇa* (‘five hindrances’)—all of which implies that anger must be steered (via ‘anger management’ as part of wider ‘social skills’ acquisition) to be optimally effective.⁶⁴⁰

Within social activities, all occupations benefit from allowing subjects a moderate degree of anger in their behaviour and thinking, as it strengthens the integrity and discursive priority of occupational reference-groups. On the one hand, anger “increases thought but decreases thoughtfulness”, which means that angry subjects are more likely to ‘unthinkingly’ reproduce the discursive values and attitudes with which they have been interpellated.⁶⁴¹ On the other hand, anger intensifies subjects’ perceptions of ingroup-outgroup relations, especially where subjects’ ingroup is more powerful than its rivals, which means that anger increases subjects’ negativity and prejudice towards outsiders, as well as their “willingness to act against relevant outgroups”.⁶⁴² This imperative for caution can be seen in, for instance, the tendency of anger to “polarise” the outcomes of sales negotiations based on the ‘steer’ of subjects’ starting positions (i.e., beneficial if positive, but deleterious if negative), or to lead ‘political subjects’ to blame political elites (e.g., for poor performance)—and while anger “may have the normatively desirable consequence of producing a more active electorate, [it] often has the undesirable consequence of leading to a greater reliance on heuristics, biases, and reduced attention to contemporaneous information”.⁶⁴³ Nevertheless, anger is disproportionately associated with subjects that are perceived to have higher social power—i.e., those in higher-class occupations.⁶⁴⁴ Larissa Tiedens argues that higher-class subjects are ‘permitted’ more anger in their behaviour and thinking, as this allows them to show dominance rather than submissiveness within their particular activities.⁶⁴⁵ However, it is clear that this ‘permissiveness’ comes at a cost—or at least creates a trade-off—for these higher-class subjects, as it gives them higher motivation to perform their tasks, but may in doing so put them under greater stress to ‘perform’, and consequently inhibit their productivity and social efficacy.⁶⁴⁶ For example, there is far greater tolerance for managed (e.g., ‘settled and deliberate’) anger among teachers, medical and care staff, parents, lawyers, &c, whereas angry behaviour and thinking of any kind is valorised extremely negatively among learners,

⁶⁴⁰ Duriez and Hutsebaut 2001; Gagen 2015; C. Harmon-Jones *et al.* 2011; Kemp and Strongman 1995; Loewenstein 2000; MacKuen *et al.* 2010; Marsh, Ambady, and Kleck 2005; Small and Lerner 2008; Watson 2009; Weber 2012.

⁶⁴¹ Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007.

⁶⁴² DeSteno *et al.* 2004; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000.

⁶⁴³ Brader, Groenendyk, and Valentino 2010; Brown and Curhan 2013; MacKuen *et al.* 2010; Sinaceur and Tiedens 2006; Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2009; Weber 2012.

⁶⁴⁴ Groenendyk 2011.

⁶⁴⁵ Tiedens 2001; Tiedens, Ellsworth, and Mesquita 2000.

⁶⁴⁶ Glomb 2002; Jehn 1995; Tiedens 2000.

patients, children, ‘lay’ defendants and witnesses, &c, as obstructive to their social functions.⁶⁴⁷ But in some activities, anger somewhat cuts across internal occupational and classist divisions. Frustration and humiliation, associated with the embrace of political violence, terrorism, or threatening behaviour, are thus encouraged to some degree in all subjects involved in coercive activity—although since they lead to an “increased impact of partisan cues” and a correlative “decrease [in] the influence of more informative cues”, they are especially useful for elites to cultivate periodically in lower-class activists or voters—while faiths that encourage practices of self-blame (e.g., apologetic self-criticism) tend to invite all subjects to foster anger in either self-oriented passive (e.g., bitterness, resentment) or more aggressive forms (i.e., militant fundamentalism *qua* mania, threats, blaming, destructiveness, hurtfulness, and vengeance).⁶⁴⁸

Third, *enthusiasm* and *pride*. Most social activities take a favourable view of enthusiasm and pride in subjects’ behaviour and thinking. Like anger, both of these emotions are associated with “greater reliance on prior predispositions”, in the sense that they reinforce the behavioural dispositions and discursive attitudes with which subjects have been interpellated.⁶⁴⁹ Like fear and anxiety, they ensure that subjects avoid risky or unusual behaviour that challenges their activities’ *habitus*.⁶⁵⁰ For example, enthusiasm and pride encourage subjects to take longer-term beneficial economic/financial decisions, like taking on higher-quality work, relying less on social security, or adopting hard negotiating positions, alongside a “larger reliance on habit” and more consistent preparedness to engage in “more costly” forms of civilian/military administrative or coercive participation, such as activist campaigning or mobilisation (albeit at the expense of a decreased preparedness to engage in political discussion), and achieve religious spirituality, either through what James calls “solemn emotion”, or the *energia* and “orgiastic ardour” of fanaticism/evangelicalism—while in educational, medical, or legal contexts both emotions help inculcate subjects with a sense of professional attachment to their *habitus* and social functions, reproducing their activities’ MRCs, and connecting the formation of positive opinions with the inculcation process itself and its behavioural and discursive outcomes.⁶⁵¹ But the guiding ‘resolution’ they offer for subjects’

⁶⁴⁷ Bialer *et al.* 2011; Frenzel *et al.* 2016; Mammen, Pilkonis, and Kolko 2000; McPherson, Kearney, and Plax 2003; McPherson and Young 2004; Pofeldt 2016; Seay *et al.* 2003; Zeman, Perry-Parish, and Cassano 2010.

⁶⁴⁸ Horgan 2005, p.51; Inbar *et al.* 2013; Inzlicht *et al.* 2009; Jacoby *et al.* 2016; Malhotra and Kuo 2009; McGregor *et al.* 2008; Miller 1994; Nelissen 2012; Silke 2003; Svaldi *et al.* 2012; Wright-Neville and Smith 2009.

⁶⁴⁹ Groenendyk 2011; MacKuen *et al.* 2010; Valentino *et al.* 2011.

⁶⁵⁰ Nguyen and Noussair 2014.

⁶⁵¹ Groenendyk 2011; James 2000; Lea and Webley 1997; MacKuen *et al.* 2010; Marcus *et al.* 2005; Marsh, Ambady, and Kleck 2005; Otto 2014; Vaillant 2013; Valentino *et al.* 2011; Weber 2012.

activities, especially how they process information, is more obviously positive than for fear/anxiety or anger, as it is based in appreciative satisfaction rather than critical dissatisfaction at the *status quo* within a given activity. For pride specifically, activities tend to attach optimal desirability to a moderate level of ‘positive’ pride that loosely corresponds to the Classical concept of *μεγαλοψυχία* or *magnanimitas* (‘greatness of soul’), rather than the more extreme, or ‘negative’, form, *ὑβρις* or *superbia* (‘vainglory/self-idolatry’).⁶⁵² The former helps cultivate in subjects a sense of attachment to their occupational group identity and ‘ownership’ of their tasks in the relevant activity, while the latter promotes an ‘unhealthy’ inflated sense of status and achievement, which may be vastly at odds with subjects’ actual purposive function and significance. This can be seen, for instance, in the importance of pride to maintaining labour force motivation, promoting company loyalty and self-respect in their task performance in individual workers, galvanising higher spending on goods and services (e.g., ‘high-status’ Veblen or Giffen goods), or encouraging subjects to maintain strong, solidaristic, and caring connections to their family and friendship groups—although it is often strongly disvalued in many faiths as harmful to the well-being gained from spirituality (e.g., as a Christian ‘deadly sin’ that fosters ‘falsely exaggerated’ self-esteem).⁶⁵³

For divisions within activities, while both enthusiasm and pride are encouraged to some degree in all occupations, there are qualitative divergences in the pride that different occupations are allowed to show that fall broadly along classist lines. Broadly speaking, enthusiasm is strongly encouraged in all subjects, as it transforms their perception of their social function as not just an ‘occupation’ (*Beruf*)—i.e., a set of purposive tasks attached to a defined role—but a ‘vocation’ (*Berufung*)—i.e., a personal identity based around a life-purpose. In other words, enthusiasm is useful for prompting subjects across all activities to accept, conform to, and reproduce their interpellation by discursive apparatuses.⁶⁵⁴ Pride, however, takes slightly different forms for different classes of subjects. Along with enthusiasm, social activities often cultivate moderate, ‘positive’ pride in lower-class subjects, as this encourages them to derive satisfaction from accomplishing their subjective occupational goals, and fosters in them high-quality, flexible, and effortful performance attainment, along with higher creativity, productivity, and efficacy.⁶⁵⁵ For instance, under late-modern economic modes, it is expected that “workers must feel and

⁶⁵² Aristotle 2014.

⁶⁵³ Cappellen *et al.* 2016; Chao and Schor 1998; Cooper 2004; Evanschitzky *et al.* 2012; Jensen and Miller 2007, 2008; Kang, Alejandro, and Groza 2015; Leibenstein 1950; Masuda and Newman 1981; Wood 1993.

⁶⁵⁴ See pp.127-8.

⁶⁵⁵ Fredrickson 2001; Oveis, Horberg, and Keltner 2010; Weiner 1985.

demonstrate ... enthusiasm” on the basis that this will foster “internal cohesion and collective pride, without discarding individual talent” within specific business concerns and enterprises, and “consumers are supposed to feel and express the same enthusiasm ... by submitting themselves to the fun morality of the consumer society”—while, in general, enthusiastic and proud subjects are usually more creative, efficacious, and generally successful as politicians, activists, teachers, students, care workers, parents, friends, or priests.⁶⁵⁶ While this is also true of subjects in higher-class occupations, these are typically granted greater (self-) esteem under activity-specific discursive sub-modes than those in lower-class occupations, which means that, to an extent, there is a greater tolerance for higher-class subjects to exhibit extreme forms of pride (e.g., self-love, egoism) in their behaviour and thinking.⁶⁵⁷ Together, this differential ‘allocation’ of pride works to entrench and enhance classist hierarchies, exaggerating subjects’ perception of similarities between themselves and other, stronger subjects, as well as of their differentiation from weaker ones—which serves to gloss over the worst effects of class conflict, in activities where this is present. Excess pride and high enthusiasm “exert a greater impact among those who possess resources”, meaning that higher-class occupations—e.g., political and religious leaders, researchers, &c—are consistently allowed to exhibit greater and more ostentatious ‘passion’ than mere conformity to their occupational norms and dispositions strictly requires.⁶⁵⁸

Fourth, *sadness* and *shame*. The various social activities have rather different approaches to the treatment of sadness and shame in subjects’ behaviour and thinking. Like fear and anxiety, sadness makes subjects see themselves as having “reduced personal control” over social phenomena (especially negative ones), which “cannot be prevented”, for which “blame is not easy to assign”, and with which they “cannot as easily cope”.⁶⁵⁹ It similarly encourages subjects to pay more attention to their immediate MRCs and the discursive cues they receive from others—which means, *prima facie*, that a moderate level of sadness may make subjects more responsive to their networks of discursive dependence. Sadness thus creates the same demand as fear and anxiety for positive resolutions to help subjects find ways of dealing or coping with their situations, specifically strategies that do not simply perpetuate sadness (e.g., rumination, ‘drowning one’s sorrows’, or permanent isolation) but challenge subjects’ underlying negativity.⁶⁶⁰ For

⁶⁵⁶ Andrade 2015; Byrd and Chavous 2009; Freitas 2007.

⁶⁵⁷ Kraus and Park 2014; Shariff and Tracy 2009.

⁶⁵⁸ Groenendyk 2011.

⁶⁵⁹ Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards 1993; Lerner and Keltner 2001.

⁶⁶⁰ Goleman 1996, pp.69-70, 72.

example, educational activity in particular uses shame to encourage subjects to try to overcome perceived inadequacies in their existing behaviour, and sadness (in the fairly mild sense of disappointment, e.g., at failures to understand new skills or information) to elicit greater attentiveness from them, while in family or friendship contexts, both emotions act as catalysts to help subjects address serious problems, such as by finding strategies to cope with hurt or loss, or cultivating ‘better’ and more independent behaviour.⁶⁶¹ Excessive sadness (gloom, grief, despair) may provoke “behaviour avoidance”, ranging from apathetic disinterest and abstention to withdrawal and self-exclusion from social settings.⁶⁶² Of course, sorrow and mourning can also foster subjects’ preparedness to fight and be creative, but in order for such forms of sadness to produce a new social ‘aliveness’ and reengagement—i.e., for them to be socially useful—they need a degree of managed “refinement”, as Julia Kristeva argues.⁶⁶³ Thus, economic activity typically downplays sadness to sustain in subjects a moderate degree of dynamic and risk-loving behaviour, as it creates “inconsistencies in [their] concern for the future over time and across activities”, while in political activity it forces a trade-off between “depress[ed]” participation and “demobilisation”, and “enhanced discussion” and “increase[d] effortful information processing”.⁶⁶⁴ Shame, meanwhile, works very much as an inverse of pride, which means that feelings of ‘self-blame’ or ‘self-contempt’ (as opposed to ‘self-idolatry’) promote an equally ‘unhealthy’ exaggerated sense of inferiority and incompetence that may be just as unreflective of subjects’ purposive function and significance.⁶⁶⁵ *In extremis*, then, shame needs to be suppressed in subjects’ behaviour and thinking. However, there is evidence that its close cognate guilt can prompt subjects to exercise restraint, avoid self-indulgence, and expend effort to cooperate in social situations, which implies that it helps ensure subjects’ conformity to the norms and dispositions, and discursive values and attitudes, with which they are interpellated in each activity.⁶⁶⁶ For example, faiths make ample use of sadness (at negative social phenomena) and guilt (at subjective failures) to reinforce doctrinal orthodoxy and motivate prayer as a coping mechanism, either in a lapsarian sense as a reflection on subjects’ ‘sinfulness’, or in a more Spenserian reading as a marker of spiritual fidelity, while juridical activity uses ‘disintegrative’ or ‘reintegrative’ shaming (e.g., shunning or ostracism versus reinclusion) to

⁶⁶¹ Albu 2014; Fraiberg 1987, p.274; Fraser and McLaughlin 2014; Hautz *et al.* 2016; Mahler *et al.* 2000, p.92; Masman 2010, p.8; Resnick 2016; Wilson 2001; Winnicott 1991, p.64.

⁶⁶² Weber 2012.

⁶⁶³ Kristeva 1989; Parsons 2000, p.4.

⁶⁶⁴ Coricelli *et al.* 2005; Loewenstein 2000; MacKuen *et al.* 2010; Weber 2012.

⁶⁶⁵ Hareli *et al.* 2013.

⁶⁶⁶ Giner-Sorolla 2001; Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, and Fitzsimons 2007.

punish criminals and prevent reoffending, economic activity leverages “humiliation and low self-esteem” as stigmatising ‘peer pressure’ to make workers and consumers “chang[e] their circumstances”, either by ‘overhauling’ their assets and possessions or seeking a new job, and political activity links pity and shame to greater “generosity of welfare recommendations” as positive resolutions to social adversity.⁶⁶⁷

Within activities, sadness and shame are treated fairly equally across all occupations. All subjects are allowed (if not exactly required) to show a moderate level of sadness in their behaviour and thinking, as long as this does not spill over into the extreme forms that lead to ‘behaviour avoidance’ and hence jeopardise subjects’ performance of their social functions. And, as first noted by Ruth Benedict, shame (and guilt) are frequently used to control and regulate subjects, and offer effective guidance for collective occupational and classist group behaviour and thinking.⁶⁶⁸ However, there is a slight classist distinction detectable in the treatment of sadness and shame, which is unsurprisingly the mirror-image of the treatment of enthusiasm and pride, since these are, after all, their opposite feelings. While it is higher-class occupations that are permitted, or even encouraged, to show more extreme forms of (especially) pride, the equivalent expectations for shame accrue disproportionately to lower-class occupations, as under many activities’ modes of cooperation (and discursive sub-modes), failure is equated closely with lack of control over, disposal of, or access to the relevant means. Many activities use shame (i.e., guilt, remorse, anguish) as a form of social control, to ensure that subjects in lower-class occupations—e.g., workers, learners, ‘lay’ worshippers, ‘the punished’, children and young relatives, even patients, &c—are restrained and cooperative in their behaviour and thinking, and encourage it vicariously in other subjects who either know ‘the shamed’ through other social contexts, or who engage in similar (albeit ‘unshamed’) behaviour.⁶⁶⁹ To illustrate: in political activity, for instance, sadness is associated with an “increased impact of partisan cues” and correlatively “decrease[d] ... influence of more informative cues”, while a “deeply rooted and continually reinforced” feeling of shame “generates and signals a break in the social bond”, encouraging subjects to passively accept their political situation rather than “organising in their

⁶⁶⁷ Andrade 2015; Baanders 1997, p.51; Bandelj 2009; Braithwaite 1989; Duriez and Hutsebaut 2001; Hermann *et al.* 2015; Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004; Nussbaum 2015; Ronel and Segev 2015; Schilderman 2001; Small and Lerner 2008; Trevor 2004, p.48.

⁶⁶⁸ Benedict 1989.

⁶⁶⁹ Bynum 2017; Bynum and Goodie 2014; Harris 2006; Inbar *et al.* 2013; Jacoby *et al.* 2016; Muris 2015; Muris *et al.* 2014; Nelissen 2012; Novin and Rieffe 2015; Svaldi *et al.* 2012.

own interests”, often through discourses of privatism that “keep the ‘shamed’ from defining personal troubles as public issues”, and hence actively demanding changes to the prevailing political modes.⁶⁷⁰

Fifth, *disgust*. Social activities take perhaps the most straightforward view on disgust out of any of the emotions that have a demonstrable impact on opinion-formation. In general, all of them have to exercise some caution in attempting to galvanise disgust in subjects’ behaviour and thinking, as it strongly motivates a desire for social distance, and even complete withdrawal from social settings.⁶⁷¹ But while unrestricted use of disgust may damage social activities’ integrity, in a more managed form it offers them several advantages. Disgust increases subjects’ preference for their own in-group and negativity or aversion towards other out-groups, through the association of ‘similarity’ with ‘healthy’ behaviour and thinking (broadly construed), and ‘difference’ with ‘sickness’ or ‘danger’ (often to the extent of imputed dehumanisation).⁶⁷² This helps cement subjects’ identification with the tasks of their occupation and wider activity, and their preparedness to take their fellow occupation-holders as a discursive reference-group for their opinion-formation. Further, disgust in its moralised sense motivates subjects to avoid transgressing norms—i.e., it encourages conformity to their occupational *habitus*—and avoid forming social relationships with other subjects who do so—i.e., it leads them to shun or expel such subjects from their social ‘circles’. This effect is particularly pronounced for perceived violations of ‘purity’ in both behaviour and thinking—e.g., cheating, murder, rape, &c, as well as deception, hypocrisy, or even ignorance—and promotes a form of what Andrew Jones and Julie Fitness call ‘moral hypervigilance’ that is designed to safeguard social cohesion.⁶⁷³ How this, in turn, translates into the ‘severity’ of subjects’ opinions (i.e., estimative judgments) depends on subjects’ sensitivity to disgust.⁶⁷⁴ Meanwhile, disgust is generally negatively correlated with aggression, which means that it may discourage subjects from engaging in hurtful or harmful forms of “behavioural approach”.⁶⁷⁵ These effects can be seen in what Foucault and Jonathan Haidt have separately identified as curative and educational uses of ‘pathogen disgust’ and ‘moral disgust’ to connect personal or social (often sexual) necessities—e.g., avoiding death,

⁶⁷⁰ Malhotra and Kuo 2009; Scheff 1994.

⁶⁷¹ Sherman and Haidt 2011.

⁶⁷² Navarrete and Fessler 2006.

⁶⁷³ Horberg *et al.* 2009; Jones and Fitness 2008; Tyber, Lieberman, and Griskevicius 2009.

⁶⁷⁴ Cummins and Cummins 2012; David and Olatunji 2011; Landy and Goodwin 2015; May 2014; Ong *et al.* 2014; Schnall *et al.* 2008.

⁶⁷⁵ Pond *et al.* 2012.

illness, and injury—with thicker normative views of desirability—e.g., avoiding wrongness, badness, or evil—or religious disgust for behaviour and thinking that is classified as ‘sinful’ according to what Hans Schilderman calls “rules of concern significance” (e.g., questions of sex, marriage, &c).⁶⁷⁶ However, some social activities take a much more hesitant approach to disgust. For instance, excessive juridical reliance on “magical ideas of contamination”, to use Nussbaum’s term, may foster rules and sanctions that are oppressive, bigoted, disproportionately harsh, or vindictive towards ‘wicked’ subjects found guilty of perpetrating crimes, while in political contexts disgust makes subjects less deliberative, more confrontational, closed-minded, and inclined to dehumanise ‘othered’ groups (e.g., via xenophobia, racism, cultural chauvinism, anti-welfarism, or disenfranchisement), and in economic contexts warps subjects’ perceived benefit from engaging in transactions, as it “triggers goals to expel, reducing buying and selling prices”.⁶⁷⁷

For divisions within social activities, disgust is typically encouraged (or discouraged) to a similar degree across all occupations. But there is an incentive for all activities to cultivate a degree of disgust in higher-class occupational groups towards subjects in lower-class occupations.⁶⁷⁸ Disgust entrenches higher-class subjects’ identification with the behaviour and thinking of the fellow members of their activity’s ‘elite’, as well as their desire for social distance from lower-class subjects, which reinforces classist hierarchies and asymmetries of power, and reproduces the prevailing mode of cooperation. This form of classist distinction is replicated across most social activities, although the rise of egalitarian, pluralist, and inclusivist discourses across several of them under their most recent modes of cooperation has arguably pushed disgust further into the background, usually in exchange for more ‘pro-social’ emotions such as empathy, solidarity, or love.⁶⁷⁹ There is still a heavy element of disgust tied up with classist divisions in behaviour and thinking, as with the ‘aristocratic’ or ‘paternalist’ condescension often shown by political elites towards the activities of ‘political subjects’, or the supposed association between economic poverty and the supposed ‘dirtiness’ of the ‘working class’ and precariat.⁶⁸⁰ Meanwhile, two major exceptions to this classist division are the curative and educational domains, where efficacy and success in higher-class occupations—especially for parents, medical and care staff, and teachers—may

⁶⁷⁶ Foucault 1996, 1998; Haidt 2007; Schilderman 2001.

⁶⁷⁷ Bonini *et al.* 2011; Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004; MacKuen *et al.* 2010; Nussbaum 2010.

⁶⁷⁸ Andrade 2015; Skeggs 2004; Soldatic 2012.

⁶⁷⁹ Britzman, Frosh, and Luttrell 2009; Cantillon and Lynch 2017; Chun, Jang, and Ju 2014; Rakopoulos 2016; Rozakou 2016; Ussher and Perz 2008; Van Lange 2008.

⁶⁸⁰ Arya 2014; Jensen 2014; Smith *et al.* 2013; Tyler 2008.

need subjects to partly suppress their other-regarding disgust, while retaining a normal level of self-regarding disgust in their behaviour and thinking.⁶⁸¹ This suppression is needed to allow them to ‘deal with’ the potentially ‘disgusting’ behaviour and thinking of lower-class subjects—children, patients, and younger learners—in whom the nature and level of disgust required by the various social domains in which they are involved has not yet been fully cultivated.

To recapitulate the analysis in this section, there is considerable variety in the emotions that subjects in different activities, occupations, and classes use to form opinions. Subjects in all activities are encouraged to entertain high *enthusiasm* and *pride* and a low-to-moderate level of *fear* in their thinking, while *sadness* and *shame* are much more variable, and *anger* and *disgust* generally tolerated only in specific cases and to a limited degree. These emotions are allowed, or emphasised, to a low-to-moderate level across all occupations, but anger, pride, and disgust are typically indulged more in higher-class subjects, while fear and shame generally manifest more strongly in lower-class subjects. In light of the effects of these emotions on opinion-formation, opinion research can also expect to see occupational (and classist) differences in how subjects form opinions that result from their differential use of emotions. In general, these may include *contingent* tendencies (i.e., manifesting when emotions are ‘deployed’) for higher-class subjects to be: (1) more likely to conform to existing predispositions; (2) slightly more likely to rely on their memories instead of new information; and (3) slightly more likely to form positive opinions about the given MRCs. This can be seen, for example, in the rigid (and arguably highly damaging) insistence of the IMF and OECD policymakers on neoliberal principles of fiscal austerity in the wake of the 2007–8 financial and sovereign debt crisis, the tendency of ‘the elderly’ to view the present day in terms of ‘rose-tinted’ nostalgic recollections of ‘the past’, or wealthier and more powerful subjects claiming to be ‘satisfied with the direction their country is going’. Meanwhile, lower-class subjects may contingently be: (1) more open to being endowed with new predispositions; (2) more receptive to new information; and (3) more likely to form negative opinions about their MRCs. This covers newspaper readers being persistently ‘shocked’, or ‘outraged’, into adopting particular views on social phenomena, advertisers fostering envy or ‘fear of missing out’ to create demand for their products, or the regular use of messaging centred on decline and regeneration by opposition parties seeking to win popular support—e.g., ‘Labour Isn’t Working’, ‘*Le changement, c’est maintenant*’, ‘Make America Great Again’, &c. Subjects in all

⁶⁸¹ Leahy 2014; Muris *et al.* 2012; Randler, Hummel, and Wüst-Ackermann 2013; Stevenson *et al.* 2010; Wiggins 2012.

Case study 6: The People's Princess?

The reactions to the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in a car crash in the Pont de l'Alma road tunnel in Paris on 31 August 1997 show how starkly subjects in different social classes can diverge in their emotional processing of social issues. The Royal Family's initial outward indifference to the death, and disgust towards the public's 'hysteria', reflected a long-standing upper-class irritation with Diana's 'flashy' and savvy flirtation with the UK tabloid press (e.g., regarding her romantic involvements after divorcing Prince Charles in 1996, including with Dodi Fayed, who also died in the crash). Their immediate inclination was to sedately 'carry on as usual' under the strictures of royal protocol (e.g., symbolised by the refusal to return to London from Balmoral Castle, or to fly the Royal Standard at half-mast over Buckingham Palace), tinged with a sense of relief that one of the 'thorns in the side' of the UK feudal elite had been removed. By contrast, much of the UK public reacted to the death with considerable shock, followed by a nationwide outpouring of grief (e.g., the vast quantities of flowers laid at Kensington Palace and thrown in front of her funeral cortège, as well as the spike in rates of suicide and self-harm in the month after Diana's funeral). This manifested a widespread sense of disorientation at the sudden loss of one of the lodestones of 1990s liberal 'Cool Britannia' culture, standing for empowered femininity, innovative fashion, and gender role emancipation. To avoid the risk that this disjunct might spark the UK population to resent the 'callous' aloofness of the Royal Family and the wider aristocratic elite, and call into question their privileged status within UK society (e.g., the *Sun* headline 'Where is our Queen? Where is her Flag?', or the emergence of conspiracy theories alleging that Diana was assassinated), the Royal Family was urged to consciously and overtly 'bridge' the class divide by 'joining' and 'sharing in' the popular mourning (e.g., the Queen's television broadcast to the nation, the televised royal ceremonial funeral service). At the same time, the population were 'invited' to replace their fear and sadness with pride in Diana's 'Britishness' as the Royal Family retroactively embraced and recognised her life and achievements (e.g., her support for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, or her work with Great Ormond Street Hospital). Arguably, this intervention prevented 1997, already an *annus horribilis* for the Royal Family, from becoming one of its last years as a major UK institution.

classes are 'pulled' contingently towards both heuristics and rationality by different emotions, with a very slight net inclination towards heuristics in higher-class subjects and towards dutiful rationality in lower-class subjects. This may seem paradoxical, but it essentially reflects higher-class subjects' greater power and privilege. There is greater indulgence and leeway for higher-class subjects because they have 'made it', as *in extremis* with the tolerance for 'fat-finger' mistakes in market trading, government corruption and waste, and under-reasoned *ex cathedra* pronouncement by senior academics or religious leaders. By contrast, many activities expect dutiful, 'good behaviour' (and thinking) in lower-class subjects, often in expectation of congratulatory rewards, or to avoid blame for failures—e.g., school pupils practising rigorous and homogenised learning methods, poorer consumers economising their 'household budgets', or low-ranking clergy and worshippers abiding stringently by doctrinal injunctions. Given these extreme

classist tendencies in the use of emotions, social subjects can, in general, be placed on a spectrum between ‘positive reproducers’ at the higher-class end, and ‘negative rethinkers’ at the lower-class end.

§4. *Reason: rational purists and reasonable approximators*

Finally, reason. The analysis suggested earlier that there are two broad ways in which subjects use reason, again contingently, to form opinions: *rationality* and its derivatives, and *heuristics*.⁶⁸² The various types of reasoning determine how thoroughly subjects ‘work through’ their mental pictures into fully-fledged opinions, and decide how much information they try to incorporate, to what extent they take into account other subjects’ mental pictures, and how far they sacrifice logical rigour for tried-and-tested ‘rules of thumb’ when forming their opinions. Now, the enquiry continues by examining each of these forms of reasoning in turn. Again, if different uses of reason prove to be associated more with some activities, occupations, and classes than others, opinion research will be able to give a more thorough social explication of subjects’ different approaches to rationality, for their greater or lesser reasonable circumspection, and for the degree of approximation they are prepared to countenance when forming opinions, compared to other subjects in their population.

First, *rationality* and *reasonability*. Nearly all social activities incorporate some understanding of rationality and reasonability into their ideal-types of how subjects (should) behave and think, although there are differences in how far each of them has developed an understanding that is unique to its activities. For rationality, each activity offers a specific reading of instrumentality (*Zweckrationalität*), based on the means at subjects’ disposal and the ends they seek to achieve, and value (*Wertrationalität*), based on the guidance subjects receive from norms and dispositions that “are *per se* neither rational nor irrational”.⁶⁸³ It applies the overarching principle of efficiency and effectiveness to each one, and reconciles them into a combined procedure for subjects to ‘rationalise’ their behaviour and thinking. In each activity, subjects’ ends are given by the prevailing division of purposive activities, and their guiding norms and dispositions are determined by the prevailing mode of cooperation at a given physical and temporal conjuncture. Thus, for instance, economic rationality (as characterised by Daniel Bernoulli) or ‘rational choice theory’ (in William Stanley Jevons’ formulation) require subjects to formulate complex, logical deductions from complete (clear) and transitive (internally consistent and continuous)

⁶⁸² See pp.95-102.

⁶⁸³ Sibley 1953, p.556.

preferences, aimed at maximising utility from production, exchange, or consumption outcomes, which involves adopting high standards, taking into account all available information, exploring alternatives, forming probabilistic assessments of event likelihoods and potential costs/benefits, and not making decisions too quickly or easily, while juridical rationality demands either deductive (applying reasoning rules) or inductive (argument from precedent and analogy) internal coherence, and is either geared instrumentally towards ends of fairness and good policy (for legal realists or critical legal scholars), or based on predetermined *Grundnormen* and derived validated norms (for legal formalists or positivists) or social morality (for legal interpretivists).⁶⁸⁴ In a less developed form, political rationality—especially after its colonisation by economic rationality, thanks to ‘positive’ political theorists such as Downs, Gary Becker, and William H. Riker—aims to maximise the winning, securing, and ordering of bureaucratic and military power, and help subjects craft strategic choices within the conditioning parameters of organisations, while educational and curative activity (e.g., in medical contexts or ‘science’ teaching) merely encourages subjects to adhere generally to the ‘scientific method’, and exhibit formal logical consistency and congruence with empirical evidence.⁶⁸⁵ Prominently, religious activity has a more ambiguous relationship with rationality, as some faiths defend fideist or apologetic anti-rationalism (e.g., neo-orthodox Protestantism or Catholic traditionalism), and others try to incorporate it to avoid descending into either superstition or nihilism (e.g., Anselmian and Thomist Catholicism, Calvinist scholasticism, or Bahá’í views on scientific-religious ‘harmony’).⁶⁸⁶ Meanwhile, reasonability extends subjects’ understanding of means-end relationships and values from the subjective to the intersubjective level, formalising how they should take each other’s perspectives and tasks into account. The ability to act intersubjectively and transperspectively is crucial to maintaining the integrity of social groups in all activities—so, for example, though reasonability is often downplayed in economic reasoning as “essentially related to the disposition to act morally”, and hence “incompatible” with rational “egoism”, subjects are also motivated by gains from cooperation and ‘reasonable’ concerns of moderation, fairness, and equitability, while in juridical reasoning the emergent and manipulable legal fiction of the

⁶⁸⁴ Austin 1998; Diab, Gillespie, and Highhouse 2008; Dworkin 1986; Hart 2012; Kelsen 2009; Lai 2010; Leiter 2005; Llewellyn 2008; Nenkov *et al.* 2008; Raz 1979; Rustichini 2009; Scott 2000; Turner *et al.* 2012; Weinhardt *et al.* 2012; Weinrib 1988.

⁶⁸⁵ Becker 1978; Conn, Meltz, and Press 1973; Downs 1997; Dunleavy 1991; J. Friedman 1996; Green and Shapiro 1994; McKinnon 2013; Riker 1962.

⁶⁸⁶ Aquinas 2014; Barth 1959; Geisler 2013, pp.19-55; Hemming and Parsons 2011; Kierkegaard 1985, 1992; Maistre 1819; Plantinga 2000, pp.250, 291; Reymond 2008; Maritain 1999.

‘reasonable person’ refers to a “certain average of conduct” that covers moderate education, intelligence, appropriate information from a “common set of facts”, capability, awareness of the law, fair-mindedness, and preparedness to “sacrifice [...] individual peculiarities [...] beyond a certain point” in order to take others’ interests into account.⁶⁸⁷

Within activities, all occupations are expected to conform somewhat to rational and reasonable forms of behaviour and thinking, in order for subjects to fulfil their social tasks effectively and efficiently, and in a way that coheres with the similar efforts of other subjects. Insofar as there are occupational or classist distinctions within activities, they take the form not of greater or lesser levels of rationality and reasonability in subjects’ activities, but qualitative differences in how subjects ‘apply’ each of these to their behaviour and thinking. In general, higher-class subjects carry slightly greater expectations of ‘pure’ or ‘full’ subjective rationality, with these expectations relaxed for lower-class subjects, who are steered towards (or restricted to) relying on forms of ‘rational ignorance’ or ‘low-information rationality’, due to their smaller role in affecting the MRCs of the given activity.⁶⁸⁸ For instance, business owners, jurists, civil servants, senior academics, or doctors are expected to take detailed positions in debates over value and instrumentality, and demonstrate internally coherent reasoning—although not to the point of what H. Igor Ansoff terms ‘analysis paralysis’, where their thinking is overwhelmed by their attempts to research all the information open to them.⁶⁸⁹ By contrast, workers, consumers, jurors, citizens, or patients are disproportionately encouraged to ‘default to’ rational ignorance and low-information rationality—e.g., in the preference of convenience and availability of goods and services (bolstered by ‘brand loyalty’) are valorised ahead of fully reasoned selection (‘consumer choice’), or single-issue and party-line ‘voting the ticket’, jingoism, and ‘dart-throwing’, instead of a full consideration of the available candidates or policies to draw their own conclusions.⁶⁹⁰ The only occasional exceptions to this are educational and curative activity, which may demand a higher standard of rationality from lower-class subjects—e.g., early-years learners and children—to encourage them to develop more complex behaviour, as well as the necessary skills of logical reasoning that underlie higher-level intellectual activity.⁶⁹¹ Meanwhile, for reasonability, the expectations flow the other way, with higher-class subjects (e.g., ‘senior’ occupations

⁶⁸⁷ Holmes 2012, p.108; Rilling *et al.* 2002; Sibley 1953, p.560.

⁶⁸⁸ On class and rationality, see Barbalet 1992; Duncan 2005; Goldthorpe 1996, 2000; Lim 2012; Savage 2000; Wilks 1995.

⁶⁸⁹ Ansoff 1965.

⁶⁹⁰ Aidt 2000; Ben-Yashar and Zahavi 2011; Christiano 2015; Fishkin 1995, 2009; Kaye 2015; Kitahara and Sekiguchi 2008; Landauer 2015; Martinelli 2006, 2007; Somin 2006, 2015.

⁶⁹¹ Stylianides and Stylianides 2008.

or ‘experts’) occasionally excused from strictures about ‘unreasonable’, ‘selfish’, even ‘bullying’ behaviour and thinking, but lower-class subjects (e.g., ‘junior’ occupations or ‘laity’) often required to downplay their self-interest, ‘pro-socially’ emphasise their ‘communal spirit’, and thereby sustain their occupational group’s (and activity’s) norms and dispositions, and discursive values and attitudes.⁶⁹² This is remarkably consistent across all activities, with the sole possible exceptions being familial and friendship curative contexts, and educational activity, where a significant degree of reasonability is expected from higher-class subjects as well—e.g., parents and senior academics—in order to show understanding for the interests and ‘imperfections’ of lower-class subjects.⁶⁹³

Second, *heuristics*. All activities include some ‘rules of thumb’ in their ideal-types of behaviour and thinking, chiefly because, as Cass Sunstein notes, they recognise that even bounded forms of rationality may impose demands on subjects that are too stringent for constant and consistent application.⁶⁹⁴ In other words, all social activities are open to a degree of attribute substitution, and the differences between domains manifest themselves in precisely which simplifications they encourage subjects to use to conserve their psychic resources. Some heuristics are commonly found across several activities, especially ones like the ‘availability’, ‘representativeness’, ‘anchoring-and-adjustment’, or ‘fluency’ heuristics, which raise subjects’ receptiveness, and attribution of significance, to both their contextual information and occupational norms and dispositions, and are thus useful for ‘high-spotting’ or ‘priming’ information for discursively dependent subjects—e.g., pithy or memorable slogans and mantras, eloquent and persuasive cases and sermons, or clear instructions. These steer subjects towards the most vivid and easily-formed ‘pictures in their heads’, such as ‘demonised’ policy concerns and ‘idealised’ aspirations, ‘catchy’ brand advertising, learners’ previous grades affecting teachers’ assessments of their later performance, past cases, testimonies, expert statements, the penal code, and prosecution and defence pleas affecting the final terms of judicial sentencing, as well as the ‘imaginability’ of illness, injury, death, or the afterlife.⁶⁹⁵ Meanwhile, some heuristics are associated with certain activities more than others. For example, the

⁶⁹² For a selection of literature on class and behaviours linked to (un)reasonableness in different activities, see variously Boermans *et al.* 2014; Brookes, Dunn, and Edwards 2014; Cullen 1983; Eckersley 1989; Frey and Meier 2004; Gillet, Cartwright, and van Vugt 2011; Hutchinson *et al.* 2005; Liu 2011; Pilgrim and Tomasini 2012; Taylor 1967.

⁶⁹³ Høigaard, Jones, and Peters 2008; Jones 2005; Kilpatrick 2005; Laible, Carlo, and Roesch 2004; Parsons *et al.* 2014; Swain *et al.* 2013; Warren 2015.

⁶⁹⁴ Sunstein 2005.

⁶⁹⁵ Caverni and Pèris 1990; Englich, Mussweiler, and Strack 2006; Hastie and Dawes 2009, pp.78-80; Mussweiler, Englich, and Strack 2004, p.183; Park and Lessig 1981; Plous 1993, pp.123-4; Riddle 2010.

‘effort’ heuristic is used to measure the exchange value of commodities, as well as the correctness and worth of teaching, learning, and research, in terms of the quantity, intensity, and duration of the purposive inputs that ‘went into’ them (e.g., Marxian statements of the ‘labour theory of value’, post-Fordist ‘tailoring’ and ‘customisation’, and ‘artisanal’ or ‘organic’ goods marketing), while the ‘contagion’ heuristic (‘magical thinking’) is used to incentivise juridical, educational, and curative subjects to avoid ‘contaminated’ and echo ‘clean’ behaviour and thinking (e.g., criminality, stupidity, or toxicity versus lawfulness, cleverness, or healthiness), and the ‘equity’ heuristic is cultivated as part of ‘good parenting’ or ‘good friendship’, with subjects encouraged to allocate their attention equally among other subjects (children, relatives, friends) to avoid socially dangerous neglect.⁶⁹⁶

Within activities, there is a clear classist divide in the degree to which heuristic thinking is encouraged in different occupations. In general, heuristics are more tolerated—and more prevalent—among lower-class than higher-class occupations, as less ambitious demands are made on lower-class subjects’ reasoning, with barely any expectation of ‘perfect’ rationality (except, perhaps, regarding the MRCs with which they are directly involved). Thus, for example, ‘peak-end’ heuristics are encouraged to focus consumers’ attention onto the positive ‘highlights’ and ‘finishes’ of their service purchases and experiences, to direct voters’ attention onto incumbent and previous administrations’ major (and recent) policy successes or failures, or to make patients’ memories of onerous but necessary medical procedures less painful in order to ensure that they return for repeat appointments.⁶⁹⁷ Similarly, ‘diversification’ heuristics (e.g., through ‘X for the price of’ deals) are used to pressure consumers into making multiple simultaneous purchases that increase the variety (and scale) of the goods and services they consume, ‘familiarity’ heuristics are used to encourage patients to ‘fall back on’ treatment options that are readily available and have worked previously (useful as a ‘stop-gap’ to alleviate some of the pressure on doctors), ‘scarcity’ heuristics help patients assess how at-risk they are personally from specific medical conditions, based on the frequency of their occurrence in the wider population, and ‘simulation’ heuristics are used to help children and patients imagine medical conditions to warn them off noxious behaviour.⁶⁹⁸ Lower-class subjects are particularly encouraged to employ ‘imitate-the-successful’ and ‘imitate-the-majority’ types of social heuristics, as these foster their dependence on the ‘castlist’ of discursive influencers by

⁶⁹⁶ Bowles and Gintis 1977; Briñol, Petty, and Tormala 2006; Fajardo and Gardner 2013; Fischer 2016; Hertwig, Davis, and Sulloway 2002; Kim and Labroo 2011; Koriati *et al.* 2009; Kruger *et al.* 2004.

⁶⁹⁷ Just, Sigirci, and Wansink 2015; Kahneman *et al.* 1993; Miron-Schatz 2009; Schneider *et al.* 2011; Suzuki *et al.* 2014.

⁶⁹⁸ Broemer 2004, p.103; Cytryn 2001; Ditto and Jemmott 1989; Garb 1996; Gilovich and Savitsky 1996; Raune, MacLeod, and Holmes 2005; Yudkowsky 2008, pp.102-3.

cultivating their reliance on ‘canonical’ authorities—e.g., successful investors, political rulers, judges, tutors, parents, or religious leaders—alongside an ‘ingroup bias’ in their thinking, which help sustain their activity’s networks of discursive dependence and interpellation processes. For example, ‘social proof’ and ‘social-circle’ heuristics make consumers and voters imitate the spending and electoral choices of their reference-groups, ‘scarcity’ heuristics motivate consumers to compete with their peers by ‘tagging’ commodities with expectations of rivalry and loss, and ‘fluency’ heuristics make citizens more responsive to the rhetoric of political leaders.⁶⁹⁹ Higher-class subjects are generally considered to ‘know better’ in their respective activities, with ‘anchoring-and-adjustment’ heuristics especially strongly downplayed in favour of greater reliance on direct experience.⁷⁰⁰ Nevertheless, some activities encourage particular higher-class heuristics, such as ‘tit-for-tat’ heuristics, advised for large businesses and ‘big-money’ consumers and investors, or institutional ‘veto players’, party leaders, and parliamentary candidate, to appear ‘strong’ in competitive market or electoral contexts (in contrast to ‘weak’ consistent cooperation and ‘unfair’ or ‘dangerous’ consistent competition), or ‘hot-hand’, ‘equity’, and ‘diversification’ heuristics, which guide investors’ approaches to allocating resources among ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ capital and stock investments, based on past and current market trends.⁷⁰¹

To summarise, there is extensive qualitative variation in the forms of reasoning that subjects in different activities, occupations, and classes can use to form opinions. Most activities favour subjects using some kind of *rationality* and *reasonability* in their thinking, although they vary somewhat in the ‘balance’ they strike between the two, and encourage them to use *heuristics*, with some commonly shared throughout ‘the social’, and others specific to individual activities. Meanwhile, subjects in higher-class occupations typically exhibit purer forms of rationality and lower reasonability, and use a smaller set of heuristics (e.g., hot-hand, tit-for-tat, equity), while lower-class subjects use rational ignorance or low-information rationality, show greater reasonability, and rely on a much more diverse range of heuristics (e.g., social-circle/proof, scarcity, peak-end, familiarity, fluency). Taking into account the effects of these forms of reasoning on opinion-formation, opinion research should be able to detect occupational (and classist) differences in how subjects’ differential use of reason shapes the way they form opinions. Overall,

⁶⁹⁹ Fukawa and Niedrich 2015; Hertwig *et al.* 2008; Pohl *et al.* 2016; Rao and Monroe 1989; Volz, Schooler, and von Cramon 2010.

⁷⁰⁰ Wilson *et al.* 1996.

⁷⁰¹ Bonhage-Freund and Kurland 1994; Coram 1994; DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal 2006; Dluhosch 2016; Johnson, Tellis, and Macinnis 2005; Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis 2004; Read and Loewenstein 1995.

Case study 7: The 'gay plague'?

The wide range of views on HIV and AIDS, especially on how to address the pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa, act as a useful microcosm of how subjects in different classes reason when forming opinions about social issues. Senior medical professionals, scientific researchers and university tutors, development economists, pharmaceutical company executives, and healthcare policymakers all tend to acquire a regular stream of full, up-to-date information about advances in medical understanding and treatment of HIV and AIDS (e.g., from scientific or medical journals), and do so 'impartially' in the sense that they are not usually 'on the lookout for' putative ideological bias when sourcing information about HIV/AIDS. At the same time, there have been clear cases when such elites have defended established practices well beyond the point at which they were 'backed up' by medical evidence (e.g., the long preservation of the legal ban on blood donations by men with a recent history of homosexual sex despite growing evidence that AIDS was not just 'gay-related'), as well as a less-than-accommodating tendency to insist on the policy demands implied by their area of insight (e.g., the struggles between medical researchers and policymakers over the mandatory rollout of the 'pre-exposure prophylactic' medication emtricitabine/tenofovir to all gay men 'on the NHS' regardless of the cost), and to dismiss anyone not in line with their latest consensus as delusional, wilfully mendacious, or flat-out wrong. At the same time, 'ordinary' people, including HIV/AIDS patients and 'at-risk' groups, acquire their information about the illness more selectively and intermittently (e.g., from incidentally encountering news stories), and are more responsive to incorporating a wide range of competing interpretations they have heard from others about how it should be treated. Many of the typical forms of lower-class heuristic reasoning are on show in the case of HIV and AIDS as well. There have been many incidents where so-called 'AIDS denialists' appeal disproportionately to the obscure arguments of the small number of scientific dissenters against the consensus on the link between HIV and AIDS (e.g., the 'Duesberg hypothesis' that antiretroviral drugs, not HIV, cause AIDS), cleave to familiar historical misconceptions about the illness (e.g., that HIV transmission occurs only via homosexual anal sex), make simplistic analogies with the pathology of other illnesses (e.g., that HIV is transmitted by mosquito bites, like dengue fever, malaria, yellow fever, or West Nile virus), adopt rationalisations that are prevalent in their communal or generational peer-groups (e.g., around the 'healing' effects of 'virgin cleansing' or zoophilia), or draw false parallels between HIV/AIDS and high-profile stigmatised activities (e.g., recreational drug use, sexual promiscuity). Of course, this is not to suggest that elites are necessarily always 'more right' about HIV and AIDS than lower-class subjects, but to illustrate that the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of subjects in different groups comes about through potentially very divergent types of reasoning.

higher-class subjects may *contingently* (i.e., when they 'invoke' their reasoning) be: (1) more likely to incorporate a fuller range of information; (2) less likely to take others' mental pictures into account; and (3) more likely to 'stick to' established judgments, agree with like-minded subjects, and source their information 'impartially'. This can be illustrated by the ability of academics, judges and senior lawyers, or high-value traders to (choose to) invoke complex rational reasoning and 'cold logic', and the tendency of political or religious elites to cluster into 'factions' (e.g., the alleged isolation of 'metropolitan bubbles' and 'echo chambers' from the views of lower-class subjects) yet also 'read widely' when informing their opinions. At the same time, lower-class subjects may contingently be: (1) more likely to be selective in

the information they incorporate; (2) more likely to take others' mental pictures into account; and (3) more likely to focus on information and predispositions that are either obscure, familiar, easily processed, provided by their peer-groups, or prompted by intense and recent experiences. This can be seen in the tendency of 'ordinary' voters or consumers to appeal to 'simple' or 'straightforward' logic and 'common sense', and respond to information that 'looks impressive' (because expressed in intelligent-sounding pseudoscientific or pseudophilosophical terms), 'looks obvious' (because expressed in 'their' terms), stems from 'trusted' and 'tried-and-tested' sources (i.e., their 'cast list' of influential subjects), or is 'memorable' in some other way. Based on these extreme classist tendencies in the use of reason, social subjects can, in general, be arranged along a spectrum from 'rational purists' at the higher-class end to 'reasonable approximators' at the lower-class end.

§5. Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the ways in which the functional differentiation of social agency can create—and, in late modernity, has created—a significant degree of pluralism in the way subjects use their means of thinking to form opinions about 'the social'. The type of pluralism found here can be termed *multiformity*, which refers to the fact that, as a social artefact, mass opinion is formed by thinking processes whose 'shape' is highly diversified across many individual subjects in their respective activities, occupations, and classes. The chapter began by arguing that the use of personality, emotions, and reason to form opinions is not—and has never been—distributed homogeneously across all social subjects. It outlined how subjects' access to these means of thinking, and their socialisation into *habitus* governing their use, has changed in successive historical modes of ideation, and how it has become cross-cut by classist divisions within these modes, and by the differentiation of ideation into sub-types 'dedicated to' separate social activities, themselves divided into classes. Then, it examined exactly what these (qualitative or quantitative) differences between subjects in different activities, occupations, and classes are for each means of thinking in turn. It found that there are clear asymmetries in the way subjects in higher- and lower-class occupations in different activities use particular personality-traits, emotions, and forms of reasoning, which have a significant effect on how they form opinions, and (to some extent) on the precise opinions they form. Overall, what emerges from these observations is that, under the prevailing modes (and sub-modes) of ideation, thinking—and hence opinion-formation—is not at all necessarily 'simple' or 'harmonious' for subjects in different classes. For

instance, for lower-class subjects, there are tensions between the emotional drive towards information and rational reasoning, and the parallel enforcement of low-information rationality and heuristics encouraged by many of the prevailing sub-modes of ideation, along with an interesting dynamic between the conservatism towards which their favoured personality-traits incline them, and their emotional attentiveness to very specific sorts of information from their discursive networks. Similarly, for higher-class subjects, there are tensions between the expectation of fuller rationality and their emotional drive towards relying on a small set of 'comfortable' heuristics under the prevailing ideative sub-modes, as well as a fascinating interaction between the tentative liberal-conservative balance prompted by their personality-traits, and their emotional inclination towards becoming entrenched in their pre-existing views. Also, for subjects in all classes, there are clear contradictory pulls between the 'underlying' and 'contingent' elements of personality and emotions/reason respectively. This means that higher-class subjects are *ex ante* oriented towards new information and inclined to use their reason, but contingently 'pulled towards' relying more on their existing memories and predispositions, and use heuristic thinking. Meanwhile, lower-class subjects are fundamentally inclined to conform to their prior predispositions and use their emotions, but contingently 'pulled towards' acquiring new cues and micro-indications from their existing sources of information and predispositions, and using rational thinking. All these effects of multiformity and social stratification are crucial for opinion research to bear in mind when analysing the diverse ways in which mass opinion is formed. Next, and lastly, the enquiry applies the same analysis of the pluralistic effects of functional differentiation to the processes of opinion-expression.

V. They have not fail'd to pester us with message: pluralism in opinion-expression

It comes dangerously close to an expression of opinion.

——Duke of Wellington, on hearing soldiers cheering their officers⁷⁰²

The more we elaborate our means of communication, the less we communicate.

——John B. Priestley⁷⁰³

The previous chapter considered how subjects' social activities, occupational positions, and class situations affect how they use the means of thinking with which they form opinions about 'the social'. The effect of strong classist tendencies within the prevailing modes of ideation, and within the hybrid sub-modes of ideation associated with different social activities, is that in late modernity there are extensive occupational (and classist) asymmetries between subjects in the extent to which they (can) use personality-traits, emotions, and reason to form their opinions. This chapter picks up where the last one left off, and, *mutatis mutandis*, applies the same approach to communication. That is to say, it explores how far subjects' control over, disposal of, and access to, the means of articulation they use to express opinions—i.e., the material basis of their communicative power—differs depending on the activities in which they are engaged, the occupations they hold, and the class situations they occupy. The chapter starts by evaluating to what degree means of articulation are 'permanent' features of opinion-expression for all subjects, and how far they are contingent on occupational divisions and classist stratifications within the prevailing mode of communication in late modernity, and in the prevailing sub-modes of communication pertaining to different activities—i.e., whether they are universally or differentially available to subjects in different parts of 'the social' (§1). It then explores, in turn, the differences that the division of 'the social' into activities and occupations (and classes) introduces into the ways that

⁷⁰² Johnson 2008.

⁷⁰³ Priestley 1957, p.201.

subjects use each means of articulation to express their opinions: bodily organs (§2), and media (§3). Overall, it observes that the processes of communication by which contemporary mass opinion is expressed are characterised by a large and growing degree of pluralism, which it terms the *multimodality* of the concept in late modernity.

§1. *Occupation, class, and the means of articulation*

Before examining the extent of occupational and classist variation in the way subjects use their means of articulation, it is worth revisiting the comments in chapter II about how subjects ‘turn’, or ‘translate’, their formed opinions into opinions-to-be-expressed.⁷⁰⁴ Following Zaller, the analysis argued that subjects ‘sample’ a selection of the opinions they have formed about their MRCs, and ‘average across’ this selection to derive the particular cognitive or estimative judgment they will communicate. Further, it suggested that this process of ‘sampling’ and ‘averaging across’ remains wholly subjects’ own subjective choice. Now, following the analysis of chapter III, it must be recognised that this ‘choice’ is heavily influenced by the way subjects have been constituted by the processes of socialisation (and especially interpellation) associated with the activities in which they engage. ‘Proximally and for the most part’, in the Heideggerian sense used earlier, subjects’ choice is ‘steered’ by which occupations (and, more broadly, activities) they are engaged in that are ‘closest’ to the MRCs about which they are forming and expressing opinions. A significant part of this ‘steer’ comes from the further consideration of which occupations and activities are most personally ‘important’ to subjects themselves. For every subject, their various subjectivities often compete to assert themselves—and included in every occupational *habitus* with which subjects are imbued are often norms and dispositions that justify each subjectivity’s claim to social (and more narrowly discursive) primacy over any other. For instance, it is this that partly explains the monistic theoretical and practical prioritisation of some occupational ‘roles’ over others in different traditions of enquiry: ‘owners’, ‘workers’, ‘consumers’, ‘taxpayers’, ‘citizens’, ‘voters’, &c.⁷⁰⁵ In other words, when subjects choose which opinions to ‘sample’ and ‘average across’, they are trying to reconcile the ‘pulls’ of different subjectivities to provide a ‘definitive’ opinion which they can then go on to express.⁷⁰⁶ But as well as this, subjects’ choice is also determined by which means of articulation they

⁷⁰⁴ See pp.105-10.

⁷⁰⁵ See pp.48-53.

⁷⁰⁶ Zaller 1992, pp.38, 51.

have control over, disposal of, and access to for each of their occupations (and the limits that imposes on what they can communicate). The connected but fundamentally autonomous social conditions of ideation and communication mean that the contexts in which subjects ‘have cause to’ form opinions do not automatically also provide opportunities to express these opinions, and that, instead, different contexts are often required for them to do so effectively. Subjects are no more able to express themselves by drawing or writing something in their capacity as religious worshippers than they are to do so by standing up and singing in the context of a university examination. At the same time, they may be asked to fill out survey questionnaires or find themselves posting on social media about a host of different things—ranging from customer satisfaction to medical appointments to their political views—but do so in subtly different ways for each context.

With this insight, the enquiry can now turn to examine these contextual variations in subjects’ use of means of articulation. As with the means of thinking, this part of the analysis starts with the parallel observation that, while all subjects use some bodily organs and media to convert their substantive opinions into opinion-statements, different subjects recourse to these means (separately and in combination) to express their opinions in very different ways. The concrete opinions that subjects ‘voice’ about ‘the social’ can be created by a large range of competing physiological and (other) material elements, reliance on which can vary radically: different subjects can express opinions ‘verbally’, ‘posturally’, ‘gesturally’, ‘facially’, &c, or they can ‘depict’, ‘write’, ‘print’, ‘broadcast’, ‘record’, ‘post’, &c, them, as well as any combination of these. The point here, then, is to clarify what effect ‘the social’ itself has on determining why this is the case, and indicate some broader trends within these intersubjective differences. The premises of this analysis are extremely similar to those for the means of thinking as well. As argued in chapter I, the distribution and arrangement between subjects of the MRCs for every activity is determined by its prevailing mode of cooperation, and for opinion-expression, this is governed by the mode of communication. Under the functional differentiation that characterises late-modern society, and with the rise of sub-types of communication ‘dedicated to’ different social activities, the distribution/arrangement of the MRCs of communication is devolved to the various sub-modes of communication. These have created communicative occupations that specialise ‘in’ particular parts of ‘the social’—journalists and publicity agents, and other members of the communicative ‘branch’ of the discursive ‘intelligentsia’ for an activity, mirroring the (mostly) ideative occupations of academic

researchers—as well, again, as informal ways of ‘articulating about’ them.⁷⁰⁷ In chapter II, the analysis outlined the ways in which different means of articulation facilitate opinion-expression, and suggested that subjects can use organic and media articulation in (again) mutually supportive or contradictory ways to transmit the complex, sophisticated opinions they have formulated.⁷⁰⁸ Again, the aim of this chapter is once again to continue reconciling the classist asymmetries present in late modernity identified in chapter I with the universality of the model of opinion-expression presented in chapter II.

This analysis begins with the same consideration as for the means of thinking, namely how much scope there is for differentiations in how subjects use means of articulation—i.e., how ‘permanent’ or ‘variable’ their control over, disposal of, or access to bodily organs and media is. Here, however, there is a much clearer divide than for the means of thinking. Bodily organs are almost uncontroversially ‘permanent’ elements of human biology and physiology, as with the exception of the physically disabled, they are something that all subjects have, and that is ‘naturally’ connected to their existence as living, embodied beings. Thus, to a large extent, organs are always-already present in subjects’ ‘kernel’ of pre-social humanity. Media, meanwhile, occupy a uniquely separate position to both means of thinking and organic means of articulation, in that they are not necessarily connected in any way to human biology, physiology, or psychology.⁷⁰⁹ Even though all subjects are to some extent surrounded by materials—even in ‘the natural’ rather than specifically ‘the social’—these are strictly physically detached from the embodied elements comprising subjects’ pre-socialised ‘kernel’.⁷¹⁰ This also affects the question about how far subjects’ specific expressive behaviours or recourse to communicative resources are ‘permanent’ or ‘contingent’ features of their subjectivities—i.e., whether subjects’ precise ‘arrangement’ of their bodily organs, and how they use different media are also immutable and fundamental characteristics, or variable consequences of socialisation processes. In the case of bodily organs, subjects’ expressive capacities and behaviour are determined by a mixture of genetic inheritance and extensive socialisation, which gives each of them a ‘baseline’ level, and way, of using their bodies that is subjectively largely constant (even if intersubjectively variable), and which can be refined over the course of their lives.⁷¹¹ Thus, subjects are ‘given’ a particular voice type, body size and shape, facial appearance, &c, by virtue of the ‘natural’

⁷⁰⁷ See pp.65-7.

⁷⁰⁸ See pp.105-22.

⁷⁰⁹ See pp.114-7.

⁷¹⁰ See pp.34-7, 57. This analysis has very little time for either theological or Hegelian and other idealist attempts to find a transcendental unity between subjects and the materials in their environments at any level beyond contingent physical contact.

⁷¹¹ Birdwhistell 1952; Darwin 2009; Ekman 2003; Kendon 2004; Kirch 1979; Krauss, Chen, and Chawla 2000; Navarro 2008.

features of their embodiment, but they can choose to ‘learn’, or be ‘trained’ in, many different uses of these features—e.g., through athletic exercise, Alexander technique, finishing school, voice coaching and singing lessons, or taking part in dramatic and other stage performances.⁷¹² By contrast, the range of ways in which media can be used in different contexts is limited only by the nature of communicative materials themselves, and by the state of technological development—which, however, also means that no subject is ‘guaranteed’ the use of *any* media simply by being ‘thrown’ into ‘the social’⁷¹³. In other words, in late modernity, subjects can *prima facie* express themselves by writing a diary entry, making a phonecall, being interviewed on radio or television, sending an email, writing a blogpost, tweeting, or in any other way they choose, restricted only by the technical requirements of each format—but also that access to any of these means is never ‘unconditional’ or ‘universal’, but always comes ‘at a cost’ that makes them (at least potentially) exclusive.⁷¹⁴ This means that, while the capacity for organic expression may be more or less universal across all subjects, and while the range of media available to them is extremely high (and still rising), there is considerable scope for ‘the social’—and socialisation processes—to ‘emphasise’ different organs and media under some conditions more than others. With bodily organs, socialisation is barely at all a question of determining *whether* subjects have control over, disposal of, or access to them, and almost entirely one of *how* they do so—i.e., again, how they use the organs they have ‘naturally’—whereas with media, it is a case of determining almost entirely *both* whether they have access, control, or disposal—i.e., what means they have, and how they (choose to) use them.

The contingently prevailing modes (and activity-specific sub-modes) of communication thus have significant latitude to affect how subjects use specific bodily organs and media to express opinions about different parts of ‘the social’. Opinion research has hitherto only superficially recognised that the opinions subjects express, as part of their wider discursive ‘output’, depend on the communicative ‘tools’ available to them, especially media but to an extent also their organs.⁷¹⁵ But beyond that, this enquiry also argues that opinion research must explore how far subjects’ opinions and the particular combination of means of articulation they use to express them—i.e., any or all of the many different organs and mediums—can be predicted through ‘deep-structure’ analysis of the mode of communication by which

⁷¹² Finn 2011; Kerrigan 2012; Perkin 1995; Tarr 2011.

⁷¹³ Thompson 1995, pp.44–80, 207–34.

⁷¹⁴ Anderson and Coate 2000; Anderson and Gabszewicz 2005; Frijters and Velamuri 2010; Lau and Wydick 2014; Reisinger 2012; Rochet and Tirole 2003; Rosse 1967; Spence and Owen 1977; Steiner 1952.

⁷¹⁵ See p.117. See, again, Berelson 1952; During 2007; Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler 1992; Krippendorff and Bock 2008; Miller 2006; Roberts 1997; Wimmer and Dominick 2005.

their articulation is governed, and other aspects of their communicative *habitus*.⁷¹⁶ As with opinion-formation, in lieu of a complete overview of each mode's articulation 'preferences', this analysis offers a few illustrative examples of how different means of articulation have historically been mobilised and essentialised. The only caveat here is that, unlike ideation, communication has not traditionally been divided into a similar set of periodisations—at least, not ones that enjoy the same degree of clarity and uncontroversial recognition. This renders the claims here of necessity a little more sweeping and speculative than those for ideation.

The norms around the various means of articulation have mostly focused on cumulatively expanding subjects' expressive opportunities beyond the limitations of foregoing modes of communication, albeit more with a view to supplementing and diversifying rather than displacing 'established' techniques and resources. As a result, the historical development of these norms (again, at least within Europe) has left bodily organs largely unaffected as means of articulation since the most 'primitive' periods of human society—perhaps because they are integral to subjects' embodiment, and because their physiology has not evolved significantly during the Anthropocene era, which has limited how far radically new ways can be invented to use bodies to communicate.⁷¹⁷ But beyond this remarkable transhistorical consistency, there have been some indications of slight variations in organic communication over time, often via (re)invention and new appropriation of its *meaning* in line with contingent norms of personal etiquette: different standards of beauty, elegance, or gracefulness in social appearance and conduct have led subjects to shift their reliance between different organs as expressive elements.⁷¹⁸ By contrast, given media's 'subject-independent' status, their role under consecutive modes of communication is more variable by several orders of magnitude than that of bodily organs, and can be separated into three broad and discretely identifiable 'waves', or revolutionary moments, of diversification and transition.⁷¹⁹ First, the invention of writing and other symbols 'decoupled' communication from subjects' bodies, giving information 'externalisation', systematised 'regularity', and 'permanence' that lowered the immediacy and contemporaneity required for its meaning to 'flow' between subjects.⁷²⁰ Second, the development of printing and other mechanical media vastly increased

⁷¹⁶ Gellner 1988; Halmos 1969; Haykin 2001; Mann 1986; Thompson 1990; Thompson 1995, pp.10–31.

⁷¹⁷ Ekman 2003; Kendon 2004; Kirch 1979; Navarro 2008.

⁷¹⁸ Elias 2000; Martin 1979; Roberts 1967; Vanderbilt 1957.

⁷¹⁹ Carey 1989; Cullen 2014; Kovarik 2011; Meyrowitz 1995; Poe 2011; Thompson 1995, pp.23–30, 44–80; van Dijk 2013.

⁷²⁰ Chandler 1995; Daniels and Bright 1996; Ifrah 1999; Lenman 2005; Logan 2004; Powell 2009; Robinson 2003; Rogers 2005; Wells 2004.

the volume of subjects' communicative output, as well as further increasing its systematised 'regularity', allowing for a more consistent dissemination to more subjects over a larger area and further reducing the need for immediacy and contemporaneity.⁷²¹ Third, the discovery of electric and digital media vastly expanded the possible forms of communication, extending the 'permanence' of writing and symbolism to auditory information via sound recording, and deepening the complexity available for visual information via (moving) image recording, as well as further reducing the need for immediacy by increasing their 'reach' via broadcasting, virtual, and online media.⁷²² Over time, each of these 'waves' has led to significant additions to, and changes in, the norms of communication expected under its successive modes. Thus, for example, the increased 'pace' of information exchange since the advent of electric and digital media especially has significantly reduced the tolerance for prolixity in writing styles—e.g., from the lengthy 'social problem novels' of the 18th and 19th centuries to the pithy social media 'threads' of the 21st—and for the length of the 'soundbites' used in radio and television broadcasting.⁷²³ Each stage of technological development has also consistently heralded a slight decline in the intensity, or prominence, with which subjects use bodily organs and media from the earlier 'waves', generally once new means emerge in later 'waves'.⁷²⁴ This has mostly been a *relative* decline, as the emergence of new means has 'taken the pressure off' older ones, rather than directly 'replacing' them. But there has also been some *absolute* decline, with shifts towards new technologies leading to a 'neglect', 'unlearning', or 'attrition', of earlier, more rudimentary, and less pervasive or adaptable means, as with the near-extinction of petroglyphy and petrography, the rapid rise and disappearance of telegraphy, the ongoing decline of print media, or the endangered status of oral lore, 'kerygmatic', and proclamation traditions in various forms of religion, law, and other literature.⁷²⁵ This, in part, has had the effect of 'deprioritising' or even 'crowding out' bodily organs in favour of successive 'waves' of media outside subjects' embodiment.⁷²⁶ In late modernity, with the extensive diversification of means of thinking available to subjects, it is difficult to 'pin down' a reductive set of norms that govern all 'contemporary'

⁷²¹ Chandler 1995; Hardt and Splichal 2000, pp.130-1, 137, 146-54, 159, 163, 173, 185; McLuhan 2001, pp.170-94, 220-35; Muhlmann and Birrell 2008; Powell 2009; Robinson 2003; Rogers 2005.

⁷²² Boyd and Ellison 2007; Goggin 2011; Herbert 2000; Kawamoto 2003; McLuhan 2001, pp.267-80, 289-368; Scott 2005; Stallings 2004; Wheen 2011.

⁷²³ Fehrman 2011; Gehl 2015; Hallin 1992; Guy 1996; Scheuermann 1985; Williams 1958.

⁷²⁴ McLuhan 2001, pp.3-80; Pavlik and MacIntosh 2015; Thompson 1995, pp.44-118.

⁷²⁵ Foley 1992; Harmanşah 2014; Hopia 2013; Huurdeman 2003; Nielsen 2015; Ong 1982; Tunstall 2008; Wenzlhuemer 2013.

⁷²⁶ LaFata 2014; McLuhan 2001, pp.4-5, 15, 49; Tardanico 2012.

organic or media communication. But there clearly are such norms that apply to each one with some degree of definition.

For each mode of communication, socialising (and interpellating) apparatuses endow subjects with these norms for using bodily organs and media as part of their wider communicative *habitus*. Like the ideative norms that instruct subjects ‘how to think’ using personality-traits, emotions, and forms of reasoning, these communicative norms present the contingent ideal-type of ‘how to articulate’ using bodily organs and media under the prevailing mode of communication. For every physical and temporal conjuncture, they ‘set’ the ‘average’ societal archetype for *how* ‘vocally’, ‘posturally’, ‘gesturally’, ‘visually’, &c, or in how ‘symbolic’, ‘written’, ‘telecommunicative’, ‘digital’, &c, a format subjects should articulate themselves when they express opinions. Again, while these norms *prima facie* apply partly to all subjects engaged in communication at any given conjuncture, the specific ideal-types become ‘disaggregated’ according to the division of articulation under each mode of communication. As a result, the norms around the use of means of articulation which subjects follow when they express opinions depend on the communicative occupation they hold within the division of articulation, and ‘their’ distribution and arrangement of the MRCs of communication. Again, the ‘content’ of each subjects’ norms (and hence the kind, or level, of their access, &c, to their bodily organs and media) depends on the type of (vernacular or specialised) ‘communicating’ they are doing when they form opinions—i.e., public speaking, personal correspondence, literary writing, making art, current affairs broadcasting, &c.⁷²⁷ In late modernity, the mode of communication is highly classist, which creates systematic (and radical) inequalities in the MRCs of communication, and hence the communicative power, of subjects in different communicative occupations—including differential control over, disposal of, and access to the means of articulation. Just as it is the ideative occupations within the intelligentsia who have the best use of means of thinking, the correlative communicative occupations—i.e., journalists and other publicity agents—enjoy the most favourable distribution and arrangement of MRCs of communication, constitute a communicative elite, and are able to use means of articulation more than subjects in lower-class or ‘informal’ communicative occupations. Subjects in the intelligentsia are thus expected to use their bodies and media in a way that enhances, rather than inhibits, the complexity and sophistication of their articulation processes—here, linked to aspects of ‘skill ideology’, such as rhetorical ‘clarity’, ‘eloquence’, ‘artfulness’, ‘persuasiveness’, &c—again to the cost of subjects outside the communicative

⁷²⁷ See pp.65–7.

elite.⁷²⁸ As with ‘thinking aids’ and reasoning tools and strategies, this communicative distinction becomes obvious when organic or media expression is materialised in, or relies on, external resources—i.e., make-up, clothing, ‘handbooks’, ‘instruction manuals’, or a host of ‘support’ technologies, such as computer coding, graphic design software, or high-definition recording devices. Journalists and publicity agents typically have greater and more immediate control over, disposal of, and access to these resources than other ‘communicators’—again, often because they (or their close colleagues) have developed them themselves—and hence a firmer and ‘more skilful’ grasp of the ways of articulating they ‘embed’, or ‘realise’.⁷²⁹ Thus, again, subjects in the intelligentsia have a ‘fuller’ ideal-type of ‘how to articulate’, and those in other communicative occupations receive somewhat ‘derivative’ ideal-types that reflect their comparatively lower use of means of articulation.

As with opinion-formation, the way in which subjects express opinions is also differentiated according to more than just the divisions within communication. The norms and practices for bodily organs and media, and the classist divisions within communication, are likewise ‘cross-cut’ by the division of purposive agency into activities (and domains) and occupations (and classes) in the same way. The activities about which subjects express opinions modify the general communicative norms governing how, and whether, they use the various means of articulation to do so, with the result that for different sub-types of communication ‘dedicated to’ specific activities, certain bodily behaviours and types of media are reified and universalised across all subjects engaged in these activities. For instance, the emergence and expansion of voting, either in elections or plebiscites/referendums, in response to the rise of democratic constitutionalism made the act of ‘casting a ballot’—i.e., either marking a paper and placing it in a box or pulling a lever on a machine—a characteristic form of political expression. Similarly, the strong and consistent accompaniment of prayer in different faiths by particular ‘iconic’ postures and gestures—e.g., folded hands, bowed head, kneeling, &c—and specific vocabulary in verbal communication has given these organic behaviours an indelible association with religious activity. Further, these activities likewise modify the general classist divisions in the use of means of articulation inherited from the overarching mode of communication, so that different sub-types of communication grant differential control over, disposal of, and access to the means of articulation to the specialised discursive occupations compared with subjects who only ‘informally’ express opinions within ‘their’ social

⁷²⁸ See p.172. Dunne 1997; Papillion 1995; Poulakos 1983; Roochnik 1996; Sterne 2006.

⁷²⁹ Bourdieu 1988; Dencik and Wilkin 2016; Ellcessor 2016; Gutsche 2015; Lester 2010; Perttula, Carter, and Denoue 2011; Potter and Baum 2013; Sourbati 2012.

activity. Thus, again, despite the major differences between ‘their’ activities, there are similar divisions between, for example, company advertisers and business executives or consumers, government press spokespeople and politicians or voters, ‘public intellectuals’ and school pupils, or religious ‘preachers’ and worshippers, in the ‘way they articulate’ when they express opinions about various parts of ‘the social’. At the same time, different sub-modes of communication also reflect the occupational plurality and class stratifications within the activities with which they are associated, again either because the different requirements under these activities’ modes of cooperation lead subjects to favour some bodily behaviours or types of media over others, or because subjects can leverage their fungible MRCs and power within the ‘primary’ activities—e.g., wealth and income, education level, and social status—to gain better access to the means of articulation.⁷³⁰ Thus, at the purely occupational level, there are clear differences between, for example, the way activists going on a protest express opinions—e.g., by marching, singing, shouting slogans, making iconic hand gestures, wearing more or less informal clothing, carrying placards, rioting, &c—and the way police officers sent out to meet them do so—e.g., by standing in the way, kettling them, making public broadcast announcements, wearing uniforms, making arrests, launching baton-and-shield charges, &c. Moreover, at the classist level, the opinion-statements of government ministers, business leaders, senior clergy, judges, or cultural figures, &c, are awarded vastly greater prominence (and a greater social ‘cachet’), whether ‘on the airwaves’, ‘in writing’, or online, than those of subjects in lower-class occupations within each of these domains.⁷³¹

Again, subjects in the ‘castlist’ of influential personalities and groups can use the processes and apparatuses of socialisation to give themselves more privileged communicative positions, and perpetuate classist divisions in subjects’ use of bodily organs and media under the given sub-modes of communication. Elites and intelligentsia, with the help of educational occupations, restrict exposure to certain ‘ways of articulating’—e.g., defining ‘genteel’ and ‘polite’ versus ‘vulgar’ or ‘taboo’ behaviours, ‘jargon’, foreign languages, rhetorical delivery and presentation skills—to only the narrow set of subjects intended to replace them.⁷³² Again, peer-groups act to ensure that subjects ‘talk properly’ and ‘behave themselves’ in a way ‘appropriate to’ their social situations, while heroic individuals either ‘elevate’ or

⁷³⁰ Bourdieu 1977, pp.40-9, 54-67, 70, 89, 171-87; Bourdieu 2010, pp.5-9, 14-20, 56-8, 67-80, 98-9, 110-19, 131, 176, 225, 258-61, 283-5, 376-7, 407-12, 536-7; Gellner 1988; Mann 1986; Savage *et al.* 2015, pp.57-184; Thompson 1995, pp.12-18; Weininger 2005, pp.86-90.

⁷³¹ Brody 1991; Lewis 2001; Zaller 1992, pp.6-22.

⁷³² Culpeper and Kádár 2010; Fershtman, Gneezy, and Hoffman 2008; Green 1987; Haugh 2015; Holden 2001; Leech 2014; Nash 1993; Watts 2003; Watts, Ide, and Ehlich 2005.

popularise certain articulation styles—e.g., the self-indulgently florid prose of Russell Brand or Stephen Fry, versus the simple imagery of Donald Trump or (in a different register) Beyoncé.⁷³³ Of course, since the materials that constitute media are separate from subjects' embodiments, there is not (as such) any limit on how unequally the nature and the level of subjects' control, disposal, and access to them can be distributed under classist modes and sub-modes of communication. While in many cases there is a straightforward financial hurdle that prevents lower-class subjects from 'affording' the same media technology as those in higher classes—e.g., high-quality drawing and writing equipment, recording studios with expensive equipment, large-scale printing and publishing, &c—'denial of access' can take many subtler forms in late modernity.⁷³⁴ For instance, news and current affairs discussion websites often require subjects to register an account (sometimes in their real name) in order to contribute to 'below-the-line' comment sections, while their editorial teams impose tight limits on who can publish on them that favour a narrow cadre of regular writers. At the same time, owners and operators of social networking and search engine websites (e.g., Facebook, Wikipedia, Google) can amend or delete 'content', as well as 'blocking' the sites' users, with very little accountability or oversight. Hence, just as for the means of thinking, occupational and classist divisions in the use of means of articulation for each sub-type of communication partly 'align with' occupational and classist divisions within both communication in general and the activities about which subjects are expressing opinions.

As with the means of thinking, then, this all suggests that the functional differentiation of society, which leads to the hybridisation of communication with the activities about which it takes place, adds similarly significant variety to the way subjects express opinions about 'the social'. The ways subjects use bodily organs and media to transform their substantive opinions about their environments into opinion-statements are likewise not universal, but strongly affected by the activities, occupations, and class situations into which they are socialised—which may even 'outweigh' the differentiations imposed by the prevailing mode of communication itself. As with ideation in chapter IV, the longer and more closely subjects are engaged in an activity, and hold a particular occupation (or occupy a particular class situation) within it, the more they 'adopt' the *habitus* of its associated sub-mode of communication—i.e., the more they tend towards the ideal-typical way in which each activity 'expects' subjects to use their means of articulation when expressing opinions about it. As in the previous chapter, the enquiry now looks at precisely how functional differentiation impacts the way subjects in different social roles express

⁷³³ McFadden 2016; Sandhu 2016; Shafer 2015; Sutherland 2013; West 1985.

⁷³⁴ Frijters and Velamuri 2010; Lau and Wydick 2014; Reisinger 2012; Spence and Owen 1977; Steiner 1952.

Case study 8: Free and Green?

The evolution of Irish nationalism offers an intriguing example of the different restrictions and possibilities subjects in different classes face when expressing their views on a given social issue—here, the autonomy of Ireland. Despite renouncing extra-parliamentary activity under the terms of the 1882 Kilmainham Treaty, nationalist elites in the Irish Parliamentary Party, led by Charles Stewart Parnell and John Redmond, found extreme limits to their ability to further the cause of Irish self-government through the ‘accepted’ channels of Westminster debate, since even though they won the support of the Liberals under Gladstone, successive Home Rule bills were defeated in the House of Commons in 1886 and the House of Lords in 1893. These defeats took place against a background of prolonged Irish agrarian agitation (the Land War) and the Fenian bombing campaign, and also led to sporadic outbreaks of sectarian urban unrest and even rebellion (e.g., the 1886 Belfast riots, the 1916 Easter Rising). While a third Home Rule bill passed in 1914, the delay in its promulgation due to WW1 and the UK government’s hasty and brutal reprisals after the Easter Rising turned nationalist elites away from Home Rule towards Irish republicanism (e.g., Sinn Féin’s declaration of the Dáil Éireann as a parliament independent of the UK in 1919), and galvanised the Irish public to support mass physical force separatism over elite negotiation (i.e., the 1919–21 Irish War of Independence). Since then, in the Republic of Ireland and especially Northern Ireland, Irish nationalist partisanship and activism has operated along a spectrum of uneasily coexisting tactics, ranging from formal coordination with the UK (e.g., the 1922 Anglo-Irish Treaty, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, or the 2006 St. Andrew’s Agreement) to outright war and paramilitary conflict (e.g., 1922–23 Irish Civil War, the Troubles). These have all been characterised by a recurring pattern of ‘mainstream’ nationalist elites calling for a turn to direct or mediated negotiation (e.g., power-sharing in the Northern Ireland Assembly), and encouraging their popular supporters to employ nonviolent means of expression such as protest marches (e.g., the 1968–9 civil rights marches, or the 1972 anti-internment rally that culminated in the Bloody Sunday massacre) or popular art (e.g., the ‘Free Derry’ mural, and songs such as ‘Come Out Ye Black and Tans’ or ‘Go On Home British Soldiers’). In turn, these are routinely condemned by ‘hardline’ counter-elites and dissident activists (e.g., Republican Sinn Féin, Continuity IRA, Official IRA, Provisional IRA, Real IRA), who by their self-exclusion from ‘conventional’ forms of discourse restrict themselves to a narrow range of often crude and indirect ways to express their support for nationalism (e.g., communiqués, hunger strikes, riots, robberies, bombings, or assassinations).

opinions, and illustrate how different bodily organs and mediums are mobilised and essentialised by different sub-modes of communication. And again, the focus is on the mobilisation and essentialisation tendencies for subjects in higher- and lower-class occupations in their activities, and it is assumed that the tendencies for ‘middle-class’ subjects lie between these extremes.

§2. *Bodily organs: sophisticate poseurs and common obsequy*

In chapter II, this enquiry noted that the bodily organs that have a consistent effect on how subjects transmit information about ‘the social’ can be categorised according to the parts of the body

(i.e., organ-groups) they use, and the type of information they create: *vocal* and *sonic*, *ocular* and *visual*, *facial*, *postural*, *gestural*.⁷³⁵ The precise nuances in their vocal stress, intonation, rhythm, tone, or tempo, and in their use of certain gestures, postures, eye movements, and facial expressions, variously influence how subjects convey the substantive content—above all the emotional content, or in broad terms the ‘positivity’ or ‘negativity’—of their opinions. Here, the analysis takes each bodily organ identified earlier, and examines them in turn. As with the means of thinking in chapter IV, the aim is to clarify whether subjects’ use of—i.e., control over, disposal of, and access to—certain bodily organs is generally more associated with some activities and occupations (and classes) than others. Again, insofar as this is the case, it enables opinion research to pinpoint the social determination of how subjects express—or, in fact, *do not* express—opinions about different parts of ‘the social’, and in particular explicate why these opinions may appear in forms that are ostentatiously sophisticated and overt, or modestly simple and subdued, compared with those of other subjects in a given population.

First, *vocal* and *sonic* communication. In general, all activities use communication that is spoken and linguistic—i.e., in technical terms, communication through the syntactical and grammatical arrangements of lexicals, based on the phonetic combination of delineated sets of vowel and consonant speech sound units. For instance, verbal expression is prized as integral to success in face-to-face sales pitches, business negotiations, market trading, advertising, and hawking or peddling wares, as well as in consumer ‘taste tests’, focus groups, speeches, and interviews, and similarly in political campaigning and protesting, conferences and summits, question-and-answer sessions, or legislative scrutiny and debate, in curative activity for doctors, patients, and care staff to share information about medical conditions and treatments, and in juridical activity to facilitate prosecution and defence arguments, jury discussions, and courtroom consultations or judgments.⁷³⁶ Likewise, speech is key to reproducing religious discourse in worship (e.g., preaching sermons, creeds and testimonies, textual readings) and proselytism (e.g., the Christian Great Commission, or the Islamic *da’wah* dialogical missionary tradition), and to facilitate educational message comprehension, either via speech repetition in early-years and language teaching and learning or through complex discussion as a major format for instruction in higher education.⁷³⁷ The major point of divergence comes in the vocabularies associated with each activity. Thus, for example,

⁷³⁵ See pp.111–4.

⁷³⁶ Aoi 1984; Cyphert 2010; Gallino 2008; Sparks and Areni 2002.

⁷³⁷ Bloom, Hood, and Lightbown 1974; De Smet, Van Keer, and Valcke 2008; Gathercole 2006; Hoff, Core, and Bridges 2008, pp.903–16; Masur 1995; Miller 1977; Pilkington and Walker 2003; Smith 2008, pp.198–9; Speidel and Herreshoff 1989; Stokes and Klee 2009.

economic, political, juridical, and medical discourse lean heavily on often highly stylised jargon, prosody, and theoretical terminology specific to different contexts (e.g., industries and sectors, plenary sessions, protest marches, court hearings, surgical operations, GP consultations), while in families and friendship groups there is uniquely greater tolerance for subjects using a diverse range of ‘unofficial’ or ‘semi-private’ vocabularies, and relaxing conventional linguistic rules (e.g., grammar, syntax, spelling).⁷³⁸ Moreover, activities exhibit significant variance in their use of non-spoken or non-linguistic communication. Vocal music, for instance, is predominantly the preserve of ‘work songs’ performed during labour tasks (e.g., agricultural and pastoral songs, ‘field hollers’, ‘slave songs’, sea shanties, waulking songs, industrial folk songs), national anthems and other patriotic songs, ‘underground’ protest, topical, or anti-war songs, political music genres (e.g., punk, rap, *nueva canción*), or celebratory music for religious worship (e.g. Christian hymns and carols, Hasidic Jewish *nigunim*, Sikh *gurbani* and *rāgas*, or Hindu *pathas* for Vedic chanting).⁷³⁹ Meanwhile, oral noises are tolerated only in some activities, such as the fairly extensive allowance made for keening, cheering, or roaring (dis)approval alongside or in response to political speech, the embrace of non-spoken linguistic expression in ‘interactive’ early-years education (i.e., nursery, kindergarten, primary school), or the wide range of shouts and screams subjects can use to express opinions within families and friendship groups.⁷⁴⁰

Within social activities, there is a high degree of *a priori* fundamental symmetry in the use of vocal and sonic communication across occupations. Due to subjects’ pervasive and extensive ownership of their bodily organs, there is a limit to how far even extremely classist sub-modes of communication for any given domain can inhibit mass vocalisations. However, some asymmetries emerge, mostly via divergence in the communicative *habitus* for different occupations, which can lead to classist divisions in the quality of different subjects’ linguistic and non-linguistic expression. For instance, economic speech is often most visibly the preserve of sales and ‘customer relations’ occupations, market analysts and consultants, and forecasters (e.g., central bankers), alongside economic theorists and journalistic commentators, ‘sophisticated’ political speech is dominated by professional politicians, spokespeople, senior bureaucrats, or political researchers, and juridical speech is restricted to a narrow tranche of higher-class occupations (e.g., barristers/advocates, solicitors/notaries, judges) who ‘speak for’ lay subjects engaged with the legal

⁷³⁸ Berman *et al.* 2016; Green 1987; McDonnell, Barker, and Wieman 2016; Nash 1993; Roland 1968; Schnitzler *et al.* 2017.

⁷³⁹ Brown 1999, p.200; Cohen 1993, pp.334-5; Gioia 2006; Lloyd 1967, pp.323-8; McSherry 2015; Peddie 2006; Robb 2010; Weber 1976, pp.431-5; Wilson-Dickson 2003, pp.110-1.

⁷⁴⁰ Barnes *et al.* 2017; Buchan 2012; Dobson 2012; Flynn 2016; Freeden 2013, pp.170, 177, 182-4, 195-6; Kallio 2012; Kenney 2012; Kuhl 2011; Oliveira-Formosinho 2007; Tepedeldiren and Özkan 2014.

system.⁷⁴¹ At the same time, teachers and learners in higher education are expected to rely predominantly on complex and stylised linguistic communication (e.g., topic-specific terminology and linguistic rules), medical and disciplinarian familial contexts occasionally skew notionally ‘universal’ vocal communication in favour of doctors and care staff, parents, or senior family members, and faiths built on clericalism and sacerdotalism often reserve speech for certain privileged occupations (e.g., priests, other senior religious figures) and limit proselytic functions to a few ‘specialists’ (e.g., Bahá’í pioneers, Christian missionaries, or Buddhist *bhante* and *bhikku* monks).⁷⁴² By contrast, at lower educational levels teachers’ and learners’ expressions are allowed (or expected) to be simpler and more informal, and to include non-spoken and non-linguistic elements as well, in medical contexts the importance of patients’ linguistic and non-linguistic expressions is somewhat downplayed beyond basic moments of consultation, while in familial and friendship contexts the norms around use of speech, &c (e.g., by children), vary informally between different groups, and in juridical activity, lower-class subjects are permitted to use verbal communication only when they are called as witnesses, selected for jury service, or otherwise contribute to courtroom debates, consultations, and the delivery of verdicts.⁷⁴³ In the same vein, lower-class workers or consumers can often only use speech in ‘workforce satisfaction’ and ‘customer feedback’ assessments—hence the emergence of ‘work songs’ precisely to ‘give a voice’ to subjects (e.g., slaves, proletarians) excluded from other forms of economic vocalisation—while lower-class subjects protesters and activists, campaigners, or voters are often limited to verbalising opinions in fairly rudimentary ways, but enjoy greater latitude in using non-spoken and non-linguistic communication (e.g., cheering, political songs, &c), depending on the degree of mass inclusion (i.e., enfranchisement) permitted under their prevailing administrative modes, and lower-class religious subjects’ use of speech is often restricted to ‘response’ or ‘reaction’ via highly stylised creeds and testimonies (e.g., the Islamic *shahada*, Christian Nicene, Apostles’, Tridentine, &c creeds, Jewish *Shema Yisrael*, &c) or intermittent congregational hymns and chants—except in some

⁷⁴¹ Bastos and Mercea 2016; Beer 1994; Brandis and Henderson 1970; Corfield 1991; Freedden 2013; Kirkham 2015; Lawton 1968; Spence, Clegg, and Stachkhous 2013; Thompson 1996.

⁷⁴² Carel and Györfy 2014; Carel and Kidd 2014; Maskey 2002; McNamara 2011; Menken 2013; Moore 2016; Murray and Hicks 2016.

⁷⁴³ Barnes *et al.* 2017; Flynn 2016; Kuhl 2011; Menken 2013; Spencer, Clegg, and Stackhouse 2012; Tepedeldiren and Özkan 2014.

comparatively egalitarian or participatory faiths (e.g., Quakers, Methodists, or the Evangelical Christian tradition of ‘witnessing’).⁷⁴⁴

Second, *postural* and *gestural* communication. Beyond vocal and sonic communication, the use of postures and gestures (i.e., haptics, proxemics, and kinesics) are the forms of nonverbal communication that exhibit the clearest differences across activities and occupations. Before exploring these differences, it is worth bearing in mind that all postural or gestural communication takes place in a wider context of what Erving Goffman calls “civil inattention”, whereby subjects who are in close proximity to strangers show they are aware of each other but avoid imposing on each other.⁷⁴⁵ In other words, postural and gestural communication in general is extensively moderated vis-à-vis most other subjects ‘to start with’. This greatly restricts what forms of haptics, proxemics, and kinesics are considered acceptable for use under the habitual norms of any social activity. Partly as a result of this, as has been clear since the earliest theorisations of nonverbal communication by, among others, Birdwhistell and Edward T. Hall, each use of body language—each *hapteme*, *proxeme*, and *kineme*—has more than just one meaning.⁷⁴⁶ It is the particular norms and dispositions of a given activity’s or occupational *habitus* that give non-verbal uses of bodily organs to communicate their more fixed and precisely specified meaning. For instance, economic activity rigorously enforces systems of body language etiquette for business settings, including forms of greeting (e.g., handshakes, nods and bows, or *wai*, *sampeah*, *sembah*, or *añjali mudra* signs) and gestures designed to convey respect, positivity, or trustworthiness (e.g., ‘open’ and ‘confident’ stances, rules about eye contact, &c), while different faiths have carefully defined and choreographed the exact meaning of an extensive range of postures (e.g., Jewish or Christian *orans* prayer position, Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist contemplative ‘lotus position’ *āsana*), kneeling and bowing (e.g., Christian genuflection, *поясной*, and *земной поклон*, or Islamic *rukū* ‘ and *sujūd*), hand gestures (e.g., Christian ‘sign of the cross’ and *benedictio*, Kohanic blessing, Christian or Shinto clasped hands, Hindu or Buddhist *mudras*), or kissing (e.g., ‘holy kiss’, ‘kiss of peace’).⁷⁴⁷ Meanwhile, the political uses of nonverbal communication

⁷⁴⁴ Bastos and Mercea 2016; Brandis and Henderson 1970; Celuch, Robinson, and Walsh 2015; Corfield 1991; Hu *et al.* 2016; Kipfelsberger, Herhausen, and Bruch 2016; Kumar 2010; Lawton 1968; Nasr, Burton, and Gruber 2015; Smith 2000, pp.334–5; Spence, Clegg, and Stackhouse 2013; Thompson 1996; Waśkiewicz 2008.

⁷⁴⁵ Goffman 1972, p.385.

⁷⁴⁶ Birdwhistell 1970; Knapp, Hall, and Horgan 2014.

⁷⁴⁷ Benson and Wirzba 2005; Caffarel 1978; Cook and Cook 2011; DuPont 1993; Gruys, Stewart, and Patel 2009; Hurn 2014; Williamson 2016.

include gestures and postures carefully defined and choreographed for military or electoral contexts (e.g., rising to stand, standing at attention, waving, raising hands to vote, applauding, ‘hand hugs’, tipping, raising, or removing headgear, hugging, or ‘hands up’) as well as iconic gestures with specific ideological undertones (e.g., fascist Roman salute or *quenelle*, leftist or ‘Black Power’ clenched fist, socialist ‘fraternal kiss’, Egyptian ‘*Rabia* sign’, Turkish nationalist ‘Grey Wolf salute’, Serb nationalist ‘three-finger salute’, German ‘Merkel-*Raute*’)—with high tolerance for ‘negative’ taboo or destructive symbolism, especially in the context of campaigning and protest (e.g., clenched fists, sticking tongues out, ‘giving the finger’ or ‘V sign’, ‘loser’, ‘wanker’, ‘cutthroat’ motions, rioting, looting, physical aggression/fighting, or using ‘stress positions’ on prisoners)—while in familial and friendship contexts, subjects have the latitude to use many different ‘unofficial’ or ‘semi-private’ vocabularies of nonverbal communication to express their opinions, particularly through touch or other forms of physical contact (e.g., intimate or romantic, which are otherwise construed as frotteurism or groping).⁷⁴⁸ As Kendon notes, postures and gestures occupy a continuum from less linguistic to fully linguistic (e.g., spontaneous gesticulations, language-like gestures versus emblems, sign language), based on whether their communicative meaning is evident without co-occurrence of speech.⁷⁴⁹ Some activities have thus been able to cultivate complex, clear, and unique vocabularies of emblematic postures and gestures for subjects to use, including instructions to discipline their pose, bearing, physical distance and contact, body language, and movement in their environment. For example, juridical and political activity have enjoyed a long association with *chironomia*—the use of gesticulations and hand motions as part of rhetoric or oratory (e.g., the ‘Clinton thumb’ emphatic gesture)—to help subjects support or underline verbal discourse, while in educational contexts, subjects are encouraged to use ‘iconic’ or ‘beat’ gestures, timed to fit the rhythm of their co-occurring verbal expression, to represent and make memorable aspects of the images, actions, subjects, or objects about which they are communicating.⁷⁵⁰

Within activities, there are extremely clear occupational and classist divisions in the use of postures and gestures. In general, higher-class subjects exhibit forms of nonverbal communication associated with confidence, dominance, or openness—e.g., the expectations that political leaders, government ministers, and parliamentary politicians avoid lazy, stupid, or offensive postures and gestures, and that teachers, tutors, lecturers, or educational counsellors adopt ‘open’ postures and gestures to signal not only their

⁷⁴⁸ Fernandez and Cairns 2011, p.77; Hall 1966; Hertenstein *et al.* 2006.

⁷⁴⁹ Kendon 2004.

⁷⁵⁰ Austin 1806; McNeill 1992.

superior position, but also a friendly demeanour that makes learners more receptive to their messages.⁷⁵¹ Meanwhile, lower-class subjects are expected to show obeisance through postures and gestures signalling respect, reverence, and submission—e.g., hat-tipping, ‘tugging the forelock’, clasping hands, the ‘kiss of respect’, bowing, curtsying, kneeling, kowtowing or *dogeza*, prostration, or other forms of *proskynesis*. These can be seen, for instance, in the practice of lawyers and legal clerks bowing cursorily to judges presiding in court, the various gestures used to nonverbally communicate familial respect (e.g., Indian *pranāma* reverential bowing, Filipino and Malaysian *mano* and *salim* gestures) or affection (e.g., physical contact, ‘hunkerin’, cuddling, hugging, caressing, holding hands, kissing), and the expectations in many faith traditions that ‘lay’ worshippers diligently use prayer gestures (e.g., clasping hands) and kneel or prostrate themselves before senior religious figures or sacred objects.⁷⁵² But often, lower-class subjects are extensively prohibited from engaging in much postural or gestural communication at all. Thus, for example, the pervasive norm that office workers sit down ‘at work’ places significant restrictions on their ability to express themselves through their posture beyond the limited scope of ‘hunching’ or ‘relaxing’, law enforcement heavily (and ever-increasingly) uses nonverbal communication to surmise subjects’ guilt or otherwise make judgments about them, patients are often restricted to various supine lying positions (e.g., Fowler’s position, *decubitus* position, Rose’s position, Sims’ position, Trendelenburg position) that limit their ability to express themselves through movement, and especially younger learners are restricted in their use of postures under the remit of ‘good behaviour’ (e.g., sitting versus standing in class, raising hands to ask questions, ‘stress positions’ as punishment), while their gestures are limited to those shown to help them memorise information.⁷⁵³ The use of physical contact to express closeness or confidence bears particularly strong class markers, and is far more prevalent between subjects who share the same class position—though the exact nature of this contact is shaped by different classist norms, from lower-class back-slapping or high-fiving to (at least historically) higher-class formal hand-kissing.⁷⁵⁴ However, higher-class subjects are far more likely to touch subordinates to assert their dominance, with lower-class subjects expected to avoid contact with their superiors (often ostentatiously).⁷⁵⁵ For example, there

⁷⁵¹ Philp 2007; Ridley and Asbury 1988.

⁷⁵² Benson and Wirzba 2005; Caffarel 1978; Newland 2015; Slocum and Stone 1958; *Time Magazine* 1959; White 1999.

⁷⁵³ Cohen 1981; Engelkamp and Krumnacker 1980; Jarus *et al.* 2011; Matsumoto *et al.* 2011; Mayberry 2000; Özsoy, Şekerci, and Ögüt 2015; Pinizzoto, Davis, and Miller 2006; Pollard *et al.* 2012; Riskind and Gotay 1982; Satz and Donnenwerth-Nolan 1981; Tai 2014.

⁷⁵⁴ Jones and Yarborough 1985.

⁷⁵⁵ Henley 1977.

is far greater tolerance for intimate contact (e.g., cheek kissing, hugging, high-fiving, fist-bumping, &c) among office team members and close colleagues than between co-workers at different ‘paygrades’, and children and adults can use a much wider and more diverse range of ‘body language’ to express themselves among one another compared to across children–adults divide, while at all educational levels, teachers are expected to maintain control over their strategic (especially vertical) distance towards their students, which they either reduce to improve reciprocal communication or increase to enforce discipline and gain psychological advantage.⁷⁵⁶

Third, *ocular*, *visual*, and *facial* communication. There is not as much variation in how other forms of nonverbal communication—specifically, oculosics, and facial expression as a subset of kinesics—are used in different activities and occupations. Of course, this is not to say that these bodily organs are unimportant to opinion-expression: facial expression especially is crucial to the observable expressive patterns of emotion, as Izard argues.⁷⁵⁷ Nor should this be taken to suggest that there are no discernible differences whatsoever—just that the various forms of ocular, visual, and facial expression have not been ‘claimed’, or systematised, by particular activities or occupations (especially classes) anywhere near as much as other uses of bodily organs. In fact, the only differences lie in whether different activities tolerate or downplay these forms of nonverbal communication. Some activities merely tolerate or do not exclude paralinguistic and meta-communicative forms of nonverbal expression, as long as they do not ‘distract’ from subjects’ other (verbal, postural, or gestural) expression, such as, for instance, with the valorisation of direct intersubjective contact and communication in economic negotiations or ‘deal-making’, the concept of ‘face time’ in production contexts, or procedural restrictions designed to foster discursive civility in legislative chambers (e.g., gaze orientation).⁷⁵⁸ Others actively discourage even the possibility of subjects using ocular, visual, or facial communication to express opinions, as with the requirement in many faiths, as well as various national or cultural schooling traditions, that lay worshippers, junior clergy, and learners (especially schoolchildren) avert their faces or lower their gaze in deference or respect to senior religious figures, sacred objects, or teachers—although most educational contexts allow subjects

⁷⁵⁶ Dobrescu and Lupu 2015; Hertz-Lazarowitz and Miller 1992; Houts *et al.* 2010; Slentz and Krogh 2001; Tobin 2002; Vaaland and Roland 2013.

⁷⁵⁷ Izard 1977, p.4.

⁷⁵⁸ Asan, Smith, and Montague 2014; Brugel, Postma-Nilsenová, and Tates 2015; Cesqui *et al.* 2013; Elsbach, Cable, and Sherman 2010; Hoehl, Wahl, and Pauen 2013; Howell, Elsbach, and Villablanca 2016; Ronsse, White, and Lefèvre 2007; Stahl, Drew, and Kimball 2014.

to use meta-communicative eye contact to support and reinforce the retention, or recall, of information delivered via other forms of communication.⁷⁵⁹ Only in curative activity is nonverbal communication actively encouraged—less in medical contexts, where subjects usually only rely on rudimentary ocular, visual, or facial communication if other forms (i.e., vocal, postural, or gestural) are ruled out for reasons of ill-health, but in familial, romantic, or friendship contexts, where subjects can use a large spectrum of ‘unofficial’ or ‘semi-private’ nonverbal communication forms (e.g., facial expressions, gaze, eye contact) to express opinions, relying on reciprocal and highly ‘localised’ tacit or explicit determination of ‘appropriate’ norms around intimacy, interest, attention, deceit, discomfort (e.g., for oculusics like winking, blink rate, pupil dilation, eyebrow flashes, &c).⁷⁶⁰

To summarise, there is a moderate degree of variety in the bodily organs subjects who are engaged in different activities, hold different occupations, and occupy different class situations can use to express their opinions. Subjects in all activities use *vocal* and *sonic* elements in their articulations, while *postural* and *gestural* articulation is much more variable, and the use of *ocular*, *visual*, and *facial* means to express opinion is restricted overwhelmingly to familial and friendship contexts. All of these means are more or less differentiated along class lines, as the permitted quality and quantity of vocal, postural, and gestural expression especially, and also often ocular, visual, and facial expression, accrues disproportionately in favour of subjects in higher-class occupations. In light of the effects of these organic means on opinion-expression, opinion research should expect this moderate diversity in subjects’ use of bodily organs to effect occupational (and classist) differences in how subjects express opinions. These differences manifest fairly straightforwardly in a clear tendency for higher-class subjects to ‘dominate’, ‘capture’, or ‘swamp’ both the quality and quantity of organic expressions within mass opinion, especially for verbal forms of vocal communication, at the direct expense of lower-class subjects. In fact, this tendency is so extensive that it belies, and may even obscure, the (comparatively) greater parity across classes in how subjects ‘contribute’ to the way mass opinion is formed, as outlined in chapter IV. In other words, the classism of the prevailing modes (and sub-modes) of communication compounds the classism of the prevailing modes (and sub-modes) of ideation, with the result that lower-class subjects’ discursive role is *doubly*

⁷⁵⁹ De Schuymer *et al.* 2012; Estrada *et al.* 2005; Fullwood and Doherty-Sneddon 2006; Holland *et al.* 2017; Mayer 2005; Niedenthal *et al.* 2010; Rodvold 1989.

⁷⁶⁰ Argyle 1988, pp.153-5; Brooks and Meltzoff 2002; Burgoon, Blair, and Strom 2008; Ekman and Friesen 1969; Farroni *et al.* 2002; Farroni, Johnson, and Csibra 2004; Hains and Muir 1996; Reid and Striano 2005; Samuels 1985

Case study 9: Separate but equal?

The 1954–68 African-American Civil Rights movement, as well as the wider campaigns against racial segregation and discrimination and for black emancipation, are an instructive example of how subjects, especially in lower social classes, can use comparatively limited bodily means to express their views effectively. Throughout the existence of the movement, verbal communication, especially on a mass scale, was almost exclusively the preserve of leaders and other senior figures, including religious ministers (e.g., Martin Luther King, Malcolm X), rights activists (e.g., James Farmer, Bayard Rustin, Roy Wilkins), labour organisers (e.g., A. Philip Randolph, Whitney Young), and educational activists (e.g., Dorothy Height, John Lewis). These held an extensive oligopoly over the coordinated or devolved spoken communication of the major civil rights organisations (e.g., NAACP, SCLC, SNCC, CORE), whether in the form of public speeches and sermons (e.g., ‘I Have A Dream’, ‘I’ve Been to the Mountaintop’) or in-person negotiations with local or federal officials and legislators (e.g., the 1963 meeting between James Baldwin and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, or the 1964 meeting between King, Farmer, Young, and President Lyndon B. Johnson). However, many of the most iconic moments of the civil rights struggle came about as a result of far more junior African-American activists using their bodies to physically disrupt the spaces and structures of racial segregation, especially since most civil rights groups adhered to a strategy of nonviolent civil disobedience that precluded the kind of terrorism practised by their white supremacist opponents (e.g., the 1963 16th Street Baptist Church bombing in Alabama by the KKK). These included both ‘merely’ passively occupying ‘whites-only’ spaces (e.g., Rosa Parks’ 1955 refusal to give up her seat on a public bus, or the 1958–60 ‘sit-ins’ campaign in Wichita, Greensboro, Richmond, Nashville, and Atlanta), or actively entering them (e.g., the 1957 desegregation of Little Rock Central High School, or the 1961 Freedom Rides). Or, more elaborately, they took the form of protest marches, either with the consent of political authorities (e.g., the 1963 March on Washington) or in the face of their resistance (e.g., the 1963 Children’s Crusade, the 1965 Selma to Montgomery marches), or full-blown race riots (e.g., the 1963 Birmingham riot, or the 1968 King assassination riots in Washington, D.C., Baltimore, and Chicago). In all cases, these careful and specific uses of otherwise ‘normal’, or even ‘submissive’, postures and gestures (e.g., sitting, kneeling, walking) provided a simple, almost eloquent, way for activists who lacked the privilege to have their voices heard to nevertheless register their opposition to institutional racism in the U.S.A.

suppressed in late modernity. This can be seen in the many social situations—e.g., speeches, lectures, or sermons—where higher-class subjects have a structural monopoly on verbal communication (with lower-class subjects acting as a silent audience), but also in the tendency of richer, more powerful, or more ‘important’ subjects to instinctively ‘take up’ a more expansive amount of ‘personal space’—e.g., in the gendered concept of ‘manspreading’—as well as the disproportionate scrutiny to which the ‘body language’ and facial expressions of political leaders and their ministers are submitted in an attempt to gauge their views. Given these extreme classist tendencies in the use of bodily organs, social subjects can, in general, be said to lie on a spectrum between ‘sophisticate poseurs’ at the higher-class end, and ‘common obsequy’ at the lower-class end.

§3. *Media: omnivolent magnates and sporadic gadflies*

Finally, this enquiry observed that the majority of materials associated with opinion-expression can be categorised according to the technologies they rely on, and the type of information they create: *imagery* and *symbolism*, *writing* and *printing*, *telecommunications* and *broadcasting*, *electronic* and *digital* media, as well as a few other *sui generis* categories.⁷⁶¹ The vast and proliferating number of different media, ranging from basic imagery all the way through cutting-edge electronic and virtual technology, and the scope for varying distortion, deformation, leakage, crosstalk, noise, interference, simplification, compression, definition, or resolution in the messages they transmit afforded by their associated content formats, affect how subjects can convey the substantive content—especially in detail—of their opinions. Now, this analysis takes each of the media identified earlier, and examines them in turn. Again, if different uses of media are found to be associated more with some activities, occupations, and classes than others, opinion research will be better able to identify the social determination of how subjects express—or do not express—opinions about different parts of ‘the social’, especially why for some subjects these may be ‘plastered everywhere’ via a vast smörgåsbord of different channels, while others are forced to rely on occasional ‘capture’ through a narrow tranche of media types.

First, *imagery* and *symbolism*. These are one of the most fundamental forms of mediated communication, and are copiously used in almost all social activities. However, there are some differences between activities in whether images and symbols are used primarily in a technical or artwork capacity—a distinction that hinges mostly on whether clarity and accuracy of communication, or aesthetic considerations, are the message’s primary purpose. Of course, some symbolic representations belong primarily to one of these categories—e.g., graphs and statistical tables to ‘technical’ expressions, and paintings and sculptures to ‘artwork’ contexts. But most imagery and symbolism—i.e., pictures and illustrations, photographs, models, diagrams, maps, animations, alphabetic and numerical systems, can be used for either purpose, depending on the context. So, for instance, on the ‘technical’ side, businesses, financial institutions, policy research bodies, government departments, law courts, schools, and hospitals all rely extensively on subjects using numerical systems, statistics, and their pictorial representations (e.g., graphs, diagrams, charts, tables, models, technical illustrations) alongside scientific and mathematical symbols (e.g., astronomical, chemical, electronic, engineering, ecological, cartographical, or alphabetic

⁷⁶¹ See pp.114-7.

systems) to express opinions, either in a paralinguistic or meta-communicative way (i.e., on handouts, poster boards, flipcharts, slides and transparencies, computer and overhead projections, or drawing on whiteboards and blackboards) or as ‘speaking for themselves’.⁷⁶² Meanwhile, some imagery has taken on symbolic meaning that is specific to particular activities, such as the use of ‘ticks’, ‘crosses’, or numbers to express voting preferences and other forms of electoral feedback, the standardised use of ‘consumer symbols’ (e.g., currency signs, barcodes and QR codes, copyrights and trademarks, recycling, laundry instructions, food safety/identification symbols, shipping symbols, computer icons, &c), faith-specific and medical logos and icons (e.g., the Hindu *aum* and *sri chakra yantra*, Christian crucifixes, Jewish ‘star of David’ and *menorah*, Islamic crescent, and Abrahamic and Dharmic aureolas and halos, or the Red Cross, Red Crescent, Red Star of David, ‘rod of Asclepius’, and *caduceus*), and the use of numerical and alphabetical systems to award educational ‘marks’, ‘grades’, and ‘ratings’ or ‘rankings’.⁷⁶³ By contrast, on the ‘artwork’ side, economic advertising and political campaigning rely on (favourable) visualisations of products or policies and reactions to them (e.g., commemorative statues, maps, paintings, sketches, cartoons, photography, posters, placards, graffiti, &c), ideograms and emblems as brand identification marks (i.e., commercial logos, coats of arms, crests and heraldry, national and other flags and emblems, &c), and highly visualised alphabetic and numerical systems (e.g., slogans on banners and flags, clothing, &c).⁷⁶⁴ Meanwhile, political and religious activity make particularly prominent use of colours to indicate partisan, ideological, or faith affiliation (e.g., socialist/communist red, conservative blue, anarchist black, fascist brown, liberal/libertarian yellow/orange, feminist or LGBT pink/purple, and ecological green, or Islamic green, Jewish blue, and Christian seasonal colours)—while, depending on their ‘iconoclastic’ or ‘iconodulist’ leanings, faiths prominently use embellished imagery (e.g., Christian flat or *bas-relief* icons, Islamic *kufic*, *naskh*, *thuluth*, or *Nasta‘liq* calligraphy, Dharmic *mandalas*, manuscript illuminations, &c) to express veneration, restricted only by norms limiting ‘idolatrous’ portrayals of sacred objects.⁷⁶⁵

Within social activities, occupational divisions in the use of imagery and symbolism are so unique to each activity that it is difficult to draw out any overarching classist tendencies—apart from a tentative

⁷⁶² Abeysekera 2008; Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft 2014; Boulding 1970; Boumans and Davis 2015; Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 2010; Frey 2013; Hand 2004; Hausman 1992; Hays 1973; Huff and Geis 1954; Johnson 2016; K Sipilä 2014; Kettl 2016; Liu, Lin, and Chang 2015; Putterman 2007; Rom 2015; Rosewarne 2010; Schervish 1995; Smart 2003.

⁷⁶³ Eliade 1991; Fanet 2011; Lacey and Lawson 2013; Levy 1999; Saltman 2006.

⁷⁶⁴ Arens and Weigold 2012; Ewen 1976; Jamieson 1996; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 2013; McAllister and West 2013; McFall 2004; Okorie 2011; Vestergaard and Schröder 1985; Wells *et al.* 2014.

⁷⁶⁵ Barasch 1992; Besançon 2009; Pals 1996; Tillich 1964, pp.54, 58–9, 283–4.

suggestion that they seem to offer slightly more leeway to higher-class occupations, but also have higher expectations of the quality of imagery and symbolism they use. The use of imagery and symbolism is tightly controlled in many activities, so it is overwhelmingly company executives, government ministers, senior civil servants, senior clergy, traders, economists, policy researchers, or doctors, and to a lesser extent managers, 'PR' professionals, nurses, judges, barristers/advocates, and solicitors/notaries, &c, who are expected (or permitted) to 'fluently' use statistics and their representations, technical illustrations, iconic or scientific symbols, and 'artwork'—let alone able to use grand, expensive, or large-scale imagery (e.g., statues, posters)—and discretion over their ability to present their opinions in the form of imagery or symbolism generally lies with the most senior occupations in each activity.⁷⁶⁶ By contrast, lower-class subjects' use of images and symbols extends little further than the basic use of 'ticks' and 'crosses', and numerical or 'star' ratings, in carefully-delimited voting and 'customer feedback' situations, and modest, cheap, small-scale, and *ad hoc* forms of political or religious symbolism (e.g., graffiti, placards, banners, overt 'activist' or 'partisan' use of colours, &c)—again, often at the discretion of higher-class occupations (e.g., via formal and informal franchise restrictions, 'freedom of speech' rights and regulations, &c).⁷⁶⁷ The only exceptions to this trend are educational activity, where lower-class teachers and learners (e.g., in early-years or 'special needs' education) are encouraged to use 'rudimentary' or 'immature' imagery and symbolism to express themselves, whereas at higher levels (e.g., secondary school, higher education) their expression is limited to lectures, presentations, set work, examinations, &c, which are usually verbal and written—except for the continued use of mathematical and scientific symbols and 'artwork' imagery in scientific and 'fine art' contexts—and the comparative universalisation (with some 'localised' variation) of symbolic communication in familial and friendship contexts.⁷⁶⁸

Second, *writing* and *printing*. These are the other fundamental form of mediated communication, and are likewise commonly used in all social activities. However, their use is often highly specific and carefully circumscribed by stylistic and orthographical norms, and in several cases the greatest volume of written and printed communications for an activity comes in the form of academic and journalistic

⁷⁶⁶ Abbing 2002; Fourie 2007; Holmwood 1996; Ifrah 1999; Lamos *et al.* 2016; Lawson 2014; Lenman 2005; Sontag 1977; Wells 2004; Wolfson and Funke 2014.

⁷⁶⁷ Barendt 2007; Celuch, Robinson, and Walsh 2015; Hu *et al.* 2016; Kenski and Jamieson 2017; Kipfelsberger, Herhausen, and Bruch 2016; Nasr, Burton, and Gruber 2015; Paul and Miller 2004; Romanelli 1998; Thomas 2010.

⁷⁶⁸ Chandler 1995; Luckie *et al.* 2013; Merrill 2014; Ortega-Sanchez 2016; Powell 2009; Veraksa and Veraksa 2015.

commentary about it (e.g., theoretical and ‘trade’ books, academic journal and press articles).⁷⁶⁹ There is a distinction within ‘writing’ between handwritten messages (e.g., notes, cards, some letters, surveys, or questionnaires) and those that are typeset or word-processed, as late-modern technological (especially computing) developments have vastly expanded the latter at the expense of the former.⁷⁷⁰ This same distinction maps onto a broader differentiating criterion of the scale for which the written or printed communication is intended. Messages designed for ‘mass publication’ (e.g., newspaper or magazine leaders, opinion-pieces, op-eds, posters, or pamphlets) were historically among the first media to be typeset, and are now almost universally word-processed and printed.⁷⁷¹ However, those intended for ‘personal’ use or smaller and more ‘targeted’ audiences (e.g., diary entries, letters, or essays) continued to be handwritten well into the modern period, and subjects still often use handwriting to ‘personalise’ printed communication (e.g., signatures, marginalia).⁷⁷² Activities vary mainly in how specific, limited, and standardised they require subjects’ use of written and printed formats to be. For instance, internal and external business or governmental correspondence (e.g., performance reports, departmental and ministerial reports, worksheets, memos, press releases, manifestos, campaign literature, and letters to constituents, employees, shareholders, or customers), product information (e.g., descriptions, packaging information, labels), and customer or citizen feedback (e.g., product reviews, feedback forms, letters of complaint, letters to parliamentarians, petitions, political literature, written responses to surveys), as well as educational communication both ‘transient’ (e.g., essays, précis summaries, study and revision notes) and ‘permanent’ (e.g., handouts, textbooks, course guides, readers), and medical expression (e.g., medical forms, doctor’s notes, letters to patients), are often characterised by extremely terse and brief articulation, semi-private languages or orthography (e.g., Grecian or Latinate terminology, acronyms, symbols), and more or less stringent format standardisation through ‘house styles’.⁷⁷³ Meanwhile, in many faiths, ‘core’ sacred texts and scriptures are often ‘fixed’ and viewed as ‘inerrant’ (e.g., the Christian Bible, Jewish *Tanakh* (including the Torah), Islamic Qur’an and hadith, Sikh *Guru Granth Sahib* and *Dasam Granth*, Hindu *Śruti* Vedas and *Bhagavad Gita*, or Buddhist *sutras*), so subjects are limited to expressing opinions

⁷⁶⁹ Carey 1989; Fourie 2007; Nash 1993; Powell 2009.

⁷⁷⁰ Chandler 1995; Daniels and Bright 1996; Enstrom 1965; Heavens 2015.

⁷⁷¹ Blanchard 1998; Briggs and Burke 2010; Chapman 2005; Kovarik 2011; Logan 2004; McKitterick 2003; Steinberg 1961.

⁷⁷² Blanchard 1998; Blythe 1989; Carey 1989; Chandler 1995; Powell 2009; Robinson 2003; Rogers 2005; Warburton 2006.

⁷⁷³ Bovens 1998; Celuch, Robinson, and Walsh 2015; Chapman 2005; Folkerts and Teeter 2001; Hu *et al.* 2016; Jamieson 1996; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 2013; Kipfelsberger, Herhausen, and Bruch 2016; Mulgan 2000; Nasr, Burton, and Gruber 2015; Rogers 2005; Roland 1968; Schnitzler *et al.* 2017; Strunk and White 1959; Thomas 2010.

by reissuing and decorating these ‘core’ texts, or through derivative exegeses within their faith tradition (e.g., Christian Patristic, Catenist, or Scholiast Biblical commentaries, Jewish *Mishnah* and *Gemara*, *midrash*, and *peshet* texts, Islamic *Tafsīr* commentaries and *ta’wil* esoteric interpretations, Hindu *Smṛti* texts, and Buddhist *vinayas*)—while in juridical activity, subjects rely on a vast range of legal instruments (e.g., treaties, constitutions, certificates, licenses and charters, acts and statutes, contracts, court orders and rulings, legal opinions and statements, affidavits, briefs and memorandums, deeds, testaments, writs, summonses or plaint notes and warrants), each of which is governed by clear and rigid norms of use and relies heavily on semi-private (Latinate and archaic) legal terminology.⁷⁷⁴ By contrast, in familial and friendship contexts, writing and printing are often secondary to other forms of communication—and are declining in the wake of telecommunications, electronic, and digital innovations—so subjects’ use of them is less regulated or controlled, especially regarding the enforcement of linguistic rules (grammar, syntax, spelling), and generally errs away from highly formalised expression.⁷⁷⁵

Within social activities, there are noticeably universal occupational and classist differences in the ways subjects use written and print communication. To varying degrees, every activity reserves the use of ‘its’ written and print media at least partly for higher-class subjects—from business correspondence, governmental reports, and press releases, to religious exegeses, medical prescriptions, and textbooks.⁷⁷⁶ This is especially true of academic and journalistic commentary, which is largely restricted to higher-class subjects due to the prevalence of oligopolistic media conglomerates and the entry costs of higher education—although there have been historical periods of much more equal and cross-classist access to both writing and printing (e.g., the early proliferation in publishing before the consolidation of media oligopolies), reanimated by recent technological innovations (e.g., the rise of self-publishing).⁷⁷⁷ It takes its most extreme form in juridical activity, where the use of many forms of writing and print is so restricted that it accrues exclusively to single occupations, or even individual subjects (e.g., acts and statutes, writs, licenses and charters, court rulings, or legal opinions).⁷⁷⁸ Of course, some media are more

⁷⁷⁴ Carey 1989; Green and Lieber 2009; Powell 2009.

⁷⁷⁵ Chandler 1995; Daniels and Bright 1996; Jordan 2009; Robinson 2003; Rogers 2005.

⁷⁷⁶ Blanchard 1998; Denton and Woodward 1998; Edwards 2011; Fourie 2007; Holmwood 1996; Kenski and Jamieson 2017; Lawson 2014; McNair 2003; Morrison 2014; Panebianco 1988; Paquette 2006; Powell 2009; Raag *et al.* 2011; Tyler 2010; Swanson and Nimmo 1990; Wellington and Torgerson 2005.

⁷⁷⁷ Allan and Thorsen 2009; Atton 2003; Deming *et al.* 2015; Folkerts and Teeter 2001; Fuchs 2010; Herbert 2000; Kawamoto 2003; Oreopoulos and Petronijevic 2013; Pigini and Staffolani 2016; Psacharopoulos and Papakonstantinou 2005; Scott 2005; Wakeling and Savage 2015.

⁷⁷⁸ Cotterrell 2006; Dan-Cohen 2002; Luhmann 2004; Podgórecki 1974.

universal across occupations (e.g., worksheets, memos, feedback forms, attitude surveys), but even here lower-class subjects' access is often controlled by those in higher class situations. This control occasionally extends to a form of 'supervision', where lower-class subjects' use of written or print media requires the presence, indirect involvement, or advice of higher-class subjects—as with learners writing essays or sitting examinations, or citizens filling out tax forms, signing contracts, deeds, or testaments. Only in familial and friendship contexts is subjects' use of writing (and printing) largely universal across occupations—though even here there may be some localised variation, since often children's use of media depends on parental discretion, with a certain ageism in parents' and childrens' different norms of use.⁷⁷⁹

Third, *telecommunications* and *broadcasting*. The main contribution of telecommunications and broadcast media has been to introduce new formats for already-existing bodily and mediatic forms of communication, expanding their possible scale, range, and sophistication.⁷⁸⁰ This is especially the case for vocal and sonic communication (e.g., landline and mobile telephony, radio, audio recordings, even musical instruments), but also for imagery, symbolism, writing, and print (e.g., telefax, text messaging, film, television). These are used across several activities, such as for business contacts with employees, customers, and suppliers, sales tactics (e.g., 'cold-calling'), to disseminate parliamentary proceedings, campaigns, protests, or major national events, to illustrate learning exercises and depict the techniques subjects are expected to acquire, to offer medical advice (e.g., contacting emergency services, phonecalls or texts to patients, health and advice information services, public health campaigns), to give 'supporting' evidence to illustrate and demonstrate legal arguments (e.g., CCTV footage)—or to increase the 'reach' and 'complexity' of pre-existing forms of expression (e.g., televised and recorded speeches, trials, public lectures, classes, seminars, dramatic and musical performances).⁷⁸¹ However, many of these audiovisual media have superseded their original 'supportive' or 'accompanying' role for other media, and become novel and independent means of articulation in their own right.⁷⁸² For example, for all activities, broadcast journalistic commentary in the form of radio and television media (e.g., news channels, current

⁷⁷⁹ Jordan 2009; Notten, Kraaykamp, and Konig 2012; Pavlik and MacIntosh 2015; Stallings 2004.

⁷⁸⁰ Brooks 2004; Thompson 1995.

⁷⁸¹ Bickerdike, Whittle, and Pickering 2014; Biocca 2013; Blanchard 1998; Briggs and Burke 2010; Chapman 2005; Denton and Woodward 1998; Franklin *et al.* 2011; Gillam, Yates, and Badrinath 2012; Kovarik 2011; Levinson 1997; McNair 2003; O'Callaghan 2017; Pavlik and MacIntosh 2015; Royal Society for Public Health 2009; Swanson and Nimmo 1990; Wheen 2011.

⁷⁸² Brooks 2004; Chapman 2005; Goggin 2011; Kolker 2008; Kovarik 2011; Lotz 2007; Peters 1999.

affairs analysis programmes) constitutes a significant and prominent part of all the communication that takes place about them.⁷⁸³ But this novelty also covers, for instance, business advertising through radio, television, and cinema commercials, shopping channels, brand jingles or advertising ‘scenarios’, party-political broadcasts, political films and television shows, campaign ‘phonebanks’ to contact supporters and voters, and telephone polling—still the dominant form of large-scale opinion surveying—as well as the widespread use of ‘home’ media in familial or friendship contexts, the development of new ‘teaching aids’ (e.g., educational films, public service announcements, radio and television documentaries), and the adaptation of religious ‘conversion’ and proselytism to modern technologies in many faiths (e.g., the rise of Christian ‘televangelism’, and similar tendencies in Bahá’í, Buddhist, or Islamic traditions).⁷⁸⁴

Within activities, the use of telecommunications and especially broadcast media is characterised by major occupational and classist differences. Since both of these media are significantly ‘younger’ than imagery and symbolism, or writing and print, they have not had the same time or opportunities to proliferate and become ‘commonplace’ across activities and subjects.⁷⁸⁵ Moreover, in many societies, both telecommunications and broadcasting networks were created through state (or state-sanctioned private) investment, as highlighted by Mariana Mazzucato, and are controlled by state (or state-enforced private) oligopolies, or majority stakes or shares in their ownership and provision (e.g., via state broadcasters and telecoms suppliers).⁷⁸⁶ Beyond a very basic level of universal access (e.g., simple recording devices, ‘home’ studios, various forms of telephony), there are radical classist differentials in subjects’ ability to use these media to express their opinions.⁷⁸⁷ This is especially true of radio and television journalistic commentary across all domains, which has historically been restricted to higher-class subjects through the hegemony of media conglomerates. Although this use and access is starting to be slightly expanded with the proliferation of cable television, and ‘pirate’ and local radio stations relying on low-cost technology, the most sophisticated or large-scale telecommunications and broadcasting continues to be almost entirely

⁷⁸³ Brooks 2004; Carey 1989; Herbert 2000; Kawamoto 2003; McLuhan 2001, pp.310–68; Thompson 1995; Wells 1996.

⁷⁸⁴ Arens and Weigold 2012; Biocca 2013; Briggs and Burke 2010; Bruce 1990; Denton and Woodward 1998; Donsbach and Traugott 2008; Hadden and Shupe 1988; Horsfield 2015; Ishizuka and Zimmermann 2008; Jordan 2009; Kolker 2008; Kovarik 2011; McAllister 2013; McFall 2003; McNair 2003; Moriarty *et al.* 2014; Okorie 2011; Panebianco 1988; Paquette 2006; Rascalori, Monahan, and Young 2014; Swanson and Nimmo 1990; Thomas and Lee 2012; Vestergaard and Schröder 1985.

⁷⁸⁵ Blanchard 1998; Curran and Gurevitch 2005; Kovarik 2011; Levinson 1997; Wheen 2011.

⁷⁸⁶ Chapman 2005; Fourie 2007; Mazzucato 2013.

⁷⁸⁷ Goggin 2011; Levinson 1997; Wheen 2011; Shirky 2008; Tyler 2010.

the preserve of higher-class occupations.⁷⁸⁸ Thus, on the one hand, access to telecommunications networks is effectively universal to all occupations and classes in economic and political activity, or familial and friendship contexts, with at most some differences in the quality and sophistication of the ‘in-house’ (i.e., higher-class) versus ‘national’ (i.e., lower-class) telecoms networks at subjects’ disposal, or slight localised differences and variations in quality within families or friendship groups (e.g. depending on ageist parental discretion and restrictions).⁷⁸⁹ But, on the other hand, access to radio, television, and film broadcasting extensively favours (and may be entirely restricted to) professional advertisers, branding consultants, salespeople, government information/propaganda services, party strategists and campaigners, barristers/advocates, senior clergy, and teachers—usually at the discretion of higher-class subjects (e.g., political and religious leaders, ministers, company executives, boards, judges, headteachers, heads of faculty and department) or in the ‘publicity’ and journalistic sides of the intelligentsia—with only occasional scope for lower-class use of audiovisual media as part of customer feedback, non-state and protest movement mobilisation, or teachers and learners in specific ‘disciplines’ (e.g., music, art, languages).⁷⁹⁰

Fourth, *electronic* and *digital media*. As with telecommunications and broadcasting, the electronic and digital revolution has increased the scale and sophistication, and expanded the range of formats, of already-existing bodily and mediatic forms of communication, in particular increasing their capacity for rapid large-scale dissemination and reproduction (e.g., ‘going viral’). The extent to which these media have significantly displaced subjects’ use of other forms of mediatised communication depends on how far different activities have adopted the most up-to-date electronic and digital resources (e.g., computers, personal printers and other peripherals, electronic document processing, computer networks, and web and application development)—as well as how far they have become bound by forms of standardisation

⁷⁸⁸ Blanchard 1998; Ciciora, Farmer, and Large 2004; Clark, Thrift, and Tickell 2004; Fourie 2007; Goggin 2011; Himberg 2014; Hind and Mosco 1985; Kolker 2008; Kovarik 2011; Skues and Kindred 2014; Street 2011; Wells 1996.

⁷⁸⁹ Chapman 2005; Curran and Gurevitch 2005; Dinkha, Mitchell, and Zogheib 2014; Jordan 2009; Kovarik 2011; Notten, Kraaykamp, and Konig 2012; Pavlik and MacIntosh 2015; Tang 2015; Wheen 2011.

⁷⁹⁰ Bernays 2005, 2011; Bruce 1990; Celuch, Robinson, and Walsh 2015; Chapman 2005; Cull, Culbert, and Welch 2003; Cunningham 2002; Curran and Gurevitch 2005; Deming *et al.* 2015; Hadden and Shupe 1988; Horsfield 2015; Hu *et al.* 2016; Jamieson 1996; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 2013; Jowett and O'Donnell 2014; Kalathil 2011; Kenski and Jamieson 2017; Kipfelsberger, Herhausen, and Bruch 2016; Kumar 2006; Nasr, Burton, and Gruber 2015; Randal 2002.

or homogenisation, such as ‘house styles’ of computing and online etiquette.⁷⁹¹ Subjects’ use of imagery and symbolism has been bolstered by the emergence of digital image file formats, which has facilitated the late-modern phenomena of ‘emoji’ and online ‘memes’, as well as the proliferation of photo and video sharing services like Instagram, Snapchat, and Vine.⁷⁹² Written and printed media have developed into a series of online resources, including email, instant messaging (e.g., WhatsApp, Yammer, Slack), websites, search engines, forums and wikis (e.g., Wikipedia), blogs (e.g., Blogger, Medium, Technorati, Wordpress), and microblogs (e.g., Tumblr, Twitter, Weibo).⁷⁹³ Telecommunications and broadcasting have also taken electronic and digital forms, thanks to the rise of virtual and computing media platforms, podcasting, and videotelephony (e.g., FaceTime, Google Hangouts, Skype).⁷⁹⁴ These developments can all be seen especially in economic, political, medical, and religious activity through the proliferation of company, government, public health, or religious websites and microblogging accounts, pop-up adverts, electronic and digitised documents (e.g., spreadsheets, reports, press releases, health guidance, religious texts), and internal messaging, emails, or videoconferencing between shareholders, employees, and customers, parliamentarians and constituents, or doctors and patients, as well as in educational activity with the surge in popularity of electronic and digital ‘learning aids’ (e.g., ‘remote’ or ‘distance learning’, ‘open access’ publishing, teacher-pupil discussion forums, and out-of-class electronic contact), especially for wholly new ‘disciplines’ (e.g., ICT, Computer-Aided Design, music technology).⁷⁹⁵ At the same time, again, the development of electronic and digital media has led to the creation of additional means of articulation in their own right, with the emergence of ‘apps’ used for various forms of social interaction with other subjects, and social networks (e.g., Facebook, Google+, LinkedIn, Pinterest) with their own internal systems of posts, comments, likes, ‘reactions’, and ‘favouritings’.⁷⁹⁶ As a result, many sources of communication about social activities, especially commentary by the relevant intelligentsia, have moved

⁷⁹¹ Agozzino 2012; Benkler 2006; Jue, Marr, and Kassotakis 2010; Lardi and Fuchs 2013; Li and Bernoff 2008; Piskorski 2014; Scoble and Israel 2006; Shirky 2008; Tapscott and Williams 2006; Watts 2003.

⁷⁹² Bosker 2014; Briggs and Burke 2010; Distin 2005; Hern 2015; Hess 2016; Larson 2016; Malik, Dhir, and Nieminen 2016; Pavlik and MacIntosh 2015; Shifman 2013; Wheen 2011; Wiggins and Bowers 2014.

⁷⁹³ Boyd and Ellison 2007; Bruns and Jacobs 2006; Curran and Gurevitch 2005; Levinson 1997; Mader 2007; Rosenberg 2009; Stallings 2004; Tapscott and Williams 2006; Wheen 2011; Wright and Hinson 2008.

⁷⁹⁴ Abdous, Facer, and Yen 2012; Altman 2015; Cox, Scott, and Varley 2006; Ho, Chou, and O’Neill 2010; Lewis and Nightingale 1999; MacDougall 2011; Moller and Gentles 2003.

⁷⁹⁵ Anderson and Dron 2010; Arens and Weigold 2012; Daly and Hansell 1999; Deming *et al.* 2015; Holmberg 1995; Major 2015; McAllister and West 2013; McFall 2004; Moriarty *et al.* 2014; Okorie 2011; Wilcox and Gibson 2005.

⁷⁹⁶ *BBC News* 2016a; Boyd and Ellison 2007; Kadushin 2012; Kovarik 2011; Pavlik and MacIntosh 2015; Shirky 2008; Wheen 2011.

increasingly into electronic and digital communication, with even outlets originally rooted in written or broadcast media intensively using computing, online, and social network communication resources, such as e-journals, news websites and apps, or dedicated social networks (e.g., Academia.edu, arXiv).⁷⁹⁷ Thus, customer feedback opportunities have been noticeably expanded by the development of online retailing (e.g., Alibaba, Amazon, or eBay) and industry- or sector-specific apps, incorporating complex systems of product 'ratings' and facilitating contact to sellers, and citizen opinion can be channelled through e-petitions and other forms of 'clicktivism', news website comment sections, or online polling and analysis websites (e.g., 270towin, FiveThirtyEight, Political Betting)—while in familial and friendship contexts, subjects' use of electronic and digital media is rising to the extent that it is starting to crowd out other forms of communication.⁷⁹⁸

Within social activities, the occupational and classist divisions in the use of electronic and digital media are analogous to those for telecommunications and broadcasting, but not as extreme. Electronic and digital communication is an even later arrival than telecommunications and broadcasting—in fact, so recent as to receive only passing mention by Fishkin or the other public opinion theorists—but has proliferated and become 'commonplace' far more quickly across activities and subjects.⁷⁹⁹ Again, electronic and digital media are often 'rolled out' through massive state (and state-sanctioned private) investment, and thus retain state (or state-enforced private) oligopolies or even monopolies in their control and provision (e.g., through energy producers, electricity suppliers, hardware and software manufacturers, internet service providers, search engine providers, and social networking service corporations).⁸⁰⁰ As a result, although there is quite a high degree of basic universal 'end user' access across occupations/classes (e.g., electricity grid connections, 'home' or 'office' computers and peripherals, dial-up, broadband, or wireless internet connections, social media accounts), there remain often subtle and underexplored classist differentials that may limit subjects' ability to use these media to express their opinions. The upshot of this is that electronic and digital means of expressing opinions about social activities are only partly restricted to higher-class occupations—as, for instance, the rapid uptake of these media in educational activity has expanded access to them fairly evenly across teachers and learners at all educational levels (e.g., via the use of computers and tablets in class, reliance on email to submit study

⁷⁹⁷ Curran and Gurevitch 2005; Herbert 2000; Kawamoto 2003; Kenski and Jamieson 2017; Scott 2005.

⁷⁹⁸ Agozzino 2012; Andresen 2011; Briggs and Burke 2010; Chapman 2005; Kenski and Jamieson 2017; Siegel 2015; Stallings 2004; White 2010; Wright and Hinson 2008.

⁷⁹⁹ Fishkin 2009, pp.3, 5, 21-2, 831, 117, 155, 160, 169-75, 183; Moog 2001, pp.367-8.

⁸⁰⁰ Boyd and Ellison 2007; Fourie 2007; Kadushin 2012; Kovarik 2011; Piskorski 2014; Shirky 2008; Wheen 2011.

assignments, &c).⁸⁰¹ Where such classist restrictions exist, they are often a hangover from conglomerate media oligopolies in print and broadcasting as well as a result of the divergent technological needs of different activities. Both causes can be seen, for instance, in the asymmetric access of senior company employees, officials, or legal and medical specialists to ‘in-house’ networks (e.g., company and departmental intranets, computer-assisted research resources, or messaging platforms), as well as the disproportionate availability of electronic and digital media to subjects in tertiary (as opposed to primary or secondary) industries and public relations or security occupations (e.g., government information and communications units, campaign social media ‘teams’, policing, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity)—while lower-class citizens or workers are all but prevented from expressing their opinions through anything other than online polls and feedback surveys.⁸⁰² Thus, although subjects’ use of these media has vastly expanded across occupations/classes due to their (relatively) low entry costs and effort (e.g., setting up a website, blog, email and messaging accounts, or downloading apps), this universality ultimately belies the tight control that a narrow tranche of higher-class subjects exert over them—including everything from company chief operations officers, senior civil servants, headteachers, heads of faculty and department, boards of governors, and religious leaders, as well as informal forms of parental discretion.⁸⁰³

Fifth, *sui generis* media. The materials from ‘the natural’ or from other activities that subjects can use to express opinions about various parts of ‘the social’ either ‘transcend’ the historical development of modes of communication, or are associated overwhelmingly with one activity over all the others. For instance, beyond their chief use as means of biological survival, food and drink are used above all for economic, political, religious, and curative communication—e.g., purchasing/boycotting low-quality ‘value’ versus high-quality ‘luxury’, ‘organic’ versus ‘GM’ foodstuffs, or imports from specific countries, adopting abstemious diets to campaign against animal cruelty, food waste, or agricultural pollution, conforming to *kosher*, *halal*, or other dietary rules, or ‘cutting down’ on certain food and drink on medical

⁸⁰¹ Briggs and Burke 2010; Curran and Gurevitch 2005; Deming *et al.* 2015; Fourie 2007; Fuchs 2010; Hawisher and Selfe 1991; Kenski and Jamieson 2017; Kovarik 2011; Lampos *et al.* 2016; Lin, Hoffman, and Borengasser 2013; Pavlik and MacIntosh 2015; Shirky 2008; Tyler 2010; Yates, Kirby, and Lockley 2015; Zhou 2011.

⁸⁰² Aichner 2015; Boyd and Ellison 2007; Chapman 2005; Curran and Gurevitch 2005; Daly and Hansell 1999; Kovarik 2011; Marquess 2000; Stallings 2004; Wilcox and Gibson 2005.

⁸⁰³ Briggs and Burke 2010; Jordan 2009; Pavlik and MacIntosh 2015; Shirky 2008; Siegel 2015; Tang 2015; Yates, Kirby, and Lockley 2015.

advice.⁸⁰⁴ Likewise, clothes as a source of warmth and shelter and means of activity in many social activities are governed by norms that subjects are typically required to abide by (or encouraged to contravene) to express endorsement (or rejection) of their relevant *habitus*—e.g., industry and company office wear (usually the ubiquitous suit and tie or their equivalents), national dress, military uniforms and ‘gear’, religious vestments, medical ‘scrubs’, clothes for ‘going out’ or ‘meeting up’ with friends and family, school uniforms and ‘academic dress’, or lawyers’ robes.⁸⁰⁵ Similarly, buildings and infrastructure as ways of getting shelter and mobility have become staple resources for many activities, but subjects can also use decisions (not) to use them to reveal their opinions about the *status quo* of the relevant activities, their own or others’ social situations, their locality, destinations, or society in general—e.g., constructing company offices, shops, government buildings, courts, or places of worship, planning and investing in schools, universities, and hospitals, moving into or out of residential housing, as well as using roads for trade and delivery, military manoeuvres, or travel.⁸⁰⁶ The *sui generis* means of articulation associated most strongly with economic activity is money—e.g., financial capital for investment in production, currency as a means of exchange and *fiat* store of value, or wealth and income as means of consumption—as the action of (not) investing, exchanging, or spending money reveals some judgment about a good or service, its producer and vendor, subjects’ own economic situation, and the wider economic *status quo*.⁸⁰⁷ The use of weaponry to facilitate coercion or repression, meanwhile, is especially linked to political activity—and juridical, educational, and curative activity through capital and corporal punishment—and, as hinted at by Althusser, the action of (not) using weapons to attack other subjects represents some judgment about these subjects, but also about subjects’ own situation, the political *status quo*, and society overall.⁸⁰⁸

Within activities, all of these *sui generis* media exhibit some occupational and classist differences in the way subjects use them to communicate, which make them far more amenable to higher-class than lower-class expressions of opinion. These differences often follow on directly from asymmetries in how these materials are distributed as means in their ‘core’ activities—especially those that have a ‘natural’ origin or, like money, are highly fungible into other means of activity. In principle, absent severe natural

⁸⁰⁴ Bourdieu 2010, pp.71–2, 172–99, 377, 383–4; Counihan and van Esterik 1997; Davidson 2006; Humphery 1998; Schor and Taylor 2003; Simoons 1994.

⁸⁰⁵ Bohn 2004; Bourdieu 2010, pp.200–2, 246, 379; Cumming 2004; Esposito 2011; Laver 1979; McLuhan 2001, pp.129–32; Polhemus and Procter 1978; Yammiyavar, Clemmensen, and Kumar 2008.

⁸⁰⁶ McLuhan 2001, pp.133–41, 195–203, 236–45; Sassen 1992; Wright 1983.

⁸⁰⁷ Davies 1996; Jevons 1875; Jones 1976; McLuhan 2001, pp.142–56; Menger 1892; Weatherford 1997.

⁸⁰⁸ Althusser 2014, p.244; McLuhan 2001, pp.369–77.

or social catastrophe, subjects can access and use both food and drink and clothing regardless of occupation or class—but since control over these rests with higher-class subjects in the relevant activities (often through their concurrent higher economic or political class situations), lower-class subjects may lack the abundance and variety in both food and drink and clothing (beyond a basic level) they would need to use them realise complex social opinions (e.g., impoverished families' inability to afford healthy food or school uniforms for their children).⁸⁰⁹ Similarly, subjects' use of buildings and infrastructure, while in principle universal, is controlled by higher-class subjects and often limited by their affordability (e.g., public buildings, toll roads, &c), so lower-class subjects can typically use them to express opinions only on an extremely reduced scale, and in ways directly relevant to their occupations (e.g., attending church, travelling 'for work', 'points-based' migration of skilled occupations, being 'stuck' in a locality versus living as a 'rootless cosmopolitan').⁸¹⁰ The same classist distinction applies to the two *sui generis* media that are specific to economic and political activity. Using money is, in principle, again, universal to all subjects in a given economy, but it is tightly controlled by a small set of higher-class occupations (e.g., decisions on money creation by central bank boards and policy committees, senior executives in commercial banks, &c), as well as by contingent restrictions such as having a personal bank account, an electronic payment card, and above all a remunerated occupation that provides a steady source of income.⁸¹¹ Meanwhile, subjects' use of weaponry varies drastically across different jurisdictions, but is strictly controlled by higher-class occupations, with most lower-class subjects having access to only very basic weapons (e.g., primitive, improvised, or specific types of *mêlée* and ranged armaments), and the use of heavier or more complex weaponry (e.g., artillery, biological or chemical, explosive, nuclear, incendiary, energy, &c) limited or denied by age and mental health restrictions, by their cost, or by their exclusive availability to professional security apparatuses (i.e., police, gendarmerie, armed forces).⁸¹²

Overall, there is significant variety in the media that subjects in different activities, occupations, and classes can use to express opinions. In all activities, subjects are encouraged to use *imagery*, *symbolism*,

⁸⁰⁹ Bourdieu 2010, pp.71-2, 172-202, 246, 377-9, 383-4; Counihan and van Esterik 1997; Cumming 2004; Davidson 2006; Humphery 1998; Laver 1979; McLuhan 2001, pp.129-32; Messer, Derose, and Millman 1998; Polhemus and Procter 1978; Schor and Taylor 2003; Simoons 1994; Yammiyavar, Clemmensen, and Kumar 2008.

⁸¹⁰ Chaichian 2014; Manning 2005; McLuhan 2001, pp.133-41, 195-203, 236-45; Sassen 1992; Sayad 2004; Wright 1983.

⁸¹¹ Breen 2005; Davies 1996; Jevons 1875; Jones 1976; McLuhan 2001, pp.142-56; Menger 1892; Samuelson and Nordhaus 2009; Weatherford 1997.

⁸¹² Dyer 2010; Lott 2010; Malcolm 2002; McLuhan 2001, pp.369-77; Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie 2005; Winkler 2013.

Case study 10: *Auferstanden aus Ruinen?*

The decline and disintegration of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) provides a wealth of examples for how subjects, again especially in lower social classes, can use various different media to express their view on social issues, even in the face of extensive totalitarian censorship and control. Of course, the governmental institutions of the GDR exercised a clear monopoly over many media, including imagery and symbolism (e.g., state control of art and culture through the *Amt für Literatur und Verlagswesen* or *Staatliche Kommission für Kunstangelegenheiten*, or the renaming of roads, buildings, and urban areas after famous communists), writing and printing (e.g., the official SED party newspaper *Neues Deutschland*), telecommunications and broadcasting (e.g., the state TV broadcaster *Deutscher Fernsehfunke*, or the radio broadcaster *Rundfunk der DDR*), as well as *sui generis* media such as buildings and infrastructure (e.g., the Berlin Wall after 1961, the 1969 *Kulturpalast* in Dresden, or the 1976 *Palast der Republik* in Berlin). However, in the lead-up to *die Wende*, East German citizens found increasingly high-profile ways to express their dissatisfaction with the régime despite these apparent restrictions. The 1989-91 Monday demonstrations in Leipzig became associated with now-iconic imagery, including placards (e.g., depicting a single Germany under the West German flag, or the fraternal kiss between Leonid Brezhnev and Erich Honecker), slogans (e.g., ‘*Wir sind das Volk*’, ‘*Wir sind ein Volk*’), or defaced flags (e.g., with the GDR coat of arms cut out) to express support for reunification. From the mid-1970s, East Germans increasingly abandoned domestic broadcasters in favour of ‘*Westfernsehen*’ (e.g., the TV channel *Deutsches Fernsehen*, or the public radio station *Deutschlandfunk*), helped by the ARD broadcasting consortium’s construction of powerful transmitters in East Berlin and close to the East German border. Popular forms of *sui generis* expression also included greater reliance on high-quality and imported Western food and drink available at designated retail stores (e.g., Intershop, Exquisit, Delikat), purchased with the West German *Deutschmark* rather than the increasingly worthless GDR *Ostmark*, higher church attendance (e.g., at the *Friedensgebet* in Leipzig’s St. Nicholas Church) to show a rejection of state atheism and support for Protestant churches’ opposition to state oppression, and the rising tide of emigration (e.g., the population decline from 19 million in 1948 to 16 million in 1990) and the late surge in refugees via West German embassies in other Soviet bloc countries. Ultimately, these culminated in the most famous moment of popularly expressed resistance to the East German state: the ‘fall’ (i.e., occupation and later dismantling) of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.

writing, and *printing* consistently to articulate themselves, though their use of the latter two has been eroded by later ‘waves’ of technological development, while the use of *electronic*, *digital*, *sui generis*, and especially *telecommunications* and *broadcast* media is much more variable, as some of these are specific to individual activities, or still in the process of superseding prior technological ‘waves’. Again, all of these means are differentiated along class lines beyond a basic level of universality, as subjects in higher-class occupations benefit from (in some cases) slightly greater leeway or (in others) near-exclusivity in the quality and quantity of their image, symbolic, and especially written, printed, broadcast, and *sui generis* expression, with similar divides also rapidly starting to emerge in electronic and digital means as well. Given the effects of these media on opinion-expression, opinion research can expect to find occupational (and classist) differences in how subjects express opinions based on their differential use of these various

media. As with bodily organs, although arguably not to quite the same extent, these differences are likely to manifest in a similar tendency for higher-class subjects to ‘dominate’ the quality and quantity of most if not all media expressions within mass opinion, especially for printing, broadcasting, and *sui generis* media, and also to a lesser degree for imagery/symbolism, writing, telecommunications, electronic, and digital media. By extension, therefore, lower-class subjects’ discursive role is similarly doubly suppressed within the mediatic as well as organic ways in which mass opinion can be expressed. This is evidenced by the near-exclusive population of radio and television programming by ‘talking heads’ taken from the upper echelons of government, business, and higher education, or the constant reappearance of the same journalists with ‘platforms’ across multiple media (e.g., programme hosts, regular correspondents or contributors, newspaper columnists, &c), as well as elite advantages in spending decisions, military strategy, infrastructure projects, and spatial mobility. At the same time, among the few areas where a certain degree of (rudimentary) cross-class parity exists in subjects’ ability to make opinion-statements are the statistically random chance of being sampled in an opinion poll, the ability to post and otherwise interact on social media, or (inevitably) the right to vote. In light of these extreme classist tendencies in the use of media, social subjects can, in general, be placed on a spectrum from ‘omnivalent magnates’ at the higher-class end to ‘sporadic gadflies’ at the lower-class end.

§4. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the ways in which the functional differentiation of social agency in late modernity has introduced an extensive degree of pluralism into the way subjects use their means of articulation to express opinions about ‘the social’. The type of pluralism created here can be called *multimodality*. As with the way this concept is used in semiotics and communication studies, the sense of plurality it identifies is that, as a social artefact, mass opinion is composed using communicative ‘modes’—or, in the terminology of this analysis, resources acting as means of articulation—that are highly diversified across many individual subjects in their respective activities, occupations, and classes.⁸¹³ Similar to the previous chapter, this one started by arguing that the use of bodily organs and media to express opinions is not distributed homogeneously across all social subjects. It gave an overview of how subjects’ access to these means of articulation, and their socialisation into *habitus* covering their use, has

⁸¹³ Bateman 2008; Kress 2010; Leeuwen 1999.

developed and become complexified in successive historical modes of communication, and how it has been cross-cut by classist divisions in these modes, and by the differentiation of communication into sub-types associated separate classist social activities. Then, it went on to elucidate exactly what these (qualitative or quantitative) differences between subjects in different activities, occupations, and classes are for each means of articulation in turn. As with opinion-formation, the analysis observed clear asymmetries in the way subjects in higher- and lower-class occupations in different activities use particular organs and media, which have a significant effect on how they express opinions, and (to some extent) on how detailed the precise opinions they express are. What emerges from this analysis is that, under the prevailing modes (and sub-modes) of communication, articulation—or, to be precise, the conversion of formed opinions into actually expressed opinions—is by no means necessarily (or equally) ‘straightforward’ and ‘immediate’ for subjects in different classes. There is a clear tendency for higher-class subjects to ‘dominate’ several of the most ‘visible’ or ‘audible’ expressions of mass opinion—i.e., judgments articulated via verbal, print, broadcast, and *sui generis* media—which, added to the classism of the prevailing modes of ideation, doubly suppresses lower-class subjects’ discursive contributions to mass opinion in late modernity. Returning to Freeden’s cautionary comment that discursive analysis in general needs to avoid focusing only on “exceptional individuals”, highlighted at the end of chapter I, it becomes clear that opinion research needs to consider very carefully the effects of multimodality and social stratification when analysing the ways in which mass opinion is expressed, and above all to recognise the ‘hidden’ pluralism of lower-class opinion that is partly ‘silenced’ by the discursive domination of subjects in higher-class occupations.⁸¹⁴

⁸¹⁴ See p.70.

Conclusion: Beyond the *Pollsterdämmerung*

Ὅτι πᾶν ὑπόληψις.

Remember that all is opinion.

——Marcus Aurelius⁸¹⁵

We know better what we measure, and what measurement means, when we calculate the dynamic mass of a galaxy than when we quantify by polling a state of opinion.

——Régis Debray⁸¹⁶

The social model of the structure and creation of mass opinion is now complete. This enquiry started by presenting a thoroughgoing analytic framework that broadens social-theoretical understandings of social occupation and class. It moved away from a narrow reading of classes as purely economic categories, and towards a more complex appreciation of the way power is structured in ‘the social’ through differences in the material and relational conditions (MRCs) of the activities in which subjects participate. It also shifted away from outdated, broad-brush treatments of social class towards more a granular consideration of social occupations (chapter I). The enquiry next mapped the processes by which subjects form and express their opinions about ‘the social’. It outlined what psychology, communications theory, and other areas of social science, have identified as the primary means of thinking—i.e., personality-traits, emotions, and reason—and articulation—i.e., bodily organs and media—to give an overall view of how subjects form and express opinions (chapter II). The enquiry then applied this social-theoretical analytic framework to these processes, to provide a ‘deep-structure’ explication of their complexity in late-modern society. It argued that subjects’ occupational situations and class positions determine: their endowment with specific predispositions that orient their opinions about ‘the social’, as well as the specific MRCs with which they are familiar, and hence how their opinions are informed (chapter III); their access to means of thinking, which affects the complexity with

⁸¹⁵ Marcus Aurelius 1909, II.15.

⁸¹⁶ Debray 1996, p.9.

which they form opinions based on their mental pictures of ‘the social’ (chapter IV); and their access to means of articulation, which affects their scope and opportunity for expressing these opinions within ‘the social’ (chapter V).

§1. *‘Between foxes and hedgehogs’: the social nature and basis of opinion*

The enquiry can now ‘take stock’ of where its analysis leaves theoretical understandings of ‘mass opinion’. To respond to the two hypotheses outlined in chapter I, there is a clear methodological advantage to be gained by examining mass opinion not just as an object but an activity, or rather, two intersecting activities, namely ideation and communication. By analysing opinion in terms of discursive interpellation, discursive dependence, and means of thinking and articulation, the insight emerges that *almost every aspect of opinion is in some way socially determined*. The stimuli and cues that underpin subjects’ mental pictures are determined by their occupational positions (and class situations) within the social activities through which they interact with MRCs, and by the prevailing modes of ideation and communication (and their activity-specific ‘sub-modes’), and they are delivered to them by discursive networks. The ‘thinking power’ and ‘articulation power’ with which they form and express opinions is governed by their occupational (and classist) ideative and communicative *habitus*, which are partly shaped by the occupational (and classist) *habitus* of the activities about which they are opining, imparted to them by discursive apparatuses. And how subjects use their means of thinking (personality-traits, emotions, and forms of reasoning) to form opinions, and their means of articulation (bodily organs, media) to express them, is determined by the prevailing modes (and ‘sub-modes’) of ideation and communication. Moreover, as Althusser notes, this social determination of subjects’ information, interpellation, ideation, and communication to a great extent happens ‘concurrently’—i.e., the processes outlined in chapters III to V are overlapping, simultaneous, and mutually dependent.⁸¹⁷ The only aspects of opinion that might partly be beyond the reach of ‘the social’ are subjects’ personality-traits, possibly their emotions, and their bodily organs. To reiterate, none of this should be taken to mean that subjects’ opinions are in any way less ‘authentic’ than if (counterfactually) this social determination were absent.⁸¹⁸ Subjects’ social environments, perceptual horizons, and purposive inputs and means of thinking and articulation, are very much subjects’ own, in that subjects still personally direct their ‘functions’ at the

⁸¹⁷ Althusser 2014, pp.189, 194, 264.

⁸¹⁸ See p.155.

individual level. Rather, the concept of ‘authenticity’ itself must be prised away from its atomistic liberal, or social-scientific connotations, and its full social aspects more strongly recognised.

It is worth summarising the implications of this social determination for how subjects form and express opinions *at any given moment*. Fundamentally, since most subjects engage in more than one social activity—in parallel, or over the course of their life—they have complex identities, comprising multiple occupational (and class) subjectivities, often arranged into some subjective hierarchy of importance. For each of these subjectivities, they are interpellated to behave and hence think and articulate in a particular way, in the sense that they are ‘trained’ to use (and ‘used’ to using) particular combinations of means of thinking and articulation to form and express their opinions, depending on (and determined by) the set of occupations they hold. Of course, there is no guarantee that subjects’ occupational (and class) subjectivities—especially how these encourage subjects to use personality-traits, emotions, forms of reasoning, bodily organs, and media when forming and expressing opinions—will ‘align’ with each other. Indeed, given the proliferation and diversity of ‘sub-modes’ of ideation and communication, it is more likely that they will ‘clash’, with “instances of objective grating and grinding” between the discursive apparatuses associated with different activities.⁸¹⁹ How subjects think and articulate (and behave) ‘overall’ depends on how they choose (even if only at a basic and ‘instinctive’ level) to subjectively reconcile the competing ‘pulls’ of these interpellations, but all of them leave some kind of ‘trace’ on their thinking.

In view of this, the effects of social determination can be disaggregated into three ‘scenarios’ for how subjects form and express opinions. In the most basic scenario:

I. Opinions about MRCs belonging to one activity in which subjects are engaged

When subjects form and express opinions about MRCs associated with *one* of their social activities, they predominantly do so on the basis of those values and attitudes, depending on those informational networks, and using those means of thinking and articulation they have been ‘called’ to use by virtue of their occupation within this activity. (Here, ‘predominantly’ signifies that subjects’ thinking and articulation may contain ‘traces’ of the ideative and communicative interpellations they have for other activities.)

⁸¹⁹ Althusser 2014, p.200.

Of course, to some extent, social activities overlap at the margins, meaning that some of subjects' MRCs are exclusively the 'preserve' of some activities, whereas others are 'shared' between, or cross-cut them. Consequently:

II. Opinions about MRCs belonging to several activities in which subjects are engaged

When subjects form and express opinions about MRCs that cross-cut *several* of their activities, they predominantly do so using a subjectively-reconciled combination of the values and attitudes, informational networks, and means of thinking and articulation they have been 'called' to use by virtue of their occupation(s) within each of these activities.

In addition, there will be some activities in which subjects are not engaged at all, and perhaps by which they may not even be affected, and for which they consequently lack any interpellation (beyond a very basic 'lay' subjectivity). In these cases:

III. Opinions about MRCs belonging to activities in which subjects are not engaged

When subjects form and express opinions about MRCs (at least partly) associated with activities in which they are *not engaged*, they predominantly revert to using a subjectively-reconciled combination of the values and attitudes, informational networks, and means of thinking and articulation they are 'called' to use for *other* activities in which they *do* hold occupations.

Between them, these cover the ways in which subjects' social activities, occupational positions, and class situations can affect how they form and express opinions in any given context. In each case, subjects are located on a 'sliding scale' from experts down to ignorant laypersons, which affects how stringently they conform to their occupational values and attitudes, how close they are to the 'hubs' of informational networks, and how rigidly they are 'bound' to use certain means of thinking and articulation—as well as how likely the opinions they form and express are to be 'picked up' and replicated by other subjects.

Concretely, this means that if it is to overcome its theoretical limitations and practical mistakes hitherto, opinion research cannot any longer be universalistic in its treatment of how subjects form and express opinions. It cannot simply assume that all the opinions of different individual subjects that together comprise 'mass opinion' are: (1) based on any set of universally applicable values and attitudes (e.g., efficiency, justice, holiness); (2) informed by any one group of discursively original subjects (e.g., homogenised social elites, journalists, academics); (3) formed through one kind of thinking process (e.g., pure rationality, emotionality); or (4) expressed through only one kind of articulation process (e.g., media

articles, opinion polls). The sheer plurality present at every one of these stages underpins the situation originally referred to in the introduction as subjects being located on a spectrum ‘between foxes and hedgehogs’ when they form and express opinions about ‘the social’, which can now be clarified. Different subjects can be occupationally involved with between one and many parts of ‘the social’, and consequently endowed with between one and many social (and, more narrowly, discursive) subjectivities. The point of the ‘spectrum’ is that, except perhaps for some liminal cases of genuine ‘one-trick ponies’ or polymath savants, no subject conforms perfectly to either extreme of the hedgehog-fox binary distinction. No subject forms and expresses opinions about ‘the social’ from the subjective perspective of a singular social occupation—i.e., based on only its values and attitudes, depending only on its informational networks, and using only its associated means of thinking and articulation. But at the same time, no subjects are engaged in a full range of social occupations, and the ones they do engage in are organised for them into a subjective hierarchy of priority, so some subjective expert perspectives—i.e., values and attitudes, informational networks, and means of thinking and articulation—are more important to them when they form and express opinions than others. For each subject, the situation is somewhere in between the two extremes, and it is only through ‘deep-logic’ analysis of their location in the division of purposive agency within highly-differentiated late-modern society that their situation can be precisely determined. It is this radical pluralism at the level of *individual*, and hence ‘mass’, opinion-formation and opinion-expression that late-modern opinion research has failed to comprehend.

§2. *Occupation, class, and mass opinion: a review*

With this, the analysis can now revisit the opinion research question from the start: *what is the effect of social occupation and class on whether, and how, people have opinions about something (as opposed to having others, or not having them at all)?* The answer this enquiry offers is straightforward: subjects’ occupational situations and class positions extensively and significantly determine (1) which behavioural norms and dispositions shape their social activities, and motivate the values and attitudes that underpin their opinions; (2) whether they receive information about MRCs from their own embodied experience or via cues from beyond their perceptual horizon; and (3) which means of thinking (personality-traits, emotions, reason) and articulation (bodily organs, media) they use to form and express their opinions.

At root, then, this enquiry endorses the view that theorists over time and across multiple research traditions have, in various ways, been right to argue that mass opinion has an occupational and classist

aspect. However, on top of this more obvious result, by reintroducing a social-theoretical framework of analysis to the study of mass opinion, this account has been able to specify the ‘whether’ and ‘how’ of this occupational/classist determination claim far more precisely than any other tradition has hitherto. Specifically, it has explored how occupations, and the classes into which they can be aggregated, interact with the processes by which subjects form and express their opinions—rather than merely the links between class and substantive ‘differences of opinion’. This account thus partly confirms and partly goes well beyond pre-existing intuitions and insights about the connections between the two.

The explanatory force of this account of mass opinion is intended to operate at both the social and individual level. It is partly with this aim in mind that this project has sought throughout to compatibilise both these levels of analysis, treading a careful middle path between the extremes of rigid monolithic structuralism and the reification of personal agency. To borrow and slightly paraphrase a useful distinction made by Wendy Brown, this project has articulated a model that balances (but does not replace) structural analysis of “macrophysical social processes” and “forces [...] that can be said to shape the contours of modern ‘history’” with a concern for subjective experience of the “psychic, social, and moral economies imbricated with such processes” and “the very making of bodily subjects and socio-political desires”.⁸²⁰ Of course, there is always a limit to how far pure and granular structural predictability should be taken, and this enquiry is not trying to endorse the crude and rigid determinism that characterises ‘old-school’ structuralist methodologies. Nonetheless, this analysis can point to ways in which social structures do lead to fairly specific qualitative differences in different subjects’ ‘approaches’ to opinion-formation and expression, if not perhaps more pronounced substantive differences in content.

At times, the argument has passed through some extremely dense and complex conceptual analysis, and relied on some obscure terminology (including the division of human social agency into activities and domains, the relationship of discursive apparatuses to both discourse itself and the domains that ‘host’ them, or the concepts of ‘thrownness’, ‘ideation’, and ‘interpellation’). Yet ultimately, the main insight of this model is extremely simple: *mass opinion has a pervasive occupational and classist aspect*. Specifically: the social processes by which mass opinion is oriented (interpellation), informed (dependence), formed (ideation), and expressed (communication) are all occupational and classist. Not only are they about occupational and classist things (occupation- and class-governed social activities),

⁸²⁰ Brown 1995, pp.xi-xii. Brown’s model is more indebted to Nietzsche and Foucault, whereas this account owes more to Marx, Heidegger, Althusser, and Bourdieu.

but they are also *themselves* occupation- and class-governed activities. Of course, these processes, and the mass opinion which they produce, may well also carry socially significant markers of age, health, bodily ability, skin pigmentation, reproductive organs, &c*, in a way that is not reducible to occupation/class as characterised here. But, while this analysis is strongly sympathetic to such claims, they lie beyond the scope of the present project. This enquiry has merely set out to show that mass opinion—whatever else it might have—has a fundamental occupational aspect, which manifests as a contingent classist aspect if the prevailing modes of activity whose constellation determines the overall nature of social conditions are overwhelmingly classist (which they almost always are). What makes this project a *social* theory of mass opinion, therefore, is precisely the fact that it uncovers the ways in which (and extent to which) occupation and class has *some* part to play in explicating mass opinion as a social phenomenon. How this aspect intersects with further ageist, ableist, racial, gendered, queer, &c*, metrics of social privilege and discrimination—including whether these manifest themselves in mass opinion only insofar as they become integrated into occupational frameworks and class hierarchies—remains a question for further study.

It remains to ask what advantage has been gained by taking what was from the very start admitted to be a relatively unusual approach to addressing the neglected topic of mass opinion. In terms of filling the ‘social theory lacuna’ in opinion research, this project has sought to examine mass opinion through a social-theoretic lens that has been updated to take into account some of the major advances in social theory since the time of the early sociologists and critical theorists. This is especially true (for obvious reasons) for analyses of class and—albeit to a lesser extent—new methodological approaches to the structure-agency debate. Partly as a result of this, the account of mass opinion outlined here gives a serious impetus to the attempt to reverse the two trends of mutual disinterest and unfamiliarity between social theory and mass opinion identified at the start. First, by highlighting the social determination of how opinions are formed and expressed, it gives opinion research a reason to turn back to and adopt insights from social theory, as has started to happen for other areas of social science. Second, by offering an account of opinion as a form of discourse that sits on a par with other forms of social activity, it gives social theory both the conceptual tools and a reason to take mass opinion seriously as an object of theoretical as well as practical importance.

§3. *Measuring and emancipating mass opinion*

By way of some concluding reflections, now that the need for interpretative (and historical) analysis has been satisfied, this account examines some ways in which its insights can be applied in theory and practice. Above all, it is important to indicate areas where this analysis can be used to advance current understandings and practices of opinion research on the one hand, and emancipate mass opinion itself on the other. In doing so, it is worth indicating the comparative advantages of this model of mass opinion over others currently in use. However, this is not intended to invalidate either the main traditions in opinion research (e.g., Bourdieu, Fraser, or Zaller), or the interdisciplinary syntheses attempted hitherto (Fishkin, Price, Splichal), since these are *pro tanto* valuable for examining various aspects of the concept of mass opinion. Rather, it provides an alternative perspective on *what it means to* synthesise traditions in social theory and social science, specifically regarding mass opinion as a social phenomenon.

One of the central features of this analysis is the idea that subjects have (at least one, and usually multiple) occupational subjectivities, determined by their positions in the social activities with which they are involved. The move from interpretation to prescription is especially concerned with the implications of this idea for the way mass opinion should be understood. This move can be conducted in two ways. First, this social model, based on the division of society into occupations (and classes), offers a deeper analysis of agents as social subjects. Analysing subjects in terms of their occupational situations and class positions gives social researchers a type of *Verstehen*, ‘understanding’, about them—and a better explication of their behaviour than superficial positivist types of *Erklären*, ‘explanation’, to use the distinction first drawn by Johann Gustav Droysen and Wilhelm Dilthey.⁸²¹ Instead of treating social roles and behaviour as supervenient and changeable aspects of subjects—mere ‘characters’ or ‘whims’—this model encourages opinion researchers to see them as deeper and more enduring.

The key factor here is that occupational situations determine not only (1) who subjects are, based on the social subjectivities they are ‘given’ for the occupations they hold, but also (2) how they act, based on the purposive inputs they contribute to the social activities to which their occupations belong. This means that integrating occupational (and class) analysis allows social research not only to evaluate (empirically or normatively) social arrangements, conditions, and phenomena (broadly construed) ‘as

⁸²¹ Dilthey 1991; Droysen 1893; Simmel 1977; Weber 1978.

they are', or even 'as they might be', but also account far more extensively for how (by which processes), and by whom (by which authors), they are produced and created. Applied to mass opinion specifically, the point is that occupational (and class) analysis allows opinion research to overcome the limitations of existing practice, which looks predominantly at 'opinions' *qua* social facts without considering that they are the 'outputs' of processes of opinion-formation and opinion-expression. This, it should be recalled, was expressed earlier in terms of a 'static-dynamic' distinction.⁸²² As should be clear from the foregoing analysis, depending on which part(s) of 'the social' opinions are about, occupational (and class) divisions determine both who the authors of these opinions are, and how they form and express these opinions.

The second way of moving from interpretative to prescriptive analysis is to use the occupational (and class) model of society as a tool to further subjects' own self-understanding. Making subjects themselves—as well as the theorists analysing them—aware of their own occupational situations and class positions is a useful way not just of attaining *Verstehen* of (or about) them, but also of giving subjects a better *Selbstverständnis*, 'self-conception'. Subjects can glean from this social model a better comprehension of the nature and conditions of their own material and relational place in constellations of power-concentrations—specifically, that their social existence and activities *in particular* are extensively affected (if not completely determined) by social divisions in the way that subjects *in general* exercise their purposive agency. To be precise, it offers individual subjects the insight that their interactions with their MRCs are not 'atomised' (independent from or uncorrelated with those of other subjects), but intersubjectively streamlined, convergent, or harmonised at an occupational (and class) level. This means that, if subjects pursue projects to emancipate themselves from radical and systematic 'material' inequalities, 'relational' asymmetries, and hence power-differentials, they need not do so 'on their own'. While it is unambiguously at the individual level that these interactions with MRCs take place, occupational (and class) divisions give subjects a structural basis for collective solidarities based on the subsequent co-orientation of these behaviours to emerge. Because, as above, occupational situations determine not only who subjects are, but also how they act, subjects with the social *Selbstverständnis* this model provides can identify more clearly with and against whom their emancipatory projects should be mobilised, and which processes these projects should challenge.

⁸²² See pp.37, 61-2.

For mass opinion, discursive emancipation entails subjects challenging and altering how they form and express opinions about the part(s) of ‘the social’ with which they interact (i.e., by which they are affected, or which they affect). It must, as Mark Fisher argues,

always destroy the appearance of a ‘natural order’, must reveal what is presented as necessary and inevitable to be a mere contingency, just as it must make what was previously deemed to be impossible seem attainable.⁸²³

Depending on the part(s) in question, occupational (and class) analysis thus enables subjects to identify the structural foundations of their potential discursive solidarities, as well as the specific discursive *habitus*, and means and relations of ideation and communication, which they should aim to transform. Of course, it should go without saying that the way in which mass opinion is formed and expressed may be more in need of emancipation with regard to some social activities (and occupations/classes) than others. Moreover, it should be noted that this ‘route’ to emancipation is slightly different to that of the Frankfurt School or critical discourse analysts, who typically construct their models in a way that seeks to achieve emancipation directly via critique.⁸²⁴ This account is first and foremost a ‘positive’ intervention, an analytic corrective that builds on and goes beyond critique, and which acts as an intermediary staging-post on the way to emancipatory and other normative stipulations—insights that are ultimately only of contingent and secondary concern.

For both theoretical evaluation of the authors and processes of ‘mass opinion’, and subjects’ self-conceptions, one of this model’s advantages is that it recognises the large degree of *plurality* that characterises the concepts it analyses in late modernity. This is the result, first, of the multiplicity of subjectivities created by the social division of purposive agency—dictated by the needs of different natural and social situations, as well as contingently prevailing modes of cooperation for different activities—and, second, of the means of discourse within the activities of ideation and communication. Returning to a consideration raised briefly at the start of this analysis, this plurality affects what the ‘mass’ aspect of ‘mass opinion’ represents. Given the fundamental individualist assumptions of the model, whereby ‘the social’ is characterised as conditioning *individual* human subjects as participants in social activities, it is not wedded to any particular monolithic or even corporate conception of ‘the mass’. That is to say, although, as observed earlier, there are clearly ‘borders’ that cross-cut the differentiation of MRCs according to the division of social agency, none of the groups that these ‘borders’ create—

⁸²³ Fisher 2009, p.17.

⁸²⁴ Adorno and Horkheimer 1979; Fairclough 1995, 2001; Habermas 1987; van Dijk 1998; Wodak and Meyer 2001.

nations and citizenries, *demoi* and electorates, biological categories (gender, race, &c), even crowds—is necessarily privileged under the terms of this model as the primary, let alone the only, entity to which ‘mass opinion’ is conceptually tied.⁸²⁵ Nor is ‘mass’ intended simply as a counterpoint to ‘elite’, since although this comes closer to the occupational and classist framework of this analysis, it exaggerates the qualitative dichotomy between the opinions of subjects in elite versus non-elite occupations, and overlooks the similarities in how they are formed and expressed.

In this instance, methodological individualism is not so much a limitation as a source of versatility and flexibility. The model easily allows for intersubjective dynamics in opinion-formation and opinion-expression to be expanded (or contracted) to human associations at any scale or level, from ‘private individuals’ up to the whole of humanity. The precise nature of these dynamics, and the exact scale and level of these associations, is the contingent product of the interaction between and hybridisation of contemporaneous modes of cooperation across all the various social activities for each physical and temporal context. In other words, ‘mass’ is simply an aggregate placeholder for all the various (individual or collective) activities taking place, e.g., in a given society. In turn, this implies that the existence of ‘mass opinion’ as an aggregate of various individual opinions significantly predates (1) the development of an opinion polling industry (20th century), (2) extensive popular enfranchisement (19th century), and even (3) the first formation of ‘publics’ (17th and 18th centuries). In fact, *contra* Tönnies, in the all-encompassing sense used here, ‘mass opinion’ is not a new construct of post-religious modernity, but has always been a transhistorical feature of human social life, comprising every subject’s (individual or collective) opinion-‘contributions’.⁸²⁶ This means that, at the heart of any attempt to fully emancipate mass opinion, there needs to be an understanding of it, not as a modern invention—the remit of modern social science—but as a ‘world-historical’ phenomenon, and an ongoing concern of social theory.

But the main effect of this conceptual plurality relates to what this model counts as ‘opinion’. In chapters III to V, the enquiry argued that this plurality comes in three types, which can now be elaborated on slightly. First, *multipolarity*, or the existence of many rival, alternative *subjects* who act as sources of, or contributors to, mass opinion. No single subject or group of subjects is uniquely privileged in forming or expressing ‘mass opinion’—although the analysis nonetheless identified a ‘cast list’ of subjects who extensively influence it in late modernity. Nor, by the same token, is any one of the various (kinds of) competing occupational or class experiences each subject has across different activities

⁸²⁵ See pp.60-1.

⁸²⁶ Hardt and Splichal 2000, p.181.

consistently favoured in opinion-formation and opinion-expression processes at the individual level. Subjects are simultaneously (any or all of) voters, officials, consumers, workers, carers, teachers, parents, &c—without any of these subjectivities automatically having a greater, or more legitimate, influence on their individual ‘contribution’ to mass opinion than any other. This account has not tried to define any singular conception of who (i.e., what kind of subject) ‘counts as’ the ‘one true author’ of opinions, and hence which aggregative group (i.e., which composition of subjects) can be classed as the ‘one true mass’ as the author(s) of the ‘one true mass opinion’. To do so would be to import arbitrarily restrictive ‘membership criteria’ that have no integral basis in the conception of social theory on which this account relies. It is precisely such creeping *unipolar* tendencies that this account seeks to avoid and expose.

The second and third types of plurality, *multiformity* and *multimodality*, can be taken together here. They refer respectively to the existence of many rival, alternative *ways* in which mass opinion can emerge. No single means of thinking and articulation (or combination thereof) is automatically dominant, or uniquely privileged, in opinion-formation and opinion-expression, either for individual subjects in their occupational positions and class situations, or aggregated up to the level of ‘mass opinion’. In other words, subjects in ‘the mass’ think differently and articulate themselves differently, often in ways that are mutually alien to the extent that they simply cannot understand how or why many others do so—but all of which must be captured within a wide notion of ‘mass opinion’. This model has not sought to ‘pin down’ a singular conception of what (i.e., which kinds of thinking and articulation) ‘counts as’ the ‘one true way’ of forming and expressing opinions for individual subjects, and hence does not provide the kind of narrow ‘right answer’ Price is hoping to see about how the ‘one true mass opinion’ must be formed and expressed.⁸²⁷ Doing so would unjustifiably exclude both contemporary and historical ways of forming and expressing opinions, and impoverish the social perspective this account tries to offer. The perennial catalogue of ‘*Pollsterdämmerung*’ fiascos serves as a reminder of the dangers of relying on too small a range of means of discourse to provide ‘full coverage’ of mass opinion—and it would be extremely unwise to simply move opinion research into a different category of methodological *cul-de-sac*. Rather, this account has actively tried to steer away from such *uniform* and *unimodal* tendencies wherever they have reared their heads.

Alongside these three, this analysis can now identify a fourth plurality, *multivocality*, which addresses the fact that, as a result of consistent plurality within the authorship, formation, and expression

⁸²⁷ Price 1992. See p.17.

of opinions, there are many rival, alternative *statements* which mass opinion can encompass. It signifies that, as a complex phenomenon, mass opinion comprises many ‘voices’, or ‘instances’—i.e., the set of clustered substantive outcomes of processes of ideation and communication—with none of them uniquely privileged as the consensus ‘view’ of mass opinion in its entirety. No single cognitive or estimative judgment that subjects come to on the basis of their occupational or classist experiences constitutes their definite, or final, ‘verdict’ on the MRCs it addresses. Likewise, no single combination of subjects’ personalities, emotions, or reason—and no single substantive opinion that subjects form using them—is necessarily prioritised as their main, or final, ‘thoughts’ about the MRCs in question, especially at the point where subjects ‘average across’ these thoughts before articulating them. And no single combination of subjects’ bodily organs and media—and no single form in which subjects express opinions using them—is *prima facie* to be preferred as their exclusive, or final, ‘say’ on these MRCs. Bearing in mind the competing pulls that multiple subjectivities can exert on them, subjects can be extremely ‘conflicted’, uncertain, and inconsistent in their ‘given’ opinions. Their opinion-statements may exhibit little (or no) significant common overall tendencies on any of the dimensions of judgment. But while this lack of clarity may be a sign of contradictory effects within subjects’ processes of opinion-formation and opinion-expression, this in no way indicates that their opinions are somehow trivial. As with the other forms of plurality above, this account has not attempted to define a singular conception of what (i.e., what quality or coherence of judgment) ‘counts as’ the ‘one true opinion’ for individual subjects, and has not pursued pseudo-Rousseauian projects of achieving monolithic agreement on what the ‘one true mass opinion’ is thought to ‘say’. To do this would be to impose a synthetic unanimity that bluntly ignores the sheer social complexity this account has uncovered—as with the questions with which this analysis began, regarding the extent to which the narrow ‘Leave’ victory in the EU referendum could be seen as ‘speaking for’ the entire UK electorate. Instead, this account has sought to work against such *univocal* tendencies, with the ultimate aspiration to eliminate them entirely.

In this context, emancipating mass opinion means recognising, and extending, the existing tendencies towards each of these forms of plurality. Of course, there is already some *multipolarity* in the constitution of mass opinion. Partly thanks to the classist critique of Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, opinion research has moved well beyond the Habermasian tendency to see only bourgeois literati as the authors of mass opinion, or Francis Wilson’s similar inclination to grant this role exclusively to the

‘middle class’.⁸²⁸ But more must be done to diffuse ideational and communicational power among social subjects, and aim (to continue the international relations imagery) for a greater ‘balance of power’ between them at an individual and group level. Networks of discursive dependence must be made less hierarchical and more (for lack of a better word) egalitarian, in order to break down the division of subjects into net opinion-makers and opinion-takers. In addition, the visible stratifications in subjects’ control over, disposal of, and access to the means of discourse must be challenged—which Splichal touches on in his recommendation to expand the role and availability of public service media.⁸²⁹ But this challenge also includes reducing inequalities in the closeness of interaction different social domains have with ideation and communication—e.g., the heavy prominence of the economic and political domains through the commercialisation and commodification of discourse, and the dominant role of state structures in determining its content and ‘reach’.

Likewise, there is already some *multiformity* and *multimodality* in current conceptions of mass opinion. When it comes to trying to work out what a given subject thinks about ‘the social’, there is a dim yet growing awareness within opinion research that simply looking at opinion polls is not necessarily the best, or even the right, way to go. Not all subjects use opinion polls to articulate what they think—i.e., not all subjects are polled (in fact only very few are)—and there is a limit to how far statistically random sampling can be taken to accurately or comprehensively ‘represent’ or ‘capture’ their views. In a way that Fishkin, Price, and Splichal have not really recognised, different research traditions have started to consider not just opinion polls, attitudes surveys, and voting, but also media articles, fictional literature, political speeches, artwork, music, and social media as in some way indicative of trends in mass opinion.⁸³⁰ Yet much more can still be done to diversify the ‘go-to’ sources of mass opinion, and to find a broad and holistic way of ‘capturing’ their full range in a comprehensive and sophisticated way. Normative expectations about what ‘counts’ as the kind of thinking that ‘merits’ inclusion in the formation of mass opinion need to be significantly relaxed and expanded. Opinion research must move definitively away from the contingent hegemony of rationality and reasonability over, for instance, emotional thinking—and above all, *contra* Becker, away from the erasive, narrow economism of ‘rational choice’ approaches.⁸³¹ At the same time, the ‘cast-list’ of *analysanda* for opinion research can still be

⁸²⁸ Habermas 1989; Negt and Kluge 2016; Wilson 1955.

⁸²⁹ Splichal 1999.

⁸³⁰ Anstead and O’Loughlin 2014; Back 1988; Dempsey 2017; Hecken 2010; Herbst 1998; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Jamieson and Waldman 2003; RAND Corporation 2012; Weissmann 2016.

⁸³¹ Becker 1978.

expanded much further, to give far greater consideration to neglected ways in which a vast range of material resources and social activities can ‘embed’ cognitive or estimative judgments about ‘the social’. This is particularly true for the often subtle ways in which bodily organs are used to express opinions, as well as the mediatic aspects of means borrowed from other social domains, such as using money to make consumption choices.

Lastly, there is already some *multivocality* in statements of mass opinion. For some time, there have been moves within both theoretical and practical opinion research away from the logic of majoritarianism and binary-choice reductionism in polling and survey techniques. Instead, researchers have tried to recognise that different sections of ‘the mass’ can cluster heterogeneously around different, and often contradictory, responses to a given issue—which they have sought to accommodate using scalar measures of agreement or disagreement, and approval or aversion, as well as ‘don’t know’ or ‘indifference’ options such as abstention.⁸³² But, as with the other forms of plurality, more must be done to bring out the uncertainty, dissensus, and contradictions that characterise mass opinion at both collective and individual levels. The scalar measures already in use could be adapted to offer more ‘multidimensional’ and nuanced representations of the precise ways in which mass opinion clusters not just around degrees of approval/aversion or (dis)agreement, but around different substantive responses to a given social issue. Similarly, opinion research must also recognise that subjects are likely to use different means of discourse to form and express slightly (or even extremely) different opinions about the same social phenomena. Again, just because their opinions exhibit a high level of subjective heterogeneity should not be a reason for opinion researchers to dismiss them automatically as ‘ignorant’ or ‘meaningless’—or, worse, lead them to selectively identify only one of them (e.g., the one they voice in an opinion poll) as ‘dominant’ or ‘representative’ of subjects’ full range of relevant views.

All in all, this plurality means that opinion research must extensively disaggregate any given mass opinion from the group of subjects that ostensibly form and express it, and break down its ‘origins’ into a fuller picture of the social structures that shaped its creation. The major question now is how the social determination of mass opinion should be *measured*—i.e., how opinion research should (1) ‘test for’, and (2) ‘bring out’ the kind of occupational and classist differences the analysis above has theorised. In particular, opinion measurement needs to explore how occupational (and classist) differences in subjects’ use of personality-traits, emotions, reason, bodily organs, and media affect the judgment-dimensions of

⁸³² Guttman 1950; Likert 1932; Thurstone 1927a, 1927b, 1928.

the opinions they form and express—i.e., their direction, intensity, degree, certainty, firmness, salience, and importance. Moreover, opinion research must find a way of differentiating in its measurement methodologies between subjects with one (fewer) or several (more) occupational and classist subjectivities, in order to distinguish between subjects who are reconciling competing ‘pulls’ from ‘clashing’ sub-modes of discourse, and subjects who are simply ‘following’ the sub-mode for their main (or only) occupation, within the opinions they record. Likewise, opinion research also has to differentiate between subjects who are conforming to what should be expected from their occupational (and classist) ideal-types under their ‘sub-modes’ of ideation and communication, and subjects who are—for whatever reason—failing to meet these social expectations.

While there is insufficient room to develop a full answer here, there are a few clear ‘pointers’ that emerge from this enquiry. Providing a better analysis of subjects’ occupational situations and class positions fits into a wider programme of refining the understanding opinion research has of subjects’ personal identities—including age, ability, race, gender, &c*. In particular, however, opinion research needs to add greater sophistication to its understanding of subjects’ ‘overall’ *social class* as an aggregative product of their class positions across the different activities in which they participate (i.e., have occupations). This requires a far greater engagement with the contextual ‘metadata’ of, or about, individual subjects and their opinions than opinion research has had hitherto. To use the polling industry as an obvious example, there is a limit to the marginal insight that can be gained about (e.g.) the partisan allegiances of a national electorate by simply ratcheting up the volume of ‘surface-level’ opinion data the industry produces. Rather than churning out vast quantities of hastily-compiled and methodologically dubious polling data to meet the urgent deadlines of their media clients, it is more important for polling companies to ask the ‘meta-level’ questions around each poll that more accurately ‘place’ the respondents and their opinions in the context of the discursive and other social structures that shaped them.

In general, the contextualising information that can act as ‘metadata’ in this sense is of a kind that can complete claims along the lines of ‘this subject holds this opinion, *and* this subject is ...’, or, more strongly, ‘this subject holds this opinion *because* this subject is...’. In order to gauge subjects’ occupational situations and class positions, opinion researchers need to establish three tiered categories of social subjectivity: (1) *what activity (or activities) subjects participate in* (political, economic, religious, curative, educational, juridical, &c); then (2) *what occupation (or occupations) subjects have in each activity*; and finally (3) *how subjects rank these activities and occupations in terms of their importance to them* (in absolute and relative terms). While of course they can be extensively refined, these categories—in this sequence—

would already give analysts considerable insight into the social ‘background’ that shapes how subjects form and express their opinions. When these are framed as questions—as, for instance, in the context of a poll or survey—they should, of course, be framed in more accessible vernacular terminology, and accompanied by pre-defined lists of activities and occupations. Moreover, each category would need to include options for ‘don’t know’ and ‘other’, plus some scope for respondents to offer alternatives, and analysts would need a back-up list of typologies (or a form of glossary) to allow them to accurately ‘sort’ respondents’ answers into the correct categories independently.

This is only a rough initial indication, and a more nuanced engagement would introduce further categories of ‘metadata’ to shed more light on precisely how subjects’ social situation is reflected in their opinions. At the moment, the practice of eliciting such information is most closely associated with the opinion polling industry—perhaps because it is comparatively straightforward to ask poll respondents to self-report or self-assess for ‘meta-level’ questions in a context where their ‘surface-level’ responses are already being elicited from them. But there is no reason why such reporting practices should remain exclusively the domain of polls and surveys—and, even though self-assessment is still the most reliable means to discover such information, much of it can also be inferred from the social markers which various means of thinking and articulation bear in any given context.⁸³³ It is this, for instance, that motivates recent attempts in computational linguistics, discourse analysis, and content analysis to extract increasingly precise specifications of ‘mood’, ‘sentiment’, ‘focus’, and ‘argument’ from written, printed, broadcast, digital, or online texts—methods which, in turn, are increasingly applied commercially by firms specialising in ‘data mining’ (e.g., Cambridge Analytica) or ‘sentiment analysis’ (e.g., TheySay), often in connection to business marketing or electoral campaigns.⁸³⁴

Thus far, then, the applications of this analysis to the contemporary practice of opinion research. They raise vital methodological questions, which require and deserve far more extended consideration than can be afforded them here. Of course, even a full treatment of how to measure and emancipate ‘mass opinion’ would not exhaust the full set of conceptual aspects and concerns potentially of interest under the social-theoretic approach this project has adopted. But it is hoped that these comments have indicated possible trajectories for further research, and sketched out how the model outlined in this analysis can be steered in their direction. Mass opinion is clearly a phenomenon of crucial social

⁸³³ Cook and Campbell 1979; Dunning, Heath, and Suls 2005; Huizinga and Elliott 1986; Johnson 2004; Paulhus and Levitt 1987; Paulhus and Vazire 2007; Robins and John 1997; Robins, Tracy, and Sherman 2007; Schacter 1999; Wilson 2002.

⁸³⁴ Bermingham and Smeaton 2010; Jungherr *et al.* 2012; Skoric *et al.* 2012; Tumasjan *et al.* 2010.

importance, and this analysis has sought to begin the process of reversing its current neglect in social research. A plausible and extensive methodological groundwork is now in place, and it is left to future projects to add further layers of sophistication to the social theory of mass opinion which this account has outlined.

S. D. G.

M.S.J.O. MMXVII

Bibliography

- Abbing, Hans, 2002, *Why are artists poor?: the exceptional economy of the arts*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Abbott, Andrew Delano, 1988, *The System of Professions: Essay on the Division of Expert Labour*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- , 2001, *Chaos of Disciplines*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Abdous, M'hammed, Betty Rose Facer, and Cherrng-Jyh Yen, 2012, 'Academic effectiveness of podcasting: A comparative study of integrated versus supplemental use of podcasting in second language classes', *Computers & Education* 58(1), pp.43-52.
- Abelson, Robert, Donald Kinder, Mark Peters, and Susan Fiske, 1982, 'Affective and Semantic Components in Political Personal Perception', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 42(4), pp.619-30.
- Abercrombie, Nicholas, Stephen Hill, and Bryan S. Turner, 1994, 'Determinacy and Indeterminacy in the Theory of Ideology', in Slavoj Žižek (ed.), *Mapping Ideology*, London: Verso, pp.152-66.
- Abeysekera, Indra, 2008, 'Intellectual capital practices of firms and the commodification of labour', *Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal* 21(1), pp.36-48.
- Abrams, Mark, and Richard Rose, 1960, *Must Labour Lose?*, London: Penguin.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson, 2008, 'Paths of Economic and Political Development', in Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ackerman, Phillip L., 2014, 'Nonsense, common sense, and science of expert performance: Talent and individual differences', *Intelligence* 45(1), pp.6-17.
- Aderhold, Jens, 2004, *Form und Funktion sozialer Netzwerke in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag.
- Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, 1950, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York, NY: Harper & Row.
- Adorno, Theodor W., and Max Horkheimer, 1979 [1944], 'The Culture Industry as Mass Deception', in Adorno and Horkheimer, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, London: Verso.

- Agamben, Giorgio, 2005, *State of Exception*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt, 1992, 'A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction', *Econometrica* 60(2), pp.323-51.
- Agozzino, Alisa, 2012, 'Building a Personal Relationship through Social Media: A Study of Millennial Students' Brand Engagement', *Ohio Communication Journal* 50(1), pp.181-204.
- Aichner, Thomas, and Frank Jacob, 2015, 'Measuring the Degree of Corporate Social Media Use', *International Journal of Market Research* 57(2), pp.257-75.
- Aidt, Toke, 2000, 'Economic voting and information', *Electoral Studies* 19(2), pp.349-62.
- Albu, Gabriel, 2014, 'Shame, a Landmark of Education or a Sign of its Weakness? Case Study', *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences* 127(1), pp.83-7.
- Albig, William, 1939, *Public Opinion*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Alessandri, Angela J., 2011, 'Parents know best: Or do they? Treatment refusals in paediatric oncology', *Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health* 47(9), pp.628-31.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C., 1985, *Neofunctionalism*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Allais, Maurice, 1953, 'Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l'école Américaine', *Econometrica* 21(4), pp.503-46.
- Allan, Stuart, and Einar Thorsen (eds.), 2009, *Citizen journalism: global perspectives*, New York, NY: Peter Lang.
- Allen, Katie, and Phillip Inman, 2017, 'Five things economists can do to regain trust', *Guardian*, 6 January, <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/06/economists-trust-bank-of-england-brexit-crisis> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- Allen, Natalie J., and John P. Meyer, 1990, 'Organizational socialization tactics: A longitudinal analysis of links to newcomers' commitment and role orientation', *Academy of Management Journal* 33(4), pp.847-58.
- Allison, C. FitzSimons, 2003, *Guilt, Anger, and God*, Vancouver, BC: Regent College Publishing.
- Allison, Scott, 2010, *Heroes: What They Do and Why We Need Them*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Allport, Floyd H., 1937, 'Toward a science of public opinion', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 1(1), pp.7-23.
- Allport, Gordon W., 1937, *Personality: a psychological interpretation*, New York, NY: Holt.
- , 1950, *The Individual and his Religion: A Psychological Interpretation*, London: Macmillan.
- Almond, Gabriel A., 1968, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

- Alstott, Linda, 2004, *No Exit: What Parents Owe Their Children and What Society Owes Parents*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Althusser, Louis, 2014 [1971], *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, G.M. Goshgarian (tr.), London: Verso.
- , Étienne Balibar, Roger Establet, Pierre Macherey, and Jacques Rancière, 2016 [1965], *Reading Capital: The Complete Edition*, London: Verso.
- Altman, Michael J., 2015, 'Podcasting religious studies', *Religion* 45(4), pp.573-84.
- Altvater, Elmar, and Birgit Mahnkopf, 1996, *Grenzen der Globalisierung: Ökonomie, Ökologie und Politik in der Weltgesellschaft*, Münster, Germany: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Ames, Daniel R., and Lara K. Kammrath, 2004, 'Mind-Reading and Metacognition: Narcissism, not Actual Competence, Predicts Self-Estimated Ability', *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior* 28(3), pp.187-209.
- Anderson, Barbara A., Brian D. Silver, and Paul R. Abramson, 1988, 'The Effects of the Race of the Interviewer on Race-Related Attitudes of Black Respondents in SRC/CPS National Election Studies', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 52(3), pp.289-324.
- Anderson, Simon P., and Stephen. Coate, 2000, 'Market provision of public goods: a welfare analysis', *Review of Economic Studies* 72(4), pp.937-72.
- Anderson, Simon P., and Jean J. Gabszewicz, 2005, 'The media and advertising: a tale of two-sided markets', *CEPR Discussion Papers no.5223*.
- Anderson, Terry, and Jon Dron, 2010, 'Three generations of distance education pedagogy', *The International Review of Research in Open and Distance Learning* 12(3), pp.80-97.
- Andrade, Daniel Pereira, 2015, 'Emotional Economic Man: Power and Emotion in the Corporate World', *Critical Sociology* 41(4-5), pp.785-805.
- Andresen, Katya, 2011, 'Why Slacktivism is Underrated', *Mashable*, 24 October, <http://mashable.com/2011/10/24/slactivism-cause-engagement/#YCf6UqTLIqqG> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Anger, Isabel, and Christian Kittl, 2011, 'Measuring influence on Twitter', *Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Knowledge Management and Knowledge Technologies*, no.31.
- Ankerl, Guy, 1980, *Toward a Social Contract on Worldwide Scale*, Geneva: ILO.
- Annas, Julia, 1999, *Platonic Ethics: Old and New*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Ansoff, H. Igor, 1965, *Corporate Strategy: An Analytic Approach to Business Policy for Growth and Expansion*, London: Penguin.
- Anstead, Nick, and Ben O'Loughlin, 2014, 'Social Media Analysis and Public Opinion: The 2010 UK General Election', *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 20(2), pp.204-20.
- Anthias, Floya, 2005, 'Social stratification and social inequality: models of intersectionality and identity', in Fiona Devine, Rosemary Crompton, Mike Savage, and John Scott (eds.), *Rethinking Class: Culture, Identities and Lifestyles*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Antliff, Mark, 2007, *Avant-garde fascism: the mobilization of myth, art, and culture in France, 1909-1939*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Aoi, Tsuda, 1984, *Sales talk in Japan and the United States: An Ethnographic Analysis of Speech Events*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Appleyard, Diana, 2013, 'Fobbed off by your doctor? Now a second opinion from an expert is just one phone call away', *Daily Mail*, 11 June, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2339263/Fobbed-doctor-Now-second-opinion-expert-just-phone-away.html> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Aquinas, Thomas, 2014 [1274], *Summa Theologica*, 9 vols., New York, NY: Catholic Way Publishing.
- Arendt, Hannah, 1958, *The Human Condition*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- , 1970, *On Violence*, New York, NY: Harcourt.
- Arens, William, and Michael Weigold, 2012, *Contemporary Advertising: And Integrated Marketing Communications*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Argetsinger, Amy, 2009, 'Famesque: Amy Argetsinger on Celebrities Famous for Being Famous', *Washington Post*, 10 August, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/09/AR2009080902084.html> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Argyle, Michael, 1988, *Bodily Communication*, London: Routledge.
- , Veronica Salter, Hilary Nicholson, Marilyn Williams, and Philip Burgess, 1970, 'The communication of inferior and superior attitudes by verbal and non-verbal signals', *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 9(3), pp.222-31.
- Ariely, Dan, and Ziv Carmon, 2003, 'The Sum Reflects only Some of its Parts: A Critical Overview of Research about Summary Assessment of Experiences', in George Loewenstein, Daniel Read, and Roy Baumeister, *Time & Decision: Economic & Psychological Perspectives on Inter-temporal Choice*, New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, pp.323-50.

- Aristotle, 2014, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Roger Crisp (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Arnett, Jeffrey Jensen, 1995, 'Broad and narrow socialization: The family in the context of a cultural theory', *Journal of Marriage and Family* 57(3), pp.617-28.
- Aronson, Elliott, and Judson Mills, 1959, 'The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 59(2), pp.177-81.
- Arrow, Kenneth, Samuel Bowles, and Steven Durlauf (eds.), 1999, *Meritocracy and Economic Inequality*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Arthur, C.J., 'Ineffability and intelligibility: Towards an understanding of the radical unlikeness of religious experience', *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 20(2), pp.109-29.
- Arya, Rina, 2014, 'The many faces of abjection: a review of recent literature', *Journal for Cultural Research* 18(4), pp.1-10.
- Asan, Onur, Paul D. Smith, and Enid Montague, 2014, 'More screen time, less face time – implications for EHR design', *Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice* 20(6), p.896.
- Ashcroft, Michael, 2016, 'How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday... and why', *Lord Ashcroft Polls*, 24 June, <http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/> (accessed 19 July 2016).
- Asher, Herbert B., 1998, *Polling and the Public*, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Ashforth, Blake E., and Alan M. Saks, 1996, 'Socialization tactics: Longitudinal effects on newcomer adjustment', *Academy of Management Journal* 39(1), pp.149-78.
- Ashton, Michael C., Kibeom Lee, Marco Perugini, Piotr Szarota, Reinout E. de Vries, Lisa Di Blas, Kathleen Boeis, and Boele De Raad, 2004, 'A Six-Factor Structure of Personality-Descriptive Adjectives: Solutions From Psycholexical Studies in Seven Languages', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 86(2), pp.356-66.
- Asimov, Isaac, 1980, 'A Cult of Ignorance', *Newsweek*, 21 January.
- Atton, Chris, 2003, 'What is "alternative journalism"?', *Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism* 4(3), pp.267-400.
- Austin, Gilbert, 1806, *Chironomia, or a Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery*, London: T. Cadell and W. Davies.
- Austin, J.L., 1979, 'Performative utterances', in Austin, *Philosophical Papers*, James O. Urmson and Geoffrey J. Warnock (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Austin, John, (1998 [1832]), *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.
- Axelrod, Robert, 2006, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Baanders, Mariëtte F., 1997, *The Rules of the Game: Emotion Norms in Daily Life*, PhD thesis, Leiden University, The Netherlands.
- Baber, Christopher, Neville A. Stanton, James Atkinson, Richard McMaster, and Robert J. Houghton, 2013, 'Using social network analysis and agent-based modelling to explore information flow using common operational pictures for maritime search and rescue operations', *Ergonomics* 56(6), pp.889-905.
- Bachorowski, Jo-Anne, 1999, 'Vocal Expression and Perception of Emotion', *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 8(2), pp.52-7.
- Back, Kurt W., 1988, 'Metaphors for Public Opinion in Literature', *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 52(3), pp.278-88.
- Badiou, Alain, 2005 [1998], *Metapolitics*, London: Verso.
- Baecker, Dirk, 1994, 'Soziale Hilfe als Funktionssystem der Gesellschaft', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 23(2), pp.93-110.
- Baehr, Peter R., and Melvin Richter, 2004, *Dictatorship in history and theory: Bonapartism, Caesarism, and totalitarianism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bailey, Michael (ed.), 2008, *Narrating Media History*, London: Routledge.
- Bakker, Arnold B., Evangelia Demerouti, and Lieke K. Ten Brummelhuis, 2012, 'Work Engagement, Performance, and Active Learning: The Role of Conscientiousness', *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 80(2), pp.555-64.
- Baldwin, Thomas (ed.), 2012, *The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1870-1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bandelj, Nina, 2009, 'Emotions in Economic Action and Interaction', *Theory and Society* 38(4), pp.347-66.
- Barasch, Moshe, 1992, *Icon: Studies in the History of an Idea*, New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Barbalet, J.M., 1992, 'Class and Rationality – Olson critique of Marx', *Science & Society* 55(4), pp.446-68.
- Barendt, Eric M., 2007, *Freedom of Speech*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Bargh, John A., and Roman D. Thein, 1985, 'Individual construct accessibility, person memory, and the recall-judgment link: The case of information overload', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 49(5), pp.1129-46.
- Barnes, Adrienne E., Young-Suk Kim, Elizabeth L. Tighe, and Christian Vorstius, 2017, 'Readers in Adult Basic Education', *Journal of Learning Disabilities* 50(2), pp.180-94.
- Baron, Jonathan, 2008, *Thinking and deciding*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barrera, Catherine Grace, 2014, 'Skill, Job Design, and the Labor Market under Uncertainty', PhD thesis, Harvard University.
- Barrett, H. Clark, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, 2010, 'Coevolution of cooperation, causal cognition and mindreading', *Communicative & integrative biology* 3(6), pp.522-4.
- Barrett, Lisa Feldman, Michelle M. Tugade, and Randall W. Engle, 2004, 'Individual differences in working memory capacity and dual-process theories of the mind', *Psychological Bulletin* 130(4), pp.553-73.
- Barrett, Michèle, 1994, 'Ideology, Politics, Hegemony: From Gramsci to Laclau and Mouffe', in Slavoj Žižek (ed.), *Mapping Ideology*, London: Verso, pp.235-64.
- Barrick, Murray R., and Michael K. Mount, 1991, 'The Big Five personality dimensions and job performance: a meta-analysis', *Personnel Psychology* 44(1), pp.1-26.
- Barry, Brian, 1991, *Democracy, Power, and Justice: Essays in Political Theory I: Democracy and Power*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bartels, Larry, 1988, *The Dynamics of Presidential Primaries*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Barth, Karl, 1959 [1949], *Dogmatics in Outline*, New York, NY: Harper & Row.
- Barthes, Roland, 1985, *The Responsibility of Forms: Critical Essays on Music, Art and Representation*, New York, NY: Hill and Wang.
- Bartlett, Eugene R., 2000, *Cable television handbook*, London: McGraw-Hill.
- Barzelay, Michael, 2001, *The new public management: improving research and policy dialogue*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Bastos, Marco T., and Dan Mercea, 2016, 'Serial activists: Political twitter beyond influential and the twittertariat', *New Media & Society* 18(10), pp.2359-78.
- Bateman, John A., 2008, *Multimodality and Genre: A Foundation for the Systematic Analysis of Multimodal Documents*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Batifoulier, Philippe, and Nicolas Da Silva, 2014, 'Medical Altruism in Mainstream Health Economics: Theoretical and Political Paradoxes', *Review of Social Economy* 72(3), pp.261-79.
- Batson, C. Daniel, Patricia Schoenrade, and W. Larry Ventis, 1993, *Religion and the Individual: A Social-Psychological Perspective*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Battersby, Mark, 2014, 'The Competent Layperson: Re-envisioning the Ideal of the Educated Person', *Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines* 29(3), pp.4-12.
- Bauer, Talya N., and Berrin Erdogan, 2011, 'Organizational socialization: The effective onboarding of new employees', in Sheldon Zedeck (ed.), *APA handbook of industrial and organizational psychology, Vol 3: Maintaining, expanding, and contracting the organization*, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, pp.51-64.
- , Todd Bodner, Berrin Erdogan, Donald M. Truxillo, and Jennifer S. Tucker, 2007, 'Newcomer adjustment during organizational socialization: A meta-analytic review of antecedents, outcomes and methods' *Journal of Applied Psychology* 92(3), pp.707-21.
- Bayertz, Kurt (ed.), 1999, *Solidarity*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Bazzanella, Carla, and Rossana Damiano, 1999, 'The interactional handling of misunderstanding in everyday conversations', *Journal of Pragmatics* 31(6), pp.817-36.
- BBC News*, 2015, 'Election 2015: Results', 8 May, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results> (accessed 25 August 2016).
- , 2016a, 'Facebook rolls out five new Reactions buttons including angry, wow and sad', 24 February, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-34264624> (accessed 5 August 2016).
- , 2016b, 'Junior doctors' row: The dispute explained', 6 April, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-34775980> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- , 2017, 'Theresa May to seek general election on 8 June', 18 April, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39629603> (accessed 19 April 2017).
- Beaney, Michael (ed.), 2015, *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Beck, Ulrich, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, 1994, *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Becker, Gary S., 1978, *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Becker, Lawrence C., and Charlotte B. Becker (eds.), 2002, *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, London: Routledge.

- Beckers, Kathleen, and Raymond A. Harder, 2016, “‘Twitter Just Exploded’: Social media as alternative vox pop’, *Digital Journalism* 4(7), pp.910-20.
- Beckers, Kathleen, Stefaan Walgrave, and Hilde van den Bulck, 2016, ‘Opinion Balance in Vox Pop Television News’, *Journalism Studies*, published online.
- Beer, 2010, ‘Words of Reason’, *Political Communication* 11(2), pp.185-201.
- Beidel, Deborah C., and Samuel M. Turner, 1988, ‘Comorbidity of test anxiety and other anxiety disorders in children’, *Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology* 16(3) (1988), 275-87.
- Belknap, George, and Angus Campbell, 1951, ‘Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy’, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 15(4), pp.601-23.
- Bell, David R., and James M. Lattin, 2000, ‘Looking for Loss Aversion in Scanner Panel Data: The Confounding Effect of Price Response Heterogeneity’, *Marketing Science* 19(2), pp.185-200.
- Bell, Edward, Michael A. Woodley, Julie Aitken Schermer, and Philip A. Vernon, 2012, ‘Politics and the General Factor of Personality’, *Personality and Individual Differences* 53(5), pp.546-51.
- Belussi, Fiorenza, 2000, ‘Towards the post-Fordist economy: emerging organisational models’, *International Journal of Technology Management* 20(1-2), p.20.
- Bem, Daryl J., 1970, *Beliefs, attitudes, and human affairs*, Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Ben-Yashar, Ruth, and Mor Zahavi, 2011, ‘The Condorcet jury theorem and extension of the franchise with rationally ignorant voters’, *Public Choice* 148(3), pp.435-43.
- Benedict, Ruth, 1989 [1946], *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, Boston, MA: Mariner Books.
- Benjamin, Walter, 1985 [1968], *Illuminations*, New York, NY: Schocken Books.
- , 2008 [1936], *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, London: Penguin.
- Benkler, Yochai, 2006, *The Wealth of Networks*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Bennett, Maxwell R., and Peter M.S. Hacker, 2003, *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bennett-Hunter, Guy, ‘Divine Ineffability’, *Philosophy Compass* 10(7), pp.489-500.
- Benson, Bruce Ellis, and Norman Wirzba, 2005, *The phenomenology of prayer*, New York, NY: Fordham University Press.
- Berelson, Bernard, 1952, *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- , and Gary A. Steiner, 1964, *Human behavior: An inventory of scientific findings*, New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World.

- Berg, Irwin August, and Bernard M. Bass, 1961, *Conformity and deviation*, New York: Harper.
- Bergvall-Kåreborn, Birgitta, and Debra Howcroft, 2014, 'Amazon Mechanical Turk and the commodification of labour', *New Technology, Work and Employment* 29(3), pp.213-23.
- Berinsky, Adam, 2012, 'Introduction', in Adam J. Berinsky (ed.), *New Directions in Public Opinion*, London: Routledge.
- Berlin, Isaiah, 2014 [1953], *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Berliner, David C., 1976, 'Impediments to the study of teacher effectiveness', *Journal of Teacher Education* 27(1), pp.5-13.
- Berman, Jessica R., Juliet Aizer, Anne R. Bass, Irene Blanco, Anne Davidson, Edward Dwyer, Theodore R. Fields, Wei-Ti Huang, Jane S. Kang, Leslie D. Kerr, Svetlana Krasnokutsky-Samuels, Deana M. Lazaro, Julie S. Schwartzman-Morris, Stephen A. Paget, and Michael H. Pillinger, 2016, 'Fellow use of medical jargon correlates inversely with patient and observer perceptions of professionalism: results of a rheumatology OSCE (ROSCE) using challenging patient scenarios', *Clinical Rheumatology* 35(8), pp.2093-9.
- Bermingham, Adam, and Alan F. Smeaton, 2010, 'Classifying sentiment in microblogs: is brevity an advantage?', *CIKM '10 Proceedings of the 19th ACM international Conference on Information and Knowledge Management*, pp.1833-6.
- Bernat, James L., 2012, 'Restoring medical professionalism', *Neurology* 79(8), pp.820-7.
- Bernays, Edward, 2005 [1928], *Propaganda*, Brooklyn, NY: Ig Publishing.
- , 2011 [1923], *Crystallizing Public Opinion*, Brooklyn, NY: Ig Publishing.
- Besançon, Alain, 2009, *The Forbidden Image: An intellectual history of iconoclasm*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Bester, Garfield, 2007, 'Personality development of the adolescent: peer group versus parents', *South African Journal of Education* 27(2), pp.177-90.
- Bette, Karl-Heinrich, 1999, *Systemtheorie und Sport*, Frankfurt, Germany: Suhrkamp.
- Bialer, Philip A., David Kissane, Richard Brown, Tomer Levin, and Carma Bylund, 2011, 'Responding to patient anger: Development and evaluation of an oncology communication skills training module', *Palliative and Supportive Care* 9(4), pp.359-65.
- Bickerdike, Sue, Sue R. Whittle, and James D. Pickering, 2014, 'Do lecture audio-recordings support engagement and flexible learning?', *Medical Education* 48(5), pp.522-3.

- Biocca, Frank, 2013, *Television and Political Advertising, vol.1: Psychological Processes*, London: Routledge.
- Birchall, Clare, 2006, *Knowledge goes pop from conspiracy theory to gossip*, New York, NY: Berg.
- Birdwhistell, Ray L., 1952, *Introduction to Kinesics: An Annotation System for Analysis of Body Motion and Gesture*, Washington, DC: Department of State, Foreign Service Institute.
- , 1970, *Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Communication*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- , 1975, 'Background considerations to the study of the body as a medium of "expression"', in Jonathan Benthall and Ted Polhemus (eds.), *The body as a medium of expression*, Bungay: Allen, pp.36-58.
- Biressi, Anita, and Heather Nunn, 2013, *Class and Contemporary British Culture*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bishop, George F., Robert Oldendick, and Alfred Tuchfarber, 1984, 'What must my interest in politics be if I just told you "I don't know"?', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 53(2), pp.285-318.
- Blake, Aaron, 2017, 'Kellyanne Conway says Donald Trump's team has "alternative facts". Which pretty much says it all.', *Washington Post*, 22 January, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/22/kellyanne-conway-says-donald-trumps-team-has-alternate-facts-which-pretty-much-says-it-all/> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Blanchard, Margaret A. (ed.), 1998, *History of the Mass Media in the United States: An Encyclopedia*, London: Routledge.
- Blashfield, Jean, 1981, *Hellraisers, Heroines, and Holy Women*, New York, NY: Saint Martin's Press.
- Blau, Shawn, J. Ryan Fuller, and Thomas P. Vaccaro, 2006, 'Rational-emotive disputing and the five-factor model: Personality dimensions of the Ellis Emotional Efficiency Inventory', *Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy* 24(2), pp.87-100.
- Blazer, Dan G., 2005, *The Age of Melancholy: 'Major Depression' and its Social Origin*, London: Routledge.
- Blewett, Sam, 2016, 'Politicians top list of least trustworthy professions', *Independent*, 4 December, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-news-least-trustworthy-jobs-a7454641.html> (accessed 9 January 2017).
- Bloch, Marc, 2014 [1940], *Feudal Society*, 2 vols., London: Routledge.
- Bloom, Lois, Lois Hood, and Patsy Lightbown, 1974, 'Imitation in language development: If, when, and why', *Cognitive Psychology* 6(3), pp.380-420.

- Bluff, Rosalind, and Immy Holloway, 1994, “‘They know best’: women’s perceptions of midwifery care during labour and childbirth’, *Midwifery* 10(3), pp.157-64.
- Blum, Jason, 2012, ‘Radical Empiricism and the Unremarkable Nature of Mystic Ineffability’, *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 24(3), pp.201-19.
- Blumer, Herbert, 1946, ‘Collective behaviour’, in A.M. Lee (ed.), *New Outlines of the Principles of Sociology*, New York, NY: Barnes and Noble, pp.167-222.
- , 1948, ‘Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling’, *American Sociological Review* 13(5), pp.542-54.
- Blumler, Jay G., and Dennis Kavanagh, 1999, ‘The third age of political communication: Influences and fears’, *Political Communication* 16(3), pp.209-30.
- Blythe, Ronald, 1989, *The Pleasures of Diaries: Four Centuries of Private Writing*, New York, NY: Pantheon.
- Bodenhausen, Galen, Lori Sheppard, and Geoffrey P. Kramer, 1994, ‘Negative Affect and Social Judgment: The Differential Impact of Anger and Sadness’, *European Journal of Social Psychology* 24(1), pp.45-62.
- Boermans, S.M., W. Kamphuis, R. Delahaij, C. van den Berg, and M.C. Euwema, 2014, ‘Team Spirit Makes the Difference: The Interactive Effects of Team Work Engagement and Organizational Constraints during a Military Operation on Psychological Outcomes Afterwards’, *Stress & Health* 30(5), pp.386-96.
- Bohn, Cornelia, 2004, *Clothing as Medium of Communication*, Lucerne: University of Lucerne.
- Boldizzoni, Francesco, and Pat Hudson (eds.), 2015, *Routledge Handbook of Global Economic History*, London: Routledge.
- Bonhage-Freund, Mary Theresa, and Jeffrey A. Kurland, 1994, ‘Tit-for-Tat among the Iroquois: A Game Theoretic Perspective on Inter-tribal Political Organization’, *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology* 13(3), pp.278-305.
- Bonini, Nicolao, Constantinos Hadjichristidis, Ketti Mazzocco, Maria Luisa Demattè, Massimiliano Zampini, Andrea Sbarbati, and Stefano Magon, 2011, ‘*Pecunia Olet*: The Role of Incidental Disgust in the Ultimatum Game’, *Emotion* 11(4), pp.965-9.
- BonJour, Laurence, 2002, *Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Borghans, Lex, Angela Lee Duckworth, James J. Heckman, and Bas ter Weel, 2008, 'The Economics and Psychology of Personality Traits', *Journal of Human Resources* 43(4), pp.972-1059.
- Borghans, Lex, Bas ter Weel, and Bruce A. Weinberg, 2008, 'Interpersonal Styles and Labor Market Outcomes', *Journal of Human Resources* 43(4), pp.815-58.
- Bosch, Brandon, 2014, 'Beyond Vox Pop: The Role of News Sourcing and Political Beliefs in Exemplification Effects', *Mass Communication and Society* 17(2), pp.217-35.
- Bosker, Bianca, 2014, 'How Emoji Get Lost In Translation', *Huffington Post*, 27 June, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/27/emoji-meaning_n_5530638.html (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Bouchard, Thomas J., and Matthew McGue, 2003, 'Genetic and Environmental Influences on Human Psychological Differences', *Journal of Neurobiology* 54(1), pp.4-45.
- Boulding, Kenneth E., 1970, *Economics as a science*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Boumans, Marcel, and John Bryan Davis, 2015, *Economic Methodology: Understanding Economics as a Science*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, 1977 [1972], *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Richard Nice (tr.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , 1979, 'Public Opinion Does Not Exist', in Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegelaub (eds.) *Communication and Class Struggle, Vol. 1: Capitalism, Imperialism*, Amsterdam: International General.
- , 1988, *Homo Academicus*, Peter Collier (tr.), Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- , 1990, *The Logic of Practice*, Richard Nice (tr.), Cambridge: Polity.
- , 1992, *Invitation to a Reflexive Sociology*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- , 2010 [1984], *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, Richard Nice (tr.), Abingdon: Routledge.
- Bovens, Luc, and Stephen Hartmann, 2003, *Bayesian Epistemology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bovens, Mark, 1998, *The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organisations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis, 1977, 'The Marxian theory of value and heterogeneous labour: A critique and reformulation', *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 1(2), pp.173-92.
- , 2013, *A cooperative species: human reciprocity and its evolution*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Bowman, Sam, 2016, 'I'm a neoliberal. Maybe you are too', *medium.com*, 5 August, <https://medium.com/@s8mb/im-a-neoliberal-maybe-you-are-too-b809a2a588d6#.3qfb7nxrr> (accessed 23 February 2017).
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (eds.), 2008, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Boyd, Danah M., and Nicole B. Ellison, 2007, 'Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship', *Journal of Computer-mediated Communication* 13(1), pp.210-30.
- Boyle, Gregory John, 'Critique of Five-Factor Model (FFM)', 2008, in Gregory John Boyle, Gerald Matthews, and Donald H. Saklofske (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Personality Theory and Assessment: Vol.1 – Personality Theories and Models*, London: Sage.
- Brader, Ted, 2006, *Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How emotional appeals in political ads work*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- , 2011, 'The Political Relevance of Emotions: "Reassessing" Revisited', *Political Psychology* 32(2), pp.337-46.
- , 2012, 'The Emotional Foundations of Democratic Citizenship', Adam J. Berinsky (ed.), *New Directions in Public Opinion*, London: Routledge.
- , Eric Groenendyk, and Nicholas A. Valentino, 2010, 'Fight or flight: When political threats arouse public anger and fear', *Proceedings from Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association*, Chicago, IL.
- , Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay, 2008, 'What triggers public opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and immigration threat', *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4), pp.959-78.
- Braithwaite, John, 1989, *Crime, Shame, and Reintegration*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brandis, Walter, and Dorothy Henderson, 1970, *Social class, language and communication*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Brandstätter, Hermann, and Karl-Dieter Opp, 2014, 'Personality Traits ("Big Five") and the Propensity to Political Protest: Alternative Models', *Political Psychology* 35(4), pp.515-37.
- Brant, William A., 2013, *Mental Imagery and Creativity: Cognition, Observation and Realization*, Saarbrücken: Akademikerverlag.
- Brass, Tom, 1990, 'Class struggle and the deproletarianisation of agricultural labour in Haryana (India)', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 18(1), pp.36-67.

- Breen, Richard, 2005, 'Foundations of a neo-Weberian class analysis', in Erik Olin Wright (ed.), *Approaches to Class Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.31-50.
- Breheny, M.J., 1998, 'Do the Experts Know Best?', *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design* 25(4), pp.479-82.
- Brenkert, George G., and Tom L. Beauchamp (eds.), 2012, *The Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brenner, Robert, 2009, *Property and Progress: The Historical Origins and Social Foundations of Self-Sustaining Growth*, London: Verso.
- Brentano, Franz, 1995, *Descriptive Psychology*, Benito Müller (tr.), London: Routledge.
- Briggs, Asa, and Peter Burke, 2010, *A Social History of the Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Briggs, Stephen R., 1989, 'The optimal level of measurement for personality constructs', in David M. Buss and Nancy Cantor (eds.), *Personality Psychology: Recent trends and emerging directions*, New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.
- Briñol, Pablo, Richard E. Petty, and Zakary L. Tormala, 2006, 'The Malleable Meaning of Subjective Ease', *Psychological Science* 17(3), pp.200-6.
- Britzman, Deborah, Stephen Frosh, and Wendy Luttrell, 2009, 'Affective equality: love, care and injustice', *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 30(6), pp.773-87.
- Brody, Richard A., 1991, *Assessing the president: the media, elite opinion, and public support*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Broemer, Philip, 2004, 'Ease of imagination moderates reactions to differently framed health messages', *European Journal of Social Psychology* 34(2), pp.103-19.
- Brooker, Charlie (presenter), 2016, *Have I Got News For You?*, s.52 e.6, Hat Trick Productions, London, 11 November, Television, at 9:09 PM GMT.
- Brookes, Stephen, Michael Dunn, and Gareth Edwards, 2014, 'Is selfless leadership an impossible ideal for public leaders?', *The International Journal of Leadership in Public Services* 10(4), pp.200-16.
- Brooks, Brian, 2004, *Telling the Story: The Convergence of Print, Broadcast and Online Media*, Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's Press.
- Brooks, Katherine, 2014, 'The Real Meaning of Normcore, The Fashion Trend That Went Oddly Viral', *Huffington Post*, 6 March,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/06/normcore_n_4912788.html (accessed 17 April 2017).

Brooks, Rechele, and Andrew N. Meltzoff, 2002, 'The importance of eyes: how infants interpret adult looking behaviour', *Developmental Psychology* 38(6), pp.958-66.

Brown, Ashley D., and Jared R. Curhan, 2013, 'The Polarizing Effect of Arousal on Negotiation', *Psychological Science* 24(10), pp.1928-35.

Brown, Kerry, 1999, *Sikh Art and Literature*, London: Routledge.

Brown, Phillip, Sally Power, Gerbrand Tholen, and Annabell Allouch, 2014, 'Credentials, talent and cultural capital: a comparative study of educational elites in England and France', *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 37(2), pp.191-211.

Brown, Reva, 2004, 'Consideration of the Origin of Herbert Simon's Theory of "Satisficing" (1933-1947)', *Management Decision* 42(10), pp.1240-56.

Brown, Steven D., Robert W. Lent, Kyle Telander, and Selena Tramayne, 2011, 'Social cognitive career theory, conscientiousness, and work performance: A meta-analytic path analysis', *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 79(1), pp.81-90.

Brown, Wendy, 1995, *States of Injury*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———, and Janet Halley (eds.), 2002, *Left Legalism/Left Critique*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Bruce, Steve, 1990, *Pray TV: televangelism in America*, London: Routledge.

Brugel, Sabrina, Marie Postma-Nilsenová, and Kiek Tates, 2015, 'The link between perception of clinical empathy and nonverbal behavior: The effect of a doctor's gaze and body orientation', *Patient Education and Counseling* 98(10), pp.1260-5.

Bruns, Axel, and Joanne Jacobs (ed.), 2006, *Uses of Blogs*, New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Bryce, James, 1995 [1888], *The American Commonwealth*, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.

Buchan, Bruce, 2012, 'Listening for Noise in Political Thought', *Cultural Studies Review* 18(3), pp.36-66.

Buckingham, Robert M., Margaret A. Charles, and Helen C. Beh, 'Extraversion and neuroticism, partially independent dimensions?', *Personality and Individual Differences* 31(5), pp.769-77.

Bump, Philip, 2016, 'Americans now live in two worlds, each with its own reality', *Washington Post*, 15 October, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/15/americans-now-live-in-two-worlds-each-with-its-own-reality/> (accessed 9 January 2017).

- Buncombe, Andrew, 2017, 'Donald Trump's press secretary Sean Spicer says "we can sometimes disagree with the facts"', *Independent*, 23 January, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-press-conference-sean-spicer-facts-disagree-white-house-a7542466.html> (accessed 23 February 2017).
- Burgoon, Judee K., J. Pete Blair, and Renee E. Strom, 2008, 'Cognitive biases and nonverbal cue availability in detecting deception', *Human Communication Research* 34(4), pp.572-99.
- Burns, Nancy, and Donald Kinder, 2012, 'Categorical Politics: Gender, Race, and Public Opinion', in Adam J. Berinsky (ed.), *New Directions in Public Opinion*, London: Routledge.
- Burris, Russell W., 1976, 'Human Learning', in Marvin D. Dunnette (ed.), *Handbook of Industrial and Organisational Psychology*, Skokie, IL: Rand McNally College Publishing Company.
- Bursztyn, Leonardo, and Robert Jensen, 2015, 'How Does Peer Pressure Affect Educational Investments?', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130(3), pp.1329-67.
- Burton, Diana, 2006, 'The myth of "expertness": cultural and pedagogical obstacles to restructuring East European curricula', *Journal of In-Service Education* 23(3), pp.219-29.
- Busato, Vittorio V., Frans J. Prins, Jan J. Elshout, and Christiaan Hamaker, 1998, 'The relation between learning styles, the Big Five personality traits and achievement motivation in higher education', *Personality and Individual Differences* 26(1), pp.129-40.
- Bushardt, Reamer L., 2016, 'Patience is still a virtue', *Journal of the American Academy of Physician Assistants* 29(5), pp.13-14.
- Bynum, William E., 2017, 'Assessing for Learner Shame Should Be a Routine Part of Remediation for Unprofessional Behavior', *Academic Medicine* 92(4), p.424.
- , and Jeffrey L. Goodie, 2014, 'Shame, guilt, and the medical learner: ignored connection and why we should care', *Medical Education* 48(11), pp.1045-54.
- Byrd, Christy M., and Tabbye M. Chavous, 2009, 'Racial identity and academic achievement in the neighbourhood context: a multilevel analysis', *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 38(4), pp.544-59.
- Byrne, Zinta S., Jason Stoner, Kenneth R. Thompson, and Wayne Hochwarter, 2005, 'The Interactive Effects of Conscientiousness, Work Effort, and Psychological Climate on Job Performance', *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 66(2), pp.326-38.
- Caffarel, Henri, 1978, *The body at prayer: an introduction*, London: SPCK.
- Calder, Jenni, 1977, *Heroes: From Byron to Guevara*, London: Hamish Hamilton.

- Çalışkan, Koray, and Michel Callon, 2009, 'Economization, part 1: Shifting attention from the economy towards processes of economization', *Economy and Society* 38(3), pp.369-398.
- , 2010, 'Economization, part 2: A research programme for the study of markets', *Economy and Society* 39(1), pp.1-32.
- Calvó-Armengol, Antoni, and Matthew O. Jackson, 2010, 'Peer Pressure', *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8(1), pp.62-89.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, 1960, *The American Voter*, New York, NY: John Wiley.
- Campbell, Joseph, 1949, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Campbell, Richard, 2003, *Media & Culture: An Introduction to Mass Communication*, Boston: Bedford Books.
- Campion, Michael A., Gina J. Medsker, and A. Catherine Higgs, 1993, 'Relations between work group characteristics and effectiveness: implications for designing effective work groups', *Personnel Psychology* 46(4), pp.823-47.
- Canovan, Margaret, 1981, *Populism*, London: Junction Books.
- Cantillon, Sara, and Kathleen Lynch, 2017, 'Affective Equality: Love Matters', *Hypatia* 32(1), pp.169-86.
- Cappellen, Patty van, Maria Toth-Gauthier, Vassilis Saroglou, and Barbara L. Fredrickson, 2016, 'Religion and Well-Being: The Mediating Role of Positive Emotions', *Journal of Happiness Studies* 17(2), pp.485-505.
- Caprara, Gianvittorio, Michele Vecchione, Guido Alessandri, Maria Gerbino, and Claudio Barbaranelli, 2011, 'The Contribution of Personality Traits and Self-Efficacy to Academic Achievement: A Longitudinal Study', *British Journal of Educational Psychology* 81(1), pp.78-96.
- Caprara, Gianvittorio, Michele Vecchione, and Shalom H. Schwartz, 2009, 'Mediational Role of Values in Linking Personality Traits to Political Orientation', *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 12(1), pp.82-94.
- Carel, Havi, and Gita Györffy, 2014, 'Seen but not heard: children and epistemic injustice', *The Lancet* 384(9950), pp.1256-7.
- Carel, Havi, and Ian James Kidd, 2014, 'Epistemic injustice in healthcare: a philosophical analysis', *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy* 17(4), pp.529-40.
- Carey, James, 1989, *Communication as Culture*, London: Routledge.

- Carlyle, Thomas, 1841, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic History*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Carmi, Amnon, 1983, 'The role of social energy in prison', *Dynamische Psychiatrie* 16(5-6), pp.383-406.
- Carney, Dana R., John T. Jost, Samuel D. Gosling, and Jeff Potter, 2008, 'The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind', *Political Psychology* 29(6), pp.807-40.
- Carroll, Lewis, 2015 [1865], *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, London: Macmillan.
- Carter, Dorinda J., 2008, 'Achievement as Resistance: The Development of a Critical Race Achievement Ideology among Black Achievers', *Harvard Educational Review* 78(3), pp.466-97.
- Cattell, Raymond B., 1946, *The description and measurement of personality*, New York, NY: World Book Company.
- Caverni, Jean-Paul, and Jean-Luc Péris, 1990, 'The Anchoring-Adjustment Heuristic in an "Information-Rich, Real World Setting": Knowledge Assessment by Experts', in Jean-Paul Caverni, Jean-Marc Fabré, and Michel González (eds.), *Cognitive biases*, New York, NY: Elsevier, pp.35-45.
- Celce-Murcia, Marianne, Donna Brinton, and Janet M. Goodwin, 1996, *Teaching Pronunciation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Celuch, Kevin, Nadine M. Robinson, and Anna M. Walsh, 2015, 'A framework for encouraging retail customer feedback', *The Journal of Services Marketing* 29(4), pp.280-92.
- Central Election Committee of the 20th Knesset, 2015, 'National Results', 17 March, <http://www.votes20.gov.il/> (accessed 25 August 2016).
- Cesqui, Benedetta, Rolf van de Langenberg, Francesco Lacquaniti, and Andrea d'Avella, 2013, 'A novel method for measuring gaze orientation in space in unrestrained head conditions', *Journal of Vision* 13(8), published online.
- Chaichian, Mohammad, 2014, *Empires and Walls: Globalisation, Migration, and Colonial Control*, Leiden: Brill.
- Chandler, Daniel, 1995, *The Act of Writing: A Media Theory Approach*, Aberystwyth: Prifysgol Cymru.
- Chao, Angela, and Juliet B. Schor, 1998, 'Empirical tests of status consumption: Evidence from women's cosmetics', *Journal of Economic Psychology* 19(1), pp.107-31.
- Chapman, Jane L., 2005, *Comparative Media History: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Polity.

- Charoensukmongkol, Peerayuth, Murad Moqbel, and Sandra Gutierrez-Wirsching, 2016, 'The role of co-worker and supervisor support on job burnout and job satisfaction', *Journal of Advances in Management Research* 13(1), pp.4-22.
- Chen, Gilad, Wendy J. Casper, and Jose M. Cortina, 2001, 'The Roles of Self-Efficacy and Task Complexity in the Relationships Among Cognitive Ability, Conscientiousness, and Work-Related Performance: A Meta-Analytic Examination', *Human Performance* 14(3), pp.209-30.
- Chi, Michelene T.H., Robert Glaser, and Ernest Rees, 1982, 'Expertise in problem solving', in Robert J. Sternberg (ed.), *Advances in the psychology of human intelligence, vol.1*, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp.7-75.
- Childs, Harwood L., 1965, *Public Opinion: Nature, Formation, and Role*, Princeton, NJ: D. van Nostrand.
- Chomsky, Noam, 1997, *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda*, New York, NY: Seven Stories Press.
- , 1999, *Profit over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order*, New York, NY: Seven Stories Press.
- Christensen, Henrik Serup, 2011, 'Political activities on the Internet: *Slacktivism* or political participation by other means?', *First Monday* 16(2), published online.
- Christiano, Thomas, 2015, 'Voter Ignorance Is Not Necessarily a Problem', *Critical Review* 27(3-4), pp.253-69.
- Chubin, Daryl E., 1976, 'The conceptualization of scientific specialties', *The Sociological Quarterly* 17(??), pp.448-76.
- Chun, Youngsub, Inkee Jang, and Biung-Ghi Ju, 2014, 'Priority, solidarity and egalitarianism', *Social Choice and Welfare* 43(3), pp.577-89.
- Ciciora, Walter S., James Farmer, and David Large, 2004, *Modern cable television technology: video, voice, and data communications*, London: Elsevier.
- Civettini, Andrew J.W. and David P. Redlawsk, 2009, 'Voters, emotions, and memory', *Political Psychology* 30(1), pp.125-51.
- Clark, Colin, 1940, *Conditions of Economic Progress*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Clark, Gordon L., Nigel Thrift, and Adam Tickell, 2004, 'Performing finance: the industry, the media, and its image', *Review of International Political Economy* 11(2), pp.289-310.
- Clark, D. Joseph, and Kristin Guest, 1995, 'Voila', *Executive Educator* 17(1), pp.18-24.

- Clarke, Desmond M., and Catherine Wilson (eds.), 2011, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Clarke, Peter B. (ed.), 2009, *The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Claussen, Dane S., 2004, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Media*, New York, NY: Peter Lang.
- Clayton, Victoria, 2015, 'The Needless Complexity of Academic Writing', *The Atlantic*, 26 October, <https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/complex-academic-writing/412255/> (accessed 11 April 2017).
- Cochrane, Lauren, 2014, 'Normcore: the next big fashion movement?', *Guardian*, 27 February, <https://www.theguardian.com/fashion/fashion-blog/2014/feb/27/normcore-the-next-big-fashion-movement> (accessed 17 April 2017).
- Cohen, Bernard P., and Hans Lee, 1975, *Conflict, conformity, and social status*, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Cohen, Gerald A., 1978, *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2002, 'Deeper into Bullshit', in Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.), *Contours of Agency: Themes from the Philosophy of Harry Frankfurt*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Cohen, Norm, 1993, 'Worksongs: a demonstration of examples', in Archie Green (ed.), *Songs about Work: Essays in Occupational Culture for Richard A. Reuss*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Cohen, Ronald L., 1981, 'On the generality of some memory laws', *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology* 22(1), pp.267-81.
- Coleman, Jules L. and Scott Shapiro (eds.), 2002, *The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Collini, Stefan (ed.), 1992, *Interpretation and Overinterpretation: Umberto Eco, with Richard Rorty, Jonathan Culler, Christine Brooke-Rose*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Collins, Randall, 1979, *The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification*, New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Conley, James J., 1985, 'Longitudinal stability of personality traits: A multitrait-multimethod-multioccasion analysis', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 49(5), pp.1266-82.
- Conn, Paul H., David B. Meltz, and Charles Press, 1973, 'The Concept of Political Rationality', *Polity* 6(2), pp.223-39.
- Conner, Ross F., 1981, *Methodological advances in evaluation research*, London: Sage.

- Conover, Pamela J., and Stanley Feldman, 'Emotional Reactions to the Economy: I'm mad as hell and I'm not going to take it anymore', 1986, *American Journal of Political Science* 30(1), pp.30-78.
- Converse, Jean M., and Stanley Presser, 1986, *Survey Questions: Handcrafting the Standardized Questionnaire*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Converse, Philip E., 1964, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- , 1987, 'Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51(4), pp.S12-S24.
- Cook, John, and Stephan Lewandowsky, 2012, *The Debunking Handbook*, St Lucia: University of Queensland.
- Cook, Roy A., and Gwen Cook, 2011, *Guide to Business Etiquette*, London: Prentice Hall.
- Cook, Thomas D., and Donald T. Campbell, 1979, *Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis issues*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Cooper, Charlie, 2016, 'EU referendum: Final polls show Remain with edge over Brexit', *Independent*, 23 June, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-poll-brexit-remain-vote-leave-live-latest-who-will-win-results-populus-a7097261.html> (accessed 25 August 2016).
- Cooper, Christopher A., Lauren Golden, and Alan Socha, 2013, 'The Big Five Personality Factors and Mass Politics', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 43(1), pp.68-82.
- Cooper, Joel, 2007, *Cognitive dissonance: Fifty years of a classic theory*, London: Sage.
- Cooper, John M., 2012, *Pursuits of Wisdom*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Cooper, Terry D., 2004, *Sin, Pride, and Self-Acceptance: The Problem of Identity in Theology and Psychology*, London: SPCK.
- Cooper-Chen, Anne M. (ed.), 2005, *Global entertainment media: Content, audiences, issues*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Copp, David (ed.), 2007, *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Coppedge, Michael, 2012, *Democratization and research methods*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Coram, Bruce T., 1994, 'Why tit-for-tat will not replace government intervention in most cases', *Australian Journal of Political Science* 29(3), pp.575-81.
- Coren, Victoria, 2003, 'Straight expectations', *Observer*, 26 October, <https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2003/oct/26/martinamis> (accessed 30 January 2017).

- Corfield, Penelope J., 1991, *Language, history and class*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Coricelli, Giorgio, Hugo D. Critchley, Mateus Joffily, John P. O'Doherty, Angela Sirigu, and Raymond J. Dolan, 2005, 'Regret and its avoidance: a neuroimaging study of choice behavior', *Nature Neuroscience* 8(9), pp.1255-62.
- Corrigan, John, 2014, 'Religion and emotions', in Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns (eds.), *History of Emotions: Doing Emotions History*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, pp.143-62.
- Cosmides, Leda, and John Tooby, 1992, 'Cognitive adaptations for social exchange', in Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby (eds.), *The adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.163-228.
- Costa, Patricio, and Frederico Ferreira da Silva, 2015, 'The Impact of Voter Evaluations of Leaders' Traits on Voting Behaviour: Evidence from Seven European Countries', *West European Politics* 38(6), pp.1226-50.
- Costa, Paul T., and Robert R. McCrae, 1985, *The NEO Personality Manual*, Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.
- , 1988, 'From catalog to classification: Murray's needs and the five-factor model', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 55(2), pp.258-65.
- Costin, Frank, and Joseph E. Grush, 1973, 'Personality correlates of teacher-student behaviour in the college classroom', *Journal of Educational Psychology* 65(1), pp.35-44.
- Cottam, Martha L., Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors, and Thomas Preston, 2010, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Cotter, Patrick R., Jeffrey Cohen, and Philip B. Coulter, 1982, 'Race-of-Interviewer Effects in Telephone Interviews', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 46(2), pp.278-84.
- Cotterrell, Roger, 2006, *Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Coulson, Mark, 2004, 'Attributing Emotion to Static Body Postures: Recognition Accuracy, Confusions, and Viewpoint Dependence', *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior* 28(2), pp.117-39.
- Counihan, Carole, and Penny van Esterik (eds.), 1997, *Food and Culture: A Reader*, London: Routledge.
- Courty, Pascal, and Mario Pagliero, 2010, 'Price variation antagonism and firm pricing policies', *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 75(2), pp.235-49.
- Cowell, Henry, 2004, 'The joys of noise', in Christoph Cox and Daniel Warner (eds.), *Audio Culture: Readings in Modern Music*, New York, NY: Continuum.

- Cowen, Robert, Andreas M. Kazamias, and Elaine Unterhalter (eds.), 2009, *International Handbook of Comparative Education*, London: Springer.
- Cowen, Tyler, 2017, 'Why Trump's Staff Is Lying', *Bloomberg*, 23 January, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-01-23/why-trump-s-staff-is-lying> (accessed 23 February 2017).
- Cox, Ian, Martin Scott, and Claire Varley, 2006, *Creating a mass consumer market for videotelephony: opportunities and challenges*, Cambridge: Analysys.
- Coyle, Simone, Amy Ishizawar, and Holly Seesel, 2012, 'The Medical Examiner as Factfinder: The Effect of the Lay Evidence Doctrine on VA's Duty to Assist in Securing Medical Nexus Opinions', *Veterans Law Review* 4(1), pp.131-61.
- Cozolino, Louis, 2006, *The Neuroscience of Human Relationships*, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.
- Crane, Lesley, 2012, 'Trust me, I'm an expert: identity construction and knowledge sharing', *Journal of Knowledge Management* 16(3), pp.448-60.
- Crippen, Dan L., Charles C. Daniel, Amy K. Donahue, Susan J. Helms, Susan Morrissey Livingstone, Rosemary O'Leary, and William Wegner, 2005, 'Annex A.2: Observation', in Return to Flight Task Group (eds.), *Return to Flight Task Group final report*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, pp.188-207.
- Crisp, Roger (ed.), 2015, *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Critchley, Simon, 2014, *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Crompton, Simon, 2007, *All About Me: Loving a narcissist*, London: Collins.
- Croom, Adam M., 2011, 'Slurs', *Language Sciences* 33(3), pp.343-58.
- Cross, Frank Leslie, and Elizabeth A. Livingstone, 1997, 'Infallibility', in Cross and Livingstone (eds.), *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Crunden, Evelyn Anne, 2016, 'Brexit was sold as a victory for the working class. It isn't.', *Think Progress*, 24 June, <http://thinkprogress.org/world/2016/06/24/3792551/brexit-working-class/> (accessed 19 July 2016).
- Cruttenden, Alan, 1997, *Intonation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Crystal, David, 1969, *Prosodic Systems and Intonation in English*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Csikszentmihályi, Mihály, 1999, 'Implications of a systems perspective for the study of creativity', in Robert J. Sternberg (ed.), *Handbook of creativity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.313-35.
- Cudd, Ann, 2006, *Analysing Oppression*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cull, Nicholas John, David Culbert, and David Welch (eds.), 2003, *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present*, New York, NY: ABC-CLIO.
- Cullen, Jim, 2014, *A Short History of the Modern Media*, London: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Cullen, John B., 1983, 'An occupational taxonomy by professional characteristics: Implications for research', *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 22(3), pp.257-67.
- Culler, Jonathan, 1982, *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Culpeper, Jonathan, and Dániel Z. Kádár, 2010, *Historical (im)politeness*, Oxford: Peter Lang.
- Cumming, Valerie, 2004, *Understanding Fashion History*, London: Costume & Fashion Press.
- Cummins, Denise Dellarosa, and Robert C. Cummins, 2012, 'Emotion and deliberative reasoning in moral judgment', *Frontiers in Psychology* 3 (published online).
- Cunningham, Stanley B., 2002, *The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction*, Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Curran, James, 1977, *Mass Communications and Society*, London: Edward Arnold.
- , and Michael Gurevitch (eds.), 2005, *Mass Media and Society*, London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- Curtice, John, Miranda Phillips, and Elizabeth Clery, 2016, *British Social Attitudes: the 33rd Report*, London: NatCen Social Research.
- Cutler, Fred, 1999, 'Jeremy Bentham and the Public Opinion Tribunal', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63(3), pp.321-46.
- Cyphert, Dale, 2010, 'The rhetorical analysis of business speech: unresolved questions', *Journal of Business Communication* 47(3), pp.346-68.
- Cytryn, Kayla N., 2001, *Lay reasoning and decision-making related to health and illness*, PhD thesis, McGill University, Canada.
- Dacey, John, 1999, 'Concepts of Creativity: A history', in Mark A. Runco and Steven R. Pritzer (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Creativity, Vol.1*, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Dael, Nele, Marcello Mortillaro, and Klaus R. Scherer, 2012, 'Emotion expression in body action and posture', *Emotion* 12(5), pp.1085-1101.
- Daly, Edward A., and Kathleen J. Hansell, 1999, *Visual Telephony*, Boston: Artech House.

- Damasio, Antonio, 2000, *Descartes' Error*, New York, NY: Quill.
- Dan-Cohen, Meir, 2002, *Harmful Thoughts: Essays on Law, Self, and Morality*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dancy, Jonathan, 1991, *An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*, Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
- Daniels, Peter T., and William Bright, 1996, *The World's Writing Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Danmarks Statistik, 2015, 'Folketingsvalg Torsdag 18. Juni 2015: Resultater – Hele Landet', 20 June, <http://www.dst.dk/valg/Valg1487635/valgopg/valgopgHL.htm> (accessed 25 August 2016).
- Dante Alighieri, 2003 [1971], *Divine Comedy: Inferno*, Mark Musa (tr.), London: Penguin.
- Darity, William, *Professionalization*, Detroit, MI: Macmillan.
- Darwin, Charles, 2009 [1872], *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dascal, Marcelo, 1999, 'Introduction: Some questions about misunderstanding', *Journal of Pragmatics* 31(6), pp.753-62.
- David, Bieke, and Bunmi O. Olatunji, 2011, 'The effect of disgust conditioning and disgust sensitivity on appraisals of moral transgressions', *Personality & Individual Differences* 50(7), pp.1142-6.
- Davidson, Alan (ed.), 2006, *The Oxford Companion to Food*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davidson, Janet E., and Robert J. Sternberg, 1984, 'The Role of Insight in Intellectual Giftedness', *Gifted Child Quarterly* 28(2), pp.58-64.
- Davies, D., and J. Dodd, 2002, 'Qualitative research and the question of rigor', *Qualitative Health Research* 12(2), pp.279-89.
- Davies, Glyn, 1996, *A History of Money from Ancient Times to the Present Day*, Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
- Davis, Darren W., 1997, 'Interviewer Effects Among African Americans', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61(1), pp.183-207.
- , and Brian D. Silver, 2003, 'Stereotype Threat and Race of Interviewer Effects in a Survey on Political Knowledge', *American Journal of Political Science* 47(1), pp.33-45.
- Davis, Michael, 1992, 'The role of the amygdala in fear and anxiety', *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 15(1), pp.353-75.
- Davison, W. Phillips, and Betty B. Bredemeier (eds.), 1957, *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 21(1), Princeton, NJ: American Association for Public Opinion Research.

- Day, Mark, 2015, 'The Proprietorial Model', *Media International Australia* 157(1), pp.28-33.
- Dearden, Lizzie, 2016, 'Anger over "Bregret" as Leave voters say they thought UK would stay in EU', *Independent*, 25 June, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-anger-bregret-leave-voters-protest-vote-thought-uk-stay-in-eu-remain-win-a7102516.html> (accessed 25 August 2016).
- de Bonald, Louis, 2014 [1796], *Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux, dans la société civile, démontrée par raisonnement*, 3 vols., Paris: Hachette,
- Debray, Régis, 1996, *Media Manifestos: On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Decherney, Peter, and Katherine Sender (eds.), 2017, *Stuart Hall Lives: Cultural Studies in an Age of Digital Media*, London: Routledge.
- Deigh, John, and David Dolinko (eds.), 2011, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- De Landsheer, Christ'l, Philippe De Vries, and Dieter Vertessen, 2008, 'Political Impression Management: How Metaphors, Sound Bites, Appearance Effectiveness, and Personality Traits Can Win Elections', *Journal of Political Marketing* 7(3-4), pp.217-38.
- Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter, 1992, 'The Public's Knowledge of Politics', in J. David Kenamer (ed.), *Public Opinion, the Press, and Public Policy*, Westport, NY: Praeger, pp.19-40.
- , 1996, *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- de Maistre, Joseph, 1975 [1819], *The Pope*, in de Maistre, *Works*, Richard A. Lebrun (ed.), Montréal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- DeMartino, George, and Deirdre N. McCloskey (eds.), 2016, *The Oxford Handbook of Professional Economic Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- de Meijer, Marco, 1989, 'The contribution of general features of body movement to the attribution of emotions', *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior* 13(4), pp.247-68.
- DeMiguel, Victor, Lorenzo Garlappi, and Raman Uppal, 2006, '1/N', *EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings*.
- Deming, David James, Claudia D. Goldin, Lawrence F. Katz, and Noam Yuchtman, 2015, 'Can Online Learning Bend the Higher Education Cost Curve?', *American Economic Review* 105(5), pp.496-501.

- Dempsey, Hannah, 2017, 'Does Social Media Hold The Key To Public Opinion?', *Huffington Post*, 31 January, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hannah-dempsey/does-social-media-hold-the_b_14491484.html (accessed 6 April 2017).
- Dencik, Lina, and Peter Wilkin, 2016, *Worker Resistance and Media: Challenging Global Corporate Power in the 21st Century*, Oxford: Peter Lang.
- Denhart, Robert B., and Philip W. Jeffress, 1971, 'Social learning and economic behavior: The process of economic socialization', *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 30(2), pp.113-25.
- Denton, Robert E., and Gary C. Woodward, 1998, *Political Communication in America*, New York, NY: Praeger.
- Dequech, David, 2007, 'Neoclassical, mainstream, orthodox, and heterodox economics', *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics* 30(2), pp.279-302.
- Derber, Charles, William A. Schwartz, and Yale Magrass, 1990, *Power in the Highest Degree: Professionals and the Rise of a New Mandarin Order*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Derrida, Jacques, 1978 [1967], *Of Grammatology*, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (tr.), Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- De Schuymer, Leentje, Isabel De Groote, Annemie Desoete, and Herbert Roeyers, 2012, 'Gaze aversion during social interaction in preterm infants: A function of attention skills?', *Infant Behavior and Development* 35(1), pp.129-39.
- De Smet, Marijke, Hilde Van Keer, and Martin Valcke, 2008, 'Blending asynchronous discussion groups and peer tutoring in higher education: An exploratory study of online peer tutoring behaviour', *Computers & Education* 50(1), pp.207-23.
- DeSteno, David, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Monica Y. Bartlett, and Aida Cajdric, 2004, 'Prejudice From Thin Air: The Effect of Emotion on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes', *Psychological Science* 15(5), pp.319-24.
- Devlin, L. Patrick (ed.), 1987, *Political Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Dewey, John, 2012 [1927], *The Public and its Problems*, University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State Press.
- Dezalay, Yves, and David Sugarman, 1995, *Professional Competition and Professional Power*, London: Routledge.

- Diab, Dalia L., Michael A. Gillespie, and Scott Highhouse, 2008, 'Are maximisers really unhappy? The measurement of maximising tendency', *Judgment and Decision Making* 3(5), pp.364-70.
- Dietrich, Bryce J., Scott Lasley, Jeffery J. Mondak, Megan L. Remmel, and Joel Turner, 2012, 'Personality and Legislative Politics: The Big Five Trait Dimensions among U.S. State Legislators', *Political Psychology* 33(2), pp.195-210.
- Digman, John M., and Naomi K. Takemoto-Chock, 1981, 'Factors in the natural language of personality: Re-Analysis, comparison, and interpretation of six major studies', *Multivariate Behavioural Research* 16(1), pp.149-70.
- Dillner, Luisa, 2017, 'Should I ask for a second opinion', *Guardian*, 10 April, <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/apr/10/should-i-ask-for-a-second-opinion> (accessed 16 April).
- Dilthey, Wilhelm, 1991 [1883], *Selected Works, vol.1: Introduction to the Human Sciences*, Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (eds.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dinkha, Juliet, Charles Mitchell, and Bashar Zogheib, 2014, 'Parental Control: the Relationship Amongst Parental Supervision, Education, Income and Children's Viewing Habits', *American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 2(3), pp.157-70.
- Distin, Kate, 2005, *The selfish meme: A critical reassessment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ditto, Peter H., and John B. Jemmott, 1989, 'From Rarity to Evaluative Extremity: Effects of Prevalence Information on Evaluations of Positive and Negative Characteristics', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 57(1), pp.16-26.
- Dixon, Huw, 1992, 'Some Thoughts on Artificial Intelligence and Economic Theory', in Scott J. Moss and John Rae (eds.), *Artificial Intelligence and Economic Analysis*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp.131-54.
- Dluhosch, Barbara, 2016, 'Tit-for-tat in trade policies: nothing but a fest for vested interests', *Journal of Institutional Economics* 12(1), pp.217-39.
- Dobbins, Richard, and Barrie Pettman, 2006, *What Self-Made Millionaires Really Think, Know and Do: The straight-talking guide to business success and personal riches*, North Mankato, MN: Capstone.
- Dobrescu, Tatiana, and Gabriel Stănică Lupu, 2015, 'The Role of Nonverbal Communication in the Teacher-pupil relationship', *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences* 180(5), pp.543-8.
- Dobson, Andrew, 2012, 'Listening: The New Democratic Deficit', *Political Studies* 60(4), pp.843-59.

- Dodge, Arthur F., 1943, 'What are the personality traits of the successful teacher?', *Journal of Applied Psychology* 27(4), pp.325-37.
- Doherty, Eva M., and Emmeline Nugent, 2011, 'Personality factors and medical training: a review of the literature', *Medical education* 45(2), pp.132-40.
- Donsbach, Wolfgang, and Michael W. Traugott, 2008, *The Sage handbook of public opinion research*, London: Sage.
- Doob, Leonard W., 1948, *Public opinion and propaganda*, New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Downs, Anthony, 1997 [1957], *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York, NY: Prentice-Hall.
- Dreyfus, Hubert, and Stuart Dreyfus, 2005, 'Expertise in real world contexts', *Organization Studies* 26(5), pp.779-92.
- Droysen, Johann Gustav, 1893 [1868] *Outline of the Principles of History*, E. Benjamin Andrews (tr.), Boston: Ginn & Company.
- Druckman, James N., Nancy A. Mathiwetz, and Phyllis Silverstein (eds.), 2011, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 75(5), Cary, NC: Oxford University Press.
- Dryzek, John S., 2010, *Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (eds.), 2006, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dubin, Robert, 1958, *The World of Work: Industrial Society and Human Relations*, London: Prentice Hall.
- Duckworth, Angela Lee, and David Weir, 2012, 'Personality and Response to the Financial Crisis' (working paper).
- Duclos, Sandra E., James D. Laird, Eric Schneider, Melissa Sexter, Lisa Stern, and Oliver Van Lighten, 1989, 'Emotion-specific effects of facial expressions and postures on emotional experience', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 57(1), pp.100-8.
- Duncan, Simon, 2005, 'Mothering, class and rationality', *The Sociological Review* 53(1), pp.50-76.
- Dunleavy, Patrick, 1991, *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science*, London: Routledge.
- , Helen Margetts, Simon Bastow, and Jane Tinkler, 2006, 'New Public Management Is Dead—Long Live Digital-Era Governance', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 16(3), pp.467-94.
- Dunn, John, 2000, *The cunning of unreason: making sense of politics*, London: HarperCollins.

- Dunne, Éamonn, 2012, 'Love Foolosophy: Pedagogy, parable, perversion', *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 45(6), pp.625-36.
- Dunne, Joseph, 1997, *Back to the Rough Ground: 'Phronesis' and techne in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Dunning, David, Chip Heath, and Jerry M. Suls, 2005, 'Flawed self-assessment: Implications for education, and the workplace', *Psychological Science in the Public Interest* 5(1), pp.69-106.
- Dunning, David, Kerri Johnson, Joyce Ehrlinger, and Justin Kruger, 2003, 'Why people fail to recognize their own incompetence', *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 12(3), pp.83-87
- DuPont, M. Kay, 1993, *Business etiquette and professionalism*, Los Altos, CA: Crisp Publications.
- Duriez, Bart, and Dirk Hutsebaut, 2001, 'Approaches to Religion and the Moods and Emotions Associated with Religion: An Exploratory Study in Flanders (Belgium)', *Journal of Empirical Theology* 14(2), pp.75-84.
- During, Simon, 2007, *The Cultural Studies Reader*, London: Routledge.
- Durkheim, Émile, 2014 [1893], *The Division of Labour in Society*, Steven Lukes (ed.), New York, NY: Free Press.
- Dworkin, Ronald, 1986, *Law's Empire*, London: Harper Collins.
- Dyer, Gwynne, 2010, *War: The New Edition*, London: Random House.
- Dyson, Rachel, Gail C. Robertson, and Maria M. Wong, 2015, 'Brief report: Peer group influences and adolescent internalizing problems as mediated by effortful control', *Journal of Adolescence* 41(1), pp.131-5.
- Eagleton, Terry, 1994, 'Ideology and its Vicissitudes in Western Marxism', in Slavoj Žižek (ed.), *Mapping Ideology*, London: Verso, pp.179-226.
- Eagleton, Terry, 2007, *Ideology: An Introduction*, London: Verso.
- Eargle, John, 2005, *Handbook of Recording Engineering*, Berlin: Birkhäuser.
- Eby, Lillian Turner de Tormes, and Tammy D. Allen, 2012, *Personal relationships: the effect on employee attitudes, behavior, and well-being*, London: Routledge.
- Eckersley, Robyn, 1989, 'Green Politics and the New Class: Selfishness or Virtue?', *Political Studies* 37(2), pp. 205-23.
- Eco, Umberto, 1986, 'Cogito interruptus', in Eco, *Travels in Hyperreality*, London: Picador.

- Edmunds, Angela, and Anne Morris, 2000, 'The problem of information overload in business organisations: a review of the literature', *International Journal of Information Management* 20(1), pp.17-28.
- Edwards, John Richard, 2011, 'Writing masters and accountants in England: A study of occupation, status, and ambition in the early modern period', *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability* 24(6), pp.685-717.
- Edworthy, Judy, Elizabeth Hellier, Lex Newbold, and Kirsteen Titchener, 2015, 'Passing crisis and emergency risk communications: The effects of communication channel, information type, and repetition', *Applied Ergonomics* 48(2), pp.252-52.
- Egan, Louisa C., Laurie R. Santos, and Paul Bloom, 2007, 'The origins of cognitive dissonance: Evidence from children and monkeys', *Psychological Science* 18(11), pp.978-83.
- Ehrenreich, Barbara, 1989, *Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class*, New York, NY: HarperCollins.
- Ehrlinger, Joyce, and David Dunning, 2003, 'How Chronic Self-Views Influence (and Potentially Mislead) Estimates of Performance', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 84(1), pp.5-17.
- , Kerri Johnson, Matthew Banner, David Dunning, and Justin Kruger, 2008, 'Why the unskilled are unaware: Further explorations of (absent) self-insight among the incompetent', *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 105(1), pp.98-121.
- Eisenstein, Elizabeth L., 1979, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ekman, Paul, 1992, 'An argument for basic emotions', *Cognition & Emotion* 6(3-4), pp.169-200.
- , 2003, *Emotions revealed: Recognising faces and feelings to improve communication and emotional life*, New York, NY: Times Books.
- , and Wallace V. Friesen, 1969, 'Nonverbal leakage and clues to deception', *Psychiatry* 32(1), pp.88-106.
- Elders, Fons (ed.), 2011, *Human Nature: Justice vs Power: The Chomsky-Foucault Debate*, London: Souvenir Press.
- Electoral Commission, 2016, 'EU referendum results', <http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/upcoming-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information> (accessed 25 August 2016).

- Eliade, Mircea, 1991, *Images and symbols: studies in religious symbolism*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Elias, Norbert, 2000 [1939], *The Civilizing Process*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Elkins, Kathleen, 2016, '13 habits of self-made millionaires, from a man who spent 5 years studying rich people', *UK Business Insider*, 17 March, <http://uk.businessinsider.com/habits-of-self-made-millionaires-2016-3> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Ellcessor, Elizabeth, 2016, *Restricted Access: Media, Disability, and the Politics of Participation*, New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Ellerman, David P., 1990, *The Democratic Worker-Owned Firm: A New Model for the East and West*, London: Unwin Hyman Ltd.
- Ellershaw, Julia, Christie Fullarton, John Rodwell, and John McWilliams, 2016, 'Conscientiousness, openness to experience and extraversion as predictors of nursing work performance: a facet-level analysis', *Journal of Nursing Management* 24(2), pp.244-52.
- Ellis, Albert, Mike Abrams, Lidia D. Abrams, Alexander Nussbaum, and Rebecca J. Frey, 2009, *Personality theories: critical perspectives*, London: Sage.
- Ellsberg, Daniel, 1961, 'Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 75(4), pp.643-69.
- Elsbach, Kimberly D., Dan M. Cable, and Jeffrey W. Sherman, 2010, 'How passive "face time" affects perceptions of employees: Evidence of spontaneous trait inference', *Human Relations* 63(6), pp.735-60.
- Embi, Peter J., and Joel Tsevat, 'Commentary: The Relative Research Unit: Providing Incentives for Clinician Participation in Research Activities', *Academic Medicine* 87(1), pp.11-14.
- Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 2010, 'Heroism', in *Essays: first and second series*, Douglas Crase and Joel Porte (eds.), London: Penguin.
- Emmons, Robert A., and Raymond F. Paloutzian, 2003, 'The Psychology of Religion', *Annual Review of Psychology* 54(1), pp.377-402.
- Engelkamp, Johannes, and Horts Krumnacker, 1980, 'Imaginale und motorische Prozesse beim Behalten verbalen Materials', *Zeitschrift für experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie* 27, pp.511-33.
- Engels, Friedrich, 1976a [1847a], *Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith*, in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, vol.6: *Marx and Engels 1845-48*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

- , 1976b [1847b], *Principles of Communism*, in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, vol.6: *Marx and Engels 1845–48*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- , 1987 [1878], *Anti-Dühring*, in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, vol.25: *Engels 1873–83*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Englich, Birte, Thomas Mussweiler, and Fritz Strack, 2006, 'Playing Dice With Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts' Judicial Decision Making', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 32(2), pp.188–200.
- Ensor, Phil S., 1988, 'The Functional Silo Syndrome', *AME Target*, Spring, p.16.
- Enstrom, E.A., 1965, 'The Decline of Handwriting', *The Elementary School Journal* 66(1), pp.22–7.
- Ericsson, K. Anders, 2014, 'Why expert performance is special and cannot be extrapolated from studies of performance in the general population: A response to criticisms', *Intelligence* 45(1), pp.81–103.
- , Neil Charness, Paul Feltovich, and Robert R. Hoffman, 2006, *Cambridge Handbook on Expertise and Expert Performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , Ralf T. Krampe, and Clemens Tesch-Romer, 1993, 'The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance', *Psychological Review* 100(3), pp.363–406.
- , Michael J. Prietula, and Edward T. Cokely, 2007, 'The Making of an Expert', *Harvard Business Review*, July–August.
- Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson, 2002, *The Macro Polity*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Esperdy, Gabrielle, 2015, "A Parley of Historians"; or, a Learned Society in Public', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 74(1), pp.8–12.
- Esposito, Elena, 2011, 'Originality through imitation: The rationality of fashion', *Organization Studies* 32(5), pp.603–13.
- Estlund, David M. (ed.), 2017, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Estrada, Carlos A., Sangnya R. Patel, Gregg Talente, and Suzanne Kraemer, 2005, 'The 10-minute oral presentation: what should I focus on?', *American Journal of Medical Science* 329(6), pp.306–9.
- Etheredge, Lloyd S., 1978, 'Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898–1968: A Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory', *American Political Science Review* 72(2), pp.434–51.
- Eubanks, Philip, and John D. Schaeffer, 2008, 'A kind word for bullshit: The problem of academic writing', *College Composition and Communication* 59(3), pp.372–88.

- Evans, Jonathan, 1984, 'Heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning', *British Journal of Psychology* 75(4), pp.451-68.
- , 2003, 'In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning', *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 7(10), pp.454-9.
- Evanschitzky, Heiner, B. Ramaseshan, David Woisetschläger, Verena Richelsen, Markus Blut, and Christof Backhaus, 2012, 'Consequences of customer loyalty to the loyalty program and to the company', *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science* 40(5), pp.625-38.
- Ewen, Stuart, 1976, *Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of Consumer Culture*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Eysenck, Michael W., 2000, 'Anxiety, cognitive biases, and beliefs', in Nico H. Frijda, Antony S.R. Manstead and Sacha Bem (eds.), *Emotion and Beliefs: How Feelings Influence Thoughts*, pp.171-84.
- Fairclough, Norman, 1995, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, London: Longman.
- , 2001, *Language and Power*, London: Longman.
- Fajardo, David, and Lauren M. Gardner, 2013, 'Inferring Contagion Patterns in Social Contact Networks with Limited Infection Data', *Networks & Spatial Economics* 13(4), pp.399-426.
- Fanet, Hervé, 2011, *Photon-based medical imagery*, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Farroni, Teresa, Gergely Csibra, Francesca Simion, and Mark H. Johnson, 2002, 'Eye contact detection in humans from birth', *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 99(14), pp.9602-5.
- Farroni, Teresa, Mark H. Johnson, and Gergely Csibra, 2004, 'Mechanisms of eye gaze perception during infancy', *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 16(8), pp.1320-6.
- Federal Election Commission, 2017, 'Official 2016 Presidential General Election Results', 30 January, <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf> (accessed 6 April 2017).
- Federico, Christopher M., 2012, 'Ideology and Public Opinion', in Adam J. Berinsky (ed.), *New Directions in Public Opinion*, London: Routledge, pp.79-100.
- Feeley, Kathleen A., and Jennifer Frost (eds.), 2014, *When Private Talk Goes Public: Gossip in American History*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fehrman, Craig, 2011, 'The incredible shrinking sound bit', *Boston Globe*, 2 January, http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/01/02/the_incredible_shrinking_sound_bite/ (accessed 14 April 2017).

- Fernandez, Eva M., and Helen Smith Cairns, 2011, *Fundamentals of Psycholinguistics*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Ferrero, Mario, 2011, 'The infallibility of the pope', *Economics of Governance* 12(1), pp.89-99.
- Ferri, Giovanni, and Andrea Morone, 2014, 'The effect of rating agencies on herd behaviour', *Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination* 9(1), pp.107-27.
- Fershtman, Chaim, Uri Gneezy, and Moshe Hoffman, 2008, *Taboos: considering the unthinkable*, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Festinger, Leon, 1957, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
- , 1961, 'The psychological effects of insufficient rewards', *American Psychologist* 16(1), pp.1-11.
- Feyerabend, Paul, 2010 [1975], *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge*, London: Verso.
- Fiedler, Fred E., 1967, *A theory of leadership effectiveness*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Finch, Tracy L., Tim Rapley, Melissa Girling, Elaine McColl, Ian N. Steen, Frances S. Mair, Elizabeth Murray, Shaun Treweek, and Carl R. May, 2013, 'Improving the normalization of complex interventions: Measure development based on normalization process theory (NoMAD): Study protocol', *Implementation Science* 8(1), p.43.
- Finkel, Steven E., Thomas M. Guterbock, and Marian J. Borg, 1991, 'Race-of-Interviewer Effects in a Preelection Poll: Virginia 1989', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 55(3), pp.313-30.
- Finn, Gerry P.T., 2011, 'Reappraising Athleticism?', *International Journal of the History of Sport* 28(13), pp.1891-1901.
- Firestone, Shulamith, 1970, *The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution*, New York, NY: William Morrow and Company.
- Fischer, Kurt W., 1980, 'A theory of cognitive development: The control and construction of hierarchies of skills', *Psychological Review* 87(6), pp.477-531.
- Fischer, Robert William, 2016, 'Disgust as Heuristic', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 19(3), pp.679-93.
- Fisher, Allan G.B., 1939, 'Production, primary, secondary, and tertiary', *Economic Record* 15(1), pp.24-38.
- Fisher, Mark, 2009, *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?*, Winchester: Zero Books.

- Fishkin, James S., 1995, *The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- , 2009, *When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fishwick, Carmen, 2016, 'Why did people vote for Donald Trump? Voters explain', *Guardian*, 9 November, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/09/why-did-people-vote-for-donald-trump-us-voters-explain> (accessed 9 April 2017).
- Fiske, Donald W., 1949, 'Consistency of the factorial structures of personality ratings from different sources', *Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology* 44(3), pp.329-44.
- Flint, Thomas P., and Michael Cannon Rea (eds.), 2009, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Flynn, Erin Elizabeth, 2016, 'Language-Rich Early Childhood Classroom: Simple but Powerful Beginnings', *The Reading Teacher* 70(2), pp.159-66.
- Foglia, Carlos, 2017, 'These last moments of the Standing Rock protest will break your heart', *Upworthy*, 23 February, <https://www.upworthy.com/these-last-moments-of-the-standing-rock-protest-will-break-your-heart> (accessed 28 February 2017).
- Foley, John Miles, 1992, *The Theory of Oral Composition: History and Methodology*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Folkerts, Jean, and Dwight Teeter, 2001, *Voices of a Nation: A History of Mass Media in the United States*, Toronto, ON: Pearson.
- Ford, Donna Y., 1992, 'The American Achievement Ideology as Perceived by Urban African-American Students', *Urban Education* 27(2), pp.196-211.
- Forster, Michael N., and Kristin Gjesdal (eds.), 2015, *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Foucault, Michel, 1977a, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, New York, NY: Pantheon.
- , 1977b, 'What Is an Author?', in Foucault, *Language, Counter-memory, practice: Selected essays and interviews*, Donald F. Bouchard (ed.), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp.113-38.
- , 1980, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, Colin Gordon (tr.), Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- , 1996 [1963], *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, New York, NY: Vintage.

- , 1998 [1976, 1984], *The History of Sexuality*, 3 vols., Robert Hurley (tr.), London: Penguin.
- , 2008 [1969], *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, A.M. Sheridan Smith (tr.), London: Routledge.
- Fouché Gaines, Helen, 1939, *Cryptanalysis: A Study of Ciphers and Their Solution*, New York, NY: Dover Publications.
- Fourie, Pieter J. (ed.), 2007, *Media Studies: Media History, Media and Society*, Cape Town: Juta Legal and Academic Publishers.
- Fraiberg, Selma H., 1987 [1959], *The Magic Years*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
- Francis, Leslie (ed.), 2017, *The Oxford Handbook of Reproductive Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frankfurt, Harry, 1986, 'On Bullshit', *Raritan Quarterly Review* 6(2).
- Franklin, David S., Jennifer W. Gibson, Jeanne C. Samuel, William A. Teeter, and Craig W. Clarkson, 2011, 'Use of Lecture Recordings in Medical Education', *Medical Science Educator* 21(1), pp.21-8.
- Fraser, Kristin, and Kevin Mclaughlin, 2014, 'Can we avoid the guilt of shame in medical education?', *Medical Education* 48(11), pp.1036-8.
- Fraser, Nancy, 1985, 'Michel Foucault: A "Young Conservative"?', *Ethics* 96(1), pp.165-84.
- , 1992, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy', in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- , *et al.*, 2014, *Transnationalizing the Public Sphere*, Kate Nash (ed.), Cambridge: Polity.
- Frazer, James, 2009 [1911], *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fredrickson, Barbara L., 2001, 'The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions', *American Psychologist* 56(3), pp.218-26.
- Freeden, Michael, 2003, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2008, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2012, 'Editorial: Interpretative realism and prescriptive realism', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 17(1), pp.1-11.
- , 2013, *The Political Theory of Political Thinking: The Anatomy of a Practice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2017, 'After the Brexit referendum: revisiting populism as an ideology', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 22(1), pp.1-11.

- Freeman, Daniel, Nicole Evans, and Rachel Lister, 2012, 'Gut feelings, deliberative thought, and paranoid ideation: A study of experiential and rational reasoning', *Psychiatry Research* 197(1-2), pp.119-22.
- Freitas, Maria Ester de, 2007, *Cultura organizacional: evolução e crítica*, Andover: Cengage.
- Frenzel, Anne C., Reinhard Pekrun, Thomas Goetz, Lia M. Daniels, Tracy L. Durksen, and Betty Becker-Kurz, 2016, 'Measuring Teachers' enjoyment, anger, and anxiety: The Teacher Emotions Scales', *Contemporary Educational Psychology* 46(1), pp.148-63.
- Frey, Bruno S., 2013, *Economics as a science of human behaviour: towards a new social science paradigm*, New York, NY: Springer.
- , and Stephan Meier, 2004, 'Pro-social behaviour in a natural setting', *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 54(1), pp.65-88.
- Friedersdorf, Conor, 2015, 'What Do Donald Trump Voters Actually Want?', *The Atlantic*, 17 August, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/donald-trump-voters/401408/> (accessed 9 April 2017).
- Friedman, Jeffrey, 1996, *The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Friedman, Meyer, 1996, *Type A Behavior: Its Diagnosis and Treatment*, New York, NY: Plenum Press.
- , and Ray Rosenman, 1959, 'Association of specific overt behaviour pattern with blood and cardiovascular findings', *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 169(12), pp.1286-96.
- Friggeri, Adrien, Lada A. Adamic, Dean Eckles, and Justin Cheng, 2014, 'Rumor Cascades', *Proceedings of the Eighth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media*, pp.101-10.
- Frijters, Paul, and Malathi Velamuri, 2010, 'Is the internet bad news: The online news era and the market for high-quality news', *Review of Network Economics* 9(2), pp.1-31.
- Frodeman, Robert, Julie Thompson Klein, and Carl Mitcham, 2010, *The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fry, Prem S., 2003, 'Perceived self-efficacy domains as predictors of fear of the unknown and fear of dying among older adults', *Psychology and Aging* 18(3), pp.474-86.
- Fu, J. Sophia, 2016, 'Leveraging Social Network Analysis for Research on Journalism in the Information Age', *Journal of Communication* 66(2), pp.299-313.
- Fuchs, Christian, 2010, 'Class, knowledge, and new media', *Media, Culture & Society* 32(1), pp.141-50.

- Fuchs, Peter, 2000, 'Systemtheorie und Soziale Arbeit', in Roland Merten (ed.), *Systemtheorie Sozialer Arbeit: Neue Ansätze und veränderte Perspektiven*, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, pp.157-75.
- Fukawa, Nobuyuki, and Ronald W. Niedrich, 2015, 'A Fluency Heuristic Account of Supraliminal Prime Effects on Product Preference', *Psychology & Marketing* 32(11), pp.1061-78.
- Fukuyama, Francis, 2012 [1992], *The end of history and the last man*, London: Penguin.
- Fullwood, Chris, and Gwyneth Doherty-Sneddon, 2006, 'Effect of gazing at the camera during a video link on recall', *Applied Ergonomics* 37(2), pp.167-75.
- Furnham, Adrian, 1999, *Body language at work*, London: Institute of Personnel and Development.
- , John Crump, and Viren Swarmi, 2009, 'Abstract Reasoning and Big Five Personality Correlates of Creativity in a British Occupational Sample', *Imagination, Cognition and Personality* 28(4), pp.361-70.
- Gabler, Neal, 2001, *Toward a New Definition of Celebrity*, Los Angeles, CA: USC Annenberg Norman Lear Center.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 2013 [1975], *Truth and Method*, Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (tr.), London: Bloomsbury.
- Gagen, Elizabeth A., 2015, 'Governing emotions: citizenship, neuroscience, and the education of youth', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 40(1), pp.140-52.
- Galek, Kathleen, Neal Krause, Christopher G. Ellison, Taryn Kudler, and Kevin J. Flannelly, 2007, 'Religious doubt and mental health across the lifespan', *Journal of Adult Development* 14(1), pp.16-25.
- Gallino, Jeff, 2008, 'Swell your sales with speech analytics', *Sales and Marketing Management* 160(1), pp.26-7.
- Galloway, Alexander R., 2013, 'The Poverty of Philosophy: Realism and Post-Fordism', *Critical Inquiry* 39(2), pp.347-66.
- Galor, Oded, 2005, 'From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory', in Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf (eds.), *Handbook of economic growth*, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.171-293.
- Garb, Howard N., 1996, 'The representativeness and past-behavior heuristics in clinical judgment', *Professional Psychology: Research and Practice* 27(3), pp.272-7.
- Gardner, Jane F., 1974, *Leadership and the cult of the personality*, London: Dent.

- Gardner, William L., Claudia C. Coglisier, Kelly M. Davis, and Matthew P. Dickens, 2011, 'Authentic leadership: A review of the literature and research agenda', *Leadership Quarterly* 22(6), pp.1120-45.
- Gartman, David, 1998, 'Postmodernism; or, the cultural logic of post-Fordism?', *Sociological Quarterly* 39(1), pp.119-37.
- Gastil, John, E. Pierre Deess, Phil Weiser, and Jordan Meade, 2008, 'Jury Service and Electoral Participation: A Test of the Participation Hypothesis', *The Journal of Politics* 70(2), pp.351-67.
- Gathercole, Susan E., 2006, 'Nonword repetition and word learning: The nature of the relationship', *Applied Psycholinguistics* 27(4), pp.513-43.
- Gauntlett, David, 2002, *Media, Gender and Identity*, London: Routledge.
- Gaus, Gerald, 1996, *Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 1998, 'Reason, Justification, and Consensus: Why Democracy Can't Have It All', in James Bohman (ed.), *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- , 2011, *The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Geen, Russell G., David Stonner, and Gary L. Shope, 1975, 'The facilitation of aggression by aggression: Evidence against the catharsis hypothesis', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 31(4), pp.721-6.
- Gehl, Robert W., 2015, 'The Case for Alternative Social Media', *Social Media + Society* 1(2), published online.
- Geisler, Norman L., 2013 [1976], *Christian Apologetics*, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.
- Gellner, Ernest, 1988, *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History*, London: Collins Harvill.
- Gentile, Emilio, 2003, *The Struggle for Modernity: Nationalism, Futurism, and Fascism*, Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, and Conor M. Dowling, 2011a, 'Personality Traits and the Consumption of Political Information', *American Politics Research* 39(1), pp.32-84.
- , and Shang E. Ha, 2010, 'Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts', *American Political Science Review* 104(1), pp.111-33.
- , Connor Raso, and Shang E. Ha, 2011b, 'Personality Traits and Participation in Political Processes', *The Journal of Politics* 73(3), pp.692-706.

- Gerth, Hans-Heinrich, and C. Wright Mills, 1946, 'Introduction: The Man and his Work', in Gerth and Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Geuss, Raymond, 1981, *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giddens, Anthony, 1985, *The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, Cambridge: Polity.
- , 1987, *Social Theory and Modern Sociology*, Cambridge: Polity.
- , 2014 [1984], *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Gigerenzer, Gerd, 1996, 'On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky', *Psychological Review*, 103(3), pp.592–6.
- , and Reinhard Selten, 2002, *Bounded Rationality*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- , Peter M. Todd, and the ABC Research Group, 1999, *Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gilbert, Margaret, 2000, *Sociality and Responsibility*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gill, Michael J., 2015, 'Elite identity and status anxiety: An interpretative phenomenological analysis of management consultants', *Organization* 22(3), pp.306–25.
- Gillam, Stephen, Jan Yates, and Padmanabhan Badrinath, 2012, *Essential public health: theory and practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gillet, Joris, Edward Cartwright, and Mark van Vugt, 2011, 'Selfish or servant leadership? Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games', *Personality and Individual Differences* 51(3), pp.231–6.
- Gilman, Sander L., Helen King, Roy Porter, G.S. Rousseau, and Elaine Showalter, 1993, *Hysteria Beyond Freud*, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Gilovich, Thomas, and Kenneth Savitsky, 1996, 'Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudo-Scientific Beliefs', *Skeptical Inquirer* 20(2), pp.34–40.
- Gilovich, Thomas, Amos Tversky, and Robert Vallone, 1985, 'The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences', *Cognitive Psychology* 3(17), pp.295–314.
- Giner-Sorolla, Roger, 2001, 'Guilty pleasures and grim necessities: Affective attitudes in dilemmas of self-control', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 80(2), pp.206–21.

- Gingrich, Newt, 2016, Interview by Aislyn Camerota, 'New Day', *CNN*, New York, NY, 22 July, Television, at 8:35AM ET.
- Ginns, Paul, Fang-Tzu Hu, Erin Byrne, and Janette Bobis, 2016, 'Learning By Tracing Worked Examples', *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 30(2), pp.160-9.
- Ginsberg, Benjamin, 1989, 'How Polling Transforms Public Opinion', in M. Margolis and G.A. Mauser (eds.), *Manipulating Public Opinion*, Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, pp.271-93.
- Gintis, Herbert, 2005, *Moral sentiments and material interests: the foundations of cooperation in economic life*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gioia, Ted, 2006, *Work Songs*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Gladwell, Malcolm, 2008, *Outliers: The story of success*, New York, NY: Little, Brown & Co.
- Glomb, Theresa M., 2002, 'Workplace anger and aggression: Informing conceptual models with data from specific encounters', *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology* 7(1), pp.20-36.
- Glynn, Carroll J., Susan Herbst, Mark Lindeman, Garrett J. O'Keefe, and Robert Y. Shapiro, 2016, *Public Opinion*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Glynn, Carroll J., and Jack M. McLeod, 1984, 'Public Opinion du Jour: An Examination of the Spiral of Silence', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48(4), pp.731-40.
- Gobet, Fernand, 2015, *Understanding expertise: A multi-disciplinary approach*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Godrej, Farah, 2011, 'Spaces for Counter-Narratives: The Phenomenology of Reclamation', *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* 32(3), pp.111-33.
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 1833, *Werke: Einzelheiten, Maximen und Reflexionen*, Tübingen: Cotta.
- Goffman, Erving, 1972, *Relations in Public*, London: Penguin.
- Goggin, Gerard, 2011, *Global Mobile Media*, London: Routledge.
- Goldberg, Amir, 2011, 'Mapping Shared Understandings Using Relational Class Analysis: The Case of the Cultural Omnivore Reexamined', *American Journal of Sociology* 116(5), pp.1397-1436.
- Goldberg, Lewis R., 1993, 'The structure of phenotypic personality traits', *The American Psychologist* 48(1), pp.26-34.
- Goldman, Alvin I., 1999, *Knowledge in a Social World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Goldstein, Daniel G., and Gert Gigerenzer, 2002, 'Models of ecological rationality: the recognition heuristic', *Psychological Review* 109(1), pp.75-90.

- Goldthorpe, John H., 1980, *Social Mobility and Class Structures in Modern Britain*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- , 1996, 'Class analysis and the reorientation of class theory: the case of persisting differentials in educational attainment', *British Journal of Sociology* 47(3), pp.481-505.
- , 2000, *On Sociology: Numbers, Narrative and the Integration of Research and Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2002, 'Globalisation and Social Class', *West European Politics* 25(3), pp.1-28.
- , and Keith Hope, 1974, *The Social Grading of Occupations: A New Approach and Scale*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Goleman, Daniel, 1996, *Emotional Intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Golomb, Jacob, 1995, *In Search of Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus*, London: Routledge.
- Goodall, Amanda H., Lawrence M Kahn, and Andrew J. Oswald, 2011, 'Why do leaders matter? A study of expert knowledge in a superstar setting', *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 77(3), pp.265-84.
- Goodin, Robert E. (ed.), 2011, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gosling, Samuel D., Peter J. Rentfrow, and William B. Swann, 2003, 'A Very Brief Measure of the Big-Five Personality Domains', *Journal of Research in Personality* 37(8), pp.504-28.
- Gountas, Sandra, John Gountas, and Felix T. Mavondo, 2014, 'Exploring the associations between standards for service delivery (organisational culture), co-worker support, self-efficacy, job satisfaction and customer orientation in the real estate industry', *Australian Journal of Management* 39(1), pp.107-26.
- Gove, Michael, 2016, Interview by Faisal Islam, 'EU: In or Out?', *Sky News*, London, 3 June, Television.
- Grabner, Isabella, and Gerhard Speckbacher, 2016, 'The cost of creativity: A control perspective', *Accounting, Organizations and Society* 48(1), pp.31-42.
- Graff, Gerald, 2000, 'Scholars and Sound Bites: The Myth of Academic Difficulty', *PMLA* 15(5), pp.1041-52.
- Graham, David A., 2017, "Alternative Facts": The Needless Lies of the Trump Administration', *The Atlantic*, 22 January, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/the-pointless-needless-lies-of-the-trump-administration/514061/> (accessed 16 April 2017).

- Gramsci, Antonio, 2005 [1935], *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (eds.), London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Grandjean, Martin, 2016, 'A social network analysis of Twitter: Mapping the digital humanities community', *Cogent Arts & Humanities* 3(1), published online.
- Grazian, David, 2010, 'Neoliberalism and the realities of reality TV', *Contexts* 9(2), pp.68-71.
- Greco, John, and Ernest Sosa, 1999, *Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Green, Deborah A., and Laura Suzanne Lieber, 2009, *Scriptural exegesis: the shapes of culture and the religious imagination: essays in honour of Michael Fishbane*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro, 1994, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*, Binghamton, NY: Vail-Ballou Press.
- Green, Jeffrey Edward, 2011, *The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Green, Jonathon, 1987, *Dictionary of Jargon*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Grierson, Jamie, 2017, 'Britons' trust in government, media and business falls sharply', *Guardian*, 16 January, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/16/britons-trust-in-government-media-business-falls-sharply> (accessed 24 February 2017).
- Grindstaff, Laura, 2011, 'Just be yourself—only more so: ordinary celebrity', in Marwan M. Kraidy and Katherine Sender (eds.), *The politics of reality television: Global perspectives*, London: Routledge, pp.44-58.
- Groenendyk, Eric W., 2011, 'Current Emotion Research in Political Science: How Emotions Help Democracy Overcome its Collective Action Problem', *Emotion Review* 3(4), pp.455-63.
- Gross, Bertram Myron, 1964, *The managing of organizations: The administrative struggle*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Grossberg, Lawrence, Cary Nelson, and Paula A. Treichler (eds.), 1992, *Cultural Studies*, London: Routledge.
- Grotius, Hugo, 2005 [1625], *The Rights of War and Peace*, Richard Tuck (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
- Grøthe, Åse Annbjørg, Stian Biong, and Ellen Karine Grov, 2015, 'Acting with dedication and expertise: Relatives' experience of nurses' provision of care in a palliative unit', *Palliative and Supportive Care* 13(6), pp.1547-58.

- Grudin, Jonathan, 2004, 'Crossing the divide', *ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction* 11(1), pp.1-25.
- Grusky, David, 2005, 'Foundations of a neo-Durkheimian class analysis', with Gabriela Galescu, in Erik Olin Wright (ed.), *Approaches to Class Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.51-81.
- Gruys, Melissa L., Susan M. Stewart, and Trupti Patel, 2009, 'Business etiquette in 12 countries: special considerations for female expatriates', *International Journal of Management Practice* 4(1), p.51.
- Guchait, Priyanko, Aysin Paşamehmetoğlu, and Mary Dawson, 2014, 'Perceived supervisor and co-worker support for error management: Impact on perceived psychological safety and service recovery performance', *International Journal of Hospitality Management* 41(1), pp.28-37.
- Guinn, Jeff, and Douglas Perry, 2005, *The Sixteenth Minute: Life In the Aftermath of Fame*, New York, NY: Jeremy F. Tarcher.
- Gutiérrez, Gustavo, 1973, *A Theology of Liberation*, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson, 2004, *Why Deliberative Democracy?*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gutsche, Robert E., 2015, *Media Control: News as an Institution of Power and Social Control*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Guttman, Louis, 1950, 'The basis for scalogram analysis, in Samuel Stouffer *et al.* (eds.), *Measurement and Prediction*, vol.IV, New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
- Guy, Josephine M., 1996, *The Victorian social-problem novel: the market, the individual and communal life*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Haakonssen, Knud, 2004, 'Protestant Natural Law Theory: A General Interpretation', in Natalie Brender and Larry Krasnoff (eds.), *New Essays on the History of Autonomy: A Collection Honoring J.B. Schneewind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.92-109.
- Habermas, Jürgen, 1981, 'Modernity versus Postmodernity', *New German Critique* 22(1), pp.3-14.
- , 1986 [1981], *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol.1: *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, Thomas McCarthy (tr.), Cambridge: Polity.
- , 1987 [1968], *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Cambridge: Polity.
- , 1988 [1973], *Legitimation Crisis*, Thomas McCarthy (tr.), Cambridge: Polity.
- , 1989a [1962], *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Thomas Burger (tr.), Cambridge: Polity.

- , 1989b [1985], *The Theory of Communicative Action, vol.2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, Thomas McCarthy (tr.), Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- , 1990, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber-Nicholsen (trs.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- , 1995, 'Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism', *The Journal of Philosophy* 92(3), pp.109-31.
- , 2014, 'Modernity – an Incomplete Project', in Peter Brooker (ed.), *Modernism/Postmodernism*, London: Routledge, pp.125-38.
- Hackman, J. Richard, and Richard E. Walton, 1986, 'Leading groups in organizations', in Paul S. Goodman (ed.), *Designing effective work groups*, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Hadden, Jeffrey K., and Anson D. Shupe, 1988, *Televangelism, power, and politics on God's frontier*, New York, NY: H. Holt.
- Hafen, Martin, 1998, 'Die gesellschaftliche Funktion der Sozialen Arbeit', *Fachzeitschrift Soziale Arbeit* 1998(21), pp.3-9.
- Hagy, Jessica, 2012, 'Plutchik's Wheel of Emotions', *Indexed*, 6 July, <http://thisisindexed.com/2012/07/plutchiks-wheel-of-emotions/> (accessed 30 January 2017).
- Haidt, Jonathan, 2007, 'The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology', *Science* 316, pp.998-1002.
- Hains, Sylvia M.J., and Darwin W. Muir, 1996, 'Infant sensitivity to adult eye direction', *Child Development* 67(5), pp.1940-51.
- Hall, Edward T., 1966, *The Hidden Dimension*, New York, NY: Doubleday.
- Hall, Stuart, 1980, 'Encoding/decoding', in Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Love, and Paul Willis (eds.), *Culture, Media, Language*, London: Hutchinson.
- Hallin, Daniel C., 1992, 'Sound Bite Democracy', *The Wilson Quarterly* 16(2), pp.34-7.
- Halmos, Paul (ed.), 1969, *The Sociology of Mass-Media Communicators*, Keele: Keele University.
- Hanauer, David I., and Shoshi Waksman, 2000, 'The Role of Explicit Moral Points in Fable Reading', *Discourse Processes* 30(2), pp.107-32.
- Hand, David J., 2004, *Measurement theory and practice: The world through quantification*, London: Arnold.
- Hansen, E. Damsgaard, 2001, *European Economic History: From Mercantilism to Maastricht and Beyond*, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School.

- Hanson, Russell, 1993, 'Deliberation, Tolerance and Democracy', in Russell Hanson and George Marcus (eds.), *Reconsidering the Democratic Public*, University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
- Hardman, David, 2009, *Judgment and decision making: psychological perspectives*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Hardt, Hanno, and Slavko Splichal (eds.), 2000, *Ferdinand Tönnies on Public Opinion: Selections and Analyses*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri, 2005, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, London: Penguin.
- Hareli, Shlomo, Nathan Berkovitch, Liat Livnat, and Shlomo David, 2013, 'Anger and shame as determinants of perceived competence', *International Journal of Psychology* 48(6), pp.1080-89.
- Hargreaves-Heap, Shaun P., and Yanis Varoufakis, 2004, *Game Theory: A Critical Introduction*, London: Routledge.
- Harmanşah, Ömür (ed.), 2014, *Of Rocks and Water: An Archaeology of Place*, Barnsley: Oxbow Books.
- Harmon-Jones, Cindy, Brandon Schmeichel, Eileen Mennitt, and Eddie Harmon-Jones, 2011, 'The Expression of Determination: Similarities between Anger and Approach-Related Positive Affect', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 100(1), pp.172-81.
- Harmon-Jones, Eddie, and Judson Mills (eds.), 1999, *Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology*, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Harmon-Jones, Eddie, Kate Vaughn-Scott, Sheri Mohr, Jonathan Sigelman, and Cindy Harmon-Jones, 2004, 'The Effect of Manipulated Sympathy and Anger on Left and Right Frontal Cortical Activity', *Emotion* 4(1), pp.95-101.
- Harris, James A. (ed.), 2017, *The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harris, John, 2016, 'Britain is in the midst of a working-class revolt', *Guardian*, 17 June, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/17/britain-working-class-revolt-eu-referendum> (accessed 19 July 2016).
- Harris, Judith Rich, 1995, 'Where is the child's environment? A group socialization theory of development', *Psychological Review* 102(3), pp.458-89.
- Harris, Nathan, 2006, 'Reintegrative Shaming, Shame, and Criminal Justice', *Journal of Social Issues* 62(2), pp.327-46.

- Harrison, Tom, 1940, 'What is Public Opinion?', *The Political Quarterly* 11(3), pp.368-83.
- Hart, H.L.A., (2012 [1961]), *The Concept of Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hartley, Henry Alexander, 1958, *Audio Design Handbook*, New York, NY: Gernsback Library.
- Harvard Law Review*, 2002, 'Originality', 115(7), pp.1988-2009.
- Harvey, David, 2014, *Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism*, London: Profile.
- Hastie, Reid, and Robyn M. Dawes, 2009, *Rational Choice in an Uncertain World: The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making*, London: Sage.
- Hastie, Reid, and Bernadette Park, 1986, 'The relationship between memory and judgment depends whether the task is memory-based or on-line', *Psychological Review* 93(3), pp.258-68.
- Hatchett, Shirley, and Howard Schuman, 1975, 'White Respondents and Race-of-Interviewer Effects', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 39(4), pp.523-8.
- Haugh, Michael, 2015, *Im/politeness implicatures*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Hauser, Gerard A., 2001, 'Reading Public Opinion: Vernacular Rhetoric and Political Learning', in Slavko Splichal (ed.), *Public Opinion & Democracy: Vox Populi – Vox Dei?*, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., pp.165-92.
- Hauser, Robert M., and John Robert Warren, 1997, 'Socioeconomic Indexes of Occupational Status: A Review, Update, and Critique', in Adrian Raftery (ed.), *Sociological Methodology 1997*, Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Hausman, Daniel M., 1992, *The inexact and separate science of economics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hautz, Wolf E., Therese Schröder, Katja A. Dannenberg, Maren März, Henrike Hölzer, Olaf Ahlers, and Anke Thomas, 2017, 'Shame in Medical Education: A Randomized Study of the Acquisition of Intimate Examination Skills and Its Effect on Subsequent Performance', *Teaching and Learning in Medicine*, published online, p.1-11.
- Hawisher, Gail E., and Cynthia L. Selfe, 1991, 'The Rhetoric of Technology and the Electronic Writing Class', *College Composition and Communication* 42(1), pp.55-65.
- Hayden, Mary, Jack Levy, and John Jeffrey Thompson (eds.), 2015, *The SAGE handbook of research in international education*, London: Sage.
- Hayden, Michael V., 2017, 'Donald Trump Is Undermining Intelligence Gathering', *New York Times*, 9 March, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/opinion/how-trump-undermines-intelligence-gathering.html?_r=0 (accessed 13 April 2017).

- Hayek, Friedrich A. von, 2012 [1973], *Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Hayes, Brian, 2000, 'The Nerds Have Won', *American Scientist* 88(5), p.1.
- Haykin, Simon, 2001, *Communication Systems*, Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
- Hays, William Lee, 1973, *Statistics for the Social Sciences*, London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Heavens, Rose A., 2015, *The Decline of Handwriting and the Effectiveness of Handwritten Communication: A Grounded Theory Study*, PhD thesis, University of Phoenix.
- Hecken, Thomas, 2010, 'Popular Culture, Popular Literature, and Literary Criticism Theory as the Politics of a Term', *Journal of Literary Theory* 4(2), pp.217-33.
- Heckman, James J., and Tim D. Kautz, 2012, 'Hard Evidence on Soft Skills', *Labour Economics* 19(4), pp.451-64.
- Hedegard, James M., 1979, 'The Impact of Legal Education: An In-Depth Examination of Career-Relevant Interests, Attitudes, and Personality Traits among First-Year Law Students', *American Bar Foundation Research Journal* 4(4), pp.791-868.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1991 [1821], *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Allen W. Wood (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heidegger, Martin, 1962 [1926], *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (tr.), Oxford: Blackwell.
- Heimer, Rawley Z., 2016, 'Peer Pressure: Social Interaction and the Disposition Effect', *Review of Financial Studies* 29(11), pp.3177-3209.
- Hellmueller, Lea C., and Nina Aeschbacher, 2010, 'Media and celebrity: Production and consumption of "wellknownness"', *Communication Research Trends* 29(4), pp.3-35.
- Helpman, Elhanan, 2004, *The Mystery of Economic Growth*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hemming, Lawrence Paul, and Susan Frank Parsons (eds.), 2011 [1998], *Restoring Faith in Reason: A New Translation of the Encyclical Letter Faith and Reason of John Paul II together with a commentary and discussion*, Canterbury: SCM Press.
- Henderson, J. Vernon, Peter M. Mieszkowski, and Yvon Sauvageau, 1976, *Peer group effects and educational production functions*, Ottawa, ON: Economic Council of Canada.
- Hendricks, Vincent F., 2006, *Mainstream and Formal Epistemology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Henley, Nancy M., 1977, *Body politics: Power, sex, and nonverbal communication*, New York, NY: Prentice-Hall.
- Heppner, Whitney L., Michael H. Kernis, John B. Nezlek, Joshua Foster, Chad E. Lakey, and Brian M. Goldman, 2008, 'Within-Person Relationships Among Daily Self-Esteem, Need Satisfaction, and Authenticity', *Psychological Science* 19(11), pp.1140-5.
- Herbert, John, 2000, *Journalism in the Digital Age: Theory and Practice for Broadcast, Print and On-line Media*, Kidlington: Focal Press.
- Herbst, Susan, 1993, *Numbered Voices*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- , 1998, *Reading Public Opinion: How Political Actors View the Democratic Process*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hermann, Anthony D., Austin J. Simpson, Mark J. Lehtman, and Robert C. Fuller, 2015, 'Does Guilt Motivate Prayer?', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 54(3), pp.540-54.
- Hermann, Margaret G., 1976, 'When leader personality will affect foreign policy: Some propositions', in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *In Search of Global Patterns*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, pp.326-33.
- Hern, Alex, 2015, 'How to (pretend to) be young and down with the internet', *Guardian*, 12 August, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/12/how-to-be-young-internet-lol-facebook> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Herring, Jonathan, and Charles Foster, 2012, 'Welfare means relationality, virtue and altruism', *Legal Studies* 32(3), pp.480-98.
- Hertenstein, Matthew J., Dacher Keltner, Betsy App, Brittany A. Bulleit, and Ariane R. Jaskolka, 2006, 'Touch communicates distinct emotions', *Emotion* 6(3), pp.528-33.
- Hertwig, Ralph, Jennifer Narissa Davis, and Frank J. Sulloway, 2002, 'Parental investment: How an equity motive can produce inequality', *Psychological Bulletin* 128(5), pp.728-45.
- Hertwig, Ralph, Stefan M. Herzog, Lael J. Schooler, and Torsten Reimer, 2008, 'Fluency heuristic: A model of how the mind exploits a by-product of information retrieval', *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition* 34(5), pp.1191-1206.
- Hertz-Lazarowitz, Rachel, and Norman Miller, 1992, *Interaction in Co-operative Groups: The Theoretical Anatomy of Group Learning*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hess, Amanda, 2016, 'Secrets of the Emoji World, Now With Its Own Convention', *New York Times*, 7 November, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/arts/secrets-of-the-emoji-world-now-with-its-own-convention-emojiicon.html> (accessed 16 April 2017).

- Hewitt, Andrew, 1993, *Fascist modernism: aesthetics, politics, and the avant-garde*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Higgins, E. Tory, and G. King, 1981, 'Accessibility of social constructs: Information-processing consequences of individual and contextual variation', in N. Cantor and J.F. Kihlstrom (eds.), *Personality, Cognition, and Social Interaction*, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp.69-121.
- Hill, Annette, Lennart Weibull, and Åsa Nilsson, 2007, 'Public and popular: British and Swedish audience trends in factual and reality television', *Cultural Trends* 16(1), pp.17-41.
- Hilton, James L., and William von Hippel, 1996, 'Stereotypes', *Annual Review of Psychology* 47(1), pp.237-71.
- Himberg, Julia, 2014, 'Multicasting', *Television & New Media* 15(4), pp.289-304.
- Hind, John, and Stephen Mosco, 1985, *Rebel radio: the full story of British pirate radio*, London: Pluto Press.
- Hippocrates, 1983, *Hippocratic Writings*, G.E.R. Lloyd (ed.), London: Penguin.
- Hirose, Iwao, and Jonas Olson (eds.), 2015, *The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hirschhorn, Kristine A., 2006, 'Exclusive versus everyday forms of professional knowledge: legitimacy claims in conventional and alternative medicine', *Sociology of Health & Illness* 28(5), pp.533-57.
- Hirsh, Jacob B., Sonia K. Kang, and Galen V. Bodenhausen, 'Personalized persuasion: Tailoring persuasive appeals to recipient personality traits', *Psychological Science* 23(6) (2012), pp.578-81.
- Hirst, D., and A. Di Cristo, *Intonation Systems*, 1998, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hitti, Aline, and Melanie Killen, 2015, 'Expectations About Ethnic Peer Group Inclusivity: The Role of Shared Interests, Group Norms, and Stereotypes', *Child Development* 86(5), pp.1522-37.
- Ho, Chien-Ta Bruce, Yu-Ting Chou, and Peter O'Neill, 2010, 'Technology adoption of mobile learning: a study of podcasting', *International Journal of Mobile Communications* 8(4), p.468.
- Hobbes, Thomas, 1996, *Leviathan*, Richard Tuck (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobhouse, Leonard T., 1994 [1911], *Liberalism*, in Hobhouse, *Liberalism and Other Writings*, James Meadowcroft (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hochstrasser, Tim J., 2000, *Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hodder-Williams, Richard, 1970, *Public Opinion Polls and British Politics*, Abingdon: Routledge.

- Hoehl, Stefanie, Sebastian Wahl, and Sabina Pauen, 2013, 'Disentangling the Effects of an Adult Model's Eye Gaze and Head Orientation on Young Infants' Processing of a Previously Attended Object', *Infancy* 19(1), p.53.
- Hoerder, Dirk, and Silke Neunsinger, 2015, *Towards a Global History of Domestic and Caregiving Workers*, Leiden: Brill.
- Hoevel, Ann, 2010, 'Are you a nerd or a geek?', *CNN*, 2 December, <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/12/02/nerd.or.geek/index.html> (accessed 17 April 2017).
- Hofer, Barbara K., and Paul R. Pintrich, 1997, 'The Development of Epistemological Theories: Beliefs about Knowledge and Knowing and Their Relation to Learning', *Review of Educational Research* 67(1), pp.88-140.
- Hoff, Erika, Cynthia Core, and Kelly Bridges, 2008, 'Non-word repetition assesses phonological memory and is related to vocabulary development in 20- to 24-month-olds', *Journal of Child Language* 35(4), pp.903-16.
- Hoffman, Steven J., and Charlie Tan, 2013, 'Following celebrities' medical advice? meta-narrative analysis', *British Medical Journal* 347(1), f7151.
- , 2015, 'Biological, psychological and social processes that explain celebrities' influence on patients' health-related behaviors', *Archives of Public Health* 73(3), pp.1-11.
- Hoffman, Tom, 2001, 'Democratic Theory and the Intellectual Division of Labor in Mass Electorates', in Slavko Splichal (ed.), *Public Opinion & Democracy: Vox Populi – Vox Dei?*, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., pp.125-46.
- Hofstadter, Richard, 1963, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life*, New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Høigaard, Rune, Gareth W. Jones, and Derek M. Peters, 2008, 'Preferred Coach Leadership Behaviour in Elite Soccer in Relation to Success and Failure', *International Journal of Sports Science & Coaching* 3(2), published online.
- Holden, Lynn, 2001, *Taboos: structure and rebellion*, London: Institute for Cultural Research.
- Holland, Elise, Elizabeth Baily Wolf, Christine Looser, and Amy Cuddy, 2017, 'Visual attention to powerful postures: People avert their gaze from nonverbal dominance displays', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 68(1), pp.60-7.
- Hollmann, Barbara B., 2002, 'Hazing: Hidden campus crime', *New Directions for Student Services* 99, pp.11-24.

- Holloway, John, 2002, *Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today*, London: Pluto Press.
- Holmberg, Börje, 1995, *Theory and Practice of Distance Education*, London: Routledge.
- Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 2012 [1881], 'Lecture III—D. Liability for unintended Harm is determined by what would be Blameworthy in Average man', in Holmes, *The Common Law*, York: Empire Books.
- Holmes, Su, and Deborah Jermyn (eds.), 2004, *Understanding reality television*, London: Routledge.
- Holmwood, John, 1996, *Social Stratification*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Holton, Gerald, 1993, *Science and anti-science*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hood, Christopher, and Michael Jackson, 1991, *Administrative argument*, Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Hooghe, Marc, and Jennifer Oser, 2015, 'The rise of engaged citizenship: The evolution of citizenship norms among adolescents in 21 countries between 1999 and 2009', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 56(1), pp.29-52.
- Hook, Sydney, 1943, *The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility*, London: Transaction.
- hooks, bell, 1987, *Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism*, London: Pluto Press.
- Hopia, Henna, 2013, 'Decline of the media? Decline of democracy?', *European View* 12(1), pp.41-9.
- Horberg, Elizabeth J., Christopher Oveis, Dacher Keltner, and Adam B. Cohen, 2009, 'Disgust and the moralisation of purity', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 97(6), pp.972-3.
- Horgan, John, 2005, 'The Social and Psychological Characteristics of Terrorism and Terrorists', in Tore Bjorgo (ed.), *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities, and Ways Forward*,
- Horkheimer, Max, 1972 [1938], 'Traditional and Critical Theory', in Horkheimer, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, Matthew J. O'Connell et al. (tr.), New York, NY: Continuum, pp.188-243.
- Horsfield, Peter G., 2015, *From Jesus to the internet: a history of Christianity and media*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Houthakker, Hendrik Samuel, 1956, 'Economics and biology: Specialization and speciation', *Kyklos* 9(2), pp.181-9.
- Houts, Renate M., Avshalom Caspi, Robert C. Pianta, Louise Arseneault, and Terrie E. Moffitt, 2010, 'The Challenging Pupil in the Classroom: The Effect of the Child on the Teacher', *Psychological Science* 21(12), pp.1802-10.

- Howell, Lydia Pleotis, Kimberly D. Elsbach, and Amparo C. Villablanca, 2016, 'The Role of Compensation Criteria to Minimize Face-Time Bias and Support Faculty Career Flexibility', *Academic Pathology* 3, published online.
- Hoy, David Couzens, 2002, 'Critical Resistance: Foucault and Bourdieu', in Gail Weiss & Honi Fern Haber, *Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersections of Nature and Culture*, London: Routledge.
- Hu, Hsin-Hui, H.G. Parsa, Chi-Ting Chen, and Hsin-Yi Hu, 2016, 'Factors affecting employee willingness to report customer feedback', *The Service Industries Journal* 36(1-2), pp.21-36.
- Huber, David Miles, 2005, *Modern Recording Techniques*, Kidlington: Focal Press.
- Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, and Erin Cassese, 2007, 'On the distinct political effects of anxiety and anger', in W. Russell Neuman, George E. Marcus, Ann N. Crigler, and Michael MacKuen (eds.), *The affect effect: Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and behaviour*, pp.202-30.
- Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav, 2005, 'Threat, anxiety, and support of antiterrorism policies', *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3), pp.593-608.
- Hudson, Liam, 1973, *Originality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huff, Darrell, and Irving Geis, 1954, *How to Lie with Statistics*, New York, NY: Norton.
- Hughes, Paul M., 2013, 'Anger', in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, pp.67-70.
- Hugon, Artur, Alok Kumar, and An-Ping Lin, 2016, 'Analysts, Macroeconomic News, and the Benefit of Active In-House Economists', *Accounting Review* 91(2), pp.513-34.
- Huizinga, David, and Delbert S. Elliott, 1986, 'Reassessing the Reliability and Validity of Self-Report Delinquency Measures', *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 2(4), pp.293-327.
- Huizinga, Johan, 1955, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture*, Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Hume, David, 1985, 'Of the First Principles of Government', in Hume, *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, Eugene F. Miller (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
- Humphery, Kim, 1998, *Shelf Life: Supermarkets and the Changing Cultures of Consumption*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Humphreys, Paul (ed.), 2016, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hurn, Brian J., 2014, 'Body language – a minefield for international business people', *Industrial and Commercial Training* 46(4), pp.188-93.

- Hurrelmann, Klaus, 2009 [1988], *Social Structure and Personality Development: The Individual as a Productive Processor of Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hurtz, Gregory M., and John J. Donovan, 2000, 'Personality and Job Performance: The Big Five Revisited', *Journal of Applied Psychology* 85(6), pp.869-79.
- Hutchinson, Marie, Margaret H. Vickers, Debra Jackson, and Lesley Wilkes, 2005, "I'm Gonna Do What I Wanna Do": Organizational Change as a Legitimized Vehicle for Bullies', *Health Care Management Review* 30(4), pp.331-6.
- Hurdeman, Anton A., 2003, *The worldwide history of telecommunications*, Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
- Ianucci, Armando (dir.), 2007 [2005], 'Series 2 – Episode 3', *The Thick of It*, London: BBC Worldwide, DVD.
- Ifill, Gwen, 2012, 'The Curse of the Political Surrogate: When Silence Should Be Golden', *PBS*, 20 April, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/the-curse-of-the-political-surrogate-when-silence-should-be-golden/> (accessed 17 April 2017).
- Ifrah, Georges, 1999, *The Universal History of Numbers: From Prehistory to the Invention of the Computer*, Oxford: Wiley.
- Ikenberry, G. John, 1999, 'Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order', *International Security* 23(3), pp.43-78.
- Immelman, Aubrey, 1998, 'The political personalities of 1996 U.S. presidential candidates Bill Clinton and Bob Dole', *The Leadership Quarterly* 9(3), pp.335-66.
- Inbar, Yoel, David A. Pizarro, Thomas Gilovich, and Dan Ariely, 2013, 'Moral masochism: on the connection between guilt and self-punishment', *Emotion* 13(1), pp.14-18.
- Inglehart, Ronald, 1977, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- International Labor Office, 1990 [1968], *International Standard Classification of Occupations: ISCO-88*, Geneva: ILO.
- Inzlicht, Michael, Ian McGregor, Jacob B. Hirsh, and Kyle Nash, 2009, 'Neural markers of religious conviction', *Psychological Science* 20(3), pp.385-92.
- Ipsos MORI, 2016, 'June 2016 Political Monitor', 23 June, <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/eu-referendum-topline-23-june-2016.pdf> (accessed 25 August 2016).

- Isbell, Linda, and Victor C. Ottati, 2002, 'The Emotional Voter', in Victor C. Ottati, R. Scott Tindale, John Edwards, Fred B. Bryant, Linda Heath, Daniel C. O'Donnell, Yolanda Suarez-Balcazar, and Emil J. Posavac (eds.), *The Social Psychology of Politics*, New York, NY: Kluwer, pp.55-74.
- Ishizuka, Karen L. and Patricia Rodden Zimmermann, 2008, *Mining the home movie: excavations in histories and memories*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Israel, Jonathan L., 2000, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald Kinder, 1987, *News That Matters*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Izard, Carroll Ellis, 1972, *Patterns of Emotions: A New Analysis of Anxiety and Depression*, New York, NY: Academic Press.
- , 1977, *Human Emotions*, New York, NY: Springer.
- Jack, Rachael E., Oliver G.B. Garrod, and Philippe G. Schyns, 2014, 'Dynamic Facial Expressions of Emotion Transmit an Evolving Hierarchy of Signals over Time', *Current Biology* 24(2), pp.187-92.
- Jackson, Stanley W., *Melancholia and Depression: From Hippocratic Times to Modern Times*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Jacobs, Ben, 2017, 'Trump attacks "dishonest media" while making false claims at Florida rally', *Guardian*, 19 February, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/18/donald-trump-attacks-press-dishonest-media-florida-rally> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Jacobs, Jerry A., and Scott Frickel, 2009, 'Interdisciplinarity: A critical assessment', *Annual Review of Sociology* 35(1), pp.43-65.
- Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro, 2000, *Politicians don't pander: Political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Jacobs, Merle, and Stephen E. Bosanac (eds.), 2006, *The Professionalization of Work*, Whitby, ON: de Sitter.
- Jacoby, Ryan, Rachel Leonard, Bradley Riemann, and Jonathan Abramowitz, 2016, 'Self-Punishment as a Maladaptive Thought Control Strategy Mediates the Relationship Between Beliefs About Thoughts and Repugnant Obsessions', *Cognitive Therapy and Research* 40(2), pp.179-87.
- James, Paul, and Imre Szeman, 2010, *Globalization and Culture, vol.3: Global-Local Consumption*, London: Sage.

- James, C. Vaughan, 1973, *Soviet Socialist Realism: Origins and Theory*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- James, William T., 1932, 'A study of the expression of bodily posture', *Journal of General Psychology* 7(2), pp.405-36.
- , 2000 [1890], *The Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols., Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.
- Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, 1996, *Packaging the presidency: A history and criticism of presidential campaign advertising*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , and Joseph N. Cappella, 2008, *Echo chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the conservative media establishment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , and Paul Waldman, 2003, *The Press Effect: Politicians, Journalists, and the Stories That Shape the Political World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jaquith, Andrew, 2006, *Security Metrics: Replacing Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt*, Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Jarus, T., O. Bart, G. Rabinovich, A. Sadeh, L. Bloch, T. Dolfin, and I. Litmanovitz, 2011, 'Effects of prone and supine positions on sleep state and stress responses in preterm infants', *Infant Behavior and Development* 34(2), pp.257-63.
- Jee, Samuel D., Ellen I. Schafheutle, and Peter R. Noyce, 2016, 'Exploring the process of professional socialisation and development during pharmacy pre-registration training in England', *International Journal of Pharmacy Practice* 24(4), pp.283-93.
- Jehn, Karen A., 1995, 'A multimethod examination of the benefits and detriments of intragroup conflict', *Administrative Science Quarterly* 40(2), pp.256-82.
- Jencks, Christopher, 1979, *Who Gets Ahead? The Determinants of Economic Success in America*, New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Jensen, Robert, and Nolan Miller, 2007, 'Giffen Behavior: Theory and Evidence', *NBER Working Paper No.13243*.
- , 2008, 'Giffen Behavior and Subsistence Consumption', *American Economic Review* 97(4), pp.1553-77.
- Jensen, T., 2014, 'Welfare Commonsense, Poverty Porn and Doxosophy', *Sociological Research Online* 19(3), published online.
- Jervis, Robert, 2009, 'Unipolarity: A structural perspective', *World Politics* 61(1), pp.188-231.
- Jevons, W. Stanley, 1875, *Money and the Mechanism of Exchange*, London: Macmillan.

- Jo, Tae-Hee, Lynne Chester, and Carlo D'Ippoliti (eds.), 2018, *The Routledge Handbook of Heterodox Economics*, London: Routledge.
- John, Oliver P., 1989, 'Towards a taxonomy of personality descriptors', in David M. Buss and Nancy Cantor (eds.), *Personality Psychology: Recent trends and emerging directions*, New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.
- Johnson, Addie, 2004, *Attention: Theory and Practice*, New York, NY: Sage.
- Johnson, Carolyn Y., 2017, 'Harvard scientist worries we're "reverting to a pre-Enlightenment form of thinking"', *Washington Post*, 23 February, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/02/23/harvard-scientist-worries-were-reverting-to-a-pre-enlightenment-form-of-thinking/?utm_term=.480164b3dd36 (accessed 23 February 2017).
- Johnson, John A., 2004, 'Impact of item characteristics on item and scale validity', *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 39(2), pp.273-302.
- Johnson, Joseph, Gerard J. Tellis, and Deborah J. Macinnis, 2005, 'Losers, Winners, and Biased Trades', *Journal of Consumer Research* 2(32), pp.324-9.
- Johnson, Malynnda A., 2016, 'Asking Numbers to Speak', *Qualitative Health Research* 26(13), pp.1761-73.
- Johnson, Paul, 2008, 'The peacock and the professional: Nelson and Wellington, both heroes for all their flaws', *Daily Mail*, 6 February, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-512555/The-peacock-professional-Nelson-Wellington-heroes-flaws.html> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- Johnson-Cartee, Karen S., and Gary Copeland, 2013, *Negative political advertising: Coming of age*, London: Routledge.
- Johnstone, Ronald, 1983, *Religion in Society: A Sociology of Religion*, New York, NY: Prentice Hall.
- Jones, Andrew, and Julie Fitness, 2008, 'Moral hypervigilance: The influence of disgust sensitivity in the moral domain', *Emotion* 8(5), pp.613-27.
- Jones, Carwyn, 2005, 'Character, virtue and physical education', *European Physical Education Review* 11(2), pp.139-51.
- Jones, Gareth R., 1986, 'Socialization tactics, self-efficacy, and newcomers' adjustments to organizations', *Academy of Management Journal* 29(2), pp.262-79.
- Jones, Owen, 2015, *The Establishment: And how they get away with it*, London: Penguin.

- Jones, Quentin, Gilad Ravid, and Sheizaf Rafaeli, 2004, 'Information overload and the message dynamics of online interaction spaces: A theoretical model and empirical exploration', *Information Systems Research* 15(2), pp.194-210.
- Jones, Robert A., 1976, 'The Origin and Development of Media of Exchange', *Journal of Political Economy* 84(4), pp.757-76.
- Jones, Roger, 2002, 'Declining altruism in medicine', *British Medical Journal* 324(7338), pp.624-5.
- Jones, Stanley E., and A. Elaine Yarborough, 1985, 'A naturalistic study of the meanings of touch', *Communication Monographs* 52(1), pp.19-56.
- Jong, Jonathan, and Jamin Halberstadt, 2016, *Death Anxiety and Religious Belief: An Existential Psychology of Religion*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Jordan, Amy B., 2009, 'Social class, temporal orientation, and mass media use within the family system', *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 9(4), pp.374-86.
- Jowett, Garth S., and Victoria O'Donnell, 2014, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Judge, Timothy A., Chad A. Higgins, Carl J. Thoresen, and Murray R. Barrick, 1999, 'The Big Five Personality Traits, General Mental Ability, and Career Success across the Life Span', *Personnel Psychology* 52(3), pp.621-52.
- Jue, Arthur L., Jackie Alcalde Marr, and Mary Ellen Kassotakis, 2010, *Social media at work: how networking tools propel organizational performance*, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark (ed.), 2011, *The Oxford Handbook of Global Religions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jung, Carl Gustav, 1971 [1921], *Psychological Types*, in Jung, *Collected Works*, vol.6, Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, Gerhard Adler, and William McGuire (eds.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jung, Heajung, In-Jo Park, and Juil Rie, 2015, 'Future time perspective and career decisions: The moderating effects of affect spin', *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 89(1), pp.46-55.
- Jungherr, Andreas, Pascal Jürgens, and Harald Schoen, 2012, 'Why the pirate party won the German election of 2009 or the trouble with predictions: A response to Tumasjan *et al.*', *Social Science Computer Review* 30(2), pp.229-34.
- Junn, Jane, Tali Mendelberg, and Erica Czaja, 2012, 'Race and the Group Bases of Public Opinion', in Adam J. Berinsky (ed.), *New Directions in Public Opinion*, London: Routledge.

- Just, David R., Ozge Sigirci, and Brian Wansink, 2015, 'Peak-end pizza: prices delay evaluations of quality', *Journal of Product & Brand Management* 24(7), pp.770-8.
- Kaboolian, Linda, 1998, 'The New Public Management: Challenging the Boundaries of the Management vs. Administration Debate', *Public Administration Review* 58(3), pp.189-93.
- Kadushin, Charles, 2012, *Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kagan, Jerome, 1998, *Galen's Prophecy: Temperament in Human Nature*, New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Kagan, Shelly, 2012, *The Geometry of Desert*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kahana, Eva, David E. Biegel, and May L. Wykle, 1994, *Family caregiving across the lifespan*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Kahneman, Daniel, 2003, 'Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics', *The American Economic Review* 93(5), pp.1449-75.
- , 2011, *Thinking, fast and slow*, New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- , and Shane Frederick, 2002, 'Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment', in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman (eds.), *Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.49-81.
- , Barbara L. Fredrickson, Charles A. Schreiber, and Donald A. Redelmeier, 1993, 'When More Pain Is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End', *Psychological Science* 4(6), pp.401-5.
- Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, 1979, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk', *Econometrica* 47(2), pp.263-92.
- , 1982, 'The simulation heuristic', in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.201-10.
- Kahoe, Richard D., and Rebecca Fox Dunn, 1976, 'The fear of death and religious attitudes and behavior', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 14(4), pp.379-82.
- Kang, Jun, Thomas B. Alejandro, and Mark D. Groza, 2015, 'Customer-company identification and the effectiveness of loyalty programs', *Journal of Business Research* 68(2), pp.464-71.
- Kant, Immanuel, 1952 [1781], *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica.
- , 1996 [1784], 'An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?', in Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, Mary J. Gregor (tr.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Käpilä, Markku, 2014, 'A phenomenological view of pictures in teaching and a novel method of analysing them', *Nordina* 10(2), pp.231-42.
- Kalathil, Shanthi, 2011, *Developing independent media as an institution of accountable governance: a how-to guide*, Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Kallio, Kirsi Pauliina, 2012, 'Political Presence and the Politics of Noise', *Space and Polity* 16(3), pp.287-302.
- Katwala, Sunder, 2009, 'Bringing equality back in: the role of a think-tank', *Benefits: the journal of poverty and social justice* 17(1), pp.57-63.
- Kaufman, James C., and Ronald A. Beghetto, 2009, 'Beyond Big and Little: The Four C Model of Creativity', *Review of General Psychology* 13(1), pp.1-12.
- Kaufman, Nancy, Susan Allan, and Jennifer Ibrahim, 2013, 'Using Public Health Legal Counsel Effectively: Beliefs, Barriers and Opportunities for Training', *The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* 41(2), pp.61-4.
- Kawamoto, Kevin, 2003, *Digital Journalism: Emerging Media and the Changing Horizons of Journalism*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kaye, Simon T., 2015, 'Democracy despite ignorance: questioning the veneration of knowledge in politics', *Critical Review* 27(3-4), pp.316-37.
- Keirse, David, and Marilyn Bates, 1984, *Please Understand Me: Character and Temperament Types*, Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis Book Co.
- Kellenbenz, Hermann, 1976, *The rise of the European economy: an economic history of continental Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century*, New York, NY: Holmes & Meier Publishers.
- Keller, Punam Anand, 1999, 'Converting the unconverted: The effect of inclination and opportunity to discount health-related fear appeals', *Journal of Applied Psychology* 84(3), pp.403-15.
- Kellner, Peter, 2014, 'The changing politics of social class', *YouGov*, 9 June, <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/06/09/changing-politics-social-class/> (accessed 6 April 2017).
- Kelly, Kathleen, 1999, 'Media and Primary Socialization Theory', *Substance Use & Misuse* 34(7), pp.1033-45.
- Kelly, Jason M., 2009, *The Society of Dilettanti: Archaeology and Identity in the British Enlightenment*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Kelly, Nora, 2016, 'The Gamble of Using Campaign Surrogates', *The Atlantic*, 24 May, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/surrogates-clinton-trump-sanders/484031/> (accessed 17 April 2017).
- Kelman, Mark, 1987, *A Guide to Critical Legal Studies*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kelsen, Hans, 2009 [1934], *Pure Theory of Law*, Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange.
- Keltner, Dacher, Phoebe Ellsworth, and Kari Edwards, 1993, 'Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger on Social Perception', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 64(5), pp.740-52.
- Kemp, Simon, and Kenneth T. Strongman, 1995, 'Anger theory and management: A historical analysis', *American Journal of Psychology* 108(3), pp.397-417.
- Kendall, Lori, 1999, 'Nerd Nation: Images of Nerds in U.S. Popular Culture', *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 2(2), pp.260-83.
- Kendon, Adam, 2004, *Gesture: Visible Action as Utterance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kennedy, Duncan, 2004, *Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System: A Critical Edition*, New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Kenney, Mary Kay, 2012, 'Child, Family, and Neighborhood Associations with Parent and Peer Interactive Play During Early Childhood', *Maternal and Child Health Journal* 16(S1), pp.88-101.
- Kenschaft, Lori, 2008, *Professions and Professionalization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kenski, Kate, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (eds.), 2017, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kernis, Michael H., and Brian M. Goldman, 2006, 'A multicomponent conceptualization of authenticity: Theory and research', *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 38, pp.283-357.
- Kerrigan, Colm, 2012, "'Sweet analytics": Athleticism and Elementary-School Football Associations', *International Journal of the History of Sport* 29(18), pp.2500-31.
- Kettl, Donald F., 2016, 'Making Data Speak: Lessons for Using Numbers for Solving Public Policy Puzzles', *Governance: an international journal of policy and administration* 29(4), pp.573-9.
- Key, Valdemar O., 1967 [1961], *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, New York, NY: Knopf.
- Kierkegaard, Søren, 1985 [1844], *Philosophical Fragments*, in Kierkegaard, *Writings VII*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- , 1992 [1846], *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, in Kierkegaard, *Writings XII*, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (eds.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- , 2015 [1844], *The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin*, Alastair Hannay (ed.), New York, NY: Liveright.
- Kiesling, Stephan, Jil Klünder, Diana Fischer, Kurt Schneider, and Kai Fischbach, 2016, 'Applying social network analysis and centrality measures to improve information flow analysis', *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, vol. 10027, pp.379-86.
- Kilpatrick, Kym L., 2005, 'The Parental Empathy Measure: A New Approach to Assessing Child Maltreatment Risk', *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 75(4), pp.608-20.
- Kim, Kyung Hee, 2005, 'Can only intelligent people be creative?', *Journal of Secondary Gifted Education* 16(1), pp.57-66.
- Kim, Sara, and Aparna A. Labroo, 2011, 'From Inherent Value to Incentive Value: When and Why Pointless Effort Enhances Consumer Preference', *Journal of Consumer Research* 38(4), pp.712-42.
- Kincaid, Harold, and Don Ross (eds.), 2009, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kinder, Donald, 1994, 'Reason and Emotion in American Political Life', in Roger Schank and Ellen Langer (eds.), *Beliefs, Reasoning, and Decision Making*, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- , and Lynn Sanders, 1990, 'Mimicking political debate with survey questions: The case of white opinion on affirmative action for blacks', *Social Cognition* 8(1), pp.73-103.
- Kipfelsberger, Petra, Dennis Herhausen, and Heike Bruch, 2016, 'How and when customer feedback influences organizational health', *Journal of Managerial Psychology* 31(2), pp.624-40.
- Kirch, Max S., 1979, 'Non-Verbal Communication Across Cultures', *Modern Language Journal* 63(8), pp.416-23.
- Kirkham, Sam, 2015, 'Intersectionality and the social meanings of variation: Class, ethnicity, and social practice', *Language in Society* 44(5), pp.629-52.
- Kitahara, Minoru, and Yohei Sekiguchi, 2008, 'Condorcet Jury Theorem or Rational Ignorance', *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 10(2), pp.281-300.
- Klee, Stephanie, and Karl-Heinz Renner, 2013, 'In search of the "Rescue Personality": A questionnaire study with emergency medical services personnel', *Personality and Individual Differences* 54(5), pp.669-72.

- Klein, Gary, and Andrea Jarosz, 2011, 'A Naturalistic Study of Insight', *Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making* 5(4), pp.335-51.
- Klein, Howard J., Jinyan Fan, and Kristopher J. Preacher, 2006, 'The effects of early socialization experiences on content mastery and outcomes: A mediational approach', *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 68(1), pp.96-115.
- Klein, Howard J., and Natasha A. Weaver, 2000, 'The effectiveness of an organizational-level orientation training program in the socialization of new hires', *Personnel Psychology* 53(1), pp.47-66.
- Kmicinska, Malgorzata, Sara Zaniboni, Donald M. Truxillo, Franco Fraccaroli, and Mo Wang, 2016, 'Effects of rate conscientiousness on evaluations of task and contextual performance of older and younger co-workers', *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology* 25(5), pp.707-21.
- Knapp, Mark L., Judith A. Hall, and Terrence G. Horgan (eds.), 2014, *Nonverbal Communication in Human Interaction*, Boston, MA: Wadsworth.
- Koehler, Derek J., and Nigel Harvey, 2004, *Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision-making*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kolker, Robert (ed.), 2008, *The Oxford Handbook of Film and Media Studies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kollontai, Alexandra, 1980, *Selected Writings*, Alix Holt (tr.), New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.
- Komarraju, Meera, and Steven J. Karau, 2005, 'The relationship between the big five personality traits and academic motivation', *Personality and Individual Differences* 39(3), pp.557-67.
- Koriat, Asher, Rakefet Ackerman, Kathrin Lockl, and Wolfgang Schneider, 2009, 'The memorizing effort heuristic in judgments of learning: A developmental perspective', *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology* 102(3), pp.265-79.
- Kornhauser, Arthur, 1950, 'Public Opinion and Social Class', *American Journal of Sociology* 55(4), pp.333-45.
- Kosko, Bart, 2006, *Noise*, New York, NY: Viking Press.
- Kounios, John, and Mark Beeman, 2009, 'The Aha! Moment: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Insight', *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 18(4), pp.210-16.
- Kovarik, Bill, 2011, *Revolutions in Communication: Media History from Gutenberg to the Digital Age*, New York, NY: Continuum.

- Kozbelt, Aaron, Ronald A. Beghetto, and Mark A. Runco, 2010, 'Theories of Creativity', in James C. Kaufman and Robert J. Sternberg (eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kraus, Michael W., and Jun W. Park, 2014, 'The undervalued self: social class and self-evaluation', *Frontiers in Psychology* 5, p.1404.
- Krauss, Robert M., Yihsiu Chen, and Purnima Chawla, 2000, 'Nonverbal behaviour and nonverbal communication: What do conversational hand gestures tell us?', *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 1(2), pp.389-450.
- Kress, Gunther R., 2010, *Multimodality: Exploring Contemporary Methods of Communication*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Krippendorff, Klaus, and Mary Angela Bock (eds.), 2008, *The Content Analysis Reader*, London: Sage.
- Krishnamurthi, Lakshman, Tridib Mazumdar, and S.P. Raj, 'Asymmetric Response to Price in Consumer Brand Choice and Purchase Quantity Decisions', *Journal of Consumer Research* 19(3), pp.387-400.
- Krishnan, Armin, 2009, *What are Academic Disciplines? Some observations on the Disciplinarity vs. Interdisciplinarity debate*, Southampton: University of Southampton.
- Kristeva, Julia, 1989, *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Krosnick, Jon A., 1988, 'The role of attitude importance in social evaluation: A study of policy preferences, presidential candidate evaluations, and voting behaviour', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 55(2), pp.196-210.
- , 1990, 'Government policy and citizen passion: A study of issue publics in contemporary America', *Political Behavior* 12(1), pp.59-92.
- Kruger, Justin, and David Dunning, 1999, 'Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77(6), pp.1121-34.
- , Derrick Wirtz, Leaf van Boven, and T. William Altermatt, 2004, 'The effort heuristic', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 40(1), 91-8.
- Kuhl, Patricia K., 2011, 'Early Language Learning and Literacy: Neuroscience Implications for Education', *Mind, Brain, and Education* 5(3), pp.128-42.

- Kühne, Rinaldo, Christian Schemer, Jörg Matthes, and Werner Wirth, 2011, 'Affective Priming in Political Campaigns: How Campaign-Induced Emotions Prime Political Opinions', *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 23(4), pp.485-507.
- Kumar, Anand, 2010, 'Understanding Lohia's Political Sociology: Intersectionality of Caste, Class, Gender and Language', *Economic & Political Weekly* 45(40), pp.64-70.
- Kumar, Krishna, 2006, *Promoting independent media: strategies for democracy assistance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Kunda, Ziva, 1999, *Social Cognition: Making Sense of People*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Künzler, Jan, 1989, *Medien und Gesellschaft: Die Medienkonzepte von Talcott Parsons, Jürgen Habermas und Niklas Luhmann*, Stuttgart, Germany: Enke.
- Lacewing, Michael, 2015, 'Expert Moral Intuition and Its Development: A Guide to the Debate', *Topoi* 34(2), pp.409-25.
- Lacey, Simon, and Rebecca Lawson, 2013, *Multisensory Imagery*, New York, NY: Springer.
- Ladd, D. Robert, 2009, *Intonational Phonology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- LaFata, Alexia, 2014, 'Stop Texting: It's Actually (Scientifically and Psychologically) F*cking Up Your Life', *Elite Daily*, 15 September, <http://elitedaily.com/life/culture/psychology-modern-day-texting-5-reasons-actually-ruining/752583/> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- LaFollette, Hugh (ed.), 2003, *The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (ed.), 2014, *Ethics in Practice: An Anthology*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Lagorio-Chafkin, Christine, 2014, 'Clickbait Bites. Downworthy Is Actually Doing Something About It', *Inc.*, 27 January, <https://www.inc.com/christine-lagorio/clickbait-destroyer-downworthy.html> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- Lai, Linda, 2010, 'Maximising without difficulty: A modified maximising scale and its correlates', *Judgment and Decision Making* 5(3), pp.164-75.
- Laible, Deborah J., Gustavo Carlo, and Scott C. Roesch, 2004, 'Pathways to self-esteem in late adolescence: the role of parent and peer attachment, empathy, and social behaviours', *Journal of Adolescence* 27(6), pp.703-16.
- Lakey, Chad E., Michael H. Kernis, Whitney L. Heppner, and Charles E. Lance, 2008, 'Individual differences in authenticity and mindfulness as predictors of verbal defensiveness', *Journal of Research in Personality* 42(1), pp.230-8.
- Lampert, Khen, 2012, *Meritocratic Education and Social Worthlessness*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Lampos, Vasileios, Nikolaos Aletras, Jens K. Geyti, Bin Zou, and Ingemar J. Cox, 2016, 'Inferring the Socioeconomic Status of Social Media Users Based on Behaviour and Language', *European Conference on Informational Retrieval: Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, vol.9626, pp.689-95.
- Landauer, Matthew, 2015, 'Democracy, Voter Ignorance, and the Limits of Foot Voting', *Critical Review* 27(3-4), pp.338-49.
- Landry, Lorraine Y., 2000, *Marx and the Postmodernism Debates: An Agenda for Critical Theory*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Landy, Justin F., and Geoffrey P. Goodwin, 2015, 'Does incidental disgust amplify moral judgment? A meta-analytic review of experimental evidence', *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 10(4), pp.518-36.
- Lane, Robert E., and David O. Sears, 1964, *Public Opinion*, New York, NY: Prentice Hall.
- Lang, Gladys Engel, and Kurt Lang, 1983, *The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press, and the Polls during Watergate*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Langer, John, 1998, *Tabloid television: popular journalism and the 'other news'*, London: Routledge.
- Lapsley, Irvine, Peter Miller, and Neil Pollock, 2013, 'Foreword: Management Consultants – Demons or Benign Change Agents?', *Financial Accountability & Management* 29(2), pp.117-23.
- Lardi, Kamales, and Rainer Fuchs, 2013, *Social Media Strategy – A step-by-step guide to building your social business*, Zurich: vdf.
- Larmore, Charles, 2002, 'Public Reason', in Samuel Freeman (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.268-93.
- Larsen, Randy J., and Timothy Ketelaar, 1989, 'Extraversion, neuroticism and susceptibility to positive and negative mood induction procedures', *Personality and Individual Differences* 10(12), pp.1221-8.
- Larson, Selena, 2016, 'Emoji can lead to huge misunderstandings, research finds', *Daily Dot*, 11 April, <https://www.dailydot.com/debug/emoji-miscommunicate/> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Lash, Scott, 2007, 'Capitalism and metaphysics', *Theory, Culture & Society* 24(5), pp.1-26.
- Latour, Bruno, 2004, 'Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern', *Critical Inquiry* 30(2), pp.225-48.
- Lau, Man-Lui, and Bruce Wydick, 2014, 'Does New Information Technology Lower Media Quality? The Paradox of Commercial Public Goods', *Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade* 14(2), pp.145-57.

- Laver, James, 1979, *The Concise History of Costume and Fashion*, London: Abrams.
- Laver, John, 1994, *Principles of Phonetics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lawrence, Cooper, 2009, *The Cult of Celebrity*, Guildford, CT: Lyons Press.
- Lawson, Tony, 2006, 'The Nature of Heterodox Economics', *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 30(4), pp.483-505.
- Lawson, Andrew, 2014, *Class and the Making of American Literature: Created Unequal*, London: Routledge.
- Lawton, Denis, 1968, *Social class, language and education*, London: Routledge.
- Lea, Mary R., and Brian V. Street, 2006, 'The "Academic Literacies" Model: Theory and Applications', *Theory Into Practice* 45(4), pp.368-77.
- Lea, Stephen E.G., and Paul Webley, 1997, 'Pride in economic psychology', *Journal of Economic Psychology* 18(2-3), pp.323-40.
- Leach, Mark M. (ed.), 2012, *The Oxford Handbook of International Psychological Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Leahy, Deana, 2014, 'Assembling a health[y] subject: risky and shameful pedagogies in health education', *Critical Public Health* 24(2), pp.171-81.
- Lebel, Udi, and Natti Ronel, 2009, 'The emotional reengineering of loss: On the grief-anger-social action continuum', *Political Psychology* 30(5), pp.669-91.
- Lecklider, Aaron, 2013, *Inventing the Egghead: The Battle over Brainpower in American Culture*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- LeDoux, Joseph E., 1996, 'Emotional networks and motor control: a fearful view', *Progress in brain research* 107, pp.437-46.
- , 1999, *The emotional brain: The mysterious underpinnings of emotional life*, New York, NY: Touchstone.
- , 2017, 'Semantics, Surplus Meaning, and the Science of Fear', *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 21(5), pp.303-6.
- Lee, Frederic S., 2009, *A History of Heterodox Economics: Challenging the mainstream in the twentieth century*, London: Routledge.
- Lee, M.J., Sara Murray, Jeremy Diamond, Noah Gray, and Tal Kopan, 2016, 'Why I'm voting for Trump', *CNN*, 28 January, <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/27/politics/donald-trump-voters-2016-election/index.html> (accessed 9 April 2017).

- Lee, Byeong Gi, and Seok Chang Kim, 2013, *Scrambling Techniques for Digital Transmission*, London: Springer.
- Leech, Geoffrey N., 2014, *The pragmatics of politeness*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Leeuwen, Theo van, 1999, *Speech, Music, Sound*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Leibenstein, Harvey, 1950, 'Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 64(2), pp.183-207.
- Leiter, Brian, 2005, 'American Legal Realism', in Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundson (eds.), *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lemert, James B., 1981, *Does Mass Communication Change Public Opinion after All? A New Approach to Effects Analysis*, Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
- Lenin, Vladimir I., 1974 [1924], 'Opportunism, and the Collapse of the Second International', in Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol.21, Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp.438-54.
- Lenman, Robin (ed.), 2005, *The Oxford Companion to the Photograph*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lerner, Jennifer S., and Dacher Keltner, 2001, 'Fear, anger, risk', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81(1), pp.146-59.
- Lerner, Jennifer S., Deborah A. Small, and George Loewenstein, 2004, 'Heart Strings and Purse Strings: Carryover Effects of Emotions on Economic Decisions', *Psychological Science* 15(5), pp.337-41.
- Lester, Libby, 'Big tree, small news: Media access, symbolic power and strategic intervention', *Journalism* 11(5), pp.589-606.
- Levi-Faur, David (ed.), 2014, *The Oxford Handbook of Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Levin, Lowell S., 1976, 'The Layperson as the Primary Health Care Practitioner', *Public Health Reports* 91(3), pp.206-10.
- Levins, Richard, 1996, 'Ten propositions on science and antiscience', *Social Text* 46/47, pp.101-11.
- Levinson, Paul, 1997, *The Soft Edge: A Natural History and Future of the Information Revolution*, London: Routledge.
- Levinson, Stephen, 2006, 'Cognition at the heart of human interaction', *Discourse Studies* 8(1), pp.85-93.
- Levy, Frederick, 2008, *15 Minutes of Fame: Becoming a Star in the YouTube Revolution*, London: Penguin.
- Levy, Sidney, 1999, *Brands, consumers, symbols, and research: Sidney J. Levy on marketing*, Dennis W. Rook (ed.), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

- Lewis, A.V., and C. Nightingale, 1999, 'The Paradox of Videotelephony – Unconscious Assumptions and Undervalued Skills', *BT Technology Journal* 17(1), pp.47-58.
- Lewis, Justin, 2001, *Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They Like and Why We Seem to Go Along with It*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Lewis, Katie J.S., Becky Mars, Gemma Lewis, Frances Rice, Ruth Sellers, Ajay K. Thapar, Nicholas Craddock, Stephan Collinshaw, and Anita Thapar, 2012, 'Do parents know best? Parent-reported vs. child-reported depression symptoms as predictors of future child mood disorder in a high-risk sample', *Journal of Affective Disorders* 141(2-3), pp.233-6.
- Li, Charlene, and Josh Bernoff, 2008, *Groundswell: Winning in a World Transformed by Social Technologies*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lichtenstein, Sarah, Baruch Fischhoff, and Lawrence D. Phillips, 1982, 'Calibration of probabilities: The state of the art to 1980', in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.306-34.
- Liebert, Robert M., and Larry W. Morris, 1967, 'Cognitive and emotional components of test anxiety: A distinction and some initial data', *Psychological Reports* 20(3), pp.975-8.
- Likert, Rensis, 1932, 'A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes', *Archives of Psychology* 140(1), pp.1-55.
- Lilienfeld, Scott O., Steven Jay Lynn, and Jeffrey M. Lohr (eds.), 2014, *Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology*, New York, NY: Guildford Press.
- Lilienfeld, Scott O., Irwin D. Waldman, Kristin Landfield, Ashley L. Watts, Steven Rubenzer, and Thomas R. Faschingbauer, 2012, 'Fearless Dominance and the U.S. Presidency: Implications of Psychopathic Personality Traits for Successful and Unsuccessful Political Leadership', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 103(3), pp.489-505.
- Lim, Leonel, 2012, 'Ideology, class and rationality: a critique of Cambridge International Examinations' *Thinking Skills* curriculum', *Cambridge Journal of Education* 42(4), pp.481-95.
- Lin, Meng-Fen Grace, Ellen S. Hoffman, and Claire Borengasser, 2013, 'Is Social Media Too Social for Class? A Case Study of Twitter Use?', *TechTrends* 57(2), pp.39-45.
- Lindberg, David C., 2007, *The Beginnings of Western Science: the European Scientific Tradition in philosophical, religious, and institutional context, prehistory to A.D. 1450*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Lippmann, Walter, 1955, *Essays in the Public Philosophy*, Boston, MA: Atlantic Monthly Press.

- , 1993 [1927], *The Phantom Public*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- , 2010 [1922], *Public Opinion*, Blacksburg, VA: Wilder Publications, Inc.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1981, 'Whatever Happened to the Proletariat? An Historic Mission Unfulfilled', *Encounter* 56(6), pp.18-34.
- , and Stein Rokkan, 1967, *Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- , and Reinhard Bendix, 1991, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, London: Transaction.
- Lister, Andrew, 2013, *Public Reason and Political Community*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Liu, Hsueh-Fen, Fang-Suey Lin, and Chien-Ju Chang, 2015, 'The effectiveness of using pictures in teaching young children about burn injury accidents', *Applied Ergonomics* 51(1), pp.60-8.
- Liu, Mingnan, and Yichen Wang, 2015, 'Race-of-Interviewer Effect in the Computer-Assisted Self-Interview Module in a Face-to-Face Survey', *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 28(2), pp.292-305.
- Liu, Siyu, 2015, 'Virtual Experiments or Worked Examples? How to Learn the Control of Variable Strategy', *Technology, Knowledge and Learning* 20(1), pp.27-41.
- Liu, Ting, 2011, 'Credence Goods Markets with Conscientious and Selfish Experts', *International Economic Review* 52(1), pp.227-44.
- Livingston, Paul M., 2014, *The Politics of Logic: Badiou, Wittgenstein, and the Consequences of Formalism*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Livneh, Hanoch, and Cheryl Livneh, 1989, 'The five-factor model of personality: Is evidence for its cross-media premature?', *Personality and Individual Differences* 10(1), pp.75-80.
- Lizardo, Omar, Robert Mowry, Brandon Sepulvado, Dustin S. Stoltz, Marshall A. Taylor, Justin van Ness, and Michael Wood, 2016, 'What Are Dual Process Models? Implications for Cultural Analysis in Sociology?', *Sociological Theory* 34(2), pp.287-310.
- Llewellyn, Karl N., 2008 [1962], *Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice*, Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Lloyd, Albert Lancaster, 1967, *Folk Song in England*, London: Harper Collins.
- Lodge, Milton, 1995, 'Toward a Procedural Model of Candidate Evaluation', in Milton Lodge and Kathleen M. McGraw (eds.), *Political Judgment: Structure and Process*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

- , and Patrick Stroh, 1993, 'Inside the Mental Voting Booth', in Shanto Iyengar and William McGuire (eds.), *Explorations in Political Psychology*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp.225-63.
- , Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick Stroh, 1989, 'An Impression-Driven Model of Candidate Evaluation', *American Political Science Review* 83(2), pp.399-419.
- , and Marco R. Steenbergen, 1995, 'The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation', *American Political Science Review* 89(2), pp.309-26.
- , and Charles S. Taber, 2005, 'The automaticity of affect for political leaders, groups, and issues: An experimental test of the hot cognition hypothesis', *Political Psychology* 26(3), pp.455-82.
- Loewenstein, George, 2000, 'Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behaviour', *The American Economic Review* 90(2), pp.426-32.
- Logan, Robert K., 2004, *The Alphabet Effect: A Media Ecology Understanding of the Making of Western Civilization*, New York, NY: Hampton Press.
- Long, Thomas G., 1992, 'Myers-Briggs and other Modern Astrologies', *Theology Today* 49(3), pp.291-5.
- Lorimer, Rowland, and Paddy Scannell, 1994, *Mass Communications: A Comparative Introduction*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Lotringer, Sylvère, and Christian Marazzi, 2008, *Autonomia: Post-political politics*, Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).
- Lott, John R., 2010, *More guns, less crime: Understanding crime and gun-control laws*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Lotz, Amanda, 2007, *The Television will be Revolutionized*, New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Luckie, Douglas B., Aaron M. Rivkin, Jacob R. Aubry, Benjamin J. Marengo, Leah R. Creech, and Ryan D. Sweeder, 2013, 'Verbal Final Exam in Introductory Biology Yields Gains in Student Content Knowledge and Longitudinal Performance', *CBE – Life Sciences Education* 12(3), pp.515-29.
- Luhmann, Niklas, 2004, *Law as a social system*, Klaus A. Ziegert (tr.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2012 [1997], *Theory of Society*, 2 vols., Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- , Stephen Holmes, and Charles Larmore, 1982, *The Differentiation of Society*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

- Lukes, Steven, 2004, *Power: A Radical View*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Luthans, Fred, and Bruce J. Avolio, 2003, 'Authentic leadership development', in Kim S. Cameron, Jane E. Dutton, and Robert E. Quinn (eds.), *Positive organizational scholarship: Foundations of a new discipline*, San Francisco, CA: Barrett-Koehler, pp.241-61.
- Lutz, Peter L., 2002, *The Rise of Experimental Biology: An Illustrated History*, New York, NY: Humana Press.
- Lynn, Michael, 1989, 'Scarcity effects on desirability: Mediated by assumed expensiveness?', *Journal of Economic Psychology* 10(2), pp.257-74.
- , 1992, 'The Psychology of Unavailability: Explaining Scarcity and Cost Effects on Value', *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 13(1), pp.3-7.
- Lyons, Kate, 2016, 'Is Nigel Farage right to say MEPs have not done "proper jobs"?' , *Guardian*, 28 June, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/28/is-nigel-farage-right-meps-have-not-done-proper-jobs> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Lyytinen, Kalle, Richard Baskerville, Juhani Ivari, and Dov Te'eni, 2007, 'Why the old world cannot publish? Overcoming challenges in publishing high-impact IS research', *European Journal of Information Systems* 16(3), pp.317-26.
- Maaß, Olaf, 2009, *Die Soziale Arbeit als Funktionssystem der Gesellschaft*, Heidelberg, Germany: Carl Auer.
- Maccoby, Eleanor .E., and John A. Martin, 1983, 'Socialization in the context of the family: Parent-child interaction', in Paul H. Mussen and E. Mavis Hetherington (eds.), *Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol.4: Socialization, Personality, and Social Development*, pp.1-101.
- MacDonald, Douglas A., 2000, 'Spirituality: description, measurement, and relation to the five factor model of personality', *Journal of Personality* 68(1), pp.153-97.
- Macdonald, Keith M., 1995, *The Sociology of the Professions*, London: Sage.
- MacDougald, Park, 2016, 'Milo Yiannopoulos and the Gay Fascist Sophisticate', *NYMag.com*, 21 July, <http://nymag.com/selectall/2016/07/milo-yiannopoulos-and-the-gay-fascist-sophisticate.html> (accessed 11 April 2017).
- MacDougall, Robert C., 2011, 'Podcasting and political life', *American Behavioral Scientist* 55(6), pp.714-32.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1970 [1518], *The Discourses*, Bernard Crick (ed.), London: Pelican.

- Mackie, Diane M., Thierry Devos, and Eliot R. Smith, 2000, 'Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79(4), pp.602-16.
- MacKuen, Michael, Jennifer Wolak, Luke Keele, and George E. Marcus, 2010, 'Civic engagements: Resolute partisanship or reflective deliberation', *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2), pp.440-58.
- Mackworth, Norman H., 1965, 'Originality', *The American Psychologist* 20(1), pp.51-66.
- MacLeod, Jay, 2004, *Ain't No Makin' It*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Macrae, C. Neil, and Galen V. Bodenhausen, 2000, 'Social cognition: Thinking categorically about others', *Annual Review of Psychology* 51(1), pp.93-120.
- Mader, Stewart, 2007, *Wikipatterns*, Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
- Madigan, Patrick, 2013, 'Expressive Individualism, the Cult of the Artist as Genius, and Milton's Lucifer', *The Heythrop Journal* 54(6), pp.992-8.
- Mahler, Margaret, Fred Pine, and Anni Bergman, 2000 [1975], *The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant: Symbiosis and Individuation*, New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Mahon, Brad Z., and Jessica F. Cantlon, 2011, 'The specialization of function: Cognitive and neural perspectives', *Cognitive neuropsychology* 28(3-4), pp.147-55.
- Maistre, Joseph Marie de, 1850 [1819], *The Pope; considered in his relations with the Church, temporal sovereignties, separated churches, and the cause of civilisation*, Aeneas M. Dawson (tr.), London: C. Dolman.
- Major, Claire Howell, 2015, *Teaching online: A guide to theory, research, and practice*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Malcolm, Joyce, 2002, *Guns and violence: The English experience*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Malhotra, Neil, and Alexander G. Kuo, 2009, 'Emotions and moderators of information cue use: Citizen attitudes toward Hurricane Katrina', *American Politics Research* 37(2), pp.301-26.
- Malik, Aqdas, Amandeep Dhir, and Marko Nieminen, 2016, 'Uses and Gratifications of digital photo sharing on Facebook', *Telematics and Informatics* 33(1), pp.129-38.
- Mallett, Kimberly A., Rob Turrissi, Anne E. Ray, Jerod Stapleton, Caitlin Abar, Nadine R. Mastroleo, Sean Tollison, Joel Grossbard, and Mary E. Larimer, 2011, 'Do Parents Know Best? Examining

- the Relationship Between Parenting Profiles, Prevention Efforts, and Peak Drinking in College Students', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 41(12), pp.2904-27.
- Mammen, Oommen K., Paul A. Pilkonis, and David J. Kolko, 2000, 'Anger and parent-to-child aggression in mood and anxiety disorders', *Comprehensive Psychiatry* 41(6), pp.461-8.
- Mangset, Marte, Claire Maxwell, and Agnès van Zanten, 2017, 'Knowledge, skills and dispositions: the socialisation and "training" of elites', *Journal of Education and Work* 30(2), pp.123-8.
- Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David Weil, 1992, 'A contribution to the empirics of economic growth', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107(2), pp.407-37.
- Manktelow, Ken, 2000, *Reasoning and Thinking*, Hove: Psychology Press.
- Mann, Michael, 1986, *The Sources of Social Power, vol.1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD1760*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mannheim, Karl, 2014 [1956], *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, Bryan S. Turner (tr.), London: Routledge.
- Manning, Patrick, 2005, *Migration in World History*, London: Routledge.
- Mansfield, Edward D., 1993, 'Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power', *International Studies Quarterly* 37(1), pp.105-28.
- Mao Tse-tung, 2007 [1963], 'Where do correct ideas come from?', in Mao, *On Practice and Contradiction*, Slavoj Žižek (ed.), London: Verso.
- Marcus Aurelius, 1909, *Meditations*, George Long (tr.), London: P.F. Collier & Son.
- Marcus, George E., Michael MacKuen, and W. Russell Neuman, 2011, 'Parsimony and Complexity: Developing and Testing Theories of Affective Intelligence', *Political Psychology* 32(2), pp.323-36.
- Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, 2000, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Marcus, George E., John Sullivan, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, and Daniel Stevens, 2005, 'The Emotional Foundation of Political Cognition', *Political Psychology* 26(6), pp.949-63.
- Marcus, George E., Sandra L. Wood, and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 1998, 'Linking neuroscience to political intolerance and political judgment', *Politics and the Life Sciences* 17(2), pp.165-78.
- Marcuse, Herbert, 1969, 'Repressive Tolerance', in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, and Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, pp.95-137.
- , 1972, *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, London: Penguin.

- Marenbon, John (ed.), 2015, *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Margolis, Howard, 1987, *Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition: A Theory of Judgement*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Maritain, Jacques, 1999 [1932], *The Degrees of Knowledge*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Marquess, Kate, 2000, 'Caught in the Web: Survey Reveals Increasing Use of Internet in Law Practices, but Lawyers Are Making Transition Slowly', *ABA Journal* 86, p.76.
- Marshall, Alfred, 2010 [1890], *Principles of Economics*, London: Atlantic.
- Marsh, Abigail, Nalini Ambady, and Robert Kleck, 2005, 'The Effects of Fear and Anger Facial Expressions on Approach- and Avoidance-Related Behaviors', *Emotion* 5(1), pp.119-24.
- Martin, Judith, 1979, *Miss Manners' Guide to Excruciatingly Correct Behavior*, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.
- Martinelli, César, 2006, 'Would rational voters acquire costly information?', *Journal of Economic Theory* 129(1), pp.225-51.
- , 2007, 'Rational ignorance and voting behavior', *International Journal of Game Theory* 35(3), pp.315-35.
- Martinez, Mario Antonio, 2016, 'Secondary socialization of andragogical content knowledge: What are the forces at work in an oil and gas safety training conference?', *Safety Science* 85(2), pp.220-9.
- Marx, Karl, 1975a [1844], *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works, vol.3: Marx and Engels 1843-44*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- , 1975b [1845], *Theses on Feuerbach*, in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works, vol.5: Marx and Engels April 1845-April 1847*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- , 1976 [1847], *The Poverty of Philosophy*, in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works, vol.6: Marx and Engels 1845-48*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- , 1977 [1849], *Wage Labour and Capital*, in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works, vol.9: Marx and Engels 1849*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- , 1987 [1859], *Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works, vol.29: Marx 1857-61*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- , 1996 [1867], *Capital, vol.1*, in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works, vol.35: Capital, vol.1*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

- , and Friedrich Engels, 1975 [1846], *The German Ideology*, in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, vol.5: *Marx and Engels April 1845–April 1847*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- , and Friedrich Engels, 1976 [1848], *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, vol.6: *Marx and Engels 1845–48*, London: Lawrence & Wishart
- Maskey, Sean, 2002, 'Children are still seen but not heard', *British Medical Journal* 325(7364), p.599.
- Masman, Karen, 2010, *The Uses of Sadness: Why Feeling Sad is No Reason Not to Be Happy*, London: Allen & Unwin.
- Mason, Paul, 2016, 'Brexit is a fake revolt – working-class culture is being hijacked to help the elite', *Guardian*, 20 June, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/20/brexit-fake-revolt-eu-working-class-culture-hijacked-help-elite> (accessed 19 July 2016).
- Masuda, Etsusuke, and Peter Newman, 1981, 'Gray and Giffen Goods', *The Economic Journal* 91(364), pp.1011-14.
- Masur, Elise Frank, 'Infants' early verbal imitation and their later lexical development', 1995, *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 41(3), pp.286-306.
- Matsumoto, David, Hwang Hyi Sung, Lisa Skinner, and Mark Frank, 2011, 'Evaluating Truthfulness and Detecting Deception', *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 80(6), pp.1-8.
- Matthys, Mick, 2012, *Cultural Capital, Identity, and Social Mobility*, London: Routledge.
- Mauss, Marcel, 1934, 'Les Techniques du corps', *Journal de Psychologie* 32(3-4).
- May, Carl R., and Tracy L. Finch, 2009, 'Implementing, Embedding, and Integrating Practices: An Outline of Normalization Process Theory', *Sociology* 43(3), pp.535-54.
- May, Joshua, 2014, 'Does Disgust Influence Moral Judgment?', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 92(1), pp.125-41.
- Mayberry, Rachel I., 2000, 'Gesture Reflects Language Development: Evidence from Bilingual Children', *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 9(6), pp.192-6.
- Mayer, Kathrin, 2005, 'Fundamentals of surgical research course: research presentations', *Journal of Surgical Research* 128(2), pp.174-7.
- Mayselless, Naama, Ayelet Eran, and Simone G. Shamay-Tsoory, 2015, 'Generating original ideas: The neural underpinning of originality', *NeuroImage* 116(2), pp.232-9.
- Mazerolle, Stephanie M., Thomas G. Bowman, and Thomas M. Dodge, 2014, 'The Professional Socialization of the Athletic Trainer Serving as a Preceptor', *Journal of Athletic Training* 49(1), pp.75-82.

- Mazzucato, Mariana, 2013, *The Entrepreneurial State: debunking public vs. private sector myths*, London: Anthem Press.
- McAbee, Samuel T., and Frederick L. Oswald, 2013, 'The criterion-related validity of personality measures for predicting GPA: a meta-analytic validity competition', *Psychological Assessment* 25(2), pp.532-44.
- McAdams, Dan P., 2001, *The Person: An Integrated Introduction to Personality Psychology*, Orlando, FL: Harcourt.
- McAllister, Matthew P., and Emily West (eds.), 2013, *The Routledge Companion to Advertising and Promotional Culture*, London: Routledge.
- McCall, Leslie, 2013, *The Undeserving Rich: American Beliefs about Inequality, Opportunity, and Redistribution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , and Jeff Manza, 2011, 'Class Differences in Social and Political Attitudes in the United States', in George C. Edwards, Lawrence R. Jacobs, and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McCarty, Craig, Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, and Russell Spears (eds.), 2002, *Stereotypes as explanations: The formation of meaningful beliefs about social groups*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McCrae, Robert R., and Paul T. Costa, 1987, 'Validation of the five-factor model of personality across instruments and observers', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52(1), pp.81-90.
- McDonnell, Lisa, Megan K. Barker, and Carl Wieman, 2016, 'Concepts first, jargon second improves student articulation of understanding', *Biochemistry and Molecular Biology Education* 44(1), pp.12-19.
- McFadden, Syreeta, 2016, 'Beyoncé's Lemonade is #blackgirlmagic at its most potent', *Guardian*, 24 April, <https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/apr/24/beyonce-lemonade-album-video-black-girl-magic-womanhood-america> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- McFall, Elizabeth Rose, 2004, *Advertising: A cultural economy*, London: Sage.
- McFarland, Thomas, 1985, *Originality & imagination*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- McGinn, Bernard, 2006, 'Withdrawal and Return: Reflections on Monastic Retreat from the World', *Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality* 6(2), pp.149-72.
- McGinnis, Reginald, 2009, *Originality and intellectual property in the French and English Enlightenment*, London: Routledge.

- McGrath, Joseph E., 1962, *Leadership behavior: Requirements for leadership training*, Washington, DC: U.S. Civil Service Commission Office of Career.
- McGregor, Ian, Reeshma Haji, Kyle A. Nash, and Rimma Teper, 2008, 'Religious Zeal and the Uncertain Self', *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 30(2), pp.183-8.
- McGuigan, Jim, 1992, *Cultural populism*, London: Routledge.
- McGuire, William J., 1969, 'The nature of attitudes and attitude change', in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (eds.), *The handbook of social psychology, vol.2*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- McKee, Y., 1998, 'Patience, empathy, and grace: a medical triune', *Journal of pastoral care* 52(4), pp.407-9.
- McKinnon, Andrew M., 2013, 'Ideology and the Market Metaphor in Rational Choice Theory of Religion: A Rhetorical Critique of "Religious Economies"', *Critical Sociology* 39(4), pp.529-43.
- McKitterick, David, 2003, *Print, Manuscript, and the Search for Order, 1450-1830*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McKnight, David, and Mitchell Hobbs, 2011, "'You're all a bunch of pinkos': Rupert Murdoch and the politics of HarperCollins", *Media, Culture & Society* 33(6), pp.835-50.
- McLaren, Margaret, 2002, *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- McLuhan, Marshall, 2001 [1964], *Understanding Media*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- McNair, Brian, 2003, *An Introduction to Political Communication*, London: Routledge.
- McNamara, Tim, 2011, 'Multilingualism in Education: A Poststructuralist Critique', *The Modern Language Journal* 95(3), pp.430-31.
- McNeill, David, 1992, *Hand and Mind: What Gestures Reveal about Thought*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- McPherson, Mary B., Patricia Kearney, and Timothy G. Plax, 2003, 'The Dark Side of Instruction: Teacher Anger as Classroom Norm Violations', *Journal of Applied Communication Research* 31(1), pp.76-90.
- McPherson, Mary B., and Stacy L. Young, 2004, 'What students think when teachers get upset: Fundamental attribution error and student-generated reasons for teacher anger', *Communication Quarterly* 52(4), pp.357-69.
- McQuail, Denis, 2010, *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*, London: Sage.

- McSherry, J. Patrice, 2015, *Chilean new song: the political power of music, 1960s-1973*, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randers, and William W. Behrens, 1972, *The Limits to Growth*, New York, NY: Universe Books.
- Meehl, Paul E., 1997, 'Credentialed persons, credentialed knowledge', *Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice* 4(1), pp.91-8.
- Mehrabian, Albert, 1981, *Silent messages: Implicit communication of emotions and attitudes*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Inc.
- Meiksins Wood, Ellen, 2002, *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View*, London: Verso.
- , 2008, *Citizens to Lords: A Social History of Western Political Thought from Antiquity to the Late Middle Ages*, London: Verso.
- , 2012, *Liberty and Property: A Social History of Western Political Thought from Renaissance to Enlightenment*, London: Verso.
- Meilaender, Gilbert, and William Werpehowski (eds.), 2007, *The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Melia, Susan Perschbacher, 2002, 'Solitude and Prayer in the Late Lives of Elder Catholic Women Religious: Activity, Withdrawal, or Transcendence?', *Journal of Religious Gerontology* 13(1), pp.47-63.
- Meng, Tham Kai, 2016, 'Everyone is born creative, but it is educated out of us at school', *Guardian*, 18 May, <http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/2016/may/18/born-creative-educated-out-of-us-school-business> (accessed 9 August 2016).
- Menger, Carl, 1892, 'On the Origin of Money', *Economic Journal* 2(2), pp.239-55.
- Menguc, Bulent, Sang-Lin Han, and Seigyoung Auh, 2007, 'A test of a model of new salespeople's socialization and adjustment in a collectivist culture', *Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management* 27(1), pp.149-67.
- Menken, Kate, 2013, 'Emergent bilingual students in secondary school: Along the academic language and literacy continuum', *Language Teaching* 46(4), p.438.
- Merrill, Melissa, 2014, *What do you want? Using picture communication symbols with bilingual preschool aged children with special needs*, MA thesis, California State University Dominguez Hills.
- Merton, Robert K., 1957 [1949], *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

- Messer, Ellen, Laurie Fields Derosé, and Sara Millman, 1998, *Who's Hungry? And How Do We Know?; Food Shortage, Poverty, and Deprivation*, Tokyo: UN University Press.
- Metcalfe, Janet, and David Wiebe, 1987, 'Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving', *Memory & Cognition* 15(3), pp.238-46.
- Metin, Irem, and Selin Metin Camgöz, 2011, 'The Advances in the History of Cognitive Dissonance Theory', *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 1(6), pp.131-6.
- Meyrowitz, Joshua, 1995, 'Mediating Communication: What Happens?', in J. Downing, A. Mohammadi, and A. Sreberny-Mohammadi (eds.), *Questioning the Media*, London: Sage, pp.39-53.
- Mieg, Harald A., 2001, *The social psychology of expertise*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Mihailidis, Paul, and Benjamin Thevenin, 2013, 'Media Literacy as a Core Competency for Engaged Citizenship in Participatory Democracy', *American Behavioral Scientist* 57(11), pp.1611-22.
- Mihut, Ioana-Sorina, Ioan Trenca, and Andreea-Maria Pece, 2015, 'Herd Behaviour of Institutional and Individual Investors in the Context of Economic Governance: Evidence from Romanian Stock Market', *Review of Economic Studies and Research Virgil Madgearu* 8(1), pp.177-90.
- Miliband, Ralph, 2009 [1969], *The State in Capitalist Society*, London: Merlin Press.
- Mill, John Stuart, 1994 [1848], *Principles of Political Economy*, in Mill, *Principles of Political Economy and Chapters on Socialism*, Jonathan Riley (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 1989 [1859], *On Liberty*, in Mill, *On Liberty and Other Writings*, Stefan Collini (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , 2004 [1863], *Utilitarianism*, in Mill and Bentham, *Utilitarianism and Other Essays*, Alan Ryan (ed.), London: Penguin.
- Miller, Ann Ratner, Donald Treiman, Pamela Cain, and Pamela Roos, 1980, *Work, Jobs, and Occupations: a critical review of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles*, New York, NY: National Academy Press.
- Miller, David, 1976, *Social Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, George A., 1977, *Spontaneous apprentices: Children and language*, New York, NY: Seabury Press.
- Miller, Greg, and Adam Entous, 2016, 'Trump turning away intelligence briefers since election win', *Washington Post*, 23 November, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-turning-away-intelligence-briefers-since-election-win/2016/11/23/5cc643c4-b1ae-11e6-be1c-8cec35b1ad25_story.html?utm_term=.6229554e5836 (accessed 13 April 2017).

- Miller, Jon, 1994, *The Social Control of Religious Zeal: A Study of Organizational Contradictions*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Miller, Joshua Benjamin, and Adam Sanjurjo, 2015, 'Surprised by the Gambler's and Hot Hand Fallacies? A Truth in the Law of Small Numbers', *IGIER Working Paper #552*.
- Miller, Paul VanR., 1967, 'Personality Differences and Student Survival in Law School', *Journal of Legal Education* 19(4), pp.460-8.
- Miller, Toby (ed.), 2006, *A Companion to Cultural Studies*, Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Mills, C. Wright, 2000 [1956], *The Power Elite*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miron-Shatz, Talya, 2009, 'Evaluating multiepisode events: Boundary conditions for the peak-end rule', *Emotion* 9(2), pp.206-13.
- Mises, Ludwig von, 2007 [1940], *Human Action: A Treatise on Economics*, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
- Mitchell, Dona-Gene, 2014, 'Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? Assessing How Timing and Repetition of Scandal Information Affects Candidate Evaluations', *Political Psychology* 35(5), pp.679-701.
- Moller, Chris, and Kate Gentles, 2003, *The future for personal videotelephony*, Cambridge: Analysys.
- Mondak, Jeffery J., 2010, *Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , and Karen D. Halperin, 2008, 'A Framework for the Study of Personality and Political Behavior', *British Journal of Political Science* 38(2), pp.335-62.
- , and Matthew V. Hibbing, 2012, 'Personality and Public Opinion', in Adam J. Berinsky (ed.), *New Directions in Public Opinion*, London: Routledge.
- , Matthew V. Hibbing, Damarys Canache, Mitchell A. Seligson, and Mary R. Anderson, 2010, 'Personality and Civic Engagement: An Integrative Framework for the Study of Trait Effects on Political Behaviour', *American Political Science Review* 104(1), pp.85-110.
- Monin, Benoît, 2003, 'The Warm Glow Heuristic: When Liking Leads to Familiarity', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85(6), pp.1035-48.
- Montepare, Joann, Elissa Koff, Deborah Zaitchik, and Marilyn Albert, 1999, 'The use of body movements and gestures as cues to emotions in younger and older adults', *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior* 23(2), pp.133-52.
- Montesquieu, Charles de, 1989, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. Stone (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Moog, Sandra, 2001, 'America Political Communication in the Information Age: The Mixed Promises of the New Media and Public Journalism', in Slavko Splichal (ed.), *Public Opinion & Democracy: Vox Populi – Vox Dei?*, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
- Moore, Emilee, 2016, 'Conceptualising multilingual higher education in policies, pedagogical designs and classroom practices', *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 29(1), pp.22-39.
- Moore, Nina, 2010, *Nonverbal Communication: Studies and Applications*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moran, Michael, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin (eds.), 2006, *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Morrison, Leslie M., 2014, *Making status legible: self-writing in the long eighteenth century*, PhD thesis, University of Oregon.
- Morriss, Peter, 2012, *Power: A Philosophical Analysis*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Morse, Janice M., 2004, 'Preparing and evaluating qualitative research proposals', in Clive Seale, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Giubrium, and David Silverman (eds.), *Qualitative research practice*, London: Sage, pp.493-503.
- Morse, Nancy, and Robert Weiss, 1955, 'The Function and Meaning of Work and the Job', *American Sociological Review* 20(2), pp.191-8.
- Morton, Adam, 2002, *A Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mosca, Gaetano, 1939 [1896], *The Ruling Class*, Hannah D. Kahn (tr.), New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Mosterín, Jesús, 2008, *Lo mejor posible: Racionalidad y acción humana*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
- Mouffe, Chantal, 1999, 'Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism?', *Social Research* 66(3), pp.745-58.
- , 2009, *The Democratic Paradox*, London: Verso.
- Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, 'Populism', in Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mueller, Claus, 1973, *The Politics of Communication*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mueller, Gerrit, and Erik Plug, 2006, 'Estimating the Effect of Personality on Male and Female Earnings', *Industrial Labor Relations Review* 60(1), pp.3-22.
- Muhlmann, Géraldine, and Jean Birrell, 2008, *A political history of journalism*, Cambridge: Polity.

- Mulgan, Richard, 2000, "Accountability": An Ever-Expanding Concept?', *Public Administration* 78(3), pp.555-73.
- Muris, Peter, 2015, 'Guilt, Shame, and Psychopathology in Children and Adolescents', *Child Psychiatry & Human Development* 46(2), pp.177-9.
- , Jorg Huijding, Birgit Mayer, Marit Langkamp, Ela Reyhan, and Bunmi Olatunji, 2012, 'Assessment of Disgust Sensitivity in Children with an Age-Downward Version of the Disgust Emotion Scale', *Behavior Therapy* 43(4), pp.876-86.
- , Cor Meesters, Maaïke Cima, Maaïka Verhagen, Nanda Brochard, Angelique Sanders, Chantalle Kempener, Judith Beurskens, and Vera Meesters, 2014, 'Bound to Feel Bad About Oneself: Relations Between Attachment and the Self-Conscious Emotions of Guilt and Shame in Children and Adolescents', *Journal of Child and Family Studies* 23(7), pp.1278-88.
- Murray, Harry G., J. Philippe Rushton, and Sampo V. Paunonen, 1990, 'Teacher Personality Traits and Student Instructional Ratings in Six Types of University Courses', *Journal of Educational Psychology* 82(2), pp.250-61.
- Murray, Joan, and Seymour Feshbach, 1978, 'Let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater: The catharsis hypothesis revisited', *Journal of Personality* 46(3), pp.462-73.
- Murray, Neil, and Margaret Hicks, 2016, 'An institutional approach to English language proficiency', *Journal of Further and Higher Education* 40(2), pp.170-87.
- Murray, Penelope, 1989, *Genius: the history of an idea*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Murray, Susan, and Laurie Ouellette (eds.), 2009, *Reality TV: Remaking television culture*, New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Mussweiler, Thomas, Birte Englich, and Fritz Strack, 2004, 'Anchoring effect', in Rüdiger F. Pohl (ed.), *Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgment, and Memory*, New York, NY: Psychology Press, pp.183-200.
- Myers, Isabel Briggs, 1995 [1980], *Gifts Differing: Understanding Personality Type*, Mountain View, CA: Davies-Black Publishing.
- Nash, Walter, 1993, *Jargon: Its Uses and Abuses*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Nasr, Linda, Jamie Burton, and Thorsten Gruber, 2015, 'When good news is bad news: the negative impact of positive customer feedback on front-line employee well-being', *The Journal of Services Marketing* 29(6-7), pp.599-612.

- Naumann, Laura P., Simine Vazire, Peter J. Rentfrow, and Samuel D. Gosling, 2009, 'Personality Judgments Based on Physical Appearance', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 35(12), pp.1661-71
- Navarrete, Carlos David, and Daniel M.T. Fessler, 2006, 'Disease avoidance and ethnocentrism: The effects of disease vulnerability and disgust sensitivity on intergroup attitudes', *Evolution and Human Behavior* 27(4), pp.270-82.
- Navarro, Joe, 2008, *What Every Body is Saying*, New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers.
- NBC News, 2016, 'NBC News/Wall Street Journal Survey', *SurveyMonkey*, 7 November, <https://www.scribd.com/document/330243723/NBC-News-SurveyMonkey-Toplines-and-Methodology-1031-11-6> (accessed 6 April 2017).
- Neblo, Michael A., 2015, *Deliberative Democracy between Theory and Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Negt, Oskar, and Alexander Kluge, 1990, 'Selections from Public Opinion and Practical Knowledge: Toward an Organizational Analysis of Proletariat and Middle Class Public Opinion', *Social Text* 25/26, pp.24-32.
- , 2016 [1972], *Public Sphere of Experience: Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere*, London: Verso.
- Nejaime, Douglas, and Reva B. Siegel, 2015, 'Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics', *Yale Law Journal* 124, pp.2516-91.
- Nelissen, Rob M.A., 2012, 'Guilt-Induced Self-Punishment as a Sign of Remorse', *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 3(2), pp.139-44.
- Nelson, Cary, and Lawrence Grossberg (eds.), 1988, *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Nenkov, Gergana Y., Maureen Morrin, Andrew Ward, Barry Schwartz, and John Hulland, 2008, 'A short form of the Maximisation Scale: Factor structure, reliability and validity studies', *Judgment and Decision Making* 3(5), pp.371-88.
- Neumann, Erich P., and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, 1962, *Statistics on Adenauer*, Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie.
- New York Times*, 1984, 'On the Trail of London's Sloane Rangers', 25 March, <http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/25/travel/on-the-trail-of-london-s-sloane-rangers.html> (accessed 16 April 2017).

- Newland, Lisa A., 2015, 'Family well-being, parenting, and child well-being: Pathways to healthy adjustment', *Clinical Psychologist* 19(1), p.3.
- Newman, Lareen, Kate Biedrzycki, Jan Patterson, and Fran Baum, 2011, 'Partnership in knowledge creation: lessons learned from a researcher-policy actor partnership to co-produce a rapid appraisal case study of South Australia's Social Inclusion Initiative', *Evidence & Policy* 7(1), pp.77-96.
- Ng, Thomas W.H., Lillian T. Eby, Kelly L. Sorensen, and Daniel C. Feldman, 2005, 'Predictors of Objective and Subjective Career Success: A Meta-Analysis', *Personnel Psychology* 58(2), pp.367-408.
- Nguyen, Yen, and Charles N. Noussair, 2014, 'Risk Aversion and Emotions', *Pacific Economic Review* 19(3), pp.296-312.
- Niedenthal, Paula M., Martial Mermillod, Marcus Maringer, and Ursula Hess, 2010, 'The Simulation of Smiles (SIMS) model: Embodied simulation and the meaning of facial expression', *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 33(6), pp.417-33.
- Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis, 2015, *Local journalism: the decline of newspapers and the rise of digital media*, London: I.B. Tauris.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 2008 [1891], *Thus spoke Zarathustra: a book for everyone and nobody*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Niu, Weihua, and Robert J. Sternberg, 2006, 'The Philosophical Roots of Western and Eastern Conceptions of Creativity', *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology* 26(1), pp.18-38.
- Noack, Rick, 2016, 'The ugly history of "Lügenpresse", a Nazi slur shouted at a Trump rally', *Washington Post*, 24 October, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/24/the-ugly-history-of-luegenpresse-a-nazi-slur-shouted-at-a-trump-rally/> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth, 1974, 'The spiral of silence: A Theory of Public Opinion', *Journal of Communication* 24(2), pp.43-51.
- , 1979, 'Public opinion and the classical tradition', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 43(1), pp.143-56.
- , 1984, *The spiral of silence: Public opinion – our social skin*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- , 1991, 'The Theory of Public Opinion: The Concept of the Spiral of Silence', in James A. Anderson (ed.), *Communication Yearbook 14*, Newbury Park: Sage, pp.256-87.
- Norr, James L., and Kathleen S. Crittenden, 1975, 'Evaluating college teaching as leadership', *Higher Education* 4(3), pp.335-50.

- Notten, Natascha, Gerbert Kraaykamp, and Ruben P. Konig, 2012, 'Family Media Matters: Unraveling the Intergenerational Transmission of Reading and Television Tastes', *Sociological Perspectives* 55(4), pp.683-706.
- Nouwen, Henri J.M., 1978, 'Foreword', in Pierre Wolff, *May I Hate God?*, Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.
- Novin, Sheida, and Caroline Rieffe, 2015, 'Validation of the Brief Shame and Guilt Questionnaire for Children', *Personality and Individual Differences* 85(1), pp.56-9.
- Nugent, Benjamin, 2008, *American Nerd: The Story of My People*, New York, NY: Scribner.
- Nurco, David, 1999, 'A Complementary Perspective to Primary Socialization Theory', *Substance Use & Misuse* 34(7), pp.993-1003.
- Nussbaum, Emily, 2017, 'How jokes won the election: How do you fight an enemy who's just kidding?', *New Yorker*, 23 January, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/23/how-jokes-won-the-election> (accessed 25 February 2017).
- Nussbaum, Martha C., 1996, 'Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion', *Social Philosophy and Policy* 13(1), pp.27-58.
- , 2000, *Women and Human Development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , 2010, *From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2015, *Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Nuwer, Hank, 2004, *The Hazing Reader*, Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Nyborg, Karine, 2011, 'I Don't Want to Hear About It: Rational Ignorance among Duty-Oriented Consumers', *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 79(3), pp.263-74.
- O'Callaghan, Frances V., David L. Neumann, Liz Jones, and Peter A. Creed, 2017, 'The use of lecture recordings in higher education: A review of institutional, student, and lecturer issues', *Education and Information Technologies* 22(1), pp.399-415.
- O'Donnell, Patrick, 1992, *Echo chambers: figuring voice in modern narrative*, Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press.
- O'Neill, Brendan, 2016, 'Brexit: a brilliant revolt against the political class', *spiked*, 24 June, <http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/brexit-a-brilliant-revolt-against-the-political-class-eu-referendum/18490> (accessed 19 July 2016).

- Office of the Federal Register, 2009, *Code of Federal Regulations, Title 38, Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief, Pt.0-17*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Okin, Susan Moller, 1989, *Justice, Gender, and the Family*, New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Okorie, Nelson, 2011, *The Principles of Advertising: Concepts and trends in advertising*, New York, NY: Lambert Academic Publishing.
- Oleson, Alexandra, and John Voss, 1979, *The Organization of knowledge in modern America, 1860-1920*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Oliveria-Formosinho, Julia, 2001, 'The specific professional nature of early years education and styles of adult/child interaction', *European Early Childhood Education Research Journal* 9(1), pp.57-72.
- Olsaretti, Serena (ed.), 2003, *Desert and Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ong, How Hwee, O'Dhanial A. Mullette-Gilman, Kenneth Kwok, and Julian Lim, 2014, 'Moral judgment modulation by disgust is bi-directionally moderated by individual sensitivity', *Frontiers in Psychology* 5 (published online).
- Ong, Walter S.J., 1982, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*, London: Methuen.
- Onion, Rebecca, 2014, 'The Awful Emptiness of "Relatable"', *Slate*, 11 April, http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexicon_valley/2014/04/11/relatable_the_adjective_is_everywhere_in_high_school_and_college_discussions.html (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Oosterwijk, Suzanne, Mark Rotteveel, Agneta H. Fischer, and Ursula Hess, 2009, 'Embodied emotion concepts: How generating words about pride and disappointment influences posture', *European Journal of Social Psychology* 39(3), pp.457-66.
- Oppenheimer, Daniel M., 2006, 'Consequences of erudite vernacular utilized irrespective of necessity: problems with using long words needlessly', *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 20(2), pp.139-56.
- Oreopoulos, Philip, and Uros Petronijevic, 2013, 'Making College Worth It: A Review of the Returns to Higher Education', *The Future of Children* 23(1), pp.41-65.
- Orford, Anne, and Florian Hoffmann (eds.), 2016, *The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Pres.
- Orr, Julian Edgerton, 1996, *Talking about Machines: An Ethnography of a Modern Job*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Ortega-Sanchez, Cesar, 2016, 'Written Exams: How Effectively are We Using Them?', *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences* 228(1), pp.144-8.

- Oscosz-Irurozqui, Maitane, and Felipe Ortuño, 2016, 'Genuises of medical science: Friendly, open and responsible, not mad', *Medical hypotheses* 97, pp.71-3.
- Osman, Magda, 2004, 'An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning', *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review* 11(6), pp.988-1010.
- Ostroff, Cheri, and Steve W.J. Kozlowski, 1993, 'The role of mentoring in the information gathering processes of newcomers during early organizational socialization', *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 42(1), pp.170-83.
- Ostrowski, Marius, 2015, 'Twilight of the pollsters: what should the polling companies do next?', *New Statesman*, 14 May, <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/05/twilight-pollsters-what-should-polling-companies-do-next> (accessed 7 July 2016).
- Ott, Henry W., 1976, *Noise Reduction Techniques in Electronic Systems*, Oxford: John Wiley.
- Otte, Evelien, and Ronald Rousseau, 2002, 'Social network analysis: a powerful strategy, also for the information sciences', *Journal of Information Science* 28(6), pp.441-53.
- Ottenheimer, Harriet J., 2007, *The anthropology of language: an introduction to linguistic anthropology* (Kansas State: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Otto, Rudolf, 2014 [1922], *Das Heilige: Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältniß zum Rationalen*, Munich, Germany: Verlag C.H. Beck.
- Oveis, Christopher, Elizabeth J. Horberg, and Dacher Keltner, 2010, 'Compassion, pride, and social intuitions of self-other similarity', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 98(4), pp.618-30.
- Oxford English Dictionary*, 2016, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Özkırmılı, Umut, 2017, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Özsoy, Umut, Rahime Şekerci, and Eren Ögüt, 2015, 'Effect of sitting, standing, and supine body positions on facial soft tissue: detailed 3D analysis', *International Journal of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery* 44(10), pp.1309-16.
- Ozouf, Mona, 1988, "Public opinion" at the end of the Old Regime', *Journal of Modern History* 60, pp.S1-S21.
- Paar, Christof, and Jan Pelzl, 2011, *Understanding Cryptography: A Textbook for Students and Practitioners*, London: Springer.

- Pace, C. Robert, 1964, 'The Influence of Academic and Student Subcultures in College and University Environments', Cooperative Research Project no. 1083, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, ERIC Document no. 003037.
- Pachman, Mariya, John Sweller, and Slava Kalyuga, 2014, 'Effectiveness of Combining Worked Examples and Deliberate Practice for High School Geometry', *Applied Cognitive Psychology* 28(5), pp.685-92.
- Pachur, Thorsten, Ralph Hertwig, and Jörg R. Rieskamp, 2013, 'Intuitive judgments of social statistics: How exhaustive does sampling need to be?', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 49(6), pp.1059-77.
- Pacini, Rosemary, and Seymour Epstein, 1999, 'The Relation of Rational and Experiential Information Processing Styles to Personality, Basic Beliefs, and the Ratio-Bias Phenomenon', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 76(6), pp.972-87.
- Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro, 1983, 'Effects of Public Opinion on Policy', *American Political Science Review* 77(1), pp.175-90.
- Page, Diana, and Joseph G. Donelan, 2003, 'Team-Building Tools for Students', *Journal of Education for Business* 78(3), pp.125-8.
- Pals, Daniel, 1996, *Seven Theories of Religion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Panebianco, Angelo, 1988, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Papacharissi, Z., and A.L. Mendelson, 2007, 'An exploratory study of reality appeal: Uses and gratifications of reality TV shows', *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 51(2), pp.355-70.
- Papillion, Terry, 1995, 'Isocrates' techne and Rhetorical Pedagogy', *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 25(1-4), pp.149-63.
- Paquette, Laure, 2006, *Campaign Strategy*, New York, NY: Nova.
- Pareto, Vilfredo, 1971 [1906], *Manual of Political Economy*, Ann S. Schwier (tr.), New York, NY: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers.
- Parfit, Derek, 2011, *On What Matters*, 2 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Park, Alice, 2014, 'Human Faces Can Express at Least 21 Distinct Emotions', *Time*, 31 March, <http://time.com/43758/human-faces-can-express-at-least-21-distinct-emotions/> (accessed 22 January 2017).

- Park, C. Whan, and V. Parker Lessig, 1981, 'Familiarity and its impact on consumer decision biases and heuristics', *Journal of Consumer Research* 8(2), pp.223-30.
- Parker, Sharon K., Toby D. Wall, and John L. Cordery, 2001, 'Future work design research and practice: Towards an elaborated model of work design', *Journal of Occupational & Organizational Psychology* 74(4), pp.413-40.
- Parkinson, John R., 2012, *Democracy and Public Space: The Physical Sites of Democratic Performance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parrott, W. Gerrod (ed.), 2001, *Emotions in Social Psychology: Essential Readings*, New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Parsons, Christine E., Katherine S. Young, Else-Marie E. Jegindø, Peter Vuust, Alan Stein, and Morten L. Kringelbach, 2014, 'Music training and empathy positively impact adults' sensitivity to infant distress', *Frontiers in Psychology* 5, p.1440.
- Parsons, Michael, 2000, *The Dove that Returns, the Dove that Vanishes: Paradox and Creativity in Psychoanalysis*, London: Routledge.
- Parsons, Talcott, 1967 [1937], *The Structure of Social Action*, 2 vols., Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Paul, Ellen Frankel, and Fred D. Miller, 2004, *Freedom of Speech*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paulhus, Delroy L., and Karen Levitt, 1987, 'Desirable responding triggered by affect: Automatic egotism?', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52(2), pp.245-59.
- Paulhus, Delroy L., and Simine Vazire, 2007, 'The Self-Report Method', in Richard W. Robins, R. Chris Fraley, and Robert F. Krueger (eds.), *Handbook of Research Methods in Personality Psychology*, New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Pavlik, John V., and Shawn MacIntosh, 2015, *Converging Media*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Payne, Stanley G., 2005, *A history of fascism, 1914-1945*, London: Routledge.
- Pêcheux, Michel, 1994, 'The Mechanism of Ideological (Mis)recognition', in Slavoj Žižek (ed.), *Mapping Ideology*, London: Verso, pp.141-51.
- Peddie, Ian (ed.), 2006, *The Resisting Muse: Popular Music and Social Protest*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Penny, Daniel, 2017, '#Milosexual and the Aesthetics of Fascism', *Boston Review*, 24 January, <http://bostonreview.net/politics-gender-sexuality/daniel-penny-milosexual-and-aesthetics-fascism> (accessed 11 April 2017).

- Pennycook, Gordon, James Allan Cheyne, Nathaniel Barr, Derek J. Koehler, and Jonathan A. Fugelsang, 2015, 'On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit', *Judgment and Decision Making* 10(6), pp.549-63.
- Perkin, Joan, 1995, *Victorian Women*, New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Persky, Joseph, 1995, 'Retrospectives: the ethology of homo economicus', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9(2), pp.221-31.
- Perttula, Arttu, Scott Carter, and Laurent Denoue, 2011, 'Retrospective vs. prospective: two approaches to mobile media capture and access', *International Journal of Arts and Technology* 4(3), pp.249-59.
- Peters, John Durham, 1995, 'Historical Tensions in the Concept of Public Opinion', in Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon (eds.), *Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent*, New York, NY: Guildford Press.
- , 1999, *Speaking into the Air*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- , 2001, 'Realism in Social Representation and the Fate of the Public', in Slavko Splichal (ed.), *Public Opinion & Democracy: Vox Populi – Vox Dei?*, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., pp.85-102.
- Peterson, Suzanne J., Fred O. Walumbwa, Bruce J. Avolio, and Sean T. Hannah, 2012, 'The relationship between authentic leadership and follower job performance: The mediating role of follower positivity in extreme contexts', *Leadership Quarterly* 23(3), pp.502-16.
- Pettit, Philip, 2012, *On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Peus, C., J.S. Weschem, B. Streicher, S. Braun, and D. Frey, 2012, 'Authentic leadership: An empirical test of its antecedents, consequences, and mediating mechanisms', *Journal of Business Ethics* 107(3), pp.331-48.
- Pfaffenberger, Bryan, 2000, 'The rhetoric of dread: Fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD) in information technology marketing', *Knowledge, Technology & Policy* 13(3), pp.78-92.
- Pfeil, Florian, 2011, *Globale Verrechtlichung: Global Governance und die Konstitutionalisierung des internationalen Rechts*, Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos.
- Phillips, David, 1997, *Exhibiting Authenticity*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Philp, Mark, 2007, *Political Conduct*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Piff, Paul K., 2013, 'Wealth and the Inflated Self: Class, Entitlement, and Narcissism', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 40(1), pp.34-43.

- Pigini, Claudia, and Stefano Staffolani, 2016, 'Beyond participation: do the cost and quality of higher education shape the enrolment composition? The case of Italy', *Higher Education* 71(1), pp.119-42.
- Piketty, Thomas, 2014, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, Arthur Goldhammer (tr.), Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Pilgrim, David, and Floris Tomasini, 2012, 'On being unreasonable in modern society: are mental health problems special?', *Disability & Society* 27(5), pp.631-46.
- Pilkington, Rachel M., and S. Aisha Walker, 2003, 'Facilitating debate in networked learning: Reflecting on online synchronous discussion in higher education', *Instructional Science* 31(1), pp.41-63.
- Pilling, Geoffrey, 1980, *Marx's 'Capital': Philosophy and Political Economy*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Pinheiro, Carlos A.R., 2011, *Social Network Analysis in Telecommunications*, Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
- Pinizzoto, Anthony J., Edward F. Davis, and Charles E. Miller, 2006, 'Dead Right', *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 75(3), pp.1-8.
- Pinker, Steven, 2014, 'Why Academics Stink at Writing', *The Chronicle Review*, 26 September, <http://www.chronicle.com/article/Why-Academics-Writing-Stinks/148989/> (accessed 11 April 2017).
- Piper, Fred, and Sean Murphy, 2002, *Cryptography: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pirenne, Henri, 2006 [1936], *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, New York, NY: Harcourt Brace & Company.
- Piskorski, Mikołaj Jan, 2014, *A Social Strategy: How We Profit from Social Media*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pittam, Jeffrey, and Klaus R. Scherer, 1993, 'Vocal Expression and Communication of Emotions', in Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (eds.), *Handbook of Emotions*, New York, NY: Guildford Press, pp.185-97.
- Plantinga, Alvin, 2000, *Warranted Christian Belief*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Plomin, Robert, and Denise Daniels, 1987, 'Why are children in the same family so different from one another?', *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 10(1), pp.1-60.
- Plous, Scott, 1993, *The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

- Plutchik, Robert, 2001, 'The Nature of Emotions', *American Scientist* 89(4), pp.344-50.
- Podgórecki, Adam, 1974, *Law and Society*, London: Routledge.
- Poe, Marshall, 2011, *A history of communications: media and society from the evolution of speech to the Internet*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pofeldt, Elaine, 2016, 'How anger is fraying the doctor-patient relationship', *Medical economics* 93(10), pp.30-8.
- Pohl, Rüdiger F. (ed.), 2004, *Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement, and Memory*, Hove: Psychology Press.
- , Edgar Erdfelder, Martha Michalkiewicz, Marta Castela, and Benjamin E. Hilbig, 2016, 'The limited use of the fluency heuristic: Converging evidence across different procedures', *Memory & Cognition* 44(7), pp.1114-26.
- Poincaré, Henri, 1982 [1913], *The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science, Science and Method*, Washington, DC: University Press of America.
- Polhemus, Ted, and Lynn Procter, 1978, *Fashion and Anti-fashion: An Anthropology of Clothing and Adornment*, London: Thames and Hudson.
- Pollard, T.C., T. Khan, A.J. Price, H.S. Gill, S. Glyn-Jones, and J.L. Rees, 2012, 'Simulated hip arthroscopy skills: learning curves with the lateral and supine patient positions: a randomized trial', *Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery* 94(10), p.68.
- Pond, Richard S., C. Nathan Dewall, Nathaniel M. Lambert, Timothy Deckman, Ian M. Bonser, and Frank D. Fincham, 2012, 'Repulsed by violence: Disgust sensitivity buffers trait, behavioural, and daily aggression', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 102(1), pp.175-88.
- Poole, Eric D., and Robert M. Regoli, 1981, 'Alienation in prison: An examination of the work relation of prison guards', *Criminology* 19(2), pp.251-70.
- Pope, Thaddeus Mason, 2010, 'Legal Briefing: Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal', *Journal of Clinical Ethics* 21(2), pp.163-80.
- Popkin, Samuel, 1991, *The Reasoning Voter*, Chicago: IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Popper, Karl R., 1972, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 1994, *The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Poropat, Arthur E., 2009, 'A Meta-Analysis of the Five-Factor Model of Personality and Academic Performance', *Psychological Bulletin* 135(2), pp.322-38.

- Portes, Jonathan, 2017, 'What's the role of experts in the public debate?', *The UK in a Changing Europe*, 15 March, <http://ukandeu.ac.uk/whats-the-role-of-experts-in-the-public-debate/> (accessed 17 March 2017).
- Potter, Philip B.K., and Matthew A. Baum, 2013, 'Looking for Audience Costs in all the Wrong Places: Electoral Institutions, Media Access, and Democratic Constraint', *Journal of Politics* 76(1), p.167.
- Poulakos, John, 1983, 'Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric', *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 16(1), pp.36-7.
- Poulantzas, Nicos, 1978, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, David Fernbach (tr.), London: Verso.
- , 2014 [1978], *State, Power, Socialism*, Patrick Camiller (tr.), London: Verso.
- Pous, Terri, 2017, '23 Books You Need To Read Before You Get Married', *Buzzfeed*, 26 February, https://www.buzzfeed.com/terripous/books-everyone-should-read-before-getting-married?utm_term=.xsazyJEW9#.spW82WkR1 (accessed 28 February 2017).
- Povinelli, Daniel J., and Todd M. Preuss, 1995, 'Theory of mind: evolutionary history of a cognitive specialization', *Trends in Neurosciences* 18(9), pp.418-24.
- Powell, Barry B., 2009, *Writing: Theory and History of the Technology of Civilization*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Powell, Mark E., 2013, 'The "Patient and Fraternal Dialogue" on Papal Infallibility: Contributions of a Free-Church Theologian', *Theological Studies* 74(1), pp.105-18.
- Price, John, 2014, *Everyday Heroism: Victorian Constructions of the Heroic Civilian*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Price, Vincent, 1989, 'Social identification and public opinion: Effects of communicating group conflict', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 53(2), pp.197-224.
- , 1992, *Public Opinion*, London: Sage.
- Priestley, John B., 1957, *Thoughts in the Wilderness*, London: Heinemann.
- Prisock, Louis, 2015, 'The CEO of Self: Herman Cain, Black Conservatism and the Achievement Ideology', *Journal of African American Studies* 19(2), pp.178-91.
- Psacharopoulos, George, and George Papakonstantinou, 2005, 'The real university cost in a "free" higher education country', *Economics of Education Review* 24(1), pp.103-8.
- Pufendorf, Samuel von, 2005 [1672], *Of the Law of Nature and Nations: Eight Books*, Basil Kennett (tr.), Buffalo, NY: Hein.
- Pullman, George, and Baotung Gu (eds.), 2017, *Content Management: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice*, London: Routledge.

- Putler, Daniel S., 1992, 'Incorporating reference price effects into a theory of consumer choice', *Marketing Science* 11(3), pp.287-309.
- Putterman, Louis, 2007, 'Commodification of labor follows commodification of the firm: On a theorem of the new institutional economics', *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics* 60(2), pp.161-79.
- Quong, Jonathan, 2013, 'On the Idea of Public Reason', in Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Rawls*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp.265-80.
- Raag, Tarja, Karen Kusiak, Meredith Tumilty, Anna Kelemen, Hilana Bernheimer, and Jessica Bond, 2011, 'Reconsidering SES and gender divides in literacy achievement: are the gaps across social class and gender necessary', *Educational Psychology* 31(6), pp.691-705.
- Rafienia, Parvin, Parviz Azadfallah, Ali Fathi-Ashtiani, and Kazem Rasoulzadeh-Tabatabaieei, 'The role of extraversion, neuroticism and positive and negative mood in emotional information processing', *Personality and Individual Differences* 44(2), pp.392-402.
- Raftopoulos, Athanassios, 2007, *Cognition and Perception*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rahn, Wendy M., 2000, 'Affect as Information: The Role of Public Mood in Political Reasoning', in Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin (eds.), *Elements of Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.135-50.
- , Brian Kroeger, and Cynthia M. Kite, 1996, 'A Framework for the Study of Public Mood', *Political Psychology* 17(1), pp.29-58.
- Rakopoulos, Theodoros, 2016, 'Solidarity: the egalitarian tensions of a bridge-concept', *Social Anthropology* 24(2), pp.142-51.
- Rancière, Jacques, 1992, 'Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization', in *October: The Identity In Question* 61, pp.58-64.
- Rand, David G., and Martin A. Nowak, 2013, 'Human cooperation', *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 17(8), pp.413-25.
- RAND Corporation, 2012, 'Can Social Media Help Analyze Public Opinion? A Case Study of Iranian Public Opinion After the 2009 Election', *Research Brief-9685*, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9685/index1.html (accessed 6 April 2017).
- Randal, Malin, 2002, *Propaganda & The Ethics of Persuasion*, Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press.
- Randler, Christoph, Eberhard Hummel, and Peter Wüst-Ackermann, 2013, 'The Influence of Perceived Disgust on Students' Motivation and Achievement', *International Journal of Science Education* 35(17), pp.2839-56.

- Rascalori, Laura, Barry Monahan, and Gwenda Young, 2014, *Amateur filmmaking: the home movie, the archive, the web*, New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Rauch, Andreas, and Michael Frese, 2007, 'Let's put the person back into entrepreneurship research: A meta-analysis on the relationship between business owners' personality traits, business creation, and success', *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology* 16(4), pp.353-85.
- Raune, David, Andrew MacLeod, and Emily A. Holmes, 2005, 'The simulation heuristic and visual imagery in pessimism for future negative events in anxiety', *Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy* 12(4), pp.313-25.
- Rawls, John, 1971, *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- , 1996, *Political Liberalism*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- , 2001, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Raworth, Kate, 2017, *Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist*, London: Random House.
- Raz, Joseph, 2009 [1979], *The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rea-Dickins, Pauline, 1992, *Evaluation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Read, Daniel, and George Loewenstein, 1995, 'Diversification Bias: Explaining the Discrepancy in Variety Seeking between Combined and Separated Choices', *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied* 1(1), pp.34-49.
- Read, Oliver, 1952, *The Recording and Reproduction of Sound*, Indianapolis, IN: H.W. Sams & Co.
- , and Walter L. Welch, 1976, *From Tin Foil to Stereo: Evolution of the Phonograph*, Indianapolis, IN: H.W. Sams & Co.
- Reese-Schäfer, Walter, 1999, *Luhmann zur Einführung*, Hamburg, Germany: Junius.
- Reichel, André, 2012, 'Civil society as a system', in Ortwin Renn, André Reichel, and Joa Bauer (eds.), *Civil society for sustainability*, Bremen, Germany: Europäischer Hochschulverlag, pp.56-72.
- Reid, Vincent M., and Tricia Striano, 2005, 'Adult gaze influences infant attention and object processing: implications for cognitive neuroscience', *European Journal of Neuroscience* 21(6), pp.1763-6.
- Reimann, Mathias, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), 2008, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Reisberg, Daniel, 2013, *Cognition: Exploring the Science of the Mind*: New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Reisinger, Markus, 2012, 'Platform competition for advertisers and users in media markets', *International Journal of Industrial Organization* 30(2), pp.243-52.
- Revesz, Rachael, 2017, 'Intelligence agencies told to keep Donald Trump's briefings short and without nuance', *Independent*, 16 February, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/intelligence-agencies-donald-trump-briefings-short-barack-obama-michael-flynn-a7584011.html> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- Reymond, Robert L., 2008, *Faith's Reasons for Believing: An Apologetic Antidote to Mindless Christianity (and to Thoughtless Atheism)*, San Clemente, CA: Mentor.
- Rhodes, R.A.W., Sarah Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), 2006, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ricœur, Paul, 1976, *Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning*, Fort Worth, TX; Texas Christian University Press.
- Riddle, Karen, 2010, 'Always on My Mind: Exploring How Frequent, Recent, and Vivid Television Portrayals Are Used in the Formation of Social Reality Judgments', *Media Psychology* 13(2), pp.155-79.
- Ridley, Nancy L., and Frank R. Asbury, 'Does counselor body position make a difference', 1988, *The School Counselor* 35(4), pp.253-8.
- Riemann, Rainer, Claudia Grubich, Susanne Hempel, Susanne Mergl, and Manfred Richter, 1993, 'Personality and Attitudes towards Current Political Topics', *Personality and Individual Differences* 15(3), pp.313-21.
- Riesman, David, and Nathan Glazer, 1948, 'The meaning of opinion', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12(4), pp.633-48.
- Riggio, Heidi R., and Ronald E. Riggio, 2002, 'Emotional Expressiveness, Extraversion, and Neuroticism: A Meta-Analysis', *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior* 26(4), pp.195-218.
- Riker, William H., 1962, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Riley, Patrick, 1978, 'The General Will Before Rousseau', *Political Theory* 6(4), pp.485-516.
- Riley, Sam G., 2010, 'Temporary celebrity', in Riley (ed.), *Star struck: An encyclopedia of celebrity culture*, Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press, pp.294-9.

- Riley-Smith, Ben, 2016, 'EU referendum: George Osborne says tax hike needed to cover £36bn Brexit black hole', *Telegraph*, 18 April, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/18/brexit-would-cost-every-family-4300-a-year-treasury-forecasts/> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- Rilling, James K., David A. Gutman, Thorsten R. Zeh, Giuseppe Pagnoni, Gregory S. Berns, and Clinton D. Kilts, 2002, 'A neural basis for social cooperation', *Neuron* 35(2), pp.395-405.
- Riquelme, Fabián, and Pablo González-Cantergiani, 2016, 'Measuring user influence on Twitter: A survey', *Information Processing & Management* 52(5), pp.949-75.
- Riskind, John H., and Carolyn C. Gotay, 1982, 'Physical posture: Could it have regulatory or feedback effects on motivation and emotion?', *Motivation and Emotion* 6(3), pp.273-98.
- Riso, Don Richard, and Russ Hudson, 2000, *Understanding the Enneagram: the practical guide to personality types*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Robarchek, Clayton A., 1979, 'Learning to fear: A case study of emotional conditioning', *American Ethnologist* 6(3), pp.555-67.
- Robb, David, 2010, 'Narrative Role-Play in Twentieth-Century German Cabaret and Political 'Song Theatre'', *New Theatre Quarterly* 26(1), pp.25-37.
- Roberts, Brent W., Avshalom Caspi, and Terrie E. Moffitt, 2003, 'Work Experiences and Personality Development in Young Adulthood', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 84(3), pp.582-93.
- Roberts, Carl W. (ed.), 1997, *Text Analysis for the Social Sciences: Methods for Drawing Inferences from Texts and Transcripts*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Roberts, Patricia Easterbrook, 1967, *Table settings, entertaining, and etiquette: a history and guide*, London: Thames & Hudson.
- Robertson, Donald James, and J.S. Symons, 1996, *Do peer groups matter?: peer group versus schooling effects on academic attainment*, London: Centre for Economic Performance.
- Robins, Richard W., and Oliver P. John, 1997, 'The quest for self-insight: Theory and research on accuracy and bias in self-perception', in Robert Hogan, John A. Johnson, and Stephen R. Briggs (eds.), *Handbook of personality psychology*, San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Robins, Richard W., Jessica L. Tracy, and Jeffrey W. Sherman, 2007, 'What Kinds of Methods Do Personality Psychologists Use?: A Survey of Journal Editors and Editorial Board Members', in Richard W. Robins, R. Chris Fraley, and Robert F. Krueger (eds.), *Handbook of Research Methods in Personality Psychology*, New York, NY: Guilford Press.

- Robinson, Andrew, 2003, 'The Origins of Writing', in David Crowley and Paul Heyer (eds.), *Communication in History: Technology, Culture, Society*, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
- Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole, 2003, 'Platform competition in two-sided markets', *Journal of the European Economic Association* 1(4), pp.990-1029.
- Rodvold, Michelle Ann, 1989, 'The influence of eye gaze on perceptions of dominance', MA thesis, San José State University.
- Rogers, Everett M., 2003 [1962], *Diffusion of Innovations*, New York, NY: Free Press.
- Rogers, Henry, 2005, *Writing Systems: A Linguistic Approach*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Roland, Charles G., 1968, 'Jargon', *Journal of the American Medical Association* 204(4), pp.317-18.
- Rom, Mark Carl, 2015, 'Numbers, Pictures, and Politics: Teaching Research Methods Through Data Visualizations', *Journal of Political Science Education* 11(1), pp.11-27.
- Romanelli, Raffaele, 1998, *How did they become voters?: the history of franchise in modern European representation*, London: Kluwer Law International.
- Romme, Georges, 2016, *The Quest for Professionalism: The Case of Management and Entrepreneurship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ronel, Natti, and Dana Segev (eds.), 2015, *Positive Criminology*, London: Routledge.
- Ronsse, Renaud, Olivier White, and Philippe Lefèvre, 2007, 'Computation of gaze orientation under unrestrained head movements', *Journal of Neuroscience Methods* 159(1), pp.158-69.
- Roochnik, David, 1996, *Of Art and Wisdom: Plato's Understanding of Techne*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Rook, Laurens, 2006, 'An Economic Psychological Approach to Herd Behavior', *Journal of Economic Issues* 40(1), pp.75-95.
- Rorty, Richard, 1979, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- , 1995, 'From Formalism to Poststructuralism', in George Alexander Kennedy (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol.8*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosenberg, Scott, 2009, *Say Everything: how blogging began, what it's becoming, and why it matters*, New York, NY: Crown Publishers.
- Rosenberg, Shawn W., 2014, 'Citizen competence and the psychology of deliberation', in Stephen Elstub and Peter McLaverty (eds.), *Deliberative Democracy: Issues and Cases*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp.98-117.

- Rosenfeld, Michel, and András Sajó (eds.), 2012, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rosewarne, Stuart, 2010, 'Globalisation and the Commodification of Labour: Temporary Labour Migration', *The Economic and Labour Relations Review* 20(2), pp.99-110.
- Rossberg-Gempton, Irene, and Gary D. Poole, 1993, 'The effect of open and closed postures on pleasant and unpleasant emotions', *The Arts in Psychotherapy* 20(1), pp.75-82.
- Rosse, James N., 1967, 'Daily newspapers, monopolistic competition, and economies of scale', *American Economic Review* 57(2), pp.522-33.
- Rostow, Walt Whitman, 1960, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Roth, Steffen, and Anton Schütz, 2015, 'Ten Systems: Toward a Canon of Function Systems', *Cybernetics and Human Knowing* 22(4), pp.11-31.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 1984 [1754], *Discourse on Inequality*, Maurice Cranston (tr.), London: Penguin.
- Rouvillois, Frédéric, 2008, *Histoire du snobisme*, Paris: Flammarion.
- Rowe, David, and Kylie Brass, 2008, 'The uses of academic knowledge: the university in the media', *Media, Culture & Society* 30(5), pp.677-98.
- Rowling, J.K., 2007, *Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Royal Society for Public Health, 2009, *Perspectives in Public Health*, London: Sage.
- Rozakou, Katerina, 2016, 'Socialities of solidarity: revisiting the gift taboo in times of crisis', *Social Anthropology* 24(2), pp.185-99.
- Rozin, Paul, and Carol Nemeroff, 2007, 'Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and Similarity "Heuristics"', in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman (eds.), *Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.201-16.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997, *Modeling bounded rationality*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Rudoff, Alvin, 1991, *The paths to social deviance and conformity: a model of the process*, Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, 1992, *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Rugman, Alan M., and Thomas L. Brewer (eds.), 2009, *The Oxford Handbook of International Business*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Rummel, Jeffrey L., Zhiping Walter, Rajiv Dewan, and Abraham Seidmann, 2005, 'Activity consolidation to improve responsiveness', *European Journal of Operational Research*, 161(3), pp.683-703.
- Runco, Mark A., and Robert S. Albert, 2010, 'Creativity Research', in James C. Kaufman and Robert J. Sternberg (eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rushton, J. Philippe, Harry G. Murray, and Sampo V. Paunonen, 1983, 'Personality, research creativity, and teaching effectiveness in university professors', *Scientometrics* 5(2), pp.93-116.
- Rushton, Stephen, Jackson Morgan, and Michael Richard, 2007, 'Teacher's Myers-Briggs personality profiles: Identifying effective teacher personality traits', *Teaching and Teacher Education* 23(4), pp.432-41.
- Ruskin, John, 1997 [1860], *Unto This Last*, in Ruskin, *Unto This Last and Other Writings*, Clive Wilmer (ed.), London: Penguin.
- Russo, Silvia, and Erik Amnå, 2015, 'When political talk translates into political action: The role of personality traits', *Personality and Individual Differences* (in press).
- Russolo, Luigi, 2004, 'The art of noises: futurist manifesto', in Christoph Cox and Daniel Warner (eds.), *Audio Culture: Readings in Modern Music*, New York, NY: Continuum.
- Rustichini, Aldo, 2009, 'Neuroeconomics: What have we found, and what should we search for?', *Current Opinion in Neurobiology* 19(6), pp.672-7.
- Rustin, Michael, 1989, 'The Politics of Post-Fordism: or, The Trouble with "New Times"', *New Left Review* 175.
- Sadler, Brook Jenkins, 2007, 'Collective Responsibility, Universalizability, and Social Practices', *Journal of Social Philosophy* 38(3), pp.486-503.
- Sadler, John Z., Werdie van Staden, and K.W.M. Fulford (eds.), 2015, *The Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sagan, Carl, 1983, *Cosmos: The Story of Cosmic Evolution, Science and Civilisation*, London: Abacus.
- , 1996, 'The Fine Art of Baloney Detection', in Sagan, *The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark*, New York, NY: Ballantine Books.
- Salas, Eduardo, Deborah DiazGranados, Cameron Klein, C. Shawn Burke, and Kevin C. Stagl, 2008, 'Does Team Training Improve Team Performance? A Meta-Analysis', *Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society* 50(6), pp.903-33.

- Salomon, David, 2008, *A Concise Introduction to Data Compression*, Berlin: Springer.
- Saltman, Roy G., 2006, *The history and politics of voting technology: in quest of integrity and public confidence*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Samar, Stephanie M., Kate E. Walton, and Wilson McDermut, 2013, 'Personality Traits Predict Irrational Beliefs', *Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy* 31(4), pp.231-42.
- Sampson, Anthony A., 1991, *Peer group screening in labour markets*, Salford: University of Salford.
- Samuels, Curtis A., 1985, 'Attention to eye contact opportunity and facial motion by three-month-old infants', *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology* 40(1), pp.105-14.
- Samuelson, Paul, and William Nordhaus, 2009 [1948], *Economics*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Sanders, Bernard, 2016, *Our Revolution: A Future to Believe In*, London: Profile Books.
- Sandhu, Serina, 2016, 'Donald Trump's use of grammar "typical of children aged 11 and under"', *Independent*, 17 March, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-elections/donald-trump-uses-language-typical-of-children-under-11-a6936256.html> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- Santrock, John W., 2005, *A Topical Approach to Life-Span Development*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Saroglou, Vassilis, 2002, 'Religion and the five-factors of personality: A meta-analytic review', *Personality and Individual Differences* 32(1), pp.15-25.
- Sartori, Giovanni, 2005, 'Party Types, Organisations and Functions', *West European Politics* 28(1), pp.5-32.
- Sassen, Saskia, 1992, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sassi, Sinikka, 2001, 'Public Opinion as Local Opinion', in Slavko Splichal (ed.), *Public Opinion & Democracy: Vox Populi – Vox Dei?*, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., pp.103-24.
- Satz, Eli, and Suzanne Donnenwerth-Nolan, 1981, 'Does Motoric Imagery Facilitate Memory for Sentences? A Selective Interference Test', *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior* 20(2), pp.322-32.
- Sauter, Disa A., Frank Eisner, Andrew J. Calder, and Sophie K. Scott, 2010, 'Perceptual cues in nonverbal vocal expressions of emotion', *The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology* 63(11) (2010), pp.2251-72.
- Savage, Mike, 2000, *Class Analysis and Social Transformation*, Buckingham: Open University Press.

- , Niall Cunningham, Fiona Devine, Sam Friedman, Daniel Laurison, Lisa McKenzie, Andrew Miles, Helene Snee, and Paul Wakeling, 2015, *Social Class in the 21st Century*, London: Pelican.
- Say, Jean-Baptiste, 1971 [1832], *A Treatise on Political Economy, or the Production, Distribution, and Consumption of Wealth*, New York, NY: Augustus M. Kelley.
- Sayad, Abdelmalek, 2004, *The Suffering of the Immigrant*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Schacter, Daniel L., 1999, 'The seven sins of memory: Insights from psychology and cognitive neuroscience', *American Psychology* 54(1), pp.182-203.
- Schaffer, Robert H., and Jonathan M. Stearn, 2015, 'Making the match: Senior executives and management consultants', *Leader to Leader* 76(1), p.48.
- Scheff, Thomas, 1994, *Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism and War*, Nashville, TN: Winston-Derek Publishers, Inc.
- Schervish, Mark J., 1995, *Theory of statistics*, New York, NY: Springer.
- Scheuermann, Mona, 1985, *Social Protest in the Eighteenth-Century English Novel*, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
- Schickel, Richard, 1985, *Intimate Strangers: The Culture of Celebrity*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Schilderman, Hans, 2001, 'Religion and Emotion: Notes on their Relationship', *Journal of Empirical Theology* 14(2), pp.85-96.
- Schmandt-Besserat, Denise, 1996, *How Writing Came About*, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Schmidtchen, Gerhard, 1959, *Die befragte Nation: Über den Einfluss der Meinungsforschung auf die Politik*, Freiburg: Romabach.
- Schmitt, Carl, 1985 [1923], *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, Ellen Kennedy (tr.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- , 2014, *Dictatorship: From the origin of the modern concept of sovereignty to proletarian class struggle*, Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (trs.), Cambridge: Polity.
- Schmitt, Charles B., and Quentin Skinner (eds.), 1990, *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schnall, Simone, Jonathan Haidt, Gerald L. Clore, and Alexander H. Jordan, 2008, 'Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 34(8), pp.1096-1109.

- Schneider, Stefan, Arthur A. Stone, Joseph E. Schwartz, and Joan E. Broderick, 2011, 'Peak and End Effects in Patients' Daily Recall of Pain and Fatigue: A Within-Subjects Analysis', *Journal of Pain* 12(2), pp.228-35.
- Schneider, Tamera R., 2004, 'The role of neuroticism on psychological and physiological stress responses', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 40(6), pp.795-804.
- Schnitzler, Lena, Sian K. Smith, Heather L. Shepherd, Joanne Shaw, Skye Dong, Delesha M. Carpenter, Frances Nguyen, and Haryana M. Dhillon, 2017, 'Communication during radiation therapy education sessions: The role of medical jargon and emotional support in clarifying patient confusion', *Patient Education and Counseling* 100(1), pp.112-20.
- Schoeneborn, Dennis, 2011, 'Organization as communication: A Luhmannian perspective', *Management Communication Quarterly* 25(4), pp.663-89.
- Schor, Juliet, and Betsy Taylor (eds.), 2003, *Sustainable Planet: Roadmaps for the Twenty-First Century*, New York, NY: Beacon Press.
- Schrager, Allison, 2016, 'People don't trust economists anymore', *Quartz*, 24 July, <https://qz.com/735166/the-end-of-economists-influence-is-nigh/> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- Schröder, Kim Christian, 2000, 'Making sense of audience discourses: Towards a multidimensional model of mass media reception', *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 3(2), pp.233-58.
- Schulz, Winfried, 2001, 'Changes in Mass Media and the Public Sphere', in Slavko Splichal (ed.), *Public Opinion & Democracy: Vox Populi – Vox Dei?*, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., pp.339-58.
- Schulze, Bernd, 2005, *Sportarten als soziale Systeme*, Münster, Germany: Waxmann.
- Schuman, Howard, and Stanley Presser, 1981, *Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on question form, wording, and context*, New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A., 1962 [1942], *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, New York, NY: Harper & Row.
- Schwartz, Hillel, 2011, *Making Noise: From Babel to the Big Bang & Beyond*, New York, NY: Zone Books.
- Schwartzberg, Melissa, 2007, 'Jeremy Bentham on Fallibility and Infallibility', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 68(4), pp.562-86.
- Schwarz, Norbert, and Gerald L. Clore, 1983, 'Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45(3), pp.513-23.

- Schwarz, Norbert, William Servay, and Martin Kumpf, 1999, 'Attribution of Arousal as a Mediator of the Effectiveness of Fear-Arousing Communications', *Journal of Applied Psychology* 15(2), pp.178-88.
- Schweickart, David, 2002, *After Capitalism*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Scoble, Robert, and Shel Israel, 2006, *Naked Conversations: How Blogs are Changing the Way Businesses Talk with Customers*, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
- Scott, Ben, 2005, 'A contemporary history of digital journalism', *Television & New Media* 6(1), pp.89-126.
- Scott, John, 2000, 'Rational Choice Theory', in Gary Browning, Abigail Halcli, and Frank Webster (eds.), *Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present*, London: Sage, pp.126-38.
- Scruton, Roger, 2014, *How To Be A Conservative*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Sears, Susan J., John J. Kennedy, and Gail L. Kaye, 1997, 'Myers-Briggs personality profiles of prospective educators', *The Journal of Educational Research* 90(1), pp.195-202.
- Seay, Heather A., Virginia E. Fee, Keli S. Holloway, and J. Martin Giesen, 2003, 'A Multicomponent Treatment Package to Increase Anger Control in Teacher-Referred Boys', *Child & Family Behavior Therapy* 25(1), pp.1-18.
- Segerstrale, Ullica (ed.), 2000, *Beyond the Science Wars: the missing discourse about science and society*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Seifert, Erica A., 2012, *The Politics of Authenticity in Presidential Campaigns, 1976-2008*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
- Sen, Amartya, 1977, 'Rational fools; a critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6(2), pp.317-44.
- Seneca, 1995, *Moral and Political Essays*, John M. Cooper and J.F. Procopé (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Serazio, Michael, 2016, 'Encoding the paranoid style in American politics: "anti-establishment" discourse and power in contemporary spin', *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 33(2), pp.181-94.
- Sewell, William H., 1961, 'Social Class and Childhood Personality', *Sociometry* 24(4), pp.340-56.
- Shafer, Jack, 2015, 'Donald Trump Talks Like a Third-Grader', *Politico*, 13 August, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/donald-trump-talks-like-a-third-grader-121340> (accessed 13 April 2017).

- Shah, Anuj K., and Daniel M. Oppenheimer, 2008, 'Heuristics made easy: An effort-reduction framework', *Psychological Bulletin* 134(2), pp.207-22.
- Shanahan, Michael J., Shawn Bauldry, Brent W. Roberts, Ross Macmillan, and Rosemary Russo, 2014, 'Personality and the Reproduction of Social Class', *Social Forces* 93(1), pp.209-40.
- Shanteau, James, David J. Weiss, Rickey P. Thomas, and Julia C. Pounds, 2002, 'Performance-based assessment of expertise: How to decide if someone is an expert or not', *European Journal of Operational Research* 136(2), pp.253-63.
- Shapiro, Ian, and Russell Hardin (eds.), 1993, *Political Order: NOMOS XXXVIII*, New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Shariff, Azim F., and Jessica L. Tracy, 2009, 'Knowing who's boss: Implicit perceptions of status from the nonverbal expression of pride', *Emotion* 9(5), pp.631-9.
- Shaver, Phillip, Judith Schwartz, Donald Kirson, and Cary O'Connor, 1987, 'Emotion knowledge: further exploration of a prototype approach', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52(6), pp.1061-86.
- Shelton, Dinah (ed.), 2015, *The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sherif, Muzafer, 1935, 'A study of some social factors in perception', *Archives of Psychology* 27(187), pp.23-46.
- Sherman, Barbara R., and Robert T. Blackburn, 1975, 'Personal characteristics and teaching effectiveness of college faculty', *Journal of Educational Psychology* 67(1), pp.124-31.
- Sherman, Gary D., and Jonathan Haidt, 2011, 'Cuteness and Disgust: The Humanizing and Dehumanizing Effects of Emotion', *Emotion Review* 3(3), pp.245-51.
- Sherwin, Adam, 2011, 'Fake breasts, fake tan, fake storylines?', *Independent*, 23 May, <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/tv/features/fake-breasts-fake-tan-fake-storylines-2288159.html> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Shifman, Limor, 2013, *Memes in Digital Culture*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Shirky, Clay, 2008, *Here Comes Everybody*, London: Penguin.
- Shklar, Judith, 1989, 'The Liberalism of Fear', in Nancy L. Rosenblum (ed.), *Liberalism and the Moral Life*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sibieta, Luke, 2015, *Schools Spending*, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Sibley, W.M., 1953, 'The Rational Versus the Reasonable', *The Philosophical Review* 62(4), pp.554-60.

- Siegel, Alyssa, 2015, 'How Social Media Affects Our Relationships', *Psychology Tomorrow*, 7 September, <http://psychologytomorrowmagazine.com/curfeat-how-social-media-affects-our-relationships/> (accessed 15 April 2017).
- Siegel, Harvey (ed.), 2009, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sijuwade, Philip O., 2007, 'Nationalism, Class Conflict and Social Transformation in the Twentieth Century', *Research Journal of Applied Sciences* 2(9), pp.1001-6.
- Silke, Andrew, 2003, 'Becoming a Terrorist', in Silke (ed.), *Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences*, Oxford: Wiley, pp.29-54.
- Silverman, Craig, 2017, 'Some Of Those Hyperpartisan Sites On The Right And Left Are Actually Owned By The Same People', *Buzzfeed*, 28 February, https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/how-the-hyperpartisan-sausage-is-made?utm_term=.vd7BORvPq#.bigZNM3yx (accessed 28 February 2017).
- Simmel, Georg, 1977 [1892], *The Problems of the Philosophy of History: An Epistemological Essay*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Simon, Herbert A., 1947, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization*, New York, NY: Macmillan.
- , 1955, 'A behavioural model of rational choice', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 59(1), pp.99-118.
- , 1956, 'Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment', *Psychological Review* 63(2), pp.129-38.
- , 1957, *Models of Man: Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting*, Oxford: Wiley.
- , 1979, *Models of Thought*, 2 vols., New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Simonson, Itamar, 1990, 'The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on Variety-Seeking Behaviour', *Journal of Marketing Research* 27(2), pp.150-62.
- Simoons, Frederick J., 1994, *Eat Not This Flesh: Food Avoidances from Prehistory to the Present*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Sinaceur, Marwan, and Larissa Z. Tiedens, 2006, 'Get mad and get more than even: When and why anger expression is effective in negotiations', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 42(3), pp.314-22.

- Singer, Eleanor, and Howard Schuman (eds.), 1987, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51(4s), Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Sinyavsky, Andrei [as Abram Tertz], 'On Socialist Realism', 1982, in Sinyavsky, *The Trial Begins' and 'On Socialist Realism'*, Max Hayward and George Dennis (trs.), Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Siune, Karen, and F. Gerald Kline, 1975, 'Communication, Mass Political Behavior, and Mass Society', in Steven H. Chaffee (ed.), *Political Communication: Issues and Strategies for Research*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Sjöberg, Lennart, 2001, 'Limits of Knowledge and the Limited Importance of Trust', *Risk Analysis* 21(1), pp.189-98.
- Skeggs, Beverley, 2004, *Class, Self, Culture*, London: Routledge.
- Skoric, Marko, Nathaniel Poor, Palakorn L. Achananuparp, Ee-Peng Lim, and Jing Jiang, 2012, 'Tweets and votes: A study of the 2011 Singapore general election', in *Proceedings of 45th Hawaii International Conference on Systems Science (HICSS-45 2012)*, Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society, pp.2583-91.
- Skues, Keith, and David Kindred, 2014, *Pirate radio: an illustrated history*, Stroud: Amberley.
- Slentz, Kristine L., and Suzanne L. Krogh, 2001, *Early Childhood Development and its Variations*, London: Routledge.
- Slocum, Walter L., and Carol L. Stone, 1958, 'Factors Associated with Family Affection Patterns', *The Coordinator* 7(2), pp.21-4.
- Sloman, Steven A., 1996, 'The empirical case for two systems of reasoning', *Psychological Bulletin* 119(1), pp.3-22.
- Small, Deborah A., and Jennifer S. Lerner, 2008, 'Emotional Policy: Personal Sadness and Anger Shape Judgments About a Welfare Case', *Political Psychology* 29(1), pp.149-68.
- , and Baruch Fischhoff, 2006, 'Emotion priming and attributions for terrorism: Americans' reactions in a national field experiment', *Political Psychology* 27(2), pp.289-98.
- Smart, Barry, 2003, 'An economic turn', *Journal of Classical Sociology* 3(1), pp.47-66.
- Smith, Adam, 1999a [1776], *The Wealth of Nations: Books I-III*, Andrew Skinner (ed.), London: Penguin.
- , 1999b [1776], *The Wealth of Nations: Books IV-V*, Andrew Skinner (ed.), London: Penguin.

- Smith, Angela M., 1998, 'Knowledge and Expertise in the Early Platonic Dialogues', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 80(1), pp.129-61.
- Smith, Eliot R., and Jamie DeCoster, 2000, 'Dual-process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems', *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 4(2), pp.108-31.
- Smith, Laura, Kim Baranowski, Alizah Allen, and Rashidah Bowen, 2013, 'Poverty, Crime Seriousness, and the "Politics of Disgust"', *Journal of Poverty* 17(4), pp.375-93.
- Smith, Margot W., 1979, 'A Guide to the Delineation of Medical Care Regions, Medical Trade Areas and Hospital Service Areas', *Public Health Reports* 94(3), p.247.
- Smith, Peter, 2000, *A Concise Encyclopedia of the Bahá'í Faith*, Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
- , 2008, *An Introduction to the Baha'i Faith*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Soldatic, Karen, 2012, 'The place of disgust: disability, class and gender in spaces of workfare', *Societies* 2(1), pp.139-56.
- Solomon, Michael R., Judith L. Zaichkowsky, and Rosemary Polegato, 2013, *Consumer Behaviour: Buying, Having, and Being*, Toronto, ON: Pearson.
- Solow, Robert M., 1956, 'A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 70(1), pp.65-94.
- Somin, Ilya, 2006, 'Knowledge about ignorance: New directions in the study of political information', *Critical Review* 18(1-3), pp.255-78.
- , 2015, 'The Ongoing Debate Over Political Ignorance: Reply to My Critics', *Critical Review* 27(3-4), pp.380-414.
- Sontag, Susan, 1977, *On Photography*, London: Penguin.
- Sourbati, Maria, 2012, 'Disabling communications? A capabilities perspective on media access, social inclusion and communication policy', *Media, Culture, & Society* 34(5), pp.571-87.
- Sparks, John R., and Charles S. Areni, 2002, 'The effects of sales presentation quality and initial perceptions on persuasion: a multiple role perspective', *Journal of Business Research* 55(6), pp.517-28.
- Specht, Jule, Boris Egloff, and Stefan C. Schmukle, 2011, 'Stability and Change of Personality Across the Life Course: The Impact of Age and Major Life Events on Mean-Level and Rank-Order Stability of the Big Five', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 101(4), pp.862-882.

- Speidel, Gisela E., and Madeleen J. Herreshoff, 1989, 'Imitation and the construction of long utterances', in Gisela E. Speidel and Keith E. Nelson (eds.), *The many faces of imitation in language learning*, New York, NY: Springer Science + Business Media, pp.181-97.
- Speier, Hans, 1950, 'Historical Development of Public Opinion', *American Journal of Sociology* 55(4), pp.376-88.
- Spence, Michael A., and Bruce M. Owen, 1977, 'Television programming, monopolistic competition, and welfare', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 91(1), pp.103-26.
- Spencer, Herbert, 1841, *The Study of Sociology*, New York, NY: D.A. Appleton.
- Spencer, Sarah, Judy Clegg, and Joy Stackhouse, 2012, 'Language, social class and education: listening to adolescents' perceptions', *Language and Education* 27(2), pp.129-43.
- Splichal, Slavko, 1999, *Public Opinion: Developments and Controversies in the Twentieth Century*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- , 2001a, 'Introduction: Public Opinion and Democracy Today', in Slavko Splichal (ed.), *Public Opinion & Democracy: Vox Populi – Vox Dei?*, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., pp.1-20.
- , 2001b, 'Publicity, Democracy, and Public Opinion', in Slavko Splichal (ed.), *Public Opinion & Democracy: Vox Populi – Vox Dei?*, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., pp.21-54.
- Spode, E.J., 2016, 'The Calvinist Roots of American Anti-intellectualism', *3:AM*, 23 October, <http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/calvinist-roots-american-anti-intellectualism/> (accessed 17 April 2017).
- Stahl, James E., Mark E. Drew, and Alexa Boer Kimball, 2014, 'Patient-clinician concordance, face-time and access', *International Journal of Health Care Quality Assurance* 27(8), p.664.
- Stalin, J.V., 1953 [1913], *Marxism and the National Question*, in Stalin, *Collected Works*, vol.2, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
- Stallings, William, 2004, *Data and Computer Communications*, Toronto, ON: Pearson Prentice Hall.
- Stausberg, Michael, and Steven Engler (eds.), 2016, *The Oxford Handbook of the Study of Religion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stearns, Peter, 2006, *Consumerism in World History: The Global Transformation of Desire*, London: Routledge.
- Stebbins, Robert, 2015, *Serious Leisure – A Perspective for Our Time*, New York, NY: Transaction.

- Stein, Rob, 2011, 'Obama administration replaces controversial "conscience" regulation for health-care workers', *Washington Post*, 18 February, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021803251.html> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Steinberg, Sigfrid Henry, 1961, *Five Hundred Years of Printing*, London: Penguin.
- Steiner, Jürg, 2012, *The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Steiner, Peter O., 1952, 'Program patterns and preferences and the workability of competition in radio broadcasting', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 66(2), pp.193-223.
- Stern, George G., 1970, *People in Context: Measuring Person-Environment Congruence in Education and Industry*, Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
- Sternberg, Robert J., and Janet E. Davidson (eds.), 1996, *The nature of insight*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Sternberg, Robert J., and Linda A. O'Hara, 1999, 'Creativity and intelligence', in Robert J. Sternberg (ed.), *Handbook of creativity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.251-72.
- Sterne, Jonathan, 2006, 'Communication as Techné', in Gregory J. Shepard, Jeffrey St. John, and Theodore G. Striphas, *Perspectives on Theory*, London: Sage, pp.90-8.
- Sternhell, Zeev, 1998, 'Crisis of Fin-de-siècle Thought', in Roger Griffin (ed.), *International Fascism: Theories, Causes, and the New Consensus*, London: Bloomsbury.
- , Mario Sznajder, and Maia Ashéri, 1994, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sternthal, Brian, and C. Samuel Craig, 1974, 'Fear Appeals: Revisited and Revised', *Journal of Consumer Research* 1(3), pp.22-32.
- Stevenson, Richard J., Megan J. Oates, Trevor I. Case, Betty M. Repacholi, and Paul Wagland, 2010, 'Children's Response to Adult Disgust Elicitors: Development and Acquisition', *Developmental Psychology* 46(1), pp.165-77.
- Stewart, Gail Barbara, 1991, *Peer-group pressure*, London: Simon & Schuster.
- Stichweh, Rudolf, 2005, *Inklusion und Exklusion: Studien zur Gesellschaftstheorie*, Bielefeld, Germany: Transcript.
- Stimson, James A., 1999, *Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- , 2002, 'The Micro Foundations of Mood', in James H. Kuklinski (ed.), *Thinking about Political Psychology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 253-80.

- , Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson, 1995, 'Dynamic Representation', *American Political Science Review* 89(3), pp.543–65.
- Stockhausen, Karlheinz, 1989, *Stockhausen on Music: Lectures & Interviews*, Robin Maconie (ed.), London: Marion Boyars.
- Stokes, Stephanie F., and Thomas Klee, 2009, 'Factors that influence vocabulary development in two-year-old children', *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry* 50(4), pp.498–505.
- Street, John, 2011, *Mass media, politics and democracy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Strunk, William, and E.B. White, 1959 [1918], *Elements of Style*, London: Macmillan.
- Struyk, Raymond J., 2002, 'Transnational think-tank networks: purpose, membership and cohesion', *Global Networks* 2(1), pp.83–90.
- Stylianides, Gabriel J., and Andreas J. Stylianides, 2008, 'Proof in School Mathematics: Insights from Psychological Research into Students' Ability for Deductive Reasoning', *Mathematical Thinking and Learning* 10(2), pp.103–33.
- Suhonen, Pertti, 2001, 'Opinion Polls and Journalism: The Case of Finland', in Slavko Splichal (ed.), *Public Opinion & Democracy: Vox Populi – Vox Dei?*, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., pp.311–38.
- Sunstein, Cass R., 2005, 'Moral heuristics', *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 28(4), pp.531–42.
- Suspitsyna, Tatiana, 2012, 'Higher Education for Economic Advancement and Engaged Citizenship: An Analysis of the U.S. Department of Education Discourse', *The Journal of Higher Education* 83(1), pp.49–72.
- Sutherland, John, 2014, 'Studying Russell Brand at A-level? Boring...', *Telegraph*, 7 May, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationopinion/10813676/Studying-Russell-Brand-at-A-level-Boring....html> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- Sutherland, Stuart, 2013 [1992], *Irrationality: The enemy within*, London: Pinter & Martin Ltd.
- Suzuki, Haruna, Satoshi Fujii, Tommy Gärling, Dick Ettema, Lars Olsson, and Margareta Friman, 2014, 'Rules for aggregated satisfaction with work commutes', *Transportation* 41(3), pp.495–506.
- Svaldi, Jennifer, Christina Dorn, Swantje Matthies, and Alexandra Philipsen, 2012, 'Effects of suppression and acceptance of sadness on the urge for non-suicidal self-injury and self-punishment', *Psychiatry Research* 200(2–3), pp.404–16.

- Swain, James E., Sara Konrath, Carolyn J. Dayton, Eric D. Finegood, and S. Shaun Ho, 2013, 'Toward a neuroscience of interactive parent-infant dyad empathy', *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 36(4), pp.438-9.
- Swan, Trevor W., 1956, 'Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation', *Economic Record* 32(3), pp.334-61.
- Swanson, David L., and Dan Nimmo, 1990, *New Directions in Political Communication: A Resource Book*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Sweller, John, 1988, 'Cognitive load during problem solving: Effects on learning', *Cognitive Science* 12(2), pp.257-85.
- Sykes, Timothy, 2015, '10 Practices for Becoming a Self-Made Millionaire', *Entrepreneur*, 23 September, <https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/250730> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- Sylvers, Patrick, Scott O. Lilienfeld, and Jamie L. Laprairie, 2011, 'Differences between trait fear and trait anxiety: Implications for psychopathology', *Clinical Psychology Review* 31(1), pp.122-37.
- Tabvuma, Vurain, Yannis Georgellis, Thomas Lange, Nicholas Theodorakopoulos, and Pawan Budhar, 2015, 'Orientation Training and Job Satisfaction: A Sector and Gender Analysis', *Human Resource Management* 54(2), p.303.
- Tafvelin, Susanne, Ulf Hyvönen, and Kristina Westerberg, 2014, 'Transformational Leadership in the Social Work Context: The Importance of Leaders Continuity and Co-Worker Support', *British Journal of Social Work* 44(4), pp.886-904.
- Tai, Yuanyuan, 2014, 'The Application of Body Language in English Teaching', *Journal of Language Teaching and Research* 5(5), pp.1205-9.
- Tait, Amelia, 2017, 'The march of the micro-influencers: why your friends are promoting toothpaste', *New Statesman*, 4 March, <http://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/social-media/2017/04/march-micro-influencers-why-your-friends-are-promoting-toothpaste> (accessed 17 April 2017).
- Tang, Junyao, 2015, *Family Socioeconomic Status and Personal Media Technology Use*, MSc thesis, Middle Tennessee State University.
- Tange, Hanne, 2016, 'Inclusive and exclusive knowledge practices in interdisciplinary, international education', *International Journal of Inclusive Education* 20(10), pp.1097-1108.
- Tapscott, Don, and Anthony D. Williams, 2006, *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything*, New York, NY: Portfolio.

- Tardanico, Susan, 2012, 'Is Social Media Sabotaging Real Communication?', *Forbes*, 30 April.
- Tarr, Jennifer, 2011, 'Educating with the hands: working on the body/self in Alexander Technique', *Sociology of Health & Illness* 33(2), pp.252-65.
- Tauss, Aaron, 2012, 'Contextualizing the Current Crisis: Post-Fordism, Neoliberal Restructuring, and Financialization', *Colombia Internacional* 76, pp.51-79.
- Tavris, Carol, and Elliot Aronson, 2007, *Mistakes were made (but not by me): Why we justify foolish beliefs, bad decisions, and hurtful acts*, Orlando, FL: Harcourt.
- Taylor, Adam, 2016, 'Before "fake news", there was Soviet "disinformation"', *Washington Post*, 26 November, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/26/before-fake-news-there-was-soviet-disinformation/?utm_term=.d142a43b5161 (accessed 13 April 2017).
- , 2017, 'Italian populist leader suggests juries of random people should decide what's "fake news"', *Washington Post*, 4 January, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/01/04/italian-populist-leader-suggests-juries-of-random-people-should-decide-whats-fake-news/?utm_term=.5dcd64ca7136 (accessed 23 February 2017).
- Taylor, Charles, 1992, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Taylor, Shelly E., and Susan Fiske, 1978, 'Salience, attention, and attribution: Top of the head phenomena', in Leonard Berkowitz (ed.), *Advances in Social Psychology*, New York, NY: Academic Press, pp.249-88.
- Taylor, Stuart P., 1967, 'Aggressive behaviour and physiological arousal as a function of provocation and the tendency to inhibit aggression', *Personality* 35(2), pp.297-310.
- Teigen, Karl Halvor, 1994, 'Yerkes-Dodson: A Law for all Seasons', *Theory & Psychology* 4(4), pp.525-47.
- Temperley, David, and Daniel Gildea, 2015, 'Information Density and Syntactic Repetition', *Cognitive Science* 39(8), pp.1802-23.
- Tepedeldiren, Yusuf Tayfun, and Ayten Özkan, 2014, 'The Use of Simple-sample Explanations for Math Education', *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences* 116(1), pp.149-51.
- Teschke, Benno, 2003, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations*, London: Verso.
- Tesser, Abraham, 1978, 'Self-generated attitude change', in Leonard Berkowitz (ed.), *Advances in Social Psychology*, New York, NY: Academic Press, pp.289-38.

- Tett, Robert P., Douglas N. Jackson, and M. Rothstein, 1991, 'Personality measures as predictors of job performance: A meta-analytic review', *Personnel Psychology* 44(4), pp.703-42.
- Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein, 2008, *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Therborn, Göran, 1980, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology*, London: Verso.
- , 1994, 'The New Questions of Subjectivity', in Slavoj Žižek (ed.), *Mapping Ideology*, London: Verso, pp.167-78.
- Thiele, Leslie Paul, 1990, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp.11-48.
- Thomas, Ann, 2010, *Pay attention!: How to listen, respond, and profit from customer feedback*, Oxford: John Wiley.
- Thomas, Pradip, and Philip J. Lee, 2012, *Global and local televangelism*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thompson, Derek, 2013, 'Upworthy: I Thought This Website Was Crazy, but What Happened Next Changed Everything', *The Atlantic*, 14 November, <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/11/upworthy-i-thought-this-website-was-crazy-but-what-happened-next-changed-everything/281472/> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- Thompson, Edward Palmer, 1963, *The Making of the English Working Class*, London: Penguin.
- Thompson, James, 1996, 'After the Fall: Class and Political Language in Britain, 1780-1900', *The Historical Journal* 39(3), pp.785-806.
- Thompson, John B., 1990, *Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication*, Cambridge: Polity.
- , 1995, *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Thompson, Michael J. (ed.), 2017, *The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Theory*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thorpe, Louis P., and Allen M. Schmuller, 1958, 'Education as a determinant of personality formation', in Thorpe and Schmuller (eds.), *Personality: An interdisciplinary approach*, New York, NY: Van Nostrand, pp.178-209.
- Thurstone, Louis Leon, 1927a, 'A Law of comparative judgment', *Psychological Review* 34(2), pp.273-86.

- , 1927b, 'The method of paired comparisons for social values', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 21(3), pp.384-400.
- , 1928, 'Attitudes Can Be Measured', *American Journal of Sociology* 33(4), pp.529-54.
- Tiedens, Larissa Z., 2000, 'Powerful emotions: The vicious cycle of social status positions and emotions', in Neal M. Ashkanasy, Charmine E.J. Härtel, and Wilfred J. Zerbe (eds.), *Emotions in the workplace: Research, theory, and practice*, Westport, CT: Praeger, pp.71-81.
- , 2001, 'Anger and advancement versus sadness and subjugation: the effect of negative emotion expressions on social status conferral', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 80(1), pp.86-94.
- , Phoebe C. Ellsworth, and Batja Mesquita, 2000, 'Sentimental Stereotypes: Emotional Expectations for High- and Low-Status Group Members', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 26(5), pp.560-75.
- Tight, Malcolm, 2009, *The Routledge International Handbook of Higher Education*, London: Routledge.
- Tillich, Paul, 1964, *Theology of Culture*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 1976, *Systematic Theology*, 3 vols., Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- , 2014 [1952], *The Courage To Be*, Harvey Cox (ed.), New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Time Magazine*, 1959, 'Hanker to Hunker?', LXXIV (19), 9 November.
- Tisdell, Clem, 1996, *Bounded Rationality and Economic Evolution: A Contribution to Decision Making, Economics, and Management*, Cheltenham: Brookfield.
- Tobin, Michael, 2002, 'Editorial', *British Journal of Visual Impairment* 20(1), pp.2-3.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de, 2003 [1835], *Democracy in America*, in Tocqueville, *Democracy in America and Two Essays on America*, Isaac Kramnick (ed.), London: Penguin.
- Toffler, Alvin, 1970, *Future Shock*, New York, NY: Random House.
- Tomasco, Anthony T., 1980, 'Student perceptions of instructional and personality characteristics of faculty: A canonical analysis', *Teaching of Psychology* 7(1), pp.79-82.
- Tooby, John, Leda Cosmides, and M.E. Price, 2006, 'Cognitive adaptations for n-person exchange: the evolutionary roots of organizational behavior', *Managerial and Decision Economics* 27(2-3), pp.103-29.
- Tourangeau, Roger, and Kenneth Rasinski, 1988, 'Cognitive processes underlying context effects in attitude measurement', *Psychological Bulletin* 103(3), pp.299-314.
- Trager, George L., 1961, 'The typology of paralanguage', *Anthropological Linguistics* 3(1), pp.17-21.

- Trevor, Douglas, 2004, *The Poetics of Melancholy in Early Modern England*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Trilling, Lionel, 1974, *Sincerity and Authenticity*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Trollope, Anthony, 1989 [1925], *The Warden*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tronto, Joan, 1993, *Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care*, London: Routledge.
- Trump, Donald, 2016, Interview by Mika Brzezinski, 'Morning Joe', *MSNBC*, New York, NY, 16 March, Television, at 7:40 AM ET.
- Tschorn, Adam, 2014, 'Normcore is (or is it?) a fashion trend (or non-trend or anti-trend)', *Los Angeles Times*, 18 May, <http://www.latimes.com/style/la-ig-normcore-20140518-story.html> (accessed 17 April 2017).
- Tully, James, 2008, *Public Philosophy in a New Key, Vol.1: Democracy and Civic Freedom*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tumasjan, Andranik, Timm O. Sprenger, Philipp G. Sandner, and Isabell M. Welpe, 2011, 'Election Forecasts With Twitter', *Social Science Computer Review* 29(4), pp.402-18.
- Tunstall, Jeremy, 2008, *The media were American: U.S. mass media in decline*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tupes, Ernest C., and Raymond E. Christal, 1961, *Recurrent personality factors based on trait ratings* (ASD-TR-61-97), Lackland, TX: U.S. Air Force.
- Turner, Brandon M., Hye Bin Rim, Nancy E. Betz, and Thomas E. Nygren, 2012, 'The Maximisation Inventory', *Judgment and Decision Making* 7(1), pp.48-60.
- Tuuvu, Jari, Petri Näätänen, Arto Ryynänen, Pertti Keskivaara, and Liisa Keltikangas-Järvinen, 1997, 'Extraversion, neuroticism and emotional reactivity', *International Journal of Psychophysiology* 25(1), p.59.
- Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman, 1973, 'Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability', *Cognitive Psychology* 5(2), pp.207-32.
- , 1974, 'Judgments Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases', *Science* 185(4157), pp.1124-31.
- Twardowski, Kazimierz, 1999, *On Actions, Products, and Other Topics in Philosophy*, Johannes Brandl and Jan Woleński (eds.), Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Tyber, Joshua M., Debra Lieberman, and Vladas Griskevicius, 2009, 'Microbes, mating, and morality: Individual differences in three functional domains of disgust', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 97(1), pp.103-22.

- Tyler, Imogen, 2008, “‘Chav mum, chav scum’: class disgust in contemporary Britain’, *Feminist Media Studies* 8(2), pp.17-34.
- Tyler, Jill, 2010, ‘Media Clubs: Social Class and the Shared Interpretations of Media Texts’, *Southern Communication Journal* 75(4), pp.392-412.
- Tynjala, Päivi, 1999, ‘Towards expert knowledge? A comparison between a constructivist and a traditional learning environment in the university’, *International Journal of Educational Research* 31(5), pp.357-442.
- Tyrell, Hartmann, 1979, ‘Familie und gesellschaftliche Differenzierung’, in Helge Pross (ed.), *Familie – wohin? Leistungen, Leistungsdefizite und Leistungswandlungen der Familie in hochindustrialisierten Gesellschaften*, Reinbeck, Germany: Rowohlt, pp.13-77.
- Unger, Roberto Mangabeira, 1983, *The Critical Legal Studies Movement*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- , 2004, *Social Theory: Its Situation and its Task*, London: Verso.
- Unkelbach, Christian, Klaus Fiedler, and Peter Freytag, 2007, ‘Information repetition in evaluative judgments: Easy to monitor, hard to control’, *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 103(1), pp.37-52.
- Urry, John, 2010, ‘Consuming the planet to excess’, *Theory, Culture & Society* 27(2-3), pp.191-212.
- Ussher, Jane M., and Janette Perz, 2008, ‘Empathy, Egalitarianism and Emotion Work in the Relational Negotiation of PMS: The Experience of Women in Lesbian Relationships’, *Feminism & Psychology* 18(1), pp.87-111.
- Vaaland, Grete S., and Erling Roland, 2013, ‘Pupil aggressiveness and perceptual orientation towards weakness in a teacher who is new to the class’, *Teaching and Teacher Education* 29(2), pp.177-87.
- Vaggi, Gianni, and Peter Groenewegen, 2003, *A Concise History of Economic Thought: From Mercantilism to Monetarism*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vaillant, George E., 2013, ‘Psychiatry, religion, positive emotions, and spirituality’, *Asian Journal of Psychiatry* 6(6), pp.590-4.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., Ted Brader, Eric W. Groenendyk, Krysha Gregorowicz, and Vincent L. Hutchings, 2011, ‘Election Night’s Alright for Fighting: The Role of Emotions in Political Participation’, *Journal of Politics* 73(1), pp.156-70.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., Krysha Gregorowicz, and Eric W. Groenendyk, 2009, ‘Efficacy, emotions, and the habit of participation’, *Political Behaviour* 31(3), pp.307-30.

- Vanderbilt, Amy, 1957, *Amy Vanderbilt's Complete Book of Etiquette*, New York, NY: Doubleday & Co.
- van Dijck, José, 2013, *The culture of connectivity: a critical history of social media*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- van Dijk, Teun A., 1998, *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, London: Sage.
- van Gyes, Guy, Hans de Witte, and Patrick Pasture, 2001, *Can class still unite?: The differentiated work force, class solidarity and trade unions*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Van Lange, Paul A.M., 2008, 'Does empathy trigger only altruistic motivation? How about selflessness or justice?', *Emotion* 8(6), pp.766-74.
- Van Maanen, John, and Edgar H. Schein, 1979, 'Toward a Theory of Organizational Socialization', in B.M. Staw (ed.), *Research in Organizational Behavior, vol.1*, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp.209-64.
- Veith, Ilza, 1965, *Hysteria: The History of a Disease*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Veraksa, Aleksander, and Nikolay Veraksa, 2015, 'Symbolic representation in early years learning: the acquisition of complex notions', *European Early Childhood Education Research Journal* 24(5), pp.668-83.
- Verhulst, Brad, Lindon J. Eaves, and Peter K. Hatemi, 2012, 'Correlation not Causation: The Relationship between Personality Traits and Political Ideologies', *American Journal of Political Science* 56(1), pp.34-51.
- Vestergaard, Torben, and Kim Schrøder, 1985, *The Language of Advertising*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Viner, Katharine, 2016, 'How technology disrupted the truth', *Guardian*, 12 July, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/12/how-technology-disrupted-the-truth> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- Vining, Joseph, 1999, 'On the Future of Total Theory: Science, Antiscience, and Human Candor', *Erasmus Institute Papers, Vol.1*.
- Volkmer, Ingrid, 2014, *The Global Public Sphere: Public Communication in the Age of Reflective Interdependence*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Vollmer, Howard M., and D.L. Mills, 1966, *Professionalization*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Volz, Kirsten G., Lael J. Schooler, and D. Yves von Cramon, 2010, 'It just felt right: The neural correlates of the fluency heuristic', *Consciousness and Cognition* 19(3), pp.829-37.
- Vrij, Aldert, João Oliveira, Annie Hammond, and Howard Ehrlichman, 2015, 'Saccadic eye movement rate as a cue to deceit', *Cognition* 141, pp.15-19.

- Vroom, Victor H., and Arthur G. Jago, 1988, *The New Leadership: Managing Participation in Organizations*, New York, NY: Prentice Hall.
- Vroom, Victor H., and Phillip W. Yetton, 1973, *Leadership and Decision-Making*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Vulliamy, Ed, 2016, “We are the 48%”: tens of thousands march in London for Europe’, *Observer*, 2 July, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/02/march-for-europe-eu-referendum-london-protest> (accessed 25 August 2016).
- Wade, Graham, 1994, *Signal coding and processing*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wadeson, Nigel, 2013, ‘The Division of Labour under Uncertainty’, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 169(2), pp.253-74.
- Wainwright, William J. (ed.), 2007, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wakeling, Paul, and Mike Savage, 2015, ‘Entry to elite positions and the stratification of higher education in Britain’, *The Sociological Review* 63(2), pp.290-320.
- Wallbott, Harald G., 1998, ‘Bodily expression of emotion’, *European Journal of Social Psychology* 28(6), pp.879-96.
- Waller, Niels G., and Yossef S. Ben-Porath, 1987, ‘Is it time for clinical psychology to embrace the five-factor model of personality?’, *American Psychologist* 42(9), pp.887-9.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel, 2004, *World-systems analysis: An introduction*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth, 1964, ‘The Stability of a Bipolar World’, *Daedalus* 93(3), pp.881-909.
- , 1993, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, *International Security* 18(2), pp.44-79.
- , 2000, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, *International Security* 25(1), pp.5-41.
- Walumbwa, Fred O., Bruce J. Avolio, William L. Gardner, Tara S. Wernsing, and Suzanne J. Peterson, 2008, ‘Authentic leadership: Development and validation of a theory-based measure’, *Journal of Management* 34(1), pp.89-126.
- Warburton, Nigel, 2006, *The basics of essay writing*, London: Routledge.
- Warren, Chezare A., 2015, ‘Conflicts and Contradictions: Conceptions of Empathy and the Work of Good-Intentioned Early Career White Female Teachers’, *Urban Education* 50(5), pp.572-600.

- Waśkiewicz, Andrzej, 2008, 'The language of the Polish political class', *Polish Sociological Review* 163(2), pp.285-96.
- Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust, 1994, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Watson, David, 2009, 'Locating Anger in the Hierarchical Structure of Affect: Comment on Carver and Harmon-Jones', *Psychological Bulletin* 135(2), pp.205-8.
- Watts, Duncan J., 2003, *Six degrees: The science of a connected age*, London: Vintage.
- Watts, Richard J., 2003, *Politeness*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , Sachiko Ide, and Konrad Ehlich, 2005, *Politeness in language: studies in its history, theory, and practice*, New York, NY: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Way, Baldwin M., and Roger D. Masters, 1996, 'Political Attitudes: Interactions of Cognition and Affect', *Motivation and Emotion* 20(3), pp.205-36.
- Weatherford, Jack, 1997, *The History of Money*, New York, NY: Crown Publishers.
- Weber, Christopher, 2012, 'Emotions, Campaigns, and Political Participation', *Political Research Quarterly* 66(2), pp.414-28.
- Weber, Eugen J., 1976, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernisation of rural France, 1870-1914*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Weber, Max, 1978 [1922], *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.), Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- , 1946, 'Politics as a Vocation', in Hans-Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weber Cannon, Lynn, 1980, 'Normative Embourgeoisement among Manual Workers: A Reexamination Using Longitudinal Data', *The Sociological Quarterly* 21(2), pp.185-95.
- Weigand, Edda, 1999, 'Misunderstanding: The standard case', *Journal of Pragmatics* 31(6), pp.763-85.
- Weinberger, Marc G., Harlan E. Spotts, and Ereni Markos, 2010, 'Joe Camel, Post-mortem of a brand spokesperson', *International Journal of Advertising* 29(3), pp.401-30.
- Weiner, Bernard, 1985, 'An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion', *Psychological Review* 92(4), pp.548-73.
- Weingast, Barry R., and Donald A. Wittman (eds.), 2006, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Weinhardt, Justin M., Brendan J. Morse, Janna Chimeli, and Jamie Fisher, 2012, 'An item response theory and factor analytic examination of two prominent maximisation tendency scales', *Judgment and Decision Making* 7(5), pp.644-58.
- Weininger, Elliot B., 2005, 'Foundations of Pierre Bourdieu's class analysis, in Erik Olin Wright (ed.), *Approaches to Class Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.82-118.
- Weinrib, Ernest J., 1988, 'Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law', *Yale Law Journal* 97(6), pp.949-1016.
- Weinschenk, Aaron C., and Costas Panagopoulos, 2014, 'Personality, Negativity, and Political Participation', *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 2(1), pp.164-82.
- Weinstein, Neil D., 1993, 'Testing four competing theories of health-protective behaviour', *Health Psychology* 12(4), pp.324-33.
- Weisberg, Robert W., 1993, *Creativity: Beyond the myth of genius*, London: Freeman.
- Weissmann, Shoshana, 2016, 'How social media gives public opinion wings', *Washington Times*, 12 September, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/12/how-social-media-gives-public-opinion-wings/> (accessed 6 April 2017).
- Weisz, George, 2003, 'The Emergence of Medical Specialization in the Nineteenth Century', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 77(3), pp.536-74.
- Welles, Orson (dir.), 1941, *Citizen Kane*, USA: RKO Radio Picture.
- Wellford, Charles F., John V. Pepper, and Carol V. Petrie (eds.), 2005, *Firearms and Violence: A Critical Review*, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
- Wellington, Jerry, and Carole J. Torgerson, 2005, 'Writing for publication: what counts as a "high status, eminent academic journal"?', *Journal of Further and Higher Education* 29(1), pp.35-48.
- Wellman, Barry, and Stephen D. Berkowitz, 1988, *Social Structures: A Network Approach*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wells, Alan, 1996, *World Broadcasting: A Comparative View*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.
- Wells, Liz (ed.), 2004, *Photography: A Critical Introduction*, London: Routledge.
- Wells, William D., John Burnett, and Sandra Moriarty (eds.), 2014, *Advertising: Principles and Practice*, London: Prentice Hall.
- Wenzlhuemer, Roland, 2013, *Connecting the nineteenth-century world: The telegraph and globalization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- West, Paul, 1985, 'In defense of purple prose', *New York Times*, 15 December, <http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/15/books/in-defense-of-purple-prose.html> (accessed 13 April 2017).
- Wheen, Andrew, 2011, *Dot-Dash to Dot.Com: How Modern Telecommunications Evolved from the Telegraph to the Internet*, London: Springer.
- Whitbeck, Les B., 1999, 'Primary Socialization Theory: It All Begins with the Family', *Substance Use & Misuse* 34(7), pp.1025-32.
- Whitby, Daniel, 1845, *A Commentary on the Gospels and Epistles of the New Testament*, New York, NY: Wiley and Putnam.
- White, Lynn, 1999, 'Contagion in Family Affection: Mothers, Fathers, and Young Adult Children', *Journal of Marriage and Family* 61(2), pp.284-94.
- White, Micah, 2010, 'Clicktivism is ruining leftist activism', *Guardian*, 12 August, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/aug/12/clicktivism-ruining-leftist-activism> (accessed 16 April 2017).
- White, Stuart, 2003, *The Civic Minimum: On the Rights and Obligations of Economic Citizenship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- White, Winson, 1961, *Beyond conformity*, New York, NY: Free Press.
- Whitehead, Alfred North, 2010 [1929], *Process and Reality*, New York, NY: Free Press.
- Whitehead, Laurence, 2002, *Democratization: Theory and Experience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Whittington, Keith E., Daniel R. Kelemen, and Gregory A. Caldeira (eds.), 2008, *The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Whitworth, Brian, and Rob Friedman, 2009, 'Reinventing academic publishing online, Part I: Rigor, relevance and practice', *First Monday* 14(8), <http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2609/2248> (accessed 11 April 2017).
- Wiebe, G.D., 1953, 'Some implications of separating opinions from attitudes', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 17(3), pp.328-52.
- Wiggins, Bradley E., and G. Bret Bowers, 2015, 'Memes as genre: A structural analysis of the memescape', *New Media & Society* 17(11), pp.1886-1906.
- Wiggins, Sally, 2012, 'The social life of "eugh": Disgust as assessment in family mealtimes', *British Journal of Social Psychology* 52(3), pp.489-509.

- Wilcox, James R., and David K. Gibson, 2005, *Video Communications: The Whole Picture*, San Francisco, CA: Focal Press.
- Wilczek, Bartosz, 2016, 'Herd Behaviour and Path Dependence in News Markets: Towards an Economic Theory of Scandal Formation', *Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics* 28(2), pp.137-67.
- Wilks, Stuart, 1995, 'Rationality, Marxism and class struggle', *Contemporary Politics* 1(2), pp.15-36.
- Williams, Bernard, 2005, *In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument*, Geoffrey Hawthorn (ed.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Williams, Joan, 2000, *Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, Luke, 2011, *The echo chamber*, London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Williams, Raymond, 1958, *Culture and Society, 1780-1950*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- , 2014, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, London: Fourth Estate.
- Williamson, Lloyd B., 2016, 'Communication Through Eye Contact: Personal Reflections of the Human Life Cycle Using "I" Statements', *Academic Psychiatry* 40(1), pp.186-7.
- Williamson, Timothy, 2008, *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wilson, Francis G., 1955, 'Public Opinion and the Middle Class', *The Review of Politics* 17(4), pp.486-510.
- Wilson, John, 2001, 'Shame, Guilt and Moral Education', *Journal of Moral Education* 30(1), pp.71-81.
- Wilson, Timothy D., 2002, *Strangers to ourselves: Discovering the adaptive unconscious*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- , and Sara D. Hodges, 1991, 'Attitudes as temporary constructions', in Leonard L. Martin and Abraham Tesser (eds.), *The Construction of Social Judgment*, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- , Christopher E. Houston, Kathryn M. Etling, and Nancy Brekke, 1996, 'A new look at anchoring effects: Basic anchoring and its antecedents', *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 125(4), pp.387-402.
- Wilson-Dickson, Andrew, 2003, *The Story of Christian Music: From Gregorian Chant to Black Gospel*, Oxford: Lion Publishing.
- Wimmer, Roger D., and Joseph R. Dominick, 2005, *Mass Media Research: An Introduction*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Winch, Christopher, and John Gingell, 2008, *Philosophy of Education: The Key Concepts*, London: Routledge.

- Winfrey, Oprah, 2014, *What I Know for Sure*, London: Macmillan.
- Wink, Paul, 2006, 'Who is afraid of death? Religiousness, spirituality, and death anxiety in late adulthood', *Journal of Religion, Spirituality, and Aging* 18(2), pp.93-110.
- Winkler, Adam, 2013, *Gunfight: the battle over the right to bear arms in America*, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.
- Winnicott, Donald W., 1991 [1957], *The Child, the Family, and the Outside World*, London: Pelican.
- Witty, Paul, 1947, 'An Analysis of the Personality Traits of the Effective Teacher', *The Journal of Educational Research* 40(9), pp.662-71.
- Witvlied, John D., 2010, 'Worship', in Gerald R. McDermott (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Evangelical Theology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wodak, Ruth, 2015, *The Politics of Fear*, London: Sage.
- , and Michael Meyer (eds.), 2001, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage.
- Wolff, Jonathan, and Avner de-Shalit, 2007, *Disadvantage*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wolff, Michael, 2010, *The man who owns the news: inside the secret world of Rupert Murdoch*, London: Vintage.
- Wolfson, Todd, and Peter N. Funke, 2013, 'Communication, class and concentric media practices: Developing a contemporary rubric', *New Media & Society* 16(3), pp.363-80.
- Wood, Alex M., P. Alex Linley, John Maltby, Michael Baliousis, and Stephen Joseph, 2008, 'The authentic personality: A theoretical and empirical conceptualization, and the development of the Authenticity Scale', *Journal of Counseling Psychology* 55(3), pp.385-99.
- Wood, Allen W., and Songsuk Susan Hahn (eds.), 2012, *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century (1790-1870)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wood, Jack M., 2004, *Organisational Behaviour: A Global Perspective*, Oxford: Wiley.
- Wood, John C., 1993, *Thorstein Veblen: Critical Assessments*, Hove: Psychology Press.
- Worrell, James, Molly Wasko, and Allen Johnston, 2013, 'Social network analysis in accounting information systems', *International Journal of Accounting Information Systems* 14(2), pp.127-37.
- Wray, Christopher M., Steven R. Bishop, and Daniele Marinazzo, 2016, 'A Financial Market Model Incorporating Herd Behaviour', *PLoS ONE* 11(3), published online.
- Wren-Lewis, Simon, 2016, 'The public trusts academic economists but the media are losing interest', *Royal Economic Society Newsletter* no.174, pp.13-14.

- Wright, Ben, 2016, 'There's a sinister strain of anti-intellectualism to Gove's dismissal of "experts"', *Telegraph*, 21 June, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/06/21/in-defence-of-experts-whether-they-support-leave-or-remain/> (accessed 14 September 2016).
- Wright, Donald K., and Michelle D. Hinson, 2008, 'How Blogs and Social Media are Changing Public Relations and the Way it is Practiced', *Public Relations Journal* 2(2).
- Wright, Erik Olin, 1985, *Classes*, London: Verso.
- , 1996, *Class Counts: Comparative Studies In Class Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , 2005a, 'Foundations of a neo-Marxist class analysis', in Erik Olin Wright (ed.), *Approaches to Class Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.4-30.
- , 2005b, 'Conclusion: If "class" is the answer, what is the question?', in Erik Olin Wright (ed.), *Approaches to Class Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.180-92.
- , 2015, *Understanding Class*, London: Verso.
- Wright, Gwendolyn, 1983, *Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Wright, Richard D., and Lawrence M. Ward, 2008, *Orienting of Attention*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wright-Neville, David, and Debra Smith, 2009, 'Political rage: terrorism and the politics of emotion', *Global Change, Peace & Security* 21(1), pp.85-98.
- Wyer, Robert, and Thomas Srull, 1989, *Memory and Cognition in their Social Context*, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Yammiyavar, Pradeep, Torkil Clemmensen, and Jyoti Kumar, 2008, 'Influence of Cultural Background on Non-verbal Communication in a Usability Testing Situation', *International Journal of Design* 2(2), pp.31-40.
- Yanson, Regina, and Richard D. Johnson, 2016, 'An empirical examination of e-learning design: The role of trainee socialization and complexity in short term training', *Computers & Education* 101(1), pp.43-54.
- Yates, Simeon, John Kirby, and Eleanor Lockley, 2015, 'Digital Media Use: Differences and Inequalities in Relation to Class and Age', *Sociological Research Online* 20(4), published online.
- Yavetz, Zvi, 1971, *Caesar, Caesarism and the historians*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

- Yong, Ben, and Robert Hazell, 2016, *Special advisers: who they are, what they do, and why they matter*, Oxford: Hart Publishing.
- Young, Michael, 1958, *The rise of the meritocracy, 1870-2033: An essay on education and inequality*, London: Thames & Hudson.
- Yudkowsky, Eliezer, 2008, 'Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks', in Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Ćirković (eds.), *Global catastrophic risks*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.91-119.
- Yukl, Gary A., 2010, *Leadership in Organizations*, New York, NY: Prentice Hall.
- Zaff, Jonathan, Michelle Boyd, Yibing Li, Jacqueline Lerner, and Richard Lerner, 2010, 'Active and Engaged Citizenship: Multi-group and Longitudinal Factorial Analysis of an Integrated Construct of Civic Engagement', *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 39(7), pp.736-50.
- Zajonc, Robert B., 1980, 'Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences', *American Psychologist* 35(2), pp.151-75.
- Zaleskiewicz, Tomasz, Marco Perugini, and Boele De Raad, 2001, 'Beyond risk seeking and risk aversion: personality and the dual nature of economic risk taking', *European Journal of Personality* 15(S1), pp.S105-S122.
- Zaller, John R., 1992, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zelik, Daniel J., Emily S. Patterson, and David D. Woods, 2010, 'Measuring Attributes of Rigor in Information Analysis', in Emily S. Patterson and Janet E. Miller (eds.), *Macrocognition Metrics and Scenarios*, London: Ashgate.
- Zemack-Rugar, Yael, James R. Bettman, and Gavan J. Fitzsimons, 2007, 'The effects of nonconsciously priming emotion concepts on behavior', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 93(6), pp.927-39.
- Zeman, Janice, Carisa Perry-Parrish, and Michael Cassano, 2010, 'Parent-Child Discussions of Anger and Sadness: The Importance of Parent and Child Gender during Middle Childhood', *New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development* 2010(128), pp.65-83.
- Zhou, Baohua, 2011, 'New media use and subjective social status', *Asian Journal of Communication* 21(2), pp.133-49.
- Zimmer, Ben, 2010, 'The Origins of "Relatable"', *New York Times*, 13 August, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/magazine/15onlanguage.html> (accessed 16 April 2017).

Žižek, Slavoj, 1994, 'Introduction: The Spectre of Ideology', in Slavoj Žižek (ed.), *Mapping Ideology*, London: Verso.

———, 2011, *Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?: Four Interventions in the (Mis)Use of a Notion*, London: Verso.

Zukier, Henry, 1982, 'The dilution effect: The role of the correlation and the dispersion of predictor variables in the use of nondiagnostic information', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 43(6), pp.1163-74.